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Meditation and the Concept of Insight in Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*

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December, 2002

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of
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Martin T. Adam

ABSTRACT

Meditation and The Concept of Insight in Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*

Martin T. Adam

This thesis is composed of two parts, one a translation, the other a commentary on the material that has been translated -- a set of three well known identically entitled works by the famous Indian Buddhist scholar, Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795 C.E.). The *Bhāvanākramas* are here translated from both Sanskrit and Tibetan sources. The commentary takes the form of an extended critical Prologue to the texts and is centred around an examination of the notions of meditation and insight as found therein. The first chapter of the commentary examines the various terms for meditation found in the texts and argues for a specific way of translating them that regards as normative only one of these, that is, *bhāvanā*. The argument is made that if one is to take the basic Buddhist distinction between intellectual and experiential wisdom seriously, no other concept of meditation will prove satisfactory. The concept of *bhāvanā* is contrasted with that of *dhyaṇa*, and explained in light of other important terms, notably *samādhi*, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. Two different conceptions of *samādhi* are identified as existing within the texts, one corresponding with *dhyaṇa* and one with *bhāvanā*. The latter is identified as predominant. This conception holds that meditation is not to be principally identified as non-conceptual in nature, but rather encompasses both nonconceptual states and conceptual processes. These latter, however, are not to be identified with ordinary reasoning processes (*cintāmayī prajñā*) but rather with a form of experiential knowing (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, *vipaśyanā*) that is conceptual in nature. It is in accordance with this conception that the actual translation of the texts has been undertaken.

The second chapter of the commentary examines the concept of insight (*vipaśyanā*) in light of the earlier findings. Here the text is analyzed for its explanations of its insight, understood in terms of the important technical term *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Here an argument is made for translating this term in a particular manner consistent with the conception of meditation outlined in Chapter 1. The term is explored in light of key passages containing descriptions of the cultivation of wisdom as well as in light of other important technical terms appearing in the texts, notably *dharmapracaya*, *smṛti* and *manasikāra*. Chapter 2 closes with a discussion of Kamalaśīla's ideas of śrāvaka insight meditation (*vipaśyanā*) and how it differs from that of the Mahāyāna. Most notable in this regard is the suggestion that Kamalaśīla may have regarded śrāvaka insight practices (*vipaśyanā*) as instances of *śamatha* meditation. In the third chapter the suggestion is made that such considerations could lead to the development of an important area of future research into the differences among diverse Indian Buddhist traditions. The concluding section of Chapter 3 contains a summary of the concrete findings of this analysis.

Résumé

La méditation et le concept de l'intuition pénétrante dans les *Bhāvanākramas* de Kamalaśīla

Martin T. Adam

Cette thèse comporte deux parties: une traduction et un commentaire sur le matériel traduit, trois oeuvres homonymes bien connues du célèbre érudit bouddhiste indien, Kamalaśīla (c. 740-795). La présente traduction des *Bhāvanākramas* a été effectuée à partir des textes sanskrit et tibétain. Le commentaire se présente comme une préface élaborée au texte examinant les notions de méditation et d'intuition pénétrante telles qu'elles y sont représentées. Le premier chapitre se penche sur les divers termes employés dans les textes pour signifier la méditation et propose une manière spécifique de les traduire en choisissant *bhāvanā* comme seule expression normative. L'auteur défend l'idée qu'aucun autre concept de méditation ne ressort comme satisfaisant si l'on prend au sérieux la distinction bouddhiste entre la sagesse intellectuelle et de l'expérience. Le concept de *bhāvanā* est comparé à celui de *dhyāna* et est expliqué en relation avec d'autres termes importants, notamment *samādhi*, *śamatha*, et *vipaśyanā*. On identifie ensuite deux conceptions différentes de *samādhi* se retrouvant dans le texte, l'une correspondant à *dhyāna* et l'autre à *bhāvanā*, et cette dernière est décrite comme étant prédominante. Selon cette dernière conception, la méditation ne doit pas être comprise comme étant principalement non-conceptuelle, mais comprend autant des états non-conceptuels que des processus conceptuels. Ces derniers, cependant, ne doivent pas être confondus avec des processus ordinaires de raisonnement (*cintāmayī prajñā*) mais plutôt avec une forme de connaissance basée sur l'expérience (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, *vipaśyanā*) mais de nature conceptuelle. L'auteur a traduit le texte en se basant sur cette conception.

Le deuxième chapitre du commentaire examine le concept d'intuition pénétrante (*vipaśyanā*) en se basant sur les découvertes précédentes. L'auteur analyse le texte et l'explication qu'on y trouve de l'intuition pénétrante à travers le terme important *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Ils soutient une traduction de ce terme basée sur la la conception de méditation décrite dans le premier chapitre, particulièrement à partir de certains importants passages comportant des descriptions de la culture de la sagesse et d'autres importants élément de terminologie dont *dharmapracaya*, *smṛti* and *manasikāra*. Ce chapitre se termine par une discussion des idées de Kamalaśīla sur la méditation sur l'intuition pénétration (*vipaśyanā*) des śrāvakas et sur comment cette dernière diffère de celle du Mahāyāna. En particulier, l'auteur considère la possibilité que Kamalaśīla ait considéré les pratiques d'intuition pénétrante des śrāvakas comme des exemples de méditation *śamatha*. Au troisième chapitre l'auteur suggère que ces considérations pourraient mener au développement d'une nouvelle aire de recherche sur les différences entre les différentes traditions de bouddhisme indien. Ce chapitre se termine par un résumé des découvertes concrètes de la présente recherche.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to Robert Carr-Wiggin (November 19, 1947 - June 18, 1989).
Teacher, friend, and continuing inspiration.

Meditation and The Concept of Insight in Kamalaśīla's *Bhāvanākramas*.

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I arrived in Lausanne after a year of studying at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath. I am grateful to the entire staff there and would like to express my appreciation of the openness of Samdhong Rinpoche to receiving visiting students like me. In this context, however, I have to especially thank Dr. K. N. Mishra who so freely and generously shared his time and knowledge with me. My study of Sanskrit really came into its own under his guidance, as we read the first *Bhāvanākrama* together over the course of a year (1998-1999). During this period when the heat arrived I was delighted to be forced to return to my "other home," Kathmandu. And at this time I was further delighted to find that the learned scholar Mahesh Raj Pant was willing to carry on my instruction in Sanskrit. There were other teachers too and special mention must be made of one of them. Throughout my time in Sarnath, and later in Dharamsala, I read portions of the first and second *Bhāvanākramas* with the inimitable Mr. G. Raj of no fixed address, India. To this wandering skeptic, seeker, and fellow student of life I feel a deep gratitude and gladness that we happened to cross paths. I learned as much Sanskrit (and Tibetan) from this natural-born, one of a kind teacher as I did from any other officially planted professor or pundit. Thanks are owed to Barb Clayton for making the introduction, and for letting me follow in her shadow all these years.

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The Faculty of Religious Studies at McGill University has proven itself to be a most agreeable place to complete my studies. I was especially fortunate to have been twice given the opportunity to teach the *Bhāvanākramas* in the Advanced Sanskrit course offered by the Faculty.

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Last and deepest thanks have to go Carrina and Junan, who teach me about real life.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS USED:

Abhk - Abhidharmakośa

Bdp - Bodhisattvapiṭaka

Bhk - Bhāvanākrama

CIHTS - Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies

MS - manuscript

O.E.D. - Oxford English Dictionary (on-line)

P. - Pāli

VSM- Vissuddhimagga

RGV - Ratnagoravibhāga

Skt. - Sanskrit

T. - Tibetan

Editions of the Tibetan bsTan 'gyur.

C - Co ne edition

D - sDe dge edition

N - sNar thang edition

P - Peking edition

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Most of the world's religions are today well passed the stage of having met and mingled -- even if only in the halls of the academe. For the most part and happily, they remain on speaking terms, if not mutual comprehension. It might be suggested that among the many areas of contemporary interreligious dialogue the topic of spiritual practice potentially holds a special place. While theologies may not be shared, it is perhaps easier to find common points of reference in the sphere of practical religious life. In the domain of religious ethics, for example, one may discover similar values being promulgated in different faiths. Yet when it comes to the field of meditative practices, such points of comparison may seem harder to come by. Indeed it might well be suggested that dialogue in the area of "meditation" has only added to the collective confusion. Such confusion has, in fact, resulted from the repeated encounter of European and Asian traditions. Many different conceptions of meditation have emerged. And while these may be loosely linked together by family resemblance, given the size of the family and the largely introspective, uncommunicative character of its members, their actual natures have not always been clear.

Thus the notion of "meditation" has come to mean many things to many people. To some, it mainly signifies a process of pondering, ruminating over or contemplating some topic -- often one considered to have deep existential or religious import. Thus meditation is a term for "seriously thinking about." For others, meditation is exclusively identified with states that are said to be "free from thought."¹ For others yet, it is identified with any one of a myriad of techniques designed to

¹ Meditation is sometimes spoken of in such a way as to rule out analytic, discursive modes of consciousness. Psychological studies sometimes adopt such working definitions of meditation, implying that 'analytic meditation' is somewhat of an oxymoron. One researcher in the field recently characterized meditation as "mental processes of focussing attention in a non-analytic manner, combined with an attempt to be non-discursive."

induce unusual, usually positively considered states or frames of mind, including various affective states. As well, it would seem that both these *states* as well as the *processes* leading up to them are thought of as "meditation."² This variety makes for a confused state of affairs and this is often reflected in modern translations of ancient texts dealing with this topic. It is my hope that the present translation of a well known Indian Buddhist meditation manual might be not be considered in this category, and that my thesis will in some small way help to dispel confusion regarding Buddhist meditation -- rather than muddy the picture any further.

In this thesis, which focusses upon an Indian Buddhist tradition, we shall see that there are many Sanskrit words that have been legitimately translated as "meditation." But before discussing these, it would perhaps be helpful to examine the English word a bit more closely. The verb "to meditate" is derived from the latin root *√mēd*, "to think about" about or "to care for." The Online Oxford English Dictionary provides many attested meanings for the verb including both transitive and intransitive employments. In short, we find the following senses: 1a. transitive: To muse over or reflect upon; to consider, study, ponder. b. To fix one's attention upon; to observe with interest or intentness. c. to meditate the Muse: to occupy oneself in song or poetry. 2a. To plan by revolving in the mind; to conceive or design mentally (e.g. 1651 Hobbes' *Leviathan*. I. xv: It is also a law of nature, that all men that meditate peace, be allowed safe conduct). b. const. with inf. as obj.

-- From notes taken at: Kristeller, Jean (2001). *A Multimodal Developmental Model of Meditation Effects*. A paper presented to Conference on Neuroscience and the Person, Montreal.

² E.g. "Meditation is not an escape from the world; it is not an isolating self-enclosing activity, but rather the comprehension of the world and its ways. The world has little to offer apart from food, clothes and shelter, and pleasure with its great sorrows.

Meditation is a wandering away from this world; one has to be a total outsider. Then the world has a meaning, and the beauty of the heavens and the earth is constant. Then love is not pleasure. From this all action begins that is not the outcome of tension, contradiction, the search for self-fulfillment or the conceit of power." J. Krishnamurti (1970: 9)

(e.g. 1794 Godwin Cal. Williams 283: I meditated to do you good). 3. To entertain as an opinion, think. (e.g. 1609 Bible, Douay, Pref., What shal we therefore meditate of the especial prerogative of English Catholiques at this time?) Of intransitive employments we find: 4. "To exercise the mental faculties in thought or contemplation; spec. in religious use. (e.g. 1847 Tennyson Princess I. 95 While I meditated, A wind arose). b. const. on, upon, over, of, in. (e.g. 1560 Bible, Geneva, Ps. i. 2 In his Law doeth he meditate day and night).

Thus according to the O.E.D. the derived noun "meditation" can have the following senses:

1. The action, or an act, of meditating; continuous thought or musing upon one subject or series of subjects; serious and sustained reflection or mental contemplation of something. 2. in religious use: That kind of private devotional exercise which consists in the continuous application of the mind to the contemplation of some religious truth, mystery, or object of reverence, in order that the soul may increase in love of God and holiness of life. b. Used for: The theme of one's meditation. 3. A discourse, written or spoken, in which a subject (usually religious) is treated in a meditative manner, or which is designed to guide the reader or hearer in meditation. With regard to this last meaning one thinks, most famously perhaps, of Descartes' *Meditations on First Philosophy*.

The texts I translate here, commonly referred to in the singular as The *Bhāvanākramaḥ*, might also be considered a meditation of this sort -- a meditation on first principles, in this case the first principles of Mahāyāna Buddhist meditation. In point of fact there are three separate texts entitled *Bhāvanākramaḥ* written by the great Indian Buddhist scholar Kamalaśīla (c.740-795 C.E.) and together they may be considered a set. I shall refer to them collectively as the *Bhāvanākramas*. Individually I shall refer to them as Bhk 1, Bhk 2 or Bhk 3 or alternately as the first, second or third *Bhāvanākrama*. These three texts were probably composed between 792-794 C.E. in what is

presently the occupied country of Tibet.³ In their own way they may be considered every bit as foundational as Descartes' *Meditations*.

It is not clear why Kamalaśīla wrote three identically entitled *Bhāvanākramas*. In this connection Edward Conze describes their contents as follows: "The first explains the doctrine of the Mahāyāna, the second how it can be meditated upon, and the third what is the result of meditation" (Conze 1975: 177). In making this assertion Conze is following a description contained in one Tibetan record cited in Tucci (1958: 40-41). The account has it that the Tibetan king, Khri Sroñ lde btsan, requested these explanations in turn, following Kamalaśīla's pivotal victory in debate over a Chinese Ch'an rival. (We will come to this debate shortly). The "doctrine" of Bhk 1 is described as that of the three kinds of wisdom (*śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī*, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). The way of meditation of Bhk 2 is explained in light of the realization that there is only one vehicle; it is the result of this meditation that Bhk 3 is said to explain.

In point of fact, such categorical statements are best made with caution; all three texts contain discussions of doctrine, meditation and its result. There is considerable overlap between them, and not infrequently repetition. They cover an extraordinary range of subjects, all united around the central purpose of providing guidance to new (presumably Tibetan) practitioners of the teachings of the Mahāyāna *sūtras*. Meditation, is of course, a central element of these teachings -- if not their sole content. In any case, historically, the account of meditation contained in these texts has been enormously influential. Paul Williams has referred to the *Bhāvanākramas* as "the principal systematic Indian sources for the integration of emptiness teachings into madhyamaka meditation practice" (Williams 1989: 72). Taniguchi describes them as "the origin of Tibetan tradition of how

³ However see Taniguchi (1992) for an argument that Bhk 1 was likely composed in India.

to meditate" (Tanaguchi 303).

Perhaps it is as much due to the excellence of scholarship already devoted to their study as it is to the breadth of their concern that the *Bhāvanākramas* tend to be among the most widely quoted of Indian Buddhist texts. We owe it to Professor Giuseppe Tucci for having provided excellent critical editions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan of the first Bhk (1958) and the Sanskrit of the third Bhk (1971). It should be noted that of the three texts, the original Sanskrit of the second Bhk is lost. As well, the first folio of the Sanskrit of Bhk 1 is also lost to us now, as are the edges of many of the pages of the manuscript of the third Bhk from which Tucci worked. Hence we are fortunate to be able to rely on the Tibetan translations of all three texts preserved in the Tibetan *bsTan 'gyur*. A critical edition of the Tibetan text of Bhk 2 based on the *sNar thang*, Peking, *sDe dge*, and *Co ne* editions has been prepared by Kiyotaka Goshima (1983). The Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies (CIHTS) in Sarnath has also published an edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts together with a Hindi translation (Namdol, 1997); this work is quite interesting for its Sanskrit reconstructions of Bhk 2 and the first folio of Bhk 1. However, in general the CIHTS version of the Sanskrit is less reliable than Tucci, which was in any case its Sanskrit source. There are occasions where it does serve to clarify Tucci and these have been noted. In my translation I have worked mainly from the editions of Tucci, Goshima, and the *sDe dge bsTan 'gyur dBu ma KI* (22a-41b, 42a-55b, and 56a-68b respectively for the three texts). Unless noted otherwise, references in this thesis are to Tucci (1958) for Bhk 1, the *sDe dge* edition of the *bsTan 'gyur* for Bhk 2, and Tucci (1971) for Bhk 3.

Previous English translations of the individual texts have already appeared. Stephen Beyer's translation of Bhk 1 (1974) from the Sanskrit and Tibetan cannot be neglected, even if one finds

oneself wishing this scholar had opted for a more critical treatment of the text.⁴ As for Bhk 2, two somewhat different versions have appeared in recent years, one by Ven. Geshe Sopa (1998, with Ven. Elvin Jones and John Newman) and one by His Holiness the Dalai Lama (2001, trans. Ven. Geshe Lobsang Jorhen, Losang Choephel Ganchenpa, and Jeremy Russell). With regard to the Bhk 3, it has been translated by Robert F. Olson and Masao Ichishima (1979). Finally a translation of all three texts together in a single volume does exist, that of Parmananda Sharma (1997); this labor is based exclusively upon the Sanskrit versions of the three texts contained in the CIHTS edition.

As for versions of the *Bhāvanākramas* in other languages, there are French translations from the Sanskrit and Tibetan of Bhk 1 (Van Den Broeck, 1977) and from the Tibetan of Bhk 3 (Lamotte in Demieville, 1952). I have had occasion to benefit from all these translations in creating my own rendition of the *Bhāvanākramas*.

B. Introducing the *Bhāvanākramas*

Taken as a whole the *Bhāvanākramas* appear to constitute a kind of apology or justification for a gradualist approach to the Mahāyāna Buddhist goal of Awakening. The Tibetan tradition regards them as a summary of arguments employed by Kamalaśīla in the successful refutation of a Chinese Ch'an (Skt. *dhyāna*) doctrine of "sudden" awakening that was being advocated in Tibet during the eighth century. It is said that a debate between the two sides occurred at bSam yas, Tibet's first monastery, which had been recently founded by Kamalaśīla's teacher, Śāntarakṣita. L.

⁴ This translation appears in a popular textbook introducing the Buddhist tradition to a general readership. Unfortunately this fact appears to have meant that difficult passages would sometimes be omitted without mention. *Sūtra* titles are reduced to "in the scriptures" and some liberties are taken in making the text intelligible to the intended audience.

Gomez has suggested that the so-called debates were actually a "haphazard series of indirect confrontations" (1983: 396), but whatever the historicity of the debates it seems certain that the *Bhāvanākramas* represent a manifestation of interreligious tensions existing in Tibet at that time. The cross-currents of contention are, however, rather more subtle and complex than might first meet the eye (see esp. Gomez: 1987). For example, even though the issue is scarcely mentioned in the *Bhāvanākramas* the notion of an innate Buddha-nature may be seen to be tangentially addressed at a number of points. This is unsurprising if one considers the strong association in some Ch'an schools between this idea and that of sudden enlightenment. It must be noted that the theory of Buddha-nature is in fact mentioned by Kamalaśīla precisely in the context of showing the insufficiency of practicing concentration (*samādhi*, *tiñ ne 'dsin*) on its own, without insight.⁵ This conception of *samādhi* as nonconceptual *dhyāna* appears in a number of *sūtras* that Kamalaśīla cites. We shall see that there are other passages of the *Bhāvanākramas* wherein Kamalaśīla objects to it, associating it with the views of his rivals.

In these texts the central issue is not that of innatism versus the idea of acquired Awakening, logically related though this topic may be. Nor does it concern whether or not the moment of Awakening is without conceptual mediation -- most Buddhists, including Kamalaśīla, accept some such view as uncontroversial (Gomez, 1987: 120-123). Instead it has to do with the notion of preparing the ground for this moment to arrive. Kamalaśīla's gradualist position is that one can and must cultivate certain causes and conditions that have the effect of making the arrival of Awakening possible. His opponents appear to have held that any such activity is futile and for the dull-witted - more likely, in fact, to have the effect of further obscuring one's mind.

⁵ Bhk 2 D45a4-b1. See pp. 61-62 below, note 97.

Tibetan and Chinese historical accounts indicate that the Chinese side of the contest was led by one Ho shang Mo-ho-yen, or, in Sanskrit, Hva śaṅ (Ācārya) Mahāyāna. Whether this teacher regarded himself as the embodiment of the Great Vehicle or not, his name may well have been taken as salt in the wounds of those who found his teachings heretical. It is recorded that Kamalaśīla came to Tibet to lead the Indian side of the dispute at the last behest Śāntarakṣita, who had passed away some time earlier. Before his death Śāntarakṣita had apparently foreseen the further expansion of the so-called *Dhyāna* school; he therefore left a parting request that if this misfortune would come to pass his famous disciple Kamalaśīla should be summoned from India (Ruegg 1989: 60, Tucci 8-9). It has, however, been well pointed out that the debate at bSam yas is recorded as having been initiated by the Tibetans themselves "in order to clarify acute problems of theory and practice that had urgently come to their attention" (Ruegg 1992: 239). The debate that ensued was officially presided over by the Tibetan King Khri Sroṅ lde bstan, and was probably conducted in the Tibetan language, with Tibetan disciples of Kamalaśīla arguing for the gradualist position (Ruegg 1992: 239).

Scholars have theorized Indian and Tibetan opponents for Kamalaśīla and his supporters as well as Chinese. Ruegg plausibly suggests that the debate may be more appropriately viewed as having been one between local Tibetan traditions (Ruegg 1989: 126-37). Fascinating as these historical details are, they cannot be my main focus in this thesis. These topics have already been admirably explored and need not be investigated again here.⁶ That the *Bhāvanākramas* are best read as at least partially a "response" to an antagonistic point of view is clear from Bhk 3, where an

⁶ I would refer the reader to the detailed studies of Tucci (1958) and P. Demieville (1963), as well as to the more recent works of Gomez (1983, 1987) and Ruegg (1989, 1992).

unnamed opponent's views are identified and dealt with. There is sufficient historical evidence to reasonably conclude that this opponent was probably the Chinese Hva śaṅ Mahāyāna, even if not him alone. In what follows I shall assume this to be the case.

Whoever Kamalaśīla's opponents really were, it is clear that they were regarded by him as misguided as to the true nature of the Mahāyāna path. As I read the *Bhāvanākramas*, Kamalaśīla is primarily concerned to stress two aspects of the gradual path as necessary to the attainment of the Mahāyāna goal of Buddhahood. The first is *method* (*upāya*, *thabs*): acting for the benefit of others through the cultivation of virtue. Without moral cultivation, Kamalaśīla argues, Awakening cannot be achieved. The particular path of moral cultivation he advocates is framed primarily in terms of the theory of perfections (*pāramitās*), but is also theoretically connected to the first of the two so-called accumulations of merit and gnosis (*puṇyajñānasambhāra*).

Secondly, and connected to the accumulation of gnosis, Kamalaśīla is intent on demonstrating the necessity of "the discernment of reality" (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*, *yan dag par so sor rtog pa*), a discernment which he believes his opponents neglect. In both Bhk 2 and Bhk 3 Kamalaśīla quotes the same passage from the *Ratnamegha sūtra* in identifying this discernment with *insight*.

Tranquillity (*śamatha*, *ḥi gnas*) is one-pointedness of mind; insight (*vipaśyanā*, *lhag mthoñ*) is the discernment of reality.⁷

Another related way of making this second point would be to say that Kamalaśīla views his

⁷ Bhk 2 D47a2: *ḥi gnas ni sems rtse gcig pa ḥiḍ do // lhag mthoñ ni yañ dag par so sor rtog pa'o //*

Also quoted in Bhk 3 3.1-4: *tatra śamathas cittaikāgratā / vipaśyanā bhūtapratyavekṣeti samkṣepād ārvaratna(meghādaḥ bhagavatā) śamathavipaśyanayor lakṣanam uktam / D56b3-4: de la mdor na ḥi gnas ni sems rtse gcig pa ḥiḍ do / lhag mthoñ ni yañ dag pa la rtog pa'o / zes bcom ldan 'das kyis 'phags pa dkon mchog sprin la sogs pa las ḥi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi mthsan ḥiḍ bka' stsal to / Thus in the noble Ratnamegha and elsewhere the Bhagavān concisely stated the definition of tranquillity and insight, "Tranquillity is one-pointedness of mind, insight is the discernment of reality."*

opponents as one-sidedly championing *dhyāna* over *prajñā*, thereby misunderstanding the real nature of Awakening, which brings both of these spiritual states together:

When it is so, one has entered a nonconceptual state that is free from conceptual proliferation (*niṣprapañcanirvikalpatā*) and there is no reliance upon material form and the rest. And having discriminated with wisdom, on the basis of not apprehending an independent nature in anything one becomes a concentrator of the highest wisdom (*prajñottaradhyāyin*).⁸

In this thesis my primary aim is to clarify the meaning that the term *vipāśyanā* carries in our texts. Thus I am especially concerned to explore Kamalaśīla's conception of *vipāśyanā qua bhūtapratyavekṣā* a topic that is taken up in earnest only in Chapter 2.

C. A Note on Methodology

Much of my commentary on the *Bhāvanākramas* is concerned with the clarification and explanation of key terminology found in the texts. Here I would like to briefly explain the methodology I employ in arriving at my understandings of these terms. Broadly speaking I think there are four ways to investigate the question of the meaning of any single term: 1) Etymological: the investigation of the origins and derivation of a word. 2) Definitional: the investigation of what the text or tradition itself says in defining a word, including commentaries' and modern teachers' explanations. Here we must take cognizance of both the *sūtra* and *śāstra* traditions. Obviously with such a range of potentially relevant material, not every text can be examined. In this thesis I hope to have correctly identified the key relevant sources. 3) Actual use: the investigation of how a word is actually employed in relation to other terminology found in the texts. 4) Hermeneutical: the

⁸ Bhk 3 8.11-13: *evam sati niṣprapañcanirvikalpatām avatīrṇo bhavati rūpādiṣu cānīśrito bhavati / prajñayā ca nirūpayataḥ sakalavastusvabhāvānupalambhāt prajñottaradhyāyi bhavati* / D 59a1-2: *de ltar gyur na spros pa med pa nam par mi rtog pa ŋid la žugs pa yin no / gzugs la sogs pa la yañ mi gnas pa yin no / šes rab kyis brtags na dños po mtha dag gi ŋo bo ŋid ma dmigs pa'i phyir šes rab mchog gi bsam gtan pa yañ yin no /*

investigation of and the attempt to enter into the historical, literary and practical contexts within which a word was understood by the author himself.

The present study relies on all four methods but is primarily focussed on an analysis of the *actual use* of key meditation terminology within the text. Etymological analyses are provided when needed, as are relevant definitions. While the etymology of a word is important to its comprehension, in this thesis we give precedence to actual employment. Sometimes an exclusive emphasis on the former can lead to imprecise translation. As for the hermeneutical approach it is my hope that in attempting to one-pointedly follow the arguments of the *Bhāvanākramas*, and in familiarizing myself with the historical circumstances in which those arguments were made, I will have discerned the relevant contexts of the terminology employed, sufficiently in any case to avoid serious inaccuracy in its presentation here.

D. Outline of Chapters

Chapter 1 is framed in terms of considering the best Sanskrit equivalent for the English word "meditation" in these texts. But because the meaning of the term *vipaśyanā* is our ultimate focus, we will remain guided by this overarching concern. Thus this chapter will serve the double purpose of providing an explanation of the rationale behind some of the choices that I have made in translation as well as providing an account of the conceptual background against which Kamalaśīla's conception of *vipaśyanā* should be understood.

This chapter first attempts to clarify the *Bhāvanākramas'* most general conception of meditation, that in the broader context of which the concept of insight must be understood. In the Buddhist tradition *vipaśyanā* is generally considered one of two branches of *bhāvanā*; the other

being *śamatha* or "tranquillity." Even though Kamalaśīla never explicitly states the division of *bhāvanā* in this way, numerous passages in the *Bhāvanākramas* leave little room for doubting his acceptance of it. For example, it is clearly implied in the following passage from Bhk 2:

The yogin, forsaking meat and fish at all times of cultivation/meditation (*sgom pa, bhāvanā*), should eat only the proper amount of food and that which is not in disaccord (with the scriptures). In this manner, bodhisattvas who have accumulated all the conditions of tranquillity and insight (*‘zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs, śamathavipaśyanāsambhāra*) should enter into cultivation/meditation (*bsgom pa, bhāvanā*).⁹

We shall examine other such examples in Chapter 1.

As for term *bhāvanā* itself, it has been variously translated as "meditation," "cultivation," "development," "contemplation" and so on. But before endorsing any such translation I will first attempt to clarify the manner of its actual employment in our texts. To what does the term refer? How is it used? With this focus in Chapter 1, I will provide a general overview of the contents and structure of our three texts, followed by an inquiry into three specific senses of *bhāvanā* to appear in these texts. This will lead us to include a discussion of the meanings of, and the logical relations obtaining between, the most general terms used to denote meditative states and processes in these texts: *bhāvanā, dhyāna, samādhi, śamatha*, and *vipaśyanā*.

Chapter 2 is composed of a detailed analysis of the concept of insight meditation *qua bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Here I examine this notion in the light of other related concepts and terminology found in the texts. I also demonstrate that the process of insight meditation advocated in the *Bhāvanākramas* is thought by its author to differ in some significant respects from that of the

⁹ Bhk 2 D46b1-2: *rnal ‘byor pas ni sgom pa’i dus thams cad du ña dañ śa la sogs pa spañ žiñ mi mthun pa ma yin pa dañ / zas tshod zin par bza’ bar bya’o // de ltar byañ chub sems dpa’ ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs mtha’ dag bsags pa des bsgom pa la ‘jug par bya’o //*

śrāvakayāna or Vehicle of the Disciples.¹⁰ It should be noted that such a focus constitutes somewhat of a departure from previous studies of these texts. These have by and large investigated the historical circumstances of the debate at bSam yas and the theoretical differences between Kamalaśīla's teachings and those his opponents. This ground has already been well trod. My tack in Chapter 2 is different. I examine the arguments of Kamalaśīla focussing on what they reveal about his conception of *Mahāyāna* meditation. What is it that Kamalaśīla believes to uniquely distinguish the *Mahāyāna* in this regard?

A standard pattern of argument that Kamalaśīla employs is to show that because his opponents' account of the Buddhist path is deficient in either "the discernment of reality" (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) or in method (*upāya*) it amounts to a lower order teaching or a *śrāvaka* approach and is therefore inferior. Such arguments presuppose a shared view between Kamalaśīla and his adversaries on the inferiority and undesirability of the *śrāvakayāna*. Thus in this section the arguments pertaining to the necessity of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* will be isolated and analyzed.¹¹ I investigate the nature of this process of insight *qua bhūtapratyavekṣā* as well as how it is that

¹⁰ My main concern in this section is with Kamalaśīla's own self-identification as a *Mahāyānist*; only when directly relevant to the understanding of our text will I touch on his later classification by Tibetan doxographers as a *Yogācāra-Svātantrika* as opposed to a *Sautrāntika-Svātantrika*, or among the former, as a *satyākāravādin* as opposed to an *alīkākaravādin*. On the general division see Lopez, Jr (1987: 218-227, esp. 223-224 on the difference between *satyākāravādins* and *alīkākaravādins*). In our texts Kamalaśīla is not primarily concerned with disputes that lie behind later classifications made within the *Madhyamaka*. Indeed, he is only slightly more concerned with the more general distinction between the *Madhyamaka* and the *Yogācāra*. When Kamalaśīla draws a distinction within the Buddhist fold, it is nearly always between the *Mahāyāna* and *Śrāvakayāna*.

¹¹ In the case of method, for example, someone who says that it is unnecessary receives the following admonition: "If a bodhisattva were to adhere to wisdom alone, then because of falling into the *nirvāṇa* sought by śrāvakas it would be like a bondage. And he would not be liberated by non-abiding *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, as for wisdom without method, it should be called a bondage for bodhisattvas." Bhk 2 D 52b7: *byañ chub sems dpas šes rab tsam bsten na ni ñan thos kyis 'dod pa'i mya ñan las 'das par ltuñ bas 'chin ba bzin du 'gyur te / mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pas grol bar mi 'gyur ro // de lta bas na thabs dañ bral ba'i šes rab ni byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi 'chiñ ba'o žes bya'o //*

Kamalaśīla thinks it differs from the meditation of the *śrāvakayāna*.

Thus Chapter 3 is more speculative; it discusses the possibility that Kamalaśīla was correct, that is, the possibility that at least some Mahāyānists did have insight practices distinct from those of the *śrāvakayāna*. In the past there have been many proposals for defining Mahāyāna Buddhism in contrast to the earlier *śrāvakayāna*. The Great Vehicle, it has been said, places a stronger emphasis on compassion and the doctrine of emptiness. Its ideal figure is no longer considered the arahat striving for a personal *nirvāṇa* but rather the bodhisattva -- a being who puts the Awakening of every sentient being before his own. The bodhisattva's aim of full Buddhahood or omniscience, as opposed to mere liberation, is also commonly identified as a key difference. In my closing arguments I argue that there may yet be another way to draw a distinction between these two vehicles, a way indicated by Kamalaśīla. This is in terms of their respective practices of insight meditation. The idea that Mahāyāna meditation might have differed from that of the *śrāvakayāna* in some way is not entirely unheard of, but as far as I know no study explicitly focussed on insight meditation has yet been undertaken in this connection.¹² Here I make some initial suggestions as to how it is that such differences might have existed. I then propose a method by which to test this idea that śrāvakas and at least some Mahāyānists actually did operate with different *conceptions* of the psychological procedure to follow in undertaking insight meditation.¹³ If this should turn out to

¹² See Harrison (1978) on the possibility of distinctive Mahāyāna visualization practices. Also see Gomez (1987: 107-109) for the specific suggestion that Mahāyāna insight practices were conceived by Kamalaśīla as differing from those of the Hinayāna.

¹³ I am not primarily concerned here with different conceptions of the place of the practice of insight meditation on the path to Awakening relative to other components of the path. Because conceptions of the path and its components differ, it is clear that the "place" of insight meditation will also differ. Here we are principally concerned with what a practitioner does rather than how he theoretically contextualizes it. Recognizing that there is no tidy division between these two, we here place the emphasis on the former rather than the latter.

be the case then the suggestion is that the conception of the term *vipaśyanā* in different Indian Buddhist schools might be taken as a heuristic device or clue for differentiating various Indian Buddhist schools and perhaps in tracing their development. After outlining this as a possibility for future research, in the final section of Chapter 3 I close my study by summarizing the results of my analysis of the *Bhāvanākramas*.

CHAPTER 1

MEDITATION

1.1 Overview of the Contents and Structure of the *Bhāvanākramas*.

The *Bhāvanākramas* contain a marvelous variety of conceptual schemas relating to the proper course of practice for individuals aspiring to follow the Mahāyāna path. Indeed, were it not for their opening statements one might never guess that with these texts Kamalaśīla conceived himself to be laying out this path "in brief" -- as a kind of summary for those wishing to practice in the *sūtra* teachings of the Great Vehicle. But after paying homage to the bodhisattva of wisdom, Mañjuśrī, Kamalaśīla opens the first Bhk with a clear statement that this is his purpose (*prayojana*): "The *bhāvanākramah* is briefly set forth with regard to the regulation of conduct of a beginner in the Mahāyāna *sūtras*."¹⁴ Here the intended audience is clearly identified as "beginners" (*las ni dan po pa*, Skt: *ādikarmika*). It is, perhaps, as a consequence of the limited range of his intended audience that so many of the concepts to which Kamalaśīla refers are mentioned only in passing or treated in summary fashion. This seems particularly true, for example, of those sections of the text dealing with the advanced stages of a bodhisattva (Bhk 1 224.13-229.6). However, because the intended audience is also composed of individuals already committed to the Mahāyāna, some

¹⁴ As mentioned, the first folio of the Sanskrit text of Bhk 1 has been lost. For the Tibetan of this first folio as well as for other references to the Tibetan texts of the *Bhāvanākramas* I will employ the sDe dge edition of the bsTan-'gyur, hereafter abbreviated "D." Bhk 1 D 22a1: *theg pa chen po'i mdo sde yi / tshul spyod las ni dan po pa // de las brtsams te bsgom pa yi / rim pa mdo tsam brjod par bya //* CIHTS 195: *mahāyānasūtrānām ya ādikārmikasya caryāniyamaḥ / tamadhikṛtya saṃkṣepād bhāvanākramastvabhīdhīyate //* Bhk 2 D 42a1: *theg pa chen po mdo sde'i tshul gyi rjes su 'jug pa mams kyis bsgom pa'i rim pa mdor bsad do //* CIHTS 231: *mahāyānasūtrāntanaye 'nuviśyamānānām bhāvanākramah saṃkṣepato kathyate* Bhk 3 1.2-3: *mahāyānasūtrāntanayapravṛttānām saṃkṣepato bhāvanākramah kathyate / D 55b6: theg pa chen po mdo sde'i tshul la žugs pa mams kyi phyir bsgom pa pa'i rim pa mdor brjod par bya'o //* One may note slight differences in the way the intended audience is named in each of the three texts viz., *las ni dan po pa*, *'jug pa mams*, and *žugs pa mams* (Skt: *pravṛtta*). It is just possible that these differences reflect differences in the intended audiences viz., those who are complete beginners (Bhk 1), those who are proceeding (Bhk 2), and those who have already proceeded in the way of the Mahāyāna *sūtras* (Bhk 3). However the contents of the texts do not conform to this neat distinction and as all three of these expressions can simply mean "beginner" that is how I have understood them.

elementary concepts may simply have been assumed as shared background knowledge. On at least two occasions in Bhk 1 Kamalaśīla acknowledges limiting his discussion out of concern that too many details would unnecessarily bog down the reader. The first passage refers to meditations on impurity and so forth (*aśubhādibhāvanā*) which presumably Kamalaśīla finds too elementary a topic for his audience.¹⁵ The second passage refers to an alternative way of conceiving the bodhisattva stages -- presumably a topic too advanced given the limited scope of the text.¹⁶

In any case the relationships obtaining between the various terminologies employed by Kamalaśīla are not always obvious. Models of the elements of the path to the final goal of universal Awakening overlap and intersect -- sometimes describing similar terrain in different terms, sometimes different terrain in similar terms. In some instances one model is subsumed by another. In others one just exists alongside the other, no explanation provided. Among the many concepts and conceptual schemas employed in the *Bhāvanākramas* we find: great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), dependent origination (*pratīyasamutpāda*), the two kinds of thought of Awakening (*dvividham bodhicittam*), the two truths (*satyadvaya*), the two accumulations of merit and gnosis (*punyañānasambhāra*), the complementary pairs of tranquillity (*samatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*) and of wisdom (*prajñā*) and method (*upāya*), the threefold training of superior morality, concentration and wisdom (*adhiśīla, adhicitta, adhiprajñā*), the four noble truths (*āryasatyā*), the four means of conversion (*vastusaṃgraha*), the four penetrating insights (*nirvedhabhāgiya*), the

¹⁵ Bhk 1 206.15-16: *aśubhādibhāvanākramas tu granthavistarabhayān na likhitah* / But the process for meditating on the topics beginning with impurity is not written of, out of concern for too much detail in this book.

¹⁶ Bhk 1 228.6-8: *aparair api skandhāparisuddhyādivyavasthāpanair bhūminām vyavasthāpanam asti granthavistarabhayān na likhitam* / There is also an arrangement of the stages in terms of other classifications such as the aggregates, purifications and so on -- this is not written of (here) out of fear of (too much) detail in this book.

four objects of meditation (*catvāry ālambanavastūni*), the [five?] paths (*mārga*), the six perfections (*ṣaḍpāramitā*), the ten perfections (*daśapāramitā*), and the ten bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*) plus the Buddha stage (*buddhabhūmi*). As well, a two *pramāṇa* theory of knowledge based on the epistemological tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti pervades the entire text without ever becoming an explicit topic of discussion. Kamalaśīla's religious system is nothing if not a syncretic one.

In spite of this incredible proliferation of concepts there are some fairly straightforward strategies for seeing the forest and not just the trees of the three *Bhāvanākramas*. We have already noted the fact that these works are directed towards beginners; thus they are not generally directed towards accomplished bodhisattvas. Keeping this thought in mind should help us in keeping our interpretations on track. Another point to notice is that all three texts contain further opening statements emphasizing a threefold necessity: of compassion (*karuṇā, sñiñ rje*), the thought of Awakening (*bodhicitta, byañ chub kyi sems*) and one other element. In Bhk 1 this third element is practical realization (*sgrub pa = pratipatti*).¹⁷ In Bhk 2 it is method (*thabs, upāya*) while in Bhk 3 it is the threefold practice of study, thinking and *bhāvanā*, which, as we shall see, is also identifiable with a threefold wisdom (*prajñā*).^{18 19} It is tempting to see the respective emphases of each of the

17 D 22a2: *thams cad mkhyen pa ñid myur du thob par 'dod pas mdor na sñiñ rje dan / byañ chub kyi sems dan / sgrub pa dan / gnas 'di gsum la 'bad par bya'o* / In brief, those wishing to quickly reach the state of omniscience should strive in three areas: compassion, the thought of Awakening and practical realization. CIHTS (195.6-7) renders *sgrub pa* as *pratipatti*: "*acireṇa sarvajñatām prāptukāmaih samkṣepataḥ karuṇā bodhicittam pratipattiśceti triṣu sthāneṣu prayatitavyam* /" Beyer (100) reads it as "meditation."

18 It should be noted that in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3 these statements in fact follow short introductory passages which properly speaking open the text. In Bhk 2 the topic of the opening pertains to the necessity of acquiring all the causes and conditions of omniscience. This provides the backdrop for the threefold statement. The statement of Bhk 3 follows a discussion of tranquillity and insight. Bhk 2 D 42a7-b1: *bcom ldan 'das kyis der bka' stsal pa / 'gsañ ba pa'i bdag po thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes de ni sñiñ rje'i rtsa ba las byuñ ba yin / byañ chub kyi sems kyi rgyu las byuñ ba yin / thabs kyis mthar phyin pa yin no*" *žes 'byuñ no // de lta bas na thams cad mkhyen pa ñid thob par 'dod pas sñiñ rje dan / byañ chub kyi sems dan / thabs dan gsum po 'di dag la bslab par bya'o* // The

three *Bhāvanākramas* in terms of the third member of these opening statements: practical realization (Bhk 1), method (Bhk 2), and wisdom (Bhk 3) respectively. Because these statements differ only with respect to this one element, one may also wonder if they were regarded by Kamalaśīla as mutually implicative.²⁰ It may be possible to read *sgrub pa* as a general non-technical term implicitly suggesting both method and wisdom. Thus if we choose to focus simply on this pair one might speculate that Kamalaśīla intended the first Bhk as a comprehensive overview of the entire Buddhist path including both wisdom and method; the second would have been conceived as concentrating on method, while the third would focus on wisdom. Thus this interpretation could perhaps be thought of as a variant of what Conze had in mind in his statement that the three texts focus respectively on the overall theory, the way to practice it and its result.

Illustrious One said to them: “O Master of Secrets, the wisdom of omniscience has arisen from the root which is compassion. It has arisen from the cause which is the thought of Awakening. It has reached its completion through method.” So it is. Thus one seeking to attain omniscience should train in the triad of compassion, the thought of Awakening and method.

Bhk 3 3.6-8: *tatra yoginā śilaviśuddhyādau śamathavipaśyanāsaṃbhāre sthiteṇa sarvasattveṣu mahākaruṇām utpādyā samutpāditabodhicittena śrutacintābhāvanāyām prayoktavyam* / There, the yogin established in the prerequisites for tranquillity and insight such as moral purification, having generated great compassion toward all beings, should practice in hearing, thinking and cultivation by way of the thought of Awakening which has been produced. D 56b3-4: *de la mal 'byor pas zi gnas dan lhag mthoñ gi tshogs tshul khrims mnam par dag pa la sogs pa la gnas pa des sems can la sñid rje chen po bskyed de / byañ chub tu sems bskyed nas thos pa dan bsam pa dan sgom pa la sbyar bar bya'o /*

¹⁹ Kajiyama (115) lists three elements as essential to the highest enlightenment according to Kamalaśīla: *karuṇā*, *upāya* and *prajñā*. While Kamalaśīla does consider these three to be fundamental, he does not list them together in quite this way.

²⁰ Ulrich Pagel translates *pratipatti* as “cognitive realization” and argues that this term can be equated with *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* within the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (245-249). Within the *Bdp* the parallel terms for *śrutamayī prajñā* and *cintāmayī prajñā* are *śruta* and *pravṛtti*. One of Pagel's arguments for this equation is that Kamalaśīla's introduction of the three wisdoms in the first Bhk occurs right after a discussion of the five preliminary *pāramitās*. (Pagel assumes that this constitutes a suggested order of practice). This parallels the location of the introduction of *śruta*, *pravṛtti* and *pratipatti* in the *Bdp*. The implication is that these terms may have been equated by Kamalaśīla with the three kinds of wisdom. Pagel comments that this argument is inconclusive; Kamalaśīla does not cite his sources and may have been inspired by any text in this context. It should be noted however that Kamalaśīla does in fact quote the *Bdp* on one occasion, in Bhk 2 (D44b5-b7), in the context of a discussion of necessity of *prajñā* to the elimination of obscurations. The fact that Kamalaśīla employs the *Bdp* in the context of providing an explanation of the function of *prajñā* lends some marginal support to Pagel's argument concerning the interpretation of the three terms found in the *Bdp*.

Consistent with this view is the fact that Bhk 1 is indeed the longest of the three texts (thirty-eight, twenty-six and twenty-four folios respectively in D) and does in fact contain the widest variety of topics -- including compassion, method and wisdom, tranquillity and insight, the three kinds of wisdom, and the ten stages of the bodhisattva with the Buddha-stage. While Bhk 2 and Bhk 3 also both contain discussions of method and wisdom as a pair, Bhk 2 does seem to place the accent on the necessity of method. Bhk 3 on the other hand tends to return our attention to the nature of wisdom, giving a slightly shorter shrift to topics connected with method. Thus in Bhk 1 and Bhk 2 Kamalaśīla devotes some considerable discussion to compassion and its cultivation, while in Bhk 3 he does not.²¹ Similar considerations apply to the thought of Awakening, *bodhicitta*; it is given fairly detailed treatments in the first two texts but is barely mentioned in the third.²²

Although the process may well be likened to that of examining a Rorschach blot, it does seem possible to identify certain recurring central themes that stand out and that are given different treatments in each of the three texts. If we choose to examine the texts with an eye towards the classical dyad of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, we find it is only in the latter two *Bhāvanākramas* that this schema is spelled out in detail. Roughly the first half of Bhk 2 and the first three quarters of Bhk 3 consist of accounts of this pair; both eventually give way to discussions of method and wisdom. Now, as we shall see, the concepts of insight (*vipaśyanā*) and wisdom (*prajñā*) are very closely related; in some usages they are more or less synonymous. Thus in Bhk 2 there is a natural avenue from the discussion of "tranquillity and insight" to a discussion of "wisdom and

²¹ Bhk 1 187.4-190.16 (D 22a1-24a2), Bhk 2 D 42a7-44a2, Bhk 3 3.6f and elsewhere *passim*.

²² Bhk 1 190.16-193.12, Bhk 2 D 44a2-a7, Bhk 3 3.6-8 *passim*.

method."²³ Interestingly, while Bhk 2 and Bhk 3 both contain detailed accounts of tranquillity and insight conceived as a natural "pair," in Bhk 3 tranquillity is less emphasized. Insight is more the focus in the third text and this corresponds nicely with its emphasis on wisdom, already suggested.

In any case, I take it that Kamalaśīla is primarily concerned with explaining these two pairs, in and of themselves and in relation to a few other notable connected topics which are also treated: compassion, the thought of Awakening, the three kinds of wisdom and the bodhisattva stages (*bhūmi*). (These latter are summarized together with the *buddhabhūmi* at the end of Bhk 1). This is what the *Bhāvanākramas* are "about." Whatever appears in these texts is subsumable under one of these topics. I have already noted that Kamalaśīla seems particularly concerned to stress the necessity of one member of each of the two pairs viz. *upāya* and *vipāśyanā*. Interestingly, these two never appear coupled up as a pair (unlike *prajñā* and *śamatha*). But because their practice may be seen as associated with the acquisition of the accumulations of merit and gnosis, one may also say that the *Bhāvanākramas* are also broadly concerned with this latter pair.

1.2 *Vipāśyanā* in Relation to Other Meditation Terminology

1.2.1 On the Compound "*bhāvanākramaḥ*"

Perhaps the most obvious way to begin one's approach to these texts would be to analyze their unusual triplicate title. The relationship between the two component words, *bhāvanā* and *kramaḥ* is usually accepted as *śāṣṭhī tatpuruṣa* (genitive determinative) compound, although it has also been taken as *karmadhāraya* (descriptive determinative). This is reflected in its Tibetan

²³ In Bhk 2 the shift in focus occurs at D 48a6; in Bhk 3 this transition is less direct; discussion of tranquillity and insight proceeds to a discussion of the necessity of the accumulation of merit (Bhk 3 20.14f) which eventually ties in to a discussion of the necessity of method and wisdom (Bhk 3 22.6f).

rendering, *bsgom pa'i rim pa* which allows both interpretations. As for the meanings of the components themselves, *bhāvanā* is usually translated as "meditation" or "cultivation" while *kramah* has been rendered either "process" or "stages."²⁴ Let us briefly look at these components.

To deal with the second element first: *-krama*. Both "process" and "stages" imply a causal sequence or temporal movement, one that is either naturally occurring or deliberately undertaken by an agent. For this study we have chosen "process," but in principle either translation would do. The idea of a process is certainly compatible with the idea of many stages, phases or steps being covered. The disadvantage of "stages;" on the other hand, is that it might suggest that these texts are principally concerned with providing a systematic sequential presentation of well-delineated, clearly defined phases of spiritual development, such as the stages of the bodhisattva (*bhūmi*). While the texts do include descriptions of the *bhūmis*, these form only a small part of their contents. And while a general sequence of phases of practice is discernible within the texts, these phases are not always sharply delineated by Kamalaśīla. (One thinks principally of the sequence of generating compassion, then the initial thought of Awakening, followed by tranquillity, then insight, and their union).

As for the first member of the compound, much of this chapter is devoted to its explanation. Here we provide a brief initial introduction. Derived from the causative form of the verbal root $\sqrt{bhū}$, ($\sqrt{bhū} + \text{nic} + \text{either } \textit{lyu} \text{ or } \textit{lyuṭ}$, Apte 1194) the word *bhāvanā* literally means "causing to be," "making become," or "giving rise to," hence "cultivation," "development," "realization," or even "actualization." Strictly speaking, these translations are etymologically more

²⁴ Thus *Stages of Meditation* (Dalai Lama, 2001 and Beyer 1974) or *Meditation Stages* (Thurman 1984: 412) on the one hand, and *The Process of Meditative Actualization* (Olson and Ichishima, 1979) on the other. As for the French versions, Van Den Broek (1977) gives "La Progression Dans La Meditation" and Lamotte (1952), "L'Ordre des Exercices Spirituels."

precise than "meditation" and have the added advantage of implying a gradual progression, or at least a temporal movement towards Awakening -- which, as we have noted, is the position Kamalaśīla advocates in the *Bhāvanākramas*.²⁵ On the other hand such philological and philosophical considerations do not preclude "meditation" as a possible rendering of *bhāvanā* as a technical term. We shall discuss this possibility in greater detail below.

Now, as mentioned, a discussion of the term *bhāvanā* is also an appropriate place to begin our enquiry concerning insight. The term is found in three different Buddhist conceptual schemas related to insight, all of which figure importantly in our texts. These are the three kinds of wisdom (*śrutamayī prajñā*, *cintāmayī prajñā* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*), the five paths (*sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga*, *bhāvanāmārga* and *niṣṭhāmārga*), and the already mentioned schema of the two branches of cultivation (*i.e. bhāvanā* as *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*). We will deal with each of these in turn.

1.2.2 Three Kinds of Wisdom

Much of Bhk 1 is based around a model of three kinds of *prajñā* -- those associated with study, thinking and meditation. This division is also mentioned in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3. It would appear to constitute one of India's oldest and simplest ways of breaking down the wisdom

²⁵ One of the implications of a subitist conception of Awakening is that it is the kind of state that does not take time to complete; in an important sense *dhyāna* already *is* Awakening. Interestingly, the contrast between *bhāvanā* and *dhyāna* with respect to *bodhi* would appear to parallel that made by Aristotle between actions that are movements (*kinesis*) and those that are activities (*energia*) or "actualities" containing their own ends at each moment of their existence. Whenever such exist they are complete; the end for the sake of which they exist is instantaneously fulfilled at every instant of the activity's existence. Hence it may also be said that a process which contains its own end contains no potentiality; it is "actual." If the parallel is a solid one, there would be many interesting points to explore, most notably perhaps in the field of comparative (virtue) ethics. We do not have time to pursue the matter in the present context, but see *Metaphysics*, 1048b 18-37, for Aristotle's account of the distinction. Also see my forthcoming: "Buddhist Virtue Ethics in Light of Aristotle's *energia/kinesis* Distinction."

component of spiritual practice. It is already mentioned in the Pāli Canon and later in the *Vissudhimagga*.²⁶ Interestingly what appears to be a parallel version of the same schema is to be found in the *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad*, where the terminology differs but the general threefold structure is clearly identifiable.²⁷ Although conceptions of its scope and place on the Buddhist path vary, among modern Buddhists it has become so generally accepted as to border on the platitudinous rather than the profound. When examined, however, this apparently simple doctrine yields some rather curious and intriguing implications.

Here we shall begin our examination of this schema with one of its early formulations -- the account found in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*:

(The wisdom) arisen from study (*śrutamayī*) is a certitude born from the authority of a qualified person (*āptavacanaprāmāṇyajāta*); the wisdom arisen from thinking (*cintāmayī*) is born from the profound reflection of reasoning (*yuktinidhyānajā*); the wisdom arisen from *bhāvanā* (*bhāvanāmayī*)... is born from concentration (*samādhijā*).²⁸

The first thing to notice in this passage is that Vasubandhu interprets the *taddhitapratyayaḥ -mayāḥ* in a very specific way, namely, as indicating a cause (*hetu*) and thus having a sense of "arisen from" or "transformation of." Here I understand "cause" to be intended in a sense similar to that of a *preceding*, effective cause. The example he gives is "Vital breaths are the result of food,

²⁶ See *Dīgha Nikāya* 33: 486; *Vissudhimagga* XIV, 14: 438.

²⁷ B.U. II 4.5: *ātmā va are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ / maitreyi ātmano vāre darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditā //* "You see, Maitreyī -- it is one's self (*ātman*) which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one's self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one's self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world." (trans. in Olivelle: 28-29). See also B.U. IV 5.6 (Olivelle: 69-70). I am grateful to Christine Fillion for giving me these references and would refer the reader to her forthcoming M.A. thesis (McGill University) on the topic of the treatment of this threefold division in the *Upaniṣads* and in the *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya.

²⁸ *Abhk* 892.3-4: *āptavacanaprāmāṇyajātaniścayā śrutamayī, yuktinidhyānajā cintāmayī, samādhijā bhāvanāmayīti....*

cows are the result of grass."²⁹ However, it is also normal to understand the suffix more in the sense of a *present*, material cause meaning "made of," "consisting of," (Apte 1240) or even "having the nature (*svabhāva*) of."³⁰

The ambiguity here may be understood to imply another important ambiguity: that between "state" and "process." If we accept the understanding of *-mayat* as indicating a preceding effective cause then the wisdoms of learning, thinking and *bhāvanā* are more readily conceived "statically" as results, which is to say as *states* of knowledge that have arisen. On the other hand if we take the suffix to indicate a cause in the sense of a present material cause ("consisting in," "having the nature of") then the three kinds of wisdom may also be interpreted in a more "dynamic" sense, as processes. On this understanding the preceding passage would read "The wisdom consisting in study is a certitude born from the evidence of a qualified person; the wisdom consisting in thinking is born from the profound reflection of reasoning; the wisdom consisting in *bhāvanā* is born from concentration (*samādhi*)."³¹ Now it is clear that this reading does not make sense given the *definiens* provided by Vasubandhu. There is, however, no logical necessity of following this definition; the suffix *-mayat* is ambiguous and lends itself to being interpreted in either one of the two senses noted, depending on the context in which it is used. Another way of making the same

²⁹ *Abhk* 892.4-5 *tadyathā -- annamayāḥ prāṇāḥ, tṛṇamayyo gāva iti /*

³⁰ As in Chapter 2 of the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā*: [22.28 - 22.32] *mahidharā ratnamayās tathānye vanapradeśāśca vivekaramyāḥ / latāḥ sapuṣpābharāṇojjalās ca drumās ca ye satphalanamrasākhāḥ // 3 //* "So too, mountains composed of jewels and other forested regions, isolated and delightful. And creepers brilliant with ornaments of beautiful flowers, and trees of paradise that have branches bent down with good fruit...." Prajñākaramati's commentary [23.5] provides the following explanation for the suffix: *ratnamayā ratnasvabhāvāḥ* See Pāṇini, 4.3.82 ff.

³¹ *Abhk* 892.

point would be to say that the suffix *-mayaṭ* can function analogously to either a *pañcāmī tatpuruṣa* (ablative determinative) or a *karmadhārya* compound. On the latter interpretation wisdom would be identified with the very processes of studying, thinking and *bhāvanā*, not with the results of these processes. It appears to me that Kamalaśīla's understanding of this suffix varies between these two conceptions. For now, because I do not wish to rule out either possibility in the case of the *Bhāvanākramas*, I will deliberately translate the suffix *mayaṭ* in an open ended manner, as analogous in meaning to a *śāṣṭhī tatpuruṣa* - i.e. the wisdom of study, etc.

The account given by Vasubandhu regards the three kinds of wisdoms as progressive -- the wisdom arisen from thinking basing itself on the wisdom arisen from study, and the wisdom arisen from *bhāvanā* basing itself on that arisen from thinking.³² Kamalaśīla accepts this notion. The account of the three wisdoms as presented in the *Bhāvanākramas* does not differ from it in essence, but only in so far as greater detail is provided. Thus examples of the wisdom of study are given in the form of quotations from the *sūtras* (*āgamataḥ*, Bhk 1 199.5-200.11). The wisdom of thinking is spelled out logically (*yuktyā*) with key arguments that are meant to independently establish the truth of assertions taken from scripture. (Bhk 1 200.12-204.9). As such, the wisdom of thinking encompasses the wisdom of study, and takes its statements as its starting point. One "thinks on" the *sūtras*.

Kamalaśīla describes the wisdom of thinking as a process in which one disentangles two kinds of scriptural statement, the *nītārtha* and the *neyārtha*. This important hermeneutical distinction

³² *Abhk* 861.4-6: *śrutvā cintayati / aviparītam cintayitvā bhāvanāyām prayujyate / samādhau tasya śrutamayim prajñām niśritya cintāmayī jāyate / cintāmayim niśritya bhāvanāmayī jāyate /* Having studied, he thinks. Having thought correctly, he engages in *bhāvanā*. Having relied on the wisdom arisen from study of one in *samādhi*, (the wisdom) arisen from thinking is born. Having relied on (the wisdom) arisen from thinking, (the wisdom) arisen from *bhāvanā* is born.

is a tool developed by Buddhists in order to classify scriptural statements as respectively definitive or provisional in meaning. For the Madhyamaka the distinction is cashed out in terms of their reference: definitive statements are those that pertain to the ultimate reality, provisional statements refer to conventional reality.³³ According to Kamalaśīla's account it is the task of the wisdom of thinking to identify which statements refer to a real object or meaning (*bhūtam artham*) and which do not.³⁴ The task of the wisdom of *bhāvanā* is to realize the object or meaning that is real.

There, first of all, the wisdom of hearing should be generated. For through it first of all one enters into the meaning of the scriptures. Thereafter one penetrates their provisional and definitive meanings by the wisdom of thinking. After that, having ascertained the meaning that is real (*bhūta*, i.e. *nītārtha*) by means of that (wisdom of thinking), one should cultivate (*bhāvayet*) it, not that which is unreal (*abhūta* i.e. *neyārtha*).³⁵

Thus Kamalaśīla's discussion of the wisdom of *bhāvanā* details the process for experientially realizing the conclusions regarding ultimate reality that have already been reached through the wisdom of thinking. It is interesting to observe that *bhāvanā*, the process of making real, or *real-izing* is derived from the verbal root $\sqrt{bhū}$, the same root that lies at the basis of the

³³ Thurman (1978: 26, 32-34). Also see Lopez Jr (1993: 3), Lamotte (1993: 19).

³⁴ In Chapter 2 we shall see that the term *bhūtam* has a wide semantic range. Here we understand the term in an ontological vein that does not adequately capture its ethical implications: it could also be translated as "good" or "a good thing." Thus "*bhūtam artham*" could be read as indicating "the goal that is good," the worthy goal. Thanks to Richard Hayes for pointing this out.

³⁵ Bhk 1 198.10-13: *tatra prathamam tāvat śrutamayī prajñotpādaniyā / tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati / tataś cintāmayyā prajñayā nītaneyārtham nirvedhayati / tatas tayā niścītya bhūtam artham bhāvayen nābhūtam /*

Also see Bhk 2 D 46a7-b1: *tshul bzün bsam pa gañ ze na / gañ nes pa'i don gyi mdo sde dañ drañ ba'i don gyi mdo sde la sogs pa legs par gtan la 'bebs pa ste / de ltar byañ chub sems dpa' the tsho med na, bsgom pa la gcig tu nes par 'gyur ro // de lta ma yin na the tshom gyis 'phyañ mo ñug pa'i theg pa la 'dug pa ni lam kha brag gi mdor phyin pa'i mi ltar gañ du yañ gcig tu nes par mi 'gyur ro //* And who is correct in thought? He is one who has become clear with regard to the proper ordering of the *sūtras* of definitive and provisional meaning. If a bodhisattva is without doubt in this regard, he will be certain in meditation. If it was not like this, if one was on an uncertain course due to doubt, then he couldn't become certain of anything at all — just like a man who has arrived at the juncture of a forked road.

word we have here translated as "real," *bhūta*. We will return to a discussion of the meaning of this word in Chapter 2 in the context of our discussion of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*.³⁶

For the time being it is enough to notice another important conceptual link of this sort made by Kamalaśīla himself in this context: that between *bhāvanā* and *anubhāva*, experience (lit: "following being"). Kamalaśīla commences his discussion of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* with the statement, "Experience (*anubhāva*) belongs to those who practice."³⁷ This kind of experiential wisdom can be seen to depend on and include the other two kinds of wisdom. One "cultivates" or "realizes" the conclusions already reached by thinking. What it means to realize or cultivate in this way is, of course, our subject in this thesis. While it definitely includes a conceptual dimension, it also appears somewhat different from a simple case of thinking deeply about some profound topic. The wisdom of *bhāvanā* is thought to include a "direct" non-intellectual character, it is "experiential" -- this is what distinguishes it from the mere wisdom of thinking.

In the Buddhist context, direct experience possesses an epistemologically privileged position; it is considered indubitable in a way that conclusions reached through reasoning alone are not.³⁸ In Chapter 2 we shall explore the sense in which experience might be said to be "direct." Here the two forms of wisdom may be contrasted as "thinking through" (*cintāmayī prajñā*) what one has studied *versus* actually "going through" or concentratedly "experiencing" the truth of what one has already thought through (*bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). In Bhk 3 Kamalaśīla makes this point

³⁶ In Chapter 2 we shall see that *bhūta* (i.e. *nītārtha*) may also be identified as *pudgaladharmanairātmya*, which is also to say non-origination and emptiness.

³⁷ Bhk 1 204.14-15: *anubhāvaś ca pratipattṃnāṃ*.

³⁸ One thinks of the Buddha's advice to the Kālāmas, which among other things included an admonition not to rely on scripture and logic. *Āṅguttara Nikāya* i 189.

using an analogy:

And whatever is known through the wisdom of study and thinking is itself to be realized through the wisdom of *bhāvanā* (*bhāvanāmayyā prajñayā bhāvanīyaṃ*), nothing else. (For example,) it is like a horse running along a previously indicated running track. Therefore the discernment of reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) is to be undertaken.³⁹

Thus Kamalaśīla maintains that *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is required for Awakening and that this form of wisdom is a more direct realization than *cintāmayī prajñā*. From this he concludes that "discernment of reality" should be undertaken. We have seen above that this "discernment of reality" is explicitly identified with *vipāśyanā*. Thus it seems that *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, conceived as a process, can here be especially identified with one branch of the well-known two-branch schema of *bhāvanā*: *sāmātha* and *vipāśyanā* -- even though *vipāśyanā*, if understood as synonymous with *prajñā*, would also appear to be identifiable with the first two kinds of wisdom.

In this connection it may be noted that Hayes (1988: 168) and Prévèreau (33) have both suggested that *cintāmayī prajñā* is identified as a kind of *vipāśyanā* meditation by Dignāga (c. 480-540). According to Prévèreau, "Yaśomitra suggests that *vipāśyanā* is synonymous with *prajñā* (AKIV:14) so that there is not only the insight brought about by mental discipline (*bhāvanā*) to which today's meditators tend to limit themselves, but also that brought about by critical reasoning (*cintā*)" (1994, 33). Although Prévèreau here appears to regard both *vipāśyanā* and *prajñā* as states resulting from processes, he also asserts that Dignāga introduced a new way of doing *vipāśyanā* consisting in critical reasoning, and this implies a conception of *vipāśyanā* and *prajñā* qua process.

³⁹ Bhk 3 20.3-6: *kiṃ ca yad eva śrūtacintāmayyāprajñayā viditaṃ tad eva bhāvanāmayyā prajñayā bhāvanīyaṃ nānyat / samdiṣṭa[dhāvana]bhūmyaśvadhāvanavat / tasmāt bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā / D 64a2-3: yañ thos pa dañ bsam pa las byuñ ba'i śes rab kyis rtogs pa gañ yin pa de ñid bsgom pa las byuñ ba'i śes rab kyi bsgom par bya'i / g'zan du ni ma yin te rta dkyu sa kyī sa bstan nas rgyug pa b'zin no / de lta bas na yañ dag par so sor brtag par bya'o / On the analogy of the running horse, see Abkh 328.10-13.*

Now it may well be that a tendency to identify insight with profound (but nevertheless non-meditative) thinking originated with Dignāga. This would be consistent with the establishment of *anumāna* as a distinct *pramāṇa*. The wisdom of study would perhaps not, in and of itself, have been considered *vipaśyanā* – just as testimony (*āgama, śabda*) itself was not considered a distinct means of knowledge. Testimony as a basis for believing is not granted the status of separate *pramāṇa* in the Buddhist epistemological tradition; it is rather subsumed under *anumāna*.⁴⁰ Thus the conceptual correspondences would have been between *pratyakṣa* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, and *anumāna* and *cintāmayī prajñā*. Both would have been considered insight. As part of this tradition it is perhaps possible that Kamalaśīla was the inheritor of just such a conception. We will return to this question at the close of this chapter.

In any case in the *Bhāvanākramas* it is clear that *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, as the most profound of the three kinds of wisdom, is identifiable with insight *par excellence*. Given this fact and the additional fact that insight and tranquillity are considered as constituting *bhāvanā*, it would seem consistent with both schemes to translate *bhāvanā* as "meditation" in the context of these texts. But as we shall see, this translation is not without difficulties. There are other contenders, most notably *dhyāna*. But for reasons that will soon be obvious, in our texts *dhyāna* and *bhāvanā* cannot easily be considered equivalent even though both terms are commonly translated into English as "meditation." In point of fact we shall see that the question of the best Sanskrit equivalent for "meditation" is not unrelated to the debate between Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla. It is perhaps not without reason that these texts were so repetitively entitled.

⁴⁰ See Tillemans (1990: 23-29) for the technical details of how Buddhist epistemologists subsumed appeals to scripture under "inference." Also, cf: Yoga Sūtras: 1.7 *pratyakṣānumānāgamāḥ pramāṇi* / In Whicher (1998: 109, 343).

1.2.3 Processes and States.

Let us now turn to an exploration of this problem. We begin with a more detailed account of some of the key terms for meditation found in the texts: *dhyāna*, *samādhi*, *bhāvanā*, *śamatha*, and *vipaśyanā*. At the outset a general observation should be noted regarding the analysis of these terms: it would seem that for at least some of them there is an inherent ambiguity, or flexibility to their meanings such that they may be understood "actively" or "passively." This kind of ambiguity in Sanskrit terminology has recently been noted by Francis Brassard in a study of the concept of *bodhicitta*.⁴¹ Brassard draws a distinction between active and passive senses of certain Sanskrit technical terms, pointing out the fact that many terms seem to imply both senses. When translated, however, it is often the case that only one of the senses is captured and the original concept is thus misrepresented. Here, in the specific context of meditation, I would like to refine his argument by connecting it to the aforementioned notions of *process* and *state*. This is the same ambiguity that we have just noted in connection with the suffix *-mayat*. I would suggest that in the case of certain meditation terminology the active sense may best be considered a process; the passive sense is best thought of as a state. We can often see how these two senses may be implied by one term: they seem to refer both to activities or processes deliberately undertaken by an agent as well as to the conditions or states that result from such activities. While both senses may be implicit in principle it is often the case that either grammatical or contextual considerations render one of the two less likely.

⁴¹ Brassard's observations regarding Sanskrit terminology are applied to the terms *citta*, *saṃskāra*, *dhāraṇa*, derivatives of *√grah*, and *karma* (Brassard: 38, 53- 58, 114, 160n.1).

In this connection, although it is not a term for meditation *per se*, we may recall the very word we rendered "process" in the title of our text . The word *kramaḥ* in the compound *bhāvanākramaḥ* may be construed both as "process" and as "stage." We have seen that the former rendering is somewhat preferable given the contents of the texts, even though both senses could be implied in principle depending on the context of use. The English word "process" itself has a more active, dynamic sense than "stage." Some processes are such that they are actively undertaken, and not merely passively experienced (e.g. housebuilding). A process in this sense is akin to a "proceeding" or a "procedure"; it often indicates a step by step programme deliberately followed by an agent. This would seem to perfectly fit the context of Kamalaśīla's gradualism. On the other hand the word "process" retains a passive possibility; many processes are non-volitional or automatic (e.g. the digestion of food). Again this fits our context well. Many of the milestones along the Buddhist path do seem to be conceived as occurring on their own; they are "undergone" or "experienced," not "done" or "performed" by an agent. Thus to use the term "procedure" as a translation for *-kramaḥ* would be to err in the opposite direction -- we would fail to capture the non-volitional dimension of the spiritual path.

On the other side, as an example of a word with a more "static" signification we may examine the very word most commonly rendered "stage" in the Mahāyāna Buddhist context. This is the Buddhist technical term *bhūmi*. The *bhūmis* are stages of spiritual development that result from deliberate practices; considered individually, they are not processes or activities in and of themselves. Indeed, as Mo-ho-yen himself might have been quick to point out, "Awakening" or the "*buddhabhūmi*" is itself is the prime example of such a state. Thus, considered individually, the *bhūmis* are best thought of as atemporal spiritual states or conditions; the translation "stage" is thus

appropriate for them. Their overall sequence may be thought of as a process, but not as a procedure *per se*.

Thus some processes are procedures, some are not. When understood in the sense of a procedure, a process is something one does *and* experiences; a state or condition, on the other hand, is something one simply experiences. We shall see how both conceptions are implied in some of the concepts of the terms for meditation we now turn to examine. But as the case of the title of our text demonstrates, this conceptual ambiguity need not imply actual ambiguity in use.

1.2.4 Meditation Terminology

In brief, here are the terms and some of their most commonly attested translations:

dhyāna - absorption, trance, concentration, contemplation, meditation

samādhi - concentration, state of concentration, unification, meditation

bhāvanā - cultivation, development, contemplation, inculcation, practice, actualization, realization, meditative actualization, meditative realization, meditation

śamatha - tranquillity, serenity, calm abiding, meditation

vipāśyanā - insight, insight meditation, discernment, wisdom

As can be seen, four out of five of these terms can be, and have been, translated as meditation while the fifth, *vipāśyanā*, can be considered a kind of meditation (*vipāśyanābhāvanā*). Thus my purpose in this section will be to clarify the individual senses of these terms, as well as the relationships obtaining between them -- without begging the question by using the word "meditation" in my explanation of any one of them. When possible I will choose what I take to be a non-controversial translation for each term. Once the relationship between them has been clarified we can go on to ask whether any of them is the best single candidate for translation as "meditation" in the context of our texts.

1.2.4.1 *Dhyāna*

The Sanskrit term most commonly associated with the English word "meditation" is probably *dhyāna* (P. *jhāna*). Many textbooks introducing Buddhism to a general audience state that this term simply means "meditation" and that it is the Sanskrit basis for the Chinese word, *ch'an*, and thus the Japanese, *zen*. Usually the matter is left at that. Sometimes it is added that the word also refers to a set of four specific meditative attainments that are first mentioned in the Pāli Nikāyas. More rarely yet, it may be mentioned that the term *dhyāna* also occurs as the fifth perfection in the scheme of the six perfections (*pāramitā*) accepted in Mahāyāna Buddhism.

V.S. Apte's *Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary* provides the following meanings: "(1) Meditation, reflection, thought, contemplation; (2) Especially abstract contemplation, religious meditation; (3) Divine intuition or discernment; (4) Mental representation of the personal attributes of a deity" (869). This word is derived from the verbal root √*dhyai* plus the *kr̥tpratyaya* "lyuṭ," which forms abstract, instrumental or verbal nouns. According to Apte the root itself means "to think of, meditate upon, ponder over, contemplate, reflect upon, imagine, call to mind" (869). In the Buddhist context the term did in fact originally indicate a set of four successive attainments or absorptions in which the meditator's mental contents are gradually attenuated to a point of concentration free from disruptive mental activity and emotions.⁴² These *dhyānas* were said to be optionally followed by another sequence of four "formless attainments" (*ārūpya samāpatti*)

⁴² "Stated briefly the term denotes (any one of) a series of precisely defined altered states of consciousness, altered states which are characterized by an increasing attenuation of the practitioner's emotions. Thus in the fourth and highest *jhāna* of form, the only emotional response left to the practitioner is that of equanimity; ratiolation, pleasure, pain and indeed all intense emotional reactions have been left behind. The techniques used to gain the four *jhāna* of form are also enstatic, designed to withdraw the practitioner from emotional attachments to and contacts with the external world, as well as from the tendency to rationally analyze his experience" Griffiths (1986: 20).

occurring on the basis of the fourth *dhyāna*.⁴³

While the precise nature of each of the *dhyānas* and formless attainments is not our subject here, there are two important points that should be noted about them.⁴⁴ First of all, all *dhyānas* are said to share the quality of *ekāgratā* or onepointedness of mind,⁴⁵ a quality which we shall see is also said to characterize *samādhi* and *śamatha*.⁴⁶ Secondly, it is important to recognize that after the first *dhyāna*, discursive thinking is said to be eliminated. Both *vitarka* (gross or applied thought) and *vicāra* (subtle or sustained thought) are absent in the second through the fourth *dhyānas*.^{47 48} After this point, while concepts (*vikalpa*) may be present to the mind, one is no longer engaged in

⁴³ While of considerable interest in and of themselves these attainments are not our main concern here. They are only referred to in passing by Kamalaśīla. No school of Buddhism regards them as constitutive of insight. See Griffiths (1986) for an indepth treatment.

⁴⁴ The nature of the *dhyānas* has been thoroughly explored by others. See for example, Crangle (1994: 201-207) and Gethin (1998: 184-186).

⁴⁵ Bhk 1 209.2-4: *eṣā ca cittaikāgratā uttarottarakarmaṇyatāsamprayogād ālambanādiguṇaviśeṣayogāc ca dhyānārūpya[samāpatti]vimokṣādīvyapadeṣam labhate* / And this one-pointedness of mind receives the designation, 'absorption', 'formless attainment', 'liberation' and so forth on account its being endowed with greater and greater effectiveness and on account of union with the distinctive qualities of its object.

⁴⁶ *samādhi* : Bhk 1 214.3-4, *śamatha*: Bhk 1 207.8-9, Bhk 3 3.1-2.

⁴⁷ On *vitarka* and *vicāra* see *Abhk* 204.7-9: *vitarkacārāvaudāryasūkṣmate / kasya? cetasa iti paścād vaksyati / cittaudārikatā vitarkaḥ / cittasūkṣmatā vicāraḥ* / The view of Vasubandhu is that the first *dhyāna* may contain either one, but not both in the same moment.

⁴⁸ In including an intermediate stage between the first and second *dhyāna* in which *vitarka* is absent while *vicāra* remains, the account of the *dhyānas* found in the *Bhāvanākramas* follows that outlined by Vasubandhu. See *Abkh* viii 22d, 23d-e. The relevant passage is Bhk 1 209.2-11. In effect Vasubandhu divides the first *dhyāna* into two, the first with *vitarka*, the second with *vicāra*. See preceding note.

intellectual deliberations (i.e. *vitarkavicāra*).⁴⁹ Thus for the second, third, and fourth *dhyānas* this consideration would seem to completely rule out the possibility of *cintāmayī prajñā*. However, the fact that *vikalpa* may still be present indicates that *dhyāna* does not preclude *vipaśyanā* conceived as *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* occurring on its basis. In section 1.3.1 we shall see that *vipaśyanā* is defined as *savikalpa*, not *savitarka* or *savicāra*. Vasubandhu's conception of *dhyāna* appears to be that all four absorptions are compatible with *vipaśyanā*. Thus *vipaśyanā* should be regarded not as one of the *dhyānas*, but rather as a separate sphere or supervenient quality that may optionally occur on their basis.

The conception of *dhyāna* as referring to a specific kind of meditative attainment is clearly one in which what is being referred to is a state. On the other hand, the word *dhyāna* can be used generally to refer to all *dhyānas* and the successive ascent through (or descent into) these states may be understood more actively as a process. Similar considerations apply to the word *dhyāna* when considered as part of the *pāramitā* model of practice.

1.2.4.1.1 *Dhyāna* as a Perfection

In Mahāyāna treatments of the perfections, *dhyāna* is generally described in functional terms as opposed to psychical ones. Rather than describing the mental processes one experiences in *dhyāna*, it is the necessity and place of *dhyāna* in the implementation of the bodhisattva's vow to

⁴⁹ How do we understand the continued presence of concepts? As we shall see, *vikalpa* is said to be absent in the case of *samatha* meditation even though an object is present before the mind. This suggests that *vikalpa* is not to be minimally conceived, à la Kant's categories, as simply that which serves to unite the manifold of a given sensory intuition as an object. An intentional "object" is clearly present before the mind in *samatha* meditation in spite of its status as *nirvikalpa*. The subject-object dichotomy is still present in these states and one may be aware of the objects of meditation as they present themselves, especially through the four foundations of mindfulness. Some conscious application of concepts is thus implied by the term *vikalpa*. We shall discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 2.

rescue all beings that is the focus. That is, the role of *dhyāna* is described relative to the welfare and conversion of others (*i.e.* *upāya*, method) and to the attainment of wisdom (*prajñā*). Ulrich Pagel has pointed out the pivotal role of *dhyāna* with respect to the other perfections, serving as a kind of "nexus" between the four mundane perfections (giving, morality, patience and energy) and the transmundane perfection of wisdom (237).

While the schema of the four absorptions is often mentioned in the Mahāyāna *sūtras*, it is usually treated as preliminary to the distinctive *dhyāna* attainments of the bodhisattva (Pagel 217-218). The latter are typically described in terms of the achievement or production of five kinds of psychic power of cognition (*abhijñā*) and the concentrations that lead up to them.⁵⁰ What remains rather unclear is whether these superknowledges are generally characterized as *dhyāna per se* or rather as taking place on the basis of *dhyāna*, which strictly speaking is still identified with the four absorptions. Such powers are described as arising *on the basis of* the fourth *dhyāna*.⁵¹ Because the concept of *dhyāna* is sometimes understood in a way that extends beyond the traditional four absorptions and includes non-enstatic, indeed other-directed, states it is easy to see why the translation "absorption" might be thought inadequate.

It also seems to be true that *dhyāna* is, in fact, sometimes used as a general, non-technical term for any meditative state, that is, any beneficial state of extraordinary concentrated awareness. In some of its most common usages it would appear to be understood as synonymous with

⁵⁰ For details of the Mahāyāna treatment of *dhyāna* in terms of the superknowledges see Pagel: 219-232. Classically these are: (1) knowledge of magical powers (*ṛddhividhijñāna*), (2) knowledge gained through divine hearing (*divyaśrotaññāna*), (3) knowledge of the thought of others (*paracittajñāna*), (4) knowledge of the recollection of previous births (*pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna*), (5) knowledge gained through divine sight (*divyacakṣujñāna*) or knowledge of falling from one existence and rebirth into another (*cyutupapādajñāna*) (Pagel: 220).

⁵¹ Gethin (1992: 101-102, 1998: 185-186).

samādhi or *śamatha*. In section 1.2.5 we shall see that such an understanding of *dhyāna* is assumed at a number of points in the *Bhāvanākramas*.

