There's a Party at City Hall: Municipal Political Organization and Pathways to Power

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Abstract

The conventional view of Canadian local government is that municipalities are dominated by a spirit of non-partisanship and where "there is no Liberal or Conservative way to pave a street," (Slayton, 2015). While non-partisanship has long been a fixture of municipal government in most Canadian provinces, other municipalities have active political parties operating within legal frameworks established by provincial governments. To further complicate matters, some candidates in non-partisan jurisdictions are backed by "shadow parties", which I identify as clandestine organizations of partisan actors. Such variation provides an opportunity to consider scholar James Lightbody's claim that "Non-partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men," (2006, p. 257). This suggests Canadian municipal elections have barriers to the participation of those from historically marginalized communities – specifically women, racialized, and Queer Canadians. Non-participation means an absence of such voices on city councils and local boards, meaning those impacted by the decisions of local governments have no say in how a municipality operates.

In this dissertation, I connect issues of partisanship and identity to the political geographical theory of local government as a scale worthy of inquiry, the history of municipal government in Canada, and the unique partisan structure present in Canadian municipalities. I make five central claims. First, municipalities, as essential components of the state, perform crucial functions that are commonplace and seemingly innocuous. These functions are called "civic banality" and can have an outsized impact on the lives of historically marginalized people in the municipality.

Second, I identify five eras in Canadian municipal political history, beginning with the Rebellions of 1837/1838. In the important Reform and Battleground Eras, (1902-1958), the foundations for municipal non-partisanship were laid, resulting in damaging planning decisions that further marginalized many Canadians from participation.

Third, I examine non-partisanship itself, arguing that it has been primarily a tool of the *status quo*, used to frame the municipality as a state entity aligned with the interests of business and of social and economic elites. This is done in contrast with the existing forms of municipal partisan organization and the different ways in which partisan networks can form when influenced by the spectre of non-partisanship.

Fourth, I demonstrate the presence of clandestine networks of partisans – shadow parties – through an analysis of campaign donations. These organizations operate behind-the-scenes in formally or conventionally non-partisan jurisdictions. I posit that shadow parties, while seemingly self-interested, may also bolster the candidacy of historically marginalized people who would otherwise be without the support a partisan network can provide. I find that evidence pointing to the benefits of shadow parties is mixed, though there are some significant impacts of shadow parties on the candidacy of some groups.

Finally, I analyze the relationship between shadow party support, candidate diversity, and candidate success. Although the results are mixed, I find substantial evidence that such party support aids candidates from historically marginalized groups.

To test the final two claims, I use two original datasets. First, a survey of municipal candidates, sent to 2,512 municipal candidates in the 25 largest municipalities in Ontario and 762 municipal candidates in the 15 largest municipalities in British Columbia. Second, a smaller detailed dataset of 1,523 candidates in five cities in both Ontario and British Columbia. This incorporates financial data to determine a candidate's shadow party affiliation. I evaluate the final two claims using logistic and linear regression models, and descriptive statistics regarding the candidate pools.

Résumé

La vision conventionnelle du gouvernement local canadien est que les municipalités sont dominées par un esprit non partisan et où « il n'y a pas de façon libérale ou conservatrice de paver une rue » (Slayton, 2015). Alors que l'impartialité fait depuis longtemps partie intégrante des gouvernements municipaux dans la plupart des provinces canadiennes, d'autres municipalités ont des partis politiques actifs qui fonctionnent dans des cadres juridiques établis par les gouvernements provinciaux. Pour compliquer davantage les choses, certains candidats dans des juridictions non partisanes sont soutenus par des « partis politiques clandestins », que j'identifie comme des organisations clandestines d'acteurs partisans. Une telle variation offre l'occasion d'examiner l'affirmation du chercheur James Lightbody selon laquelle « les conseils non partisans à travers le Canada, en particulier ceux élus dans les grandes circonscriptions, fonctionnent à l'avantage des hommes blancs d'âge moyen » (2006, p. 257). Cela suggère que les élections municipales canadiennes ont des obstacles à la participation des personnes issues de communautés historiquement marginalisées - en particulier les femmes, les personnes racialisées et les Canadiens « Queer ». La non-participation signifie l'absence de telles voix dans les conseils municipaux et les conseils locaux, ce qui signifie que ceux qui sont touchés par les décisions des gouvernements locaux n'ont pas leur mot à dire sur le fonctionnement d'une municipalité.

Dans cette thèse, je relie les questions de partisanerie et d'identité à la théorie politique géographique du gouvernement local en tant qu'échelle digne d'enquête, à l'histoire du gouvernement municipal au Canada et à la structure partisane unique présente dans les municipalités canadiennes. Je fais cinq revendications centrales. Premièrement, les municipalités, en tant que composantes essentielles de l'État, remplissent des fonctions cruciales qui sont banales et apparemment anodines. Ces fonctions sont appelées « banalité civique » et peuvent avoir un impact démesuré sur la vie des personnes historiquement marginalisées de la municipalité.

Deuxièmement, j'identifie cinq époques dans l'histoire politique municipale canadienne, en commençant par les Rébellions de 1837/1838. À l'ère de la Réforme et des Champs de Bataille (1902-1958), les fondations de l'impartialité municipale ont été jetées, ce qui a entraîné des décisions de planification préjudiciables qui ont encore plus marginalisé de nombreux Canadiens de la participation.

Troisièmement, j'examine l'impartialité elle-même, en faisant valoir qu'elle a été principalement un outil du *statu quo*, utilisé pour définir la municipalité comme une entité étatique

alignée sur les intérêts des entreprises et des élites sociales et économiques. Cela se fait en contraste avec les formes existantes d'organisation partisane municipale et les différentes façons dont les réseaux partisans peuvent se former lorsqu'ils sont influencés par le spectre de l'impartialité politique.

Quatrièmement, je démontre la présence de partis politiques clandestins, à travers une analyse des dons de campagne. Ces organisations opèrent en coulisses dans des juridictions formellement ou conventionnellement non partisanes. Je postule que les partis politiques clandestins, bien qu'apparemment intéressés, peuvent également soutenir la candidature de personnes historiquement marginalisées qui, autrement, seraient sans le soutien qu'un réseau partisan peut fournir. Je trouve que les preuves indiquant les avantages des partis politiques clandestins sont mitigées, bien qu'il y ait des impacts significatifs des partis fantômes sur la candidature de certains groupes.

Enfin, j'analyse la relation entre le soutien aux partis fantômes, la diversité des candidats et le succès des candidats. Bien que les résultats soient mitigés, je trouve des preuves substantielles qu'un tel soutien aux partis aide les candidats issus de groupes historiquement marginalisés.

Pour tester les deux dernières affirmations, j'utilise deux ensembles de données originaux. Premièrement, un sondage auprès des candidats municipaux, envoyé à 2 512 candidats municipaux dans les 25 plus grandes municipalités de l'Ontario et 762 candidats municipaux dans les 15 plus grandes municipalités de la Colombie-Britannique. Deuxièmement, un plus petit ensemble de données détaillées de 1 523 candidats dans cinq villes de l'Ontario et de la Colombie-Britannique. Cela intègre des données financières pour déterminer l'affiliation d'un candidat à un parti politiques clandestin. J'évalue les deux dernières réclamations à l'aide de modèles de régression logistique et linéaire et de statistiques descriptives concernant les pools de candidats.

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Dedication

To those bold enough to dream, courageous enough to act, and ambitious enough to stand for public office. To them, I say: Our cities are not simply corporations or administrative units or creatures that exist at the whim and will of provinces and states and legislative bodies in far-flung places. They are people. They are bodies of bodies, living and breathing and growing and changing and adapting. Fight to make them better, more just, and livable for all.
And when the going gets tough: hold and hold fast.

Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning	Scale	Location (if applicable)
ABC	Agencies, Boards, and Commissions	Aspect of government	
BP	Branch Party	Party Type	
CA	Candidate Alliance	Party Type	
CBC	Canadian Broadcasting Corporation	Media Organization	
CCF	Co-operative Commonwealth Federation	Political Party/Organization	Canada-wide
CGA	Civic Government Association	Political Party/Organization	Lethbridge
CIVAC	Civic Action	Political Party/Organization	Toronto
CLC	Campaign Life Coalition	Political Party/Organization	Canada-wide
CMA	Census Metropolitan Areas	Statistical/modeling definition	
COPE	Coalition of Progressive Electors	Political Party/Organization	Vancouver
DLP	Distinct Local Party	Party Type	
EPOA	Edmonton's Property Owner's Association	Political Party/Organization	Edmonton
FRAP	Front d'action politique	Political Party/Organization	Montreal
FSA	Forward Sortation Area (Canada Post)	Aspect of government	
IA	Ideological Alliance	Party Type	
ILP	Independent Labour Party	Political Party/Organization	Canada-wide
IP	Incipient Party	Party Type	
LDU	Local Delivery Unit (Canada Post)	Aspect of government	
LP	Liminal Party	Party Type	
LSA	League for Socialist Action	Political Party/Organization	Toronto
NAICS	North American Industry Classification System	Statistical/modeling definition	
NDP	New Democratic Party	Political Party/Organization	Canada-wide
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization	Aspect of government	
NHBA	North Hill Businessmen's Association	Political Party/Organization	Calgary
NPA	Non-Partisan Association	Political Party/Organization	Vancouver
PA	Partisan Alliance	Party Type	
PC	Progressive Conservative	Political Party/Organization	Canada-wide (historical); Ontario, Manitoba, Atlantic Canada (contemporary)
PQ	Parti Québécois	Political Party/Organization	Quebec-wide
RCM	Rassemblement des citoyens et des citoyennes de Montréal / Montreal Citizen's Movement	Political Party/Organization	Montreal
RoD	Record of Donation	Statistical/modeling definition	
SOGI	Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity	Government Policy	British Columbia
SSSOCCC	Stop Spadina Save Our City Coordinating Committee	Political Party/Organization	Toronto
TEAM	The Electors Action Movement	Political Party/Organization	Vancouver
UCA	United Citizen's Association	Political Party/Organization	Calgary

Sir Humphrey Appleby: "I implore you to stay out of the minefield of local government! It is a political graveyard!"

Bernard Wolley: "Excuse me, Sir Humphrey. You cannot have a graveyard in a minefield, because all the corpses would... *explosion sounds, gesturing upward*"

Yes, Minister (BBC)
Series 3, Episode 2 – "The Challenge"
November 18, 1982

1 – Difficulties in Abundance

They're tearing up streets again
They're building a new hotel
The mayor's out killing kids
To keep taxes down
My Favourite Chords – The Weakerthans

1.1 – Autumn, 1969

The cold, grey pall of late autumn hung over the city of Toronto. That seasonal liminal space – made a distinctly Upper Canadian affair by both its intensity and brevity – saw the last vestiges of seasonal colour give way to the sparseness that, in any other year, would accompany a long northern hibernation. But this year was different. The world seemed abuzz, pulsating and writhing, moving ever faster, ever more boldly, and in an ever more uncertain direction.

One could see it walking the streets of Toronto. Eager commuters bustling in and out of TTC stations, clutching copies of *The Edible Woman*, the first novel from the award-winning poet Margaret Atwood which had fast become a staple in feminist circles. Young children, staring intently through windows of the Eaton's Department Store at toy models of the Saturn V rocket that had, just months ago, put humanity on the Moon for the very first time. Hushed conversations in downtown diners, rumours and theories mostly, about the band of "hippies" and their charismatic leader picked up by the Los Angeles police in connection with the brutal murders of seven people, including, so very tragically, Sharon Tate, that past August.

And as one stood, watching this play out in the urban melange and marveling in the stark beauty of the slate sky, growing ever darker as the small allotment of daylight afforded Toronto in the lead-up to the December solstice was pulled beyond the city's western suburbs, into their hands may have been pressed a handbill. An eager campaign worker or a candidate themselves (though the appearance of the latter would be rare unless it was nearing the time when throngs of office workers would flood out onto Front and Bay and York Streets, hanging up their white collars and clocking out for the day), may have passed along a physical reminder that in this time of change, of tumult, and of uncertainty, even the city's civic politics was changing. The leaflets resembled the leaves now gone from the city's trees, with their hues of orange and soft red and *"Red"* red, a reminder that some were predicting the fall of the old order and the coming of an optimistic, new season at city hall. Others, mainly old timers and entrenched politicians, saw nothing on the horizon but a winter of discontent.

During the fall municipal election of 1969, the residents of Toronto were witness to a campaign unlike any the city had seen since the fading days of the Second World War. And no matter whom among the mayoral candidates was victorious – the lanky, mustachioed incumbent raised up through the ranks of local office by the forces of labour; the former Controller, famed for her Red Tory principles, who aimed to be the first woman mayor of Ontario's largest city; the idealistic young university professor with the dynamic family and the bounce of a Kennedy; or (least likely) the blisteringly young adherent to the boutique brand of communism once advanced by Leon Trotsky – the December 1st, 1969 municipal election would be historic.

The reason for this was something voters in some of the largest cities in the world – London, Paris, Tokyo – were not only used to, but almost took for granted. To a voter from any of those cities or, indeed, even from Vancouver or Montreal, Toronto's 1969 municipal election would look standard, simple, banal. And yet, for voters in Toronto, things were glaringly different. That is because this time, candidates had eschewed the unspoken custom of civic non-partisanship that had been firmly cemented in the psyche of Ontarians after the victory of non-partisan forces over organized labour two decades prior. In this election, organized branches of federal political parties openly fielded candidates for local office.

The New Democratic Party, then still less than a decade old, fielded 16 candidates for the 22 available city council offices as the "Metro NDP", in reference to "Metropolitan Toronto", the quasi-upper-level administrative body that assembled local politicians from Toronto, the three "Yorks" – York proper, North York, and East York – and the two sprawling suburbs of Scarborough in the east and Etobicoke in the west, into a regional decision-making body.

The Metro NDP was organized and led by former Danforth Member of Parliament Reid Scott. It was Scott who, as the only New Democrat on the "flag committee" during the Great Flag Debate of 1963/1964, introduced an early prototype of today's Canadian flag (albeit with thick and soothing blue borders, rather than today's passionate red). After retiring from Parliament in 1968, Scott sought the office of councillor in Ward 9, which covered his home turf in the Beaches community. By organizing, the Metro NDP drew on the long tradition in the Canadian left of organizing to run municipal campaigns (Saiz, 1999). Scott indicated to the *Toronto Daily Star* that the party needed to run a unified, partisan campaign to address inconsistency at city hall, saying of sitting members of council, "They're just a group of mavericks...Between elections, they're not responsible to anybody or to any program," (Zaritsky, 1969, p. 7). This sentiment was echoed by

Ontario NDP leader Donald MacDonald, who told the delegates to a November meeting of the Metro Toronto Labour Council: "The only way we can have responsible government is through party government in which a team is elected to fulfill its platform," (*Toronto Daily Star,* November 21, 1969a, pg. 10). Responsibility was the watchword of the civic social democrats, an attempt to echo the language of the dedicated non-partisans who, in the past, hammered their more radical predecessors by positioning labour's political flank as fundamentally opposed to tempered, cautious, sound civic government.

The Metro NDP were opposed by the Toronto Municipal Liberal Association, or the "Civic Liberals". This branch party was organized by Senator Keith Davey, who was a star in the party, having the honour of being the former Canadian Football League commissioner. Though, as a senator, he opted to not campaign for local office, instead coordinating the party's efforts from behind the scenes. The Civic Liberals would nominate 15 candidates for city council and 9 for the school board, though there was some controversy over the nomination of a trustee candidate in Ward 5 who was also supported by a ragtag group of anti-sex ed, pro-"corporal punishment in the classroom" conservative parents known as the "Parent Action League". The Civic Liberal's slate of 25 was rounded out by the young University of Toronto professor, Stephen Clarkson, who stood as their mayoral candidate. Clarkson, reflecting after the campaign, came to see the addition of parties into the municipal campaign of 1969 as a natural extension of the frustration of the citizenry with the ineffectiveness of local government and the desire for reform:

> With neither the structure of City Hall able to reform itself nor the provincial government willing to step in, there was no institution able or willing to give expression to the reform pressure. It was at this point that a new set of players came onto the field of action. Hesitantly and gingerly new municipal parties came forward to champion the cause of reform, (Clarkson, 1972, p. 23)

The two major parties were not alone. While the federal and provincial Progressive Conservative Parties did not endorse any local candidates publicly, the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA) also nominated candidates. The LSA, locked in a political feud with the New Democratic Party over the latter's rebuking of their endorsements, ran three candidates for council in the downtown core and nominated the 27-year-old John Riddell for mayor. Speaking with *The Daily Star*, Riddell acknowledged the odds against his success, but claimed that by running an organized campaign, "We're going to be the real winners," (Szende, 1969, p. 51).

The campaigns of the Civic Liberals, Metro NDP, and LSA, were preceded by the appearance of a local party comprised of other Liberal Party-aligned reformers in the previous election. The Metro Civic Action Party, or "CIVAC", was founded by David Crombie, a lecturer at what was then Ryerson Polytechnic Institute, and had elected a single candidate to city council in 1966. Prior to CIVAC's entry into the city's municipal field, partisan actors had operated in the shadows for years. Indeed, a *Globe and Mail* column prior to the city's 1960 municipal election stated plainly, "...if not in the open, Metro [Toronto's] municipal elections on December 5 will be fought on party lines, by party workers but without party labels," (Westall, 1960). Since the strategic retreat of the forces of organized labour, forward-facing non-partisanship covering a scaffolding of partisan participation had dominated Toronto's politics. The rise of CIVAC and their subsequent recruitment of other councillors to their caucus, coupled with ambitious new leadership in the NDP and Liberals created the ideal conditions for the entry of true, formal parties into the city's election. A *Toronto Daily Star* staff writer noted, "The party approach has recruited candidates who, in the old system of every man for himself, would probably not have run," (Best, 1969).

The palpable excitement around the party slates and promises of unified, coherent municipal government did not extend beyond the city's political class. Maybe it was the tumultuous times, or maybe voters just found the reliable system of independents more appealing, but Toronto's electors resoundingly rebuked the efforts of partisans. Of the 22 council members elected on December 1, half were independent of formal party affiliation. Five members of CIVAC were elected, along with three Metro New Democrats and two Civic Liberals. But the independents held the overall majority, as council would be led by incumbent Mayor William Dennison, a New Democrat who was vocally opposed to partisan labels in municipal government (Newman, 1969). The *Toronto Daily Star*, commenting on the results of the previous day, wrote "...the long-heralded entry of national parties into municipal politics proved so inconclusive that both those for it and those against it claimed victory," (December 2, 1969, pg. A1).

Clarkson was defeated, polling third with 20.9 percent of the popular vote (Szende, 1969). Despite his loss and the general rejection of Liberal-affiliated candidates, Clarkson's optimism about party politics serving as a force for good in local government remained. Writing three years after the election, Clarkson reaffirmed his belief, remarking:

> Municipal Liberals remain convinced that party politics will come to Toronto and improve the quality of City politics. But whatever party advocates may think, the public has not been won over to what they associate with corruption and backroom wheeler-dealing, (178).

Despite the dedication of Clarkson and the reformers, with their dreams of open party nominations and coordinated electoral campaigns, by the election campaign of 1972, CIVAC had been disbanded and both the Civic Liberals and Metro NDP had retreated from the municipal field, opting instead to provide subtle endorsements to candidates they deemed to be "reformers" (*Toronto Star*, 1972; Stoffman, 1972). While the Metro NDP would appear periodically, usually organizing intently in the lead-up to municipal elections over the next two decades (including a notable number of years into the 1990s when they were led by future federal NDP leader Jack Layton), Toronto's local government came to be dominated by partisan-backed independents once again (Barber, 1997).

In the twilight hours of the 1960s, during a time of incredible change and upheaval, it seemed that party politics in Canadian municipal politics was inevitable. The eagerness of its proponents, the idealism of candidates, and the energy of parties seemed to create an unstoppable force, destined to change the stuffy ways and Victorian sensibilities of the Upper Canadian elite, come hell or high water. But within a few short years, the whole event seemed a fever dream.

1.2 – Why local politics? Why parties?

The opening story – a literary non-fiction treatment of the 1969 Toronto municipal election – is illustrative of one of the last times where multiple branches of existing federal and provincial parties nominated candidates and coordinated campaigns for municipal office. But even in the aftermath of that event, municipal politics in much of settler, Anglophone Canada remains underpinned by the axiom that "there is no Liberal or Conservative way to pave a street," (Slayton, 2015). Institutionalized municipal non-partisanship is the present norm in all Canadian provinces and territories, save for British Columbia and Quebec. Despite a rich history of partisan participation in local politics, particularly by forces aligned with organized labour and the political left, local elections in many of Canada's largest cities feature campaigns by those purporting to be unaffiliated independents running as municipal free agents.

I assert that, while candidates unaffiliated with political parties do contest local office, so too do those who support or are supported by political parties. This clandestine partisan

participation may impact a candidate's perspective on policy, their campaign strategy, and even the kinds of candidates who seek and win local office.

Though neglected by scholars, political operatives, media commentators, and politicians themselves have raised the possibility that partisanship does indeed play a role in municipal politics. At the height of his popularity, former Calgary mayor Naheed Nenshi delivered a speech at the Toronto Board of Trade that critiqued the city's local government: "Is fixing the potholes more 'New Democrat' or 'Conservative?' It's ridiculous," Nenshi said. "Forget about all the shadow parties you have in Toronto political life that I find very, very strange," (Hepburn, 2014, p. A17).

In this speech, Nenshi referred to "shadow parties", which I define as groups of partisan-affiliated actors who seek to coordinate the election of particular municipal candidates without openly stating they are acting as a coordinating body and applying partisan labels to their campaigns (see Section 4.4 for a more detailed discussion). As of yet, there has been no effort to examine this perceived phenomenon in any systematic way, either in popular media or academia.

This may be due to the nature of Canadian municipal government. As local government is a responsibility of the provinces as outlined by the Constitution Act, 1867, each province creates its own electoral and political framework for municipalities. This is why in Quebec and British Columbia for example, political parties operate openly, nominating candidates and doing the work to fund, coordinate, and provide assistance to their campaigns, while non-partisanship is mandated by law in jurisdictions like Ontario and Alberta. Developing a uniform understanding of municipal government in Canada is difficult when considering 13 distinct systems with varying election days, offices to be elected, and rules regarding financial contributions.

Despite this, attempts have been made to understand the nebulous operation of municipal government across all of Canada. Notably, the late James Lightbody dedicated a considerable portion of his career to understanding local governments. One particularly poignant observation effectively summarizes much of the scholarly work done on local government in Canada. While describing the composition of local councils, Lightbody observed that "Non-partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men," (2006, p. 257). This is what I call the "Lightbody assertion", a clear summarization of an oft-observed and yet infrequently studied phenomenon in Canadian local government.

While some scholars have attempted to consider the issue of racial diversity (see: Bloemraad, 2008; Siemiatycki, 2011; Bird, 2015) and gender diversity (see: Gidengil & Vengroff, 1997; Maillé, 1997; Tolley, 2011) in Canadian local government, none have embarked upon a comprehensive multi-jurisdictional project that attempt to understand what role, if any, non-partisanship plays in the composition of Canadian municipal councils and local boards.

This dissertation will add to the body of work on Canadian municipal government by studying the electoral participation of organized bodies of partisans, both formally and informally, and what impact their participation has on the candidacy and electoral performance of those coming from historically marginalized communities. I will do this using the 2018 municipal elections in select cities in Ontario and British Columbia as case studies.

Specifically, I make five central claims:

- First, I assert that municipalities are a scale worthy of inquiry in political geography as essential executors of state power through what I call "civic banality" – the most prosaic and common functions of the state that are essential to its functioning;

- Second, I argue that there are observable "eras" in the history of Canadian municipal government, each laying the groundwork for the present situation. From the aftermath of the Rebellions of 1836/1837, through the Reform era, the post-World War 1 era of class struggle, the era of urban renewal, and up to the present era where municipalities are decidedly subservient to provincial machinations, key events serve as the historical foundations for the present political cultures of municipalities. Key among these is the idea of municipal non-partisanship, which leads to my third point;

- Third, I assert that non-partisanship is a tool of the *status quo*, used to reinforce and support a notion of the municipality as a state entity aligned with the interests of business and of social and economic elites. In maintaining this pattern of municipal consistency, a system has been designed that systematically disadvantages three key historically marginalized communities subject to some of the most punitive and punishing manifestations of civic banality: women, racialized people, and Queer people.

- Fourth, I find that shadow parties do exist and are identifiable in the financial records of candidates and of political parties themselves. These parties operate

despite attempts to characterize local government as a bastion of apolitical scientific rationalism. Possible reasons for this clandestine participation are explored, including the notion that parties seek to "flex their political muscle" and demonstrate their campaign capabilities outside regular federal and provincial elections, or to develop a competent "farm team" of individuals on whom they can draw for higher-order candidates in the future. While the efforts of shadow party groups may seem to be self-interested, their efforts may have the added benefit of bolstering the profile of historically marginalized people seeking municipal office;

- Fifth, I find that – contrary to expectations – there is only mixed evidence that formal parties operating at the local level, such as those active in British Columbia, support the candidacy of historically marginalized people more than informal shadow parties. The institutional and organizational resources of formal parties relative to shadow parties should have a stronger effect on such candidates. While initial evidence points to a positive impact of formal parties on the electoral success of women and the candidacy of members of racialized minority communities, the pattern of benefits associated with each party type is inconsistent, pointing to the need for further research.

1.3 – Research Approach

The five central claims in this dissertation required different approaches. The first three claims involve theoretical ideas regarding state power, urban government, and Canadian political history. To achieve this, I engaged critically with the literature on the central topics and the nature of Canadian municipal political parties to develop an original typology of local parties in Canada. This forms the foundation for my arguments regarding civic banality, the history of Canadian municipal government, and the political foundations of non-partisanship.

The final two claims required the creation of unique datasets derived from case studies of municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia. I began to assemble these datasets from 2017 to 2021. The scope of this project changed multiple times before data collection began, in part thanks to the complicated dynamics of local government in Canada. A last-minute change to the structure of Toronto's municipal wards in 2018, mere hours before the close of nominations for

the city's scheduled municipal elections required an expansion of the project's scope for reasons more fully discussed in Section 5.2.

Data collection occurred in two stages: the first involved a survey of municipal candidates in Ontario and British Columbia, which ran from July 31st, 2018 to November 16th, 2018 and was administered using an online survey platform. The survey was sent to 2,512 municipal candidates in the 25 largest municipalities in Ontario and 762 municipal candidates in the 15 largest municipalities in British Columbia. Upon the close of the survey, there were a total of 1,000 responses in Ontario and 217 responses in British Columbia. This created a dataset of self-reported characteristics, opinions, and affiliations upon which a profile of municipal candidates in both provinces was built.

The second stage of collection began on November 16th, 2018 and concluded on March 1st, 2020. This stage was more intensive than the first, despite focusing on a smaller candidate pool. This stage required filling in gaps left by non-respondents to the survey and matching financial records for candidates in Ontario (which became available on April 29th, 2019) with existing federal financial returns. The labour-intensiveness of this necessitated a reduction in the number of examined municipalities to five in each province: Toronto, Ottawa, Mississauga, Brampton, and Hamilton in Ontario and Vancouver, Surrey, Burnaby, Richmond, and Victoria in British Columbia. While the number of municipalities was cut dramatically, the number of candidates examined was only cut by just under half, creating a second dataset including 1,523 candidates.

1.3.1 – Study areas: Ontario and British Columbia

Ontario and British Columbia are two of Canada's largest provinces in terms of population. The 2016 Canadian census indicates the provinces are home to 51.5% of all Canadians (Statistics Canada, 2017c). The 40 case study cities for the first stage of my survey are home to the majority of residents in both provinces: 68% of Ontarians and 59% of British Columbians. Combined, the population of the forty first round case study cities is just over 1/3 of the Canadian population (Statistics Canada, 2017c). Each municipality has a single mayor who serves as "head of council", and a varying number of elected representatives on council and on associated local boards (and the number and organization of local boards themselves), as indicated in Table 1 and Table 2. While many of the case study municipalities are geographically clustered, there are included examples from across their respective provinces, as indicated in Figures 1 and 2.

Table 1 – Case study municipalities in Ontario

| | | | | | School Board Trustees | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | English Public | | English Catholic | | French Public | | French Catholic | |
	Name	Pop. as of the 2016 Census	Mayor	Councillors	Name	Trustees	Name	Trustees	Name	Trustees	Name	Trustees
								Profile of the 25 Case Study Cities in Ontario				
1	**Toronto**	2731571	1	25	Toronto District School Board	22	Toronto Catholic District School Board	12	Conseil scolaire Viamonde (CSV)	3	Conseil scolaire de district catholique Centre-Sud (CSDCCS)	2
2	**Ottawa**	934243	1	23	Ottawa-Carleton District School Board	12	Ottawa Catholic School Board	10	Conseil des écoles publiques de l'Est de l'Ontario	7	Conseil des écoles catholiques du Centre-Est	8
3	**Mississauga**	721599	1	11	Peel District School Board (PDSB)	6	Dufferin-Peel Catholic District School Board (DPCDSB)	7	CSV	1*	CSDCCS	1
4	**Brampton**	593638	1	10	PDSB	5	DPCDSB	3	CSV	1*	CSDCCS	1†
5	**Hamilton**	536917	1	15	Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board	11	Hamilton-Wentworth Catholic District School Board	9	CSV	1⍟	CSDCCS	1
6	London	383822	1	14	Thames Valley District School Board	6	London District Catholic School Board	5	CSV	1◊	Conseil Scolaire Catholique Providence	1
7	Markham	328966	1	12	York Region District School Board (YRDSB)	3 + 1∅	York Catholic District School Board (YCDSB)	2	CSV	1⌘	CSDCCS	1✦
8	Vaughan	306233	1	8	YRDSB	2 + 1∅	YCDSB	4	CSV	1⌘	CSDCCS	1✦
9	Kitchener	233222	1	10	Waterloo Region District School Board (WRDSB)	4	Waterloo Catholic District School Board (WCDSB)	4	CSV	1◊	CSDCCS	1⌘
10	Windsor	217188	1	10	Greater Essex County District School Board	6	Windsor-Essex Catholic District School Board	5	CSV	1	Conseil Scolaire Catholique Providence	3
11	Richmond Hill	195022	1	8	YRDSB	2	YCDSB	2	CSV	1*	CSDCCS	1✦
12	Oakville	193832	1	14	Halton District School Board (HDSB)	4	Halton Catholic District School Board (HCDSB)	4	CSV	1⍟	CSDCCS	1ˣ

Table 1 (cont.) - Case study municipalities in Ontario

13	Burlington	183314	1	6	HDSB	4	HCDSB	3	CSV	1 ★	CSDCCS	1 X
14	Sudbury *(Greater Sudbury)*	161531	1	12	Rainbow District School Board	6	Sudbury Catholic District School Board	6	Conseil scolaire public du Grand Nord de l'Ontario	6	Conseil scolaire catholique du Nouvel-Ontario	7
15	Oshawa	159458	1	10	Durham District School Board (DDSB)	3	Durham Catholic District School Board (DCDSB)	2	CSV	1 ⬠	CSDCCS	1 ✧
16	Barrie	141434	1	10	Simcoe County District School Board	3	Simcoe Muskoka Catholic District School Board	2	CSV	1	CSDCCS	1
17	St. Catharines	133113	1	12	District School Board of Niagara	4	Niagara Catholic District School Board	3	CSV	1 ★	CSDCCS	1
18	Guelph	131794	1	12	Upper Grand District School Board	5	Wellington Catholic District School Board	4	CSV	1 ◊	CSDCCS	1 †
19	Cambridge	129920	1	8	WRDSB	3	WCDSB	3	CSV	1 ◊	CSDCCS	1 ⵜ
20	Whitby	128377	1	8	DDSB	2	DCDSB	2	CSV	1 ⬠	CSDCCS	1 ✧
21	Kingston	123798	1	12	Limestone District School Board	5	Algonquin & Lakeshore Catholic District School Board	4	Conseil des écoles publiques de l'Est de l'Ontario	1	Conseil des écoles catholiques du Centre-Est	1
22	Ajax	119677	1	6	DDSB	2	DCDSB	2	CSV	1 ⬠	CSDCCS	1 ✧
23	Milton	110128	1	10	HDSB	2	HCDSB	1	CSV	1 ★	CSDCCS	1 X
24	Thunder Bay	107909	1	12	Lakehead Public Schools	8	Thunder Bay Catholic District School Board	6	Conseil scolaire public du Grand Nord de l'Ontario	1	Conseil scolaire de district catholique des Aurores boréales	5
25	Waterloo	104986	1	7	WRDSB	3	WCDSB	2	CSV	1 ◊	CSDCCS	1 ⵜ
Bolded municipality names are those also included in the second stage of research.					**Matching symbols indicate the same trustee represents each of the municipalities.**							
TOTAL		9111692	25	285	135		107		22		31	

11

Table 2 – Case study municipalities in British Columbia

	Name	Pop. as of the 2016 Census	Mayor	Councillors	School Board Trustees		Other Boards	
					Name	Trustees	Name	Elected officials
1	**Vancouver**	631486	1	10	Vancouver School Board (School District #39)	9	Vancouver Park Board	7 (Commissioners)
2	**Surrey**	517887	1	8	Surrey Schools (School District #36)	6		
3	**Burnaby**	232755	1	8	Burnaby Schools (School District #41)	7		
4	**Richmond**	198309	1	8	Richmond School District (School District #38)	7		
5	Abbotsford	141397	1	8	Abbotsford School District (School District #34)	7		
6	Coquitlam	139284	1	8	Coquitlam School District (School District #43)	4		
7	Kelowna	127380	1	8	Central Okanagan School District (School District #23)	4		
8	Saanich (District of)	114148	1	8	Saanich School District (School District #63)	2		
9	Langley	102238	1	6	Langley School District (School District #35)	2		
10	Delta (District of)	102238	1	6	Delta School District (School District #37)	7		
11	Nanaimo	90504	1	8	Nanaimo-Ladysmith School District (School District #68)	9		
12	Kamloops	90280	1	8	Kamloops/Thompson School District (School District #73)	5		
13	North Vancouver (District of)	85935	1	6	North Vancouver School District (School District #44)	4		
14	**Victoria**	85792	1	8	Greater Victoria School District (School District #61)	9		
15	Chilliwack	83788	1	6	Richmond School District (School District #33)	7		
Bolded municipality names are those also included in the second stage of research.								
	TOTAL	2743421	15	114	89		7	

Profile of the 25 Case Study Cities in British Columbia

Figure 1 – Case Study Municipalities in Ontario
(Map by author)

Figure 2 – Case Study Cities in British Columbia
(Map by author)

1.4 – Positionality and considerations of identity

In the preface to *City Lib*, Stephen Clarkson (the Liberal candidate for mayor of Toronto in 1969 referenced in Section 1.1) makes an observation that is relevant here:

> ...I do not claim to be observing events from the Olympian towers of academe. Writing almost three years after the event, I trust that the commotion is recollected with some lucidity and that my analysis is accurate. My aim is not to explain away a defeat. Nor is it to shed bitter tears or gather belated sympathy. As a professor of political science I learned more in those ten weeks of active politics than I had learned in the previous ten years of study and teaching (1969, pg. x).

Clarkson's assertion that he learned more in active campaigning than in his previous academic career is a testament to the importance of active participation as a supplement to study.

In 2014, I sought elected office in Hamilton, Ontario, running for the vacant Wards 1 & 2 trustee seat on the Hamilton-Wentworth District School Board. I believed firmly in the importance of schools as public resources and was concerned about the implications of proposed school closures in west Hamilton, where I still proudly live, on the city's already complicated housing market, planning situation, and community cohesion. Though I was unsuccessful, placing last in a field of five, I share Clarkson's observations and recognize the importance of active learning to provide a tangible connection to the sometimes ethereal concepts we investigate. Indeed, my experiences sparked further curiosity regarding the role of party networks, having been exposed to discussions wherein candidates were "accused" of having the clandestine support of parties. Such discussions and other personal interactions drove me to understand this issue in a more systematic and scientific way.

In seeking elected office, I found myself becoming familiar with many of the other candidates and politically engaged people in Hamilton and the surrounding area. As such, I have personal relationships with a small number of the candidates included in this study. My association with these candidates in no way changed or impacted their participation or my analysis of their responses to the candidate survey, their financial returns, or their campaigns overall.

I also acknowledge my position as an individual who is not a racialized minority and does not identify as a woman. Studying the issues of representation among other marginalized groups in Canadian society requires careful consideration of lived experience and a commitment to abandon preconceived notions and outdated concepts, particularly when informed of a more

inclusive and affirming method, process, or line of thinking is available. I hope this work will support my fellow scholars, particularly those from more diverse backgrounds, and will allow us to work collaboratively to examine pressing social issues and propose changes where appropriate.

1.5 – Terminology

Words matter. Their histories, evolutions, and contemporary uses make them complicated. They have the power to humanize and dehumanize, validate and invalidate, recognize and ignore. In this spirit, a conscious decision has been made throughout this text to use particular words, which is an act that may require clarification.

The Government of Canada uses the term "Visible Minority" widely throughout official reports and research. This term is defined in Canada's Employment Equity Act as "persons, other than Aboriginal peoples, who are non-"Caucasian" in race or non-white in colour," (Employment Equity Act, 1995).[1] Conceptually, it is based on physical (visible) appearance. The term is used by all government agencies, including Statistics Canada, but is contentious, with racial justice advocates and scholars calling for it to be abandoned. In 2007 and again in 2017, the United Nations' Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination called on Canada to "revise" the use of the term as, "it renders invisible the differences in the lived experiences of diverse communities," (CERD, 2017). The Canadian Race Relations Foundation, a Crown-corporation dedicated to the elimination of racism in Canada notes that many of those given that label by the state prefer terms like "racialized minority" or "Person/People of Colour" (2021). Mindful of history and context, for the purposes of this study, the term "racialized minority" and derivations of such term will be used. In select instances, particularly when referring to an individual or a unique instance, a specific term such as "Black" or "Woman of Colour" may be used. I recognize my positionality in the academy, in research, and in Canadian society. Embarking upon this research required ample research regarding the perspectives of scholars who come from racialized minority communities. As such, I am aware that there is considerable debate within racialized minority communities over terminology. Debate and dialogue regarding terms and categorization

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[1] The Employment Equity Act makes use of the outdated term "Caucasian" to define those who are not racialized minorities. The term "Caucasian" was developed to scientifically classify races in an effort to advance the project of White Supremacy and to create justifications for the exclusion of other races from white settler and colonial society (Mukhopadhyay, 2008). Its use in contemporary scholarship is inappropriate, but is used here in direct reference to government policy.

is important, and I acknowledge that the use of any term may elicit a variety of responses from those with lived experience and hailing from communities described. The use of any term henceforth does not preclude adaptation in the future based on changing understandings within the academy and society overall of the language we use.

Another word used here that requires clarification is "Queer". This term is used as an all-encompassing term for those who do not identify as "heterosexual". While the acronym "LGBTQIA+" is gaining popularity, it is a limiting and narrow agglomeration for a few reasons. First, the acronym assumes the even and narrow application of a particular label, which may not reflect the lived reality of many Queer people. The case of "B", representing "bisexual", is poignant, as such a term is eschewed by some in favour of "P" for "pansexual", which acknowledges the limitations of a gender binary.

