

**The Use of Islam as Propaganda in the Iran-Iraq War**

by

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## Abstract

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Relations between Tehran and Baghdad became strained with the advent to power of Āyatullāh Khumaynī and his subsequent endorsement of the exportation of the Islamic Revolution. Within a matter of months a war of words had erupted between Iraq's President Husayn and Iran's Āyatullāh Khumaynī.

When in September 1980 Iraq invaded Iran the reason for the invasion was ostensibly the Shatt-al-Arab. This study will show that underlying grievances were, in fact, more instrumental in precipitating the conflict and that within a very short time the Shatt-al-Arab had receded in importance. The conflict in the Gulf is veiled under important ideological differences. The fundamental differences in ideology have rendered impracticable any prospects for peace so long as Husayn and Khumaynī remain in power.

An initial investigation into the political background of the conflict and the functions of propaganda is followed by a presentation and an analysis of Iranian and Iraqi propaganda. It will show that while Iraq has relied more on the persuasiveness of Arab Nationalism in its propaganda, Iran has consistently employed Islam.

## Abstrait

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Les rapports entre les gouvernements de Téhéran et Bagdad se sont tendus dès la venue au pouvoir d'Āyatullah Khumaynī et son appui subséquent à l'exportation de la révolution Islamique. Dès les premiers mois, une guerre de mots a éclaté entre le président Husayn de l'Iraq et l'Āyatullah Khumaynī de l'Iran.

La raison pour l'invasion de l'Iran par l'Iraq en septembre 1980 était ostensiblement le Chatt-al-Arabe. Cette étude démontrera que des raisons sous-jacentes étaient en effet responsables de la précipitation du conflit, et qu'en peu de temps le Chatt-al-Arabe avait diminué en importance. Le conflit du Golfe est voilé de divergences idéologiques importantes. Ces différences fondamentales en idéologie ont rendu impossible toutes perspectives de paix tant et aussi longtemps qu'Husayn et Khumaynī demeurent au pouvoir.

Une enquête initiale dans l'arrière plan politique du conflit et les fonctions de la propagande est suivie d'une présentation et une analyse de la propagande Iranienne et Iraquienne. Il sera démontré qu'alors que l'Iraq comptait plutôt sur l'influence du Nationalisme Arabe dans sa propagande, l'Iran a employé de façon consistante, l'Islam.

Dedication

To My Parents

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### A Note on the Transliteration

The system of transliteration used in this thesis follows the system adopted by the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. Proper names are not italicized, but common nouns are. Words such as Iraq and Shah have become sufficiently common in English so as not to require diacritical marks. Place names are spelled in their most common Anglicized forms as well. In those cases when English nominal endings have been added, for example Shi<sup>c</sup>ism, diacritical marks have been retained for the sake of uniformity. Plurals have been made by adding an 's' to the Arabic or Persian singulars, the 's' not being italicized, for example, Āyatullāhs.

Throughout the thesis the names of non-Western authors appear as they have been spelled in the works cited. Only those articles which have been used in the thesis are cited in the bibliography.

### Introduction

On the eve of the Iran-Iraq War a militarily strong and politically cohesive Iraq faced Iran, a nation in turmoil. Iraq had also acquired a measure of Arab support as she consciously strove to make friends and allies and put an end to her period of regional isolation. In contrast, Iran found herself isolated owing to her foreign policy in the Gulf and on the international scene,

On September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded the Iranian oil rich province of Khuzistan. The Iraqi president, Saddam Husayn, claimed that the invasion had been launched as a means to acquiring Iraqi control of the entire Shatt-al-Arab. Within a relatively short time, however, the territorial question which had ostensibly begun the war was superseded by the ideological dimensions of the conflict. It also receded in importance as the struggle for regional domination commenced between Iran and Iraq. The struggle for hegemony in the Gulf is veiled under important ideological differences. The ideological component in this drive for regional domination has been used by both Iran and Iraq. We stand as witnesses to a struggle between Arab Nationalism and Islam and secular and theocratic governments. Husayn .



emphasized this aspect of the conflict when he said:

Khomeini's scheme through the so-called Islamic revolution was to destabilize the region through inciting religious sectarian strife. We in Iraq refuse such a medieval ideology. Our concept is secular and we do not mix together affairs of state and religion. 1

No clearer explanation of Ba<sup>C</sup>thist orientation is required; separation of religion and state is a foregone conclusion.

Tareq Ismael states that the confrontation underlines the conflict inherent in two diametrically opposed ideologies. Iraq adheres to an ideology that is basically secularist while Iran's is a religiously oriented one with a messianic, universalist doctrine.<sup>2</sup>

Ideologies are being used by Iran and Iraq to legitimize their hegemonic aspirations. In the process, however, the opposing ideologies have become an integral component in the conflict. The use of these powerful ideologies in the propaganda war between Iran and Iraq has rendered the crisis particularly salient. One legitimizing tool or ideology that has been used by both actors but most often and most effectively by Iran is Islam.

Islam has been used to motivate the Iranian people in defense of their homeland. Arab nationalism, has for the most part, been used to justify Iraq's invasion of another sovereign state and to refute the verbal allegations of the Iranian regime. Iraq has placed its emphasis on the traditional Arab versus Persian nationalism.

This thesis will examine the use of ideology in the war. For the purpose of this work, Islam is accepted as an ideology. In the current conflict the ideologies of Islam and Arab nationalism have become effective propaganda. The thesis will show that powerful ideologies have been used to mask the true nature of the conflict, and that even in the modern world Islam is being used to gain purely political mileage.

The thesis will deal with the propaganda emanating directly from Iran and Iraq as well as from secondary sources. Most of the material I will be examining is found in a series of books, pamphlets and speeches which I obtained from the Iranian and Iraqi embassies in Ottawa. I propose to cover the material in a thematic rather than a chronological sequence in order to avoid monotony.

In the first part of chapter one an investigation is made into the political background of the conflict. In the second part I will discuss the function and goals of propaganda. In the following chapters I will present and discuss some of the topics covered in the propaganda of Iran and Iraq.

Notes

<sup>1</sup>J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984), pp. 183-184.

<sup>2</sup>Tareq Y. Ismael, Iraq and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 27.

## Chapter 1

### Political Background

With the advent of Āyatullāh Khumaynī and his followers to power in Iran in 1979 the delicate balance of power and fragile co-existence constructed and maintained by the Shah and the Iraqi regime became another victim of the Islamic Revolution.

Initially, the chance for normalized relations between the Iranian mullāhs and the Iraqi Ba<sup>C</sup>th party portended well. Although the secular Ba<sup>C</sup>th must have been more than a little apprehensive and perhaps even a little bewildered at the turn of events in neighboring Iran they openly welcomed the new Iranian rulers. J. M. Abdulghani quotes a speech by the Iraqi Foreign Minister in February 1979 in which he downplayed the nature of Iran's revolution as a religious phenomenon, stressing that it was basically against corruption, the disparity of the classes, dictatorship and the suppression of freedom.<sup>1</sup> Whether the Minister's remarks were simply tailored for Iraqi public consumption or in fact constituted an official government stance is difficult to ascertain.

In a message to Khumaynī, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn, the Iraqi president expressed hopes of continued good relations with Iran. Almost immediately, however, relations began to sour

when, according to Iraq, Iran did not reply in an appropriate manner to Husayn's best wishes. Tareq Ismael, a scholar of modern Iraq, notes that "within weeks of Iran's revolution a war of words had erupted between Iran and Iraq. On the surface, this appeared to be a personality conflict between Iraq's President Hussein and Iran's Āyatollāh Khomeini."<sup>2</sup> "But," he says, "underlying this was a deepseated ideological conflict."<sup>3</sup> Within a matter of months relations had deteriorated still further when Khumaynī began to openly call for the exportation of the Islamic Revolution and more ominously singled out President Husayn for un-Islamic conduct.<sup>4</sup> It stands to reason that if the mullāhs were bent on exporting their revolution their first targets would be the states closest home. Furthermore, the presence of an avowedly secular government on their border made Iraq the most auspicious target.

Simultaneous with the verbal attacks that began to filter into Iraq was the growth within Iraq itself of Islamic resurgent terrorist groups believed to be receiving financial and logistical support from Iran. When, in an act of retaliation against their terrorist activities, Iraq deported 35,000 Iraqi Shi'ī said to be of Iranian descent Iran's acrimony grew. Border clashes escalated. Another indicator of the deepening hostilities was the frequent invasion of each actor's air space by the other.

Who in fact was responsible for the outbreak of the war

is the subject of much heated and bitter debate between the two countries.<sup>5</sup> Iran claims that Iraq began the war when she invaded Iranian territory. Iraq, for her part, claims that Iranian interference in her internal affairs is a breach of the Algiers Agreement and as such constitutes Iran's being responsible for the Agreement becoming null and void.

When, in September 1980, Iraqi troops invaded the Iranian oil rich province of Khuzistan the reason for the invasion was ostensibly the Shatt-al-Arab, a waterway of vital economic importance to Iran and Iraq.<sup>6</sup> The troop deployment followed on the heels of President Saddam Husayn's unilateral abrogation of the Algiers Agreement, the latest treaty to deal with the long standing Shatt-al-Arab dispute.<sup>7</sup>

The Iraqi initiative which was based on Baghdad's perception of Iran as a weak and fragmented society in upheaval was meant to strike a preemptive blow to the fledgling Islamic Republic and restore to Iraq sovereignty over the entire Shatt-al-Arab.

Now, over five years later and with no end in sight, the conflict has settled into a costly war of attrition. The costs for both actors have been very high, in human as well as in financial terms. By mid 1984 it was estimated by American military analysts that 180,000 Iranians and 65,000 Iraqis had been killed.<sup>8</sup> The same analysts placed the number of wounded at 540,000 for Iran and 165,000 for Iraq.<sup>9</sup> Much needed infrastructures have either been destroyed or have not been

completed as funds and manpower are diverted to the war effort. In May 1983 Iran claimed that it had suffered \$90 billion in economic damages.<sup>10</sup> Dilip Hiro reports that Iranian oil exports declined from 1.5 million b/d to 600,000 b/d.<sup>11</sup> The fall, he says was steeper in the case of Iraq: from 2.5 million b/d to 500,000 b/d.<sup>12</sup> In 1983 Iraq's war effort was costing her an estimated \$1.5 billion a month.<sup>13</sup> In addition her foreign reserves have fallen dangerously low, from \$30 billion at the outset of the conflict to \$4 billion in 1983.<sup>14</sup> In addition to these bleak figures Iraq has been forced to borrow or accept grants from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia to the tune of \$45 billion.<sup>15</sup> According to Hiro, the Islamic Republic of Iran, in contrast to Iraq, has borrowed nothing from abroad and has even managed to repay all of the international debts that it inherited from the previous regime.<sup>16</sup>

While the Iraqi regime was undoubtedly alarmed at the vehemence of Khomeini's verbal attacks on its leadership, one may argue that the Iraqis sought to take advantage of the shift in the balance of power that occurred as a result of the Islamic Revolution. These two factors made September 1980 a propitious time for an Iraqi armed assault. In addition, Iran appeared to be intensely demoralized and fragmented.

What Husayn failed to consider, however, was the effect a foreign assault would have on the newly constituted Islamic Republic. Rather than crumble at the foundation the war acted as a catalyst to bring dissenting groups together in

defense of their homeland and revolution. Husayn had either miscalculated the depth of Iranian nationalism that could still be tapped or overlooked the tendency for revolutions to thrive in adversity.<sup>17</sup> To attack a young, mass-based revolution from the outside is to run the risk of reviving its spirit and glorifying its leaders as the protectors of the revolution. Khomeini has maintained: "there are no nationalities in Islam. It abolishes all of them. In a sense nationalism is a pre-Islamic legacy. Islam came to eliminate fanaticism..."<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, it was in fact national pride and determination that rallied the Iranian people to defend their country. Husayn was to have inflated expectations on another front as well. He had expected the Arab Iranians to rise en masse to welcome and join the advancing Iraqi armies once the initial thrust into Iran had been accomplished. The anticipated welcome was not forthcoming. It is ironic that Khomeini was to similarly miscalculate and misinterpret the Iraqi Shi'i loyalty to their homeland. His projection of a warm Shi'i reception was to be thwarted as well. This allegiance to their respective governments by the Arab Iranians and the Iraqi Shi'i clearly indicates that in both Iran and Iraq national identities had been forged over the last sixty years. These identities proved stronger than the appeals of either Khomeini or Husayn.

The key territorial issue of the war concerns the Iraq-Iran border where it runs along the Shatt-al-Arab River, the



127 mile long confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.<sup>19</sup> The dispute over who owns this strategic waterway dates back to the sixteenth century. Mustafa al-Najjar and Nadjat Pathi Safwat, scholars of Middle Eastern history, contend that the "eastern bank of the Shatt-al-Arab has been a purely Arab river since ancient times."<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, they claim that the Arab character of the area led to its being called Arabistan, a name given to it by the Persians themselves.<sup>21</sup> Until 1975 the border demarcated by the Ottomans and the Safavids recognized Ottoman (and consequently Iraqi) control of the entire river.

In the aftermath of World War I, Iraq became one of the states carved out of the former Ottoman Empire. As a result, the Shatt-al-Arab took on a new importance to the principals who were both anxious to assert their national rights.<sup>22</sup> Daniel Pipes, a scholar of Arab history, states that it was at this point "that the political and economic stakes rose; no longer merely the end of a long border, the Shatt-al-Arab became a vital passage and the focus of national passions."<sup>23</sup> Inevitably disagreements ensued over past border delimitations. Iran had consistently demanded that the border be redrawn down the middle (thalweg) of the main navigable channel of the river. Iraq, or authorities on her behalf prior to the birth of modern day Iraq, just as consistently refused, stating that the river was an Iraqi national river and hence Iraqi territory. In 1975, Iran renewed her claim that the Shatt-al-Arab was a boundary river and as such should be held

under joint sovereignty with Iraq.

In the Algiers Agreement of 1975 signed under the auspices of Algerian President Houari Boumedienne, Iran succeeded in pressing her claim and it was agreed that the river boundary would be redrawn down the thalweg. In exchange for this all important concession<sup>24</sup> Iran agreed to discontinue her financial and logistical support of the Iraqi Kurds who were engaged in a battle against the central government for greater autonomy. The threat posed by the Kurdish rebels under the direction of General Barzani was becoming so serious that it was feared by the Iraqi regime that its very stability was being undermined. For Husayn who signed the Agreement as the vice-president of Iraq the treaty was a profound personal as well as political and national humiliation. Confronted with either signing the treaty or facing a scenario where his government could be brought down through the combined energies of the Kurds and the Shah, he capitulated. Consequently, before the ink was even dry on the treaty the seeds of the future conflict had been sown. The treaty contradicted one of the most sacred Ba<sup>C</sup>th ideological principles. The Ba<sup>C</sup>th party regards the Arab homeland and its frontiers as inviolable. The Arab homeland had acquired an almost mystical dimension of a land to be cherished and protected. Thus, the Algiers Agreement was a blemish and a humiliation fostered not only on the Iraqi people but on the whole Arab "nation."