In any case, among the conceptions of *dhyāna* employed in the *Bhāvanākramas* it is the four absorptions that are given the most detailed treatment. Higher distinctively Mahāyāna accomplishments are not detailed in terms of *dhyāna*. Perhaps this is because these texts were written for beginners in the Mahāyāna *sūtras* or perhaps it is simply because Kamalaśīla was more concerned to place the emphasis elsewhere; it will be recalled that these texts were probably written *contra* an opponent who was perceived to be advocating the supremacy of *dhyāna* over *prajñā*.

1.2.4.2 *Samādhi*

This term is often given as a gloss for *dhyāna* but usually its scope is wider than that of *dhyāna* understood in the limited sense of the four absorptions. It includes these as well as other states of mental one-pointedness, such as "access concentration" (*anāgāmya*, "capable," T: *mi lcogs pa med pa*, "not unable"), a degree of mental focus that allows one to either enter into the *dhyānas* proper or turn one's attention to insight practices. It is perhaps the broadest term for meditative state, in different contexts denoting the *dhyānas*, the immeasurables, tranquillity or insight.⁵² It occurs as part of the threefold division of the path: moral conduct, concentration and wisdom (*śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*) -- a very early schema indeed, although not one that figures very prominently in the *Bhāvanākramas*. In general it denotes "concentration" as a *state* of nondistractedness, although in the *Visuddhimagga* of Buddhaghosa it is said that the *process* of becoming non-distracted may be

⁵² For an account of the immeasurables, see Crangle: 176-178 and Gethin 1998: 186-187.

meant.⁵³ Derived from the verbal root $\sqrt{dhā}$ (to put, place, set, join unite) in combination with the prefixes "sam" (together) and "ā" (around) and the masculine suffix "ki",⁵⁴ the sense of *samādhi* is one of "placing (that which is) around together," or simply, "bringing together." The VSM takes its relevant sense to be one of "the single-pointedness of a virtuous mind" (VSM III2), thereby excluding states of concentration that are not directed toward liberation (e.g. the concentration of an assassin, etc). Among its many dictionary definitions we find: "collecting, composing, concentrating (as mind), profound or abstract meditation, concentration of mind on one object, perfect absorption of thought into the one object of meditation..." (Apte 1633).

We shall see that there is an ambiguity with regard to the intended scope of this term in the *Bhāvanākramas*. Kamalaśīla is not always consistent in his employment of it and this reveals that two different concepts of *samādhi* were at work in his mind as he composed these works. On the one hand following the *Samādhirājasūtra* he clearly states that Awakening is not achievable by *samādhi* alone; in addition it is said to require *prajñā*.⁵⁵ In these contexts the word *samādhi* is being employed in such a way as to equate it with *śamatha* or *dhyāna*. On the other hand we shall soon see that Kamalaśīla also follows the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* in regarding *samādhi* as divisible into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* (i.e. *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*). On this latter account the concept of *samādhi*, as a profitable unification of the mind, would appear to be intimately related to that of

⁵³ The idea of a process is more clearly captured in its gloss: *samadhāna*. See: VSM III 3. Here we once again see the *kṛtpratyaya* "lyuṭ" in a word indicating a process. It is notable that this suffix appears as well in both *dhyāna* and *bhāvanā*.

⁵⁴ (Pāṇini 3.3.92) Thanks are owed to Sanjay Kumar Shastri at McGill University for clarifying the Sanskrit derivations of *samādhi* and *śamatha*.

⁵⁵ Bhk 1 210.1-4; Bhk 2 D 43b3-5; Bhk 3 18.5-8. Cf. *Samādhirājasūtra* BST No. 2 19-26.

bhāvanā.

1.2.4.3 *Bhāvanā*

Unlike the case of the term *samādhi*, in Sanskrit one does not speak of "attaining" *bhāvanā*; we have already seen that in its most general sense this word refers to processes through which one brings things into being. However, it should be noted that translations such as "cultivation" and "development," while capturing this primary signification do not necessarily imply *samādhi*. The word "*bhāvanā*" obviously can have a wider non-technical sense that includes giving rise to things not necessarily consistent with virtue or characterized by concentration (a plant, a meal, hatred, etc.). In the technical sense, like the term *samādhi*, *bhāvanā* must refer to profitable efforts, those that further the cause of liberation by generating positive states or conditions (*dharmas*). According to one account found in the *Abhidharmakośa*, *bhāvanā* is divisible into four types corresponding to a classical fourfold division of right effort -- efforts for the arising of unarisen pure *dharmas*, for the growth of already arisen pure *dharmas*, for the non-arising of non-arisen impure *dharmas* and for the destruction of already arisen impure *dharmas*.⁵⁶ In terms of this term's relation to *samādhi* one might note that the process of making such efforts would involve concentrating (*samādhāna*) on the desired state. In addition when specific states of concentration such as the absorptions are aimed at, this might be thought of as a case of the first right effort, that which is aimed at the arising of unarisen pure *dharmas*. This however was apparently a point of

⁵⁶ *Abhk* 1081.1-5, 22-31. For a detailed treatment of the classical Nikāya account see Gethin (1992: 69-80).

controversy between different Buddhist schools.⁵⁷

Perhaps the best known conception of *bhāvanā* is that of the twofold division of *samatha* and *vipāśyanā*. Before dealing with this conception in detail, it is necessary to examine another conceptual schema in which the word *bhāvanā* figures prominently. This is the schema of the five paths.

1.2.4.3.1 *Bhāvanā* as a Path (*bhāvanāmārga*)

The term *bhāvanāmārga* appears in a number of Buddhist path schemes. For example, there are those of the *Abhidharmakośa* and Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasammucaya*. The particular scheme assumed in the *Bhāvanākramas* is not entirely clear. For reasons to be given momentarily it seems likely that Kamalaśīla adhered to a five path model, possibly that set forth in the *Abhidharmasammucaya*. The five paths are those of accumulation, preparation, seeing, *bhāvanā*, and the final path (*sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga*, *bhāvanāmārga* and *niṣṭhāmārga*).⁵⁸ Kamalaśīla does not discuss this theory in detail; the only two components he mentions by name are the *darśanamārga* and the *bhāvanāmārga*. His account of the *bhāvanāmārga* is limited to a summary treatment at the end of Bhk 1 (224.24 f) which actually is spelled out more in terms of the ten stages of the bodhisattva than in terms of the paths. As well, there are similarly brief mentions in Bhk 2 (D55a3, quoting the *Laṅkāvatāra*) and Bhk 3 (2.11-15).

Whether Kamalaśīla adhered to the five path theory of *Abhidharmasammucaya* or to some

⁵⁷ The Vaibāsikas apparently considered *samādhi* a separate mental *dharma* while the Sautrāntikas thought it simply referred to a concentrated mind. *Abhk* 1126.6-1127.3.

⁵⁸ On the five paths of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika system, see Lamotte 1988: 677-86.

other conception does not appear particularly relevant to the interpretation of the *Bhāvanākramas*. It is very important, however, to take note of his description of an essential Buddhist division between the worldly path (*laukikamārga*) of the ordinary person (*prthagjana*) and the transcendent path (*lokottaramārga*) of the bodhisattva.⁵⁹ The latter is said to arise with the first direct nondual and nonconceptual cognition of the lack of inherent existence of all *dharmas* (*sarvadharmiḥsvabhāvatāsākṣātkāri sphuṭataram jñānam*). This first moment marks the arising of the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) or the first bodhisattva stage, called "Delighted" (*pramuditā*). It also marks the beginning of the transcendent path of the bodhisattva. In the *sarvāstivādin* account the *darśanamārga* is held to be divisible into sixteen incredibly short moments in which the four noble truths are directly apprehended, each in four aspects. In point of fact, the final sixteenth moment is said to mark the commencement of the *bhāvanāmārga*,⁶⁰ identified by Kamalaśīla with the "remaining stages" of the ten stage scheme. His account of the paths of *darśana* and *bhāvanā* mentions the effects of each path, not how they are each to be practiced.⁶¹ The *bhāvanāmārga* is distinguished by its effect of eliminating sixteen (unnamed) afflictions not already eliminated on the

⁵⁹ Bhk 1 224.16-21: *tathā hi yadāgradharmānantaram prathamataram lokottaram sarvaprapañcarahitam sarvadharmiḥsvabhāvatāsākṣātkāri sphuṭataram jñānam utpadyate, tadā bodhisattvaḥ samyaktvanyāmāvakrāntito, darśanamārgotpādāt, prathamam bhūmiṃ praviṣṭo bhavati* / In this regard, when upon the completion of 'the best (worldly) condition' a clearer knowledge arises for the first time ever -- superior, transcendental, devoid of all conceptual proliferation, directly perceiving the lack of inherent existence of all *dharmas* -- then, on account of the arising of the path of seeing from descending into certainty of the truth (*samyaktvanyāma* i.e. the assurance of *nirvāna*) the bodhisattva has entered the first stage.

⁶⁰ Lamotte (1988): 682, Gethin 1998: 197.

⁶¹ The practices of the *bhāvanāmārga* appear to be no different in kind from those of the worldly path. That is, they consist in the repeated reinforcement of realizations already undergone through the worldly practices of tranquillity and insight ("considération répétée, en français 'méditation' " La Vallée Poussin vi). They are said to gain an increased efficacy on account of occurring after the abandonment of afflictions occurring on the *darśanamārga*.

preceding *darśanamārga* (Bhk 1 225.1-2). This number matches that given by Asaṅga; in the *Abhidharmakośa* only ten are listed (Griffiths 1983: 575).⁶²

In Abhidharma literature the three kinds of wisdom are usually mapped onto to the earliest path, that of accumulation (Pagel 242, Lamotte 1988: 679), which together with the path of preparation corresponds to the stage of zealous conduct (*adhimukticāryabhūmi*) of the ordinary person.⁶³ Neither of these paths appear by name in the *Bhāvanākramas*.⁶⁴ Now, given the fact that the *bhāvanāmārga* is said to follow the *darśanāmārga* we can see that there is a problem in mapping the schema of the three kinds of wisdom onto that of the paths. It is however clear enough why one should want to locate insight practices in the worldly path. It is precisely through developing insight that the first nonconceptual cognition of the lack of inherent existence of all *dharmas* arises.

Kamalaśīla provides a brief account of this process. The consummation of the stage of zealous conduct is said to consist of a graded sequence of increasingly penetrating insights which, according to the simplified account given in the *Bhāvanākramas*, progressively discern the lack of identity of all *dharmas*. These are known as the *nirvedhabhāgīyāḥ*.⁶⁵ Interestingly, the final

⁶² Awakening is achieved through the removal of deeply rooted "habit patterns" or "tendencies" towards ignorance and negative emotional states. This can only be accomplished on the *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*. The term employed in this context is *anusāya*. The arising of the *darśanamārga* is itself hindered by cognitive and afflictive "obscurations" or "coverings." The term employed here is *avarāṇa*. The division is between *jñeya*- and *kleśa-avarāṇas*. See Bhk 1 214.25-218.7.

⁶³ Mentioned at Bhk 1 224.10-11. The term can also be translated: "the stage of conduct of implicit faith."

⁶⁴ The term *saṃbhāra* (*tshogs*) appears on its own many times -- often as the "accumulations" of merit and knowledge (*puṇyajñānasambhāra*, *bsod rnamś dan ye śes kyī tshogs*) and sometimes in reference to the "prerequisites" for tranquillity and insight (e.g. moral conduct, a quiet spot to meditate, etc). See Bhk 1 205.14-20, Bhk 2 D45b1, Bhk 3 3.6-8.

⁶⁵ Bhk 1 223.18-224.11: *asyā eva ca mṛdumadhyādhimātrādhimātratarāvasthācatuṣṭayena catvāri nirvedhabhāgīyāni vyavasthāpyante / tathā hi yadā [sarvadharmānairātmīyaṃ bhāvayata] iyatspaṣṭo jñānāloko [bhavati tadā uṣmagatanāmakaṃ nirvedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati / sa cātra mahāyāna ālokalabdhasamādhīr ucyate / yadā tu sa eva*

penetration -- the 'best worldly condition' is said to be both conceptual *and without subject and object*, which is to say nondual. This stage results in the arising of the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*) in which one's realization is for the first time direct, in the sense of being both nondual and *nonconceptual*.

Thus it would appear that there are two categories of *bhāvanā*, one ordinary or this-worldly (*laukika*) the other transcendent (*lokottara*). One gives rise to the path of seeing, the other arises from it. If the term *mārga* is applied to both, a corresponding distinction must be drawn between two kinds of *bhāvanāmārga* -- one worldly, the other transcendent. In terms of the path scheme adopted in the *Bhāvanākramas*, only the latter is referred to as the *bhāvanāmārga* proper.^{66 67}

jñānāloko] madhyamaspaṣṭo bhavati, tadā mūrddhanāmakanirvedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati vṛddhālokaś ca samādhir ucyate / yadā tu spaṣṭataro bāhyārthānābhāsaññānāloko jāyate, tadā vijñaptimātrāvasthānāt kṣāntināmakaṃ nirvedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati / ekadeśapraviṣṭaś ca samādhir ucyate grāhyākārānupalambhapravesāt / yadā tu grāhyagrāhakākārahitam advayaṃ jñānaṃ vibhāvayēt, tadāgradharmākhyāṃ nirvedhabhāgīyaṃ bhavati ānantaryaś ca sa samādhir ucyate / tadanantaram eva tattvapravesāt / atra tāvad adhimukticyābhūmiḥ / And of this very (stage of zealous conduct) four degrees of penetration are distinguished by way of the tetrad of soft, middling, strong and stronger. That is, when, from meditating on the selflessness of all *dharma*s the light of knowledge arises to the extent that it is just evident, then this is the degree of penetration called 'Become warm' (*uṣmagata*). And that, here in the Mahāyāna, is called 'The *samādhi* reaching the light'. But when that very light of knowledge becomes moderately evident, then it is the degree of penetration called 'The summit' (*mūrddhan*), but which (in the Mahāyāna) is called 'The *samādhi* of increased light'. And when an even more evident light of knowledge is born -- one in which there is no appearance of external objects -- then, because it rests on conception (*vijñapti*) only, it is the degree of penetration termed 'Forbearance' (*kṣānti*). And it is called 'The *samādhi* which has entered one domain' because one has entered the nonapprehension of the object's aspects. But when one would ascertain the nondual knowledge which is devoid of the forms of the object and subject, then this is the degree of penetration designated 'The best (worldly) condition' (*āgradharma*). And this is called 'The *samādhi* without interval' because, in fact, immediately following it one enters into suchness. Up to this point (we have been dealing with) the stage of zealous conduct.

The account given in the *Abhidharmakośa* Ch. vi is considerably more detailed, explaining the penetrations and the consequent path of seeing in terms of discerning the four noble truths. According to Gethin (1992: 71) the treatises of the northern tradition generally classify the four right efforts (*samyak-prahāna*) as corresponding to *uṣmagata*. See Gethin 1998: 196-197, Ruegg 1989: 176.

⁶⁶ We have seen that insight practices can be situated within the three wisdom schema which in turn is locatable within the path of accumulation and the path of preparation. According to Gethin (1998: 195 f) however, the ordinary path of development may either proceed or follow the path of seeing, depending on whether one has already developed the *dhyānas* while on the worldly path. If not, then the ordinary path of *bhāvanā* must follow the path of seeing. In spite of this explanation being well-attested within the Buddhist tradition itself, there is a problem with it. If we maintain that the ordinary path of *bhāvanā* is a necessary preparation for the arising of the path of seeing, this means that the latter is impossible without first engaging in the former.

This kind of problem is common enough in a tradition as diversely informed as Kamalaśīla's. Different

When the *Bhāvanākramas* provide instructions for practicing tranquillity and insight they are concerned with the practices of a beginner, and thus with the *laukikamārga*. In spite of the placement of insight practices so early in the stages and five path schemes, one should not think that the bodhisattva's spiritual state is not to be thought of as characterized by tranquillity and insight. Quite the opposite. According to Kajiyama, the bodhisattva repeats *samatha*, *vipāśyanā* and their union (*yuganaddha*) in each of the ten stages (135). One might infer that the need to undertake practices aimed specifically at tranquillity and insight is progressively diminished precisely as one is more and more able to effortlessly abide in the spiritual state that carries their union. The transcendent path is generally characterizable as one in which spiritual qualities cultivated on the worldly path are second-nature (or rather, *first-nature*).⁶⁸ One might suggest that other behaviors are thus able to take priority on this foundation -- particularly those related to the welfare of others, that is method (*upāya*).⁶⁹

Now interestingly, Kamalaśīla summarizes the practices of the transcendent path of the

conceptual schemas are inconsistent in different ways. In hypothetical case (1) if conceptual schema X is mapped onto conceptual schema Y it becomes inconsistent with conceptual schema Z. In case (2) if X is mapped onto Z it becomes inconsistent with Y. How we choose between (1) and (2) depends on a range of considerations, not the least of which is how important we judge the respective inconsistencies generated relative to other aspects of the path or to our own conception of the Buddhist path as a whole.

⁶⁷See Frauwallner's speculation on the origin of these two concepts of *bhāvanā* (174-76).

⁶⁸ In this connection see Rupert Gethin's observations regarding the noble eightfold path (1998:164); for a more detailed treatment see 1992: 190-226.

⁶⁹ Thus each bodhisattva stage is said to be characterized by a different perfection's becoming unexcelled. It is not clear whether this is mainly understood as a natural sequence of development of the bodhisattva's spiritual character or rather as the result of a deliberate honing of practices associated with the perfection in question. The former seems the more natural reading to me, especially considering the repeated injunction in Mahāyāna literature that the perfections be undertaken together.

bodhisattva as consisting of wisdom and method.⁷⁰ Thus we can see that *for a bodhisattva*, *bhāvanā* may be understood as divisible into the two components of wisdom and method. It is only for an ordinary person that *bhāvanā* is to be primarily understood as divisible into tranquillity and insight. Here we should recall that *dhyāna* as one of the perfections is part of method. Thus an interesting inversion of schemas takes place upon reaching the transcendent path. *Bhāvanā* comes to be principally thought of as consisting of the perfections. As one ascends the stages towards the *buddhabhūmi* the perfections become decreasingly a matter of practice and increasingly integrated into one's natural state or constitution. Thus eventually *prajñā* and *dhyāna* (and the other perfections) become indistinguishable, which is to say "one."

One problem with this explanation is that in equating wisdom and method with the conduct of the transcendent path of the bodhisattva, it would seem to be contradicting my earlier characterization of the *Bhāvanākramas* as principally concerned with the worldly path. After all, so much of the *Bhāvanākramas* is centred precisely upon wisdom and method. The answer to this worry is that the virtues that define the perfections characterize the worldly path as well. Indeed it is exactly there that they must first be practiced. But it is only when *prajñā* arises for the first time on the *darśanamārga*, that these virtues truly become perfections -- in virtue of the wisdom that now understands their true nature as empty. All of this is common Mahāyāna soteriological theory and

⁷⁰ Bhk 2 D 53b4-b5: *gzan yan byan chub sems dpa' mams kyi ses rab dan thabs zuñ du 'brel bar 'jug pa'i lam ni 'di yin te / sems can thams cad la lta ba'i sñiñ rje chen pos yons su zin pas 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam bsten pa dan / lañs pa'i thabs kyi dus na yan sgyu ma mkhan bzin du phyin ci ma log pa kho na'i sbyin pa la sogs pa la bsten pa ste /* Furthermore, this is the path that carries the union of wisdom and method for bodhisattvas: they rely on the transcendent path because thoroughly gripped by the great compassion that beholds all sentient beings. And at the time of emergent method, they rely on giving and so forth which is unmistakable -- just like miracle workers (*sgyu ma mkhan*). Also see Bhk 1 221.11-13: *prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhi bodhisattvānām mārgo /*

is directly applicable to the contents of the *Bhāvanākramas*.⁷¹

1.2.4.4. *Śamatha*

The term *śamatha* is derived from the verbal root $\sqrt{\text{śam}}$ plus the *kṛtpratyaya* *athac*.

According to Apte the term has the primary sense of "tranquillity, calmness; especially mental calmness, absence of passion." (Apte 1534). The cultivation of tranquillity involves practices of calming the mind that induce states of deep concentration such as the *dhyānas*. One brief explanation given in Bhk 2 captures many of the nuances, including that of onepointedness of mind.

Tranquillity is understood as one's *abiding* in a state of mind which is thoroughly disciplined and joyful and which is continually and by its own nature fixed inwardly upon the meditation object -- after having *calmed* one's distractions related to external objects.⁷²

It is especially notable that the Tibetan term for *śamatha*, "*zi gnas*," combines the word for calm, *zi*, with that for abiding, *gnas*. Thus another acceptable translation for *śamatha* is "calm abiding" or even, "staying calm." While *śamatha* may be conceived as the process of bringing about the state of calmness, it may also to be understood as precisely the calm state achieved once a certain degree mental and physical flexibility can be maintained without effort.⁷³ Further, from the

⁷¹ See, for example, Brassard 112, 129-132.

⁷² Bhk 2 D 46b7-47a1: *phyi rol gyi yul la nam par g'yeñ ba zi nas nañ du dmigs pa la rgyun du rañ gis nañ gis 'jug pa dga' ba dañ śin tu sbyaṅs pa dañ ldan pa'i sems ñid la gnas pa ni zi gnas zes bya'o //*

⁷³ Kamalaśīla quotes the *Samdhinirmocana*'s description of *śamatha* in this connection. Bhk2 D 47a6-7: *de ltar žugs śin de la lan mañ du gnas pa de la lus śin tu sbyaṅs pa dañ sems śin tu sbyaṅs pa 'byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni zi gnas zes bya ste / de ltar na byañ chub sems dpa' zi gnas yoṅs su tshol bar byed pa yin no //* Entering like that, a pliant body and a pliant mind arise for the one who repeatedly dwells in that state, and this is called tranquillity. Thus the bodhisattva undertakes his pursuit of tranquillity. Also see Powers: 150-151.

definition just cited we can also see that both as a process and as an achieved state, *śamatha* may be understood as non-distraction, concentration (*samādhi*) upon the meditation object.⁷⁴ Although certain meditation objects are mentioned by Kamalaśīla as especially appropriate, he is clear in asserting that *śamatha* is not to be defined in terms of what object is used as a focal point.⁷⁵ This is an important point: in defining *śamatha* it is not the object of concentration that is the crucial consideration. Objects that one might be inclined to associate with insight (e.g. the four noble truths, emptiness) may also be the objects of *śamatha* (and thus *dhyāna* as well).

1.2.4.5 *Vipaśyanā*

This term is a Buddhist hybrid Sanskrit word derived from the Pāli *vipassanā*. The latter is derived from the verbal root \sqrt{pas} "to see," plus the prefix "vi" which can have the senses of "apart, asunder" and "different, distinct." The resulting sense is one of "seeing into" or "discerning." In general, *vipaśyanā* is understood either as an observational/analytic process that leads to a knowledge of reality, or else, secondarily, as the resulting state of knowledge itself. The term *prajñā* is commonly given as a gloss for *vipaśyanā*, although we have seen that it tends to be employed for the resulting states of knowledge rather than the observational/analytic processes leading up to them. Thus although these two terms are similar in meaning I believe some

⁷⁴ At Bhk 1 207.13-208.3 nine stations of tranquillity meditation are outlined in brief and in terms of *samādhi*. It is possible that Kamalaśīla is here following an account outlined in Asaṅga's *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (Gethin 1998: 181-82). For a more detailed explanation of these steps see Sopa 1991: 48-50.

⁷⁵ Bhk 1 207.5-11: *yadā tu tatrālabane 'nabhisamśkāravāhi yāvadicchaṃ cittam pravṛttam bhavati / tadā śamatho niṣpanno veditavyaḥ / etac ca sarvaśamathānām sāmānyalakṣaṇam / cittaikāgratāmātrasvabhāvāt śamathasya / ālambanam tu tasyāniyatam eva/* But when the mind is proceeding just as long as one likes, spontaneously bearing in upon the object there, then tranquillity should be known to be accomplished. And this is the general definition of all tranquillity since tranquillity has the nature of mere one-pointedness of mind. Its object, on the other hand, is definitely not fixed.

distinctions in their actual employment may be observed. By and large the term *vipaśyanā* refers to processes that give rise to *prajñā*, conceived as a state. On those occasions when the term *vipaśyanā* is in fact used to denote a state as opposed to a process, it refers to a mental episode (i.e. an insight) as opposed to a disposition or factor of one's constitution. On the other hand *prajñā* qua state appears to be commonly understood both dispositionally and episodically.

Now if it is the case that *vipaśyanā* is by and large employed in reference to "processes," one must further inquire after the nature of these processes. Here I have tentatively characterized them as "observational/analytic" -- but this is somewhat awkward. In choosing such a description I have taken my lead from Paul J. Griffiths, who has described *vipaśyanā* in terms of "observationally analytic techniques" (OATs) in contrast to the "concentratively enstatic techniques" (CETs) of *samatha* and *dhyāna*.⁷⁶ Griffiths' characterization of *vipaśyanā* attempts to capture the two main implications of its myriad descriptions: that it involves a perceptual (or quasi-perceptual) element as well as an intellectual element. Interestingly, it could be argued that Griffiths' terminology appears to be weighted in favor of the intellectual. Witness the effect of inverting the qualifiers from "observationally analytic" to *analytically observational* techniques. I think it is fair to suggest that Buddhist traditions (and academics) vary in the degrees to which they consider *vipaśyanā* to be a perceptual or an intellectual process.⁷⁷ I will continue to translate *vipaśyanā* as insight; as for an explanation of *vipaśyanā* qua "discernment of reality" (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*),

⁷⁶ Griffiths 1983: 88, 171f.

⁷⁷ Griffiths' reading favors an intellectual understanding of the concept of *vipaśyanā*: it is aimed towards a "knowledge that" such and such is the case (171). Whatever insight may realize it is such that it is articulatable in propositional form. He concludes this based on the observation that when insight is described, it is regularly placed inside an "iti" clause (P. 'ti). But one might well ask how else one would attempt to convey the experience than by use of such a construction. At points Griffiths seems to hedge on whether insight has the character of being articulated at the time of its occurrence, or is merely articulatable in principle. (88, 90, 123, 129)

discussion of this topic will be deferred until Chapter 2.

1.2.4.6 Summary of this Analysis

We have seen that of the five words analyzed three of them have wide nontechnical senses as well as more precise technical meanings: "*samādhi*" may refer to any process or state of concentration or, narrowing our universe of discourse slightly, to any *profitable* process or state of concentration. Technically, according to Vasubandhu, the term *dhyāna* may be taken as synonymous with *samādhi* in this latter sense (*Abkh* viii.1e: 1128). Likewise, the word *bhāvanā* may refer to any process of cultivation. In their technical senses however these words refer to specific states and processes undergone as part of the path to Awakening. It is important to recognize when these terms are being used loosely, in a nontechnical sense. When this is the case, the prospect of equivocation and confusion looms near. As for the terms *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*, both appear to have only very specific technical senses. All of these terms may be used to refer to either process or states, with the exception of *bhāvanā*, which is exclusively used to denote a process. It is also to be noted that while the term *samādhi* may refer in principle to processes, it is most commonly employed to denote particular states of concentration.

With these considerations in mind we can now turn to a detailed examination of the employment of these terms within the *Bhāvanākramas*. While our initial focus is on the relationship of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*, our analysis in this section is aimed at revealing the closest possible equivalent for the English word "meditation" to be found *in these texts*. From the above considerations I maintain that the three main contenders are *bhāvanā*, *samādhi* and *dhyāna*. As for *śamatha* it too has sometimes been very loosely understood as equivalent to *dhyāna*, and has

therefore been translated simply as "meditation."⁷⁸ However, it is clear that in its most common usage the term is mainly thought of as a *subdivision* of meditation (whether of *bhāvanā*, *samādhi* or even *dhyāna*).⁷⁹

The term *samādhi* itself is sometimes understood as synonymous with *dhyāna*; as we shall see it is also intimately tied to the concept of *bhāvanā*. Because of this unique position, *samādhi* is an excellent candidate for translation as meditation. It may be, however, that this possibility is somewhat limited by its strong association in the *Bhāvanākramas*, and perhaps in the Mahāyāna more generally, with *states* of concentration as opposed to the processes leading up to them.

We have seen that *bhāvanā* is divisible into two subcategories viz. *śamatha-bhāvanā* and *vipāśyanā-bhāvanā*. The term *dhyāna* either appears in the context of the four absorptions or as one

⁷⁸ In a very different context, that of Vasubandhu's *Sukhavātivyūhopadeśa*, Kiyota Minoru translates *śamatha* as meditation. Insight (*vipāśyanā*) is said to be derived from it (259).

⁷⁹ The conception of *dhyāna* as being the basis of both *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*, occurs in the *Abhidharmakośa*. In *anāgāmya* and *dhyānāntara* the two are not in balance: *vipāśyanā* is strong, while *śamatha* is weak. In the *arūpyas* the opposite is true. *Abkh* 1014.3-9., 1128.1-4. Also See: Pruden, 1021, 1217-18, 1284.

Kamalaśīla's usage of *dhyāna* tends to equate it with *the nonconceptual*. This is very important. It will be recalled that his opponent is charged with being an advocate of *dhyāna*. Kamalaśīla presents himself as an advocate of *prajñā* and *dhyāna* together. When used loosely all three of these terms -- *bhāvanā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* -- might be understood as roughly equivalent, and in the appropriate context each may be translated as "meditation." But it would be logically difficult for a single text to employ the three terms synonymously in the sense of encompassing the two branches of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*. If all three were to be regarded as divisible into the subdivisions of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*, a problem would arise in the explication of the concept of *śamatha*, which is generally thought to be a broader concept encompassing *dhyāna* in the technical sense of absorption. Further one would be forced to consider *dhyāna* qua absorption as a subdivision of *dhyāna* qua concentration (*samādhi*) and so on.

As far as I can make out there is only one occasion in the *Bhāvanākramas* where *dhyāna* and *bhāvanā* might plausibly be interpreted as being understood as synonymous. It is notable that this occurs in the context of a discussion of the transcendent path of the bodhisattva. *Bhk* 1 226.12-16 *ata evāsyām iyaṃ upāyasamgrhitabodhipakṣabhāvanā suṣṭhu duḥkena jīyate abhyasyatā iti sudurjayety ucyate / asyām cāryasatyākārabhāvanābahulikārāt, dhyānapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / upāyasamgrhitabodhipakṣabahulavihārī ca bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti saṃsārapravṛttipratyavekṣaṇān nirvitsahayā cittasantatyā 'nimittavihāraṃ samāpattum tāvat pañcamī bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrītaḥ ṣaṣṭhī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate /* Hence only in this stage because the repeated cultivation of the aids to Awakening collected under method is won with great difficulty, it is called: "Very hard to win". And in this stage the perfection of *dhyāna* becomes unexcelled on the basis of doing a lot of meditation (*bhāvanā*) on the aspects of the noble truths. And he becomes one who dwells extensively on the aids to Awakening collected under method. So long as he cannot attain the signless state because of his mental continuum being filled sorrow from its discernment of the activity of *saṃsāra*, that long it remains the fifth stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the sixth stage is distinguished.

of the five perfections collectively considered as part of method (*upāya*) to be cultivated along with wisdom (*prajñā*), the sixth and ruling perfection. The main conception of *dhyāna* outlined in these texts is that of a *nonconceptual* state of concentration, that is as a subspecies of *śamatha* rather than its genus. This is very important. It will be recalled that Kamalaśīla considered his opponent at bSam yas an advocate of *dhyāna* alone. Kamalaśīla on the other hand presented himself as a champion of *dhyāna* and *prajñā* conjoined.

1.3 Two Concepts of *Samādhi*

1.3.1 *Samādhi* Conceived as Divisible into *Śamatha* and *Vipaśyanā*:

Kamalaśīla's conceptions of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* appear to be based on those set forth in a large number of Mahāyāna *sūtras*. Those he cites most often in this context are the *Samdhinirmocana* and the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtras*. The others that are cited more than once in this context are the *Ratnamegha*, the *Samādhirāja*, the *Ratnakūṭa*.⁸⁰ As noted, it is to beginners in such *sūtras* that all three *Bhāvanākramas* are explicitly addressed. In the third Bhk this statement

⁸⁰ In the *Bhāvanākramas* there are approximately twenty-five occasions when Kamalaśīla mentions or quotes from a *sūtra* source in explaining the nature of *śamatha* and/or *vipaśyanā*. Ten of these refer to the *Samdhinirmocana*, five to the *Ratnamegha*, two each to the *Laṅkāvatāra*, the *Samādhirāja* (once as *Candrapradīpa*) and the *Ratnakūṭa* (the same reference cited twice) and one each to the *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, *Gocaraparisuddhi*, *Prajñāpāramitā* and an unknown *sūtra* source. On fifteen occasions *sūtras* are appealed to when tranquillity and insight are being discussed as a *pair*: three times in Bhk 1 (*Laṅkāvatāra*, *Ratnakūṭa* and *Ratnamegha*), ten times in Bhk 2 (*Samdhinirmocana* four times, *Ratnakūṭa*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, *Samādhirāja* [*Candrapradīpa*], *Ratnamegha*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Gocaraparisuddhi*), and twice in Bhk 3 (once to the *Ratnamegha* and once to the *Samdhinirmocana*). There are only four occasions where *sūtras* are cited when tranquillity is being explained on its own: three in Bhk 1 (*Samdhinirmocana*, *Prajñāpāramitā*, and an unknown *sūtra*), once in Bhk 2 (*Samādhirāja*) and none in Bhk 3. There are seven occasions where *sūtras* are cited when insight is being discussed on its own: none in Bhk 1, three in Bhk 2 (all references to the *Samdhinirmocana*) and four in Bhk 3 (*Ratnamegha* twice, *Samdhinirmocana* and an unknown *sūtra* from the *Sutrasamuccaya* once each).

While one should not put too much stock in this sort of analysis some suggestive results can be gleaned. When insight is being discussed, it is the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* that is most commonly cited. This is especially true in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3. In Bhk 1 the term *vipaśyanā* appears only rarely; however it is fairly clear that the expression *prajñābhāvanā* refers to the process of insight. In its explanation the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* is cited at length.

regarding the intended audience is immediately followed by a passage indicative of Kamalaśīla's conception of the logical relations obtaining between many of the key terms employed in the context of meditation.

Homage to Tara! The *bhāvanākrama* is related in brief for those who are beginners in the way of the Mahāyāna *sūtras*. In that context, even if the *samādhi* of bodhisattvas was taught by the Bhagavan to be limitless (in variety), by way of the (four) Immeasurables and all the rest, nevertheless all *samādhis* are subsumed under tranquillity and insight. Therefore, precisely that path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight is related.⁸¹

There are many points made in this brief passage. For our purposes we must first notice that every single *samādhi* or state of concentration is here said to be included under the rubric of tranquillity or insight; Kamalaśīla is here paraphrasing a point made in the *Samdhinirmocana*. (The actual *sūtra* passage is quoted by him near the outset of Bhk 2; it refers not only to the *samādhis* of bodhisattvas, but also to those of śrāvakas and Tathāgatas).⁸² Secondly, it is interesting that the division of tranquillity and insight is made among *samādhis* or concentrations, and not within *bhāvanā* as such. We have already seen that Kamalaśīla regards *bhāvanā* as divisible into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*; it would appear that he also considers *samādhi* as divisible in the same way. In

⁸¹ BHK 3 1.2-6: *namas tārāyai / mahāyānasūtrāntanayapravṛttānām saṃkṣepato bhāvanākramāḥ kathyate / tatra yady api bo(dhisattvānām apa)rimito 'pramāṇādibhedena bhagavatā samādhir upadiṣṭaḥ, tathāpi śamathavipaśyanābhyām sarve samādhayo vyāptā iti / sa eva śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhi mārgas tāvat kathyate / D 56b6-57a2 'jam dpaḥ g'zon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo / theg pa chen po mdo sde'i tshul la žugs pa mams kyi phyir bsgom pa'i rim pa mdor brjod par bya'o / de la bcom ldan 'das kyi byañ chub sems dpa mams kyi tiñ ne 'dsin tha dad pa tshad med dpag tu med pa la sogs pa bstan du zin kyañ / ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gñis kyi tiñ ne 'dsin thams cad la khyab pas na ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ zun du 'brel pa 'jug pa'i lam de ŋid brjod par bya'o /*

⁸² Bhk 2 D44a7-44b1: *de gñis kyi tiñ ne 'dsin thams cad bsdus pa'i phyir rnal 'byor pa thams cad kyi dus thams cad du nes par ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ bsten par bya ste / 'phags pa dgoñs pa nes par 'grel pa de ŋid las bcom ldan 'das kyi ži skad du / "nas ŋan thos mams dañ / byañ chub sems 'dpa mams / de bžin gsegs pa mams kyi tiñ ne 'dsin rnam pa du ma bstan pa gañ dag yin pa de dag thams cad ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gis bsdus par rig par bya'o" žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o // Since all the concentrations (*samādhis*) are encompassed by those two, every yogin must adhere to them all times. As was said in that very same noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, "All the myriad concentrations taught by me -- whether they be of the śrāvakas, the bodhisattvas or the Tathāgatas - all should be understood as included in tranquillity and insight." In this way the way it is explained.*

point of fact Kamalaśīla never employs the compounds *śamatha-bhāvanā* and *vipaśyanā-bhāvanā*. It is, however, clear from this passage that *bhāvanā* and *samādhi* are here regarded by him as being coextensive. Not only does he refer to limitless *samādhis* in explaining the process of *bhāvanā*, but the passage from the *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra* that he quotes to explain their inclusion under tranquillity and insight applies to them the gerund of the causative form of the verbal root √*bhū*. This indicates a conception of *bhāvanā* as coextensive with *samādhi* within the intended universe of discourse for these texts, that is, the way of practicing for a beginner in the Mahāyāna sūtras. This latter qualification is important insofar as it is clearly possible for one to cultivate something without concentration and to concentrate on something without cultivating anything in particular. Here, however, in the context of Mahāyāna practice the two concepts converge.

Thus for any x, if x is *bhāvanā* then it involves *samādhi*; and for any y, if y is *samādhi* then it involves *bhāvanā*. Like the concepts of lake and lakeshore, or parent and child, the two concepts are mutually implicative although not identical in meaning. In effect what this means is that we cannot think of the one without thinking of the other. It does not mean that every proposition that is true of the one is true of the other. This understanding is consistent with Vasubandhu's understanding of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* given above, that "the wisdom arisen from *bhāvanā* is born from *samādhi*." (...*samādhijā bhāvanāmayīti*).⁸³

What is interesting here is that while both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are ambiguous in terms of

⁸³ Notice that if we understand *prajñā* as the nonconceptual state arising at the outset of the transcendent path we must also accept that the suffix *-mayaḥ* means "arisen from." If, on the other hand, we were to attempt to interpret it as "consisting in" *prajñā* would have to be understood as the conceptual process leading up to this moment. However in this case, the assertion of Vasubandhu would not as clearly hold "the wisdom consisting in *bhāvanā* is born from *samādhi*." (...*samādhijā bhāvanāmayīti*). Indeed it would make better sense to invert it: "The wisdom consisting in *samādhi* is born from *bhāvanā*" (...*bhāvanājā samādhimayīti*), understanding *samādhi* here to refer the *state* of nonconceptual *samādhi* which is that first moment. However, this is not what Vasubandhu says.

their referring to processes or states, *bhāvanā* and *samādhi* can best be viewed as referring to processes and states respectively. Thus when one considers the subsumption of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā* under the former one may be thinking of them as processes, under the latter as attained states -- although there is no necessity in this. To use an analogy: the distinction between *bhāvanā* as a process and *samādhi* as a state may be thought of as similar to the distinction between waves and particles of light. One sees what one preconceives.⁸⁴

Now if concentration is divisible into tranquillity and insight, what is it that differentiates these two? One way of understanding the division between *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā* is in terms of their respective *functions* or *effects*. In brief, the function of tranquillity is to stabilize the mind thereby making insight possible. The function of insight is to remove ignorance of the way things are. Viewed psychologically, this same distinction may be characterized by the respective *purposes* or *goals* for which they are each undertaken. Thus the opening statement of Bhk 3 is immediately followed by a quotation from the *Samdhinirmocana* that indicates the effects of *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā* in respectively eliminating one's afflictive and cognitive obscurations. This in turn is said to be required for the arising of nonconceptual gnosis, which in turn inevitably leads to the elimination of all obscuration (i.e. Awakening).

And the Bhagavān has said: "Having cultivated tranquillity and insight, a living being is liberated from the bondages of signs (*nimitta*, T. *mtshan ma*) and negative dispositions (*dausṭhula*, T. *gnas nan len*)." Therefore one who aims to abandon all

⁸⁴ The close conceptual relationship between these two terms is indicated by the fact that La Vallee Poussin appears to regard them as interchangeable, at least in the context of the *Abhidharmakośa*: "Pratique de la méditation de l'horrible (*aśubhābhāvanā*) et de l'application de la mémoire à la respiration (*ānāpānasmṛti*) (vi. 9-13), par laquelle on triomphe du désir et de la distraction, par laquelle on devient capable d'entrer en *bhāvanā* ou *samādhi*, recueillement." (v.iv) The gloss of these two by "recueillement" is also interesting. Pruden translates this as "absorption," but this seems unsatisfactory (Vol.3 xiv). The word "absorption" is strongly associated with the *dhyānas*. The word "recueillement" on the other hand seems to carry more of a discursive flavor, of "introspection" or "contemplation" rather than "trance" or "absorption." As noted already, the necessary connection of *bhāvanā* and *samādhi* is consistent with the definition of *bhāvanāmāyī prajñā* given above.

obscurations should practice (*sevaniye*; T. *bsgom par bya*, "should cultivate") tranquillity and insight." By the power of tranquillity the mind becomes steady on its object, like a lamp in a place without wind. By insight, the light of perfect gnosis emerges from accurately realizing the thusness of *dharma*s (*yathāvad dharmatattvāvagamāt*). And on that basis all obscuration is removed, just as the night by the dawning of the sun.⁸⁵

Thus in this passage we see the functions of tranquillity and insight set out in the context of a syllogism summarizing the entire Buddhist path. Tranquillity is required for insight; tranquillity and insight are required for the arising of nonconceptual gnosis or wisdom (*prajñā*); gnosis is required for and assures one of complete Awakening (i.e. Buddhahood, omniscience).

With regard to tranquillity, in both Bhk 1 and Bhk 2 Kamalaśīla provides practical instructions in connection with the process of successfully stabilizing the mind in the face of various impediments.⁸⁶ With regard to the practice of insight a large section of Bhk 1 is devoted to tracing its course in accordance with the *Lankāvatārasūtra*. This account is given in terms the cultivation of wisdom (*prajñābhāvanā*).⁸⁷ The term *vipaśyanā* only appears on two occasions, both

⁸⁵ Bhk 3 1.6-14: *uktaṃ ca bhagavatā: nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt / vipaśyanāṃ bhāvayitvā śamathāñ ca vimucyata iti / tasmāt sakalāvaranāprahānārthinā śamathavipaśyane sevaniye / śamathabalena svālbhane cittam aprakampyaṃ bhavati nivāsthitapradīpavat / vipaśyanayā yathāvad dharmatattvāvagamāt samyagjñānālokaḥ samutpadyate / tataḥ sakalam āvaranāṃ prahiyate / andhakāravād ālokodayāt / D 56a1-3: bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / skye ba po yi lhag mthoñ dañ ži gnas goms par byas na ni gnas ñan len gyi 'chiñ ba dañ / mtshan ma'i 'chiñ ba rnam grol 'gyur / žes so / de lta bas na sgrib pa mtha dag spoñ bar 'dod pas ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ bsgom par bya'o / ži gnas kyis stobs kyis ni mar me rluñ med pa na gnas pa bžin du dmigs pa las sems mi gyo bar 'gyur ro / lhag mthoñ gis mun par ñi ma śar ba bžin du chos kyis de kho na ji lta ba bžin du rab tu rtogs pas yañ dag pa'i šes rab kyis snañ ba 'byuñ ste / sgrib pa mtha dag spoñ bar 'gyur ro /*

⁸⁶ Bhk 1 208.3-20, D 46b2, D 47b2-48a4.

⁸⁷ A brief explanation of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* at Bhk 1 204.10-205.4 (Tucci, section 12) is immediately followed by lengthier accounts of *śamatha* (section 13), *samādhi* (section 14), *dhyāna* (section 15) and *prajñābhāvanā* (section 16). Considering that *śamatha*, *samādhi* and *dhyāna* can be grouped together, this suggests that Kamalaśīla was here adhering to the division of *bhāvanā* into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, even though here he refers to *prajñābhāvanākramaḥ* not *vipaśyanābhāvanākramaḥ* as such. Bhk 1 210.7-8: *tatrāyam āryalankāvatāre samkṣepāt prajñābhāvanākramo nirdiṣṭaḥ* / In this regard, this process of cultivating wisdom is briefly taught in the noble *Lankāvatāra*.

in reference to the union (*yuganaddha*) of tranquillity and insight as the cause of the arising of nonconceptual (*avikalpa*) knowledge of suchness.⁸⁸ In Bhk 2 and Bhk 3 the descriptions of this process employ the term *vipāśyanā*. All these descriptions share a common feature: the application of concepts to the object (*ālambana*) of the meditative process. This is said to distinguish *vipāśyanā* from *śamatha*. In Bhk 3, again adhering to the *Samdhinirmocana sūtra*, Kamalaśīla asserts that *śamatha* is nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) and that *vipāśyanā* is conceptual (*savikalpa*).

Precisely because of this the Bhagavān taught four realities as meditation objects for yogis: a) a mental image without conceptualization b) a mental image accompanied by conceptualization c) the limit of things and d) the perfection of purpose. In this context, when by means of tranquillity one has committed oneself to a mental image of all *dharma*s or to a form like that of the Buddha, that which is depended upon is called a mental image without conceptualization. It is called without conceptualization here because of an absence of concepts determining the meaning of reality (*bhūtārthanirūpaṇāvikalpābhāva*). And it is called a mental image because it is depended upon, having committed oneself to an image of *dharma*s as they have been learned and understood. When, by means of insight, the yogin analyzes (*vicārayati*) that very reflection in order to realize reality (*tattvādhigamārtha*), then it is called a mental image accompanied by conceptualization on account of the presence (*samudbhāva*, *T. yod pa*) there of a concept determining reality (*tattvanirūpaṇāvikalpa*), which is the characteristic of insight.⁸⁹

⁸⁸ Bhk 1 213.13-19: *ata evāvaraṇaprahāṇāya śamathavipāśyanāyuganaddhavāhi mārgo bhagavatā nirdiṣṭaḥ, tayor avikalpasamyagjñāne hetutvāt / tathā cōktaṃ - "śīlaṃ pratiṣṭhāya samādhilābhaḥ / samādhilābhāc ca hi prajñābhāvanā / prajñāyā jñānaṃ bhavati viśuddhaṃ viśuddhajñānasya hi śīlasaṃpat" // iti /* On account of this alone the Bhagavān taught the path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight in order to remove the obscurations, since those two are the causes of perfect nonconceptual knowledge. Thus it is said: Having established morality, there is the gaining of concentration. And from the gaining of concentration, there is the development of wisdom. By means of wisdom, knowledge becomes pure. For one whose knowledge is pure, verily there is the wealth of morality. Bhk 1 219.21-220.5: *evam anena krameṇa tattvaṃ bhāvayet / tatra ca layauddhatyādin vyutthitān pūrvavat praśamayet / yadā tu sarvadharmāṅsvabhāvatālbane ca layauddhatyādirahitam anabhisamskāreṇa pravṛttaṃ jñānaṃ bhavati, tadā śamathavipāśyanāyuganaddhavāhi mārgo niṣpanno bhavati / tadā yāvat śaknoti tāvad adhimuktibalenādhimukticyābhūmau sthito bhāvayet /* Thus one should cultivate reality by this process. And there, as before, one should neutralize the laxity, excitement and so forth that have arisen. But when knowledge is proceeding spontaneously, without laxity or excitement, unto the object which is the lack of inherent existence of all *dharma*s, then the path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight is perfected. Then as much as one can, one should meditate established in the stage of zealous conduct, with the power of zeal.

⁸⁹ Bhk 3 1.14-2.5: */ ata eva bhagavatā catvāry ālambanavastūni yogināṃ nirdiṣṭāni / nirvikalpapratibimbakam / savikalpapratibimbakam / vastuparyantatā / kāryapariniṣpattis ca / tatra śamathena yat sarvadharmapratibimbakam buddhādirūpaṃ cādhimucyālambyate tan nirvikalpapratibimbakam*

Thus the cultivation of insight is said to aim for the correct apprehension of reality. This is understood by Kamalāśīla as a conceptual process which eventually results in a direct nonconceptual knowledge of natural condition of things, thusness, reality as it is. As we have seen however, this is not merely a kind of ordinary reasoning on the basis of scripture (*cintāmayī prajñā*), but rather a special form of scripturally based discernment of reality that occurs *while in a state of concentration (bhāvanāmayī prajñā)*.

"... [H]aving abandoned mental distractions, he inwardly discerns those very same previously considered *dharmas* as mental images (*gzugs brñan*) *in the sphere of concentration (tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul, my emphasis)*... In this manner, discriminating the meaning of what is to be known in those mental images of the sphere of meditative concentration, thoroughly discriminating, completely considering, completely investigating, forbearing, accepting, classifying, looking and knowing -- *That* is called insight. So it is that the bodhisattva is skilled in insight." 90

This process of examining the nature of *dharmas* is said to be so vivid that it is like looking at the

ucyate / tatra bhūtārthanirūpañāvikalpābhāvān nirvikalpakam ucyate / yathāśrutodgrhītānāñ ca dharmānām pratibimbakamadhimucyālambyata iti kṛtvā pratibimbakam ucyate / tad eva pratibimbakam yadā vipaśyanayā vicārayati yogī tattvādhiḡamārthañ tadā savikalpapratibimbakam ucyate / tattvanirūpañāvikalpasya vipaśyanālakṣaṇasya tatra samudbhavāt / D 56a3-7: de lta bas na bcom ldan 'das kyis rnal 'byor pa mams kyi dmigs pa'i dños po bñi bstan te / mam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brñan dan / mam par rtog pa dan bcas pa'i gzugs brñan dan / dños po'i mtha dan / dgos pa yoñs su grub pa'o / de la ži gnas kyis na chos thams cad kyi gzugs brñan gañ yin pa dan / sañs rgyas kyi gzugs la sogs pa la mos nas dmigs pa ste / de ni rnam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brñan žes bya'o / de la yañ dag pa'i don la rnam par rtog pa med pas na de rnam par mi rtog pa žes bya'o / ji ltar thos pa dan ji ltar zin pa'i chos mams kyi gzugs brñan žes bya'o / rnal 'byor pas de kho na'i don rtogs par bya ba'i phyir gañ gi tshe lhag mthoñ gis gzugs brñan de ñid la spyod pa de'i tshe lhag mthoñ gi mtshan ñid de kho na la rtogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa de na yod pas na rnam par rtog pa dan bcas pa'i gzugs brñan žes bya'o /

90 From the *Samdhirmocanasūtra* (cf. Powers, 150-152). Bhk 2 D 47a7-47b2: *sems kyi rnam par g'yeñ ba spañs nas ji ltar bsams pa'i chos de dag ñid nañ du tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul gzugs brñan du so sor rtog par byed / mos par byed do // de ltar tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul gzugs brñan de dag la šes bya'i don de rnam par 'byed pa dan / rab tu rnam par 'byed pa dan / yoñs su rtog pa dan / yoñs su dpyod pa dan / bzod pa dan / 'dod pa dan / bye brag 'byed pa dan / lta ba dan / rtog pa gañ yin pa de ni lhag mthoñ žes bya ste / de ltar na byañ chub sems dpa' lhag mthoñ la mkhas pa yin no" žes gsuñs so // See Powers: 341-342.*

blemishes on one's face through their reflection in a mirror.⁹¹ When finally the yogin reaches the point of comprehending thusness nonconceptually, this constitutes "the limit of things" and the arising of the first stage of the bodhisattva.⁹² We have seen above that this constitutes the beginning of the transcendent path of the bodhisattva. Gradually, but inevitably, the bodhisattva's purpose on the *bhāvanāmārga* is fulfilled and the omniscience of Buddhahood is achieved at the *buddhabhūmi*.⁹³ Based on this account Kamalaśīla reiterates his syllogism and its clear conclusion: the final goal of the Mahāyāna, Buddhahood, necessitates the practice of both tranquillity and insight:

That being so, what is shown by this? The realization of the limit of all things occurs through practicing tranquillity and insight. And through that, the perfection of purpose defined by the removal of obscurations is attained. And that itself is Buddhahood. Therefore tranquillity and insight must be adhered to in order to realize Buddhahood. Conversely it is taught that for one who does not practice

⁹¹ Bhk 3 2.5-8: *tasyaiva ca pratibimbasya svabhāvaṃ nirūpayan yogī, darpaṇāntargatasvamukhapratibimbapratyavekṣanena svamukhagata vairūpyāṇāṃ viniścayavat, sarvadharmāṇāṃ yathāvat svabhāvāgamāt* / And in determining the nature of that very mental image on the basis of understanding the nature of all *dharma*s as they are, the yogin is as if ascertaining blemishes upon his own face by discerning its reflection in a mirror. D 56a7-8: *rnal 'byor pa gzugs brīan de űid kyi űo bo űid la rtog pas chos thams cad kyi űo bo űid ji lta ba bzin du khoñ du chud de / bdag gi bzin gyi gzugs me loñ gi nañ du byuñ ba la brtags na bdag gi bzin la mi sdug pa la sogs pa mñon pa bzin no /*

⁹² Bhk 3 2.8-10: *yadā vastuparyantatālakṣaṇāṃ tathatām pratividhyati, tadā vastuparyantatāvagamāt prathamāyām bhūmau vastuparyantatāmbanam ucyate* / When he penetrates thusness which marks the limit of things then, on account of understanding the limit of things, this is called the object which is the limit of things on the first stage. D 56a7-b1: *gañ gi tshe dños po'i mtha'i mtshan űid kyi de bzin űid rtog par gyur pa de'i tshe dños po'i mtha khoñ du chud pas na sa dañ po la dños po'i mtha la dmigs pa zes bya'o /*

⁹³ Bhk 3 2.11-15: *tato bhāvanāmārgena pariśiṣṭāsu bhūmiṣv oṣadhirāsāyanopayogād iva krameṇa viśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād, āśrayaparāvṛttau satyām, āvaraṇaprahāṇalakṣaṇā kārya-parisamāptir yadā bhavati, tadā buddhabhumau tad eva jñānaṃ kārya-pariniṣpattiyālambanam ucyate* / After that, by the *bhāvanāmārga* in the remaining stages, gradually there is a reorientation of the basis (of the mind) on account of the arising of moments of greater and greater purity -- just as when one employs an elixer of medicinal herbs. This being so, when there is the accomplishment of what must be done, which is defined by the removal of obscurations, then that very knowledge in the Buddha-stage is called the object for the perfection of purpose. D 56b1-2: *des na sman bcud kyis len za ba bzin du bsgom pa'i lam gyis sa lhag ma rnams su rim gyis śin tu rab tu rnam par dag pa'i skad cig byuñ bas gnas gyur nas / gañ gi tshe sgrīb pa ma lus pa spañs pa'i mtshan űid dgos pa yoñs su rdsogs par gyur pa de'i tshe sañs rgyas kyi sa la ye śes de űid dgos pa yoñs su grub pa la dmigs pa zes bya'o /*

those two there is neither the realization of the limit of things nor the perfection of purpose.^{94 95}

The entire argument of this section may thus be summarized:

1. Insight only if Tranquillity,
2. Gnosis only if Insight,
3. Buddhahood if and only if Gnosis.
4. Therefore Buddhahood only if both (Insight and Tranquillity).
5. If not (Tranquillity and Insight) then not (Gnosis or Buddhahood).

1. If I then T
2. If G then I
3. B if and only if G
4. If B then (I and T)
5. If not (I and T) then not (G or B)

In the course of making this argument we have seen that Kamalaśīla seems to employ at least three closely related, yet distinguishable ways of understanding the distinction between *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. The first is in terms of their respective effects. Tranquillity eliminates afflictions that obscure the mind and prevent its remaining calm and concentrated; insight, on the other hand, rids the mind of cognitive obscurations, which is to say false views of the way that things are. The second way restates the first from a psychological point of view, in terms of purpose or function. Tranquillity aims at a state of calm concentration, a condition that makes insight possible. Insight, by contrast, aims to see reality as it is. More generally, both may be

⁹⁴ Bhk 3 2.15-3.1: *tad evam, anena kiṃ darśitaṃ bhavati? śamathavipaśyanābhyāṃ samastavastuparyantādhigamo bhavati / tena cāvaranāprahāṇalakṣaṇā kāryapariniṣpattir avāpyate / tad eva ca buddhatvam / ato buddhatvādhigamārthinā śamathavipaśyanā sevanīye / yas tu te na sevate tasya naiva vastuparyantatādhigamo nāpi kāryapariniṣpattir iti / D 56b2-3: de lta bu 'dis ci bstan pa yin ze na / zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ goms par byas pas dños po'i mtha rtogs par 'gyur te / des sgrib pa mtha dag spon ba'i mtshan ñid dgos pa yoñs su grub pa 'thob bo / de ñid sañs rgyas ñid yin te / de bas na sañs rgyad ñid thob par 'dod pas zin gnas dañ lhag mthoñ la bsgom par bya'o / This fourfold schema is found in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. See Powers: 205.*

⁹⁵ Here the necessity of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* appears in connection to the worldly path of the ordinary person. Together they give rise to the realization of the limit of things, that is emptiness. This marks the beginning of the transcendent path. Thus on the *bhāvanāmārga*, *bhāvanā* would be better thought of in terms of the perfection of one's purpose, i.e. Awakening, through the *pāramitās*, divisible into wisdom and method.

undertaken with the goal of Buddhahood in mind. When practiced together or in alternation they form a complementary pair (*yuganaddha*), or as David Ruegg has colourfully dubbed them, a "syzygy" (Ruegg 1989: 6 *et passim*). The third way distinguishes between the two in terms of the application or nonapplication of concepts. Insight is a conceptual process, tranquillity is not.⁹⁶

1.3.2 *Samādhi* Conceived as *Śamatha* and/or Nonconceptual *Dhyāna*

We have just seen that *bhāvanā* and *samādhi* are considered mutually implicative by Kamalaśīla. Such a conception is compatible with regarding *bhāvanā* as the broadest term for the processes of meditation; *dhyāna*, on this account, would either best be translated with another term denoting a specific *kind* of meditation e.g. absorption, or else simply left untranslated. Let us call this way of talking conception "A." Thus "meditation" (*bhāvanā*) here would be conceived as divisible into two kinds, one that is concentrated and nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*, *i.e.* *śamatha*, *samādhibhāvanā*) and aimed towards pliancy and specific concentrated states, and one that is concentrated and conceptual in nature and aimed at the understanding of reality (*vipaśyanā*, *prajñābhāvanā*).

There is a problem however. Kamalaśīla is not always consistent in the conception of *samādhi* he employs. Put simply, *samādhi* is sometimes exclusively identified with the nonconceptual side of the equation *i.e.* *śamatha*. There is a thread running throughout the *Bhāvanākramas* which simply equates the pair of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* with that of *samādhi* and *prajñā*. Here is one example:

⁹⁶ A fourth way of distinguishing between the two may also be identified as implicit in the text. Tranquillity cannot be defined in terms of its meditation object; insight can. The object of insight is always some conception of reality, or the way things really are.

By means of insight alone (*lhag mthoñ 'ba' žig, vipaśyanāmātra*), without tranquillity (*ži gnas, śamatha*), the mind of the yogin would become distracted with respect to its objects; like a butter-lamp in the wind, it would not be stable. And on account of that, the light of knowledge would not be very distinct. Thus both should be practiced equally. For this reason it is also said in the noble *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*, “Because their wisdom (*śes rab, prajñā*) is weak and their concentration (*tiñ ñe 'dsin, samādhi*) strong, śrāvakas do not perceive the germinal essence (*rigs, gotra*) of the Tathāgata. The bodhisattvas see it, but not clearly -- because while their wisdom is strong, their concentration is weak. The Tathāgata sees everything because he is equally possessed of tranquillity and insight.” Because of the power of tranquillity the mind will not become unsteady with the flurries of thought -- just like a butter-lamp that does not flicker in the wind. Because of insight, it will not be disturbed by others, since all the stains of mistaken views are removed.⁹⁷

On other occasions *samādhi* appears to be regarded as synonymous with both *śamatha* and *dhyāna*. It is worth quoting such passages at length in order to see how Kamalaśīla slips from one term to another:

As it is said in the noble *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, “O Maitreya! All the worldly and transcendental qualities that constitute the virtues of śrāvakas, bodhisattvas and Tathāgatas should be understood as the result of tranquillity (*ži gnas, śamatha*) and insight (*lhag mthoñ, vipaśyanā*).” That’s the way it’s explained. Since all the concentrations (*tiñ ñe 'dsin, samādhi*) are encompassed by those two, every yogin must adhere to them at all times. As was said in that very same Noble *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, “All the myriad concentrations taught by me - whether they be of the śrāvakas, the bodhisattvas or the Tathāgatas - all should be understood as included in tranquillity and insight.” That’s the way it’s explained. By merely becoming practiced in tranquillity alone, yogins do not eliminate their obscurations; on the contrary, their afflictions are only repressed for a little while. Their latent tendencies would not have been properly rooted out, since one cannot do that unless one has given rise to the light of wisdom (*śes rab, prajñā*). Thus from that very same noble *Samḍhinirmocanasūtra*, “Afflictions can be repressed by absorption (*bsam gtan, dhyāna*), but it’s by wisdom (*śes rab, prajñā*) that the latent tendencies

⁹⁷ Bhk 2 D45a4-a7: *ži gnas dañ bral ba'i lhag mthoñ 'ba' žig gis ni rnal 'byor pa'i sems yul nams la mam par g'yeñs par 'gyur gyis / rluñ gi nañ na 'dug pa'i mar me bžin du brtan par mi 'gyur ro // de bas na ye śes kyi snañ ba śin tu gsal bar mi 'byuñ ste / de lta bas na gñis ka dañ 'dra bar bsten par bya'o // de'i phyir 'phags pa voñs su mya ñan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo las kyañ "ñan thos nams kyis ni de bžin gšegs pa'i rigs mi mthoñ ste / tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi śas che ba'i phyir dañ / śes rab chuñ ba'i phyir ro // byañ chub sems dpa' nams kyis ni mthoñ mod kyi mi gsal te / śes rab kyi śas che ba'i phyir dañ / tiñ ñe 'dsin chuñ ba'i phyir ro // de bžin gšegs pas ni thams cad gzigs te / ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ mtshuñs par ldan pa'i phyir ro" žes bka' stsal te / ži gnas kyi stobs kyis ni mar me rluñ gis ma bskyod pa bžin du mam par rtog pa'i rluñ mams kyis sems g'yo bar mi 'gyur ro // lhag mthoñ gis ni lta ba ñan pa'i dri ma mtha' dag spañs pas gžan dag gis mi phyed de /*

are properly rooted out.” And from the noble *Samādhirājasūtra*, “Although indeed one might cultivate (*sgom pa*) concentration (*tiñ ñe 'dsin*), self-conception would not be disengaged. Again one’s afflictions would become enraged, just as in Udraka’s cultivation of concentration (*tiñ ñe 'dsin bsgom pa, samādhi-bhāvanā*). If one investigates the identitylessness of *dharmas* and having investigated thus, if there is cultivation (*bsgom pa, bhāvanā*), that itself is the cause which has its effect the attainment of *nirvāṇa*. Through any other cause true peace does not transpire.”⁹⁸

This passage begins with the familiar conception of *samādhi qua* tranquillity *and* insight; it proceeds to identify tranquillity with *dhyāna* (and insight with *prajñā*); it then concludes by identifying *dhyāna* with *samādhi*. Such usage is consistent with a normal Buddhist understanding that the conceptual process of cultivating *prajñā* is complementary to, or occurs on the basis of *samādhi*, but is not itself a kind of *samādhi*. Now if *prajñā* and *vipaśyanā* are simply identified it follows that *vipaśyanā* also cannot be a kind of *samādhi*, but must rather be complementary to it. Thus when the *śamatha / dhyāna* side of the equation is exclusively identified with *samādhi* there seems to be little alternative but to regard the *vipaśyanā / prajñā side* as intellectual in nature (*cintāmayī prajñā*). And thus the identification of *vipaśyanā* with *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* becomes unclear. In this case the division of the three kinds of wisdom appears to break down over the question of the distinction between the wisdom of thinking and the wisdom of cultivation. Indeed


98 Bhk 2 D 44a6-b5: ‘*phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par ‘grel pa las ji skad du / “byams pa gañ yañ ñan thos rnam kyī’am / byañ chub sems dpa’ rnam kyī’am de bzin gsegs pa rnam kyī dge ba’i chos ‘jig rten pa dañ ‘jig rten las ‘das pa thams cad kyañ ‘zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi ‘bras bu yin par rig par bya’o” ‘zes gsuñs pa lta bu’o // de gñis kyis tiñ ñe ‘dsin thams cad bsdus pa’i phyir rnal ‘byor pa thams cad kyis dus thams cad du ñes par ‘zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ bsten par bya ste / ‘phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par ‘grel pa de ñid las bcom ldan ‘das kyis ji skad du / “ñas ñan thos rnam dañ / byañ chub sems ‘dpa rnam / de bzin gsegs pa rnam kyī tiñ ñe ‘dsin rnam pa du ma bstan pa gañ dag yin pa de dag thams cad ‘zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gis bsdus par rig par bya’o” ‘zes gsuñs pa lta bu’o // ‘zi gnas tsam ‘ba’ ‘zig goms par byas pas ni rnal ‘byor pa rnam kyī sgrīb pa mi spoñ gi / re ‘zig ñon moñs pa rnam par gnōn pa tsam du zad de / ‘ses rab kyī snañ ba ‘byuñ ba med par bag la ñal legs par choms mi srid pa’i phyir bag la ñal legs par choms par mi ‘gyur ro // de bas na ‘phags pa dgoñ pa ñes par ‘grel pa de ñid las “bsam gtan gyis ni ñon moñs pa rnam rnam par gnōn to // ‘ses rab kyis ni bag la ñal legs par ‘joms par byed do” ‘zes bka’ tsal to // ‘phags pa tiñ ñe ‘dsin gvi rgal po las kyañ / “tiñ ñe ‘dsin de sgom par byed mod kyī // de ni bdag tu ‘du ‘ses ‘jig mi byed // de ni ñon moñs phyir rab tu ‘khrugs // lhag spyod ‘di na tiñ ñe ‘dsin bsgom pa bzin // gal te chos la bdag med so sor rtog // so sor de brtags gal te bsgom pa ni // de ñid mya ñan ‘das thob ‘bras bu’i rgyu // rgyu gzan gañ yin des ni mi ‘gyur //’ ‘zes gsuñs so //*

this division is not always very clear in the *Bhāvanākramas*. On this conception either *śamatha* or *dhyāna* would best be translated as meditation; *bhāvanā* would best be translated as cultivation, not meditation. Hence it should be observed that this conception of *bhāvanā* would broadly encompass both meditation as well as other kinds non-meditative cultivation including for example, the cultivation of morality (*śīla*) and the intellectual investigations that of *cintāmayī prajñā*. Let us call this conception "B."

Thus it would appear that Kamalaśīla was the inheritor of at least two different concepts of *samādhi* that rest uneasily together in the *Bhāvanākramas* viz., those corresponding to *bhāvanā* and *dhyāna*. How we choose to deal with this fact has profound implications not merely on our translation but also on our understanding of the Buddhist prescription for Awakening as advocated by Kamalaśīla. At different points the *Bhāvanākramas* appear to endorse both readings. That is, there are occasions in which *samādhi* is equated with both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, and others where it is treated as exhausted by the nonconceptual states of *śamatha* and *dhyāna*.⁹⁹

Both these conceptions exist within the *Bhāvanākramas* and a translator is left with the dilemma of choosing to translate the interrelated meditation terminology in accordance with the one

⁹⁹ If we think of the classical threefold division of the path as *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*, another way of making the same distinction would be to say that *bhāvanā* is either divisible into *śīlabhāvanā*, *samādhibhāvanā*, and *prajñābhāvanā* or else coextensive with only *samādhi* and divisible into *śamathabhāvanā* and *vipaśyanābhāvanā*.



According to Gethin (1998: 83) *bhāvanā* also sometimes occurs as the third and final component of an early schema found in the Nikāyas, that of *dāna*, *śīla* and *bhāvanā*. This conception seems more consistent with number 2.

or the other. What is clear is that whichever term we choose to principally associate with *samādhi*, whether *dhyāna* or *bhāvanā*, that term will be the one that is translated as "meditation." This leads to the question as to why we do not simply translate the term *samādhi* as meditation. At various points such a translation for *samādhi* is indeed appropriate. At other points all that is meant by the word is nonconceptual concentration, not insight. Thus our solution in conception "A" is to understand Kamalaśīla's concept of *bhāvanā* as meditation *qua* process and his concept of *samādhi* as meditation *qua* concentrated state.

Here are the two possibilities:

- A.
1. *bhāvanā* - meditation/cultivation (*bhāvayati* - one meditates on, cultivates)
 2. *samādhi* - meditative concentration
 3. *śamatha* - tranquillity
 - 3a. *dhyāna* - absorption
 4. *vipaśyanā* - insight: analytical meditation: *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* (based on *cintamayī prajñā* and *śrutamayī prajñā*)

Thus here *samādhi* is a necessary and sufficient condition for *bhāvanā*, but only a necessary condition of *dhyāna*. Stated in more formal terms the conception is thus: 1) S if and only if Bh, and 2) if Dh then S.

- B.
1. *bhāvanā* - cultivation (*bhāvayati* - one cultivates)
 2. *dhyāna* / *samādhi* / *śamatha* - meditation
 3. *vipaśyanā* - insight: analytical process of cultivation, non-meditation, primarily conceived as *cintāmayī prajñā* (the distinction of which from *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is necessarily unclear)

According to this way of thinking, *samādhi* is a necessary and sufficient condition for *dhyāna*, but only a sufficient condition of *bhāvanā*. Here the conception is 1) S if and only if Dh, and 2) if S then Bh.

1.3.2.1 Two Concepts of *Samādhi* Not Predominant in the *Bhāvanākramas*

There are at least two other manners in which one might conceive the logical relations between the various terms in such a way as to understand *dhyāna* as the primary term for "meditation." One possibility combines aspects of both A and B. In it *dhyāna*, *samādhi* and *bhāvanā* are all seen as coextensive. Here *dhyāna* would be regarded as divisible into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. While this is indeed a logical possibility it would seem to invert the relationship between *śamatha* and *dhyāna*. Are the *dhyānas* a necessary condition of *śamatha*, or is *śamatha* the condition for the *dhyānas*?

- C.
1. *bhāvanā* - meditation/cultivation (*bhāvayati* - one meditates on, cultivates)
 2. *samādhi* - meditative concentration
 3. *dhyāna* - meditative absorption
 4. *śamatha* - tranquillity (nonconceptual *dhyāna*)
 5. *vipaśyanā* - insight (conceptual *dhyāna*): analytic meditation
bhāvanāmayī prajñā (based on *cintamayī prajñā* and *śrutamayī prajñā*)

Here Bh if and only if S if and only if Dh.

In conception C the *dhyānas* are regarded as divisible into forms of *śamatha* (and *vipaśyanā*), rather than being founded upon them. This conception blurs important distinctions and does not accurately reflect the manner in which the terms are actually employed by Kamalaśīla. Most egregious is its conception of *vipaśyanā* as a subdivision of *dhyāna* as opposed to a separate sphere that may coexist along with it, or arise on its basis. In conception C both *samādhi* and *bhāvanā* are regarded as mutually implicative with *dhyāna*, in spite of the fact that Kamalaśīla seems to regard *dhyāna* as a nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) state. As we have seen, for Kamalaśīla *samādhi* and *bhāvanā* are both thought of as including conceptual states and processes. This is precisely the point of Kamalaśīla's attack on Mo-ho-yen. For these reasons we choose not to

translate in conformity to conception C.¹⁰⁰

A fourth possibility is based on the following considerations. We have seen that *vipaśyanā* is described as both a kind of *samādhi* and as a conceptual process (*savikalpa*) that includes reasoning. Because insight is described as a kind of *samādhi*, by translating *dhyāna* as meditation we would imply that insight is not a *meditative samādhi* per se. Let us call this conception D. In this way of thinking, we can continue to call *dhyāna* "meditation" and think of meditation as one among many kinds of *bhāvanā* or "cultivation," all of which involve concentration (*samādhi*) but not meditative concentration (*dhyāna*). Thus *vipaśyanā* would no longer to be thought of as a form of meditation as such, but rather a kind of concentrated conceptual cultivation that is complementary to *dhyāna* i.e. *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. While coherent in and of itself this scenario would almost certainly constitute an unwarranted widening of Kamalaśīla's conception of *samādhi*. We list it here only as a logical possibility.

- D. 1. *bhāvanā* - cultivation (*bhāvayati* - one cultivates)
 2. *samādhi* - concentration
 3. *dhyāna* - meditation
 4. *śamatha* - tranquillity
 5. *vipaśyanā* - insight: analytical meditation: *cintamayī prajñā*.

1.3.3. In Favor of Conception A

Thus we are left with conceptions A and B. Both conceptions appear internally consistent. Furthermore both are compatible with *prajñā's* being regarded as divisible into the three kinds of processes. In conception A *vipaśyanā* is identified with *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. In conception B

¹⁰⁰ In some respects conception C is not so different from conception A. One intriguing possibility is that Kamalaśīla may have regarded something like it to obtain only on the transcendent path of the bodhisattva. See note 79 above.

vipaśyanā seems most clearly identifiable with the processes of *cintāmayī prajñā*. As mentioned above, there is a strong case to be made for just such an identification within the tradition of Dignāga. In this usage *vipaśyanā* is most easily identifiable with *cintāmayī prajñā* because it is considered complementary to, but not a kind of, *samādhi*. This conception has the advantage of making an apparently clear distinction between *samādhi* (which is non-intellectual and meditation) and *prajñā* (which is intellectual and not meditation). What then is wrong with it?

It has already been noted that such a conception of *vipaśyanā* as exclusively identified with *cintāmayī prajñā* is inconsistent with the division of *samādhi* into *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, a division that is obviously of central importance to Kamalaśīla in both the Bhk 2 and Bhk 3. However, it would simply beg the question if we took this consideration as decisive. The same argument could simply be reversed.

The main disadvantages of conception B lie in its blurring of important conceptual distinctions. Obviously the simple equation of *samādhi* with *śamatha* and/or *dhyāna* cannot be upheld if these terms are taken in their technical senses, discussed above. While all absorptions (Dh) are instances of concentration (S), not all concentrations (S) are absorptions (Dh). Similarly while all absorptions presuppose the attainment of tranquillity (understood as access concentration), the reverse is not true. Such subtleties are lost in this equation. Furthermore, with regard to the schema of the three kinds of wisdom this equation results in a blurring of the distinction between *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* -- in effect leaving the latter term as a place filler, a cipher with no possibility of signifying anything different in kind from the former. It would also appear to contradict the specific association of insight with *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, a term that is employed with reference to *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, but not the other two kinds of wisdom. We shall

explore this latter point in greater detail in Chapter 2. In any case it is clear that conception B is highly problematic, even though it does regularly appear in our texts -- especially, it should be noted, in a number of *sūtra* passages that Kamalaśīla quotes.

Conception A is more consistent with the schema of the three wisdoms: by identifying *vipāśyanā* and *bhāvanāmayīprajñā*, it allows for harmony between the model of the three kinds of wisdom and the model of *samādhi* as divisible into *śamatha* and *vipāśyanā*. In conception A, tranquillity (*śamatha*) itself is conceived as being further divisible into a variety of states among which are the nonconceptual absorptions. The term *samādhi* is understood as mutually implicative with *bhāvanā*, and is thus consistent with the latter term's translation as "meditation."

One of the virtues of conception A is that it allows for a clear distinction to be made between *cintāmayī prajñā* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. Kamalaśīla wishes to maintain that *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* is required for Awakening and that it is more profound than *cintāmayī prajñā*. Thus, in this way of thinking, *vipāśyanā* is conceived as *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, not *cintāmayī prajñā*. The practice of insight is not equated with ordinary thinking processes. The process of *vipāśyanā* is experiential, indeed meditative in nature, in a way that mere thinking is not.

The drawback of this conception is that it still leaves one wondering what exactly this *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* can possibly consist in if not ordinary rational thought. Somewhat mysteriously, *vipāśyanā qua bhāvanāmayī prajñā* appears to involve both an enstatic state free of intellectual activity and a discerning of reality that is said to be conceptual. While this may be difficult to comprehend, it appears to have the advantage of being what Kamalaśīla says: insight is discernment of reality while in the sphere of concentration. The next section of our study will attempt to make sense of this idea. We will examine it below, in our analysis of the notion of

bhūtapratyavekṣā. This analysis may allow us to further refine our understanding of conception A.

1.4 Conclusions of Chapter 1

We have seen that two conceptions of *samādhi* are present in the *Bhāvanākramas*. Because of this, two corresponding conceptions of *vipaśyanā* are also present in the text. Kamalaśīla's employment of both these conceptions is understandable when one considers that he is quoting from a wide variety of Mahāyāna *sūtras*, not all of which are bound to be mutually consistent. From among such sources he inherited a conception of *dhyāna* and *prajñā* as perfections. He also inherited the models of the three kinds of wisdom and two branches of *bhāvanā*. It is possible that these different schemas do not map onto each other entirely consistently in part because they may have developed independently.

An argument has been made that one conception of *samādhi*, that of conception A, allows for greater logical consistency between two key conceptual schemas employed in the text: that of the three kinds of wisdom and that of the two branches of *bhāvanā*. In addition, this conception seems to be more centrally employed than conception B, particularly in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3, and especially when Kamalaśīla is speaking in his own voice. It seems clear that Kamalaśīla wishes to maintain the primacy of conception A, even while attempting to integrate *sūtra* passages that advocate conception B; such passages could appear to support the views of his Ch'annist rivals. For all these reasons we shall here conclude that conception A more accurately reflects the predominant conception and intended meaning of the author (assuming a desire and capacity on his

part for maximum consistency).¹⁰¹ We shall therefore translate in accordance with this conception, fully aware that an alternate translation based on conception B is also possible, even though less consistent.

Now this, of course, leads to the question: If conception A is so much clearer than conception B why then did Kamalaśīla not consistently employ it? One reason, that of a diverse tradition, has just been mentioned. Further, one might speculate that the general conception of *dhyāna* as a nonconceptual state is a broader pan-Indian conception, not specifically referring to the four *dhyānas* of the Buddhist. Puzzles such as those being faced here can be resolved to some extent if we assume that terminology was sometimes not being employed technically, but rather generally and imprecisely based upon common parlance. In this way *dhyāna*, *samādhi*, and *śamatha* might be thought of as roughly synonymous with no exact nuance implied by their respective usages.

In any case, here, for the sake of greater consistency we choose to translate in accordance with the more inclusive conception of meditation, that of *bhāvanā*. In spite of the fact that *dhyāna* is so commonly translated as "meditation," for the *Bhāvanākramas* such a translation would generate serious inconsistencies. If *bhāvanā* is indeed the more general term for meditation in these texts, then to translate *dhyāna* as "meditation" would be akin to translating "pomme" by "fruit."

This way of translating implies that for Kamalaśīla the way of insight was not principally equated with either nonconceptual absorption nor with a purely intellectual analysis. His main conception of insight includes conceptual processes, but not those of ordinary reasoning

¹⁰¹ This is a huge hermeneutical assumption, one so commonly made by translators that it is scarcely, if ever, mentioned.

unaccompanied by meditative concentration (*cintāmayī prajñā*). This conception of insight *qua bhāvanāmayī prajñā* does include a conceptual dimension, but for reasons we will discuss in the next chapter this does not necessarily imply that it is to be identified with *cintāmayī prajñā*.

Nevertheless, because Kamalaśīla's conception of insight as "discernment of reality" (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) is counterintuitive in referring to a process of *experiential* wisdom, the temptation exists to understand the description of its object as *savikalpa* as simply indicating that it is to be identified with the ordinary thinking processes of *cintāmayī prajñā*. Indeed given the two alternatives, most modern interpreters would prefer a hazy three wisdom schema to a self-contradictory conception of insight. Indeed, as mentioned at the outset, the very idea of "analytic meditation" (= analytic one pointedness of mind) may strike some as oxymoronic. Such a sensibility may not, however, have been shared by ancient Indians; the idea of "discerning reality" may not have been seen as precluding enstatic states of mind.

As a final note, it must be pointed out that the inclusion of conceptual processes as part of what is meant by the word "meditation" is very much in conformity with the English language definitions mentioned at the outset of this thesis. Three points relating to these definitions need to be borne in mind. First of all, there were both transitive and intransitive employments of the verb "to meditate" (historically the former appeared to be more common). Second, we saw that there were many common usages in which meditation was considered to involve thinking (1a above). Third, there were also attested usages in which meditation was said to involve special attention, observation or application of the mind, but not necessarily thought *per se* (1b).

The first two points would seem to nicely accommodate a conception of meditation *qua cintāmayī prajñā* and thus conception B. One might note that the modern day prevalence of

intransitive employments is perhaps one cause for uncertainty regarding the nature of meditation.

