CULTURAL FRAGMENTATION IN BRAZIL: THE FUNCTION OF TELEVISION

IN ASSIMILATION

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Cultural Fragmentation in Brazil: The Function of Television in Assimilation

for Tonia

ABSTRACT

The Third World has often been studied through conceptual frame-
works arising from the historical-cultural experience of the West. Two
such approaches, the 'dominant paradigm' and the dependency approach are
articulated through a concept of development based on the West's particular
creation, the 'ideology of progress.' Because of the cultural specificity
of central concepts, these approaches are inadequate for the analysis of
Latin American cultural problems. The alternative culture approach,
however, removes the centrality of the notion of development which is
replaced by culture. Development is thus subordinated to the particular
cultural existence. Latin American society is understood as a fragmented
culture resulting from a tension between assimilation into the hegemonic
culture and resistance and rejection of this culture. The assimilational
tension is integrated, is given coherence, by a media system. The particular
culture into which Brazilian society is at present being assimilated is
the consumer culture and the media system which has gained preeminence is
television which thus links industry to potential consumers, potential
cultural participants. Two functions of the media system are of
considerable importance; maintenance is the means whereby television is
linked and maintained within the modality of the consumer culture, while
promotion is the means of linkage of the media system to the society at
large. At the locus of maintenance are the advertisers, advertising
agencies and the audience research organizations. The locus of promotion

is here studied through the technological presence; the receivers,

transmitters, their distribution socially and geographically, and the

organizations which control them - the networks. Development is

conceived as the resolution of cultural fragmentation. In sum, media

systems cannot be viewed in isolation, and so, this study proposes the

particular use of television in Brazil.

SOMMAIRE

Les pays du Tiers Monde ont souvent été étudiés dans le cadre de
l'expérience historique et culturelle des pays occidentaux. La création
d'une idéologie particulière au monde occidental, "l'idéologie du progrès,"
a suscité au cours des années l'opposition de deux approaches: le
"paradigm dominant" et l'approche de dépendance. Les concepts fondamentaux
de ces deux théories étant spécifiques au monde occidental, ces approches
sont inadéquates pour l'analyse des problèmes culturels latino-américains.

L'approche alternative considérée dans ce travail supprime le
principe conventionnel de développement d'une société doit être intimement
relié à sa propre existence culturelle. Le monde latino-américain est
perçu comme une société dont la culture est fragmentée par l'opposition
entre l'assimilation et le rejet de la culture hégémonique. L'assimilation
de la société brézilienne correspond actuellement à son intégration dans la
société de consommation el la télévision; reliant l'industrie au
consommateurs, représente le média prédominant dans la réalisation et le
renforcement de cette assimilation.

Deux fonctions du système de média sont d'importance primordiale:
la conservation, c'est-à-dire la façon avec laquelle la télévision
s'ajuste et respecte les modalités de la culture du consommateurs et la
promocion, c'est-à-dire la façon avec laquelle le média est relié à la
société en général. A la base de la fonction de conservation sont les

publicitaires, les agences de publicité et les organismes d'évaluation du public-cible. La fonction de promotion est étudiée dans ce travail à travers l'aspect technologiques: les émetteurs, les récepteurs, leur distribution sociologique et géographique et les organisations de contrôle des chains télévisées.

Le développement doit donc tenis compte de la fragmentation culturelle. En résumé, les systèmes de communication ne peuvent être considérés de façon isolée, en tant qu'entité. Cette étude propose une évaluation de l'utilisation particuliére de la télévision au Brézil.

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INTRODUCTION

In recent years there has been a growing debate on the presence of
media systems, primarily electronic media such as radio and television,
in societies variously labelled 'underdeveloped,' 'developing' or
generically, the 'Third World.' The various approaches which have arisen
to describe the import of such media systems in the 'Third World' center
around the concepts of development and culture. In Latin America three
approaches have had preeminence. What has been termed the 'dominant
paradigm' concentrates on the capacity of media systems to generate social
change toward a pre-defined ideal social state based on the West's
historical experience. As a critique of the 'dominant paradigm,'cultural
dependency (based on the dependency approach) suggests that media systems
serve to promote the expansionist tendencies of capitalism and so, just
as the economic development of peripheral nations is impeded and becomes
uneven by capitalist expansion, the cultural superstructure is modified
and distorted through the importation of alien cultural products.[1]

Central to these approaches which have during the last decades
dominated the study of communication, culture and development in Latin
America is the concept of development and its linkage to the West's
particular set of beliefs, here termed the 'ideology of progress.'
The first chapter of the thesis, therefore, consists of the analysis
and description of each approach and the critique of the centrality of
the notion of development to them and the intimate relationship of the

concept of development to the 'ideology of progress' which assumes an evolutionary, linear directionality to change. In order to study the cultural problems and articulations in the Third World, however, these approaches are insufficient: the notion of development is culturally specific, and therefore, the particular cultural universe of the hegemonic culture cannot accurately be used to comprehend the state of cultural fragmentation arising from the cultural imposition brought about by expansionist societies.

For change, however labelled, to be meaningful change, its understanding must arise from within a culture. Accordingly, this thesis proposes the transition from the centrality of the notion of development to the centrality of culture from which could arise a society's particular often varied notion of development. In the history of Euro-Atlantic societies, the notion of development has lent an understanding to their particular existence. Thus, rather than subordinating culture to development, development should be viewed as a means of understanding and a realm through which action is taken, based on a people's particular experience. 'Third World' peoples contain the uniqueness of being the objects of Euro-Atlantic expansion and subjugation, and so have also been evaluated through its concept of development. During the thesis, therefore, a concept of culture is pro-posed in which it is neither simply an effect nor only one on a historical line in which the West is at the forefront, but one which recognizes the validity of particular experience.

In the context of the particularity of any notion of development,

the literature here reviewed arises from within Latin America of which Brazil is part. In Latin America and, in fact, throughout the 'Third World' there has arisen the call for indigenous theorization in which a central theme and goal has been the end of the 'captive minds.' Luiz Beltran in the mid-seventies and José Vidal-Beneyto more recently are examples of such a call which sees in the West's intellectual tradition a powerful means of control. Vidal-Beneyto, for example, points to the notion of development as the key to Euro-Atlantic hegemony within the 'Third World.'[2] Cultural dependency and the alternative culture approach are viewed as attempts at such 'liberation.' Thus because of the importance of a particular cultural realm in theorization, the goal here is to understand media systems in Brazil from within Latin American theorization which is often cast as 'against' the various 'dominant paradigms.'

A third Latin American approach to the study of relations between cultural realms, alternative culture and communication, follows the criticisms made by the dependency approach and bases itself on the work of Paulo Freire in order to conceptualize popular culture as having the roots of resistence to expansionist culture. An alternative culture, however, also requires alternative modes of communication, thus dialogic community based media systems are posed as alternatives to the vertical, monologic, electronic media, such as radio and television.

Popular culture as such is not necessarily an alternative, but it is here used, along with the dependency approach, to formulate and describe a central tension inherent in peripheral society which is unique to those

societies; the tension between the culturally superimposed, the tension

of assimilation, and the significance of local existence often as

rejection of imposed culture. Many theorists in Latin America, Paulo

Emilio among them, have pointed to a uniqueness of the Latin American

situation in which there is no indigenous culture which must be

continually negated in the process of cultural superimposition while at

the same time it is clear that Latin Americans are not of the hegemonic

culture, they are only with it. The cultural tension and the unique

situation are components of a particular state of underdevelopment.

Based on this confluence of theoretical propositions a framework and

factors of analysis of the presence of television as a cultural system

in Brazil, and its recent rise to preeminence as a media system, are

described in chapter two.

Cultural fragmentation, composed of the tension between assimilation

and rejection of hegemonic culture, characterizes Latin American

societies. Assimilation is integrated by a media system which, in the

present state of cultural fragmentation, is the television cultural

system within the implementation of the consumer culture in Brazil.

Integration refers to the bonding, the creation of coherence in the

assimilational tension which is made possible by the media system. This

is, therefore, the central proposition of the thesis; that industrial-

ization in Brazil and the television media system which integrates the

present process of assimilation is not a result of some 'natural,'

'universal,' development, but is a result of continued cultural

fragmentation, and as such, operates within the uniqueness of the

cultural state of Latin American societies. Chapters three and four deal with specific aspects of integration fulfilled by television. In chapter three the maintenance functon in which television is maintained within the specific modality of the consumer culture, is discussed. Chapter four treats the promotional function whereby the consumer culture is extended to increasingly large, more extensive and geographically dispersed society members. Television is thus understood as a component of a particular cultural state constituting the current cultural relationship between hegemonic and peripheral society.

The term consumer culture here refers to the current form of relationship held between hegemonic culture and peripheral fragmented culture and serves to distinguish this particular fragmentary state from others which came before, but also asserting the essentially similar relationship of cultural fragmentation prevailing. The use of the term consumer culture, and, in fact, the notion of culture itself, often brings connotations to communication and media researchers of a semiotic study of the systems of signs inherent in the cultural text of programming and advertising.[3] Such studies underscore the validity of looking at symbolic processes in order to get at that which "goes. on inside a participant's head." Nonetheless, the cultural cannot be reduced to a text nor is the symbolic the only indicator of the constitution of a cultural universe. Paulo Freire's concept of culture, developed further later on in this study, emphasizes not only the symbolic but above all those aspects of praxis, the relational tools, inherently imbeded in a culture. That is, culture is not understood by symbols

alone but being inherently active it becomes the "transforming action

of man, of his work" and the means of action of a people." Culture is

not only Man's symbolic processes, Freire's "word," but is inherently re-

lational, thereby including the tools of linkage, of relations, which

Freire then divides along either monologic or dialogic lines. Thus,

Freire points to the transformational tools of literacy and education,

which contain symbolic content but which are used for the cultural

liberation of oppressed groups through their relational potential as a

means of social structure change. For this reason the alternative

culture approach calls for alternative media, and so here too the

financial and technological aspects of the television media system point

to, as could a semiotic study of advertising and programming on Brazilian

television, the particular universe being implemented in Brazil; of the

particular transforming action of participants in a particular assimi-

lational process in culturally fragmented society. The consumer culture

here referred to, implies the expanded and extended consumption of

industrialized goods and as such has three central components; the

industry, the media system, and the consumer, aspects of which, the

maintenance and promotional functions, will be dealt with in greater

detail leaving aside for now any attempt at a semiotic study of programs

or advertisements from within this framework though, of course, such a

study is possible and eventually necessary. In sum, a study of the

semiotics of the consumer culture in media content says little about the

maintenance and promotional functions, but these functions as

understandings of the relational tools in consumer culture say alot about

the nature of the consumer, culture being implemented in Brazil at present.

Television is worthy of detailed study because it at present directly and most successfully links and integrates society members into the assimilational process. Though it is only one of the many media systems in Brazil, it has come to boast the primacy of being the link of the most dynamic aspects of industrial Brazil to society members, both socially and geographically. The significance of the two primary functions now becomes clear. The maintenance function in focusing on the means whereby the television system is maintained within a particular modality required at a particular moment by the assimilational process, becomes the locus of the linking of media systems into assimilation, thereby contributing to the continuance of cultural fragmentation. Similarly, the promotional function is significant for analysis since it is the geographic and broader social link of society members into assimilation, and so, is a promotion of current cultural fragmentation. The two functions studied here do not exhaust the integrational charac- teristics of television; the actual signification imbeded in program-. ming could be studied. Nonetheless, these factors, as indicated, are strategic in terms of the media system as a whole.

Brazil has been chosen for analysis since it has been labelled the "most developed of the underdeveloped," potentially the "first of the underdeveloped to become developed," and so, has been the center of much recent debate on development, especially following the "Brazilian miracle" of the early 1970's. Thus the fragmentary tension within

Brazil is evident even though there is no 'original' people remaining.

Significantly, as well, technologically assisted communication systems

have been pervasively implemented in Brazil. These factors provide for

ample range of analysis even though similar patterns of media

implementation cannot be extended to other societies since each

articulates the fragmentary tension in particular ways.

Problems arise, however, because of difficulties obtaining data

and because of a general lack of data. This results in often patchwork

descriptions of media situations. The creation of a coherent

understanding of television in Brazil is, therefore, difficult. There

are also difficulties in any attempt to quantify fragmentary cultural

states. Nonetheless, data concerning the linkage of the television

system to industry through advertising agencies in the maintenance

function, and the number, distribution, and organization of the

technological presence in the promotional function, indicate the extent

and means of creation and continuation of the assimilational process

through the television system in Brazil. The factors of analysis,

the promotional and maintenance functions, are useful given the need

for particular analysis of individual societies rather than the broad

generalizations found in many studies of media and development. The

factors of analysis, therefore, follow from the theoretical propositions

discussed above, nonetheless, they are limited to the assimilational

process and as such cannot take into account rejectional processes within

the television system.

To summarize, in the subordination of the notion of development

to culture, the conception of development and the import of
technological media systems must be understood through the uniqueness
of the particular cultural universe in question. Latin American
societies are characterized by cultural fragmentation resulting from
the tension between assimilation into and rejection of the hegemonic
culture. An aspect of the tension is the utilization of the Euro-
Atlantic notion of development based on its 'ideology of progress' for
the understanding of the presence of media systems and Latin American
society in general. The call for an alternative has been made and
begins with the conceptualization of this unique situation.   Throughout
the·thesis, therefore, there is a reconceptualization of culture,
development, and the significance of technologically assisted communication
systems in Brazil.

ENDNOTES

[1] The categorization of approaches is, of course, arbitrary. Nonetheless, such categorization is often used. The 'dominant paradigm' in communication studies refers to the mainstream research approaches based on Modernization theory. The dependency approach refers to a Marxian view of development which arose primarily in Latin America. Both approaches contain significant theoretical variants though with common assumptions.

[2] See, Luiz Ramiro Beltran, "Alien Premises, Objects, and Methods in Latin American Communication Research," in Communication and Development: Critical Perspectives, E. Rogers,ed.(Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage,1976), pp. 15 -42.

José Vidal-Beneyto, "La Dependencia de Las Categorias Conceptuales en Las Ciencias Sociales," Comunicacion Y Cultura,6 (Feb. 1979), 29-37.

[3] See, William Leiss, The Limits to Satisfaction(Toronto: U.Toronto Press,1976). The consumer culture is defined in this study through its symbolic content.

[4] Paulo Freire, "Cultural Freedom in Latin America," in Human Rights and the Liberation of Man in the Americas, I. Colonese,ed.(London: U. Notre Dame Press,1970),p. 165.

CHAPTER I

MODERNIZATION, DEPENDENCY, AND THE

NOTION OF DEVELOPMENT

The relationship of the West, the Euro-Atlantic societies, with other societies has had many and varied explanations. Few such explanations have arisen from the societies into which the West expanded, resulting in limited Western explanations concerning the significance of expansion, often, merely as self-justification. Two important approaches to the understanding of the relationship between the West and the rest are articulated through the notion of development with its close links to the "ideology of progress," itself a historical-cultural product of the West. This chapter deals with two approaches: the diffusionist 'dominant paradigm' with its roots in Modernization theory, and the dependency approach, especially cultural dependency. These will be dealt with in a general way in order to discuss their inadequacy for the study of the relationship of the Euro-Atlantic societies to other societies.

In the United States of the early 1960's the primary framework for the study of the difference between societies and thus the affirmation of concepts held in societies of Western Europe and North America was Modernization theory. Having roots in evolutionary sociological theory of the nineteenth and twentieth century Europe and North America such as the work of Spencer, Tonnis or Comte and more

recently Talcott Parsons, Modernization theory emphasizes pattern
variables which functionally characterize on the one hand the modern
society, and on the other, the "underdeveloped" society. The five
pattern variables have been simplified into UNESCO's "indicators of
development." Stages of growth theory assumes certain action patterns
as "built into the modern economic/technological institutions which the
underdeveloped countries" are encouraged to adopt.[1] The 'modern'
society, Lucien Pye suggests, is characterized by a "scientific and
rational outlook," "higher levels of technology," "urban and
industrial" settings while embracing "the spirit of enlightenment,"
·"human values" coupled with "the acceptance of rational-legal norms
for government behavior."[2] In essence the modification of pattern
variables in traditional societies, impels them into transitional
states and, hopefully, on toward modernity, a route which the West,
being the world's leader, has already taken.

Communication scholars steeped in the stages of growth theory
and the two-step flow framework, described media systems as
fundamental movers of the breakdown of traditional society and so the
process of communication through technology became an index of
development. Lucien Pye after stating that "a central problem of our
day ... is that of comprehending the many facets of political
development and of influencing the dynamic processes of nation
building," goes on to state that "it was the pressure of communication
which brought about the downfall of traditional societies" and that
"in the future it will be the creation of new channels of
communication and the ready acceptance of new content of communication

which will be decisive determining the prospects of nation building."[3] The process of development promoted by communication is seen as necessary, for the "process of recreating a coherent modern society." Thus the "pressure of communications" is toward development and the reproduction of the West's historical experience around the globe through the media.

For many scholars, therefore, communication which usually means the mass media, is seen as a major tool for the encouragement of the recreation of modern society. The euphoria and optimism surrounding this missionary endevour is exemplified by Wilbur Schramm who states that "as nations move from the patterns of traditional society toward the patterns of modern industrial society, spectacular developments take place in their communication."[4] Media, conceptualized as "movers," encourage "the feeling of nation-ness," helping to "teach the necessary skills," "extend the effective market," to "help prepare people to play their new parts" both within a nation and as a "nation among nations."[5] Consequently media serve as channels for the diffusion of "innovations" which already characterize the modern society. Diffusion of innovations seeks economic growth through industrialization, consumption, and the usage of capital intensive technology through the adaption of "traditional" peoples to "modern" situations.[6] For Schramm economics and the media are the primary "movers" of development; between the two all necessary cultural changes are made.

Utilizing the dichotomies of Modernization theory, communication scholars such as Daniel Lerner created the dichotomy between oral

communication systems characteristic of traditional society, and the
media systems which characterize modern society. Following a long
tradition in Western sociology, Lerner sets up the communication
systems as ideal types and so claims that "most societies in the
world appear to be in some stage of transition from one pattern to
the other."[7]   Nevertheless, Lerner states that "the <u>direction</u> of change
is always from oral to media system" and that "the <u>degree</u> of change in
communication behavior appears to correlate significantly with other
behavioral changes in the social system."[8]   Pye, however, suggests
that the media system and the oral system in modern society are in
an "orderly relationship" whereas in transitional society communication
systems have a "bifurcated and fragmentary nature" where each
represents a more or less autonomous communication system."[9]   Thus
Lerner claims that the transition is "a long-term process of historical
change that is unilateral in direction."[10] Development, therefore,

> involves the increasingly effective penetration of
> the mass media system into all the separate communal
> dimensions of the Nation; while at the same time the
> informal systems must develop the capacity to interact
> with the mass media system.[11]

Media systems not only become the 'movers' of development but also
their presence becomes indicative of the capacity of any society to
follow the unidirectional economic growth and social change. The
development process is considered to be achievable by all societies,
yet that which is 'development' is unique to only certain societies.

During the past decade the dominant articulation of

development, Modernization or stages of growth theory, has come under sharp criticism. In stages of growth theory, including its communication variant, the West is the model for development and the problems inhibiting development are considered to be internal to the "underdeveloped' society, resolved by implementing technological devices, especially those considered to produce communication, through which innovations are diffused. Schramm bases the requirements for development on the 'modern industrial state.' Lerner, meanwhile, assures us that media systems are of a higher order, therefore change is away from oral communication systems and toward the implementation of media systems. Having extrapolated from the Western experience in creating "ideal types," Lerner suggests that change is "unilateral in direction." Thus the West becomes the model for development and it is the West, as Pye suggests, that must be reproduced elswhere; the index and means of reproduction are the technological communication systems which are conceived as isolated institutions with ultimate effects.

Needless to say such theorizing has been criticized for 'intellectual ethnocentrism,' the apparent ignorance of inter-societal dimensions inhibiting development and its all too naive assumption that simple implementation of Western technology automatically generates development. In the light of criticism, however, a modified, refurbished 'dominant paradigm' has arisen. Everett Rogers, for example, proposes modifications to the diffusionist stance concentrating on "communication effects gaps,"

"audience participation," "network analysis" and some social change

needed for 'development'. The "new" approach has managed to incorporate

some of the vocabulary of criticisms. Nonetheless, it assumes an

essentially beneficial communication. Rogers and Lawrence Kincaid

suggest that communication is for mutual understanding and benefit

since the primary goal is convergence though divergence at times

exists. Thus it does not provide, as Robin Mansell points out,

"conceptual clarity or insight into systematic factors that constrain

development processes" especially "factors that constrain

communication."[12]

Criticism has dealt with aspects of the stages of growth

theory and the 'dominant paradigm', but the central concept on which

all such theorizing is based - the notion of development itself - is

never criticized, is never placed into doubt. A similar situation

reigns in the dependency approach and its derivative, cultural

dependency to which we now turn.

The dependency approach to the study of development arose not so

much as a critique of stages of growth's assumptions about 'modernity'

but of the means of modernity diffusion. For Celso Furtado the

"theory of dependency" is based on an "overall view of capitalism ...

aimed at the apprehending of the heterogeneity, in time and space, of

the process of accumulation and its forms of impact on the dynamism of

peripheral segments."[13] It assumes, along with Modernization theory,

a general progressive, if not evolutionary process. Thus there are

references to "countries" of "belated industrialization," as compared

to those where "industrial capitalism developed as an independent

process."[14] Dependency, however, emphasizes the external determinants

in which are found "the bases of the power system, whose action

intervenes in the restructuring of society which accompanies the

advent of capitalism."[15] Development and underdevelopment arise from

the same process of "acceleration of accumulation which took place in

Europe at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth

century."[16] The "peripheral" economies are dependent because capitalism

started there late and as a result of foreign impact, as if such

economies would have produced or even conceived of some form of

autonomous accumulation had there not been the late advent of

capitalism and the belated industrialization. Both types of society

follow an essentially similar process but the 'developed' got 'ahead'

and so are able to create dependencies.

