THE LOWER CANADIAN MINORITY, THE PRESS, AND FEDERAL UNION, 1856 - 1860.

THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING MINORITY OF LOWER CANADA, THE PRESS, AND FEDERAL UNION, 1856 - 1860.

A STUDY OF PUBLIC OPINION.

by

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Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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April 15, 1966.

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CHAPTER I

THE LOWER CANADIAN MINORITY

In the decade between Canada's first two decennial censuses, taken in 1851 and 1861, the Province, despite internal political difficulties, had become the largest, wealthiest, most populous, and most economically diversified of all Britain's colonies. [1] The lower St. Lawrence was rugged and inhospitable, but above Quebec the valley widened into a fertile plain on both sides of the river which, in conjunction with the fertile Ontario "peninsula" to the west, supported the bulk of Canada's population. The Ottawa River divided the predominately French-speaking section of Canada East from the English-speaking settlements of Canada West. Bounded on the north by the Laurentian highlands and on the south by the international boundary, the 35,000 square miles which comprised the habitable area of the United Province [2] were being rapidly occupied, in both sections, [3] by a vigorously expanding population.

The census returns revealed a formidable increase in total population from 1,842,265 to 2,507,677, [4] but even more significant were the clearly discernable trends within each of the two sections. In Upper Canada [5] a massive influx of settlers of British origin was in the process of overlaying the original Loyalist and American stock. By 1861 about one third

of Upper Canada's total population of 1,396,091 was of British origin, something like one-half was composed of first-generation British Canadians, while only 50,758 were of American origin.[6] This strengthening of British traditions was to leave its mark upon that section's political leadership in the pre-Confederation era.[7]

The most notable feature concerning Lower Canada's population was, on the other hand, the rapid natural increase of native French Canadians. With no immigration[8] and despite the loss of many habitants through emigration[9] the French Canadians kept pace with the general rise of Lower Canada's population -- from 890,261 in 1851 to 1,111,566 in 1861 -- by increasing their own numbers from 669,528 to 847,615 during the same decade.[10] Well might the Montreal Witness marvel that, whatever one might say of the French face in Canada, "no one can deny that it possesses the qualities of vitality and fecundity in a very high degree."[11] The French Canadians had, in fact, increased at the staggering average annual rate of 2.651 per cent -- double the rate of increase in Britain and 40 per cent in excess of the highest known rate of increase in Europe at the time.[12] The import of this was not lost upon the English-speaking Lower Canadians. Evidently they would remain a minority in their section of the province. Some were even becoming dubious about their chances for survival. As the Witness rue-fully observed, the French Canadian rate of increase "was never

greater than at present" and that race, "multiplying with great rapidity,...bids fair to fill up Lower Canada, at no distant date, to the exclusion, with trifling exceptions, of all others." [13]

What comprised the English-speaking minority of Lower Canada? A glance at the census returns supports two main assumptions -- that the group was far from homogeneous and that its various components tended to be concentrated in certain areas. Quite the largest single conglomeration of English-speaking persons was within the City of Montreal, whose non-French inhabitants numbered 46,714 in 1861 as opposed to 43,509 French Canadians. Whatever political advantage this slight majority might have given the English-speaking people of Montreal was diminished somewhat by their heterogeneity in relation to the city's comparatively cohesive Roman Catholic French Canadian community. A fast breakdown of the 1861 figures reveals 14,179 Montrealers of Irish origin, 4,293 persons of English or Welsh origin, 3196 of Scottish, 1,679 of American, 22,226 native born and 1,241 others of non-French origin. This fragmentation of English-speaking Montreal was compounded by religious differences [14] within and between the national groups which rendered them quite incapable of finding much basis for common expression or concerted political action. The Irish, for example, wielded a voting strength of considerable magnitude but were themselves torn between Protestant and

Roman Catholic. [15] The Catholic Irish also tended to be at odds with the other Protestant elements among the English-speaking population and to identify their interests more closely with those of their Roman Catholic brethren, the French Canadians. Their Church-supported organ True Witness and Catholic Chronicle was publicly pledged to uphold "the nationality of the French Canadian and the nationality of the Irishman....so inseparably connected with their common religion." [16] The Irish even ran Thomas D'Arcy McGee as their own candidate in the elections of 1857, committing him to support the demand for Roman Catholic separate schools in Upper Canada and to oppose the incorporation of Orange lodges. [17]

The political life of Montreal was as variegated as the social composition. At once the center of Lower Canadian radicalism, the seat of Canadian big business, and the home of vociferous minority groups, Montreal sent to parliament in 1858 Antoine Aimé Dorion, leader of the Rouge opposition; John Rose, a conservative lawyer and supporter of the Macdonald-Cartier ministry; and D'Arcy McGee, the approved candidate of the St. Patrick Society. [18] Montreal newspapers, from the conservative Gazette to the liberal Herald, and from the Scottish-Protestant Witness to the Irish-Catholic True Witness, expressed the full range of political and religious opinion which existed in Canada prior to Confederation.

By far the most powerful faction among the English-speaking inhabitants of Montreal's cosmopolitan society was the English-Protestant business oligarcy which ran the Grand Trunk Railway, the Montreal Ocean Steamship Line, the Ottawa timber trade, and other comparable enterprises. [19] Montreal had become the commercial metropolis of Canada, and men like Peter Redpath, president of the Board of Trade, William Molson, president of Molson's Bank, and Hugh Allan, president of the Merchant's Bank and of the Allan Steamship Line, controlled the commerce and finances of a vast trading empire in the St. Lawrence. [20] Though responsible government had temporarily eclipsed their political power by rendering their considerable influence with governors-general and Home Parliaments ineffectual, [21] their successful cultivation of local politicians was soon reflected in legislation favourable to St. Lawrence River development, subsidies to railways, and the raising of protective tariffs. [22] Still possessed of a political influence out of all proportion to their numbers, and anxious to preserve their commercial ascendancy, the gentlemen who comprised the mercantile hierarchy of Montreal were apt to resist instinctively any political innovation like representation by population or federal union until it could be demonstrated that the proposed change would not adversly affect their vested interests. As the Quebec Mercury put it: "Of all the classes in life, those who are by their situation the most sensitive, the most easily

affected by good and evil, by legislation, are capitalists and men of enterprise." [23] None, then, would be likely to weigh the consequences of Confederation more carefully.

Quebec City had been rapidly surpassed by Montreal as the chief port of Canada, and, although it remained an important ship-building and lumber-exporting center, [24] its development in the decade between the censuses was far less spectacular than that of its rival. Where Montreal's population had increased by 32,608, Quebec's showed a gain of but 9,057, of which 7,030 represented the natural increase of the city's native-born population. Thus the effects of British immigration, so evident in Upper Canada and Montreal, were almost negligible in Quebec, and that city's non-French population of 21,819 remained proportionately more English-Canadian than Montreal's. In 1861 Quebec City's population of 51,109 was still greater than Toronto's 49,000 [25] but was scarcely better than half Montreal's total of 90,323. The largest component of Quebec's population was the native French-speaking majority of 28,689, while the largest national group of foreign origin consisted of 7,373 Irish who competed with their co-religionists for jobs in the shipyards. [26]

Quebec also had its British-Protestant commercial oligarchy and middle class, longer-established and even more conservative than Montreal's, but the continued displacement of the old port by the rising metropolis made for deteriorating

relations between the two communities. Again and again the Quebec Morning Chronicle grumbled about Montreal intrigues which were undermining the historic center. [27] Most of the carping was about the "wasteful" use of public funds for the river development to which Montreal owed its "unnatural" preeminence. Lake St. Peter expense would end only when there was no more public money to be had. [28] "Large money interests" at Montreal, having secured the trans-Atlantic mail contract, [29] had made the "useless" voyage past Quebec an integral part of their arrangements with shipping contractors: "Why should we continue to pay £104,000 a year of subsidy to make a 400 miles longer trip when a provincially subsidized Grand Trunk Railway is available to provide that link?" [30] Neither Quebec nor Upper Canada had any desire to continue to see public money "sunk ten times over in Lake St. Peter" to enable "one particular port to monopolize the trade of the Province." [31] The Reciprocity Treaty was another bête noire in Quebec, having diverted "into other channels" the St. Lawrence grain trade and the West Indian trading fleet "which used to be the annual pride of Quebecers and their principal source of wealth." [32] Quebec's opposition to Montreal would become insignificant as the old center declined, but the growing opposition of the expanding agricultural west to the commercial domination of Montreal was already a major factor determining the alignment of political groups during the pre-Confederation period.

The most appreciable concentrations of English-speaking settlement in rural Canada East occurred in the 9,120 square miles of hilly but fertile territory called the Eastern Townships. [33] These townships, lying between the seigniorial ranges on the south bank of the St. Lawrence and the United States border, and extending from the seigniorial lands on the east bank of the Richilieu to the Chaudière, [34] had been originally designated for British settlement unencumbered by the seigniorial conditions which prevailed elsewhere in the province, but the opposition of the Lower Canadian assembly, the rebellion of 1837, the peculation of land company agents, the opening of Upper Canada and the American midwest, and the reluctance of the British immigrant to settle in a "French" area all combined to wreck these early plans. [35] Settlement lagged so discouragingly that in 1848 the British American Land Company, the major developer of the area, was constrained to seek to recoup its losses by advertising for French Canadian settlers. [36] As the depletion of good land in the seigniories was causing a large-scale exodus of habitants to the New England mill towns [37] the Canadian assembly facilitated French settlement in the Eastern Townships by authorizing the establishment of Roman Catholic parishes beyond the old bounds. [38] French Canadians began to occupy the northern townships via the seigniories and the Chaudière. [39] The transformation of the

Eastern Townships into the predominately French-speaking area it is today had begun.

The census figures reveal that by 1861 the French were in a commanding overall majority of 111,125 to 80,963 in the fourteen ridings of the Eastern Townships. [39] Only Sherbrooke Town and five counties retained English-speaking majorities. Sherbrooke's modest population of 5,899 was marked by a high proportion of persons of American extraction and included only 1,419 persons of French origin. Brome and Missisquoi were border counties which had also attracted a relatively large number of settlers from United States. [40] Of Missisquoi's 18,608 settlers less than one-third was of French origin, and of Brome's 12,732 less than one-seventh was of French origin. To the east along the international boundary lay two additional counties, Stanstead and Compton, which had first been settled by American immigrants. [41] The French-speaking population of Stanstead was almost negligible -- 935 of a total population of 12,258 -- while less than one-fifth of Compton's 10,210 inhabitants was of French origin. Richmond County, immediately to the north, was a sparsely settled lumbering region [42] whose population of 8,884 included only 1,312 of French origin. The eight remaining Township counties of Drummond, Arthabaska, Bagot, Beauce, Dorchester, Megantic, Shefford and Wolfe contained French majorities. The largest English-speaking minorities among this group occurred in

Megantic and Shefford where they comprised 6,728 of a total population of 17,889, and 5,745 of 17,779 respectively. In Bagot and Beauce, on the other hand, only 1,558 persons of a combined total population of 39,257 were not of French origin.

These French Canadian inroads marked the beginning of that minority sense among the English-speaking inhabitants of the Eastern Townships which was to leave its mark upon Confederation. The Montreal Witness, always vigilant where the survival of Protestantism was concerned, had already noticed that an alarming exodus of English settlers from Lower Canada in general and the Eastern Townships in particular was underway:

> The few British or American settlers in French parishes, are either becoming in a generation or two, French Canadians themselves, or selling out to their French neighbours and moving westward.... Even the [Eastern Townships] ....originally English, [were being] ...transferred in like manner to French Canadians. [43]

This process was dangerous, warned the Witness, because, unless checked, it must terminate with the "control of the secular government and .....the property and power of the country in the hands of an insatiable and domineering priesthood." [44] Newspapers in the Townships also evinced concern about the "constant drain of men and money to the West" but attributed the migration to two or three poor farming seasons and "Western fever". [45] Promoters from New York were "painting everything Western in a rosy hue". [46] Whatever causes underlay the

process which one writer termed the "Frenchification" of the Eastern Townships, [47] those English-speaking settlers who remained could hardly avoid becoming increasingly conscious of their minority status. They would not be likely to favour any political scheme which might jeopardize the rights of British-Protestants within what was fast becoming a predominately French-speaking Roman Catholic area.

Life in the Eastern Townships of Lower Canada was rural. Sherbrooke, at the confluence of the Magog River with the St. Francis, though obviously emerging as the commercial and industrial capital of the region, [48] remained a modest metropolis of but 5,899 souls in 1861. Headquarters of the British American Land Company since 1833, [49] admirably linked by the Grand Trunk Railway to Montreal, Quebec City, and Portland, [50] and with ready access to water power resources which had already encouraged the establishment of the first industries in the area, [51] Sherbrooke, according to its contemporary boosters, had all the attributes necessary to make it "the principal seat of manufactures in Lower Canada". [52] For the moment, however, Townships settlement consisted, in the main, of small villages and freehold farms, and Mrs. Catherine M. Day's admonition to prospective settlers gives us some insight into the life of the Eastern Townships pioneer:

> The class of settlers best adapted to this country in its present state, are those known at home as small farmers; men who do their own work or a part of it; whose wives are

> accustomed to do the work of the house or dairy, and think it no hardship to get up at four o'clock...to see that each department of the housework is properly attended to... Experiences in the past have shown that those who came to the country entertaining romantic notions of 'Life in the woods', were most unfortunate... Energy, self-command, and strength to labour, are the essential elements of success [in the Townships]. [53]

By 1860 the economic diversification which typifies the Eastern Townships today was becoming evident. To lumber and potash, the original staples of the region, [54] were now being added the varied products of a mixed farming and live-stock-breeding economy. Wheat, the agricultural mainstay of Canada West, [55] was apparently of lesser consequence as a market or export crop in the Townships: "While many of the farmers in the Townships do grown wheat of excellent quality -- enough to satisfy their own wants -- they find it more advantageous to attend to the rearing of sheep, cattle, and horses, and the cultivation of grass and the common grains, than to the growing of wheat on an extensive scale." [56] Root crops were also cultivated extensively, and maple sugar was produced for domestic consumption. [57] The climate, soil, and pure water of the Townships were pronounced favourable to the cultivation of flax and hops, but these crops were not common. [58] H. H. Miles estimated that the average Townships farmer raised, per acre, 40 to 50 bushels of oats, 200 to 300 bushels of potatoes, 40 to 60 bushels of maize, and one to one and one-half tons of grass. [59] Dairy farming had begun to develop when

the Grand Trunk Railway brought the consumer markets of Montreal and Quebec within reach of the Townships farmer, and this industry was further stimulated by the Reciprocity Treaty. Quoting a $5,304,382 gain in Canada's balance of trade with United States over the year 1856, the Stanstead Journal revealed the significance to the Eastern Townships of railway connections to open American markets:

> But the most important feature of this trade with the United States to the Canadian farmer, is the fact that it opens up a market to him for the sale of productions which he could not previously dispose of at anything like remunerating prices. Great quantities of Butter, Poultry, Eggs, etc., are now exported to the United States, in addition to the Cattle, Sheep, Horses, Grain, etc., which form the staple articles of production. [60]

In the opinion of the Journal the Reciprocity Treaty was "fulfilling the most ardent anticipations of its friends and advocates". [61] Nor can there be much doubt that railway and market connections were primarily responsible for that close identification of Eastern Townships interests with those of Montreal which is perhaps best typified in the career of Alexander Tilloch Galt. [62] Professor Creighton has referred to the Eastern Townships of 1850 as "the old ally of Montreal" [63] and by 1858 the Montreal Gazette was referring to "Central Canada", consisting of Montreal, the Eastern Townships, and the upper St. Lawrence and lower Ottawa, as an indivisible economic and political unity. [64]

There were three additional concentrations of English-speaking settlement in Canada East -- the Chateauguay basin

south and west of Montreal, the lumbering counties of Pontiac, Argenteuil, and Ottawa on the lower Ottawa River, and the remote settlements which had been founded in the Chaleur Bay and Gaspé regions by loyalists from New Brunswick. [65] The Ottawa counties, along with Gaspé and Bonaventure, sent ministerialists to parliament in 1858, but Chateauguay and Huntingdon counties consistently returned Liberals or Liberal-independents. [66] The Canadian Gleaner was not established by Robert Sellar at Huntingdon until 1863, [67] but one judges from his later testimony [68] and the strong advocacy given to representation by population by Robert Brown Somerville in parliament [69] that the predominately English-speaking farming population of Huntingdon county was already seriously concerned about the inroads of the French Roman Catholic parish system into the township lands of the Chateauguay basin.

Perhaps it is now possible to reaffirm the supposition with which this brief survey began -- that the non-French minority of Canada East was a highly diversified population in every respect -- and to indicate in summary a few of the areas wherein the interests of the various communities diverged. The English-speaking Lower Canadians, to begin, did not occupy a continuous expanse of territory. They tended to settle in pockets at a time when physical distance was a formidable barrier to a united outlook, and frequent clashes of economic interests tended to perpetuate the divisions on a regional basis.

Montreal's integration of the economy of "Central Canada" did not include Quebec or the settlements of Gaspe and the Chaleur Bay region, which, because of their isolation and the necessity of their maritime outlook, [70] can scarcely be considered "Canadian" communities at all. The many differences of religion and national origin gave rise to deep-seated suspicions and antagonisms which could not easily be overcome. Even the twin threat of French and papal domination failed to impose a bond of union because the fears which it invoked were neither universal nor widespread during the 1850's. The Catholic Irish, a major English-speaking group, tended to identify with at lease the ecclesiastical aspirations of the French Canadians while the urban English, who were sufficiently numerous and affluent to provide adequately for their educational and other needs, and whose numbers were still increasing, did not exhibit unanimous or even general concern for the plight of those country dwellers who were beginning to see their numbers diminish, their farms change hands, and their institutions endangered by an expanding French Canadian population and Roman Catholic parish system. Although French and Roman Catholic encroachment was beginning to arouse some uneasiness in the predominately "English" townships, it would seem that the danger was not yet generally viewed as a serious threat to survival. F. H. Underhill has speculated that the English of the Eastern Townships would have aligned themselves politically with their co-linguists and

co-religionists of Upper Canada had concern for racial and religious survival been an overriding political factor during the 1850's. [71] The lack of political unity on this and other questions is perhaps best reflected in the common tendency of the Lower Canadian English to elect "independents", most of whom were inclined, as Robert Sellar complained, to vote with "whoever controlled the patronage", [72] namely, the French Canadian majority. Clearly these people were not as yet in possession of anything approaching a sense of common national purpose. Divided into what Professor Creighton has described as "several contemptible fragments" [73] they would, with a few notable exceptions, prove quite incapable of considering a great national issue like federal union from a non-partisan viewpoint during the years 1856 to 1860.

CHAPTER II

THE PRESS

How does one ascertain with any degree of accuracy the political opinions which prevailed among the English-speaking communities of Canada concerning the state of the Canadian Union from 1856 to 1860? Surely one of the first things to be realized is that there were, in the 1850's, relatively few means by which public opinion could be reflected or influenced; and the modern observer, accustomed as he is to perpetual bombardment by opinion-moulding mass media, must attempt to imagine a world from which the profound influences of radio, television, cheap books, international newsgathering agencies, facilities for easy travel and the like, have been subtracted. Fred Landon says that during the 1830's ideas could be disseminated in Canada only by word of mouth at the various types of public assembly which brought people together, and through the press.[1] The pamphlet, though not mentioned by Landon, was another means of circulating ideas frequently resorted to by a few of the more articulate and affluent individuals or associations in colonial society. By the 1850's there can be little doubt that the influence of newspapers had become paramount. Massive immigration had increased the size of the reading public and the demand for news to the point where daily journals had become

a feasible reality. New technical improvements like the steam-driven cylinder press enabled the mass production of newspapers, [2] better roads and railway communications facilitated their distribution, while the installation of telegraphic services and the trans-Atlantic cable [3] gave a tremendous impetus to the gathering of news and sense of immediacy to its reporting. W. Meikle's Canadian Newspaper Directory for 1858 reveals the existence in Canada of no fewer than 20 dailies, 18 tri-weeklies, 15 semi-weeklies, and 156 weeklies, [4] and in 1859 a Canadian Press Association was founded at Kingston "to promote the influence of the press as a factor in the welfare of the state". [5] This influence had indeed already become such a factor that journalists, from Mackenzie to Brown, found themselves catapaulted into political careers [6] while politicans, from Hincks to Cartier, found it not only advantageous but essential to acquire control of at least one newspaper as a supporting "organ". [7] According to J. C. Dent, influential journals like the Gazette and Herald of Montreal shared, prior to Confederation, "a practical monopoly of political influence among the English-speaking population of Lower Canada" [8] while the Toronto Globe, "the most formidable political organ in Canada", was capable of moulding and guiding mass sentiment in Canada West for more than a decade. Fortunately newspapers are now competently recognized as not only valid but invaluable sources in the reconstruction of ideals, standards, and climates of opinion of a time, locality, or a people, [9] and

their exploitation is particularly pertinent to the present study because of the unrivalled power they exercised over public opinion throughout the English-speaking world during the Victorian age. [10]

The unique power wielded by Victorian newspapers was not solely due to their having been the only mass communications medium in the field. It owed something also to the relatively greater emphasis which was given then to editorial comment as opposed to the reporting of news. Indeed, the decline of the editorial in favour of the headline might be cited as a major development in the evolution of modern journalism. With the development of new communications media and worldwide news-gathering agencies news has displaced editorial comment as the chief commodity dispensed by newspapers. [11] Also, the trend towards corporate ownerships of newspapers has deprived them of their personal flavour, and advertising has replaced political patronage as the all-important source of revenue with which the bills are paid. [12] The modern editor, supplanted by the business manager in the administration of the journal, has, in consequence, waxed comparatively timid and conventional, and the editorial prudent and prosaic. [13] It is therefore essential to remember that, a hundred years ago, newspaper editors exercised an influence which was much more far-reaching. L. M. Salmon refers to the period 1830 to 1890 as "the era of personal journalism" when it was the rule for a paper to be edited by its

owner, who, more often than not, had a political axe to grind. In those days the editorial and the newspaper were considered synonymous, and the success of a journal depended upon the impact of its editorial. [14] Editorials were outspoken, black or white, pungent and audacious, while news and editorial correspondence was selected largely on the basis of its value as editorial ammunition. [15] The political lines between opposing editors were often so sharply drawn that little or no attempt at impartiality was pretended. Editorials in the British tradition were, as today, anonymous, [16] thus affording greater freedom and shelter for those expressing strong opinions than was the case in, say, France, where journalists were required to affix their signatures to their articles. The Victorian editor was, as G. B. Dibblee has pointed out, essentially a political pamphleteer who used his organ as in other days one would use a publisher, for the uninhibited circulation of his particular, and often personal views on current issues. [17]

Unfortunately the very vitality with which nineteenth century newspapers presented their news and comment tended to militate against their veracity, and for evidence that the treatment of current questions was frequently less than authoritative one need look no further than the journals themselves. Editors habitually imputed the integrity of their contemporaries with an abandon which could only be born of an age prior to that of the million dollar libel suit. Adjectives

like dishonest, untrue, brutish, vicious, malicious, corrupt, ignorant, scurrilous, unscrupulous, misleading, meddlesome, impertinent, false, insincere, cowardly, outrageous, partisan, self-seeking, etc. occur in sufficient proliferation to warn us against the uncritical acceptance of newspaper fact and opinion at face value. In the view of J. M. S. Careless, however, Canadian journals generally gave scrupulous care to the reporting of whatever news they chose to report, their chief sin being a pronounced tendency to belittle, or to ignore or suppress, through the editorial privilege of selection, what they regarded as unfavourable while playing up that of which they approved. [18] In assessing public opinion through a study of old newspapers then, the problem is basically one of establishing the relative validity of contending editorial opinions. Of all the views expressed concerning any given matter, which were genuinely reflective of prevailing popular sentiment and which were attempts to lead or to form it? Given the highly illusive nature of the entity called "public opinion", we would be naive to expect such questions ever to be settled with certainty. [19] Nevertheless there are criteria against which editorial efforts of the past can be roughly measured. The Lower Canadian franchise, for example, was sufficiently liberal by 1856 to afford most adult males the opportunity of expressing their will at the polls; [20] and a little knowledge of an editor's behind-the-scenes activities and affiliations helps to qualify our acceptance of his assertions.

The key to an understanding of the editorial behaviour of the pre-Confederation journals is, as P. B. Waite has stressed, an understanding of the sort of patronage they received.[21] For of all the factors which may have conditioned the independence of the nineteenth century press the fundamental one was that every newspaper was a business enterprise subject to economic pressures which only circulation, advertising, printing contracts, or direct subsidization could alleviate.[22] As one seasoned newspaperman explained:

> "The real difficulty [in the conduct of a journal] is the reconciliation of a high standard of efficiency with vulgar solvency. The Toronto dailies have been, and yet are, conducted on a scale much too expensive for the city. Morrison's idea and mine is to bring the Colonist on to a business footing -- to see that its expenditure sustains some honest relation to its receipts; and until this part of the problem be solved, we deem caution the better part of management.[23]

Something of the financial difficulties likely to be encountered in the operation of an independent Canadian journal is revealed in the commentary of the Montreal Witness, whose moralizing editorial and advertising policy proscribed tempting but compromising sources of revenue with a steadfastness which was indeed unique:

> Many political papers are supported by Government advertisements at no end of expense to the people; but we have not and could not consistently take one Government advertisement. Other papers are largely supported by advertisements of quack doctors, theaters, circuses, saloons, etc., etc., none of which can be permitted in the Witness.[24]

Contrary to popular opinion, maintained the Witness, newspapers

chiefly dependent upon circulation were not moneymakers. At a new price of $2.00 per year the Witness, with 6,500 subscriptions, would bring in £3,250 in 1857 and still lose money:

> Two or three editors, besides correspondence, paper, printing, telegraphs, postages, clerks, and office expenses, require, in the course of a year, a very large sum of money. One item alone, that of paper, amounts to nearly £1,900, and the printer's charges will be about £1,400..... [25]

Anticipating a loss of about £300 for the year, the Witness appealed repeatedly for 4,000 additonal subscriptions to avoid the necessity of a curtailment of special supplements which the paper put out. [26]

The hard times of 1857 revealed the precarious financial situation of numerous other journals. On January 15, 1858, Irish Catholics were taken aback to read that, because of their lack of support, the True Witness, "the English organ of Catholic opinion in Canada", might have to be discontinued. Banquets and meetings of "friends of the True Witness" were held in Montreal and Kingston, resolutions were passed and committees formed, while pass-the-hat collections yielded $500.00 and "three cheers for the True Witness". [27] The editor, though duly touched by such demonstrations of affection, found that they failed to solve his basic problem:

> We know that Mr. Clerk has the confidence of the great body of the Catholic people; but that is not sufficient. Their confidence is not worth a groat if they do not prove it by supporting his paper. We are in a position to state that, at present, the receipts are not sufficient even to pay expenses -- a state of things which cannot possibly last long. [28]

Few were the journals which were not constrained to apply extra pressure, however subtly, to delinquent subscribers between the winters of 1858 and '59. Some were content to publish cheery reminders, [29] some stated frankly that they needed the money, [30] while a few, grown desperate, threatened to "put in force the machinery of the law." [31] Agents were sent beating about the countryside collecting accounts [32] while incentives were offered to induce people to drum up new business. [33] One journal was willing to take whatever it could get: "Of those who cannot pay money, butter, wheat, peas, corn, oats, hay, wood, beef, and tallow will be received at current prices". [34] At least one paper in Lower Canada, [35] the Anglo-Rouge Montreal Argus, folded up in 1858 "for want of support." [36] A good part of the trouble, according to the Sherbrooke Gazette, was that there were simply too many papers being published in Canada: "There are seven in the Eastern Townships, and probably not half of them are self-supporting." [37] Apparently the Witness was sincere in maintaining that the Canadian newspaper business of the 1850's was no royal road to riches.

Advertising, of course, helped to fill the gap between expenditures and circulation receipts, and as few journals were as scrupulous as the Witness [38] an astounding array of ads for a marvellous variety of products was the general result. A. Hayward, a contemporary observer, noted that pain or fear of pain was the most active stimulant to advertising in the last century, [39] and the first and fourth pages of the Canadian journals

of the period certainly bear him out. George W. Merchant's Celebrated Gargling Oil, "Good for man and Beast", Perry's Hungarian Balm, "To destroy Hair-Eaters at the Hair-Roots", and Carter's Spanish Mixture, guaranteeing an "infallible remedy" for eighteen horrible-sounding ailments such as "Scald-head" or "Obstinate Cutaneous Eruptions", were but a few of the questionable panaceas offered for public consumption. To confine one's journal to a more respectable advertising policy was to cut oneself off from lucrative sources of much-needed revenue.

But to many proprietors political patronage was the most important means of economic salvation. If the publicizing power peculiar only to newspapers made their support invaluable to politicians, it would seem that financial insecurity caused many journals to fall victim to the long purse. F. W. Scott has shown how, in the early history of a comparatively undeveloped country, political "rewards" like government advertising, printing contracts, low postal rates and the like, which would not be worth much in the affluence of modern society, were eagerly coveted by newspapermen, often as the sole means of keeping their journals alive. [40] Evidence of such patronage, while not abundant, [41] is not lacking with regard to Canadian newspapers of the Victorian period. E. Porritt has demonstrated how the Liberal party, through advertising for the Departments of Agriculture and Immigration, the Intercolonial Railway, and

contracts for the printing of official notices, rewarded the newspapers which helped it to power in 1873.[42] Sometimes government "favours" to helpful newspaper proprietors were bestowed in a manner somewhat less than respectable. Opposition papers abounded in calumnious imputations of the propriety of this relationship but only rarely did the facts behind these secretive backstage dealings come to light. During May of 1859, however, the senior editor of the Montreal Herald found reason to comment on some of the less savoury aspects of the liaison between the Cartier-Macdonald administration and members of the "servile press". With authoritative evidence at his disposal he did not, on this occasion, shrink from naming names:

> When reading the warm eulogies passed by the Government scribes on their patrons and the ever ready defense for the worst acts of the men in power, we are often irresistably reminded of the question which the devil put to Job: 'Do these men serve the government for nought?'....From time to time....the truth crops out of the surface to show the rich vein which lies beneath. A little of what, geologically, may be called the Rollo Campbell vein appears in the report of the Committee of the House of Assembly on Printing. These gentlemen have investigated the accounts of the patriotic publisher of the Pilot, once called the 'Reformer's Own Paper', and they report anything but a reform in the printer's bills which come from the more profitable branch of the proprietor's establishment. They state that Mr. Rollo Campbell's accounts have included a number of charges, about one hundred per cent in advance of the highest rates which ought to have been charged, and that these overcharges amounted last year to over £2000, which we suppose are in the nature of what Dr. Ryerson calls advantages. These overcharges were not simple errors. One of the clerks of the Assembly noticed them once, but, as Dr. Ryerson got a wink from Mr. Hincks and a hoarse laugh from Sir Allan McNab, and so felt himself entitled to any stealings which he could grab from that time forth, so Mr. Campbell's friend who checked the accounts, having been told once by

> Mr. Stevenson, Chairman of the Printing Committee, to pass a false statement, felt himself bound to do so and to continue doing so for ever. Of course, the Government are not responsible for Mr. Campbell's acts, nor for the failure of the clerk (for reasons best known to himself) to act like an honest man; but it is the impunity granted to every rascality practiced by political partizans, which encourages men, placed like Mr. Campbell, to sin against the public. It will be seen that this £2000 was the produce of the Rollo Campbell vein during the period of the investigation of this year's Committee. What profitable workings there must have been if the mining has been pursued with the same zeal and business energy for ten years past. [43]

Warming to the analogy, the Herald speculated on the prospecting potential of two additional excavations, the "James Beaty mine" (Toronto Leader), [44] and the "Thompsonian development" (Toronto Colonist), and pronounced them good in each case, depending "upon the judgement with which the proprietor proceeds, and especially on the question of skilled assistance." Beaty, for example, had been allowed by Hincks, over the objections of certain municipalities, to purchase York roads valued at $300,000 eight years previously. Although he still owed $29,000, the Cartier-Macdonald government quietly dropped its claim to this remainder despite the fact that £70,000 had been derived from the roads and only £18,000 spent in their maintenance over the eight years. "Another vein worth working", concluded the Herald: [45]

> Mr. Beaty is a wealthy man, and yet he must get a haul of $29,000 out of the Provincial Treasury. But the Leader would probably go into opposition as it has twice before -- each time for a few hours -- unless some douceurs of this kind were thrown in the way of its proprietor. [46]

On April 30, 1860, George Brown rose in the Legislative Assembly to move a resolution for the abolition of the Queen's

printership. [47] Citing evidence drawn from the recent report of the Printing Committee, he pointed out the impropriety of the Queen's printers drawing revenues of $26,000 to $27,000, even in a bad year, for work that should have cost $8,000 or $10,000 at the most. Why had the Queen's printers been selling the Consolidated Statutes for $14.50 instead of $4.00? Why were they charging 50¢ for printing composition and $1.25 for press work instead of the normal rates of 28¢ and 15¢ respectively? Because, he concluded, and his vast knowledge of the printing business lent weight to his words, the Queen's printership was one of the grossest jobs ever perpetrated in Canada. No defense could be made for the continuance of "so injurious a monopoly". The old argument that large profits enabled the printers to keep large inventories on hand he ridiculed as a well known absurdity. He was for a system of public tenders and free competition. Statutes would be just as authoritative issuing from other printers so long as they bore some official mark of identification.

Brown, as usual, was circumvented by John A. Macdonald and his supporters. An amendment was passed naming a committee to inquire into the business of the Queen's Printer to ascertain whether the office ought to be abolished. Brown was the only man on the committee who favoured abolition.

As Brown was being effectively sidetracked in parliament, the Herald renewed its objections to the manner in which

government printing contracts were awarded. In many cases the court favourites were incompetent and could not meet competition:

> Except two of our neighbours in Montreal, there is hardly a city newspaper in the Province on the Government side, which is not blessed with printing jobs, given to them without any public competition. One gentleman, whose main business is in the grocery department, has recently gone into the Printing business in Quebec, and in return for puffs, gets jobs....[and] must be paid an extravagant price in order to make up the loss which usually arises on business conducted without professional aptitude. Men like Mr. [John] Lovell, with all his experience and machinery, are passed over in favour of a Tea importer, with no other machinery than a grinding organ, from whence is constantly croaked out monotonous music to the tune of 'Praise those from whom all profits flow'. [48]

Even more disquieting to the Herald was a parliamentary award of £500 to George Benjamin, the chairman of the very committee which had uncovered the printing abuses. [49] Did not the Independence of Parliament Act prohibit members from accepting "pecuniary grants" which, "under the guise of remuneration for services, are so readily convertible into bribes?" The Herald began to despair of any "real reform" in the printing department of the government: "We regret to find his [Mr. Benjamin's] name among those who have voted to continue the present monopoly in the hands of the Queen's Printer." [50] "Who", asked the Herald, "shall keep watch on such watchmen?" [51] And had there been any refunding of the money from the Rollo Campbell "robbery" of the last session?