"I'm meditating" is not as immediately clear as "I'm meditating peace."

As for conception A, the third point would seem to fit quite well with it. While we have yet to determine the exact manner in which concepts are involved in its processes of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, or indeed what kind of "attention, observation or application of the mind" these processes might involve, there can be little doubt that in the *Bhāvanākramas* the notion of *bhāvanā* has a much more inclusive scope than *dhyāna* -- a term that seems to be mainly associated with nonconceptual states. Thus we may say that Kamalaśīla was an advocate of a wider conception of meditation, that of *bhāvanā* as opposed to *dhyāna*. His charge against the Ch'annists consisted precisely in the accusation that they failed to understand the breadth and nature of the conceptual activity necessary for the achievement of Awakening. As advocates of *dhyāna* alone, he viewed them as interpreting liberation as an accomplishment achieved all at once, simply by ceasing all activity, a practice he regards as impossible.¹⁰² The idea of a conceptual process of gradually cultivating insight did not figure in their conception of Awakening, except in so far as such processes were considered hindrances to the achievement of the nonconceptual state of *dhyāna*. According to Kamalaśīla's account only the conceptual processes of insight (*vipaśyanā, prajñābhāvanā*) can give rise to the nonconceptual state of wisdom or gnosis (*nirvikalpañāna, prajñā*). This presupposes the attainment of a degree of *śamatha*, although not necessarily the *dhyānas per se*. If, then, *bhāvanā* is to be considered the broadest term for meditation, and if *vipaśyanā* is a kind of *bhāvanā*, we must now

¹⁰² This doctrine is ascribed by Kamalaśīla to the *ājīvakas*. Bhk 3 20.14-16: *yac cāpy ucyate / na kimcit kuśalādikarma kartavyam iti / tatraivaivaṃvadatā karmakṣayān muktir ity ājīvakavā(dābhyupagamo) bhavet /* Now as for what is also said -- that not a single action, skillful or otherwise, should be performed -- those who speak thus would here be accepting the doctrine of the *Ājīvakas*, that is, liberation on the basis of *karma's* destruction. D 64a5: *yañ dge ba la sogs pa'i las ci yañ mi bya'o zes zer ba de ni de skad smra bas las zad nas grol bar 'gyur ro zes mu stegs can kun tu 'tsho ba'i smra ba khas blañs par 'gyur ro /*

examine what precisely its undertaking is thought to involve.

CHAPTER 2

INSIGHT

2.1 On the Compound "*bhūtapratyavekṣā*"

In examining Kamalaśīla's account of the process of insight, it is perhaps no surprise to find two broad kinds of activities described by him in contexts where *vipaśyanā* is discussed, namely, those involving concentrated observation of reality and those involving concentrated analysis of reality. It will be recalled that *vipaśyanā* is said to be conceptual in nature (*savikalpa*) and that it is identified by Kamalaśīla with *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, which I have translated as "the discernment of reality." I have further identified this with the experiential processes of *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. In this connection it should be noticed that the Tibetan translators of the *Bhāvanākramas* consistently employed *rtog pa* as opposed to *rtogs pa* for the root $\sqrt{ikṣ}$ when translating *pratyavekṣā*. This is noteworthy in that the former is usually confined to contexts wherein a *conceptual* realization is indicated; the latter, by contrast, normally indicates a nonconceptual realization.¹⁰³ Hence we begin our considerations in this chapter by noting that the Tibetan translators also understood the processes of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* to involve concepts (*vikalpa*, *mam par rtog pa*), although not necessarily those of ordinary reasoning.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Ref: Leslie Kawamura. Lecture notes 1996.

¹⁰⁴ The Sanskrit "*bhūtapratyavekṣā*" is always translated with *rtog pa* as opposed to *rtogs pa*, as in *yañ dag so sor rtog pa* (or *yañ dag rtog pa* at Bhk 2 D 47a2, repeated at Bhk 3 D 56b3-4) -- but not *yañ dag so sor rtogs pa*. On the other hand when the concept of *vipaśyanā* is being explained the N and P editions of Bhk 2 give *rtogs pa* where D and C give *rtog pa* (D 47b1; see Goshima 31). And vice versa. A lack of certainty on the translators' parts as to the point at which the cognition associated with insight is thought to become nonconceptual is reflected on other occasions in the same way (D 49b5, Goshima 45; D49b7, Goshima 47; and D55a1, Goshima 77). In Bhk 2 N and P are always in agreement on this point, as are C and D. However, such confusion never occurs in the context of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. That is, *yañ dag par so sor rtogs pa* is unattested in these texts.

It should also be pointed out at the outset that this important technical term, *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, appears only in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3. In Bhk 1, however, the verb *pratyaivekṣāte* does sometimes appear on its own, and in reference to the processes of both *śrūtamayī* and *cintāmayī prajñā*.¹⁰⁵ To keep this distinction clear I use the verb "investigate" for *pratyaivekṣāte* when referring to analytical processes uncoupled with meditative concentration. I use the term "discernment" only in cases where what is being discussed is *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, which is to say, *vipaśyanā*. This occurs especially in the compound *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, but not exclusively so. For example, in the portion of the text entitled "Pratipatti" by Tucci (222.4-223.5; D38b1-39a3), it is clear that the context is one of practical realization or *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. Here the numerous instances of cognate forms of *prati + ava + √ikṣ-* are translated in such a way as to suggest the fact that the processes described are not those of ordinary reasoning (*cintāmayī prajñā*). They indicate, rather, observationally based insight into the nature of reality or "what is" (*i.e. bhūta, dharma*), namely, in this case, the five aggregates. Hence "discernment" is appropriate.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Bhk 1 198.17-199.2: *uktam ca bhagavatā samādhirāje / nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyaivekṣate / tān pratyaivekṣya yadi bhāvayeta / sa hetur nirvānaphalasya prāptaye / yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye / iti / tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyām pratyaivekṣya bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam bhāvanīyam / vastūnām svarūpam ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam /* And the Bhagavān stated in the *Samādhirāja*: "If one investigates *dharma*s without identity, and if, having investigated them, one would meditate, that is the cause of obtaining the fruit of *nirvāna*. Any other cause does not lead to peace." Therefore when the wisdom consisting in thinking has investigated by way of both logic and scriptures, the very reality which is the natural condition of things should be cultivated. And the natural condition of things is ascertained, on the basis of scripture and reasoning, to be in the ultimate sense only non-origination.

Bhk 1 200.9-13: *evam tāvad āgamataḥ pratyaivekṣānyam / yuktyā hi sthīrīkṛtasyāgamārthasya anyair apohitum āśakyatvāt / ato yuktyāpi pratyaivekṣānyam /* Thus first one should investigate on the basis of scripture. Since the meaning of a text that has been made firm by reasoning cannot be assailed by others, one should investigate on the basis of reasoning also.

¹⁰⁶ Bhk1 222.11-223.4: *tasya skandheṣu māyāvat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca skandhāparityāgamāṃ sprhatīti / dhātuṣv āśīviṣavat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca dhātuparityāgamāṃ sprhatīti / āyataneṣu śūnyagrāmahavat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na cāyatana-parityāgamāṃ sprhatīti / rūpasya phenapiṇḍavat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca tathāgatarūpakāyaviṭhapanā[m] jahāti / vedanāyā budbudavat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca tathāgata-dhyānasamādhisamāpattisukhanispādāna prayogaṃ nārabhate / samjñāyām maricivat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca tathāgatajñānanispādanāsamjñāyām apratipattih / saṃskārānām kadalivat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca buddhadharmasamskārānām apratipattih / vijñānasya māyāvat pratyaivekṣānā pratipattir na ca*

It must be noted that in rendering *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as "the discernment of reality" significant choices in translation have been made. Other translations are certainly possible and some of these would significantly shift our understanding towards a more strictly intellectual understanding of *vipaśyanā* associated with conception B described above (Section 1.3.2). While we have thus far understood this compound as a *śāsthī tatpuruṣa*, it is important to note that others have read it as a *karmadhāraya*. Olson and Ichishima (1979: 27, 29) take it to mean "true examination." Etienne Lamotte takes the sense to be that of "l'analyse correcte" (1952: 348-349). David S. Ruegg's usual understanding is also that of "correct analysis" (1989: 110) or, sometimes, "exact analysis" or "exact analytic investigation" (96, 64). We shall see, however, that Ruegg is not entirely consistent on this point.

The Tibetan rendering of this compound is nearly always *yañ dag par so sor rtog pa*, although there is one occasion where it is rendered *yañ dag pa la rtog pa* (Bhk 3 D56b3-4).¹⁰⁷ The use of a *la don*, where we might expect to find a possessive marker should alert us to the possibility of other understandings of the case relationship obtaining between the two members of

jñānapūrvamgamakāyavānmanaska[rma]niṣpādanā 'pratipattir' iti vistaraḥ /... For him, the practical realization is discerning the aggregates to be like an illusion and yet it does not seek the abandonment of those aggregates. The practical realization is discerning the elements to be like a snake and yet it does not seek the abandonment of the elements. The practical realization is discerning the sense-spheres to be like an empty village and yet it does not seek the abandonment of the sense-spheres. The practical realization is discerning material form as like a ball of foam and yet it does not relinquish the creation of a Tathāgata's form-body. The practical realization is discerning feeling as like bubbles and yet it does not fail to begin the application of the production of the bliss of attainment in the absorptions and concentrations of the Tathāgatas. The practical realization is discerning perception to be like a mirage and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the perception that produces the knowledge of the Tathāgatas. The practical realization is discerning mental formations to be like a banana tree and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the mental formations that are the qualities of the Buddha. The practical realization is discerning consciousness to be like an illusion and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the production of the actions of body, speech and mind that are the forerunners of knowledge.

¹⁰⁷ Interestingly, when the same passage from the *Ratnamegha* is quoted in Bhk 2 *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is rendered with the standard *yañ dag par so sor rtog pa*. More interesting yet, the version of the *Ratnamegha* found in the P edition has *yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du chos la so sor rtog pa'o* / (Goshima 29-30). This is consistent with Kamalaśīla's understanding of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as *dharmapracicaya*. See section 2.2.1 below.

the compound.¹⁰⁸ It may, in fact, be best understood as *dvītiyā* or *saptamī tatpuruṣa*.¹⁰⁹

It is true that *bhūta* often has the force of an adjective meaning "exact," "correct," "true," "actual," or "real." Yet it is also the case that it may be translated substantively as "that which is true," "what is," "the real," "reality," or "element." Grammatically *bhūta* is the past passive participle of the verbal root $\sqrt{bhū}$. Taken substantively, it thus suggests something that exists or that has become. Thus it is also possible to understand the word as referring to elements of *conventional* reality (*dharmas*) such as the five aggregates. We have also seen that in the context of Madhyamaka hermeneutics this word is associated with the meaning that is ultimately real, i.e. the "object" indicated in *nītārtha* teachings¹¹⁰ (i.e. variously, *anutpāda*, *śūnyatā*, *paramatattva*, *tathatā pudgaladharmanairātmya* etc.). On one occasion Ruegg renders *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as "exact analytical investigation [of the real]" (1989: 182), noting that there is a point in the third Bhk at which Kamalaśīla (Bhk 3 5.18) explicitly identifies *bhūta* with the Mahāyāna doctrine of the identitylessness of persons and *dharmas* (*bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyaṃ*). Whatever else it might be thought to indicate, this latter consideration clearly suggests that *bhūta* is not to be considered as an adjective. Yet Ruegg maintains his adjectival translation, while adding a parenthetical qualification in order to reflect Kamalaśīla's statement. We will return to this important

¹⁰⁸ On at least one occasion Ruegg (1989: 64) gives *yañ dag pa'i so sor rtog pa* rather than *yañ dag par so sor rtog pa* for *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, but as far as I can tell this construction does not appear to be attested anywhere in the Tibetan translations of the *Bhāvanākramas*.

¹⁰⁹ There is also the possibility that the compound could be understood as a *cathurthī tatpuruṣa*, "discernment for the sake of reality" or, perhaps, "discernment for the sake of the worthy" but this seems less likely here. However, see note 34 above.

¹¹⁰ Above, pp. 26-28.

passage below.¹¹¹

As for the term *pratyavekṣā* itself, it has an analogous spectrum of possible senses. The conceptual yardstick ranges from perceptual observation at one end to a more intellectual analysis at the other: "perception," "observation," "examination," "discernment," "analysis," and "investigation."¹¹² The word "discernment" seems to occupy somewhat of a middle position, carrying connotations of both ends.¹¹³ The Sanskrit word is derived from the verbal root *√ikṣ* (to see, behold, perceive, view, observe, look or gaze at), plus the *kṛtpratyaya* "a," plus *ṭāp* to make it feminine. It is combined with the *upasārgas* "prati-" (toward, back to) and "ava-" (down). In philosophical contexts the latter prefix sometimes seems to suggest a sense of depth or penetration. The total sense is thus one of "seeing into" or "understanding the nature of."¹¹⁴

Thus we see that both components of the compound have a significant semantic range. Their combination in a compound form allows for a wide variety of possible translations. The problem in choosing a translation rests in part on the inherent ambiguity of the terminology. As was the case with Brassard's observations concerning the passive and active senses of Sanskrit

¹¹¹ See p. 93 below.

¹¹² Similar considerations apply to other terms relating to cognition found in the *Bhāvanākramas*. The verbal noun *nirūpaṇa*, for example, has a wide semantic range -- from the object of perception and the act of perceiving on the one hand, to investigating and defining on the other. Apte (913) gives: (1) Form, shape (2) sight, seeing (3) looking for, searching (4) ascertaining, investigation; determination. (5) definition. But note that T. is *rtog pa* not *mthoṅ ba*. Bhk 3 5.1-2: *nirūpaṇataḥ*, D57a6: *rtog pas*.

¹¹³ B. Alan Wallace, in the context of his work on Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*, also translates *so sor rtog pa* (*pratyavekṣānā*) as discernment (304). He does not explain his reasons for this choice, but one suspects similar considerations to my own. Discernment can be understood as both intellectually and observationally analytical. Interestingly, Wallace also chooses to translate *bhūta* (*yaṅ dag pa*) as reality (308).

¹¹⁴ Compare *pratyakṣa* (perception) - *prati + akṣa*. It seems vaguely possible that the word *akṣa* (eye) may even be etymologically related to *√ikṣ*, -- this is not clear to me. No *kṛtpratyaya* has the effect of transforming an initial *ī* to an *a*. Ref: Sanjay Kumar Shastri.

technical terms, we may here also note another common ambiguity -- that between the ontic and the epistemic. We can see that the word *bhūta* holds a spectrum of meanings, shading from the clearly epistemic (e.g. correct, true) to the clearly ontic (e.g. what is, the real, reality). In translating, if we wish to emphasize the unmistakableness of the cognition involved in *pratyavekṣā* we would choose from among the former; if we wish to emphasize the actuality of the object cognized we would choose from among the latter. In this way we can understand the diversity of translations that have been and may be offered for this compound: true examination, correct analysis, exact investigation, analysis of the real, the discernment of reality and so on.

2.2 On That Which is Signified by the Compound "*bhūtapratyavekṣā*"

Thus the translation "correct analysis" is certainly possible on simple lexical grounds. Such an interpretation of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* has the advantage of being clear and relatively easy to interpret. It can be taken as implying that *bhūtapratyavekṣā* was conceived as an essentially intellectual process, one that is capable of being incorrect as well as correct, inexact as well as exact. In effect on this reading *bhūtapratyavekṣā* would be amenable to being identified with ordinary thinking -- distinguished, perhaps, only by the importance or profundity of what one is reasoning *about*. This interpretation would be consistent with conception B given above. Thus this conception is one of *vipāśyanā* understood *qua* "intellectual investigation." We have seen, however, such an understanding glosses over the subtleties of distinctions made within the text and does not mesh well with Kamalaśīla's conception of *vipāśyanā qua bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. It seems basic that the term *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is not intended to be understood as existing apart from *samādhi*.

A second possible interpretation compatible with the translation "correct analysis" and

consistent with conception B attempts to address this concern by conceiving the intellectual processes involved as *alternating* with nonconceptual *śamatha* or *dhyāna*. On this interpretation, *bhūtapratyavekṣā* would amount to a taking of turns, a switching back and forth between ordinary thinking (*cintāmayī prajñā*) and one-pointed nonconceptual concentration (*nirvikalpa samādhi, śamatha, dhyāna*). This concentration would be conceived of as reinforcing the conclusions reached through thinking -- perhaps in virtue of one's ability to remain focussed on the subtle concepts involved in the reasoning process. Only when undertaken in alternation in this way would these two aspects together be considered *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. Let us refer to this conception of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as one of "serial alternation" between ordinary thinking and nonconceptual *samādhi*.¹¹⁵

A final interpretation consistent with the translation of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as "correct analysis" is that it refers to a special kind of intellectual process undertaken while actually abiding in a state of *śamatha* or *dhyāna*. Here *bhūtapratyavekṣā* would be considered a special form of meditative analysis. This interpretation also fits well with the translation "discernment of reality," a point we will return to momentarily. Let us refer to this conception of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as one of "concentrative analysis." We shall see that this interpretation is particularly compatible with conception A.

Of all these possible understandings what then does Kamalaśīla really intend by this term? In point of fact our author actually tells us a fair bit about his own understanding of what is denoted by this term and its synonyms, and what he does not say explicitly is often discernible

¹¹⁵ A version of the latter possibility appears to have been accepted by the dGe Lugs school of Tibetan Buddhism. See Ruegg on Tsong kha pa's conception of meditation (1989: 111-112); I take the description "serial alternation" from this source, as well as from Paul Williams' account of Madhyamaka meditation (1989: 72-74).

between the lines of the text. The first and probably most important point to note has already been made -- the process of cultivating wisdom is described as being undertaken while actually abiding in a state of *śamatha* or *dhyāna*.

[H]aving renounced all obscurations, one who wants pure knowledge to arise must cultivate wisdom while abiding in tranquillity.¹¹⁶

This suggests that the interpretation of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as a serial alternation between nonconceptual *samādhi* and ordinary intellectual investigation is not what is meant. On the other hand it is clear that Kamalaśīla's description of *prajñābhāvanā* according to the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* does in fact imply the idea of a different kind of serial alternation, as well as the notion of concentrative analysis. Both appear to form part of what is meant by insight. What we find described in this extended passage of Bhk 1 is a series of unusual judgements about (or, better, "directed at") reality or "what is," with each such judgement interspliced by a passage describing a non-inferential experience of reality or "what is," upon which the next line of analysis is based. Thus both concentrative analysis and serial alternation are implied. But note that the alternation is not between a nonconceptual *samādhi* (*śamatha*, *dhyāna*) and an ordinary inferential process; it is, rather, between a conceptual *samādhi* that in some sense "views" the meditation object and a special kind of meditative process that analyzes that object *experientially*. The alternation is thus between meditative observation (*savikalpa*, but not *savicāra*)¹¹⁷ and concentrative analysis (*savikalpa* and *savicāra*). Both components taken together, appear to be what is meant by *prajñābhāvanā*. After

¹¹⁶ Bhk 2 D 44b7-45a1: *de lta bas na sgrīb pa 'mtha dag spañs nas yoñs su dag pa'i ye śes 'byuñ bar 'dod pas zi gnas la gnas śin śes rab bsgom par bya'o* // While basic, such a notion has been taken by some scholars as suggesting a conceptual tension in Buddhist meditation theory. According to Paul Griffiths it led to various attempts to regard insight as occurring in "liminal states" between the *dhyānas*. See Griffiths (1983): 245-251, 285-287 for a treatment of Vasubandhu on this issue.

¹¹⁷ Nor, it might be added, *savitraka*.

having stabilized the mind on the five aggregates as a meditation object (Bhk 1 206.7-15), the analytical process is described as commencing with an analysis of *dharmas* with material form:

First of all the yogin should analyze (*vicārayet*, T. *dpyad par bya*) those *dharmas* having a material form, imagined by others as being external objects: "Are these other than consciousness, or is it this consciousness itself appearing in that manner -- just as in dreamstate?" In that regard [*i.e.* if the position held is that they have a nature] outside of consciousness, he should break them down into atoms (*paramānuśo vicārayet*, T. *rdul phra rab tu bśig ste*). And discerning (*pratyavekṣamāṇaḥ*, T. *so sor brtags pa*) those atoms by way of parts, the yogin does not see (*na samanupaśyati*, T. *mi mthoñ*) those things. Not seeing (them), he thinks: "All this is indeed mind-only, an external object does not exist." Therefore thus: "Having ascended to mind-only, one would not imagine an external object." The meaning is that he would abandon conceptualizations of *dharmas* that have a material form. He should draw a conclusion (*vicārayet*, T. *mam par dpyad*) from the nonapprehension (*anupalabdhi*, T. *mi dmigs pa*) of those things that are in principle apprehensible (*teṣam upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānām*, T. *dmigs su ruñ ba'i mtshan ñid du gyur pa de dag*). Thus having broken down (*vibhāvya*, T. *mam par bśig nas*) *dharmas* with a material form, he should break down (*vibhāvya*, T. *mam par bśig bya*) those without material form.¹¹⁸

It is apparent that here the conceptual analysis of experienced realities is considered part of the process of insight. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to consider the inferences comprising this analysis as instances of *cintāmayī prajñā*. Because they are undertaken while in the sphere of *samādhi* they are properly considered as meditative in nature; they form part of what is meant by

¹¹⁸ Bhk 1 210.16-211.4: *prathamam yogi ye rūpiṇo dharmā bāhyārthatayā paraiḥ parikalpitās teṣu tāvad vicārayet / kim ete vijñānād anye, āhosvid vijñānam evaitat tathā pratibhāsate, yathā svapnāvasthāyām iti / tatra vijñānād bahiḥ paramānuśo vicārayet / paramāṇūś ca bhāgaśaḥ pratyavekṣamāṇo yogi tān arthān na samanupaśyati / tasyāsamanupaśyata evaṃ bhavati / cittamātram evaitat sarvaṃ na punar bāhyo 'rtho vidyate / tad evam / "cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet" rūpidharmavikalpān tyajed ityārthaḥ / teṣām upa[labdhi]lakṣaṇaprāptānām vicārayed anupalabdheḥ / evaṃ rūpiṇo dharmān vibhāvya rūpiṇo vibhāvayet / D 33a4-34b1: thog mar rnal 'byor pas chos gzugs can gañ dag gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don du gzan dag gis brtags pa de dag la ci 'di dag rnam par śes pa las gzan zig yin nam / 'on te rnam par śes pa de ñid de ltar snañ ste / rmi lam gnas skabs ji lta ba bzin nam źes dpyad par bya'o / de la rnam par śes pa las phyi rol pa rdul phra rab tu bśig ste / rdul phra rab mams kyañ cha śas kyis so sor brtags na rnal 'byor pas don de dag mi mthoñ ño / des de dag ma mthoñ bas 'di sñam du 'di dag thams cad ni sems tsam ste phyi rol gyi don med do sñam du sems so / 'di ltar / sems tsam la ni rab brten nas / phyi rol don la mi brtag go / źes de skad 'byuñ ba ni chos gzugs can la rnam par rtog pa spon ba'o źes bya ba'i tha tshig go / dmigs su ruñ ba'i mtshan ñid du gyur pa de dag rnam par dpyad na mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro / de ltar chos gzugs can mams rnam par bśig nas gzugs can ma yin pa mam par bśig par bya ste /*

bhāvanāmayī prajñā. They appear to be distinct from cases of ordinary inference insofar as they seem to be conceived as directly "based upon" objects being concurrently experienced in meditation. This appears to be so in the sense that the meditator is thought of as being able to remain one-pointedly focussed upon these objects, holding them in view while "analyzing" them. In brief: one looks, then analyzes while continuing to look. After analysis when one looks again for the purported "external" realities, one sees that there is nothing there. Such is one's "conclusion." Articulating, one then thinks that such so-called material *dharmas* are in fact mental in nature. A similar analysis is then performed on mental *dharmas*. The conclusion reached is that the duality of subject and object is illusory. Mind is recognized as nondual. This "conclusion" is also an "experience" and appears to form the basis for the next "inference," (or better, perhaps, "movement") -- the recognition that goes beyond the dualistic knowledge of a non-dual mind to dwell in a knowledge that is without any appearance of duality. In the end even this knowledge is to be transcended, recognized as itself unreal since it is no different than the subject and object which are known to be unreal on account of their unoriginated nature.¹¹⁹ Dwelling in such a state, one has come to experience the unreality of all *dharmas*, up to and including even the knowledge of

¹¹⁹ This is a synopsis of Bhk 1 211.4-14: *tatra yac cittamātram tad apy asati grāhye grāhako na yukto grahakasya grāhyāpekṣatvāt / tataś cittam grāhyagrāhakaviviktam advayam eva cittam iti vicārayet advayalakṣaṇe - "tathatālabhane sthitvā [tad api] cittamātram atikramet" / grāhakam ākāram atikramet / dvayanirābhāsa evādvayajñāne tisthet ity arthaḥ / evam cittamātram atikramya tad api dvayanirābhāsam yaj jñānam tad atikramet / svataḥ parato bhāvānām janmānupapatteḥ grāhyagrāhakayoś cālīkatve tadvyatirekāt tasyāpi satyatvam ayuktam iti vicārayet /* There, that too is the mind alone. When there is the nonexistence of an object, a subject is not logical -- because of the dependence of subject upon object. Therefore one should analyze (*vicārayet*, T. *mam par dpyad pa*) thus: "The mind separated from the object and the subject is precisely the non-dual mind." (And) with respect to the characteristic of nonduality -- "Dwelling on the meditation object of suchness, one should also transcend the mind-only." The meaning is that one should go beyond the subjective aspect; one should dwell in the knowledge of non-duality which is without the appearance of duality. Thus having transcended the mind-only, so too one should transcend even the knowledge that is without the appearance of duality. And when the subject and object are false on account of the unacceptability (*anupapatti*, T. *mi 'thad pa*) of the birth of phenomena from themselves (or) from another, one should analyze thus: "That being real (*i.e.* the knowledge that is without the appearance of non-duality) is illogical, since it is not different from those."

non-duality.

The meaning is that there also one should abandon attachment to the reality of this knowledge of nonduality; one should remain in the knowledge that definitely has no appearance of the knowledge of non-duality. When this is so, one is established in the practical realization of the lack of inherent nature of all *dharms*. Because the one who is established there enters ultimate suchness, there is the entry into nonconceptual *samādhi*. And thus when the yogin is established in the knowledge that has no appearance of nondual knowledge, then, due to his being established in the ultimate suchness he sees the Mahāyāna.¹²⁰

Thus we can see that this process of concentrative analysis is so closely tied to that of meditative observation that at points the two seem indistinguishable. In describing it we face the limitations of language. In the first phase of the process the objects of analysis (*dharms* with material form) appear to be actually broken down or dissolved (*vibhāvya*, T. *mam par bśig bya*) before the mind's eye.¹²¹ In general, each object of the increasingly subtle analysis might be thought of as constituting the logical subject term of a subsequent analytic judgment directed "at" or "toward" it. The experiential inferences based upon these meditation objects can thus be considered instances of a special kind of perceptual or quasi-perceptual judgment. Their "conclusions" are also "seen" as effects in the meditation object.¹²² Here we can see the relevance of our considerations regarding the use of a *la don* in the Tibetan translation "*yañ dag par so sor rtog pa*," mentioned

¹²⁰ Bhk 1 211.14-20: *tatrāpy advayajñāne vastutvābhiniveśaṃ tyajet, advayajñānanirābhāsa eva jñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ / evaṃ sati sarvadharmāṅśvabhāvatāpratipattaḥ sthito bhavati / tatra sthitasya paramatattvapravesāt, nirvikalpasamādhipravesaḥ / tathā cādvayajñānanirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogi tadā paramatattve sthitatvāt, mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati /*

¹²¹ In this connection we may notice that the verb employed for this experiential analysis of *dharms* is rendered in Tibetan as *mam par bśig* "to break down." On these occasions the Sanskrit is either *vibhāvya*, or *vicārayet*. In other, nonexperiential, contexts this latter verb is usually rendered [*mam par*] *dpyad pa* (to investigate, examine). The former verb does not appear in nonexperiential contexts.

¹²² Because the Buddhist tradition regards the mind as a sixth sense organ, and for the sake of simplicity, I will simply refer to these as *perceptual* judgements.

above;¹²³ the discernment involved in this process is thought of as being "direct" in a way that might be masked by the natural adjectival and possessive English language locutions "correct analysis," "analysis of the real," and so on.

This understanding of the of process of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is consistent with the perceptual implications of the verbal root $\sqrt{ikṣ}$, (as well as \sqrt{pas} in *vipaśyanā*). The component upon which the concentrative analysis is based and with which it "alternates" is perceptual in nature. But because the nature of this element as "perceptual," "observational," or "experiential" is not immediately obvious, the temptation exists to think of the whole process as basically one of ordinary rational thinking. The translation "correct analysis" lends itself to this interpretation. Once such a conception of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is accepted, one is only a short step away from a further conflation of *bhāvanāmayī* and *cintāmayī prajñā*. Thus the translation "discernment of reality (or 'the real,' or 'what is')" is to be preferred. In the context of the *Bhāvanākramas* the translation of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* by "correct analysis" would fail to capture the experiential dimension associated with *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*.¹²⁴

2.2.1 On the Observational Aspect of "*bhūtapratyavekṣā*"

What then is the nature of this distinction, what is this so-called "observational" element of insight? We have already seen that *vipaśyanā* is defined by Kamalaśīla as *savikalpa*. But the concept of "conceptuality" does not necessarily imply those of reasoning, thought or inference. It

¹²³ See above pp. 77-78.

¹²⁴ On the other hand the translation of "true examination" would seem to err in the opposite direction; while capturing the observational aspect of the verbal root it less clearly suggests the fact that through the process of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* something is *understood*.

simply indicates the presence of concepts. Put another way, we can say that the concept of *vikalpa* does not entail that of *vicāra*, (although *vicāra* most certainly implies *vikalpa*). Thus both the observational and analytic dimensions of the discernment of reality are to be thought of as marked by the presence of concepts (*vikalpa*); but it is only with the conscious application of concepts in concentrative analysis that *vicāra* is implied. If we think in terms of the *dhyānas* discussed earlier, these considerations would seem to further imply that the observational component of *vipāśyanā* may occur up to the fourth *dhyāna*, whereas the analytic component would seem to have to be limited to the first.¹²⁵

In order to see how a process or state might be considered conceptual, but not inferential, we must scrutinize Kamalaśīla's discussions of the term *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as found in Bhk 2 and Bhk 3. In the latter text we find the following statement which I take to be a significant indicator of Kamalaśīla's conception of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*.

So it is that this one who abandons the discernment of reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) would have abandoned the very foremost limb of Awakening, called "the discrimination of *dharmas* (*dharmapracicaya*)." And without the discernment of reality how could the mind of the yogin, attached to beginninglessly ingrained existents such as material form, enter into nonconceptuality?¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Much has been made of this kind of concern by modern scholars, but it is not entirely clear to me that this is warranted. The prevailing way of understanding the mind's capacities in this connection is rather two-dimensional. It excludes the possibility of different kinds of awareness and mental activity coexisting simultaneously. Whether this conception was held by early Buddhists is still not entirely clear to me. In any case Vasubandhu makes the following statement which shows that the concept of *dhyāna* and discursivity were not always held to be mutually exclusive. "In the School [of the Sarvāstivādins], all *dhyāna* is *prajñā* [whereas in some other schools, *dhyāna* is *cinta* or reflection]." (Pruden 1217). See Griffiths (1983) and Vetter (1988: xxv-xxvii) among others.

¹²⁶ Bhk 3 15.5-8: *tathā hy anena bhūtapratyavekṣām pratikṣipatā dharmapracicayākhyam pradhānam eva bodhyaṅgam pratikṣiptam syāt / vinā ca bhūtapratyavekṣayā, yoginaḥ katham anādikalābhystarūpādibhāvābhiniveśasya cittam nirvikalpatām praviśet?* D 62a1-2: *de ltar des yañ dag par so sor rtog pa spañs na chos śin tu nram par 'byed pa žes bya ba byañ chub kyi yan lag dam pa kho na yañ spañs par 'gyur ro / yañ dag par so sor rtog pa med par rnal 'byor pas thabs gañ gis thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa'i dños po la mñon par žen ciñ goms pa'i sems nram par mi rtog pa ñid la nram par gžag par bya /*

Here a new term, *dharmaprvicaya*, is introduced in order to explain the necessity of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as a component of proper Mahāyāna Buddhist practice. There are at least three ways of reading the relationship obtaining between *bhūtapratyavekṣā* and *dharmaprvicaya* in this passage. Kamalaśīla could be identifying *bhūtapratyavekṣā* and *dharmaprvicaya*. On the other hand, the relationship of the former to the latter might be one of necessary precondition. A third and final possibility is that *dharmaprvicaya* is to be understood as a necessary precondition of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Ruegg (1989: 182) sometimes seems to accept their equivalence:

This discernment of reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) consists in the analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmaprvicaya*) which is otherwise known as discriminative knowledge [III pp. 14-15] (Emphasis added).

Yet elsewhere (96) Ruegg takes the relationship of *bhūtapratyavekṣā* to *dharmaprvicaya* to be one of necessary precondition .

Crucial in this context is exact analysis (*bhūtapratyavekṣā = yañ dag par so sor rtog pa*) leading to analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmaprvicaya = chos śin tu mam par 'byed pa*) and discriminative understanding (*prajñā = śes rab*), and to Insight (*vipaśyanā = lhag mthoñ*) (Emphasis added).¹²⁷

What then does Kamalaśīla mean by *dharmaprvicaya*? And how is it to be understood in relation to *bhūtapratyavekṣā*? Before we can begin to answer these questions it is necessary that we first introduce some related terminology found in the context of the above passage, which occurs as Kamalaśīla is in the process of explicitly refuting his opponent's position. This position is characterized as the view that one can simply enter into a nonconceptual state without first discerning reality in a conceptual manner. The way that Kamalaśīla presents his opponent's views

¹²⁷ Also see Ruegg (64), where the author speaks of "...the fundamental factors of exact analytic investigation (*bhūtapratyavekṣā = yañ dag pa'i so sor rtog pa*) and its culmination in the analysis of the factors of existence (*dharmaprvicaya = chos śin tu mam par 'byed pa*)..." (Emphasis added).

is that of having him advocate the position that one may enter nonconceptuality through simple nonmindfulness and nonattention towards *dharmas* (*sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtyamanasikāreṇa praviśatīti cet*).¹²⁸ He refutes this view by arguing that one may not undertake such nonmindfulness (*asmṛti*) and nonattention (*amanasikāra*) towards *dharmas* without first being mindful and paying attention to them:

And without the discernment of reality how could the mind of the yogin, attached to beginninglessly ingrained existents such as material form, enter into nonconceptuality? If it is said that one enters through nonmindfulness and nonattention toward all *dharmas*, that is not reasonable. For without the discernment of reality it is impossible to undertake either nonmindfulness or nonattention toward all *dharmas* even though they are being experienced. And if one would (attempt to) cultivate these [*dharmas*] without attending and minding, cultivating thus, "These which are called *dharmas* are not to be noticed nor paid attention to by me," then still more would they have been noticed and attended to by him!¹²⁹

Thus the negatively prefixed terms nonmindfulness (*asmṛti*) and nonattention (*amanasikāra*) here indicate a positive realization of the identitylessness of *dharmas* that has a foundation in observation. If one is to realize the identitylessness of *dharmas*, one's consciousness requires an object, which is to say *dharmas*. Thus it is understood that one must engage in the practice of the discrimination of *dharmas* (*dharmapraṇīcayā*).

¹²⁸ Bhk 3 15.12-13. D 62a2-3: *gal te chos thams cad la dran pa med pa dan / yid la byed pa med pas 'jug go ze na /*

¹²⁹ Bhk 3 15.7-17: *vinā ca bhūtapratyavekṣayā, yoginaḥ katham anādikālābhyastarūpādi bhāvābhiniveśasya cittam nirvikalpatām praviśet? sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtyamanasikāreṇa praviśatīti cet / tad ayuktam / na hi vīna bhūtapratyavekṣayānubhūyamāneṣv api sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtir amanasikāro vā śakyate kartum / yadi ca nāmāmī dharmā mayā 'smartavyā nāpi manasikartavyā ity evaṃ bhāvayānn asmṛtīmanasikārau teṣu bhāvayet, tadā sutarām eva tena te smṛtā manasikṛtās ca syuḥ / D 62a1-4: yañ dag par so sor rtog pa med par mal 'byor pas thabs gañ gis thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa'i dnos po la mñon par ze na cin goms pa'i sems mnam par mi rtog pa ñid la mnam par gzag par bya / gal te chos thams cad la dran pa med pa dan / yid la byed pa med pas 'jug go ze na / de yañ rigs pa ma yin te / yañ dag par so sor rtog pa med par ni ñams su myoñ pa'i chos thams cad mi dran par bya ba dan / yid la mi bya bar byed mi nus so / gal te bdag gis chos 'di dag dran par mi bya'o / yid la mi bya'o sñam du de ltar bsgom zin de dag la dran med pa dan / yid la byed pa med pa bsgom pa ni de'i tshes des de dag sin tu dran pa dan / sin tu yid la byas par 'gyur ro /*

2.2.1.1 *Dharmapracaya*

We have seen that for Kamalaśīla the observational aspect of the discernment of reality is characterized as conceptual in nature and that it involves the discrimination of *dharmas* as meditation objects. These realities form the bases of the concentrated perceptual judgments directed at them. Although it would appear that the discrimination of *dharmas* is thought of as involving both *smṛti* and *yoniso-manasikāra* the meaning of these terms, like *dharmapracaya* itself, are not explicitly spelled out by Kamalaśīla. Before discussing Kamalaśīla's employment of these terms we may take our bearings on this subject by noting a few points made by Rupert Gethin in the context of his study of the seven factors of Awakening (*bodhi-pakkhiyā dhammā*). Although most of his account of *dharmapracaya* (1992: 146-154) is based upon Pāli sources' treatments of the corresponding Pāli term, *dhammavicaya*, much of his treatment of the topic has a more general relevance.

Gethin notes that the verbal root \sqrt{ci} in *vicaya* has two possible, although perhaps related, senses: 1. to gather, accumulate 2. to observe, note. The first meaning is particularly indicated when the root is prefixed with "vi." The resulting sense is thus "to take apart." Thus in attempting to explain the nature of *vipāśyanā* one may take one's cue from both the idea of seeing *dharmas*, as suggested by the verbal roots $\sqrt{ikṣ}$ and \sqrt{pas} in *bhūtapratyavekṣā* and *vipāśyanā*, and from the idea of "breaking down" *dharmas*, as suggested by the verbal root \sqrt{ci} in *dharmapracaya*.¹³⁰

According to Gethin the term *dhammavicaya* may be taken to mean either the discrimination

¹³⁰ Cf. our earlier discussion of *vi + pasyanā* in 1.2.4.5 and of *mam par bśig* as the Tibetan rendering of *vi + bhāvya* and *vi + cārayet* in Section 2.2, p. 85.

of *dhammas* or the discernment of *dhamma*. Understanding *dhamma* in the plural, the term refers to the various mental factors known and cultivated through meditation. Understanding the term in the singular, the term here seems to refer to the "order of law of the universe" or, possibly, "the Buddha's teaching." Gethin indicates the Nikāyas' understanding of how it is that in seeing the former one would also see the latter:

It is stated in the Nikāyas that he who sees *paṭicca-samuppāda* sees *dhamma* and that he who sees *dhamma* sees *paṭicca-samuppāda*. This is in fact a very succinct statement of the principle involved, for what is *paṭicca-sammupāda* apart from the interrelatedness of *dhammas*? To see *dhammas* is to see their interrelatedness; to see their interrelatedness is to see *dhamma*. One might rephrase the Nikāya, saying, then as: "He who sees *dhammas* sees *dhamma*; he who sees *dhamma* sees *dhammas*" (1992:151).

Gethin goes on to add that in the Nikāyas "to know *dhamma* is to know the four noble truths, and knowledge of the four noble truths involves knowledge of *dhammas* in various ways." (151). The central feature of *dharmapracaya* is the "discernment of the subtle operation of the view of individuality with regard to the five aggregates" (1992: 153-154). This knowledge is associated with the cultivation of the wholesome *dhammas* that constitute the factors of Awakening. These considerations are mentioned here only for the sake of suggesting what might have formed part of Kamalaśīla's general conception of *dharmapracaya*. Unfortunately for us Kamalaśīla did not see the need to spell this conception out in detail in the *Bhāvanākramas*.

Some important clues of Kamalaśīla's conception of *dharmapracaya* do, however, exist, between the lines. To begin with, it seems vital to notice that in this specific context Kamalaśīla actually refers to *dhammas* in the plural:

If it is said that one enters [nonconceptuality] through nonmindfulness and nonattention toward all *dhammas*, that is not reasonable. For without the discernment of reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) it is impossible to undertake either nonmindfulness or

nonattention toward all *dharmas* even though they are being experienced.¹³¹

The plural ending here suggests that Kamalaśīla was thinking of a practice involving the identification of a number of factors of existence. The passage indicates that without first undertaking the discernment of reality there can be no *nonmindfulness* or *nonattention* towards *dharmas*. In this connection it important to remember that *nonmindfulness* and *nonattention* towards *dharmas* are interpreted positively by Kamalaśīla -- they do not indicate mere absences. Failure to recognize this could lead to some misunderstandings e.g. the absence of *nonmindfulness* and *nonattention* toward *dharmas* could simply be equated, by double negation, with the presence of *mindfulness* and *attention* towards *dharmas*. In ordinary everyday experience, however, the kind of *nonmindfulness* and *nonattention* towards *dharmas* Kamalaśīla is talking about are not present. Yet neither is *mindfulness* and *attention* towards *dharmas*, which clearly are intentionally cultivated states. If we understand Kamalaśīla to be conceiving *mindfulness* and *attention* towards *dharmas* as necessarily preceding *nonmindfulness* and *nonattention* towards *dharmas*, and further conceiving *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as also necessarily preceding *nonmindfulness* and *nonattention* towards *dharmas*, this would imply that the pair of *mindfulness* and *attention* towards *dharmas* is being considered as either constitutive of, or a necessary condition for, *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. It is also logically possible, however, that he conceived *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as necessarily preceding *mindfulness* and *attention* towards *dharmas*, understanding *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as *cintāmayī prajñā*. For reasons already presented, however, I do not believe this nonexperiential conception of insight to be the central one

¹³¹ Bhk 3 15.12-15: *sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtyamanasikāreṇa praviśatīti cet / tad ayuktam / na hi vīna bhūtapratyavekṣayānubhūyamāneṣv api sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtir amanasikāro vā śakyate kartum / D 61b2-3: gal te chos thams cad la dran pa med pa dañ / yid la byed pa med pas 'jug go že na / de yañ rigs pa ma yin te / yañ dag par so sor rtog pa med par ni ñams su myoñ pa'i chos thams cad mi dran par bya ba dañ / yid la mi bya bar byed mi nus so /*

employed by Kamalaśīla in the *Bhāvanākramas*.

Let us first consider the possibility that *bhūtapratyavekṣā* is to be taken as synonymous with *dharmapracaya*. If this is so, then *bhūta* would correspond to *dharma*, and *dharma* as we have seen, would be understood in the plural. But on the other hand we have already noted that *bhūta* is, at one point, clearly understood in the sense of *pudgaladharmanairātmya*. Here is the passage:

And the discernment of reality is said to be insight. But what is real (*bhūta*) is the selflessness of persons and *dharmanas*. Here, the selflessness of the person is the aggregates' lack of self or belonging to a self. The selflessness of *dharmanas* is precisely their being like an illusion.¹³²

This suggests that the two terms are not to be considered synonymous. It seems to indicate that *dharmapracaya* is to be regarded as an initial phase of, or a necessary condition for, *bhūtapratyavekṣā*. Yet if this is to be maintained, we must be careful to notice that according to the system of meditation set out in the *Samādhinirmocana sūtra*, insight (here, *bhūtapratyavekṣā*) is not identified with the actual nonconceptual realization of the limit of things (*vastuparyantatā* = *sūnyatā*, = *pudgaladharmanairātmya*), which would be more readily identifiable with *asmṛti* and *amansikāra*. Thus the identification of the *bhūta* in *bhūtapratyavekṣā* with *pudgaladharmanairātmya* in the above passage would have to be understood as the concept of *pudgaladharmanairātmya* rather than its nonconceptual realization. If we are to make our reading of the text consistent with the system of the *Samādhinirmocana*, the entire process of *vipaśyanā* must be recognized as conceptual in nature. The perceptual object of *vipaśyanā* is *dharmanas*; that which is discerned about them is their lack of

¹³² Bhk 3 5.17-19: *bhūtapratyavekṣāṇā ca vipaśyanocyate / bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyaṃ / tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhānām ātmātmīyarahitatā / dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣāṃ eva māyopamatā /*
D 57b4-5: *yañ dag par so sor rtog pa ni lhag mthoñ zes bya'o / yañ dag pa ni gañ zag dañ chos la bdag med pa'o / de la gañ zag la bdag med pa ni gañ phun po mams bdag dañ bdag gi med pa ñid do / chos la bdag med pa ni gañ de dag sgyu ma lta bu ñid do /*

identity. With regard to both aspects, the knowledge is conceptual.

The knowledge involved in the observation of *dharmas* is conceptual in the sense that realities like the five aggregates, mind-only, and so on must be known for what they are or recognized before they can be judged. In the terms of Buddhist psychology this function would be performed by the aggregate of *saṃjñā*, which we have generally translated as "recognition," or in some cases, "perception." The basic idea of *saṃjñā* is that of a mental function serving to associate a concept or a name with an experienced reality.¹³³ The aggregate responsible for the actual perceptual judgment would be *saṃskāra*. We will return to these considerations regarding the aggregates below.

2.2.1.2 *Smṛti* and *Manasikāra*

The passage quoted above¹³⁴ may suggest the possibility that *dharmapracicaya qua smṛti* was understood by Kamalaśīla as partially consisting in mindfulness practices, traditionally associated with the four *smṛtyupasthānas* (P. *satipaṭṭhānas*). These practices involve the conceptual recognition awareness of the body, feelings, mind and mental contents (*dharmas*) -- in particular, it

¹³³ We can see the importance of how we choose to translate *saṃjñā*. Among common translations we find e.g. "recognition" (Boisvert), "perception" (Nyanatiloka), and "ideation" (Schmithausen 1981, Johansson 1978). In English, these three seem to carry progressively less force in terms of their implication of truth-preservation. One would be hard-pressed to imagine circumstances under which one speaks of *recognizing* something mistakenly. "Recognition" captures the psychological implications of the process involved, a re-cognition of sensory awareness under a particular concept. It also carries the connotation of possibly being a perceptual process, but not one free of concepts (as the term 'perception' is sometimes understood). As is the case with "ideation" it carries the implication of conceptuality, but lacks this latter term's clumsiness. "Ideation" appears to be a word academics have invented; it has no cognate verbal forms. On the other hand "recognition" carries less of a connotation of possibly being a falsifying or superimpositional process, something Kamalaśīla would probably wish to maintain if it was ever put to him this way. Thus no single English language term seems satisfactory here. "Perception" has the disadvantage of being the standard translation for *pratyakṣa* in the Buddhist epistemological tradition. This latter term, however, would seem to correspond to *vijñāna* rather than *saṃjñā*.

¹³⁴ Above pp. 91-92.

should be noted, in their character of arising and passing away. However, there is no explicit mention of these practices in the contexts of *dharmapравicaya*, *bhūtapratyavekṣā* or *vipaśyanā* in the *Bhāvanākramas*. Interestingly, the most of the references that are made to *smṛti* (as opposed to *asmṛti*) in the *Bhāvanākramas* occur in the context of discussions pertaining to *śamatha* or *dhyāna*, a point we will return to momentarily.¹³⁵

As for the term *manasikāra*, it is not entirely clear from the account provided in the *Bhāvanākramas* that Kamalaśīla understood it to have a specific technical reference and if so what that might be. That the term is vague in its reference is clear enough when one considers both the obscurity and the innocuousness of the translations it has sometimes received, even from two of Kamalaśīla's most capable modern interpreters, viz. "mentation" (Ruegg 1989: 94 *et passim*) on the one hand, and "mental activity" and "conscious mental acts" (Gomez 1987: 108) on the other. Elsewhere, however, Gomez (1983: 405) has translated *manasikāra* as "the act of bringing to mind (attention)," and this is how I have understood the term; it is a general one that seems mainly to indicate a conscious and deliberate act of paying attention to something.¹³⁶ At points in the *Bhāvanākramas*, however, context sometimes seems to suggest that it may have a more specific technical sense: it may in fact refer to what we have called perceptual judgement. The following

¹³⁵ e.g. Bhk 2 D 48a2-a4: *de nas rnam par g'yeñ ba zi bar byas nas dran pa dañ śes bzin gyi thag pas yid kyi glañ po che dmigs pa'i sdoñ po de ñid la gdags par bya'o // gañ gi tshē byiñ ba dañ rgod pa med par gyur te / dmigs pa de la sems rnal du 'jug par mthoñ ba de'i tshē ni rtsol ba glod la btañ sñoms su bya ziñ / de'i tshē ji srid 'dod kyi bar du 'dug par bya'o // de ltar zi gnas goms par byas pa de'i lus la sems śin tu sbyañs par gyur pa dañ / ji ltar 'dod pa bzin du dmigs pa de la sems rañ dbañ du gyur pa de'i tshē de'i zi gnas grub pa yin par rig par bya'o // After calming the distraction, the great ox of the mind should be bound to that very tree-trunk of the object with the rope of clear comprehension and mindfulness. When one is without sinking and excitement and one sees that the mind is settled on the object, then one relaxes one's effort and should be equanimous, remaining that way as long as one likes. Thus the mind and body of one who has practiced tranquillity become very disciplined; (when) one can freely direct the mind to the object in the manner desired, tranquillity should be known to be established.*

¹³⁶ I owe this explanation, and others too numerous to repeat, to Prof. K. N. Mishra of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies.

considerations suggest this.

It has not, to my knowledge, been pointed out that Kamalaśīla may have viewed the term *manasikāra* as in some sense corresponding to, or paralleling, the idea of *samprajanya* or "clear comprehension." This possibility is suggested by the fact that *samprajanya* and *smṛti* often form a natural dyad in the context of Buddhist meditation instructions, just as *manasikāra* and *smṛti* (and more especially *amanasikāra* and *asmṛti*) do in the third Bhk. At one point, in the course of describing the *dhyānas*, Kamalaśīla glosses *samprajanya* and *smṛti* together as the "clarity pertaining to the self" (*ādhyātmasamprasād*).¹³⁷ In Bhk 3 they are described alongside each other in the specific context of antidotes to distractions that may come up in the process of practicing *śamatha*:

In brief, there are six (possible) faults for every single *samādhi*: laziness, loss of the object, laxity, excitement, lack of effort and overexertion. Eight conditions of abandonment should be cultivated as their antidotes, namely: faith, aspiration, exertion, pliancy, mindfulness, clear comprehension, willpower and equanimity...

Mindfulness is the antidote of "loss of the meditation object". Clear comprehension is the antidote of laxity and excitement, since having been noticed by it, they are abandoned.¹³⁸

Thus *samprajanya* or clear comprehension is associated with the relatively passive act of

¹³⁷ Bhk 1 209.6-8: *yadā ca kāmatṛṣṇayā [pāpadharmaiḥ] viviktā bhavati [vitarkavicāra]pṛitisukhādhyātmasamprasādaiḥ samprayuktā bhavati / tadā prathamam dhyānam ucyate / And when (one-pointedness of mind) is separated from the thirst for pleasure [as well as] conjoined with [gross and subtle thought] rapture, joy, and clarity pertaining to the self (ādhyātmasamprasād, i.e. mindfulness and clear comprehension), then it is called the first absorption.*

¹³⁸ Bhk 3 10.8-13: *saṃkṣepataḥ sarvasyaiva samādheḥ ṣaḍ doṣā bhavanti / kausīdyam / ālambanasampramoṣaḥ / layaḥ / audhdhatyam / anābhogaḥ / ābhogaś ceti / eṣāṃ pratipakṣeṇāṣṭau prahānasam(skārā) bhāvaniyāḥ / śraddhā / chandaḥ / vyāyāmaḥ / praśrabdhīḥ / smṛtiḥ / samprajanyam / cetanā / upekṣā ceti /.... Bhk 3 10.19-21: smṛtir ālambanasampramoṣasya pratipakṣaḥ / samprajanyam layaudhdhatyayoḥ pratipakṣaḥ / tayos tena samupekṣya parivarjanāt / Cf. Bhk 1 208 3-5 and Bhk 1 208.14-16. The passages are nearly identical.*

"noticing." What is interesting about this is that in Bhk 3 after these two references in which *smṛti* and *samprajanya* appear together, all references are to *smṛti* in association with *manasikāra* (or more often than not to the pair of their negations).¹³⁹ More interesting still, the context of discussion has also changed from one of *śamatha* to one of *vipaśyanā*. This suggests a possible parallel, but definitely not an equivalence between the two terms. Both occur along with *smṛti*, but *manasikāra* appears to possess a more active volitional sense than that indicated by the term *samprajanya*. Further, whereas *samprajanya* is associated with *śamatha*, *manasikāra* is associated with *vipaśyanā*.

In this connection one final point should be noted about Kamalaśīla's conception of *manasikāra*. It is said to be on account of this specific factor, properly undertaken, that it becomes possible for nonconceptual knowledge to arise.

Even if this discernment of reality has a conceptual nature, nevertheless on account of the fact it has a nature of proper (or fundamental) attention (*yoniso manasikāra*), a nonconceptual knowledge of reality (*bhūta* T. om) arises from it. And therefore those who aim for such knowledge should practice that (i.e. the conceptual discernment of reality).¹⁴⁰

It is vital to remind ourselves that this knowledge marks the entry of the transcendent path, wherein emptiness is realized nonconceptually. Nonattention (*amanasikāra*) and nonmindfulness (*asmṛti*) seem to be associated with this particular state of nondual *samādhi* which is also gnosis

¹³⁹ Beginning at Bhk 3 15.12 and continuing to 17.11, D62a2-64b1.

¹⁴⁰ Bhk 3 20.6-8: *yadi nāmāsau vikalpasvabhāvā tathāpi yoniso manasikārasvabhāvatvāt, tato bhūtanirvikalpajñānodaya iti kṛtvā tajjñānārthinā sā sevanīyā* / D 64a3-4: *de nam par rtog pa'i no bo ñid yin du zin kyañ tshul bzin du yid la byed pa'i no bo ñid yin pa'i phyir de las mam par mi rtog pa'i ye ses 'byuñ bar 'gyur pas na ye ses de 'dod pas de la brten par bya'o /*

(*prajñā, nirvikalpajñāna*).¹⁴¹

2.2.2 Process and States Revisited

All of these considerations combined lead to a general conception of *dharmapracaya* as one of observing *dharmas* in such a way as to allow for an understanding of their emptiness. It also appears that the same kind of systematic ambiguity obtains in the case of the term *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as we saw in the case of *vipaśyanā* itself, namely, that between process and state. As a conceptual "process" it may be thought of as referring to the entire twofold procedure of discrimination (*dharmapracaya*) by being aware of or observing *dharmas* (*smṛti*) and concentratively analyzing them while continuing to bear them in mind (*manasikāra*). As a resulting conceptual "state," on the other hand, it may be thought of as referring to that which is recognized *about dharmas* (*nairātmya, śūnyatā*). Thus if we conceive *bhūtapratyavekṣā* more statically, as a result i.e. a conceptual understanding of emptiness, then *dharmapracaya* may be viewed as its necessary condition and identified with the conceptual discrimination of *dharmas* leading up to it (encompassing both components of observation and analysis).

If, on the other hand, we conceive *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as a process then it may be identified with *dharmapracaya*. At different points it would appear that Kamalaśīla uses both meanings; the

¹⁴¹ Here one must observe that such a conception of the necessity of *manasikāra* is not without precedent. See *Mahāvedalla Sutta, Majjhima Nikāya 43, sections 26f*. Two conditions are given for the attainment of "signless deliverance of mind," (*animittā ceto-vimutti*) which is identifiable as the attainment of fruition, namely, "non-attention to all signs" (*amanasikāra*) and "attention to the signless element" (*nibbāna*). *MN 43.27*: "Friend, there are two conditions for the attainment of the signless deliverance of the mind: nonattention to all signs and attention to the signless element." Two further conditions are listed for the emergence from the signless deliverance of mind. These are "attention to all signs" (*manasikāra*) and non-attention to the signless element. *MN 43.29*: "Friend, there are two conditions for emergence from the signless deliverance of mind: attention to all signs and non-attention to the signless element." This inversion implies that *manasikāra* also precedes the establishment of *amanasikāra*. Note also the displacement of *nibbāna* by *śūnyatā* in the role of "the signless element."

two are not clearly disambiguated in the text. In any case, both are consistent with the system of the *Samdhinirmocana sūtra* as both conceive *bhūtapratyavekṣā* as being conceptual (*savikalpa*) in nature. It is only the state resulting from *bhūtapratyavekṣā* that is variously identified as the nonconceptual realization of *vastuparyantatā*, *pudgaladharmanairātmyam*, *śūnyatā*, *tathatā* or *paramatattvam*.

Thus the term *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, as "the discernment of reality," may be understood as carrying a twofold implication: it indicates a conceptual process undergone as well as a conceptual state arrived at through this process.

2.2.3 Summary

The central conception of *vipaśyanā* according to Kamalaśīla's reading of the *Laṅkāvatāra sūtra* is one of a sequence of perceptually or experientially based judgments of *dharmas* through which one comes to know various soteriologically relevant aspects of their true nature. This ascending sequence of conceptual understandings eventually gives way to a moment of nonconceptual gnosis (*nirvikalpajñāna*) that marks the beginning of the transcendent path.

We have seen that this process of breaking down *dharmas* begins with the concentrated observation of the *dharmas* that are thought by śrāvakas to constitute a person. The objects are held in mind while being analyzed with a view towards understanding their lack of identity, or, in other words, the impossibility of their inherent existence. Through a series of experiential inferences directed at these realities it is gradually recognized that all things material and immaterial, including

the very mind which is analyzing, are empty of inherent nature.¹⁴²

Insight is thus partially identified with a special kind of analytic *process* that takes place in a *state* of meditative concentration. It *issues* in a nonconceptual realization and it is this that eliminates fundamental ignorance. This ineffable nonconceptual state marks the definitive turning point for the bodhisattva, the beginning of the path of seeing. Quoting from the *sūtras*, the description of this final result of insight is given in both the second and the third Bhk:

Someone who only cultivates the mere abandonment of mental activity but does not meditate having analyzed (*so sor brtags*) the nature of entities with wisdom, he will never get rid of concepts and will not come to realize the absence of inherent nature - on account of the absence of the light of wisdom. So it is said by the Illustrious One, "When the fire of knowing reality as such arises from the very discernment of reality (*yañ dag par so sor rtog pa ñid, bhūtapratyavekṣaiva*), it incinerates the wood of concepts (*rtog pa'i śiñ*), just as the fire of firesticks rubbed together [consumes the sticks themselves]."¹⁴³

The *nonrational* nature of this realization is clear from its paradoxical description, which also, it must be noticed, indicates its *nonperceptual* nature.¹⁴⁴ At this point all duality is gone; *samādhi* and *prajñā* are effectively one and the same in their nonconceptual nature. The importance of this

¹⁴² Much has been written regarding the different logical forms of reasoning which partially serve to distinguish the two main Mādhyamika schools (Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika). Our purpose here is not to provide an account of the logical form of the inferences accepted by Kamalaśīla. It is, rather, to examine *the nature* of the processes he accepts as being involved in *vipaśyanā*. These are a) concentrated observation of realities experienced in meditation and b) concentrative analytical inference, "founded on" or concurrently "directed at" these experienced realities.

¹⁴³ Bhk 2 D 49b5-b6: *gañ śes rab kyis dños po'i ño bo ñid so sor brtags nas mi bsgom gyi / yid la byed pa yoñs su spon ba tsam 'ba' žig sgom par byed pa de'i mam par rtog pa nam yañ mi ldog (NP rtog) ciñ ño bo ñid med pa ñid (NP omit ñid) rtogs (Goshima follows NP: rtog) par yañ mi 'gyur te / śes rab kyi snañ ba med pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar "yañ dag par so sor rtog pa ñid las yañ dag pa ji lta ba bžin du śes pa'i me byuñ na gtsubs śiñ gtsubs pa'i me bžin du rtog pa'i śiñ sreg go" žes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to // Cf. Bhk 3 30.8-11.*

¹⁴⁴ Compare Gunaratana (1985: 144-145) on Buddhaghosa's understanding of *paññā* as "a mode of knowing (*jānana*) distinct from and superior to the modes of perceiving (*sañjānana*) and cognizing (*vijānana*). What distinguishes wisdom from these forms of cognition is its ability to comprehend the characteristics of impermanence, suffering and selflessness and to bring about the manifestation of the supramundane path."

nonconceptual realization is clear from Kamalaśīla's identification of it with the Mahāyāna itself:

At this point, on account of the established one's entry into the ultimate suchness, there is the entrance into the *samādhi* without conceptualizations. And thus when the yogin is established in the knowledge which has no appearance of nondual knowledge, then, due to his being established in the ultimate suchness, he sees the Mahāyāna. Only this itself is said to be the Mahāyāna which is the seeing of the ultimate suchness. This very seeing of the ultimate suchness, when there is the vision of genuine knowledge (*samyagjñānāvaloka*, T. *yañ dag pa'i ye śes kyī snañ ba śar*) of one who observes all *dharma*s with the eye of wisdom, is a non-seeing (*adarśana*, T. *mthoñ ba med pa*). And thus it is said in the *sūtra*: 'What is the seeing of the ultimate reality? It is the non-seeing of all *dharma*s.'¹⁴⁵

2.3 Kamalaśīla's Conception of Śrāvaka Insight

In the *Bhāvanākramas* there are clear indications that Kamalaśīla understood the śrāvaka conception of insight to differ from that of the Mahāyāna.¹⁴⁶ While sharing the view that insight consists in seeing and knowing something important about the *dharma*s experienced in meditation, the difference appears to lie in what is known about them. According to Kamalaśīla, the śrāvakas' conception of insight is distinguished by: 1) knowing the identitylessness of the person, but failing to recognize the identitylessness of the *dharma*s that comprise the person and 2) a conception of meditative practice as consisting in the cultivation of the observational knowledge of these *dharma*s

¹⁴⁵ Bhk 1: 211.17-212.3: *tatra sthitasya paramatattvapravesāt, nirvikalpasamādhipravesaḥ / tathā cādvayajñānanirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogi tadā paramatattve sthitaṭvāt, mahāyānam sa paśyati / etad eva tan mahāyānam ucyate yat paramatattvadarśanam / etad eva tat paramatattvadarśanam yat sarvadharmān prajñācaksuṣā nirūpayataḥ samyagjñānāvaloke saty adarśanam / tathā cōktam sūtre --"katamaṁ paramārthadarśanam / sarvadharmānām adarśanam /" iti /*

¹⁴⁶ This point has been also noted by Gomez (1987: 107). His observations in this connection, while not detailed, seem consistent with my own: "Kamalaśīla's critique reflects both a general Indian belief in the necessity of practicing both calm and insight, and a Mahāyāna notion that the followers of the Hinayāna do not practice the correct form of insight. Mahāyāna insight is a process of discrimination and a state of nondual knowledge. As discrimination or contemplative analysis, it is an essential aspect of meditation practice, for it guarantees both the correctness of the process (defining its object accurately) and the dialectical nature of the result. As a dialectic, insight is also the basis for generating thoughts of compassion in the calm mind of the contemplative. A doctrine proposing a direct access to liberation through the practice of sheer nondiscrimination (*nirvikalpa*), therefore, lacks in awareness and compassion."

arising and passing away, not the analytical knowledge of their emptiness. These points are obviously very closely connected.

We have already noted the first point in passing. The śrāvaka's analysis stops short of the goal. This is a standard Mahāyāna criticism of the śrāvaka vehicle. In the following passage from the first Bhk Kamalaśīla summarizes the hierarchy of realizations which we have just explored. The śrāvaka's insight into the five aggregates is superseded by that of the mind-only, which recognizes the mentally projected nature of the so-called external world and with it, the inapplicability of the notions of arising, enduring, and passing away to this non-dual mind. This insight is itself the proper point of entry into the highest realization, that of suchness.

The path of the śrāvakas was only taught with the intention of getting started. So it is that by contemplating, "Indeed this is only the aggregates; there is no self", the śrāvaka enters into the view of the selflessness of the personality. One enters into the view of the identitylessness of external objects held by the Vijñānavādin by contemplating, "The three worlds are mind only." In this way, from the entrance which is the identitylessness of this nondual knowledge one comes to enter into the highest suchness. But the entrance into mind-only alone is not the entrance into suchness. Just as was said before. And as was said in the noble *Lokottaraparivarta*: "Moreover, O son of the Jinas, one realizes the three realms as mind-only, and that mind presents itself (*avatarati*) by way of the absence of middle and extremes." The mind is without middle or extremes on account of the nonexistence of the two ends characterized by origination and dissolution, and of the middle which has the characteristic of endurance. Therefore the entrance into nondual knowledge is definitely the entrance into suchness (*tattva*).¹⁴⁷

For Kamalaśīla it is not merely the nondual mind that is ultimately free from origination

¹⁴⁷ Bhk 1 217.2-15: *kevalam avatāraṇābhisaṃdhiṇā śrāvakādīmārgo deśitaḥ / tathā hi skandhamātram evaitat / na tv ātmāstīti bhāvayan śrāvakaḥ pudgalanairātmyam avatarati / vijñaptimātram traidhātukam iti bhāvayan vijñānavādiabhyārthanairātmyam avatarati / anena tv asyādvayajñānasya nairātmyapraveśāt paramatattvapraviṣṭo bhavati / na tu vijñaptimātratāpraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ / yathoktam prāk / uktam cārvalokottaraparivarte "punar aparam, bho jinaputra, cittamātram traidhātukam avatarati tac ca cittam anantamadhyatayāvatarati" iti / antayor utpādabhaṅgalakṣaṇayoḥ sthītilakṣaṇasya ca madhyasyābhāvād anantamadhyam cittam / tasmād advayajñānapraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ /*

(and thus endurance and cessation); all *dharmas* are, in truth, unarisen.¹⁴⁸ An entity which analysis has shown to be impossible cannot truly arise. But this is not to say that entities do not arise conventionally. They are not, for example, like a hare's horn. Thus in a conventional sense things do in fact arise. From the ultimate perspective however, they are like an illusion.

But that of which a cause does not exist even conventionally also does not arise conventionally -- just as a hare's horn and so forth. But that of which a cause exists, although ultimately false, definitely arises -- just as do illusions, reflections and so forth. And even though conventionally such illusions do arise in interdependence, ultimately their reality (*vastutva*) is not feasible since it does not stand up to analysis. Hence the entire world is like an illusion.¹⁴⁹

The yogin who is possessed of the light of wisdom can distinguish between the conventional and ultimate nature of things. The importance of being able to do so is clear.

According to Kamalaśīla,

[O]mniscience is obtained through knowing all things just as they are in terms of their conventional and ultimate nature.¹⁵⁰

Thus from the ultimate perspective *dharmas* are to be seen as beyond predication, neither originated nor unoriginated. Quoting the scriptures, Kamalaśīla makes his point:

¹⁴⁸ Bhk 3 7.5-9: *nāpi cittam utpādyamānaṃ kutaścīd āgacchati / nāpi nirudhyamānaṃ kvacid gacchati / nāpi svaparobhayataḥ paramārthenāsyotpādo yuktaḥ / tasmān māyopamam eva cittam / yāthā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat paramārthato 'nutpannāḥ / Nor also does the mind, in being generated, come from anywhere; nor when ceasing, does it go anywhere. Nor also is its generation ultimately from itself, another or both reasonable. Therefore the mind is just like an illusion. Just as the mind, so too all *dharmas*, like an illusion, are ultimately unarisen. D 58a7-58b1: *sems skye ba'i tshe yañ gañ nas kyañ mi oñ / 'gag pa'i tshe yañ gañ du yañ mi 'gro ste / don dam par na bdag dañ gžan dañ gñis ka las skye bar mi rigs so / de lta bas na sems kyañ sgyu ma bžin te / sems ji lta ba de bžin du chos thams cad kyañ sgyu ma lta bu ste / don dam par na ma skyes pa'o sñam du brtag par bya'o /**

¹⁴⁹ Bhk 1 218.22-219.2: *kimtu yasya saṃvṛtyāpi kāraṇaṃ nāsti sa saṃvṛtyāpi notpadyate / yathā śaśaviṣāṇādi / yasya tu karanam vidyate sa paramārthato 'liko 'pi samutpadyata eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādi / na ca māyādeh saṃvṛtyā pratītyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvapasangaḥ / tasya vicārākṣamatvāt / ataḥ sarvam eva māyopamaṃ jagat /*

¹⁵⁰ Bhk 1 216.16-18: *ataḥ saṃvṛtiparamārtharūpeṇa sakalasya vastuno yathāvat parijñānāt sarvajñatvam avāpyate /*

In this context, from the scriptures -- as it's put in the noble *Dharmasamgīti*, "Non-origination is truth, other attributes are falsehood." And this non-origination is called true on the basis of its being in accord with ultimate truth (*paramārthānukūlatva*), even though from the perspective of the ultimate truth there is neither origination nor non-origination since (ultimate truth is) beyond all mundane relations. Once again, and here itself, it is said, "The worldly crowd is preoccupied with arising and cessation, Kulaputra. Therefore the Tathāgata, possessed of great compassion, spoke in accord with mundane relations so as to remove the occasion of fear of the world, 'It arises, it stops,' -- even though there does not exist here the origination of any *dharma* whatsoever."¹⁵¹

Here it is apparent that Kamalaśīla regards the teaching of arising and passing away as a case of the Buddha's *upāya*. It is a lower order teaching, compassionately designed for those who would be frightened by the distinctively Mahāyāna teaching of emptiness. Thus impermanence is also a lower-order characterization of reality which lacks ultimate validity:

And again this is said in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*, "As for those who are adrift (*viprayukta*, T. *sems par žugs pa*) among inconceivable *dharma*s, they are without foundation (*ayoniśaḥ*, T. *tshul bžin ma yin pa*)." And also in that context, there are those like the śrāvakas who having imagined the origination of these ultimately non-arisen *dharma*s, give preeminence to a notion consisting in impermanence, suffering and so forth. They are without justification (*ayoniśaḥ*, T. *tshul bžin ma yin pa*), producing (such) an idea through the extremes of superimposition and denial. What is said here is to rule out those (extremes); it does *not* rule out the discernment of reality, since that is assented to in every *sūtra*.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Bhk 1 199.5-14: *yathoktam ārvadharmasamgītau / "anutpādaḥ satyam asatyam anye dharmāḥ" iti / etac ca paramārthānukūlatvād anutpādaḥ satyam ity uktam / paramārthatas tu notpādo nāpy anutpādaḥ / tasya sarvavyavahārātītatvāt / punaś cātraiva cōktam / "utpādanirodhābhiniṣṭaḥ, kulaputra, lokasaṃniveśaḥ / tasmāt tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokasyottarāsapadaparihārārthaṃ vyavahāraśādaḥ uktavān utpadyate nirudhyate ceti na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādaḥ /" iti /*

¹⁵² Bhk 3 19.1-7: *tat punar brahmapariṣcchāvāṃ uktam / ye tv acintyeṣu dharmeṣu viprayuktās teṣā(m ayoni)śa iti / tatrāpi ye paramārthato 'nutpannānāṃ dharmānāṃ utpādaṃ parikalpyānityaduḥkhādirūpeṇa śrāvakādivac cintam prakurvanti, teṣāṃ samāropāpavādāntena cintam pravartayatām ayoniśas tad bhavatīti tatpratiṣedhāya yad uktam na bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ sa pratiṣedhaḥ / tasyāḥ sarvasūtreṣv anujñānāt / D 63b3-5: tsaṅs pas žus pa las kyaṅ bka' stsal te / gaṅ dag bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i chos mams la sems žugs pa de dag ni tshul bžin ma yin pa'o žes 'byuṅ no / de la gaṅ dag don dam par ma skyes pa'i chos mams la skye bar yoṅs su brtags te / űan thos la sogs pa bžin du de dag la mi rtag pa daṅ sdug bsṅal gyi tshul du sems par byed pa de dag ni sgro 'dogs pa daṅ skur pa 'debs pa'i mtha' de dag la sems pa 'jug pas tshul bžin ma yin par 'gyur te / de dgag pa'i phyir de skad bka' stsal gyi / yaṅ dag par so sor rtog pa de dgag par ni ma yin te / de ni mdo sde kun las kyaṅ bka' stsal pa'i phyir ro /*

In this passage it is the idea of dwelling on all three marks of existence, not merely impermanence, that comes in for criticism. But Kamalaśīla is careful to make a distinction. Denial of the importance of observing the three marks does *not* amount to a denial of the discernment of reality. Kamalaśīla goes on to associate such practices with the lower two forms of the three kinds of wisdom, those of mere hearing and ordinary thinking (*śrutamayī* and *cintāmayī prajñā*). Interestingly he further identifies the advocates of these practices with "those who teach that *dharmas* are to be known *individually*" ("*pratyātma*" -- this is Tucci's reconstruction from T. *so sor rañ gis*).

Therefore, in whatever situation conceptual proliferation (*prapañca*. T. *tshig*) concerning such inconceivables is studied, the knowledge of reality is only through mere hearing and thought. Those who think in that way, because hindered by pride, teach that *dharmas* are to be known each *individually*. But it should be realized that while an unfounded mind is denied, this does not constitute a denial of the discernment of reality.¹⁵³ (Emphasis added).

The meaning and force of this criticism are not entirely clear, but it could possibly be the case that Kamalaśīla was here making a fairly standard Mādhyamika criticism of Abhidharmika thought: that it reifies *dharmas* and is generally obsessed with their individual identification, enumeration and so on. In this connection it should be observed that the meditation processes of the *Lañkāvatāra sūtra* as described by Kamalaśīla commence with the observation of *dharmas* considered as collections or "groups" (*saṃgraha*), specifically the *dharmas* with material form, the

¹⁵³ Bhk 3 19.14-20.2: *tad evaṃ yatra yatrācintyādiprapañcaḥ śrūyate, tatra tatra śrutacintāmātreṇaiva tattvādhiḡamaṃ ye manyante, teṣāṃ abhimānapraṭiṣedhena pra(tyātma) vedanīyatvaṃ dharmānāṃ pratipādyate / 'yonisāś ca cittapraṭiṣedhaḥ kriyāta iti boddhavyaṃ, na bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ praṭiṣedhaḥ / D 63b7-64a2: de ltar gañ dag gañ du bsam gyis mi khyab pa la sogs pa'i tshig thos na de dañ der thos pa dañ bsam pa tsam kho nas de kho na rtogs par gañ dag sems pa de dag gi mñon pa'i ña rgyal dgag pa'i phyir chos mams so sor rañ gis rig par bya ba ñid du bstan par byed do / tshul bñin ma yin pa'i sems pa yañ dgag par byed par khon du chud par bya'i / yañ dag par so sor rtogs pa de dgag par ni ma yin no /*

immaterial *dharmas*, which is to say the five aggregates.¹⁵⁴ Perhaps a contrast is intended here; it may be that Kamalaśīla regarded a more detailed observation of *dharmas* individually as a possible but soteriologically irrelevant practice of the lower vehicle. We shall return to this point below. In any case, we may take it as established that Kamalaśīla had something else in mind when it came to his understanding of the discernment of reality, or, to come full circle, *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*:

Otherwise it would be thoroughly opposed to reason and scripture. Just as already stated. And whatever is known through the wisdom of hearing and thinking is itself to be realized through the wisdom of meditation, nothing else. (For example,) it's like a horse running along a previously indicated running track. Therefore the discernment of reality is to be undertaken.¹⁵⁵

Because the cultivation of an awareness of individual *dharmas* and their impermanence is clearly not to be associated with the realization of emptiness it is perhaps no surprise that we also do not find Kamalaśīla mentioning impermanence in contexts wherein *vipaśyanā* is being

¹⁵⁴ Bhk 1 205. 20-206.9: *tatra prathamam tāvad yad vastu vicārayitavyam yāvataḥ prakāreṇa samksepataḥ sakalavastusamgraho bhavati tatra cittam badhniyāt / samkṣiptam punar vastu rūpyarūpibhedena dvidhā bhavati / etac cādikarmikasya viksepadoṣaparihārtham samkṣiptam tāvad yuktam ālambayitum / yadā tu jītamanaskāro bhavati tadā skandhadhātvdibhedena viśodhya vistāraśo 'py ālambata eva / tathā samdhinirmocanāḍau yoginām aṣṭādaśprakāraśūnyatālabanādibhedena [nānā]prakāram ālambanam uktam / atraiva bhagavatā sattvānugrahād rūpyarūpyādibhedena samksepamadyavistārair vastubhedo 'bhidharmāḍau nirdiṣṭaḥ / tac ca vastv adhyāropāpavādaparihārāya skandhadhātvdīsamgrahato gaṇayet /* In that context, initially at the outset, the thing to be analyzed is the collection of all things abbreviated in terms of kind; one should fix the mind there. But, summed up, a thing is twofold -- by way of division into material and immaterial. For a beginner it is appropriate to objectify summarily in order to avoid the fault of distraction. But when he becomes one whose attention is mastered, then having analyzed in terms of the division of the elements which are the aggregates and so on, he then also relies on a (more) detailed way. Thus in the *Samdhinirmocana* the various kinds of meditation object are spoken of in terms of the division of meditation objects into the eighteen kinds of emptiness for yogins and so on. And in precisely this connection in the *Abhidharma* and elsewhere, out of the kindness to sentient beings, the Bhagavān taught the division of a thing in brief, in moderate detail, and in detail -- by way of the division into material, immaterial and so on. And that thing should be counted (*gaṇayet*) as a collection of the elements which are the aggregates and so forth in order to avoid exaggeration and underestimation.

¹⁵⁵ Bhk 3 20.2-6: (*anyathā*) *bahutaram yuktyāgamaviruddham syāt / yathoktam prāk / kiṃ ca yad eva śrūtacintāmayyāprajñayā viditam tad eva bhāvanāmayyā prajñayā bhāvanīyam nānyat / samdiṣṭa[dhāvana]bhūmyaśvadhāvanavat / tasmāt bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā /* D 64a2-3: *de lta ma yin na rigs pa dan luñ śin tu mañ po dan 'gal bar 'gyur ro zes snar bśad pa bzin no / yañ thos pa dan bśam pa las byuñ ba'i śes rab kyis rtogs pa gañ yin pa de ñid bsgom pa las byuñ ba'i śes rab kyi bsgom par bya'i / gzan du ni ma yin te rta dkyu sa kyi sa bstan nas rgyug pa bzin no / de lta bas na yañ dag par so sor brtag par bya'o /*

specifically discussed. When the topic of impermanence is brought up in the context of meditation it is nearly always in the context of instructions for *śamatha*. It is regarded as an antidote to a distraction. One is to contemplate sobering topics like impermanence, as a reminder not to get enmeshed in distractions and so forth:

And if one would see the mind excited while remembering previous laughter, enjoyment and so on, then one should pacify the excitement by paying attention to sobering topics such as impermanence.¹⁵⁶

When the concept of impermanence does appear in a general context pertaining to insight or wisdom, it is always in the role of a lower-order characterization of reality that one is to go beyond, and which is not to be dwelt on for nonconceptual gnosis to arise. Thus in general three observations may be made regarding Kamalaśīla's treatment of the concept of impermanence in the *Bhāvanākramas*:

- 1) It is treated as a lower-order teaching, compassionately designed for those who would be frightened by the teaching of emptiness.
- 2) It sometimes appears in the course of argumentation as a lower-order characterization of conventional reality.
- 3) In the context of meditation procedures it appears in instructions for *śamatha*, but not *vipaśyanā*.

¹⁵⁶ Bhk 1 206. 23-25: *atha yadā pūrvahasitaramitādyanusmarato 'ntarā cittam uddhataṃ paśyet / tadā 'nityatādīsaṃvegamanasikārād auddhatyaṃ praśamayet /*

CHAPTER 3

CLOSING CONSIDERATIONS

3.1 A Suggestion for Future Research

All of this is suggestive, if not conclusive. It would appear that for Kamalaśīla the śrāvakas' conception of *vipāśyanā* is that of the comprehension of the three marks of impermanence, suffering and lack of self. This is also the view of modern day Theravādin traditions.¹⁵⁷ There is little doubt that when it comes to insight meditation practices modern day Theravāda Buddhism accords a much greater role to the realization of impermanence, and more generally the three marks of existence, than is evident in the *Bhāvanākramas* (and the Mahāyāna *sūtra* passages Kamalaśīla quotes from). In the Pāli scriptures insight into impermanence is sometimes even said to be liberating.¹⁵⁸ One can see what the relation might be by expanding on Gethin's observations above: He who sees *paṭicca-samuppāda* sees *dhamma* and he who sees *dhamma* sees *paṭicca-samuppāda*. He who sees *paṭicca-samuppāda* sees the arising and passing away of *dhammas*. Therefore he who sees the *dhamma* sees arising and passing away, which is to say impermanence (*anicca*).¹⁵⁹ We

¹⁵⁷ See e.g. Bhikkhu Bodhi: "Insight should be understood as the three contemplations of impermanence, pain and not self; not contemplation of impermanence alone." (PM 9-10) VSM: 750.