This approach to development is the trade mark of Cardoso and

Faletto in which 'development' is assumed. They state that "Latin

American industrialization ... was promoted by internal social forces,

so it could not have been the result of the industrial expansion of the

center" and so "Latin America ... attempted to enter the era of

modern industrial production."[17] In this apparently "natural"

process resulting from the "rise of capitalism" there is the problem

of the external relationship which is viewed as hindering the autonomy

of the process of accumulation. For example, Cardoso and Faletto state

that when the process is not "directed by the national society, this

transformation entails another, more complex dependency," and so, "there

is no doubt that the direct participation of foreign enterprise gave a

special cast to the development of industries in the Latin American periphery."[18] A list of requirements is drawn up for a "modern process of industrialization" which includes "vast capital inputs," "large store of technological knowledge," "highly skilled managerial organization," "scientific development" and a "complex differentiated social structure" in which "previous accumulation and investment has occurred."[19] Needless to say these attributes, as with Pye's, belong to the "central nations" which in turn modify the periphery's development process engendering "specific relations between internal growth and external ties."[20] Once again the development process is assumed but with the further qualification that dependency imposes itself on development. Peter Evans describes dependency as "a situation in which the rate and direction of accumulation are externally conditioned" which is an obstacle to the ideal of "self-sustained, autocentric accumulation."[21]

Just as communication scholars utilize the notions of Modernization theorists to analyze the impact and usefulness of media in bringing 'modernity' to 'traditional' societies, so too do 'cultural dependency theorists follow the work done by dependency theorists. The cultural dependency approach suggests that because there is economic dependency as a result of the rise of capitalism, there is also cultural dependency; the problems of dependency in the economic base are reflected in the cultural super-structure.

Cultural dependency analysis begins on the broad inter-societal level of the so called "world system." "The countries of the Third

World are inserted," Juan Somavia points out, "in an international
system whose rationality operates in favor of the developed countries."[22]
Herbert Schiller, for example, points to "the sum of the processes by
which a society is brought into the modern world system" as the root of
each country's dependency.[23] It is thus on the 'world-economy' level,
which Immanuel Wallerstein describes as "the basic economic entity
comprising a single division of labor" arising with the development
and explosion of capitalism, that many cultural dependency theorists
concentrate.[24] There are, of course, various approaches at this broad
level emphasizing various aspects more than others, but the description
of the inter-societal level has been the essential for the critique of
Modernization theory. From this level the cultural dependency approach,
considering itself integrated into the "theory of imperialism," moves
to individual societies emphasizing the economic roots of the dependent
cultural process as the means of integration of each society into the
'world-system.'

Cultural dependency theorists depend on the economic critique
of the 'world-system' provided by authors such as Celso Furtado,
Theotonio dos Santos and others in providing the basis for their
discussions. Raquel Salinas and Leena Paldan, for example, state that
the "accumulation processes of the national economies are conditioned
by the means of their insertion into the international economy."[25]
Following a mechanistic concept of dependency, Maria Nazareth
Ferreira suggests that "the form of the development of capitalism is
responsible for the underdevelopment of certain countries and for the
development of others."[26] This economic root and framework for the

cultural analysis of Third World societies is summarized by Salinas
and Paldan when they state that "domination and dependency make up the
history of the world economic system, whose unequal and combined
development is continually renewing·its exploitative and centralizing
character."[27] It is the inequality of the linked economic relationship
between center and periphery which not only brings about economic
dependency but also cultural dependency. The autonomous development
of the center causes the lack of autonomy in the periphery as both
follow the laws of development.

Though economic dependence is said to have serious effects on the
development of the periphery, the cultural effects which it engenders
are not clear, for as Salinas and Paldan state, "a further understanding
of how the state of dependent development is created and expressed in
the cultural sphere of societies subjected to an external domination
system" is called for.[28] The cultural dependency approach argues that,
economic dependence offers dominance and control over the "underdeveloped"
world's information and cultural diffusion systems thereby being open
and available to the promotion of new forms of dependence each with its
own cultural effects. Thus the "new stage in the development of the
international order of domination ... is producing distinct effects in
the cultural sphere of the societies affected."[29] Roberto Amaral
Vieira points out that "our values are forgotten, Brazilian thematics
are put aside" as a result of the "preeminence of alien cultural values
and artistic production."[30] Ferreira summarizes cultural effects in the
following way; "the expansionist culture of imperialism transforms its
cultural·expressions into the model or paradigm of all possible culture,

just as it makes the characteristics of its people the only human

expressions."[31]   Thus Salinas and Paldan conclude;

> In comparison with former stages of dependency
> relationships, the contemporary stage seems to have
> a distinct character in the cultural sphere ... a
> drive toward cultural homogenization. Dependent
> development is, however, a capitalist form of
> development ... a process of modernization of the
> mechanisms for domination in the cultural-ideological
> sphere and, thereby, for the reproduction of the whole
> society as a system of domination.[32]

Dependency not only brings about the cultural homogenization of

the periphery following lines set down by the center, but also the

linkage between social groups in the periphery and counterparts in

the center is articulated through complex ideologies. Octavio Ianni

attempts to grasp this relationship through the conceptualization of

imperial ideologies and dependent ideologies offered to the dependent

elites as a contract of alliance. Thus Ianni sets out to "separate that

which is general to capitalism and that which seems to be particular to

imperialism" and so identifies several properties such as the principle

of private property and profits for corporations which are considered

to be common to capitalism everywhere.[33] To these general principles

of capitalism other principles are added by the hegemonic bourgeoisie

dealing with the relationship of hegemony and dependence. These

principles include, according to Ianni, the call to fight communism,

the notion that development is the reproduction of capital, and ideas

dealing with the non-European character of much of the underdeveloped

world.[34] These sets of "imperial" ideological elements, in conjunction

with the general principles of capitalism, are accepted by dependent elites and serve as the "principles and values that orient and organize the activity of the hegemonic and the subaltern bourgeoisie, establishing the limits and possibilities of business and alliances."[35] Thus there is not only an ideology of capitalism but also an implicit ideology facilitating imperialism, both produced by hegemonic elites and dependent on their acceptance by dependent elites. The "mass media" in this context serve "the cultural industry of imperialism" which comprehends "the processes of production and commercialization of cultural products following the requirements of the relations, processes and structures which guarantee the international reproduction of capital;"[36] the cultural is simply a tool of capital. Thus not only does cultural dependency bring about severe effects on the autonomous cultural processes in peripheral societies, but with Octavio Ianni's contribution, the cultural gap between center and periphery, common to many theoretic presentations, is filled through the postulation of different and complementary ideologies between center and periphery which maintain the relationship of dependence.

Dependency might bring severe socio-economic problems to dependent societies, but it is maintained by members of these societies. Salinas and Paldan suggests that "the state enterprises, multinational corporations and local firms associated with both or either of them" benefit from dependency.[37] While "the principal vehicle for acculturation is the relation between social classes," Ferreira suggests that "cultural dependency is facilitated because dominant classes of dependent countries adopt the cultural models of the

dominant society" legitimizing the relationship with the imperial center.[38] Thus dominant elites in dependent societies benefit from cultural and economic dependency as long as these elites fulfill the function of acceptance of subordination through the maintenance of the alliance with the imperial bourgeoisie.

The dependency approach in criticizing Modernization theory emphasizes the inter-societal aspects which limit development and thus shares some basic premises with its criticized counterpart. Salinas and Paldan state that "culture and dependence appear as the central words among these terms exclusively used in present day political discussion about the cultural independence of the underdeveloped part of the world."[39] Strangely, the concept of development itself is not considered a central term as if it were a law of nature and not a cultural product itself. The development concept is central to both modernization and dependency and it is through this concept that the critique, be it internal or external, of the 'underdeveloped' society and the 'world economic system" is undertaken. Dependency is not only the tampering with autonomous economic development but also with the cultural realm since dependent societies are "determined by their own laws of development" and by increasing dependence as well. Center-periphery studies have thus been stimulated "by the theoretical and practical problems posed by the chronic underdevelopment of Latin American societies."[40] Vieira suggests that

> Underdevelopment, root of our political crisis ... is, at once, cause and effect of the whole system of cultural uneveness. ... From the underdevelopment arises the

> poverty of the channels, the low participation of the
> people in culture and the delivering of the media of mass
> communication, and as a consequence, the culture, ...
> to cultural colonization.[41]

Thus whether using terminology describing class relationships of

capitalism in the maintenance of dependence or relying more on the

notion of the nation and its culture, the central concept through

which theory is articulated is development. The dependency approach

states that the Third World societies would not be underdeveloped if

it were not for belated accumulation of capital and continued

dependence through dependent industrialization, though all societies

are on the road to development of some sort. Presumably, the state of

dependent development is superior to being excluded from the world

system; modernity is the goal, the problem is in how to achieve it.

There have been many criticisms of the depencency approach

ranging from the circularity of argumentation in which as Ivaar Oxaal

indicates, Third World countries are dependent because they are

dependent,[42] to criticisms of its limited applicability resulting

from the too general description of relationships. Similar

criticisms are aplicable to cultural dependency, an example of which

is that provided by Ingrid Sarti. Sarti summarizes the cultural

dependency approach in the following way:

> (it) is a critique of the dominant ideology in Latin
> American countries because it (the ideology) is external
> to the national interests, to the extent that it is
> imposed from outside, and because it is opposed to the
> interests of the majority of the population of the continent
> to the extent that it is capitalist, thus, expressing the

interests of the dominant class.[43]

For Sarti, however, "cultural dependency neither clarified the ideological process nor its effect on Latin American peoples." because imperialism is viewed as a struggle between nations, and Latin Americans are considered to be passive receivers of impositions and in no way modifying the cultural imposition.[44]

The central problem which Sarti finds with cultural dependence is that it removes itself from the "essence of the problem" which is the·capitalist nature of dependency thereby making "anti-imperialism the main theme, leaving aside the class struggle and its specific results in each dependent society."[45] Since the role of the dominant elite in ideological production is ignored, theorists are unable to perceive that the "ideology is produced here and responds to interests dominating here" by elites who "can identify themselves with other capitalist centers to the point of association, but without doubt do not need 'imported lessons' to promote their own domination."[46] Thus Sarti suggests that though there is·economic dependence there is not necessarily cultural dependence because capitalist societies anywhere produce their own means of ideological domination rather than requiring external domination; internal relations are most important and should be the focus of attention. For Sarti there are, quite simply, capitalist relations which are universal and are thus produced where capitalism reigns. Though calling for a historical analysis, as if the tools of analysis which Sarti uses were not themselves specific historical-cultural products, the theorists must deal only with the universal laws of capitalism as understood from within a specific European theoretical

framework. Sarti calls for the reproduction of the critique of capitalism in a more orthodox fashion at least by negating the importance of the spread of the West's cultural products, and ultimatelly, by accepting them. The possibility of the existence of other worldviews at least hinted at by cultural dependency is negated by Sarti. The appropriate theoretical framework, it would seem, already exists and is, at least in central thematics, definitive.

The central problem with cultural dependency is not in its ignoring of capitalist relations but in its selectivity of ideological imposition. Though claiming that the center's consumerist culture is being reproduced in the periphery, cultural dependency does not acknowledge that by using such concepts as capitalism, class conflict, ideology, nation and ultimately development, they are themselves participating in ideologico-cultural reproduction. It is this position which Sarti faced though preferring to return to greater orthodoxy. But is there any other option for analysis of a perceived situation? What other means of analysis are available? This is a central dilemma of 'object' societies.[47] In sum, the problem with cultural dependency is that the "line which prevails, above all, is that of the Euro-atlantic socio-cientific perspective."[48] The important concepts acting as driving forces behind this perspective must, therefore, be discussed and criticized in order to break out of just such an intellectual straight-jacket.

Behind much of the socio-scientific thought prevalent today is some form of the notion of development. Development has become the standard against which the validity and evils of political regimes,

nations, and social systems are measured, and thus, as Vidal-Beneyto points out, is "above all culturally and ideologically speaking, the principal vector of penetration and control that imperial powers have used to establish and consolidate their economic and political domination."[49] Development has become the dominant intellectual preoccupation of Latin Americans in wondering how they become underdeveloped, in the critique of governments, imperial centers, political elites and is, above all, the goal for the future.

The fervent belief in 'progress' and 'development,' at least as currently conceived, is a product of Western-European culture. John White describes the notion of development as "far more potent than the crude instruments of 'neo-colonialism'" since it "is the last and brilliant effort of the white Northern world to maintain its cultural dominance in perpetuity, against history, by the pretense that there is no alternative."[50] Henryk Skolimowski states that the idea of progress arose within the historical relations of Western society in which the "idea of the fulfillment on earth has in time become institutionalized and known as the pursuit of progress."[51] The concept of development which finds its roots in the 'ideology of progress,' is comprehensible only within the framework of the intellectual history of the West. The "ideology of progress" is not one unified set of beliefs, but, according to Skolimowski, "the common denominator, the most powerful line of convergence, the overriding influence which has affected not only the development of science but of society and civilization."[52] This 'ideology of progress' will be described with the focus on its usage as a means for

the description of the relationship of the West to other societies;
how the "civilized," the "primitive," the "developed" and the "under-
developed" come into focus, are defined and characterized. To
paraphrase a sentence from Edward Said's Orientalism, progressivism can
be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing
with the Third World - dealing with it by making statements about it,
authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it,
rulling over it.[53]

The ideology of progress offers direction to what otherwise
would only be change. The "idea of progress" Robert Nisbet suggests,
"holds that mankind has advanced in the past - from some aboriginal
condition of primitiviness, barbarism, or even nulity - is now
advancing through the foreseable future."[54] The matrix of necessary
notions for the maintenance of the idea of progress include, Nisbet
asserts,

> Mankind or the human race; the unfolding cumulative
> advancement of mankind, materially and spiritually through
> time; a single time frame into which all the civilizations,
> cultures, and peoples which have ever existed on earth, or
> now exist can be compressed; the idea of time as unilinear
> flow; the conception of stages or epochs, each reflected by
> some historic civilization or group of civilizations or a
> level of cultural development; the conception of social
> reform rooted in historical awareness; the belief in the
> necessary character of history and in the inevitability of
> some future end or objective; the idea of conflict of cities,
> nations, and classes as the motor spring of the historical
> process; and finally, the raptured picture of the future ...
> affluence, security, equity, freedom, and tranquility. And
> justice![55]

It is apparent that the idea of progress contains two basic lines of convergence; it depends on the linear conception of time, and the belief in the cumulative nature of achievement. Hans Blumenberg states that the idea of progress "must contain a coordinative between the quantum of time and the quality of achievement."[56] With these notions, the universalization of the "ideology of progress" is achieved, or, more specifically, the negation of other world views. Thus the 'ideology of progress,' as a central aspect of the European-Western worldview, limits meaningful experience or action to those aspects capable of conceptualization within the convergent lines of thought on progress; any other form of organization is at best primitive at worst anti-progressive, reactionary. The implication of such a belief for non-participant societies now becomes obvious.

Nevertheless, what constitutes the actual advance is not at all clear in Robert Nisbet's definition of the "ideology of progress." This is because the "advance" has been re-defined historically. Though, as Skolimowski suggests, "a comprehensive reconstruction of the entire worldview of this society or that civilization" is needed in order to understand the aspect of "advance" contained in any people's idea of progress,[57] the present understanding of the advance is needed in order to comprehend those components of assumed importance in the relation between the "developed" and the "under-developed" societies. Thus without going into the historical reconstruction of the West's worldview, the present form of the ideology of progress identifies the union of the idea of fulfillment on earth through material gain with the validity of science and

technology; "for it has been of our universal belief, of our
ideology, of our myth, that material progress is the key to all
progress and that the machine is the key to material progress."[58]

The work of Francis Bacon and the ideas of Enlightenment,
France are found to be the keys to the present definition of progress.
Bacon, Skolimowski suggests, "linked general progress and the progress
of scientific knowledge" while the ideals of Enlightenment France
"unmistakably pointed at a certain concept of progress as unifying
reason, science, and the amelioration of the material condition."[59]
Nisbet echoes this but credits the Puritans;

> What is so striking about the Puritan conception of
> progress is that it clearly and firmly unites these two
> strands for the first time in Western history. Progress
> in the arts and sciences is held to be at once a sign of
> the imminence of the golden age of the spirit on earth and
> a cause of this imminence.[60]

There are, of course, various geneologies of the idea of progress, the
point here, however, is to indicate the specificity of the
creation of today's preeminent idea of progress in its scientific-
technological version. The central point is clearly identified by
Skolimowski when he states that:

> we have made of science and technology the kind of
> instrument our civilization required for its pursuit
> of progress; as a result we evolved Western (not
> universal) science and Western technology, both being
> part of our acquisitive conquering, materialistic,
> ideology.[61]

In the present version of the ideology of progress in which the

scientific-technological in the production of material "improvements"
is paramount, the ultimate goal of progress has been eliminated.
Though in previous versions of the progress ideology, such as that
held by St. Augustine or the Puritans, the goal was the implementation
of a specific religious state on earth, the secularization of progress
has resulted in there being no ultimate end for progress; progress,
however defined, is undertaken for progress' sake. A "new" toothpaste
is progress, so is the latest car an example of progress, as is the
"information revolution." Progress thus becomes an ideal, a goal in
itself. Doña Richards states that "progress" is sufficiently abstract
as to be only "approximated by humanity" - many barriers limit
progress - and so "one never reaches 'progress', one 'makes progress',
and in the Western view, there is always more of it to be made."[62]
Any change, any increase in efficiency, any innovation, "wherever this
force leads is by definition 'good.'"[63] Thus there is an assumed
possibility of unfettered, unlimited accumulation of scientific-
technological achievements which are by definition helpful to all of
mankind. Any questioning is, as Peter Berger would have it, an act
of anti-modernity, the ultimate in primitive irrationality.

The linearity of time is central to the progress ideology.
"Phenomena," Richards points out,

> must relate to one another within a lineally defined
> whole, where 'causes' precede 'effects,' and growth
> impels the incorporation and surpassing of that which
> has come before in a way that precludes repetition.
> Progress does not recur; it is triumph over the past.[64]

Thus through linear time "what precedes on the line is always

destroyed and denied."[65] Any non Western society is by definition

a previous form and thus must be developed, destroyed. Many are the

authors describing the cruel choices and pyramids of sacrifice

inherent in 'development.'

The ideology of progress is presently defined as the union of

science and technology in the promotion of the abstract, linear goals,

often understood only in certain forms of material "amelioration"

Dona Richards summarizes well the significance of the ideology of

progress to the West;

> Progress determined what was meaningful to the European
> and what lacked value - what was ethical and what was not.
> It became a frame of reference, and ideological base
> out of which other concepts were created and by which
> they were judged. ... It became linked totally with the
> scientific-technical and with the power relationships their
> development suggested. Progress became identified with
> scientific knowledge.[66]

The present version of the progress ideology, as did previous versions,

serves well to distinguish between peoples defining 'empirically' those

in need of 'aid.'

Significantly the ideology of progress has been used, be it by

the Greeks, Romans, nineteenth century social theorists or by present

day development theorists, as a means of comparative description; as

a means of defining not only the difference between societies and

cultures but also the superiority, and thereby, the supremacy of one

culture over another. Robert Nisbet, though pointing out that early

Greek philosophers such as Hesiod or Aeschylus articulated notions

of progress, and though he traces the supposed usefulness of such

notions in the making of the West, he fails to adequately describe

the usage of the ideology of progress as a means of discrimination

between the Greeks (or Romans, or Europeans), those who progress,

and the Barbarian, those who are not Greek. For Nisbet, the

expansion of Europe beginning in the 15th century, the age of

"voyage and discovery," serves only to indicate the "degree to which

the faith in human progress became a means of assimilating all

the non-Western peoples into a single progressive series reaching

its apogee in Western civilization."[67] On non-Europeans little

thought is lost, after all, "their rude, even savage cultures

rendered them fair game for enslavement, exploitation and colonization

by Western nations - for profit, yes, but in the long run also with

the intent to tutor and christianize these peoples as a means of

hastening their development."[68] The articulation of the ideology of

progress as a barrier between the West and the rest is here evident.

Discrimination is made possible through the supposed

universal applicability of the ideology of progress; not only is it

the fundamental belief held by the West but it is also claimed

to be the standard for mankind. Thus H.C.F. Mansilla points out

that "technological industrial progress appears as a universal

process, immanent to all cultures and in the form of a law

of nature."[69] Dona Richards corroborates this view by stating that

"the idea of progress is nothing if it is not projected as having

universal significance; otherwise it does not work."[70] The West
has "universalized the particular"[71] and in so doing created the
means for self-justification. Progress when applied on the inter-
societal level claims that though mankind progresses, the West has
managed to harness progress and become the most progressive, thus
any contact with other therefore less progressive, often apparently
stagnant societies, must be an aid to the progress of mankind no
matter what the pain, destruction, and horror the contact might have
engendered.

The universalization of the ideology of progress arises in the
context of linear time of history as a process of cumulative change.
Though "progress" is and has been achieved in a specific history,
that of Europe, it is projected as having universal validity. Thus a
specific linear time becomes the standard for mankind by its
existence beyond time, as a law, a standard, a reason for 'superiority.'
The West's history becomes the history of mankind; all must be
induced to follow since 'they' are the deviants, the arrestors of
time. Dona Richards points out that "the idea of progress both
creates Western history and simultaneously stands outside that
history, becoming an absolute in Western thought."[72]   Thus Nisbet
states that "mankind progresses," development theorists such as John
Goldthorpe and Peter Berger point to the 'improvements' brought to
Africa, Asia and Latin America through contact with Europe, thus also
the absurdity of the claims of how Third World societies would be
developed had there not been European invasion and colonization.