Second, it "acronymizes" the community, clustering identities without a careful reflection of what truly unifies Queer people and orders said identities based on linguistic simplicity. And finally, it can sometimes exclude important identifiers, such as "2" for "two-spirit" individuals, an identity held by some Indigenous Queer people reflecting an identity rooted in a pre-colonial understanding of sexuality and gender. This is in addition to Queer being a preferred term of use by the author.

For the purposes of this study, Queer is an appropriate identifier, as it recognizes the electoral challenges faced by any non-heterosexual candidate. While the challenges for some are greater than others – particularly concerning the candidacy of trans individuals – more study is required to truly grasp these challenges. Working within the limitations of this study, the term Queer is more than sufficient.

Finally, there will be periodic references to legislative bodies, locations, or other concepts that are rooted primarily in other cultures, languages, and/or countries. When these are mentioned, the accompanying word in that culture or country's language will be included for reference.

1.6 – Overview

This dissertation examines the five central claims established in Section 1.2, all built around the core notion that there is partisan participation in non-partisan Canadian municipal elections, that these partisans may help boost the electoral profile of historically marginalized people, and that

jurisdictions where formal parties operate will see more diversity among candidates and elected officials at the local level than those provinces where non-partisanship is the "norm".

In Chapter 2, I discuss municipalities as a scale worthy of inquiry within political geography, asserting that the power of the state is felt in more subtle and commonplace ways in the municipality. I call this "civic banality", the everyday expressions of state power that are, in some instances, so normal, they are not even thought of as expressions of said power. Based on this, I argue that the principles of democratic fairness and representation theory pushes us to consider the identities of those who are elected to local government and, therefore, oversee this banality. I isolate four identifiable historically marginalized groups in Canadian local government: women, racialized minorities, Queer people, and Indigenous peoples. I then discuss "pathways to candidacy", considering the forces that may hinder or encourage the political participation of an individual from the aforementioned communities.

Chapter 3 serves as a historical overview of Canadian municipal government. I identify five key eras, beginning in 1837 with the "Victorian Municipality", influenced heavily by the Rebellions of 1836/1837 and the subsequent push for "responsible government" in what were then the British colonies of Upper and Lower Canada. This gave way to the "Reform Municipality", where American ideals of "good government" and "scientific rational administration" took hold in Canadian cities. Following this was the era of the "Battleground Municipality", which saw local government become a major site of conflict between leftists, including representatives of organized labour, socialists, and more orthodox Communists, and the established business classes, who were represented by the Liberal and Conservative parties. While this era began during World War One, the real push for labour representation occurred after the Labour Revolts of 1919. But, by the late 1950s, labour had been pushed back, and scientific rational managerialism became the norm in Canadian cities. Thus began the era of the "Renewal Municipality", wherein programs of urban renewal were forced onto urban spaces, creating a new cleavage in the municipal struggle: civic technocrats versus urbanists. Following the neoliberal revolution of the 1980s and the push for reducing the size of governments, provincial administrations began imposing costly and expansive "amalgamation" plans on cities, giving rise to the present era in Canadian municipal government: the "Reorganized Municipality". In this era of reorganization, municipalities are firmly creatures of the province, manipulated to serve the political aims of a provincial government, all while expected to remain crucial sites of capitalist accumulation and business growth.

In Chapter 4, I develop a typology of Canadian municipal political parties that incorporates historical parties and the partisan entities we see in local government presently. This typology is an effort to simplify and categorize seemingly disparate and distinct groups of partisans to provide clarity and contrast from existing federal and provincial parties. This chapter also investigates shadow parties that operate in jurisdictions where partisan participation is banned or discouraged and discusses ghost candidates and ghost parties, both phenomena that can complicate an understanding of local government and municipal parties.

Following these three chapters, which work to provide support for some of my claims while also providing a foundation for the consideration of primary data, Chapter 5 is an overview of the first stage of my research: the survey of municipal candidates. This chapter outlines in detail the steps involved in creating the survey, picking the case study locations, and the process of contacting the candidates. I outline my correspondence with candidates, which provided illuminating and important insight into subtle aspects of campaigning a higher-level, quantitative analysis alone could not capture. The survey helped to provide an overview of candidate identities and political affiliations. Candidate respondents were, as expected, majority men, older, non-Indigenous, non-racialized minority, and non-Queer. They held higher levels of education than the general population and were more likely to work in more technically-based services – education, law, government, or management – than the general population in their province. The majority of respondents in both provinces had not sought elected office before, and claimed no membership or affiliation with federal or provincial political parties. Strikingly, in both provinces, the majority of respondents indicated they did not support the active involvement of political parties in municipal politics.

Finally, Chapter 6 serves as the second stage of analysis on the select case study cities. In this chapter, I provide detail regarding the data collection process for the second dataset, including a detailed description of the process by which financial records were obtained and screened to determine candidate shadow party affiliations. Using this new dataset, I ran a series of models to test hypotheses regarding the impact of shadow and formal parties on candidates who were women, from racialized minority and/or Queer communities. The results clearly indicated that Ontario and British Columbia feature distinct political cultures. Only one variable – incumbency status – had a consistent positive impact on candidate success. The models provided some evidence to support the notion that candidates from marginalized groups received some support from partisan

networks, with women and Queer candidates more likely to be affiliated with partisan forces in Ontario while racialized minority candidates were more likely to be affiliated with formal parties in British Columbia. The key findings indicate that women, who are more likely to run for and win races for "gendered" down-ballot offices like school trustee, perform better when affiliated with formal parties in British Columbia, that a longer-term study incorporating more municipalities is needed to assess Queer electoral performance at the local level, and that municipal government in both Ontario and British Columbia is characterized by overwhelming whiteness, with racialized minority candidates performing poorly with regards to both winning their electoral races and capturing higher percentages of the popular vote. Finally, while party affiliation and partisan support may provide some assistance to historically marginalized candidates, the results of this study prove that more work must be done to fully understand what impacts the candidacy of women, Queer folks, and members of racialized minority communities. Parties alone may not hold the answer to why some candidates succeed and why others perform so poorly.

I conclude with Chapter 7, which seeks to recentre the discussion on the notion that the municipality is a scale worthy of study within the context of a traditional political geographic conceptualization of the state as a form of human community that lays claim to the legitimate use of force. Municipalities oversee civic banality and, through their historical development and the changing form of local political parties, municipal councils – the bodies tasked with the day-to-day management of civic banality – presently do not reflect the diversity of the populations within cities subject to, benefitting from, and forced to live with civic banality in all its forms. Particularly with regard to the racial composition of Canadian cities, municipal councils are overwhelmingly white, signaling a need for work to be done to provide the same electoral opportunities to racialized minority candidates as to white candidates. Partisan networks appear to play a role, but further study is required to understand the size of that role.

We rode our bikes to the nearest park
Sat under the swings and kissed in the dark
We shield our eyes from the police lights
We run away, but we don't know why
And like a mirror, these city lights shine
They're screaming at us: "We don't need your kind."
Sprawl II (Mountains Beyond Mountains) - Arcade Fire

2.1 – Municipalities as a scale of analysis

Municipal government is a decidedly neglected area of inquiry within political geography, yet local institutions, from municipal councils to agencies, boards, and commissions (ABCs), serve as important sites of daily expressions of power. Municipalities, as administrative divisions of the state, are just as much executors of state power as national-level governments in contemporary liberal democracies, albeit with different designated responsibilities.

The responsibilities of each composite level of a state's government range in perceived importance. In the Canadian case – as in many liberal democratic states around the world – the municipal level has been assigned the most "prosaic", or mundane and commonplace state actions. The prosaic actions of the state constitute the involvement by state actors in "everyday" life and the come in the form of the provision of "basic" services (Painter, 2006). While each level of government is tasked with some unromantic functions, the municipal level assumes responsibility for the bulk of the most prosaic public services provided by the state.

Arguably, these apparently commonplace, prosaic, or even banal responsibilities render the municipality a less interesting scale of inquiry. Nonetheless, these banal responsibilities are structurally important for the maintenance of state power and have a profound impact on the populations of contemporary liberal democracies. Moreover, these banal actions of the state (regardless of the feelings said actions invoke in voters or, indeed, researchers) are still *state actions*. In the context of a contemporary democracy, the question of "who" serves as an elected official overseeing the provision of said banality is one of great importance. The banality of the force of the state at the local level does not render municipal governments and the elected officials serving in a legislative capacity within those governments as less important or less deserving of scholarly attention.

In this chapter, I illustrate this point with a discussion of the role of municipal-level politics in maintaining social order and in facilitating capital accumulation. I begin by considering the banal responsibilities of the municipality and how the system of service provision at the local level advances the aims of the state and capital. I then consider the issue of civic representation itself, examining those tasked with the supervision of municipal service provision. I then proceed to a more specific examination of scholarly work regarding women, ethnic minorities and immigrant communities, Queer people, and Indigenous peoples in local government and the role of party elites in supporting or hindering the candidacy of members of such groups.

2.2 – Civic Banality

At its core, political geography considers the dynamic and vibrant impositions of power over space. The state is key among those executors of power, serving as a simultaneously tangible and abstract entity capable of efficiently wielding coercive force. Indeed, the state has been considered broadly and debatably as the most "important" scale of analysis, at least within "traditional" political geography (Claval, 2006; Cox, 2005; England, 2005). Humanity's general acquiescence to the presence of the state and the underlying coerciveness of state actors more broadly means that political geography, while certainly capable and qualified to consider concepts outside the state, remains cognizant of states and ways in which their power is manifested over space. Within the state, though, are differing scales at which power is manifested. These scales are politically constructed, fluid, and regularly contested (Delaney et al., 1997; Marston, 2000).

Municipalities are grounded, small-scale administrative divisions tasked with performing essential state functions at the local scale. In Canada, having been granted authority over municipal entities by Section 92 of the Constitution Act, provinces have established extremely rigid and narrowly defined responsibilities to be undertaken by the municipalities in their jurisdiction. These responsibilities include overseeing solid-waste and waste-water management facilities, establishing official plans and zoning codes, the contracting or direct establishment of policing, the provision of a system of public transportation, the maintenance of parks and public spaces, and the responsibility for local roads. The level of detail can border on micromanagement, as is the case in for municipalities in Nova Scotia, which are explicitly allowed to remove diseased trees from all properties, municipalities in Ontario, which are granted the right to sell impounded animals if they are not claimed within a reasonable time, or in Saskatchewan, where municipalities

may declare a part of a day as a civic holiday (Nova Scotia Department of Municipal Affairs, 1998; Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2001; Saskatchewan Ministry of Government Relations, 2001).

I term the prosaic responsibilities of the state assigned to the municipal level "civic banality". This term encompasses both the general responsibilities of local councils and the more specialized obligations of their affiliated ABCs. Through the provision of civic banality, the municipality constitutes a key agent in the imposition of coercive force, the encouragement of self-regulation and establishment of principles of good citizenship, and the reproduction of labour for the continued accumulation of capital. Those who come to oversee civic banality, then, *truly matter*, as they are those to whom power has been distributed. It then matters that the individuals holding power and controlling the provision of civic banality are reflective of the communities providing that power and over whom the power of the state will be exerted.

The strikingly unromantic nature of the functions of municipal government – dealing with human waste, regulation of lived spaces, and managing traffic flows – although foundational to the functioning of a contemporary liberal democratic state, are so commonplace and expected that they become invisible, sinking unceremoniously into the background of daily life. Municipalities, then, as the most "on-the-ground" scale of the state, factor into the apparatus of state power integrally while exerting state power in the most banal and "forgettable" ways.

There are echoes at the local level of what Billig discusses nationally in his conceptualization of "banal nationalism". As with civic banality, the facets of banal nationalism are marked by a hegemonic persistence and striking universality that renders them subdermal and dormant until called upon to resurface and reinforce the existing order (Billig, 1995). The persistence of singular languages, accepted rites, familiar flags, common histories, and delimitation of "us" on the side of patriotism and "them" on the side of rabid extremism push these symbols, actions, and thoughts from regular view, essentializing and obscuring them. They become commonplace and uncritically accepted, on a more grand scale, but not unlike the key components of civic banality at the local scale.

Consider a deeply unremarkable facet of urban space: the sidewalk. Much has been written about the unremarkability of the sidewalk as a stand-alone concept. As Jane Jacobs made a point of noting: "A city sidewalk by itself is nothing. It is an abstraction," (1993, p. 37). But the sidewalk is itself a crucial component of civic banality and a site of numerous other banal expressions of

state power through the municipal. Sidewalks are subject to, among other things, bylaws, police surveillance, and organization in ways that benefit capital. As Blomley notes, the sidewalk is where "Pedestrianism" occurs. This conceptualization "understands the sidewalk as a finite public resource that is always threatened by multiple, competing interests and uses," (Blomley, 2011, p. 3). The uses of sidewalks are broad and diverse, serving as sites of commerce, expression, survival, recreation, and fundamental debates over the shape of urban spaces (Loukaitou-Sideris et al., 2009). Indeed, sidewalks serve to tie together otherwise disparate components of the urban landscape, with Jacobs elaborating upon her initial observation by remarking on the interconnectedness of the sidewalk and its bordering uses (1993). Sidewalks, as simple pieces of municipal infrastructure, are rather eloquently representative of civic banality; built, maintained, and regulated by the municipality, they are so essential and so unremarkable that they are a crucial space of activity and life rendered nearly invisible, their presence obscured by the activities that occur on them or given meaning only in relation to nearby uses. Underfoot and out of mind.

I argue that, through the provision of civic banality, municipalities encourage the citizenry of liberal democratic states toward one of two general states-of-being: deferential to the coercive force of the state and larger social pressures that are supported by the state, or toward a self-regulatory, comfortable position of "good citizenship", or "*geborgenheit*", from the German meaning "a personal state of security, comfort, warmth". The functions of the state at the municipal level play a deeply important role in evoking either coerced deference or *geborgenheit* in individuals, establishing the dominance of the existing state order and pacifying dissent. Civic banality, by the very nature of its unromantic and commonplace appearance, elicits less intense feeling than the expressions of state power at higher scales.

2.2.1 – Banality and Force

In one obvious case, the use of legitimate force at the municipal level is considered less noteworthy than its use through national militaries and the national security apparatus. The Weberian conceptualization of the state does not establish a single *scale* that holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, stating simply that it is the state which is afforded this power. Evidently, the municipality maintains an important role in the legitimate use of force, particularly because a key component of civic banality is the management of daily order among members of a state. While this is reflected in the design and the urban landscape (see: Graham, 2004), it is best and

most tangibly displayed by local law enforcement. These law enforcement officials, (police, by-law officers, transit police, etc.) are the primary point-of-contact between most people and the force of the state. It is a local police force that is the best expression of state power made manifest in everyday life.

In the early years of the 21st century, as neoliberal policy shifted law enforcement responsibility to municipalities, they, in turn, played an important role in "securitizing" populations. In doing so, residents of municipalities came to accept that threats to "our way of life" are pervasive and imminent, which justified massive expenditures on local-level policing and making the presence of local law enforcement has been ubiquitous in municipalities (Lithopoulos et al., 2005; Murphy, 2007). This presence is essential to the enactment of local policy objectives, as municipalities hold the primary responsibility for regulating the movement and presence of people in spaces. Cities are able to pass bylaws, in the name of order, public health, or efficiency, that dictate traffic flow, acceptable use of public and private space, and regulate which bodies (human and animal) may occupy which spaces in their jurisdictions (Rock, 2013; Valverde, 2005). These bylaws are particularly punitive to non-property owners, especially those in situations of homelessness, engaged in sex work, and to those critical of the existing neoliberal economic order (Mitchell, 2003; Van der Muelen, 2008). Local law-enforcement, managed by municipalities, enforce those laws which regulate the day-to-day lives of citizens and residents.

As a central legislative reflection of civic banality, bylaws that manage the use of space and the legality of certain bodies in those spaces are a crucial way to reinforce "law and order" narratives that support the class and societal distinctions underpinning the liberal democratic state. This categorization of spatial deviance and the subsequent regulation of deviant behaviours and bodies by police are, as Giddens notes, "intrinsic to the expansion of the administrative reach of the state, penetrating day-to-day activities – and to the achievement of an effective monopoly of violence in the hands of the state authorities," (1987, p. 184).

Local bylaws and initiatives serve a dual purpose. While providing the legal foundations on which local law enforcement can police bodies in spaces, bylaws and initiatives additionally enforce the self-regulation of the body, expressed through the Foucauldian concept of individual self-regulation in liberal democracies. Analogously tied to the hypothetical prison design by Jeremy Bentham, Foucault's "Panopticism", or the internalizing of surveillance, is foundationally supported by the municipality.

Foucault's initial description of Panopticism begins with an allegory of a Renaissance municipality addressing the arrival of the Bubonic Plague in their jurisdiction. In this town, the acts of record-keeping, local policing, and encouragement of citizen participation in the regulatory process all come together to keep the town safe. Foucault notes,

> ...there was also a political dream of the plague, which was exactly [the reverse of the lawless, festive atmosphere]: not the collective festival, but strict divisions; not laws transgressed, but the penetration of regulation into even the smallest details of everyday life through the mediation of the complete hierarchy that assured the capillary functioning of power...the town immobilized by the functioning of an extensive power that bears in a distinct way over all individual bodies – this is the utopia of the perfectly governed city, (Foucault, 1995, pp. 197 - 198).

This exercise of power, while including a very real threat of physical violence, was coupled with an encouragement for the citizenry to do their part, follow order, and be "good citizens" so as to help prevent the spread of disease. The shifting of the emphasis away from law enforcement (who *should* only need deal with "bad citizens") onto the individual is the internalization of the imposition of force. But to regularize and systematize this is an important part of maintaining state power. Easing into a reflection on Bentham's Inspection House – *the* Panopticon – Foucault ties the analogies together:

> Hence the major effect of the Panopticon: to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power. So to arrange things that the surveillance is permanent in its effects, even if it is discontinuous in its action; that the perfection of power should tend to render its actual exercise unnecessary... (Foucault, 1995, p. 201).

In this is the essence of Panopticism. Regulation is, at least in part, internalized, so that the constant costly monitoring of the population is unnecessary. Rather, the reminder that one *could* be monitored and subjected to coercive force is ever-present and factors into the daily actions of the individual. Later works on Foucault's interpretation of Bentham's concept note the importance of this form of regulation on the human imagination, encouraging behaviours that fall in line with the expectations of the ethereal "general inspector" (Tusseau, 2012).

Panopticism in the municipality comes in myriad forms. Local authorities are responsible for acts of municipal legibility, making the urban environment more easy-to-comprehend and navigable through urban planning and the setting of property standards. Similarly, the act of registering properties and the ownership therein is the responsibility of local authorities, rendering

municipal governments as essential in the act of *surveille*. In a more crude way, residents of a municipality are exposed daily to notices regarding prohibited actions and the corresponding municipal bylaw that prohibits said actions in the form of simple pictograms. Things like cigarettes, skateboards, "P"s denoting spaces to leave one's car, and couples casually dropping crumbs to waiting birds are crossed through with large, red, encircled X's. These seemingly innocuous and pervasive signs litter the urban landscape of North American cities. Police or bylaw officers may not lurk on every street corner, but the regular reminders of the penalties for transgressing the established law help to internalize the regulatory functions of the state. In experiencing these reminders of the local state's power around us, we can feel either rebellious and ungoverned when we ignore them or that overwhelming sense of *geborgenheit* when we situate ourselves on the side of good citizenship, knowing we shall obey and report those who offend, thus maintaining our comfort and allying ourselves with state actors.

2.2.2 – Banality and Accumulation

While regulation can be encouraged through reminders of the state's presence and the penalties associated with subverting the laws of the municipality, there can also be encouragement to conform to a municipality's stated goals through an emphasis on "civic pride", "civic boosterism" or "urban propaganda projects". These efforts aim to encourage residents of a municipality to participate in the broader goals of the civic government. Among critical scholars, these are "efforts made by an urban elite to refashion collective emotion and consciousness within cities in order to legitimate political projects which function primarily in their interests," (Boyle, 1997, p. 1975). Municipalities can encourage participation in efforts to advance the cause of their locality by framing discussions in pride in one's place, tapping into the already regulated human imagination with an appeal to the comforting warmth of *geborgenheit* and the principles of "good citizenship".

The drive for public acceptance of civic boosterism is a component of one of the most important functions of the municipality: that as a structurally crucial partner in the accumulation of capital in liberal democratic states. The municipality is a site of capitalist accumulation, fundamentally aiding in the process, serving the role of "concrete" to the "bricks" of capital. Municipalities are essential to the stability of the structure, but are overlooked, blending into the background, obscured by the perceived importance and superficial beauty of the bricks they join together. Capital and the present system of capitalist economic organization are fundamental to

the stability of the contemporary liberal democratic state, and without municipalities as that crucial binding agent, the state and the existing economic order would fall at the slightest push.

On a basic level, the municipality is the preeminent site of the simultaneous processes of capital accumulation (the place where profit is extracted from labour in factories and stores, and from the land itself), the expending of surplus (where the most obvious indulgences, in the form of services and goods, can be acquired), and labour regeneration and reproduction (Harvey, 2010). For all the emphasis on the ethereality of capital, it is certainly spatially bound. As Cox notes, "Value must continue to flow through capital in its fixed forms if industrial capitalists are to realize profits, landowners rents, and workers wages in particular places," (1998, p. 4). Though there is still capital that remains unsettled, necessitating efforts to attract and keep it in a particular place. This drives municipalities to compete in order to protect that which they have and solicit that which they want from other municipalities. Peterson (1981) frames this competition as a necessity thanks to the subordinate position of the municipality and the limited tools local governments have at their disposal. With a fundamentally different set of policy options than those available to other levels of government, municipalities compete, he asserts, necessitating a focus on civic pride, as all members of a municipality share an interest in the success of that municipality (Peterson, 1981).

Particularly upon the onset of neoliberal economic hegemony in the 1980s, municipalities began engaging in this competitive effort of municipal entrepreneurialism to attract and sustain capitalist firms, which was tied inexorably to the new push for civic boosterism. As Harvey points out,

> Urban entrepreneurialism (as opposed to the much more faceless bureaucratic managerialism) here meshes with a search for local identity and, as such, opens up a range of mechanisms for social control. Bread and circuses was the famous Roman formula that now stands to be reinvented and revived, while the ideology of locality, place and community becomes central to the political rhetoric of urban governance which concentrates on the idea of togetherness in defence against a hostile and threatening world of international trade and heightened competition," (Harvey, 1989, p. 14).

In this, municipal actors support the interests of capital by encouraging the population of the municipality to support their particular growth philosophy. But, in order to do so, the municipality must itself provide civic banality, which constitutes those goods and services which capital is unable or unwilling to provide on its own. These services, as banal as they may be, are

consumed by those who live in and visit the municipality, ensuring the reproduction of the labour necessary to aid in capital accumulation. The failure of the liberal capitalist economic order to sufficiently provide for the reproduction of labour thus necessitates municipalities undertake the provision of these services.

This requires a contribution from capital. The sought-after tax base, though occasionally unbalanced in favour of capital against homeowners, is still expected to provide a contribution to the provision of public services, representing a minor constraint on capital's accumulative goals. The imposition of constraints upon the accumulation of capital and expectations on extractors has resulted in municipalities becoming flashpoints in larger debates over the size, scope, and robustness of the state (Cox et al., 1993).

Capitalists, both to ensure the ease of capital accumulation and reflexively oppose any restrictions on their ability to generate surplus will manipulate and segment the landscape of the municipality, particularly those with higher rates of urbanization, and bend the will of the state to their ends. In doing so, write Moreno and Shin, "the state, its representatives, and the people they politically represent, [have] become an apparatus which serves finance and makes use of the urban as the 'unit of accumulation'," (2018, p. 80).

All this is to say that, for all the emphasis on the ethereality of capital, it is certainly spatially bound. Cox discusses this, acknowledging that capital seeks to "subordinate geography", but must also contend and acquiesce to space, aiming instead to "revolutionize" those localities that the might of capital cannot fully subvert (2012, p. 58). Brenner, Marcuse, and Mayer similarly note that "Urban space under capitalism is therefore never permanently fixed; it is continually shaped and reshaped through a relentless clash of opposed social forces..." (2009, p. 178). It is in capital's reliance on the local state and the dynamics of the spaces in which it operates that a revolutionary opportunity arises. This opportunity gives revolutionary, human-focused municipal projects a chance to carve out a space for people and a greater say for workers so that services may be provided for the benefit of local residents, rather than serving the needs of capital alone (Brenner et al., 2009). As Harvey notes, this is where the concept of having a "right to the city" becomes important, as having such a right gives *common people* the right to shape the municipality "after our heart's desire," (2003, p. 939).

<u>2.2.3 – Banality in Action</u>

The municipality is a scale worthy of analysis. As a key partner in the imposition of coercive force, the encouragement of self-regulation and establishment of principles of good citizenship, and the reproduction of labour for the continued accumulation of capital, the municipality features as a key component in the maintenance of state power. While, as Cox notes, there need not be a local *state* to have a local *politics* that aims to attract capital or aid in the larger application of state goals, (1998) it is the local state itself, in the form of the municipality, that is tasked with carrying out the provision of civic banality in specific forms. Similarly, while there are larger networks and regional agglomerations that can perform similar duties, the peculiarities in how civic banality is administered in individual municipalities, what patterns exist, and the administrators themselves warrant consideration.

For all its unromantic and mundane attributes, civic banality still represents the force of the state in action and expressions of power over common people. This is, in part, why the municipality has been the primary battleground for a number of social and political movements aimed at fundamentally restructuring society.[2] Notable among them were the socialists who found unprecedented success at the municipal level in Milwaukee, Wisconsin during the first decades of the 20th century. Their assumption of elected office in Milwaukee and their management of civic banality in a progressive manner led more radical leftists to derisively brand their colleagues "sewer socialists" (Mukherji, 2017).

Socialist municipal administrations, which lasted from 1910 to 1940 (save a four-year break from 1912 to 1916), were fiscally prudent, aiming to slowly transform the nature of economic organization in the city by effectively, diligently, and progressively managing civic banality. The emphasis on simply managing civic banality differently was opposed by establishment forces, but often more strongly by their fellow travellers. As Booth notes, "Socialist ideologues criticized municipal socialism for its lack of revolutionary zeal," (1985, p. 52). Milwaukee's sewer socialists did not aim to overthrow the capitalist order with policy proposals outside their jurisdiction, focusing instead on better managing civic banality to improve conditions

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[2] Civic banality is not the only contributing factor to the widespread presence of progressive and labour-affiliated groups competing for power at the municipal level. Such groups also found success at the local level where they could not at other levels. Movements on the political left at the municipal level were historically uniquely successful, particularly when as much attention was paid to local politics as to elections at other levels (see: Epp-Koop, 2015; Graham, 2018; Stevens, 1979).

for working people. Early proposals included reforming the city's police to refocus their efforts on public services including enforcing workplace health and safety regulations and delivering local utilities bills, with one local official proposing a merged fire and police service made up of "safetymen" (Harring, 1982). There were efforts to change perceptions of ownership with a city-led "Garden Homes" project that began in 1920 as a housing co-op with strong ties to the city's socialist administration. Though the co-op was dissolved in 1927, it stands as one of the first instances of public housing in the United States (Attoe et al., 1976). Socialists, under the leadership of Meta Berger serving as school board president, sought to reform the city's education system, taking control of the privately-run trade school, establishing similar schools for women, and expanded lunch programs and playgrounds (Reese, 1981).

Milwaukee's sewer socialists sought to obtain political power at the municipal level precisely because of civic banality. Recognizing the transformative potential of that which lay under municipal jurisdiction, socialists sought to win office and begin using civic banality in ways that benefited working people, advancing their goals through structural reforms to a level of government that was such an important executor of state power.

Power is, fundamentally, at the heart of this discussion. Weber's assertion that the state is the only legitimate entity capable of using force is followed by an important, but oft-neglected observation. Politics, Weber noted, "means for us to strive for a share of power or to influence the distribution of power, whether between states or between the groups of people contained within a state," (2004, p. 33). It is in that elaboration upon his view of the state where the importance of studying municipal political actors is grounded. In contemporary democracies, it has been decided that we, the people, strive for a share of state power through politics. As it is most common across democratic states for that expression to manifest in electoral contests aimed at selecting officials to serve as legislators, the identities of those candidates and legislators are worth considering.

2.3 – Civic Representation

If power has been distributed to local officials tasked with managing civic banality in all its forms, it follows that, in a democratic society, those with the power to oversee such force should be reflective of the communities over whom that power is exerted. In considering the identities of those who oversee civic banality, then, it is important to draw on the work of representational scholars, beginning with Hannah Pitkin. Pitkin opens her seminal work *The Concept of*

Representation by noting the deep importance of words in establishing the bounds of contemporary society. Words, Pitkin notes, are crucial as "human beings are not merely political animals but also language-using animals, their behaviour is shaped by their ideas," (Pitkin, 1967, p. 1).

The core tenants of representational theory rest on the interpretation of specific words and their reflection in the reality of existing political situations. Indeed, it would seem that much of the discussion herein rests on linguistic interpretations, as the idea of "prosaics" similarly derives from literary theory.

Pitkin highlights descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation. Descriptive representation focuses on the characteristics of the individual selected to represent in relation to the constituency represented. Here, Pitkin (1967, p. 61) notes that the emphasis is on "less what the legislature does than how it is composed." This form of representation, then, may seek to create a legislative chamber that is a "miniature" or a "map" of the people or state as a whole.

Symbolic representation, in an alternative interpretation, holds that the individual selected to represent a constituency derives their legitimacy from the collective belief maintained by those represented that the individual in question is, indeed, legitimate. Pitkin notes that this form of representation makes present "something that is *not* in fact present," (Pitkin, 1967, p. 92). While descriptive representation aims to synthesize and make *more* present a constituency, symbolic representation creates a representative to make *entirely* present that same constituency.

These differ notably from substantive representation, which focuses more on the actions of the representative rather than their characteristics or source of legitimacy. Substantive representation holds that a representative "acts for" a constituency to the best of their abilities, or, as Pitkin notes, "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them," (Pitkin, 1967, p. 209). In this, the focus is shifted and lands on the actions of the representative, allowing for an individual, regardless of their personal characteristics, to represent a constituency's interests. Pitkin explores the notion of substantive representation by embracing the complications raised by its own existence. Substantive representation is a balancing act, with a representative acting in such a way that considers decisions as "scientific-rational" problems to be solved and matters of opinion, between acting on behalf of a single constituency and recognizing the impossibility of representing a modern, democratic constituency with, as Pitkin notes, "their apathy, their ignorance, their malleability," (1967, p. 215). Pitkin explores the complexity of adding modern politics, modern parties, and modern sensibilities into the equation, observing that the addition of

complicating factors does not render a core definition false, rather, that the mere existence of so many complicating factors is a natural by-product of the application of philosophical and linguistic theories to something as "organic" as contemporary politics.

These forms of representation have been broadened and made more specific by more contemporary scholars. Mansbridge (2003) discusses four specifically electoral concepts of representation that build on and supplement Pitkin's work. These are promissory representation, anticipatory representation, gyroscopic representation, and surrogate representation. While promissory representation focused on the platform specifics of candidates and their fulfilment, anticipatory representation sees representatives acting in ways they believe will provide optimal positive outcomes in their next electoral contest. Gyroscopic representation privileges a representative's own worldview, "rotating on their own axes, maintaining a certain direction, pursuing certain built-in (although not fully immutable) goals," (Mansbridge, 2003, p. 520). Surrogate representation, alternatively, is close to the Burkesonian "virtual" representation, wherein a representative 'speaks for' a constituency by whom they were not directly selected. Mansbridge uses the example of elected Queer legislators serving as 'surrogate' representatives for the Queer community in a legislative chamber (2003, p. 523).

These distinct and theoretically discrete conceptualizations of representation help to form a crucial basis on which to build an ideal for local officials. This ideal would, in reality, see the elected or appointed representative be accountable to themselves and their constituency, their values and their party or ideological orientation. They must balance a myriad needs simultaneously, combining their judgement, commitments, expertise, lived experiences, and emotions to arrive at a decision that best addresses each of these complex components foundational to their representative accountability. These decisions will then be made manifest in singular judgments, both visceral and reasoned, constituting a vote in council chambers or around board tables of Yea, Nay, or Abstain.

This conceptualization of the local representative legislator is rooted in the principles of democratic fairness. The identities and characteristics of these legislators matters for two broad reasons. The first reason is that the state remains the sole executor of legitimate coerciveness. That coerciveness can come in the form of the threat or reality of physical violence and force, the ethereal encouragement to self-regulate, or the drive to maintain the present system economic organization at all costs. The local representative legislator oversees the local application of said

coerciveness. In a robust and principled democracy, those over which that coercive power is wielded must be afforded an opportunity to manage that power to ensure its uniform distribution and to afford it legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Further to this idea, a democratic system should have a moderating effect on that coercive power, as a community which is experiencing said power applied with more vigour on their members can use the tools afforded them by a local democracy to elect representatives more understanding of their position (either through lived experience, personal connections, or an openness to understanding their situation) and correct the imbalance. In those places where the coercive force of the state is still unevenly applied to particular communities (women, immigrants and ethnic minorities, Queer folks, and Indigenous peoples in particular) and those communities are not "represented" in a real or substantive way, questions then arise as to why this is the case and what can be done to more fully realize the promise of a democracy.

Second, the state performs essential functions to retain its legitimacy and power. Those actions falling into the category of civic banality are an essential variant of those functions. The supervisory role of the local representative is a crucial opportunity for the populace, subjected to state power, to assume control over the provision of said services and ensure their equitable distribution. Just as the presence of diverse bodies can moderate the imposition of force, so too can they bring equity to the provision of services.

2.4 – Identities, issues, and influences for Marginalized and Minority Municipal Candidates and Communities

Now we come to a point where it is crucial to understand *who* serves as democratically elected executors of state power at the local level. Using their own knowledge to inform their decision making, which can be drawn from or influenced by that official's identity, lived experience, and/or access to opportunities, a local official is an essential indicator of democratic fairness and the full realization of a democracy's promise. As Spicer et al. (2017, p. 10) note, "The health and legitimacy of any representative democracy depend heavily on the range and quality of the candidates that run for a win political office."

The conventional scholarly view holds that Canadian municipalities suffer from a diversity deficit, notably summarized by the "Lightbody assertion", namely that "Non-partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged

white men," (2006, p. 257). His claim is often repeated as fact, although research supporting this claim is relatively shallow. In part, this is because there has been far more attention to diversity among Federal and provincial-level representatives relative to the municipal level.

Any consideration of the identities of the candidates who run to serve on local councils or ABCs must also be accompanied by an understanding as to how civic banality impacts the communities from which these candidates originate. The arguments of managerialists and Reform Era-influenced advocates of non-partisan "sound civic government" (see further discussion in Chapter 3) contend that there is no partisan way to provide civic banality (Good, 2017; Lightbody, 2006). It is from here that the presently held axiom "there is no Liberal or Conservative way to pave a street" originates (Slayton, 2015). There remains a broad assumption that civic banality sees no distinctions between municipal residents, with sewers and sidewalks and street parking regulations neutrally applied to all. While such claims were useful for advancing the "non-partisan" agenda, in practice, non-partisanship did not dissolve disparities among different urban identity groups within cities. Indeed, "non-partisan" structures often maintained and worsened disparities based on class, race, and other marginalized groups by reinforcing a particular status quo that was, in the case of settler liberal democracies like Canada, white, male, and slanted toward the interests of capital.

To illustrate these effects, I will now review the research on marginalized groups (women, ethnic minorities and immigrant communities, Queer Canadians, and Indigenous peoples) in Canadian government and elections. Studies of municipal and local government outside of Canada are useful for filling in the gap created by the scholarly neglect of Canadian cities, and offer opportunities for comparative study, though the emphasis remains on the Canadian situation.

2.4.1 – Gender diversity at city hall

The importance of women's involvement in local politics is a subject of considerable debate centred around two theoretical approaches. The first of these focuses on "Male Planning" and the notion that cities have been designed for and by men for centuries, actively making the lives of women harder. The act of planning cities (including the final and most crucial step in the planning process – the approval of democratically elected local officials) has worked to exclude women through purposefully constructing environments suited to men and men's bodies. As Kern notes,

"Male power and privilege are upheld by keeping women's movements limited and their ability to access different spaces constrained," (2019, p. 36). Kern elaborates by discussing how a male focus builds cities, which then influence social relations and power, which then encourages planners to continue to build in such a way that women are excluded from the urban sphere. In this framing, it is crucial for women to actively participate in local electoral politics to provide their perspectives and guide the planning process toward a goal of correcting inherent bias.

The structure of the urban, as feminist geographers have asserted, has been deeply influenced by gender roles. The planning and zoning of the "home space" has been predicated on a gendered understanding of "spheres of work", with women expected to assume responsibility for the out-of-sight domestic functions and men performing public labour. As unchecked capitalist expansion began to expect and extract more from workers, women were then brought into a dual capacity as both private-domestic workers and public-labours, working in urban environments designed by and around men (Massey, 1994; McDowell, 1997; Mackenzie, 1999). In addition to one's labouring-status, the simple fact of patriarchal tendencies in the fields of urban planning and design, municipal-related engineering (civil, transportation, waste), and architecture, have neglected to consider the needs and concerns of women in urban spaces. Matters ranging from as structural as housing policy, as obvious as designing sidewalks and pathways for strollers, and as deeply troubling as rates of sexual harassment on public transit and city streets reflect the failure of municipal authorities to consider gender when planning (Beebeejaun, 2017).

The second theoretical focus rejects the notion that cities can be built by one gender to subjugate another by questioning the permanence of roles assigned to each gender. Trimble (1995) notes that assumptions regarding women's involvement in local politics precisely because it has a strong impact on women's issues:

> ...reflects patriarchal thinking, since it draws a firm line between public and private spheres. It implies that women's motivations for seeking elected office and their subsequent political activities are really *apolitical*, particularistic, and subordinate bold to male authorities and to higher levels of government. (p. 106).

Rather than accept that people of particular gender identities must conform to specific roles and perform specific tasks, this theoretical focus instead advances that women's involvement in local politics is because of a drive toward equality and a desire for women to hold the same offices as men by virtue of their competence, capacity, and citizenship.

Onto these theoretical foundations, a small, but influential, contemporary body of scholarly work on women in municipal politics has been built, generally rooted in what Vickers (1997) calls the "Electoral Project". The "Electoral Project" asserts that real, descriptive representation includes female presence in legislative bodies, as these bodies and the state apparatus they oversee can be used as both tools and allies in the advancement of feminist goals – be they the correction of the municipal imbalance that disadvantages women or the promotion of the idea that gender roles need not be so rigidly defined (Vickers, 1997, p. 25). When women do campaign, as Dabelko et al. (1997) found, they have been more likely to run on social issues of importance to women. While the perception of local office as a more masculinized, accumulation-aiding, and technocratic level of government may explain why some women have forgone local candidacy in favour of candidacy to provincial legislatures or federal parliament (Gidengil & Vengroff, 1997), two feminist schools of thought regarding the provision of civic banality – both that cities are gendered and must be built for women and men, and that gendered divisions are social constructs reinforced by state structures – speaks to the importance of having women's voices participating in discussions. From these perspectives, the role of women in government overall is an important indicator of the progress toward greater equality in broader society.

