

A THEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE OF CARL ROGERS

ABSTRACT

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Title: A Theological Critique of Carl Rogers

A thesis submitted to the Department of Religious Studies, McGill University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Systematic Theology, Spring, 1972.

This thesis attempts to show in the light of Christian teaching the strengths and the weaknesses of Carl Rogers' understanding of man and of his client-centered therapeutic approach as a means of helping man. The first part of the thesis deals with Rogers' teaching on the development of the human self and why the individual so often falls far short of his potential, as well as his methodology for helping the individual to become fully-functioning. This is followed by a Christian understanding of man and an evaluation of Carl Rogers' teaching and methodology in the light of this Christian teaching.

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by

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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of Religious Studies, McGill
University, Montreal,
Spring, 1972.

ABBREVIATIONS

- CCT - Carl Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy
- OBP - Carl Rogers, On Becoming a Person
- PP - Carl Rogers, Person to Person

PREFACE

Modern psychotherapy presents a significant opportunity and challenge to Christian thought, and since both the Christian counselor and the psychotherapist are concerned for the well-being of the whole man, the Christian counselor can no longer afford, as some try, to dismiss the teachings and findings of the psychotherapist as nonchantly as many of an earlier generation dismissed "the new Biology." The opportunity comes from what psychotherapy has discovered regarding the workings of the human psyche, some of which can be adapted with profit by the Christian counselor. The challenge comes from the fact that the psychotherapist has often adopted a world view that is not readily compatible with the Christian perspective without first being subjected to adequate examination and reflection. Yet there is an implicit assumption hidden in all effective psychotherapy which is made explicit in the Christian proclamation. Hence, the concerned Christian who is also convinced of the immense significance and value of psychotherapy in modern life must explore some of the basic issues that lie between them. To do so may prove very profitable for the Christian counselor.

This is particularly applicable in respect to Carl Rogers and his method of client centered therapy. In this thesis we shall attempt in the first three chapters to provide an understanding of Rogers' teaching on the development of the human self and why the individual so often falls far short of his potential. We shall consider how Rogers would help that person to become fully-functioning and what this would mean for that individual. In the following chapter we shall consider a Christian estimate of man, and in the final chapter attempt an evaluation of Carl Rogers' teaching and methodology in the light of Christian faith.

I would like to express my appreciation to the staff of the Library of the Faculty of Religious Studies for the great assistance they provided during the course of the research. In particular, I acknowledge my indebtedness to the Reverend Professor Monroe Peaston, who suggested the topic and for the interest he showed and the help he provided during the time this paper was in preparation. He was not merely an advisor; he guided me in this work, and I am most grateful to him for his many helpful acts rendered with unfailing courtesy.

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Chapter I

THE SELF CONCEPT

"Each of us has some idea of what we regard as basic in human nature, some notion of what man really is. Usually we do not make these views explicit, but they influence us in the way we deal with others. It makes a difference whether we think of man as essentially destructive and bad, or basically positive, or primarily a malleable putty without basic characteristics. It naturally makes a difference in our interpersonal and social relationships with others."¹

Carl Rogers leaves no doubt in the mind of his readers as to his personal conception of man. In direct contrast to Sigmund Freud, Rogers holds what we might term a "high" view of man, a creature with great potential and of extreme significance and worth. He writes as follows:

Of all the incredible forms of life and non-life with which I am acquainted in the universe, the individual human being seems to me to have the most exciting potential, the greatest possibilities for an expanding development, the richest capacities for self-aware living. . . . my experience leads me to place a primary value on the person of the human individual . . . only in the individual does awareness exist. Only in the individual can alternative courses of action be most deeply and consciously tested as to their enriching or destructive consequences. The whole history of mankind, it seems to me, shows a gradually increasing emphasis upon the significance and worth of each individual.²

Central to Rogers' anthropology is his concept of the self. He shows us how fully and integrally involved the self-system is in each level of existence, from the lowest to the highest. The insights he displays are worthy of serious consideration for they can be of much help in pastoral counseling. On the other hand, Rogers' teaching on the nature and development of the self leaves some very important questions unanswered, questions which the Christian counselor must consider central for they will have a very definite bearing on his approach to individuals and his aims in trying to help them. Therefore we must consider in some detail Rogers' understanding of the self. In the final chapter, after we have considered other aspects of his anthropology and a Christian view of man, we shall try to deal with these questions.

Rogers points out that man is one of many species of organisms, and as such has characteristics which are inherent and which set him apart from other species.³ This means that when man is "fully man" certain common characteristics can be distinguished. It should be pointed out that these characteristics are not always clearly visible, even to the individual, because under the influence of exterior stimuli which are perceived as threatening, the individual will often erect defenses, and these may submerge his true nature. Further reference will be made to this fact later; now, I shall attempt to set forth Rogers' conception of the development of the individual.

Each person exists in a continually changing world of

experience of which he is the centre.⁴ Some of these experiences are encountered consciously, but most of them remain on the subconscious level. As the organism matures, a portion of his total experiences gradually becomes differentiated as the self.⁵ As the self-structure is central to Rogerian anthropology, we shall consider at length its evolution.

As the infant interacts with his environment he gradually builds up concepts about himself, about the environment, and about himself in relation to the environment. These concepts, whether conscious or not, whether expressed or not, function as guiding principles.

Closely associated with all the infant's experiences is a direct organismic valuing process which appears highly important for understanding later development. In this organismic valuing process each element, each moment of what he is experiencing, is somehow weighed and selected or rejected, depending on whether, at this moment, it tends to actualize the organism or not. This complicated weighing of experience is clearly an organismic, not a conscious or symbolic function. These are operative, not conceived values. Yet this process can none the less deal with complex value problems.⁶

The locus of this evaluating process is clearly within the infant. Unlike many of us, he knows what he likes and dislikes, and the origin of these value choices lies strictly within himself. He is the centre of the valuing process, the evidence for his choices being supplied by his own senses. He is not at

this point influenced by what parents think he should prefer, by what the Church says, by the opinion of the latest "expert" in the field, or by the persuasive talents of an advertising firm. It is from within his own experiencing that his organism is saying in non-verbal terms, "This is good for me." "That is bad for me." "I like this." "I strongly dislike this." Rogers states, "He would laugh at our concern over values, if he could understand it. How could anyone fail to know what he liked and disliked, what was good for him and what was not?"⁷ That is, he appears to value those experiences which he perceives as enhancing himself and to place a negative value on those experiences which seem to threaten himself or which do not maintain or enhance himself.

Soon, however, there enters into this picture the evaluation of self by others. "You're a good child." "You're a naughty boy." These and similar evaluations of himself and of his behaviour by his parents and others come to form a large and significant part of the infant's perceptual field.⁸ Social experiences, social evaluations by others, become a part of his phenomenal field⁹ along with experiences not involving others--e.g., radiators are hot; candy tastes good; etc.

As the child experiences positive sensory values he also experiences enhancement in other ways--e.g., it is satisfying to hit baby brother, to have a bowel movement at any time or place when the physiological tension is experienced. Initially these experiences are not necessarily inconsistent with the

concept of self as a lovable person. This view is destined to change for it will not be long before the child experiences a serious threat to self. He is exposed to words and actions of his parents that give him the impression, "You are bad; your behaviour is bad; and you are not loved or lovable when you behave in this way." This constitutes a threat to the nascent structure of self. The child faces the dilemma that if he admits to awareness of the satisfactions of these behaviours and the values he apprehends in them, then this is inconsistent with the self as being loved or lovable.

Certain results follow in the development of the average child. One is a denial in awareness of the satisfactions that were experienced or that derived from experience. The other is to distort the symbolization of the experience of the parents. The accurate symbolization would be: "I perceive my parents as experiencing this behaviour as unsatisfying to them." The distorted symbolization, distorted to preserve the threatened concept of self, is: "I perceive this behaviour as unsatisfying."

Rogers believes that it is in this way parental attitudes are not only introjected, but, what is much more important, are experienced not as the attitude of another, but in a distorted fashion, as if based on the evidence of one's own sensory and visceral equipment. Thus, through distorted symbolization, expression of anger is experienced often as satisfying or enhancing. The more accurate representation is not, however,

permitted to enter awareness, or if it does enter, the child is anxious because of the inconsistency he is entertaining within himself. Consequently, "I like baby brother" remains as the pattern belonging in the concept of the self, because it is the concept of the relationship which is introjected from others through the distortion of symbolization, even when the primary experience contains many gradations of value in the relationship from "I like baby brother," to "I hate him!" In this way the values which the infant attaches to experience become divorced from his own organismic functioning. The primary sensory and visceral reactions are ignored or are not permitted to emerge into consciousness, except in distorted form. The values which might be built upon them cannot be admitted to awareness. A concept of self based in part upon a distorted symbolization has taken their place. It is out of these dual sources--the direct experience of the individual, and the distorted symbolization of sensory reactions resulting in the introjection of values and concepts as if experienced--there grows the concept of the self.¹⁰

As the organism develops certain needs are acquired--the positive regard of others, self-regard, a value system or conditions of worth.

Man, says Rogers, is incurably social. He has a fundamental craving for secure, close, communicative relationships with others, and he feels very much cut off, alone and unfulfilled, when such relationships do not exist. As with other

tendencies, this one may be blocked and distorted, but the deeper tendency, the more basic characteristic, seems to be the social one. This is indicated by the fact that if a non-threatening relationship is offered, as in therapy, and can be perceived as safe, individuals tend invariably to enter into it.¹¹

The need for positive regard from others is pervasive and persistent in the individual. If he experiences himself as making a positive difference in the life of another, as in some way satisfying another's need for positive regard, he experiences satisfaction of his own need for this. The need for positive regard is satisfied through interaction with others, especially significant others. This has an important bearing on his behaviour. He tends to observe the effect of his behaviour on others, especially those who are of particular importance to him, and since he wishes to have their positive regard, each act that evidences their approval tends to be regarded as satisfying behaviour, and each act that indicates their disapproval as unsatisfying behaviour. Therefore, he develops a value system and tries to act only in ways which will be regarded as in keeping with that value system.¹²

To a greater degree than any other living organism, man has the capacity to be aware of his functioning, to symbolize that which is going on in his experience and that which has gone on in the past. He can think, plan, take a pathway symbolically and foresee its consequences without taking it in fact. This is not an unmixed blessing for this potentiality

in man leads not only to the possibility of his being open to his experience and being aware of it so that each is symbolized, perceived, and organized into some relationship with the self, but also to ignoring experiences because he does not perceive them as having any relationship to the self-structure or to denying symbolization to his experiences or giving them a distorted symbolization because they are inconsistent with the structure of the self.¹³

It is these experiences which are either denied symbolization or are given a distorted symbolization because they are inconsistent with the structure of the self that present the greatest danger to the well-being of the individual. For example, an individual may have a self-concept in which he depicts himself as having a below average ability for leadership. He is placed in a position where he has to give leadership, and he does so effectively. When others point to this and state that he has such ability, he denies it because he never thought of himself as such; this does not fit into his self-structure; contradictory evaluations of his self-structure are denied by selecting and stressing other perceptions as "You do not know how nervous I was and you did not see the mistakes I made." This type is common.¹⁴

Rogers maintains that the "fluid but consistent organization which is the structure or concept of self, does not permit the intrusion of a perception at variance with it, except under certain conditions."¹⁵ The perceptions not permitted are

excluded because they are contradictory, not because they are derogatory. He notes that it seems nearly as difficult to accept a perception which would alter the self-concept in an expanding or socially acceptable direction as to accept an experience which would alter it in a constricting or socially disapproved direction.

Rogers states this in the form of a Proposition: "Most of the ways of behaving which are adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the concept of self."¹⁶ In other words, there is a direct correlation between the organism's self-concept and behaviour. As the organism strives to meet its needs in the world as it is experienced, the strivings will take a form consistent with the concept of self. The man who has certain values attached to honesty cannot strive for a sense of achievement through means which seem dishonest to him. Needs can be satisfied only through channels which are consistent with the organized concept of self.

In keeping with the value system of his conditions of worth, the individual will assess each of his experiences selectively. Because of his need for self-regard he views each experience as either enhancing or threatening that self-regard. If the individual perceives¹⁷ the experience as enhancing his self-regard, he will behave positively toward it, but if he perceives it as threatening to his self-regard, he may take a distorted view of it, and try to represent it in a way that is more in keeping with his conditions of worth but

which is not accurate to his experience. Thus, accurate representation is denied to his awareness, and these experiences are not recognized as being personal to him, hence, not incorporated into his self-structure.

To express this briefly we could say that in an attempt to gain or hold love, approval, esteem, the individual relinquishes the locus of evaluation which was his in infancy and places it in others. He learns to have a basic DIStrust for his own experiencing as a guide to his behaviour. He learns from others a large number of conceived values¹⁸ and adopts them as his own, even though they may be widely discrepant from what he is experiencing. Because these concepts are not based on his own valuing, they tend to be fixed and rigid, rather than fluid and changing.

The result of this is that the individual's behaviour is no longer regulated by his self-concept; he cannot continue to live as a unified whole person; instead, various part functions now become characteristic. When an experience is seen as threatening to the self-structure, defensive reactions are necessary. Experiences seen as not threatening can be integrated accurately into the self-structure.

Herein, Rogers maintains, lies the basic estrangement in man. He has not been true to himself, to his own natural organismic valuing of experience, but for the sake of preserving the positive regard of others he has now come to falsify some of the values he experiences and to perceive them only in

terms based upon their value to others. Rogers cites the case of one young woman client who, after undergoing therapy for a time, expressed it briefly and accurately as follows: "I've always tried to be what the others thought I should be, but now I'm wondering whether I shouldn't just see that I am what I am."¹⁹

A common example of defensive behaviour is rationalization²⁰--"I didn't really make that mistake. It was this way.

. . . " What is actually happening is that the individual is trying to perceive his behaviour distorted in such a way as to make it congruent with his concept of himself--that is, as a person who does not make that type of mistake.

When many of the organic needs experienced by the organism are refused admittance to consciousness because they are inconsistent with the concept of the self, the pressure of the organic need may become so great that the organism initiates its own seeking behaviour and thereby brings about the satisfaction of the need without ever relating the seeking behaviour to the concept of the self. The illustration Rogers gives of this is the case of a boy whose upbringing created a self-concept of purity and freedom from "base" sexual impulses, but who was arrested for lifting the skirts of two little girls and examining them. He insisted that he could not have performed this behaviour, and when presented with witnesses, was positive that "I was not myself." The developing sexuality of an adolescent boy, and the accompanying curiosity, constituted

a strong organic need for which there seemed no channel of satisfaction which was consistent with the concept of self. Eventually the organism behaved in such a way as to gain satisfaction, but this behaviour was not felt to be, nor was it, a part of the self. It was behaviour which was dissociated from the concept of self, and over which the boy exercised no conscious control. The organized character of the behaviour grows out of the fact that the organism on a physiological basis can initiate and carry on complex behaviour to meet its needs.

This type of behaviour is not uncommon. Many individuals are concerned over the fact that certain types of behaviour go on without their control, or the possibility of their control. Individuals are heard to say, "I don't know why I do it; it is surely not that I want to act like that; I just can't seem to help it." Many could say with Saint Paul, "The good which I want to do, I fail to do; but what I do is the wrong which is against my will."²¹ Rogers holds that this occurs because behaviour which is organically determined on the basis of experiences denied accurate symbolization is carried through without having been brought into any consistent relationship with the concept of self. This is the cause of psychological maladjustment. Although this is Rogers' explanation, Christian faith would view this as oversimplification. We shall consider this in the final chapter.

If we think of the structure of the self as being a

symbolic elaboration of a portion of the private experiential world of the organism, we may realize that when much of this private world is denied symbolization, certain basic tensions result. The self becomes very inadequately representative of the experience of the organism. Conscious control becomes more difficult as the organism strives to satisfy needs which are not consciously admitted, and to react to experiences which are denied by the conscious self. This leads to feelings of insecurity, unsureness regarding the direction the individual should take, fear for the future--in short, an inner lack of integration. Rogers believes that this is the true state of the majority of individuals.²²

On the other hand, psychological adjustment exists when the self-structure is able to accept and take account in consciousness of the organic experiences, when the organizational system is expansive enough to contain them; then clear integration and a sense of direction are achieved, and the individual feels that his strength can be and is directed toward the clear purpose of actualizing and enhancing a unified organism.²³

There is much here that enhances and complements the biblical teaching on man; for example, the emphasis on the effect of one's self-evaluation of one's actions. On the other hand, we shall try to show in the final chapter that despite this, Rogers' understanding of the self is

unsatisfactory because it fails to give sufficient consideration to the human quandary and to the true nature of man, and this distorts, according to Christian teaching, the understanding of the way in which man can become what he was meant to be.