Prior to the fall of the Pahlavi regime the regional power structure had remained intact. "The assumption of the reigns of power by Khomeyni and his supporters signalled for Iraq a possible change in that power structure. Abdulghani states that "the fall of the Shah and the advent of Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran signalled an end to the regional status quo which had been carefully established and preserved by the Shah and the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist government since the Algiers Agreement."<sup>25</sup> He continues, "Khomeini's accession to power signalled a return to tension and confrontation in Iran-Iraq relations."<sup>26</sup>

Husayn's decision to go to war was not an impulsive act<sup>27</sup> but rather the culmination of a strategy that had been carefully nurtured and designed to wrench a revision of the terms of the 1975 treaty. Sepehr Zabih makes the interesting observation that "on the face of it the Iraqi's seemed to be insisting upon their share of the 1975 Agreement while simultaneously declaring the Agreement invalid."<sup>28</sup> In an attempt to redress what Husayn felt were unfair terms extorted by a country with a superior military capability he presented Iran's new leaders with a demand for a treaty revision. Although Iran was suffering the effects of revolutionary turmoil it was highly unlikely that she would have agreed to demands that had not been put to the Shah (or if they had been demanded of the Shah he would have rejected). While the leadership of the country had changed, and as a result its

domestic as well as foreign policy, Iran's new leaders were not about to abandon strategic waterways of importance to her or be pressured by any foreign nation. In the face of Iran's refusal to renegotiate Husayn manipulated Tehran's stance to appear to be one more proof of the Āyatullah's intransigence.

Another factor that made September 1980 an auspicious time for the invasion of Iran was Husayn's strength at home. With the resignation of President Abu Bakr in 1979 Husayn became Head of State, President of the Revolutionary Command Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. His elevation to Iraq's highest office was accompanied by one of the most ruthless purges in the history of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party.<sup>29</sup> He consolidated his position in one fell swoop by repressing all personal and political opposition. As a result, the regime now enjoyed a marked degree of stability. Furthermore, oil revenues had dramatically improved her balance sheet. This enabled Iraq to strengthen her defense posture and made her a major military power in the Gulf region and the Middle East.<sup>30</sup> In addition, the armed forces in Iraq had been a source of support for the Ba<sup>C</sup>th regime.<sup>31</sup> Not only had they helped bring Abu Bakr and Husayn to power, but by 1978 all military officers who were members of the Revolutionary Command Council had been purged leaving only party adherents and members of the national Ba<sup>C</sup>th leadership in key positions.<sup>32</sup> Alongside the regular forces, a popular army, a Ba<sup>C</sup>th militia was created.

In the years leading up to the war the government of Iraq had begun to soft peddle some of its more revisionist policies in a bid to return to the Arab fold. Initially, Iraq's secular, revolutionary stance was a cause of concern for the more conservative Gulf states. Astutely, the Iraqi leaders recognized that if their ambitions directed them to aspire to a potential leadership role in the Arab world, or at least in the Gulf, a change in their ideological posture was necessary. To abet her in her more limited goal of becoming the "policeman" of the Gulf the Iraqi government espoused the cause of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs. These islands which belonged to the United Arab Emirates had been occupied by Iranian forces since 1971. Donning the mantle of "Protector of the Gulf", Husayn called for their immediate return to Arab sovereignty. By espousing this cause Husayn hoped to garner Arab support, or at least neutrality, in the event of war with Iran.<sup>33</sup>

In sharp contrast to the cohesive armed forces of Iraq stood the army of Iran. Following the 1979 revolution the Iranian army was demoralized and distrusted by the new leaders. Key officers had been tried and executed for their collaboration with the Pahlavi regime. Their reliability as an efficient fighting force seemed uncertain and their loyalty in question. This too augured well for Husayn. However, as has been witnessed the army did rally convincingly to Iran's defense. Perhaps of more significance to Iran's war effort has been the

resolution displayed by Khomeini's newly created national guard, the Pasdaran. They have proven to be fearless in battle and almost eager to meet with death. Zabih and other authors describe one particular incident where the Pasdaran volunteered as human mine detectors rather than use the conventional military devices available to them.<sup>34</sup> The apparent longing and joy with which these combatants met death has had a demoralizing effect on Iraq's soldiers.

It is possible that in a protracted war of attrition Iran stands a better chance of emerging victorious.<sup>35</sup> Iran's oil revenues have not plummeted as much as those of Iraq's due to her capacity to ship directly via her Persian Gulf terminals. In addition, less than one sixth of Iran's budget is earmarked for defense expenditures. Furthermore, Iran has a much larger population from which she can draw new recruits to replenish her armed forces.<sup>36</sup> These factors were obviously not considered by Husayn who had never envisaged such a protracted war. His preemptive strike has turned out to be a very costly one for him.

When Husayn dispatched his troops to Iran in September 1980 he notified all concerned that the government of Iraq had no designs on Iranian territory. He summarily announced that all Iraq wanted was recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab and the return of those lands granted to Iraq in the Algiers Agreement. These latter territories which had been allocated to Iraq had never been returned by

Iran and in view of Iran's superior military capability at the time Baghdad did not deem it in her best interest to press her claim. It is also possible that to show goodwill Iraq chose not to demand the promised territories.

On the surface the territorial issues appeared to be responsible for the deterioration of diplomatic relations and the eventual outbreak of the war. Daniel Pipes claims that the territorial issue was indeed the bona fide reason for the outbreak of hostilities.<sup>37</sup> Ismael, however, takes a different view. He claims that "the battle with Iran was viewed as an act of national defense to keep the area free from foreign interference and encirclement."<sup>38</sup>

Although the importance of the territorial dimension of the conflict cannot be denied other important grievances were also instrumental in bringing about the war; the Shatt-al-Arab served as the most convenient and safe cover. Over the centuries there had been many disagreements over this river and its boundary but at no time did the hostilities evolve into a comparable situation. That they should do so now is highly problematic, even given Iraq's more direct interest being at stake--that is, that she might be more zealous of her national boundaries than the Ottomans might have been. I would argue that two other factors were more salient and played a larger role in precipitating the conflict. I will call these short and long term concerns.

The most salient short term concern stemmed from Iraq's

uneasiness and anger at Iran's revolutionary appeals. These appeals led to a great deal of anxiety among the ruling circles in Iraq. The insecurity that the regime felt was heightened when Iraq and its president were singled out for special attacks. Khumaynī's advocacy of the exportation of the revolution appeared to justify their fears.<sup>39</sup> As Khumaynī grew bolder he openly called for the overthrow of both Iraq's strongman Ṣaddām Ḥusayn and the secular Ba<sup>C</sup>th party. The Āyatullāh likened the contest between the two governments as one between Muslims and infidels, a charge that not even the secular Ba<sup>C</sup>th could afford to ignore. Ḥusayn was portrayed as evil incarnate, or alternately as the butcher of Baghdad.

Over 55 percent of Iraq's population are Twelver Shī<sup>C</sup>ah. This means that they subscribe to the same faith as the Iranian Shī<sup>C</sup>ah. The Shī<sup>C</sup>I majority in Iraq are governed by the Sunni minority government.<sup>40</sup> The appearance within the Shī<sup>C</sup>I community of Islamic resurgent groups coupled with the Āyatullāh's agitating remarks at first caused the Ba<sup>C</sup>th to question the loyalty of their Shī<sup>C</sup>I subjects. While the Kurdish revolts had been a very real threat to the stability of the Iraqi government a Shī<sup>C</sup>I revolt was viewed with even greater apprehension. The Ba<sup>C</sup>th knew that the Kurds in general only wanted greater autonomy within the Iraqi nation. An orchestrated Shī<sup>C</sup>I revolt on the other hand would topple the government, wresting power for themselves. Daniel Pipes makes two interesting observations concerning the questionable



loyalty of the Shī'ī. He claims that if Husayn had been suffering some real misgivings about the Shī'ī he would not have chosen to launch his attack on Iran from the most heavily Shī'ah populated area of the country.<sup>41</sup> Secondly, he says, the regime went to war not out of fear of a Shī'ī reaction, but in spite of any possible forthcoming reaction.<sup>42</sup> Husayn must have calculated the odds and in the end determined that the majority of Shī'ī citizens were loyal Iraqi subjects.<sup>43</sup>

It is undoubtedly true that the virulence of the attacks by Khumaynī and Husayn stem from a deep-seated personal animosity. The Āyatullāh has clearly not forgiven or forgotten his expulsion from Iraq, on the Shah's request.<sup>44</sup> Their already volatile relationship is exacerbated by their different ideological orientations and mutual suspicion.<sup>45</sup>

As Khumaynī's attacks on Husayn and his regime grew in number and vehemence fear in Baghdad increased accordingly. Husayn had reason to hope that by implementing a strong blow to the Islamic Republic in September 1980 that he would achieve a twofold gain: the return of the Shatt-al-Arab and the disputed territories and the toppling of the Iranian regime.

Khumaynī's continual interference in Iraqi affairs was undoubtedly viewed with great alarm by Husayn and as a result was the most salient short term concern. Husayn had to dispose of this danger on his frontier which was beginning to permeate Iraqi society.

The long term cause of the war lies in the concurrent

drive for hegemonic domination of the region by both actors. The Ayatullah saw his revolution as one with a universalistic appeal, one that could profit the whole world.<sup>46</sup> It was imperative that Iran's strength in the region be maintained so that the process of exporting the Islamic revolution could safely begin near home. Furthermore, although the Islamic clerics had changed many important aspects of Iran's foreign policy they shared the Shah's view of Iran as the dominant power in the region. They were not about to relinquish this role without a fight to any would be usurper.

For Husayn, who had envisaged a new role for Iraq in the Gulf, Iran's expansionist designs presented a credible threat to his drive for regional hegemony. The Ba'ath party places strong emphasis on its pan-Arab character. They see themselves as the natural heirs to the leadership of the Arab world. Prior to the fall of the Shah, Iraq's aspirations to leadership of the Arab world or at least the Gulf were continually thwarted on both fronts by Egypt and Iran. With the fall from grace of Egypt owing to her Camp David settlement with Israel, Iraq now jockeyed to replace her. By the late seventies a militarily, economically and politically strong Iraq was in a position to challenge any would be contender.

## Propaganda

"Propaganda has existed for centuries. M. Abdel-Kader Hatem quotes Driencourt who claimed that Aristotle's Rhetoric "remains a classic of spoken propaganda as technique. It is the first surviving handbook of its kind of propaganda: the propaganda of persuasion by speech and oratory."<sup>47</sup>

The twentieth century only really awoke to the potential power of propaganda during and in the aftermath of World War II. The effective manipulation of public opinion by the Nazis remains one of the hallmarks of their rule. As a technique it has evolved into quite a sophisticated process. It has become one of the most popular tools in politics because of its low cost and its effectiveness.

What is propaganda? In short experts have claimed that it is persuasion of the masses to a predetermined response. F. Tonnies has characterized propaganda as "the agitation of public opinion on a large scale for the purpose of spreading an idea without regard to its truth or accuracy."<sup>48</sup> H.L. Childs said: "to propagandize is to propagate ideas and doctrines, to attempt deliberately to influence the minds of other people."<sup>49</sup> T.H. Qualter's definition emphasizes ultimate ends, "propaganda is...the deliberate attempt by some individual or group to form, control, or alter the attitudes of other groups by the use of instruments of

communication, with the intention that in any given situation the reaction of those so influenced will be that desired by the propagandist."<sup>50</sup> J. A. C. Brown notes the purpose of propaganda when he states "propaganda which does not lead to action has very largely failed."<sup>51</sup> The master propagandist of this century, Josef Goebbels, effused "to arouse outbursts of fury; to get masses of men on the march; to organize hatred and suspicion--all with ice-cold calculation--that is the task of the propagandist."<sup>52</sup>

As a result of statements such as these a negative connotation has been attached to propaganda. It can, say some media experts, be a harmless tool as well as a potentially destructive one. Much of the effectiveness of propaganda emanates from the psychological manipulation of the intended audience. In warfare, this manipulation is in effect psychological warfare.

Harold D. Lasswell, the dean of media communication studies, has been researching the uses of propaganda since the 1920's. He has reached some very interesting and valuable conclusions as to what propaganda is, what it is designed to do, how it is used and why. In dealing with propaganda during war he claims that when it is "employed in conjunction with other arms of offence, propaganda saps the stamina of the armed and civilian forces of the enemy, and smoothes the path for the mailed fist of men and metal."<sup>53</sup> If used properly, propaganda has the capability of functioning

as a tool to demoralize the enemy and hence hopefully reduce their willingness to continue the fight.

