

A History of Palestinian Uprisings through Prison Resistance since 1967

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Abstract

This thesis explores how Palestinian prisoners in Israel and across the Middle East organized and mobilized during periods of nationalist revolt since the 1970s. It examines the way prisoners formed internal governing structures and committees that provided order, discipline, and services, like education. With the help of these structures, prisoners raised morale and maintained the unity necessary for collective action. Prisoners participated in collective actions ranging from noncompliance, hunger strikes and refusing to stand for counts to more militant stances, like rioting, and arson. Prisoners themselves created important art works and also came to be symbols of *sumud*, or steadfastness in the broader culture of Palestinian resistance. The thesis considers the way resistance was a collective and individualized endeavour for Palestinian prisoners and how often the line between the two blurred. And through narrating prisoners' organization and mobilization, the thesis shows exactly how prisons became nationalist spaces and how these nationalist spaces changed over time.

Résumé

Cette thèse explore comment les prisonniers palestiniens en Israël et au Moyen-Orient se sont organisés et mobilisés lors des diverses révoltes nationalistes depuis les années 1970s. Elle examine les façons dont les prisonniers ont formé des structures de gouvernance interne et des comités qui ont maintenu l'ordre et la discipline et ont aussi offert plusieurs services, tel l'éducation. À l'aide de ces structures, les prisonniers ont préservé le moral de leur groupe et maintenu l'unité nécessaire pour entreprendre des actions politiques collectives. Les prisonniers ont pris part à des actions allant de la non-conformité et désobéissance, la grève de la faim et le refus de se lever pour les décomptes, jusqu'aux actions plus militantes comme les émeutes et les incendies. Les prisonniers ont aussi créé des œuvres d'art importantes et sont devenus des symboles de *sumud*, ou ténacité dans la culture de résistance palestinienne plus généralement. Cette thèse considère comment résistance était collective et individuelle pour les prisonniers palestiniens et comment les deux ne sont pas complètement séparés. Partir racontant l'organisation et mobilisation des prisonniers palestiniens, cette thèse montre comment les prisons sont devenues des espaces nationalistes et comment ces espaces nationalistes ont changé au fil du temps.

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Introduction

Historical Background

In April 1920, the League of Nations granted Great Britain the Mandate for Palestine, which came into full effect in September 1923. This was a legal and constitutional document that granted them the right to rule the land and its people. The document did not mention Palestinian people by name or mention any right to self-determination. In contrast, it explicitly recognized the then-Jewish minority and their national rights. It guaranteed the right to establish a Jewish National Home. It either denied Palestinians rights to national determination and representation or “subordinated them completely” to those of the Jewish people.¹ Rashid Khalidi describes the Palestinian position during this period as the “Iron Cage”. Accepting the Mandate would have meant accepting its terms. It would have meant subordinating their rights on their own land to those of the Jewish community and accepting “their nonexistence as a people.”² It was a system in which they felt that accepting the British system would mean delegitimizing themselves and further contributing to their powerlessness. The Mandatory government rejected their requests for representative governing structures, like a parliament. Instead, Lord Passfield, the Colonial Secretary, offered them an agency, like the Jewish Agency. However, this offer was that the agency should be appointed, rather than elected, as the Jewish Agency was. In the Mandatory government, there was a glass ceiling that prevented Palestinians from advancing in the ranks, which limited their ability to influence the government. British authorities also refused to recognize Palestinian political structures, like the Muslim-Christian Associations of the early 1920s or the Palestinian Arab Congress of the mid-to-late-1920s.³

With access to political institutions limited and largely cut off for Palestinians, Rory Miller has contended that violence was “the primary instrument available to the Arabs of Palestine for opposing the Zionist project”.⁴ Palestinian armed resistance to the Mandate first began with its announcement in April 1920, with the Nabi Musa riots in Jerusalem, so-called because they took place at the annual Nabi Musa Festival. The riot was motivated by anti-British and anti-Zionist sentiments and frustrations. In 1929, Haganah and Revisionist Betar, militant

¹ Rashid Khalidi, *Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006), 33.

² Khalidi, 33.

³ Khalidi, 34–65.

⁴ Rory Miller, “Introduction: Britain, Palestine, and Empire,” in *Britain, Palestine, and Empire: The Mandate Years*, ed. Rory Miller (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 3.

Zionist groups, demonstrated at the al-Buraq Wall to claim it as an exclusively Jewish space.⁵ In response, Palestinians held counter-protests and rioted in several towns. Close to 250 Palestinians and Jews were killed. These riots showed Palestinians' resistance to and frustration with the Zionist project in their land. Larger and more organized resistance came in 1936 with the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine.

Immigration and Zionist land purchases, which began in the late nineteenth century, increased during the Mandate period at a rate that threatened Palestinians' position in the country. Rapidly increasing immigration, pushed by growing antisemitism across Europe, helped drive land sales that threatened the livelihoods of Palestinians. This ramped up in the 1930s. By 1930, 30% of Palestinians were landless, and among those who had land, 75% had insufficient land to meet their economic needs.⁶ In 1935, as the global and economic effect of the Great Depression added to these already worsening conditions, Palestine's Congress of Youth began organizing a strike.⁷ By the end of 1935, strike committees formed across Palestinian cities and in the countryside in response to broad demand.⁸ It was not a country-wide strike immediately, as regional circumstances dictated when people on the ground were willing or able to strike.⁹ The death of Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian Imam and militant opponent to Zionism, at the hands of the British in November 1935 helped convince the last of the holdouts. By May 1936, rural nationalist committees were formed and had a "specific peasant agenda".¹⁰ It was a grassroots movement, and not a top-down one. After demonstrations at al-Qassam's funeral, Arab leaders met the High Commissioner of Palestine, and declared that they had "lost their authority over the people", with the implication that while they represented Arab Palestinians, they did not control them.¹¹ Arab leaders tried to balance and moderate their own citizens, who were largely on the side of striking, while they tried to "position themselves favourably for anticipated

⁵ Alex Winder, "The 'Western Wall' Riots of 1929: Religious Boundaries and Communal Violence," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42, no. 1 (2012): 6.

⁶ Ted Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939)," in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 487.

⁷ Weldon Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine*, Library of Middle East History (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 236.

⁸ Matthews, 247.

⁹ For example, in Nablus, they waited until after the orange season finished. Matthews, 241.

¹⁰ Swedenburg, "The Role of the Palestinian Peasantry in the Great Revolt (1936-1939)," 191.

¹¹ Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation*, 247.

negotiations” that were to follow the strike.¹² They continued this balancing act into the General Strike and the Revolt. Palestinian elites formed the Arab Higher Council “to salvage their positions as representatives of the Palestinian Arabs to the government”.¹³ While they had positioned themselves as the leaders of the rural nationalist committees, they were beholden to them. The Revolt emerged from the General Strike and continued, as economic conditions for Palestinians worsened, until October 1936, when Arab leaders from other countries called for its conclusion. A truce was called to allow a Royal Commission to investigate the causes of the General Strike and the Revolt.

The Peel Commission met with Jewish and Arab representatives in public and private sessions and released a report a year later. The report recommended partitioning the country into an independent Jewish state and a Palestinian state that would eventually be independent, complete with land swaps and population transfers. It also recommended that Jerusalem be placed outside of the proposed Palestinian state and that the Galilee would be Jewish land, despite Arabs owning the overwhelming majority it. While Zionist leadership was divided over the proposal but inclined to accept it, the Palestinian side was outraged and roundly rejected it. They renewed the Revolt with new fervor.

During the periods of unrest following 1929 and between 1936 and 1939, the prison population increased. Prisoners arrested following the al-Buraq Disturbances remained in jail for several years past 1932, which was a subject of complaint during a youth conference in January 1932. In a report by the American Consulate in Jerusalem, there was a section from the Arab press, *Falastin*, that critiqued the induction of multiple new magistrates who were responsible for the sentencing following the 1929 Disturbances in order to deal with the high volume of cases. Many of those inducted lacked judicial backgrounds.¹⁴ According to the “Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan”, it was not until 1932 that the prison population began to fall, with a decline of 12% of the daily average prisoners in 1931, and a decline in the total number from 34,682 prisoners in 1931 to 33,906 in 1932.¹⁵ This same

¹² Matthews, 248.

¹³ Matthews, 254.

¹⁴ Cyril Thiel, “Report on Police, Crime and Prisons in Palestine 1932” (April 14, 1932), 7, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

¹⁵ Government of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “Report to the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Trans-Jordan” (Manuscript, 1932), 63, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

report, however, noted the poor and overcrowded nature of prisons. At an Arab Youth Conference held in early January 1932, participants discussed how poor prison conditions were. The report read: “This is not (...) the first time that ill treatment in the prisons has been discussed in public and the Arabs allege that up to now the Government [*sic*] has not justified its position either by contradiction of the allegations made or by holding an impartial enquiry or by the introduction of reforms.”¹⁶ This quotation shows that the conditions in prisons and the treatment of prisoners was a matter of public and political interest. As well, it revealed that there was little government interest in or commitment to prisoners. It also showed a level of disinterest on the part of the Mandate government, which in turn dissatisfied Palestinians. The Palestinian newspaper, *Falastin*, reported poor sanitation, poor quality of food, overwork in prison labour, and no differentiation between political and criminal prisoners.¹⁷ (Other debates at the Youth Conference focused on the national fund, encouraged buying locally produced goods and abstaining from foreign ones.)¹⁸ When covering other Arab Youth Congresses, other newspapers like *The Arab Federation* broached the length of prison terms that people served for their participation in or their accused participation in political activities. An article published on 12 January 1935 described the al-Burqa Disturbances as being of “a political nature” and “a direct result of the Jewish policy followed in Palestine” and as such rejected the treatment of those prisoners as criminals. Instead, it suggested that they were “the victims of a policy which the whole Arab nation rejects.”¹⁹ The article considered these prisoners to be political prisoners and saw their treatment as unacceptable.

Palestinians were not the only ones struggling to be granted status as political prisoners. Jewish communists who had recently immigrated also struggled to seek recognition as political prisoners. Their hunger strike in 1935 was crushed by prison authorities who refused to announce news of the strike. The lack of external support, ultimately led to its failure.²⁰ However, communist prisoners had previously had more luck gaining special privilege. A report, “Socialism and Communism in Palestine”, written by the American Vice Consul Robert

¹⁶ Thiel, “Report on Police, Crime and Prisons in Palestine,” 6.

¹⁷ Thiel, 7.

¹⁸ Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation*, 120.

¹⁹ “Arab Prisoners,” *Al-Wihda al-'Arabiyya*, January 12, 1935, Volume 1, Number 44 edition, National Library of Israel, http://jrayed.org/Olive/APA/Apress_EN/?action=tab&tab=browse&pub=Falastin#panel=document.

²⁰ Ely Palmer, “Jailed Communists Undertake Twenty-Day Hunger Strike, Claiming Treatment as Political Prisoners” (Manuscript, August 24, 1935), 1, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

McGregor in May 1930, described how immigrant communist prisoners were temporarily “appeased” to give up their strike after the Commandant of Police and Prisons invoked an “arbitrary ruling” from the Ottoman period that allowed foreigners to receive special treatment, including better food and separate cells.²¹ This allowed them to receive the approximate treatment of political prisoners without being labeled as such. Prisoners renewed their strike upon the discovery that there were several Arab citizens amongst the Communist ranks who were excluded from this ruling.

During the 1936 Revolt, the prison population rapidly increased. This necessitated the construction of a detention camp in Akka, which held nearly 700 prisoners by 1937. In February 1938, the group “Arab Ladies of Jerusalem” sent a letter to the High Commissioner of Jerusalem, protesting the mass and “wholesale arrest” of Arab men, as well as the poor living conditions of those in prison in Palestine, and those interned on the Seychelles.²² The families of these men were suffering economically and lacked food, as the men had been the main breadwinners. The group protested that the British treatment of Palestinian men, women and children was “incompatible with human rights and principles or with the championing of the weak and the subjected peoples, which championing Great Britain preaches on every occasion.”²³ The letter pulled from a rights-based rhetoric and criticized the distance between civilizing ideals of British imperialism and its reality. During that year there were 1,000 more prisoners in Akka alone. The Mandate government’s Health Department reported that the Akka Central Prison medical resources were “strained”.²⁴ With overcrowding, other material resources were also strained. According to a memo written by Leland Morris the American Consulate, poor living conditions was the reason for the hunger strike of more than sixty detainees at Sarafand Prison, in June 1936. The occupants of the “No. 3 camp” were “less prominent and less well-to-do”, as opposed to those in “No. 1 camp, the elites”, who supplemented the food provided with “specifically

²¹ Palmer, 3.

²² Arab Ladies of Jerusalem, “Petition from Arab Ladies of Jerusalem to High Commissioner” (Manuscript, February 5, 1938), 1–2, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

²³ Arab Ladies of Jerusalem, 1–2.

²⁴ Department of Health, “Annual Report for the Year 1937” (Jerusalem: Department of Health, n.d.), 15, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

imported food”.²⁵ The “No. 1 camp” did not strike.²⁶ The newspaper articles from *Falastin* and *The Arab Federation* and the American Consulate’s press reviews show that the wider political movement was active around and concerned about the conditions of prisoners.

Hunger strikes continued throughout the Revolt. In May 1937, the American Consulate’s biweekly “Review of the Palestine Press”, recorded that an estimated 200 Arab prisoners began a hunger strike in Akka Prison on 10 May. Public outrage ensued in Haifa and Akka. The shopkeepers of both cities went on strike. Notes of protest were sent to the High Commissioner and people marched to the District Commissioner’s office. The demonstrators were quieted when the prisoners’ lawyer assured them that the hunger strikers were to be released that very day and that others would be released later in the week. The American Consul’s comment on this story said: “Over half of the prisoners have since been released and the incident, which the Jerusalem Chief of Police tells me threatened seriously to disturb public security, has been satisfactorily liquidated.”²⁷ The application of widespread public pressure helped secure the freedom of hunger strikers and threatened the Mandatory government. Another press review from April 1938 recorded another hunger strike in Akka Prison, as well as a “sympathy strike”, in which shops closed across northern Palestine and “a procession of Arab women marched to the District Commissioner’s office to present a petition” in Haifa.²⁸ The comment declared that this was the first instance of shops closing during that phase of the Revolt and that it was a “fore-runner” to more activities and another General Strike, like the one in 1936.²⁹ The hunger strike of detainees in Sarafand Prison and Akka Prison showed the beginning of Palestinians utilizing hunger strikes as a strategy to protest their circumstances, be they the poor quality of food or their wrongful imprisonment. In some cases, hunger strikes were precursors to widespread public unrest, as Palestinians turned out in mass to demand changes. The scale of participation meant that

²⁵ Leland Morris, “Disturbances of 1936: June 26 to July 26” (Manuscript, July 6, 1936), 8, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

²⁶ Morris, 8.

²⁷ George Wadsworth, “Review of the Palestine Press: For the Fortnight Ended May 23, 1937” (Manuscript, May 29, 1937), 6, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

²⁸ George Wadsworth, “Review of the Palestine Press for the Period Ended April 18, 1938” (Manuscript, April 30, 1938), 4, Record Group 84: Records of Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, U.S. Consulate, Jerusalem, Palestine. National Archives (U.S.), Archives Unbound.

²⁹ Wadsworth, “Review of the Palestine Press May 1937,” 5.

demonstrations threatened order and the Mandatory government. It showed that outside forces were necessary for prisoners' success.

During the 1936–1939 Arab Revolt in Palestine, prisoners remained politically active and dictated their views and their demands to the public and the Arab Higher Council. The Council were beholden to the rural nationalist committees and their demands. Prisoners were among those who dictated to the Council.

Akram Zu'aytir, born in Nablus, was a member of the Arab Youth Congress, as well as a teacher, a journalist, and a political activist. He wrote several books about history and politics, including a nationalist history textbook that he co-authored with Darwish Miqdadi. After his friend, Wasif Kamal, had been released from prison in 1932, they discussed the detrimental effects of imprisonment on prisoners' families, many of which did not have food, as the man was usually the breadwinner and, even if the man was working in prison under the Penal Labor Ordinance, was not paid. In response, Zu'aytir and Kamal formed the Prisoner's Aid Society, which had membership that was "confined to the most devoted pro-independence activists."³⁰ Zu'aytir was sent to prison for a year in 1936 for his participation in the General Strike.³¹

Zu'aytir's papers, produced during his imprisonment, reveal the continuation of his political activities and his disagreement with the actions of the ruling elites. In July 1936, the detainees of Sarafand Prison sent a memorandum, signed by seventy-seven people, to the Arab Higher Council about a magazine article initially published in London that quoted Jamal al-Husayni. They rejected the narrative that al-Husayni presented. The article suggested that it was "largely innocent, uneducated people who were causing the trouble" and that the revolt was not against the British.³² The detainees asserted that the Revolt was against British colonial rule and that participants were from all classes. They demanded the Council send a correction to the magazine, so that the Revolt and Palestinians would not be misrepresented to the public, both in Britain and in Palestine, where the statement had been reprinted. In this memorandum, they disagreed with the narrative of the elites, asserted their own narrative and demanded action in response.

³⁰ Matthews, *Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation*, 121.

³¹ Matthews, 272–73.

³² Akram Zu'aytir and Bayan Nuwayhid Hut, *Watha'iq al-Haraka al-Wataniya al-Filastiniyya, 1918-1939: Min Awraq Akram Zu'aytir* (Beirut: Mu'assasat al-Dirasat al-Filastiniyya, 1984), 445.

A *bayan*, signed by ninety-seven detainees at Sarafand Prison, rejected the High Commissioner's call to end the strike. Instead, they declared that continuing was the best way forward.³³ They issued a memorandum to the Arab Higher Council with their recommendations to continue the strike and to have the Iraqi government act as guarantor to their demands on the Mandatory government, which were to halt Jewish immigration and land sales and to form a representative government.³⁴ These three examples show that prisoners dictated their views and made demands on both the Arab Higher Council, the national authorities, and the British Mandate, the colonial authorities. These papers were the result of reflection and discussion among prisoners, which showed a social aspect among the detainees. They met and discussed political events taking place outside of their prison and gave their advice and thoughts to national and colonial authorities. They held their leaders accountable and were interested in being leaders themselves.

Rebels completely rejected the British colonial government, which thus entailed rejecting their justice system. To maintain and assert their own order and discipline, rebels formed ad hoc courts. These became alternative governing structures to provide order during the Revolt, a time of chaos.³⁵

Nuh Ibrahim, from Haifa, produced some of the Mandate period's most famous poetry both in and about prison. He became politically active supporting Izz al-Din al-Qassam. After al-Qassam's death, Ibrahim memorialized him in poetry and song.³⁶ He was sent to Akka Prison for five months in 1937 because of his membership in the al-Qassam brigades. In prison he "found a new audience for his poetry and its underlying political message."³⁷ While his fellow prisoners were largely illiterate fellaheen, they were interested in the content and the form of his poetry. One such example was "Mr. Bailey", a poem about an unjust British magistrate, whose sentencing of Palestinians were "too harsh" during the Revolt.³⁸ The poem describes Mr. Bailey sentencing people severely based on "few reports" and silencing them so they "can't disclose

³³ Zu'aytir and Hut, 446.

³⁴ Zu'aytir and Hut, 452.

³⁵ Mustafa Kabha, "The Courts of the Palestinian Revolt, 1936-39," in *Untold Histories of the Middle East: Recovering Voices from the 19th and 20th Centuries*, ed. Amy Singer, Christoph K. Neumann, and Selçuk Akşin Somel (London: Routledge, 2011), 197-200.

³⁶ David A. McDonald, *My Voice Is My Weapon: Music, Nationalism, and the Poetics of Palestinian Resistance* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013), 43.

³⁷ McDonald, 44.

³⁸ Samih Shaheeb, "Poetry of Rebellion: The Life, Verse and Death of Nuh Ibrahim during the 1936-39 Revolt," *Jerusalem Quarterly*, no. 25 (2006): 66-67.

[their] certain innocence”.³⁹ It also denounces Britain’s repressive criminal justice system and prisons.

Ibrahim’s poems are “conversational” and use the “quatrain (*murabba*)” rhythm”, which made his poetry highly accessible and easily remembered for recitation purposes.⁴⁰ His poems had a performative aspect to them. “From Akka Prison” (“Min sijn Akka”) was popularized as a folk ballad. In the 1980s, the band al-’Ashiqin recorded a popular version of it.⁴¹ It describes the execution of three men, Mohammad Jumjum, Fuad Hijazi, and ‘Ata al-Zir in June 1930. The first stanza ends by declaring the speaker’s country was surrounded by light.⁴² The poem calls the men “lions” for their martyrdom.⁴³ In the poem, al-Zir asks his sister not to be sad and the poem asks “Mother”, a general category, to provide more sons after the men die.⁴⁴ In their sacrifice, the mothers rise to the same ranks as martyrs. The poem celebrates the *sumud*, or steadfastness, of the three prisoners who went to their execution, each volunteering to die first for Palestine. It also contains two tropes that play a large role in resistance culture in many mediums throughout other revolutionary periods—the pain of mothers and light illuminating and countering the darkness and hopelessness of prisons.

Resistance culture, particularly that which the author drew from experiences of imprisonment, was also present and popular, both inside prisons and among wider society. Barbara Harlow has argued that resistance poetry “actively engage[s] in the historical process of struggle against the cultural oppression of imperialism, and assert[s] thereby their own polemical historicity.”⁴⁵ She asserts that: “The institutions of state order and its authoritarian control are the target of the resistance poems just as much as of the resistance movement’s military and political operations.”⁴⁶ This was the case with “Mr. Bailey”. During this period, poetry and resistance culture were empowering to Palestinians in and outside prisons. Ibrahim’s experience reciting

³⁹ Nuh Ibrahim quoted in Shaheeb, 67.

⁴⁰ Nuh Ibrahim quoted in Shaheeb, 69.

⁴¹ “From Acre Prison, With Love,” Palestinian Journeys, January 16, 2018, <https://www.paljourneys.org/en/story/9562/acre-prison-love>.

⁴² “En/Faraq al-’Ashiqin: Min Sijn ‘Akka,” LyricWiki, accessed April 23, 2019, https://lyrics.fandom.com/wiki/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%82%D8%A9_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D8%B4%D9%82%D9%8A%D9%86:%D9%85%D9%86_%D8%B3%D8%AC%D9%86_%D8%B9%D9%83%D8%A7/en.

⁴³ McDonald, *My Voice Is My Weapon*, 53.

⁴⁴ McDonald, 53.

⁴⁵ Barbara Harlow, *Resistance Literature* (New York: Methuen, 1987), 37.

⁴⁶ Harlow, 50.

poetry in prison emphasize this, as well as the social aspect of prisons. Prisons could be creative spaces for Palestinians.

These aforementioned aspects—collective actions, particularly hunger strikes, collective discussions, textual production, and resistance culture—played a role in the periods of unrest that followed. During this period, there were several instances that set a precedent or formed a pattern that has played out during periods of unrest throughout the twentieth and twenty-first century. This includes both the physical structures of the prisons themselves and the policies that shape and contain imprisonment, as well as practices by prisoners to resist. There were many physical structures that were built or converted to prisons by the Mandate government. In the 1920s, the British established a military base near the village Sarafand al-Kharab, and next to that, they built Sarafand Prison to hold Palestinian activists.⁴⁷ This was the prison where Zu‘aytir and his fellow detainees wrote their memorandums and *bayans*. Many Palestinians have since been jailed there during the Palestinian Revolution, the First Intifada and to this day. People like Sharif Youssef Mansour, whose accounts are discussed in Chapter One, were in Sarafand Prison during the Palestinian Revolution. During the First Intifada, Hani Ahmad Issawi, a man who went on hunger strike for thirty-three days with his fellow prisoners, called Sarafand Prison, “*Armon ha-Avadon*”, which means “the Place of Hell”, as it had the reputation as a “slaughterhouse”.⁴⁸ Similarly, Muskabiyya, a detention centre in West Jerusalem, was converted from a missionary hostel for Russian pilgrims to a detention centre by the British during the Mandate period. It remains an active site for holding and interrogating prisoners to this day. It was known then and continues to be known for the brutal treatment detainees receive there. It is chiefly where detainees are held and interrogated when they are first arrested, before they see the inside of a court room, a lawyer or a Red Cross representative. During the Palestinian Revolution, Rasmiya Odeh referred to it as a “torture factory”.⁴⁹ In terms of policies with long-lasting and far-reaching effects, in 1945, the Mandate government passed the “1945 Emergency Regulations Act”, which was designed to maintain order during a time of war. Rashid Khalidi has referred to it as the “body of abusive legislation that has been the backbone of Israel’s legal

⁴⁷ Walid Khalidi, *All That Remains: The Palestinian Villages Occupied and Depopulated by Israel in 1948* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1992), 411.

⁴⁸ Hani Ahmad Issawi quoted in Dina Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian: Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 112.

⁴⁹ Soraya Antonius, “Prisoners for Palestine: A List of Women Political Prisoners,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 9, no. 3 (1980): 46.

and carceral policies in the areas of Palestine occupied in 1967.”⁵⁰ These regulations allow acts such as administrative detention and the demolition of the houses of suspects, both of which contravene international and humanitarian law. Their use was prominent during the Palestinian Revolution and the First Intifada and continue to today.

Historical Context

Following the Palestinian Arab Revolt, Arab leaders were exiled to the Seychelles, and, for Britain to better maintain order, were not allowed to return during World War II. The War, and the growing knowledge of the horrors of the Holocaust created more support for the Zionist movement, especially in the United States. During the War years, while Arab political factions were crippled, Zionist leadership prepared for armed confrontation, but remained supportive of the British fight against the Nazis. Following World War II, there were three phases of fighting. Between 1945 and 1947, the Jewish community in Palestine, led by Haganah, Irgun and the Jewish Agency, led a campaign of sabotage against the British. Between 1947 and 1948, war broke out between Arab and Jewish communities. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine arrived in 1947, determined to make a speedy resolution of the mounting tensions and devolving situation. The committee had an eight-to-three split divided on whether to recommend partition or a federal state. With lobbying from American President Harry Truman, the General Assembly approved the partition plan. The Arab states took a hardline after World War II, struggling to shore up domestic support, and refused any compromise to avoid any impression of negotiating with imperialism.⁵¹

In the midst of the intercommunal war, Great Britain made little effort to prevent fighting or to enforce order. Irgun massacred around 250 civilians in the village of Dayr Yassin, an act that spread fear across the Arab population, encouraging many to flee. (Irgun and Haganah added to this urgency by razing villages and forcing expulsions.) In response, an Arab unit ambushed a Jewish medical envoy, killing doctors. The British did not work with the UN to institute the partition plan. Instead, on 14 May 1948, they pulled out, leaving no formal government in charge. During the intercommunal war, Jewish forces were more disciplined and prepared. A few

⁵⁰ Rashid Khalidi, “From the Editor: Israel: A Carceral State,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 43, no. 4 (2014): 6.

⁵¹ William L. Cleveland and Martin P. Bunton, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 4th ed. (Boulder: Westview Press, 2009), 261–66.

hours after the British pulled out, David Ben-Gurion declared independence for the newly created Israel. In response, the Egyptian, Syrian, Lebanese, Transjordanian, and Iraqi armies invaded. Between May and December 1948, the first Arab-Israeli War waged, ending with the decimation of the Arab armies and the expansion of Israeli territory. When the war concluded, there was no Arab Palestinian state, more than 700,000 Arab refugees, and various armistice agreements between Israel and the Arab states, but no peace treaties.⁵²

Relations between Israel and its neighbouring Arab states remained tense and did not normalize in the years that followed. In 1956, during the Suez Crisis, when Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, Israel, France and England invaded Egypt, intending to force the Straights of Tiran to remain open. Due to international outrage, the invading countries were forced to withdraw, with the agreement that the Straights would remain open, but there was not agreement for demilitarization. Nasser emerged from the crisis a national and pan-Arab hero.⁵³ This began a period of enthusiastic pan-Arab political sentiments and initiatives, which included promises for Palestinian liberation. While there were a number of Arab governments speaking supportively of Palestinians, there was not an independent space for Palestinians to speak for themselves. The majority of Palestinians were stateless and refugees.

Nasser's popularity began to wane, as he had failed to bring a lasting pan-Arab union and had invaded Yemen. In June 1967, Soviet and Syrian intelligence erroneously reported that Israel was planning to invade Syria in response to Palestinian guerilla activities based in Syria. Nasser responded by deploying troops to the borders and announced the closure of the Straights of Tiran. In response, Israel began to mobilize its troops along the border. An Israeli surprise attack began the Six Day War. Israel decimated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armies and became an occupying power, with control over the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights. With the scale of the Israeli victory, they felt secure in their military prowess and felt no need or urgency to negotiate. Arabs across the region were left disappointed by the failures of pan-Arabism. The War badly damaged the reputation of the military regimes that had come to power in the 1950s. In the aftermath, there was no peace or détente. Palestinian guerrilla activity along the Israeli borders increased.⁵⁴

⁵² Cleveland and Bunton, 267–69.

⁵³ Cleveland and Bunton, 311–12.

⁵⁴ Cleveland and Bunton, 337–42.

Research Problem

This thesis examines Palestinian prison resistance within the framework of Palestinian nationalism and anti-colonialism. The prison system during the Mandate period and the periods that followed were colonial in nature. As such, prison resistance falls within the scope of anti-colonial resistance. Harlow, who explores anti-colonial resistance in prisons through literary output, argues that prisons, like universities, are institutions of the state, filling similar needs as universities. As such, activism and resistance in prisons through education and literary production, for example, undermine the institutions that contain them. Nahla Abdo's *Captive Revolution* discusses how resistance to imperialism and colonialism extends to prisons. This was part of a global trend during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in Third World countries, like Algeria and Vietnam.⁵⁵ As such, Palestinian nationalism as an ideology and an identity was constructed largely within a colonial context.⁵⁶ There has been criminalization of political dissent across the Middle East in both national and anti-colonial contexts.⁵⁷

This thesis will attempt to delineate the history of Palestinian resistance in prisons during periods of political unrest and popular uprisings since the 1970s. It focuses on the Palestinian Revolution, the First Intifada, and after the al-Aqsa Intifada. It seeks to understand how prisons function as a site of resistance for Palestinians, both in real terms and at a symbolic level. It examines how common elements across uprisings—hunger strikes as a tool to protest abuse and gain material benefits and rights, the centrality of education, and the links between prisoners and *sumud* in resistance culture—change function and meaning across time. It is concerned with themes of collective action, the relationship between the individual and collective action, prisoners' use of and contribution to resistance culture, and the image and symbolic portrayal of prisoners. It will argue that the formation of internal, alternative governing structures allowed prisoners to function as a collective, while not precluding individual action or subjectivity. Resistance culture is a field in which prisoners assert themselves and contest their circumstances, their depictions, and continue to struggle.

⁵⁵ Nahla Abdo-Zubi, *Captive Revolution: Palestinian Women's Anti-Colonial Struggle within the Israeli Prison System* (London: Pluto Press, 2014), 43.

⁵⁶ Rashid Khalidi, *Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 1–5.

⁵⁷ Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler, "Introduction," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion*, ed. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 3.

Scope and Terms

This thesis examines how Palestinian prisoners built internal governing structures and interacted with them. Much like the ad hoc courts of the Palestinian Arab Revolt (1936-1939), Palestinian prisoners could not change the existing prison system, but they did construct alternative governing structures to provide order and services during the Palestinian Revolution. During the First Intifada, these structures remained in place, but not without their own stresses. Prisoners rebuilt them following the Oslo period and the al-Aqsa Intifada. This thesis examines these structures, the collective action that they facilitated and the resistance culture that they inspired.

Prison was not a site of demobilization. The prisons considered in the thesis are both established structures and buildings, like al-Jafr Prison in Syria and Neve Tirza Prison in Israel, and ad hoc structures, like schools, tents, or camps, like Ansar Prison Camp. If people were confined, no matter the buildings or structures, established by states or their militaries, with or without trials or lawyers, it was a prison.

Prisons create a dichotomy of inside and outside. Despite being national spaces, they were designed to isolate and separate prisoners, something Ismail Nashif has explored.⁵⁸ Within prisons, the cell has been referred to as a “prison within a prison” for political prisoners, as it keeps them separate from their community and support networks.⁵⁹ While not all prisoners were in solitary confinement, confinement and isolation were central tenets of imprisonment. Generally, prisons are meant to deter people from committing crimes, to incapacitate them from committing crimes, and to rehabilitate those who have committed crimes.⁶⁰ As such, prisons are meant to remove a person from society, to limit, to mediate, and in some cases, to prevent their contact with those outside prisons. Another side of imprisonment is the criminalization of political strugglers, which has the consequence of delegitimizing their cause. Similarly, in another colonial setting, in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and the 1980s, political prisoners

⁵⁸ Ismail Nashif, *Palestinian Political Prisoners: Identity and Community* (London: Routledge, 2008), 41.

⁵⁹ Rachael Kamel and Bonnie Kerness, “The Prison Inside the Prison” (Philadelphia: Justice Visions Briefing Paper, 2003), 1.

⁶⁰ Shawn Bushway and Raymond Paternoster, “The Impact of Prison on Crime,” in *Do Prisons Make Us Safer?: The Benefits and Costs of the Prison Boom*, ed. Michael A. Stoll and Steven Raphael (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009), 119–20.

also struggled with the British government's efforts to delegitimize their political struggle by criminalizing them.⁶¹

Throughout this thesis, I use the terms "detainee" and "prisoner". While these terms are defined differently across scholarship, this thesis pulls from Nahla Abdo's definition of political detainees. She described them as "individuals who were (or are) activists, politically conscious of different modes of oppression, and who have struggled and continue to engage in a struggle, including the armed struggle against oppressive conditions."⁶² This thesis largely draws on the accounts of Palestinians who were incarcerated for diverse political reasons, like carrying weapons, attending demonstrations or memberships in a political party. For example, in Chapter Two, this thesis includes individuals who were formerly fedayeen, and then became members of labour unions, who were placed in administrative detention for their union activities. Those who were imprisoned for criminal reasons, like for theft or drugs, rather than political actions, fall outside of the purview of this thesis.