SUMMARY

A very important concept in Rogerian Anthropology is that of the Self. The Child from his earliest days experiences sensory values, which he feels are enhancing. He soon learns, however, that some things he finds basically satisfying do not enhance him in the eyes of persons from whom he wants positive regard. He finds this threatening. The result is that he begins to deny to awareness these satisfactions, and as a result the individual comes gradually to have a basic distrust for his own experiencing as a guide for his behaviour.

The need for positive regard from significant others causes him to develop a value system and to act in ways that are in keeping with this. This means frequent denial or distortion of his experiences because they are not in keeping with his concept of self. When this stage is reached the individual's behaviour is no longer regulated by his self concept. Psychological maladjustment results.

In the following chapter we shall consider Carl Rogers' view of the individual who is psychologically adjusted, who would "be that self which one truly is."

Chapter II

TO BE THAT SELF WHICH ONE TRULY IS¹

Carl Rogers points out that beneath the apparent multiplicity of problems in personal living there is perhaps only one fundamental issue. "Below the level of the problem situation about which the individual is complaining--behind the trouble with studies, or wife, or employer, or with his own uncontrollable or bizarre behaviour, or with his frightening feelings, lies one central search. It seems to me that at bottom each person is asking, 'Who am I really? How can I get in touch with this real self, underlying all my surface behavior? How can I become myself?'"² It is the first of these questions I wish to consider in this chapter; the second shall be the subject of the following chapter.

One thing that is necessary for the individual who is seeking truly to understand himself is a point of reference, a standard of evaluation. Where is this standard to be found? Is it within man or is it outside him? If it is outside man, is it at the human level or is it on a transcendental plane? These are questions we must consider presently, but first it is necessary to determine Rogers' teaching on Who am I really?

We have already pointed out that for the sake of

preserving the positive regard of others, the individual falsifies some of the values he experiences and perceives them only in terms based upon their value to others, or he may rationalize his behaviour or deny accurate symbolization to some of his experiences in an attempt to behave in ways in keeping with his concept of self. That is, when the organism's response to experiences are perceived or anticipated as threatening, as incongruent with the individual's existing picture of himself, or of himself in relationship to the world, he erects defenses in an attempt to render these threatening experiences temporarily harmless by distorting them in awareness or denying them to awareness. In this way the organism becomes unaware of attitudes and feelings he has been experiencing and unable to "own" them as part of himself.³

When an individual begins the process of becoming that self which he truly is, the first thing that happens is that he begins to drop the false fronts or the masks or the roles with which he has faced life, and to an ever increasing degree becomes open to his experiences as he appears to be trying to discover something more basic, more truly himself. He moves away from the compelling image of what he "ought to be," not because he felt that this was what in truth was right for him, but because he believed that others considered this was what he should be, and he wanted to please them. Again, it may be a move away from that form which the organization or the culture dictates to what he himself thinks he should be; away from pleasing

others to pleasing himself.⁴

One of Rogers' clients said with considerable passion: "I've been so long trying to live according to what was meaningful to other people, and what made no sense at all to me, really. I somenow felt so much more than that, at some level;"⁵ and a professional man, looking back at some of the processes he had been through, wrote, towards the end of therapy:

I finally felt that I simply had to begin doing what I wanted to do, not what I thought I should do, and regardless of what other people feel I should do. This is a complete reversal of my whole life. I've always felt I had to do things because they were expected of me, or more important, to make people like me. The hell with it! I think from now on I'm going to just be me--rich or poor, good or bad, rational or irrational, logical or illogical, famous or infamous. So thanks for your part in helping me to rediscover Shakespeare's--'To thine own self be true.'⁶

On the positive side, the individual that is becoming his true self tends to move towards greater autonomy. He begins to choose the goals towards which he wants to move. This comes about gradually as he allows himself to be more open to his experiences. Rogers lays great emphasis on the notion that the person who is in the process⁷ of becoming his true self will, therefore, become "open to experience." He points out that if the evidences of our senses run contrary to our picture of self, then the evidence is distorted. In other words, we cannot see all that our senses report, but only the things which fit the picture we have. In a safe relationship, such as that of client centered therapy, this defensiveness or

rigidity tends to be replaced by an increasing openness to experience.⁸

As the individual moves away from the pole of defensiveness toward the pole of openness to experience, he becomes more able to listen to himself, to experience what is going on within himself. He becomes more open to his feelings of fear and discouragement and pain, as well as to feelings of tenderness and courage and awe. He becomes free to live his feelings subjectively as they exist in him, and also be aware of these feelings. He becomes more able to live fully the experiences of his organism rather than shutting them out of awareness.

Rogers uses the following rather lengthy portion of a recorded interview with a young professional man (it was this client's forty-eighth interview) to illustrate this:

C: It doesn't seem to me that it would be possible for anybody to relate all the changes that you feel. But I certainly have felt recently that I have more respect for, more objectivity towards my physical makeup. I mean I don't expect too much of myself. This is how it works out: It feels to me that in the past I used to fight a certain tiredness that I felt after supper. Well, now I feel pretty sure that I really am tired--that I am not making myself tired--that I am just physiologically lower. It seemed that I was just constantly criticizing my tiredness.

T: So you can let yourself be tired, instead of feeling along with it a kind of criticism of it.

C: Yes, that I shouldn't be tired or something. And it seems in a way to be pretty profound that I can just not fight this tiredness, and along with it goes a real feeling of I've got to slow down, too, so that being tired isn't such an awful thing. I think I can also kind of pick up a thread here of why I should be that way in the way my father is and the way he looks

at some of these things. For instance, say that I was sick, and I would report this, and it would seem that overtly he would want to do something about it but he would also communicate, 'Oh, my gosh, more trouble.' You know, something like that.

T: As though there were something quite annoying really about being physically ill.

C: Yeah, I'm sure that my father has the same disrespect for his own physiology that I have had. Now last summer I twisted my back, I wrenched it, I heard it snap and everything. There was real pain there all the time at first, real sharp. And I had the doctor look at it and he said it wasn't serious, it should heal by itself as long as I didn't bend too much. Well this was months ago--and I have been noticing recently that --hell, this is a real pain and it's still there--and it's not my fault.

T: It doesn't prove something bad about you--

C: No--and one of the reasons I seem to get more tired than I should maybe is because of this constant strain, and so--I have already made an appointment with one of the doctors at the hospital that he would look at it and take an X ray or something. In a way I guess you could say that I am just more accurately sensitive--or objectively sensitive to this kind of thing. . . . And this is really a profound change as I say, and of course my relationship with my wife and the two children is--well, you just wouldn't recognize it if you could see me inside--as you have--I mean, there just doesn't seem to be anything more wonderful than really and genuinely--really feeling love for your own children and at the same time receiving it. I don't know how to put this. We have such an increased respect--both of us--for Judy and we've noticed just--as we participated in this--we have noticed such a tremendous change in her--it seems to be a pretty deep kind of thing.

T: It seems to me you are saying that you can listen more accurately to yourself. If your body says it's tired, you listen to it and believe it, instead of criticizing it; if it's in pain, you can listen to that; if the feeling is really loving your wife or children, you can feel that, and it seems to show up in the differences in them too.9

This would mean that as the individual progresses toward being that self which he truly is there would be no barriers, no inhibitions, which would prevent the full experiencing of what was organismically present--for example, he would find that he was making value judgments in a way that is new to him and yet in a way that was also known to him in infancy. Again, he finds that it is his own organism--his senses, his psychological equipment--that supplies the evidence upon which value judgments may be made and also revised. He does not need nor indeed desire to depend on what others tell him. He would retain those values which are experienced as maintaining or enhancing the organism as distinguished from those which are said by others to be for the good of the organism. For example, an individual accepts from the culture the value "One should neither have nor express feelings of jealous aggressiveness towards siblings." The value is accepted because it is presumed to make for the enhancement of the individual--a better, more satisfied person. But in therapy this person, as a client, may examine this value in terms of a more basic criterion, namely, his own sensory and visceral experiences: "Have I felt the denial of aggressive attitudes as something enhancing myself?" The value is tested in the light of personal organic evidence. The same applies to each experience, and the fully functioning person behaves so that his behaviour becomes the meaningful and balanced satisfaction of all his needs, those needs being also available to consciousness.

This individual subjective establishing of values might seem to suggest a complete anarchy of merit. Not so, claims Rogers. Experience indicates that quite the opposite is true. Since all individuals have basically the same needs, including the need for acceptance by others, it appears that when the individual formulates his own values, in terms of his own direct experience, it is not anarchy which results but a high degree of commonality and a genuinely socialized system of values.¹⁰

Another result of openness to experience is that the individual moves toward greater possibility of conscious control, for openness to experience means that all the sensory and visceral experiences are admissible to awareness or available to consciousness.¹¹ They can then be organized into one integrated perceptual system, and the individual can thereby acquire the control by which reasonable conscious objectives can be achieved. He acquires a sense of autonomy because now there are no longer aspects of his behaviour which he cannot govern.¹²

The importance that Rogers attaches to personal experience is indicated in the following statement: "Experience is, for me, the highest authority. No other person's ideas, and none of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my experience. It is to experience that I must return again and again, to discover a closer approximation to truth. Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man can take precedence over my own direct

experience."¹³

A further characteristic of the person who is becoming that self he was meant to be is an increasing trust in his organism as a means of arriving at the most satisfying behaviour in each existential situation.

Rogers points out that in choosing what course of action to take in any situation, many people rely upon guiding principles--a code of action laid down by some group or institution, upon the judgment of others (from wife and friends to the etiquette authority of the day), or upon the way they have behaved in some similar situation in the past.¹⁴ However, the person who is open to all his experiences is able increasingly to trust his total organismic reaction to a new situation because he discovers to an ever greater degree that if he is open to his experiences, doing what "feels right" proves to be a competent and trustworthy guide to behaviour which is truly satisfying.¹⁵

Rogers explains the reason for this as follows: to the extent that the individual is open to all of his experiences, he has access to all of the available data in the situation, on which to base his behaviour. He has knowledge of his own feelings and impulses, which are often complex and contradictory. He is able freely to sense the social demands, from the relatively rigid social "laws" to the desires of friends and family. He has access to his memories of similar situations, and the consequences of different behaviours in those

situations. He has a relatively accurate perception of this external situation in all of its complexity. He is able more realistically to permit his total organism, his conscious thought participating, to consider, weigh and balance each stimulus, need, and demand, and its relative weight and intensity. Out of this complex weighing and balancing he is able to discover that course of action which seems to come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation, long-range as well as immediate needs. Rogers admits that in such a weighing and balancing of all of the components of a given life choice, his organism would not by any means be infallible. Mistaken choices might be made. But because he tends to be open to his experience, there is a greater and more immediate awareness of unsatisfying consequences, a quicker correction of choices which are in error.¹⁶

The defects which in most of us make this process untrustworthy are the inclusion of information which does not belong to this present situation, or the exclusion of information which does. It is when memories and previous learnings are fed into the computations as if they were this reality, and not memories and learnings, that erroneous behavioral answers arise. Or when certain threatening experiences are inhibited from awareness, and hence are withheld from the computation or fed into it in a distorted form, this, too, produces error. But the person who is open fully to all his experiences will find his organism thoroughly trustworthy, because all of the

available data will be used, and it will be present in accurate rather than distorted form. Hence his behaviour would come as close as possible to satisfying all his needs--for enhancement, for affiliation with others and the like.¹⁷

From Rogers' concept of the real "self" certain definite points in his anthropology emerge. We shall try to summarize these.

First, it is evident that Rogers views man as living very subjectively. He disagrees with the behavioral sciences movement in the direction of making man an object to himself, a complex sequence of events no different in kind from the complex chain of equations by which various chemical substances interact to form new substances or to release energy. The behavioral sciences hold increasingly a depersonalized, dehumanized, mechanical view of man. It is the belief of many such scientists, says Rogers, that viewing man as a machine is the best avenue leading to the discovery of fundamental laws of human behaviour.¹⁸

Rogers disagrees with this view, and since he speaks from within the behavioral sciences and as a contributor to them, he feels that he has "some right to express, as part of my conception of man, a very different view, a paradox which does not deny the objective mechanical view, but which exists as co-equal with it."¹⁹

Rogers holds that no matter how completely man comes to understand himself as a determined phenomenon, the product of

past elements and forces, and the determined cause of future events and behaviours, he can never live as an object. He can live only subjectively. The person who is developing his full potential cannot understand and predict his behaviour objectively; rather, he is able to accept the subjective aspects of himself and to live subjectively. For example, when he is angry he is angry. He moves in self-selected directions, he chooses responsibly; he is a person who thinks and feels and experiences; he is not merely an object in whom these events occur. He plays his part in a universe which may be determined, but he lives himself subjectively, thus fulfilling his own need to be a person.

Rogers says, "We cannot, without great peril, deny this subjective element in ourselves. It precedes our scientific activities, it is more all-encompassing than scientific knowledge, it is more important than any technical development. It is an essential part of being human, of being a person, and no present or future development of the behavioral sciences should be permitted to contradict this basic fact."²⁰

The fact that man lives subjectively is, in Rogers view, an asset²¹ because he says that it has been his experience that persons have a basically positive direction: "The innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his 'animal nature', is positive in nature --is basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic."²² He is quite aware that this point of view is foreign

to our present culture, so revolutionary in its implications that it will be difficult to accept, and, he says, should not be accepted without thorough-going inquiry. He points out, rightly, I believe, that religion, and particularly the Protestant Christian tradition (although I believe other Christian traditions hold a similar view of the sinfulness of man) has been the means of permeating our culture with the idea that man is basically sinful, and only by something approaching a miracle can his sinful nature be negated. Furthermore, with a few basic exceptions,²³ the whole viewpoint of the professional worker as well as the layman is that man as he is, in his basic nature, had best be kept under control or under cover or both.²⁴ The reason for this attitude seems to be that in therapy there are continually being uncovered hostile and anti-social feelings, so that it is easy to assume that this indicates the deeper and, therefore, the basic nature of man. However, clinical experience has convinced Rogers that these untamed and unsocial feelings are neither the deepest nor the strongest, and that the inner core of man's personality is the organism itself, which is essentially both self-preserving and social. He writes:

So the basic discovery of psychotherapy seems to me, if our observations have any validity, that we do not need to be afraid of being "merely" homo sapiens. It is the discovery that if we can add to the sensory and visceral experiencing which is characteristic of the whole animal kingdom, the gift of a free and undistorted awareness of which only the human animal seems fully capable, we have an organism which is beautifully and constructively realistic. We have then an organism which is as aware of the demands of the culture as it is of its own physiological demands for food or sex--which is just as aware of its

desire for friendly relationships as it is of its desire to aggrandize itself--which is just as aware of its delicate and sensitive tenderness toward others, as it is of its hostilities toward others. When man's unique capacity of awareness is thus functioning freely and fully, we find that we have, not an animal whom we must fear, not a beast who must be controlled, but an organism able to achieve, through the remarkable integrative capacity of its central nervous system, a balanced, realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behavior as a resultant of all these elements of awareness. To put it another way, when man is less than fully man--when he denies to awareness various aspects of his experience--then indeed we have all too often reason to fear him and his behaviour, as the present world situation testifies. But when he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his behavior is constructive. It is not always conventional. It will not always be conforming. It will be individualized. But it will also be socialized.²⁵

Rogers sees man, not only as having a basically positive direction, but also as having great potential. His capacity for a highly complex awareness makes him capable of an incredibly rich, adaptive and creative living; creative relationships; for choice and sound decision based on openness to all aspects of his experience; the capacity for living his life subjectively as a choosing, responsible person in a universe he cannot fully predict, but in which he can choose to play a part. He writes as follows:

I am sure it is clear that to me the most significant characteristic of man is his enormous potential; his capacity for becoming fully-functioning in an open and acceptant relationship to himself and to life. I am well aware that there is a very real possibility that our culture may blow man himself off the globe. I realize the even more likely possibility that as a culture we may permit human lives to become depersonalized, dehumanized, without meaning or purpose. Yet I cannot, from my experience, lay these possible outcomes to some inherent defect

in man's nature. On the contrary, It is my experience that given an adequate human climate, man chooses to develop in ways that are both personally and socially enhancing, that move him in directions constructive for himself and for others. In my judgment, if we are to avoid the awesome catastrophes which threaten the modern world, we need to release this capacity for freely constructive functioning, far more than we have to date, in our personal relationships, our teacher-student relationships, our employer-employee relationships, and eventually in our international relationships.²⁶

Rogers' views pose some searching questions for the Christian. For instance, can man be as autonomous as Rogers seems to claim? Can he find within himself the control that Rogers maintains he can? Does he have within himself the criteria for making value judgments of the type being considered here? In the light of the Christian faith, can we agree with Rogers' thesis regarding man's subjectivity? Or, is the subjective/objective paradox in man more basic than Rogers accepts? These are questions raised in this chapter; we shall try to answer them in the evaluation.