In an age which prides itself for being more humane than its forebears, propaganda is a tool of illusion and persuasion. Otto Lerbinger, a communications scholar, underlines the debt propaganda owes to coercion and its more subtle contemporary approach. He states: "our tendency to think of persuasion as moving people reveals its link to force. The motive of force remains but the method of force is replaced by persuasion."<sup>54</sup>

Lasswell argues that "hatred propaganda is always necessary in wartime to arouse and intensify animosity against military and diplomatic rivals and to attract neutral support."<sup>55</sup> To ensure a massive response to the enemy in accordance with the propagandists view it becomes their responsibility to sway or persuade their audience. According to Lasswell:

for the mobilization of national hatred the enemy must be represented as a menacing, murderous aggressor, a satanic violator of the moral and conventional standards, an obstacle to cherished aims and ideals of the nation as a whole and each constituent part. Through the elaboration of war aims the obstructive role of the enemy becomes particularly evident. The maintenance of hostility depends upon supplementing the direct representation of the menacing, obstructive, satanic enemy by assurances of ultimate victory, thus preventing diversion of attention. <sup>56</sup>

In a war situation propaganda works to discredit the

enemy as well as boost the morale of the home population and increase their resolution to fight. It is vital to prevent or arrest the sentiments of the indifferent or hostile elements within the jurisdiction from becoming openly antagonistic. Symbols which have meaning for the audience must be used and manipulated. In Iran, for example, Islam has successfully been used as a rallying cry because most of the Iranian people believe in it and consequently feel that it is something worth defending. The Āyatullāh's propaganda thus acts on and reinforces their belief. Hatem notes that the propagandist will "exploit to the full any pre-existing habits and attitudes that may accord with his purpose."<sup>57</sup> Michael Choukas in Propaganda Comes of Age states that the "unhinging of the mind from the real is a prerequisite to all subsequent manipulation and control and is the goal propaganda constantly strives to attain."<sup>58</sup> Furthermore, he

adds:

human conduct, the response of the individual to his surroundings is determined and controlled by the dual function of the mind, feeling and thinking. For action to be generated, the emotions must be stimulated, our feelings must be aroused; we must become motivated. Stimuli evoke images and these images, purely intellectual initially, have become charged with emotion; they have become symbols. These symbols serve as a link that connects the intellectual to the emotional function of the human mind; a lever, that anyone interested in stirring up people emotionally may utilize for that purpose. 59

Lasswell adds in connection with the above, that if emphasis

is placed on the aggressiveness, immorality and impropriety of the 'enemy', this acts as a sop to loosen the restraining grip of the conscience upon destructive impulses.<sup>60</sup>

Besides appealing to the intended audience's cultural and symbolic affiliations, the language of the message must be clear and easily understood by the people. Goebbels noted:

I learned...especially that the rank and file are usually more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must, therefore, always be essentially simple and repetitious. In the long run, only he will achieve basic results in influencing public opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms and who has the courage to keep forever repeating them in this simplified form despite the objections of the intellectuals. 61

Hatem, pointing to a related aspect of propaganda, stated:

even in a society endowed with the highest analytical abilities, possessed of and capable of assimilating all the relevant data on a given issue would nevertheless remain susceptible to illogical emotions based on personal, family or group experience, and on the manner in which information is presented, including the personality of the presenter and a host of possible nuances and emphases intentional or not. 62

On September 6, 1934 Goebbels gave a speech in Nuremburg in which he defined political propaganda. It is as applicable today in Iran and Iraq as it was then in Germany. "Political propaganda," he said, "is designed to establish the state's belief in the minds of the masses and make them committed to these beliefs. Propaganda

could no longer be simply a message to seize power; it had become a means for consolidating this power."<sup>63</sup>

Propaganda is not limited to spoken or written words alone. Propaganda also makes use of other significant symbols such as flags, specific pictures and songs. Public meetings play a major role. The Nuremburg Rally in Germany was as much propaganda as the words spoken at it. Billboards in China, Iran and Iraq featuring respectively Mao, Khumayni and Husayn as father figures or leaders of the revolution are also propaganda devices.<sup>64</sup>

Webster's Dictionary defines ideology as the integrated assertions, theories and aims that constitute a socio-political program; a systematic body of concepts especially about human life or culture.<sup>65</sup> At times it seems that the line between ideology and propaganda ceases to exist and they become interchangeable words. Like propaganda the absorption of ideology has been facilitated by the growth of the mass media. James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, political scientists, claim that when government leaders unleash a barrage of arguments, exhortations, appeals, promises or statements of principle these ideas are, whenever possible, related to already accepted notions or cherished ideas or popular individuals. Furthermore, they claim that if this "mishmash" of argument assumes some semi-organized and rational form it is then called ideology.<sup>67</sup> Like propaganda, the ideas or beliefs promulgated by the



ideologue need not be true but they would have to have the believability to persuade the targeted audience. Bill and Leiden assert that a great deal of the energy of Middle Eastern governments is spent in dissemination of ideology and the denunciation of alien ideologies. This is true of both Iran and Iraq even prior to the Iraqi armed invasion of Iranian territory in September 1980. Like propaganda, the more an alien ideology is denounced the more the opponent is placed on the defensive and forced to make a rebuttal. The cycle becomes endless, breeding more and more propaganda in the form of replies.

When Bill and Leiden discuss nationalistic ideology they sound very much like Lasswell on propaganda. They claim that nationalistic ideology "always" contains beliefs about the rightness of the cause, the inevitability of its victory, and the catastrophe to those who impede it."<sup>68</sup>

Furthermore, they note that religion is itself essentially ideological.<sup>69</sup> This must be taken into account in the Muslim world. It is for this reason that the secular Ba<sup>C</sup>th party in Iraq cannot afford to tolerate or ignore Khomeini's attacks. While the Iraqi regime can weather the Āyatullāh's charges that they are a secular party and government, they cannot be seen as un-Islamic or unreligious. This could threaten the very legitimacy of their government. Not only must the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party assure the people of their loyalty to Islam they must show as well how religion has inspired the party or

its operating principles. While Islam might not be the *raison d'être* of the state it must be shown to have provided a unique cultural difference that constitutes a part of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th ideology.

Khumayni, like Husayn uses the media well and to his advantage. Speeches, pamphlets, cassettes and radio broadcasts abound exhorting the faithful in both countries. Both Iran and Iraq have presented one another as having governments which are illegitimate and consequently not deserving the support of citizens. In their propaganda war both Iran and Iraq appear to have reached a point of irreconcilable differences. This war of words has served to render the conflict more salient.

The succeeding pages will highlight some of the issues which have been played up in the war of words between Iran and Iraq. Notable is the way in which both regimes portray their opposite as satanic and evil, just as Lasswell prescribes.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>J.M. Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran: The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 181.

<sup>2</sup>Tareq Y. Ismael, Iraq and Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p. 22.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>The fact that Husayn had been instrumental in the Ayatullah's deportation from Iraq possibly accounts for the personal attacks on him by Khumayni.

<sup>5</sup>What is remarkable about the conflict, according to Elaine Sciolino, in a news feature published in The Gazette on February 9, 1985, is that "although the two countries have been fighting for years neither side has ever declared a state of war or formally broken diplomatic relations." She also reports that Iranian Embassy personnel remain in their Embassy in Iraq. For a conflicting view see Dilip Hiro's Iran Under The Ayatollahs (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 167, where he claims that diplomatic relations were severed in June 1980.

<sup>6</sup>The Shatt-al-Arab is of crucial importance to Iraq because it is her only outlet to the sea. Iran has ports in the Persian Gulf so the closure of the Shatt-al-Arab is not as much of a hardship for her.

<sup>7</sup>The Algiers Agreement was signed by Iran and Iraq under the auspices of Algerian President Boumedienne. The signatories were the Shah of Iran and Saddam Husayn. The Agreement was signed on March 6, 1975. In the Agreement both parties agreed to effect a definitive demarcation of their land frontiers and to delimit their fluvial frontiers according to the thalweg line. Furthermore, both countries agreed to commit themselves to exercising "a strict and effective control over their common boundaries with a view to putting an end to all acts of infiltration of a subversive character." On June 13, 1975 a Treaty of International Boundaries and Good Neighborliness was signed by Iran and Iraq.

<sup>8</sup>Dilip Hiro, "Chronicle of the Gulf War," M.E.R.I.P., 14, (February 1984): 3.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid. All figures cited are in American dollars.

- <sup>11</sup>Hiro, Iran Under The Ayatollahs, p. 173.
- <sup>12</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>13</sup>"Costly War," Time Magazine, June 1983, p. 37.
- <sup>14</sup>Gwynne Dyer, "Iran Settles In For A Long And Expensive War With Iraq," The Gazette, 12 September 1983, Section B.
- <sup>15</sup>Ibid. See also David Lamb, "Arab Power: What Went Wrong," The Gazette, 10 August 1985, Section B. He claims that the oil states have underwritten Iraq's war effort against Iran with an estimated \$30 billion.
- <sup>16</sup>Hiro, "Chronicles of the Gulf War," p. 4.
- <sup>17</sup>Shahram Chubin, "La guerre Irano-Irakienne: Paradoxes et Particularites," Politique Etrangere 47 (June 1982): 380.
- <sup>18</sup>Ismael, Iraq and Iran, p. 34. For a different view of Khumayni's expression of nationalism, see Hiro, Iran Under The Ayatollahs, in which he maintains that Khumayni made astute use of Islamic history and Iranian nationalism to create and encourage anti-monarchial militancy.
- <sup>19</sup>Daniel Pipes, "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict," ed. Shirin Kheli-Tahir and Shaheen Ayubi, The Iran-Iraq War (New York: Praeger, 1983), p. 12.
- <sup>20</sup>Mustafa al-Najjar and Nadjat Pathi Safwat, "Arab Sovereignty Over the Shatt-al-Arab During the Ka'bide Period," ed. M.S. El Azhary, The Iran-Iraq War (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 20.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup>Pipes, "A Border Adrift: Origins of the Conflict," p. 16.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup>In fact it was not a concession in the true sense of the word because Iraq signed under duress and most probably would not have signed or agreed to a new border delimitation if she had been militarily strong enough to challenge Iran or if the Kurds had posed less of a threat to Baghdad.
- <sup>25</sup>Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran: The Years of Crisis, p. 235.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 235. See also Sepehr Zabihi, Iran Since the Revolution (London: Croom Helm, 1982), p. 175. He claims that the war was a culmination of tensions in Arab-Iranian relations that could no longer be contained.

<sup>27</sup>Hanna Batatu in The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movements of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 1084, states that "Abu Bakr and Hussein shared a number of traits; they are very reserved and on the whole not prone to hasty judgements." Interestingly, he contends that while Abu Bakr could be ruthless occasionally "Saddam is of a tougher fiber and is generally more feared." Batatu wrote these words in 1978, a year before Husayn began his bloody purge.

<sup>28</sup>Zabihi, Iran Since the Revolution, p. 179.

<sup>29</sup>See footnote no. 27.

<sup>30</sup>Lorenzo Kent Kimball in The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq 1958 to 1971 (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 175-176, suggests that militarism has become the strongest force in countries such as Iraq. He contends that nationalism whether it be regional (the Arab homeland) or local (Iraq) has become the tool of the predominant force--militarism.

<sup>31</sup>Christopher S. Raj, "Iraq: Challenge to Saddam's Regime," Foreign Affairs Report, vol. xxxii, no. 2.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Ghassan Salameh, "Checkmate in the Gulf War," M.E.R.I.P. (July-September 1984), 16. Salameh argues that the "Arab world did not embrace the war as their own. The Gulf states offered financial and logistic support, but wasted no time in forming a closed club, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) which did not include Iraq." He does state further on in the article that the Shaikh of Ras al-Khaimah, a UAE leader abetted Husayn in his quest to regain the three islands.

<sup>34</sup>Zabihi, Iran Since the Revolution, p. 215.

<sup>35</sup>That is, so long as the war remains limited in scope to the two parties currently engaged. It is generally accepted that neither superpower relishes the prospect of a clear winner emerging. Henry Kissinger once remarked that the U.S.A. would like to see them both lose. The bombings of Tehran, Isfahan and Baghdad in 1985 suggest that

both parties were trying to end the impasse of the past few years. The September 1985 bombings of Kharg Island by the Iraqis indicates the growing desperation of the regime, as well as the competence of their air force. Iranian oil exports are certain to suffer as a result of these attacks.

<sup>36</sup>In 1982 the population of Iraq was: 14,110,425  
In 1983 the population of Iran was : 42,071,000

<sup>37</sup>Pipes, "A Border Adrift," p. 12.

<sup>38</sup>Ismael, Iraq and Iran, p. 30.

<sup>39</sup>In an interview with Middle East magazine, Latif Nasseif Jassem, Iraq's Minister of Information and Culture was asked if the war arose out of details in the Algiers Agreement. He answered: "No. Iran's proclaimed aim to export the so-called Islamic ideology at any cost is the root cause of this war...It (Iran) has also conspired with the Daawa party to destabilize us."

<sup>40</sup>The November 1982 issue of the Middle East magazine states that in June 1982 Husayn reshuffled his cabinet and the RCC--this too says "the magazine" strengthened his hand. The new cabinet was seen as a response to Shia demands for better representation in the mainly Sunni government: five Shia ministers were brought in."

<sup>41</sup>Pipes, "A Border Adrift," p. 12.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid.

<sup>43</sup>Ghassan Salameh states in "Checkmate in the Gulf War," that the Iraqi Shi'is did not go over to Khumayni because of their traditional loyalty, the overwhelming majority of whom are ethnic Arabs. They also remained loyal because Baghdad skilfully combined bloody repressions and religious concessions. Furthermore, he says the Islamic revolution was largely discredited by the bloody power struggle and the fierce repression then taking place in Iran. Obviously while they suffered at home the Iraqi Shi'ah were still not anxious to exchange Iraqi rule for the rule of the Ayatullahs.

<sup>44</sup>See Michael M.J. Fischer in Iran From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 200. He claims that "strikes and demonstrations broke out protesting Iraqi harrassment of Khumayni. His expulsion from Iraq prompted three days

of demonstrations all over Iran. Taxi drivers, Iran Air, government ministries...went on strike, both for economic and social benefits and in support of Khomeini."

<sup>45</sup>Abdulghani, Iraq & Iran: The Years of Crisis, pp. 183-184.

<sup>46</sup>Ismael, Iraq and Iran, p. 27.

<sup>47</sup>M. Abdel-Kader Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause (London: Longman Group Limited, 1974), p. 54.

<sup>48</sup>F.L. Tonnies cited by M. Abdel-Kader Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause (London: Longman Group Limited, 1974), p.56.

<sup>49</sup>H.L. Childs, Introduction to Public Opinion (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1940), p. 88.

<sup>50</sup>T.H. Qualter, Propaganda & Psychological Warfare (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 27.

<sup>51</sup>J.A.C. Brown cited by Michael Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age (Washington D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p.32.

<sup>52</sup>Josef Goebbels cited by Michael Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age, p. 78.

<sup>53</sup>Harold D. Lasswell, On Political Sociology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977), p. 223.

<sup>54</sup>Otto Lerbinger, Designs for Persuasive Communication (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 4.

<sup>55</sup>Lasswell, On Political Sociology, p. 230.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 232.

<sup>57</sup>Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause, p. 98.

<sup>58</sup>Choukas, Propaganda Comes of Age, p. 92.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 93.

<sup>60</sup>Lasswell, On Political Sociology, p. 232.

<sup>61</sup>Josef Goebbels cited by Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause, p. 32.

<sup>62</sup>Hatem, Information and the Arab Cause, pp. 6-7.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid., p. 59.

<sup>64</sup> Michael Coyne, "Iran Under the Ayatollah," National Geographic (July 1985):111. Coyne writes that when he arrived in Tehran he was "struck by the larger-than-life images proclaiming the messages of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini." He continues: "wall posters and billboards show raised fists, blood-dripping rifles, and warriors striding into heaven--all in support of the five year holy war against Iraq and its president, Saddam Hussein." He claims that in Mashhad a martyrs' fountain bubbles with red-dyed water.

<sup>65</sup> Webster's Dictionary, 6th ed. (Toronto: Thomas Allen Limited, 1961), p. 411.

<sup>66</sup> James A. Bill and Carl Leiden, Politics in the Middle East (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 281.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid.. p. 287.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 290.