¹⁵⁸ e.g. Samyutta Nikāya 22. 102.10: 961-2: At Sāvattihī. "Bhikkhus, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust, it eliminates all lust for existence, it eliminates all ignorance, it uproots all conceit 'I am.' Just as, bhikkhus, in the autumn a ploughman ploughing with a great ploughshare cuts through all the rootlets as he ploughs, so too, when the perception of impermanence is developed and cultivated, it eliminates all sensual lust.... it uproots all conceit 'I am.'.....And how, bhikkhus, is the perception of impermanence developed and cultivated so that it eliminates all sensual lust, eliminates all lust for existence, eliminates all ignorance and uproots all conceit 'I am.'? 'Such is form, such its origin, such its passing away; such is feeling... such is perception... such are volitional formations such is consciousness, such its origin, such its passing away': that is how the perception of impermanence is developed so that it eliminates all sensual lust, eliminates all lust for existence, eliminates all ignorance, and uproots all conceit 'I am.' "

¹⁵⁹ The Pāli texts standardly seem to suggest that the other two marks of existence are what we would call "inferred" rather than "seen" in the same direct way as impermanence -- at least initially. The inferences are that if something is impermanent it is not satisfying, and if something is not satisfying it is not the self. The process also would appear to involve what we call "induction" to establish their universality throughout the three times. It is also said to involve emotional states such as terror. See Gethin 1998: 188-194 for a useful summary. One must note

should notice, however, that the relationship is "one-way"; on this formulation the observation of impermanence is not a sufficient condition of seeing the *dhamma*. It is, however, necessary.¹⁶⁰

In our text it is *pudgaladharmanairātmya* that is identified with the key content of *vipaśyanā* -- not impermanence or the three marks. Furthermore, Kamalaśīla appears to explicitly reject the idea that the three marks of existence are soteriologically relevant. Rather than being observed under the aspects of three marks, observed *dharmas* are experientially analyzed by kind to demonstrate their lack of ultimate reality. Whether permanent or impermanent, they are all ultimately unreal. In the Madhyamaka school an understanding of the impossibility of anything truly existing is what counts. For Kamalaśīla this is established on the basis of the concentrative analysis described above.

One could research the possibility that these suggestions point to an actual area of difference between various Indian Buddhist schools. It seems reasonable to suggest, for example, that the Mādhyamika conception of the process of insight might have co-arisen along with its theoretical rejection of the earlier ontology of *svabhāva* associated with the Vaibāśikas' theory of

here that perception and inference were not identified as distinct modes of knowledge in the Pāli texts. While instances of both abound in the Nikāyas, there was no need to clearly distinguish between them.

Knowledge of impermanence does seem to stand on a different epistemological footing from other items of Buddhist dogma. When in meditation we "see change" this involves a sensed comparison and contrast between consecutive moments of experience. Change is not a *presupposition* of intellectual judgment, it is in fact a *precondition* for it. Insight meditation that focusses on impermanence aims to make the awareness of change explicit by removing obscuring conditions. Among such obscuring conditions are included the five hindrances (which are emotional in nature), *as well as intellectual activity*.

¹⁶⁰ To see impermanence is perhaps only to see dependent origination in its most minimally conceived of senses (i.e. When this, that is. This arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not. This ceasing, that ceases). To see dependent origination in a more sophisticated formulation, as for example the well known twelve *nidānas*, much more than a simple observation of impermanence is implied (in this case very specific causal connections must be seen and understood). If this is so, how much more so in the case of Mādhyamika conceptions of *pratīyasamutpāda* as emptiness and dependence on a designating mind (See Williams 1989: 61).

dharmas.¹⁶¹ The emergence of the Madhyamaka might have been characterized by a recasting of the notion of insight such that the identification of *dharmas* and the *observation* of their arising, enduring, and passing away (i.e. "impermanence") was displaced by the *understanding* of *emptiness* (and the *nonarising* of phenomena). Such a shift in the basic conception of insight could be understood as correlated with the theoretical shift away from an ontology of *dharmas*. No longer considered as ultimate realities, the meditative act of watching *dharmas* arise and pass away might naturally have come to be considered as an unnecessary, secondary or even an inferior kind of practice.¹⁶² Thus within the Mahāyāna a trend may have developed towards the identification of insight practices with specific intellectual lines of reasoning. Observation of the impermanence of *dharmas* may have been relegated to a lesser role -- no longer associated with the liberating insight that marks the entry into supramundane wisdom, so much as a healthy reminder that time is short and one had best practice while one can.¹⁶³

For the śrāvaka schools the mode of cognition involved in insight may have been less

¹⁶¹ Note that for the Theravāda the notion of *svabhāva* is simply that of nature, or character, *svalakṣana*, rather than one of an ontological ultimate. Hence water has the character of wetness -- nothing in this conception implies permanence, irreducibility or ultimacy. See Gethin (1992:149-150).

¹⁶² These observations are consistent with the commonly made generalization that an empirically oriented early Buddhism was gradually displaced by a more philosophically inclined religion concerned with defending itself against brahmanical critics.

¹⁶³ Such a suggestion would seem particularly compatible with the tradition of Tathāgatagarbha teachings as found in sutras like the *Tathāgatagarbha*, *Mahāparinirvāṇa*, *Śrīmālādevī*, *Laṅkāvatāra* and the *Ghanavyūha sūtras*. In these texts, to varying degrees, we find the rejection of the three marks (along with impurity, *aśubha*) as proper characterizations of the *Dharmakāya*. Somewhat problematically, from the traditional Buddhist point of view, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* actually defends the attribution of permanence, bliss, self, and purity to the *Dharmakāya*. Although traditionally one must come to see conditioned phenomena as they are -- impermanent, suffering, of no substantial ego and impure, this characterization will itself be in error if it is applied to the *Dharmakāya* considered as emptiness, and even to *dharmas* understood to be empty of self-nature (Brown: 78). These errors are attributed to the śrāvakas, for whom the notions of *anitya*, *asukha*, *anātman* and *aśubha* have become the objects of dogmatic attachment. Thus the RGV negates them -- albeit while attempting not to posit the *Dharmakāya* as a substantial entity. See Brown (72-81) and Ruegg (1989:17-55).

conceived as involving the deliberative inferences of the aggregate of *saṃskāra*, and more as a process of cultivating and intensifying an *observational recognition (saṃjñā)* of *dharma*s qualified by the three marks. The conception Kamalaśīla outlines on the other hand most certainly involves the volitional formations. It is through a deliberate concentrated analysis directly founded on the objects of observation, that emptiness is conceptually understood. Put in other terms, we may alternately suggest a śrāvaka emphasis on *samprajanya* rather than *manasikāra*, which would be more strongly emphasized, and associated with insight, in some Mahāyāna schools. For example, the Madhyamaka in general may have placed less emphasis on the observational aspect and more on the analytic dimension of insight. It is possible that these two conceptions were combined in the Yogācāra school, two of whose *sūtras* appear as the main sources of the experientially based analytic meditation we find described in the *Bhāvanākramas*.

Thus for Kamalaśīla it is clear that the relatively passive act of observing *dharma*s is not considered sufficient. More generally we can say that for those who would have held the observation of the arising and passing away of *dharma*s to be insufficient (or misguided), there would obviously have been less scope for accommodating practices aimed at the direct observation of the three marks of existence. For śrāvakas to see reality as it is is at least to see *dharma*s as impermanent; for Mahāyanists it is to understand that *dharma*s are actually unoriginated. Any predication of impermanence (or permanence) is ultimately unfounded, as the logical subject or property holder (*dharmin*) of the predication is unreal, like an illusion.

In different Mahāyāna schools, and in varying degrees, active inferential analyses of various kinds would thus have come to characterize their conceptions of insight. It seems credible to suggest that when taken to its limit such a position would imply an identification of insight with

cintāmayī prajñā and meditation with nonconceptual *dhyāna*, as outlined in conception B in Section 1.3.2 above.¹⁶⁴ We have seen, however, that for Kamalaśīla this reading is not as plausible as that of conception A. As a Madhyamaka, Kamalaśīla did indeed conceive the process of insight as aimed at the cognition of emptiness. But he also describes insight as an *observationally based* analytic process -- even if not one aimed at recognizing the three marks of existence. Thus while the observational experiencing of *dharmas* in meditation is not regarded as sufficient, it is considered necessary.

It is further possible that the two conceptions of *samādhi* found in the *Bhāvanākramas* can be respectively attributed to Yogācāra (A) and Madhyamaka (B) influences. The former might be principally associated with a conception of *samādhi qua bhāvanā* and *vipaśyanā* as essentially including an observational component. The latter could be associated with a conception of *samādhi qua dhyāna* and *vipaśyanā* as intellectual analysis. Further research is necessary to corroborate or falsify this hypothesis.¹⁶⁵

If Indian Buddhist traditions did indeed differ regarding their *conceptions* of what is known in insight meditation, would this fact suggest anything at all about what individuals may actually have been doing when practicing meditation? I think it is reasonable to suppose that it would. For Kamalaśīla the notion of origination is not accepted (Bhk 1 199.3-202.8). It would not make sense for a meditator who takes such a recognition seriously to cultivate anything more than a minimal

¹⁶⁴ It is possible that within some Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions, such as the Prāsaṅgika tradition of the dGe lugs, a tendency to understand insight as primarily intellectual in nature arose from just such an understanding. More research is required to determine if this is true.

¹⁶⁵ This is suggested by the fact that conception A seems to be partially based on the conception of *samādhi* found in an important Mādhyamika proof text, the *Samādhirājasūtra*, while conception B is primarily based on two texts associated with the Yogācāra: the *Samdhinirmocana* and *Laṅkāvatāra sūtras*.

awareness of arising and ceasing -- just enough, perhaps, to be subsequently negated.

At a minimum, these considerations can be used to understand one scholastic stream of Indian Buddhism's self-understanding, its self-identification as Mahāyāna in contrast to the Śrāvakayāna (i.e. those whose insight meditation practices consist in a special mode of concentrative analysis). It is clear that Kamalaśīla held that the two vehicles differed in their respective conceptions of insight. It is possible that he was correct. This hypothesis is falsifiable in principle. Given the central importance of both meditation and the concept of insight to the Indian Buddhist tradition, it seems to me that an attempt to test it would be a worthwhile, albeit vast, undertaking. In order to investigate this scholars would have to first analyze what the various schools' texts have to say about the concept of insight. One could word-search the corpus of various early Mahāyāna texts for references to insight (*vipāśyanā*) and to the three marks of existence (individually and collectively). One could then chart the results to see the frequencies and correlations of such references over the centuries in different schools of thought. It is possible that in the Mahāyāna in general, the Madhyamaka in particular, or some further sub-schools thereof, there gradually came to be fewer and fewer references to the observation of the three marks and insight in the same breath.

3.2 Conclusions

In the course of this study of the *Bhāvanākramas* six general and interconnected themes have emerged:

1. Two concepts of *samādhi* exist within the text, associated with two views of *vipāśyanā*. The first regards *samādhi* as both conceptual and nonconceptual and *vipāśyanā* as *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*. The second understands *samādhi* as nonconceptual and *vipāśyanā* as *cintāmayī prajñā*.

2. The first of these, conception A, predominates in the *Bhāvanākramas*. The texts have therefore been translated accordingly. A very different translation would have resulted if conception B was taken as normative.
3. Kamalaśīla regarded *bhāvanā* as a broader concept than *dhyāna*, one that more truly reflects the nature of Mahāyāna practice.
4. For Kamalaśīla *vipāśyanā* involves both the meditative observation of *dharmas* and a special kind of experiential analysis that is not identifiable with ordinary reasoning.
5. Kamalaśīla held that what is known through insight in the Mahāyāna is different from what is known through insight in the Śrāvakayāna. Recognition of emptiness is regarded as distinctively belonging to the Mahāyāna. Knowledge of impermanence, and more generally of the three marks of existence, is not, in and of itself, regarded as insight. It is, rather, associated with *śamatha* meditation.
6. This suggests the possibility that different conceptions of insight prevailed in different streams of Indian Buddhism. In particular, some elements of the Mahāyāna, especially within the Madhyamaka, may have distinguished themselves from the Śrāvakayāna in terms of the meditation practices they prescribed for insight. This hypothesis is falsifiable in principle.

It is generally agreed by Buddhists that *vipāśyanā* is an observationally analytic process.

But it may be the case that while the weight of this notion initially rested on the observation aspect, in later times analysis was emphasized. This fact may be reflected in a blurring of the distinction of *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*, a phenomenon which is apparent in the *Bhāvanākramas*. We have seen that in the *Bhāvanākramas* the concept of insight is associated both with observation and analysis. Insight is said to be experiential in a way ordinary reasoning is not. I suggest that this is because of the observational dimension of the process. It is thus because of this aspect of insight that the process is correctly considered one of *bhāvanāmayī* rather than *cintāmayī prajñā*. Insight is equated with *bhūtapratyavekṣā*, which in turn is said to be either identified with or based upon *dharmapracaya*. Each of these terms is associated both with a dimension of observation and a dimension of analysis. *Dharmapracaya*, however, is a term more clearly conceived along observational lines. Unfortunately its nature is not clearly spelled out in the *Bhāvanākramas* --

perhaps because it was considered too obvious (or perhaps because it was too obscure).

It may be the case that the experiential nature of the analytic component of *vipaśyanā* was not considered crucial by some within the Buddhist tradition. This may have allowed *vipaśyanā* to become identified with strictly intellectual processes of analysis, and the nonconceptual processes of *śamatha* and *dhyāna* to become exclusively associated with the experiential dimension of practice. While both conceptions are present within the *Bhāvanākramas*, the elevation of the status of nonconceptual *dhyāna* over *bhāvanā* was vigorously opposed by Kamalaśīla.

One possible reason for the lack of clarity surrounding the experiential dimension of insight is that practices involving the cultivation of awareness of the three marks of existence may have fallen by the wayside in some schools of the Mahāyāna. We have seen that such practices were not held by Kamalaśīla to constitute insight. It is, however, clear that he held them to be part of the śrāvakas' conception of insight and felt that his opponent would also recognize them as such. He himself appears to associate these practices with *śamatha* meditation.

TEXTS

The Process of Meditation I

¹ In the Indian language *bhā va na kra ma*; in the language of Tibet: *bsgom pa'i rim pa*.

Homage to Manjuśrī Kumārabhūta!
The Process of Meditation is briefly set forth
with regard to the regulation of conduct
of a beginner in the Mahāyāna *sūtras*

1. Great compassion is of primary importance to the bodhisattva;
universality of pain; necessity of compassion.²

In brief, those wishing to quickly reach the state of omniscience should strive in three areas: compassion, the thought of Awakening and practical realization (*pratipatti*). Knowing that compassion alone is the root cause of all the qualities of the Buddha, that is cultivated at the very outset. As it is said in the noble *Dharmasamgītisūtra*:

Then the great being, the bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara said this to the Bhagavān: "Bhagavan, a bodhisattva should not train in too many teachings. Bhagavan, if one teaching is completely adopted, completely realized by a bodhisattva then all the qualities of the Buddha rest in the palm of his hand. Which is the one teaching? Great compassion. It is because of great compassion, Bhagavan, that all the Buddha-qualities rest in the palm of the hand for bodhisattvas. For example Bhagavan, where the Wheel-treasure of a wheel-turning king appears, all the multitudes of troops appear. In the same way Bhagavan, where the great compassion of the bodhisattva appears, all the qualities of the Buddha appear. Bhagavan, just as when the life-force is present other powers will arise, likewise Bhagavan, when great compassion is present the bodhisattva's other qualities will arise."

And it is also said in the noble *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*:

"Moreover, Venerable Śaradvatīputra, the bodhisattvas' great compassion is inexhaustible. Why is that? Because of its precedence. Venerable Śaradvatīputra, just as breaths are the predecessors of a person's vital force, so too for the full accomplishment of the accumulations (*sambhārah*, i.e. of merit and knowledge) of

¹ Unless otherwise noted the present translation is based on Tucci (1986).

² Division and heading of sections follow Tucci.

the Mahāyāna the bodhisattva's great compassion is the predecessor".

And it is said in the noble *Gayāśīrṣa*:

"Mañjuśrī! The practice of the bodhisattvas has what starting-point, what sphere?"
Mañjuśrī said, "The practice of the bodhisattvas has great compassion as its starting point, O Son of the Gods -- its sphere is that of sentient beings."

Thus being moved by the great compassion that has the goal of helping others, the bodhisattvas, indifferent to themselves, one-pointedly proceed in the task of acquiring the accumulations -- even though this is very difficult and takes a long time. And thus it is said in the noble

Śraddhābalādhāna:

"Therefore, because of [great] compassion there is nothing whatsoever which imparts pleasure that he does not give up for the sake of ripening all sentient beings [nor any misery-ridden rebirth that he does not accept]."

Henceforth, having fulfilled the accumulations without delay, the one who undergoes great difficulty definitely attains omniscience. Thus compassion alone is the root of the Buddha's qualities. Having attained omniscience by fully adopting great compassion, the Illustrious Buddhas remain working (*vikurvāna*) for the entire world; thus the Bhagavāns' great compassion is itself the reason for their not remaining in *nirvāṇa*. And this increases by increasing one's attention on the object of distressed sentient beings. And it should be cultivated towards all sentient beings, since every sentient being in the three world realms is perpetually afflicted by the three kinds of suffering, each according to its circumstances.

And so, first of all, the Bhagavān described the denizens of Hell submerged in various miseries, such as continuous, protracted burning. And the ghosts also experience acute suffering, their forms emaciated by the agony of unbearably severe pains of hunger, thirst and so forth. They are thus described by the Bhagavān as not obtaining a dirty ball of snot to eat, even in the course of

a century. Animals also are seen experiencing diverse kinds of suffering because of mutual malice, killing and mutilation. Thus some, being tormented from all sides and completely against their will, have their bodies subjugated by piercing the nose, beating, binding and so forth. They are exhausted, their bodies worn out by carrying unbearably heavy burdens. Thus too, certain harmless ones dwelling in the wilderness, having been hunted down (*anviṣya*) for some purpose somewhere, are slain. And as they perpetually remain fleeing hither and thither with minds agitated by fear, their suffering is definitely seen to be unlimited.

So too among men, hellish suffering is definitely seen. Here there is the hellish suffering of those who are robbers and such, who are done in by chopping off their limbs, impalement on spikes, hanging and so forth. And the suffering caused by hunger, thirst and so on belonging to the poverty-stricken and their ilk is just like that of the hungry ghosts. And the suffering caused by beating, confinement and so on belonging to those who are slaves and their ilk, whose bodies are completely subjugated and who having been seized by the powerful are oppressed, is just like that of the animals. Thus their suffering, created by desire, by mutual animosity, killing and such, and by separation from the agreeable as well as union with the disagreeable, is immeasurable.

Even those who are spoken of as contented rich people somewhere, of whom the wealth does come to an end, sunk in a pit of various mistaken views they accumulate the various actions and afflictions that are the causes of the experience of suffering for hell-beings and so on. In reality they are truly miserable, existing in the cause of suffering just like trees on a precipice.

Even the gods, of the desire-realm to begin with -- those of whom the hearts are ablaze with the fire of acute desire, and whose thoughts are beclouded as though their minds were convulsed -- they do not attain concentration of their minds even momentarily. Deprived of the treasure which is

tranquillity and ease -- what kind of happiness is *that*? How are those afflicted by the fear and sorrow of perpetual transmigration, decline and so forth happy?

And those (gods) of the realm of form and the realm of the formless as well -- even if they have temporarily left behind the suffering connected with pain -- because they have not completely relinquished the latent tendencies (*anuśaya*) of the desire-realm, the suffering connected with change definitely still exists for them, on account of the possibility of falling into hell and so forth. In fact, all those who are gods and men are afflicted by the suffering connected with mental formations, in virtue of their subservience to afflictions, actions and so forth.

2. *How compassion should be meditated upon.*

Thus having understood that the entire world is licked by the blaze of the fires of suffering, compassion towards all beings should be cultivated by considering, "Just as suffering is disagreeable to me, it is likewise disagreeable to others." First of all (it) should be cultivated by keeping in view the aforementioned experiences of various suffering among those who occupy the position of friends. Then one who does not see difference owing to the basic equality of beings should cultivate compassion towards strangers (*vyasta*) by broadly considering, "And in beginningless *samsāra* there is not a single being who has not been a relative of mine a hundred times." Once an equal compassion is developed towards strangers as towards those in the position of friends then, in the same way, it also should be cultivated towards one in the position of an enemy -- by bearing in mind the basic equality of beings and so on.

And once it is equally developed towards an enemy as towards a friend, then gradually (it) should be made to arise towards all the beings of the ten directions. And when compassion is

developed equally towards all beings as dear as afflicted children, carrying its own essence in the form of wishing to rescue (them) from suffering, then it is perfected and obtains the designation "great compassion", just as it is described in the *Akṣayamatisūtra*. And this gradual meditation of compassion is described by the Buddha in the *Abhidharmasūtra* and so on.

3. It helps the thought of Awakening.

Thus for him the thought of Awakening arises effortlessly from the power of the practice of compassion -- in the form of seeking after unsurpassed, perfect Awakening through the vow to rescue all beings. Thus it is said in the *Daśadharmasūtra*:

Having seen beings unprotected, defenceless, without refuge; having produced a thought devoted to compassion, he then generates the thought of unsurpassed, perfect Awakening.

Although (here it is said that) the magnanimous bodhisattva's thought of Awakening arises because of deliberate reflection upon others and so forth, in the noble *Tathāgatajñānamudrāsamādhi* the bodhisattva's thought of Awakening that arises on its own, from an impulse of compassion, is described by the Bhagavān as being superior. This very thought of Awakening even lacking in practical realization is described by the Bhagavān as a great reward in *samsāra*. And thus it is said in the *Maitreyavimokṣa*:

Thus, for example, O noble son, even a fragment of a diamond-jewel outshines any highly refined golden ornament. It does not lose the name diamond-jewel and it (still) dispels all poverty. Thus noble son, even a fragment of the practice of the diamond-jewel which is the production of a mind of omniscience outshines any golden ornament of the virtues of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. And it does not lose the name of the thought of Awakening and it (still) dispels the poverty of *samsāra*.

Even one who is unable to train in the perfections completely in every respect, should generate the thought of Awakening - on account of the great fruitfulness of embracing method.

And as is said in the noble *Rājāvavādakasūtra*:

Because you, O great king, with many duties and much to do, are not able to train in the perfection of giving completely in every respect, and equally so in the perfection of wisdom, on account of that then, you, O great king, must constantly and continuously remember, bear in mind and cultivate - the wish, the faith, the longing, and the prayer for Awakening whether you be walking, standing, sitting, lying down, waking, eating or drinking. Having accumulated the roots of virtues of the past, future and present relating to all the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, noble śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, laypeople as well as yourself - rejoice! And having rejoiced with great rejoicing, perform the rituals of worship of all the Buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas and noble śrāvakas. And having acted thus, extend it to all beings. Then, in order to obtain omniscience for all sentient beings, and to fulfill all the teachings of the Buddha, develop unsurpassed, perfect Awakening at three times throughout the day. Thus indeed, O King, being accomplished you will govern, and you will not neglect the king's duties." Having spoken thus, he said, "Thus indeed, O great King, having done much through the ripening of the roots of virtue on account of the genuine thought of Awakening, you have become fit for the gods. Having done much, you have become fit for men. And among all those appearing as gods and men you will be made sovereign.

4. Bodhicitta: Thought of Awakening.

But it is established that the thought of Awakening that has its heart in practical realization (*pratipattisāram*, T. *sgrub pa sñiñ po byed pa*) has an extraordinarily abundant reward. Thus it is stated in the noble *Vīradattapariṣcchā*:

The merit from the thought of Awakening,
 if it took shape,
 having filled the sky would yet surpass it
 A man who would offer to the Lords of the world,
 filled with jewels
 Buddha-fields as many as the sands of the Ganges
 And one who, having made *prāñjali*,
 bends his thought to Awakening:
 It is this worship which excels,
 of which there is no end.

Just as it is described in the noble *Gaṇḍavyūha*, "The thought of Awakening is like the seed (*bijabhūta*) of all the qualities of the Buddha."

And that thought of Awakening is of two sorts: the thought which is an intention and the thought which is (actually) proceeding (to act). It is described in the noble *Gaṇḍavyūha* thus:

Difficult to find, O noble son, are those beings in the world of beings who wish for unsurpassed, perfect Awakening.

In comparison, most difficult to find are those beings who have actually proceeded towards unsurpassed, perfect Awakening.

The consciousness which has the form of firstly seeking, "May I become a Buddha for the benefit of the entire world," -- that is the intending thought. From the moment beings exist in the adoption of vows and have entered (T. *zugs*; Skt. *drśyante*, "are seen") into the accumulations - that is the proceeding Thought. And vows should be taken (*grāhyah*) from another, from a spiritual friend who is (already) established in vows and whose strength is known. But when there is no suitable initiator (*grāhaka*), then having turned to face the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, one should produce the thought of Awakening in the same way as it was produced by Mañjuśrī who became King Ambara. A bodhisattva with the thought of Awakening produced thus, himself gives gifts and so forth and undertakes the practical realization (*pratipatti*), having thought, "One who is himself untamed does not tame others."

5. Wisdom and Method, prajñā and upāya, must be realized jointly.

Moreover, without practical realization Awakening is not attained. Just as is said in the noble *Gayāśirṣa*:

Awakening belongs to bodhisattvas who have the essence that is practical realization, not to those who do not have the essence which is practical realization.

And it is said in the noble *Samādhirāja*:

O son, you should train thus: "Therefore, may I become one possessing the essence

of practice." Why is that? Because for one with the essence of practice, unsurpassed genuine Awakening is not difficult to find.

And in *sūtras* such as the *Akṣayamati* and the *Ratnamegha* the practical realization of bodhisattva is described in detail by way of division into perfections, immeasurables, attractions and so forth³.

Thus a bodhisattva should train in the areas of the worldly arts,⁴ etc. How much more so in the transcendent absorptions! Otherwise how would they perform every kind of benefit for beings?

This itself, in brief, is the bodhisattva's practical realization which has the form of wisdom and method -- not wisdom alone, nor method alone. As in the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśaḥ*, "Method without wisdom, and wisdom without method, are a shackle of bodhisattvas."

Wisdom accompanied by method, method accompanied by wisdom are described as being liberation. And it is said in the noble *Gayasīrṣaḥ*:

These two are the two shortened paths of the bodhisattvas. Magnanimous bodhisattvas who are endowed with these two paths will quickly wake up to unsurpassed, perfect Awakening. Which two? Method and wisdom.

6. Wisdom and Method.

In that context, having abandoned the perfection of wisdom, everything that includes the perfections beginning with giving, the attractions and so forth -- the skill that allows one to attain

³ Six perfections (*ṣaḍ pāramitāḥ*, *pha rol tu phyin pa drug*) - 1. Giving (*dāna*, *sbyin pa*) 2. Morality (*śīla*, *tshul khriṃs*) 3. Patience (*kṣānti*, *bzod pa*) 4. Energy (*vīrya*, *brtson 'grus*) 5. Absorption (*dhyāna*, *bsam gtan*) 6. Wisdom (*prajñā*, *shes rab*). Four immeasurable contemplations (*catvāryāpamānāni*, *tshad med bzī*) - 1. Love (*maitrī*, *byams pa*) 2. Compassion (*karuṇā*, *sñin rje*) 3. Sympathetic Joy (*muditā*, *dga' ba*) 4. Equanimity (*upekṣā*, *btañ sñoms*). Four means of conversion (*catvāri saṃgraha vastūni*, *bsdu ba'i dños po bzī*) -- 1. Giving whatever is necessary (*dāna*, *mkho ba sbyin pa*) 2. Speaking pleasantly (*priyavādītā*, *sñan par sgra ba*) 3. Helping others (*artha caryā*, *don spyod pa*). 4. Consistency between words and deeds (*samānārthatā*, *don mthun pa*). In this *sūtra* the scheme is one of six perfections, the first five falling under Method. In another later (?) development Method (*upāya*) came to be considered a separate perfection which together with vow (*prañidhāna*), power (*bala*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) together constitute the ten perfection scheme found at the end of Bhk1.

⁴ T: *bzo*. According to Candra Das (1111) divisible into arts of body, speech and mind. Arts of the mind are again divisible into three: *thos*, *bsam* and *sgom* i.e. *śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī*, and *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*.

all the *dharmas* of worldly development:⁵ the complete purification of the fields, great enjoyment, many followers, prosperity, the ripening of beings, magical transformations and so on -- is said to be method. As for wisdom, it is the cause of ascertaining the true nature of that very method. Because of it, having discriminated genuine method, one is unchanged by acting (*anuṣṭhānam*) appropriately for the benefit of oneself and others; the one who is experiencing does not get afflicted, just as with poison taken along with a *mantra*. Thus it is said in the very same *sūtra*:

Method is the knowledge of attraction, wisdom is discriminating knowledge.

And it is said in the noble *Śraddhābalādhāna*:

Which is the skillfulness in method? It is the bringing together of all *dharmas* correctly (*T. only: yañ dag par*). Which is wisdom? It is skillfulness by way of not getting mixed up with any *dharmas*.

These two, method and wisdom, are definitely to be adhered to at all times, also by those who have entered the stages (of the bodhisattva) -- not just wisdom alone, nor method alone. On account of which, the proper practice of the perfections of the bodhisattva in all ten stages is recited in the *Daśabhūmika* and so on, as in the words, "Never is it the case that in the remaining stages, one does not properly practice." In the eighth stage of the bodhisattva dwelling in peace, the neglect of duty (*vyutthānam*) would be opposed by the Buddhas. And that is to be understood from reading.

7. No contradiction can be discovered in the scriptures.

And that which is stated in the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and *Gayāśīrṣa sūtras* also would contradict what was previously said, on account of what is generally stated there. And that which is

⁵ *abhyudaya* = "sukham" worldly goods, things pertaining or pleasing to the senses. Its counterpart is *nīḥsreyas* = "hitam" metaphysical goods, things pertaining to spiritual development. (Ref: K.N. Mishra).

said in the noble *Sarvadharmasaṃgrahaivaipulyasūtra* would also be in contradiction. There it was said:

"Subtle indeed, O Mañjuśrī, is the veil of actions opposing the true *Dharma*. Mañjuśrī! Whosoever generates to a positive evaluation (*śobhanasaṃjñām*) of one teaching spoken by the Tathāgata [i.e. wisdom] (and) a negative evaluation with respect to another (teaching) [i.e. method], that person rejects the true *Dharma*. The Tathāgata is maligned by one who rejects the true *Dharma*." Having clearly spoken in this way, he said, "As for this, Maitreya, which is the bodhisattvas' realization of the six perfections for the sake of Awakening (T. *byañ chub*; Skt. *bodha*) those ignorant people will speak as follows. 'A bodhisattva should train only in the perfection of wisdom, what with the remaining perfections!' They consider the other perfections relating to method to be reprehensible. Is that what you think Ajita? Did he who was the king of Kaśī possess corrupt wisdom, he by whom his own flesh was given to a hawk for the sake of a dove?" Maitreya said, "Definitely not this, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "Maitreya, with regard to those meritorious deeds linked to the six perfections I accumulated by travelling the bodhisattvas' course, was any harm done by those virtuous actions?" Maitreya said, "Definitely not so, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "You, Ajita, to the extent of having realized sixty aeons in the perfection of giving, have to the same degree realized sixty aeons in the perfection of wisdom. Therefore (only) those who are ignorant people say, 'Awakening is only (reached) by a single way, that is, by the way of emptiness.'"⁶

And it is also said in the *Vairocanābhisambodhisūtra*, "This omniscient knowledge which has compassion as its root and the thought of Awakening as its cause is the end of method."

Therefore both [i.e. method and wisdom] should be pursued by the bodhisattva at all times.

8. *Apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*; it can be explained only if there is cooperation of wisdom and method.

So it is that the nonabiding *nirvāṇa* of the Bhagavāns is demonstrated. For the Bhagavāns' not abiding in *nirvāṇa* is on account of their embracing the prosperity of the fruit of great enjoyment such as a form body, a (Buddha-) field, followers and so on, (all of which) belong to method i.e. giving and so forth. And because of wisdom, there is no staying in *samsāra* on account

⁶ Cf. Bhk 2 D 52a1f. and Bhk 3: 26.16-27.4

of the complete abandoning of all mistakes -- for *samsāra* is rooted in a mistake. Moreover, by this path which consists in wisdom and method, the middle way is made to arise -- on account of the abandonment of the extremes of superimposition and denial (of reality). By wisdom the extreme of superimposition is abandoned; by method the extreme of denial is abandoned. Hence it is said in the noble *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra*:

Such a one is an enjoyer of the perfection of the form-body (*rūpakāya*), that is, the major and minor characteristics -- not one who delights in the realization of the *Dharmakāya* alone.

Again it is said:

Born from wisdom and method, the arising of the Tathāgatas should be understood to be dependent upon others.

Which is stated again:

Those who know the method of the teachings to possess the likeness of a raft should abandon the teachings. And even before that, what is not the teaching.

But this is said with the intention that they should be abandoned by abandoning one's mistaken attachment, but not that they should not also be resorted to in order to achieve the purpose. And so it is said, "The teaching should be adopted, not clung to." The meaning is that it should not be adopted in a misguided way. And giving and the rest, which in some places are described as worldly fruits, were previously spoken of (in that way) for the benefit of those who possess them without wisdom -- who are satisfied with meritorious deeds as such -- in order to inspire (them to) higher meritorious actions. Otherwise it would all contradict the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*. Therefore it is established that the two, wisdom and method, are to be pursued. In that context, when adopted along with wisdom, giving and the rest obtain the designation "perfection" -- not otherwise. Hence having remained concentrating in order to completely purify giving and the rest, one should strive

to obtain wisdom.

9. *Prajñā: śrutamayī, cintamayī, bhāvanāmayī.*

There, first of all, the wisdom of hearing should be generated. For through it first of all one enters into the meaning of the scriptures. Thereafter one penetrates their provisional and definitive meanings by the wisdom of thinking. After that, having ascertained the meaning that is real [*bhūtam artham*, i.e. non-origination, emptiness] by means of that (wisdom of thinking), one should cultivate it, not that which is unreal [*abhūtam i.e. neyārtha*]. Otherwise, on account of meditating upon the false and the (consequent) non-disappearance of doubt, there could be no production of perfect knowledge. And then meditation would be pointless, just like that of the non-Buddhists. And the Bhagavān stated in the *Samādhirāja*:

If one investigates *dharma*s without identity
And if, having investigated them, one would meditate
That is the cause of obtaining the fruit of *nirvāṇa*
Any other cause does not lead to peace.

Therefore when the wisdom consisting in thinking has investigated by way of both logic and scriptures, the very reality which is the natural condition of things should be cultivated. And the natural condition of things is ascertained, on the basis of scripture and reasoning, to be in the ultimate sense only non-origination.

10. *The non-origination of all things is ascertained by a) āgama and b) yukti.*

a) *āgama*, authority:

In this context, from the scriptures -- as it is put in the noble *Dharmasaṃgīti*, "Non-origination is truth, other attributes are falsehood." And this non-origination is called true on the

basis of its being in accord with ultimate truth (*paramārthānukūlatva*), even though from the perspective of the ultimate truth there is neither origination nor non-origination since (ultimate truth is) beyond all mundane relations. Once again, and here itself, it is said:

The worldly crowd is preoccupied with arising and cessation, Kulaputra. Therefore the Tathāgata, possessed of great compassion, spoke in accord with mundane relations so as to remove the occasion of fear of the world, 'It arises, it stops,' -- even though there does not exist here the origination of any *dharmas* whatsoever.

And it is said in the noble *Buddhasaṃgīti*:

What is the fundamental inquiry? What is the foundation? It is said: Non-origination is the foundation. The inquiry with regard to it is the fundamental inquiry.

And again here itself it is said:

All *dharmas* because they have their beginning with 'a'⁷ are free from death and birth. All *dharmas* have as their beginning non-existence owing to their emptiness of inherent nature.

And in the noble *Satyadvayavibhāga* (it is said that) the equality of all *dharmas* is because of their equality with regard to non-origination. And it is said in the *Prajñāpāramitā*:

Material form, Subhūti, is empty of an inherent nature of material form, just as much as consciousness is empty of an inherent nature of consciousness -- owing to its emptiness of any specific characteristic.

And it has also been said in the *Hastikakṣya*:

There is no existent whatsoever to be found
of which origination is possible,
An ignorant person seeks origination
among non-originated *dharmas*.

And it was said in the *Pitāputrasamāgama*:

All these *dharmas*, all are equal because of the equality of the three

⁷ Reference to the Tantric theory that the letter 'a' is implicit in all phenomena in virtue of the fact that a) it is the first letter of the alphabet and b) it is the vowel inherent in all Sanskrit consonants. As this letter is also the prefix of negation, the implication is that all objects denoted by words are ultimately nonexistent, nonoriginated.

times. In the past time all *dharmas* were devoid of an inherent nature right up to the present time.

b) yukti, arguing: b.1 Origination is not uncaused:

Thus first one should investigate on the basis of scripture. Since the meaning of a text that has been made firm by reasoning cannot be assailed by others, one should investigate on the basis of reasoning also.

In this context the reasoning is briefly discussed. The origination of things could be either without or with a cause. (It can) not (be) without a cause, since it is seen to occur on specific occasions. For (if origination was) unconnected to a cause, would not things occur at all times and places in the same way as at the time of origination, on account of there being no distinction (between them)? Alternatively, because there is no difference between the time when it arises and the time when it does not arise, they could not even occur at the time of origination either! Thus it is proven that (origination) is not without a cause.

b.2 Origination is not caused; criticism of God as creator:

Not, however, that it has a cause. That is, in so far as a being such as God (Íswar) is imagined by non-Buddhists as a permanent cause, things (can) not be born from Him – since they are seen to originate gradually. For the gradual origination of an effect from a complete cause is not logical, because of [its] non-relation (*i.e.* to other contributing causes). For a powerful, self-sufficient being such as God there (can be) no connection to other (causes). This is on account of the fact that (such beings) cannot be assisted by others by reason of their permanence. And on account of the fact that a connection to one who is unassisted is not appropriate. Hence because

God and his ilk are devoid of all capacity, they have no nature. They are just like the son of a barren woman, since a real thing (*vastu*) is capable of causal efficacy. They have no capacity for gradual (origination) with regard to any effect anywhere in the manner thought (by non-Buddhists).

Nor also simultaneously. That is, having produced all effects suddenly, at a later time if He was truly capable of production then there would again be the entailment of the production of the (same) effects as before, in a repetition (resulting) from the nature of that capacity. Or else, if there was no such repetition, (his) impermanence would be entailed by (his) abandonment of (his) previous nature (of producing the set of effects). Therefore there is no real thing whatsoever designated "permanent." Hence truly it was stated by the Bhagavān:

But the superimposition is false, O Mahāmati, the superimposition due to attachment to unmade phenomena; the sky, cessation and *nirvāṇa*.

Therefore the origination of these from the permanent is not logical.

b.3 A noneternal cause is also illogical:

Nor also from the impermanent. On account of the unreality of the past and future, to that extent birth from that is not logical since it entails a condition of causelessness. But (it can) not (be) from the present, because origination from that in the same and different times is not appropriate. That is, not at the same time -- since the effect, like the nature of the cause, would (already) be accomplished by having been made to arise at the same time as it.

Nor also at a different time -- since if there is origination (after) a different interval of time (between cause and effect), then there would be the (absurd) entailment of the (present) production

of effects from a (disconnected) past. On the other hand, if origination occurred without an interval (between cause and effect) -- if origination was completely without interval, then the momentariness of an aeon would be entailed, since all moments would merge into one moment. Just as when there is the union of ultimate particles completely, there is the entailment of a lump being only a particle. Thus (if a moment had a connection) by one side, this would necessitate its being composed of parts. Nor do they arise from themselves, since this position is already covered by the position of (origination) without a cause, and because of the contradiction of activity in oneself.

Nor also from both -- since this would entail a double fault by partaking in both positions! Therefore [all] those things are from the ultimate perspective, non-originated. But because origination exists conventionally there is no contradiction with any particular scripture. And thus the Bhagavān said:

Things are born conventionally,
In the ultimate sense they are without a nature.
An error with regard to things without an inherent nature
is accepted as a convention.

And this reasoning was intended by the Bhagavān in the *Śalistamba* and elsewhere, since he (therein) denied birth from oneself, from another, from both and without a cause.

11. Other reasons. Criticism of the notion of matter (and atoms), of immateriality (vijñāna), of external objects as being distinct from mind:

Alternatively it should be analyzed by reasoning as follows. Things are of two sorts: those with a material form and those which are immaterial.

But here, first of all, those with a material form, such as pots and so forth, do not have an

individual nature since a material form is divisible into atoms. (And) their multiplicity (also) is not logical, since the condition of having the nature of a collection of atoms is not proven for atoms aligned in sequence being divided into directions like "in front" and so forth. And since aside from single or multiple natures there does not exist any other nature whatsoever for a thing, from the ultimate perspective natureless indeed are these entities with material form,, just like the forms perceived in a dream. And this was stated by the Bhagavān himself in the noble *Laṅkāvatāra*:

O Mahāmāti! As a cowhorn being divided into atoms does not remain, so too even the atoms -- being divided they do not retain the character of atomhood.

And those which are immaterial, being analyzed in this way, are also definitely without an inherent nature. That is to say, since an object which is external such as blue does not exist, the immaterial aggregates such as consciousness and the rest appear in the form of 'blue' out of their own capacity. It should be approached in this way. The Bhagavān said, "Material form is not outside, it is one's own mind that is seen outside." And thus those (immaterial things) having a singular nature are not logically possible since they appear in various aspects such as blue and so on [and] since they appear under the (two) forms of subject and object. And an individual having a multiple nature is not reasonable, since "one" and "many" are opposed.⁸ Since no individual nature (can be) established, then a multiple nature is also illogical -- since something multiple has the form of a collection of individuals!

But if it is accepted here that those untrue material forms and so forth appear as aspects, then consciousness also proves to be false since consciousness is no different in nature from those.

⁸ D 30a4: *de bas na sñon po la sogs pa sna tshogs kyi nam par snañ ba'i phyir dañ / gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa'i nam par snañ ba'i phyir ño bo ñid gcig tu mi ruñ ste / gcig dañ du ma mi mthun pa'i phyir gcig ni du ma'i ño bo ñid kho nar mi ruñ ño /*

For there is no other form of consciousness apart from the form it has in appearing. And material forms and so forth do not appear on their own. And since those which have been reduced to the nature of consciousness are false, it should be granted that all consciousness is false. Therefore the Bhagavān said, "All consciousness is like an illusion."

Therefore it is certain that all these things are ultimately false because of their voidness of singular or multiple natures. And this meaning was spoken by the Bhagavān in the *Laṅkāvatāra*:

Just as a form in a mirror, its oneness and otherness abandoned,
is seen and yet is not there, so too is the reality of things.

'Oneness and otherness abandoned' means 'without oneness or otherness'. And again it is said:

Discriminating with the intellect, an inherent nature is not
ascertained. Thus they are shown to be inexpressible and without an
inherent nature.

12. *Bhāvanāmayī prajñā*.

Thus having ascertained the real meaning by means of the wisdom of thinking, one should give rise to the wisdom of meditation in order to directly perceive it. In the noble *Ratnamegha* and others, it is declared, "The meaning does not become evident by merely hearing a great deal."

And experience (*anubhāvaḥ*) belongs to those who practice (*pratipattī*). Indeed also without the rising of the light of a clearer knowledge, the darkness of obscuration is not properly abandoned. From doing a lot of meditation, even upon an unreal object, a clearer knowledge arises. For example (it arises) for those practitioners who have attained nonauspicious objects and so on, as well as the entire earth and so forth. What to speak of those objects which are real? In that way, because meditation has the fruit which is very clear knowledge, its fruitfulness is spoken of in the noble *Samādhirāja*:

I illuminate (and) proclaim to you:
 Just as a man would reason a great deal
 So too in this way he becomes one deep in mind
 through those reasonings dependent on it.

Therefore he who wants to directly perceive (*sākṣātkartukāma*) reality proceeds in meditation.

13. Śamatha.

In this regard, first of all a yogin should produce tranquillity in order to stabilize the mind. Since the mind is tremulous, like water, there is no steadiness without a calm foundation. And reality as it is cannot be known by an unconcentrated mind. For it is stated by the Bhagavān, "One who has a concentrated mind discerns reality as it is."

Tranquillity is more quickly accomplished for [one who] is free from desires for gain and such, who is established in the correct orientation, whose discipline (*śīla*) endures pain and so forth and whose effort is begun. On account of this, giving and the others are repeatedly described in the noble *Samdhinirmocana* and the rest.

Therefore, one who in this way is established in the prerequisites (*sambhāra*) of tranquillity which begin with morality, having prostrated (oneself) before all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas in a place which is agreeable to the mind, confesses his sins taking joy in its merits. Then, manifesting great compassion and sitting down on a comfortable seat with the body straight and in the lotus posture, this one who intends to rescue the entire world should bring about *samādhi*.

In that context, initially at the outset, the thing (*vastu*, *T. dños po*) to be analyzed is the collection of all things abbreviated in terms of kind; one should fix the mind there. But, summed up, a thing is twofold -- by way of division into material and immaterial. For a beginner it is appropriate to objectify (*ālabhayitum*) summarily in order to avoid the fault of distraction. But

when he becomes one whose attention is mastered, then having analyzed in terms of the division of the elements which are the aggregates and so on, he then also relies on a (more) detailed way (*vistāraśo 'py ālambata eva*). Thus in the *Samādhinirmocana* the various kinds of meditation object (*ālambana*) are spoken of in terms of the division of meditation objects into the eighteen kinds of emptiness for yogins and so on.

And in precisely this connection in the *Abhidharma* and elsewhere, out of the kindness to sentient beings, the Bhagavān taught the division of a thing in brief, in moderate detail, and in detail -- by way of the division into material, immaterial and so on.

And that thing should be counted (*gaṇayet*) as a collection of the elements which are the aggregates and so forth in order to avoid exaggeration and underestimation. And next, having ascertained the collection of all things, again one should continuously motivate the mind there itself. If in so doing the mind should be distracted outward because of desire and so forth, then having recognized the distraction and having pacified it by meditating on the topics beginning with impurity, one should again repeatedly motivate the mind there itself. But the process for meditating on the topics beginning with impurity is not written of, out of concern for too much detail in this book.

But when in that context one would see the mind dissatisfied, then one should develop satisfaction there by seeing the advantages of *samādhi*. One should pacify the dissatisfaction by seeing the faults in distraction. And if from being overcome by sluggishness and sleep, the mind has sunk because of a lack of clarity in the grasping the object, then having alleviated that laxity by meditating on a perception light or from paying attention to delightful things like the qualities of the Buddha, one should again seize that very object more firmly.

And if one would see the mind excited while remembering previous laughter, enjoyment and so on, then one should pacify the excitement by paying attention to sobering topics such as impermanence. Then one should again make an effort with respect to the mind's spontaneously engaging exactly that meditation object. And when, because of being cut off from laxity and excitement, one would see the mind bearing its own flavour, proceeding evenly, then by letting go of effort one becomes equanimous. For if an effort is made while the mind is proceeding evenly, then one would distract the mind.

But when the mind is proceeding just as long as one likes, spontaneously bearing in upon the object there, then tranquillity should be known to be accomplished. And this is the general definition of all tranquillity since tranquillity has the nature of mere one-pointedness of mind.⁹ Its object, on the other hand, is definitely not fixed. And this path of tranquillity has been explained by the Bhagavān in the noble *Prajñāpāramitā* and so on.

14. Six defects and eight counteragents.

Which is said with nine words, "One (acts upon) the mind there thus: *sthāpayati*, *samsthāpayati*, *avasthāpayati*, *upasthāpayati*, *damayati*, *śamayati*, *vyupaśamayati*, *ekotīkaroti* and *samādadhāti*." There *sthāpayati* (means) that one binds (the mind) by means of a meditation object. *Samsthāpayati* (means) that one makes (the mind) proceed continuously on the meditation object there itself. *Avasthāpayati* (means) that having understood distraction one avoids it. *Upasthāpayati* (means) that having avoided that distraction one again repeatedly binds (*sthāpayati*) (the mind) to

⁹ T: *zi gnas kyi ño bo ñid ni sems rtse gcig pa tsam du zas pa'i phyir 'di ni zi gnas thams cad kyi spyi'i mtshan ñid yin no /*

the meditation object there itself. *Damayati* (means) that one gives rise to satisfaction. *Śamayati* (means) that, by seeing the faults of distraction one quells dissatisfaction. *Vyupaśamayati* means that one quells the torpor and drowsiness that have arisen. *Ekotīkaroti* means that one makes an effort with respect to spontaneously engaging the meditation object. *Samādadhāti* means that one cares for, pays heed to the mind which has attained its balance. Such is the meaning. And the meaning of these words was explained by previous teachers and by Maitreya.

In brief, there are six (possible) faults for every single *samādhi*: laziness, loss of the object, laxity, excitement, lack of effort and overexertion. Eight conditions of abandonment should be cultivated as their antidotes, namely: faith, aspiration, exertion, pliancy, mindfulness, clear comprehension, willpower (*cetanā*) and equanimity. Here the first four are antidotes of laziness. That is to say, it is through the faith which has the characteristic of a firm confidence in the virtues of *samādhi* that the yogin's aspiration arises there. Then, out of that aspiration effort should commence. Through the power of that effort one obtains capability (*karmanyatā*) of body and mind. Then, for the one who is pliant (*praśrabdha*) in mind and in body the laziness abates. Hence (those antidotes) beginning with faith should be cultivated for the removal of laziness. Mindfulness is the antidote of "loss of the meditation object." Clear comprehension is the antidote of laxity and excitement since it is by it that laxity and excitement are properly noticed. But at the time when there is no alleviating the laxity and excitement, there is the fault of lack of effort; and as the antidote of that, willpower should be cultivated. Laxity and excitement being alleviated, when the mind is the carrier of calmness then there [can be] the fault of (over)exertion. Then its antidote, equanimity, should be cultivated. The *samādhi* which is accompanied by these eight conditions of abandonment is extremely effective. It establishes qualities such as the extraordinary powers. Thus

it is said in the *sūtra*, "One who is endowed with [the eight conditions of]¹⁰ abandonment develops a condition of extraordinary powers."

15. *Dhyāna etc.*

And this one-pointedness of mind receives the designation, "absorption", "formless attainment", "liberation", and so forth on account its being endowed with greater and greater capability and on account of possessing the distinct qualities of its object and so forth. That is, when it is conjoined with feelings of equanimity, and has gross thought and subtle thought, then it is called 'capable' (*anāgāmya*, T. *mi lcogs pa med pa*, "not unable"). And when it is separated from the thirst for pleasure [as well as] conjoined with [gross and subtle thought,] rapture, joy, and clarity pertaining to the self (*ādhyātmasamprasāda*, i.e. mindfulness and clear comprehension), then it is called the first absorption.

After this the first absorption without gross thought alone is called "intermediate absorption" (*dhyānāntara*). When it is without (both) gross thought and subtle thought, as well as separated from thirst for the stage of the first absorption -- (but still) conjoined with rapture, joy, and clarity pertaining to the self -- then it is called the second absorption.

But when it is separated from the thirst for the second absorption, (and) is conjoined with joy, equanimity, mindfulness and clear comprehension, then it is called the third absorption. And when it is separated from thirst for the stage of the third absorption and conjoined with the mindfulness and equanimity and without sorrow or pleasure, then it is called the fourth absorption.

Thus among the supreme domains and so forth which are the formless attainments and

¹⁰ D 32b2: 'du byed brgyad

liberations, one should engage (*yojyam*) according to the aspects and so forth of the meditation object. Having stabilized the mind upon the meditation object in this way, one should analyze by means of wisdom -- since the thorough removal of the seed of delusion occurs on the basis of generating the light of knowledge. For otherwise, through *samādhi* alone there would be no removal of the afflictions - as is the case with the non-Buddhists. Just as it is said in the *sūtra*:

And however one might cultivate this *samādhi*
 but that self-perception not be meditated upon
 Again its *kleśas* will be enraged
 here just as in Udraka's cultivation of *samādhi*¹¹

16. Method of meditation according to the *Laṅkāvatāra*; *vicāra* on the *dharmas*
 (no object, no subject), etc.

In this regard, this process of cultivating wisdom is briefly taught in the noble *Laṅkāvatāra*:

Having ascended to 'mind-only',
 one would not imagine an external object.
 Dwelling on the object which is suchness,
 one should transcend the mind-only.
 Having transcended the mind-only,
 one should pass into nonappearance.
 Established in the state of nonappearance
 the yogin sees the Mahāyāna.
 The effortless condition,
 pacified, is purified by prayers
 He sees the best knowledge,
 from which self has gone out,
 by means of nonappearance.

There this is the meaning. First of all the yogin should analyze (*vicārayet*, *T. dpyad par bya*) those *dharmas* having a material form, imagined by others as being external objects, "Are these other than consciousness, or is it this consciousness itself appearing in that manner -- just as in

¹¹ From the *Samādhirāja*. Udraka Rāmaputrah, one of the renunciate Siddhartha's teachers.

dreamstate?" In that regard (i.e. if the position held is that they have a nature) outside of consciousness, he should break them down into atoms (*paramāṇuśo vicārayet*, T. *rdul phra rab tu bśig ste*).

And discerning (*pratyavekṣamānaḥ*, T. *so sor brtags pa*) those atoms by way of parts, the yogin does not see (*na samanupaśyati*, T. *mi mthoñ*) those things. Not seeing (them), he thinks, "All this is indeed mind-only, an external object does not exist." Therefore thus, "Having ascended to mind-only, one would not imagine an external object." The meaning is that he would abandon conceptualizations of *dharmas* that have a material form. He should draw a conclusion (*vicārayet*, T. *mam par dpyad*) from the nonapprehension (*anupalabdhi*, T. *mi dmigs pa*) of those things that are in principle apprehensible (*upalabdhi*, T. *dmigs su ruñ ba*). Thus having broken down (*vibhāvya*, T. *mam par bśig nas*) *dharmas* with a material form, he should break down those without material form. There, that too is the mind alone. When there is the nonexistence of an object, a subject is not logical -- because of the dependence of subject upon object. Therefore one should analyze (*vicārayet*, T. *mam par dpyad pa*) thus: "The mind separated from the object and the subject is precisely the non-dual mind." (And) with respect to the characteristic of nonduality -- "Dwelling on the meditation object of suchness, one should also transcend the mind-only." The meaning is that one should go beyond the subjective aspect; one should dwell in the knowledge of non-duality which is without the appearance of duality

Thus having transcended the mind-only, so too one should transcend even the knowledge that is without the appearance of duality. And when the subject and object are false on account of the unacceptability (*anupapatti*, T. *mi 'thad pa*) of the birth of phenomena from themselves (or) from another, one should analyze thus: "That being real (i.e. the knowledge that is without the

appearance of non-duality) is illogical, since it is not different from those."

The meaning is that there also one should abandon attachment to the reality of this knowledge of non-duality; one should remain in the knowledge that definitely has no appearance of the knowledge of non-duality.

When this is so, one is established in the practical realization of the lack of inherent nature of all *dharmas*. Because the one who is established there enters ultimate suchness, there is the entry into nonconceptual *samādhi*. And thus when the yogin is established in the knowledge that has no appearance of nondual knowledge, then, due to his being established in the ultimate suchness he sees the Mahāyāna.

17. Meditation on the Absolute.

Only this itself is said to be the Mahāyāna which is the seeing of the ultimate suchness. This very seeing of the ultimate suchness, when there is the vision of genuine knowledge (*samyagjñānāvaloka*, T. *yañ dag pa'i ye śes kyi snañ ba śar*) of one who observes all *dharmas* with the eye of Wisdom, is a non-seeing (*adarśana*, T. *mthoñ ba med pa*). And thus it is said in the *sūtra*, "What is the seeing of the ultimate reality? It is the non-seeing of all *dharmas*." Here precisely this kind of "non-seeing" is intended, not the non-seeing which is from lacking a condition -- as with those who are blind by birth or whose eyes are closed, or which is from lack of attention. Therefore a mistaken inclination of attachment and so on towards things (*bhāva*, T. *dños po*) occurs on the basis of nonabandonment. Even if he is one who has emerged from the "unconscious state of attainment" and so forth (*asamjñīsamāpattyādivyutthita*), if possessed by the root which is attachment to existence, the yogin would yet be unliberated from the (future) arising of the group of

afflictions which are passions and so forth.

Passion and so forth, which has its root in attachment to existence, is described in the noble *Satyadvayanirdeśa* and elsewhere. But when it is said in the *Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇi*, “He sets aside the phenomenal signs of material forms and so forth on the basis of nonattention (*amanasikāra*),” the nonattention intended, which is nonapprehension (*anupalambha*) on the basis of observing with wisdom, is not the mere absence of mental activity (*manasikārābhāvamātra*). For beginningless attachment to material form and so forth is not removed by the mere abandonment of mental activity, as in the unconscious state of attainment etc. When there is no removal of doubt, one cannot avoid mental activity based upon attachment to previously apprehended material forms etc, just as there is no avoidance of burning when there is no avoidance of fire.

In this way, these false conceptualizations which are the material forms and so forth are not to be manually extracted from the mind like a thorn or some such thing pulled out by hand. Then what, (must it not be) by the disappearance of the seed of doubt? And that seed of doubt, when there is the light of *samādhi* of the yogin who is observing with the eye of wisdom, vanishes like the cognition of a snake in a rope, on account of the non-apprehension of those previously apprehended material forms and so forth which had taken on the character of findability -- not otherwise.

Thus mental activity based on phenomenal signs of material forms and so forth can be avoided on the basis of the disappearance of the seed of doubt, not otherwise. Indeed, otherwise, if there were no light of *samādhi* and also no vision with the eye of wisdom, the yogin’s doubt regarding the existence of material forms and so forth would not cease -- just as for a man situated down in an overgrown well with regard to the pots existing in a house. And with the non-cessation

of that, the irrational attachment to false material forms and so forth would continue -- just as for one who has the fault of unremoved eye disease. It could not be stopped by anyone. Therefore having taken hold of the mind with the hand of *samādhi* (the yogin) should clear away the seed of false conceptualizations of material forms, etc in the mind there with the sword of very subtle wisdom. When this is so, false conceptualizations, just like uprooted trees, because the ground is free of (their) roots, do not grow in the mind again. On account of this alone the Bhagavān taught the path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight in order to remove the obscurations, since those two are the causes of perfect non-conceptual knowledge. Thus it is said:

Having established morality,
 there is the gaining of concentration
 And from the gaining of concentration,
 there is the cultivation of wisdom.
 By means of wisdom,
 knowledge becomes pure
 For one whose knowledge is pure,
 verily there is the wealth of morality.¹²

So it is that when the mind is fixed upon the object by means of tranquillity, then the light of genuine knowledge arises for the one who analyzes with wisdom, and then the obscuration is banished just as the darkness when the light is shining. Therefore on account of the fact that these two are established as compatible qualities regarding the production of genuine knowledge, like the eye and light, there is no mutual incompatibility as there is between light and darkness. For *samādhi* does not have the nature of darkness. Then what, does it not have the character of onepointedness of mind? From the words, “And he who is concentrated knows reality as it is,” (it can be seen that *samādhi*) is entirely consistent with wisdom, and is not opposed. Therefore for the

¹² From the *Ratnakūṭa*.

one who is concentrated, who is observing with wisdom, there would be the nonapprehension of all *dharma*s. And that is the highest nonapprehension. And in this way, that yogins' condition characterized by stability is "effortless" because of the nonexistence of anything to be seen more than that. (The condition is) "pacified" because of the pacification of conceptual proliferation characterized by conceptions of existence and nonexistence, etc.

That is, when the yogin observing with the eye of wisdom does not apprehend any inherent nature in existents, then, for him there is no conception of existence. And also for him there is no conception of nonexistence. If ever an existent is seen, that being the case, a conception of nonexistence occurs by the denial of that. But when throughout the three times an existent is not apprehended by the yogin observing with eye of wisdom, then how can he form a conception of nonexistence through denial? Thus other conceptualizations definitely do not arise for him at that time because of the pervasion of all conceptualizations by conceptions of existence and nonexistence, and because when there is an absence of pervader there is no possibility of that which is to be pervaded. This itself is the *yoga* of the highest nonconceptualization.

18. *Definite Elimination of kleśa- and jñeya- āvaraṇa.*

In this circumstance, on the basis of all the steadfast yogin's conceptualizations coming to an end, afflictive and cognitive obscurations are completely removed. For the root cause of the afflictive obscuration is described by the Bhagavān in the noble *Satyadvayanirdeśasūtra* and elsewhere as the mistaken transposition (*viparyāsa*) of existence and so forth (*bhāvādi*) onto nonoriginated, unobstructed phenomena (*anutpannāniruddhabhāva*).

And on the basis of the removal of all conceptualizations of existence and so forth by this

practice of yoga, there is the removal of the mistaken transposition of all existence, which is of the nature of ignorance and the root of the afflictive obscurations. Thus on account of being cut off at the root the afflictive obscuration is completely removed.

Thus it is said in the *Satyadvayanirdeśa*:

"How, Mañjuśri, are the afflictions restrained? How are the afflictions fully known?" Mañjuśri said, "From the ultimate perspective, upon all of these *dharmas* which are really unborn, unoriginated and without substance there is a false inversion (*asadviparyāsaḥ*) because of conventions. On the basis of that false inversion, there is imagination and conceptualization (*saṃkalpavikalpa*). From that imagination and conceptualization comes unfounded mental activity (*ayoniśomanasikāra*). Out of unfounded mental activity there is a superimposition of self (*ātmasamāropah*). From the superimposition of self, there is the emergence of views (*drṣṭiparyutthāna*). On the basis of the emergence of views, the afflictions advance. But he, O Son of the Gods, who knows all *dharmas* to be really unborn, unoriginated and without existence -- such a one is ultimately unmistaken. And he who is ultimately unmistaken is without conceptualization (*avikalpa*). And one who is without conceptualizations is in touch with the fundamental (*yonīṣaḥ prayukta*). And for one who is in touch with the fundamental, the superimposition of a self does not occur. And for one to whom the superimposition of a self does not occur, there is no emergence of views. Ultimately there is not even the emergence of any view among the views of *nirvāṇa*. Thus the afflictions of one who dwells in nonorigination should be seen to be completely restrained. This is called the restraint of the afflictions. O Son of the Gods! When, ultimately, by means of knowledge without appearance he knows the afflictions to be really empty, really without existence, really without a phenomenal sign then, O Son of the Gods, the afflictions are fully known. As an example, O Son of the Gods, he who understands a species of snake neutralizes the poison of that snake. Just so, O Son of the Gods, for one who understands the origin of afflictions, the afflictions are completely neutralized." The Son of the Gods said, "What, O Mañjuśri, is the origin of the afflictions?" Came the reply, "Ultimately it is this imagination with respect to all *dharmas*, which are really unborn, unoriginated, and without existence, that is the origin of afflictions."

And because all inversion is pervaded by the inversion with respect to existence, on account of the removal of all inversion when there is the removal of that (inversion with respect to existence), the cognitive obscuration is also completely removed by this, since an obscuration is

defined in terms of an inversion. And when there is the removal of the cognitive obscuration, then on account of this absence of obstruction the yogin's perception (*yogipratyakṣa*) shines forth with the light of knowledge, unimpeded anywhere -- like a sunbeam through a sky whose covering of clouds has retreated. Thus consciousness has the appearance of light upon the nature of things (*vastusvabhāva*). But so long as an obstruction is present (*pratibandhasadbhāva*), it does not illuminate even something close at hand. When obstructions are absent however, then, from gaining a quality of inconceivable power, why indeed would not every single thing be illuminated just as it is? Therefore omniscience is obtained through knowing all things just as they are in terms of their conventional and ultimate nature. Thus only this is the highest path for removing obscurations and attaining omniscience. For the two obscurations are not properly removed by that which is the path of the śrāvakas, on account of the nonremoval of inversion. And so it has been said in the noble *Lāṅkāvataraśūtra*:

Others indeed, having seen all *dharma*s dependent on causes become possessed of such minds (as mistakenly see) *nirvāṇa* even in what is not *nirvāṇa*. Because they do not see the identitylessness of *dharma*s, Mahāmati, for them there is no liberation. Mahāmati! One who belongs to the class having the realization of a śrāvaka has the idea of a final emancipation (*niryāṇa*) in what is not the final emancipation (*aniryāṇa*). In such a case, Mahāmati, practice should be undertaken in order to purify false views.

And thus since there is no liberation by any other path, the Bhagavān spoke of only one vehicle. The path of the śrāvakas was only taught with the intention of getting started. So it is that by contemplating, "Indeed this is only the aggregates; there is no self", the śrāvaka enters into the view of the selflessness of the personality. One enters into the view of the identitylessness of external objects held by the Vijñānavādin by contemplating, "The three worlds are mind only." In this way, from the entrance which is the identitylessness of this nondual knowledge one comes to

enter into the highest suchness. But the entrance into mind-only alone is not the entrance into suchness. Just as was said before. And as was said in the noble *Lokottaraparivarta*:

Moreover, O Son of the Jinas, one realizes the three realms as mind-only, and that mind presents itself (*avatarati*) by way of the absence of middle and extremes.

The mind is without middle or extremes on account of the nonexistence of the two ends characterized by origination and dissolution, and of the middle which has the characteristic of endurance. Therefore the entrance into nondual knowledge is definitely the entrance into suchness (*tattva*). And how is that state of yogin purified? It is said, "It is purified by prayer." What is prayed for by the bodhisattva is the benefitting all beings through great compassion. Thereafter, from the practice of the virtues such as ever-increasing giving, having the power of prayer, that great compassion thus becomes purified. Because of this, even when there is knowledge of all *dharmas'* lack of inherent existence, the needs of all beings are not neglected to such an extent that it is said, "As long as this world itself remains, those undefiled by its faults will remain."

But how (is such a state) "without effort" (and) "pacified" ? Here the cause is said, "He sees the best knowledge, from which self has gone out, by means of nonreflection." On account of which, even that knowledge that has the characteristic of nonduality which is accepted as ultimately the best by the nondualists, the yogin sees as devoid of self, without a nature -- by means of knowledge which is without the appearance of nonduality. Hence it is without effort since there is nothing else to see; it is pacified because of the absence of all conceptualization.

19. Absolute and conventional: *paramārtha* and *saṃvṛti*.

Now here, if it is asked, "Who is this yogin who sees?", ultimately there isn't anyone with an independent self or some such, nor either any yogin who sees. But conventionally just as

consciousness occurs by the mere generation of cognitions of the aspects of sense objects such as material forms, so too in the world one maintains (*vyavahriyate*): "Devadatta sees Yajñadatta through cognition," even though there does not exist any self whomsoever, etc. So here too, that very cognition arising without the appearance of nondual knowledge is designated thus: "One sees by a knowledge without appearance." It is not the case that because of there being a lack of inherent existence of all *dharmas* from the ultimate perspective, that conventionally the knowledge of the yogins or other knowledge of the layman is not sought. So it is said in the noble *Satyadvayanirdeśasūtra*, "Although ultimately completely nonexistent, conventionally one cultivates the path." Otherwise, how could there be a distinction between ordinary people and śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and so on? However, that of which a cause does not exist even conventionally also does not arise conventionally -- just as a hare's horn and so forth. But that of which a cause exists, although ultimately false, definitely arises -- just as do illusions, reflections and so forth. And even though conventionally such illusions do arise in interdependence, ultimately their reality (*vastutva*) is not feasible since it does not stand up to analysis. Hence the entire world is like an illusion.

In this regard, just as for sentient beings the illusion of birth proceeds in dependence upon the illusions which are the actions and afflictions, so too for yogins the illusion of yogic knowledge proceeds in dependence upon the illusions which are the accumulations of merit and knowledge!

Thus it has been said in the noble *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*:

Someone is an apparition of a śrāvaka, someone an apparition of a pratyekabuddha,
 someone an apparition of a bodhisattva, someone an apparition of a Tathāgata.
 Someone is an apparition of actions, someone is an apparition of afflictions.
 Through this enumeration, Subhūti, all natures are known as apparitions.

But this is the distinction between yogins and common people: they are like magicians who,

from knowing that illusion as it really is, do not become attached to it as real. It is for that reason they are called yogins. Those who have taken a trick to be real, as have childlike, ordinary people illusion, are called 'childlike' because of their attachment to what is mistaken. Hence everything is consistent. As it is said in the noble *Dharmasamgiti*:

Just as a certain magician tries to liberate an apparition
 even while there is no attachment to the apparition
 because of his previous knowledge,
 So too he who has completely mastered Awakening
 having known the three worlds to resemble an apparition
 readies himself for this previously known world
 for the sake of living beings.

20. Progress in meditation, yuganaddhamārga.

Thus one should cultivate reality by this process. And there, as before, one should neutralize the laxity, excitement and so forth that have arisen. But when knowledge is proceeding spontaneously, without laxity or excitement, unto the object which is the lack of inherent existence of all *dharmas*, then the path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight is perfected. Then as much as one can, one should meditate established in the stage of zealous conduct, with the power of zeal. Then having broken the lotus posture just as one likes, and having arisen, one should again consider: Even if all these *dharmas* are ultimately without an inherent nature, the fact remains that they are established conventionally! Thus it was said in the noble *Ratnamegha*:

"How is a bodhisattva skillful in selflessness? Here, O Kulaputra, the bodhisattva discerns material form by means of genuine wisdom, he discerns feeling, perception, formations and consciousness. Discerning form, he does not find the production of form, nor does he find its cessation, nor does he find its origin. Thus he does not find the production of feeling, perception, formations or consciousness. Nor does he find their cessation. Nor does he find their origin. But this is so from the ultimate perspective, by the wisdom which abides in nonorigination -- not from the perspective of designated nature." And these who have minds like children experience diverse sufferings wandering around in *samsāra* because of their

mistaken attachment to entities that have no inherent nature.

Having manifested great compassion, one should think as follows, "I will act in such a way that once I have obtained omniscience I would make the *Dharma* nature known to them." Then having performed offerings and hymns of worship to all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas, one should offer the prayer which is the noble *Bhadracaryā*. Then one proceeds in the acquisition of all the accumulations of merit and knowledge, starting with giving, which has the womb of emptiness and compassion. As it is put in the noble *Dharmasaṃgīti*:

The great compassion of the bodhisattva who sees reality as such issues forth and he thinks, "For the sake of all beings I should perfect this doorway of *samādhi* which is the vision of all *dharmas* as they really are.¹³ He who is being impelled by that great compassion having fulfilled the three teachings of exalted morality, mindfulness, and wisdom is awakened to unsurpassed, perfect Awakening."

This alone is the bodhisattvas' path which carries the union of wisdom and method, that even while viewing the ultimate they do not cut off the conventional. And those unmistaken ones who do not cut off the conventional, for whom great compassion comes first, enter into action for the benefit of all beings.

Now it may be the case that adherence to method is not possible while in the condition of world-transcending wisdom. Nevertheless at the time of adhering to method, because the bodhisattva, like a magician, is unmistaken due to his world-transcending knowledge, the wisdom with a background in (that world-transcending) practice is present, connected to the ultimate suchness of things as they are! Therefore there is definitely a path which carries the union of wisdom and method! And (it is stated) in the noble *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* that the path which carries

¹³ T: *de yañ 'di sñam du bdag gis chos thams chad yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du mthoñ ba'i tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi sgo 'di sems can thams cad la bsgrub par bya'o sñam du sems te /*

the union of wisdom and method should be followed with inexhaustible concentration

(*dhyānākṣayatā*)

And it was said in the noble *Ratnamegha*:

How does a bodhisattva become skillful in the Mahāyāna? Here the bodhisattva learns all the training, even though he does not apprehend a path in the training. And that which he learns also is not apprehended. And the one who is taught, he too is not apprehended. And it is by way of that reason, that cause, that condition that he does not fall into annihilationism.

21. *Pratipatti*.

And it said in the noble *Dharmasaṃgīti*:

What is the practical realization of the bodhisattvas? Whatever the bodhisattvas' bodily action, whatever their vocal action, whatever their mental action -- it proceeds for the sake of all beings because of the precedence of great compassion. The sovereignty of great compassion is produced from the intention (to act) for all sentient beings' happiness and well-being. The one with the intention of well-being takes cognizance in this way: 'I should realize in practice the practical realization that produces well-being, that brings happiness to all beings'. For him, the practical realization is discerning the aggregates to be like an illusion and yet it does not seek the abandonment of those aggregates. The practical realization is discerning the elements to be like a snake and yet it does not seek the abandonment of the elements. The practical realization is discerning the sense-spheres to be like an empty village and yet it does not seek the abandonment of the sense-spheres. The practical realization is discerning material form as like a ball of foam and yet it does not relinquish the creation of a Tathāgata's form-body. The practical realization is discerning feeling as like bubbles and yet it does not fail to begin the application of the production of the bliss of attainment in the absorptions and concentrations of the Tathāgatas. The practical realization is discerning perception to be like a mirage and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the perception that produces the knowledge of the Tathāgatas. The practical realization is discerning mental formations to be like a banana tree and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the mental formations that are the qualities of the Buddha. The practical realization is discerning consciousness to be like an illusion and yet there is no abstaining from the practical realization of the production of the actions of body, speech and mind that are the forerunners of knowledge.

Thus among limitless *sūtras* the practical realization which has the form of wisdom and method

should be followed.

22. The stages: *adhimukticyā*.

Thus by this process, having constantly honoured wisdom and method, twelve kinds of state arise for the bodhisattva who develops by practicing over a long period of time. Those very states are distinguished (*vyavasthāpyante*) as stages in the sense that they are the bases of progressively higher virtues -- from the stage of conduct of zealous conduct right up to the stage of a Buddha. In this connection, as long as one does not directly experience the suchness (*tattvam*) of the selflessness of the personality and of *dharmas*, (there is) only a very intense zeal. Unshakable by the likes of Mārā, when one cultivates suchness with the power of zeal, then the stage of zealous conduct is distinguished on the basis of intense zeal. The bodhisattva existing in this stage, although still an ordinary person, has completely passed beyond all the calamities of a fool and is endowed with innumerable qualities like *samādhis*, spells, freedoms, superknowledges and so on. Thus it is read in the noble *Ratnameghasūtra*.

And of this very (stage) four degrees of penetration are distinguished by way of the tetrad of soft, middling, strong and stronger. That is, when from meditating on the identitylessness of all *dharmas* the light of knowledge arises to the extent that it is just evident, then this is the degree of penetration called "Become warm" (*uṣmagata*). And that, here in the Mahāyāna, is called "The *Samādhi* reaching the light". But when that very light of knowledge becomes moderately evident, then it is the degree of penetration called "The summit" (*mūrdha*), which (in the Mahāyāna) is called "The *samādhi* of increased light". And when an even more pronounced light of knowledge is born -- one in which there is no appearance of external objects -- then, because it rests on

conception (*vijñapti*) only, it is the degree of penetration termed "patience" (*kṣānti*). And it is called "The *samādhi* which has entered one domain" because one has entered the non-apprehension of the object's aspects. But when one would ascertain the non-dual knowledge which is devoid of the forms of the object and subject, then this is the degree of penetration designated "The best (worldly) condition" (*āgradharma*). And this is called "The *samādhi* without interval" because, in fact, immediately following it one enters into suchness. Up to this point (we have been dealing with) the stage of zealous conduct .

23. The ten *bhūmis* and the *Buddhabhūmi*.

But the other stages are briefly distinguished on the basis of fulfilling eleven components. In that context the first stage is distinguished at the outset on the basis of fulfilling the component which is understanding suchness which is the identitylessness of the personality and of *dharma*s. In this regard, when upon the completion of "The best (worldly) condition" a clearer knowledge arises for the first time ever -- superior, transcendental, devoid of all conceptual proliferation, directly perceiving the lack of inherent existence of all *dharma*s -- then, on account of the arising of the path of seeing from descending into certainty of the truth (*samyaktvanyāma* i.e. the assurance of *nirvāṇa*)¹⁴ the bodhisattva has entered the first stage.

Thus in this stage, the bodhisattva is delighted on account of understanding for the first time the suchness that was not understood. Hence this stage is called 'delighted'. And here the one hundred and twelve afflictions that are fit to be abandoned by seeing are forsaken. But the remaining stages have the nature of a path of cultivation. In them the sixteen afflictions of the three

¹⁴ Edgerton 298, *Abhk* 923.

worlds that are fit to be abandoned by cultivation are forsaken. And in this stage the bodhisattva's perfection of giving becomes unexcelled on account of proceeding in the interests of others just as in the interest of oneself -- on the basis of a realization which has a full comprehension the *Dharma* Realm. But even that bodhisattva for whom suchness is well mastered, verily, so long as he cannot become one who dwells in clear comprehension of subtle immoral slip-ups (*skhalita*), that long (he remains in) the first stage. But when he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the second stage is distinguished.

Hence in this stage the perfection of morality becomes unexcelled because of his non-performance of subtle immoral slip-ups. This stage is called "pure" on account of the departure all the filth which is moral undiscipline. He becomes one who dwells in clear comprehension of subtle immoral slip-ups. So long as he cannot attain the entire worldly *samādhi* and keep to the meaning as it was heard, until then it is merely the second stage. When he can then on the basis of fulfilling this component the third stage is distinguished.

And in this stage the perfection of patience becomes unexcelled on account of enduring every suffering in order to achieve the all worldly *samādhis* by means of the learned *dharaṇis* of the bodhisattva. On account of gaining those *samādhis* this stage is called "Light-maker" since it creates an immeasurable light of knowledge that transcends the world. But as long as he who possesses the entire worldly *samādhi* gained cannot repeatedly dwell in the qualities that aid Awakening just as they were gained, and cannot make the mind equanimous in connection to all the attainments, that long it remains the third stage. But when he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the fourth stage is distinguished.

In this stage, continuously for the bodhisattva, the perfection of energy becomes unexcelled

on the basis of staying with the qualities that aid Awakening in order to proceed beyond the babble of body, speech and mind. And this stage is called 'Brilliant' on account of the flaring of the flame of the qualities that aid Awakening which is capable of burning up all the fuel of the afflictions. He becomes one who continually dwells upon the qualities that aid Awakening. Meditating on the truths, so long as he cannot turn around the mind which faces *nirvāṇa* and does not face *saṃsāra*, and cannot cultivate the qualities that aid Awakening collected under method, that long it remains the fourth stage. But when he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the fifth stage is distinguished.

Hence only in this stage because the repeated cultivation of the aids to Awakening collected under method is won with great difficulty, it is called "Very hard to win". And in this stage the perfection of concentration (*dhyāna*) becomes unexcelled on the basis of doing a lot of meditation (*bhāvanā*) on the aspects of the noble truths. And he becomes one who dwells extensively on the aids to Awakening collected under method. So long as he cannot attain the signless state because of his mental continuum being filled with sorrow from its discernment of the activity of *saṃsāra*, that long it remains the fifth stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the sixth stage is distinguished.

And in this [stage] the bodhisattva's perfection of wisdom becomes unexcelled on the basis of dwelling in meditation upon dependent origination. Thus from the unexcelled quality of the perfection of wisdom one exists in this stage facing towards all the teachings of the Buddha. Therefore it is called "Facing towards". He is one who gains (the state of) dwelling upon the signless. So long as he cannot attain (the state of) dwelling upon the signless uninterruptedly, that long it remains the sixth stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the

seventh stage is distinguished.

But in this stage the bodhisattva understands all signs as signless and does not oppose designation that is made in signs. Hence in this (stage) the perfection of method becomes unexcelled. And this stage is "Far going" due to its going very far because of its close contact with the effortless path. He becomes one who continuously dwells on the signless. Until he can attain the state of dwelling upon the signless that carries itself effortlessly, it remains the seventh stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the eighth stage is distinguished.

And in this [stage] from effortlessly joining to the aids of virtue¹⁵ the perfection of the vow becomes unexcelled. And this stage is called "Immovable" on account of its quality of not wavering with effort for the signless. He becomes one who effortlessly dwells upon the signless. As long as he cannot become an authority on all *dharmā* instructions of all kinds according to divisions such as synonyms, etymologies and so forth, that long it remains the eighth stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the ninth stage is distinguished.

And in this [stage] on the basis of gaining distinction in the analytic sciences¹⁶ because of possessing excellence in the power of wisdom, the bodhisattva's perfection of power becomes unexcelled. And on account of the distinction of gaining a faultless intellect through skillfulness in *dharmā* instructions of all kinds, the stage is called "Having praiseworthy intellect". And in this stage he becomes one who obtains the set of four analytic sciences. So long as he is unable to display Buddha-fields, retinues, magical projections and so forth, and cannot enjoy the complete teaching and ripen beings, that long it remains the ninth stage. When he can, then on the basis of

¹⁵ Edgerton 188. *kuśalapakṣa* - the side of virtue, good morals.

