

A STUDY OF NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN ENGLISH CANADA

McGILL UNIVERSITY

PROSPECTS FOR QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE:
A STUDY OF NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION IN
ENGLISH CANADA

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BY
ROBERT ANDREW YOUNG

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Abstract

Because Québécois are not likely to share in any Canadian consensus at the level of national identification, this is the critical area for Canadian federalism. And, were Quebec to become independent, this basic dimension would certainly underlie the English-Canadian reaction. This study breaks national identification into attitudes towards Canada, Quebec, and the United States, and examines these in a sample of English Canadians to see how separation would affect them.

The methodological emphasis is upon validity and exploration of meanings, so no hypotheses were pre-defined, interviews were non-directive, and the actual concepts used by the respondents were employed in the analysis.

Four types of attitude-set were isolated with relation to national identification; the Individualist, the Local, the Dogmatist, and the Cosmopolitan. These types are described, their internal coherence and inter-differentiation are examined, and they are explored in detail with illustrations.

Finally, the implications of this pattern of national identification for Quebec independence is considered.

Résumé

Le fait que les Québécois ne s'identifient pas au niveau national en tant que Canadiens représente le point clef pour le fédéralisme. Egalement, ce niveau de l'identification nationale soutiendrait la réaction des Canadiens-anglais si un jour le Québec devient indépendant. Ce travail présente l'identité nationale comme un ensemble d'attitudes envers le Canada, le Québec, et les États-Unis, et examine celles-ci à partir d'un échantillon de Canadiens-anglais afin de déterminer si la sécession de Québec est croyable.

Au plan méthodologique, l'attention se porte sur la validité des attitudes, et donc aucune hypothèse n'est préformulée, les entrevues sont non-dirigées, et on a créé des types idéaux des attitudes structurées par induction des mêmes concepts exprimés par les personnes interrogées.

On a peut distinguer quatre genres; l'Individualiste, le Local, le Dogmatique, et le Cosmopolite. Ces genres sont décrits, et examinés en détail en fonction de leur cohérence interne et de leurs différences.

Enfin, la signification des attitudes identifiées est analysée à propos de ce que représenterait un Québec indépendant.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	v
INTRODUCTION	vi
Chapter	
1. FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND IN CANADA	1
2. THE POSITION OF QUEBEC	28
3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY	48
The Sample	
Problem Orientation	
Hypotheses	
Indicators	
Interviewing	
4. ANALYSIS I: CONSTRUCTING THE TYPES	67
The Local	
The Dogmatist	
The Cosmopolitan	
The Individualist	
5. ANALYSIS II: THE TYPES OF ATTITUDES	81
The Individualists	86
Attitudes Towards Canada	93
Dogmatists	
Locals	
Cosmopolitans	
Attitudes Towards the United States	107
Cosmopolitans	
Locals	
Dogmatists	
Attitudes Towards Quebec	113
Locals	
Cosmopolitans	
Dogmatists	
Quebec Independence	125
Dogmatists	
Locals	
Cosmopolitans	
Exceptions	145
6. CONCLUSION: PROSPECTS FOR QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE	151
Appendix	
A: The Sample	165
B: Sample Interviews	169
C: Concepts Used in the Analysis	184
D: Background and Interview Characteristics of the Respondents and the Types	188
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	194

V

PREFACE

This thesis grew out of good discussions in Professor Michael Stein's federalism seminar at McGill University, and I'd like to thank him for his painstaking reading of several early drafts, for his thoughtful criticisms, and most of all, for his encouragement. I am also indebted to Professor Léon Dion for several general discussions of political culture and methodology, and to Professor Harold Waller for his sympathetic supervision of what has proven to be a long and awkward progression to a reasonable style, in more than this thesis. Obviously, there's yet some way to go.

I take responsibility for all awkwardness in construction, lapses in argument, inconsistencies, and typing mistakes that the reader may discover, and apologise for the inconvenient placing of the notes.¹

Finally, I would like to thank P.L. Gadbois for her illustrations and interest, and the Graduate Faculty of McGill University for the summer's support necessary for the research.

R.A.Y.

Oxford

1. In the hope that out of gratitude he may still read them in order, I dedicate this work to the reader.

INTRODUCTION

This is the report of a piece of research into a specific aspect of Canadian federalism. But the thesis presented here is not the result of the disciplined application of a fixed scientific viewpoint onto a defined problem area; instead it developed, and is presented as it developed, over time as both the problem and the view of the author moved together towards definition.

So the work is frankly exploratory and interpretive, and the path traced constitutes one of the many lines of approach that could be taken in investigating the nature of federalism in Canada.

Unlike a 'focus', which implies that there exists some 'known and fixed referential context for the problem, this idea of 'line' emphasizes the omnidirectional potential of inquiry: in this light, rather than assuming a position within a body of knowledge or with respect to some pre-defined object of knowledge, research involves a reflective exploration of the problem at hand. This need not imply that science becomes some quixotic individual quest. Previous work provides a conceptual foundation, but if it is seen that social science does not so much progress on its own as attempt to keep up with changes in its subject matter, then it is not sufficient to share current perspectives. It may be that emergent prospects must be grasped before an inquiry can even begin.

The problem at hand is the nature and possibilities of federalism in Canada. Several stages were passed through in its exploration, and if the line seems tenuous or poorly supported in places, the fault is only the author's, and the only justification is that much ground had to be covered in a relatively short time; some of it requires a great deal more digging.

In Chapter 1, the major currents of recent federal theory are considered in their relation to the federal experience in post-war Canada. Due to the wide range of assumptions of various theories, and especially with regard to the dichotomy between social and institutional approaches, it is argued that no one approach can be universally appropriate. Considering the problems

involved in comparative attempts, an examination of federalism, especially its social aspects, should be inductive and preferably society-specific. Finding the approach that fits is a difficult problem, but by considering some in turn, it is suggested that the one most likely to yield adequate results at the present time would emphasize the underlying cultural dimension of our federal society. At bottom, as is apparent in times of crisis, the integrity of a federation depends on the sense of self-identification with the structure as a whole.

At this point, Quebec, the entity which has driven Canadians to be consciously concerned about national unity, is examined briefly in Chapter 2. Stress is laid upon the nationalist issue, and upon the culturally based reality of autodetermination. Yet Canada and Quebec condition the bounds of each other's action, and the rest of the study explores the kinds of conceptual structures common among English Canadians which make up their sense of national identification, and which would be brought to bear upon the event of Quebec's secession. We want to explore the way English Canadians conceive of their country to see whether and in what way separation is thinkable for them.

A separate chapter discussed the scientific issues which surround such an attempt, and the concrete steps taken in this project. Interpreting social meanings demands a problem-oriented approach which seeks to clarify rather than to explain. To get at the meanings which Canadians attribute to the relevant social objects - Canada, Quebec, and the United States - validity was emphasized at the expense of reliability and representativeness. Hypotheses were not rigidly formulated in advance nor were concepts rigorously defined, and interviews were conducted in the manner of a chat between strangers. The practical problems were severe, but in the end, a non-probability sample of 80 respondents from throughout the country was selected. The goal was to understand the thought of the subjects themselves, in their own terms, and then to go beyond to induce the attitudinal complexes in which these notions are embedded.

The findings are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. The first describes the process of analyzing the interviews according to the concepts used and the groups which employed them. It also

includes brief descriptions of the four types of attitude-set eventually isolated. In the second chapter the analysis of the types is pursued in detail; the sets of attitudes towards Canada, Quebec, and the United States are broken down into their components, compared to the other groups, and finally related to the question of Quebec independence. Throughout, interview data is used to illustrate. These types provide a picture of the sense of English-Canadian national identification which may condition the future course of events.

In the conclusion, this basic element is fitted into the situation as it might develop in Canada, and we also explore kinds of mass reactions that might be elicited by different elite definitions of events. Finally, the types of attitudes are used to draw the bounds which English Canada would set on Quebec's independence.

CHAPTER I

FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND IN CANADA

Any overview of modern federal theory must begin with the work of K.C. Wheare. Published in 1946 when interest in federalism was intense due to its imminent application in former colonies, his Federal Government is considered the 'classic' in the field. Using the United States as paradigm, Wheare derived the federal principle, "that method of dividing powers so that the general and regional governments are each, within a sphere, co-ordinate and independent."¹ With this yardstick, he examined both the constitutions of federal states and the actual operation of their governments, the latter being the essential facet of the study.² Although later criticized for excessively emphasizing institutions to the neglect of social factors, he had nonetheless carried through a new type of analysis which pointed the way to the very positions from which he would be attacked.

For Wheare did attempt to isolate the necessary prerequisites of the federal form of government and recognized as most important that "the communities or states concerned must desire to be under a single independent government for some purposes at least. That is essential."³ Yet just as essential is that they also desire to remain somewhat distinct. Sets of contrary factors such as military insecurity combined with divergent economic interests produce this balance of wills. And with regard to the capacity to operate the federation, an even more important factor than similarity of institutions is the simple "desire" to maintain it: Wheare did recognize that the major weakness of federalism is not solely institutional;

It is the continual problem of statesmanship in a federation to avoid the clash of rival loyalties. That the two loyalties must be there is the prerequisite of federal government, but that one should not overpower the other is also a prerequisite.⁴

However, these background factors remain just that; they are static and unexplored. This analysis was used to draw up constitutions for states which had the desire to unite, but could neither explain this desire nor account for later developments.⁵

An examination of legal forms of federalism must always be somewhat retrospective. For example, the notion of 'independent' can be defined as "the mutually irrevocable freedom of each unit to initiate those measures and pursue those ends it believes to be within its ambit of power."⁶ An institutional analysis can deal with legal restraints upon this freedom, or with historical changes in formal spheres of power, but not with the originating impulse to unite, and certainly not with why a state may come to pursue ends it believes should be within its powers.⁷ Davis, after thoughtful consideration, found the federal principle useless for prediction and of value only in describing the juridical relationship; the categories themselves tell nothing of "weakness or strength, radicalism nor conservatism, flexibility nor rigidity in its institutions.. These attributes, if they are meaningful, are functions of the society, not of its legal forms alone."⁸ From this perspective, consideration of institutions is important, but is essentially a focus upon the manifestations of more basic social forces which, by the time changes are reflected in legal form, may have shifted again.

This type of critique flows from the position of W.S. Livingston who, in the 1950s, clearly specified the major alternate approach. It was his contention that institutions are merely instrumentalities of the underlying society: therefore federal government should be regarded as "a device by which the federal qualities of the society are articulated and protected."⁹ It is important that these diversities must be territorially based to find expression in federal structures:

If a society contains territorial groups that are so different from the rest of society that they require some instrumentality to protect and articulate their peculiar qualities, then the society is likely to provide some means for the creation of such an instrumentality.¹⁰

Watts, applying this approach to colonial federations, shows

that federal institutions are only relevant to the middle range of the "spectrum" of societies; that is, those in which there is a rough balance of a large number of factors tending towards integration or independence.¹¹ Stein makes an essential distinction between colonial federations and the union of independent states and argues that more factors should be included to make societal analyses empirical and more broadly comparative.¹²

When one focuses on the federal society however, such comparison may be either impossible or fruitless, simply because the relevant factors are not the same in every federation. As Livingston pointed out;

Societies employ instrumentalities for the expression of diversities in accordance with what men in particular societies think is necessary; and this view of what is necessary and what is not will vary considerably from society to society.¹³

Therefore the weighting of factors must be society-specific and would in practice entail the detailed analysis of individual federations that such global comparison seeks to avoid and transcend. Moreover, diversities along different cleavage lines may be incommensurable. And finally, if we resort to studying the existing institutions, considering them as indicators of social forces, then there is difficulty in interpreting changes and little possibility of prediction.

There is no way to estimate the relative weights of these factors except in results; we have observed already that some are more significant than others, at least within a single society.¹⁴

Problems with comparison arise from the fact that institutions, like cleavages, have different meanings within different societal contexts. If they are rejected as reliable indicators, and the focus is directed upon the underlying society itself, then any overarching categorization of societal cleavages must be sterile for it obscures precisely whatever unique elements make men of distinct cultures feel and act differently.

A related problem occurs within specific societies as the meanings of institutions and cleavages change over time. One reason for this is that the instrumentalities, once in operation, react back on the social base. Thus, in any state,

legislative composition, elite behavior, the party system, and perhaps even citizen loyalties are affected by the institutions:¹⁵ it becomes hard to separate society and instrumentality because "the old means have become ends, and the old techniques have become values."¹⁶ Yet, while existing institutions shape social patterns and channel social forces, it is equally evident that they respond to such forces and may be reformed by them.¹⁷ The problem in analysing any state is to sort out these reciprocal relationships.

One obvious example of this interaction in a federal state is the process of constitutional change through judicial review. Studies of this process have generally tended to be historical and 'classical', but the insistent focus upon the principles as they are written in the constitution and the view of the courts as impartial umpires, gave way in the thirties as young American lawyers taught that the judges' decisions were heavily influenced by their social backgrounds and the political realities as they perceived them.¹⁸ This is now well understood, and a moderate example of the prevailing position as it came to be elaborated in Canada is Russell's Leading Constitutional Decisions.¹⁹ This centrist formulation explicitly moves beyond "the atmosphere of competitive jurisdictions" which characterized the old balance-of-powers doctrine but is not activist in the sense of urging conscious judicial adaptation of the law. The stance is somewhat analogous to Wheare on federalism; while it recognizes that there is discretion in the courts' decisions, as Wheare recognized the importance of background factors, the actual review of cases is conducted largely in terms of decisions' impact upon the formal division of power in the federation. This emphasis is justified on the grounds that although judicial review is affected by social and political forces, as institutions the courts react upon and shape that context.²⁰ In general terms this seems most reasonable, but the current validity of this perspective must be judged according to the actual impact of judicial review in the federation.

There has been no lack of constitutional conflict in

5

Canada, especially in the past decade, but for particular reasons the important decisions of the past thirty years have generally not been made by the formal constitutional arbiters. Instead, the formal division of powers has been circumvented by intergovernmental agreements which have allowed the federal government to exercise great influence in provincial affairs through liberal employment of its spending powers.²¹ Judicial decision has been replaced by negotiated agreements whose constitutionality "has seldom been tested in the courts, at least partly because no government has been willing to risk the programmes being shot down."²² Similarly, the past decade's provincial counter-thrust against federal dominance has not generally been carried through in the courts, but in secret negotiation.²³ This pattern has led one political scientist to state flatly;

The federal-provincial and interprovincial conferences at the political level now fulfil the function formerly carried out at the judicial level by the constitution and the courts.²⁴

There are many reasons for this pattern, but an important one would seem to be French-Canadian mistrust of the Supreme Court as an institution which has historically favoured the central government by reflecting English-Canadian values.²⁵

Yet more important than individual challenges to the distribution of powers is the fact that the constitution has itself been thrown into question. Quebec's persistent demands for fundamental constitutional revision led to the Confederation of Tomorrow Conference in 1967 and to the 1968 decision of the Pearson government to undertake a full-scale review.²⁶ At the Victoria Conference of 1971, major changes in the British North America Act seemed to be agreed upon, but they were later rejected by Quebec: since that time the country has been in a condition of constitutional drift, as the definitive institution of the state has been devalued.

The dilemma was clear: the demand for the constitutional change stemmed from deep conflict; this conflict in turn

meant that consensus on any new constitution would not soon develop, at the same time as the existing one was at least partly discredited. Four years later, the dilemma had not been resolved.²⁷

Even if it is not evident that the constitution is always only an outgrowth of the society (as the more radical members of the societal school might claim), it is clear that an examination of judicial review has not been crucial to the understanding of Canadian federalism for some time.²⁸

One theoretical reflection of this pattern is the strong development in this country of the idea of co-operative federalism. As part of the postwar trend in political analysis toward studying the actual operations of government and the behavior of policy-makers, it involves the recognition that "co-ordinate and independent" exercise of power by the two levels of government is impossible; a focus on the strict functional division of powers must be over-simplifying since governments' responsibilities actually interpenetrate in a 'marble cake' of shared functions.²⁹ Co-operative theorists emphasize that since any government policy affects decisions made in other spheres, federal and provincial authorities must consult and form co-operative relationships in which power is shared and non-centralized.³⁰

The new approach involved a recognition of what was already happening in practice. In spite of some rather strained efforts to show that this pattern has always been the reality in federal systems,³¹ it can only become dominant when governments assume responsibility for the quality of economic and social life in the nation.³² The idea involves implicit assumptions about the role of government: the goal of the federal partnership (which is not between states, as the classic view of the compact theorists holds, but between the states and the central government³³) is to provide political goods for citizens seen as consumers of policy.³⁴ Programmes must be coherent and expert. It is assumed that the issues surrounding them can be rationally resolved according to the characteristics of the problem, or at least, that all involved will eventually agree on the optimal plan. From the beginning the approach is blind to

7

the possibility of irreconcilable issues arising within any given framework, and can never account for change involving the breakdown of the 'federal spirit' of compromise which it assumes.³⁵

More often, the approach is criticized on the grounds that it harbours a centrist bias. In fact, this bias is easily discerned in the work of many American theorists who find the President's strength to be the controlling factor in the balance between centre and periphery:

Those who value the virtues of decentralization which writ large are the virtues of freedom, need not scruple at recognizing the defects of those virtues. The defects are principally the danger that parochial and private interests may not coincide with, or give way to, the nation's interest. The necessary cure for these defects is effective national leadership.³⁶

Similarly, in Canada, Lower saw a gradual centralization flowing from co-operation, F.R. Scott saw centralization through the co-operation forced by technology, J.M. Leger feared and resented it, and J.R. Mallory spoke of "an incestuous relationship in which administrative co-operation has become an effective device for control and initiative from the centre."³⁷ However, these analysts were referring to the actual practice of co-operative federalism, and if its essence is accommodation, then its effect in practice may be centralizing or decentralizing, depending on which side has the initiative and which side is accommodating. During the heyday of such co-operative federalism in Canada (1946-1966), the current flowed in both directions.

The Liberal federal government emerged strong from the war, and when its comprehensive welfare-state proposals were formally rejected by the provinces, it set about to implement them piecemeal.³⁸ The prime tool was the exercise of the federal spending power within a range of shared-cost programmes, and the main lever was a competent and progressive bureaucracy which could reach substantive agreement with opposite numbers in the relatively quiescent provincial administrations.³⁹

In short, the practical workings of the federal system in the post-war decades came to be decided more and more by

politicians and administrators who shared a common interest in making the system work rather than in determining its internal dividing lines.⁴⁰

By 1961, the phrase 'co-operative federalism' was enshrined in the platforms of both the federal Liberal party and the NDP, and it was soon after this moment of recognition that the initiative was reversed.

The major impetus for the shift was the accession to power of the activist Lesage government in Quebec, with its demands for autonomy in fields of provincial jurisdiction and increased tax points to enable it to function effectively within these areas. A high quality civil service produced plans and proposals to move forward a re-awakened province.⁴¹ Of course Quebec was not alone in this resurgence - other provinces had voiced irritation at disruption of their long-term planning by the federal initiatives, and there were social factors tending towards decentralization at work elsewhere⁴² - but it was largely the dynamism of the strong, nationalist-oriented Quebec government which was responsible, by 1964, for placing the federal government on the defensive.

Quebec, with its strong demands, carefully designed proposals, and forceful presentation was effectively setting the agenda for federal-provincial discussion.⁴³

The pendulum had swung so quickly that many national leaders were worried about the evaporation of central dominance and therefore, about national unity itself. Quebec had won large concessions in the social field and aimed for still more autonomy and tax room. It was decided in Ottawa that a new policy was essential and that the line must be held on finances.⁴⁴

At about the same time, Canadian political analysts began to point out some of the flaws in co-operative federalism. It was seen to complicate planning, distort priorities, blur responsibility, and make administration more difficult; at the same time it promoted instability by circumventing the constitution and weakening and restricting the autonomy of the central government.

The direction in which the theory and practice of co-operative federalism are taking us deny this autonomy.⁴⁵

In this context, Donald Smiley's paper "Public Administration and Canadian Federalism", published in 1964, was most important. He distinguished between 'joint' and 'consultative' styles of co-operation; the former had caused conflict because it entails sharing decision-making and responsibility, which "depends on the will and ability of the executives of the two levels of government to devise and implement collaboration agreements".⁴⁶ Since this will to co-operate closely had become strained by Lesage's challenges and the growing awareness in other provinces of divergent goals, Smiley advocated the reaffirmation of the division of powers, single-level responsibility, and constant intercommunication that is the 'consultative' variant of co-operative federalism.

The new federal position was unveiled at the Tax Structure Committee meeting in September 1966 by Finance Minister Mitchell Sharp. Basically, it proposed a stricter delineation of authority, uniform intergovernmental arrangements, adequate resources for each level of government (with federal economic priority for fiscal policy and equalization payments), and machinery for harmonizing policies.⁴⁷ This initiative was met by the provinces with surprised dismay. At the subsequent Federal-Provincial Conference, Ottawa made clear its intention to withdraw from major shared-cost programmes in return for tax concessions to the provinces. It had been a difficult position to take:

Ottawa was caught in a painful dilemma - to allow Quebec to continue its special relationship (which risked, in federal eyes, a threat to national unity), or to assert that all provinces should have the same degree of autonomy as Quebec (which risked a possible paralysis of the federal initiative in dealing with important national problems).⁴⁸

But the choice was made, and the adoption of this formula (which may be called the "two strong" formula⁴⁹), marked the end of truly co-operative federalism in Canada and the beginning of the pattern of negotiating or bargaining. It is perhaps symbolic that the November 1966 Conference was never adjourned: it broke up.

The accommodation essential to co-operation demands that all parties come to see both long-term and short-term interests

as congruent. By the mid-sixties, however, federal-provincial conflict, especially with Quebec, was plainly evident, and the new formula embodied an attempt to disentangle the two parties and reduce friction. The disagreement that had become endemic was to be channelled, while the long-term congruence of goals was reaffirmed. And hence the current problems with a focus on federalism as co-operation; conflict runs against the entire formulation and its underlying assumptions about the polity. The theory explains little about the tenacity with which units will pursue specific demands, or the symbolic pressures acting on elites, and is therefore unable to deal with the possibility that consultation might result not in the best plan for all, but only in further disagreement. It does not recognize the fact that there may be strongly opposed local and national definitions of citizens' needs. And, like most approaches, it could not account for events which signal the demise of its usefulness; in this case, the onset of bargaining.⁵⁰

The approach to federalism which regards it as a bargain is often associated with the work of Riker, who, from an examination of federalism in the United States, derives hypotheses to be tested in other countries.⁵¹ The origins of federations lie in a bargain struck by politicians who desire to expand their territorial control, and those who accept, giving up some independence for the sake of union because their desire to meet some external threat or to share in the spoils of expansion "outweighs any desire they may have for independence."⁵² In this theory, which ignores most societal factors and emphasizes the political manoeuvrings of elites, the balance of desires noted by Wheare is central. But the main object is to explain the maintenance of the structure: Riker refutes the theory of partnership in administration, shows that the original conditions can no longer be operating, and finds that in the U.S., the main institutional factor sustaining the federal pattern is the decentralized party system. This structure, however, may be only an intervening variable:

Standing behind these specific institutional arrangements is a yet more fundamental feature of our life which is the

sense of national and state identification. It is very likely that the basic condition that allows for both centralization and resistance to centralization is the degree of popular identification with national and state governments.⁵³

Riker shies away from this conclusion, calling it close to tautological, and regains the focus on the party system as the chief institutional feature which may distort underlying social forces, but which plays the main role in translating them into patterns of centralization.⁵⁴

A more consistent and applicable bargaining approach is that of Lijphart; he accounts for the smooth running of deeply fragmented societies by examining the interaccommodation of elites who "understand the dangers" of political division.⁵⁵ If these groups are firmly committed to the continued existence of the system and can satisfy the demands of their subcultures, they can hold together a consociational state by maintaining cleavages:

Subcultures with widely divergent outlooks and interests may coexist without necessarily being in conflict: conflict arises only when they are in contact with each other.⁵⁶

In this way, a society which lacks any underlying consensus may be held together politically.

As Lijphart has recognized, this notion is in clear opposition to much current theory on regional integration which assumes that contact must build community and consensus.⁵⁷ Deutsch, for example, defines integration as the attainment within a territory of institutions to ensure peaceful change and a positive sense of community.⁵⁸ Yet his definition of 'sense of community' is extremely weak; it is

...a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreements on at least this one point: that common social problems must and can be resolved by processes of peaceful change.⁵⁹

Deutsch found nine background factors necessary for the 'takeoff' into integration (including the mutual compatibility of main values and unbroken communication links - both unnecessary according to Lijphart), but in several recent cases, not all of

these factors have been present. Moreover, the fact that integration may take anywhere from twenty to one hundred and twenty years to achieve after the objective takeoff point has been reached indicates that important society-specific factors are also operating.⁶⁰ In Canada, even if the crucial point has been passed, it would seem that any integration that may have been achieved is under severe strain.⁶¹ Clearly the Lijphart model is more appropriate to understanding how our two cultures have gotten along 'together'.

Elite accommodation in Canada is often associated with the federal cabinet. The argument is that since 1840, an ad-hoc system of concurrent majorities has been able to operate there because of strong French-Canadian representation.⁶² However, there is certainly doubt as to the effectiveness of this mechanism in safeguarding the interests of French Canadians, and more important, there is currently much dispute over whether the federal cabinet or the government of Quebec speaks for this ethnic group.⁶³

A much more likely locus of accommodation is the process of direct negotiation between governments. In Canada, because the co-operation of programme officials has weakened with tighter control of bureaucracies, disagreement is sharpened and channelled to the political level; regional disputes have become intergovernmental conflicts.

Combined with the inadequacy of national political institutions as arenas for adjustment, and the apparent isolation of federal and provincial political systems, they provide an essential reason for the overall pattern of direct negotiations between senior executives as the dominant form of adjustment.⁶⁴

This pattern is the norm at the present time under the "two strong" formula, and it was especially clear in the bargaining over constitutional revision.⁶⁵ In this debate, it was the fundamental contention of the Trudeau government that the most essential goal is national unity:

Provincial governments will contribute to this venture at the same time as they are contributing to the social and cultural development of their provinces and regions. For

these two are not conflicting goals. As the several regions and cultures of Canada flourish, as her two main linguistic communities flourish, so Canada will flourish as well.⁶⁵

But the ultimate product of the revision process was rejected by Quebec:

✓ The disagreement stemmed from the fundamentally different views of Confederation held by Quebec and Ottawa and the English-speaking provinces. That is what led to the debate, that is what prevented agreement. It would continue to do so unless there were major revisions in the objectives of either side.⁶⁷

The cleavage is clear and deep, in spite of the attempted regulation of conflict: Ottawa speaks for the whole country; Quebec speaks for itself. For the moment, both sides continue to bargain and the consociation holds together. But how can the outcome be predicted?

According to the Lipphart model, for the system to continue, there must be a low total load of demands and widespread approval of rule by elite cartel, or at least the elites must command the loyalty of their subcultures.⁶⁸ It would seem that if one subculture is in a permanent minority position, or becomes aware of differences in interests, or is unwilling to support the larger whole which the bargaining maintains, then these conditions collapse, and the whole with them.⁶⁹ The elite of the subculture, forced to satisfy popular demands, could withdraw from bargaining, although it is much more likely that another elite embodying demands for change would replace it. The crucial consideration, however, is that underlying social factors within the subculture provide the drive for the maintenance or breakdown of the consociation. Therefore, a focus on elites, the institutions within which they function, their strategies, and the short-term bargains reached is not sufficient to understand potential outcomes. The approach is useful for indicating the central problems of a federation which has reached this stage, but cannot answer its own paradigmatic question which depends on values and value changes within the subcultures - "Is the bargain worthwhile?"

In dealing with the question of political culture and federalism thus revealed, one must examine the processes through which differences in values and identities shape the evolution of a federal society and its government. All the approaches examined have considered these basic processes to be the impetus for federal change, but none have focused directly upon them. The reluctance to explore this level is grounded in a fear of tautology: a sense of community or a change in national identification seems to develop by 'pulling itself up by the bootstraps', so scientists hesitate to use it as a major explicandum.⁷⁰ However, as the present treatment has attempted to illustrate, federal theory has been consistently retrospective; to answer the most crucial questions about changes in federalism, and to estimate the direction of the Canadian federation, theories which focus on the less elemental manifestations of changes in culture and identification are of limited value. To assume that identification, both political and cultural, can be accounted for without residue by other factors is misleading: although the prevailing sense of national identification is doubtless influenced by many other elements, there exists some evidence, necessarily indirect, to show that it has a weight of its own which may, at times, be crucial.

Thomas Franck and his associates have conducted inquiries into the failure of the federations of East Africa, Central Africa (Rhodesia and Nyasaland), the West Indies, and Malaysia.⁷¹ The goal was to examine each case individually and explore the possibilities for inductive generalization; from cases of failure, Franck attempts to find prerequisites for success.⁷² Three levels of state goals and factors were isolated: the tertiary level, that of bargain-striking, where factors include the desire for ethnic balance and goals may be the reduction of friction or national independence; the secondary level, that of a general coalition of interests, where factors are similar values and complementary economies, and goals include the provision of common services and security; and the primary level, where the federal value is paramount, with factors such as

popular or elite charisma, and goals of federation for its own sake and national greatness.⁷³ It was found that secondary factors alone (essentially the prerequisites of Deutsch and Riker) will not ensure success: in the failed federations studied, the only element consistently missing was the primary level of goal-factors. For federations to be certain of continuing, it is necessary that "the leaders and their followers must 'feel federal' - they must be moved to think of themselves as one people."⁷⁴ Without this national feeling, the federation may fail. Some possibilities are suggested for its occurrence: it may be fostered by charismatic leaders or events, or perhaps built gradually upon the secondary level. But while secondary factors may promote this commitment, they cannot guarantee it, and institutions alone are not certain to build it. There must be some significant fund of shared experience to form the collectivity.⁷⁵

This analysis is most useful in isolating the underlying basis for the integration of federations - the sense of national identification. The essential question is whether citizens identify with the whole country or regard their own state unit as a whole unto itself. Given the recent evolution of the Canadian federation towards the exposure of this question, an emphasis on national identification seems most important at present. Naturally, this factor has already been widely recognized as critical to the future of the country.

If, in an established federation, the "terminal community" (i.e.: the largest community which effectively commands men's loyalty) becomes identified as the region, the federal system is in a process of disintegration, although the rituals of federalism may long remain.⁷⁶

Ramsay Cook has written that the most serious threat to Canada is that "French Canadians would come to identify their nation solely with the provincial state."⁷⁷ And it is the goal of establishing such a community which has motivated recent pleas for nation-building policies.⁷⁸

Franck assumes that once attained, the primary-level commitment is maintained: it seems, however, that strains in

secondary factors could cause deep questioning and fragmentation in the community. The situation in Canada at present could be either: some would say we never achieved full unity as a nation;⁷⁹ others that strains, especially economic ones, are disrupting existing unity.⁸⁰ Can it be claimed that there exists a real split? If it becomes institutionalized in an independent Quebec, what will be the effects? These questions, at this time, can best be answered by examining the political culture of the federation. But first it is necessary to turn briefly to Quebec to consider the choices that must be made at the level of national identification.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. K.D. Wheare, Federal Government, 4th ed. rev. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p10.
2. This was an inquiry into "the workings of federal government". Ibid., p1. See also ibid., p20, p33.
3. Ibid., p35. The prerequisites are developed in pp35-39.
4. Ibid., p49. This is strikingly similar to the conclusion of the Canadian J.A. Corry who worked within a framework similar to Wheare's:
 Nevertheless, in these democratic aggregates with which we are concerned, sentiment and opinion, molded and canalized no doubt by material factors, will decide where power lies.
 (From J.A. Corry, 'Constitutional Trends and Federalism', pp92-125 in Evolving Canadian Federalism, ed. A.R.M. Lower and F.R. Scott (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1958), p115.
5. For a clear statement of this limitation see E. McWhinney, Comparative Federalism, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p95.
6. R. Davis, 'The Federal Principle Reconsidered', pp3-33 in American Federalism in Perspective, ed. A. Wildavsky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p32.
7. The use of 'necessary prerequisites' involves some methodological problems. Historically derived, they obtain (if no errors or omissions have been committed) only until the present: that is, they have been necessary for all cases so far. When the condition of "similar institutions" is not present in the formation of some future federation, it will no longer be a necessary prerequisite. Wheare avoided this problem by using "desire" as the major factor and showing that the other conditions influence this, but he still held the others to be necessary. An essay by Birch is most helpful here, for he points out concrete errors in various compilations of prerequisites, and in effect demonstrates that the most reliable set is the one which is most vague; A.H. Birch, 'Approaches to the Study of Federalism', pp3-20 in Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality?, ed. J. Mackison (Toronto: Methuen, 1968). On the logic of these attempts, see W.S. Robinson, 'The Logical Structure of Analytic Induction', American Sociological Review (hereafter called ASR) vol. 16 (1961): pp812-818.
8. Davis, 'Federal Principle', p15.
9. S. Livingston, 'A Note on the Nature of Federalism', pp33-47 in Wildavsky, American Federalism, p37.

10. Ibid., p40.
11. R. Watts, New Federations: Experiments in the Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966). His factors include the desire for independence, geography, leadership, the influence of the U.K., differences in institutions, and so on. In fact, he deals with so many that the only reasonable account to be made is historical.
12. M. Stein, 'Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies', World Politics vol. 20 (1968): pp721-747.
13. Livingston, 'The Nature of Federalism', p40. For a fuller treatment of this point, see Watts, New Federations, chap.13.
14. Livingston, 'The Nature of Federalism', p41.
15. On legislative composition, see A. Cairns, 'The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada, 1921-1965', Canadian Journal of Political Science (hereafter called CJPS) vol.1 (March 1968): pp55-80. On elite behaviour, see Richard Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p38. On the party system, see F. Englemann and M. Schwartz, Political Parties and the Canadian Social Structure (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p128.
 Many analysts have shown how regional loyalties may be reinforced by regional governments. For a suggestive essay, see H. Jeune, 'Federalism and Political Integration', pp213-233 in Federalism: Infinite Variety in Theory and Practice, ed. V. Earle (Itasca, Ill.: E.E. Peacock, 1968). A Canadian treatment is E. Black and A. Cairns, 'A Different Perspective on Canadian Federalism', pp81-97 in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, esp. pp93-4.
16. Livingston, 'The Nature of Federalism', p47.
17. This is a simple statement of a fundamental problem. Sorting out the relative influences of the two grand sets of elements is impossible in general; it is only within a specific society at a particular time that one can hope to disentangle society and instrumentality to ascribe causal impact to one or the other. The rest of Chapter 1 seeks to do this in the Canadian case.
18. Whereas Dicey, in his Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, 8th ed., (London: MacMillan, 1924), had no chapter on the discretion of judges, Jennings did, albeit a short one; The Law and the Constitution (London: University of London Press, 1933). But in America, the search for the "personal equation" in judicial decision had led to works like F. Gaudet, 'Individual Differences in the Sentencing Tendencies of Judges' (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1938), and Warner and Cabot, Judges and Law Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1936).
19. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), 2nd ed..

20. Russell admits that a determinant of interpretation has been the judges' "implicit commitment to a certain view of federalism or some other economic or social value." (pxviii). But he is very discreet in introducing us to this reality; see the passage that begins, "On questions such as these, rational men can differ..." (pxvi). For a less hesitant view, see A.R.M. Lower, 'Theories of Canadian Federalism - Yesterday and Today', pp3-53 in Lower and Scott, eds., Canadian Federalism, esp. pp38-40, on the Persons case.
21. See Donald V. Smiley, 'The Rowell-Sirois Report, Provincial Autonomy, and Post-War Canadian Federalism', in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, pp65-81. See also Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality (Toronto: Methuen, 1967), pp42-3.
22. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p30.
23. These discussions mainly concern finances, but constitutional questions underlie them. Under the pressure of events, however, these fundamentals may be glossed over as governments "agree to disagree" and carry on negotiations on substantive matters. See Caplan, 'Offshore Mineral Rights: Anatomy of a Federal-Provincial Conflict', Journal of Canadian Studies vol. 5 (February 1970): pp50-61. For a statement of the general theoretical advantages of such government by consultation, see Léon Dion, 'Politique Consultative et Système Politique', CJPS vol. 2 (June 1969): pp226-244.
24. A. Dubuc, 'The Decline of Confederation and the New Nationalism', pp112-132 in Nationalism in Canada, ed. P. Russell (Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966), p129. Simeon, in Federal-Provincial Diplomacy (esp. pp23-38), gives a good overall account of this pattern of direct negotiation. Although a factor, this resort to top-level discussion does not in itself explain the devaluation of judicial review. The two go hand-in-hand in an increasingly fluid situation caused by social factors.
25. See J.-Y. Morin, 'Le Québec et L'Arbitrage Constitutionnelle', pp169-182 in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, esp. p182: because judges are federally-appointed, "Le pouvoir central est à la fois juge et partie".