The literature on women in Canadian municipal government prior to Vickers' identification of the "Electoral Project" is scattered. Gidengil and Vangroff asserted, in the opening line of their 1997 study of women in the municipal governments of Quebec, "Surprisingly little attention has been paid to women's representation in municipal politics," (1997, p. 513) speaking broadly about the topic within the field of political science and, indeed, in Canadian society as a whole. Importantly, they observed as a notable disinterest in all the facets of local government and municipal elections on the part of organized women's groups otherwise working diligently to increase the number and profile of female candidates. What was true in 1997 appears to remain the case nearly 25 years later.

This is, of course, contrasts with the common claim that local government is "more accessible" to women for reasons ranging from the lack of party gatekeepers to the appeal of local officials being able to remain in their community rather than travel great distances to a provincial capital or to Ottawa (Andrew et al., 2008; Gavan-Koop et al., 2008; Gidengil & Vengroff, 1997; Kopinak, 1985; Tremblay et al., 2013). Contemporary considerations of these claims indicate this was a colloquial understanding of gender in local government, with Tolley noting, "Although the

idea of a municipal advantage [for women] has achieved remarkable academic currency, the empirical evidence has been rather mixed and muted," (2011, p. 537). This, as will be considered more thoroughly in the next section, is different than the perceived benefits of running at the local level for candidates from racial and ethnic minority communities. While the perceived benefits of municipal candidacy for racial and ethnic minority candidates is the presence of a concentrated, geographically-identifiable community on which they can draw, women alternatively were perceived to benefit from imposed and assumed gender roles and areas of interest.

Early work on women in Canadian local government connected high rates of municipal turnover with increased success for women. Despite women increasing their presence on local councils in Quebec significantly between 1984 and 1995, for example, female mayors constituted only 8.7% of those holding head-of-council offices at the time (Gidengil & Vengroff, 1997, p. 524). The high rate of turnover in local office providing opportunities for women could speak to the regional differences in the rate of women's municipal political participation, as Ontario is alternatively marked by the regular return of incumbents to office with little turnover (Siegel, 2009). Municipality size was also a factor, as larger urban centres featured more female municipal councillors than smaller or more rural municipalities (Maillé, 1997).

While there was little work done on women in local government historically, scholars have recently begun to consider the phenomenon more intently. Such contemporary scholarship updates the prior work on the topic and calls into question any perceived municipal benefit to female candidates. When compared with female members of provincial legislatures and the federal parliament, there is an inconsistent advantage to female candidates municipally (Tolley, 2011, p. 585). From 2002 to 2009, the percentage of women in municipal government compared to those elected provincially or federally differs by no more than 3%, with Tolley noting "there is little evidence to support the assertion of a municipal advantage for women," (2011, p. 588). Tolley concludes with a call to consider why there is an "electoral stalling" of women at 25% representation, pointing to the notion that men more readily consider themselves candidates and that the method of electoral organization employed in Canadian cities may provide answers as to why there is not greater female success at the local level (2008, p. 589).

Consideration of women's political participation in Vancouver's civic politics provides a helpful comparison between non-partisan, ward-based systems and partisan, at-large systems. Early scholarship from the United States noted some success for women in at-large systems and

not-significant, but still notable, successes for women in partisan systems, partially thanks to party-nominated candidates not needing to rely as heavily on personal finances and name-recognition (Welch et al., 1979). Similarly, the role of political parties of particular ideological orientations has been noted as an important indicator of the presence of women candidates, with environmentalist and left/socialist parties more aggressively supporting and recruiting women to run for office (Caul, 1999; Norris et al., 1995; Tremblay et al., 2003). In Metropolitan Vancouver, though, the differing political success for women led researchers to mixed conclusions, as municipality size, the presence of political parties, and other unique legislative aspects of British Columbia's local political scene did not present any definitive benefit or drawback for women (Gavan-Koop & Smith, 2008).

Beyond party involvement and district magnitude is the question of electoral system. Canadian cities use plurality (first-past-the-post or FPTP) electoral systems to select local officials (more on this in Section 2.4.2), so there are no Canadian studies regarding the role of electoral systems and how they may impact women's representation and candidacy. In Germany, alternatively, municipalities use a variety of different voting methods for local councils. Some municipalities use a distinct open party list system that includes "panachage" or "vote splitting", which allows voters as many votes as there are seats on a local council that they may distribute among the listed candidates of any party in any way they see fit. Other municipalities only afford voters three votes to distribute among candidates, while others still feature a closed list entirely. As Bieber et al. (2020) found, women performed poorly in open list systems, which the authors attributed to conscious or unconscious bias on the part of voters. They note the challenge faced by their results: while acknowledging the more democratic nature of open list systems, they balance this with the notion that, though one system may be more democratic, it may put women in particular at a disadvantage (Bieber & Wingerter, 2020, p. 19). A complicating factor may also be the political culture in each state, as the varieties of municipal electoral system in Germany vary from subnational unit to subnational unit, but not within. This regional issue arises in a similar consideration of open and closed list systems in Peru. Local governments in Peru use closed list systems while upper levels rely on open lists. In the capital, Lima, women have fared better electorally in races for upper levels of government that use open lists than women running municipally under closed lists. This is the opposite in regions outside the capital (Schmidt, 2020). With evident regional differences in electoral success under varying electoral systems, it is evident

that balloting method alone does not determine the success or failure of women candidates at the local level.

While this may be the case, the addition of quotas can balance municipal elections. In South Korea, political parties have been legislated to adopt a "zipper list" quota for the proportional representation side of their parallel voting system at the municipal level.[3] A "zipper list" alternates between men and women on a closed party list to ensure those of a particular gender identity are not all placed at the top of the list, therefore making them more likely to be elected. As Yoon et al. (2017) note, the adoption of such laws increased the representation of women on local councils in South Korea. The authors acknowledged pushback from political elites, many of whom are still men, and a challenge to the quota system in the form of a push for non-partisanship in local elections in the early 2010s. Proposals for non-partisan local elections, advanced at the time by then-President Park Geun-hye, failed to result in any legislative changes, though such a reform would have had the added effect of eliminating the quota system for women (Yoon & Shin, 2017). Quotas of any type have never been formally mandated in Canada, and their application at the local level would require the widespread and legal involvement of political parties.

If the structures of elections themselves provide little indication as to what will benefit women candidates, what of the presence of other women in legislative bodies? Considering the political involvement of women more broadly, there is little evidence to show that the electoral success of women encourages other women to put themselves forward as candidates. An examination of women's political participation in 35 liberal democracies was unable to draw linkages between women's presence in legislative bodies and the increased candidacy of other women (Karp et al., 2007). Similar analyses of the presence of women in American state legislatures found insignificant connections to women's turnout or candidacy (Broockman, 2014). As Karp and Banducci raise in their analysis of women's political participation in American state-level politics:

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[3] The parallel voting system combines plurality/first-past-the-post elections in single member constituencies with proportional representation across a country-wide at-large district. Unlike with a system like Mixed-Member Proportional, the party list vote has no impact on the constituency vote. At present, 253 of the 300 seats in the National Assembly (대한민국 국회) are single member districts. Quotas only apply to proportional representation seats. This system is replicated at the local level with varying levels of division between constituency and list seats. In Seoul, for example, 100 of the Metropolitan Council's (서울특별시의회) 110 seats are single member constituencies (Mobrand, 2019).

While a number of studies have found that descriptive representation matters for minorities, the same cannot be said for women. One possible explanation for the differences in the findings between minorities and women is that gender does not usually represent a significant political cleavage, (2007, p. 114).

The authors observe that descriptive representation "matters" in that it helps other minority groups enter the political fray by setting a precedent for their candidacy. For women, alternatively, this is not the case, as the issues surrounding gender in politics appear to be different.

The failure to identify a clear relationship between women's electoral success and electoral participation may be due to the heterogenous nature of "women" as a political category. Research commonly finds considerable ideological variations among women which, particularly in Canada, are explained by the intersections of gender and class (Jelen et al., 1994; Kopinak, 1987). Hence women may stand as candidates advancing ideological tenets from across the spectrum, placing some women voters in difficult electoral situations. Trimble and Arscott raise the point that, in Canadian federal politics, voters can sometimes be faced with a "Deb vs. Svend" choice. In this, electors are faced with voting for a woman candidate representing a right-wing, anti-feminist perspective (embodied at the time of their writing by Deb Grey, the Alberta-based Reform/Canadian Alliance MP) or a male candidate representing a progressive, pro-feminist perspective (best reflected then by the first openly gay MP in Canada, the New Democrats' Svend Robinson from British Columbia), forcing voters to choose between descriptive representation and adherence to ideological beliefs (Trimble et al., 2003).

There are present efforts to encourage more women to participate in municipal politics to provide just such a perspective. To address the organizational gaps left by a lack of party-organization in jurisdictions with non-partisan local elections, a number of groups have been established to train women candidates in the intricacies of campaigning and ensure women are electorally viable (Tremblay & Mévellec, 2013). Despite this, considerably more work on the contemporary involvement of women in municipal politics must be done, to which this study aims to add.

2.4.2 – Ethnic, racial, and migrant communities

The limited research on the participation of racialized minorities and migrant populations in local government provides some support for Lightbody's assertion regarding the overwhelming whiteness of local councils. The wider body of literature on the participation of marginalized

groups in electoral politics more broadly similarly finds relatively little diversity in local Canadian governments compared to their populations.

Issues of ethnocultural diversity in municipalities pertain to local government and municipal representation for the simple fact that the overwhelming majority of racialized minorities and "new" immigrants (those arriving between 2011 and 2016) settled in Canada's major cities. As of the 2016 Canadian census, 86.97% of all racialized minorities and 81.2% of all new immigrants settled in 10 largest Census Metropolitan Areas alone,[4] while only 8.9% settled outside CMAs (Statistics Canada, 2017d). With so many racialized minorities and new immigrants making urban centres their homes, municipalities (and thus municipal political figures) have taken on responsibilities with regard to the day-to-day urban experiences of these individuals and communities. Revisions to housing policy, supports for cultural programming such as festivals and community centres, and directives to police and transit agencies to better serve diverse communities have been undertaken by municipalities to respond to the unique needs of racialized minorities and migrants (Poirier, 2004).

Particularly in the area of settlement and immigration concerns, Canadian provinces have assumed more control from the federal government. As such, there has been a move to share responsibilities between municipalities and provincial governments in some jurisdictions, meaning an increasingly large role for local governments and the addition of immigration-related policies to the roster of civic banality (Tossutti, 2012). These trends make the question of diversity in local government increasingly urgent and stress how important diverse voices are to our understanding of democratic fairness in a contemporary democracy.

Siemiatycki (2011) examines the diversity of elected officials in Toronto, contrasting the demographics of the city with the identities of the city's council and mayor. This study analyzes available data and creates a "proportionality index" to indicate the lack of diversity among elected officials at the municipal level in Toronto. Comparing levels of diversity of elected officials between all levels of government across Toronto and surrounding municipalities, the racial and ethnic homogeneity of municipal government is confirmed. Siemiatycki notes, "one finds rather surprisingly that the city [Toronto] – vaunted for its commitment to diversity – had the worst record of diversity among its elected officials," (2011, p. 1225). The reasoning for the selectiveness of

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[4] These are Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver, Calgary, Ottawa-Gatineau, Edmonton, Quebec City, Winnipeg, Hamilton, and Kitchener-Cambridge-Waterloo (KCW).

the lack of diversity between local councils is attributed to unique patterns of immigrant settlement, while Toronto's perceived progressive attitude toward racialized minorities is cited as a potential reason for dampening their electoral participation (Siemiatycki, 2011, pp. 1225-1226).

Studies of Hamilton and Vancouver similarly found relatively little diversity among elected officials at all three levels of government (Bird, 2008; Bloemraad, 2008). In Vancouver, older, well-educated males are over-represented when compared with the percentage of the general population falling within these categories. While the number of elected racialized minorities in Vancouver is higher than in other comparable jurisdictions, is still lower than the percentage of the city's population from these communities (Bloemraad, 2008, pp. 54 - 55).

Hamilton features several "firsts" in terms of diversity, with an array of diverse figures tracing their political beginnings to the city's dynamic local government (Bird, 2008). The city elected Canada's first female cabinet minister in Ellen Fairclough (formerly a member of Hamilton City Council), Canada's first black Member of Parliament in Lincoln Alexander (who defeated a former council member to be elected MP for Hamilton West), and Canada's first female Deputy Prime Minister, Shelia Copps (whose father, Victor, was the city's mayor, and whose mother, Geraldine, sat on city council). Despite these achievements at the Federal level, Hamilton's local political offices have been held almost exclusively by white males. Despite some successes made in municipal politics by members of immigrant and cultural minority communities, particularly Italian-Canadians in local school boards, the city's municipal, provincial, and federal representatives featured very little diversity.[5] Scholars suggest that solutions to this diversity deficit include improving economic opportunities for marginalized populations, expanding opportunities for non-political participation, and reform of electoral institutions and political culture (Bird, 2008, p. 151).

Marginalized groups themselves see the lack of diversity in local Canadian governments as a problem. Bird (2015) found that there was significant support for more diversity in government, particularly among racialized minorities, in the Golden Horseshoe. Bird notes, "a

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[5] At the time of Bird's writing in 2008, the last member of a racial minority community to hold any office across Hamilton was Lincoln Alexander, who resigned as Member of Parliament for Hamilton West in 1980. The 2014 election marked the end of that period, though, as Matthew Green, a local Black businessman, won election to city council representing the city's working-class Ward 3 (Craggs, 2014). Green was subsequently elected Member of Parliament for Hamilton Centre as a New Democrat in 2019 (Van Dongen, 2019). He was replaced on Hamilton City Council by his former campaign manager, Nrinder Nann, who became the first Woman of Colour elected to local office in the city (Reilly, 2018). In 2022, Elizabeth Wong became the first person of East Asian origin to serve in local government in Hamilton, being appointed to the vacant Wards 1&2 Public Trustee office (Pattison, 2022).

more descriptively inclusive City Hall and House of Commons were seen as generally desirable," (2015, p. 270), even as she notes considerable variance in opinion among such groups.

Studies in Canada – typically focused on Ontario and on racialized populations – find both limited diversity in local government and concern among marginalized groups about this lack. Given the relative paucity of research, however, it is helpful to turn to the more robust literature on local government diversity in the United States. The fraught and complex racial dynamics of local government in the United States have provided researchers with ample research material. While the racial and social dynamics in Canadian and American cities are distinct, the two countries share many fundamentals of local government.

Several studies show positive relationships among minority turnout, electoral success, and ties between representative and constituents. Using a broad and detailed analysis of large data sets, including information on local turnout and on the demographic breakdowns of candidates and their municipalities, Hajnal (2010), for example, finds a positive association between the size of a constituency's minority population and minority voter participation to the electoral success of minority representatives. While increased turnout does not provide an equitable number of council members from different minority populations, it does have the impact of reducing underrepresentation (Hajnal, 2010, p. 80). Further research indicates that members of minority communities are impacted by the presence of a minority representative in one's congressional district, in that they are more able to identify and approve of their representative if they share the same identity (Banducci et al., 2004).

On the "candidate" side, demographics play a similarly uneven, while important role. In Chicago, for example, with a very large city council and an incredibly spatially segregated population, race impacts not only the diversity of representatives, but the kinds of candidates who emerge. Thanks to their deeper historical involvement with Chicago's municipal politics, the Black community in that city is regularly presented with more candidates in Black-majority wards than Latinx community members are in the wards where they hold the majority (Krebs, 1998).[6] This speaks to the importance of building a culture of political involvement among particular cultural

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[6] The first Black and first Latino members of Chicago City Council were elected in the same year – 1914. Oscar Stanton De Priest, a Republican, was elected as Ward 2 Alderman and William E. Rodriguez, a Socialist, was elected as Ward 15 Alderman (Johnson, 2020; Kampf-Lassin, 2019). De Priest's time on council would be followed by many more Black council members, while Rodriguez (potentially due to his politics) was followed by far fewer Latinx council members.

groups, as the precedent of having fellow community members elected to office may help to inspire other potential candidates who see a long and storied history of their community's participation in local politics.

Research from Europe establishes that limited minority success in local elections extends beyond North America. In the United Kingdom, for example, where political parties are active in local government, members of minority communities face hostility from party gatekeepers when seeking opportunities to stand. Labour Party leadership, for example, denied Muslim aspirants (typically from former colonial states in South Asia) opportunities to stand in constituencies where members of the white community would feel threatened by their presence unless the South Asian population was enough to likely impact the results of an election (Dancygier, 2014). In some constituencies, Labour Party officials became more accepting of Muslim aspirants only after members of the Muslim community had won local office as independents. In other cases, the national Labour Party intervened when local party officials sought to prevent Muslim candidates from standing for municipal office (Dancygier, 2013; Purdam, 2001). This illustrates the conflicting roles that parties may play in limiting or facilitating diversity based on complicated local circumstances and measured political risk calculations by "gatekeepers" in positions of authority within parties.

Denmark has seen modest improvements to the underrepresentation of ethnic minorities, with their presence on local councils increasing from 0.3% of all local officials in 1989 to 1.1% in 2001 (Togeby, 2008, p. 330). This is presented as a result of Denmark's utilization of open-party list proportional representation, the extension of voting rights to resident non-citizens at the local level, and aggressive candidate recruitment efforts among left-wing parties (Togeby, 2008). This provides an important contrast between Canada and Denmark, two states with uneven spatial distribution of minority communities but two distinct methods of local balloting.

Reforming electoral institutions, particularly electoral systems, may have an impact on promoting minority success, though the evidence from Canada is as-of-yet unclear. London, Ontario's experimental 2018 municipal election using a ranked ballot system did see the election of their council's first Woman of Colour (Rivers, 2018). Yet, the impact of London's ranked ballot on other ethnic and racial minority candidates has not been studied, nor will there be any opportunities to examine the long-term impacts of the change; in 2020, against the wishes of municipalities like Toronto and London, the provincial government of Doug Ford banned cities

from using all but the plurality (FPTP) electoral system in local elections (Pagliaro, 2020). International experiments with alternative voting systems may prove to have more longevity, resulting in a greater potential for them to be studied more widely. Though the system is relatively new, the ranked ballot system used for the Democratic primary election in New York City's municipal election has already received praise, with third-place finisher in the mayoral nomination race, civil rights lawyer Maya Wiley, declaring that the system has been and would continue to be transformative and positive for women and minority candidates (Wiley, 2021). To support this claim, more research is needed.

2.4.3 – Queer candidates for local office

Recent General Social Survey estimates indicate that only 4% of Canadians are members of the Queer community, though this number does not consider the evidence pointing to the geographic clustering of Queer Canadians in urban areas (Pilon, 2019; Statistics Canada, 2021). While the Queer community is no longer entirely centered around the "gay village", the Great Gay Migration of Queer folks into urban areas during the 1970s and 1980s remain created identifiable constituencies of Queer people in cities that have, historically and presently, exerted notable political pressure (Ghaziani, 2021; Weston, 1995). The promise of a democracy is the political inclusion and representation of all, and democratic fairness holds that, where groups of minority voters are, they deserve representation. Thus, the local level becomes one where the political presence of Queer folks is of the utmost importance.

Even in the understudied world of Canadian municipal politics, Queer identity has received little attention, which is an unfortunate and glaring gap. As Thomlinson notes,

> ...many of the day-to-day concerns of urban gays tend to be local in nature. Where an identifiable gay community exists, its concerns are thus somewhat more likely to find their way onto the agenda of local government...[a gay perspective] ensures that issues of particular concern to all or part of the gay community find their way onto the relevant agenda. This central reality has begun to penetrate the political consciousness of Canadian gays, resulting in increased political energy being devoted to the local level, (1997, p. 116).

Thomlinson continues by detailing the specific ways in which municipal governments directly impact Queer lives. Canadian municipalities have considerable responsibility over the provision of housing, either through zoning for private development, the management of social

housing, and the regulation of temporary shelters. The notable issues of importance among members of the Queer community in relation to the provision of affordable housing for those living with HIV/AIDS, the acceptance of same-sex partners cohabiting, and homelessness among Queer youth (Thomlinson, 1997). The latter issue is particularly urgent as Queer youth are vastly overrepresented in the homeless population, with estimates positing between one quarter and 40% of homeless youth in Canadian cities identify as Queer (Abramovich, 2012, 2016; Gaetz et al., 2010). As safety, public health, regulation of public space, and housing are all components of civic banality, the situations in which Queer youth find themselves involve municipal policy to an integral degree. While the provision of shelters is not a municipal responsibility alone, agencies that provide shelters rely on municipal support to function and municipalities have considerable control over housing policy. It is telling that, in Canada, there are no emergency Queer youth shelters and few programs to place Queer youth in more permanent housing, with Vancouver's RainCity serving as a notable exception (Ecker, 2016).

Municipalities – in likely the most interesting break from the monotony of civic banality – are often-unwitting participant in Queer sexual expression through licencing regimes. For some members of the Queer community, sexual activity is a binding, kinship-facilitating component of membership in the community, which can be found in bathhouses, bars, night clubs, gyms, and other business-oriented social spaces, though the importance of these locations has been declining in the "internet age" (Doderer, 2011). Despite the rise of app-based sexual encounters, these Queer-oriented businesses remain, all licenced and regulated by the municipality (Thomlinson, 1997).

Nonetheless, municipal involvement in Queer sex creates considerable tension. While licencing and municipal regulation facilitates activities, historically local police often conducted raids on bathhouses in particular. The Toronto Bathhouse Raids of February 5, 1981 brought one wing of the municipality (licencing and business development) into conflict with another (the Toronto Police Service), the latter of which used antiquated federal laws to persecute and humiliate Queer patrons of six Toronto bathhouses (Bérubé, 2003). This is similarly reflected in the policing of public spaces historically frequented by Queer men in particular in the act of "cruising" for sex. Public parks and washrooms, while spaces intended for the public, have been used as spaces of intimacy and have been contested sites over moral regulation (Tewksbury, 1996). In Toronto, local police would regularly patrol notable public spaces, from the city's sprawling High Park to the legislature's grounds of Queen's Park, seeking to regulate Queer sexual expression (Churchill,

2004). Montreal's public parks, most notably the Frederick Law Olmsted-designed Mount Royal Park, were fundamentally reshaped thanks to fears over Queer sex. Under the mayoralty of Jean Drapeau in the 1950s and 1960s, Mount Royal Park was redesigned in a process colloquially referred to as the "Morality Cuts", named as such thanks to the deforestation of selected parts of the park to create more a legible, open, "surveillable" park. Drapeau and the city's conservative establishment viewed the park, particularly a heavily forested area at the corner of Mont-Royal Avenue West and Park Avenue – labelled "the Jungle" in the city's press – as a den of sin in what they saw as frighteningly close proximity to a children's playground. As Caron notes, "at times, newspapers described the Jungle as infested with drunkards, criminals, or a seemingly interchangeable collection of sex maniacs, perverts, and homosexuals," (2018, p. 40). Drapeau's Morality Cuts fundamentally reshaped Mount Royal, with the area around the monument to Father of Confederation Sir George-Étienne Cartier now a wide, open grassy plain and the remaining forested area of the park still presently suffering from invasive species of flora allowed to flourish thanks to the cuts (Semenak, 2014).

While these sites of sexual expression may presently have limited appeal to many members of the Queer community, the act of regulation of Queer bodies, particularly in public spaces, elicits a visceral reaction from Queer residents of the city. It is a reminder that civic banality gives (licencing, provision of public spaces) and civic banality takes (crackdowns, raids). When, in 2016, the Toronto Police Service again targeted Queer men in a "sting operation" in a suburban park known for its cruising grounds, the city's local Queer media summarized the reasons behind the general outrage behind the heavy-handed approach by the executors of the state's legitimate force at the municipal level:

> ...the sting and its resulting charges rightly provoke a visceral reaction for many, bringing up feelings of guilt and shame, and pride and resilience. They are a reminder of every indignity, and also a reminder of our strength in the face of all that happens to us...accountability extends to city council, who oversee the police. In particular, council must be asked: was this a good use of the police's scarce budget, and if not, what are you going to do to stop it? (McCann, 2016)

The author passionately articulates the complicated relationship between Queer urban residents and civic banality. When used in the pursuit of narrow social aims, the force of the state comes to humiliate and repress, forcing those on the receiving end to resist and rebel.

Although municipal government has long played a leading role in the regulation of sexuality, the role of Queer Canadians in municipal politics (and, as a result, overseeing civic banality) is noticeably understudied. This is of particular concern considering, as Button, Wald, & Rienzo point out, Queer communities are moving away from having to, "rely indefinitely on sympathetic patrons," (1999, p. 190). Indeed, Queer communities have encouraged members to seek elected office rather than relying on allies, with the Queer pioneer Harvey Milk remarking, "a gay official is needed not only for our protection, but to set an example for younger gays that the system works; ...we've got to give them hope," (D. P. Haider-Markel, 2010, p. ix). In this, we see the connections to descriptive, symbolic, and substantive representation: the substantive representation provided by sympathetic patrons, the symbolic representation of an elected official deemed legitimate by their constituents, and the descriptive representation of Queer legislators. Indeed, much like racial/ethnic minorities, Queer candidates often have the greatest success in constituencies with strong connections to the Queer community.

Thomlinson's examination of Queer elected officials in Canada from the 1990s found only four openly gay municipal politicians (all gay men). While Thomlinson notes none of the officials sought to only address Queer issues while in office, voting patterns in the Church-Wellesley neighbourhood of Toronto, which Thomlinson argued had the highest concentration of Queer people in Canada, showed strong support for Queer candidates and explicit allies at rates higher than that of the electoral district as a whole (1997).

Thomlinson's study has been vindicated by time. Toronto's gay village has remained contained within a single municipal ward which has returned Queer representatives consistently from 1991 to the present, as well as featured a larger number of Queer candidates than wards elsewhere across Toronto (Nash et al., 2019). Similarly, the electoral district containing Montreal's Gay Village [7] – Saint-Jacques – returned Quebec's first out gay political official in 1986 when voters there elected Raymond Blain to be their city councillor. Podmore (2016) attributes Blain's success to the popularity of his party (the RCM – further discussion in Sections 3.6 and 4.3.3), the desire for reform amongst the electorate, and Blain's ability to build coalitions between Queer and non-Queer voters in his district. The foundation of Blain's candidacy was the Gay Village, though,

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[7] "Gay Village" becomes a proper noun in the case of Montreal, as the neighbourhood's official name is *Le Village Gai* or, more simply, *Le Village*.

and Podmore notes, "the spatial concentration of gay commerce and residence in Montreal's emerging gay village had created the possibility of political representation," (2016, p. 196).

In the United States, Fleischmann and Hardman (2004) found similar patterns of electoral success for Queer candidates in Atlanta. Focusing on a district where gay and lesbian residents were clearly spatially clustered, Cathy Woolard sought election to Atlanta City Council's 6th District, becoming the city's first Queer public official. Over the course of successive campaigns, Woolard used connections to the established Queer community, spatially identified with the district in which Woolard was seeking election, to draw on the political power of the community and win (Fleischmann et al., 2004).

Button, Wald, & Rienzo similarly found that Queer candidates in the United States chose to run in electoral districts that encompassed a large Queer population or a traditional "gay village" (1999). Despite their choice of favourable electoral district, Queer candidates for local office indicated they saw responsible administration of municipal affairs as a more notable campaign issue than identity, which aligns with previous work on concerns over public perception and the previous campaign strategies of Queer candidates. Button, Wald, and Rienzo suggest that incrementalist strategy may be most effective, positing that Queer electors can be viewed as similar to electors from distinct cultural and racial groups. Building off Eisinger's theory about "ethnic succession", they suggest Queer electors may first seek out sympathetic political officials to advance their case and then, once firmly established, rally around candidates from the community (Button et al., 1999). The authors do consider the limitations of this theory, specifically concerns about the role "passing" plays for Queer electors and candidates that is less a factor for their counterparts from racialized communities. Regardless, they assert the patterns of mobilization and support are significant.

While geographic patterns of settlement remain important, as Queer populations spread out and become less spatially clustered than before, individual identity and wider public perception become an important features. As Rayside (1998) notes, the commonly-held belief was that Queer candidates, once elected, would be marginalized by their identities, expected to serve as descriptive advocates for only their community and not venturing into other areas of policy. Notably, Rayside contends that Queer racialized minorities in particular would face difficulty in the electoral arena, and the issues they face "make the very aspiration to political office unlikely," (1998, p. 192).

Considerations of Queer candidates for office in Canada have highlighted the importance of public perception. Queer Canadians who seek public office and downplay their sexuality, focusing instead on building a record of public service that emphasizes other attributes, prove to be more politically successful (Everitt et al., 2014). Many Queer Canadians carefully tailor their image in an effort to strengthen their electoral chances or are disuaded from seeking public office altogether by an assumption that a kind of image manipulation is necessary. As Wagner notes, "The closer a candidate is to exemplifying the heterosexist norms of society in their mannerisms, dress, and home life, the more the person will be seen as a model minority," (2019, p. 9). Prospective and former Queer candidates have noted a moral regulatory standard that would be, and is, more harshly applied to them than to heterosexual candidates, noting greater public stigmatism and distrust of Queer people who stand out, specifically identifying tattoos, skin colour, deviation from gender expectations, non-monogamy, and/or unclearly defined relationship status.

Research on Queer candidates in the United States echoes some of these concerns, but tends to focus on voter perceptions and preferences. Golebiowska notes that heterosexual male voters in particular are unwilling to consider an "effeminate" gay male as a viable candidate (2001). More recent work considers similar perceptions of the electorate toward transgender candidates, finding an even larger segment of the population willing to dismiss candidates from the trans community than those unwilling to support gay or lesbian candidates (D. Haider-Markel et al., 2017). The anticipated perceptions of the voting public toward candidates in both Canada and the United States notably influences the campaign strategies of Queer candidates, encouraging them to appear more gender-conforming and heteronormative to eschew any potential rejection from voters. Problematically, while gay, lesbian, and bi candidates can strategically use the tactic of downplaying their sexuality, trans candidates are unable to employ that strategy as easily.

Regardless of (or possibly thanks to) voter perception of a candidate's identity, Queer political success remains limited. The Victory Institute, a US organization promoting the candidacy of Queer people in all offices, reported that, in 2021, only 56 mayors and 601 other local officials (city councillors, council presidents, aldermen, selectmen, county commissioner, etc.) were members of the Queer community (Victory Institute, 2021).

Queer residents of Canadian cities are subject to the application (or denial) of civic banality in unique and often troubling ways. Despite a small overall population, Queer Canadians are clustered in cities, rendering the urban an important scale of analysis in the study of Queer political

participation. It is within urban spaces, historically in gay villages, that Queer municipal officials find electoral success. Though, as society evolves and changes and Queer residents spread out across cities, geographic proximity to a historic gay village is becoming less important. Rather, the emphasis is now on public perception and outward presentation, which highlights lingering biases and distinct challenges to Queer candidates for local office.

2.4.4 – Indigenous Communities and Municipal Government

To date, there have been no scholarly considerations of Indigenous peoples seeking municipal office in Canada. This is of particular concern, as 51.8% of individuals identifying as being members of Indigenous communities in Canada, including 62.6% of Métis individuals, live in urban areas (Statistics Canada, 2017a). The heterogeneity of the Indigenous peoples living in Canada is noted as a complicating factor, which, as Tomiak and Patrick note, make "any definitive statements about urban Indigeneity problematic," (2010, p. 131).

The presence of reserves, which are federally designated Indigenous spaces, further complicates understandings of the Indigenous relationship with local government. Reserves have governing bodies (referred to as "band councils") that function in ways similar to municipal councils, with elected and occasionally hereditary chiefs functioning in roles similar to heads of council. Rather than falling under the umbrella of provincial responsibilities as municipal governments do, councils on reserves are overseen by the federal government and are more strictly regulated than their municipal counterparts. This considerably more subservient position led Abele and Prince to designate band councils as "minus-municipalities" (2006, p. 572) – meaning band councils assume many of the same responsibilities and liabilities that municipal councils do, while not having the same powers and status. While discussions at the time of the repatriation of the Canadian Constitution in the early 1980s sought to provide band councils with powers akin to those generally maintained by municipalities, the fraught political climate and concerns over the "delegation" of powers led to the abandonment of such proposals (Abele & Prince, 2006). These councils, controlled by Indigenous peoples, may serve to complicate considerations of the involvement of Indigenous peoples in municipal politics off-reserve, as the lines of differentiation between the two forms of local government may be confused by colonial comprehensions of government. This study only considers Indigenous representation in formal municipalities because band councils and Indigenous governance presents a distinct set of questions.

More generally, the notion of participation in a system of government established by colonial authorities – whether on reserves or in formal municipalities - may run in opposition to the pursuit by some members of Indigenous communities for greater self-determination. Disengagement with municipal government can, however, create tensions when that level of government controls provision of basic public goods and services. Indigenous communities have asserted their independence with regard to housing, for example, which has conflicted with municipal policy goals that are firmly rooted in colonial structures (Walker, 2006).

The relationship between Indigenous communities and Canadian municipalities is impossible to consider without recognizing the deeply colonial nature of Canadian urban development. The reserve system itself was an attempt by early colonial authorities to displace (and re-displace when original lands set aside for reserves became desirable for development) Indigenous communities, enabling an erasure of Indigenous culture and history to suit the needs of the expanding dominion (Barman, 2007, pp. 3-4). Municipalities themselves were used as tools, specifically in rural areas, through which colonial authorities established their dominance over the land and the Indigenous peoples to whom the land had been home for centuries. As Stanger-Ross notes, "Scholars have identified cities as key mechanisms of colonial expansion," (2008, p. 543).

In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut (ᓄᓇᕗᑦ), the colonial policy of displacement and relocation of Indigenous people into municipalities has been an ongoing and consistent process. This policy uses urbanization and the forced relocation of the Inuit people to serve Canada's domestic and international goals relating to "Arctic sovereignty". In the 1950s, the Canadian government began a policy of forced relocation, moving members of Inuit communities in Nunavik (ᓄᓇᕕᒃ - the area of the province of Quebec north of the 55th parallel) to new "colonies" – Grise Fiord (ᐊᐅᔨᐊᑦᑐᖅ) and Resolute Bay (ᖃᐅᓯᐊᑦᑐᖅ)[8] – in those parts of the Northwest Territories that would become Nunavut. The establishment of these colonies signalled a shift in government policy, wresting "control" of the Arctic from Christian churches, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, seeking instead to centralize management with federal authorities under the auspices of challenging the Soviet Union and ensuring "financial independence" for Inuit peoples (Tassinari, 1995). Inuit communities were used as tools, forcibly

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[8] The Inuktitut names for these places, *Anjuittuq* and *Qausuittuq*, indicate the harshness of the environment in which these colonies persist, as they translate in English to "the place that never thaws" and "the place with no dawn", respectively.

relocated to isolated and unfavourable municipalities to serve the needs of colonial policy makers who neglected to provide any services or supports for the Inuit peoples subjected to this policy (Marcus, 1991).

Upon the establishment of Nunavut as a separate territory, efforts were made to decentralize government responsibilities to the distinct municipal entities in the territory. Since the July 1, 1999 formal establishment of the new territory, there has been both a process of centralization and decentralization. The territorial government has provided more support to smaller settlement areas in an effort to decentralize control and reverse the colonial policy of forced urbanization, though the territorial government still too often relies on *Qallunaat* (ᖃᑉᓗᓈᖅ - meaning "non-Inuit") to fill municipal positions (B. Weber, 2014). Concurrently, though, there is a centralization of population and economic power in Nunavut's largest cities, most notably the capital Iqaluit (ᐃᖃᓗᐃᑦ), where 21.5% of the territory's population lives. There is concern among community leaders that the urban environment of cities like Iqaluit inhibits the transference of traditional knowledge and where power is "monopolized" by *Qallunaat* who are often more economically-advantaged than their Inuit neighbours (Searles, 2010).

While there are distinct challenges to municipal government in Nunavut, particularly considering the harsh colonial legacy of urbanization, there is notable potential in local governments to reverse the most negative aspects of lingering colonialism. As many communities in Nunavut face housing crises, municipalities, along with territorial agencies, are seeking to innovate and develop locally-based programs to address the dire need for better shelter, as development of local housing policy is a crucial component of civic banality (Tester, 2009). Agencies, boards, and commissions that address specific issues are considered locally-significant for many residents of Nunavut, as municipal governments themselves are financially and politically dependent on the territorial government (White, 2009). As Minor notes, residents of Nunavut saw more specialized and micro-level institutions as more responsive to their needs and, therefore, more important to become involved with, while "participation as a whole was lower at the higher levels of municipal government because they felt their concerns were not addressed at these levels," (2002, p. 78). There is some evidence that this is changing, though, as voter turnout in the 2019 municipal elections across the territory ranged from 31.62% in Clyde River (ᑲᖏᖅᑐᒑᐱᒃ) to a turnout in Whale Cove (ᑎᑭᕋᕐᔪᐊᖅ) of 72% (Nunavut, 2019).

Challenges to the colonial nature of cities in the south, alternatively, have come in the form of "urban reserves". The creation of urban reserves was enabled by changes to reserve policy that allowed Indigenous communities the opportunity to acquire land in urban centres. Urban reserves are primarily focused on business development and economic expansion, appearing to present a challenge to the traditional "settler city". Though, as Tomiak notes, while urban reserves fit neatly into existing models of settler/colonial capitalism in that these urban reserves follow settler models of city building and planning:

> At the same time...new urban reserves contribute to decolonization and transformative place-making based on First Nations' assertions of sovereignty and self-determination in various ways, including by making visible, politicizing, and reclaiming cities as Indigenous places, (2017, p. 940).

Thus, urban reserves constitute a unique reimagination of the urban, using the tools of colonial society to carve out urban spaces for Indigenous peoples and make strides toward self-determination.

While there is a deeply problematic history and relationship between municipal governments and Indigenous people in Canada, there is some recognition that Indigenous Canadians call municipalities their home. What is needed now is an understanding of the involvement of First Nations, Métis, and Inuit people in the electoral politics of urban areas. For this, further study is required.

At present, the number of Indigenous candidates in the selected case study cities was so low, the inclusion of "Indigenous" as a category of consideration in the models present in Sections 5 and 6 was impossible. Similar to recommendations made in Section 6.6.5, a more detailed future study including qualitative, interview- and popular media-based analysis, combined with quantitative data collected in conjunction with Indigenous communities and scholars, focused on municipalities with larger Indigenous populations, and over a longer period of time could provide much-needed insight into the municipal political participation and success of Indigenous candidates.

2.5 – Pathways to Candidacy
A candidate's identity alone does not determine their success, nor can a citizen's demographic characteristics necessarily determine their likelihood of standing for local office. Indeed, a

potential candidate's chances of electoral success are dependent on a number of factors that shape the complexity of launching a campaign for local office. As Lieske (1989, p. 153) explains, the interconnected aspects that influence candidacy and electoral outcomes can be explained by "legitimacy theory", which holds that candidates in local elections are judged by:

1. The cultural acceptability of the candidate;
2. The candidate's social standing in a community; and
3. The political mechanisms and processes that legitimate or bestow group and institutional approval on them.

If this is indeed what influences municipal elections, then the candidate's identity and personality are crucial factors, but the institutional aspects of municipal elections play an important role as well.