Order of the Thesis

Chapter One examines prison activism and resistance during the Palestinian Revolution (1970s to mid-1980s). It discusses how prisoners formed alternative governing structures that boosted morale and provided order, discipline, unity, and services through internal security, education and the organization of collective actions. They interacted with the wider nationalist community and organizations through solidarity strikes, radios and the exchange of important documents. This resistance was strongly connected to resistance culture, which prisoners engaged with and saw themselves represented in and part of nationalist imagery and symbols of rebirth. Part of resistance was making appeals to the international community for solidarity through posters. These appeals were typically made within a human rights framework and there were distinct limitations.

Chapter Two studies the way internal structures and organizing changed after the prisoner exchanges of the 1980s and during the First Intifada (1987-1993), which resulted in the loss of senior prisoners and increased the incarceration and the criminalization of young men and

⁶¹ They were denied prisoner of war status and struggled and went on strike to achieve it.

Paul Dixon and Eamonn O'Kane, *Northern Ireland Since 1969* (Harlow: Longman, 2011), 49.

⁶² Abdo-Zubi, *Captive Revolution*, 19.

children. The increase in arrests, abuses, and torture led to a change in attitudes and awareness in Palestinian society. While prisoners had always been considered heroes to the cause, during the First Intifada, they were increasingly categorized and discussed in terms similar to martyrs. Art, poetry and cartoons reflected this, as well as themes of rebirth and the transgressive power of nature.

With the entrenchment of contemporary Palestinian politics, something that garnered mass responses of solidarity, both inside and outside prison walls, was hunger strikes. Using a comparative approach, Chapter Three examines the 2012 and 2017 hunger strikes to identify key similarities and differences between them in order to understand the impact of collective action in the face of an immense disparity of power. Concurrently, individual hunger strikes took place with the support of other prisoners and Palestinian society at large. It emphasizes that hunger strikes were one of Palestinian prisoners' few recourses. Meanwhile, in his cartoons, Mohammad Saba'aneh problematizes Palestinian society's idealization of Palestinian prisoners as it undermines the suffering that accompanies imprisonment.

Methodology and Sources

Throughout this thesis, I use a mixture of written and visual sources. Among the written sources, there are a variety of oral histories, interviews and testimonies. In Chapter One, my sources are largely oral histories, testimonies of and interviews with former prisoners from the database, the Palestinian Revolution, as well as the edited volume *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*. I also use memoirs and autobiographies, some stored in the Palestinian Revolution database and others published elsewhere, like Sami al-Jundi's *The Hour of Sunlight* and Felicia Langer's *With My Own Eyes: Israel and the Occupied Territories 1967-1973*.

Like Chapter One, Chapter Two pulls from the oral histories of the edited volume *Homeland* and the autobiography of Sami al-Jundi. It also pulls from the oral histories in Dina Matar's *What It Means to Be Palestinian: Stories of Palestinian Peoplehood*. It utilizes other testimonies, like that of Yesh Gvul's "The Palestinian Uprising Ansar 3", as well as "Political Detainees in the Russian Compound in Jerusalem: Overview and Testimonies", collected by the Women's Organization for Political Prisoners in Jerusalem. Chapters Two and Three also use interviews with leaders, like Faysal Husayni, Marwan Barghouti, and Ahmad Sa'adat.

From oral histories and interviews, I concentrate on what the historical protagonists themselves focused on, and how and what they repeated in their accounts. As much as is possible, I let their words drive and frame this study. As well, I examine the similarities between testimonies to flesh out trends and themes, particularly collective action, internal structures, and resistance culture.

Chapters Two and Three principally draw from testimonies and affidavits, gathered by human rights groups. I examine trends and similarities between accounts, as well as the changes in attitudes, particularly in regard to the increased abuse and whether the testifier had experienced abuse previously. For these chapters, this thesis also pulls from human rights reports written and published by various human rights organizations, like Human Rights Watch, Al-Haq, B'Tselem, and Addameer. It uses annual and sectional reports and reports on specific topics, like administrative detention. Chapter Three chiefly draws from Addameer and B'Tselem publications.

Using human rights reports for these periods fits with the increased use of human rights as a framework to study Palestine, which became increasingly prevalent in scholarship following the First Intifada. (One such example is *Courting Conflict*, which Lisa Hajjar considered a study of struggle for human rights, rather than a national conflict.)⁶³ While this may be new to secondary scholarship, this is not necessarily a new trend, as Rashid Khalidi points out, Palestinian elites during the Mandate chiefly attempted to negotiate with the British authorities on a rights-based framework.⁶⁴ However, testimonies and reports collected by human rights organizations had one distinct limitation. They were principally interested in transcribing the narrative of events that constitute the abuse of an individual's body, their human rights, international and/or humanitarian laws. These narratives were centred on an event of abuse. They did not include what came before or extend beyond. In this way, there were clear limitations as these testimonies follow a particular narrative and frequently allow for little to no expressions of individuality or subjectivity or anything beyond this field. These transcripts sought solely to lay out objective facts.

⁶³ Lisa Hajjar, *Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 1–21.

⁶⁴ Khalidi, *Iron Cage*, 33.

For Chapter One, I pull from two anonymous manuscripts that were written in prison, “Kitchen of Crime” and “Art and Revolution”, both of which are in the Palestinian Revolution database. I refer to handwritten miniature letters written in prison and radio transcripts that were written by prisoners to look at prisoners’ communication in internal structures. I use these sources to look at communication between prisoners and the variety of texts created and circulated within prisons. I use the manuscripts and radio transcripts to examine the subjects that interested prisoners.

Chapters One and Two also feature some United Nations documents, including letters to the Secretary General of the UN. I use these letters to examine prisoners’ strategies—applying a human rights framework and appealing to international bodies—to resist. These two chapters also include calls to solidarity with prisoners originally published in *al-Nida* newspaper and the calls to action in the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising’s communiqués, distributed during the First Intifada. I use these calls to action to examine how the wider community supported prisoners. I also use the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising’s communiqués to look at how the First Intifada’s leadership viewed and idolized prisoners as exemplums for the community.

Throughout Chapters One and Two, this thesis draws from poetry and poetry anthologies. In Chapter One, I use four nationalist and revolutionary poetry anthologies. I examine several poems in more detail. They are: Samih al-Qasim’s “A Letter from Prison”, Fadwa Tuqan’s “From Behind the Bars”, and Mahmoud Darwish’s “The Reaction” and “Defiance”. Chapter Two draws from Badawi al-Jabal’s “O Negev”. I draw on the clear imagery, motifs, symbolism and voice to understand the way people viewed prisoners and imprisonment. I do not consider the meter or form of the poetry. I focus on the content present in the poetry rather than the way it is presented. I examine imagery of nationalist symbols and motifs of light and rebirth related to the theme of imprisonment, as well as the symbolism of mothers. I address the similarities between poetry of the Palestinian Revolution and the First Intifada, along with other mediums of art from the post-Second Intifada period. This takes into account the throughlines of how poetry, posters and cartoons depict prisoners.

Principally in Chapters Two and Three, this thesis uses newspapers, such as *The Jerusalem Post*, *Al Jazeera*, *Samidoun*, *Maan News Agency*, *The Times of Israel*, *Electronic Intifada*, and *The New York Times*. I use them to examine the size and participation in

demonstrations external to prisons. Particularly, I draw on quotations from prisoners and their families, as well as the reaction of those outside prisons, in terms of protesting in support of prisoners. I focus on both the chronology of events and what prisoners' supporters highlighted about their experiences demonstrating to support prisoners.

The thesis also uses a number of visual sources, like poster art stored on the database, the Palestine Poster Project. Chapter One examines Mohammed Roukwi's "Ashkelon Prison Series – 1" and Zuhdi al-Adawi's "Les Detenus" in detail. Chapter Two uses Marc Rudin's "Free All", "Ghazi Inaim's "The Rainbow Reaches Us", and Mohammed Roukwi's cover of "Palestinian Affairs Magazine" to examine the use of nature as a trope during the First Intifada. Chapter Three uses Hafez Omar's "Free Khader Adnan" and Waleed Idrees's "The Prisoner Hana Shalabi" to examine the depiction of individuals amidst the trend of individual hunger strikes, as well as nostalgia in poster art. I examine a mixture of seen and unseen aspects of poster art, drawing on colours and symbolism, like with the poetry, as well as the context of where and how people created the images. I do not go deep into aspects of visual analysis, like artistic style, scale, or pictorial space.

Chapters Two and Three use the cartoons of Naji al-Ali and Muhammad Saba'aneh to examine hunger strikes and the nationalist imagery of nature, as well as the role of Handala in Naji al-Ali's cartoons. For Muhammad Saba'aneh's cartoons, I examine the portrayal of imprisonment and its negative effects on prisoners and their families, as well as their subversion of a familiar nationalist symbol. In addition to the cartoons themselves, Chapter Three also considers the collaborative aspect of the creation of Saba'aneh's book.

Chapter One: Building Prisons as Nationalist Space: Palestinian Prisoners' Experiences of during the Palestinian Revolution

The Palestinian Revolution, from 1967 until 1982, was a period of intense political activity, in which people and parties mobilized and organized en masse to build up a resistance movement. Increased mobilization went hand in hand with a massive and distinct cultural output. Newspapers, broadcast media, protest posters, and other forms of art expressed revolutionary ideas and reached a broad audience. During the 1960s, these entities converged with the purpose of liberating Palestine. This was reflected by pan-Arab nationalist groups, like the Ba'ath Party and the Muslim Brotherhood, to which Palestinians also belonged. Following the Arab defeat in the War of 1967, armed resistance gained wide support among Palestinians.¹ Many groups were inspired by Algeria's National Liberation Front. One of the more popular cadres was Fatah, formed in 1964, which helped bring "a new generation and a new image", one of kufiyahs and military fatigues, to the fore.²

Consequently, during this period, many Palestinians faced prison sentences for their political activities across Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. They faced prison sentences because their activities were viewed as threats to the legitimacy of the countries' political systems where they were based. They formed large, organised networks, with their own means and objectives, in Jordan before 1970 and in Lebanon after 1970. In both countries, Palestinians effectively formed a "state within a state". This threatened the sovereignty of the state they existed within. Even in countries like Syria that never saw the same scale of operations as Jordan or Lebanon, when there was instability, such as during coup d'états or the establishment of a new system, Palestinians were seen as a threat and vulnerable to reprisals. Taking up arms, the creation of social programming, and mobilizing the Palestinian population challenged the authority of these governments.

However, some prisoners were not arrested for their political activities. The Israeli military indiscriminately rounded up and imprisoned Palestinians and Lebanese between the ages of twelve and eighty in Ansar, a prison camp in the south of Lebanon. There were those who were politically active amongst its population, but most were inactive. They were civilians targeted for being Palestinian men found in Lebanon during the Israeli invasion.

¹ Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 90–91.

² Matar, 89.

The first half of this chapter examines how Palestinian prisoners built internal governing structures and interacted with these structures. These were alternative structures and support systems that provided discipline and services, through education and internal security. This united prisoners, thus allowing them to use strikes to achieve their aims. The second half of the chapter explores the interaction between nationalist communities within prisons and the nationalist community outside the prison and across international communities.

Within Prisons

During the late 1960s, many prisoners considered the lack of internal structure to be the worst part of imprisonment. This was a practical approach, as without them, prisoners lived wholly on the terms of prison authorities. Abuse was common.³ When prisoners organized collectively and mobilized towards a common goal, it alleviated the helplessness of their positions. Organizing across factional lines created a sense of national unity, which was important to creating a sense of purpose and community. This interaction and organization made prisons politically active sites.

When Sharif Youssef Mansour described the conditions in Bi'r Sab'a Prison in 1970 as "really bad", he referred to the lack of political and revolutionary organization and discipline within the prison, rather than the living conditions.⁴ It was a given that the living conditions were poor. His description of his treatment in his early weeks in Sarafand Prison exemplified this. Casually, he said, "As usual, conditions were horrible", before describing the small, dark cell where he was in solitary.⁵ The term "as usual" reveals abuse and poor living conditions were the norm during this period. Although, Mansour described terrible conditions in 'Asqalan Prison as extensive abuse and humiliation from guards, as well as a divisive, every-faction-for-itself mentality.

Mansour called Abdel Aziz Ali Shahin, a senior Fatah member and leader of the early prison movement, the "greatest credit" for organizing their prison, seeing him as "the leader of

³ While not the primary focus of this thesis, every testimony and memoir referenced in this paper contained mention or discussion the abuses and torture the individual suffered.

⁴ Sharif Youssef Mansour, "Sharif Youssef Mansour: Mobilising," interview by K Nabulsi and AR Takriti, Video, 2016, The Palestinian Revolution, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01p3GGJDu2w&list=PLJk45-KnC0dxm5fW79TO5uWsDgJ_e4VQy&index=9.

⁵ Mansour.

all the prisoners.”⁶ According to Mansour, Shahin organized everyone from different factions, be they Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), or Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), to become “one unit”.⁷ Shahin began by organizing Fatah members to hold sessions to give political lectures and organized literacy classes. Education became a foundational basis for organizing. Through this organizing, Shahin coordinated across factional lines, with other leaders, and from there his group planned a general hunger strike for 5 July 1970, to obtain demands and improvements.

As punishment for this strike, the prison authorities transferred Shahin, Mansour and other leaders, or “trouble makers”, to another prison, Bi’r Sab’a.⁸ There, according to Mansour, the prison population lacked “organizational discipline and the factions were not coherent”.⁹ However, the knowledge and experience that this group had gained from organizing traveled with them, which enabled them to install a similar structure in Bi’r Sab’a. In a brief and pointed way, Mansour noted that the prisoners of Bi’r Sab’a used to build mesh nets for the Israeli military, but they stopped less than one month after their transfer. He credited the termination of this policy with a plan Shahin created and implemented across factions. In this way, knowledge and experience became living and transferable, derived wholly from the prisoners themselves.

Prison leadership built these structures throughout the 1960s and the early 1970s. However, new prisons, like the Ansar Prison Camp, meant that prisoners, like Salah Tamari, had to recreate these structures from scratch. Tamari, a member of Fatah since 1965, arrived in Ansar after spending months in solitary confinement.¹⁰ With a population between 12,000 and 15,000 detainees, he estimated that only 10% were Palestine Liberation Organization members or had experience with the Struggle.¹¹ As Laleh Khalili has shown, the Ansar prison administration created a “state of exception”, in which those incarcerated were denied their judicial rights, and placed outside of Geneva Convention protection.¹² The administration carried out these measures in order to prevent Palestinian resistance and insurgency and to enable the smooth removal of

⁶ Mansour.

⁷ Mansour.

⁸ Mansour.

⁹ Mansour.

¹⁰ While Ansar was a unique situation, Tamari offers many details about he organized and mobilized so many people.

¹¹ Salah Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 4 (1984): 51.

¹² Laleh Khalili, “Incarnation and the State of Exception: Al-Ansar Mass Detention Camp in Lebanon,” in *Thinking Palestine*, ed. Ronit Lentin (London: Zed Books, 2008), 111.

individuals for interrogation.¹³ Tamari's primary concern was how to organize a large group of terror-stricken people. This initially entailed a logistical question and the fact-finding mission, realized by throwing letters wrapped in stones to other sections, to find out the number of people in each section, and then their needs. They organized around these needs, turning them into demands for the administration, with a special emphasis placed on obtaining a copy of the Geneva Convention. Reaching a wider, international audience through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and later the United Nations (UN) was a major strategy.

From there, the prisoners formed committees and elected heads for each section of Ansar. The central committee was organized across factions. While each faction maintained its own infrastructure, each major organization picked a representative to sit on the committee.¹⁴ Tamari represented Fatah, Ahmed Abu-Leila represented the DFLP, and Nabil al-Masri represented the PFLP, while Nemi Juma'a represented the Arab Front. Tamari emphasized the "oneness" of this central committee and the organizational structure across Ansar.¹⁵ Mazin, a student from Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Lebanon, attested to the success of the committee, saying that they "did a good, good job."¹⁶ According to Mazin, when members of the committee were removed from the camp, "[t]he people in Ansar started making more and more demonstrations, big intifada, and the Israelis were forced to release this committee and send the members back to Ansar."¹⁷ The committee created a sense of unity that was capable of surviving and driving action even when the leaders were absent. They acted in "oneness" and became a "we", instead of an individual.¹⁸

In order to fight the isolating strategy of the Israeli soldiers, their "first aim was *unity*", which was entwined with keeping morale high.¹⁹ To Tamari, unity meant focusing on one enemy and preventing infighting.²⁰ Morale-boosting strategies included singing, chanting slogans that angered the Israeli soldiers, and informing people that when they were taken for interrogation, the community missed them. When soldiers removed people, their meals would be set aside next to a sign that said their name and how long they had been gone. In a community where food

¹³ Khalili, 102–3.

¹⁴ Salah Tamari, "Salah Tamari," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 140.

¹⁵ Tamari, 137.

¹⁶ Mazin, "Mazin," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 119.

¹⁷ Mazin, 119.

¹⁸ Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1998, 137.

¹⁹ Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1984, 54. Emphasis in the original.

²⁰ Tamari, 54–55.

quantity and quality were poor and one of their demands was for more and better food, they let meals rot in the sun, to assure their fellow detainees that they remembered them and that they were waiting for their return. It was a collective action to inform the individual how integral they were to the community. In other cases, they would sing and chant slogans all night when prisoners were gone. One Lebanese detainee, Sheikh Yousef, told Tamari that when a guard told him that Ansar stayed up all night, he felt “like a different person”.²¹ It was a renewing and humanizing experience for him after being dehumanized, tortured and repeatedly called a terrorist, to know that so many people “hadn’t forgotten [him] in Ansar, and that everybody in Ansar was on [his] side, and that [they] were protesting for [him].”²²

While Ansar was eventually shut down, the changes achieved in ‘Asqalan and Bi’r Sab‘a had lasting impacts. Ten years later, Sami al-Jundi, a former Fatah member and later peace activist, was imprisoned in Bi’r Sab‘a Prison between 1981 and 1985 and in ‘Asqalan Prison between 1985 and 1990. While he did not name Shahin or Mansour, he cited the hunger strikes that they organized in ‘Asqalan and Bi’r Sab‘a in the early 1970s for the improvements and benefits he enjoyed. He noted that “old prisoners” had “earned the right for certain cells within a section to be opened for one hour each day.”²³ This allowed prisoners to visit each other and hold political meetings. As well, these strikes allowed them to gain access to books, which facilitated their education system and their political meetings.²⁴ It was these books and this education system that made al-Jundi’s time in prison tolerable.

Education

A well-worn sentiment, almost to the point of cliché, was that prison was the university of the revolution. Sami al-Jundi noted this in his autobiography,²⁵ as did Sharif Youssef Mansour²⁶ and Hamoudeh al-Adawi in interviews.²⁷ Multiple former-prisoners described their time in prison as formative to their lives and to their revolutionary identities. It provided valuable political and ideological education. In prisons across the Middle East, Palestinians met in groups,

²¹ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1984, 56.

²² Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 56.

²³ Sami al-Jundi and Jen Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight: One Palestinian’s Journey from Prisoner to Peacemaker* (New York: Nation Books, 2011), 125.

²⁴ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 122–25.

²⁵ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 113.

²⁶ Mansour, “Sharif Youssef Mansour.”

²⁷ Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 114.

and interacted with other Arab prisoners, often discussing the cause and their revolutionary politics.

Similar to other structures in prison specifically, and in the Palestinian Revolution generally, prisoners developed and formalized education structures over time. Lawahez Bursal, a woman from East Jerusalem who was imprisoned in Neve Tirza Prison in 1975, decried the lack of education and preparation she received before she was arrested, interrogated, and tortured.²⁸ She had not been told “what to expect in prison and how to handle it.”²⁹ Israeli security personnel speaking Arabic fluently and using aliases, so that it was impossible for her to report them for abuses, shocked her. She was also unprepared for Israeli military doctors denying, in court, that she had been tortured.³⁰ Salah Abu Kteish of East Jerusalem echoed this sentiment. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) arrested him in February 1969. He spent two months under interrogation in Muskabiyya; “It was probably the most horrendous time for interrogation in the life of our struggle. This is the word of prisoners that have gone through all the different stages.”³¹ During the early days of the Palestinian Revolution, interrogation was at its most brutal and there was little training, preparation or recourse available to Palestinians at the time.

In prisons, great strides were made in a relatively short, ten-year period. In 1981, in Bi’r Sab’a Prison, al-Jundi had to be moved to a different cell so that he could be enrolled in a “mandatory course” with other new prisoners.³² The cell he had initially been placed in was for an economics course. While al-Jundi entered prison at a time when prisoners discussed books and political issues in their cells, older prisoners remembered a time when they wrote with smuggled pens on cigarette containers and margarine wrappers.³³ In ‘Asqalan Prison in 1970, Fatah members taught literacy with pebbles in the dirt, as they had no access to pensils or paper.³⁴ Al-Jundi cited strikes as the cause for these advancements and rights. The prisoners’ organization of space in Bi’r Sab’a Prison during the 1980s was designed around prisoners taking courses.

²⁸ Lawahez Bursal, “Lawahez Bursal,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 148.

²⁹ Bursal, 148.

³⁰ Bursal, 148–50.

³¹ Salah Abu Kteish, “Salah Abu Kteish,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 186.

³² al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 122.

³³ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 122.

³⁴ Mansour, “Sharif Youssef Mansour.”

Prisoners who provided and received education prioritized it. In Neve Tirza Prison, a former member of the PLO, Therese Hasaleh, said that classes were “holy for all the prisoners”.³⁵ They were widely attended. They organized *tawjihi* classes for children who were arrested before finishing school, as well as literacy classes for older women.³⁶ They offered classes like math, English, and Hebrew. Lawahez Burgal was one of those teenagers, who took her high school proficiency test in Neve Tirza.³⁷ Prisoners even went on strike for them to be able to sit these exams, showing how education was prioritized. From there, they organized further to obtain university education for these students.³⁸ Education was so central that al-Jundi declared that “[o]ur books were our souls.”³⁹

Other education sessions were politically based. In Neve Tirza Prison, prisoners discussed the Russian and Vietnamese revolutions and analyzed the Lebanese Civil War and how it affected the Palestinian cause.⁴⁰ In 1981 in Bi’r Sab’a Prison, the introductory course that al-Jundi took, taught by Abdel Fatah, a prison leader, began with the Bolshevik revolution, before discussing Cuba and Vietnam. Al-Jundi transitioned from rarely reading outside prison to reading an average of 300 pages per day in prison.⁴¹ It was a distinct part of prison culture to constantly be reading and discussing revolutionary material. The first book al-Jundi was assigned to read was Mahdi Abdul Hadi’s *The Palestinian Issue and the Political Projects for Resolution*.⁴² Also translated as, *The Palestine Question and the Political Peaceful Solutions 1934-1974*, it is a history of the “Palestinian question”, beginning during the Mandate, in 1934, and ending with what its author calls the Arabs’ victory (“النصر”) during the October War of 1973. It examines the Mandate, partition, the Tripartite Agreement, John F Kennedy’s policies, Gunnar Jarring’s tenure as International Mediator appointed by the UN, the 1967 War and settlements in the West Bank, as well as the leadership and calls to action by Gamal Abdel

³⁵ Therese Halaseh, “Interview with Therese Halaseh,” interview by K Nabulsi and AR Takriti, Transcript, trans. The Palestinian Revolution, 2016, 2, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/58e776a561d4b.pdf>.

³⁶ This was the General Secondary Education Certificate Examination in Jordan.

³⁷ Burgal, “Lawahez Burgal,” 153.

³⁸ Halaseh, “Interview with Therese Halaseh,” 1–2.

³⁹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 144.

⁴⁰ Halaseh, “Interview with Therese Halaseh,” 1–2.

⁴¹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 130.

⁴² al-Jundi and Marlowe, 124.

Nasser and Yasser Arafat.⁴³ The first book Abdel Fatah assigned to al-Jundi was a chronological study of the Palestinian struggle. His reading expanded to novels and other nationalist and political material. According to al-Jundi, Dostoevsky was invoked in daily conversation and Angela Davis was popular, having been a political prisoner herself.⁴⁴

An early facet of communication and community building in prisons came from meeting and discussing political and leftist discourses. In addition to literacy classes, in ‘Asqalan Prison in the 1970s, Shahin organized Fatah members to give lectures about politics, a practice that continued into the 1980s. Through political debates, George Habash became acquainted with Syrian political prisoners, across the political spectrum, like members of Akram al-Hourani’s group, and Ba‘athists who opposed to the regime in Damascus.⁴⁵ From his experiences in Bi’r Sab‘a during the 1980s, al-Jundi attested with certainty, “Prisoners had always discussed books and political issues in their cells.”⁴⁶

There was a social element to education and political discussions. Dafi Jama‘ani, a Syrian officer, in al-Jafr Prison in the 1950s, regularly attended intellectual meetings convened by another prisoner, Dr. Munif al-Razaz. Arab prisoners, which included Ba‘athist and Communist Palestinians, widely attended these sessions, where they debated each other and their doctrines.⁴⁷ Jama‘ani described how prison in Jordan provided an “intellectual luxury”.⁴⁸ There, he and his fellow prisoners had the freedom to discuss the political issues, something they did not have before prison, when they “were living under the shadow of martial law and emergency regulations.”⁴⁹

With education and political discussions, prisons became creative spaces. Within these communities, Palestinian prisoners produced, reproduced, and circulated educational and leftist material. They created their own magazines and books, sometimes reproducing books published outside prison, written entirely by hand and passed around. Other prisoners transcribed radio

⁴³ Mahdi Abdul Hadi, *Al-Mas’ala al-Filastiniyya wa Mashari‘a al-Halul al-Siyasiyya, 1934-1974* (Beirut: al-Maktaba al-‘Asriyya, 1975), 1–10.

⁴⁴ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 131.

⁴⁵ George Habash, *Al-Thawriyyun La Yamutun Abadan*, trans. The Palestinian Revolution (Beirut: Dar Al-Saqi, 2009), 2, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/59240c59740a5.pdf>.

⁴⁶ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 122.

⁴⁷ Dafi Jama‘ani, *Min Al-Hizb Ila Al-Sijn, 1948-1994: Mudhakkirat*, trans. The Palestinian Revolution (Beirut: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wa-al-Nashr, 2007), 6, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/589645a07e93f.pdf>.

⁴⁸ Jama‘ani, 4.

⁴⁹ Jama‘ani, 3.

shows from the Voice of Palestine.⁵⁰ Prisoners reproduced educational and research pamphlets by hand, and disseminated them.⁵¹ For example, a prisoner produced a study of political and social conditions inside prisons,⁵² while another, during the late 1970s, produced a study of art and culture.⁵³ Mazin recalled a fellow detainee of Ansar, a man with a PhD in French, who translated a book provided by the ICRC about the Sabra and Shatila massacres from French to Arabic, “night by night, chapter by chapter” for distribution.⁵⁴

Another part of this production and distribution was supportive and communicative. The writings and books created and distributed in prison were not solely revolutionary material. In Ansar, Salah Tamari and his fellow prisoners created a kind of survival guide, giving advice on how to survive solitary confinement and interrogation, and other information about living in prison.⁵⁵ Tamari took his own lived experience, after being in solitary confinement for nearly five months. In addition to the book, Tamari and the other contributors organized lectures on these subjects for their fellow prisoners.

To many, education and the intellectual and political discussions were the only redemptive features of prisons. In Nablus Prison, Tayseer Nasrallah, a former Fatah fedayeen from Balata Refugee Camp and later the director of the Yaffa Cultural Centre, read revolutionary works written by Karl Marx, Vladimir Lenin and Che Guevara. He used his time in prison as an opportunity to read political treatises.⁵⁶ He called his time in prison a formative period in his life. As such, he left prison “more aware and more focused.”⁵⁷ In Sheikh Hassan Prison in 1968, once George Habash gained access to books, his time in prison became more tolerable. He read “books focused on Marxist theory, which [he] hadn’t had time to delve into in enough depth before then. [He] thus read Lenin and some of Marx and Engel’s work. When [he] got out of

⁵⁰ Zohdi Khalil Awad El-Tawil, “Words for Palestine: The Country and the People” (Handwritten Radio Broadcast Transcription, N/D), *The Palestinian Revolution*, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d916c54c0a.pdf>.

⁵¹ Anonymous, “Kitchen of Crime,” trans. *The Palestinian Revolution* (Anonymous Manuscript, N/D), *The Palestinian Revolution*, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d8636b893b.pdf>.

⁵² “Kitchen of Crime,” Anonymous Manuscript.

⁵³ Anonymous, “Art and the Revolution,” trans. *The Palestinian Revolution* (Anonymous Manuscript, N/D (late 1970s)), *The Palestinian Revolution*, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d7f0eb5148.pdf>.

⁵⁴ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1998, 118.

⁵⁵ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1984, 62.

⁵⁶ Tayseer Nasrallah, “Tayseer Nasrallah: Mobilising,” interview by K Nabulsi and AR Takriti, Video, trans. *The Palestinian Revolution*, 2016, *The Palestinian Revolution*, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z0Sl64TDVBg&list=PLJk45-KnC0dxm5fW79TO5uWsDgJ_e4VQy&index=13.

⁵⁷ Nasrallah.

prison, all this reading would influence [his] leanings.”⁵⁸ He called this period a “complete mental repose” after the torture and the lack of intellectual stimulation during his interrogation period.⁵⁹

Former prisoners repeatedly connected the importance of learning languages with a sense of self-growth. Notably, to some prisoners, learning and gaining fluency in Hebrew in Israeli prisons became a sign of their rejection of their past antisemitism. To them, it was a mark of their beginning to differentiate between Israeli soldiers and the wider Jewish community. While she was in Neve Tirza Prison, Lawahez Burgal shouted at guards that she wanted Hitler to come back. Older prisoners intervened and talked to her, however, and she changed her ways and her views. They told her to view Israelis as a diverse community, who were not collectively responsible for what she suffered. They told her to say “soldiers” and not “the Jewish”.⁶⁰ Burgal highlighted these conversations and her ensuing shame, as the reason why she learned multiple languages, particularly Hebrew and English.⁶¹ Ali Mohammed Jiddah, a black Palestinian from East Jerusalem, described himself as “an extremist” who refused to have anything to do with learning Hebrew, until he realized he was being “an idiot” and became fluent.⁶²

For many prisoners, education was the foundation of prison life. It organized life physically, as noted with al-Jundi’s transfer to a different cell so he could take an introductory course. It organized life emotionally, as at it was a source of growth and a redemptive feature. It organized life socially, as discussions and meetings were central to many prisoners’ interactions with each other. Education structures gave something back to prisoners. While organized across diverse communities and factions, education provided individual benefits and growth, which benefited the collective. It was a service provided by internal structure that served to boost morale and inspired and enforced unity. Education was not the only aspect of internal structures that ordered life. Internal security provided order and discipline to prisoners.

⁵⁸ Habash, *Al-Thawriyun La Yamutun Abadan*, 2.

⁵⁹ Habash, 2.

⁶⁰ Burgal, “Lawahez Burgal,” 153.

⁶¹ Burgal, 153.

⁶² Ali Mohammed Jiddah, “Ali Mohammed Jiddah,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 165.

Internal Security

Internal security was a concern echoed across multiple accounts. However, few people offered examples or opinions about it beyond asserting the necessity of cracking down on collaborators. Sharif Youssef Mansour shifted from talking about the development and discipline of the internal structure in ‘Asqalan Prison to internal security concerns and the punishment for those who “disobeyed orders”.⁶³ To Mansour, discipline and security went hand in hand with the internal structures that provided unity and education. The prison movement leadership, who Mansour exclusively referred to as “we”, conducted their “own security investigations”, which entailed the discovery of individuals, who were “weak” and “tricked into spying” for the Israelis.⁶⁴ They would “interrogate them and punish them accordingly.”⁶⁵ He did not provide examples of possible punishments but did mention that there were executions in ‘Asqalan after 1971.

Salah Tamari’s accounts offer more details. He considered the main difficulty in this realm, to be the rumour mill. In order to handle what Tamari deemed to be an “illogical” increase in accusations, the prisoners’ committee made rules that if someone had an accusation, they had to “go to a certain committee, bring proofs, and everybody should have a right to defend himself.”⁶⁶ Tamari insisted that the “verdict” would be respected after the “case” had been “filed”.⁶⁷ If they had a collaborator, they passed another law so that “if two-thirds of the prisoner is with the Israelis, let’s pull him back by the third that is left.”⁶⁸ According to Tamari, many of those who came forward of their own volition, were “pardoned by leadership.”⁶⁹ Tamari’s accounts were the only ones that explicitly differentiated between “informers” and those who were tortured or terrorized into confessing. He insisted on the careful handling of these cases by respecting this distinction, as he believed abuse would push them into the arms of the Israelis. He blamed this “weak[ness]” on the “unbearable circumstances under which we lived.”⁷⁰ Ansar’s system of internal security was designed to account for nuance, to function democratically, and

⁶³ Mansour, “Sharif Youssef Mansour.”

⁶⁴ Mansour.

⁶⁵ Mansour.

⁶⁶ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1998, 140.

⁶⁷ Tamari, 140.

⁶⁸ Tamari, 140.

⁶⁹ Tamari, 141.

⁷⁰ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1984, 58.

“to pull them [collaborators] to our side.”⁷¹ Through these means, Tamari asserted, they “managed to maintain unity of the prisoners”.⁷²

However, violence was a function of these systems. Tamari only ever saw one “real collaborator”, who was twice almost beaten to death by prisoners in two different sections of Ansar.⁷³ This happened while Israeli soldiers looked on, even after Tamari asked them to interfere. The suggestion was that these were actions taken outside of the jurisdiction of the committee but went unpunished. Mansour for his part, acknowledged that there were “executions” in ‘Asqalan sometime after 1971.⁷⁴

In Bi’r Sab’a Prison during the early 1980s, before the 1985 prisoner exchange, Sami al-Jundi saw an example of discipline that, while violent, had nothing to do with collaborators. One prisoner, Ahmad, beat up another prisoner, Yusuf, after he accused Yusuf of stealing his seeds. The prison leadership appointed a special committee to investigate the incident. Their verdict was to break Ahmad’s foot in retribution for kicking Yusuf in the head. Three people took him out to the courtyard during break and broke it with a toilet seat. One person was there to break the foot, while the two others were witnesses.⁷⁵ Al-Jundi took issue with this *lex talionis* approach, seeing it as unnecessarily harsh and lacking nuance because Ahmad was not mentally stable. Thus, al-Jundi believed he was not wholly accountable for his actions.