Quebec resentment of the court is based both on considerations of power and on conscious differences in values: as McWhinney (Comparative Federalism, p77) has said,

Insofar as these 'Open Society' values accord essentially with the attitudes of the English-speaking majority of Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada has preferred national values over provincial values.

The Victoria Charter included a provision that three Supreme Court justices be from Quebec. This type of formal ascription may well be the end result of 'recognitions' like Russell's, and of their extension by the activists like McWhinney to the position that since the courts do make policy, it should be done more or less consciously. They do not seem to realize that if this role is adopted, there is no alternative but diminished legitimate influence:

once the courts are widely seen as conscious wielders of power, judges will not be able, "when necessary", to "retire discreetly into judicial self-restraint" (McWhinney, Comparative Federalism, p99), for even this will be regarded as a political act.

On the theme of the emergent 'federalism of politics' in Canada, see Livingston, 'Canada, Australia, and the United States: Variations on a Theme', in Earle, Federalism, pp94-141.

26. For a good short account, see Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, chap. 5.
27. Ibid. p91.
28. Dubuc, 'Decline of Confederation', p113, maintains that a constitution is "the outgrowth of that society at a given moment in its historical evolution". Therefore, to submit that it has no importance at present because of the pattern of negotiation and its devaluation in the eyes of decision-makers, is to say that it has no basis in social reality. It is detached from a society with which it is no longer congruent.
29. The idea of the 'marble cake' sharing of powers is found in C.J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice (New York: Fredrick Praeger, 1968). I believe the term was originally used by Grodzins.
30. See D.J. Elazar, American Federalism: A View From the States (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1966), esp. chap. 1.
31. See Grodzins, 'The Federal System', pp256-277 in Wildavsky, American Federalism, esp. p260.
32. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism, p27. Also see Watts, New Federations, p12. On the Canadian case, see Corry, 'Constitutional Trends', p96.
33. Elazar, American Federalism, pvi: federalism is the "end product of a covenant uniting separate parties without merging them - in other words, a partnership."
34. See *ibid.*, p2: federalism ties "all levels of government together functionally in the common task of serving the American people." The system is sustained because it provides "most interests with enough satisfactions to convince them that it works." (*Ibid.*, p205)
35. See Friedrich, Trends of Federalism, p39 on the 'federal spirit', a pragmatic attitude of compromise and accommodation held by decision-makers who do not insist on fundamental agreement, "and similar forms of doctrinal rigidity." W.R. Lederman has used the phrase in a recent article, 'The British Parliamentary System and Canadian Federalism', in One Country or Two?, ed. R.M. Burns (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1971): pp17-39. (Continued overleaf)

More concretely, Donald Smiley drew attention to the role played by experts with similar value orientations in formulating joint federal-provincial programmes in his article, 'Public Administration and Canadian Federalism' in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, pp271-287. In spite of the fact that truly co-operative federalism is a thing of the past in Canada, the idea occasionally surfaces because of its close links to managerial notions of government, and its 'middle-of-the-road' appeal. See M. LaLonde, 'Notes for a Speech by Mark LaLonde QC', a speech delivered to the Liberal Businessman's Club, Royal York Hotel, Toronto; October 5, 1972. Also interesting in this regard is R.G. Robertson, 'The Canadian Parliament and Cabinet in the Face of Modern Demands', in Contemporary Issues in Canadian Politics, eds. F. Vaughan et al. (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1970), pp151-158.

36. Grodzins, 'Federal System', p277. See also Friedrich's discussion of the Canadian situation, where federalism "is impeding integration", but "if it contains adequate integrative devices, this disadvantage may be kept at a minimum" (Trends of Federalism, p61). This statement approaches tautology, and makes little sense other than to reveal his biases. As for prediction, he finds it "difficult to delineate future developments". With this kind of analysis, no wonder.
37. A.R.M. Lower, 'Theories of Canadian Federalism', esp. pp48-50. F.R. Scott, 'French Canada and Canadian Federalism', pp54-91 in Lower and Scott, Evolving Canadian Federalism, esp. pp89-90. J.M. Leger, 'Le "fédéralisme coopératif" ou le nouveau visage de la centralisation', in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, pp317-320. J.R. Mallory, 'The Five Faces of Federalism', pp3-15 in The Future of Canadian Federalism, ed. P. Crépeau and C.B. MacPherson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), p9.
38. Mallory, 'Faces of Federalism', p8. See also Smiley, Canadian Political Nationality, pp35-43.
39. Smiley, 'Public Administration and Canadian Federalism', esp. pp272-3.
40. Black and Cairns, 'A Different Perspective', p86. The initiatives towards welfare statism came from English Canada, and although Duplessis' Quebec resisted, it did so at great cost: see John Meisel, '"Cancel Out and Pass On": A View of Canada's Options', pp139-167 in Burns, One Country or Two?, esp. pp144-5. The other provinces, unmotivated by "La Survivance", in broad agreement with the general goals, and in need of funds, accommodated to the various federal initiatives.
41. See A.W. Johnson, 'The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada', pp98-119 in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, esp. pp99-100.

42. Smiley, 'Rowell-Sirois and Post-War Canadian Federalism', pp74-78; and, on social changes in the other provinces, Black and Cairns, 'A Different Perspective', pp88-9; pp93-4. An important factor in the shift towards decentralization was the general increase in the competence of the provincial bureaucracies; see Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p224.
43. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p51. Thus, by 1964, Quebec's pension plan had been adopted by the federal government, and the right to opt out of shared-cost programmes, with compensation, had been secured. See *ibid.*, chap. 3, and Peter Newmann, The Distemper of Our Times (Winnipeg: Greywood, 1968), chap. 22. Finally useful is Ramsay Cook, 'Canada and the French Canadian Question', pp6-25 in his collection of essays of the same title (Toronto: MacMillan, 1966), p15.
44. See Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, pp64-68, p172, and p284. Also Newmann, Our Times, pp291-7. The men set to work on the new policy were Tom Kent, Gordon Robertson, R. B. Bryce, and probably most important, Dr. A.W. Johnson, assistant deputy minister of finance with special responsibility for federal-provincial relations.
45. Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism, and the Scope of Public Activity in Canada', pp95-111 in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, p109. See also Smiley, 'Rowell-Sirois and Post-War Canadian Federalism', which was first published in 1962. Also interesting is Eugene Forsey, 'Concepts of Federalism: Some Canadian Aspects', in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, pp348-354. This paper, notable for its hard line against Quebec demands, was first delivered to the 1965 Couchiching Conference. But the 'one-nation' conservatives were even more upset by this time: see, for example, W.L. Morton, 'The Conservative Principle in Confederation', Queen's Quarterly (hereafter called QQ) vol. 71 (Summer 1964): pp528-546.
46. Smiley, 'Public Administration and Canadian Federalism', p274. This essay was first published in Canadian Public Administration vol. 7 (September 1964): pp371-388. For a more detailed consideration of the notion, see Joel Weiner, 'The Development of Consultative Federalism' (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1969).
47. See Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, pp76-79. For an accessible statement of the federal position, see Mitchell Sharp, 'The Objectives of Canadian Federalism: A Federal View' (excerpted from The Federal-Provincial Tax Structure Committee, September 14 and 15, 1966 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1966)) in Public Finance in Canada: Selected Readings, eds. A.J. Robinson and James Cuttino (Toronto: Methuen, 1968), pp109-111.
For what it is worth, Peter Newmann, in Our Times (p297), reports that upon presentation of the brief, Mitchell Sharp was nearly embraced by Eugene Forsey, who exclaimed, "My

- God, at last somebody's standing up for Canada!" This may not be entirely accurate, but there can be little doubt that the new position marked a definite turning point in the evolution of Canadian federalism. For a detailed account of the events leading up to the meeting, see Weiner, 'Development of Consultative Federalism', pp134-63. Also interesting is Smiley, 'Canadian Federalism and the Resolution of Federal-Provincial Conflict', pp48-66 in Vaughan, Contemporary Issues.
48. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p284.
 49. For "strong regional and strong federal governments", a phrase which designated A.W. Johnson's favoured federal option which was elaborated in a semi-official paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, June 1967, 'The Dynamics of Federalism in Canada', reprinted in Meekison, Canadian Federalism, pp98-119.
 50. In spite of Smiley's effort to keep "consultative federalism" within the co-operative rebric, and hence practice a sort of conceptual boundary-maintenance, the seeds of future conflict are clearly present in his definition of consultative federalism. Both levels of government are to be informed of the values and objectives of plans, "whenever the interests of both are involved". To governments concerned with long-term planning, and with increased budgetary control, it is evident that the interests of both will almost always be seen to be involved. In a later work, The Canadian Political Nationality, Smiley, like Grodzins, was to emphasize firm new leadership and charismatic policies as a solution to conflict.
 51. W. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964). His methodology is similar to Wheare's in that he measures other cases against one archetypal federation: this approach is really semi-comparative or 'projective'.
 52. Ibid., p12. But see Birch's important test of this theory which results in a suggested reformulation to include internal threats to regime security as well: Birch, 'Approaches to Federalism', p19. This may rob the prerequisites, already rather global (see note 7 above) of whatever incisive power they may have had. Certainly the factors were pertinent in the origins of the Canadian federation, given the fear of the United States, the internal deadlock, and the desire to control the West at the time of Confederation; however, the step-by-step extension and evolution of the federation may be more difficult to explain with these rather gross factors.
 53. Riker, Federalism, p104.

54. It is interesting that Riker later returns to his original position, and does so much more radically, in his review article, 'Six Books in Search of a Subject, or Does Federalism Exist and Does it Matter?', Comparative Politics vol. 2 (Spring 1969): pp135-146. Here he provocatively decides that federalism itself is an unimportant intervening variable between political culture and decentralization. The institutions of regional government are significant in the origin of the federation, but "what maintains or destroys local autonomy is not the more or less superficial feature of federalism, but the more profound characteristics of the political culture." (p142) Hence, the party system merely "expresses" these cultural characteristics. This is a rather careless reduction, for it ignores the influence of the structure on the regional loyalties, which certainly has some importance in the United States. Riker is correct in pointing to the basic dynamic, but overstates his case: it is only appropriate to examine political culture directly when its influence is crucial and its nature unreadable through institutional indicators. His glib conclusion - "federalism is a fiction", so "In the study of federal governments, therefore, it is always appropriate to go behind the fiction to study the real forces in a political system" (p146) - is simply misleading. There is no single approach that is always appropriate.
55. A. Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy', World Politics vol. 21 (1969): pp207-225.
56. Ibid., p219.
57. See Lijphart, 'Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration', CJPS vol. 4 (March 1971): pp1-14, esp. pp3-7.
58. K. Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), chap. 1. See also t.B. Haas, 'International Integration: The European and the Universal Process', International Organization vol. 15 (1961): pp366-392.
59. Deutsch, Political Community, p5. This is made deliberately weak because he hopes to avoid the "easy" use of some intangible force of nationalism as a supposed cause of union or separation (p19). However, he does redefine the concept later: the notion of community relevant to integration is "a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties, of 'we-feeling', trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests" (p36). This is more in line with A. Etzioni, Political Unification (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965), who sees as one of three major elements of unity that the central authority must be the dominant focus of political identification for the large majority of politically aware citizens (pp4-5). Deutsch, in his investigation, found pluralistic security communities to be more stable than unified (amalgamated) ones. The reason for this apparent disagreement with Etzioni is that in Deutsch's framework, an amalgamated security

community required a common government, but no common identification with that government. Thus Deutsch's examples of failed amalgamated security communities "lack at least one central element of integration, that of being the dominant focus of political identification of their citizens" (Etzioni, Unification, ppix-xx).

60. Deutsch, Political Community, p85. On the lack of factors in some cases, see Birch, 'Approaches to Federalism', p10. Birch also points out that such an approach - 'beginning with a large number of cases and attempting to establish some uniformities as necessary - "involves such a radical process of abstraction and generalization that the sense of concrete reality is apt to disappear." (pp19-20)
61. This strain is perhaps due to one of the factors Deutsch isolates as promoting disintegration - an increase in ethnic or linguistic differentiation or "a rise in the political awareness of such differences as may already exist" (Ibid., p62). The mechanisms of this process are not explored in his book, but that this dynamic is neglected by a theorist writing in the hopeful dawn of a united Europe is not surprising.
62. See Ramsay Cook, 'Quebec, Ontario, and the Nation', in Cook, French Canadian Question, pp26-42. Also Lederman, 'Parliamentary System and Federalism', esp. pp26-38.
63. At times of national crisis, there can be no doubt that the English-Canadian majority has prevailed, although the French Canadians may be able to exert some influence on timing. See Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism', p100. Also relevant is Justice Rand's decision in the Padlock case, cited in Lower, 'Theories of Canadian Federalism', p43.
 Accommodation within the federal government is distrusted not only because of numerical weakness, but also because of the quality of the representation, especially under the Liberals:
 The party strategists had but to find an acceptable stablemaster - Laurier, LaPointe, St. Laurent - and the trained donkeys sitting in the back benches could be trusted to behave.
 (P.E. Trudeau, 'Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec', pp103-123 in his Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1968), p120). Plus ça change...
64. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p38. On the tighter control of programme officials, see Smiley, 'Public Administration and Federalism', pp280-81. Also useful is G. Veilleux, Les Relations Intergouvernementales au Canada: 1867-1967 (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université de Québec, 1971), esp. Table 1, p54, which shows the relative increase of higher-level - political - officials at various federal-provincial conferences. The idea that the provinces form the real opposition in Canadian politics is, however, an old one: see Harold Innis, 'Decentralization and Democracy', Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,

(hereafter called CJEPS) vol. 9 (1943): pp317-330.

65. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, chap. 4.
66. The Rt. Hon. P.E. Trudeau, The Constitution and the People of Canada, document prepared for the second meeting of the Constitutional Conference, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, February, 1969), p10.
67. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p121.
68. Lijphart, 'Consociational Democracy', pp221-2. See also S. Noel, 'Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism', CJPS vol. 4 (March 1971): pp15-18.
69. See Lijphart, 'Cultural Diversity', pp10-11; he assumes that each group will have a fair degree of autonomy, a mutual veto, and roughly proportional representation.
70. See Riker, Federalism, p109, and Deutsch, Political Community, p19. It is interesting, however, that both writers waver about this position; see notes 54 and 59 above.
71. T. Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail (New York: New York University Press, 1968).
72. This is formally different from the attempt to test derived hypotheses. To examine holistically and derive principles is quite a different strategy than that of setting out with propositions to test. Working under the latter method, one inescapably tends to distort and to select supportive data. (See, for example, Birch, 'Approaches to Federalism', for very different accounts of the Nigerian and Malaysian cases than those sketched by Riker in Federalism.) Of course, it is impossible to detach oneself completely and examine something as complex as a federal country 'in itself', but this is a matter of emphasis, and it seems the inductive approach leaves one more flexible and open to revising theory.
 Franck's methodology is different in another way as well: it is the inverse of the strategy chosen by many others who examine successful federations to derive prerequisites necessary for success. He attempts to find what was missing in failed federations. There are problems with this approach; the positing of the absence of a factor as a cause of failure is questionable - after all, there were no snowballs in any of these federations either. But there are also difficulties with the inverse strategy: if one posits factors necessary for success, then one has difficulty in consistently explaining failure, and there is a tendency to indicate too many factors since the list has to cover all cases. Some may well be coincidental or superfluous in some federations. It seems that Franck's type of analysis, and his findings (which are convincing enough to overcome the snowball problem), show the only way to isolate the factor in federalism that makes the complex of other factors sufficient for success.

73. Franck, Why Federations Fail, pp171-2.
74. Ibid., pp173-4. See also R. Watts, 'The Survival or Disintegration of Federations', pp41-72 in Burns, One Country or Two?, p63:
 While an essential feature of any federal system is the autonomy of provincial governments making possible regional distinctiveness, federations which have failed to develop a positive consensus among their different regional groups have almost inevitably disintegrated.
75. Judging that the possibility of forging consensus is limited at present, Franck foresees a trend of "post-federalism"; that is, arrangements based on complex, pragmatic forms of association between states. Essentially economic, these unions will be governed by set rules of association and/or an impartial administration. Thus they will be organized flexibly and functionally and will balance local politicians and centralizing bureaucrats. (Franck, Ibid., pp184-190). See also P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organizations: Patterns for New Legal Structures (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1968), esp. chap. 8.
76. Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism', p97. See also R. Watts, Multicultural Societies and Federalism, Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1970), esp. p27, pp47-50.
77. Cook, 'The Meaning of Confederation', pp168-189 in his French Canadian Question, p187.
78. See Smiley, Canadian Political Nationality, and also Stephen Clarkson, 'A Programme for Binational Development', in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, pp133-150.
79. This lack of identification is implicit, for example, in Trudeau, 'The New Treason of the Intellectuals', in his Federalism, pp151-181.
80. See Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism', p107, on the fragmentation of national social organizations along Quebec/Canada lines.

CHAPTER 2

THE POSITION OF QUEBEC

It may seem strange, after going to such lengths to show the critical importance of national identification for the future of the Canadian federation, that the present study does not principally concern Quebec. Instead, the purpose is to explore the second aspect of the problem, the English-Canadian sense of identification, because the position of Quebec is assumed as a given. We assume, in the light of considerable evidence, that many Québécois do in fact feel primary allegiance to their own state and that this attachment is likely to become more widespread. Of course, this future is only a possibility, but it is certainly a conceivable one, and while the Quebec situation will not be explored here in depth, it is upon the belief in this emergent reality that the investigation of English-Canadian national identification is based. It seems at present that the country is still at the impasse noted by Smiley in 1965:

Canadians and Canadiens do not agree on the community to which they give their primary allegiance - Canada or French Canada - and this difference in allegiances makes impossible any agreement on the appropriate distribution of powers and privileges between federal and provincial governments.¹

The form of eventual agreement will depend on both groups, so here, before concentrating on the English side of the equation, we shall briefly examine the Quebec situation.

Much of the conflict discussed in the preceeding chapter centred around finances. In the sixties, there was an effort on the part of the provinces, led by Quebec, to improve their financial position relative to the central government. Thus one could perhaps see the present strains in the federation as simply flowing from competition for scarce resources - certainly the provinces have forcefully pressed their demands in this area, and it has been argued that because provincial services are labour intensive and have a relatively high income elasticity of demand, a financial swing in favour of state units, such as has occurred in Canada, is quite normal.² But this account is

not sufficient: not only do federal allocations distort existing provincial priorities, they also interfere with the felt needs of the provinces to finance new programmes. In short, while the central government controls the lion's share of the resources, the latent fiscal conflict can only be perceived because the provinces have goals and plans of their own.

Tax-sharing is essentially a question of persuading Ottawa to abate more; equalization, for the beneficiaries, is similarly a matter of asking Ottawa to be more generous. In neither case do the provinces control requisite actions.³

This lack of autonomy may not be greatly regretted if the plans pursued and the values underlying them are shared by both parties, but if they diverge, there will be constant wrangling as every question involves fundamental issues of right and principle. Thus, whereas the pragmatic federal Liberals hope to see issues as being "considered and debated on their merits rather than on the basis of doctrinaire attitudes which have little relation to reality and to the problems involved",⁴ those provinces which attempt to define goals and to plan for their own ends must engage in frustrating conflict.

Le résultante est l'accroissement des 'zones grises', la négation systématique de toute répartition constitutionnelle en tant soit peu claire des compétences gouvernementales, l'essoufflement stérilisant des hommes politiques et des fonctionnaires en conflit les uns avec les autres et le gaspillage de ressources humaines et financières.⁵

While all provinces except the most poor and dependent are involved in disputes with the federal government, these largely concern relative financial resources and means: conflict with Quebec, on the other hand, centres around finances, but this is rather a manifestation of differences in ends which result from the province's unique position as homeland of a nation. Its disputes with the federal government go deeper than the other provinces which generally agree with Ottawa on goals of 'national unity' and development, for these disputes have centred around the need for autonomy created by a resurgence of separate national feeling.⁶ Quebec must set policy for itself.

Nationalism has always been an arousing topic. We approach it with distaste or fling ourselves into it: we hesitate

to give it any weight, or see it as a powerful force. Elie Kedourie refers to it as a mere invented doctrine⁷, and Deutsch hesitates to ascribe any real substance to it:

Nationalism has in fact appeared as such a dominant power, a power not so much in its own right, but like a whirlpool, the visible expression of the meeting of other forces which created it.⁸

A useful way of looking at it is as a real issue which may come to be central to the politics of a state.⁹ Thus we can trace its rise, impact, and the ideological stance which comes to dominate the issue and lend it direction.¹⁰ It is an understatement to say that the national issue is important in Quebec.

Generally, French-Canadian nationalism is seen as arising due to the recent rapid modernization of the province. The strains and dislocations of this process create both a sense of normlessness, and new classes arise whose interests lie in being at the levers of control of further change. In this vein, J.J. Deutsch finds nationalism filling the transcendent void left by the decline of the Church, Taylor stresses the importance of urbanization and social mobility, and Guindon shows how the old conservative nationalism has become dynamic with modernization.¹¹ Ideologically, when historical attention was focused once more on the Conquest, it was 'pessimistic', for it was then that French Canada was thought to have been deprived of its potential for full national autonomy. This current of thought made nationalism and modernization compatible.¹² Now, the new nationalism is based on a drive to remake the province, to project it into the future:

The nationalism of growth, in essence and vocation, is pragmatic rather than doctrinaire. In effect, its destination is to permit energies and talents to emerge in action.¹³

It is easy to see why this drive is limited to French Canadians in Quebec. While national issues are generally associated with a perceived threat, it is only in Quebec that there is majority control of a governmental apparatus strong enough to counter it.¹⁴ Since 1896, when the province supported Laurier's stand against federal intervention in provincial cultural affairs, La Vérendrye's dream of a French presence from

coast to coast was doomed; at the same time, however, Quebec was preserved.

The French Canadian could stay French in public as well as in private, in official as well as in unofficial life only in Quebec.¹⁵

Elsewhere in the country, French is steadily losing the competition of languages, and it is doubtful that the official policy of Bilingualism, this 'assurance-séparatisme', will have a great deal of impact, least of all in Quebec itself, where the debate has gone far beyond the question of bilingual districts throughout Canada.¹⁶

Language is very important of course; it is a highly visible means of recognizing the differences that the national issue rests upon, and it helps preserve deeper differences, for it makes possible the sharing of meanings within a culture. It is upon these shared meanings and values as they are embedded in historical experience that a culture finally rests, and while there is great dispute as to how culture should be approached, it is clear that these intersubjective foundations give to a culture its claim to global distinctiveness.¹⁷

Personality is never completely reducible to individuality, A common culture implies, therefore, a common psychological reality, a common way of perceiving and understanding the world, and being motivated to act in it with relation to commonly sensed goals, values, and satisfactions. It is in this sense that culture is intrinsic to the human personality as well as a variable but ubiquitous feature of all the societies of mankind.¹⁸

Any human act, even in its first expression in the person of a single individual, is a group product to begin with.¹⁹

Although this latter statement may seem rather strong, we may at least agree that because the behavioural environment is culturally constituted, the culture involves more than language; as the governor of perception, it may be seen as involving everything.²⁰ The nationalist attempt, then, based on the differences revealed in interaction with the Other, is to bring to consciousness this unified cultural world-view among those who share it - to build, and to build upon, a sense of 'we-ness'.²¹

They were attempting to transform the symbolic framework through which people experienced social reality, and thus, to the extent that life is what we make of it all, that reality itself.²²

In any such attempt, there is always the possibility of artificiality. It may seem like a "passion to make a community he will love, like a woman marrying a drunkard in order to reform him."²³ Deutsch attempted to deal with this question, but with little success, for it is extremely difficult to ascribe to a united group of people some form of false consciousness or delusion about their own unity, especially if the people involved carry through their effort. Social scientists may measure differences and similarities among peoples in order to ascribe nationhood or a global culture, but such measurements are certainly open to dispute, not least of all by the subjects themselves:

The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel they are a nation; and it may be that when all the fine-spun analysis is concluded this will be the ultimate statement as well.²⁴

While it is interspersed with a good deal of hopeful rhetoric, there is much concrete evidence that Québécois do form a separate cultural group.²⁵ The success of the nationalist attempt to intensify the issue in Quebec will depend upon the extent of identification with a distinct, global culture.

But the issue is not only whether Québécois continue to derive part of their identity from a distinct culture (and hence maintain it), as they certainly have done in the past; it also depends on whether they are coming to be conscious of such identification and of threats to it. As the Parti Québécois puts it:

Et quant à la culture, on ne cesse en fait d'en parler puisqu'elle englobe le tout. Surtout dans un cas comme le nôtre, où l'autodétermination commence par l'autodéfinition.²⁶

Within the middle classes, this effort to bring the national issue consciously to the forefront seems to be succeeding. Taylor found a strong tendency among the intelligentsia to identify themselves as different; "over and against" the North American norm, Johnson isolated ethnocentric perceptions among

the young, and Hargrove found that such identification, while the most important theme of the new nationalism, did not result, in a chauvinistic sense of superiority:

Rather, the dominant attitude was a sober pragmatism, an awareness of a French identity which had to be preserved because without it there was no identity at all.²⁷

The issue rests on the growth of the belief that Quebec culture is distinct, valuable, and global, and that the province therefore constitutes a group-person with rights of self-determination.²⁸ As we shall see, the nature of this unit is problematical, but nevertheless,

Assuming, therefore, that you accept the existence of ethnic groups as a basic natural and necessary phenomenon, you must also accept the logical consequences, namely that the ethnic group has rights - not merely as a tangential by-product of man's 'right to associate', but as distinct ethnic group rights...the most important one being the right to continue to live.²⁹

For the nationalists, this right entails the power and autonomy necessary for self-determination.

In the case of Quebec, the outcome of the issue is still open. However, given the social and political changes of the past fifteen years, and the recognition of the national issue by both Quebecers and the federal government, it seems unlikely that ethnic accommodation could return to the "mutually desired self-segregated institutions" involved in consociational democracy.³⁰ For similar reasons, the federal-provincial conference may be in decline as a means of settling disputes.³¹ The fundamental stakes of national unity vs Quebec autonomy provide a background for few creative resolutions of conflict. And, given even the present level of national self-consciousness among the new elites in Quebec, it seems doubtful that any new nation-building consensus could suddenly arise throughout Canada.³² Such attempts currently retain an artificial flavour either of trumped-up frontierism or of mobilization for its own sake, or else are obviously inspired by a kind of English-Canadian identity crisis vis-à-vis the United States.³³ A new national purpose is not immediately likely.

If, however, the prominence of the national issue is seen as resulting from the social and economic strains of modernization, then it may simply become less salient as these problems resolve themselves. This is essentially the federal Liberal strategy, born of years of pragmatic adjustment, and currently buttressed by the rationalistic anti-nationalism of Pierre Elliot Trudeau:

I believe that, in the last analysis, a human being in the privacy of his own mind has the exclusive authority to choose his own scale of values and to decide which forces will take precedence over others.³⁴

This is in clear opposition to the cultural emphasis which supports the nationalists. There are three prongs to the Liberal attempt to defuse their appeal: to increase the personal income of French Canadians at all costs³⁵; to increase occupational mobility for the new Quebec elite³⁶; and to combat nationalism of all types:

In Canada, as I will explain later, there is, or will be, a Canadian nation insofar as the ethnic communities succeed in exercising their own respective nationalisms. If, then, a Canadian nationalism does take form, it will have to be exercised in its turn, and the Canadian nation will be asked to yield a part of its sovereignty to a higher authority, just as asked, today, of the French-Canadian and English-Canadian nations. ... Now the history of civilization is a chronicle of the subordination of tribal 'nationalism' to wider interests.³⁷

The aim is to consider the French Canadians in Quebec as another interest group, albeit a strong one, within the North-American liberal framework. It is based on a firm individualism, and a theoretical separation of state and nation that is the counterpart to the kind of vague consensus which Geertz has called "the diffuse sense of common destiny that tends to characterize industrialized states."³⁸ There is little nationalism, less conflict, and only slight leadership, as politics takes the form of the adjustment of interests which are assumed to be fundamentally harmonious.³⁹ Of course, such assumptions are not universally accepted, even within English Canada, for they may well involve the dissolution of that entity.⁴⁰

One other alternative is that the nationalist issue will not be downplayed, but will continue to become more prominent in Quebec as the national awareness grows, and a consensus develops for the independentist option. For instance, the very problems of modernization may come to be seen as more fruitfully resolvable within the new frame of reference of autonomy. While the process seems to have suffered a setback among the middle classes in October 1970, and while the Bourassa government's jailing of the leaders of the Front Commun may have stunted the broadening of the movement, the votes - if not the Parliamentary seats - of the Parti Québécois continue to increase. However, the most central problems may well concern the inner contradictions of the nationalist attempt. The nationalists must build upon a traditional unity, while seeking to transform that tradition at the same time; thus,

It represents the kind of nationalism which can affirm the nation over and against the colonial power, while at the same time denying in the name of a rejuvenated future what the nation has in large part actually been.⁴¹

Geertz has pinpointed this clash of "essentialist" and "epochalist" strains in modern nationalist movements: the first persuasion seeks to preserve the traditional values and social patterns which have always defined the unity of the group by resisting cultural erosion through modernization; the second strain attempts to build up existing solidarity for a unified leap into the modern era, in the course of which the traditional bases of the culture are changed, but unity is maintained.⁴² This tension may be roughly characterized by the Créditistes and the Parti Québécois in contemporary Quebec politics, although the Créditistes appear to be in a process of transformation. Still, Quebec has a more solid fund of unity than many of the new states with which Geertz is concerned; it is not here a question of artificially drumming up solidarity so much as preserving existing unity from cultural and value fragmentation. The Parti Québécois, with its vision of a self-defined drive into the future, has the upper hand in nationalist circles.⁴³ The goal is not to be content with "playing variant melodies within the general theme"⁴⁴ of Canadian liberalism, but to aim,

united, for a distinct and more personal future.

Nationalist movements originate in situations of inequality, tension, and conflict. They begin with an incipient phase of 'unrest' among the intellectuals and develop through the phase of organization in which the popular base of the movement is established by propaganda and education, and during which the growing national solidarity is expressed by more and more definite forms of separatist cultural, political, and sometimes economic associations. Whether this phase will or will not turn into the final phase of stable 'national culture society' depends not only on the 'maturity' of a given movement, but on the magnitude of the forces which oppose its aims.⁴⁵

This directs us towards the other side of the problem, the attitudes and reactions of English-speaking Canadians. If seen as units in interaction, Canada and Quebec continually condition each other's action and therefore Canada sets the bounds of the possible outcomes of the national issue, and vice-versa. At times of severe conflict in the past, it has been the majoritarian strength of the English which has dominated, which is why Brunet has correctly said, "They must never demand of the majority that which the latter cannot give them."⁴⁶ The weight of the majority has been heavily applied during the two world wars, and in the post-war federal expansion, but if culturally based normative cleavages are to be settled by numbers alone, then French Canadians must have little interest in continuing to be part of the whole:

Car si la force du nombre règle seule les rapports entre une majorité et une minorité ethniques, alors la vie en commun devient impossible, il ne reste qu'à se séparer.⁴⁷

Yet, even if the independentist possibility is realized, even after a formal divorce, Canada and Quebec are still locked together on this half of the continent and their inter-relations would be crucial for each unit. Intransigence, misconceptions, and distrust could cripple both units, whereas conceivably, independence could benefit each group.⁴⁸ At present, the situation is one of double-bind. To talk and plan for a sovereign Quebec in the hopes of avoiding great dislocation is to make it more plausible and hasten the event: on the other hand, to refuse to consider the possibility is to be unprepared for its occurrence and to invite confusion and economic disaster.

Predictions tend to become self-fulfilling. To this problem, the Canadian reaction has been a certain fear of speaking: Kenneth McNaught, for example, rejects the idea of associate statehood because "It would make a fact out of what has been so far carefully woven propagandist theory."⁴⁹ And Mitchell Sharp has waffled about the problem:

From this experience and observation, I draw a simple and obvious conclusion: there are two societies in Canada, an English-speaking society comprising various ethnic groups, to which I belong, and a French-speaking society. I prefer not to talk about 'two nations' as my French-Canadian friends do, because nation is an ambiguous word in the English language, unfortunately with an emotional content that inhibits rational discussion.⁵⁰

Very similar problems were encountered by some members of the special mixed Senate-House Committee on the Constitution.⁵¹

This difficulty clearly points to the normative nature of the question. The situation is fluid and unstable, for (if we allow ourselves to see it), the conflict goes very deep, as deep as the definition of the shape of the polity itself. To take a position on any aspect is to take a position on the whole, and moreover, to help shape the future outcome. To the problem posed by system theorists, "The distinction between conflict within and conflict between social systems depends entirely upon one's system perspective for a given problem",⁵² Ramsay Cook has replied;

Although some deal with French Canada alone, and others relate to French - English relations, I do not see these as separate questions. Canada and the French Canadian question is really the Canadian question.⁵³

Such normative positions, often because they are implicit, infect much scholarship on the issue.⁵⁴ While various attempts have been made to sort out the implications of our societal cleavages on our scholarship,⁵⁵ the normative element in this national issue remains strong because, given widespread democratic ideology, any simple description of the cohesiveness or unity of a people involves inadvertently ascribing rights to that collectivity.⁵⁶ Furthermore, our (choice of) frame of reference is itself constitutive of our entire stance towards the question:

There are a number of different evaluative viewpoints for the analysis of American society because American society consists of ethnic and other groups which make conflicting value judgements, or which have conflicting aspirations.⁵⁷

Thus, in Canada, we have diverse culturally-based explanations of group and individual rights, of the idea of membership in a group, and of federalism itself.⁵⁸

Such a double-bind can be resolved only by making the choice, making it clear, and then proceeding with the option. It is made, of course, personally, but in the context of many other ideas and values: certainly notions of the current economic position of the nation-state, of progress, and of political action are involved.⁵⁹ The question may even remount to ideas of modernity and whether similarities or differences are, or should be, most fundamental among men.⁶⁰ For most of us, perhaps, it involves our subjective images of Quebec and Canada, and probably of the United States, and pragmatically, our opinion of which option is most likely to come to pass. It involves, all in all, our own sense of national identification.

Underlying this thesis is the contention that if Canadians ask themselves, "Should be Quebec be able to be independent?", or perhaps, "Would Quebecers choose independence if they knew that no sanctions would be applied?", then we can extricate ourselves from the present morass. The research undertaken here begins from the assumption that Quebec, as a nation, has a right to aspire to autonomy, and furthermore, that English Canada, if it wishes a reasonable resolution of the present predicament, should aid in this effort as a true partner. Otherwise, we may endanger our most decent common traits, and our very selves.

French Canadians cannot achieve their objectives at any reasonable cost without active support from English Canadians. Nationalists in the rest of the country must realize that the continued repression of Quebec will only create a society which is not worth inhabiting.⁶¹

The present research, then, represents a choice to talk about and explore this possibility among English Canadians, in the belief that "only by doing this will they be able to retain some control over events."⁶² It is thus based in the future, but attempts to scientifically investigate one of the many

factors that will define that future - the nature and strength of English Canadians' identification with their country. In Canada, while the question is openly political, it is time for such research. There has been enough speculation on the culture, the unity, and the 'identity' of English Canada to fuel hundreds of essays and articles. Most of these are quick distillations of personal experiences or sheer speculation, and they are ungrounded in any idea of the dynamics of cultural processes.⁶³ They seem to thrive in the airs of Toronto and over the air of the CBC. While there is no doubt that the orientation of English Canadians to their country is crucial in determining the outcome of the national issue (in both Canada and Quebec), as was pointed out clearly in many of the articles in the excellent collection edited by Burns, One Country or Two?, the need now is for a careful study of the real shape of this identification.⁶⁴

The key question, assuming a certain legitimate process leading to a decision to separate by Quebec, is just how strong a blow to English Canada this would be - for that is what would determine the initial and vital reaction.⁶⁵

The work reported here seeks to indicate the present state of identification with Canada, and with special regard to Quebec and the U.S.A., to examine how these elements fit together in various groups of the population, and to reliably infer the probable reactions of citizens to the event of a move by Quebec towards independence. Do Canadians identify with their country in such a way that the independence of Quebec would be inconceivable? Further, strains found within the patterns of identification may enable us to speculate on the possibilities for change, and hence upon the bounds that may be open to Canadian elites to impose various definitions of the event.