¹⁶ For Buddhists, four: *dharmā*, *artha*, *nirukti*, *pratibhānam*. Edgerton 370, LaV-P *Abhk.vii89ff*

fulfilling this component the tenth stage is distinguished.

And in this [stage] the bodhisattva's perfection of knowledge becomes unexcelled owing to his possessing excellence in knowledge for the sake of ripening sentient beings through magical projections and so forth. And this is called the "Cloud of teachings" on account of the downpour of teachings on endless world-realms by the clouds of *dharma* instructions. There is also an arrangement of the stages in terms of other classifications such as the aggregates, purifications and so on -- this is not written of (here) out of fear of (too much) detail in this book. Even though he has obtained supernatural powers such as magical creation, until with regard to all knowable objects, he can give rise to unattached, unimpeded knowledge of all kinds, that long it remains the tenth stage. When he can, then on the basis of fulfilling this component the Buddha Stage is distinguished.

And the excellence of this stage is explained in the noble *Samdhinirmocana*:

There is no other circumstance higher than this Buddha stage on account of going to the highest limit of all accomplishments of every kind.

And the division containing the position of the qualities of this Buddha stage cannot be spoken in any way, not even by the Buddhas. (Now) since that (stage) is immeasurable, how then by the likes of me?!!! Just as was said in the noble *Gaṇḍavyūha*:

Even though examining, one would not comprehend even one part of the qualities of the self-existent. For the excellences of the Buddha are unthinkable.

But this much it is possible to say briefly here¹⁷ as the bodhisattva's *Process of Meditation* by the

¹⁷ *From this point T. gives:* Having reached the condition wherein all faults have departed, the illustrious Buddhas who have gone to the end of attaining the benefit of self and others, abide in the body of the *Dharma*, effortlessly performing the benefit of the entire world by means of their complete enjoyment and emanation bodies remaining as long as *samsāra* exists. Therefore the wise should generate faith in the Bhagavāns who are the sources of all virtue, and should strive to accomplish their virtues by whatever means. As for the division of the three bodies, it is not written of here out of concern for too much detail in the text. By following the system of the

renowned Venerable Kamalaśīla is concluded:

The Tathāgata taught the cause of *dharma*s that have a causal origin, as well as their cessation. The one who speaks thus is the great renunciate.

sūtras, and by speaking well of this path of the Buddha's sons, I have obtained great merit. By this may the foolish world quickly reach the highest wisdom. By the order of the World-ruler and King of the Gods Kamalaśīla made this summary of the procedure for meditating. The First *Bhāvanākrama* is completed.

The Process of Mediation I

1. Great compassion is of primary importance to the Bodhisattva;
universality of pain; necessity of compassion.¹

rgya gar skad du / bhā va nā kra ma / bod skad du / bsgom pa'i rim pa / ²[jam dpal g'zon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo / theg pa chen po'i mdo sde yi / tshul spyod las ni dañ po pa // de las brtsams te bsgom pa yi / rim pa mdo tsam brjod par bya // thams cad mkhyen pa ñid myur du thob par 'dod pas mdor na sñiñ rje dañ / byañ chub kyī sems dañ / sgrub pa dañ / gans 'di gsum la 'bad par bya'o / / de la sañs rgyas kyī chos ma lus pa'i rgyu'i rtsa ba ni sñiñ rje kho na yin par śes par byas la de ñid la thog ma kho nar bsgom mo / de skad du 'phags pa chos vañ dag par sdud pa las gsuñs te / de nas bcom ldan 'das la 'phags pa spyan ras gzigs dbañ phyug gis 'di skad ces gsol to / / bcom ldan 'das byañ chub sems dpas chos rab tu mañ po la bslab par mi bgyi'o / / bcom ldan 'das byañ chub sems dpas chos gcig rab tu gzuñ žiñ rab tu rtogs par bgyis na sañs rgyas kyī chos thams cad de'i lag mthil du mchis pa lags so / chos gcig po gañ že na / 'di lta ste / sñiñ rje chen po'o / bcom ldan 'das sñiñ rje chen pos ni sañs rgyas kyī chos thams cad byañ chub sems dpa' rñams kyī lag mthil du mchis pa lags so / / bcom ldan 'das dper bgyis na 'khor los sgyur³ ba'i rgyal po'i 'khor lo rin po che gañ du mchis pa der dpuñ gi tshogs thams cad mchi'o / / bcom ldan 'das de bžin du byañ chub sems dpa'i sñiñ rje chen po gañ du mchis pa der sañs rgyas kyī chos thams cad mchi'o / / bcom ldan 'das dper bgyis na srog gi dbañ po mchis na dbañ po gžan rñams 'byuñ bar 'gyur ro / / bcom ldan 'das de bžin du sñiñ rje chen po mchis na byañ chub sems dpa'i chos gžan rñams kyañ 'byuñ bar 'gyur ro žes 'byuñ ño /]

{187} dharmānām pravṛttir bhavati / "āryākṣayamatiniṛdeśe cōktam / "punar aparaṃ, bhādanta śāradvatīputra, bodhisattvānām mahākaruṇā apy akṣayā / tat kasya hetoḥ / pūrvaṅgamatvāt / tad yathāpi nāma, bhādanta śāradvatīputra, āśvāsāḥ puruṣasya jīvitendriyasya pūrvaṅgamāḥ / evam eva mahāyānasambhāra[samud]āgamāya bodhisattvasya mahākaruṇā pūrvaṅgamā" iti vistaraḥ / āryagavyāśīrse cōktam / "kimārambhā, Mañjuśrīḥ, bodhisattvānām caryā kimadhiṣṭhānā / Mañjuśrīr āha / mahākaruṇārambhā, devaputra, bodhisattvānām caryā sattvādhiṣṭhānā" iti vistaraḥ / tathā hi

¹ Division and heading of sections follow Tucci. Numbers in large brackets indicate Tucci's pagination.

² Bracketed Section: D 22b 1-6; Skt reconstruction from T. in CIHTS 195: namo mañjuśriye kumārabhūtāya mahāyānasūtrānām ya ādikārmikasya caryāniyamāḥ / tamadhikṛtya saṃkṣepād bhāvanākramastvabhidihiyate // acireṇa sarvajñatām prāptukāmaiḥ saṃkṣepataḥ karuṇā bodhicittam pratipattiśceti triṣu sthāneṣu prayatitavyam / buddhatvasya aśeṣadharmahetumūlaṃ karuṇaiveti jñātvā sā "dāveva bhāvayitavyā / yathoktam āryadharmasamgītisūtre -- atha khalvavalokiteśvaro bodhisattvo mahāsattvo bhagavantametadavocāt - "na bhagavan bodhisattvena atībahūsu dharmeṣu śikṣitavyam / eko dharmo bhagavan bodhisattvena svārādhitāḥ supratividdhāḥ kartavyāḥ / tasya sarvabuddhadharmāḥ karatalagatā bhavanti / katama ekadharmāḥ / yaduta mahākaruṇā / mahākaruṇayā bhagavan bodhisattvānām sarvabuddhadharmāḥ karatalagatā bhavanti / tadyathā bhagavan yena rājñāścakravartinaścakraratnaṃ gacchati tena sarvo balakāyo gacchati, evameva bhagavan yena bodhisattvasya mahākaruṇā gacchati tena sarve buddhadharmā gacchanti / tadyathā bhagavan jīvitendriye sati anyeṣāmindriyānām pravṛttir bhavati evameva bhagavan mahākaruṇāyām satyāmanyeṣām bodhisattvānām].

³ CIHTS: bsgyur.

tayā preryamāṇā bodhisattvāḥ svātmanirapekṣā ekāntena paropakārārthatayā, atiduṣkaradīrghakālike 'pi saṃbhāropārjanapariśrame pravartante / tathā cōktaṃ āryaśraddhābalādhāne: "tatra ⁴[mahā]karuṇayā api sarvasattvapariṣānārtham [na tat kiñcid duḥkhasahitaṃ janma yan na pariṅhāti] na tat kiñcit sukhopādhānam yan na parityajati" iti / ato 'tiduṣkare pravartamāno na cireṇaiva saṃbhārān pariṣūryāvaśyam eva sarvajñapadam adhigacchati / {188} tato buddhadharmāṇāṃ karuṇaiva mūlam / mahākaruṇāparigrahād eva buddhā bhagavanto 'dhigamya sarva[jñā]padam aśeṣasya jagato 'rtham vikurvānās tiṣhanta iti nirvānāpratiṣṭhāne saiva bhagavatāṃ mahākaruṇā hetuḥ⁵ / sā ca duḥkhitasattvāmbanamanaskārabahulkārato vṛddhim upayāti⁶ / sarve ca te sattvās tridhātukāvacarās trividhaduḥkhatayā yathāyogam atyantaduḥkhitā eveti sarveṣu eva sattveṣu bhāvaniyā /⁷ tathā ca ye tāvan nārakās te vividhacirantanadīrghakālikadāhādīduḥkeṣu nimagnā eva bhagavatā varṇitāḥ / tathā pretā api duḥsahativrakṣuttṛṣādīduḥkhapīḍābhi-saṃśoṣitamūrtayas tivraduḥkam anubhavanti / yena varṣāsatenaṇy aśuciṃ khetapiṇḍanam ca bhoktuṃ na labhanta ityādi varṇitaṃ bhagavatā / tiryāṅco 'pi parasparakrodhavadha⁸himsādibhir anekavidhaṃ duḥkham anubhavanto dṛśyanta eva / tathā hi kecin nāsikābhedanatāḍanabandhanādibhir tantrīkṛtāśarīrāḥ⁹ paritaḥ paripīḍyamānāḥ katham apy anicchanto 'pi atidurvahagurubhārodvahana-parikhinnavapuṣaḥ pariklāmyanti / tathāraṇye 'pi nivasanto 'naparādhāḥ kecit kvacit¹⁰[artha]to 'nviśya hanyante / nityaṃ ca bhayavihvalamanasas tatas tataḥ palāyamānās tiṣhantīty aparimitam eṣāṃ duḥkhaṃ dṛśyata eva / tathā mānuṣye 'pi nārakaṃ duḥkhaṃ dṛśyata eva / atra ye caurādayo 'ṅgacchedaśūlārpaṇodbandhanādibhiḥ kāryanta eva teṣāṃ nārakaṃ eva duḥkham / ye ca dāridryādyupahatās teṣāṃ pretānāṃ iva tat kṣuttarśādibhi[r] duḥkham / ye ca bhṛtyādayaḥ parāyattīkṛtātmabhāvāḥ / ye ca balibhir ākramya pīḍyante teṣāṃ tiraścām iva tādanāvarodhanādīduḥkham / tathā paryeṣṭiktaṃ anyonyadrohopa-ghātādīkṛtaṃ priyaviprayogāpriyasamyogakṛtaṃ cāprameyam eṣāṃ duḥkha[m] / {189} ye kvacid īśvarāḥ sukhitā iva lapyante te 'pi viparyavasānasampado vividhakudṛṣṭigahananimagnā nārakādīduḥkhānubhavahetuvividhakleśakarmāṇy upacinvantāḥ¹¹ prapātasthās taravo iva¹² duḥkhaḥetau vartamānāḥ paramārthato duḥkhitā eva / devā api ye tāvat kāmvāvacarās te 'pi tivrakāmāgnisamdiptamānasā ākṣiptacittā ivāśvacchacetasaḥ kṣaṇam api samādhānam cetasaṃ na

4 Square brackets T. only.

5 Tucci: ?namahākaruḥetuḥ.

6 Following CIHTS. Tucci: "upetya (?)"

7 Abhk 875: duḥkhāstrīduḥkhatāyogād yathāyogamaśeṣataḥ / manāpā amanāpāśca tadanye caiva sāstravāḥ // tisro hi duḥkhatāḥ -- duḥkhduḥkhatā, vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā, saṃskāraduḥkhatā ca / tābhīryathāyogamaśeṣataḥ sarve sastravāḥ saṃskārā duḥkhāḥ / tatra manāpā vipariṇāmaduḥkhatayā, amanāpā duḥkhaduḥkhatayā / tebhyo'nya saṃskāraduḥkhatayā /

8 Following CIHTS. Tucci: vadhā.

9 Following CIHTS. Tucci: atantrīkṛtāśarīrāḥ.

10 Reading with CIHTS; Tucci: "kvacit... to 'nviśya".

11 Following CIHTS. Tucci: upacinvantāḥ.

12 Following CIHTS. Tucci: prapātasthā iva taravo...

labhante / teṣāṃ praśamasukhadhanadaridrāṇāṃ kīdrśaṃ nāma tat sukham /
nityacyavanapatanādibhayaśokopahatāḥ kathāṃ sukhitā nāma / ye ca rūpārūpāvacarās te 'pi yadi
nāma kiyatkālaṃ duḥkhaduḥkhatāṃ vyatītās tathāpi atyantāṃ kāmāvacarāṇāṃ anuśayānāṃ
aprahāṇāt [teṣāṃ] punar api nārakādivinipātasambhavād vipariṇāmaduḥkham [asty eva] / sarve
nāma devamanuṣyāḥ kleśakarmādipāratantryāt te saṃskāraduḥkhatayā duḥkhitā eva /

2. How compassion should be meditated upon.

tad evaṃ sakalam eva jagad duḥkhāgnijvālāvalīḍham ity avetya yathā mama duḥkham apriyaṃ
tathānyeṣāṃ apriyaṃ iti cintayatā sarveṣu eva sattveṣu kṛpā bhāvanīyā / prathamam tāvat
mitrapakṣe[ṣu] pūrvoktavividhaduḥkhānubhaveṣu anupaśyatā bhāvanīyā / tataḥ sattvasamatayā
viśeṣam apaśyatā 'nādimati ca saṃsāre na kaścit sattvo yo na me śataśo bandhur abhūd iti
paricintayatā vyasteṣu bhāvanīyā / {190} yadā mitrapakṣeṣu iva [vyasteṣu] tulyā karuṇā pravṛttā
bhavati / tadā śatrupakṣe 'pi tathāiva sattvasamatādīmanasikāreṇa bhāvanīyā /
yadā ca [śatrupakṣe] 'pi mitrapakṣavat samapravṛttā bhavati / tadā kramaśo daśasu dikṣu
sarvasattveṣu bhāvayet / yadā ca duḥkhitabālapriyeṣu iva duḥkhoddharaṇecchākārā svarasavāhinī
sarvasattveṣu samapravṛttā kṛpā bhavati / tadā sā niṣpannā bhavati mahākaruṇāvyapadeśa[ṃ] ca
labhate / yathā akṣayamatisūtre ca varṇitam / ayaṃ ca kṛpābhāvanākramo bhagavatā
'bhīdharmasūtrādaḥ varṇitah /

3. It helps the thought of Awakening.

tasyaivaṃ kṛpābhyāśabalāt sakalasattvābhyuddharaṇapratijñayānuttarasamyak-
saṃbodhiprārthanākāram ayatnata eva bodhicittam utpadyate / yathoktaṃ daśadharmasūtre:
"sattvān atrāṇān aśaraṇān advīpān drīṣvā karuṇāyai cittam upasthāpya yāvad anuttarāyāṃ
samyaksaṃbodhau cittam utpādayati" / iti / yadi nāma parasamādāpanādināpi bodhisattvasya
mahāsattvasya bodhicittam utpadyate / tathāpi kṛpāvegato yat svayam eva bodhisattvasya
bodhicittam utpadyate tad bhagavatāryatathāgatajñānamudrāsamādhaḥ viśiṣṭataratvena varṇitam /
tad etad bodhicittam pratipattivikalām api saṃsāre mahāphalaṃ bhagavatā varṇitam / {191} tathā
oktaṃ maitreyavimokṣe / "tad yathāpi nāma, kulaputra, bhinnam api vajjaratnaṃ sarvaṃ
atīviśiṣṭaṃ suvarṇālaṃkāraṃ abhībhavati / vajjaratnanāma ca na vijahāti sarvadāridryaṃ ca
vinivartayati / evam eva, kulaputra, pratipattibhinnam api sarvajñatācittotpādavajjaratnaṃ
sarvaśrāvakaḥpratyekabuddha-guṇasuvarṇālaṃkāraṃ abhībhavati /¹³ bodhicittanāma na vijahāti /
saṃsāradāridryaṃ ca vinivartayati" iti / yo pi pāramitāsu sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā śīkṣitum
asamarthaḥ, tenāpi bodhicittam utpādanīyam eva / upāyaparigraheṇa mahāphalatvāt / yathā oktaṃ
āryarājāvavādakasūtre / "yasmāt tvam, mahārāja, bahukṛtyo bahukaraṇīyo 'sahaḥ sarveṇa sarvaṃ
sarvathā dānapāramitāyāṃ śīkṣitum yāvat prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śīkṣitum / tasmāt tarhi tvam,
mahārāja, evam eva saṃbodhau chandaṃ śraddhāṃ prārthanāṃ praṇidhiṃ gacchann api tiṣṭhann
api niṣanno 'pi śayāno 'pi jāgrad api bhuñjāno 'pi pibann api satatasamitam anusmara manasikuru

¹³ [1] CIHTS.

bhāvaya /¹⁴sarvabuddhabodhisattvāryaśrāvakaṃpratyekabuddhapṛthagjanānām ātmanas
cātītānāgatapratyutpannāni kuśalamūlāni piṇḍayitvā, anumodasva / agrayā 'numodanayā 'numodya
ca sarvabuddhabodhisattvapratyekabuddhāryaśrāvakānām pūjākarmāṇi niryātaya / niryātya ca
sarvasattvasādhāraṇāni kuru/¹⁵tataḥ sarvasattvānām yāvat sarvajñatāpratīlambhāya
sarvabuddhadharma-paripūranāya dine traikālyam anuttarāyām samyaksambodhau pariṇāma[ya] /
¹⁶evam khalu tvam, mahārāja, pratipannaḥ san rājyam¹⁷ kariṣyasi / rājakyāni ca na hāpayiṣyasi /
{192} ityādīkam uktvāha ¹⁸/atha khalu punas tvam, mahārāja,
samyaksambodhicittakuśalamūlavipāke nānekakṛtyo deveṣūpapanno 'bhūh / anekakṛtyo
manuṣyeṣūpapanno 'bhūh / sarvasu ca devamanuṣyopapattiṣv ādhipatyam kārayiṣyasi" / iti vistaraḥ
/

4. Bodhicitta: Thought of Awakening.

yat punaḥ pratipattisāraṃ bodhicittam tad atitarāṃ vipulam [phalam] iti siddham / ata
evārvavīradattapariṣcchāvām uktam /

bodhicittād vai yat puṇyam tac ca rūpi bhaved yadi /
ākāśadhātuṃ sampūrya bhūyaś cottaritam bhavet //
gaṅgāvālukāsamkhyāni buddhakṣetrāṇi yo naraḥ /
dadyād ratnaprapūṃṇāni lokanāthebhya eva hi //
yaś caikaḥ prañjalībhūtvā cittam bodhāya nāmati /
iyam viśiṣyate pūjā yasyā anto na vidyate // iti /

yathāryagandavyūhe varṇitam / "bodhicittam, kulaputra, bījabhūtam sarvabuddhadharmānām" iti
vistaraḥ / tac ca bodhicittam dvididham prañidhicittam prasthānacittam ca / āryagandavyūhe
varṇitam / tathā / durlabhās te, kulaputra, sattvāḥ sattvaloke ye 'nuttarāyām samyaksambodhau
prañidadhati" iti / "tato 'pi durlabhatamās te sattvā ye 'nuttarām samyaksambodhim
abhisamprasthitāḥ" iti / {193} sakalajagato hitāya buddho bhaveyam iti prathamataram
prārthanākāra cetanā tat prañidhicittam / yataḥ prabhṛti samvaragrahaṇe... vartamānāḥ sambhāreṣu
drśyante tat prasthānacittam / samvaraś ca vijñātapratibalasamvarasthitā[t] kalyānamitrāt purato
grāhyah / asati pratirūpe grāhake buddhabodhisattvān āmukhīkṛtya yathā mañjuśrīyā
'mbararājābhūtena bodhicittam utpāditam tathotpādanīyah / evam utpāditabodhicitto bodhisattvah
svayam eva dānādi dadāti pratipattau prayokṣyate / na hi svayam adāntaḥ parān damayatīti matvā /

14 [/] CIHTS.

15[/] CIHTS.

16 [/] CIHTS.

17 Following CIHTS. Tucci: svarājyam.

18 Following CIHTS. "āha" not in Tucci.

5. Wisdom and Method, *prajñā* and *upāya*, must be realized jointly.

na cāpi vinā pratipattiyā bodhir avāpyate / yathoktam āryagavāśirse "pratipattisārāṇām bodhisattvāṇām bodhir nāpratipattisārāṇām" iti / āryasamādhirāje coktam / tasmāt 'pratipattisāro bhaviṣyāmi' ity evaṃ tvayā kumāra śikṣitavyam / tat kasya hetoḥ / pratipattisārasya hi, kumāra, na durlabhā bhavaty anuttarā samyaksambodhir" iti / {194} sā ca pratipattir bodhisattvasya pāramitā'pramānasamgrahavastvādibhedena akṣayamatiratnameghādisūtreṣu vistareṇa varnitā / tathā laukikāśilpādīsthāneṣv api yāvad bodhisattvena śikṣitavyam / kiṃ punar lokottareṣu dhyānādiṣu / anyathā katham sarvākāraṃ sattvārtham kuryuḥ / sā ceyam samkṣepeṇa bodhisattvasya prajñopāyarūpā pratipattir na prajñāmātraṃ nopāyamātraṃ yathāryavimalakīrtinirdeṣe "prajñārahita[upāya] upāyarahitā ca prajñābodhisattvāṇām bandhanam" ity uktam / upāyasahitā prajñā prajñāsahita upāyo mokṣatvena varnitaḥ / āryagavāśirse coktam / "dvāv imau bodhisattvāṇām samkṣiptau mārḡau / dvābhyāṃ mārḡābhyāṃ samanvāgatā bodhisattvā mahāsattvāḥ kṣipram anuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambhotsyante / katamau dvau / upāyaś ca prajñā ca" / iti /

6. Wisdom and Method.

tatra prajñāpāramitāṃ tyaktvā dānādīpāramitāsamgrahavastvādikaṃ sarvam eva kṣetrapariśuddhimahābhogaparivārasampatsattvapariṣāṇānirmāṇādikasakalābhyudaya-dharmasamgrāhakaṃ kuśalam upāya ucyate / prajñā tu tasyaiva copāyasyā'viparitasvabhāvaparicchedahetuḥ / tayā hi samyagupāyam vivicyā'viparyasto yathāvat svaparārthānuṣṭhānād viṣam iva mantrapariḡrhitam bhuñjano na samkliśyate / {195} tathā coktam atraiva sūtre / "upāyaḥ samgrahajñānam / prajñā paricchedajñānam" iti / āryaśraddhābalādhāne coktam / "upāyakaśalam katamaṃ / yat samgrahaḥ sarvadharmāṇām / prajñā katamā / yat sarvadharmāṇām asaṃbhedanakauśalam" iti / etau prajñopāyau dvāv api sarvakālam eva sevanīyau bhūmipraviṣṭair api na tu prajñāmātraṃ nopāyamātraṃ /¹⁹ yataḥ sarvāsv eva daśasu bhūmiṣu bodhisattvasya pāramitāsamudācārah pathito daśabhūmikāda / "na ca pariṣeṣāsu na samudācarati" iti vacanāt / aṣṭamyāṃ ca bhūmau bodhisattvasya śantavihāriṇo buddhair vyutthānam tad virudhyeta / tac ca tatas tatra pāṭhād avagantavyam /

7. No contradiction can be discovered in the scriptures.

yac cāryavimalakīrtinirdeṣe gavāśirse coktam tad api pūrvoktam virudhyeta eva sāmānyenaiva tatrābhīdhānāt / yat sarvadharmasamgrahavaipulve coktam tad api virudhyeta eva / tatroktam / sūkṣmaṃ hi, mañjuśrīḥ, saddharmapratikṣepakarmāvaraṇam / yo hi kaścin, mañjuśrīś, tathāgatabhāṣite dharma ekasmin śobhanasamjñām utpādayati / {196} ekasminn aśobhanasamjñām utpādayati / sa saddharmaṃ pratikṣipati / tena saddharmaṃ pratikṣipatā tathāgato 'bhyākhyāto

¹⁹ [1] CIHTS.

bhavati" iti vistaram uktvā āha / yo 'yaṃ, maitreya, śaṭpāramitasamudāgamo bodhisattvānāṃ bodhāya /²⁰ taṃ te mohāpuruṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti / prajñāpāramitāyāṃ eva bodhisattvena śikṣitavyaṃ kiṃ śeṣābhiḥ pāramitābhir' iti / te 'nyam upāyapāramitāṃ dūṣayitavyāṃ manyante / tat kiṃ manyase, 'jīta, duṣprajñāḥ sa kāśīrājo 'bhūt yena kapotārthaṃ śyenāya svamāṃsāni dattāni / maitreya āha / no hīdaṃ, bhagavan / bhagavān āha / yāni mayā, maitreya, bodhisattvacaryāṃ caratā śaṭpāramitāsamuktāni kuśalamūlāny upacitāni / apakṛtaṃ nu taiḥ kuśalamūlair / maitreya āha / no hīdaṃ bhagavan / bhagavān āha / tvam, tāvad, ajīta, dānapāramitāyāṃ śaṣṭiṃ kalpān samudāgataḥ / yāvat prajñāpāramitāyāṃ śaṣṭiṃ kalpān samudāgataḥ / tat te mohāpuruṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti / ekanayenaiva bodhir yaduta śunyatānayaena" iti vistaraḥ / vairocanābhisambodhau cōktaṃ²¹ / tad etat sarvajñānāṃ karūnamūlaṃ bodhicittahetukam upāyaparyavasānam" iti / tasmād ubhayaṃ sarvakālam eva bodhisattvena sevaniyam / {197}

8. *Apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa*; it can be explained only if there is cooperation of Wisdom and Method.

evaṃ hi bhagavatāṃ apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaṃ sidhyati / tathā hi dānāder upāyasya rūpakāyakṣetraparivārādīmahābhogātāphalasaṃpatparigrahād bhagavatāṃ na nirvāṇe 'vasthānam / prajñāyā ca sakalaviparyāsaprahānān na saṃsāre 'vasthānam viparyāsamūlatvāt saṃsārasya / anyac²² ca prajñopāyasvarūpayā pratipādā samāropāpavādāntavivarjanena madhyamā pratipad udbhāvitā / prajñāyā samāropāntasya varjanād upāyenāpavādāntasya varjanāt / ata evāryadharmasamgītāv uktam / "lakṣaṇānuvyañjanarūpakāyapariniṣpādanābhirataś ca bhavati na dharmakāyābhisamayamātrābhirataḥ / iti / punar uktam / "prajñopāyajanitas tathāgatānāṃ parapratyayataḥ sa[m]bhavo 'nugantavyaḥ" / iti / yat punar uktam / "kolopamaṃ dharmaparyāyam ājānadbhir dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ / prāg evādharmāḥ" / iti / tad viparītābhiniveśaprahānataḥ prahātavyā ity abhiprāyād uktam na tu prayojanasampādanārtham api nāśrayaṇīyam / tathā cōktaṃ / "dharmāḥ pragrahītavyo nodgrahītavya" / iti / nonmārgena pragrahītavya ity arthaḥ / yac cāpi kvacid dānādi sāmārikaphalatvena varṇitaṃ tat prajñārahītānāṃ dānādīnāṃ pūrvam uktam tāvanmātrakuśalamūlasamtuṣṭāns cādhiḥkṛtyottara-kuśalamūle protsāhanārtham / {198} anyathā vimalakīrtiyādinirdeśaḥ sarva eva virudhyeta / tasmāt tu dvāv api prajñopāyau sevaniyav iti sthitam / tatra prajñāparigrhītā dānādayaḥ pāramitāvyapadeśaṃ labhante nānyatheti / ato dānādīparisuddhaye samādhānam āsthāya prajñopādānārtham yatnaṃ kurvīta /

9. *Prajñā: śrutamayī, cintamayī, bhāvanāmayī.*

tatra prathamam tāvat śrutamayī prajñōtpādaniyā / tayā hi tāvad āgamārtham avadhārayati / tatas cintāmayyā prajñāyā nitaneyārtham nirvedhayati / tatas tayā niścītya bhūtam artham bhāvayen

²⁰ [/] not in text.

²¹ Tibetan places this quote a few sentences below at the point in section 8 immediately following "prajñopāyajanitas tathāgatānāṃ parapratyayataḥ sa[m]bhavo 'nugantavyaḥ" / iti / .

²² Following CIHTS. Tucci: *anayā*.

nābhūtam / anyathā hi viparīṭasyāpi bhāvanād vicikitsāyās cāvyaṣṭapagamāt samyagjñānodayo na syāt / tataś ca vyarthaiva bhāvanā syāt / yathā tīrthikānām / uktam ca bhagavatā samādhirāje / nairātmyadharmān yadī pratyavekṣate/ tān pratyavekṣya yadī bhāvayeta / sa hetur nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye / yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye / iti / tasmāc cintāmayyā prajñayā yuktyāgamābhyāṃ pratyavekṣya bhūtam eva vastusvarūpam bhāvanīyam / vastūnām svarūpam ca paramārthato 'nutpāda evāgamato yuktitaś ca niścitam / {199}

10. The non-origination of all things is ascertained by a) āgama and b) yukti.

a) āgama, authority: *tatrāgamato / yathoktam āryadharmasamgītau / "anutpādaḥ satyam asatyam anye dharmāḥ" iti / etac ca paramārthānukūlatvād anutpādaḥ satyam ity uktam / paramārthatas tu notpādo nāpy anutpādaḥ / tasya sarvavyavahārātītatvāt / punaś cātraiva cuktam / "utpādanīrodhābhīniviṣṭaḥ, kulaputra, lokasamīveśaḥ / tasmāt tathāgato mahākāruṇiko lokasyottarāśapadaparihārārtham vyavahāravaśād uktavān utpadyate nirudhyate ceti na cātra kasyacid dharmasyotpādaḥ /" iti / āryabuddhasamgītau cuktam / "katamā yonīśaḥ pṛcchā / katamā yonīḥ / āha / anutpādo yonīḥ / tasya pṛcchā yonīśaḥ pṛcchā" / punar atraivoktam / "akāramukhāḥ sarvadharmās cyutyutpattivigatāḥ / abhāvamukhāḥ sarvadharmāḥ / svabhāvaśūnyatām upādāya" iti / āryasatyadvayavibhāge cānutpādasamatayā sarvadharmānām samatā bhavati / {200} prajñāpāramitāvāṃ cuktam / "rūpam, subhūte, rūpasvabhāvena śūnyam yāvad vijñānam vijñānasvabhāvena śūnyam iti svalakṣaṇaśūnyatām upādāya" iti / hastikaksye cuktam / "na kaścil labhyate bhāvo yasyotpādasya sambhavaḥ / asambhaveṣu [dharmeṣu] bālāḥ sambhavam icchati" / iti pitāputrasamāgame cuktam / "sarva ete dharmāḥ sarve samās traikālyasamatayā / atīte 'dhvani sarvadharmāḥ svabhāvarahitā yāvat pratyutpanne 'dhvani /" iti / evaṃ tāvad āgamataḥ pratyavekṣaṇīyam / yuktyā hi sthīrīkṛtasyāgamārthasya anyair apohitum aśakyatvāt /*

b) yukti, arguing: b.1 Origination is not uncaused: *ato yuktyāpi pratyavekṣaṇīyam / tatra samkṣepato yuktir ucyate / utpādo bhāvānām ahetuko vā syāt sahetuko vā / na tāvad ahetukaḥ kādācitkatvadarśanāt / kāraṇānapekṣā hi viśeṣābhāvād utpādakālavat sadā sarvatraiva ca bhāvāḥ kiṃ na bhaveyuh / abhāvakālād aviśeṣād vā utpādakāle 'pi naiva bhaveyuh / evaṃ tāvan na nirhetuko yuktāḥ /*

b.2 Origination is not caused; criticism of God as creator: *nāpi sahetukaḥ / tathā hi yas tāvad īśvarādis tīrthikair nityo hetuḥ kalpitas tato bhāvā na jāyante krameṇotpādadarśanāt / na tv avikalakāraṇasya [phalasya]²³ krameṇotpādo yukto nirapekṣatvāt / nāpīśvarādeḥ svayaṃ samarthasya parāpekṣā / nityatvena parair anupakāryatvāt / anupakāriṇi cāpekṣā 'yogāt / {201} ata eveśvarādīnām sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvād vandhyāputrādīvan niḥsvabhāvatvam eva / arthakriyāsamarthatvād vastunaḥ / teṣām kvacid api kārye na kramena sāmarthyam yathā vicāritam / nāpi yaugapadyena / tathā hi sarvakāryam sakṛd utpādyottarakāle 'pi yady [utpatti]samartha evāsau tadā punar api samarthasvabhāvānuvṛttau pūrvavat kāryotpattiprasaṅgaḥ / ananuvṛttau vā pūrvasvabhāvaparitāyāgād anityatvaprasaṅgaḥ / tasmān na nityam nāma kiṃcid vastu vidyate / ata*

23 Following T.

evoktaṃ bhagavatā / "asatsamāropah punar, mahāmate, ākāśanirodhanirvāṅākṛtakabhāvābhiniveśa-samāropah" / iti / tasmān na nityād eṣāṃ utpādo yuktaḥ /

b.3 A noneternal cause is also illogical: nāpi anityāt / tatrātītānāgatayor avastutvān na tāvat tato janma yuktaṃ / ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt / nāpi vartamānāt / samānāsamānakālayos tata utpādāyogāt / tathā hi na tāvat samānakālam kāraṇasvabhāva[va]t kāryasyāpi tatsamānakālabhāvitayā niṣpannatvāt / nāpi bhinnakālam / kālāntaravyavadhānenotpāde 'tītāder evotpattiprasaṅgāt / avyavadhānenāpy utpāde sarvātmanā yady avyavadhānam tadaikasminn eva kṣaṇe sarvakṣaṇānām anupravesāt kalpasya kṣaṇamātratāprasāṅgaḥ / yathā paramānoḥ sarvātmanā saṃyoge piṇḍasyāṇumātratāprasāṅgaḥ / athaikadeśena / tadā kṣaṇasya sāvayavatvaprasāṅgaḥ / svato 'pi notpadyante / nirhetukapakṣeṇaivāsya pakṣasya saṃgrhītatvāt / svātmāni ca kārītravirodhāt / {202} nāpy ubhayataḥ / ubhayapakṣabhāvidošadvayaprasaṅgāt / tasmāt paramarthato 'nutpannā evāmī bhāvāḥ / saṃvṛtyā tūtpādasya vidyamānatvān, nāgamādivirodhaḥ / tathā coktaṃ bhagavatā / " bhāvā jāyante saṃvṛtyā paramārthe 'svabhāvakāḥ / niḥsvabhāveṣu bhāveṣu bhrāntiḥ sā saṃvṛtir matā " / iti / iyaṃ ca yuktir bhagavato 'bhīpretā śālistambādau / svataḥ parata ubhābhyām ahetos ca janmaniśedhāt /

11. Other reasons. Criticism of the notion of matter (and atoms), of immateriality (vijñāna), of external objects as being distinct from mind:

athavā evaṃ yuktyā vicārayet / dvividhā bhāvā rūpiṇo 'rūpiṇas ca / tatrāpi tāvad rūpiṇo ghaṭādayas te 'nuśo vibhinnarūpatvān naikasvabhāvāḥ / aṇūnām pūrvāparāvasthitānām pūrvādidigbhāgatvena vibhidyamānānām asiddhāv apy aṇusamcayātmakatve nānekasvabhāvo yuktaḥ / na caikānekasvabhāvavyatirekenāparaḥ kaścīd bhāvasvabhāvo 'stīti niḥsvabhāvā evāmī paramārtthataḥ svapnādyupalabdharūpādivad rūpiṇo bhāvāḥ / {203} etac ca bhagavataiva coktaṃ āryalaṅkāvatāre / " [go]viśānam punar, mahāmate, anuśo 'pi vibhidyamānam nāvatiṣṭhate / punar apy aṇavo 'pi vibhidyamānā aṇutvalakṣaṇena nāvatiṣṭhanta " iti / ye cārūpiṇas te 'pi tathaiva vicāryamānā niḥsvabhāvā eva / tathā hi bāhyasya nilāder arthasyābhāvāt sāmartyata eva vijñānādayo 'rupiṇaḥ skandhā nilādirūpeṇa pratibhāsanta ity abhyupeyam / uktaṃ ca bhagavatā / bahirdhā nāsti vai rūpaṃ svacittaṃ drśyate bahiḥ / iti / caikasyānekarūpatā yuktimatī, ekānekavirodhāt / ekasya kasyacit svabhāvasyāsiddhāv anekarūpatāpy ayuktimatī, ekasamūharūpatvād anekasya / athavā tatrālīkā evāmī rūpādaya ākārāḥ pratibhāsanta ity abhyupagamyate / tadā vijñānam apy alīkaṃ prāpnoti / vijñānasya tatsvarūpāvyatirekāt / na hi svayam prakāśamānarūpatāvyatirekenānyad vijñānasya rūpam asti / svayam ca na nirbhāsante rūpādayaḥ / teṣāṃ ca vijñānasvarūpāpannānām alīkatve sarvam eva vijñānam alīkaṃ abhyupetaṃ syāt / tasmān māyopamaṃ ca vijñānam ity uktaṃ bhagavatā / {204} tasmād ekānekasvabhāvasūnyatvena paramārtthato 'likā evāmī sarvabhāvā iti niścitam etat / ayaṃ cārtha ukto bhagavatā laṅkāvatāre / yathaiva darpane rūpam ekatvānyatvavarjitaṃ drśyate na ca tatrāsti tathā bhāveṣu bhāvataḥ / iti / ekatvānyatvavarjitaṃ iti / ekatvānyatvarahitaṃ ity arthaḥ / punas coktaṃ / buddhyā vivicyamānānām svabhāvo nāvadhāryate / ato nirabhilāpyās te niḥsvabhāvās ca darśitāḥ /

12. Bhāvanāmayī prajñā.

tad evaṃ cintāmayyā prajñayā niścītya bhūtaṃ arthaṃ tasya pratyakṣīkaraṇāya bhāvanāmayīm prajñāṃ utpādayet / bahuśrutādīmātrakeṇa nārthaḥ pratyakṣo bhavātīti niveditam āryaratnameghādiṣu / anubhāvaś ca pratipatṛṇām / na cāpi sphuṭatarajñānālokodayam antareṇa samyag āvaranātamo 'pahīyate / bhāvanābahūlikāra[ta]ś cābhūte 'py arthe sphuṭatarajñānam utpadyate / yathā 'śubhādiṣṭhvikṛtsnādisamāpannānām / kiṃ punar bhūte / tathā ca bhāvanāyāḥ parisphuṭajñānaphalatvena sāphalyam uktam āryasamādhirāje / ārocayāmi prativedayāmi vo yathā bahulam vitarkayen naraḥ / {205} tathā tathā bhavati hi nimnacittas tehi vitarkehi tanniśritehi // iti vistaraḥ / tasmāt tattvaṃ sāksātkartukāmo bhāvanāyāṃ pravartate /

13. Śamatha.

tatra prathamataṃ tāvad yoginā śamatho niṣpādaniyaś cittasthirīkaraṇāya / salilavac cañcalatvāc cittasya, na śamatham ādhāram antareṇa sthitir asti / na cāsamāhitena cetasa yathābhūtaṃ śakyate jñātum / uktaṃ hi bhagavatā "samāhitacitto yathābhūtaṃ prajānati" iti / śamatho lābhādikāmanā²⁴nirapekṣasya samyakpravṛtau sthitasya duḥkhādyadhivāsanaśīlasya ārabdhavīryasya śīghrataraṃ saṃpadyate / ata evāryasamādhinirmocanādaḥ dānādaya uttarottaratvena varṇitāḥ / tad evaṃ śīlādisamathasamābhāreṣu sthito mano'nukūlade[śe] sarvabuddhabodhisattveṣu praṇāmādikam kṛtvā pāpadeśanāṃ puṇyānumodanāṃ vidhāya sakalajagadabhyuddharanāśayo mahākaruṇāṃ evābhīmukhikṛtya kāyam ṛjuṃ praṇidhāya sukhāsanopaviṣṭaḥ paryaṅkaṃ ābhūjya samādhim abhiniṣpādayet / tatra prathamam tāvad yad vastu vicārayitavyam yāvataḥ prakāreṇa saṃkṣepataḥ sakalavastusamgraho bhavati tatra cittam badhniyāt / saṃkṣiptam punar vastu rūpyarūpiḥhedena dvidhā bhavati / {206} yadā tu jītanaskāro bhavati tadā skandhadhātvdibhedena viśodhya vistāraśo 'py ālambata eva / tathā samādhinirmocanādaḥ yogināṃ aṣṭādaśprakāraśūnyatālamānādibhedena [nānā]prakāraṃ ālambanam uktam / atraiva bhagavatā sattvānugrahād rūpyarūpyādibhedena saṃkṣepamadyavistārair vastubhedo 'bhidharmādaḥ nirdiṣṭaḥ / tac ca vastv adhyāropāpavādaparihārāya skandhadhātvdīsamgrahato ganayet / tato niścītya sarvavastusamgrahaṃ tatraiva puṇasā cittam prabandhena prerayet / yadā tu antarā rāgādīnā cittam bahir vikṣipet / tadāvagamya vikṣepatām aśubhādibhāvanayā vikṣepam upaśāmya puṇasā tatraivopary upari cittam prerayet / aśubhādibhāvanākramas tu granthavistarabhayān na likhitaḥ / yadā tu cittam tatrānabhiratam paśyēt / tadā samādher guṇadarśanato 'bhiratiṃ tatra bhāvayēt / vikṣepadoṣadarśanād aratiṃ praśamayēt / atha yadā styānamiddhābhībhavād ālambanagrahanāprakaṭayā līnam cittam bhavati / tadā ālokaśamjñābhāvanayā²⁵ prāmodyavastubuddhādiguṇamanasikārāt [vā]²⁶ layam upaśāmya puṇasā tad evālamānam dṛḍhataraṃ gṛhṇiyāt / atha yadā pūrvahasitaramitādyanusmarato 'ntarā cittam uddhataṃ paśyēt /

24 Following CIHTS. Tucci: kāmata.

25 Tucci: tadā lokasamjñābhāvanayā...

26 Following CIHTS and T.

tadā 'nityatādisamvegamanasikārād auddhatyam praśamayet / tataḥ punas tatraivālabane
cittasyānbhisamskāravāhitāyām yatnaṃ kurvīta / {207} atha yadā layauddhatyābhyām viviktatayā
samapravṛttam svarasavāhi cittam paśyēt / tadābhogaśithilikaraṇād upekṣate / yadā tu samapravṛtte
saty ābhogaḥ kriyate tadā cittam vikṣipet / yadā tu tatrālabane 'nabhisamskāravāhi yāvadiccham
cittam pravṛttam bhavati / tadā śamatho niṣpanno veditavyaḥ / etac ca sarvaśamathānām
sāmānyalakṣaṇam / cittaikāgratāmātrasvabhāvavāt śamathasya / ālabanam tu tasyāniyatam eva /
ayam ca śamathamārgo bhagavatā āryaprajñāpāramitādaṃ nirdiṣṭaḥ /

14. Six defects and eight counteragents

yad āha "tatra cittam sthāpayati / samsthāpayati / avasthāpayati / upasthāpayati / damayati / śamayati
/ vyupaśamayati / ekotikaroti / {208} samādhāti / " i[ti nava]padaiḥ / tatra sthāpayati, ālabanena
badhnāti / samsthāpayati, tatraivālabane prabandhena pravartayati / avasthāpayati, vikṣepam
avagamyā tat pariharati / upasthāpayati, vikṣepam parihṛtya upary upari punas tatraivālabane
sthāpayati / damayati, ratim utpādayati / śamayati aratiṃ vyupaśamayati vikṣepadoṣadarśanā[t] /
vyupaśamayati, styānamiddhādīn vyutthitān vyupaśamayati / ekotikaroti, ālabane
'nabhisamskāravāhitāyām yatnaṃ karoti / samādhāti, samaprāptam cittam upekṣate
samanvāharatīty arthaḥ / eṣa caiśām padānām arthaḥ pūrvācāry[air] maitreyeṇa ca vyākhyātaḥ /
samkṣepeṇa sarvasyaiva samādheḥ ṣaḍ doṣā bhavanti / kausīdyam ālabanasampramoṣo
layauddhatyam anābhoga ābhogateti teṣām pratipakṣeṇāṣṭau prahānasamskārā bhāvanīyāḥ / tad
yathā śraddhā chando vyāyāmaḥ praśrabdhīḥ smṛtiḥ samprajanyam cetanā upekṣā ceti / tatrādyās
catvāraḥ kausīdyasya pratipakṣāḥ / tathā hi samādher guṇesv abhisampratyayalakṣaṇayā śraddhayā
tatra yogino 'bhilāṣa utpadyate / tato 'bhilāṣād vīryam ārabhet [/]²⁷ tadvīryabalena
kāyacittakarmanyatām āsādayati / tataḥ praśrabdhakāyacetasāḥ kausīdyam āvartate / ataḥ
śraddhādayaḥ kausīdyaprahāṇāya bhāvanīyāḥ / smṛtir ālabanasampramoṣasya pratipakṣāḥ /
samprajanyam layauddhatyayoḥ pratipakṣāḥ / tena layauddhatyayoḥ samyagupalakṣaṇāt /
layauddhatyā²⁸ praśamanakāle tv anābhogadoṣāḥ / tat pratipakṣeṇa²⁹ ca cetanā bhāvanīyā /
layauddhatyapraśame sati yadā cittam praśa[ma]vāhi tadābhogadoṣāḥ / tatpratipakṣas³⁰ tadānīm
upekṣā bhāvanīyā / ebhir aṣṭabhiḥ prahānasamskāraiḥ samanvāgataḥ samādhiḥ paramakarmanyō
bhavati / ṛddhyādīn guṇān niṣpādayati / ata evoktam sūtre / "prahānasamanvāgataḥ ṛddhipādam
bhāvayati" iti / {209}

15. Dhyāna etc.

eṣā ca cittaikāgratā uttarottarakarmanyatāsamprayogād ālabanādiguṇaviśeṣayogāc ca
dhyānārūpya[samāpatti]vimokṣādivyapadeṣam labhate / tathā hi yadopekṣāvedanāsamprayuktā

27 [/] CIHTS.

28 Following CIHTS.

29 Following CIHTS. Tucci: tat pratipakṣeṇa.

30 Following CIHTS. Tucci: tat pratipakṣas.

savitarkasavicāra sā bhavati / tadānāgamyam ucyate / yadā ca kāmātrṣṇayā [pāpadharmaiḥ] viviktā bhavati [vitarkavicāra]prītisukhādhyātmasamprasādaiḥ samprayuktā bhavati / tadā prathamam dhyānam ucyate / ata eva prathamam dhyānam vitarkamātrarahitam dhyānantaram ucyate / yadā vitarkavicārarahitā prathamadhyānabhūmitṣṇayā viviktā ca bhavati / prītisukhādhyātmasamprasādaiḥ samprayuktā bhavati / tadā dvitīyam dhyānam ucyate / yadā tu dvitīyadhyānabhūmitṣṇayā viviktā bhavati / sukhopekṣāsmṛtisamprajanyasamprayuktā bhavati / tadā tṛtīyam dhyānam ucyate / yadā tṛtīyadhyānabhūmitṣṇayā viviktā bhavati, aduḥkhāsukhā upekṣasmṛtyabhisamprayuktā bhavati, tadā caturtham dhyānam ucyate / evam arūpyasamāpattivimokṣābhībhvāyatanādiṣv ālambanākārādibhedena yojyam / tad evam ālambane cittam sthīrīkṛtya prajñayā vivecayet / yato jñānalokotpādāt samṃohabijasyātyantaprahāṇam bhavati / anyathā hi tīrthikānām iva samādhimātreṇa kleśaprahāṇam na syāt / yathoktam sūtre {210} kiṃ cāpi bhāv[ay]et samādhim etam / na vāpi bhāvayet sā ātmasamjñā // punaḥ prakupyati kilesu tasyā / yathodrakasyeha samādhībhāvanā" / iti /

16. Method of meditation according to the *Laṅkāvatāra*; vicāra on the dharmas (no object, no subject), etc.

tatrāyam āryalaṅkāvatāre samkṣepāt prajñābhāvanākramo nirdiṣṭaḥ /

cittamātram samāruhya bāhyamarthaṃ na kalpayet /
tathatālabane sthītvā cittamātram atikramet //
citta[mātram] atikramya nirābhāsam atikramet /
nirābhāse sthīto yogī mahāyānaṃ sa paśyati //
anābhogagatiḥ śāntā praṇidhānair viśodhitā /
jñānam nirātmakam śreṣṭham nirābhāseṇa paśyati // iti /

tatrāyam arthaḥ / prathamam yogī ye rūpiṇo dharmā bāhyārthatayā paraiḥ parikalpitās teṣu tāvad vicārayet / kim ete vijñānād anye, āhosvid vijñānam evaitat tathā pratibhāsate, yathā svapnāvasthāyām iti / tatra vijñānād bahiḥ paramāṇuśo vicārayet / paramāṇūś ca bhāgaśaḥ pratyavekṣamāṇo yogī tān arthān na samanupaśyati / tasyāsamanupaśyata evam bhavati / cittamātram evaitat sarvaṃ na punar bāhyo 'rtho vidyate / tad evam / {211} "cittamātram samāruhya bāhyam arthaṃ na kalpayet" rūpidharmavikalpān tyajed ityarthāḥ / teṣāṃ upa[labdhi]lakṣaṇaprāptānām vicārayed anupalabdheḥ / evam rūpiṇo dharmān vibhāvvyārūpiṇo vibhāvayet / tatra yac cittamātram tad apy asati grāhye grāhako na yukto grahakasya grāhyāpekṣatvāt / tatasā cittam grāhyagrāhakaviviktam advayam eva cittam iti vicārayet advayalakṣaṇe - "tathatālabane sthītvā [tad api] cittamātram atikramet" ³¹ grāhakam ākāram atikramet / dvayanirābhāsa evādvayajñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ / evam cittamātram atikramya tad api dvayanirābhāsam yaj jñānam tad atikramet / svataḥ parato bhāvānām janmānupapatteḥ

³¹ Following CIHTS. Tucci: ...vicārayet, advayalakṣaṇe tathatālabane sthītvā tad api cittamātram atikramet /

grāhyagrāhakayoś cālikatve tadvyatirekāt tasyāpi satyatvam ayuktam iti vicārayet /
tatrāpy advayajñāne vastutvābhiniveśam tyajet, advayajñānanirābhāsa eva jñāne tiṣṭhed ity arthaḥ /
evam sati sarvadharmāniḥsvabhāvatāpratipattau sthito bhavati / tatra sthitasya paramatattvapraivesāt,
nirvikalpasamādhīpraveśaḥ / tathā cādvayajñānanirābhāse jñāne yadā sthito yogī tadā paramatattve
sthitatvāt, mahāyānam sa paśyati /

17. Meditation on the Absolute.

etad eva tan mahāyānam ucyate yat paramatattvadarśanam / etad eva tat paramatattvadarśanam yat
sarvadharmān prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayataḥ samyagjñānāvaloke saty adarśanam / {212} tathā cōktam
sūtre - "katamaṁ paramārthadarśanam / sarvadharmānām adarśanam /" iti / atreḍṣam evādarśanam
abhipretam / na tu nimilitākṣajātyandhānāmiva pratyayavaikalyād amanasikārato vā yad adarśanam /
tato bhāvābhiniveśādiviparyāsavāsanāyā aprahīnatvāt / asaṁjñīsamāpattyādivyutthitasyeva punar
api bhāvābhiniveśamūlasya rāgādikleśaganasyotpatter amukta eva yogī bhavet /
bhāvābhiniveśamūlo rāgādir āryasatyadvayanirdeśādau varṇitaḥ / yat punar uktam
avikalpapraveśadhāraṇyām "amanasikārato rūpādinimittam varjayati" iti / tatrāpi prajñayā
nirūpayato yo 'nu[p]jalambhaḥ sa tatrāmanasikāro 'bhipreto na manasikārābhāvamātram /
na hy asaṁjñīsamāpattyādir iva anādikāliko rūpādyabhiniveśo manasikārāparivarjanamātrāt
prahīyate / saṁśayāprahāne tu na pūrvopalabdheṣu ca rūpādiṣv abhiniveśamanasikārāparivarjanam
śakyam kartum agnyaparivarjane dāhāparivarjanavat / tathāmi rūpādīmīthyā vikalpāḥ kaṅṭakādivad
utkīlya na hastena cetaso 'panetavyāḥ / kiṁ tarhi, saṁśayabījāpagamāt / tac ca saṁśayabījam
yoginaḥ samādhīvaloke sati prajñācakṣuṣā nirūpayatas teṣāṁ rūpādinām purvopalabdhānām
upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānām anupalambhād, rajjau sarvajñānavad apagacchati nānyathā /
{213} tathā³² saṁśaya[bījā]pagamād rūpādinimittamanasikāraḥ śakyate varjayitum nānyathā /
anyathā hy asati samādhīvaloke prajñācakṣuṣāpy anavaloke yathā
andhakūpāvasthitapurūṣasyāvācarakagataghaṭādiṣv iva yoginoḥ rūpādiṣv astitvasaṁśayo naiva
nivarteta / tadaniṣṭyā cāprahīnatimiradoṣasyeva yo 'yukto 'likarūpādyabhiniveśaḥ pravarteta na
kenāpi nivartyeta / tasmāt samādhīhastena manaḥ saṁdhāya sūkṣmataraprajñāśāstreṇa tatra cetasi
rūpādīmīthyāvikalpabījam³³ uddharet / evam saty utkhātamūlā iva taravo bhūmer nirmūlatayā
mīthyāvikalpāḥ punaś cetasi na virohanti / ata evāvaraṇaprahāṇāya
śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo bhagavatā nirdiṣṭaḥ, tayor avikalpasamyagjñāne hetutvāt /
tathā cōktam / śīlam pratiṣṭhāya samādhilābhāḥ samādhilābhāc ca hi prajñābhāvanā /
prajñayā jñānam bhavati viśuddham / viśuddhajñānasya hi śīlasaṁpat" // iti / tathā hi yadā
śamathenālambane cittam sthīrikṛtam bhavati / tadā prajñayā vicārāyataḥ samyagjñānāloka
utpadyate, tadāndhakāram³⁴ ivāloke prakāśayati āvaraṇam apahīyate / {214} ata evānyoś
cakṣurālokayor iva samyagjñānotpādam praty anyo 'nyānugūnyenāvasthitvān nālokāndhakāravat
parasparavirodhaḥ / na hi samādhīr andhakārasvabhāvaḥ / kiṁ tarhi cittaikāgratālakṣaṇaḥ / sa ca

32 T. dei ts'e.

33 T. adds zug rñu, śalyam.

34 Following CIHTS and T. Tucci: utpadya / tetathāndhakāram...

samāhito yathābhūtaṃ prajānātīti vacanād ekāntena prājñānukula eva bhavati na tu viruddhaḥ /
tasmāt syāt³⁵ samāhitasya prajñayā nirūpayataḥ sarvadharmāṇām anupalambhaḥ / sa eva paramo
'nupalambhaḥ / sā ca tādrśī yoginām avasthānalakṣaṇā gatir anābhogā / tataḥ paraṃ
draṣṭavyasyābhāvāt / śānteti bhāvāvādivikalpalakṣaṇasya prapañcasyopaśamāt /
bhāvavikalpo bhavati / abhāvavikalpo 'pi tasya nāsty eva / yadi bhāvaḥ kadācit dr̥ṣṭo bhavati, evaṃ
sati tanniṣedhenābhāvavikalpaḥ pravartate / yadā tu kālatraye 'pi bhāvo yoginā prajñācakṣuṣā
nirūpayatā nopalabdhaḥ / tadā kathaṃ tasya pratiseḍhenābhāvavikalpaṃ kurvīta / evaṃ anye 'pi
vikalpās tadā tasya na samutpadyanta eva bhāvābhāvavikalpābhyāṃ sarvavikalpasya vyāptatvāt /
vyāpakābhāve ca vyāpyasyāsambhavāt / ayam asau paramanirvikalpo yogaḥ /

18. Definite Elimination of kleśa- and jñeya- āvaraṇa.

atra sthitasya yoginaḥ sarvavikalpānām astaṃgamāt samyak kleśāvaraṇaṃ jñeyāvaraṇaṃ ca
prahīyate / tathā hi kleśāvaraṇasya anutpannāniruddhabhāveṣu bhāvādiviparyāso mūlaṃ kāraṇam
āryasatvadvayanirdeśādu varṇitaṃ bhagavatā / {215} anena ca yogābhyāseṇa
sarvabhāvādivikalpānām prahāṇāt sakalabhāvādiviparyāsyāvīdyāsvabhāvasya
kleśāvaraṇamūlasya prahāṇam / tato mūlocchedāt kleśāvaraṇaṃ samyak prahīyate /
tathā coktaṃ satvadvayanirdeśe / "kathaṃ, mañjuśrīḥ, kleśā vinayaṃ gacchanti / kathaṃ kleśāḥ
parijñātā bhavanti / mañjuśrīr āha / paramārthato 'tyantājātānutpannābhāveṣu sarvadharmeṣu
saṃvṛtyāsadviparyāsaḥ / tasmād asadviparyāsāt saṃkalpavikalpaḥ / tasmāt saṃkalpavikalpād
ayoniśomanasikāraḥ / tasmād ayoniśomanasikārād ātmasamāropaḥ / tasmād ātmasamāropād
dr̥ṣṭiparyutthānam / tasmād dr̥ṣṭiparyutthā[nāt] kleśāḥ pravartante / yaḥ punar, devaputra,
paramārthato 'tyantājātānutpannābhāvān sarvadharmān prajānāti, sa paramārthato 'viparyastaḥ / yaś
ca paramārthato 'viparyastaḥ so 'vikalpaḥ / yaś cāvikalpaḥ sa yoniśaḥ prayuktaḥ / yaś ca yoniśaḥ
prayuktas tasyātmasamāropo na bhavati / yasyātmasamāropo na bhavati tasya dr̥ṣṭiparyutthānam
[na] bhavati / yāvat paramārthato nirvāṇadr̥ṣṭisarvadr̥ṣṭiparyutthānam api na bhavati / tasyaivam
anutpādavihāriṇaḥ kleśā atyantam vinitā draṣṭavyāḥ / ayam ucyate kleśavinayaḥ / yadā, devaputra,
kleśān nirābhāseṇa jñānena paramārthato 'tyantaśūnyān atyantābhāvān atyantānimitān³⁶ prajānāti
tadā, devaputra, kleśāḥ parijñātā bhavanti / atra yathāpi nāma, devaputra, ya āśīviṣasya gotraṃ
prajānāti / {216} sa tasyāśīviṣasya viṣam śamayati / evaṃ eva, devaputra, yaḥ kleśānām gotraṃ
prajānāti tasya kleśāḥ praśāmyanti / devaputra ahā / kataman, mañjuśrīḥ, kleśānām gotraṃ / ahā /
yāvad eṣā paramārthato 'tyantā[jātā]nutpannābhāveṣu sarvadharmeṣu kalpanā idaṃ kleśānām
gotraṃ" iti vistaraḥ / bhāvādiviparyāseṇa ca sakalaviparyāsyasya vyāptatvāt / tatprahāṇe
sakalaviparyāsaprahāṇāt / jñeyāvaraṇam api anena samyak prahīyate, viparyāsalakṣaṇatvād
āvaraṇasya / jñeyāvāraṇe ca prahīyate pratibandhābhāvād ravikiraṇavad apagatameghādyāvaraṇe
nabhāsi sarvatrāvyāhato yogipratyakṣo jñānālokaḥ pravartate / tathā hi vastusvabhāvaprakāśarūpaṃ
vijñānam / tac ca saṃnihitam api vastu pratibandhasadbhāvān na prakāśayati / pratibandhābhāve tu
saty, acintyaśaktiviśeṣalābhāt kimiti sakalam eva vastu yathāvan na prakāśayet / ataḥ
saṃvṛtiparamārtharūpeṇa sakalasya vastuno yathāvat parijñānāt sarvajñatvam avāpyate / ato'yam

35 ? Tucci note 1, p. 524 "Ms. viruddhas tu syāt."

36 Following Tucci 215 note 6. (Ms: atyantānityān, CIHTS: atyantānirnimittān, T: śin tu mtshan med pa).

evāvaraṇaprahāṇe sarvajñatvādhigame ca paramo mārgaḥ / yas tu śrāvakādīnām mārgas tena viparyāsāprahāṇān na samyag āvaraṇadvayam prahīyate // tathā cōktaṃ āryalankāvatāre / "anye tu kāraṇādīnān sarvadharmān dr̥ṣṭvā 'nirvāṇe'³⁷ 'pi nirvāṇam itibuddhayo bhavanti / dharmanairātmyādarśanāt nāsti, mahāmate, mokṣa eṣāṃ / mahāmate, śrāvakayānikābhisamaya-gotrasyāniryāṇe niryāṇabuddhiḥ / atra, mahāmate, kudr̥ṣṭivivārtanārtham yogaḥ karaṇīyaḥ" iti / ata eva cānyena [mārgena] mokṣābhāvād, ekam eva yānam uktaṃ bhagavatā / {217} kevalam avatāraṇābhisamdhinā śrāvakādīmārgo deśitaḥ / tathā hi skandhamātram evaitat / na tv ātmāstīti bhāvayan śrāvakaḥ pudgalanairātmyam avatarati / vijñaptimātram traidhātukam iti bhāvayan vijñānavādi bāhyārthanairātmyam avatarati / anena tv asyādvayajñānasya nairātmyapraveśāt paramatattvapraviṣṭo bhavati / na tu vijñaptimātratāpraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ / yathoktaṃ prāk / uktaṃ cāryalokottaraparivarte "punar aparam, bho jinaputra, cittamātram traidhātukam avatarati tac ca cittam anantamadhyatayāvatarati" iti / antayor utpādabhaṅgalakṣaṇayoh sthitilakṣaṇasya ca madhyasyābhāvād anantamadhyam cittam / tasmād³⁸ advayajñānapraveśa eva tattvapraveśaḥ / sā ceyam yoginām avasthā kuto viśodhiteti / āha / praṇidhānair viśodhitā iti / mahākaruṇayā yat sarvasattvārthakaraṇāya bodhisattvena praṇihitaṃ, tataḥ praṇidhānabalād uttarottaradānādikuśalābhyaśāt sā tathā viśuddhā jātā yena sarvadharmāniḥsvabhāvātājñāne 'pi sakalasattvāpekṣā na vyāvartate yāvat saṃsāra [evā]nānuḥliptāḥ saṃsāradoṣair avatiṣṭhanta iti / katham punar anābhogā śāntety atra kāraṇam āha / jñānam nirātmakam śreṣṭham nirābhāseṇa paśyati / iti / {218} yasmād yad advayalakṣaṇam [jñānam] advayavādinām śreṣṭham paramārthenābhimatam tad api nirātmakam niḥsvabhāvam advayanirābhāseṇa jñānaena paśyati yogi / ato 'parasya draṣṭavyasyābhāvād anābhogā / sarvavikalpābhāvāt śānteti /

19. Absolute and conventional: paramārtha and saṃvṛti.

atredānīm ko 'sau yogī vidyate yaḥ paśyatīti cet / na paramārthataḥ kaścīd ātmādiḥ svatanthro 'sti yogī nāpi kaścīd paśyati / kimtu saṃvṛtyā yathā rūpādiviṣayākārajñānotpādamātreṇa vijñānam eva loke tathā tathā vyavahriyate devadatto yajñadattam jñānena paśyatīti na tu kaścīd ātmādir asti / tathā'trāpi jñānam evādvayajñānanirābhāsam utpadyamānam tathā vyapadiśyate nirābhāseṇa jñānena paśyatīti / na hi sarvadharmāṇām paramārthato niḥsvabhāvātve 'pi saṃvṛtyā yogijñānam anyad vā pṛthagjñānam neṣṭam / tathā cōktaṃ āryasatvadvyāvanirdeśe / "paramārthato 'tyantābhāvas ca saṃvṛtyā ca mārgam bhāvayati" iti / anyathā śrāvakapratyēkabuddhabodhisattvādi pṛthagjanavyavasthā katham bhavet / kimtu yasya saṃvṛtyāpi kāraṇam nāsti sa saṃvṛtyāpi notpadyate / yathā śāśaviṣāṇādi / yasya tu karanam³⁹ vidyate sa paramārthato 'liko 'pi samutpadyate eva / yathā māyāpratibimbādi / na ca māyādeḥ saṃvṛtyā pratīyasamutpāde paramārthato vastutvapasāṅgaḥ / {219} tasya vicārākṣamatvāt / ataḥ sarvam eva māyopamam jagat / tatra yathā kleśakarmamāyāvaśāt sattvānām janmamāyā pravartate, tathā

³⁷ Following CIHTS. Tucci, nirvāṇe . T: gzan dag ni chos thams cad ryan la rag las par mthoñ nas mya nian las 'das pai blor gyur te /

³⁸ Following CIHTS. Tucci: tasmann; Tib. de lta bas.

³⁹ kāraṇam not in Skt. Added from T: rgyu.

yoginām api puṇyajñānasambhāramāyāvaśāt yogijñānamāyā pravartata eva / tathā cōktam ārvaprajñāpāramitāyām / "kaścit śrāvakanirmitaḥ / kaścitpratyekabuddhanirmitaḥ / kaścid bodhisattvanirmitaḥ / kaścit tathāgatanirmitaḥ / kaścit kleśanirmitaḥ / kaścit karmanirmitaḥ / anena, subhūte, paryāyena sarvadharmānirmitopannaḥ" iti / ayam tu viśeṣo yoginām pṛthagjanebhyaḥ / te hi māyākāravat tām māyām yathāvat pariññānāt satyato nābhiniśante / tena te yogina ucyante / ye tām bālapṛthagjanavat kautūhalaṃ satyatvenābhiniśtās te viparītābhiniveśād bālā ucyanta iti sarvam aviruddham / tathā cōktam āryadharmasamgītau / māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ mokṣaṃ udyataḥ / na cāsyā nirmite saṅgo jñātapūrvō yato 'sya saḥ // tribhavaṃ nirmitaprakhyam jñātvā sambodhipāragah / samnahyate jagaddhetor jñātapūrvam jagat tathā // iti /

20. Progress in meditation, yuganaddhamārga.

evam anena krameṇa tattvaṃ bhāvayet / tatra ca layauddhatyādīn vyutthitān pūrvavat praśamayet / yadā tu sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvatālabane ca layauddhatyādirahitam anabhisamskāreṇa pravṛttam jñānam bhavati, tadā śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo niṣpanno bhavati / {220} tadā yāvat śaknoti tāvad adhimuktibalenādhimukticaryābhūmau sthito bhāvayet / tato yatheccham paryāṅkam ābhujya vyutthāya punar evaṃ cintayet / yadi nāmānī dharmāḥ paramārthata eva niḥsvabhāvā apy ete samvṛtyā sthitā eva / tathā cōktam āryaratnameghe / katham bodhisattvo nairātmyakuśalo bhavati / iha, kulaputra, bodhisattvaḥ samyakprajñayā rūpaṃ pratyavekṣate vedanāṃ samjñāṃ samskārān vijñānaṃ pratyavekṣate / sa rūpaṃ pratyavekṣamāno rūpasyotpādaṃ nopalabhate / nirodham nopalabhate / samudayaṃ nopalabhate / evaṃ vedanāyāḥ, samjñāyāḥ, samskārāṇāṃ, vijñānasyotpādaṃ nopalabhate / nirodham nopalabhate / samudayaṃ nopalabhate / ayam ca paramārthato 'nutpādavihāriṇyā prajñayā na punar vyāvahārikena svabhāvena" iti vistarāḥ / ete ca bālabuddhaya evaṃ niḥsvabhāveṣu bhāveṣu viparītābhiniveśāt saṃsāre paribhramanto vividhāni duḥkhāni pratyanubhavanti / mahākaruṇā evāmukhikṛtya evam anuvicintayet / tathāham kariṣyāmi yathā sarvajñatvaṃ prāpya eteṣāṃ dharmatām, avabodhayeyam iti / {221} tataḥ sarvabuddhabodhisattvebhyaḥ pūjāstotropahāraṃ kṛtvā, āryabhadracarvāprañidhānam abhinirharet / tataḥ sūnyatākaruṇāgarbha eva sakaladānādīpunya[jñāna]sambhāropārjane pravartate / tathā cōktam āryadharmasamgītau / yathābhūtadarśino bodhisattvasya sattveṣu mahākaruṇā pravartate [evaṃ cāsyā bhavati] idaṃ mayā samādhimukhaṃ sarvadharmayathābhūtadarśanaṃ ca sarvasattvānāṃ niṣpādayitavyam / sa tayā mahākaruṇayā samcodyamāno 'dhiśīlam adhicitam adhiprajñam ca śikṣātrayaṃ paripūryānuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyata iti / ayam eva prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī bodhisattvānāṃ mārgo yat paramārthadarśane 'pi samvṛtiṃ nocchedayanti / samvṛtiṃ cānucchedayanto mahākaruṇāpūrvāṅgamā aviparyastā eva sattvārthakriyāsu pravartante / ⁴⁰tatra yadi nāma lokottaraprajñāvasthāyām upāyasevanā na sambhavati / upāyasevanākāle tu bodhisattvasya māyākāravat aviparyastatvāl lokottarajñānāt prayogaprṣṭhabhāvanī yathāvad vastuparamārthatattvābhiniveśanī prajñā sambhavaty eveti / bhavaty eva prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī mārgaḥ / āryāksayamatinirdeśe ca dhyānāksayatayā prajñopāyayuganaddhavāhī mārgo 'nugantavyaḥ / uktam āryaratnameghe "katham bodhisattvo mahāyānakuśalo bhavati / iha bodhisattvaḥ sarvāsu śikṣāsu śikṣate śikṣāmārgaṃ ca nopalabhate /

⁴⁰ In T. and CIHTS this passage is placed at the end of section 21 after anugantavyā.

yac ca śikṣate tad api nopalabhate / {222} yaś ca śikṣyate tam api nopalabhate / na ca taddhetukam tannidānam tatpratrayam ucchedaḍṣṭau patati" iti /

21. Pratipatti.

āryadharmasamgītau cōktam / katamā bodhisattvānām pratipattiḥ / yat kimcid bodhisattvānām kāyakarma, yat kimcid vākkarma, yat kimcin manahkarma [tat] sarvasattvāpekṣakam pravartate mahākaruṇāpūrvāṅgamatvāt, mahākaruṇādhipatyam sarvasattvahitasukhādhyāśayasamutthitam" iti / ayam evam hitāśayaḥ samjñābhavati / sā mayā pratipattiḥ pratipattavyā sarvasattvānām hitāvahā sukhāvahā / tasya skandheṣu māyāvāt pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca skandhaparitvāgamam sprhatīti / dhātusv āśivīṣavat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca dhātuparityāgamam sprhatīti / āyataneṣu śūnyagrāmavat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na cāyatanaparityāgamam sprhatīti / rūpasya phenapiṇḍavat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca tathāgatarūpakāyaviṭhapanā[m] jahāti / vedanāyā budbudavat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca tathāgatadhyānasamādhisamāpattisukhanīpādana prayogam nārabhate / samjñāyām marīcivat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca tathāgatajñānanīpādanasamjñāyām apratipattiḥ / samskārānām kadalīvat pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca buddhadharmasamskāraṇām apratipattiḥ / {223} vijñānasya māyāvāt pratyavekṣaṇā pratipattir na ca jñānapūrvamgamakāyavānmanaska[rma]niṣpādanā 'pratipattir iti vistaraḥ / evam aparyanteṣu sūtrānteṣu prajñopāyarūpā pratipattir anugantavyā /

22. The stages: adhimukticyā.

evam anena krameṇa bodhisattvasya prajñām upāyam ca satatam satkrtya dīrghakālābhyāsena bhāvayato dvādaśāvasthāviśeṣā bhavanti / tā evāvasthā uttarottaraguṇapratīṣṭhārthena bhūmayo vyavasthāpyante / adhimukticyābhūmer yāvad buddhabhūmir iti / tatra yāvat pudgaladharmanairātmyatattvam na sāksatkaroti / kevalam dṛḍhatarādhimuktiḥ / ⁴¹ mārādibhir apy abhedyo yadādhimuktibalena tattvam bhāvayati / tadā dṛḍhādhimuktito 'dhimukticyābhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyām api bhūmau vartamāno bodhisattvaḥ pṛthagjano 'pi sarvabālavipattiḥ samatikrānto 'samkhyeyasamādhidhāraṇīvimokṣābhijñādīguṇāvita āryaratnameghe paṭhyate / asyā eva ca mṛdumadhyādhimātrādhimātratarāvasthācatuṣṭayena catvāri nirvedhabhāgīyāni vyavasthāpyante / tathā hi yadā [sarvadharmānairātmyam bhāvayata]⁴² iyatspaṣṭo jñānāloko [bhavati tadā uṣmagatanāmakam nirvedhabhāgīyam bhavati / sa cātra mahāyāna ālokalabdhasamādhir ucyate / {224} yadā tu sa eva jñānāloko]⁴³ madhyamaspaṣṭo bhavati, tadā mūrddhanāmakānirvedhabhāgīyam bhavati vṛddhālokaś ca samādhir ucyate / yadā tu spaṣṭataro bāhyārthānābhāsajñānāloko jāyate, tadā vijñāptimātrāvasthānāt kṣāntināmakam nirvedhabhāgīyam bhavati / ekadeśapraviṣṭaś ca samādhir ucyate grāhyākārānupalambhapraveśāt / yadā tu

41 [] CIHTS.

42 CIHTS: bāhyārtham vibhāvayatā. T: phyi rol gyi don nam par 'jig pa, "examining the external object".

43 Tucci's restoration from T.

grāhyagrāhakākārahitam advayaṃ jñānaṃ vibhāvayet, tadāgradharmākhyāṃ nirvedhabhāgiyaṃ bhavati ānantaryaś ca sa samādhir ucyate / tadanantaram e[va] tattvapraveśāt / atra tāvad adhimukticyābhūmiḥ /

23. The ten bhūmis and the Buddhabhūmi.

itarās tu bhūmayāḥ saṃkṣepata ekādaśāṅgaparipūrito vyavasthāpyante / tatra prathamā bhūmiḥ prathamam pudgaladharmanairātmyatattvādhighamāṅgaparipūrito vyavasthāpyate / tathā hi yadāgradharmānantaram prathamatarāṃ lokottaram sarvaprapaṅcarahitam sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvatāsākṣātkāri sphuṭatarāṃ jñānaṃ utpadyate, tadā bodhisattvaḥ samyaktvanyāmāvakrāntito, darśanamārgotpādāt, prathamāṃ bhūmiṃ praviṣṭo bhavati / ata evāsyāṃ bhūmau prathamato 'nadhigatatattvādhighamād bodhisattvaḥ pramudito bhavati / tata eṣā bhūmiḥ pramuditety ucyate / atra ca dvādaśottaram darśanaheyaṃ kleśāsatam prahīyate / śeṣās tu bhūmayo bhāvanāmārgasvabhāvāḥ / {225} tāsu bhāvanāheyās traidhātukāḥ ṣoḍaśa kleśāḥ prahīyante / asyāṃ ca bhūmau bodhisattva[sya] [dharmadhātusamudāgamatā] prabodhāt svārtha iva parārthe pravartanāt, dānapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / sa ca bodhisattvaḥ samadhigatatatto 'pi vā yāvan na śaknoti sūkṣmāpattiskhaliteṣu saṃprajanyavihārī bhavitum, tāvat prathamā bhūmiḥ / yadā tu śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrito dvitīyā bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / ata evāsyāṃ bhūmau sūkṣmāpattiskhalitāsamudācārāt, śīlapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati sarvadauḥśīlyamalāpagamād iyaṃ bhūmir vimalety ucyate / sa sūkṣmāpattiskhaliteṣu saṃprajanyavihārī bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti sakalalaukikaṃ samādhim samāpattum yathāśrutam cārtham ādhartum tāvad dvitīyaiva bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti, tadā tasyāṅgasya paripūritas tṛtīyābhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyāṃ ca bhūmau bodhisattvasya śrutadhāraṇyā sarvalaukikasamādhyabhinirhārārtham sarvaduhkhasahanāt, kṣāntipāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / teṣāṃ samādhinām lābhād iyaṃ bhūmir apramāṇam lokottaram jñānāvabhāsam karotīti prabhākarīty ucyate / sa pratilabdhalaukikasakalāsamādhir api yāvan na śaknoti yathāpratilabdhair bodhipakṣair dharmair bahulam vihartum sarvasamāpattinām ca cittam upekṣitum tāvat tṛtīyā bhūmiḥ // {226} yadā tu śaknoti tadā tasyāṅgasya paripūritas caturthī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyāṃ bhūmau bodhisattvasyābhikṣṇam kāyavānmanojalpasamatikramaṇāya bodhipakṣair dharmair viharanāt, vīryapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / iyaṃ ca sakalakleśendhana[dāha]samarthasya bodhipakṣadharmārciṣa udgatavād arcīsmatīty ucyate / so 'bhikṣṇam bodhipakṣadharmavihārī bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti satyāni bhāvayan saṃsārā[na]bhīmukhaṃ nirvāṇābhīmukhaṃ ca ceto vyāvartayitum upāyasamgrhītān bodhipakṣān dharmān bhāvayitum tāvat caturthī bhūmiḥ / yadā tu śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūritas pañcamī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / ata evāsyāṃ iyaṃ upāyasamgrhītābodhipakṣabhāvanā suṣṭhu duḥkena jīyate abhyasyatā iti sudurjayety ucyate / asyāṃ cāryasatyākārabhāvanābahulikārāt, dhyānapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / upāyasamgrhītābodhipakṣabahulavihārī ca bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti saṃsārpravṛttipratyavekṣaṇān nirvitsahayā cittasantatyā 'nimittavihāram samāpattum tāvat pañcamī bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūritas ṣaṣṭhī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyāṃ ca bodhisattvasya pratīyasamutpādabhāvanāvihārāt prajñāpāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / ata eva prajñāpāramitāyā atiriktataratvāt, sarvabuddhadharmeṣv abhimukho 'syāṃ bhūmau vartata iti kṛtvā, abhimukhīty ucyate / so 'nimittavihārālābhī bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti niśchidram animittavihāram samāpattum tāvat ṣaṣṭhī bhūmiḥ / {227} yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūritas saptamī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyāṃ api bhūmau bodhisattvaḥ sarvanimittam nimimittena pratividhyati

nimittakṛtavyavahāraṃ ca na virodhyati / ato 'syām upāyapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / iyaṃ ca bhūmir anābhogamārgopaśeṣāt suṣṭhu dūraṃgamāt, dūraṃgamā / [sa] niśchidrānimittavihārī bhavati / yāvan na śaknoty anābhogavāhinam animittavihāraṃ samāpattum tāvat saptamī bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrīto 'ṣṭamī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyām ca [bhūmau] anābhogena kuśalapakṣayogāt prañidhānapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / animittānābhogāprakampyavād iyaṃ acalety ucyate / so 'nābhogānimittavihārī ca bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti paryāyaniruktyādiprabhedaiḥ sarvākārasarvadharmadeśanāyām vaśībhavitum tāvad aṣṭamī bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrīto navāmī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyām ca [bhūmau] bodhisattvasya pratisaṃvidviśeṣalābhāt prajñābalaviśeṣayogād balapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / sarvākāradharmadeśanākuśalato 'navadyamativiśeṣalābhāt sādhumatī bhūmir ucyate / asyām ca pratisaṃviccatuṣṭayalābhī bhavati / yāvan na śaknoti buddhakṣetraparāṇnirmāṇādi darśayitum paripūrīnadharmasambhogam sattvapariṣākaṃ ca kartum tāvan navāmī bhūmiḥ / {228} yadā tu śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrīto daśamī bhūmir vyavasthāpyate / asyām ca nirmāṇādinā sattvapariṣākanāyā jñānaviśeṣayogād bodhisattvasya jñānapāramitā 'tiriktatarā bhavati / iyaṃ ca dharmadeśanāmeghair ananteṣu lokadhātuṣu dharmapravarṣaṇād dharmameghety ucyate / aparair api skandhapariśuddhyādivyavasthāpanair bhūminām vyavasthāpanam asti granthavistarabhayān na likhitam / sa pratilabdhanirmāṇādivaśīto 'pi yāvan na śaknoti sarvasmin jñeye sarvākāram asaktam apratihataṃ jñānam utpādayitum tāvad daśamī bhūmiḥ / yadā śaknoti tadāsyāṅgasya paripūrīto buddhabhūmir vyavasthāpyate / etac ca bhūmivyasthāpanam āryasamdhinirmocane nirdiṣṭam / asyāś ca buddhabhūmeḥ sarvākārasakalasampatprakarṣaparyantagamanān nāparam utkrṣṭam sthānāntaram asti" iti / asyāś ca buddhabhūmer guṇapakṣaprabhedo buddhair api na śakyate sarvākāram vaktum / tasyā aprameyatvāt kathām punar asmatsadrśaiḥ / yathoktam āryagandavvūhe [guṇaikadesaparyantaṃ nādhigacchet svayaṃbhavaḥ / ni]rīkṣyamāno 'pi buddhadharmā hy acintiyāḥ // iti / {229} etāvat tu saṃkṣepeṇa vaktum śakyate ⁴⁴ [yath]lālabdho bhāvantakamalaśīlaviśruto bodhisattvabhāvanākramaḥ samāptaḥ /

ye dharmā hetuprabhavā hetum teṣāṃ tathāgato hy avadat /
teṣāṃ ca yo nirodha evamvādi mahāśramaṇaḥ //

44 * [From here T. differs: bdag dan gzan gyi don phun sum tshogs pa rab kyi mthar phyin pa ñes pa ma lus pa bsal ba'i mthar thug pa brñes nas sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das rnams chos kyi sku la bžugs te / loñs spyod rdsogs pa dan sprul pa'i tshul gyis mdsad ciñ 'khor ba ji srid par bžugs so / de lta bas na rtog pa dan ldan pa mams kyis yon tan thams cad kyi 'byuñ gnas bcom ldan 'das rnams la dad pa bskyed la de dag gi yon tan yoñs su bsgub pa'i phyir rnam pa thams cad kyi rab tu 'bad par bya'o / / sku gsum la sogs pa'i ranm par dbye ba ni yi ge mañs kyis dogs te ma bris so / mdo sde dag gi tshul gyis (Tucci: gyi) lugs mthun pa / rgyal ba'i sras kyi lam 'di legs bśad pas // bdag gis bsod nams mi chuñ gañ thob des / 'gro ba śes žan blo mchog myur thob śog // sa'i mña'i bdag dpal lha bstan pas bka'i stsal nas ---- ka ma la śi las bsgom pa'i rim pamdor bsdu pa 'di bgyis so / / bsgom rim dan po rdsogs so // // rgya gar gyi mkhan po pra jñā va rma dan / žu chen gyi lo tsā ba bande ye śes sde la sogs pas bsgyur ciñ gtan la phab pa // SKT reconstruction in CIHTS: svaparārthasampatti prakarṣaparyantagataḥ aśeṣadoṣāpagamaniṣṭhām prāpya bhagavān buddho dharmakāye sthītvā sambhoganirmānakāyābhyām anābhogenarūpeṇa aśeṣajagadarthaṃ kurvan yāvat saṃsāraṃ viharati / tasmāt prekṣāvadbhīḥ sarvaguṇākareṣu bhagavatsu śraddhā utpādanīyā, tadguṇapariśādan-ārthaṃ sarvaprakāreṇa prayatitavyam / trikāyādivibhāgastu granthadistarabhayāna likhyate / nayasyānusāreṇa sūtrasya cātha saduktyā'sya mārgasya jinaputrakāṇām / mayānalpapuṇyaṃ yadāptam ca tena parāmetu buddhiṃ jaganmandamāṣu // bhūpatiśrīdevarājavacanena kamalaśīlena bhāvanākramasya ayaṃ saṃkṣepaḥ kṛtaḥ // bhāvanākramaḥ prathamāḥ samāptaḥ /

The Process of Meditation II¹

{D42a1} ka ma la śī las mdsad pa'i sgom rim bar pa bžugs so²
 rgya gar skad du / bhā va nā³ kra ma /
 bod skad du / bsgom⁴ pa'i rim pa /
 'jam dpal gžon nur gyur pa la phyag 'tshal lo //

The Process of Meditation, a work by Kamalaśīla, is contained herein.
 In Sanskrit: *Bhāvanākrama*
 In Tibetan: *bsGom pa'i rim pa*
 Homage to Mañjuśrī!

theg pa chen po'i⁵ mdo sde'i gyis⁶ rjes su 'jug pa mams kyi⁷ bsgom⁸ pa'i rim pa mdor
 bśad do //

'di la thams cad mkhyen pa ñid śin tu myur du thob par 'dod pa rtog⁹ pa dañ ldan pas de
 thob par byed pa'i rgyu mams dañ rkyen mams la mñon par brtson par bya'o / 'di ltar thams cad
 mkhyen pa ñid 'di ni rgyu med pa las 'byun bar mi ruñ ste / thams cad kyañ dus thams cad du
 thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du 'byuñ bar thal bar 'gyur ba'i phyir ro // bltos¹⁰ pa med par 'byuñ na
 ni gañ du yañ thogs par mi ruñ ste / gañ gis na thams cad kyañ thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du mi
 'gyur ro // de lta bas na la lar brgya lam na 'ga' žig 'byuñ du zad pas dños po thams cad ni rgyu la
 bltos¹¹ pa kho na yin no // thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du yañ la lar brgya lam na 'ga' žig 'gyur te /
 dus thams cad du yañ ma yin / gnas thams cad du ma yin / thams cad kyañ ma yin pas de'i phyir de
 ni rgyu dañ rkyen la bltos¹² par nes so //

¹ Tibetan text for this translation is principally based on Goshima and D. Departures from Goshima are noted. I have included all his footnotes regarding variations in the manuscripts. I have mainly followed Goshima in the division of paragraphs.