> If we got back the thousands of dollars which the Printing Committee says were filched from us, we might afford to pay something to the person who detected the fraud. As it is, all that has happened is that we pay another £500 for the

> pleasure of knowing how we were cheated....Can we not spend our money in detecting something whose detection can be made to pay expenses? If not, let us....at least avoid throwing good money after bad as Benjamin's has gone after Campbell's. [52]

Publishing a table of the Printing Committee's original findings against Campbell, the Herald noted that "the printer whose accounts are summed up above still appears in the public ledger for sums, which, at the same rate of charge, give opportunity for a very large extent of further plunder." [53]

Rollo Campbell's reply to all of this was a classic of sorts. Obviously cut to the quick by the Herald's repeated charges he responded in a manner quite the reverse of dignified:

> Philip drunk and Philip sober are very different persons.... [but] we cannot congratulate our contemporary of the Herald for often being in the latter desirable condition....Kinnear is at present guzzling down below, and Penny has the management of the journal, for the time being, in his own hands.... A whip has been sent to the proprietor of the Pilot, having, written on the end of it --'TO FLOG D. K.'.....It would not be quite legal to give David Kinnear 'a good horse-whipping'... [and] he is altogether too contemptible a creature for the proprietor of the Pilot to soil his hands with. We propose, shortly, to notice the low, mean, cowardly poltroon in a more legal way....We are again under the disagreeable necessity of copying from the Herald -- a paper which we generally shun as we would a pest-house -- but which, like other dirty things, we are occasionally obliged to handle, to show of what contemptible stuff they are made....The whip is still in our possession; if Kinnear would like to smell it, he is invited over....[Kinnear's] chief employment is reported to be playing dumps with the boys in the office, or spitting out from the windows on the old apple-woman passing below. [54]

But rail though he might, Campbell could not deny the substance of the Herald's "insinuations". He finally admitted having been found guilty of overcharging to the extent of £1098 7s 5d, but preferred to attribute it to oversight, [55] pointing out

that "Messrs. Lovell, Kinnear, & Co." of the Herald had made similar "mistakes" in the past. Had not Lovell been compelled to refund money to the Grand Trunk Railway, whose printing contract he had lost due to outrageous overcharging? [56] The Herald's present attitude was dismissed as simply that of a poor loser. The opposition had failed in their recent bid for power, thus eliminating any chance that "the printing and publishing of the Official Gazette, with all that the other work that the Government have it in their power to bestow, shall be divided between the proprietors of the Herald and another Montreal printer [Lovell] for whom they are greatly interested." [57] Again, during the last session, Mr. Penny had made a futile effort to secure government printing for the Herald. The consequences, explained the Pilot, were inevitable: "Hatred towards Mr. Campbell because he was more fortunate." [58]

Considerable light is shed upon the relationship between government and newspapers by certain passages in the extant letters of John A. Macdonald to Brown Chamberlin of the Montreal Gazette. In what would appear to be his first communication with Chamberlin Macdonald commenced his cultivation of the Montreal journalist:

> I am exceedingly obliged to you for your friendly and important communication and am gratified by the feeling that dictated it. I am especially pleased at your estimation of myself and my position, and with the prospect of having such followers. I will have an added inducement to endeavour to make myself worthy of being a leader. [59]

Requesting that his correspondence be burned, Macdonald proceeded to supply Chamberlin with lengthy and "confidential" answers to his questions about Lower Canadian representation in the cabinet. In conclusion he deftly added a word or two of direction:

> Your article in the Gazette on the new changes was on the whole favourable, but I wish you had come out a little stronger....We expect from our friends a generous confidence and hope that when you have anything to our disadvantage you will communicate with us, and hear our answer and explanations before committing yourself or your paper against us. In fact we want you to
>
> 'Be to our faults a little blind
> And to our virtues always kind'

Reference to the mundane but vital matter of patronage was reserved for the final paragraph. Unfortunately Macdonald felt compelled to obliterate five whole lines of this meaningful passage but enough remains to justify our suspicions concerning his liaisonn with the Gazette: "We are making arrangements about the Government patronage in the way of advertisements, which we will complete in a few days, and I will advise you thereof." In another letter to Chamberlin Macdonald again concluded with a reference to patronage: "I observe what you say about printing patronage. If it has not been corrected, I will see to it."[60] Finally, with Confederation accomplished, the last extant letter from Macdonald to Chamberlin reassured the editor with regard to patronage and exhorted him to again put his shoulder to the wheel in the Conservative cause:

> I consider you as perfectly safe in the hands of the present Government, and if you will take my advice you will show no distrust by pressing just how for a written contract.

> This cannot be done until we all reassemble after the elections. Bide your time therefore and work like a Trojan to return our friends and all will be well.[61]

Virtue was indeed rewarded. Relinquishing control of the Gazette in 1867, Chamberlin served as Conservative M. P. for Missisquoi until 1870 when he was appointed Queen's Printer at Ottawa, a post which he held until 1891.[62]

A brief excerpt from the chequered history of the Toronto Colonist might serve to illustrate how Macdonald was capable of dealing with journalists less devoted than Brown Chamberlin. During the session of 1858 George Sheppard, the new editor and co-owner of that ministerial journal committed the "crowning sin" of admitting Brown to be right in something.[63] Macdonald, "full of passion, wrote an insolent letter" demanding a retraction but Sheppard and his colleague Morrison refused.[64] Sheppard had, in fact, developed strong apprehensions about the government's failure to come to grips with the double majority and other problems, and he now broke deliberately away from the ministerial fold with a strong editorial alleging that the country was drifting rapidly to wreck.[65] Government supporters heaped contumely upon Sheppard for his desertion, and the Quebec Herald declared frankly that a party paper was paid to support its patrons through thick and thin.[66] On July 18 Sheppard wrote to his friend Charles Clarke: "Macdonald is now hunting us with the malignity of a fiend."[67] Within weeks he was out of work. The backers of the financially unstable Colonist had agreed to a

merger with Macdonald's brand new organ, the Toronto Atlas.[68] For the second time in a year the ministry had caused the Colonist to be bought out and its editor ejected.[69] In an article entitled "Flunkeyism" the Montreal Herald could not resist pronouncing the following valedictory:

> The Colonist after a momentary fit of Opposition during the last session of Parliament, speedily relapsed into ministerialism. To supply its place, during its temporary absence, the Atlas was started. A few short months have passed, and to keep one Government organ alive, it is found necessary to suppress the other. So the poor Colonist, after all its chopping and changing, is dead, and is become a component part of the Atlas, which will enable the whole, at some early day, to be interred in one grave and lamented on the same tombstone.[70]

But John A. Macdonald, in explaining to Brown Chamberlin why government patronage was withdrawn from the Montreal printer John Lovell, reveals what steps the government had taken to ensure the success of the Atlas:

> When the Colonist turned traitor during the session before last, our conservative supporters met and resolved to establish a conservative newspaper. Lovell agreed to start and carry it on and was promised lots of patronage to sustain him....An editor procured...the New Conservative organ trumpeted to the world and the first number printed. Before it was published Lovell came to our friends and drew back. This put them and the Government in a most ludicrous and damaging fix. In fact the nonappearance of the Atlas would have been ruin. We were therefore obliged to ask Thompson to start the paper. He did so in face of a certain loss and we, of course, had to sustain him with all the Government printing we could legally and properly give...[and] we cannot yet deprive Thompson of the patronage -- that he may lose at any time by a change of ministry....he must have it until the account of profit and loss turns in his favour....Lovell has but himself to thank for his position with us. The truth is Sheppard and Co. were frightened by the Atlas and succeeded in

> frightening and choking off Lovell....Had he not broken his agreement he would have had all the Government printing and patronage at his own prices.[71]

Even the Herald was forced to revise its estimate of the Atlas' chances:

> The indications of a valuable mine are good. They appear in entries in the public accounts, showing that several thousands of pounds were raised during the past twelve months, which, considering the newness of the machinery and the rawness of the hands, must be admitted pretty good working.[72]

Clearly, concluded the Herald, "to set down the constancy of affection of the Ministerial journalists to any sincerity of conviction is to entertain a faith, which, in the words of an act of Edward the 6th's Parliament, about chantries, is but 'a fond and foolish thing'".[73]

In the case of the Colonist (it was finally decided to retain the old name) it would seem that these allusions to great wealth were ill-founded. During September of 1860 Thompson was forced to close down his newspaper. The Herald pronounced upon its career:

> [Since the death of Hugh Scobie, its founder], the Colonist has been the prey of politicans, especially since the coalition ministry has been formed, and, deeply mortgaged, it has been taken in hand by one adventurer after another, each of whom has hoped to sell his services for public plunder, and to some extent has succeeded in doing so. The competition, however, has been too severe, and the consequent expenses too heavy to enable the concern to be kept up under its load of debt, by men without capital in money or character. Its expressions of opinion were, therefore, constantly changing; and, except for a brief period when, under Mr. Hogan's control, it maintained a vigorous opposition fight from the conservative point of view, it has been sensibly declining from year to year. Its late proprietor, Mr. Thompson,...states that he has

> sunk a large property and involved himself in debt in the attempt to carry on the Colonist, while he has succeeded as little in pleasing the politicans, whom he not very wisely attempted to serve, as in filling his own pocket. [74]

As far as the Lower Canadian press is concerned, there can be little doubt about the allegiance of the Montreal Gazette. The opposition press abounded in charges of its being a "government organ", J. C. Dent refers to it as "the Conservative organ of the Province", [75] while J. M. S. Careless writes it off as "a party oracle". [76] The Gazette's defense of its editorial policy deserves attention for two reasons: it offers a rather sad commentary on the nineteenth century conception of the freedom of the press, and it indicates yet another kind of patronage for which newspapers would compromise their independence; namely, inside news. The Gazette did not deny its preference for the ministry but maintained that it was only the result of sincere conviction. [77] The charge of being a "Government organ" was dismissed as "a chattering, parrot kind of cry of men in want of a correct term." The allegation "that the Ministry have paid writers in their service we believe to be totally untrue." It was, however, judged quite permissible for an "independent journalist" to serve a party out of "sincere convictions", and to "work with that party with which he has the most sympathy, to say all that he honestly can in its favour, and to defend it from....the malignant and factious attacks of its assailants." It was then only fitting that government ministers, in return

for such service, should give such a journalist "all the information they can, which is really the most important return they can make...." A journal receiving and publishing information from ministers is an organ "in that particular only -- its independence is in no way compromised." As to the Herald's contention that the "point of honour" with a journalist should lie in his "obtaining support from the public instead of depending on more collateral gains "the Gazette asserted that public support, while essential, was no guarantee of "TRUTH". Have not the "vilest lampoons been known to obtain large circulation?" Has not "great success been known to follow systematic and bold lying?" [78]

Whatever our reservations concerning the propriety of the Gazette's ethical position, we would be naive to assume that that newspaper's partiality to the Macdonald-Cartier party was dictated solely by the desire of its proprietors to secure government patronage. Patronage was anticipated and welcomed, to be sure, but the fundamental interest of the Gazette was in far bigger stakes. Brown Chamberlin was himself a leading figure in Montreal's commercial hierarchy, [79] and it is indeed difficult to imagine a paper of his giving support to any party not firmly committed to railway building, development of the St. Lawrence, and protective tariffs, let alone a party as allegedly hostile to urban and Lower Canadian business interests as the Upper Canadian Grits. The support

given by Lower Canada's most formidable English-language newspaper [80] to Macdonald, Cartier and Galt, was probably the result of a nice admixture of expediency, conviction, and desire for profit and inside news, as far as its proprietors, Brown Chamberlin and John Lowe, were concerned.

As regards the Pilot, one need scarcely add to the indictment preferred by the Herald against the "ministerial organ" and the "nabob of Place d'Armes" who operated it. [81] Rollo Campbell, the operator of a printing business which was "perhaps the most extensive in Canada", purchased the Pilot from Francis Hincks in 1849 and ran it as a ministerial mouthpiece until its demise in 1862. [82] At first the Pilot professed great indignation at the suggestion that it was "a thick and thin supporter of the Government," but after repeated failures to convince the opposition press (or anybody else) that it was "the most independent paper in this city, and the only one, perhaps, that can dare to be independent", [83] it came out in the open:

> Now, supposing for the sake of argument, that the Pilot is what the Globe describes it to be -- the 'hired organ' of the Government, we ask in the name of common sense, why should it not?....If Mr. George Brown keeps up a paper, and hires men to advocate his peculiar political views, and defend them when attacked by his adversaries -- why should not Mr. Macdonald, or Mr. Cartier, or Mr. anybody else?....We esteem it a cause of honour rather than shame to be recognized as an organ, ready and able and willing to defend the Ministry against the baseless attacks of the Globe or any of the smaller fry who do as that paper tells them. [84]

To the list of ministerial journals in Lower Canada may be added the Quebec Morning Chronicle. It was the Chronicle's original intention, when launched May 18, 1847, by Robert Middleton and Charles St. Michel, to concentrate primarily on commercial news, to avoid long editorials and bitter polemics on political topics, and to present "only an abstract and brief chronicle of the times". [85] In 1849 the paper passed under the sole control of St. Michel, a moderate Tory, who believed that the forces of economic development, once underway, were irreversible and unaffected by political considerations. [86] A keen scrutineer of government economic measures, St. Michel supported the Liberal-Conservative policies of government aid to canals and railways, and protective tariffs. On March 16, 1860, the paper was sold to S. B. Foote. Under its new owner the Chronicle retained a strong interest in things commercial but was given a much more pronounced political bias. Foote's opening editorial left little to the imagination:

> Today the Morning Chronicle is issued under a new regime..... [The] Chronicle under our management will be essentially a Liberal, Conservative and commercial paper....We shall not decline to give our adherence to the best practicable financial policy, because it is introduced by a Minister of the Crown, nor to the best possible postal system because its exponent is in office....fantems of treason and sedition shall not be permitted to insult the representative of the sovereign -- or to disseminate their disunionist, and anti-Canadian theories unanswered. Regarding Canada as a unity, and her inhabitants as one people, we shall not pander to any prejudice of race, creed, or origin. [87]

These sentiments, upon which John A. Macdonald himself could

scarcely have improved, were nothing if not a direct denunciation of the Upper Canadian Liberal party, its leader George Brown and his Globe newspaper, and the 1859 Reform Convention resolutions. Foote insisted that his newspaper was free of "any extraneous influences" but, even in the absence of any really conclusive evidence that this was not the case, the unqualified nature of the support he gave to John A. Macdonald militates against our easy acceptance of his assertion. On January 21, 1863, the paper was turned over to Foote's brother, John B. Foote, who announced no changes in the journal's editorial policy. As far as P. B. Waite is concerned, the Quebec Morning Chronicle remained "a ministerial paper" [88] which faithfully reflected "the ideas of its chief", John A. Macdonald. [89] Its influence on the Confederation movement was comparable to that of the Montreal Gazette, [90] and was strongest among the conservative and Protestant English-speaking merchants and businessmen of Quebec who comprised the vast majority of its readers. [91]

The most influential English-language opposition newspaper in Lower Canada was the Montreal Herald, "the chief organ of the English-speaking Liberals of the Province". [92] Its proprietors were David Kinnear, who had operated the paper since the mid 1840's, Edward Goff Penny, who would take over the paper after Kinnear's death in 1862, [93] and one Andrew Wilson. Kinnear and Penny functioned as senior and junior editor res-

pectively. [94] If we may believe the Montreal Gazette, the Herald was backed by a "clique" of "politicians hungry after office". [95] The Pilot also implied strongly that the editorial staff of the Herald was subject to outside control:

> It used to be said of the senior editor, that, as a general rule, the poor man was not allowed to meddle very much with the Herald, and that it was only as a very special favour he was every now and then permitted to say something spiteful and nasty. [96]

P. B. Waite does not establish the identity of the Herald's backers but notes the obvious -- the paper's editorial allegiance to Luther H. Holton, [97] the wealthy "half-American radical" [98] who sat for Montreal in the Legislative Assembly from 1854 to 1857 and for Chateauguay in the Assembly and House of Commons from 1863 until his death in 1880. [99] Holton, an advanced liberal, was a close political confidant of George Brown, [100] and not infrequently the Globe gave editorial expression to ideas which originated with Holton. [101] The parallel stands taken by the Globe and the Herald on many issues gained for the latter a reputation in the ministerial press as an "echo" of the former, [102] but the silence of the Herald on George Brown during 1857 when he and Holton had fallen out over the Grand Trunk investigations, and its refusal to support either the 1859 Reform Convention resolutions or the Great Coalition of 1864, indicates that this reputation was not deserved. A more accurate appellation for the Herald was the one used by the Montreal Gazette -- "Anglo-Rouge organ" -- [103] for, like

the Rouges, Holton and the English-speaking Liberals of Lower Canada owed Brown no allegiance, and, in the final analysis, the Herald comprised a major part of that "very considerable opposition" which Confederation encountered in the English-language press of Lower Canada. [104] Its influence was formidable, especially among "leading merchants all over the country" who read the paper because of the excellent reputation of its commercial news. [105]

Editorially, the Herald tended to approach a political scheme with three basic criteria in mind: would it be practicable? would it be expensive? would it be free from government jobbery or other forms of corruption? Since its benefactors were not in the happy position of being the initiators of government policy the Herald's decisions were generally in the negative on each acount. Cynicism was the prevailing attitude, satire the usual mode of expression, whenever ministerial projects were under consideration, and there was something to the Montreal Gazette's charge that the Herald refused to see "ought but the greed of gold" in every act of public men. [106] According to the Pilot the Herald's sourness was but a condition inevitably brought on by acute and chronic deprivation of political patronage. [107] The Herald, for its part, denied the allegation that it was a seeker after patronage: "George Brown and his friends are, we sincerely believe, quite incapable of practicing the 'base arts' by which Mr. Cartier and his friends....reward their supporters

at the expense of the public." [108] Having made full allowance for the Herald's failings one still senses that a major reason for that journal's full-time career of muck-raking must have been a superabundance of muck to rake.

Of lesser account on the opposition side was the short-lived Montreal Argus, founded in 1854 and discontinued in 1858 by William Bristow, one-time editor of the Montreal Transcript. Bristow, the deputy master of Montreal Trinity House, obtained his political news and views at first hand acting as secretary at the meetings of the Lower Canadian Reformers. [109] The Argus made no pretence at being impartial:

> Our old members, Messrs. Holton and Dorion,....have been for several days before the constituency as declared opponents of the Government, and the list of our candidates, we are happy to be the means of announcing, this day is completed, by adding to their names that of T. D'Arcy McGee, Esq., the chosen candidate of the Irishmen in Montreal. [110]

Upon the demise of the Argus the Herald had this to say of its career:

> The course of the Argus, from its first to its last number, has been a consistent one; earnest in its support of those liberal principles, to advocate which it was established, and unflinching in its opposition to the unprincipled 'coalition' by which the country has ever since been, and continues to be, misgoverned. [111]

The Sherbrooke Gazette brushed off the Montreal Gazette's intimations that the Argus' discontinuance was indicative of a deteriorating opposition by pointing up the example of the recently defunct Toronto Colonist on the ministerial side. There were, it concluded, simply too many newspapers being published in Canada for all to survive. [112]

The gap created by the collapse of the Argus was closed by the return of the Montreal Transcript to the ranks of the opposition during 1859. According to the Herald, the Transcript, though long a "journal of respectability", had been lured by "gentle means" into the ministerial fold as a preliminary to the 1857 elections. [113] Its change of editorial platform had indeed been sudden. Up until November 19 the Transcript, printed and published by Donald McDonald and edited by J. K. Edwards, was strongly critical of the two government leaders. Cartier was sharply rebuked for his cavalier disregard of the Montreal voters while Macdonald, though perhaps "a smart politican", was found wanting the qualities of "earnestness, steadiness, and comprehensiveness of mind" held necessary for true statesmanship. [114] George Brown, though charged with "religious bigotry", had been credited with rare "conscientious sincerity" on other matters in general and in his opposition to the Grand Trunk subsidies in particular. [115] By November 24, however, the Transcript had reversed its field, and its treatment of the liberals seeking election in Montreal was exceedingly brusque. Referring to L. H. Holton's Grand Trunk affiliations the Transcript asserted: "We want men who will serve their constituencies and their country, and not aim exclusively at their own profit and advancement." Dorion was criticized for insisting upon "senseless platforms" which "the common people do not understand, and which the country at large cares not a brass farthing about." [116] D'Arcy McGee was dismissed as an adventurer "of unknown qualities." [117]

The Herald was convinced that the political editorials of the Transcript "since its conversion to Macdonald-Cartierism" were the work of "a certain junior partner in a legal firm in this city" who had usurped the editorial chair: "As to the nominal and ostensible editor of the Transcript: poor fellow, we cheerfully exonerate him from all blame....[He], like Romeo's apothecary, has no will in matter." [118] But the Transcript soon began to waver in its support of the ministry. On August 16,1858, it was willing to "humbly" concede that "His Excellency made a mistake" in refusing Brown a dissolution, and by February 5, 1859, it had grown harshly critical of the government's motives in adopting the policy of federal union. This disenchantment proceeded apace until 1860 when the Transcript emerged as the most vehement supporter of George Brown in Lower Canada, carefully reporting his "able" speeches, [119] defending his integrity, [120] and countering the assertions of the ministerial journals with the Upper Canadian Liberal party line. [121] Some sort of liaison between the Transcript and the Herald at this time is perhaps indicated by the Pilot's reference to the latter as the Transcript's "big brother" [122] and by extensive advertising carried in the Transcript for the Herald's special illustrated edition. [123] But whatever the connection, if it did exist, the editorial lines of the two papers were not synonymous. The Herald continued to be "the only journal in Montreal [speaking] for the English-speaking Rouges," [124] while the Transcript

defended itself against charges of being "the organ of Mr. Brown". [125] It is unfortunate that we do not know more about the Transcript since it seems to have been a prominent urban journal. Its circulation was advertised without contradiction as the largest in Montreal. [126]

While most of the journals argued the primarily political aspects of current questions certain papers, notably the Montreal Witness, Scottish-Protestant in character, and its counterblast, the Irish-Catholic True Witness and Catholic Chronicle (or as the True Witness would have it, "the two Witnesses, the True and the Other") reserved the better part of their editorial spleen for heated debate on the religious and moral overtones which were inevitably generated by public issues in a dual society. Charged local controversies like the separate school question and more remote disputes like the one over slavery furnished alike the sort of ammunition with which these devout rivals so fervently strove to demolish each other: "The first step towards the amelioration of the slave's lot must be the conversion of his heathen, or Protestant, master to Catholicity." [127]

The Witness, founded as a weekly by John Dougall in 1846, [128] was dedicated to the combat of "whatsoever opposes spiritual religion and injures society" and to the promotion of "whatsoever is pure, honest, lovely, and of good report." [129] Roman Catholic institutions, alcoholic beverages, and corrupt

politicians were generally lumped together in the first category while the good work of the various Protestant church and benevolent societies came in for commendation in the second. [130] A good part of the Dougall philosophy is summed up in his allegation that the Anglo-Saxon race was "the dominant race of the world, and were it to be characterized by temperate principles, its chief source of weakness would be cut off." [131] Papal authority he denounced as "that masterpiece of satanic ingenuity"; priests he exposed as "the dictators of Canada". [132] Indeed, a major concern was that the "priest power" would take over Canada, [133] and as Dougall's solutions were, characteristically, religious and moral ones -- the conversion of French Canadians to Protestantism [134] and the reconstruction of public affairs by men of "ability and integrity" [135] -- his political preferences must be viewed in the light of these overriding apprehensions:

> There has been a Ministerial crisis, and a new Government is formed consisting chiefly of the old members, with the following changes of cast: -- Col. Taché the out and out priest party man, the denouncer of all who seek to curb the dangerous power of the Church of Rome as 'pharasaical brawlers', takes the place of Sir Allan McNab as Prime Minister....Then again, Mr. Drummond, who had committed the unpardonable sin of applying a remedy in his new corporations bill to clerical greediness, has been kicked out, and Mr. Cartier, from whom the priests, doubtless, fear nothing of the kind, is put in his place. And Mr. John A. Macdonald, who will, doubtless, harmonize happily with these two, is to lead Upper Canada at the bidding of the Archbishop of Quebec....It is said there will be a dissolution and an appeal to the country. If there is, and if the people give ecclesiasticism and mortmain a majority, they well deserve to be hewer of wood and drawers of water for lazy and luxurious monks, ask their fathers were before the Reformation, and as the peones of Mexico are now. [136]

The Brown-Dorion ministry of 1858 was heralded, on the other hand, as "Canada's long wished for combination of ability and integrity in her public men." [137]

Dougall's sympathy for Brown and Upper Canada undoubtedly owed much to religious affinity, but they shared, in addition, a belief in free trade and a certain admiration for the achievements of the United States. [138] Moreover Dougall, who had entered journalism as the proprietor of the Temperance Advocate, [139] was apt to view the behaviour of John A. Macdonald with a particularly jaundiced eye. On the economic side, Dougall confidently regarded material progress as a positive manifestation of divine blessing. [140] An ardent promoter of Montreal commercial interests, his excellent trade reviews and circulars gave the Witness, in the estimation of no less an observer than the Montreal Gazette, "an unquestioned status among commercial men." [141] But it is in vain that one looks for any indication that Dougall's concern for Montreal might have modified in any way his political preference for the Upper Canada Reform Party. His editorials have the ring of independence and genuine, if somewhat one-sided, conviction. The support given Brown by the Witness was, however, qualified by Dougall's preoccupations, and would be summarily withdrawn the moment it was felt that the interests of Lower Canada's English-speaking Protestants were being seriously jeopardized. That moment arrived in 1864 when Brown came to terms with Macdonald in the interests of a

confederation which would place the Lower Canadian minority at the mercy of a Roman Catholic provincial legislature.

The circulation and influence of the Witness were substantial, and both were enhanced by the advent of the daily Witness in 1860. [142] The weekly and semi-weekly editions continued to be sent through the mails to their readers in both sections of Canada and in the United States [143] while the daily edition was successfully circulated by newsboys in Montreal. [144] By 1867 the circulation of the daily stood at 5000, that of the semi-weekly at 3,000, and of the weekly at 4,500. [145] Professor Cooper says that the Witness spoke for a somewhat smug and "established" clientele of Protestant farmers, town workers, and small tradesmen who had not as yet been superseded by the rising French Canadian middle class or abandoned by the Anglo-Canadian capitalist class. [146]

The True Witness and Catholic Chronicle was founded in 1849 by John Gillies and George Edward Clerk, a Scottish-Catholic graduate of Eton who had recently settled in Montreal. [147] Clerk had been apprised by Bishop Bourget of the need to establish a Catholic organ to refute the malignant and damaging attacks of papers like the Montreal Witness, and, dedicating himself to such an undertaking, was promised the support of the Church. [148] Gillies became the proprietor and Clerk the sole editor, while the Bishop of Montreal persuaded the other Canadian bishops to subsidize the enterprise on an annual

basis. [149] Clerk never left anyone in doubt as to the editorial creed of the True Witness:

> Since the first appearance of the True Witness, now six years ago, it has been our constant object to merit the approval of our ecclesiastical superiors, and the confidence of the Catholic public, by our firm and consistent assertion of Catholic principles, and our unflinching advocacy of Catholic rights. We have endeavoured to be of no party, to know no party save the Church -- and to consult no interests save those of our holy religion. [150]

These principles Clerk adhered to with undeviating constancy. The entries in his diary reveal that no editorial policy was embarked upon without the prior sanction of the bishop. [151]

Thus, to the True Witness, the "three great questions" of the late 1850's were representation by population, the movement to abolish separate schools in Canada West, and incorporation of the Orange lodges. Each was naturally opposed. [152] The True Witness saw little of which to approve in any of the contemporary parties or politicians. George Brown was a religious fanatic [153] while Macdonald, an Orangeman, was worse. [154] "God alone can defend us from such friends as Cartier, Cauchon, Drummond, and the rest of the mercenary tribe" who betrayed their Church by passing a Religious Corporations bill restricting bequests to religious institutions, by opposing separate schools for Upper Canada, and by recommending that Governor Head receive a deputation from "a secret political society....animated by a deadly hatred of Catholicity." [155] Dorion's voting record was satisfactory but, as a Rouge, he too was suspect. [156] Even

D'Arcy McGee, the chosen candidate of the Montreal Irish, ran afoul of the True Witness for assuming an Irish rather than a Catholic stand and for committing the "strange sin" of supporting George Brown. [157] Federal union would be interpreted by the True Witness as was everything else -- in the light of the anticipated effect it would have upon Roman Catholic institutions.

It is difficult to gauge the influence of the True Witness. The journal admitted to "a very limited circulation" [158] and its financial difficulties were chronic. From Clerk's diary one discovers that, despite the sporadic handouts ranging from $60 to £200 which the devoted editor received from well-wishers and the clergy, only a gift of £752 from his father averted the discontinuance of the paper during the hard times of 1857: "For this most unexpected piece of good news I heartily thank God." [159] Published in Montreal, the journal collected accounts in the Ottawa and Kingston districts [160] but no wider coverage of the province is indicated. Still, Clerk spoke with the authority of the Church behind him, and the Montreal Irish vote did go where it was intended in the elections of 1857. Clerk's diary reveals that the good bishops were quite capable of applying pressure to induce their parishioners to subscribe to the True Witness, and that they would even collect accounts from delinquent subscribers when all else had failed. [161] It would seem that the Lower Canadian clergy considered the True Witness far too valuable an organ to let die.

The rural newspapers, in Canada as elsewhere, withstood the challenge of the widely distributed metropolitan journals by increasing their emphasis on local affairs:

> It is our aim to give the News in an attractive form, and in its season; to make an interesting and elevating Family journal; to discuss public affairs temperately and with a view to the elucidation of correct principles; and as home matters are of the greatest moment, to pay particular attention to affairs of local interest; and to this end we solicit the co-operation of friends in furnishing notes of local events, worth notice, for publication. [162]

This primary concern for the development of the local community and the greater degree of personal contact which occurred between an editor and his readers in a small town or rural county may have tended, as L. M. Salmon suggests, to make the country editor a more authentic spokesman for his particular society than was his urban counterpart, whose favours were so often purchased and whose columns were filled with items of wider and more varied interest, [163] but one would be naive to assume too much. An examination of two representative rural journals, the Stanstead Journal and the Sherbrooke Gazette, reveals that, while both papers were genuinely solicitous of the welfare of the Eastern Townships and of their particular counties, the political in-fighting which was carried on between them was as partisan as could be found anywhere. One discovers each paper committed to the support of a local politician and a corresponding major political group, and one observes each paper accusing the other of corruption, shady practices and the

like, while devoutly proclaiming its own pristine innocence and independence:

> The Sherbrooke Gazette echoes the key note of his file leader, the Montreal Herald. Certain newspapers have received an advertisement from the Bureau of Agriculture, the editor says 'three columns to the Stanstead Journal'. We are sorry to inform our amiable and disinterested contemporary that he states the amount more than one-third too large. If this is the fault of the department we hope they will make up the extra column, but fear that undue excitement makes our estimable neighbour 'see double'. Does the Gazette judge the honesty of others by its own? We find an answer at hand which is too true, more's the pity....[The Gazette] has been the willing slave -- body and soul -- of a clique: whose editor seldom ventures to insert anything political in his columns without the sanction of his masters, for fear that his knuckles will be rapped as a reward for his temerity; who is ready to vacate his editorial chair when a superior power wishes to assume it, and who recklessly fills his columns with libels and forthwith swallows them again when he fears that 'money' is to be taken out of his pocket and its 'sweet music' lost to him for ever. [164]

On the surface one could hardly say that either the Stanstead Journal or the Sherbrooke Gazette seemed inherently more virtuous than the Montreal Gazette or the Montreal Herald, their respective big-city prototypes.

The Stanstead Journal was founded in 1845 by Lee Roy Robinson of Castleton, Vermont, at the thriving trade and manufacturing center of Rock Island. [165] Robinson, formerly the publisher of the Vermont Statesman, was, as might be expected, a firm supporter of across-the-border railway communications and trade, [166] and this southern outlook was no doubt stimulated by the fact that the Journal was published within one hundred yards of the international frontier. [167] But he was,

first and foremost, a booster of his adopted county. Were farmers grumbling about restrictive market regulations at Sherbrooke? Let them come to Stanstead:

> The farmers of Hatley, Compton, etc., who now sell their produce at Sherbrooke, can find a market unrestricted by any regulations whatever in Stanstead. Freighting from this point to Boston or Portland, via the Grand Trunk, is cheaper than from Sherbrooke or Waterville, and prices of produce are consequently as good or better. In the way of exchanges, there is no doubt but Stanstead merchants can do as well by their customers as any traders in the country. Most kinds of mechanical work can be readily obtained here as elsewhere, and at low prices. More Boots and Shoes are manufactured here than at any other place in the Eastern Townships. [168]

Politically, the Journal stood opposed to the Grits and Rouges, "whose line of policy has been clearly opposed to the general interests of Lower Canada," [169] but denied that it was a ministerial journal: "We shall continue to speak of this Ministry or others that may follow in accordance to what seems to us right and just. We never have solicited Government patronage, and never shall." [170] That patronage was nonetheless bestowed during 1856 was no doubt due to the benevolent influence of Timothy Lee Terrill, the Stanstead M. P. P. who entered the Taché-Macdonald administration that year as provincial secretary and Eastern Townships representative. [171] The Journal's support of Terrill had always been unqualified and it was maintained even as he was compelled to resign from the cabinet under rather compromising circumstances. [172] As the Journal pleaded Terrill's cause during the election campaign of 1857 the Sherbrooke Gazette was moved to allege that

Mr. Terrill "had control" of the only newspaper in Stanstead county, but this, too, was categorically denied: "We are captain of our own boat. Mr. Terrill has never sought any control. We have supported him, it is true, as it is our right to do, but at the same time have opened our columns to his opponents for fairly written communications....Has the Gazette been more fair?" [173] This claim, that the Journal's columns were open to the views of all parties, was Robinson's patented response to charges that his was a partisan journal, [174] but Terrill's political foes seldom took advantage of this generosity for reasons which became obvious whenever one of them was foolish enough to do so. Lewis T. Drummond, for example, submitted an article in support of Albert Knight, Terrill's opponent in 1857. Drummond's message was duly printed, but the following was appended to it: "It will be borne in mind by Stanstead County Electors that this is simply an electioneering expedient -- andoutside interference with our local election." [175] And immediately below the offensive epistle appeared an article entitled "Mr. Drummond" which gave that gentleman some cause to regret having availed himself of the Journal's vaunted impartiality.

The Stanstead Journal and its rival, the Sherbrooke Gazette and Eastern Townships Advertiser, appear to have been the most widely circulated and influential newspapers in the Eastern Townships. [176] Each enjoyed a long continuity of

development under a single proprietor. The Gazette was founded in 1837 when Robert Armour Jr., a former editor of the Montreal Gazette, purchased the printing establishment of the old Farmer's Advocate at Sherbrooke, but in 1839 J. S. Walton took over as editor and publisher and operated the paper for thirty years. [177] Walton was partial to Brown, and Dorion and representation by population, [178] and in local politics he championed the cause of John Sewall Sanborn, "a moderate supporter of the Liberal Party" [179] who represented Sherbrooke in the Legislative Assembly from 1850 to 1854 and Compton from 1854 to 1857. [180] The Sherbrooke Gazette did not support Alexander Galt until after his accession to the ministry in 1858 -- a transformation which annoyed the Canadian Times, the Sherbrooke paper which had been supporting Galt:

> Our contemporary of the Times, it seems, cannot appreciate the independence of a public journal which can commend what it approves and condemn what it conceives to be wrong in a public servant. Well, we pity the Editor who is so bound hand and foot that he dare not speak his honest sentiments. [181]

The Times responded: "We said ineffect, that the Gazette, after having systematically worked against Mr. Galt for sometime, had suddenly turned and enshrined him as 'Our Inspector General', when the success of his tariff was certain...." [182] Walton's support of Galt did not alter his low opinion of the Cartier-Macdonald ministry. Galt was looked upon as a pearl cast among the swine:

And now a word of home affairs,
And our Provincial hopes and cares,
Still stands our mal-Administration,
Though passing through much tribulation.
They still usurp the helm, nor reck,
So they but tread, the quarter deck,
How soon the ship of state may go --
'To Davy's locker', down below.
'Steeped in corruption to the lips',
First see how well the garment fits!
The Cartier and Macdonald folks,
Those men who love such famous jokes
As catching Brown, so like a rat,
In their safe ministerial trap;
Great men, and clever! and what follows?
The only cost Nine Million Dollars.
We'd feel a little hurt to see
'Our Member' in such company,
But for our hopes his honest leaven
May permeate the Whole Eleven;
For now he seems, like Goshen's land,
Mid Egypt's plagues on every hand. [183]

In its approach to issues the Sherbrooke Gazette shared with the Montreal Herald a tendency to judge them solely upon the basis of their pecuniary practicability:

> Make sure what you undertake will pay....There is already too much railroad at public expense....The chief difficulty in the way of a political union of the colonies is their isolated position and the additional expense....Union with the Lower Provinces will be a poor return....Militia reorganization is needed, yes, but not such an expensive one. [184]

Federal union of the colonies would be ruled out by the Sherbrooke Gazette largely on the grounds of its inexpediency. The opposition proposals for a federation limited to the Canadas would be received more favourably.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS AND NEWSPAPER OPINION

Lord Durham, concerned with finding a means of establishing an immediate hegemony of British interests in Lower Canada, recommended a legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada. [1] He warned specifically against the folly of granting equal representation to the two old provinces "in order to attain the temporary end of outnumbering the French," [2] but, because the total French population then exceeded that of the English, Lord Sydenham, the chief framer of the 1841 Act of Union, sought to protect the latter from the outset by allowing 42 seats to each of the old provinces in the new united legislature. [3] Durham's fears were soon realized. The English-speaking elements fell into parties while the French, occupying a compact territory and bound together in a common struggle to frustrate the policies of Anglicization, soon emerged as the most formidable political entity in the united province. [4] Their solid bloc of votes became a political prize eagerly sought after by the English factions as the prerequisite for parliamentary supremacy and the spoils of office. [5] Even William Henry Draper and the Tories were prepared to cooperate

for the sake of gaining power, [6] but the French, for the moment, found Baldwin's Reformers better suited to their interests. In view of the sectional division which equality of sectional representation had perpetuated, French support was contingent upon the adoption of quasi-federal political expedients like the double premiership, the double cabinet, and the double majority principle. [7] Tacit adoption of these principles enabled Lafontaine to secure passage of the controversial Rebellion Losses Bill which, to the dismayed British Tories of Lower Canada, was too blatant a demonstration of "French domination" to be borne passively. [8] Responsible government had, in fact, cemented French power at the expense of the Tories. Well might the Montreal Witness, reviewing the history of the Union with the wisdom of hindsight, conclude that the effort to swamp the French Canadians had proved "abortive", and that Lord Sydenham "was a clever but not a profound statesman, or he would have foreseen this result". [9] The decade of the 1850's would witness a formidable attempt to undermine French influence by those who would do violence to the system of equal sectional representation upon which it was founded.