SUMMARY

Man, in an attempt to obtain and preserve the positive regard of others, erects defenses or misrepresents experiences he perceives as threatening, and as a result eventually ceases to be his real, his true self. When a certain type of relationship is entered, the individual can begin the process of becoming his true self--revert to the valuing system which was his in infancy; that is, he will be open to his experiences and trust his total organism to consider, weigh and balance

each stimulus, need and demand, and its relative weight and integrity.

In this way the individual discovers the course of action best for him in each situation, for the person who is fully open to all his experiences finds his organism trustworthy. He will live subjectively, but, contrary to the opinion of many, the direction of such living will be positive, self-preserving and social.

Chapter III

HELPING THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE FREE

The Christian counselor may find much in Carl Rogers' methodology that will prove helpful in the pastoral approach to individuals, in any serious attempt to help people with problems, or in interpersonal relationships generally. Rogers' emphasis on helping through a relationship, and his description of the particular type that is necessary, bear striking parallels to the teaching Jesus demonstrated during His ministry. Some persons have dismissed Rogers' client centered approach as a wooden technique of pseudo-understanding in which the counselor "reflects back what the client has just said."¹ In so doing these people are revealing their lack of understanding of Rogers' method. Far from being superficial, it is an attempt to understand in depth the other person and to convey that understanding to the client in such a manner that he received help and strength from it. How Rogers tries to do this will now command our attention.

Rogers' therapeutic method was neither purely theoretical nor borrowed from others. It was developed over a long period by Rogers himself, and implicit in it are some important aspects of his concept of man. We shall approach our examination

of it by noting some of the steps he considers necessary for building a helping relationship.

At the outset it is well to note how Rogers' attitude towards the therapeutic relationship changed over the years. He states that in his early professional years he was asking the question, "How can I treat, or change, or cure this person?" Now he would phrase the question this way, "How can I provide a relationship this person can use for his own personal growth?"²

We should note first that man has his being in relationship. It is through a satisfactory relationship that he finds himself. Rogers writes as follows:

It has gradually been driven home to me that I cannot be of help to this troubled person by means of any intellectual or training procedure. No approach which relies upon knowledge, upon training, upon the acceptance of something that is taught, is of any use. These approaches seem so tempting and direct that I have, in the past, tried a great many of them. It is possible to explain a person to himself, to prescribe steps which should lead him forward, to train him in knowledge about a more satisfying mode of life. But such methods are, in my experience, futile and inconsequential. The most they can accomplish is some temporary change, which soon disappears, leaving the individual more than ever convinced of his inadequacy. The failure of such approach through the intellect has forced me to recognize that change appears to come about through experience in a relationship. . . . I can state the overall hypothesis in one sentence, as follows. If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use that relationship for growth, and change and personal development will occur.³

What is the atmosphere which should pervade if such a relationship is to assist the client to become his true self?

The first requirement is congruence on the part of the therapist. This means that in his relationship with his client he is genuine and without "front" or facade, openly being the feelings and attitudes which at that moment are flowing in him. That is, the feelings the counselor is experiencing must be available to him, available in awareness. He is able to live these feelings, be them in the relationship, and able to communicate them if appropriate. He comes into a direct personal encounter with his client, meeting him on a person-to-person basis.

This involves much more than being able to keep confidences, being a person to whom the client can reveal his deepest secrets without fear of them being disclosed to others. Congruence as used by Rogers expresses the idea of a genuineness on the part of the therapist that will convey to the client that the former's words are in accord with his true feelings towards the latter--that the therapist is being himself, not denying himself. For instance, if the therapist feels annoyed or skeptical regarding the client, this will be perceived by him even though the therapist's remarks may not carry any indication of it.⁴ In other words, to be congruent the therapist must be aware of his own feelings towards the client, and also be sufficiently expressive as a person that what he is will be communicated unambiguously to the client. There must be no hypocrisy on the part of the therapist; he must not present a front, a facade; he must be transparently real.

Some might feel that to be congruent, to let one's genuine feelings toward a client show through word and attitude is dangerous and might harm rather than help establish the proper helpful relationship. Rogers, however, argues that if his words give one message while his feelings, for example, annoyance, are something else and yet are communicating in subtle ways which are not in keeping with his words, then his communication contains a contradictory message. This confuses the other person and makes him distrustful, even though he, too, may be unaware of the difficulty. Rogers put it like this: "When as a parent or therapist or a teacher or administrator I fail to listen to what is going on in me, fail because of my own defensiveness to sense my own feelings, then this kind of failure seems to result. It has made it seem to me that the most basic learning for anyone who hopes to establish any kind of helping relationship is that it is safe to be transparently real. If in a given relationship I am reasonably congruent, if no feelings relevant to the relationship are hidden either to me or to the other person, then I can be almost sure that the relationship will be a helpful one."⁵

Rogers concedes that this is not a simple thing to achieve; such reality is difficult, and lest he be misunderstood he illustrates the point as follows:

I am not saying that it is helpful to blurt out impulsively every passing feeling and accusation under the comfortable impression that one is being genuine. Being real involves the difficult task of being acquainted with

the flow of experiencing going on within oneself, a flow marked especially by complexity and continuous change. So if I sense that I am feeling bored by my contacts with this student, and this feeling persists, I think I own it to him and to our relationship to share this feeling with him. But here again I will want to be constantly in touch with what is going on in me. If I am, I will recognize that it is my feeling of being bored which I am expressing, and not some supposed fact about him as a boring person. If I voice it as my own reaction, it has the potentiality of leading to a deeper relationship. But this feeling exists in context of a complex and changing flow, and this needs to be communicated too. I would like to share with him my distress at feeling bored, and the discomfort I feel in expressing this aspect of me. As I share these attitudes I find that my feeling of boredom arises from my sense of remoteness from him, and that I would like to be more in touch with him. And even as I try to express these feelings, they change. I am certainly not bored as I try to communicate myself to him in this way, and I am far from bored as I wait with eagerness and perhaps a bit of apprehension for his response. I also feel a new sensitivity to him, now that I have shared this feeling which has been a barrier between us. So I am very much more able to hear the surprise or perhaps the hurt in his voice as he now finds himself speaking more genuinely because I have dared to be real with him. I have let myself be a person--real, imperfect--in my relationship with him. 6

Rogers describes this first element, congruence, at some length, not only because he regards it as highly important,⁷ but also because it is neither easy to grasp nor to achieve. He says, "I hope it is clear that I am talking about a realness in the counselor which is deep and true, not superficial. I have sometimes thought that the word transparency helps to describe this element of personal congruence. If everything going on in me which is relevant to the relationship can be seen by my client, if he can see "clear through me," and if I am willing for this realness to show through in the relationship, then I can be almost certain that this will be a

meaningful encounter in which we both learn and develop."⁸

Rogers concedes that no one fully achieves this condition, yet the more the therapist is able to listen acceptantly to what is going on within himself, and the more he is able to be the complexity of his feelings without fear, the higher the degree of his congruence and the more probability there is that change in personality in the client will occur.

Closely associated with congruence on the part of the therapist is his need for an accurate empathic understanding of his client's private world, and his ability to communicate some of the significant fragments of that understanding. Rogers defines "empathy" as the ability "to sense the client's inner world of private personal meanings as if it were your own, but without ever losing the 'as if' quality."⁹ The therapist who achieves this ability in dealing with his clients will be able to sense the feelings and personal meanings which the client is experiencing in each moment--his confusion or his timidity or his anger or his feeling of being treated unfairly --perceive these from "inside" as they seem to the client yet without his own uncertainty or fear or anger or suspicion getting bound up in it. Hopefully, when the client's world is clear to the counselor and he is able to move about in it freely, he can both communicate his understanding of what is vaguely known to the client, and he can also voice meanings in the client's experience of which the client is scarcely aware. This highly sensitive empathy will make it possible for a person to

get close to himself and to learn to change and to develop.¹⁰

This, I believe, is very different from the type of understanding which we normally receive or give. As Rogers points out, we normally give an evaluative understanding from the outside: "Yes, I understand what's wrong with you, what makes you act that way. I experienced a similar situation, but I reacted this way." That is, it is an objective analysis that is almost judgmental. This may be prompted by fear on our part, for if I am truly open to the way life is experienced by another person --if I can take his world into mine--then I run the risk of seeing life in his way, of being changed myself, and we all resist change. Hence, we tend to view the other person's world only in our terms, not in his. On the other hand, when someone understands how it feels and seems to be me, without wanting to analyse me or judge me, then I can blossom and grow in that climate. So when the counselor can grasp the moment-to-moment experiencing occurring in the inner world of the client, as the client sees and feels it, without losing the separateness of his own identity in this empathic process, then change is likely to occur.

Even if one cannot empathize fully with the client, the communication of intent to understand is important. In dealing with a confused or inarticulate or bizzare individual, it might be very difficult to empathize, but if that person perceives that the therapist is trying to understand his meanings, this is helpful. It communicates the fact that I perceive his

feelings and meanings as being worth understanding.

As was the case with congruence, so also with empathy, no one achieves this completely. It is a goal towards which one can work, and Rogers states that there is no doubt that individuals can develop along this line.¹¹

The third condition that facilitates growth and change in therapy is defined by Rogers as an unconditional positive regard on the part of the therapist for the client. This means that he prizes the client in a total, rather than a conditional way--with somewhat the same quality of feeling that a parent feels for his child, prizing him as a person regardless of his particular behaviour at the moment, not simply accepting the client when he behaves in certain ways and disapproving of him when he behaves in other ways..It means that he cares for his client in a non-possessive way, as a person with potentialities. It involves an open willingness for the client to be whatever feelings are real in him at the moment--hostility or tenderness, rebellion or submissiveness, assurance or self-depreciation. Rogers says that what he is describing is a feeling that is not paternalistic nor sentimental nor superficially social and agreeable, an outgoing positive feeling, without reservations, that respects the other person as a separate individual, does not possess him, nor is it demanding. It is a feeling that has strength.

The fact that this positive regard is unconditional means that it is a positive feeling that is without reservations and

without evaluations--it does not make judgments.¹² When such a nonevaluating prizing is present in the encounter between the counselor and his client, constructive change and development in the client is more likely to occur.¹³

For the therapist to be effective in helping the client towards constructive growth, notes Rogers, it is important that these conditions should not only exist but that they should be expressed to the client and experienced by him. Otherwise they do not exist in his perceptual world and thus cannot be effective. But development in personality and change in behaviour are predicted when the client perceives, to a minimal degree, the genuineness of the counselor and the acceptance and empathy which the counselor experiences for him.¹⁴ Rogers states that he believes that most of his failures to achieve a helping relationship can be traced to an inability to communicate unambiguously to the client what he was and what was going on within him. On the other hand, in those relationships where he is reasonably congruent, he can be almost sure that the relationship will be helpful.¹⁵

What may one expect will be the effect on the client of such a relationship as that we have described? It is Rogers' experience that the client uses it to become more and more himself. As this process takes place, three things happen within the individual.

First, he begins to drop the false fronts or the masks or the roles with which he faced life. He tries to discover

something more basic, something more truly himself. Gradually he learns how much of the feeling he experiences, how much of his behaviour, is not real, is not something which flows from the genuine reactions of his organism, but is a facade, a front behind which he has been hiding. He discovers how much of his life is guided by what he thinks he should be, not by what he is. Often he discovers that he exists only in response to the demands of others, that he seems to have no self of his own, that he is only trying to think and feel and behave in the way that others believe he ought to think and behave and feel. This can be a traumatic experience for the client will find himself involved in removing false faces which he did not know were false faces, and will begin to explore the turbulent and sometimes violent feelings within himself. Yet, traumatic as this may be, the individual usually feels a compelling necessity to search for and become his true self.¹⁶

In the second place, simultaneously with his dropping false fronts, the client moves from living by values introjected from others to values which are experienced in himself in the present. That is, he begins to live in an existential fashion. The self and personality begin to emerge from experience rather than experience being translated and twisted to fit a pre-conceived self-structure. He becomes a participant in and an observer of the ongoing process of organismic experience, rather than being in control of it. "What I will be in the next moment and what I will do, grows out of that moment, and cannot be predicted

in advance, either by me or by others. It seems to mean letting my experience carry me on, in a direction which appears to be forwards towards goals that I can only dimly define, as I try to understand at least the current meaning of that experience.¹⁷ Such living in the moment means an absence of rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition of structure on experience. It means instead a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flowing, changing organization of self and personality. One is open to the experiences of the moment in oneself and in the situation and can, therefore, resolve the needs of the moment in the existing environment in a flexible manner. He can, as a result, deal realistically with people, situations, problems.^{17a}

This leads, finally, to the client discovering a locus of evaluation within himself as a means of arriving at the most satisfying behaviour in each existential situation. Rogers holds that in a person who is open to all his experiences his total organism may be, and often is, wiser than his awareness.¹⁸ He feels less fear of the emotional reactions which he has. There is a gradual growth of trust in, and even affection for the complex, rich, varied assortment of feelings and tendencies which exist in him at the organic level. Consciousness, instead of being the watchman over a dangerous and unpredictable lot of impulses, of which few can be permitted to see the light of day, becomes the comfortable inhabitant of a society of impulses and feelings and thoughts, which are discovered to

be very satisfactorily self-governing when not fearfully guarded.¹⁹

Rogers describes the change which takes place in the individual experiencing for his first time a relationship of congruence, empathy, and unconditional positive regard as a process, not a product. He cites what a client said in a rather puzzled fashion at the conclusion of therapy as a personal description of what it seems like to accept oneself as a stream of becoming, not a finished product: "I haven't finished the job of integrating and reorganizing myself, but that's only confusing, not discouraging, now that I realize this is a continuing process. . . . It's exciting, sometimes upsetting, but deeply encouraging to feel yourself in action, apparently knowing where you are going even though you don't always consciously know where that is."²⁰ This means that a person is a fluid process, not a fixed and static entity; a flowing river of change, not a block of solid material; a continually changing constellation of potentialities, not a fixed quantity of traits.

Rogers points out that this is a movement from as well as a movement towards. The client moves significantly away from being a person driven by inner forces he does not understand, fearful and distrustful of these deeper feelings and of himself, who lives by values taken from others. He moves significantly towards being a person who accepts and even enjoys his own feelings, who values and trusts the deeper layers of his nature, who finds strength in being his own uniqueness, who lives by values

he experiences.²¹ This learning, this movement, enables him to live as a more individuated, more creative, more responsive, and more responsible person; it enables him to be himself.

SUMMARY OF ROGGERIAN ANTHROPOLOGY

Rogers holds that when a child is born his nature is not basically inclined towards evil; there is no inherent defect in his nature; the inner core of man's personality is not untamed and unsocial feelings but the organism itself which is essentially both self-preserving and social. "There is no beast in man."²² As the organism develops, however, the infant very early acquires a need for positive regard from others. In order to achieve this he finds he has to deny to awareness or distort in awareness experiences he finds satisfying and enhancing. Eventually he comes to depend too much on values taken over from others. This leads to a lack of trust in himself, in what he is experiencing, in what he "feels" he would like to do and what he "thinks" he should do in any given circumstance. His own experiencing is no longer a guide to his behaviour. Consciously or often unconsciously he has become enslaved to acting in a manner not of his own choosing. He is no longer his true self. This leads to feelings of insecurity, unsureness, fear of the future, an inner lack of integration. This, Rogers believes, is the situation with most of us.