The assumption concerning the universal applicability of the

ideology of progress is, however, a potentially fragile means of discrimination since it can be adopted by any society thereby loosing its discriminatory power. The ideology of progress, however, is able to maintain the discriminatory power through its inherent circular argumentation and control over the 'knowledge' it permits. The eighteenth century notion of progress, Celso Furtado points out, is articulated as the bringing of such features as reason, accumulation of wealth and "superior modes of life" to all of mankind.[73] But, by what standards? By European standards; the evidence of superior endowments were the Europeans themselves since to be progressive is to be European. The circularity found in the scientific technological version of the ideology of progress is articulated in the following manner;

> ideals of material progress prompt science to explore
> the _physical_ aspects of the universe in a predominantly
> _quantitative_ manner; and prompt technology to produce
> goods and gadgets that contribute to our material
> standards of living. The presence of this science and
> this technology (which form the backbone of our world-
> view) in turn justifies our materialistic and quantitative
> life-styles.[74]

Thus the progress ideology becomes self-justifying, yet universal and linear; it becomes the standard for mankind even though rooted in a specific historico-cultural tradition and is capable of being re-defined as needed by the 'progressive' society. In sum, the ideology of progress provides and permits the framework of the knowledge about non-participant, non-Western societies, thereby also providing the need for the administration of those societies in the promotion of their

'progress.' If those societies could have, under their own strength,
progressed, so the rationale goes, then they would have, but since they
have not progressed they are incapable of it (as they truly are
since they could not be the West), and so aid agencies, social
scientists and bureaucrats are authorized to provide and administer
'progress' in doses devised by the 'progressive' in order to raise
those societies out of the misery of stagnation. Progress ideology
spawns 'developmentalism.'

The ideology of progress provides the backdrop through which
the concepts of development are articulated. The similarity between
Lucien Pye's and Cardoso and Faletto's concept of development mentioned
above, is therefore, not surprising. Everett Rogers exemplifies the
virtual reproduction of the progress ideology when in attempting to.
define the post-dominant paradigm concept of development he suggests
that development should be viewed as

> a widely participatory process of social change in a
> society, intended to bring about social and material
> advancement (including greater equality, freedom and
> other valued qualities) for the majority of the people
> through their gaining greater control over their
> environment.[75]

The notion of development as "human ascent," defined by Denis
Goulet, in which there is the "full realization of human capabilities
men and women become makers of their own histories, personal and
societal,"[76] further exemplifies the use of progress ideology;
realization of human capabilities is only within the context of
progress. In essence, therefore, the concepts with which the "Third

World' is described, the concepts and values through which the 'Third World' relates to the West, and the concepts used for critique, are of the dominant culture. The primary notion in all approaches used to study the state of communication and culture in Latin Amer ca is development. Though theories call for 'autonomous' and 'autocentric development' these theories continue to rely on the belief in "modernization in the economic-technological field following metropolitan paradigms."[77]

Throughout the 'Third World' there is a call for the autonomous creation of concepts, models and methods which are to arise within the framework of each society. "It is necessary," suggests Mohammad Quadeer, "that Third World countries, individually, should have opportunities to evolve autonomous disciplinary outlooks and cease to be what has been described as 'captive minds.'"[78] Many authors perceive the powerful force of 'imperial' centers articulated through the intellectual creations of the West and see in local creation a form of liberation. The dependency approach is considered to be a first step in the critique of dominant views of development since it at least indicates the relationship between the dominant society and the so called 'underdeveloped world,' while at the same time indicating the possibility of the existence of societies outside the limited Western framework. Because the dependency approach is articulated through dominant society's self-conception, the inadequate description of 'Third World' relations persist. The problem often recognized within the 'Third World' is that, as Vidal-Beneyto argues, there

remains the necessity of establishing

> the complete chain of our own scientific structure from
> the theoretical level to the practical conclusions,
> passing through the epistemological foundations of the
> hypothetical theories, their methodological formalization,
> their technical adequacy and their affective analytical
> practice.[79]

The end of imperialism will come only with the substitution of "imperialism and cultural colonialism" by an intellectuality that responds to the "ultimate determinants and the essential objectives of our specific situation."[80] The problem here, therefore, is not the ideology of progress and the concept of development as such, but it is their use in defining, and discriminating between societies in such a way as to justify the supremacy of one society over another. Thus it is the utilization of the ideology of progress on the inter-societal level (not such an ideology) which is at the root of the 'Third World's' self-concept, and which requires reconsideration. Rather than returning, as Sarti would have it, to more orthodox utilizations of theory, there is the search for means of analysis which utilize the insights coming from such authors as Franz Fanon, Paulo Freire, and of course, the dependency approach, but in so doing continue the practice of deliberate removal from the confines of a specific historico-cultural tradition. In the following chapter just such a framework is sought.

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CHAPTER II

CULTURAL FRAGMENTATION AND MEDIA SYSTEMS

The concept of development is, as discussed in the first
chapter, a particular cultural product of the Euro-Atlantic societies,
and, as such, is inadequate for the analysis of the cultural state of
the 'Third World.' In this chapter a third approach to the study of
the relationship between the peripheral societies and the West,
alternative culture, will first be discussed and then used along with
insights from the dependency approach in the formulation of the
analytic framework to be used in the discussion of television in
Brazil.

The primary aim as well as the key problem for alternative—
culture theorists has been to conceptualize such 'alternatives'
in the Latin American context. The ideology of progress through
the conceptualization of development has dominated much of Latin
American and Third World socio-cultural theory, but as Henryk
Skolimowski has clearly indicated, "there is no ultimate criterion
that would enable us to decide which instrumentalization of the world
is superior to others."[1] The notion of development postulates a
superior form while an alternative culture and media system is unable
to accept such a postulate. This position is clearly stated in Denis
Brutus' words,

> a re-examination (was undertaken) of the choices
> being offered to Africa between a Western capitalist
> system, ideology, set of values, and a Marxist communist
> system on the other hand. And after much discussion,
> much analysis, the consensus was, ... that for Africa
> there did not exist this either/or choice, or that it need
> not accept this either/or choice, that it would be
> possible instead to find a third, an African way, an
> African solution.[2]

In much of the Third World, in Africa and in Latin America, the postulation of the need for a cultural alternative has been made. There is no consensus on what such an alternative might be, but that the alternative is needed and that such an alternative involves the rejection of choices offered the Third World are primary premises.

Much of Latin American postulates concerning alternative culture and communication have roots in the work of Paulo Freire and so it is to a brief consideration of his work that we shall now turn. For Freire culture is understood as "a product of man's transforming activity (praxis) upon the world" and this permanent relationship of man to the world "produces not only material goods, sensible things, and objects but also social institutions, ideologies, art, religion, science and technology."[3] There are, thus, "real objects and the creating consciousness of the object, for as Freire states;

> culture arises as an effect of the transforming action
> of man, of his work, which acquires this meaning through
> the dialectical operation of the world's 'admiration' by
> means of which he 'separates' himself from it in order to
> remain in and with the world.[4]

Man's transforming activity, praxis, is for Freire the "act of knowing" or of "naming the world;" the process of culture creation. Man is differentiated from animals by cultural creativity though man shares the material existence with all other animals.

Communication for Paulo Freire is a central component of the "act of knowing." Freire relies on the Spanish philosopher Eduardo Nicol who in "studying the three relationships comprising knowledge - the gnosiological, the logical, and the historical - adds a further one, which is fundamental and indispensable to the act of knowing - the relationship of dialogue," and so,

> the thinking subject cannot think alone. In the act of thinking about the object she/he cannot think without the co-participation of another subject. There is no longer an "I think" but "we think." It is the "we think" which establishes the "I think" and not the contrary. This co-participation of the subjects in the act of thinking is communication.[5]

Communication is not the relationship of a subject to a knowable object, but is the relationship between subjects mediated by the object. Thus the object, the concrete, is an inseparable part of culture. For communication to exist and thereby "authentic knowledge,"

> the object ... cannot be communicated from one Subject to another as the object of communication, i.e., a communiqué. ... However, once the object provides, through communication, the mediation between two Subjects "A" and "B", the Subject "A" cannot have the object as an exclusive term of thought. Neither can "A" transform the Subject "B" into

> a depository for his thinking. When this does occur
> there is no communication.[6]

In sum, man is a creative thinking subject who comes to "know"
only in relationship to other thinking subjects in the act of
communication. This social relationship becomes a political one to
the extent that dialogue is broken and a "knowable object" is
transmitted to and deposited in a subject who becomes a dehumanized
object.

The political discussion of communication begins for Freire
in the statement that men are "beings who cannot be truly human
apart from communication, for they are essentially communicative
creatures," thus "to impede communication is to reduce men to the
status of 'things'" which is the "job for oppressors."[7] The
political aspect of communication, however, deals with the dialogic
aspect of the act of knowing. Thus Freire states that "only
dialogue truly communicates" since,

> dialogue is not to invade, not to manipulate, not to
> 'make slogans'. It is to devote oneself to the constant
> transformation of reality. In that dialogue is the
> con ent of the form of being which is peculiarly human,
> it is excluded from all relationships in which people are
> transformed into 'beings for another' by people who are
> false 'beings for themselves.' Dialogue cannot imprison
> itself in any antagonistic relationship.[8]

Since only mankind can know through reflection on the world, and
since knowing comes about through dialogic communication between
knowing subject under conditions of equality of "knowledgeability,"

only humans can experience, in fact create, the political realm and thus, only they can "dominate," "oppress," and de-humanize.

A key feature of dialogue and the political dimension of communication is thought and language combined in the "word." The word, which not only permits dialogue but is also the goal of dialogue, is made up of the two dimensions: reflection and action, which are in "such radical interaction that if one is sacrificed - even in part - the other immediately suffers."[9] If action is negated, the result is mere verbalism which constitutes an empty word because one "cannot denounce the world, for no denounciation is possible without a commitment to transform, and there is no transformation without action."[10] If reflection is sacrificed, activism, "action for action's sake," is the result which thus "negates the true praxis and makes dialogue impossible."[11] The "true word," the unsacrificed thought and action is praxis, and so, to "speak a true word is to transform the world." Freire explains himself in the following manner;

> human existence cannot be silent. ... To exist, humanly, is to name the world, to change it. Once named, the world in turn reappears to the namers as a problem and requires of them a new naming. Men are not built in silence, but in word, in work, in action-reflection. ... Saying that word is not the privilege of some few men, but the right of every man.[12]

The men, however, who are the object of "communiqués," with whom dialogue and therefore whose praxis is negated, speak the false words of the oppressor and are, as such, dehumanized. The

"oppressed" peoples are characterized by speaking of their

oppression through the oppressor's words, the false words which

enforce oppression; the "ontological vocation" of becoming

subjects is negated.

Culture, therefore, is a product of man's work, of praxis.

Praxis here, however, is the process of culture creation, of

"naming the world" through dialogic interaction with people; culture

is not the effect of a material state but is the process of

symbolizing and thereby changing the material world. To symbolize

alone, however, is mere verbalism since action and the means of

action are required for an "authentic word" and so for culture

itself. Thus the symbolic and the concrete, the concrete and the

symbolic are inseparable as a word, as cultural action by elites

and oppressed alike. Freire's concept of word does not negate the

effect of the cultural product since he states that culture as a

set of relations, conditions man

> by the products of his own activity which through the
> 'inversion of praxis' turn back on him and so in a
> certain way creates him. ... It is through creating,
> and being conditioned by his own creation, by creating
> an object and becoming an object, that he finds the
> great challenge of freedom.[13]

It follows from this that "if culture has such a conditioning

effect on its own creators, cultural freedom as well as cultural

oppression are directly conditioned by culture itself."[14]

"Culture of silence" is for Freire the state of oppression and

dehumanization. It is not a product of a material state, of a "mode

of production," but is the negation of man's praxis of "naming the world." The communication situation is characterized by a lack of dialogue and the "transmission" mentality. To the extent that transmission is successful the

> invaders penetrate the cultural context of another group,
> in disrespect of the latter's potentialities; they impose
> their own views of the world upon those they invade
> and inhibit the creativity of the invaded by curbing their
> expression.[15]

As the invaded respond to the values and points of view of the invaders the culture becomes inauthentic, dialogue is broken, and the invaded no longer act but "the invaders act; those they invade only have the illusion of acting, through the action of the invaders."[16] Thus culture ceases to be praxis and becomes only an adaption. Significantly, it is not a material state which is imposed in the negation of man's ontological vocation of transforming the world, but is a "view of the world," a culture; the "act," the combination of thought and action in the "word," is negated.

The process of liberation must occur, therefore, on the cultural level, it must occur in the "naming of the world" through the reconstruction of the word. Cultural action and "conscientizaçao" comes about through the discussion of "hinge themes." These themes serve to clarify "the role of men in the world and with the world as transforming rather than adaptive beings,"[17] and so to "develop an increasingly critical understanding" of the world. In sum, men recognize their oppressed state and seek "to assume the posture

of one who 'has a voice,' of one who is the subject of his choices, of one who freely projects his own destiny."[18]

The process of "liberation" is characterized by Freire in the following way;

> Men are because they are in a situation. And they will
> be more the more they not only critically reflect upon
> their existence but critically act upon it. ... Men emerge
> from their submersion and acquire the ability to intervene
> in reality as it is unvailed. Intervention in reality-
> historical awareness itself - thus represents a step forward
> from emergence, and results from conscientizaçao of the
> situation.[19]

Thus from the "culture of silence" through critical awareness of "conscientizaçao," intervention in reality, symbolically and concretely in cultural action, and thus praxis and cultural creativity in dialogic communication is sought.

Man is oppressed by cultural action and is 'liberated' by cultural action since it is culture that best characterizes the 'human' state. The oppressed become a source of alternative culture the moment they 'speak' their 'word;' they become alternatives also for the dominant groups in society since the oppressed are able to modify their situation of oppression and liberate the oppressor who, by Freire's definition, is also in an 'un-natural' situation.

Freire extends the notion of 'false words' to the broader context of 'Third World' societies. In the introduction to Cultural Action for Freedom Freire states that "authentic thought-language is generated in the dialectical relationship between the subject and his

concrete historical and cultural reality." In the case of the alienated cultural process characteristic of dependent or object societies, however, "thought-language itself is alienated" since these societies "do not manifest an authentic thought of their own during the periods of most acute alienation."[20] Thus the goal for the 'Third World' is to conquer its own voice through dissociation from inauthentic thought and thereby pronounce "true words."

These then are the roots of the concenptualization of alternative culture and communication. Since the emphasis is on culture as praxis, the result is not so much a preoccupation with the sign as such, but with any 'word's' creation. The source of oppression is the negation of the validity of the cultural realm of social groups and of societies. The silent society, like any silent group, speaks through the symbols of the hegemonic society. Thus in Latin America a state persists in which certain groups continue to articulate their worldview through the concepts of dominant society, thereby negating the 'true words' arising in these societies. Since there is an emphasis on praxis, the role of media systems in Latin American society, through their vertical monologic nature, have come to be central concerns of the alternative culture approach. Thus it becomes clear how Freire's concepts of communication and culture offer fertile ground for the criticism of present cultural states in Latin America.

In Latin America the conceptualization of an alternative has taken a specific course in nominating "popular culture" as a model for an alternative culture and communication practice. Maria Nazareth

Ferreira states that "to delimit a national culture it will be necessary to identify 'national' with 'popular' ... giving, evidently, more weight to the so called popular culture, which is the cultural expression of the great majority of colonized populations."[21] Luiz Mota and Ubirajara Silva have suggested that the "concern of professionals and theorists of communication should be with the Brazilian culture that ... corresponds to classes which historically have always been subjugated."[22] Though popular culture is not an "instrument of political struggle," Tulio Hernandez and Oscar Lucien state that it is the arena of political struggle.[23] Thus what has been termed "popular culture," has been postulated as having the potential to offer an alternative culture and communication.

Popular culture, defined by Carlos Eduardo de Silva as the "symbolic product elaborated, diffused and consumed by the subaltern classes", is permeated by mass culture, the symbolic products diffused by mass media, but this domination is "hegemonic and not totalitarian."[24] Thus though there is no coherent unified popular culture, it is capable of resisting the impositions of mass culture and as such provides an alternative to mass culture which is allied with the expansionist culture. Popular culture, Alfredo Chacon indicates, has a two part structure, one auto-generated while the other induced by dominant culture and so it carries the historical problem of the "alternative between authenticity and cultural alienation."[25] It is through the historical alternative that popular culture becomes a means of resistence to hegemonic culture. In this fashion popular culture becomes the realm of the struggle for cultural

alternatives.

Lucien and Hernandez seek, therefore, to characterize the alternative nature of popular culture; they claim its diversity since not only does it correspond to local creative processes, but also ,its defense and promotion implies the "respect of the right to be different, the legitimacy of diversity" which is to "reaffirm the role of the subject of history;" Secondly, popular culture "reunites experience·and knowledge" through the reappropriation of "experience, information,-knowledge by the masses," and finally, it ·is "essentially participatory," and so acts as a "conserver and reactivator of the memory" of subaltern classes.[26] Through this characterization Lucien and Hernandez suggest that popular culture offers the "seeds of resistence to the tendency of homogenization" of culture; and thereby, a break with the homogenized mass culture presented through the media by dominant culture.[27] Confirming this, Martin Barbero defines "the popular character as a memory of another gaged and negated cultural matrix" which "expresses a discourse of resistence, a retort to dominant discourse" and so, "more than an alternative, these practices constitute a lesson concerning the impoverishment of everyday communication."[28] Thus popular culture, Freire's culture of silence, is not considered to be so mute, but has come to be valued as a model for alternative culture, a realm in which the mass mediated culture and the expansionist culture can be resisted and negated.

A model of alternative communication accompanies the model of

a cultural alternative. Barbero states that communication is
alternative to the extent that it expresses the "popular character" or
comes about through the expression of "popular memory" and
"imagination."[29] Following the Freirean concept of communication,
Margarita Graziano states that "communication implies a dialogic
relation" which seeks the "inversion of the relation sender-receiver."[30]
For Miguel Angel Chapa alternative communication is characterized by
an "increasing degree of participation" in media systems culminating
in the "return of the voice to the people, to break with the silence
to which domination condemns them."[31] Oswaldo Capriles further
characterizes alternative communication as governed by access and
participation and as such offers resistence to the vertical monologic
media systems of dominant culture.[32] A synthesis of conceptualizations
of alternative communication is offered by Luiz Beltran in which
"access" is the "effective exercise of the right to receive messages,"
"participation" is the "effective exercise of the right to emit
messages," and the exercise of access and participation is dialogue;
the "effective exercise of the right to concurrently receive and
emit messages."[33] The alternative communication model is offered with
the goal of permitting the popular culture to be expressed and be
confirmed thereby overcoming the limitation and homogenization imposed
by vertical-monologic media systems, for as Chapa states, "the central
character of alternative communication is that it is the communication
of the dominated, of the oppressed."[34] Again the alternative
communication model is postulated as a means of resistence to the

expansionist society, represented locally by the elites. Dialogic communication is understood, therefore, as the means whereby the power and control of elites is broken.

Both alternative culture and communication are postulated as models of resistence to more than simply mass mediated products, but to the inter-societal-cultural expression. Lucien Hernandez states that popular culture and dialogic communication are alternatives not only to the "world socio-cultural 'unification' imposed by the development and expansion of capitalism" but also to conceptualizations. founded in the "historical process of Western Europe."[35] Similarly, Barbero suggests that the "transnational information structure" opposes local cultural alternatives,[36] while Capriles states that alternative communication rejects the authoritarian minipulatory model of the mass media created by Euro-Atlantic societies.[37] The emphasis on popular culture and communication as an alternative in Latin America is summarized by Orlando Fals Borda as a response to the

> contemporary tendencies that promote social homogenization,
> the impersonal and secondary relations, urban anonimity,
> the centralized administrative control, and the monopolistic
> exploitation, tendencies which, in general terms, have
> originated in the dominant capitalist countries of the
> North.[38]

Popular culture and dialogic communication are considered to be not only alternatives to monologic media systems but more importantly are in opposition to the expansionist nature of the capitalist West. Thus cultural resistence is sought not in traditional forms of culture but in conceptualized popular cultures,

not in an attempt to return to pre-colonial cultural realms, but in
an attempt to define the resistence potential within the constituted
society. The point here is neither to evaluate the resistence
potential of popular culture nor to evaluate differences between
conceptualizations, but to emphasize the call for an alternative, the
perceived need to resist, to overcome the cultural impact resulting
from European expansion, be it capitalist or otherwise. For special
reasons, which will be discussed below, Latin Americans have sought
resistence in popular culture, Africans, as Denis Brutus and many
others suggest, seek resistence in other forms of cultural expression,
nonetheless, the significance of the concepts of communication and
culture utilized in Latin America and elswhere in the Third World
is the central focus of cultural autonomy, of resistence to a
·perceived expansionist culture.

The diffusionist approach, cultural dependency and alternative
culture are the trends of thought on communication and culture which
have predominated in Latin America in recent years. There has been a
rejection of the missionary zeal and optimism of the "dominant
paradigm" in favor of conceptualizations which emphasize resistence to
hegemonic culture. The dependency approach has utilized the concepts
of the "dominant paradigm," the central concept of which is
development, in order to criticize the rise to modernity in
peripheral society indicating the very limited success of the
'dominant paradigm' because of its ignorance of inter-societal
limitations on development. Articulation of the dependency apprpach

through the concept of development is a key weakness of the
theorization since it does not recognize its use of conceptualizations
and modes of thought created by the dominant culture and it thus
selectively describes cultural penetration. The dependency approach
is criticized by Ingrid Sarti, among others, for being unable to
accurately describe the ideological and cultural articulations in
Latin America. Nevertheless a return to more orthodox Marxist
forms of analysis resolves nothing since it is part and parcel of the
expansionist society, as Denis Brutus has pointed out. In order to
overcome, or at least put to one side the continued limitations on the
study of cultural disarticulation inherent in the existence of the
periphery, some theorists turned away from attempting to
conceptualize and explain the means of expansion to conceptualize
resistence in the form of alternative culture. Nowhere is an
alternative easily conceptualized. Denis Brutus attempts to grasp
the focus of resistence stating that

> it is not resistence even liberation merely in the
> sense of freedom to govern yourself. It has
> penetrated beyond that. ... It is not a local, nor
> even a national struggle. We see ourselves as an
> element in the global struggle against imperialism.
> This seems to me the truly revolutionary element in our
> struggle for cultural liberation.[39]

Nonetheless, vagueness prevails in the description of the alternative.
In Latin America the alternative has been described, relying on the
writing of Paulo Freire, as the culture of the 'oppressed.' Though
not fulfilling all the prerequisites of the truly alternative culture,

popular culture at least offers a model and a source of
resistence to the hegemonic culture which other social strata,
apparently, are unable to resist. The goal of conceptualization
of alternative culture is to describe a culture which exists through
means uncommon to the dominant culture. Thus, alternative
communication is also required. In sum, the alternative is a
rejection of the West though again limited by available concep-
tualizations such as cultural dependency,and the emphasis on the level
of capitalist forms of production as root of the cultural dis-
articulation in the periphery. In all cases, however, the alternative
is not to be a Western alternative.

