

AN INQUIRY INTO
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLĀM AND NATIONALISM
IN THE WRITINGS OF EGYPTIANS,
1945-56

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DEDICATION

With deep filial love and respect and gratitude
to my dear father

MUHAMMAD ZAFAR AHMAD ANSARI, ESQ.

No education and no intellectual training has been more enlightening and valuable than the one I have had at your feet. If this first academic effort of mine evidences any clarity of mind, any grasp of the issues involved, the credit mainly goes to you. As for the confusion and the muddle and the mediocrity that this work might contain, it is all mine — and it is there inspite of you.

Zafar Ishaq

PREFACE

The present work on the inter-relationship between Islām and nationalism in Egypt, it may be made clear at the very outset, is an attempt to understand the ideological, intellectual trends, rather than political movements of contemporary Egypt. It is a probe into the aspiration^s of the different ideological groups found in that country. A number of considerations, however, have prevented a fuller treatment of the subject and certain important aspects — the impact of Islāmic and nationalist ideas in the fields of legislation, the effect of these ideas on the interpretation of history, etc. are being omitted. This thesis, therefore, seeks to analyze only certain aspects of the problem posed by the development of nationalist ideas for orthodox Islām, and vice versa.

Two considerations have caused this limitation of our field of inquiry: the limitation of time and the insufficiency of the material available at the Library of the Institute of Islāmic Studies. Due to the comparatively greater interest that the Institute has in religious, rather than non-religious trends of thought in the contemporary Muslim world, books and magazines explaining the nationalist viewpoint were relatively few. Moreover, since the period of our inquiry is a very recent one i.e., 1945-56, a good deal of the relevant material could only have been dug out of Egyptian magazines. Unfortunately the Institute Library had none of the files of the Egyptian magazines except those of Majallat al-Azhar. The writer was, however, fortunate to have been in possession of almost a complete personal file of the monthly

al-Muslimūn, published formerly from Cairo and now from Damascus.

The writer feels constrained to express his deep-felt indebtedness to the Institute of Islāmic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, for having granted him fellowships during the academic years 1956-57 and 1957-58, which made the present work possible and also enabled him to spend two enjoyable years of his life in that beautiful bi-cultural and bi-linguistic city of Canada, Montreal.

The writer is deeply grateful to the staff and the fellow-students of the Institute who assisted and encouraged him in every possible way in the preparation of this thesis. The name of Dr. Charles J. Adams, my thesis supervisor, deserves a special mention here. But for his valuable criticisms and suggestions, the thesis would have been less sufferable than it is now.

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THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLĀM AND NATIONALISM

IN THE WRITINGS OF EGYPTIANS

1945-56

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon in human history. For, in the past man's loyalty had been due not to the nation-state or nationality, but to differing forms of social authority, political organization and ideological cohesion such as tribe or clan, the city-state or the feudal lord, the dynastic state, the church or the religious group.¹ During the Middle Ages there are hardly any traces of nationalism, either in the Islāmic World or Christendom. In those times, the object of popular loyalty was not nationality but religion. In Europe, "the object of popular loyalty which was superior to all others" was Christendom.² In the Muslim World, a Muslim considered his first loyalty to be due to his faith and the community of believers and only then to the family or the local group.³

This, however, does not mean that nationalities are non-existent in pre-modern times. Nationalities in the sense of cultural societies conscious of their distinctness, internally homogeneous and alien from other groups, had existed in Middle Ages and even before. Similarly, patriotism — the attachment to one's native soil and to local traditions, had also existed long. What, however, did not exist prior to modern times is the "fusion of patriotism and nationality and the pre-dominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties — which

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1. See Kohn, Hans, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Anvil Books no. 8, (Princeton: 1955), p. 9. Cited hereafter as Kohn.
 2. Hayes, Carlton J.H., Essays on Nationalism, (New York: 1933), p. 28. Cited hereafter as Hayes.
 3. See von Grunebaum, G.E., "Problems of Muslim Nationalism", Islam and the West, R.N. Frye (ed.), (The Hague: 1957), p. 14. Cited hereafter as Muslim Nationalism.

is nationalism."⁴ This is indeed modern, very modern. In fact it was not until the seventeenth century that we find the first full manifestations of nationalism in England and it was only towards the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the modern sense of the term became a generally recognized sentiment in Europe, increasingly moulding all public and private life.⁵

The rise of nationalism in Europe synchronizes with the disintegration of the medieval, and the gradual emergence of the modern civilization. The powerful material as well as ideational forces which had been released by Renaissance and Reformation had been in operation for many centuries and had enormously affected the structure of European society and culture, and had prepared the ground for the acceptance of the nationalist idea. For instance, there had grown up several regional languages in Europe and each one of them had come to possess fairly rich literatures. The Church had lost most of its former power and authority. It had split up into several mutually antagonistic churches, and had thus the spiritual unity of Christendom rent asunder. The weakening of feudalism, and later on of monarchy, had increased active participation of the people in public affairs. Along with this practical change, new currents of thought like the sovereignty of the people and the doctrine of natural rights were also sweeping across Europe. Moreover, the economic transformations which were taking place in the pre-modern times had brought into the fore a new economic class, the middle class. Furthermore, there had also occurred a

4. Hayes, op. cit., p. 29.

5. See Kohn, op. cit., p. 9.

tremendous change in the mentality of the people due to the change of circumstances and the impact of scientific progress. This change in the mentality of the people mainly consisted in the refusal of the enlightened sections of the European people to conform blindly to the tradition. A number of factors had even weakened the faith of the Europeans in Christianity. People particularly became increasingly averse to the idea that religion should remain the pivotal point in public life. For, the memories of religious civil wars which had ravaged Europe and had led to wholesale massacres, were still fresh in their minds. It is ⁱⁿ this milieu that nationality began to acquire an increasing importance in Europe and hence by and by it became the focus of loyalty in the body-politic, and thereby replaced religion.

Nationalism has naturally passed through varied courses of development in the various European countries. Hence in certain respects every nationalism is different from all others. There have, however, also grown up certain characteristics which are common to every nationalism. To borrow the words of Carlton Hayes, nationalism is:⁶

a condition of mind among members of a nationality perhaps already possessed of a national state, a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state as superior to all other loyalties and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its "mission" are integral parts.

The nationalist ideology has two basic tenets. In the first place, nationalism believes that each nationality should constitute a united, independent and sovereign state. Hence, if a nationality is subjected

6. Hayes, op. cit., p. 6. This is the standard definition of nationalism. Cf. Kohn, op. cit., p. 9.

to the domination of any other nationality, it should become free and independent; and if the nationality is divided into numerous states, these states should merge into a single national state. Thus, the nationalist view has been that nationality should be the basis of statehood. In the second place, nationalism places national loyalty above all other loyalties,⁷ (at least in so far as public affairs are concerned). It is this feature of nationalism which distinguishes it from mere patriotism, which had existed even in pre-modern times.

Nineteenth century was the century of the triumph of nationalism. Nationalism remained a very potent force throughout the century and led to tremendous changes in the political map of Europe. Nation-states had come into existence and had caused numerous important changes in the character of the political life. Formerly, religion had been the most important cohesive force in the life of the community. Nationalism led to the replacement of religions by the national tie. Thus, religion receded into a position of secondary importance in political life. For, nationalism had taught the people to participate in the political life of their nation-states as its citizens, as the members of the English or the French or the Italian nation and not as Jews and Christians, or as Catholics and Protestants. The natural corollary of all this was that state ceased to be an institution which could be expected to devote itself to the promotion of the cause of faith, although this was expected of it during the Middle Ages. State came to be concerned exclusively with

7. Cf. Hayes, op. cit., pp. 26-29 and Kohn, pp. 9-12.

the achievement of common national interests and national well-being.

Along with nationalism there developed in Europe the trend of thought which is known as 'secularism'. The impact of this development was that this-worldly matters were separated from other-worldly matters; the concern for well-being here was separated from the concern for the well-being in the hereafter. The rise of nationalism and secularism have coincided in the history of modern Europe and since then have remained inseparable.

So far we have been talking about Christian Europe. Coming to the Muslim world we find that during the centuries when Europe was casting away the medieval moulds of its civilization, the Muslim world remained steeped in its medieval traditions and maintained its old patterns of life. Later on in the eighteenth century when the Muslims started to realize the need to borrow certain healthy aspects of western civilization, they tried to confine these borrowings to reforming the Muslim Army along western lines and acquiring a few of the western sciences. They hardly felt any need of re-considering the basic notions upon which their socio-political life rested.

The endeavours to reform and re-invigorate the Muslim countries did not prove of much avail. They continued their downward march until by the end of the nineteenth century most of the areas which had formerly been under Muslim domination came to be occupied by the European powers. Nationalism in Muslim countries was born as a direct result of this foreign, non-Muslim domination over Islāmic lands.

In the beginning nationalism mainly denoted the desire to eject foreign control. Nationalism as understood in this sense created no problems for

Islām. A nationalism devoted to the liberation of Muslim countries was compatible with Islām, as W.C. Smith has observed, "in its traditional, in its religious and its social and every other sense."⁸ For, foreign subjugation stood in the way of the achievement of many of those objectives for which Islām stands. The all-embracing nature ^{of Islām} / (to which we shall turn later)⁹ demanded that Islāmic injunctions be carried out in all spheres. This was impossible until Muslim lands were under the rule of non-Muslims. And thus, again to borrow from Smith, "those who have wanted to see Islam once again 'a going concern' have naturally and emphatically supported the several attempts to free its people."¹⁰

It is nationalism in this negative sense which has been and continues to be one of the most powerful driving forces in the contemporary Islāmic world. It is nationalism in this sense that has found an enthusiastic response from the broad masses of Muslims in every part of the Muslim world.

However, during the course of time there developed in Muslim countries a small class of people, a westernized intellectual elite, which began to believe in nationalism in the sense in which it was understood in Europe. These nationalist intellectuals, like their European counterparts, believed that nationality should be the basis of statehood, that the state should be based on the precept that all citizens owe the nation-state their supreme loyalty, and that participation in the affairs of the state should be as citizens of the states and not as Muslims, Christians, etc.

8. Smith, W.C., Islam in Modern History, (Princeton: 1957), p. 74.

Cited hereafter as Smith.

9. Vide. infra. pp. 116ff.

10. Smith, op. cit., p. 74.

In other words, the state should be unconcerned with religious ideals and should devote itself merely to the realization of common national (material) interests and promote national well-being.

Nationalism in this sense has posed a number of problems for Islām. Speaking historically, the basic precepts of the nationalism are divergent ~~from~~, and incongruous with the concepts which Muslims have cherished throughout their history, and which were the theoretical bases of their socio-political life.

With regard to nationalism in this latter sense and its relationship with Islām, the following striking points are of great importance:

Firstly, throughout its history Islām has insisted upon controlling the entire life of man. It has uncompromisingly claimed that its jurisdiction embraces all the sectors of human life. It has not suffered the idea that there was any no-man's land which was outside the jurisdiction of Islām. State in particular has almost universally been regarded by Muslims as an institution designed primarily to serve the cause of the faith: to fulfil the Will of God and enforce His Commandments.¹¹

Now, nationalism at least wants that in public affairs national, and not religious considerations, should be the reigning considerations. It is due to this implication of nationalism that we find that every contemporary Muslim nationalism — Egyptian, Arab, Indonesian, and so on — is opposed to the idea of Islāmic state and each one of these believes in the precept of separation between religion and state.

11. See von Grunebaum, G.E., Medieval Islam: A Study in Cultural Orientation, II edition, (Chicago: 1954), pp. 142ff.

Secondly, Muslims have always theoretically clung to the notion that the Muslims of the world constitute a separate ummah and one, indivisible, universal brotherhood. Islām has been regarded by the Muslims throughout their history as the binding factor and as the cohesive force in Muslim socio-political life. It is true that in Islāmic history this ummah has remained united in the form of a single state only for a very short period of time. Nevertheless, the Muslims have regarded themselves as belonging merely to this ummah. This belief has two important aspects. Firstly, the non-Muslims living in Islāmic lands were never considered by Muslims a part of their ummah because of the communities of fatherland, of language, etc. Secondly, Muslims could not develop any concept of belonging to any community on geographical, linguistic or any other similar grounds. Even though the world of Islām has mostly remained fragmented into several countries ruled by Muslim princes, a Muslim did not regard any part of the dār al-Islām as foreign land. A Muslim could freely move about the length and breadth of the Islamic world and take employment wherever he liked.¹² As against the traditional Islāmic belief that religion is the fundamental cohesive force, nationalism believes that national feeling rather

12. Muslim Nationalism, op. cit., p. 14.

During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the concept of the indivisible unity of Muslim ummah had been particularly emphasized due to the impending threat of western expansionism in the Muslim world, which has left quite a deep imprint on modern Islāmic attitude.

than faith binds people into the bonds of a common nationality. Nationalism also believes in delimiting the 'fatherland', and has a tendency to glorify the peculiar and the parochial, as against the stress of traditional Islām on the universality of the Muslim ummah. Hence, here too nationalism comes into serious conflict with traditional Islāmic attitudes.

These two, among others, are the important points on which nationalism comes into conflict with the traditional Islāmic ideology. Hence the harmonization of the two is possible only if either both or any one of the two are prepared for serious readjustment and modification.

It is apparent that the all-embracing nature of Islām, and its insistence on the universality of Islāmic brotherhood, cannot go hand in hand with nationalism. Similarly, nationalism with its secular and particularist orientation, denying the ideals of Islāmic state and Pan-Islāmism, cannot go hand in hand with Islām, if neither of them is prepared to modify its views.

This thesis is an attempt to study the problem of the interrelationship between Islām and nationalism which is facing the contemporary Islāmic world. This inquiry is restricted to Egypt, and covers only eleven years, 1945-56. It is hoped, however, that the exposition and analysis of the problem in the following pages will prove helpful in understanding this important problem not only as it is confronting Egypt, but as it is facing the whole of the Islāmic world. For, the nature of the inter-relationship has been essentially the same in almost every Islāmic country.

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND

Egyptian society maintained with equanimity its old, stagnant patterns of life until it was rudely shaken from its stupour by the French invasion of Egypt in 1798. The 'infidels' led by Napoleon, encountered a feeble resistance from the Mamālīk and overran the country. Although the French occupation lasted only a few years, yet it proved to be a turning-point in Egypt's history and the dawn of its modern era. Under its pressure the walls that had kept Egypt in seclusion from the advanced countries of Europe crumbled, and the door for the penetration of Western modernity was swung open.

The endeavours of Napoleon to change the mentality of the Egyptians during his short stay proved of little avail. His real contribution to the awakening of modern Egypt lies in his introduction of the printing press and newspapers. For, very soon after his return to France, we find newspapers, classical works and translations of European books on a variety of subjects beginning to be printed in Egypt.

Another important event which changed the course of events in Egypt occurred soon after Napoleon's departure. This was the seizure of power in Egypt by a talented and ambitious Albanian soldier, Muhammad 'Alī. Driven by the desire to build a strong empire for himself, Muhammad 'Alī put Egypt on the road to modernization. Sending

Egyptians to France for studies, opening modern schools, introducing non-religious subjects in the educational curricula, generously patronizing the translation of European books, building up a strong, modern army and improving the administration of the country — all these go to his credit. Thus he set in motion a process of change in Egyptian society along the lines of modernization. This process was soon accelerated when closer contacts with Europe developed as a result of the opening of the Suez Canal. The process has continued ever since, has developed an impetus and dynamic of its own and has been gaining momentum.

Change, however, began taking place not only in the 'civilization' of the people, but also in their 'culture', to borrow Zia Gökalp's terminology.¹ The most dramatic changes were, of course, taking place in the physical aspects of life. The achievements of eighteenth and nineteenth century science were coming to Egypt: railways, telegraphs and so on. But another change, perhaps a more important one, was imperceptibly taking place because of the stealthy intrusion of new ideas from across the Mediterranean. Even the first group of Egyptian students who studied in France began to write about such previously unknown subjects like the French Revolution and constitutional monarchy of the British pattern.²

1. Gökalp uses 'civilization' to denote the material and technological aspect of a nation's life; and 'culture', to denote non-material aspects, e.g. a nation's outlook on life, its moral values etc. See Uriel Heyd, The Foundations of Turkish Nationalism, (London: 1950), pp. 63-68.

2. Hamzah,^c Abd al-Latif, Adab al Maqālah al-Suhufiyyah fī Miṣr, (Cairo: 1950), p. 55. Cited hereafter as Hamzah.

Among the new ideas that came to Egypt from abroad was the idea of waṭan (fatherland) and waṭaniyah (patriotic nationalism). In the second half of the nineteenth century these words came into frequent use. In those days waṭan did not denote the sense it does to-day. It meant one's birthplace - the particular village or town in which one was born, rather than the whole country.³ Gradually the boundaries of the waṭan expanded until it came to mean the whole of Egypt.

There is a number of reasons for the growth of a sense of identity among the people of Egypt. Improved means of communication led to more and closer contacts among the Egyptians. More important, however, were some elements of long standing in Egyptian life. Geographically, the frontiers of Egypt were well-defined by natural factors, as the country is surrounded by desert and sea. Then, during its long history, Egypt has mostly remained one, undivided country and always under strong centralized governments. The Egyptians spoke one and the same language all over the country - an Egyptianised, colloquial version of Arabic. Moreover, the rulers of Muḥammad ^CAlī dynasty consistently followed a policy of separation and independence from the Ottoman Empire. All these contributed to the development of national consciousness among the Egyptians.

Ṣubḥī Wihīdah narrates this development in these words:⁴

3. Even Rifā^Cah al-Taḥṭāwī (d. 1873), who was in the first group of Egyptians who went to France, uses waṭan in the sense of birthplace rather than the whole country. Ibid., pp. 140f.

4. Fī Uṣūl al-Mas'alah al-Misriyah, (Cairo: 1950), pp. 170f. Cited hereafter as Wihīdah

By and by this new society oriented itself to the realization that it was different from other societies, whether Islāmic or non-Islāmic. It also started to develop nationalist consciousness. al-Ṭaḥṭāwī writes about waṭaniyah and about the ancient Egyptian history and about the obligations to work for the welfare of Egypt. This we miss in al-Jabartī though the period of time separating the two is short. ⁵Ali Mubarak coins the term 'muwāṭin' to differentiate between one's fellow-countrymen and others. And ⁶Arābī uses the words 'Egyptian' and 'Egyptian ummah' (nation) in their modern connotation and regards all those who do not belong to the country, be they Armenians or Turks, Muslims or non-Muslims, as foreigners who had no right to rule over Egypt.

The concepts of 'nation' and 'nationalism', however, were still hazy, and according to the same writer:⁶

al-Ṭaḥṭāwī writes about al-waṭaniyah al-Misriyah but he is Islamic before everything else. ⁷Ali Mubarak is closer to the nationalist idea but he, too, does not evince a completely Egyptian consciousness. And ⁸Arābī's Egyptian consciousness bears an Arab-Islāmic imprint which persists in the consciousness of many of us even today.

It was around this period that al-Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d. 1897) visited Egypt. He remained there for about eight years (1871-79). His magnetic personality, his dauntless courage and extraordinary eloquence drew around him a large number of young Egyptians, who later played major parts in shaping the destiny of modern Egypt. ⁹Arābī, the revolutionary, Muḥammad ¹⁰Abduh, the religious reformer, Luṭfī al-Sayyid, the theoretician of Egyptian nationalism - all these came under the spell of al-Afghānī's dynamism. Even Christian journalists like Adīb

5. "This is the translation of the word 'citoyen' which was quite current in France in those days." *Ibid.*, n.p. 171.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

See Ḥamzah, op. cit., pp. 48-77, for the development of national consciousness in Egypt during the nineteenth century and the part played by writers and journalists of Egypt especially al-Ṭaḥṭāwī and the Syrian journalist Adīb Ishāq who published most of his journals from Egypt.

Ishāq and Khalīl Muṭṭarān were deeply impressed by him. His memory is still cherished in Egypt, and his contribution to the making of present-day Egypt, generously acknowledged. He is rightly credited with having initiated a number of important trends - religious reformism, anti-Western nationalistic revolutionism, Pan-Islāmism and so on. He even had a noteworthy part in encouraging literary and journalistic activities. Above all, he implanted in the hearts of Egyptians a deep love for freedom. He created in them self-respect and self-confidence. He infused them with revolutionary enthusiasm to attain freedom and a better order of things.

al-Afghānī's main concern was the problem of Western expansion at the expense of Islām. Algeria had already fallen. The Moghul rule in India had been replaced by the British rule. The Ottoman Caliphate was in the process of disintegration. Muslims all over the world were weak and divided, victims of backwardness, stagnation and ignorance. al-Afghānī's solution to the problem was to unite the Muslim world in some manner in order to check Western expansion and to revive Islām. Internally, he believed in the adoption of certain features of Western civilization like Western sciences and technology. He also stood for religious reforms based on return to the doctrines and practices of early Islām. If those things were done, al-Afghānī was confident that "the Muslim peoples would be able to work out for themselves a new and glorious order of affairs, without dependence on, or imitation of

European nations."⁷

This account of al-Afghānī's ideas explains the paradox of his championing Pan-Islamism and Egyptian nationalism at one and the same time. The obvious reason is that he regarded both as instrumental in meeting the European threat to the Muslim world.

al-Afghānī was expelled from Egypt by the Khadive Tawfīq in 1879. The Khadive was perhaps scared of the liberal-constitutionalist movement which was growing up around al-Afghānī. al-Afghānī went away from Egypt but left behind him his ideas, his revolutionary spirit and a group of people inspired by him.

During the years 1879-82, the growing Egyptian national consciousness found violent and confused expressions in a series of military uprisings led by ^cArabi (d. 1911) in collaboration with Muhammad ^cAbduh (d. 1905). Both were disciples of al-Afghānī. These incidents led to the occupation of Egypt by the British in 1882. ^cArabi's failure created despair and demoralization in the country; but the occupation proved a blessing in disguise for the development of Egyptian nationalist feelings. It gave Egyptian nationalism a definite objective - the evacuation of the British. It provided an external force against which struggle could continue, and in doing so keep the nationalist

7. Adams, Charles C., Islam and Modernism in Egypt, (London: 1933), p. 13. Our description of al-Afghānī's ideas is mainly based on Adam's work. See mainly pp. 4-17 and pp. 58-62. This work is cited hereafter as Adams.

consciousness alive and active. From then on Egyptian nationalism has evidenced a negative factor as one of its important, perhaps even essential, components. The British occupation was something against which feelings of hatred could be aroused. This negative factor unquestionably played a vital role in developing national consciousness in the beginning, and keeping it on a high pitch later on.

From the time of the British occupation onwards, we may discern two distinct trends of thought growing up in Egypt. Historically, the ideas of both schools are traceable to al-Afghanī. Both shared the desire for Egypt's freedom. Both loved Islām, the Ottoman Islāmic Caliphate and Pan-Islāmism. And yet the two trends were distinctly different in their emphasis. One was more concerned with the inner reform of Islām and the unification of Muslims, while the other stressed Egypt's independence and the necessity of driving the British away from Egypt. In the light of this difference in their emphasis, we may regard the former as the exponent of Islāmic ideas and the latter as the exponent of nationalist ideas. Muḥammad ^cAbduh (d. 1905) and Muṣṭafā Kāmil (d. 1908) may be regarded as the best representatives of the two respective trends of thought during the years approximately 1895-1905.

Muṣṭafā Kāmil, who had received a non-Azharite education in Egypt and later on his higher education in law in France, was a devout Muslim. His frame of reference, however, was different from

that of the Azharite ^Culamā', even the enlightened among them like ^CAbduh, due to his educational background and his close contact with the West. He was undoubtedly devoted to Islām. But his devotion was not as exclusive and single-minded as, for instance, that of ^CAbduh. Islām inspired Mustafā Kāmil, and remained an inspiration for him throughout his life. But unlike the cases of Muḥammad ^CAbduh and Rashīd Ridā, it was not the sole inspiration. No wonder, therefore, that 'fatherland' meant much more to him than it meant to Muḥammad ^CAbduh. It occupied a very high place in his scale of values, almost equal to Islām.

Kāmil's role in the development of Egyptian nationalist ideas was that of a pioneer. His ideas and his contribution to Egyptian nationalism may be summarized as follows:

Firstly, Kāmil claimed devotion and love for watān which unexcelled vigour and eloquence. His was not merely a plea to love one's fatherland and recognize obligations towards it, such as Muḥammad ^CAbduh had made in one of his articles in al-^CUrwah al-Wuthqā.⁸ Kāmil's was an impassioned appeal to regard Egypt as a centre of devotion and loyalty. The intense love and enthusiasm that Egypt evoked in Kāmil are conspicuously missing in ^CAbduh. Here are a few examples which demonstrate the intensity of Kāmil's feelings for Egypt:⁹

8. Ridā, Radhīd, Tārīkh al-Ustādh al Imām, Vol. II; II edition (Cairo: 1344 A.H./ 1925 A.D.), pp. 194-96. Cited hereafter as Tārīkh.

9. Rafī^Cī, ^CAbd al-Rahmān, Mustafā Kāmil: Ba^Cith al-Nahdah al-Watanīyah, al-Hilāl Book Series No. 20 (Cairo: 1952), pp. 195-96. Cited hereafter as Kāmil.

Oh my country! Oh my country!
 To thee belong my love and my heart.
 To thee belong my very life and existence.
 To thee belong my blood and my spirit.
 To thee belong my intellect and my tongue.
 To thee belong my soul, the very essence of my being.
 Thou, thou alone art life, oh Egypt,
 and there can be no life without thee.

Had I not been born in Egypt,
 I would have (still) wished to become an Egyptian.

Egypt deserves to be loved with all one's power, with
 all one's feeling, . . . with all one's spirit and
 with all one's life.

Kāmil's predecessors had written casually about ḥubb al-waṭan
 (love of the fatherland). These writings appear dull and colourless
 when compared with the writings and speeches of Kāmil, who gave
waṭaniyah a rich emotional content.

Secondly, Kāmil came forward with the bold idea that all Egyptians,
 Muslims as well as Copts, constituted one nation and shared the father-
 land equally. He stated this in clear terms and made it the corner-
 stone of his political ideology. It goes to his credit that he won
 the support and co-operation of Copts for his nationalist movement.

To quote his own words:¹⁰

We have cried at the top of our voice that the Muslims and
 the Copts of Egypt are one nation; they are rather one family.
 We have said that the blood that flows in the veins of most
 of the Muslims of Egypt is the blood which flows in the veins
 of the Copts. The first obligation to the fatherland is a
 complete unity among its sons.

Thirdly, Kāmil was emphatic in his claim that there could be no
 conflict of loyalties between Islam and Egypt. His conception of each

10. Ḥamzah, op. cit., V, p. 59.

was such that he could not visualize their coming into conflict. He argued that both Copts and Muslims have two-fold obligations: religious and national. In the discharge of their religious obligations the Copts may retain their creed, profess their faith devotedly and love their Christian brethren, both within and outside Egypt. In the same way Muslims too have the right to practise their faith and to regard Muslims all over the world as their brethren. In fact, it is the duty of all Muslims to unite for the glory of Islām and in defence of their common political interests. All this would be in discharge of the Muslims' religious duty. As for their national duty, to strive for the independence of Egypt, both Muslims and Copts have a complete unanimity on this point. Thus, Kāmil argued, there is no conflict between the service of Islām or call for Islāmic unity and the principles of wataniyah.¹¹

So far as Kāmil himself is concerned, he had harmoniously integrated religious and nationalist elements in his thinking. He agitated for Egypt's independence, but also wrote in defence of Islām, refuting the criticisms made by European scholars. His attachment to the Ottoman Islāmic Caliphate and his Pan-Islāmism, too, are well-known. The same is true of his successor, Muhammad Farīd (d. 1918), although in Farīd the Islāmic element is not as prominent as in Kāmil's ideology.

Fourthly, Kāmil took up the theme of the British evacuation (al-jalā') and made it the main demand of the nationalist movement, "Egypt for Egyptians", became a popular catchword and a basic creed of

11. Ibid., pp. 59f.

Egyptian nationalism. This demand for evacuation has remained the main prop of Egyptian nationalism since Kāmil's days uptil recent years.

As for the other school, its best representative was the Azhar-trained, albeit highly enlightened, Muḥammad ^CAbduh. He was the ablest colleague and disciple of al-Afghānī and the pioneer of Islāmic modernism in Egypt.

^CAbduh, like al-Afghānī, stood for Islāmic reform and Islāmic unity. He asserted that modern sciences were compatible with Islām and should be adopted by Muslims. As for his socio-political thinking, he shows hardly any trace of external influence beyond his advocacy of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy.