² Omitted in CD; P *par* for *bar pa*.

³ CD *na*.

⁴ NP *sgom*.

⁵ CD *po*.

⁶ CD *gyi*.

⁷ CD *kyis*.

⁸ NP *sgom*.

⁹ CD *rtogs*.

¹⁰ CD *ltos*.

¹¹ CD *ltos*.

¹² CD *ltos*.

The process of meditation for those who apply themselves in accordance with the Mahāyāna sūtras will now be explained in brief.

A thoughtful person who wishes to rapidly obtain the state of omniscience should strive for the causes and conditions that bring it about. Such omniscience cannot emerge without a cause; since (if it could) it would then absurdly follow that all beings would be omniscient at all times. If it were to emerge independently, there could be no obstructions to it anywhere -- obstructions on account of which not everyone becomes omniscient.¹³ Because events occur only to certain people at certain times and places, all (events) are indeed dependent on causes. So too omniscience -- it arises for certain people, at certain times and places; but because it does not occur to everybody at all times and places, it is certain that it depends on causes and conditions.

rgyu dañ rkyen de dag gi nañ nas kyañ ma nor ciñ ma tshañ ba med pa mams bsten¹⁴ par bya'o // rgyu nor ba la nan tan byas na ni yun śin tu riñ mo¹⁵ žig gis kyañ 'dod pa'i 'bras bu 'thob pa med do// dper na rwa las 'o ma bzo ba bzin no // rgyu mtha' dag ma spyad¹⁶ pa las kyañ 'bras bu 'byuñ ba med de / sa bon la sogs pa gañ yañ ruñ ba žig med na myu gu la sogs pa 'bras bu mi 'byuñ ba'i phyir ro // de lta bas na 'bras bu 'dod pas rgyu dañ rkyen ma nor ba dañ mtha' dag la bsten par bya'o //

Moreover, from among those causes and conditions one should adhere to those which are non-erroneous and complete. If one applied oneself to an *erroneous cause*, even for a very long time, one would not obtain the effect sought for. For example, it would be like milking the horn of a cow for milk. The effect also will not arise from not putting into practice *all its causes*, since an effect such as a sprout will not occur if any one (of its causes), such as the seed, is missing. Therefore someone who seeks a result should adhere to its causes and conditions -- non-erroneous and complete.

'bras bu thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyi¹⁷ rgyu dañ rkyen de dag gañ ze na / smras pa / bdag lta bu dmus loñ dañ 'dra bas de dag bstan¹⁸ par mi nus mod kyi / 'on kyañ bcom ldan 'das ñid kyis mñon par rdsogs par sañs rgyas nas gdul bya mams la ji skad bśad pa de bzin du bdag gis bcom ldan 'das kyis bka'¹⁹ ñid bśad do //

¹³ Here I have understood the expression *gañ gis na* as '(that) on account of which,' (Sanskrit *yena*), taking this relative clause to refer back to the obstructions to omniscience.

¹⁴ P *sten*.

¹⁵ CD *po*.

¹⁶ NP *dpyad*.

¹⁷ P *gyi*.

¹⁸ DN *bsten*.

¹⁹ D *bdag*.

bcom ldan 'das kyis der bka' stsal pa / "gsañ ba pa'i bdag po thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes de ni sñiñ rje'i rtsa ba las byuñ ba yin / byañ chub kyī sems kyī rgyu las byuñ ba yin / {D42b1} thabs kyis mthar phyin pa yin no" žes 'byuñ ño //

de lta bas na thams cad mkhyen pa ñid thob par 'dod pas sñiñ rje dañ / byañ chub kyī sems dañ / thabs dañ gsum po 'di dag la bslab par bya'o // sñiñ rjes bskyod²⁰ na byañ chub sems dpa' rnam sems can thams cad mñon par gdon pa'i phyir ñes par dam 'cha' bar 'gyur ro // de nas bdag ñid la lta ba bsal nas śin tu bya dka' žiñ rgyun mi 'chad la yun riñ por bsgrubs²¹ pa'i bsod nams dañ ye śes kyī tshogs la gus par 'jug go // de žugs nas ñespar bsod nams dañ ye śes kyī tshogs yoñs su rdsogs par bsgrub²² bo // tshogs rnam yoñs su rdsogs na thams cad mkhyen pa ñid lag mthil du²³ thob pa dañ 'dra bar 'gyur ro //

Now, if it is asked what are the causes and conditions of which omniscience is the effect, I say that one like me, who is as if blind by birth, cannot explain them. What I can do, however, is convey them in accordance with the very words of the Illustrious One, just as he conveyed them to his disciples after he became enlightened.

The Illustrious One said to them, "O Master of Secrets, the wisdom of omniscience has arisen from the root which is compassion. It has arisen from the cause which is the thought of Awakening. It has reached its completion through method."

Thus one seeking to attain omniscience should train in the triad of compassion, the thought of Awakening and method. When moved by compassion, bodhisattvas will definitely make vows for the sake of rescuing all sentient beings. Then, having removed self-centredness, they will devotedly apply themselves to the accumulations of merit and knowledge, which are extremely hard work and which are perfected uninterruptedly over a long period of time. Once they have embarked upon it, there can be no doubt that they will thoroughly perfect the accumulations of merit and knowledge. When the accumulations are complete, it will be as if omniscience is contained in the palm of one's hand.

de bas na thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyī rtsa ba ni sñiñ rje kho na yin pas de ni thog ma kho nar goms pas bya'o //

chos vañ dag par sdud pa las kyañ bka' stsal te / "bcom ldan 'das, byañ chub sems dpas²⁴ chos rab tu mañ po la bslab par mi bgyi'o // bcom ldan 'das byañ chub sems dpas²⁵ chos gcig rab

20 C *bskyed*.

21 NP *bsgrub*.

22 CD *sgrub*.

23 CD *lag tu*.

24 NP *dpa'*

25 N omits *dpas*. P *dpa'*.

tu bzun²⁶ zin rab tu rtogs par bgyis na²⁷ sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad de'i lag mthil du mchis pa lags so // chos gcig po gan ze na / 'di lta ste / sñiñ rje chen po'o" zes byun ño //

sñiñ rje chen po yoñs su zin pas na, sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das mams rañ gi don phun sum tshogs pa mtha' dag brñes²⁸ kyañ sems can gyi khams mthar thug pa'i bar du bzugs par mdsad do // ñan thos bzin du mya ñan las 'das pa'i groñ khyer śin tu zi bar yañ 'jug par mi mdsad de / sems can la gzigs nas mya ñan las 'das pa'i groñ khyer zi ba de lcags kyi khañ pa 'bar ba bzin du thag rin du spon²⁹ bas bcom ldan 'das mams kyi³⁰ mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa'i rgyu ni sñiñ rje chen po³¹ de ñid yin no //

Therefore, because this very compassion is the root of omniscience, it should be practiced right from the start.

As was said in the *Dharmasaṃgīti*, "Illustrious One! A bodhisattva should not train in too many teachings. Illustrious One, when a bodhisattva has thoroughly embraced one teaching, thoroughly understood it, then all the qualities of the Buddha are there in the palm of his hand. And if it is asked what is this one teaching, it is nothing other than great compassion."

Because they are fully possessed by great compassion the Illustrious Buddhas remain in the world until reaching its end -- in spite of the fact that they have already acquired all of their own perfections. They will not enter the serene citadel of *nirvāṇa*, as śrāvakas do. Having contemplated sentient beings, they distance themselves from the serene citadel of *nirvāṇa* as though it were a blazing house of iron. Thus the cause of the Buddhas' nonabiding *nirvāṇa* is precisely that great compassion.

de la sñiñ rje bsgom pa'i rim pa de dañ po 'jug pa nas brtsams te brjod par bya'o // thog mar re žig btañ sñoms bsgoms³² pas sems can thams cad la rjes su chags pa dañ / khoñ khro ba bsal te / sñoms pa'i sems ñid bsgrub par bya'o // {D43a1} sems can thams cad bde ba ni 'dod sdug bsñal ba ni mi 'dod la / thog ma med pa can gyi 'khor ba na³³ sems can gañ lan brgyar bdag gi gñen du ma gyur pa de gañ yañ med do sñam du yoñs su bsam zin / 'di la bye brag ci žig yod na la la la ni rjes su chags la la la ni khoñ khro bar gyur pas³⁴ de lta bas na bdag gis sems can thams cad la sems sñoms pa ñid du bya'o sñam du de lta yid la bya zin bar ma phyogs nas brtsams te

26 CD gzuñ.

27 NP nas.

28 P brñed.

29 NP soñ.

30 NP kyis.

31 NP po'i.

32 NP bsgom.

33 C ni. NP nas.

34 P omits pas. N pa.

mḍsa' bśes ḍaṅ ḍgra la sems sñoms pa ñid du bsgom mo //

Here then, starting from the very outset, the stage of cultivating compassion should be explained. Initially, at the beginning, one cultivates equanimity -- thereby clearing away anger and attachment towards any sentient being. Thus even-mindedness should be produced. Thinking, "All sentient beings desire happiness and do not desire suffering. In beginningless *samsāra* there is no sentient being who has not been a relative of mine at least a hundred times ..." -- what distinction could there be among them that one could be attached to some and angry at others? Therefore, taking it to heart that one should act with even-mindedness towards all sentient beings, commencing from a position of neutrality, one cultivates even-mindedness towards friends and enemies alike.

de nas sems can thams cad la sems sñoms pa ñid du bsgrubs nas byams pa bsgom mo //
byams pa'i chus³⁵ sems kyi³⁶ rgyud brlan te gser yod pa'i sa gzi bzin du byas la sñin rje'i sa bon
btab na bde blag tu śin tu yons su rgyas par 'gyur ro //

de nas sems kyi rgyud byams pas bsgos nas sñin rje bsgom par bya'o // *sñin rje de ni sems*
can sdug bsñal ba thams cad³⁷ sdug bsñal de ḍaṅ bral bar 'dod pa'i rnam pa yin no //

khams gsum pa'i³⁸ sems can thams cad ni sdug bsñal ñid rnam pa gsum gyis ci rigs par
śin tu sdug bsñal ba dag yin pas de'i phyir sems can thams cad la de bsgom par bya ste /

'di ltar "re žig sems can dmyal ba pa'i sems can gaṅ dag yin pa de dag ni rgyun mi 'chad
cin yun riṅ la tsha ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsñal sna tshogs kyi chu bor byin ba kho na yin no" žes
bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to // de bzin du "yi dags rnams kyaṅ phal cher śin tu mi bzad pa'i
bkres pa ḍaṅ skom pa'i sdug bsñal gyi mes bskams pa'i lus śin tu sdug bsñal maṅ po myoṅ ṅo"
žes bka' stsal to // dud 'gro rnams kyaṅ gcig la gcig za ba ḍaṅ / khro ba ḍaṅ / gsod pa ḍaṅ / rnam
par 'tše ba la sogs pa'i sdug bsñal rnam pa maṅ po myoṅ ba kho nar snaṅ ṅo // [8] mi rnams kyaṅ
'dod pa yoṅs su tshol bas phoṅs pas³⁹ gcig la gcig 'khu ba ḍaṅ / gnod pa byed pa⁴⁰ ḍaṅ / sdug pa
ḍaṅ bral ba ḍaṅ / mi sdug pa ḍaṅ phrad pa ḍaṅ / dbul phoṅs las gyur pa la sogs pa'i sdug bsñal
dpag tu med pa ñams su myoṅ bar snaṅ ṅo // {D43b1} gaṅ dag 'dod chags la sogs pa'i ñon moṅs
pa'i⁴¹ kun nas dkris pa dag ḍaṅ / gaṅ dag lta ba ṅan pa rnam pa sna tshogs gziṅ gziṅ bar gyur pa
de dag⁴² thams cad kyaṅ sdug bsñal gyi rgyu yin pas gad ka na 'dug pa bzin du śin tu sdug bsñal
ba kho na yin no // lha rnams kyaṅ thams cad 'gyur ba'i sdug bsñal ñid kyis sdug bsñal ba dag ste

35 NP omits *chus*.

36 NP *kyis*.

37 NP *rnams la*.

38 P omits *pa'i*.

39 CD *nas*.

40 *byed pa* omitted in NP.

41 CD *pas*.

42 CD omit *dag*.

/ 'dod pa na spyod pa'i lha gañ dag⁴³ yin pa de dag ni rtag tu 'chi 'pho ba dañ ltuñ ba la sogs pa'i 'jigs pa'i mya ñan gyis sems la gnod na ji ltar bde / 'du byed kyi sdug bsñal ñid ni las dañ ñon moñs pa'i mtshan ñid kyi rgyu'i gžan gyi dbaṅ gi ño bo ñid dañ / skad cig re re la 'jig pa'i ñaṅ can gyi mtshan ñid de / 'gro ba thams cad la khyab pa yin no //

Next, having established even-mindedness, one cultivates kindness. Saturating the mental continuum with the waters of kindness so that it becomes like a soil of gold, when the seed of compassion is sewn there it readily flourishes.

Then, having permeated the mental continuum with kindness, one should cultivate compassion. And that compassion consists in the wish that all suffering sentient beings might be free from that suffering.

Every sentient beings in the three worlds is thoroughly miserable due to the three kinds of suffering, each according to its respective circumstances; hence compassion should be cultivated towards *all* sentient beings.

On this point the Illustrious One said, "First of all, as for those beings who are the denizens of the hells, they are truly submerged in a torrent of myriad sufferings, such as uninterrupted protracted heat." Similarly he said, "The hungry ghosts also undergo incredible suffering, their bodies nearly entirely withered away by agonizing fires of intolerably intense hunger and thirst." "As for the animals, they do seem to experience many kinds of suffering, such as mutual malice, mutilation, slaughter and consumption." People as well are seen experiencing endless sufferings, such as mutual insult and injury, separation from the agreeable, union with the disagreeable and everything that is born from poverty -- (all) on account of neediness and the pursuit of desires. All those minds which are ensnared by the various snares of the afflictions of passion and so forth, which have become a tangle of all kinds of mistaken view -- all (such mindsets) are causes of suffering and are therefore extremely miserable, like being stuck in a pit. Even the gods are subject to suffering due to the state of suffering which is universal change. As far as those gods who partake of desire go, how can they be happy when their minds are constantly oppressed by the misery which is fear of death, decline and so on? And the suffering of conditioning penetrates all living beings on account of their having a nature of subservience to causes which are actions and afflictions, and a characteristic which is the natural tendency to decay moment by moment.

de bas na 'gro ba mtha' dag ni sdug bsñal gyi me lce 'bar ba'i ñaṅ du žugs pa yin par bltas la / ji ltar bdag⁴⁴ sdug bsñal mi 'dod pa ltar gžan thams cad kyaṅ de dañ 'dra'o sñam du bsam žiñ / kye ma kyi hud bdag la sdug pa'i sems can 'di dag sdug bsñal na sdug bsñal de las ji ltar thar bar bya žes bdag ñid sdug bsñal ba bžin du byed ciñ de dañ bral bar 'dod pa'i nam pa'i sñiñ rje de⁴⁵ tiñ ñe dsin la⁴⁶ 'dug kyaṅ ruñ / spyod la thams cad du yaṅ ruñ ste / (dus thams cad du yaṅ ruñ ste

43 NP omit *dag*.

44 N omits *bdag*.

45 D *des*.

46 NP *las kyaṅ* for *la*.

/)47 *dus thams cad du sems can thams cad la bsgom par bya ste / thog ma kho nar mdsa' bses kyi phyogs mams la ji skad smos pa'i sdug bsñal sna tshogs ñams su myoñ bar mthoñ bas*48 *bsgom par bya'o // de nas sems can mñam pa ñid kyis*49 *bye brag med par mthoñ nas sems can thams cad ni bdag gi gñen du gyur pa kho na'o sñam du yoñs su bsam žin bar ma'i phyogs mams la bsgom par bya'o //*

Thus when it is seen that all beings are immersed in the blazing flames of suffering, the compassion which consists in the desire to be free from suffering reflects, "Just as I do not wish to suffer, so it is with everyone else. Alas, alas! These sentient beings, so dear to me, are suffering! How can they be freed from it?" Taking them to be like oneself in suffering, such compassion towards all beings should be cultivated at all times -- whether one is in a state of concentration or engaged in any activity whatsoever. And to begin with, it should be developed by seeing that the above-described surfeit of sufferings is experienced among one's own friends. Then, having recognized that sentient beings are without distinction owing to their basic similarity, and reflecting that indeed all sentient beings have been one's own relations, neutral parties should be meditated upon.

*gañ gi tshe de la mdsa' bses kyi phyogs bžin du sñiñ rje de mñam par žugs par gyur pa de'i tshe phyogs bcu'i sems can thams cad la bsgom par bya'o / gañ gi tshe bu chuñ ñu sñiñ du sdug pa sdug*50 *bsñal bar gyur pa'i ma bžin du, bdag ñid kyis*51 *šin tu sdug pa*52 *sdug bsñal ba las 'don par 'dod pa'i mam pa rañ gis 'jug pa'i sñiñ rje de sems can thams cad la mñam par žugs par gyur pa de'i tshe rdsogs pa žes bya ste*53 */ sñiñ rje chen po'i miñ yañ 'thob bo // {D44a1} byams pa bsgom pa ni mdsa' bses kyi phyogs la*54 *thog mar byas nas bde ba dañ phrad par 'dod pa'i mnam par ste / rim gyis tha mal pa dañ dgra la yañ bsgom par bya'o //*

de ltar de sñiñ rje goms par byas nas rim gyis sems can mtha' dag mñon par 'don par 'dod pa rañ gi nañ gis 'byuñ ba ñid du 'gyur ro //

When that compassion has been equally engaged towards them as towards those in the position of friends, then it should be developed towards all the beings of the ten directions. When that compassion has been equally engaged towards all sentient beings, naturally taking the form of wishing to rescue one's own very dear ones from suffering -- just like the mother of a cherished

47 NP only.

48 NP *bar*.

49 NP *kyi*.

50 D *sdag*.

51 CD *kyis*.

52 CD omit *sdug pa*.

53 *rdsoqs pa žes bya ste* omitted in NP.

54 NP omit *la*.

little child who has come into suffering -- then, at that time, it is said to be perfected. And it obtains the name great compassion. This meditation of loving kindness, having first been cultivated towards friends and consisting in the wish for them to meet with happiness, should be gradually extended even towards indifferent people and enemies.

In this way, having practiced compassion, the wish to rescue all sentient beings gradually comes to arise on its own.

des na rtsa ba'i⁵⁵ sñiñ rje goms par byas nas, byañ chub kyi sems bsgom par bya'o // byañ chub kyi sems de ni rnam pa gñis te kun rdsob dañ / don dam pa'o // de la kun rdsob pa ni sñiñ rjes sems can mtha' dag mñon par 'don par dam bcas nas 'gro ba la phan gdags⁵⁶ pa'i phyir sañs rgyas su gyur cig sñam du bla na med pa yañ dag par rdsogs pa'i byañ chub tu⁵⁷ 'dod pa'i rnam pas sems dañ po bskyed pa'o // de yañ tshul khriims kyi le'u las bstan pa'i cho ga bzin du byañ chub sems dpa'i sdom pa la gnas pa mkhas pa pha rol po las sems⁵⁸ bskyed par bya'o // de ltar kun rdsob pa'i⁵⁹ byañ chub kyi sems bskyed nas don dam pa'i byañ chub kyi sems bskyed pa'i phyir 'bad par bya'o // don dam pa'i byañ chub kyi sems de ni 'jig rten las 'das pa spros pa mtha' dag dañ bral ba / śin tu gsal ba / don dam pa'i spyod yul / dri ma med pa / mi g'yo ba / rluñ med pa'i mar me'i rgyun ltar mi g'yo ba'o⁶⁰ //

Thus having practiced the compassion which is the root, one should cultivate the thought of Awakening. The thought of Awakening is of two kinds: conventional and ultimate. Now as for the conventional, it is the initial mindset generated by someone wishing for unsurpassed perfect Awakening after vowing, out of compassion, to rescue all sentient beings: "May I attain Buddhahood in order to help all living beings!" Moreover, this mind(set) should be produced by relying on the foundation of another person, a wise person who is already established in bodhisattva vows according to the method taught in the Morality chapter. In this way, having generated the conventional thought of Awakening, one should exert oneself in order to generate the ultimate thought of Awakening. As for this ultimate thought of Awakening -- it is utterly beyond this world, free from all conceptual proliferation, extremely clear, the sphere of the ultimate, stainless, unmoving and steady as the stream of a lamp out of the wind.

de grub⁶¹ pa ni rtag tu gus par yun riñ du ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi rnal 'byor goms par

55 NP *ba*.

56 NP omit *gdags*.

57 CD omit *tu*.

58 NP omit *sems*.

59 NP *kyi* for *pa'i*.

60 NP *g'yos* *pa'o*.

61 CD '*grub*.

byas pa⁶² las 'gyur te / 'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa las ji skad du / "byams pa gañ yañ ñan thos mams kyi'am / byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi'am de bzin gsegs pa mams kyi⁶³ dge ba'i chos 'jig rten pa dañ 'jig rten las 'das pa thams cad kyañ ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi 'bras bu yin par rig par bya'o" žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //

Its achievement arises from having been practiced in the union of tranquillity and insight, for a long time, constantly with veneration. As it is said in the noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, "O Maitreya! All the worldly and transcendental qualities that constitute the virtues of śrāvakas, bodhisattvas and Tathāgatas should be understood as the result of tranquillity and insight."

de gñis kyis tiñ ñe 'dsin thams cad bsdus pa'i phyir mal 'byor pa thams cad kyis⁶⁴ dus thams cad du ñes par ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ bsten par bya ste / 'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa de ñid las bcom ldan 'das kyis ji skad du / "ñas ñan thos mams dañ / {D44b1} byañ chub sems 'dpa mams / de bzin gsegs pa mams kyi⁶⁵ tiñ ñe 'dsin mnam pa du ma bstan pa gañ dag yin pa de dag thams cad ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gis bsdus par rig par bya'o" [18] žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //

Since all concentrations (*samādhis*) are encompassed by those two, every yogin must adhere to them at all times. As was said in that very same noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, "All the myriad concentrations taught by me -- whether they be of śrāvakas, bodhisattvas or Tathāgatas - all should be understood as included in tranquillity and insight." In this way it is explained.

ži gnas tsam 'ba' žig goms par byas pas ni mal 'byor pa mams kyi sgrib pa⁶⁶ mi⁶⁷ spoñ⁶⁸ gi⁶⁹ / re žig ñon moñs pa mnam par gnon pa tsam du zad de⁷⁰ / šes rab kyi snañ ba 'byuñ⁷¹ ba med par bag la ñal legs par choms mi srid pa'i phyir bag la ñal legs par choms par mi 'gyur ro //

de bas na 'phags pa dgoñ pa ñes par 'grel pa de ñid las "bsam gtan gyis ni ñon moñs pa mams mnam par gnon to // šes rab kyis ni bag la ñal legs par 'joms par byed do" žes bka' stsal to //

62 NP *bya ba*.

63 NP *kyis*.

64 NP *kyi*.

65 NP *kyis*.

66 N adds *mams*.

67 P adds *mams*.

68 NP *spoñs*.

69 NP *kyi*.

70 NP *do* //.

71 CD *byuñ*.

'phags pa tiñ ne 'dsin gyi⁷² rgyal po las kyañ /
 "tiñ ne 'dsin de sgom⁷³ par byed mod kyi //
 de ni bdag⁷⁴ tu 'du ses 'jig mi byed //
 de ni ñon moñs phyir rab tu 'khrugs //
 lhag spyod 'di na⁷⁵ tiñ ne 'dsin bsgom pa bzin //
 gal te chos la bdag med so sor rtog //
 so sor de brtags gal te bsgom pa ni //
 de ñid mya ñan 'das thob 'bras bu'i rgyu //
 rgyu gzan gañ yin des ni ži mi 'gyur //"

žes gsuñs so //

By merely becoming practiced in tranquillity alone, yogins do not eliminate their obscurations (*sgrib pa*, Skt: *avarana*); on the contrary, their afflictions (*ñon moñs pa*, Skt: *kleśa*) are only repressed for a little while. Their latent tendencies (*bag la ñal*, Skt: *anuśaya*) would not have been properly rooted out, since one cannot do that unless one has given rise to the light of Wisdom.

Thus from that very same noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, "Afflictions can be repressed by absorption, but it is by wisdom that the latent tendencies are properly rooted out."

And from the noble *Samādhirājasūtra*:

Although indeed one might cultivate that concentration
 Self-conception would not be disengaged
 Again one's afflictions would become enraged
 Just as in Udraka's cultivation of concentration.
 If one discerns the identitylessness of *dharms*
 And having discerned thus, if there is cultivation
 That itself is the cause which has its effect the attainment of *nirvāṇa*
 Through any other cause true peace does not transpire.

byañ chub sems dpa'i sde snod las kyañ / "gañ dag byañ chub sems dpa'i sde snod kyi
 chos kyi rnam grañs 'di ma thos / 'phags pa'i chos (dañ)'dul ba ma thos par, tiñ ne 'dsin tsam gyis
 chog par 'dsin pa ni ña rgyal gyi⁷⁶ dbañ gis mñon pa'i ña rgyal du ltuñ žiñ / skye ba dañ / rga ba
 dañ / na ba dañ / 'chi ba dañ / mya ñan dañ smre sñags 'don pa dañ / sdug bsñal ba dañ / yid mi
 bde ba dañ / 'khrug pa las yoñs su mi grol / 'gro ba drug tu⁷⁷ 'khor ba las yoñs su mi grol / sdug
 bsñal gyi phuñ po las kyañ yoñs su mi grol te / de la dgoñs nas de bzin gšegs pas 'di skad ces gzan

72 CD omit gyi.

73 N bsgom.

74 CD rtag.

75 CNP ni.

76 NP omit gyi.

77 CD gyi.

la rjes su mthun pa thos pa ni rga śi las grol bar 'gyur ro źes bka' stsal to" źes gsuñs so //

And also from the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, "Those who do not pay heed to the enumeration of teachings of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, who do not heed the noble teaching and rules of conduct (*vinaya*), who are satisfied with mere concentration, they fall prey to intellectual arrogance because of such pride. They will not be liberated from birth, old age, illness, death, misery, lamentation, pain, dissatisfaction and disquiet; nor will they be liberated from the cycle of the six realms of beings, nor from the aggregates of suffering. So, with such people in mind, the Tathāgata taught that one who pays heed by faithfully following another,⁷⁸ might yet be delivered from old age and death."

de lta bas na sgrib pa mtha' dag spañs nas yoñs su dag pa'i ye śes 'byuñ bar 'dod pas⁷⁹ źi gnas la gnas śin śes rab bsgom par bya'o // {D45a1} de skad du / 'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa las kyañ bka' stsal te /

*"tshul khrims la ni gnas nas tiñ ñe 'dsin thob ste //
tiñ ñe 'dsin thob nas kyañ śes rab sgom⁸⁰ par byed //
śes rab kyis ni ye śes mam par dag pa 'thob⁸¹ //
ye śes mam par dag pas tshul khrims phun sum tshogs"*

źes bka' stsal to //

Thus having renounced all obscurations, one who wants pure knowledge to arise must cultivate wisdom while abiding in tranquillity. Just as has been said in the noble *Ratnakūṭa*:

Having become established in morality, one cultivates concentration
Having attained concentration, one cultivates wisdom
Through wisdom very pure knowledge is attained
Through very pure knowledge morality is perfected.

'phags pa theg pa chen po la dad pa bsgom pa'i mdo las kyañ /⁸² rigs kyi bu, śes rab la ñe bar mi gnas na byañ chub sems dpa'i theg pa pa⁸³ mams kyi theg pa chen po la dad pa theg pa chen po la ji ltar yañ 'byuñ bar ña⁸⁴ mi smra'o // rig kyi bu mam grañs 'dis kyañ 'di ltar byañ chub

⁷⁸ *gźan la rjes su mthuns pa thos pa* - Literally, "faith-in-another-hearing ." Here, perhaps, the necessity of a teacher is indicated.

⁷⁹ NP *pa*.

⁸⁰ C *bsgom*.

⁸¹ P *thob*.

⁸² This section highly corrupt.

⁸³ CD *dpa'* for *dpa'i theg pa pa*.

⁸⁴ N *de*.

*sems dpa' mams kyis theg pa chen po la dad pa, theg pa chen po la 'byuñ ba gañ ci yañ ruñ / de⁸⁵
thams cad ni nam par ma g'yeñs pa'i sems kyis⁸⁶ don dañ chos yañ dag par bsams⁸⁷ pa las byuñ
bar rig par bya'o" zes bka' stsal to //*

And from the noble *Prasādaprabhāvanāsūtra*, "O Noble Son! I do not say that someone who has faith in the Mahāyāna of the bodhisattvas will somehow emerge in that Mahāyāna without abiding in wisdom. According to this method, O Noble Son, whosoever would emerge in the Mahāyāna, possessed of faith in the Mahāyāna of the bodhisattvas, should be understood to have emerged (there) from properly considering the teaching and its meaning with an unagitated mind."⁸⁸

*ži gnas dañ bral ba'i lhag mthoñ 'ba' žig gis ni rnal 'byor pa'i sems yul mams la nam par
g'yeñs par⁸⁹ 'gyur gyis⁹⁰ / rluñ gi nañ na 'dug pa'i mar me bžin du brtan⁹¹ par mi 'gyur ro //
de bas na ye šes kyis snañ ba šin tu gsal bar mi 'byuñ ste / de lta bas na gñis ka dañ 'dra bar
bsten par bya'o // de'i phyir 'phags pa yoñs su mya ñan las 'das pa chen po'i mdo las kyañ "ñan
thos mams kyis ni de bžin gšegs pa'i rigs mi mthoñ ste / tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi šas che ba'i phyir dañ /
šes rab chuñ ba'i phyir ro // byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyis ni mthoñ mod kyis mi gsal te / šes rab
kyis šes che ba'i phyir dañ / tiñ ñe 'dsin chuñ ba'i phyir ro⁹² // de bžin gšegs pas ni thams cad gzigs
te / ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ mtshuñs par ldan pa'i phyir ro" zes bka' stsal te / ži gnas kyis stobs kyis*

85 NP *ste* for / *de*.

86 CNP *kyis*.

87 NP *bsam*.

88 Version 2 following *Mahāyānaprasādaprabhāvanāsūtra* P. Vol. 32 No.812 23b2-5 (Given in Goshima pp. 20&22): *šes rab la ñe bar mi gnas na rigs kyis bu byañ chub sems dpa'i theg pa chen po'i phyir theg pa chen po la dad pa ji lta yañ mi skye'o zes ña smra'o // rigs kyis bu byañ chub sems dpa' tshogs ma bsags kyañ theg pa chen po'i chos ñan tam sems kyañ ruñ ste / ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ la gnas theg pa chen po'i phyir theg pa chen po la dad skye'o // sems rtse gcig tu mi byed ciñ theg pa chen po'i chos mi 'dsin theg pa chen po la dad pa mi skye'o // rigs kyis bu byañ chub sems dpa' gab la la theg pa chen po'i phyir theg pa chen po la dad pa skye ba de thams cad ni mi g'yeñ ba'i sems kyis chos kyis don la rtog pa las skye bar nam grañs 'dis de lta rig par bya'o // O Noble Son! I say that faith in the Mahāyāna with a view towards [entering] the Mahāyāna of the bodhisattvas will not arise in any way if one is not abiding in wisdom. O Noble Son, even if one had not acquired the accumulations of the bodhisattvas or thought, "May I listen to the teachings of the Mahāyāna," still, having become established in tranquillity and insight such faith will arise. Not making the mind one-pointed, not comprehending the Mahāyāna -- faith in the Mahāyāna does not arise. For any bodhisattva whatsoever, any such faith in the Mahāyāna which arises, arises from contemplating the reality of the teaching with an unagitated mind." Thus it is that this method should be understood.*

89 CD *g'yeñ bar*.

90 CD *gyi*.

91 NP *gnas*.

92 NP *dañ*.

ni mar me rluñ gis⁹³ ma bskyod⁹⁴ pa bzin du rnam par rtog pa'i rluñ rnams kyis⁹⁵ sems g'yo bar mi 'gyur ro // lhag mthoñ gis ni lta ba ñan pa'i dri ma mtha' dag spañs pas gžan dag gis mi phyed de / zla ba sgron ma'i mdo las ji skad du /

“ži gnas stobs kyis g'yo ba med par 'gyur //

lhag mthoñ gis ni ri dañ 'dra bar 'gyur” //

{D45b1} žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o // de lta bas na gñis ka la rnal 'byor du byas par gnas so //

de la thog mar re žig rnal 'byor pas gañ gis⁹⁶ bde bar myur du ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ 'grub par 'gyur ba ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs la je⁹⁷ bsten par bya'o //

By means of insight alone, without tranquillity, the mind of the yogin would become distracted with respect to its objects; like a butter-lamp in the wind, it would not be stable.

And on account of that the light of knowledge would not be very distinct. Thus both should be practiced equally. For this reason it is also said in the noble *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, “Because their wisdom is weak and their concentration strong, śrāvakas do not perceive the germinal essence (*rīgs*, Skt: *gotra*) of the Tathāgata. The bodhisattvas see it, but not clearly -- because while their wisdom is strong, their concentration is weak. The Tathāgata sees everything because he is equally possessed of tranquillity and insight.” Because of the power of tranquillity the mind will not become unsteady with the flurries of thought -- just like a butter-lamp that does not flicker in the wind. Because of insight, it will not be disturbed by others, since all the stains of mistaken views are removed. Thus from the *Candrapradīpasūtra*:

Through the power of tranquillity one becomes unwavering

Through insight one becomes as if a mountain.

In this way it was explained. Hence it is established that both are undertaken in unison.

Here, at first, the yogin should adhere more to the prerequisites (*tshogs*) of tranquillity and insight, on account of which tranquillity and insight will be achieved easily and quickly.

de la ži gnas kyi tshogs gañ že na / mthun pa'i yul na gnas pa dañ / 'dod pa chuñ ba dañ / chog šes pa dañ / bya ba mañ po yoñs su spañs pa dañ / tshul khrims rnam par dag pa dañ / 'dod pa la sogs pa'i rnam par rtog pa yoñs su spañs pa'o //

de la yon tan lña dag dañ ldan pa ni mthun pa'i yul yin par šes par bya ste / gos dañ zas la sogs pa tshogs med par rñed pa'i phyir rñed sla ba dañ / skye bo mi srun pa dañ dgra la sogs pa mi gnas pa'i phyir⁹⁸ gnas bzan ba dañ / nad med pa'i sa yin pas sa bzañ ba dañ / grogs, tshul khrims

93 NP *gi*.

94 P *skyod*.

95 NP *kyi*.

96 NP *gi*.

97 NP omit *je*.

98 NP omit *phyir*.

*dañ ldan pa lta ba mtshuñs pa yin pas grogs bzañ ba dañ / ñin mo skye bo mañ po dag gis ma gañ
ba'i phyir dañ / mtshan mo sgra chuñ ba'i phyir legs par ldan pa'o //*

Now if it is asked what are the prerequisites of tranquillity, they are: 1) living in an agreeable place; 2) having few desires; 3) being content; 4) abandonment of many involvements; 5) very pure moral conduct; 6) complete abandonment of thoughts connected with desires and so forth.

In this regard, five qualities should be recognized in an agreeable place: a) it is convenient on account of food, clothing and so forth being obtained without difficulty; b) it's a good place to live on account of the absence of rough people and enemies; c) it's a healthy spot since it's a place without disease; d) there are happy friendships because one's friends there are moral and of similar perspective; e) it is praiseworthy since it is not crowded with living beings during the day and because there are few sounds at night.

*'dod pa chuñ ba gab že na / chos gos la sogs bzañ po'am mañ po la⁹⁹lhag par chags pa
med pa'o //*

*chog śes pa gañ že na / chos gos la sogs pa ñan ñon tsam rñed pas rtag tu chog śes pa gañ
yin pa'o //*

*bya ba mañ po yoñs su spañs pa gañ že na / ño tshon la sogs pa las ñan pa yoñs su spañs
pa¹⁰⁰ dañ / khyim pa¹⁰¹ dañ rab tu byuñ ba gab dag ha cañ smaos 'drin byed pa yoñs su spañ ba
dañ / sman byed pa skar ma rtsi ba la sogs pa yoñs su spañs pa gañ¹⁰² yin pa'o //*

*tshul khrims mnam par dag pa gab že na / sdom pa gñis ka la yañ rañ bzin dañ bcas pa'i kha
na ma tho ba dañ bcas pa'i bslab pa'i gzi mi 'dral ba¹⁰³ dañ / bag med par ral na yañ skyen pa
skyen par¹⁰⁴ 'gyod pas chos bzin du¹⁰⁵ byed pa dañ / ñan thos kyi sdom pa la pham¹⁰⁶ pa bcas su
mi ruñ bar gsuñs pa gañ yin pa de la yañ 'gyod pa dañ ldan pa dañ / phyis mi bya ba'i sems ldan pa
dañ / sems gañ gis las de byas pa'i sems de la ño bo ñid med par so sor rtag pa'i phyir ram /
{D46a1} chos thams cad ño bo ñid med par goms pa'i phyir de'i tshul khrims mnam par dag pa
kho na yin par brjod par bya'o //*

And if it is asked what it is to have few desires, it is being without attachment to many or high quality things by way of monks' robes and so forth.

99 P omits *la*.

100 CD *spañ ba*.

101 Goshima *khrim pa*.

102 NP omit *gañ*.

103 Goshima 'dra *ba*.

104 Following C. D *pa*. Goshima *pas*.

105 P omits *du*.

106 Goshima *phan*.

And what is it to be content? It is to always be content with meagre things by way of monks' robes and so forth.

What is it to abandon excessive involvements? It is ceasing common work like trade and desisting from keeping company with too many householders and monks. It is also to be one who has abandoned medicine, astrology and so forth.

What is very pure moral conduct? With reference to the two vows, it is not breaching the code of conduct (*śikṣapada*) pertaining to behavior which is harmful in itself and behavior which is religiously prohibited. It is acting in accordance with the teachings by repenting very quickly when there is a breach in attentiveness. It is also having repentance with regard to those failures in śravaka vows that are said to be irremediable -- and to possess the resolution not to repeat these. And one is said to very pure in morality indeed when one understands the lack of inherent existence of that mind which is the mind that performs actions, or when one is fully familiar with with the fact that all phenomena are without inherent nature.

*de ni 'phags pa ma skyes dgra'i 'gyod pa gsal ba*¹⁰⁷ *las khoñ du chud par rig par bya'o //*
*de bas na de*¹⁰⁸ *'gyod pa med par byas la / sgom*¹⁰⁹ *pa la mñon par brtson par bya'o //*

'dod pa mams la yañ tshe 'di dañ tshe phyi ma la ñes dmigs nam pa mañ por 'gyur bar yid
la byas la de dag la nam par rtog pa spañ bar bya'o // *nam pa gcig tu, khor ba pa'i*¹¹⁰ *dños po*
*sdug pa'am mi sdug pa yañ ruñ ste / de dag*¹¹¹ *thams cad ni nam par 'jig pa'i chos can mi brtan pa*
*ste / gdon mi za bar de dag thams cad dañ bdag*¹¹² *riñ por mi thogs par 'bral bar gyur na / bdag de*
*la ci žig lhag par chags pa la sogs par 'gyur sñam du bsgoms*¹¹³ *pas nam par rtog pa thams cad*
spañ bar bya'o //

One should know that this can be understood from the noble *Ajātaśatrukaukṛtyavinoda sūtra*. Thus when one comes to be without regret (*'gyod pa med pa*) one works diligently in meditation.

But with regard to desires, (since one knows that) once these are formed in the mind they turn into many kinds of negative consequence (*ñes dmigs*) in this life and the next, then one should abandon conceptualization concerning them. Alternatively, one should eliminate all such conceptualizations by meditating on the thought, "Inevitably all these things and I will soon be separated. Why should I be attached to them? Whether worldly things be pleasant or unpleasant, they are all unstable perishing things."

107 CD *bsal ba*.

108 P omits *de*.

109 P *skom*.

110 CNP *'khor ba'i*.

111 NP omit *dag*.

112 *dañ bdag* omitted in NP.

113 P *bsgom*.

lhag mthoñ gi tshogs gañ že na¹¹⁴ / skyes bu dam pa la brten pa dañ / mañ du thos pa yoñs su bstal ba dañ / tshul bžin sems pa'o //

de la skyes bu dam pa ji lta bu la¹¹⁵ brten par bya že na / gañ mañ du thos pa dañ / tshig gsal ba dañ / sñiñ rje dañ ldan pa dañ / skyo ba bzod pa'o //

de la mañ du thos pa yoñs su bstal ba gañ že na / gañ bcom ldan 'das kyi gsuñ rab yan lag bcu gñis po ñes pa'i don dañ drañ ba'i¹¹⁶ don la gus par byas śin / śin tu ñan pa ste / 'di ltar 'phags pa deoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa las / " 'phags pa'i gtam 'dod pa bžin du ma thos pa ni lhag mthoñ gi gegs yin no " žes bka' stsal to // de ñid las " lhag mthoñ ni thos pa dañ bsam pa las byuñ ba'i lta ba rnam par dag pa'i rgyu las byuñ ba yin no¹¹⁷ " žes gsuñs so // 'phags pa sred med kyi bus¹¹⁸ žus pa las kyañ / " thos pa dañ ldan pa ni śes rab 'byuñ bar 'gyur ro // śes¹¹⁹ rab dañ ldan pa ni ñon moñs pa rab tu ži bar 'gyur ro¹²⁰ " žes bka' stsal to //

If it is asked what are the prerequisites of insight, they are reliance upon excellent people, searching out learned people, and correct thinking.

And what kind of excellent person should be relied upon? -- A learned person, clear in words, who is possessed of great compassion and able to bear misfortune.

Who is the learned person sought? He is one who has honoured the definitive and provisional meanings of the twelve scriptural categories of the Illustrious One, and listened to them a lot. Thus in the noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* it says, "Desiring noble speech, but not listening - this is a hinderance to insight." In the very same *sūtra* it is explained, "Insight arises from the cause which is a very pure vision which (in turn) arises from listening and reflecting." And in the *Nārāyaṇaparipṛcchā* it is said, "One who listens becomes wise. Possessing wisdom, one comes to thoroughly pacify one's afflictions."

tshul bžin bsam pa gañ že na / gañ ñes pa'i don gyi mdo sde dañ drañ ba'i don gyi mdo sde la sogs pa legs par gtan la 'bebs pa ste / de ltar byañ chub sems dpa' the tsho med na, bsgom¹²¹ pa la gcig tu ñes par 'gyur ro // {D46b1} de lta ma yin na the tshom gyis¹²² 'phyañ¹²³ mo ñug pa'i

114 NP žig for že na.

115 NP omit la.

116 NP omit ba'i.

117 NP omit no.

118 NP add su.

119 D śas.

120 NP omit ro.

121 NP sgom.

122 CD gyi.

123 Goshima 'phuñ. D 'phyañ.

*theg*¹²⁴ *pa la* 'dug *pa ni lam kha brag*¹²⁵ *gi mdor phyin pa'i mi ltar gañ du yañ gcig tu ñes par mi*
'gyur ro //

rnal 'byor *pas ni*¹²⁶ *sgom pa'i*¹²⁷ *dus thams cad du ña dañ sa la sogs pa*¹²⁸ *span žin mi*
mthun pa ma yin pa dañ / zas tshod zin par bza' bar bya'o //

de ltar byañ chub sems dpa' ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs mtha' dag bsags pa des
*bsgom*¹²⁹ *pa la* 'jug par bya'o //

And who is correct in thought? He is one who has become clear with regard to the proper ordering of the *sūtras* of definitive and provisional meaning. If a bodhisattva is without doubt in this regard, he will be certain in meditation. If it was not like this, if one was on an uncertain course due to doubt, then he couldn't become certain of anything at all -- just like a man who has arrived at the juncture of a forked road.

The yogin, forsaking meat and fish at all times of meditation, should eat only the proper amount of food and that which is not in disaccord (with the scriptures).

In this manner, bodhisattvas who have accumulated all the prerequisites of tranquillity and insight should enter into meditation.

de la mal 'byor *pas bsgom*¹³⁰ *pa'i dus na thog mar bya ba ci yod pa thams cad yoñs su*
*rdsogs par byas la bsañ gci byas nas sgra'i tsher ma med pa yid du oñ ba'i phyogs su bdag gi*¹³¹
sems can thams cad byañ chub kyi sñiñ po la dgod par bya'o sñam du bsam žin / 'gro ba mtha' dag
*mñon par gdon pa'i bsam pa can gyis*¹³² *sñiñ rje chen po mñon du byas la / phyogs bcu na bžugs*
pa'i sañs rgyas dañ byañ chub sems dpa' thams cad la yan lag lñas phyag byas nas / sañs rgyas
dañ byañ chub sems dpa'i sku gzugs ri mo la sogs pa mdun du gžag gam gžan du yañ ruñ ste / de
dag la ci nus kyis mchod pa dañ bstod pa byas la rañ gi sdig pa bšags nas 'gro ba mtha' dag gi
*bsod nams la rjes su yi rañ bar byas la / stan šin tu 'jam pa*¹³³ *bde ba la rje btsun mam par snañ*
mdsad kyi skyil mo kruñ lta bu'am /¹³⁴ *skyil mo kruñ phyed du yañ ruñ ste / mig ha cañ yañ mi*

124 CD *thag*.

125 NP *dbrag*.

126 NP omit *ni*.

127 *sgom pa'i* omitted in CD.

128 NP omit *pa*.

129 NP *sgom*.

130 NP *sgom*.

131 NP *gi*.

132 NP *gyi*.

133 CD *po*.

134 NP *bu'o //*.

dbye / ha cañ yañ mi zum¹³⁵ par sna'i rtse mor bstad¹³⁶ ciñ / lus ha cañ yañ mi dgu¹³⁷ / ha cañ yañ mi dgye bar drañ por bsrañs la dran pa nañ du gżag¹³⁸ste 'dug par bya'o //

In this context, at the time of meditation having first of all finished whatever duties he may have and having emptied his bowels and bladder, in a pleasant spot without a thorn of sound the yogin reflects, "May I bring all sentient beings to the essence of Awakening." This one who intends to rescue all living beings, having actualized great compassion and having made prostrations to all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas residing in the ten directions, whether he places pictures of their bodies in front of himself or elsewhere, he praises and makes offerings to them as much as he can. Having confessed his sins, he rejoices in the merits of all living beings. Then on a very soft and comfortable seat, in the manner of Vairocana's Lotus posture, or alternatively in a Half-lotus posture, with eyes neither too open nor closed directed at the tip of the nose, and with the body neither too bent or crooked but simply straight, such a one should place his attention inwardly and remain there.

de nas phrag pa mñam par gżag¹³⁹ la mgo mi mtho mi dma' zñ phyogs gcig tu mi g'yo¹⁴⁰ bar gżag ste sna nas lteba'i bar drañ por¹⁴¹ gżag go // so dañ mchu yañ tha mal par gżag¹⁴² go // lce yañ yas¹⁴³ so'i druñ du gżag go ¹⁴⁴// dbugs phyi nañ du rgyu ba yañ sgra can dañ / rñams¹⁴⁵ pa can dañ / dbugs rgod pa can du mi btañ gi / ci nas kyañ mi tshor bar dal bu¹⁴⁶ dal bus lhun gyis grub pa'i tshul gyis dbugs nañ du rnub pa dañ phyir 'byuñ ba de ltar bya'o // [30] de la thog¹⁴⁷

135 CD *gzum*.

136 CD *gtad*.

137 CD *sgu*.

138 NP *bżag*.

139 NP *bżag*.

140 CN *ma yo for mi g'yo*

141 P *par*.

142 NP *bżag*.

143 CD *ya*.

144 CD *gżar ro*.

145 NP *sñam*.

146 NP omit *dal bu*.

147 D *theg*.

mar¹⁴⁸ re *zig* *zi gnas bsgrub par bya ste / phyi rol gyi yul la mam par g'yeñ ba zi nas*¹⁴⁹ *nañ du dmigs pa la rgyun du rañ gis ñañ gis 'jug pa*¹⁵⁰ *dga' ba dañ śin tu sbyañs*¹⁵¹ *pa dañ ldan pa'i sems ñid la gnas pa ni zi gnas zes bya'o //*

Thus squaring his shoulders and keeping his head neither raised nor lowered, nor moving it to one side (or another), he remains erect from the nose right down to the navel. The teeth and lips should be left natural, while the tongue is placed near to the upper teeth. His respirations should not be accompanied by sound, nor move too hurriedly or heavily, but rather should in this manner imperceptibly enter and depart, slowly and effortlessly." In this regard, first of all, at the outset tranquillity should be practiced. Tranquillity is understood as one's abiding in a state of mind which is thoroughly disciplined and joyful and which is continually and by its own nature fixed inwardly upon the meditation object -- after having calmed one's distractions related to external objects.

{D47a1} *zi gnas de ñid la dmigs pa'i tshes de kho na la mam par dpyod pa gañ yin pa de ni lhag mthoñ yin te / 'phags pa dkon mchog sprin las ji skad du zi gnas ni sems rtse gcig pa ñid do //* *lhag mthoñ ni yañ dag par so sor rtog pa'o" zes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //*

Once one has based oneself on that very tranquillity, insight is the investigation of reality. As it's said in the noble *Ratnamegha*, "Tranquillity is one-pointedness of mind; insight is discernment of reality" In this way it was explained.

*'phags pa dgoñs pa bes par 'grel pa las kyañ / "bcom ldan 'das, ji ltar zi gnas yoñs su tshol bar bgyid pa dañ / lhag mthoñ la mkhas pa lags / bka' stsal pa / 'byams pa, ñas chos gdags pa mam par b'zag*¹⁵² *pa 'di lta ste / mdo'i sde dañ / dbyañs kyis bsñad pa'i sde dañ / luñ du bstan pa'i sde dañ / tshigs su b'cad pa'i sde dañ*¹⁵³ *ched du brjod pa'i sde dañ / gleñ g'zi'*¹⁵⁴ *sde dañ / rtogs pa brjod pa'i sde dañ / de lta bu byuñ ba'i sde dañ / skyes pa rabs kyi sde dañ / śin tu rgyas pa'i sde dañ / rmad du byuñ ba'i chos kyi*¹⁵⁵ *sde dañ / gtan la phab par bstan pa'i sde gañ dag byañ chub sems dpa' rnam la b'śad pa de dag byañ chub sems dpa's legs par thos / legs par g'zuñ / kha ton byañ bar byas / yid kyis legs par brtags / mthoñ bas śin tu rtogs par byas nas de gcig pu dben par*

148 NP *ma*.

149 D *gnas*.

150 CD *la*.

151 Goshima *sbyañs*, "seizing, catching hold of" *avalambana*; CD *sbyañs*, pf. *sbyoñ ba* "cleanse, remove by cleaning, purify, exercise, train, practice".

152 CD *g'zag*.

153 *tshigs.... dañ* / omitted in NP.

154 C *b'zi'i*.

155 *chos kyi* omitted in NP.

'dug ste¹⁵⁶ nañ du yañ dag bžag nas ji ltar legs par bsams pa'i chos de dag ñid yid la byed ciñ / sems gañ gis yid la byed pa'i sems de¹⁵⁷ nañ du rgyun chags su yid la byed pas yid la byed do //

And also from the noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, “ ‘O Illustrious One! How is tranquillity sought and how is insight learned?’ ‘O Maitreya, I have set forth that which pertains to the *dharmā* the following way: *sūtram, geyam, vyākaraṇam, gāthā, udānam, nidānam, avadānam, itivṛttakam, jātakam, vaipulyam, adbhūta-dharma, upadeśa*¹⁵⁸. [Once] these parts of the teaching which I have explained to bodhisattvas have been well-heard by them, well-grasped, clearly recited, well-examined by their intellects, and thoroughly realized by vision, then residing alone and completely absorbed, the bodhisattva in this manner takes to heart those very teachings just as they have been well-thought over. And the very mind which takes them to heart takes them to heart by constantly, inwardly paying attention.

de ltar žugs śin de la lan mañ du gnas pa de la lus¹⁵⁹ śin tu sbyaṅs¹⁶⁰ pa dañ sems śin tu sbyaṅs pa¹⁶¹ 'byuñ ba gañ yin pa de ni ži gnas žes bya ste / de ltar na byab chub sems dpa' ži gnas yoñs su tshol bar byed pa yin no // de¹⁶² lus śin tu sbyaṅs¹⁶³ pa dañ / sems śin tu¹⁶⁴ spyāṅs¹⁶⁵ de thob nas de ñid la gnas te / sems kyī¹⁶⁶ mam par g'yeñ ba spaṅs nas ji ltar bsams¹⁶⁷ pa'i chos de dag ñid nañ du tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul gzugs brñan du so sor rtog par byed¹⁶⁸ / {D47b1} mos par byed do // de ltar tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul gzugs brñan¹⁶⁹ de dag la śes bya'i don de mnam par

156 NP *te*.

157 NP omit *de*.

158 Discourses, intermediate verses, prophetic teachings, versified teachings, specific teachings, introductory teachings, parables, legends, life stories, grand teachings, marvellous teachings, finalized teachings.

159 DN add *ni*.

160 Goshima reads *spyāṅs*. CD *sbyaṅs*.

161 Goshima reads *spyāṅs pa*. CD *sbyaṅs*; *dañ sems śin tu sbyaṅs pa* omitted in NP.

162 D *des*.

163 Goshima reads *spyāṅs*. D *sbyaṅs*.

164 NP *yoñs su* for *śin tu*.

165 CD MS unclear. Goshima reads *spyāṅs*?

166 NP *kyis*.

167 NP *bsam*.

168 NP add *do*.

169 NP omit *brñan*.

'byed pa dañ / rab tu mam par 'byed pa dañ / yoñs su rtog¹⁷⁰ pa dañ / yoñs su dpyod¹⁷¹ pa dañ / bzod pa dañ / 'dod pa dañ / bye brag 'byed pa dañ / lta ba dañ / rtog¹⁷² pa gañ yin pa de ni lhag mthoñ žes bya ste / de ltar na byañ chub sems dpa'¹⁷³ lhag mthoñ la mkhas pa yin no" žes gsuñs so //

Entering like that, a pliant body and a pliant mind arise for the one who repeatedly dwells in that state, and this is called tranquillity. Thus the bodhisattva undertakes his pursuit of tranquillity. Having abandoned mental distractions, he inwardly discerns those very same previously considered *dharms* as mental images (*gzugs brñan*) in the sphere of concentration (*tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi spyod yul*). In this manner, discriminating the meaning of what is to be known in those mental images of the sphere of meditative concentration, thoroughly discriminating, completely considering, completely investigating, forbearing, accepting, classifying, looking and knowing -- That is called insight. So it is that the bodhisattva is skilled in insight." Thus it is explained.

de la rnal 'byor pa ži gnas mñon par bsgrub¹⁷⁴ par 'dod pas thog mar¹⁷⁵ re žig mdo'i sde dañ / dbyañs kyis bñad pa'i sde la sogs pa¹⁷⁶ gsuñ rab mtha' dag ni de bžin ñid la gžol ba / de bžin ñid la bab pa / de bžin ñid la 'bab¹⁷⁷ pa'o žes thams cad bsdus te de la sems ñe bar gžag¹⁷⁸ par bya'o // nam pa gcig tu na nam pa ji tsam gyis chos thams cad bsdus par gyur pa¹⁷⁹ phuñ po la sogs pa de la sems ñe bar gžag par bya'o // nam pa gcig tu na ji ltar mthoñ ba dañ / ji ltar thos pa'i sañs rgyas kyi sku gzugs la sems gžag¹⁸⁰ par bya ste / 'phags pa tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi rgyal pa las ji skad du

"gser gyi kha dog lta bu'i sku lus kyis¹⁸¹ //
 'jig rten mgon po kun tu mdses pa ste //
 dmigs pa de la gañ gi sems 'jug pa //
 byañ chub sems dpa' de mñam gžag ces bya"

170 C *rtogs*.

171 NP *spyod*.

172 NP *rtogs*.

173 NP *dpa'i*.

174 CD *bsgrub*.

175 NP *ma*.

176 NP *omit pa*.

177 NP *bab*.

178 NP *bžag*.

179 C *gyur po*. NP 'gyur ba.

180 NP *bžag*.

181 NP *kyi*.

žes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //

Here the yogin who wishes to establish tranquillity for a little while at the outset, summarizing all, thinking that the various sacred scriptures -- such as *sūtra*, *geya* and so on -- all open out towards suchness, are inclined towards suchness and incline towards suchness should apply his mind to that. Alternatively one can place one's mind upon the *skandhas* and so forth which includes all *dharmas* by way of types. Otherwise, one can concentrate upon the body of a Buddha as one has seen it or heard of it. In the words of the noble *Samādhirāja*:

The bodhisattva whose mind is engaged upon the object
which is the World Protector
Resplendent with a body like the colour of gold
-- he should be called equipoised.

*de ltar gañ la 'dod pa'i dmigs pa de la sems bžag nas de ñid la phyir žiñ rgyun tu*¹⁸²
*sems*¹⁸³ *gžag par bya'o //* *de la ñe bar bžag*¹⁸⁴ *nas sems la 'di ltar dpyad*¹⁸⁵ *par bya ste / ci dmigs*
*pa legs par*¹⁸⁶ *'dsin tam / 'on te byiñ ñam / 'on te phyi rol gyi yul la nam par 'phyar bas nam par*
*g'yeñs sam sñam*¹⁸⁷ *du brtag par bya'o //*

de la gal te rmugs pa dañ gñid kyis non nas sems byiñ ñam / byiñ du dogs pa mthoñ ba de'i
*tshé / mchog tu dga' ba'i dños po*¹⁸⁸ *sañs rgyas kyi sku gžugs la sogs pa'am / snañ ba'i 'du ses*
yid la bya'o // *de nas byiñ ba ži bar byas nas ci nas kyañ dmigs pa de ñid la*¹⁸⁹ *sems kyis*¹⁹⁰ *šin tu*
gsal bar mthoñ bar gyur pa de ltar bya'o //

Thus after one has concentrated upon the desired meditation object one should repeatedly and continuously bring it back to that itself. Having placed the mind there, one should examine the mind in the following manner. One should investigate, thinking, "Does it grasp the object well? Or does it sink? Or is it distracted by excitement connected to external objects?"

In this regard, when one sees that the mind has sunk on account of being overcome by sluggishness or sleep, or that there is an apprehension of such sinking, then at that time one should

182 C *du*.

183 NP omit *sems*.

184 Goshima *gžag*.

185 NP *spyad*.

186 N *pa*.

187 Goshima *mñam*.

188 NP *pos*.

189 NP omit *la*.

190 CD add *dmigs pa*.

turn one's attention to a perception of light or an object of great joy such as the body of a Buddha. Then, having alleviated the the sunken state, to the extent the mind can clearly see the very meditation object, that much one should do.

*gañ gi tshe dmus loñ lta bu'am / mi mun par zugs pa lta bu'am / mig btsums pa lta bur¹⁹¹
sems kyis dmigs pa śin tu gsal bar mi mthoñ ba de'i tshe byiñ bar gyur bar rigs par bya'o //*
{D48a1} *gañ gi tshe phyi rol gyi gzugs la sogs pa la de dag gi yon tan rtog pas rgyug¹⁹²
pa'i phyir ram / gzan yid la byed pas sam / sñon myoñ ba'i yul la 'dod pas sems rgod pa'am rgod
du¹⁹³ dogs par mthoñ ba de'i tshe 'du byed thams cad mi rtag pa dañ / sdug bsñal ba la sogs pa yid
'byuñ bar 'gyur ba'i dños po yid¹⁹⁴ la bya'o //*

When the mind does not see the meditation object very clearly - like one born blind, or one gone into the dark, or one with his eyes closed -- then one should know that it is sinking.

When, with regard to external objects, one encounters an excited mind or suspects such - because of knowing¹⁹⁵ about their qualities, or because of paying attention to something else, or on account of desire for previous enjoyments -- then one should pay attention to sobering qualities, such as the impermanence of all composites, suffering and so on.

*de nas mam par g'yeñ ba ži bar byas nas dran¹⁹⁶ pa dañ śes bzin gyi thag pas yid kyi¹⁹⁷
glañ po che dmigs pa'i sdoñ po de ñid la gdags par bya'o //*
*gañ gi tshe byiñ ba dañ rgod pa med par gyur¹⁹⁸ te / dmigs pa de la sems¹⁹⁹ mal du 'jug
par mthoñ ba de'i tshe ni rtsol ba glod la btañ sñoms su bya žiñ / de'i tshe ji srid 'dod²⁰⁰ kyi bar du
'dug par bya'o //*
de ltar ži gnas goms par byas pa de'i lus la sems śin tu sbyañs²⁰¹ par gyur pa dañ / ji ltar

191 NP *bu'i*.

192 NP *brgyug*.

193 NP add *'jug*.

194 CD *ñid*.

195 *yon tan rtog pas rgyug pa'i phyir....* Literally, "for the reason of running with knowing the qualities." Perhaps the the sense is simply that of a mind which is racing with thoughts.

196 NP *mam*.

197 NP *la*.

198 NP *'gyur*.

199 NP omit *sems*.

200 D *dri srid 'dod*, NP *nam sdod* for *ji srid 'dod*.

201 Goshima *sbyañs*. CD *sbyañs*.

'dod pa bzin du dmigs pa de²⁰² la sems ran²⁰³ dbañ du gyur pa de'i tshe de'i zi gnas grub pa yin par rig par bya'o //

After calming the distraction, the great ox of the mind should be bound to that very tree-trunk of the object with the rope of clear comprehension and mindfulness.

When one is without sinking and excitement and one sees that the mind is settled on the object, then one relaxes one's effort and should be equanimous, remaining that way as long as one likes.

Thus the mind and body of one who has practiced Tranquillity become very disciplined; (when) one can freely direct the mind to the object in the manner desired, Tranquillity should be known to be established.

de nas zi gnas grub nas lhag mthon bsgom par bya ste / 'di sñam du bsam par bya'o // bcom ldan 'das kyi bka' thams cad ni legs par gsuñs pa ste / mñon sum mam²⁰⁴ brgyud²⁰⁵ pas de kho na mñon par²⁰⁶ gsal bar byed pa dañ / de kho na ses na snañ ba byuñ bas mun pa bsal ba bzin du lta ba'i dra ba thams cad dañ²⁰⁷ bral bar 'gyur ro //

zi gnas tsam gyis²⁰⁸ ni ye ses dag par mi 'gyur zin sgrib pa'i mun pa yañ sel bar mi 'gyur gyi / ses rab kyis²⁰⁹ ni de kho na legs par bsgoms na ye ses nam par dag par 'gyur / ses rab kho nas de kho na ñid rtogs par 'gyur / ses rab kho nas sgrib pa yañ dag par spon bar 'gyur te / de lta bas na bdag gis²¹⁰ zi gnas te ses rab kyis²¹¹ de kho na yoñs su btsal bar ba'i / zi gnas tsam gyis²¹² ni²¹³ chog par 'dsin par mi bya'o sñam du bsam mo²¹⁴//

Then with tranquillity established, insight should be cultivated and this thought considered:

202 CD omit *de*.

203 NP omit *rañ*.

204 NP omit *mam*.

205 NP *rgyud*.

206 CD *mñon sum du*. Goshima: *mñom par*, ftnt: CD *mñom sum du*.

207 NP omit *dañ*.

208 NP *gyi*.

209 NP *kyi*.

210 NP *gi*.

211 NP *kyi*.

212 NP *gyi*.

213 NP omit *ni*.

214 NP *sñam mo* for *sñam du bsam mo*.

All the words of the Buddha have been well-explained. They clarify suchness either directly or indirectly, and converge upon suchness. If one knows suchness, one will be freed from the entire net of views just as darkness is dispelled by the arising of light.

By Tranquillity alone knowledge will not become pure - nor also will the darkness of obscurations be dispelled. On the other hand, if one properly meditates on suchness with wisdom, knowledge will become very pure. By that very wisdom, suchness will be realized. By that very wisdom, the obscurations will be properly removed. And on account of seeing this, one thinks the thought, "Established in tranquillity, I should pursue suchness through wisdom. Tranquillity on its own should not be taken as sufficient."

*de kho na ji lta bu že na / gañ don dam par dños po thams cad gañ zag dañ chos kyī bdag
ñid²¹⁵ kyis²¹⁶ stoñ pa ñid de / de yañ śes rab kyī pha rol yu phyin pas rtogs par 'gyur gyi /
{D48b1} gžan gyis ni ma yin te / 'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa las / "bcom ldan 'das byab
chub sems dpas chos rñams kyī ño bo ñid ma mchis pa ñid pha rol tu phyin pa gañ gis²¹⁷ 'dsin pa
lags / spyan ras gzigs dbañ phyug śes rab kyī pha rol tu phyin pas 'dsin to" žes ji skad gsuñs pa
lta bu'o //*

de lta bas na, ži gnas la gnas te śes rab bsgom par bya'o //

What is this suchness? It is all entities' being ultimately empty of the selfhood of persons and things; it is that which will be understood through the perfection of wisdom, but not through anything else. As is said in the *Samdhinirmocana*, "By which of the perfections do the illustrious bodhisattvas comprehend the non-existent nature of things? -- O Chen-re-zig! Through the perfection of wisdom it is comprehended."

Thus having dwelt in tranquillity one should cultivate wisdom.

*de la mal 'byor pas 'di lta mam pa dpyad²¹⁸ par bya ste / gañ zag ni phuñ po dañ khams
dañ skye mched las gud na mi dmigs so / gañ zag ni phuñ po la sogs pa'i ño bo ñid kyañ ma yin te
/ phuñ po la sogs pa de dag ni ma rtag pa dañ du ma'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir dañ / gañ zag ni rtag pa
dañ gcig pu'i ño bo yin par gžan dag gis brtag pa'i phyir ro // de ñid dam gžan²¹⁹ du brjod du mi
ruñ ba'i gañ zag gi dños po yod²²⁰ par mi ruñ ste / dños po yod pa'i mam pa gžan med pa'i phyir
ro // de lta bas na 'di lta ste / 'jig rten gyi ña dañ ña'i žes bya ba 'di ni 'khrul pa kho na'o žes dpyad
par bya'o //*

In this state a yogin should analyze in the following manner: Apart from the aggregates,

215 ñid, following CD. Goshima gñis, following NP.

216 NP kyī.

217 NP gi.

218 CDNP spyad. => bhuj: to experience.

219 Goshima žan.

220 N yad.

the elements and the sense-spheres a person is not perceived. Yet a person cannot be the identity of the aggregates and so forth, since they are impermanent and multiple things while a personality, on the other hand, is imagined by others to be a permanent and singular thing. Something which is a personality that is impossible to describe in terms of itself or another can not exist, since a thing has no other kind of existence (than these two). Therefore the so-called I and mine of the world should be analyzed as completely erroneous.

*chos la²²¹ bdag med pa yañ 'di ltar bsgom par bya ste / chos zes bya ba ni mdor bsdu²²²
na phuñ po lña dañ / skye mched bcu gñis dañ / khams bco brgyad do // de la phuñ po dañ / skye
mched dañ / khams gzugs can²²³ gañ dag yin pa de dag ni don dam par na sems kyi mam pa las
gud na med de /²²⁴ de dag rdul phra rab tu bśig la, rdul phra rab nmams kyañ cha śas kyi ño bo ñid
so sor brtags²²⁵ na ño bo ñid ñes par bzuñ²²⁶ du med pa'i phyir ro //*

Dharmas are without identity -- this is the way one should meditate. As for what are called dharmas, if one summarizes them they are the five aggregates, the twelve sense spheres and the eighteen elements. Among them, those which are the material forms of the aggregates, spheres and elements really do not exist separate from mental aspects, since if one breaks them into atoms and analyzes the intrinsic nature of the atoms' parts, no such nature is ascertained.

*de lta bas na thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa²²⁷ yañ dag pa ma yin pa la mñon par zen
pa'i dbañ gis, rmi lam na dmigs pa'i gzugs la sogs pa snañ ba bzin du²²⁸, byis pa nmams la, sems
ñid, gzugs la sogs pa phyi rol du²²⁹ chad pa bzin du snañ gi / don dam par na²³⁰ 'di la gzugs la
sogs pa ni sems kyi mam pa las gud na med do zes dpyad par bya'o //*

Thus because of the force of beginningless attachment to non-existent material forms and so forth, the mental, material forms and so forth have appeared to innocent people as though they were externally separated - just as appear of the material forms of objects in dreams. Actually, however, these material forms and so forth should be discerned as not existing apart from aspects of the

221 NP omit *la*.

222 CD *bsdu*.

223 Following CD. Goshima *khams dañ gzugs can*.

224 Following CD. Goshima, *do //*

225 N *rtag*. P *rtog*.

226 CD *gzuñ*.

227 NP add *ni*.

228 P *tu*.

229 NP *tu*.

230 N *ni*.

mind

de 'di sñam du khams gsum pa 'di²³¹ ni sems tsam mo sñam du sems śiñ / des²³² de ltar chos brtags pa mtha'²³³ dag ni sems kho na yin par rtogs nas²³⁴ de la so sor brtags pa yin no źes sems kyi ño bo ñid la so sor rtog go // {D49a1} de 'di ltar dpyod do // don dam par na sems kyañ bden par mi ruñ ste / gañ gi tshe brdsun²³⁵ pa'i ño bo ñid gzugs la sogs pa'i mnam pa 'dsin pa'i sems ñid sna tshogs kyi²³⁶ mnam par snañ ba de'i tshe de bden pa ñid du ga la 'gyur / ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa brdsun pa de bzin du sems kyañ de las gud na med pas brdsun pa ñid do //

Therefore thinking that the three worlds are just the mind and therefore having realized all designated phenomena to be nothing but mind, one knows the nature of the mind to have been discerned. Then one investigates in the following way. In fact the mind cannot truly exist either. When the mind which grasps aspects like material forms appears as variegated, then how can it truly exist? Just as material forms and so forth are deceptive, so too the mind is also deceptive -- since it does not exist separate from those.

ji ltar gzugs la sogs pa sna tshogs kyi mnam pa yin pas gcig dañ du ma'i ño bo ñid ma yin pa de bzin du sems kyañ de las gud na med pa'i phyir gcig dañ du ma'i ño bo ñid ma yin no // de lta bas na sems ni sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ño bo ñid lta bu kho na'o // sems ji lta ba de²³⁷ bzin du chos thams cad kyañ²³⁸ sgyu ma la sogs pa'i ño bo ñid lta bu kho na'o źes dpyod do //

Just as material forms and so forth are variegated and therefore do not have a nature of being one or many, so too because the mind is not separate from those it does not have a nature of being one or many. Thus the mind is like the nature of an illusion. And just as it is with the mind, so too one analyzes that all things are comparable in nature to illusions and so forth.

des de ltar śes rab kyis²³⁹ sems kyi ño bo ñid la so sor brtags na don dam par sems ni nañ du yañ mi dmigs / phyi rol du²⁴⁰ yañ mi dmigs / gñis ka med par yañ mi dmigs / 'das pa'i sems

231 NP *de*.

232 NP *de*.

233 Goshima *tha'*.

234 N *na*.

235 NP *rdsun*.

236 NP *kyis*.

237 NP omit *de*

238 NP omit *kyañ*.

239 NP *kyi*.

240 NP *tu*.

kyañ mi dmigs / ma 'oñs pa yañ mi dmigs / da ltar byuñ ba yañ mi dmigs so //

Thus in that way when one examines the nature of mind with wisdom, ultimately the mind is not perceived internally, not perceived externally, nor perceived neither internally nor externally. Nor is a mind of the future perceived, nor one of the past, nor is one perceived presently arisen.

sems skye ba'i tshe yañ²⁴¹ gañ nas kyañ mi 'oñ / 'gag pa'i tshe gañ du yañ mi 'gro ste / sems ni gzuñ²⁴² du med pa / bstan²⁴³ du med pa / gzugs can ma yin pa'o // bstan²⁴⁴ du med ciñ gzuñ²⁴⁵ du med la gzugs can ma yin pa gañ yin pa de'i ño bo ñid ci 'dra že na / 'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa las ji skad gsuñs pa lta bu ste / " 'od sruñs sems ni yoñs su btsal na mi rñed do // gañ mi²⁴⁶ rñed pa de mi dmigs so // gañ mi dmigs pa, de 'das pa yañ ma yin / ma 'oñs pa yañ ma yin / da ltar byuñ ba yañ ma yin no" zes rgya cher 'byuñ ño //

des²⁴⁷ de ltar brtags na sems kyī dañ po yañ dag par rjes su mi mthoñ / tha²⁴⁸ ma yañ dag par rjes su mi mthoñ / bar ma yañ dag par rjes su mi mthoñ ño // ji ltar sems la mtha' dañ dbus med pa de bzin du chos thams cad kyañ mtha' dañ dbus med par khoñ du chud do //

When the mind is being born it does not come from anywhere; when it is ceasing it does not go anywhere. The mind is not graspable, it is undescribable, it is formless. If it is asked what sort of nature could there be of that which is not grasped, which is inexplicable, which has no form, it is explained in this way in the Noble *Ratnakūṭa*, “O Kāśyapa, as for the mind, if one seeks it one does not find it. That which is not findable is not perceived. That which is not perceived is not past, is not in the future and is not arising presently.” Thus it has been extensively explained in such passages...

Therefore if known in this way the beginning of the mind is not viewed as real, the end is not viewed as real and the middle is not viewed as real. Just as the mind has no middle or extremes, so too all things are understood as without middle or extremes.

des de ltar sems²⁴⁹ mtha' dañ dbus med par khoñ du chud nas sems kyī ño bo ñid gañ yañ

241 NP omit yañ.

242 NP bzui.

243 D brtan.

244 D brtan.

245 NP bzui.

246 CD ma.

247 NP de.

248 C mtha'.

249 NP omit sems.

mi dmigs so // {D49b1} sems gañ gis²⁵⁰ yoñs su rtog pa de yañ stoñ par rtogs so // de rtogs pas sems kyi²⁵¹ rnam par bsgrubs²⁵² pa'i ño bo ñid gzugs la sogs pa'i ño bo ñid kyañ yañ dag par rjes su mi mthoñ ño //

Therefore having understood that the mind is without middle or extremes, one does not perceive any nature of the mind at all. One realizes that the mind with which one analyzes is also empty. By realizing that, one does not view as real any nature of material forms and so forth, natures which have been established as mental aspects.

des de ltar śes rab kyis²⁵³ chos thams cad kyi ño bo ñid yañ dag par rjes su ma mthoñ bas gzugs rtag go že'am / mi rtag go že'am / stoñ ño že'am / mi stoñ ño že'am / zag pa dañ bcas pa'o²⁵⁴ že'am / zag pa med pa'o že'am / byuñ ba'o že'am / ma byuñ ba'o že'am / yod pa'o že'am / med pa'o źes²⁵⁵ rtog pa mi byed do //²⁵⁶

Since due to wisdom one does not regard the nature of anything as real one will not imagine material form as permanent, impermanent, empty, not empty, stained, without stain, arisen, unarisen, existent or nonexistent.

ji ltar gzugs la sogs par mi byed pa de bzin du tshor ba dañ / 'du śes dañ / 'du byed dañ / rnam par śes pa rnam la yañ rtog par mi byed de / chos can ma grub na de'i phyir²⁵⁷ bye brag rnam kyañ mi 'grub pas de la rtog pa ga la 'gyur / des de ltar śes rab kyis²⁵⁸ rnam par dpyad de /²⁵⁹ gañ gi tshe rñal 'byor pas dños po gañ gi ño bo ñid don dam par ñes par mi 'dsin pa de'i tshe rnam par mi rtog pa'i tiñ ñe 'dsin la 'jug go // chos thams cad kyi ño bo ñid med pa ñid kyañ rtogs so //

Just as one does not think about material form and so on, similarly one also does not think about feeling, recognition, formations and consciousness. When there is no establishment of a property possessor (*chos can*), then qualities (*bye brag rnam*) also cannot be established. On

250 CDNP *gi*.

251 CD *kyis*.

252 NP *bsgrub*.

253 NP *kyi*.

254 C *pa'i*.

255 NP *že'am* for *źes*.

256 NP *dam /*.

257 CD omit *phyir*.

258 CD *kyi*.

259 CD add *dños po*.

account of which, how can one entertain them? Thus it is that wisdom analyzes. When a yogin does not actually hold firmly (*ñes par mi 'dsin pa, pratinirddhāraṇa*) to the nature of any entity, then he enters nonconceptual *samādhī*. And he also understands the absence of inherent nature of all things.

gañ śes rab kyis dños po'i ño bo ñid so sor brtags nas mi bsgom gyi / yid la byed pa yoñs su spoñ ba tsam 'ba' žig sgom par byed pa de'i mnam par rtog pa nam yañ mi ldog²⁶⁰ ciñ ño bo ñid med pa²⁶¹ ñid²⁶² rtogs²⁶³ par yañ mi 'gyur te / śes rab kyī snañ ba med pa'i phyir ro // 'di ltar "yañ dag par so sor rtog pa ñid las yañ dag pa ji lta ba bžin du śes pa'i me byuñ na gtsubs²⁶⁴ śiñ gtsubs²⁶⁵ pa'i me bžin du rtog pa'i śiñ sreg go" žes bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal to // 266

Someone who only cultivates the mere abandonment of mental activity but does not meditate having analyzed (*so sor brtags*) the nature of entities with wisdom, he will never get rid of concepts and will not come to realize the absence of inherent nature -- on account of the absence of the light of wisdom. So it is said by the Illustrious One, "When the fire of knowing reality as such (*yathābhūta*) arises from the very discernment of reality (*yañ dag par so sor rtog pa ñid, bhūtapratyavekṣaiva*), it incinerates the wood of concepts (*rtog pa'i śiñ*), just as the fire of firesticks rubbed together [consumes the sticks themselves]."