The tumult of 1849 and '50 over rebellion losses, responsible government, and annexation to the United States had scarcely subsided when Canada's first census revealed an ominous preponderance of population in Canada West, the expanding English-Protestant section of the province. [10] Almost simultaneously

the Clear Grits, a new political faction composed of some pre-rebellion radicals and disgruntled Baldwinites, but reflecting mainly the agrarian views of the newly-settled western "peninsula", [11] began to demand reform in the system of parliamentary representation. [12] To the cry "no French domination", so popular among Lower Canadian Tories of the previous decade, the English-Protestant Reformers of the West added the demand for "no popery", as Upper Canada had begun to feel the weight of French solidarity and clerical influence in the ministry through the restoration of the French language to official use, [13] the imposition of provisions for Roman Catholic separate schools, [14] and the opposition of the French members to the secularization of the Clergy Reserves. [15] Upper Canadian rights, declared the North American angrily, were in the keeping of Lower Canadian Catholics: "We are bound hand and foot, and lie helpless at the feet of the Catholic Priests of Lower Canada." [16] As early as 1850 the Reform press of Canada West was fully engaged in preaching the voluntaryist crusade against "state churchism" and the agitation for representation by population. [17] George Brown first included the latter in his platform during the Kent election of 1851 [18] and the election platform endorsed by the Toronto Globe was unequivocal:

NO RESERVES!
NO RECTORIES!
NO SECTARIAN SCHOOLS!
NO SECTARIAN MONEY GRANTS!
NO ECCLESIASTICAL CORPORATIONS!
NO RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES WHATEVER! [19]

Well might George Edward Clerk note anxiously in his diary that the demand for representation by population was "more a religious than a political" issue.

The anxiety of Upper Canadian Protestants was, as Professor Morton has pointed out, not mere bigotry, but concern aroused by one of the great trends of the century -- the victory of ultramontane over liberal Catholicism. [20] To voluntaryists dedicated to the separation of state and religious communion, the ultramontane Catholicism of Pius IX, rejecting doctrines of popular sovereignty and raising the question of ecclesiastical versus secular authority in society, was an issue of real moment, and their fears where in no way assuaged by the militant demands of Armand Françoise Marie de Charbonnel, the French sulpician consecrated in 1850 as Bishop of Toronto: "We must have and we will have full management of our schools." [21] George Brown and other Protestant Reformers were quick to interpret such assertions as proof of the militant new zeal fostered by a revitalized papacy. Now that the allegedly ascendant Canada East could be shown to contain fewer voters than Canada West, [22] with the disproportion likely to grow greater due to Upper Canada's much higher proportion of immigrants and greater availability of empty fertile land, attention was increasingly focused upon the original anomaly responsible for the entrenchment of eastern power -- the union scheme of equal sectional representation. Some indignant Upper Canadians like old William

Lyon Mackenzie would begin agitating for a simple repeal of the union, [23] but the most expedient solution, born of Clear Grit political radicalism, was the straightforward majority rule principle of representation by population. This panacea, however admirably suited to the present needs of the numerically superior Upper Canadians, was one which defensive-minded French Canadians and property-minded English conservatives could hardly be expected to favour. Legislative control and executive power in the hands of radical Upper Canadian voluntaryists, Francophobes, and agrarians could be depended upon to quickly extinguish the hitherto determinant Lower Canadian influence and to secure for Canada West a dominant place in the union. [24] During the parliamentary session of 1853 George Brown moved the first emphatic and unambiguous motion for representation by population "without regard to a separating line." [25] It was defeated 57 to 15 [26] but was to be repeated many times with gathering support in the future.

As the campaign for "rep by pop" intensified, George Brown steadily emerged as the dominant spokesman for Upper Canadian reform. This was mainly due to the growing influence of his formidable newspaper, the Toronto Globe. [27] Launched under the auspices of Robert Baldwin [28] as a ministerial organ in March of 1844, Brown's trenchant weekly met with an immediate and unprecedented success. Expanding his operation rapidly, Brown acquired Upper Canada's first cylinder press in May of

his opening year [29] and by 1846 had installed the new wire services to Montreal and New York and had made two moves to more spacious offices. [30] By 1849 the Globe was a thrice-weekly publication claiming a circulation of about 4000, while a condensed weekly Globe had been instituted "to meet the widening demands for newspapers in the country districts." [31] Following Baldwin's resignation in 1851 Brown's strained relations with Francis Hincks [32] led to his final emancipation from ministerial influence and his closer association with the Grit elements he had hitherto denounced. [33] The Globe's circulation stood at 6000 by 1853, [34] but the appearance of the Daily Globe resulted in an immediate jump of 2000, and Brown could claim that in Toronto, a city of 35,000 which supported fourteen journals, the Globe was outselling all its rivals. [35] On December 19, 1854, he wrote that his paper's circulation was the largest in the British Empire, "the London Times and one or two cheap weeklies excepted." His editorial influence, strongest in Toronto and points west, also extended eastward to the St. Lawrence and beyond Montreal into the Eastern Townships of Lower Canada. [36] By 1856 the Globe's circulation had skyrocketed to 18,000. The paper spoke not only for the agrarian interests of the west, but for the formidable Toronto business community as well. [37] Such was the power of the journal which began in 1855 the systematic agitation of representation by population. [38]

As the rise of the Grits began to cut heavily into the Upper Canadian wing of the old Reform alliance the apprehensions of the essentially conservative French Canadian bloc were intensified by the emergence of a new and militant Lower Canadian radicalism in the Parti Rouge. This party included veteran radicals like Louis Joseph Papineau and J. DeWitt but was mainly composed of young men dedicated to republican democracy. [39] Through their institut canadien and the newspapers L'Avenir and Le Pays [40] the Rouges spread their ideas to the chief towns of French Canada. Opposed by the anti-liberal Church, the Rouges responded with anti-clerical outbursts which brought formal clerical condemnation down upon them, seriously impairing the strength of their movement. [41] Still, with the Rouges and Lower Canadian Liberals able to capture 19 seats in the elections of 1854, [42] no one could assume that their strength would remain minimal. Clearly the political situation had become fluid, and there existed in 1854 a rare opportunity for a re-adjustment of traditional alignments. The Hincks-Morin Reform government was now outnumbered in parliament by the combined radical-conservative opposition, but neither of the latter had sufficient strength to form a government. [43]

It was the brilliant opportunist John A. Macdonald who best succeeded in exploiting the fluctuating political situation. As the old Tory party declined and the pre-rebellion Reform coalition began to disintegrate into its original component

parts, Macdonald sought to fuse elements drawn from each into a moderate Conservative party which could cooperate with the French and thus seize power. [44] Macdonald's reconstruction of the Conservative party entailed abandonment of both "fossilized Toryism", which had become so offensive to moderates, and the old British insistence on racial and religious supremacy which was anathema to French Canadians. [45] This done, he could easily overcome the Grits, Rouges, and other diverse elements which would comprise the opposition. [46] As Hincksite Reformers tended to gravitate towards either Macdonald or Brown, the majority of French Canadians, united by their sense of racial solidarity, were willing to follow George Etienne Cartier into the bleu camp the better to resist the onslaught of the Protestant Reformers and their own radicals as well. [47] The French Canadians were now prepared to cooperate with English commercial expansion in return for participation in the fruits of economic development -- a transformation perhaps best exemplified by Cartier's legal career and his intimate connection with the Grand Trunk as its chief solicitor in Canada East. [48] The first ministry which the newly-organized coalition brought into being was headed by McNab and Morin in 1854, but the formation of the Macdonald-Cartier administration of 1857 symbolized the actual and final emancipation from Family Compact Toryism. [49] The term "coalition" was now disowned, and the Macdonald-Cartier forces went confidently before the electors of 1857 under the ingenious designation of Liberal-Conservative party. [50]

While Macdonald, with his unrivalled talent for buying off or conciliating diverse personalities, [51] was generally able to hold together his conglomerate and restive following, [52] coordinated action among the equally variegated opposition was rendered considerably more difficult by the lack of patronage to bestow and by Brown's lack of dexterity in handling volatile liberal elements. [53] John Sandfield Macdonald, whose personal animosity towards Brown was common knowledge, [54] and his "tail" of moderate Liberals from the Upper Canadian river constituencies dependent upon Montreal tended to hold themselves aloof from Brown's leadership. [55] This gap the ministerial press sought to widen: "The Hon. J. Sandfield Macdonald is distinctly pledged against representation by population, and is in favour of fixing the Seat of Government at Montreal, and, if we mistake not, is not in favour of Mr. Brown's crusade against separate schools." Surely, having led the Liberals through the last parliament, "he will, or ought, not to submit to Brown's leadership." [56] Nor could the Rouges maintain more than a cautious, intermittent, and frequently embarrassed association with Brown, for to be an acknowledged adherent to the anti-French and anti-Church diatribes which appeared in the Globe was tantamount to committing political suicide in French Canada. [57] The Rouges, for the most part, were forced to go it alone:

> The Rouges, with or without allies, will act, we have no doubt, with the same independence and conscientiousness, which has already distinquished them. They are certainly

> neither fanatics, nor Bigots, but many of them are Catholics, as sincere in reverence for their faith as the Protestants of Upper Canada can be. If, therefore, these latter intend to have a political party distinguished by a religious faith, they must have it to themselves. [58]

Similarly, many of the English Liberals in Canada East found that they could not identify themselves with the racial and religious Francophobia of the Grits which was so offensive to their Rouge associates:

> Whatever passions may occasionally come to the surface among any portions of the community -- whatever differences in policy may sometimes grow out of differences in religion -- the great bulk of the people in Lower Canada habitually respect the religion the one of the other, and will not be so suicidal as to begin religious war amongst themselves to please any faction in Upper Canada. [59]

Brown's impolitic denunciations of Luther Holton and Alexander Galt during the Grand Trunk investigations of 1857.[60] were hardly calculated to promote a closer unity between the Liberals of the two sections, and an open split occurred May 12, 1857, when Holton struck back publicly at Brown:

> The honorable gentlemen has already ventured to read me out of the Liberal party and he has now repeated that operation. I was a Radical Reformer before the honorable gentlemen saw this country and before the Globe had an existence, and I presume I shall continue to be a Radical Reformer long after that sheet has ceased to vex the Liberal party with its intolerable bigotry. (Encore! Encore!) [61]

The Montreal Herald was aghast: "We do not pretend to explain the sudden freak which has converted professions of respect into words of contumely; but whatever may have caused the change, there has been no time when it admitted of less justification." [62] Holton and Galt were no longer stockholders or contractors for

the Grand Trunk; Brown was guilty not only of "political error" but of "direct falsehood and fraud" in accusing them. [63] The Herald thereupon said as little as possible about Brown until relations between the Upper Canadian leader and Holton were patched up during the summer of 1858.

Macdonald, meantime, was seeking to exploit the feud among the Liberals to the advantage of his party. Dorion, offended by Brown's opposition to the extension of the Lower Canadian Grand Trunk line from Levis to Rivière du Loup, [64] was tempted with a cabinet post which he refused. [65] Galt, who thought Dorion unwise in rejecting the offer, was himself invited to "cut loose from Holton and Dorion and those other beggars" to become "true blue" at once. [66] If Galt did not succumb to Macdonald's blandishments immediately he did go so far as to cut loose from his erstwhile Rouge associates for the December elections of 1857. Reported the Stanstead Journal: "Mr. Galt assumes an independent position, and will support the general policy of the Government." [67] Macdonald's siren-song to the Lower Canadian opposition leaders persisted in the ministerial press for a short while after the elections. Mr. Dorion, argued the Montreal Gazette, could not "in conscience" unite with Brown. Why then should he remain in isolation and continue to abuse the ministry with which he must one day unite in the spirit of compromise or forever remain a mere political "cipher"? [68] When Dorion showed no indication of abandoning

his role as cipher the Gazette's comment became harsher, and the "weakling Rouges" were attacked at their most vulnerable point -- their unwillingness to accept representation by population, "the cardinal point of the only intelligible idea of Democracy". [69] Men like Cartier and Cauchon, the Gazette counselled, did not "pretend to be Democrats", but, realizing that there were "many things to be considered in the government of a country", they, unlike the Rouges, sought to make a positive contribution through service in the ministry.[70] Thus the Rouges and their English associates, through their inability to find adequate grounds for common action with either the Upper Canadian opposition or the government, relegated themselves to comparative political oblivion.

That George Brown was incapable of mustering greater support from the English of Lower Canada seems, at first glance, strange, since, as the Globe never tired of pointing out, an alliance with the Upper Canadian majority offered the Lower Canadians an alternative to the "French domination" which had been their chronic bugbear throughout the preceding decade. [71] But John A. Macdonald had shrewdly anticipated this appeal, and his efforts to provide his publicists with suitable responses to it are recorded in his correspondence with Brown Chamberlin of the Montreal Gazette. The prerequisite for political supremacy, he reasoned, had always been the French vote:

> But the truth is, you British Canadians can never forget that you were once supreme -- that Jean Baptiste was once

> your hewer of wood and drawer of water -- you struggle..... not for Equality but Ascendancy....You can't and won't admit the principle that the majority must govern....It would surprise you to go over the names of officials in a Lower Canada almanac and reckon the ascendancy you yet hold of official positions...No man in his senses can suppose that this country can for a century to come be governed by a totally unfrenchified government. If a Lower Canada British desires to conquer he must 'stoop to conquer'. He must make friends with the French....Treat them as a nation and they will react as a free people generally do -- generously. Call them a faction and they become factious..... So long as the French have twenty votes they will be a power, and must be conciliated. I doubt much however if the French will lose their numerical majority in L. C. in a hurry. What with the cessation of emigration from Europe, their own spread in the Townships, the opening up of the Ottawa and St. Maurice, and the certainty that they will ere long be the labourers in our factories that are fast coming, I am inclined to think they will hold their own for many a day yet." [72]

The British of Canada East had to be convinced that only a united support of the Liberal-Conservative party and its principles of harmony with the French Canadians could win them representation in the provincial government. [73] If Macdonald failed to open Chamberlin's British-Conservative heart towards French Canadians, his arguments at least furnished the basis of the Gazette's reply to the Globe -- a reply which was realistic to the point of cynicism. Upper Canada had been tried in the past and found wanting. All that really mattered now was to be on the winning side:

> Either party at the west -- Conservative or Radical, has been ever ready to sacrifice the British of Lower Canada for the sake of the French Canadian majority. Even Lord Metcalfe and Mr. Draper were prepared to hand us over whenever they could get a large enough bid of French Canadians. For long, long years the British of Lower Canada, had but one wish -- an intimate union with Upper Canadians

> that the Province might be anglified. Because they were weak, and the French Canadians more powerful in numbers, and, therefore, more effectual allies to either party in Upper Canada, the latter have been courted and the British neglected. The ties of race and blood and language went for nothing in the race for office. Such a thing as a government made up without a preponderating French element in Lower Canada has not been thought of since Lord Metcalfe's day, -- not more by George Brown than by the rest. Placed in such a case, the British of Lower Canada have been compelled, much to their distaste, to learn the craft of other weak bodies -- the art of holding a balance of power and looking well to their material interests....When it suited their [Upper Canada's] purpose they made a bargain with the French Canadians at our expense. Are we to be ashamed if we make a similar bargain at their expense, when we find it advantageous to do so? They don't like it. Nor did we. They compelled us to endure it. We compel them; and their screams at the infliction are rather pleasant than otherwise. 'Nous avons l'avantage; profitons-en!' They don't like to hear it. How did they think these same British of Lower Canada liked once to hear a loyalty that offered property, home, children, life itself, to keep this same Lower Canada to the British crown, scoffed at and reviled by Upper Canadians, and be told by them we must put our hands in our pockets and pay the losses of the lambs that strove to blow the loyalty out of our heart with gunpowder and balls and burn it out of our homes by the midnight torch?...Then the iron entered into our souls. The plea of nationality was of no avail then. It was turned into jest and mockery. Who shall blame us if we retort the sneer? We were taught we must look forward to see Lower Canada governed forever by its majority, which meant, of course, a French Canadian majority. And now we are blamed because we learned this very difficult lesson -- that we have forgotten as far as we could, old national prejudices, and have learned to cooperate with our French Canadian fellow countrymen, to appreciate more rationally their good qualities, to live in comparative peace and harmony with them..... [74]

There were additional factors militating against an alliance of Lower Canadian Conservatives with the Brown forces, not the least of which were the political radicalism of the Grits, and their alleged antipathy towards Lower Canadian business interests. Clear Grit radicalism has been interpreted

by some on the basis of Frederick Jackson Turner's famous "frontier hypothesis" as the embodiment of the revolt of the pioneer farmer against the domination of exploiting urban commercial interests in political and economic affairs.[75] Politically, the Grits called for universal suffrage, elective officials, abolition of primogeniture, and representation by population,[76] each of which was unpalatable to the conservative taste. "There is much reason to believe," opined the Montreal Gazette, citing reports of violence in the election of judges in the United States, "that a pure democracy can only be permanently successful where the people are altogether pure. When the millenium will come we know not. There seems to be no indication now of its near approach."[77] Representation by population was similarly unacceptable as the corollary of universal manhood suffrage:

> [Rep by pop] is one of those simple democratic theories which are very charming in the eyes of the closest philosopher -- a very admirable topic for the declamation of a demagogue to an unthinking multitude, but must be viewed with distrust by every reflective philosophic statesman. The theory is as true as that fustian phrase which a nation of slaveholders put forth, as if in mockery,.... that 'All men are born free and equal'....[78]

Is the idiot, inquired the Gazette, born equal to the genuis? Is it wisdom to confer the same political rights upon the "unlettered dolt" as upon "the well-informed and upright citizen?" Should men of social inequality be given constitutional equality?

> A doctrine involving these absurdities savours of the statesmanship of the demagogue -- the philosophy of the fool. If

> the doctrine is untrue, then universal suffrage is likewise unsound....[and] the basis of population alone is a most incorrect one for representation....Even in the United States, all the states send an equal number of members to the Senate. [79]

Representation, to ensure "proper legislation", should be according to "a mixed basis of territory and population and great interests." [80] Emphasing the necessity of preserving "a decentralization and distribution of power", the Gazette built its case:

> Now in any country where the people become more dense in one small district, so dense that the district secures the preponderance of population, the application of the principle of representation by population tends to a centralization of authority there, and the weak and dependent outlying districts are entirely at the mercy, and pensioners, as it were, on the country of the aristocracy there set up. The money, the influence, the public expenditure are all directed into this one reservoir, and the rest of the country drained and impoverished....Mr. Brown knows, and his fellow grits know -- none better -- that the lumber interests of the Ottawa and the Bay of Quinte would not submit to be placed entirely at the mercy of the peninsulars -- that the sturdy backwoodsmen and graziers of Central Canada will not be prepared to be ruled over by the men of the more densely populated wheat growing districts farther west.....[81] The sparsely settled lumbering and fishing districts and the manufacturing interests are not fairly represented in our Legislative Assembly.....[82]

Lower Canadian Conservatives, in short, favoured pocket boroughs as the medium of political expression.

In referring to representation by population as a threat to vested interests the Gazette drew close to the basic point of contention between Lower Canadian businessmen and Upper Canada. D. G. Creighton and others have explained how the Erie Canal captured an increasingly large portion of the St. Lawrence

trade and how the Reciprocity Treaty served to disorient the Canadian economy from Britain in favour of the United States.[83] Lower Canadian interests, without convenient access to New York, had countered American initiative by investing heavily in the development of the Canadian waterway and the Grand Trunk Railway, and were irrevocably committed to the maintenance and expansion of each. Upper Canada east to Kingston comprised part of Montreal's hinterland and generally seconded her enterprise[84] but the "peninsulars" farther west who relied chiefly on the American route and New York[85] opposed the use of public funds for river development and denounced the unsavoury financial condition of the Grand Trunk as but another glaring example of the iniquities attendant upon too close a liaison between government and business.[86] Also, without much prospect for preferred treatment on the British markets, Canada's rising industrialists were now seeking tariff protection for their budding enterprises[87] while western merchant and agrarian interests, as importers, favoured free trade.[88] William Weir, secretary of the Tariff Reform Association of 1858, has recorded the gist of speeches made by William Workman and John Molson of Montreal in favour of tariff protection and the informal negotiations with William Cayley, Macdonald, and Cartier, which resulted in government adoption of the protectionist principle in the Cayley tariff of 1858.[89] The Galt tariff of 1859, though ostensibly a revenue tariff, extended protective coverage

to an enlarged list of enumerated articles.[90] Weir noted that "Mr. Galt also legislated in favour of the St. Lawrence route, much to the disgust of Hamilton and Toronto merchants who were, for part of their supplies, thus shut out of New York markets, where a much better selection could be made than in Montreal."[91] George Brown's objections that the removal of canal tolls on "goods and craft passing to and from Montreal" while they were retained "in full on all goods and craft passing from and to the United States" would "break up the Reciprocity Treaty" by diverting "the trade of the West from Buffalo to the St. Lawrence" and by "injuring the profitable trade of the [Upper Canadian] farmers with the United States" were glibly dismissed by the Quebec Morning Chronicle with the admonition that any toll reduction was consistent with the principles of free trade and reciprocity: perhaps United States might be so induced to reciprocate.[92] Fumed the Montreal Pilot in a similar vein: "Whenever a stone can be cast at Montreal, Mr. Brown is ready to throw it. Whenever our city, or any company connected with it, can be shown, or attempted to be shown at a disadvantage, Mr. Brown is always ready to trot us out."[93] Maintaining that the welfare of the "the first commercial city of the Province" was vital to Canada as a whole, the Pilot branded Dorion and McGee "traitors to their constituency" for voting with Brown against additional subsidies to the Montreal Ocean Steamship Company.[94] Testimony from the Conservative

Toronto Colonist was cited by the Pilot to prove the irrationality of Grit hostility to Lower Canadian interests:

> According to the Clear-Grit vocabulary everything done by the Ministry is a job. Building lighthouses and making harbours on Lake Huron were all jobs. Lending money.... the paltry sum of £15,000....to the Montreal Harbour Commissioners, on the best of security, to enable them to complete the deepening of Lake St. Peter -- a work in which the trade of the whole Province is interested -- is another job; but a greater -- a blacker -- a worse job in every point of view -- and why? Because it is in Lower Canada. [95]

Clearly a direct clash of economic interests underlay the more widely discussed political differences between the sections. Upper Canadian political ascendancy would, it was feared, result in economic reorientation inimical to the interests of the Montreal commercial establishment. The Montreal Gazette, while not emphasizing this mundane point in attempting to rally public opinion against Brown, did not deny that it was a major factor in the opposition of Lower Canadians to representation by population:

> To yield to it [rep by pop] would be to give up everything we hold dear.... especially our material interests....to the grasping selfishness of the extreme West, which contemns all things Lower Canadian, and which views our great St. Lawrence route and any money expended on its improvement with no favour, preferring rather to trade with New York....[96] If the Grits had ever manifested any honest intentions of doing justice to the British inhabitants of Lower Canada they might have formed an alliance with them. But from the first day that Mr. Brown commenced his leadership of the opposition of 'forty', till his sudden opposition to ad valorem duties....and the recent declaration by the Globe that the Lake St. Peter ship channel is not a public work and ought not be recognized as such, the nature of his policy has been -- war to the knife with Lower Canada. [97]

Lower Canadian newspapers abounded with still other reasons why representation by population should be opposed. Upper Canada, accused the Quebec Gazette, a commercial and shipping paper, simply wanted an excuse to make off with "the lion's share of the spoils". [98] The True Witness, which had much to fear from a Protestant takeover of the Province, agreed: "The present union was forced upon the people of Lower Canada greatly to their disadvantage" and had enriched Upper Canada at Lower Canada's expense. [99] It was unjust for Upper Canadians, now that they found themselves a majority rather than a minority, to "seek to repudiate the principle of equality of representation" upon which they had hitherto "most eloquently insisted". [100] At least, chimed in the Montreal Gazette, Upper Canada ought to submit to equality of representation for as long as had Lower Canada while her population had been the greater. [101] The application of an abstract principle like representation by population, explained the True Witness, was not unjustified in the case of "one country inhabited by one homogeneous population." But, "paltry Acts of Parliament" notwithstanding, Upper and Lower Canada constituted "two essentially distinct countries", and representation by population was therefore a morally invalid principle in this instance. [102] The Montreal Transcript, a traditional spokesman for British rights, now found it convenient to pose as the champion of the "religious rights, privileges, and liberties" of "our Catholic brethren",

the French Canadians, for the purpose of opposing Brown.[103] Even the Montreal Gazette assumed the unlikely posture of the benevolant protector in deploring Brown's aim "to govern Canada East with a Western majority" which would enable "the intolerant section of Protestantism to predominate in the political world over Romanism, and the Anglo-Saxon to tyrannize over the French Canadian race."[104] The worst possible motives, needless to say, were attributed to the Upper Canadian leader who, seeking "to rule as Napoleon rules in France, no lesser sway will satisfy his ambition", would not shrink from "a civil war of races and creeds even to extermination" in the furthering of his malevolant designs.[105] Even the Montreal Herald, by failing to rise to the defense of Brown against these charges, seemed to be holding him coolly at arm's length.[106]

The motives underlying the political behaviour of the Lower Canadian business community vis a vis George Brown and "rep by pop" can perhaps now be summarized. What the businessmen feared most was political isolation. Faced with the growing threat of western agrarian radicalism on the one hand and the receding danger of French domination on the other they opted in favour of the latter as the lesser of two evils, and sought, in conjunction with office-hungry Upper Canadian Conservatives, to secure advantages for themselves by wielding a balance of power in favour of a political party based upon the French bloc. Politically, this meant adherence to Cartier's view that

the Union rested on the principle "that the two provinces coexist with equal powers, and that neither should dominate over the other in parliament" [107] -- a view which Lower Canadian businessmen were not averse to supporting for mercenary reasons of their own.

The prevailing views among those English-speaking Lower Canadians who were not members of the commercial elite are harder to document or generalize. Scattered, disorganized, and generally without "organs" to propagate their views, the lower-paid urban workers and the smaller farmers were voiceless in comparison to the commercial hierarchy. Many journals lectured to "the common people" but few attempted to speak on their behalf. The Montreal Witness, one paper which exhibited concern for the forgotten English Protestants of rural Lower Canada, dissented from the Liberal-Conservative point of view. If we may believe the Witness, French domination, to these people, was still the paramount concern, and assimilation with Upper Canada a consummation to be wished rather than dreaded. Agreeing with the Conservative press as to the precarious position of Lower Canada's minority since the Union, the Witness had some harsh words to say about representatives of the Lower Canadian minority who sought security through an alliance with French Canadians rather than Upper Canadians. They were spineless traitors who could only be depended upon to follow the patronage:

> Another bad effect of the Union has been to sink out of view the British population of Lower Canada. Upper Canada,

> in treating of or with its sister province in the United Legislature, knows only the French Canadian majority, and never thinks of the interests or the feelings of the British portion of the population. The Townships, indeed, being a distinct and solid mass of voters, chiefly of American origin, may have some little deference showed to them, but the English-speaking population, scattered among the French Canadians, have none. They are a political nonenity, and if any of their number do get into the Legislature, it is as the creatures of the priests....It is to this class of dough-faces and cat's-paws that Canada owes the introduction of her worst measures and most unjust laws. If any peculiarly obnoxious and iniquitous measure is to be moved...it is sure to be one of the above described gentlemen who is put forward to do it, whilst the solid phalanx of French Canadian voters, or, as they are politically called, moutons, back him up. [108]

Deploring Macdonald's Liberal-Conservative alliance with the French Canadians as responsible for the sectionalism by which "all good laws are stopped by the Lower Canadian boundary line", the Witness called instead for "a real union", a national legislation "affecting all portions of the country alike", and an "assimilation" of the existing laws. [109] This was, of course, the language of George Brown, and while the Witness studiously avoided mention of that name in this regard, it did not shrink from advocating representation by population as the means of achieving the desired results:

> Let Parliament, as a united body, possessed of a single majority, assimilate the laws of both Provinces under the lead of British constitutional precedents....The Hierarchy and the Priesthood, who have a special interest in perpetuating the false system of double majority and special legislation...know that a national legislation would sweep away their tithes, sectarian schools, and other tyrannical assumptions, and for this very purpose they will always set their political tools in opposition to national unity, and act out the Machiavellian principle -- Divide et Impera....Perhaps it is best they should be permitted to

> carry out their plans for a time, in order to arouse the Protestant feeling of the country...in order also to unite all the friends of progress and enlightenment in behalf of that representation by population which must lead to the oneness of our legislation, and lighten the dead weight of that part of our Legislature educated in the colleges of the priests, and sent by them into Parliament to do their bidding. [110]

Lower Canada's English-speaking Liberals were indeed tending towards a closer alignment with the Upper Canadian Liberals by the end of the 1850's. Brown's success at recruiting a competent Lower Canadian wing for his "short ministry" of 1858 was fatal to the notion that he was "a governmental impossibility". [111] He had gained Dorion's qualified assent to representation by population by guaranteeing safeguards for Lower Canada. [112] The rift with Holton had been smoothed over, and their extensive correspondence reveals a broad area of agreement over a wide range of problems. [113] D'Arcy McGee, disgusted with ministerial corruption, was supporting the Liberals, [114] and R. B. Somerville of Huntingdon had emerged as an outspoken advocate of representation by population. [115] The Montreal Herald, the Witness, and the Sherbrooke Gazette were giving guarded approval to Brown's policies while the Montreal Transcript was developing into an out-andeout Brown supporter. English members from Lower Canada were tending, as P. G. Cornell has observed, to drop their pretensions towards political separateness to divide fairly consistently with one or other of the major party groups which were crystallizing on either side of the House. [116] Despite internal strains, imperfections, and defections,

a two-party system was in fact evolving, and the Quebec Morning Chronicle summed it up from a Conservative point of view on June 14, 1860:

> There are but two parties in the Province: -- one seeking for sweeping constitutional changes....the other, forming a two-thirds majority in both branches of the Legislature, prepared to make more gradual, and better-considered changes in the Constitution, suited to the exigencies of the time. [117]

As party lines hardened over the issue of representation by population during the latter 1850's one of the first alternatives proposed to alleviate the growing sectional discord was that of federal union. The following commentary by the Toronto correspondent of the Montreal Gazette was as profound as it was prophetic in its analysis of political trends in Canada:

> He [Brown] has thundered away against a certain class of evils, and in favour of certain reforms, until he has come to consider them the sum total of political good... but in appealing to the prejudices of Upper Canadians, has but roused the prejudices of Lower Canadians against him. He has imperilled the existence of the Union by arraying the two sections in open hostility....I am glad to hear, however, that as the cry of dis-Union grows louder, the merits of a Federal Union of British North America are being fully discussed, and men seem fast coming to the belief that that Union is not far distant. While men feel more and more the difficulties of dealing with local questions in a United Parliament, few or none seem willing to give up the hope of founding here, apart from the United States, a Northern nationality for ourselves. While patriots must deplore then the sectionalism which threatens to rend Canada asunder, they may rejoice if, out of so great an evil, so great a good as a Federal Union is to be educed. [118]

Unfortunately, many more years of sectional strife, with very little rejoicing, were to pass before such hopes would be fulfilled.

CHAPTER IV

FEDERATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO SECTIONALISM, 1856

As party lines hardened over representation by population the inevitable panaceas for the alleviation of sectional discord began to appear. In addition to "rep by pop", suggestions entertained during 1856 included colonial representation in the British parliament, outright dissolution of the Canadian Union, federation of the Canadas, adherence to the double majority system, and British American Union.

Colonial representation in the Home Parliament attracted considerably less notice in Canada than in either the Maritime provinces or Britain. [1] The Montreal Gazette decided that the British would never accept a federalized Imperial Congress in place of their present parliament and that the alternative, a legislative union of the empire, would necessitate "one monster Parliament" with "impossible" burdens to discharge. [2] The Quebec Mercury similarly castigated this "futile" and "useless theme", reminding its readers that such a system would place colonial executives under the direct control of the Imperial legislature. [3]

Simple repeal of the Union did not become a serious issue until it was taken up by disillusioned Upper Canadian

Liberals in 1859. Prior to the "double shuffle" episode which completed their disenchantment, George Brown and other Reform leaders tended to spurn the idea in favour of representation by population:

> I cannot think it would be statesmanlike .... to yield up the solid advantages obtained by the present union of the two Canadas. I could fancy if a dissolution were accomplished today, that ten years hence we would look back with astonishment at the utter imbecility of 1,300,000 Anglo Saxons in Upper Canada and 300,000 in Lower Canada, frightened by some 700,000 Frenchmen into surrendering forever the noble St. Lawrence and all the fertile land it traverses .... For one, Sir, I will never be a party to such a transaction -- until every other remedy has failed![4]

Until such time arrived dissolution remained the relatively harmless hobby of the once-terrible William Lyon Mackenzie who, through his Repealer's Almanac and weekly Messenger, advocated repeal as "the only means of averting priest rule and financial bankruptcy from Upper Canada".[5] In parliament he habitually appended a motion for repeal of the Union to each resolution for representation by population, and it was in response to such a motion that, on April 24, 1856, the federal principle was introduced as a possible way out of the sectional dilemma.

Federal union, in one form or another, was apparently a notion of long standing in Canada's political consciousness. R.G. Trotter has traced the idea back as far as one Robert Morse, who served at Quebec with the Royal Marines in 1785.[6] Among the notables who, for various reasons,

gave early if fleeting advocacy to schemes of colonial union were Chief Justice William Smith of Quebec and his son-in-law and successor Jonathan Sewell; [7] Lord Dorchester; John Strachan, the first Anglican bishop of Toronto; [8] rebel leader William Lyon Mackenzie; and the colonial reformers, Lord Durham [9] and Earl Grey. [10] Federal Union again cropped up briefly in the press and in the resolutions of the British American League as an antidote to "French domination", hard times, and Annexation during the troubles of 1849 and '50; [11] but there was, throughout these years, almost nothing in the way of a sustained agitation. It had become almost traditional to propose federal union as an heroic solution to immediate problems and then to forget about it when the problems either disappeared or were otherwise resolved. Accordingly, as sectional deadlock began to paralyse Canada's political institutions during the 1850's, it is not surprising that federalism was again trotted out as one of the conceivable panaceas.

Nor is it surprising that the man who suggested the federal principle in parliament as an alternative to Mackenzie's motion for dissolution was the Rouge Leader Antoine Aimé Dorion. As a liberal Dorion could give his assent to representation by population; as a French Canadian he could not. Federalization of the Canadas seemed to him to represent the most logical way out of the quandry. [12] The chief source of friction he held to be the nature of the legislative union which made for the wasteful use of funds by

requiring equal sums to be voted for each section whether needed or not. Why not draw up a compromise arrangement whereby commercial interests, railways, public works, trade and navigation would be left to "a general legislature representing the whole Province according to population" while reserving education and local matters for sectional legislation? Dorion was careful to limit his federal plan to Canada as he regarded a federal union of all the provinces as neither feasible nor desirable. Canada was sufficiently large and populous to warrant subdivision for local purposes. He regretted the tone of ultimatum attached to Mackenzie's motion and allowed that he would concede representation by population only after the whole question of federal union had been seriously investigated and found wanting.

Dorion's moderate and well-reasoned proposals fell, for the most part, on unsympathetic ears. In the government reply, L. T. Drummond deplored the tendency of some members to waste Parliament's time and the taxpayer's money on idle theoretical discussions which could bear no practical result. [13] While he confidently looked forward to a future union of all the provinces he was, for the present, satisfied with the existing constitution, anxious to proceed with the actual business before the House, and opposed to any plan for the fragmentation of the great and united country of Canada. Drummond's rebuke did not close the debate however. George

Brown ominously reminded the House that the present state of things could not long continue. [14] Alexander T. Galt, perhaps as a result of prior consultation with Dorion, [15] incorporated his colleague's proposals into a notice of amendment calling for a select committee to reconsider the terms of union with a view to recommending either representation by population or "a plan of federative union whereby the laws and local interests of the several sections of the Province shall be committed to the charge of Local Legislatures, with one General Legislature, having supreme control over the trade, commerce, and common interests of the whole community." [16]

Some confusion seems to have arisen concerning the Galt-Dorion federation proposals of 1856. We know from the press reports that both Dorion and Galt voiced their proposals to the House on April 24; Dorion in a speech to Mackenzie's motion for repeal and Galt in a notice of motion in amendment to Brown's proposed resolution for representation by population. [17] We learn further, from an exchange between Dorion and Brown nearly ten years later, that, as Dorion "did not exactly like" Galt's amendment, he forwarded his own notice of motion in amendment to Galt's on the following day, deleting all reference to representation by population. [18] W. M. Whitelaw says that Dorion's motion was defeated, [19] but it is in vain that one searches

the sources which he cites [20] for evidence of a vote. Whatever the fate of Dorion's motion, we learn from Luther Holton that Galt "did not venture to move [his], so that the House did not pronounce upon it." [21] Whitelaw also implies that Galt was moving in 1856 for "a general federation" [22] but this is not borne out by the text of Galt's motion. Galt's biographer, O. D. Skelton, was most anxious to secure for his subject the honour of being the first public man to advocate the larger federation but he makes no mention of the 1856 amendment and cites the 1858 federal resolutions as Galt's first move in the direction of British American Union. [23]

Lower Canadian press reaction to the Galt-Dorion proposals was generally unfavourable. The friendly Montreal Herald neglected to report them, and the field was left to the Montreal Gazette which parrotted the ministerial line about members wasting the time of the House. [24] The True Witness passed over the proposals altogether in putting forward the opinion that if repeal or representation by population were to be the only alternatives, "the friends of Lower Canada will not be long in making choice of the former". [25] On a more positive note the Sherbrooke Gazette declared in favour of Dorion's plan:

> This is the only feasible, reasonable solution of the question. It must come.... It has not yet become much a question of feeling, but time will make it so

> if the disparity between the population of Upper and Lower Canada becomes greater.[26]

But the Stanstead Journal threw cold water on the idea and voiced what was to become the prevailing Eastern Townships attitude towards Confederation:

> The plan is liable to many objections. If it is the object to have these local legislatures embrace the whole of each section of the Province, according to the division prior to the Union, the English portion of Lower Canada would be placed in the position of a helpless minority in all cases where the interests or prejudices of the two races clash.[27]

Of the urban journals only the Montreal Transcript was willing to venture cautious approval to the notion of a federated Canada, provided that "Protestants in the Lower Province shall not have their interests jeopardized".[28] But in considering the prospects of a larger union the Transcript revealed that, like the others, it was not ready to consider federal union as a feasible solution for immediate problems:

> Mr. Drummond trusts we shall have a federal union of the British North American provinces...but all this is prospective and imaginary. Upper and Lower Canada want at present some tangible, immediate reform; which will correct the many grievances of which they both complain; subdue those animosities which, if persisted in, will be our ruin; make us independent of each other, in a pecuniary point of view; and check that bitter religious hostility which influences one section of the province to thwart any measure or scheme which might be beneficial to the other.[29]

Apparently federal union was not the sort of political Carter's Spanish Mixture which the Transcript had in mind.