With regard to the problem of Islām and nationalism, Muḥammad ^CAbduh stood for the idea that Islām and Islām alone constituted the nationality of Muslims.¹² He believed that Islāmic ^Casabiyyah was the only ^Casabiyyah that Muslims knew; that this ^Casabiyyah was a sacred and pure and useful one; and that it obliterated every other ^Casabiyyah. Due to racial and nationalist ^Casabiyyah, he contended, no group of non-Muslims was prepared to accept the authority of the other. In accepting such an authority, it either feared injustice, or humiliation. But the Muslims have before them the principles formulated by God to govern

12. See ^CAbduh's article, "al-Waḥdah al-Islāmiyyah", reproduced in Tarikh, op. cit., II, p. 278.

their life. An Arab, therefore, ungrudgingly accepts the rule of a Turk, and a non-Arab, the rule of an Arab, so long as it is in accord with the Islāmic Shari^cah.¹³ ^cAbduh went so far as to say; . . . "all ties except the ties of the true Shari^cah have been the object of the Prophet's disapproval . . ."¹⁴

Would it be correct, then, to infer that ^cAbduh wanted one government for all Muslim countries? Ideally, it appears, ^cAbduh would say 'yes'. He, however, feels that it would be "perhaps difficult" to have one person to rule over the whole Muslim world. So, he would like all the Muslim countries to have the Qur'^ān as their authority (and their symbol of unity), and to support each other.¹⁵ ^cAbduh's words indicate that he had not given up the classical Islāmic ideal of one government embracing the whole of the Islāmic ummah. He was merely making concessions to changed circumstances. The practical form that ^cAbduh conceived for such a unity in present times, as Riḍā observes, was similar to that of the Germanic states in the Prussian Empire. These states, despite remaining independent, were united.¹⁶

^cAbduh had some notion of ḥubb al-waṭan too. In one of his articles in al-^cUrwah he spoke about waṭan as a place where one's rights are secure, towards which one has certain obligations, and association with which is a source of one's pride. It was incumbent, then, upon the Egyptian to love his waṭan,¹⁷ said ^cAbduh. His concept of waṭaniyah was that fellow

13. Ibid., pp. 123-27, 276-82, 282-88.

14. Ibid., p. 225. Italics our own.

15. Ibid., p. 281.

16. Ibid., I, pp. 306-07.

17. Ibid., II, p. 195.

countrymen should co-operate in constructive projects and in the improvement of the government.¹⁸

^CAbduh's reference to wataniyah, it will be noted, lacked that extravagance of adoration and that burning love and devotion to fatherland which Kamil's writings and speeches betray. ^CAbduh's treatment of wataniyah is casual, and in a matter-of-fact spirit. Attachment to fatherland in ^CAbduh's ideology does not furnish any basis for the social and political life of Muslims.

The course of ^CAbduh's life since he returned to Egypt in 1888 from his exile, remained different from that of Kamil because ^CAbduh did not take any part in the political movement for Egypt's independence. One of the main reasons for this was that ^CAbduh had become convinced that al-Afghani's revolutionary political activity could not do much good. He chose for himself the quiet type of constructive work to bring about religious reform and educate people, instead of agitating against the British occupation of Egypt. A number of other circumstances like ^CAbduh's strained relations with the Khadive, his distrust of Kamil because of the latter's close collaboration with the Khadive, and a generally poor opinion about his character, and probably also the fact that he had been allowed to return Egypt from his exile on the stipulation that he would not participate in anti-British agitation, all these contributed in keeping him aloof from the rising nationalist movement. May we take it, then, that ^CAbduh had given up his idea of Egypt's liberation from foreign control

18. Ibid., I, p. 910.

which had led him to collaborate with [°]Arābī'? There is no evidence of this change in view. On the contrary, we find Blunt testifying his strong support for the demand of evacuation.¹⁹ The fact is that although [°]Abduh took no active part in the movement for independence, yet he was in favour of it. The upshot of the ideas that he had preached in the columns of al-[°]Urwah was also that Muslim lands should be liberated from foreign domination.

Now we are in a position to make a comparison between the two personalities, Kāmil and [°]Abduh.

In brief, their difference was sometimes a difference of emphasis, but on other occasions their trends of thought were perceptibly divergent. Kāmil's tendency to elevate fatherland to such a position that it could claim the loyalty of a Muslim people in its own right was contrary to [°]Abduh's thinking. However, perhaps because of Kāmil's Islāmic and Pan-Islāmic tendencies and because he failed to follow the rigorous logic of nationalist ideas with regard to the problem of the supremacy of the Sharī[°]ah in the future set-up of Egypt (a problem which he had not faced and which was later on taken up by the nationalists, as we shall see), there was ^{not} much of a conflict between the ideologies of Kāmil and [°]Abduh. Their courses, however, remained distinct.

After Kāmil's death another important factor had a deep influence on

19. Blunt, My Diaries..., p. 91, quoted by Hammūdah [°]Abd al [°]Āṭī, The Concept of Freedom in [°]Abduh, (Typescript) M.A. Thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1957, p. 67

Egyptian nationalist thinking. It came as a result of the publication of the researches of foreign scholars and archaeologists. Their works depicted the ancient glories of Egyptian culture and civilization.

Ancient Egypt was described in superlative language. Egyptian civilization was hailed as among the earliest of all civilizations. All this left a deep impression on the rising class of the moder-educated youth. It stirred their patriotic feelings and aroused their national pride. This admiration of Pharaonic culture and civilization developed into the Pharaonic movement which we shall discuss later.

Egyptian nationalism started to change its orientation in the beginning of this century when Ahmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid (1872 -) began to expound his concept of Egyptian nationalism through al-Jarīdah (founded in 1907). To describe its policy succinctly, al-Jarīdah opposed the infiltration of Pan-Islāmic ideas into Egyptian nationalism. It rejected religion as the basis of political life. It claimed for Egypt a devotion which was more exclusive than in Kāmil's ideology. Muḥammad Ḥusayn Haykal (d. 1956) followed the same line in his al-Siyāsah (founded in 1913). Luṭfī was not opposed to Islām as such. He even wrote articles defending Islām against the attacks of Lord Cromer. All that Luṭfī did was to stress that Islām should not intrude into Egyptian political life, and that Pan-Islāmic ideas should not confuse the fact that Egypt belongs to Egyptians and to none else, not even to Non-Egyptian Muslims.²⁰

20. The ideas of Ahmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid will be discussed later ~~in~~ at greater length because his writings have been published during the years under inquiry, i.e. 1945-56, and had an important influence on contemporary Egyptian nationalist thinking.

Alongside Luṭfī's theorising about nationalism there went on in Egypt the agitation for Egypt's independence. Resentment against British domination mounted to a high pitch. Egyptian national consciousness developed in this atmosphere of struggle and strife, and it is under their stress that national unity was realized. The defeat of Turkey in the first world war destroyed the last centre of hope abroad for any effective support for Egyptian independence. This development helped the spread of the doctrines that were being propagated by Luṭfī and his group. Egyptian nationalism became more and more exclusivist as Pan-Islāmism increasingly went out of fashion. The latter even began to be regarded as dangerous for the national cause as it might alienate the sympathies of Western powers for Egypt. Similarly, Egyptians remained indifferent to Arab nationalism which was developing in the Fertile Crescent. King Fayṣal's attempt to unite all Arab countries into one Arab Kingdom after the end of the first world war, far from being welcomed, was even suspected in Egypt.²¹

Immediately after the end of the first world war, the Egyptian liberation movement gained momentum. Its leadership was assumed by a disciple of Muḥammad ʿAbduh named Saʿd Zaghlūl (d. 1927). Zaghlūl had belonged to the moderate wing of Egyptian rationalists, known as Hizh al-Ummah. He had co-operated with the Occupation authorities. He also

21. Colombe, Marcel, L'Evolution de L'Egypte, 1924-50, (Paris: 1951), p. 167. Hereafter cited as Colombe.

was enthusiastic about the religious reform advocated by ^CAbduh. Later on, however, the nationalist enthusiasm had the better of him, and he plunged into the struggle for Egyptian independence.

Zaghlūl's contribution to Egyptian nationalism was two-fold. He aroused patriotic zeal and brought Muslims and Copts together to struggle jointly for the national causes. The latter was a big achievement in so far as since the death of Muṣṭafā Kāmil, the unity of Muslims and Copts had been almost destroyed.

This had an important, almost a revolutionary effect on the ideological development of Egyptian nationalism. For, since then non-Muslims have maintained their active participation in the nationalist movement, and began to occupy great influence in the nationalist movement. In the Wafd Party in particular, which championed the cause of Egyptian nationalism for about a quarter of a century, they wielded considerable influence.²² This factor, coupled with the secularizing influence of Western education and culture upon the minds of the rising class of educated Egyptians, the nationalist movement gradually became completely secular with the separation of religion and state as a basic tenet of its ideology. The guiding motto of Egyptian nationalism has been: al-Dīn li Allāh wa al-Waṭan li jamī^C al-muwāṭinīn. (Religion is for Allāh and fatherland is for all fellow-countrymen).

22. According to Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, when the Wafd Party drew up its list of candidates for the house of deputies in 1924, the Copts obtained 150 out of 214 seats.
Our Beginning in Wisdom, (Washington: 1953), p. 100.
 Cited hereafter as Ghazzālī.

The orthodox Muslims of Egypt look at this period of Egypt's recent history with discomfort. In the words of Dr. Muḥammad al-Baḥī, an Azharite scholar:²³

The ten-year period, from the opening of the Egyptian University in 1925 to the flourishing of the Muslim Brotherhood and the second rectorship of Shaikh al-Marāghī in 1935, is relatively considered most neglectful period to Islām. Egyptian nationalists, particularly the Wafdis, disregarded Islām in regard to common matters.

It is around this period that there flourished in Egypt the movement known as Pharaonism. This movement was led by the famous Coptic writer, Salāmah Mūsā. The ideas of the movement, in the words of Nabīh Amīn Fāris and Muḥammad Tawfīq Ḥusayn were:²⁴

...the phil-Pharaonics were preaching that Egypt was essentially Pharaonic and that the Egyptians still retained the heritage of their forbears in bodily structure, facial form, as well as psychological makeup, emotional predilections and social customs. When compared with the Pharaonic, the Arab influence among the Egyptians was superficial. They, therefore, stressed the need for the restoration of the Pharaonic tradition, the revival of ancient literature, and the development of modern literature in accordance with the ideas and models of the ancient. They called for the glorification of Pharaonic Egypt, its great Pharaohs, its immortal deities, and for breaking away from Arabs and their civilization. They insisted that Egypt had its own particular humanistic, cultural, and educational entity and that it was not linked to the other (Arab and Islāmic) countries except through weak and tenuous bonds, the most important of which was religion. Religion, however, was in the process of receding from social life in these modern times, and language alone would not make those who speak it a nation.

23. Factors of the Islāmic Movements in the Arab World ... (Mimeographed) (Montreal: 1956), p. 69.

24. The Crescent in Crisis, (Lawrence: 1955), p. 136. Cited hereafter as The Crescent in Crisis.

Leaving aside the development of nationalist ideas for the moment to return to the Islāmic strain in Egyptian political thinking, we find the concepts originating with ^CAbduh continued by Rashīd Ridā in his al-Manār.

This Syrian-born disciple of ^CAbduh. carried on the propagation of his master's reform ideas through al-Manār. He attacked taqlīd, and summoned Muslims to a return to the simple and vigorous Islām of the days of the Holy Prophet and his Rightly-Guided Caliphs. Ridā's frame of reference was not substantially different from ^CAbduh's. With the passage of time he leaned more and more towards orthodoxy, especially with regard to socio-political matters. The abolition of the temporal Caliphate impelled Ridā to spell out his views and this he did in a series of articles published in al-Manār, later published in the form of a book entitled al-Khalāfah aw al-Imamah al-^CUzma.²⁵

Ridā's concept of the Caliphate is essentially in line with that of classical Sunnī jurists. The Caliphate is to him an agency for the protection of Islām from attacks and innovations, for the propagation of the teachings of Islām and for enforcement of the laws of Islām etc. This Caliphate would embrace all Islāmic lands.²⁶ The fact is that throughout his life the idea of brotherhood of Islām which obliterated racial and national boundaries and constituted a bond uniting all Muslims in one

25. (Cairo: 1922).

26. Ibid., p. 10 and pp. 27-30.

community, remained his ideal.

Riḍā became increasingly harsh towards the nationalists, both of Turkey and Egypt. One psychological reason for his resentment of nationalism might perhaps be the fact that the upholders of Turkish nationalism had been the very people who had abolished the Caliphate, the restoration of which Riḍā regarded as imperative. Riḍā branded them 'Westernized atheists' who, in his opinion:²⁷

...believe that in this age religion is not compatible with politics and science and civilization and that the state which binds itself to religion cannot become powerful ...(so,) the opinion of most of them is that government should be non-religious. Their party is organized in Turkey, disorganized in Egypt, and weak in Syria and Iraq...The opinion of this party is that the Islāmic Caliphate should be abolished; the (influence of) Islāmic religion on the ummah should be weakened, all means should be adopted to substitute a racial or nationalistic tie for the Islāmic religious tie.

For Riḍā, Islām is the basic tie of socio-political life. This line of thinking was bound to come into conflict with the particularist nationalism that was growing in Egypt. Riḍā saw in the latter a threat to Islāmic unity, which is evident from his criticism of the policy of al-Siyāsah.²⁸ He also felt quite uncomfortable even when Sa^cd Zagh^lūl turned towards nationalism.²⁹ The impression that one gathers from Riḍā's

27. Ibid., pp. 62f. Italics our own.

28. Adams, op. cit., p. 184.

29. Ibid., p. 229.

writings may be summed up by saying that nationalism is a potential threat to Islāmīc unity and is essentially a part of 'Westernist atheism and apostacy'.

In this respect Riḍā is not alone in the recent history of Islām. Orthodox Islām in Egypt and elsewhere has generally looked at nationalism with suspicion. In 1928, Abū al-Faḍl al-Jazā'irī, the Rector of the Azhar University, and ^CAbd al-Rahmān Qurrah declared that there existed no nationality except the religious one and that Islām had made all believers into brothers, uniting Arabs and non-Arabs. In 1932 another ^Calim, Shaykh al-Ghunaymī al-Taftāzānī declared that Islām was an enemy of 'ethnic particularism' and 'regionalism'. Later on in 1938, Muṣṭafa' al-Marāghī, another Rector of al-Azhar, insisted upon Islām's opposition to the 'racial spirit' and urged the ^Culama' to work for the realization of Islamic unity.³⁰

An important event of this period for our purposes is the appearance of a book, al-Islām wa Usul al-Hukm in the year 1925 by an Azharite scholar, ^CAlī ^CAbd al-Rāziq. The book was a refutation of the generally held Muslim idea that the Caliphate is a succession to the Prophet's twin offices of religious and political leadership. The prophet's mission, according to ^CAbd al-Rāziq, was religious and not political. He also held that:³¹

30. Colombe, op. cit. pp. 171f.

31. al-Islām wa Usul al-Hukm, II ed., 1925, p. 84, quoted by Adams, op. cit., p. 265.

All that Islām prescribed as law, and all that the Prophet imposed upon the Muslims in the way of regulations and rules and moral principles, had nothing at all to do with methods of political rule, nor with the regulations of a civil state.

All the prescriptions of Islām, in ^CAbd al-Rāziq's opinion, constituted merely a religious code, entirely concerned with the service of God and the religious welfare of mankind. As for the civil laws, they had been left to men, to develop according to their knowledge and experience.³²

The book caused a stir in the religious circles of Egypt. The court of the Azhar ^Culamā' issued the verdict that he was guilty of unorthodoxy. Several books written by ^Culamā' were soon published, refuting ^CAbd al-Rāziq's point of view. In general, his views were not accepted by the religiously-oriented Muslims of Egypt.

The views of ^CAbd al-Rāziq, had they been generally accepted by the religious circles of Egypt, could have had a revolutionary effect on Muslims. Their acceptance could have paved the way for a basic re-orientation of Muslim political thought on Islāmic grounds. ^CAbd al-Rāziq's ideas could also perhaps have made easier of acceptance the nationalist view that an individual owes his supreme loyalty to his

32. These statements are based on Adams' description of ^CAlī ^CAbd al-Rāziq's ideas. See *ibid.*, pp. 265ff.

nation-state and to his nationality. His book might well have become the basis for forging an all-inclusive loyalty for all Egyptians, Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It could have contributed to solving the difficulty which the eight per cent non-Muslim minority among the Egyptian population finds in evolving a common nationality with the Muslims of Egypt who believe that Islām should be the basis of public life and that the state should be an agency for the realization of Islāmic ideals and the propagation of Islāmic teachings.

But, as we have already observed, his views were generally rejected by the religious groups. The traditional interpretation of Islām that Islām should be the guiding principle for the whole of man's life and that Islām required a state for the realization of its ideals, was retained. Furthermore, during the latter half of the 1930's we witness a vigorous assertion of this interpretation and the resurgence of the complex of Islāmic and Arab-Islāmic sentiments. This movement had actually begun towards the close of the twenties, had steadily gained momentum, and had become a reckonable force in the intellectual and political life of Egypt in the latter half of the thirties. With the rise of this trend, the Pharaonic movement began to lose ground because of the absence of any deep roots of the Pharaonic idea in the life of the Egyptian people. Even during its heyday, the movement's influence had remained confined to the educated élite. While this élite glorified the Pharaonic period and the Pharaonic civilization, the common Egyptian

considered the word 'Pharaoh' to mean 'tyrant',³³ and regarded these ancient rulers of Egypt as 'infidels'.³⁴ Another, and a very important reason for the weakening of the Pharaonic movement and the growth of the popularity of Islāmic ideas may be found in the exigencies of Egyptian politics. Previously Egypt had been afraid of losing Western sympathies if she came forward with very pronounced Pan-Islāmic views. She had, therefore, been pressed by circumstances to remain aloof from the neighbouring Arab and Islāmic countries. Later on in 1936, Egypt gained her independence which enabled her to play the role to which Egypt was entitled in the Middle East in view of her resources, her level of intellectual culture and her population.³⁵ The Pharaonic movement could only have gone along with an isolationist policy. Once Egypt realized its position as the cultural and political leader of the neighbouring countries, and felt inclined to assume the responsibilities of that role, the Pharaonic movement was bound, in the very nature of things, to recede into the background.

As for the resurgence of Islāmic (and along with them, of Arab) sentiments, we find its first manifestations of this trend in the formation of a large number of Islāmic societies in Egypt around the year

33. Sa^cīd, ^cAbd al-Mughnī, Ān li hādha al-Sha^cb an yafham, (Cairo: 1952, pp. 48f. Cited hereafter as Sa^cīd.

34. Kamil, Mahir, and Ṣāliḥ, Amīn ^cAbd Allāh, Thaqāfah Isāsiyah, vol. I, (Cairo: 1957), p. 322.

35. Colombe, op. cit., pp. 172-73.

1930. Colombe and Heyworth-Dunne mention in all about a dozen of such societies.³⁶ The most prominent of those were the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn and Jam'iyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn. These associations have in common a desire to strengthen the belief of Muslims in Islām, to spread Islāmic moral virtues, to ensure for Islām a basic position in the socio-political life of Egypt and to realize the dream of Islāmic unity in some form.

This Islāmic recrudescence may be attributed to a number of reasons. It was the outcome of the realization, on the part of a small number of sincere Muslims, as Heyworth-Dunne points out, that their heritage was disappearing and being replaced by the Western system, which was considered of doubtful moral value and the cause of turning Muslims into nominal members of their society.³⁷ Another factor, perhaps, was the fact that the Islāmic ideas were championed by a galaxy of talents, such as Ḥasan al-Bannā' (d. 1949), Muḥibb al-Dīn al-Khaṭīb, Aḥmad Amīn, Ṣāliḥ Ḥarb and others.

Ever since the above-mentioned Islāmic resurgence, the attitude of Islāmically-oriented groups has become increasingly unambiguous and virulent in opposition to nationalism. This has happened in spite of the fact that the indifference characteristic of 'Abduh in the last phase of his life towards the movement of national liberation had given place to active and enthusiastic participation in that struggle on the

36. See ibid., p. 141 and Heyworth-Dunne, J., Religious and Political Trends in Modern Egypt, (Washington, D.C: 1950), passim. Cited hereafter as Dunne.

37. Ibid., pp. 10f.

part of the religious groups. The interest of these groups in Egyptian freedom movement, (as also in the problems of Palestine, Morocco, Algeria and so on), however, had an Islāmic motivation. Their sympathy with these movements was essentially because they aimed at the liberation of Muslim lands from the domination of non-Muslim Imperialism.

Riḍā's concept of a Caliphate encompassing all Muslim lands was not insisted upon as an immediate goal, perhaps due to practical difficulties. This concept was replaced by the concept of an Islāmic state in Egypt, which would ultimately unite all Muslims under the flag of Islām.³⁸ The inseparability of religion and state remained an article of faith and was frequently stressed.

Another offshoot of this Islāmic resurgence was the popularity of the idea of Arab unity. This trend, however, had not become important enough until the end of the second world war to be discussed here.

Thus, on the threshold of the period which is our special concern, we find that the orthodox Islāmic and the nationalist schools had discovered those points of agreement and disagreement due to which their inter-relationship has simultaneously been one of mutual co-operation as well as one of mutual opposition and hostility. Orthodox Islām and nationalism have been one so far as the immediate political objectives of nationalism are concerned, viz., the realization of Egypt's full

38. Ḥasan al-Bannā' expressed this viewpoint very frequently in his writings. See, for instance, al-Bannā', Ḥasan, "To the Youth of Islām", Students' Voice, Vol. V, no. 1, p. 4. Cited hereafter as Youth. Other Islāmic writers and thinkers generally held the same view.

sovereignty, the unification of the Nile Valley, etc. But the two disagreed on the ideological plane. On this plane we find that the two schools of thought had not only become divergent but were in serious conflict and disagreement with one another on numerous points. The idea of Pan-Islāmic unity, and of a state serving as an instrument for the realization of Islāmic ideals, which was preached by orthodox Muslims, went counter to the exclusivist, and secular ideology of Egyptian nationalism. In the same way, the Egyptian nationalist vision of an Egyptian nation-state, based on an exclusive devotion to the fatherland and a denial of Islām as the basis of national life, conflicted with the socio-political ideals of orthodox Islām. In brief, those basic points of disagreement, which later (i.e. during the period of our inquiry, 1945-56) led to the general feeling that the ideologies of orthodox Islām and nationalism were basically incompatible, were becoming apparent.

During the following years the nature of the inter-relationship between Islām and nationalism in Egypt has remained essentially the same as we shall see in the following pages.

CHAPTER II.

CONTEMPORARY EGYPTIAN NATIONALISM VIS-A-VIS ISLĀM.

The years following the end of the second world war in 1945 saw a powerful resurgence of Egyptian nationalist sentiments. A number of events which had taken place during the second world war or which soon followed in the wake of its termination provided a powerful impetus to the movement for ^{the} realization of Egypt's complete sovereignty. In 1942, for instance, the British had forced Egypt under the threat of tanks and canons, to join the world war on the side of the Allies. Egyptian public opinion was against participation in the war and so felt that its national self-respect had been violated by British coercion. The Egyptians began to feel intensely indignant about the presence of the British troops which, they realized, could reduce their national independence to a sham. On the other hand, solemn declarations had been made by the Allied during the war to respect every nation's right to independence. This had kindled fresh hopes about the success of the struggle which the Egyptians were waging for their national freedom. In addition, Britain had emerged out of the travails of the second world war, a considerably weakened, second-rate world power. The illusion of her invincible might had been shattered. Furthermore, the coming into power of the Labour Party in Britain had further reinforced Egyptian hopes. For, the Labour Party was committed to pursuit of liberal policies with regard to the areas under British domination. The achievement of independence by Syria, the Lebanon, India, Pakistan and Burma within two years after the end of the war, all went to intensify Egyptian nationalist enthusiasm.

The years 1945-56 were, therefore, years of constant nationalist strife and struggle in Egypt. Mass demonstrations took place frequently either against the policies of the British government or against the men-in-power in Egypt itself who were seen as following weak policies. The struggle often even resulted in the outbreak of violence and rioting.

The Egyptian nationalist struggle during the period was all along focussed on two immediate objectives: the evacuation of the British forces from the Suez Base and the unification of the Nile valley.

Here it is necessary to sound a note of caution. The fact that the two above-mentioned objectives were the main objectives of Egyptian nationalism does not mean that devotion to these objectives was confined only to those who have been designated as 'Egyptian nationalists' in these pages. In fact, so far as these objectives are concerned, all sections of Egypt's public opinion were unanimous in supporting them. The Ikhwan, the ^culama' of al-Azhar, the Arab nationalists, the Socialists and the Communists, all were in complete agreement with the Egyptian nationalists on these points. All these elements even worked shoulder to shoulder in the struggle for national liberation.

What distinguished these ideological groups from one another was their viewpoint with regard to the ultimate, rather than the immediate goals of the Egyptian national life. On what lines has Egypt to be built up? Which socio-political ideals should be pursued? What should be the character of the state and polity? These questions confronted all these groups alike. And the Egyptian nationalists consisted of the people who believed Egyptianism to be the only, or the most important

factor in the public life of their country and advocated that it should form the basis of the future national development. They stressed that the Egyptians owed their fatherland and their nationality their primary and supreme loyalty, and in the affairs of their country they had to participate merely in their capacity of being Egyptians.

In this chapter we shall examine and analyse Egyptian nationalist ideas, devoting special attention to the attitudes of the Egyptian nationalists towards Islām.

(1)

An account of the development of the Egyptian nationalist ideas before 1945 has been given briefly in the previous chapter. During the years following 1945 the theoretical formulations of Egyptian nationalism remained substantially unchanged. One noteworthy change, however, did take place. This was the decline of the Pharaonic movement. This movement almost died out, but some of its underlying ideas retained their vigour. There was no decline in nationalist feelings as such, only a reorientation in the forms of expression which they took. Pharaonic Egypt no longer represented the model for the Egyptian nation, the ideal towards which it should strive. The influence of the movement lingered on, however, for there is still among the Egyptians an intense admiration for the Pharaonic period as a time of Egyptian splendour and glory. The continuing existence of pride in the Pharaonic past is even to-day a factor in the complex of emotions which binds Egyptians to their country.

The contemporary Egyptian nationalist ideology rests on the belief

that the Egyptians constitute a distinct and separate nationality, bound together mainly by virtue of belonging to the same fatherland, and also due to other important factors (to which we shall turn later). Race and religion, which are sometimes put forward as elements of national identity, are not regarded as constituent factors of Egyptian nationality. For the clarification of their views on this point, as on many others, the Egyptians nationalists owe a debt of gratitude to Ahmad Luṭfī al-Sayyid (1872 -). His role in shaping Egyptian nationalist thought in the second decade of this century has already been mentioned in the previous chapter. Luṭfī has deeply influenced Egyptian thought throughout the period ever since he founded al-Jarīdah in 1907. al-Jarīdah continued publication uptil 1914. Then as a prominent political figure and as a writer, contributing articles to magazines and journals, Luṭfī continued to spread his views. When the Egyptian University was established in 1925, Luṭfī became its Director. He was associated with it almost continuously uptil the early years of the fifties. He is regarded very highly by Egyptians nationalists and his views are accepted as a standard exposition of the central concepts which the Egyptian nationalists cherish.

Luṭfī considers the Egyptians one nationality although he recognizes that they do not have the same racial origin. Egypt is populated by the descendants of her ancient inhabitants as well as the descendants of foreigners like Turks, Circassians, Arabs etc. But in the course of time, according to Luṭfī, these foreigners have become Egyptianized. After some time the foreigners who had settled down in Egypt found

themselves emotionally and materially enmeshed in the fabric of Egyptian life. In Luṭfī's view the process of their Egyptianization was that they acquired property, intermarried with the local population, had offspring and thus began to share Egyptian life in its fullness. Before the passage of many generations they became like other Egyptians around them, children of the Egyptian fatherland whose ancestors rested beneath the Egyptian soil. They ceased to regard themselves as belonging to any other country but Egypt, and began to feel the same pride in, and the same enthusiasm for Egypt as did the descendants of her original inhabitants.¹

In the opinion of the Egyptian nationalists the Egyptian nationality has come into existence as a result of the operation of all those factors which usually go to strengthen the national unity of a people viz. the communities of history, of culture and of material interests. The fact that the Egyptians possess a common history is particularly stressed as an important factor in solidifying the foundations of the Egyptian nationality. This factor corroborates the Egyptian nationalist contention that the Egyptians have always remained a distinct entity. Although Egypt has been time and again overrun by conquerors from across the seas and beyond the deserts, the Egyptians have remained a distinct people throughout their history, marked out by peculiar characteristics.² The achievements of Egyptians in the

1. al-Sayyid, Aḥmad Luṭfī, al-Muntakhabāt, (Cairo: n.d.), I, p. 170. Hereafter cited as Muntakhabāt.

2. Ghālī, Mirrit Boutrous, The Policy of Tomorrow, (Washington, D.C: 1953), p. 105. Cited hereafter as Ghālī.

Pharaonic times and their struggles to win their independence during subsequent periods, are all called into play by the nationalists to emphasize that the Egyptians possess common memories of joys and sorrows, of fortunes and misfortunes. Some nationalist writers stress, with a view to emphasize the unity and continuity of Egyptian history, that the way of life of the present-day Egyptians is remarkably similar to what it was in ancient times.³ Luṭfī, the most important Egyptian nationalist thinker sees the Egyptians preserving the legacy which they have inherited from their ancestors, with the result that the Egyptian nationality rests on solid foundations:⁴

All these national characteristics, material as well as moral. . . (which we have inherited from the past,) create in us a bond of nationality which is stronger than that found among most of the nation.