'phags pa dkon mchog sprin las kyañ bka' stsal te / 267 "de ltar skyon la mkhas pa de spros pa thams cad dañ bral bar bya ba'i phyir stoñ pa ñid bsgom pa la mnal 'byor du byed do // de stoñ pa ñid la²⁶⁸ bsgom pa mañ bas gnas gañ dañ gañ du / sems 'phro žiñ sems mñon par dga' ba'i gnas de dañ de dag gi ño bo ñid yoñs su btsal na stoñ par rtogs so // sems gañ yin pa de yañ brtags na stoñ par rtogs so // {D50a1} sems gañ gis²⁶⁹ rtogs pa de yañ ño bo ñid kun tu btsal na stoñ par rtogs te / de de ltar rtogs pas mtshan na med pa'i mnal 'byor la 'jug go" žes 'byuñ ño //

It is also said in the noble *Ratnamegha*, "One who is wise to faults in this way turns to

260 NP *rtog*.

261 *pa* omitted in Goshima.

262 NP omit *ñid*.

263 Goshima follows NP: *rtog*.

264 CD *gtsub*.

265 C *bcubs*.

266 NP *pa*.

267 CD *to //*.

268 NP omit *la*.

269 NP *gi*.

practice in the cultivation of emptiness²⁷⁰ so as to become free from all conceptual proliferation.

By repeatedly cultivating emptiness, whatever objects the mind approaches and the mind enjoys, when one seeks their nature one realizes them to be to be empty. Even that which is the mind, when examined, is realized to be empty. Even the mind which realizes when seeking the nature of all things is realized to be empty. By realizing in this manner one enters into the signless yoga."²⁷¹

'di²⁷² ni yoñs su rtog²⁷³ pa sñon du gtoñ ba²⁷⁴ ñid mtshan ma med pa ñid la 'jug par bstan te²⁷⁵ / yid la byed pa yoñs su spoñ ba tsam dañ / śes rab kyis²⁷⁶ dños po'i ño bo ñid mi dpyod²⁷⁷ par mam par²⁷⁸ mi rtog pa ñid du 'jug pa mi srid par śin tu gsal bar bstan pa yin no //

Now this explains [that it is] the very analysis already undertaken [that] enters into signlessness. It is a very clear explanation that wisdom which is linked to the mere abandonment of mental activity and does not analyze the nature of things cannot enter into nonconceptuality.

de de ltar²⁷⁹ śes rab kyis gzugs la sogs pa'i dños po'i ño bo ñid yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du brtags²⁸⁰ nas bsam gtan byed kyī / gzugs la sogs pa gnas nas bsam gtan mi byed ciñ / 'jig rten 'di dañ 'jig rten²⁸¹ pha rol gyi bar la gnas nas bsam gtan mi byed do // ²⁸² gzugs la sogs pa de dag mi dmigs pa'i phyr ro // de lta bas na mi gnas pa'i bsam gtan pa źes bya'o //

In that way, one concentrates on the basis of precisely analyzing (*yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du brtags*) the nature of things like material form with wisdom. One does not concentrate on the basis of objects like material forms. Nor does one concentrate on the basis of (any) object from this

270 Skt: *sūnyatābhāvanāyā(m) yogam āpadyate* / Bhk 3 7.17.

271 Skt: *nirmittāyām yogam āpadyate* / Bhk 3 7.22-8.1.

272 CD 'dis.

273 NP *rtogs*.

274 NP *mñon du stoñ pa* for *sñon du gtoñ ba*.

275 CD *to*.

276 CDNP *kyi*.

277 NP *spyod*.

278 *mam par* omitted in NP.

279 CD *de ltar de*.

280 NP *brtag*.

281 'jig rten omitted in NP.

282 CD *de /*

world right up to the next. For those material forms and so forth and are not found. Thus this is called the non-abiding concentration.

śes rab kyis²⁸³ dños po mtha' dag gi ño bo ñid la so sor brtags nas gañ gi phyir mi dmigs par bsam gtan byed pa de'i phyir śes rab mchog gi bsam gtan pa źes bya ste / 'phags pa nam mkha' mdsod dañ / 'phags pa gtsug na rin po che la sogs pa las bstan pa bźin no //

Having examined the nature of all things with wisdom, one is a concentrator of the highest wisdom (*śes rab mchog gi bsam gtan pa*) on account of concentrating upon no object, as is explained in the Noble *Gaganagañja*, the Noble *Ratnacūda* and so forth.

de ltar gañ zag dañ chos la bdag med pa'i²⁸⁴ de²⁸⁵ kho na la źugs pa de yoñs su brtag par bya ba, blta bar bya ba²⁸⁶ gźan med pas rtog pa dañ dpyod pa dañ bral ba, brjod pa med pa ñañ gcig tu gyur pa'i yid la byed pa rañ gi ñañ gis²⁸⁷ 'jug pa mñon par 'du byed pa med pas²⁸⁸ de kho na ñid la śin tu gsal bar bsgom źiñ 'dug par bya'o // der gnas nas sems kyi rgyun mnam par mi g'yeñ bar bya'o //

In that way, the one who has entered into the reality of the identitylessness of the person and phenomena is free from conceptualization and investigation (*rtog pa dañ dpyod pa dañ bral ba*) because there is nothing else to be considered or examined; by automatically entering an undivided state of attention which is inexpressible he should remain very clearly meditating on that suchness, without effort. After dwelling upon that, the mind's continuity should not be disturbed.

gañ gi tshe bar skabs su 'dod chags la sogs pas sems phyi rol du²⁸⁹ mnam par g'yeñ ba de'i tshe mnam par g'yeñs pa²⁹⁰ tshor bar byas la, myur du mi sdug pa bsgom pa la sogs pas²⁹¹ mnam par g'yeñ ba źi bar byas nas myur du de bźin ñid la sems phyir źiñ 'jug par bya'o //

When the mind is occasionally distracted by passion etc, then having felt the distraction and having pacified it by quickly cultivating inauspicious signs, immediately the mind should be

283 CDPN *kyi*.

284 D *pa*.

285 CD add *ltar*.

286 *blta bar bya ba* omitted in NP.

287 NP *gi*.

288 NP *pa*.

289 NP *tu*.

290 NP *g'yeñ ba*.

291 NP *pa*.

repeatedly engaged upon suchness.

gañ gi tshé de la sems mñon par mi dga' bar²⁹² mthoñ ba de'i tshé tiñ ñe 'dsin gyi²⁹³ yon tan mthoñ bas de la mñon par dga' ba bsgom par bya'o // {D50b1} mam par g'yeñ ba la ñes par²⁹⁴ mthoñ bas kyañ mi dga' ba rab tu źi bar bya'o //

When in that context the mind would meet with dissatisfaction, then one should cultivate satisfaction there by seeing the virtues of *samādhī*. And one should pacify one's dissatisfaction by seeing the flaws in distraction.

ji ste rmugs pa dañ gñid kyis non²⁹⁵ te rgyu ba mi gsal bas sems byiñ ñam byiñ du dogs par mthoñ ba²⁹⁶ de'i tshé goñ ma bźin du mchog tu²⁹⁷ dga' ba'i dños po yid la byed pas myur du byiñ ba źi bar byas la / yañ dmigs pa de kho na de ñid śin tu dam por gzuñ bar bya'o //

Now it may happen that one sees the mind is sinking or is apprehensive about it sinking because (its) movement is not clear, having been overcome by sluggishness and sleep. At that time, quickly compensating for the sinking by paying attention to an object of great joy as (mentioned) above, one should again very firmly grasp that very object which is reality.

ji ste gañ gi tshé sñon bgad pa dañ / rtses pa rjes su dran pas bar skabs su sems 'phyar ba'am rgod du dogs par mthoñ ba de'i tshé goñ ma bźin du mi rtag pa la sogs pa yid du²⁹⁸ 'byuñ bar 'gyur ba'i dños po yid la byas pa²⁹⁹ la g'yeñ ba źi bar bya' źiñ / de nas yañ³⁰⁰ de kho na ñid la sems mñon par 'du byed pa med par 'jug par 'bad par bya'o //

But if occasionally one sees the mind is excited due to remembering past laughter and merriment or that it is apprehensive about (becoming) distracted, then, as (mentioned) above, one pays attention to sobering topics like impermanence and pacifies the distraction. Then one should again make an effort to spontaneously engage the mind upon suchness.

292 NP *ba*.

293 NP *gyis*.

294 NP *pa*.

295 NP *gnon*.

296 NP *pa* for *par mthoñ ba*.

297 P *du*.

298 CD omit *du*.

299 CD omit *pa*.

300 *de nas yañ* omitted in NP.

ji ste gañ gi tshe byiñ ba dañ rgod pa dañ bral bar gyur nas mñam par žugs te / de kho na ñid la sems rañ gi ñañ gis 'jug par 'gyur ba de'i tshe rtsol ba glod³⁰¹ de btañ sñoms su bya'o //

Now when one has entered into a balanced state, having become free from sinking and excitement, and the mind is engaged upon suchness on its own accord, then having relaxed one's effort one should (abide) in equanimity.

gal te sems mñam par žugs pa la brtsal³⁰² ba byas na de'i tshe sems mam par g'yeñ bar 'gyur ro //

gal te sems byiñ bar gyur pa la brtsal³⁰³ bar ma byas na³⁰⁴ de'i tshe³⁰⁵ śin tu byiñ bas lhag mthoñ med de / sems dmus loñ bžin du 'gyur ro //

de lta bas na sems byiñ bar gyur na brtsal³⁰⁶ bar bya'o // mñam par gyur na brtsal³⁰⁷ bar mi bya'o //

If an effort is made while the mind is proceeding in equanimity, then the mind would become distracted.

If an effort is not made when the mind has sunk, then without Insight because sunken, the mind would be like a blind man.

Therefore if the mind is sunken one should make an effort. If equanimous one should not make an effort.

gañ gi tshe lhag mthoñ bsgoms³⁰⁸ pas śes rab śin tu śas che bar gyur pa³⁰⁹ de'i tshe ži gnas chuñ bas mar me rluñ la bžag³¹⁰ pa³¹¹ bžin du sems g'yo bar 'gyur te / de'i phyir de kho na śin tu gsal bar mthoñ bar mi 'gyur te / de bas na de'i tshe ži gnas bsgom par bya'o // ži gnas kyi³¹² śas che bar gyur na yañ śes rab bsgom par bya'o //

301 NP *glo*.

302 NP *btsal*.

303 NP *btsal*.

304 NP *nas*.

305 NP omit *tshe*.

306 NP *btsal*.

307 C *rtsal*.

308 NP *bsgom*.

309 NP *'gyur ba*.

310 Following CD. Goshima *gžag*.

311 NP add *de*.

312 P omits *kyi*.

gañ gi tshe gñis ka mñam du³¹³ 'jug pa'i tshe lus dañ sems la gnod par³¹⁴ ma gyur gyi bar du mñon par 'du byed pa med par gnas par bya'o //

When wisdom becomes very acute from cultivating insight, then if one's tranquillity is little, one's mind might waver like a lamp placed in the wind. And on account of that it would not see reality very clearly. Then, at that time, tranquillity should be cultivated. But if tranquillity becomes excessive, wisdom should again be cultivated.

At the time when one has equally entered both, one should abide spontaneously as long as there is no pain in the body or mind.

lus la sogs pa la³¹⁵gnod par gyur na de'i bar skabs su 'jig rten mtha 'dag sgyu ma dañ / smig rgyu dañ / rmi lam dañ / chu zla dañ / mig yor³¹⁶ lta bur lta žiñ / 'di sñam du bsam par bya ste / sems can 'di dag ni chos zab mo 'di lta bu khoñ du ma chud pas 'khor ba na kun tu³¹⁷ ñon moñs par 'gyur³¹⁸ gyis³¹⁹ / {D51a1} bdag gis ci nas kyañ de dag chos ñid de khoñ du chud par 'gyur bar³²⁰ de lta bya'o sñam du bsam žiñ / sñiñ rje chen po de³²¹ byañ chub kyi sems mñon du bya'o // de nas ñal bso la yañ de bžin du chos thams cad snañ ba med pa'i tiñ ñe 'dsin la 'jug par bya'o // yañ sems śin tu skyo bar gyur na de bžin du ñal gso³²² bar bya'o //

If there is such a discomfort in the body, in that period one views the entire world as like an illusion, a mirage, a dream, a water-moon, an appearance. And one reflects in this way, 'These sentient beings! Because they don't understand this view of the profound teaching, they are afflicted throughout *samsāra*! Thus I should cause them to understand the *Dharma* nature.' Thus great compassion triggers the thought of Awakening. Then, upon resting, in this way one should again enter into the *samādhi* which is without the appearance of any *dharma*. Also if the mind becomes very sorrowful, one should take rest in this way.

313 NP *par*.

314 NP *pa*.

315 NP omit *la*.

316 NP *g'yor*.

317 D *du*.

318 CD *gyur*.

319 NP *gyi*.

320 NP *gyur pa*.

321 CD *dañ* for *de*.

322 NP *bso*.

'di ni *zi gnas* *dañ lhag mthoñ zuñ du 'brel par* ³²³ *'jug pa'i lam ste nmam par rtog pa dañ bcas pa dañ*³²⁴ / *nmam par mi rtog pa'i gzugs brñan la dmigs pa'o //*
*de ltar rnal 'byor pas rim pa 'dis*³²⁵ *chu tshod gcig*³²⁶ *gam / mel tshe thun phyed dam / thun gcig gam / ji srid 'dod kyi bar du de kho na bsgom žiñ 'dug par bya'o //* *'di ni don rab tu nmam par 'byed pa'i*³²⁷ *bsam gtan te / 'phags pa lañ kar gšegs pa las bstan to //*

As for this, because it is a path that carries the union the pair of tranquillity and insight, it has objects which are (both) conceptual and non-conceptual mental images.

In that way, by this process a yogin should remain cultivating reality for one hour, a half watch or a watch³²⁸, or just as long as he likes.

As for this, it is the absorption which is the thorough discernment of the (ultimate) object (*don rab tu nmam par 'byed pa'i bsam gtan*, Skt: *arthapravicayadyāna*). And it is taught in the noble *Lañkāvatārasūtra*.

*de nas 'dod na tiñ ñe 'dsin las lañs te, skyil mo kruñ ma*³²⁹ *bšig par 'di sñam du chos 'di dag thams cad don dam par ño bo ñid med pa ñid yin du zin kyañ / kun rdsob tu nmam par gnas pa ñid do de lta ma yin na las dañ 'bras bu 'brel pa la sogs pa ji ltar nmam par gnas par 'gyur / bcom ldan 'das kyis kyañ / 'dños po skye ba kun rdsob tu // dam pa'i don du rañ bžin*³³⁰ *med " ces bka stsal to //*

Then having emerged from *samādhi* just as wished, and not breaking the lotus posture, one thinks, "Even though all these *dharmas* are ultimately without a nature, they are conventionally established. If it was not like this, then how could such notions as the connection of an action with its result be established? The Illustrious One has also said, "A thing which is born conventionally, ultimately is without a nature."

sems can byis pa'i blo can 'di dag ni ño bo ñid med pa'i dños po nmams la yod pa la sogs pa sgro 'dogs pas blo phyin ci log tu gyur te / yun riñ por 'khor lo na yoñs su 'khyams pas bdag gis ci nas kyañ bsod nams dañ ye šes kyi tshogs bla na med pa yoñs su rdsogs par bya ste / de nas thams cad mkhyen pa'i go 'phañ thob par byas la de dag chos ñid khoñ du chud par bya'o sñam du

323 NP *pa*.

324 NP omit *dañ*.

325 NP *'di*.

326 NP *cig*.

327 NP *rab tu dbye ba'i* for *rab tu nmam par 'byed pa'i*.

328 One Indian hour is 24 minutes, a half watch is 90 minutes and a watch 180 minutes.

329 NP *mi*.

330 NP *ni* for *bžin*.

*bsams*³³¹ la / de nas dal bus skyil mo kruñ bśig ste³³² phyogs bcu na bźugs pa'i sañs rgyas dañ
 byañ chub sems dpa' thams cad la phyag byas la / de dag la mchod pa dañ bstod pa byas nas /
 'phags pa bzañ po spvod pa la sogs pa'i smon lam rgya chen po gdab bo // de nas³³³ stoñ pa ñid
 dañ sñiñ rje chen po'i sñiñ po can sbyin pa la sogs pa³³⁴ bsod nams dañ ye śes kyi tshogs mtha'
 dag bsgrub pa la mñon par brtson par bya'o //

As for these childlike sentient beings, their minds are inverted because of the
 supeimposition of existence and so forth upon things that are without a nature. And hence they
 roam around the cycle of life for a long time. Therefore, may I complete the unsurpassed
 accumulations of merit and knowledge and then, having attained the rank of the omniscient, may I
 cause them to understand the *Dharma* nature." Then, breaking the Lotus posture and bowing to all
 the Buddhas and bodhisattvas residing in the ten directions, one worships and praises them. After
 that, one offers a long prayer like the noble *Bhadracarī*. Then, the compassionate one possessing
 emptiness and great compassion should strive to establish all the accumulations of merit and
 wisdom, starting with giving.

{D51b1} de ltar gyur na bsam gtan de mnam pa³³⁵ thams cad kyi mchog dañ ldan pa'i stoñ
 pa ñid mñon par bsgrubs³³⁶ pa yin te / 'phags pa gtsug na rin po che las ji skad du / "de byams pa'i
 go cha bgos śiñ sñiñ rje chen po'i gnas la gnas nas, mnam pa thams cad kyi mchog dañ ldan pa'i
 stoñ pa ñid mñon par sgrub pa'i bsam gtan byed do // de la mnam pa thams cad kyi mchog dañ ldan
 pa'i stoñ pa ñid gañ źe na / gañ sbyin pa dañ ma bral ba / tshul khirms dañ ma bral ba / bzod pa dañ
 ma bral ba / brtson 'grus dañ ma bral ba / bsam gtan dañ ma bral ba / śes rab dañ ma bral ba / thabs
 dañ ma bral ba " źes bya ba la sogs pa rgya cher bka' stsal pa lta bu'o //

If that is how it is then concentration will thoroughly establish the emptiness which
 possesses the best of all aspects. As is said in the noble *Ratnacūda*, "From donning the armour of
 kindness and dwelling in the state of great compassion one performs the concentration which
 thoroughly establishes the emptiness which possesses the best of all aspects. Here, if it is asked
 what is the emptiness which possesses the best of all aspects: it is that which is not separated from
 giving, not separated from morality, not separated from patience, not separated from effort, not
 separated from concentration, not separated from wisdom, not separated from method." Like that,
 conduct and so forth were elaborated.

331 Goshima: *sñam bsams*.

332 NP *te*.

333 NP *na*.

334 NP omit *pa*.

335 NP *mams*.

336 NP *bsgrub*.

byañ chub sems dpa' ni sems can thams cad yons su smin par byed pa dañ / zñ³³⁷ dañ / lus dañ / g'yog 'khor mañ po la sogs pa phun sum tshogs par gyur pa'i thabs sbyin pa la sogs pa'i dge ba ñes par bsten par bya dgos so //

The sublime method of the bodhisattva's ripening of all beings, his field, his body and his many worldly attendants definitely must rely upon the virtues which are giving and so forth.

de lta ma yin na sañs rgyas mams³³⁸ kyī zñ la sogs pa phun sum tshogs pa gañ bka' stsal pa de gañ gi 'bras bu yin par 'gyur / de lta bas na mam pa thams cad kyī mchog dañ ldan pa thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes de ni sbyin pa la sogs pa thabs kyis yons su rdsogs par 'gyur bas bcom ldan 'das kyis thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes de ni thabs³³⁹ kyis³⁴⁰ mthar phyin pa yin no " zes bka' stsal to //

de'i phyir byañ chub sems dpa's sbyin pa la sogs pa thabs la yañ bsten par bya'i / stoñ pa ñid 'ba' žig ni ma yin no //

If it were not so, then how does that which is explained as the endowment of a Buddha-field and so forth come to fruition? Thus as for that wisdom which is the omniscience possessed of the best of all aspects it is completed by means, beginning with giving. And therefore the Buddha explained, "As for the wisdom which is omniscience, it reaches its completion through Method."

On account of that a bodhisattva must rely upon method, beginning with giving! Not just emptiness.

de skad du 'phags pa chos thams cad śin tu rgyas pa bsdus pa las kyañ bka' stsal te / " byams pa byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyī pha rol tu phyin pa drug yañ dag par bsgrub³⁴¹ pa 'di ni rdsogs pa'i byañ chub kyī phyir yin na / de la mi blun po de dag 'di skad du / byañ chub sems dpa' śes rab kyī pha rol tu³⁴² phyin pa kho na la bslab par bya'i³⁴³ / pha rol tu phyin pa lhag ma mams kyis³⁴⁴ ci žig bya zes³⁴⁵ zer zñ / {D52a1} de dag pha rol tu phyin pa gžan dag la yañ sun 'byin par sems so // ma pham pa 'di ji sñam du sems / ka śi ka'i rgyal por gyur pa gañ yin pa des³⁴⁶ phug

337 NP *zi*.

338 NP omit *mams*.

339 *de ni thabs* omitted in NP.

340 P *kyi*.

341 CD *bsgrubs*.

342 N omits *tu*.

343 NP *bya'o //*

344 NP omit *kyis*.

345 NP omit *zes*.

346 NP *de*.

ron gyi phyir rañ gi śa khra la byin³⁴⁷ pa de śes rab 'chal ba yin nam / byams pas gsol pa / bcom ldan 'das de ni ma lags so // bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / byams pa ña³⁴⁸ byañ chub sems dpa'i spyad pa spyod pa na pha rol tu phyin pa drug dañ ldan pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba gañ dag bsags pa'i dge ba'i rtsa ba de dag gis gnod par gyur tam / byams pas gsol pa / bcom ldan 'das de ni ma lags so / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / ma pham pa khyod kyis kyañ bskal pa drug cur sbyin pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa yañ dag par bsgrubs / bskal pa drug cur tshul khirms kyī pha rol tu phyin pa / bskal pa drug cur bzod pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa / bskal pa drug cur brtson 'grus kyī pha rol tu phyin pa / bskal pa drug cur bsam gtan gyi pha rol tu phyin pa / bskal pa drug cur śes rab kyī pha rol tu phyin pa yañ dag par bsgrubs na / de la mi blun po de dag 'di skad du³⁴⁹ tshul gcig³⁵⁰ kho nas byañ chub ste / 'di lta ste / stoñ pa ñid kyī³⁵¹ tshul gyis so źes zer te / de dag ni spyod pa yoñs su ma dag par 'gyur ro " źes bya ba la sogs pa 'byuñ ño //

And it was said in the noble *Sarvadharmavaipulyasūtra*, "Maitreya! This realization of the six perfections by bodhisattvas is for the sake of Awakening. [Yet] those ignorant people will speak thus of it, 'A bodhisattva should train only in the perfection of wisdom, what's the point of the remaining perfections!' Thus they consider the other perfections to be discreditable. Do you think this Ajita? Did he who was the king of Kaśi possess corrupt wisdom, he who gave his own flesh to a hawk for the sake of a dove?" Maitreya said, "No, indeed, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "Maitreya! "When I was in the sphere of practice of the bodhisattva was any harm done with those roots of merit I accumulated, the roots of merit which are the six perfections? Maitreya said, "Indeed not this, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "You, Ajita, practiced for sixty aeons the perfection of giving, for sixty aeons the perfection of morality, for sixty aeons the perfection of patience, for sixty aeons the perfection of effort, for sixty aeons the perfection of concentration, for sixty aeons the perfection of wisdom. Therefore those who are ignorant people speak this, 'Awakening is only reached by a single way, that is, by the way of emptiness. For them practice is not completely pure.'"

thabs dañ bral na byañ chub sems dpa'i śes rab 'ba' źig gis ni ñan thos³⁵² bźin du sañs rgyas kyī mdsad pa byed mi nus kyī / thabs kyis³⁵³ bstañs na nus par³⁵⁴ 'gyur te / 'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa las ji skad du / " 'od sruñs 'di lta ste dper na blon pos zin pa'i rgyal po mams

347 NP *sbyin*.

348 NP omit *ña*.

349 'di skad du omitted in NP.

350 NP *cig*.

351 NP *kyis*.

352 NP add *kyi*.

353 NP *kyi*.

354 NP *pa*.

*dgos pa thams cad byed pa de b'zin du byañ chub sems dpa'i śes rab thabs mkhas pas yoñs su³⁵⁵
zin pa de yañ sañs rgyas kyi mdsad pa thams cad byed do " zes gsuñs pa lta bu'o //*

Without method, the mere wisdom of the bodhisattva could not perform the actions of a Buddha, just like (that of) the śrāvakas. But if accompanied by method, it is possible. As is said in the noble *Ratnakūṭa*, "Kāśyapa, in this way for example, kings supported by their ministers carry out all their duties. Likewise the wisdom of the bodhisattva supported by skillful method performs all the actions of the Buddha"

*byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi lam gyi lta ba yañ g'zan / mu stegs can dañ / ñan thos mams
kyi lam gyi lta ba yañ g'zan te / 'di ltar mu stegs can mams kyi³⁵⁶ lam gyi lta ba ni bdag la sogs pa
la³⁵⁷ phyin ci log dañ ldan pa'i phyir thams cad kyi thams cad du śes rab dañ bral ba'i lam yin te /
de bas na de dag thar pa mi thob bo // {D52b1} ñan thos mams kyi ni sñiñ rje chen po dañ bral
bas thabs dañ mi ldan pa yin te / de bas na de dag gcig tu mya ñan las 'das pa la g'zol bar 'gyur ro //*

Moreover the view of the path of the bodhisattvas is other than the view of the path of the non-Buddhists and the śrāvakas. Thus as for the view of the path of non-Buddhists it is a path completely without wisdom in every respect on account of being in error with regard to self and so on. Hence they do not attain liberation. The śrāvakas are without great compassion and therefore not possessed of method. Therefore they abide in *nirvāṇa* individually.

*byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi lam ni³⁵⁸ śes rab dañ³⁵⁹ ldan par 'dod de / des na³⁶⁰ de
dag³⁶¹ mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa la g'zol bar 'gyur ro // byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi lam
ni³⁶² thabs dañ ldan par 'dod de / des na mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa thob ste / śes rab kyi
stobs kyi ni³⁶³ 'khor bar mi ltuñ la / thabs kyi stobs kyi ni³⁶⁴ mya ñan las 'das par mi ltuñ ba'i
phyir ro //*

As for the the path of the bodhisattvas, it aims to embody wisdom and hence those

355 yoñs su omitted in NP.

356 NP *gyis*.

357 CD *par*.

358 NP omit *ni*.

359 CD add *thabs dañ*.

360 CD *de bas na* for *des na*.

361 NP omit *de dag*.

362 CDNP add *śes rab dañ*.

363 NP omit *ni*.

364 NP omit *ni*.

[bodhisattvas] alight in a non-abiding *nirvāṇa*. On the other hand, the path of the bodhisattvas aims to embody method and hence reaches a *nirvāṇa* that is non-abiding. Thus, because of the force of wisdom there is no falling into *samsāra*, and because of the force of method there is no falling into *nirvāṇa*.

*de bas na 'phags pa ga va go'i ri las / "byañ chub sems dpa' rnam kyī lam ni mdor
bsdus³⁶⁵ na 'di gñis te / gñis gañ ze na / 'di lta ste / thabs dañ śes rab bo" zes bka stsal to //*
'phags pa dpal mchog dañ po las kyañ / "śes rab kyī pha rol tu phyin pa ni ma yin no //
thabs la³⁶⁶ mkhas pa ni pha yin no" zes bka' stsal to //

Thus it was said in the noble *Gayāśīrṣa*, "As for the path of the bodhisattvas, summarized in brief it is two. What are the two? To wit: method and wisdom."

Also in the noble *Śrīparamādyā* it is said, "As for the perfection of wisdom, it is the mother. As for skill in method, it is the father."

*'phags pa dri ma med par grags pas bstan pa las kyañ /
"byañ chub sems dpa' rnam kyī 'chiñ ba ni gañ / thar pa ni gañ ze na / thabs med par srid
pa'i³⁶⁷ 'gro ba yoñs su 'dsin pa ni byañ chub sems dpa'i 'chiñ ba'o // thabs kyis srid pa'i³⁶⁸ 'gro bar
'gro ba³⁶⁹ ni thar pa'o //370*

Thus it is elaborated in the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, "If it is asked what is bondage for a bodhisattva and what liberation? Embracing the beings of world without method is bondage for a bodhisattva. Embracing the beings of the world with method -- that is liberation!

*thabs kyis ma³⁷¹ zin pa'i śes rab ni 'chin ba'o // thabs kyis zin pa'i śes rab ni thar pa'o // śes rab
kyis³⁷² ma zin pa'i thabs ni 'chin ba'o // śes rab kyis zin pa'i thabs ni thar pa'o " zes rgya cher bka
stsal to //*

Wisdom not grasped with method is bondage. Wisdom grasped with method is liberation. Method not grasped with wisdom is bondage. Method grasped with wisdom is liberation.

365 CD *bsdus*.

366 NP omit *la*.

367 CDNP *par*.

368 NP *par*.

369 CD and Goshima 'gro bar 'gro ba for 'gro ba yoñs su 'dsin pa.

370 CD add *śes rab med par srid par 'gro ba yoñs su 'dsin pa ni byañ chub sems dpa'i 'chiñ ba'o // śes rab kyis srid pa'i 'gro bar 'gro ba ni thar pa'o //*

371 NP *mi*.

372 NP *kyi*.

byañ chub sems dpaś śes rab tsam bsten na ni ñan thos kyis³⁷³ 'dod pa'i mya ñan las 'das par ltuñ bas 'chin ba bzin du³⁷⁴ 'gyur te / mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pas grol bar mi 'gyur ro // de lta bas na thabs dañ bral ba'i śes rab ni byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyī 'chiñ ba'o źes bya'o //

If a bodhisattva were to adhere to wisdom alone, then because of falling into the *nirvāṇa* sought by śrāvakas it would be like a bondage. And he would not be liberated by nonabiding *nirvāṇa*. Therefore, as for wisdom without method, it should be called a bondage for bodhisattvas.

de lta bas na lhags³⁷⁵ pas ñen³⁷⁶ pa me la bsten³⁷⁷ pa bzin du byañ chub sems dpaś phyin ci log gi lhags pa tsam spañ ba'i phyir thabs dañ bcas pa'i śes rab kyī³⁷⁸ stoñ pa ñid bsten par bya'i / {D53a1} ñan thos bzin du mñon du ni mi bya ste /

Therefore just as someone oppressed by a freezing wind relies on fire, the bodhisattva should rely on the emptiness of wisdom along with method in order to escape the wind of mistakes. But he does not manifest it in the same way as a śrāvaka.

'phags pa chos bcu pa'i mdo las ji skad du / " rigs kyī bu 'di lta ste / dper na mi la la žig³⁷⁹ me yoñs su spyod par gyur te / ³⁸⁰ de me de la bsti stañ byed / bla mar byed kyañ de 'di sñam du bdag gis me de la bsti stañ byas / bla mar byas / ri mor byas kyañ 'di la lag pa gñis kyīs yoñs su gzuñ³⁸¹ bar bya'o sñam du mi³⁸² sems so // de ci'i phyir že na / gži de las bdag la lus kyī sdug bsñal ba'am / sems kyī yid mi bde bar 'gyur du 'oñ / sñam pa'i phyir ro // de bzin du byañ chub sems dpa'³⁸³ yañ mya ñan las 'das pa'i bsam pa can yañ yin la mya ñan las 'das pa mñon sum du yañ mi byed do // de ci'i phyir že na / gži de las bdag byañ chub las phyir ldog par 'gyur du 'oñ sñam pa'i phyir ro " [79] žes bka stsal pa lta bu'o //

373 NP kyī.

374 P tu.

375 N lhag.

376 C ñan.

377 CD la me bsten. NP me la brten.

378 CD kyīs.

379 NP dag.

380 CD to //.

381 NP bzui.

382 NP omit mi.

383 P dpa'i.

Just as was said in the *Daśadharmakasūtra*, "Noble son, in this way suppose someone respects a fire and he bows to that fire. Although revering it he does not think, 'I have bowed to the fire and revered it and also honoured it, now I should pick it up with both hands.' Why does he do this? It is because he thinks, 'On that account I would suffer physically and be unhappy mentally. Similarly while a bodhisattva also has the thought of *nirvāṇa*, he does not actualize *nirvāṇa*. Why does he do this? It's because he thinks 'On that account I would turn away from Awakening'."

*thabs tsam 'ba' žig bsten na yañ byañ chub sems dpa'*³⁸⁴ *so so'i skye bo'i sa las mi 'da' bas śin tu bciñs pa kho nar 'gyur ro // de lta bas na śes rab dañ bcas pa'i thabs bsten par bya ste / 'di ltar śnags kyis yoñs su zin pa'i dug bžin du byañ chub sems dpa' rñams kyī'*³⁸⁵ *ñion moñs pa yañ śes rab kyis yoñs su zin pa'i stobs kyis bsgoms na bdud rtsir 'gyur na / rañ bžin gyis'*³⁸⁶ *mñion par mtho ba'i 'bras bu can sbyin pa la sogs pa gañ yin pa lta smos kyañ ci dgos te /*

If he adhered to mere method alone a bodhisattva would be very restricted, not going beyond the stage of an ordinary person. Thus he should adhere to method conjoined to wisdom. In this way, if developed with the strength that is held by wisdom, the afflictions of bodhisattvas are transformed into nectar just like poison held by a *mantra*. As for giving and so forth, which by themselves possess the fruit of an exalted rebirth, why say more?

*'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa las ji skad du / " 'od sruñs 'di lta ste / dper na śnags dañ sman gyis yoñs su zin pa'i dug gis ni 'chi bar byed mi nus so // de bžin du byañ chub sems dpa' rñams kyī'*³⁸⁷ *ñion moñs pa śes rab kyis yoñs su zin pas kyañ log par ltuñ bar byed mi nus so " žes bka' stsal to //*

As it's said in the noble *Ratnakūṭa*, "In this way Kāśyapa, just as a poison held in check by *mantras* and medicines cannot cause death, so too because the bodhisattvas' afflictions are held in check by wisdom, they cannot cause one to fall into error."

*de lta'*³⁸⁸ *bas na gañ gi phyir byañ chub sems dpa' thabs kyī stobs kyis 'khor ba mi 'dor ba de'i phyir mya ñan las 'das par mi ltuñ ño // gañ gi phyir śes rab kyī stobs kyis dmigs pa mtha' dag spoñ ba de'i phyir 'khor bar mi ltuñ ste / {D53b1} de'*³⁸⁹ *bas na mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa*

384 NP *dpa'i*.

385 CD *kyis*.

386 NP omit *gyis*.

387 NP omit *kyī*.

388 NP omit *lta*.

389 Goshima: *des*

yañ³⁹⁰ sañs rgyas ñid thob³⁹¹ bo //

Therefore, since by strength of method a bodhisattva does not abandon saṃsāra, he does not fall into nirvāṇa. Since by strength of wisdom he renounces false imagination, he does not fall into saṃsāra. Thus he attains the nonabiding nirvāṇa, Buddhahood.

de bas na 'phags pa nam mkha' mdsod las kyañ / " de śes rab kyi śes pas ni ñon moñs pa thams cad yoñs su 'dor³⁹² ro // thabs kyi śes pas ni sems can thams cad yoñs su mi gtoñ ño " źes bka' stsal to //

Therefore it is also said in the *Gaganagañja*, "By the knowledge of wisdom one completely abandons afflictions. By the knowledge of method one does not forsake any sentient being."

'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa las kyañ / "sems can gyi don la śin tu mi phyogs pa dañ / 'du byed mñon par 'du bya ba thams cad la śin tu mi phyogs pa ni bla na med pa yañ dag par rdsogs pa'i byañ chub tu ñas ma³⁹³ bstan to " źes bka' stsal to // de lta³⁹⁴ bas na sañs rgyas ñid thob par 'dod pas śes rab dañ thabs gñis ka bsten par bya'o //

The *Samdhinirmocana Sūtra* also states, "That which is not oriented toward the benefit of sentient beings and which is not oriented towards all the performances of action, I do not call unsurpassed, perfectly complete Awakening." Therefore one who wishes to attain Buddhahood should rely on both wisdom and method.

de la 'jig rten las 'das pa'i śes rab bsgom pa'i gnas skabs sam / śin tu mñam par gźag pa'i gnas skabs na sbyin pa la sogs pa thabs la bsten³⁹⁵ pa mi byuñ du zin kyañ / de la sbyor ba dañ de'i rjes las byuñ ba'i śes rab gañ yañ³⁹⁶ byuñ³⁹⁷ ba de'i tshe thabs la bsten³⁹⁸ pa 'byuñ ba de³⁹⁹ ñid de / de'i phyir śes rab dañ thabs gñis cig car 'jug go //

390 NP omit yañ.

391 CD 'thob.

392 N 'dir.

393 NP omit ma.

394 NP omit lta.

395 CD brten.

396 gañ yañ omitted in NP.

397 NP 'byuñ.

398 CD brten.

399 CD omit de.

In that context when in the situation of cultivating world-transcending wisdom or in the condition of concentrated equipoise (*mñam par gźag pa'i gnas skabs*), one does not rely upon method such as giving. But in that context, during preparations and following (those meditations) whatever wisdom has arisen at that time, that itself comes to rely on method. On account of that one simultaneously engages the two: wisdom and method.

gźan yañ byañ chub sems dpa' nams kyi śes rab dañ thabs zuñ du 'brel bar 'jug pa'i lam ni 'di yin te / sems can thams cad la lta ba'i sñiñ rje chen pos yoñs su zin pas 'jig rten las 'das pa'i lam bsten pa dañ / lañs pa'i thabs kyi dus na yañ sgyu ma mkhan bźin du phyin ci ma log pa kho na'i sbyin pa la sogs pa la bsten⁴⁰⁰ pa ste /

Furthermore, this is the path that carries the union of wisdom and method for bodhisattvas: they rely on the transcendent path because thoroughly gripped by the great compassion that beholds all sentient beings. And at the time of emergent method, they rely on giving and so forth which is unmistakable -- just like miracle workers (*sgyu ma mkhan*).

'phags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa las ji skad du / "de la byañ chub sems dpa'i thabs ni gañ / śes rab mñon par sgrub pa ni gañ že na / gañ gi phyir mñam par gźag pa na sems can la⁴⁰¹ lta bas na⁴⁰² sñiñ rje chen po'i dmigs pa la sems ñe bar 'jog pa de ni de'i thabs so // gañ gi phyir źi ba dañ rab tu źi bar sñoms par 'jug pa de ni de'i śes rab bo " žes rgya cher bka' stsal pa lta bu'o //

Just as was extensively explained in the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*, "There, if it is asked what is the method of the bodhisattva and what the establishment of wisdom: that for the sake of which he places the mind on the object of great compassion, by viewing all sentient beings while abiding -- that is his method. That for the sake of which he equanimously enters calm and pacification -- that is his wisdom."

bdud btul ba'i le'u las kyañ bka stsal te / " gźan yañ byañ chub sems dpa' nams kyi sbyor pa yañ dag phul ni śes rab kyi śes pas mñon par brtson par yañ mi byed la / {D54a1} thabs kyi śes pas dge ba'i chos thams cad sdud par yañ sbyor ba dañ / śes rab kyi śes pas bdag med pa dañ / sems can med pa dañ / srog med pa dañ / gso ba med pa dañ / gañ zag med par yañ sbyor la / thabs kyi śes pas sems can thams cad yoñs su smin par byed par⁴⁰³ yañ sbyor ba gañ yin pa'o " žes rgya cher 'byuñ ño //

This is also elaborated in the *Māradamanaparivarta*, "As for the perfected practice of the bodhisattvas, because of the knowledge of wisdom he does not make an effort, while because of the knowledge of method he never the less practices the collection of all the beneficial qualities. By

400 CD *brten*.

401 NP omit *la*.

402 NP omit *na*.

403 D *pa*.

knowledge of wisdom he practices without an identity, without sentient beings, without living beings, without lives, without a person, while because of knowledge of method, he is one who never the less practices the ripening of all sentient beings."

'phags pa chos thams cad yañ dag par sdud pa'i mdo las kyañ /

*"dper na sgyu ma'i mkhan po žig //
sprul pa thar par bya phyir brtson //
des⁴⁰⁴ ni sña nas de śes pas //
sprul pa de la chags pa med //
srid gsum sprul pa 'dra bar ni //
rdsogs pa'i byañ chub mkhas pas śes //
'gro ba'i ched du go bgos te //
'gro ba de ltar sña nas śes // " žes 'byuñ ño //*

As is said in the *Sarvadharmasaṃgraha Sūtra*:

For example, a magician
attempts to liberate a phantom.
Because he already knows this
he is not attached to that phantom.
Similarly, the awakened sage knows
the phantom of three worlds.
He dons armour for living beings
even though already knowing living beings in that way.

*"byañ chub sems dpa' rnam kyī śes rab dañ / thabs kyī tshul kho na sgrub pa'i dbaṅ du
mṣad nas / de'i sbyor ba 'khor ba na gnas pa yañ yin pa la / bṣam pa mya ñan las 'das pa la gnas
pa⁴⁰⁵ yañ yin no " žes bka' stsal to //*

Having activated the power which establishes the very conduct of the bodhisattvas'
wisdom and method, their practice is situated in the world while their thoughts remain on *nirvāṇa*."

*de ltar stoñ pa ñid dañ sñiñ rje chen po'i sñiñ po can bla na med pa yañ dag par rdsogs pa'i
byañ chub tu yoñs su bños pa'i sbyin pa la sogs pa'i thabs goms par byas la / don dam pa'i byañ
chub kyī sems bskyed pa'i phyir⁴⁰⁶ sña ma bžin du rtag par dus dus su ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi
sbyor ba la ci nus su bsgom par bya ste / 'phags pa spvod vul yoñs su dag pa'i mdo las / "gnas*

404 NP de.

405 P repeats *la gnas pa*.

406 NP *skyed pa* for *bskyed pa'i phyir*.

*skabs thams cad du sems can gyi don byed pa'i byañ chub sems dpa' mams kyi phan yon⁴⁰⁷" ji
skad du bstan pa de bzin du ñe bar gnas pa'i dran pas dus thams cad du thabs la mkhas pa goms
par bya'o //*

In that way, after practicing method, starting with giving, which is the complete resolve for unsurpassed, perfect awakening, then just as before, the one who has the heart of great compassion and emptiness should continually cultivate the practice of tranquillity and insight as much he can in order to generate the ultimate thought of Awakening. Just as was explained in the noble *Gocarapariśuddhisūtra*, "The merit of the bodhisattvas which acts for the benefit of sentient beings in all situations," so too one should practice skill in method at all times by remembering their presence.

*de ltar sñiñ rje dañ / thabs dañ / byañ chub kyi sems goms par byas pa de⁴⁰⁸ tshe 'di la
gdon mi za bar khyad par du 'gyur te / des na rmi lam na rtag tu⁴⁰⁹ sañs rgyas dañ byañ chub sems
dpa' mthoñ bar 'gyur / rmi lam bzañ po gzan dag kyañ rmi bar 'gyur / lha mams kyañ yi rañs⁴¹⁰ nas
sruñ ba byed par 'gyur / skad cig re re la yañ bsod mams dañ ye šes kyi tshogs rgya chen po sogs
par 'gyur / {D54b1} ñon moñs pa'i sgrib pa dañ / gnas ñan len kyañ byañ⁴¹¹ bar 'gyur / dus thams
cad du yañ bde ba dañ yid bde ba mañ bar 'gyur / skye bo mañ po la sdug par 'gyur / lus la yañ nad
kyis mi thebs par 'gyur sems las su ruñ ba ñid kyi mchog kyañ thob par 'gyur te / des na mñon par
šes pa la sogs pa yon tan khyad par can thob bo //*

One who has practiced compassion, method and the thought of Awakening in that way will certainly become distinguished at this time. By doing so, he will continually see Buddhas and bodhisattvas in his dreams. He will also dream other good dreams. The gods, out of delight, will protect him. In each and every moment there will be a great accumulation of merit and knowledge. The obscuration of the afflictions and corruption also will be purified. His happiness and gladness will continually increase. He will suffer for many people. He will not be afflicted by illness in the body. He will attain the distinction of being one who is capable mentally. By doing so, he will come to possess the distinction of qualities such as transcendent cognition.

*de nas rdsu 'phrul gyi stobs kyis⁴¹² 'jig rten gyi khams mtha' yas pa dag tu soñ⁴¹³ nas sañs
rgyas bcom ldan 'das la mchod pa byed do // de dag la chos kyañ ñan to //*

407 N *yan*.

408 NP *ste* / for *de*.

409 P *du*.

410 NP *rañ*.

411 NP *'byañ*.

412 NP *kyi*.

413 N *soñs*.

'chi ba'i dus kyi tshe na yañ gdon mi za bar sañs rgyas dañ byañ chub sems dpa' nams mthoñ bar 'gyur ro / tshe rabs gžan na⁴¹⁴ yañ sañs rgyas dañ byañ chub sems dpa' dañ mi 'bral ba'i yul dañ khyad par du 'phags pa'i khyim du yañ⁴¹⁵ skye bar 'gyur te / des na 'bad mi dgos par bsod nams dañ ye śes kyi tshogs yoñs su rdsogs par byed do // loñs spyod che ba dañ / g'yog 'khor mañ bar 'gyur ro // śes rab rno bas skye bo mañ po yoñs su smin par yañ⁴¹⁶ byed par 'gyur ro // tshe rabs thams cad du tshe rabs dran par 'gyur te / de ltar phan yon tshad med pa mdo gžan dag las 'byuñ ba khoñ du chud par bya'o //

After that, by means of miraculous power one enters endless worldly realms, and honours the Illustrious Buddhas. And one listens to their teachings.

At the time of death one will inevitably see Buddhas and bodhisattvas. In other births one will be favourably born in a noble home and country which is not separated from the Buddhas and bodhisattvas. And after that one will easily accomplish the accumulations of merit and knowledge. Great wealth and attendants will accumulate. With acute wisdom, one will undertake the ripening of many living beings. In all one's lives one will remember one's lives. In this way one should understand unlimited benefits, as is said in other *sūtras*.

des de ltar sñiñ rje dañ / thabs dañ / byañ chub kyi sems rtag tu gus par yun riñ du bsgom na rim gyis sems kyi⁴¹⁷ rgyud śin tu yoñs su dag pa'i skad cig 'byuñ bas yoñs su smin par 'gyur ba'i phyir gtsubs⁴¹⁸ śiñ gtsubs pa'i me bžin du yañ dag pa'i don la bsgom pa rab kyi mthar phyin par gyur nasjig rten las 'das pa'i ye śes rtog pa'i dra ba mtha' dag dañ bral ba / chos kyi dbyiñs spros pa med pa śin tu gsal bar rtogs pa / dri ma med ciñ mi g'yo la mar me rluñ med par gžag⁴¹⁹ pa bžin du mi g'yo ba tshad med par⁴²⁰ gyur pa / chos thams cad bdag med pa'i⁴²¹ de kho na mñon pa mthoñ ba'i lam gyis⁴²² bsodus pa don dam pa'i byañ chub kyi sems kyi⁴²³ ño bo ñid 'byuñ⁴²⁴ ño //

Thus if one continually cultivates compassion, method and the thought of Awakening with content

414 C omits *na*.

415 NP omit *yañ*.

416 NP omit *yañ*.

417 NP 'di.

418 CD *gtsub*.

419 CD *bžag*.

420 CD *mar* for *med par*.

421 CD add *ño bo*.

422 NP *gyi*.

423 NP omit *kyi*.

424 D *dbyuñ*.

devotion, then by the arising of moments of very great purity the mental continuum will gradually become ripened. On account of which, like the fire of fire-sticks rubbed together, the meditation on the object of reality (*yañ dag pa'i don la bsgom pa*) reaches its highest limit. Then transcendent wisdom is free from the entire net of conceptual proliferation, and very clearly realizes the *Dharmadhātu* which is without activity. Stainless and motionless, resting like a butter-lamp out of the wind, the motionless is unlimited. Encompassed in the path of seeing that realizes the reality of the identitylessness of all *dharmas*, it is the nature of the ultimate thought of Awakening.

*de byuñ nas dños po'i*⁴²⁵*mtha' la dmigs pa la žugs pa yin te / [89] de bžin gšegs pa'i rigs su skyes pa yin / {D55a1} byañ chub sems dpa'i skyon med pa la žugs pa yin / 'jig rten gyi 'gro ba thams cad las log pa yin / byañ chub sems dpa'i chos ñid dañ chos kyi dbyiñs rtogs*⁴²⁶ *pa la gnas pa*⁴²⁷ *yin / byañ chub sems dpa'i sa dañ po thob pa yin no žes phan yon de rgyas par sa bcu pa la sogs pa las khoñ du chud par bya'o //*

Then one has entered the meditation object which is the limit of things. One is born in the lineage of the Tathāgatas. One has entered the faultlessness of the bodhisattva. One has turned away from the cycles of the world. One dwells in the realization of the bodhisattva's *Dharmatā* and *Dharmadhātu*. One has attained the first stage of the bodhisattva. Thus these benefits should be understood in detail from works like the *Daśabhūmika*.

*'di ni de bžin ñid la dmigs pa'i bsam gtan te*⁴²⁸ */ 'phags pa lañ kar gšegs pa las bstan te / " 'di ni byañ chub sems dpa' rñams kyi spros pa med pa rñam par mi rtog pa ñid la 'jug pa'o // mos pas spyod pa'i sa la ni mos pa'i dbañ gis*⁴²⁹ *'jug par rñam par gžag*⁴³⁰ *gi / mñon par 'du byed pas ni ma yin no //*

This is the concentration having the object of thusness. It has been taught in the noble *Lañkāvatārasūtra* as follows, "As for this, one enters the bodhisattvas' thorough non-conceptuality which is without conceptual proliferation. At the stage of conduct of zealous conduct one remains engaged by the power of zealous conduct, but not spontaneously.

*ye šes de byuñ bar gyur na ni mñon du žugs pa yin te / de ltar sa dañ por žugs pa des*⁴³¹ *phyis bsgom pa'i lam la 'jig rten las 'das pa dañ / de'i rjes pa thob pa'i ye šes gñis kyis šes rab dañ / thabs*

425 Goshima *gños po'i*, correction: Tomubechi Tōru (with thanks).

426 NP *rtog*.

427 Goshima omits *pa*. correction: Tomubechi.

428 CD *de*.

429 NP *gi*.

430 NP *bžag*.

431 D *de*.

*bsgoms*⁴³² *pas rim gyis bsgom pas spañ bar bya ba'i sgrib pa bsags pa phra ba bas kyañ ches phra ba byañ ba'i phyir dañ / yon tan khyad par can goñ ma goñ ma thob pa'i*⁴³³ *phyir goñ ma*⁴³⁴ *mams yoñs su sbyoñ bas de bzin gsegs pa'i ye ses kyi bar la žugs nas thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyi rgya mtshor 'jug ciñ dgos pa yoñs su 'grub pa'i dmigs pa yañ 'thob ste / 'di ltar rim pa kho nar sems kyi*⁴³⁵ *rgyud yoñs su dag par " 'phags pa lañ kar gsegs*⁴³⁶ *pa las kyañ bka' stsal to //*

Once that knowledge has arisen it is entered. After entering the first stage in that way, on the path of cultivation one cultivates wisdom and method by means of the two knowledges obtained: the transcendent and that which follows it. Therefore, since it is by gradually meditating that the subtle and very subtle accumulations of obscurations to be abandoned are purified, one thoroughly trains in the lower in order to attain the higher distinctive virtues. Therefore, having entered into the wisdom of the Tathāgatas one will attain the entrance into the ocean of omniscience and the object which is the perfection of purpose. In precisely this gradual way, the mental continuum is completely purified." This was taught in the noble *Lankāvatārasūtra*.

*'phags pa dgoñs pa ñes par 'grel pa las kyañ / " rim gyis*⁴³⁷ *sa*⁴³⁸ *goñ ma goñ ma mams su gser lta bur sems mam par sbyoñ la bla na med pa yañ dag par rdsogs pa'i byañ chub kyi bar du mñon par rdsogs par 'tshañ rgya 'o " žes gsuñs so //*

Also it is said in the noble *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, "Gradually on the highest stages when the mind is thoroughly purified like gold, it directly and completely awakens right up to the point of unsurpassed, perfect Awakening."

*thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyi rgya mtshor žugs pa na yid bzin gyi nor bu lta bur sems can mtha' dag ñe bar 'tsho ba'i yon tan gyi phuñ po dañ ni ldan / sñon gyi smon lam gyi 'bras bu yod par ni mdsad / thugs rje chen po'i rañ bzin du ni 'gyur / lhun gyis grub pa'i thabs sna tshogs dag dañ ldan / sprul pa dpag tu med pa dag gis 'gro ba ma lus pa'i don mnam pa thams cad ni mdsad / {D55b1} yon tan phun sum tshogs pa ma lus pa rab kyi*⁴³⁹ *mthar phyin par ni 'gyur / bag chags*

432 NP *sgom*.

433 NP *tho ba'i* for *thob pa'i*.

434 D *sa 'og ma* for *goñ ma*.

435 D *kya*.

436 Goshima *šegs*.

437 NP *gyi*.

438 NP omit *sa*.

439 NP omit *rab kyi*.

*dañ bcas pa'i ñes pa'i dri ma mtha' dag bsal nas / sems can gyi khams kyi⁴⁴⁰ mthas⁴⁴¹ gtugs par
žugs⁴⁴² pa yin par rtogs pa dañ ldan pas / sañs rgyas bcom ldan 'das yon tan mtha' dag gi 'byuñ
gnas la dad pa bskyed la yon tan de yon su bsgrub pa'i phyir bdag ñid thams cad kyis 'bad par
bya'o //*

When one enters the ocean of omniscience, then like a wish-fulfilling jewel one possesses heaps of virtues which provide for all sentient beings. One bears the fruit of previous prayers. One takes on the nature of great compassion. One possesses various uncontrived methods. Employing limitless emanations one does everything that leads to the goal of every living being. One reaches the highest limit of all excellent qualities. One clarifies all stains along with their underlying habits and then has the realization which extends to the limits of all the realms of sentient beings. Therefore when one has generated faith in the blessed Buddhas as the source of all these qualities, in order to thoroughly establish those qualities one should totally exert oneself.

*de bas na bcom ldan 'das kyis 'di skad du / thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye šes de ni sñiñ rje'i rtsa
ba las byuñ ba yin / byañ chub kyi sems kyi rgyu las byuñ ba yin / thabs kyis mthar phyin pa yin
no " žes bka' stsal to //*

Thus the Buddha said, "The wisdom of omniscience has arisen from the root which is compassion. It has arisen from the cause which is the thought of Awakening. It has reached its completion through method."

*dam pa phrag dog la sogs dri ma thag bsriñs pa //
yon tan rnams kyis mi ñoms chu yi(?s) mtsho 'dra dag //
nam par phye nas legs par bsad rnams 'dsin byed de //
ñañ pa rab dga' chu las 'o ma len pa bžin //
de lta bas na mkhas rnams kyis //
phyogs lhuñ dkrugs yid riñ spoñs la //
byis pa las kyañ legs bsad pa //
thams cad blañ ba kho nar bya //
de ltar dbu ma'i lam bsad pas //
bdag gis bsod nams gañ⁴⁴³ thob pa //
de yis⁴⁴⁴ skye bo ma lus pa //
dbu ma'i lam ni thob par šog //*

440 NP omit *kyi*.

441 NP *mtha'*.

442 CD *bžugs*.

443 D *gar*.

444 NP *yi*.

A holy person casts away defilements such as jealousy
 He can't get enough of virtue, just like the ocean and water
 He understands the good instructions, having first discriminated
 just as the delighted swan who obtains milk from water.
 Hence the wise leave far behind
 their opinionated and confused mind
 and accept the good instructions
 even from a child.
 Thus through the merit I obtained
 by the middle path explained
 May beings without limit
 the middle path attain.

bsgom pa'i rim pa ā cā rya ka ma la śī las bar du mdsad pa rdsogs so⁴⁴⁵ //

*rgya gar gyi mkhan po pra jñā va rma dañ / lo tsā ba ba nde ye śes sdes bsgyur ciñ źus te /
 gtan la phab pa'o //*

The *Bhāvanākrama*, composed by Ācārya Kamalaśīla, is completed.

It was translated, revised and arranged by the Indian master Prajñāvarman and the translator Venerable Ye śes sde.

The Process of Meditation III¹

1. Śamatha and vipaśyanā

Homage to Tara!
The Process of Meditation is related in brief
for those who have entered
the way of the Mahāyāna sūtras.

There (in those sūtras), even if the *samādhi* of bodhisattvas was taught by the Bhagavan to be limitless (in variety), by way of the (four) Immeasurables and all the rest, nevertheless all *samādhis* are subsumed under tranquillity and insight. Therefore, precisely that path which carries the union of tranquillity and insight is related. And the Bhagavān has said:

Having cultivated² tranquillity and insight
A living being is liberated from the bondages of signs (*nimitta*, *T. mtshan ma*)
and negative dispositions (*dauṣṭhula*, *T. gnas ñen len*).

Therefore one who aims to abandon all obscurations should practice³ tranquillity and insight. By the power of tranquillity the mind becomes steady on its object, like a lamp in a place without wind. By insight, the light of perfect gnosis emerges from accurately realizing the suchness of *dharmas* (*yathāvad dharmatattvāvagamāt*). And on that basis all obscuration is removed, just as the night by the dawning of the sun.⁴ Precisely because of this the Bhagavān taught four realities as meditation objects for yogins: a) a mental image without conceptualization b) a mental image accompanied by conceptualization c) the limit of things (*vastuparyantatā* i.e. *sūnyatā*) and d) the

¹ Based on Tucci (1971) and D. Division of sections follows Tucci.

² D 56a1: *goms par byas*. Tucci 1.9: *bhāvayitvā*.

³ D 56a2: *bsgom par bya'o* / Tucci 1.11: *sevanīye* /

⁴ D 56a2: *mun par ñi ma śar ba bzin du*.

perfection of purpose.

a) In this context, when by means of tranquillity one has committed oneself to a mental image of all *dharmas* or to a form like that of the Buddha, that which is depended upon is called a mental image without conceptualization. It is called without conceptualization here because of an absence of concepts determining⁵ the actual state of (that) reality (*bhūtārthanirūpaṇāvikalpābhāva*). And it is called a mental image because it is depended upon, having committed oneself to an image of *dharmas* as they have been learned and understood.

b) When, by means of insight, the yogin analyzes (*vicārayati*) that very mental image in order to understand reality (*tattvādhigamārtha*), then it is called a mental image accompanied by conceptualization on account of the presence (*samudbhāva*, *T. yod pa*) there of a concept determining reality (*tattvanirūpaṇāvikalpa*), which is the characteristic of insight.

c) And in determining the nature of that very mental image on the basis of accurately understanding the nature of all *dharmas*, the yogin is as if ascertaining blemishes upon his own face by discerning its reflection in a mirror. When he penetrates the suchness (*tathatā*) that marks the limit of things then, on account of understanding the final nature of objects, this is called the meditation object of the limit of things in the first stage (of the bodhisattva).

d) After that, by the path of cultivation in the remaining stages, gradually there is a reorientation of the basis (of the mind) on account of the arising of moments of greater and greater (mental) purity -- just as when one employs an elixir of medicinal herbs. This being so, when there is the accomplishment of what must be done, which is defined by the removal of obscurations, then that very knowledge in the Buddha-stage is called the object for the perfection of purpose.

⁵ Tucci 1.20: *nirūpaṇā* D. om.

That being so, what is shown by this? The realization of the limit of all⁶ things occurs through practicing⁷ tranquillity and insight. And by that, the perfection of purpose defined by the removal of obscurations is attained. And that itself is Buddhahood. Therefore tranquillity and insight must be practiced by one who aims for the realization of Buddhahood. Conversely, for one who does not practice those two there is neither the realization of the limit of reality nor the perfection of purpose. Thus in the noble *Ratnamegha* and elsewhere the Bhagavān concisely stated the definition of tranquillity and insight:

Tranquillity is one-pointedness of mind, insight is the discernment of reality
(*bhūtapratyavekṣā, yan dag pa la rtog pa*).

2. How to practice *samatha* and *vipāśyanā*.

There, the yogin established in the prerequisites (*sambhāra*) for tranquillity and insight such as moral purification, having generated great compassion toward all beings, should practice in studying, thinking and meditation by way of the thought of Awakening that has been produced. In this context, at the time⁸ of meditation, having first of all finished with all his obligations and having emptied his bladder and bowels, in a pleasant spot free from barbs of sound and such, the yogin who intends to rescue all living beings resolves, "May I bring⁹ all sentient beings into the heart of Awakening." Having actualized great compassion he makes prostrations to all the Buddhas

⁶ Tucci 2.16: *samasta*. D: om.

⁷ D 56b2: *zi gnas dañ lhag mthoñ goms par byas...*

⁸ Following D 56b5: *sgom pa'i dus* and Bhk II: *bsgom pa'i dus* (D 46b2). Tucci 3.11: *bhāvanābalena*, by the force of meditation.

⁹ Tucci 3.14: *niṣpādayitavayā*. D 56b6: *dgod par bya?*

and bodhisattvas residing in the ten directions, whether by placing pictures of their bodies in front of himself or elsewhere, properly praising and making offerings to them as is his liking. Having confessed his faults, he rejoices in the merit of the entire world. Then on a very soft and comfortable seat, in the manner of the venerable Vairocana's Lotus posture, or alternatively in the 'Half-lotus' posture, with eyes neither too open nor closed directed at the tip of the nose, and with his body neither too bent nor rigid but simply straight, he should remain one whose awareness is inclined inward. Then he should square his shoulders. The head should be kept neither raised nor lowered, nor moving to one side (or another), thereby keeping the nose properly centred. His teeth and lips should be left natural, while his tongue is placed at the upper base of the teeth. His respirations should not be accompanied by sound, neither hurried nor heavy, but rather just as they should enter and depart without being discerned, very slowly and without effort, that's the way it should be done.

There first of all the yogin, having placed his mind on the form of the Tathāgata as seen or studied, should generate tranquillity. And that form of the Tathāgata is yellow like refined gold, adorned with the marks and secondary marks, surrounded by a circle of attendants. One who continuously pays attention to helping sentient beings through a variety of methods takes on¹⁰ the desire for the (Tathāgata's) virtues and neutralizes laxity, excitement and so forth. One should concentrate to such an extent as to see him so clearly that it is as if he were sitting directly before one.

And then insight should occur on the basis of observing¹¹ the coming and going of the

¹⁰ Tucci 4.17: *samupādāya* D 57a5: *bskyed*.

¹¹ Tucci 5.1: *nirūpanataḥ* D 57a6: *rtog pas*.

reflection of the Tathāgata's form. And after that one should think along the following lines, "Just as this reflection of the Tathāgata's form does not come from anywhere, will not go anywhere, and also remains empty of an independent nature, free of a self and of belonging to a self, so too all *dharmas* are empty of an independent nature, free from coming and going, like reflections, without a nature of existence and so on." Having thought thus, the one cultivating suchness with a mind whose thought has stopped and which has the singular flavour of silence should abide as long as he likes. And this *samādhi* is taught as the *Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhi*. Instruction on its advantages can be known in detail in that very sūtra. According to this, all *dharmas* are collected together by way of kind. Having bound the mind on that point, one should then generate tranquillity by ceasing laxity, excitement and so forth.

And, in brief, *dharmas* are grouped together by dividing them into those with material form and those with an immaterial form. There, those with material form are collected under the aggregate of material form. Those with an immaterial form have the nature of the aggregates of sensation and so forth. Now with regard to this, it is due to the attachment of clinging to existence and so forth that innocent people roam around *samsāra* with inverted minds. In order to reverse their error, and having manifested great compassion towards them, the yogin who has generated tranquillity cultivates insight so as to realize thusness. And the discernment of reality is said to be insight.

But what is real is the selflessness of persons and *dharmas*. Here, the selflessness of the person is the aggregates' lack of self or belonging to a self. The selflessness of *dharmas* is precisely their being like an illusion. Here the yogin should examine as follows, "First of all, apart from

material form and the rest there is no person; this on account of its nonappearance.¹² It is only among material form and the other (aggregates) that there is an "I". And thus it is a production by conditions. Moreover, there is no person who possesses the nature of the aggregates of material form and the rest. This is because those (aggregates), material form and so on, have a nature of being impermanent and multiple while a person is imagined by its proponents as permanent and unitary. Nor also is the reality of a person whom one cannot describe as existing that (way) or the other (way) reasonable, since real things have no other kind of existence." Therefore that which the world calls "I and mine" is clearly shown to be nothing more than a misguided delusion.

Next, in order to realize the identitylessness of *dharmas*, those *dharmas* with material form should also be analyzed, "Are these established as existing ultimately, independent from the mind? Or could it be that the mind itself appears, manifesting as material form and the rest, just like appearances in a dream-state?" These he observes as atoms, but when discerning the atoms in terms of (their own) parts, he does not find (them). And thus not apprehending (them), he dismisses conceptualizations regarding their existence or nonexistence. And he understands that the three worlds are mind alone, nothing more. Thus it is said in the *Lañkāvatara sūtra*:

One analyzes a substance into atoms and indeed should not conceive material form,
It is because of a false view that one does not clarify the state of mind only.

One thinks, "Because of the force of beginningless attachment to false forms and the like, for the naive the mind itself takes on an appearance of a material form as if it exists separated externally, just like those forms and so on being apprehended in the dreams. Therefore the triple world is just mind-alone." Having ascertained all designation to be just mind in this way, and

¹² D 57b5: *de mi snañ ba'i phyir dañ /*

having discerned there, one also discerns the nature of mind since, "The nature of all *dharmas* is discerned." Thus he investigates. Ultimately the mind too is nonarisen, like an illusion. When the mind itself appears in diverse aspects because of grasping the aspects of false-natured material form and the rest, then the same goes for it as for material form and the rest. Because it is not independent of these, where could there be any reality? Just as material form and the rest have a nature of being neither one nor many on account of their diverse aspects, so too the mind also has a nature of being neither one nor many since it is not independent from those. Nor also does the mind, in being generated, come from anywhere; nor when ceasing, does it go anywhere. Nor also is its generation ultimately from itself, another or both reasonable. Therefore the mind is just like an illusion. Just as the mind, so too all *dharmas*, like an illusion, are ultimately unarisen.

The yogin who is examining does not even apprehend a nature of the mind by which he discerns! Thus in this way wherever the yogin's mind extends to a meditation object, when upon examining its nature it is not found, then having analyzed every single thing (and) having understood them to be without a pith -- like the trunk of a plantain tree -- he turns his mind away from that (analysis). Then, when all conceptualization of existence and so forth has ceased, the signless yoga free of all conceptual proliferation is obtained. Thus it is stated in the noble *Ratnamegha*.

He who is skillful regarding faults in this way practices in the cultivation of emptiness in order to eliminate all conceptual proliferation. One who is experienced in cultivating emptiness, in searching for an independent nature¹³ realizes as empty whatever places the mind flows toward, those places that the mind enjoys. The mind too, upon being examined, is realized to be empty.

¹³ Tucci 7.19: *svabhāvataḥ parigaveṣamāno*. D 58b4-5: *no bo ñid yoṇis su btsal na*.

Even the mind which examines when an independent nature is being sought, is realized to be empty. One who closely examines in this way enters into a unified state in a condition of signlessness.¹⁴ Thus for this reason it is pointed out, "For one who does not look closely, there is no entrance into the signless." (And) when, upon closely examining the nature of *dharmas*, he does not find (anything), he conceives neither "It exists" nor "It does not exist." With regard to that which is imagined "It does not exist," this is on account of the fact that it does not appear in his mind at all times. For if at some time an existent was seen, then one could conjecture "It does not exist" by denying it. But if, in surveying the three times with wisdom, the yogin does not apprehend an existent, then by denying what could one conjecture "It does not exist"? So too, other concepts do not exist for him at that time, since all concepts are included under the conceptions of existence and nonexistence. Thus because of the nonexistence of the pervader, the pervaded also does not exist. When it is so, one has entered a nonconceptual state that is free from conceptual proliferation (*niṣprapañcanirvikalpatā*) and there is no reliance upon material form and the rest. And on the basis of not apprehending an independent nature in anything because of discriminating with wisdom, one becomes a concentrator of the highest wisdom (*prajñottaradhyāyin*). One has entered the Suchness (*tattvam*) consisting in the identitylessness of the person and of *dharmas*. And because there does not exist anything further to be examined, the yogin effortlessly abides, ever more clearly penetrating that very Suchness with a mind whose thoughts have ceased and which carries its own distinct flavour, the singular taste of nonconceptuality.

¹⁴ Tucci 7.22-8.1: *sa evam upaparīkṣamāno nīrnimittatāyāṃ yogam āpadyate* /D 58b5: *de de ltar rtogs pas mtshan ma med pa'i rnal byor la 'jug go zes 'byuñ dan* / Thus he who realizes in this way enters into union without signs.

3. Distractions to be avoided: how to be counteracted.

And abiding in that state, one should not disperse one's mental cohesion. When it happens that one would see the mind distracted outward, then after calming the disturbance by discerning its nature, one should once again repeatedly motivate the mind there itself. But if one would see that the mind is dissatisfied there, then one should develop satisfaction there by seeing the virtues of *samādhi*. And one should pacify one's dissatisfaction by seeing the faults in distraction. And if, on account of being overcome by torpor and drowsiness, one should see the mind sunk because of its condition of wandering, or if there is a suspicion of such laxity, then having paid attention to something delightful like the form of a Buddha or to a perception of light, one should alleviate that laxity. On that basis one should seize that very reality (*tattva*) more firmly. But when the yogin can not determine that reality more clearly - like one who is blind from birth, a man who has entered darkness, or one whose eyes are closed - then his mind should be recognized as sunken and devoid of insight.

Further, if one should see the mind excited by a desire for previously experienced objects, or suspect such excitement, then one should calm the excitement by paying attention to sobering topics such as impermanence. On that basis one should once again make an effort to enter an effortless state of mind¹⁵ with respect to the reality right there. And if the mind should come to possess an unstable turn, like a bewildered person or a monkey, it should be recognized as excited and devoid of tranquillity. And when, because of being cut off from laxity and excitement, a very

¹⁵ Tucci 9.17: (*cittā*)*nabhisamṣkāravāhitāyām yatnam kurvīta* / D 59b.1: *sems mñon par 'du byed pa med par 'jug pa la 'bad par bya'o* /

clear mind is generated upon reality right there, balanced,¹⁶ and bearing its own distinct flavour,¹⁷ then by letting go of effort it should become equanimous. And then the path that carries the union of tranquillity and insight should be known as established.

But if one should cultivate insight and one's wisdom would become too acute,¹⁸ then on account of the fact that one's tranquillity is too weak, there would not be a very clear vision of reality because of the mind's wavering -- like a butter-lamp in a breezy spot. On this basis, at that time tranquillity should be cultivated. (Conversely,) if tranquillity becomes too excessive there would not be a very clear vision of reality -- just as for someone overcome by drowsiness. Therefore, at that time, wisdom should be cultivated. But when the two are proceeding in balance like a pair of oxen working in union, then one may abide effortlessly, as long as there is no pain in the body or mind.

In brief, there are six (possible) faults for every single *samādhi*: laziness, loss of the object, laxity, excitement, lack of effort and overexertion. Eight conditions of abandonment should be cultivated as their antidotes, namely: faith, aspiration, exertion, pliancy, mindfulness, clear comprehension, willpower and equanimity. Here the first four are antidotes of laziness. That is to say, it is through faith characterized by a firm confidence in the virtues of *samādhi* that the yogin's aspiration arises. Thereafter, from that aspiration his effort begins. Then through force of effort he produces physical and mental capability.¹⁹ Then, for one who is pliant in mind and in body the

16 Tucci 9.19: *sampravṛttam*. D 59b2: *mñam par žugs*.

17 Tucci 9.19: *svarasavāhi*. D 59b2: *rañ gi ñañ*.

18 Tucci 9.24: *prajñātiriktatarā*. D 59b3: *śes rab śin tu śes che bar*.

19 Tucci 10.16: *tato vīryārambañāt kāyacittayoḥ karmaṇya(tām) bhāva)iyati*. D 59b7: *de nas brtson 'grus la brten pas lus dañ sems las su ruñ ba ñid du byed do /*

laziness abates. Thus the (antidotes) beginning with faith proceed with respect to the abandonment of laziness.²⁰ It is for that reason that they are to be cultivated. Mindfulness is the antidote of 'loss of the meditation object.' Clear comprehension is the antidote of laxity and excitement, since having been noticed by it, they are abandoned. But at the time of alleviating laxity and excitement²¹, the fault of lack of effort (could occur). And then as the antidote of that, willpower should be cultivated. When laxity and excitement are alleviated, if the mind becomes a bearer of calmness then the fault of overexertion [could occur]. Then its antidote, equanimity, should be cultivated.

And if an effort is made when the mind proceeding in balance, then it gets distracted. On the other hand, if an effort is not made when the mind is lax, then because of a lack of insight it could become sunken like that of a blindman. Therefore one should conquer a lax mind (and)²² calm an excited (one. When the mind has) once again attained its balance, one should be equanimous. Then the yogin should remain spontaneously cultivating Suchness as long as he wishes. And should physical or mental pain occur, then repeatedly intuiting the whole world, one should realize it as a reflection, like the moon in the water, that is, like an illusion. And thus it is said in the *Avikalpapraveśa*:

By means of world-transcending knowledge (*jñāna*) one sees all *dharma*s just as the vault of the sky. By the subsequently attained [knowledge] one sees them as like an illusion, a mirage, a dream, the moon in the water.²³

²⁰ D 59b7-60a1: *de bas na dad pa la sogs pas le lo spon bar 'gyur te. Tucci. om.*

²¹ Tucci 10.20-21: *layauddhatyaprasamanakāle. D 60a1-2: byiñ ba dañ rgod pa ma zi ba'i dus na...*

²² Tucci 11.3-4: *linacittam nigrhñiyād. D 60a3: sems zum pa bsal zin...*

²³ D 60a4-6: *lus dañ sems la gnod par gyur na skabs skabs su 'jig rten mtha' dag la bitas la sgyu ma dañ rmi lam dañ chu zla lta bu dañ mig yor lta bur rtogs par bya'o / de skad du mam par mi rtog par 'jug pa las kyañ bka' stsal te / 'jig rten las 'das pa'i ye ses kyi chos thams cad nam mkha' kyil dañ 'dra bar mñam par mthoñ no // de'i rjes la thob pa ni sgyu ma dañ / smig rgyu dañ / chu zla bzin du mthoñ no zes 'byuñ no /*

Thus having realized that the world is like an illusion, and having manifested great compassion towards sentient beings, one should consider along the following lines, "Those with the intellects of children, not understanding such profundity of teaching, accumulate various actions and afflictions, mistakenly superimposing existence and so forth upon *dharmas* that have been at peace from the very outset. Because of that they wander around in *saṃsāra*. I will act unto them in such a way as to awaken them to such profundity of teachings." Then, having taken rest, one should once again enter into the *samādhi* which is without the manifestation of any *dharma*, exactly in this way. If the mind becomes weary, then after taking rest, once again one should enter exactly in this way. Thus by this process one should abide for as long a time as one can, whether an hour or a watch.

4. How to get up from *samādhi*.

Then when one wishes to rise from *samādhi*, without breaking one's Lotus position one should consider as follows. Even if all of these so-called *dharmas* are ultimately nonarisen, because (they are) subject to the totality of various fixed causes and conditions -- like an illusion they nevertheless proceed, variegated and to be enjoyed without thought. Therefore there is no implication of a view of annihilationism nor even of a conclusion involving denial. And because being considered by wisdom they are not apprehended, there is no implication of eternalism on that account or even of a conclusion involving superimposition.

Now as for those who perform various actions out of self-obsession, whose intellects are inverted because lacking the eye of wisdom -- they wander around in *saṃsāra*. But those who have decisively turned away from *saṃsāra*, who tame the self but do not fulfill the perfections beginning with giving because lacking the condition of great compassion -- those beings fall into the

Awakening of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas because lacking in method.

But having realized the nonsubstantiality of the world, those whose intellects are uninverted -- like that of a magician -- resort to the vast accumulation of merit and knowledge with the determination to rescue the entire world by force of great compassion. Having attained the transcendent (*asamsāram*) condition of a Tathāgata²⁴ they remain, giving rise to benefits and happiness in every way for the entire world. And because their afflictions are removed by the force of wisdom, they do not fall into *samsāra*. On the other hand, out of consideration for all beings they do not fall into *nirvāṇa* because of the power of their simultaneously acquired, vast immeasurable accumulation (*sambhāra*) of merit. And they become the life-support for all sentient beings. Therefore I who wish to achieve a nonabiding *nirvāṇa*, aiming to generate welfare and happiness for all beings, should endeavor in the acquisition of the vast accumulation of merit and knowledge. Thus it is said in the noble *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*:

The accumulation of knowledge is brought together in order to remove all afflictions. The accumulation of merit is brought together in order to sustain all beings. On account of that then, O Bhagavan, the great being the bodhisattva should always endeavor in the accumulation of knowledge and the accumulation of merit.

And it is said in the noble *Tathāgatotpattisambhāvasūtra*:

But indeed, this arising of the Tathāgatas is not from only one cause. Why is that? O son of the conquerors! The Tathāgatas realize (*samudagacchanti*) through the ten hundred thousand immeasurable causes that have been realized. By what ten? To wit: by the cause(s) of fully comprehending dissatisfaction through the limitless accumulations of merit and knowledge.

And it's said in the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*:

The bodies of the Tathāgata come forth from a hundred merits, come forth from all

²⁴ Tucci 12.13: *te tathāgataṃ padaṃ prāpyāsamsāram*. D 60b6: *de b'zin gsegs pa'i go phaṅ brñes nas 'khor ba na*.

the wholesome *dharma*s, come forth from limitless wholesome roots of action!

Having acted in this way, he gently breaks the Lotus posture. Then having bowed down to all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas situated in the ten directions he performs hymns of praise and makes offerings to them. And then he should make a vow such as that of the noble *Bhadracarya*. After that he should endeavor to establish all the accumulations of merit starting with giving, which are brought to fruition in the unsurpassed Awakening that has the womb of emptiness and compassion.

5. - Thesis of the *Hva śāñ*.

But some consider, "Because they are subject to positive and negative actions generated by the conceptual mind sentient beings spin around in cyclical existence experiencing the fruits of their actions, such as heaven. But those who do not think anything, nor perform any action whatsoever, they are fully liberated from cyclical existence. Therefore nothing should be thought. Nor should the skillful conduct of giving and the rest be undertaken. The wholesome conduct of giving and the rest is taught only with foolish people in mind."

6 - Refutation

a) General implications of such a thesis.

By such a one the entire Mahāyāna would be abandoned! And since all the vehicles are at root Mahāyāna, by abandoning it every vehicle would be abandoned. That is to say, those who say that nothing should be thought would have abandoned the wisdom marked by the discernment of

reality. For perfect knowledge has as its root the discernment of reality.²⁵ By abandoning it, the world-transcending wisdom would also be abandoned. (And) by abandoning that, omniscience would also be abandoned!

And one who says, "Nor also should the conduct of giving and the rest be undertaken," has very clearly²⁶ abandoned method which begins with giving, and to exactly this extent the Mahāyāna -- which, in brief, is precisely wisdom and method. Just as its said in the noble *Gayāśirṣa*:

These two, in brief, constitute the path of the bodhisattvas. What two? Wisdom and method.