This sampling of editorial opinion serves nothing if not to indicate just how far federal union, whether of the Canadas or of the provinces, was from everyone's mind as a real solution to the problems of 1856. Federal union was as yet a purely academic topic. Few editors were prepared to deny that the ultimate destiny of the British provinces lay in union but in view of the difficulties involved and the want of interest among politicians they tended, like the Transcript, to regard their own day as singularly inappropriate for so great a consummation. This ambivalent attitude was well underlined in the Montreal Gazette of April 29, 1856. While dismissing Dorion's eminently practical proposals in a few lines as "bunkum speechmaking" the Gazette ran, on the adjoining page, a lengthy contribution in which the correspondent Obiter Dictum divested himself of one of his prophetic visions of a British North American Legislative Union. [30] Such a union, though infinitely less practicable than Dorion's modest scheme, was upheld as the "sole means" of "ending the hostility of races" and of forming a powerful northern nationality which might "in some measure preponderate the great and increasing influence of the United States on the American continent." Obviously it was one thing to air grandiose declamations about the future destiny of British North America and quite another to gain a hearing for a truly national issue in the hurly-burly of sectional politics.

CHAPTER V

PUBLICISTS, PAMPHLETEERS, AND FEDERAL UNION, 1857-1859

The first indication of a change of attitude towards the federal principle in the ministerial press came in May of 1857 after Dorion had again responded to Brown's annual resolution for representation by population with an appeal for a federated Canada. [1] The subdivision of Canada into three or four federated provinces, argued Dorion somewhat inconsistently with his earlier (and later) stand on the issue, was a necessary preliminary to a federal union of all British North America which must come at no distant day. The Montreal Gazette's initial reaction was the typical lament "that such matters should be taken up just now", [2] but a week later this attitude was reconsidered. Recalling Dorion's resolution in amendment which "would be declaratory of the necessary preparation for a federal union of the Provinces, "the Gazette commenced agitation in favour of federal union:

> The time seems fast approaching when this subject must be met by public men as the great measure of the day. The sooner men apply themselves to the consideration of the best mode of doing what is fast becoming a political necessity, the better for all parties. With another census will come, doubtless -- perhaps with another election -- a stronger demand for representation by population or, as an alternative, a dissolution of our present union. Ere that the Hudson's Bay Company territory will be opened up for settlement and the greatness of our future nationality assured to us. [3]

Why the editorial somersault? It is obvious that the source of this new initiative was not the government. The Gazette, in fact, went to some length to excuse the government for its failure to embrace the cause of federal union:

> It is almost idle to expect the government to take the initiative in such a scheme. Ministers, if wise in their generation, never assume the responsibility for great changes such as this, unless in obedience to great pressures from without. A man in opposition or untrammeled with the cares of office, may properly keep a little in advance of popular opinion; ministers -- like well bred men -- one step behind the newest fashion. [4]

Though not necessarily in agreement with Dorion's particular federation scheme, the Gazette urged the press and the public to "second these preliminary movements" in order to establish a climate of opinion receptive to the idea of federal union which would eventually bring the necessary pressure to bear upon the government.

It is not illogical to suppose that the force behind the Gazette's new look at federal union was no less an advocate of that cause than Alexander T. Galt himself. P. B. Waite has observed Galt's influence on the Gazette, [5] and there is every indication that this association was underway even before Galt entered the ministry. Galt had, in fact, drifted apart from the Rouges and was being earnestly wooed by John A. Macdonald during 1857. [6] Formerly a commissioner of the British American Land Company and a promoter of the Grand Trunk Railway, Galt was a leading spokesman for Eastern Townships and Montreal business interests, [7] and, as such, was a logical contributor

to the Gazette. His interest in the Northwest paralleled that of the Gazette -- the first Lower Canadian newspaper to agitate for the annexation of Rupertsland. [8] The growing rapport between Galt and the Gazette is indicated by the extensive coverage given to his speeches and activities during the late 1850's, and it is surely significant that the Gazette was the first journal to carry advance publication of Galt's federal resolutions of 1858. These were printed in full and approved by the Gazette on April 17, 1858, nearly three months prior to their introduction in Parliament. [9] There can be little doubt that the persuasive influence of Alexander T. Galt had much to do with the Gazette's conversion to the cause of federal union nearly a year in advance of government policy.

Whatever the source of the Gazette's inspiration, it would seem that its proprietors, Brown Chamberlin and John Lowe, were, by 1858, at the nucleus of a small but influential group of men who had become interested in promoting British American union. References to such a group crop up intriguingly from time to time, and each is in some way linked to Chamberlin. One such associate was James Anderson, who contributed to the Gazette under the nom'de plume OBITER DICTUM. Anderson, editor of the Farmer's Journal and author of Currency and Corn Law Letters, Philosophy of Duty, and other contemporary works, wrote at great length to arouse interest in a legislative union of the colonies and territories of British

North America. [10] He took pains to publicize the value of the Northwest and Pacific Territories and urge their incorporation into his proposed union. [11] His primary concern was that British North America, with comparable territory and resources at her disposal, was falling behind the United States in population and development for "want of union". He preferred legislative to federal union for several reasons. Such a union would better assimilate the laws and population, thus submerging Canada's racial problem into a unique British North American nationality. Anxious to preserve the British tie, he declared the federal system inoperative since British America, unlike the United States, would not have an independent central government. Canada was already "as free as she could desire to be -- except in name". In any case it would be well to avoid the sort of bickering between different levels of government which one currently observed in the American system by adopting a legislative rather than a federal plan of union. In a letter to the Gazette July 31, 1858, Obiter Dictum pointed out the implications for Canada of the Imperial Government's creation of New Caledonia, the Fraser gold discoveries and the Pacific trade, and urged "the immediate formation of a body, to be named the Canadian Institute and National Union, having for its object to bring about by every legitimate means, the Union of these provinces, and to watch over and promote, to the utmost of its combined ability, the general progress and improvement of the

country." A collection of these contributions to the Montreal Gazette was circulated in pamphlet form in 1859. [12]

That Chamberlin was himself interested in the formation of some kind of society is revealed by a letter addressed to him from Pierce Stevens Hamilton of Halifax. [13] Hamilton, editor of the Acadian Recorder, was probably the most inexhaustible petitioner, pamphleteer, and letter-writer in the confederation movement. [14] Chamberlin must have alluded publicly to the desirability of founding a "British American Society" during a tour of the Maritimes in the summer of 1859, prompting Hamilton to explore the subject in correspondence with the Montreal journalist following his departure:

> Now, about the project of founding a British American Society of which you spoke some when you were here -- do you not think it would be well, in founding any society of an essentially British American character, to have some more simple and clearly defined object in view, than would characterize any organization modelled after the national societies now existing in these Colonies? If not, I do not see quite clearly what object -- what bond of cohesion, we could have. Do you not think it would be well to initiate an organization which might soon spread over the whole of British North America, and which would have for its object the Union of these Colonies, the maintenance of their connection with Great Britain, and their devotion in political morality?

Regretting that he had not had the opportunity of raising the matter during the course of his brief meeting with Chamberlin, Hamilton invited the editor's confidential views. He, for his part, would like to see an association of "the best educated, most intelligent, honorable, and I may perhaps add, wealthy men -- in short, the gentlemen of all the provinces "which

would act "in concert" but, for a time, "sub rosa" in the interests of British American union -- a scheme which, Hamilton assured Chamberlin, was not one "which has just recently popped into my head".

On May 8, 1858, the Montreal Gazette welcomed another "zealous co-worker" to"the small, but now fast increasing, number of Canadians in different parts of the province" who were endeavouring "to build up a British American nationality. The new recruit was Alexander Morris, a Montreal barrister and personal friend of Brown Chamerlin's who had backed federal union at the British American League Convention in 1849, [15] and the occasion for the Gazette's announcement was the publication in pamphlet form of his lecture "Nova Britannia" which had been delivered before the Mercantile Library Association of Montreal March 18, 1858. [16] Morris, a frequent contributor to "the newspaper press of Montreal" on the twin subjects of British American union and the annexation of Rupertsland, had become so engrossed with these heroic possibilities that his friends were beginning to banter him with having "Confederation and Hudson's Bay Territories on the brain". [17] His "Nova Britannia" lecture publicly inaugurated what became virtually a life-long career of speechmaking and promotion in favour of Confederation and its expansion. [18] Nova Britannia is notable in that it transcended politics entirely to view colonial union within the broader framework of British American nationalism:

"Ere I close, I shall indulge in what some may deem the fanciful dream of an enthusiast, with regard to the future destiny of that immense tract of country which extends from the Atlantic to, in fact, the Pacific Coast...." [19] Morris did what he could to bolster his dream with authoritative evidence. A lengthy topographical, historical, and economic outline of the British American provinces and Rupertsland is used as the basis for a claim that Nova Britannia was potentially an empire "mightier in the West than India has even been in the East." [20] The opinions of respected historical personages like Durham and Seward are cited as if in proof of the viability of a British American union. Haliburton is one of his authorities on the feasibility of a trans-continental railway, and on this score Morris was prepared to argue that a northern route would be preferable to one through the United States, because it would avoid "the summer heat of a southern route, which threatens disease and death to the unacclimated European traveller." [21] Though he regarded British American union as "not only possible but inevitable" Morris made no attempt to suggest even tentatively what political form such a union might take: "Canada and Acadia have begun to stretch out their hands to each other. The alliance of their hearts and hands will follow." [22] Some writers have found fault with Morris' failure to delineate either a legislative or a federal scheme of union, [23] but the vagueness of the proposal was probably its greatest strength.

Others could hammer out the terms of union; Morris sought only to build up support for the idea. The more general, attractive, and non-partisan the appeal, the broader its base of potential adherents. At a time when nationalist aspirations were enveloping Europe and America Alexander Morris' purpose was to kindle the spirit of national enterprise in young British Americans that they would not be "loiterers or laggards by the way" in the acquisition of their "princely heritage". [24] Apparently Morris did not declaim in a vacuum. The reception given to the original lecture "was such as to render its publication in pamphlet form almost a necessity", and "a large edition" was sold out within ten days of its appearance. [25]

Morris' second effort, stressing the value of the Northwest and urging its annexation by Canada, was also reviewed at some length in the Montreal Gazette. [26] Duly appearing in pamphlet form, [27] it attracted the notice of the Quebec Mercury, which credited Morris with an able treatment of the topic, "though his statements of fact scarcely bear out the large generalities in which he indulges." [28] The Hudson's Bay question, observed the Mercury, was arousing considerably more interest in Montreal than in Quebec. Alexander Morris was later to make a distinctly practical contribution to Confederation as a go-between in the pourparlers which led to the Brown-Macdonald coalition of 1864, and to its expansion as governor of troubled Manitoba and the Northwest Territories from 1872 to

1877, [29] but one gathers that he preferred in later years to be remembered as the "far-sighted visionary and patriot" of 1858 and '59. [30]

Another academic promoter of British American union was George H. Macaulay. Macaulay, about whom little is known today, was a highly respected Montreal literary man and public speaker in his time. [31] His most notable contribution was the published lecture entitled "Canada: Its Political Past, Present, and Probable Future" which he delivered before the Hochelaga Debating Club December 12, 1858. [32] Macaulay's theme was that Canada's development would always remain secondary to that of the United States until the former also adopted independent federal republican institutions. In urging Canada's "emancipation from Downing Street" Macaulay was going farther than most of his contemporaries were willing to go, though he was careful to stress that "Britain's blessing" would be necessary for this "spirit of independent enterprise" to be suitably cultivated. Like Alexander Morris, George Macaulay depicted a glorious trans-continental nation and exhorted young men to involve themselves in politics to fulfill this vision. The most formidable difficulty, he anticipated, would be that of obtaining the sanction of all the peoples and governments involved. Macaulay's words were not lightly dismissed. Newspaper editors were wont to refer to him and quote him as an authority on the subject of Canada. [33]

Thomas D'Arcy McGee, who became one of the most renowned proponents of British American union, arrived in Montreal during the spring of 1857. Well known in Irish circles as editor of the American Celt, which he had founded at Boston in 1850 and moved to Buffalo in 1852, [34] he was persuaded by some leading Irish Canadians to become their political spokesman in Lower Canada. [35] Selling the Celt to the Messrs. Sadlier of Montreal and New York, [36] McGee attempted to find a Montreal businessman "standing tolerably well with all parties" to go "half-partner" with him in "an independent tri-weekly, Catholic only on Catholic questions,....but Irish and Canadian on all others." [37] This "McGee business" was frowned upon by the French Canadian clergy and G. E. Clerk who realized that the newcomer's emphasis on "Irish" interests could prove fatal to the purely "Catholic" political front they were attempting to build through the struggling True Witness. [38] McGee's supporters nevertheless managed to collect enough in a subscription fund drive [39] to enable their leader to establish a journal at Montreal in May of 1857. [40] Its name, New Era, proved symbolic of its editorial philosophy, for the paper, owing partly to McGee's unfamiliarity with parochial politics in Canada and partly to his poetic imagination, frequently advanced broad non-partisan arguments in favour of colonial union when considering the narrower political difficulties currently under debate. A. Brady believes that McGee's was "the first newspaper in the

British colonies dedicated to the cause of colonial union and the establishment of a British American nationality under the rule of a royal prince." [41] Transcending politics, McGee stirred the emotions by considering British American union, not as a mere expedient for the alleviation of sectional difficulties, but in a larger aspect as the means of moulding a common nationality, culture, and destiny for the peoples of British North America. [42] McGee's oratorical skill was legend, and he pleaded British American union no less effectively from the public platform than through the press. Speaking in Ottawa, October 9, 1857, McGee developed nis favourite theme, "Canada and Her Destiny". He began by supporting Dorion's plan for a Canadian federation but imaginatively depicted it as expanded east and west through union with the other provinces and territories:

> If we extend our vision so as to embrace all British North America, we survey a region larger than all Europe. If we have no coal, Nova Scotia has abundance. If Newfoundland has an indifferent soil, this Ottawa valley can grow wheat enough to supply all that is required. Throughout this wider view we find at least four millions already in the field -- one quarter more than laid the neighbouring republic. Nature pronounces for a union of the provinces. Canada needs a sea coast. [43]

A telling argument in favour of union for defense was also put forward. The political weakness, the desirable resources, and the great St. Lawrence waterway of British America might well induce the United States to attempt annexation or conquest:

> Facts are logical, and unless we dream that the laws of cause and effect will be suspended in our favour, we must

> look either to the internal union or the political extinction of these provinces at no distant day. [44]

Given the consolidation of the colonies into a single state, McGee envisaged, within a half-century, a Canada 25,000,000 strong, laced together by rivers, canals, and railways, possessing, in addition to political stability and economic prosperity, those other attributes of national life -- a national literature, and achievements in art, science, and philosophy. [45] Unlike John A. Macdonald and other Canadian constitution-builders whose initial preferences were for legislative union, McGee perceived from the outset the need for federal institutions as a guarantee of provincial rights and liberties in the new state. [46] One of his editorials, "A New Nationality", provided the catch-phrase which was to become the slogan of the Confederation movement. [47] McGee's significant little newspaper was unfortunately too short-lived to exercise a lasting influence. [48] With the entry of its proprietor into parliament following the December elections of 1857 it was discontinued, no editor having been found who would "maintain the consistency of the New Era's politics." [49]

If the Conservative Montreal Gazette was the most influential journal promoting federal union and the Irish New Era the most eloquent, the ultra-Tory Quebec Mercury was certainly the most persistent. [50] The Mercury's agitation for federal union, launched in 1857, sustained through 1858, and abandoned in 1859, is notable in several respects. It publicized an

otherwise obscure set of federal union resolutions which anticipated the Galt resolutions of 1858 by more than a year; it indicated the sequence of formal procedures which was ultimately followed in the Confederation negotiations with Britain; it pondered conceivable forms of government for the proposed union; and it indicated how, through federal union, the influence of the defunct British Tory party of Lower Canada might be restored. Strangely, the Mercury's ardent campaign for federal union was not noticed by contemporaries.

The resolutions with which the Mercury inaugurated its crusade were those of Arthur Rankin, a Hincksite Reformer representing the western constituency of Essex.[51] They were mainly a repetition of the Dorion proposals for the division of Canada into three or four confederated provinces with the significant addition of recommendations for representation by population and the incorporation of the other British provinces and territories into the union. Such an arrangement would promote material progress, settle vexed racial, religious and political questions, and strengthen Imperial ties, while offsetting the influence of the United States. There is no indication that these resolutions ever came before parliament, and their existence is perhaps symbolic of the status of the federation movement at the time. Prior to August of 1858 federal union was the project not of governments, nor even parties, but of individuals.

A few days later the Mercury admitted, with some perception, that British American federal union was far too comprehensive a scheme to be carried from a set of resolutions in a colonial legislature. [52] The project would require "previous understanding" and study by the interested legislatures and governments, and solemn affirmation by the Imperial Government. The biggest hurdle would be the attitude of the latter towards British American independence "-- we must pronounce that word --" since (as many Canadians would later agree) "a Federal Government without entire power would be useless, almost ridiculous." Good relations with Britain would always be a necessity and could probably be preserved if the whole question were discreetly handled by an inter-colonial commission acting in full consultation with the Home Government. Judging from the reaction of the Colonial Office to the Canadian initiative of 1858 this was sage advice which Messrs. Macdonald and Cartier might have done well to heed.

In speculating as to a desirable system of government for the union the Mercury came up with suggestions calculated to win British approval. An appointed Viceroy from among "the males of the Royal Family of England" would provide "the best guarantee of stability to our new-formed institutions" and would ensure "abiding and affectionate moral union with the parent state". [53] Whether federative or legislative, such an imposing union as that of the British provinces and

territories must have "a lofty and imposing head, invested with a title suitable to the power and dignity....of ruler of a Western Empire." [54] Aristocracy? "Why not! Whether you have the title or not the thing does and must exist." [55] Democracy would be feasible only when God made all men "of the same height, of the same capacity, and of the same dispositions." Even the "Republican denizens of the United States " were longing for titles. [56] With regard to a legislative system the Mercury favoured a a greater centralization of powers than was afforded by the "pure federalism of the United States". [57] Let each province have a House of Assembly, but let every measure other than money bills be subject to ratification by two-thirds majority of a central Senate. Whatever its appeal to the Home Government, such a system was well suited to the congenital conservatism of the Quebec Mercury.

The reasons underlying the Mercury's agitation for federal union came out during 1859. The Mercury had been founded by Thomas Cary as the official organ of the British Tories of Lower Canada in 1805, [58] and, although the pre-rebellion Tory party had ceased to exist as a separate entity in the House with the formation of the Macdonald-Cartier coalition of 1854, [59] Tory sentiment continued to prevail in the columns of the still-flourishing newspaper [60] operated by George T. Cary until 1862. [61] Cary and the Quebec Tories were primarily concerned with finding ways and means of reviving the fortunes of the

"British party of Lower Canada" which had declined to such a low ebb since the advent of the Canadian union and responsible government. [62] Dominated by French Canadians and ignored by Upper Canadians, British Protestants of Lower Canada now found themselves, according to the Mercury, "a mere zero in the arithmetic of politics,....ground to powder between two unfriendly majorities,...fast becoming extinquished as a race". [63] Mindful of British supremacy in bygone days the Quebec lawyer and Mercury journalist John Henry Willan urged a Petition to the Crown for a return to "the old colonial system" with its strong executive to protect the British minority "against the hostile French population", [64] but George Cary still felt that a federal union of British North America offered the best prospects to the "murdered men" of Lower Canada. Legislative union was rejected because of the desire of Lower Canadian "capitalists and men of enterprise" to "relieve themselves of the incubus of union with Upper Canada". [65] Outright repeal of the Union, on the other hand, "would give a blow to our credit in the eyes of English capitalists which it is worth while to avoid". [66] In a federal union "French Canadians would form less than one third of the population [and]...would no longer be allowed to obstruct the onward progress of the country, or to compel men to eschew modern improvement and adhere to the customs of their great-great grandfathers." [67] The grounds for Macaulay's reproach that "'Lower Canada remains inert while the whole

continent around us is in a ferment with activity and enterprise,'" would be removed. [68] Although the British would remain a minority within a separate Lower Canada, "they could not as now be ignored." They might even inherit the balance of power. Lower Canada's Catholic majority would naturally divide into "equally poised, nicely balanced factions" if only the unifying pressure from Upper Canada was removed. In this event "the casting vote" would be left to the British Protestants. They would again become "masters of 'the situation'" and their national importance would revive. [69] Invoking the spectre of George Brown and representation by population the Mercury castigated the French Canadians for not themselves recognizing federal union as their best safeguard. [70] Yet French Canadians who, like J. C. Taché in Courrier du Canada, [71] did attempt to popularize federal union were reproached for approaching the subject from "a French Canadian view alone." [72]

CHAPTER VI

FEDERAL UNION BEFORE THE CANADIAN ASSEMBLY, 1858.

The December elections of 1857 further aggravated Canadian politics by breaking down the double majority system which had been in tacit operation since 1848. Election returns and party alignments had hitherto enabled the formation of ministries which could command, in addition to an overall parliamentary majority, a majority within each of the equally-represented sections; but this artificial stability was undermined when the Liberals took majority control of Canada West away from the government. John A. Macdonald, supported by about 23 of the 65 available seats, [1] was now more vulnerable than ever to the charge of ruling his section through Lower Canadian votes. [2] George Brown, on the other hand, had little to hope for from Canada East, where Cartier's triumphant Bleus, supported by 15 English members, had reduced the opposition to but nine Rouges, five English "Liberal-independents", and one independent. [3] While it looked as though Macdonald and Cartier had lost Canada West, no one could be sure, owing to the loose party ties of those days, until the ministry had actually been tested in the House. It is not surprising therefore, that along with the renewed demands for representation by population, one of the first items

to be debated in press and parliament was the viability of the double majority system itself.

With the government in all likelihood deprived of a double majority the ministerial press was not apt to press for continued adherence to the system. Answering the question "What will the Government do if the majority in Upper Canada is against them?" the Montreal Gazette supplied the classic answer: Her Majesty's Government must be carried on! [4]

> We believe that the system of double majorities is well nigh passed away .... and that any attempt to adhere to it too strictly is likely to lead to anarchy and confusion. The sooner a Minister has the moral courage to rid himself of its trammels the better for the country. [5]

In parliament John Sandfield Macdonald was the only English-speaking representative to defend the double majority system as the only means of governing both sections fairly, [6] but French Canadians were more reluctant to abandon what they considered their "peculiar safeguard". [7] Joseph Cauchon, in his Journal de Québec, considered a course of action which was anathema to English Conservatives:

> The abandonment of the double majority brings with it logically and necessarily, representation based upon population, or what comes to the same thing, the negation of the federal principle which pervades the constitution of 1841. All understand this, but, at the same time, with a just horror of Mr. Brown's doctrines, inquire whether it be practicable to leave this man out of a new ministerial combination, and yet secure the double majority. [8]

While the liberal press applauded Cauchon's "impartial and most enlightened view", [9] the Montreal Gazette recoiled from the notion of a Grit-Bleu ministry with an emotional outburst betraying deep-seated fears of political isolation. Had French Canadian politicians "of the Cauchon and Thibaudeau school" forgotten the sacrifices made by the Lower Canadian British in their efforts to "bury the hatchet", to "heartily co-operate" with French Canadians in the development of their section's prosperity, and to defend French Canadian institutions against the malevolent designs of the Grits? Reminding Cauchon of prejudices still latent in British souls, the Gazette threatened that English Conservatives could counter any attempt on the part of French Canadians "to break down the ministry on the 'double majority' question" by forming a backlash alliance of their own with their "bitterest enemies", the Grits, "to crush out what French Canadians so much desire to preserve and [to] make Canada radically and essentially a British colony." "The double majority system, counselled the Gazette, ought not to be "pushed too far." [10]

The liberal press, for its part, was prepared to scrap the system which perpetuated sectional division in favour of representation by population and assimilation. The Montreal Witness had long deplored double majority as a "pernicious" system "which makes members vote one thing for one province and

the opposite for the other, which makes right and wrong a question, not of principle, but of longditude", [11] and when the opening division of 1858 proved "conclusively" that the government was in a minority in the west [12] the Witness called for redress in the form of a single majority, a "national legislation" and an "assimilation of the laws" through "representation by population." [13] The Sherbrooke Gazette, in demanding representation by population, again expressed its willingness to accept a federated Canada as a compromise solution:

> It is perfectly absurd to suppose that U.C. will long submit, while she has a large majority of voters, to be ruled by L. Canada. The thing is so manifestly unjust, that no one can reasonably ask it. Representation by population must be conceded, unless the two sections of the Provinces resort to the Federal system, and become virtually two governments. [14]

The Upper Canadian opposition, meantime, had been toying with the Lower Canadian federation idea but remained resolved, in view of their recent success at the polls, to press ahead with representation by population. George Brown weighed the various alternatives in a letter to Luther Holton:

> No honest man can desire that we should remain as we are; and what other way out of our difficulties can be suggested but a genuine legislative union, with representation by population -- a federal union, -- or a dissolution of the present union? I am sure that a dissolution cry would be as ruinous to any party as (in my opinion) it would be wrong. A federal union, it appears to me, cannot be entertained for Canada alone, but when agitated must include all British America. We will be past caring for politics when that measure is finally achieved. I can hardly conceive of a federal union for Canada alone. What powers should be given to the provincial legislatures, and what to the federal? Would you abolish county councils? And yet if

> you did not, what would the local parliaments have to control? Would Montreal like to be put under the generous rule of the Quebec politicians? Our friends here are prepared to consider dispassionately any scheme that may issue from your party in Lower Canada. They all feel keenly that something must be done. Their plan is representation by population and a fair trial for the present union in its integrity; failing this, they are prepared to go in for dissolution, I believe, but if you can suggest a federal scheme or any other that could be worked, it will have our most anxious examination. [15]

This was substantially the way things stood with the Liberals until Brown's hand was forced by the ministerial crisis of July.

But if Brown had his panacea for the political malaise of 1858 the government, for the moment, had none, and the ministerial press was constrained to undertake the difficult task of defending the "anomalies" of the existing constitution. If Brown would but abandon irresponsible demagoguery in favour of "that spirit of moderation and compromise" so essential to the harmonious functioning of British institutions, the constitution still might be made to work. [16] Governments need not take advantage of "accidental" overall majorities to impose upon either section unpalatable measures emanating from the other. [17] But this approach was soon abandoned, for without a double majority government in office no really satisfactory defense against representation by population could be made. Perceiving the need for an attractive alternative to both representation by population and the existing constitution, the Montreal Gazette printed in full the resolutions which A. T. Galt had given notice he would bring before the Assembly, [18] and again urged federal union in

advance of government policy:

> We have now in Canada a veritable constitutional crisis replacing the half dozen pretences which have passed away. The pressure for representation by population contemporaneously with a loudly reiterated demand ... for the preservation of the double majority system ... produces a new issue, which now or shortly hereafter must be tried and decided. Shall we draw closer the present Legislative Union; or shall we relax it in favour of the principle of federation, so as to enable us to add new territories from time to time, taken from the Colonies of the East or the unorganized Territories of the West? It is in this broader aspect we hope to see Parliament deal with the much vexed question now before it. [19]

In answer to Dorion and others who might be considering federation as a means of safeguarding French Canadian rights, the Gazette let it be known that British Lower Canadians would favour a union of all the colonies:

> If the Federal principle is insisted upon by French Canadians, British Canadians should urge its extension. If we are never to have thorough legislative union of the two parts of Canada ... better begin immediately to fashion the framework of a larger confederation.

If there was to be a division of Canada itself it must be into three parts, not two, and Montreal must not be deprived of her economic environs:

> If Montreal and the Eastern Townships are not willing to be governed by the Peninsula of Upper Canada, they are not altogether delighted with the prospect of entire submission to Three Rivers, Quebec, or Gaspé .... a central Province comprising that part of Canada east of the Bay of Quinte and west of the eastern boundary of the Eastern Townships comprising the river (St. Lawrence and Ottawa) counties in Upper Canada, Montreal and the Eastern Townships in the Lower, must come out. The East may stand still as long as it likes; the West rush as frantically onward: this great central district is that part of Canada where the speedy assimilation and codification of the laws, progress in commerce and manufactures, lumbering and mining, that gradual, sure, true progress which is the best indication of material prosperity, may be most certainly looked for. [20]

This "Central Canada" outlook was used henceforth by the Gazette to condition opposition demands, whether for a federated Canada or for dissolution of the union. [21]

With the Galt resolutions having been placed before the public by its arch-rival the Gazette, the Montreal Herald finally broke its long silence on the question of federal union. While professing "no desire to pronounce for it or against it" until all the pertinent facts were known, the Herald indicated that its mind was, in reality, already made up, and the caustic tone of its commentary augured ill for the federation movement. The leading argument was that the advocates of federal union would be unable to prove satisfactorily that the scheme would profit Canada:

> We expect to hear a detailed enumeration of thousands of square miles, and the millions of square acres embraced within the Nova Scotian and New Brunswick boundaries ... we shall have the usual flourishes with which, on this continent, one sets off his descriptions of wild lands, whether they be situated on the fever swamps of Illinois or the frozen regions of the Saguenay .... Then the coast line will be traced up and down the two shores of the Bay of Fundy, round by Canso and old Louisbourg, till we get again to our own territory a little this side of the Bay of Chaleurs, from whence we shall be asked to travel through the Straits of Northumberland, taking a view of the mackerel and herring grounds there and in the Bras d'Or; and having thus circumnavigated St. Johns and Cape Breton, we shall probably be invited to dine on cod in Newfoundland, which, being an outlying possession, will be treated in a detached manner. We shall hear of the 'noble' forests of these countries; the statistics of their ship-building will be spread out in unimpeachable and imposing tabular statements; the mines will come in for their share of the general panegyric, and there will be thrown in a sketch of all the people who have thriven by the fishing business from the Ichthyosauri, who lived upon fish because

> they could get nothing else .... But having looked at and admired all the provisions which Providence has made for the maintenance of a large population around the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the question will yet have to be answered -- how will confederation make these resources any more our own than they are at this moment?

Dwelling on this point, the Herald maintained that the produce of the Lower Provinces was not the sort of thing Canada imported. How was "the Canadian to be enriched by a union which leaves all these material riches exactly where they were?" If it be free trade Canada was after, an examination of the tariff would show that "we practically have it now." Unwanted duties could easily be removed in the normal way, through legislation, "without the squabbling of a whole legislature, where the music now made by contention and recriminations between two Provinces, would be increased more by the claims and counter claims of three or four." In terms of dollars and cents a federal union would, in fact, be ruinous:

> We shall have a federal legislature ten times more extravagant than the present, and committing ten times more jobs; and we shall have another edition of the Grand Trunk Railway, with this difference, that the extravagance and bad management of the road we have, at least procured something that was wanted, while the new railroad will pass where no one wants to go. In the first Grand Trunk the railroad was made for the country. In the second an imaginary railroad wants a country and we are asked to make one for it, as our industrious grandmothers used to make their quilts -- by patchwork.

Surely, concluded the Herald, it would be well to ponder these points "before we run into more expense and trouble than is occasioned by our past outlays and present complications." [22]

On May 29 the Herald made its proposal for the solution of current problems in Canada. Double majority was dismissed as untenable -- "dispelled by the light thrown upon it" -- while confederation would be "only the pricking of another bladder." Nor was dissolution the answer. The way to settle the problem was to concede Upper Canada's "right and just" demands for representation by population. The argument in favour of rep by pop was audacious in its simplicity. Representation by population would not really hurt anybody; not even the French Canadians:

> Representation by population will, of course, have some little effect on the course of legislation; but, practically, when granted, as it surely will be, the effect will be hardly appreciable for many generations. If French Canadian nationality is to disappear -- and we trust that it never will until such disappearance occur by the formation of a united Canadian people, in whose genius the virtues and graces of the French character shall be as obvious as the qualities drawn from other elements ... it will not be the consequence of any arrangement of the representation. [23]

French Canadian solidarity, predicted the Herald, would be the controlling element in the legislature "for a century at least" after the advent of rep by pop, and no one would then be entitled to object. The real evil, which representation by population would eradicate, was not the French influence but John A. Macdonald's unwarranted control of all the Upper Canadian patronage. [24] The Herald's stand was indicative of the newly-restored relations between Upper and Lower Canadian Liberals. There is, however, no indication that any French Canadians were

won over by the Herald's eloquence.

Finally, on July 5 and 7, Alexander Galt brought in his resolutions. They called for a Canadian federation of two or three provinces, a local government in the Northwest which could join the union, and a general federation of all British America.[25] Federal union, he urged, should be adopted not only as a remedy for those "sectional jealousies" which threatened to arrest the progress of the present union, but for the many other tangible benefits it would bestow; an enlarged area of free trade among communities whose resources were complementary, national greatness and prestige, and improved capabilities for self-defense. The United States, as usual, served as the basis for all meaningful comparisons, and was flourished as the bogey which would assuredly make off with the individual colonies should they fail to unite. The same arguments applied to the Northwest. It behooved Canada as "the foremost colony of the foremost empire in the world" to immediately assume the responsibility for occupying "that region ten times as large as the settled heart of Canada.... otherwise the Americans would certainly go there first.... Half a continent is ours if we do not keep on quarrelling about petty matters and lose sight of what interests us most."

This was the essential scheme of Confederation laid for the first time before the Canadian parliament, but the time was not propitious. Galt's speech of July 7, a nice admixture of patriotic zeal and concrete proposals, failed to arouse much

enthusiasm in the small House, and the ensuing debate was of a "temperate character". [26] Galt was perhaps unwise to have presented his case during the debate on representation [27] by population since the latter subject commanded far greater attention than federal union. [28] George Brown attempted to move an amendment to take the vote on rep by pop first since "before I can vote on a proposition for a federal union I must know whether representation by population will or will not be granted." [29] Galt was agreeable to Brown's suggestion that the House convene a full-dress debate on representation by population, double majority, and federation, the three competing solutions for current problems, but Macdonald would not guarantee that time would be available. [30] Cartier, perhaps beginning to appreciate the value of federal union from a French Canadian standpoint, urged Galt to continue, since many French Canadians who would never accept representation by population would consider federation should the population differential continue to grow in Upper Canada's favour. [31] Brown's motion was ruled out of order and the debate continued. [32]

Before the House finally adjourned at midnight, [33] several speakers had assented to federal union in principle, but as a project for the future rather than the present. L.V. Sicotte welcomed the prospect of Canada's obtaining a sea coast but felt that public opinion in the various provinces was not yet sufficiently matured for any government to legislate upon federal union. [34] A.A. Dorion assumed the position he was to

hold until Confederation; opposed to any plan for union with the "unknown" Atlantic provinces. There was no menace requiring defense. Trade was lacking not for want of union but simply because each province had too little of what the others required. He was, as ever, ready to consider a Canadian federation or even representation by population with proper safeguards for the religion, language, and laws of Lower Canada, but federal union of British North America he deemed madness -- at least for a century's time. [35] Cauchon and Merritt were opposed. Britain would defend her colonies which, for the moment, were too isolated to be brought under one government. [36] L. T. Drummond, just out of the cabinet, argued in favour of a commercial union of the provinces, financed by Fraser River gold, until such time as Britain would construct an inter-colonial railway, without which federal union was inconceivable. [37] Colonel Playfair, a supporter of federal union in 1849, spoke favourably of Galt's proposals but stressed the need for a railway to the Pacific. [38] No prominent spokesman for either government or opposition participated in the debate. D. G. Creighton says that John A. Macdonald had not yet decided upon federal union and was holding his opinions in reserve. [39]

Press reaction to Galt's scheme was even less enthusiastic. The Gazette and Herald of Montreal had already pronounced upon it and found nothing further to say. Even the Quebec Mercury, for all its interest in federal union, failed

to notice the Galt resolutions. Editorial comment was almost non-existent. The Montreal Transcript was content to cite a negative reaction from the ministerial Toronto Leader:

> It is not the duty of a Government to extemporize Revolutions and carry them by surprise Before the people interested can learn the why or the wherefore. Should the chances of political fortune make Mr. Galt minister four or five years hence, he will find it quite soon enough to make the project of union a cabinet question. [40]

The Stanstead Journal, opposed to the notion of federal union, found nothing to worry about in the reception given to the Galt resolutions: "Any action upon the part of our legislature, at the present time, will be confined to a mere expression of opinion, and it appears doubtful whether even this will be obtained during the present session." [41] The Witness took the occasion to comment not upon British American union at all, but to weigh the pros and cons of a customs union with United States. [42] The Quebec Morning Chronicle thought it might be interesting to learn what some of the other "denizens" of British North America were thinking about federal union. [43] The Leader predicted that the resolutions would never come to a vote because Galt knew that he stood alone. [44] The resolutions were, in fact, quickly swept aside with the resumption of House business, and within a month a ministerial crisis had altered the entire situation.