The unity of culture and the community of material interests are also mentioned as important factors in the formation of the Egyptian nationality.⁵ The latter is particularly stressed by several nationalist writers, particularly by Luṭfī. Luṭfī holds the view that contemporary life is based on a striving after 'benefits' or 'utilities', rather than on emotional considerations. He stresses that the interests of all Egyptians are common, and are different from the interests of

3. Loc. cit.

4. Cited in Hamzah, op. cit., p. 21. Cf. Ghālī, op. cit., p. 105.

5. Cf. Muntakhabāt, op. cit., I, p. 170. Also Ḥusayn Kāmil Salīm in al-Ḥusari, Saṭi, al-Urūbah Awwalan, II edition, (Beirut: 1955), p. 127. Cited hereafter as Urūbah. See also Ghālī, op. cit., p. 103.

others.⁶

Despite this recognition of the importance of communities of history, culture and material interests, Egyptian nationalists regard the geographical factor as the fundamental factor in unifying the Egyptians into a distinct nationality. It is evident from their interpretation of the other factors that all of them emanate from the fact that Egypt possesses frontiers well-defined by natural factors and which for centuries past have been relatively unchanged. In their opinion it is mainly the geographical factor which gave the Egyptians a distinct identity, and preserved it throughout the ages. In the words of Ghālī:⁷

If we look upon the geographical contour of Egypt we find that its frontiers are perfectly defined and that these have remained unchanged for some sixty centuries (sic!). Nature has so arranged, by surrounding Egypt with a desert on all sides — West, East and South — that the country has grown independently and by itself since the earliest times.

Another feature of Egyptian nationalism is that it evinces a tendency discernible in almost every nationalism: to stress the national personality and its uniqueness, to ascribe to the nation certain characteristics, and to assign to it a special mission or message. All this constitutes the raison d'etre of every nationalism. Such ideas are put forward to develop among the members of the nation a sense of homogeneity within themselves and a feeling of being different and distinct from the rest of the world. The result of holding such beliefs is the creation of

6. Muntakhabāt, op. cit., I, p. 170.

7. Ghālī, op. cit., p. 105.

a sense of pride in belonging to the nation, and perhaps even a feeling of superiority. In Egypt this trend arose as a result of the necessity to instil self-confidence and inspire hope in the hearts of the subjugated populace. Thus in stressing the uniqueness of Egypt, the nationalist writers generally were led to indulge in a good deal of extravagance, and exaggeration.

The Egyptian nationalists express their firm conviction that Egypt has had a distinct personality throughout her long and eventful history.

Egypt was undoubtedly time and again overrun by outsiders — Romans, Persians, Arabs, Turks and so on. This, in the Egyptian nationalist view, has had little effect upon those characteristics of the Egyptians which go to make them a distinct national entity. Ever since the Macedonian period, remarks Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, "Egypt has always proceeded to Egyptianize every invader until each became an Egyptian."⁸ This has enabled Egypt to preserve her identity. Instead of allowing itself to dissolve, says Ṭāhā Ḥusayn, Egypt has "dissolved into itself every invader and everyone who attempted to exploit or colonize it."⁹ The belief in Egypt's distinct personality is supported, according to Egyptian nationalists, by the fact that the Egyptians possess as they have possessed in the past, certain peculiar characteristics which distinguish them from others.

Hence we find a number of Egyptian writers putting forth the different characteristics which, in their view, are peculiar to Egyptians. Ghālī, for instance, enumerates the following:

8. The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., p. 140.

9. Loc. Cit. See also Ghali, op. cit., p. 105.

The Egyptians are very conservatively inclined so that old and established customs have a hold upon them to an extent not found among other nations. This conservatism can be seen in the similarity of the present way of living of the Egyptians to that of the ancient Egyptians. It can also be noticed in the continuity of the folk-mind and the persistence of the same familial and social mores.

Secondly, they possess certain spiritual "characteristics — like strong religiosity, fanaticism and obstinacy."¹⁰

Following the premise that Egypt has been in history the meeting-point between the Orient and the Occident, Ghālī assigns a "world-message" to his country:¹¹

...it would behoove Egypt to always strive to be, what it has always been, namely, a connecting link and a mixing ground for the civilizations of the Mediterranean world. Egypt's world-message is to work, in this unique position, for the reapproachment of peoples and countries and to do everything in its power to maintain cultural and spiritual trade between Europe, Asia and Africa.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn (1889-), the greatest living literateur of Egypt, excels all other Egyptian writers in stressing Egypt's uniqueness. In so doing he employs such terms as "Egypt's eternal nature" and "Egyptian spirit".¹² To try to find out what Ṭāhā Ḥusayn exactly means by these terms is a difficult task, however. It is all the more difficult because on different occasions he ascribes divergent traits of character to Egyptians. In one instance he asserts that nothing is so opposed to Egypt's nature as "short hopes and small aspirations". On another occasion he points out the frugal nature of the Egyptians and their quality of being content with little. At other

10. Ibid., pp. 105f.

11. Ibid., p. 110.

12. Cited in Cachia, Pierre, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn: His Place in Egyptian Literary Renaissance, (London: 1956), p. 101. Cited hereafter as Cachia.

times he dwells upon the asceticism of Egyptians, their smiling acceptance of adversity, and their apathy even towards rulers who despoil the country.¹³

He also speaks of an 'Egyptian taste', which is:¹⁴

neither all smile nor all frown, but something
in between the two, in which there is a great
deal of rejoicing and also a little unhappiness.

He finds Egyptian character to be:¹⁵

marked by calm and moderation, a moderation born of the
mildness of Egypt's climate, a moderation which
"dislikes idle rumbling and does not boast to exaggera-
tion such good fortune as life may chance to bring it"...

His stress upon the congeniality of the Egyptian and the European mind, and his insistent advocacy of westernization¹⁶ create the impression that his 'Egyptian culture' would not be different from the European culture. This, however, is not the case. Ṭāhā Ḥusayn's call is actually not a call for a wholesale imitation of the West. His call, according to Cachia, is for drawing upon the West in order to strengthen Egypt's "personality" until it becomes equal to that of the West though distinctively its own.¹⁷ The idea obviously stems from his belief in the uniqueness of the 'Egyptian spirit' and in 'the eternal nature of Egypt'. Hence he believes that:¹⁸

the ancient Egyptian heritage, the Arab-Islāmic heritage,
and the daily acquisitions from the West blend on Egypt's
soil and form a culture which may be truly called Egyptian.

13. Vide *Ibid.*, pp. 101f.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

15. *Loc. cit.*

16. See his work *The Future of Culture in Egypt*, Tr. Sidney Glazer, (Washington, D.C.: 1953), *passim*.

17. *Cachia, op. cit.*, p. 92.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

Another illuminating example in this regard is that of 'Abd-al-nahmān 'Azzam, the former Secretary-General of the League of the Arab States and an upholder of the cause of Egypt's close co-operation with other Arab countries. Despite his feelings for Arabism, Egypt occupies the central position in his thinking and he is, consequently, concerned to demonstrate the inherent 'merits' of Egypt. He sums up these merits into the following four:

1. Egypt was the first school for mankind. It is the country in which the first human civilization was born and flourished.

2. The central location of Egypt in the world has made it close to the whole of humanity.

3. Egypt is Arab. This fact creates a bond between Egypt and half of the African continent and West Asia.

4. Egypt is Muslim. People (i.e. Muslims) regard Egypt as worthy of being followed. They come from the East and the West seeking its knowledge.¹⁹

'Azzam elevates Egypt to ridiculous heights. He concludes the enumeration of the 'merits' of Egypt by observing that Egypt is the centre of world enlightenment. He goes so far as to say: "We, here in Cairo --- whenever we are angry, the whole of mankind is angry; whenever we are happy, the whole of mankind is happy."²⁰

Another important tenet of Egyptian nationalism, as of other modern nationalisms, is its claim upon the supreme loyalty of the individual. The Egyptian nationalist aspiration is that the body-politic should be

19. Cited in 'Urubah, op. cit., p.117.

20. Ibid., pp.117f.

based upon an exclusive, undivided loyalty of Egyptians to their fatherland. Lutfī, for instance, insists that all the good that an Egyptian can do, all the services that he can render, should be reserved for Egypt. For, the love of the fatherland can tolerate no shirk (partnership). He, therefore, urges again and again that the Egyptians should turn their attention exclusively towards Egypt and should regard themselves as Egyptians before everything else.²¹ He wants to inculcate in the Egyptian youth the consciousness that:²²

The greatness of none except that of Egypt will benefit you. The weakness of none except that of Egypt will debase you...You are answerable with regard to none except Egypt. If even an atom of your emotions or the products of your intellectual or physical labour is spent on any (country) other than your own at a moment when she badly needs your services, she will brand you as undutiful children...

Khalid Muhammad Khalid also talks in the same vein with regard to Egypt. He quotes a sentence of Disraeli: "Our goal in life should be (the service and glorification of) our country; our country alone; the whole of our country; and nothing else except our country."²³ Khalid even endeavours to build up an ethical philosophy revolving around loyalty to the fatherland. This philosophy he terms as al-Muwatīniyah (compatriotship). In his own words:²⁴

Compatriotship is the axis around which we now choose to organize all our standards and values.

Compatriotship, dear countrymen, from now on, is our highest ideal.

21. Cited in Ḥamzah, op. cit., V, p. 21.

22. Muntakhabat, op. cit., II, p.166. See also ibid., I., p.166.

23. Muwatinun...la-Ra'aya, IV edition, (Cairo: 1951), p.161.

Cited hereafter as Muwatīnūn.

24. Ibid., p. 154.

Compatriotship, from now on, is our glorious objective, an objective worthy of every effort and sacrifice.

Compatriotship means that you should live in your fatherland as an active citizen and should be equal and free, and not as a passive resident, or as a slave.

Compatriotship demands that you should be virtuous, not merely out of love for virtue; and you should be good, not merely out of inclination towards goodness...but in order that you might be worthy of your fatherland.

The firm belief of the Egyptian nationalists that the Egyptians are a distinct nation, marked by peculiar characteristics, possessing a "world-message"; their view that the fatherland deserves one's supreme loyalty --- all these lead the Egyptian nationalists to fix Egyptianism as the foremost factor in the socio-political life of their country and as the primary determinant of loyalty in the body-politic. Islamic and Arab bonds are not necessarily denied; their claims to constitute the basis of Egyptian nationality or state are, however, rejected. Neither of them is common to all Egyptians, and thus they are regarded as inadequate bases of statehood. The Egyptian nationalist case has been well presented by Husayn Kāmil Salīm in these words:²⁵

What are the elements that go to create a state? Is it unity of language? (Salīm quotes examples to show that this is not so) The same is the case with unity of race...Then, what are the chief elements which make the Egyptians and Englishmen different from one another, if these elements are neither (unity of) language, nor (of) race, nor (of) religion?

In my opinion, such elements are (communities of) history and culture and material interests...We (Egyptians) had a state even before we had heard anything about the Arabs...We had a state even before

25. Cited in 'Urubah, op. cit., pp.127f.

Cf. Ghali, op.cit., pp.102f.

the appearance of Islam. Egypt is the oldest state as is proved by history (Sic!). And it is strange that its frontiers did not change for over five thousand years...We are Egyptians, first and last.

What Salīm wants to stress here is that neither language nor race²⁶ nor religion have been responsible for bringing into existence the ancient Egyptian state. This state came into existence because the factors requisite/of statehood , viz., the communities of history, culture and material interests had developed, marking out the Egyptians from other peoples and creating in them the homogeneity which is essential for corporate life. Thus Salīm seems to say that Egyptianism should continue as the basis of statehood. Whatever the different elements of public life in Egypt might be, from the viewpoint of race or that of religious belief, their participation in the political life should be only in their capacity of being Egyptians.

(2)

The writings of Egyptian nationalists make it evident that Islam does not occupy any normative position within the framework of their ideology. This is the inevitable result of consistently following the implications of the basic premise of Egyptian nationalism: all Egyptians constitute one nationality irrespective of religious considerations. It is essential to caution that this attitude does not mean that Egyptian nationalism is opposed to Islam or religion as such. Egyptian

26. Salīm mentions race probably because he considers the Arabs a racial entity. This view is, however, rejected by the leaders of the Arab nationalist thought.

nationalism has no objection against people's profession of their religions, faithfully and devotedly. In general the nationalists may even encourage religious devotion: "Go to the mosque on Friday if you are a Muslim, to the Church on Sunday if you are a Christian, or to the Synagogue on Saturday if you are a Jew."²⁷ It would not be wrong to say that this attitude of respect to all religions may be regarded as representative of the general attitude of the leaders of Egyptian nationalist thought.

With respect to Islam, disregarding rare exceptions, the Egyptian nationalists, including the Copts, are particularly respectful. The famous Coptic nationalist leader, Makram^c Ubayd, is reported to have said: "It is true, that I am a Christian by faith; but I am a Muslim by fatherland."²⁸ Despite these considerations, the plain fact is that Egyptian nationalism confines itself to the realization of objectives common to all Egyptians, Christians as well as Muslims. It is not committed to the realization of Islamic ideals.

Is Islam, then, of no greater significance to the Egyptian nationalists than one out of the numerous badges of honour for Egypt which is to be paraded to win acclamation and praise for Egypt? The answer is in the negative. Few exceptions apart, the Muslim Egyptian nationalists have a positive role for Islam in view. They recognize Islam --- and for that matter every religion --- to be of enormous value as a means of awakening the conscience of people and toning up their morals.

27. cited in Ghazzali, op. cit., p.78.

28. Cited in Colombe, op. cit., p.146.

Khalid Muhammad Khalid, whose book Min Huna Nabda' (Cairo, 1950),²⁹ contains the most virulent criticism of the Islāmic religious groups (whom he terms 'priesthood') and of their ideals, regards religion as an indispensable need of mankind.³⁰ He insists that his attack on priesthood stems from the desire to save religion from being misrepresented and exploited. He attributes to religion the qualities that he himself cherishes. He regards religion as humane and altruistic and democratic in spirit. He also extols it for its firm belief in reason, its love for life and its disapproval of asceticism as sheer idiocy.

Similarly, Luffi's opposition to Pan-Islāmic ideals is well-known. Yet his love of Islām is evident from the articles that he wrote defending Islām against the attacks made by Lord Cromer. He gave vent to his Islāmic religious emotions in an article which he wrote after his visit to Madīnah. The sight of the green dome of the Holy Prophet's Mosque awakens in his mind:³¹

...the memories of that Arab glory, and illumines...
the soul with the light of those noble principles of
which this sacred precinct was the cradle; and from
where they radiated to all corners of the world,
from one end to the other.

The core of the Egyptian nationalist position is that religion and state should be separate. This separation is considered by them to be in the interests of both religion and state. The issue that they take up with orthodox Muslims is that the traditional interpretation of Islām, according

29. We are using the English translation of the book by Isma'il al-Ṭarūqī, entitled From Here We Start, (Washington: 1953). Cited hereafter as Khalid.

30. Khalid, op. cit., p.31. See also pp.56ff.

31. Muntakhabāt, op. cit., I, pp.236.

to which the two are inseparable, is erroneous. Some of them hold the view that Islām permits this separation of state and religion. Others go farther and say that this separation is Islām's own intent which has been misinterpreted by Muslim ^Culama'. They are, therefore, of the view that they have not broken away from Islām; they have merely broken away from its traditional interpretation.

This non-traditional outlook of the Egyptian nationalists is common to the leaders of other Muslim nationalisms, e.g. Arab nationalism, Indonesian nationalism, etc. It seems to be the outcome of two main factors: the change in the general frame of reference of a fairly large section of the modern-educated Muslims, and the requirements of a nationalist movement which is not confined solely to Muslims.

The change in the frame of reference has been brought about by the increasingly vigorous penetration of Western ideas and values in Egypt over the past hundred and fifty years. The main vehicles for the spread of these ideas were the modern educational institutions. The education which had been introduced had either no, or else a very obscure place for Islām. The result was the rising generation of educated Muslims began to grow under the predominant influence of Western, rather than Islamic ideas. The degeneration, backwardness and stagnancy in which the contemporary Muslim society had sunk, presented a sharp contrast to the progress and dynamic of Western society. Thus a considerable section of Muslims who were the products of the new education grew skeptical about orthodox Islām and the ideas and values upon which it was founded. They developed an intense admiration for the West and began to regard its ideas and institutions as the norms for their own society. They began to look upon

westernization as imperative for the progress of their people. The leadership of the Egyptian ^{nationalist} ~~nationalist~~ movement --- both political and intellectual --- was generally in the hands of the people who had received western education and who generally looked towards Western ideas, traditions and institutions for guidance and inspiration. The situation has been described by Heyworth-Dunne in these words:³²

During the nationalist struggle, there was a tendency to place the loyalty to Islam aside because of the fashionable influence of Western-trained politicians, many of whom never opened a book connected with the traditional science of Islam. By adopting Western political methods, and ignoring the fact that Islam was the traditional way of life, the new politician imagined that he would achieve success.

The fact that the separation of religion and state was a part of Western political traditions facilitated the popularization of this idea. Some people considered the Western development seriously and were convinced that its movement had been in the correct direction. A good many accepted it simply on the authority of the West.

In the second place, the existence of a substantially influential Coptic minority has deeply influenced the secular orientation of Egyptian nationalism. The Copts roughly constitute eight per cent of Egypt's total population, and claim to be the descendants of the ancient Egyptians. They consider themselves, and are considered by their Egyptian muslim compatriots, to be an integral part of the Egyptian nation. Their church is a national church, confined to Egypt. During the nationalist struggle, the bulk of the Copts threw in its lot with the

32. Dunne, op.cit., p.8.

movement, particularly with the Wafd. In the Wafd they have wielded very considerable influence and power.³³ The Copts have been always opposed to the idea of their country becoming a religious state. For, obviously a religious state in Egypt would mean a state formed around the religion of the muslim majority. The possibility of an Islamic State in Egypt has been feared by the Copts because of its possible menacing implications for them. They feared that they might lose the equality of rights that they have enjoyed. They might also lose their full freedom to practice their faith fully. Also, they have feared the possibility that they might be discriminated against in the political and economic fields and be made to live on the margin of the national community as they had done prior to modern times. Their support for a secularist national state was, therefore, a support for the assurance that they would be treated in every respect on equal terms with Muslims, that their religious freedom would remain intact and that they would not be made victims of religious fanaticism and discrimination. Moreover, as Hourani points out, many educated Coptic youth, are becoming agnostic or atheist, while remaining nominally Copts.³⁴ This conscientious lack of faith in Religion on the part of such elements may also be regarded as a factor in the Coptic enthusiasm for advocating the cause of the separation of religion and state.

33. Ghazzali, op. cit., p.100.

34. Hourani, A.H., Minorities in the Arab World, (London: 1947), p.47.

The leaders of the Egyptian nationalist movement have throughout been careful not to afford cause for any dissatisfaction among the Copts lest Egyptian nationalist unity be shattered. The British authorities had tried to justify their occupation of Egypt by raising the bogey that the Copts needed their protection. This made the Egyptian nationalists even more cautious. The goals of Egyptian nationalism were, therefore, confined to those non-religious aspirations of Egyptians which could be shared by Copts and Muslims alike.

Furthermore, the problem which confronted the Egyptian nationalists was to explore a common, all-inclusive basis of loyalty for all Egyptians. Could Islam be the basis of such a loyalty? The answer was in the negative since Islam is not the common denominator in Egyptian life. If Islam were made the basis of Egyptian political life and statehood, the Copts could never develop a deep feeling of attachment and belonging to their fatherland. Whatever their formal attitude, they cannot be reasonably expected to devote themselves wholeheartedly to Egypt, were an Islamic state to be established in the country. The nationalists, however, firmly believe that Egypt belongs as much to Copts as it belongs to Muslims. Hence, the problem before the nationalists was not merely to assure the minorities that they would not be wronged. The problem was to guarantee the Copts full participation in the national life and to ensure their wholehearted loyalty and devotion to the fatherland. This was obviously not possible if Islam was to be the axis around which the whole public life had to revolve.

All these factors operating for a long period of time have combined to give Egyptian nationalism an unambiguously secular orientation. The Egyptian nationalist vision of the national state is purely secular. In such a state the religions of all the religious communities living in the state are to be treated equally. There can be no discrimination either in favour of, or against any of them. Such a state will not be an agency working for the realization of the ideals of any one particular religion. In short, the state will not grant any privileged position in the public life of the country to any particular religion as against other religions.

Thus, the contemporary Egyptian nationalist ideology rests upon the secularist premise that state and religion should remain separate. What is surprising is the lack of a detailed discussion of the issue by the Egyptian nationalist writers. Nuseibeh's following observations about Arab nationalists as well hold true in the case of Egyptian nationalists:³⁵

Theorists of Arab nationalism, under the spell of Western ideas, have made no serious attempt to accommodate Western experience to their own historical background. In most instances they have glossed over the whole issue as being too delicate and embarrassing, or they have advocated the secularization of nationalism in deference to modern progressive ideas and the need to keep pace with the rest of the world. Surely a question so vital and so deep-rooted deserves far more attention than has so far been accorded to it. The masses of people, who are acquiring increasing political significance with the spread of education, will doubtless demand a better reason for the banishment of religion from public life than the fact that Europe or America or India have done so.

Apart from Khālid Muhammad Khālid's writings, we hardly find

35. Nuseibeh, op. cit., p. 67.

any detailed discussion of the problem in the nationalist writings. Luṭfī, however, discusses the problem at some length. His discussion, too, lacks the clarity and cogency which are characteristic of his other writings. Luṭfī seems to be impressed that the concern for mutual benefits and common good can be shared by all the members of a nationality. The promotion of common good can, therefore, furnish a firm ground for national unity. As for religion, it is bound to have a divisive effect in a country where several religious communities are living side by side, if it is made them reigning consideration in public life. The whole of his argument is, however, shrouded with ambiguity although the purpose is clear. He wants to stress that 'utility' rather than religious beliefs, about which there are bound to be differences, should be the foremost factor in political life. Criticising the views of Pan-Islāmists, he points out that their ideology is inconsistent, and traces this inconsistency to:³⁶

the endeavour to make different religious beliefs the basis of participation in worldly politics. This is a dangerous line of thought. We have explained its danger on every convenient occasion. We have said with others that vital utilities (al-manāfi^c al-hayawīyah) alone can be correctly taken as the basis of political life. We strongly believe that making 'utility' the basis of political life is an idea not shunned by the true religion (i.e. Islām). People strive in this life for their benefits (or utility) the way they like. This is not wrong from the Islāmic viewpoint, so long as they do not make 'permissible' what is 'prohibited' and do not 'prohibit' what is 'permissible' and comply with the morals of Islām. We do not deny that some European politicians have sometimes used religion in the past as a weapon to serve politics. But this weapon is likely to prove more dangerous for the one who carries it than for his opponent. Hence, it is beneficial as well as necessary to make 'utility' the only basis of participation in politics, disregarding differences in religious beliefs.

36. Muntakhabat, op. cit., I, p. 309.

On another occasion, he proudly proclaims that the Egyptians had learned their principles of freedom from:³⁷

the most perfect teacher in respect of knowledge i.e. the twentieth century. Therefore, we shall base the (public) life of our country on the principle of utility without (allowing) differences of (religious) beliefs to exert any influence, big or small, on the general politics of Egypt.

Thus Luṭfī showed the direction along which Egyptian nationalist ideology was to develop. He left, however, a number of question unanswered which were later on taken up by other leaders of nationalist thought. Luṭfī, for instance, did not make it clear whether or not, in his view, Islām had made it obligatory on the Muslim community to use the coercive power of the state to enforce the Islāmic Shari^cah. He also did not spell out his opinion about the view that the state should be the protector of Islām and the agency for its propagation. It is amazing that he did not speak with frankness and clarity on these issues although it is unlikely that he did not know that the above-mentioned ideals were held by orthodox Muslims on religious grounds. Thus Luṭfī did not say in clear, unambiguous terms whether the idea of Islāmic state is inconsistent with his ideology or not. The general tenor of his writings quoted above, however, makes it clear that his ideology supported the idea of the separation of religion and state.

It was left for Khālīd Muḥammad Khālīd, a graduate of al-Azhar, and an ardent nationalist, to take up the issue and to express and argue with frankness and vigour the secularist attitude of the Egyptian

37. Ibid., I, p. 170.

nationalists. A lengthy chapter of his controversial book From Here We Start (Min Huna Nabda'), entitled "National Rule" is devoted to discussing this problem. In discussing this issue he re-opened the debate which had been initiated by ^CAlī ^CAbd al-Rāziq about a quarter century ago. ⁶Abd al-Rāziq had discussed the issue purely from the theological, Islāmic point of view. Khālīd too gives religious arguments in favour of the idea of separation between state and religion. He, however, added two new features to his discussion of the problem which are not found in ^CAbd al-Rāziq's book. One of these was the presentation of national and religious governments as mutually exclusive entities in unambiguous and vigorous terms. The possibility that national government could be conciliated with Islāmic, religious government, is altogether ruled out by Khālīd. A national rule, in his conception, can be nothing else but secular. Secondly, Khālīd brings in non-theological arguments as well to support his idea. He rejects the idea of religious government not only because it is inconsistent, in his view, with religion itself but also because of its own 'demerits', as we shall see.

Khālīd strongly pleads for the separation of state and religion. Far from being in conflict with Islām, this separation appears to Khālīd as the purpose of Islām itself. Mixing state and religion means to him soiling the purity of religion, jeopardising its security; and harming both state and religion.³⁸ This separation rests, in Khālīd's view, on the fact that the nature of the tasks to be pursued by religion

38. Khālīd, op. cit., p. 118.

and state are basically different. The task of religion consists of guiding people towards spiritual and moral values, and exhorting them to virtue and righteousness.³⁹ The task of the state, on the other hand, consists of protecting the civic interests of the people, establishing peace and security and safeguarding the fatherland against aggression. The means at the disposal of the stateman are coercion and punishment in the case of the violation of law.⁴⁰ The speciality of the religious leader, asserts Khālid, is the care for the human soul, the preservation of its virtues and its relation to God; and his method is preaching, guidance and persuasion.⁴¹ The religious leader cannot invest himself with the rights to punish and coerce, argues Khālid, because God has laid down in the Qur'ān: "No coercion in religion."⁴²

Khālid mentions three important grounds on which the case for a religious government is pleaded. These grounds are:

1. the elimination of vice;
2. the enforcement of prohibitions; and
3. the complete liberation of the country.⁴³

He shows that none of these reasons is sound enough to support the contention for religious government.

With regard to the first, Khālid argues that state legislation cannot bring about the spiritual elevation of the individual. On the contrary, fighting vice through state and law is to confer upon it such

39. Ibid., p. 143

40. Loc. cit.

41. Loc. cit.

42. Loc. cit.

43. Ibid., p. 125.

allurement as belongs to forbidden things. Religion without being a state, in Khālid's opinion, is the force capable of awakening the consciences and changing the hearts of people.⁴⁴ But this object can only be achieved if religion confines itself to preaching and persuasion and does not resort to the use of force. For, according to Khālid:⁴⁵

Religion commands far greater authority and influence in combating vice when it reaches men's souls through tolerance, mercy, calm argument and sound logic. But when the approach turns into the whip and sword of religious government, virtue receives a deadly blow.

The second ground on which the case of religious government is pleaded is the need for enforcing Islāmic prohibitions. Among the Islāmic prohibitions Khālid discusses those regarding theft, adultery and alcohol. He argues that these prohibitions are impractical and can hardly ever be enforced.

With regard to theft, Khālid does not consider it a ~~rather~~ guilt if it is committed under the compulsion of need and poverty. The people of the Islāmic world have to be considered "in a state of famine as long as the people have not yet obtained the necessities of life." Consequently, theft will remain unpunished until people become prosperous. Then, it will be proper to cut off the hand -- and even the foot -- of the thief. But a few thieves do not necessitate the establishment of a special government," observes Khālid, "one section added to our criminal code will suffice."⁴⁶

44. Loc. cit., p. 125.

45. Ibid., p. 126.

46. Ibid., pp. 126f.

As for adultery and alcohol, in Khālīd's opinion, it is difficult, or rather impossible to convict people for these crimes. For, a person's guilt can be established only by direct witness or confession. In the case of direct evidence, God has provided that there should be four witnesses prepared to testify that they personally witnessed the crime in flagranti. But such evidence is impossible to produce. In fact, if there were persons who deliberately witness the actual commission of adultery, their witness would never be acceptable to God. Because of these obstacles to the punishment of adultery only in a very few cases was the guilt of adultery established during the times of the Prophet and his Caliphs. And in all these cases, observes Khālīd, the guilt was established by confession under the compulsion of idealism and moral enthusiasm.⁴⁷

As for the argument that national liberation and national reconstruction demand a religious government, it is simply dismissed by Khālīd. Any strong, nationalist and sincere government, in his opinion, is capable of achieving this. Khālīd even considers the nationalist government to be in a better position to achieve this goal. Says Khālīd:⁴⁸

A nationalist government is, in fact, even more capable of such a task than a religious government, because it can unite all the citizens, whereas a religious government is necessarily sectarian and thus not representative of all its subjects.