Al-Jundi had many negative experiences in ‘Asqalan Prison after the 1985 prisoner exchange, when chaos mounted, and accusations of collaborators abounded and multiplied to impossible heights. He formed many critical opinions about internal security structures, as he had witnessed the dangers to prisoners’ safety and well-being that a paranoid atmosphere ripe with accusations created. He himself eventually was ultimately treated leniently. (For asking to be transferred out of ‘Asqalan without the leadership committee’s permission, his knuckle was lightly wrapped with a ruler.) The system struck fear into him, despite his never having been a collaborator.

This fear and self-policing were an effect of these internal security measures. In Ansar Prison Camp, Mazin “became good friends” with a soldier, a young German man who was

⁷¹ Tamari, 58.

⁷² Tamari, 58.

⁷³ Tamari, 57-58.

⁷⁴ Mansour, “Sharif Youssef Mansour.”

⁷⁵ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1998, 146.

generally curious about Mazin and the other Palestinians.⁷⁶ The soldier had assumed that all the detainees of Ansar were PLO fighters until Mazin explained that he was student and had never been a fighter. The soldier gave Mazin and his friends bananas, which was meaningful to Mazin, considering the poor quality of food in Ansar. Despite this, when the soldier gave Mazin his telephone number to call him when he returned to Germany, Mazin threw it away out of fear. He described being caught “in the middle” and did not want to be labeled a collaborator for maintaining this friendship.⁷⁷ Leadership was conscious of this as well. Tamari was careful when interacting with the prison commander of Ansar to never seem as if he were benefitting from his position of leadership. As such, he refused any special treatment offered to him by the prison commander, including a light to be able to work late,⁷⁸ believing that “corruption starts innocently.”⁷⁹

The judgement of “weakness” suggests that working with the Israeli prison administration was a personal or moral failing on the part of the individual. In this sense they are removed from the community, as shown with the repeated beating of the only “real collaborator”. The concern over these security questions was not ultimately the “weakness” of those accused, but the unity of the prisoners. As such, the justice that committees doled out was preventative and retributive. Across these accounts, former-prisoners used officialising language, including “verdict”, “execution”, “filing”, and “case”, to describe the committee’s work, which acted to regulate these procedures. Through this, fear became a means to maintain internal coherency and structure. This ultimately limited communication between prisoners and prison authorities to official dialogues and channels. To improve their living conditions and end violence against them, prisoners organized and mobilized, using hunger strikes as their main tool.

Strikes

Strikes were an organizing tool to take back power, gain rights to education and other material benefits. Strategies included work stoppages, noncompliance, like refusing to stand during counts, and hunger strikes. Rarer, more militant, and often more disorganized, tactics

⁷⁶ Mazin, “Mazin,” 120.

⁷⁷ Mazin, 120.

⁷⁸ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1998, 140.

⁷⁹ Tamari, 140.

included riots. Many prisoners had experience with strikes and more specifically, hunger strikes. Once in prison, Palestinians' acts of resistance became limited to what was available to them. George Sweeney argues that hunger strikes are "a weapon of last resort, of those nurturing a sense of oppression and frustrated in their attempts to resist".⁸⁰

Demands for more freedom of movement within prison and for hygiene items were fairly common. The hunger strike that began on 5 July 1970, organized by Mansour, Shahin and others, aimed to improve living conditions in 'Asqalan. They demanded an end to abuses and torture, increased break time outside, the ability to move around in their cells, and shaving kits.⁸¹ In Neve Tirza Prison, Therese Halaseh described striking for soap, napkins, hot water and cleaning products, as well as education rights.⁸² While in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison in 1980, prisoners went on hunger strike for beds and for access to books, newspapers and radios, as well as to end collective and individual punishments, like solitary confinement and food deprivation.⁸³

In contrast, some strikes were solely motivated to end abuses, or as a desperate bid for freedom. In Neve Tirza, in May 1970, the women and girls went on a hunger strike to protest the beating of Ramiyya Awda by a guard.⁸⁴ In Abbasia Prison in Egypt, Abu Rakaba and his fellow Palestinian prisoners organized their hunger strike because they had no access to legal recourse. It was an attempt to force their jailers to either release them or to put them on trial.⁸⁵ They used their bodies to protest the confinement and treatment of their bodies.

In addition to demanding better treatment, strikes were also in service of aiding the revolution however prisoners could, which sometimes meant ending forced labour in prisons. As previously mentioned, when Mansour and other leaders arrived in Bi'r Sab'a Prison, they found that prisoners were compelled to build mesh nets for Israeli tanks. So, they organized to halt this process.⁸⁶ It was more common for women in prison to work, than it was for men.⁸⁷ At Neve

⁸⁰ George Sweeney, "Irish Hunger Strikes and the Cult of Self-Sacrifice," *Journal of Contemporary History* 28, no. 3 (1993): 421.

⁸¹ Mansour, "Sharif Youssef Mansour."

⁸² Halaseh, "Interview with Therese Halaseh," 1–2.

⁸³ Abdel Rahim al-Noubani, "The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980," interview by Palestine News Network, Transcript, trans. The Palestinian Revolution, 2012, 1–2, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d9506eedd6.pdf>.

⁸⁴ Felicia Langer, *With My Own Eyes: Israel and the Occupied Territories, 1967-1973* (London: Ithaca Press, 1975), 50.

⁸⁵ al-Noubani, "The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980," 4.

⁸⁶ Mansour, "Sharif Youssef Mansour."

⁸⁷ Lea Tsemel, "The Political Prisoners," *Arab Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 2/3 (1985): 127.

Tirza Prison, the women went on strike to stop the prison authorities from forcing them to cook for the prison guards.⁸⁸ They only wanted to cook for prisoners, Israeli and Palestinian.⁸⁹ Prisoners saw refusing to do work that aided Israeli security forces as a way to aid the revolution.

By the 1980s, hunger strikes were a well-worn tool for prisoners. In 1985 in ‘Asqalan Prison, all political groups formed joint operations committees in order to collect votes on whether or not to strike. When the votes came in positively, the “[e]xperienced prisoners detailed on paper how our bodies would respond day by day. The emergency committee transferred all the sick people and diabetics to one cell.”⁹⁰ Those in that cell would not participate. Seniors prisoners prepared the others for the “vicious techniques” that would be used by the guards to break the strike.⁹¹ As much as was possible, his fellow prisoners prepared al-Jundi for the suffering he encountered. Strike preparation became a necessary subject of the education system.

As the experiences of al-Noubani, Halaseh, and al-Jundi attest, prison authorities inflicted brutal repression on prisoners to try to break strikes. This included beatings, putting leaders in solitary confinement or transferring them to another prison. Al-Noubani witnessed prisoners prepare for violent repression. Some people pre-emptively shaved their heads to prevent guards from being able to pull it. This also prevented their hair from falling out during the strike. Others wrote their wills and memoirs, aware of the mortal risk involved in striking, from the hunger strike itself and from the prison officials trying to break it.⁹² At Neve Tirza Prison, guards beat Therese Halaseh and her fellow prisoners, and released poison gas in the confined spaces of their cells.⁹³ When Sami al-Jundi needed to use the bathroom during a strike at ‘Asqalan, a comrade told him, “Have a safe trip”, before he left.⁹⁴ Even making a trip to use the toilet became dangerous for Palestinian prisoners during hunger strikes.

Additionally, prison officials used force-feeding to combat hunger strikes by removing Palestinians’ leverage and to terrorize them. While Mansour was on strike in ‘Asqalan Prison, the prison authorities used the force-feeding tube as an implement of torture.⁹⁵ During the hunger

⁸⁸ Lea Tsemel is one of multiple people who highlight that women prisoners were just as active as men in this period.

Tsemel, 127.

⁸⁹ Burgal, “Lawahez Burgal,” 153.

⁹⁰ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 141–42.

⁹¹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 142.

⁹² al-Noubani, “The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980,” 2.

⁹³ Halaseh, “Interview with Therese Halaseh,” 1.

⁹⁴ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 143.

⁹⁵ Mansour, “Sharif Youssef Mansour.”

strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison in 1980, guards botched the force-feeding of three prisoners, causing their deaths.⁹⁶ During this hunger strike, al-Noubani was also force-fed. Prison authorities transferred him and twenty-five others to Ramle Prison. There, he heard guards go from one room to the next, dragging people out of the section to the clinic. He described hearing screaming, and then moaning, getting closer and closer to him until the guards arrived in his room. When they force-fed him, they did not use food, but boiling water and salt. There was no pretense of feeding al-Noubani or his comrades to provide sustenance. It was done to traumatize. He was “convinced that the Ramle prison authorities intended to end [his] life” while force-feeding him.⁹⁷ The deaths of the three men, helped lead to force-feeding being outlawed in Israel.

Considering the brutal repression to strikes, when prisoners made gains through strikes, they viewed them as both meagre and substantial at the same time. Walid, then a young man from Nablus, participated in the 1970 strike in ‘Asqalan. He emphasized the death of one prisoner and the painful physical consequences force-feedings had on prisoners. His final comment on a strike in ‘Asqalan, was that his “two centimeter mattress was replaced with a five centimeter sponge mattress.”⁹⁸ Similarly, in a hunger strike in Sabi‘a Prison, prison authorities met their demands for better food and healthier conditions, after multiple hemorrhoid cases, with a soup “‘improved’ by adding an ingredient used to feed cows.”⁹⁹ Walid called these collective gains an “accomplishment”.¹⁰⁰ During the strike at Nafha Prison in 1980, prison authorities force-fed the so-called “hotheads” and beat prisoners. From these abuses and the three deaths, they gained the “most basic need of all prisoners”, which was a bed.¹⁰¹ Walid noted that Israeli civilian prisoners already had this and more, automatically. Whereas, Abdul Rahim al-Noubani, a former fedayeen, said the strike in Nafha in 1980 “produced tangible results, and most importantly it overthrew the school of oppression and terrorism and broke its might.”¹⁰² Al-Noubani declared that visitors and reporters who came after the strike had ended, left with the

⁹⁶ al-Noubani, “The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980,” 5–6.

⁹⁷ al-Noubani, 5.

⁹⁸ Walid, “Walid,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 159.

⁹⁹ Walid, 159.

¹⁰⁰ Walid, 160.

¹⁰¹ Walid, 160.

¹⁰² al-Noubani, “The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980,” 7.

“impression of the utmost importance of the Palestinian prisoners (...).”¹⁰³ To many, more was at stake than material needs.

Hunger strikes were only one tool in prisoners’ repertoire. In ‘Asqalan Prison in 1985, when prison authorities introduced a new rule that families were to be strip-searched before being able to visit them, the prisoners launched a two-pronged strike. They stopped seeing their family, so that there would be no one for prison guards to strip-search, and they stopped standing for the daily count. In response, the guards took away the clothes, televisions, and radios that the prisoners had gained in their previous hunger strike, as well as their books, paper and pens. When they still would not stand, the guards beat them and gassed their cells several times throughout the day. Prisoners with asthma were hospitalized and the guards broke sixteen arms and hands during the struggle. Eventually the administration put an end to the rule about strip-searches, so the prisoners began standing again. Then they got their radios, television, and books back.¹⁰⁴ The rule proved to be more trouble than it was worth for the prison authorities.

In Ansar Prison Camp, detainees used other forms of noncompliance to halt practices of abuse and interrogation. They took control of their schedule and made small, but significant changes to their daily lives. Instead of getting up at 6:30 AM, the detainees started getting up at 6:00 AM, and refused to stand for counts. Tamari considered the repeated counts in the desert heat to be a dehumanizing and unnecessary indignity. It was meant to exhaust and drain prisoners emotionally.¹⁰⁵ These tactics were empowering, as they allowed the detainees to assert themselves and live on their own terms after having been imprisoned, demoralized, and denied their rights.

Each day in Ansar, a truck, nicknamed the owl, took people away, seemingly at random, for interrogation. Torture was a part of this routine. Tamari considered this to be a cruel practice, as its sole purpose was “not to obtain information from the prisoners, but to break their spirits.”¹⁰⁶ After an adolescent collapsed after he returned, detainees protested this process. This created a stand-off between Tamari, who demanded that all interrogations end, and the prison commander, who promised that the brutality of interrogations would end. The following day, soldiers removed twelve people, possibly as a forced transfer. In protest, Tamari set a tent on fire

¹⁰³ al-Noubani, 9.

¹⁰⁴ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 144–45.

¹⁰⁵ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1998, 136.

¹⁰⁶ Tamari, 136.

and threatened the prison commander with worse.¹⁰⁷ The commander promised the twelve men would be returned the next day. The next time the owl came to take a prisoner to interrogation, Tamari went with him, in solidarity, to solitary confinement. Their section, outraged, rioted until the soldiers returned them, which ultimately brought an end to the practice.¹⁰⁸ It proved to be more trouble than it was worth for the prison authorities.

In a way, these strikes were negotiations on the national scale, as prisons are government-run institutions. As such, prisoners' committees, negotiated with sections of national governments in places like Israel and Egypt. Ansar and the 1980 hunger strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison specifically gained the attention of the UN. Ansar's prisoners' committee also interacted with other international bodies. A letter penned by Salah Tamari, demanding the rights of the detainees of Ansar, went from the ICRC to the *Charge d'Affaires* of the Permanent Observer Mission of the PLO to the United Nations.¹⁰⁹ The Committee to Defend the Rights of Prisoners gained international media attention and international support for their cause, and ultimately culminated with Ansar's closure. (This is discussed in greater detail in the section "Posters and International Solidarity".) Prison leadership represented Palestinian nationalist interests, while negotiating with foreign government representatives.

These strikes were usually non-violent and entailed some form of noncompliance, whether it be not eating, not standing, or waking up at a different time. Militancy and riots were rarer. These were collective actions to achieve collective gains for the benefit of the prisoners on strike and for future prisoners. The vast power disparity between prisoners and soldiers and the administration coloured these exchanges. To suppress strikes, prison authorities used a combination of collective brutality and individual targeting, through gassing cells and indiscriminate beatings, and by transferring leaders to solitary confinement or different prisons. Still, this did not preclude individual suffering, or individual action—Tamari burned a tent at the removal of twelve prisoners.

¹⁰⁷ Tamari only mentions one tent was burned, but Mazin recalls "tents", plural was burned when prisoners, including the central committee were removed from the camp.

¹⁰⁸ Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1998, 143–45.

¹⁰⁹ Falikou Kane to Kurt Waldheim, "Letter to Secretary General," Letter to the Secretary-General, August 6, 1980, A/35/377, S/14089, United Nations, <https://undocs.org/A/35/377>.

Emotional Consequences and Individual Resistance

In her study of Palestinian women political prisoners, Nahla Abdo argues for agency to be central to the understanding of women's resistance. The women she studied had diverse strategies to assert themselves and make demands while they were in prison. These actions reveal the women's underlying agency and affirm their revolutionary identity as political prisoners and their rejection of the label of "terrorist".¹¹⁰ Essentially, amidst the collective struggle, there was a subjective, individual and internal struggle for prisoners.

Former prisoners frequently commented that prison authorities treated them cruelly solely for the sake of breaking their wills and their spirits, which led to long-lasting psychological effects. Salah Tamari spent months in solitary confinement. Lawahez Burgal was fifteen years old when she was tortured and sexually abused by security services. George Habash described: "Forty years on from this painful experience, I still can't forget the way in which the chief interrogator, (...) treated the prisoners, the abuse and insults he submitted them to. (...) I would hear their cries, the pain of those who had been tortured."¹¹¹ Salah Tamari noted that many policies in Ansar were designed to break people down. Part of the fear of being taken for interrogation in Ansar was not knowing who would be next. Tamari repeatedly asserted that the strategy "had no purpose",¹¹² other than to terrorize people, to keep them separate and to "hollow" them.¹¹³ Burgal echoed these assertions that guards and soldiers tried "to break prisoners" and "to force you to forget *anything* about the society and about the reason that you are inside there",¹¹⁴ while Ali Mohammad Jidah said that the administration intended prisons to be "collective cemeteries for political prisoners."¹¹⁵

Tamari, Burgal, and Jidah expressly said that the prison authorities failed. Simply, Burgal said, "Inside prison, they didn't break us."¹¹⁶ Jidah said that prisoners turned the "collective cemeteries into the most academic revolutionary schools".¹¹⁷ During his months spent in solitary confinement, Tamari faced "how to turn pain into deep anger at injustice, (...) and how to keep that anger deep inside one, and turn it into a constructive power to eliminate injustice, (...)

¹¹⁰ Abdo-Zubi, *Captive Revolution*, 33–34.

¹¹¹ Habash, *Al-Thawriyun La Yamutun Abadan*, 1.

¹¹² Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1998, 136.

¹¹³ Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1984, 54.

¹¹⁴ Burgal, "Lawahez Burgal," 152. Emphasis in the original.

¹¹⁵ Jiddah, "Ali Mohammed Jiddah," 165.

¹¹⁶ Burgal, "Lawahez Burgal," 153.

¹¹⁷ Jiddah, "Ali Mohammed Jiddah," 165.

irrespective of who is exposed to it.”¹¹⁸ In a cell the size of a broom closet, he struggled to not fall to bitterness by focusing on his culture and identity.¹¹⁹ Afterward in Ansar, Tamari organized and made sure prisoners knew, even when they were in solitary confinement, that they were never alone, and the rest of the camp was waiting for them to come back.

Resistance for many came down to a deeply personal level. This inner struggle was as important as the collective struggle, especially for those like Tamari, who spent so long in solitary confinement and during the early stages of arrests, experienced by Burgal and countless others, when they were isolated from their families, lawyers, and fellow prisoners. This was a period when most of their human interaction was with soldiers, torturers, and interrogators. Inside prisons, communities were necessary support networks. They built nationalist structures that replaced the loss of family and friends that came with imprisonment. There were individual aspects of the struggle, within the bounds of these communities and internal structures. These strengthened individuals and vice versa.

Within prisons, prisoners formed alternate governing structures that provided services and discipline. These acted as defence mechanisms to abuse and also as a rejection of the authority of prison officials and soldiers that kept them captive, and through this, their sovereignty. When built up, these systems were highly organized. However, prisoners were always fighting to assert themselves and their rights. Internal security prevented prisoners from forming ties or negotiating individually. There was only formal dialogue between elected prison leadership and the prison authorities, which served to reinforce unity. Still, these informal, alternative structures did have formal dialogue, not only with national bodies, like the Israeli prison administration, but with international bodies, like the International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations.¹²⁰

Solidarity between Prisons and the Outside World

Despite their efforts, prison authorities were not able to completely close off prisons from the outside world. Demonstrations inside the prisons inspired calls for solidarity and

¹¹⁸ Tamari, “Salah Tamari,” 1984, 48.

¹¹⁹ Salah Tamari, *Memoirs*, trans. Salah Tamari and Naomi Shihab Nye, 2016, 4, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d95eeafdee.pdf>.

¹²⁰ Abdullah Salah to Secretary General, “Letter Dated 5 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General,” Letter to the Secretary-General, May 9, 1983, 1–4, A/38/179, S/15748, United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/38/179.

demonstrations of support outside prisons. Notably, in response to the hunger strikes that began on 28 April 1970 and took place across several prisons in Israel and the OPT, including Neve Tirza Prison, the PFLP released a call for solidarity. The “Appeal by the Popular Resistance Front in the West Bank and the United National Front in the Gaza Strip for Solidarity with Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons” announced the strike, demanded that people stand in solidarity, and listed the prisoners’ demands.¹²¹

Demonstrations in solidarity with hunger strikes were common. In Tel Aviv and Nazareth in 1970, there were also “activities (...) to express solidarity with the strikers”.¹²²

Demonstrations of support were not limited to Israel or the OPT. In support of this same strike, women organized a demonstration in Damascus, in front of the ICRC representative’s office.¹²³ As al-Noubani highlighted, these demonstrations were solely for the sake of supporting prisoners “to improve the quality of life of the detainees who had been denied their human rights”.¹²⁴

There was a level of reciprocation in these demonstrations of solidarity. Palestinian prisoners also demonstrated in solidarity with those outside of prison. In Neve Tirza Prison, the women organized strikes for the anniversary of the Nakba and “other national occasions especially those concerning the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause.”¹²⁵ Interaction with those outside prison could be indirect but was constant. Solidarity and support were a mutual, two-way exchange. Those inside and outside prison recognized the importance and the validity of the other’s work for the Palestinian cause. That political groups like the PFLP and the PLO supported strikes in prisons shows how the political sphere of the Palestinian Revolution extended to include prisons in their own right, not just as an extension of activities taking place outside prisons.

Radios

Throughout testimonies, former prisoners repeatedly referenced radios. These were coveted items. During World War Two, radios offered “immediacy and accessibility” to the

¹²¹ The Palestinian Revolution, trans., “Appeal by the Popular Resistance Front in the West Bank and the United National Front in the Gaza Strip for Solidarity with Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons [Excerpts],” *Al-Nida*, April 29, 1970, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588f1fc6646f8.pdf>.

¹²² Langer, *With My Own Eyes*, 50.

¹²³ Langer, 49.

¹²⁴ al-Noubani, “The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980,” 7.

¹²⁵ Habash, *Al-Thawriyun La Yamutun Abadan*, 1.

people at home, away from the action, allowing them to remain informed and connected to the war and those fighting it.¹²⁶ Michele Hilmes notes, that the radio spoke “in a common language and through national semipublic institutions,” and “spoke to, and about, a nation.”¹²⁷ Radios provided a link to the outside world, to nationalist programming and to valuable information. In the wake of the 1967 War, in May 1968, the leadership of Fatah launched an independent radio station in Egypt. The Voice of Asifah broadcast news, popular revolutionary songs, poetry, and slogans celebrating steadfastness, resilience, and defiance. It focused on stirring up and unifying the public.¹²⁸ The PLO’s station merged with Asifah in 1973, and then, this station merged with the Voice of Palestine. Originally, a group of four students received broadcast training and ran the Voice of Asifah.¹²⁹ These students then trained others and sometimes immigrated to other countries, spreading their expertise to other Palestinians and factions across the Middle East. One of these four students left Asifah Radio to start Zamzam 105 in Jordan and trained new people in broadcasting. Haj Khaled Mismar emphasized the role of the radio as a key way to unify Palestinians and disseminate revolutionary content.¹³⁰ Prisoners transcribed and disseminated radio shows from the Voice of Palestine in some prisons.¹³¹

Radios in prisons showed the far reaches of nationalist programming, as well as prisoners’ desire and tactics to monitor what was happening outside. Dafi Jama‘ani and George Habash both mention the importance of secret radios. Habash listened to news about “the battle of Karameh in Jordan, and (...) reports of the first hijacking of an Israeli airplane by the PFLP,” which “filled [him] with joy.”¹³² When the prison authorities transferred Dafi Jama‘ani and other prisoners to al-Jafr Prison, one of their first concerns was how to safely and secretly transport their radio to the next prison.¹³³ Frequently, when prisoners went on strike, one of the things they demanded was a radio. This was the case for the prisoners striking in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison in

¹²⁶ Gerd Horten, *Radio Goes to War: The Cultural Politics of Propaganda During World War II* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 3.

¹²⁷ Michele Hilmes, *Radio Voices: American Broadcasting, 1922-1952* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 22–23.

¹²⁸ Haj Khaled Mismar, “Interview with Haj Khaled Mismar,” interview by K Nabulsi and AR Takriti, Transcript, trans. The Palestinian Revolution, 2016, 1–4, *The Palestinian Revolution*, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d8056154a0.pdf>.

¹²⁹ Mismar, 2.

¹³⁰ Mismar, 7.

¹³¹ El-Tawil, “Words for Palestine: The Country and the People.”

¹³² Habash, *Al-Thawriyun La Yamutun Abadan*, 2.

¹³³ Jama‘ani, *Min Al-Hizb Ila Al-Sijn, 1948-1994: Mudhakkirat*, 1.

1980.¹³⁴ One of the demands, presented by Salah Tamari of the Committee to Defend the Rights of Prisoners, at Ansar Prison was a radio.¹³⁵

During Abdel Rahim al-Noubani's time in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, there was one man whose job was to listen to everything that was said on their secret radio, record important information and pass it along to other prisoners.¹³⁶ In Bi'r Sab'a Prison, in the early 1980s Sami al-Jundi was in a cell that had the role of listening to the radio all night, and then passing the information they learned to the other prisoners.¹³⁷ In the case of al-Noubani, the Nafha al-Sahrawi radio also showed communication between prisoners, as they exchanged money with an Israeli civilian prisoner to buy it.¹³⁸ This was apparently a familiar formula, as it was the same for Bi'r Sab'a Prison. In Bi'r Sab'a, families slipped prisoners capsules of money, which the prisoners swallowed and then used the money to buy their first transistor radio from Israeli criminal prisoners.¹³⁹ This reflected a community practice to gather information and disseminate it to other prisoners. One-way communication with the outside world led to internal communication, which was not limited to Palestinians. This element of communication created a national sense of unity and belonging to the Palestinian cause.

Despite having noted the importance of radios in monitoring the outside world and keeping morale high, after a hunger strike in 1985, al-Jundi saw the radios and televisions in the cells of 'Asqalan Prison as detrimental to the prisoners' education. He suggested that it took valuable time away from reading, which he thought was the most important part of imprisonment. He blamed radios and televisions for multiple prisoners failing a course that he taught.¹⁴⁰

Documents

Letters and documents were smuggled in and out of prison, but with great difficulty. The technique was to write miniature letters, place them in capsules and swallow them.¹⁴¹ Ismail

¹³⁴ al-Noubani, "The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980," 1–2.

¹³⁵ al-Noubani, 1–2.

¹³⁶ al-Noubani, 2.

¹³⁷ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 139.

¹³⁸ al-Noubani, "The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980," 2.

¹³⁹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 139.

¹⁴⁰ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 155.

¹⁴¹ Omar al-Asmar to Zuheir Karroum, Handwritten Miniature Letters, N/D, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d9774142c7.pdf>.

Nashif argues that this technique subverted the space of prisons, as it “use[d] the materials available in the prison, namely the body of the captive, and reallocates the spatial networks of the prison to counter and alter the existing formal structures of power.”¹⁴² According to al-Jundi, “Extremely sensitive information was sent out with released prisoners, each of whom carried at least a dozen messages in his digestive tract.”¹⁴³ When Walid from Nablus tried to shove a capsule into his mouth to swallow it prior to his release, guards entered the cell unexpectedly, intending to prevent him from doing so. They knocked out his front teeth in the ensuing struggle.¹⁴⁴

Prisoners who produced documents that were too big to be swallowed were not able to take them with them upon their release. Mazin experienced a great deal of brutality while in Ansar, but one of his experiences that bothered him the most was his diary, which he wrote in every day and was nearly 600 pages long by the time of his release, was confiscated by guards.¹⁴⁵ The transference of materials and information was constrained to the body, and more specifically what could be contained within the body.

After Release

Another method of communication was more direct, as people did not always remain in prison permanently. Upon release, many Palestinians remained active and continued to mobilize. Tayseer Nasrallah described how “because of the cultural education they received in prisons, these freed prisoners emerged as cadres educated intellectually, culturally, politically, and organizationally.”¹⁴⁶ As such, students gathered around them and learned about prison and other revolutionary issues from them. Because of their time in prison, other students saw them as worthy leaders. Long-term prisoners gave younger, soon-to-be-released prisoners ideas and programs to enact. After Nasrallah and others left prison, he enacted one such idea of organizing public factions within Fatah. The newly-freed students formed committees for social work in al-Shabiba (the youth wing of Fatah) and “reactivated Fatah’s trade union bodies”, like al-

¹⁴² Nashif, *Palestinian Political Prisoners*, 41.

¹⁴³ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 139.

¹⁴⁴ Walid, “Walid,” 160.

¹⁴⁵ Mazin, “Mazin,” 118.

¹⁴⁶ Nasrallah, “Tayseer Nasrallah.”

Zaytouna, at al-Najah University in the OPT.¹⁴⁷ Nasrallah credited this idea exclusively with senior prisoners who had remained in prison after him and others left.

After being exiled, Therese Halaseh traveled from Israel to Egypt, and then settled in Jordan. There, she reoriented her activities and became head of the Committee for the Wounded, a socially based organization that helped with the children of wounded individuals and provided financial support.¹⁴⁸ George Habash and Matar Hamdi also continued their revolutionary activities after their release, or in the case of Habash, his escape.¹⁴⁹ After Hamdi's release from al-Mahatta Prison in Jordan, the authorities monitored him and he had to check in at a police precinct twice a day, which did not deter his "clandestine work".¹⁵⁰

Art and Poetry

Revolutionary and anti-colonial literature have been central to Palestinian national art since the early twentieth century, with the creation of the Mandate of Palestine. Poetry is the "dominant" art form in Palestinian resistance culture,¹⁵¹ which presents a "historical repository" and a "body of knowledge" to draw on when examining Palestinian history.¹⁵² Khaled Furani attributes the "primacy of poetry over other genres", like novels, to its "belonging to an ancient form of Arab life that had found immediate expression in poetry."¹⁵³ According to Barbara Harlow resistance poetry challenges "the dominant and hegemonic discourse of an occupying or colonizing power by attacking the symbolic foundations of that power and erecting symbolic structures of its own".¹⁵⁴ Experiences of prisoners have become part of this Palestinian artistic canon. Some of Palestine's most famous and beloved poets, such as Mahmoud Darwish, Tawfiq Zayyad, and Samih al-Qasim, have spent time in prison. Their poetry is included in various Palestinian nationalist and resistance poetry anthologies. Anthologies can be a good indicator of

¹⁴⁷ Nasrallah.

¹⁴⁸ Halaseh, "Interview with Therese Halaseh," 3.

¹⁴⁹ Halaseh, 3.

¹⁵⁰ Hamdi Matar, "Interview with Hamdi Matar," interview by K Nabulsi and AR Takriti, Transcript, trans. The Palestinian Revolution, 2011, 1, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/58e77613aa780.pdf>.

¹⁵¹ Abdo-Zubi, *Captive Revolution*, 85.

¹⁵² Khaled Furani, *Silencing the Sea: Secular Rhythms in Palestinian Poetry*. (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2012), 3.

¹⁵³ Furani, 39.

¹⁵⁴ Harlow, *Resistance Literature*, 85.

what is widely accepted as canon, as Jeffery Di Leo notes, because frequently the literary “canon is shaped and disciplined through anthologies”.¹⁵⁵

A Lover from Palestine and Other Poems seeks to present and commemorate “a new generation of Palestinian poets,” and posits poetry as an indication of Palestinian identity.¹⁵⁶ Throughout this anthology, there are multiple poems that commemorate or speak to imprisonment. Amidst poetry about the centrality of land and the desire to return, is al-Qasim’s “Letter from Prison”.¹⁵⁷ This poem’s presence shows how experiences in prisons are an expression of Palestinian identity. The introduction of *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance* describes poetry as symbolic of “Arab resistance to the Israeli occupation of Palestine”, and divides Palestinian poetry into two categories, poetry written inside Israel and poetry written outside Israel.¹⁵⁸ Among them are al-Qasim’s “A Letter from Prison”,¹⁵⁹ Fadwa Tuqan’s “From Behind the Bars”,¹⁶⁰ Rashid Hussayn “Jail and Children”¹⁶¹ and Mahmoud Darwish’s “Defiance”.¹⁶² Other poems like al-Qasim’s “I Defy” mention resistance to and resilience in the face of imprisonment, but do not focus on it exclusively.¹⁶³ Four out of sixty-five poems in the anthology express narratives that focus on steadfastness in the face of imprisonment as part of resistance. *The Palestinian Wedding: A Bilingual Anthology of Contemporary Palestinian Resistance Poetry*, dedicated to Ghassan Kanafani, is divided into six parts, the fifth of which is titled “Resistance”. The first two poems of this section are al-Qasim’s

¹⁵⁵ Jeffrey R. Di Leo, “Introduction to Focus: Anthologies and Literary Landscapes,” *American Book Review* 28, no. 2 (2007): 3.

¹⁵⁶ Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, “Introduction,” in *A Lover from Palestine, and Other Poems: An Anthology of Palestinian Poetry*, ed. Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (Washington DC: Free Palestine Press, 1970), v.

¹⁵⁷ Samih al-Qasim, “Letter from Prison,” in *A Lover from Palestine, and Other Poems: An Anthology of Palestinian Poetry*, ed. Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (Washington DC: Free Palestine Press, 1970), 51.

¹⁵⁸ Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, “Introduction,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), xxvi.

¹⁵⁹ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter from Prison,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 65.

¹⁶⁰ Fadwa Tuqan, “From Behind the Bars,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 38.

¹⁶¹ Rashid Hussayn, “Jail and Children,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 10.

¹⁶² Mahmoud Darwish, “Defiance,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 92.

¹⁶³ Samih al-Qasim, “I Defy,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 96.

“A Letter from a Prison Camp”¹⁶⁴ and Ahmad Dahbur’s “The Prison”.¹⁶⁵ According to Abdelwahab Elmessiri, the editor and translator, this section is meant to show how “[s]teadfastness, a passive type of resistance” becomes an “active one (...). A price is paid for resisting, but a calm assurance sustains the victim.”¹⁶⁶ In this sense, according to Elmessiri prisoners epitomize *sumud*. By placing these poems at the beginning of the section dedicated to resistance, the editor presents prisoners with a preeminent role in the Palestinian Revolution. *Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine* is prefaced by a selection of quotations by revolutionary poets and activists like Pablo Neruda, and quotations depicting defiance and resilience, as well as an extract from Kanafani’s “Resistance Literature in Occupied Palestine”. In this extract, Kanafani attributes the prevalence of poetry as a medium of resistance partially to its historical popularity and mentions the dangers to poets for their resistance and their poetry. Among these dangers is imprisonment.¹⁶⁷ The final poem of this anthology is al-Qasim’s “A Letter from Prison”.¹⁶⁸ Darwish’s “The Reaction”, which recounts remaining resilient and defiant in the face of imprisonment, is almost exactly in the middle of this volume.¹⁶⁹ The placement of a poem about prison right at the end of the anthology can act to emphasize that it is an important facet of the revolution being memorialized.