The next section concentrates upon the theory guiding such cultural research, and outlines the methods employed in this initial attempt to get at the information needed.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Smiley, 'The Two Themes of Canadian Federalism', CJEPS vol. 31 (1965): pp80-97; p88.
2. D.G. Davies, 'The Concentration Process and the Growing Importance of Noncentral Governments in Federal States'; Public Policy vol. 18 (Fall 1970): pp649-657.
3. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p203. On the same point, see Mallory, 'Faces of Federalism', and Smiley, 'Public Administration and Federalism', p280.
4. LaLonde, 'Notes for a Speech', p13.
5. Claude Morin, Le Pouvoir Québécois...en Négociation (Québec: Boréal Express, 1972), p176. The results of bargaining can take diverse forms: see, for instance, Haas, 'International Integration', pp367-68. In Canada, agreement generally seems to have been of the order of the 'minimum common denominator', or 'splitting the difference', rather than the type of creative solution which upgrades the common interests of the parties and ensures further co-operation.
For an earlier indictment of the BNA Act as a barrier to effective government, see J. Beetz, 'Les Attitudes Changeantes du Québec à l'endroit de la Constitution de 1867', in Crépeau and MacPherson, Future of Federalism, pp113-130.
6. See E.M. Corbett, Quebec Confronts Canada (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), esp. pp33-4, p124. Corbett maintains that the upsurge of national feeling in Quebec is undeniable, and that it was not provoked, as in the past, by outside events, but sprung from changes within the society itself. See also Smiley, 'The Structural Problem of Canadian Federalism', Canadian Public Administration vol. 14 (Fall 1971): pp326-343.
7. E. Kedourie, Nationalism, 3rd ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1966).
8. K. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication 2nd ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p181.
9. See K.R. Minogue, Nationalism (London: B.T. Botsford, 1967), esp. chap. 1.
10. This is a puzzling point in the conception of nationalism as a 'force': many writers have emphasized that the movement does not inherently tend towards one or another ideological direction, which raises problems in defining its essential nature. See, for example, Kedourie, Nationalism; nationalism can be either left- or right-wing, and hence, "It is neither" (p89). It is thus a force without direction.

11. J.J. Deutsch, 'Introduction' to Burns, One Country or Two?, pp1-15.
 Charles Taylor, 'Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study', QQ vol. 72 (1965): pp150-168.
 H. Guindon, 'Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class, and Ethnic Tension', in O. Kruhlak et al., The Canadian Political Process (Montreal: Holt Rinehart, and Winston, 1970), pp75-93. See also Guindon, 'Social Unrest, Social Class, and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution', QQ vol. 71 (Summer 1964): pp150-162, in which he discusses the new role of the middle class in Quebec and states flatly that "Separatist discontent, in the final analysis, boils down to protest against real or imagined restricted occupational mobility." (p157). This is some rendering.
12. See Guindon, 'Two Cultures', pp86-7. Also Cook, 'The Historian and Nationalism', in his French Canadian Question, pp118-142. This reconciliation is, of course, bitterly contested by those who opposed the old reactionary nationalism of Duplessis and hence see all nationalism as reactionary on liberal-humanist grounds; eg.; P.E. Trudeau.
13. Léon Dion, 'The Origin and Character of the Nationalism of Growth', Canadian Forum vol. 43 (January 1964): pp229-233; p231.
14. On the importance of a threat in arousing nationalism, see Minogue, Nationalism, and also K. Symmons-Symonolewicz, Modern Nationalism: Towards a Consensus in Theory (New York: Polish Institute of Arts and Science in America, 1968), p31. Also Watts, 'Survival or Disintegration', p48. As for the Quebec elite in particular, E.C. Hargrove found a perceived threat to be pertinent in arousing nationalist sentiments; 'Nationality, Values, and Change', Comparative Politics vol. 12 (April, 1970): pp473-499.
15. Guindon, 'Two Cultures', p91.
16. For a theory of languages in conflict, see S. Lieberman, Language and Ethnic Relations in Canada (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1970), esp. p35. He found that "Outside French Canada, the ethnic group is in a state of incomplete mother tongue shift to English" (p242). See also Johnstone, Young People's Images of Canadian Society, Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), esp. chap. 3, pp55-78. When French and English meet, the French adjust, "and the language of the intergroup transaction becomes predominantly English" (p78).
 'Assurance-séparatisme' is used in Morin, Pouvoir Québécois, p126: it is a common term of derision among intellectuals for the federal policies. See Language Commissioner Keith Spicer's testimony before a House of Commons Committee (reported in Montreal Star, May 16, 1970; pE-6), that the greatest danger to the policy of Bilingualism and Biculturalism is the skepticism of French Canadians themselves.

17. See Watts, 'Survival or Disintegration', p42: language "shapes the very way in which men order their thoughts coherently", and is therefore "an expression of a community of interests among a group of people".
The dispute in anthropological circles turns around whether culture can best be studied in itself as a "super-organic" phenomenon (Durkheim, Kroeber, Leslie White), or whether more stress should be laid upon the individual as the creator and carrier of the culture (Sapir, Hallowell). A good examination of the issue is found in The Meaning of Culture ed. Morris Freilich (Toronto: Xerox, 1972).
18. Irving Hallowell, Culture and Experience (New York: Schocken Books, 1955), p36. In chaps. 4 and 6 of this work, Hallowell uses the interesting concept of the 'modal personality structure' as characteristic of a given culture.
19. White, 'The Concept of Culture', pp97-123 in Freilich, Meaning of Culture, p119.
20. This seems an appropriate place to remember Stanley Ryerson's "footnote", 'Concepts of "Race" and "Nationality" in Anglo-Canadian Historiography', presented to the Canadian Historical Association annual meeting, Montreal, 1972. The obscuring use of the concept of 'race' to refer to the major cultural and social split in Canada is ridiculous and deplorable.
21. See, for example, Marcel Rioux, La Question du Québec (Paris: Editions Seghers, 1969), or G. Fortin, 'Le Québec: une société globale à la recherche d'elle même', Recherches Sociographiques vol. 8 (1967): pp7-13. Fortin cites exactly this ability of a group to define itself as marking the difference between a subculture and a potential nation. On the importance of the idea of 'société globale', see Corbett, Quebec Confronts, chap. 7, pp185-219.
22. Clifford Geertz, 'After the Revolution - the Fate of Nationalism in the New States', in Stability and Social Change ed. B. Barber and A. Inkeles (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971): pp357-376.
23. Minogue, Nationalism, p42. He refers, perhaps somewhat ethnocentrically, to nationalism outside Europe as "a sustained exercise in unreality" (p88).
24. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and African Peoples (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), p102. Cited in Mel Watkins, 'Technology and Nationalism', pp284-302 in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, p285.
25. Johnstone, Young People's Images, reports some major differences on projective tests, and see also, by the same author, 'Definitions of Canadian Society', in Kruhlak, Canadian Political Process, pp94-131.

An interesting summary comment was made in the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion Report, Saturday, October 12,

1968:

A multitude of Gallup Poll surveys, over the years, have shown that Canadians and Americans think alike on many questions. In fact, the greatest divergence of opinions is found between Quebec and the rest of Canada rather than between Canadians and Americans.

26. Quand Nous Serons Vraiment Chez Nous, a document prepared for the Parti Québécois congress of October 1972, (Montreal: Editions Parti Québécois, 1972), p8.
27. Charles Taylor, 'Nationalism and Intelligentsia', pp159-161. Johnstone, 'Definitions of Society', esp. p97, pp102-5, p131. Hargrove, 'Nationality, Values, and Change', p480.
28. This use of the idea of nation does not necessarily involve the ascription of some mystic corporateness to the group, nor the use of the kind of anthropomorphic conceit that has characterized cases of extreme nationalism. Neither is it necessary to sink one's person into the whole of the nation and see it as transcendent. All it implies is the awareness that one's present identity has been formed to some extent by the prevailing values and meanings of the culture, and that members of the group therefore share in a communality. One important aspect of this is the movement towards a commonly defined future, a future that in the attaining may change the elements of the common world of the group quite drastically, obliterating some and causing new ones to arise. While this conscious realization of shared culture may seem to make it rather fragile, what is essential and definitive for the nationalist is not the specific elements of the culture, but the unity that 'having a culture' implies.
29. M.H. Myerson QC, 'Ethnic Group Rights and the Rights of Man Compared', QC vol. 71 (1964): pp163-171; p166. On this point, see also Karl Aun, 'Cultural Autonomy of National and Ethnic Minorities', CPSA Paper, delivered to the 44th annual meeting, Montreal, 1972, and also Michel Brunet, 'The French Canadians' Search for a Fatherland', in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, pp47-60.
30. See Guindon, 'Bureaucratic Revolution', p157.
31. Simeon, Federal-Provincial Diplomacy, p292.
32. See Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism', *passim*. Smiley realized that the Canadian federation appears to many to be purposeless, and for a similar understanding, see Frank Underhill, The Image of Confederation, the Massey Lectures, (Toronto: CBC Publications, 1964), esp. pp55-61. And finally, for suggestions on the bases for such a primary-level commitment to be generated, see Clarkson, 'Binational Development', or Maxwell Cohen, 'Canada and Quebec in North America: A Pattern for Fulfillment', QC vol. 75 (1968): pp389-400.
33. It is within this last category that we may place most attempts to derive an identity from Canada's posture as an

- 'international nation'. See, for example, Barbara Ward, '...the first "international nation", Canadian Forum vol. 48 (October 1968): pp152-3; Roy Matthews, 'Canada, The International Nation', QQ vol. 72 (1965): pp499-523; and even Hugh MacLennan, 'After 300 Years Our Neurosis is Relevant', in William Kilbourn ed., A Guide to the Peaceable Kingdom, (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970), pp8-13.
34. Trudeau, 'Quebec and the Constitutional Problem', pp3-51 in his Federalism, p11.
35. Ibid., pp21-35. The DREE and LIP programmes are the mainstays of this short-term plan. Basically the strategy deprives the aware elite of "the restless native population whose aspirations are to be fulfilled by political independence" (Guindon, 'Bureaucratic Revolution', p150). That the plan is carried through in spite of the long-term damage that is done to the country by the lack of an industrial strategy that is coherent and independent is a reflection of the real importance that is attached to 'national unity'.
36. See, for example, Trudeau, 'Quebec and the Constitutional Problem', p32:
 The Canadian community must invest, for the defense and better appreciation of the French language, as much time, energy, and money as are required to prevent the country from breaking up.
 One aspect of this is making places for Quebec technocrats and bureaucrats in the federal civil service, through quotas if necessary.
37. Trudeau, 'Treason of the Intellectuals', p155, note 8, and p156. For a similar view, see Cook, 'The Meaning of Confederation', in his French Canadian Question, pp168-189.
38. Geertz, 'After the Revolution', p362.
39. On the lack of nationalism, see Trudeau, 'Federalism, Nationalism, and Reason', in his Federalism, pp182-203.
 On the lack of conflict, he waxes eloquent:
 Our concept of a political party, which is attuned to the needs of our society, is not one which confines itself to particular regions or language groups, but one which reaches out to absorb the ideas and reflect the aspirations of all Canadians.
 ('Notes for remarks by the PM at the Harrison Liberal Conference', in Hockin, 'Pierre Trudeau on the Prime Minister and the Participant Party', pp96-102 in T. Hockin, ed., Apex of Power (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p100.
40. On the right, see George Grant, Lament for a Nation: the Defeat of Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1965). On the left, see Gad Horowitz, 'Mosaics and Identity', Canadian Dimension vol. 3 (1966): pp17-19.
41. Taylor, 'Nationalism and Intelligentsia', p153.

42. Geertz, 'After the Revolution', esp, pp363-370.
43. See Quand Nous Serons, p8:
 En fait, tout ce que nous proposons à l'égard du secteur public des institutions financières consiste à faire entrer le Québec dans le vingtième siècle et, à partir de là, orienter et agencer nos instruments en fonction de nos besoins et de l'évolution de notre Société.
 See also Jacques Berque, '"Contenu" et "Forme" dans la Décolonisation', in Perspectives de la Sociologie Contemporaine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), pp21-37.
44. The phrase comes from Corry, 'Constitutional Trends', p108.
45. Symmons-Symonolewicz, Modern Nationalism, pp45-6.
46. Cited in Cook, 'Quebec and Confederation: A Look at Some Current Proposals', pp62-78 in his French Canadian Question, p73.
47. André Laurendeau, La Crise de la Conscription 1942 (Montreal: Les Editions du Jour, 1962), p74. See also Smiley, 'Federalism, Nationalism', esp. pp98-100 on the 'moral compact' in Confederation. The question revolves around the nature of the whole within which English and French are now united. This Commonwealth or 'Gesamtstaat' cannot be seen as under the exclusive jurisdiction of either group, or the other must feel constrained to declare that it can no longer form part of the whole. In more familiar terms, if the "political system" within which federal and provincial governments operate is seen as coterminous with the (English-dominated) central government itself, then there is no real equality between the two levels, and one side is always the loser. See G. Sawyer, Modern Federalism (London: C.A. Watts & Co., 1969), esp. pp117-130. In Canada, the over-arching unit is largely undefined, although there have been attempts to see it in the mechanisms of the federal-provincial conference and its associated committee structure; see Veilleux, Relations Intergouvernementales, pp87-8, pp97-8.
48. See Simeon, 'Scenarios for Separation', in Burns, One Country or Two?, pp73-94.
49. Kenneth McNaught, 'The National Outlook of English-Speaking Canadians', pp61-71 in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, p63.
 Incidentally, it could not be too comforting for Quebecers to discover that, according to McNaught, "the English-speaking view has always anticipated a Canadian nationality in which the significance of racial (sic) origin will diminish rather than increase."
50. Mitchell Sharp, 'Learning to be a Canadian', QC vol. 72 (1965): pp304-312; p308.

51. See the minority report by Pierre DeBané and Martial Asselin, excerpted in Le Devoir (Montreal); 17-March, 1972; p5. It can also be found, translated, in Canadian Forum vol. 52 (May 1972): pp6-11.
52. Stephen D. Nelson, The Concept of Social Conflict, CRUSK-ISH Working Paper (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute for Social Research, Publications Division, 1971), pl.
53. Cook, 'Introduction', to French Canadian Question, p2.
54. Thus, in the Cook anthology, French Canadian Nationalism (Toronto: MacMillan, 1969), Trudeau and Ouellet are not listed with the "exponents", but offer "interpretations". See also A. Cairns, 'The Electoral System and the Party System in Canada', who examines massive changes in the electoral system in the hope of strengthening national unity: a system of proportional representation might be beneficial if it increased class voting because "Classes, unlike sections, cannot secede from the political system, and are consequently more prone to accept its legitimacy" (p75).
 These examples are not raised to quarrel with these specific positions; they are merely included to show how certain assumptions about what is desirable in Canada naturally affect the questions raised and the criteria of choice used by our scholars.
55. See, for example, C. Berger, ed., Approaches to Canadian History (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), esp. the Introduction by the editor; and also W.L. Morton, 'Clio in Canada: the Interpretation of Canadian History', University of Toronto Quarterly vol. 15 (1946): pp42-49.
56. See David Potter's excellent essay, 'The Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa', American Historical Review vol. 67 (1962): pp924-950.
57. John Rex, 'The Plural Society in Sociological Theory', British Journal of Sociology vol. 10 (1959): pp114-124; pl20. For a broader treatment of the entire question, in the context of an interesting 'global' example, see J.W. Bennett, 'The Interpretation of Pueblo Culture: A Question of Values', in Personal Character and Cultural Milieu, ed. D. Haring, 3rd ed. rev. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1956), pp203-216.
58. On group and individual rights, see Lower, 'Theories of Federalism', esp. pp43-4. See also McWhinney, 'The Supreme Court and Constitutional Reviews', in Vaughan, Contemporary Issues, pp242-255. According to McWhinney, civil liberties cases "reveal two radically different, if not sometimes directly opposing, judicial weltanschauungen or value systems, going to the basic values of a constitutional society" (p253). On the idea of group membership, compare Trudeau, Constitution and People, who speaks of membership in the state in terms of "bonds" and "ties", and Brunet, 'Search for a Father-

land', who discusses the "natural and spontaneous solidarity that exists among members of a human group sharing a historical and cultural tradition from which the group derives its distinctive identity" (p47).

The debate on the nature of federalism is at the basis of the problem examined in this whole thesis. In the literature, it has centred around whether federalism is conducive to individual freedom at the expense of group dynamism. The participants are too numerous to consider here, but good basic treatments of the question are found in Sawyer, Modern Federalism, esp. pp182ff, and in Neumann, 'Federalism and Freedom: a Critique', in Federalism - Mature and Emergent, ed. A. MacMahon (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp44-57.

59. See Grant, Lament, in which he discusses whether the history of civilization really should consist of subordination to empire and 'integration'; "If this is the noblest goal, then the idea of Canada was a temporary and misguided parochialism" (p85). Also Abe Rotstein, 'The Twentieth Century Prospect: Nationalism in a Technological Society', in Russell, Nationalism in Canada, pp341-363.
On the other side, very interesting is H.G. Johnson, 'An Overall View of International Economic Problems Facing Britain, the United States, and Canada During the 70's' (London: The British North America Committee, 1970).
60. See H.M. Johnson, 'Stability and Change in Ethnic-Group Relations', in Stability and Social Change, ed. Barber and Inkeles, pp311-353.
61. Rotstein and Horowitz, 'Quebec and Canadian Nationalism: Two Views', in Power Corrupted, ed. Rotstein (Toronto: new press, 1971), pp122-127.
62. Simeon, 'Scenarios for Separation', pp74-5.
63. See, for instance, Clarkson, 'Binational Development';
Whereas the "traditional" French-speaking culture must be encouraged to modernize its value system, the "modern" English-speaking culture must be given a "traditional" sense of common identity through a fusion of its many immigrant components. (p140)
See also Glazebrooke, A History of Canadian Political Thought (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1966), esp. pp333-5.
64. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of Burns' volume; it represents the first public discussion of the issue by a group of serious and well-respected scholars in Canada. Possession of the book in the formative stages of the present research would have been of great benefit; as it is, the collection is most encouraging. Several authors - Deutsch, Mallory, Meisal, Archer, and especially Simeon - attach some importance to English-Canadian national identification.
65. Simeon, 'Scenarios for Separation', p87.

CHAPTER 3

THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Given that the independence of Quebec is possible, and possibly desirable, we are interested in examining what would likely be the major factor conditioning this event. Is the sense of English-Canadian national identification such that separation is 'thinkable' and tolerable, or would the event cause such a shock as to render it impossible or undesirable because of the dislocation that would ensue? For English Canada, is the independence of Quebec conceivable? The question is hypothetical, but obviously important.

'Sense of national identification' is a rather slippery concept: while it has been approached within a variety of frameworks, it most clearly implies two components, the self and the country, which are involved one with the other.¹ A nation or nation-state must have some such meaningful existence for most of its citizens, while the individual (though certainly not all individuals, even in the most total system) has some more-or-less clear and conscious image of the country in which his self is involved to some degree. Considered in this way, national identification does not necessarily imply some positive consensus or loyalty; it refers abstractly to a relation of a self and a social object in which we can speak of the meaning of the object for the subject. It is this relation that is central here. We want to understand the meaning attached to 'Canada' by its citizens, and estimate their degree of self-involvement with that object.

A great many epistemological debates swirl about this problematic term 'meaning'. To cut the question, the position taken here is that an exact meaning neither inheres in the object, to be apprehended or misperceived by the subject, nor is meaning conferred upon or deposited in the object by an active subject. Simply enough, these processes are two sides of the same coin: one has a position about an object, and while the stance depends upon the perception of the object, this per-

ception is necessarily a function of the position or the point of view. In this light, perceiving and conferring meaning are indissociable. We may then think of the meaning of an object for a subject as existing within the field defined by them, that is, within their relation itself: "What we call an attitude is thus, phenomenologically considered, not a state of the self, but a state of the 'field' of which the self is a part."² We are interested in exploring this field, this relation of Canada and individual citizens; its structure, unique in each case, but perhaps broadly comparable, is the attitude to be described.

Attitudes can often be inferred from behaviour, but unfortunately, one cannot directly observe the 'experience of being in Canada'; it is at once all-embracing and extremely diffuse, and is not often felt by people in their everyday round. Yet if we expect the accumulated residue of this experience to be important in crucial national situations, it must be inferred. The idiosyncratic personality is not of prime importance, nor is it necessary to probe the total national psyche or character, although these areas may be important as limiting contexts to the level focused upon here.³ Still less is it isolated 'opinion' that is sought: this effervescent phantom must be superseded by going beyond the simple meaning of the object for the individual to infer the basic structure of the field. What is central is precisely this field, this 'attitude' of the individual toward the country - a relatively enduring structure which shapes and accommodates incoming information, which may rest on personality and overall culture, but which itself structures and informs changing opinions, and which must be inferred by the observer from behaviour or expressed judgements.⁴

In the present problem, there is no specific behaviour to be studied, and as an ethnographic study was out of the question, interviewing individual subjects was chosen as the cutting-point into the set of attitudes which comprise national identification. Three objects were felt, a priori, to be relevant to the question of national identification as it is related to Quebec independence. Obviously the attitude towards Canada

itself is central. Secondly, because this specific problem brings into focus the relations between the two units (and indeed, whether they are seen as constituting two units), there is the attitude towards Quebec. Finally, chosen because of its general preponderance in Canadian affairs, is the United States, the backdrop to much of our communal life. The starting point of the research was that together, the structure of these three dimensions would define the attitude-set relevant to a future attempt at Quebec independence, and it is this complex which we are to describe and understand.

Although these attitudes must be inferred from various individuals, it was expected that in their ideal form, detached from individual expressions, they would represent much more. Formed over years of schooling, family life, conversations, and travels, such structures exist for the individual; yet it may be more exact to speak of them as intersubjective. Meanings attached to, or perceived in, social objects and institutions spring from a common basis in experience, and people act towards these objects in terms of their meanings:

Consequently, the objects of the external world as meaningfully defined in a traditional ideology constitute the reality to which the individuals habituated to a particular system of beliefs actually respond.⁵

Through action based on them then, such meanings are actually constitutive of social structures, objects, and situations.⁶ Similarly, the various basic attitudes explored here may be understood as being constitutive of the social objects (and their inter-relations) to which they refer: that is, they support, with some degree of congruence, the present political situation.

In a modern heterogeneous society, common and intersubjective meanings are unlikely to be uniformly shared, and basic differences are seldom randomly distributed. From the outset, this investigation aimed at contacting enough respondents so that, if necessary, different types of attitude-sets could be isolated. In addition, it was hoped to contact a broad and roughly representative sample of subjects, so that the distribution of various types in the population could be examined.

The Sample

The interviews were conducted in 1972 over a period of eight weeks from the third week of June until the end of August. While this is a relatively long time for the collection of data, there was no major event which could have introduced significant variation into the results; interviewing was completed by the time election speculation became current.

The original goal of 200 interviews in 40 days quickly proved unrealistic; in all, at the rate of 2 per day, 80 complete interviews were made. Sampling was purposive, for the aim was a widely varied sample that would be roughly representative along dimensions of age, sex, class, and region. But, for reasons detailed below as well as the usual one of cost, a probability sample was impossible in this case. Relations found hold only within the sample since it is impossible to reliably estimate population values without knowing the probability of any individual having been included. Nevertheless, while proportions and percentages found in the sample cannot be safely generalized, in exploration of attitudes, it is the meaningful relations between the components which is most important, not variable values: certainly the sample appears to comprise a reasonable selection of the Canadian public, and at least it is more representative than some.⁷

The major weaknesses within the sample are under-representation of women and elites. There is no one included who could really be considered as 'upper-class', and only three or four individuals who could possibly exercise some independent political influence. The degree to which such people share the basic attitudes explored here is an important question, but could not be answered here simple because these people are hard to encounter informally. Women are not included in their universal proportions because they are less accessible: they do not tend to be isolated in public, are more apprehensive of strangers, and often cannot be contacted in gathering places by a male interviewer.

As is by now apparent, the deficiencies in the sample's

representativeness result not only from the usual constraints of time and money, but from a more important consideration - the need for validity. While a modicum of representativeness was hoped for, and a great deal of trouble taken to increase it by travelling throughout English Canada and seeking respondents from all population groups, the methods employed here were bent by the necessity of ensuring that the attitudes discovered by research were undistorted by the research process itself.⁸ In this light, a probability sample was impossible.

In the context of our problem, it is important to know how English Canadians would react to future moves by Quebec. If this necessitates examining whatever attitudes they will bring to bear on the event, then it is essential to aim, not for a perfect sample or a well-designed "instrument", but for the attitudes of the people in their own terms. In the belief that the respondents' attitudes are most important in this problem, the methodology of this study was devoted primarily to eliciting them, with as little distortion as possible, as a solid base for later inference. It is an approach different in emphasis from much recent research which has stressed scientific reliability and methodical techniques:

For the former, the objective approach, the relation between the student and the culture which he examines is taken for granted, and the central concept is that of scientific procedure, under which aspects of the relation between student and culture which have become problematical are subsumed as **technicalities**. For the latter, the cultural approach, the scientific procedure is taken for granted, and the central concept is the cultural equation, under which aspects of scientific procedure which may have become problematical are subsumed as technicalities.⁹

Problem Orientation

The first feature of the present research which may enhance the validity of its findings is its problem orientation. A current political problem, not recent political theory, is the guide, so the possibility of importing an unsuitable framework is minimized. This orientation does mean that an initial position had to be adopted on the fluid and normative question of

Quebec self-determination, but we are to explore a factor that conditions the possibility and advisability of this solution: the original position is a necessary starting point for handling the problem, but is certainly open to modification by results. Howard Becker is illuminating on this question:

While it is clear that "We must always look at the matter from someone's point of view", it is crucial that "Whatever side we are on, we must use our techniques impartially enough that a belief to which we are especially sympathetic could be proved untrue."¹⁰

Scientifically then, commitment to initial premises is not total, and it is in the interests of the researcher (unless he favours the possibility of beating his head against the prevailing winds), to subject his openly stated bias to empirical scrutiny. And the way to ensure the validity of this scrutiny is to minimize the possibility of the researcher distorting the object of study. Apart from self-consciously recognizing bias, several techniques were adopted here to ensure that no conceptual framework was overlaid upon the subject's thoughts; the goal was not to test a theoretical system, but to explore the field of national identification as they constructed it.

Hypotheses

Within the problem area itself, no specific hypotheses were formulated in advance. Evidence was marshalled that showed the factor of national identification to be important in general, and in Canada at present, but no propositions or inter-relations were culled from the literature for testing. Firm hypotheses may be desirable for testing deductive theories, but in work which seeks to discover how variables are important, firm initial conceptualization of the area is more likely to obscure important facets of the problem than to allow them to come to light.¹¹ Going into the field without anything to prove, the researcher can discover structures he may otherwise have missed, and is free to conceptualize the problem in the terms dictated by field experience.

It is the attempt to view phenomena, in their entirety and without prejudice, to distinguish the essential from the

non-essential, to let the phenomena themselves dictate the conceptual framework and the further course of the inquiry.¹²

While this may be the ideal, the present research aimed also at some degree of comprehensiveness, and it was impossible to gradually build theory by re-interviewing respondents or by participant observation in the activity of national identification. So to ensure some comparability among various interviews, each interview covered in its own way the three dimensions considered central - Canada, Quebec, and the United States. As well, because it was rapidly apparent that to broach the subject of Quebec in conversation is to invite comments on its people, politics, and sooner or later, about separation, views on the question of independence form for all practical purposes, a fourth dimension of all interviews. The use of these wide-open dimensions as guidelines for each interview was a compromise between imposing a predesigned set of concepts and allowing totally unstructured interviewing. While the major "categories" were decided in advance, their internal conceptual "properties" and the inter-relations between them were not predefined, but arose from the subjects' own terms in the course of the analysis.¹³

Indicators

In line with the foregoing, it is evident that no fixed indicators could be employed. Investigations of the meanings of social objects must deal with the subjects' concepts, so the goal here was to be adaptable in interviewing, to encourage self-expression on the part of the respondent, and to gain a common-sense understanding of his views. Certain questions were asked fairly regularly, (e.g.; whether the person found some difference between Canada and the U.S., or among the various areas of Canada; whether separation would "bother" him), but there were no specific questions used to tap each dimension.

As well as being distorting, fixed interview schedules tend to homogenize the subjects' views within a predefined analytical grid, and the point at which the destruction is done is in the rigid linking of concept and indicator. The meanings of indicators are taken for granted as already understood by

the investigator in theoretical terms. Hence, Lazarsfeld portrays the process of choosing indicators as a deduction from imagery to specification to actual selection, and because of the emphasis on correlational testing, maintains that indicators are "interchangeable" as long as results are consistent.¹⁴ This approach certainly helps reliability; in fact, it negates the possibility of conceptual variation. But it may result in serious misunderstanding of the subjects if the theory is systematically wrong:

We concentrate on consistency without much concern with what we are being consistent about or whether we are consistently right or wrong. As a consequence, we may have been learning a great deal about how to pursue an incorrect course with a maximum amount of precision.¹⁵

In this research, the opposite strategy was chosen - to understand the subject on his terms, and then build congruent, ordering categories to englobe his concepts. With this approach,

The feature most firmly established is the relevance of the indicators to the content of the theoretical construct for the latter is shaped and modified to fit the properties of the actual incidents.¹⁶

It is this "emergent" aspect of the categories, the inverse of the deductive approach, that ensures the fit of findings and data.¹⁷ As our concepts are generated out of many people's expressions, they are not definitive, but sensitizing; that is, they do not tell us what to see, but where to look.¹⁸

Interviewing

These considerations also guided the strategy of interviewing itself. Because it was important to allow the subject's own concepts to emerge, the formal interview technique was not used: instead, to approach the ideal of a participant observer, the interviewer was not identified as such, but was simply a travelling stranger, curious to learn what people felt and thought in the areas passed through. It has often been pointed out that the interviewer, as a person in social interaction, is assigned some role and must affect the respondent in some way.¹⁹ However, in this inquiry, distortion was minimized by a more

sympathetic and less commanding approach than is usual: while a good formal interviewer must excel at asking questions, listening was more important here.

One problem of unidentified interviewing is that of reciprocal questioning.²⁰ While it is necessary to establish rapport, and thus reveal a bit of the self, this can arouse bias. Accordingly, the interviewer was not always of the same background: for 44 of the 80 interviews my home was Montreal; for 8, Toronto; for 14, Edmonton; for 12, New Jersey; and for 2, the Maritimes. While the city of origin of the interviewer does not seem to have affected the thrust of the interviews, the fact that the interviewer was always from somewhere else may have increased the comments about travel. In any event, this travel was necessary to gain representativeness, and the stranger role did facilitate questions and conversation. The project itself was not revealed to any respondents, although some evasion and deflection of questions was necessary, yet not one respondent showed suspicion of my behaviour. Just enough interviewer background was selectively revealed to make the respondent comfortable.²¹ The idea was to meet the respondent on his ground: when hunting office workers in the Yonge St. mall (Toronto) at lunchtime, the interviewer requires a smarter appearance and crisper speech than when sitting on the benches on Fredericton's Queen Street. When hitchhiking, the intellectual and social level of the driver was adapted to. When in the laundromat, an inoffensive air is necessary. Although such adaptation is exhausting and never perfectly accomplished (very few people could just 'fit into' North Battleford, Saskatchewan), it may help people express themselves more comfortably than in a formal interview situation.

The chief problem of the strategy was contact. The procedure was to go to places where different types of people would be accessible to a stranger and have time to talk. Respondents were met in malls (13) and restaurants (7); on street benches (6), at public parks (4), work (5), exhibitions (3), and in bars and taverns (5). In addition, as the country had to be covered, there were drivers who offered lifts (18) and people met on boats (2) and trains (9). Unfortunately, there are

relatively few places where strangers can meet for conversation, so the sample is biased in obvious directions, and perhaps in ways less definable - certainly there are some personalities who are never available to strangers, and some types who are over-available. Hopefully, the attitudinal dimensions of national identification are relatively isolated from these factors: that is, we hope although we cannot know that the characteristics which make a person pick up hitchhikers or shop in malls are not related to those explored here.

It was mainly problems of contact that resulted in the relatively small sample. Even though the interviewer is continually searching, it can easily take an hour or two to locate and engage a subject. And sometimes (most frustrating of all), he has to go back to work, or catch a bus, or her girlfriend shows up, and the interview is lost. A half-hour interview, if completed, would take 45 minutes to transcribe, and at least half an hour to tape, so each interview can easily represent an investment of 5 hours. After some practice, of course, it becomes easier if not quicker: the typical strategy was to make contact, establish some rapport by talking about whatever seemed to most unite us, introduce the topic, and then sit back and let the respondent talk - most people like being attentively listened to - only intervening to keep him on track and to lead him over all dimensions. An elderly Fredericton gentleman was non-communicative at first, so I waited. After 5 minutes, a ridiculous hot-rod roared by, and we each chuckled. A few minutes later, two kids passed riding double on a bicycle; this time we shared a chuckle, and five minutes later he was giving me his impressions of the States.

Seeing a young man of about 25 in a mall, obviously waiting for a wife to shop, I approached, sat down, and introduced the subject quickly, for there wasn't much time.

I: "Tough waiting for them to shop, isn't it?"

R: "Sure is; she's been in every fabric store in the place."

I: "Yeah, it'd probably be easier if they all took 5 bolts of material, put them out on the floor, and said 'Pick'."

R: (laughs) "Yeah...and its crowded too. It's just like Friday night. I'm surprised to see so many people here"

on a Monday."

I: "You from Burlington?"

R: "Yeah. You?"

I: "Toronto. This seems like a pretty good place..."

R: "It is if you've got a car. It's pretty spread out and you need one...but it's pretty good too. You can get into Toronto or Hamilton for a night out. It's ok. I can't knock it after all - I've lived all my life here. I don't know very much else."

(pause)

I: "Say, I read in the paper today an article by a Montrealer who says Quebec isn't going to separate after all."

R: "Well, I think one of these days they will."

I: "Oh yeah?"

R: "Yeah, I think so."

I: "Would that bother most people do you think?"

R: "It seems so...But I understand why a lot of people would wanna tell 'em to get lost. It's a whole different culture there - it really is different."

The interview went on for another 20 minutes. As in most of them, the interviewer said little: in line with the general tendency of this research towards the uncontrolled side of the methodological spectrum, the typical 'questionnaire', once the interview got rolling, could well consist of grunts, short comments, non-descriptive phrases, and occasional leading or probing questions.²²

The transcription of this data is another problem. Obviously in unidentified interviewing the data cannot be taped directly: instead, the conversation is remembered, transcribed immediately, and then recorded with the interviewer playing both parts. Questions of bias, faulty memory, selective attention, etc., come to mind immediately, and they doubtless did operate to some extent; all that can be said is that, after a few trials and some practice, a huge amount can be recalled. Not only the order, the structure, and the striking passages are retained, but also the personal expressions, hesitations, descriptions, and anecdotes come back in chunks. In fact, interviewing in this manner can be quite exhilarating; one is within the conversation as a normal actor (and conscious of it),

guiding it subtly from the scientific viewpoint towards the dimensions to be covered, and noting for later recall at the same time. While some of the interviews done under optimum conditions are preserved almost word for word, others doubtless do not reach this standard. They were weighted for the analysis and most attention given the most complete ones, but the others are certainly still worthwhile, given that the presence of a tape recorder can be a very inhibiting thing - for both interviewer and respondent - as was discovered in a few early attempts.²³ The immediate taping of the conversation from memory and notes enables the preservation of the tone of remarks, and was very useful in later interpreting the meanings which respondents had attached to anecdotes and expressions.

A final advantage of this type of interviewing is that its loose structure, two-way flow of conversation, and naturalness, allow the researcher to estimate the subjective importance of his topic for the respondent. One can note the degree of interest and emotional involvement in the questions raised with a confidence not possible in formal interviews, and can see the subject's tendencies to take the conversation off on tangents. Study of these tangents proved very useful in the analysis. Hence, simply because the interviewer is not in control, we can observe the salience of the matter to the respondent. We read his involvement and his concepts, structured his way: although individual questions may have been 'forcing', it would appear that the interviewing as a whole produced quasi-structured data, but did so most unobtrusively.

In spite of all the pains taken to prevent the overlay of any fixed set of concepts upon the subjects' thought, it is difficult to assess whether the aim of enhancing validity was achieved. There is always some distortion in any interview situation, and no scientist can hope to perfectly understand what his respondents really mean, especially when the interviews cover a relatively narrow set of attitudes. We can design and conduct the research to aim at 'fit' rather than forcing, yet the analysis must supersede the concepts of the respondents and accordingly it is open to question in a way that is less apparent

in quantitative research, with its fixed and 'understood' indicators - on grounds of mis-interpretation.