Spicer et al. (2017, p. 11) identify three institutional aspects of local government that have the potential to discourage or disadvantage candidacy: district magnitude, incumbency, and remuneration. Though the authors examine these structural issues as impacting the decision to stand as a candidate for women and ethnic/racial minority candidates, the case can be made that such aspects can also impact Queer and Indigenous candidacy. While considerations about Queer candidacy have not been included in previous analyses regarding structural constraints on electoral participation, as Everitt et al. (2019) observe, the experiences of Queer people in politics are closely aligned with the experiences of women. A strong connection between Indigenous peoples and the aforementioned structural barriers is lacking, though an argument could be made that many of the same issues candidates from diverse ethnic and racial minority communities face could also be faced by Indigenous candidates.

While these three structural factors are useful to consider when looking at pathways to candidacy, campaign financing laws and the presence of political parties/party elites are also important to consider on the structural side. Similarly, an individual's own personality is an important factor in driving their decision to become a candidate or not. Each of these structural or personal issues will be briefly considered here.

District magnitude refers to the number of seats allocated to each electoral district, which can be a ward (geographically-defined electoral area for the purposes of electing council members or school trustees) or an entire municipality at-large. While ward systems are more popular among larger cities in Canada, at-large systems are more numerous, with many smaller municipalities

opting for a five- or six-person council consisting of a mayor/reeve and council members elected at-large. In Ontario, this is reflected in over 58% of municipalities *by number* using at-large systems while just under 58% of Ontarians *by population* live in cities with single-member ward systems (see Table 3). British Columbia remains the exception, as all but one of the province's 162 municipalities uses an at-large system for their council and, where applicable, parks board elections.[9]

Table 3 - Methods of Municipal Electoral Organization in Ontario
(Author's calculation)

Method of Electoral Organization	Cities using the system		Ontarians living in cities using the system	
	#	%	#	%
Single-Member Wards	71	17.15	7,683,793	57.53
Multi-Member Wards	52	12.56	2,347,151	17.57
Mixed Single- and Multi-Member Wards	24	5.80	359,306	2.69
Hybrid Ward + At-Large	26	6.28	1,406,941	10.53
At-Large	241	58.21	1,560,006	11.68

Spicer et al. (2017), observed a distinct disadvantage for diverse candidates running in all but single member ward systems, with the effect being more pronounced for ethnic/racial minority candidates than for women. Few academic analyses have been conducted on this phenomenon in Canada, though international studies may help further our understanding of the importance of district magnitude. Sass (2000), for example, considered the role of district or at-large elections for Latinx candidates for local office in the United States, finding a weak, but positive relationship between district elections and the success of Latinx candidates, dependent upon the demographic composition of the districts. The example of New Zealand provides interesting opportunities for comparison. Canada and New Zealand share a propensity in local politics for non-partisan contests and both country's municipalities are divided between those using ward systems and those with higher district magnitude. New Zealand differs from Canada in that those municipalities with

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[9] The single municipality that uses wards – The District of Lake Country (DLC) – operates under a hybrid ward and at-large system. DLC's system is a hold-over from the municipality's incorporation in 1995 where the composite municipalities that merged to create the DLC wanted to retain some level of dedicated representation. Approved by voters in a 1998 referendum, the hybrid ward and at-large system in DLC has come under fire from local commentators who critique the unbalanced ward population and high acclamation rates (Berry, 2018).

larger seats also use Single Transferable Vote. Despite the employment of an alternative voting system, Vowels et al. (2021) found no distinct advantage for women or Indigenous Māori candidates in contests with higher district magnitude. Indeed, the authors note that a possible solution to the underrepresentation of Indigenous Māori in local government being "the establishment of Māori wards which would ensure representation for the very group...we find under-represented," (Vowels & Hayward, 2021, p. 15).

Incumbency is one of the most important factors in non-partisan Canadian municipal elections. As Lucas (2021) observed, the presence of two or more political parties participating actively and seriously in an electoral contest for a particular seat, the advantage to incumbent candidates decreases. As Lucas (2021, p 392) simply puts, "As the proportion of votes received by independent candidates increases – that is, as the role of partisanship in the election declines – incumbency advantage increases." Questions remain as to *why* this is the case, though. Considering Calgary, Lucas et al. (2021, p. 13) found that, while the personal connection incumbents make with constituents does explain some of their advantage, "this personal vote is not sufficiently large to assuage concerns about incumbent dominance and possible accountability deficits in non-partisan city elections."

Yet, despite the lack of understanding as to why incumbents perform well in non-partisan elections, in the cities where they stand – such as Toronto – their advantage is clear. As Moore et al. (2017, p. 88) note, Toronto is a city where "incumbents are king". By the authors' calculations, 93% of incumbents were re-elected from 2003 to 2014. The presence/absence of incumbents in a particular race influenced voter engagement in a unique way: where voters were presented with an "open race", they came to decisions regarding their vote choice later in the election, while voters in wards where incumbents were seeking re-election were less attentive to the election overall (Moore et. al., 2017).

Incumbency appears to similarly impact a voter's ability to identify competitiveness in electoral races. Considering the 2018 election in neighbouring Mississauga, Anderson et al. (2020) found few voters able to identify which opponent presented the biggest challenge to a sitting incumbent. The authors noted, "Rallying around a credible challenger is therefore a particularly difficult task for voters in wards dominated by an incumbent," (Anderson et al., 2020, p. 867).

One of the least-studied possible institutional barriers to participation is the complicated nature of pay for elected officials. There is a cultural apprehension among Canadians with regard

to discussing money issues, which makes surveying prospective and declared candidates on their own feelings toward pay difficult.[10] Spicer et al., (2017) found no connection between council pay and the presence of a more diverse array of candidates. This finding was echoed by Breux et al. (2019) who found that higher pay for elected officials and the "prestige" of the office did not result in more women standing for office. Though while the salaries of elected officials may not drive historically marginalized candidates to seek election, campaign finance regimes may increase accessibility across-the-board. In their study of the council races in the 2014 municipal election in Toronto, Taylor et al. (2019) found that strict election spending limits enabled crowded or "noisy" elections. While the barrier to entry was low, the sheer number of candidates created a field that was confusing for donors, incumbents, and challengers alike. Due to the "low information" status of local elections and the absence of overt party cues, political actors have little idea as to which challenger poses a serious threat to an incumbent. This results in high profile donors opposed to an incumbent scattering their donations among challengers without a strong sense of who is the most serious opponent. Further to this, incumbents themselves can be unsure if a challenger poses a serious threat to their re-election effort, which could result in their high spending despite their apparent advantage. Taylor and McEleney (2019) speculate on this:

> Why do so many incumbents engage in high spending if challengers pose only a minimal threat? One possibility is that they cannot accurately perceive the magnitude of threats posed by challengers. Commissioned polling remains rare at the ward level in Toronto, and so candidates assess their electoral strength through such imprecise measures as door-to-door canvasing and yard sign market share. Even if it is ineffective, incumbents may view high spending as an insurance policy to protect their advantage in the fog of the campaign, (226).

As the authors note, though, there has been little work done on the impact of campaign financing laws and fundraising capacities of individuals on candidacy. This presents a further opportunity for inquiry.

Aside from structural issues that may help or hinder the candidacy of individuals at the municipal level, the unique personal characteristics of a potential candidate may also play a role. Scott et al. (2020), in part using data from a survey run concurrently with mine, found candidates

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[10] Popular trade-group commissioned surveys have, in the recent past, indicated that Canadians are more comfortable discussing sex, religion, and politics than they are discussing money and finances (Morello, 2020; Nassar, 2020).

for local office to be more extroverted, open, and emotionally stable than the population as a whole. This is echoed by Dynes et al. (2021) who find extroversion and openness to be strongly correlated with political ambition.

District magnitude, incumbency, and personality all impact an individual's decision to seek local office while campaign financing laws appear to impact the number of candidates and spending habits of incumbents. Each of these structural issues and personal characteristics can further influence local candidacy, though must be considered alongside issues of gender, ethnicity, sexuality, and settler or Indigenous status. Through all these components, a picture of who seeks local office and who wins becomes more clear.

Though one crucial pathway to candidacy remains: the role of political parties and of "party elites". Representatives of political parties can act as important arbiters between a prospective candidate's ambition and their candidacy. An individual's personal political ambition is a major factor in the decision to run for office, though party elites can act as key supporters, encouraging prospective candidates to begin the nomination process (Allen & Cutts, 2017).

In the context of Canadian federal and provincial elections, political parties are the ultimate deciding force in whether many prospective candidates are allowed to stand. Prospective candidates must endure a party "vetting" process before they can be cleared to even contest a party's nomination to become a candidate in a riding. The vetting process involves a team of individuals, appointed by the party leader, meticulously researching the prospective candidate for past misdeeds, which can range from declaring bankruptcy and hate speech to "embarrassing or controversial behaviour of family members" and using "dating apps in a controversial way" (Marland & DeCillia, 2020, p. 353). Candidates who fail to pass this vetting process are prohibited from seeking their party's nomination. The candidate nomination process is "formally" a responsibility of the local Electoral District Association (EDA), and EDA executive members who are tasked with organizing nominations are informed of how intensive and difficult the vetting process can be at times (Pruysers & Cross, 2016). Given this, local EDA members can encourage, assist or, alternatively, dissuade prospective candidates from moving forward with this information. Particularly when prospective candidates from diverse or historically marginalized communities signal their intent to contest a party's nomination, the party officials present in

electoral districts or "ridings"[11] can possibly play a crucial role in helping or hindering the transition from prospective to nominated candidate. In this way, party elites act less as "key supporters" and more as "gatekeepers" to nomination.

Research regarding the role parties play as gatekeepers to women's candidacy is scattered. Tremblay and Pelletier (2001) find that the presence of women in positions of authority in ridings does not necessarily bolster the candidacy of women, as other partisan factors appear to be more important when considering the qualities a party looks for in a candidate. This is contrasted with the work of Cheng and Tavits (2011) and of Cross and Pruysers (2019), all of whom found that the presence of a women in the office of "riding association president" (the leader of a political party's EDA)[12] did make the nomination of a woman candidate more likely. An explanation for this variation may be temporal; Tremblay and Pelletier examined the 1997 Canadian Federal Election, while the work of Cheng and Tavits considered the 2004 and 2006 elections and that of Cross and Pruysers examined the election held in 2015. Indeed, Young (2013) notes that there has been a steady, albeit slow, increase in women's political participation in Canada since the 1970's. Young continues by acknowledging the limitations of the gatekeeper theory – specifically the idea that men in positions of power in riding associations hinder the candidacy of women – while also highlighting the "significant variations in the level of effort [parties] devote to encouraging women candidates," (p 264). This speaks to the possibility that, while party elites may not necessarily be hindering the candidacy of women, they may also not be actively encouraging women candidates to run. This may constitute "dissuasion through apathy", as Medeiros, Forest, and Erl (2019) note that party officials in Canada have observed women need to be approached by party officials and convinced of candidacy to a more notable degree than men.

Differing results may also be explained by Canada's use of a FPTP electoral system. Kunovich and Paxton (2005) examined the impact that women in positions of party power had on women's candidacy. Their findings indicated that women as "party elites" helped encourage the

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[11] The word "riding" holds multiple meanings. A "riding" is a term for a lower-level administrative division in the United Kingdom. The word is believed to derive from the Old English *Þriðing* (or "*trithing*" in Latin script), which means the third division of an area (Turner, 1911). The term was brought to Canada by colonial administrators to refer to segments of counties and became a colloquialism for an electoral district. There is little academic work done in the etymology of the term, which constitutes another unfortunate scholarly oversight in our understanding of the linguistic and political history of Canada.

[12] A "riding association" is a legally-constituted group of party volunteers in a single electoral district. This body exists to "search" for candidates, manage donations that are directed toward them between elections, and (ostensibly) develop policy by passing policy resolutions and sending delegates to party conventions.

candidacy of women in those states that use proportional representation systems more so than in FPTP systems. Though, when women did manage to secure a party's nomination in a FPTP election, women party elites provided an identifiable "boost" to their candidacy, resulting in greater electoral success.

While the research regarding women and party elites is scattered, a more definitive case is that of racial and ethnic minorities seeking elected office. Party gatekeepers play a significant role in the elevation of racial and ethnic minorities from prospective to nominated candidate. As Tolley (2019) observes, particularly when candidates from diverse ethnic and racial groups express interest in seeking office in Canada, the presence of a local party official from a similarly marginalized racial/ethnic community can play a key role in the prospective candidate's nomination. The same patterns carry through into municipal elections in Sweden, where political parties field candidates openly and where municipal councils are elected through proportional representation. R. M. Dancygier, Lindgren, Oskarsson, and Vernby (2015) found that the underrepresentation of immigrants in local government cannot be explained by a lack of resources or by the structure of Swedish municipal elections, emphasizing instead the disinterest on the part of party gatekeepers in advancing the candidacy of those from marginalized ethnic and racial communities. Further study from many of the same authors (see: R. Dancygier, Lindgren, Nyman, & Vernby, 2021) reinforced this notion, specifically by surveying elected officials, candidates, and citizens and finding no less interest on the part of members of racial and ethnic minority communities toward seeking elected office, observing that "Immigrants do want to enter electoral politics, but they are thwarted by party elites," (p. 685). While no substantive research has been conducted regarding the role of political parties in acting as gatekeepers to the candidacy of Indigenous people, we can again speculate that similar patterns appear between party gatekeeping efforts toward prospective candidates from racial and ethnic minority communities and from Indigenous ones.

Scholarship regarding party recruitment and gatekeeping efforts toward prospective Queer candidates is very recent. Complicating the issue is, as Everitt, Tremblay, and Wagner (2019) and Wagner (2019) note, the small number of Queer candidates and elected officials, particularly when contrasted with their women and racial/ethnic minority counterparts. While Wagner was able to identify a number of Queer candidates who had been recruited by party officials or politically-engaged community members, they note the limitations of their research having only recruited 16

individuals for their study. Of note, though, is the observation that Queer women were more likely to put themselves forward without the urging of party officials than others. Nevertheless, Everitt et al. (2019, p. 246) stress that "the sample size is too small to reach any definitive conclusions about the sources of recruitment for LGBT candidates in Canada." So too, it would seem, is the scholarly body of work to draw any larger conclusions.

Given the eclectic nature of Canadian municipal government, it is difficult to understand the role of party gatekeepers in supporting or hindering the candidacy of those from diverse communities at the local level. Where an official party nomination is involved, party gatekeepers have been shown to more enthusiastically promote the candidacy of those from backgrounds similar to theirs in formal settings. While this may impact municipal contests in British Columbia, the impact of said gatekeepers in Ontario is as-of-yet indeterminate.

With that said, it can be assumed that those women, racialized minorities, and Queer people who do stand for local office with the backing of a shadow party organization have secured the support of some party elites, meaning that the process of "vetting" and encouraging, which would have occurred in a more transparent way during federal or provincial nomination contests, may have occurred behind-the-scenes. This characterization takes into account the "clandestine" nature of shadow party activities. Further, it implies that the few candidates from these communities with support from parties can "count on" the support they provide in the form of financial, community, and logistical assistance.

Missing from these conversations and from the study of Canadian municipal government, political parties, and electoral diversity, is any focus on the impact of non-partisanship on diversity overall. This may be thanks to the difficulty associated with examining a negative, specifically in proving the *potential* that parties can have on the diversity of candidates and the success of said diverse candidates. Cross-jurisdictional comparisons have proven challenging, given the nature of the Canadian municipal archipelago (partisan, at-large elections in British Columbia with some elected ABCs and a single non-denominational school system versus non-partisan elections in Ontario conducted under a multiplicity of systems with four distinct faith-based and non-denominational school boards, for example). While Section 4.4.1 – "Non-partisanship and the prevalence of Shadow Parties" touches on the impacts of municipal non-partisanship on the ideological make-up of local governments, little attention is paid to their demographic make-up.

Here, again, we turn to the Lightbody assertion, which makes the claim that non-partisan elections favour "middle-aged white men", with an implication regarding the sexuality of said men (2006, p. 257). Given the lack of formal academic work on the impact of partisan/non-partisan systems and the colloquial understanding of non-partisan systems disadvantaging women, members of racial and ethnic minority communities, and Queer folks, it becomes imparative to study these claims using a cross-jurisdictional analysis.

2.6 – Conclusions

Municipalities matter. While scholarship has neglected the municipality as a scale, it is still a place where state power can be observed, felt, and managed. Civic banality – those basic, prosaic, everyday things like sidewalks, waste management, and road maintenance – is still a reflection of state power and is crucial to the maintenance of said power in a contemporary liberal democracy. Residents of municipalities come to expect their provision and come into regular contact with state agents tasked with performing the duties that constitute civic banality. Civic banality is how the municipality renders residents deferential to state power or encourages passionate self-regulation that elicits *geborgenheit*. The role of the municipality is to more fully bring into a community all the disparate actors that constitute its membership through the regular, reliable, and routine provision of services.

Those services include the physical force of the state in its most recognizable: local law enforcement. These agents of state force manage public safety, transportation, and health, ordering the spatial landscape and managing the citizenry. Behind these agents lies a network of laws and bylaws that set the direction for municipal spaces. Laws are to be followed, once again pushing municipal residents into self-regulation, eager to escape the watchful panoptic eye of the state and to generate that sense of *geborgenheit* which accompanies the self-assurance that one is doing their part as a good citizen.

Municipalities employ civic banality in the pursuit of accumulation and the advancement of the capitalist economic project, organizing the local state apparatus into an entity that best facilitates private growth. Civic boosterism performs the dual role of eliciting local pride in place while simultaneously advertising a municipality as "open for business". But, while municipalities can be shaped to aid in the accumulation process, those like the "sewer socialists" of Milwaukee

show that civic banality can aid in the creation of a more equal municipality that affords opportunity to more than just the wealthy elite.

The immense power of civic banality, coupled with the understanding of a modern democracy as affording a voice to as broad an array of its citizenry as possible, requires us to deepen our understanding of *who* serves as a local official. Particularly when aspects of civic banality can be denied to a particular community or used in such a way that targets a particular community, those who come to oversee its provision truly matter.

If we follow the Lightbody assertion that municipal councils in Canada, particularly those that are non-partisan and those featuring large electoral districts benefit "middle-aged white men", then understanding why members of particular communities – namely women, ethnic and racial minorities, Queer folks, and Indigenous peoples – have difficulty standing for and being elected to local councils in Canada is important. For each community, lingering prejudices and perceptions play a large role in hindering the electoral efforts of individual candidates from diverse communities. An understudied, though compelling line of inquiry also considers structural issues: non-partisanship, electoral systems, district magnitude, and campaign financing. Studies from around the world have come to mixed conclusions on the impact each of these unique structural issues can play in supporting or hindering the electoral efforts of diverse communities, and Canadian examinations of these effects are limited. As such, there is an incredible opportunity to consider the impact of some measurable, identifiable structural issues on diverse candidates' electoral performance. The study outlined here is in pursuit of this aim.

3 – Poor Cousins and Passing Mentions: The History of Municipal Politics in Canada

I understand if it's all a bit much
It's a bit of a circus, it's a little bit rough
I heard this place was run by the mob
Buying everyone off down at city hall
Cynical Bastards - Arkells

3.1 – The municipal mausoleum

In Stephen Leacock's 1914 satire, *Arcadian Adventures With the Idle Rich*, the Canadian author presents a series of vignettes, focusing on the antics and ambitions of the members of a fictional petite-bourgeois social association, the Mausoleum Club, in an equally chimerical unnamed American city. The final chapter centres on the machinations of the club's membership regarding what they perceive to be the moral degeneracy of their municipal government. The club's membership, convinced they must do something about the situation, establish the 'Clean Government Association' to field a slate of reform candidates for aldermanic honours in the city's upcoming election. As they're considering the collapse of their local government, there comes a point when the Mausoleum Club's membership seems almost unaware of how they arrived at their present state of annoyance with their civic institutions:

> It was not just clear how and where this movement of indignation had started. People said that it was part of a new wave of public morality that was sweeping over the entire United States. Certainly it was being remarked in almost every section of the country. Chicago newspapers were attributing its origin to the new vigour and the fresh ideals of the middle west. In Boston it was said to be due to a revival of the grand old New England spirit. In Philadelphia they called it the spirit of William Penn. In the south it was said to be the reassertion of southern chivalry making itself felt against the greed and selfishness of the north, while in the north they recognized it at once as a protest against the sluggishness and ignorance of the south. In the west they spoke of it as a revolt against the spirit of the east and in the east they called it a reaction against the lawlessness of the west. But everywhere they hailed it as a new sign of the glorious unity of the country. (Leacock, 2009, p. 371 – 372)

The confusion established by Leacock is echoed in a general uncertainty among urban scholars over the desire for reform that washed over the residents of growing American cities in the Progressive Era. Indeed, there was no singular event or instance that was the point of incipience for this movement; rather, a series of concurrent processes and movements coalesced in North American municipalities creating multiple "civic reform" movements. These movements spanned

the ideological spectrum, emphasized very different solutions to urban ills, and were heavily gendered in their composition (Flanagan, 1990).

Canadian cities began to grow rapidly as their American counterparts faced this crisis of identity. The indignation Leacock humorously references was toward cities in the United States that, while once promising, had lost their way and needed reform. But, as Canadian cities were only becoming centres of power, trade, and interaction at that time, during the formative years of their growth, they were seen as corrupting and immoral places in need of redemption. The word redemption is used purposefully, as the moralizing tone and promotion of socially conservative Christian values were inseparable from the seemingly nondenominational campaigns for improved public health, provision of public greenspaces, and investment in public infrastructure (Rutherford, 1971).

This chapter will outline the history of Canadian municipalities from the Rebellions of 1837/1838 to the present. I begin by establishing a unique division of Canadian municipal history into five eras. These eras begin with the Victorian Municipality, wherein an overview of the Rebellions, District Councils Act, Baldwin Act, and the struggle for Responsible Government in municipalities is provided. Next is a discussion regarding the Reform Municipality and a focus on how the American battle against corrupt party machines and the machinations of reformers came to influence Canada. Following this, I outline the tumultuous period I call the Battleground Municipality, which begins during the First World War and the Labour Revolts of 1919 which saw organized labour assert itself as a major player in municipal politics, drawing the ire of the business class and establishing the contemporary party/non-partisan system present in Canada today. Then I move into a discussion regarding the shift from a labour/business axis of confrontation to an urbanist and New Left vs. scientific rational planning and politicians focused on urban renewal in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s during an era I call that of the "Renewal Municipality". Finally, I end with the present situation, that of Reorganized Municipalities, which began with high-profile municipal mergers and reorganizations dictated by provincial authorities against the wishes of municipal councils and residents.

3.2 – The eras of Canadian municipal political history

While Canadian cities in each of the country's distinct regions developed and changed in their own unique ways in response to technological changes and the push for reform, international influences, most notably the American ideals borne from the Progressive Era, played an important role in shaping the urban landscape of Canada. Without the established framework from the earliest days of Canada's municipal history and the ways in which organized labour in particular responded to the changes made by reformers, though, the city of today would have been notably different.

I divide the history of Canadian municipalities into five periods that shape the municipality of today (also see Figure 1):

- The Victorian Municipality (1837 – 1901)
- The Reform Municipality (1902 – 1915)
- The Battleground Municipality (1916 – 1958)
- The Renewal Municipality (1959 – 1990)
- The Reorganized Municipality (1991 – Present)

In the era of the Victorian Municipality, Canadian cities were impacted by the establishment of Responsible Government and the push for social change in the Dominion after Confederation. The era of the Reform Municipality was a time in which Canadian cities were influenced heavily by the American Progressive Era. At this time, civic leaders emphasized the role and superiority of the middle and upper classes, with an undercurrent of imperial patriotism that came to define Canadian municipalities as hybrids between those in the United Kingdom and those in the United States. This era was succeeded by growing class antagonism and a concerted effort to challenge the power of organized labour in Canadian municipal government from the Labour Revolts of 1919 to, roughly, the 1950s, turning the municipality into a battleground in a soft class war. After the retreat of labour, municipalities began focusing on planning and service provision in ways that would best facilitate the growth of business. This period would be characterized by large-scale urban renewal projects that brought urbanists and the New Left into conflict with planners and the business establishment. After a number of high-profile amalgamations and deamalgamations, Canadian municipalities entered the present era: that of the Reorganized Municipality. During this era, the shape and structure of municipalities was changed by provincial administrations while the internal culture of local governments shifted toward a new form of boosterism that focused on creativity and identity.

Eras in Modern National and Municipal Politics

Canada
Municipal
National

United Kingdom

United States

Year	Canada Municipal	Canada National	United Kingdom	United States
1800s	Early Colonial Local Governments	Early British Colonial	The Georgian Era	The Jeffersonian Era
1810s		1812 and Consolodation		The Era of Good Feelings
1820s				
1830s	The Victorian Municipality	Rebellion and Reorganization	The Victorian Era	The Jacksonian Era
1840s				
1850s		Victorian Colonial		The Civil War Era
1860s				
1870s		Victorian Dominion		Reconstruction
1880s				The Guilded Age
1890s				
1900s	The Reform Municipality	Edwardian	Edwardian	The Progressive Era
1910s	The Battleground Municipality	WWI and the Imperial Era	WWI	WWI and the Roaring 20s
1920s			The Inter-War Years	
1930s		Depression and Independence		The Great Depression
1940s		WWII	WWII	WWII
1950s		The Post-War Compromise	The End of the Empire	The Post-War Era
1960s	The Renewal Municipality	The Trudeau I Era	The Turn to Europe	The Civil Rights Era
1970s				
1980s		The Neoliberal Era	The Thatcher Era	The Reagan and Post Cold War Era
1990s	The Reorganized Municipality		The Neoliberal Era	
2000s		The Harper Years		The Post 9/11 Era
2010s		The Trudeau II/ Post-Pandemic Era	The Brexit/ Post-Pandemic Era	The Trump Years
2020s				The Post Pandemic Era

Figure 3 - Canadian National and Municipal "Eras", contrasted with American and UK Eras
(Diagram by author)

3.3 – Rebellion and responsibility: The Victorian Municipality (1837 – 1901)

For much of Canada's early colonial history, the country's population lived in rural areas, with small urban centres slowly growing amidst a vast hinterland dominated by space reserved for primary resource extraction and farming. Canada's urban/rural population division would continue well into Confederation, only reaching equilibrium briefly in the 1920s before inverting in favour of urban areas (see Figure 4).

Canada's Rural and Urban Populations from the Censuses of 1851 to 2016

Figure 4 - Canadian Rural and Urban Population from 1851 to 2016
(Author's calculations using data from Statistics Canada (2018).)

Throughout much of the first half of the 19th century what few urban centres existed were loosely collected groups of craftspeople and merchants who informally decided amongst themselves who would maintain peace, order, and justice. Local officials, often elected from amongst the property-owning members of small communities, would serve simultaneously as magistrates and aldermen and would oversee the hiring, assembling, and supervising of early police forces (Marquis, 1987).

Despite the seemingly ad-hoc nature of Canada's early municipal governance, the cities of the Dominion were sites of reformist pressure in the struggle for greater self-determination for the colonies. Republican-sympathizer and radical reformer, William Lyon Mackenzie, for example, became Toronto's first mayor in 1835. Mackenzie, already known as a firebrand, used the office

of mayor as a position from which he could attack his opponents and agitate for reform. As Armstrong notes, "Mackenzie loved to battle, a trait of personality that can be admirable in a newspaper editor, or in opposition, but one which can easily lead an administrator astray," (F. H. Armstrong, 1967, p. 330)". This became evident when Mackenzie would avoid the stated responsibilities of a mayor in favour of stumping for reformist causes and personally attacking his Conservative opponents. Despite losing in his bid for a second term, Mackenzie would use municipal office as a springboard into a leadership role during the Upper Canada Rebellion of 1837 (Kilbourn, 2008).

Both Mackenzie's Upper Canada Rebellion and the Lower Canada Rebellion of Louis-Joseph Papineau in the same year would prove to be formative events in the history of Canadian cities. While their focus was breaking the power of the aristocratic and deeply conservative *Family Compact* in Upper Canada and the Protestant, Anglophone *Château Clique* in Lower Canada,[13] the rebels had a revolutionary spirit that spoke to an overall dissatisfaction with the lack of democratic accountability in the colonies. Following their defeat, colonial administrators launched a wholesale review of British policy in Canada. That review led to two important pieces of legislation that would begin to shape the structure of Canadian municipal governments: the Upper Canada District Councils Act of 1841 and the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, also known as the "Baldwin Act".

The District Councils Act of 1841, championed by Charles Thomson (the Lord Sydenham and first Governor General of the united Province of Canada) served as an attempt to address some of the concerns raised by the rebels in 1837 and belay the desire for a more democratic, republican form of government, such as that advocated by Mackenzie and Papineau. Rather than acquiesce to the defeated, Sydenham sought to begin the slow process of careful devolution of powers on a timetable and in a way approved of by colonial administrators, as well as to simplify, formalize, and professionalize the existing ad-hoc system of municipal organization. As Whebell asserts:

> It is abundantly clear that a general law for municipal institutions in which elective corporate bodies have control over both the raising and dispensing of local revenues – in short, modern municipal corporations – was first introduced into Canada by the British government through its agent, the Governor-General, and was not the outgrowth of local trends in municipal government...Lord Sydenham's part in the

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[13] The Château Clique was occasionally referred to as the "Scotch Party", as it was dominated by a group of wealthy Scottish businessmen, of which James McGill was a prominent member (Raddall, 1957).

creation of this local municipal system was central. He was neither the originator of the basic idea of political union with sub-legislatures, not merely an agent of some other interested party... but his role was certainly one of selection and application from the pool of ideas then in circulation among the English liberal Whigs and parliamentary radicals (Whebell, 1989, p. 203).

While the District Councils Act provided Canada's cities and urban spaces with more order and the Whiggish elements of their foundations, it was the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849 that established the constitutional subservience of municipal government that still today defines civic government in Canada.

Following the Rebellions of 1837, Robert Baldwin rose to prominence in the Province of Canada, advocating the implementation of a policy of Responsible Government.[14] Part of his reforms to make the government of Canada more responsive to the needs of the people was to simplify the municipal structure, particularly that of Ontario. The resultant legislation became the Municipal Corporations Act of 1849, also known by its colloquial name, "the Baldwin Act". Thanks to the small number of municipal institutions in Ontario and the lack of long-standing municipal traditions, the implementation of the Baldwin Act saw little resistance. Rather, the Act became the cornerstone of Canadian municipal government, establishing that higher-order governments had the responsibility to, through legislation, devolve some powers to municipal governments overall, creating consistency and uniformity amongst municipal institutions under their authority (Taylor, 2014).

The Baldwin Act managed to tactically balance the calls for democratic reform, the expectations of American migrants, and the changing size of Canadian cities, by both providing local power and elected councils (chosen by an electorate that was solely comprised of property-holding males) while maintaining centralized control so that rebellious local officials could be managed by colonial administrators (Magnusson, 1983). It was the Baldwin Act that would, in

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[14] It is necessary to provide a brief definition of responsible government, as it factors so prominently into the Anglo Canadian foundation of, not only municipal government, but the entire system of parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy to which we are presently subjected. What is meant by responsible government is an executive (cabinet) that is answerable to the legislature elected by the people and not to the sovereign to whom they have pledged their loyalty (Keith, 1912). Rather than the monarch or their designated representative in the Dominion selecting chief executives and the ministers, advocates of responsible government (such as Baldwin and Louis Hippolyte LaFontaine in Canada East), wanted a system that was more accountable to the people. Writing in 1840, Charles Buller, the principal secretary to Lord Durham and a Radical MP in the United Kingdom, said the system of unaccountable government in the colonies led to bickering and instability, as it became a contest between the aristocratic, appointed cabinet and the popularly-elected parliaments of the people. "We have made the fire," he wrote, "but stopped the chimney," (Buller, 1840, p. 10).

1867, influence the authors of the Constitution to place Canada's cities under the responsibility of Provincial governments in Section 92 of the British North America Act, 1867, cementing municipal subservience into the culture of Canadian cities.

From the implementation of the Baldwin Act and the formalization of municipal powers in the Constitution into the last decades of the Victorian Era, Canada's cities began to slowly change. A gradual evolution began to occur, with the traditional ruling elite, notably those of storied lineage, loyalist affiliation, and just one generation removed from that of the Family Compact and Chateau Clique against whom the rebels of 1837 fought, found themselves losing prominence in Canada's largest cities. Replacing the Canadian aristocracy was a cadre of new professionals and merchants who found benefit in controlling the apparatus of local administration. As Kaplan notes, in reference to the political culture of Canada's largest cities,

> ...local elections in Montreal and Toronto increasingly produced a new breed of alderman, middle class but drawn more from the lower middle class – lawyers, retailers, the small, self-employed industrialist – than from the new giants of commerce and industry. The typical new alderman was the owner of his own business, financially secure rather than wealthy, and with far less formal education than the earlier councillors, (Kaplan, 1982, p. 122).

These individuals had common unifying ideological characteristics, in that they were loyalists, often members of the Conservative Party, occasionally held values closely aligned with the Temperance movement or other moralizing philosophies and, in many cases, had a strong connection or membership in the Orange Order (Kaplan, 1982). The Orange Order, originally an organization for Unionist sympathizers in the north of Ireland, had become a powerful element of the imperial political culture of Canada at the time, and maintained control of the municipal politics of Toronto in particular for decades, with "Orangemen" dominating civic affairs in the city until 1972 (Smyth, 2015, p. 276). It was from these deeply conservative Protestant officials, who enthusiastically filled the ranks of Toronto's civil and police services with their allies, that Toronto earned the nickname "Toronto the Good", an almost tongue-in-cheek reference to the city's "puritanical" nature in the late 1800s (C. Armstrong et al., 1977).

It was these individuals – a coalition of moralizing crusaders and the new middle class – who were receptive to the ideals of the reform movement. The business-oriented principles aligned with their commercial interests and, when viewed alongside the excesses evident in the municipal

politics of the United States, the reform message found fertile ground in new Canadian municipalities.

3.4 – Pack of rogues: The Reform Municipality (1902 – 1915)

Leacock's Mausoleum Club was written as the quintessential "Reform" organization, with its middle class, business-oriented membership balking at the disorder and chaos of partisan, working class and immigrant supported municipal politics. The members of the club harboured a healthy anti-establishment sentiment, which they believed would help them in their crusade to clean up local government. As Leacock wrote:

> Meantime the wave of civic enthusiasm as reflected in the conversations of Plutoria Avenue grew stronger with every day. "The thing is a scandal," said Mr. Lucullus Fyshe. "Why, these fellows down at the city hall are simply a pack of rogues" (Leacock, 2009).

The structure of Canadian municipal government in the decades after Confederation was, as previously noted, impacted immensely by the American urban reform movement of the Progressive Era. Canadian cities at the turn of the 20th century were already more conservative than their American counterparts. Their deferential placement under provincial authority in the Constitution and domination by conservative, loyalist, and imperially-aligned organizations made them ideal spaces for reformers to test their ideological and managerial hypotheses. The British traditionalism and restricted powers imbued upon municipalities in Canada stood in stark contrast to the seeming excess of city governments in Gilded Age America, making it relatively simple to transform them into corporate bodies.

Canadian reformers drew their inspiration from Americans who had ample experience in crusading against perceived inefficiencies and immoralities in their own municipalities. In the rising power of organized labour and an increasingly-class conscious mass of workers, the American middle and upper classes saw a threat to their position. Urban politics, ultimately being the first point of entry into the political system, needed to be isolated. The fears of those in positions of power, as Hawley noted, were of "the specter of boss-led masses and the threat they saw posed by organized labor," (1973, p. 11).

The notion of "boss-led masses" had some rooting in the political reality of the time. Both Newton and Hart consider the role of political machines in local politics. These were organizations led by "bosses" who served as central coordinators and managers, rather than in overt political

leadership roles (though sometimes in both simultaneously). Bosses used a strategy that included bribery, fear, and manipulation of distinct, vulnerable new migrant communities (Newton, 1978). Machines and "boss politics" were not the exclusive domain of any one political party, with Frank Hague of Jersey City, New Jersey coordinating his local Democratic Party organization while Enoch "Nucky" Johnson oversaw the operations of a Republican machine less than 200 kilometres to the south in Atlantic City, New Jersey (Hart, 2013).

While both the Hague and Johnson machines operated well into the 20th century, the near-eponymous instance of a political machine was the spectre that haunted American reformers through the 19th century: New York City's Tammany Hall. While the reform movement's origins cannot be traced with linear precision to the most infamous instance of municipal corruption in the United States, William "Boss" Tweed's egregious corruption and downfall became a kind of mythological cautionary tale to the urban reform movement as a whole. As Callow notes:

> There have been many corrupt city machines more successful and certainly more ruthless than the Tweed Ring, yet to the American imagination, the Tweed Ring is still the most audacious and notorious of them all. (Callow Jr., 1966, p. 3).

Tammany Hall (officially the Society of St. Tammany)[15] was a social and political club affiliated with the Democratic Party established by Tweed and his associates. Tammany gained control the city's municipal political apparatus, drawing on only a minority of electoral support that emanated mainly from distinct immigrant communities and impoverished New Yorkers. Immigrant communities, geographically dispersed and seeking a place in their new home, were isolated by the traditional Anglo-Saxon and Dutch ruling class. The organizers of Tammany Hall recognized and capitalized on this population's disenfranchisement, a shrewd and effective political strategy as suffrage was broadened. As Allswang notes, "No ambitious political organization with impunity could ignore such a large group of potential voters," (1986, p. 41). Democratic partisans of Tammany Hall strategically mobilized the working class and immigrant populations through cynically exploiting long-standing prejudices, notably sympathizing with the

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[15] "St. Tammany" is not a saint in the Roman Catholic canon but is, rather, in reference to Tamanend/Tamenund, an Indigenous leader of the Lenni-Lenape nation. As MacGregor (1983) notes, Indigenous motifs have been used by political organizations in the West since the beginning of colonization, often in an uncritical and fetishistic way. The character of Tammany is used in the eastern American context as a mythologized symbol of docility, peace, and fraternity, perpetuating a "noble" stereotype. As an organization, Tammany Hall appropriated Indigenous words and customs for their rites and rituals.

Confederacy and supporting slavery in the name of supporting Irish immigrants while opposing prohibition and Dutch intellectuals to buoy support with poor German migrants (Rorabaugh, 1976).

In five short years, Tweed and his ring's caricaturesque inner circle ("Elegant" Oakey Hall, Peter "Brains" Sweeny, and Richard "Slippery Dick" Connolly) led an organization that, through brazen corruption and graft, defrauded the City of New York of over $6.3 million USD by 1871, the equivalent in 2021 of nearly $137 million USD (Callow Jr., 1966, p. 279).[16]

In response to the egregious corruption of Boss Tweed's Tammany Hall, the New York State Assembly passed a series of reforms to the city's charter that capped the power of alderman and aimed to mute the tantalizing prospect of bribery and graft to local officials. The reforms created a prototypical system of commission government, stripping individual aldermanic power over functions prone to abuse like the granting of contracts for the construction of infrastructure projects, the responsibility to budget, and the leasing of public wharves, over to more tightly controlled commissions (Mandelbaum, 1965).

But the very fact that Tweed's organization could so easily manipulate the existing structure of New York's municipal governance would long serve as a rallying cry for reformers. As Callow noted,

> The Tweed Ring found in municipal government a machinery admirably suited to its purposes. The government of the City of New York, a thing of shreds and patches, offered a standing invitation to plunder. A man attempting to describe it paused after several thousand words to say that he had undertaken to write a discourse on the government of New York but was actually writing a discourse on stealing. (Callow Jr., 1966, p. 76).