What is necessary to release man from this servitude? Rogers says it is not some miracle but simply to "add to the

sensory and visceral experiencing which is characteristic of the whole animal kingdom, the gift of a free and undistorted awareness of which only the human animal seems fully capable," and then, "we have an organism which is beautifully and constructively realistic." We have an individual who is "fully man."

How is this brought about? Through a certain type of relationship. When the individual is enabled to enter a relationship with another in which he experiences in the other congruence, empathy and unconditional personal regard, he will be able to begin the process of becoming that person he was meant to be. This will free him for normal growth and development, which Rogers believes is towards being a socialized, self-enhancing, other-enhancing, responsive, responsible person. Man has within himself the capacity to be this, but in the course of years it has been stifled, and man's salvation consists in removing the obstacles that are obstructing his normal growth and development.²³

It is significant that Rogers should describe this change in the individual as "Learning to be free."²⁴ While disagreeing with those persons in the psychological sciences who hold an underlying philosophy of rigid determinism, Rogers notes several ways in which man is not free. He is, for example, a pawn of government; he is molded by mass propaganda; he is the product of class and his values and behaviour are shaped by the class to which he belongs; he is determined by heredity; and,

he is the product of his conditioning. The freedom of which he speaks, however, is different from that.

This freedom is, first of all, essentially an inner thing, something which exists in the living person, quite aside from any of the outward choice of alternatives which we so often think of as constituting freedom. It is what Frankl vividly describes in his experience of the concentration camp, when everything--possessions, identity, choice--was taken from the prisoners. But even months and years in such an environment showed only that everything can be taken from a man but one thing; the last of the human freedoms--to choose one's own attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way."²⁵ Rogers says that the freedom of which he speaks is this inner, subjective, existential freedom, the realization that "I can live myself, here and now, by my own choice," the quality of courage which enables a person to step into the uncertainty of the unknown as he chooses himself. It is the discovery of meaning from within oneself, meaning which comes from listening sensitively and openly to the complexities of what one is experiencing. It is the burden of being responsible for the self one chooses to be. It is something that exists within the individual, something phenomenological rather than objective, but none the less prized.

Secondly, this experience of freedom exists not as a contradiction to the picture of the psychological universe.²⁶ Freedom rightly understood is a fulfillment, by the person, of

the ordered sequence of his life!"²⁷ In answer to the modern philosopher who holds that man is no more than the sum of his conditioning, Rogers quotes Buber as follows: "The free man .

. . . believes in destiny, and believes that it stands in need of him." "He who forgets all that is caused and makes decision out of the depths . . . is a free man, and destiny confronts him as the counterpart of his freedom. It is not his boundary but his fulfillment."²⁸ This intellectual answer, says Rogers, is confirmed convincingly in the experiences of one client after another, as he moves in therapy towards an acceptance of the realities of the world outside and inside himself, and also moves towards becoming a responsible agent in this real world.

We may summarize Rogers outline of the freedom of which he speaks by noting that it is a freedom which exists in the subjective person, a freedom which he courageously uses to live his potentialities, a freedom in which the individual chooses to fulfill himself by playing a responsible and voluntary part in bringing about the destined events of his world. Such a freedom, says Rogers, assists his clients in becoming human, in relating to others, in being a person.

While there is much here that is in keeping with Christian teaching regarding the type of relationship that should exist between persons, there are some points that we must question in view of a Christian understanding of man. For instance, is the esteem in which Rogers holds man really as high as that in

which the Christian faith places him? Is Rogers' view of what is necessary to release man sufficient? Is Rogers' understanding of "destiny" adequate in the light of the Christian teaching on Providence? We shall consider these and other questions after we attempt to outline a Christian understanding of man.

Chapter IV

A CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF MAN

The Christian doctrine of man has its basis in the affirmations that God is the Creator of all things and that creation is good. Man's beginning lies in the creative act of God. He came into existence by the voluntary act of a Creator, and he is preserved in being by God's continuing creativity. Man's knowledge of himself and the world begins here for man is understood in his true nature from beyond himself and the world. He is to be understood primarily from the standpoint of God rather than in terms of the uniqueness of his rational faculties or of his relation to nature.

Man does not set himself in his place; he has been placed. He cannot succeed, therefore, in ordering his life unless he first knows and accepts the position he has been given. To that position, which is determined by the Divine providence of man can relate himself, and in the light of that relatedness he can direct and correct himself.

The essential truth about man in this context is that he is created in the image of God. The implications of this Christian doctrine of the "imago Dei"¹ are important.

First, it affirms the unity of body and soul in human

personality, and is thus opposed to the idealistic error of regarding the mind as essentially good or essentially eternal and the body as inherently evil. Man is, according to the Biblical view, a created and finite existence in both body and spirit.

Secondly, the doctrine of the "imago Dei" provides a basis for the acceptance of creatureliness. It implies that there is nothing wrong with being finite, with having a body, with being this particular individual, with being subject to the vicissitudes of life and death in the environment of nature. This serves as a safeguard against all views which attempt to regard the finite, temporal world as unreal, the body as evil, and death as an incident which relieves man of a temporal encumbrance without touching the intrinsically immortal core of his soul. It also guards against the notion that man is "intrinsically divine," that the moral, spiritual part of man is his "real" nature, linking him to the invisible world, and that his bodily, animal nature must not be regarded as fundamental, in short, that at the core man is "nice". The doctrine of the "imago Dei" stresses that there is a difference between the creature and the Creator, as well as a similarity.

In the third place, the doctrine of the imago Dei suggests that although man is a creature he is a special kind of creature, significantly different from everything else in nature. His humanity must be interpreted in terms of his rational faculties and of something beyond them. Reinhold Niebuhr cites approvingly

the statement by Heidegger that this something more is "the idea of transcendence", that man is something that reaches beyond himself, that he is more than a rational creature.² This quality of transcendence is described by Max Scheler in the following terms: "The nature of man, and that which could be termed his unique quality, transcend that which is usually called intelligence and freedom of choice and would not be reached if his intelligence and freedom could be raised to the n^{th} degree. . . . It is the quality of the human spirit on the other hand to lift itself above itself as living organism and to make the whole temporal and spatial world, including itself, the object of its knowledge."³

Man is self-determining, not only in the sense that he transcends natural processes in such a way as to be able to choose between various alternatives presented to him by the processes of nature, but also in the sense that he transcends himself in such a way that he must choose his total end. In this task of self-determination he is presented with endless possibilities and he can set no limit to what he ought to be, short of the absolute ideal. Yet this same man is a creature whose life is definitely limited by nature, and he is unable to choose anything beyond the bounds set by the creation in which he stands.

Christian faith affirms, contrary to the view held by Carl Rogers, that man can find his true norm only in God. At the

same time man is a creature who must not aspire to be God. The God who is his norm is God as He is revealed in an historical figure, Jesus Christ, the God-man. He is at once an historical character and more than an historical character. His life transcends the possibilities of history, but it remains relevant to all historical striving. Hence, in the Christian doctrine of man, two things must be kept in balance, the height of self-transcendence in man's spiritual stature which the doctrine of the imago Dei implies, and also man's weakness, dependence, and finiteness, his involvement in the necessities and contingencies of the natural world, which his creatureliness implies.⁴ In its purest form the Christian view of man regards man as a unity of God-likeness and creatureliness in which he remains a creature even in the highest spiritual dimensions of his existence and may reveal elements of the image of God even in the lowliest aspects of his natural life.

This relatively high status in which the doctrine of the imago Dei places man poses certain problems for him. Unlike other individuals, man has the power to bind past, present and future together in a stable, organized center of ongoing experience; the power of grasping universal principles; the power to direct his action intentionally towards previsions aims; the power to distinguish between beautiful and ugly, true and false, good and bad; the power to be both actor and spectator in relation to his own existence. Hence man is "above" nature, even though he must remain within it.

Therefore, although there is nothing wrong with man being a creature, he is the only "animal" for whom acceptance or rejection of his status can pose a problem. The intelligence and freedom which are the marks of his grandeur are also the marks of his misery. The endowments of creativity carry with them the question of their use. Man as spirit transcends the natural and temporal processes in which he is involved and also transcends himself. Thus his freedom is the basis of his creativity but it is also his temptation.

Since man is involved in the contingencies and necessities of the natural processes on the one hand, and since, on the other, he stands outside of them, forsees their caprices and perils, he is anxious. In his anxiety he seeks to transmute his finiteness into infinity, his weakness into strength, his dependence into independence. In other words, he seeks to escape finiteness and weakness by a quantitative rather than a qualitative development of his life. The quantitative antithesis of finiteness is infinity. The qualitative possibility of human life is its obedient subjection to the will of God, a possibility expressed by Jesus as follows: "A man . . . by losing his life for my sake . . . will gain it."⁵

We should note that the Christian statement of the ideal possibility of man does not involve self-negation but self-realization. The self is not evil by reason of being a particular self, and its salvation does not consist in absorption into the eternal. Neither is the self divided into a particular or

empirical and a universal self; hence, salvation does not consist in ridding itself of its particularity and in achieving universality. The Christian view of the self is only possible from the standpoint of Christian theism in which God is revealed as loving will and His will is active in creation, judgment, and redemption. The highest self-realization is, therefore, not the destruction of the self's particularity but the subjection of its particular will to the universal will.

But the self lacks the faith and the trust to subject itself to God. It seeks to establish itself independently. It seeks to find its life and thereby loses it, for the self which it asserts is less than its true self. It is the self which asserts the contingent and arbitrary factors of an immediate situation, and in so doing it loses itself. It increases its insecurity because it gives its immediate necessities a consideration which they do not deserve and which they cannot have without disturbing the harmony of creation. By this inordinate self-love, by giving life a false centre, the self then destroys the real possibilities for itself and others. Hence, inordinate self-love, possible because of man's freedom, points to lack of trust in God, and this leads to ever increasing anxiety. But it is significant that the same freedom which tempts to anxiety also contains the ideal possibility of knowing God. Pauline theology is significant here. He declares that man is without excuse because "All that may be known of God by men lies plain before their eyes; indeed God himself has disclosed it to them.

His invisible attributes, that is to say his everlasting power and deity, have been visible, ever since the world began, to the eye of reason, in the things he has made."⁶ The anxiety of freedom leads to sin only if the prior sin of unbelief is assumed.

This raises the question as to why man is so reluctant to "lose his life that he might find it"? Why is he so hesitant to place himself in obedient subjection to the will of God? In attempting to answer this question, which is so basic to man's essential nature, one can scarcely avoid reference to the doctrine of original sin and its effect on man. "(This doctrine) in its classical form offends both rationalists and moralists by maintaining the seemingly absurd position that man sins inevitably and by a fateful necessity but that he is nevertheless to be held responsible for actions which are prompted by an ineluctable fate."⁷

We need not consider here the arguments put forth by those who take the basically Augustinian view, that there is a bias towards evil in the will of man, or those who follow the Pelagian school, which emphasizes that there is in man an essentially free will and that his sinful actions are a conscious choice of evil in defiance of a known good. It will suffice for our purpose to point out that there is a dimension of human experience that is always present, namely, that we have been created for fellowship with God, that we repudiate this continually, and that the whole of mankind does this along with us.

"Christian anthropology affirms the notorious conflict between man's recalcitrant will and the divine purpose in which alone man and his world find their true meaning. It describes that age long misdirection of human life which is the very presupposition of the Gospel."⁸

The sense of a conflict between what man is and ought to be is apparent everywhere, even though the explanations of the conflict are usually contradictory and confused. Some contemporary thinkers in their attempt to do justice to this bondage of the human will assert that man becomes caught in it, not because the nature he has received from God is evil, but because man makes it evil himself. From birth to death the human individual is continually violating his own good nature, not merely because he is ignorant of what he ought to do, but because he will not do it. He is so enslaved to this evil will that he cannot unfetter himself by an act of will, for every act of will issues from a center that is wrongly disposed. If one asks how man came into the position where his will is thus rebelliously fixed, it will be difficult to find an answer. Many modern writers on the problem agree that every particular refusal to follow the good presupposes a will that is already set in such refusal. Yet these same writers insist that continuation in bondage to sin is carried forward responsibly, not ignorantly or automatically.

The contrast between what man truly is, that is, as seen in Christ, and what he has become has given Christianity a

heightened sense of sin. This destroys the prestige of normality which sinful forms of life periodically achieve in the world. Yet faith in Christ could not find response in the human soul were it not uneasy about the contrast between its true and its present state. Men who have fallen deeply into the wretchedness of sin are never easy in their minds, but their uneasiness is frequently increased by some vivid reminder of the innocence of their childhood or the aspirations of their youth. Man's uneasy conscience can be understood only as the protest of his essential nature against his present state.

What then does Christianity say about the means whereby man may be restored to that for which he was created? How can he become that self he was meant to be? Is it, as Carl Rogers says, by being provided with a certain type of relationship? Or is it by being established in a relationship with a particular One?

We have said that man becomes a sinner and falls into confusion by his voluntary rejection of his true position in the original order decreed by God. This means that man, who is set by God in tension between finiteness and freedom, a tension which in obedience to God would be good and meaningful, is determined to end that tension independently and by his own power. Instead of purging his anxiety by faith in the ultimate security of God's love overcoming all immediate insecurities of nature and history, man seeks to overcome his insecurity by a will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness. He

fails to acknowledge his limitations. In pride he denies his finitude or surrenders his freedom. The sin of pride is basic in man.

Pride takes several forms. There is the pride of power in which the human ego, while failing to recognize the contingent and dependent character of its life, assumes its self-mastery and self-sufficiency and believes itself to be the author of its own existence, the judge of its own values and the master of its own destiny. Again, man's feeling of insecurity may cause him to seek security by an endeavour to assert himself at the expense of others, but the more he establishes himself in power and glory, the greater is his fear that he may tumble from his eminence or be discovered in his pretension. In trying to make himself God he finds himself betrayed by his own weakness.

At other times pride displays itself in an intellectual form which causes man to forget that he is involved in a temporal process, and he imagines himself in complete transcendence over history. Intellectual pride leads to moral pride in which finite man believes that his highly conditioned virtue is the final righteousness and that his very relative moral standards are absolute. Moral pride is revealed in all self-righteous judgments in which the other is condemned because he fails to conform to the highly arbitrary standards of the self. Since the self judges itself by its own standards and finds itself good. It judges others by its own standards and finds

them evil when their standards fail to conform to its own. It is, in short, establishing one's own righteousness instead of God's righteousness.⁹ The result of pride is that it leads to inordinate self-love, as was noted above. In the final chapter we shall consider whether Rogers takes sufficient account of the danger pride presents.

Man's pride is the great barrier to his becoming what his Creator meant him to be. How, then, is he to reach his true nature? Sin has caused a broken relationship between God and man, and as a further consequence, between man and his fellows. Christian faith affirms that man can reach his true position only when this broken relationship has been re-established. This is something that unaided man cannot do. It must be worked out from the side of God on behalf of man.

It is to enable man to find his true norm, in relatedness to God and to his fellowmen, that, according to Biblical faith, God speaks to man in the Incarnation. The content of this revelation is an act of reconciliation in which the judgment of God upon the pride of man is not abrogated, in which the sin of man becomes more sharply revealed and defined by the knowledge that God is Himself the victim of man's sin and pride. Yet the final word is not one of judgment but of mercy and forgiveness, for God in his love does not leave man alone to continue in his sinful condition. God sees man's heart and knows that sin is not merely the regrettable slip of an essentially good man but a perversion of the will which deforms the whole

man and distorts all his thoughts and deeds. God then takes upon Himself the guilt of sin and all its fatal consequences, in the atoning death of His Son on Golgotha. This is the significance of the historic doctrine of the God-man, of Christ as the "second Adam". The same Christ who is accepted by faith as the revelation of the character of God is also regarded as the revelation of the true character of man.¹⁰

Hence, salvation should be thought of primarily in terms of a dynamic transformation that removes man-made evils at the source by changing the man. It should not be thought of in terms that would require a complete sloughing off of creatureliness. Furthermore, we must not think that the conditions of salvation are fulfilled exclusively by God apart from existing resources in human nature nor must or can they be fulfilled exclusively by man, as Carl Rogers implies. Salvation, in Christian thought, is that condition of wholeness which comes about when human life is based on certain openness to the creative and redemptive power of God.

This condition is reached by means of man's freedom and constitutes an enhancement of that freedom. The freedom of man, so conceived, is directly related to acquaintance with his own depths; his assent cannot be unforced and wholehearted if it is opposed by unconscious motives and impulses. Yet the very process of widening acquaintance with the sources of human bondage leads to the release of healing power. That is, faith in God can rest upon actualities that function here and now; it

need not be directed exclusively to something which utterly transcends our experience and our history.