Khālīd also enumerates in great detail the 'demerits' of religious government. These he designates as its 'instincts'. The 'instincts' of religious government, in Khālīd's opinion, are the following: obscurity

47. Ibid., p. 127.

48. Ibid., p. 125.

with regard to the source of authority; lack of confidence in human intelligence; glorification of the poverty of spirit and stupidity; denial of the freedom to criticize, to oppose, and to think; absolute monocracy; stagnancy and an attitude of opposition towards life; and beastly cruelty.⁴⁹

The 'detachment of religion from politics', Khālīd repeatedly stresses, is advantageous for religion itself and is in accord with the spirit of Islām:⁵⁰

...religion must remain as Lord has always wanted it to be — namely, priesthood, not empery; guidance, not government; and preaching, not a sword. The detachment of religion from politics and its soaring high above it is the surest way of its remaining pure, bright and blissful. Such detachment saves religion from responsibility for the mistakes and injustices of government and safeguards in the people's breasts their high regard, their love and reverence, their response and enthusiasm for religion.

Ṭāhā Ḥusayn is another Egyptian nationalist intellectual whose views concerning Islām deserve a special mention. His views, however, have passed through a series of changes during the past three decades. In the beginning he was cool and unsympathetic towards Islām. At that time, according to Cachia, he thought that "Egypt could hardly borrow from the Islāmic past anything relevant to its present."⁵¹ Later on, however, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn developed the theory that religion is "an instinct of the soul", and therefore, is an entirely personal matter which should not interfere with science or with politics. The provision in the Egyptian Constitution that Islām was the religion of the state is understood by Ṭāhā Ḥusayn to be nothing more than a recognition of certain existing facts and practices —

49. *Ibid.*, Pp. 129ff.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

51. Cited in *Cachia, op. cit.*, p. 94.

that the king was a Muslim, that religious festivals were publicly celebrated, and that Waqf funds were spent on purposes for which they had been created. This did not mean to Ṭahā Ḥusayn that the state was committed to the defence of Islām or to the application of its laws.⁵²

During the last eighteen or nineteen years Ṭahā Ḥusayn's former coolness has given way to warmth and admiration. He extols Islām's role in its relationship with Science as less intolerant than Christianity. He praises Islām as a religion which makes its appeal primarily to reason. He also considers the message of Islām, apart from monotheism, to be a call for social and economic equality.⁵³

Despite this changed attitude, his position on the question of Islāmic state is perhaps not much different from that of Khālid. His present position with regard to Islām has been correctly summed up by Cachia in the following words:⁵⁴

Ṭahā Ḥusayn now advocates in the name of Islām substantially the same course as he once advocated in the name of Reason, enlightenment, or progress: let the individual believe in order to satisfy his "instinct", but let the Azhar confine itself to training religious teachers; and let the State — Islāmic though the Constitution calls it -- recognize and foster the religions of its subjects, both Muslims and Copts, as components of a citizen's national consciousness, but otherwise model itself on the Western system of Government.

In the case of Ṭahā Ḥusayn too, therefore, the idea of an Islāmic state is unacceptable, even though he has become increasingly respectful towards religions, and regards them as component parts of the citizens' national consciousness.

52. Ibid., pp. 94f.

53. Ibid., p. 97.

54. Ibid., p. 98.

Other less noted Egyptian nationalist writers have argued that there exists incompatibility between the nationalist ideology and the ideal of an Islāmic state. The argument proceeds on the basis of the famous nationalist motto: "Religion is for Allāh, and fatherland is for all compatriots." The role of religion is recognized as important, but its proper role, however, is the improvement of the spiritual and moral condition of the people. As for political affairs, the adjudication of disputes and other matters related to statehood and nationality, Islām should have nothing to do with all that. For, says one writer, "the Egyptian fatherland belongs not only to the Muslims of Egypt, and all civilized states covet the separation of politics from religion." The endeavour to make the Qur'ān the basis of legislation and the mixing introduction of religious matters into politics, according to the same writer, have only led to evil.⁵⁵

Another nationalist writer demands that the clause of the Egyptian Constitution (of 1923) which lays down that Islām is the religion of the state, should be expunged. This, in his view, should be done in order to destroy "sectarianism and (religious) fanaticism." The writer argues on the basis of the motto quoted above. The separation of state and religion is supported by him as follows:⁵⁶

Egyptian state means the whole apparatus working to facilitate the affairs of the society, to guide its activities and its productive energies. To stamp this apparatus officially with the Islamic faith would mean the establishment of a religious

55. Cited in Majallat al-Azhar, XX, No. 6, p. 524.

56. Cited in al-Ghazzālī, Muḥammad, Fi Mawkab al-Da'wah, (Cairo: 1954), p. 152.

government which will apply the heavenly Sharī^cah and enforce penalties like the (Islāmic) penalty for theft which requires the cutting off of the hand, ...and this is impossible of enforcement.

Even though the issue has not been dealt with in great detail, the idea of the separation of religion and state is generally accepted by Egyptian nationalist writers. This seems to be the culmination of the trend which was initiated by Muṣṭafa' Kāmil when he put forth the idea of twin parallel loyalties: religious and nationalistic. Muṣṭafa' Kāmil, were he to come back to life and explain his ideas, would perhaps consider the application of the Sharī^cah the religious duty of Muslims. Nevertheless, the seeds of the separation of religion and politics are to be found embedded in his thought.

Thus contemporary Egyptian nationalist ideas with regard to the ideological aspect of statehood exhibit the following striking points:

1. That Islāmic and national states generally are held to be mutually incongruous. Egypt belongs to all the Egyptians, both Muslims and Copts. Hence, Egypt cannot be made an Islāmic state. In other words, the nationalists are of the opinion that the idea of Islāmic state runs counter to the Egyptian nationalist ideology.

2. The Egyptian nationalists consider religion and state to carry out functions which are of considerably different nature. Thus the two cannot be joined together.

3. The Egyptian nationalists evince the consciousness that important developments have taken place in human history which necessitate basic changes in the socio-political life of Egypt. In this regard, they generally consider the Western nations and their social and political systems as the models for the future reconstruction of Egypt. Thus the

changes they envisage for Egypt are largely along Western lines. The separation of state and religion is a part of the tendency to find an ideal in the West.

4. The Egyptian nationalists insist that they are not opposed to Islām or to religion as such. They want only that the state should not be committed to any particular religion. All religions should be treated equally.

There is another issue on which Egyptian nationalist views sharply conflict with the views of the exponents of traditional Islām. The issue is that of Pan-Islāmism. Deeply committed as they are to the belief in Egyptian identity, it is but natural that the Egyptian nationalists feel little disposed to accept Pan-Islāmic or Arab nationalist ideas. On this issue heated discussions have taken place during the years with which we are concerned. The Egyptian nationalists generally have stood for an isolationist foreign policy for Egypt and have opposed all wider groupings. Even with regard to the Palestine issue some Egyptian nationalists evinced coolness and some others even openly opposed Egyptian participation in the Palestine war.⁵⁷ After the 1949 truce agreement, in particular, the Egyptian nationalists have insisted on pursuing an isolationist policy.⁵⁸

The Egyptian nationalist opposition to Pan-Islāmic trends finds its most forceful expression in the writings of Luṭfī. He opposes Pan-Islāmism on the following grounds:

1. The foremost obligation imposed by patriotism is to delineate the frontiers of the fatherland. For, if this is not done and Egypt is regarded as the fatherland of every Muslim (which is the Pan-Islamists' goal), this

57. See Ghazzālī, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

58. See *Uṭrubah*, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

would lead to the disappearance of the Egyptian nationality. In such a case, independence becomes meaningless. Independence implies that national rights should be confined within well-specified geographical borders.

To say that Egypt legally belongs to all Egyptians -- Muslims as well as Christians -- and then to say that it belongs to all the Muslims of the world is self-contradictory. This is tantamount to saying that independence is not independence.⁵⁹

2. The Pan-Islāmic idea is based on the assumption that religion should be the basis of political life. This is an erroneous and dangerous assumption. Utility rather than religious beliefs should be the basis of the polity.⁶⁰

3. The view of earlier Muslims that the "land of Islām" is the fatherland of all Muslims was an imperialistic precept. This precept provided the ground for expansion and conquest. But in the present times there are no possibilities for the Eastern nations to become imperialistic. They have become too weak to pursue such a policy. On the contrary, their main concern is to defend themselves. Hence wataniyah rather than Pan-Islāmism, is in accord with the present needs of the Eastern nations.⁶¹

^CAbd al-Rahmān ^CAzzām appears to be the ^{only} important personality among the Egyptian nationalists demanding closer Arab relations. His plea is based, however, on a consideration of the interests of Egypt rather than the interests of all Arab countries. He opposes the policy of isolation from the Arab countries, claiming that Egypt is "the heart and the centre of

59. Muntakhabāt, op. cit., I, p. 301.

60. Vide. supra., pp. 57-58.

61. Cited in Hamzah, op. cit., VI, pp. 22f.

Arabism."⁶² One of the main reasons that he puts forth for his opposition to isolationism is that Egypt's strategic needs force closer relations with the Arab countries. Syria in particular appears to ^CAzzām to be highly important from the view point of Egypt's strategic needs. "We cannot allow Syria to do what she wants to", says ^CAzzām, "because natural strategy requires that Syria should remain within our 'vital area'".⁶³ He goes on to add:⁶⁴

Egypt cannot defend herself if she remains isolated...from her neighbours. And the day Syria falls, Egypt will not be able to stand more than one battle.

This need of 'vital area' and demand of 'natural strategy' leads ^CAzzām to favour a Pan-Arab policy. What differentiates ^CAzzām from Arab nationalists in this regard is the motivation for following such a policy. Sāṭi^C al-Ḥuṣarī, therefore, deplores ^CAzzām's use of terms such as mentioned above for being similar to those used by avaricious states to justify their policies of imperialist expansion.⁶⁵

As for other Egyptian nationalists, their general belief was that all Pan-Arab and Pan-Islamic trends should be resisted. Egypt's interest, which was of supreme importance in ^{their} opinion, demanded the pursuit of an isolationist foreign policy. During its nascent period, says Iḥsān ^CAbd al-Quddūs, the editor of Rūz al-Yūsuf and a famous writer of Egypt, the U.S.A. had kept the Munroe Doctrine as their guiding light. This Doctrine was, to put it briefly: "Europe should not interfere in our

62. ^CUrūbah, op. cit., p. 116.

63. Ibid., pp. 119 f.

64. Ibid., p. 120

65. Loc. cit.

affairs and we should not interfere in theirs." Contemporary Egypt, in his view, was passing through a period which is similar to that period when the U.S.A. had accepted the Munroe Doctrine as its basic policy.⁶⁶

To conclude, we find that Egyptian nationalism during the years 1945-56 has shared with orthodox Islām some immediate goals — complete independence and unity of the Nile Valley — which were dear to all Egyptians. Egyptian nationalism has, however, also developed long-term aspirations, and has come to possess a vision of the future national state. It believes that Egypt rightly claims from Egyptians their loyalty and allegiance. These, the Egyptian nationalists seem to say, rightfully belong to the fatherland in its own right and not merely as an offshoot of loyalty to Islām, which is the view of orthodox Muslims, as we shall see later. The Egyptian nationalists regard Egyptianism as the basis of statehood. In the national state that they have in view, all Egyptians will participate equally, by virtue of their being Egyptians. Moreover, this national state would also be a secular state — a concept which has become an integral part of the Egyptian nationalist ideology. Moreover, it was regarded as the requirement of the changed circumstances and of the need to catch up with the advanced Western world. It was also, perhaps, due to the desire to see both religion and state function smoothly. Thus the Egyptian nationalists were

66. Cited in al-Huṣarī, Saṭi^c, Ara' wa Ahādīth fī al-Qawmīyah al-^cArabiyyah, (Cairo: 1951), p. 95.

See also similar views of Hafnī Mahmūd Pasha cited in ibid., p. 79 and p. 88; and the views of Luṭfī, ibid., p. 81. See also Urubah, op. cit., passim.

opposed to the orthodox Muslims' ideal of a state wedded to the protection of Islām and the application of the Shari^cah. Moreover, the Egyptian nationalists were deeply committed to the idea of Egypt's unique and distinct personality and hence the frontiers of Egypt (which according to some of them had not changed for more than five thousand years) had a sanctity and a deep-rooted emotional importance for them. They were, therefore, opposed to the larger groupings viz., Pan-Islāmic or Pan-Arab unity which were advocated in Egypt by orthodox Muslims (and Arab nationalists).

CHAPTER III

CONTEMPORARY ARAB NATIONALISM IN EGYPT VIS-A-VIS ISLĀM.

To-day Arab nationalism is the strongest political force in the Arab world and is engaged in re-shaping the whole map of the area. It is led at the present moment by Egypt, or to be more precise, by the United Arab Republic. Its source of inspiration is the dynamic personality of Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir (1918-) until recently the president of Egypt, and now the president of the United Arab Republic. This movement is, however, not of Egyptian origin. It was born and nurtured in the Arab Fertile Crescent about the same period when Egyptian nationalism began to arise in Egypt. It is also in the Fertile Crescent that the ideas and concepts of Arab Nationalism were developed and elaborated. As for Egypt, its so-called Arab Nationalism still suffers from retarded development and so far has hardly struck any roots in the Egyptian soil. Whatever Arab national consciousness is found in Egypt to-day is due to the exigencies of politics which necessitated a larger grouping in order to be able to confront common external dangers, rather than due to any deep convictions about Arabism among the Egyptians. The Egyptians as yet do not seem to be genuinely convinced that they are primarily Arabs, that they owe their supreme loyalty to the Arab nationality, and that their political life should be based on this premise. Hence, so far they have not been able to develop a clear and consistent Arab nationalist ideology, and their writings on Arabism generally betray a lack of seriousness, as we shall see in the following pages.

In this chapter we shall trace the beginning of the Arab national consciousness in the Arab world, cast a glance at its development both in

the Fertile Crescent and Egypt, and examine the attitudes of Egypt's Arab nationalism towards Islām.

(1)

The first manifestations of Arab national consciousness appeared in the second half of the nineteenth century. This consciousness arose in the wake of the cultural and intellectual regeneration of the Arab Fertile Crescent. The stimulation for this cultural awakening had been provided, as in the case of Egypt, by contact with Western peoples and Western culture.

In their embryonic form the Arab nationalist ideas arose among a group of Christian intellectuals of the Lebanon. The Arab consciousness of these intellectuals was partly the outcome of the growing popularity of Arabic as a literary and scientific language. An even more important factor was their study of Arab history from the modern historical point of view. This study changed their entire outlook. Formerly Christian Arabs had lived in their own religious communities, separated from Muslim Arabs. Moreover, they had regarded Arab history as synonymous with Islāmic history, and Arab civilization as synonymous with Islāmic civilization. Being Christians, naturally they could not regard either Islāmic history or Islāmic civilization as their own. But through their study of Arab history in the works of Orientalists, they learned that the Arabs had possessed a civilization of their own even before the appearance of Islām and that Christian Arabs had made valuable contributions to Arab civilization both during and before the Islāmic era. Arab history and civilization, therefore, gradually ceased to appear as

exclusively Muslim. These Christian intellectuals began to regard them as common to both Christian and Muslim Arabs. Despite the difference of faith, they began to discover a number of important affinities which bound them to Muslim Arabs. They spoke the same language. They possessed more or less the same cultural heritage -- the Arab heritage. All this made them feel with a great intensity of feeling that they were Arabs. Thus they began to feel proud of their Arab past and think in terms of joining hands with Arab Muslims for the restoration of Arab glory.¹

The first tangible expression of Arab national consciousness was the formation of a secret society in Beirut in the year 1863 at the initiative of some Christian intellectuals. This society created some stir in the atmosphere when it posted a series of revolutionary placards in Beirut directed against the Ottomans in the early 1880's. These placards voiced Arab grievances against the policies of the Ottoman government and demanded reforms. The issue of making Arabic the medium of instruction and the official language in the Arab provinces of the Empire featured very prominently in these placards. Independence for Syria in union with the Lebanon also appeared among the demands.²

It is not surprising that such ideas first arose among Christians, rather than Muslim Arabs. Unlike the Muslim Arabs, Christian Arabs had no

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1. al-Ḥusarī, Sātī^c, Muḥadarāt fī Nushū' al-Fikrah al-Qawmīyah, III edition, (Beirut: 1956), pp. 182 ff. Cited hereafter as Nushu'.
 2. See an account of the activities of this Society in Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening, (London: 1938), pp. 79ff. Cited hereafter as Antonius.

sense of identity with the Ottoman rulers. Unlike the Muslim Arabs who were loyal to the Ottoman Caliphate on religious grounds, the Christian Arabs did not have any loyalty for the Caliphate; their submission to it was almost completely involuntary. Unlike the Muslim Arabs, again, the Christian Arabs were not regarded as the community of the state and were, therefore, exempt from military service. For all these reasons, they did not feel that they shared the fortunes of the Empire. Furthermore, the Christians preceded the Muslims in receiving Western education and assimilating Western culture (which was the source of new ideas like nationalism and which also set in ^{motion} a process of changes in the life of the Arabs which paved the way for the acceptance of new ideas). This was easier for them to do in view of the fact that modern education was introduced into the Lebanon and Syria by Christian missionaries. As a result of these factors, the Arab national consciousness was awakened among Christian Arabs before it found a place in the hearts of their Muslim compatriots. And when their Arab national consciousness was aroused, it developed very rapidly and led them to think in terms of demanding independence from the Ottoman Empire and the formation of an Arab state.³

This early expression of Arab national sentiment among Christians was immune from religious impulses.

Among Muslim Arabs, the early manifestations of Arab national sentiment took a different form, and appeared a little later. The impact of their

3. Nushu', op. cit., pp. 178f. and p. 194.

aroused national sentiment may be seen in their starting to question the legitimacy of the Ottoman Caliphate from the Islāmic point of view. Nevertheless, they thought in terms of a united Islāmic world and in terms of the Islāmic Caliphate. They, however, began to desire that Arabs instead of Turks should have an upper hand in the Caliphate. Umm al-Qurā' of the Syrian writer, ^cAbd al-Rahmān al-Kawākibī (d. 1903), published in 1898, is a good example of this trend of thought. al-Kawākibī believes that by virtue of language and descent the Arabs occupy a distinctive position within Islām. He advocated the transfer of the Caliphate to an Arab of the Quraysh tribe, with Mecca as its capital.⁴

Thus in the early expression of Arab national consciousness among Muslim Arabs, the religious impulse predominated over the national impulse.

In the early part of this century, these two trends of Arab nationalism began to merge together. The merger was to a large extent the Arab reaction to the rise of Pan-Turanian nationalism in Turkey and to the policy of Turkification of all parts of the Empire pursued by the Ottoman government from the time of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908. As a result of this merger, the religious impulse started to be replaced by national impulses.

The First Arab Congress held in Paris in 1913 evidenced an Arab nationalism which was divested of religious motivations. The proceedings of the Congress shed an abundant light on the character of Arab nationalism around that period.⁵

4. Nuseibeh, Hazem Zaki, The Ideas of Arab Nationalism, (Ithaca: 1956), p. 48. Cited hereafter as Nuseibeh.

5. See the proceedings of the Congress in Nushu', op. cit., pp. 207-19.

In the light of the speeches, statements and resolutions of the Congress, Arab nationalism appears as a movement exclusively concerned with Arab national questions. The speakers of the Congress stressed that the Congress had no religious objectives. The idea that all Arabs, whatever their religion, constitute one nationality, was emphasised. It was even pointed out (and with approval) that the racial pride of the Arabs takes precedence over their religious pride.⁶ The demands made by the Congress were also confined solely to matters which were of common interest to Muslim as well as Christian Arabs. These demands were mainly for better Arab representation in the central government, the reform of the administration of the Arab provinces on the basis of the principle of decentralization and the use of Arabic as the medium of instruction and as the official language of the Arab provinces.

The allegation that the Arab movement wanted the separation of the Arab provinces from the Empire was repudiated. However, it was made clear by the chairman of the Congress that even this Arab desire to remain a part of the Congress was not based on religious considerations. They so desired solely because of their hope that the Ottoman Empire could ensure the progress and well-being of the Arabs. Consistent with this point of view, the warning was voiced that if the expected reforms were not carried out, the Arabs would completely change their attitude towards the Ottoman Empire.⁷

The demands of the Congress were initially accepted by the Ottoman

6. Ibid., pp. 210f.

7. Ibid., p. 212.

government. But soon its policy changed and the agreement between the government and the Arabs was not put into effect. On the contrary, the Ottoman government adopted a repressive policy towards the rising Arab national movement. A number of Arab leaders were executed. The trend of granting greater autonomy to the Arab provinces was reversed. This changed attitude of the Ottoman government provided the external challenge and the negative stimulant which help to integrate the diverse forces within a people and which give birth to a strong national consciousness. In the case of the Egyptians, as pointed out before, the British had provided this challenge by occupying Egypt. In the case of the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent, the challenge was provided by the Muslim rulers of the Ottoman Empire. Common grievances against these non-Arab Muslims, provided the meeting ground between Muslim and Christian Arabs. They also provided the initial push to the Arab national movement.

The Arab Revolt of 1916 was the outcome of a complex of motives. The personal ambitions of the Sharīf, Ḥusayn, the machinations of the British, and perhaps even religious motives were interwoven with the national impulse of Arab independence. Whatever the motives of Ḥusayn might have been, the participation of the Arabs — both Muslim and Christian — in the Revolt was to a great extent because of the national impulse of Arab independence. The Revolt marked a new milestone in the ideological development of Arab nationalism. One of the results of the Revolt, according to Nuseibeh, was that:⁸

8. Nuseibeh, op. cit., p. 54.

...it provided a living history inspired by national rather than predominantly religious motivations. This constituted a break with a millenium of religious universalism as a foundation of polity.

The Arab longing for independence, however, did not materialize as the British went back on their promises after the end of the first world war. The Arab Fertile Crescent was bifurcated into several states, some of which were put under the control of the British and some under the control of the French. Since the 'twenties, Arab nationalism has stood for the liberation of Arab countries and their unification into an Arab national state.

The first world war created another problem for the Arabs which has played a very important role in the development of their national consciousness. This is the menace of Zionism. The British had promised Jews the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. They, however, had also assured the Arabs that nothing would be done at the cost of their legitimate rights and interests. These assurances notwithstanding, British policies on the Palestine issue made the British appear to the Arabs to be working in collaboration with the Zionists against Arab interests. All this created a deep hatred against Zionism as well as the British. The problem of Palestine which persists as the overridingly important Arab problem even to-day, has been instrumental in creating among the Arabs the sense of confronting a common danger and thus in reinforcing their sense of identity.

Along with the political struggle aimed at the liberation of Arab countries (and subsequently their unification into one single Arab state), Arab nationalism has developed a fairly impressive nationalist ideology. This ideology embodies the desire of the Arab intellectuals to elaborate the bases of the Arab nationality; to fix their immediate as well as long-term

goals and to clarify their vision of the future course of Arab development, particularly the character of the Arab national state.

The starting point of the Arab nationalist ideology as it has evolved in the Fertile Crescent, is the premise that the members of all Arab-speaking countries are Arabs, whatever their religious faith or racial origin. All these people constitute one nationality, even though they might be living in a number of different states, which are regarded by Arab nationalists as artificially created. The constituent factors of this nationality are generally regarded by the Arab nationalists to be a common language, a common history and culture, and community of material interests. Among these, the unity of language is generally regarded as the most important factor.⁹

The historical role of Islām in putting the Arabs on the road to greatness is acknowledged in glowing terms by all Arab nationalists, Christians as well as Muslims. The Prophet Muḥammad is looked upon as the Arab national hero and the greatest man ever to appear among the Arabs. The Qur'ān is regarded as the ideal in Arab literary achievement and a model for Arab writers of all times. The debt of gratitude to the Qur'ān for having preserved the Arabic language is also generously recognized. Moreover, the Arab legacy, which is deeply permeated with Islām, is regarded by Arab nationalists as the foundation upon which modern Arab culture rests. The memories of the glorious days of the early Islāmic Caliphs — the days of

9. See the ideas of the leaders of Arab nationalist thought in ibid., pp. 65ff.

Arab creative greatness and the efflorescence of Arab genius — are cherished by the Arab nationalists as the days of Arab glory. Islāmic heroes such as ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, are held in veneration as Arab national heroes. In short, due to the birth of Islām among the Arabs and the coincidence of Arab glory with the rise and expansion of Islām, the Islāmic and Arab factors are often closely interlinked.¹⁰

In spite of this intimacy, the differences between the Muslim religious and Arab nationalist attitudes are basic. The Arab nationalist accepts the Prophet Muḥammad as the national hero of the Arabs. The duty of an Arab nationalist, therefore, is to honour his memory. But the Muslim religious attitude, based on accepting Muḥammad as the Prophet of God, demands more than that. It demands that his words be accepted as divinely inspired and, therefore, as embodiments of eternal truths. Similarly, accepting the Qur'ān as the highest Arab literary achievement from the Arab nationalist viewpoint, necessitates that the debt of gratitude to the Qur'ān be acknowledged and that its style be regarded as the model to be imitated by Arab writers. But the Muslim religious attitude, again, demands more. It demands that the teachings of the Qur'ān should be accepted as Divine Guidance of eternal validity.¹¹ It is here that the attitude of the Arab nationalists

10. Costi Zurayq's Al-Wa^cY al-Qawmī, pp. 128-30, and p. 132 quoted in ibid., pp. 82f.

11. Gf. Loc. cit.

separates from the attitude of orthodox Muslims, as Arab nationalism is not prepared to go all the way along with this attitude, though it does not stand in the way of Muslims believing in such tenets as individuals.

In fact, while the historical value of Islām is accepted by Arab nationalism, it does not accept Islām as one of the constituent factors of Arab nationality.¹² This obviously does not essentially mean an attitude of opposition to Islām or to religion as such. In fact, some of the Arab nationalists insist that religion should continue to guide and inspire the Arabs, both Muslims and Christians. In their view, attachment to religion should, however, not lead to fanaticism and sectarianism which might imperil Arab unity. However, the point on which they insist strongly is that religion and state should remain separate and independent from one another. The leaders of Arab nationalist thought, according to Nuseibeh, are now generally agreed that "in order to forge a progressive and homogeneous nation religion must be taken out of politics, as was done in the West after the Reformation."¹³

This secular orientation of Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent is the outcome of several important factors. The spread of Western ideas which has changed the whole outlook of a large number of educated Arabs, is one of them. It has led them to regard the modern Western world and its ideas and institutions as their source of inspiration. Moreover, it has even led a number of Arab Muslims to reject Islām as their norm for modern times. Again, it has led a number of people to reject the traditional

12. See Nuseibeh, op. cit., pp. 90f.

13. Ibid., p. 91.

interpretation of Islām which holds that Islām should uncompromisingly control and guide the whole of man's life and should even be the basis of his socio-political life. In addition to this change of outlook towards Islām, the situational factors have also played an important part in this development. The influence of the large Christian population of the Lebanon, which by far exceeds its numerical strength owing to its higher intellectual and cultural level, has also had a secularizing effect upon the Arab nationalist ideology. The Christian Arabs are not prepared to accept any ideology which takes Islām as its basis. The problem before the Arab nationalists was essentially one of finding a common denominator among Muslim and Christian Arabs to serve as a basis of loyalty. Obviously, Islām could not be such a common denominator. Furthermore, the Christian intellectuals have made valuable contributions to Arab nationalist thought, which also contributed to its developing an a-religious orientation.¹⁴

Thus the Arab nationalist vision of the character of the Arab national state is divergent from the concept of an Islāmic state as expounded by the Islāmic movements and the Islāmic scholars of the Arab world. Still, the Islāmic and Arab nationalist elements had common meeting grounds with regard to the immediate political goals of Arab nationalism. These goals have been the liberation of Arab lands from foreign domination and the unification of Arab states into a single Arab state. On these two points the Arab nationalist and orthodox Islāmic groups have been in complete agreement.¹⁵

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14. According to Nuseibeh, at least half of the works cited on Arab nationalism in his book are by Christian Arabs. Loc. cit.

15. The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., pp. 154 f.

Their differences are with regard to ultimate, long-term objectives. The orthodox Muslims insist that Islām should be the basis of the body-politic, the axis around which the public life should revolve. The Arab nationalists are, as we have said earlier, generally opposed to this view.