When we deal with meanings of social objects, we are interpreting them, and interpretations may differ. This is a cruel dilemma, for if an attempt to clarify the intersubjective and common meanings is disputed, we can only appeal to further interpretations; as we cannot prove, we cannot claim to have made a correct interpretation. Taylor has clearly exposed this hermeneutical problem, and it was less rigorously but more practically understood by Becker, who argued that in this type of research we should not expect replication of results, but their compatability.²⁴ The net result of this problem is to throw the burden onto the audience to whom the scientist is translating the subjects' attitudes. Any interpretation or clarification of the meanings of social objects or institutions must be at once in phase with the views of subjects and audience to be credited (for no one can embrace a version of his thought that is unrecognizable), and out of phase to provide clarification.

At all times, if we subscribe to the interpretive model, we must admit that our conclusions, our readings, although they may be true, are only hypothetical. Ultimately, we cannot judge their truth value until the outcome of the situation is investigated, and even then, we face problems of the same order. We can only hope - if we accept C.W. Mills' pithy dictum that verification is rationally convincing others as well as ourselves - that our data is suggestive and our interpretation makes sense.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3

1. A modified Freudian formulation is often used by students of national identification: see C.G.W. Buchanan, 'Identification, Political', in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. D.L. Sills (New York: The MacMillan Co. and The Free Press, 1968), pp57-61.
2. Robert B. MacLeod, 'The Phenomenological Approach to Social Psychology', Psychological Review vol. 54 (1947): pp193-210. See also Hallowell, Culture and Experience, esp. chap. 4, 'The Self and Its Behavioral Environment', pp75-110.
3. On the idea of limiting contexts, see M.E. Upler, 'Themes as Dynamic Forces in Culture', American Journal of Sociology (hereafter called AJS) vol. 51 (1945-46): pp198-206.
4. This discussion has obviously slipped over a huge body of work. Clearly the concept of 'attitude' which describes the general relation of which national identification is an example owes much to the 'Parsonian 'orientation', at least in its presumed stability. However, aside from general obtuseness and constant revision, the latter concept seems tainted by its rigid fragmentation into cognitive, cathectic, and evaluative orientations. First, there must be some doubt that normative and existential propositions can be considered as mutually exclusive, as brought out clearly by Kluckhohn et al. in 'Values and Value Orientations in the Theory of Action', pp388-433 in Toward A General Theory of Action, ed. T. Parsons and E. Shils (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), and more recently by Williams, 'Change and Stability in Values and Value Systems', in Barber and Inkeles, Stability and Social Change, pp123-159. Even if "analytically separable", it is difficult to see the purpose such separation serves, unless it is to make easier the mechanical compilation of components of 'culture', as in Ralph Bunch, 'Orientational Profiles: A Method for Micro-Macro Analysis of Attitude', Western Political Quarterly vol. 24 (1971): pp666-674.

Secondly, evaluation seems to be a higher-order component which underlies and orders the cognitive and cathectic elements, and from which is derived the master category of "value-orientation", that is, "modes of distinguishing, testing, sorting, and selecting" experience, which can form a set of linked propositions "embracing both value and existential elements". (From 'A General Statement', pp3-29 in Parsons and Shils, General Theory, p5; and Kluckhohn, 'Values and Value Orientations', p409.) While the analysis of statements and action into this system may be analytically interesting, it seems to greatly obscure the actual content - the orientations and values themselves, and their relations for the subject. This is evident both in the amount of effort devoted to conceptual definition and re-definition, and in the tendency of researchers working within this system to overlay their universal theoretical grid on actions and

statements which simply may not fit, or worse yet, to ignore the possibility that actions and statements which would not fit may exist at all. (As an example, Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963) will serve.)

Finally, by the focus upon the way, in which orientations are 'received' from the culture and social institutions (which are regarded as definable in themselves without reference to the intersubjective meanings conferred upon them by active individuals), the approach becomes bound up into a system in which change is not satisfactorily explicable.

Another associated concept in this area is the "image" popularized by Kenneth Boulding. (The Image (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1956)). While it brings the Parsonian orientation down to earth by emphasizing the fundamental unity of "subjective knowledge of the world", the concept moves too far in this direction. Its lack of differentiation makes it of little use in analytical research; indeed, the 'image' could easily be seen as synonymous with the 'mind'.

The concept of 'meaning' is closely related to the present use of attitude. Meaning is of something and for a subject, and only exists in this relation (at least manifestly). However, we generally think of meaning as unitary, as referring to one element; to be formulated or interpreted, it must be set in the context of other meanings to which it is related. 'Attitude', on the other hand, implies a relatively enduring stance towards a multifaceted object or set of objects, and hence constitutes the context or ground within which meanings take on form and intelligibility. The bounds of this cluster are set jointly by the observer and the subject, as its structure is inferred by moving beyond isolated expressions of meaning to interpret them against the ground they imply. Hence, 'attitude', the structure that informs and orders meanings, is used to englobe and clarify them, sometimes in terms unfamiliar to the subject. While meaning is therefore central to attitude, it does not exhaust it.

The last qualification concerns the reality of the attitude. As will be seen, we cannot be certain of any description of its structure, because this is necessarily a matter of interpretation and inference. More practically, the construct itself does seem to have some valid basis as a conceptualization of a segment of the total set of relations of the self with social objects. It is a field, part of a larger experiential field, in which social objects are grounded through their meanings. As for the influence of attitude on behaviour, one may only speculate. Kluckhohn ('Values and Value Orientations', pp404-5), likens value to a force; it is visible only in its manifestations. One may similarly conceive of attitude, as a predisposition whose influence emerges only in the event as it unfolds. Until then, we must be content with examining intangible attitudes, with the presumption that they will be important in affecting later behaviour, and with the knowledge that, in advance of non-repeatable action, there is little else to go on.

5. Hallowell, 'Psychological Leads for Ethnographical Field Workers', in Haring, Personal Character and Cultural Milieu, pp341-388; p . See also K. Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 3 (1959): pp120-131.
6. Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man', Review of Metaphysics vol. 25 (September 1971): pp3-51, esp. pp22-32. See also Léon Dion and M. De Sève, 'Cultures Politiques au Québec', unpublished MS, esp. pp168-176 on the intersubjective basis of values; throughout this work, the constitutive power of values is stressed.
7. A detailed breakdown of the respondents in the sample is presented in appendix A. Other attempts to investigate the components of political culture have often employed a smaller and less diverse sample: e.g., Robert Lane, Political Ideology (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), and by the same author, Political Thinking and Consciousness (Chicago: Markham, 1969). Both analyses were based upon small homogeneous samples: in the first, 15 men from the same housing project; in the second, 24 upper middle class students. This is no justification for the present non-probability sample, of course, and Lane's interviews were much longer (although also more structured) than those conducted in the present study.
It is worthwhile to remember the dictum that a perfectly representative sample is not needed to discover the existence of some pattern; see B. Glaser and A. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory (Chicago: Aldine, 1967), p64. However, we do aim here to infer some indication of the distribution of types of national identification, if only by showing how some mental structures are logically related to certain background characteristics. The sampling here represented a choice forced by the need to reconcile various goals.
8. A useful categorization of this trade-off is found in Morris Zelditch Jr., 'Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies', AJS vol. 67 (1961/62): pp566-576.
9. Kurt Wolff, 'A Methodological Note on the Empirical Establishment of Cultural Patterns', ASR vol. 10 (1945): pp176-184; p177.
10. Howard Becker, 'Whose Side Are We On?', pp123-134 in his Sociological Work: Method and Substance (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p131, p133. Gunnar Myrdal has also advocated recognition and revelation rather than denial of bias; hence, an entire piece of research may become a test of the relevance or realism of initial premises. For Myrdal, change can be forced in these premises because "facts kick". See G. Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), esp. p5, pp54-76.
11. This point is well discussed in anthropological and qualitative sociological writing. It is the spur to the "upside

down" approach to social research advocated and formalized by Glaser and Strauss in Grounded Theory. See also Oscar Lewis, Anthropological Essays (New York: Random House, 1970), pix.

12. Macleod, 'Phenomenological Approach', p208. He gives a useful example of the 'open' approach: in interviewing white children with the intention of finding out how they feel about black playmates, we might design a series of questions about black vs white children. But for the kids, even though they would answer our questions, "bullies" or "sissies" may well be more central a concept than black/white.
13. See Glaser and Strauss, Grounded Theory, pp33-37. They advocate that both categories and their properties should be grounded in the data. This was impossible here, because emergent categories could not be developed by changing topics during the course of the interviewing; there had to be some common ground assumed from the beginning. However, the dimensions covered by the respondents were extremely broad, and it would seem that the major criterion of grounded theory - that no preconceived relevancies in concepts and hypotheses guide the collection of data - is fulfilled.
14. Paul Lazarsfeld, 'Evidence and Inference in Social Research', Daedalus vol. 87 (1958): pp99-130.
15. Irwin Deutscher, 'Words and Deeds: Social Science and Social Policy', in Qualitative Methodology: Firsthand Involvement with the Social World, ed. W.J. Filstead (Markham: Chicago, 1970), pp27-51; p33.
16. G.J. McCall, 'The Problem of Indicators in Participant Observation Research', pp230-237 in Issues in Participant Observation, ed. G.J. McCall and J.L. Simmons (Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley, 1969), p233.
17. Glaser and Strauss are very strong on this point. See Grounded Theory, pp36-7, and the Epilogue.
18. The idea is Herbert Blumer's. See his 'What is Wrong With Social Theory?', pp52-62 in Filstead, Qualitative Methodology, esp. p59:
 - Because of the varying nature of the concrete expression from instance to instance, we have to rely, apparently, on general guides and not on fixed objective traits or modes of expression.
 - The point is, I think, fundamental in social science, if we are honestly concerned that our theory connects with the social world. Again, Blumer, p54:
 - Concepts are the means, and the only means of establishing such connection, for it is the concept that points to the empirical instances about which a theoretical proposal is made.
 - But this concern is doubly important if we consider the growing practical links of social science and its object of study. Dispute or unclarity about the meaning of common

institutions is reflected in both realms, and there is more than 'conceptual spillover' between them; institutional change engenders change in theory as well as in behaviour. Pateman draws this out clearly with an illustration of the effects of divergent perceptions of the well-known variable, 'political efficacy' upon political practice and some contemporary theory: see Carole Pateman, 'Political Culture, Political Structure, and Political Change', British Journal of Political Science vol. 1 (1971): pp291-305. Another writer suggests that deductive, pre-structured social science actually contributes to the social problems that it investigates; see H. Reid, 'Contemporary American Political Science in the Crisis of Industrial Society', Midwest Journal of Political Science vol. 16 (August 1972): pp339-366.

What is at stake here is analogous to whether a psychosomatic disease will be understood or will be treated mechanically. As Schutz and others have long emphasized,

The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not 'mean' anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist - social reality - has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it.

(Schutz, 'Concept and Theory Formation in the Social Sciences', pp48-66 in A. Schutz, Collected Papers, ed. Maurice Natanson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), vol. 1, p59.

It seems that an emphasis on validity, on understanding the subjects' own ideas, marks a social science of which the aims are not to explain, control, and predict, but rather to understand, to influence, and to envision. In this context, discussions of indicators, concepts, and validity take on a larger meaning:

The safeguarding of the subjectivist point of view is the only but sufficient guarantee that the world of social reality will not be replaced by a fictional non-existing world constructed by the scientific observer.

(Schutz, 'The Social World and the Theory of Social Action', pp3-19 in *ibid.*, vol. 2, p9.)

19. See A.J. Vidich, 'Participant Observation and the Collection and Interpretation of Data', in McCall and Simmons, Participant Observation, pp78-87. See also F.H. Blum, 'Getting Individuals to Give Information to the Outsider', in Filstead, Qualitative Methodology, pp83-90. Finally, see C.F. Connell, 'The Respondent Reports on the Interview', AJS vol. 62 (1956-57): pp177-181.
20. H.W. Riecker, 'The Unidentified Interviewer', AJS vol. 62 (1956-57): pp210-212.
21. See L.A. Dexter, 'Role Relationships and Conceptions of Neutrality in Interviewing', AJS vol. 62 (1956-57): pp153-157.
22. Sample interviews are presented in appendix B.

23. See McCall and Simmons, 'Data Recording' in their Participant Observation, pp73-75. On the potential for the interviewer to be involved and self-conscious, see Merton and Kendall, 'The Focused Interview', AJS vol. 51 (1945-46): pp541-557. Finally, for a striking example of the great depth attainable in an unstructured interview situation, see Thomas J. Cottle, 'A Middle-American Marriage', Harpers, vol. 24b (February 1973): pp56-68.
24. Charles Taylor, 'Interpretation and the Sciences of Man'. Becker, 'Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation', in his Sociological Work, pp25-38.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS I: CONSTRUCTING THE TYPES

In a strict sense, the results of the research consisted of about 15 hours of taped interviews with the 80 respondents. The problem was finding how to cut into, compress and englobe, and make intelligible this mass of data. To gain some distance from the material, the tapes were left for a cooling period of about six months, then a few interviews were heard at random to regain their flavour, and the coding process was begun.

The interviews were examined in the order of their collection, and under four major dimensions - Canada, Quebec, the United States, and Independence - the concepts expressed by the respondents were noted. Subsequent interviewees who made statements of a similar sense were numbered under the relevant concept. For example, under Quebec, respondent #11 was the first to suggest that the province was a very "different place": this concept was used as a rough heading for coding, and #13, #32, ("I'll tell you, that border is like a wall."), #34, and many others were noted as expressing a similar idea. In addition, it was first found in the course of interview #41 that some people not only felt that Quebec was "separate" and "different", but also that the difference was irritating and should not persist. A few others were coded under this sub-heading which was one of the components of the later, more encompassing property of 'latent hostility'. On the other hand, a Vancouver housewife was the first to state clearly enough to be noticed that Quebec represented a distinct "Culture", and was therefore "different and enriching"; five other respondents expressed roughly similar sentiments. In this way, categories were added and subdivided throughout the first run of coding, and so, rather chaotically at first, the basic concepts relevant to respondents were isolated.

During the coding, whenever an interview seemed to suggest some more general observation about groups of respondents or relations between categories, short memos were written.

It was found, for instance, that for some people, the irrationality of the old French-Canadian stereotype is transferred onto the separatists alone: they are seen as under-educated, ignorant, and emotional. These memos often led to notes on the apparent importance of the various concepts, and on other possible categories further removed from the statements themselves (e.g., 'little idea of Canada as a whole'). By forcing clarification of the meaning of the various properties, this dual procedure helps keep the coding uniform while encouraging and channelling the search for relations between the concepts.¹ Before the second coding run, the concepts expressed and the memos taken were used to structure the categories within each dimension so that it became more differentiated internally while they were made more abstract and inclusive. Hence, under Quebec, one major category was "Society"; it included the following concepts:

- i) troubled:
 - "settling down":
- ii) Weak and poor:
 - bad economy:
 - Rich and strong:
- iii) Immature and dependent:
 - Mature:
 - dynamic:
- iv) Unified:
 - Not unified:
- v) "Different and Separate":
 - Formally "A part like the rest":

In this way, the second complete coding of the interviews was done with terms which combined the respondents' expressed concepts and the analyst's emerging categories and structure.² It is this initial loyalty to the subjects' expressions, and the subsequent necessity of englobing their points of view, that keeps qualitative analysis on track; we can be more certain that later conclusions do fit the data.

The final coding was made with a total set of 173 substantive categories. As well as the four major dimensions, attention was paid to two other aspects of the interview: the tangents, if any, along which the respondent led the conversation after the topic had been broached; and secondly, the

extent to which and arena in which he felt his views to be shared. The latter aspect proved relatively unenlightening, except as it helped indicate the subjects' own reference areas, because people overwhelmingly think that others share their position. 'Tangents', however, were useful as guides in judging the overall importance of the topic for the respondent, and to help show the more general context which surrounds his attitudes about the objects in question. Finally, the background characteristics of each subject were noted, and the interviews themselves were rated according to the respondent's interest, willingness to talk, and other aspects of the conversation.³

Coding was difficult and time-consuming, for a single key statement might well fit two or three categories at once: coding this type of data is not in any sense mechanical, but is rather a continuous series of tiny judgments. In over 3,000 coding operations, nearly 2,000 of them substantive, there are bound to be errors and unreliability. However, when there was uncertainty as to the meaning of a statement, the context was taken as guide, and, if necessary, the whole tone of the interview. Such uncertainty is useful in that it forces more theoretical thinking and so, as in the first run, memos were taken when necessary. In any case, later examination showed that most errors were of omission rather than direction, so that relations found were, if anything, weakened in the coding.

After the second coding run, the net result was that a set of concepts grouped all those who had expressed them. Of the 173 categories which were used by more than 4 people, the average respondent had made statements which could be fitted into only 22 of them. Thus is revealed a major difference in this kind of analysis. Since it is not assumed from the start that everyone has an opinion or position upon each of a set of pre-selected, one-dimensional variables, but rather that the major components - Quebec, Canada, and the U.S. - are multifaceted, then the respondents themselves not only suggest the various properties, but also may ignore others. They are not forced into a position about every one of them: rather the dimensions themselves can accommodate various groups of people who share a

similar view of their properties, who attribute a similar meaning to the object. Hence, theory about types of cognitions can be more readily developed, and their validity is enhanced. However, the analysis is difficult for it is, conceptually, somewhat like factor analysis - we attempt to locate bunches of concepts and properties that seem to be related. These are, in the end, associated through groups of people, and the way the groups' attitudes are made clear is through the construction of ideal types in which the concepts expressed are shown to be meaningfully linked together.

The first stage in isolating distinct attitude-sets was finding relations among the concepts themselves. Obviously, the number of possible relations is immense and the sets of relations even greater (say, 17^3C_{20}), but here the emergent hypotheses of the memos served as guides to inform the several conclusions reached merely by glancing at the coding sheets (for instance, the near-unanimity that independence would hurt Quebec, or the vast majority of respondents who, in one way or another, implied some awareness of the sectional nature of Canada). One thing that was apparent, in spite of some opinions being widely shared, was that no one attitude was characteristic of all respondents; the pattern of responses was varied, and groups would have to be isolated.

Many tests were conducted with pairs and sets of concepts, as in Example 1, where a felt lack of Canadian unity was compared with those who thought Canada to be dependent: it sprang from a thought in the memos that some group might be worried about the country's vulnerability.

Example 1

"Canada should be together";
 15, 17, 20, 26, 33, 35, 38, 41, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 74, 80
 "Canada is dependent";
 9, 43, 53, 67, 69, 78

(The numbers refer to the interview numbers of those who expressed each concept; a line under a number shows that the person fitted into both categories.)

In this example, of the 21 people who thought that Canada was now lacking needed unity, 9 of them also felt that it is a

dependent country. Inversely, of those 15 respondents who believed the country to be dependent, 9 also thought that Canada "should be together". This searching method, playing off observations in the memos and a developing feel for the data at all levels of compactness, turned up some suggestive findings.

For instance, not one of the 19 respondents who pointed out that the separatists in Quebec were a minority also felt that independence was likely (15 people in the sample did see a "definite trend" towards it), or even that the present situation could be "up in the air" or uncertain. Checking this group on other concepts (e.g.; independence is "crazy" or unreasonable; Quebec is a unified society), it became apparent that one group felt the chances of separation to be slight because most Quebecers were reasonable people who would not let themselves be led astray by a hotheaded minority, whereas another bunch thought it unlikely because it would be too disruptive a change. The interviews themselves were consulted at all times, and examples of each type follow.

Type 1: #17; a Bell Telephone lineman from Northern Ontario:

You see, the radicals go on talking, they go on building up and getting excited, but the silent majority (if I can use that expression) say at one point, "Well, you may say that, but here's my vote - do it this way." And I think that's what'll happen.

Type 2: #76; a salesman from Fredericton, N.B.:

R: "Well, all the ones who talk and cause trouble and all that sort of thing, it just hurts the whole bunch of them. And I think the rest know that - they end up fighting amongst themselves, like. But it won't happen. I sure wouldn't like to see it happen anyway."

I: "No...?"

R: "No. You can't just break away like that. I mean Canada's Canada, and that's it."

By such examination of the concepts expressed, some relations may be clarified and others suggested. However, as in the example above, there is a great deal of overlap within categories as different groups of people come together in expressing certain ideas for obviously different reasons. Manipulation of the concepts alone is an intermediate-level activity: relations

found demonstrate individual associations between sets of people, but to understand whether they shared more than an isolated concurrence of opinion and to uncover the basic structures which may differentiate the groups' viewpoints, the interview material is essential. Moreover, to comprehend why people had similar attitudes towards one or another of the objects, both conceptual relations and raw data must be combined to infer entire complexes of attitudes. For instance, it is interesting to find that 6 of the 11 people who felt that "one has to visit the U.S. to really know it" also saw Canada as a collection of places. But to understand how these two ideas are associated, the interviews must be examined, and to clarify why they should be related, as well as to come to terms with the other 5 individuals who tended to mention 'places' but were quite negatively impressed with the United States, an overview which integrates the attitudes into sets must be developed.

Accordingly, after the concepts were explored and a feel for the data acquired, the analysis was inverted: instead of concepts grouping people who expressed them, a set of provisional ideal types was constructed, and respondents were then classed within one type. In other words, a type of person grouped a set of concepts that could be logically and empirically related. These types are not specifically analytical, but empirical: they do not group individuals at the poles of conceptual spectra, nor can they be neatly displayed in 2x2 dichotomies; instead, they are ideal characterizations of existing attitudes towards a set of social objects which allow us to understand how these attitudes are structured. As convenient capsulizations, they group a set of characteristics which are discovered to be related.⁴

Originally three types were postulated - the Cosmopolitan, the Local, and the Individualist. Subsequent examination revealed a lack of consistency among the Locals, and, to some extent, among the Cosmopolitans; as well, several prominent categories were not employed. So a fourth type, the Dogmatist, was constructed, and found to work well. The types were modified, rearranged, and individuals were shuttled about from one to another, but rather than attempt to reconstruct their construction,

they are presented here in their final form. (A sample interview with each of the main types is to be found in appendix B.) Along with a few exceptions, they are examined in detail in Chapter 5.

The Local

Somewhat reserved, but calm and easygoing, these people provided many good interviews as they revealed their views with sincerity and occasional humour. Because the interests of this type of person revolve around family, home, and region, they are labelled 'Locals', but although they often live in small or medium-sized towns, they are also represented in urban areas, and their horizons do extend far, if selectively, beyond their area through occasional vacation trips and exposure to local media. While other areas, peoples, and countries may hold interest to some extent as topics of conversation or as they affect the locale, it is principally this immediate life that is truly important.

Accordingly, the Local's attitude towards Canada involves two components. First is his own locality, his context, rarely conceived as larger than the province, home of family, work, and most friends. The province or section is seen as an entity in itself, although he knows it too well to ever consider it homogeneous. Canada is the larger unit within which he lives, and it groups other discrete sections; while these are seen as quite different from his own locale, for he has generally visited other places within the country and met their inhabitants, together they form more than their sum. There are common bonds between the distinct sections, and the entity which they make up is a flexible but enduring one; in short, Canada is a unit very much like the family. Mutual obligations, interests, and trust join the various sections, bonds partially ordained by history and partially voluntary, and they are maintained because at bottom most sections, like most people, want the same things; peace, decency, and a fair chance at a good living.

This family-like unit forms the larger, less immediate

context of the Local's life; it is thought of rarely, but generally with some affection, for it lets him live reasonably well. It is regarded as clearly different from and better than the United States, which displays an alarming violence and is disturbingly fast-paced. The neighbour to the south is, on the whole, quite different, but the American people are perceived as basically similar, except that due to their wealth and power they may sometimes be arrogant or overbearing. Our subordinate position is sometimes resented, but there is little that can be done about this; you take the bad with the good.

Quebec is, naturally, a section of Canada, a part of the family. It is certainly different, but for most Locals it remains undefined and unexplored, except for the big city of Montreal; and is seen as a place among others. Little attention is expended on Quebec as such: more important are the people who are superficially distinct; their language and customs evoke some irritation or hostility according to personal (or friends') experiences on travels, yet underneath their veneer, Quebecers are basically similar to the rest of us. Within, their section of the country operates as the others do, although from without, the group appears to form an emotional, noisy, and somewhat demanding member of Canada. In return for this troublesomeness, it is rather pampered. Some old French-Canadian stereotypes are retained by members of this type, but they are generally applied to the separatists who constitute a small minority of radicals.

For the Local, independence is obviously a silly notion, for Quebec is much better off 'in' Canada. The province is immature and dependent upon the larger whole so a move to break ties would only hurt Quebecers themselves as Canadian support would end. Locals do generally realize however, that headstrong Quebecers may disagree and decide to try it on their own. While such a declaration of maturity - which would be at the same time a sign of immature emotionalism - is conceivable and not too worrisome, for the effects on Canada or the home region would be minimal, there may be some sense of rejection and some-

times, a bit maliciously, an inclination to let the province find out how difficult independence really is.

The main variations in the type are regional. In the West, there seems to be somewhat greater hostility towards Quebec. Locals in the Maritimes (except Newfoundland) have more enthusiasm for the United States because of their own economic problems, and express at the same time a more intense regional loyalty than most, perhaps because they feel already more isolated. And in Ontario, they display a heartland mentality: Ontario is the centre of the country, the biggest, richest member of them all.

The Dogmatist

This type is rarely dogmatic or harsh in conversation: the name implies rather an underlying rigidity of thought, an unbending quality that insists on the obvious clarity and correctness of things as they are. Perhaps the possibility of mutation is dimly seen, and thrust away, but in any event the Dogmatist, although superficially similar to the Local in some respects, reveals a different cast of attitude altogether. At least with regard to the attitude-set examined here, these people display a conservative fixity which distinguishes them as a group.

As was the case with the Locals, the home and its region are the main concern, but for the Dogmatist it is also the rock of solidity that is consciously maintained. He often exhibits a rather peevish orientation towards outside affairs; goings-on in other sections of the country or other nations may be confusing and are disposed of quickly and definitively. These people also tend to be more concerned with their own economic affairs than the Locals, who can often forget their preoccupations in conversation.

The context of the home - Canada - is typically seen as a geographic entity. The places inside Canada form Canada, and although the country may occasionally be alluded to in symbolic terms, these are not dynamic or soaked in any meaning beyond the physical. Canada is the large red map in the Grade 5 geography

textbook, unifying its sections within its boundaries from coast to coast. But for all of this, the Dogmatist is a mild patriot. The status quo is acceptable and likely better than the future, and his feeling for the country is based on its mere existence in the present state of affairs; it is identified with because it is there, not because of any intrinsic value.

This is illustrated by the attitude towards the United States: this country itself is seen neutrally, and the people are pretty much the same as in Canada. It has to be visited, to be really known, and until then, judgement is suspended.

Québec, on the other hand, is a puzzling anomaly - a very distinct unit within a unit. While it isn't seen as directly affecting the Dogmatist, he does often bear it a clear hostility. Not only is the province itself perplexingly different, but the people, with their language and 'uppityness', are somewhat bizarre and troublesome for the rest; these people remember October, 1970. The Dogmatist often draws upon traditional stereotypes of the Quebec French to support his case. Most of all, he is irritated by their ceaseless demands and their desire to 'force' him to speak French.

Naturally, separation is a ridiculous idea - what should happen is the uniting of the country in English. In any event, Independence won't occur because Quebec has a good deal as it is, being supported by the rest of the country, and because with the sanctions English Canada would impose it would be disastrous. French Canadians, or at least the 'smart ones', realize this. Most important for the Dogmatist, however, is not what would happen to Quebec, but the effects of Independence on Canada. If the province were to break away, the country would be intolerably split; in fact, it would be broken right in two. For this reason, many Dogmatists care deeply about the question, but coupled with their negative attitude towards the people of Quebec, this may produce a severe strain in their position.

Regional variations are found in the Maritimes, where the geographic imagery is more pronounced, especially with regard to Quebec.



The Cosmopolitan

The individuals who fit this type hold varied opinions, in fact, we could almost say 'differentiated' because they are the classic outward-looking, educated, well-placed products of a modern economic and social system. Generally in white-collar occupations, they speak well, keep abreast of the news, and employ abstractions which they know to be abstractions. They are characterized by expertise in one field and interest in most others - their horizons are as broad as the world is round, and unlike the Locals and Dogmatists, they have no fixed centre.

Canada is their society, and they regard it as such: it is the inter-relations and connections of the various regions and strata that occupy them, and it is apparent to most that their society is sadly divided, both physically and spiritually. At least partly because the nature of the society is so difficult to define, economic factors within the unit are given much attention, and as the economy forms a unified base, so, upon reflection, it is social 'unity' that exercises these individuals. Cosmopolitans identify with Canada in the abstract; they identify, often intensely, with an idea of the country. And the prime element in this idea is neither specific nor positive, it is simply that Canada is different from the United States, and superior to it. It is better for various reasons - its lack of violence, its lack of social problems, its lack of power - but the essential and defining thing is Canada's lack of whatever makes the USA distasteful. A Cosmopolitan may feel this way to the point of declaring himself a 'nationalist'.

The United States is generally seen as a troubled or sick society. Its influence causes problems for Canada, and a good deal of resentment, but the pattern of dominance seems irreversible. For the Cosmopolitan, America does not lie below the border, it looms over it.

Quebec is a counterpoint on a smaller scale, a sub-society to the US super-society. It has thrust its distinctiveness at the Cosmopolitan and evoked a lukewarm response. As a sub-society it is necessarily dependent upon the larger unit,

especially as it has an extremely shaky economy, a problem which has led to social strain and political unease. Cosmopolitans do not perceive the province as monolithic, but see a balance of contending factors and forces whose workings are somewhat unclear and whose issue is uncertain.

Separation is an important topic to the Cosmopolitans, a group in a position to appreciate its consequences. It may well occur as a result of the acceptance of the idea by a majority of Québeckers, but would involve great economic problems for both units, and especially for Quebec. It is the disruption of Canada though, that is most worrisome: with the splitting of the country (seen as a severing of social and economic ties or a pronouncement that henceforth they are severed, rather than as a geographic split), the ever-present USA would exert great influence over Quebec and dominate or even annex a divided and uncertain Canada. The unity of the country is fragile and might not survive the blow: although these individuals are certain in their desire to remain Canadian, they are not so sure of the others' determination.

Variations in the type are not so much by region as by emphasis upon one or another attitude of the set, although those from British Columbia do seem less concerned about Quebec. In fact, there is an inkling of a sub-type within this group; there are some who may incorporate some of the more rigid attitudes of the Dogmatists into the general Cosmopolitan framework. There are insufficient examples and the distinctions cannot be too finely drawn out, but these individuals may sense an erosion of a positive Canadian unity, feel slightly less antipathy towards the US, and take a firmer stance towards Quebec in the belief that weakening of unity opens the door to radical change. However, there are differences of emphasis within all the types as positions are shaded by concentration on one or another of the dimensions. It is the total configuration from which these expressions spring which illuminates and differentiates them, and the ill-defined sub-group, while perhaps more solidly conservative, are essentially Cosmopolitan and are treated as such.

The Individualist

The final type found in this research is less relevant to our problem than the preceeding three simply because 'Individualist' tags those people who feel little sense of identification with anything beyond themselves. Unlike the others, in their mind's eye these people are larger than their surroundings. What is important for them is not social objects or groups of people, but the experiences that they produce: there is little interest in that which does not pass through the self.

Accordingly, Canada is a place, a pure context, in which the Individualist lives, works, enjoys, and develops himself. It is formed of sections which contain various mixes of people and geography; but these configurations are not important in themselves; one can meet good people, have a good time, and 'get by' just about anywhere. As places go, Canada is a pretty good one, but there is no deep attachment.

Individualists generally see the United States in a similar light. It is difficult for these people to pre-judge places, especially when they are so richly variegated, but chances are it isn't quite so pleasant as Canada. While there may be social problems, every place has its positive features, and these people either glide through unaware of blemishes or else avoid them.

Within Canada, Quebec is an interesting place. Although it doesn't affect the Individualists politically, it is something unique, and Montreal is a large, enjoyable city. One can get by there in English.

While Independence may hurt Canada, these people do not feel personally affected, and are neutral to the idea. The event is generally seen as of little consequence, as long as there are no barriers or personal restrictions, as long as the individual's lifestyle is not affected.

There are variations within this type: some are more intellectual, some are slightly more critical, and some are totally apolitical; but with respect to the problem at hand, they are out of the picture. Their very essence is lack of identification.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

1. See B. Glaser, 'The Constant Comparative Method of Qualitative Analysis', in McCall and Simmons, Participant Observation, pp216-227. See also Glaser and Strauss, Grounded Theory, pp49-61.
2. A complete list of the substantive concepts used in the final analysis is found in appendix C.
3. The respondents' backgrounds and interview characteristics are broken down by types, and compared to the total sample in appendix D.
4. This kind of typology may be called a 'matrix formulation'; a descriptive type which sums up many attributes or facts and accounts for them in terms of some basic orientation. See Barton and Lazarsfeld, 'Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis in Social Research', pp163-196 in McCall and Simmons, Participant Observation, esp. pp192-96.
5. Some time has been devoted here to explaining the method of the analysis. While the real results of the study are the types of attitudes and their structural arrangement, to avoid imparting that puzzling sensation that conclusions have somehow magically appeared, it seemed necessary to include some of the 'natural history' of the analysis (see Becker, 'Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation', in his Sociological Work, pp25-38). Certainly the analyst can follow general rules in sifting and weighing qualitative material, but the data is often so massive and far removed from the final structured condensation that the progression from one stage to another may seem rather mysterious. I have attempted to clarify the process in this case.

While such accounts may eventually lead to codification of qualitative analytical techniques, the process can never be completely mechanical. Searching for related concepts is fruitless without some emergent idea of meaningful associations. And the sudden inversion of the analysis requires some insight which brings together diverse observations and makes sense of them. It is only with the global view afforded by the preliminary type that the essence of each individual attitude can be formulated.

No doubt it is the immersion in the data and the occasional striking interview which provide the foundation and the impulse for such leaps. (I well remember a respondent explaining that Canada should be "a big happy family", although this was not considered as significant until similar imagery was found among the people I had begun to think of as 'Locals'.) Nevertheless, it is the cold-hearted examination of the fit and relevance of the type, and the constant reformulations, that make it a useful theoretical or conceptual instrument.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS II: THE TYPES OF ATTITUDES

The construction of types, no matter how methodically pursued, remains subject to the problem of social scientific interpretation discussed briefly in Chapter 3. While this is unavoidable, safeguards are available to indicate the relevance of results, and to assure both analyst and audience that the regularities isolated are valid abstractions from the social world.

For Weber, any explanation in ideal-typical form had to be both meaningfully and causally adequate. That is, "its component parts taken in their mutual relation" must be empathetically understandable "according to our habitual modes of thought and feeling", while at the same time, the causal impact of the subjective complex must be demonstrated by correlating predicted action and observed results.¹ In the present case, however, causal adequacy is impossible to demonstrate. To estimate the social distribution of the types, a probability sample would be necessary, and more crucially, there is no concrete behaviour to be related to the types of attitude-set. The action central to this problem is hypothetical; only the 'subjective meaning' that would guide it can be examined at present.² It is difficult to show the impact of these attitudinal complexes in history that hasn't been made.

The same problem arises with Alfred Schutz's typological postulates. Types are built by social scientists to supersede common-sense thought, and they must be:

1. logically consistent
2. accessible to subjective interpretation; that is, given the content of the type, observed actions must be understandable in its terms
3. adequate; that is, the type must be constructed so that an act performed in the manner it indicates would be understandable for the actor himself.³

Although the types presented above are clear and consistent,

they cannot be linked to action. They are purely conceptual, and although it will be demonstrated that they are adequate, that the components do fit meaningfully for real actors, this only provides speculative grounds for inferring how they would act. Nothing is actually 'explained' by these types, and in this lies their essential difference from theory: if valid, they can only be descriptive of present attitudes.

However, their meaningful adequacy can be empirically established, and further, the same attitude-sets abstracted here can be isolated in newspapers, speeches, and commentaries; in other words, detached as ideologies. Without maintaining that the elements isolated here constitute the entirety of relevant attitudes or that they are as discrete as depicted, the types do show some logically abstracted structures that may shape our own thought and future behaviour.

Another approach to the validity of types, since they remain unrooted to actual behaviour, is to assess their internal coherence. Examining them empirically, in themselves and in their inter-relations, is one response to the problem that many different sets could theoretically be cut out of the same data:

There are any number of possible relationships or attributes which might be picked out and put into a formal scheme; the strategic act is to "feel out" those which are important, which will ultimately help to solve the problems in which we are interested.⁴

To gain some idea of the overall cohesiveness or fit of each type and of the degree of differentiation between them, a simple measure was derived.