Tweed's legacy cemented a notion in the minds of the elite that the masses were easily controlled by powerful political machines, playing to each distinct groups' anxieties and frustrations. Reform, then, was an attempt by the new elites to solidify their position and remove working people and migrant communities from positions of power. Hays makes note of this, remarking,

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[16] The term "caricature" is used very deliberately here, as the editorial cartoons of Thomas Nast in *Harper's Weekly* helped to push the corruption of Tammany Hall into the wider public discussion about civic government. Tweed recognized their potential at unsettling his organization, remarking "I don't care a straw for your newspaper articles, my constituents don't know how to read, but they can't help seeing them damned pictures." (Callow Jr., 1966, p. 254).

The movement for reform in municipal government, therefore, constituted an attempt by upper-class, advanced professional, and large business groups to take formal political power from the previously dominant lower- and middle-class elements so that they might advance their own conceptions of desirable public policy. These two groups came from entirely different urban worlds, and the political system fashioned by one was no longer acceptable to the other. (1964, p. 162).

So universal was the connection that it featured as a minor plotline in Upton Sinclair's 1904 novel, *The Jungle*, wherein the protagonist, a Lithuanian immigrant, is hired by the local Democratic ward 'boss' to influence an aldermanic election.

On election morning he was out at four o'clock, 'getting out the vote'; he had a two-horse carriage to ride in, and he went from house to house for his friends, and escorted them in triumph to the polls. He voted half a dozen times himself, and voted some of his friends as often; he brought bunch after bunch of the newest foreigners – Lithuanians, Poles, Bohemians, Slovaks – and when he had put them through the mill he turned them over to another man to take to the next polling place. (Sinclair, 2001 [1906], pp. 219 - 220).

Reformers knew that to effectively enact the reforms they desired, it would be essential to restrict the franchise and diminish the power of particular immigrant communities. In some instances, reformers allied with nativist and anti-immigrant groups to restructure local governments to permanently sideline the participation of groups deemed to have a negative influence on civic affairs. This proved to be difficult in places where strong organizations existed and thrived thanks to the involvement of the established parties and their constituencies. Conversely, where reform efforts succeeded were in the less diverse and organized cities of the American South and West, with urban scholars noting:

Reformers succeeded by writing the rules to win, disenfranchising their opponents, and so creating electorates more middle class than the adult population as a whole...Crucial to opponents' weakness was suffrage restriction, which changed the composition of local electorates, not incidentally disenfranchising the strongest opponents of municipal reform. In the same places – in the South and West – the working classes lacked strong parties or political machines to defend them... reformers succeeded by writing the rules so they could win. (Bridges et al., 2007, p. 75)

There are assumptions about the composition of the reform movement that have been challenged and reinvestigated by scholars since the 1960s. Hays, for example, reflected on the popular assumption that the urban progressive movement was born from and advanced by the

middle class. Rather than the movement being middle class in origin, it was the urban bourgeoisie that provided much of the social capital and financial backing for the movement, sweeping sympathetic middle class support along as it advanced (Hays, 1964). Huthmacher ties particular working class, immigrant, and labour-affiliated groups to the reform movement, noting that many key reform proposals and prominent political figures would not have found success if it were not for the support of said groups (1962). The urban reform movement, then, was not a middle class monolith. Rather, as Hammack observed:

> ...power was concentrated not in one or two but in several distinct economic, social, and political elites. In their efforts to influence decisions these elites engaged in a shifting complex of alliances, bargained with find another, and sometimes made important concessions to secure the support of other elites end of wider publics. (1982, p. 304).

Cerillo expands upon this conceptualization and asserts that, particularly in post-Tammany New York, three notable "clusters" formed to advance reform issues: municipal reformers, economic planners, and health, safety, and sanitation advocates. Among these groups, Cerillo identified five main groups of people: wealthy elites concerned with charity, middle class professionals seeking to implement their technical specialties, academics believing the municipality to be a laboratory, Christian humanitarians and practical sociologists, and finally reform-minded politicians (2018, pp. 2 - 4).

Similar groups appeared in the United Kingdom in the 19th century, equally concerned with the growing power of workers and, by extension, the political movements of the left with which they were most associated. While there was less emphasis on the political power of immigrants, the mobilization of workers concerned both Britain's traditional and new elites. Local elections were first held in 1835 under systems that were designed to prioritize the protection of property, with voters and candidates subjected to rigorous property ownership requirements. As Copus, Wingfield, Steyvers, & Reynaert (2012, p. 214) note, "Local government was to be 'ratepayer' rather than 'representative' in nature and would ensure property could not be threatened by municipalization and local redistributionary policies."

Where the two traditions diverged was in their evolution. In the United States, reformers were, in many cases, working in contexts where cities had notably shallow histories. As such, the power of parties and party organizations was minimal. Given the poor reputation of parties in more

established American cities such as Chicago and New York, reformers were able to impose nonpartisan ballots on newer jurisdictions, such as the state legislatures of Nebraska and Minnesota and on newer municipalities, most notably across California (Adrian, 1952; Hawley, 1973; E. C. Lee, 1960). Alternatively, in the United Kingdom, only a few municipalities maintain a robust "nonpartisan" tradition in their councils (Copus et al., 2012; Gyford, 1985). As national parties' involvement in the local politics of large cities and regional bodies has become universally accepted, the space for nonpartisan politics has been diminished.

The principles of the American municipal reform movement and the UK's pivot toward municipal ratepayers would have been accepted by the Canadian municipal electorate as standard practice. The party machines American reformers sought to break in the cities of the Atlantic coast had no strong equivalents in Canada's comparatively smaller cities. The demographics of Canada remained strongly connected to the British Isles as the American population began to incorporate other European communities at vastly higher rates. As such, the relative homogeneity of Canada's cities at the time of the greatest reform pressure meant there was little incentive for political groups to isolate and target particular communities for electoral support. Finally, the labour situation in Canada did not lend itself to the same animosity as in the United States prior to 1919. The alliance between some organs of organized labour and the Liberal Party was matched by the broad support amongst working class Canadians for the protectionism of the Conservative Party. The absence of a real working class movement and the tendency toward labourism amongst the leadership of existing unions made for a comparatively peaceful municipal political situation in Canada (Heron, 1984).

While American reformers aimed to radically change how civic government operated, their proposals already had a long tradition in Canada. In 1909, considering American reformists, S. M. Wickett made light of how Canada led the charge in that field, listing all the attributes of Canadian municipalities that American reformists strove to implement in their own jurisdictions:

> The conservatism of the urban franchise; the homogeneity of the city population, which the future will probably not affect to the same extent as in the United States; the general policy with regard to municipal patronage and the consequent absence in large measure of party politics in city elections; and, finally, the efficacy of 'conservative innovation' and gradual growth and expansion of municipal legislation - these are features whose importance cannot be lost sight of. The conditions for good city government seem, therefore, propitious. (Wickett, 1972, pp. 24 - 25).

While American reformers aimed to implement Canadian-style governance, Canadians too began to enthusiastically borrow American principles of municipal administration. Indeed, the form of municipal government adopted universally in Canada, that of the council-manager form of government, was an American innovation, having been developed and implemented in the city of Staunton, Virginia in 1908 (Knoke, 1982).

The symbiotic relationship of American and Canadian reformers continued as each movement entered into its next phase. While American reformers focused their efforts on the growing cities of the west, Canadian reformers found themselves faced with growing class antagonisms that threatened the stability of the order they had established.

3.5 – Class struggle: The Battleground Municipality (1916 – 1958)

The story of labour in local politics is a story of struggle. While labour's efforts in Canadian municipalities began in response to pressing social issues, their presence locally quickly became a story of conflict. Using non-partisanship as a tool, the business class struck back at labour's efforts with increasing persistence following the Labour Revolts of 1919.

Prior to the First World War, organized labour had a strong presence in Canadian municipal politics. Particularly in the local government of prairie and western towns that left many workers behind in their boom years, labour proved to be a formidable force. Early in labour's civic participation, the broad ideology of "labourism" was a guiding principle, with unions and working people joining and participating in the politics of the Liberal and Conservative parties to advance their causes as part of a broad coalition (Heron, 1984). Much of this philosophy was inspired by Samuel Gompers (the founder and president of the American Federation of Labor, which held considerable influence over the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada or the TLC), whose antipathy toward socialism and independent political action pushed working people into partnerships with parties dominated by the capitalist class (Horowitz, 1968).

In the early 20th century, working people began to feel the limitations of labourism and embarked on projects that would result in the creation of their own political organizations. In these early labour parties, there was little central political organization. Even as workers began establishing Independent Labour Parties (ILP) to contest local office, their members remained active in the Liberal and Conservative parties at the federal and provincial levels. It was only when,

as Heron notes, "there were enough of these local parties with sufficient vitality and strength would they federate at the provincial level," (1984, p. 48).

In Ontario, this occurred in 1907. The labour movement had been inspired by the success of Allan Studholme in a provincial byelection in the riding of Hamilton East the year prior. The presence in the Ontario legislature of a dedicated labour representative spurred disparate labour groups to unite under a broad "Labour" banner for the province's 1908 general election. Only Studholme was successful during labour's first official independent foray into electoral politics, which led to a decline in all but the Hamilton branch of the ILP (Robin, 1966). This local ILP branch, which existed to primarily support Studholme and various other labour-affiliated candidates for Parliament and the Ontario Legislature, kept the dream of political labour alive while other branches quickly faded into obscurity.

Three events would change the Hamilton ILP's electoral focus: an economic depression in 1913, the outbreak of war in 1914, and a period of sustained inflation from 1914 to 1916. Discontent with how Hamilton's local government managed these crises, the ILP took the unprecedented step of fielding party-nominated candidates in the city's municipal elections on New Year's Day 1917. While their attempt to provide a stronger labour voice in municipal politics only resulted in the election of two alderman and a single school trustee, their organizational efforts inspired the creation of 14 new local ILP branches across the province and the reconstitution of an Ontario ILP by July, 1917 (Robin, 1966, 1968).

The tension between the growing strength of increasingly independent labour organizations prior to the First World War gave way to outright hostility caused by the end of the imperial struggle and the scene on the homefront. The months after the armistice would come to fundamentally reshape Canadian politics. In 1919, the country erupted as workers, frustrated with the changes to the working environment initiated by the capitalist class without sufficient worker's input, launched general strikes across Canada. While the most notable and bloody strike occurred in Winnipeg from 15 May to 25 June, strikers walked off the job in cities from Amherst, Nova Scotia and Sioux Lookout, Ontario to Humbolt, Saskatchewan and Fernie, British Columbia. In total, there were 210 general strikes from May to July, 1919. While the strikes were crushed with intense brutality by the Canadian government, workers who participated rightly equated many of their central demands (high rents and unaffordable housing, lack of sanitation and healthy communities, and an exclusion from general political decision making) with the responsibilities of

local government (Kealey, 1984). Inspired by the persistence of ILP groups across Ontario during the war, organized labour began to mobilize and begin electoral projects that would blossom into broader and more ambitious political movements.

In Winnipeg, the city's network of labour groups, grappling with their defeat in the General Strike, coalesced around one of two groups: the ILP and the Communist Party. Both parties would experience moderate success, tempered by the opposition of the "Citizens". While there was no consistent name for the pro-business groups that would contest Winnipeg's municipal elections in direct opposition to labour, their branding as "Citizens" illustrates that they could trace their origins to the Citizen's Committee of One Thousand, collection of business elites working to actively undermine the General Strike in 1919. Citizen council members worked to restructure Winnipeg's local government to disadvantage labour, combining high-population working-class wards in the city's north into a single "super ward" that would elect multiple council members, strictly enforcing property requirements for candidates, and adopting a complicated balloting system that ensured that Citizen candidates were advantaged even in labour strongholds (Lightbody, 1978).

Citizen manipulation of the system worked until 1934, when economic conditions saw the election of a combined ILP and Communist city council majority. The worker's victory would be short-lived, and Citizen dominance would return in 1936 (Epp-Koop, 2015). Wichern (1983) asserts that even the ILP-Communist majority should not be considered an example of a unified labour presence, more accurately reflecting an example of the "fractured left", thanks to ideological and personal differences that permeated every aspect of local decision making among labour-affiliated members.

Workers in Brandon, Manitoba would similarly attempt to contest local elections as part of an attempt to bring working-class issues to city hall. From 1921 to 1942, ILP or other worker's campaign organizations would field candidates for alderman with moderate success. After the local branch of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) organized the labour campaign in 1943 with a disastrous result, organized labour abandoned local politics in favour of focusing efforts on provincial and federal contests (Black, 1992).

A branch of the ILP was established in Regina in 1929 from remnants of other civic labour groups that had enjoyed electoral success since the First World War. This quickly transformed into the unique local Co-operative Labour Party which, in 1934, took the unprecedented step of entering into an electoral alliance with members of the Communist Party to create the Civic Labour

League (CLL). Despite organized efforts by the city's business class to oppose the CLL (inspired by Citizen-style tactics), labour would come to control Regina's city council from 1936 to 1939. The alliance between moderates and communists proved to be too contentious, resulting in in-fighting and animosity. Coupled with the business class pushing a referendum to abolish Regina's ward system in favour of at-large voting, labour would not have as central a role in Regina's local politics again (Brennan, 2013).

In Alberta, a sizable number of the province's municipal "alphabet parties" (more on this in Chapter 4) were affiliated with labour, though each struggled with longevity. While the ILP and loosely affiliated Dominion Labour Party ran candidates with varied success in Edmonton and Lethbridge, the province's tendency to see short-lived candidate alliances and one-time parties contest local elections resulted in no sustained effort by any one group to field civic candidates. Even the CCF, which became involved in Calgary's municipal politics in 1943 and 1944, abandoned the municipal scene by 1945 (Masson, 1985).

The path of labour to municipal politics in British Columbia was more complicated than elsewhere in Canada. ILP branches in the province had become more radical in the late 1920s and early 1930s, appending "Socialist" to their name in 1931 before quickly renaming themselves the Socialist Party of Canada (SPC) the following year. This organization viewed the newly formed CCF with suspicion as simply another capitalist party (in striking contrast to some ILP members in Ontario who viewed the CCF as a radical Marxist project to overthrow the system). By 1935, the SPC and CCF had formally merged in the province (Young, 1976). The merger allowed the CCF to concentrate on winning elections at all levels. In Vancouver's 1936 municipal election, the party succeeded in electing members to city council and almost immediately terrifying the local Liberal and Conservative Party faithful, who would found the Non-Partisan Association (NPA) in less than a year to challenge the CCF on the civic scene. What followed was unbroken NPA rule for 30 years and the CCF's abandonment of civic campaigns (Miller, 1975; Smith, 1982; Tennant, 1980).

The response of the business class to the electoral efforts of workers – particularly in Western Canadian cities – followed a basic formula, outlined clearly by Lucas:

First, a labour party decided to contest municipal elections; then a "non-partisan slating group" (NPSG)[17] consisting of local elites emerged to oppose the labour party; a period of intense competition ensued in which the NPSG typically held a majority of seats by faced a significant labour minority; and finally, in the 1940s and 1950s, a combination of fragmentation among labour groups and strategic action by NPSGs led to the decline of significant electoral competition and a period of near-monopoly by NPSGs (2021, p. 389).

Key to this assertion is the idea that local groups were "non-partisan". Indeed, one of the more prominent, lasting remnants of this era is the fanatical devotion to non-partisanship at the local level.

Higgins (1977), notes that the right-leaning opponents of labour who professed non-partisanship were "concealed conservatives". An example of this in practice played out during Hamilton's municipal election in 1946. Mayor Samuel Lawrence, former CCF MLA for Hamilton East and long-standing party leader had served as the city's chief magistrate since 1943 (*Hamilton Spectator,* 1943). Since his election, the presence of a dedicated partisan in the mayor's chair and the persistence of the CCF in fielding candidates during each year's municipal vote had been a source of frustration for the city's political right and business community.

Following a summer of industrial action and labour union militancy, the political right saw an opportunity in the local elections scheduled for December, 1946. Regular editorials spoke to the importance of avoiding civic partisanship, warning voters:

If we elect a machine on December 9 in Hamilton by design or indifference we hand the power of our government over to it and become subservient to its aims and policies. We will thus surrender all control of our own affairs. *(Hamilton Spectator,* 1946b).

Lawrence was frustrated by this rhetoric. By his understanding, the insistence on the part of his opponents that they were without partisan affiliations was disingenuous. His only challenger in the mayoral contest, Board of Control member Donald Clarke (whom he defeated in 1943 to assume the city's mayoralty) finally struck a nerve with Lawrence. On the evening of Wednesday, December 4, 1946, after Clarke again attacked the mayor for his political affinities, Lawrence replied:

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[17] Lucas' conceptualization of opponents as NPSGs is a fascinating addition to the literature, though I would classify the groups differently based on city and context (more on this in Chapter 5).

It is well-known to the people of this city where I stand...At least [the CCF is] clean and above board. We prepare a program and present it to the electorate; we don't disguise ourselves. You have people calling themselves independents – disguising themselves – but when elected to office they react to their political ideologies, (*Hamilton Spectator,* 1946a).

Lawrence, simply put, took issue with Clarke, a right-leaning local politician affiliated with the Conservatives, "disguising" himself during his run for mayor. From the NPA in Vancouver to the Citizens in Winnipeg, the business class organized with passionate intensity when faced with a real or perceived threat of labour at the local level, as Lucas (2021) noted. Business class efforts to challenge labour maintained that they were the ideological successors of the reformers, were strictly "non-partisan", emphasized private ownership and control over civic assets, and promoted "civic boosterism" as a philosophy (Epp-Koop, 2015).

Civic boosterism is the outward facing result of what Cox and Mair call "local dependence". As described by the authors, local dependence "signifies the dependence of various actors – capitalist firms, politicians, people – on the reproduction of certain social relations within a particular territory," (Cox et al., 1988, p. 307). They go on to note the social relations signify an interconnectedness between particular interests that manifests in the creation of business promotion groups. With this as a motivation, it is understandable why, as Epp-Koop (2015) notes, campaigns such as those waged by the Citizens in Winnipeg warned voters that labour would scare away investment with threats of expropriation and unfair regulation on honest, hardworking businessmen.

The partisanship of labour became a hinderance when faced with the appeal to civility and cross-partisan dialogue presented by their opponents. While the business class professed non-partisanship, labour was firmly couched within the party structure that began to hinder their efforts to win elections. Particularly when the CCF assumed control over most local ILP apparatuses, the feeling of federal and provincial parties descending upon municipalities to field candidates conjured images of Tammany Hall in the minds of local voters – an image strategically advanced by business-friendly local papers (Smith, 1982).

Labour's attempts to exert influence and win victories for working people from the First World War to the late 1950s were stifled by what Lucas (2021, p. 389) identified as "labour fragmentation". Labour was rarely united for a long enough period of time to successfully contest local elections and build the infrastructure necessary to secure electoral victories long-term. In

Hamilton, for example, when the CCF and ILP collaborated during the 1933 municipal election, the combined effort drew 70,101 votes between Board of Control, council, and trustee candidates, of whom 6 were successful. After an acrimonious falling out, the parties directly competed with one another the following year. In the 1934 civic contest, the CCF earned 37,385 votes to the ILP's 18,769. The combined total was nearly 14,000 fewer votes than in the previous year, and labour's representation on Hamilton city council dropped to just a single party member each. Differences in personality, ideology, and electoral strategy can be counted among the causes for the decline and collapse of labour's civic projects across Canada, particularly when placed in contrast with sustained business class opposition.

3.6 – A misconceived solution to a (mis?)perceived problem: The Renewal Municipality (1959 – 1990)

By the late 1950's, dedicated labour parties had abandoned their civic projects. Following the merger of the TLC with the Canadian Congress of Labour, organizers with the CCF began orchestrating a second merger between the party and the newly formed Canadian Labour Congress that would, in 1961, result in the creation of the New Democratic Party or "NDP" (Horowitz, 1968). This effort would refocus labour and many urban progressives, allowing new forces to dominate municipal governments. Gone were the class struggles of labour and capitalist; the new battlelines would pit the forces of renewal and sprawl against urbanists and the "New Left".

Urban renewal projects were not unique to this era, though their intensity and scope expanded dramatically through the 1960s. As the swath of destruction left by wrecking balls increased, so too did local opposition to renewal schemes. Hamilton's downtown core was gutted in the name of an urban renewal effort advanced enthusiastically by the city's municipal government under the supervision of Mayors Lloyd Jackson (1949 – 1962) and Victor Copps (1962 – 1976). Hamilton's historic core was converted into a number of "superblocks" featuring enclosed malls, "tower in the park" office developments,[18] and a modernist city hall set within a

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[18] "Tower in the park" is in reference to the architectural movement advanced by Charles-Édouard Jeanneret (*Le Corbusier*). Proposed in the 1920s, *Le Corbusier*'s idea was for neat, orderly residential and office towers placed in a field of parks, connected by expressways, allowing light and "views" into each superstructure, all connected in one "Radiant City" (Mumford, 1995). Considered ambitious and bold for their time, the execution of these plans revealed major flaws, which, despite being glaringly apparent, continue to be replicated to this day. As urban historian Witold Rybczynski observed, Radiant City "...was authoritarian, inflexible, and simplistic...[its] Standardization proved inhuman and disorienting. The open spaces were inhospitable; the bureaucratically imposed plan, socially destructive," (1998).

sweeping concrete plaza. Rockwell explains why urban renewal was initially supported by enthusiastic Hamiltonians before the city turned on the schemes in dramatic fashion:

> After years of hearing how the downtown was replete with slum-like derelict buildings, urban renewal funds offered Hamiltonians a chance to dream of greening the core with beautiful pools and gardens, making the downtown reflect the pride they felt for their city. Unfortunately, the dream had no room for the legacy of the past, and the clean sweep of the redevelopment are left no reminders of the pedestrian-friendly street[s]. Hamiltonians wanted to beautify their city, and the initial scheme responded to their aspirations, but these plans, like many urban renewal schemes, looked better on paper and needed more funds than the ambitious city could raise. Hamilton had latched onto a misconceived solution to its perceived problem and then compounded the outcome by poorly executing the renewal. (Rockwell, 2009, p. 59)

The intention was for the "superblock" model to be replicated across the entire downtown core, though plans were stopped by what one local architect called "hippy anti-intellectualism" in the spirit of Jane Jacobs (Rockwell, 2009, p. 59). While Hamiltonians pushed back only once much of the damage of urban renewal had occurred, Torontonians – Jacobs prominent among them – stepped up to pre-emptively halt renewal projects.

Jacobs, already a renowned urbanist thanks to her landmark work, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, relocated to Toronto from New York in the 1960s, settling in the city's Annex neighbourhood (Wellman, 2006). The Toronto that Jacobs and her family settled in was one grappling with similar issues she had years of experience fighting in New York, foremost being the expansion of the urban highway system.

In the late 1940s, the Government of Ontario embarked on an ambitious highway building scheme in an effort to better facilitate interurban transportation and commerce. Proposals for a west-central Toronto bypass or highway had circulated through the 1950s, but pressure from developers (including the Eaton's family and others connected with the new Yorkdale Shopping Centre which was, when it opened in 1964, the largest shopping mall in the world) in the 1960s accelerated plans (Robinson, 2011; White 2011). By 1966, all the requisite partners had approved a multimillion-dollar expressway and subway line that would have required the demolition of all of Toronto's historic Spadina Neighbourhood, home to many in the city's Chinese and Jewish communities (Robinson, 2011). Officially the William R. Allan Expressway, the project was dubbed the Spadina Expressway in the city's media and by activists who sought to challenge the plan.

The opponents of the plan present a unique reorientation of the battlelines in the municipality. While once municipal contests were a struggle between workers and bosses, now the civic debate had formed along more ambiguous lines. Opponents of the Expressway ranged from local residents and multicultural communities to urbanist academics and revolutionaries. The largest group in opposition was the "Stop Spadina Save Our City Coordinating Committee" (SSSOCCC), which was aligned with the urbanist academic camp (including the famed Canadian philosopher Marshall McLuhan), though counted among its members urban reformer John Sewell, whose values align with those of the moribund "Red Tory" faction in Canadian politics (Klemek, 2008; Robinson, 2011). A more revolutionary element aligned with the New Left similarly established opposition to the project, adding a class and capital critique to the Expressway debate and drawing the attention of the RCMP, concerned with the radical nature of these groups. As Graham et al. (2019, p. 212) note, the chair of SSSOCCC wrote at the time about acknowledging the two poles in the movement: "'class-conscious-centralist-socialist ideology inspired by Marx' and 'consensus-decentralist-populist-pragmatism inspired by Jane Jacobs.'"

Jacobs, though not the only figure in the fight against the Expressway (and was, by accounts, hesitant to take such a strong position after only a few months residency in the city), helped lead to the eventual cancellation of the project in 1971 through her advocacy (White, 2011). Jacobs came to influence the urban and provincial politics of her new home, serving as a guiding force for Sewell and his chief rival, David Crombie. Her presence saw even the province's Progressive Conservative Party adopt Jane Jacobian-inspired policies and her acumen was called upon during Crombie's redevelopment of the St. Lawrence neighbourhood during his tenure as mayor (Klemek, 2008).

In the middle of the Expressway controversy came the Toronto municipal election of 1969, famous for the involvement of a number of parties at the local scene (see Chapter 1). The fact that parties appeared in 1969 was no accident (Clarkson, 1972). Indeed, the events leading up to and during the Expressway debate (as well as larger debates over top-down, scientific-rational planning) directly inspired the partisans who organized to contest that election. The appearance of parties in 1969 occurred because of a convergence of a number of factors:

1. Young partisans who had no connection to the failed partisan attempts to control municipal politics during the Battleground era were now in positions of power within

parties, replete with an absence of institutional memory on the part of those groups that had contested elections prior to the 1960s.

2. Among these partisans, there was a populist and reform-minded spirit that crystalized into, as Clarkson (1971, p. 209) notes, an opposition to "the existing system of institutionalized individualism in which the elected representatives were not genuinely accountable to the public..."

3. Planning decisions from the end of the Second World War to the 1960s led to a similar populist sentiment that opposed "technocratic rule"/scientific-rational planning and a reorientation toward community-driven planning and development, or a point between the two aforementioned poles of the SSSOCCC.

In his retrospective on the '69 campaign, Clarkson characterizes the entry of parties into the civic election as an inevitability. Writing about the perfect storm of issues – from the controversy over the Expressway to issues relating to housing and urban governance, Clarkson notes:

> These were no longer theoretical problems for urban planners to debate in cozy seminars. The cost of housing was becoming unbearable for low-income people and even uncomfortable for the middle-income bracket. Projects for governmental reforms were no longer academic if the price of inaction was measured both in rising tax bills and in increasing annoyance with a City Hall that was unable to cope with what was once the uncontroversial opinion of building roads. The concern about the quality of urban life and be objective need for structural reform could easily be related theoretically. By 1969, they were merging politically into a perceptible, if not an overwhelming pressure for reform. (1972, p. 23)

The parties that participated in the '69 election reflected the divide within the SSSOCCC. The Civic Liberals, CIVAC, and segments of the Metro NDP followed the Jane Jacobs model, while the remaining elements of the Metro NDP and the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action were closer to the Marx-inspired node. Within and among each party, there were notable variations, with CIVAC more on the side of cautious reform, the Civic Liberals adopting an uncharacteristically confrontational perspective, and the Metro NDP opting to cautiously play to both streams of thought within the movement opposed to the establishment (Joyce & Hossé, 1970).

The desire for reform and opposition to top-down projects imposed on communities without their consent or participation was not limited to the Golden Horseshoe. Vancouver had struggled with scientific-rational proposals, including a planned "urban renewal" scheme aimed at the multicultural Strathcona community, imposed on the neighbourhood by government actors without the participation of area residents. A coordinated campaign on the part of Chinese business

owners and residents saw the plans adjusted to incorporate community concerns (Kim et al., 1982). It was during this time that, as Vogel (2003) notes, a similar style of opposition to politics-as-usual arose in the city. Angered by the imposition of unpopular urban renewal schemes and to the one-party dominance of the NPA, the Vancouver municipal election of 1968 saw the entry of The Electors Action Movement (TEAM) and the Committee of Progressive Electors (COPE) enter the civic fray. Similar to Toronto, TEAM was closer to a Jane Jacobs-inspired philosophy, skeptical of technocratic planning while more focused on urbanist and progressive ideals. This was in stark contrast to COPE, which was an early confluence of left-wing forces in the city (Miller, 1975; Tennant, 1980; Vogel, 2003).

Similar to their counterparts in Vancouver, activists in Montreal had grown weary of the "authoritarian" one-party rule of Jean Drapeau and his Civic Party. Buoyed by the revolutionary spirit of the Quiet Revolution, committees of citizens, trade unionists, and urban activists began organizing against Drapeau in the 1960s, culminating in the creation of the *Front d'action politique* (FRAP) in May, 1970. Promoting the creation of worker's councils, implementation of proportional representation, establishment of free abortion clinics and daycares, universal public transit, and an early move to "Defund the Police", FRAP symbolized the most radical and well-organized opposition to Drapeau and the planning and business establishment in Montreal. While FRAP had presented a serious threat to the Civic Party's hegemony over Montreal, a massive blow came just 20 days before the October 25 municipal elections with the start of the October Crisis. After the kidnapping of British diplomat James Cross and Quebec Minister of Labour Pierre Laporte, Drapeau requested Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau implement the War Measures Act, allowing the local police to arrest anyone indiscriminately and indefinitely. Supporters of the FRAP were among those arrested and Drapeau, who refused to postpone the election and actively equated the FRAP with the extremists who would eventually murder Laporte. The communities in which FRAP actively campaigned and had the best chance of electing councillors saw high abstention rates and the party received only 15.6% of the vote (Clément, 2008; Comby, 2011). FRAP would disband the following year.

While the October Crisis helped mark the end of FRAP, the anti-Drapeau contingent of Montreal learned from their predecessors and coalesced around a new party: the *Rassemblement des citoyens et des citoyennes de Montréal* (Montreal Citizen's Movement in English) or the RCM. The RCM bridged the gap between factions on the progressive left and was able to form a cohesive

opposition to Drapeau's authoritarian administration and the scientific-rational planning that had left many residents of Montreal out. As Drapeau's influence waned and he neared retirement, the RCM became the city's most dominant opposition party and, in 1986, the RCM formed the first non-Civic Party government in Montreal since 1960 (Thomas, 1997).

Elsewhere, the enthusiasm of New Left and urbanist groups was diminished by the worldwide shift toward neoliberal economic policy. Burdens of responsibility were placed on cities and the population to fend for themselves (Harvey, 2012). This shift toward municipal entrepreneurialism sought to attract business and investment to their municipality in order to diversify their local economy and, optimistically, raise the assessment rates of properties so that they expand their property tax revenues. Entrepreneurialism forces cities to change their values and perspectives, as the governance apparatus is reoriented to operate in a manner similar to that of a large corporation. As Cleave and Arku note,

> Entrepreneurialism captures the sense in which cities are being run in a more businesslike manner, and the practices that have seen local government imbued with characteristics once distinctive to businesses—risk-taking, inventiveness, promotion and profit motivation. (Cleave et al., 2015, p. 326).

In a response to the increased pressure to provide services and unable to generate revenue in the same way their national and subnational counterparts can, municipalities slouched into the role of becoming the primary agents of economic development. Local governance shifted from ensuring the provision of high-quality services to residents, to adopting a focus on incubating investment, moving from service providers to agents of economic development.

This shift in focus on the part of municipalities was matched by a change in provincial priorities. Changing provincial priorities and the pressures of meeting the expectations placed on governments during the neoliberal turn pushed provincial authorities to reconsider how municipalities were structured. The resulting changes brought upon a new era in local government that we are still living in today.

3.7 – All together now: The Reorganized Municipality (1991 – present)
The current era in Canadian municipal history is one defined by reorganization and a reorientation of priorities, as well as a decided subservience to provincial authorities. Through the late 1990s, provincial governments in Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick embarked on

projects aimed at streamlining local services and making municipal boundaries more coherent. The legacies of those plans have impacted municipal governments across Canada and carry through to the present.

Municipal reorganization is not a new phenomenon in Canada, though the response to the most recent round of changes has profoundly impacted the political culture of municipalities. Following the tumultuous provincial election of 1991, Frank McKenna's Liberal government in New Brunswick embarked on a project of "restructuring" the province's municipalities. Citing a desire to make urban service delivery more cost-effective and accountable, McKenna's government proposed amalgamating Moncton with surrounding municipalities, which drew considerable backlash from Francophone communities worried about losing political power. The plans were subsequently abandoned (Sancton, 1996).

Shortly after, the government of Nova Scotia began to investigate municipal amalgamation, originally planning to reorganize the governments of Cape Breton, Pictou, Halifax, Colchester, and Kings. Halifax was the first to be amalgamated with the surrounding communities of Dartmouth, Bedford, and Halifax County. The new Halifax Regional Municipality was met with opposition by both residents and elected officials, and new urban officials complained of communications issues, service interruptions, and cultural differences between the merged departments. The reported savings from the amalgamation were negligible (Vojnovic, 1998).

The amalgamations – both successful and abandoned – in Atlantic Canada were overshadowed by similar events in Ontario and Quebec, which had a profound impact on their local and provincial politics. The Ontario Progressive Conservative (PC) Party came to power in 1995 after defeating a one-term NDP government. Campaigning on an extreme neoliberal platform called the "Common Sense Revolution", party leader Mike Harris had made the case that the size of government in Ontario was too big and that his PCs would cut back on services, end waste, and privatize what could be privatized (Keil, 2002). Shortly after taking power, Harris and the PCs embarked on a project to drastically reduce the number and size of municipalities in the province, which would eventually slash the number of municipalities from 850 to 443 upper, lower, and single tier municipalities (Gillis, 2014).

Most dramatically, Harris' government created four new single-tier cities from regions that had previously given constituent communities a degree of political independence while still coordinating service provision centrally. With the move to a single-tier government, the cities of

Toronto, Hamilton, Ottawa, and Sudbury all lost elected representatives and created central councils which featured both "urban" and "suburban" representatives. Initial considerations of the fallout from these forced mergers and other municipal amalgamations found that, while council members found the new situations challenging, but not impossible to work with, a portion of the community – particularly those from smaller communities – expressed concern about how difficult it had become to contact local representatives (Kushner et al., 2003). The impact to local politics was more striking, as suburban councillors tended to create voting blocs in opposition to their urban colleagues (Spicer, 2012). While Harris asserted municipal restructuring would provide $250 million in savings, the number of municipal employees has dramatically increased and, by 2011, Ontario's municipalities spent $750 million on staff wages, a massive increase over spending during Harris' tenure as Premier (Gillis, 2014).

The *Parti Québécois* (PQ) in Quebec abolished the system of regional government that covered the island of Montreal. Previously a collection of 28 municipalities that made up the "Montreal Urban Community", the largest of which was the City of Montreal, the provincial government merged each into one "megacity". The plan was vigorously opposed by residents of the new city, prompting the PQ government to implement the "borough council" system, which afforded communities a level of independence within the new, unified municipality (Collin et al., 2005). In 2003, the Quebec Liberal Party defeated the PQ, having promised any community that wished to "deamalgamate" a chance to hold an independence referendum of their own. The resulting vote saw 15 municipalities leave the "megacity", requiring the creation of a new City of Montreal just four years after amalgamation. Deamalgamation was driven primarily by economic and linguistic concerns among residents of previously independent municipalities (Tanguay et al., 2008).

The impacts of amalgamations are still being felt today. The ideas behind amalgamation and reorganization are not necessarily flawed, as efficiencies can always be found and institutional structures can always be reordered or, at the very least, studied. Particularly in the case of Ontario, though, there were few clear aims aside from vague promises about cost savings and, as such, no unifying vision for the project. The newly amalgamated cities created more political division, more council conflict, and a less homogenous population. Slack et al. (2013, p. 20) note that, in the case of Toronto, amalgamation failed to provide a government that could adequately respond to regional planning needs and respond to local resident concerns, writing "Amalgamation in Toronto

has resulted in the creation of a city that manages to be both too small and too big." Building on this idea, Lesch (2018, pp. 11 - 12) notes that "Restructuring the boundaries of local governance not only alters how services are delivered, but also can redefine how residents conceptualize their place within a political community."

This reconceptualization occurred at a time when the values of municipalities were changing. The classic municipal entrepreneurialism that local governments adopted near the end of the Renewal Era had begun to shift and rebrand. As global markets changed and urban areas began to seek out ways to reverse or forestall decline, new theories regarding how municipalities should market themselves arose. The shift to a new vision of municipal entrepreneurialism and the push behind municipal reorganization come from the same neoliberal undercurrent driving political decision-making in the 1990s and early 2000s. A drive to efficiency pushed provincial governments to adopt reorganization schemes while municipal governments, drawing on business-oriented adaptations of Jacobs-inspired urbanism reoriented their perspectives on the goals of the city toward a more friendly, user-inclusive entrepreneurialism (Tochterman, 2012). The aim of reorganizing municipalities and reimagining the role of municipal governments in attracting business come from the same desire to rebrand the same policies and structures from the Renewal Municipality for the 21st century.

One of the central figures in this rebranding of municipal entrepreneurialism was Richard Florida, who published a series of popular non-fiction books on the topic. Florida was a sought-after authority on the matter, arguing that cities had a responsibility to create the conditions necessary for "creative" businesses and their employees to view their cities as viable spaces for relocation or expansion. Florida dismissed the notion that innovations in technology have rendered geography useless, instead refocusing on cities and agglomerations of cities as the drivers of investment. Focusing on how cities can draw investment on the micro-scale, Florida wrote, "Successful places do not provide just one thing; rather they provide a range of quality of place options for different kinds of people at different stages in the life course," (Florida, 2002, p. 233).

Florida's ideas and theories surrounding a new form of municipal entrepreneurialism impacted municipal service provision and governance cultures. Local leaders saw their role as local advocates, aiming to position their cities as welcoming and attractive enough for new investment opportunities, in much the same way that the local boosterists did during the Battleground Era, albeit now with an eye to identity (Tochterman, 2012). In Toronto, arts and

culture programs aimed at serving marginalized communities were, in the mid 2000s, refocused to serve as examples of the city's regional competitiveness (Leslie et al., 2013). For its part, Montreal, a city already associated with creative industry and progressive values, began to brand itself as such in an effort to draw investment. Particular projects and design-specific competitions aimed to draw the attention of potential investors and solidify the city's position as a creative hub (Rantisi et al., 2006).

A reorientation of the municipal entrepreneurialist culture did not mean cities abandoned a focus on economic growth. Rather, the governance culture of municipalities in the Reorganized Era is just as consumed by a focus on expanding investment as ever. By refocusing their interactions with residents and emphasizing their role as incubators of business, cities have maintained their business-influenced governance style. This style has bred competition, with Leo observing that cities,

> ...have developed in an atmosphere of avid competition for growth. This atmosphere has made perceived 'losers' out of cities that are growing slowly, in terms of either population or economic expansion, and often induced a sense of inferiority in the citizens and leaders of slowly growing cities, (Leo, 2002, p. 223).

Municipalities remain drivers of business, rather than providers of services, and the competitive nature of one municipality spurs competitive philosophies in the administrations of other municipalities. Urban governance, the confluence of ideas and philosophies and opinions of staff and elected officials and citizens is then dominated by discussions over optimizing investment attraction strategies.