Though there are problems with the two approaches to the study
of communication and culture arising in Latin America, cultural
dependency and alternative culture , they do indicate that the
problems of the periphery are not those of the center. From the
dependency approach the importance of the inter-societal level and
the articulation of the dominant culture in the periphery must continue
to be central to any study of the periphery. From the alternative
culture approach the seeking of means to achieve "liberated"
culture and communication must be maintained. The dependency
approach is only a first level criticism, alternative culture a
level further removed at least in its goals though popular culture
need not be the sole alternative. Thus, aspects of each must be
maintained though awareness of the state of cultural disarticulation
must also be maintained in any study.

Having described, in summary form, the various frameworks of culture and communication analysis in Latin America, an attempt will be made to describe a framework arising from those discussed above with which to analyze the presence of the television media system in Brazil. The goal here is to attempt to conceptualize that cultural state in which the rejection of a perceived, overriding culture is undertaken though limited by the concepts created in the historico-cultural process of the expanding society, and thus to characterize the cultural tension which is expressed and typifies the societes of the so called "Third World". A brief discussion of the concept of culture will be undertaken and following this the conceptualization of cultural fragmentation.

Culture here will be understood as the realm through which man understands and perceives the world. Culture is what Skolimowski has described as the "medium sphere ... composed of man-made tools" and so continues "the totality of man-made inventions and tools - technological, scientific, conceptual, artistic and otherwise - composes the universal medium in which man lives."[40] Similarly Paulo Freire has described culture, the historical creation of man's transforming cultural praxis, as the "permanent relationship with reality" which "produces not only material goods, sensible things, and objects but also social institutions, ideologies, art, religion, science and technology,"[41] thereby becoming as Venicio de Lima points out, an eveloping symbolic universe in which men act as conscious beings.[42] Imbeded in this conception of culture is its twofold nature; it is at once symbolic and concrete, it is science , technology, and material goods as well as

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symbolic in ideologies, art and religion. Culture is neither reduceable
to sets of codes but, nonetheless, utilizes them, nor is culture
excluded from material goods, technologies and the organized social
institutions. Each is inevitably cultural since each forms a part of
reality and of a peoples' permanent relation to it; each belongs to the
sphere of the man-made tools and the man-made is inherently cultural.
In this study, however, only the media system as technology and social
institution will be dealt with, the codes of organized symbolic content
of the cultural realm are left to another study, another method.

Since it is through culture that man grasps the world, it is
through culture that conceptualization of the appropriateness of the
"medium sphere," such as the ideology of progress and its inter-societal
conceptualization, development, is defined and articulated. Since it is
through culture that reality is understood, but since there is no
ultimate universal means of understanding reality, it is at the
cultural level that there is the inability to conceptualize clearly and
independently the primary problem of the 'Third World' here approximated
by the notion of cultural fragmentation. Given the difficulty of
conceptualizing the alternative, the goal should be to conceptualize
"the period of revolt."[43]

A cultural universe is historically limited to any society.
The ideology of progress is valid within the context of its creation
since it offers directional explanation to change within Western
society, but when it is applied to other societies as an inevitable
universal it comes to be utilized as a means of explaining and

justifying the supremacy of one society over others and the negation of other cultural creations. For this reason Albert Memmi states that the colonized "must cease defining himself through the categories of the colonizers."[44] Paulo Freire echoes this plea when he states that "the fundamental theme of the Third World - implying a difficult but not impossible task for its people - is the conquest of its right to a voice, of the right to pronounce its word."[45] A cultural tension characteristic of peripheral society is thus alluded to by both Memmi and Freire as a result of the universalization of the particular.

It is in this context that cultural fragmentation can be conceptualized. Much of Latin American communication and culture theory deals with the cultural state in which there is the perceived need and the attempt to define a cultural alternative which rejects those aspects of hegemonic society in their manifestation in peripheral society. Cultural fragmentation describes the tensions of cultural disarticulation, the negation of continuity, created and perpetuated within a cultural universe by the contact, interaction, and subjugation to an imposing supremacy oriented cultural realm. The tension is articulated, in general terms, between two poles; on the one hand are those processes promoting and maintaining the linkage and hegemony of the dominant culture by encouraging attempts at assimilation, while on the other hand, the cultural processes of rejection promote resistence and change in the assimilational processes by seeking an alternative cultural universe. This then is the tension of revolt referred to by Albert Memmi.

Albert Memmi states that the promotion of assimilation is
inherent in the colonial missionary ideology but is demonstrated in
the colonized as the drive to become "equal to that splendid model and
to resemble him to the point of disappearing in him," in which case the
colonized "hides his past, his traditions, in fact all his origins."[46]
Rejection of the offer of assimilation, however, occurs in the "name of
the very values of the colonizer" and uses "his techniques of thought and
his models of combat."[47]   Thus "in the midst of revolt, the colonized
continues to think, feel and live against and, therefore, in relation to
the colonizer and colonization;" the colonized's "individuality is that
which is limited and defined by the colonizer."[48] Thus after a process
of negation and subjugation of the pre-colonial cultural universe,
replaced but not completely by the imposing culture, (nor is this
possible by the definition of the relationship) the colonized reject the
imposition but now their previous cultural universe is no longer useful
for rejection, in fact, it is coherently meaningless since by being
colonized the previous is negated, and so the colonized must speak the
words of the colonizer even in revolt. On the broader level of the
cultural universe itself, there have been several conceptualizations
of cultural fragmentation as a struggle unique to peripheral societies.

As well as the frameworks of cultural dependency and of
alternative culture, H.C.F. Mansilla points to the "crisis of identity"
suffered by Third World societies "since the more or less permanent
contact with the expansive and successful culture of metropolitan centers"
as the primary feature of peripheral society, especially when large

groups of the general population are integrated into assimilation through the mass media.[49] Paulo Emilio points to the Latin American cultural dilemma in stating that;

> we are not Europeans nor North Americans, but without
> an original culture, nothing to us is foreign because
> everything is. Our arduous self construction develops
> in the rarefied dialectic between the not being and the
> being other.[50]

Diverse from the African or Asian example which Albert Memmi has described, in Latin America there is no pre-colonial cultural óption to reactivate; Emilio clarifies, "the occupiers created the occupied approximately in their image."[51] Brazil, for example, "does not have a cultural field different from that of the West into which to extend roots. We are a prolongation of the West, there is no natural barrier ... that must be constantly suffocated."[52] There, therefore, is a particular form of cultural fragmentation in the Latin American case. Cultural fragmentation is not a particular form of cultural imposition arising with multinational corporations, television and the satellite, but is a historical characteristic of the Latin American object societies; these societies themselves created as parts of the expanding civilization, have become through changes of the dominant society within, expanding Europe, peripheral and disarticulated culturally. This process is only possible through the virtual elimination of pre-European societies which is not the case in Africa or Asia. Nevertheless, the tension of cultural fragmentation characterizes Latin American society and this tension Emilio defines as the "state of underdevelopment."[53]

The cultural relationship by which the periphery is maintained in a subordinated relation to the metropolitan center has been described by Octavio Ianni through several forms of culture. Having described the ideology common to capitalism, Ianni defines the specific ideology of the hegemonic bourgeoisie and an ideology of the subordinate elite through which the hegemonic relationship is maintained.[54] Though Ianni's argument suffers from the selective approach to cultural fragmentation in the periphery be limiting himself to those aspects considered to be typical of the capitalist bourgeoisie, the ideologico-cultural relation between certain social groups in which group members accept, articulate, and promote those concepts of the dominant culture, is a useful explanation of the means of maintenance of cultural fragmentation. The Brazilian filmmaker Glauber Rocha describes the bourgeoisie as those members of the peripheral society who seek to promote assimilation into dominant culture as a means of overcoming fragmentation. For Rocha the "primitive" only exists through the cultural processes created by those who claim "civilized" status. The acceptance of "primitivism" by peripheral society members is indicative of the state of underdevelopment.[55]

Paulo Emilio utilizes a similar dichotomous conceptualization of the peripheral society. Those society members integrated into, and therefore, promoting assimilation in local cultural processes are considered to be "occupiers." The status of the occupier, representative of any given moment's metropolis, is unchanging as long as there is the external orientation in which there resides the explanatory notions of the

occupier/occupied cultural realm. It is not the case that internal

cultural processes are mere mechanistic responses to hegemonic

culture's directives, but that internal action results and relates to

the most recent locus of fragmentation through modified explanatory

models such as the change from colonialism to developmentalism. Thus,

though the cultural processes evolve complex articulations, the central

contradiction within fragmented culture, the occupier/occupied

dichotomy, is not adequately dealt with. In peripheral society the

culturally creative component of social existence is marked by the lack

of continuity and premature decadence.

Paulo Emilio suggests that social stratification in peripheral

society occurs not so much through 'modes of material production' but

primarily through affinity to the dominant cultural universe.[56]

Similarly Ali Mazrui has stated that elites in African society are a

result of their Western education; their adoption of Western models and

socio-political explanations permits them to maintain power in an

essentially "Westernized" world.[57] For as Marshall Sahlins affirms,

> there is no material logic apart from the practical
> interest, and the practical interest of men in production
> is symbolically constituted. The finalities as well as
> the modalities of production come from the cultural side:
> the material means of the cultural organization as well as
> the organization of the material means.[58]

The colonial experience served to define the means of elite creation

since it set the boundaries of possible culture, of possible

explanations, in sum, it served to organize knowledge within a

particular mode. Though it is much too simple to dichotomize society

as Emilio does, the notion that peripheral society is stratified through assimilation into dominant culture through a complex articulation is useful in understanding cultural fragmentation.

In the context of cultural fragmentation the notion of development corresponds to that state in which assimilational cultural processes predominate within a society and is thus the process of continued Westernization, cultural articulation through the West's particular cultural experiences, and therefore, of the negation of all other cultural universes in non Western societies. Development, on the other hand, is the culturally creative process which undertakes a critical appraisal of the fragmented cultural universe and its history while seeking to re-codify reality. Paulo Freire has stated that "development is achieved only when the locus of decision for the transformations suffered by a being is found within and not outside of him."[59] Thus underdeveloped society is that which is characterized by an existence as a shadow and as an image of other cultural realities; a situation of reflexivity and thus of cultural fragmentation.

The elite within a society dominated by the assimilational process of cultural fragmentation have a cultural affinity with the hegemonic culture. It is thus not simply an alliance between hegemonic and subordinate elites who being capitalists have "natural" and mutual interests, as dependency theorists would have it, nor does the elite simply adopt, as if they had such objective choices, the cultural values of the hegemonic culture. The elite should be understood as being permitted access to hegemonic culture and created in this fashion,

thus as culture is the symbolic universe through which men act, the elite culture is whatever cultural realm most permeates the inter-societal relationship at a particular time. The elite, be it critical or assimilation promoting, exists only within the hegemonic cultural setting and thus seeks to articulate, to a large extent, only those options available within their specific cultural universe. Thus reproductions on a smaller scale of hegemonic culture appear throughout the Third World. Urban areas become centers of 'Westernization,' 'developing' industrialism and consumption. In this fashion dynamic areas appear in fragmented society. These dynamic areas are those in which the elite with the current links to the hegemonic culture, act to create and implement their particular articulation of the hegemonic culture. Yet by definition, by their subordinate status, the full implementation is not possible and recourse to several alternatives offered and available in hegemonic culture are taken. Transnational corporations, for example, become options for rapid growth, foreign "aid" is called for, and in the process of reproducing the particular historical experience of the West, a very different experience emerges. Thus an elite, which depends to a great extent on the state of the hegemonic culture for its existence and practice, promotes cultural assimilation.

In Brazil there have been several dynamic areas which correspond to what has been usually called the cycles of economic and social development of Brazil. These cycles have been characterized by an increase in wealth and settlement of particular goegraphic areas combined with intense trade and commerce between the hegemonic culture

and Brazil succeeded by a period of decline following a re-articulation of the particular relationship the subordinate elite has with the hegemonic elite. All such dynamic areas specialized in some form of extractive economy be it sugar, hides, gold and silver, or later coffee, rubber. Above all, each area represented the particular implementation of the understanding maintained between the hegemonic culture and the periphery. Presently the dynamic area comprises the Rio-Sao Paulo area of Brazil, the center of industrial expansion in Brazil. The present cultural realm is that delimited by the consumption of those products generated in the course of the reproduction of hegemonic culture in Brazil.

The present dynamic is characterized, according to Pedrinho Guareschi, by the variable "consumerism."[60] Allan Wells describes consumerism as the rise in the consumption of manufactured goods either through local production or importation thereby entailing the reproduction of consumers with similar values and ways of life as those in "developed" societies.[61] The implementation of consumerism has resulted, Karl Sauvant points out, in "the values and behavioral patterns of important segments of the Third World societies" being "transformed to reflect those of metropolitan countries."[62] The assimilational process, one in which the elite seek to reproduce the industry, markets and required linkages within object societies, is the reproduction of the particular cultural realm of the Euro-Atlantic societies in which the culture embues industrial production and consumerist organization with ultimate validity. For as Marshall Sahlins points out,

> The cultural scheme is variously inflected by a dominant
> site of symbolic production, which supplies the major idiom
> of other relations and activities ... a priviledged
> institutional locus of the symbolic process, where emanates
> a classificatory grid imposed upon the total culture.[63]

In the West,

> the economy is the main site of symbolic production.
> For us the production of goods is at the same time
> the priviledged mode of symbolic production and
> transmission.

There are, therefore, three components of the implementation of the
consumer culture; the creation of industry, the creation and
maintenance of social groups oriented to the consumption of industrialized
products, and the media system which links the two above mentioned
components.

The assimilational process in culturally fragmented society is
integrated by a media system. The alternative culture approach
recognizes that the monologic, vertical media system such as television
integrate the dominant culture. Media systems act in maintenance of
and promotion of the specific form of assimilation. Thus each historical
period of cultural fragmentation is integrated through a communication
system linking the occupier and the hegemonic culture, at times more
directly at times less so, at times integrating larger groups in society
such as present media systems do, while at times only maintaining elite
members. It is, therefore, the present technological media system in
Brazil, television being central, which is of special interest in this
study. Other media systems have been used previously; radio reached

its peak in the 1950's as Miriam Goldfeder demonstrates,[65] while in the 1960's and 1970's the implementation of a television system became the primary form of assimilation promotion. This is not to claim that the tension of cultural fragmentation is alien to integrational media systems. This tension does exist and its forced compromises in media systems are a relevant area of study, nevertheless the problem of how television integrates the occupier realm and this realm with that of the occupied is here of primary interest.

Paulo Emilio has undertaken a study of one integrational media system; cinema in Brazil. He delineates three periods in the history of Brazilian cinema in which there is the rise of internal expression of the primary theme of the "underdeveloped" world, the occupier/occupied dichotomy, followed by atrophy resulting from the reimposition of the 'occupier's expression.' For Emilio an example of the expression of the occupier is the Atlantida film company which though financed locally and presided over by Alberto Cavalcanti, was a resounding failure. Atlantida, Emilio suggests, modelled itself on Hollywood studios attempting to produce Brazilian Hollywoodian musicals in 1950's. The audience, however, chose the Hollywood film resulting in low box-office receipts for Atlantida and eventual bankruptcy. Atlantida, Emilio concludes, started from erroneous presupositions when it should have first dealt with local cultural contradictions.[66] In essence, integrational media systems operate in reflexive fashion attempting to reproduce aspects of the dominant culture thereby promoting assimilation while the state of cultural fragmentation is ignored.

The appearance of television systems in the Third World has
often been studied in terms of the transfer of models of television
organization. Elihu Katz and George Wedell, taking the stance of the
'dominant paradigm,' state that "most of the countries concerned have
relied on models of broadcasting developed in the United States, France,
the United Kingdom, or one of the other colonial nations of Europe."[67]
While the model and the structure of the institution are culturally
specific, broadcasting as such is assumed not to be. Katz and Wedell
confirm this by stating that "the models adopted in Western countries
were, of course, themselves designed in response to the particular
circumstances obtaining at a particular point in each country's
history."[68] In this context the problem for the Third World is related
to what Rita Cruise O'Brien calls the particular "socio-cultural features
of transferred metropolitan models of professional training and the
organization of communications structures."[69] While broadcasting has
an assumed universality, problems are found in its application. This form
of analysis exists in the framework of an "evolutionary analysis of
broadcasting" in which countries seeking development struggle in their
"quest for membership of the electronic age."[70] Thus Peter Golding,
though critical of the 'dominant paradigm,' summarizes the problem
concerning the appearance of mass media in the Third World; "They do
not appear spontaneously at an appropriate moment in social evolution,
but have been transplanted from metropolitan centers."[71] Interference
in evolutionary development by the inappropriate transfer of broadcasting
models and the subsequent adaption to local needs are considered to be

at the root of media problems in the Third World.

The approach to the study of media systems such as television in the Third World in which the model transfer is the key, offers a universalizing stature to broadcasting since it is suggested that broadcasting belongs to a higher order of societal evolution. Cultural problems arise only at the level of the model. Not only do these approaches overlook the culturally specific notions of evolution and progress, but they also ignore the culturally specific invention of electronic broadcasting. Significantly, all models of broadcasting identified by Katz and Wedell have origins in the West. The critique of transferred broadcasting models only partially deals with the problems of cultural expansion in the case of media systems. Skolimowski states that "the story of the inventions of a given society or civilization is intricately woven with the values and social ideals of this civilization," and so "it is egocentric and megalomaniac on our part to view inventions of other cultures through the telescope of our culture,"[72] or, for that matter, to view the West's inventions as universal standards. Thus it is not the transferred model that is the root of the cultural fragmentation in the Third World, but is the whole television cultural system in its integration of the assimilational cultural process.

The television cultural system as part of the totality of media systems integrating the process of cultural assimilation, has come to be of increasing importance in integrating the consumer culture and so is not defined as an economic or technological unit since its importance is

found in the aggregate of interactions of economic, ideological and technological components in the implementation of the expanding and self-replicating cultural universe.. The television system includes the technological presence, the programming, the financing and ownership, and the general governing ideology, which is, in the Brazilian case, that of private commercial television. The television system, however, is only one aspect of the cultural process in peripheral society within the fragmentary tension. These then are factors of analysis which are to be persued here. The topics discussed here do not exhaust the impact of television, nonetheless it promotes a particular universe in which assimilation presently is articulated.

The financing, in conjunction with ownership, is another component of the television cultural system. This component becomes inordinantly important as a form of control on signification since the television system is an integrational media system linked to the West's creation - the consumer culture - as it is recreated in Brazil. Only particular types of financing are permitted, offering therefore, control by negation of other forms of participation in the expansion of the television cultural system. This provides the analytic link to the industry, advertising agencies and products characteristic of the present state of cultural fragmentation and which requires the integrational functions of television. This is the maintenance function, dealt with in chapter three, in which television is maintained within a particular modality.

The technological presence of the television cultural system comprises

the equipment itself which includes all television production and transmission equipment and receivers, the country of origin, the structures of organization and ownership, and the geographical and social distribution of the technology in the assimilating society. This permits the analysis of the linkage of media institutions to society members through network formaticn and control, thereby describing the monologicity and verticality of the television system limiting the access and participation of society members. This is the promotional function to be discussed in chapter four.

In the television cultural system, programming has become the signification which bridges the financial aspect and the technological presence. Many studies of Third World television concentrate on programming as if it alone bore the imposing culture, as if it alone were a cultural product. Programming, however, is predicated within the television cultural system. The point here is that the whole of the television cultural system can only be comprehended within a specific cultural framework and this within the specific form of assimilational cultural processes operating within the society at a specific time. It is, therefore, the television cultural system, through linkages to industry and to society members, and not programming alone which integrates these components of the assimilational process presently at work in the object society. This thesis thus deals only with the maintenance and promotional functions of the television cultural system as it integrates the consumer culture leaving aside any detailed analysis of programming. It is to the consideration of the maintenance function to which we turn in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER III

THE MAINTENANCE FUNCTION AND THE
TELEVISION CULTURAL SYSTEM

The period of change from one assimilational state to another,
corresponding to a change of the source of predominant action within
the hegemonic culture, occurred in Brazil during the twentieth
century. From a linkage in which certain agricultural products
constituted the significant purpose of the hegemonic link, the period
following the increasing dominance of the United States and the
weakening of the agricultural assimilation process during the 1930's,
saw the implementation of industry in Brazil. An opportunity arose,
therefore, for local elites to implement that which, within the Euro-
Atlantic cultural realm, came to be termed the 'progressive' course
to take, it was, after all, the much acclaimed 'industrial revolution.'
Such sought after reorganization of the dynamic areas does not occur
without difficulties. In Brazil before the opportunity to implement
industry, all consumer goods were imported, industrialization has thus
concentrated on import substitution, here understood on a much broader
level than simply government policy, financial investments or the
importation of capital goods, but as representing the significance of
the changing relationship between reflex culture and hegemonic culture
by creating a new dynamic area and assimilational process seeking the
reflection of hegemonic culture to the most minute detail. Import

substitution here identifies the attempts at·reproduction in a reflexive manner of a particular society and the substitution of the previous relationship. Industrialization takes a particular form in Brazil because it implies the cultural choices necessary in facing the uniqueness of recreating the particular.