CHAPTER VII

FEDERAL UNION IN THE GOVERNMENT PLATFORM, 1858-1859.

The week of political crisis which saw the rise and fall of the Brown-Dorion ministry had the effect of altering the stand of both major parties towards federal union. On being invited by Governor Head to form a ministry Brown's immediate problem was to reach an accord with the Reform leaders of Canada East. On July 29 and 30 he and Dorion conferred on the problems which divided the sections and a ministry was formed. [1]

The Brown-Dorion cabinet was sworn in August 2 despite a warning from Head that a dissolution of parliament might not be granted. [2] The new ministers, according to law, vacated their seats in the House to await re-election in their home constituencies, [3] but before parliament adjourned for the day a vote of no confidence had been carried against them on the grounds that the known principles of their two leaders were irreconcilable. [4] Head's refusal of a dissolution August 3 left Brown and his colleagues no alternative other than to resign the following day. [5] After A.T. Galt had declared himself incapable of forming a succeeding ministry, [6] a Cartier-Macdonald combination was organized to replace the Macdonald-Cartier cabinet which had resigned only a week before. [7] The one significant alteration in the ministry was the substitution of A.T. Galt for William Cayley. [8]

Galt agreed to enter the cabinet only on condition that his federation policy be adopted. [9] Most writers are now agreed that Galt's inclusion in the Cartier-Macdonald administration was but one of several profound developments which were being precipitated at this critical time by no less a personage than the Governor General himself. For although few politicians or publicists seemed aware of it, Sir Edmund Walker Head had for many years been interested in various schemes of colonial integration. [10] In 1846 he and Lord Elgin had been urged by Earl Grey to promote colonial federation as a means of fulfilling Durham's vision of a virile British American nationality. [11] British American union, it had been argued, would relax colonial ties with the Mother Country and provide the colonies with better prospects for internal prosperity, political stability, and mutual defense. [12] By 1851 Head, as governor of New Brunswick, had become a convert to the notion of colonial federation only to see Grey and his colleagues resign the following year. [13] When negotiations for an Inter-colonial Railway subsequently went on the rocks, Head reverted to the view that a more modest scheme for maritime union was all that was practicable at the time. [14] But in the fall of 1856, after conversations with Robert Lowe on the precarious British position in America and the feasibility of colonial union as a means of diminishing Britain's commitment there, [15] Head had cautiously revived the subject of the larger federation

with Palmerston's Colonial Secretary, Henry Labouchere. [16] He was encouraged to develop the theme with three main considerations in mind: union, the Intercolonial Railway, and the Hudson's Bay Territories. [17] When, in the summer of 1857, Head, John A. Macdonald, and J.W. Johnston, an outspoken advocate of the Intercolonial and federal union [18] and also premier of Nova Scotia, mysteriously converged upon London, [19] Lower Canadian editors had begun to wonder what was afoot. The Quebec Mercury was overly optimistic in its expectations:

> It is stated that the Federation of all the British North American Provinces is so far resolved on that the terms of union have been drafted. We make no doubt that this highly important subject will form matter for the consideration of Her Majesty's advisers, and that Sir Edmund Head will be appealed to for his personal opinion as well as to be the interpreter of the sentiments of Canada on this question .... [20] The idea is daily gaining intensity .... just as the waves proceeding from a single broken point in an unruffled sheet of water eddy in wider and wider circles .... until it has come to be a settled conviction that in Federation lies the future of British North America. [21]

Such hopes proved ill-founded for the moment. The absence of a New Brunswick delegation was fatal to the Intercolonial negotiations, and when the Colonial Office refused to ask Parliament for subsidies to the railway the immediate prospects for political union of the colonies fell to the ground. [22] Only one door remained open. Labouchere pronounced himself favourable to colonial union provided all the colonies were party to the agreement, and Head was authorized to pursue British American federation subject to this condition. [23] Labouchere's successor in the Colonial Office, Lord Stanley, concurred with his pre-

decessor's view in private correspondence to Head, but the latter, incapacitated by illness upon his return to Canada, did nothing to further any plans in this regard. [24] But with a serious ministerial and constitutional crisis now blowing up underneath him Head must have suddenly felt himself confronted with the necessity of taking immediate and positive action. Unfortunately Stanley's place in the Colonial Office had been taken by Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton, who, ignorant of his predecessor's private correspondence with Head, was altogether unaware that the Canadian governor considered his hand free to proceed with so grand a design as British American Union. [25]

On the Canadian side the project was swiftly activated. On August 7 Cartier announced that his ministry would communicate with the Home Government and the Lower Provinces as to "the expediency of a Federal Union," [26] and Head's throne speech of August 16 indicated that the threefold question of the Hudson's Bay Territories, the Intercolonial Railway, and federal union would be formally raised. [27] On August 23 Alexander Galt, having entered the cabinet, appealed to his constituents for re-election. He reaffirmed his determination to push onward towards federal union in order to afford Canada, like the United States, "the means of preserving intact the local interests of the several states, while [securing] all the advantages [28] of a United Empire in whatever concerns the interests of all." The Northwest and Pacific Territories, moreover, could be incorporated under a federal constitution. Was it not Canada's obligation to

take the initiative, to negotiate with the Imperial authorities and the sister provinces, to ascertain the feasibility of union, and then "to place the whole subject fairly before the people for their decision." [29] Repeating these sentiments in a post-election speech, Galt predicted that the time was not far distant when federal union would enjoy general, if not unanimous support. [30] On September 9 a minute of council calling for a British and North American conference on federal union was circulated by Head to the Colonial Office and the governors of the maritime provinces, [31] and in early October Cartier, Galt, and John Ross embarked to lay their case before the authorities in Downing Street. [32] With their departure federal union assumed the aspect of political practicability for the first time.

The circumstances and manner in which federal union was brought forward by the Cartier-Macdonald administration militated against a favourable reception for the move in Canada, let alone the Lower Provinces or Britain. During the savage debate which raged in the wake of Head's refusal of a dissolution to Brown and Dorion and his complicity in the "double shuffle" device by which the returning ministers avoided the necessity of having to seek re-election like their disillusioned opponents [33] few public men or newspaper editors in Canada were inclined to consider the new government initiative for federal union in anything approaching a bi-partisan spirit. Many were too busy denouncing or defending the governor and his advisers to notice

it at all. The fabled eloquence of D'Arcy McGee was not heard in praise of federal union on this occasion as McGee bitterly accused the royal representative of outright collusion with the "cabal" and the "back-stairs work" of the Liberal-Conservative party. [34] Fully engaged in refuting such charges and levelling counter-charges of their own, [35] the ministerial journals found little time or space for federal union. Neither the Gazette nor the Pilot of Montreal carried any comment, and the Transcript limited its approval of the government project to three words: "This sounds well." [36] The Quebec Morning Chronicle welcomed "important steps in the accelerating progress of this country towards its culminating destiny" but also declined to enlarge upon the subject. [37] Post-mortems of the Brown-Dorion affair and the double shuffle preempted most of the editorial space in the opposition journals as well. [38] The Sherbrooke Gazette saw "the dim shadowing forth of the possibility of considering a federative union of the Provinces" only as belated government recognition that something must be done to solve the constitutional question. [39] The Witness was not ill-disposed to the idea of a federal union provided "the present awkward and unequal division of provinces should not be necessarily followed," but wondered whether, in a union similar to that of the United States, there would remain "any longer anything for Britain to do." Did Mr. Galt have some scheme for reserving functions for the British government over and above

those of the proposed central and provincial governments? [40] The Quebec Mercury took advantage of the ministerial impasse to exult in the "total failure" of responsible government and to support the government initiative for what had long been its private panacea. Perhaps"the principle of miscalled Responsibility" would work better on a more extended stage, and with the check of a double, or Federal Legislation. [41] The most hostile reaction to the new government policy was forthcoming, as might be expected, from the Montreal Herald. Like the Toronto Globe the Herald saw federal union in the hands of the present ministry as nothing more than a red-herring, a smokescreen, another dodge like the double shuffle:

> As to these schemes of political confederation and railway speculation, we confess we can only regard them as tubs thrown out to amuse the whale - as projects set afloat for the purpose of distracting the attention of the people of Canada from what is of infinitely more importance to their welfare and prosperity, namely the honest, judicious, and economical administration of the government of the country. [42]

If the people would not repeat the cost of the Grand Trunk for "a road much less useful" [43] they had best withstand the "specious and plausible attempts" being made to "persuade them to take Mr. Solicitor General Rose's [44] first step --the construction of the Halifax railway --towards Mr. Galt's confederation panacea." [45] The Herald reproached Galt for having deserted his old friends for the sake of office and expressed considerable doubt as to whether his new associates were really behind his federation policy. [46]

> In whatever scheme the project may hereafter appear, it now presents itself merely in the shape of an attempt of several politicians to prevent a direct decision upon their past conduct, by obtaining new means of corruption -- or at best an attempt to get rid of internal embarrassments by overriding them with new complications. [47]

Canadians should restore order in their own house before embroiling themselves in union with the people of the Maritimes. It was ludicrous to form a government of five provinces "only for the sake of finding a way to govern two." [48] There was nothing to be gained by a political union of the provinces "which could not as well be obtained by other means. [49] The grandiose references to "a Great Empire" were nothing but "vapid talk". [50]

But the Herald, for all its skepticism as to the sincerity with which federal union was being promoted, was beset by apprehensions that Head and the Canadian delegation might somehow, through intrigue and corruption, carry the thing off. The British public was, after all, ill-informed about Canadian affairs, and passage of a "plausible-sounding" scheme like federal union would require only the purchase of half-a-dozen legislators in England:

> A Governor General sustained in England, and authorized judiciously to dispose of a few Knighthoods .... with the more substantial advantages which reward political services among the crowd, can accomplish any object to which he sets himself. [51]

Surely, ventured the Herald with more hope than conviction, the Imperial Government would never allow federal union to be "purchased of the people's representatives at the people's expense, for the sake of serving the purposes of Colonial politicians". [52] Surely they would not "lend themselves to a mere party trick." [53]

The Herald might have spared itself the anxiety, for the Colonial Office proved unreceptive to both the Canadian project and the manner of its implementation. Ignorant of the private correspondence concerning colonial integration which had passed between his predecessors and Governor Head, Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, the Colonial Secretary in Derby's Tory administration, was outraged at Head's presumptuousness in setting afoot, on his own initiative and with his public concurrence, a scheme of Imperial magnitude. [54] When assured by Permanent Under-Secretary Herman Merivale of the prior authorization granted Head by Labouchere and Stanley, Lytton's anger subsided but his aversion to Canadian initiative in matters of "an Imperial character involving the future government of the other North American colonies" remained. [55] As Lytton awaited the submissions of the Canadian delegation the already-limited prospects of a colonial federation suffered further setbacks. On October 19 an elaborate despatch (the first of three) opposing union of the Lower Provinces with Canada, imputing Canadian motives, and proposing legislative union of the Atlantic provinces was received from Governor J.H.T. Manners-Sutton of New Brunswick and endorsed by Arthur Blackwood and Thomas F. Elliot of the Colonial Office. [56] The silence from the other provinces was almost equally inauspicious, even though the wording of Head's letters to the provincial governors did not necessitate immediate action on their part. [57] By October 25, when the Canadian proposals

went before the Colonial Secretary, [58] only Newfoundland had expressed a willingness to participate in a conference on British America: [59] from Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island -- no word. [60]

The official Canadian proposals were embodied in two letters, one public and the other private, which were drafted by Galt and addressed to Sir E.B. Lytton. [61] The first was a routine request that the Home Government convene a British and North American conference on federal union as a possible solution to Canada's sectional problems and as a means of promoting the general interests of all the provinces. The second was a remarkably perceptive blueprint for the proposed federal union. The structure and tentative powers of the central government, as conceived by Galt, bore a great resemblance to the system which was eventually adopted, [62] and Galt took pains to point out wherein his constitution would be superior to that of the United States. The central government must, above all, be strong:

> It will form a subject for mature deliberation whether the powers of the Federal Government should be confined to the points named, or should be extended to all matters not specifically entrusted to the local legislatures ....[The proposed federation] does not profess to be derived from the people but would be the constitution provided by the imperial parliament, thus affording the means of remedying any defect, which is now practically impossible under the American constitution. The local legislature would not be in a position to claim the exercise of the same sovereign powers which have frequently been the cause of difference between the American states and their general government. [63]

As Professor Morton has observed, the system proposed by Galt was essentially a legislative union in a federal guise [64] -- a union which would preserve British parliamentary institutions and the monarchal connection.

Although Galt's lucid grasp of the factors involved in colonial union produced a favourable impression at the Colonial Office [65] it failed to dissipate the skepticism of British officials as to the underlying purpose of the Canadian overture. "In Canada, I suspect," wrote Herman Merivale, "[federal union] is chiefly popular with politicians, not with the community, and rather as a mode of getting out of the inextricable scrape in which they seem involved by the present union." [66] In submitting a memorandum on the question of federation to the cabinet November 10 T.F. Elliot expressed confidentially his opinion that federal union was being used by the Canadian ministry to hide their failure to solve the problems of the union. [67] Lytton, still harbouring grave doubts about the constitutionality of Head's recent conduct, [68] tended to agree that the Canadian project was probably being pursued as a mere political convenience. [69] The initiative, in any event ought to remain in Imperial hands. [70] As Cartier and Rose slipped off to Paris and then home, Galt waited anxiously in London for the cabinet decision on Lytton's recommendations. [71] By November 22 he was in full possession of the bad news but managed to persuade Lytton to word the official despatch in such a way as not to disown the federation

project for all time. [72] His communication to the Colonial Secretary reveals his deep disappointment at the outcome:

> I need scarcely add that I deeply regret that it is not more favourable and that I feel that even if conveyed in terms such as I myself [have] now outlined, it will cause our Government much embarrassment, and I fear weakness .... Apart from all personal or political considerations, I venture to suggest that inasmuch as the question will certainly and necessarily be discussed in the Colonies, it would be a serious and I may almost say, dangerous complication if such discussion took place in the face of an adverse decision from the Home Government.
>
> My deliberate opinion is that the question is simply one of Confederation with each other or of ultimate absorption in the United States, and every difficulty placed in the way of the former is an argument in favour of those who desire the latter. I trust you will pardon my frankness, but on such a question duty forbids me to conceal my apprehensions even if you should deem them groundless. [73]

The decision expressed in Lytton's subsequent circular to Head and the other governors, though couched in language designed "to soften as much as possible our refusal," [74] was negative. As one province had indicated a preference for legislative union while the views of the others were as yet unexpressed, it would hardly be fitting for the Home Government to commit them to a conference on the "momentous question" of federal union. [75] The door to such a conference was left slightly ajar -- the implied condition being prior consultation and agreement among the several provinces [76] -- but both the indifferent attitude of the Colonial Office and the subsequent lukewarm and hostile responses from the other provinces were fatal to such a contingency. [77] The failure of the Canadian mission of 1858 was obvious.

The official documents pertaining to the negotiations were not tabled in the Canadian Assembly until February of 1859, and until they were made public Canadians remained pretty much in ignorance of what had transpired. The opposition press had kept its ear close to the ground for news of unfavourable developments, and the Herald reported rumours to the effect that the ministerial application for railway aid had "turned out a very blank failure," and that Head was about to be replaced by Joseph Howe.[78] But when neither confirmation nor denial was forthcoming from the ministerial press the Herald likewise subsided to await the outcome. Occasionally, during this waiting period, the ramifications of federal union would be thoughtfully mooted. The Witness detected a certain apprehensiveness about federal union in the Eastern Townships which prompted it to print the following letter to the Sherbrooke Gazette and the editor's reply:

> Will Upper and Lower Canada come in as a unit? or will each province form an individual member with a separate local legislature of our own? If the former, we can make no reasonable objection, and so rest content; but if the latter, then we have not a moment to lose in seeking another organization, which shall effectually conserve our local interests and influences.[79]

In a reply which can hardly have assuaged the fears of its correspondent the Sherbrooke Gazette replied that Upper and Lower Canada would probably form separate provinces within the confederacy:

> Otherwise one of the main objects of the scheme would not be gained, viz. to do away with the war of races -- and to heal the dissentions growing out of different needs. The question of representation by population would be as troublesome as ever.[60]

The Sherbrooke Gazette, a long-time supporter of Dorion's plan for a federated Canada,[61] had never been troubled about the minority status to which many feared the English-speaking population of the Townships would be reduced in the event of a constitutional separation from Upper Canada. It apparently assumed that the Eastern Townships would be grouped with Montreal and the Ottawa Valley in any local subdivision of the province. It was cool, however, to the proposed extension of the federal principle from Canada to the Atlantic provinces. Like the Herald, the Sherbrooke Gazette was unconvinced that such a union would be materially advantageous to Canadians, particularly those residing in the Eastern Townships.[62] Would federal union become merely another burdensome expense?

> But before we call a Convention, or otherwise to determine whether Montreal and the Ottawa and the Eastern Townships shall be erected into a new Province, there appears to us to be important preliminary questions to settle. Are the people of the Eastern Townships in favour of a Federal Union with the Lower Provinces? Are the proposed advantages sufficient to compensate for the extra expenses of supporting a local Government, by direct taxation, in addition to the cost of the General Government, which will of course absorb all the revenue which we now contribute by direct taxation.[63]

With the publication of the official despatches from Lytton and the provincial governors[64] there was suddenly no need to debate the matter further.

When parliament convened on January 29, 1859, Head's

throne speech gave no indication that the ministry had sustained any rebuffs in its quest for federal union: "The possibility of unity, by some tie of a federal character, the British Colonies in North America, has formed the subject of a correspondence which will be placed in your hands." [85] Optimistic reference was, in fact, made to all the great issues; federal union, the Intercolonial Railway, and the Hudson's Bay question. [86] The Quebec Mercury rejoiced anew that federal union was still in prospect [87] while the Pilot bestirred itself to fend off the usual opposition charges that federal union was just "moonshine to divert public attention from more practicable issues." [88] But within days the tell-tale documents were produced and the truth was out. The Herald was exultant:

> It will be seen that the project has fallen as flat in England and in the other Colonies as it did in Parliament, when Mr. Galt, previous to his joining the Ministry, almost failed to get a quorum to hear his views, and when, of course, Mr. Cartier and his then colleagues voted against the plan, [89] which, three weeks after, they announced as their grand stroke of policy for the salvation of Canada. As to the Colonies, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward's Island do not seem to have thought it worth while to reply at all, [90] and New Brunswick declines to have anything to do with it .... [91]

Only Newfoundland, gloated the Herald, had shown even the remotest interest, no doubt to secure Canadian backing for her fishery dispute with France -- and ominous foreboding of "the sort of embroglio into which this precious incorporation of dispersed elements would lead us." [92] The reception given to the Canadian delegates in London had, in fact, been cordial, [93] but not

according to the Herald:

> In England, instead of the warm gratitude which it was probably expected such a magnificent plan would inspire, the Canadian delegates met with the coldest reception consistent with civility, and a very plain hint that they had hurried themselves a great deal too much.[94]

Had the ministry suppressed documents still less flattering to their pride? Where was the despatch in which Sir E.B. Lytton was reputed to have been "cruel enough to ask Messrs. Ross, Galt, and Cartier what authority they had for coming to him on behalf of Canada?"[95]

On the ministerial side the Quebec Morning Chronicle attempted to see the despatches in a more favourable light. The ministers were lauded for having done "so much" in "such a manner." Reviewing Lytton's reply to Head's "well drawn up" despatch, the Chronicle concluded that "although our Canadian zeal may have received a slight check, the cause of the delay cannot be regarded as a formidable obstruction to a successful and satisfactory result at no distant day."[96] But the Montreal Transcript, which had been plagued by sober second thoughts about the events related to the "double shuffle",[97] chose this occasion to disown government policy. Though doubtful, as ever,[98] that Canada was ready to fulfill the "large souled visions of the future" with which "sanguine" British Americans were wont to "recreate themselves from time to time," the

Transcript regretted that the government had pursued federal union as "the work of a day" without allowing it "that full and fair discussion which it has never yet received." It was to be lamented that federal union, which would be worth labouring for "when the proper time arrives," was continually "the plaything of the politician, to be used for the passing hour to amuse the people by filling up a gap in the policy of a government or of an opposition, and then to be thrown aside when the end was served." Why had the ministry suddenly seized the issue as a "grand scheme" to be prosecuted "with as little delay as possible" when Mr. Galt's resolutions, five weeks previously, had been "treated with almost contemptuous silence?" The "true explanation" was that the government, "afraid that they would be in the unpleasant predicament of having no policy, either worth opposing or contending for, [had] clutched at Federal Union as a large subject," and, in order to have it "in a state of forwardness by the time Parliament should meet," they precipitated hasty and premature overtures to the British government which had now "injured its acceptability." [99] Coming from a newspaper which had for the past year supported the government this was damning criticism indeed. The ministers and the ministerial press maintained a discreet silence. When parliament prorogued on May 4 the Speech from the Throne was devoid of any allusion to federal union. Nor was it included in the government's legislative program for 1860. [100] Federal union had apparently been

dropped from the government's platform altogether.

The question of the government's sincerity in forwarding the issue of federal union in 1858 is an intriguing one which, argued at some length in the contemporary press, has been debated by historians ever since. Probably there is little cause, as W.M. Whitelaw points out, to doubt the earnestness with which Head promoted the project. [101] His interest in schemes of colonial integration was long standing, and the reaction of the Colonial Office to his initial proposals reveals that the initiative behind the 1858 mission was manifestly his own. [102] Yet Whitelaw observes, in another connection, that "with the Canadian crisis of 1858 safely over," Head was among the first to abandon federal union in favour of another of his old loves -- maritime union. [103] Federal union of all the provinces, he assured the Duke of Newcastle, [104] had been advocated only as "the least of two evils" -- a "last resource" to ward off dissolution of the Canadian Union. [105] Now that conditions had improved there was no longer a need for it. [106] Head knew that the great 1859 Reform Convention of the Upper Canada opposition had just rejected the policy of outright repeal in favour of a plan for a purely Canadian federal union. [107] His remarks to Newcastle imply that, had the Reformers come out officially for dissolution, he would have felt constrained to continue to back federal union as the "wise and right" alternative. One wonders whether Head would

have risked burning his fingers with federal union a second time under any circumstances. In the opinion of J.A. Gibson, Head was primarily concerned with vindicating his conduct, not with defending the federation proposals. [108]

Galt's sincerity with regard to federal union was never questioned even by his political opponents. Like other annexationists of 1849 he still harboured a profound admiration for the material achievements of the United States but now desired to emulate them independently in British America. [109] He differed from the majority of his contemporaries in his early appreciation of most of the salient features of the Confederation scheme. Federal union was a single stroke of statesmanship which could at once dispose of the sectional problem, provide a political framework for territorial expansion from Atlantic to Pacific, rescue the Grand Trunk from bankruptcy, and restore Canadian credit. [110] Its consummation was therefore pursued by Galt as an eminently practical policy at a time when most beheld it as the stuff of dreams. According to Head, Galt was the real author of the 1858 mission. [111] He was also the last to allow the initiative to lapse. During a visit to London in the autumn of 1859 he wrote to Newcastle to ask whether anything had developed from the correspondence with the other provinces on the 1858 proposal for a conference on British American union. [112] Newcastle's reply was a non-committal reiteration of Lytton's policy with the added condition that

the Colonial Office be consulted by the provincial governors prior to the appointment of any delegates to such a conference.[113] Galt was in London again during 1860 but apparently thought the subject no longer worth raising. Newcastle had, meanwhile, expressed his preference for legislative union of the maritime provinces.[114]

But if Galt was a sincere advocate of federal union he was not altogether a candid one. It is a fact that in proposing federal union before parliament and before the people, he neglected to elucidate all the aspects of his master plan. Concentrating on the need to find a lofty solution to the problems of sectionalism and the Northwest, he studiously avoided any public reference to the possibility that federal union might serve the more mundane purpose of broadening Canada's credit base for the rehabilitation of the ever-sinking Grand Trunk.[115] That this was, in fact, a major object of the 1858 mission is indicated by the inclusion of John Ross -- the president of the Grand Trunk, who had testified before Brown's committee of 1857 that the railway's only hope lay in its extension from Atlantic to Pacific[116] -- in the delegation, and by our knowledge of what transpired at the negotiations.[117] Railway politics had assumed a distinctively unsavoury odor in Canada, and this no doubt accounts for Galt's reluctance to reveal all when seeking to enlist public support for federal union. A long-time railway promoter and contractor himself,[118] Galt had not emerged

entirely unscathed from Brown's investigations of Grand Trunk affairs during May of 1857, [119] and, to avoid future charges of political profiteering he decided, on assuming public office in 1858, to sever all overt connections with railways. [120] If this explains his reluctance to openly link federal union with railway development in general and the discredited Grand Trunk in particular it does not quite justify it. If the railway consideration was uppermost in his mind, as Professor Morton says it was, [121] then Galt and his ministerial colleagues were guilty of a certain deception in deliberately concealing from the taxpayers and their elected representatives important ramifications of the federation scheme. Surely it was this sort of deviousness which gave rise to the Herald's suspicions, that federal union was being sought mainly for the benefit of "contractors and stock jobbers and speculators," [122] and which lent some substance to opposition charges, perhaps best summed up by Dorion's allegation during the Confederation debates, that "the Grand Trunk people were at the bottom of it." [123]

If Head and Galt were solidly behind the principle of British-American federation, can the same be said of Cartier and Macdonald? W.L. Morton advances reasons which may have accounted for Cartier's acceptance of federal union: his audacious temperament, his commitment to the Grand Trunk coupled with an appreciation of the extent to which the welfare of his government and the destiny of the province were dependent upon railway

development, and his growing realization of the need for some new political context in which to defend French Canadian rights. [124] Whitelaw notes in addition that the intimate association between Cartier and Head and the common interest of Cartier and Galt in the Grand Trunk might have provided the basis for a genuine acceptance on Cartier's part of the project in which these others were so vitally interested. [125] But suppositions do not constitute proof, and Whitelaw takes pains to indicate how federal union could have been frivolously adopted by Cartier solely as a means of circumventing the political crisis of 1858. [126] Was not the "conversion" rather sudden and unlooked-for, and did it not occur under the most inauspicious of circumstances? Was not the project advanced with a precipitation which was almost certain to invite censure from the Colonial Office and arouse suspicion in the Lower Provinces? Finally, argues Whitelaw, was not federal union within a year "complacently dropped from the Liberal - Conservative legislative program" only to be revived whenever a pat answer was required to the oft-repeated opposition charge that the government had no solution to offer for the sectional problem? [127] O.D. Skelton puts forward the tenable view that the adoption of federal union may simply have been Cartier's way of postponing another vote on the troublesome Seat of Government question which had defeated the government July 29, and expresses surprise that the opposition failed to grasp the obvious link between the two

issues. [128] Creighton maintains that Macdonald and Cartier were converted to the idea of federal union by the warning inherent in the 1858 crisis of "the growing difficulties of governing a divided and distracted Canada," [129] but Professor Careless denies that any such conversion took place. According to Careless the old leaders were not interested in federal union beyond the immediate political advantages that would accrue to them for advocating it. [130] Morton tries to draw the line between a "manoeuvre" and an "insincere trick," but the enigma, at least with respect to Cartier's real views about federal union, remains undocumented and unresolved. [131]

There is even less reason to link Macdonald directly to the federation policy of 1858. Donald Creighton and others have attempted to associate Macdonald with the 1858 initiative, [132] but the only real evidence for this is the fact that Macdonald was a member of a ministry which took up federal union. Creighton notes Macdonald's silence on the question of federal union down through the years after 1849 (when he opposed it) but attributes it to impartiality. Macdonald had been wisely reserving his opinion so that, in 1858, he was "free to commit himself and his party to the most ambitious and splendid solution of all." [133] This interpretation would seem to be open to objection on several accounts. To begin, the party was not Macdonald's and it was not he who did the committing. Macdonald's weak position in the House, coupled with the recent defeat of his ministry, rendered his position in both the

party and the reorganized cabinet inferior to that of Cartier, upon whose French Canadian votes he depended for his portfolio. As old Sydney Bellingham noted in his memoirs, it was Cartier who "kept John A. Macdonald in his place": but for this support "Macdonald would have disappeared as a leader of the House." [134] Secondly, there is nothing to suggest that the rank and file of the Liberal-Conservative party endorsed the ministerial policy. "Mr. George Cartier," wrote the French Consul from London, "appears to be committed to [confederation]; the obstacles it meets are however imposing and the French Canadian party at Montreal is disinclined to support him." [135] Nor is there evidence to suggest that Macdonald was himself committed. It is in vain that one examines Creighton's sources for evidence of a favourable word, written or spoken, from Macdonald on behalf of federal union during the year 1858. Apparently Macdonald's personal "impartiality" long outlasted the official partiality of his government towards federal union. Even this impartiality is open to serious doubt, for when Creighton says that Macdonald never opposed federation [136] he overlooks a speech which Macdonald made in parliament August 5, the day after the resignation of the Brown-Dorion ministry and the day before the Cartier-Macdonald ministry was sworn in:

> Some short time ago it would be remembered, that Mr. Brown when in opposition, stated he could retire from public life forever could he only succeed in establishing representation by population (hear hear) .... But when Mr. Brown came into office, the first thing he did -- for we all know it now --

> was to agree with his cabinet that the question should stand over to some future day (hear hear) when the Council could all agree, and would say when and where and how they could get New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Prince Edward Island -- and Her Majesty -- and, after all, the French Canadians -- to agree as to a basis of representation and federal union (loud laughter).[137]

Macdonald's belief that Brown and Dorion had decided upon a federation of all the provinces turned out to be erroneous, but that is not the point. What is significant is the scorn with which Macdonald dismissed the notion of a federal union within twenty-four hours of his becoming a minister ostensibly dedicated to that very project. It is unlikely that he would have ridiculed federal union as puerile opposition folly had he known he was about to become a "convert" to the idea in the very near future. One therefore gathers that, unless Cartier and Head had already decided for federal union without consulting Macdonald, the decision to take in federal union and Galt was made sometime between this speech of August 5 and Cartier's formation of a ministry August 6 -- a miraculous conversion indeed. There is nothing to suggest that Macdonald contributed anything to this policy other than his acquiescence. His absence from the Canadian negotiating team and his silence on either the intent or the outcome of its mission would seem to indicate a certain lack of enthusiasm for the project. When Macdonald did refer to the 1858 policy during the session of 1860 he came close to disowning it:

It was true that the Government had proposed a Confederation

> of the British North American provinces -- that they would like to take into it the Red River on the one side, and the Lower Provinces on the other, so as to make a great empire, stronger by wealth, position, and general standing than the parts could be while divided. But they were not prepared to admit that there were any internal grievances which could not be constitutionally remedied -- cured without any alteration in the constitution whatever.[138]

Whatever the roles of Head, Galt, and Cartier, there would seem to be no real reason for supposing that John A. Macdonald had much, if anything, to do with the movement for federal union during 1858.

CHAPTER VIII

THE LIBERAL OPPOSITION AND CANADIAN FEDERATION, 1859-1860.

The idea of a local federation of the Canadas, proposed by Dorion in 1856 and 1857, had not found much favour initially with Upper Canadian Liberal leaders. Brown, it will be recalled, wrote disparagingly of the notion to Luther Holton.[1] Still, he had never ruled out the contingency and had asked the Lower Canadians to draft a tentative plan.[2] Before any plan was forthcoming the ministerial crisis of 1858 intervened, and suddenly it became necessary for Brown to reach an accord with the Lower Canadians, if he wished to form a ministry. Brown's major statement on the negotiations with Dorion which resulted in the formation of the Liberal cabinet was made in a public speech at the Toronto Royal Exchange two days after his fall.[3] He maintained that Dorion had agreed to accept representation by population provided it was accompanied by suitable safeguards for French Canada, and that a federative union of the Canadas had been entertained as a conceivable guarantee:

> We want no advantage whatever over Lower Canada -- but we will not submit to the unfair disadvantages now existing. Give us representation by population, and let it by all means be accompanied by every reasonable protection for your local interests and for ours (loud cheering). Earnest discussion then followed as to the character of the desired protections, and the mode of securing them -- whether by a written constitution proceeding direct from the people, or by a Canadian Bill of Rights guaranteed by Imperial statute, or by the adoption of a Federal Union, with provincial rights guaranteed, in place of the Legislative Union that now exists .... I say to you that we

> found the strongest reason to believe that we could mature a measure acknowledging population as the basis of representation, that would be acceptable to both sections of the Province (loud cheers).

Dorion confirmed, much later, that he and Brown had agreed that the constitutional question should be settled either by a confederation of the two sections or by representation by population with guarantees for the religion, language, and laws of each section. [4] There had been no time to delineate the exact nature of the guarantees, and the early demise of the Brown-Dorion ministry had snuffed out the policy almost at its inception.

The federation idea was all but lost sight of during the hectic twelve months which followed the "double shuffle." Embittered Reformers, engrossed in the immediate problems of seeking re-election, were primarily occupied with venting their spleen on the objects responsible for their humiliation. Speeches made at the round of Reform assemblies and demonstrations held across the province during the autumn of 1858 revealed the deep disillusionment of the Liberal leaders, especially George Brown. [5] Lawsuits launched against Macdonald and two of his ministers to test the legal validity of the "double shuffle" assumed the aspect of "state trials." [6] Brown's health failed, and the Globe, left to the editorial management of George Sheppard, [7] a believer in written constitutions and American institutions, [8] began to hint darkly at the need for sweeping "organic changes." [9] During the session of 1859

renewed sectional feeling heightened by divisive debates on the tariff and the seigniorial tenure question again impaired Brown's relations with the Liberal contingent from Lower Canada.[10] By July, Sheppard and the Globe were demanding outright dissolution of the union, a written constitution, and separation of the executive from the legislature.[11] Representation by population had been discarded by disenchanted Upper Canadians for new and much more radical demands.

The Montreal Transcript, a journal which was swinging perceptibly away from support of the ministry, noticed the ominous new agitation for dissolution and pronounced it but the inevitable result of the malfunctioning of the Canadian union:

> A cloud ... is gathering in the West .... We refer to the growing agitation which has lately sprung up in Upper Canada pointing towards a Dissolution of the Union between the two Provinces. There has been for some time a very prevalent sentiment in that section, that the experiment of trying to get two distinct races to work together harmoniously as one nation under representative institutions, has, after a trial of eighteen years, proved to be a failure -- that the practical effect of it, in consequence of the struggles of each section to get advantages for itself at the expense of the whole, has been to inaugurate a deplorable system of political corruption and public plunder -- that the Union has been particularly disastrous to Upper Canada, owing to the French Canadians having succeeded in acquiring the balance of power, so as to be able to enforce any demands they may choose to put forth -- and that the interests of good government would be better served in both Provinces, if Upper and Lower Canada were to manage their own affairs, separately and independently of each other.[12]

Dissolution of the union, the Transcript predicted, would be "for some time to come" the "great political cry" of Upper Canada.[13]

Of the Lower Canadian journals the Transcript came the closest to owning the Globe's radical platform in favour of Americanized institutions:

> We cannot say that we are yet prepared to give our adhesion to the new movement. The British system of responsible government is still on trial in this country. It has been found to work admirably at home, and, as lovers of everything British, we would like to see the same system firmly established here, in preference to the American system of checks on the action of the Legislature and the Executive. We confess, however, with regret, that hitherto the working of responsible government in this country has not been satisfactory, and that, if matters do not speedily improve, a written constitution, however unpalatable as an Americanism foreign to British ideas, will become necessary ....[14]

By July 14 the Transcript had made up its mind. The Upper Canadians were right. The Union of 1841 was a failure. Responsible government was a failure. Constitutional change was necessary:

> We are not a homogeneous people .... We find now no greater fusion or blending of feeling and interest than at the commencement of the experiment. In all matters of legislation and government, the French seek to advance their own interests, without any care for Upper Canada, and the British of Upper Canada, in like manner, study what will be of benefit, not of the whole Province, but of their own section of it. The Executive, subjected to constant pressure from these opposing forces, are placed in circumstances of extreme difficulty.... We do not see how, on a survey of the history of the past eighteen years, the conclusion can be avoided that some change in our constitutional system must be made, in order to save Canada from going further on the downward career to helpless embarrassment.[15]

When a public man of George Brown's "experience and standing and influence" declared that "some modification of the constitution of 1841 is necessary," the Transcript concluded, it was time to take action.[16] The emancipation of the Transcript from ministerial influence was complete.