## Chapter II

### Iranian Propaganda

Propaganda coming out of the Islamic Republic of Iran for the most part conforms to the descriptions, motives and mobilizational techniques discussed in the preceding pages. Iranian propaganda is designed to arouse the masses against the infidel threat posed by Iraq. It is also crafted to convince the Iranian people of the rightness of their cause and their duty to defend both the state and Islam until victory. It has intensified the fervor of the people and the war has taken on the aura of a crusade. It has succeeded in angering the people; succeeded in instilling in the people a desire for martyrdom. Finally, it has succeeded in making Khomeini's vision of an Islamic Iranian state their vision. His enemies by association have become their enemies. In those cases where propaganda has failed to convince, the armed mechanisms of the state intervene. Iranian propaganda is as much for home consumption as for the outside world. In its war of words with Iraq, Iran has consistently employed Islam. On certain occasions Iran has initiated the war of words, while on other occasions she is responding to Iraqi allegations.

One of the most serious charges Iraq has levelled against

Iran, and one with potentially serious repercussions, concerns Iran's steadfast desire to export the Islamic Revolution. The Ba<sup>c</sup>th regime in Iraq which has been singled out for particularly vicious attacks by Khomeyni and his colleagues were noticeably worried about this aspect of the Āyatullah's foreign policy. I would argue that the Āyatullah's attacks in conjunction with his call for the export of the revolution were the most important short term factors that led to the escalation of hostilities. Khomeyni has denied that the export of the revolution he has been advocating would be accomplished by force or violence. Khomeyni's thoughts on this subject, some of which are cited in Sepehr Zabih's Iran Since the Revolution seem to indicate that the exportation will occur by way of example and not by way of armaments.<sup>1</sup> This would be a small comfort to the Iraqi authorities who fear any interference in their affairs, peaceful or otherwise, by the Iranian regime. In addition, the non-violent approach which Khomeyni appears to favor is evidently lacking in other statements from him and his government. On February 11, 1980 Khomeyni stated: "we will export our revolution to the four corners of the world, because our revolution is Islamic, and the struggle will continue until the cry 'la ilaha ila 'llah' prevails throughout the world."<sup>2</sup> A month later, on March 15, 1980 he stated: "Iran intends to export its Islamic revolution to support any Islamic movement that may arise against any Arab government."<sup>3</sup> On May 1, 1980 Qutbzadah, then Foreign

Minister, admitted that "the message of our revolution is to annihilate any corrupt and criminal system. If you call this exporting the revolution then I am in agreement."<sup>4</sup> From the Commentary of the Revolutionary Guards Corp, Message of Revolution, comes the following:

That is why the redeeming message of the Islamic Revolution has been swiftly received, in the light of whose progressive logic the obstacles and barriers created by the expansionists dissemination of nationalistic ideas have begun to fade away. The exportation of the Islamic Revolution is a fact which has encountered broad reception by the Moslem nations even before we ask for it. 5

Although there may have existed within the hearts of individual Muslims profound sympathy and support for the Islamic Revolution, many "Moslem nations" might be found to disagree with the Message of the Revolution's contention that they would support the exportation of the revolution. Recognizing the new regime in Iran can hardly be said to be equivalent to accepting the Āyatullah's conception of an Islamic state. While it is undoubtedly true that certain groups in Muslim states, for example, the Shī'ī of Saudi Arabia welcomed the Islamic Revolution, this only served to enhance the uneasiness with which the Saudi and other rulers regarded the new Iranian regime.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic which was ratified in 1979 was a cause of concern for Iran's neighbors. Principle 11 (eleven) made them wary and the Army of the Book did nothing to ~~ALLAY~~ their suspicions. An excerpt from the

Army of the Book reads "the Islamic Republican Army and the Revolutionary Guards Corps will be responsible not only for defending the borders, but also for the mission stated in the Book, of holy war in the way of God and fighting to expand the rule of God's law in the world."<sup>6</sup> President Khāmanah-ī summed up the Iranian position quite succinctly when he said "there is no geographic border for the Imām."<sup>7</sup>

President Husayn strenuously objected to another aspect of Iranian propaganda. The Iraqis were indignant with Khumayni's portrayal of their regime as a criminal one. The propaganda dealing with the evil infidel Husayn and his government made a sharp distinction between the officials and the rest of the population. Although his tactic was from all indications a failure, the Āyatullah was shrewd enough to want to avoid alienating the common people of Iraq. Iranian propaganda continually points out the disparity between the mass based popular support for its regime in contrast to the oppressive nature of the minority ruling elite in Iraq.

Qutbzādah noted this when he stated "the Iraqi government is criminal, exercising power in spite of the will of the Iraqi people."<sup>8</sup> On April 28, 1980 he noted "we believe that the regime in Iraq is a criminal regime against the people of Iraq and we support the people of Iraq to get rid of this criminal regime. If President Husayn is not in hell now then he shall be there soon."<sup>9</sup> On another occasion Qutbzādah called for a demonstration in Tehran for people to express

their disgust with the crimes of the ruling Ba<sup>C</sup>th in Iraq which "exposed the wicked and devilish reality of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th government in Iraq and its anti-Islamic nature."<sup>10</sup>

On March 5, 1980 Khomeyni addressed himself to the issue in an Arabic language broadcast from the Tehran Broadcasting Station in which he warned: "You the Iraqi people beware of your enemies. Revolution until victory."<sup>11</sup> On April 23, 1980 he adopted a different tone, pretending astonishment:

The Islamic peoples especially the noble Iraqi people, the tribes of the Tigris and Euphrates and the faithful youth of the universities and other dear youths in Iraq are suffering grave calamities befalling Islam and the offspring of the Messenger of God...what is most amazing is that the Iraqi army and the rest of the Iraqi regular forces are in the grip of these criminals helping them to destroy Islam and the Glorious Qur'an. 12

Khomeyni in this speech reaches out to the university students, that sector of the population which proved so zealous in the Iranian struggle and so instrumental in the downfall of the Shah. He also noticeably speaks to the armed forces knowing full well that any lack of support by them would break the back of Khomeyni's regime.

Bani'sadr, a former president of the Islamic Republic, entered the fray as early as April 12, 1980 pointing out to Iraq's leaders: "if you were heading a popular system of government you would have accepted our revolution. But you dread our revolution, because your system is not popular."<sup>13</sup>

Attacks aimed directly at the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party in Iraq

increased once the war broke out; but we find Iranian political personalities attacking the Ba<sup>C</sup>th as early as July 21, 1979. On that date Ahmad Madani<sup>I</sup>, the Governor of Arabistan in Iran, claimed that "the Ba<sup>C</sup>thists began to fear and suspect the Iranian Revolution because the Ba<sup>C</sup>thists have failed in their policy, hardly realizing any progress for the Iraqi people in economic and social fields...The Iraqi people have every hope in the Islamic Revolution, because they sense the end of their anti-Islamic government."<sup>14</sup>

On September 23, 1980 Muhammad <sup>C</sup>Ali Raja<sup>C</sup>I, the Iranian Premier, aligned the Iranian nation with the Iraqi citizens in their supposed effort to topple the Iraqi regime. He said, "we assure the Iranian nation that the end of the Iraqi government is near, and that God Almighty has chosen this means to let our nation and the Iraqi people have the honor of doing away with the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist system."<sup>15</sup> One day later Ayatullah Tāliqānī made a speech attacking the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party and he claimed that the Iraqi people had declared their sincerity to the revolution and the Islamic nation.<sup>16</sup> What constituted this support he did not say. Following this line of reasoning Hashimi Rafsanjānī, the leader of the Iranian Majlis, declared on October 14, 1980 that "since the victory of the Islamic Revolution we have repeatedly said that the Saddam government is illegitimate and illegal and that the Iraqi people resent this system."<sup>17</sup>

Statements such as those contained in the last two quotes

were designed as much for Iraqi as well as Iranian public consumption. The Iranian regime seemed bent on convincing the Iranian people that the Iraqi people were decent God fearing people, on the side of truth and consequently on the side of the Islamic revolutionaries. One day later the then Foreign Minister, Ibrāhīm Yazdī, made clear his thoughts when he described the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist doctrine as "a philosophy based on atheism" and went on to add that the Arabs could never triumph but through Islam.<sup>18</sup> On October 17, 1980 in a speech before the United Nations Security Council, Prime Minister Rajā<sup>C</sup>ī explained to his listeners that the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party in Iraq was made up of the supporters of Michel <sup>C</sup>Aflaq who he depicted as "a Freemason and a cunning Zionist."<sup>19</sup> On November 22, 1980 Muhammad Husayn Adillī, the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires in Canada summed up Iranian sentiments in one concise sentence: "The Ba<sup>C</sup>th," he said, "is an anti-Islamic, anti-people system."<sup>20</sup> As the war dragged on statements such as these grew in number and vehemence. The Iranians never seemed to tire of repeating their self-righteous claim that only theirs was a popularly based regime.

Prior to the actual outbreak of the war the Iranians began to attack the Iraqis for falling amiss in their Islamic duties. In fact it was this charge that exacerbated the tension between the two countries and the two leaders. As often as Khumaynī attacked the un-Islamic nature of the Iraqi government the Iraqis responded by noting quite unapologetically

that theirs was a secular philosophy of government. The Iraqi leadership stressed that Islam was a part of their unique cultural heritage but that it had no place in the affairs of the state. Notwithstanding their belief in the correctness of their philosophy of state and government the Iraqi regime nevertheless flinched under Iranian abuse and felt compelled to reply and defend themselves. On April 14, 1980 the then Foreign Minister, Qutbzādah, opined: "the Iraqi government is not an Islamic government and has no connection with Islam..."<sup>21</sup> While what he said could be construed to be true by many observers the Iraqis viewed his comments as interference in their internal affairs. Furthermore, they obviously did not appreciate having to defend or justify themselves to outsiders. Justify themselves they had to do for the simple reason that they could not afford to have their own people raise questions and believe that they were promoting an atheist-like system of rule. Within days of Qutbzādah's pronouncement, Khumaynī entered the debate calling on the Iraqi people to "liberate themselves from the claws of the enemy. It should also topple this non-Islamic party in Iraq."<sup>22</sup> On October 29, 1980 Khumaynī played the Islamic trump card when he compared the Iraqi attitude to that which had existed between the revolution and the Shah, or between the Prophet Muhammad and Abu Jahl.<sup>23</sup>

Iraq charged Iran with interference in Baghdad's internal affairs on more than one occasion. The Iranian attitude



to this charge was well expressed by Banī Sadr on May 1, 1980. The Khalij newspaper asked him if he personally considered an interference Iran's threat to go to Baghdad to liberate the Iraqi people. Banī Sadr's answer is a clear indication of why the Iraqis felt they had real cause for concern. He replied as follows:

this is not regarded as an interference in the domestic affairs of Iraq because we consider the Islamic nation as one and the Imam is the religious leader for us, as well as for Iraq, and for all Islamic peoples, and he feels he is responsible for Iran as well as for Iraq. It is only interference when it is in the interest of the Iranian people against the Iraqi people that it will be interference in the domestic affairs. 24

The Āyatullāh stated on more than one occasion that it was only in Iran that the true Islam was being practiced. He claimed that while the Arabs had either ignored or misinterpreted Islam, he and his followers were the true believers and heirs to Muhammad's legacy. On April 11, 1980 Banī Sadr made this patently clear. He also took the opportunity to denigrate the Iraqi regime. "We," he pontificated, "are the real inheritors of the liberating force of Islam. The Bath faith is Nazist, Fascist and Marxist."<sup>25</sup> On April 18, 1980 Khomeynī delivered what was to be his definitive stance:

Hussein said many things...he said that they are Arabs. All the Moslem people should know the meaning of this statement. This means that they do not want Islam. Everybody who utters this word 'Arabs' must know that Arabs once tried to stand in the way of Islam. These people want us to revive the Umayyads. They want us to go back to the age of Jahiliyah in order that the Arab power may be the sole power with no trace of Islam. The Arab people

know well that the late Ayatollah Muhsin Hakim gave his Fatwa in which he considered the party of these people as atheist...If the Arab people want to work for God and Islam they should oppose those people... The war which the Bath wants to wage is the war against Islam. Shall the Iraqi army consent to combat Islam? Will it consent to erecting its bayonets against the Quran? These bayonets are being directed against the Quran. Duty calls upon the Iraqi people to leave this non-Islamic party and this non-Islamic clique. 26

In this speech Khumayni is using powerful Islamic symbols to speak to the Iraqi people. By depicting the war against Iran as one in which bayonets will be lifted against both Iran and the Quran, Khumayni is raising the specter of <sup>C</sup>Ali and memories of his ill fated battle.<sup>27</sup>

While Khumayni and his followers have harped on Islamic symbolism they have never overlooked an opportunity to denigrate Arab Nationalism and the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist interpretation of it. I have already quoted in preceding pages a statement by Khumayni in which he said there are no nationalities in Islam. His Islamic universalistic world view cannot accept or tolerate the modern concept of the nation state and international boundaries. In his view he is the tool chosen by God to create an Islamic world order reaching out across geographic borders incorporating the four corners of the globe.

Bani Sadr expressed a somewhat different view, however, in a speech he gave on December 23, 1979. He said:

In my opinion, nationalism in the western sense

of the word, or rather in the sense of control, contradicts Islam. Our revolution has succeeded not because we are not nationalists or nationalistic but because it has two bases: Iranianism and Islam. The former as we see it reflects Islam. Arab nationalism has the characteristics of Zionist nationalism, and not the Islamic character. 28

Two days later Hassan Ayā, a member of the Iranian Republican Party (IRP), declared that "the concept of Arab nationalism adopted by the Bath party runs contrary to Islam...enough proof is the open Iraqi resistance to the Islamic Revolution in Iran."<sup>29</sup> The Āyatullāh registered his thoughts on the subject once again on September 23, 1981 when he remarked: "those who bring separation and division among the Moslems by resorting to phrases such as nationality or nationalism and the like are the army of Satan contributing to the super-powers and the enemies of the Koran."<sup>30</sup> As early as April 1980, Khomeynī was telling the Iranian people that the president of Iraq and his government were going to meet with the same destiny as the Shah.<sup>31</sup> Adding his voice to the gathering furor Qutbzādah declared: "we have decided to overthrow the system of government in Iraq."<sup>32</sup> Iraq could not sit idly by or overlook these threatening statements. The result was that Iraq responded by increasing her own propaganda campaign against Iran and by fortifying her defenses. Qutbzādah's statement proved to the Iraqi regime that Iran was determined to interfere in her internal affairs. It was also a statement that was tantamount to a declaration of war.