In every person there is an ideal he feels he should reach because his essential nature places an obligation upon him, an obligation to live up to a certain standard. Although this law within him gives rise to this sense of obligation, it cannot help him fulfill it. It is the "good that I would" but which all too often "I do not", as Paul reminds us. It heightens man's anxiety, his sin, by arousing sinful egotism to a more conscious defiance of his essential nature. It may even arouse sinful pride by tempting man to assume that he keeps the law because he knows it.¹¹

It is not possible, however, for a man to understand himself merely from the standpoint of the law within him, that is, from the perspective of the good which he knows he ought to do. Fully to understand himself he must know that he violates the law which he regards as his norm, but neither can he be fully understood if it is not recognized that that law is the claim of his essential nature upon him. Man's transcendent freedom can be tolerable and creative only when it has found its source, end, and norm in the will of God, growing out of response to the love of God.

Because man is not merely creature but also free spirit, and because every moral norm stands under higher possibilities by reason of his freedom, there is no moral standard at which the human spirit can find rest short of the standard of "Faith,

hope, and love."

The relation of the law of love to law as such is perfectly comprehended in the story of Jesus' encounter with the rich young man.¹² The young man had "kept all the commandments"; but the commandments, the "law" in the more restricted sense, did not satisfy him and his continued uneasiness prompted the question, What lack I yet? This question, What lack I yet? suggests that what lies in the uneasy conscience of the sinner is not so much a knowledge that the ultimate law of life is the law of love, as the more negative realization that obedience to the ordinary rules of justice and equity is not sufficient.

Jesus defines the more ultimate possibility toward which the young man is yearning in the words: "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast and give to the poor." What is demanded is an action in which regard for the self is completely eliminated. All simple moralism, which assumes that the law of life needs only to be stated in order to be obeyed, is refuted by the response of the rich young ruler to this demand: "He went away sorrowful for he had great possessions." For the moment it would appear that only the extent of the young man's possessions made it impossible for him to obey the ultimate law, for Jesus observes: "Verily I say unto you that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven." But the disciples quickly realize that the command runs counter to the anxieties of all men about themselves and their possessions. Their question, Who, then, can be saved? quickly and justly

extends the predicament of the rich young man to include all men, since all men are involved in the sin of establishing their own security by what they have and what they are.

The answer of Jesus to this despairing question implies a complete acceptance of the viewpoint of the disciples. Jesus admits that the ultimate possibility of human life is beyond the capacity of sinful man: "With man this is impossible." It is an ultimate possibility only by divine grace: "But with God all things are possible." This suggests that the contradiction between man's essential nature and his sinful condition is insoluble from the standpoint of man's own resources and can be solved only from the standpoint of God's resources. This thesis is emphasized by Saint Paul.¹³

This recorded incident illustrates that man realizes that within himself there lies an higher law than simply "law", a law which transcends all "law". It also illustrates that man's fulfillment is dependent upon his being in a right relationship with God and with his fellow man, the former being the prerequisite of the latter. This finds expression in the commandments given by Jesus as the sum of the Law and the Prophets, namely, "Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind. . . . Love your neighbour as yourself."¹⁴

The first of these commandments is the basic one, just as unbelief or mistrust is the basic sin. This prime requirement of love is identical with the other two terms of the Pauline

triad, "faith" and "hope". Without faith in the providence of God the freedom of man is intolerable, because the anxiety of freedom tempts man to seek a self-sufficiency and self-mastery incompatible with his dependence upon forces which he does not control. Hope is a particular form of that faith. The future is the symbol of the unpredictable possibilities of eternity which may appear in time, and these must be a realm of terror without the hope which places them under the providence of God, for in that case they would stand under either a blind fate or pure caprice. Without faith and hope these possibilities represent an intolerable threat to man's little system of meaning by which he lives and by which he seeks to maintain his sense of domestic security, for they may at any moment introduce into it uncalculated and incalculable elements.

Faith in the wisdom of God is thus a prerequisite of love because it is the condition without which man is anxious and is driven by his anxiety into vicious circles of self-sufficiency and pride. The admonition "be not anxious" has meaning only in conjunction with the faith expressed by Jesus, "Your heavenly Father knows that you have need of these things."

Without complete love for God, "love with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your mind," willing obedience to God is impossible. The anxious self invariably makes itself its own centre and end. Insofar as the self is centered in itself, it can offer only coerced obedience to God. At the same time, inasfar as the self transcends itself it knows the

inadequacy of such reluctant attitudes. Acts of obedience which fall short of love produce an uneasiness of conscience, different only in degree, not in kind, from the uneasiness created by disobedience.

The perfect harmony of the soul with itself is thus a derivative of its perfect communion with and love of God. Where the love of God transcends obedience the soul is centered in its true source and end without reservation. There are obviously no actions of sinful man that conform to this ideal possibility. Just as that faith, hope and trust which eliminate anxiety are not simple possibilities of human existence, even for those in whom Christian revelation has penetrated through the confusion of sin, so freedom from anxiety, as each Christian who honestly analyses his own concerns knows, is an ultimate possibility which man as sinner denies in action. The sinful self is anxious about itself, yet it knows it ought not to be. There is the sense that an obedience which is less than love is not normative even though it is universal. It is the "thou shalt" which suggests that there are no "thou shalts" in perfection.

The second of these commandments, "Love your neighbour as yourself," is dependent upon the first. That is, love in its horizontal dimension is dependent on love in its verticle dimension. Human personality has a depth and uniqueness which escapes the ordinary process of knowledge. Those processes always tend to reduce the fellowman to a thing or object.

Human as well as divine personality is obscured when the self seeks to understand the other merely as an object of observation. The creative initiative of the other, the unique depth of personality in the other, is veiled by an approach which touches the surface of his life but does not penetrate to the secret of his being. Since men are separated from one another by the uniqueness and the individuality of each spirit, however closely they may be bound together by ties of nature, they cannot relate themselves to one another in terms which will do justice to both the bondsof nature and the freedom of their spirit if they are not related in terms of love. Only in such a relation can the uniqueness of each individuality be known; it cannot be known in terms of general knowledge in which the self seeks to subordinate uniqueness in order to fit the "other" into the general categories of reason.

Real love between person and person is, therefore, a relationship in which spirit meets spirit in a dimension in which both the uniformities and the differences of nature, which bind men together and also separate them, are transcended. This is no simple possibility. There is a sense in which each soul remains inscrutable to its fellows; there are mysteries in the heart of each person; there are "walls of partition" between man and man. This tends to frustrate love between persons. Insofar as human love is possible it is always partly a relation between the soul and soul by way of their common relation to God. Where the love of God does not undergird and complete the

relation of man to man, the differences which nature creates and sin accentuates, differences of geography, race, time, place and history, separate men from one another; and although similarities of nature and of reason may indeed unite men, it is not on the level of spirit and freedom.

The law of love is thus a requirement of human freedom, and the freedom of the self and of the other both require it. The freedom of the self requires it because it is such that no matter what rules or regulations or beneficiaries are made to alleviate the concerns of others, these are general, and as such they are lacking when it comes to meeting the unique needs of the particular individual. The other has needs and requirements which cannot be satisfied by general rules of equity. So the free self finds that it is constantly rising above these laws and rules because they are not determined by contingent factors and hence they fall short of the ultimate possibility of loving the neighbour "as thyself". Therefore, love is the end term of any system of morals. It is the moral requirement in which all schemes of justice are fulfilled and negated. In the final chapter we shall consider this in relation to the position taken by Carl Rogers.

SUMMARY

In the process of reaching maturity and autonomy, most of us strive for security by trying to organize the universe around ourselves, and most of us learn only through the suffering and

estrangement which attend egocentricity that this way leads not to security but to an endlessly precarious and ultimately fruitless attempt to twist reality into meeting our private specifications. Insofar as we are incapable of love, we are not only divided within ourselves and isolated from other human beings, but also we are violating the universal principle upon which human fulfillment is based. Our defensive structures must be broken through by healing power which is wider than ourselves; yet, this power does not operate without our free acceptance of and desire for it. We see, not merely intellectually, but with heart and soul, that what is made accessible to us in our "new" selves has been what we have yearned for all along. We have evaded it partly because the price in suffering seemed too high, especially when there was no guarantee of a satisfying outcome. We have also evaded it because literally we could not work toward it effectively as long as we were imprisoned within the old strategies of anxiety, defensiveness, and the need to feel superior. The price in suffering is a facing and grasping, in feeling as well as in thought, of the deeply hidden causes of inner dividedness. This facing can be carried on healingly, redemptively, only in a relationship of genuine unconditional acceptance, one aspect of which is forgiveness.

Such a relationship is offered to man by God in Jesus Christ. He offers himself in all his gracious forgiveness, strength and energizing power to as many as will receive him.

To all such He opens a way of life which reaches personal fulfillment along with and partly through the fulfillment of others. The power which emancipates man from enslavement to a bad conscience is divine as well as human, but the end result of such emancipation is not love for God and hatred for self; it is affirmation of self as grounded in God. Because He accepts us we come to accept ourselves. This involves moving forward into a deepened recognition of failure, impotence, and need at many points.

The divine forgiveness which He discloses always has been and always will be accessible to men. We experience it as that "making right" of our lives which occurs when we turn away from fighting ourselves and others and the truth itself and turn trustfully towards the divine power which surrounds us and can work through us. This experience of reconciliation, despite past failures and unsolved problems in the present, makes men actually more lovable, more discerning, more capable of devoting themselves to that which will enrich all humanity.

It needs to be emphasized that this relationship with God in Christ, which Christian anthropology affirms as the only means of man becoming truly "that person he was meant to be," does not mean the negation of self; rather, it is the fulfillment of self. Man, renewed and empowered by the Christ, does not become a puppet on a string. Instead, he becomes a channel through which the redemptive work of Christ is carried on in co-operation with Him. We are made whole through being enabled

to bring ourselves, with our possibilities and limitations, into the service of the redemptive power which the Christ incarnates. We are not made whole through trying to eradicate ourselves and live through Christ as a substitute.

Chapter V

EVALUATION

In attempting an evaluation in the light of Christian theology of Carl Rogers' teaching about man, one needs to note briefly the background out of which Rogers speaks. He tells us that he was raised in a home marked by close family ties and a very strict and uncompromising religious and ethical atmosphere. After spending some time at Union Theological Seminary in preparation for the Christian ministry, he changed to the study of psychology, largely as the result of a seminar in which the students discussed freely their own questions and doubts and which caused him to think himself "right out of religious work." He wanted a field in which he could be sure his freedom of thought would not be limited.¹

Possibly Rogers' desire for freedom from religious doctrines to explore his own questions says something regarding his desire for a freedom he did not find in Christianity, perhaps due to his conservative upbringing, but which might not be alien to Christianity. Whether or not this is so, the fact remains that although he does not profess to embrace Christian theology, there are strong indications that he did not divest himself completely of the influence of his Christian upbringing

and training. His methodology and anthropology contain much that is basic to Christianity, and he is worthy of receiving serious consideration in these areas for he recalls us to understandings and attitudes that are embedded in the ministry of Jesus but which are in danger of being overlooked by the Christian Church in general and the Christian counselor in particular.

First, there is the fact that Rogers sees man as a being of supreme worth. Even though an individual may have ceased to be that person he was meant to be, there is still a strong chance that if the proper relationship is provided he can regain something of his original possibility.

Rogers sees in man a basic estrangement from his created nature, an estrangement which prevents him from achieving his potential. T. C. Oden² sees here a marked similarity to the basic structure of the Pauline-Augustinian-Protestant dialectic of the estranged creature, created for authentic life in the image of God, yet existing in a wretched estrangement from himself, a cleavage which prevents him from being fully himself. While there may be this similarity evident in the workings of man's estrangement, Christian theology and Rogers' doctrine of man would not agree on the basic cause. However, Rogers is fully aware that though persons may be far from fully-functioning, the possibility for renewal under appropriate conditions remains. This dialectic is embedded deeply in his theory of therapy.

Rogers' emphasis that man is a being in relationship³ is an important concept of Christian faith and essential to an understanding both of Christianity and of man's role as a Christian. If man is to be delivered from his condition of estrangement, self-alienation, incongruence, and become aware of himself he will need help. For Rogers that help is the mediation of unconditional positive regard through a congruent and empathetic person. The emphasis he places on the need for congruence and empathy in the helping individual are parallel to the emphasis of Christ in dealing with people. Yet there is a real danger that the Christian counselor may adopt a position that either is or appears to the client to be judgmental and moralistic. I do not think that Rogers would refrain from making any kind of judgment, but by his very positive regard he would endeavour to provide that kind of relationship which communicates to the counselee that even though he is the kind of person he is, despite his failings of which the counselor does not approve, he is accepted as an individual of supreme worth. There is judgment here, but it is judgment tempered with mercy, and not an attitude of superiority. Furthermore, this is not the type of unconditional positive regard that attempts to explain away all guilt and say nothing that would make the counselee feel bad.⁴

The proper attitude on the part of one who would help a troubled person is of vital importance. The need is for someone in whom this frightened, estranged individual will sense

understanding, not one who is merely an interested observer, as he tries to explain himself, but an empathic companion who is willing to "go with him on the fearful journey into himself, into the buried fear, and hate, and love which he has never been able to let flow in him."⁵ That is, the mediator who would lead a person out of his estrangement must be one who is willing to engage in a certain kind of descent into hell, the hell of the internal conflict of the estranged man, an incarnate participation in the suffering of his human brother, even though that brother may at times perceive the mediator as an intruder and a threat; he must be willing to become all things to all men.⁶

Surely this kind of relationship is a basic tenet of the Christian faith, of Christ's teaching on what our attitude to our fellows should be. Yet it is more; it is the very relationship demonstrated by Jesus in relation to man during his ministry and supremely at Calvary; it is Christian love at its best.

Such a relationship is possible only when one's attitude to the person to be helped is that of unconditional positive regard. As we have seen⁷, this means that the therapist cares for the client in a non-possessive way; he exhibits an outgoing positive feeling, without reservations, that respects the other person as a separate individual, does not possess him nor is it demanding. Christian faith reads this process in the light of the kerygma's explicit proclamation of the unconditional agape

of God, viewing the therapeutic process from the vantage point of the divine redemptive process. Rogers does not mention the love of God as the proper basis of understanding unconditional positive regard, even though he sees the latter as a prerequisite of effective therapy. The question might be raised, Is unconditional positive regard a human possibility apart from the love of God? In some instances it may be, but Christian faith leads one to believe that there are many cases where it is not, and to maintain that this could be the attitude of man to all, apart from a direct relationship to God in Christ, is to fail to take into account the full depth of the human predicament.

In the preceding chapter this point was developed at some length. There it was shown that the commandment "Love your neighbour as yourself" is dependent on the prior commandment regarding love of God. That is, love in its horizontal dimension is dependent on love in its vertical dimension. Human personality has a depth and uniqueness which escapes the ordinary processes of knowledge. Real love between person and person is a relationship in which spirit meets spirit in a dimension in which both the uniformities and the differences of nature, which bind men together and also separate them, are transcended. Where love of God does not undergird and complete the relation of man to man it remains questionable whether it is realistic to expect individuals to have a fully developed unconditional positive regard for their fellows.

We should note that the unconditional positive regard of which Rogers speaks is directed not only towards the individual as he is but also towards his whole potentiality to become an authentic person with full humanity. He tries to see the individual, not merely as he is at present, but as he might become, although his present brokenness must be received also in unconditional acceptance. He quotes with approval Martin Buber whose phrase "confirming the other," has special significance for Rogers. Buber says, "Confirming means . . . accepting the whole potentiality of the other. . . . I can recognize in him, know in him, the person he has been . . . created to become. .

. . I confirm him in myself, and then in him, in relation to this potentiality that . . . can now be developed, can evolve."⁸

Rogers goes on to point out that if he accepts another as something fixed, already diagnosed and classified, already shaped by his past, then he is doing his part to confirm a limited hypothesis about the person. If he accepts him as a process of becoming, then he is doing what he can to encourage or actualize his potentialities.