The other issue on which disagreements arise between the two groups is that of Pan-Islāmic unity. Here again the Arab nationalists come out in opposition to this idea, in much the same way as the Egyptian nationalists do.¹⁶

(2)

To this point we have been discussing developments in the Fertile Crescent. For a long time the Egyptians were cut off from these trends of thought, immersed as they were in their own problems. In the second half of the nineteenth century when the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent were beginning to express their unrest against the Ottoman domination, the Egyptians were engaged in struggling against the British occupation. The Egyptians had been virtually independent from the Ottomans during the nineteenth century, and they expected an effective support from the Ottoman Empire in their struggle for independence against the British. All this turned their sympathies in a direction which was quite different from that of the Arabs of the Fertile Crescent. The Egyptians, therefore, were either indifferent or unsympathetic towards the rising Arab nationalist movement. Hence, when the Arab Revolt of 1916 took place, the Egyptians resented it as a betrayal of 'Islāmic

16. See the views of the Arab nationalist writers on this issue in Nuseibeh, op. cit., pp. 90-93.

brotherhood,¹⁷ and in the words of Sāṭi^c al-Ḥuṣarī, even "began to hate Arabs and Arabism."¹⁸

Later on, when Pan-Islāmic ideas gradually began to recede into the background after the end of the first world war, Egyptian nationalism became highly exclusivist. The Egyptian nationalist leaders held the opinion that the ideal of Arab unity was useless.¹⁹ Pan-Islāmic and Pan-Arab ideas were generally regarded as detrimental to the cause of Egyptian independence.²⁰

In the twenties, however, closer political and cultural relations between Egypt and other Arab countries began to develop. The sufferings of the Arabs of other countries such as on the occasion of the Moroccan Revolt of 1924-25, the Italian-Sanūsī War in the latter twenties and early thirties of this century, aroused Egyptian sympathies for these neighbouring countries. The linguistic unity, the sharing of the same religion by the predominant majority of Arabs, the increased facilities of communication, the radio and the press, all these have reinforced the Egyptians' sense of identity with other Arabs, even though their Arab consciousness might not be the predominant feeling.

During the four years of ^cAlī Māhir's prime ministership (1936-40), the

17. Najjār, Husayn Fawzī, al-Siyāsah wa al-Istrāṭījīyah fī al-Sharq al-Awsat, Vol. I, (Cairo: 1953), p. 15. Cited hereafter as Najjār.

18. Nushū^c, op. cit., p. 254.

19. See for instance Sa'd Zaghlul's remark about Arab unity: "If you add one zero to another, what will be the result?" Quoted in ^cUrubah, op. cit., p. 60.

20. Colombe, op. cit., p. 167.

Egyptian government's policies changed very markedly in the pro-Arab and pro-Islamic direction. The consciousness that Egypt was the leader of Arab countries by virtue of her population, her resources and her high level of education and culture began to grow in Egypt. Since then, Egypt has persisted in her pro-Arab policy. The policies of the Egyptian government have played a considerable part in awakening the Egyptians' sense of Arab identity. The problem of Palestine, which began to feature very prominently since 1936 as a common Arab problem, also made a major contribution to this trend of development. All these circumstances eventually led to the formation of the League of Arab States in 1945, with Cairo as its headquarters. The Egyptian government had played an important role in paving the ground for the formation of the Arab League, and the founding of the headquarters of the League at Cairo evidenced the acceptance of Egypt as the leader of the Arab world by the Arab countries.

Since 1945, the pace of the spread of Arab national consciousness has been accelerated because of a number of reasons. Firstly, Cairo became the haven of refuge for the fugitive leaders of other Arab countries who were persecuted by the foreign powers in their own countries. Their presence in Cairo and their efforts to acquaint the people of Egypt with their problems and sufferings have also helped to arouse Arab feelings among the Egyptians. Secondly, a number of Arab problems arose in rapid succession. The problems of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and above all these, the problem of Palestine. With regard to the last of them, there was a good deal of enthusiasm at the popular level in Egypt. A considerably large number of Egyptian volunteers actually took part in the Palestine War (1948-49). All this served gradually to expand the horizon of the Egyptians' struggle. What had formerly been

the Egyptians' hatred against British Imperialism was widened into hatred against Western Colonialism in general and to that was added the undying enmity against Zionism. Colonialism and Zionism began to appear as the common enemies of all Arabs. This external, negative factor, in combination with other factors which have been mentioned briefly a little earlier, led to the spread of Arab national consciousness in Egypt, although the consciousness of being Egyptians has been predominant and it is noteworthy that not a single Egyptian political party, excepting the Ikhwan, championed the cause of Arab unity.

The Egyptian Revolution of July 1952 was a turning point in Egypt's modern history. Since then, the Egyptian government has thrown its weight in favour of pro-Arab sentiments. In 1954, the Egyptian Prime Minister, Jamāl ʿAbd al Nāṣir in The Philosophy of the Revolution expressed his Arab sentiments vigorously.²¹ ʿAbd al-Nāṣir's personal influence, combined perhaps with the fear of the regime and restrictions on expressing views disfavoured by the government, have silenced the critics of Arab nationalism and the field is not open for it to develop without any serious ideological resistance.

In 1956 when the new Egyptian constitution was framed, Egypt was declared to be an Arab state and Egyptians a part of the Arab nation.²² This was an important step forward for Arab nationalism in Egypt. Since that time a number of important developments have taken

21. ʿAbd al-Nāṣir, Jamāl, The Philosophy of the Revolution, (Cairo: n.d.) p. 58 and pp. 60-75. Cited hereafter as Revolution.

22. Cited in Ḥatīm, Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Qādir, Rūḥ al-Dustūr, (Cairo: 1956) pp. 205f.

place, all helping to arouse the Arab consciousness of the Egyptians. In July 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company which boosted the prestige of Egypt in the eyes of all Arabs and her president, ^cAbd al-Nāṣir, began to be venerated by Arabs as a courageous and trustworthy leader who had been able to slap back the enemies of the Arabs. Thus he began to be regarded as a great hero and became the centre of the hopes of all Arabs. In October-November 1956, Israel, France and England invaded Egypt, but subsequently withdrew their forces under international pressure. During this period of crisis Arab countries and Arab masses stood solidly behind Egypt, which contributed to the strengthening of Arab national sentiment in Egypt. The joint aggression of the three states also made the Egyptians realize more pressingly the need for unity with their neighbouring Arabic-speaking peoples.

(3)

Coming to the intellectual aspects of the so-called Arab nationalism in Egypt during the years 1945-56, we find that its trends are perceptibly different from the trends of Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent. Egypt's Arab nationalism — if it can be so termed — has so far not been able to develop any systematically formulated nationalist ideology. Egyptian writings with regard to Arabism generally betray a lack of seriousness and single-minded devotion to Arabism. The ideology of Arab nationalism in Egypt consists of heterogeneous elements of thought which have been impulsively pieced together into an uneasy ~~synthesis~~ synthesis, without any regard for inconsistency, with the result that these elements are not harmoniously integrated, as we shall see in the following pages.

What is understood by Arab nationalism in Egypt is mainly the desire of the Arabic-speaking peoples to get rid of Colonialism and Zionism; to foster closer relations among the Arab countries in order that they may join hands in encountering common dangers and their struggle for a free and honourable place in the world may be strengthened as a result of unity and co-operation. It is only recently that Arab nationalism in Egypt has also begun to mean the desire that all Arab countries be unified into one Arab national state. Arab nationalism in Egypt has so far been concerned almost exclusively with the immediate political aspirations of the Arabs. Unlike Arab nationalism in the Fertile Crescent, it has not been able to elaborate a nationalist ideology. In the writings of Arabism-loving Egyptian writers it is not clear that in their view Arabism has a claim upon the primary loyalty of all Arabs and that Arabism should be the basis of the body-politic, although these are the foundations of every nationalist ideology.

This is partly to be accounted for by the fact, pointed out earlier, that Arab national consciousness has begun to spread in Egypt only recently. None of the national heroes of Egypt's recent times --- Mustafa Kamil, Muhammad Farid, Sa^cd Zaghlul, --- has expressed any warmth for Arabism. Moreover, Arabism in Egypt has been upheld by religiously-oriented Muslims. Their love for Arabism had stemmed from their love for, and devotion to Islam. To them it was secondary to Islam; and hence could not constitute a centre of loyalty independent of Islam. The reason for this attitude is that in the Arab Muslim mind generally Islam and Arabism are very closely inter-linked. Arabism appears to many of them

as something essentially Islāmīc: something which can not be separated from Islām. In the same way, Islām denotes to them something primarily Arab. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the connection between Islām and Arabism was very close in the early period of Islāmīc history. For, the Arabs were the means for the glory of Islām and Islām had provided the Arabs with the stimulus, the pushing force which led them towards their historic greatness. Whatever the reason, it is undeniable that in the Arab Muslim thinking Arabism and Islām have been closely inter-related. The ideas of ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi have already been mentioned.²³ Even Rashid Rida's Islāmīc ideas seem to bear an Arab inprint. This is evident, for instance, from the fact that he holds the non-Arab Muslim peoples responsible for the decadence of the Muslim world.²⁴ In contemporary times, in the writings of the Muhibb al-Din al-Khatib, at present the editor of Majallat al-Azhar, and formerly the editor of the famous Islāmīc magazine al-Fath and an associate of Rashid Rida, the Arab-Islāmīc sentiments are closely interfused.²⁵ In the writings of the Ikhwan too Arabism and Islām are intertwined. In one of their pamphlets, for instance, the Ikhwan quote a saying of the Prophet: "When Arabs are abased, Islām is abased."²⁶ These Islāmīcally-oriented and Arabism-loving

23. Vide. supra. p. 77.

24. Colombe, op.cit., pp.174f.

Hasan al-Banna's views about the decline of Muslims are similar. See for instance al-Banna', Hasan, Bayn al-Ams wa al-Yawm (Cairo: 1952), p.10, Cited here after Ams wa Yawm.

Ahmad Amin too follows the same trend. See Fayd al-Khatir (Cairp: 1953 circa), Vol.II, p;39. Cited here after as Fayd al-Khatir.

25. See for instance his article "Man Nahn?", Majallat al-Azhar, xxiv: 4, pp.399ff.

26. al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, Da watuna fi Tawr Jadid, (Cairo: 1952), p.12. Cited here after as Tawr Jadid.

people seem to consider, as we have already pointed out, Arabism to be in some sense Islāmic; and Islām in a sense primarily Arab. Hence they cannot perceive of an Arabism which is not inspired and guided by Islām. For, their basic loyalty is to Islām.

Due to the above-mentioned factors the development of Arab consciousness in Egypt has followed a course different from the course followed in the Fertile Crescent. When the grip of Egyptian particularism began to weaken, the feelings of Islāmic religious, and Arab solidarity began to grow simultaneously, and perhaps even indistinguishably. Perhaps the fact that the Copts have generally remained indifferent towards Arabism contributed to this development. The sympathy of the orthodox Islāmic groups for Pan-Arab trends as a step forward towards greater Islāmic unity and because of their love for Arabism on religious grounds too was perhaps a factor in this development. Whatever the causes, the result is that the Arab consciousness of many Egyptians remains Islāmically-oriented.

Another factor which held back the development of Arab nationalism in Egypt has been the strong grip of Egyptian nationalism. Egyptian nationalists have persistently and vigorously resented the intrusion of both Pan-Arab and Pan-Islāmic ideas as both were contrary to the exclusivism which Egyptian nationalism had developed. In fact, during most of the period which is our special concern (i.e. 1945-56), it is Egyptian nationalism and not Arab-nationalism, which has held the sway.

In short, the strong grip of the Egyptian nationalist ideas and of Islāmic sentiments have prevented the Egyptians from developing a nationalist ideology with Arabism as its basic and predominant factor.

Jamal ^cAbd al-Nasir (1918-) is a good illustration of the Egyptian variety of Arab nationalism. His Arabism has as its component parts Islamic and Egyptian nationalist elements. These elements have been woven into an uneasy synthesis at the expense of clarity and consistency.

^cAbd al-Nasir is clear (at least now) as to the goal of his Arab nationalism. It is to unite all Arabs into one Arab state so that "the Arab fatherland extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf."²⁷ This Arab unity, in Jamal ^cAbd al-Nasir's opinion, is supported by the fact that "our (Egyptian) history has been mixed with it (i.e. the Arab history) and...its (i.e. Arab) interests are linked with ours."²⁸ Another important factor in Arab unity in ^cAbd al-Nasir's opinion is the confrontation of common external dangers and the facing of common enemies --- Imperialism and Zionism.²⁹ The only way towards a better future for all lies in unity. "Arab nationalism knows," says ^cAbd al-Nasir, "that its existence lies in its unity and its strength lies in its nationalism."³⁰ The facts that the predominant majority of Arabs shares the same religion and that Arab lands are geographically contiguous, in the opinion of ^cAbd al-Nasir, also strengthen the bond of Arab unity.³¹ In view of these factors the Egyptian constitution of 1956 specified that the Egyptian people were a part of the Arab nation.³²

27. ^cAbd al-Nasir, Jamal, Qal al-Ra'is, (Cairo: 1957), p.224. Cited here after as Jamal.

28. Revolution, op.cit., p.50

29. Jamal, op. cit., p.192 and p.224.

30. Ibid., p.224.

31. Revolution, op. cit., p.60.

32. Vide. supra., n.22.

In Jamal [̣]Abd al-Naṣir's statements and writings we find not only the idea of Arab unity, but also that of Islamic unity. Asked if Pan-Islamism and Pan-Arabism were mutually inconsistent, [̣]Abd al-Naṣir replied in the negative and added: "Both of them supplement and consolidate one another."³³ The Islamic Congress which is working under the patronage and direction of [̣]Abd al-Naṣir is also based on the idea of Islamic unity, even though it has not expressed itself in favour of the political unification of the Muslim world. The Pan-Islamic sentiments of [̣]Abd al-Naṣir find an eloquent expression in The Philosophy of the Revolution when he mentions the 'third zone' in which Egypt has to play its rightful role. This zone is the one:³⁴

that goes beyond continents and oceans...the circle of our brethren in faith who turn with us, whatever part of the world they are in, towards the same Kibla in Mecca, and whose pious lips whisper reverently the same prayers.

He thinks of Hajj in terms of:³⁵

a regular political congress wherein the leaders of Muslim states, their public men, their pioneers in every field of knowledge, their writers...draw up in this universal Islamic Parliament the main lines of policy for their countries and their co-operation together until they meet again.

It is true that [̣]Abd al-Naṣir is presently engaged in attempting to unify the Arab world, and therefore, his recent writings and speeches, contain a persistent emphasis on Arab unity. But his writings taken as a whole evidence the trait of the Egyptian Muslim mind mentioned earlier: the inseparability of Arabism from Islam.

33. Surur, Ṭaha [̣]Abd al-Baqi, Jamal [̣]Abd al-Naṣir..., (Cairo: 1958), p.91.

Cited here after as Surur.

34. Revolution, op. cit., p.7.

35. Ibid., p.72.

This tendency is perceptible also in his interpretation of the decline of Arabs and Muslims. Their rise, in his view, coincides with "the illumination of the heavens and the earth by the light of God..."

Says ^cAbd al-Nāṣir:³⁶

When Muslims believed in God and the Last Day, and in accountability to God, and were conscious that they had been created only to deliver the message of Islām, they shook the world and made astounding conquests. Later on a time came when Muslims lost their faith in God and became confused about their belief. Then Islām received a strong blow when the Muslims became divided into several groups and parties and the Bloc of Muslims and Arabs began to disintegrate.

He summons Arabs and Muslims in these words:³⁷

Arabs and Muslims throughout the world! Obey God and the Prophet; unite as one front against whomsoever be your enemy. Never disagree or weaken; for if you are truly guided by the spirit and ideals of Islam you will be superior; and yours will be the upper hand.

With all these vehement declarations of Arab-Islamic unity in ^cAbd al-Nāṣir, we also find him speaking in the vein of a staunch, extremist Egyptian nationalist. He repeatedly mentions that Egypt has remained under foreign occupation and has been ruled by foreign invaders for more than two thousand years.³⁸ This emphasis in his thought undermines the whole basis of Arab nationalism. For, this view implies that when ^cAmr ibn al-^cĀṣ and the Arab soldiers under his command conquered Egypt and 'Arabicized' it, they were 'foreign invaders'. In the same

36. Jamāl, op. cit., pp. 88-90.

37. Jamāl ^cAbd al-Nāṣir in Foreword to ^cAṭā, M.M., Islamic Call, (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 6f.

38. Jamāl ^cAbd al-Nāṣir in Foreword to al-Sādāt, Anwar, The Revolt on the Nile, (London: 1957), pp. viiif. Also Jamāl, op. cit., p. 54.

way, ^cAbd al-Nāṣir designates the period of Arab rule in Egypt (which of course falls within the last two thousand years!) as a period of 'slavery' for Egyptians, a period of foreign occupation over Egypt. If these views are to be accepted, then all the claims that Egyptian history is mixed with the history of the Arabs, and that the Arab circle "is as much a part of us as we are a part of it",³⁹ appear as empty of content and his talk of Arab nationalism begins to appear as hollow and superficial.

In fairness to Jamāl ^cAbd al-Nāṣir it must be recognized that he is a politician engaged in leading his people, rather than an academician theorizing about Arab nationalism. Whatever he says or writes is, therefore, often full of exaggerations and evinces little regard for consistency. What probably counts with ^cAbd al-Nāṣir is the effectiveness of his statements in achieving certain practical objectives rather than consistency and accuracy. His Arab nationalist ideology is, therefore, an uneasy synthesis of different elements which have been joined together without any effort to harmonize them. This quality of his thought is an advantage for him rather than a disadvantage. The eclectic nature of his ideas makes his appeal more broad-based. The ambiguities of his ideology draw a larger support for his leadership than if he had built up a consistent ideology on the basis of a definite premise. In the long run, however, this synthesis of divergent trends of thoughts is bound to break up under the pressure of inner contradictions.

39. Revolution, op. cit., p. 54.

A number of other Egyptian writers write about Arabism in the same fashion. Their writings usually have an Islāmic imprint and their Arabism-oriented ideas can hardly be termed as Arab nationalist ideology. A good instance in hand is that of Muḥammad al-Bindārī. His 172-page book is entitled Nahw 'Urūbah Jadīdah (Towards New Arabism).⁴⁰ His Arab national consciousness manifests itself in his expression of intense dislike against the Ottoman domination over the Arab world and his support of the Arab Revolt of 1916.⁴¹ He conceives of the Arab world as one unit and discusses the problems of scientific progress, economic development and so on in terms of the whole Arab world. While dealing with these problems he unfailingly brings forward views based on Islām. Some of the subjects that he deals with in the book are: the message of Islām, the problems of disease and poverty and their remedies in Islām; the status of women in Islām, the Islāmic viewpoint on war and peace; the struggle of Islām against racialism; the emancipation of humanity through Islām, etc.⁴² The underlying idea appears to be that Islām is the basis of Arabism, its message, its guiding light and the true form that its expression should take. This Arabism has little to do with the Arab nationalism of the Fertile Crescent. Due to the author's ambiguous treatment of the subject it is difficult to locate the focus of loyalty for the body-politic. Is it Arab nationality or is it Islām? The book fails to furnish any clear reply.

40. (Cairo: 1950). Cited hereafter as Bīndarī.

41. Ibid., pp. 18ff.

42. Ibid., pp. 122ff.

Moreover, the author seems to gloss over, or has not realized the difficulties that his version of Arabism creates. If the laws of Islām are to be regarded as eternally applicable, if the Islāmic remedies for the problems of poverty, ignorance and disease, are to be regarded as mandatory, if the status of women is to be determined according to the verdict of Islām, then what should be the meeting-ground between Christian and Muslim Arabs, if he considers Arab nationality comprising all Arabs whatever their faith? And what are the possibilities of the development of homogeneity and fellowship among Arabs on the grounds of Arabism?

Several other writers follow similar trends. It appears that among other factors the Islāmic element in their thinking prevents the development of a clear Arab nationalist ideology by which we mean developing an ideology on the basis of the premise that all Arabs owe their supreme loyalty to the Arab nationality.

Another writer who illustrates the ambiguous, ambivalent, eclectic and under-developed Arabism of Egypt is ^CAbd al-Mughnī Sa^Cīd. In his book Ān li hādha al-Sh^Cab an Yafham he speaks frequently of Arab unity. Because of his Arab national feeling he expresses uneasiness at the Pharaonic movement in Egypt which slights the idea of Arab unity and scoffs at the Arab legacy. In Sa^Cīd's view, Egyptians are closer to Arabism than to Pharaonism by virtue of language, time and race. He mentions with an undertone of approval, that the Egyptians hated Pharaonism and Pharaohs and adds that these terms awaken in the minds of Egyptians the horrors of social inequity and class system. He advocates that Arabism instead of Pharaonism

should be the motto of Egyptians in order to keep their nationalist movement along correct lines.⁴³

Sa'īd also opposes Pan-Islāmic ideas. Pan-Islāmism appears to him to be an emotional rather than a practical idea, one which is not based on historical and economic foundations. With regard to this problem he comes to the conclusion that:⁴⁴

We cannot merge into ourselves, and we do not want to merge into ourselves the peoples who are different from us in race and mentality even though they might be united with us in faith, or even in language and faith.

If even language is not sufficient for unification, then what is the basis on which Sa'īd thinks of 'Arab unity'? His plan of unifying Arab and Islāmic states into 'larger national units' which he lays down in his book betrays a lack of his single-mindedness with regard to Arabism. His plan for larger national units arises from the consciousness of the possibility that Arab countries, if they remain weak and divided, may fall prey to the greed of European nations. Sa'īd, therefore, would like these countries to unite due to the exigencies of politics -- to be able to ward off the foreign menace, and also out of consideration for economic interests. He suggests that the Arab and Islāmic nations should form a reasonable number of 'larger national units' and co-operate to the utmost by unifying their systems of finance, by abolishing or reducing customs, etc. He suggests the unification of the Nile Valley, Palestine and Barqah into a single national unit. He suggests the same course for Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

43. Sa'īd, op. cit., pp. 48ff.

44. Ibid., p. 74.

The countries of the Maghreb and Tripolitania could also form a single unit. Thus he provides for the creation of homogeneous Arab and Islāmic states, which might then co-operate and enter into mutual alliance for their defence.⁴⁵

Sa^cīd's ideology, it will be observed, can hardly be considered an Arab nationalist ideology. For he opposes language as the basis of unity and his scheme of Arab unity does not consist of establishing an Arab national state embracing all Arab lands. True, he expresses the view that the Arabs constitute one nationality.⁴⁶ However, he does this in a very general fashion and does^{not}/pursue it to the conclusion which is logical from the nationalist viewpoint, viz., that the national state should embrace the whole of the nationality. His view appears to be that statehood is far too complex a matter to be based merely on considerations of language or of religion. Economic factors are considered by him to play a very important role in political life. Hence his attitude, inspite of all his professions of love for Arabism, is markedly different than that of Arab nationalists who consider the nationality of Arabs a solid fact and proceed to develop an ideology on the premise that there should be one and no more than one state embracing the Arab lands.

Sa^cīd also attaches a deep importance to Islām. He is of the view that the sound movement which can guide the people of Egypt along right lines should stand for an ideology which has nationalism, Islām and socialism

45. Ibid., pp. 75f.

46. Ibid., p. 75.

as its component elements. He denies that the three are in any way mutually incongruous. The appearance of incongruity between them, in his opinion, is the result of superficial thinking.⁴⁷ The content of Sa'īd's view of Islām hardly shows any substantial difference from the traditional view of Islām even though he regards nationalism and socialism as compatible with Islām, as he is in agreement with orthodox Muslims in claiming that Islām provides direction and guidance even with regard to socio-economic matters and seeks to remove maldistribution of wealth and to establish social justice, etc.⁴⁸

It is interesting to note that Sa'īd finds in the Ikhwān a movement which approximates his ideal of a "nationalist, Islāmic, socialist" movement.⁴⁹ Perhaps hardly anything else could have demonstrated in a more pronounced manner the lack of clarity of Sa'īd's views with regard to nationalism.

Thus we find that the emerging Arab national consciousness in Egypt lacks clarity. It has not yet been able to develop an Arab nationalist ideology. In Egyptian writings, Arabism retains a deep Islāmic imprint. This Islāmic influence on Arabism, however, appears to be one of the factors holding back the development of a clear and consistent Arab nationalist ideology. In general, this Arab' nationalism is not based, at least explicitly, on a fundamental opposition to the ideals of orthodox Islām. It is distinguished from the ideology of orthodox Islāmic groups

47. Ibid., p. 74.

48. Ibid., pp. 69-73.

49. Ibid., p. 99.

only by stressing the uniqueness of Arabism a little more than do the exponents of orthodox Islām. It talks also of Arab unity in vague terms; but since the basic concepts of nationalism are not clear, this Arab unity does not always necessarily mean the establishment of a unified Arab national state embracing all Arab lands.⁵⁰

Another striking feature of Egypt's so-called Arab nationalism is its overridingly negative character. This, in fact, has been the characteristic feature of all Muslim nationalisms. The Egyptian variety of Arab nationalism exhibits this feature in even a more pronounced way than does the Arab nationalism which has evolved in the Fertile Crescent. Egypt's Arab nationalism is largely, almost exclusively, the Arab response to external challenges.⁵¹ The Arab nationalism of the Fertile Crescent, on the contrary, has outlived this phase and has developed positive aspirations.

50. For a further illustration of the above-mentioned nature of Arab nationalism in Egypt see Ḥatīm, ^CAbd al-Qādir (ed.) al-Qawmiyah al-^CArabiyyah wa al-Isti^Cmar, (Cairo: 1957), passim. Cited hereafter as Qawmiyah.

For example, M.M. ^CAtā, remarks that as compared with Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islāmism is a better scheme (p.15). The same writer deplors the development of secularism in Turkey. In his view a secular state cannot carry the flag of Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islāmism (p.16). In the author's opinion, if Pan-Arabism is realized it would be "Islām's first line of defence and its citadel," (p.16). See also Jāmi ^Cat Udabā' al-^CUrūbah, Adab al-^CUrūbah, (Cairo: 1947), passim, and Najjār, op. cit., passim.

51. See Qawmiyah, op. cit., passim. See also Jamāl, op. cit., passim, and Revolution, op. cit., pp. 70-71.

Because of the relatively retarded stage of Arab nationalism in Egypt, and because of its stress upon immediate goals, the extirpation of foreign influence and domination and the unification of Arab countries, it is not basically opposed to orthodox Muslims. Whenever the latter set themselves against Arab nationalism, they have in mind the kind of viewpoint just beginning to appear in Egypt and characteristic of the Fertile Crescent.

(4)

A full-fledged and consistent Arab nationalist ideology has started to develop very recently in Egypt. Its exponent is not an Egyptian but a Syrian of very remarkable intellectual calibre. This man is $\bar{S}a\bar{t}i^c$ al- $\bar{H}\bar{u}\bar{s}a\bar{r}\bar{i}$ (1879-), 'the philosopher of Arab nationalism'. He came to Egypt in 1945 (circa) after having led an eventful life in Syria, Iraq and the Lebanon. Thenceforth al- $\bar{H}\bar{u}\bar{s}a\bar{r}\bar{i}$ has lived in Egypt, writing and lecturing about his favourite subject, Arab nationalism. All through these years he has conducted controversial discussions with the opponents of Arab nationalism and in so doing has elaborated the doctrines of Arab nationalism. He enriched Arab nationalist literature by contributing over a dozen of impressive books on the subject. In his writings we find a well-articulated and consistent Arab nationalist ideology. The basic premises of al- $\bar{H}\bar{u}\bar{s}a\bar{r}\bar{i}$'s Arab nationalism are the following: All Arabic-speaking countries are Arab countries. Every one who belongs to these countries and speaks Arabic is an Arab, whatever his race or - religion. Arabism is not confined either to the Arabian peninsula or to Muslims.⁵²

52. Urūbah, op. cit., p. 11.

The Arab lands, therefore, embrace the whole territory:⁵³

from the Zagros mountains in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the West, and from Mediterranean coast and Anatolian foothills on the north to the Indian Ocean, the sources of the Nile and the Sahara Desert on the south."

The peoples inhabiting this vast region are all Arabs, the members of "one Arab nationality". The goal of Arab nationalism is to bring about the unification of all the Arab lands into an united Arab national state. As for the existing division of the Arab world into numerous states, that is a product of Imperialism, and is recent and temporary.⁵⁴

al-Ḥuṣarī recognizes that the nationalist idea is relatively recent. It arose in Europe only in the nineteenth century. It emerged because of the increasing importance of the people in the affairs of the state. The eighteenth century notion of "natural rights" led to the principle that: "The source of all authority is the people." This idea forced a more precise definition of 'people'. In turn, the quest for precision gave birth to the principle of the "rights of nationalities" which changed the whole map of Europe in the nineteenth century.⁵⁵

The principle of the 'rights of nationalities' has been defined by al-Ḥuṣarī in the following words:⁵⁶

That states should be founded on the basis of nationalities so that every nationality should form a state of its own. The nationality should become independent if it is subject to the rule of any other nationality; and should unite if it is divided into several states.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 12.

55. *al-Muḥāḍarah al-Iftitāḥīyah...*, (Cairo: 1954), pp. 9f.

56. *Nushu'*, op. cit. pp. 13ff.