A major conflict of interest existed between the two adversaries as a result of their respective drives for regional domination. Iran, from her statements appears to have had territorial designs on Iraq as well. On April 7, 1980 the Commander of the Iranian land forces declared that "Iraq is Persian."<sup>33</sup>

Another contentious issue between the two regimes were the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs whose cause Husayn had espoused on behalf of the United Arab Emirates and his own aspirations. With regard to these islands which the Iranians had occupied since 1971 Banī Sadr said: "Iran will hang on to the three islands;" he also stated: "this matter is not Iranian or Arab, the aim for us is to unify all the Islamic world."<sup>34</sup> In June 1979 Daryush Froher, the Iranian Labor Minister, stated: "All the islands in the Gulf belong to Iran and not the three islands only."<sup>35</sup> Adding his voice to the angst that was being created over the Gulf, General Afdhali stated: "the states and the Sheikhdoms of the Gulf would suffer a severe military punishment if they should assist the Iraqi government."<sup>36</sup> These statements only served to increase apprehension among the Gulf states. When the King of Saudi Arabia issued a formal protest to Khumaynī about his followers' disruptive behavior during the Hajj, Khumaynī answered forthrightly that in Islam religion and politics could not be divorced. The Gulf states, already wary of the Āyatullah's philosophy of government had little choice but to

throw in their lot with Husayn, who they hoped, would put an end to the threat posed by the Islamic Revolution.<sup>37</sup> An ominous note was sounded by Banī Sadr, when, in March 1980 he declared that "unless an Islamic awakening in the Arab world takes place the Tehran relations with Arab capitals will not improve."<sup>38</sup>

On certain issues seemingly contradictory statements were issued almost simultaneously by the Iranians. As a result, it is often difficult to ascertain what is official government policy or a government approved point of view or an official of the regime speaking on his own behalf.

While much of Iran's propaganda effort was directed against the Iraqi regime and its incumbent president, a sizeable portion of Iranian propaganda addressed itself to the Iranian people in an attempt to sway them to the government's point of view. Besides using propaganda to incriminate the Iraqi regime, the Iranians used it to convince the Iranian people of the loyalty of the ordinary Iraqi citizen to Islam and their revolution. Iranian propaganda focused on other aspects of the war as well. They used Islam in their propaganda to coopt the people, to rally them for the cause of the revolution and the war and to glorify their Imān. Child soldiers were lauded in the press, and in addresses to the nation Khomeynī praised them for their fervor, valor, devotion and loyalty. The ultimate sacrifice, martyrdom, was encouraged. In a recent article in The New York Times.

Mansour Farhang observed:

the clerical vanguards of Iran urge the populace to die for the cause of the state, but they show little inclination to serve as examples. There is no evidence, for instance that the Ayatollah was suggested to his son, Ahmed, a young cleric, to gain early entry to heaven on the battlefield. 39

Nevertheless, soldiers oblige the clerics with apparent relish because the reward of which the mullās speak far outweigh any earthly gains or pleasures. Pictures of young soldiers, who were in many cases little older than children were and still remain a very effective propaganda device. Their eagerness to die is also propaganda of the first order. Almost as jarring are photographs of the dead and injured scattered across bloody battlefields far from home. The most horrific photographs, available in glossy papered pamphlets, depict Iranian soldiers who are the victims of Iraqi chemical warfare. No detail seems too gruesome to print or reproduce. The brutality inherent in these releases is heart rendering and sickening. They are calculated to enrage the Iranian people against Musayn and his regime and to have readers or viewers commiserate with the victims and their families. What all this adds up to is capitalizing on the tragedy for Iranians.

Khumayni painted a picture of a no lose situation for the soldiers when he told them on the first anniversary of the revolution: "I have good tidings that if you kill the enemy you will be rewarded by going to paradise and if you

are killed you will go to paradise."<sup>40</sup> Earlier he had proclaimed: "if a movement or an action is for the cause of God, it will never be defeated."<sup>41</sup> It would appear from these speeches that there was nothing too grandiose for Khomeyni to promise. Few seem to have questioned from whom the Ayatullah received these "good tidings." One must question whether Khomeyni having accepted the title of Imam had now placed himself on a equivalent basis with the twelve imams of Twelver Shi'ism. This would effectively change his status from one who interprets the will of God to the vehicle of That will.

On November 16, 1980, Raja'i addressed the Revolutionary Guard. He put them on notice that either

Islam comes out victorious or we all become martyrs. There is no third alternative. We must continue the war on a strong political level, and the war should end with a strong political attitude. Our war is not with the Iraqi's only, and it will not be the last war. 42

Iranian propaganda constantly emphasized that the Iran-Iraq War was being waged on behalf of Islam. Rarely, if ever does the notion of fighting on behalf of Iran enter into the Iranian regime's propaganda output. Clearly, Raja'i is indicating the expansionist aims of the new regime when he declared "this will not be the last war." Undoubtedly, Raja'i would take exception to this interpretation of his statement. One might assume, in light of his other remarks, that he would state unequivocally that this is not an expansionist

declaration but one which aims at the establishment of an Islamic world order. However, expansion whether under the guise of religion or some other pretext remains in the final analysis expansion.

Khumaynī is a staunch believer in the Islamic injunction that there should be no separation between state and religion. As such, he considers political activity not only acceptable but as a necessary and integral part of Islam. In June 1979 he said: "political activities are a religious obligation."<sup>43</sup> Three months later Khumaynī addressed himself to the issue again noting that "Islam is a political religion whereby everything, even its form of worship and its ritual prayers have a political nature."<sup>44</sup> Turning to a related issue, that of governing, he stated his view quite clearly: "we (i.e. ulama') must form the government because all this is carried out by a government led by a trustworthy and pious ruler who commits no injustice, deviation and corruption."<sup>45</sup> Placing both himself and his regime in a special category Khumaynī called on all Muslims on the occasion of Id-al-Fitr to "overthrow their governments, except that in Iran, because they are all against Islam."<sup>46</sup> In another instance the Āyatullāh opined that "all countries are the lands of the tyrannized. God, the Most Exalted, the Most High has ordained to give to the deprived and to remove the oppressed and tyrants from the scene of history."<sup>47</sup> Clearly Khumaynī sees himself as an instrument of the Divine through which these changes will be



brought about.

A rather novel propaganda piece that the Iranians employed was to publish letters and wills from martyrs to their families. The following excerpts come from letters which were published in Iranian newspapers. The first excerpt is from the will of Martyr Masoud Arianpour:

People of the world; if I have committed any act of injustice, slander or disgrace against your lives, property or dignities, please claim against what I have left, through my parents...Fellow strugglers, God is the avenger of my blood; my killers are neither those soldiers nor their officers. They are America, the Zionists and the tyrannical powers. 48

Morteza Mahizadeh, another martyr left the following letter for his family:

O Great God. O Exalted Mightiness!... Dearest father, and of course, you mother, and my brothers too; you who sent your child to fight in the battle of right against wrong; like Abraham...be firm and willingly present your gift...I ask you not to wear black clothes after I have gone. 49

Finally, Martyr Sayyid Rahim Pejouhiden had this to say to his waiting relatives:

I have thought how blind I was before my arrival at the battlefront. Now I feel so much enthusiasm that I have forgotten myself, my wife and child; and my only thoughts are for Islam and religion, and my only worry is the delay in our offensive. Dear father, please remember that I am not coming home if I do not achieve martyrdom in this coming offensive operation, for I shall continue fighting... 50

These letters and others like them are frequently being used

by the Iranian regime. They are very powerful propaganda pieces. In these letters we see the Iranian regime identifying the Iranian cause and the need and desirability of sacrifice with Islam and Islamic symbols. The whole concept of martyrdom which plays such an integral role in the Twelver Shi<sup>C</sup>ah belief system is being played on here. If a noble man like <sup>C</sup>Ali's son Husayn could lay down his life for Islam, then certainly the youth of today could be called upon to do the same. Husayn's martyrdom and sacrifice is rekindled in the hearts of believers every year in the reenactment of the Karbala tragedy. These "passion plays" are a constant reminder to the listeners that martyrdom is a pious and glorious act when it is a result of guarding the faith. No higher glory can be sought. Young men, as we have seen, are told that to die the death of a martyr on the battlefield in defense of the faith is an immediate guarantee of gaining entry to paradise.

Khumayni's expansionist views are closely linked to his vision of an Islamic world order. According to Khumayni, "Islam is a sacred trust from God to ourselves and the Iranian nation must grow in power and resolution until it has vouchsafed Iran to the entire world."<sup>51</sup> "Iran," he said on another occasion, "is God's mercy for you."<sup>52</sup> R.M. Ramazani notes that Khumayni's disciples consider the Iranian leadership as a divine obligation. They point, he says, to the uniqueness of the present form of government in Iran, only

Iran has a faqih as a head of state.<sup>53</sup>

As the tide of war began to turn in favor of Iran, Adee Dawisha claims that Khomeyni's enthusiasm for setting up an Islamic republic in Iraq increased accordingly.<sup>54</sup> Khomeyni, he says, explained the purpose of Iran's war effort when he said: "when Iran defeats Iraq, Iraq will be annexed to Iran."<sup>55</sup> Abdulghani states that the Iraqis perceived Khomeyni's religious ideology as a political vehicle to further Iran's national interests and to disguise expansion.<sup>56</sup> As late as April 1983 Hujat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Natiq Nuri, the Minister of the Interior, was declaring that their aim was "the establishment in Iraq of an Islamic government."<sup>57</sup>

Iran has consistently rejected any opportunities for a ceasefire with Iraq since the early days of the war. On March 1, 1980 Khomeyni met with a nine member Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) delegation whom he urged to sit in judgement on Iraq and fight "whosoever had launched the aggression."<sup>58</sup> The ICO submitted a peace plan on March 5 which called for a ceasefire in a week to be followed by Iraqi withdrawal from Iran.<sup>59</sup> On that occasion Ayatullah Muntazari said that Iran would accept nothing less than Saddam Husayn's overthrow and trial. Two days later, notes Dilip Hiro, Iraq made it clear that it would not withdraw from a single inch of Iranian territory before Tehran recognized Iraqi rights.<sup>60</sup> Hiro claims that Khomeyni had "shrewdly allowed the ICO delegation a chance to define the terms of the truce and thus

test Iraqi morale. When Baghdad showed itself eager for peace, Khomeyni was encouraged to fight on until victory-- and Saddam Hussein's downfall."<sup>61</sup>

In 1982 the Algerian government offered its services as a mediator. Any hopes for a successful mediation were squashed, however, when the Speaker of the Iranian Majlis, Rafsanjani said that "though Iran would not object to Algeria taking the role of the mediator, no mediation was needed."<sup>62</sup> "Iran", he said, "would not appoint anyone as a mediator."<sup>63</sup>

In August 1983 Khomeyni explained why the government of Iran would not discuss peace with Iraq: "The Islamic government of Iran cannot sit at the peace table with a government that has no faith in Islam and in humanity. Islam does not allow peace between us and him, between a Muslim and an infidel."<sup>64</sup>

On yet still another occasion, Rafsanjani declared that "the removal of Saddam's regime is our strategic goal on which we will not compromise."<sup>65</sup> Leaving a meeting with Khomeyni, General Fallahi remarked: "I will never agree to negotiate to end the state of war with the Iraqi regime."<sup>66</sup> He added that Iran believed in total victory over the aggressors.<sup>67</sup>

Tareq Ismael in Iraq and Iran, quotes a lengthy speech of the Ayatullah's which shows the Iranian leader's definitive stance on the question of a ceasefire:

Saddam Hussein is asking for a compromise.  
We cannot compromise with him. He is a  
pagan. He is corrupt. He is an infidel.  
We cannot compromise with such a person.  
We will fight to the end and come out

victorious with the help of God. We do not care if other countries extend their assistance to the Iraqi regime because we have to implement our religious duties. We are religiously bound to protect and preserve Islam. If we are killed, we have fulfilled our duties. This was the same logic which we pursued in our fighting against the corrupt Pahlavi regime. Our logic was not to become victorious in any case. Our logic was based on this fact that Islam had confronted problems...If we are martyred, we will go to paradise and if we kill, we are victorious. 68

On another occasion Khomeini stated unequivocally that he would not deal with Husayn. His speech is a perfect example of using Islam purely for the purpose of gaining political mileage.

How shall we accept reconciliation? With whom shall we reconcile? This is similar to asking the Messenger of Islam to reconcile with Abu Jahl. There will be no reconciliation in this affair...A great number of clergymen fell martyrs, shall we the men who consider ourselves Muslims hold talks with them on the basis of reconciliation? What is our answer before God, the prophets, the angels, and the destitutes of the world? How shall we answer the Iraqi people when we receive a petition from Karbala asking us how are you going to reconcile with those who killed our clergymen and imprisoned our intellectuals? The matter here is that of a mission and not a matter of whims...Our conflict is about Islam. We state that there is a certain personality who considers Islam against his own party and his Islam is the Islam of 'Aflaq and it is worse than the Islam of Carter...there is no reconciliation with these Iraqi Bathists because our aim is Islam and their aim is running counter to Islam and Islam cannot agree with the enemy of Islam. 69

Both of these speeches highlight the extreme animosity that Khomeini harbors for the Iraqi president. It is highly

probable that if Husayn was relieved of his posts the prospects for peace might improve. The personal hatred that exists between the two leaders will continue to stand in the way of any negotiations. Banī Sadr expressed sentiments similar to Khumaynī's when he said that the Iranians would not stop the war so long as Husayn remained in power.<sup>70</sup> In fact, as early as October 1980, one month after the war had begun Rajā'ī had stated that Iran would never sign a peace treaty with Saddām Husayn even if the war lasted ten years.<sup>71</sup>

What has become increasingly clear throughout the course of the conflict is that the personal hatred that exists between the two leaders has not only intensified the struggle but has also become a part of it. The animosity that Husayn and Khumaynī harbor for one and other has become a part of the propaganda of other government officials as well.

The issues which the Āyatullah seized upon and made the focus of his propaganda war with Iraq have for the most part remained the same throughout the course of the conflict.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Zabih, pp. 192-193. Zabih contends that given "the *raison d'être* of this revolution, it could never remain confined within the geographical borders of Iran."

<sup>2</sup>Abdulghani, p. 180. Furthermore, he notes that "it is this novel conception of international relations, advocated by Khomeini, which lies at the roots of Iran's strained relations with Iraq and the other Arab Gulf states."

<sup>3</sup>Al-Rai Al-Am daily, Kuwait, 15 March 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections From Iraq-Iran Dispute (Republic of Iraq, 1983), p. 23.

<sup>4</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections From Iraq-Iran Dispute (Republic of Iraq, 1983), p. 13.

<sup>5</sup>Zabih, p. 193. The "Message of the Revolution" is the organ of the Revolutionary Guards' Corps. The "Message" carried the detailed Commentary.

<sup>6</sup>Ismael, p. 147. Principle Eleven reads: "According to the Koran, all Muslims are of the same and one single religious community, and the Islamic Republican Government of Iran is bound to base its general policies on the coalition and unity of the Islamic nations, and it should exert continuous efforts in order to realize the political, economic and cultural unity of the Islamic world."

<sup>7</sup>Abdulghani, p. 180.

<sup>8</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 15.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., p. 14.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 17.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 20.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Abdulghani, p. 182.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 16.

<sup>21</sup>Al-Safer daily, Beirut, 14 April 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 12.