This insight, this attitude, is one that deserves emphasis. Surely this was the insight Jesus demonstrated in his treatment of the rejects of the society of his day. The Christian Church would do well to note this and try to recover this perspective in ministering to persons. This means that we can not regard the underprivileged as persons destined to that role, or as "hopeless types," or simply as people whom we must assist if

we are to have an easy conscience. Instead, we see those who are now classed as rejects, underprivileged, and ~~soon~~, as individuals in their own right, with the potential for living a full life and becoming fully-functioning. Rather than moralizing or "carrying them along" we should endeavour to be the means of enabling them to reach their potential and become positive contributors to society.⁹

One may take exception to Rogers' optimistic view of man, as noted earlier. If man is so forward looking, ~~so~~ concerned for the welfare of the species, why has the history of man shown so much of the beast? On the other hand, Rogers recalls us to see the potential in man and to work to help him achieve this.

Carl Rogers' concept of the self has been considered in detail.¹⁰ We are indebted to him for the clarity and concreteness with which he traces this development. He has depicted the self as emerging in a biological process that begins at birth and is carried on in a societal matrix through to adulthood. It depends on both these processes at every point and is affected by them at every level. The factors that influence most markedly the type of self that will emerge are what the organism views as "satisfying" and as providing "security". The pursuit of satisfactions refers to the biological needs for food, drink, elimination, sex, sleep, and so on. Throughout life the need for these satisfactions is physiologically provoked or decreased as the body dictates. The need for

security has reference to the claim of Rogers that man is a being in relationship. It is the very deeply motivated desire for acceptance, belonging, approval and the fear of disapproval, rejection and loss of support. "Security" is affected by changes in the personal environment and by the impact of society. This applies particularly to the perceived attitude of significant others. Disapproval is the sign of the threat of abandonment; approval is the sign of continued support and security.

This double enterprise, satisfaction and security, governs the process by which the self emerges and finds its individual form. The most crucial aspect of the process is the perception of and reaction to the attitudes of other persons. The self-system's relation to others is determined by the way it has assimilated what it perceives to be the attitudes and actions of others. The pattern of the self-system, constructed thus out of appraisal and reaction, develops slowly and tends to persist tenaciously thereafter. It determines to a great degree the manner in which the individual will react in future to persons hitherto unknown. The unconscious influence of memories and attitudes no longer relevant may even distort future person-to-person relationships.

That is, the human self registers the felt dispositions of significant others; it is the organizing center of the energies of the organism as these are directed towards "satisfactions" and "security"; it is the sum of the reflected

appraisals, yet, at the same time, it is the "appraiser" of these appraisals. Hence, the self is shaped in the social matrix and its nature determined to a considerable degree by the social process.

We are indebted to psychotherapists such as Rogers for showing us how fully and integrally involved the self-system is in each level of existence, from the lowest to the highest. This understanding is of immense importance and applies to every aspect of our interpretation. Yet, as A. C. Outler¹¹ points out, psychotherapists (including Rogers) still leave us with our basic question unanswered. Why do human selves emerge as they do, and with such extraordinary characteristics, in a process which is so nearly similar for many other organisms that are highly responsive to stimuli, yet which develop so differently? Other organisms have hedonic drives, they are conditioned by their cogeners, they seek satisfactions and securities, and develop energy systems which are impressively integrative, biologically stable and efficient. The human self emerges in a matrix which has very much in common with that in which simian "selves" emerge; the human fetus and infant show plainly their close kinship with their primate cousins, and the human adult does not disengage himself from the animal kingdom. But the human self appears to vary more widely from simian selves than the differences in their genetic processes would seem to allow. And human selves seem to be affected by human appraisals in a fashion quite distinct from the appraisals of

other "selves" in their environment. Interpersonal relations appear to be quite different from intersimian. Thus, if the self can be explained simply in reductionist terms it would be necessary to show empirically that the differences between human selves and other selves are natural developments in an evolutionary continuum, that "mind" and "spirit" and "personality" are nothing more than symmetrical extensions of the organic process. Christian faith holds that this cannot be shown; it maintains that the self cannot be "explained" if one omits its relation to ultimates beyond it.

Rogers (and others) have explored the positive and normative role of culture for the making of personality. He would hold that the individual self is the sum of reflected appraisals from significant other selves. These appraisers would also, presumably, in their turn be sums of reflected appraisals. If this is so, what then is society? Is it a vast and incredibly complex equilibrium of individual reactor systems, each contingent on the harmony and integrative action of the respective individual entities? Society is certainly the matrix of selfhood and the medium of all self activities, but is it the self's creator, sustainer and redeemer? We should have to conclude that it is if we omit any reference to the transcendental. Society may be the matrix but is not the source of selfhood.

The self needs to be explained in its finiteness, but all such explanations must have an open end to the mystery of the

self as it responds to the infinite. The Christian message entails certain specific notions about man which have to be related to empirical psychology if it is to be assimilated into Christian wisdom. The Christian is bound, by the radical implications of his faith, to maintain the conviction that each human self is a unique creature of God. He cannot be subsumed within the species nor yet within nature and society. Man exists as an item in nature but his distinctively human existence comes from his self-participation in an order and a purpose which transcends nature, for he passes beyond the limits of the natural order through his participation in the transcendental unities of reason, freedom and grace. To be a man is to be a unique entity,¹² not merely an instance of a process; it is to be a singular existent capable of being known as a self and of knowing other selves, but always in a transcendental relation to God, who stands before and beyond our existence as the ground of our existence whether as organisms or as persons. In the depth of his being man is radically dependent upon the power of God. In the height of his being, man is a beloved child of God and bears God's image; he is a finite creature made for communion with his Creator.

In the Christian view, therefore, there could be no human selves apart from God, without a relation to God, for the ground of the self's transcendence is in God. To be a self, in Christian terms, is to transcend the empirical systems in which the naturalist would place him and to exist in a unique relation

to God, in every way dependent on Him, yet at every point open to the options and crises which arise in the life situations in which he finds himself, through which he develops, as he comes to know other selves and God and is known by them. The Christian view does not deny but affirms that man's development is conditioned by his relation to God, by his response to God--in love or hate, trust or mistrust, harmony or conflict. The Christian perspective on selfhood as developed in the preceding chapter is radically theocentric. It asserts that man is from God and exists before God, that he may be against God yet can be redeemed by God, that he may enjoy communion with God in and through the God-man.

It is the reality of God which guarantees the reality of the human person; it is the love of God which defines the person's highest hope and good; it is God's self-disclosure in Christ and immanent presence in the Holy Spirit which creates the atmosphere in which we can truly know ourselves as God knows us, and accept ourselves as He has accepted us in His grace. We would agree with Rogers that the human self emerges in the dynamic patterns of nature and society, but the intention behind and within that emergence is a special project of God, who has made us for communion with Himself and made us to be ourselves, and any account of personal growth and healing which leaves the divine reality unacknowledged is insufficient.¹³

The human self is certainly an object that can be described in Rogerian terms or examined by the sciences of man, yet it is

also a subject which never appears to the view of others or even to the most determined introspection. I do not think that Rogers would deny this.¹⁴ However, he might not agree with the Christian view that this is so because this self-subject transcends the causal order without abrogating it. It is this self as subject which is related to God as divine Subject, never as divine Object. As we have already noted, the human self is finite and, as object, touches all other finites, in some sort of relation. But the self as subject touches the infinite; it is the meeting place of time and eternity, of man and God. Thus the self escapes itself in freedom and is, therefore, never a fully predictable or manipulable object. The self as object is in the world and of the world, hence, it falls within the province of the sciences. But the subject-self is in the world but not of the world, hence it does not fall within the province of the sciences. Yet these are not two separate selves but a complex integer which has to be considered from two aspects.

The self must be explained in its finiteness, but all such explanations must have an open end to the mystery of the self as it responds to the infinite. God comes to man, knows him in his total existence, makes Himself known to man in the offer of love and the demand for righteousness. In this process God draws man beyond his purely "natural" share in the causal order and thrusts him into freedom. The human organism becomes an authentic person, then, not merely through the impulses of

nature and society described in the psychodynamic account of human growth but also by the impulsion and purpose of the Creator-Spirit, the ground and sustaining power of existence.¹⁵

The Christian view of man needs to appropriate the psychotherapeutic ideal of psychological autonomy which Rogers stresses. Undistorted by superego tyrannies and the arbitrary interventions of other persons, man can become self-directing. Autonomy on this level needs to be distinguished from the secular conceptions of autonomy in which man is the measure and master of ~~existence~~ as well. The Christian message makes it plain that man is God's creature; it is from God, the Source, that man's being and goodness flow. Our destiny stands in our knowledge of Him, and in His service our freedom and finiteness are perfected.

What are some of the practical implications of the Christian view of the self as compared with that of Carl Rogers? Doctrines of the self are bound to affect our interpretation of every interpersonal relation. If, for example, a therapist believes that his client, and that he himself, are nothing but energy systems in a natural process which is itself the only ultimate there is, he will have a certain estimate of the goals and ends of therapy. He will interpret the quandaries into which men fall in a certain way. He will hold certain beliefs about the possibilities of this or any other man. He will have a particular view of the good ordering of the best life for man. If, on the other hand, he works from the inner conviction

of his own creatureliness and of God's loving concern for the well-being and blessedness of his children, if he believes that men are finite yet not fettered by the bonds of finitude, will he not see and answer the essential questions differently? Even though at the outset the clinical course of therapy might begin and go forward in much the same way, both the quality of the process and the aims would be different. And as growing psychic health brought up the possibility of searching questions about the self and its ground, the two different sets of assumptions would more and more generate two different frames of reference, not only for the termination of therapy but for the preparation for living beyond therapy. The same broad principles apply in all inter-personal relationships.¹⁶

Christianity's concern for the health of the whole man and psychotherapy's goal of sane, productive living agree in many important ways. If men are to live well, they must know themselves as they are and as they may be. Psychotherapy, as a strictly empirical discipline, cannot tell us what we are, and ought not to tell us we are nothing but. Neither can it supply a rigorous description of existence as a whole, although within limits the methodology of Rogers is quite valid. The fact is that both sides could profit from a sincere attempt to understand and adopt the good in the other.¹⁷

In Carl Rogers' conception of man, which is really a restricted humanism, nature is ultimate and, within the natural order, man is both the measure and measurer, master of his

fate, captain of his soul. A Christian view of man, on the other hand, sees the Living God standing before and beyond and in all things, Creator, Righteous Judge, Redeemer, Sustainer, in whose love and power we live and find the meaning of our lives. This does not mean that the Christian rejects everything that the humanist psychologist teaches regarding man; rather, he is free to learn what and where he can from the humanist psychology, but also free to reject the uncertain faith with which it has been largely associated.

The fact of human nonfulfillment poses a serious problem for the Christian just as it does for the humanist. It is, for the Christian, a distortion of a process in which God and man are both deeply engaged; God in sovereign love and man in tragic freedom. Human existence is set in the total enterprise of God's creation. Neither nature nor man within nature is self-authenticating or self-contained. All life's meanings must be sought and found in the immanent action of a transcendent love from which life proceeds and to which life's destiny is turned. Man is, first and last, God's creature, endowed with freedom-in-finiteness, as we have already noted. His selfhood is neither an accident nor an episode. He stands in the depths of his being, before God and over against God, a finite reagent to the infinite Agent. God purposed to create a community of finite, free and rational creatures who could react to Him and to one another, in a mode of responsibility which is distinctive in the order of creation. Man is made to share in

God's creative and redemptive process, for he is made for faith, for commitment, for community, for love.¹⁸

Man's failure of fulfillment is a deeper tragedy than a deformity of the growth process. There is what Outler calls a "human quandary" which is something far more serious than maladaptation or error. It is a distortion of the self's right relation to its ultimate ground, and as a consequence of this, to other persons. If the self were nothing more than an energy system and the ultimate ground of such a system were natural process, nonfulfillment would be simply an aspect of the withdrawal of nature, a consequence of the fact that nature seems to care for the species but not for the individual. But if the context of the human self is transcendent reality, as we have maintained, and if God is the ground and end of existence and all its values, then the failure of the self to fulfill God's purposes is the worst of all tragedies. This tragedy may express itself in varying degrees of maladjustment; but, deeper than maladjustment is the human estrangement which the Christian calls sin, and which still remains as the human quandary, even when neurosis is cured or "normalcy" made tolerable. We must beware of confounding a successful psychotherapeutic cure with repentance. The barrier of sin cannot be surmounted even by the best analysis. This requires that forgiveness which brings relief from the bondage of sin, and which God alone can bestow. Before the individual is able to receive this there must be repentance.¹⁹

Rogers would agree that man has many defects and errors, but that man is basically a sinner is something which he cannot accept.²⁰ For if man is a sinner, it means he is in a wrong relation, an estranged and alienated relation, to God the primal source of his selfhood. And such a man could not save himself nor manage his own destiny apart from God's grace. Neither nature nor society could restore him or bring him to fulfillment. If the human plight is really radical, it would take God's interventative power and love to restore man to a just and right relation to God and his fellows. But this assumes the reality of God's priority and initiative in human existence. Without this the possibility of what we have described above as the bondage of the will or original sin must be denied.

We have already noted that the basic sin of man is pride. Man falls into pride when he seeks to raise his contingent existence to unconditioned significance. One form of pride, moral pride, is the pretension of finite man that his highly conditioned virtue is the final righteousness and that his very relative standards are absolute. On this score we must take exception to Rogers' view of the fully functioning person, who is supposed to find within himself the locus of evaluation as the means of arriving at the most satisfying behaviour in each existential situation. This makes man his own arbiter, his own referrent. To Rogers, the "free" man is the one who lives subjectively for freedom exists in subjectivity. He is free because he chooses to fulfill himself by doing what he feels he

should. Surely this is the way to pride, to the inordinate self-esteem in virtue of which a man sees himself not as a dependent creature but as supreme. Unless an individual has a referral point beyond himself conditions are likely to come which are either fatuous or desperate in that man is left to celebrate only his own powers and capacities for self-realization. On this view man's virtue lies not in obedience to a higher law or power but in spontaneous self-expression in freedom and responsibility. Faith becomes essentially self-reliance and the confidence that truth must come from within one's own experience, judgment and commitment. It is the firm conviction that all distinctively human meanings and values in life are supplied by man himself. Man does not require a God whose sovereign wisdom and love are the source and ground of existence. He needs no redemption from sin that only God can supply. This, in Christian thought, is the essence of pride.²¹

The wisdom that Carl Rogers has shown in his client centered therapy and the Christian wisdom agree at many points touching the kind of relationships that should exist between man and man and touching the human possibility. They agree on the need for unconditional positive regard, for empathy, for congruence, as Rogers understands those terms in human relationships. They agree that life is growth towards the goal of meaningful living and that this process of growth should not be hindered by authoritarian tyrannies and taboos. They agree that "out of the heart are the issues of life," that spontaneity

and mutuality are good signs of authentic human vitality. They agree that men should be free to find strength and courage to live without servility, that they should become themselves and not copies of imposed and alien stereotypes drawn to the scale of family and societal values. In common, they teach that men deserve the experience of individual self-acceptance and self-expression, and that this requires freedom in assuming responsibility and self-control in inter-personal relations. They agree that love, truth and devotion are required to generate an atmosphere in which human character ~~may~~ grow and be transformed and in which men ought to be able to live in freedom, dignity and peace. In fact, there is a very real sense in which a Christian doctrine of man and Carl Rogers' client centered therapy not only agree but actually complement one another, for how can one be responsive and open to God unless one becomes the fully-functioning person of whom Rogers speaks?

But there are disagreements at other crucial points between Rogers' psychotherapy and the Christian concern for man. First, there is their respective estimates of the worth and final significance of the human person. Rogers sets a high value on persons; he rates them at the top of the value scale. But this superlative estimate fails to secure for man the worth it espouses. For if the human person is a final value, how can a just judgment be reached in a basic conflict between persons? From other persons? This would mean that society is more ultimate than the individual. But is society, then, the ultimate

source of value? From the evidence supplied by history and experience it cannot be, for when there is no judge of men above men and nations men become their own judges, exhibit strife and aggression, and wrack the world with their disorders.