3.8 – Conclusions

There are five distinct eras in the history of Canadian municipalities, each with their own unique characteristics and impacts on urban life and politics. Beginning with the Victorian Municipality (1837 – 1901), Canadians were introduced to the concept of Responsible Government and a cautiously expanding democracy in the wake of the Rebellions of 1836/37. The rules and regulations established to govern early Canadian municipal institutions came to influence who would run these cities, affording early partisans, religious reformers, and aristocratically-inclined social communities like the Orange Order chances to insert themselves into the daily governance of Canada's cities.

This spirit carried through to the era of the Reform Municipality (1902 – 1915). Though the shortest of all the eras, it had an incredible impact on Canadian cities. The Canadian reform movement drew heavily on the experiences of American reformers who had spent decades battling graft and corruption in the form of party machines like Tammany Hall. From these reformers, they learned the need to write the rules to keep undesirable elements out of local government for the good of everyone. The implementation of a professionalized, business-inspired bureaucracy and an emphasis on non-partisanship were essential to the aims of the reformers.

This, coupled with the breakdown in the labourist philosophy and the subsequent Labour Revolts of 1919 brought about the era of the Battleground Municipality (1916 – 1958). What began as attempts by workers to secure a voice on local councils through their independent branches of the ILP became a full-on class war, waged between an increasingly professionalizing political wing of labour and an increasingly combative business class. While labour's wins were few-and-far between, the animosity led to an entrenchment of the business philosophy in local government.

When labour abandoned the municipal scene for other endeavours, the age of urban renewal dawned. In the Renewal Municipality (1959 – 1990), planners and engineers, armed with technical expertise, proposed sweeping changes to Canadian cities, taking aim at what they saw as blight and decay. Supported by business-minded local politicians, these plans began to reshape Canadian cities. A consequence of this was the mobilization of the New Left and urban progressives, who returned to partisan solutions to achieve their aims. Inspired by activists like Jane Jacobs, a number of unique urban social movements and parties appeared to challenge the planning and local government establishment.

The neoliberal turn in the 1980s and 1990s dampened the enthusiasm of the New Left and gave way to the current era in Canadian municipalities. The Reorganized Municipality (1991 – Present) is one defined by the short, but turbulent legacy of amalgamations, reorganizations, and mergers that caused so much tumult in Canadian cities. The forced mergers of cities in eastern Canada caused division and strife for local governments and residents. For their part, municipal politicians, adjusting to their new reality, also adopted an entirely new kind of civic boosterism, inspired heavily by Florida and the creative cities movement. Cities remain sites of capital accumulation and local governments still place an incredible importance on business promotion, albeit with branding that sets them apart from their predecessors in the Battleground and Renewal eras.

Importantly, the past eras have established the situation in which Canadian municipalities and, thus, their elections are in today. The Victorian and Reform eras paved the way for the struggles during the Battleground era, which firmly cemented the notion of non-partisanship into the Canadian municipal psyche for much of the country while establishing central behemoth parties committed to the status-quo in many other municipalities. The Renewal era saw a redrawing of the battlelines, creating a firm urbanist/establishment divide in Vancouver and laying the groundwork for the widespread adoption of the elector organization system that persists in the province to this day while also witnessing the failed attempts by established parties to break into Ontario. The failure of CIVAC, the Civic Liberals, and the Metro NDP dampened the drive to create official parties at the local level in Toronto and, instead, helped to push party organizations underground. The neoliberal Reorganization era brought urban and suburban communities into conflict while rebranding the policies and governance aims of municipalities that drew the ire of the New Left and urbanists in the decades prior.

How this current era will evolve remains to be seen. Chapter 4 will touch on some new party forms that are challenging how municipalities operate, bringing a rejuvenated urbanist spirit to local politics. Particularly with the rise of global right-wing populism, the growing climate crisis, and the as-of-yet unknown impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the opportunities for local governments to embark on ambitious new projects are abundant. How cities respond to the challenges and the crises of the present moment, though, remains to be seen.

4 – Parties and Political Organizations in Canadian Municipal Politics

And he's not coming back
After studying the facts
He knows of all the problems of the past
But he's quick to concede
That in order to proceed
We can't just keep on preaching 'bout what we need
<u>No Champagne Socialist - Arkells</u>

4.1 – "Considerable political dickering"

Over a century ago, another Ph.D. dissertation also addressed the governance of Canadian municipalities and the role of political parties in their elections. Writing in 1914, a doctoral candidate at Harvard summarized the Canadian civic situation before posing an important question:

> At the present time, while political parties do not come out openly in civic campaigns, there is undoubtedly considerable political dickering beneath the surface which occasionally finds an echo in the party press. But even if it were possible to eliminate national parties from city politics, is it more desirable to have local campaigns backed by fraternal orders, moral or temperance reform societies, or even religious bodies, as sometimes occurs? (McLeod, 1914, p. 204)

McLeod's normative question goes unanswered in their own analysis of Canadian municipal affairs. In the century following McLeod's acknowledgement of the "considerable political dickering" in Canada's cities, civic governance has enjoyed limited scholarly attention, and contemporary studies focus on the presence and form of parties rather than on temperance societies and fraternal orders. The principal puzzle, however, has been whether parties operate openly or covertly, and has spawned questions about the existence and influence of "shadow parties."

All research acknowledges the organizational potential of political parties and has been particularly concerned with the capacity of parties to create unrepresentative councils and boards. This is of importance as there is a long-standing assumption that, according to Lightbody (2006, p. 257) "Non-Partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men." Scholars more recently note the transformative *potential* of local parties, but only if there is a truly competitive and open party system, rather than de facto one-party rule as has been the case in many cities where parties operate (Good, 2017).

The potential of parties is hard to predict as there is little systematic understanding of the kinds of parties that can and do organize in Canadian cities.

This chapter will examine the scholarly and popular work on local political parties and previous typologies of local parties in Canada. As each of the typologies have significant shortcomings, what follows is a more comprehensive and contemporary typology of local parties and political groups that considers forms of political organization across Anglophone and Francophone Canada and in a wide array of jurisdictions. This chapter will then consider the clandestine operations of existing federal parties in local elections, or "shadow parties", including a consideration of how non-partisanship is used as a political strategy to obcure partisan affiliations. This is followed by a brief consideration of "ghost" candidates and parties, refering to a phenomenon in Canadian municipal politics whereby candidates and parties do not actively participate in a campaign but remain on the ballot or on the list of officially registered parties.

4.2 – Documenting sandbox politics

Curiously, there is little research on municipal partisan politics even in the late 19th and early 20th centuries when national parties were most aggressively active in municipal affairs, as summarized in Chapter 3. Rather, 1970 marked the start of scholarship focused on civic parties (likely thanks to the Toronto Municipal Election of 1969) with a study published by two scholars from the University of Western Ontario, Joyce and Hossé. This became the opening salvo in the contemporary study of Canadian municipal political parties, and began with a justification that reflected that moment's civic situation:

> With a growing percentage of the Canadian population being concentrated in a few urban areas, with an increasing number of metropolitan areas, and with a higher proportion of economic activity occurring in large cities, a study of party involvement as a method of local decision-making may be useful. (Joyce & Hossé, 1970, p. 1)

Joyce and Hossé track the history of Canadian municipalities and the role that parties played at periodic intervals in the affairs of cities and identify the civic political parties operational at that time or in recent preceding decades. Their initial typology reflected the situation at the time, with three broad party types: the National Civic Party, the Local Civic Party, and the Non-Partisan Party (Joyce & Hossé, 1970, pp. 10-11)

For Joyce and Hossé, National Civic Parties had fallen out of fashion in Canadian cities. These parties were easily identified, as they maintained the same name as their federal and provincial counterparts. National Civic Parties selected candidates in open nomination meetings, clearly divided policy and platform development, and had disparate levels of organization depending on party and city.

The Local Civic Party was the most common form of municipal party. These organizations had an emphasis on policy, varying nomination structures, and broad reasons for their formation. Justifications for the creation of a Local Civic Party included, "Inability to implement a program, desire to overthrow a 'clique' ruling city hall, and the general reform of the municipal council structure," (Joyce & Hossé, 1970, p. 41).

Finally, their category of Non-Partisan Parties included mostly civic boosterist movements and broad, generally anti-leftist movements that maintained weak policy but strong organizational frameworks, similar to the pro-business groups that opposed labour in the Battleground Municipality (see Chapter 3).

The generalization of Joyce and Hossé serves to create an important foundation, though leaves out important nuances that help to better distinguish political parties that would otherwise be clustered using only their criteria. Their neglect of Quebec's unique situation, other than a passing mention to Jean Drapeau as the individual who popularized Local Civic Parties (pp. 41), is a notable weakness.

Of importance, though, is Joyce and Hossé's establishment of the "English Precedent" for the study of municipal political parties in Canada. The authors adopted the theoretical frameworks used by scholars in the United Kingdom to consider the political party situation in their cities and towns, going so far as to use as their definition of a local political party, that developed by J. G. Bulpitt three years' prior, namely:

> ...we must adopt a relatively low common denominator as a basis for our definition of party in local government. Party in this sense can only be defined as a group of individuals who are willing to seek election under a common political label – national or local – *or* a group of individuals who, although not elected under a party label, adopt some form of coordination and organization once in Council. (Bulpitt, 1967, p. 108)

For the broad generalizations made by Joyce and Hossé and their unenviable position as the intellectual vanguard for the contemporary study of municipal political parties, their establishment in Canada of Bulpitt's broad definition is invaluable.

The following years saw the publication of two analyses of the event that precipitated the newfound interest in civic political parties: the Toronto Municipal Election of 1969. In 1971, the non-profit Bureau of Municipal Research published a collection of papers originally presented at the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association the previous year. Consisting of five papers, *Parties to Change* addressed the momentousness of the 1969 municipal election and provided essential context to the rise of local parties. These papers posited several hypotheses, including the claim that the emergence of party politics signaled a kind of maturation of civic politics (Clarkson, 1971), and that the presence of federal parties was evidence of a shifting culture among new activists (Hough, 1971). Most strikingly, though, was the assertion by Fowler and Goldrick that, "politicians craved organized competition in urban politics, *whether or not they felt the electorate was ready or interested in it*," (1971, p. 41). In this, the authors are implying that the appearance of partisan entities in municipalities with a more pronounced antipathy toward local parties was a top-down, elite-led endeavour, rather than an organic outgrowth of municipal activists, which contrasts with the other conceptualizations of local parties as citizen-led responses to new urban conditions.

The second piece of reflection from the 1969 election was authored by a central figure in it. Stephen Clarkson's account of his mayoralty run, and the inner workings of the Liberal Party machine provide invaluable first-hand knowledge of a partisan civic organization. Clarkson provides a clear reasoning behind the motivations of party activists:

> The first way the parties would transform city politics was to be by their electoral behaviour. Candidacy in elections would no longer be at the whim of the individual, but would be coordinated by a properly constituted party organization open to public scrutiny. The parties would provide an instrument for citizen involvement allowing the active and concerned to take part in formulating party policy programs and in working with elected representatives between elections as a channel of communication with the local constituency...The existing system of institutionalized individualism, in which the complexity and obscurity of City Hall's inner workings shielded elected representatives from genuine accountability to the elector, would be replaced by a party system imposing discipline and accountability... (Clarkson, 1972, p. 26)

Radical transparency. Policy development by active citizens. Order and accountability. Clarkson outlined a vision where the era of citizens needing to "fight city hall" was over, a battle for tranquility in civic affairs won by advocates of party politics. This was a battle Clarkson compared to the winning of Responsible Government in the 1800's (1972, p. 26).

In the same year, another compilation of works on municipal party politics was published. While *Emerging Party Politics in Urban Canada* included some of the pieces from the Toronto Bureau of Municipal Research's 1971 collection, it also provided poignant commentary and additional sources that aimed to add more kindling to the nascent fire that was the study of civic partisanship in Canada. The authors were abundantly optimistic about the situation, noting that it was all-but-certain that national parties would become deeply and regularly involved in municipal elections, asserting: "the unaffiliated, non-partisan alderman may soon be a rarity in the larger cities," (Anderson, 1972, p. 20)

This collection of pre-existing commentary pieces on municipal party politics further adds foundational context and provides interesting debates, including a reprint of a multi-month struggle between Clarkson and Jack Granatstein from the pages of *The Canadian Forum* that ended in a plea by the latter for the former mayoral candidate to abandon his branch party and work on a distinct civic reform movement (Granatstein, 1972).

One of the most consequential arguments made in the book came from James Lightbody. Considering the patterns of urban development in Canada, Lightbody provided this justification for why wings of existing federal and provincial parties had not become involved in municipal affairs:

> Because of the lack of significant independent authority, the sandbox politics of City Hall offer little incentive for organized partisan activity or division...Given the Canadian geography of urban centres in each province, it is quite likely that provincial administrations will maintain their reluctance to delegate sufficient power to the cities to permit them to compete as equals for public attention or to develop as countervailing power centres to the provincial regimes...when the power to take significant decisions is lacking, it is not surprising that organized parties are not involved in the process. (Lightbody, 1972, p. 192)

The Lightbody thesis is a compelling, if not under-formed one that accounts for the complicated nature of Canadian federalism. According to Lightbody, political parties are focused on organizing and contesting elections so that they may obtain the power to fundamentally shape

legislation. It would be futile, then, to utilize that party machinery to contest elections for a level of government that is, by its very nature, subject entirely to the whims of a higher entity. Where this account falters is in ignoring the fervent efforts of partisans, particularly in the CCF to contest civic elections while proudly displaying their party's name (see Chapter 3). Regardless, Lightbody's early arguments provide the basis for further inquiry.

In 2006, Lightbody would dedicate an entire chapter in his textbook on municipal politics in Canada to the issue of civic parties, building on the points he raised three decades prior. Acknowledging the changing urban context, Lightbody (2006) asserts that there are two forms of political party operating in Canadian cities. Using Duverger's (1954) foundational theories on political parties, Lightbody makes the claim that local political parties are of the Cadre (weak organizationally, strong electorally) and Mass (more dedicated to policy) variety. His classification is one of a small number of more academically focused attempts to better understand civic parties, as they differ so distinctly from those that operate at the federal and provincial levels in Canada and are similarly unique in the international context.

One of the first modern attempts to analyze Canadian municipal parties comes from Filion's 1999 piece that focuses primarily on Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. From the historical and contemporary situation in these cities, Filion (1999, pp. 90 - 91) asserts that there are five types of civic parties in Canada:

1. Local wings of senior-level parties
2. Nonpartisan Associations
3. Civic parties with open membership
4. Civic parties with restricted membership
5. Loose electoral alliances

These party types reflect the hyper-specific circumstances present in each of the four cities and time periods on which Filion focuses. The first two variants are situated firmly in the past. Filion references the CCF and NDP, as well as the Civic Liberal expedition in 1969 as the cases for Local Wings, with no contemporary equivalents or any that operated outside Toronto, Winnipeg, or Vancouver. The addition of Nonpartisan Associations as a distinct category is similarly questionable. By validating these organizations through distinguishing them as truly non-partisan, it further buoys the case made by adherents that these organizations were indeed without ideology and sought to maintain a kind-of upstanding civic government free from the machinations of hyper-partisan ideologs. Filion's Closed Civic Parties are limited to Quebec, with Drapeau's

Civic Party as the only example provided. Loose Alliances are described as teams assembled by mayoral candidates for the simple purpose of securing an electoral majority on council (Filion, 1999).

Filion's theory was followed eight years later by Sproule-Jones. This theory utilized the work of Robert Michels and Lance Carlsson to create a "party compass" that establishes parties in boxes based on their level of hierarchical organization and cohesive coordination during campaigns and in caucus (Sproule-Jones, 2007). While this theory has shortcomings, Sproule-Jones acknowledges the need to consider local politicians in a new light and provide opportunities to compare between Canada's municipal and federal/provincial systems. It is apt, then, that the section of the piece in which this theory appears is entitled "Toward a New Theory of Local Parties," indicating a conceptualization not yet fully formed (Sproule-Jones, 2007, p. 250).

There have been other attempts to categorize Canadian municipal parties and candidates. In Vancouver, a local journalist and a political scientist collaborated on a reimagined political spectrum that placed municipal parties and candidates on a grid defined by two axes: a combined social and economic left/right axis and a "municipal issues" axis that ranks positions from "urbanist" to "conservationist". Prest and Bushfield's (2019) new "municipal political compass" tries to distinguish from those who take more socially and economically conservative positions (opposition to marijuana shops, increased support for police, lower business taxes, etc.) and those with socially/economically left positions (support for increased social services, universal transit, funding for local Pride organizations, etc.), while also adding a candidate's position on intensification, transit projects, affordable housing, and "NIMBY" (not in my backyard) takes on urban issues. In this conceptualization, Bushfield and Prest position Vancouver's OneCity on the left of social/economic issues and the most urbanist while the Coalition of Progressive Electors is considered more socially/economically left but decidedly conservationist in its urbanist outlook (Cheung, 2019).

Many of the existing typological classifications of Canadian parties have not adequately maintained relevance in a dynamic and rapidly changing municipal political landscape. While those who provided general categories of municipal parties have offered an instrumental initiation of the conversation, it is necessary to present a more comprehensive and contemporary typology.

The existing literature on party typology provides measures that distinguish parties of different categories. Gunther et al. (2003, p. 171) establish three basic criteria that informs their

broader examination of party typology: a party's formal organization, programmatic commitments, and behavioural style. These are useful criteria and are easily identifiable in the Canadian civic context. Similarly, Joyce and Hossé (1970)'s civic party classifications help to inform the categories of external affiliation that are present among local parties in Canada. While each of these typologies provides insight, they all have shortcomings that can be addressed by considering a new typology.

4.3 – A typology of municipal political parties in Canada

In contrast to prior typologies, I assert the Canadian municipal political party landscape has consistently featured three broad types of parties and political organizations with select sub-categories:

1. Candidate Alliances
    a. Partisan alliances
    b. Ideological alliances
2. Liminal Parties
    a. Ideological pressure groups
    b. Identity pressure groups
    c. Confluences
    d. Incipient parties
3. Formal Parties
    a. *Équipes*
    b. Distinct local parties
    c. Branch parties

Beyond the three broad categories of parties and political organizations, there is an added form of partisan organization in Canadian politics: the Shadow Party. Shadow Parties are informal networks of federal and provincial partisans who organize around municipal elections in jurisdictions where political parties are prohibited and/or parties do not traditionally participate in local elections.

Each of these types of party and political organization have varying degrees of ideological difference and temporal longevity. As such, they can be positioned on a grid in relation to one another (see Figure 5). Ideologically, parties and political organizations exist somewhere on a spectrum from total ideological heterogeneity to total ideological homogeneity. Temporally, parties exist on a similar spectrum from ephemeral (in that there is little party infrastructure and/or

the party appears for an election cycle before disbanding) to durable (featuring strong party infrastructure, regular activities between campaigns, and an expected longevity).

arrows point to possible ranges for individual parties and political groups

Figure 5 - The organizational alignment of municipal parties and political organizations in Canada
(Diagram by author)

4.3.1 – Candidate Alliances

A Candidate Alliance (CA) is a group of like-minded candidates that bands together for the purposes of contesting one election before either disbanding or allowing their slate to slide into

dormancy between elections. CAs are characterized by their lack of internal organization, nominating procedure, candidate vetting process, and control over those members who are elected. CAs are often organized on an *ad hoc* basis, with candidates proposing a casual alliance without a central organizing body directing or coordinating their campaign.

CAs differ from *Équipes* in that they are not organized around or committed to a central leader. These decentralized bodies focus on particular issues and allow their members to float between "independence" and "alignment" based on local circumstances. An important characteristic of CAs is that they rarely "whip" their vote, meaning there is no insistence that CA members follow a party line once elected. They fit within the framework of municipal parties, though, as they exist to pool resources, talent, and strategies that provide aligned candidates with support they otherwise may not have.

There are two variations of CA in Canada: Partisan Alliances and Ideological Alliances. A Partisan Alliance (PA) features members united by their shared membership in or proximity to a political party. A notable example is the "Students Count" group in the 2017 Calgary Municipal Elections, which was a PA of four female trustee candidates for the Calgary Board of Education. The candidates vehemently denied partisan involvement, though each were members of the former Progressive Conservative Association of Alberta and were involved in the creation of the new United Conservative Party or UCP (Ferguson, 2017). Progressive activists were quick to note the partisan affiliation of the Students Count members and highlight their collective agreement with policies similar to those of the UCP, such as opposition to Gay-Straight Alliances and their support "parental choice" in the form of charter schools (Morrison, 2017; Progress Alberta, 2017).

The purpose of a PA is to unite partisans around a banner that obscures or downplays their partisan affiliations to broaden their appeal beyond their partisan base during an election. Political parties carry a set of perceptions that prospective candidates may want to diminish during a campaign, despite relying on their party for support. While some voters may appreciate the partisan cue, many more will actively oppose groups that are more transparent about their affiliations. As is evidenced in the United Kingdom (also see Section 4.4.1), partisans may obscure their real affiliations for fear of being associated with an unpopular government at a different level (Grant 1971). This form of organization is rare in Canada, as the existence of such a PA raises questions about transparency and accountability that may simply complicate a candidate's run for office.

A more common CA is an Ideological Alliance (IA), which crosses partisan lines and is focused on unified support for or opposition to a particular aim or policy. Among council candidates, examples of this could be support for a transit project, opposition to a business tax, or a desire to see a municipality adopt a stance that is more friendly to a particular community such as labour or business. For school board candidates, this could be support for keeping community schools open in the face of proposed closures, opposition to "culture war" issues, or a general spirit of education reform. Importantly, IAs will expect a unified belief in a broad ideology or a general philosophy (eg: urbanism, localism, boosterism, social conservatism, progressivism, etc.) but will allow for a range of beliefs on more specific issues.

IAs have appeared throughout the country's local political history. An IA may resemble a Liminal or Distinct Local Party, but it will lack the organizational composition, long-term capacity, and rigidity of more formalized institutions. IAs can exist for one election or may appear over a few elections, will organize around a central theme, and promote the candidacy of multiple figures, but lack the figurehead of an *Équipe* or the desire to bind elected officials to a set of policies that other parties will.

Alberta was home to several IA-style groups, which campaigned as slates of like-minded people, often running against organized labour, branch parties, or to promote a "boosterist", pro-business philosophy. Many of Alberta's "Alphabet Parties", named for their confusing acronyms, maintained IA characteristics. Calgary's North Hill Businessmen's Association (NHBA), Lethbridge's Civic Government Association (CGA), and Edmonton's Property Owner's Association (EPOA) all promoted the candidacy of individuals on the right of the political spectrum who agreed more broadly with conservative policy while not mandating their adherence to a concrete platform once elected. Many of the groups that would go on to become Incipient Parties, like Calgary's United Citizen's Association (UCA) and Lethbridge's CGA would start their "lives" as IA groups, but develop into more formal parties, hindered in their development only by the lack of formal structures available to parties in Alberta (Masson, 1985).

A contemporary example appeared in British Columbia in 2018, where a network of IAs ran candidates for school trustee across the province. These candidates all shared an ideological opposition to the province's new SOGI (Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity) legislation, which updated the BC curriculum to provide support to Queer and gender non-conforming students. Anti-SOGI candidates ran both in jurisdictions where elector organizations did and did not operate,

running predominantly as independents and unified by their shared opposition to the legislation (Pawson, 2018). In cities like Chilliwack, the anti-SOGI candidates did not form a formal, durable organization, but did pool their resources to produce campaign material and referred to themselves as a "slate" (Henderson, 2018).

4.3.2 – Liminal Parties

Liminal Parties (LPs) exist in a grey area. These bodies are more organized and cohesive than CAs but may exist in jurisdictions where parties are not formally allowed to operate or may opt for a less public-facing presentation of their structure. LPs can take on varying levels of organization, but there is a general understanding that members will maintain a uniform set of values and vote accordingly on key issues if elected. There are four broad types of LPs: Ideological Pressure Groups, Identity Pressure Groups, Confluences, and Incipient Parties.

An Ideological Pressure Group LP will focus on running campaigns and endorsing candidates without specifically vetting or nominating those candidates on their own. Ideological Pressure Groups have a more formal structure than a CA, for example, in that they will likely be incorporated as a non-profit or equivalent organization that allows them to accept donations, hire staff, and register as third-party campaigners during municipal elections. Canadian labour councils also fit under the category of Ideological Pressure Groups, as they endorse candidates and channel resources to labour-friendly campaigns while remaining somewhat outside the official municipal electoral process (Savage, 2008).

Notable among Canada's Ideological Pressure Groups is the far-right, anti-choice Campaign Life Coalition or "CLC" (Woodrow, 2021). Since the 1980s, the CLC has been actively participating in electoral politics by encouraging and promoting candidates they deem to be "pro-life", socially conservative, and "God-fearing" (Hammer, 2014; McNenly, 1988; Walkom, 1988).

The CLC's own website stressed the importance of municipal elections to their agenda:

> Municipal elections are often overlooked and undervalued, but these are where some of the most important battles in the culture wars are taking place. It's on the municipal level where we elect the school trustees who are responsible for accepting or rejecting increasingly radical sex-ed curriculums, and a plethora of anti-family, pro-homosexualist [sic] propaganda designed to eradicate the religious beliefs of traditionally-principled Canadians. City Councillors and Mayors will also be elected who have much influence over the funding with public tax dollars of radical pro-abortion groups like Planned Parenthood. (Campaign Life Coalition, 2021).

The organization does not formally nominate candidates as a traditional party does, but rather focuses on supporting like-minded candidates and promoting their candidacies while opposing those candidates it deems "anti-family." While it does not run candidates under its own banner, it is an active organization in municipal elections, acting as a registered Third-Party Advertiser during campaigns (City of Toronto, 2018).

A related form of pressure group is the Identity Pressure Group. While the Ideological Pressure Group seeks to endorse candidates sympathetic to their ideals and inform the discussion around specific policy issues, Identity Pressure Groups work to support the candidacy of people based on a facet of their personal identity without regard for their ideological values.

A notable example of an Identity Pressure Group is ProudPolitics, a Queer political organization that works with candidates from sexual minority communities to bolster their profile, help with campaign organization, and respond to homophobic or transphobic attacks. According to the group's mission statement:

> ProudPolitics believes that the best way to empower LGBTIQ+ communities across Canada, is through greater civic-representation: have more diverse, inspirational, and competent openly LGBTIQ+ leaders, of all political stripes, serving the public through elected office, and on public boards, commissions, and agencies. ProudPolitics envisions these leaders championing greater inclusion from across the political spectrum. (ProudPolitics, 2021a)

Rather than focus on a candidate's ideological foundation, ProudPolitics amplifies the candidacy of Queer folks in general. This was evident in the organization's advocacy during the 2019 Canadian federal election, where the group endorsed candidates from the NDP, Green, Liberal, and Conservative Parties. The organization works municipally without regard for ideology, as they endorsed candidates from two parties and independent candidates in Vancouver's municipal election and went so far as to endorse two competing Queer candidates for city council in Hamilton's Ward 1 (ProudPolitics, 2021b). The efforts of the group are focused purely on applying pressure to voters in elections to elect Queer candidates regardless of their ideology or office.

A Confluence draws on a broad array of political forces to build a local coalition of otherwise disconnected or oppositional forces. These organizations are formed from existing political groups, including multiple like-minded national parties and social movements. A

Confluence is designed expressly as a purely local coalition, pooling resources and fielding a "united ticket" of candidates. Rubio-Pueyo, from an activist academic's perspective, provides considerable insight into the Spanish political situation, where Confluences participate widely in local politics, albeit in a more formalized fashion. Confluences have, in many key Spanish cities, successfully unified resource-strapped progressives around specific local issues. Citing the electoral program of *Barcelona En Comú*, Rubio-Pueyo notes that the important organizing drive for these organization is:

> ...a confluence candidacy, with a clear winning, majoritarian purpose. A candidacy capable of inspiring, and of being present in neighbourhoods, workplaces, [and the] cultural milieu. (Rubio-Pueyo, 2017, p. 7).

Eizaguirre, Pradel-Miquel, and García note that the Confluences prevalent in Spanish cities, *Barcelona En Comú* foremost among them, eschew traditional party organizational structures in favour of methods that speak to the unique traditions from which each component group came (2017). For example, thanks to the youth and radicalism of *Barcelona En Comú*'s constituent parts, the party "crowd sourced its code of ethics and allowed online citizen input into the design of its manifesto," (Charnock et al., 2018, p. 189). This kind of unique approach was derived from mixing the organizational strength of some of its participating political parties, such as *Izquierda Unida* (the United Left), and the grassroots activism of the youth participating in the 2011 *Movimiento Indignados*.

Confluences have a long history in Canadian municipal government. This particular form of party organization appears in the historically unified, seemingly independent agglomerations of right-leaning forces to counter the influence of the left that existed from British Columbia to Ontario.

In Hamilton, for example, groups of right-leaning candidates created more formalized slates to oppose the forces of organized labour during the Great Depression. Unofficially called the "Economy Slate", these candidates came from the Conservative and Liberal Parties, though the slate also drew on non-partisan businesspeople for their membership as well. Running candidates on a unified platform, the Economy Slate promised cooperation during campaigns and the governing year. In an advertisement published in the *Hamilton Spectator*, the Economy Slate announced:

Last year ten candidates for municipal office pledged themselves to give co-operative effort to secure a better business administration of the city's affairs with a view to reducing expenditures and lessening the tax burden. All ten were elected and with other council members joining them accomplished much in the way of reorganization and gave undivided support to the economy policies of the Mayor and Board of Control...The same man, augmented by others who have like ideas and the interests of the city at heart, are prepared to carry on for the year 1934. This year, at the polls, they will be faced with organized opposition holding contrary and radical views." (*Hamilton Spectator* 1933a, p. 17).

The local branch of the CCF, opposing the Economy Slate's characterization, fired back accusing the group of being a "group of self-appointed dictators operating from a local club," in reference to the Hamilton Club, an elite businessman's social hall (*Hamilton Spectator* 1933b, p. 20).

The coordination of prominent Conservatives and Liberals for the campaign allowed the Economy Slate to dominate Hamilton's council in 1933 and 1934 before party rivalries split the partisans once more. Importantly, the Economy Slate saw previously disconnected candidates united in their goal for a more business-friendly administration, in essence creating a local party to contest the campaign and govern as one entity, driven in no small part thanks to their animosity toward labour and the CCF.

Last among the LPs is the Incipient Party (IP). IPs are named such in that they are on the precipice of becoming a formal party but have stalled at this stage or are prevented from advancing thanks to structural or organizational barriers. In Ontario, where provincial legislation prohibits the involvement of formal provincial and federal parties in municipal elections while not providing any mechanism for the creation of a local party, two such organizations have become active since 2018: Progress Toronto and Horizon Ottawa.

Progress Toronto was founded in early 2018 with the express goal of electing politically progressive councillors and school trustees in Canada's largest city. The organization has close ties to both the NDP and the party's arms-length research wing, the Broadbent Institute, with Progress Toronto's founder having previously served as the executive assistant to Toronto councillor Mike Layton (son of former NDP leader Jack Layton) and as the national campaign director for current NDP leader Jagmeet Singh (Pagliaro, 2018). Though the nomination process for the group is somewhat opaque, the organization actively assists candidates for council and

trustee that they have either sought out or have passed Progress Toronto's internal vetting process. As the organization notes on its website:

> We are connecting people to democratic power through mobilization and engagement in decision making at Toronto City Hall. That means running and supporting campaigns to put progressive solutions onto the city's agenda and organizing to win... we will work to elect new progressive champions in key city council races in Toronto. (Progress Toronto, 2018)

In the 2018 Toronto Municipal Election, Progress Toronto ran fourteen candidates for council and trustee, succeeding in electing 3 while placing second in 5 more races and had a cumulative vote total greater than that of Conservative-affiliated candidates (more on that in Chapter 6).

Horizon Ottawa was founded in 2020 with similar aims as Progress Toronto, albeit with a more decentralized and transparent candidate selection process. Horizon Ottawa features similar ties to the NDP and progressive political organizations in Canada's capital, and has focused much of its energy on promoting a more equitable municipal budget and fighting evictions occurring during the COVID-19 pandemic (Baig et al., 2020; Hersh, 2021).

While their public-facing branding focuses on presenting themselves as "a municipal-focused grassroots organization dedicated to creating a city that genuinely works for everyone," their candidate nomination structure is nearly identical to the provincial/territorial and federal candidate selection process of the major parties in Canada (Horizon Ottawa, 2020a). During a by-election in Ottawa's Cumberland Ward in 2020, Horizon Ottawa published a detailed accounting of how they approached their nomination. Candidates were invited to participate in a survey, the results of which were then distributed to Horizon Ottawa members. Those members were given four days to rank the candidates. The "leading candidate" and any candidates with at least half that candidate's score were given a chance to present to Horizon Ottawa members and answer questions. Members than voted using a ranked ballot to select their preferred candidate (Horizon Ottawa, 2020b).

The Horizon Ottawa candidate selection method is reflective of that maintained by more established parties. The engagement of the membership in the process and the democratic candidate "vetting" process is reflective of the behaviour of more formalized political parties. Operating under Ontario's stringent municipal elections rules, though, requires Horizon Ottawa (and Progress Toronto) to function as IP-LPs.

Formal parties are the municipal equivalents of higher order parties. Only two jurisdictions in Canada allow for their creation and operation at the local level: British Columbia and Quebec. Historically, formal parties ran candidates at the local level in many more jurisdictions, though their involvement dissipated through the 1980s and 1990s.

The three broad categories of formal party are the *Équipe*, the branch party (BP) and the distinct local party (DLP).

An *Équipe* is a form of political party that focuses on the election of a team that will support the administration of a head-of-ticket candidate. *Équipe* is the French word for "Team", used to define this kind of party for several reasons. First, *Équipes* are most prominent in Quebec, where they form nearly 43% – a plurality – of municipal political parties that were registered up until January, 2020 (see Table 4). Second, the precedent for this form of party organization was set by Montreal's Civic Party, led by Jean Drapeau for all but 8 of the party's 34 years.

Table 4- Typology of parties in Quebec as of January, 2020
(Author's calculation)

Party Typology	Number	Percent
Équipes	60	42.86
Distinct local parties or Ideological Alliances	46	32.86
Ghost parties	34	24.29
TOTAL	**140**	

Drapeau structured the Civic Party in such a way that dissent and departure from the will of the leader was impossible. The goal of the Civic Party was merely to support Drapeau's agenda, offering up the requisite number of votes to easily pass any motion the mayor wanted on the floor of the *hôtel de ville*. Kaplan discussed the nature of the Civic Party thus:

> What was [The Civic Party], then, but a personal following, a magnified and far more disciplined version of the personal cliques that had always dominated Montreal politics...The party consisted of two leaders and roughly forty followers, with nothing in between. No attempt was made to establish heirs apparent or middle-level lieutenants, (1982, p. 417).

The Civic Party was Drapeau's personal team, organized to support his administration. The level of control was such that Drapeau discouraged his hand-picked council candidates from becoming too invested in their wards by creating local party wings or becoming too close to

community leaders (Kaplan, 1982; Milner, 1988). The party's own newsletter contained no information on the party's internal affairs or opportunities for citizens to become involved, rather discussing the number of awards given to Drapeau or stating: "We are confident that our readers will render us the testimony that we have not departed from the lign [sic] of conduct traced out by the leader of The Civic Party, His Worship Mayor Jean Drapeau," (Civic Party, 1964, p. 13).

While Drapeau's Civic Party faded from the municipal scene in Montreal by 1994, it had established a strong and influential foundation on which subsequent political movements built their brand. *Équipes* are so ubiquitous in the municipal politics of Quebec (and are present to a lesser extent in British Columbia) that their taxonomical specifics are easy to identify.

The purpose of the *Équipe* is to ensure the election of the "head of ticket" candidate and, once in office, to ensure as few impediments to their administration exist. The *Équipe* maintains a shallow, albeit present, platform, but deemphasizes policy specifics in favour of equating the representative performance of each individual candidate in distinct local races with the personality and political spirit of the leader. It is often the case that *Équipe* are named for, or prominently include the name of, their leader.

The *Équipes* of Quebec often have names like "Équipe Steve Plante - L'Épiphanie en action" (Team Steve Plante – [The City of] L'Épiphanie in Action), "Avenir hilairemontais - Équipe Yves Corriveau" (Mount St. Hilaireian's Future – Team Yves Corriveau), or "Parti Municipal Énergie avec Sylvie Surprenant," (Party of Municipal Energy with Sylvie Surprenant). Each of these municipal *Équipe* were named for their mayoral candidate, who coordinated their campaign and the campaigns of their selected council candidates.

An *Équipe* may be formally constituted in much the same way as a Distinct Local Party, but will rarely maintain as strong a presence in the community between elections. While a Distinct Local Party will activate its membership periodically between campaigns and keep a regular web and social media presence, most *Équipes* will remain dormant until the period just before an election.

The history and strength of *Équipe*-style parties has led other organizations to adopt some of their branding strategies. Political parties that are not *Équipes*, such as Projet Montréal, changed their name through a vote of the party's membership prior to the 2017 Municipal Election to add "Équipe Valérie Plante", attempting to more closely associate the party with its young, dynamic new leader and mayoral candidate (*Montreal Gazette,* 2017).

Équipes, though more readily recognizable in Quebec, exist in other Canadian jurisdictions. A notable example in British Columbia was the Surrey First Elector's Society.[19] This organization, created by former Mayor Dianne Watts, presented itself as a political party during municipal elections, but maintained no open nominations, meetings, or conventions. Prior to the 2013 Municipal Elections in British Columbia, the *Vancouver Sun* highlighted the fundamentals of Watts' party:

> ... potential candidates will have to convince Watts and her eight councillors — the sole directors and executive of the Surrey First Electors Society — that they have what it takes to run with the self-described coalition of independents. This is partly because Watts, as the society's president and chief executive officer, wants to hand-pick candidates to prevent special interest groups from taking over City Hall. (Sinoski, 2013).

Équipes, then, exist to present a unified team of candidates loyal to a central leader for the purposes of efficiently managing local affairs. These political parties have little in the way of succession plans or the mass membership involvement characteristic of other party types. As such, there is little longevity among *Équipes*. The oldest *Équipe* in Quebec presently registered was founded in 1998.

A BP is, rather straightforwardly, is a local wing of a national or subnational party. Branch Parties will maintain formal ties to parties at other levels and share resources where possible. There may be situations where membership is shared or automatic upon joining one of the party's levels, similar to the case of the New Democratic Party's "federation" structure, wherein party membership is in the provincial or Yukon sections of the party, which then come together in the national "federation" that is the federal New Democratic Party (Cross et al., 2004).

The BP is a rare organization in Canada, though constituted the vast majority of the historic municipal formal parties. The CCF strategically ran candidates in municipal elections from its inception in 1932, particularly in jurisdictions where it sought to build a strong worker's movement (see: Chapter 3; Epp-Koop, 2015; Gutstein, 1983; Miller, 1975; A. B. Smith, 1982; Tennant, 1980). This strategy came from the CCF's British sister-party, The Labour Party of the United Kingdom, whose members had long participated in local government under their party banner in

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[19] Prior to the 2014 Municipal Election in Surrey, Watts announced her intention to move into Federal politics, and Surrey First transitioned into a Distinct Formal Party, led by Linder Hepner.

the name of raising class consciousness and organizing working people (Grant, 1971; MacColl, 1949).

At present, this form of external party organization is more common in countries where party politics has more thoroughly permeated the municipal level. Copus et al. (2008), for example, identify Branch Parties in the United Kingdom, and note that these organizations have varying degrees of institutional autonomy, but maintain a strong connection with the central coordinating group behind the larger party.