In the process of rearranging and solidifying the types by shuffling individuals and categories, each respondent was examined as to how well he expressed the major concepts characteristic of his type. Then, once the types were definite, by counting the total number of concepts expressed by the individual as well as those which fell into the typical categories, a ratio could be formed:

$$\frac{\text{number of typical concepts expressed}}{\text{total number of concepts expressed}}$$

Thus, if an individual was coded within 30 of the 173 categories, and 15 of these were among those chosen as typical for his group, the ratio value would be .5.

This measure aided in discarding individuals from types (A rough minimum of .30 was maintained, but obviously other aspects of the interview, such as emphasis and number of tangents, had to be considered also.), and it was in this way that the three exceptional respondents were finally excluded from all groups. But the aggregate figure was also calculated for each type: as displayed in Table 1, it indicates their relative internal cohesion.

TABLE 1

RATIO OF TYPE CONCEPTS TO TOTAL CONCEPTS EXPRESSED (BY TYPES)

Type	Ratio
Locals.....	.50
Cosmopolitans.....	.53
Individualists.....	.44
Dogmatists.....	.54

These figures may be difficult to interpret, but considering that the number of concepts chosen as definitive of a type was highest for the Cosmopolitans with only 32 out of the 173 total categories, they do seem comfortably high. As the table shows, 53% of all statements made by Cosmopolitans actually did fall within their categories.⁵ Relatively, the Individualists form the least cohesive group.

It is apparent that a similar procedure is useful in evaluating the differences between the types, by seeing to what extent groups express the key concepts of other types. Table 2 enumerates the concepts expressed by each group that were characteristic of each type.

TABLE 2
NUMBER OF CONCEPTS EXPRESSED WITHIN EACH TYPE'S CATEGORIES
(BY TYPES)

Type Categories	Types			
	Locals	Cosmopolitans	Dogmatists	Individualists
Local (27 categories)	242	190	176	67
Cosmopolitan (32 categories)	163	317	157	32
Dogmatist (30 categories)	187	195	244	62
Individualist (17 categories)	111	83	97	83
Total	703	795	674	244
Total concepts actually expressed	487	597	455	190

NOTE: The totals of the columns are greater than the total number of concepts actually expressed by each group because the groups' categories are not mutually exclusive. The expression of a few concepts is characteristic of more than one type, so some were counted twice.

Table 2 shows, for example, that within the set of 17 concepts characteristic of the Individualist, the Cosmopolitans were coded 83 times. Within their own set of 32 categories, the Cosmopolitans were coded 317 times. A glance at the major diagonal shows that between-group differences are fairly large, but to reduce any confusion resulting from the different totals of concepts expressed by each group, Table 3 reverts to the ratio form.

This table shows, for example, that of all the Cosmopolitans' expressions, 53% fitted the categories characteristic of their type, but only 11% could be included in the categories

of the Individualists.

TABLE 3

CONCEPTS EXPRESSED WITHIN EACH TYPE'S CATEGORIES
AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL CONCEPTS EXPRESSED
(BY TYPES)

Type Categories	Types			
	Locals	Cosmopolitans	Dogmatists	Individualists
Local	.50	.33	.39	.35
Cosmopolitan	.33	.53	.35	.17
Dogmatist	.38	.33	.54	.33
Individualist	.23	.11	.24	.44

It is evident that the Locals and Dogmatists are most closely related; 39% of the latter's statements fitted the Local categories, and 38% of the Locals' statements fitted the Dogmatist ideal categories. This is mostly due to overlap in the defining concepts themselves; the two types often take similar individual positions and make similar statements, but, as will be apparent, this is for quite different basic reasons. The Cosmopolitans, on the other hand, are relatively distinct, fitting other types' categories rather poorly, and expressing themselves in terms unattractive to the other sets of people. The Individualists show up to be not only least cohesive within, but also the group least differentiated from all the others. They fit the Locals' almost as well as their own categories, and are really only alien to the Cosmopolitans. But this is somewhat illusory, for it is precisely their distinctiveness in not expressing certain concepts that makes the Individualists stand out; for instance, their uniform lack of any sense of

frustration at the non-dynamism of the country, their lack of latent hostility towards Quebec, and the absence of any sense of rejection when they contemplate the independence of Quebec. With this qualification, the overall results displayed above provide reasonable, if rather mechanical, evidence of cohesion within and differentiation between the types abstracted here.

However, a meaningfully adequate interpretation cannot depend on mathematical relations. Glaser and Strauss are clear on the strategy of the theorist:

His job is to suggest a theory based both on the theoretically relevant order of elaborated relationships and on the content of the variables he employs. He cannot think methodologically or statistically with symbols such as t factor or X leads to Y ; he must think theoretically about the content of his indicated categories and infer why the order of their possible relationships may be as he found them.⁶

This is doubly pertinent in the present case, because the numerical relations found to exist between concepts and groups would perhaps be significantly altered in another sample.

More precisely, due to the non-probability sample selected, it is impossible to mathematically specify the degree to which the relations found are likely to hold in the total population.

- On the other hand, it has been cogently argued that the generalizing aim of statistical tests of significance may obscure or cause to be neglected some relationships which are theoretically significant.⁷ Hence, while proportions are used below as adjuncts when the relationships are gross and unlikely to be erased in a new sample, the analysis aims to suggest that such erasure is unlikely, not by exploring the attitudinal relations in terms of statistical significance, but by demonstrating how the components are related logically and meaningfully.

The Individualists

The Individualists, as a type, are less cohesive than the other groups isolated here. They are related by generally convergent attitudes towards Canada, Quebec, and the United States, by the non-sharing of meanings common to other groups, and are characterized by a general predisposition to transform

could be put into other use. ... world's ... with ... the ...

... of the ... about 1% of the total. ... the ... were ... regard to the ... the same ... were ... of a ... straight ... and all ... feature of the ... were ... in the ... countered in this type ... relieved ... were ... the ... the ... pure context, for the ...

... this is ... the ... the ... reflects the attitude towards Canada as a place in which it is more or less acceptable to live. ... a workman's ... when we were speaking about the United States (I was a traveller from New Jersey):

- 1: "Well, what do people here think of the States?"
R: "Oh, they like it. They like it a lot - at least I do. They're all dying to move down there."
1: "Really...."
R: "Sure."
1: "I thought Canadians were getting pretty nationalistic."

know - drop first...."

K: "It's there's not too much of that...No, I find it
too cold here. A lot of people, see. All these retired
folks, you know, they come down there, down to the States
in the South to get away from the winter."

I: "Yeah, I guess it's a little cold out here."

I: "You do. A lot of them move down to Colorado and New
Mexico - down that way. Then they come up here in the
summer time. A big trailer, you know, comes down beside a lake,
they're all summer. Then it starts to get a little
cold, then they head back down South."

I: "Do you find much difference between the States and
Canada?"

I: "Oh, not much. Treated me well when I was down there."

At 10:00, a young Toronto suburban, a neophyte French teacher,
just returned from a year's course at the Sorbonne; on a hot day
near a fountain on the Yonge Street Mall, we chatted about Toron-
to's new cosmopolitan atmosphere:

K: "Actually, I don't mind American influence that much."

I: "Well, I think it's stronger here, but I've talked to
a lot of people who are still very anti-American States
and pro-Canadian."

K: "But don't you think that's a movement that's going on
all over Canada for the past year or two. It's
certainly been increasing."

I: "Yeah, I suppose so."

K: "I think it's a little sickening, really...I mean we have
a nice place here, but it's certainly not the end of the
world. It's not all that wonderful."

I: "Yes, I suppose a year in France gives you a different
perspective on the country."

K: "Yes, that's right."

The Individualist does not entertain myths or grasp at
symbols. Canada is therefore seen in simple geographic terms,
but with no affection attached: that good land up north of
Saskatoon is "good", because of the fishing; Vancouver is all
right because "we had a good time there" (a young man from
Richmond Hill, Ontario). Such approval is parcelled out according
to experience: the Individualist does not generalize to the whole,
in fact, most of the group had no clear image of the country as
a whole. It is the places within it that are most important.

...is quiet; ...then, finding a suitable one to live in, ...individualists, like most Canadians, are very aware of the sections, and divisions of the country (of the ill indicated tone), ...is striking that not one of them expressed a sense of regional pride or inferiority. They do not identify themselves with a country or region, even though it may be favoured, favoured or otherwise. This detachment is well-illustrated by a young carpenter, carpenter met in the city of a large Vancouver hotel around six ... or a stilling July day.

I: "You've traveled much in Canada?"

R: "Yes, I've been across the country, four times."

I: "How...you must have a pretty good idea of the place..."

R: "Right. You see, that's how I did my apprenticeship; I was working for an international construction company. You see, you'll work everywhere. I'll work for a bit here and then move on, work for a bit and then move on... worked no way. I traveled across - but I got tired of going back and forth and I came here to Vancouver."

I: "Well, do you think it's the best place to live?"

R: "Yeah, I think so."

I: "How about Ontario?"

R: "Well, I was born there in Ontario."

I: "Where, what part?"

R: "Oh, around Inverness."

I: "Pretty far north that..."

R: "Yeah, it is. But you see, the wages in Ontario are pretty low. I'd make maybe \$5.00, \$5.00 an hour there. And it's a lot better here. Of course, there's more taxes here, but still, you end up coming out a little bit ahead."

What is striking in this attitude is what is left out: perhaps because, like the young Richmond Hill man who was asked if he heard much news of Quebec - "I don't know. Like I don't watch T.V. and I don't sit down and read the newspaper or anything like that, so I don't really know. I don't really go in for that sort of thing." - they are classically apolitical; perhaps because they are consciously content with their own lives, they show little capacity for involvement. Only one of the group felt that the country was unified in any special sense, one other

thought it divided, none felt frustration with a perceived lack of a purpose or goals. For all their experience, the Individuals noted few characters that fit Canada's stereotype. It was noted that working for a corporation and in business interiors, saw the opposite of office and "freedom":

I: "Do you think there's such interference between Canadians and freedom?"

R: "Well...I think the people are about the same. I would tell you to live there though."

I: "What?"

R: "Well...like you have more freedom here."

I: "Oh...how do you mean?"

R: "Well, like here you can drink and you can vote at 18. Only 19. And I think all of these stuff. And other things that you don't have there."

With respect to the United States, the Individuals' attitude is not much different. The "attitude" was interesting people, and saw beautiful place there as in Canada. Overall characteristics are not consistent; hence, relatively few of the group felt that it negatively, and this evaluation centered around the effects on the self. The Vancouver carpenter was one:

"I mean, like here I can walk out of this door, any time of the night, and I'll be safe. No one's going to trouble me. Put down there, someone could have the least little nite for me, and he'd be up on the roof waiting for me to come out so he could take a shot at me."

Many more, whether conservative even than the socialists (40% as opposed to 10%), were clearly neutral with respect to the U.S.: they regarded it as a terrific place to visit or to make a living. In fact, of the 16 people who non-negatively mentioned visiting or working there, 6 were Individuals. A middle-aged, part-time clerk in a suburban Toronto department store was eager to recount her travels during lunch hour:

I: "And do you like it?"

R: "Yes - oh yes. There's some beautiful places there. Like Las Vegas, San Francisco, and I like Seattle very much. And Sandusky, Ohio, is a beautiful town, really, a nice town. No, we've been all over down there - Florida, California...I like San Francisco better than Los Angeles, I think...although it's really hard to say."

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of understanding the cultural context of communication.

1. "I'm not taking it, I'm not about" to end. "It's too late
now, or it's too late" really wanted to get to the
"I'm not taking it" the other way we haven't been, and I
am sorry, so to speak to the other. But now that
husband's in, he's not getting to be better off."

those who have not a great experience in the field of
education, and the other is the one who has a great
experience in the field of education.

have to visit. Four of the group detected a possible
 infection, but not, and left them alone. The other three
 were the "good" "new" group. The, the "new" group

the attitude of the law enforcement agencies. The United States is full of a constant flow of all sorts of stuff, and the things are rooted around in, and the things are not.

[illegible]

1: "Well, did you find much difference between the countries while you were in France?"

Q. "Oh yes, I thought they were very different. I had
to run it down exactly...the only other place I went to
was Liberia really, though once when we were driving to
from home, we stopped in a little city, at about three
o'clock in the morning...and I thought 'wow, this is
just like the South.' You see, I had read in history
when I was in college, and this place, it was like right
out of the books. Hadn't changed at all. For me, it
was just the South."

With the attitudes described above, it is obvious that for the Individualist, Quebec is of no special importance. Of the 11, 2 said they received little news of the place, and 5 clearly indicated that Quebec didn't affect them at all. The

eccentric Vancouverer for enter the area:

1: "Well, what do people out here think about Quebec?"

2: "As much. Like, there's not many French people out here. I mean, I see three in a day."

Not one of them, it seemed, had been; perhaps the people are superficially different, but in interest, in interesting, in, one can have a point. It is worth noting that many common and unfounded opinions about Quebecers - that they are emotional, 'impractical', and 'disorganized' - find no expression among the individuals. The Vancouver center was an exception. He gave an interesting short history of how some "17th Frenchmen" had been led astray by their leaders into supporting separatism. Only one of the group, a Toronto man who had driven his car into Quebec City for two hours, evidenced any hostility toward the place, although a Scottish merchant living in Ford town had noticed it among native westerners. Individualist 100, prepared to encounter and experience cultural differences: for example, the all-time schoolteacher had also gotten lost in Quebec during a whirlwind trip to Montreal years ago, and unlike many local and dogmatists, had no complaints.

3: "Well, I'm not sure where it was. But we went into this cafe to ask how to get back, and I was the only one who spoke French at all. I tried English, but the waiters in the cafe didn't understand, so I tried French, and she looked even more confused. Finally in the end we worked it out though, mostly by sign language and so on."

4: "So you had to haggle with the language?"

5: "No, not at all."

While Quebec is an interesting place, there are many which are more accessible, and most individualists are not concerned with it in the least. They certainly do not care if it becomes independent. 7 of the 11 said this explicitly, and only one expressed anything approaching irritation with the idea: this was the Toronto French specialist, who thought the present biculturalism to be enriching, and hoped that "something can be worked out." But there was no one in this group involved enough to lean forward and say, "You know, I can't see why they'd want to."

40. ... of ... with ... the ... of ...

... of ... with ... the ... of ...

... of ... with ... the ... of ...

... of ... with ... the ... of ...

While the ... try to concentrate on their ... the ... an ... view of the country beyond their area, even though it is rather sketchy and indistinctly ... Thus, ... of the ... it were judged to have little abstract idea of the country as a whole, as compared to ... Individualists, and ... They do not tend to see it as dependent, (only ...), cautious (...), or even as peaceful (...). In short they do not perceive characteristics of the country: overwhelmingly, they emphasize the country itself - its geography, its oneness. Fully 87% spoke of Canada in geographic terms (7% ; local, 46% ; ... , 41% ; Individualists, 17%).

grows naturally, spontaneously, out of his feeling for his home and region. Accordingly, his attitude towards it is articulated. The union is good, enduring, and while the other sections do not affect the Local directly to any great extent, it is somehow comforting to know that the country is, at bottom, together. After all, as we said, with regard to Quebec especially, and as could be further illustrated with respect to the East and West, while sections, economies, and lifestyles are different, "people are the same everywhere" (6 of the 23). Sections of the larger unit are often personified, and it seems that the underlying metaphor for the whole articulated, organic structure is the family - a unit that is divided within but solid from without, that changes yet endures, and that operates to support and sustain its members, just as it is sustained by them.

Cosmopolitans

The attitude towards Canada which characterizes the Cosmopolitan is substantially different from that of the two former types. Both Locals and Dogmatists have an attitude towards the country - the family and the geographic unit - which is concrete and easily transferable from their immediate lives. The Cosmopolitans, however, are immersed in the world of abstractions: their existence is second-order, and lacking the other groups' fixed centre of life, they conceive of Canada as a whole abstract entity. The problem is that 'Canada', for most of them, is not only abstract, but also hazy and difficult to define; the image that results is in most respects a negative reflection of the United States, and even the concrete characteristics noted tend to reflect hopes or ideals rather than real attributes. The Cosmopolitans rarely exhibit the immediate sense of region or the geographical orientation of the Local or Dogmatist. While they often speak of the geography of the country (as did 10 of the 25), this is mainly to point out its varying economic and resource bases, or to illustrate how the land divides the people. A student, working for the summer in

all lumped together, like cows in the states. So after
while you expect it, and it's all part of the show."

If these people who expressed some such view took of the 'cosmopolitans', as we were cosmopolitans. Not that this group does see
Canadian 'society' as divided: 17 of the 25 explicitly mentioned
this attribute, as compared to only 1 Indian Indian, 1 cosmopolitan,
and 1 local. Only two drew attention to its unity, and whereas
the others could point to many different schisms, these two could
only emphasize the 'spirit' of unity. Such an observation really
reflected a consensus here. In general, the divisions of the
country are deeply resented by cosmopolitans: a middle-aged
Vancouver woman, wife of a high-ranking air officer, explained
over coffee after we had met in a lounge:

I: "A Trudeau has done it, ay?"

B: "Yes, it seems that way. I think there's a lot of
people disillusioned with him. You know, I felt he
might have been the best prime minister since Laurier...
because I thought it could have gone two ways when the
election was on: I thought he could have been a real
hero, like a true Canadian hero, or a real washout.
and I guess he's a washout."

I: "Yes, I think many people hoped he would hold the country
together..."

B: "That's right! I thought he could. But it seems like
that shrug, you know - that's what he is to people in
Ontario. Now that may be just a gallic...gallic? Is
that how you pronounce it? Well, it may just be a
gallic gesture, but in English it means to them, "So what".
I felt he could have told the English a bit about Quebec
and said, "Look, these people need a few points. They've
been being taken advantage of for a while. They've been
shortchanged." And at the same time he could have told
Quebec that he was getting the English people to move,
that he was negotiating. But he hasn't done that."

For some, this lack of unity is accepted with resignation
as a fact of Canadian life: for instance, a Toronto middle-
management type who said, "Yeah, it's because they haven't
travelled very much: like people in N.C. don't like Easterners -
you'll find that out - and that includes Ontario." For most,
however, the lack of unity is disturbing; it is felt as a gap,
as a need to be filled. One of the most striking points of
agreement among Cosmopolitans is that the country "should be
together": 15 of the 25 expressed this sentiment (that is, 60%

as compared to Locals, 17; Individualists, 9; and Dogmatists, 11). An engineer for the City of North York was musing about a projected radio editorial which had enumerated the advantages of war:

"Yes, but the reason is that war gives national unity also. That's why we fight it, you know. You get the country united, you get the other and winning for victory so you get this unity and peace and brotherhood and unity. We sure don't have to know."

Because of this fact, the nature of the society is difficult to define; hence, the Cosmopolitan is perplexed at the lack of Canadian identity. In fact, for most of this group our transnational and fragmented society can only be considered as such by some conscious effort to bridge the various gaps that divide Canadians. Hence, one concept that Cosmopolitans employ to measure themselves of unity is to focus attention upon the economy: the variable and solid interdependence of trade and transport seem to provide solid underpinning for national identity. Fifteen out of twenty Cosmopolitans are in a position to appreciate the links of the economy: nine of them were judged to be upper middle class as compared to 1.5 for the sample as a whole; in other words, 71 of the upper middle class respondents were of this type. (Their higher level of information reflects this. When the Individualists scored 1.6 on a sample scale of level of information, and the mean for the sample was 1.5, the mean rating for the Cosmopolitans was 3.4, by far the highest of the groups.) Hence, the economy takes on some importance as a defining characteristic of the country. Yet even here, the old fear of the 'natural' North-South trading and communications pattern can emerge, and there remains the problem of American economic control. The retired police supervisor, asked simply if he liked the states, surprisingly responded, "No, not really. They own so much of us, you know." Of the 15 people who referred bitterly to U.S. dominance, 8 were Cosmopolitans.

Even for those satisfied with the economic situation, the society must still be defined, and the major Cosmopolitan approach is to do so with reference to the United States. In

fact, to understand the attitude of this type towards Canada, it must be grasped that the country is perpetually seen ~~as~~ as a reflection of the United States, or against the dominant American backdrop. The attitude toward Canada finds its place in the overall American context. Indeed, those who yearn for unity likely do so I feel, because the American model of a nation is before them; in this context is the lack of the unity which defines a nation felt. An Albert power station worker had remarked on the differences between Canadian regions before he began to talk about the U.S.:

R: "It seems they're more unified somehow. How would you, I'm not anti-American or anything like that. There's a lot of good things they've done, and they have many fine traits, but it does seem that they're violent and that they're more unified."

I: "What, do you mean that they identify more with the central government?"

R: "Yes, that's right; they're more tied to it. There's not much of that in Canada, and what there is seems to be declining."

Even those who do not crave unity but point instead to the mosaic pattern of the Canadian conglomerate often tend to do so not just because it is worthwhile in itself, but because it provides a cert in distinctiveness from the United States. A young British Columbian now living near Lunenburg, N.S., explained Canada to me:

R: "Like most people haven't travelled, so they have no idea of what Canada really is. So I figured I'd find out, and I ended up here."

I: "Did you find out about Canada?"

R: "Yeah...yeah...It's a funny place you know; it's huge. It's not really a nation - you couldn't call it that - it's too vague and indistinct. People are different everywhere, and they don't get mixed up like down in the States. It's sort of a big pattern and that's all."

Yet, not even he could see this pattern enduring:

I: "Yeah, it's really not too together..."

R: "Well, that's what makes us different really. But we're not all that different - we're quite a bit like the States I think."

I: "Really?"

R: "Yeah, we're just sort of scaled down, that's all."

"We're basically the same. It's like if something happens in the States, it'll happen here a couple of days later. But there's not all that much difference."

I: "Well, do you think we're becoming more like them?"

E: "Yes, yes. I mean we're becoming very Americanized. And it's going to increase - there's no other way."

Most cosmopolitans, however, are not so glib in their acceptance of this judgement. Against the major pre-occupations of the country, the real history of the recent period, and his own disquieting thoughts to perhaps we're not so different from the other Americans, the cosmopolitan asserts Canada's distinct unity. He illustrates this, not by pointing to outstanding characteristics (as there are few about) nor by simply referring to his country as 'home' (only 4/5) or as a 'good country' (6 of the 24), nor even by pointing to a distinct history, but rather by constantly mentioning that Canada is better than the U.S. Within this type, this was the strongest point of consensus: 17 of the 25 or 63 mentioned it for compared to individualists, 26; Socialists, 33; and Locals, 52%. Their basis of belief in the country, in its identity and integrity, is that it is different as a whole from the sea to the south. Hence, other attributes are seen in terms of the U.S.: 14 of them mentioned how Canadians are different, 8 felt it was to be expected, and 7 mentioned how Canada was peaceful, obviously in relation to the U.S. The cosmopolitans assert this superiority consciously, but it seems as though by affirming the difference, they hope to build something different; by being distinct over and against the States, they are then free united; by not being Americans, if they try hard enough, they will be Canadians.

Within the type, this relation ranges from those who emphasize simple differences - the retired man from Tweed, Ont., who said simply, "This place isn't like the States. It's not going to hell!" - to those who are smug in their superiority, like the teenaged doctor's son from Halifax who said, "Tourists are good for bringing money in. Sometimes they're stupid, but that's expected, you know, from Americans." However, it reaches its culmination in those who actually call themselves 'nationalist'. All 6 who did so were Cosmopolitans. A Mississauga, Ontario, woman in her early thirties spoke about her husband's young

company and the difficulties of acquiring capital for expansion:

"If you, they'd like very much to keep it Canadian. Certainly I'd like to see it - I'm quite a nationalist myself. I believe in the country, and I think that we should try to stay as Canadian as we can be."

Then there was the same upper housewife who favoured the Monarchy:

"I certainly think that we should keep it, because it's... unique... to have a representative for the government like that. I think the Americans pay a lot, and I think a lot of other countries do too. I don't think it's a very thing for people like that - it's even a tourist attraction."

An upper middle class Vancouver woman and I were discussing the difficulties of being nationalist in Canada when her twenty year-old daughter broke in and unwittingly answered us both:

I: "But I suppose it's tough to be a nationalist when you're not really sure what it's for..."

M: "That's true. It's difficult to define really. Still I think there's something about it..."

Daughter cuts in: "Well, I don't want to be anything special as long as I'm not an American."

Such comments recall the theme of S. L. Clark and the school of Canadian historiography which emphasized the conscious, controlled maintenance of Canada as a separate unit for the benefit of the present and later of the native vested interests.¹¹

Certainly it is the Cosmopolitans who disproportionately enjoy stable, well-paying jobs in the bureaucracies, and benefit from protection accorded entrepreneurs in Canada. Perhaps it is obvious that they should worry most about the survival of our distinct society and economy. But in this study description is the goal: aside from its existence as economic unit, Canada in the abstract is difficult for the Cosmopolitan to define, and the crucial point is that when he attempts to do so, reference is generally made to the greatest fact of Canadian life - the United States. In contrast to the patriotism of the Local and (to a lesser extent) the Dogmatists, which is concretely founded on their regions and immediate lives, the national feeling of the Cosmopolitan is a vague and abstract reaction against the vividness and power of the United States.

Attitudes Towards The United States

Cosmopolitans

The attitude of the cosmopolitans towards the United States can be summed up in a word - negative. Not one of them expressed any wholly favourable sentiment with regard to their neighbour, and 17 of the 25 expressed dislike and distrust for American society. This is, of course, the viewpoint that allows them to see Canada itself in a favourable light.

In its own right, the United States is a deeply troubled society: it is "crazy" (1/25), violent (2/25), crowded (1/25), and hectic (2/25); but more important, the social situation there is simply "bad" (1/25). Comments ranged from "erratic" to "sick", but the great majority of cosmopolitans regarded the American scene with distaste. At times these sentiments are expressed rather self-righteously, especially by the youth: but some older cosmopolitans remember a different America. A travelling salesman met at a lunch counter in Owen Sound, Ontario, eloquently revealed his changed attitude:

I: "Have you been to the States?"

R: "Yes, I've travelled down there."

I: "Well, do you see much difference between Americans and Canadians?"

R: "No...no...not among the people."

I: "Well, would you like to live down there?"

R: "No, I don't think so. (pause) I grew up in Fort Erie, and at the time I was young, everybody was heading down to the States to get jobs - that's where the action was. I thought about it seriously a couple of times, but in the end I decided not to. I'm sure glad I didn't. I've got a brother in Cleveland now, and I go down to visit him sometimes. It's ok to visit, but it sure is tense. It's terrible down there - they've got a lot of problems."

I: "Yes, talk about an atmosphere of tension..."

R: "Well, they're a great people. I think they're one of the most generous countries. You could see that...they've given a lot of money out and...I often think back to the time when they dropped that bomb on Japan at the end of the Second World War - I guess you're too young to remember that - but I mean nobody else had that bomb. They could've just planted one on Russia too. Could've taken over the whole world and they didn't. I think that's a good example of how they are....But they've gone wrong

...somewhere, they've really gone wrong."

Some recall the gift of American uniforms: "your [son] took a student working for the summer in an outfitter's shop, covered my [son] as to whether [Canada] could ever be a great country:

"No...we're not really trying to do that you see. We like it just the way it is. I like it just the way it is, and we'd be doing it fighting like the Russians and the States. I like they're just competing with each other all the time. That's all it turns into. It's a lot better like this, I think."

Most Cosmo-politans fear their core saw, about the differences they perceive.

Two reporters to this type is the way the U.S. actually affects Canada: it is generally seen as rather menacing, like a massive overt hand rock. While this is not unique to explain it within the type, it is the only did expressly mention its power, and although the other Cosmo-politans tended to accept it as an overblasted claim, none of the young Cosmo-politans rejected it; the young Cosmo-politans in America that we saw anything but threatened. The young Cosmo-politans in Canada, however, did not buy into the idea of the U.S. as a threat, and continued;

"The States want to take us over - they'd like to, anyway. They own most of the place already. Actually, they're too smart to take us over outright, you know - politically - so they do it through their companies."

He was ready to slip away at the over-noon:

"They can't keep running the world you know; they found out that they have to freeze. Like after the Second World War, they could do anything they wanted to, right? They could call all the shots. But now they have to do it economically. Well, what we should do is unite with the other countries, then the States will fall in line, sooner or later."

While this is extreme in the type, most Cosmo-politans did sense American dominance: 5 of the 25 mentioned foreign ownership of industry, 1 (from the Maritimes) pointed to American land-buying, and 9 regarded the United States as generally greedy for Canada's resource wealth. (Only 7 other respondents did so). A young Hamiltonian on vacation in the West said it crudely;

"The States are dominant you know. They want us for sure. If they had us, they'd get all the people and the resources: that's all they could ever want."

117

An articulate and politically-involved Nova Scotia lawyer expressed his concern:

"and the thing that most people are getting irritated about is that the whole province is being bought up. A lot of land along the seacoast is going and pretty soon there won't be room for anyone in Nova Scotia to buy land, let alone a couple of acres for themselves. There's a lot of money money coming in here - Americans are coming up, buying farms, homesteading. It's mostly the Americans...I don't know what can be done about it. It certainly is the biggest problem facing Nova Scotia today - the extent of American investment here - but we don't seem to be able to convince the government of that."

While the cosmopolitans therefore regard the U.S.A. as dominant and somewhat threatening, they are at the same time able to see the current wave of anti-Americanism and to regard it self-consciously. As they seek their unity and identity, implicitly attempting to derive it from Canada's lack of U.S.-ness, they can stolidly accept anti-Americanism as a fact of Canadian life. The Vancouver Ltd met on the train to Toronto is an example:

I: "Have you ever thought of moving down there?"

R: "Oh no, never. I couldn't really see it. It's a nice place to visit and all, but...no...I don't like much of their things. I mean, all those old spills have really irritated us out on the coast, and then there was the Amchik test. People were pretty upset about that. Many people in U.S. are really quite anti-American...It's strange, I suppose, because we're so close and so influenced by them."

And finally, the Nova Scotia lawyer:

I: "Well, is there much interest in the States here?"

R: "No, not really. It's a pretty anti-American feeling coming across now. There's no question really of getting close to them - they're too close already. The main problem is just that; that's what we have to work on now."

To the Cosmopolitan, then, 'America' is the immense entity that casts the shadow within which Canada must struggle to keep its form.

Locals

The Local shares certain isolated Cosmopolitan views of the United States, but is not so preoccupied by its overall effects

of dominance. For is the object so salient for him, because his home and Canada can both be defied without external reference. While Canada is diverse and united like a family, the U.S.A. is regarded from without as a more monolithic unit, and the prevailing opinion among locals is that it is not as good a home for their own. One of the ways Canada is "better than the U.S.", and is at the same time a derogatory evaluation of the states. The prevailing reason for this judgement is the violence of American society. Local experience of the country is limited to a tourist trip and those segments of the mass media which sensationalize violence: the information prepares them to expect an uncomfortable social situation, and if they go, they go to find something to substantiate the image. An elderly lady who hadn't been out of Toronto in years was a case in point:

"I certainly couldn't live in the States. It's terrible down there - all that fighting and murders and robberies. I could never live there, especially in New York."

Is an immigrant from Canada, now living in Vancouver:

I: "Did you ever think of going to the States when you were looking around?"

R: "No, not really. I couldn't go now for sure. I thought at one time that if I didn't make it here, I'd probably move there, but we wouldn't do that now."

I: "Oh..."

R: "No, not unless I wanted to carry a six-gun in my pocket."

The violence, the fast pace, and the social problems are emphasized and render the place uninviting. A young lady met in Toronto's Union Station was quite blunt:

I: "Have been there?"

R: "Yes, I live in Windsor - it's right near Detroit."

I: "Why don't you like them?"

R: "They're crazy down there, really crazy. They go around killing each other."

The local generally sees the American people themselves as all right, but about their effects on Canada, he is not so certain. For one thing, some Americans who come as tourists are extremely arrogant, and there is resentment at a manner perceived almost as swaggering; as the lady met on the train to

Province, the 'd here, the 'd here."

Later we talked about the money - the money."

E: "Now the Americans come up and get 'em. I'll hardly blame 'em, 'cause they just don't use the meat, you know. They only use the best, the best, for a trophy."

I: "Well, they have to get it, 'cause they don't have it."

E: "Oh yeah, sure. Remember they pay a buck for a live one, a Newfoundland pays all."

I: "Pretty cheap."

E: "For sure. To shoot 'em, the 'd here, the 'd here, the 'd here, that's twenty-five dollars, and you have to live where you're sure, or they probably pay about a hundred dollars a day, but that's not much."

"The thing is, you know, you go down and see up on a hill, and there's a house and you go to buy, 'Do you want to take that house?', and he takes a look and says, 'Yeah, I'll take it', so you shoot him and get up there, and he's in a fight, and one of his birds is broken or maybe he's not so good, he looked, and he's what do you do? Well, he went to go on for another one, and so you go on for another one."

I: "I can see why... the birds are so easy to get."

E: "Yeah, the 'd here, another twenty-five bucks a month, and maybe the my 'd here, the 'd here, the 'd here, how fifty dollars is a lot of money to a man like me."

for most locals, the Americans are an overwhelming force, and they are either widely resented or are simply seen, from far away, to be leading an inferior form of life. For those touched directly by their influence, there is resentment, and a certain fear of their power, but nothing to compare in abstract interest with the attitude of the Cosmopolitans.

Doctrinists

It is the Doctrinists for whom the United States is least relevant; they regard it as a fact of the world, neither very different nor especially threatening. As Canada is a distinct unit, so does the United States, and the people and places within it are pretty much the same as in this country, except that they are subject to different geography and weather. Only 4 of the 10 were clearly negative in their attitude, most for reasons of social violence, while 7 were quite neutral. Another 5 of

the group said that one would have to visit the country to judge it fairly. Americans are basically the same as Canadians; it expressed this (as compared to: Individualists, 16%; Locals, 12%, and the population, 8%). The Winnipeg bakery worker mentioned only the difference in accents; a Toronto laundromat owner was struck by Americans' tendency to fatness:

"People are about the same everywhere. Except one thing - they're a lot fatter - the way they eat down there. They're all fatter."

.....
"I've never been out of Michigan ourselves, so we don't know what it's like out there. But people in the rest seem to be like Canadians pretty much, except for this thing about eating and how big they are."

Only one of this group mentioned the power of the U.S., and none saw it as exerting any undue control over Canada. For the book artist, the United States figures little: it is a unit about the same as Canada, except that it is further south. It is simply a relatively unimportant part of the present state of affairs.

Attitudes Towards Quebec

In the view of each group of English Canadians isolated here, Quebec is a distinctive entity. Since the time of the Quiet Revolution especially, it has thrust itself before them, and although many would prefer it to recede again, most have somewhat begrudgingly accommodated themselves to its special nature. Depending upon their other attitudes, however, Quebec is fitted into the picture in very different ways.

• Locals

For the Locals, Quebec is at once a place and a group of people. They feel familiar with it from their vacations or from news coverage (especially of Expo 67), although outside of the "big city" of Montreal it is largely undefined. Of the 25 people in this type, 11 spoke of it as a place, and as an entity in its own right it has a distinct character, like their own regions. The Old Maritime legionnaire put it this way:

"Have you been to Quebec?"

"Yes, I've been there a few times."

"Did you like it?"

"Oh, she's quite a place, quite a place."

"Tell me, did you get on ok there without speaking French?"

"Oh yes, there's no trouble there."

"I'm going there, you know, before I'm heading up there next."

"Oh, it's worth a go to see, I think...worth going to see."

While the slight character of Quebec society and language can arouse some hostility in those who struggle through it, the unit as a unit is generally seen as having similar characteristics to the local's own region. An equipment operator from North Sydney explained why:

"Oh, we don't think about it too much. It's a province like all the rest...not more, not less than most I suppose. But it's about the same. Seems to be settling down now though."

Similarly, the retired diesel mechanic from St. John's said:

"Oh, what do you think about Quebec?"

"Oh - I don't know. Never been down there either. It's like the others I guess - no one here has anything to say about it."

As another of the entities in the family-like union of Canada, Quebec is not felt to influence the other regions to any great degree. The Winnipeg engineer felt that it "doesn't matter too much to the West"; and 10 of the 23 made statements of a similar kind. When asked whether people in his town talked much about Quebec, the Newfoundland accountant replied,

"Quebec? Yeah, it's like the rest - people come down and they talk about it for a while. You know, it's discussed for a while. Now, people talk about Iceland - last year it was Quebec: it comes in and it's discussed for one week or two weeks, three weeks or a month, depending on how important it is, and then it's let drop. Something else is picked up and if there's no big news, then there's always the gossip in town - that's going on all the time."