Al-Qasim’s “A Letter from Prison” is considered significant enough and representative enough to be featured in each of these anthologies. It references the pain that imprisonment causes, mainly represented through the speaker’s mother, discusses rebirth, and ends with imagery of light. It focuses on the mother’s pain, rather than that of the speaker. The speaker’s mother expresses her suffering through her “silent tears” and anxious waiting for the speaker’s release.¹⁷⁰ The significance of this is twofold. Firstly, by focusing on the mother’s pain rather

¹⁶⁴ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter from a Prison Camp,” in *The Palestinian Wedding: A Bilingual Anthology of Contemporary Palestinian Resistance Poetry*, ed. Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (Washington DC: Three Continents Press, 1982), 185.

¹⁶⁵ Ahmad Dahbur, “The Prison,” in *The Palestinian Wedding: A Bilingual Anthology of Contemporary Palestinian Resistance Poetry*, ed. Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (Washington DC: Three Continents Press, 1982), 187.

¹⁶⁶ Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, “Introduction,” in *The Palestinian Wedding: A Bilingual Anthology of Contemporary Palestinian Resistance Poetry*, ed. Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri (Washington DC: Three Continents Press, 1982), 17.

¹⁶⁷ Ghassan Kanafani, “Resistance Literature in Occupied Palestine [Extract],” in *Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine*, ed. and trans. Sulafah Hijjawi (Baghdad: Directorate General of Culture, 1968), 13.

¹⁶⁸ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter from Prison,” in *Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine*, ed. and trans. Sulafah Hijjawi (Baghdad: Directorate General of Culture, 1968), 47.

¹⁶⁹ Mahmoud Darwish, “The Reaction,” in *Poetry of Resistance in Occupied Palestine*, ed. and trans. Sulafah Hijjawi (Baghdad: Directorate General of Culture, 1968), 27–28.

¹⁷⁰ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter From Prison,” (1968), 47.

than that of the speaker, this poem invokes a Palestinian literary trope. Lori Allen notes that the connection between Palestinian nationalism and mothers invokes “nationalist values that express the local positive significance of motherhood, sacrifice, fortitude and resistance.”¹⁷¹ Julie Peteet asserts that maternal sacrifice has become a nationalist trope, one that was so respected that it became a category through which to critique the revolutionary movement and its leadership, especially after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982.¹⁷² This emerged from the idea that motherhood was a political practice in and of itself and the idea that sacrifices were necessary for Palestine, which this poem exemplifies. Secondly, there are nationalist tropes that refer to Palestine as a lover and as a mother. In this sense, the poem can be read as if the speaker is addressing Palestine itself. This makes the image of the mother, or Palestine, crying for the speaker and their imprisonment more striking. Both allow the speaker to acknowledge the pain and suffering involved with prison, without suggesting that he or she is defeated by this pain.

Instead, from the mother’s pain, the poem takes a defiant stance. It frames prison as a place of rebirth, asserting that the “splendor of life/Is being born within the walls of my prison”.¹⁷³ To this end, it uses irony to say that the prison guard will be broken, not the speaker. It has a triumphalist tone, asserting that the speaker will overcome imprisonment and the guards. It ends by declaring the coming of a new day.¹⁷⁴

Light is prevalent throughout many of the anthologized poems. Tuqan’s “From Behind the Bars” ends with imagery of light, saying the oil in the lamp “is abundant”, and those outside prison will carry on.¹⁷⁵ Darwish’s “The Reaction” emphasizes light in response to the darkness and hopelessness of imprisonment, saying:

They shut me in a dark cell
My heart glowed with sunny torches. (...)
I hurled defeat to obscurity
And plunged my hands
In rays of light.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷¹ Lori A. Allen, “Mothers of Martyrs and Suicide Bombers: The Gender of Ethical Discourse in the Second Palestinian Intifada,” *The Arab Studies Journal* 17, no. 1 (2009): 34.

¹⁷² Julie Peteet, “Icons and Militants: Mothering in the Danger Zone,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 23, no. 1 (October 1997): 111.

¹⁷³ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter From Prison,” (1968), 47.

¹⁷⁴ al-Qasim, 47.

¹⁷⁵ Tuqan, “From Behind the Bars,” 42.

¹⁷⁶ Darwish, “The Reaction,” 27–28.

As the translations of the title, “Defiance” and “I Defy”, suggest, the speaker asserts that he or she will carry on and not be beaten in the face of this hardship and suffering. The frequent mention of light contrasting the darkness of prisons represents hope,¹⁷⁷ a call to *sumud* and to remain dedicated to the revolution. Defiance and resilience in the face of imprisonment become memorialized and disseminated to the public. This shows how people viewed prison as another sphere in which revolutionary politics were practiced, and even necessary to survival.

Prisoners took inspiration from this poetry. Akram Haniyeh, a PLO member, deported from the Occupied Territories for his political activities, “always remembered a new poem by Mahmud Darwish” when he was in difficult times.¹⁷⁸ Experiences of imprisonment became glorified by those in the cause. Aside from, al-Qasim’s poem saying that “the splendor of life/Is born in my prison”,¹⁷⁹ Salah Tamari, in his memoirs, depicted prison as a place of purity and rebirth. He asserted, that his cell in which he was in solitary confinement for five months was “not a cell,” but “a womb from which [he] shall be delivered, stronger, purer!”¹⁸⁰

Prisoners smuggled their art and poetry out of jails. After 1967, Darwish wrote “My Homeland” in prison,¹⁸¹ and smuggled other poems out on cigarette cartons.¹⁸² Zuhdi Hamoudeh al-Adawi and Muhammed Roukwe, both former PFLP fedayeen from Gaza who now reside in Syria, smuggled out their art, as well. They found solace in their art during their imprisonment and had several similarities. They both drew with crayons and chalk on pillowcases and sheets in ‘Asqalan Prison. Al-Adawi and Roukwe were there between 1975 and 1985 and released in the 1985 prisoner exchange.¹⁸³ They were limited in their surroundings and access to material. Al-Adawi’s family smuggled in art supplies, like coloured pencils, for him. For this smuggling and artistic creation, guards eventually placed al-Adawi in solitary confinement.

Both al-Adawi and Roukwe use bright colours in their art. Al-Adawi said, “In those days, the word ‘Palestine’ or anything to do with Palestine was a crime. And all my paintings

¹⁷⁷ Alternatively, it can also represent the glorification of prisoners. See the following paragraph.

¹⁷⁸ Akram Haniyeh, “I See Everything But Exile: The New Palestinian Generation,” trans. The Palestinian Revolution, *Filastin Al-Thawra*, January 10, 1987, 5, The Palestinian Revolution, <http://learnpalestine.politics.ox.ac.uk/uploads/sources/588d96e87d278.pdf>.

¹⁷⁹ Samih al-Qasim, “A Letter From Prison,” (1968), 47.

¹⁸⁰ Tamari, *Memoirs*, 4.

¹⁸¹ Mahmoud Darwish, “My Homeland,” in *Enemy of the Sun: Poetry of Palestinian Resistance*, ed. Naseer Hasan Aruri and Edmund Ghareeb, trans. Naseer Hasan Aruri (Washington DC: Drum and Spear Press, 1970), 135.

¹⁸² Abdo-Zubi, *Captive Revolution*, 112.

¹⁸³ Laila Hotait, *Crayons of Askalan Film Trailer*, Web (Beirut: Screen Institute Beirut, 2012), <https://vimeo.com/23040994>.

were about Palestine and resistance.”¹⁸⁴ He called this a continuation of the struggle from outside prison to inside, but “not the struggle of carrying a gun. It is the struggle of the storyteller, the painter, the politician and the leader.”¹⁸⁵ Al-Adawi considered the expression of colours in his art to be part of his resistance. Art was an escape for him. In a documentary about al-Adawi, he said: “The most precious thing a prisoner has, is his imagination.”¹⁸⁶ On colours he said, the Israeli soldiers “close the gates and you see only iron, no green, white or blue. The plates we eat from are the colour of death, yellow, and the clothes we are given to wear are red. But we were able to imagine the colours of the rainbow.”¹⁸⁷ Roukwié’s brightly coloured pieces depict both imprisonment and images related to freedom outside of prison.¹⁸⁸ The vibrant colours act as a contrast to the somber, muted tones of prison, similar to motifs of light in poetry. The expression of colours became a way to boost al-Adawi’s morale. To these men, art was an escape, as well as a form of resistance.

In 1983, Roukwié made a piece from his “Ashkelon Prison Series” (Figure 1).¹⁸⁹ It depicts a girl wearing a kufiyah, holding up two fingers in a V-shape, with tents and trees in the background. The young girl possesses many symbols of nationalism, including wearing a kufiyah. She also has the Palestinian flag on her wrist and holds up two fingers. As Ronald A. Francisco notes, the V-sign “is used in Palestine as a symbol of unity and nationalism.”¹⁹⁰ In front of rows of tents, which represent a refugee camp, there is a fedayeen, who also wears a kufiyah and has a gun slung over his shoulder. In the foreground, in front of the girl, there is the Dome of the Rock. It has eyes on it, looking at the audience. The eyes are possibly a reference to the constant international attention paid to the structure because of its symbolic importance and because it is a site of occasional violence. A set of eyes on the Dome of the Rock appears in other pieces in Roukwié’s “Ashkelon Prison Series”.¹⁹¹ Another possibility is that the eyes are a

¹⁸⁴ Zuhdi al-Aldawi quoted in Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 115.

¹⁸⁵ Zuhdi al-Aldawi quoted in Matar, 115.

¹⁸⁶ Zuhdi al-Aldawi quoted in Hotait, *Crayons of Askalan Film Trailer*.

¹⁸⁷ Matar *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 115.

¹⁸⁸ Zuhdi al-Adawi, *Les Detenus*, 1982, Poster, N/A, 1982, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/les-detenus>.

¹⁸⁹ Mohammed Roukwié, *Ashkelon Prison Series - 1*, 1983, Poster, N/A, 1983, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/ashkelon-prison-series-1>.

¹⁹⁰ Ronald A. Francisco, *Collective Action Theory and Empirical Evidence* (New York: Springer New York, 2010), 46.

¹⁹¹ Mohammed Roukwié, *Ashkelon Prison Series - 6*, 1987, Poster, 19.75 x 23.25 inches, 1987, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/ashkelon-prison-series-6>.

reference to the golden exterior of the Dome, which “had a strong glitter that no eye could look straight at it.”¹⁹² It is ironic. This is a site that is usually a topic of debate and international attention, as well as being a nationalist and religious symbol. It is usually looked at and instead, it stares at the audience. It is an assertion of life and agency. Next to the Dome, there is a candle and on the other side, the head of a dead child. Faintly, there are streams of bloods flowing from their head, while ferns grow up around. The ferns, along with the trees, represent the motif of nature that is common in Palestinian art, representing the Palestinian connection to the land. In the case of the child, they are being returned to the land in death, or that their death and sacrifice are nourishing the land.




Figure 1

The Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Prisoners and Detainees in Israeli Prisons redistributed Roukweh’s art in Syria. Eventually, several pieces of his art found an international audience, traveling as part of an exhibit called “Made in Palestine” throughout the United States and Canada.¹⁹³ This communicated the experiences of Palestinian prisoners internationally. The exhibit explored the experiences of Palestinians and made “compelling commentaries on

¹⁹² Abu-Bakr al-Wasiti, *Fada’il Bayt al-Maqdis* (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press, 1979), 80–81.

¹⁹³ Delinda Hanley, “‘Made in Palestine’: A Stirring Art Exhibit Rocks Houston and Hits the Road,” *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs* 22, no. 9 (2003): 33.

Palestinian identity and struggle”.¹⁹⁴ It included prison art amidst its ranks. Furthermore, this exhibit showed how the experiences of prisoners diffused to those outside prison via their art. Through this art, prisoners themselves came to occupy a special symbolic space in revolutionary culture as those who had made the ultimate sacrifice, while remaining alive.

For many Palestinians, art and poetry were a continuation of their struggle. Light and colours became acts of defiance. The art and poetry created inside prisons, while created by individuals, contributed to a collective body of revolutionary culture. Art and poetry appealed to a sense of resistance and defiance, in spite of violence, brutality, and material constraints, while contributing to a sense of national belonging. They were created by and for the Palestinian community inside and outside prison.

Posters and International Solidarity

Posters calling for solidarity with Palestinian prisoners became common during the late 1970s and the early 1980s. They were released by groups like the League of Arab States,¹⁹⁵ the Palestinian Liberation Organization,¹⁹⁶ the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,¹⁹⁷ and Fatah,¹⁹⁸ which called for solidarity with or freedom for Palestinian prisoners and detainees. Frequently, these calls for solidarity coincided with Prisoners’ Day, 17 April. These posters are rife with imagery that symbolize imprisonment and the Palestinian national cause. Common imagery includes barbed wires, chain link fences, kufiyahs,¹⁹⁹ doves and quotations from Darwish’s poetry.²⁰⁰ Posters call prisoners “patriots”.²⁰¹ They feature defiantly raised fists and

¹⁹⁴ Rob Eshelman, “Review: ‘Made in Palestine’ Exhibit,” *The Electronic Intifada*, April 12, 2005, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/review-made-palestine-exhibit/3480>.

¹⁹⁵ Farag al-Jalasi, *Palestine*, 1983, Poster, N/A, 1983, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/palestine-palestine-0>.

¹⁹⁶ Khazeema al-Luani, *Libertà*, 1983, Poster, 17 x 22 inches, 1983, Palestine Poster Project, <http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/libert%C3%A0>.

¹⁹⁷ Marc Rudin, *Prisoners In Occupied Palestine*, 1981, Poster, N/A, 1981, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/prisoners-in-occupied-palestine>.


¹⁹⁸ N/A, *Fatah - Prisoners*, 1983, Poster, N/A, 1983, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/fatah-prisoners>.

¹⁹⁹ Hosni Radwan, *The Chains Must Break Inevitably*, 1980, Poster, N/A, 1980, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-chains-must-break-inevitably>.

²⁰⁰ N/A, *Watani - My Country*, 1970, Poster, N/A, 1970, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/watani-my-country>.

²⁰¹ Zuhdi al-Adawi, *Walls and Chains*, 1980, Poster, 15.5 x 22 inches, 1980, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/walls-and-chains>.

chains breaking.²⁰² They associate prisoners with Palestine's nationalist imagery and the words of Palestine's national poets.



Solidarity with the
Palestinian detainees
in Israeli Prisons

Solidarite avec les
detenus Palestinian
dans les Prisons
Israelines

كل الدعم والتضامن
مع مهتقلي شعبنا
في
سجون الاحتلال الصهيوني

الفصائل الفلسطينية العشرة

Figure 2

In 1982, the PLO released a poster calling for solidarity with the Palestinian detainees in Israeli Prisons. Zuhdi al-Adawi drew the art (Figure 2).²⁰³ This poster uses bright colours and depicts nationalist symbols. At the centre of the image stands a prisoner, a man behind breaking bars in an orange Israeli prison uniform. He looks behind him, at a wall crumbling beneath a glowing tree and at Palestine, glowing like a sun on the horizon. There is one Palestinian flag above the broken wall, between the torn barbed wire, and another one transposed across the prisoner's face. That flag represents his connection to the struggle and his land. There is also a fighter on the horizon line, near the tree. In the foreground, there is a hand holding a bloody baton, representing the brutality and abuse prison authorities meted out to prisoners. The map of Palestine on the horizon shows how central it is both as a form of hope and as the ultimate goal of the struggle. It literally takes the place of the sun. This imagery is in other Palestinian art, such as a comic in Leila Abdelrazaq's *Baddawi*.²⁰⁴ While there is an acknowledgement of the brutality

²⁰² Radwan, *The Chains Must Break Inevitably*.

²⁰³ al-Adawi, *Les Detenus*.

²⁰⁴ Leila Abdelrazaq, *Baddawi* (Charlottesville: Just World Books, 2015), 113.

suffered, the prison's wall, the cell door, and the barbed wire are all broken. The glowing tree, a familiar symbol of Palestinian land, takes its roots in the prison walls, growing down and breaking stone. Prisoners' very connection to the land is what brings them their freedom. In another interpretation, the prisoner embodies Palestine itself, with the flag on his face. As such, the poster represents prison as a temporary impediment to achieving the Palestinian homeland.

This artwork was smuggled out and used for this poster. Even while al-Adawi was trapped, his artwork acted as resistance, travelling out of prison, and across the border to Syria. Another noteworthy thing about this poster is the languages, English, French, and Arabic, used for calls for solidarity. This emphasizes the international audience that the PLO sought to address. Among these international pleas for solidarity was a call for the application of a human rights framework. The non-violent nature of solidarity campaigns tended to fit the framework desired by Western groups and individuals.²⁰⁵

Where Israeli prisons were concerned, human rights lawyers and international groups, like the United Nations and the ICRC, were a viable venue of protest for Palestinian prisoners. In many other countries, there was an absence of a human rights framework. As Sune Haugbolle asserts, in Syria, the majority of the population, aside from intellectuals, were unaware of the possibility of a human rights framework.²⁰⁶ Consequently, such a framework had a "limited impact" in civil society.²⁰⁷ The framework has also been criticized for its history of depoliticizing and internationalizing causes, by putting the "onus for action on outside forces", rather than those on the ground.²⁰⁸

In Israel and the OPT, however, there are multiple examples of human rights lawyers intervening on behalf of prisoners. One such case occurred during the hunger strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison in 1980. After the force-feeding deaths of three prisoners, news spread and a group of lawyers, including Lea Tsemel, came to the prison. They met with prisoners and transmitted "a powerful description of the prisoners' conditions in Ramleh to the Israeli public and the world."²⁰⁹ According to al-Noubani, Tsemel "shamed" the Israeli government, the

²⁰⁵ Angela Davis, Frank Barat, and Cornel West, *Freedom Is a Constant Struggle: Ferguson, Palestine, and the Foundations of a Movement* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2016), 9.

²⁰⁶ Sune Haugbolle, "The Victim's Tale in Syria: Imprisonment, Individualism, and Liberalism," in *Policing and Prisons in the Middle East: Formations of Coercion*, ed. Laleh Khalili and Jillian Schwedler (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 234.

²⁰⁷ Haugbolle, 234.

²⁰⁸ Haugbolle, 235.

²⁰⁹ al-Noubani, "The Facts of the Legendary Hunger Strike in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison, 1980," 6–7.

interior minister and the director of public prisons, which, combined with international outcry, added pressure to the administration to give into the prisoners' demands.²¹⁰ Human rights lawyers magnified the prisoners' demands. In Ansar in 1983, Salah Tamari, on behalf of the Committee to Defend the Rights of Prisoners, gained the attention of the United Nations, through the ICRC, on the subject of the widespread human rights abuses in Ansar. His letter quoted the Geneva Convention on Prisoners' Rights and described daily violations. This letter crawled through multiple international bodies before arriving at the UN Security Council on 5 May 1983.²¹¹

However, there were limitations to the actions of international bodies and human rights lawyers. Not all such appeals were successful. Felicia Langer's memoir, *With My Own Eyes*, recounts multiple occasions in which she attempted to have Palestinian prisoners released or have confessions extracted under torture precluded from consideration of the court, only to be rejected.²¹² Langer also noted how there were many occasions that she was denied access to prisoners, even those who were her clients. This happened during the initial period of interrogation, as well as later, while prisoners were on hunger strike. In Kfar Yuna Prison, a strike started on 7 July 1973, but she was not able to access the prison until 7 September 1973.²¹³ The prison administration attempted to break the strike by keeping information about it contained, to avoid demonstrations outside the prison.

In a similar vein, Salah Tamari has criticized the ICRC's inability to help in the early months at Ansar. The IDF initially considered the ICRC to be a "hostile organization" and denied them access to the camp.²¹⁴ Even when they gained access to Ansar, Tamari noted that while they "did their best for the sake of the prisoners, (...) there was very little concrete help they could give."²¹⁵ In 1983, after much pushing from the prisoners and the ICRC, they brought in a few copies of the Geneva Convention, in order to demand rights and better treatment for the detainees. The prisoners demanded that Articles Three and Four of the Geneva Convention be

²¹⁰ al-Noubani, 6–7.

²¹¹ Salah to Secretary General, "Letter Dated 5 May 1983 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General."

²¹² Langer, *With My Own Eyes*, 8–14.

²¹³ Langer, 129.

²¹⁴ Khalili, "Incarnation and the State of Exception: Al-Ansar Mass Detention Camp in Lebanon," 104.

²¹⁵ Tamari, "Salah Tamari," 1984, 52.

applied.²¹⁶ The commander reportedly told them that Geneva Convention Article Five, which did not exist, should be applied instead. After the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that prisoners in Ansar should be treated in accordance with Geneva Convention Article Four, Tamari reported that “the camp commander responded that he had not heard of the Israeli Supreme Court. The ICRC presence unfortunately was of little help in obliging the Israeli authorities to apply international law.”²¹⁷ No lawyers, including Israeli lawyers, were allowed in Ansar. There were limits to the powers of lawyers and international human rights groups on the ground, if Israeli soldiers and administrations prevented them.

Conclusion

For the Palestinian prison movement, the Palestinian Revolution was a period dedicated to the construction of internal governing structures and their promulgation across prisons. Prisoners built internal governing structures around the national cause. They responded to demands specific to prisons, like the alleviation of abuses and amelioration of living conditions, with their own distinct methods, like hunger strikes. These communities were united across factions and sought to maintain this unity and a strong morale to continue pursuing political activities. They provided discipline and services. These precepts were portable and transferable. Prisoners took the knowledge and experience that they gained with them to the other prisons they were transferred to, as was the case with Salah Tamari with Ansar Detention Camp and Sharif Youssef Mansour with Bi'r al-Sab'a Prison. These structures and the principles behind them could be taught to new prisoners and maintained, as Sami al-Jundi experienced.

Prisoners built education systems that unified and benefited them by expanding their knowledge of their own and other anti-colonial causes. Prisoners gained degrees, both at the high school and university level, while others became literate. Education provided an opportunity for self-growth and reflection on intellectual topics that prisoners had not considered at length prior to imprisonment. Internal security was built into these internal structures to maintain order, discipline, and prevented “weakness” in individuals. Often, this enforcement invoked fear that induced self-policing. This meant that the only dialogue with prison authorities was controlled by

²¹⁶ Article Three focused on non-international conflicts and declared that combatants who had laid down their arms and non-combatants were to be treated humanely, with dignity, and not subjected to violence. The fourth article was a general protection for civilians during times of war.

²¹⁷ Salah Tamari, “Memories of an Ansar Prisoner,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 7, no. 2–3 (1985): 121.

prisoners' committees. Prisoners achieved their needs and aims through strikes. Collective actions were not limited to hunger strikes but included other forms of noncompliance, like refusing to stand for counts, as was the case in 'Asqalan Prison and Ansar Detention Camp. During the Palestinian Revolution, strikes and collective actions aimed to achieve things and changes, like better food, beds, books, radios, as well as education rights. Much of these struggles were about changing and improving daily life in prisons for the collective.

While there was much room for individual action and individual strength, these internal structures were designed to benefit and maintain the collective. In many ways, in prison, the individual and the collective were inseparable from each other. The internal governing structures were about maintaining and acting as a coherent unit, while handling those who were deemed "weak" or detrimental to the wider community. However, individual agency and personal struggles, like those of Tamari, Lawahez Burgal and Ali Mohammad Jidah, to remain resilient were replete across oral histories.

Prisoners interacted and communicated with the wider Palestinian revolutionary movement, their organizations and their institutions. The cases of mutual solidarity between those inside and outside prison showed that prisons were another arm of the Palestinian Revolution. They both worked towards similar goals and recognized the validity of the other's nationalist struggle. Palestinians outside prison demonstrated in solidarity with hunger strikers, while prisoners demonstrated in support of collective actions going on outside prisons, like Land Day. One-way tools of communication, like radios, poetry and art, provided ways to support each other and demonstrate solidarity. Radios were a unifying force, a source of information about the national movement and a comfort to prisoners. The exchange and smuggling of documents allowed for two-way communication between prisoners and the wider nationalist movement. Poetry and art memorialized and romanticized the role of prisoners in the struggle. Poetry was, and remains today, an important nationalist indicator. The four anthologies included poems about prison and prisoners in general and Samih al-Qasim's "A Letter from Prison" in particular. This poem exemplifies the use of tropes, like the pain of the mother, and the contrast between light and dark, which celebrates prisoners' resilience. It is also reminiscent of the personal and individual struggles that Tamari, Jidah and Burgal discussed, while still referencing the communal effects of pain of imprisonment with the tears of the mother. Poetry and art were a part of a distinct artistic culture that adapted Palestinian nationalist themes and tropes to prisons.

Some of the art that prisoners created was smuggled out and used in posters to address international and national audiences. These posters called for the freedom of prisoners, for the rights of prisoners or for actions in support of prisoners. Similar to the motifs of light in poetry, the art of Muhammed Roukwe and Zuhdi al-Adawi use bright colours in contrast to the dull, grey surroundings of their prisons. Their art is replete with nationalist imagery. It was very common for posters that called for solidarity with Palestinian prisoners to heavily feature nationalist imagery and symbols, like the transgressive power of nature, fedayeen and kufiyahs. These were not exclusively symbols that represented prisoners. They were symbols that represented Palestinian nationalism and resistance. These posters connected prisoners to these symbols and embroiled them in the wider nationalist narrative. These symbols were invoked in order to support them. However, these international appeals had their limitations and were not always successful.

Across testimonies, memoirs, interviews, poetry, art and posters, there was a series of values—the importance of unity, morale, education and *sumud*. The sense of *sumud* and defiance were the desire and the assertion that prisons would not break prisoners. Instead, prisoners would break prisons. Prisoners rejected victimization despite the repeated attempts of prison authorities to victimize them. The education structures were a product of this. They were about making gains in a space meant to deny opportunities through learning and growth. Strikes were tools of noncompliance and non-violence that prisoners saw as offensive rather than passive. They were about taking control and asserting the needs and wills of the community. This portrayal was celebrated through the art and poetry that prisoners smuggled out. It was a far-reaching image. The following chapter explores prisoners' experiences during the First Intifada and their portrayal as nationalist symbols in their own right.

Chapter Two: Prison Resistance during the First Intifada

The prisoner exchanges of 1983 and 1985 predated the massive shift in the prison population during the First Intifada. On 24 November 1983, the PLO exchanged six Israeli soldiers for 4,800 Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners held in jails across the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel, and in the Ansar Detention Camp in Southern Lebanon.¹ On 20 May 1985, the PFLP General Command exchanged three Israeli soldiers for 1,155 Palestinian prisoners in Israeli Prisons.² In both cases, those exchanged tended to be the most senior prisoners, with the longest sentences. They were also the prisoners with the most organizational experience. Therese Halaseh, Ali Mohammed Jiddah, and Salah Tamari, whom I discuss in Chapter One, were among them. Mounir Mansour speculates that part of the reason that he was released, in addition to his being a long serving prisoner, was because he was a “representative of the National Prisoners’ Movement and of the inmates in Ramla Prison.”³ This loss of leadership created a vacuum that younger prisoners struggled to fill. Badran Bader Jaber, a man from Hebron, noted that just one year later, in 1986 at Jneid Prison, there was a completely new set of prisoners and the new leadership had to explain “even the alphabet of a hunger strike” to them.⁴

For twenty years prior to the First Intifada, the occupation had shaped the daily lives of Palestinians through an amalgamation of settler-colonialism and military rule. Israel had attempted to incorporate the OPT by exploiting Palestinians economically, taking over administration in the area, alienating Palestinian land, and settling Israelis there.⁵ This carried an extensive and totalizing affect across Palestinian society. There was not one Palestinian in the OPT or inside the Green Line left unaffected by the occupation. During the 1970s and the 1980s, united by nationalism, the labour movement and the women’s movement developed institutions and organizations from the gap left by the occupation authorities’ neglect of basic services and human rights. These structures provided services and acted as a stand-in in the absence of a

¹ James Dorsey, “The Prisoner Exchange,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 13, no. 2 (1984): 182.

² Mounir Mansour, “Prisoner Exchange Deals: Between Figures and Emotions,” in *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*, ed. Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 175.

³ Mansour, 179.

⁴ Badran Bader Jaber, “Badran Bader Jaber,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 162.

⁵ Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women’s Movements in the Occupied Territories*, Princeton Studies on the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 208.

state.⁶ The development of this framework allowed much of the grassroots organizing that defined the Intifada.

The Intifada broke out in December 1987. There had been growing political activity throughout the year by youth and increased outrage following the deportation of Fatah and Islamic Jihad leaders.⁷ On 9 December 1987, an IDF truck hit a civilian car and killed four Palestinians in Jabalia Refugee Camp. In the days that followed, demonstrations spread across Gaza, the West Bank and East Jerusalem.⁸ Palestinian participation was widespread and pervasive and the leadership driving the movement was local and at the grassroots level. In the following weeks, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) organized and distributed communiqués across the territories that focused on keeping the movement unified and consistently active.⁹ In large numbers, people marched, protested and put up barricades, blocking off areas from the IDF and the GSS. They participated in economic boycotts by refusing to pay taxes, to work in Israel or in Israeli settlements, or to consume Israeli products.¹⁰ Throughout this period, Palestinians channelled their activities into noncompliance and civil disobedience.¹¹ In contrast, the Israeli response was one of brute force. They dispatched 70,000 soldiers to the territories and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin was widely quoted as calling for a policy of “Iron Fist” and “breaking Palestinians’ bones”.¹² Ultimately, the First Intifada culminated into the Oslo Accords in 1993 with a sense of triumph and hope for the future.

Changes in Israeli Prisons before and during the First Intifada

In ‘Asqalan Prison, Sami al-Jundi noted that after the 1985 prisoner exchange, “the ratio between new and old prisoners had shifted dramatically. Our community elders had been lost. The prison committees were growing weaker. Our mission became much harder.”¹³ In 1985,

⁶ Hiltermann, 209–11.

⁷ Hiltermann, 210.

⁸ Don Peretz, “Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising,” *Foreign Affairs* 66, no. 5 (1988): 966–67.

⁹ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, “Communiqués from the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising,” in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 38–40.

¹⁰ John Collins, *Occupied by Memory: The Intifada Generation and the Palestinian State of Emergency* (NYU Press, 2004), 41.

¹¹ Wendy Pearlman, *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement* (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 112.

¹² Pearlman, 114.

¹³ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 153.

after being in prison for five years, he became an “old prisoner.”¹⁴ This was in contrast to when he first arrived, and the other prisoners teased him that with his ten-year prison sentence, they should place him closest to the door because he would be out the soonest. Someone told him, “compared to the rest of us, you’re practically a free man.”¹⁵ At that time most of the other prisoners were serving life sentences or had already been behind bars for decades. In ‘Asqalan Prison, a shuffle of transfers in the lead-up to the prisoner exchanges created an influx of younger Gazan prisoners. Al-Jundi described how these younger prisoners came from harsher prisons run by the military, where overcrowding and torture was “more severe” and their internal structures were weaker.¹⁶ However, because there was such a large number of them, combined with the loss of older, more experienced prisoners, they quickly took over the prisoners’ committees.¹⁷ While al-Jundi served on the education committee and taught literacy and classes about Fatah, fears about collaborators gave way to violence between political prisoners at a scale that he had never seen before. Accusations, rumours, paranoia and violence became so extensive that despite al-Jundi not being a collaborator, he feared for his safety. Leaders outside the prison, like Yasser Arafat, sent messages demanding that the younger prisoners cease their violence, and that they “listen to those with experience and to rebuild hope and trust.”¹⁸ By 1988, the remaining senior prisoners regained control, but not before al-Jundi asked for a transfer to another prison for a period, to escape the fear and violence. Due to the Intifada there was a rapid increase in incarceration and many transfers and shuffling in the prison population. Because of this, the Israel Prison Service (IPS) transferred many of ‘Asqalan’s more violent and belligerent leaders of this period to Nafha Prison. The old prisoners regained control and formed new ties with the remaining Gazan prisoners.¹⁹

Around the same time as the prisoner exchanges, Israeli torture and abuse practices gained national and international attention. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s awareness gradually grew, but a watershed moment came in 1984, when the General Security Service (GSS) arrested and promptly executed two hijackers after a failed bus hijacking.²⁰ Following this, Moshe

¹⁴ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 149.

¹⁵ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 121.

¹⁶ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 154.

¹⁷ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 154.

¹⁸ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 156.

¹⁹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 159.

²⁰ Catherine Cook, Adam Hanieh, and Adah Kay, *Stolen Youth: The Politics of Israel’s Detention of Palestinian Children* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 154.

Landau headed a special commission, which released its findings in 1987. It found that since 1971, the GSS, which was in charge of the arrest and detention of prisoners, had systematically and routinely physically and psychologically tortured prisoners to extract confessions.²¹ Often, this was the only evidence that military courts used to convict Palestinians accused of security offences. The commission found that the GSS had also committed systematic perjury, as interrogators had lied about their interrogation methods. The GSS had even issued written instructions on how to lie in court should an individual try to retract their forced confession. To many Palestinians, their lawyers, like Lea Tsemel, and other Israelis on the left, this information was neither new, nor revelatory. Tsemel noted in a seminar in 1984 that: “In a normal, daily Security Services interrogation, either in the occupied territories or in Israel, torture and ill-treatment are a given fact.”²² Despite this, the Landau Commission endorsed the use of “moderate physical pressure” on detainees.²³ As such, the United Nations Committee Against Torture rejected the Landau Commission’s sanction of “moderate physical and psychological pressure”, stating in June 1994 that the Landau Commission’s permission was “completely unacceptable” to the Committee and that they were concerned that no steps had been taken to apply the Convention Against Torture.²⁴

With the prisoner exchanges, as well as the new international attention on abuses and torture, there was an increase in general knowledge amongst Palestinians about imprisonment. The First Intifada compounded this. The posters released by organizations, like the Palestine Solidarity Campaign and the PFLP, reflect a change in the awareness and attitude about the abuses that Palestinian prisoners and detainees suffered. Calls to release all prisoners were plastered over images of blindfolded and handcuffed young men led by heavily armed soldiers.²⁵ In this period, calls to action also emphasized torture and abuse through imagery. Calls to close Ansar 3 were prevalent.²⁶ This awareness occurred in tandem with the increase of quotidian abuses that came with increased resistance and repression during this period. Depictions of

²¹ Cook, et al, *Stolen Youth*, 147.