As Helio Jaguaribe suggests, however, import substitution through import reflexivity seemed to offer Latin Americans greater control over their societies.[1] The means whereby this process occurred as well as the conflict with elites of the previous assimilational state became central aspects of political activities in Brazil after 1930. Armand Dreifuss identifies alternating governments seeking either a more 'nationalist' process of industrialization, such as the Getulio Vargas governments , which often translated into incrased government participation in industry, or a more "developmentalist" policy such as that chosen by Juscelino Kubitschek in his "Plano de Metas" in which consumerist industrial implementation occurs with the aid of "foreign" corporations.[2] During the period following the 1930 crises of coffee exports and with the increasing importance of industry, governments were characterized by often tenuous "alliances" between groups of each assimilational state. Later, however, rivalry gave way to open ,struggle between the two groups. The implementation of the consumer culture and concomitantly of industry made the rise of the "trans-national" corporation and "foreign" investment possible, comprehensible, desirable, but not without political debates on this issue. Seldom, if ever, has assimilation itself been questioned. This section, therefore, will deal with the increasing importance of

industry in the Brazilian economy, the importance of transnational, local and state owned corporations, the creation of another dynamic area, not as the process of development, but as an aspect, a component, of the present assimilational state.

In the agricultural assimilation state consumption is limited·to a small segment of the population. This is indicated in Table 3:1 which presents the value of various categories of imported goods in Brazil; as the value of consumer goods decreased as percentage of total imports, the value of capital goods increases and industry is implemented. Between 1930 and 1961 Brazilian industrial production

TABLE 3:1   Distribution of Brazil's Imports   (Percentage of Total)

	1901-07	1919-23	1929	1937-38	1948	1955	1961
Consumer goods	36.9	19.9	18.7	13.3	17.3	9.3	7.4
Capital goods	7.1	11.5	26.7	23.7	39.3	27.2	31.6
Raw materials and intermediary goods	55.1	68.6	54.6	63.0	43.4	63.5	61.0

Source: Evans, p.68.

increased 68.3 percent[3] coming to represent 33 percent of GDP in 1960 and rose to 36.3 percent in 1970.[4] Peter Evans, though presenting slightly smaller figures, indicates the decreasing importance of agriculture and the increasing importance of industry since the Second World War.[5]   The present assimilational state is one in which industry supercedes agriculture and has come to create a new dynamic

area with the most direct relationship with the present state of the hegemonic culture.

TABLE 3:2   Changes in Sectoral Composition of GDP

Year	Agriculture	Industry	Service
1939	25.8	19.4	54.8
1949	26.0	26.2	47.8
1959	20.2	30.1	49.7
1966	19.1	27.1	53.8
1973	15.3	33.3	51.5

Source: Evans, p.71.

Many are the analysts of Brazil's recent past, Armand Dreifuss and Peter Evans among them, who have described Brazilian industrialization as a struggle between foreign and local elites. 'Foreign' capital amounts to investments from the center of the hegemonic culture which comes to play an important part in cultural assimilation in Brazil. Though since the late 1940's industry has had an increasing share of the economic output, Table 3:3 indicates that foreign investment has been significant in Brazil since at least the late nineteenth century. At the beginning of the twentieth century European investments were much more important than North American but with the increase in industry in the creation of a dynamic area, the importance of North American, primarily United States investments, has increased. The largest U.S. economic groups in Brazil founded

since World War Two, are industrial, whereas-European investment has traditionally been in agriculture.[6]

TABLE 3:3 Distribution of Foreign Investment by Country of Origin

Percentage of Total

	1914	1930	1950	1959	1972
North America	4	25	71	56	46
Europe	96	72	25	36	42
Other	--	3	4	8	12

Source: Evans, p.82.

Some of the largest firms in Brazil are foreign. In the early 1960's transnational groups represented 34.9 percent of corporations with between 900 million and 4 billion cruzeiros of capital and increased to 56.4 percent of those with over 4 billion invested cruzeiros. But when local corporations with some foreign investment are included the total reaches 83.7 percent[7] of these corporations with over 4 billion invested cruzeiros.

By 1970 among the top 15 corporations only one was a private Brazilian firm while in 1971 among the largest firms seven were foreign and twelve were state owned corporations.[8] These then are two aspects of import substitution; foreign input in industrial implementation which represents the substitution of a particular relationship with hegemonic culture by another while the industrial investment from the United States represents a change in the locus of

hegemony from Europe to the United States. This form of assimilation, however, is accompanied by increased state investment in an attempt to continue the implementation of industry and to maintain local control which is a promise made by hegemonic culture when viewed as an example of appropriate industrialization.

Along with industry, however, came the need and the logic of 'foreign' investment and so the promised increased control over society became illusive. Local private groups were unable to maintain the pace of investment nor had the technological prowess that hegemonic elites could command. The state became an alternative for investment and came to play an important part in the assimilational process. This is a second characteristic of the implementation of the consumer culture in Brazil.

In 1976 there were 373 state owned corporations in Brazil, 70 percent of which founded since 1964.[9] Table 3:4 demonstrates that since the end of World War II and with increasing industrialization in Brazil, state owned corporations have increasingly been utilized to command investment funds in the face of 'foreign' investments. As

TABLE 3:4   Number and Percentage of State-Owned Corporations Founded in

Time Periods

1808-1930	1930-1945	1945-1955	1956-1963	1964-1976
18 (5%)	12 (3%)	17 (4%)	63 (17%)	262 (70%)

Source: Evans, p.222.

Eduardo Suplicy points out, it was during the period of rapid GDP

'growth between 1967 and 1973 that most such corporations were founded;

during the Costa e Silva government (1966-1969) 55 were organized and

during the Medici government (1969-1973) 99 were created. These

corporations are, as with the largest 'foreign' owned, among the

largest corporations in Brazil as indicated in Table 3:5. In sum,

TABLE 3:5 State Enterprises Among the Top 300   (percentage of assets)

1966			1972		
Transnational	Local	State	Transnational	Local	State
47	36	17	42	28	.30

Source: Evans, p.222.

local private groups have increasingly been displaced by large foreign

and state run corporations. Transnational corporations predominate in

chemical, machinery, electrical, tobacco, pharmaceutical, transport and

rubber industries, the state dominates in the petroleum industry and

steel, while local private corporations predominate in what Peter Evans

calls "traditional" industries such as textiles, foods, wood and paper

products.[11] Thus at the same time that the consumer culture has been

implanted in Brazil there has been increased 'foreign' and state

investment especially in the more 'advanced,' that is, more current

industries with origins in hegemonic society.

A new dynamic area, by redefinition of the form of cultural

hegemony, has been created through import substitution. "Since its

beginnings," Werner Baer points out, "the industrial growth of Brazil

has been concentrated in the Center-South, especially Sao Paulo."[12]

This is not only characteristic of the present assimilational state, but "regional disparities in the growth of economic activities and in the distribution of the National product have been a constant feature in Brazil's economic history."[13] In 1970 the Southeast, including the Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo area, "was responsible for 80.3 percent of industrial value added" though having only 42.7 percent of the population, while in contrast, the Northeast "with 30.3 percent of the population accounted for only 5.8 percent of industrial value added."[14] The implementation of the consumer culture has created a dynamic area, characterized by industrial production, in which there has been high amounts of 'foreign' and state capital investment, and in which much of Brazilian consumption, the practice of the consumer culture, takes place. Media systems, significantly, are centered and concentrated in the dynamic area. Regions outside the dynamic area have been created in which outposts of the consumer culture are found.

While reproducing a particular model in Brazil, a significant difference is created. Local private groups, incapable of mimicking the hegemonic model, give way to foreign investments and the state is then called on to return through massive investments to a semblance of local control. It is not the transnationals which are 'foreign' but the Brazilians who are alien to the process the transnationals implement. The consumer culture as assimilational state maintains the predominance of hegemonic culture. These, then, are some of the characteristics of the industrial factor in the implemented consumer culture in Brazil, a pattern which will tend to be evident in the linkages with the television media system.

The maintenance function within the assimilational state occurring in Brazil refers to the point of linkage between the particular media system and the implemented industry. At this point various mechanisms are at work assuring the distributive capability of television. The most important aspect of control is not, as is often stated, the mere financial control, but is in the particular cultural understanding that the favored linkage, media usage and industrial organization represent. It is often supposed that the advertising agencies and media systems produce and distribute the culture required by industry, this however, is much too simple a suggestion. The industry, advertising agencies and media systems are all components of a particular cultural universe, that of the Euro-Atlantic consumer culture, and thus are the 'tools' of the cultural system. Each component of the consumer culture thus articulates the required cultural signification. None of the components of the consumer culture are understandable without the other and they are together understandable only because of the over-arching and binding consumer culture. The maintenance function is significant because it is the locus of transference of the consumer culture of industry into the consumer culture as articulated in the media system. Indices of the importance of the maintenance function as it links industry to the television cultural system are various and include the actual amounts of financing, the percentage spent per medium, origin and geographical distribution of agencies, the research companies and methods, the advertisers, and finally, the constitution of the chain of linkage from industry through the television media system.

Accompanying the implementation of industry in Brazil is the usage of advertising. As a consumer culture is implemented, the impact and importance of advertising is increasingly felt, advertising comes to command increasing financial resources; the goal is, as Mauro Salles of Salles-Inter Americana suggests, to reach the "advanced" levels of the United States or Japan which invest approximately two percent of GNP in advertising.[15] In 1971, 430 million dollars were spent on advertising in Brazil. By 1975 the advertising expenditure had doubled to over 974 million dollars,[16] and by 1977, 1.3 billion dollars were spent on advertising.[17] Recently Eugenio Saller, president of ABA (Brazilian Advertisers Association) stated that in 1982 alone, between 400 and 500 billion cruzeiros, between $2.15 billion and $2.65 billion US dollars (at mid-August 1982 exchange rates), would be spent on publicity in Brazil.[18]

TABLE 3:6   Amount Spent on Advertising

Year	US$	SOURCE
1968	233.7 million	Roncagliolo and Janus, p.35
1971	430.0 million	Salles, p.16
1974	941.9 million	Roncagliolo and Janus, p.35
1975	974.0 million	Salles, p.16
1977	1,300.0 million	Anuario, p.CXXXVIII
1982	2,150.0 million to	
	2,650.0 million	Saller, p.19

During the 1970's the amount spent on advertising has not increased significantly as a percentage of GNP as Table 3:7 indicates.

The amount spent in 1970 as a percentage of GNP was slightly greater than the percentage amount spent in 1979, though for two years running, 1977 and 1979, the advertising spending equalled approximately one percent of GNP. Thus though there has been an increase of 819.98 percent between 1968 and 1982 in advertising spending, advertising

TABLE 3:7 Advertising as % of GNP

Year	Percentage
1970	0.89
1971	0.93
1972	0.97
1973	0.95
1974	0.92
1975	0.82
1976	0.89
1977	0.99
1978	1.01
1979	0.84

Source: Brazilian, p.51

has not significantly increased against GNP. This indicates that the vast increase in advertising spending is sufficient only to keep pace with the focus of the dynamic area. The almost one for one relationship between GNP increase, in which industry is significant, and advertising expenditure increase indicates the extent to which industry and advertising agencies are part and parcel of a single cultural process; the process of assimilation through the reproduction

of the consumer culture. As will be demonstrated in the next

chapter, this period of increase in consumer industry and in

advertising spending coincides with the rapid geographical and social

penetration of the television cultural system.

Just as there has been an increase in advertising spending so

has there been an increase in the amount spent on television. In 1950

when television was being installed in Brazil, newspapers received the

most advertising investments, 38 percent of the total, by 1962,

however, television had surpassed all other media except magazines,

receiving 24.7 percent of the advertisers budgets.[20] The transfer of

spending from other media continued through the 1960's and so in

1970 though television captured 39.6 percent of spending, radio had

dropped to a low of 13.2 percent and magazines held 31.9 percent. This

trend continued through the 1970's, as Table 3:8 demonstrates, and by

TABLE 3:8 Advertising Investments in Media. Percentage per Medium

Year	Medium					
	TV	Newspaper	Magazine	Radio	Out-Door	Cinema
1962	24.7	18.1	27.1	23.6	6.4	0.1
1964	36.0	16.4	19.5	23.4	4.1	0.6
1968	44.5	15.8	20.2	14.6	4.3	0.6
1970	39.55	21.02	21.9	13.26	3.76	0.51
1972	4C.1	21.8	16.3	9.4	5.1	1.3
1974	51.1	18.5	16.0	9.4	4.0	1.0
1976	51.9	21.1	13.7	9.8	2.9	0.6
1979	55.9	20.1	13.0	8.5	1.5	1.0
1980	57.8	16.2	14.0	8.1	1.5	2.4

Source: Dias, p.256 - Brazilian, p.53 and supplement.

1979 television received 55.9 percent of advertising spending, news-
papers 20.1 percent and radio 8.5 percent. As Fred Fejes points out,
television "advertising provided the opportunity to reach not only
the upper and middle income groups, but also large lower income
groups."[21] Newspapers and magazines, for example, depend on the
ability of the audience to regularly acquire them as well as to read,
and radio because of its non-network organization, could not offer the
concentrated, yet geographically dispersed audiences. In sum, as
particular forms of industry utilized increased advertising spending,
television tended to receive grater attention and came to be, by the
early 1970's, the primary medium through which the consumer culture has
been implemented in Brazil.

There is, however, some variance of the importance of television
to advertisers when the distinction between house agencies and other
advertising agencies is made. In 1980, for example, when house
agency advertising is included, television received only 37 percent
of total advertising expenditures ar compared to 57.8 percent when
other agencies' budgets are computed alone, while other media have
an increased share: newspapers from 16.2 percent to 18 percent, radio
from 8.1 percent to 15.3 percent.

Thus far the discussion of the relationship between television
the consumer products industry has been taken from an aggregate point
of view. The impact of advertising, however, can be better
understood in a more minute study of the advertisers and agencies with
particular reference to television.

The largest advertisers in Brazil include a large number of

transnational corporations with origin in Western Europe and the United States. The largest private Brazilian advertisers, such as Grupo Pao de Açucar, Mesbla S/A and Mappin, are the largest stores and supermarkets which in turn tend to advertise the products of the largest producing corporations. The largest advertiser, however, is the Federal government through direct and state run corporation advertising. The largest ten advertisers, as shown in Appendix 3:A for three recent years, include many transnational corporations. In 1979, 14 of the top 20 were transnationals while in 1980, 13 of 20 were transnationals. The corporations which have consistently through the 1970's been found in the top 10 include several cigarette manufacturers such as Souza Cruz and R. J. Reynolds, soaps and cleaning equipment manufacturers such as Gessy-Lever, Johnson's and Johnson's, and Colgate-Palmolive, banks such as Bradesco, Banespa and Banco do Brasil, and the retailers.

The largest twenty advertisers in the years for which data is available, 1977, 1979, 1980, represent 54.76 percent, 62.36 percent and 63.37 percent respectively, of the total expenditure of the largest 50. Within the largest twenty are the few advertisers which command the market in general.[22] In 1979, for example, of the 5.29 billion cruzeiros spent by the largest 20, 1.09 billion was spent by the top two, Souza Cruz and Gessy-Lever, while the following three spent an additional 1.01 billion cruzeiros representing 39.66 percent of the top 20's spending and 24.73 percent of the top 50 spending. There can thus be demonstrated a tendency through the late 1970's for the increased concentration of control in the top 20,

especially the top five advertisers. In 1977 the largest five
represented 38.93 percent of the top 20 spending, in 1979, 39.66 and
in 1980, 41.36 percent, thereby also increasing their share of the
top 50 as indicated in Table 3:9. The largest five advertisers include
Souza Cruz, Gessy-Lever, Pao de Açucar and Nestlé; three transnationals
and a local retailer. In sum, there has been a tendency toward
increased concentration of advertising expenditures into a small
number of advertisers of which the top five have come to represent
leading factors of control on advertising in Brazil. These corpora-
tions specialize either in the production of light consumer goods
or in retailing these goods and tend to advertise on television.

TABLE 3:9   Leading Advertisers: The Top Five

Year	Top 5-%of top 20	Top 5-%of 50	Top 20-%of top 50
1977	38.93	21.32	54.76
1979	39.66	24.73	62.36
1980	41.36	26.21	63.37

Rafael Roncagliolo and Noreene Janus point out that such
products as food, detergents, tobacco, drugs and cosmetics among
light consumer goods and "durable" goods such as automobiles and
electrical appliances are among the most advertised goods in the
Third World.[24] In Brazil similar products are advertised.
Toiletries, food products, savings accounts, medicines and cigarettes
were in 1980 the main products advertised. Of the 2.5 trillion
cruzeiros spent on advertising toiletries, Gessy-Lever, Johnson and

Johnson and Colgate-Palmolive accounted for 1.6 trillion cruzeiros, 64 percent. Nestlé alone accounts for approximately 33 percent of the food products budget. Companhia Souza Cruz, owned by a Brazilian transnational, accounted for 850 billion cruzeiros of the 1.3 trillion cruzeiros spent on cigarette advertising. These five categories in turn accounted for 19.2 percent of advertising in media. These categories of products are also heavily advertised on television since 86.5 percent of the budget for toiletries, 87 percent for food products, 70.5 percent for cigarettes and 72.5 percent for medicines was spent on television.[25] This indicates that a closer analysis of agency spending is necessary in order to clarify the link between the producing corporations and television since the largest advertisers tend to invest in television advertising through agencies and not, as some retailers do, through house agencies. Nonetheless, the pattern of spending by product indicates the importance that television has as a medium integrating the process of cultural assimilation characterized by the reproduction and implementation of the consumer culture in Brazil.

The transnational corporations tend to contract transnational advertising agencies. In 1977, for example, Gessy-Lever hired four transnational agencies including Lintas, J. Walter Thompson, McCann Erickson and Standard; Souza Cruz hired J. Walter Thompson, Grant and Standard, as well as the Brazilian agency, Salles Interamericana; Nestlé hired McCann-Erickson, J. Walter Thompson, Norton and D.P.Z. Propaganda. The contracted agency can change from year to year but the point here is that transnational corporations tend to contract

transnational agencies. Often these corporations arrive along with the agency, as in the case of McCann-Erickson, Exxon and Coca Cola, for as Willard C. Mackey Jr. - president of McCann-Erickson Worldwide - pointed out, "wherever Esso went, McCann went;" McCann arrived in Brazil in 1935 with the Esso account.[26]

In 1978 there were ten United States transnational advertising agencies operating in Brazil.[27] In 1960, however, there were only three transnational agencies with billings of US$15 million, but in 1977, 12 agencies held a total of US$239 million in billings.[28] As Table 3:10 demonstrates, U.S. agencies have increasing importance in agency billings, increasing billings 466.35 percent between 1968 and 1977, and so, in 1977 transnational agencies alone controlled 64 percent of billings and 58 percent of income.[29] It is thus not surprising that transnational agencies figure highly among the leading agencies in Brazil.

TABLE 3:10 Transnational Agencies and Billings

Year	Number	U.S. Millions
1960	3	15.0
1964	5	16.1
1968	8	42.2
1970	10	78.3
1972	11	92.7
1974	14	168.3
1976	12	174.3
1977	12	239.0

Source: Fejes, pp.40-41.

The largest agencies in Brazil for selected years between 1970 and 1980 are listed in Appendix 3:B. The number of transnational agencies among the top ten varies from year to year but usually include J. Walter Thompson, which arrived in Brazil in 1930, McCann-Erickson, Standard Ogilvy and Mather, and Lintas' Brazilian subsidiary. Other agencies have participation of the transnationals. Norton, for example, is part owned by International Needham Univas.[30] Transnational agencies, as Fred Fejes points out, "more or less set the criteria by which all advertising production and services in a country are measured."[31] This is the case because local agencies are fac-similes only of the transnational agencies and as such tend to reproduce, often without the 'latest techniques,' the services offered by the transnationals. Brazilian agencies thus seek some linkage with the transnationals in order to survive. Geralso Alonson of Norton agency stated that "it is important to establish an international connection with an American agency. It is not reasonable for us to keep our position in Brazil without knowledge from the U.S.."[32] Thus the impact of the transnational agencies is much greater than their rank by billings and reaches the level of current articulations of the consumer culture. It is not the simple problem, as is often assumed, of national agencies being subverted by transnational ones, but as long as the dynamic area of peripheral society articulates the consumer culture, the hegemonic cultural products will be most attractive, the most 'real.'

As indicated in Appendix 3:B, between 1970 and 1973 J. Walter Thompson was Brazil's largest agency, in 1974 it was McCann's turn.

Only in 1975 did a Brazilian agency capture first place in billings when MPM-Casablanca was first and ALMAP second. Nonetheless, at no time were J. Walter Thompson or McCann-Erickson out of the ranks of the largest five agencies; since 1977 McCann has been third. The participation of the five leading agencies in total revenues of the top twenty has varied from 46.86 percent in 1977 to 50.17 percent in 1978 and 46.87 percent in 1980. The five agencies with highest revenues represent, as do the advertisers which hire these agencies, the locus of advertising control in Brazil. This is indicated by the relationship of aggregate revenues of the largest five as compared to those ranking from 6th to 10th place. In 1978 the aggregate revenues of the second group of five agencies represented only 50.86 percent of the revenues of the largest five and though increasing its share, in 1980 the second five represented 58.97 percent of top five revenues. There is a similar relationship between those ranked from 6th to 10th place and the following five, in 1978 59.39 percent and in 1980 52.68 percent. The total revenue of those ranked from 11th to 15th place is only equal to 30.2 percent of the largest five's revenue in 1978 and 31 percent in 1980. In sum, the largest five represent almost twice the revenues of the second five and three times the revenue of those ranked 11th to 15th. There is thus a considerable amount of concentration of revenues into a few large agencies. Though Eugenio Saller estimates that there are 1700 advertising agencies in Brazil,[33] the agencies representing the dynamism of the implementation of the consumer culture are the largest twenty, of which the largest five tend to be the most

significant.

These leading agencies, contracted by large transnationals, tend to invest in television. In 1975 the five largest agencies in Brazil spent 66.8 percent of their budgets on television,[34] while some agencies invested as much as 90 percent.[35] As Table 3:8 indicates, there has been during the 1970's increased spending by leading agencies on television, while other media have continuously received lesser amounts. A large Brazilian agency, ALMAP (Alcantara Machado, Periscinoto), for example, invested as much as 73 percent of its budget on television, averaging 67.45 percent during the last years of the 1970's.[36]

These then are significant aspects of the maintenance function of the linkage between the producing industry, retailers and the media system. The linkage tends to be articulated through advertising agencies which undertake the transfer of cultural significance of the product into media terms within the broader context of the consumer culture. That the television cultural system has become the primary medium integrating the consumer culture is indicated by the extent to which television is preferred by advertisers and their agencies. This provides the means for maintenance of the television cultural system and producing industry within the particular modality of the consumer culture.