It's striking the degree to which both locals andheimatists, who travel little, are dependent on the media, and often upon only

one source, for all their impressions. The result is often that only the 'big news' of violence or unrest is absorbed: there is little opportunity for them, because of shortage of time and sources, to keep track of the slow evolution and minor but significant changes within other regions. And if they were to do so, the local news, as it is, and relationships which link them tightly to their region would be sacrificed. As we have seen, for the Communist, left-revolutionary and secure, this limited exposure often results in a distorted view of Quebec: the local seems to pay less strict heed to their reports and to soften the news through discussion. The local, possessing a more organic attitude towards the country, is more likely to give Quebec the benefit of the doubt: although they are culturally distinct, fully that the Communist noted that the people are basically the same as themselves, with common to a political, social, cultural, and individual life.

Among Locals, however, the traditional stereotypes they retain come into play, depending on personal experiences. The reference through a Communist's own thought about the local is correct, and the book, but the Communist recorded the following:

Q: "You don't like them."

A: "No, not exactly. I like it a lot, but not much, but I have some that I know - drinking, drinking and stuff - and, uh, they're lazy, that's all."

Q: "Well, do you think most people think that?"

A: "Yeah... 'cause that's how they are - it's a racial characteristic; you know. I know those guys are lazy. There's about twenty of them that I know; they all work at this one factory... and, uh, they just don't work. They're just lazy people; you know, they work as little as they can."

But such one-sided opinions are relatively rare. To the Locals, Quebec is a distinct unit and its people have a distinct pattern of life: in this sense, they are united, homogeneous, and somewhat different. However, as another member of the Canadian Union, Quebec is fundamentally similar to their own region, and at bottom the Local regards the place as equal (or from the west especially, as more than equal) and as operating pretty well as his own does. Hence, while Locals seem to hold various positions

according to whether distinctiveness or similarity is temporarily emphasized, most express an understanding of both facts, and one-sided labelling, such as that reported above (which really depends on being able to regard French Canadians, from without, as homogeneous) is very rarely met. Indeed, such old stereotypes are often transferred onto the separatists alone; the other people are seen as anxious to locate themselves.

The one thing that does irritate most members of the group, is that their sincere ideas of equality and underlying similarity, if not identity, are not reciprocated. Those who have visited have felt frustrated and rejected by Quebecers' lack of good will, and by their 'uppityness' or self-concern, which after business is put out said:

"It sure is a whole different thing down there...It's like in Canada, most ethnic groups sort of stick to themselves, especially the French. It's like a wall there."

For the mail truck driver from St. John:

"You know, I got lost up there once and I was asking directions, and no one would tell me anything. I even asked a policeman, and he just said he couldn't speak English. Now the thing is - a policeman should. And you, some of them are OK, but...well, the way I found my way out was there was a car that had been following me around, and this car were 'anti-amer'. They'd seen my plates and they'd followed me, and then they gave me directions to get to the highway to Montreal. So I got out."

Or finally, the basketball carpenter:

"Well, I worked in a crew of five you see (in a munitions plant during World War II) and I had four ~~ten~~ under me - every one of those men was French. They were good workers sometimes...but...they spoke English on the job and they could speak English fine, but after work, they'd go off to do things...you know, they'd go off to have a few beers or to parties and things, and they wouldn't speak English. They'd just speak French all by themselves. So I'd tell 'em - 'You do that and you can bloody well go on your own 'cause I'm not going with you. See if I give a shit.'"

If we can ignore for a moment the structural conditions which have led Quebecers to consciously turn inward, it is this perceived 'uppityness' that makes the Locals resentful. Of the 23, 6 mentioned that Quebec was "noisy" and "demanding" in its relations with the rest of the country, and it is regarded

rather like the troublesome adolescent of the family. It has problems, but it is immature and dependent on the rest of Canada (12 of the 23). Quebecers should be more grateful for the support of the larger unit, yet even if they are not, the locals are willing to put up with them, in spite of occasional exasperation. A young man from a northern Ontario bush town summed up the generally tolerant attitude of the locals:

Q: "What do people in ----- think of Quebec?"

A: "Well, they don't think of it very much. A lot don't like the wine tax that's down there, you know. They think they can put it up, or the new one - 40 and 45 cents, or whatever it's called."

Q: "What do you think?"

A: "Well I've never been, so it's hard to say. I've heard people are pretty nice though. I've heard the country's ok, but I haven't seen it. I think though, that there's a lot of farmers - that's what it sounds like."

Cosmopolitans

The cosmopolitan attitude towards Quebec is more refined than the local's, if no more complex. It is important that they are very aware of the province; it is a key element in their view of the Canadian situation, and in line with their concern for the problems within the country, only 3 of the 25 - an Ontario farmer, a young man from Halifax, and a housewife from British Columbia - claimed that it doesn't really affect them (as compared to the local). Doctrinaires, and a individualists; Quebec is regarded as a distinct unit: all of the group clearly indicated that it is different and separate from the rest of Canada, although most expressed this idea with more nicety than the young Burlington men who said simply "It's a whole different culture down there - it really is different." In contrast to the locals, only 2 of the 25 cosmopolitans volunteered the view that French Canadians were basically similar to the English majority. Yet, like all sections of the country, like all the other regions that are inescapably distinct because of geography or special interests, Quebec constitutes a sub-society. It is definitely not equal to the rest of the country: rather, from the economic aspect stressed by many cosmopolitans, the province is all the more dependent on the greater whole as it has an especially bad economy. A young Canadian National investigator

met on the train to Toronto and:

"I didn't know it all that well except. But I don't think many people would want to live there. Prices are awful low - five cents, and it's hard to find food down there, with all the industry round out."

On the 26, he made similar statements. The restriction of Quebecers is thought to be at least partially responsible in bringing about this condition: social, economic, caused by the anti-foreigner feeling of the French Canadians, and by a tight economic situation. In fact, the Canadian economy has brought social problems, and of the 26 emphasized that Quebec is a troubled and unsettled society. Other, also, as compared to: bourgeois, and individualist, and locally, and. The 26 never told his wife had once lived in Montreal but was found it "stagnant", some official with the Ontario Department of Education mentioned the "stagnant" people getting out of Quebec, or who would if they could, and the young men and women, who had that they were better off in time but told career staffs of friends who lost their jobs on their but when they tried to get, the 26 continued:

"I understand how they want to protect their culture, and I can only think the 26 have been oversteered: to get a good job, you have to speak English, and that's all there is to it. If you speak French, then you're going to get a lower-paying job."

"I used to see it when I was in Quebec. You know, my father's request, and I was the manager of the ---- plant there. All the labourers were French of course, and they were doing the worst jobs, that's all. And I could see that as they became more educated and saw what was happening, then they'd begin to get angry. But I can sympathize with them for that, I really do."

This group may be in a position to understand and sympathize, but not too much: they feel that the Quebecers are hurting themselves by their apathy; and that the situation is becoming a little extreme; there are limits, and sooner or later, they will be reached. The young Halifax man, now at a doctor, mentioned the great increase in political activity in this city due to labour problems in Montreal and said,

"Most people think they're causing a lot of trouble for nothing. They seem to be asking a lot of trouble there, and then about all."

A similar view was expressed by the Alberta power station manager:

"Well, it's a shame they have so many troubles there. It's very tough to understand, but I think there's two sides to every coin. Certainly they've been discriminated against and have gotten the short end of the stick, but on the other hand, they make lots of noise - perhaps more noise than is warranted. It's like that generally, I suppose."

Among cosmopolitans, there is little actual hostility towards Quebec (only 3 of the 25, and only occasional mild stereotyping Quebecers are "noisy" or "excitable"). There is rather a dominant feeling of unease with regard to Quebec: internally, because they seem to have carried the situation too far (6 of the 25 spontaneously mentioned the events of October 1970, although they are quick to point out that the province as a whole cannot be held responsible. It was rather a symptom of the underlying trouble.); and externally, because Quebec's persistent self-concern and the people's tendency to "look inward" at the same time as the pressures upon the rest of the country, tend to destroy the fragile unity of the greater society. The Stratford, Ontario salesman would not move down to his company's head office in Montreal because "there's just sort of this pressure in the air." The North York engineer mentioned how Quebecers "peg you real quick as an outsider...it's just something you can feel...sort of closed-off to you." And a young Hamilton man typified the weariness felt by a number of cosmopolitans at Quebec's lack of commitment to national understanding:

I: "Have you been down to Quebec?"

R: "Yep."

I: "How'd you like it?"

R: "Well, it was ok except...well, I don't know, this bi-lingualism thing...like I went the long way round - I went through a lot of little towns on the way down to Montreal...stopped in a lot of them. And the old people would...they'd try English, and those trying to sell you something would speak English, but the young kids - if you spoke English, they just looked at you like...like you were, I don't know...from a different planet or something. I was pretty sick of the whole thing by the time I got to Montreal.

"I don't know...Then I met a bunch of people and

we were travelling around...stopped in this restaurant, in this bar, and they asked us where we were from. And the other ones said the names of the places they were from, and I just said I was from 'Canada'. One guy almost came out into the car after me for that!"

While the province is thus a troubled and increasingly troublesome sub-society, the problems within it are seen as a dynamic of social unrest, economic uncertainty, and political dispute. Cosmopolitans do not tend to see Quebec as monolithic and the people as united, but understand the province to be in a balance of contending forces: the most forceful one, while not yet dominant, represents potential disaster for Canadian unity. Indeed, for this group in general, Quebec is not so important in itself, as in how it affects the fragile whole. It is solely within this group that those who consider the French influence to be enriching are found (except for the individualist French teacher); but they are strikingly few - only 4 of the 25 embrace bilinguism. For the rest, the new Quebec is a self-centred sub-society which makes the achievement of national unity more difficult. The retired police supervisor spoke to this point:

I: "I found people in the west didn't care very much about Quebec..."

R: "Not me, at least in Brandon. It seemed that they cared quite a bit. They didn't like them, but they cared a lot. But I just kept my feelings to myself...staying and travelling with these people for three weeks. Still I thought to myself, 'Oh, God, this is a luxury we just can't afford. If we can't be civilized and get together in this day and age, it's a pretty poor hope.' I mean just...a lot of those people think Quebec should just be bombed back into desolation!"

"And they have another idea too - that the war was won on the plains of Abraham, so why the hell are we still fighting. But God, that war was 300 years ago - we can't go on thinking about that. That's what they do down in Quebec."

The Cosmopolitan attitude towards Quebec is thus often marked by a sense of sadness and loss. The Nova Scotia lawyer, speaking to me in the front seat of his brand-new car with two French-Canadian hitchhikers from Sherbrooke in the back, expressed this:

"People here are worried though. They're basically con-

derivative, you know. And yet I know they wouldn't admit it, but a lot of them will go up there, and have problems with the language and not be able to understand, and see a completely different culture, and they'll come back and the 'll probably gripe about it, but the 'll still feel proud underneath that this too is part of the country. Even if it's so different, it's still part of a bigger thing, and they'll feel it would be a shame to lose it.

"Our people here used to go down, and traditionally, they'd be sort of open and proud of French Canada - I said. But now many of them go down, and many of them don't speak French, and as soon as they find out that you're not bilingual down there, wift - you're closed off...they sort of shut off from you. It's inefinable really."

Dogmatists

Quebec is least comfortable in the attitude-set of the Dogmatists. This is natural enough, given their view of Canada as a unitary geographic entity, for Quebec inevitably forms a distinct unit itself. In a country that is unitary, it is puzzling that gross differences persist, and although other "ethnic groups" are content to conduct their affairs in English and are reasonably dispersed, the French Canadians are not; they are both concentrated and different, and therefore, in the Dogmatist attitude, anomalous.

One indication of this problem is that very few of the Dogmatists feel Quebec does not affect them; surprisingly enough, given their general isolation from outside events, only 3 of the 18 indicated that Quebec was irrelevant to them, as compared to 10 of the 23 locals. For some of this group, it is simply a place (6 of the 18), and many are apt to mention only Montreal as the metropolis they have passed through on travels, but in general, it is the alien nature of the people in their monolithic unit in the centre of Canada that bends the Dogmatist thoughts when he comes to regard "Quebec".

The people themselves are clearly perceived as different; 11 of the group indicated this, as opposed to only one who emphasized similarity - and that on broad biblical grounds in the context of an argument for their disappearance. An elderly Austrian immigrant met in Hamilton's Gage Park was blunt:

"It's like the niggers in the States...we used to live right near the niggers in Philadelphia. We lived on one side of the street, the niggers on the other side. It was peaceful. That was in 1744, it was. I worked with some of them and they were ok. French Canadians are like that.. sort of the same thing."

Most Dogmatists are a little more specific: 4 described the Quebecers as a group as "reactional" or "radical"; 5 thought them "supercity", and resented it; and 7 of the group thought 'the' were 'crazy and demanding'. At the same time as these differences are asserted, however, Quebec must somehow be squeezed in to the whole of Canada. A student met hitchhiking in Toronto was brief in explaining the situation to me, a traveller from New Jersey:

1: "What do people here think of Quebec?"

2: "Oh, we get on fine. It's a part of Canada like the rest. Only thing is, they want too much."

It is this demand made by Quebec that irritates Dogmatists: is that people should be bilingual. People who share this attitude form the hard-core opposition to the idea of multiculturalism; time and time again, they exclaim that Quebec is trying to "force" the rest of Canada to speak French. Of the 11 people who mentioned this, 6 were of this group, and they were most vehement. An elderly Fredericton contractor complained,

"They just shouldn't try to run it down our throats, you know. If someone wants to learn French, let them go ahead, but don't force it on other people."

This point is important to the Dogmatists: they react as if Quebec were trying to subvert the country, to change its true nature. The Winnipeg bakery worker was somewhat excited about this;

"I don't understand - they want everybody to speak French. They sort of think that they're the only Canadians; that's what it looks like to me. That's the feeling I get. Like they think they're Canada, and that's all, and everybody else is just sort of squatters here. But it belongs to everybody, to everybody. I mean, if they want to think we're all squatters, they should look at the Indians anyway; they were here first."

The idea seems all the more ridiculous in that the French spoken in Quebec is not real French; Quebec is even culturally immature. A Burlington, Ontario, girl provides an example;

"I think it's good. Country should be bilingual, I really do, but they don't even speak French... it's part English and part Canadian, and part French. It's not a language really, I like how. So it's still - the can't really be country."

Obviously, in a country things need not be uniform throughout, but differences should not form major divisions. Unlike the United States, for whom the unity of a country can be intrinsically different, the Dogmatist attitude argues that the parts should be internally pluralistic and hence alike. There is no place for a distinct, united group. A truck driver who lived outside of Toronto, Ontario, recounted his embarrassing experience in a French restaurant: he and his wife had clucked and flogged their arms for five minutes to convey the idea of 'legs' to the waiter who watched, considerably amused no doubt by this large, simple, but good-natured individual, and then turned and yelled to the kitchen, "Can I see some legs, sir!"

"I mean that we're real ignorant. I just took the plates when they came and crashed them in his face, and left. He never wanted to go for them!"

"That's stupid. Why all around here, there's groups like that. Kitchener is mostly German people. The Dutch are over further west. Tobacco country - mostly - regions down there. And they're all the same. They all speak English and get along. I always say there's only two original Canadians, the Indian and the skunk; and I don't think those French people are Indians."

This helps illuminate a category used by 4 of the 18 Dogmatists, and by only 2 other respondents: in Canada, there is 'room for everybody'. Groups can stay separate and spread out everywhere, but they should be willing to get along together in English, especially if they are large enough to pose a threat to the dominant culture. A rich Manitoba real estate man, who appeared to have recently converted to an evangelical sect, explained;

R: "Nationalism is basically an egotistical thing. It's bad. A multi-language country, it seems to me, just can't work. It's fine to keep your culture, it's fine: I think it's an incredibly enriching thing. You have your language that you can speak with your family, you keep different traditions, music, foods... but to force a language on others and to make them speak your language, I think is... is... really too much."

I: "But don't the Quebecers feel that this has been their

"problem for the last 300 years..."

"Oh well, this is silly. You have all other ethnic groups fair on their terms in English. They keep their cultures, and they do their thing in English, and that's how I think it should be."

More bluntly, the idea for maintenance had followed the same line:

"I wouldn't mind it if it was Chinese or English or German or Russian - I'll be in it and then we could get somewhere. But there should be one language, and it shouldn't be just for one province, but for the whole country."

At the same time, continuing; Quebec is the home of an ethnic group that won't lie down and behave like one. Naturally enough, since it constitutes only a part of Canada, it is seen as dependent (on the rest) and is relatively weak and poor. However, it is entitled to be the most important, it constitutes a unit that is different and separate from the rest of the country. This last point was clearly expressed by fully 16 of the 18 respondents, a very high proportion. Yet paradoxically, for one who should be a part of the larger whole, this group is also often to be found on the idea that Quebec is a "part" like the rest, even though they know it is not. At the 11 respondents who made this statement, it was Quebecists, and they expressed the sentiment with a good deal of insistence and, at times, indignation. The Winnipeg factory worker was one:

"I think that's good if they speak French - I don't give a damn - but they shouldn't expect everybody else here to do it too. They want us out here to speak French, and they get mad if we don't: that's really stupid. They can keep their language and their culture and all that, but English is the language of business, you know. Even the French, when they did that friendship treaty or something with Canada, it was done in English. The French don't mind, and after all it's their language. They're really a nation, and Quebec is just a province! So they're stupid not to speak English... they just want to bother with everybody else and they should really look after themselves."

Or the Burlington girl, who felt she'd made a slip;

I: "Tell me, what do folks here think of Quebec?"

R: "Oh, I've been there. It's a nice country, pretty... province, that is. I have an aunt and uncle who live in Montreal, and I've visited them."

With these difficulties in reconciling Quebec with their attitude towards Canada, it is no wonder that Dogmatists demonstrated most hostility towards the province. Of the 21 respondents so coded, 9 were of this group, a much higher proportion than found in the other types. In addition, perhaps as an incontrovertible buttress to their resentment, 8 of the 11 spontaneously mentioned the events of October, 1970; again, a higher proportion than any other type. As will soon be apparent, the tension in the Dogmatist attitude-set about the place of Quebec in Canada makes the question of its independence most perplexing.


Quebec Independence

Dogmatists

This group maintains a relatively inflexible attitude towards Canada: it is a solid unit, rather undifferentiated, in which places rather than sectors are most prominent. Moreover, for the Dogmatist, Canada is set; it is a given, a firm constant which is difficult to imagine in any form but its present one. For these people, the United States is neither such unit, but it is certainly less relevant to them. Quebec, when they think of it, is a puzzle: it lies right there in the centre of the country, home to a unified, different, and irritating group of people that should, naturally, fade away. At the centre of all this is the home, a known and stable centre of life; while it is definitely the key element, to ensure its nature, the larger context must also be maintained. The overall attitude-set may be rather impressionistically represented as in Figure 1 below.

The Dogmatist's strength of identification with Canada as he perceives it is moderate. An overall reading of the interviews reveals that people in this group are not involved to an great extent with the country in itself, but, on the other hand, they are not self-isolated from it like the Individualists.

Figure 1: A Representation of the Attitude-set
of the Dogmatist



In a simple five-point scale of strength of identification ranging from low to high, the group was most symmetrically distributed, with the mode being 'moderate'. The mean on this scale for the entire sample was 3.1, and the mean for the Dogmatists was also 3.1 (as compared to the Individualists' 1.5). They are thus less self-identified with the country than either Locals or Cosmopolitans, but are still quite committed to it.

With this basic set of attitudes, the Dogmatist view of Quebec independence makes perfect sense, even in its apparent inconsistencies. In the first place, given that Canada is a pretty satisfactory country and that any change in its nature is rather incomprehensible and certainly undesirable, they cannot understand why Quebecers would want to be independent. Altogether 8 of the 18 implied this; the idea is "stupid", "crazy", or irrational. The girl from Burlington was one;

"There's some who want to separate, I suppose, but...well, I think they're idiots. They're stupid...I don't see why they want to."

For the Dogmatists, any change is a radical move, whether it affects them or not; change should only occur when it is forced by events, otherwise it is best to let well enough alone.

Those who actually seek to promote change are necessarily "hot-

heads" or radicals. Naturally this characterization meshes well with the view of French Canadians as basically irrational and emotional. An aging trator of an Ontario Community College at a small in Burlington was innocently asked;

I: "Well, what about Quebec?"

A: "I, they're crazy. They make a lot of noise. They've been at it before and nothing came of it... they just keep complaining because they're not getting a good enough deal."

.....

"It's just that the French want too much, that's all. And we have to bribe the, to stay in. We pay them an awful lot."

In all, 2 of the 15 denied the stupidity of the separatists, and 2 were made a direct link between all separatists and the FLQ. To the majority, the FLQ simply brought back the survey, if not in a collection however well exercised;

A: "If you know, I can't see why they should want to leave and speak French all by themselves."

I: "Do you think Canada could be all English?"

A: "Well, there's a lot of people here. Like Canada's a country, it's not like we should be able to get along... that's what a country is."

Given their view of Canada as unitary, it is reasonable that separatism would be regarded as irrational. And in line with them to deny to regard Quebec as homogeneous and united, very few of the group pointed out that the separatists are a minority in the province; only 3 of the 15 did so. They are more likely to see the decision to secede as the product of a collective mood; Quebecers, it once separated from the rest of the country, in their own unit and homogeneous by their sharing of a language, are seen as needed, and it is as such a united group that they would "break away".

But separation is all the more irrational as the province itself would be severely hurt. As a necessarily dependent part of the whole, Quebec is absolutely bound to suffer if it breaks away, and 11 of the 15 preferred the support that would be forfeited by such a move. The Edmonton maintenance man was blunt:

I: "Do you think Quebec'll separate?"

R: "Honestly no. I don't think they have the guts."

I: "Huh..."

R: "No, I don't think so, and there'd be a pretty tough time if they did...not much money down there..."

I: "No, that's true. And there's a lot of unemployment..."

R: "Well, you see, they depend on us for a lot of help, and they wouldn't get far without it."

Independence would be especially difficult, were Canada to pull out everything that has rather artificially been keeping Quebec alive, and localists are most likely to see this happening.

One of a pair of steel workers interviewed over a lunchtime beer in the employees' hall in Hamilton was certain of this:

I: "Well, I think it's pretty well up in the air."

R: "Well, they'd be stupid if they did. Really stupid...it's crazy. Like, it's just not strong enough to...to be independent or be separate from the rest of us. All the industry would pull out. Jesus, all those companies...I mean, there's a lot of big companies anyway, but they'd pull out and then they'd have real trouble with their loans and their Medicare, and their unemployment insurance, and their welfare. In fact, I'd have to leave, 'cause they sure wouldn't get it if they came around to Canada."

His good friend felt that separation would hurt Canada economically, (only 2 of the 10), or that Quebec would "go with" the United States (only 2). In fact, from their point of view, the worrisome thing is what would happen to Canada itself.

Since the country is a geographic unit, and Quebec is inescapably in the centre; the disturbing aspect of independence is that their Canada would be split in half. Fully 6 of the 18 felt that separation would seriously hurt Canada (that is, 44% as compared to: Locals, 5%; Individualists, 9%; and Cosmopolitans, 4%), and only 2 indicated that the country wouldn't be much affected. Separation would be disaster because the coast-to-coast unit, the solid geographic entity (And what is more secure than geography?), would be left with a gaping hole, impossible to repair, as its dead centre. As the Community College administrator said;

"It'd be pretty tough on the Maritimes. It's pretty hard to run a country when you've got some of the country, and then

you've got nothing, and then you've got some of the country again."

The London truck driver thought it was "ignorant" to go splittin' up the place", and the retired Fredericton contractor said,

"Well, Quebec couldn't go on its own - things would just get worse up there. And Canada, why we'd be split right up the middle!"

Finally, a young school teacher in Newfoundland's Port au Port Peninsula considered the question;

I: "Well; do you think the place'll separate?"

R: "Oh Jeez, I hope not. I don't think so really. Like, if they segregated, it'd be no damn good. Why, what do you think?"

I: "Well, I think it's pretty well up in the air right now. It's hard to say exactly what's going to happen... But you said you hoped not - how come?"

R: "Well, because I think it's at the end of Canada. I think it'd be the end of the Dominion of Canada right there... just go down the drain. It'd be split right up the middle, wouldn't it, if Quebec was on its own. Logically even... just like that, let alone anything else, hey. There'd be - what? - there's four provinces on this side, and there'd be five provinces on the other side, so there'd just be a split right in the middle of the country. That'd be a bad thing; that'd be real bad."

For the separatists, independence actually means a large piece of the country leaving. The imagery they generally use makes it evident that for them, Quebec would be there no longer; it would "break away", "leave", or "split off".

It is because of this possibility of physical disruption that so many separatists declare about the question of separation. Because if what Canada is to them, it could not survive the experience, and 9 of the 11 strongly advocated that separation would bother them, as compared to only 3 of the 23 Locals.

From this perspective arises the indignant contention that Quebec is a part of Canada like the rest - it can't leave. The Winnipeg legal society was clear on this point;

R: "I guess that's what they're aiming for - going off by themselves. But I don't know... they start killing people and all that... there's a lotta killings in Montreal, ay?"

I: "Well; not too much lately. It's been pretty quiet."

R: "Were you there when LaPorte was killed?"

I: "No, I was away then."

R: "Oh...well, I don't know why they want to be on their own. They want to be French Canadians and they want to be all by themselves and tell the rest of us to get lost. I mean, I don't see how they can do it when they're only a province. They're part of Canada, and after all, they can't really go off on their own."

Another was the Newfoundland teacher:

"I wouldn't like to see it happen. I sure hope it doesn't. I wouldn't want to let it happen. Nope, as far as I'm concerned, Quebec's a part of Canada, and that's it. Province like the other ones."

But of course, the separatists are uncomfortably aware that Quebec is not a province like the other ones; it is irritating and different because the people are alien, and caught in this pressure, some of the group come out on the other side, in favour of "letting them go". If the 18, I did indicate that separatism wouldn't bother them, even if it did hurt Canada. The Edmonton maintenance man was one; after he had talked at length about French-Canadian pride and pushiness, I asked whether independence would bother him;

R: "No, I couldn't give a damn."

I: "Do you think most people feel that way?"

R: "Sure, why should they care? We'd fly over them or go around them."

Another was the Toronto laundromat owner;

I: "Well, what do people here think of Quebec?"

R: "Do you want me to say what they really think? They think Quebec is a pain in the neck. They can go off on their own anytime, and it wouldn't bother me at all."

I: "No...?"

R: "No, I can't see that it would. If they want to, let them go ahead; that's what I say, and I think that's what most people think."

The last is an extreme position for this type, as it contains little geographic imagery, but seems to spring entirely from a distaste for the people of Quebec; it is important that all the separatists who didn't care about independence - even if they did

think the country would be split - were from Ontario or the West; no Maritimer expressed such feelings about Quebecers sufficiently strongly to overcome the geographic obstacles to acceptance of separation. Yet even the Westerners showed clear signs that their respect held some ambiguity for them. The Logmatist senses the pressure between the uniformity within the country and the geographic division that independence would entail; they could get along fine without the people of Quebec, but the club should not be broken. If Quebec were in the position of Nova Scotia, it couldn't separate fast enough for these people. Let it stay put, and a conservative young Maritimer from Florenceville, N.B., was driven to absurdity;

I: "What do people in the area think of Quebec?"

A: "Like how?"

I: "Well, politically..."

A: "Like with the separatists and all that? Well, I'd say most of 'em don't really think about it very much at all, and those that do are unfavorable, I'd say. They don't think very much of it. And neither do I, to tell you the truth."

I: "No..."

A: "No, I don't see it at all. And I've got nothing against the French, and you, but I say keep Canada whole. Let them go if they want to, but leave the province. I mean, the people can do if they want to, as long as we keep the place."

In spite of the psychic quivering such pressures may arouse, many Logmatists are not too exercised about the prospect of separation because they see it as an extremely unlikely event. Of the 11, only 2 gave it any chance of occurring, 11 saw it as unlikely, and 4 said flatly that there was "no chance". One of the reasons for this certainty, aside from the fact that it would be a large change and is therefore unlikely, is simply that this group is generally not willing to concede to Québec the right to choose independence. Only 28% clearly indicated the matter was in the hands of Quebec alone, as compared to 60% of the Cosmopolitans and 70% of the Locals. Most left the mechanics of separation unspecified, but another 28% implied either that both units would decide, or that the decision lay

with Canada alone. A couple mentioned war, but more important is the widespread view among these people that if Quebec were to do something as foolish as break up the country, then strict sanctions should certainly be imposed. This conviction may be related to a sense of rejection at the prospect of Quebec breaking off (6 of the 10), but nevertheless, it is in this way that the Bognatists' hostility towards Quebec would be unleashed.

The truckdriver from London explained:

R: "They're pretty stupid. Like they want to depend on France only. That's silly - a tiny little place all cut off from everybody."

I: "Yeah..."

R: "Sure, we'd put up a wall around it - charge taxes on everything coming in and out. It'd be a pretty miserable little place, that's for sure."

The Winnipeg baker, worker furnishes another example:

R: "How would they get things down the river, right, through the rest of Canada. They just couldn't."

I: "Well, couldn't they do it the same as they do now?"

R: "Oh, no. If they want to leave! Well, if they want to leave, then there's going to be taxes on everything, the way I see it... custom. It wouldn't be so good for them."


With this as a conditioning factor of the situation, it is quite reasonable that the Bognatists believe it is undesirable. In fact, everything in the position, except a desire to be rid of the animal, that the people of Quebec represent, maintains against the option.

Locals

For the local, the independence of Quebec represents quite a different event. Their attitude towards the country involves a flexibility not found among Bognatists; for this type, Canada is a relatively loose organization of sections that definitely has some existence in itself, but is not strictly defined and clung to. Change is admitted. For members of this group, the home region is most important, and Canada only places these units as a family does its members. As an entity, Canada forms a rather comfortable umbrella, certainly superior to the United

States, yet the neighbour to the south is of little importance to the Local except as a topic of conversation and base for occasional comparison. Quebec is another member of Canada, more different than most, but not disturbingly so, and for most Locals it is not very relevant. It is not generally seen as monolithic, and beneath their peculiarities, people there are similar to those in the home area. This attitude-set may be represented as in Figure 2.

Figure 2: A Representation of the Attitude-set of the Local



The Local identifies himself more strongly with his country than the cosmopolitan. Most were judged as having moderate or moderate-to-high levels of national identification, and the mean score for the group as a whole was 3.2 on the five point scale. It should be noted, however, that while the Local tends to be highly committed to the country as he sees it, the greater part of this group identified most strongly with their region. Their sense of national identification is less intense than the Cosmopolitans' and is firmly grounded in the local area.

For these people, the idea of Quebec's independence is thinkable, but is rather silly; most do not take it all that seriously. It's obvious to them that Quebec is better off in Canada than it would be outside the union - in fact, it is

panpered at present - and those who propose "separation" are generally regarded as "hotheads" or radicals. In contrast to the Dogmatists, however, this group does not consider Quebecers as homogeneous, so they emphasize that the separatists are only a ^{minority} ~~minority~~, a small group of wrong-thinkers, and feel that the majority of the people will probably not be led astray. Of the 23, 6 referred to the separatists as radicals, and 7 (as compared to only 3 dogmatists) felt they constituted a small minority, a contumescence on the body politic. (It may be worth noting that for these people, a radical is someone interested in interfering in others' lives.) The industrial/business student thought independence unlikely:

1: "No, you⁴ and the place'll separate?"

Q: "No, I don't think so. It's the same thing - they yell a bit, but they're still in the minority. It's just a few radicals mostly that are stirring up trouble."

The lad, from the small Saskatchewan town felt the same;

"No, I can't really see it. Seems to me that it's just a small group of people that talk a lot."

After all, most Americans are reasonable. As the Northern
Atlantic Bell Telephone worker put it;

"You see, the radicals go on talking - they go on building up and getting excited, but the silent majority (if I can use that expression) say, at one point, "Well, I may say that, but here's my vote - do it this way." And I think that's what'll happen."

As can be seen in the last statement, for some locals it is the leaders of Quebec who are stirring up the trouble; 4 of them mentioned this specifically. But most people will reject their influence and democratically resist. For the local, independence is not so much irrational as unreasonable for Quebec.

This idea is dominant because Locals overwhelmingly feel that separation could only hurt Quebec. The province is immature, small, and if it were to "go off on its own", (an expression used by 7 of the 23), it would surely find itself in a difficult position. There would be no more support from Canada" (8 of the 23), and Quebecers would find that independence is

hard to achieve (7 of the 23). It is a cruel world. It is not because of fear that Quebec would form other links (only 3 of the group mentioned this possibility, and without much apprehension), that locals think the idea unreasonable; it is simply because Quebec would suffer. The North Battleford equipment operator explained;

I: "Well, do you think it'll go its own way?"

R: "No, I don't. There'd be an awful lot of problems if they did."

I: "How so?"

R: "Well, they'd get no further than if Saskatchewan tried to go on its own. Where'd they get their money from? They wouldn't have anything to do with the federal government anymore, and that's where they're getting their money from now - more than any other province. Still they keep asking for more... get more tax."

I: "That's true, I suppose, but they've got a lot of people down there..."

R: "Yeah, that's for sure. Well, maybe they could do it, but there'd be problems. If they want to go their own way, they should go ahead. Maybe the place'd work out for a while, but there'd be a lot of people starvin'. If they knew what they were doing, it might be ok, but I don't know that they do."

To the local, it is possible that Quebecers could, in the end, decide to embark on a course of action that is unreasonable. And sometimes, this prospect is considered with a certain malicious glee, as if the headstrong and noisy Quebecers would be taught a lesson by the experience. If the 23, 5 did mention the prospect of sanctions against Quebec: the idea would be to ostracize the province. The Markham firemen made this very clear:

I: "Well, do you think it would hurt Canada if they did separate?"

R: "Hurt us? No, I don't think so. 'Cause it would only be a temporary separation you see - they'd come crawling back, and that's why it'd be good."

I: "Why, because it would teach 'em a lesson?"

R: "Sure, it'd show them once and for all that they're better off where they are. Then we'd be done with all this stuff."

I: "Well, do you think Canada should help them at all?"

R: "Help them...what, to become independent?"

I: "No, I mean after, if they did become independent, with trade and aid and stuff like that."

R: "Nope. I think we should treat 'em just like any other country. If they have something we need, then buy it, and put tariffs on all the rest, just like other countries. Why treat 'em special if they don't want to stay?"

Interestingly enough, this vindictive variation is found mostly in Ontario, where Locals' irritation at Quebec seems to be greatest, and it may be sustained by the confidence which accompanies their belief that Ontario is the real keystone of the country. However, it also coincides with a sense of rejection largely concentrated among Locals from Ontario; 7 of the 8 who were judged to sense it were from Ontario. As the closest section to Quebec, perhaps they would sense the loss most keenly, but still the heartland mentality predominates - "Why treat 'em special if they don't want to stay?".

Aside from this marginal consideration, Locals simply do not care whether Quebec leaves or not. From the view of Canada as a family, it makes little difference, for the over 11 unit could hardly be hurt, and the other regions would not be much affected. Altogether, 10 of the 23 Locals, or 70%, declared that independence would not affect them; only 1 thought that Canada would be (briefly) injured, and 2 of the group expressly stated that Canada itself would not be adversely affected by the event. An unemployed labourer from Vancouver would not be bothered by it:

I: "Well, do you think Quebec'll separate?"

He: "No, I doubt it. It's hard to tell, but I can't see that they could do it. Let I think that most people there don't want to anyway; I mean there's a few people there that make a lot of noise, but after all, it's been going on for a hundred years ever since Confederation. It's only lately that they've gotten more exposure in the news."

I: "Oh...I see...well, would it bother you?"

R: "No, I couldn't give a goddam. Because it wouldn't affect me in the least really. Like if I was down there in Quebec and it was gonna hurt my business, then I might be upset. Or if I lived there and had kiddies, then it might bother me. But out here, it's ok with me."

Neither would the Woodstock, New Brunswick, trucker care much;

I: "Well, do you think it would hurt Canada if Quebec goes?"

R: "No, not really. It wouldn't make much difference: we don't pay much attention to them, and they don't pay attention to us. That's how it is with most nationalities, you know."

It is because Quebec alone would be affected by the move that 8 of the 23 Locals said clearly, "let them go". A combination of fearlessness with the troublesome member and isolation from any adverse effects allows them to do so: only 5 others in the entire sample expressed a similar idea. In fact, this attitude reaches its extreme manifestation in those who think that separation would be positively beneficial; besides the malicious Parkton fireman, the Saskatoon carpenter thought that separation would bring a better deal for the West, and that Canada as a whole could "get on with it" without the drag of Quebec's backwardness.