²² Tsemel, “The Political Prisoners,” 124.

²³ Ilan Peleg, *Human Rights in the West Bank and Gaza: Legacy and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), 63.

²⁴ Quoted in Cook, Hanieh, and Kay, *Stolen Youth*, 155.

²⁵ N/A, *No To Israeli Concentration Camps*, 1988, Poster, N/A, 1988, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/no-to-israeli-concentration-camps>.

²⁶ Steve Fessler, *How Low Must They Stoop?*, 1988, Poster, N/A, (1988), Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/how-low-must-they-stoop>.

Palestinian prisoners and detainees suffering were a tool to mobilize people. They emphasized what prisoners were living through and suffering for the cause.

For a huge number of Palestinians, confronting the IDF became a daily occurrence. One of the consequences was waves of mass arbitrary arrests and a massive increase in imprisonment. In 1991, Human Rights Watch reported that between 1981 and December 1987, there had been no more than 5,000 Palestinians total imprisoned or in detention in the OPT. In the first six months of the First Intifada, this number had more than doubled.²⁷ During these six months, the human rights group Al-Haq estimated that some 17,000 Palestinians had been arrested and detained. In June 1988, there were 10,000 Palestinians in detention, and 2,000 of which were administrative detainees.²⁸

Arrests were frequent but did not always lead to lengthy sentences. It became common for the IDF to round up the men and boys of a village or neighborhood, detain them at a nearby school, and then search the surrounding premises. In other cases, soldiers would arrive at homes in the middle of the night and indiscriminately arrest all the teenaged boys present.²⁹ On 8 June 1988, in al-Janiya near Ramallah, after someone injured two soldiers with a Molotov cocktail, other soldiers rounded up all of the men and boys over the age of fourteen in the village and brought them to the school for questioning.³⁰ In an interview in August 1991, Elias Rishmawi described mass and arbitrary arrests in Bayt Sahour as retribution for the village's refusal to pay taxes. He described soldiers rounding up groups of old people in an attempt to provoke a violent reaction.³¹ Al-Haq reported that in the aftermath of an individual episode of violence or protest, "the whole male population in the vicinity of such an incident, in particular between the ages of 14 and 30, can expect to be arrested."³²

In order to accommodate the massive increase in the prison population, the IPS built new jails and detention centres and the Israeli military courts held mass trials, in which they convicted people in groups. Among these new prisons were Ansar 2 and Ansar 3. In January 1988, Ansar

²⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Prison Conditions in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, Middle East Watch Report (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1991), 1.

²⁸ Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations during the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-December 1988: A Report* (Boston: South End Press, 1990), 242.

²⁹ Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations during the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-December 1988* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), 234.

³⁰ Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 1990, 234.

³¹ Elias Rishmawi, "Elias Rishmawi," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 275–76.

³² Al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation*, 1988, 335.

2, also known as the Gaza Beach Camp, opened in Gaza City.³³ Two months later, Ansar 3, a prison complex largely constructed of tents and guard towers in the Negev desert, opened in March 1988. In November 1989, Mousa, then a young man from al-Birra in the West Bank, described his court hearing following his second arrest, at Dahariyya jail, where a judge came every Wednesday to sentence prisoners.³⁴ The courts accused Mousa and seven other men of being in an armed cell together, based on the confession of another prisoner, extracted through torture. The courts charged them together, “as one.”³⁵ The judge extended their prison sentence together, although they went to different jails.

Overcrowding became a constant feature of detention and imprisonment during the First Intifada. Human Rights Watch described it as “severe.”³⁶ This intensified the abuses that prisoners suffered. In Ansar 3, solitary confinement was not possible due to its infrastructure. Instead, collective punishments, like gassing, and beatings took its place.³⁷ Mousa described being tear gassed multiple times in the tents in Ansar 3.³⁸ Overcrowding, poor quality of food,³⁹ the denial of menstrual pads,⁴⁰ unhygienic conditions, and medical negligence were pervasive complaints, especially in places where imprisonment was temporary and transitory, like Muskabiyya (also known as the Russian Compound),⁴¹ or where temporary structures had been built to absorb the excess prison population, like Ansar 3⁴² and Ansar 2.⁴³

While the IDF and the GSS systematically targeted young men and boys, the rate of women detained also increased during this period. Women frequently faced threats of sexual violence. For example, on 13 February 1989, the IDF arrested Laila, a sixteen-year-old girl from

³³ Anita Vitullo, “Uprising in Gaza,” in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 48.

³⁴ His first arrest was part of a mass arrest in which all young men that were his age were rounded up because soldiers claimed one of them had thrown rocks at a barricade. He was released after eighteen days. Mousa, “Mousa,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 170.

³⁵ Mousa, 174.

³⁶ Human Rights Watch, *Prison Conditions in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 28.

³⁷ Yesh Gvul, “The Palestinian Uprising Ansar 3,” *Race & Class* 30, no. 1 (1988): 79–80.

³⁸ Mousa, “Mousa,” 179.

³⁹ However, Human Rights Watch notes that food had improved in prisons by 1991.

Human Rights Watch, *Prison Conditions in Israel and the Occupied Territories*, 74.

⁴⁰ Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, “Political Detainees in the Russian Compound in Jerusalem: Overview and Testimonies,” in *Palestinian Women: Identity and Experience*, ed. Ebba Augustin (London: Zed Books, 1993), 187.

⁴¹ Hiba A Shweiki quoted in Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, 192–93.

⁴² Gvul, “The Palestinian Uprising Ansar 3,” 80–81.

⁴³ Don Peretz, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 65.

al-‘Azarian, near Jerusalem. Settlers accused her of throwing stones and chased her down. Soldiers arrested her, beat between her legs, and threatened her with penetration. They took her to Muskabiyya and during the interrogation she was beaten repeatedly, once by a guard after she refused to sign a confession that interrogators had not translated for her, and later, after a guard lied to her, telling her that her friend had died. The night before her trial, three guards took her to a room and threatened to rape her with a metal wire.⁴⁴ After this, she signed a confession. In another example, Majdolen Abu Atwan was twenty years old and eight months pregnant. Israeli military forces threatened her husband that they would beat her until she lost the baby.⁴⁵ Teenaged girls frequently reported that female soldiers would make them strip down to their underwear and then let men pass through the interrogation room in order to humiliate them.⁴⁶

For Lawahez Burgal, mentioned in the previous chapter, her second arrest came during the First Intifada, when she was a mother of two children. The rage she felt did not come from being arrested in front of her children, but from the fact that the soldiers would not let her breastfeed her crying son before they took her away. During her interrogation and torture, which included solitary confinement, sleep deprivation, *shabeh*, and the psychological torture of interrogators playing the recordings of crying children that they claimed were her own children, she told them: “If you want to kill me, kill me. I am not going to say one thing, because I am not going to forget what you did to my son.”⁴⁷

Administrative detention increased during the First Intifada. When Israeli security forces wanted to place someone under administrative detention, the Israeli military commander of the region signed the administrative detention order. The commander usually signed these orders on the grounds of secret evidence, which the detainee and their lawyer did not have access to. This allowed the Israeli military to incarcerate Palestinians, who had not even committed an offence, without charge or trial, on the grounds that they will commit an offence in the future. International law makes allowance for administrative detention in the most extreme circumstances, when there is no other possible alternative.⁴⁸ However, it has become routine in

⁴⁴ Laila quoted in Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, “Political Detainees in the Russian Compound in Jerusalem,” 195.

⁴⁵ Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, 187–88.

⁴⁶ Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, 187–88.

⁴⁷ Burgal, “Lawahez Burgal,” 155–56.

⁴⁸ Daphna Golan, *Detained Without Trial: Administrative Detention in the Occupied Territories Since the Beginning of the Intifada* (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1992), 57–58, https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files2/detained_without_trial.pdf.

Israel. Security forces have used administrative detention as “an inexpensive and quick substitute for punishment”, which contravenes international law.⁴⁹ Administrative orders are typically for six-month increments, but they can be renewed indefinitely. During the 1980s, the use of administrative detention declined. Throughout the First Intifada there were more than 14,000 administrative detention orders. At the height of the Intifada there was 1,500 administrative detainees per month, the number dropping to 185 detainees by September 1992.⁵⁰ Many people were skeptical that administrative detention is for security reasons rather than political reasons. Souad Dajani notes,

“Of the thousands of Palestinian administrative detainees held without charge during the *intifada* (many in the Ansar III camp in the Negev Desert), several were arrested primarily because of their contacts with Israeli Jews. Palestinians noted a pattern: A doctor from Gaza invites Israeli doctors to tour the Shifa Hospital and is later arrested and sent to the desert camp. Four months after some 15 Palestinian writers and journalists met with their Israeli counterparts to sign an agreement concerning coordination of efforts against the occupation, they were summarily thrown into prison.”⁵¹

Faysal Husayni experienced such circumstances. A pragmatic politician, he frequently went on Israeli radio to discuss Palestinian issues. Israeli military courts placed him under administrative detention three times between 1987 and 1989. He noted that one of his own house arrests and administrative detentions were “certainly meant to curtail the [Arabic Studies Society] center’s activities.”⁵² His arrest in August 1987, came after a period in which he had been negotiating with Israeli officials for a peace deal and the mutual recognition of the Israeli and future Palestinian states. Husayni and Sari Nussayba met with Moshe Amirav, representing the Likud Party, but there was a breakdown on the issue of guaranteeing a Palestinian state immediately, or even at all after the developmental stages that Amirav insisted were necessary.⁵³ The IDF placed Husayni under administrative detention a week before the final meeting between Husayni, Arafat, Amirav and Yitzhak Shamir was due to take place in Switzerland. While officials claimed that Husayni had been arrested because his activities with the Arab Studies Society

⁴⁹ Golan, 58.

⁵⁰ Golan, 7.

⁵¹ Souad Dajani, *Eyes Without Country: Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995), 85.

⁵² Faysal Husayni, “Interview with Faysal Husayni,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 18, no. 4 (1989): 6.

⁵³ This was despite the agreement to recognize Israel immediately. The proposal that Amirav presented was that Palestinians would wait up to 5 years for their own recognition.

threatened national security, many Palestinians and Israelis believed that it was his moderate position that threatened Israeli hardliners, who claimed there were no Palestinians with whom they could negotiate.⁵⁴ At a conference in Romania not long after, Shamir asserted that there was no need for an international dialogue to discuss the Palestinian-Israeli conflict because his party was already in a dialogue with the PLO.⁵⁵ After being released from administrative detention in June 1988, Husayni participated in a public debate with several Israeli politicians in front of an Israeli Jewish audience in June 1988. Security forces placed him under administrative detention again within a week.⁵⁶

The IDF and GSS also targeted labour organizers with administrative detention. Joost Hiltermann found that security forces targeted the labour movement prior to the Intifada, alongside student unions, for their “nationalist outlook and potentially broad base.”⁵⁷ In 1980, Israeli authorities tried to control elections by legally restricting who could run for a position. Harassment and intimidation, including arresting and beating members as they attempted enter union offices, was not uncommon.⁵⁸ Salah Abu Kteish had a history of imprisonment during the Palestinian Revolution, as noted in the previous chapter. By the 1980s, however, he dedicated his life to his family and the Palestinian labour movement. He founded the Popular Worker’s Committee, which created several unions. They built up a federation. On 3 August 1988, an Israeli military court placed him under administrative detention for six months.⁵⁹ There were no charges, and his interrogators focused on his role as a leader of the Popular Worker’s Committee. An Israeli military court placed Mohammed, from Jenin Refugee Camp, under administrative detention a number of times during the Intifada, “for activism in general”, which included his labour union activities.⁶⁰ Many of his fellow prisoners were union workers. He asserted that “[a]dministrative detention was used to arrest these people without actually charging them with unionism, because the Israelis felt that union activism was political.”⁶¹

⁵⁴ John Wallach, *Still Small Voices* (New York: Carol Publication Group, 1990), 95–96.

⁵⁵ Wallach, 96.

⁵⁶ Wallach, 97.

⁵⁷ Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 102.

⁵⁸ Hiltermann, 104–5.

⁵⁹ Abu Kteish, “Salah Abu Kteish,” 192.

⁶⁰ Mohammed, “Mohammed,” in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 194.

⁶¹ Mohammed, 194.

Internal Organization and Resistance

While al-Jundi described a loss of control following the 1985 prisoner exchange in ‘Asqalan Prison, the senior prisoners overcame it as the Intifada grew in strength. The Intifada had extensive impact on mobilization and resistance. In Jneid Prison, Badran Bader Jaber, a man from the West Bank, described a crash course-style education on how to organize and mount a hunger strike in March 1987. With Jneid Prison’s opening in 1984, the IPS transferred prisoners there from ‘Asqalan, Hebron, and Nablus. According to Jaber, the guards treated prisoners very badly, “as they had treated them in the first days of the occupation after 1967.”⁶² To assert themselves, the prisoners launched an initial hunger strike in September 1984.⁶³ A second setback came after the prisoner exchange of 1985. The prison administration began diminishing prisoners’ quality of life by removing books, which were of immense cultural significance in jail, and by preventing prisoners from visiting each other’s cells in the same section.⁶⁴ As I discuss in Chapter One, prisoners had previously established these as their rights. Jaber described the process of educating fellow detainees to tell administrators and guards only to talk to the prisoners’ spokespeople about their strike. By April 1987, after their hunger strikes, they had regained all their rights.⁶⁵ For prisoners, in many ways, the concept of “improvement” meant continually fighting to maintain existing rights. This highlights the intense power disparity between them and the prison administration. While prisoners did have some power to assert themselves, the GSS, the IDF and the IPS had the power to repeatedly move the goal posts. Even when giving the impression of granting concessions, they were actually giving back something that they had taken away or denied in the first place. For example, the Mandela Institute, a human rights organization, noted that following the hunger strike of September-October 1992, the IPS met very few of the terms agreed upon through negotiations.⁶⁶

This particular strike was organized by prisoners like Faysal Husayni in Nablus Prison.⁶⁷ B’Tselem reported that it began on 27 September 1992, in order to protest “the conditions of their imprisonment”, which included solitary confinement, lack of access to medical care, short

⁶² Jaber, “Badran Bader Jaber,” 161.

⁶³ Jaber, 161.

⁶⁴ Jaber, 162.

⁶⁵ Jaber, 163. Emphasis in the original.

⁶⁶ Golan, *Detained Without Trial*, 112.

⁶⁷ Thomas Mattair, *The Arab Israeli Conflict: From Shamir to Rabin to Peace?* (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1992), 112, https://www.btselem.org/sites/default/files/sites/default/files2/human_rights_violations_in_the_occupied_territories_1992_1993.pdf.

family visits, and poor quality and quantity of food.⁶⁸ The strike concluded on 11 October 1992, after both sides agreed that the IPS would lessen restrictions on and lengthen family visits, shorten lines for medical exams, place heaters in cells, and allow prisoners to study in the Open University by correspondence.⁶⁹

Even without pre-existing committees, prisoners still organized and mounted strikes. Hiba Shweiki, a 45-year-old widow, was detained, tortured, and interrogated in Muskabiyya, which was known for its brutal conditions.⁷⁰ While in a cell with twelve other women, one of them lost their right to walk outside the cell, so they “collectively” refused to leave the cell, until the IDF allowed the woman to join them.⁷¹ The IDF separated the participants and placed Shweiki in solitary confinement. When they returned to their cell, a Red Cross representative told them they were being collectively punished, so they went on hunger strike.⁷²

Prisoners organized in ways other than hunger strikes. For Mousa, from al-Birra in the West Bank, while imprisoned at Majyddu Prison, there was a pre-existing organizational structure, built during the Palestinian Revolution. This structure had undergone changes though. He met with fellow prisoners to discuss topics like the political climate of the Intifada and martyrs. According to al-Jundi, in ‘Asqalan Prison, the prisoners’ political meetings and discussions also revolved around the Intifada. They discussed how people outside were organizing, and what advice they should send out to them.⁷³ As well, Mousa described how, on 15 November 1989 in Dahariyya Detention Centre, the prisoners organized singing and clapping to commemorate the 1988 Palestinian declaration of independence.⁷⁴ As a consequence of this, they were not allowed to move from their cells to tents.

Communication, both across prisons and with those outside prisons, remained vital to internal organizing. People organized by communicating across the cells and sections of their prisons and with those visiting them from outside prison. Mousa described this communication as “very, very dangerous”.⁷⁵ In Ansar 3, prisoners threw a rock from one section to another

⁶⁸ Mattair, 112.

⁶⁹ Mattair, 112.

⁷⁰ Hiba A Shweiki quoted in Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, “Political Detainees in the Russian Compound in Jerusalem,” 190.

⁷¹ Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, 194.

⁷² Women’s Organization for Political Prisoners, 194.

⁷³ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 161.

⁷⁴ Mousa, “Mousa,” 174.

⁷⁵ A soldier shot and killed a prisoner while they tried to retrieve a message that had fallen outside the barbed wire of their section. See below for more information.

section, and then they threw a second rock with a message wrapped around it to communicate and organize across distance, barriers, and the hostile force of guards.⁷⁶ The first rock was to get the attention of the other section and to prepare them for the coming message. Prisoners used this technique in Ansar 1. Al-Jundi described how prisoners

sent messages of solidarity and support to [their] people, hiding the papers in capsules under [their] tongues and passing them through the mesh net to [their] families on visiting days. Some of the messages contained advice, such as suggesting that neighborhoods organize underground classes to serve as a substitute for [their] regular schools that the Israelis had closed.⁷⁷

In Ansar 3, each section had a prisoner who was fluent in Hebrew and assigned to communicate with the guards.⁷⁸

Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin, who was affiliated with Islamic Jihad, noted that “when I came out of prison there were so many factions trying to get recruits, all at the expense of the people, the grassroots, who started the intifada.”⁷⁹ What is noteworthy here was the way al-Hazzarin differentiated between his time inside prison and his time outside prison. Outside prison, there were factional divides, but inside prison, aside from the abuses he suffered during his arrest, it was calmer. He spent much of his time reading. Prison offered unity in a way that society outside, during the latter part of the First Intifada, did not. Al-Hazzarin described all his prison experiences as “we”; “we read a lot” and “we had hopes”.⁸⁰ When he left prison, he shifted to the singular; “I came out”.⁸¹

As noted previously, many people faced arrest for the first time during this period. As such, they were young and inexperienced when it came to prisons. Serving shorter and repeated sentences meant many people had fewer chances to learn or gain experience participating in strikes or negotiating with prison officials. People like Nidal, then a fifteen-year-old boy from the Gaza Strip, who were part of cells, received training from committees organized by older, twenty-five to thirty-year-old activists. He described,

⁷⁶ Mousa, “Mousa,” 178.

⁷⁷ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 161.

⁷⁸ Mousa, “Mousa,” 179.

⁷⁹ Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin quoted in Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 177.

⁸⁰ Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin quoted in Matar, 177.

⁸¹ Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin quoted in Matar, 177.

Three times a week we used to meet to become educated on different issues: what to expect during interrogation, what are the methods they used to interrogate, what to say, what not to say. (...) We enter jail knowing a lot about what to expect, but time in prison deepens your whole awareness about jail, about the intifada, about different things.⁸²

Mousa commented on the lack of internal organizing and mobilization in Dahariyya jail, saying that this made it worse than the other prisons.⁸³ He received training from his cell and had previously been imprisoned. However, not everyone was part of a cell.

Violent resistance was uncommon, but still occurred. In 1989, in Ansar 3, Mousa described how when throwing letters wrapped around rocks, between sections, one of the rocks landed outside the barbed wire. A young man leaned into the barbed wire to retrieve it. A soldier in the guard tower shot and killed him. The prisoners' organization sent a communiqué to the rest of the prisoners, saying that the soldier "must be hit. He must pay for what he did."⁸⁴ Later, the guard who gave the order to shoot walked too close to a door made of metal bars, where a Gazan prisoner grabbed him and smashed his face against it in retribution. When soldiers came to take the Gazan man away for punishment, the entire section began throwing their spoons and plates at them in protest. The soldiers gassed them.⁸⁵ On 9 February 1989, *The Jerusalem Post* reported that a riot broke out in Majyddu Detention Centre, when IDF soldiers attempted to cut a family visit short after they saw a visitor waving a Palestinian flag. The inmates began throwing rocks and wood at the soldiers. To quell the riot, IDF soldiers fired into the crowd, killing two detainees and injuring eighteen others.⁸⁶ As can be noted from these two incidents, while violence did occur it was typically in extreme circumstances, and the repression meted out in response was often disproportionate to the initial resistance.

Outside prison, the IDF and the GSS targeted education structures as places of "unrest" and "terrorism".⁸⁷ Inside prison, education structures were still active. Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin was in administrative detention for six months in 1989. He described reading a lot and participating in organized discussions.⁸⁸ This central tenet of imprisonment during the

⁸² Nidal, "Nidal," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 266.

⁸³ Mousa, "Mousa," 174.

⁸⁴ Mousa, 178.

⁸⁵ Mousa, 178.

⁸⁶ "INMATE KILLED AS PALESTINIAN PRISONERS RIOT," *The Jerusalem Post*, February 9, 1989.

⁸⁷ Peretz, *Intifada*, 74.

⁸⁸ Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin quoted in Matar, *What It Means to Be Palestinian*, 177.

Palestinian Revolution was still present. As noted above, one of the 1992 hunger strikes' demands was for prisoners to be able to study by correspondence in the Open University. Al-Jundi described struggling with the curriculum that had been relevant during the Revolution, but by the time of the First Intifada, was out of date. He felt that the new prisoners' course about Fatah did not acknowledge changes that occurred since 1982, such as the PLO's relocation to Algeria and Yemen. He recalled his discomfort from teaching Fatah's ideals about democratic principles, knowing about the violence, infighting and corruption that had emerged since 1985. His discomfort did not extend to all his lessons. He felt immense pride for teaching literacy classes, taking a small group of prisoners from the alphabet to a high school reading level.⁸⁹ In 'Asqalan Prison, the Palestinian political situation outside prison was changing and the prison curriculum did not reflect all these changes.

The struggle of the First Intifada extended from the streets of the OPT to the prisons. The Intifada led to a new phase of prison resistance, one that adapted to the massive influx of people, their repeated arrests and releases. During the Palestinian Revolution, prisoners like Sharif Youssef Mansour, Abdel Aziz Ali Shahin, and Salah Tamari created and built up internal structures that provided discipline, order, and education programs. These structures and the gains they obtained largely remained in place during the Intifada, but experienced new pressures. While prisoners referenced the gains made during the Palestinian Revolution, they had to cope with overcrowding, poor living conditions, and harsh abuse from the IPS, the GSS, and the IDF. Prisoners continued to use bodily protest to fight to ameliorate their quality of life. While their discussion and education remained based on the world external to prisons, focusing on possible advice for those outside prison and resistance during the First Intifada, most of the prison movement and resistance was concerned with life inside prison.

Symbolism and Attitude Outside Prison

During the Intifada, there was an increase in awareness and interest about imprisonment outside of prisons. Notably, *sumud* was a pronounced theme of resistance in the rhetoric of daily conversation and the symbolism of art, like posters and cartoons. Faced with circumstances well

⁸⁹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 152–254.

beyond their control, in prisons and in the streets, prisoners and those who supported them relied on *sumud* as another facet of resistance and as a coping mechanism.

During the Intifada, increased imprisonment occurred in tandem with the increase of political activity across society, especially from women. Following 1967, with more access to education and partial entry into the workforce, women became more politicized. Women's increased politicization occurred against the backdrop of threats to their homes and families, deprivation of male breadwinners, male oppression within the family and wider community, and imprisonment.⁹⁰ While women were very active during the Palestinian Revolution, there was an increase in women from non-political families taking part in demonstrations and organizing during the Intifada. Despite their resistance, women were not systematically targeted like men. A change in attitude accompanied this. Notably, Emily Rishmawi of Bayt Sahour,⁹¹ Elias Rishmawi's mother, declared: "We are a normal family. We are not a problem family. No one of our children has ever thrown stones or done something like that."⁹² Still, she discussed intervening when soldiers hassled or targeted children. She insisted that "[t]hese are *my* kids", and that all Palestinian children were "*our* kids".⁹³

This shift in attitudes took place concomitantly in prisons. When a large group of soldiers rounded up five of her six sons as part of an arbitrary arrest, Um Sa'alem of Jenin in the West Bank, told them, "Why don't you just go ahead and take Ahmad [the youngest], because six kids is not enough to bring to Palestine."⁹⁴ Ahmad, who was thirteen at the time, said, "Everybody's waiting their turn to go to prison. I'm not scared of prison. My brother's like everybody else."⁹⁵

During the Intifada, there was a sense that prison was a fundamental part of life and the cost of independence. Prison was necessary, particularly for men. Um Sa'alem exemplified this. She said,

⁹⁰ Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, 34.

⁹¹ Bayt Sahour made international headlines when the town was placed on lockdown and citizens were rounded up en masse for refusing to pay their taxes.

⁹² Emily Rishmawi, "Um Elias Rishmawi," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 250.

⁹³ Rishmawi, 248. Emphasis in the original.

⁹⁴ Um Sa'alam, "Um Sa'alam," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 241.

⁹⁵ Um Sa'alam, 241.

There is not one mother who lives in this country that does not want to see her son get out of prison. However, if the release of my son means that we aren't going to be able to achieve freedom for everyone in this country, I want my son to be in prison. I'd want him to have three lifetimes in prison if that meant the ultimate goal would be achieved.⁹⁶

Many women's political activity began with visiting their sons in prison and demonstrating to support them. Sami al-Jundi's mother continued to visit prisoners even after he was released. She told him that she had "other sons in prison".⁹⁷ She expanded her activities to visiting old people in the Old City and by learning Hebrew to be able to understand soldiers and protect children at demonstrations during the First Intifada. Um Jabr Wishah, from Gaza, visited her son with the help of the Red Cross, which organized buses that took families to visit prisoners regularly, even during curfews. Like al-Jundi's mother, she continued organizing with the mothers of other former-prisoners to visit the prisoners who remained in jail at the end of the First Intifada and during the Oslo period.⁹⁸

While the IDF and the GSS incarcerated women, they overwhelmingly targeted men were for arbitrary arrest. Gendered ideas about the roles of men and women emerged from this systematic targeting. Amal Deeb, from the Rafah Refugee Camp in Gaza, said, "The woman now has respect because she is carrying the family. The man's role is to go to prison. Each neighborhood does this. We are all together."⁹⁹ The incarceration of men became a unifying feature for Palestinians. Scholars have analyzed the overall shift in attitude due to the sheer number of beatings, imprisonment and other direct confrontations with Israeli soldiers. Julie Peteet has found that beatings and imprisonment came to be seen as a rite of passage, as "an instance of the social construction of a male gender and resistant subjectivity".¹⁰⁰ Imprisonment became a confirmation of adulthood and masculinity. There was a new dimension of honour and respect accorded to imprisonment.

Poetry, cartoons and poster art reflected this. Badawi al-Jabal's popular poem, "O Negev", is an ode to Ansar 3. The speaker describes themselves and their fellow prisoners as "the

⁹⁶ Um Sa'alam, 241.

⁹⁷ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 172.

⁹⁸ Um Jabr Wishah, "'Prisoners for Freedom': The Prisoners Issue Before and After Oslo," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 36, no. 1 (2006): 74.

⁹⁹ Amal Deeb, "Amal Deeb," in *Homeland: Oral Histories of Palestine and Palestinians*, ed. Staughton Lynd, Sam Bahour, and Alice Lynd (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1998), 94–95.

¹⁰⁰ Julie Peteet, "Male Gender and Rituals of Resistance in the Palestinian 'Intifada': A Cultural Politics of Violence," *American Ethnologist* 21, no. 1 (1994): 31.

voice of the people/The sharpened sword of revolution”.¹⁰¹ This line evokes the belief that prisoners and detainees were both representative of and a tool of the uprising and resistance to occupation. The poem expresses a desire and an intent for Ansar 3 in particular, and imprisonment in general, to be an “honour” and “a lesson”, specifically, “one of the lessons of the intifada”, to those outside prisons.¹⁰² Ansar 3 being “a lesson” is an invocation of a trope that dates to the Palestinian Revolution, that prisons are the university of the Revolution. This idea remained pervasive during the First Intifada.

As well, there are recurring motifs of light and rebirth that can be interpreted as calls to steadfastness and a continuation of the struggle while imprisoned. Addressing Ansar 3, Al-Jabal writes,

They want you as a grave for us
But we turned you into a flower
And carried the sun as a dawn¹⁰³

Prisoners took what was meant to kill them and flourished.¹⁰⁴ The implication is that prisoners are the bringers of light, by carrying the sun, even in a place of darkness, transforming their surroundings and their sufferings. They turned prison into a flower and bred new life in the harshness of the Negev Desert, contrasting between light with dark and the flourishing of flowers with barrenness of desert. These are familiar themes, seen in poetry of the Palestinian Revolution. “O Negev” celebrates the resistance and defiance of prisoners. The poem contains multiple tropes that had been established during the previous decades in prison literature.¹⁰⁵

Importantly, nature and coming from the earth hold significant value in Palestinian art. As Rasha Salti notes, Palestine’s natural landscape is a powerful national symbol.¹⁰⁶ The floral motif and the idea of breaking free also occur in other mediums, like cartoons. The cartoons of

¹⁰¹ Badawi al-Jabal, “O Negev,” in *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation*, ed. Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 304.

¹⁰² al-Jabal, 304.

¹⁰³ al-Jabal, 304.

¹⁰⁴ To native English speakers, this verse may seem familiar. It resembles a familiar protest slogan, “They tried to bury us, they didn’t know we were seeds”, which is an adaptation of Greek poet Dinos Christianopoulos’s “The Body and the Wormwood”, translated to English by Nicholas Kostis in 1995.

An Xiao, “On the Origins of ‘They Tried to Bury Us, They Didn’t Know We Were Seeds,’” *Hyperallergic*, July 3, 2018, <https://hyperallergic.com/449930/on-the-origins-of-they-tried-to-bury-us-they-didnt-know-we-were-seeds/>.

¹⁰⁵ Rasha Salti, “From Resistance and Bearing Witness to the Power of the Fantastical: Icons and Symbols in Palestinian Poetry and Cinema,” *Third Text* 24, no. 1 (2010): 39.

¹⁰⁶ Salti, 39.

Naji al-Ali exemplify this. Al-Ali was assassinated and died on 29 August 1987 from a gunshot wound he had sustained five weeks prior. A few months before he was shot, on 16 April 1987, *al-Qabas* published a cartoon of al-Ali's famous cartoon character, Handala, giving a prisoner in an Israeli jail a potted flower (Figure 1).¹⁰⁷ This flower helps the prisoner to break free, as it grows and breaks the roof of his cell, and this allows him to bend the bars on the window. Handala is famous for being a silent witness to Palestinians' suffering and resistance. However, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, Handala became more active. In other images, rather than only watching, he waves the Palestinian flag or throws rocks.¹⁰⁸ This cartoon is an example of Handala's activeness. He is an outside force giving the prisoner a symbol of Palestinian nationalism and a means of hope. Again, there is the added irony of a flower growing, when prisons are designed to be a place where nothing flourishes. It subverts the idea that prisons are not supposed to be places of opportunity. Through support from an external source, the prisoner is able to gain his freedom.




Figure 1

¹⁰⁷ Naji al-Ali, *Le Livre de Handala: Les Dessins de Résistance de Naji al-Ali*, ed. Muhammad al-As' ad, Nouvelle éd. actualisée et enrichie (Bischoheim: Scribest éditions, 2015), 28.

¹⁰⁸ Michel Faber, "Review: A Child in Palestine: The Cartoons of Naji al-Ali," *The Guardian*, July 10, 2009, sec. Books, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2009/jul/11/child-palestine-cartoons-al-ali>.



Figure 2

On 19 April 1987, *al-Qabas* published a cartoon depicting a prisoner on hunger strike in an Israeli jail (Figure 2).¹⁰⁹ This cartoon was likely in support of the hunger strike that took place between 26 March and 13 April 1987, across Kfar Yona, Nablus and Hebron prisons, in which more than 3,000 prisoners participated.¹¹⁰ Handala watches a prisoner lie prone, an upturned bowl of food symbolizing the strike, while an Israeli guard watches through the cell's door. At the barred window, a bird pecks at and breaks one of the bars with its beak. It sheds a tear. One source suggests that the bird is a hoopoe.¹¹¹ Hoopoes have made appearances in other notable Palestinian art, like Mahmoud Darwish's allegorical poem "The Hoopoe" originally published in *I See What I want to See* and republished in other volumes.¹¹² Regardless of its genus, the bird symbolizes escape and freedom and is pictured as breaking free from the confines of the prison. Even in the darkness and with the suffering, there is the promise of freedom and escape. As noted above, it is significant, that this late in al-Ali's career, Handala's back is to the reader and he is merely watching in this cartoon. Separated from prisoners who go on hunger strike, both by prison walls and by the frequent punishment of solitary confinement intended to break the strike,

¹⁰⁹ al-Ali, *Le livre de Handala*, 27.

¹¹⁰ United Nations, "REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE ISRAELI PRACTICES AFFECTING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE POPULATION OF THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES," October 15, 1987, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/05479189C2F89F40052567F5006F02E0>.

¹¹¹ Another source suggests that it is a dove.

"Handala.Org: Cartoons about Doves," [handala.org](http://www.handala.org), accessed May 29, 2019, <http://www.handala.org/cartoons/cartoon-gallery/doves/index.html>.