The Montreal Gazette deplored the agitation for repeal

of the union but expressed no surprise that it had arisen: [17] "We have long foreseen ... this agitation ... and have therefore advocated a federation ... which would work more easily than the present union." [18] Brown was apparently so embittered at recent setbacks that he had "renounced all his old opinions." Dissolution would have the evil effect of prolonging the existence of petty colonial governments and would weaken Canada so as to encourage her annexation by American "slaveholders". A federal system with a written constitution assigning and restricting legislative and executive powers and functions would be "too cumbrous" a machinery for governing the small population of Canada. If the Maritimes could be brought in that was another matter. [19]

The Montreal Witness, solicitous of the welfare of Lower Canada's Protestant population, favoured assimilation of the populations of the two provinces and stood opposed to their separation: "At present Roman Catholics and Protestants are about equally represented which would not be the case in two legislatures." [20] Still, the Globe's arguments that the union had failed to assimilate the laws and customs of the two races were well taken: "Certain it is, Lower Canada Protestants, as a general rule, have showed such an abject and doughfaced servility to the priest power, as would fully justify Upper Canada in leaving them wholly to its tender mercies". [21] The Witness also conceded that the union had "enormously increased the expenses of Government by establishing a system of bribes

and equivalents, and by making both sections consent with fatal facility to any increase of taxation, however great, so that each may only have its desired share of public money:"

> In other words, the system of paying for local improvements and bribing class interests out of the public purse, makes each locality quite willing to bear any amount of indirect taxation, in the hope of drawing more back again in the shape of grants from the Legislature.[22]

This "log-rolling system," complained the Witness, whereby public men in each locality, "seeing that the grants were pretty sure to come through their hands," were enabled "to promote their own private interests thereby" and to "exercise much patronage and obtain a great increase of dignity, importance and influence," was responsible for the deplorably low level of morality in Canadian public life.[23] The Union compounded this "vicious" system of"purchasing votes" by pitting one section of the province against the other. But still the Witness would not countenance dissolution: "peculation, jobbing, bribing and log-rolling among public men" would not end with repeal. Business interests would still clamour for government grants for canals, railways, timber slides, inland navigation improvements, mining developments and subsidies to fisheries.[24] And would it be wise to yield control of the St. Lawrence to the French Canadians who would then be in a position "to tax and toll" Upper Canada's highway to the ocean, or who might, "in a fit of insane nationality, hand it over to Louis Napoleon?"[25] As long as the union was preserved there remained the hope that the French Canadians might ultimately be con-

verted to Protestantism: "Just as Christian Hindoos are reliable citizens so will it be with Protestant French Canadians." [26]

The prospect of a repeal of the union elicited response from every quarter in Lower Canada. The Tories at the Quebec Mercury almost welcomed the Globe's turn in favour of dissolution:

> Not only is the existing Union prejudicial to all Lower Canadian interests, but more especially to the interests of Lower Canadian Protestants. For them the present Union is an Egyptian bondage, its dissolution would be a political millenium .... Upper Canada uniformly recognizes Lower Canada in its majority alone, its minority it as uniformly ignores .... Every middle aged man in the country remembers the past glory, contrasts it with the present degradation of the British party, and regards the Act of Union as the fountain from which their degradation has been derived. [27]

The Mercury, despairing of federal union after the failure of the Canadian delegation to London in 1858, was now in the process of abandoning the panacea it had urged for two years in favour of repeal. As far as the True Witness was concerned there was only one reason why Catholics should not favour a repeal of the union "with or without Federation," but that reason was overriding -- the Catholic minority in Upper Canada, who would be "the only sufferers by a repeal of the Legislative Union," must not be left at the mercy of the "Protestant Reformers." [28] It was the duty of Catholics of both sections to stand by each other and maintain the constitution without change. [29]

As the Canadian press debated dissolution of the Canadian union George Brown moved to stabilize his position upon more tenable ground. Reasserting his control over the Globe, he suddenly checked Sheppard's editorial campaign for dissolution, [30] causing the latter to complain about how many of his "distinct committals" were being disowned. [31] On July 8 Brown acted to restore good relations with the Lower Canadian Liberals by inviting Holton and his colleagues to the Reform Convention being planned for the fall. [32] Editorially, the Globe began to emphasize the desirability of a federal union of the Canadas as the basis of the new policy of the Liberal party. [33] Such a policy indeed had much to recommend it. It was acceptable to Lower Canadian Liberals, the original promoters of the idea. It would incur the advantages of dissolution while avoiding the radical extremism of a cry for out-and-out repeal of the union, [34] and, most important, it would preserve the commercial unity of the St. Lawrence. [35] A federal system would allow new English-speaking territories to be added to Canada from the Northwest without endangering the local rights of the Lower Canadian French and arousing their opposition. [36] Above all, argued the Globe, a Canadian federation policy, unlike the recent ministerial scheme, was practicable since it did not depend upon the other provinces. [37] The Globe's campaign for federation reached its peak as Brown, William McDougall, Michael Foley, and other Upper Canadian Reform leaders met at Rossin House in Toronto, September 23, to draft the agenda for the upcoming

convention.[38] A series of resolutions prepared by Brown which rejected solutions other than federation were adopted by the meeting, and the general gathering of the Upper Canadian Liberal party was scheduled for November 9 in Toronto.[39]

Brown's Rossin House resolutions came under sharp attack in the ministerial press of Lower Canada. Emphasising the dissolutionist aspect of the federation scheme the Quebec Morning Chronicle heaped contumely upon Brown "and his confederating friends" for their "shameless demagoguery" and "irresponsible initiative" to destroy the existing union:[40]

> The chief features [include] ... the subdivision of all Canada into four administrative departments with a federal legislature and the understood power of admitting into the federative Union the Eastern Provinces and Western Territories of British North America under voluntary conditions .... [But] surely there is no necessity for Canada to break herself up into local sections and legislatures for the purpose of trying rash experiments, and in view of some future confederation that may or may not take place .... As in union there is strength, so must there be weakness in unclenching the rivets which already exist.[41]

The Pilot responded to Brown's campaign for constitutional changes with a stout defense of the existing union: "We have, ourselves, always insisted that the Union has not been a failure, but that, on the contrary, it has worked better, and effected more good, than those who designed it expected from it."[42] Could such eminent statesmen as Durham, Buller, Sydenham, Russell, and Baldwin have imagined that there would be no difficulties inherent in the operation of the union? "No, they were guilty of no such folly. They weighed the benefits of a

union against the evils which they knew would accompany it, and they made their choice." Nor was it a mistaken choice, concluded the Pilot, since other unions, even from similar stock, such as that between England, Scotland, and Ireland, have not worked so well. That "some hundreds of thousands of French habitans" had not suddenly become Anglo-Saxons was an "unreasonable" complaint. Canada's progress was "almost without a parallel, even on this continent," and the Pilot therefore requested Brown to produce "facts, not declamation," when enumerating grievances alleged to have emanated from the union. [43] The Herald's rejoinder to this line of attack was the reminder that it was not only the opposition which had sought constitutional change. Just because their "ministerial patrons" had gone "a little too far and too fast for our friends in Downing Street" was no reason for certain editors to satisfy themselves with the theory "of a bad system justifying a bad administration" and to "give up all attempts to obtain a better." [44]

As the Lower Canadian plan for a federated Canada was apparently to be the policy with which George Brown would seek to reunite and rebuild the shattered forces of the Upper Canadian opposition, the Lower Canadian Liberals were quick to demonstrate their support. A manifesto bearing the signatures of A.A. Dorion, T.D. McGee, L.T. Drummond, and L.A. Dessaulles [45] appeared in the latter days of October as "a distinct utterance by the Lower Canada Opposition on the constitutional questions which

are to engage the Upper Canada Convention, shortly to assemble at Toronto .... " [46] It thoughtfully considered various constitutional alternatives and found them unacceptable. The provinces were too interdependent for dissolution; representation by population would not end sectional conflict; double majority was awkward and frequently unattainable. Only in federation lay an appropriate solution:

> Your committee are impressed with the conviction that whether we consider the present needs or the probable future condition of the country, the true, the statesmanlike solution is to be sought in the substitution of a purely Federative for the present so-called Legislative Union; the former, it is believed, would enable us to escape all the evils, and to retain all the advantages, appertaining to the existing union. [47]

A federal system, the document continued, would be no more expensive than the present system with its "enormous indirect costs" and would, "without any disturbance" facilitate "such territorial extension as circumstances may hereafter render desirable."

J.C. Dent has noted that the movement for Canadian federation made little headway in Lower Canada as many oppositionists held aloof due to their antipathy for Brown. [48] Certainly the press reaction to the manifesto of 1859 was not likely to have whipped up much enthusiasm for the project. Even the Liberal papers were lukewarm. The Transcript judged the document worthy of attention [49] but the Herald thought it unwise for Lower Canadian politicians to try to anticipate the actions of an Upper Canadian convention. [50] Although sympathetic

to Upper Canada's grievances the Herald confessed to an "instinctive -- perhaps more instinctive than reasoning -- feeling against cutting up political bodies into small states." It preferred to await a formulation of the "now inchoate programme" of the Upper Canadian opposition before passing judgment. [51] The only Conservative journal to comment on the federation manifesto was the Quebec Morning Chronicle, which pronounced the difficulties attending so important a change so great that "neither the blustering threats of the Clear Grits in the West, nor the more temperate efforts of self-styled liberals in the East [would] be able to overcome them." The division of Canada "into federative states or provinces" would be "virtually a dissolution of the established union" and was again pronounced "retrograde." [52] The caucus of Lower Canadian Liberal M.P.s did not adopt the report of its leaders on federation. [53]

On November 9 Upper Canadian Liberals assembled in Toronto's St. Lawrence Hall for the convention which would define the party's official stand with regard to the Canadian union. It was obvious before the convention began that the main fight would be between those who favoured outright dissolution and those who did not. [54] Of the 520 delegates well over half (273) were from western and Niagara peninsula counties where agrarian interests, unconcerned about the St. Lawrence trading system, strongly favoured dissolution. [55] No dissolutionists could be found from the constituencies east of Toronto which were committed to St. Lawrence trade, but fewer than

70 delegates from eastern Upper Canada attended the convention.[56] John Sandfield Macdonald, the chief spokesman for the lower St. Lawrence region economically dependent upon Montreal, was conspicuously absent from the assembly.[57] George Brown's main concern was that the party and the province would split over dissolution, and his problem therefore was one of persuading both sides to accept the Rossin House plan for a Canadian federation as a compromise which would at once disentangle the affairs of the warring sections while preserving the commercial unity of the St. Lawrence.[58] According to George Sheppard Brown sought to ensure the success of his policies by "cooking" the convention in advance.[59] It was a fact that Brown managed to weight the convention's all-important twelve-man nominating committee with anti-dissolutionists. Brown, Oliver Mowat, and William McDougall, federationists all, were members, and men like Michael Foley, Malcolm Cameron, and Dr. Skeffington Connor could be counted upon to support federation as an alternative to more radical measures.[60] Grit radicals like David Christie who represented the largest component part of the convention were hopelessly outnumbered on committees.[61]

Following the organizational preliminaries the committee on resolutions, duly packed with federationists, proposed a series of resolutions remarkably similar to those drafted by George Brown for the Rossin House meeting of September 23.[62] The first pronounced the existing legislative union a failure;

the second rejected double majority; the third acknowledged that although some constitutional restraint on the power of the legislature and executive to borrow and spend money was necessary this would not provide a complete remedy for existing evils -- a considerable modification of the earlier demands for organic change. [63] The fourth resolution rejected British American federation as being unattainable for the moment, but the fifth proposed Canadian federation as a practicable preliminary step in this direction which would also solve immediate problems:

> That in the opinion of this assembly the best practicable remedy for the evils now encountered in the government of Canada is to be found in the formation of two or more local governments to which shall be committed the control of all matters of a local or [illegible] character and a general government charged with such matters as are necessarily common to both sections of the province. [64]

The last resolution reaffirmed that "no general government would be satisfactory to the people of Upper Canada which is not based on the principle of representation by population." [65]

Malcolm Cameron's keynote speech began by pointing up the need to maintain the unity of the St. Lawrence river system, [66] and, in espousing Canadian federation as a means of achieving this, Cameron shrewdly linked the narrow federation to the broader and more glorious vision of British American union: "All that we have to do is to lay down a platform on which, as in the United States, other territories may come into the confederation, and we shall then have the nucleus of an empire extending from

the Atlantic to the Pacific." [67] Explaining the resolutions, George Brown assured the assembly that they were consistent with the policy the Brown-Dorion ministry would have implemented had it remained in office. [68] He would favour a federation whose general government possessed only a few well-defined powers such as management of the public debt, canals, and public works, but, probably to avoid divisive debate on contentious practical issues, he maintained that the working out of the actual terms of union was a job for the people's representatives in parliament. [69] Thus the federationists successfully steered the convention through its first day.

On the second day of the proceedings George Sheppard emerged as the challenger of the federation policy: "So far the advocates of federation have had it all their own way. I appear here as the advocate of simple, unadulterated dissolution of the union. I think the time has come to say something on the other side." [70] Federation, he argued, would be unattainable because Lower Canada would not consent to it, especially if representation by population was a condition: "Are you to continue under this union because Lower Canada says you shall? I put it to the advocates of federation if dissolution is not their only alternative?" [71] Dissolution was less expensive: "We want economy of expenditure -- and we may have it!" [72] Sheppard was careful not to alienate sentiment favourable to British American union: "If you say you desire federation because it would be a great step to nationality then I am with

you -- but if it is to be a federation with a view to nationality let us have a federation of all the provinces as much more favourable to that nationality." [73] Sheppard's powerful speech aroused a formidable groundswell of opinion in favour of dissolution, and he preceded a second appeal with a motion to amend the resolution on federation with a proposal for "totally unqualified dissolution" instead. [74] Despite the fact that the first four resolutions had been passed unanimously the danger of an east-west party split over dissolution was now imminent. [75]

Sheppard's challenge was answered by William McDougall, another editorial writer for the Globe. [76] Seeking to head off a fatal vote on Sheppard's amendment McDougall countered with an amendment of his own which would replace the term "general government" with the more nebulous designation "some joint authority." [77] The federationist case was strengthened when the radical David Christie surprised everyone by coming out for the "federal principle in Canada" as "a step in the right direction ... to a federation of all the British North American Provinces first, and beyond that to the admission of other territories in the great North American confederacy," [78] and a well-timed and masterful speech by George Brown swung the convention decisively in favour of McDougall's amendment as one "affording room for an honourable compromise by all parties." [79] Sheppard's amendment was withdrawn and McDougall's

carried with only four dissenting votes. [80] But if federation had won out over dissolution as the official policy of the Upper Canadian Liberal party it had been necessary, in the interests of preserving party unity, to state the policy in exceedingly vague terms. [81] The expressions "federal" or "general government" did not appear in the Reform Convention resolutions, and, as the ministerial press was soon to point out, the designation "some joint authority" left a good many questions unanswered. The federal principle was indeed implicit in the resolutions but it was well camouflaged by the inoffensive verbiage which had served to placate the western dissolutionists.

If the ministerial press had been awaiting the outcome of the Reform Convention with some trepidation their anxieties were dispelled by the relatively mild issue of the great assembly. "A great humbug," scoffed the Montreal Gazette. The western men had favoured dissolution and the moderates were opposed; so, "not to break up, they agreed upon a term to substitute for Federal Government: to wit, 'some joint authority'.... What does the term mean? It is not explained." [82] Noting that Brown had, in effect, adopted the federation policy ofthe Lower Canadian Liberals the Gazette chided him with having become "exceedingly plastic" in his desire for reform unity and amity. "Have Mr. McGee and Mr. Holton mesmerized him, robbed him of his sting, or filed his teeth and claws?" [83] The Quebec Morning Chronicle played up the fact that many prominent Liberals had

either not attended the convention or had opposed its resolutions, [84] and the Pilot similarly questioned the right of "some five hundred Upper Canadians -- pledged followers of George Brown, and opponents of the Ministry," to purport to speak for all of Upper Canada. [85] The resolutions were mild, and could have been produced "without such a fuss," but the "proper place for discussing constitutional grievances and legislating for their reform," concluded the Pilot, was "the House of Assembly." [86]

The opposition journals of Lower Canada, though sympathetic to the profound sense of public indignation in Upper Canada which had inspired such a massive demonstration, were not overly enthusiastic about the recommendations which the convention had adopted: "And now we have the long-looked for Clear Grit panacea for all our political evils," announced the Quebec Gazette, "but we doubt very much whether the federative and other nostrums of the conventionists will have the desired curative effect." [87] The Montreal Herald agreed, doubting that "a dozen men of British descent" could be found in Lower Canada to support dissolution, "either in itself or as a preliminary to a federative Canada," of a union which, with all its political faults, had "so greatly conduced to the prosperity of both sections of the province and given United Canada a rank and position in the world which, as separate colonies of the Empire, she never could have attained." [88] The solution to Canada's problems, counselled the Herald, was not to be found in "crude and undigested" panaceas, but in the return of government to

the

the control of honest men. [89] When some six hundred leading citizens were willing, at their own cost, to leave their homes, in every part of the country, and meet in the capital to consult about "the gross and corrupt mal-administration of the government," this was proof, "strong as Holy writ, of the universality of the disgust that prevails in Upper Canada, created by the political dishonesty and corruption of the Macdonald-Cartier Cabinet, and the determination of the people to grudge no sacrifice by which their expulsion from office can be secured .... It is not by dissolution and reconstruction, but by wholesome regimen and healthy exercise, that the body-politic, any more than the body-natural, can be cured of its ailments." [90] The Herald predicted a resumption of the cry for representation by population with the hope that the Lower Canadian British, "the natural allies" of the Upper Canadians would "prove true to themselves rather than mere party interest" by supporting Upper Canada's just demands. If not, the Herald feared, Upper Canada might attempt a cure for existing evils "beyond the limits of the existing constitution." [91] Not anticipating the adoption of the Upper Canadian remedy by "any influential section of our own people, of either origin," and "by no means ready to advocate it," the Herald proposed henceforth to remain "quiescent" on the subject. [92]

Perhaps the best summary of the Reform Convention proceedings was given by the Montreal Transcript, now George Brown's staunchest supporter in Lower Canada. The Transcript

saw the most important immediate result as the "narrowing down within certain definite limits the constitutional changes alleged to be necessary for the future well-being of Canada." Having decided that change was necessary, "the next thing was to find out what remedy or remedies were best adapted to the circumstances of the country, and best-fitted to cure existing evils. Here, of course, there was considerable diversity of sentiment ...." [93]

> Some thought that a written constitution would act as an efficient check on the proclivities of men in power to extravagance and corruption; others favoured a dissolution pure and simple of the Union between the two Canadas, each Province being likely to manage its own affairs ... more economically ... than under the present system, which tempts Lower Canadian representatives to grab all they can for Lower Canada purposes, and Upper Canadian representatives to grab all they can for Upper Canada purposes -- each member of the partnership helping to bankrupt the common firm by a greedy appropriation to itself of all it can clutch out of the common purse. By another and more numerous class, the substitution of a Federative for the present Legislative Union was advocated as the most satisfactory remedy. A few urged a Federation of all the British American Provinces; and a small section of the Upper Canada Reformers were in favour of still continuing the struggle for Representation by Population, which had been given up by the leaders of the party as unattainable. [94]

The Transcript attached more weight to the resolutions of the Reform Convention than any other journal in Lower Canada. The convention, which was declared representative not only of the party but the people of Upper Canada, had served "to prepare the public mind for giving an intelligent decision on the whole of the questions raised." [95]

Upper Canada, after full deliberation, ... is pledged to

> Federation. The leaders of the Lower Canada Opposition have publicly pledged themselves to the same principle .... We can see, therefore, important changes looming in the not distant future. The discussion has become definite. It is no longer about constitutional changes in general, but about the special question whether the adoption of the Federative principle is likely to prove an efficient remedy for existing evils. Thus narrowed down, the discussion may be expected to be brought to a speedy issue. [96]

The next session of parliament, predicted the Transcript correctly, would decide the question. [97]

In preparation for the parliamentary session of 1860 the Reform Convention, in closing, had established a Constitutional Reform Association Central Committee entrusted with the task of drawing up and publicizing the new policy. [98] As the Globe stressed party unity and pressed federation George Brown, Oliver Mowat, William McDougall and John Scoble, one of the secretaries of the convention, began work on an address to the Upper Canadian electors. [99] On February 15 the mammoth Address made its appearance and was quickly circulated throughout the province, the Globe running it as a supplement consisting of 27 columns of finely worded print under heavy black headings which proclaimed: "Injustice to Upper Canada in Parliamentary Representation -- Upper Canada Pays Seventy Per Cent of the National Taxation -- Lower Canada Rules Upper Canada Even in Local Matters," culminating finally in "The True Remedy" -- the platform of the Reform Convention. [100] The Address, after supplying lengthy statistical documentation to substantiate its charges, concluded with the promise that the Convention plan would be brought before parliament, which was due to

convene on February 28.

There can be little doubt that the size of the Address militated against its effectiveness. Even the friendly Montreal Transcript boggled at the prospect of having to wade through the formidable document whose length was such that "publication in full in our columns is out of the question." [101] A cursory examination was sufficient to convince the Transcript that the Address contained "gross inaccuracy" with referenee to Lower Canada, but serious analysis was deferred -- permanently, as it turned out. The Quebec Morning Chronicle, now under the management of S.B. Foote, also shied perceptibly away from the Address, labelling it a "rehash of all the illogical arguments and unfounded or perverted statements, which have been re-iterated in the Globe, times without number." [102] Although the manifesto would do the party "no good", the Chronicle found it regrettable that "the circumstance of its being unreadable may lessen its self-damaging qualities." [103] Thus for a Lower Canadian interpretation of the Upper Canadian platform one was compelled to resort to the Pilot, whose proprietor's dislike for Brown overcame any disinclination to give the Address a thorough editorial examination even though the going-over pre-empted editorial space in four issues of the newspaper. The Pilot's consideration of the Address began on February 22 with a letter from one "Uncle Toby", who, having banned the Globe in his household for fear of "corrupting" his family, wondered

whether the Pilot would report on the Grit programme. Such a service was necessary, confided the correspondent, since it was "impossible that the political doctors of the Grit party will let their child die before birth, after the experience they have had of how Drs. Dessaulles, McGee, and Drummond strangled their pet in Lower Canada." Having been thus invited, the Pilot pitched into the Reform Association Address with a relish born of hostility:

> Being intended exclusively for the people of Upper Canada, [the Address] presents Lower Canada as always the oppressor -- Upper Canada the victim bound hand and foot, and dragged at the chariot wheels of the 'inferior race' .... To set down Lower Canada as a sort of political vampire that sucks the last drop of blood in the shape of money, offices, emoluments and such like from the sister Province, is unnatural and untrue. For the material interests of both sections are the same; and each have an equal advantage in increasing the prosperity, developing the resources, and adding to the wealth of the Province.[104]

Having dismissed the hypothesis of the Address the Pilot took issue with specific claims. The alleged "excess" of 400,000 population in Upper Canada's favour could not be authoritatively settled until the census of 1861. Even should the injustice exist, "great injustice was done to Lower Canada at the time of the Union, and since, by giving to the Upper Province equal representation; and it seems to us no great hardship for Mr. Brown and his friends to put up with the inconvenience a short while longer, until its positive existence is definitely ascertained."[105] Regarding the second major claim to the effect that "Upper Canada pays seventy percent of the national

taxation, while Lower Canada contributes thirty percent only," and the accompanying "exposition of the injustice to Upper Canada in the annual expenditures," the Pilot cautioned against the acceptance of Brown's figures, which were always "unreliable", and contented itself with the thought that even if Upper Canada "be paying more in the shape of taxes than is the Lower Province, it must be borne in mind from what a debt at the time of Union we rescued her." [106] The "Seigniorial Tenure Robbery -- as the Reform Association politely term it -- is represented as the most outrageous act of injustice ever perpetrated under the British flag." Had Mr. Brown forgotten his own pledges made to the Lower Canadian branch of his cabinet "when the two-days Ministry were in power?" [107] As the Address was too long to be published in the daily press, "or even to be read in one day," the Pilot returned to the attack on February 24 with a defense of the existing methods of public expenditure and sale of Provincial debentures. On February 27, the day before parliament was to assemble, the Pilot delivered its verdict:

> [This] manifests from the Globe office can only be looked at as a bad specimen of cunning special pleading; the grievances set forth in which all can be redressed under the constitution as it is, and would be redressed if the blind, bigotted, and factious hostility of the Clear Grits to everything in the shape of Reform that emanates from the present Government was at an end. This Address is one of the most wretched dishes of hotch-potch ever served up to a thinking and a reading public.

A final article was devoted to disposing of "the very unconstitutional" measures propounded by "Mr. Brown's Constitutional Reform Association, to make Canada a heaven upon Earth." [108]

These, in summary, consisted of the dissolution of the existing union followed by a subdivision of Canada into two or more provinces whose local legislatures would control "every local interest" subject to the sanction of the people "by direct vote," and the establishment of "some Central Authority over all" with clearly limited and defined powers to administer general matters -- the whole to be secured by a written constitution "ratified by the people, and incapable of alteration except by their formal sanction." [109]

> It will be noticed that the 'Joint Authority' -- the proper meaning of which term has caused so much speculation -- is again altered, but the phrase is still so ambiguous that people are as much in the dark as ever. The whole of the proposed changes has been over and over again discussed, and their inutility and their unfitness to subserve the ends proposed clearly proved. They do very well to humbug the readers of the Globe and the worshippers of its proprietor and editor-in-chief; to the public at large they are -- leather and prunella. [110]

With this the Pilot subsided to await the session.

George Brown wasted no time in announcing his intentions to the Canadian Assembly. Immediately after the Speech from the Throne he gave formal notice that he would move, as soon as possible, the first and fifth resolutions of the Reform Convention pronouncing the legislative union a failure and proposing its replacement by a federation under a joint authority. [111] The Quebec Morning Chronicle emphasized as usual the dissolutionist aspect of Brown's intentions:

> Even Mr. Brown .... could find no fault with the speech itself, and therefore ... rushed like a fool-hardy partizan to seize the bull by the horns at once; and gave notice

> that he would move a dissolution of the Union between Upper and Lower Canada. Does Mr. Brown imagine that he comes here to frighten the inhabitants of Lower Canada with his bug-bear of dissolution. He may rest assured that there is hardly an individual in Lower Canada, who is not fully convinced that the Western section of the Province would suffer much more severely by a dissolution than the eastern; and that indeed the eastern section might feel relieved at the separation. [112]

Brown's precipitate action brought to the surface a rift in the Reform party which the convention had not completely closed and which now widened to threaten party unity and Brown's leadership. The principal malcontents were not the extremists, though George Sheppard bitterly attacked the joint authority resolutions through the columns of the Hamilton Spectator, but men from the moderate wing of the party. [113] John Sandfield Macdonald, who had not attended the convention, did not consider himself bound to support its resolutions, and moderates like Foley and Connor who had endorsed federation at the convention had done so reluctantly as a means of staving off the more radical drive for outright dissolution. [114] Brown was attacked in the party caucus for having proceeded without authorization, [115] and rumours of a "tremendous burst up" in the Reform party leaked into the ministerial press. [116] "Is George Brown", wondered the Pilot, "really to be the bête noir of the Opposition -- to pull down his party as effectually as ever he built it up?" [117] As tension heightened within the Reform caucus the Pilot and the Quebec Morning Chronicle detected a movement to substitute Sicotte or Foley for Brown as Liberal house leader, [118] and gleefully

reported that Brown had placed his resignation in the hands of his party. [119] Brown's threat to resign succeeded in staving off any immediate challenge to his leadership. [120] but the disarray of the Liberal party in the House was fatal. Michael Foley rashly moved a vote of no confidence in the government which, "having taken the wind out of the sails of his leader," [121] was defeated in both sections on March 26. [122] The fate of Brown's joint authority resolutions was now a foregone conclusion. For Brown to proceed with his resolutions now would be "in wretched bad taste," confided the Pilot, "but as claptrap and effect is all that the honourable gentleman seems to care about, we fear this second infliction will not be spared." [123] The Pilot made no attempt to conceal its elation at Brown's discomfiture:

> The present defeat of the Opposition is a very serious one, and if they had fifty lives ought to kill them off. Alas, poor Brown! 'Where are your gibes now? your gambols? your songs? your flashes of merriment, that were wont to set the House in a roar?' ... [124] Like Actaeon [Brown] is now being torn to pieces by his own dogs. [125] We protest against this cruelty once and for all ....

Sensing an imminent defeat of Brown's joint authority resolutions the Quebec Morning Chronicle attempted to revive public interest in the all-but-forgotten government policy of British American federal union:

> When the proper time arrives, both sections of the Province may no doubt cordially unite in some comprehensive measure which, with the consent of the Imperial authorities, and the cooperation of the other Colonial Governments, will embrace in a well-considered Federative scheme the whole of the Maritime Provinces. In working out such a scheme, time will be needed, not less than statesmanship. And what, above all, will be needed is temperate discussion, in place of party bluster;

> and an earnest desire for the public good, in place of a frantic struggle for office. [126]

Party upheaval had forced Brown to postpone the introduction of his resolutions from March 5 to April 16. [127] When failing health compelled Brown to seek a second postponement [128] the Quebec Morning Chronicle was not charitable in its consideration of the renewed delay: "[It] looks to us and must look in the eyes of the country very much like backing out. Cowardice is a strong word, and not particularly pleasant, but it will be applied to these repeated delays .... " [129] The Pilot gave an interpretation of Brown's "suspicious" illness which was a sort of testimonial to the political power of the press:

> That outside pressure which Mr. Brown, through the Globe, for so long has brought to bear against all who differ with him -- friends as well as foes -- is now recoiling upon himself. The dread of the black capitals has fled. The fear of being posted in the Globe -- even of being denounced as a traitor to the cause, or excommunicated as a deserter from the party, has vanished. Mr.George Brown, though he has the Globe at his back, is powerless; and he knows and feels it .... No wonder then, that Mr. Brown is ill. Hope deferred, it is said, maketh the heart sick. [130]

Any "opportune" illness to Brown at this stage, concluded the Pilot, was almost "providentially" calculated to "save him from open defeat, degredation, and disgrace." [131] Nor was this the last delay, [132] and on April 25, after publicizing charges which Michael Foley later made before the House -- that the Reform Convention had been mockery of democracy, a "farce" packed and manipulated by Brown, McDougall, and the Toronto Grits -- the Pilot advised Brown to give up not only the convention resolutions

but "his pretensions to the leadership of the Opposition as well." [133] Things indeed could hardly have gone worse for Brown but he still refused to back down. On the evening of April 30 the embattled Upper Canadian leader rose inexorably to speak to his much-maligned and long-awaited resolutions. [134]

The only Lower Canadian newspapers to cover the proceedings with interest were again the Pilot and the Quebec Morning Chronicle, who, having systematically harassed Brown throughout the session, now closed in for the kill. Brown's speech, reported the Pilot, was "wanting alike in freshness and novelty."

> [The] grievances complained of are all old ones; and upon that we may well congratulate ourselves. Lord Durham's report was largely quoted from to show that the difficulties in the working of our present system of Government had been forseen. Upper Canada was shown to be an oppressed, down-trodden, persecuted part of the Province, over whose condition we should sit down and weep. Her larger population than Lower Canada was insisted upon; her greater contribution to the revenue pointed out; her larger exports set forth with an unction the Clear-Grit Chief rarely exhibits; and her being ruled by a Lower Canada majority, and her interests sacrificed to this Section of the Province, was painted in most glowing terms. Notwithstanding [what] Mr. Brown held and wrote a few years ago ... he holds now that Responsible Government is entirely inapplicable to this country .... There were no such checks to the undue exercise of power here as in England, and our Executive were impotent to resist the demands made upon them by supporters upon whose vote their existence depended. The Legislative Council did not represent the Lords, and merely retarded the bills of the Assembly .... He asked for Upper Canada the control of her own affairs, and this he declared was the only remedy for the anomalous and very unsatisfactory state of things at present existing. [135]

Reminding its readers that "other people" failed to see Brown's list of grievances "through the same spectacles," and that perfection in constitutional government was lacking even in England, the Pilot preferred to "bear the ills we have than

fly to those we know not of." Sandfield Macdonald was cited as a believer in the possibility of an "honest, upright, high-principled Government" under the "constitution as it is." Perhaps it was best that Brown had persisted with his resolutions as they were certain to incur a defeat "which will still the agitation, and set it at rest for ever." [136]

In the ensuing debate Dorion and Mowat endorsed Canadian federation and McDougall spoke well in its favour, [137] but the most eloquent appeal came from D'Arcy McGee. Dissolution, he agreed, was a retrograde step: "But because I am a unionist, must I, therefore, be for this Act of Union and for no other?" [138] It was no longer possible to stand by "Sydenham's union" which had been "frittered away, year by year, by Imperial legislation and by Provincial legislation, till it now hangs in tatters upon the expanding frame of this colony. Of its sixty-two clauses, no less than thirty have been repealed by statute within the last ten years!" [139] Its evil intent, that of "swamping the French," had been defeated, and the present state of things was intolerable for much longer. Having justified his support for Canadian federation McGee proceeded typically to expand the vision: "But the best and most desirable thing, to my mind, is the Federal Union of all the North American colonies." [140] British American federation would bring commercial unity to the colonies and provide greater security than a mere customs union like the German Zollverein; it was imperative "unless we are to

look forward to annexation to the United States; the "tendencies of our times are all in favour of such Unions" and the obstacles were by no means insurmountable. Canadians must look forward to their future as "a Northern nation": [141]

> I look to the future of my adopted country with hope, though not without anxiety; I see in the not remote distance, one great nationality bound like the shield of Achilles, by the blue rim of ocean — I see it quartered into many communities -- each disposing of its internal affairs but all bound together by free institutions, free intercourse, and free commerce; I see within the round of that shield, the peaks of Western mountains, and the crests of Eastern waves -- the winding Assiniboine, the five-fold lakes, the St. Lawrence, the Ottawa, the Saguenay, the St. John, and the Basin of Minas -- by all these flowing waters, in all the valleys they fertilize, in all the cities they visit in their courses, I see a generation of industrious, contented, moral men, free in name and in fact -- men capable of maintaining, in peace and in war, a constitution worthy of such a country.