Of the few Branch Parties that exist in Canada, the most prominent is the Green Party of Vancouver. As a municipal elector organization, the Vancouver Greens maintain a commitment to work with existing Green parties in Canada and globally and have included a clause in the party's constitution forbidding the elector organization from dissolving or ceasing operations without the express approval of the Green Party Political Association of British Columbia (Green Party of Vancouver Society, 2016).

The DLP, in contrast, is unique in its structure and origins. DLPs exist around the world, and, in many jurisdictions, active seek out and encourage the participation of a broad array of partisans and politically engaged groups throughout their communities. DLPs coordinate activities and fundraising during and between elections, have an established candidate nomination process, and expect a certain level of loyalty to the party's core principles and platform from elected officials.

DLPs are focused on local issues and present platforms developed by community members to address specific local concerns (Copus et al., 2008). These distinct entities, due to the nature of party politics, will maintain some overlap with the memberships of existing national and subnational parties, though formal links between the institutions will be absent.

Montreal and Vancouver are home to some of Canada's most well-established and recognizable DLPs. In Montreal, the city's largest DLP, is Projet Montréal (simply "Projet" among *les Montréalais*). With an emphasis on a comprehensive and ideologically-centred platform, Projet's programs – built and supported by the party's members – regularly take positions on regular issues of municipal importance, such as transportation and planning policy, but also on expanding voting rights to non-citizen residents, promoting indigenous-settler reconciliation, and advancing Queer rights (Montréal, 2017). Projet has been an important, unique local party in Montreal from its formation in 2004 up through its sweeping electoral victory in 2017.

Projet is the ideological successor of one of the most successful and prominent early DLPs in the country: the *Rassemblement des citoyens et des citoyennes de Montréal* or RCM (see also Section 3.6). The RCM began its political life inspired by European left-libertarian parties (Thomas, 1997). The groups participating in the formation of the RCM in 1974 included *Parti Quebecois* and New Democrat partisans frustrated with the Civic Party's total domination of Montréal, as well as student activists, progressive urbanists, and democratic reformers (Milner, 1988). While the RCM's first campaigns were poorly coordinated, the party restructured and professionalized in the 1980s. Focusing their efforts on presenting a comprehensive, progressive platform and highlighting the personalities of their leadership team, at the top of which was the popular Jean Doré, the RCM was able to present a formidable challenge to the Civic Party. On the occasion of Drapeau's retirement, Doré and the RCM swept 55 of 58 seats on Montréal City Council (Milner, 1988). The RCM's electoral professionalization was paired with a concerted effort to activate and involve the party's membership, present a realistic urbanist platform, and take stances on important social issues, such as the rights of women (Thomas, 1997).

British Columbia, and Vancouver in particular, is home to various DLPs. Of the elector organizations registered to contest the 2018 municipal elections in British Columbia, 86% could be classified as DLPs. First among them is the Non-Partisan Association (NPA), which has the distinction of being the oldest DLP in Canada. The NPA was formed as a "free-enterprise coalition" to counter the electoral aims of the CCF in Vancouver, drawing from the existing membership of the Liberal, Conservative, and Social Credit parties in British Columbia (Miller, 1975, pp. 4-5). Since its inception, the NPA has focused on the personality of the candidates they present for office and presenting a broadly conservative, albeit highly pliable, platform (Cutler et al., 2005; Filion, 1999).

Originally a loose-knit coalition of individuals who would come together only to campaign as what Miller would refer to as a "slate-making body" (reminiscent of an Ideological Alliance or a Confluence), the NPA would face a challenge to its position from the activities of organized opposition groups through the 1960s and 1970s (1975, p. 13). This challenge occurred because,

> Unlike the NPA, which promised a vague and generalized goal of good government for all, the new parties took explicit stands on central issues of the day and identified themselves with particular concerns and interests, (Miller, 1975, p. 20)

While scholars at the time referred to this as the era of the NPA's decline, it was, in reality, a time where the party restructured (Tennant, 1980). In the decades during which the NPA faced its most serious challenges, the party reoriented its strategy. Rather than ramp-up organization before an election to assemble a slate of candidates who had already registered or signaled their intent to stand for office independently of party organization, the NPA adopted a practice of formal organization and centralization (A. B. Smith, 1982). In doing so, the NPA was able to effectively organize in the space between elections and maintain control over a unified caucus of councillors, school trustees, and parks board members who advanced the party's broad centre-right agenda, firmly solidifying their status as a DLP.

The NPA, historically, had a relative level of ideological fluidity among its leaders and members. A 1969 analysis of values held by civic partisans in Vancouver found that 56.7% of NPA members identified as "traditionalists", while 43.3% identified as "moderates" or "progressives".[20] This is in contrast to the membership of the NPA's chief Municipal Project rival, the Coalition of Progressive Electors (COPE),[21] of whom 77.8% identified as "progressives" (Easton et al., 1969, p. 23).

Founded in 1968 by community and labour organizers allied with both the New Democratic and Communist Parties, COPE symbolized the unified political wing of the city's disparate activist movements (Vogel, 2003). COPE's successes came in the form of serving as an effective opposition to the NPA and conservative forces provincially. In the 1980s, as the governing right-wing British Columbia Social Credit Party began to drastically cut funding to public education and embark on a protracted war against teachers' unions, COPE engaged its activist constituency and won a plurality on the Vancouver School Board. As Kilian notes, "The COPE trustees had campaigned on a platform of resistance to further cutbacks, and they were determined to fight the government to the last ditch," (1985, p. 179).

The activism of the COPE trustees included openly supporting protesting teachers and educational support workers, as well as their defiance of provincial legislation requiring them to pass budgets and submit them to the Ministry of Education. When the COPE-led school board

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[20] Through 2020 and into 2021, the NPA has been embroiled in an internal crisis after several figures on the far-right assumed positions of leadership within the party, forcing the resignation of more moderate executive members and driving the NPA's elected caucus to call for their removal (Bula, 2020; Fumano, 2021) Nearly all elected NPA councillors and trustees have since resigned amid fears the new far-right executive could select fellow travellers to stand as candidates during the 2022 election (Bains, 2021; Green, 2021; Little, 2021).

[21] COPE's original name was the "Committee of Progressive Electors".

failed to do so, the province fired the duly elected trustees on May 6, 1985, and replaced them with a single supervisor (Kilian, 1985). While COPE swept the trustee by-elections held to replace the fired board in January, 1986, by the general municipal election later that year, the party's activists had grown weary. Faced with a dynamic conservative NPA leader, Gordon Campbell, the activists of COPE ran an outspoken socialist councillor Harry Rankin for mayor. Rankin's dogmatic campaign was no match for the NPA machine, which tapped into the conservative wave sweeping the world through the 1980's, and almost every COPE candidate went down to a bitter defeat (Vogel, 2003).

COPE's history is decidedly eclectic. The party's candidates have ranged from outspoken communists and militant anti-poverty activists to establishment New Democrats (Persky, 1980). The dichotomy was accentuated in the decades after COPE's 1986 defeat. The party struggled with its origins, attempting to stay true to its activist roots while also making its slate electable and attractive to Vancouver's voters. When the politically moderate former RCMP officer and British Columbia Chief Coroner Larry Campbell took the reins of the party in 2002, COPE formalized its campaign strategies and moderates its platform. Campbell and COPE won that year's elections, but the tensions between the pragmatists and the activists destabilized Campbell's administration. Within two years, Campbell and more moderate COPE councillors broke off to sit as a "caucus-within-the-caucus" known as "COPE Lite" (Bula, 2004). By the time of the next municipal election in 2005, COPE Lite had become Vision Vancouver, leaving the original COPE (or "COPE Classic" to the Vancouver media) to retrench to its activist roots (Bula, 2005).

After the complicated days of the early 2000s, COPE is once again a firmly activist-led DLP. The COPE of today maintains a strong social justice focus and remains committed to the principles on which the party was founded. In their nomination procedures, COPE specifically outlines a commitment to gender parity and reserves seats for Indigenous candidates (Coalition of Progessive Electors, 2014a). COPE candidates have recently run with specific areas of focus, such as Indigenous sovereignty, housing justice, and ending childhood poverty (Coalition of Progessive Electors, 2014b).

Both COPE and the NPA are responsible for the establishment of nearly all other DLPs operating in Vancouver presently, with the centrist Vision Vancouver and the centre-left urbanist OneCity having broken from COPE and both the hard right Coalition Vancouver and libertarian, pro-business YES! Vancouver having split from the NPA (Cheung, 2018; J. Lee, 2014).

<u>4.4. – On shadows</u>

The typology I have laid out rests on the relative durability and ideological homogeneity of parties and quasi-parties, but the degree of formal organization is heavily influenced by province. Quebec and British Columbia recognize and regulate Branch Parties and DLP's. In these jurisdictions, municipal parties can exist and operate openly as parties. In other provinces, party-like organizations more commonly exist as "shadows" of provincial or federal parties.

Quebec's provincial elections authority oversees and regulates local parties, maintaining records on those parties that have registered to participate municipally (Quebec, 2018; Sproule-Jones, 2007). While Quebec has formally acknowledged the existence of political parties since the 1950's, British Columbia's acceptance of parties is more recent. The abolition of the nonpartisan ballot occurred in 1992 as part of larger municipal reforms initiated by the NDP government of Mike Harcourt who was, himself, a former party-affiliated councillor in Vancouver (P. J. Smith et al., 2009).[22] Following these reforms, Elections British Columbia, the province's independent elections body, followed the Quebec model and assumed responsibility for managing and registering local parties in the province (Columbia, 2014).

So-called "shadow party" municipal candidates – a term from the news media – are ones affiliated with formal provincial or Federal parties. Commentators and columnists coined the term to refer to political parties active in municipal politics that conduct campaign activities "behind the scenes", mainly in jurisdictions that have no formal mechanism for the participation of political parties or have outright bans on their formal participation (see: Barber, 2014; Bascaramurty, 2014; Hepburn, 2014; Manning, 2013).[23]

Shadow parties are generally groups of partisan-affiliated actors who seek to coordinate the election of particular municipal candidates without openly stating they are acting as a

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[22] Harcourt was a TEAM (The Electors Action Movement) council member from 1972 to 1976. In 1976, he sought the TEAM nomination to run for mayor, but was defeated and subsequently resigned from the party to contest the next election as an independent candidate for council. During his successful 1980 mayoral run, Harcourt ran as an independent against the TEAM and NPA candidates (Tennant, 1980).

[23] During the same 1969 municipal elections described in Section 1.1, an interesting event occurred in North York, then an independent suburb of Toronto. The Civic Liberals had nominated Ron Barbaro to run as mayor against Basil Hall, who was ostensibly independent. Hall's campaign literature featured endorsements from 13 incumbent councillors of varying centre-right political ideologies. Barbaro accused Hall of launching an "underground party" in opposition to the Liberal attempts to introduce formal party politics to the municipal field (*Toronto Daily Star*, November 22, 1969b, pg. 73). Rather than being a "shadow party", which is an organization directed by partisans, Barbaro likely identified a "shadow Ideological Alliance", organized by Hall and centre-right councillors who may or may not have been partisans. This incident highlights the importance of correctly identifying and classifying the types of organizations present in local politics.

coordinating body and applying partisan labels to their campaigns. This can occur for a number of reasons, including informal norms against partisan campaigns in local government, and formal institutional restrictions on partisan or group activity during municipal election campaigns (Good, 2017; Sproule-Jones, 2007). Shadow parties could be single riding associations, groups of riding associations, unorganized partisans, or figures from "central party offices" who aim to coordinate campaigns by drawing on party resources, networks, and support in a clandestine and possibly unofficially unsanctioned way. The key unifying factor is that they are partisans who have access to power and resources which allow them to coordinate a municipal campaign in a way similar to how a federal or provincial campaign would be organized.

Shadow parties have little incentive to operate in the jurisdictions that allow for the open participation of local municipal parties, i.e., Quebec and British Columbia. Partisan participation is a legal grey area in Nova Scotia, which allows for the full participation of "associations" in local elections. These associations are, according to Section 49A – 1(b) of the Nova Scotia Municipal Elections Act, "one or more people established to, a trust established for or a fund established to further the election of the candidate," (Affairs, 2015). While not officially allowing for parties, the legal recognition of associations focused on electing municipal candidates allows for parties to establish themselves at the local level in every way except by name. Nova Scotia is not part of the current study, but presents an avenue for future inquiry.

As documented in subsequent chapters, I identify five federal parties that engaged in shadow party activity in the five case study cities in Ontario: the Conservative, Liberal, New Democratic, Green, and Communist parties. In some cases, particularly in Toronto, candidates backed by shadow party organizations have also been supported by IPs, specifically Progress Toronto. In the case study cities in British Columbia, formal parties operate openly.

4.4.1. – Non-partisanship and the prevalence of Shadow Parties

Municipal non-partisanship in the Canadian context traces its history to the era of the Reform Municipality, but was more firmly entrenched as a political strategy during the time of the Battleground Municipality (see Chapter 3). When faced with the threat of organized labour, pro-business factions in Canadian municipalities would employ non-partisanship as a strategy aimed at opposing the electoral participation of left-wing forces (Saiz, 1999). In British Columbia, where political culture and provincial law facilitates the creation of local parties, right-wing non-partisan

organizations evolved into formally recognized parties, moving from the realm of Confluences and IAs to DLPs, with the NPA serving as the standard bearer for this kind of organization in Canada. In jurisdictions where parties are prohibited and/or are not a lasting part of the municipal political culture, non-partisanship is used as a façade to obscure one's partisan affiliations. In Ontario specifically, municipal non-partisanship has been professed by candidates from all ideological orientations, though is more readily associated with the political right.

Ample research has been conducted on the phenomenon of non-partisanship as a partisan political strategy. Lee's (1960) formative work on the nonpartisan phenomenon in California was followed by Hawley's 1973 examination of nonpartisan local contests across the United States. Lee's work was built on the research of Adrian in 1952, who considered nonpartisan elections that had occurred on a larger scale, namely those in the aforementioned state legislatures.

Adrian presented a series of propositions based on analyzing the elections and eventual legislative behaviour in non-partisan systems. Among those were:

- Difficulty in recruiting candidates for public office and closing of normal candidate recruitment channels,
- Difficulty in fundraising for campaigns,
- The avoidance of ideology and policy in campaigns and legislative debates,
- "Passing blame" for poor performance or unpopular opinions, and
- The consistent return of more experienced, conservative legislators, (Adrian, 1952, pp. 767 - 774).

Lee's analysis of local elections in California addresses these hypotheses. Considering the state of local governance in California at the time, Lee's research found incumbents played a strong part in recruiting fellow candidates and their successors in closed, often secretive ways. Those favouring municipal non-partisanship were generally mayors or already connected to the establishment, while those advocating for a stronger role for parties were those affiliated with the Democratic Party, which faced a disadvantage on the non-partisan ballot. Importantly, Lee (1960, p. 128) found that campaigns avoided ideological or policy-based discussions, noting local campaigns "more often center on personalities than issues." The notion that candidate recruitment became secretive mirrors the situation in Canadian cities where Shadow Parties operate.

Hawley's 1973 work, which uses Lee's research from 13 years prior as a significant foundation, reaffirms many of these assertions. Importantly, Hawley strategically analyzes a larger number of municipalities, again finding a slight conservative, Republican bias in the nonpartisan

system (1973, p. 33). This tilting of the electoral field toward Republicans and organized conservative groups is problematic from a democratic standpoint. As Hawley notes:

> ...virtually all of the available evidence once can bring to bear on this question *[that of electoral advantage]* points in the same direction: Democrats, and persons of lower socioeconomic status generally, tend to have fewer resources with which to make the linkages discussed *[with donors, the electorate, etc.]* than do Republicans. (1973, p. 63, clarification added).

The implication here is that Republicans used non-partisanship as a partisan strategy, professing a belief in the importance of keeping party politics out of local government while actively benefiting from their own partisan networks.

As time progressed, the advantages for the Republican Party changed. Democratic leaders began to make electoral breakthroughs with racialized and other minority populations, and became associated with large, metropolitan cities. As such, while councils in the United States still tend to lean more toward conservative ideology, centrist and left-of-centre candidates have slowly been making electoral headway (Burnett, 2017; Welch et al., 1986).

Similarly, in the United Kingdom, two unique phenomena connected to the non-partisan movement that began appearing in the 1970's during a period of municipal reorganization (Copus et al., 2012). These phenomena were the "ratepayer" group and the "concealed Conservative" candidate. Ratepayer groups echo the Victorian sentiment that local politics is about the protection of property. These groups range from anti-partisan Ideological Alliances to DLP's, dependent on the jurisdiction and the organizational inclinations of their membership, though the DLP variants of ratepayer groups adopt a non-partisan presentation in much the same way the early NPA did in Vancouver (Grant, 1971).

More directly connected to the non-partisan strategy, though, are "concealed Conservatives". These are ostensibly independent candidates who obscure their political connections. Grant (1971) posits that these candidates can run alone or form a "concealed Conservative ratepayer" group, all to distance themselves from a potentially unpopular Conservative government nationally, or as a result of an informal electoral alliance between the

Conservatives and Liberal-Democrats, constituting a UK version of a "shadow Confluence" (1971, p. 203).[24]

Sproule-Jones (2007) and Good (2017) provide insight from the Canadian context, though approach the question of municipal non-partisanship from different angles. Sproule-Jones encourages researchers to consider the possibility that council members on non-partisan councils may act in partisan ways, establishing informal party groupings amongst one another based on the strength of unifying actors. These less structured pseudo-parties may have appeal to an electorate uneasy with the open participation of political parties in Canadian cities. Indeed, the author notes, "At the local level of government, loosely coupled and non-hierarchical groupings appear to resonate among voters in many cities," (Sproule-Jones, 2007, p. 252).

Good, alternatively, questions the extent to which local political is "non-partisan", remarking that the maintenance of a non-partisan ballot is often unquestioned and the historical origins of such a practice unknown (2017, p. 452). Good also raises the assertion of Lightbody that non-partisan government at the local level results in right-leaning administrations.

The research from the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada on the non-partisan phenomenon in local government provides further insight into Shadow Parties. Lee and Hawley provide evidence that conservative partisans, particularly those affiliated with the Republican Party benefit from non-partisan systems and organize in a clandestine way behind the façade of non-partisanship, creating American versions of Shadow Parties. Grant identifies a phenomenon so prevalent in the United Kingdom that a unique term – Concealed Conservative – can be applied to those who use their organizational connections to the Conservative Party all while downplaying their partisan affiliations. Canadian scholars, for their part, acknowledge some level of partisan organization on non-partisan councils, though do not identify Shadow Parties as such. Scholarship has provided a strong basis for a more detailed investigation of the Shadow Party phenomenon in Canada.

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[24] Grant's work was situated in the early 1970's, when the political culture in the United Kingdom was different than it is today. The concealed Conservative designation is of particular use in understanding the present non-partisan situation, particularly in Canada, though it is unclear if that phenomenon is widespread in the United Kingdom today. Considering the brief, albeit intense, period in which the right-wing populist United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) gained crucial roles in many local councils (for popular media accounts, see: Addley et al., 2013; McGhee, 2013) further research into the evidently changing nature of local government in the United Kingdom is necessary.

<u>4.5. – On ghosts</u>

Ghost parties are organizations that have lapsed into dormancy or have announced their dissolution but have remained registered with provincial authorities. As such, there is a distinction between shadow parties and ghost parties. Shadow parties are "real"; ghost parties are not.

While such persistence may seem puzzling, it may be that the tasks required for formal dissolution –finalization of financial records, selling assets, deactivation of web and social media accounts, and various paperwork to be filed with elections authorities – may be too difficult for the remaining party members. In Quebec, local parties may be voluntarily or involuntarily deregistered. Voluntary deregistration requires approval by the party's executive and complete financial records while involuntary registration is at the discretion of the province's Chief Electoral Officer (Élections Quebec, 1987). Elector organizations in British Columbia are subject to less stringent requirements. Such groups are not registered or deregistered by the provincial elections authority that oversees them, rather, their continued presence requires they nominate a candidate for office, have at least 50 members, and promises to comply with the province's Local Elections Campaign Financing Act. If a party slips into dormancy, they may not be listed with the province's elections authority but may retain at least some component of party infrastructure (Elections British Columbia, 2015). An example of a party that "ghosted" for a period of time is the Work Less Party in Vancouver. A Branch Party connected to a federal and provincial party of the same name, Work Less ran a mayoral candidate in 2005 and a slate of council and parks board candidates in 2008 before slipping into dormancy (Inwood, 2009). The party remained a ghost organization for a decade before once again nominating a single parks board candidate in 2018 (*Vancouver Sun,* 2018).

Ghost candidates – an entirely different phenomenon altogether – are common features in municipal elections. Candidates, particularly those who stand as independents or contest elections in provinces where parties are prohibited or discouraged from fielding candidates, are under no obligation to campaign once they have submitted their nomination papers. In Ontario, for example, a candidate need only be a citizen (who is not presently incarcerated, serving as an MP, MPP, Senator, or judge, and is not a municipal employee who has not taken an unpaid leave), collect 25 signatures (if they are running for mayor or council and in a municipality with over 4000 residents), travel to their city hall, present government issued photo ID, and pay a registration fee (Ontario Ministry of Municipal Affairs and Housing, 2017). In short, registering as a candidate is less

challenging than running a campaign, which leads to a substantial number of ghost candidates in Ontario's municipal elections. Taylor and McEleney (2019), puzzled by the presence and motivations of candidates who do not appear to campaign, and both raise *and* spend no money characterize these candidates as another component of the "noise" in municipal elections with low barriers to entry.

While ghost candidates appear on the ballot, they do not participate in campaign activities (attending debates, canvassing, speaking to media, etc.) and are unreachable by local media and voters. Hamilton-based journalist Joey Coleman notes that each candidate receives access to a complete voters list, providing direct marketers or real estate agents with a comprehensive collection of all the registered voters in a municipality, including addresses and phone numbers (Coleman, 2021). Registering as a candidate may be the most economical way to obtain such valuable information.

The phenomenon of ghost candidates reminds us that local politics attracts especially colourful characters. One of the most notable ghost candidates in recent history was Henry Mak, who sought the office of mayor of Edmonton in 2017. *Edmonton Journal* reporter Paula Simons first noted that Mak had failed to attend any candidate forums near the end of the city's campaign. Rather, a man claiming to be a retired United Church minister, George Lam, would appear in his place. Lam was, at the time, seeking a school trustee's seat. Mak and Lam appeared to run on a joint platform, though their campaign's online promotions did little to highlight their policy points, opting instead to feature stock photos of young women and rant against the dangers of communism.

Simons began to inquire as to Mak's identity, with his appointed agent, Lam, saying that he had previously run for office and was in hiding due to "fears for his safety" (Simons, 2017a, p. A4). Efforts to contact Mak at a cell phone number listed to him were met with anger from the respondent and Simons began to speculate that Lam and Mak were the same person. Inquiries made to Edmonton's returning officer raised more questions, as it could not be confirmed if Lam and Mak were indeed separate people. Soon after Simons began her inquiries, she received confirmation from Lam that Mak had indeed sought election in 2007 under a different name and had received reports of Mak appearing at campaign events disguised as a campaign worker and hiding from voters. Simons also received a report of Mak insisting on meeting a candidate for council before depositing "stacks" of brochures on their vehicle and fleeing. Simons noted that, while she had seemingly discovered Mak's identity,

...that doesn't solve the larger mystery of why a candidate would want to run for mayor while keeping his identity a secret. To me, it's even more bizarre that Mak would attend forums, and hand out flyers, without taking the stage to answer questions and without identifying himself as the candidate... what would happen if Mak won the mayoralty after all[?] Would he show up at city hall? Or would he be like our own version of the Scarlet Pimpernel, elusive and anonymous? Something tells me we're not likely to find out. (Simons, 2017b).

Ghost candidates are less common in British Columbia. Only one candidate in the case cities (a school trustee candidate in Vancouver named "Mrs. Doubtfire"[25]) had no campaign presence. In contrast 11.5% of candidates in Ontario had no identifiable presence and no record of their identity could be ascertained. This varied by city, ranging from 16.17% of candidates in Toronto to 1.27% in Hamilton (see Table 5).

Table 5 - Ghost candidates by jurisdiction in Ontario
(Author's calculation)

"Ghost" status	Toronto		Ottawa		Mississauga		Brampton		Hamilton	
	Number	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*	*Number*	*Percent*
Yes	81	16.17	10	5.29	22	14.77	15	11.36	2	1.27
No	387	77.25	166	87.83	116	77.85	115	87.12	130	82.28
In Default	33	6.59	13	6.88	11	7.38	2	1.52	26	16.46
TOTAL	**501**		**189**		**149**		**132**		**158**	

The majority of ghost candidates sought school trustee seats (see Table 6), which suggests unfamiliarity with the rigours of campaigning and/or an assumption that proximity to a small group of people in a similar position (parents, educators, those living close to a school/within a school's catchment area, etc.) may have constituted the entirety of their campaign strategy.

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[25] The presence of a candidate like "Mrs. Doubtfire" was made possible by a 1993 change to the City of Vancouver's charter by the province of British Columbia. Determined to ensure money was not a barrier to political participation, the province changed the city's charter to eliminate the $300 filing fee and requirement that candidates get the endorsement signatures of 25 electors. The change, along with the long-standing acceptance of the use of pseudonyms on the ballot, saw the number of mayoral candidates increase from 23 in 1993 to 58 in 1996. Many of the 58 candidates were encouraged to run by Brian Salmi, an editor at a Vancouver alternative newspaper and 1993 Mayoral candidate who offered to buy beer for anyone who registered. Encouraged by Salmi, candidates signed up using names like "Sage Advice", "Zippy the Circus Chimp," "Zaius", "Yummy Girl", "Barb E. Doll", "Mr. X", "Buzz", and "The Stainer" (who tied for last place with 10 votes). Salmi's "stunt" was partly a political protest, rooted in the editor's frustration that Vancouver's local government did not represent the economic and social diversity of the city (Bula, 1996). Nearly all Vancouver municipal elections since 1990 have featured pseudonymized candidates standing with varying levels of seriousness. In this case, it is unclear if "Mrs. Doubtfire" was said candidate's legal name.

4.6 – Conclusions

It is crucial to establish the partisan framework in Canadian cities before beginning an analysis of elections, electoral outcomes, diversity, and campaign financing. While each of these could be considered independently, the ubiquitousness of partisan politics is impossible to ignore. Even in those municipalities where civic non-partisanship is mandated by provincial law or enforced by local custom, partisan politics looms, spectre-like, over all political affairs in Canada.

Table 6 - Ghost candidates by office in Ontario
(Author's calculation)

Office	Number	Percent of Ghost Candidates
Mayor	7	9.21
Councillor	46	8.04
Trustee	77	66.37
Public School Trustee	53	16.93
Catholic School Trustee	15	12.61
French Public School Trustee	4	16.00
French Catholic School Trustee	5	20.83
TOTAL	**130**	

Establishing a typology of political parties aids in providing clear delineation between the kinds of parties and political organizations operating presently. The two forms of Candidate Alliances, namely the Partisan and Ideological Alliances see candidates rallying around either a shared affiliation with a particular party or a common belief in a broad, overarching philosophy regarding how a city should operate. These CAs are weaker organizations, in that they have nominal central organizing, allow for some variation on positions of policy among their members, and are more ephemeral than most other party groups.

Liminal Parties occupy a space between formality and informality, existing as entities that act like parties, though often without the institutional recognition their Formal Party counterparts have. Ideological and Identity Pressure Groups often organize independently of candidates but work to push voters on certain issues or to accept particular people standing for election. Ideological and Identity Pressure Groups will endorse candidates based on their values or identity respectively, and are similar in all but their ideological grounding. Ideological Pressure Groups will seek to support candidates who share a set of core values, expecting those candidates to then advance a particular ideological agenda once elected. Identity Pressure Groups do not hold

candidates to ideological standards, instead seeking to promote the candidacy of people who share their identity, be that gender, racial, cultural, sexuality, ability, or religious.

Confluences and Incipient Parties are the final two forms of Liminal Parties. A Confluence is a collection of partisans and groups from a wide array of ideological and organizational backgrounds with the goal of contesting an election on a "unified ticket". This unique fusion of partisan groups helps elect like-minded candidates who agree on core principles, particularly in a First Past The Post electoral system where competition may diminish the chances of each constituent group. Incipient Parties are those organizations that are on the precipice of becoming Formal Parties, but have either not matured to this point or are prohibited by law or convention from doing so. These groups will focus specifically on municipal issues and will either endorse or run candidates, operating as a party in all but name.

Finally, Formal Parties are the most commonly recognized form of party organization thanks to their prevalence at the federal and provincial levels in Canada. The first form, *Équipes*, are most common in Quebec, but appear in other jurisdictions as well. These bodies are the most ephemeral of the party types, appearing during elections and then often becoming dormant during inter-election periods. These bodies exist to support the candidacy of a head-of-ticket contender, most likely a mayor. *Équipes* will often be named for their leader and present a slate of candidates who will be loyal to the party's "leader", serving as a reliable voting bloc on council for the head-of-ticket's agenda. The Branch Party is a local wing of a federal and/or provincial party that will maintain formal ties and share resources with the central party office. While historically common, Branch Parties have faded in more recent eras. Last among the Formal Parties is the Distinct Local Party, which is a unique entity focused on a specific municipality that has a strong central organization, regularly includes its membership in decisions, conducts activities outside elections, and responds specifically to local needs.

Distinguishing between those parties that operate in the open and shadow groups makes clear the complicated nature of municipal politics across the federation, acknowledging the distinctions between municipal regimes in British Columbia and Ontario, while not precluding the possibility that there is coordinated partisan activity happening in the latter. Chronicling the use of non-partisanship as a partisan tactic fully covers the municipal situation in Ontario, where the Reform Era ideology remains law.

These fundamentally foundational concepts will help to inform the analysis in the following chapters. Without these core ideas being established, or through simply relying on the patchwork of previously existing conceptualizations of the municipal partisan situation in Canadian cities would not be sufficient for the kind of analysis that follows.

5 – Local Leaders: Understanding Municipal Candidates in Ontario and British Columbia

Sitting on a sofa on a Sunday afternoon
Going to the candidates' debate
Laugh about it, shout about it
When you've got to choose
Every way you look at this you lose
Mrs. Robinson – Simon & Garfunkel

5.1 – A two-stage analysis of local elections: Stage one

The 2018 municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia offered an opportunity to better understand municipal candidates and the partisan networks that support them. To do this, it was necessary to determine who candidates were as individuals. News reports and candidate websites provide limited information and can inadvertently or purposefully omit information about a candidate. Surveying candidates on their identities, motivations, and political connections was an attempt to gather information that can otherwise be difficult to ascertain.

This chapter will discuss the scope of the survey, determined during the political crisis in Toronto caused by a last-minute realignment of ward boundaries. It will then outline the process of contacting candidates in Ontario and British Columbia. Then, the chapter will discuss the secondary component of this study, namely the collection of missing data from those candidates who declined to participate in the survey or did not respond to survey prompts and an investigation of candidate financial records.

After a brief discussion of survey challenges and select comments from candidates made through email or in the survey itself, I present an overview of candidate demographics and characteristics from the survey, comparing them to provincial averages where appropriate. I will conclude with an analysis of respondents' partisan affiliations and feelings toward party involvement in local government.

5.2 – Background and scope

My original dissertation proposal focused on four cities, Toronto and Ottawa in Ontario and Vancouver and Surrey in British Columbia, but this plan changed abruptly on the evening of July 26th, 2018. Reports circulated that recently elected Ontario Premier Doug Ford – a former Toronto city councillor and mayoral candidate – would introduce legislation to redraw Toronto's ward boundaries the following day, which was also the last day of nominations. The reduction was an

attempt to realize an unfinished goal from his tenure on Toronto City Council, where Ford had advocated aligning Toronto's municipal wards with the city's federal and provincial electoral districts, and consequently reducing the number of city councillors (Benzie, 2018). This proposal destabilized the political situation in Toronto, with local officials and candidates regularly referring to the changes as "chaos" (Rider et al., 2018). A columnist for the Toronto Star summarized the situation by writing: "So he's [Ford] throwing a bomb. In a pure display of belligerent power, in the middle of an election campaign, just as nominations close, to throw the city government into chaos," (Keenan, 2018).

With lawsuits launched against the Ford government's plan and the insistence on the part of the Premier that any measures would be taken to ensure the success of his plan – eventually threatening to invoke the Notwithstanding Clause of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Benzie et al., 2018)[26] – the fate of the city's municipal election was called into question. The complex legal situation and the now-reduced timeframe raised the possibilities that Toronto's election could be delayed for an indefinite period of time over concerns the election would not be "fair" (Gray, 2018).

Premier Ford's action led me to reorient my research design. Concerned over a delayed election in Toronto, I expanded the survey to include the 25 largest cities in Ontario and the 15 largest cities in British Columbia to ensure adequate data if the election in Toronto or other cities were delayed. Expanding the scope of the candidate survey produced a candidate population of 2,512 in Ontario and 762 in British Columbia. This change also expanded the geographic coverage to wider regions in both provinces (see Figure 6).

My survey of municipal candidates in Ontario and British Columbia ran from July 31st, 2018 to November 16th, 2018. A population of 2,512 candidates in 25 municipalities in Ontario and 762 candidates in 15 municipalities in British Columbia were contacted during that time. By the final day of the survey, 632 full responses were recorded along with 368 partial responses for

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[26] The Notwithstanding Clause is an element of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms that allows, upon invocation, a provincial government to "override" the rights and freedoms listed therein and pass legislation that would otherwise be in violation of said rights and freedoms as long as they indicate which rights and freedoms the legislation violates. This Clause was used by nationalist *Parti québécois* governments in Quebec from 1982 to 1985 to protest the adoption of the Canadian Constitution 1982. The Clause, before 2021, had only been used three other times in Canadian history; once in relation to a land use planning bill in Yukon, once to protect back-to-work legislation in Saskatchewan, and once to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman in Alberta (Brosseau et al., 2018). Ford's government broke that record, employing the Clause in June, 2021, to pass an election spending bill that had previously been ruled a violation of the Charter (McKenzie-Sutter, 2021).

a total of 1,000 responses in Ontario while 162 full responses and 55 partial responses were recorded for a total of 217 responses were recorded in British Columbia. In Ontario, 1,050 candidates did not respond to inquiries and 78 declined to participate, while in British Columbia, 32 declined while 435 candidates did not respond.

The survey elicited demographic information and political opinions from a wide range of candidates across many municipalities seeking many different local offices. The majority of candidates in both provinces were political novices, male, white, heterosexual, and were well-educated. Additionally, the majority of respondents noted they were not members or supporters of a political party. Among those who were, the plurality in Ontario indicated a support for the federal or provincial Liberal Parties, while the plurality of those in British Columbia did the same for the NDP. The majority of respondents in both provinces also expressed opposition to the involvement of political parties at the local level.

Although the survey was successful overall, obtaining contact information for each candidate was time- and labour-intensive, particularly in Ontario. Candidates also resisted completing a survey during the campaign period, noting busy schedules and distrust of unfamiliar figures asking personal questions. The desire to match survey questions to Census questions also caused problems, as some candidates objected to seeing the word "Aboriginal" used, rather than "Indigenous". Many candidates also applied a broad definition to "mixed race", resulting in much higher numbers for that category than can be found in the general population.

The survey provided a helpful foundation on which a larger analysis of candidate identity, party connection, and finances was built. The self-identification of candidates with particular identities and values added a helpful component that would have otherwise not been captured performing an analysis of campaign materials, social media profiles, and media coverage alone.

5.3 – Contacting candidates

In Ontario, cities record the roster of candidates and their contact information independently rather than through a centralized, province-wide database, and post the information on their municipal websites. In contrast, British Columbia's elections authority manages local elections in concert with municipalities but a non-government organization (NGO) – CivicInfo BC – provided the most

up-to-date and detailed information on registered candidates.[27] The registration of candidates was confirmed by finding the same information on each municipality's website. In most instances, such candidate information included contact information (email address) and information on the identity of the candidate, specifically their name, office sought, incumbency status, elector organization, and gender. I used their email addresses as the primary means to solicit survey participation.

I searched candidate's websites and social media (Twitter, LinkedIn, Facebook) to find contact information if the registration data did not include an active email address (355 in Ontario, 50 in British Columbia). In BC, contacting some candidates was complicated if they ran as part of an elector organization because some would provide only a general email address for the party. In these cases, I made inquiries to the party organization to obtain individual email addresses or used website and social media searches.

The survey of municipal candidates ran for 109 days, from July 31st, 2018 to November 16th, 2018. Candidates in Ontario were the first contacted, as nominations opened on May 1st, 2018 and closed on July 27th, 2018. Candidates in British Columbia were contacted later, as BC features a more compact nomination timeline, running for only 10 days from September 4th, 2018 to September 14th, 2018 (see Figure 7).

Candidates generally responded based on their availability and in response to prompts. In Ontario, a substantial number of candidates (197) answered the survey within the first three days of receiving an invitation. Many candidates responded to a pre-campaign prompt/initial email to new or re-registered candidates in Toronto that was sent in early September and a substantial number responded after a final prompt one week following the election in October. Candidates in British Columbia only received two prompts thanks to the shortened nomination window, which meant that I did not have complete contact information until one week before election day. As in Ontario, many candidates (76) responded within the first three days (see Figure 7).

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[27] CivicInfo BC is an independent organization consisting of the British Columbia Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Union of BC Municipalities, professional organizations representing BC-based municipal employees, and the Local Government Institute at the University of Victoria. (CivicInfo BC, 2021). As an independent organization, their data is reliable.

Figure 6 – Stage 1 case cities in British Columbia and Ontario
(Maps by author)

135

Figure 7 - Candidate responses per day in Ontario and British Columbia
(Author's own work)

In Ontario, 87% of candidates in the case cities were contacted compared to 94% of candidates in British Columbia (see Figure 8). While a smaller percentage of total candidates were contacted in Ontario, a greater number responded to the survey. In total, 632 full responses were recorded along with 368 partial responses for a total of 1,000 responses (39.7%). While 1,050 candidates did not respond to inquiries, 78 declined to participate. In British Columbia, 162 full responses and 55 partial responses were recorded for a total of 217 responses (28.5%). Those declining numbered 32 while 435 candidates did not respond.

Candidates Contacted in Ontario

Candidates Contacted in British Columbia

Figure 8 - Sankey diagrams of candidate interactions
(Author's own work)

The number of candidates who answered the survey varied widely city, ranging from under 45% in Burlington, Ontario to just 8% in Saanich, British Columbia. Overall, Ontario's average response rate was 28%, while British Columbia's was 22% (see Figure 9). Receiving responses from over 1/5 of candidates is typical for this kind of survey, and I appreciate the time it took to respond, particularly for people in the middle of campaigns and the busyness of everyday life.

Figure 9 - Percent response rate per municipality
(Author's own work)

<u>5.4 – Preliminary comments from respondents</u>

Interacting with the public while conducting research brings unique challenges. Candidates for office are expected to be busy people with unique schedules and time constraints. The hope was that, in issuing the survey to candidates in Ontario early in the campaign period, the pressure to their schedule would be light enough to allow them an opportunity to respond. This was not the case in British Columbia, given the province's shorter nomination timeline. A final follow-up email was sent post-election reminding candidates about the survey and informing them that the survey would remain open for many weeks following the vote in each province.