Thus far the discussion of the maintenance function has been limited to those aspects related to the linkage between producing industry and the media system, but since the media system integrates the assimilational state as a means of message distribution, there are

specific requirements of maintenance operating through the media system and guiding its operation. This aspect of the maintenance function is conceptualized and understood by what is termed audience research and it relates to the requirements of the best utilization of a particular media system such as television by the consumer culture. This research provides the knowledge considered to be necessary for the increasingly smooth integration between the three primary aspects of the consumer culture in its rationalistic, scientific-technological form.

Audience research in Brazil has become more important as the consumer culture is being implemented. Four years after television was inaugurated in Brazil, IBOPE - Instituto Brasileiro de Opiniao Publica e Estatistica - undertook the first television audience study dealing with aggregate audiences by each half hour period between 6PM and 11PM in the Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo markets. Marplan agency of Sao Paulo began consumer research in 1958 but only in 1963 did the daily audience figures become available to Sao Paulo advertisers. In the late 1960's audiences research was extended first by IBOPE and later complemented by Marplan to other large urban areas; Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Salvador and Curitiba by 1965, other state capitals in 1968. This research provided, essentially, ratings for time periods during prime time produced from a sample of household interviews or by coincidental call methods. In 1970 Audi-TV of Sao Paulo began the "tevemetro" in Sao Paulo, through equipment which registers the channel being tuned in at any moment on a strip of paper. By 1980 this research equipment had been installed in 220 households

in Sao Paulo and 220 in Rio de Janeiro. Only in 1975 did IBOPE extend

the daily audience research to other cities outside the Rio de Janeiro

-Sao Paulo area. In 1979 more specific research of media usage

behavior began by Marplan in Brasilia, while in 1980 research for the

Multi-media data bank began in which data on various aspects of

audience behavior is stored.[37] Some research methods were implemented

at the behest of large advertisers. The concept of Gross Rating Point,

for example, brought by Gilette and first used in 1967 by ALMAP,

permits advertisers to more easily select hours and target audiences.[38]

All such research has been standardized by the ABA (Brazilian

Advertisers Association), ABIPEME (Brazilian Association of Market

Research Agencies) criterion for socio-economic classification into a

six class (A, B1, B2, B3, C, D) scheme created by a point system

based on ownership of various consumer goods. In sum, knowledge

concerning the audience for which products are culturally designed

has become increasingly important for television but also within the

consumer culture as a whole.

As indicated by the brief history of audience research

implemented in Brazil, three agencies provide the majority of the data

produced. These agencies are Audi-TV, IBOPE, and Marplan. Audi-TV

uses the data provided by its TV-meter to produce and publish a

number of audience reports at varying intervals. There are, for

example, weekly reports on one minute modules providing the audience

to the minute to broadcasting stations, similar weekly reports are

produced for 15 minute intervals, and once a month a report divided

by the ABA-ABIPEME socio-economic classification scheme. Audi-TV.

also produces reports on the average hours of viewing per day by TV homes.[39]

IBOPE provides reports produced by coincidental call techniques in which data describing total TV's per households, audience per station percentage, average tuned in audience per station and audience composition per station by socio-economic class, geographical location, sex, age and education.[40] IBOPE provides this service to advertisers in six metropolitan regions, and twenty-three cities including the interior of Sao Paulo state, the Federal District and the cities primarily of the Southeast and South. In the Northeast only Fortaleza, Joao Pessoa, Natal and Aracaju are regularly represented while all other markets are researched under contract.[41]

Marplan researches the 'penetration' of the advertising media into particular 'markets.' It publishes five reports annually which deal with such topics as aggregate number of people exposed to the medium, audience opinion of each medium, penetration rate of the media, a rating for each medium, a rating for broadcast media according to type of program, TV and radio attention habits by hour and day of the week, and finally, this data in comparison to various media. Marplan thus deals with the relationship between media type and its usage while Audi-TV specializes in television usage.

Other research organizations such as LPM-Burke and Gallup provide "day after recall," Gallup also providing research on brand changes. Organizations such as TV Fiscal and Leda provide program monitoring and control.[42] Research is not only undertaken by outside agencies but also as an integral part of the media system. The large

Globo Organization provides research through its own research unit which publishes the monthly <u>Mercado Global</u> providing information on its particular audience and the virtues of its programming. No other television network provides such detailed research on its audience, but all other provide some form of orientation to advertisers.

To complement the research directed toward the audience there are research organizations which analyze the relationship between advertisers, agencies and particular stations. SERCIN, established in 1968, issues monthly reports giving information on media investments as well as survey on advertising compaigns in various media. LEDA provides more complete information for TV advertisers including a weekly report by product group and advertisers, an analysis of channel time by agency, advertisers and product category, and a report showing the allocation of budget funds in television.[43]

Thus a full body of research based on the problems, interests and solutions sought within the maintenance of television as the primary form of consumer culture promotion and reproduction is created. Not only is there consumer research but there is also internal research concerning the functioning of the consumer culture at a particular moment and the actual linkage of industry to the media system. This knowledge, in its limited form, exemplifies the standards of the media system as integrator of the consumer culture and so, is an important factor in the functioning and maintenance of the assimilational state as a whole.

The maintenance function comprises the complex linkage of

industry to media system here only studied through a limited set of
indicators. The primary advertisers are often transnational
corporations which have unequalled experience in the functioning of the
consumer culture within the dominant society, the retailers of the
often transnational products, and the Brazilian government at various
levels. Advertisers tend to use a limited number of large trans-
national advertising agencies, of which the largest fifteen comprise
the source of financing for the television cultural system. This
complex is girded by a series of research endeavors which not only
link the advertisers, agencies and media system to the audience as a
control mechanism, but also provide inter-component research as a
measure of the functioning of the system as a whole. Audience research
overlaps with the promotional function of the television system in
consumer culture. As indicated, the industry, the advertisers,
agencies and research activities are, and have been, concentrated in
the dynamic area as center of the assimilational process in Brazil. As
other areas and social groups become integrated and integratable
the research efforts are extended to them and knowledge which
facilitates the state of increased assimilation into the consumer
culture. This interest in television is not for naught since through
the promotional function these advertisers, agencies and research
organizations are able to reach a large audience of potential
consumers throughout Brazil. The promotional function exemplified
by the technological presence, the number, distribution and organization
of receivers and transmitters, is discussed in the following chapter.

Endnotes

[1]Helio Jaguaribe, <u>Brasil: Crise e Alternativas</u> (Rio de Janeiro: ZAHAR, 1974), p.18.

[2]Rene Armand Dreifuss, <u>1964: A Conquista do Estado</u> (Petropolis, Rio de Janeiro: Vozes, 1981), pp.21ff.

[3]Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, <u>Desenvolvimento e Crise no Brasil</u> (Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1972), p.56.

[4]Werner Baer, "Evaluating the Impact of Brazil's Industrialization," <u>Luso-Brazilian Review</u>, 15:2 (1977), 179.

[5]Evans, pp.55-100.

[6]Evans, p. 105.

[7]Dreifuss, p.52.

[8]Vieira, pp.54-55.

[9]Eduardo Matarazzo Suplicy, <u>Politica Economica Brasileira e Internacional</u> (Petropolis, R.J.: Vozes, 1977), p.161.

[10]Suplicy, p.164.

[11]Evans, p.114.

[12]Baer, p.182.

[13]Baer, p.182.

[14]Baer, p.182.

[15]Mauro Salles, "Opiniao Publica, Mercado e Comunicaçao Social no Brasil," <u>Comunicaçao</u>, 6:20 (1976), 16.
See also "Entrevista com Ailton de Figueiredo," <u>Comunicaçao</u>, 6:20 (1976), 6.

[16]Saller, p.16.

[17]<u>Anuario Brasileiro de Propaganda 77/78</u> (Sao Paulo: Publiform, 1978), p.CXXXVIII.

[18]"Investimentos em Publicidade Pode Chegar a Cr$500 bilhoes este Ano," Jornal do Brasil, 12 August 1982, p.19.

[19]Brazilian Media Guide (Sao Paulo: ALMAP, 1981), p.51.

[20]Marco Antonio R. Dias, "Politica de Comunicaçao no Brasil," in Meios de Comunicaçao: Realidade e Mito, J. Werthein, ed. (Sao Paulo: Editora Nacional, 1979), p.256.

[21]Fred Fejes, "The growth of Multinational Advertising Agencies in Latin America," Journal of Communication, 30:4 (Autumn 1980), 47.

[22]"Distribution of Advertising Budgets in 1980," The Brasilians, October 1981, p.19.

[23]Brazilian, p.55.

[24]Rafael Roncagliolo and Noreene Janus, "Advertising and the Democratization of Communications," Development Dialogue, 2 (1981), p.37.

[25]"Distribution," p.19.

[26]"McCann's Overseas Buildup," Business Week, February 23, 1981, p.153; and Claudia Richer, "Ha Cem Anos, A Propaganda Brasileira dava um Passo Importante," Comunicaçao, 6:20 (1976), p.9.

[27]Noreene Janus and Rafael Roncagliolo, "Advertising, Mass Media and Dependency," Development Dialogue, 1(1979),88

[28]Fejes, p.41.

[29]Fejes, p.43.

[30]Fejes, p.46.

[31]Fejes, p.43.

[32]Fejes, p.44.

[33]"Investimentos," p.19.

[34]Dias, p.259.

[35]Fejes, p.47.

[36]Brazilian, p.54 and supplement.

[37]Celso Sabadin, "TV e Propaganda," Briefing, 25 (Sept. 1980), 16,18,20.

[38]Sabadin, p.26.

[39]Sabadin, pp.20,26.

[40]Brazilian, pp.60-61.

[41]Sabadin, p.20.

[42]Brazilian, pp.75,77.

[43]Brazilian, p.82.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROMOTIONAL FUNCTION AND THE TELEVISION

CULTURAL SYSTEM

The maintenance function, as discussed in chapter three, is
articulated at the locus of transfer of the consumer culture from the
industry to the media system through advertising agencies. The
research methods, part of the requirements of the maintenance function,
deal with the audience as objects of research and as such overlap with
the promotional function, the linkage of the media system to the
audience, which is the subject of this chapter. The promotional
function deals with the technological presence, its organization and
usage, as the linkage of the consumer culture to the population at
large. This chapter will first deal, therefore, with several trends
of change in the Brazilian population coinciding with the implementation
of the consumer culture. Among such trends is the rapid urbanization,
migration into the dynamic area, the involvement of more Brazilians in
industry and related work, and, above all, the increasing concentration
of income in the hands of certain groups found within urban areas
initially of the dynamic area but later found in pockets throughout
Brazil. These factors are related to the potential audience of the
television cultural system which concerns the means whereby the media
system is able to provide the linkage to and integration of potential
consumers into the consumer culture.

The creation and maintenance of social groups capable, and,

more importantly, comprehending, accepting and practicing their role
as consumers within assimilation is necessary for the successful
implementation of the consumer culture. During the period of relation-
ship between Brazil and European powers until the early part of the
twentieth century, consumption of industrialized goods was limited to
those groups most intimately linked to the assimilation process; the
Brazilians producers and exporters of raw materials and agricultural
products. With the ascendancy of the United States as a dominant
center within hegemonic culture, the particular form which hegemonic
culture had taken became exportable thereby encouraging the creation
of fac-simile cultures in Brazil and throughout the Third World.
Rene Armand Dreifuss indicates that many of the first consumers were
coffee, cocoa, or rubber plantation owners and the proprietors of the
export houses, while later this state was extended to populations of
urban areas in Southeastern Brazil.[1] It is to this newly constituted
dynamic area that Brazilians flocked.

Just as in previous periods of rearticulation of cultural
relations between Europe and Brazil, the population tends to migrate
into the newly constituted dynamic area . During the mining boom
of the nineteenth century, land owners and slaves moved and were
transferred into Minas Gerais and out of the previous dynamic area of
the sugar producing Northeast. A similar phenomenon occurred during
the present century. Since industry and the consumer culture in
general require concentrated populations, urban areas become the
focus of assimilation. In 1940 the rural population in Brazil
corresponded to approximately 69 percent of the country's total

population, but by 1970 only 44 percent of Brazilians lived in rural
areas and by 1980, 36 percent. The increased urban population has
concentrated in two states, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, where urban
populations reach 93 percent and 92 percent of the total respectively.
The Northeast, in contrast, is fully 52.56 percent rural with some
states such as Maranhao with 68.5 percent rural population. This
urbanization occurred despite the rapid population increase from
93.2 million in 1970 to 123 million in 1980, fully 32 percent.[2]

This urbanization and concentration of population in the
dynamic area- Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo states alone have 29.3
percent of the total population - came about through the process of
migration from rural areas, especially of the Northeast. Concomitantly
with migration and the creation of the dynamic area, more Brazilians
came to be involved in work related to the consumer culture as
Table 4:1 demonstrates. Though the work force has continued to grow,
from 9.6 million in 1920 to 32.8 million in 1972, the work force involved
directly in industry has grown as a percentage of total and more
significantly those involved in merchandising, transport and
communication, banking and other services have increased even more
rapidly. Thus many of the migrants found work only in the services
industries within the dynamic area.[3] There are many involved but
few are the actual participants in the consumer culture since many
'services' are mere menial labor in urban areas.

The increased urbanization through migration into the
dynamic area with the concomitant increase in population involvement
in work related to the present assimilational state, has been

accompanied by a general increase in income and concentration in the
hands of a small group within the population as a whole. The goal
here is to give a general overview of the potential consumer creation
in Brazil. Celso Furtado suggests two characteristics of the so
called "Brazilian model of development" which created the "Brazilian
miracle" of the post 1964 Brazil. In 1964 the per capita income in
Brazil was only 400 dollars per annum, whereas in hegemonic societies
income varied from between 2,000 and 4,000 dollars per annum. There
arose the need, if a consumer culture were to be implemented, for the
concentration of income into the hands of between 5 percent and 10
percent of the population. This, Furtado believes, resulted in
marginalization, the exclusion of large segments of the population
from more intensive participation in the consumer culture.[4] Pedrinho
Guareschi comments that the result of such policy and practice is the
creation of a miniature "developed and industrialized country in an
underdeveloped and peripheral nation."[5] The dynamic area becomes a
reproduction of hegemonic culture within the peripheral society.

TABLE 4:1 Structure of the Work force, 1920, 1969, 1972.

Work force	1920	1969	1972
Primary (agriculture)	67%	43%	42.2%
Secondary (industry)	13%	19%	17.7%
Tertiary (services)	20%	38%	40.1%

Source: Evans, p.96 and Jaguaribe, p.56.

The process of income concentration was achieved in part by

the creation of a minimum wage which during the last two decades has been maintained at approximately $100 US per month. According to Eduardo Suplicy and as indicated in Table 4:2, if the 1952 minimum wage were given an index of 100, in 1970 this index would be 86.02, improving slightly to 92.45 in 1976. During this same period, however, the per capita income increased from the 1952 index of 100 to 252.71 in 1976. Helio Jaguaribe points out that in 1960 70 percent of the population received approximately 35 percent of the total income, while the wealthiest 10 percent received 39 percent of the total income. By 1970, however, 28 percent of the total income went to 70 percent of the population, while the wealthiest 10 percent received 47 percent of the income. In 1972, 43.2 percent of wage earners

TABLE 4:2 Minimum Wage and Per Capita Income: 1952-1976

Year	Minimum Wage Index, 1952 = 100	Per Capita Product 1952 = 100
1952	100.00	100.00
1955	116.13	110.36
1960	115.05	132.51
1962	120.43	145.35
1964	110.75	143.49.
1966	94.62	146.32
1968	92.47	158.37
1970	86.02	178.56
1972	89.25	207.35
1974	88.21	239.20
1976	92.45	252.71

Source: Suplicy, p.102.

received up to one minimum wage and a further 32.3 percent received up to two minimum wages, thus Jaguaribe concludes, 75.5 percent of the population is in either "absolute" or "relative" marginalization being able to supply only basic needs.[6] In sum, by the early 1970's income was concentrated in the hands of at best 25 percent of the population which constitutes the consumer elite.

This concentration of income, however, varies by involvement in the dynamic area. Whereas in agricultural regions 89.5 percent of wage earners received up to one minimum wage, only 32.1 percent of industrial workers, 36.6 percent of those in service industries, and 25.1 percent of administrators and technicians received up to one minimum wage.[7] A large part of those in Jaguaribe's "absolute marginalization" are those involved in the activities characteristic of previous dynamic areas which are ignored in the redefinition of the dynamic area. Though there has always been income concentration in Brazil, this concentration has increased in the hands of a small group within the dynamic area. Absolute marginalization tends to be reserved for those in a previous dynamic area, whereas relative marginalization is reserved for large groups within the dynamic area. The actual consumers, by the necessity of reproducing the hegemonic culture in Brazil, have been created by increased concentration of income within the dynamic area.

The conclusion of Eduardo Suplicy and Helio Jaguaribe from the beginning of the 1970's are confirmed by the 1980 census results. According to the census, in 1970 82.3 percent of the labor force received up to two minimum wages, the equivalent of 41.2 percent of

the aggregate income, while in 1980 64.4 percent of the labor force received up to two minimum wages but only 22.3 percent of the aggregate income; a drop of 21.7 percent in percentage of population but a 45.87 percent decrease in aggregate income. In contrast those with five or over minimum wages increased from 5 percent to 12 percent of the labor force and an increase from 34.1 percent of aggregate income to 52 percent of the income. There has thus been an increase in mid-range wage earners and in their income.[8] As increasing numbers of people become involved, at least marginally, in the consumer culture, the media system becomes a direct means of integration.

The integration of potential consumers, created by the policies of income concentration, into the consumer culture is the promotional function of the television cultural system. A requirement for this is the technological presence as a means of integrating groups within and into the dynamic area. Television, as indicated in chapter III, has become, at least for advertisers and their agencies, the primary medium for investment of appropriate cultural significance. It is to be expected, therefore, that television first integrated the dynamic area, and then those urban areas outside the dynamic area in which consumption is possible reaching the most marginal areas only after more localized television transmitters serve the dynamic region. The key element in technological presence of the transmitters is networking and network creation. The actual understanding of the audience for television thus comes to be of special interest.

There are three basic components of technological presence: the receivers, the transmitters and the various means of networking

such as video-tape, film, microwave and satellite links. The first of
these to be dealt with is the presence of receivers which, as their
increasing numbers indicate, demonstrate the importance of the televi-
sion cultural system. On September 18, 1950 when television was
inaugurated in Brazil, TV Tupi channel two of Sao Paulo, there were
only 200 television sets in Brazil.[9] At that time newspapers, radios
and picture magazines were the most important media in Brazil.
Television during the 1950's was in what Sergio Mattos terms, its
"elitist phase" when sets were so expensive as to be limited only to
those with the highest incomes. Soon, however, sets were assembled in
Brazil and later wholly produced there with a resulting decrease in
relative cost. By 1955 approximately 74,000 sets were in operation
in Brazil, and by 1960 between 598,000 and 1.2 million, depending on
estimates, were in use mostly in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In
1965 between 1.99 million and 2.3 million sets were in operation.
During the 1970's, however, the number of receivers in use grew more
rapidly; from 4.58 - 6.1 million in 1970 to between 13.4 - 16.7
million in 1979, an increase of between 173.77 percent and 192.32
percent.[10] ALMAP, however, projects that given an average increase
of 2.3 million new sets per year, in 1980 there were approximately 20
million sets in Brazil, of which six million were color sets,
reaching almost 70 percent of Brazilian households.[11]

Receiver production is an important aspect of the implementation
of television in Brazil. Table 4:4 indicates the production of
television sets in Brazil for selected years since the first 3,500
were produced in 1951, to the over 2.6 million produced in 1980.

TABLE 4:3 Receivers in Brazil

Year	Number	Per 1,000 of population
1950	200	N.A.*
1953	21,000 - 70,000	N.A.
1955	74,000 - 150,000	5
1960	598,000 - 1,200,000	18
1964	1,663,000 - 2,300,000	29
1970	4,584,000 - 6,100,000	66
1972	6,250,000	N.A.
1975	10,127,000 - 10,680,000	100
1978	14,818,000	N.A.
1979	13,400,000 - 16,740,000	N.A.

* Not Available

Sources: UNESCO TV World Survey, 1953

UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 1965, 1976

Freitas, p.48

Kupfer and Serrano, p.64

TABLE 4:4 The Production of Receivers in Brazil

Year	Number	Five Year Period	
1951	3,500	1951-1955	74.000
1956	67,000	1956-1960	525,000
1961	200,000	1961-1965	1,469,000
1966	408,000	1966-1970	3,115,000
1970	816,000	1971-1975	6,952,000
1972	1,117,000	1976-1980	11,583,100
1974	1,664,000	Total	23,717,100.
1976	1,872,000		
1978	2,300,000		
1980	2,686,100		

Source: Freitas, p.48 and Brazilian Media Guide, p.105

Between 1951 and 1980 approximately 23.78 million sets were produced of which 19.35 million were produced between 1970 and 1980 alone, 81.33 percent of the total. Thus the decade of the 1970's has witnessed a vast increase in the number of sets in use and the number of people integrated into the consumer culture through the television cultural system. Brazil has the largest number of installed sets of any Third World country, placing ninth in the world by the mid-seventies.[12]

Though there are many and increasing numbers of receivers in use in Brazil, it is expected that these sets would be found primarily in urban areas of the dynamic and other linked urban areas. The dynamic area has the largest number of television sets. In the state of Sao Paulo are 35.79 percent of households receiving television but only 22.67 percent of the total number of households. Between the two states of the dynamic area, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, are 33.96 percent of total households but 58.91 percent of those receiving television. By way of contrast, in the whole of the Northeast with 22.9 percent of the households are only 13.41 percent of households with television. Thus in terms of television receivers in use, the dynamic area is the most expressive.