The Christian estimate of human nature, for all its realistic insistence on man's sinful and tragic flaw, is actually higher than the humanist position of Rogers, for man, as child and image of God, is a creature of sacred worth, valued by God and redeemed by His love. Any worth, dignity, and merit he may have is not "in his own right," but because of the love of God for him expressed in Jesus Christ.²² The Christian's self-estimate, therefore, is curiously independent of the appraisals of the world. It is God who judges men, and His judgment is sternly set against any devaluation or reduction of human worth. The worth of men before their fellows is established by the God above them all. Thus, the Christian's motives for justice are radical and revolutionary. They are aimed at valuing men at God's evaluation of them. The Christian knows that his justification does not rest with others nor even with himself. It rests with God. The Christian's aim must be to value man as God values him. The Christian ethic grounds the dignity of man in his double relation to God and neighbour.

Secondly, Christian theology insists, against Rogers, that man faces a radical need for depth regeneration as the precondition to his self-fulfillment, to becoming "that self which one truly is." This is not to write off Rogers' therapeutic methods

and help or even to hold that they are unimportant. It is simply to say that, valuable as they are and necessary as they are, they are never sufficient. If men are to become themselves, truly and fully, they must also find their way into the orbit of God's mercy and grace, from which they have strayed in self-exile. Man is finite and ~~is~~, therefore, not self-sufficient, self-explanatory or self-fulfilled. Hence, for the human possibility to be actualized a radical shift of focus is needed from human concern for the self and its powers to God and His providence, from self-reliance to reliance upon God's love and grace, from fear to faith, from self-confidence to confidence born of a new pattern of involvement in God's creative and redemptive work. This is the Gospel's demand for conversion, for depth regeneration, for a reorientation of motive and inner dependence. All this brings man to a new level of self-acceptance in God's love in virtue of which he responds, with glad acknowledgement, to God's control of his life in sure confidence that such control is not self-mutilating nor a loss of true dignity, but literally, justification. Man becomes free by losing his life for Christ's sake.²³ Because he is beloved and because the love is from his Creator and Redeemer, he can overcome his sense of basic insecurity and rise above his elemental fears of rejection and extinction.

A third point of disagreement between Christian theology and the teaching of Carl Rogers lies in the dynamics of arriving at the condition of being fully-functioning. For Rogers

the management and repair of wrongdoing, error and sin is primarily a human affair. As under appropriate conditions men achieve insight into their own motives and those of others they find they can discard their feelings of guilt and condemnation and forgive themselves and others. "To understand all is to forgive all." There is obviously much neurotic guilt and morbid self-condemnation which arises from depreciatory attitudes towards self and others which can, and ought to be, handled by the psychological process of self-examination and self-acceptance. Human errors may be identified as such and dealt with constructively in a permissive situation where reason and love prevail. But Rogers' humanistic approach seems to contend that this is all there is to the problem of human wrongdoing and to its repair.

Christian theology holds that man never sins against himself alone or against his neighbour alone. There is a dimension in human wrongdoing which far exceeds ignorance and miscalculation; it has to be named unfaith, irresponsibility, sin; and, its result is estrangement and separation from God and neighbour. Even when this is unacknowledged, it continues to disturb and demoralize the minds and hearts of men. If man is to be reconciled to God, to the ground of his being, and to his fellows and to his own true self, his sin must be dealt with without indulgence and without loss of true humanity. This is possible only by the forgiveness of God.

From the Christian standpoint forgiveness is a central

ethic for any concept of psychic health. The Christian experience of forgiveness is not an earned acquittal nor an indulgent dismissal of the guilty. It is effectual for the individual when, repentant, he faces the reordering impact of God's grace on his disorder. And one of the most striking aspects of the Christian teaching about forgiveness is that "he who would be forgiven must himself forgive."²⁴ Thus the way of reconciliation to God is never unilateral; it always reaches out towards neighbour and community.

T. C. Oden sees here a weakness in what he terms Rogers' doctrine of redemption. He feels that this is narrowly limited to personal reconciliation and has little to say about the reconciliation of society or about a broader hope for the redemption of the cosmos. There is no concept of authentic human community, no doctrine of the Church.²⁵

In the light of developments in Rogers' personal interest and approach I believe we need to revise this estimate. Some years ago Rogers expressed his belief that as his teaching on interpersonal relations is practised on an everwidening scale in industry, education, and so on, not only will individuals become more fully-functioning but society itself will be better adjusted and more fully-functioning.²⁶ Yet even here there was a certain individualistic approach to the entire helping process. In recent years, however, Rogers has been doing an increasing amount of work with basic encounter groups.²⁷ He describes this type of group as a very potent experience which people

find either strikingly worthwhile or deeply questionable.

"People do not react in a neutral fashion toward the intensive group experience."²⁸ In these groups people come into much closer and more direct contact individually than is customary in ordinary life. If the feelings expressed in this relationship can be accepted this may have a very beneficial effect, and as sessions proceed there may build an increasing feeling of warmth and group spirit and trust, not out of positive attitudes only, but out of a realness which includes both positive and negative feelings. "The development of the basic encounter group . . . is a part of a very significant modern trend in which people are endeavouring to fight alienation, overcome alienation, endeavouring to explore more of themselves, endeavouring to become more of themselves, endeavouring to find more meaning in relationships with others, endeavouring to use themselves differently. I think the intensive group experience is a really significant modern invention that deserves to be classified along with radar or penicillin in importance. . . . It has its faults and dangers but it's part of a trend."²⁹

Although all group experiences do not have a positive effect, the majority do,³⁰ and Rogers is emphatic that the basic encounter group has great possibilities that should be explored. "I have tried to indicate some of the reasons why it deserves serious consideration, not only from a personal point of view, but also from a scientific and philosophical point of view. I also hope I have made it clear that this is

an area in which an enormous amount of deeply perceptive study and research is needed."³¹

In the light of Christian teaching the basic encounter group could compliment the doctrine of the Church by helping to develop or discover a larger interpersonal context for a fully functioning community through which congruence and openness could be nourished. While this positive factor needs to be acknowledged, the weakness of the basic encounter group approach lies in the fact that it is basically centered in man, and since it fails to relate man to ultimates beyond himself, it does not provide the deep and lasting transformation of the person that Christian theology affirms can be realized only by entering a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. Even Rogers admits that the greatest and most obvious deficiency of this form of therapy is the failure of the long range effects of the experience, "that frequently the behaviour changes, if any, which occur, are not lasting."³²

Participants have admitted frankly that after leaving the group they find it difficult to hold permanently the openness with which they leave the conference, and instead slip back into their old habits and roles. The basic encounter group apparently fails to provide, as the Christian Church at its best does, the nurturing, disciplining, supportive community which would continue to mediate to the estranged individual the means of grace which Christian faith affirms is necessary if genuine healing is to take place, and by which a person can love and

serve in the midst of human alienation.

The issue at stake is really the comparative values of two ethics--the Christian ethic and the ethic expressed by Carl Rogers, which is really a restricted humanism. However instructive Rogers' psychological ethic may be to the Christian, both for correction or reproof and for positive guidance, it is incompatible finally with the Christian ethic in respect of some of its basic premises. Every ethic is an expression of faith of some sort, and the humanist faith on which Rogers' psychological ethic rests must be judged inadequate by Christian theology which seeks to ground its ethical precepts in the widest and deepest reach of faithful reason. The choice is between man's faith in himself, as his own lawgiver and source of grace, and man's faith in God as the source of human good, as giver and sustainer of life, as the righteous judge of all men and as the power of love which triumphs over evil and tragedy.

Rogers' ethical wisdom is based on the confidence that human life transforms itself in the absence of crippling or aberrant influences and in the presence of love and rational insight. The Christian ethic is no less interested in the optimum conditions for human development, but it is convinced that the transformation of life is achieved as the result of an interaction between man and a reality and power beyond. The Christian evangel calls for a conversion of loyalties and reliance upon self and society to the true Creator and Redeemer,

who is before and above all human existence. It is with this basic demand for a radical change in man's disposition that Christianity confronts the humanistic ethic.

Although Rogers' teaching on self-affirmation does not wholly agree with the Christian ethic, yet it does compliment the Christian teaching on self-denial. Unfortunately, all too frequently, statements in the New Testament calling for self-denial³³ have been interpreted in such a way that what passes for Christian self-denial is either pious or impious self-hostility, in which merit is measured by self-punishment and humility by self-deprecation. This appears to be a misunderstanding of the Christian message. A closer inward look at the Christian meaning of self-denial yields a very different conception and leads us to the very centre of conflict between the two ethical viewpoints under review.

In an ethic which takes man as the measure of all things, and pre-eminently of human values, any radical denial of self-importance is a sort of self-humiliation. Although it is obvious that one must not be overly proud or self-assertive, yet the value a man is able to place upon himself, in the light of the appraisals of others, is his value. Hence, self-affirmation is most important, and self-denial, except as a mode of self-control, is unjustifiable.

In the Christian ethic, the teaching on man is sometimes presented in a manner that fails to take into account the dignity the Creator has given to man, that He made man "little

less than a god, crowning him with glory and honour . . . "34, that God makes man His "fellow-worker"35 and the fact that the Christian doctrine of redemption implies that God considered man worth redeeming even at such an awful price. Possibly the reason that the dignity afforded man by his Creator is played down so often in Christian teaching is since the sin of pride is so basic in man, emphasis on man's personal value may cause him to become unduly proud. While this motive may be commendable, the fact remains that self-denial itself has little meaning unless there is first self-affirmation, for there must be a self to deny. In this way Rogers' teaching compliments the Christian teaching on man; it affirms man's dignity as a creature. Where it fails is in making man the measure and measurer of all things. This gives encouragement for pride in man to take precedence.36

In the Christian perspective man is not viewed as the measure and measurer of all things. Man is a finite creature whose Creator is the real source and ground of man's being and values and destiny. Man is understood as a being who is subordinate, yet of infinite worth, to his Creator. To deny oneself in the Christian sense is not to despise or condemn the self; rather, it is the free subordination of a self-valuing person to a value not only higher than, but also the actual ground of, human values. It does not deprive man of his rights; instead, it commits him to the acknowledgement that his gifts and powers are his own as divine endowments, to be received

and exercised in faithful stewardship and service to all mankind. It is the ethical form of the Christian confession of the reality and sovereignty of God, the free obedience to the Great Commandment that we are to love God with our total selves and all our powers and our fellows as ourselves. To do this one must believe that one is a self worth loving, as Rogers' self-affirmation teaches; but, one must also place that self in its proper subordinate relation to the Creator.

It is the Christian conviction that self-denial, rightly understood, is the master key to the right ordering of life, for it sets first things first and provides a system of value relations in which we can judge for ourselves, in responsible decision, as to the right and the good. In the pivotal section of the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus highlights the problem of human anxiety and frustration,³⁷ insisting that basic anxiety rises as a result of putting self-concerns foremost. The way beyond anxiety is through the abandonment of the program of self-security to risking oneself to the upholding of God's constant action in our existence. That is, autonomy is found, not by way of independence, but by a healthy dependence.

The Christian tradition will always remain indebted to Carl Rogers for his teaching on human nature, for all he has done to help us to understand man, and for his methodology that recalls us in many ways to that demonstrated by Jesus in His dealings with people. At the same time his basically

humanistic evaluation of man, and thus his humanistic ethic, falls short when measured by the Christian faith.

NOTES

THE SELF CONCEPT

1. C. Rogers, "A Humanistic Conception of Man," Science and Human Affairs, Richard Farson, editor, (Palo Alto, California, 1965), p. 18
2. "Some Thoughts Regarding the Current Presuppositions of the Behavioral Sciences," Pastoral Psychology, October, 1967, p. 41.
3. "A Humanistic Conception of Man," op. cit., p. 19.
4. C. Rogers, CCT, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), Proposition I, p. 483.
5. CCT, Proposition VIII, p. 497. Rogers later defines the "self" as follows: "The self-structure is an organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It is composed of such elements as the perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and to the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence. It is, then, the organized picture, existing in awareness either as figure or ground, of the self and the self-in-relationship, together with the positive or negative values which are associated with those qualities and relationships, as they are perceived as existing in the past, present, or future." CCT, p. 501.
6. Cf. "Toward a Modern Approach to Values: the Valuing Process in the Mature Person," C. Rogers and Barry Stevens, PP, (Richmond Hill, Ontario: Simon & Schuster of Canada, Limited, 1971), p. 7.
7. Ibid., p. 8.
8. The world of experience is for each individual, in a very significant sense, a private world--no one can know assuredly how another individual perceives an experience--yet it is the individual's perception of his experience that motivates and influences his behaviour. Cf. CCT, p. 484 ff.
9. "Phenomenal field" includes the individual's whole range of experiences, in relation both to himself and to others and also to events. Cf. CCT, p. 142.
10. CCT, pp. 494, 497 ff.; PP, p. 6 ff.

11. Science and Human Affairs, p. 20. This view of Rogers is in direct conflict with the estimate of man held by Freud. He speaks of the primary hostility of men toward one another. He states that "Civilization has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man's aggressive instincts. . . . Hence, too, the ideal commandment to love one's neighbour as oneself--a commandment which is really justified by the fact that nothing else runs so strongly counter to the original nature of man." S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. J. Riviere, (London; Hogarth Press, 1963), p. 49.
12. Cf. Psychology: A Study of a Science, vol. III: Formulations of the Person and the Social Context, editor, S. Koch, (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), p. 223 f.
13. CCT, Proposition XI, p. 503; cf. Science and Human Affairs, p. 20. When, for example, an individual suddenly finds that he is confronted with a need for a repair shop, he recalls that there is one at a certain location even though he has never "noticed" it before, yet he may have passed the machine shop several times. Previously the experience had been ignored because it was not perceived as having any relationship to the self structure. Had it been something that was related to the needs of the self --e.g., a book on a topic in which the individual is vitally interested--he would "notice" it the first time he saw it.
14. There is a more significant type of denial which is the phenomenon the Freudians have tried to explain by the concept of repression. For example, the adolescent who is brought up in an oversolicitous home, and whose concept of self is that of one who is grateful to his parents, may feel intense anger at the subtle control which is being exerted over him. Organically he experiences the physiological changes which accompany anger, but his conscious self can prevent these experiences from being symbolized and hence consciously perceived; or, he can symbolize them in some distorted fashion which is consistent with his structure of self, such as perceiving these organic sensations as "a bad headache." CCT, p. 505.
15. CCT, p. 505.
16. CCT, Proposition XII, p. 507.
17. I use the term "perceive" in the sense defined by Koch, op. cit., p. 199: " . . . a perception is a hypothesis or prognosis for action which comes into being in awareness when stimuli impinge on the organism. When we perceive 'this is a triangle,' 'that is a tree,' 'this person is my mother,' it means that we are making a prediction that the objects from which the stimuli are received would, if checked in other ways, exhibit properties we have come to regard, from our past experience, as being characteristic of triangles, trees, mother."

18. Rogers notes a number of value patterns we introject and by which we live today. They come from a variety of sources, are often quite contradictory in their meaning, and are introjected as desirable or undesirable. They are as follows:
 Sexual desires and behaviour are mostly bad. The sources of this construct are many--parents, church, teachers. Disobedience is bad. Here parents and teachers combine with the military to emphasize this concept. To obey is good. To obey without question is even better. Making money is the highest good. The sources of this conceived value are too numerous to mention. Learning an accumulation of scholarly facts is highly desirable. Abstract art or "pop" art or "op" art is good. Here the people we regard as sophisticated are the originators of the value. Communism is utterly bad. Here the media is a major source. To love your neighbour is the highest good. This concept comes from the church, perhaps from parents. Cooperation and teamwork are preferable to acting alone. Here companions are an important source. Cheating is clever and desirable. The peer group probably originates this idea. Coca-Colas, chewing gum, electric refrigerators, and automobiles are all utterly desirable. This conception comes not only from advertisements, but is reinforced by people all over the world. From Jamaica to Japan, from Copenhagen to Kowloon, the "Coca-Cola culture" has come to be regarded as the acme of desirability. Cf. PP, p. 10.
19. Rogers cites the case of one young client who, after undergoing therapy for a time, expressed it briefly and accurately as follows: "I've always tried to be what the others thought I should be, but now I'm wondering whether I shouldn't just see that I am what I am." CCT, p. 512.
20. E. Fromm describes rationalization as "This counterfeit of reason," and "one of the most puzzling human phenomena." Psychoanalysis and Religion, (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 55.
21. Romans 7:19, New English Bible.
22. "I believe that this picture of the individual, with values mostly introjected, held as fixed concepts, rarely examined or tested, is the picture of most of us. By taking over the conceptions of others as our own, we lose contact with the potential wisdom of our own functioning and lose confidence in ourselves. Since these value constructs are often sharply at variance with what is going on in our own experiencing, we have in a very basic way divorced ourselves from ourselves, and this accounts for

much of modern strain and insecurity. This fundamental discrepancy between the individual's concepts and what he is actually experiencing, between the intellectual structure of his values and the valuing process going on unrecognized within him--this is a part of the fundamental estrangement of modern man from himself. This is a major problem for the therapist." PP, p. 12.