Naturally enough, because in the Local's conception, each constituent member has some independent personality and volition as an entity in itself, the decision to secede lies with Quebec alone. Of the 23, 16 made this clear, and only one implied that it might be otherwise. And one, the old militiaman, was asked about the possibility of fighting over the question:

I: "Do you think it'll be a war?"

R: "Well now, that's hard to say. It could happen you know. They've been talkin' about it for a long time...she wants to go off on her own; well, maybe she will."

I: "Do you think Canadians would be irritated?"

R: "Well, no, I don't see why they should be. (pause) She's a big territory...lots of land...yeah, maybe she could do it - I don't know."

I: "Would it bother you?"

R: "No? No, not at all. Let them go if they want to."

I: "Well, tell me, do you think it could ever come to fighting?"

R: "No, that could never happen...nobody would bother all that much."

Whether this calm attitude that characterizes the Local's

reaction to the prospect of Quebec independence can be said to spring from some deep well of patriotic sentiment or problem-atic. It seems just as likely, considering their overall attitude-set, that these people are simply not aware of how separation would affect them. Furthermore, since they believe the event to be quite unlikely, they do have the benefit of being non-committed only hypothetically: 12 of the 13 felt there to be little chance of independence, and no possibility if it occurred, and 11 believed the situation could go in either direction. With all of this, therefore, seems that, confronted with the event, Quebec would be somewhat less philosophical about the prospect, though as thinkable and even tolerable to them, and their fundamental attitude towards Canada itself would have to undergo some basic change to take their position here.


Cosmopolitans

The question of independence bears down on a cosmopolitan attitude-set which it poses as a severe threat. Members of this group regard Canada as a society, coherent and differentiated, and focus most clearly upon the inter-relations of its diverse components. In the economic network, some unity is found, but more important for their attitude is defining the society as its plain abstract unity which is clearly evident only through continual comparison of Canada with the United States. The Americans are dominant; they threaten, they tempt; it is only because they have created a satellite that Canada can be the still water. Even without Canada, they are threats, for it is a distinct sub-society bound mostly by economic ties; while it is certainly dependent, its cultural coherence is rather ominous. Forces in the province contend for power, and Cosmopolitans accord the struggle an importance not bestowed upon the other provinces. This attitude-set is shown (again impressionistically) as in Figure 3 below.

The Cosmopolitan, of all the groups, identifies most strongly with the country. He clearly sees his future to be bound up with it, not just with the region in which he lives but

with the entire unit; the region is dependent on the whole of which it is a segment, and the Cosmopolitan devotes most attention to Canada. While the mean score for intensity of identification was 3.8 for the sample as a whole, the Cosmopolitans' score as a group was 3.6, and it is important to remember that this type identifies consciously with the country; they are aware of their own efforts to build national unity and see it as a national goal.

Figure 3: A representation of the attitude-set of the Cosmopolitan.



The question of further independence is a matter of concern for the Cosmopolitan. The indication of this is their 'interest in the topic', subjectively evaluated by the interviewer immediately after each interview was completed. On the familiar five point scale, the Individualists averaged 2.3 as a group, and the other two types were slightly below the mean of 3.1, but the Cosmopolitans scored 3.2, highest by far. More important, 12 of the 25 explicitly stated that they cared about the issue, and that were independence to come about, they would be affected. While the idea troubles them, (5 of the 25 expressed bafflement at the motives for the move), they are willing and prepared to consider its implications.

The first prediction they tend to make is that separation would be economically disastrous for Quebec. In their view, with its consciousness of fragile unity, there is little that ties Quebec to Canada beyond federal subsidies and a common economy. It is quite natural therefore that in arguing for maintaining unity, 15 of the 25 make some immediate reference to the factor. Fully 11 of the group mentioned the loss of federal support. The Vancouver student, for example, who is vague in detail, was definite in opinion:

"No, I'm pretty sure they won't. It would be quite hard on them if they did, for they've got a lot of unemployed down there, you see. They need capital, they need money, and they don't have it. Right now they get a lot from the federal government - they have special arrangements, you see."

Perhaps more to the point, Canadian businesses would pull out of the province due to the unsettled atmosphere that would follow independence. One of the group proposed this as a factor to consider: a mining consultant from Sault Ste. Marie, let us find out where he was looking into a new project, was also concerned with investment:

"But with Quebec, there's no point to it. First we'd pull out - we'd not have already pulled out; it's not a good place to invest. It's better now, but before Trudeau, you would take a good long, long careful look at whether or not you'd invest in Quebec."

This opinion is certainly not unanimous, however, and not of those who propose it concede that such decisions would not be automatic and inflexible, but would depend on the situation at the time. In cosmopolitan, unlike the Dogmatists, are not preoccupied towards retaliation. Not like them, it is not the effects of independence on Quebec that are of primary concern, but the implication for Canada. For most cosmopolitans, there are three elements involved.

The first is that the event would disrupt the economic base of the country; 9 of the 25 dwelt on the economic problems that would face Canada (only one other respondent, a Dogmatist, mentioned such considerations). Another 4 of the group felt independence would hurt both parts economically, and 6 mentioned the "barriers" that might disrupt trade. This last concept,

mountains and the Canadian shield. Then Ontario and Quebec are pretty well at the centre, and then the Maritimes are isolated also. I mean, there's so many splits, that it's really just a dream."

I: "A dream?"

R: "Yeah...well, like you've seen the Canadian shield - you know what it's like."

I: "Yeah..."

R: "Well, it just cuts off the country. The only thing that really holds us together is...is a spirit of the people. Some say that there's no nationalism here, but they're wrong. There's a feeling in the country that it is a special place, a good place. And that's what holds it together really."

I: "And the French Canadians share that?"

R: "Yes, at bottom they do. You see, most separatists are rural people. Like, the kind of separatists basically, are the kind that realize that conditions they get. I think with a few exceptions that that attitude'll change and they'll realize that they're really in the country and that's it."

at this abstract concern for the unity of the country does not reflect the separatists' concern. The third factor is apparent and it is to be expected, given the overwhelming majority of the United States in these people's attitudes. There is a strong fear, not so much of independence itself, but of the possibility that Quebec might be annexed by the United States. Altogether 40 of the group expressed this apprehension, and of the 10 respondents who did mention it, fully 11 were from the Maritimes. It would appear that this fear, intimately associated with the problem of unity, underlies and sustains the immediate economic arguments about independence. The young (18-24) investor came to it:

"Well yeah, I must say it would bother me. I can't see why they'd want to in the first place. I guess they're pretty irrational down there at times, but if they just sit down and looked at it, they'd realize that they're better off inside of Canada. Down there, first they're for Levesque, then they're not, then they're for him, then they're for Bourassa. Now they don't like Bourassa."

There's a lot of problems down there though. They've had high unemployment...if they're moving out. So if they did separate, I mean, they'd have to go with someone - probably with the US, and that would bother me. I wouldn't like to see that."

The retired police supervisor was another:

"I think the businesses would pull all their money out. Then the U.S. capital would come in and take over the place."

The RCF wife concluded her oration:

I: "But would we be essential 'loss'?"

R: "Yes, we would be all split up, divided. And I think more over there's a great danger that Quebec would fall to the States. Right, they're highly influenced by the States down there."

Even an Ontario marketing executive for a multinational computer firm, after a strictly economic analysis, expressed his concern with the prospect:

I: "All right, but it'll operate?"

R: "It's hard to say... I don't think it would be very good for them. They're largely a subsidized province now, and they have to get money from somewhere."

I: "Would it bother you if it did?"

R: "About as much as if Manitoba separated! No, it would only bother me because it would be bad for the country: now Quebec has to get help to others, right? They've got a bad economic situation and I can't see it getting any better, especially if they separate. In this case it seems, they'd be a state of the United States."

I: "Do you think so?"

R: "Yes. It would be very hard for them. Companies would pull out... I don't think they'd like to, but the U.S. would make them an offer that would be good enough, and they'd take it. I don't think they'd have the power to resist."

The complement to this idea, of course, is that the divided Canada would itself be vulnerable to the overwhelming power of the United States. With unity dissolved, with Quebec gone, with the economy shaky, perhaps the rest of the country would simply collapse into America's rear embrace. Of the 25 Cosmopolitans, 6 made this fear explicit during calculations of a post-independence future. The only thing that could stand between a divided Canada and the States would be the spirit of unity of English Canadians, and the Cosmopolitan - perhaps inevitably, as they are the most conscious of it - have only uncertain confidence in this spiritual unity.

Yet strangely enough, in spite of the fact that many believe that a whole fatally wound country, the Cosmopolitans show no signs of resistance to independence; overwhelmingly, they accord to Quebec the right to secede. For 16 of the 25, or 64%, it was clear that the choice lay with Quebec alone. Independence would represent a declaration that Quebec was no longer a sub-society, and even though many Cosmopolitans feared disaster, they recognized that societies - nations - have the right to make their own mistakes. Only one of this group thought that sanctions and all-feeling must mark the separation. Although a few of them have a slimmer of the idea that continued economic association would inevitably bring Quebec back within a restructured union, the Cosmopolitans would simply try to pick up the pieces and carry on.

At bottom of this amazing leniency, however, lies the hard realization that there is little Canada could do, without terribly hurting its own interests, to prevent the move, if it were democratically approved by the citizens of Quebec. As the young Saskatoon student explained simply,

"Most people here don't worry too much about it. If they want to go ahead, there's not much to be done really. There's not much we could do."

It might seem that this calm, as is partially the case with the locals, could result from the perceived unlikelihood of the event. However, of all the groups, the Cosmopolitans are most likely to apprehend the possibility of separation. While 8 of the 25 thought it unlikely, an equal number found a definite trend in the direction of independence; in other words, at least one-third of the group had begun to accommodate themselves to the idea. There are few clues as to how they had done so: 2 were from B.C. and felt they would be only slightly affected; the Stratford salesman seemed resigned to radicalism; the young Iurding-ton man felt that Quebec was already well-started on its separate path; one Nova Scotian approved because the rest of Canada could then more easily unite; and finally, 3 others, including the Nova Scotia lawyer and the official from the Ontario Department of Education, were simply preparing to make the best of any eventuality. It would seem that the main factor in such ac-

commodation is the degree of stress on the existing distinctiveness, in a global sense, of Quebec society. In this way, the basic strategy of the nationalists in Quebec works as well to prepare the others for the event of independence.

Given the final separation, the Cosmopolitans, the group most likely to be psychologically prepared for it, would likely to be also prepared to once more organize, incite, and promote unity among English Canadians. As the Nova Scotian lawyer said when asked about Maritime Union;

R: "It'll come. The situation in Quebec is, I think, sort of a spur for it."

I: "Yes...."

R: "Oh yes. Well, no one will admit it openly, or anything like that, but there's the feeling that if the country's split up, there may be hard times down here. And we'll have to stick together and organize to promote our links to Ontario and the West."

For the Cosmopolitan, there is no real alternative.

Exceptions

There remain to be considered those individuals who could not reasonably be included in any of the four types. Although the types themselves are fairly loose, for within them various people take up positions which may emphasize one or another of the attitudes central to the ideal set, and between them there is often concurrence on some dimension, still these three respondents could not be lumped with the rest. Their attitudes are unique, and while they may include components found in one type or another, as a set, they are differently structured. One thing that does make them worth analyzing is that each, in his own way, favours the independence of Quebec. Of course, 3 other people in the sample were so inclined, but this was for reasons understandable in terms of their type's attitudes. They simply emphasized one aspect of the set to the extreme: one was a Cosmopolitan hoping for increased national unity; one Local hoped to teach an overly demanding Quebec a lesson; and another Local aimed at improving the situation of

his own region. For the three exceptions, the aspiration arises from different complexes altogether.

The first was a man between twenty-five and thirty years old, met on the ferry to Manitoulin Island in Ontario. He had been a news photographer on a medium-sized newspaper and was leaving the country for an extended tour of South America with his wife. He enjoyed Canada, and preferred it strongly to the United States, which he condemned for a strained social situation and an imperialist foreign policy, yet he was not extremely involved in the country - Canada was his home base. He displayed great empathy with the people of Quebec, which seemed to result from a predisposition to favour any oppressed people, and from an experience which had enabled him to clearly perceive the French Canadians as such. He had met, by accident, a local organizer for the Parti Québécois and, after a long discussion, found himself forced to agree with him; this point of view was possible to assume because he was not fully committed to standing with English Canada. I asked whether independence would bother him:

R: "No, not a bit. It'd hurt Canada, but I think the average guy in Quebec is becoming more and more aware of his situation. I think he realizes he's getting worse off."

I: "How do you think the rest of English Canada would feel?"

R: "Well, I'm not quite sure. I think they'd pretty well all say, 'let them go and screw themselves'. I think they'd be pretty...I don't know...they'd be bitter. Business would raise a big fuss. And then the English people there would raise a big fuss. Especially business. I think it would be pretty bad economically for about five years. But I think the Quebecers would pull themselves up."

In this case, the concern is for Quebec alone; some positive propaganda coupled with an admiration for a people with a clear direction, have enabled him to adopt his English-Canadian views. He hoped for Quebec.

The second man was met soon afterwards. He lived about thirty miles outside Espanola, Ontario, where he worked at the Eddy Catch Company, the town's only industry. About fifty years old, he had sold his Saskatchewan farm and moved to Elliot Lake,

historic, during the 1957 boom. The distinctive feature of his thought was a complete ideological commitment to Socialism, no doubt for the masses. He regarded the Quiet Revolution as the awakening of a suppressed people, and fully supported any steps they thought essential to the improvement of their economy and government:

A: "I don't understand why it didn't happen years ago...they only had to vote on a better government, that's all they had to do. Let 'em try anything; let 'em try Communism, who cares - anything. They've been kept down so long. The church has been keeping them down, that's why they're."

I: "Do you think English Canada will be disappointed?"

A: "Well, I think so. They'll be bitter. I don't agree with Trudeau and St. Laurent and all those parties though. I vote for myself - I was left and now I'm not, so I wouldn't vote for much. Not with all those old parties, we're not going anywhere. You can vote it - people keep voting, they keep voting them and voting them. That's all I think voters should vote in for - they're not voting, they're not voting, but they could work the vote up the other way. They could let anything they wanted, break any government. If they keep on voting for the old parties, they're not going to get anywhere."

For this man, independence represented a radical change from the old liberal politics in the course of a unified, progressive movement: he could identify with it because of a background in a movement which aimed for similar goals, the major difference being that in Quebec, the entire nationality formed the suppressed class. While he doubtless shared the aims and tendencies of the separatists to some extent, its main feature - rejection of the status quo - is accepted by an old agrarian socialist.

The final exception to the types is somewhat different: it was culture, not economic well-being, which most influenced the attitudes of an Acadian school teacher from northern New Brunswick, who was met in Fredericton where he followed summer courses. His central concern was for his own group and their separate "reawakening", and he was quick to emphasize the difference between Acadians and Québécois, but there was no doubt in his mind that Quebec would and should choose independence:

"Quebec is definitely on the move; there's no alternative to independence really. It was, I think, Expo that got them really going, that gave them confidence. The whole world

was looking at them and saying it was pretty nice, pretty nice, and they started to believe it...and they still do."

Because of his emphasis on culture and language, and his belief that English Canadians are not so distinct from Americans in either respect, he saw no possibility that Canada could avoid falling to the United States after Quebec's secession.

"Anti-Americanism isn't enough. To ask someone to tighten up their belt, there must be more than that, or else they won't do it. People are willing to make sacrifices when there is something positive there, and between English Canada and the States, there isn't that."

Standing outside of the normal Canadian social world, in a parallel position to the nationalists of Quebec, this man was able to foresee Quebec's independence without hesitation. Whether or not his own cultural stance led him to seriously underestimate Canadian distinctiveness and ignore totally the will towards unity that exists in English Canada remains to be considered.

APPENDIX 5

1. Max Weber, Economy and Society, ed. and trans. by Luthner Koss and C. Wittich, 2 vols. (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), I; p11.
2. The expression is from *ibid.*, p.: the task of the sciences of man is "interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning," here we are attempting to go beyond the isolated meanings to abstract the structure of the attitudes which informs them, and these attitudes are presumed to be relatively stable guides to action. At the very least, they are the structures which change just overcome.
3. Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, ed. L. Natanson, 3 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), vol. 1, The Problem of Social Reality, pp3-47; 'Commonsense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action', esp. pp46-44.
4. Barton and Lazarsfeld, 'Some Functions of Qualitative Analysis', p27.
5. The total number of categories into which cosmopolitans were coded, excluding tangents, was 14. A crude way to standardize this measure would be by restricting the number of ideal-typical categories to the average number of coded categories of the type. As used here, however, the measure merely indicates the relative convenience of the type.
6. Gieser and Strauss, Grounded Theory, p10.
7. See *ibid.*, p26 and p149, and also Nathan L. Levin, 'A Critique of Tests of Significance in Survey Research', AJR/vol. 27 (October 1957): pp520-527.
8. The estimation of social class was non-rigorous; it took into account whatever information cropped up in the course of the interview - job, schooling, area of residence, etc. - as well as an evaluation of dress, mode of speaking, conversations, and so on. Most attention was paid to the job, because this is one item for which information was recorded for almost every respondent. These estimates were made immediately after each interview and were later reviewed. Complete information on class for the sample is found in appendix A, and is broken down by type in appendix B.
9. For the individualists, on the average, 2.3 tangents were recorded. The other groups were appreciably less apt to wander from the subject: Logmatists averaged 1.1; Cosmopolitans, 1.2; and Locals 1.6.
10. It may appear that the non-attitudes, or lack of involvement of this type springs from a systematic flaw in the interviews. In fact, the individualists are under-represented in the interviews classed as very good. However, their modal grade of interview, B-, was the same as the sample.

as a whole. It would appear that their attitudes, or lack of them, result from their own characteristics, not from systematically distorted interviews. Their mean interview length was the same as for the sample as a whole, as was their rated 'willingness to converse'. However, on a five point scale, their average score for 'interest in topic' was only 2.6 compared to 3.1 for the entire sample, and equally telling is their 'level of information': a mean of 1.0 compared to 2.5 for the whole group. Their greater tendency to leave the subject on personal tangents is another indication of their general lack of interest in social objects. All this merely shows that while interviews proceeded in a similar fashion, the Individualist was fundamentally different.

11. S.D. Clark, The Developing Canadian Community, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), esp. pp185-196; 'The Canadian Community and the American Continental System', and pp207-226; 'The Frontier in the Development of the Canadian Political Community'.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS: PROSPECTS FOR QUEBEC/INDEPENDENCE

Such writing on the current condition of Canadian federalism has shown that the factor of national identification which underlies federal institutions is now visible and crucial for determining the futures of Canada and Quebec. The research reported here was an attempt to investigate national identification among English Canadians; it was conducted with the aim of eliciting individual views of the country with as little distortion as possible as to infer the basic structure of their attitudes. Four types of attitude-set were located: the Log-matist, who is concerned with the home and stability, sees Canada as geographically unitary and socially integral, and Quebec, therefore, as anomalous; the Local, who is most concerned with the region and regards Canada as an entity like the family, which flexibly groups its constituent members; the Cosmopolitan, more educated and familiar with abstractions, who regards his country as a tenuously integrated society which takes on form only through his references to the United States; and the Individualist, who really does not have an attitude-set towards social objects, but rather regards them as a context for his own activity, or as raw material to be transformed into personal experience.

Each of these various types has been thoroughly explored. They may be regarded as isolated chunks of the total Canadian political culture (although this culture must be pretty fragmented), and are also probably related to personality factors both idiosyncratic and common. As limited here, however, to specific social objects - Canada, Quebec, and the United States - and to analysis which described rather than attempted to explain their structure, these attitude-sets define the relations between objects and individuals which make up English Canada's sense of national identification. Among other factors shaping a reaction to Quebec independence, this basic sense of country

would be of critical importance.

The sample from which these types were induced was small and non-random, and so it is impossible to reliably estimate their distribution in the general population. However, within the sample, there is some quantifiable evidence for their coherence as ordering categories, and moreover, the relations between the elements of the attitude-sets make sense, both rationally, from the observer's standpoint, and as meaningful, experienced by respondents. Therefore, while we cannot claim precision in these findings, it is possible to use them to evaluate likely reactions to various events. Even though most people only speak casually about Canada on occasion and have no need to come to grips with their own ideas, if we have correctly interpreted how groups of English Canadians really understand their country, then this should provide an indication of their perception of attempts to fundamentally alter it, and of their reaction to such attempts.

Any scenario or forecast must grossly reduce the complexities of a massive and multi-faceted interaction. However, there are three important elements whose inter-relations must define any projection about separation. These are traced in the rest of this chapter. First is the way Quebec's position is presented, presumably by the Parti Quebecois. What objectives would be required? What would be the stance towards bargaining? Could the negotiations be calm, secret, and protracted, or must the atmosphere be tense and sensational? In the initial stages of the secession process, this position would likely depend on the extent of support within Quebec; once negotiations were begun, the concrete results would guide the evolution of the Quebec position. The second major element is the English-Canadian mass attitudes. So far they have been considered in isolation, as sets linked to discrete types. But in reality, the groups' positions merge one into the other, emphases vary even within types, and the people are physically dispersed throughout the regions and social strata of the country. With heightened interest and discussion, our types will interact.

And at such a momentous event, changes even in the structure of attitudes is possible. To what positions, the , do the groups' attitudes coincide? What types are dominant and which ones will be less involved or lack an audience? Who will shift under the pressure of events and to which positions? The third major element is that the elite of English Canada must be taken into account. What are their attitudes? What sense of identification of the situation? What do they think? Should they lead the country in the repression of Quebec?

It was impossible to broaden the study to include elite attitudes after it became apparent that few influential respondents would be contacted; however, a different method could have been necessary. Yet their views are at least as important as those reported here. In any social situation, the definition imposed upon it largely determines the nature of the action of interest that will be sought. Even today, however, their definitions of the terms and the situation are broadly recognized, but to take specific action, the characteristics of the situation must be well perceived. The elite are in a position of what is commonly known as a "position of power" which it is their duty to use. So far, we have examined the characteristics which are broadly recognized. For the sake of the elite, the political, religious, journalistic, and intellectual - all of them to define events as they occur; the elite group provides a lead in conceptualizing issues. Such definitions have an impact on public opinion, and are therefore well defined. If the two elements, elite definition and popular attitudes, are out of phase or inconsistent, then the definition fails: at the extreme (generally through the leadership of some competing groups), elites who consistently or momentarily misread those they would lead can be brought down. In the other hand, by making definitions accessible to people, elites can shape and channel sentiment to bend it into the desired form that will support their actions.

If we credit the public statements of dominant Canadian elites, and extrapolate from the class characteristics of the groups identified above, it is clear that at the national level

English-Canadian elites manifest Cosmopolitan attitudes. While the stress upon the United States as threat may not be so marked in the upper echelons, elite statements are often explicitly concerned with national unity and the economic condition of individual citizens and the country as a whole. These are quite general notions, but it is important to ask how they would mesh with the mass attitudes explored here.

The Individualists are largely out of our picture; it would take a calamity or a Renaissance to involve them, but the independence of Quebec represents neither. As for the other groups, in addition to the basic structures, there are limiting factors for each of the three central types of attitude-set.

With regard to the problem of independence, three elements arise from cultural values or from attitudes not examined here, but prevent the attitudes isolated here from being carried to their logical extreme. Hence, although Cosmopolitans are most concerned with the unity of Canada, they could not support the immediate use of force to counter a democratic decision to leave it. They are generally pacific and also aware that the national unity they support is consensual and cannot be maintained by arms. The Locals have no difficulty in accepting the idea of independence, but they are not expecting it. Besides this aspect of surprise, another element is their neglect of economic interdependence and consequent belief that Quebec's action would not affect them; there seems to exist a limiting factor of self-interest that is, for the moment, latent. The Individualists exhibit strain about the idea of independence resulting from incompatible attitudes towards Quebec and Canada. Already they are somewhat withdrawn from social and political events, and if this strain were heightened, the tendency towards non-participation could be strengthened. The operation of these factors does narrow the range of possible outcomes and simplifies the projection.

In the time before negotiations, we may expect that the elites would emphasize the importance of national unity. The Locals, who are inclined to let Quebec have her head, this appeal would have little effect; for them the unity of Canada does not

require the inclusion of Quebec as a part of the appeal. This appeal could only succeed with this group if the elite tried to show that the country as a whole would be better served by Quebec's leaving. Such an argument is most unlikely in the initial stages because if it failed, there would be few cards left to play; anyway, even if taken to this extreme, the argument could well find sufficient ground for support and for the rest part thoroughly convinced that Quebec is of little direct importance to them. To the Englishists, on the other hand, stable unity is a perfect and prime essential. They are the group most willing to exert military force to ensure the country's physical integrity. However, if this could be maintained without the cost of the continued existence of Quebec as a distinct cultural entity, this part of the power of the elite appeal would be lost. Englishists, to the extent that they are not too involved, would rather see a forced union with Quebec rather than a free one, and no state is likely to force such a final solution to the problem of unity. In addition, such a move is likely to be overshadowed by the more influential French position. If the Englishists would strike a responsive chord with this group, it would be a self-anchored one. The union that must be enforced. The Englishists can gauge their attitude to the idea of independence - some have done so already - and could reject it only if their elites showed that it was not firmly backed by Quebec's population. The mode of referendum would be important here, as would a display made by the English in Quebec. But if the new government were not openly discriminatory, and a decisive verdict supported independence, then cosmopolitans would accept it. Their elite could not whip them over to rebellion in words of national unity or else. Especially if negotiations were protracted, this group would have time to cushion the shock for themselves and begin, with independence in mind, to begin again. They would have no alternative but to concentrate on British-Canadian national unity, and to support hard bargaining for the right-of-ways, markets, and resources necessary to ensure it.

157
be assured. Otherwise, this group could well respond to an elite appeal against separation, even if the short-term effects of such a response might be very severe economic dislocation.

A definition of separation, which stressed economic effects could have dual effects on the localists, if it forcefully presented a link between future personal income and changes in personal and corporate taxes. And with this group, the localists, the predictions, the writer will be the response, for in general they possess little information to counter hyperbolic reports. The localists, aware of the pattern of economic interference, but they are very concerned with personal financial affairs. Such a definition would lead to their general fear of instability, fuel their frustration with the French, and strengthen their interventionist tendencies. It is possible to envision localists, however, about economic unity being influenced by a particularistic element so that the overall attitude of localists might be said to remain, however, an extreme hostility in Quebec, and all the rest of the downward spiral caused by the French in the localist movement for separation. However, the localists, even if they total only about one-quarter of the population of Quebec, are not likely to overcome the localist's natural tendencies under such conditions. A very extreme stand, or one which is well-informed by the localists.

In this situation, the localists would form the crucial element. They may be regarded as a moderate between the localists and the nationalists, though to some extent the flexibility of the first type and the rigidity of the second. Under the impact of an elite appeal to resist separation on economic grounds, could the localists' organic view of the country as a family solidify to the extent that they would support the enforcement of the present order? Could they shift to a pragmatic position?

Among localists in the West, this seems unlikely. Here, they tend to accord very little importance to Quebec. Even though it is regarded as economically strong, an elite attempt to illustrate Quebec's importance to the individual Westerner

would leave this group unmoved: in the Prairies, because the economic inferiority of the local area is resented and such a definition would only consolidate this feeling; and in Alberta and British Columbia, because of the complacent isolation of the second and the growing consciousness of strength in the first. The western locals would not attempt to hold Quebec on economic grounds or, in fact, on any grounds.

In the Maritimes, conversion to the Dequistist outlook is somewhat more probable. For one thing, the geographic element of the situation is more apparent from this area. On the other hand, Maritime locals already feel quite isolated, and have a very strong sense of regional identification (which reached its extreme expression in Newfoundland). Under an economic appeal by a national elite, the group could probably split. Some, very concerned about their relatively poor economic prospects, would become Dequistist; others, more strongly oriented towards the region and perhaps in more comfortable personal situations, would be willing to "let Quebec go". That there is very likely to be a split in attention would be focused upon attempt to finally reach an economically viable Maritime Union under the guidance of local elite.

Ontario, then, is the key. A split is quite possible here as well. The surprise of the report, and the sense of rejection that many locals here could experience, would make them susceptible to an argument that played upon their economic prospects. As seen in the course of the analysis how serious this bunch seems to regard Ontario and Quebec as in some way alike,

as the two parts of the centre of the country, and therefore could be led to fear for their position. But most locals in Ontario know Quebec to be relatively poor: the admitted mortality that regards their province as the real centre of the country, as the essence of Canada, is surprisingly strong.

To maintain this image, most locals would be inclined to dismiss Quebec's influence. After all, not one of the Ontario locals who felt a sense of rejection at the prospect of Quebec leaving also thought that it would hurt Canada. Coupled with their general non-enthusiasm for French Canadians, and the belief that

Quebec could have to maintain links (on Canada's terms) to ensure its own survival, this certainty about the power of their own province would decide the issue. "Remember, 'I've got everything here.'" While more detailed study would be helpful, it seems that a definite repudiation of independence as economic disaster would be outside the bounds of the interior locality's attitude.

So, all the above shows that, even from the English-Canadian side, the independence of Quebec is possible. It is conceivable. The basic problem of secession can be accepted by Canada as a whole; with some unimportant exceptions, English Canada can accommodate the idea within the basic set of attitudes which comprise their sense of national identification. And it is a probable event that national disaster, particularly if it is to arise from the existing situation as disastrous for Canada as it is of national unity, and economic dislocation, it could still be thinkable. This destination would not take hold and win, the nation and a role of fear, harsh negotiation, no solution, and eventual disaster or economic repression. The situation of English-Canadians requires such a repudiation out of hand. If there is a declaration of separatist intent by Quebec, there would be a period of turmoil in which the English-Canadian side, at the end, English-Canadians would come out of it in favour of realistic and reasonably negotiations. Perhaps, above all, a reasonable people.

However, in these considerations, one factor has been held constant. The projections clearly depend on the specific actions taken by the Quebec government, and the conclusion holds only if this government conducted itself in such a way as to actually improve the chances of a favourable reception of its basic demand. While independence could be accepted, this could only happen fruitfully (that is, without the downward spiral of deterioration leading to severe economic problems and repression) if certain other subsidiary positions appeared to be adopted by Quebec.² We can examine the necessary Quebec stance towards its independence in light of the types of English-Canadian attitudes to be placated.

To improve the slight chance of a favourable reception of independence by federalists, Quebec must emphasize that geographical continuity would remain. Ties between the parts of English Canada would have to be guaranteed, and single citizenship laid on the fact that Quebec is not about to "break off". Separation should be presented as a cultural withdrawal that would leave the rest of Canada in an already free country and able to work more effectively. Quebec could be written as never before.

There is no doubt to be ascertained that independence does not affect them. While they already believe this profoundly, it must be clear that a complete severance of ties is not desired by Quebecers, but merely a recognition of their collective nationality. What is needed here is a picture of simple goodwill, and perhaps rather than formal declarations could be used to good effect. Finally, to convince people that the decision is rational and mature, a firm majority decision is essential: the constitutional breach of a minority government could not impress the group in such a convincing manner, as finally if it were also dictated by a liberalized elite. A straightforward referendum would appear and would be accepted.

The Communist Party also has a role to play. They are the most influential group and should to lose the most, accepting the basic idea of independence. The cultural revolution is if the points of the settlement fall within their interests. In the first place, the decision to secede must be a fair expression of popular sentiment: there should be no manipulation, no drastic changes in electoral procedure, and no violence. If the same taken, however, they are unlikely to support an excessive federal intervention or a referendum or plebiscite. But for this group, the economy is most important. Any seizure of property or "blackmail" threats to do so would require a swift response. In addition, disruption of economic relations and the interdependent economies would have to be avoided; Quebec must not appear to be about to transform itself into a closed economic unit. Existing links like those which characterize the automobile or computer industries threatened by a government

prepared to dictate the structure of its economy, then for the Cosmopolitan, not only would national unity be broken, but economic integrity, even with it. They could resist. Hence, at least in the short-term, no major state-controlled changes could be implemented in Quebec. Movement towards the partial decoupling of local control associated with the partial realization of a common market would have to be very gradual indeed. However, this indicates that the necessary statist office could be squeezed between a declining population and English-Canadian conservatism, with unforeseeable results.

The requirements that arise from the issue of national identification of English-Canadians would not have to be perfectly fulfilled, and so, that they are important does not imply that they should be so. But the need to appease this sense of loss does depend upon what an independent Quebec could do. And for the issue of English-Canadian attitudes, Quebec must be able to negotiate its relationship with the rest of the world in the face of such provocation and the loss of that position in the international position. That is, Quebec will have to maintain a balance between the two fragments of Canada, and it will have to survive the effects of other international relations, and it will have to be successful. There must be a firm, full-scale, as an favour of independence, and it cannot waver throughout negotiation. Major disruption of economic links and finally cut off from the new nation, rather than forming a firm economic unit, must refrain from major rearrangement of the economic structure. Quebec must continue to fit in with the Canadian economy.

This study has shown that independence is possible. For most English-Canadians it is conceivable; that is, it can be accommodated within their attitudes towards Canada and their strength of commitment to these attitudes. The group, which is more liberal; another would be surprised but not shocked; and a group's view of Canada would be severely bitter, but strong concern, Quebec would be relieved at the situation. The group, the most influential, could only its basic attitude to a country, and so on. However, the three groups could

could seize the levers of the economy. Much more likely is the accession of native elites to control of the financial and industrial posts now occupied by the English and Americans. If, of course, real power would still lie with these local agents, but elsewhere, and those in political office, caught between external powers and their new agents, would find reform difficult. Under the terms, of independence really, appear to these elements in such a case is separation the route to a more equitable, just and truly autonomous society? It is, to ask what independence is desired for.

The question put into a spirit of the 21st Century. On one side is the view that independence as a way to throw out the other side to control the country as it now exists, to run it as a French-Canadian preserve. On the other side are those who see independence as a way to escape the present political structures, to start the process for change, to change the social structure to be a more fluid and more amenable to the evolution of a whole. It is the conclusion of this research that because of the conditions under which independence would be desirable for French Canada, to pursue it in a hope of radical economic change is ill-considered. Independence, in fact, could mean, at best, a dependence can involve little more than formal control. To enable to transfer for itself, and to have to transfer all of French Canada.

Little of the effort still seems worthwhile and will be decided only in 1980. If it is chosen, there is a way from there that English Canadians, people appointed, and the "protection" of the independent one holds in their country. A situation will be seen that would be independent disrupt this activity as little as possible. If independence is rejected, there will be a vigorous exercise and continued by the of subjects, more with a "cooperation," especially in the cultural and economic spheres. And more than any other, the province is open to a great first political; the potential for great change exists. It is well to that historical precedent, and commitment to real change of the province will prove more worthwhile than a formal declaration of independence, which is hollow and constraining rather than liberating.

1. TIES TO CHAPTER 6

1. Dimeon, 'Scenarios for Separation', in Burns, The Country or Two?, pp73-94, esp. pp88-91.
2. These positions must 'appear' to English Canadians to be adopted by Quebec. This is technically the case because it is the image of its place in relation to Canada that would be crucial in encouraging a favourable response. However, since native elites have more influence in defining the issue for the people of Canada than Quebec could have, then for all practical purposes we may as well talk about the positions that would have to be actually adopted. These must satisfy the English-Canadian elite, and through them, the population of Canada. Obviously, in this gap between elite and populace there is room for elite manipulation. We may assume then, that the positions about to be discussed are the minimum positions that must be taken by Quebec. In other words, these conditions are necessary to satisfy the people of Canada, but more may be demanded by their elites.

appendix A: the sample

The sample of 80 respondents was selected purposively from the universe of Canadians living outside Quebec who were over 16 years old. It was meant to be roughly representative along the major dimensions of age, sex, residence (urban/rural), and section of the country. Most attention was directed to the regional dimension to co-ordinating the rate of travel with the number of interviews obtained. In all, about 8,000 miles were covered, and the major sample centres were (in order): Toronto, Hamilton, Windsor, Saskatoon, Edmonton, Vancouver, Edmonton, Toronto, Stephenville, Afton, Halifax, and Fredericton. In addition, to preserve the urban/rural balance, smaller towns were sampled wherever possible (e.g., through an area (e.g., Owen Sound, Idemary, and Canola, Ontario).

Clearly, because of the method of selection, it is impossible to estimate the representativeness of the sample, or to indicate statistically significant relationships for the universe from which it was rather haphazardly drawn. We can, however, compare its parameters with known population values to gain some idea of its strengths and weaknesses. In the following tables, values and percentages for 'Canada' refer to Canada excluding the population of Quebec. All figures were calculated from the 1971 Census.