As to the constituent factors of nationality, common language and history are basic in al-Ḥuṣarī's view. Culture is also of great importance, but it is the concomitant of language and history. Among these factors, language is fundamental. al-Ḥuṣarī regards it as the very life and soul of a nation. Its importance is stressed by al-Ḥuṣarī in these words:⁵⁷

...Language is, firstly, the means of understanding among people; secondly, the means of thought for the individual; and thirdly, the means of transmitting ideas and acquisitions from father to son, from ancestry to posterity. The unity of language produces a kind of community of feeling and thought, and binds individuals together in a long and complicated chain formed by ideational and emotional links and constitutes the strongest tie which links individuals to groups... Thus they (i.e. all those who speak a particular language) form a nation separate from others. If a nation loses its language, ...it will have lost its life.

Next in importance comes history. The history of a nation is the means through which it attains self-consciousness. The important role of history in the formation of Arab nationality is set out in these words:⁵⁸

The unity of this (Arab) history generates uniform sympathies and inclinations; it leads to a sharing of pride in the glories of the past and of collective sorrow over past misfortunes; and consequently, it creates identity of aspiration for the future.

The Arab nationality, too, is based on the community of language and history, supplemented by other secondary factors such as geographical homogeneity, etc. These factors go to make all Arabs one nationality even though they are now living in separate states. The logical outcome of al-Ḥuṣarī's analysis of the situation is that all the existing Arab states

57. Nushū', op. cit., pp. 25f.

58. al-Ḥuṣarī cited in Nuseibeh, op. cit., p. 77.

should merge into a united Arab national state, founded around the bond of Arabism.⁵⁹

Should this Arab national state be based on the socio-political ideals of Islām? Should this Arab national state, after it comes into existence, move forward towards a larger Pan-Islāmic grouping?

Sāṭi^c al-Ḥuṣarī's ideology, as explained above, and especially his non-recognition of Islām as a factor of Arab nationality, are enough to indicate that he rules out both possibilities. In fact, the whole development of the nationalist idea as presented by him has been one of substituting national loyalty for the pre-modern religious loyalty. In the Arab case, according to al-Ḥuṣarī, the dominant control of the Islāmic religious sentiment was an obstacle in the way of the development of Arab national consciousness. The Islāmic sentiments of the Muslim Arabs had made them contented with the Ottoman Caliphate and had prevented them from realizing that they were in reality subject to the dominance of a foreign people.⁶⁰

The whole tenor of al-Ḥuṣarī's Arab nationalist ideology is implicitly opposed to Islām as the basis of socio-political life. There is evidence beyond the implicit, however, for al-Ḥuṣarī's nationalist ideology is explicitly wedded to laicism or secularism.

al-Ḥuṣarī regards Arab nationalism as completely secular or laique, but objects to calling it 'irreligious'. He denies that the nationalist idea implies any rejection of religion or dislike for it.⁶¹

59. ^cUrubah, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

60. ^cIftitāhiyah, *op. cit.*, pp. 13f.

61. ^cUrubah, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

The process of secularization in Europe, according to al-Ḥuṣarī, has essentially been a process of making certain fields of life 'independent' of religion. In the field of science secularization led to acceptance of the principle of "the independence of science from religion", which is to-day accepted universally by the scientists. This principle means that scientific truths are derived from observation and experiment and not from the texts of heavenly scriptures. This does not entail any rejection of religion as such. It only means the recognition of the fact that both religion and science have their own and separate spheres.⁶²

al-Ḥuṣarī sums up his views about secularism in these words:⁶³

Thinking about certain matters independent of religion does not mean the rejection of religion. It also does not mean that we should not turn to religion in any field of life nor does it prevent us from paying special attention to religion in certain fields. It (only) means that there are certain matters which do not lie within the jurisdiction of 'religion'.

The idea that al-Ḥuṣarī wants to drive home is that the laicism of the nationalist ideology does not mean the rejection of religion. He wishes only to say that political life is outside the religious jurisdiction. This is, however, exactly the point where the Arab nationalism of al-Ḥuṣarī conflicts with the ideas of orthodox Muslims as they are not prepared to accept this restriction of the jurisdiction of religion. Thus nationalism even of the Arab variety comes back to the same theme: the separation of religion and state.

In one of his articles al-Ḥuṣarī deals in some detail with the notion that religion should be the basis of socio-political life. He discusses this problem with reference to Egypt, but his arguments are of a general nature.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

"Is it possible for politics to be based on religious feelings?

Is it proper for Egypt to regard the Islāmic tie as the axis around which her internal and external policy should revolve?",⁶⁴ asks al-Ḥuṣarī.

His answer is no.

With regard to the internal policy, al-Ḥuṣarī argues, Islām cannot be this basic tie because Islām is not the faith of all Egyptians. In Egypt there are one and a half million Christians who are not foreigners. They have, therefore, the same rights and duties as Muslims have. It follows, says al-Ḥuṣarī, that:⁶⁵

...Egypt must have a tie which knits together all its children whether they are Muslims or Christians. Naturally, such a tie can only be formed out of patriotic and nationalist feelings which are shared by all Egyptians.

al-Ḥuṣarī expresses great satisfaction at the fact that since the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 Egypt has taken long strides in the direction of forging such a tie. He regards the famous sentence: "Religion is for Allah and fatherland for all the countrymen", as the best expression of the trend of Egyptian development.⁶⁶

Similarly, al-Ḥuṣarī is opposed to making the 'Islamic tie' the basis of external policy. In other words, he is opposed to Pan-Islāmism.

On this issue, he argues his case on the basis that in modern times international relations are not oriented towards religious considerations. He asserts that:⁶⁷

64. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 100.

66. *Ibid.*, p. 101.

67. *Loc. cit.*

It is incumbent upon us to realize that we are living in an age in which political relationship have long since been broken off from religious relationships...The modern times have seen many a war break out between states belonging to the same faith. On the contrary, many agreements and alliances have been concluded between states belonging to different faiths...

Substantiating this contention by enumerating events from modern history, al-Ḥuṣarī stresses that his judgment applies to the Muslim world as well. He disagrees with those who visualize the possibility of "a political union embracing all Islāmic peoples".⁶⁸ He regards this impossible for the following reasons:

Muslims differ among themselves even with regard to religious matters, and are therefore divided into several schools. Then, how can it be expected that they will agree with regard to "intricate worldly interests" and "complicated political affairs".⁷⁰

Moreover, Muslim nations are varied and numerous and spread over a very vast area. These nations do not speak the same language and do not understand each other.

Each of the Muslim nations faces social, economic and political problems which are different from those of the other Muslim nations and peculiar to itself. This is to be expected in view of the differences of their geographical situations and also because they have had different courses of history.⁷⁰

The upshot of his argument is that religion is not sufficient to

68. Ibid., p. 106.

69. Loc. cit.

70. Ibid., pp. 106f.

create a nationality, which is the only adequate basis of statehood according to the principle of "the rights of nationalities."

It is significant, however, that al-Ḥuṣarī perhaps remained the only noted standard-bearer of a consistent ideology of Arab nationalism in Egypt until 1956. It is noteworthy that until 1956 there had not appeared even one single work from an Egyptian pen which clearly and consistently expounded the Arab nationalist ideas. Perhaps it is also significant that even though al-Ḥuṣarī has lived in Egypt from 1945 onwards, he is a Syrian by birth and has spent most of his life in the Fertile Crescent. Since 1957,^{however,} a clearer and more consistent ideology has started to emerge in the writings of a few Egyptians. One of those Egyptians who have proceeded systematically to build up an Arab nationalist ideology is Yahyā' C Uways. Yahyā's long article in al-Qawmīyah al-^CArabiyyah wa al-Isti^Cmār (pp. 17-84), is conspicuous for its clear, systematic and serious approach to the problem.

In Yahyā's view, all Arabs belong to one nationality even though they are divided at present into several states.⁷¹ The constituent factors of their nationality are unity of language and religion and the "feeling of racial unity", the unity of culture, an identity of feelings and aspirations, common political and economic interests, and above all, a common struggle against the wrongs committed by foreigners.⁷² (This

71. Qawmīyah, op. cit., p. 25.

72. Ibid., p. 35 and p. 61.

negative factor finds a very prominent place in Yahyá's thinking and he repeats it over and over again). All these factors serve to create strong ties of kinship among the Arabs so that they are eventually bound to unite into a "united Arab national state".⁷³

Yahyá does not specifically deal with the question as to what should be the attitude of Arab nationalism towards Islām, but his article evinces a trend of thought which would make his views unpalatable for orthodox Muslims. He observes, for instance, that:⁷⁴

...fatherland is above everything and the interest of the fatherland is above sectarian (generally used to mean religious) and personal interests. The national cause is above all other causes.

At another place he remarks, "waṭaniyah (patriotic nationalism) in this age recognizes no religious differences."⁷⁵

This trend of thought is obviously at variance with the orthodox Islāmic views on socio-political problems, as we shall see later.

(5)

The above discussion makes it clear that the Arab consciousness in Egypt is still generally undeveloped. A number of writers are hopelessly confused between Islām and Arabism and inter alia for this reason fail to develop a clear and consistent Arab nationalist ideology. This stage of ambiguity and ambivalence, however,^{is} bound to be a short-lived one. Before long either the clear-cut and consistent formulations of Arab

73. Ibid., p. 35.

74. Ibid., p. 18.

75. Ibid., p. 50.

Another recently published book evinces similar trends. See al-Sahartī, Muṣṭafá ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, Idiyūlujiyah ʿArabīyah Jadīdah, (Cairo: 1957), passim.

nationalism as developed in the Fertile Crescent will replace the present ambivalent, Islāmically oriented Arab nationalism of Egypt (although as yet it has no roots in the Egyptian soil), or if this does not happen, the Islāmic element is bound to gain an upper hand and the content of Arab nationalism will not be different substantially from, let us say, the ideology of the Ikhwan or the Azhar people who, inspite of their overwhelming Islāmic enthusiasm, are also proud of their Arabism.

These are, however, speculations about the future. As for the present, Arab nationalism in Egypt is predominantly Islāmically-oriented; it is concentrated almost exclusively upon immediate political goals, and is, therefore, not inharmonious with the ideas and aspirations of orthodox Islāmic groups who regard the ejection of foreign control and the realization of Arab unity essential for the realization of their Islāmic dreams.

There is also gradually developing in Egypt another variety of Arab nationalism. It is the Fertile Crescent brand of Arab nationalism, and it is a purely secular movement and is unequivocally opposed to the ideals of Islāmic state and Pan-Islāmism — the two cherished political ideals of orthodox Islām.

CHAPTER IV.
CONTEMPORARY ISLĀMIC SOCIO-POLITICAL IDEAS
AND
ISLĀMIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS NATIONALISM
IN EGYPT

One of the most striking features of the Islāmic socio-political thought in contemporary Egypt (and in fact, in the whole of the Islāmic world except Turkey) is that it has not undergone any basic changes. No radical reformulation of Islāmic attitudes has so far taken place. The effort to bring about such a reformulation have been only a few. However, these efforts too were not vigorous enough to influence the general tenor of Islāmic socio-Political thought. The outlook of Islām on life, its sources of guidance and inspiration, its vision of social and political life — all these remain very much the same. Islām still clings to its traditional interpretations. Hence we find that the predominant Islāmic attitudes in Egypt are typically represented by the Azhar and the Ikhwan, rather than by people like Khalid Muhammad Khalid and Tahā Husayn.

In matters of detail undoubtedly Islāmic socio-political thought does exhibit a number of modifications. For instance, the democratic concepts and values are persistently stressed as a part of the scheme of political life envisaged by Islām. This is done on the plea that democratic ideas and institutions embody the Qur'ānic principle of shūrā.¹

1. See al-Bannā', Ḥasan, Mushkilātuna fī Daw' al-Nizām al-Islāmi, (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 38-68, cited hereafter as Mushkilāt; also al-^cAqqād, Abbās Mahmūd, al-Dimūqrāṭīyah fī al-Islām, (Cairo: 1952), passim., and Ramaḍān, Sa'īd, Ma'alim al-Tariq, (Damascus: 1955), pp. 60f. Cited hereafter as Tariq.

In the same way, some change in the attitude towards non-Muslims is also noticeable. Leaders of contemporary Islāmic thought, for instance, repeatedly stress that non-Muslims share equal rights and responsibilities with their Muslim compatriots.² Certain aspects of inequality and discrimination with regard to non-Muslims which have been an integral part of the classical Islāmic attitude and were embodied in the pre-modern socio-political institutions of Islām, are either connived at, or regarded as a misunderstanding of the real purport of Islām on the part of the Muslims of the past. The jizyah tax, for instance, which used to be imposed upon non-Muslims in the past, is no longer universally deemed obligatory by orthodox Muslims. It is pleaded that jizyah had been imposed in lieu of the exemption from the responsibilities to defend the state which had been granted to non-Muslims. If non-Muslims are now prepared to stake their lives to defend the (Islāmic) state, this tax may be abolished.³ These attitudes are obviously departures from the pre-modern past of Islām. These changes, however, do not exceed minor purging and pruning of the traditional formulations of Islām. They do not indicate any basic change in the general Islāmic frame of reference. A more or less literal interpretation of the Qur'ān and the Sunnah is still regarded as valid. More: Islām is regarded as the guidance for man's life in its entirety.

Thus, as we have already pointed out, contemporary Islām is pre-dominantly traditional. The exposition of the socio-political doctrines

2. See al-Bannā', Ḥasan, Ilā al-Shabāb, (Cairo: n.d.), p. 15. Cited hereafter as Shabāb; Tarīq, op. cit., p. 69 and Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 80.

3. Tarīq, op. cit., p. 69.

of Islām and its attitudes towards nationalism which is being essayed in the following pages will, therefore, be an exposition of the ideals and doctrines expressed by orthodox Muslims during the period under our consideration. We shall attempt to explain some of the important political ideas and aspirations of orthodox Muslims. We shall also try to explain their attitudes towards nationalism, and will show how far orthodox Islām goes with nationalism and where it parts company.

(1)

The contemporary traditional Islāmic thought rests on the assumption that Islām can ensure not only success and felicity in the hereafter but can also ensure a judicious ordering of worldly affairs. This is natural in view of the belief of Muslims that Islām is the embodiment of Divine Wisdom and is the final and superbly perfect version of Divine Guidance (huda') revealed to mankind through the last of His Prophets. The reason for sending prophets to deliver God's message to mankind is seen to arise from the fact that man cannot discover the 'straight path' himself, if he is not aided by God's Guidance communicated to mankind through His Prophets. Human intellect is not relied upon in this respect. It may succumb to base human desires (al-ahwā'), and thus deviate from the path of true human nature. It could also be swayed to extremes, thus losing the point of balance and moderation. Due to these presumptions, the contemporary socio-political ideologies are a priori regarded by the Islāmically-oriented thinkers as defective and erroneous, being the products of the frail and fallible human

intellect.⁴

On the contrary, Islām is seen to contain all that is essential for ensuring the guidance of man to a conduct which is consistent with his true nature. It is regarded as the system of life which has succeeded in blending harmoniously all the various urges of man. It is hailed as a system of life which contains all the healthy elements which are found scattered in other systems of life. All such healthy elements are seen to have been integrated to make Islām the best and the most balanced way of life — a way of life which is independent as well as self-sufficient.⁵

Moreover, orthodox Islām is emphatic and uncompromising in its insistence that Islām comprehends the whole of human life. It maintains that Islām is indivisible in the same way as human life is incapable of being divided into different compartments. Hence, it is argued, man should have one and the same system to guide and regulate all sectors of human activity. Such a system, in the orthodox Islāmic view, could be none else but Islām. The all-embracing nature of Islām is eloquently stressed as one of the foremost merits of Islām. It is considered one of these characteristic features of Islām which makes it vastly superior to all other religions and ideologies. It is insisted with great vehemence that the jurisdiction of Islām is not restricted to what is generally known as

4. Based on extensive reading of contemporary literature. See particularly Ramadān, Sa'īd, "???", al-Muslimūn, Damascus, Vol. V, No. 6, pp. 529f; also Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 80, and infra, pp. 117ff. See also al-Khaffājī, Muḥammad 'Abd al-Mun'im, "al-Islām wa Muthal al-'Ulyā", Majallat al-Azhar, vol. XX, no. 6, p. 582.

5. See infra, pp. 117ff.

spiritual and religious life. The entire human life, the 'sacred' as well as the 'profane', fall under its purview. Islām is not merely regarded as a means for the cognition of metaphysical truths. It is also the source for finding out the principles which have to be followed in day-to-day life. And these principles have to be followed not only in the domain of spiritual devotion, in observing prayers and fasting and so on. They are mandatory even matters related to politics and economics. In short, Islām is seen to embrace the whole of human life, and the application of the Islāmic sharī^cah, and of the whole of it, is considered obligatory from the religious viewpoint. For, the whole of human life is considered ibādah^c (worship), and as a contemporary Islāmic writer has put it: "Islām has made the whole world a vast sanctuary in which God has to be worshipped by every action and every movement."⁶

Pursuing the same line of thinking Aḥmad Amin, for instance, stresses the all-embracing nature of Islām in these boastful terms:⁷

Some religions have confined themselves to regulating the relationship between man and his Lord. They have, therefore, (merely) laid down the rituals of worship and have stopped at that point. They did not come into grips with worldly problems. . . . Some of them in fact even urge that man should remain aloof from worldly life.

Islām is not (a religion) of this variety. It has followed a different course. It has regulated the relationship between man and his Lord and has, therefore, laid down a variety of ibādāt^c (rituals of worship). On the other hand, it has taken full cognizance of worldly life and has played the role of a social reformer and legislator. It has regulated

6. Ramaḍān, Sa^cīd, "Raka'iz Da^cwat al-Islām", al-Muslimūn, Cairo, vol. I, no. 6, p. 549.

7. Fayḍ al-Khatir, op. cit., vol. III, p. 172.

the family life and has devised a system of marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. It has regulated monetary transactions by devising rules pertaining to sale, purchase and lease, and prohibition of usury. It has laid down the fundamentals of the Criminal Law by defining crimes and prescribing their punishments. . . . It has determined the principles (upon which) the governmental system (should be based) by defining the functions of the Caliphate and laying down the system of consultation (shūrā).

In brief, Islām has faced all the aspects of the worldly existence of man. . . .

Ḥasan al-Bannā' (d. 1949), the founder of the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, who has deeply influenced contemporary Islāmic thought in Egypt, is another important personality to stress the all-embracing nature of Islām. In fact, he made this interpretation of Islām — which is the traditional interpretation of Islām — the very basis of his movement. He explains the Ikhwān's conception of Islām by saying that the Ikhwān consider Islām:⁸

creed and worship, fatherland and nationality, law and culture, tolerance and strength. They believe in it as an all-embracing system which regulates all aspects of human life, which concerns itself with this world as well as the world to come. They have faith in it as a system which is simultaneously practical and spiritual. For them it is religion and state; and Qur'an and sword.

Sayyid Quṭb, another noted Egyptian writer on Islāmic subjects, whose book Social Justice in Islam⁹ (al-ʿAdālah al-Ijtīmāʿiyyah fī al-Islām) is one of the most significant books on the socio-political doctrines of Islām in recent years, bases his whole theory of Islāmic social justice upon the belief in the all-embracing nature of Islām. In his own words:¹⁰

8. Shabāṭ, op. cit., p. 13.

See also Muḥkilat, op. cit., p. 18; al-Rasā'il al-Thalāth, (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 13f. Cited hereafter as Rasā'il; Similar ideas are expressed in Risālat al-Mu'tamar al-Khāmis, (Cairo: n.d.), pp. 11f. Cited hereafter as Mu'tamar.

9. Tr. John B. Hardie, (Washington, D.C.: 1953).

10. Ibid., p. 17.

. . . the faith of Islām, which deals with the whole field of human life, does not treat the different aspects of that life in the mass, nor yet does it split up the field into a number of unrelated parts. That is to say Islam has one universal theory which covers the universe and the life and humanity, a theory in which are integrated all the different questions; in this Islam sums up all its beliefs, its laws and statutes, and its modes of worship and work.

Consistent with these ideas and with the traditional Muslim political theories, orthodox Islām insists that state is a part of Islām; that it is its pillar.¹¹ The views of Rashīd Riḍā about the Caliphate have been mentioned by us earlier and it has also been noted that Muḥammad ^cAbduh had held similar views. In recent times too the idea that the state is a part of Islām, that it should be directed, regulated and controlled by Islām, has remained the generally accepted Islāmic view and has been very frequently and vigorously stressed. The state, it is insisted by orthodox Muslims, must be an Islāmic state. It should serve as the protector of Islām. It should actively work for the propagation of Islām and for the realization of all the ideals for which Islām stands.

The contemporary concept of Islāmic state exhibits the following important features:

Firstly, the state is required to play the role of the "defender of the faith". It is insisted that preaching is not enough; that religion must also be backed by the power of the state. If the state does not protect Islām, it is feared that its authority would weaken. Ḥasan al-Bannā' quotes the following sentence of the famous Muslim philosopher and theologian, al-Ghazzālī (d. 1111), to stress this viewpoint:¹²

11. Mu'tamar, op. cit., p. 37.

12. Mushkilāt, op. cit., p. 39.

Know ye that the Sharī^cah is the root and the government is the sentinel. If something (i.e. the government) has no roots, it is bound to fall into ruins; and if something (i.e. the Sharī^cah) has no sentinel, it will be lost and destroyed.

On the basis of this statement, al-Banna' argues that the dissemination of Islāmic teachings can be effectively carried out only if Islām enjoys state protection.¹³

Similarly, Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī in his rebuttal of Khālīd Muḥammad Khālīd, refutes the view that the faith of Muslims should remain undefended by the state. The starting-point of his argument is that the monotheistic thesis is the basis of Islām and the maintenance of this thesis entails the establishment of the rights of man — of liberty, equality, and fraternity — since true monotheism implies that all men are the servants of the one true god. If someone starts to impose his will upon others, then he has to be prevented from doing so. The arrogant aristocrats, however, do not relinquish their hereditary power and are opposed to the dissemination of the monotheistic thesis as they consider it dangerous for themselves.¹⁴ al-Ghazzālī seems to argue the point that a government not committed to, and not controlled by Islām, is bound to be against Islām as the ruling

13. Mushkilāt, op. cit., p. 39.

Muḥammad Faṭḥī Muḥammad Uṭḥmān expresses the same view in these words: "Government in Islām is a part of its Sharī^cah; it is a duty without which religion does not attain perfection." Majallat al-Azhar, vol. XXIV, no. 5, p. 408.

Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī stresses the point by quoting a saying of Uṭḥmān, the third Caliph of Islām, to the effect that God achieves through power what He does not achieve through the Qur'ān. Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 27.

14. Ghazzālī, op. cit., pp. 13f.

classes cannot tolerate the dissemination of the monotheistic thesis of Islām. Hence he concludes that:¹⁵

If, therefore, unbelief has its political state that gives its false logic life and power, then, a fortiori, faith should not be left without a political stronghold to give it protection, to defend it against its enemies.

Secondly, the Islāmic state is required to play a positive role vis-a-vis the propagation of Islām and the realization of Islāmic ideals. The Islāmic state is envisioned as an instrument of Islām, and as completely dedicated to the promotion of the cause of Islām. In this regard the example of Communist Russia, as a state wedded to the promotion of a particular ideology, is specially kept in view. A Communist state considers its primary task to build up the entire system of life on Communist principles, and exerts its utmost to propagate Communism. The same should be the role of the Islamic state in respect of Islām.

In the words of Ḥasan al-Bannā':¹⁶

Is it not surprising that you find Communism having a state which extols Communism and voices its appeal and is dedicated to its cause . . . and you also find Fascism and Nazism being backed by nations who hold them sacred, struggle for them, take pride in them and subordinate all their vital systems to their teachings; (you find all this) and you do not find any Islāmic government taking up the duty of calling towards Islām?

Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī considers Islāmic state essential, inter alia, because state alone can achieve certain ideals of Islām. Islām, in his opinion, is a comprehensive plan for the reconstruction of individuals and

15. Ibid., p. 14.

16. al-Ikḥwān al-Muslimūn taht Rāyat al-Qur'ān, (Cairo: 1952), pp. 23f. Cited hereafter as Rāyat al-Qur'ān.

societies and states. To put such a comprehensive plan into effect it is essential to have political power. In view of all this, al-Ghazzālī believes that:¹⁷

Even if it were the case that Islām did not actually intend to take over the Government . . . it would not be surprising if it oriented itself towards the seizure of worldly power.

He cites the examples of the French and the Russian revolutions. The realization of the ideals of liberty, equality, and fraternity forced the standard-bearers of these ideals to capture power as they could not have been realized without it. The same is the case with Islām. Hence:¹⁸

Where Islam is dispossessed of power, the greater part of its teachings remain as mere ink on paper because its observation is impossible through the efforts of individuals alone. Even the performance of certain personal religious duties would wither and cease once the Islamic state was completely obliterated.

Quite a number of contemporary Islāmic thinkers of Egypt have tried to elaborate the programme of socio-economic improvement and moral reform of the society which an Islāmic state should implement. This programme embraces the provision of social security to all citizens of the state, irrespective of race, creed or colour, by state assuming the guarantee of procuring the basic needs of life — food, shelter, medical treatment and education. Unless these needs are fulfilled, it is contended, some of the provisions of the Islāmic Penal Code, like cutting off the hand of the thief, cannot be applied.¹⁹ Another item in the proposed economic programme,

17. Ghazzālī, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

19. *Vide.* al-Hudaybī, Ḥasan, *Dustūrūnā*, (Cairo: n.d.), p. 11.
Cited hereafter as *Dustur*.

which is suggested by certain religious groups to be carried out with a view to realize Islāmic ideals, is to eliminate usury and build up "a healthy economic system divested of the injustice of usury."²⁰

Ḥasan Ismā'īl al-Hudaybī, who became the Supreme Guide of the Ikhwān al-Muslimūn in 1951, stresses that the purpose of the Qur'ān is to purify the souls of the people, cultivate good morals, purge the society of evils, and remove the causes which lead to crimes, and not merely to inflict penalties.²¹ On this basis he argues that:²²

When we demand that we should operate our life in accordance with the Book of Allāh and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Allāh we do not merely want the application of the commandments (ahkām) which occur in the Qur'ān. We rather wish that the Qur'ān should be made the programme for the whole of our life.

Thirdly, an Islāmic state is required to apply Islāmic laws, or as orthodox Muslims express it, in order to "decide in accordance with what Allāh has revealed" (al hukm kima anzal Allāh). Not to decide according to the revealed guidance of God, it is stressed by quoting the verses of the Holy Qur'ān, is infidelity (kufr); injustice (zulm), and disobedience of Allāh (fisq).²³

In the light of this precept, the present laws of Egypt are regarded as worthless, catastrophic for the Egyptians, and contrary to the explicit injunctions of Islām. The Islāmic Sharī'ah, according to orthodox Islāmic view, has been suspended from operation. "The suspension of the Sharī'ah",

20. Ramadān, Sa'īd, al-Muslimūn, vol. IV, no. 5, p. 441.

21. Dustūr, op. cit., p. 6.

22. Loc. cit.

23. See ^cUdah, ^cAbd al-Qādir, al-Islām wa Awdā'unā al-Qanūniyah, (Cairo: 1951), p. 42. Cited hereafter as ^cUdah. See also Dustūr, op. cit., p. 6, and Abu Shahbah, Muḥammad Muḥammad, Majallat al-Azhar, vol. XXIV, no. 9, p. 865.

claims ^CAbd al-Qādir ^CUdah (d. 1954), the Deputy Supreme Guide of the Ikhwān ", and a renowned jurist of Egypt, "is the suspension of Islām itself".²⁴ He indicts the Egyptian government for having set aside the Shari'ah and, among other things, points out that usury, alcohol, gambling, the flesh of swine, adultery, prostitution and semi-naked dances of women, have been permitted in disregard of explicit Islāmic injunctions.²⁵

In short, the Islāmic state as conceived by the orthodox Muslims would protect and propagate the faith of Islām, would strive for the realization of Islāmic ideals and would apply Islāmic laws. The sources of guidance and inspiration for such a state would be the Qur'an and the Sunnah.²⁶ Orthodox Muslims in Egypt have tenaciously clung to the ideal of Islāmic state. They have, therefore, remained opposed to the idea of the separation of state and religion. The intensity of feelings on such an issue can be gauged by the observations made in 1949 by ^CAbd al-Rahmān Tāj (who later on became the Rector of the Azhar), when a suggestion for the separation of state and religion was bluntly made by an Egyptian nationalist. In an article in Majallat al-Azhar, Tāj remarked:²⁷

We are at present encountering a danger: a danger which should make us move our pens and which should agitate our minds; a danger which should cause restlessness in the heart of every

24. ^CUdah, op. cit., p. 52.

25. Ibid., pp. 53-55.

26. These ideas are closely in line with classical Muslim Political thought. cf. al-Mawardi, Abū al-Ḥasan, al-Ahkām al-Sultāniyah, (Cairo: 1909), p. 2.

27. "al-Dīn wa al-Dawlah", Majallat al-Azhar, vol. XX, no. 6, pp. 522f.

believer who is genuinely proud of his faith. . . . Never before this writer did anybody in Egypt dare to call for a separation of religion from the affairs related to state and politics. And I do not think that anybody will agree with his claim that since long the Egyptian nation has been working on the basis of this separation (of religion and state). Such a claim is an evil claim; it is a call towards fitnah (evil), a fitnah which had remained aslumber. And God's curse be upon the one who awakened it.