McGee, noted the Quebec Morning Chronicle, had decided to fall back on "Mr. Galt's proposition of federative union of all the Provinces as the best excuse he could offer "for siding with Brown. [142]

George Benjamin of North Hastings, past Grand Master of the Orange Lodge, replied on behalf of the ministry to the proposals of Brown and his supporters. [143] Although his address was somewhat marred by the fact that he lost his temper in the flush of his eloquence and deviated into an irrelevant tirade against the Rebellion Losses Bill and Lord Elgin, the Pilot was content that he had "utterly and completely demolished the arguments of Mr. Brown." [144] Repeal of the union, he had argued, would throw Upper Canada under American domination. The incon-

sistency of Brown's political creeds over the years was denounced. Why had Brown abandoned his platform on representation by population and separate schools since the formation of the short ministry? Brown had once supported Baldwin but had driven that gentleman to his grave by attacks in the Globe upon finding that he could not dominate the party. "Joint Authority" was dismissed as "a contemptible and more than juggling phrase" -- an "invention to avoid creating the impression of increased expense -- yet exhibiting the strongest ignorance." Brown's doctrines would foster a "republicanism" hostile to British institutions. The Toronto Convention was a "dodge" and its resolutions "the most arrant humbug ever foisted on the public." Benjamin concluded by lauding the benefits of the present union and by moving the previous question in order to preclude any amendments. [145]

The votes taken on the Reform resolutions May 7 settled the matter in no uncertain terms: 66 to 27 against dissolution of the present union; 74 to 32 against federation under some joint authority. [146] There was some consolation for the Reform press in the fact that Brown managed to retain an Upper Canadian majority on both resolutions, [147] but the pro-ministerial press, noting that the "disunionists" were confined to "but a small portion of the United Province," maintained that "it must require no small amount of assurance for a party so small numerically and geographically to dictate a constitution to the remainder of the Province." [148] While the Reform journals were

edified that, despite the "much-talked-of split in the Upper Canada party," Conner and Foley and all but three of the maverick Reformers had voted with Brown in the end, [149] the ministerialists played up the paucity of support the resolutions had received from Lower Canada:

> The discussion of the Constitutional question has had its day; and poor Mr. Brown, must now be satisfied to his hearts content. When the division was taken on his second resolution, what a falling off was there .... and with only Dorion, Drummond, McGee, and Papineau in the Lower Province, giving their sweet voices in favour of this joint authority scheme, how could he ever have had the face to push it forward, or the madness to believe it could be carried? Will the reception it has met with cool Mr. Brown down; or will he persist in his factious efforts to agitate and annoy? [150]

The Quebec Morning Chronicle was jubilant. The vote was seen as a decisive repudiation of the "premature" agitation for dissolution and federation. In spite of the "lofty tumbling" and "seedy recantations" of Conner, Foley, and others the vote was so overwhelming that "no friend of the Union has anything to regret." [151]

> Central Canada, as far west as Hastings, goes to a man against the insane scheme of division. Four members out of sixty five from Lower Canada ... come to the call of their Upper Canada chief; the rest take the side of the present constitution. One fourth of the whole House goes for a rupture ... the remainder adhere to the Union .... " [152]

But the editors of the Montreal Gazette, like most in Lower Canada, had become bored by the protracted issue:

> We grudge it the space it occupies. But, it is a debate in the Parliament of Canada on a constitutional question, and, if people have no curiosity to read it, it is still the custom to give them the opportunity. For our part, we have

> little desire to go seriously into the argument again at present. It has scarcely had time enough to cool since the last discussion in which it was worn fairly thread bare. We like a little variety in our intellectual food. [153]

The opposition journals also abstained from anything more than a perfunctory involvement in the matter. The Herald, having disassociated itself from the federation policy from the outset, remained "quiescent" as promised; the Transcript, disgusted at the spectacle of the Upper Canadian Liberals' "unseemly squabbling" amongst themselves in public, [154] toned down its editorial support of that party for the time being; the Witness gave no notice to the subject of Canadian federation whatever. The True Witness took the occasion only to reiterate its rigid stand that any disruption of the existing union was "fraught with danger" for Catholics. [155] Only the Quebec Mercury developed an original line of thought on the constitutional issue. Suspicious of Brown's plan to expand Canada westward but not eastward the Mercury came to some ingenious conclusions. Brown's resolutions for organic changes were nothing but the manifestation of an Upper Canadian conspiracy to carry her "favourite and monstrous crime of land speculations into an immense wilderness, as yet perhaps almost unpolluted by the presence of the land shark," to secure "such an accession of territory as shall enable her ... to domineer the mouth of the St. Lawrence to the ruin at once of the river and inland carrying trade, and the deep sea commerce of Lower Canada." [156] Brown's speech on the joint authority resolutions convinced the

Mercury that his motive was not solely hostility to the French Canadian race nor the Roman Catholic Church. Brown was also hostile to "British commerce in Lower Canada;"

> Again, no more ports were to be created in Lower Canada, no closer relations were to be entered into either for traffic or defence with the mother country, the fullest free trade principles were correct, and the Reciprocity Treaty was more especially precious in the eyes of Upper Canada .... What do these things mean, except a Canadian confederation in which the Upper Province shall be all dominant, that the Lower Provinces shall be kept out of the confederation in order that the maritime interest of Canada shall be utterly sacrificed to the domination of the men of the Western wilds, who shall determine what amount of British trade crosses the Atlantic; whether the St. Lawrence or an American canal shall be preferred for communication ... and that the men of the seaboard shall be excluded ... in order that British Lower Canadian commerce, and the entire Provincial revenue derived therefrom may be sacrificed to the greed and ambition of the West.[157]

Brown's propositions, embodying "the threat of vengeance against the British of Lower Canada," amounted to this: "We will ruin the deep sea commerce in order to carry on a frontier trade with the Americans, and we will by our Western majority force the [French Canadian] agriculturalists of Lower Canada to submit to direct taxation as their only means of raising a revenue for any purpose whatever .... "[158] Since all efforts to achieve British American federal union had proved to no avail the Mercury fashioned yet another scheme designed to protect the commerce and nationality of the British Lower Canadians who, "being separated by natural boundaries and separate interests from Upper Canada and being philologically distinct from the other inhabitants of Lower Canada, and being almost the sole depositories

of its commercial wealth, are in fact a nation."

> 1st. Dissolution of the Union.
> 2nd. A new and original constitution of Lower Canada, based entirely on her exceptional circumstances, and of which equality of representation between the French and the English language would be the basis. That is to say, LET THE CANADAS BE AS COMPLETELY SEPARATED AS THEY WERE BEFORE THE UNION ACT, AND LET THE LOWER CANADIANS BE REPRESENTED AMONGST THEMSELVES EQUALLY BY THEIR TWO NATIONAL LANGUAGES WITHOUT REGARD TO DISPARITY OF NUMBERS. [159]

Two days before the vote on Brown's resolutions the Mercury concluded its agitation with the admonition that "if all that remained to the British of Lower Canada were a choice of masters, the last master they would choose is Upper Canada." [160] With the defeat of Brown's resolutions the Mercury gave up its own campaign for constitutional change.

The defeat of the Reform Convention resolutions during the parliamentary session of 1860 marks, in a subtle way, the termination of that phase of the Confederation movement which Dorion had inaugurated in 1856. In the intervening period both major parties had adopted and tested a policy based on the federal principle without success. The Montreal Herald, in summarizing the results of the session of 1860, pronounced upon the removal of the issue of federal union from practical politics:

> [The] leaders of the party now in the ascendancy, who two years ago reconstructed their Ministry on the basis of Mr. Galt's declarations in Parliament, that some change of an organic nature was required, have now made an opposite statement. They who lately avowed it a part of their policy henceforth to labour for the formation of a confederacy of the whole of the British North American Provinces, have now not only ceased to move toward the promotion of their own remedy for evils which they officially recognized as grave and imminent, but they have voted against a recognition of

> the same ills as requiring redress .... [During] the present session the same Parliament, under the same leadership, which informed to Imperial authorities that some great change was required, and who sent home able negotiators to urge that change, have now authoritatively informed us that we live in the best possible world, where any change would be for the worse, and where it is a pious and patriotic duty to keep things just as they are. Of course the different projects of the Upper Canadian minority have been voted down. [161]

The session had, in fact, immeasurably strengthened the position of the ministry. [162] Cartier and Macdonald were able, for the time being, to cope with the renewed demands for outright dissolution in the West, [163] and, with the approach of the 1861 census, with the revival of the cry for representation by population, [164] without considering the necessity of federal union. The ministerial press, to be sure, utilized the government's past association with the grand scheme of British American union whenever it was desirable to score debating points on the opposition with regard to the government's record or its ability to come up with constructive policies for the alleviation of sectional discord. [165] The Transcript noticed this "fashion" among the ministerial journals and pronounced it insincere: the issue was being revived, "not with any definite expectation of success, but to give the impression that something is intended to be done." [166] Nor was public opinion in the Maritimes judged favourable:

> Now, we do not wish to express an opinion against what appears to be the 'Manifest Destiny' of this portion of the British dominions; but there must be two consenting parties to a contract; and the other North American provinces are by no means disposed to be united with us, with our heavy debt, our extravagant expenditure, our corrupt system

> of government with its (omnibus) bills -- its pampering one section of the country to the detriment and at the expense of the other -- its fostering of nationalities and sectional prejudices .... If the marriage were proclaimed, the people would with one voice at present forbid the bans.[167]

When, in conjunction with John A. Macdonald's speaking tour of Upper Canada in the fall of 1860, the Quebec Morning Chronicle alluded to "Federation" as the "Great Question of the Hour" which "can only be carried by a Conservative Government,"[168] the Transcript again attempted to cut such claims down to their proper size:

> Humbug! -- The Quebec Chronicle says 'Federation is the great question of the hour,' when not a human being troubles himself about the question. No province has declared itself in favour of Federation. The Canadian Parliament has not uttered a voice in its favour, and when Canadian Ministers gave an obiter dictum in favour of a scheme, resting on their own incapacity to carry out the government of this country, not a single Province of British North America responded to the call. Canada, with such a government as it now possesses, ... offers no inducements for its alliance. Not a single North American Province would vote for it.[169]

The Chronicle pushed ahead undismayed: "The more certain it becomes that the present Administration is to be sustained by the country in their Conservative policy of Federation, as opposed to Dissolution, the more virulent becomes the temper of the Opposition."[170] But the government did not reincorporate federal union into its platform. During December there were rumours that the Duke of Newcastle had become a convert to the idea of colonial federation during his North American tour with the Prince of Wales and planned to do something about it,[171] but nothing concrete was forthcoming. Indeed many Conservatives began to adopt representation by population instead, as that

issue again became paramount during the session of 1861.[172] Others, including George E. Cartier, who believed in the retention of the existing system, began to draw closer to John Sandfield Macdonald and the double majority system which he had never ceased expounding.[173] Nor did the Reformers make any attempt to resurrect their discredited plan for a Canadian federation, and McDougall went so far as to hint to the House that Upper Canada might be compelled "to look to Washington" for relief.[174] The exhaustion on both sides of the initiative for federal union and the absence of any new palliative for the Canadian problem made at least a temporary return to one or other of the old devices almost inevitable, and an attempt was made by Sandfield Macdonald and L.V. Sicotte to reconstitute the government according to the hackneyed double majority principle during 1862.[175] By March of 1861 the Chronicle, which had campaigned hard for federal union throughout the preceding seven months, was becoming disillusioned over the government's failure to initiate any positive action:

> What has been done? ... Sooner or later a confederation must come, if British power and British interests are to be maintained in this portion of the North American continent. We should like to know what has been done, that we may shape our future course accordingly.[176]

The issue was not really dead, but it had become impolitic. A new combination of circumstances would be required to bring federal union to the forefront of Canadian politics again.

NOTES TO CHAPTER I

[1]W.L. Morton, The Critical Years: The Union of British North America, 1857-1873 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), p. 1.

[2]E. McInnis, Canada: A Political and Social History (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin & Co., 1959) p. 3.

[3]Morton, pp. 2-3.

[4]Census of Canada, 1851-52, 1, 36; 104: Census of Canada, 1861-62, 1, 42; 78.

[5]Although Upper and Lower Canada ceased to exist as constitutional entities in 1841 the old nomenclature continued to be applied to the western and eastern sections of the united province until Confederation. Editors and politicians continued to refer to the sections as "provinces". This is in itself a commentary on the failure of the Union Act. The terms Upper Canada and Lower Canada are used in this study as by contemporaries -- ie. interchangeably with the designations Canada West and Canada East respectively.

[6]Census, 1861-62, 1, 78.

[7]Professor Morton points out that, although the older families maintained their social prominence, nearly all Upper Canada's political leaders of the 1850's and '60's were of British extraction: Morton, p. 2.

[8]J. Langdon, The Census of 1861 (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1864), p. 11.

[9]Morton, p. 3.

[10]All ensuing figures and computations involving population for 1851 are based upon the census abstract, Census, 1851-52, 1, 104. Those for 1861 are based upon the census abstract for that year: Census, 1861-62, 1, 42-43.

[11]Montreal Witness, February 14, 1857.

[12]Langdon, p. 11.

[13]Witness, February 14, 1857.

[14]For a breakdown on the basis of religion, see Census 1861-62, 1, 122.

[15]I. Skelton, The Life of Thomas D'Arcy McGee (Garden City: Gardenvale, 1925), p. 325.

[16]True Witness and Catholic Chronicle, January 22, 1858.

[17]I. Skelton, pp. 325-326.

[18]See I. Skelton, pp. 325-331.

[19]P.B. Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864-1867 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1962), p. 134. See also W. M. Whitelaw, The Maritimes and Canada Before Confederation (Toronto: Oxford University, 1934), p. 69. For a directory of commercial establishments in Montreal, see Commercial Sketch of Montreal and Its Superiority as a Wholesale Market (Montreal, 1868).

[20]Waite, pp. 134-135. Also of interest are the obituary articles on John Molson and Peter McGill in Montreal Gazette, July 14, 1860 and September 29, 1860 respectively. For information about the Montreal Ocean Steamship Line (Allan Line), see H. Y. Hind, Eighty Years of Progress (Toronto: L. Stebbins, 1863), p. 143.

[21]D. Creighton, The Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), p. 380.

[22]For an enlightening inside account of the backstage manoeuvres which preceded the Cayley tariff of 1858, see W. Weir, Sixty Years in Canada (Montreal: John Lovell, 1903), pp. 100-116.

[23]Quebec Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[24]Timber to the value of $10,000,000 was shipped out of Quebec during 1863: C. M. Day (Mrs.), History of the Eastern Townships (Montreal: John Lovell, 1869), p. 115. Mazo de la Roche says that there were 25 shipyards and eight floating docks in Quebec in 1852, and that 55 large vessels were constructed there during 1855: M. de la Roche, Quebec: Historic Seaport (New York: Doubleday, 1944), pp. 187-188.

[25]Waite, p. 134.

[26]Morton, p. 2.

[27]For a sampling of anti-Montreal editorializing, see Quebec Morning Chronicle, October 5, 1860; November 5, 1860; November 28, 1860; December 8, 1860; March 2, 1861; March 4, 1861.

[28]Chronicle, November 5, 1860.

[29]The Allan Line: See Hind, p. 143.

[30]Chronicle, October 5, 1860.

[31]Chronicle, November 5, 1860.

[32]Mercury, December 13, 1860. Quebec's shipbuilding industry was also curtailed after 1855 by the rapid depletion of tamarack stands in the province -- a consequence of the Reciprocity Treaty, which allowed Canadian timber free entry to the American market. Quebec spruce, the best available substitute, was apparently inferior to the fog-nurtured spruce of the Bay of Fundy: de la Roche, pp. 187-188.

[33]Encyclopedia Canadiana (Ottawa: Grolier, 1962), 111, 329.

[34]The designation "Eastern" had nothing to do with the location of the townships relative to Montreal or the Richilieu River as is commonly supposed. It was applied to differentiate the townships south of the St. Lawrence from the Western Townships along the Upper Ottawa. By this criterion the counties south of the St. Lawrence and west of the Richilieu also qualify as Eastern Townships counties since Beauharnois and Chateauguay contained surveyed townships in addition to seignierial land while Huntingdon was a township county from its inception. Contemporaries apparently considered them thus. They are included as Eastern Townships in the Eastern Townships Gazetteer and General Business Directory (St. Johns: Smith and Co., 1867). To avoid confusion, however, this paper will respect the now-generally-accepted boundaries of the Eastern Townships. For the origin of the title "Eastern Townships" see O. D. Skelton, The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Tilloch Galt (Toronto: Oxford University, 1920), p. 34. For evidence of confusion among the people of the Townships as to what constitutes the region, see J. I. Hunter, The French Invasion of the Eastern Townships (unpublished M. A. thesis, McGill University, 1939), pp. 2-4.

[35]See O. D. Skelton, pp. 39-51.

[36]O. D. Skelton, p. 51.

[37]Morton, p. 4.

[38]Hunter, p. 36.

[39]It should be noted that county boundaries did not necessarily coincide with township boundaries. Drummond and Arthabaska counties, for example, embraced seigniorial lands lying beyond the region of the Eastern Townships. This made for greater French Canadian population totals in these counties.

[40]Day, p. 293.

[41]Encyclopedia Canadiana, IX, 396; III, 67.

[42]Day, p. 419.

[43]Witness, February 14, 1857. For evidence of the exodus, see Hunter, p. 39.

[44]Witness, February 14, 1857.

[45]See Stanstead Journal, April 23, 1857. The Journal defined "the West" simply as "territory about and beyond the Great Lakes".

[46]Stanstead Journal, April 23, 1857. See also the article "Don't 'Go West' in Canada" describing the horrendous difficulties awaiting the hapless Western migrant: Sherbrooke Gazette, November 20, 1858.

[47]Witness, February 14, 1857.

[48]Richmond, the junction of the Montreal, Portland, and Quebec lines of the Grand Trunk, was considered to be Sherbrooke's main rival at the time: H. H. Miles, "The Eastern Townships of Lower Canada", Toronto University Commission Report, 1862 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1862), p. 45.

[49]O. D. Skelton, p. 38.

[50]For a map showing the extent of Canadian railway development in 1860, see O. D. Skelton, p. 80. The Grand Trunk ran from Sarnia to Montreal via the North Shore, crossed the St. Lawrence by the Victoria Bridge, and proceeded across the Eastern Townships to Richmond where it divided into two branches. The north branch touched the South Shore across the river from Quebec and extended to Riviere du Loup. The south branch ran through Sherbrooke, Waterville, and proceeded to Portland. Portland was described by H. H. Miles as "virtually a Canadian sea-port": Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, p. 36.

[51]The first grist mill was established at Sherbrooke in 1794, closely followed by a carding and clothing works, a sawmill, an axe factory, a tannery, and a shoemaking shop: Day, pp. 370-371.

[52]Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, p. 41.

[53]Day, pp. 237-238.

[54]See G. McAleer, Reminiscient and Otherwise: Life in the Eastern Townships of the Province of Canada Fifty Years Ago (Worcester, 1901), p. 5; p. 10. See also Hunter, p. 7; p. 36.

[55]Morton, p. 4.

[56]Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, pp. 51-52.

[57]Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, pp. 51-52.

[58]Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, p. 51.

[59]Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, p. 51.

[60]Stanstead Journal, February 5, 1857.

[61]Stanstead Journal, February 5, 1857. Contrast this estimate of the Reciprocity Treaty with the one in Quebec Mercury, December 13, 1860.

[62]Galt, a former commissioner for the British North American Land Company and promoter of the Grand Trunk Railway, had large interests in lands and railways centering in Montreal (Whitelaw, p. 123). Representing Sherbrooke in parliament, he became the chief spokesman for the English minority of Lower Canada in the Cartier-Macdonald ministry (Waite, p. 135). As Finance Minister he legislated in favour of railway and river development and protective tariffs.

[63]Creighton, Commercial Empire..., p. 382.

[64]Gazette, April 17, 1858; February 15, 1860.

[65]The ratios of English to French-speaking population in these counties were as follows in 1861: Huntingdon,

13,431 to 4,060; Chateauguay, 5,548 to 12,289; Beauharnois, 1,589 to 14,153; Pontiac, 11,096 to 2,161; Argenteuil, 10,116 to 2,781; Ottawa county, 13,400 to 14,357; Gaspe, 5,308 to 8,769; Bonaventure, 5,853 to 7,239. Thus only Huntingdon county in the Chateauguay basin and Pontiac and Argenteuil counties on the lower Ottawa contained English speaking majorities.

[66]D.E. Papineau represented Ottawa county; E. Heath, Pontiac; S. Bellingham, Argenteuil; J. LeBoutillier, Gaspé; J. Meagher, Bonaventure; H. Starnes, Chateauguay; R.B. Somerville, Huntingdon: P.G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada, 1841-67 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1963) p. 48.

[67]Canadian Library Association, Canadian Newspapers on Microfilm, notes on Canadian Gleaner.

[68]Sellar, a vigorous spokesman for the rights of the Protestant farmers of rural Quebec before and after Confederation, made "the expulsion of the Protestant farmer" the subject of an important book. Though somewhat over-inclined to see in the extension of the French Roman Catholic parish system an overt clerical plot to dispossess the British farmer, Sellar manages to delineate, in a most convincing manner, the problems, fears, and attitudes of the English-speaking farmer during the "invasion" of township lands by the "priest power". See R. Sellar, The Tragedy of Quebec (Toronto: Ontario Press, 1910), pp. 165-167.

[69]Cornell, p. 76.

[70]Whitelaw, p. 69.

[71]F.H. Underhill, "The Development of National Political Parties in Canada", Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 373.

[72]Sellar, p. 165.

[73]D. Creighton, John A. Macdonald: The Young Politician (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), p. 226.

NOTES TO CHAPTER II

[1]F. Landon, "The Common Man in the Era of the Rebellion in Upper Canada", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1937, pp. 77-79.

[2]J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe: The Voice of Upper Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), p. 46.

[3]For a newspaper report on the cable, see Montreal Pilot, August 5, 1858.

[4]Canadian Press Association (ed.), A History of Canadian Journalism (Toronto, 1908), p. 8.

[5]C. P. A. (ed.), p. 1. The only Lower Canadian journals represented at the outset were the Montreal Echo (Anglican), by Thomas Sellar, and the Montreal Gazette, by John Lowe. See the Gazette's cautious approach to the notion of a press association: Montreal Gazette. February 6, 1860.

[6]Fred Landon reveals, for example, that 42 of the 62 signatures on the notice calling for the 1859 Reform Convention were those of editors, while at least 28 of the actual delegates to the convention were editors: F. Landon, Western Ontario and the American Frontier (Toronto: Ryerson, 1941), p. 245.

[7]Hincks' organ until 1849 was the Pilot; Cartier's was La Minerve: Wallace (ed.), p. 10: Waite, p. 9.

[8]J.C. Dent, Canada Since the Union of 1841 (Toronto: George Virtue, n. d.), II, 587.

[9]L.M. Salmon, The Newspaper and the Historian (Oxford, 1923), p. Xl: J. B. Chaney, "The Historical Value of Newspapers," Minnesota Historical Society Collections, 1895-'96 (St. Paul, 1896), VIII, 110.

[10]G.B. Dibblee, The Newspaper (London: London & Norwich, n.d.), p. 107.

[11]Salmon, pp. 259-262.

[12]Salmon, p. 259.

[13]Salmon, p. 41: Waite, p. 5.

[14]Salmon, p. 31.

[15]Salmon, p. 58.

[16]See Montreal Gazette, May 29, 1860, on the advantages of anonymity.

[17]Dibblee, pp. 103-104.

[18]Careless, p. 331.

[19]Salmon, p. 252.

[20]The Constitutional Act of 1791 fixed the franchise for male British subjects aged 21 and over at a free hold of 40

shillings annual value in rural ridings and ownership or occupancy of house or grounds worth £5 or £10 per annum in urban ridings until 1856, when an assessment franchise was introduced. Though the franchise was not universal the real restrictions on its exercise were not those of property but the remoteness of the rural polls and the danger of physical violence at some of the urban ones. See Careless, p. 246: Encyclopedia Canadiana, IV, 248: W.L. Morton, "The Extension of the Franchise in Canada", Candaian Historical Association Report, 1943, p. 73.

[21]Waite, p. 5.

[22]Salmon, p. 451.

[23]Public Archives of Canada, Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, March 17, 1858.

[24]Witness, November 4, 1857.

[25]Witness, March 7, 1857.

[26]See Witness, January 10, 1857; January 17, 1857; February 25, 1857; March 7, 1857; May 9, 1857; November 4, 1857.

[27]True Witness, January 22, 1858.

[28]True Witness, July 9, 1858.

[29]The most subtle insertion in this regard was the extract from Printer's Cabinet in the Stanstead Journal, November 26, 1857.

[30]Sherbrooke Gazette, February 5, 1859: Stanstead Journal, February 16, 1860: True Witness, July 9, 1858: Witness, January 10, 1857.

[31]Pilot, January 29, 1859: True Witness, January 15, 1858.

[32]Montreal Gazette, July 2, 1859: Pilot, January 29, 1859.

[33]For ten dollars nine subscriptions would be delivered (a profit of about $3.40 for the agent): Eastern Townships Gazette, May 2, 1856.

[34]Sherbrooke Gazette, February 5, 1859.

[35]See Sherbrooke Gazette, November 20, 1858.

[36]The seven journals known to exist in the Eastern Township suring 1858 were the Sherbrooke Gazette and Canadian

Times (Sherbrooke), the Eastern Townships Gazette and Shefford County Advertiser (Granby), the Richmond Advocate (Richmond), the Stanstead Journal (Rock Island), Frontier Sentinel (?), and the Brome Advertiser (Knowlton). The Brome Advertiser was edited at this time by L.S. Huntingdon, M.P.P. for Shefford from 1861 until 1882.

[37]Sherbrooke Gazette, November 20, 1858.

[38]The True Witness also editorialized against "dirty advertising": True Witness, February 26, 1858.

[39]A. Hayward, "The Advertising System", Edinburgh Review, February 1843, 77, pp. 1-43.

[40]F.W. Scott, Newspapers and Periodicals in Illinois, 1815-1879, pp. xxxvii - xl, cited by Salmon, p. 90.

[41]Waite, p. 9.

[42]E. Porritt, "The Value of Political Editorials," Atlantic Monthly, 1910, 105, pp. 62-67.

[43]Montreal Weekly Herald, May 14, 1859. For a table showing the committee's findings, see Weekly Herald, July 21, 1860.

[44]Beaty, a prosperous leather merchant, founded the Leader, in July of 1853. It was originally a Hincksite Reform paper: Careless, p. 176.

[45]Weekly Herald, May 14, 1859. The Herald elaborated upon the case a second time: Weekly Herald, April 14, 1860. The Montreal Transcript also reported this case: Transcript, May 9, 1859.

[46]Weekly Herald, April 14, 1860.

[47]The debate is reported in Weekly Herald, May 5, 1860.

[48]Weekly Herald, May 5, 1860.

[49]Weekly Herald, May 12, 1860.

[50]Weekly Herald, May 5, 1860.

[51]Weekly Herald, May 12, 1860.

[52]Weekly Herald, May 12, 1860.

[53]Weekly Herald, July 21, 1860.

[54]See Pilot, May 16, 1860; July 12, 1860; July 16, 1860; July 23, 1860.

[55]Pilot, July 16, 1860.

[56]Pilot, July 12, 1860.

[57]Pilot, May 15, 1860.

[58]Pilot, July 12, 1860.

[59]Public Archives of Canada, Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, February 2, 1855.

[60]Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, August 7, 1855.

[61]Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, July 6, 1867.

[62]W.S. Wallace (ed.), The Macmillan Dictionary of Canadian Biography (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), p. 127.

[63]The vindication of his father's honour before parliament. The Browns had been publicly accused of being defaulters in Scotland. See Careless, p. 260, and Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, July 10, 1858.

[64]Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, July 18, 1858.

[65]See his editorial, "Whither Are We Drifting?" Toronto Colonist, June 26, 1858.

[66]J.J. Talman, "George Sheppard - Journalist," Royal Society of Canada Transactions, XLIV, Series III, Section II (June, 1950), 125.

[67]Charles Clarke Papers, Sheppard to Clarke, July 18, 1858.

[68]Careless, p. 301.

[69]Sheppard had been installed prior to the 1857 elections following the "violent" ejection of his predecessor: Weekly Herald, September 11, 1858.

[70]Weekly Herald, November 20, 1858.

[71]Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, July 19, 1859.

[72]Weekly Herald, May 14, 1859.

[73]Weekly Herald, May 14, 1859.

[74]Weekly Herald, September 22, 1860.

[75]Dent, II, 586.

[76]Careless, p. 180.

[77]Montreal Gazette, July 17, 1858.

[78]Montreal Gazette, July 17, 1858.

[79]Chamberlin, a property owner in Missisquoi, was Honorary Secretary of the Board of Arts and Manufactures from 1857 to 1862 and President from 1862 to 1865. He was one of the Canadian commissioners appointed to the London International Exhibition of 1862. See Brown Chamberlin Papers, introductory note.

[80]Dent, II, 586. The Gazette did not divulge its circulation, but a list of places where accounts were being collected reveals an extensive coverage of Canada East and a penetration of Canada West at least as far as Hamilton: Montreal Gazette, July 2, 1859.

[81]Weekly Herald, May 14, 1858.

[82]Wallace (ed.), p. 62; p. 135. A.N. Rennie edited the paper under Campbell.

[83]Pilot, January 16, 1857.

[84]Pilot, January 3, 1860.

[85]Chronicle, May 18, 1847.

[86]Chronicle, September 16, 1853.

[87]Chronicle, March 16, 1860.

[88]Waite, p. 115.

[89]Waite, p. 120.

[90]Waite, p. 136.

[91]Canadian Library Association, historical notes on Quebec Morning Chronicle.

[92]Dent, II, 586.

[93]Wallace (ed.), p. 371.

[94]See Pilot, July 12, 1860.

[95]Montreal Gazette, July 17, 1858.

[96]Pilot, July 12, 1860.

[97]Waite, p. 10; p. 150. For a typical defense of Holton, see Montreal Daily Herald, May 6, 1856.

[98]Public Archives of Canada, Memoirs of Sidney R. Bellingham, II, 208.

[99]Wallace (ed.), p. 362.

[100]Careless, p. 253.

[101]Public Archives of Canada, George Brown Papers, Holton to Brown, November 22, 1859. The argument is reproduced in Toronto Globe, November 25, 1859.

[102]Pilot, January 3, 1860.

[103]Montreal Gazette, January 5, 1856.

[104]Waite, p. 150.

[105]Dent, II, 586.

[106]Montreal Gazette, July 25, 1857.

[107]Pilot, May 15, 1860.

[108]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[109]For evidence of Bristow acting in these capacities, see Weekly Herald, November 6, 1858: Montreal Transcript, October 18, 1859.

[110]Quoted in Stanstead Journal, December 17, 1857.

[111]Weekly Herald, November 20, 1858.

[112]Sherbrooke Gazette, November 20, 1858.

[113]Weekly Herald, September 11, 1858; September 18, 1858.

[114]Montreal Transcript, November 19, 1857.

[115]Transcript, May 16, 1857.

[116]Transcript, November 24, 1857.

[117]Transcript, December 8, 1857.

[118]Weekly Herald, September 18, 1858.

[119]Eg. Transcript, May 3, 1860; September 22, 1860.

[120]Transcript, July 31, 1860.

[121]Eg. Transcript, May 12, 1860; July 5, 1860.

[122]Pilot, July 30, 1860.

[123]Transcript, July 31, 1860.

[124]Chronicle, November 12, 1860.

[125]Transcript, July 31, 1860.

[126]Transcript, October 22, 1860. Reaffirmed by Quebec Morning Chronicle, November 12, 1860.

[127]True Witness, May 2, 1856.

[128]Wallace (ed.), p. 193.

[129]Witness, October 8, 1856.

[130]See J.I. Cooper, "The Early Editorial Policy of the Montreal Witness," Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, pp. 53-56.

[131]Witness, January 4, 1860.

[132]Witness, November 16, 1859; September 7, 1859.

[133]Witness, May 26, 1856; February 14, 1857; May 20, 1857; March 6, 1858; May 7, 1859; May 14, 1859; June 4, 1859; June 29, 1859.

[134]Witness, February 14, 1857; June 29, 1859.

[135]Witness, August 4, 1858.

[136]Witness, May 28, 1856.

[137]Witness, August 4, 1858.

[138]Cooper, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, p. 58.

[139]Cooper, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, p. 53.

[140]Cooper, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, pp. 57-58.

[141]Montreal Gazette, April 9, 1860.

[142]Wallace (ed.), p. 193.

[143]Cooper, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, p. 62.

[144]Witness, November 14, 1860.

[145]See Dougall's advertisement in the Eastern Townships Gazetteer and General Business Directory.

[146]Cooper, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1947, p. 62.

[147]A. Coffey, "George Edward Clerk, Founder of the True Witness: A Pioneer of Catholic Action", Canadian Catholic Historical Association Review, 1934-1935, p. 55.

[148]Coffey, Canadian Catholic Historical Association Review, 1934-1935, pp. 55-57.

[149]Coffey, Canadian Catholic Historical Association Review, 1934-1935, p. 55.

[150]True Witness, August 8, 1856; August 15, 1856.

[151]Diary of George Edward Clerk. I am indebted to Professor J.I. Cooper, who kindly placed at my disposal material drawn from Clerk's diary.

[152]True Witness, September 10, 1858.

[153]True Witness, September 8, 1858.

[154]True Witness, December 11, 1857.

[155]True Witness, December 11, 1857; January 1, 1858.

[156]True Witness, September 10, 1858.

[157]True Witness, July 2, 1858; May 27, 1859; July 15, 1859.

[158]True Witness, July 9, 1858.

[159]G.E. Clerk Diary, October, 1857.

[160]True Witness, May 8, 1857.

[161]G.E. Clerk Diary, February, 1858.

[162]Stanstead Journal, November 11, 1859.

[163]Salmon, p. 262. See also E.P. Harris and F.H. Hooke, The Community Newspaper (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1923), p.viii.

[164]Stanstead Journal, September 18, 1856. Unfortunately the companion numbers of the Sherbrooke Gazette are not available for research.

[165]B.J. Hubbard, Forests and Clearings: The History of Stanstead County (Montreal: John Lovell, 1874), p. 18.

[166]See Stanstead Journal, February 5, 1857.

[167]C.L.A., notes on Stanstead Journal.

[168]Stanstead Journal, January 22, 1857.

[169]Stanstead Journal, August 28, 1858.

[170]Stanstead Journal, September 25, 1858.

[171]Wallace (ed.), p. 742.

[172]Stanstead Journal, November 19, 1857. See the allegations of the Montreal Weekly Herald, October 21, 1857; and those of the Sherbrooke Gazette, May 30, 1857; October 14, 1857.

[173]Stanstead Journal, December 31, 1857.

[174]See Stanstead Journal, September 25, 1857; December 17, 1857; December 24, 1857; December 31, 1857; February 10, 1859.

[175]Stanstead Journal, December 24, 1857.

[176]Hubbard, p. 10: Miles, Toronto University Commission Report, 1862, p. 42.

[177]C. L. A., notes on Sherbrooke Gazette.

[178]See Sherbrooke Gazette, March 6, 1858; March 13, 1858; August 14, 1858.

[179]Eastern Townships Gazetteer, p. 27

[180]Wallace (ed.), p. 666.

[181]Sherbrooke Gazette, April 2, 1859.

[182]Quoted in Sherbrooke Gazette, April 9, 1859.

[183]Sherbrooke Gazette, January 1, 1859.

[184]Quoted in C. L. A. notes on Sherbrooke Gazette.

NOTES TO CHAPTER III

[1]D. Creighton, Dominion of the North (Toronto: Macmillan, 1957), p. 248.

[2]Quoted in O.D. Skelton, p. 161.

[3]M. Wade, The French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan, 1956), p. 224.

[4]Cornell, p. 84.

[5]Wade, pp. 231-250.

[6]Wade, pp. 247-249.

[7]For an early definition of the double majority principle, see Caron to Draper, September, 1845, cited by Wade, p. 248.

[8]See G.H.S. Mills, "The Annexation Movement of 1849-50 as seen Through the Eyes of the Lower Canadian Press" (unpublished M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1947).

[9]Witness, June 4, 1859.

[10]952,004 to 890,261: Census, 1851, 1, 36, 104.

[11]Cornell, pp. 61-62.

[12]Careless, p. 155.

[13]W.L. Morton, The Kingdom of Canada (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), p. 291.

[14]Careless, p. 119.

[15]O.D. Skelton, p. 175.

[16]North American (Toronto), July 2, 1851.

[17]Careless, p. 124.

[18]Careless, p. 166.

[19]Globe, August 21, 1851.

[20]Morton, Kingdom of Canada, p. 303.

[21]Quoted in Carless, pp. 154-155.

[22]Some members now represented 15,000 people and others 60,000. See Careless, p. 166.

[23]See Skelton, pp. 206-207.

[24]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 183.

[25]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 183: Careless, p. 168.

[26]Careless, p. 168.

[27]Dent, 11, 587.

[28]Careless, p. 42.

[29]The new rotary press could run off 1250 copies an hour as opposed to 200 by the older hand presses: Careless, p. 46.

[30]Careless, p. 46.

[31]Careless, p. 47.

[32]Part of the friction was due to their rivalry as reform editors. Hinck's Pilot, because of annual contributions from the party faithful which it needed to keep going, was sold at an artificially low price in competition with the Globe: Careless, p. 62; p. 135.

[33]Careless, p. 109; p. 199.

[34]Globe, September 8, 1853.

[35]Globe, December 21, 1853.

[36]J.M.S. Careless, "The Toronto Globe and Agrarian Radicalism", Canadian Historical Review, XXIX, 1 (March, 1948), 15-17.

[37]Careless, Canadian Historical Review, XXIX, 1 (March, 1948), 39.

[38]Careless, p. 343.

[39]Cornell, p. 61.

[40]L'Avenir was operated by J.B.E. Dorion, Le Pays by A.A. Dorion, who led the party after Papineau: Waite, pp. 147-148.

[41]See M. Ayearst, "The Parti Rouge and the Clergy," Canadian Historical Review, XV, 4 (December, 1934).

[42]Cornell, p. 39; p. 106.

[43]Cornell, p. 64.

[44]Underhill, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 368-369.

[45]McInnis, pp. 283-284.

[46]Underhill, Canadian Historical Review XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 369.

[47]Cornell, p. 64.

[48]Wade, p. 314. See also Underhill, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 371-372.

[49]Cornell, p. 64.

[50]See the analysis in Quebec Morning Chronicle, June 14, 1860.

[51]See Sellar, p. 165.

[52]Although a frequent complaint of Macdonald's was that "loose fish", once bought, "refused to stay bought": Underhill, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 369.

[53]Underhill, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December 1935), 369.

[54]See Montreal Gazette, January 9, 1858; January 16, 1858.

[55]Landon, p. 246: Careless, p. 237.

[56]Montreal Gazette, January 9, 1858.

[57]Sir J. Willison, "Some Political Leaders in the Canadian Federation," The Federation of Canada 1867-1917 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1917), pp. 48-49.

[58]Montreal Herald quoted in Stanstead Journal, December 4, 1858.