<sup>22</sup>For the original in Persian see Jumhuri Islamic Newspaper, Tehran, 19 April 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 12.

<sup>23</sup>Al-Safer daily, Beirut, 29 October 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 21. Abu Jahl was a Meccan who led the group of men opposed to Muhammad. At the Battle of Badr, Abu Jahl was killed by the forces led by the Prophet. He incited the people of Mecca against the Prophet because he understood and feared what the acceptance of the religion Muhammad was preaching would mean for the political and social direction of the community. Henceforth his name has been associated with those who wanted to stop Muhammad's attempt to spread the word of Allah.

<sup>24</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 18.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., pp. 12-13.

<sup>27</sup>In 657 at a place not far from the right bank of the Euphrates River the Battle of Siffin took place. Ali, the fourth Caliph and the most revered personality for the Shi'i, insisted that he had not come to engage in battle with Mu'awiya, but the latter refused to come to an arrangement. As a result, Ali ordered his troops to attack. Mu'awiya ordered that manuscripts of the Qur'an be fastened to his troops lanceheads to symbolically express that the fighting should cease and be left to the book of God. The battle was stopped. A split then occurred amongst Ali's supporters. Mu'awiya declared he would pay homage to Ali as Caliph as soon as the murderers of his kinsman Uthman were handed over to justice. Shortly after Ali was murdered and Mu'awiya became Caliph. Like Uthman, Mu'awiya was a Umayyad.



<sup>28</sup>Al-Nahar daily, Beirut, 23 December 1979, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup>Al-Nahar daily, 25 December 1979, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 26.

<sup>30</sup>Ismael, p. 35.

<sup>31</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 12.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., p. 18.

<sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>34</sup>Ibid., p. 31.

<sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>36</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>37</sup>It has become increasingly clear that the Gulf States do not wish a clear winner to emerge from the conflict. If there is a balance of power between Iran and Iraq in the Gulf then the likelihood of their attempting to expand in the Gulf becomes less feasible. At the outbreak of the war, however, Iran proved to be more of a threat to the Gulf States and as a result they backed Iraq.

<sup>38</sup>Al-Watan daily, Kuwait, 23 February 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 23.

<sup>39</sup>Mansour Farhang, "Iran vs. Iraq--A Personal Feud," The New York Times, 25 September 1985, p. A 19.

<sup>40</sup>Ismael, p. 40.

<sup>41</sup>Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Imam Khomeini's Views On The Particularities Of Divine Religions (Tehran: Council for the Celebrations of the Third Anniversary of the Victory of the Islamic Revolution, 1982), p.5.

<sup>42</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 88.

<sup>43</sup>Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Imam Khomeini's Views, p. 29.

<sup>44</sup>Ibid., p.4.

<sup>45</sup>Ismael, p. 34.

<sup>46</sup>Al-Hawadith daily, Beirut, 24 August 1980, cited in Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 23.

- 47 Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Imam Khomeini's Views, p.5.
- 48 Masoud Marjanpour cited by H. Faradani, The Imposed War (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1983), p.61.
- 49 Morteza Mahizadeh cited by H. Faradani, The Imposed War (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1983), pp. 63-64.
- 50 Sayyid Rahim Pejouhideh cited by H. Faradani, The Imposed War (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1983), p.68.
- 51 R. K. Ramazani, "Khomeyni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," ed. Adeed Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 18.
- 52 Ibid.
- 53 Ibid.
- 54 Adeed Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism: Islam in the Foreign Policy of Saddam's Iraq," ed. Adeed Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 123.
- 55 Ibid.
- 56 Abdulghani, p. 207.
- 57 The Middle East Magazine no. 102 (April 1983): 9.
- 58 Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs, p. 174.
- 59 Ibid.
- 60 Ibid.
- 61 Ibid.
- 62 The Middle East Magazine no. 95 (September 1982): 7.
- 63 Ibid.
- 64 Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1984), p.233.
- 65 Abdulghani, p. 207.
- 66 Ibid.
- 67 Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>Ismael, p. 40.

<sup>69</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 87.

<sup>70</sup>Ibid.

<sup>71</sup>Ibid., p. 88.

Chapter III  
Iraqi Propaganda

The propaganda which emanated from the Republic of Iraq was markedly different from that which the Iranian state issued. Initially this was due to the defensive posture that Iraq was forced to adopt as she responded to charges levelled against her by the Iranian regime. With the outbreak of the war the Iraqis were put in the awkward position of trying to legitimize why they had launched a full scale invasion into a neighboring sovereign state. The Iraqis went to great lengths to explain to the world and to the Iranians that they did not harbor any designs on any part of Iranian territory. They explained that once the Shatt-al-Arab, which they considered to be a part of their territory, had been returned to Iraqi sovereignty they would withdraw their forces to behind Iraqi lines.

While Islam is referred to in some of Husayn's propaganda dispatches, it is more likely to be found when he is attacking Khumayni's use of Islam as a justification for the war, expansion or the exportation of the revolution. Arabism and Arab Nationalism are the focal points of his campaign. It was necessary for the Iraqis to take a broader view of the

conflict, and not confine it to an Iraqi-Iranian falling out if they hoped to garner support from other Arab countries. Husayn's speeches reverberate with sentiments of deep reverence for the Arab homeland and the larger Arab nation. It was Iraq's duty, he said, to defend that homeland at all costs.

Adeed Dawisha, Deputy Director of Studies at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London, has pointed out that Husayn who had been a life-long member of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party genuinely seemed to adhere to the ideological tenets and orientation of the party.<sup>1</sup> Consequently, he says, Husayn is bound to minimize the role of Islam in politics.<sup>2</sup> Dawisha points out that to Michel <sup>C</sup>Aflaq, the founder and chief ideologue of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party, Islam was created out of the Arab essence and, therefore, must be subordinate to Arab nationalism.<sup>3</sup> As a result, no independent ideological status was accorded to Islam.

Another reason Husayn promoted the ideology of Arab nationalism and invoked pan-Arab symbols over Islam was because the Iraqi leaders had no hope of competing with the Āyatullāh's Islamic status.<sup>4</sup>

While the Iraqi regime did at various times resort to the flagrant use of Islam it was rare to find it unrelated to a statement on Arabism. The Iraqi government apparently erected a banner at the Imām <sup>C</sup>Alī Mosque which proclaimed: "We take pride at the presence here of our great father <sup>C</sup>Alī because he is a leader of Islam, because he is the son-in-law

of the Prophet and because he is an Arab."<sup>5</sup> The Iraqi leaders who are Sunni have gone to great lengths to appear to venerate and respect the Shi'ite leaders 'Ali and Husayn. Even when President Husayn speaks of the famed battle of Qadisiyyah, he emphasizes the Arab nature of the victory over the Persians rather than a victory of Islam over the infidel.

While Ayatullah Khumayni viewed the war as a battle between a Muslim republic and an infidel-led state, the Iraqis viewed the hostilities as a battle between Arabs and Persians, harking back to the traditional antagonism between the two people. Husayn has repeatedly called for a "decisive victory over the Persian enemy."<sup>6</sup> On another occasion Husayn made the point that "while the Arabs had been a source of cultural radiation to humanity the Persians had never risen except as aggressive invaders expanding at the expense of others and destroying the civilisations of other peoples..."<sup>7</sup> Husayn has clearly chosen to overlook the many important thinkers and the contributions that they made once the Persians had embraced Islam.

In most instances Husayn has shown a willingness to shoulder the responsibility for initiating the Gulf War. On numerous other occasions however, he paints a totally different scenario. He has been known to argue that the aggression commenced on September 4, and not on September 22, as is generally accepted. He thereby implicates the Iranians as the aggressive party and the Iraqis as merely responding to

their initiative. In one speech he noted: "the aggression against our country launched on September 4, 1980 by Khomeini's clique was a desperate attempt to check the movement of historic national revival and human cultural progress achieved by Iraq's revolution led by President Saddam Hussein."<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, he asks, pointing to Iranian guilt, what justified "the killing of women and children in the streets of Baghdad...killings that did, in fact take place before September 4, 1980, the date of Iran's biggest aggression on Iraq, and it took place before September 22 the date on which we stood up and repulsed their aggression on a much larger scale."<sup>9</sup> In the same speech he claims that "right up to September 22, 1980 they kept imagining they could humiliate the Iraqis and make servants out of them as they had done in respect of the Arabs of Arabistan."<sup>10</sup>

Husayn seemed to acknowledge that the cause of the war was not the Shatt-al-Arab but rather that the Shatt-al-Arab became an issue on which they could profit:

It appeared that the Iranians had wanted to make us lose our patience and temper when they started bombing our towns. At such a step they were dead right...Once a party is forced to resort to its armed forces, it would be unwise not to utilize these forces, to restore rights that had been usurped, particularly when part of this right is expressed in terms of territories, some of which had been used by the enemy artillery, on account of the distinguished position of the said territories...<sup>11</sup>

Husayn justified the Iraqi aggression on Iran by resorting

to a famous quote which he believed was attributed to the Imam 'Ali: "Humiliated are those who are attacked in their home grounds."<sup>12</sup> Thus his act would appear to have had a two-fold reason for it saved the Iraqis from humiliation while at the same time it humiliated the Iranians by catching them unprepared.

Once faced with the necessity of dealing with the issue of religion, Husayn delivered his views on Islam and its connection with Arabism. By promoting his own views he was thereby refuting the Ayatullah's. Questioning the legitimacy of the Islamic Revolution Husayn noted: "In order for an Islamic revolution to be genuinely Islamic, it must be a friend of the Arab revolution. Any contradiction between a revolution which calls itself Islamic and the Arab revolution means that the revolution is not Islamic."<sup>13</sup> On yet another occasion the Iraqi President stated that it was "not a mere coincidence that Iraq was made the target of attack by the Iranian regime...in terms of its aims and methods, was tailored to those of foreign countries hostile to Arabism and Islam."<sup>14</sup> In September 1980 when Husayn abrogated the Algiers Agreement he said: "the ruling clique in Iran persists in using the face of religion to foment sedition and division among the ranks of the Arab nation despite the difficult circumstances through which the Arab nation is passing. The invocation of religion is only a mask to cover Persian racism and a buried resentment for the Arabs."<sup>15</sup>



Dawisha claims that as early as 1977 Husayn had expounded his views on the role Islam should play in Arab politics and society.<sup>16</sup> In one address, he says, Husayn asked rhetorically whether the Arab characteristics of integrity, truth and honor came into being before Islam.<sup>17</sup> His own answer claims Dawisha was unequivocal: "these values existed before Islam but naturally changed and modified with the development of society."<sup>18</sup>

Husayn stated unapologetically that the Marxist conception of the state was not that of the Āyatullāh's. He stated on numerous occasions that "our party is not neutral between faith and atheism; it is always on the side of religion, but it is not a religious party, nor ought it ever to be."<sup>19</sup> Stressing the pride which the Arabs had in their heritage, he declared:

We are a nation. And in order that this nation does not appear as though it had been created by Islam which would strengthen religious conservatism...we have to emphasize that the history of the Arab nation extends to the ancient ages... . 20

Another time he explained:

Our ideology is not a reproduction of a religious philosophy. It is the ideology of life for Arabs and carries the spirit of their mission...including the spirit of Islam, but within a new context which is open to continuous development. As such, although it contains the Arab spirit in Islam, our ideology is neither a religious ideology nor is it contradictory to religion. 21

In an address to the National Assembly in 1981 Husayn

stated that "a person who attempts to humiliate the Arabs cannot be a true Muslim."<sup>22</sup> He continued along in this vein, drawing the conclusion that "the Muslim who respects the Arabs, their rights, their sovereignty and their language is considered a good Muslim."<sup>23</sup> Husayn is demonstrating by these remarks that he, like the Āyatullāh, has his own set of criteria by which he judges a person to be a "true Muslim."

Turning the discussion from the general to the specific Husayn demanded: "do we want the Persians to be true Muslims or do we reject them as Muslims?"<sup>24</sup> He replied:

the answer to that is we do not (want to reject them); we wish them to be true Muslims, (that is to say we wish those) people who govern in Tehran now (to be true Muslims). A true Muslim would never have reason to espouse what is contradictory to that trait in the Arab character which the Koran...emphasizes. A true Muslim should inevitably desire an Arab to be the master of himself as he should desire that all Arabs to be the master of themselves, he should endeavor to see them strong and powerful. 25

On the homefront Husayn lauded <sup>C</sup>Alī and Husayn as a gesture of goodwill to the Shi<sup>C</sup>ites of Iraq and as a means of securing their loyalty and cooperation. To the people of Iraq the regime's newspaper al-Thawra proclaimed:

We tell you that Iraq is a true Islamic state, and the people of Iraq, as well as its leaders, believe in God and the teachings of Islam as a religion and as a heritage. Indeed President Hussein's regular visits to the holy shrines...is a clear proof of his deep and unequivocal faith...and building a mosque in Yugoslavia is a living manifestation of Iraq's effort to spread the values of

Islam all over the world. 26

Adeed Dawisha claims that the regime had to make statements like this one in an effort to convince the people that Iraq's leaders were good Muslims to a population which might have been heavily imbued with Arabism yet nevertheless still adhered strongly to its Islamic faith.<sup>27</sup> By convincing the Iraqi population of their religious sincerity the Iraqi regime reaped a twofold gain. They countered the charges being levelled against them by the Iranian mullahs and they depicted the regime as being staunchly behind the Shi'ī martyrs who they professed to love and respect as Muslims, Arab Muslims.