Besides the ideal of Islāmīc state, orthodox Islām holds dear another political ideal which has had an important bearing upon its attitudes towards nationalism (and, in turn, also effects the nationalist attitudes towards orthodox Islām). This ideal is that of Pan-Islāmism (al-Jamī'ah al-Islāmiyah). Pan-Islāmism is a trend of thought, rather than a well-defined and clearly-formulated political programme. It is the expression of Muslim unrest against the fragmentation of the Islāmīc world into numerous tiny states, which is seen to have weakened the power and prestige of Islām. It rests on the belief that all Muslims are brethren, an idea to which Muslims have subscribed theoretically throughout their history. Pan-Islāmism is the projection of this religious belief into politics. Since all Muslims constitute one brotherhood, they should unify themselves and form one bloc as distinguished from the rest of the world. This idea was propagated with great vigour by al-Afghānī in the latter part of the nineteenth century due to a combination of religious belief in Muslim unity and the pressing need to unite in the face of the foreign menace which was hovering over the heads of Muslims.²⁸

28. Vide. Supra, pp. 13f.

In recent years the Pan-Islāmic ideas have been most persistently and vigorously propagated by Ḥasan al-Bannā'. Even the name of his movement, al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn suggests this idea. al-Bannā' emphasised that Islām is not merely the creed of Muslims: it is also their fatherland and nationality. The entire body of believers, in his view, belong to the same nationality. He also believed that the Islāmic fatherland comprises all Islāmic lands; and that this fatherland is one and indivisible. He stressed over and over again that:²⁹

Islām does not recognize these geographical boundaries and these racial and blood differences. It regards all Muslims as belonging to the same nationality, and considers the Islāmic fatherland one fatherland. . .

On another occasion he elaborates the same view in these words:³⁰

Islāmic brotherhood makes every Muslim believe that every piece of earth where there lives a brother who follows the faith of the Holy Qur'ān is a part of the common Islāmic fatherland. (It is a part of that common Islāmic fatherland) about which Islām enjoins upon its children to work for its protection and well-being. Therefore, the horizons of the Islāmic fatherland transcend the boundaries of geographical and blood nationalisms (wataniyah) to create a nationalism of high principles and pure and right beliefs and the truths which God has made a light and guidance for the world at large.

It is because of such ideas that Ḥasan al-Bannā' stressed the ideal of emancipating all Muslim lands and not merely Egypt or Arab world, from foreign domination.³¹ On the same grounds he held the view that an aggression against one part of the Islāmic fatherland was an aggression

29. Mu'tamar, op. cit., p. 43.

30. Rasā'il, op. cit., p. 73. al-Bannā' expresses similar views very frequently. See, for instance, Mushkilat, op. cit., pp. 35f; Shahāb, op. cit., pp. 9-11.

31. Bayn al-Ams wa al-Yawm, (Cairo: n.d.), p. 25.

against the whole.³² In this regard, he quoted an Islāmic legal edict:
 "A captive Muslim woman taken prisoner in the East must be ransomed even though the cost thereof be all the property of the Moslems."³³

Hasan al-Bannā' explained his ultimate aim in these words:³⁴

. . . we want the integration of all the parts of our Islāmic fatherland which have been cut off from one another due to the machinations of Western Powers and their imperialistic greed and avarice. In this respect we want to make it clear that we cannot accept this artificial political fragmentation of our fatherland. We also do not recognize those international treaties and agreements which have made Muslim states weak enough to be devoured by aggressors. . .

Hasan al-Bannā' has nowhere expressed himself clearly in favour of unifying all Islāmic lands into one Islāmic state. What he wanted was that Muslims of different countries should not be exclusively pre-occupied with their own particular problems, but unite themselves in some sort of an Islāmic Bloc. He wanted Muslims in all parts of the world to experience the brotherhood of Islām on the emotional level and give practical demonstration of this brotherhood by developing closer co-operation and assisting their brethren in solving their problems. In this respect he wanted the formation of a Muslim Nations Organization (Hay'at al-Umam al-Islāmiyah). This organization would embrace all Muslim nations — Arab as well as non-Arab. al-Bannā' does not elaborate his plan about this Organization. However, this would be more or less along the lines of the League of the Arab States.³⁵

32. Cited in Ḥusaynī, Ishāq Musā, The Moslem Brethren, (Beirut: 1956), p. 68.

33. Loc. cit.

34. Shabab, op. cit., pp. 9f.

35. Mushkilat, op. cit., pp. 35f.

Hence, the concept of unifying the Muslim world into one Islāmic state is not held even by al-Banna'. The fact of the matter is that no prominent Pan-Islāmist has advocated this form of Islāmic unity. They fully agree that the Muslims of the world constitute one brotherhood, and that they are "one hand against all others."³⁶ Nevertheless, they do not plead the establishment of a single Islāmic state embracing the whole of the Islāmic world. Muḥammad Abū Zuhrah, an Azhar-educated professor of the University of Cairo, and a noted Islāmic jurist of Egypt is an important instance in point. Abū Zuhrah wrote a series of articles in al-Muslimūn, the academic organ of the Iḥwān, advocating al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmiyah. He, however, insisted that he did not advocate the unification of the Islāmic world into a single state.³⁷

Abū Zuhrah traces the political history of Islām to show that the ideal of Islāmic unity in the form of one state did not last long. He even goes to say that it could not last long. Such a unity was possible only when Islām had not spread beyond the "land of the Arabs." It became impossible to maintain unity in the form of a single state after the conquests brought vast territories under the Islāmic domain. Abū Zuhrah seems to regard this development as natural.³⁸ Therefore, instead of a unity in the form of a unified Islāmic state, he pleads for the formation of an Islāmic League comprising all Muslim states. This Islāmic League should, in the opinion of Abū Zuhrah, unite the Islāmic world in the following manner:

36. A saying of the Prophet which is very frequently quoted by Pan-Islāmits. See, for instance, Abū Zuhrah, Muḥammad, "al-Jāmi'ah al-Islāmiyah", al-Muslimūn, vol. II, no. 9, p. 837.
 37. al-Muslimūn, vol. III, no. 2, p. 124.
 38. Ibid., pp. 125-27.

1. It should lead to Islāmic political union by which Abū Zuhrah means that the Islāmic League should have a council which should ensure that the Islāmic states follow a uniform foreign policy vis-a-vis the non-Muslim states.

2. It should foster economic co-operation in order to enable the Islāmic countries to establish an economy which might not be dependent upon, or inter-linked with the economies of Europe, America or Russia. This object is desirable in order that Muslims might not remain an appendix of any of the world economic blocs, and they may be able to apply the laws of their religion in the economic sphere of their life.

3. It should also have linguistic unity founded on the basis of "the language of the Qur'ān", which will be followed by a cultural unity.³⁹

Abū Zuhrah also desires that this Islāmic League should serve the purpose of maintaining Islāmic brotherhood. This purpose, in his view, can be achieved by preventing Islāmic countries from fighting among themselves either in war or on the political or economic fronts.⁴⁰

This unity should be founded on the basis of Qur'ān and its laws. The common, unifying factor will be the Islāmic faith, although individual Islāmic countries should still have the right to choose for themselves the form of government they like best. According to Abū Zuhrah, the same was the ideal of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī.⁴¹

Aḥmad Ḥasan al Zayyāt, the famous literateur of contemporary Egypt,

39. See Ibid., p. 123.

40. Ibid., p. 123.

41. Ibid., p. 127.

also expresses the longing for some form of Islāmic unity. He welcomes the formation of the Arab League and regards it as a step forward towards the realization of the real goal. This goal, in his view, should be none else than Pan-Islāmism, a goal which, in his view, is bound to be achieved sooner or later by the Islāmic nations. It is bound to be achieved because Pan-Islāmism is:⁴²

(Pan-Islamism is) the political system devised by God, as is indicated by the verse: "Verily, the believers are brethren". Then, God decreed Hajj, as an annual congress in order to strengthen Islāmic brotherhood and made the Caliphate, a means to maintain it.

Another writer whose views about Pan-Islāmism deserve attention is Sa'īd Ramaḍān (1926-), a prominent leader of the Ikhwān and the editor of their intellectual organ, the monthly al-Muslimūn since its inception in 1951. Sa'īd Ramaḍān agrees with the basic premises of the Pan-Islāmic ideology, but pleads that the ideal be put aside for the present. In his view, the present circumstances are not congenial for Pan-Islāmic unity. Pan-Islāmism, observes Ramaḍān, is not similar to the ties known to the people of our age. It is neither based on geographical factors, nor on unity of blood, nor on community of economic interests nor even on pride in the glories of the past. Pan-Islāmism comes into being only when people come together on the basis of their firm attachment to the high ideals of Islām. Such a unity alone can be regarded as al-Jamī'ah al-Islāmiyah. For, in this case, Islām is really the unifying force:⁴³

42. Wahy al-Risālah, vol. III, IV edition, (Cairo: 1956), p. 249. Ahmad Amin' also held similar views. See Fayd al-Khatir, op. cit., vol. III, p. 305.

43. Fī Ufaq al-'Ālam al-Islāmī, (Cairo: n.d.), p. 21. Cited hereafter as Ufaq.

the Islām (submission) of their emotions to Allāh, the Lord of the worlds; their submission of the affairs of their life to the commandments of Allāh. Unless this happens, no unity can become al-Jamī^cah al-Islāmiyah. It will merely be the formation of new bloc founded on a new asabi^ciyah (chauvinism); an asabi^ciyah which is unknown to Islām.

On several other occasion Sa^cīd Ramadān follows the same trend of thought. He stresses that the present politically-tinged Pan-Islāmic enthusiasm gives rise to the suspicion that this might give birth to a new asabi^ciyah in the name of Islām, without Islām actually being the genuinely motivating force behind it. He finds that the political enthusiasm and the revolutionary fervour, which are gradually having the better of the religious people, constitute a danger to the development of a sound and balanced Islāmic outlook. This, to him, appears to be a reaction against the immediate past when Islām had been confined to devotional rituals. To regard Islām as confined to the mosque, in Ramadān's opinion, is wrong. But the reaction against this attitude is manifesting itself in a trend of thought which gives rise to the fear that the mosque might be forgotten, that the call for worship and devotion and godliness might be neglected, and Islāmic movement might become (merely) a revolutionary political movement:⁴⁴

seeking its emotional base sometimes in the vendetta of the wronged or in the nationalistic jingo (na^crah), and sometimes in the chantings of Islām's political glory. In fact, it might be an agglomeration of all these . . . If (such a movement) succeeds, Islāmism would become a new jingo (na^crah); it would assume the form of a new nationalism. Uptil now we have been claiming that we were Egyptians or Syrians or Arabs or non-Arabs. . . Now we are beginning to say: "We are Muslims". The soul in both the

44. Ibid., p. 9.

cases is stirred for the sake of a prejudice . . . This is not the revolution of Islām. The success of such a movement is not the success of Islām. . .

While deferring the ideal of Pan-Islāmism, Sa'īd Ramadān stresses that his attitude to the present Pan-Islāmic sentiments is based on sympathy with the idea of Pan-Islāmism itself. That is, his opposition is based on the fear that under the present circumstances Pan-Islāmism is likely to assume a distorted form or prove "a deception to Muslims" in a new form.⁴⁵ There can, however, be no doubt as to his firm belief in Islāmic unity. At another place, after explaining the Islāmic notion of universal human brotherhood, he proceeds to express his views about Islāmic unity in these words:⁴⁶

It is no negation of this universal human bond that Islām establishes the unity of the Islāmic ummah in such words of Allah . . . as: "Verily the believers are brethren." This unity does not mean nationalistic chauvinism (ʿasabiyyah) among Muslims. It is the unity of faith and thought among a group of human beings who have the right to live according to what they believe in, and whose obligation it is to participate in the service of human-kind according to what they believe to be good, without coercion or aggression. . . (as both coercion and aggression have, according to him, been prohibited by Islām) . . . Perhaps after the world has experienced. . . (different forms of) chauvinism and nationalism. . . it is in need of a new tie which transcends all these factors (i.e. nationalism, etc.) and extends its help to truth, wheresoever and with whomsoever it may be. Muslims are duty-bound to play their role in this respect, to free themselves of the chauvinisms of interests (masālih) and desires (ahwā') and gather themselves around the call towards Truth. . .

Sa'īd Ramadān also stresses that Muslims must co-operate with one another for the solution of their common problems. If the ideal of Pan-Islāmism

45. al-Muslimūn, vol. IV, p. 453.

46. Tarīq, op. cit., pp. 72.f

cannot be realized at present, it does not mean that Muslims of one part of the world have no obligations towards their brethren in other parts of the world. It is their duty to take interest in each others' problems and help their brethren whenever the need arises. For instance, Muslims should join hands in the struggle for the liberation of Islāmic countries from foreign domination. For, the problem of the liberation of the Islāmic countries — and the problem of Palestine is on the top of them all — is one and the same problem.⁴⁷

the problem of injustice which Islām disapproves for all human beings. It is also the problem of Islām as Islām enjoins upon a Muslim not to forsake his wronged brother. The Prophet of Allāh. . . says: "A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He neither wrongs him nor forsakes him". . .

Sa'īd Ramadān's stand, to put it succinctly, is that under the present circumstances the goal of Pan-Islāmism is impossible of achievement. Hence it has to be deferred. The ideal, however, should remain the same. Meanwhile, ^{is} ground/to be prepared for a gradual advance towards Pan-Islāmism. This can be done by abolishing such barriers to the growth of intimate relationship between Muslim countries as visas and customs, and by fostering closer economic and cultural relations and co-operating with one another for the solution of the problems which Muslim countries are facing.⁴⁸

Thus we find orthodox Muslims cling tenaciously to the notions that Islām is both the nationality and the fatherland of Muslims; that Muslims all over the world constitute one brotherhood; and that this

⁴⁷. Tāḥī, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴⁸. Uṣṣa, op. cit., p. 25.

brotherhood has important claims upon them. As a result of this, national boundaries, of Egypt or of Arabism, seem to be of little significance to them, and hardly claim from them any sanctity or emotional attachment. Such a tendency is bound to draw the fire of the nationalists. Their view seems to be that at best these boundaries — of Egyptianism or of Arabism — may be tolerated and left untouched because of practical considerations (rather than because of any deep emotional attachments to them). Hence, in contemptuous disregard of the particularist feelings of the nationalists, the orthodox Muslims assert that:⁴⁹

(National egotism created by nationalism tends to) harden the boundaries drawn on the map of political geography into boundaries in the souls of people — the boundaries which sap the emotion of universalism; the boundaries for which God has issued no authority: the boundaries which were drawn by the swords of conquerors in history and it is difficult to understand how people can permit the swords of conquerors to rule over their minds, and how their hearts can expand or contract according to the extent of the conquests of conquerors. . .

Even if a close Islāmic unity on the governmental level may not be deemed advisable by a few of them, the orthodox Muslims nevertheless consider it imperative that Muslims of all parts of the world should co-operate with one another and not confine their sympathies merely to the boundaries of their particular fatherland e.g. Egypt, Syria, etc. Islāmic brotherhood, in their view, has practical, political implications. It has to find its expression in some shape or form. These super-national loyalties are naturally not approved by the nationalists, as we have seen earlier.

49. Ramadān, Sa^cīd, al-Muslimūn, vol. II, no. 8, p. 759.

(2)

While proceeding to explain and analyze the attitudes of the orthodox Muslims in Egypt towards nationalism, it should be borne in mind that it is part of a bigger problem: the problem of their attitude towards the assimilation of Western ideas and institutions. The attitude of orthodox Muslims respect is largely influenced by their earlier-mentioned views about Islām: that Islām is all-embracing, perfect and self-sufficient.⁵⁰ Since the entire Islāmic scheme of life (as extant in the Shari^cah) is considered divinely-ordained, and hence immutable, the chances of major changes, of radical departures from Islāmic traditions are generally viewed with great suspicion. Moreover, their attitude also depends, to a large extent, on the attitude of the nationalists towards the two important political objectives of orthodox Islām, viz., the establishment of an Islāmic state and the realization of the dream of Pan-Islāmic unity.

In general orthodox Islām evinces an attitude of resistance towards the ideas and institutions of the non-Islāmic, Western world. This resistance stems partly from the mere fact that the source of the said ideas and institutions is non-Islāmic. It also stems from the fact that the Western culture is generally seen by orthodox Muslims in a very unfavourable light. It is generally regarded by them as out-and-out materialistic. In fact, the term 'Western' has generally come to denote the quality of being anti-thetical to Islām. Hence orthodox Muslims are

50. Vide. Supra, pp. 117f.

generally disposed to put up a strong resistance against changes along the lines of westernization and try to save the basic values of Islāmic tradition from being swept away by the torrent of westernizing changes. In general, the religiously-oriented Muslims believe that borrowings from Western sources should be confined to the acquisition of Western scientific and technological knowledge. As for the acceptance of the Western weltanschauung, in part or in whole, or the adoption of Western socio-political ideas and institutions as norms for the Muslim society, it is not merely considered superfluous, but also positively harmful.⁵¹

Nationalism has been a victim of the suspicion and prejudice of orthodox Islām, and one of its reasons lies in its Western origination. It is branded, for instance, by Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī, as a "modern Jāhiliyah" which has been "encouraged by heathenism for the purpose of overwhelming and then obliterating Islam."⁵² Another Islāmic writer regards nationalism as a part of the "cultural invasion" of the Muslim world by the West; as a weapon of the West to weaken Islām's political power and prestige by effecting the fragmentation of the Muslim world.⁵³ Be that as it may, the contemporary Islāmic religious literature of Egypt, (as of the rest of the Islāmic world), is replete with denunciations of nationalism to such an extent that, according to von Grunebaum:⁵⁴

51. See, for instance, Tawr Jadīd, op. cit., pp. 24-27; Rasā'il, op. cit., passim.; Qutb, Muḥammad, Shukhat Hawl al-Islām, III edition, (Cairo: 1958), passim.; al-Bahī, Muḥammad, al-Fikr al-Islāmī al-Hadīth wa Silatuh bi al-Isti'mār, (Cairo: 1957), passim.

52. Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 80.

53. See Tarīq, op. cit., pp. 13-16.

54. von Grunebaum, G.E., "Problems of Muslim Nationalism", Islam and the West, Ed. Richard N. Frye, (The Hague: 1957), p. 3.

. . . the consensus of the pious of the last three or four generations seems agreed to consider nationalism within Islam a scourge not known prior to Western expansion into and interference with the dar-al-Islam. . .

This^{is}/undoubtedly true. But it may prove misleading unless we also keep in view the fact that on several points the Islāmic and nationalist groups have been in perfect agreement. They have been one with the Egyptian nationalists, for instance, on the issue of the demand for the evacuation of the British troops from the Suez Area. The attitude of the orthodox Islāmic groups, (particularly of the Ikhwan) was no less virulently anti-British and no less strongly in favour of Egypt's complete independence than that of the nationalist Wafd Party. Similarly, the orthodox Muslims were no less keenly interested than the Arab nationalists in the Palestine problem. This is evident from the fact that the Ikhwan sent their volunteers to participate in the Palestine War (1948-49). In fact the religiously-oriented groups were neither opposed to the immediate goals of Egyptian nationalism nor those of Arab nationalism. Egypt's complete independence as also the liberation of other Islāmic countries which were under foreign domination were considered by them essential on religious grounds. For them, it meant the emancipation of their co-religionists from the domination of non-Muslims. Moreover, without the liberation of Muslim countries from the dominance of non-Muslims there was no chance for the realization of the dreams of Islāmic resurgence, of Islām coming into operation as a comprehensive system of life, and of the unity of the universal brotherhood of Islām. Therefore, it is not strange to find that orthodox Muslims believed that the struggle for liberation was a duty ordained by Allāh and any shortcoming in this respect

was an unpardonable sin. As long as there is even an inch of Muslim territory under foreign dominance, it is the duty of a Muslim to keep on the struggle for liberation.⁵⁵

Similarly the goals of the liberation of Arab countries and Arab unity -- the immediate objectives of Arab nationalism -- are viewed very favourably by orthodox Muslims. They are regarded as a step forward towards the cherished goal of Pan-Islamic unity, and an advance towards the revivification of the temporal greatness of Islām.⁵⁶

Thus, so far as the immediate goals of the Egyptian and Arab nationalisms are concerned, orthodox religious groups agreed with these goals and even regarded them as their own goals. It is due to this factor that we find that the champions of Islamic orthodoxy, while they fought theoretical battles with the nationalists, also struggled shoulder to shoulder with them for the complete independence of Egypt, or for the victory of the Arab cause in Palestine and elsewhere.

Then, were the orthodox Muslims opposed to nationalism because they had failed to develop any particular loyalty for their Egyptian fatherland or Arab nationality due to the overpowering grip of the Pan-Islamic sentiment on their hearts? Had they failed to recognize that they had special obligations towards Egypt and towards the Arab nationality along with their obligations towards the universal ummah of Islām? Is it because the orthodox Muslims were lacking in warmth for Egypt or Arabism that they opposed nationalism?

55. Shabāb, op. cit., p. 14.

56. See The Crescent in Crisis, op. cit., pp. 151ff.

The answer of the orthodox Muslims is in the negative. They are vehement in their insistence that they love their fatherland, that they love Arabism, that they cherish the glory of Egypt and the efflorescence of Arabism. In their view, Egypt is the primary recipient of their devotion and their services. Obligations towards Egypt precede obligations towards the rest of the world, even the Islāmic world. Thus, Pan-Islāmic loyalty and loyalty to the particular Muslim country in which, or to the Muslim people among whom one is living are not mutually exclusive. Both are considered to exist side by side.

> al-Bannā' paid a good deal of attention to harmonize the two loyalties. For this purpose he elaborated the concept of al-qawmiyah al-Khāssah (particular nationality). One's particular nationality exists side by side with the general Islāmic nationality. A person has duties towards both of them: a general duty towards the general Islāmic nationality and a particular responsibility with regard to the people among whom one is living. al-Bannā' enunciates this view as follows:⁵⁷

. . . the Ikhwān respect their particular nationality on the consideration that it is the first foundation of their cherished renaissance. They do not consider it wrong that every person should work for his country and give precedence to it over other countries. After this, the Ikhwān support Arab unity as the next step towards renaissance. Then, they strive for Pan-Islamism as a fence to protect the general Islāmic fatherland.

The theory of particular nationality is also supported on the grounds that:⁵⁸

Islam enjoins upon every person to strive for the good of his country and lose himself in its service and render utmost

57. Mu'tamar, op. cit., pp. 49f.

58. Ibid., p. 46.

service to the nation (ummah) among whom he lives, and to give precedence to kinship and neighbourliness (in doing good). Due to preference to near ones. . . Islām does not allow the transference of the zakaḥ beyond the limits of qasr, except when necessary. Hence a Muslim is the most deeply patriotic person and is benevolent towards his compatriots. This is so because it has been so ordained by God... The Ikhwan are, for this reason, the keenest of all people in their desire for the good of their fatherland; they are completely self-denying in the service of their people; and they wish for this great and glorious country all power and glory and all progress and advancement.

Hasan al-Bannā' is keen to emphasize the extent of his agreement with the nationalists. He coins a number of terms to indicate these elements of nationalism to which he is not opposed. He does not disagree, for instance, with wataniyat al-hanīn (the nationalism of affection) by which he means the love for one's country. Far from being against Islām, al-Bannā' regards it as ingrained in human nature. Even Bilāl and the Prophet used to feel restless whenever they used to remember Makkah. He also does not disagree with the wataniyat al-hurriyah wa al-izzah (the nationalism of freedom and greatness). By this al-Bannā' means the desire to see the country free and desire to inculcate the love of freedom and honour in the souls of the compatriots. He also does not disapprove of wataniyat al-mujtama' (the nationalism of social welfare). This, in al-Bannā's opinion, means a strengthening of ties between the individuals of the same country. He believes that far from being disapproved by Islām, it is rather encouraged by Islām. He also does not denounce wataniyat al-fath, by which he means the desire to conquer the world and to attain the position of world leadership. Wataniyat al-majd (nationalism of glory), which is the desire to follow the path of the ancestors towards glory, is

also not deemed objectionable.

In the same way he considers qawmīyat al-ummah perfectly legitimate. qawmīyat al-ummah, in al-Bannā's view, denoted that a person's primary responsibility is towards his own people. They should be the primary recipients of his services. Obligations towards the people among whom a person is living have precedence over obligations towards others.⁵⁹

Thus, al-Bannā' discovers a number of points of agreement with the nationalists even though he opposes nationalism in severe terms, as we shall see later. This attitude is shared by other orthodox Muslims as well. Ahmad Amin's is a good instance at hand. He is behind none in virulently denouncing nationalism. Still he regards it neither useful nor possible to uproot the love of the fatherland:⁶⁰

the love of the watan is natural in man, rather even in animals. In the same way, to work for the wellbeing of the watan both for human beings and for animals is also natural. The bird protects its nest; the lion, its den; the bedouin lays down his life for the sake of his tribe. . . Watanīyah has deeply influenced individuals and has succeeded in extracting out of them the utmost of intellectual and artistic effort. . . This was not possible if they had been required to work for the whole of humanity, instead of their own nation. A sack of sugar can sweeten a tank of water, but not a whole river! An electric lamp can illumine a room; it cannot illumine the whole sky! Then, it is good that we should profit from the sugar in accordance with its capacity of sweetening and from the lamp, according to its capacity of illumination.

Other prominent Islamic writers and thinkers express similar views. To summarize: they are opposed to nationalism, but not to patriotism as they regard love of one's fatherland and one's people as

59. See Rasā'il, op. cit., pp. 16-21.

60. Fayd al-Khatir, op. cit., p. 111.

natural. They consider this sentiment perfectly legitimate, even praiseworthy. It should remain alive and continue to play its part in human life.⁶¹

The above-mentioned ideas provide the grounds due to which, in spite of devotion to Pan-Islamism and staunch opposition to nationalism, Egypt and Arabism occupy very important position in the framework of contemporary Islamic socio-political ideology in Egypt.

The Ikhwan's opposition to nationalism is well known. However, they take pride in being Egyptians and express great love and warmth for Egypt and pride in being Egyptians:⁶²

We are Egyptians, born and grown up in this noble part of the world, Egypt — an Islamic country. It welcomed Islam in a noble manner; it has protected Islam and repulsed aggression against Islam at various stages of history. It has sincerely and unreservedly embraced Islam and has showered upon it its intense emotions (of love) and its noblest feelings. . . . Because of various reasons it has come to be the nursery of the Islamic ideology.

. . . So, how can we (afford) not to work for Egypt and for the good of Egypt? And how can it be said that Egyptianism is inconsistent with the obligations of a person who upholds the cause of Islam? We are proud that we are sincere and faithful to our dear fatherland; that we are working for its sake; that we are struggling in the path of its well-being and we shall remain so, all our life, believing firmly that Egypt is the first ring in the chain of our cherished awakening. . . .

In the same pamphlet, the Ikhwan even express their indulgence with regard to taking interest in the ancient (non-Islamic) past of Egypt. They even express their admiration for certain aspects of Egyptian life during this period of Egyptian history. This admiration, however, is

61. See Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 80. Tarīq, op. cit., p. 74.; Taj, 'Abd al-Rahman, "al-Dīn wa al-Dawlah", Majallat al-Azhar, vol. XX, no. 6, p. 525.

62. Tawr Jadīd, op. cit., p. 12.

immediately followed by the clarification that they are opposed to the idea of Egypt's return to the Pharaonic times. To quote their own words:⁶³

We also do not consider it harmful to take interest in the history of ancient Egypt and the cultural and civilizational legacy of the ancient Egyptians, which show that the ancient Egyptians were ahead of the rest of mankind in knowledge and in arts and sciences. We, therefore, welcome ancient Egypt as a record of glory, of greatness, and of science and knowledge.

For Arabism, their warmth is not less conspicuous. In the words of al-Banna:⁶⁴

Islam has arisen among Arabs and has reached other nations through Arabs. Its noble book is in Arabic... It occurs in the traditions that "when Arabs are abased, Islam is abased." This view was vindicated when the fortunes of Arab political power changed and the reins of authority were transferred to non-Arabs. Arabs are the mainstay of Islam; they are its sentinels..

Al-Banna' even believes that Arab unity is essential for the restoration of the glory of Islam, for the establishment of the Islamic State and for the consolidation of the dominance of Islam. For these reasons, he reconsiders it incumbent upon every Muslim to strive for the revival of Arab unity.⁶⁵

All these are, undoubtedly, vigorous expressions of the attachment to Egypt and to Arabism. This should, however, not blur the realization that notwithstanding these, the attitude of orthodox Muslims towards Egypt is different from that of Egyptian nationalists; and towards

63. Loc. cit.. Italics our own.

64. Mu'tamar, op. cit., p.47.

65. Loc. cit.

Arabism, it is different from the attitude of Arab nationalists. This difference of attitudes stems from the fact that the nationalists' loyalty to their fatherland (or their nationality) is based on the simple fact that they are the children of their fatherland. Their loyalty exists in its own right, and is independent of religious considerations. On the contrary, orthodox Muslims have thus far not suffered the idea that any loyalty, which does not emanate from the Islamic loyalty and which is not subordinate to it, could be a legitimate one. In their view, a Muslim owes his primary and supreme loyalty to Islam and the Muslim ummah.⁶⁶ All other loyalties either emanate from this loyalty or exist by the sufferance of Islam, and on the stipulation that the Islamic loyalty would remain the supreme one. A perusal of the Islamic writings expressing love and enthusiasm for Egypt and Arabism makes this point sufficiently clear.