23. CCT, Proposition XV, p. 513 ff.

Chapter II

TO BE THAT SELF WHICH ONE TRULY IS

1. This title is a phrase used by Carl Rogers, and which he borrowed from the writings of Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, Princeton University Press, 1949, p. 29. Rogers feels that Kierkegaard, who more than a century ago pictured the dilemma of the individual, shows deep psychological insight, an insight which Rogers saw revealed in his dealings with persons. Kierkegaard points out that the most common despair, the deepest form of despair, is to choose "to be another than himself." On the other hand, "To will to be that self which one truly is, is indeed the opposite of despair," and this choice is the deepest responsibility of man. Cf. OBP, p. 110.
2. Ibid., p. 108.
3. Cf. "The Fully Functioning Person," Pastoral Psychology, April, 1965, p. 23.
4. Cf. OBP, pp. 109, 167f., 187; CCT, Proposition XV, p. 513.
5. OBP, p. 169.
6. Ibid., p. 170.
7. I use the term "process" rather than, e.g., "aspect of change," because it is not something that happens suddenly. It is truly a process, in which the individual who has formerly been denying his experiences opens himself to them to an ever increasing degree.
8. Cf. OBP, p. 115.
9. Ibid., p. 116f.
10. CCT, Proposition XIX, p. 522ff.; cf. OBP, pp. 177f., 105f. In PP, p. 19, Rogers states: "I find it significant that when individuals are prized as persons, the values they select do not run the full gamut of possibilities. I do not find, in such a climate of freedom, that one person comes to value fraud and murder and thievery, while another values a life of self-sacrifice, and another values only money. Instead there seems to be a deep and underlying thread of commonality. I dare to believe that when the human being is inwardly free to choose whatever he deeply values, he tends to value those objects, experiences and goals which make for his own survival, growth, and development of others. I hypothesize that it is characteristic of the human organism to prefer such actualizing and socialized goals when he is exposed to a growth-promoting climate."
11. Rogers points out that it is the fact that all experiences,

impulses, sensations are available that is important, and not necessarily the fact that they are present in consciousness. It is the organization of the concept of self against the symbolization of certain experiences contradictory to itself, which is the significant negative fact. Actually, when all experiences are assimilated in relationship to the self and made a part of the structure of self, there tends to be less of what is called "self-consciousness" on the part of the individual. Behaviour becomes more spontaneous, expression of attitudes is less guarded, because the self can accept such attitudes and such behaviour as a part of itself. Cf. CCT, p. 515.

12. Ibid., p. 514f.

13. OBP, p. 23f.

14. Rogers says that he thinks most of us have an approach to values which has the following characteristics:
The majority of our values are introjected from other individuals or groups significant to us, but are regarded by us as our own.

The source or locus of evaluation on most matters lies outside of ourselves.

The criterion by which our values are set is the degree to which they will cause us to be loved or accepted.

These conceived preferences are either not related at all, or not clearly related, to our own process of experiencing. Often there is a wide and unrecognized discrepancy between the evidence supplied by our own experience, and these conceived values.

Because these conceptions are not open to testing in experience, we must hold them in a rigid and unchanging fashion. The alternative would be a collapse of our values. Hence our values are "right"--like the law of the Medes and the Persians, which changes not.

Because they are untestable, there is no ready way of solving contradictions. If we have taken in from the community the conception that money is the summum bonum and from the church the conception that love of one's neighbour is the highest value, we have no way of discovering which has more value for us individually. Hence a common aspect of modern life is living with absolutely contradictory values. We calmly discuss the possibility of dropping a hydrogen bomb on Russia, but find tears in our eyes when we see headlines about the suffering of one small child.

Because we have relinquished the locus of evaluation to others, and have lost touch with our own valuing process, we feel profoundly insecure and easily threatened in our values. If some of these conceptions were destroyed, what would take their place? This threatening possibility makes us hold our value conceptions more rigidly or more confusedly, or both. Cf. PP., p. 11f.

15. Cf. OBP, p. 189; In "A Humanistic Conception of Man," Science and Human Affairs, p. 23, Rogers states as follows: "I have observed in my clients, and have experienced in myself, the fact that when the individual is functioning freely and well, he trusts his total organismic reaction, and this frequently shows itself to contain a better, even though more intuitive, judgment and wisdom than his conscious thinking taken by itself." i.e., how one "feels" about something, some action, whether or not to take a certain course, is more important than intellectual arguments. "The total organismic reaction" is what is all-important. Cf. OBP, p. 22f.; PP, p. 50.
16. Rogers draws the analogy between this person and a giant electric computing machine. Since he is open to his experiences, all of the data from his sense impressions, from his memory, from previous learning, from his visceral and internal states, is fed into the machine. The machine takes all of these multitudinous pulls and forces which are fed in as data, and quickly computes the course of action which would be the most economical vector of need satisfaction in this existential situation. Cf. "A Humanistic Conception of Man," p. 27f.; OBP, p. 190.
17. Cf. "A Humanistic Conception of Man," p. 28; OBP, pp. 190f., 119; CCT, p. 523; Koch, p. 234f. In "Speaking Personally" Rogers says, "I can trust my experience . . . The judgment of others, while they are to be listened to, and taken into account, can never be a guide to me. . . . evaluation by others is not a guide for me." OBP, pp. 22, 23.
18. Cf. PP, p. 44 for Rogers' exchange with Professor B. F. Skinner.
19. "A Humanistic Conception of Man," p. 29.
20. Ibid.
21. Rogers writes as follows: "I have come to place a high value on personal subjective choice. My experience in psychotherapy confirms me in the belief that such choice, made openly by the individual who is aware both of what is going on within him, and aware also of his personal environment, is highly significant. I think of the confused psychotic man hospitalized for years, whose turn toward improvement was probably best predicted when he muttered, 'I don't know what I'm going to do, but I'm going to do it.' In short, I believe that terms such as personal freedom, choice, purpose, goal, have profound and significant meaning. I cannot agree with the view that the behavioral sciences have made not only such terms but the concept of meaning itself, meaningless." "A Humanistic Conception of Man," p. 41f.
22. OBP, p. 91. Cf. pp. 26, 105, 100f.; CCT, Proposition IV, p. 487ff.
23. Maslow puts up a vigorous case for man's animal nature,

pointing out that the anti-social emotions--hostility, jealousy, etc.--result from frustration of more basic impulses for love and security and belonging, which are in themselves desirable; and Montagu likewise develops the thesis that co-operation, rather than struggle, is the basic law of human life; but, these solitary voices are little heard. OBP, p. 91.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., p. 105. Cf. PP, p. 17ff.

26. "A Humanistic Conception of Man," p. 31. Cf. p. 25f. Rogers develops this latter aspect in a paper, "Dealing with Breakdowns in Communications-Interpersonal and Intergroup," OBP, pp. 329-337, and "A Tentative Formulation of a General Law of Interpersonal Relationships," OBP, pp. 338-346.

Chapter III

HELPING THE INDIVIDUAL TO BE FREE

1. PP, p. 90 note.
2. OBP, p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 32f.
4. Rogers points out that we readily sense this quality in everyday life. Each of us could name persons whom we are confident are operating behind a facade, who are playing a role, who tend to say things they do not feel. For example, one of the things that offends us about radio and TV commercials is that it is often perfectly evident from the tone of voice that the announcer is "putting on," playing a role, saying something he does not feel. This is an example of incongruence. On the other hand, each of us knows individuals whom we somehow trust because we sense that they are being what they are, that we are dealing with the person himself, not with a polite or professional front. It is this quality of congruence which Rogers holds that research has found to be associated with successful therapy. PP, p. 47.
5. OBP, p. 41.
6. PP, p. 88; cf. OBP, pp. 50, 51, 61, 67.
7. Although Rogers gives considerable emphasis to the matter of congruence in his earlier papers, it is in his later writings that he places greater importance on this quality than any other in the therapist. He states: "I sometimes wonder if this is the only quality which matters in a counseling relationship. The evidence seems to show that other qualities also make a profound difference and are perhaps easier to achieve. So I am going to describe these others. But I would stress that if, in a given moment of relationship, they are not genuinely a part of the experience of the counselor, then it is, I believe, better to be genuinely what one is, than to pretend to be feeling these other qualities." PP, p. 89.
8. Ibid., p. 89.
9. Ibid., p. 89.
10. Cf. PP, p. 48; OBP, pp. 34, 53, 67.
11. PP, p. 90.
12. Rogers illustrates this in a lengthy excerpt from a letter written him by a friend, a therapist, who concludes that the key to the human being is the attitude with which the parents regarded him. The child who had parents who were proud of him, wanted him just as he was, exactly as

- he was, grows into life with self-confidence, self-esteem, while the child whose parents would have liked him "if"-- if he were not this way but some other; if he were like someone else--grew up in many cases feeling stupid, inadequate, inferior. PP, p. 92f.
13. Cf. OBP, pp. 32, 53ff., 62; "The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person," Pastoral Psychology, April, 1965, p. 22.
 14. PP, p. 93.
 15. OBP, p. 51.
 16. Rogers uses excerpts from interviews to illustrate the above. Vide. OBP, pp. 109ff.
 - 17.) "The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person," Pastoral
 - 17a.) Psychology, April, 1965, p. 24f.
 18. Cf. above, chapter II, p. 22f.
 19. OBP, pp. 119, 189, 191; "The Concept of the Fully Functioning Person," Pastoral Psychology, April 1965, p. 26.
 20. OBP, p. 122; cf. p. 123.
 21. Rogers writes that the client begins to realize "I am not compelled to be simply the creation of others, molded by their expectancies, shaped by their demands. I am compelled to be a victim of unknown forces in myself. I am less and less a creature of influences in myself which operate beyond my ken in the realms of the unconscious. I am increasingly the architect of self. I am free to will and choose. I can, through accepting my individuality, my 'isness', become more of my uniqueness, more of my potentiality."
 22. OBP, p. 105.
 23. Cf. C. B. Case, The Concept of Man in Client Centered Therapy: Some Contributions and Limitations for the Christian Worker, D.Th. thesis, New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, (May, 1957), p. 13.
 24. This is the title he uses for a paper in which he describes what he considers the ideal therapeutic relationship and its effect.
 25. V. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 104.
 26. Rogers disagrees with the concept that man is "a meaningless molecule in an equation which he had no part in writing," which, he states, is the logical implication of the views being put forth by such proponents of the psychological sciences who hold to an underlying philosophy of rigid determinism. He cites his exchange with Professor B. F. Skinner of Harvard as an illustration of this view. PP, p. 44f.
 27. Ibid., p. 46.
 28. Ibid., p. 46.

Chapter IV

A CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF MAN

1. Cf. the following: H. Hoffman, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956) pp. 146-171; R. Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, vol. I, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 150-166; D. E. Roberts, Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), pp. 85-93.
2. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 162.
3. Quoted by Niebuhr, ibid., p. 162.
4. This finiteness must not be regarded as a source of evil in man. The Biblical view is that the finiteness, dependence, and the insufficiency of man's mortal life are facts which belong to God's plan of creation and must be accepted with reverence and humility. Since the Christian view of the goodness of creation is solidly anchored in the very words of Scripture, "And God saw all that he had made, and it was very good," (Genesis 1:31, NEB), therefore, finiteness, dependence and insufficiency are not evil but good.
5. Matthew 10:39, NEB.
6. Romans 1:19, 20, NEB.
7. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 241.
8. J. S. Whale, Christian Doctrine, (London: Collins, 1957), p. 50.
9. Cf. Romans 10:2, 3; Niebuhr, op. cit., pp. 178-203.
10. The Christ has this two-fold significance because love has this double significance. "God is love," which is to say that the ultimate reality upon which the created world is judged is not an "unmoved mover" or an undifferentiated eternity, but the vital and creative source of life and of the harmony of life with life. But the essence of human nature is also love, which is to say that for man, who is involved in the unities and harmonies of nature but who also transcends them in his freedom, there can be no principle of harmony short of the love in which free personality is united in freedom with other persons. But the coerced unities of nature and the highly relative forms of social cohesion established by historic "laws" are inadequate as final norms of human freedom. The only adequate norm is the historic incarnation of a perfect love which actually transcends history, and can appear in it only to be crucified. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 273.

11. Cf. Romans 7. An illustration of the latter is found in Romans 2:17-21. Niebuhr points out that this challenge is remarkably relevant to the whole self-righteousness of modern culture which imagines that a man's acceptance of ideals of justice and peace proves that it is someone else and not he who is responsible for injustice and conflict. Op. cit., p. 273.
12. Cf. Matthew 19:16-22.
13. Cf. Niebuhr, op. cit., p. 287f.
14. Matthew 22:37, 39 NEB.

Chapter V

EVALUATION

1. OBP, pp. 5-8.
2. T. C. Oden, Kerygma and Counseling, (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), p. 88f.
3. Vide chapter II.
4. Cf. H. T. Close, Pastoral Psychology, June, 1970 (vol. 21, # 205), "Forgiveness, A Case Study," pp. 19-25.
5. OBP, p. 67.
6. Cf. Oden, op. cit., p. 95f.
7. Chapter II.
8. OBP, p. 55.
9. Cf. A. C. Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message, (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), p. 32f.
10. Chapter I.
11. Outler, op. cit., p. 77.
12. Cf. The Very Rev. H. R. Higgans, Journal of Pastoral Care, "Client Centered Psychotherapy and Christian Doctrine," p. 5f.
13. Cf. D. D. Williams, The Minister and the Care of Souls, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), p. 54.
14. Cf. Koch, op. cit., p. 191f.
15. Cf. Williams, op. cit., pp. 16ff., 27ff.
16. For example, I believe an illustration of this is found by comparing the writings of Carl Rogers with those of Paul Tournier, e.g., The Healing of Persons.
17. Cf. F. C. Wood Jr., Carl Rogers, A Theological Critique, an unpublished thesis from Union Theological Seminary, New York, (1964), chapters VI. VII. p. 174ff.; R. S. Green, Journal of Pastoral Care, II, 2 (Summer, 1948), p. 22, a review of Counseling and Psychotherapy.
18. Outler, op. cit., p. 128f.
19. E. Thurneysen, A Theology of Pastoral Care, (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1962), p. 245f.
20. OBP, p. 91f.
21. Cf. Higgans, op. cit., p. 6f.; Thurneysen, op. cit., p. 225ff.
22. Cf. Romans 7:18; I Corinthians 15:10; D. Baillie, God Was in Christ, (London: Faber & Faber, 1955), pp. 114-118.
23. Cf. Matthew 16:25; Williams, op. cit., p. 35.
24. Cf. Mark 11:25.
25. Op. cit., p. 95ff.
26. Cf. OBP, chapters 13-21; pp. 273-401, for Rogers' theory about how this would operate, as well as the dangers

- inherent in the developments of the behavioral sciences.
27. Rogers writes of his experience in this form of therapy in Carl Rogers on Encounter Groups, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), and New Directions in Client Centered Therapy, editors, J. T. Hart and T. M. Tomlinson, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), cf. especially chapter 16, pp. 292-319, and also chapter 27, pp. 502-533.
 28. Hart & Tomlinson, op. cit., p. 311.
 29. Ibid., p. 533; cf. p. 306.
 30. Cf. ibid., pp. 308ff. where Rogers cites statistics to indicate both positive and negative results.
 31. Ibid., p. 313.
 32. Ibid., p. 308.
 33. E.g., Mark 8:34-36, cf. Matt. 16:24-28 and Luke 9:23,24; Luke 14:33; I Cor. 6:19b-20; 7:23.
 34. Psalm 8:5, NEB; cf. Hebrews 2:7-9.
 35. I. Cor. 3:9 NEB; cf. Matt. 9:37.
 36. Cf. Hart & Tomlinson, op. cit., chapter 29, "A Short Summary and Some Long Predictions" regarding client centered therapy in which E. T. Gendlin makes some very dogmatic statements in his predictions regarding the future. This would appear to be evidence of intellectual pride; vide above, p. 56.
 37. Matt. 6:25-34.

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