¹¹² Mahmoud Darwish, *Unfortunately, It Was Paradise: Selected Poems*, ed. and trans. Munir Akash and Carolyn Forché (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 51–65.

the most al-Ali's avatar can do is bear witness and stand in solidarity with the prisoner. The cartoons show prisoners to be separated from their communities, but still demonstrate that there are things that their communities can do to support them.

In other artforms, like posters, images of national symbols like, kufiyahs and broken bars are still present.¹¹³ Motifs of light and symbols of nature breaking the bonds of imprisonment and birds flying free are common in posters during the First Intifada. In a poster drawn by Ghazi Inaim in 1987, a fruit tree—it could be an orange or a lemon tree—on a green lawn emits a rainbow that reaches across the grass, through a barred window, into an Israeli prison (represented by the Star of David on the lock). The rainbow touches the raised arm of a prisoner, who is wearing a kufiyah. The natural landscape emits light and colour into the grey and colourless prison cell (Figure 3).¹¹⁴ In February 1990, the cover of *Shu'un Filastinyya* (Palestinian Affairs), a quarterly magazine issued by the PLO's Palestine Research Center, featured the artwork of former prisoner Mohammed Roukwie (Figure 4).¹¹⁵ In the foreground, three birds fly from bent and broken bars and cracked concrete, to freedom in Palestine, represented by the Dome of the Rock and other domed buildings in the background. Colours are much less prominent in this image. The bars and concrete are grey and pink, while the birds are white and pink, against a muted grey, black, and pale pink background. The focus of the image is the birds, with no bright colours to distract from theme of freedom and escape. For Palestinian Prisoners' Day on 17 April 1991, Marc Rudin's poster features the branch of an orange tree breaking through the grey stone wall (Figure 5).¹¹⁶ The green leaves and the orange are the only vibrant colours on the poster. The force of the orange tree is so immense that it breaks the wall and pieces shatter away. Nature was an empowering force, one with agency. Prisons are depicted as uniformly grey places that highlight the absence of the light, which contrasts the light and colours emitted by the natural landscape, and the freedom achieved by birds.

¹¹³ Marc Rudin, *Free All*, 1990, Poster, N/A, 1990, Palestine Poster Project, <http://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/free-all>.

¹¹⁴ Ghazi Inaim, *The Rainbow Reaches Us*, 1987, Poster, N/A, 1987, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-rainbow-reaches-us>.

¹¹⁵ Mohammed Roukwie, *Palestinian Affairs Magazine - 1990 Shu'un Filastinyya*, Poster, 27.5 x 20 inches, 1990, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/palestinian-affairs-magazine-%D8%B4%D8%A4%D9%88%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-46>.

¹¹⁶ Marc Rudin, *Free the Detainees*, 1991, Poster, N/A, 1991, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/free-the-detainees>.




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5

These are not new tropes, symbols, or motifs. They are all discussed in the previous chapter in the context of the Palestinian Revolution. In many ways, they are generic national

tropes applied to imprisonment. The posters reflect a community response to circumstances largely out of their control to treat imprisonment as an esteemed experience with potential for growth and escape.

Poetry, cartoons, and the words of Palestinians, like Um Sa‘alam, reveal a rhetoric of popular Palestinian national symbols and *sumud*. Steadfastness, while technically passive at its core, is seen as an exemplary form of resistance. Lena Meari describes *sumud* as a reflection of “a refusal to surrender to (...) the violent power of the colonial order that penetrates and affects all aspects of Palestinians’ lives”.¹¹⁷ It is a core tenet in the “Palestinian philosophy of confrontation” and “resistance to colonial occupation in general, and particular to torture in Israeli colonial prisons.”¹¹⁸ As exemplified in the poetry, cartoons and posters, Palestinian prisoners become inseparably representative of *sumud*.

This idealization of prisoners in public organizing and the public consciousness reached a new level during the First Intifada. The popular committee leading the Intifada communicated with the public and disseminated their orders and calls to actions through communiqués. These *bayans* “were the fundamental means by which the intifada became institutionalized throughout the occupied territories.”¹¹⁹ Prisons and detention centres were first mentioned in the communiqués under “the calls to action” section on 18 February 1988, as a place to protest, along with the Red Cross Headquarters. The *bayan* intended this call to action to be a condemnation of mass arbitrary arrests.¹²⁰ For 17 April 1988, Prisoners’ Day, the UNLU called for “a sit-in in the Red Cross and Red Crescent offices and national institutions in solidarity with our sons in the fascist jails and for staging a hunger strike in these places.”¹²¹ As the year progressed, the UNLU portrayed detainees and prisoners as an example of steadfastness through the *bayans*. On 6 June 1988, the UNLU called for those outside prisons to “salute the steadfastness of our heroic detainees”¹²² and for students in particular to organize in solidarity with them.¹²³ In this particular communiqué, prisoners’ steadfastness placed them in the same

¹¹⁷ Lena Meari, “Sumud: A Palestinian Philosophy of Confrontation in Colonial Prisons,” *South Atlantic Quarterly* 113, no. 3 (2014): 550.

¹¹⁸ Said Shehadeh, “Ghazeh El Sumud: Confronting Israeli Mass Torture,” in *Gaza as Metaphor*, ed. Helga Tawil-Souri and Dina Matar (London: Hurst & Company, 2016), 37.

¹¹⁹ Helena Cobban, “The PLO and the ‘Intifada,’” *Middle East Journal* 44, no. 2 (1990): 211.

¹²⁰ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, “Communiqués from the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising,” 337.

¹²¹ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 346.

¹²² Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 361.

¹²³ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 362.

category as the “heroic kinfolk under siege”, the wounded and the families of martyrs.¹²⁴ In the communiqué of 22 August 1988, the UNLU referred to the “call of the martyrs of the uprising behind bars” as one of the most “important points issued by the popular and nationalist committees”.¹²⁵ In the communiqués, the UNLU categorized prisoners and treated their actions in a similar vein to that of martyrs. They declared that “glory” was theirs, highlighting specific prisons.¹²⁶ Moreover, the UNLU called them “martyrs of the uprising behind bars”.¹²⁷ The *bayans* did not address prisoners, but rather their families and communities and demanded that they support prisoners and portrayed prisoners as an example to follow.

Some prisoners, like Sami al-Jundi after his release in 1990, suggested that the support and idealization of prisoners was often merely symbolic. The day after his release, he went with his family and a busload of people to Tamra, to the funerals of two martyrs. The relatives of the martyrs among the convoy asked al-Jundi to give the speech on behalf of those visiting from inside the Green Line, as they were “proud to have a newly released prisoner represent” them.¹²⁸ This is another example of prisoners being placed in a similar category as the families of martyrs, both of which suffered for their dedication to the Palestinian cause. However, this respect did not last long, al-Jundi asserted, especially when he attempted to find a job. He found people were either reluctant to hire a former prisoner or that he was part of the wrong faction. While in daily conversation about the condition of prisoners, he observed that people’s attention span was limited.¹²⁹ This did not necessarily extend to the families of prisoners. Notably, his mother continued to visit other prisoners even after his release.

Prisoners were a symbol of the revolution and there was an immense quantity of prisoners during this period. The way that prisoners became symbols of the Palestinian struggle during the Intifada is similar to the way that peasants became symbols of Palestinian nationalism during the Mandate period.¹³⁰ Ted Swedenburg describes how fellahin emerged as a national signifier in the context of the 1936-9 Revolt, the Zionist conquest of land, the dissolution of the village structure, and the denial of Palestinian national identity. This image depicts the fellahin as

¹²⁴ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 362.

¹²⁵ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 376.

¹²⁶ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 337.

¹²⁷ Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, 377.

¹²⁸ al-Jundi and Marlowe, *An Hour of Sunlight*, 169.

¹²⁹ al-Jundi and Marlowe, 171.

¹³⁰ Ted Swedenburg, “The Palestinian Peasant as National Signifier,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 63, no. 1 (1990): 18.

remaining resolutely tied to the land and maintaining village structures in the face of the Zionist and British attempts to usurp Palestinian land. In a sense, there are several similarities between prisoners and the fellahin, as they take up and are associated with other national symbols, like the natural landscape (as noted in the poetry, poster art, and cartoons). Swedenburg notes the way the national discourse during the First Intifada produced “a smoothed-over memory of the revolt,” that made the “PLO guerrilla the historical heir of the peasant rebel of 1936-9”.¹³¹ While fellahin are considered the “epitome of what it means to be *samid*, to stay put, anchored to the earth with stubborn determination”, it is resistance that anchors prisoners rather than land.¹³² Prisoners become representative of *sumud* by fighting for the Palestinian cause, for the land and for the independence of Palestine and suffering for it, yet remaining defiant and active. They become an example of determination. Like fellahin, prisoners and their resistance, especially with hunger strikes, become unifying figures, cutting across class, sect, and religious lines.

Conclusion

The First Intifada brought massive changes and new internal organization to the prison movement. The prisoner exchanges of 1983 and 1985 weakened leadership and internal governing structures, creating worse conditions, as was seen in Jneid Prison and ‘Asqalan Prison. The conditions of the First Intifada allowed some correction of this, as was the case in ‘Asqalan, when the increase in the prison population led to transfers and massive turnover in the prison population and leadership. However, overcrowding and the increase of repression to control the prison population worsened the quality of life in prisons like Muskabiyya and Ansar 2. Many commentators saw the increased use of administrative detention as a way for the IDF and the GSS to target political activists and leaders merely for being active and political, as was the case for Faysal Husayni participating in peace talks and Salah Abu Kteish and Mohammed participating in labour unions.

Rebuilding and reasserting internal governing structures were another component of the construction of new prisons, like Ansar 2 and Ansar 3, as can be seen in Badran Bader Jaber’s account about the first hunger strike at Jneid Prison. Hunger strikes were a form of community knowledge. As well, it was part of the public consciousness, as can be seen with the women in

¹³¹ Swedenburg, 28.

¹³² Swedenburg, 22.

Hiba Shweiki's cell in Muskabiyya. They did not have a formalized governing structure, but they organized a hunger strike all the same.

Maintaining unity through communication came with immense risk, and even the loss of life, as was the case in Ansar 3. With the weakening of lines of communication between prisoners, the Israeli prison administration removed gains that prisoners had made during the previous decades. This illustrated the extent of their power over how prisoners lived their daily lives. Education structures and discussion groups remained a unifying force, although, as we saw with the case of the Fatah curriculum, it was not always up to date. Prisoners continued to value education, which was a demand during the September-October 1992 hunger strike. While the Intifada and what happened in the streets were the focus of much of the prisoners' discussions and meetings, most of the prisoners' collective actions were dedicated to prison life.

In response to the mass incarceration and abuse of prisoners, communities fostered a sense that imprisonment was inevitable and that prisons were a rite of passage for young men. Badawi al-Jabal's poem "O Negev" reflects this, calling prison an "honour" and a "lesson". "O Negev", Naji al-Ali's cartoon and Muhammed Roukwi and Marc Rudin's posters depicted the power of the natural landscape to break the confines of colonial prisons. Ghazi Inaim's poster and "O Negev" depict motifs of light, a familiar contrasting device from the Palestinian Revolution, to show and celebrate the defiance and resistance of prisoners. The poetry, cartoons and posters exemplify the connection between *sumud* and Palestinian prisoners. This illustrated the respect accorded to prisoners. Prisoners became national symbols themselves, similar to fellahin in the 1930s. Prisoners were symbols of resistance and of suffering for the cause.

Many of the tactics and practices that began during the Palestinian Revolution continued during the Intifada. The importance and veneration of education remained. Prisoners continued to use hunger strikes to fight the prison administration and make demands and better their lives. Prisoners also employed other strategies, such as violent responses and riots. They continued to monitor and discuss the political situation outside prisons. The discussion groups that Mustafa Naji al-Hazzarin and Mousa participated in reflected this. Prisoners' situations were defined by their surroundings, while their daily conversation revolved around the wider Palestinian movement. Old strategies, like communicating across sections of Ansar 1 by throwing rocks with letters wrapped around them, were practiced in Ansar 3. As noted with "O Negev" and Ghazi Inaim's poster, poetry and art continued to use motifs of light to show and celebrate the

resistance of prisoners. The metaphor that prisoners carried the sun and brought light remained. Artists continued to support Palestinian prisoners by associating them with other nationalist Palestinian tropes, like the transgressive power of nature, in cartoons, posters and magazine covers.

In prisons, the standard of living during the Intifada was generally higher than during the early years of the Palestinian Revolution. Prisoners had established a standard of living. For example, communicative devices like radios and televisions were no longer covert and became a norm in prisons. New prisoners, like Nidal and Mousa, had better training and knew what to expect from prisons, in comparison to those like Lawahez Bural, who was unprepared for her first prison sentence. There was a lot of push and pull between the prisoners' movement and the prison authority. Despite the loss of so many senior prisoners during the prisoner exchanges, there were many long-lasting improvements. The movement was generally more mature during the First Intifada.

Chapter Three: Prisons and Hunger Strikes: Contemporary Modes of Resistance

Contextualizing Contemporary Prisons

For Palestinians, 2004 was a landmark year. The al-Aqsa Intifada ended and Yasser Arafat, who had been at the centre of Palestinian politics for two generations, died. The Oslo Period (1993-2000) and the al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-2004) both had disastrous consequences for Palestinian society and failed to bring Palestinians closer to statehood. Following Arafat's death, there was a leadership crisis, with increased tensions and fighting between Fatah and Hamas. While Hamas's Ismail Haniyeh won the presidency during the 2006 election, the Palestinian Authority (PA), led by Mahmoud Abbas, refused to acknowledge the Hamas-led unity government. Abbas appointed Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister, dismissing the democratically elected Haniyeh. No elections have been called since 2006 (one was due in 2009) and the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) has not met since then. Apart from Abbas's refusal to call it to order, the PLC has had difficulty functioning for other reasons including the lack of freedom of movement and Israel's Closure of the Gaza Strip.

Linked to this, the PA has been subject to much distrust and a loss of credibility with Palestinians. This was partly due to the fact that the PA's security forces collaborate with Israel's security forces. The PA security forces have abused and tortured Palestinians inside their detention centres, treatment that was not unlike the treatment in Israeli facilities. Additionally, the PA security forces have shared information about Palestinians and their treatment in Palestinian facilities. Palestinian detainees have reported Israeli interrogators referencing the treatment they received in Palestinian prisons, and how Israeli security forces interrogated them about the same things as their Palestinian counterparts.¹

The Oslo period featured an extensive decrease in the number of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons. Maya Rosenfeld estimated that 9,000 prisoners were released following the First Intifada and prior to the Second Intifada. This was punctuated with lengthy delays on releases and multiple groups of prisoners who were excluded from the release agreements, like Jerusalemites, and, initially, women.²

¹ Noga Kadman, *Backed by the System: Abuse and Torture at the Shikma Interrogation Facility* (Jerusalem: B'Tselem, 2015), 44–47.

² Maya Rosenfeld, "The Centrality of the Prisoners' Movement to the Palestinian Struggle against the Israeli Occupation: A Historical Perspective," in *Threat: Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israel*, ed. Abeer Baker and Anat Matar (London: Pluto Press, 2011), 17.

At the time of the al-Aqsa Intifada, there were an estimated 800 Palestinian political prisoners in Israeli jails. There were no massive waves of arrests during the early days of the Second Intifada, when it was at its popular level of protest, before the armed conflict intensified. However, between March and April 2002, the IDF and the GSS began arresting and imprisoning people en masse when Israel took full military control of the West Bank, including Zone A.³ While Israeli security forces did not reoccupy Gaza as they had the West Bank, they still launched repeated incursions. As a result, there was a relatively low number of Gazan prisoners, about 10% over all.⁴ Most of those imprisoned were young, with less political education and training. As such, there was something of a breakdown in the prison movement's leadership during the Second Intifada.⁵

Inexperienced leadership played a role in the failure of 2004's mass hunger strike. The United Nations reported that 3,000 out of the 7,000 prisoners and detainees in Israeli prisons participated with the aim of improving their living conditions. However, according to *The New York Times*, the "strike was badly timed and had produced little international attention".⁶ There were conflicting accounts on whether negotiations between the prisoners' committees and Israeli officials actually took place. Prisoners, like Sami K, who was in Negev Prison at the time, and Palestinian Cabinet Minister Qadoura Fares affirmed that they happened,⁷ while Israeli prison authorities and politicians, like Yaacov Ganot, categorically denied it.⁸ Sami K did confirm that the strike was poorly coordinated, with some prisons ending their strike early, while others continued. This happened because there was a breakdown in leadership structures, which had become increasingly decentralized. Different leadership committees emerged in each prison and different committees formed in different sections of individual prisons. Prison communities became increasingly divided by region and faction, with a stark split between Hamas and Fatah. In many ways, the polarization was a reflection of the political landscape outside prisons. The

³ Zone A made up 18% of the West Bank, and had been under full civil and security control of the PA.

⁴ Rosenfeld, "The Centrality of the Prisoners' Movement to the Palestinian Struggle against the Israeli Occupation," 19.

⁵ Rosenfeld, 20.

⁶ Steven Erlanger, "Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Jails End Hunger Strike," *The New York Times*, September 2, 2004, sec. Middle East, <https://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/02/international/middleeast/palestinian-prisoners-in-israeli-jails-end-hunger.html>.

⁷ Imogen Lambert and Khalili Hussein, "Prison Politics behind Palestinian Hunger Strikes: Sami's Story," *Alaraby*, December 21, 2015, <https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/features/2015/12/21/prison-politics-behind-palestinian-hunger-strikes-samis-story>.

⁸ Erlanger, "Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Jails End Hunger Strike."

failure in 2004 was demoralizing for the prisoners' movement, and it was many years before prisoners employed mass hunger strikes again.

With the breakdown in Palestinian politics between the PA in the West Bank and Hamas in Gaza, which is under Closure, political activities in prisons remain important as they have had and continue to have effects on national politics outside prisons. For example, what As'ad Ganim called the "most significant initiative" to end the political infighting post-Oslo, the 2006 Palestinian Prisoner's Document, came from five jailed leaders communicating across organizations and their prison cells.⁹ The eighteen-point document was intended to bridge the political divides, particularly between Fatah and Hamas. It implicitly recognized Israel and accepted a two-state solution, which was contrary to Hamas's official mandate. It also included the acceptance of past peace agreements, like the Cairo Declaration. The right of return and the right to self-determination were central to the document.¹⁰ Hamas signed it after Abbas threatened to bring the document to referendum, but later removed their signature. During the Gaza War, also known as Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), negotiations between Fatah and Hamas broke down as violence and tensions increased and the IDF arrested PLC members and government ministers. Furthermore, the document did not solve disagreements between Fatah and Hamas over their differing views on the role of the PLO in Palestinian governance. In many ways, the document was an attempt to reconcile the lack of consensus that came with the absence of one dominant political party in Palestinian politics. It was also another example of prisoners taking on a unified cross-factional approach to organizing. Notably, two of its creators, Ahmad Sa'adat of the PFLP and Marwan Barghouti of Fatah maintained the validity the Prisoners' Document for several years after the potential agreement fell through. In an interview in 2014, Sa'adat asserted that the Document remained a "politically sound basis to bring about reconciliation and usher in national unity."¹¹ Barghouti called "on all to return to the Prisoners' Document" in a speech in 2009.¹²

⁹ As'ad Ganim, *Palestinian Politics After Arafat: A Failed National Movement* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 160.

¹⁰ Mostafa Mohamed, "National Conciliation Document of the Prisoners: Document by Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli Jails" (Document, May 26, 2006), <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/national-conciliation-document-of-the-prisoners-document-by-palestinian-political-prisoners-in-israeli-jails/>.

¹¹ "INTERVIEW WITH AHMAD SAADAT: Leading from Prison, Ending Negotiations, and Rebuilding the Resistance," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 43, no. 4 (August 1, 2014): 53.

¹² Marwan Barghouti, "Message from a Palestinian Prisoner," *Race & Class* 52, no. 3 (January 2011): 50–53.

However, the political division and separation between political groups outside prisons extended into prisons. In an interview in 2014, Barghouti noted that while there were prisoners from Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP and the DFLP in his section, in other prisons, political groups were held in separate sections. In Barghouti's section, he referred to his fellow prisoners, collectively, as his "brothers-in-arms" and "comrades-in-chains".¹³ After 2008, unity was no longer a given in prisons.

The ongoing imprisonment of prominent leaders, like Sa'adat and Barghouti, was related to the contemporary crisis in leadership. While they were detached from political events in many ways, they have remained active, notably with the Prisoners' Document for Conciliation and in education initiatives in prison. Barghouti was the leader of the 2017 hunger strike, which is discussed further below. Scholar and former UN Rapporteur on Palestine (2008-2014), Richard Falk noted that certain leaders' influence and popularity had increased since imprisonment.¹⁴ Israel has a history of targeting Palestinian leaders to undermine Palestinian political organizations.¹⁵ As such, the IDF and the IPS's concern became how to temper their influence, which was frequently done by placing leaders in solitary confinement. Sa'adat was in solitary confinement for three years. These popular figures were a sign of the recovery of the prisoners' leadership and organizing within prisons. Prisoners renewing the hunger strike as a potent political force in prisons, especially with the collective strikes of 2012 and 2017 has been part of this recovery. As noted by Walid from the West Bank (Chapter 1), these are not efforts that Israeli civilian prisoners have to make to receive their rights.

Led by a prisoners' committee of ten members, the mass strike of 2012 began on 17 April with 1,200 participants and grew to 2,000 by the end of April.¹⁶ The hunger strike of 2017 began on 17 April, after the elected negotiations committee's dialogue with the IPS failed. There were an estimated 1,500 participants, 800 of which continued their strike for the entirety of its 40-day

¹³ "INTERVIEW WITH MARWAN BARGHOUTI: Life and Politics in Prison, National Unity, and the Resistance," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 43, no. 4 (August 1, 2014): 59.

¹⁴ Richard Falk, "The Palestinian Hunger Strike: 'Our Chains Will Be Broken before We Are...'," *Foreign Policy Journal*, May 18, 2017, <https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2017/05/17/the-palestinian-hunger-strike-our-chains-will-be-broken-before-we-are%20ad/>.

¹⁵ Tahrir Hamdi, "Bearing Witness in Palestinian Resistance Literature," *Race & Class* 52, no. 3 (January 2011): 21-42.

¹⁶ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Update on the Palestinian Prisoners' Hunger Strike," (Ramallah: Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, April 25, 2012), <http://www.addameer.org/news/update-palestinian-prisoners%E2%80%99-hunger-strike>.

duration.¹⁷ A committee consisting of prisoners Karim Yunis, Nasser Abu Hmeid, Hafith Sharayaa, Nasser Uweis, Ammar Mardi, and Marwan Barghouti led the strike and negotiated with the IPS.¹⁸

2012 and 2017

The human rights groups Addameer called hunger strikes a “last resort type of political protest and visibility”.¹⁹ After all, the power of hunger strikes comes from the attention they draw. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote in his famous *The Gulag Archipelago*, “the hunger strike is a purely moral weapon. It presupposes that the jailer has not entirely lost his conscience. Or that the jailer is afraid of public opinion. Only in such circumstances can it be effective.”²⁰ While there is scholarship that explores the weaponization of the body during hunger strikes,²¹ the hunger strike is a non-violent, noncompliant form of resistance. In the Palestinian case, it aims to draw attention and support largely from prisoners’ families and communities. While there is a risk of death, people do not go on hunger strike to die, they go on hunger strike to live. It is an “extreme communicative act”,²² in which “the medium is the message”.²³ Hunger strikes and their pain become communicative. It is a bodily protest based in the degradation of the body to create moral outrage.

There is an interplay between hunger strikes and martyrdom. The threat of hunger strikers’ deaths was one of the primary motivators for their supporters and the IPS to act. Aside from the loss of life, the death of a prisoner was a problem for Israel, as it incurred increased media attention, protests, demonstrations, and violent confrontations with security forces. For Palestinians, there was another dimension, as prisoners were called “living martyrs.” This is

¹⁷ “Palestinian Prisoners in Israel Suspend Hunger Strike,” *Al Jazeera*, May 27, 2017, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/palestinian-prisoners-israel-suspend-hunger-strike-170527074751097.html>.

¹⁸ “Palestinian Prisoners’ Committee: 80% of Hunger Strikers’ Demands Met by Israel,” *Maan News Agency*, May 28, 2017, <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=777369>.

¹⁹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Bodies in Protest: The Power of Hunger Strikes,” *Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association*, November 22, 2016, 2.

²⁰ Aleksandr Isaevich Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation*, First Perennial Classics Edition (New York: Perennial, 2002), 467.

²¹ Megan A. O’Branski, “‘The Savage Reduction of the Flesh’: Violence, Gender and Bodily Weaponisation in the 1981 Irish Republican Hunger Strike Protest,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism* 7, no. 1 (2014): 97–111.

²² Lionel Wee, “‘Extreme Communicative Acts’ and the Boosting of Illocutionary Force,” *Journal of Pragmatics* 36, no. 12 (December 2004): 2161–2178.

²³ Marwan M. Kraidy, *The Naked Blogger of Cairo: Creative Insurgency in the Arab World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016), 52.

somewhat contradictory, as Jeremy Cohen argues, the power and identity of martyrs comes from their self-sacrifice and dying for their cause.²⁴ There was also the tension between the secularization of martyrs and their initially religious origin. Art and media portray prisoners as martyrs, and through this as heroes, for the cause of the nation, rather than religious purposes. Still, dying for a cause has the effect of raising the cause to sacred levels. Sacrifice became personified and the martyr's pain communicated the sacrifice and the reason for it.²⁵

This section will examine the 2012 and 2017 hunger strikes that took place across Israeli prisons, using a comparative lens to move between both time frames and analyze their similarities. Both strikes were alike in terms of their demands, the scale of participation, and the scale of support they garnered. While they were both celebrated as successes, they were only five years apart. What happened in between these strikes? If these victories were short lived, is the contemporary prisoners' movement going in circles? Are they making gains and extracting concessions, only for these to be reneged? What is the best way to measure success in a system of unforgiving and deeply asymmetric power dynamics?

In both 2012 and 2017, prisoners felt pushed to strike because of a general toughening from the IPS. Ayman al-Sharawna, from Hebron in the West Bank, described conditions as taking a "turn for the worse", saying that "[b]efore the director was terrified when he visited the prison. But later, he ignored prisoners' representatives and acted arrogantly."²⁶ In his statement published by *The New York Times*, Barghouti declared that the 2017 strike was to end "the inhumane and degrading treatment, and medical negligence" of Palestinian prisoners and detainees, as well as their deaths.²⁷ Barghouti went on to assert that "Palestinian prisoners and their families also remain a primary target of Israel's policy of imposing collective punishments. Through our hunger strike, we seek an end to these abuses."²⁸ The 2017 strike began after negotiations to improve conditions failed.

²⁴ Jeremy Cohen, *Sanctifying the Name of God: Jewish Martyrs and Jewish Memories of the First Crusade* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006), 1–9.

²⁵ Graham Spencer, *From Armed Struggle to Political Struggle: Republican Tradition and Transformation in Northern Ireland* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), 20–28.

²⁶ Ayman al-Sharawna quoted in Ashraf Mashharawi, *Hunger Strike*, Web, Documentary (Al Jazeera World, 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u49jwfcLwuE>.

²⁷ Marwan Barghouti, "Why We Are on Hunger Strike in Israel's Prisons," *The New York Times*, April 16, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/opinion/palestinian-hunger-strike-prisoners-call-for-justice.html>.

²⁸ Barghouti.

In 2012 and 2017, prisoners sought to end policies of solitary confinement and administrative detention. By 2012, there were nineteen prisoners affected by solitary confinement, one of whom, Mahmoud Issa, had spent ten years isolated.²⁹ In January 2017, there were fifteen political prisoners reportedly in solitary confinement.³⁰ The leadership of both strikes called for better visiting policies for families. In 2012, this meant ending the ban that kept Gazan families from visiting prisoners since 2007, which was a punitive measure in effect following Hamas's capture of the Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. In 2017, they fought against Israel's denial of entry permits to family members from Gaza and the West Bank. They also sought to increase the frequency and duration of visits from once a month to twice a month and from forty-five-minute sessions to ninety-minute sessions.³¹ Both strikes sought to reinstate access to education programs that the IPS had rescinded. In 2009, the IPS began denying Palestinians the right to sit *tawjihi* exams. In June 2011, the IPS denied prisoners access to university education. Both measures were in response to the continued captivity of Shalit.³² In 2017, the prisoners demanded the reinstatement of access to education through the Hebrew Open University and to be allowed to sit *tawjihi* exams. Essentially, in 2012 and 2017, prisoners demanded that education be treated as a right, rather than a privilege. Both strikes also sought to end systemic medical negligence and provide prisoners with better healthcare. Addameer referred to many of the IPS's practices and policies as "deliberate medical negligence".³³ In 2012, individual strikes, like those of Bilal Diab and Thaer Halahleh, from which the larger strike grew, demanded access to adequate healthcare.³⁴ In 2017 prisoners demanded periodical medical examinations, that surgeries be performed in a timely manner, that they not be charged

²⁹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Update on the Palestinian Prisoners' Hunger Strike."

³⁰ "Abu Hanish Wins Release from Isolation Following Plans for Collective Strike: 15 Prisoners in Solitary Confinement," *Samidoun: Palestinian Prisoner Solidarity Network*, January 10, 2017, <https://samidoun.net/2017/01/abu-hanish-wins-release-from-isolation-following-plans-for-collective-strike-15-prisoners-in-solitary-confinement/>.

³¹ They also demanded the removal of restrictions on family visits, like the denial of taking photographs with their family members.

³² Mohammed Omer, "Gazans Vent Anger as Israel Deprives Prisoners of Education," *The Electronic Intifada*, August 12, 2011, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/gazans-vent-anger-israel-deprives-prisoners-education/10268>.

³³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Medical Negligence," (Jerusalem: Addameer, May 20, 2014), http://www.addameer.org/key_issues/medical_negligence.

³⁴ Julia Kessler, "Quarterly Update on Palestinian Prisoners," (Jerusalem: Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, October 20, 2018), 2.

for the cost of treatment, and that Ramla Prison Hospital, a site long-accused of neglect and abuse, be closed.

The strikes were met with far-reaching support. In 2012, Khader Adnan, a senior member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, launched an individual hunger strike, to protest the abuse he suffered at the hands of the IPS. On 16 February, Hana Shalabi, a woman from Jenin, accused of being a member of Islamic Jihad, joined Adnan on his strike after she had been mistreated, re-arrested and placed under administrative detention again, immediately after being released from administrative detention. On 21 February 2012, Adnan ended his sixty-six-day strike after extracting a guarantee that his administrative detention would not be renewed. Shalabi was on strike for forty-three days before she agreed to a deal that she would be deported to Gaza for three years in exchange for cancelling her administrative detention order.³⁵ Their strikes inspired thirty-three other detainees to launch a solidarity strike. On 17 April 2012, Prisoner's Day, 1,200 detainees launched their strike, while an estimated 2,300 others refused meals from the IPS in solidarity.³⁶ By the end of April, 2,000 people were on strike. Among them were leaders like Ahmad Sa'adat, who was in solitary at the time, and Lina al-Jarbouni, a representative of the Palestinian women prisoners in Hasharon Prison, who was placed in solitary for her participation.³⁷ Outside prison, *The Times of Israel* estimated that 12,000 people demonstrated in Kafr Kanna, outside Nazareth on 11 May 2012, in support of Palestinian hunger strikers.³⁸ During the period of the strike, Palestinians participated in solidarity demonstrations throughout the OPT. International support included a message of solidarity from Tommy McKearney, a former hunger striker and former member of the Irish Republican Army.³⁹ When hunger strikers agreed to the deal brokered by Egypt and Jordan, Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank took to the streets to celebrate the victory.⁴⁰

³⁵ "Officials Say Deal Reached to Free Hana Shalabi," *Maan News Agency*, March 29, 2012, <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=472454>.

³⁶ Kessler, "Quarterly Update on Palestinian Prisoners," 2.

³⁷ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Update on the Palestinian Prisoners' Hunger Strike."

³⁸ Michal Shmulovich, "Thousands Rally in Solidarity with Palestinian Hunger Strikers," *The Times of Israel*, May 12, 2012, <http://www.timesofisrael.com/thousands-rally-in-solidarity-with-palestinian-hunger-strikers-in-kafr-kanna/>.

³⁹ *Khader Adnan Receives Message of Support from Former Hunger Striker Tommy McKearney*, YouTube Video (Ireland: Gaza TV News, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G1iwWZJPl_k&t=80s.

⁴⁰ Michele Eposito, "Chronology: 16 February-15 May 2012," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41, no. 4 (2012): 233. Emphasis in the original.

In 2017, there were between 1,000 participants⁴¹ and 1,500 participants.⁴² On 4 May, leaders in the prison movement, PFLP Secretary-General Ahmad Sa'adat, head of the Hamas prisoners' leadership committee Abbas al-Sayyid, and chairman of Islamic Jihad Zaid Bseisi joined the strike.⁴³ The day the hunger strike launched, there were demonstrations across the Occupied Territories, as well as during the days and weeks that followed. Thousands of Palestinians marched in solidarity with hunger strikers. Munqith Abu Atwan, the director of the Bethlehem office of the Palestinian Committee of Prisoners' Affairs, said that they participated on 17 April "to express our solidarity and support for the demands of Palestinian prisoners in the occupation's prisons against its racist and inhuman procedures."⁴⁴ Another example of the widescale solidarity came on 27 April when nearly all the shops of Ramallah in the West Bank were "shuttered in adherence to a general strike called for by the prisoners – a level of participation in a protest that one rights leader said he hadn't seen in Palestine in nearly three decades."⁴⁵ A variety of free people went on hunger strike in solidarity. This included prisoners' mothers,⁴⁶ and students of the Arab American University in Jenin.⁴⁷

Prisoners used similar slogans in both hunger strikes. The 2012 hunger strike's slogan was "We will live with dignity".⁴⁸ On 17 April 2017, an op-ed for *The New York Times*, Marwan Barghouti called it a struggle for "Freedom and Dignity".⁴⁹

After deals had been reached and each strike had concluded, the hunger strikers celebrated their strikes' as victories. Ayman al-Sharawna said, "We achieved an unprecedented victory in 2012."⁵⁰ In 2017, the prisoners' solidarity committee called the agreement the

⁴¹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Treatment of Hunger Strikers Raises Concern amongst Rights Organizations," (Jerusalem: Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, May 8, 2017), <http://www.addameer.org/news/treatment-hunger-strikers-raises-concern-amongst-rights-organizations>.