In any propaganda war issues which under normal circumstances would never have attracted any attention rise to the surface demanding answers. One instance of this was the issue of the presence within Iran, before the fall of the Shah, of an Israeli diplomatic mission. While an Israeli mission in itself is a cause for contention in the Arab and Muslim world it really had no bearing whatsoever on the war. In addition, the mission had been expelled by the Āyatullah when he assumed power, thus making it a dead issue. Nevertheless, Husayn seized on the issue and tried to score as many points as possible. He rebuked former Foreign Minister Ibrāhīm Yazdī for allowing an Israeli diplomatic mission into Iran. When Yazdī replied that the new government could not be held responsible for the deeds of the Shah, Husayn called

this an excuse, adding: "basically the Iranians are a Muslim people; consequently and as a people, accepting an Israeli diplomatic mission in a Muslim state can only reflect a deficiency in the degree of faith espoused by them."<sup>28</sup>

Husayn appeared to take great delight in pointing out to the new Iranian leaders the debt that their revolution owed to the Arabs. "Let us not forget," he said to the Iraqi National Assembly, "that the Iranians understood their revolution on the strength of the Arab cultural heritage, since the basis of their revolution was religion--the very religion that had been originally brought to them by the Arabs."<sup>29</sup>

President Husayn also took exception to the Iranian insinuation that they were the only ones who understood and practiced the true Islam of the Prophet. On one occasion Husayn described Āyatullāh Khumaynī as the "turbaned Shah" whose regime, he claimed, was "backward and racist." He also took the opportunity to accuse Iran's ruling elite of violating and distorting the basic values of Islam.<sup>30</sup> In another address the Iraqi president charged the Iranian regime with trying to deceive Iranian and world public opinion by falsifications about the real role the regime had been playing since the departure of the Shah. Husayn went on to argue that "such falsifications come under the cover of Islam. Every stand taken by the Iranian regime has Islam intruding in it. In other words it comes under the guise of Islam to exploit the Iranian way of thinking and lead it into mis-

conception... ."31

Iraqi propaganda constantly attacked Iran for her expansionist aims. It was said that the mullahs were in fact worse than the Shah in this regard because while they harbored the same designs on foreign territories as the Shah, the Islamic clerics resorted to the use of Islam as a cover for their territorial ambitions. Abdulghani quotes President Husayn with regard to this issue:

The Iranian ruling clique has been utilizing religion as a cover to expand at the expense of Arab sovereignty...and to foment seditions and divisions among the ranks of the Arab nation...Khomeini's religion is only a false mask covering Persian racism and the deep-rooted hatred against the Arabs...the clique is using religion to instigate fanaticism, hatred and divisions among the peoples of the region. 32

Reading this speech it is quite clear that Husayn has chosen to highlight the racial component of the conflict and he blames the traditional animosity between Arabs and Persians for the sad state of affairs between the two countries. It is equally clear that he recognizes the strong appeal of Khomeini's Islamic propaganda and must do his best to expose the way religion is being used to manipulate the people.

Setting himself up as "Protector of the Gulf", Husayn attacked Khomeini and his regime for the threats they had made to the Gulf states and for their continued presence in the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tumbs. Husayn had stated on many instances that the war was being

waged on behalf of the Arab nation, the Gulf and Iraq.<sup>33</sup> On September 28, 1980 he declared that Iraq was fighting for the Arab nation and the citizens of the Gulf. He termed the war "a decisive battle for the Arabism of the Gulf and for deterring the expansionist Persian ambitions since Iraq was defending the sovereignty, honor and rights of the Arab nation."<sup>34</sup> According to Abdulghani, Husayn observed that "Khomeini's scheme through the so-called Islamic Revolution was to destabilize the region through inciting religious sectarian strife."<sup>35</sup> Setting the record straight once again, he continued: "We in Iraq refuse such a medieval ideology."<sup>36</sup> Shibli-al-Aisami, Assistant Secretary General of the Ba<sup>C</sup>th National Command, maintained that "the leaders of the Iranian Revolution were sectarian in their outlook, limiting their view of an Islamic state to the Jafari Shi<sup>C</sup>i view, they are narrow minded and traditional."<sup>37</sup> Dawisha claims that Husayn is suspicious of "some opposition forces who seek under the cover of religion to entice the regime into interfering in religious matters which would plunge the party into various sectarian interpretations of Islam."<sup>38</sup> Dawisha continues: "Hussein's clear appreciation of Iraq's sectarian divisions has reinforced his own ideological leanings into endeavoring consciously to minimize the role of Islam in Iraq's political activity."<sup>39</sup>

The Iraqi regime claims that on May 11, 1980 Hujat al-Islam Pausi said: "Iran's hand is long and that the Iraqi

Shi<sup>c</sup>ites form half the population, and that they are faithful to Khomeini and not to Saddam."<sup>40</sup> Notwithstanding his claim, Dawisha states that "in Iraq, religion as a motivating force was simply not powerful enough to dislodge the secularist Ba<sup>c</sup>th leadership from power."<sup>41</sup> This proved to be true when the anti-Husayn coup Khumayni envisaged failed to materialize.

On September 22, 1980 Husayn in his capacity as Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council made an emotional appeal to the "masses of the Arab nation" urging his soldiers on:

Descendents of 'Ali bin Abu Talib, Umar Husayn, Salah-al-Din-al-Ayyoubi, and Muthana; valiant army, pride of Iraq, pride of the Arab nation, descendents of Sa'd bin Abu Waqqas ...it is the banner of Qadisiya and the honor of the mission once again which Iraq and the Arabs have placed in your hands and on your shoulders. We are confident that you are worthy of this mission and will discharge it and protect the sovereignty, honor and traditions of your land, people, nation and glorious history. 42

This appeal is in tone far more nationalistic than religious. Although there is an Islamic content in the speech, the main focus of Husayn's appeal is on the Muslim Arabs as Arabs and on Arab symbolism. Once again he has chosen to emphasize the racial nature of the victory over the religious nature of the battle. Dawisha notes that "the president and his colleagues urged the 'Arab' population of Iraq to recreate the battle Qadisiya when in 637 the Muslims of the Arabian peninsula

defeated the Sassanid Persians and expelled the Persians from all of Iraq."<sup>43</sup>

The Iraqi regime constantly stressed the necessity of protecting the Arab homeland from any outside force that threatened it. Iraqi propaganda appeared to say that although Iraq had entered the fray reluctantly, once she had, it was on behalf of and at the behest of the Arab community, not only for Iraq. Tāhir Tawfīq, a member of the Iraqi Ba<sup>C</sup>th Party's Regional Command, also failed to make the distinction between the war being an Iraqi war or an all-encompassing Arab conflict. He issued a statement in which he attacked the "aggressive, racist policy" of the new Iranian regime.<sup>44</sup> Furthermore, he vowed that the Arab nation would "cut off the criminal hands that seek to tamper with the Arab homelands sovereignty and territorial integrity."<sup>45</sup> It should be noted that Tawfīq is using a well-known Islamic practice, the cutting off of criminal hands, as a symbol, to hammer home his point. He at least has chosen to address the Iranians in language which has meaning for them.

Husayn has portrayed both he and his colleagues as custodians of the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist revolution in Iraq. Far from shirking their responsibilities to both the nation and the revolution Husayn saw in the Iranian aggression an opportunity to defend and promote the Ba<sup>C</sup>thist revolution all over again. In a speech published in a pamphlet, Thus We Should Fight Persians, he announced: "the Iranian regime's aggression has



been our revolution's decisive response to a serious part in the enemies designs on the Revolution."<sup>46</sup> He continued: "although we did not desire war, what ensued, however, added a new spirit to our people."<sup>47</sup>

Although Husayn called for and stressed Iraq's place in the greater Arab nation he was also clearly proud of being an Iraqi. Undoubtedly exasperated with their colonial experience and enjoying Iraqi independence, Husayn voiced his sentiments on this subject in an impassioned speech to the Iraqi National Assembly:

Turks and Iranians alternated in a long effort and under the mantle of Islam, to establish their rule over Iraq. This time we say enough, we want neither Turkey, nor Iran, nor indeed any other nation. We are Iraqis; and as such we are part of the Arab nation and the Arab homeland. We in Iraq have our own individuality and character and as such we behave and conduct ourselves as we see fit and suitable...we are not demanding something that is complicated; all one wants is to have an unruffled mind, a clear conscience and to live without entanglements. 48

Turning the focus of his speech back to Iran and the current hostilities, the President noted disparagingly that "Khomeini's mentality does not seem to be capable of differentiating between places and people in assessing a situation. He still lives under the misconception that since he was able to overthrow the Shah, then he is able to overthrow Saddam Hussein or any other leader anywhere or anytime."<sup>49</sup> Here, while criticizing Khumayni, the Iraqi President presents himself in a strong position to his home audience.

According to the Iraqis, Khumaynī asserted that he had received petitions from Iraq imploring him not to conclude any agreements with Saddām Husayn, because they said that Saddam "kills and executes the Mujahidin."<sup>50</sup> "Now I ask you," Husayn said in an address to the National Assembly, "to consider the futility of this rotten mind. Less than a year ago I called this man rotten; I repeat what I said then and add that his mind is extremely rotten."<sup>51</sup> A statement such as this one illustrates how very personal the attacks became at times between the two leaders in their propaganda war.

Whether Husayn was boasting, deluding himself or disputing Iranian allegations of wrongdoing, the Iraqi President claimed that his country's armed forces did not forget their principles when they moved into Iran. He asserted: "they deliberately waited a long time at the doors of Muhammarah to give the Iranians a chance to evacuate that town's women, children and noncombatants."<sup>52</sup> The Iranians, however, have taken a different view with regard to the alleged evacuation. On numerous occasions they have accused the Iraqis of committing atrocities against civilians.

Attacking the Iranian regime for its self-righteous view of its religious superiority Husayn noted: "To themselves alone the rulers of Iran attribute everything that is good in the realm of religion."<sup>53</sup> This aura of religiousness with which Husayn had no hope of competing obviously was a cause of some anxiety for the Iraqi President. On still another

On occasion Husayn stated:

Nor do those (Iranian leaders) have any connection with religion. We cannot say the same about the Arabs; nor can we say that the Iraqis do not comprehend religion. The Prophet promised Paradise to ten people and even that was not done on his initiative but in fulfillment of a command made by God ... Khomeini, on the other hand, promises Paradise to millions of people. This is a novelty. I do not think that the Almighty intended to honor Khomeini with something that had been denied to all divine Apostles before him. 54

In this speech Husayn appears to be setting himself as an authority on God's intentions. What is novel in this speech is that the Iraqi President is beginning to sound very much like his foe, the Ayatullah Khomeini. Both have taken it upon themselves to be the interpreters of God's will and intentions.

In April 1982, the Iraqi President made a speech in which he echoed sentiments often expressed by the Iranians. He said:

We shall never tire of making sacrifices as long as we know that right is on our side; as long as we know that God is with us. Today, our great ancestor, the father of all martyrs, Husayn, May God's Peace be upon him, stands as a lofty symbol of heroism. We his proud descendents are proud to be connected with him; we are proud to be tied to him in soul and blood. We are fighting to defend right, justice and the holy land of Iraq which harbors the remains of our ancestor Ali. May God brighten his face. 55

Dawisha points out that in this passage Husayn "skillfully counteracts Iranian claims that he is an 'infidel' and an

'enemy of Islam' by his deference to Iraq's Islamic heritage; by his respect for and loyalty to the two main symbols of Shi'i Islam, and by reminding his listeners that it is they, the Arabs, and not the Iranians, who are the descendants of 'Ali and Husayn."<sup>56</sup>

In an address to the Iraqi National Assembly the President had the following words to say on the public's right to the access of information. His words are of interest to us for a variety of reasons:

In fact some of our Brethren have an opinion in this respect--they maintain that this practice(of giving out information)is unusual in war. I replied by saying that this may not be the usual practice but it is our practice; we would prefer to have our people get the information from us rather than from other sources; and we prefer to have our people hear the truth as it is. Our people will not hesitate to give a thousand, two, three or even ten thousand martyrs, they are a tough breed and they do not consider war to be a childrens game in the manner of the Ayatollah Khomeini and Bani Sadr look at it; and they will not quit on account of casualties(irrespective of volume). The people of Iraq were forced to go to war; but they willingly accepted the challenge in defence of their honor, integrity and sovereignty against those who attempted to humiliate them and usurp their rights. 57

Although this speech is aimed at the Iraqi people one cannot overlook the shot Husayn takes at the Iranians for employing children as soldiers in what he clearly considers to be a man's work. The second thing that strikes the reader is the way in which Husayn tries to manipulate the public into

becoming soldiers, and if necessary, martyrs. One also suspects that he is crediting Iraq's government for allowing freedom of the press, a condition that would be highly unusual even in peacetime. In the speech Husayn is making an attempt to boost the morale of the Iraqis by informing them that the government has confidence in them and lauding them for their bravery. Finally, he is trying to make them believe that they live under freer conditions than they actually do.

In an address to the Iraqi Cabinet on the conflict with Iran the President stretched credulity to the limit when he related the following occurrence: "We may likewise wonder," he said, "what makes the daughter (of a martyr) approach us and ask us nothing more than to keep ourselves in good health."<sup>58</sup> Praising the Iraqis in an attempt to retain their support for his war effort Husayn made the following observations:

We know of no other place on earth where people, old and young, the very families of martyrs, face Saddam Hussein and tell him that those lost are a 'sacrifice' to you...What they want to express to him and the Revolution through him, is that what they say and feel represents the essence of the prevailing new spirit of the Iraqis. We have never been mistaken in sensing this spirit (among the Iraqis); nor have we ever thought otherwise in this very respect. Perhaps even some among you may have accused us of exaggeration, or even arrogance for the great esteem in which we have always held the Iraqi people. As a matter of fact I have heard something of this nature from Iraqis--they say that I put too much trust in Iraqis and that I overestimate their

potential. 59

In this speech Husayn is attempting once again to boost the morale of the Iraqi people by telling them how spirited and trustworthy they are.

The propaganda of the Iraqi government, just as that of the Iranian regime, served two purposes: while it centered on and forcefully attacked the enemy, it also served to build up the morale of the people at home.

In every war it is the task of governments to rally its citizens squarely behind the war effort being conducted. Citizens must be shown that there were extenuating circumstances and that all attempts to achieve a solution through diplomatic channels had been exhausted. Although the war has largely been identified with Husayn in Iraq, he has made it clear that he went to war on behalf of the Iraqi people who had a right to the territory that had been usurped.<sup>60</sup>

It has been shown that although the Iraqi regime employed Islam in some of its propaganda it never occupied or played a dominant role. Arab nationalism, Arab symbols and the ethnic rivalry between Arabs and Persians figured most often in speeches and broadcasts. Given the personal beliefs of Husayn and the secular ideology which is intrinsic to the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party, this is hardly surprising. Furthermore, as it has already been noted, even if Husayn had wanted to make Islam the focal point of his propaganda campaign he would have been at a disadvantage for he had no hope of competing with

Khumayni's religious status or learning.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Adeer Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism: Islam in the Foreign Policy of Saddam's Iraq," ed. Adeer Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 115.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. For an understanding of Aflaq's thought see: Michel Aflaq, "L'idéologie de vue du parti socialiste de la resurrection arabe: Notre point de vue sur le capitalisme et la lutte des classes," Orient (Paris) 30 (1964) 28 (1965). Aflaq, "Notre point de vue sur la religion," Orient (Paris) 35 (1965). Aflaq, "L'idéologie du parti socialiste de la resurrection arabe: Le Ba'ith et L'Islam," Orient (Paris) 35 (1965).

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Saddam Hussein, Thus We Shoul Fight Persians (Baghdad: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1983), p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Saddam Hussein, President Saddam Hussein Addresses National Assembly on War with Iran (Baghdad: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1981), p. 8.

<sup>8</sup> Hussein, Thus We Should Fight Persians, p. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Hussein, Addresses National Assembly, p. 11.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 13.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 28.

<sup>13</sup> Abdulghani, p. 183.

<sup>14</sup> Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 7.

<sup>15</sup> Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 125.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.