When, however, only urban areas are computed a second locus of concentration becomes aparent. In the nine largest urban areas are 30.47 percent of Brazilian households but 46.56 of households with television. When these figures are added to the figures of the dynamic area, there are 66.6 percent of all households with television but only 46.71 percent of the total number of households,

further state capitals alone control 50.62 percent of television
receiving households. Essentially, however, two large urban areas,
the cities of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, with a high concentration
of television receivers dominate over all other areas, while the
seven other large urban areas together contribute less than the Rio
de Janeiro metropolitan area alone, 12.75 percent of total households
with television for the following seven, versus 14.97 percent of
total television receiving households for the city of Rio de Janeiro.
Areas outside of the dynamic area, individually, are relatively
insignificant but in aggregate comprise a third major market for
consumer goods. Networking is the means of constituting this disparate
market.[13]

Just as there is a concentration of receivers in the dynamic
area, so too is the social distribution of those receivers more even
within the dynamic area than in other areas. Ninety-three percent of
households in the capital of Sao Paulo state, the city of Sao Paulo,
receive television, 85.5 percent in other areas and averaging 89.3
percent for the state. In Rio de Janeiro 93 percent of the households
have television, in the remainder of the state 78.9 percent,
averaging 90.3 percent for the state as a whole. This compares with
the Brazilian average of 83.6 percent in state capitals, 42.4
percent in rural areas, and an aggregate average of 56.5 percent of
households with television. In many states less than 40 percent of
households have television, 17 states in all with some with as little
as 14 percent of households with television. In Pernambuco, for
example, Recife - the state capital - and one of the nine large urban

areas has television in 64.9 percent of households, while in non-capital regions television is found in only 39.3 percent of households.[14]

TABLE 4:5   Households with Television / Percentage   Total Households

	Households receiving TV (% of total Brazil)			% total households per region
	Interior	Capital	Total	
Sao Paulo	17.00	18.79	35.79	22.67
Rio de Janeiro	3.04	14.97	18.02	11.29
	20.04	33.76	53.81	33.96
South	9.79	4.46	14.25	19.01
Northeast	7.32	6.09	13.41	22.9

Source: Freitas, pp.48-49.

IBOPE using the ABA-ABIPEME six class distribution found that in 1979, 100 percent of Sao Paulo class A1 and B1 residents, 90.6 percent of class D and 95.8 percent of class C households received television, that is, owned their own receivers. In Rio de Janeiro the situation is similar, virtually 100 percent of class A, B1 and B2 households have television receivers, while 78.6 percent of class D and 95.1 percent of class C also have receivers. Contrasting with the dynamic area, Recife, one of the six large markets surveyed, 100 percent of class A received television, but barely 60 percent of class D households own a television set.[15] This indicates that essentially all class A and B1 households have television and are

most intimately involved in the consumer culture, while outside the dynamic area the poorer classes have limited access to the television cultural system.

Though there is little data on the presence of television receivers in Brazil, this often being treated in aggregate terms, several general conclusions concerning the promotional function of television in the implementation of the consumer culture can be made. The aggregate number and the penetration, the increased availability to Brazilians of television receivers has increased especially since the late 1960's. Though implemented first in the dynamic area and there remaining for a number of years, the television receiver has been made available first in large urban areas, later in state capitals and major cities within the dynamic area, and finally to rural areas within the dynamic area. Many states with a higher percentage of rural population have fewer receivers, some having only recently received television. Nonetheless, it is the dynamic area in which are found the highest concentration of receivers in Brazil, though there are large and an increasing number of clusters throughout Brazil.. Any of these clusters alone would be insignificant to the consumer culture, and as with rural areas and small cities and towns, would not have television. In aggregate, however, these clusters represent a significant market and as such are capable of integration into the dynamic area. It is through the presence of transmitters and the means of linking them together that networking is created and the integration of consumer clusters throughout Brazil is achieved.

The television transmitters are a second necessary factor

in the promotional function of the television cultural system. A
similar pattern of implementation of transmitters as with receivers
is expected. After initial implementation in the dynamic area and
saturation of potential transmitters there, expansion into other·
areas commences, reaching first the large metropolitan areas, then
state capitals and regions within the dynamic area outside of Rio de
Janeiro and Sao Paulo, finally reaching the less populous, less
prosperous, less urban areas of Brazil, areas which often are
remnants of previous dynamic areas. The goal here is to demonstrate
this pattern followed by a discussion of the actual integration of
outlying regions through networking.

With the help of RCA technicians and equipment Assis
Chateaubriand, head of the Diarios Associados chain of newspapers
and radio stations, inaugurated on the 18th of September 1950, Brazil's·
and Latin America's first television station, PRF3-TV Sao Paulo, the
first of the Associados' Tupi Television Network.[16] Chateaubriand,
sipping whiskey at the Jockey Club, watched the first program go off
with a slight delay and a lot of improvisation. Only afterward
did technicians and showmen realize that there were no programs
planned for the following day.[17] On the 20th of January, 1951 the
first television station was inaugurated in Rio de Janeiro, PRG3-TV,
also of the Tupi network. It was to have been inaugurated before
that of Sao Paulo but the transmitter upon being uncrated in Rio de
Janeiro was found to be of 60 cycles and not of the necessary 50
cycles AC current. Both Tupi stations used RCA transmitters and
.RCA, GE and Dumont studio equipment, all of which imported and

assembled by RCA technicians. The Federal Communication Commission's
"Standards of Good Engineering Practice Concerning Television
Broadcasting Stations" became the first measure of Brazil's television
quality.[18]

Additional television transmitters were soon installed in
Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and in Belo Horizonte, and so, by 1956 five
stations were in operation, by 1958 six, and in 1959 eight had been
installed. The 1960's began with 15 installed stations and by 1965,
29 were in operation in various areas of Brazil.[19] By 1969 51 stations
had been installed and by 1980 this figure had more than doubled to
98 in operation of a total of 115 when including those in installation,
an increase of 125.49 percent.

TABLE 4:6 Installed Stations in Brazil

Year	Number	Year	Number
1950	1	1972	61
1956	5	1974	75
1959	8	1975	74
1960	15	1977	84
1962	27	1978	95
1965	29	1980	115-118
1969	51		

Source: Television, p.95

Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (several years)

Freitas, p.48

During the 1950's transmitter installation was only in Sao

Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte. Though concessions were
granted in 1950, only in 1960 were two stations inaugurated in
Recife.[20] In 1957 transmission began to the interior of Sao Paulo
state.[21] The tendency is, therefore, that during the 1950's transmitter
installation was to be found within the dynamic area.

Table 4:7 shows the division of installed transmitters by
region though actual government planning called for more stations
throughout Brazil. Though statistics vary according to the source,
the tendencies followed by television in Brazil can be outlined.
Initially during the 1950's and early 1960's transmitters were
installed in the Southeast, within which is the Rio de Janeiro -
Sao Paulo region. From the mid 1960's through the mid 1970's there
followed a period or rapid expansion in installed transmitters
outside the dynamic area, initially in the South followed later by
the Northeast and during the early seventies in the North. Thus by
1976 the Southeast had 27 percent of total installed stations.
Between 1976 and 1980 the number of installed stations again
increased and by 1979, 28.44 percent of total installed stations
were there. Installed transmitters increased in the South 191.66
percent between 1969 and 1979, and 187.5 percent in the Northeast.
In the Southeast, however, total installed stations increased only
57.14 percent most of which occurred between 1976 and 1979,
representing the extension of transmitters into smaller cities within
the states of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and Espirito
Santo. The pattern of extension of transmitters follows that of
receivers with even greater emphasis on urban areas.

TABLE 4:7   Transmitter   Installation by Region

Region	Year								
	1956	1958	1966	1969	1972	1974	1976	1979	1980
Southeast	5	6	21	21	19	21	20	33	31
South	-	-	6.	12	15	19	18	35	35
Northeast	-	-	6	8	14	15	17	23	23
Center West	-	-	3	4	5	5	6	12	9
North	-	-	1	3	6	11	12	13	13
Brasilia	-	-	3	3	4	4		(*)	3

* (included in Center West)

Source: 1956-1976, Anuario Estatistico do Brasil

1979 Mattos, p.53

1980 Brazilian, pp.92-93.

Television has become in Brazil primarily an urban medium. As Table 4:8 indicates, urban areas are essentially the state capitals. In 1969, 72 percent of all stations were in state capitals and by 1980 this figure was 40 percent even though "interior" (non-state capital) areas include large urban areas absorbing the 93.3 percent increase in the number of transmitters between 1969 and 1980. In 1980, however, there were 17 inoperative stations in interior areas and if this were taken into account, fully 61.22 percent of operative stations were in state capitals.

The extent and pattern by which non-state capital regions have been integrated into the television cultural system is indicated by Table 4:9. A general tendency is for non-capital areas in the Southeast and South to have television transmitters while this

is not the case for other regions of Brazil. In the South eleven "interior" stations are in Rio Grande do Sul; nine in Parana (of which three in the state's second largest city), and five in Santa Catarina. These stations; however, belong to the Rede Brasil Sul which is linked to Globo of Rio de Janeiro. In Sao Paulo or Rio de Janeiro states only large "interior" cities have television stations, while in the remainder of Brazil, transmitters are only found in state capitals.

TABLE 4:8 Installed Transmitters, 1956-1980

	Year					
	1956	1960	1969	1972	1974	1980
Interior	-	1	15	16	20	46
Capital	5	14	36	47	55	69

Source: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (1956-1974)
Brazilian, pp.94-96.

TABLE 4:9 Transmitters in "Interior" Regions, 1968-1980

Region	Year				
	1968	1969	1972	1974	1980
Southeast	4	7	6	7	15
South	1	6	8	9	25
Northeast	1	1	1	1	2
Center-West	1	1	-	2	2
North	-	-	-	1	1

Source: Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (1968-1974)
Brazilian, pp.94-96.

These Tables indicate the pattern of implementation of
television in Brazil. In 1965, for example, only one state in the
Northern region had television, five of nine Northeastern states,
four of five states of the Southeast, this because the city of Rio de
Janeiro was still in the state of Guanabara, two of three in the South
and both Center West states. Only the Southeast had multiple stations
in each state.[22] By 1975 all Northern, Northeastern states and
territories had television, but still multiple stations per state are
found in the Southeast and South.[23] In 1980 the situation remains
essentially the same. Thus the pattern is of implementation first
within the dynamic area followed by the extension of television into
other regions based on the capacity of those regions to be participants
in the consumer culture. The importance of this pattern of television
cultural system, integrating the consumer culture will be better
understood by the study of the networking created in Brazil.

As indicated previously, the Diarios Associados - owners of the
Tupi stations - were the first to own stations spread throughout
Brazil. Not only was Tupi the first within the dynamic area but also
the first to extend out of that region to Belo Horizonte, Recife,
Salvador and Porto Alegre, and later to other state capitals. Stations
were established where Diarios Associados newspapers and radio stations
were in operation. The actual networking, however, was minimal
because of the lack of links between stations, programming tended to
be locally produced and broadcast for only a few hours daily.

Though Tupi had the largest number of operating stations,
other companies of Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo dominated within the

dynamic area. Such stations as TV Rio in Rio, TV Excelsior and TV.
Record in Sao Paulo lived periods of dominance in television. TV Rio,
inaugurated in 1953, created programs for a broader audience and was
thus the first to take advantage of the penetration of television
into poorer classes in Rio de Janeiro. With local production of
receivers and the consequent lowering of prices, a large audience
became available to television. TV Rio took many actors and writers
from radio, mainly as Joao Prado points out, from Radio Mayrink
Veiga and Radio Nacional.[24] Its dominance ended with the founding
of TV Excelsior in Sao Paulo by a group of coffee exporters including
the Simonsen family. TV Rio, however, left the first Brazilian
experience of the telenovela which would later become the mainstay
of Brazilian networks. TV Excelsior took most of the renowned actors
and writers from TV Rio and began a period of "Shows a la Broadway."[25]
TV Record, inaugurated in 1953 and still in operation in Sao Paulo,
came to dominate in Sao Paulo during the late 1960's.[26] Thus during
the first two decades of television in Brazil networking was not a
significant aspect of organization of media, since the consumer culture
was still primarily within the dynamic area.

Networking became important after the mid-1960's, during a
period in which the technological presence of receivers and
transmitters was extended out of the dynamic area to capture potential
consumers in clusters scattered throughout Brazil. This search for
extensive networking which set the stage for Brazilian television
in the 1970's, was one-of the primary goals of a new station
inaugurated in 1965, TV Globo of Rio de Janeiro. This company

already owned a large daily in Rio - O Globo - and through an

illegal association with Time-Life set out to capture a large

segment of the audience. Globo was presided over by Walter Clark

Bueno, a "man of marketing" who also had guided TV Rio. Globo sought

the "popular" audience through dubbed feature films, telenovelas and

"shows."[27] For the first time large audiences were available in Rio

and Sao Paulo. Though a large part of this audience could not be

effective consumers, the television system functioned based on the

rating system, and so, Globo could offer to advertisers large audiences

more cheaply. Significantly audience research came to have increased

importance in categorizing the audience. Upon consolidation of

its leadership in the dynamic area, Globo sought to extend its

network. As Liba Frydman suggests, "it was in the beginning of the

decade of the 1970's that the preoccupation with the formation of a

network and reaching the audience more horizontally became Globo's

major preoccupation ."[28]

With the increase in the number of stations in Brazil during

the 1960's, three large networks took shape, Tupi, Record and Globo.

In 1972 Globo owned five stations, the maximum under law, 13

affiliates and a number of retransmitters. Tupi had two stations

and 18 affiliates, and Record owned one station and nine affiliates

of which two were shared with Globo or Tupi. As well as these, there

were two autonomous stations and seven of the Federal government.

Table 4:10 shows the distribution of networks by region in 1972. The

majority of stations were in the Southeast and South with almost

equal distribution of Globo and Tupi throughout Brazil.

TABLE 4:10 Networks by Region, 1972

Region	Network		
	Globo	Record	Tupi
Southeast	5	3	6
South	4	2	4
Northeast	4	2	5
Center West	1	-	1
North	3	1	2
Federal District	1	1	1

Source: Prado, pp.115-117

During the 1970's the Tupi network gradually lost its leadership

position. In 1980, debt ridden and near bankruptcy, the Federal

government suspended the concessions to Tupi and several of its

affiliates. In 1977 the Diarios Associados empire had 31 newspapers,

20 television stations, Editora "O Cruzeiro" with 18 magazine titles,

a news agency, two record companies, three printing companies and two

large farms.[30] The Tupi network, however, had been organized

following the standards of its predecessors in newspapers and radio

in which ownership was an association of several localized companies.

It was competent in exploiting network capabilities in the unification

of a large audience outside the Rio-Sao Paulo area, and so, lost

advertising revenue to Globo. In fact in 1972 Tupi had already lost

first place in audience to the Globo stations in Rio de Janeiro.[31]

In sum, Rede Tupi was incapable of fitting the requirements of the

extension of the consumer culture in Brazil. Networking, a highly

centralized monologic system of message distribution, has come to predominate in Brazil. The end of the Tupi organization reflects the end of a more loosely organized, less centralized media system which had been successful in the agricultural-export period.

The success of Globo is reflected by Table 4:11 as it completely dominates other networks. After the closure of the Tupi network, the Tupi affiliates along with TV Record of Sao Paulo formed the Sistema Brasileiro de Televisao (SBT). In the space

TABLE 4:11 Brazilian Television Networks, 1980

Network	Owned	Affiliates
Rede Globo	5	41
Bandeirantes	2	18
SBT	2	10
Independent	8	--
Record	3	--
Government	9	--

Source: Brazilian Media Guide, pp.94-96

left by the Tupi network, Rede Bandeirantes inserted itself. Though founded in 1967, by 1977 Bandeirantes owned two stations and had 15 affiliates and by 1980, 20 stations were integrated into the network.[32] Still the Southeast and South predominate in number of network stations and independents, while the Federal Government concentrates on implementing television in the Northeast as indicated in table 4:12.

TABLE 4:12   Brazilian Networks by Region, 1980.

Region	Network				
	Globo	SBT	Bandeirantes	Independent	Government
Southeast	10	5	6	2	3
South	16	4	6	3	1
Northeast	8	-	5	1	4
Center West	5	2	2	-	-
North	6	1	2	1	1
Fed. District	1	1	-	1	-

Source: Brazilian, pp.94-96

The largest network and media organization in Brazil is Rede Globo de Televisao which is based primarily in Rio de Janeiro but also has an important center in Sao Paulo. Rede Globo owns the maximum five stations permitted by law, one each in the most important consumer markets including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia and Salvador, and is linked to a further 41 affiliates and hundreds of municipal retransmitters spread throughout Brazil.[33] Globo's impact is further extended by the integration of several regional networks. TV Gaucha of Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul state, is a Globo affiliate and is also the leading station for the Rede Brasil Sul network which has 13 stations in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul. Several stations of the Rede Amazonica de Televisao are also integrated into the Globo network.[34] Thus in 1979 Globo could reach over 13.3 million receivers of the 13.4 million then in operation in Brazil.[35] The Globo network,

however, is only part of a large organization owned by the Marinho family which in 1979 operated the national daily "O Globo," 17 AM and FM stations, a record company (Som Livre), a telecommunications equipment company, a publishing house, art galeries in several cities, a cable television company, a show promotion company and, more recently, has branched into mining.[36]

The decade of the 1970's has been called the Globo decade of television. Choosing carefully it was able to establish itself in major markets and through offering programming and technical assistance, created a large network through which almost any Brazilian could watch programming and advertising generated in Rio and Sao Paulo. Globo extended the consumer culture from the dynamic area for as Elizabeth Carvalho has noted, "the penetration of Globo represented the expansion of the consumer market of the country."[37] Other regions which alone would be insignificant consumer markets have been integrated into the dynamic area. Though television's technological presence has expanded considerably during the last decade, this expansion has simply followed the extension of centralized networks with primary generating stations in Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In sum, the creation of networks as the primary form of television cultural system organization in Brazil serves to promote and extend the range of the consumer culture. As Walter Avancini, once a director of Globo, states,

> Bajé and Caruaru are not on Globo. What occurred
> was an acculturation of those sectors of the
> population, a standardization of more distant regions

> by a model - of programming and, fundamentally,
> of consumption - of large urban centers, in detriment
> of their characteristics.[38]

The consumer culture of the dynamic area has been extended during the 1970's to all regions of Brazil through network organization of the technological presence.

The television cultural system has come to be the most important medium of the present assimilational process. But with the intention and possibility through income concentration policies of the extension of the consumer culture from the dynamic area, networking became of utmost importance. For such a centralized system to work, for there to be 'national' advertising, rapid transmission with utmost control is necessary. Several technologies satisfied this requirement. The early 1960's saw the first use of video-tape as a cheap means of guaranteeing the distribution of programming and advertising to affiliates. Often, however, telenovelas and other programming would run a week late in more distant regions.

During the 1960's, however, the Federal Government sought to implement its policy of national integration. A creation of the Escola Superior de Guerra (Superior War College) and articulated through a notion of National Security, national integration sought to bring all regions together on the basis of the 'development' then occurring in Brazil, the implementation of the consumer culture. As the First National Development Plan states:

> national integration, with a primary socio-economic

significance, is destined, from the point of view
of demand, to create an internal market capable of
accelerated and self-sustained growth, and from the
point of view of production, to permit progressive
economic decentralization.[39]

From the point of view of media systems, national integration
was encouraged by EMBRATEL, the Brazilian telecommunications company,
after 1965. The Rede Nacional de Microondas (National Microwave
Network) and a Telstar satellite transmission system entered service
in 1968, both being further extended since. In 1978 there were
over 12 thousand kilometers of line-of-sight microwave links in
operation. The Amazon basin was linked to Sao Paulo and Rio by
tropodifusion microwave and satellite links via the Rede Nacional
Domestica Via Satellite.[40] For the first time programming could
be generated in Rio or Sao Paulo and seen virtually anywhere in
Brazil. It has often been too expensive to transmit all programming
directly, this being reserved for national newscasts, and so during
early morning hours the next day's programming is transmitted,
recorded on video-tape and then, at the appropriate time, is played
back.

Brazil is scheduled to launch its first satellite in 1986 in a
geostationary orbit over the Amazon. To be constructed by Spar
Aerospace of Montreal, the satellite is to be used primarily for
television, telephony and computer data transmission. Nonetheless
EMBRATEL with the Intelsat satellite and a Brazilian built ground
station has taken television to Macapa, Santarém, Manaus, Boa Vista,

Porto Velho, Rio Branco, Cuiaba, Tabatinga and Tefé, all in the

Amazon basin. With a satellite of its own, similar to Canada's

ANIK-D, and one in reserve, channel capacity would increase from the

present 600 to 12,000 voice channels at only slightly higher cost.[41]

Through several technologies, microwave, satellite, video-tape, the

network system came to be more easily supported and maintained and

consumer culture, through the consolidation of audiences throughout

Brazil, became the primary form of the assimilational state Brazil

is in.

To summarize the promotional function of television, a

similar pattern of implementation was followed by both installed

transmitters and receivers, initially in the dynamic area and later

spread to other large urban areas and finally to all state capitals.

This later process was accompanied by an increase in the number of

stations and receivers in the outlying regions of the dynamic area.

Networking is the primary form of station organization and private

ownership of stations predominates, the various levels of government

own only 9.18 percent of operational stations, thereby centralizing

control in the dynamic area at the source of the networks where the

media system is linked to industry and advertisers. Networking

has been aided by government policy and action which seeks to

integrate Brazil into the most 'modern', the current assimilational

state, through the creation of the necessary technological linkages.

To close this chapter a discussion of the relationship of

income concentration and the media system is necessary. This

preoccupation has undergirded the discussion as a whole thus far, since only certain groups are integrated into the media system. The remainder of the the discussion will deal with how the media system approaches the audience, how parts of the audience become significant for the sale to advertisers. In sum, how policies of income concentration created the television audience and made the consumer culture viable and reproduceable in Brazil. In chapter three the research directed toward the audience of media systems was discussed. The point of this research is to understand the audience in order to better expose it to the possibility of participation in the consumer culture. Since 1954 IBOPE has undertaken research seeking to characterize the audience of interest to advertisers, meanwhile ALMAP has sought to create an index of consumption potential for major markets in Brazil. It is this research which provides the knowledge of the potential consumers created in the process of income concentration and integration by the media system.