⁴² Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Get the Facts on Palestinian Hunger Strikes," (Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, April 25, 2017), <http://www.addameer.org/news/get-facts-palestinian-hunger-strikes>.

⁴³ Budour Youssef Hassan, "As Prisoners Strike, Relatives Wait and Hope," *The Electronic Intifada*, May 24, 2017, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/prisoners-strike-relatives-wait-and-hope/20571>.

⁴⁴ "Thousands Demonstrate for Palestinian Prisoners' Day, as Israeli Forces Detain 4," *Maan News Agency*, April 17, 2017, <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=776476>.

⁴⁵ Omar Shakir, "Hunger Strikes Highlight Isolation of Palestinian Prisoners" (Jerusalem: Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2017), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/02/hunger-strikes-highlight-isolation-palestinian-prisoners>.

⁴⁶ Maram Humaid, "Starving with Their Sons," *The Electronic Intifada*, May 19, 2017, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/starving-their-sons/20511>.

⁴⁷ "Thousands Demonstrate for Palestinian Prisoners," *Maan News Agency*.

⁴⁸ Quoted in Mashharawi, *Hunger Strike*.

⁴⁹ Barghouti, "Why We Are on Hunger Strike in Israel's Prisons."

⁵⁰ Ayman al-Sharawna quoted in Mashharawi, *Hunger Strike*.

prisoners reached with the IPS a “victory for the Palestinian people and the prisoners in their epic defense of freedom and dignity.”⁵¹

In 2012, the deal that Israel, Egypt, and Jordan reached, and hunger strikers agreed to was:

“(1) to free 320 administrative detainees at the end of their current 6-mo. [*sic*] sentences, provided no new evidence against them is found; (2) to end solitary confinements; (3) to allow prisoners from Gaza to receive visits from immediate relatives (family visits from Gaza were suspended in 2006 after Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was captured), and (4) to return the bodies of 100 Palestinians who were killed in fighting in Israel and buried there.”⁵²

Within a year of the agreement to terminate the 2012 hunger strike, the IPS began to “refute and deny” the 14 May 2012 agreement.⁵³ They continued their policy of placing prisoners in solitary confinement. Following the 2012 hunger strike, Israel temporarily limited the use of administrative detention. The number of administrative detainees dropped from 308 in May to 112 in September.⁵⁴ In 2013, the number of administrative detainees was at its height in January and February, with 178 people. The occupation authorities augmented their use of administrative detention in 2014. That year, Israeli security forces issued more than 700 administrative detention orders. There were 550 administrative detainees in custody at one time, the most since 2009.⁵⁵ In response, over 130 administrative detainees launched a hunger strike in 2014 to demand the policy end and no more administrative detention orders be signed.⁵⁶ This took place during the Israeli-Gaza Conflict, also known as Operation Protective Edge, a conflict in which Israeli security forces killed 2,202 Gazans, 63% of whom were civilians. A large portion of these death came from security forces targeting inhabited homes, 18,000 of which they destroyed.⁵⁷

Both in 2012 and 2017, prisoners demanded changes to the visiting policies, so that they could see more of their families. After the hunger strike of 2012, Israel agreed to reinstate family

⁵¹ Ali Abunimah, “Hunger Strike Ends, Prisoners Declare Victory,” *The Electronic Intifada*, May 27, 2017, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/hunger-strike-ends-prisoners-declare-victory>.

⁵² Eposito, “Chronology: 16 February-15 May 2012,” 233.

⁵³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Annual Violations Report: Violations against Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Detention 2014,” (Ramallah: Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 2015), 97, http://www.addameer.org/sites/default/files/publications/violations_report_2014.pdf.

⁵⁴ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 16.

⁵⁵ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 9.

⁵⁶ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Get the Facts on Palestinian Hunger Strikes.”

⁵⁷ B’Tselem, *Whitewash Protocol: The So-Called Investigation of Operation Protective Edge*, (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 2016), 3.

visits from Gaza. However, there were still delays and barriers. When the first visit took place “almost two months after the agreement was concluded, the Prison Service allowed only forty relatives of twenty-four Gazan prisoners (out of 554) to visit—and barred all children.”⁵⁸ As of August 2012, “only around half of the (...) 445 Gaza detainees had received one family visit”, and, in 2013 it was “unclear” whether any Gazans would receive consistent visits.⁵⁹ In 2017, the issue of visitation was slightly different. Families in the Occupied Territories continued to have difficulty accessing the proper permits that allowed them to travel to prisons. As well, in 2016, due to budget cuts, the International Committee of the Red Cross reduced family visits from twice a month to once a month.⁶⁰ With difficulty obtaining permits, families relied heavily on these ICRC-sponsored visits. As such, many families were unable to visit their relatives.

Following the 2012 strike, prisoners like Ammar Abdullah Sadeq Zwaïd asserted that there was no improvement in Ramon Prison “in terms of food, education, and transfers.”⁶¹ There were many changes necessary to counter the pervasive system of medical negligence and improve healthcare. Improvements were solely on the formal level. That is, according to the Addameer yearly report for 2014, the administration responded to requests to go to the clinic with more speed, but “all other procedures remained the same and require[d] the same amount of time, in addition to that chronic problems [were] predominantly not treated.”⁶² In Majydu Prison in 2013, Hasan Turabi, a young man from Sarra village, west of Nablus, accused of being an Islamic Jihad member, died as “the direct result of IPS’s policy of medical negligence.”⁶³ Addameer also reported that Maysar Abu Hamdiyeh, from Hebron, died on 2 April 2013 from medical negligence. He was denied medical treatment for throat cancer.⁶⁴ Prisoners continued receiving painkillers as their sole form of treatment.

The 2017 hunger strike had some notable differences. One of which was the increased fear that the IPS would force-feed prisoners. In June 2014, Israel’s Minister of Public Security,

⁵⁸ Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson, “‘Our Life Is Prison’: The Triple Captivity of Wives and Mothers of Palestinian Political Prisoners,” *Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies* 9, no. 3 (2013): 61.

⁵⁹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Restrictions on Family Visits,” (Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, July 2017), http://www.addameer.org/key_issues/family_visit.

⁶⁰ “ICRC Suspends Activities in Jerusalem after Protesters Storm Office,” *Maan News Agency*, August 5, 2016, <http://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?ID=772534>.

⁶¹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Annual Violations Report 2014,” 91.

⁶² Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 91.

⁶³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Violations against Palestinian Prisoners in Israeli Prisons and Detention Centers 2013,” (Ramallah, April 17, 2014), 14.

⁶⁴ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 20.

Gilad Erdan, introduced a bill to allow force-feeding, “Law to Prevent Harm Caused by Hunger Strikers”. Force-feeding had originally been banned in the 1980s, after the deaths of three prisoners in Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison. The bill went into effect on 15 July 2015. It gave the Israeli District Courts the power to force-feed prisoners, and in a sense, declaw one of prisoners’ few sources of recourse. The IPS considered hunger strikes to be acts of rebellion, and thus required the correct punishment. These punishments included: “raids of the prisoner cells and conducting mass search operations of prisoners’ rooms, placing hunger strikers in solitary confinement, banning family members from visiting detainees and, (...) subjecting hunger strikers to fines.”⁶⁵ While there are no explicit international laws against force-feeding, human rights groups like Addameer argue that it amounts to “an act of torture” and “fulfills the requirements to being considered as a Crime Against Humanity and a War Crime in accordance with articles 7 and 8 of the Rome Statute.”⁶⁶ The World Medical Association has deemed force-feeding to be a “form of inhuman and degrading treatment”, language which puts it in contravention of the 1948 Geneva Conventions and the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.⁶⁷ Furthermore, Addameer argued that if the IPS was genuinely concerned with the health of Palestinians, they would prevent medical negligence. As such, they viewed the force-feeding bill as a means to declaw a successful form of Palestinian protest.⁶⁸ After all, this measure came from the Minister of Public Security, not the Minister of Health.

As noted with family visits in particular, the similarities between the demands of the 2012 and 2017 hunger strikes came from reneged promises, as well as new issues from outside forces. Both scenarios produced unstable and unfavourable conditions for prisoners, which prisoners viewed as unacceptable. Despite the similar circumstance and demands between the strikes, they were not solely reflections of no or reneged progress, but of changing circumstances that were completely out of the hands of prisoners. For example, Hamas’s capture of Gilad Shalit and the 2014 Israel-Gaza Conflict, following the kidnapping and murder of three Israeli teenagers by Hamas in June 2014 and the kidnapping, torture and murder of Mohammad Abu

⁶⁵ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Factsheet: Force-Feeding under International Law and Medical Standards,” (Ramallah, November 16, 2015), <http://www.addameer.org/publications/factsheet-force-feeding-under-international-law-and-medical-standards>.

⁶⁶ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association.

⁶⁷ Sondra S. Crosby, Caroline M. Apovian, and Michael A. Grodin, “Hunger Strikes, Force-Feeding, and Physicians’ Responsibilities,” *JAMA* 298, no. 5 (August 1, 2007): 563–66.

⁶⁸ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Factsheet.”

Khdeir in July 2014, both led to repressive Israeli administrative and governmental policies. This extended to prisons. In this light, the measures taken against prisoners and their families can be read as collective punishments, and, like many repressive practices in Israeli prisons, illegal under international law.

In terms of the degree of Palestinian organizing within prisons, the massive hunger strikes were signs of success. Both hunger strikes invigorated the wider Palestinian community and initiated widespread support. However, there were long term repercussions. Hunger strikes had psychological and physical effects on the health of prisoners. This was the case for those like Adnan, who went on strike repeatedly and for many weeks at a time. This was a system threatened repeatedly and thoroughly by the IPS and the Israeli government, as can be seen by the repressive responses to hunger strikers, such as the force-feeding laws. The power prisoners did have was tenuous and by no means guaranteed or permanent.

In 2012, prisoners renewed the power of hunger strikes on an individual and a collective level. They also renewed the attention and interest across Palestinian society in their cause. There had been a collective hunger strike in 2011, but this was an effort solely by the PFLP, rather than across factions. The similar concerns and demands brought forward by the mass hunger strikes of 2012 and 2017, like administrative detention and medical negligence, were not just isolated to mass strikes. They extended to the individual strikes that increased in numbers and support following 2012.

The Symbols, Representation, and the Audience of Hunger Strikes

There was a trend of reusing and revamping poster art from the 1970s and 1980s, which could be a sign of the familiarity of these images and the traction they have. It was also practical, as pulling from pre-existing poster designs allowed people to create new posters quickly. However, at demonstrations, unique art from this period prominently featured the names and faces of individual prisoners on hunger strikes. Families and the wider Palestinian community alike held these posters. Many people may not have known the person whose image they held. For example, the images of Khader Adnan and Hana Shalabi, who both went on individual hunger strikes in 2012, were prominently featured at demonstrations. One such demonstration was on 24 March 2012, in front of Damascus Gate in Jerusalem's Old City, before the 2012 mass

hunger strike (Figure 1).⁶⁹ Adnan and Shalabi are also noteworthy because they were not political leaders, like Sa‘adat or Barghouti, who also feature prominently in posters, newspapers and social media supporting hunger strikes.



Figure 1

Frequently, these posters also feature locks over Adnan and Shalabi’s mouths, representing their rejection of food (Figure 2).⁷⁰ The denial of food, sealing their lips, became their way of speaking out. It also symbolizes how prisoners’ voices came from a space where speech was routinely denied. This was something that demonstrators, those holding or posting the posters, fought to subvert. The artist, Hafez Omar, from Tulkarem in the West Bank, who created the poster of Adnan, wanted his posters to “bring back the old tradition,” to be a call back to the Palestinian Revolution and emphasized values of self-determination and liberation to mobilize people. He believed this period and these ideals juxtaposed the state-building of the Oslo period.⁷¹ The poster art is a nostalgic view of Palestinian politics and Palestinian prisoners.

This shift in poster art reflects a trend in prisons. Since 2012, there has been an increase of individual hunger strikes. In 2013, there were thirty-eight individual hunger strikes,⁷² and

⁶⁹ Waleed Idrees, *The Prisoner Hana Shalabi*, March 28, 2012, Poster, March 28, 2012, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/the-prisoner-hana-shalabi>.

⁷⁰ Hafez Omar, *Free Khader Adnan*, 2012, Poster, N/A, 2012, Palestine Poster Project, <https://www.palestineposterproject.org/poster/free-khader-adnan>.

⁷¹ Hafez Omar quoted in Daryl Meador, “‘Graffiti Was My Education’: Interview with Palestinian Designer Hafez Omar,” *The Electronic Intifada*, March 8, 2013, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/graffiti-was-my-education-interview-palestinian-designer-hafez-omar/12246>.

⁷² Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Violations 2013,” 85.

sixty-four individual strikes in 2016.⁷³ In poster art, the imagery and symbolism become individualized and personalized. Individual strikes protested individual grievances, bringing attention to an injustice. Individual strikers represented one struggle that was part of a multitude of struggles, becoming a symbol of what many other Palestinians suffered. This personalization is noteworthy in a system that draws its strength from collectivity and unity, especially in the wider context of the factionally divided political stalemate in Palestinian politics. As such, individual hunger strikers became powerful symbols of imprisonment, grievances with the IPS and repressive Israeli policies to the wider Palestinian community, who protested and demonstrated to support them. In this context the individual grievance became a collective grievance.



Figure 2

Individual strikes did not seem to curtail communal strikes. On 24 April 2014, in Ansar 3, or Ktzi'ot Prison, Nidal al-Bum, a teacher from Gaza, was one of forty-nine administrative detainees who went on hunger strike for their freedom. An estimated eighty other prisoners joined them during the course of the strike. On 1 June 2014, Al-Bum was released when his order expired.⁷⁴ The other detainees continued their strike for sixty-three days. Many Palestinians

⁷³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Annual Violations Report: Violations of Palestinian Prisoners Rights in Israeli Prisons 2016," (Ramallah: Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 2017), 64.

⁷⁴ Nidal al-Bum, "Nidal Al-Bum, 34, Recently Released from Administrative Detention, Talks about His Detention and 39-Day Hunger Strike" (Testimony, June 12, 2014), B'Tselem, http://www.btselem.org/testimonies/20140603_administrative_detention_nidal_al_bum.

outside prison supported the prisoners through actions that included sit-ins in front of the ICRC headquarters and demonstrations in front of prisons. The High Commission for Prisoner Affairs organized over eighty solidarity activities and the Ministry of Detainees and Ex-Detainees organized several meetings at the United Nations.⁷⁵

In this sense, the Palestinians on hunger strike became symbols of their individual and repressive grievances. The suffering of the individual became a way forward for the collective, as they magnified these grievances for Palestinian society. They protested grievances that affected large numbers of Palestinians. As such, individual hunger strikers became stand-ins for others who shared the same circumstances. Those like Sa'adat asserted that prisoners have always represented the wider political movement. In 2011, he noted, "Anyone who has followed popular Palestinian activism over the past three years (...) will find that in large part, it has revolved around supporting the battles of the national prisoners' movement. This is nothing new—at every stage of our national struggle, prisoners have played a prominent and galvanizing role."⁷⁶ The prisoners' movement has long had the power to activate people. The increasing individual and personalized nature of hunger strikes raised the possibility to increase personal ties to the movement, outside of those with family members. However, family members and prisoners frequently felt that their cause was neglected by wider society. (This will be discussed in the following section.)

Administrative detention was the most common reason for individual strikes, as exemplified by Shalabi and Adnan. For administrative detainees, hunger strikes were an attempt to "regain sovereignty over their bodies" by "becoming decision makers over the prison authorities."⁷⁷ This is noteworthy as they were held according to secret evidence that they were not allowed to see. Other prisoners went on hunger strike to protest re-arrest, torture and mistreatment, medical negligence, or in solidarity with the grievances of others. For example, Bilal Kayed, a PFLP member from the West Bank, went on an open hunger strike on 15 June 2016 to protest his administrative detention. Between September 2015 and 13 June 2016, at the end of his fourteen-year prison sentence, he was in solitary confinement. However, when he was due to be released, he was re-arrested and issued an administrative detention order and placed

⁷⁵ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Annual Violations Report 2014," 107–9.

⁷⁶ "INTERVIEW WITH AHMAD SAADAT," 54–55.

⁷⁷ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Bodies in Protest: The Power of Hunger Strikes."

back into solitary confinement. He mounted a 71-day strike and reached an agreement with the IPS and the military court not to renew his administrative detention following his release on 12 December 2016.⁷⁸ Other cases include Mahmoud Sarsak, a Palestinian football player, who went on a three-month hunger strike for his release from his administrative detention that had been renewed repeatedly for three years.⁷⁹

Hunger strikes in solidarity with individual hunger strikers, who were striking against individual grievances, are noteworthy, as they happened on large and small scales. In 2013, Shadi Abdallah Mahmoud al-Rikhawi from the Gaza Strip, went on hunger strike in solidarity with his brother, Akram al-Rikhawi, who was on hunger strike, demanding to be released due to his poor health.⁸⁰ In the case of Sarsak, not all of the solidarity strikers were Palestinian. Israeli military refuser Yaaniv Mazor went on a solidarity hunger strike for more than a week, while in solitary confinement, to draw attention to Sarsak's situation and not to prompt his own release.⁸¹ In July 2016, over 100 prisoners went on hunger strike in solidarity with Kayed. At first, these were prisoners from Ofer and Ramon prisons, and then prisoners in Nafha, Naqab, Hadarim, and Gilboa prisons joined them.⁸² In 2012, the strike that gained more than 2,000 participants began as a series of individual hunger strikes. Thirty-three prisoners, the majority of whom were administrative detainees, were inspired to launch their own hunger strikes by the end of Shalabi's strike in March 2012. Arguably, the mass hunger strike grew from the momentum of individual strikes.

Hunger strikes have become the central way to extend the voices of prisoners and garner attention from those outside prison. Like the stone-throwing youth, the prisoner on hunger strike was a nationally known protest symbol. Hunger strikes were not just used to pressure the IPS. In 2013, for example, Maher Younis, a man from 'Ara, convicted of killing an Israeli soldier in 1980 and currently one of the longest serving Palestinian prisoners, went on hunger strike "to confirm his commitment to the unity of the prisoners' issue, and his refusal to use it as a bargaining element in order to pressure the Palestinian side to make further concessions."⁸³ His

⁷⁸ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Annual Violations Report 2016," 64.

⁷⁹ Ali Abunimah, "Israel to Free Footballer Mahmoud Sarsak after Epic 3-Month Hunger Strike, Lawyer Says," *The Electronic Intifada*, June 18, 2012, <https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/israel-free-footballer-mahmoud-sarsak-after-epic-3-month-hunger-strike-lawyer>.

⁸⁰ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Violations 2013," 114.

⁸¹ Abunimah, "Israel to Free Footballer Mahmoud Sarsak after Epic 3-Month Hunger Strike, Lawyer Says."

⁸² Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Annual Violations Report 2016," 97.

⁸³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Violations 2013," 85.

strike was an assertion of agency. It addressed “the Palestinian leadership calling for the need to respect their struggles and sacrifices and the indivisibility of their cause.”⁸⁴

Interestingly, there were cases of hunger strikes being used by former-prisoners, outside of prison. Muhammad Taj of the PFLP was on hunger strike for seventy-seven days in 2012. On 7 July 2013, after his release, Taj threatened to go on hunger strike when he was initially denied a double-lung transplant. He claimed that the PA officials responsible were not doing enough to organize the operation he needed to live. He agreed to postpone his strike until 11 July on the promise that officials would find a hospital to treat him. (They found one in Vienna on 10 July.) Taj attributed his condition to medical negligence and mistreatment he suffered in prison. In Gilboa Prison during the 2004 hunger strike, the IPS tear gassed him and his fellow prisoners in a closed cell.⁸⁵ In this situation, hunger strikes have become a community-recognized tool to achieve goals that were not merely central to pressuring the IPS or to prisons.

Prisoners used hunger strikes to connect with their political community outside prison. That is, while their purpose was to negotiate with the IPS, they were not necessarily seeking sympathy, interest, or support from the IPS. Prisoners aimed to garner this from their own communities, who added the pressure to Israeli agencies, like the IPS, or organizations like the ICRC. This was especially clear with Taj and Younis, who did not seek to challenge the IPS, but addressed their own communities. As such, families, those who also experience imprisonment, but in a different way, were a primary source of power outside prisons.

Discordant Voices and Alternate Views from Palestinian Prisoners

While much of Palestinian society recognized and embraced the symbolic power of prisoners, there are those who resist the idea of mythologizing of the prisoner, particularly in the nationalist and cultural context. When Mohammad Saba‘aneh, a Palestinian cartoonist, was placed in solitary confinement, his views on prisoners changed drastically. In an interview, he said, “I used to draw Palestinian [*sic*] prisoner as a hero, as superman before I was in the prison. When I was in the prison, I missed my family, I missed my work, I wanted to go back to my normal life, I don’t need anyone to deal with me as a hero. I am a human being, I want to go

⁸⁴ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, 114.

⁸⁵ Linah Alsaafin, “Released Prisoner Secures Treatment for Lung Disease after Announcing Hunger Strike,” *The Electronic Intifada*, July 18, 2013, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/released-prisoner-secures-treatment-lung-disease-after-announcing-hunger-strike/12623>.

back to (...) my life.”⁸⁶ He sought to portray prisoners as human beings as opposed to larger than life heroes through his art. His art is about understanding the devastating effects of imprisonment on people’s lives. He said, “I did not feel like superman inside the prison.”⁸⁷ Saba‘aneh suggested that prisoners took on the mantle of “hero” as a “survival tactic to protect our souls from the dehumanizing conditions in which we found ourselves and to safeguard our ability to resist.”⁸⁸ He believed prisoners embraced these assigned roles as a coping mechanism to feel powerful in a situation where they were powerless. His cartoons are an attempt to “dispense” with these concepts and instead portray “the experience of ordinary men contending with dehumanizing conditions.”⁸⁹ They are meant to portray the harsh reality of Palestinian life under occupation. His cartoons were meant to demythologize Palestinian prisoners, an act which he saw as returning them to their humanity.

Saba‘aneh conceptualized his book, *White and Black*, based his own experiences in prison. He had a daily cartoon in the Palestinian newspaper *al-Hayat al-Jadida* and was arrested in 2011 on the charge of collaborating with Hamas. He provided cartoons for a book that his brother wrote about political prisoners. His brother was a member of Hamas. Saba‘aneh had in fact been in trouble with Hamas in the past for drawing cartoons that criticized Ismail Haniyeh.⁹⁰ The idea for *White and Black* began in prison, as he came to grips with the brutal reality of his situation. He stole a piece of paper to write down his ideas during his interrogation period. Later, when he was in the general population, he drew and sent his drawings out half-finished with released prisoners, who took them to his wife. The drawings were unfinished as Saba‘aneh wished to avoid revealing that they were about prison and thus avoid the guards destroying them.⁹¹ When he was released, he finished them. His cartoons’ segmented production, pieced together across various stages of imprisonment and release, reflect the way his life was

⁸⁶ Lucy Duncan, “Drawing for Justice: Mohammad Sabaaneh on Palestine, Art, and Hope,” *American Friends Service Committee*, May 25, 2017, <https://www.afsc.org/blogs/acting-in-faith/drawing-justice-mohammad-sabaaneh-palestine-art-and-hope>.

⁸⁷ Carol Hills, “A Palestinian Cartoonist Draws the Israeli Occupation,” *Public Radio International*, May 5, 2017, <https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-05/palestinian-cartoonist-draws-israeli-occupation>.

⁸⁸ Mohammad Saba‘aneh, *White and Black: Political Cartoons from Palestine* (Charlottesville, Virginia: Just World Books, 2017), 2.

⁸⁹ Saba‘aneh, 3.

⁹⁰ Patrick Strickland, “Jailed by Israel for His Cartoons, Mohammad Saba‘aneh Speaks Out,” *The Electronic Intifada*, November 13, 2013, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/jailed-israel-his-cartoons-mohammad-sabaaneh-speaks-out/12924>.

⁹¹ Saba‘aneh, *White and Black*, 2–3.

depictions of prisoners. This could be a representation of the general prison population, of which the majority are men. Figure 3 portrays the default identity of the prisoner as a man.

Another part of Saba'aneh's rejection of the symbolic role of prisoners was the erasure of the prisoner's family. Many of his cartoons depict how imprisonment caused divisions and segmentations of relationships between family members. In one cartoon, he portrays a child who only knows her father through pictures⁹³ and in another, the loneliness of a wife, in bed alone.⁹⁴

Children and their experiences with imprisonment, both as prisoners and witnessing the incarceration of their family members, feature prominently throughout *White and Black*. One of Saba'aneh's cartoons highlights a child's pain through their parent's imprisonment and the denial of physical touch (Figure 4). In this image, a prisoner reaches through the glass, which separates him from his wife and child, to touch his child's head. The glass cracks around his arm, showing how this simple act of human contact requires breaking barriers. In the moment, it is pure fantasy. The prisoner's back is to the reader, but the pain is plain on the faces of the mother and the child. It is unclear if the prisoner in this image has a mouth. He is relegated to the desire for this simple, yet often denied, touch. There is not text to accompany the image.⁹⁵ There was a legal battle to allow prisoners to have physical contact with their children under the age of six. When the Israeli courts granted this, it was allowed for only for the last ten minutes of the visit and only once every two months.⁹⁶ In the upper corner of the image is a sun, wrapped in barbed wire, a familiar motif throughout the cartoons, which I discuss further below.⁹⁷ Saba'aneh had experienced this pain while he was in prison, as he had been denied visits and telephone calls to his family throughout the entirety of his imprisonment. The only way he was able to contact his wife was via a secret cellphone that other prisoners had smuggled in.

⁹³ Saba'aneh, 153.

⁹⁴ Saba'aneh, 180.

⁹⁵ Saba'aneh, 181.

⁹⁶ Giacaman and Johnson, "Our Life Is Prison," 67.

⁹⁷ Saba'aneh, *White and Black*, 181.



Figure 4



Figure 5

One cartoon is captioned “Families of political prisoners are prisoners too.” (Figure 5.)⁹⁸ A prisoner sits in the middle of one handcuff that is linked, across barbed wire, to another cuff that surrounds a crowd of people—men, women and children. The people stand in one cuff, while the prisoner is hunched over, with his arms around his knees. While they are both imprisoned, they are separated further by the barbed wire, by the occupation. This shows how

⁹⁸ Saba‘aneh, 79.

segmented the land they must try (and sometimes fail because of the ubiquitous “security” reasons) to travel. The position of the prisoner hunched over, without a mouth, reveals the weakness and pain that Saba‘aneh associates with imprisonment.

This notion, that the families of prisoners are prisoners too has been expressed elsewhere. In a voice therapy session with Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian in an unnamed refugee camp during the Second Intifada, a woman whose son and husband were jailed said, “I am a prisoner with no value or respect.”⁹⁹ Rita Giacaman and Penny Johnson argue that women and families experience a type of “triple captivity” because of “the Israeli colonial system, the Israeli prison, and the post-Oslo Palestinian polity and its isolating effects on their own communities.”¹⁰⁰ Described as “secondary (...) victims” of imprisonment, families also experience the violation of their human rights and the trauma of negotiating with the Israeli state to be able to access their relatives. In the aftermath of the Oslo Accords, Israel became less interested in the management and control of Palestinians, transferring that responsibility to the Palestinian Authority. Instead, Giacaman and Johnson suggest that Israel has become a necropower and the PA a biopower where Palestinians are concerned. Israel functions in a way to assure the “deconstitution or destitution of the [Palestinian] subject” and “operates by destitution, exclusion, separation, and security and insecurity”.¹⁰¹ According to Giacaman and Johnson, the PA maintains the “governmentality” of “new forms of life”, taking on the powers and responsibilities of Palestinian civilian life.¹⁰² Families must negotiate a complex bureaucratic and segmented geography in a society where the freedom of movement for Palestinians is treated as a privilege that can be rescinded. In order to visit their loved ones, family members experience humiliation and denial of basic human dignities through strip-searches, insults, and hours-long bus rides with no stops for a toilet break and no toilet on board. Family members endure strip-searches outside prisons as well. In 2016, there were multiple cases reported in the village of ‘Azun, where soldiers reportedly strip-searched and menaced the mothers and sisters of the men they arrested with dogs.¹⁰³ The European Court of Human Rights has ruled strip-searches to constitute

⁹⁹ Nadira Shalhoub-Kevorkian, “Voice Therapy for Women Aligned with Political Prisoners: A Case Study of Trauma among Palestinian Women in the Second Intifada,” *Social Service Review* 79, no. 2 (June 2005): 330.

¹⁰⁰ Giacaman and Johnson, “Our Life Is Prison,” 55.

¹⁰¹ Giacaman and Johnson, 57–58.

¹⁰² Giacaman and Johnson, 58.

¹⁰³ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, “Annual Violations Report 2016,” 77–78.

degrading treatment, and even torture.¹⁰⁴ Simply put, for Palestinians, “To be allowed to see the prisoner, the visitor must accept humiliation.”¹⁰⁵

Saba‘aneh’s cartoons portray the reality of so many prisoners’ families. This was the case of Denise al-Hamuri, from the West Bank, who visited her son, Salah al-Hamuri, a researcher for Addameer. Salah al-Hamuri was placed in administrative detention in 23 August 2017. When she visited her son, she brought pictures of her two-year-old grandson, who lived in France with her daughter-in-law. Her daughter-in-law was a French national, who was banned from entering Israel. Like one of Saba‘aneh’s cartoons, her son and grandson had only seen each other’s photographs. Denise al-Hamuri was the only one who could visit her son, as her husband was “afraid to go through the metal detector because he had open heart surgery (...) and has a metal implant in his chest. He doesn’t want to be humiliated and detained on the way to the prison, and is afraid that going through the detector will harm him.”¹⁰⁶ Salah al-Hamuri’s relationship with his son was reduced to photographs, mediated through his mother. For Israa Abu Shihab, a nineteen-year-old accounting student from Qalqiliyah in the West Bank, visiting her husband, and bringing their son ranged from being difficult to outright impossible. They were married in August 2016, four months before her husband Mahmoud was placed in administrative detention. She said in an interview with a B’Tselem field researcher, “It was very painful for me to give birth to our son without him.”¹⁰⁷ Mahmoud was only allowed to hold their son once. Israa managed to get two two-month permits and then each of her subsequent applications were denied for unknown “security reasons”. She said, “I’m going through a difficult and painful time in my life. This whole time, they haven’t charged him with anything.”¹⁰⁸

Families were also politically active in advocating for prisoners. During hunger strikes, they demonstrated, marched, held sit-ins and even solidarity hunger strikes. Marwan Barghouti’s wife, Fadwa Barghouti was an advocate and a lawyer. She has given speeches on his behalf and was active in his public defence.

¹⁰⁴ Nigel S Rodley and Matt Pollard, *The Treatment of Prisoners under International Law* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 137–40.

¹⁰⁵ Giacaman and Johnson, “Our Life Is Prison,” 65.

¹⁰⁶ Denise al-Hamuri, “With No Cause or End in Sight: Administrative Detention a Routine Matter,” Transcript, June 7, 2018, http://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention/20180730_no_case_and_no_end_in_sight.

¹⁰⁷ Israa Abu Shihab, “With No Cause or End in Sight: Administrative Detention a Routine Matter,” Transcript, July 30, 2018, http://www.btselem.org/administrative_detention/20180730_no_case_and_no_end_in_sight.

¹⁰⁸ Abu Shihab.

The sense that only prisoners and their families cared about their struggle dates back to the early days of the PA. In 1988, Rula Abu Duhou, now a lecturer at the Institute of Women's Studies at Birzeit University, was arrested and jailed for her membership in the PFLP. Part of the Oslo Accords guaranteed the release of prisoners but did not extend to female prisoners. Abu Duhou described a "collective struggle".¹⁰⁹ She and her fellow prisoners went on hunger strike and their mothers protested in front of Yasser Arafat's headquarters to bring attention to the women of Hasharon Prison. Because of this activism, in 1996, the PA reached an agreement for the release of female prisoners, which excluded five prisoners, one of whom was Abu Duhou. The prisoners due to be released refused to leave unless they could all leave. They barricaded themselves in their cells and, ultimately, won. All of them were released. Of the experience, she asserted, "In general, the experience of Palestinian political prisoners is very unique when compared to others throughout history (...). And for women, we never had support from anyone other than our mothers—not the political leaders, not the [Palestinian] Authority."¹¹⁰

Addameer has asserted that interest in the plight of detainees across Arab countries has waned during the twenty-first century. In 2014, during the hunger strike, there were only two regional meetings held between the Arab International Center for Community and Solidarity and the Defense of Prisoners and Detainees. The subject of the hunger strike was only broached once in a Conference of Arab Ministers of Information.¹¹¹

One of the grievances of family members was the loss of community that came with the post-Oslo terrain and the PA's management of prisoner affairs. The support families received was merely financial and not social. In 2013, the women Giacaman and Johnson interviewed individually and in focus groups thought this was a diminishment in the social value of prisoners. They were concerned that prisoners were being erased as symbols. As one woman in a focus group put it, with the PA's ability to merely cut a check to prisoners' families and believe that fulfilled their obligations, "The prisoner became like any ordinary person."¹¹² This financial support was thus seen as a diminishment to the communal value of prisoners in politics. Of the financial support, Abu Duhou said: "The Palestinian Authority just pays for the prisoners,

¹⁰⁹ Rula Abu Duhou quoted in Patrick Strickland, "'Only Our Mothers Supported Us'—Former Palestinian Prisoner," *The Electronic Intifada*, June 3, 2015, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/only-our-mothers-supported-us-former-palestinian-prisoner/14575>.