[59]Montreal Herald quoted in Stanstead Journal, December 4, 1858.

[60]See O.D. Skelton, pp. 107-109; pp. 227-228.

[61]Quoted in O.D. Skelton, p. 228.

[62]Weekly Herald, May 23,1857.

[63]Weekly Herald, May 23, 1857.

[64]Careless, p. 240.

[65]O.D. Skelton, p. 229: Weekly Herald, December 4, 1857.

[66]Macdonald to Galt, November 2, 1857, quoted in O.D. Skelton, pp. 229-230.

[67]Stanstead Journal, December 17, 1857.

[68]Montreal Gazette, January 2, 1858.

[69]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[70]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[71]Underhill, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 4 (December, 1935), 373.

[72]Brown Chamberlin Papers, Macdonald to Chamberlin, January 21, 1856.

[73]Creighton, Young Politician, pp. 226-227.

[74]Montreal Gazette, February 15, 1860.

[75]Landon, pp. 243-244.

[76]McInnis, p. 282.

[77]Montreal Gazette, June 27, 1857.

[78]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[79]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[80]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[81]Montreal Gazette, May 2, 1857.

[82]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[83]Creighton, Empire of the St. Lawrence, p. 383.

[84]As Fred Landon has observed, Grit strength was greatest where most remote from Montreal: Landon, p. 245. See also Montreal Gazette, February 15, 1860.

[85]Careless, Canadian Historical Review, XXIX, 1 (March, 1948), 19.

[86]McInnis, p. 282.

[87]D.G. Creighton, "Economic Nationalism and Confederation", Canadian Historical Association Report, 1942, p. 48.

[88]Careless, Canadian Historical Review, XXIX, 1 (March, 1948), 24.

[89]Weir, pp. 100-116.

[90]Weir, pp. 115-116.

[91]Weir, p. 116.

[92]Morning Chronicle, December 18, 1860.

[93]Pilot, March 12, 1860.

[94]Carried 70 to 33: Pilot, March 12, 1860.

[95]Toronto Colonist, April 30, 1860, quoted in Pilot, May 1, 1860.

[96]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[97]Montreal Gazette, November 26, 1859.

[98]Quebec Gazette, May 1, 1856.

[99]True Witness, December 9, 1859.

[100]True Witness, June 18, 1858.

[101]Montreal Gazette, February 27, 1858.

[102]True Witness, June 18, 1858.

[103]Transcript, April 29, 1856.

[104]Montreal Gazette, May 24, 1856.

[105]Montreal Gazette, May 24, 1856.

[106]The reasons for the Herald's coolness have been cited above. The Herald did not warm to Brown until the summer of 1858. See Weekly Herald, June 5, 1858.

[107]Cited by Wade, p. 318.

[108]Witness, June 29, 1859.

[109]See Witness, March 6, 1858; May 7, 1859; June 4, 1859; June 29, 1859.

[110]Witness, March 6, 1858.

[111]See Witness, August 11, 1858.

[112]These negotiations are reviewed in Chapter VIII.

[113]For the Holton-Brown correspondence, See A. Mackenzie, The Life and Speeches of Hon. George Brown (Toronto: Globe Printing Co., 1882), pp. 193-212.

[114]See I. Skelton, pp. 358-369.

[115]Cornell, p. 76.

[116]Cornell, p. 66.

[117]Chronicle, June 14, 1860.

[118]Montreal Gazette, April 26, 1856.

NOTES TO CHAPTER IV

[1]Joseph Howe agitated the issue; Lord Elgin publicized it in Britain as "tne next serious colonial question which will rise"; and Blackwood's Magazine and the London Times took them seriously. See the article from the Times in Montreal Gazette, January 26, 1856. See also Henry Taylor, On the Intention of the Imperial Government to United the Province of British North America (Toronto, 1858). The title of this pamphlet is somewhat misleading. Actually it expressed arguments against an elective Legislative Council and in favour of "the future representation of all the British North American Provinces in the British House of Commons".

[2]Montreal Gazette, January 5, 1856.

[3]Quebec Mercury, May 19, 1857; September 3, 1857.

[4]From an 1855 speech cited by Careless, pp. 204-205.

[5]Skelton, p. 207.

[6]R.G. Trotter, Canadian Federation: Its Origin and Achievement (Toronto: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1924), p. 5.

[7]Sewell published two early pamphlets on British American union: A Plan for the Federal Union of the British Provinces in North America (London, 1824); Plan for a General Legislative Union of all the British Provinces of North America (London, 1824).

[8]See J. Strachan, Observations on the Policy of a General Union of all the British Provinces of North America (London, 1824).

[9]Whitelaw, pp. 70-78.

[10]Whitelaw, pp. 97-98.

[11]See Montreal Courier, July 11, 1849: Montreal Gazette, July 31, 1849.

[12]His speech is summarized in Montreal Gazette, April 26, 1856.

[13]Also reported in Montreal Gazette, April 28, 1856.

[14]Brown's speech is summarized in Montreal Witness, May 2, 1856.

[15]Skelton, p. 215.

[16]Eastern Townships Gazette, May 2, 1856: Quebec Gazette, May 1, 1856.

[17]For a clear account see Stanstead Journal, May 8, 1856.

[18]Canada, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confederation of the British North American Provinces (Quebec: Hunter, Rose & Co., 1865), p. 111.

[19]Whitelaw, p. 113.

[20]Canada, Confederation Debates, p. 111: Journal, Legislative Assembly, Canada, 1856. These are Whitelaw's sources.

[21]Canada, Confederation Debates, p. 111.

[22]Whitelaw, pp. 112-113; p. 123.

[23]Skelton, pp. 216-218.

[24]Montreal Gazette, April 29, 1856.

[25]True Witness, May 2, 1856.

[26]Sherbrooke Gazette, May 2, 1856.

[27]Stanstead Journal, May 8, 1856.

[28]Montreal Transcript, April 29, 1856.

[29]Montreal Transcript, April 26, 1856.

[30]See Chapter V for the contribution of Obiter Dictum.

NOTES TO CHAPTER V

[1]For a summary of the debate, see Montreal Weekly Gazette, May 2, 1857: Witness, May 2, 1857.

[2]Montreal Weekly Gazette, May 2, 1857.

[3]Montreal Weekly Gazette, May 9, 1857.

[4]Montreal Weekly Gazette, May 9, 1857.

[5]Waite, p. 136.

[6]See Skelton, pp. 229-230.

[7]Whitelaw, p. 123.

[8]The articles began during 1855 and the Hudson's Bay Company tried unsuccessfully to have them stopped: See Canadian Library Association, notes on Montreal Gazette. See also Public Archives of Canada, Alexander Morris Papers, N. McLeod to A. Morris, November 10, 1868.

[9]The articles also appeared in Stanstead Journal, April 24, 1856.

[10]One such contribution is briefly reviewed in Chapter IV. See Montreal Gazette, April 29, 1856.

[11]See Montreal Gazette, July 31, 1856.

[12]J. Anderson, The Union of the British North American Provinces Considered in a Letter Addressed to the Citizens of British North America by Obiter Dictum (Montreal, 1859).

[13]Brown Chamberlin Papers, P.S. Hamilton to Brown Chamberlin, November 1, 1859.

[14]For coverage of Hamilton's efforts in this regard, see Whitelaw, pp. 110-112; p. 133; p. 174. Hamilton's pamphlets and brochures on federal union inclued: Observations Upon a Union of the Colonies of British North America (Halifax, 1855); A Union of the Colonies of British North America Considered Rationally (Halifax, 1856); Letter to His Grace the Duke of Newcastle Upon a Union of the Colonies of British North America (Halifax, 1860); Union of the Colonies of British North America (Halifax, 1861); A Review of Hon. Joseph Howe's Easay Entitled "Confederation Considered in Relation to the Interest of the Empire"(Halifax, 1866).

[15]L. Staples, "The Honourable Alexander Morris; The Man; His Work," Canadian Historical Association Report, 1928, p. 92. For evidence of a close personal friendship between Morris and Chamberlin, see Brown Chamberlin Papers, J.A. Macdonald to B. Chamberlin, October 13, 1860.

[16]See A. Morris, Nova Britannia, or Our New Canadian Dominion Foreshadowed (Toronto: Hunter, Rose & Co.), pp. vii-viii.

[17]Morris, p. vii.

[18]For a selection of his speeches, see Morris, part II.

[19]Morris, p. 4.

[20]Morris, p. 46. Morris wrote knowledgeably about such matters. See his prize-winning essay Canada and Her Resources (Montreal, 1855).

[21]Morris, p. 45.

[22]Morris, p. 48.

[23]See J.A.B. Macleish, "Quebec's Role inthe Confederation Movement" (unpublished thesis, McGill Univeristy, 1940), p. 28.

[24]Morris, p. 50.

[25]See editor's note, Morris, p. viii.

[26]Montreal Gazette, February 19, 1859.

[27]A. Morris, The Hudson's Bay and Pacific Territories (Montreal, 1859).

[28]Mercury, July 7, 1859.

[29]Wallace (ed.), p. 529. See Staples, Canadian Historical Association Report, 1928, p. 95.

[30]See author's preface, Morris, Nova Britannia.

[31]See Montreal Transcript, December 1858: Quebec Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[32]See G.H. Macaulay, Canada: Its Political Past, Present, and Probable Future (Montreal, 1858).

[33]See Montreal Transcript, December 31, 1858: Quebec Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[34]Wallace (ed.), p. 450.

[35]A Brady, Thomas D'Arcy McGee (Toronto: Macmillan, 1925), p. 38.

[36]H.J.O'C. Clarke, A Short Sketch of the Hon. Thomas D'Arcy McGee (Montreal: John Lovell, 1868), p. 34.

[37]Public Archives of Canada, James Sadlier Papers, T.D. McGee to J. Sadlier, October 14, 1856.

[38]G.E. Clerk Diary, September, 1856; Summary of 1856.

[39]G.E. Clerk Diary, February, 1857: Clarke, p. 34.

[40]Brady, p. 39.

[41]Brady, p. 40.

[42]Brady, p. 42.

[43]Quoted in Brady, p. 44.

[44]Quoted in Brady, p. 45.

[45]Brady, pp. 45-46.

[46]Brady, p. 47.

[47]I. Skelton, p. 312: F. Taylor, Thomas D'Arcy McGee: A Sketch of his Life and Death (Montreal: John Lovell, 1868), p. 15.

[48]Brady, p. 40.

[49]Canadian Library Association, historical notes on New Era.

[50]See Mercury, April 30, 1857; May 5, 1857; May 19, 1857; June 23, 1857; June 25, 1857; September 3, 1857; September 26, 1857; October 3, 1857; June 5, 1858; June 8, 1858; August 17, 1858; August 18, 1858; October 7, 1858; February 3, 1859; February 10, 1859; July 7, 1859.

[51]See Mercury, April 30, 1857.

[52]Mercury, May 5, 1857.

[53]Mercury, May 5, 1857. This idea was also promoted by McGee at about the same time.

[54]Mercury, July 23, 1857.

[55]Mercury, May 19, 1857.

[56]Mercury, July 23, 1857.

[57]Mercury, October 7, 1858.

[58]Wallace (ed.), p. 121.

[59]Cornell, p. 61.

[60]As late as December 6, 1860, the Mercury referred to an increased circulation and business which enabled an expensive renovation of the entire establishment: Mercury, December 6, 1860.

[61]The paper was leased to John Sandfield Macdonald in 1862 and operated as Liberal government organ edited by Josiah

Blackburn of the London Free Press until Sandfield's fall, whereupon it again changed hands and continued to survive, though "shorn of its once-formidable influence and pretensions": Dent, II, 587: Talman, Royal Society of Canada Transactions, XLIV, Series 3, Section 2 (June, 1950), 131.

[62]Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[63]Mercury, May 28, 1859; February 3, 1859.

[64]See Willan's pamphlet protesting a clerical ban on free speech: J.H. Willan, Thoughts on the Position of the Inhabitants Composing the Minority in Lower Canada Brought About by the Maladministration of Justice and the Tyranny of the Majority in that Province and the Remedy Thereof (Quebec, 1869). The articles which comprised this pamphlet appeared in the Quebec Mercury on the following dates: February 8, 1859; February 17, 1859; February 19, 1859; March 10, 1859; March 22, 1859.

[65]Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[66]Mercury, February 3, 1859.

[67]Mercury, June 8, 1858.

[68]Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[69]Mercury, May 28, 1859.

[70]Mercury, September 26, 1857.

[71]Tache's perceptive articles were published in book form: J.C. Tache, Des provinces de l'Amerique du Nord et d'une Union federale (Quebec, 1858).

[72]Mercury, June 5, 1858.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VI

[1]Most of the figures cited are approximations due to the unpredictable voting behaviour of independents and "loose fish": Cornell, p. 108.

[2]Sherbrooke Gazette, March 13, 1858: Weekly Herald, May 29, 1858.

[3]The fifteen English ministerialists, some of whom represented largely French-speaking constituencies, were S. Bellingham (Argenteuil), C. Dunkin (Drummond-Arthabaska), H.H. Whitney (Missisquoi), J. Rose (Montreal, E. Heath (Pontiac),

J.M. Ferres (Brome), C. Alleyn (Quebec), T.L. Terrill (Stanstead), W.H. Webb (Richmond and Wolfe), W.M. Dawson (Three Rivers), J.H. Pope (Compton), R.U. Harwood (Vaudreuil), H. Starnes (Chateauguay), T.E. Campbell (Rouville), and D.E. Price (Chicoutimi and Saguenay). The five English members who opposed the ministry were J. O'Farrell (Lotbinière), L.T. Drummond (Shefford), D. Ross (Beauce), T.D. McGee (Montreal), and R.B. Somerville (Huntingdon). The lone independent was A.T. Galt. There were a few changes involving the foregoing constituencies between 1858 and 1860. A Liberal-Conservative, A.B. Foster, succeeded L.T. Drummond inShefford September 14, 1858; Drummond replaced O'Farrell in Lotbinière October 2, 1858; J.J.C. Abbott, a Liberal, was declared elected in Argenteuil March 12, 1860, unseating S. Bellingham; and R.U. Harwood lost Vaudreuil to a Bleu, J.B. Mongenais, November 26, 1860. Thus, during the life-span of the fifth parliament, there was a net gain to the Liberal-Conservatives of one seat: Cornell, p. 48.

[4]Montreal Weekly Gazette, January 2, 1858.

[5]Montreal Weekly Gazette, January 16, 1858.

[6]Montreal Gazette, March 27, 1858; April 17, 1858.

[7]Stanstead Journal, March 11, 1858.

[8]See the translation of Cauchon's letter: Sherbrooke Gazette, March 13, 1858.

[9]Witness, March 10, 1858: Sherbrooke Gazette, March 11, 1858.

[10]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[11]Witness, June 11, 1856.

[12]The Governmental candidate for the office of speaker was defeated by a single vote: Morton, Critical Years, p. 16.

[13]Witness, March 6, 1858.

[14]Sherbrooke Gazette, March 13, 1858.

[15]A Mackenzie, G. Brown to L. Holton, January 29, 1858, p. 194.

[16]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[17]Montreal Gazette, January 2, 1858.

[18]See the summary of Galt's speech of March 8 giving notice of his upcoming resolutions: Stanstead Journal, March 18, 1858.

[19]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[20]Montreal Gazette, April 17, 1858.

[21]Eg. Montreal Gazette, February 15, 1860.

[22]Weekly Herald, May 8, 1858.

[23]Weekly Herald, May 29, 1858.

[24]Weekly Herald, May 28, 1858.

[25]See O.D. Skelton, pp. 219-223. The resolutions and the ensuing debate are in Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858. The resolutions and a summary of Galt's speech of July 7 are in Quebec Morning Chronicle, July 8, 1858, and Sherbrooke Gazette, July 17, 1858.

[26]Stanstead Journal, July 15, 1858.

[27]O.D. Skelton, p. 219.

[28]Careless, p. 257.

[29]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[30]Toronto Globe, July 8, 1858.

[31]Toronto Globe, July 8, 1858.

[32]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[33]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[34]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[35]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[36]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[37]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858: Witness, July 14, 1858.

[38]Quebec Gazette, July 12, 1858.

[39]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 264.

[40]Transcript, July 8, 1858.

[41]Stanstead Journal, July 15, 1858.

[42]Witness, July 21, 1859.

[43]To supply this information the Chronicle reviewed a tract written by P.S. Hamilton to stimulate Canada's interest in eastern expansion at a time when gold discoveries on the Pacific Coast were absorbing everyone's attention. Canadians could share in the exploitation of Nove Scotia's resources, especially coal -- as yet undiscovered in Canada -- but for the lack of an inter-colonial railway and federal union: P.S. Hamilton, Nova Scotia, Considered as a Field for Emigration (Halifax, 1858).

[44]Cited by Transcript, July 8, 1858.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VII

[1]The Upper Canadian branch of the ministry consisted of Brown, J.S. Macdonald, James Morris, Oliver Mowat, and Michael Hamilton Foley. Lower Canada's representatives were Dorion, L.T. Drummond, L.H. Holton, Françoise Xavier Lemieux, and J.E. Thibaudeau. Brown wanted Cauchon, a strong critic of the previous administration (from which he had resigned), but the latter's conservative background rendered him unacceptable to the Rouges. See Careless, p. 267.

[2]Careless, pp. 269-272.

[3]Careless, p. 272.

[4]Careless, p. 273.

[5]Head's reasons included the need to complete the business of the current session, the disinclination of the country to endure a second election within a year, the fact that the former ministry had been defeated almost accidentally and had not suffered a permanent loss of support, and the likelihood that a new election would heighten sectional and sectarian feeling: Careless, pp. 274-276.

[6]Whitelaw suggests that Galt's interest in federal union was one of the factors which motivated Head to call on him (Whitelaw, p. 124). Skelton says only that Galt was approached because he was influential and independent of both major partisan groups: O.D. Skelton, p. 235.

[7]O.D. Skelton, pp. 236-237.

[8]For the reconstructed cabinet, see O.D. Skelton, p. 237.

[9]Morton, Critical Years, p. 4.

[10]See Whitelaw, pp. 114-116.

[11]Whitelaw, pp. 97-98.

[12]Whitelaw, p. 98.

[13]See C. Martin, "Sir Edmund Head's First Project of Federation," Canadian Historical Association Report, May, 1928, pp. 14-26.

[14]Whitelaw, pp. 114-115.

[15]Lowe was a leading exponent of colonial self-sufficiency in the Palmerston administration: Morton, Critical Years, p. 8. See also D.G.G. Kerr, "Edmund Head, Robert Lowe, and Confederation," Canadian Historical Review, XX, 4 (December, 1939), 409-420.

[16]Whitelaw, p. 115.

[17]Morton, Critical Years, p. 9.

[18]For the text of Johnston's motion for federal union which was introduced in the Nova Scotia Assembly during 1854, see Whitelaw, p. 106.

[19]Whitelaw, P. 117.

[20]Mercury, June 25, 1857.

[21]Mercury, July 23, 1857.

[22]Whitelaw, p. 118.

[23]Whitelaw, p. 122.

[24]Whitelaw, pp. 122-123.

[25]Whitelaw, p. 123.

[26]Part of the address is quoted in O.D. Skelton, p. 239.

[27]For the speech, see Montreal Transcript, August 17, 1858.

[28]For the text of Galt's address to the electors of Sherbrooke, see Sherbrooke Gazette, August 21, 1858; Stanstead Journal, August 26, 1858.

[29]It is interesting to note that this final step was never taken in Canada.

[30]Reported in Sherbrooke Gazette, August 28, 1858.

[31]Careless, p. 284: Whitelaw, p. 128: Creighton, Young Politician, p. 272.

[32]Morton, Critical Years, p. 20.

[33]By the Independence of Parliament Act of 1853 a member who changed portfolios within 30 days of his original appointment was relieved of the obligation to seek re-election. On August 6 Cartier's returning ministers were sworn into an unintended set of offices which they duly resigned the following day to be formally reinstated in the offices they had occupied prior to their resignation July 29. Thus by making sharp use of a clause designed to facilitate individual changes of portfolio without the expense of an election, the entire cabinet escaped the obligation of going before the voters, and the business of the session could be resumed almost without interruption: Careless, p. 277: Morton, Critical Years, p. 19: O.D. Skelton, pp. 237-238: Creighton, Young Politician, p. 268.

[34]Careless, p. 276. I. Skelton says that McGee's disgust with government corruption in general and the double shuffle in particular was largely responsible for his subsequent alignment alongside Brown and Dorion: I. Skelton, pp. 358-361.

[35]For a typical defense of Head's behaviour, see Montreal Gazette, August 14, 1858. In attempting to discredit the opposition, ministerial journals generally took their cue from Macdonald, who charged that Brown, in joining with Dorion, had abandoned his principles "like a fish" that jumps out of the water to take the bait of office (Morton, Critical Years, p. 18). Past disagreements of the Grits and Rouges over representation by population, separate schools, etc., were used to substantiate this claim. See Montreal Gazette, August 14, 1858; September 4, 1858: Montreal Transcript, August 12, 1858: Quebec Morning Chronicle, August 10, 1858: Pilot, August 9, 1858.

[36]Transcript, August 11, 1858.

[37]Chronicle, August 14, 1858.

[38]For typical attacks on Head and his ministers, see Quebec Gazette, August 11, 1858; October 1, 1858: Witness, August 11, 1858; August 18, 1858: Weekly Herald, August 7, 1858; August 14, 1858; August 21, 1858; August 28, 1858. Of special interest is the Herald's "History of a Disgraceful Session" in five weekly installments beginning September 11, 1858.

[39]Sherbrooke Gazette, August 14, 1858.

[40]The Witness was commenting on Galt's address to the electors of Sherbrooke: Witness, August 25, 1858.

[41]Mercury, August 18, 1858.

[42]Weekly Herald, August 21, 1858.

[43]Weekly Herald, August 14, 1858.

[44]John Rose, a Montreal lawyer, banker, and politician, had, as solicitor-general in the Macdonald-Cartier administration, accompanied Macdonald to London in 1857 to negotiate for an inter-colonial railway. See Wallace (ed.), p. 646: Creighton, Young Politician, p. 254.

[45]Weekly Herald, August 21, 1858.

[46]Weekly Herald, August 28, 1858.

[47]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[48]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[49]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[50]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[51]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[52]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[53]Weekly Herald, October 30, 1858.

[54]A full treatment of the 1858 federation project from the points of view of the Colonial Office and the provincial governors is given by Whitelaw, pp. 122-139. See also J.A. Gibson, "The Colonial Office View of Canadian Federation, 1856-1868," Canadian Historical Review, XXXV, 4 (December, 1954), 283.

[55]See D.G.G. Kerr, Sir Edmund Head: A Scholarly Governor (Toronto, 1954), pp. 195-198.

[56]Whitelaw, pp. 132-135. For Elliot's memorandum on the question of a general federation, see R.G. Trotter, "British Government and the Proposal of Federation in 1858," Canadian Historical Review, IX, 3 (September, 1933), 287-292.

[57]Whitelaw, pp. 135-136.

[58]Whitelaw, p. 133.

[59]Morton, Critical Years, p. 63.

[60]In Nova Scotia the Canadian minute on federation had been merely referred to the legislature for routine consideration during 1859, but on receipt of the Colonial Office despatch of November 26 containing Lytton's formal response to Head Governor Mulgrave wrote disparagingly of colonial union in any form (Whitelaw, pp. 135-138). Daly of Prince Edward Island wrote in January of 1859 to say that he would refer the matter to his ministry: Morton, Critical Years, p. 63.

[61]For the text of the letters, see O.D. Skelton, pp. 239-244.

[62]O.D. Skelton, p. 244.

[63]See O.D. Skelton, p. 243.

[64]Morton, Critical Years, p. 68.

[65]Morton, Critical Years, p. 68.

[66]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 278.

[67]Careless, p. 284.

[68]Morton, Critical Years, p. 64.

[69]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 277.

[70]Morton, Critical Years, p. 68.

[71]See Galt's letters to his wife, cited by O.D. Skelton, pp. 246-249.

[72]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 283.

[73]Quoted in O.D. Skelton, pp. 251-252.

[74]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 283. For the text of the despatch of November 26, see O.D. Skelton, pp. 252-253.

[75]See O.D. Skelton, p. 253.

[76]O.D. Skelton, p. 252.

[77]O.D. Skelton, p. 253. See footnote #60 for the responses from other provinces.

[78]Weekly Herald, November 6, 1858.

[79]Witness, December 1, 1858.

[80]Witness, December 1, 1858.

[81]See Sherbrooke Gazette, May 2, 1857; March 13, 1858.

[82]The Townships already had railway connections to the Atlantic at Portland, Maine.

[83]Quoted in Montreal Witness, December 1, 1858.

[84]For the text of the despatches, see Quebec Mercury, February 10, 1859: Montreal Gazette, February 12, 1859: Quebec Gazette, February 7, 1859: Montreal Transcript, February 5, 1859: Quebec Morning Chronicle, February 8, 1859: Montreal Weekly Herald, February 12, 1859.

[85]For the text of the Speech from the Throne, see Montreal Transcript, January 31, 1859.

[86]See Montreal Transcript, January 31, 1859.

[87]Mercury, February 3, 1859.

[88]Pilot, January 31, 1859.

[89]There is no extant evidence of a vote on Galt's July resolutions. Though most writers say there was no vote (eg. Whitelaw, p. 124) the Herald's allegation raises the intriguing possibility that there may have been a negative one.

[90]The Canadian Assembly did not as yet have access to the replies of these provinces.

[91]Weekly Herald, February 12, 1859.

[92]Weekly Herald, February 12, 1859.

[93]Morton, Critical Years, p. 64.

[94]Weekly Herald, February 12, 1859.

[95]A reference, perhaps, to Lytton's memorandum to the cabinet, the wording of which was "softened" at Galt's request.

[96]Chronicle, February 8, 1859.

[97]Transcript, August 10, 1858; August 16, 1858.

[98]Transcript, April 29, 1856; July 8, 1858.

[99]Transcript, February 7, 1859.

[100]Whitelaw, p. 127.

[101]Whitelaw, p. 131.

[102]Whitelaw, p. 131.

[103]Whitelaw, p. 144.

[104]Lytton's successor in the Colonial Office.

[105]See the confidential despatch from Head to Newcastle, December 1, 1859, quoted in Whitelaw, pp. 145-146.

[106]Whitelaw, p. 146.

[107]Whitelaw, p. 147.

[108]Gibson, Canadian Historical Review, XXXV, 4 (December, 1954), 287.

[109]The reader will have noticed the regularity with which the proponents of federal union were wont to invoke either the vision or the spectre of American initiative as the occasion demanded. Whether as a model to be emulated or as an influence to be withstood American progress served as a stimulus to action in Canada.

[110]Morton, Critical Years, pp. 65-66.

[111]Morton, Critical Years, p. 64.

[112]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 294.

[113]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 295.

[114]Gibson, Canadian Historical Review, XXXV, 4 (December, 1954), 297.

[115]None of his public utterances or documents on the subject refers to this contingency.

[116]Morton, Critical Years, p. 66.

[117]Morton, Critical Years, p. 66. The Intercolonial Railway negotiations are treated at length in Trotter, Chapters XIV, XV, and pp. 30-31

[118]See O.D. Skelton, Chapter IV.

[119]See O.D. Skelton, pp. 107-109; p. 227.

[120]O.D. Skelton, p. 109.

[121]Morton, Critical Years, pp. 65-66.

[122]Weekly Herald, August 21, 1858.

[123]P.B. Waite (ed.), The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada, 1865 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), p. 90.

[124]Morton, Critical Years, p. 65.

[125]Whitelaw, p. 125.

[126]Whitelaw, p. 127.

[127]Whitelaw, p. 127.

[128]See the extract from Cartier's policy statement of August 7, cited by O.D. Skelton, pp. 238-239.

[129]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 271.

[130]Careless, p. 283.

[131]Morton, Critical Years, p. 19; p. 65.

[132]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 271.

[133]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 272.

[134]Bellingham Memoirs, p. 202.

[135]See Morton, Critical Years, p. 65.

[136]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 272.

[137]See Montreal Transcript, August 9, 1858.

[138]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 295.

NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII

[1]Mackenzie, G. Brown to L. Holton, January 29, 1858, p. 194.

[2]Mackenzie, G. Brown to L. Holton, January 29, 1858, p. 194.

[3]Reported in Toronto Globe, August 9, 1858, and cited by the Montreal Transcript, August 12, 1858.

[4]See Waite (ed.), Confederation Debates, p. 87.

[5]Careless, p. 288. For an account of the Montreal meeting at Bonaventure Hall, see Weekly Herald, November 6, 1858.

[6]See Weekly Herald, November 27, 1858; December 25, 1858.

[7]Careless, p. 300.

[8]Careless, p. 301. For evidence of Sheppard's "pro-American" sympathies, see Charles Clarke Papers, G. Sheppard to C. Clarke, October 27, 1859.

[9]Toronto Globe, February 15, 1859.

[10]Careless, pp. 295-299: Creighton, Young Politician, pp. 288-289.

[11]Careless, p. 303.

[12]Transcript, May 13, 1859.

[13]Transcript, May 13, 1859.

[14]Transcript, June 11, 1859.

[15]Transcript, July 14, 1859.

[16]Transcript, July 22, 1859.

[17]Montreal Gazette, July 30, 1859.

[18]Montreal Gazette, July 30, 1859.

[19]Montreal Gazette, July 30, 1859.

[20]Witness, May 7, 1859.

[21]Witness, May 14, 1859.

[22]Witness, June 29, 1859.

[23]Witness, June 29, 1859.

[24]Witness, June 29, 1859.

[25]Witness, June 29, 1859.

[26]*Witness*, June 29, 1859.

[27]*Mercury*, May 28, 1859.

[28]*True Witness*, December 9, 1859.

[29]*True Witness*, December 9, 1859.

[30]Creighton, *Young Politician*, p. 292.

[31]Charles Clarke Papers, G. Sheppard to C. Clarke, July 5, 1859.

[32]Careless, p. 305. Dorion gave the Convention his blessing but declined to attend as the presence of Lower Canadians might prove an embarrassment to Brown: Careless, pp. 309-310.

[33]*Globe*, July 11, 1859.

[34]*Globe*, July 11, 1859.

[35]*Globe*, July 7, 1859.

[36]*Globe*, July 18, 1859; July 21, 1859.

[37]*Globe*, July 11, 1859.

[38]Careless, p. 310.

[39]A resolution rejecting double majority was laid aside out of courtesy to Sandfield Macdonald who was not present: Careless, p. 310.

[40]*Chronicle*, October 29, 1859.

[41]*Chronicle*, October 7, 1859.

[42]*Pilot*, October 15, 1859.

[43]*Pilot*, October 15, 1859.

[44]*Weekly Herald*, October 15, 1859.

[45]At the Confederation Debates Luther Holton did not deny Brown's insinuation that he had had a hand in the composition of the document: Canada, *Confederation Debates*, p. 113.

[46]*Montreal Transcript*, October 29, 1859.

[47]The manifesto was printed by Montreal Transcript, October 29, 1859: Quebec Morning Chronicle, November 5, 1859: Weekly Herald, November 5, 1859.

[48]Dent, II, 387.

[49]Transcript, October 29, 1859.

[50]Weekly Herald, November 5, 1859.

[51]Weekly Herald, November 5, 1859.

[52]Chronicle, November 5, 1859.

[53]J.M.S. Careless, Brown of the Globe: Statesman of Confederation (Toronto: Macmillan, 1963), p. 12.

[54]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 311.

[55]Landon, p. 245.

[56]Landon, p. 245.

[57]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 314.

[58]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, pp. 311-312.

[59]Charles Clarke Papers, G. Sheppard to C. Clarke, October 27, 1859.

[60]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, pp. 314-315.

[61]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 315.

[62]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 315.

[63]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 315.

[64]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 315.

[65]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 316.

[66]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 316.

[67]Cited by G.W. Brown, "The Grit Party and the Great Reform Convention of 1859," Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 3 (September, 1935), 258.

[68]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 316.

[69]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 317.

[70]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 317.

[71]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 317.

[72]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 318.

[73]Cited by Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 318.

[74]Brown, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 3 (September, 1935), 255.

[75]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 318.

[76]Brown, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 3 (September, 1935), 259.

[77]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 319.

[78]Cited by Brown, Canadian Historical Review, XVI, 3 (September, 1935), 258.

[79]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 321.

[80]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 321.

[81]Landon, pp. 248-249.

[82]Montreal Gazette, November 26, 1859.

[83]Montreal Gazette, November 26, 1859.

[84]Chronicle, November 10, 1859; November 14, 1859.

[85]Pilot, November 12, 1859.

[86]Pilot, November 12, 1859.

[87]Quebec Gazette, November 14, 1859.

[88]Weekly Herald, November 19, 1859.

[89]Weekly Herald, November 19, 1859.

[90]Weekly Herald, November 19, 1859.

[91]Weekly Herald, November 19, 1859.

[92]Weekly Herald, November 19, 1859. The Sherbrooke Gazette had nothing further to add since it relied upon the Herald's correspondent for its reports of the convention proceedings; Sherbrooke Gazette, November 19, 1859.

[93]Transcript, November 15, 1859.

[94]Transcript, November 15, 1859.

[95]Transcript, November 15, 1859.

[96]Transcript, November 15, 1859.

[97]Transcript, November 15, 1859.

[98]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, p. 322.

[99]Careless, Voice of Upper Canada, pp. 322-323.

[100]See also the pamphlet version: Address of the Constitutional Reform Association to the People of Upper Canada (Toronto, 1860).

[101]Transcript, February 25, 1860.

[102]Chronicle, February 28, 1860.

[103]Chronicle, February 28, 1860.

[104]Pilot, February 23, 1860.

[105]Pilot, February 23, 1860.

[106]Pilot, February 23, 1860.

[107]Pilot, February 23, 1860.

[108]Pilot, February 27, 1860.

[109]Pilot, February 27, 1860.

[110]Pilot, February 27, 1860.

[111]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 17.

[112]Chronicle, February 29, 1860.

[113]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, pp. 18-19.

[114]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 14; pp. 18-19.

[115]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 17.

[116]Pilot, March 6, 1860.

[117]Pilot, March 6, 1860.

[118]Pilot, March 23, 1860.

[119]Pilot, March 26, 1860: Chronicle, March 27, 1860.

[120]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 20.

[121]Chronicle, March 23, 1860.

[122]Pilot, March 28, 1860.

[123]Pilot, March 28, 1860.

[124]Pilot, March 28, 1860.

[125]Pilot, April 3, 1860.

[126]Chronicle, March 23, 1860.

[127]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 18.

[128]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 21.

[129]Chronicle, April 20, 1860.

[130]Pilot, April 19, 1860.

[131]Pilot, April 19, 1860.

[132]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 21.

[133]See Creighton, Young Politician, pp. 297-298.

[134]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 21.

[135]Pilot, May 2, 1960.

[136]Pilot, May 2, 1860.

[137]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 21.

[138]Speeches and Addresses Chiefly on the Subject of British-American Union by the Hon. Thomas D'Arcy McGee, (London: Chapman & Hall, 1865), p. 164.

[139]Speeches and Addresses by Thomas D'Arcy McGee, p. 164.

[140]Speeches and Addresses by Thomas D'Arcy McGee, p. 164.

[141]Cited by I. Skelton, p. 375.

[142]Chronicle, May 4, 1860.

[143]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, pp. 21-22.

[144]Pilot, May 4, 1860.

[145]See Pilot, May 4, 1860.

[146]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 22.

[147]Eg. Weekly Herald, May 12, 1860. The Upper Canadian majorities were 25 to 22 and 23 to 22 respectively: Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 22.

[148]Eg. Stanstead Journal, May 17, 1860.

[149]Eg. Weekly Herald, May 12, 1860. Sandfield Macdonald was conspicuously absent that day: Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 22.

[150]Pilot, May 12, 1860.

[151]Chronicle, May 9, 1860.

[152]Chronicle, May 9, 1860.

[153]Montreal Gazette, May 9, 1860.

[154]Transcript, April 18, 1860; April 26, 1860.

[155]True Witness, May 11, 1860.

[156]Mercury, May 1, 1860.

[157]Mercury, May 1, 1860.

[158]Mercury, May 3, 1860.

[159]Mercury, May 3, 1860.

[160]Mercury, May 5, 1860.

[161]Weekly Herald, May 26, 1860.

[162]Creighton, Young Politician, p. 298.

[163]Morton, Critical Years, p. 89.

[164]Careless, Statesman of Confederation, p. 38.

[165]Eg. Quebec Morning Chronicle, October 30, 1860; November 8, 1860; November 12, 1860; December 13, 1860; December 15, 1860; December 31, 1860.

[166]Transcript, September 1, 1860.

[167]Transcript, September 1, 1860.

[168]Chronicle, November 8, 1860.

[169]Transcript, November 10, 1860.

[170]Chronicle, November 12, 1860.

[171]See Quebec Morning Chronicle, December 15, 1860; Pilot, December 28, 1860.

[172]Morton, Critical Years, pp. 90-91.

[173]Morton, Critical Years, p. 93.

[174]Morton, Critical Years, p. 92.

[175]Morton, Critical Years, p. 113.

[176]Chronicle, March 6, 1861.

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