And it is said in the noble *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, "And this wisdom and method sums up the set of all of the bodhisattvas' perfections."

Hence one abandoning the Mahāyāna would have created a great karmic obscuration. Therefore this one who does not respect the wise (*anupāsitavidvajjana*) nor support the teachings of the Tathāgatas, who has brought ruin to both himself and others, is corrupted in both reasoning and scripture. And therefore an intelligent person who cares for himself stays clear from his words mixed with poison, just as (one stays clear from) poisoned food.

So it is that this one who abandons the discernment of reality would have abandoned the very foremost limb of Awakening, called "The discrimination of *dharmas*." And without the discernment of reality how could the mind of the yogin who is attached to beginninglessly

²⁵ D 61b3-4: *yañ dag pa'i ye śes kyi rtsa ba ni yañ dag par so sor rtog pa yin pas...*

²⁶ Tucci 14.16-17: *sphutatarām*. D 61b4: *śin tu zur phyin par* - "incidentally".

ingrained existents such as material form , enter into nonconceptuality?²⁷

b) inconsistency of the objection that one can reach nirvikalpa by means of mere asmṛti and amanasikāra

If it is said that one enters (nonconceptuality) through nonmindfulness and nonattention toward all *dharmas*, that is not reasonable. For without the discernment of reality it is impossible to undertake either nonmindfulness or nonattention toward all *dharmas* even though they are being experienced. And if one would (attempt to) cultivate nonmindfulness and nonattention toward those (*dharmas*) cultivating thus, "These which are called *dharmas* are not to be noticed nor paid attention to by me," then still more would they have been noticed and paid attention to by him! Thus if the mere nonexistence of mindfulness and attention constituted the nonmindfulness and nonattention intended, then in what manner does the nonexistence of those two come about? This itself should be considered. [*i.e.* how could nonexistence be an effect?] Moreover, nonexistence as a cause is not logical since nonconceptuality must occur on its basis. This would entail the entrance into nonconceptuality of someone who has fainted, since mindfulness and attention do not exist for him. And there is no method without the discernment of reality by means of which one might undertake nonmindfulness and nonattention. And also, when nonmindfulness and nonattention occur, without the discernment of reality how could *dharmas'* lack of independent existence come to be realized? For without discerning them thus, "*Dharmas* stand empty of independent existence," there could be no penetration of their emptiness. Without the penetration of emptiness,

²⁷ Tucci 15-5-8. D 62a1-2: *yan dag par so sor rtog pa med par rnal 'byor pas thabs gañ gis thog ma med pa'i dus nas gzugs la sogs pa'i dños po la mñon par žen ciñ goms pa'i sems rnam par mi rtog pa ñid la rnam par gžag par bya* / By what means could a yogin without the discernment of reality place into nonconceptuality a mind which is beginninglessly accustomed to and attached to entities like form?

nor also would the abandonment of obscurations be possible. [But if you deny the necessity of such abandonment] everyone everywhere would [already] be liberated!

And if the yogin's mindfulness and attention towards *dharmas* can't proceed because of being bereft of mindfulness or in a state of stupefaction, then how could this completely stupefied one be a yogin? And in that circumstance, by practicing nonmindfulness and nonattention without the discernment of reality, ignorance itself would become one's habit! Precisely on account of that, the light of knowledge would recede. But if this [yogin] is not bereft of mindfulness, nor stupefied, then how in that circumstance could he undertake nonmindfulness and nonattention without the discernment of reality? For it is not logical to assert that it is precisely in being mindful that one is not mindful, and that precisely in seeing one does not see. And how could such qualities of the Buddha as recollection of previous lives arise from a practice of nonmindfulness and nonattention? This would be inconsistent. There would not be a warm sensation of contact for someone who holds to a cold opposed to warmth.

And for the yogin who has attained *samādhi*, if there is mental consciousness, then by necessity he must be focussed on something. For an ordinary person, knowledge would not all of a sudden lack an object. But even supposing there were no (object) -- then how could *dharmas'* lack of independent existence be realized? And by what antidote could the afflictive obscurations be abandoned? Moreover, for an ordinary person who has not attained the fourth *dhyāna* the cessation of thoughts is impossible.

c) Necessity of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*

Therefore, that which is described in the highest teachings as nonmindfulness and

nonattention is to be seen as preceded by the discernment of reality. On account of which, nonmindfulness and nonattention are to be undertaken by way of the discernment of reality, not otherwise. Which is to say that when a yogin observing with perfect wisdom does not see even a single *dharmā* in the three times as ultimately originated, then how in that context could he be mindful and pay attention? For how could that which is ultimately not experienced in the three times be noticed or attended to? Thus this one would have entered into the nonconceptual knowledge in which all conceptual proliferation has been calmed. And on the basis of that entrance one penetrates emptiness. And on the basis of that penetration there is the abandonment of the net of all false views. And one who is possessed of method, on the basis of adhering to wisdom, is perfectly skilled in conventional and ultimate reality²⁸.

Thus it is on the basis of obtaining unobscured knowledge that one understands every single teaching of the Buddha. Hence without the discernment of reality there is no arising of perfect knowledge, nor also the abandonment of the afflictive obscurations.

d) Confirmation by *Buddhavacana*

Thus it is said in the *Mañjuśrikurvitasūtra*:

How, O daughter, is the bodhisattva one who has won the war? O Manjuśri! He is one who having examined and examined (*vicīya vicīya*, T. *mam par brtag pa*), does not find any *dharmā*.

Therefore having vanquished the enemies who are the afflictions with the arrow of wisdom, with

²⁸ Tucci 17.15-16, D 63a2: *thabs dañ ldan pa'i śes rab bsten pas kun rdzob dañ don dam pa'i bden pa la yañ dag par mkhas pa yin no* / One who practices wisdom endowed with method is perfectly skilled in conventional and ultimate truth.

his eye of knowledge open and released,²⁹ the yogin stands without fear -- not like an eye-shutting coward!

It is also said in the noble *Samādhirāja*:

If one investigates *dharmas* without identity
And if, having investigated them, one would cultivate
That is the cause of obtaining the fruit of *nirvāṇa*
Any other cause does not lead to peace.

And in *Sūtrasamuccaya* it is said:

By himself he who follows the practice of insight abides; he does not force others to strive in insight. Such is the work of Māra.

And in the noble *Ratnamegha*, *Samdhinirmocana* and so on, insight has the nature of the discernment of reality. And in the noble *Ratnmegha* it is penetrating the lack of independent existence on the basis of observing with insight that is said to be the entrance into the signless.³⁰

And in the noble *Laṅkāvatāra* it is said:

Because, O Mahāmati, the specific and general characteristics of the entities being considered by the intellect are not ascertained, all *dharmas* are said to devoid of an independent nature.

One would be in opposition to the various kinds of discernment taught by the Bhagavān throughout the *sūtra*, if the discernment of reality were not to be undertaken. Thus while it is reasonable to say, "We of little wisdom and little energy are unable to seek wide instruction," it is

29 Tucci 18.2: "*vispharita*" - A pun. This Sanskrit past passive participle conveys the general sense of "opened", but also the very specific meaning of a bowstring's being "released" or "twanged". As no single English word appears to convey both these senses, I have made the translation with the two words, "opened" and "released". The Tibetan *phye* conveys the former meaning alone. D63a4-5: *de lta bas na mal 'byor pas ye śes kyi mig phye la śes rab kyi mtshon gyis űons moűs pas dgra mams pham par bya ste / 'jigs pa med par gnas pa'i phyir mi sdar ma bzin du mig 'dzums par mi bya'o / CIHTS, better, following N and P, has: 'jigs pa med par gnas par bya'i / mi sdar ma bzin du mig 'dzums par mi bya'o /*

30 D 63a7: *lhag mthoű gis brtags nas no bo űid med par rtogs pa ni mtshan ma med pa la 'jug pa'o źes 'byuű no /*

not reasonable to abandon it, since wide instruction of many kinds is praised³¹ by the Bhagavān.

And again this is said in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*:

As for those who are adrift (*viprayukta*, T. *sems par žugs pa*) among inconceivable *dharmas*, they are without foundation (*ayoniśah*, T. *tshul bžin ma yin pa*).³²

And also in that context, there are those like the śrāvakas who having imagined the origination of these ultimately nonarisen *dharmas*, give preeminence to a notion consisting in impermanence, suffering and so forth. They are without justification (*ayoniśah*, T. *tshul bžin ma yin pa*), producing (such) an idea through the extremes of superimposition and denial. What is said here is to rule out those (extremes); it does *not* rule out the discernment of reality, since that is assented to in every *sūtra*. And so, right there in the *Brahmapariṣcchā* it is said:

Cittaśūra the bodhisattva said, "He who considers all *dharmas* and in that situation remains unhindered (and) unharmed is said, on that account, to be a bodhisattva."

There itself it is said:

How are they endowed with energy? When examining the mind of omniscience they do not apprehend.

Again in that very place it is said:

And they will come to be endowed with understanding through the condition of properly discerning *dharmas*.

Again right there it is said:

They discriminate (*pravicinvarianti*, T. *rnam par 'byed pa*) all *dharmas* just as an illusion or mirage.

³¹ D 63b3: *bsiags*.

³² Tucci 19.1-2, D 63b3: *gan dag bsam gyis mi khyab pa'i chos rnam la sems par žugs pa de dag ni tshul bžin ma yin pa'o žes 'byun' ŋo /*

Therefore, in whatever situation conceptual proliferation³³ concerning such inconceivables is studied, the knowledge of reality is only through mere hearing and thought. Those who think in that way, because hindered by pride, teach that *dharmas* are to be known each individually (*pratyātma*). But it should be realized that while an unfounded mind is denied, this does not constitute a denial of the discernment of reality.³⁴ Otherwise it would be thoroughly opposed to reason and scripture. Just as already stated. And whatever is known through the wisdom of hearing and thinking is itself to be realized through the wisdom of meditation, nothing else. For example, it is like a horse running along a previously indicated running track. Therefore the discernment of reality is to be undertaken.

Even if this discernment of reality has a conceptual nature, nevertheless on account of the fact it has a nature of proper attention, a nonconceptual knowledge of reality³⁵ arises from it. And therefore those who aim for such knowledge should practice that (*i.e.* the conceptual discernment of reality). And when the nonconceptual fire of knowing reality arises, then just as two sticks are incinerated by the fire born from their rubbing, it too (*i.e.* the conceptual discernment of reality) subsequently gets burnt up by that (nonconceptual knowledge of reality) itself. Thus it is said in the noble *Ratnakūṭa*.

³³ Tucci 19.14-15: *prapañca*. D 63b7: *tshig*.

³⁴ D 63b7-64a2: *de ltar gañ dag gañ du bsam gyis mi khyab pa la sogs pa'i tshig thos na de dañ der thos pa dañ bsam pa tsam kho nas de kho na rtogs par gañ dag sems pa de dag gi mñon pa'i na rgyal dgag pa'i phyir chos rnams so sor rañ gis rig par bya ba ñiddu bstan par byed do / tshul bñin ma yin pa'i sems pa yañ dgag par byed par khon du chud par bya'i / yañ dag par so sor rtogs pa de dgag par ni ma yin no /*

³⁵ T. om. *bhūta*. D 64a3-4: *mam par mi rtog pa'i ye śes /*

e) *Mukti is not caused only by destruction of karma
but by elimination of kleśas.*

Now as for what is also said -- that not a single action, skillful or otherwise, should be performed -- those who speak thus would here be accepting the doctrine of the Ajīvakas, that is, liberation on the basis of *karma's* destruction. But in the Bhagavān's teachings liberation is not sought on the basis of the destruction of *karma*, but rather on the basis of destruction of the afflictions. This is because *karma* accumulated from time without beginning never ceases, and therefore cannot be destroyed. When experiencing its results in states of misfortune and so forth, even more *karma* is generated. And it is impossible for *karma* to cease in states wherein the afflictions have not been debilitated, since they are its cause! Just as there is no ceasing of a light when there is no ceasing of its flame.

And the destruction of afflictions of one who rejects insight is not possible, as was explained earlier. Thus when it is considered that insight must be practiced to in order to destroy the afflictions, then since it is only on the basis of the afflictions' destruction that liberation is established, attempting to destroy *karma* is pointless. It is reasonable to say that one should avoid unwholesome *karma*, but why (should) the wholesome be barred? If one says that it is prohibited on the grounds of being the engine of *saṃsāra*, that is not reasonable. It is the unwholesome alone, emerging from mistaken ideas like that of an external (world), a self and so on, which is the engine of *saṃsāra* -- not the ripening of unsurpassed Awakening that emerges from great compassion!

Thus in the *Daśabhūmaka* it is taught that these paths of the ten wholesome actions are the carriers of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas and Buddhahood, through excellent activity

such as ripening and so forth.³⁶ And in the noble *Ratnakūṭa* it is described thus:

Like the mass of water of all the great rivers that have entered into the great ocean, the bodhisattvas' root of merit accumulated from separate sources, and transformed into omniscience, becomes one flavour in omniscience.

And wherever in the *sūtra* the Bhagavān has described the Buddhas' and bodhisattvas' attainment of a form-body, field-purification, resplendence, retinue, abundance and so on as being the result of accumulating merit by giving and so forth -- that also would be contradicted.

And in denying meritorious conduct the *pratimokṣa* vows etc., would also be opposed. Thus it would imply that a shaved head and face, wearing red (robes) and so on are truly pointless. If one were to turn away from the performance of meritorious deeds, then one would also be accepting a retreat from *saṃsāra* and a turning away from helping sentient beings. And thus the Awakening of such a one would become remote.

Thus it is said in the noble *Samdhanirmocana*:

I do not ascribe unsurpassed, perfect Awakening to one who turns away from one-pointed efforts within *saṃsāra*, who turns away from one-pointed aiding of sentient beings.

And in the noble *Upāliparipṛccha* and others, turning away from *saṃsāra* is described as the most serious breach of the bodhisattvas' morality. And in the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* it is said:

Journeying through *saṃsāra* with a basis of method is the liberation of bodhisattvas. Wisdom without method is bondage. Method without wisdom is bondage. Method with wisdom is liberation. Wisdom with method is liberation.

And in the noble *Gaganagañja* it is said, "For bodhisattvas, weariness with *saṃsāra* is Māra's doing." And in the *Sūtrasamuccaya*:

³⁶ D 64b3: *dge ba bcu'i las kyi lam de dag ñid bsno ba la sogs pa yon su sbyañ ba byas pa'i bye brag gis.*

He discerns the unconditioned and is wearied by wholesome conditions -- this is Māra's work.

One knows the path to Awakening but does not seek the path of the perfections -- such is Māra's work.

But when it is said, "Attachment to the mind of giving right up to attachment to the mind of wisdom is Māra's work," there is no prohibition of practicing giving and the other perfections there. What is denied is the inverted attachment to giving and the rest of one who is attached to the thoughts of "I" and "mine", who is attached to the dualistic mind, and who is an apprehender. For those who have set themselves up with [such] an inverted attachment, giving and the rest are impure, and therefore it is said that they are the Māra's work. Otherwise even [the perfection of] absorption (*dhyāna*) would not be need to be practiced. And how then could there be liberation? Therefore, in order to make the point that the giving and other perfections of an apprehender are not pure because of recognizing a variety of entities, in the noble *Gaganagañja* too the giving and so forth of one who recognizes a variety of entities is called "Māra's work".

And this is also said in the *Punyaskandhapariṇāmaṇā*:

By not knowing the equality of giving, morality, patience, energy, concentration and wisdom all is made apprehensible (*upalambhayati*). Because of this, morality is protected by one who is attached to pure morality who possesses a thoroughly investigated giving. Patience is cultivated by one recognizing self and other and so on. In this way I have set it forth.

But there, the giving and so forth that have been set up on the basis of the inverted attachment of an apprehender who perceives a variety are impure. Just this much is pointed out. Yet this is not a prohibition of the practice of giving and the rest in all senses. Otherwise all giving and so on would be ruled out³⁷ without qualification. Not merely that which has fallen away from nonapprehension.

³⁷ D 65b5: *dgag pa 'gyur*. But Tucci 23.14: *pratidesānā kṛtā syāt* /

And it is also said in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*:

Whatever courses of conduct there may be, they are all imaginary. And the nonimaginary is Awakening.

Also there it is said that the conduct which rests on the basis of concepts such as origination is, by its very nature, imaginary. And the prediction (of Awakening) is for the established bodhisattva who spontaneously abides in the signless realm, not for any other. Precisely this much is pointed out. But even though the ultimately nonarisen nature of all giving and so on is asserted, it is not declared that practice should not to be undertaken. On the contrary, with respect to the glorious Dīpaṅkarā Buddhas revered by the Bhagavān, those of whom for an aeon even the Bhagavān's speech could not utter the names -- why did the Bhagavān not reject such conduct in his situation as a bodhisattva? Dīpaṅkara too at that time definitely did not prohibit the Bhagavān's conduct. But when it was seen to be established in the eighth stage of abiding in pacified signlessness, then the prophecy (of future Buddhahood) was made by the Illustrious One (Dīpaṅkarā). His course of conduct was not prohibited there! In the *Daśabhūmika*:

And the bodhisattvas' highest aim of abiding in the signless in the eighth stage was not prohibited by the Buddhas -- for this itself is their *parinirvāṇa*.

Therefore, if a course of conduct was not to be undertaken in any fashion whatsoever this would contradict everything that has been previously stated.

And this is also what is stated in the *Brahmapariṣcchā*:

He gives a gift, but this is free from desire for the fruit; he guards morality, but not through reification and so on.

By pursuing four divine qualities bodhisattvas become nonreverters with respect to (attaining) the qualities of a Buddha. What (is meant in saying) by the four? By embracing measureless *samsāra*! Everything beginning with honouring and revering the measureless Buddhas would be

contradicted. Moreover it is illogical to say that (such) conduct should be undertaken only by those of dull faculties, but not by those with sharp faculties. For from beginning the first stage all the way up to the bodhisattvas' finishing the tenth stage, the course of conduct which is giving and the rest arises. For it is declared, "One does not neglect proper conduct in the remaining (stages)." Indeed it is not logical (to suggest that) those of weak faculties have entered into the stages (of the bodhisattva).

And in the noble *Upālipariṣcchā* it is recounted:

Precisely by establishing patience towards the *dharma* of nonorigination, one should undertake abandonment, great abandonment and transcendent abandonment.

And in the *Sūtrasamucaya* it is described:

On the basis of practically realizing the six perfections and so on, the bodhisattva comes into the mode of the Tathāgatas' miraculous powers.

And aside from the condition of the Tathāgatas' miraculous powers, a quicker way does not exist. Moreover, other than the six perfections and ten stages there is no other path for bodhisattvas that would be a quicker vehicle.

And it is stated in the *sūtra* that purification of the mental stream only occurs gradually, like the purification of gold. When the bodhisattva is established in suchness, then he has entered the first stage. Then, only gradually, having purified (each of) the preceding stages, one enters the stage of the Tathāgata. Hence, aside from the perfections and the stages, there is definitely no other approach to the door of the palace of Buddhahood.³⁸ Nor is such taught by the Bhagavān anywhere else in the *sūtras* and so on. With regard to *dhyāna* itself, because it is included in the six

³⁸ D 66b3-4: *de'i phyir sa dan pha rol tu phyin pa las ma gtogs par sañs rgyas ñid kyi groñ khyer du cig car 'jug pa'i sgo gzan ni med do* / NB Tucci. om. "cig car".

perfections, on the basis of its practice all the perfections are (necessarily to be) practiced.³⁹ Thus if one said that each one of (the perfections of) giving and the rest did not have to be practiced that would be illogical.

Thus also with regard to a cow-dung *maṇḍala* to the Buddha, on the basis of its inclusion in the six perfections, the *maṇḍala* itself would have to be made, not (merely) on the basis of *dhyāna* etc. As well, the fulfillment of the six perfections would then follow from the improper practice of the signless by a śrāvaka who has attained the *samādhi* of cessation. And thus no distinction between the bodhisattvas and śrāvakas would be taught. But because the six perfections are supposed to be fulfilled by the bodhisattva in every single state, for all the perfections the Bhagavān pointed out the inner nature of each perfection individually -- for the sake of instruction. But it was not taught that a single perfection should be practiced on its own!

And thus it is said in the *Sarvadharmavaipulya*:

"But as for this, Maitreya, which is the bodhisattvas' realization of the six perfections for the sake of Awakening, those ignorant people will speak as follows: 'A bodhisattva should train only in the perfection of wisdom, what with the remaining perfections!' They consider the other perfections (relating to method) to be reprehensible. Is that what you think Ajita? Did he who was the king of Kaśi possessed of corrupt wisdom, he by whom his own flesh was given to a hawk for the sake of a dove?" Maitreya said, "Definitely not so, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "Maitreya, with regard to those meritorious deeds linked to the six perfections which I accumulated by travelling the bodhisattvas' course, was any harm done by those virtuous actions?" Maitreya said, "Definitely not so, Bhagavan!" The Bhagavān said, "You, Ajita, to the extent of having realized sixty aeons in the perfection of giving, have thus to the same degree realized sixty aeons in the perfection of wisdom. Therefore (only) those who are ignorant people will say, 'Awakening is only reached by a single way, that is, by the way of emptiness.'"

Thus they are not completely purified in conduct. Those who practice only emptiness on its own

³⁹ The assumption being that the perfections must all be practiced together.

fall into *nirvāṇa*, like the śrāvakas.

7. Conclusion

Therefore wisdom is to be practiced accompanied by method. Precisely on this account it was set down in the *Sūtrasamuccaya* by Master Nāgārjuna.

A bodhisattva who is without skillfulness in method should not persevere with regard to the profound *Dharma* nature.

Here the original teaching of the noble *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* and the rest is conveyed by the noble Nāgārjuna. And for a wise person it is not appropriate to grasp the words of the foolish person who has abandoned the approach of logic and scripture and completely deserted the words of the Bhagavān.

In the noble *Ratnakūṭa* it is said:

One who is endowed with all the wholesome states of giving and the rest should practice the highest kind of emptiness.

But not on its own! As well in the noble *Ratnakūṭa* it is said:

Therefore, Kāśyapa, just as it is with the support of a minister that kings perform all their duties, exactly so the bodhisattva's wisdom performs all the activities of a Buddha with the support of skillfulness in method. Therefore for one who practices emptiness on its own, let there be no entrance into *nirvāṇa*.

And it was taught by the Bhagavān in the *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*,

One should not perform a practice of mind-only, in which one remains single pointedly without an object. Skillfulness in method is also to be practiced.

In order to illustrate this it was said:

For example, O Son of Good Family, fire blazes on the basis of a material cause.

When there's no cause it is calmed. Thus the mind blazes when there's an object.⁴⁰ When there's no object it is calmed. There the bodhisattva who is possessed of skillfulness in method knows the peace which is the completely purified object of the perfection of wisdom, but he does not calm the object of the roots of virtue. And he does not promote the object of the afflictions, and as well he makes a place for the object of the perfections. And while the object of emptiness is discerned, the object is seen in terms of great compassion for all beings. So it is, O son of noble family, that the bodhisattva who is possessed of skillfulness in method, who has completely purified his perfection of wisdom, completely attains mastery over the object.

Having spoken thus, he says again:

For a bodhisattva there is no object whatsoever that is not transformed⁴¹ for the sake of accomplishing the knowledge of an omniscient one. When all of such a bodhisattva's objects are brought to fruition in Awakening, this bodhisattva who is skilled in method sees all *dharmas* as conducive to Awakening. Just as, O Noble son, it is not the case that in the vast three thousand thousand world-realms something which is not for sentient beings' sensual enjoyment would not occur, so too, Noble son, it is never the case that a bodhisattva who has skill in method does not see an object as being useful for Awakening.

In this way, in unending *sūtras*, the bodhisattvas' practice of wisdom and method is taught.

In this regard if indeed one is unable, on one's own, to initiate the effort required for the accumulation of merit starting with giving, so too it is not reasonable to give such instructions to others. This would be to do injury to both oneself and others. Therefore the manner in which a bodhisattva necessarily must undertake the discernment of reality and acquire the entire accumulation of merit starting with giving is indicated by both reasoning and scripture.

Therefore a wise person removes the speech of those proud ones of small learning as if it were poison. Then by following the nectar-like speech of various others like the noble Nāgārjuna, one

⁴⁰ Tucci 28.5f: *ārambaṇa* D 67b4f: *dmigs pa*.

⁴¹ "*na samtiṣṭhate*" Tucci 28.14. D 67b7-68a1: *de thams cad ni thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes mṅon par bsgrub pa'i phyir mi gnas pa med do* / Edgerton 556: *samtiṣṭhate* - turn into, assume the form of. (But here the examples appear to show that this verb governs the accusative not the dative).

arouses great compassion towards all beings. Then, like a magician, this unerring one should practice, striving in all the wholesome conduct of giving and the rest that are brought to fruition in unsurpassed full Awakening and in rescuing of the entire world. As it is said in the noble

Dharmasangiti:

Just as a magician who has tried to liberate some apparition
all the while without attachment to the apparition
because of his previous knowledge,
So too they who have mastered full Awakening
having known the three worlds to resemble an apparition
ready themselves for this previously known world
for the sake of living beings.

Thus in this way, from the practice of constantly honouring wisdom and method, gradually there is a ripening of one's continuum by the arising of more and more moments of greater and greater purity. On account of which, when one approaches the most extreme limit of cultivating the real meaning, transcendent knowledge arises -- like a butter-lamp unwavering out of the wind, stainless, comprehending the sphere of the *Dharma*, extremely clear, and free from the net of all concepts.

And then one has reached the object which is the limit of things. And one has entered the path of seeing. And one has attained the first stage. After that, purifying the higher stages gradually, like gold, all the remaining obscurations pass away. And having attained unobstructed, irremovable knowledge, one attains the stage of a Buddha which is the source of all virtue. And one attains the object which is the perfection of purpose.

Therefore one whose goal it is to reach Buddhahood should, to that extent, endeavor along the middle path.

Having illuminated the auspicious matchless path
May the merit I have attained by that
Cause everyone to attain the middle path.
May the stains of jealousy and the like be sent afar.
Never sated with virtues, like the ocean and its waters,
Having discriminated, (the wise) understand what has been well explained.
Like swans (discerning) milk in water, they are thoroughly delighted.
Thus the wise, banishing the mind which is mixed up with factionalism,
should accept anything which has been well explained, even from a child.

The Process of Meditation, written by Master Kamalaśīla is completed.

The Process of Meditation III

{1}¹ 1. Śamatha and vipaśyanā.

*namas tārāyai / mahāyānasūtrāntanayapravṛttānām samkṣepato bhāvanākramah kathyate /
tatra yady api bo(dhisattvānām apa)rimito² 'pramāṇādibhedena bhagavatā samādhir upadiṣṭah,
tathāpi śamathavipaśyanābhyām sarve samādhayo vyāptā iti / sa eva śamathavipaśyanā-
yuganaddhavāhi mārgas tāvat kathyate / uktam ca bhagavatā:*

*nimittabandhanāj jantur atho dauṣṭhulabandhanāt /
vipaśyanām bhāvayitvā śamathāñ ca vimu(cyata iti) /³*

*tasmāt sakalāvaraṇaprahāṇārthinā śamathavipaśyane sevanīye / śamathabalena svālabane cittam
aprakampyaṃ bhavati nivāsthitapradīpavat / (vipaśyanayā yathāvad dharmatattvāvagamāt)
samyagjñānālokaḥ samutpadyate / tataḥ sakalam āvaraṇam prahīyate / andhakāravād ālokodayāt /
ata eva bhagavatā catvāry ālambanavastūni yoginām nirdiṣṭāni / a) (nirvikalpa)pratibimbakam / b)
savikalpapratibimbakam / c) vastuparyantatā / d) kāryapariniśpattiś ca / tatra a) śamathena yat
sarvadharmapratibimbakam buddhādirūpaṃ cādhimucyālambyate tan nirvikalpapratibimbakam
ucyate / tatra bhūtārthanirūpaṇāvikalpābhāvān nirvikalpakam ucyate / {2} yathāśrutodgrhītānāñ ca
dharmāṇām (pratibimbakam a)dhimucyālambyata iti kṛtvā pratibimbakam ucyate / b) tad eva
pratibimbakam yadā vipaśyanayā vicārayati yogī tattvādhigamārtham tadā savikalpapratibimbakam
ucyate / tattvanirūpaṇāvikalpasya vipaśyanālakṣaṇasya tatra samudbhavāt / c) tasyaiva ca
pratibimbasya svabhāvaṃ nirūpayan yogī, darpa(ṇāntargatasvamu)khapratibimb-apratyavekṣaṇena
svamukhagatavairūpyāṇām viniścayavat, sarvadharmāṇām yathāvat svabhāvāvagamāt / yadā*

1 Division and heading of sections follow Tucci. Numbers in large brackets indicate Tucci's pagination.

2 Ordinary brackets: reconstructed by Tucci. Square brackets: Tibetan text only.

3 *Samdhinirmocana sūtra* Ch.VIII 32. Lamotte (1935) 111: 6-8, 227: 24-25.

vastuparyantatālakṣaṇām tathatām pratividhyati, tadā vastuparyantatāvagamāt prathamāyām bhūmau
 vastuparyantatālabanam ucyate / d) tato bhāvanāmārgena pa(riśiṣṭāsu⁴ bhūmiṣv
 ośadhi)rāsāyanopayogād iva krameṇa viśuddhataratamakṣaṇodayād, āśrayaparāvṛttau satyām,
 āvaranaprahāṇalakṣaṇā kāryaparisaṁptir yadā bhavati, tadā buddhabhumau tad eva (jñānam)
 kāryapariniṣpattyālabanam ucyate / tad evam, anena kiṁ darśitaṁ bhavati?
 śamathavipaśyanābhyām samastavastuparyantādhigamo bha(vati / tena cāvaranaprahāṇalakṣaṇā
 kāryapariniṣpattir avāpyate / tad eva ca buddhatvam / ato buddhatvādhigamārthinā
 śamathavipaśyane sevāniye / yas tu te na sevate tasya naiva vastuparyantatādhigamo nāpi
 kāryapariniṣpattir iti / {3} tatra śamathas cittaikāgratā / vipaśyanā bhūtapratyavekṣeti saṁkṣepād
 āryaratna(meghādau bhagavatā) śamathavipaśyanayor lakṣaṇam uktam /

2. How to practice śamatha and vipaśyanā.

tatra yoginā śilaviśuddhyādau śamathavipaśyanāsaṁbhāre sthitena sarvasattveṣu mahākaruṇām
 utpādyā, samutpāditabodhicittena śrutacintābhāvanāyām prayoktavyam / tatra prathamam tāvad
 yogī bhāvanābalena sarvam itikaraṇīyaṁ parisamāpya kṛtamūtrapuriṣa(ḥ kaṇṭakasvarā)dirahite
 mano'nukūle pradeśe sthitvā [mayā] sarvasattvā bodhimaṇḍe niṣpādayitavyā iti viniścayan,
 sakalajagadabhyuddharaṇāśayo mahākaruṇam āmukhi[kṛtya,]daśadigavasthitān
 sarvabuddhabodhisattvān pañcāṅgena praṇipatyāgrato paṭādau sthāpayitvā [anyatra] vā yathāvat
 tebhyas ca yathārucci pūjā(stava)naṁ kṛtvā, svapāpam pradeśya, sakalasya jagataḥ puṇyam
 anumodya, mṛdutarasukhāsane vairocanaḥṭṭārakabaddhaparyāṅken[ārdhaparyāṅkena] vā niṣadya
 nātyunmilite [nātinimilite] nāsikāgravinyaste cakṣuṣī kṛtvā, nātinamram nātistabdham ṛjukāyam

⁴ Tucci: pariśiṣṭāsu.

prañidhāyāntarmukhāvarjitasmr̥tir upaviśet / {4} tataḥ skandhau samau sthāpayet / śiro (nonnatam
 nāvanatam eka)pārśve [niścalam] sthāpayitavyam / kiṃ tarhi nābhipragūṇā nāsikā sthāpayitavyā /
 dantoṣṭham mṛdu sthāpanīyam / jihvā copari dantamūle sthāpanīyā / āśvāsprasvāsās tu na saśabdā
 nāpi sthūlā nāpi tvaritāḥ karaṇīyāḥ / kiṃ tv asaṃlakṣyamāṇā⁵ mandam mandam anābhogena yathā
 pravīśeyur nirgaccheyur vā tathā (karaṇīyam) /⁶ tatra prathamam tāvad yogī yathādr̥ṣṭāsrute
 tathāgatavigrahe cittam sthāpayitvā⁷ śamatham niṣpādayet / tañ ca tathāgatavigraham
 uttaptakanakāvadātam lakṣaṇānuvyañjanālamkṛtam paśanmaṇḍalamadhyagatam nānāvidhair
 upāyaiḥ sattvārtham kurvantaṃ prābandhikena manasikāreṇa tadguṇābhilāṣam
 samupādāyalayauddhatyādīn vyupaśamayya tāvad dhyāyed yāvat sphuṭataram puro' vasthitam iva
 tam paśyēt / {5} tatas tasya tathāgatavigrahapratibimbakasya agati(gati)nirūpaṇato vipaśyanā bhavet
 / tatas caivamvidham vicintayēt / yathedaṃ tathāgatavigrahapratibimbakaṃ na kutaścid āgatam nāpi
 kvacid gamiśyati tiṣṭhad api svabhāva(śūnyam ātmātmiya)rahitam tathāiva sarvadharmāḥ
 svabhāvaśūnyā āgatigatirahitāḥ pratibimbopamā bhāvādirūparahitā iti vicāryoparatavicāreṇa
 nirjalpaikarasena manasā tattvam bhāvayan yāvadiccham tiṣṭhet / ayam ca samādhiḥ
pratvutpannabuddhasammukhāvasthitasamādhinirdiṣṭaḥ / asya cānuśamsā vistara[ta]s tatraiva sūtre
 bodh(ayitavyā / etā)vatā prakāreṇa sarvadharmasaṃgraho bhavati / tatra cittam upanibandhya
 layauddhatyādipraśamena śamatham niṣpādayet / rūpyarūpihedena ca saṃkṣepāt
 sarvadharmasaṃgrahaḥ / tatra rūpaskandhasaṃgrhitā rūpiṇaḥ / vedanādiskandhasvabhāvā arūpiṇaḥ
 / tatra bālā bhāvādirahābhīniveśād viparyāstadhiyaḥ saṃsā(re paribhramanti) / teṣāṃ

⁵ Tucci 4.11: asaṃlikṣyamāṇā. D 57a3: mi ts'or bar. Noted by Tucci: *asaṃvedyamāna.

⁶ cf. Bhk II D 46b2-D 46b7.

⁷ Tucci 4.13: cittam sthāpayitā. D 57a4: sems gtad de b'zag nas.

viparyāsāpanayanāya, teṣu ca mahākaruṇām āmukhikṛtya, niṣpannaśamatho yogī tattvādhigamāya
 tato vipaśyanām bhāvayet / bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate / bhūtaṃ punaḥ
 pudgaladharmanairātmyaṃ / tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhānām ātmātmīyarahitatā /
 dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣāṃ eva māyo(pamatā / tatraivam) yogī nirūpayet / na tāvad
 rūpādīvyatiriktaḥ pudgalo 'sti / tasyāpratibhāsanāt⁸ / rūpādiṣv evāham iti pratyayoṭpattiś ca / na cāpi
 rūpādiskandhasvabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ / {6} teṣāṃ rūpādīnām anityānekasvabhāvavāt / pudgalasya ca
 nityaika rūpeṇa paraīr upakalpītatvāt / nāpi tattvānyatvā(bhyām anabhilāpyapu) dgalasya vastutvaṃ
 yuktaṃ / vastusataḥ prakārāntarābhāvāt / tasmād alīkavibhrama evāyaṃ lokasya yadutāhaṃ mameti
 niścayaṃ prati[pannasya] / tato rūpiṇo 'pi dharmān dharmanairātmyādhigamāya vicārayet / kim ete
 cittavyatirekeṇa paramārthasantaḥ sthitāḥ / āhosvic cittam eva rūpādīnirbhā(saṃ svapnāvasthāyām
 pratibhāsa)vat pratibhāsata iti / sa tān paramāṇuśo nirūpayan, paramāṇuś ca bhāgaśaḥ
 pratyavekṣamāno nopalabhate / tathā cānupalabhamānas teṣv astināstītvavikalpān nivartayati /
 cittamātraṃ ca traidhātukam avatarati nānyathā / atha coktaṃ laṅkāvatāre /
 anuśo vibhajati dravyam na caiva rūpam vikalpayet /
 cittamātravyavasthānaṃ kudṛṣṭyā na prasīdatīti /
 tasyaivam bhavati: cittam evānādīkālikavitatharūpādyabhiniveśavaśāt
 svapnopalabhyamānarūpādīpratibhāsavad bālānām bahīr vicchinnaṃ iva rūpādīpratibhāsaṃ khyāti /
 tasmāc cittamātraṃ eva traidhātukam / sa evaṃ cittam eva sakalaprajñaptiṃ niścītya (tatra
 pratyavekṣya) ca sarvadharmānām svabhāvaḥ pratyavekṣito bhavātīti cittasvabhāvam api
 pratyavekṣate / sa evaṃ vicārayati / cittam api paramārthato māyāvad anuṭpannaṃ / {7} yadā hy
 alīkasvabhāvarūpādyākāropagraheṇa cittam eva citrākāraṃ pratibhāsate, tadāsyāpi rūpādīvat

⁸ Tucci: tasya pratibhāsanāt / D 57b5: de mi snañ ba'i phyir dañ / (Tucci fnt: de mi snañ ba'i phyir dañ).

tadavyatirekāt satyatvaṃ kutra (bhavet? yathā ci)trākāratayā rūpādayo (naikānekasvabhāvāḥ), tathā
 cittam api tadavyatirekeṇa naikānekasvabhāvam / nāpi cittam utpādyamānaṃ kutaścid āgacchati /
 nāpi nirudhyamānaṃ kvacid gacchati / nāpi svaparobhayataḥ paramārthenāsyotpādo yuktaḥ /
 tasmān māyopamam eva cittam / yāthā cittam evaṃ sarvadharmā māyāvat paramārthato 'nutpannāḥ /
 yenāpi citte(na pratyavekṣate) yogī tasyāpi svabhāvam parīkṣamāno nopalabhate / tad evaṃ yatra
 yatrālbane yoginaś cittam prasaret tasya tasya svabhāvam parīkṣamāno 'sau yadā nopalabhate
 tadā sarvam eva vastu vicārya kadaliskandhavad asāram avagamya, tataś cittam nivartayati / tato
 bhāvādivikalpoparatau (sarvaprapañca)vigatam ānimittaṃ yogam pratilabhate / tathā coktam
āryaratnameghe / sa evaṃ apakṣālakuśalaḥ⁹ sarvaprapañcavigamāya sūnyatābhāvanāyām¹⁰ yogam
 āpadyate / sa sūnyatābhāvanābahulo yeṣu yeṣu sthāneṣu cittam prasarati, cittam abhirmate tāni tāni
 sthānāni svabhāvataḥ parigaveṣamāno (sūnyam pra)tividhyati / yad api tac cittam tad api
 parīkṣyamānaṃ sūnyam pratividhyati / yenāpi cittena parīkṣate tad api svabhāvataḥ
 parigaveṣyamānaṃ sūnyam pratividhyati / sa evaṃ upaparīkṣamāno nirmittatāyām yogam
 āpadyate / {8} tad eva anenaivaṃ darśitaṃ bhavati / yas tu nopaparīkṣate tasya nāsti
 nirni(mittāyām) praveśa iti / sa evaṃ dharmāṇām svabhāvam upaparīkṣamāno yadā nopalabhate,
 tadāstīti navikalpayati nāstīti na vikalpayati / yo 'sau nāstīti kalpyate tasya buddhau
 sarvadaivāpratibhāsanāt / yadi hi bhāvaḥ kadācid dr̥ṣṭo bhavet, tadā tasya pratiṣedhān nāstīti
 kalpayet / yadākālatraye 'pi (yogi)nā prajñayā nirūpayatā bhāvo nopalabdhas, tadā kasya
 pratiṣedhān nāstīti kalpayet / evaṃ anye vikalpās tasya tadānim na santy eva /
 bhāvābhāvavikalpābhyām sarvasya vikalpasya vyāptatvāt / evaṃ vyāpakābhā(vād vyā)pyasyāpi

⁹ D 58b4: skyon la mkhas pa.

¹⁰ Tucci: sūnyatābhāvanāyā D 58b4: stoṅ pa ñid bsgom pa la mal 'byor du byed do /

abhāvah / evaṃ sati niṣprapañcanirvikalpatām avatīrṇo bhavati rūpādiṣu cānīśrito bhavati / prajñayā
 ca nirūpayataḥ sakalavastusvabhāvānupalambhāt prajñottaradhyāyī bhavati / sa evaṃ
 pudgaladharmanairātmyamayam tattvam avatīrṇah, aparasya parīkṣaṇīyasya cābhāvād,
 uparatavicāreṇa nirvikalpaikarasena mana(sā sva)rasavāhinā, anabhisamskāratas tad eva tattvam
 sphuṭataram avadhārayan yogī tiṣṭhet / {9}

3. Distractions to be avoided: how to be counteracted.

tatra ca sthitas citta-bandham na vikṣipet / yadāntarā cittam bahirdhā vikṣiptam paśyēt, tadā
 tatsvabhāvapratyavekṣaṇeṇa vikṣepam śamayya, punas tatraiva cittam upary upari prerayet / yadā tu
 tatrānābhiraṭam cittam paśyēt, tadā samādher guṇada(rśanād a)bhiraṭim tatra bhāvayet / vikṣepe ca
 doṣadarśanād aratim praśamayet / atha styānamiddhābhibhavād yadā pracāratayā līnam cittam
 paśyēt, layābhiśaṅkitam vā tadā prāmodyavastu buddharūpādikam ālokaśaṅjñām vā manasikṛtya
 layam upaśamayet / tatas tad eva tattvam dṛḍhataram gṛhṇīyāt / yadā tu jātyandhavad
 andhakā(rapravi)ṣṭapurūṣavad vinimilitākṣavat sphuṭataram tattvam nāvadhārayed yogī tadā tasya
 līnam cittam veditavyam vipaśyanārahitaṃ ca / atha yathāpūrvānubhūtaṣayaspṛhayā cittam antarā
 samuddhataṃ paśyēt auddhatyābhiśaṅkitam vā, tadānityatādisamvegavastumanasikārād
 auddhatyām śamayet / tataḥ punas tatraiva tattve (cittā)nabhisamskāravāhitāyām yatnam kurvīta /
 yadā ca vikṣiptapurūṣavad vānaravad vānavasthitavṛtti cittam bhavet, tad auddhatyam boddhavyam
 śamatharahitaṃ ca / atha yadā layauddhatyābhyām viviktatayā samapravṛttam svarasavāhi
 sphuṭataram¹¹ tatraiva tattve cittam utpādyate, tadābhogaśīthilikaraṇād upekṣaṇīyam / tadā ca
 śamathavipa(śyanāyugana)ddhavāhī mārgo niṣpanno veditavyah / yadā ca vipaśyanām bhāvayet

¹¹ Tucci 9.19: sputataram.

prajñātirikatarā bhavet, tadā śamathasyālpavāt pravāsthitapradīpavat pracalatvāc cittasya na
 sphuṭataram¹² [tattva]darśanam bhavet / {10} atas tadā śamatho bhāvayitavyaḥ /
 śamathasyābhyādhikye middhāvaṣṭabdhapurusaṣyeva sphuṭataram tattvadarśanam na syāt / tasmāt
 tadā (prajñā) bhāvayitavyā / yadā samapravṛtte dve api bhavato yuganaddhāvāhibalīvardadvayavat
 tadānabhisamkāreṇaiva tāvat sthātavyam yāvat kāyacittapīḍā na bhavet / samkṣepataḥ sarvasyaiva
 samādheḥ ṣaḍ doṣā bhavanti / kausīdyam / ālambanasampramoṣaḥ / layaḥ / auddhatyam /
 anābhogaḥ / ābhogaś ceti / eṣāṃ pratipakṣeṇāṣṭau prahāṇasam(skārā) bhāvanīyāḥ / śraddhā /
 chandaḥ / vyāyāmaḥ / praśrabdhīḥ / smṛtiḥ / samprajanyam / cetanā / upekṣā ceti / tatrādyāś
 catvāraḥ kausīdyapratipakṣāḥ / tathā hi samādhiguṇesv abhisampratyayalakṣaṇayā śraddhayā
 yogino 'bhilāṣaḥ samutpadyate / tato 'bhilāṣavān vīryam ārabhate [']¹³ tato vīryārambanāt
 kāyacittayoḥ karmanya(tām) bhāva)yati / tataḥ praśrabdhakāyacetasāḥ kausīdyam vyāvartate / tataḥ
 śraddhādayaḥ prabhavantīti / tadartham te bhāvanīyāḥ¹⁴ / smṛtir alambanasampramoṣasya
 pratipakṣaḥ / samprajanyam layauddhatyayoḥ pratipakṣaḥ / tayos tena samupekṣya parivarjanāt /
 layauddhatyaprasāmanakāle tu anābhogadoṣaḥ / tatas tatpratipakṣeṇa ca cetanā bhāvanīyā /
 (layauddha)tyaprasāme sati yadā praśamavāhi¹⁵ cittam bhavet tadābhogadoṣaḥ / tasya pratipakṣas
 tadānim upekṣā bhāvanīyā / {11} yadi, samapravṛtte citte, ābhogaḥ kriyate, tadā cittam vikṣipyate /
 line 'pi citte sati, yady ābhogo na kriyate, tadā vipaśyanārahitatvād andhapuruṣavac cittam linam
 syāt / tasmāl linacittam nigrhñiyād, uddha(tam praśamayet) / punaḥ samaprāptam upekṣeta / tato

12 Tucci 10.2: sphuṭataram.

13 ['] CIHTS.

14 Tucci 10.18: bhāvanīyaḥ. D 60a1: de'i phyir de dag bsgom par bya'o /

15 Tucci 10.22: praśathavāhi. D 60a2: mal du 'jug pa.

yāvadiccham yogī tāvad anabhisamskāreṇaiva tattvaṃ bhāvayaṃs tiṣṭhet / satyāṃ tu
 kāyādipiḍāyām, punaḥ punar antarā sakalam eva lokam vyavalokya
 māyājalachandropamapratibhāsam avataret / tathā cuktam avikalpapraveśe / lokottareṇa
 jñānenākāśasamatalān sarvadharmān pa(śyati / pṛṣṭha)labdhena punar
 māyāmaricisvapnodakacandropamān paśyatīti / tad evaṃ mayopamaṃ jagad avagamyā, sattveṣu
 mahākaraṇām āmukhīkṛtyaivam anuvicintayet / evaṃvidhaṃ dharmagāmbhīryam anavagacchanto
 'mī bālabuddhaya ādiśānteṣv eva dharmeṣu bhāvādisamāropaviparyastā vividhakarmakleśān
 upacinvanti / tataḥ saṃsāre paribhramanti / tato 'haṃ kariṣyāmi yathaitān evaṃvidhaṃ
 dharmagāmbhīryam avabodhayeyam iti tato viśramya punar api tathaiva sarvadharmānirābhāsam
 samādhim avataret / cittakhede sati, tathaiva viśramya punar avateret / evaṃ anena krameṇa
 ghaṭikām ekapraharam vā yāvantaṃ kālam śaknoti tāvantaṃ kālam tiṣṭhet /

4. How to get up from samādhi.

tata icchayā sa(mādhher utthātum pary)āṅkam abhittvaivam anuvicintayet / yadi nāmāmi dharmāḥ
 sarva eva paramārthato 'nutpannās, tathāpi māyāvat pratiniyataividhahetupratyayasāmāgrīvaśena
 vicitrā evāvicāraramaṇīyāḥ pravartante / {12} tena nocchedaḍṣṭīprasaṅgo nāpy apavādāntasya /
 yātaś ca prajñayā vicāryamāṇā nopalabhyante, tena na śāsvataḍṣṭī(prasaṅgo nāpi) samāropāntasaya
 / tatra ye prajñācakṣurvikalatayā viparyastamataya ātmābhiniviṣṭā vivadhāni karmāṇi kurvanti te
 saṃsāre paribhramanti / ye punar ekātena saṃsāravimukhā mahākāraṇyavikalatayā ca na
 dānādipāramitāḥ pariṣūrayanti ātmānaṃ damayanti te sattvā upāyavikalatayā
 śrāvakapratyekabuddha(bodhau pata)nti / ye tu asvabhāvaṃ jagad avagamyā mahākāraṇyabalena
 sakalajagadabhyuddharaṇakṛtāniścayā māyākāraṇavad aviparyastadhiyo vipulapunyaḥjñānasambhāram

samupāyanti te tathāgatam padam prāpyāsamsāram aśeṣasya jagataḥ sarvākāram hitasukhāni
 sampādayantas tiṣṭhanti / te ca jñānabalena kleśaprahāṇān na saṃsāre pa(tanti sarva)sattvāpekṣayā
 ca samupārjitavipulāprameyapūnyasambhāraśeṣena na nirvāṇe patanti / sarvasattvopajīvyāś ca
 bhavanti / tasmān mayā sakalsattvanitasukhadhānārthinā 'pratiṣṭhitanirvāṇam adhigantukāmena
 vipulapūnyajñānasambhāropārjane 'bhiyogaḥ karaṇīyah / tathā cuktam āryatathāgataguhyasūtre /
 jñ(ānasambhārah) sarvakleśaprahāṇāya saṃvartate / pūnyasambhārah sarvasattvopajīvitāyai
 saṃvartate / tasmāt tarhi, bhagavan, bodhisattvena mahāsattvena pūnyasambhāre jñānasambhāre ca
 sarvadābhiyogaḥ karaṇīya [iti] / {13} āryatathāgatotpattisambhāvasūtre cuktam / sa khalu punar eṣa
 tathāgatānām sambhavo naikena kāraṇena bhavati / tat kasya he(toḥ / samudāgatais) tāvad bho
 jīnaputrāprameyaśatasahasra[daśa]kāraṇais tathāgatāḥ samudagacchanti / katamair daśabhir
 yadutāprameyapūnyajñānasambhārātrptisamudāgamakāraṇeneti vistaraḥ / āryavimalakīrtinirdeśe
 cuktam / śatapūnyanirjātāḥ sarvakuśaladharmanirjātā apramānakūśalamūlakarmanirjātāḥ kāyās
 tathā(gatasyeti) vistaraḥ / tad evaṃ kṛtvā śanaih paryāṅkaṃ bhittvā daśadigvyavasthitān
 sarvabuddhabodhisattvān praṇipatya tebhyāś ca pūjāstotropahāram kṛtvāryabhadracaryādi
 praṇidhānam praṇidadhīta / tataḥ śūnyatākaruṇāgarbhānuttarasambodhipariṇāmitasakaladānādipu-
 nyasambhāropārjanābhīyukto bhavet /

5. Thesis of the Hva śāṅ.

yas tu manyate (te / cittavikalpa)samutthāpitaśubhāśubhakarmavaśeṣena sattvāḥ svargādi karmaphalam
 anubhavantāḥ saṃsāre saṃsaranti / {14} ye punar na kiṃcic cintayanti nāpi kiṃcit karma kurvanti
 te parimucyante saṃsārāt / tasmān na kiṃcic cintayitavyam / nāpi dānādikuśalacaryā kartavyā /
 kevalam mūrkhajanam adhikṛtya dānādikuśalacaryā nirdeṣṭeti /

6. Refutation.

a) General implications of such a thesis.

*tena sakalamahāyānaṃ pratikṣiptaṃ bhavet / mahāyānamūlatvāc ca sarvayānānāṃ tatpratikṣeṇa
 sarvam eva yānaṃ pratikṣiptaṃ syāt / tathā hi na kiṃcic cintayitavyam iti bruvatā
 bhūtapratyavekṣālakṣaṇā (prajñā) pratikṣiptā bhavet / bhūtapratyavekṣāmūlatvāt samyagjñānasya /
 tatpratikṣepāl lokottarāpi prajñā pratikṣiptā bhavet / tatpratikṣepāt sarvākārajñatā pra(tikṣiptā bha)vet
 / nāpi dānādicaryā kartavyeti vadatā copāyo dānādiḥ sphuṭataram eva pratikṣiptaḥ; etāvad eva ca
 saṃkṣiptaṃ mahāyānaṃ yaduta prajñopayaś ca / yathoktam āryagayāsirṣe dvāv imau
 bodhisattvānāṃ saṃkṣiptau mārgau / katamau dvau / yad uta prajñā copāya(ś ca /
āryatathāgataguhyasūtre cuktam / imau ca prajñopāyau bodhisattvānāṃ sarvapāramitāsamgrahāya
 saṃvarteta iti / tatas ca mahāyānaṃ pratikṣiptatā mahat karmavaraṇaṃ kṛtaṃ syāt / {15} tasmād
 asyānupāsitavidvajjanasyānavadhāritatathāgatapravacananīteḥ svayaṃ vinaṣṭasya parān api
 nāśayato yuktyāgamadūṣitatvāt, [viśasamsrṣṭavacanam] saviṣabhojanam [iva] ātmakāmena dhimatā
 dūrata eva parihartavyam / tathā hy anena bhūtapratyavekṣāṃ pratikṣiptatā dharmapracicayākhyam
 pradhānam eva bodhyaṅgaṃ pratikṣiptaṃ syāt / vinā ca bhūtapratyavekṣayā, yoginaḥ katham
 anādikālābhyastarūpādibhāvābhinivēśasya cittaṃ nirvikalpatāṃ praviśet?*

*b) inconsistency of the objection that one can reach
 nirvikalpa by means of mere asmṛti and amanasikāra.*

sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtyamanasikāreṇa praviśatīti cet / tad ayuktam / na hi vīna

bhūtapratya(ve)kṣayānubhūyamāneṣv api sarvadharmeṣv asmṛtir amanasikāro vā śakyate kartum /

yadi ca nāmāmī dharmā mayā 'smartavyā nāpi manasikartavyā ity evaṃ bhāvayān
 asmṛtīmanasikārau teṣu bhāvayet, tadā sutarām eva tena te smṛtā manasikṛtās ca syuḥ / atha
 smṛtīmanasikārābhāvamātram asmṛtyamanasikārāv abhipretau, tadā tayor abhāvaḥ kena prakāreṇa
 bhavātīti etad eva vicāryate / na cābhāvaḥ kāraṇaṃ yuktam yena tato nirvikalpatā bhavet / {16}
 saṃmūrchitasyāpi smṛtīmanasikārābhāvān nirvikalpatāpraveśaprasaṅgaḥ / na ca bhūtapratyavekṣaṃ
 vinānya upāyo 'sti yena prakāreṇāsmṛtyamanasikārau kuryāt / saty api
 cāsmṛtyamanasikārasaṃbhave, vinā bhūtapratyavekṣayā niḥsvabhāvataḥ dharmāṇāṃ katham avagatā
 bhavet / na hi svabhāvata eva dharmāḥ śūnyāḥ sthitā ity evaṃ vinā tatpratyavekṣayā
 tacchūnyatāprativedho bhavet / nāpi vinā śūnyatāprativedhena (āvaraṇaprahāṇaṃ) saṃbhavati /
 sarvatra sarveṣāṃ muktiprasaṅgāt / kiṃ ca tasya yogino yadi sarvadharmeṣu muṣitasmṛtitayā
 mūḍhatayā vā smṛtīmanasikārau na pravartete, tadā 'tyantamūḍhaḥ katham asau yogī bhavet / vinā
 ca bhūtapratyavekṣayā tatrāsmṛtim amanasikāraṃ cābhyasyatā moha evābhyasto bhavet / ta(ta eva
 samyagjñā)nāloko dūrīkṛtaḥ syāt / athāsau na muṣitasmṛtir nāpi mūḍhaḥ / tadā katham
 tatrāsmaraṇaṃ amansikāraṃ kartuṃ śaknuyāt vinā bhūtapratyavekṣayā / na hi smarann eva na
 smarati, paśyan eva na paśyatīti yuktam abhidhātum / asmṛtyamanasikārābhyāsāc ca katham
 pūrvanivāsānusmṛtyādibuddhadharmodayo bhavet / vi(rodhāt /) na hy uṣnaviruddhaṃ śītam
 āsevamānasya uṣnasparśasaṃvedanaṃ bhavet / kiṃ ca samādhisamāpannasya yogino yadi
 manovijñānam asti, tadā 'vaśyaṃ tena kimcid ālambayitavyam / na hi pṛthagjanānāṃ sahasā
 nirālambanaṃ jñānaṃ bhavet / atha nāsti, tadā katham niḥsvabhāvataḥ dharmāṇāṃ avagatā bhavet?
 kena ca pratipakṣeṇa kleśāvaraṇaṃ prahīyate? {17} na ca caturthadhyānālābhinaḥ pṛthagjanasya
 cittanīrodhaḥ saṃbhavati /

c) Necessity of *bhūtapratyavekṣā*.

*tasmāt saddharme yāv asmṛtyamanasikārau paṭhitau tau bhūtapratyavekṣāpūrvakau draṣṭavyau /
asmād bhūtapratyavekṣayā 'asmṛtir amanasikāras ca śakyate kartum / nānyathā / tathā hi yadā
nirūpayan samyakprajñayā yogī kālātraye paramārthataḥ samutpannaṃ na kiṃcid dharmam paśyati,
tadā tatra katham smṛtīmanasikārau kuryāt / yo hi kālātraye' py asattvān nānubhūtaḥ paramārthataḥ
sa katham smaryeta, manasi vā kriyeta / tato 'sau sarvaprapañcopaśamaṃ nirvikalpam jñānaṃ
praviṣṭo bhavet / tatpraveśac ca śūnyatām pratividhyati / tatprativedhāc ca prahīnasakalakudrṣṭijālo
bhavati / upāyayuktaḥ prajñāsevanataś ca samyak samvṛtiparamārthasatyakuśalo bhavati / ato
'nāvaraṇajñānalābhāt, sarvān eva buddhadharmān adhigacchati / tasmān na vinā bhūtapratyavekṣayā
samyajjñānodayo nāpi kleśāvaraṇa[prahāṇaṃ] /*

d) Confirmation by *Buddhavaṇa*.

*tathā cōktam mañjuśrīvikurvitasūtre / katham, darike, bodhisattvo vijitasamgrāmo (bhavati) ? / āha /
yo, mañjuśrīḥ, vicīya vicīya sarvadharmān nopalabhata iti / {18} tasmād visphārita jñānacakṣuḥ
prajñāsastreṇa kleśārīn nirjitya, nirbhayo viharan yogī, na tu kātārapuruṣa iva vinimilitākṣaḥ /
āryasamādhirāje 'py uktam /*

*nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyavekṣate /
tān pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayet /
sa hetu nirvā(ṇaphala) prāptaye¹⁶ /
yo 'nyahetū na sa bhoti śāntaya iti*

*sūtrasamuccaye cōktam / ātmanā vipaśyanāyogam anuyukto viharati / parāms ca vipaśyanāyām
nābhiyojayatīti mārakarmeti / vipaśyanā ca bhūtapratyavekṣāsabhāvā*

¹⁶ Bhk 1 Tucci 198.16-20: *nairātmyadharmān yadi pratyavekṣate / tān pratyavekṣya yadi bhāvayeta / sa
hetur nirvāṇaphalasya prāptaye / yo anyahetu na sa bhoti śāntaye / iti /*

āryaratnameghasandhinirmocanādaḥ / āryaratnameghe ca vipaśyanā(nirūpa) yato
 niḥsvabhāvatāprativēdhād ānimittapraveśa uktaḥ / āryalaṅkāvatāre cōktaṃ / yasmāt, mahāmate,
 buddhyā vicāryamānānām svasamanyalakṣaṇaṃ bhāvānām nāvadhāryate / tenocyante
 niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā iti / tatra tatra sūtre yā bhagavatā (nānāprakārā) pratyavekṣā nirdiṣṭā sā
 virudhyate, yadi bhūtapratyavekṣā na kartavyā / tasmād evaṃ yuktaṃ vaktum: vayam alpaprajñā
 alpavīryās ca na śaknumo bāhuśrūtyaṃ paryeṣitum iti / na hi tatpratīkṣepo yukto, bhagavatā
 bahudhā bāhuśrūtyasya varṇitatvāt / {19} tat punar (brahma)pariprcchāyām uktaṃ / ye tv acintyeṣu
 dharmeṣu viprayuktās teṣā(m ayoni)śa iti / tatrāpi ye paramārthato 'nutpannānām dharmānām
 utpādaṃ parikalpyānityaduḥkhādirūpeṇa śrāvakādivac cintāṃ prakurvanti, teṣāṃ
 samāropāpavādāntena¹⁷ cintāṃ pravartayatām ayoniśas tad bhavatīti tatpratīṣedhāya yad uktaṃ na
 bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ sa pratīṣedhaḥ / tasyāḥ sarvasūtreṣv anujñānāt / tathā ca tatrai(va
 brahma)pariprcchāyām uktaṃ / cittasūro bodhisattva āha / yaś cittena sarvadharmāms cintayati tatra
 cākṣato 'nupahataḥ sa tenocyate bodhisattva iti / tatraivoktaṃ / kathaṃ vīryavanto bhavanti / yadā
 sarvajñatācittāṃ¹⁸ vicīyamānā nopalabhanta iti / punas tatraivoktaṃ matimantaś ca te bhaviṣyanti
 yoniṣo dharmān pratyavekṣanataye(ti / punas tatraivoktaṃ) pravicinanti te dharmān
 yathāmāyāmarīcīketi / tad evaṃ yatra yatrācintyādiprapaṇcaḥ śrūyate, tatra tatra
 śrutacintāmātreṇaiva tattvādhigamaṃ ye manyante, teṣāṃ abhimānapratīṣedhena pra(tyātma)
 vedanīyatvaṃ dharmānām pratipādyate / 'yonīśas ca cittapratīṣedhaḥ kriyata iti boddhavyaṃ, na
 bhūtapratyavekṣāyāḥ pratīṣedhaḥ / {20} (anyathā) bahutaraṃ yuktyāgamaviruddhaṃ syāt /
 yathoktaṃ prāk / kiṃ ca yad eva śrūtacintāmayyāprajñayā viditaṃ tad eva bhāvanāmayyā prajñayā

17 Tucci 19.4-5: samāropāvādāntena? D 63b4: sgro 'dogs pa dañ skur ba 'debs pa'i mtha.

18 D 63b6: thams cad mkhyen pa'i ye śes.

bhāvanīyaṃ nānyat / saṃdiṣṭa [dhāvana]bhūmyaśvadhāvanavat / tasmāt bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā
 / yadi nāmāsau vikalpasvabhāvā tathāpi yonīśomanasikārasvabhāvavāt, tato
 bhūtanirvikalpaññāno(daya i)ti kṛtvā tajjñānārthinā sā sevaniyā / nirvikalpe ca bhūtajñānāgnau
 samutpanne sati, kāṣṭhadvayanigharṣasamjātavahninā tatkāṣṭhadvayadāhavat, sāpi paścāt tenaiva
 dahyata evety uktam āryaratnakūte /

e) Mukti is not caused only by destruction of karma
 but by elimination of kleśas.

yac cāpy ucyate / na kiṃcit kuśalādikarma kartavyam iti / tatraivaivaṃvadatā karmakṣayān muktir
 ity ājivakavā(dābhyupagamo) bhavet / na hi bhagavatpra[va]cane karmakṣayān muktir iṣyate / kiṃ
 tarhi kleśakṣayāt / anādikālopacitasya hi karmaṇo na śakyate kṣayaḥ kartuṃ tasyānantatvāt /
 apāyādiṣu ca tatphalaṃ bhūñjānasyāparasyāpi karmaṇaḥ prasūteḥ, kleśeṣu cāvikaḷeṣu tatkaranaṭayā
 sthiteṣu, karmaṇo niroddhum aśakyatvāt / {21} (praḍīpāni)rodhe tatprabhāyā anirodhavat /
 na cāpi tasya vipaśyanāpavādināḥ kleśakṣayaḥ sambhavatīty uktam prak / atha kleśakṣayārtham
 vipaśyanā sevaniyeti manyate / tadā kleśakṣayād eva muktiḥ sidhyatīti karmakṣaye tarhi vyarthāḥ
 śramaḥ / akuśalakarma na kartavyam iti yuktam etat / kuśalam tu kim iti pra(tiṣidhyate) /
 saṃsārāvāhakatvāt pratiṣidhyata iti cet / tad ayuktam / yad eva bāhyātmādiviparyāśasamutthāpitam
 akuśalam tad eva saṃsārāvāhakaṃ bhavati / na tu bodhisattvānām mahākaruṇasamutthāpitam
 anuttarasambodhipariṇāmitam api / tathā daśabhūmake eta eva daśakuśalakarmapathāḥ
 pariṇāmañādi(parika)rmaviśeṣeṇa śravakapratyekabuddhabodhisattvabuddhatvāvāhakā bhavantīti
 nirdiṣṭam / āryaratnakūte ca / sarvamahānadīnām mahāsamudre praviṣṭānām pa[yah]skandhavad
 bodhisattvānām nānāmukhopacitam kuśalamūlam sarvajñatāpariṇāmitam sarvajñataikarasam

bhavati iti varṇitam / yā ca buddhabodhisattvānām

rūpakāyakṣetrapa(riśuddhi)prabhāparivāramahābhogātādisampattir

dānādipuṇyasambhāraphalasattvena tatra tatra sūtre varṇitā bhagavatā sāpi vi(ru)dhyate /

{22} kuśalacaryāpratiśedhe ca pratimokṣasamvarādir api pratikṣiptaḥ syāt / tato vyartham eva tasya

śīrastuṇḍamuṇḍitakāśāyadhāraṇādi¹⁹ prasajyet / kuśalakarmābhisamskāravaimukhye ca sati

samsāravaimukhyaṃ sattvārthakriyāvaimukhyaṃ ca sevitaṃ bhavet / tato bodhis tasya dūre bhavet

/ uktam hy āryasamdhinirmocane ekāntasattvārthavimukhasya ekāntasamsārābhisamskāravimukh-

asya nānuttarā samyaksambodhir uktā mayeti / āryopālipariṣcchādau ca samsāre viamukhyaṃ

bodhi(sattvānām) paradauḥśilyam iti varṇitam / uktam āryavimalakīrtinirdeśe copāyād bhavati

[samsāra]gamanam bodhisattvānām mokṣaḥ / upāyarahitā ca prajñā bandhaḥ / prajñārahitaś copāyo

bandhaḥ / prajñāśahita upāyo mokṣaḥ / upāyasaḥitā prajñā mokṣa iti varṇitam / āryagaganagaṇje

uktam) samsāraparikhedo (bodhisattvānām mārakarma iti / sūtrasamuccaye ca) asamskṛtam ca

pratyavekṣate / samskṛtaiś ca kuśalaiḥ parikhidyata iti mārakarma iti / bodhimārgaṃ prajānāti

pāramitāmārgaṃ ca na paryeṣata iti mārakarmeti / yat punas tatraivoktam dānacittābhīniveśo yāvat

prajñācittābhīniveśo mārakarmeti tatra na dānadīnām sevāpratiśedhaḥ, (kiṃ

tva)hamkāramamakāracittābhīniviṣṭasya grāhyagrāhakacittābhīniviṣṭasya caupalambhikasya yo

viparītābhīniveśo dānādau tasya pratiśedhaḥ / viparītābhīniveśasamutthāpitā hi dānādayo

'pariśuddhā bhavanti kṛtvā mārakarmety uktam / {23} anyathā dhyānam api na sevaniyaṃ syāt /

ta(thā ca kathaṃ mu)ktir bhavet / ata evaupalambhikasya sattvanānātvasamjñayā yad dānādi tad

apariśuddham iti pratipādanāya āryagaganagaṇje 'pi sattvanānātvasamjñino dānādi mārakarmety

¹⁹ Tucci 22.3: śīrastuṇḍitakāśāyadhāraṇādi. D 64b6: mgo bo dan kha spu bregs pa dan chos gos nur smrig bcañ ba la sogs pa. Edgerton 255: shaven of head and face; śīras-tuṇḍa-muṇḍana.

uktam / yac cāpi punyaskandhaparināmanāvāṃ uktam / sarvam eva
 dānaśīlakṣāntivīryadhyānaprajñāsamatām ajānatopalambhayati / tena (paryeṣṭitadānena)
 parāmrṣṭaśīlena śīlam rakṣitam / ātmaparasamjñinā kṣantir bhāvitetyādi / tat pratidesayāmiti / tatrāpy
 aupalambhikasya nānātvasamjñino viparītābhiniveśasamutthāpitā dānādayo 'parisuddhā bhavanti
 etāvanmātram pratipāditam / na tu sarvathā dānādīnām sevanāpratiśedhaḥ / anyathā sarvasyaiva
 (dānāder aviśeṣeṇa pratideśanā kṛtā syāt / nānupalambhādīpatitasyaiva / {24} yac cāpi
brahmapariprcchāyāṃ uktam / yāvati caryā sarvā parikalpyā / nihparikalpyā ca bodhir ityādi /
 tatrāpy utpādādivikalpacaryāyāḥ prakṛtatvāt tasyāḥ parikalpatvaṃ uktam / ānimittavihāre
 cānabhisamskāravāhina sthitasya (bodhi)sattvasya vyākaraṇaṃ bhavati / nānyasyety etāvanmātram
 pratipāditam / sarveṣāṃ ca dānādīnām paramārthato 'nuttpannatvaṃ ca paridīpitam / na tu caryā na
 kartavyety abhihitam / anyathā hi dīpaṅkarāvādāne ye buddhā bhagavatā paryupāsītā yeṣāṃ tu
 kalpam api bhagavatā bhāṣamāṇena na śakyam nāmaparikīrta(naṃ kathaṃ teṣāṃ) bhagavatā
 bodhisattvāvasthāyāṃ caryāpratiśedho na kṛtaḥ / dīpaṅkareṇāpi tadānīm bhagavatas
 caryāpratiśedho na kṛtaḥ eva / kiṃ tu yadā śāntānimittavihāre 'ṣṭamyāṃ bhūmau sthito 'sau dṛṣṭas
 tadāsau vyākṛto bhagavatā / tatra tasya caryā apratiśiddhā / sā cānimittavihāraparamatā
 bodhisattvānām (aṣṭamyāṃ bhū)mau daśabhūmike buddhaiḥ pratiśiddhā mā bhūd etad eva teṣāṃ
 parinirvāṇam iti kṛtvā / yadi tu sarvathā caryā na kartavyā bhavet pūrvoktaṃ sarvaṃ virudhyeta /
 yac ca tatraiva brahmapariprcchāyāṃ uktam / dānaṃ ca dadāti tac cāvīpākābhikāṅkṣi, śīlam ca
 rakṣati tac cāsamāropita ityādi / caturbhir brahmadharmaih (samanv)āgatā bodhisattvā avavarttikā
 bhavanti buddhadharmeṣu / {25} katamais caturbhiḥ / aparimitasamśāraparigraheṇa /
 aparamitabuddhopasthānapūjayetyādi sarvaṃ virudhyeta / nāpi mṛdvindriyeṇaiva caryā kartavyā na
 tu tīkṣṇendriy(eṇ)eti yuktaṃ vaktum / yataḥ prathamām bhūmim upādāya yāvad

daśamībhūmipraṭiṣṭhitānāṃ bodhisattvānāṃ (dānādicaryā utpa)dyate / na ca pariśiṣṭāsu na
 samudācaratīti vacanāt / na hi bhūmipraviṣṭā api mṛdvindriyā yuktāḥ / āryopālipariprcchāvāṃ
 anutpattikadharmakṣāntipraṭiṣṭitenaiva tyāgamahātyāgātityāgāḥ kartavyā iti varṇitam /
sūtrasamucayye ca ṣaṭpāramitādipratipattimān bodhisattvas tathāgatarddhigatika iti varṇitam / na (ca
 tathāgatarddhigater a)nyā śīghratarā gatiḥ asti / nāpi ṣaṭpāramitādaśabhūmivyatirekeṇānyo
 bodhisattvānāṃ mārgo 'sti yaḥ śīghrataravāhi syāt / krameṇaiva ca cittasamṭateḥ kanakaśuddhivat
 śuddhir bhavati sūtre varṇitam / tathatāyām yadā sthito bodhisattvo bhavati, tadā prathamāyām
 bhūmau praviṣṭo bhavati / tataḥ krameṇai(va pūrvabhūmī)ḥ pariśodhya tathāgatabhūmim praviśatīti
 / ato nāsti bhūmipāramitāvyatirekeṇa buddhatvapurapraveśe (anyan mukhaṃ) nāpi bhagavatā
 kvacid (sūtradau) deśitam / dhyāna eva ṣaṭpāramitāntargamāt tatsevanād eva sarvapāramitāḥ sevitā
 bhavanty ato na dānādayaḥ pṛthak sevityā iti cet / {26} tad ayuktam / evaṃ hi buddhe
 gomayamaṇḍale 'pi ṣaṭpāramitāntaragamān maṇḍalakam eva kartavyaṃ syāt na dhyānadayaḥ /
 śravakasyāpi nirodhasamādhisamāpannasyānimittād eva asamudācārāt tadā
 ṣaṭpāramitāparipūriprasaṅgaḥ / tataś ca na śrāvakebhyo bodhisattvānāṃ (bhedaḥ) pratipādito bhavet
 / sarvāvasthāyām eva tu bodhisattvena ṣaṭpāramitāḥ (paripūra)vyitavyā iti saṃdarśanārtham
 ekaikapāramitāntarbhāvaḥ sarvapāramitānāṃ bhagavatā saṃdarśitaḥ / na punar ekaiva pāramitā
 sevānīyeti / tathā coktam sarvadharmavaiṇavye / yo 'py ayam, maitreya, ṣaṭpāramitāsamudāgamō
 bodhisattvānāṃ saṃbodhāya taṃ te mohapuruṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti / prajñāpāramitāyām e(va
 bodhisattve)na śikṣitavyaṃ / kiṃ śeṣābhīḥ pāramitābhir iti te 'nyāḥ pāramitā dūṣayitavyā
 mamasyante / tat kiṃ manyase, ajita, duḥprajñāḥ sa kāśirājo 'bhūt yena kapotārthena śyenāya
 svamāṃsāni dattāni ? maitreya āha / no hīdam, bhagavan / bhagavān āha /yāni mayā, maitreya,
 bodhisattvacaryāṃ caratā ṣaṭ(pāramitāpratisaṃ)yuktāni kuśalamūlāny upacitāni, apakṛtaṃ nu taiḥ

kuśalamūlaiḥ / maitreya āha / no hīdaṃ, bhagavan / {27} bhagavān āha / tvam, [tāvad], ajita,
 ṣaṣṭikalpān dānapāramitāyāṃ samudāgataḥ / evaṃ yāvāt ṣaṣṭikalpān prajñāpāramitāyāṃ
 samudāgataḥ / tat te mohapurūṣā evaṃ vakṣyanti / ekanayenaiva bodhir yaduta (śūnyatāna)yaneti²⁰
 te caryāpariśuddhā bhavantiyādi / kevalaṃ śūnyatām eva sevamānāḥ śrāvakavan nirvāṇe patanti /

7. Conclusion.

ata upāyasaḥitā prajñā sevaniyā / ata evācāryānāgārjunapādaiḥ sūtrasamuccaye `bhihitam / na
 copāyakausālarahitena bodhisattvena gambhīradharmatāyāṃ abhiyoktavyam iti / atra
a(ryavimāla)kīrtinirdeśādijñāpakas tair upanyastah na cācāryānāgārjunapādiyaṃ vacanaṃ
 yuktyāgamopetaṃ tyaktvā bhagavadvacanaṃ ca parityajyānyasya mūrkhajanasya vacanaṃ
 prekṣavatā grahitum yuktam / āryaratnakūte ca sakaladānādikuśalopetatayā
 sarvākāravaraupeṭasūnyatā sevaniyety uktam na tu kevalā / (āryaratna)kūte coktam / tadyathā
 kāśyapāmātyasaṃgrhītā rājānaḥ sarvakāryāṇi kurvanti, evaṃ evopāyakausālyasaṃgrhītā
 bodhisattvasya prajñā sarvabuddhakāryāṇi karoti / ata eva kevalāṃ śūnyatām sevamānasya mā
 bhūn nirvāṇapraveśa iti / {28} bhagavatā cāryatathāgataguhyasūtre coktam /
 naikāntanir(ālabanaṃ) cittamātrasevanaṃ kartavyam api / upāyakausālyam api sevaniyam iti
 pradārśanārtham uktam / tadyathāpi nāma, kulaputra, agnir upādānāj jvalati / anupādānaḥ sāmyati /
 evaṃ evārambanaś cittaṃ jvalati anārambanaṃ sāmyati / tatropāyakausālo bodhisattvaḥ
 prajñāpāramitāpariśuddhārambanaṃ opā(śamaṃ api) jānāti / kuśalamūlārambanaṃ ca na śamayati /
 kleśārambanaṃ ca notthāpayati / pāramitārambanaṃ cotthāpayati / śūnyatārambanaṃ ca
 pratyavekṣate (sarvasattvamaḥākaruṇārambanaṃ ca prekṣate) iti hi ku(la)putra upāyakuśalaḥ

²⁰ Tucci: (śūnyatāna)yaneneti.

prajñāpāramitāpariśuddho bodhisattvo 'nārambaṇe vaśitaṃ pratilabhata iti vistaram uktvā pu(nar ca
 vada)ty (evaṃ) hi nāsti tat kiṃcid ārambaṇaṃ bodhisattvasya yat sarvajñajñānābhīrīhārāya na
 saṃtiṣṭhate / yasya bodhisattvasya sarvārambaṇāni bodhipariṇāmitāni, ayaṃ bodhisattva
 upāyakūśalaḥ sarvadharmān bodhyanugātān paśyati / tadyathāpi nāma, kulaputra, nāsti tat
 trisāhasramahāsāhāsre lokadhā(tau yat na sattvā)nām upabhogāya (na syād), evam eva, kulaputra,
 nāsti tat kiṃcid ārambaṇaṃ yad upāyakuśalo bodhisattvo bodhāya copakārībhūtaṃ (na) paśyatīti
 vistaraḥ / {29} evam anantasūtranteṣu bodhisattvānām prajñopāya pratipattir nirdiṣṭā /
 tatra yadi nāma svayam na śakyate dānādīpunyasambhāravīryam ārabdhum tathāpi (anyeṣāṃ evam
 u)padeśo dātum na yuktaṃ ceti svaparadrohaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt / tad evaṃ yuktyāgamābhyām
 pratipāditaṃ yathā (bodhi)sattvenāvaśyaṃ bhūtapratyavekṣā kartavyā sakaladānādīpunyasambhāras
 copārjayitavyaḥ / tataḥ prekṣāvataḥpaśrutānām ābhīmānikānām vacanaṃ viṣam
 ivāvadhūyāryanāgārjunā(di)vidvajjanavacanā(ṃrtānugatena) sakalasattveṣu mahākaruṇām
 upajanayya māyākāravād aviparyastenānuttarasambodhipariṇāmitasakaladānādīkuśalacāryāyām
 aśeṣajagaduddharane cābhīyuktena bhavitavyam / yathoktaṃ āryadharmasamgītau /

māyākāro yathā kaścin nirmitaṃ muktum udyataḥ /
 nacāsyā nirmite saṅgo jñātapūrvō yato [sya saḥ]
 tribhavaṃ nirmitaprakhyam jñātvā sambodhipāragāḥ
 sannahyanti jagaddhetoḥ jñātapūrve jage tathā /

{30} iti tasyaivaṃ prajñām upāyam ca satataṃ satkṛtyābhyasyataḥ krameṇa saṃtatiparipākād
 uttarottarīśuddhataratamakṣanodayād bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantaḥ
 sakalalāpanājālarahitaṃ sphuṭataraṃ dharmadhā(tvadhigamaṃ vima)laṃ niścalanivātadīpaval
 lokottarajñānam utpadyate / tadā ca vastuparyantatālambanaṃ pratilabdham bhavati /
 darśanamārgaṃ ca praviṣṭo bhavati / prathamā ca bhūmi prāptā bhavati / tatas taduttarā bhūmīḥ
 pariśodhayan krameṇa kanakavad aśeṣāvaraṇāpagame saty, asaktam (a)pratihatam jñānam

pratīlabhya buddha(bhūmim aśeṣaguṇā)dhārāṃ prāpto bhavati / kāryapariniṣpattiṃ cālambanam

pratīlabhate / tasmād buddhatvādhigamārthinā madhyamapaddhatau tāvad abhiyogaḥ karaṇīya iti /

*prakāśya yat prāpi mayā śubham asamapaddhitam /
 puṇyam astu janas tena prāpto madhyamapaddhitam /
 dūrīkṛtersyādimalā [hi] santo gunair atrptāḥ (salilair ivā)bdhiḥ /
 {31} vivecya grhṇanti subhāṣitāni haṃsāḥ payo ya[t] payasi prahrṣṭāḥ /
 pākṣapātākulaṃ tasmād dūrīkṛtaṃ mano budhaiḥ /
 sarvam eva grahitavyaṃ bālād api subhāṣitam /*

ācāryakamalaśīlanibaddho bhāvanākramaḥ samāptaḥ /

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