¹¹⁰ Rula Abu Duhou quoted in Strickland.

¹¹¹ Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, "Annual Violations Report 2014," 109.

¹¹² Giacaman and Johnson, "Our Life Is Prison," 69.

allowing Israel to jail Palestinians for free. Other than that, they are doing nothing.”¹¹³ Socially, prisoners’ families do not feel supported by their communities. Notably, Saba‘aneh disagreed with the sentiment that prisoners have lost their symbolic powers. Indeed, the women Giacaman and Johnson interviewed noted that this changed in 2012, as people demonstrated in large numbers in support of the prisoners’ hunger strike.

Even in Sa‘abaneh’s critiques of the portrayal of Palestinian prisoners, a familiar symbol appears. In multiple cartoons of prisoners and their conditions, there is a sun. There are two scenarios in which the sun appears. In some cases, it is produced or literally held aloft by the prisoners themselves, while in others the sun in the left-hand corner of the page, encased in barbed wire. One image depicts children in prison, “going about their business”.¹¹⁴ One child skips jump rope with the chains that shackle her wrists, another child is shackled to a teddy bear, one child thinks of his lessons, while another child draws a sun on the wall, all under the watchful gaze of their jailer. Still, the child drawing the sun raises his fist in defiance. Another cartoon represents political prisoners, crowded together, with individuals holding things like a dove, a book, and a warped, melting clock. A chain is coming out of one man’s heart. Above them all is a man holding the sun on a string. It is at equal height as the Palestinian flag, which a prisoner is holding out the barred window.¹¹⁵ In a third image, it is captioned “Our sun never sets.” (Figure 5.)¹¹⁶ A prisoner flexes his bicep, while his wrist is shackled with ball and chain. Below the ball is a sun. It illuminates the cell but is partially covered. In the right-hand corner is “كسوف”, which means eclipse. The symbol of imprisonment eclipses the sun, a central image of hope.

In these three images, none of the prisoners have mouths. This is a frequent feature throughout Saba‘aneh’s book, but in some other cartoons prisoners do have mouths. The sun, a symbol that usually acts as an allegory of prisoners’ defiance and hope, is presented in partial and mediated ways, concurrently with aphasia. The child’s drawing is half-finished, the prisoner holds the sun on a string, and the final sun never sets, but is eclipsed by a ball and chain. In all these cases it is the prisoners who provide the sun, while remaining silent. It is a silent hope. They provide their own hope and light but are not able to speak or express themselves. The

¹¹³ Rula Abu Duhou quoted in Strickland, “Only Our Mothers Supported Us.”

¹¹⁴ Saba‘aneh, *White and Black*, 37.

¹¹⁵ Saba‘aneh, 19.

¹¹⁶ Saba‘aneh, 117.

occupation took their voices. This is clear as, throughout the book, it is not just prisoners who do not have mouths. The hope is there, but it is more complicated than that. The prisoners must flex their bodies and push against imprisonment, literally hold up hope up or produce it themselves, but are still unable to overcome the aphasia. In this sense, hope remains central to resistance culture, even if Saba'aneh's image of the prisoner is drastically different, portrayed in a weakened and pained position.




Figure 5

The lack of mouths in these cartoons are similar to the posters of Adnan and Shalabi (Figure 2). Their mouths were obscured by locks. The difference was that they chose to put the locks there to fight the administration through hunger strikes. Saba'aneh seeks to show small ways in which prisoners specifically and Palestinians generally are disempowered and denied their voices.

In other cases, the sun is in the left-hand corner of the page and is wrapped in barbed wire. It appears in images of the father reaching through the glass on visitor's day to touch his son (Figure 4), and in other images of checkpoints and occupation.¹¹⁷ The father is denied the physical touch of his child. Freedom of movement is denied. The sun itself is confined with a symbol of both imprisonment and the segmentation of Palestinian land by the Israeli occupation. (Barbed wire is also used in the image of the prisoner and his family, Figure 5, to symbolize the restrictions of the occupation on families.) In another image, at a checkpoint, a flower must grow

¹¹⁷ Saba'aneh, 181.

around the barrier and the armed soldier.¹¹⁸ It is also present in the cartoon of the prisoner who writes “human being” into the caption of his own portrait (Figure 3). Even nature and daylight become controlled and constricted.

Saba‘aneh complicates the image of political prisoners in the cultural context, as well as the symbols closely affiliated with them. Prisoners’ pain and experience was shared by their families. It was not only an individual experience, but a collective one. His cartoons were a response to renewed attempts to mythologize prisoners and herald them as heroes. Saba‘aneh and other prisoners were in a predicament decided by the prison and occupation authorities. Even the production of the cartoons in Saba‘aneh’s book was an example of the individual representing the collective. It took multiple prisoners to smuggle his drawings out to his wife, so that he could complete them.

Conclusion

The Oslo Accords and the Second Intifada created a new terrain. Palestinians grappled with Israel and the PA equally. Each played a role in their imprisonment. Like the previous periods reviewed in this thesis, rebuilding and reasserting the strength of prisoners’ internal structures and committees was necessary. During the Oslo period there was a rapid decrease in the number of Palestinian prisoners, while the al-Aqsa Intifada caused a rapid increase. After this, prisoners’ organizing was weakened, decentralized and disorganized, as exemplified by the failure of the 2004 hunger strike. As a result, it was a number of years before Palestinian prisoners launched another mass hunger strike. However, prisoners remained active and present in the Palestinian public consciousness, as can be shown with the Palestinian Prisoners’ Document and the imprisonment of popular leaders, like Marwan Barghouti and Ahmad Sa‘adat.

The success of the individual hunger strikes of Khader Adnan and Hana Shalabi—against their own administrative detention orders—triggered a number of individual hunger strikes and the largescale strike of 2012. The mass hunger strike of 2017 was similar to the mass hunger strike of 2012. They both protested administrative detention and solitary confinement. They also demanded better education rights, and better family visiting policies. In addition to the large-scale participation of prisoners, these strikes also received far-reaching support in the form of

¹¹⁸ Saba‘aneh, 56.

solidarity demonstrations and rallies from Palestinian society. Palestinians heralded and celebrated both strikes as victories.

Despite this victory and the 2012 collective hunger strike gaining some results, recurring demands like administrative detention and family visits emphasized the loss of rights and privileges that came with crackdowns outside of prisoners' control, like the capture of Gilad Shalit and Operation Cast Lead. Both caused repression and the loss of rights and privileges for prisoners and their families. Improvements were temporary and tempered by wider political conditions. Between 2012 and 2017, administrative detention halted temporarily. Families faced new and old challenges to visit. People continued to die due to medical negligence.

Hunger strikes, both individual and collective, increased in popularity. They were supported by fellow prisoners and the wider Palestinian community. The demands of individual strikes were similar to the demands of the mass hunger strikes of 2012 and 2017. Individuals went on strike to protest individual grievances of which the most popular causes were administrative detention, solitary confinement, and medical negligence.

In a system designed to strip them of their power, dignity, and humanity, hunger strikes remained a strategy for prisoners to take back some control. In Palestinian society, the power of hunger strikes went beyond the collective. Individual strikes were not individual endeavours, as other prisoners joined them in solidarity and people outside prisons demonstrated to support them. Where prisoners were concerned, the individual and collective blurred. There was not a clear delineation of the line between them. Addressing Palestinian society, hunger strikes brought a unity that many families felt had disappeared with the advent of the Palestinian Authority's policy that granted families a pension. The hunger strike of Maher Younis and Muhammad Taj's threat to strike showed that hunger strikes were just as often addressing Palestinian society and the PA.

The interplay between the individual and the collective was not limited to hunger strikes. Prisoners were not the only ones struggling to maintain their dignity in this system. Saba'aneh's book of cartoons was only able to come to fruition with the help of other prisoners, who smuggled out drawings to his wife, who kept them safe. What seemed like the individual actions of a prisoner, expanded beyond them and their individual reach to include community members, making these actions more interconnected. Like the hunger strikes of Adnan, Shalabi, Kayed, Sarsak, and al-Rikhawi, who protested their administrative detention orders, other prisoners went

on strike to support them and bolster their demands. In terms of hunger strikes and other actions that prisoners took up collectively, the relationship between the individual and the collective is one of interdependence. They needed to support each other.

As Saba'aneh's cartoons emphasize, imprisonment also affected families through the simple, yet deeply painful acts of crossing Israeli constructed borders and barriers to visit and maintain contact. Saba'aneh's cartoons mediate between the societal representations of prisoners as heroes and the pain that he and his family suffered while he was in prison. His cartoons show the pain of prisoners and how they are silenced, while also showing how wives and children suffer from this separation. Saba'aneh thought that the struggle of Palestinian prisoners and the interplay between the collective and the individual extended to families. To him, families exist and act within the collective of prisoners' struggles with the prison administration but reap few benefits.

The emergence and proliferation of individual hunger strikes was a key difference between this period and the previous revolutionary periods. During periods prior to 2012, the power of hunger strikes came from the combination of mass participation and outside pressure from their community, human rights organizations and lawyers. Individual strikes received mass support and demonstrations, both from the fellow prisoners and wider society. The strikes centered on personal, individualized grievances. There were prisoners who supported individual strikes, but not in numbers as large as the mass hunger strikes of 2012 or 2017. The support for those like Adnan and Shalabi showed that public interest was not contingent on large numbers. One prisoner was as much worthy of support as hundreds of prisoners.

Prisoners employed fewer protest strategies during this period. During the Palestinian Revolution and the First Intifada, prisoners employed other means of noncompliance and occasionally violence to protest their conditions. Following the al-Aqsa Intifada, prisoners relied more on hunger strikes. In the polarized political climate, prisoners were known as "living martyrs". They retained their symbolic power, even if their actual power was more superficial and even if the PA treated them "like everyone else". This can be noted in the outrage about Marwan Barghouti's imprisonment and his increased popularity. In Palestine, it was, and continues to be, a cultural practice to idealize and glorify prisoners, despite Saba'aneh's cartoons that protest this trend. Hunger strikes inspired mass mobilization and kept prisoners in the public consciousness. There was another side to the way people talked about and viewed prisoners and

hunger strikes. Hafez Omar put it neatly when he talked about his posters denoting a nostalgia for the “old traditions”. In the celebration of prisoners, there was a nostalgia for the Palestinian Revolution and for the unity of the 1970s, prior to the Oslo period. As I note earlier in Chapter Three, a solidarity strike for prisoners in Ramallah received the most widespread public participation in three decades. Prisoners as a cause was something that all Palestinians across society agreed was worthy of support. It was unthinkable for any political faction to turn their back on them or to criticize or belittle their struggle. In many ways, prisoners were a “safe” topic for people to rally around and talk about. Their cause was conducive to widespread support. As such, in supporting prisoners, the wider Palestinian society could regain some of their lost unity.

Conclusion

Summing Up

The Introduction discusses the Mandate period, in which periods of uprising, like the al-Buraq disturbances in 1929 and the Arab Revolt in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, led to increased arrests and imprisonment. Prisoners organized and participated in collective actions, like hunger strikes, which the Palestinian public supported through demonstrations that threatened public order. For example, the hunger strikes in Sarafand Prison in 1936 and Akka Prison in 1937 closed shops and drew demonstrators to the streets to pressure the Mandate government. Many of Akram Zu'aytir's writings were the product of organization and discussion amongst the detainees of Sarafand Prison. Prisoners dictated their views and their demands to the Mandate government and the Arab Higher Council alike. Nuh Ibrahim's "Mr. Bailey" depicts the cruelty of the British criminal justice system, while "From Akka Prison" celebrates the defiance and martyrdom of Mohammad Jumjum, Fuad Hijazi, and 'Ata al-Zir, who became icons of resistance. Thus, the introduction's brief account of prison resistance during the British Mandate provides the long historical context for the main period of focus in the thesis, 1967-today.

Chapter One examines imprisonment during the Palestinian Revolution (1967-1987). Palestinian prisoners built communities and developed internal governing structures that filled many needs; at the level of individual members, they provided a source of unity and morale, and at the level of the collective, they provided an engine that drove actions in support of national causes. These internal governing structures supported nationalist communities dedicated to the revolution by providing discipline and services. Education was a fundamental component of these structures, as it reinforced unity and benefited the prisoners, both collectively by expanding their knowledge of the cause and individually by providing self-growth and emotional support. Internal security was meant to enforce order and discipline and prevent what former prisoners called "weakness", which was the threat of an individual prisoner to other prisoners. Prisoners also used collective actions, like hunger strikes, to fulfill their needs, to protest mistreatment or demand rights. Amidst these collective and internal structures, subjective and personal struggles also defined prisoners' experiences.

Prisoners communicated and acted in solidarity with different nationalist organizations and institutions. Concrete actions to support the wider revolutionary struggle included, going on strike in solidarity with demonstrations outside prisons and going on hunger strike to protest

forced labour that supported Israeli military production. Communication, both one-way, through radios, poetry and art, and two-way through the exchange of letters and advice, united not just prisoners with each other, but prisoners to the wider nationalist community and revolutionary struggle. Poetry and art memorialized and romanticized prisoners by consistently depicting them finding or being bathed in light. This literary device represents their defiance and resilience. Poster art, using Palestinian nationalist symbols and tropes, addressed a diverse audience and supported prisoners. Tropes and symbols associated with liberating Palestinian land were also associated with liberating Palestinian prisoners. This period saw the beginning of internal governing structures that defined prison life, while also bringing prisoners into the nationalist consciousness.

The second chapter discusses the changes that the prison movement and internal structures within the prison system underwent prior to and during the First Intifada (1987-1993). The prisoner exchanges of 1983 and 1985 released thousands of senior prisoners, which weakened leadership and the prisoners' unity. Violent and chaotic situations broke out in many prisons. The Intifada brought overcrowding and a massive increase in the prison population that allowed the remaining senior prisoners to regain control in prisons like 'Asqalan Prison, while at the same time it created poor living conditions in other prisons. The sheer volume of prisoners from mass arbitrary arrests and the increase of administrative detention necessitated the creation of new structures, like Ansar 2 and Ansar 3, to hold them.

Education and daily discussion groups remained central to life during this period. They continued to cultivate a sense of unity and community. However, maintaining lines of communication came with immense risk, as was the case with the detainee, who was shot trying to retrieve a letter through the barbed wire of his section in Ansar 3. Despite prison authorities' brutal repression, prisoners continued to organize collective actions, like hunger strikes. These were the product of internal political organizing and votes. Prisoners also participated in riots that were spontaneous and unplanned. The prisoners' discussions and meetings largely centred on what was happening at the street level of the Intifada, rather than on the prisons themselves. These collective actions just described were dedicated to improving the lives of prisoners and protesting abuses. In other words, much of the political debate was outward-looking, while the action taken was inward-looking, and about improving conditions within prison.

With mass incarceration and abuse, communities viewed imprisonment as inevitable and a rite of passage for young men. *Sumud* became a coping mechanism, one that was a topic of daily conversations and depicted in poetry, cartoons and posters. These three artistic mediums also espoused nationalist Palestinian imagery and portrayed nature breaking the barriers of prisons. Similar to the period of the Palestinian Revolution, Intifada poetry, poster art and cartoons also contain the theme of light and describe prisons as schools. The public rhetoric of *bayans* heralded prisoners as exemplums of resistance and as living martyrs. While art associates them with nationalist symbols, they themselves became symbols of the national cause, much like the fellahin were during the 1936-9 Arab Revolt in Palestine.

Chapter Three discusses the new terrain created by the Oslo Accords (1993-1995) and the Second Intifada (2000-2004), one which saw a rapid depopulation and then repopulation of prisons. This necessitated reconstruction of internal governing structures during the al-Aqsa Intifada and following the failure of the 2004 hunger strike. Part of this reconstruction meant revitalizing hunger strikes as tool of resistance. There were many similarities between the hunger strike of 2012 and the hunger strike of 2017. They had similar demands, a similar scale of participation inside prisons and support outside prisons, similar slogans, and were both considered successes for the prisoners. While the 2012 hunger strike accomplished many things, prisoners lost rights and privileges during the repression of the Israeli-Gaza Conflict, events outside of prisoners' control. Following the gains made in 2012, individual strikes became a new trend. While collective hunger strikes protested and made demands on behalf of all prisoners, individual hunger strikes protested individual grievances. These individual strikes garnered wide support, both from fellow prisoners and by those outside prisons.

These mass hunger strikes created a sense of unity between Palestinian prisoners, their families and the rest of Palestinian society. This was something many families felt had been lost with the PA's policy that granted families a pension. Financial support did not temper the abuses inflicted by the occupation, the IDF, the GSS, or the IPS when it came to visiting their family members in prison. As such, prisoners were not the only ones struggling to maintain their dignity. The complex relationship between the individual and the collective included families and could be seen in the simple, yet deeply painful acts of crossing borders and checkpoints to visit prisoners and maintain contact. However, prisoners remain the personification of this suffering and the limited resistance they can exert.

Continuities and Discontinuities: 1967 to Today

Periods of political instability and uprising in Palestine and across the Middle East created periods of instability in prisons and necessitated building or rebuilding prisoners' governing structures. As such, there were several commonalities between the Palestinian Revolution, the First Intifada and the post-al-Aqsa Intifada for Palestinians in prisons, as well as specificities for each period. These commonalities include the prevalence and importance of education structures, collective action and hunger strikes, and resistance culture that portrays the defiance, resistance, hope, suffering, wish-fulfillment and steadfastness of prisoners and their families. These were largely successful practices for prisoners (with some notable exceptions). They allowed prisoners to take back power and subvert the power structures of the prisons.

In constructing internal governing structures that disciplined and ordered life inside prisons, education has been central and fundamental since the 1970s. As noted in Chapter One, when Sami al-Jundi arrived in 'Asqalan Prison, he had to be transferred to another cell, so that he could be enrolled in an introductory course about revolutionary politics. Education structured daily life and allowed prisoners to create their own conceptions of space. People spent most of their days reading. In Chapter One, we saw that al-Jundi read an average of three hundred pages per day, while Tayseer Nasrallah and George Habash used their time in prison to delve into leftist political and revolutionary literature. Education and books provided a relief for Palestinians intellectually and emotionally. Through education, people got something back. People like Lawahez Burgal got high school degrees, while others, like older women in Neve Tirza Prison and young men in 'Asqalan Prison who al-Jundi taught, became literate. As we saw in Chapter Two, during the First Intifada, the trope that prison was the university of the revolution remained. It was a rallying point and a source of resistance. After the 1985 prisoner exchange in 'Asqalan Prison, during the loss of leadership and the period in which senior prisoners regained control, the education committee remained in place. During the First Intifada, throughout the chaos, the transfers, the new prisons, and the overcrowding, education remained central. Discussion and learning continued. After the construction of new prisons, like the Jneid Prison in 1984, Badran Bader Jaber described teaching new prisoners about hunger strikes and how to mobilize in order to assert themselves. Education included coverage of action and resistance in addition to intellectual and political topics. Mustafa Najji al-Hazzarin experienced chaos and disorder outside of prison, but during his administrative detention, discussion and

reading sessions with other prisoners created a sense of unity. The use of collective pronouns in “O Negev” also reflected this. From the Palestinian Revolution to the mass hunger strikes of 2012 and 2017, prisoners went on strike to demand their education rights.

Prisoners used education to subvert the space and the purpose of prisons, by fostering both self-growth and the growth of the community. They used it to foster unity and boost morale. Education helped create a sense of normalcy, stability and community. It structured the lives of prisoners in a new way, around resistance and liberation both because of the material that they studied and because it helped motivate their hunger strikes.

Throughout the periods studied in this thesis, hunger strikes were a way to achieve material needs, to take back power, to gain rights, and to protest abuses. Collective resistance was usually non-violent and entailed some form of noncompliance. Rarer, more militant, less directed tactics included riots, assaulting soldiers, and setting tents on fire. As discussed in Chapter Two, the story of Hiba al-Shweiki during the First Intifada showed that not all hunger strikes came from careful planning. They, too, could be spontaneous. As the 2004 hunger strike exemplified, hunger strikes and other collective actions were not always successful.

During the Palestinian Revolution prisoners fought to make life more tolerable and liveable. They frequently went on strike for material needs, like beds, better quality of food, and hygiene items. These early strikes established a certain standard of living, as hunger strikes following the 1980s did not push for these basics. Items like radios were no longer secret. This is not to say that prison administration did not renege on promises or remove gains, as the 2012 and the 2017 strikes showed. During the hunger strikes of the First Intifada, prisoners sought to fulfill material needs, like more and better food. They also demanded an end to solitary confinement and better visiting policies. Similarly, following the al-Aqsa Intifada, prisoners made demands that amounted to policy changes. They demanded to be able to sit their exams and for their freedom from administrative detention. While much of these material things, like food and books and radios, could be fought for and largely achieved on a permanent basis, changes to policies were harder to come by. Education rights were once guaranteed during the 1980s, but after the capture of Gilad Shalit in 2006, the Israeli Prison Service treated education as a privilege that Palestinians had to earn.

Most long-lasting gains from collective actions, particularly hunger strikes, came during the Palestinian Revolution. While prison authorities have taken away gains and renege on

promises since the 1970s, following the Palestinian Revolution, it was easier to regain the basic quality of life achieved during this period. As discussed in Chapter Two, in 1984, when Jneid Prison was first built, the living conditions were at a standard more like the early days of the Palestinian Revolution when the prison movement just began mobilizing. According to Bader Badran Jaber, the prisoners of Jneid Prison were able to return to the standard of living that they were accustomed to by the 1980s with one initial hunger strike but had to renew their efforts following the 1985 prisoner exchange. In April 1987, they had regained all their rights. Although, across all prisons many abusive practices, like administrative detention and medical negligence, persist.

The administrative response to strikes was always repression. Prisoners came to expect this. Part of strike plans was preparing younger prisoners for both how their bodies would react to starvation and how the guards and administration would react to their strike. The strength was in the collective, which prison authorities recognized. So, to break strikes, prison authorities tried to break the collective. They separated people, putting them in solitary confinement or transferring leaders to other prisons. This individualization was not always successful. As noted in Chapter One with the Nafha al-Sahrawi Prison hunger strike of 1980, prisoners continued their strike after being transferred to Ramle Prison. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter Three, when Palestinians, like Hana Shalabi, Bilal Kayed, Mahmoud Sarsak and Akram al-Rikhawi, went on individual hunger strikes in and after 2012, other prisoners went on hunger strike in solidarity, creating another collective support network around the individual and their cause.

As discussed in Chapter Three, one key difference between contemporary hunger strikes, especially those taking place after 2012, and the strikes of the previous decades was the rise of individual hunger strikes. These individual strikes protested the grievance of an individual and were typically brought on by a policy that affected many others. Largely, the power of hunger strikes came from the communal nature of prisoner's struggle, and from outside pressure from the community and lawyers, like Felicia Langer and Lea Tsemel. Individual strikes received mass support, both from fellow prisoners and wider society. Following the Oslo period, protest strategies became more focussed on hunger strikes alone. During the Palestinian Revolution and the First Intifada, prisoners employed a number of protest strategies ranging from noncompliance to violence. Given that most of the accounts of noncompliance examined in this thesis came from testimonies, interviews, autobiographies and the like, while the accounts of hunger strikes came

from newspapers and human rights reports, as well as testimonies, interviews, and autobiographies, it can be surmised that hunger strikes have been more widely publicized. This contributed to the connection of prisoners to hunger strikes, especially in recent years, as that was mainly when prisoners were in the news.

Prisons were frequently subject to and reflective of outside forces and the political conditions of Palestinian society. This was the case with the 2014 Israeli-Gaza Conflict and during times of negotiations. The loss of older, more experienced prisoners in prisoner exchanges, like those in 1983, in 1985, and during the Oslo period, created a vacuum in leadership and weakened the prisoners' movement. This was a double-edged sword, as it meant that prisoners gained their freedom, but conditions for the remaining and future prisoners worsened, causing long-term consequences. A regime of chaos and fear began in 'Asqalan Prison in 1985. And after the failure of the 2004 hunger strike, prisoners hesitated before using hunger strikes again for several years. Senior prisoners provided the strength necessary for prisoners to organize collectively and successfully, and to hold the prison administration accountable. With prisoner exchanges, senior prisoners were usually the first to be released (with the rare exceptions of those like Maher Younis who I mention in Chapter Three). As such, these sorts of deals were good for those released but detrimental to those who remained in prison.

The period following the Oslo Accords and the al-Aqsa Intifada saw the political polarization between Hamas in Gaza and the Fatah-dominated PLO in the West Bank. This polarization was reflected in many prisons where political factions had to be housed separately. This was a far cry from the cross-factional unity of the Palestinian Revolution. Part of the reason the prison movement was subject to the general forces of the revolution was because of the rapid depopulation and the repopulation of prisons during the Oslo period and the al-Aqsa Intifada. Similarly, following the 1983 and 1985 prisoner exchanges, Palestinians struggled to maintain unity across factions. As explored in Chapter Two, in 'Asqalan Prison, following the 1985 prisoner exchange and the loss of the majority of the senior prisoners, a group of younger, more militant prisoners briefly took control of elected leadership roles, bringing a regime of chaos, wide-ranging accusations of collaboration, paranoia and violence. While older prisoners eventually regained control in 'Asqalan, these situations reveal how the wider political situation in Palestinian society is reflected inside prisons.

Resistance culture was integral to prison life and prisoners have been incorporated into resistance culture since the Mandate. Moreover, the art produced by and about prisoners consistently utilized many of the same tropes across each of these periods. While the symbolism of light and dark and vibrant colours to contrast to the somber, muted tones of prison is specific to representations of imprisonment in resistance culture, as I explore in Chapters One and Two, the transgressive power of nature is a more generic nationalist trope that artists applied to prisons. The metaphor of light appears in Chapter One with the poetry of Samih al-Qasim, Mahmoud Darwish and Fadwa Tuqqan and the poster art of Mohammed Roukwi and Zuhdi al-Adawi. In Chapter Two, it is present across the poetry of Badawi al-Jabal and the poster art of Mohammed Roukwi and Marc Rudin and, in Chapter Three, the cartoons of Mohammad Saba'aneh. Nature breaking the bounds of imprisonment, demonstrating prisoners' connection to Palestinian land, and thus the cause, has also been widely expressed in art since 1967. In Chapter One, al-Adawi's poster art also showed a tree breaking walls, while, in Chapter Two, Naji al-Ali's cartoon features a flower breaking a wall and Marc Rudin's poster features an orange tree breaking through a wall.

For prisoners, art provided a medium through which they could resist and express fantasies of escape. Zuhdi al-Adawi's poster, created during the Palestinian Revolution, depicts a tree destroying a prison wall, while the bars to the prisoner's door bend and curl away. One of Naji al-Ali's cartoons depicts a flower breaking a prison wall, while the posters of Mohammed Roukwi and Marc Rudin show birds flying away from broken bars and an orange tree breaking a wall, respectively. One of Saba'aneh's cartoons depicts a man's arm breaking through the glass partition in a visiting room to touch his child's head. While the art expresses this fantasy, which is often times unrealized by prisoners physically, frequently their art did literally pass through and defy these barriers. Palestinians frequently smuggled their art out of prison. For example, as I describe in Chapter One, Darwish smuggled out poems on cigarette wrappers, al-Adawi smuggled out art on pillowcases and other prisoners carried out Mohammad Saba'aneh's cartoons, as I note in Chapter Three.

As I describe in Chapter One, al-Qasim's prison poem is part of the Palestinian canon. Its place in anthologies shows how it is seen as representative of Palestinian identity, Palestinian resistance and imprisonment. It exemplifies the darkness of prison and the trope of rebirth in prison through the use of light. Through the poem, we see how rebirth necessitates destruction to

complete its cycle. Take the phoenix for example, a symbol of resistance in Northern Ireland. It is a symbol of renewal, but this renewal comes from its own fiery destruction. Poems like al-Qasim's acknowledge this destruction and pain, but do not focus on it, turning instead to the light that follows the destruction. In contrast, as I recount in Chapter Three, Saba'aneh's more recent cartoons do focus on the suffering and destruction of imprisonment, in particular what it means for families.

Testimonies, memoirs, interviews, poetry, art and posters encompass the sense of *sumud* and defiance that prisons will not break prisoners, but prisoners will break prisons. Prisoners rejected victimization despite the prison authorities' repeated attempts to victimize them. This portrayal was as integral to the nationalist image of prisoners as surviving prisons was. The education system in prisons was a product of this, as it was about benefitting in a space meant to deny opportunities. Hunger strikes were tools of noncompliance and non-violence. Prisoners regarded striking as taking action rather than remaining passive.

Part of portraying *sumud* meant acknowledging the suffering involved in imprisonment. During the Palestinian Revolution, Samih al-Qasim's "A Letter from Prison" displaces suffering from the prisoner to the prisoner's mother, while the speaker overcomes the pain and the darkness of prison. Naji al-Ali's cartoon from 1987 shows Handala and a bird standing witness to the suffering of the hunger striker, with no references to families, only the suffering of prisoners. Decades later, in 2017, Mohammad Saba'aneh's volume of cartoons emphasizes the pain and suffering that family members face trying to cross checkpoints to visit their loved ones. Al-Qasim's poem and Saba'aneh's cartoons acknowledge the effects of imprisonment on families but focus on different aspects. Al-Qasim focuses on rebirth and light for the prisoner, while Saba'aneh keeps the focus on the lack of consolation for family members. In the cartoon of the father touching his child's head, the audience cannot even see the prisoner's face. Resistance culture always acknowledged the suffering of prisoners and families, but the portrayal of suffering shifted over time. Steadily, suffering took on a more prominent role.

The aforementioned poetry and cartoons from the Palestinian Revolution and 2017 also show how attention paid to prisoners' families has changed over time. Families went from personifying the pain of prisoners and being the sole possessors of that pain to taking on a more prominent role as the primary subject in art. Throughout the time periods discussed here, families and the wider community supported prisoners through demonstrations of solidarity. Families

remained at the centre of external support networks. The bond between family members and loved ones meant that they shared much of the negative effects of imprisonment. They had to struggle, and, for many, continue to struggle to see family members across barriers and borders and face degrading treatment. Imprisonment extended to a wider collective, one with much less symbolic power.

With poster art specifically, images of Palestinian nationalist symbols serve different purposes in each uprising since the 1970s. During the Palestinian Revolution, poster art that called on its audience to support prisoners used symbols to celebrate prisoners' sacrifices for the nation. Poster art associated prisoners with nationalist symbols, because of their struggle and their sacrifices. They paid tribute to this suffering by calling on their audiences to support them. During the First Intifada, poster art still contained these nationalist symbols, but also bore an increasing awareness of the violence and abuse prisoners suffered. These posters still asked audiences to support prisoners but put prisoners' suffering at the centre of their message. The posters emphasized their status of living, suffering martyrs to garner support. In the art of Hafez Omar, who I discuss in Chapter Three, we can see national symbols and nostalgia function to associate prisoners with the old order, a time before the Oslo period, and thus, with the values of self-determination and liberation, in order to mobilize people.

In resistance culture and action, *sumud* was entwined with Palestinian prisoners. In situations where resilience and survival were resistance, *sumud* was a strategy to mediate pain that prisoners faced as part of their imprisonment. Their survival and their resistance made them symbols of *sumud* to the wider Palestinian society. As I discuss in Chapter Three, some prisoners questioned the fact that prisoners were symbols of *sumud*. Saba'aneh, the cartoonist from Gaza, instead sought to portray the harsh reality of imprisonment through his cartoons. Others, like family members, welcomed this attention as it could be a means for prisoners to get the support that they need from the wider community.

Across the decades and the countless prisons inside and outside Israel, there was a mix of collective and individual struggles that made up the prison movement. The uniqueness and personalness of each person's struggle contributed to the movement and vice versa. As I discuss in Chapter One, the individuals who created internal structures had agency and often faced their own individual and personal struggles. Salah Tamari struggled to survive months of solitary confinement before being transferred to Ansar Detention Camp. Once in Ansar, he drew on these

experiences to help organize and elect leadership committees, to mobilize his fellow detainees, to teach them how to cope with interrogation and solitary confinement and to help organize to halt interrogation. As I describe in Chapter Three, Saba‘aneh drew his cartoons individually, but relied on other prisoners to smuggle them out. After 2012, other prisoners and people outside prison, sometimes on a largescale, supported individual hunger strikes. Internal governing structures were integral to life on an individual and collective level. Structures could sometimes fail, as was the case with the 2004 hunger strike, when the leadership was not united, or bring worse conditions, as was the case with ‘Asqalan following the 1985 prisoner exchange. Generally, however, prison leaders created a system that improved the lives of prisoners by providing education, order and the power to collectively battle with prison authorities.

Studies of prisons and prison resistance will remain pertinent as Palestinian identity continues to be moulded by confinement and imprisonment. Imprisonment of Palestinians remains an ongoing issue: In 2018, there were more than 5,000 Palestinian inmates held within Israeli prisons.¹ As freedom of movement is increasingly denied, there are many young Palestinians, from East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza alike, who feel that to be Palestinian under Israeli occupation is to live in a prison. One young man from Ramallah said that soon Palestinians will need a permit even to breathe.² Scholars like Ilan Pappé argue that Israel runs the Occupied Territories like a large open-air prison.³ Rashid Khalidi himself refers to Israel as a carceral state.⁴ To many, living under occupation is comparable to living as prisoners. Imprisonment has become part of the Palestinian nationalist consciousness.

¹ Eyal Sagiv, “Statistics on Palestinians in the Custody of the Israeli Security Forces” (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, May 22, 2019), accessed June 15, 2019, https://www.btselem.org/statistics/detainees_and_prisoners.

² Anthony Robinson and Annemarie Young, *Young Palestinians Speak: Living under Occupation* (Northampton, Massachusetts: Interlink Books, an imprint of Interlink Publishing Group, Inc., 2017), 35.

³ Ilan Pappé, *The Biggest Prison on Earth: A History of the Occupied Territories* (London: Oneworld Publications, 2017), 1–30.

⁴ Khalidi, “From the Editor: Israel: A Carceral State,” 5–10.

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