The leaders of contemporary Islamic thought make no secret of their view that they love Egypt and Arabism because Egypt is an Islamic country, and because Arabs are the mainstay and the sentinels of Islam. In other words, their love for Egypt and Arabism are not independent from their loyalty to Islam. Al-Banna's writings are permeated with this spirit. He spells out this opinion with great frankness as follows:⁶⁷

66. Vide. von Grunebaum, G.E., "Problems of Muslim Nationalism", Islam and the West, op. cit., p.14.

67. Shabab, op. cit., p.14. This view is evidenced from Islamic writings on Egypt and Arabism. Vide. supra., pp. 142f.

The Ikhwan are struggling for the sake of Egypt and are making great sacrifices in this struggle because Egypt is a part of the land of Islam (ard al-Islam) and is the leader of Islamic nations.

Thus loyalty to Islam remains supreme. All other obligations may be set aside, but not the obligation towards Islam. Of course, orthodox Muslims would not be prepared to concede that there could occur any clash of loyalties if the right concept of obligations towards the nation is kept in view. But in case such a clash of loyalties does take place, there could be no doubt that the choice of orthodox Muslims would be in favour of the Islamic loyalty. In the words of Muhammad al-Ghazzali:⁶⁸

We love our fatherland, but we do not take pride in this fact alone, for love of one's home is more than a duty --- it is an instinct with which even animals have been endowed. Yet we will not sell our religion for the whole Orient and Occident.

It is due to this fact that nationalism is forced by the orthodox Muslims to bow down before the requirements of Islam e.g., the ideals of Islamic state and Pan-Islamism and no nationalist considerations are permitted to stand in the way of these ideals. Again, to cite Muhammad al-Ghazzali:⁶⁹

This religion of ours, for which we are prepared to sacrifice everything we love, has a theology, an economic doctrine and a worldly policy, all its own. It is a sinister thing to exhort us to discard all these for nationalism...or any other 'ism' for it is nothing less than asking us to become heathen.

68. Ghazzali, op. cit., p.80.

69. Loc. cit.

In addition to this, the orthodox Muslims have not yet fully conciliated themselves to the idea of developing a common nationality with non-Muslims. This is inspite of their professions that non-Muslims share equal rights and responsibilities with Muslims. There could be little doubt that the orthodox Muslims are disposed to grant their non-Muslim compatriots more or less equal statutory rights. Yet the idea that those non-Muslims who share with them their fatherland are also a part of their ummah, that they are an integral part of their society, has not yet become a part of the Islamic attitude. The orthodox Muslims seem yet to have no sense of belonging to any other ummah except the Muslim ummah. And if they do have any sense of belonging to the Egyptian nation and the Arab nationality, it is mainly because these are parts of the Muslim ummah itself. True, the non-Muslims of Egypt are assured of being treated justly and generously in the Islamic state. This is, however, a different matter. One could treat also those whom one does not consider one's 'own' with justice and generosity. As for considering them an integral part of the community, regarding them as part of 'themselves' as the elite of nationalist intellectuals claims to do, these are altogether different matters and are still foreign to the way of thinking and emotional predilections of orthodox Muslims. That the non-Muslims are not genuinely considered a part of the ummah is clear from the tones in which the noted Islamic thinkers write about their non-Muslim compatriots. Even the word ahl al-dhimmah for

non-Muslims has not fallen out of use.⁷⁰

This attitude is illustrated by the following statement of al-Banna':⁷¹

The Ikhwan classify people into the two categories. One of them consists of those who believe in the religion of Allāh, in the Book of Allāh, in the Prophet and what the Prophet has preached. With these people we are attached by means of the most sacred tie. The tie of belief, which is much more sacred for us than the geographical tie or the tie of blood. These people (i.e. Muslims) are our kith and kin and we are their kith and kin. We shall defend them, we shall sacrifice our lives and our properties for them, to whichever country or race they might belong. As for those with whom we are not attached by this tie (of belief), we shall remain in peace with them as long as they are peaceful towards us; we shall remain their well-wishers as long as they desist from committing any aggression against us. We believe that the tie between us and them is that of da'wah (call towards Islam). It is our duty to invite them towards what we believe in, as it is a blessing for all mankind.

The line of demarcation drawn by Islam, therefore, is still there and consequently the development of a homogeneous nationality, which is the aim of the nationalists, does not fit into the framework of the contemporary Islamic socio-political thought.

(3)

It is clear from the exposition of the contemporary Islamic socio-political ideas in Egypt that there are numerous points on which orthodox Muslims agree with the nationalists. We have already mentioned that the orthodox Muslims are not opposed to the political objectives for which

70. See, for instance, Tariq, op. cit., p.69.

71. Rasa'il, op. cit., p.25. Italics our own. Similar attitudes are evidenced from the writings of other Islamic writers. See also Ufaq, op. cit., pp.24-26; Ghazzali, op. cit., p.80, etc.

the movements of Egyptian and Arab nationalism have been striving. The love of one's fatherland, the desire to see that one's nation is liberated, the desire to see one's people progress and prosper, the desire to see Egypt attain strength and greatness, the desire to see Arab glory restored — all these are approved of by orthodox Muslims as desirable objectives. Even the claims of loyalty to Egypt and to Arabism are recognized and duties to them are considered to precede the duties towards the rest of the Islamic fatherland. In spite of all this, however, the orthodox Muslims are unanimous that nationalism is a scourge as we have already mentioned.

Now we shall proceed to examine the reasons which, in their view, impel this opposition to nationalism.

One of the most serious attacks on nationalism occurs in the writings of Ahmad Amin (d. 1955). We have already seen, however, that he had no objection against nationalism as such if nationalism meant only the love for fatherland or for one's people, and the desire to serve them. Ahmad Amin, however, feels that nationalism goes much farther than that. It tends to occupy the highest position in the hierarchy of values, and thus upsets the whole system of universal moral values propounded by Religion. Under the influence of nationalism, in Amin's opinion, there has developed a new concept of morality. According to this concept:⁷²

A conduct is deemed virtuous if a man obeys the state and serves his nation without any consideration for the effect of his conduct on other nations. Nationalistic concept of morality goes all the way hand in hand with the exigencies of nationalistic politics. Nationalistic politics, being exclusively oriented to serve national interests, is likely to conflict with justice and equity. . Nationalism would

72. Fayd al-Khatir, op. cit., Vol.III, p.107.

demand that the demands of nationalistic politics be fulfilled, and so would nationalistic morality.

Ahmad Amin's writings (as also the writings of several other Islamic writers) evidence a persistent stress that nationalism and universalism are two conflicting and mutually opposed tendencies. The former is again and again virulently denounced for being chauvinistic, for creating antagonisms between nation and nation and thus endangering world peace. A good deal of this appears to be a reaction against the two devastating global wars which took place in this century during a period of no more than thirty years. It is presumed that nationalism has played the villain in this drama of blood and fire. Islam, on the other hand, is linked up with the universalist tendency. It is hailed as a religion which rises above nationalistic prejudices, believes firmly in universal brotherhood of man, and can, therefore, ensure concord and fellow-feeling among mankind. On the contrary, the ideology of nationalism as it has developed in Europe negates universalism. According to Ahmad Amin:⁷³

When Europe got rid of the impediments (placed in the path of progress by the Christian priestcraft), it invented wataniyah which turned out to be its biggest affliction and its greatest malady. Wataniyah fanned the fires of qawmiyah and made it the foundation of education and economy. Nations tried to outstrip each other in the race of nationalism and this gave birth to the race of armaments. One war hardly dies out when preparations for another war, a war worse than the previous one, are started.

In an article entitled "Universalism in Islam", he elaborates his views about nationalism as follows:⁷⁴

73. Ibid., Vol.II, pp.39f.

74. Ibid., Vol.VII, p.296.

One of the biggest tragedies that overtook the modern world is the tendency of qawmiyah or of wataniyah, in the sense that every nation should work for its own good disregarding the good of all other nations, its cherished goal being the occupancy of the leadership of the world. (Qawmiyah and wataniyah mean) that every nation should strive to possess the largest territory it is possible for it to possess; to wrest from the weaker nations whatever it can wrest; that every nation should try that its commerce should be the most flourishing one and that its military strength should be the mightiest of all. The greatest desire of every nation, therefore, is to elevate its prestige without the slightest regard for any other considerations. On this basis is founded its politics and this is what its leaders aim at. Thus, the greatest statesman is the one who can obtain the utmost for his nation from other nations; the greatest military general is the one who can add a colony to the colonies of his nation. (Under the influence of nationalism) there has spread in the world the idea that one's race is the best race, that one's blood is the best blood, that one's god is the best god...The result of nationalism, understood in this sense, has been (the outbreak of) a series of wars in the past, and the same is again bound to happen in the near future; and is again bound to take place in the near future.

Instead of nationalism, Ahmad Amin advocates universalism. Universalism to him means looking at the world "as one unit and as one family".⁷⁵ Universalism makes nationalism bow down before a general ethical system; it believes in the laws of justice and righteousness and binds every nation to common (human interests, and makes the strong work for the good of the weak and support him until he becomes sufficiently strong.⁷⁶ The remedy for the ailments produced by nationalism lies in the predominance of the universalist tendency, the extirpation of the nationalist tendency or restricting it to such an extent that it does not conflict with universalism.⁷⁷

75. Ibid., p. 297.

76. Loc. cit.

77. Loc. cit.

Ahmad Amin finds one of the greatest praiseworthy features of Islam in its call for universalism and common brotherhood of mankind. One of the most important teachings of Islam, in his opinion, is the unity of the Creator and His creatures. The unity of God's creatures has been proclaimed by Islam in such words as "all men are from Adam and Eve", and are, therefore, equal; and in such sayings of the Prophet as "God has removed from you the arrogance of Jahiliyah and its pride of ancestry. Human beings are from Adam, and Adam was from clay". Ahmad Amin pays glowing tributes to Islam in this respect. For, in his opinion, Islam obliterated racial and colour prejudices, it destroyed nationalism and linguistic and blood prejudices. It refused to make any distinctions between the black and the brown, the yellow and the white. Its motto was: "There is no preference for an Arab over a non-Arab except by virtue of piety." It effaced geographical barriers and set up the unity of creed as the foundation of sociopolitical life. Thus a Muslim counts the whole of dar al-Islam as his fatherland, and there is no distinction between Hijazi, Khurasani and Indian Muslims, as all Muslims are brethren.⁷⁸

All this notwithstanding, Amin also has some moderate remarks about nationalism. He acknowledges that it is neither useful nor possible to extirpate this feeling altogether. He, therefore, poses the question:⁷⁹

Then, why should the relation of nationalism with universalism not be the same as the relation of the individual with the family, or the relation of the family with the nation?

78. See ibid., Vol.VII, pp.297f and ibid., Vol.III, p.109.

79. Ibid., Vol.III, p.111.

This does not appear to Amīn to be impossible of achievement. For, he sees a constant broadening of man's horizons with the march of human history. There has been in constant operation throughout history a process of harmonization between wider and narrower interests as a result of the development of human consciousness. Personal interests were harmonized with the interests of the family; and family interests with the interests of the nation. Despite this broadening of outlook, both the individual and the family remained intact. Then, says Amīn, why should humanity not move a step farther and harmonize national interests with universal human interests? Why should people not start thinking from the broader human point of view and refuse to see the good of their nation in those measures which conflict with the good of humanity at large?⁸⁰

Thus Amīn does not regard the love of the fatherland or one's nationality as essentially impossible of being harmonized with his cherished ideal of universalism. This can, however, be done only by the subordination of national interests to moral principles. His main indictment of nationalism, therefore, is that it has so far refused to modify its attitude and to subordinate itself to higher considerations.

Another leader of contemporary Islāmic thought whose views on nationalism deserve due consideration is Ḥasan al-Bannā'. We have noted earlier the points on which he agrees with the nationalists. To repeat, he considers nothing objectionable in a Muslim loving his particular nationality, in struggling for the freedom of one's people, in regarding one's country and one's people as the most deserving of one's services, etc.⁸¹

80. Ibid., pp. 111f.

81. Vide. supra. pp. 139-41

But such remarks of al-Banna' are frequently followed by an enumeration of those features of nationalism which he would disapprove of. His main criticism against nationalism may be summarized as follows:

Firstly, the nationalists have a wrong concept of Islām and view it unfavourably. Some of them keep Islām and nationality separate from one another (i.e., they do not regard Islām as the nationality of Muslims, a view held by orthodox Muslims).⁸²

Secondly, the highly particularist attitude of the nationalists is an object of al-Banna's intense dislike. In the words of al-Banna':⁸³

As for the reason of disagreement between us and the nationalists, it arises because we regard creed to be the determinant of the boundaries of wataniyah. In our view, every piece of land where there is a Muslim saying: "There is no deity except Allāh and Muḥammad is the Apostle of Allāh", is our watan. All the Muslims living in these territories are our kith and kin and our brethren. We share their feelings and sentiments. The exponents of nationalism, however, are different from us. They are for nothing except the affairs of that limited and narrow part of the world (which they regard as their watan).

Thirdly, the fact that nationalists try to confine the aims of nationalism merely to the achievement of objectives which are of a secular nature is also an object of al-Banna's disapproval. The highest aim of the nationalists, according to al-Banna', is to achieve the independence of Egypt and to strengthen it from the material point of view, following the example of Europe. The proper aim, however, should be "to guide mankind by means of the light of Islām and to raise the banner of Islām in all parts of the world."⁸⁴

82. Rasa'il, on. cit., p.15.

83. Ibid., pp.18f.

84. Ibid., p.19.

In other words, al-Banna' considers nationalism a secularist ideology which is opposed to state serving as the means for the propagation of Islam.

Fourthly, nationalism may go to the extent of trying to resurrect extinct Jahili (pre-Islamic) customs and to awaken forgotten memories of the ancient past, and (thus) to weaken people's attachment with Islam. Some countries have actually done so in the name of nationalism and racial pride. These countries, says al-Banna', tried to destroy all manifestations of Islam and Arabism. They even changed their script and the vocabulary of their tongue. For nationalism of this variety al-Banna' has nothing but contempt and disdain.⁸⁵

Fifthly, nationalism sometimes intensifies racial pride to the extent of downgrading other races. This leads to aggression as Italy and Germany have done, rather as every nation which claims to be above all others does. Nationalism, in this connotation of the term, is to be opposed, says al-Banna', as "it lacks humanity and it means that human race is to be slaughtered for the sake of a myth..."⁸⁶

Another religious thinker, Sa'id Ramadan, whose views about Pan-Islamism have been already mentioned, has time and again made nationalism the target of trenchant criticism. Like other religious writers, he agrees that the love of the fatherland is ingrained in human nature and is, therefore, a genuine sentiment. Hence, the love of the fatherland may, nay it should occupy its rightful place in human life. However, it should not

85. Ibid., p.21.

86. Ibid., p.2f.

exceed its proper limits. There is no harm if people love their fatherlands and sing in praise of them. Taking pride in one's fatherland or one's people too is not harmful. Similarly, there could be no objection against taking pride in the good characteristics found among one's people.⁸⁷ None of these is bad as long as it means "an honourable fidelity for one's people and one's fatherland".⁸⁸ However, nationalism tends to exceed its proper limits. The emotion of love for the fatherland is made the life-emotion, the centre of all feelings. This leads to the subordination of all higher considerations to national egotism. Even religion and morality lose their sway over human beings. For, nationalism tends to set up national egotism as the highest ideal and anything which does not conform to it, tends to be rejected by the nationalists. Says Ramadān:⁸⁹

but if fatherlands, spread all over the world of Allāh, are transformed into idols around which people should circumbulate, then nationalism becomes a deadly poison. What is most dangerous about nationalism is that it appeals to the genuine feelings of man and then puts man on a path: the name of this path is "the path of the fatherland"; its motto is: "the love of the fatherland"; its task is: "the service of the fatherland"; its slogan is "long live the fatherland"! This path inevitably leads to the birth of nationalistic egotism. . . . This nationalistic egotism begins to be considered the highest ideal; begins to be regarded as the standard for the evaluation of gain and loss, of right and wrong—an egotism which turns the boundaries charted on the maps of political geography into boundaries in the souls of people; into boundaries which undermine the universalist emotion of man.

The nationalists subordinate to nationalist egotism the logic of life; they look at the world from its lenses; and spend all their efforts to glorify it. . . . As for

87. "al-Waṭan li Allāh", al-Muslimūn, vol. II, no. 8, pp. 758f.

Cited hereafter as Waṭan.

88. Tarīq, op. cit., p. 74.

89. Waṭan, op. cit., p. 759.

high ideals. . . as for religion. . . as for Islām (the nationalists say:) "We shall choose from them what is good for us i.e. what is determined by our national boundaries; that is, what does not turn us away from sanctifying our fatherland and glorifying our country, etc., even if the high ideals, even if Islām, even if the message of Allāh on earth and even if the legacy of Muḥammad recognise no such boundaries.

The consciousness that nationalism constitutes a menace to the supermacy of religion, that it tends to compete with religion as its rival, that it threatens the universality of the brotherhood of Islām, feature very prominently in Sa'īd Ramaḍān's writings. He makes a detailed criticism of the Arab nationalist ideology on this score. He, however, makes it clear that so far as fighting against Western colonialism is concerned, there are no disagreements in the Arab world and the Islāmic groups completely agree with the Arab nationalists on this point.⁹⁰ He even speaks of a common Arab nationality in these words:⁹¹

We Arabs are proud of our Arabic language, of our Arab fatherland, of our potentialities as manifested in history; we are proud of the treasure of alive feelings and emotions in our national structure; we are proud of our unity as a nation integrated by a common language, a common fatherland and common interests. Our nationalism in this easy sense is a reality about which there can be no disagreement.

He is conscious, however, that the concept of Arab nationalism as understood by the Arab nationalities (of the Fertile Crescent) is not in accord with this "easy sense" of the term 'nationalism' in which he uses it. The Arab nationalists go much farther than what Ramaḍān agrees

90. "???", al-Muslimūn, Damascus, vol. V, no. 6, pp. 521f. Cited hereafter as Ramaḍān.

91. Ibid., p. 526.

with. For instance, they regard the national tie as the only tie which is capable of integrating the Arabs. They also express their determination to fight against religious and sectarian prejudices, and to remove the barriers between the different religious sects and communities of the Arab world. They hold as their ideal the demolition of the present order and the building up of a new one which conforms to the 'nature of the Arabs. They also consider Arab nationality a spiritual-cultural unity and regard all the existing differences among them as transient and artificial. They also boast that the Arab nationality is a nationality with an eternal message of its own which appears in ever-changing forms at different stages of history, leading to the renovation of human values, etc.⁹²

Ramaḍān makes a lengthy criticism of these trends. To summarize them: he does not agree with the idea that the Arab nationality could be considered 'spiritual-cultural unity'. There was no such unity, says Ramaḍān, between Muḥammad and Abū Jahl, though both were Arabs. Similarly, the claim that the national tie is the only legitimate tie and all other prejudices should be obliterated is a dangerous trend of thought. It means that the nationalists deny Christians and Muslims the right to feel a special attachment to their brethren-in-faith. And if either Christians or Muslims believe that they have any other binding tie, then these ties are to be regarded as transient and artificial, and menacing for national unity.⁹³ Says Ramaḍān:⁹⁴

92. Extracts from the writings of Arab nationalists. Loc. cit.

93. See Ibid., p. 527.

94. Ibid., pp. 527f.

Does this call mean that there should be no religions to menace the national unity? Or is this call aimed at creating another religion, a new nationalistic religion.

In the same way Ramaḍān criticises the idea of 'peculiar Arab merits' put forth by the Arab nationalists. In his view, this is also as elusive and as vague as the talk of 'Arab nature', to which we shall turn soon. For, what precisely are these 'merits'? And what makes them 'merits'? Do the Arabs have any peculiar 'sense' which has not been endowed upon non-Arabs and which makes them conscious of these 'merits' or are there standards of good and evil which determine the 'merits' and 'demerits' of things? The standards of good and evil, says Ramaḍān:⁹⁵

are common to all mankind and no race has any monopoly over them. Good is good whether it is found among Arabs or non-Arabs. Similarly, evil is evil whether it is found among Arabs or non-Arabs.

These standards rest upon two things: firstly, upon 'true nature' which guides man towards good; and secondly, upon the messages of the messengers of Allāh. (It is these messages of Allāh alone which can be termed as 'eternal message', says Ramaḍān). It is to these messages of Allāh that mankind is indebted for all the virtues and moral standards which are found in the world. The last of these messages was communicated through the Prophet Muḥammad and it had the distinction of being a universal message. The universalism of Muḥammad's message is dependant on two important factors. Firstly, it depends upon the universalist spirit

95. Ibid., p. 528.

(of the message) which transcends tribal, regional, racial and religious prejudices and provides a common meeting ground for all on the basis of common standards of morality and for the sake of the good of mankind at large; secondly, it depends upon the principles of the regulation and guidance of human life which ensure the continual progress of mankind, materially as well as spiritually.⁹⁶ He concludes this discussion, saying that:⁹⁷

The Arabs have the right to be proud that this eternal universal message, when it was revealed for the first time, it was revealed amongst them; it was revealed in their language; it was revealed to a person who was one of them and the responsibilities of this message were undertaken by their ancestors who set right the deviations from truth and righteousness found among the Arabs of those days, and then illuminated the east and the west with this message. The Arabs have a right to pride in all these. . . but have no right to divest themselves of the message of the Arabic Qur'an which gathered them together and which extended the extremities of their fatherland. The Arabs also have no right to isolate their problems from the problems of the millions of Muslims of the world who are the gendarmes of every piece of Islamic land due to the commandment of Allāh... the problem (of Muslims) is one problem; it is indivisible.

Again, the concept of the 'nature of the Arabs' is held objectionable. For, the Arabs are human beings whom God has created with the same nature as the rest of mankind. They have the same potentialities for good and evil as other human beings. As for the profusion of vitality among them, it does not make their nature different from that of other human beings. This characteristic cannot place them above other human

96. Ibid., pp. 529f.

97. Ibid., pp. 530f.

beings if they are under the sway of evil. The Arabic Qur'ān, says Ramadān, mentions two groups of people. One of them responded to the call of goodness, and became Muslims. This group is regarded as the best ummah. The other group turned down the call of Islām and Qur'ān brands it as 'donkeys'. Then, in which of these two natures is the true Arab nature to be found?⁹⁸

The upshot of Ramadān's ideas is that there is nothing wrong with Arab nationalism if it merely denotes that all Arabs (Muslims as well as non-Muslims) are considered to belong to a common nationality and want to remain united due to the communities of language, of fatherland and of worldly interests. However, the Arab nationalists take things too far and tend to idolize Arabism. They place the love of Arabism above the love of everything else and want to subordinate everything, however valuable otherwise, to the dictates of national interests. The result is that the nationalists even begin to consider religion to be disruptive of national unity, for the national tie begins to be regarded by them as the only legitimate tie. Hence they oppose the concept of universal Islāmic brotherhood and seek to cut off the ties which bind Arabs with the rest of the Islāmic world. They are so much swept away by the nationalist tendency of stressing peculiar national characteristics that they tend to seek guidance for their national reconstruction not in Islām but in such elusive things as the 'nature of the Arabs'.

(4)

To recapitulate: the orthodox Muslims of Egypt agree with the nation-

98. Ibid., p. 528.

alists with regard to the immediate political objectives of nationalism. They recognize the need of Egypt attaining complete liberation from foreign control and dominance. On this point they fully agree with the Egyptian nationalists. In the same way, they agree with the Arab nationalists with regard to the desirability of Arab unity, the goal of the Arab nationalists. More: they are of the opinion that Egypt has the primary claims upon the devotion and services of an Egyptian Muslim, and then comes the Arab world. These claims should be met along with, and should even precede the claims of the Islāmic fatherland.

Despite these points of agreement, there are important points of disagreement which have led to an almost unanimous disapproval of nationalism by orthodox Muslims. For nationalism, in their opinion, does not stay at its proper limit. It begins to demand for itself a much higher position than the one to which it is entitled. It begins to claim that the interests of the nation should be kept above everything else and places even religion and morality in a secondary position. It begins to ignore Islām, fearing that it might prove harmful for national unity. Its exclusivism tends to ignore the demands of the universal unity of Muslims and regard it as dangerous. Nationalism is also seen as a force which leads to the division of mankind into hostile nations, and thus endangers world peace, and stands in the way of the growth of universal friendship and concord. The overriding consideration for the Islāmic groups, however, is that the love of the fatherland should not arrogate to itself a position higher to that of Islām. Nationalism should bow down before the dictates of Islām. It should agree with the orthodox Muslim concept that Islām should be the basis of the body-politic, and the claims of the universal

brotherhood of Muslims should not be ignored. The Islāmic opposition to nationalism largely results from the feeling that nationalism refuses to play a second fiddle to the tunes of Islām. The Islāmic attitude could be summarised in the words of Muḥammad al-Ghazzālī who poses the question: Can Islām live and prosper under the nationalist rule? He proceeds to answer the question in these words:⁹⁹

In the economic field, for instance, Islam prohibits usury and monopoly; in the political, it prohibits despotism and tyranny; in the moral, it prohibits disbelief and corruption. Islam, further, demands that its men, both shepherd and flock, observe prayers and the other commandments of God. If the state carried out these teachings in its entirety, Islam will live securely therein, and it will not matter whether that state is called nationalist or religious. The important matter is that Islam has ideals which must be realised, and upon the state falls a great portion of this obligation. If, on the otherhand, the desired nationalist state is not concerned with the political, economical, social and moral teachings of Islam and gives the Islamic civil and criminal law no place, then the state is utterly irreligious and it is impossible to expect Islam to accept it.

However, orthodox Muslims are fully aware that nationalism is not prepared to subordinate its ideology to the dictates of Islām. Hence they reject nationalism as inconsistent with their ideology.

99. al-Ghazzālī, op. cit., p. 32.

CONCLUSION

The nature of the inter-relationship between Islām and nationalism in contemporary Egypt, as the foregoing discussion evidences, has been of a dual nature. The repeat, the orthodox Muslims had important points of agreement with the nationalists and simultaneously various points of serious disagreement. The main points of agreement between the two were the immediate objectives of nationalism. The orthodox Muslims shared with the Egyptian nationalists the goal of complete liberation of Egypt. With the Arab nationalists they shared their immediate goals — the liberation and unification of all the Arab countries. Had these been the only objectives, there could have been no ideological conflict between Islām and nationalism. For, the liberation of Egypt and other Arab countries meant to the orthodox Muslims the emancipation of their co-religionists from the domination of 'infidels'. The restoration of complete sovereignty to Muslim countries was essential, in the opinion of orthodox Muslims, for providing Islām with the opportunity of full fruition and for being able to discharge the divinely-ordained duty of applying Islāmic laws. It also meant a stride towards the restoration of Islām's temporal power and prestige. Similarly, Arab unity was held desirable as a primary and necessary step forward towards the realization of their cherished dream of Pan-Islāmism.

Despite all this the orthodox Muslims persistently opposed nationalism. The main reason for this lies in the fact that nationalism in Egypt developed these tenets which are regarded as characteristic of modern nationalisms.¹

1. Vide. supra, pp. 1ff.

Egyptian nationalism, like other nationalisms, set up as its ideal the secularization of the political life. In the same way, nationalism paid scant respect to the Muslim belief in the universality of the Muslim ummah and its concomitant political doctrine, Pan-Islāmism. It developed a particularism which tended to come out in vehement opposition to this idea.

On the one hand we find the Egyptian nationalists elaborating a nationalism without much regard for the deep-rooted beliefs of the people of the country, and on the other, we see leaders of contemporary Islāmīc thought tenaciously clinging to the traditional Islāmīc socio-political concepts. They have maintained that Islām should control the totality of man's life; that even political life should not be outside its jurisdiction; that Islām has been and should remain the fundamental cohesive force in the life of Muslims. They have also maintained the attitude that all loyalties emanate from Islām and should remain subservient to the requirements of Islām. Due to these views, orthodox Islām has uncompromisingly insisted upon two of its socio-political ideals: Islāmīc state and Islāmīc unity.

The fact of the matter is that neither Islām nor nationalism has been able to outlive its past. Each is under the heavy burden of traditions. Hence, we find that the leaders of Islāmīc thought have not proved their capacity to effect a break with the tradition which was essential for the assimilation of nationalism. In the same way, leaders of the nationalist thought have failed to develop the boldness of thought and the creative insight which were essential for a re-orientation of nationalism to fit into the framework of an Islāmīc society. Both the groups have been too fettered with tradition to adapt Islām to nationalism or nationalism to Islām.

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