Region:

A fair amount of attention was devoted to obtaining an equitable regional distribution of respondents. While the exigencies of travel and the uncertainties of contact made a perfect representation impossible, it would seem that respondents were drawn from the various sections of the country in fair proportions. Distributions within the maritimes and the West by province are less true (there was no one from Prince Edward Island), but given the small numbers involved, the major sections form the only reasonable cutting points.

Table 1: Distribution of Population and Sample
by Region

Region	Canada	Sample
Ontario	40.6%	50%
Western Canada	22.8	21
British Columbia	14.1	10
Maritimes	12.0	19
Total	99.5%	100% (N=80)

NOTE: The figures for Canada do not add up to 100% because of the exclusion of the Yukon and the N.W.T. The total population of Canada, excluding Quebec, is 15,540,545.

Residence

The major weakness here is the under-representation of rural people, and the corresponding bulge in the sample in cities over 30,000. In the rural areas, contact was a problem, and so were accommodation and transportation. The effect this has had on the results is unclear, as there is no one type of attitude-set very closely associated with the population of the place of residence.

Table 2: Distribution of Population and Sample
by Size of Place of Residence

Size	Canada	Sample
100,000 plus	46%	13
30,000-99,999	9	13
10,000-29,999	8	11
5,000-9,999	4	5
1,000-4,999	7	6
rural	26	13
Total	100%	100% (N=80)

Sex

This is one of the great disappointments in the sample: while the population of English Canada is equally split between males and females, in the sample women made up only 17 of the independents, or 21%. This applies, which results from the fact that women are more difficult to contact in public places, at least for a male interviewer, could greatly affect the findings unless the sets of attitudes which define national identification are relatively isolated from or unaffected by the attitudes which are central to male-female role differences in our society. Fortunately, this seems to be the case. Table 3 relates the types of attitudes which are essentially isolated to sex, and shows that men and women are represented in each type in roughly equal proportions.

Table 3: The Distribution of Types of Attitudes by Sex

Type	Men	Women	Total
Local	30	23	53
Regional	11	10	21
International	12	29	41
Individualist	13	12	25
Exceptions	5	1	6

Total 101 (N=75) 100 (N=17) 201 (92)

Age

In choosing respondents, selection by age was difficult for the 1971 census data was not yet available. Moreover, it was hard enough finding any one in a position to carry on a conversation, so that the age of the respondent was paid to the age of the respondent. The sample includes the 18-24 age group, but even the great bulk of the sample is young, with the relative unavailability of older people. The interviewer, however, perhaps reflecting that the sample had been selected slightly

in the direction of the young. The over-representation of the younger age groups is not too extreme, however, and while it may have slightly inflated the number of individuals and turned up fewer locals and migrants than actually exist, this distortion would appear to be quite small.

Table 4: Distribution of Population and Sample by Age

Age	Canada	Sample
15-24	19.5%	21%
25-34	16.3	18
35-44	11.0	11
45-54	11.0	9
55-64	9.5	7
65-74	6.7	11
75-84	7.3	7
85-94	6.1	3
95-104	4.9	3
105-114	4.2	2
70plus	1.0	-

Total 100.3% 107% (n=50)

NOTE: Percentages for Canada are calculated on a base of all those outside Quebec over 16 years of age.

Appendix D: Sample Interviews

A complete sample interview with a member of each of the three age groups is included. It should be noted that a series of three dots (...) in the interview does not mean that words have been omitted, but instead indicates a short pause.

Example 1: Local

Interview number 63

Male

Age: 40-45

Occupation: Owns and operates a small grocery/restaurant

Marital status: Single

Place: Northborough, Ontario.

Set: In his store/restaurant, in the early afternoon.

I: "Hi, I just thought I'd have a cup of the 'new' coffee in town, please."

R: "Hi."

I: "I was just down at the marina. ~~There~~ to be a lot of tourists down there..."

R: "Well, there's usually a lot there."

I: [I was interrupted by a young boy buying pop-cicles.]

R: "That's been really busy."

I: "Well, well you see, it's a highway, as well as the main street."

I: "Do you think they'll ever order it?"

R: "No, not really. Lifetime. There's four types around this town already."

I: "Yeah, it's growing pretty fast, I guess."

R: "Well, about 1,000 in the last 10 years."

I: "That's quite a few. Did the university bring in a lot of people?"

R: "Yeah, it did." (rather hesitantly)

I: "Oh...I saw a lot of longhairs down the street there..."

R: "That's right. But they're not really, you know. We've got a few hippies around here, and they're fine."

I: "Good neighbours?"

R: "Yep, got no complaints. The way I figure it, a good student's either at school or he has his nose in a book. And they're no

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I: "I'm not sure if I'm doing it right, but I'm going to try."
Q: "I'm not sure if I'm doing it right, but I'm going to try."

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Interview: 10/10/70; 10/10/70
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Interview: 10/10/70; 10/10/70
Interview: 10/10/70; 10/10/70
Interview: 10/10/70; 10/10/70

Strength of identification: high with a view of country

Example 2: Logan

Interview: 10/10/70
Age: 40-44
Occupation: Salesman
Place: Fiddle
Home: Fredericton, New Brunswick
Met: In a lunch in Queen Street, after lunch.

I: "How do you, isn't it?"
Q: "Yes, it's a good one."
I: "Kind of day, really that could like to be on the beach."
Q: "Yes, that's right."
I: "I'm not sure if I'm doing it right, but I'm going to try."
Q: "I'm not sure if I'm doing it right, but I'm going to try."

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be addressed. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

2. The second step is to gather relevant information and resources. This may involve research, consultation with experts, or reviewing existing data.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the sequence of actions to be taken.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves carrying out the tasks identified in the plan and monitoring progress as you go.

5. The fifth step is to evaluate the results. This involves comparing the outcomes of the implementation with the original goals and objectives to determine the effectiveness of the solution.

6. The sixth step is to reflect on the process. This involves thinking about what worked well, what challenges were encountered, and what lessons can be learned for future projects.

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(continued)

79 : 19

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11. 11. 1941

[Faint, illegible handwritten notes]

Q: "The fact that the defendant is a member of the 'Black Panther Party' is a material fact in this case." A: "The fact that the defendant is a member of the 'Black Panther Party' is a material fact in this case."

[Handwritten signature]

[illegible]

It "seems" and "loving it" don't seem to get along "down here."

[illegible]

... and the fact that the *in vitro* and *in vivo* results are in good agreement.

[illegible]

$\int_0^1 \int_0^1 \frac{1}{\sqrt{1-x^2-y^2}} dx dy = \frac{\pi}{2}$

Figure 1. The effect of the concentration of the *Agrobacterium* suspension on the transformation efficiency of *Agrobacterium* strains. The number of transformed cells was determined by the number of colonies obtained on the selective medium. The results are the mean of three independent experiments. Error bars represent standard deviation.

Number of

[illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible][illegible]

2. "And, it is also true, that the same thing which is true of the whole, is true of every part; and that the same thing which is true of every part, is true of the whole." — This is a very important principle, and one which is often overlooked.

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

$\frac{d}{dt} \left(\frac{\partial L}{\partial \dot{x}} \right) = \frac{\partial L}{\partial x}$

[illegible]

1: "The first of the following is the first of the following."

... "well, that's the way, to be a ...
... "I'm not a ...
... "I'm not a ..."

[illegible][illegible]

1: " Well, you must get to know people pretty well."

10: "That's true. You find out a lot about places. Like a lot of people in the town don't have very much at all. You find that out. I used to be only looking for the people with money anyway, you know, but there's a lot of change in this town."

At this point the ~~train~~ ^{officer} and ~~officer~~ ^{officer} went by train.

[illegible]

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

[illegible]

1. *Chlorophyll a* (Chl *a*) is the primary photosynthetic pigment in most plants and algae. It is a green pigment that absorbs light energy in the blue and red regions of the visible spectrum.

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and dates, which appears to be a record of some kind. The names are written in a cursive script, and the dates are in a more formal, printed style. The list is organized into two columns, with names on the left and dates on the right. The names are: "John A. Smith", "John B. Smith", "John C. Smith", "John D. Smith", "John E. Smith", "John F. Smith", "John G. Smith", "John H. Smith", "John I. Smith", "John J. Smith", "John K. Smith", "John L. Smith", "John M. Smith", "John N. Smith", "John O. Smith", "John P. Smith", "John Q. Smith", "John R. Smith", "John S. Smith", "John T. Smith", "John U. Smith", "John V. Smith", "John W. Smith", "John X. Smith", "John Y. Smith", "John Z. Smith". The dates are: "1870", "1871", "1872", "1873", "1874", "1875", "1876", "1877", "1878", "1879", "1880", "1881", "1882", "1883", "1884", "1885", "1886", "1887", "1888", "1889", "1890", "1891", "1892", "1893", "1894", "1895", "1896", "1897", "1898", "1899", "1900", "1901", "1902", "1903", "1904", "1905", "1906", "1907", "1908", "1909", "1910", "1911", "1912", "1913", "1914", "1915", "1916", "1917", "1918", "1919", "1920", "1921", "1922", "1923", "1924", "1925", "1926", "1927", "1928", "1929", "1930", "1931", "1932", "1933", "1934", "1935", "1936", "1937", "1938", "1939", "1940", "1941", "1942", "1943", "1944", "1945", "1946", "1947", "1948", "1949", "1950", "1951", "1952", "1953", "1954", "1955", "1956", "1957", "1958", "1959", "1960", "1961", "1962", "1963", "1964", "1965", "1966", "1967", "1968", "1969", "1970", "1971", "1972", "1973", "1974", "1975", "1976", "1977", "1978", "1979", "1980", "1981", "1982", "1983", "1984", "1985", "1986", "1987", "1988", "1989", "1990", "1991", "1992", "1993", "1994", "1995", "1996", "1997", "1998", "1999", "2000", "2001", "2002", "2003", "2004", "2005", "2006", "2007", "2008", "2009", "2010", "2011", "2012", "2013", "2014", "2015", "2016", "2017", "2018", "2019", "2020", "2021", "2022", "2023", "2024", "2025", "2026", "2027", "2028", "2029", "2030", "2031", "2032", "2033", "2034", "2035", "2036", "2037", "2038", "2039", "2040", "2041", "2042", "2043", "2044", "2045", "2046", "2047", "2048", "2049", "2050", "2051", "2052", "2053", "2054", "2055", "2056", "2057", "2058", "2059", "2060", "2061", "2062", "2063", "2064", "2065", "2066", "2067", "2068", "2069", "2070", "2071", "2072", "2073", "2074", "2075", "2076", "2077", "2078", "2079", "2080", "2081", "2082", "2083", "2084", "2085", "2086", "2087", "2088", "2089", "2090", "2091", "2092", "2093", "2094", "2095", "2096", "2097", "2098", "2099", "2100", "2101", "2102", "2103", "2104", "2105", "2106", "2107", "2108", "2109", "2110", "2111", "2112", "2113", "2114", "2115", "2116", "2117", "2118", "2119", "2120", "2121", "2122", "2123", "2124", "2125", "2126", "2127", "2128", "2129", "2130", "2131", "2132", "2133", "2134", "2135", "2136", "2137", "2138", "2139", "2140", "2141", "2142", "2143", "2144", "2145", "2146", "2147", "2148", "2149", "2150", "2151", "2152", "2153", "2154", "2155", "2156", "2157", "2158", "2159", "2160", "2161", "2162", "2163", "2164", "2165", "2166", "2167", "2168", "2169", "2170", "2171", "2172", "2173", "2174", "2175", "2176", "2177", "2178", "2179", "2180", "2181", "2182", "2183", "2184", "2185", "2186", "2187", "2188", "2189", "2190", "2191", "2192", "2193", "2194", "2195", "2196", "2197", "2198", "2199", "2200", "2201", "2202", "2203", "2204", "2205", "2206", "2207", "2208", "2209", "2210", "2211", "2212", "2213", "2214", "2215", "2216", "2217", "2218", "2219", "2220", "2221", "2222", "2223", "2224", "2225", "2226", "2227", "2228", "2229", "2230", "2231", "2232", "2233", "2234", "2235", "2236", "2237", "2238", "2239", "2240", "2241", "2242", "2243", "2244", "2245", "2246", "2247", "2248", "2249", "2250", "2251", "2252", "2253", "2254", "2255", "2256", "2257", "2258", "2259", "2260", "2261", "2262", "2263", "2264", "2265", "2266", "2267", "2268", "2269", "2270", "2271", "2272", "2273", "2274", "2275", "2276", "2277", "2278", "2279", "2280", "2281", "2282", "2283", "2284", "2285", "2286", "2287", "2288", "2289", "2290", "2291", "2292", "2293", "2294", "2295", "2296", "2297", "2298", "2299", "2300", "2301", "2302", "2303", "2304", "2305", "2306", "2307", "2308", "2309", "2310", "2311", "2312", "2313", "2314", "2315", "2316", "2317", "2318", "2319", "2320", "2321", "2322", "2323", "2324", "2325", "2326", "2327", "2328", "2329", "2330", "2331", "2332", "2333", "2334", "2335", "2336", "2337", "2338", "2339", "2340", "2341", "2342", "2343", "2344", "2345", "2346", "2347", "2348", "2349", "2350", "2351", "2352", "2353", "2354", "2355", "2356", "2357", "2358", "2359", "2360", "2361", "2362", "2363", "2364", "2365", "2366", "2367", "2368", "2369", "2370", "2371", "2372", "2373", "2374", "2375", "2376", "2377", "2378", "2379", "2380", "2381", "2382", "2383", "2384", "2385", "2386", "2387", "2388", "2389", "2390", "2391", "2392", "2393", "2394", "2395", "2396", "2397", "2398", "2399", "2400", "2401", "2402", "2403", "2404", "2405", "2406", "2407", "2408", "2409", "2410", "2411", "2412", "2413", "2414", "2415", "2416", "2417", "2418", "2419", "2420", "2421", "2422", "2423", "2424", "2425", "2426", "2427", "2428", "2429", "2430", "2431", "2432", "2433", "2434", "2435", "2436", "2437", "2438", "2439", "2440", "2441", "2442", "2443", "2444", "2445", "2446", "2447", "2448", "2449", "2450", "2451", "2452", "2453", "2454", "2455", "2456", "2457", "2458", "2459", "2460", "2461", "2462", "2463", "2464", "2465", "2466", "2467", "2468", "2469", "2470", "2471", "2472", "2473", "2474", "2475", "2476", "2477", "2478", "2479", "2480", "2481", "2482", "2483", "2484", "2485", "2486", "2487", "2488", "2489", "2490", "2491", "2492", "2493", "2494", "2495", "2496", "2497", "2498", "2499", "2500", "2501", "2502", "2503", "2504", "2505", "2506", "2507", "2508", "2509", "2510", "2511", "2512", "2513

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

1. The first group of people who are interested in the study of the history of the United States are the people who are interested in the history of the United States.

[illegible]

It is the duty of the State to protect the rights of its citizens.

at "1611, 1st Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., where I have been
for the past few years." [Signature]

The following information was obtained from the records of the Bureau of Census:

"I am not going to let you go," he said.

1. "The first step in the process of the development of the human mind is the development of the language." "The first step in the process of the development of the human mind is the development of the language." "The first step in the process of the development of the human mind is the development of the language."

[illegible]

1: " ... the 'don't be ... don't be ... don't be ... " ...

2: "Well, some of the, uh, and the, uh, I guess I've got enough time, but not too much, as far as the condensed, the, uh, French and I spend in it, uh, I get a hell difference does it before it's in the one."

1: "Yes, I would have, because the heading on there is
"Expenditure"

[illegible]

[illegible]

$\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}$

[illegible]

I: "I will not let you go."

[illegible]

There followed a rather prolonged silence. I felt that this sort of thing would hinder serious thought and discussion, which ended with the observation that things were no longer beer-drinking, football, long hair, and short skirts. After a properly creditative pause, I began again.

1: "Tell me, how you travelled in the state's capital"

: "Oh no, not 'ten' much. I've been down through New York, North Carolina, but never been really off the coast in port."

I: "Do you like it?"

R: "Well, I don't know; it's about the same as everywhere else; it's a bit dirtier and a bit more crowded. But I never stayed long enough to really get to know the place."

J: "Yeah....I guess there's a lot of tourists that come up here."

R: "Oh god, yes; all the 'live tourists. There aren't too many now, but next month they'll all be coming up. The, love it x. up here, you know; they come for the trees, and air and stuff."

Q: "Well, how do people here feel about that?"

R: "Well, not bad. I mean, they're big bullshitters, you know, they really are, but along with the bull, Americans always have a lot of money to spread around, you see, and people - up here like that, I'll tell you; they lap it up."

I: "Yeah, but I was over in 1971, and people there were saying the 're buying land over there' - getting pretty upset."

1
: "I don't think I can... the people... of a reaction to
people... they... they were happy with business for
the first... but... they are... off...
... their... at
... of... with...
that..."

1: "Yes, I'm..."

1: "I... here, but..."

1: "I think I'd like to live out of town..."

1: "Yes, it's... to... it...
... only...
... driving...
..."

1: "Yes, I don't... for me."

1: "Yes, it's...-----"

1: "Yes, I don't know that."

1: "Yes, it's... of... you're
... up to..."

1: "I see... it'll reach..."

1: "Yes, I don't know... it's...
... like...
... about... and a half
... of... fields...
... further out."

1: "Yes, the... are...; the... is..."

1: "Yes, the... is... people
... for..."

1: "Yes, I don't... here...
... to... the place,
... the... are concentrated
... of..."

1: "Yes, I don't... this is the centre of the
... it's quite... and it's flat... where
... are..."

1: "I don't..."

1: "Yes, it's a pretty different place, that."

1: "Yes, it is; it's quite a change here in the East... Tell
... what...?"

1: "Yes, the... are..."

1: "Yes."

1: "Yes, I don't... for all... people here,
... if it were
... to happen."

2011.11.27

N : "Yeah...I think it's better if we don't go to work
and just stay at home until the other person comes back.
I mean, I'm not going to work, but I'm not going to
the office either."

"I think you are right," said the man, "but I am not sure."

[illegible][illegible]

1. Yes, the following are the most important factors in the development of the world's population:

2: "So, I suppose I'll be in the office tomorrow."
 3: He tried to be at work on Monday, but he was still
 4: swabbing his nose...

1. The first of these is the fact that the only person who has been able to get a copy of the document is the person who has been able to get a copy of the document.

[illegible][illegible]

"I just thought I'd tell you that."

Q: "Well, as far as I know, in the time they're getting a civil
majority, say, 1960. They get a lot of political, of course, but
I think the main reason for the majority of the people for ad-
vance really won't vote. There are a lot of people, they
think, but I think we'll realize that they're better off in
civil than in a majority. It could be an advantage if they
were separated, and I think that very few of them would
really vote for it."

-I: "I have a thing I would like to see."

I am, I think, not at all, wrong to go to the

...the

: 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914, 1915, 1916, 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592

1: "Yeah, I know what you mean. I've been there before. It's a real pain in the ass."

2: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

3: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

4: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

5: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

6: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

7: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

8: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

9: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

10: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

11: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

12: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

13: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

14: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

15: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

16: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

17: "Yeah, I know. But I'm not a fighter either. I'm just a guy who's been there before."

18: "I know, but I'm not sure if I can handle it. I'm not a fighter, you know?"

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1. The first of these is the fact that the
2. second of these is the fact that the
3. third of these is the fact that the
4. fourth of these is the fact that the
5. fifth of these is the fact that the
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8. eighth of these is the fact that the
9. ninth of these is the fact that the
10. tenth of these is the fact that the

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1. "The first thing I did was to go to the bank and get some money out of my account. I had no other choice."

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... that the ...

There is no doubt that the world is not there.

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1. The first of these is the fact that the

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154. 155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170. 171. 172. 173. 174. 175. 176. 177. 178. 179. 180. 181. 182. 183. 184. 185. 186. 187. 188. 189. 190. 191. 192. 193. 194. 195. 196. 197. 198. 199. 200. 201. 202. 203. 204. 205. 206. 207. 208. 209. 210. 211. 212. 213. 214. 215. 216. 217. 218. 219. 220. 221. 222. 223. 224. 225. 226. 227. 228. 229. 230. 231. 232. 233. 234. 235. 236. 237. 238. 239. 240. 241. 242. 243. 244. 245. 246. 247. 248. 249. 250. 251. 252. 253. 254. 255. 256. 257. 258. 259. 260. 261. 262. 263. 264. 265. 266. 267. 268. 269. 270. 271. 272. 273. 274. 275. 276. 277. 278. 279. 280. 281. 282. 283. 284. 285. 286. 287. 288. 289. 290. 291. 292. 293. 294. 295. 296. 297. 298. 299. 300. 301. 302. 303. 304. 305. 306. 307. 308. 309. 310. 311. 312. 313. 314. 315. 316. 317. 318. 319. 320. 321. 322. 323. 324. 325. 326. 327. 328. 329. 330. 331. 332. 333. 334. 335. 336. 337. 338. 339. 340. 341. 342. 343. 344. 345. 346. 347. 348. 349. 350. 351. 352. 353. 354. 355. 356. 357. 358. 359. 360. 361. 362. 363. 364. 365. 366. 367. 368. 369. 370. 371. 372. 373. 374. 375. 376. 377. 378. 379. 380. 381. 382. 383. 384. 385. 386. 387. 388. 389. 390. 391. 392. 393. 394. 395. 396. 397. 398. 399. 400. 401. 402. 403. 404. 405. 406. 407. 408. 409. 410. 411. 412. 413. 414. 415. 416. 417. 418. 419. 420. 421. 422. 423. 424. 425. 426. 427. 428. 429. 430. 431. 432. 433. 434. 435. 436. 437. 438. 439. 440. 441. 442. 443. 444. 445. 446. 447. 448. 449. 450. 451. 452. 453. 454. 455. 456. 457. 458. 459. 460. 461. 462. 463. 464. 465. 466. 467. 468. 469. 470. 471. 472. 473. 474. 475. 476. 477. 478. 479. 480. 481. 482. 483. 484. 485. 486. 487. 488. 489. 490. 491. 492. 493. 494. 495. 496. 497. 498. 499. 500. 501. 502. 503. 504. 505. 506. 507. 508. 509. 510. 511. 512. 513. 514. 515. 516. 517. 518. 519. 520. 521. 522. 523. 524. 525. 526. 527. 528. 529. 530. 531. 532. 533. 534. 535. 536. 537. 538. 539. 540. 541. 542. 543. 544. 545. 546. 547. 548. 549. 550. 551. 552. 553. 554. 555. 556. 557. 558. 559. 560. 561. 562. 563. 564. 565. 566. 567. 568. 569. 570. 571. 572. 573. 574. 575. 576. 577. 578. 579. 580. 581. 582. 583. 584. 585. 586. 587. 588. 589. 590. 591. 592. 593. 594. 595. 596. 597. 598. 599. 600. 601. 602. 603. 604. 605. 606. 607. 608. 609. 610. 611. 612. 613. 614. 615. 616. 617. 618. 619. 620. 621. 622. 623. 624. 625. 626. 627. 628. 629. 630. 631. 632. 633. 634. 635. 636. 637. 638. 639. 640. 641. 642. 643. 644. 645. 646. 647. 648. 649. 650. 651. 652. 653. 654. 655. 656. 657. 658. 659. 660. 661. 662. 663. 664. 665. 666. 667. 668. 669. 670. 671. 672. 673. 674. 675. 676. 677. 678. 679. 680. 681. 682. 683. 684. 685. 686. 687. 688. 689. 690. 691. 692. 693. 694. 695. 696. 697. 698. 699. 700. 701. 702. 703. 704. 705. 706. 707. 708. 709. 710. 711. 712. 713. 714. 715. 716. 717. 718. 719. 720. 721. 722. 723. 724. 725. 726. 727. 728. 729. 730. 731. 732. 733. 734. 735. 736. 737. 738. 739. 740. 741. 742. 743. 744. 745. 746. 747. 748. 749. 750. 751. 752. 753. 754. 755. 756. 757. 758. 759. 760. 761. 762. 763. 764. 765. 766. 767. 768. 769. 770. 771. 772. 773. 774. 775. 776. 777. 778. 779. 780. 781. 782. 783. 784. 785. 786. 787. 788. 789. 790. 791. 792. 793. 794. 795. 796. 797. 798. 799. 800. 801. 802. 803. 804. 805. 806. 807. 808. 809. 810. 811. 812. 813. 814. 815. 816. 817. 818. 819. 820. 821. 822. 823. 824. 825. 826. 827. 828. 829. 830. 831. 832. 833. 834. 835. 836. 837. 838. 839. 840. 84

$$\{f_n\} \rightarrow f \text{ in } L^1(\mathbb{R}) \text{ if and only if } \int_{\mathbb{R}} |f_n - f| \rightarrow 0.$$

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1. The first part of the document is a list of names and titles, including "The Hon. Mr. Justice" and "The Hon. Mr. Justice".

$$+1 \leq \lambda \leq 1, \quad \sigma^2 = 1, \quad \text{maximize } t, \quad t \geq 0$$

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Appendix 2: Concepts used in the analysis

The following set of concepts was used in the second run of coding. It defines concepts originally suggested by respondents in the course of the interviews with an order arising from their order in the interview. Any category followed by a colon was an actual coding category; the others if brackets.

I. Quebec;

a) Beliefs;

irrelevant:

doesn't affect:

doesn't affect others:

little news:

b) Life;

central - big city:

central - big city:

c) People;

is good:

city, regional, corrupt:

noisy and defended:

upset:

insult-looking:

'force us to speak French':

different from us:

similar to us:

d) Society;

fronched:

vest and shirt:

bad economy:

rich:

dynamic:

somebody and dependent:

nature society:

unified:

not unified:

different and separate:

'a part like the rest':

e) Latent Hostility;

f) Different and Enriching;

g) October 1970 mentioned spontaneously;

dannable:

necessary action by Trudeau:

'settling down':

II. Canada;

a) Geography;

land:

weather:

'room for everyone':

- b) little idea of whole:
 - places only:
- c) sections:
 - because few people travel:
 - preferences; east:
 - west:
 - Maritimes:
 - U.S.:
 - Ontario different:
 - West friendly:
 - central Canada as key:
 - Ontario pride:
 - Western inferiority:
 - Maritime inferiority:
- d) Economy:
 - weak:
 - strong:
 - unemployment:
- e) Country:
 - unified:
 - strong:
 - Trudeau and unity:
 - divided:
 - 'should be together':
 - united:
 - 'people the same underneath':
- f) Future:
 - uncertain:
 - could be great:
 - frustration at lack of goals and progress:
- g) Spirit:
 - cautious:
 - dependent:
 - peaceful:
 - freedom:
- h) Compared to U.S.:
 - better:
 - different:
 - tending towards:
 - similar:
 - 'nationalist':

i) Home:

j) 'Good' Country:

III. The United States;

- a) Negative:
 - bad social situation:
 - violent:
 - imperialist:
 - crowded:
 - crazy:
 - fast pace:
 - 'problems':
- b) Positive:
 - weather:

c) neutral:
- place to make a living:
- place to visit:
- visit only:

d) people:
no difference:
but system different:
different:
ignorant:
arrogant:
rich:

e) Its effect:
powerful:
greedy for us:
land-hoarding:
industry-owning:
unstoppable force:
such news:
personal experiences:

IV. Independence:

a) involvement:
don't care:
effects:
no one important:
others:
maybe others:
business:
'let them go':
care:
hurts me:
hurts Canada:
splits country:
economic problems:
vulnerable to U.S.:
can't understand, crazy, unreasonable:

b) wouldn't hurt Canada:
good thing:

c) Separatists:
all:
FLC:
minority:
hotheads, idiots:
leaders:

d) Effects:
hurts them:
problems:
no support:
business leaves:
independence hard:
because of their extreme poverty:
helps them:
hurts both:
economically:
'barriers':
they 'go with someone':
U.S.:
other:

- 1-7
- e) Possibility;
 - will happen:
 - definite trend:
 - up in the air:
 - unlikely:
 - no chance:
 - don't know:
 - f) They want to 'leave', 'split off':
 - g) Sense of Rejection:
 - h) Choice;
 - theirs by vote:
 - both:
 - ours:
 - fighting, or maybe fighting:
 - no fighting:
 - sanctions:

V. Tangents;

- a) Descriptive:
- b) Abstract:
- c) Content:
 - travels:
 - family:
 - sections of the country:
 - local area:
 - Ireland:
 - entertainments:
 - jobs:
 - change in general:
 - women:
 - isolated personal experiences:
 - vacations:
 - other:

VI. Shared Opinions;

- a) Canada; agree: disagree: split:
- b) Quebec; agree: disagree: split:
- c) Independence; agree: disagree: split:
- d) The U.S.A.; agree: disagree: split:
- e) Arena of Agreement;
 - everyone everywhere:
 - everyone reasonable:
 - everyone in English Canada:
 - people in this province:
 - people in this area:
 - people who think like me:

Appendix 3: Background and Interview Characteristics of the Respondents and the Types

Region

Table 1: Distribution of Sample and Types by Region

| Region | Sample | Types | | | |
|-----------|--------|----------|-------|---------|-----------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Boysat. | Cosmopol. |
| Atlantic | 51.0% | 64% | 3% | 44% | 56% |
| Central | 21.2% | 27% | 3% | 2% | 6% |
| South | 10.0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 20% |
| Northwest | 10.0% | 0% | 2% | 2% | 16% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| | (80) | (11) | (23) | (18) | (25) |

Residence

Table 2: Distribution of Sample and Types by Size of Place of Residence

| Size of Place of Residence | Sample | Types | | | |
|----------------------------|--------|----------|-------|---------|-----------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Boysat. | Cosmopol. |
| 100,000 plus | 10.5% | 10% | 4% | 50% | 64% |
| 50,000 - 99,999 | 12.5% | 0% | 1% | 17% | 4% |
| 10,000 - 49,999 | 11.2% | 0% | 0% | 17% | 12% |
| 5,000 - 9,999 | 5.0% | 0% | 0% | 6% | 0% |
| 1,000 - 4,999 | 6.2% | 0% | 1% | 6% | 4% |
| rural | 12.5% | 1% | 0% | 6% | 16% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100% | 101% | 102% | 100% |
| N | (80) | (11) | (23) | (18) | (25) |

DEA

Table 3: Distribution of Sample and Types by Sex

| | Sample | Types | | | |
|--------|--------|----------|-------|----------|--------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Domestic | Cosmo. |
| Male | 27.75 | 73 | 16 | 72 | 60 |
| Female | 21.25 | 27 | 18 | 28 | 20 |
| Total | 49.00 | 100 | 34 | 100 | 80 |
| | (11) | (11) | (23) | (18) | (25) |

Age

Table 4: Distribution of Sample and Types by Age

| Age | Sample | Types | | | |
|---------|--------|----------|-------|----------|--------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Domestic | Cosmo. |
| 18-24 | 27.75 | 27 | 11 | 22 | 20 |
| 25-29 | 11.25 | 5 | 1 | 2 | 4 |
| 30-34 | 11.25 | 9 | 1 | 11 | 16 |
| 35-39 | 27.75 | -- | 13 | 6 | 8 |
| 40-44 | 11.25 | -- | 9 | 0 | 16 |
| 45-49 | 11.25 | 9 | 13 | 4 | 16 |
| 50-54 | 6.25 | -- | 4 | 11 | 4 |
| 55-59 | 2.5 | -- | -- | 6 | -- |
| 60-64 | 2.5 | -- | 2 | -- | -- |
| 65-69 | 2.5 | -- | 4 | 2 | 4 |
| 70 plus | 7.5 | -- | 13 | 11 | 4 |
| Total | 100.00 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 100 |
| | (11) | (11) | (23) | (18) | (25) |

Class

It was impossible to ascertain for each respondent his income, occupation, or subjective class placement, and, in any event, the purpose of the study was not to study the social class features. However, after each interview, the respondent gave a rough class placement, objectively available for study as a factor in dress, speech, function, job, etc. etc. Since there is no known social class value to compare these to, it is interesting to see the relative of class for the types.

Table 5: Distribution of Sample and Types by Class

| Class | Sample | Type- | | | |
|--------------|--------|------------|-------|----------|----------|
| | | Individual | Local | Regional | National |
| Lower | 11.25 | -- | 10 | 11 | -- |
| Lower middle | 31.25 | 27 | 50 | 20 | 10 |
| Middle | 16.25 | 71 | 20 | 10 | 4 |
| Upper middle | 11.25 | -- | 10 | 22 | 60 |
| Total | 100.00 | 100% | 100% | 100 | 100 |
| | (%) | (11) | (23) | (10) | (20) |

Interview characteristics are based on estimates made immediately after each interview, and are included to provide a relative idea of the structure of the interviews with each type. When mean scores are given, they have been calculated by treating the five point scale (from low to high) as an interval measure with values from one to five. Obviously this provides only a compact relative measure for rough comparison.

Tables dealing with length of interview, willingness of the respondent to converse, interest in interviewer, interest in the topic, information, and the overall rating of the interview are presented on the following pages.

Interview Length

Table 6: Length of Interview for Sample and Types

| Length | Sample | Types | | | |
|---------------|--------|----------|-------|--------------|--------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Neighborhood | County |
| under 15 min. | 2.3% | 9% | 4% | -- | -- |
| 15-19 min. | 11.2% | -- | 13 | 6 | 21 |
| 20-24 min. | 38.7% | 4% | 31 | 39 | 4 |
| 25-29 min. | 11.2% | 27 | 16 | 1 | 12 |
| 30-44 min. | 21.2% | 16 | 18 | 26 | 20 |
| over 45 min. | 5.1% | -- | -- | -- | 8 |
| Total | 100.0% | 10% | 10% | 101% | 100% |

Willingness to converse

Table 7: Willingness to converse for Sample and Types

| Willingness | Sample | Types | | | |
|---------------|--------|----------|-------|--------------|--------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Neighborhood | County |
| Low | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| Low-moderate | 3.7% | -- | 9 | -- | 4 |
| Moderate | 47.5 | 54 | 52 | 44 | 44 |
| Moderate-high | 35.1 | 36 | 30 | 34 | 36 |
| High | 13.7% | 9 | 9 | 17 | 16 |
| Total | 100.0% | 99% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Mean | 3.6 | 3.6 | 3.4 | 3.7 | 3.6 |

Interest in Interviewer

Table 1: Interest in Interviewer for Sample and Types

| Interest | Sample | Types | | | |
|---------------|--------|----------|-------|---------|---------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Disput. | Unsett. |
| Low | 15.0% | 9% | 10% | 2% | 14% |
| Low-moderate | 21.25% | 27% | 31% | 11% | 12% |
| Moderate | 42.5% | 61% | 39% | 27% | 36% |
| Moderate-high | 13.75% | -- | 9% | 33% | 12% |
| High | 7.5% | -- | 4% | 6% | 16% |
| Total | 100.0% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |
| Mean | 2.8 | 2.0 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 3.2 |

Interest in Topic

Table 2: Interest in Topic for Sample and Types

| Interest | Sample | Types | | | |
|---------------|--------|----------|-------|---------|---------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Disput. | Unsett. |
| Low | 7.5% | 36% | 4% | 6% | -- |
| Low-moderate | 16.25% | 27% | 42% | 17% | 6% |
| Moderate | 42.5% | 36% | 61% | 56% | 20% |
| Moderate-high | 26.25% | -- | 13% | 17% | 60% |
| High | 7.5% | -- | -- | 6% | 12% |
| Total | 100.0% | 99% | 100% | 102% | 100% |
| Mean | 3.1 | 2.0 | 2.8 | 2.9 | 3.0 |

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Table 1: Information for Sample and Types

| Information | Sample | Types | | | |
|-------------|--------|----------|-------|---------|---------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Engest. | Losses. |
| Low | 2.75 | 41 | 50 | 44 | -- |
| Low-medium | 3.25 | -- | 30 | 33 | 12 |
| Low-high | 3.75 | 27 | 32 | 47 | 41 |
| Medium-high | 4.25 | 9 | 19 | 7 | 40 |
| High | 4.75 | 23 | -- | -- | 12 |
| Total | 101.0 | 110 | 101 | 101 | 100% |
| Per | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 | 1.0 |

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Table 2: Information for Sample and Types

| Information | Sample | Types | | | |
|-------------|--------|----------|-------|---------|---------|
| | | Individ. | Local | Engest. | Losses. |
| Low | 2.75 | -- | -- | 11 | 4 |
| Low-medium | 3.25 | -- | -- | -- | 20 |
| Low-high | 3.75 | -- | 43 | 22 | 24 |
| Medium | 4.25 | 36 | 3 | 3 | 24 |
| Medium-high | 4.75 | 40 | 26 | 22 | 20 |
| High | 5.25 | 16 | -- | 7 | -- |
| Total | 101.0 | 99 | 100 | 101 | 100% |
| Per | 1.0 | (11) | (23) | (16) | (25) |

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