The Consumption Potential Index (CPI), is used by the Brazilian Advertising agency, Alcantara Machado-Periscinoto, to designate, in broad terms, the areas of localization of consumers and so to provide a map of consumption in Brazil to advertisers. The CPI for the metropolitan areas of Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro are 19.78 and 18.82 respectively, while for Recife in the Northeast, the index is 2.42. The sum of the indices of the eight largest cities after Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo is only 15.43 as compared to either metropolitan region alone. The "interior" of the state of Sao Paulo

has an index of 4.96, the sum of the indices of those urban areas for which an index has been calculated. The ten largest cities have an accumulated index of 54.03, while for the one hundred largest cities the index is 67.3.[42] The dynamic area, including the "interior" of Sao Paulo state, is the essence of consumer Brazil though other large urban areas, those cities to which television was initially extended, comprise an extensive if dispersed consumer market. Nonetheless, these markets, as with smaller cities, must be summed and this is possible through networking. Significantly, no CPI is calculated for rural areas and mdst 'poorer' cities throughout Brazil, since they simply are not interesting to advertisers and television, they are not of the consumer culture.

Utilizing information from the IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica) census and PNAD (Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicilios) surveys coupled with data produced in its own surveys, IBOPE regularly publishes reports concerning the location, size and consumption potential of audience members in the major consumer areas identified by the CPI. The 1979 IBOPE survey indicates that the potential consumers are primarily in Rio de Janeiro-Sao Paulo region. The survey dealing with Brazil's six largest urban consumer areas, classifies the population into the six ABA-ABIPEME income categories. The two largest markets, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, will be here compared with Recife - the fifth market. As Table 4:13 indicates, the percentage of households in the poorest class, class D, varies from 21.8 percent in Sao

Paulo to 36.5 percent in Recife, while the wealthiest class, class

A is reserved for 2.9 percent of the Rio households and for 1.8

percent of Recife households. As indicated, there is a similarity of

TABLE 4:13 Households and Income in Three Consumer Markets, 1979.

	Sao Paulo			Rio de Janeiro		
	Household	Income		Household	Income	
Class	% of total	Per Capita*	% Tot.	% of total	Per Capita*	% Tot.
D	21.8	1,597.54	6.5	28.6	1,011.98	7.0
C	40.0	2,737.52	24.5	33.5	1,976.21	20.0
B3	22.7	5,020.18	26.4	18.5	3,441.08	19.0
B2	10.6	9,071.47	21.3	12.3	6,349.12	23.0
B1	2.9	14,414.48	9.2	4.0	11,678.17	13.0
A	2.0	30,250.00	12.1	2.9	20,724.98	18.0

		Recife	
	Households	Income	
Class	Percentage of total	Per Capita*	Percentage of total
D	36.5	685.94	10.8
C	33.4	1,294.68	22.2
B3	13.6	2,425.93	16.7
B2	10.0	4,600.50	21.6
B1	4.8	7,304.67	17.4
A	1.8	12,525.97	11.3

* (Per Capita Income in cruzeiros)

Source: Mercado Global

income distribution in these centers which is achieved by using a different classification system for Recife. This results in differing per capita incomes. Thus class D in Recife has a per capita income of less than half of the same class in Sao Paulo, while class A in Sao Paulo has a per capita income almost two and a half times that of class A in Recife. Thus though for the three cities the disposable income, the estimated income available after "basic costs" such as food, housing, and education equalled on average 27.6 percent in Sao Paulo, 30.2 in Rio de Janeiro and 30 percent in Recife, the aggregate amount of cruzeiros was greater in Rio-Sao Paulo thus indicating the larger consumer market in the two main centers.[43] (See Table 4:13)

Though Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have higher per capita incomes than other cities, the income alone is not enough to create an integrating consumer market, there is the need to concentrate the income in certain groups. In Sao Paulo, for example, the poorest classes comprising 61.8 percent of total households, received 31 percent of the aggregate Sao Paulo income, while in contrast, the two wealthiest classes comprising 4.9 percent of the households, received 21.3 percent of the total income. In Rio de Janeiro a similar situation reigned where 31 percent of the total income was in the hands of 6.9 percent of the households, while 27 percent of income was in the hands of the poorest 62.1 percent of the households. In both Rio and Sao Paulo disposable income is concentrated in the wealthiest classes where it reaches a high of 54.7 percent of class A income in Sao Paulo.[44] (See Table 4:14) Thus classes A and

B1 and to a lesser extent B2 and B3 comprise the major consumers and it is through this concentration of income that consumption is maintained.

TABLE 4:14   Disposable Income (as percentage of total class income)

Class	Sao Paulo		Rio de Janeiro	
	1976	1979	1979	(as % of aggregate disposable income)
D	-3	5.9	-5	–
C	23.0	12.0	14.3	9.0
B3	33.0	23.0	25.0	16.0
B2	n.a.*	n.a.	34.0	26.0
B1	40.0	43.5	42.0	18.0
A	52.0	54.7	53.3	32.0

(*n.a.) not available

Source: <u>Mercado Global</u>

The CPI index and the compilation and analysis of research undertaken by ALMAP and IBOPE are examples of the purpose of audience research and the indicators, therefore, of the actual consumers in Brazil. Much more data is produced and analyzed in order to produce such reports such as ownership of various appliances, income by various demographic variables and expenses on "basic" goods, resulting in indicators of potential consumer target audiences for variously packaged goods and "services", each within the overarching consumer culture.

Thus the promotional function of television is fulfilled, in

part, through the technological presence of the medium and its

organization and usage. As indicated, there have been several broad

demographic trends in Brazil; migration into the dynamic area,

urbanization and increased involvement of labor in the present

assimilational process, which when coupled with increased concentration

of income, provides fertile ground for the extension of the consumer

culture. Accordingly the media presence, both receivers and

transmitters, follow a specific pattern of implementation. The

pattern involves initial implementation within the dynamic area,

followed by extension to other large urban areas and increased

saturation of the dynamic area, and only afterwards the implementation

in more distant, less urban, poorer regions. The transmitters,

however, being organized in networks firmly tie outlying regions

into the dynamic area. Necessary technological means for networking

has been provided by EMBRATEL. In a sense, the promotional function

permits the actualization of consumerism as is indicated by the

"maps" of Brazilian consumption provided by media research companies.

In sum, the promotional function provides the linkage of the consumer

culture to the population at large, while the maintenance function

provides for the continued articulation by televison of necessary

aspects of the consumer culture, thereby together providing integration

of the assimilational process at work in Brazil at present.

Endnotes

[1]Dreifuss, p.23. See also Eugene W. Ridings. "Business, Nationality and Dependency in Late Nineteenth Century Brazil." Journal of Latin American Studies. 14:1 (May 1982). pp.55-96.

[2]See 1980 census figures. These are estimates taken from Brazilian Media Guide, pp, 7,17ff.

[3]Evans, pp.95ff. and Jaguaribe, pp.52ff.

[4]Guareschi, pp.68-69.

[5]Guareschi, p.69.

[6]Jaguaribe, pp.52-62.

[7]Jaguaribe, pp.52ff.

[8]"A Nova Radiografia," Veja, 30 of September, 1981, 118-119.

[9]Sergio A. S. Mattos, "The Impact of Brazilian Military Government on the Development of TV in Brazil," Diss. Univ. of Texas 1980, p.9.

[10]Estimates vary by source, data here are taken from:
     Television: A World Survey (Paris: UNESCO, 1953), pp.94-99.
     Unesco Statistical Yearbook, 1965,1976 (Paris: UNESCO, 1966 and
1976)
     Kupfer,,José Paulo and Luiz Roberto Serrano, "A Reforma da TV," Isto E, 30 July 1980, p.64.
     Freitas, Luiz Carlos T., "Os Numeros da TV," Briefing, 25 September 1980, p.48.

[11]Brazilian, p.92.

[12]Marco Antonio R. Dias, John Lee, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Osmo Wiio, "National Communication Policy Councils," UNESCO Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 83 (Paris: UNESCO, 1979), p.15.

[13]Freitas, pp.48,49.

[14]Freitas, pp.48,49.

[15]Mercado Global, 1 (1981), pp.10,19,37.

[16]Television, p.95.

[17]Joao Rodolpho do Prado, TV, Quem Vê Quem (Rio de Janeiro: Eldorado, 1973), p.125.

[18]Television, pp.95-96.

[19]Anuario Estatistico do Brasil (Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1958, 1961, 1962, 1967, 1971, 1974, 1979, 1980), pp.428,393,315,714,760,838,616,603.

[20]Roberto E. C. Benjamin, "A TV comercial em Pernambuco: Estudo da Programaçao," Revista da Escola de Comunicaçoes Culturais, 2 (1968),152.

[21]Liba Frydman, "Pequena Historia da TV," Briefing, 25, September 1980, 27ff.

[22]Anuario, (1970),pp.701-704.

[23]Anuario, (1979), p.616.

[24]Prado, p.126.

[25]Prado, p.127.

[26]Frydman, p.34.

[27]Prado, p.127.

[28]Frydman, p.42.

[29]Kupfer and Serrano, p.67.

[30]Dias, p. 263.

[31]Prado, pp.83-98.

[32]Freitas, p.51.

[33]Freitas, p.50.

[34]Freitas, pp.53,54.

[35]Kupfer and Serrano, p.67.

[36]Rede Globo 15 Anos (Rio de Janeiro: Organizaçoes Globo, 1979),p.1.

[37]Elisabeth Carvalho, "O Modelo Econômico: Uma So Naçao, Um so Mercado Consumidor," in Anos 70: Televisao (Rio de Janeiro: Europa, 1980), p.107.

[38]Carvalho, p.107.

[39]Santuza N. Ribeiro and Isaura Botelho, "A Televisao e a Politica de Integraçao Nacional," in Anos 70: Televisao (Rio de Janeiro: Europa, 1980), p.94.

[40]Freitas, p.46.

[41]Ethevaldo Siqueira, "O Satelite Brasileiro," _Jornal da Tarde_, 23 February, 1981, p.20.

[42]_Brazilian_, pp.26-28.

[43]_Mercado Global_, pp.7,17,34.

[44]_Mercado Global_, pp.7,8,17.

CONCLUSION

This study of a technologically assisted communication system seeks to demonstrate an aspect of the fragmentary tension characteristic of the cultural universe in Brazil. The assimilational process, as one aspect of the cultural tension, serves to constitute a new dynamic area. A media system, at this time predominantly television, provides integration through coherence and bonding of the various necessary aspects - industry, media system, and the consumer - of the consumer culture. The means whereby integration is achieved through the media system have here been termed the maintenance and the promotional functions.

The maintenance function is understood as the locus and means of control exercised by current assimilation in the use of television; that is, the means whereby television is maintained within the bounds, the modality, of the assimilation into consumer culture. As such, the maintenance function is exercised at the linkage of industry to the media system. At this point are found the advertisers, the advertising agencies, and the audience research organizations. A limited set of indicators have been used and a more detailed analysis of the maintenance function is, no doubt, necessary. Nonetheless, some conclusions can now be made. As indicated, television has not always been the primary assimilational medium. Its rise to preeminence has come since the mid 1960's, as indicated by increased advertising spending on television. If this is the case, then, the principal advertisers,

transnational corporations, retailers, and the government at various levels, and the primary advertising agencies, often either transnationals or Brazilian with transnational links, come as no surprise. Significantly, the research organizations also concentrate on television in audience research and in measuring the functioning of the maintenance linkage of industry through advertising to the media system. These, then, are some conclusions arising from the analysis of the maintenance function indicating the importance of television to the assimilational process occurring in Brazil.

The promotional function, the extension through the media system of the consumer culture to the population at large, is here discussed through the technological presence, the receivers and transmitters, their distribution and organization into networks. Both receivers and transmitters have become pervasive in Brazil but their distribution has not been even. Both follow a pattern of implementation first in the dynamic area followed by extension to other large urban areas and increased presence within the dynamic area, and only afterwards, implementation in poorer, less urban areas. Receivers have been extended initially, to only those who could be active consumers and so the social distribution has followed a pattern from dynamic area elites, to wealthy groups in other areas, to poorer groups in the dynamic area, and finally to poorer groups in large urban areas outside the dynamic area. Transmitters have been organized into networks, Rede Globo is the largest, which firmly tie outlying consumer regions to the dynamic area. Networking is made possible by microwave and satellite links provided by EMBRATEL. Thus the potential

consumers are induced, prodded, into actualizing the consumer culture
of the present assimilational state.

In this sense, then, the maintenance and promotional functions in the
television media system provide the integration of the assimilational state
necessary in the consumer culture. The tension of rejection has not been
dealt with though its presence is an aspect of the television cultural
system. The subtleties of the fragmentary tension have thus been over-
looked in this study.

On the theoretical level the notion of development has been
subordinated to local cultural conditions. In discussing literature
dealing with media, culture, and development three broad categories of
approaches have been discerned; the 'dominant paradigm', its critique in
the dependency approach, and the alternative culture approach. These
broad categories involve the various understandings held between hegemonic
conceptualizations and those arising in the periphery. The first two
approaches have been found inadequate for the study of cultural situations
in Latin America because of the centrality within them of the notion
of development, central premises of which they share. In assuming
governing laws of development applicable to all societies, the dependency
approach manages to criticize the 'dominant paradigm', but only
selectively criticizes, in the cultural dependency form, the implemen-
tation of hegemonic cultural views. Alternative culture, however,
'centralizes the concept of culture and, basing itself on the work of Paulo
Freire, conceptualizes popular culture as source of possible transformation
of peripheral culture in resistance to hegemonic culture.

Central to all such approaches is the assumption of the
fragmentary tension inherent in peripheral societies. The 'dominant
paradigm' points to the necessity of the destruction of the 'traditional'
in encouragement of 'modernity', while dependency points to the fragmen-
tary tension resulting from the expansion of capitalism in Latin America.
Both the dependency approach and the alternative culture approach call for
the end of cultural hegemony in Latin America. Paulo Emilio has pointed
out that in much of Latin America there is no original culture which
needs to be continually suffocated, and so the tension of rejection has
little cultural basis on which to act. For this reason alternative culture
proposes popular culture as the source of rejection and cultural resistance.
Thus a unique situation comes into being in peripheral society once
subjected to the expansion of the West. From the Third World have come
many calls for other cultural forms in resistance to the West. In order
to implement these calls, however, cultural fragmentation must be better
understood thereby pointing to the means of 'liberation'. Thus also, any
ultimate, universal laws of development based on the West's 'ideology
of progress', are rejected in favor of development conceived as the
resolution of cultural fragmentation.

Media research in Brazil cannot have the same objectives as research
current in the West, nor should research follow the directives of
developmentalist studies as conceived from within the hegemonic culture's
theoretical constructs concerning 'progress'. The media systems are
organized and articulate the assimilational process in various ways from
society to society; from the particular experience of cultural fragmentation

the significance of media systems in society will vary, so will the resolution of the fragmentary tension. Research must arise from within the goals and objectives of the particular society. Simple transfer of theory and methods corresponds to the transfer of media systems themselves as with audience research characteristic of the necessities of the television cultural system. Thus the feeling that something is missing in the two broad categories of contemporary research, 'mainstream' and Marxian, and their inability to comprehend Third World uniqueness. In sum, a significantly different meaning for media research is articulated in the periphery.

To summarize, these have been the central themes of this study: any notion of development must be subordinated to culture; Brazil is characterized by a culturally fragmented state in which the assimilational process is integrated by a media system of which television is paramount. Two functions of the media system are of considerable importance, maintenance and promotion, and are dealt with here. Thus development comes to be conceived as the process of fragmentation resolution thereby corresponding to the state of a particular culture. Media systems must be viewed in the broader context of society, and as such this study seeks to point out the particular use of television in Brazil.

APPENDIX 3:A   Leading Advertisers - Million Cruzeiros

Rank	Year		
	1977	1979	1980
01	Gessy-Lever SA. (250)	Souza Cruz (560)	Pao de Açucar (870)
02	Souza Cruz (180)	Gessy-Lever (530)	Souza Cruz (850)
03	Pao de Açucar (163)	Pao de Açuc. (410)	Gessy-Lever (780)
04	Mesbla SA. (130)	Banco Brasil (300)	S.P.Alpargatas (720)
05	Nestlé (120)	Nestlé (300)	Nestlé (660)
06	Bradesco (100)	R.J.Reynolds (280)	Dorsay (600)
07	Johnson&Johnson (100)	S.P.Alparga. (240)	Johnson&Johnson (500)
08	Caixa Econ.Feder (100)	Mesbla SA. (230)	Banespa (480)
09	S.P. Alpargatas (100)	Banespa (230)	Phillips (405)
10	Phillip Morris (100)	Johnson&John (230)	ColgatePalmol. (365)
11	General Motors (95)	Phillip Mor. (230)	Caixa Econ. Fed (365)
12	R.J.Reynolds (90)	Colg.Palmol. (220)	Volkswagen (36?)
13	Banco do Brasil (90)	Volkswagen (215)	Estrela (345)
14	Ford (80)	Dorsay (210)	Poços de Caldas (340)
15	Volkswagen (80)	Heublein (200)	Phillip Morris (320)
16	Sergio Dourado (80)	Mappin (190)	Kibon (290)
17	Colgate Palmoliv (80)	Phillips (180)	Casas da Banha (290)
18	Seagram (80)	Coca Cola (180)	Coca Cola (290)
19	Bombril SA. (75)	Kibon (180)	Fiat (275)
20	Mappin (72)	Caixa E. F. (180)	Rio Graf. Edit. (275)

Source: Anuario, p.CXXXIII

Brazilian, p.55, Supplement.

APPENDIX 3:B Leading Agencies - Million Cruzeiros

1970	Million Cruzeiros
01 - J. Walter Thompson Ltda. SP	75
02 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.	55
03 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.	45
04 - ALMAP - Alcantara, Machado, Periscinoto SP.	42
05 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.	42
06 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda SP.	39
07 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM- Casablanca S.A. SP.	39
08 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.	38
09 - SSC&B Lintas Brasil Comunicaçoes Ltda SP.	27
10 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.	18

1971	
01 - J. Walter Thompson Ltda. SP.	88
02 - Denison Propaganda S.A.	64
03 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.	63
04 - ALMAP Ltda. SP.	58
05 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.	56
06 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP.	52
07 - Saller/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.	51
08 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.	50
09 - SSC & B. Lintas Brasil Comunicaçoes Ltda. SP.	38
10 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.	28

1972

01 - J. Walter Thompson Ltda. SP.   105.5
02 - ALMAP SP.   89.0
03 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   89.0
04 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP   76.0
05 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   76.0
06 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   74.0
07 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade Ltda. SP.   71.0
08 - SSC & B Lintas Brasil Comunicaçoes Ltda. SP.   53.0
09 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.   42.0
10 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.   42.0

1973

01 - J. Walter Thompson Ltda. SP.   122.0
02 - ALMAP SP.   117.0
03 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   117.0
04 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP.   105.0
05 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   92.0
06 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.   89.0
07 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   85.0
08 - SSC & B Lintas Brasil Comunicaçoes Ltda. SP.   81.0
09 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publiciade Ltda. SP.   67.0
10 - Esquire Propaganda S.A. Rio   62.0

1974

01 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   152.0

02 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.   148.0

03 - J. Walter Thompson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   146.0

04 - ALMAP Ltda. SP.   145.0

05 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP.   139.0

06 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   )   122.0

07 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   /   105.0

08 - SSC & B. Lintas Brasil Comunicaçoes Ltda. SP.   94.0

09 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.   .   91.0

10 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.   84.0

1975

01 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP.   224.0

02 - ALMAP Ltda. SP.   220.0

03 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   213.0

04 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.   190.0

05 - J. Walter Thompson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   187.0

06 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   151.0

07 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.   141.0

08 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   140.0

09 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.   112.0

1976

01 - MPM Propaganda S.A. /MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP.   434.6
02 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   357.0
03 - ALMAP Ltda SP.   346.0
04 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.   340.0
05 - J. Walter Thompson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   287.0
06 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   246.0
07 - DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.   241.0
08 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   210.0
09 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.   183.2
10 - G. B. Publicidade e Promoçoes S.A. Rio   172.0

1977

01 - MPM Propaganda S.A. / MPM-Casablanca S.A. SP   727.0
02 - ALMAP Ltda. SP.   680.0
03 - McCann-Erickson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   670.0
04 - Salles/Inter-Americana de Publicidade S.A. SP.   590.0
05 - J. Walter Thompson Publicidade Ltda. SP.   420.0
06 - Denison Propaganda S.A. SP.   405.0
07.- DPZ Propaganda S.A. SP.   387.0
08 - Norton Publicidade S.A. SP.   350.0
09 - Standard, Ogilvy & Mather Publicidade Ltda. SP.   313.0
10 - S.G. B. Publicidade e Promoçoes S.A. Rio   305.0

1978

01 - ALMAP SP.	1,285.0
02 - McCann-Erickson SP.	1.270.0
03 - MPM SP.	1.263.0
04 - Salles SP.	850.0
05 - Denison SP.	638.0
06 - J. Walter Thompson SP.	620.0
07 - DPZ SP.	591.0
08 - Norton SP.	550.0
09 - Standard SP.	495.0
10.- Lintas SP.	443.0

1979

01 - MPM SP.	1,983.0
02 - ALMAP SP.	1,830.0
03 - McCann-Erickson SP.	1,740.0
04 - Salles SP.	1.404.0
05 - J. Walter Thompson SP.	1.024.0
06 - Denison SP.	995.0
07 - DPZ SP.	983.0
08 - Standard SP.	981.0
09 - Norton SP.	850.0
10 - Lintas, SP.	748.0

1980

01 - MPM , SP.	1,143.0
02 - ALMAP SP.	835.0
03 - McCann-Erickson SP.	725.0
04 - Salles, SP.	710.0
05 - Norton SP.	565.0
06 - DPZ SP.	550.0
07 - J. Walter Thompson SP.	570.0
08 - Denison, SP.	500.0
09 - Standard, SP.	489.0
10 - Artplan, SP.	297.0

Source: Anuario, p.CXXXVIII.

Brazilian, p.49 and supplement.

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