- <sup>19</sup>Abdulghani, p. 181.
- <sup>20</sup>Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 115.
- <sup>21</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>22</sup>Hussein, Addresses National Assembly, p. 9.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid., p. 11.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 8.
- <sup>25</sup>Ibid., pp. 8-9.
- <sup>26</sup>Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 125.
- <sup>27</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup>Hussein, Addresses the National Assembly, p. 18.
- <sup>29</sup>Ibid., p. 19.
- <sup>30</sup>This quote as well as the one directly above are from Abdulghani, p. 191.
- <sup>31</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Iran's Hostility to Iraq--Follow Up Statements by Khomeini and his Aides (Baghdad: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1983), p. 13.
- <sup>32</sup>Abdulghani, p. 184.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid., p. 205.
- <sup>34</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>35</sup>Ibid., p. 183.
- <sup>36</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>37</sup>Interview with Shibli-al-Aisami, M.E.R.I.P. (June 1981), 19. By Ja'afari Shi'i, al-Aisami is referring to what is more often called Athna 'Ashari Shi'ism. The adherents believe in the twelve Imams and seek authority in matters affecting religion from Imam Ja'far-us-Sadiq. His period coincides with the fall of the Umayyad Caliphs.
- <sup>38</sup>Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 116.
- <sup>39</sup>Ibid.

<sup>40</sup>Ministry of Culture and Information, Selections, p. 19.

<sup>41</sup>Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 124.

<sup>42</sup>Ibid., p. 114.

<sup>43</sup>Ibid. The Battle of Qadisiyyah pitted the Arabs who were Muslims against the forces of the ruling Sassanid Persians in Iran in the year 637. Initially, it appeared that the Persians were going to win the day but a contingent of Arab troops arrived. In the battle that ensued the Arabs emerged victorious. It is to this battle that Husayn constantly alludes in his speeches. He depicts the battle as an Arab victory rather than a Muslim or religious triumph. It is also significant because after this battle the Arab forces successfully drove the Persians out of what is today Iraq.

<sup>44</sup>Abdulghani, p. 184.

<sup>45</sup>Ibid.

<sup>46</sup>Hussein, Thus We Should Fight Persians, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup>Hussein, Saddam, Addresses Cabinet on the Conflict with Iran (Baghdad: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1981), p. 28.

<sup>48</sup>Hussein, Addresses the National Assembly, p. 21.

<sup>49</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., p. 24.

<sup>51</sup>Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>53</sup>Hussein, Saddam, From Saddam Hussein to the Iranian People (Baghdad: Dar al-Ma'mun, 1983), p. 13.

<sup>54</sup>Hussein, Addresses the National Assembly, p. 17.

<sup>55</sup>Dawisha, "Invoking the Spirit of Arabism," p. 125.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., p. 126.

<sup>57</sup>Hussein, Addresses the National Assembly, p. 29.

<sup>58</sup>Hussein, Addresses Cabinet, p. 28.

<sup>59</sup>Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>60</sup>Lorenzo Kent Kimball in The Changing Pattern of Political Power in Iraq 1958 to 1971, p. 165, states: "While it is obvious that local nationalism pre-empts Arab nationalism in Iraq, the fact that Iraqi leaders find it necessary to pay so much tribute to Arab nationalism must be commented on. There are continued attempts on the part of Arab nationalist adherents to relate current events as they occur in the Middle East to concepts as they existed in the early Arabic-Islamic period." Husayn's references to the battle of Qadisiyyah would fit this description.

### Conclusion

Khumayni's brand of a militant, political Islam had more than a little influence in the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War. R. M. Ramazani notes that "ever since Iraq launched its all-out war against Iran on September 22, 1980, the Islamic ideology has been a major instrument of military mobilization for the conduct of the war."<sup>1</sup> Now, over five years later the war appears doomed to continue indefinitely.

Propaganda has been responsible for a great deal of the animosity that has been generated and allowed to flourish unbridled between the two warring states. It has been the source of increased vehemence, anger, distrust and suspicion. It has, as a result, rendered the conflict more salient and decreased the likelihood of a settlement that could lead to a peaceful co-existence. So long as Husayn and Khumayni remain sworn enemies the chance for any discussions remain remote. The chances of their renouncing their personal feelings and settling down to the business of ending the war are slimmer still. It has been suggested that the removal of either Khumayni or Husayn from the helms of their respective governments would facilitate negotiations that could lead to a cessation of hostilities. Husayn, however, seems to be

securely in place in Baghdad and although there have been rumors about Khomeini's failing health, from all accounts he is still very much involved in Iranian affairs. If Husayn was to step down or be relieved of his executive positions the chance for a peaceful conclusion to the war becomes more of a possibility. The Iranian regime has concentrated its attacks on Husayn and they place much of the blame for the war on his shoulders. In Iraq the war has largely been perceived as Husayn's war and identified with him. From the outset Husayn encouraged the media to refer to the conflict as Saddam's Qadisiyyah.<sup>2</sup> In "Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of the War on Iraq" the authors state that the "decision to go to war, and the course the war has taken, cannot be separated from the political ambitions and limitations of Saddam Hussein."<sup>3</sup> The government and the president himself, have fostered an image of oneness between the personality of Saddam Husayn and the war. Hence, his removal, while difficult, would serve two ends. The Iranians might prove amenable to the idea of a ceasefire and the Iraqis could heap their anger, frustration and criticism on a figure no longer powerful. Blame could be squarely attached to Husayn and freed from this stigma the road to Iraq's reconstruction and recovery could get underway.

The list of prerequisites that the Iranians have set, which they insist must precede any peace overtures leave the Iraqis with little viable alternative but to continue the war.

The Iranians demand that the Iraqi regime admit to being the aggressor, and to the payment of astronomical war reparations, most ominously, they demand a war crimes trial for the Iraqi officials, similar one would assume to that held at Nuremburg. Undoubtedly the star defendant would be the president, Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. The Iraqis cannot, or at least not at the present time, bow to such humiliating conditions, nor one suspects is Ḥusayn willing to accommodate the Iranians by vacating his high posts. At the time of writing the war has settled into a very costly war of attrition, punctuated by periodic air strikes and ground assaults. Neither side appears willing to admit defeat and Ḥumaynī will probably hold out for major concessions from the Iraqis.

A war of words commenced between the Iraqis and the Iranians even prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and indeed Ṣ is partially responsible for the escalation of the conflict. The Āyatullāh's taunting remarks required a response. Once the Iraqis obliged the clerics with invectives of their own the propaganda war was launched. Once the war had begun propaganda was used to denigrate the enemy and secure support from home audiences.

At the first sound of Iraqi troops moving onto Iranian soil the government in Tehran alluded to mystical and religious symbolism, and the Iranian clergy played down the threat posed by Iraq. They confidently predicted the downfall of the "worthless infidel who opposes Islam."

Iran claims that Iraq's aim was to ~~become~~ become the unrivalled superpower of the region and the leader of the Arabs. Furthermore, the Iranians contend that they were drawn "into a war which was, in the precise meaning of the word, imposed, upon it."<sup>4</sup> Iraq has discounted this claim stating that the war was imposed upon her when the new Iranian regime made threatening remarks about Iraq and its leaders. Iran's interference in Iraq's internal affairs led to a great measure of insecurity within the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party in Iraq. In addition, Khomeyni had come to regard the war in terms of a messianic mission, a crusade. He stated on more than one occasion that "as much as we would like to free Jerusalem, we cannot without saving Iraq first."<sup>5</sup> That the Iraqis did not feel that they required saving was clearly beside the point for the Āyatullah.

Both Iran and Iraq served notice that they had no intention of expanding territorially yet both belied their words through their actions. Reproaching Iraq for entering into Iranian territory the Iranian regime vowed that they would never enter Iraq or any other Muslim land. However, when the opportunity presented itself they followed Iraq's lead.

Despite the enormous loss of life and the destruction of property, the Gulf War has served the Iranian rulers well. According to Eric Hooglund, the war has served as a catalyst in helping the theocratic regime to consolidate its power.<sup>6</sup>

He notes that "the Iranian clergy and their lay allies have used the Iraqi invasion to enlist popular acquiescence towards the new political institutions"; and adds that if Tehran "were to accept a ceasefire under the present conditions of apparent stalemate, the legitimacy of the regime could be seriously eroded."<sup>7</sup> He goes one step further and claims that if Iran began to encounter major military defeats then the Iranian Republican Party would be blamed directly, and its effects to institutionalize theocracy would be in jeopardy.<sup>8</sup> Ghassan Salameh asserts that the deadlock in the war can only be broken if the Iranian regime should feel secure enough to stop using the war as a major factor in mobilizing support for the revolution. Neither, he says, seems likely in the near future.<sup>9</sup> In fact Salameh contends that the war signifies "the failure and yet survival of two regimes facing problems of legitimacy."<sup>10</sup>

Although the Shatt-al-Arab served as a convenient excuse to begin the war some experts point out that now that so much blood has been spilled in the name of the Arabism of the Shatt-al-Arab, it is unlikely that the Iraqi regime can accept a truce that would share, once again, the sovereignty over the waterway.<sup>11</sup> With all the discussions of the export of the revolution, expansionism and Islam the question of the Shatt-al-Arab has receded into the background. From the early days of the war the political and ideological components of the conflict overshadowed the territorial



question. The Shatt-al-Arab may have provided a cover to escalate the hostilities but one thing is certain, no peace settlement can overlook it. Saddam Husayn cannot afford a settlement that would be a mere return to the Algiers Agreement. Although Husayn's position appears secure a humiliating peace or the renunciation of Iraqi claims over the entire Shatt-al-Arab could wreck irreparable damage to his credibility, endangering his presidency.

Iraq's preemptive strike has turned out to have been a very costly one. It is in the interest of the regime to end the conflict as quickly and with as much honor as possible. Initially, the Iraqi people had been to a large extent sheltered from the effects of the war. As the conflict dragged on, however, austerity measures which were not popular had to be implemented. In order to retain public support for his war effort Husayn must ensure that life for civilians does not become unduly harsh. On another front Husayn appears to be encountering a growing problem. A 1984 investigative article in M.E.R.I.P. reports a growing opposition to conscription within Iraq. The authors report that desertion seems to be a problem among the regular units as well.<sup>12</sup> They claim that the road from Basra to Baghdad is studded with military checkpoints . . . officially looking for terrorists, and Iranian infiltrators but who in effect are only checking the papers of draft-age Iraqis.<sup>13</sup> As the people have become more dissatisfied with the war the

regime has resorted to giving gifts to the families of dead soldiers in a bid to retain their support and one would suspect their silence.

It has been over five years since the Iran-Iraq War officially began. It has become increasingly clear over the last few years that the war is not popular with all the citizens of Iran and Iraq. It is undoubtedly true that there are still large segments of the populations of both countries that still support the war effort being conducted by their respective governments. Nevertheless, the rumblings have begun to be heard and these may prove to be a serious factor in undermining the war efforts of both regimes. Should the malcontents garner enough support for their anti-war stance the very legitimacy of the Iraqi and Iranian regimes may be called into question. The hatred that has been generated as a result of the conflict, however, is not easily forgotten especially by those families that have lost a son, a father or a husband in the war.

Propaganda must shoulder a great deal of the responsibility for the heightened tensions which existed between Iran and Iraq prior to the outbreak and during the course of the war. Propaganda, however, is not an independent entity. It is the product of the minds and imagination of man. It is fashioned by man to aid and abet him in his efforts to advance his cause and slander his enemies. So much of the acrimony that exists between the two neighbors is a direct result of

propaganda. This must surely point to the success of propaganda in both Iran and Iraq. It injected Husayn and his colleagues with fear of Iran's āyatullāhs and it served to blur the true nature of the conflict and the issues underlying it. It has, depending on one's point of view, succeeded in depicting Khumaynī as either a holy man, rightly guided, or a shrewd political opportunist. Given the fact that Iraq was on the defensive their propaganda is not of the same hue as Iran's. Furthermore, Arab nationalism has been discussed for years and by an even more charismatic figure than Husayn, Jamāl Abdul Nāser.

The Iranians used Islam which was and still is calculated to strike at the emotions of listeners. Whereas Arab nationalism as an ideology is beginning to sound a little tired and worn, Islam has been given new life and is a vibrant political vehicle. The American weekly, Newsweek, recently quoted a statement by James A. Bill, a scholar on the Middle East. Bill stated that "over the next forty years populist Islam is going to be the most important ideological force in the world."<sup>14</sup> This new interest in populist or resurgent Islam has made the Muslims as well as the world sit up and take note of the āyatullāhs and their programs in Iran. Again, depending on one's point of view the Iranian leaders have either intrigued people or made them apprehensive with their ideas of Islam reborn. Khumaynī has succeeded in placing Islam into the forefront of the world's consciousness;

much as Nāser did with pan-Arabism in the 1950's.

The road to a negotiated settlement that could lead to a state of peaceful co-existence between the warring parties remains far off in the future. Meanwhile both regimes continue their battle of arms and words. Whether either regime will be able to weather the heavy demands placed on its budget and on its civilian and military morale remains to be seen. It also remains to be seen whether Husayn's regime can maintain its repressive policies to insure adherence to the Ba<sup>C</sup>th party line and allegiance to the war. In Iran the fight between the various factions continues not just with those opposed to the rule of the theocrats but within the ruling circles as well. Only time will show whether the pragmatists will win out over the more ardent, radical factions who still insist on the export of the revolution and who view the end to be a universal Islamic world order.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>R.K. Ramazani, "Khumayni's Islam in Iran's Foreign Policy," ed. Aded Dawisha, Islam in Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 24.

<sup>2</sup>Marion Farouk-Sluglett, Peter Sluglett and Joe Stork, "Not Quite Armageddon: Impact of the War on Iraq," M.E.R.I.P., no. 125/126, July-September 1984, p. 22.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>H. Faradani, The Imposed War (Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, 1983), p. 10.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid., p. 25.

<sup>6</sup>Eric Hooglund, "The Gulf War and the Islamic Republic," M.E.R.I.P., no. 125/126, July-September 1984, p. 31.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid., pp. 31, 37.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid., p. 37.

<sup>9</sup>Ghassan Salameh, "Checkmate in the Gulf War," M.E.R.I.P., no. 125/126, July-September, 1984, p. 20. He also notes that Iran will not end the war until Iraq makes concessions which will satisfy Iran.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., 17. He also states that in Iraq as well as in Iran ideology is used to legitimize a despotic or authoritarian regime founded on a revolution or coup d'etat.

<sup>11</sup>Joe Stork, "Iraq and the War in the Gulf," M.E.R.I.P. no. 97, June 1981, p. 3.

<sup>12</sup>Marion Farouk-Sluglett et al., "Not Quite Armageddon," p. 27.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Newsweek, June 24, 1985, p. 28. Edward Said in Covering Islam (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981), p. 136 observes that for "the general public in America and Europe today, Islam is 'news' of a particularly unpleasant sort."

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