Despite this, many candidates expressed concern over receiving a survey invitation. A number of school trustee candidates responded saying they did not feel like they were municipal candidates in the same sense as council and mayoral candidates and had hesitation in responding. Others had concerns over privacy and required email or phone verification regarding the legitimacy of the project. A small number of candidates took the step of contacting the McGill Research Ethics Board for confirmation.

Three candidates demanded financial compensation for completing the survey, with a candidate in Ottawa responding "I value my time at 1 million dollars an hour. Do the math and pay me and I'll do your surveys," (Ottawa Mayoral Candidate 1, 2018).[28] I was unable to provide financial compensation to candidates for their participation and responded to these requests outlining my financial limitations. It is difficult to ascertain if these demands were genuine or simply an effort to "troll" a researcher.[29]

Another Ottawa candidate questioned the validity of an electronic survey. An email exchange on July 31st, 2018 ended with a reply from the candidate: "If that is what we have come to, that someone can now do a PHD [sic] via on-line survey, than [sic] so be it." (Ottawa School Trustee Candidate 1, 2018). Despite the attempts to survey candidates during the summer months and before campaigning began in earnest, many candidates expressed frustration at being contacted. A council candidate in Surrey responded to the initial contact by writing: "Your survey

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[28] Comments have been edited for very minor spelling and grammatical errors as otherwise noted.
[29] "Trolling" refers to efforts made by people communicating in online spaces that are "malicious in intent and aims to disrupt, aggravate, and lure victims into unproductive conversation/arguments," (March and Marrington, 2019). My responses to these requests were made assuming some element of trolling was at play and, thus, sought to defuse the situation and focus on productive research.

is very demanding...There is no way I am taking this much time out of my campaign to do social science before election day," (Surrey Council Candidate 1, 2018).

A small, but notable group of candidates were those who did not respond to the survey, but took the opportunity of receiving an email to respond by expressing their displeasure at the nature of municipal campaigning or, particularly after the campaign, at the outcome of the vote. A small group of candidates wrote to "vent" about the campaign and lament their loss. A council candidate in Toronto, for example, responded with a lengthy email outlining frustration with the new council's composition, water-fluoridation, the Ontario Liberal Party, and a belief that those on social assistance "have more disposable income than most struggling Middle-Class families." This candidate offered advice on reshaping this project, writing "Your focus should not be on the people running for office, but rather on the psychological stability of the public," (Toronto Council Candidate 1, 2018).

Candidate comments regarding parties both reflect the belief that local races are properly non-partisan and that federal and provincial parties exert "shadow" influence in them. Many comments from Ontario expressed a general antipathy toward partisan involvement without an explanation as to why party participation was negative. A council candidate in Barrie simply responded with "I think ANYONE associated to ANY political party should be disqualified from running locally."

While reviewing these comments, it became evident that candidates in Ontario interpreted the question as asking about their feelings toward the participation of federal and provincial parties through Branch Parties. A council candidate in Kingston, for example, expressed displeasure with perceived Shadow Party participation in their race, listing the (assumed) partisan affiliations of their opponents and noting, "There seems to be an undercurrent of party politics. I did not promote my Conservative leaning other than use coded language in my campaign material."

Many respondents similarly touched on the idea that some candidates were "concealed Conservatives". Opponents of those perceived to be or identified as federal Conservative or provincial PC Party members expressed frustration at the party's tactics, with a council candidate in Cambridge noting,

> ...I was up against an incumbent who is an active member of the provincial PC party. From the first week in I felt the machinations at work. I knew at the end of the first week that I would not be able to beat him. He and his people use all the tricks of the trade and I couldn't beat them on my own. I still went ahead and gave it my all. I know

the incumbent was nervous because he pulled out all the stops, spent more money than ever before and used a few surprise tactics to clinch the win. My daughter told me she was extra proud of me. At the end she said, "So Mom, how does it feel to almost single handedly [sic] scare the Conservative Party?"

Other responses repeated the conventional wisdom that non-partisan systems provide conservative candidates an advantage (see: Lee 1960; Hawley 1973). This idea was supported by a council candidate in Toronto who succinctly noted "Right leaning candidates use the non-party model to their benefit."

Some candidates were candid in their connection to Shadow Party groups. A council candidate in Hamilton responded,

It is an understood reality that political parties, although not officially a part of municipal elections, are unofficially putting their machine of volunteers and influence behind certain candidates. I, in fact, contacted my local NDP offices to check in with them to make sure I wasn't campaigning against someone they were already putting their support behind.

A council candidate in Barrie also referenced the clandestine way parties can provide support to candidates, writing "...candidates in the Conservative Party use membership lists and connections to identify voters, sign placement and donor networks." Direct evidence to support this claim was not found during this study. An Ottawa school trustee simply noted "I think one would be naïve if they believe that political parties are not involved in municipal government."

The answers of respondents in Ontario pointed to two major philosophies regarding partisan involvement in local elections: a rejection of party politics at the local level for abstract reasons and an acknowledgement of the presence of Shadow Party groups. Very few respondents reflected on parties in a positive way, though those that did expressed support for DLPs and/or highlighted potential benefits. A council candidate in Kitchener noted, "I suspect that having political party involvement in municipal politics could increase voter turnout, but I would prefer that these were municipal political parties and not merely extensions of provincial or federal parties." This was echoed by a council candidate in Markham, who wrote, "Local parties, such as those in Montreal and Vancouver, should be considered in Ontario, particularly in larger cities, to help streamline decision making." An Ottawa school trustee candidate reflected on the potential positives, writing "It makes elections more accessible for those who have less time to do the leg work (i.e., single mother of multiple children)."

The responses of candidates in British Columbia were surprising. The province has featured strong elector organizations in local politics since the 1930s, and, as such, has a stronger culture of partisan participation. Despite this, just over 59% of respondents provided negative comments regarding parties. Similar to party opponents in Ontario, those who were opposed to partisan involvement in British Columbia's local elections disliked the idea of parties in the abstract. A school board trustee candidate in Victoria responded by writing, "I think it sucks! Good people, engaged in their local community, and focused on their local community are what municipalities need to support strong and healthy communities."

Many of those who were supportive or had mixed opinions noted the need for parties thanks to British Columbia's widespread use of at-large electoral systems. A Vancouver school board trustee candidate noted, "required unless there is a ward system...Impossible without a party. No independents got elected [to the Vancouver District School Board]." A Vancouver parks board commissioner candidate echoed this sentiment, writing, "Vancouver's at-large voting system, rather than running in a designated ward, makes party affiliation significant. It's difficult (but not impossible) to be elected as an independent - unless you are already fairly well known for past political or community work." Some respondents who reflected on the importance of parties in the at-large system also expressed a desire to run as independents in a ward-based system.

Other party supporters noted the positive impacts parties had on communicating values and helping provide resources to candidates. A council candidate in Victoria observed that "Political parties are useful at the local government level in aggregating candidates according to sets of values, and thereby assisting voters in identifying those candidates who align with their values." A Surrey school board trustee candidate remarked that, "It is beneficial to have a political party behind your campaign. Not only for financial support but moral support and team effort."

Candidates expressed a variety of opinions, toward both the questions in the survey and toward the survey itself. The challenges of running a municipal campaign – from the time commitment, organizational stresses, fundraising challenges, personal exertion, and the overwhelming vulnerability of presenting yourself and your ideas to the public for their approval or disapproval – are immense. I appreciate the time and comments from each of the candidates, as they provided incredible insight into the background, identity, and personality of each person running. While some candidates expressed their displeasure at being contacted for a study or their

frustration at their electoral prospects or performance, many more provided thoughtful comments and insight into the complexities of municipal campaigns.

<u>5.5 – Candidate basics</u>

Respondents to this survey were majority men, older, non-Indigenous, white, and straight with higher levels of education than the general population and more likely to work in education, law, government, or management than the population of their provinces. More respondents identified as Queer and as members of political parties than the general population. The make-up of respondents calls into question the Lightbody assertion, in that both partisan and non-partisan systems as they exist in Ontario and British Columbia see a candidate pool that is relatively similar. Though this survey is merely of candidates and does not consider electoral success or ballot placement. This will be considered in more detail in Chapter 6.

The first set of questions asked candidates about their motivations and experience (see: Appendices A and B). Candidates were asked about the office they were seeking and if they had run for office at any level previously. The majority of candidates in Ontario and British Columbia indicated they had not previously run for office at any level. Of the remaining candidates who had sought elected office in the past, those who ran for council constituted to plurality of respondents in both provinces, followed by school trustee and then mayor. In British Columbia, 2.35% of respondents indicated they had run for Parks Board Commissioner in Vancouver. Those seeking provincial office were the next largest group, followed by those who had sought federal office, with those who had been a nomination contestant for a political party's nomination for either federal or provincial office were the smallest group (see Table 7).

Previous Office Sought	Ontario	British Columbia
Mayor	3.04%	3.53%
Councillor	17.10%	18.24%
Trustee (All Boards)	13.91%	17.06%
Public School Trustee	7.54%	*n/a*
Catholic School Trustee	4.64%	
French Public School Trustee	1.01%	
French Catholic School Trustee	0.72%	
Parks Board Commissioner	*n/a*	2.35%
Member of Parliament	1.74%	1.18%
Member of Provincial Parliament/Member of the Legislative Assembly	2.32%	4.12%
Nomination Contestant (Provincial or Federal)	0.87%	1.18%
Not Previously a Candidate	63.04%	55.29%

Following this, candidates were asked a series of open-ended questions, asking for elaboration on political experience, any community service experience, the reasons they are seeking office, the important issues and problems facing their communities, and any barriers they face in running. The open-ended question regarding any barriers to one's candidacy elicited very interesting and informative responses, both on the part of candidates explaining how their identity as a racialized minority, a woman, a Queer person, a low-income worker, a student, a young person, or an immigrant may negatively impact their chances and from white, cis-gender candidates who believed they faced barriers thanks to their lack of diversity.

The next section of the survey collected demographic data. Respondents were asked about their gender, age, immigrant status, ethnicity, Indigenous identity, racialized minority status, sexuality, education, and profession.

Candidates were asked to indicate their gender identity, including a non-binary alternative, although fewer than 1% of candidates selected this option or "other". The Canadian Census did not include a non-binary option in 2016, so comparisons with the rest of the population are

difficult.[30] Overall, more individuals identifying as men ran for local office than those identifying as women, a ratio higher than their relative share of the population.

Table 8 - Gender Identity of candidate respondents in Ontario and British Columbia vs. provincial averages from the 2016 Census
(Author's own work)

Gender Identity	Ontario		British Columbia	
	Candidate Respondents	*Provincial Average*	*Candidate Respondents*	*Provincial Average*
Men	56.26%	48.77%	53.05%	49.02%
Women	41.58%	51.23%	42.68%	50.98%
Non-Binary/Other	0.93%	*n/a*	0.61%	*n/a*
Decline to answer	*1.24%*		*3.66%*	

To measure age, the survey asked candidates for their year of their birth, which was then subtracted from 2018, providing an approximate age. Ages spanned over 60 years, ranging from 19 to 81, but in both provinces, candidates averaged nearly 10 years older (50 in Ontario; 52 in British Columbia) than the population as a whole.

The survey asked candidates to list their ethnic origins. This is a complex question because many people have ancestors from several different ethnicities and others identify simply as "Canadian." As with the Census, the survey gave candidates the option to select as many ethnicities as they wanted. This makes summarizing the results complicated, so I used the standard technique used by Statistics Canada and grouped responses into larger categories.

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[30] Research conducted on the topic of including a non-binary option on surveys found no negative reaction to the inclusion of such a question (Medeiros et al., 2020). The 2021 Canadian Census will include questions on non-binary other gender identities (Statistics Canada, 2020).

Figure 10 – Ethnic origins of candidate respondents vs. provincial averages
(Author's own work)
Note: Percent totals for each province come from the 2016 Canadian Census, which allows respondents to select multiple backgrounds.

The majority of respondents listed their ethnic origins as being European, from the British Isles (English, Welsh, Scottish, or Irish), or Canadian. In Ontario, the next largest group were those of South Asian (Indian, Pakistani, Sri Lankan, etc.) origins, while members of those communities tied with those of East Asian (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, etc.) origin in British Columbia.

Candidates were asked to list their Indigenous status from among the same options Canadians are given on the Census: First Nations, Métis, Inuk/Inuit, or Not Indigenous. In Ontario, 2.75% of candidate respondents indicated Indigenous heritage, which is close to the 2016 Census' provincial average of 2.83% of the population. A larger percent – 8.12% - of respondents in British Columbia indicated they had Indigenous heritage, which is slightly higher than the 2016 provincial proportion of 5.93%.

The survey then asked about racialized minority status. On average, there were relatively fewer racialized minority candidates in both Ontario (24%) and British Columbia (26%), compared to their population shares, 29% and 30% respectively.

Figure 11 – Racialized minority status of candidate respondents vs. provincial averages

(Author's own work)

This disparity holds true for largest single subcategories in each province. Fewer Black candidates ran than the percentage of Ontarians who are Black and fewer South Asian candidates stood for office in British Columbia than that group's proportion of the provincial population. The one exception to this pattern was the number of candidates who said that they were members of multiple racialized minority groups. Candidate respondents were much more likely than the general population to say that they belonged to more than one racialized minority community, suggesting a different conceptualization of race and identity among respondents than among the general population.

The survey then asked about candidate sexuality, given an option to select one identity from a list or write their own identity under "other". Just under 9% of respondents in each province indicated they were members of a sexual minority community (gay, lesbian, Queer, etc.). While the 2016 Census did not ask specifics about sexuality, Statistics Canada has conducted surveys of the population to provide general population estimates. The 2014 Canadian Community Health Survey found that 3% of the population across Canada identified as "homosexual" or "bisexual", up from 2% in 2004 (Statistics Canada, 2017e). By 2018, this number had increased to 4% of the population, with younger Canadians more openly identifying as members of the Queer community (Statistics Canada, 2021). The small, but steady, increase in the size of the Queer population is

reflective of growing public acceptance of the Queer community. Pew Research Center reports have observed a 16% increase in support (from 69% to 85%) for the Queer community between 2002 and 2019 (Poushter and Kent, 2020). The high number of Queer-identified candidate respondents is notable, though it can be explained by the fact that the largest cities in each province were those surveyed, as large urban centres have historically been (and certainly remain) the "natural spaces" for Queer people to reside (Baldwin Hess et al., 2021)

The inclusion of "other" as an option for sexuality and the addition of text boxes for respondents to write comments provoked numerous comments. In the free-response box, 1.25% of candidates stated that they were "allies" of the Queer community. A small, but noteworthy, group of respondents took the opportunity to write disparaging comments about the Queer community, noted that "straight" should be an option, or questioned the usefulness of asking about sexuality at all. A council candidate in Kingston, for example, wrote in the comment section for this question, "Seriously, how does this play a factor in municipal campaigns are you funded by the JT [Justin Trudeau] Liberals?"

Candidates were then asked about their level of education. This question provided a simple list that corresponded to the same question asked on the Census from which respondents could select their highest achieved level. Overall, candidates had more education than the general population; a far higher percent had at least an undergraduate degree – 65.89% in Ontario and 56.63% in British Columbia – than the provincial averages. Indeed, most candidates in both provinces had at least a bachelor's degree, and far fewer candidates had no formal education when compared with the general population. Of particular note was the proportion of candidates with Master's degrees and PhDs. In Ontario, the proportion of candidates with a Master's degree was four times higher than the provincial average (23.52% of candidates compared to 5.38% of the population).

Following education, candidates were asked about their "industry" at the time of their candidacy. The options provided followed the NAICS system (North American Industry Classification System) that categorizes professions into broad categories. Unlike the Census, candidates were also given the opportunity to indicate their "profession" as a full-time parent, a student, retired, or unemployed. Of note in this category was the high proportion of those in "Occupations in education, law and social, community and government services" such as lawyers, teachers, policy researchers, social workers, academics, and those in management positions who

were candidates, particularly in relation to the proportion of each province working in the same fields (see Table 9).

Table 9 - Professions of candidate respondents in Ontario and British Columbia vs. provincial averages from the 2016 Census (Author's own work)

NAICS-categorized industry	Ontario		British Columbia	
	Candidates	*Provincial Average*	*Candidates*	*Provincial Average*
Occupations in education, law and social, community and government services	23.70%	11.64%	19.51%	10.89%
Management occupations	18.37%	11.07%	18.90%	11.13%
Business, finance and administration occupations	13.66%	15.75%	10.98%	14.93%
Sales and service occupations	8.01%	22.85%	8.54%	24.08%
Natural and applied sciences and related occupations	4.87%	7.32%	4.27%	6.53%
Trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations	4.71%	12.99%	10.98%	14.93%
Occupations in art, culture, recreation and sport	4.87%	3.16%	4.27%	3.77%
Health occupations	2.51%	6.26%	5.49%	6.59%
Occupations in manufacturing and utilities	1.41%	5.06%	0.00%	3.10%
Natural resources, agriculture and related production occupations	0.31%	1.59%	3.05%	2.60%
Retired	8.95%		10.98%	
Full-time parent	2.83%		1.83%	
Student	1.57%		0.61%	
Unemployed	1.41%		0.61%	
Decline to answer	*2.83%*		*3.66%*	

5.6 – Candidates and Partisanship

The final section of the survey polled respondents on their partisan affiliations, their political connections, and their beliefs surrounding parties in local politics. Here, the surveys for each province differed slightly. The British Columbia version of the survey first asked candidates if they were an endorsed candidate of an Elector Organization, with 26.22% responding affirmatively. This figure suggests a lack of participation on the part of Elector Organization-backed candidates, as my independent tabulation of candidates nominated by elector organizations is 33.07% in the 15 case cities.

Respondents in both provinces were then asked about their external endorsements and affiliations, for example if they were endorsed by "political advocacy groups" (meaning Pressure

Groups such as ProudPolitics or the Campaign Life Coalition – see Chapter 4), if they had the endorsement or support from partisan groups, labour organizations, and/or any neighbourhood groups (community associations, Business Improvement Areas, Chambers of Commerce, etc.). Very few candidates responded in the affirmative to these questions. Under 5% of respondents in both provinces indicated that they had been endorsed or given support from advocacy groups, local partisan associations, or neighbourhood groups. The number of candidates indicating that they had been supported by labour was higher, with 6.23% of respondents in Ontario and 17.18% of respondents in British Columbia indicating they had some level of support from unions or CLC-affiliated labour councils.

Finally, the survey asked if candidates were members or donors to registered federal or provincial parties, and which parties they supported. When asked about their partisan affiliations, most candidates (64% in Ontario and 61% in British Columbia) said they had no party affiliation at the federal or provincial levels. While the majority of candidate respondents indicated no partisan affiliation, the number of those with affiliations is far higher than estimates of party membership in Canada. Parties do not regularly provide membership number updates and membership levels grow and shrink based on events such as elections, nomination contests, and leadership elections, though estimates place the number of Canadians as belonging to a political party at between 1% and 2% (Cross, 2015).

Among those candidates who did indicate an affiliation, support was varied. In Ontario, candidates associated with parties mostly commonly listed Liberal, Conservative and/or PC, or NDP. Notably, approximately 3% of respondents indicated they supported a mix of parties from across the political spectrum (see Table 10).

In British Columbia, the largest single group of candidates were associated with the NDP (36%). Beyond that, however, the situation in British Columbia is complicated. The political positions of the BC Liberal Party are closer to the federal Conservative Party than the federal Liberals. This is reflected by the responses indicating similar levels of support among those aligned with the BC Liberals to both the federal Liberals (12%) and federal Conservatives (10%). Supporters of the federal Liberals and BC Liberals tied with supporters of the Greens at 16% (see Table 11).

Table 10 - Partisan affiliation of Ontario respondents

Partisan Affiliation Among Ontario Respondents (federal and/or provincial unless otherwise noted)		
Liberals		35.44%
Conservatives and/or Ontario Progressive Conservative		26.58%
NDP		18.99%
Green		5.91%
Minor Parties†		2.53%
Conservatives/Ontario Progressive Conservative **and** Liberal		2.11%
Multi	Mix	3.38%
	Left	2.11%
	Right	1.69%
NDP **and** Liberal		1.27%

*Multi means a respondent listed multiple parties. Right indicates several right-wing federal and/or provincial parties, namely the Conservatives, PCs, Christian Heritage Party, Progressive Canadian, and/or Ontario Alliance. Left indicates several left-wing parties, namely the NDP, Greens, and/or Communist Party. Mix means an array of parties from across the political spectrum.

†Minor parties include the Animal Protection Party (Federal), the provincial and federal Communist Parties, the Libertarian Party (Federal), the None of the Above Direct Democracy Party (Provincial), the Northern Ontario Party (Provincial), and the Progressive Canadian Party (Federal)

Table 11 - Partisan affiliation of British Columbia respondents

Partisan Affiliation Among British Columbia Respondents (federal and/or provincial unless otherwise noted)		
NDP		35.59%
Federal Liberals		35.44%
Green		11.86%
BC Liberals	**and** Federal Liberals	11.86%
	and Federal Conservatives	10.17%
	only	8.47%
Federal Conservatives		6.78%
Multi*	Left	5.08%
	Right	1.69%
	Mix	1.69%
Minor Parties†		1.69%

*Multi means a respondent listed multiple parties. Right indicates several right-wing federal and/or provincial parties, such as the Conservatives, BC Social Credit Party, etc. Left indicates several left-wing parties, such as the NDP, Greens, Communist Party, etc. Mix means an array of parties from across the political spectrum.

†Minor parties include the Libertarian Party (Federal)

The final free-response question asked respondents their opinion on the participation of political parties in local politics specifically (see: Appendix B and C for question wording). As this was an open-ended free response, I manually categorized responses based on whether they were supportive or unsupportive. An example of a supportive comment is "I believe political parties should be allowed to be more involved and to give support to municipal candidates," which clearly and unambiguously states support for parties at the local level. This is in contrast to a comment from a candidate who did not support parties, which read, "I believe that political parties should be nowhere near the municipal level. In fact, it should be illegal for them to go near municipal elections." Similarly, those with "mixed" opinions would point out the positives and the negatives of political party involvement locally, such as the candidate who responded,

> I think it's both a benefit and a problem. Involvement with higher levels of government would help to streamline policies and collaboration between different levels of government in one regard but might also cause a lot of issues with political parties imposing their will on cities.

This sentiment highlights both sides of the idea without necessarily taking a firm stance. Candidate ambivalence toward the issue may indicate a lack of understanding of what benefits and drawbacks partisan participation can have, or may be a reflection of their own complicated relationship with municipal elections and partisan participation.

The remaining responses were more challenging to categorize. Most who had no opinion or were unsure responded with "No opinion," though some chose to elaborate more, as was the case with the respondent who wrote, "At the municipal level, I don't think it makes a difference." Some candidates used the free text box to issue other statements unrelated to party politics in local government, as was the case with the candidate who wrote,

> I don't like politician most of them aren't 'hard working', my Councillor have been elected for 30 years, and she keeps her name on the ballot and wins by default. I don't see any 'tangible results of her job', and the only one she gave us was a shelter for 10 years.

The commenter may have meant to imply that said councillor was affiliated with a party or that they believed they were affiliated with a party, but the response is clearly not addressing the main question. The most difficult comments to categorize were the ones where the respondent's intent was unclear. These were comments where the respondent may have tried to express an opinion, but the meaning was not captured in their written response, such as the respondents who

commented, "I think it makescsensrnoJ [sic]," and "Bad questions City politics does not include party politics." While there may have been an intention to provide a stated position on the topic, the responses did not make that intent clear.

The majority of survey respondents provided comments to this question (87.66% of respondents in Ontario, 90.74% in British Columbia). Most respondents in both provinces were "unsupportive" of the idea of parties participating in municipal elections. In Ontario, only 4.69% of respondents were supportive of party involvement and over 70% were against. In contrast, support in British Columbia was nearly three times higher (14.29%) and opposition (59.18%) was substantially lower (see Table 12). Opposition to parties in British Columbia was still high, particularly considering the institutionalized presence of formal parties in that province.

Table 12 - Responses to a prompt regarding party participation in municipal elections
(Author's calculations)

Response to party involvement in municipal elections	Ontario		British Columbia	
	%	n	%	n
Supportive	4.69%	26	14.29%	21
Mixed	10.83%	60	17.01%	25
Unsupportive	70.22%	389	59.18%	87
No Opinion/Unsure	6.14%	34	4.08%	6
Response to question unrelated	3.97%	22	3.40%	5
Intent of answer unclear	3.79%	21	2.04%	3
Decline to answer	0.36%	2	0%	0
		554		*147*

5.7 – Conclusions

While under half of all candidates contacted for this survey responded, the portrait of the candidate pool in the 2018 municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia is made more clear by their participation. Candidate comments regarding partisan participation in municipal elections were insightful and very helpful, with many candidates echoing the hypothesis developed for this investigation. The admission that overwhelming majority of candidate respondents in both provinces were also political novices helps to highlight the campaign experience of those seeking local office.

The demographic information provided by candidate respondents was insightful. A majority of respondents in both provinces were men and listed a cultural identity as either from the British Isles or Europe more generally. The majority of respondents were also white and an inordinate number of respondents classified themselves as "mixed race" when compared to the general population in each province. While the majority of respondents indicated they were straight, the number of Queer respondents was still notably higher than general population estimates. Candidates were also more educated than the general public and were more likely to work in education, law, community and government services, or in management positions. More candidates were also members of political parties than estimates from among the Canadian population. Finally, candidate respondents expressed overwhelming disapproval regarding the participation of political parties in local politics.

The survey helped to provide some initial context into the situation regarding those seeking local office in Ontario and British Columbia. From this, more research was conducted into the identity, characteristics, and affiliations of candidates. Candidates in Ontario had their financial records analyzed and a determination was made into how municipal donors also donated federally. This allowed for a determination of a candidate's shadow party affiliation which was then used to compare Ontario (non-partisan with heavy shadow party and limited CA and LP involvement) and British Columbia (formally partisan) which follows in Chapter 6.

6 – "Do You Know How to Get to City Hall?": Diversity on the Ballot

6.1 – A two-stage analysis of local elections: Stage two

What do we know about local leaders in Canada? Prior chapters have traced the historical development of non-partisanship in municipal elections and governance, where I argue that such "good governance" measures served to limit the power of organized labour and other politically marginalized groups. In this chapter, I analyze municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia in 2018 to test for ongoing effects of this strategy. As municipal populations grow more socially diverse, the capacity of elections to produce demographically representative results becomes especially critical. The survey results reviewed in the prior chapter show that – in general – members of traditionally marginalized groups remain under-represented in elected municipal positions. I now examine factors that lead to variations in this general pattern.

Prior research on party support and diversity in national-level elections leads to three expected outcomes: members of historically marginalized communities who would otherwise have trouble "getting on the ballot" will have higher proportions of partisan network support; candidates of these backgrounds who *do* have partisan support will perform better electorally; and the effects of formal party support (such as that present in British Columbia) will be stronger than the effects of informal and Incipient parties (namely those in Ontario).

Analyses of national-level elections indicates that greater numbers of women, racialized minorities, and Queer candidates will have formal or shadow party support. Research points toward party groups encouraging the candidacy of women (Cheng and Tavits, 2011; Cross and Pruysers, 2019), members of racialized minority communities (Tolley, 2019), and Queer people (Everitt, Tremblay, and Wagner, 2019; Wagner, 2019), particularly in the cases when individuals from these communities are active within the recruitment process. As the structural, social, political, and financial barriers present in municipal politics led to Lightbody's assessment regarding the demographic make-up of local councils, I predict that a greater proportion of those members of historically marginalized communities who do end up on the ballot will have partisan backing.

Further to this point, the organizational capacity provided by political parties may provide extra assistance to members of historically marginalized communities that could give them an advantage in their electoral contests. If structural barriers exist that make candidacy itself a daunting challenge, then even for those who surmount those barriers, a lack of access to resources will be present, diminishing electoral prospects. Parties can bridge the divide between a desire to participate fully in the democratic system and the realities of campaigning in a contemporary liberal democracy. Thus, I hypothesize that women, racialized minority, and Queer candidates who do have partisan support will perform better than those without.

Finally, the active participation of formal and visible political parties, with the ability to legally fundraise, endorse, and organize, will result in stronger effects than those impacting candidates who have to rely on clandestine networks of shadow party operatives or on the endorsement of an Incipient Party group that is limited in its ability to provide overt campaign assistance. The long history of formal parties in British Columbia will translate into stronger effects than those observed in Ontario, with its tradition of official municipal non-partisanship.

The purpose of the second stage of analysis is to understand the role of parties in local elections. Specifically: Are parties the key to transforming city councils and providing adequate representation to a wider array of groups existing in municipalities? I use comparisons between and within municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia to evaluate the effects of non-partisanship on diversity. Specifically, I used linear and logistical regression models to test if political parties and shadow parties are associated positively or negatively with candidate diversity, and the success of candidates from historically marginalized communities.

To test the stated expectations across municipalities, I identify shadow parties using systematic data on campaign contributions. By matching donations to municipal and Federal candidates in Ontario, I identify candidates who received a substantial share of their support from donors who also donated to partisan Federal candidates. In other words, I used support from partisan Federal donors as a proxy for shadow party municipal candidates. In British Columbia, I use the stated formal party affiliations of candidates for local office.

I find that women in both provinces tend to run more for "down ballot" races (meaning races for offices other than mayor), specifically for the office of school trustee, and that the strongest influence on a woman's electoral success (winning) is whether or not they were an incumbent. In British Columbia, support from a municipal party is strongly correlated with

electoral success and electoral performance, while such an effect is not significant in Ontario. Those women who do make it onto the ballot in Ontario are more likely to be backed by a shadow party group, though. I find that Queer candidates in Ontario are backed by shadow parties and that municipal parties have a strong impact on their electoral performance in British Columbia, though too few cases of Queer candidates were included to make definitive claims about their overall electoral success and performance. Finally, I find that members of racialized minority communities are more likely to seek down-ballot races and that electoral success is negatively correlated with racialized minority identity. Both formal and shadow parties have an identifiable impact on the electoral performance of racialized minorities but, once again, incumbency status is the largest and most significant indicator of positive electoral success and performance.

The chapter is organized as follows: I begin by revisiting the research on pathways to candidacy, and then discuss the methodology used to collect candidate information beyond the survey, the campaign finance data, and the definition of shadow party affiliation. I next explain the statistical models used to analyze the relationship between partisan organizations and candidates, and, finally, discuss the results in more detail.

6.2 – Examining assertions

Prior work on the municipal electoral participation of women, racialized minorities, and Queer people in Canadian cites helps form a basis of analysis, but none has systematically examined the effects of parties and non-partisanship. Consequently, none has sufficiently tested colloquial claims regarding municipal elections embodied by the "Lightbody assertion": "Non-Partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men," (2006, p. 257). As discussed in Chapter 2 (2.5 – Pathways to candidacy), a candidate's success is affected by their identity and ideology, but also district magnitude, incumbency status, renumeration, campaign financing laws, and party gatekeeping. Previous work on district magnitude and partisan involvement tackles the first segment of the Lightbody assertion, while the remaining attributes have been shown to impact candidate performance in previous studies.

The scholarship on municipal representation in Canada has tended to focus on women. While there is an oft-cited "municipal advantage" for women – specifically that there is something inherent in the system of municipal government we have in Canada at present that allows women

to compete and perform on a more "level playing field" than other levels of government – Tolley (2011) challenges this by documenting inconsistent success for women in municipal politics, and calls for further study to understand the "electoral stalling" of women in local government (see Section 2.4.1). Similarly, a case study of Vancouver (with a municipal party system) showed no evidence pointing to the municipal field providing a disadvantage or an advantage to women candidates in terms of electoral success (Gavan-Koop & Smith, 2008).

Research on other marginalized groups, particularly racialized minority and Queer candidates in Canadian municipal elections is sparser (see Section 2.4.2). This is a significant gap as recent census data show that the 10 largest CMAs are home to over 80% of racialized minorities and new immigrants. Siemiatycki (2011) notes that Toronto's incredible diversity is not reflected in its city council. Siemiatycki attributes this pattern to Toronto's perceived progressive attitude toward racialized minorities, aided by robust local government support for initiatives advanced by particular cultural communities, rather than non-partisanship.

Queer Canadians are nearly absent from the study of municipal politics, despite the important ways in which municipal government can wield civic banality to criminalize, marginalize, and stigmatize Queer lives. The work that has been done on Queer electoral participation in Canada and elsewhere mirrors findings on ethnic and racial minorities insofar as geographic concentration (in and around historic gay neighbourhoods) provide a territorial base of electoral support (Thomlinson, 1997; Podmore, 2016; Nash et al., 2019).The recent trend of dispersal of Queer residents across cities, may mean that geographic concentration may become less important to electoral participation, highlighting the need for systematic study (see Section 2.4.3).

Incumbency status is a simple and easily quantifiable aspect of one's candidacy to consider (see Section 2.5). Lucas (2021) clearly identifies a correlation between declining partisanship rates and increasing incumbent advantages. Moore et al. (2017, p. 88) went so far as to claim that Toronto is a city where "incumbents are king". This too, then, will be an important consideration when examining the relationship between structural concerns and both candidacy and success. Incumbency has been added as an independent variable in this analysis. Similarly, those candidates who are not incumbents but have sought elected office in the past are also identified so determine what impact – if any – previous political experience has on candidacy.

Beyond the characteristics of aspirants/candidates, the electoral and party systems influence the diversity and success of candidates. Spicer et al. (2017), for example, found that FPTP systems using at-large and multi-member districts disadvantage ethnic/racial minority candidates. As council and trustee elections in Ontario were contested in districts while Ontario's mayoral contests and all offices in British Columbia were elected "at-large", this will be captured in provincial-level analyses.

Finally, the role of political parties is also critical. The Lightbody assertion begins by highlighting the unbalanced nature of non-partisan councils. The work of Lee (1960), Hawley (1973), and Copus et al. (2012) found a focus on personality over policy and a notable advantage for right-leaning candidates in non-partisan systems in the United States and United Kingdom. Good (2017) echoes these sentiments in the Canadian context. These studies do not, however fully consider the impact on women, racialized minorities, and Queer candidates.

Parties can have either positive or negative impacts on candidate success and diversity because they act as "gatekeepers", strategically supporting or opposing the efforts of individuals to stand for office. Contemporary research from Canada indicates that the presence of party elites from similar backgrounds to prospective candidates can increase the chances of that candidate's successful nomination. The presence of municipal parties in British Columbia suggests that partisan support will have an effect there, but the situation is more complicated under Ontario's non-partisan system. Shadow parties may not formally vet candidates, but they may recruit aspirants to stand for office and provide organized support, including campaign donations. Insofar as such support encourages aspirants to become candidates and help candidates win votes, shadow parties can act as either positive or negative gatekeepers for women, racialized minorities, and Queer candidates.

6.3 – Data and methodology

The candidate survey described in Chapter 5 provides one set of data for my analysis of partisan effects on candidate diversity and success. I supplemented these data through additional research for five cities in each province (Toronto, Ottawa, Mississauga, Brampton, and Hamilton in Ontario; and Vancouver, Surrey, Burnaby, Richmond, and Victoria in British Columbia). The first is data on non-respondents, the second is on candidates' electoral performance, and third is on campaign donations. This created a database of 1,523 candidates with more or less complete

information across all three sources (descriptive statistics are available in Appendix E). I limited consideration to these ten cities for two reasons: first, the process of collecting and analyzing financial data and collecting missing demographic information on candidates was a time- and labour-intensive effort. Second, the 10 selected cities represent 41% of the population of Ontario and 36% of the population of British Columbia, as indicated by the 2016 Canadian Census. This provides an analysis covering a sizable portion of the population of each province. Including the five next largest cities in each province would have captured municipalities representing 51% and 49% of Ontario and British Columbia respectively but would have extended the length of the data collection period considerably, as the quality and availability of information on municipal candidates decreases notably as the size of the municipality in which they run decreases. Despite this, the foundation has been provided for a more detailed analysis in the future.

6.3.1 – Data on non-respondents

I obtained information on non-respondents' characteristics in five cities in each province from public campaign information, news media, and publicly-available social media such as profiles on Twitter, Facebook, and LinkedIn. Following Lieske (1989) and Taylor and McEleney (2019), this information included ascribed (gender, age, ethnic and racial background, sexuality, immigrant status), achieved (education and occupation), and political (campaign expenses, past candidacy for any office, incumbent/challenger status) characteristics. In much the same way Taylor and McEleney (2019) collected candidate information for the 2014 municipal election in Toronto, candidate websites and social media were scoured for identifying characteristics and personal information. Additionally, media reports and candidate debate videos were used to fill in gaps. Some media outlets, such as the *Toronto Star* and *CBC Ottawa* compiled helpful voter guides which included much of the information needed on each candidate. In the case of many cities in British Columbia, the municipality itself would produce detailed voter guides including photos and statements from each candidate which similarly included ample relevant information. Obtaining information on school trustee candidates, particularly those running for Catholic trustee or either Francophone board in Ontario was especially challenging because traditional media tend to ignore these campaigns. There were also a significant number of what I call "ghost candidates" who registered for the election but did not maintain an online presence, interact with local media,

or engage in campaigning, thus leaving questions as to aspects of their policies and identities (see Section 4.5 for a more detailed discussion on these candidates).

<u>6.3.2 – Electoral results</u>

I obtained election results from municipal websites after each city clerk and/or elections manager certified the results. CivicInfo BC also maintains a database of election results, which I used to double-check the results. As list of these websites is in Appendix F.

The models described below use two variables derived from these data: 1) the winning candidate(s) in each election and, 2) the proportion of the popular vote obtained by each candidate.

<u>6.3.3 – Campaign finance data</u>

Identifying party and shadow party support is key to testing their influence on candidate diversity and success. The presence of municipal parties in British Columbia makes this straightforward there: local formal parties – called Elector Organizations – endorsed teams of candidates who, in turn, received support from the Elector Organization in an open and transparent manner. In the five case study cities in British Columbia, 238 candidates were affiliated with Elector Organizations and 155 ran as independents. Ontario's non-partisan system means that, by definition, there is no formal list of candidate affiliation. Hence, I use federal campaign finance data to identify candidates supported by shadow parties.[31] I operationalized shadow party support by screening candidates by the proportion of support from donors who also contributed to federal parties and by total number of donors.

This process began with the collection of municipal financial returns from each city's website. These returns became available April 29, 2019 after the financial return submission deadline had passed and extensions for campaigns that had requested extra time to settle debts or compile financial records had concluded. From these records, I extracted total donations to the campaign (in the form of donations and candidates' personal transfers to their campaign account), campaign expenses, the expense limit for each race, the dollar amount of candidates own financial contributions to their own campaign, and the dollar amount given to their campaign by others.

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[31] In principle, the same methodology could be applied to provincial donor data but Elections Ontario does not disclose the postal codes of donors, which makes it extremely difficult to screen out spurious or weak matches between provincial and municipal records.

From these figures, I determined the percent of the spending limit used (the campaign expenses divided by the spending limit multiplied by 100) and the percent of their campaign income that came from themselves (the candidate's campaign contributions to themselves divided by the campaign income multiplied by 100).

The data also includes the name, contributed amount, and postal code of donors contributing $100 or more to a campaign, but many candidates listed all donors. These data required considerable correction, particularly of postal codes because many were mis-entered or became jumbled in the process of digitizing paper returns.[32]

I then used a Python program (see Appendix A) to extract possible matches with donors names from Elections Canada's donor database via "web scraping" (automated routine queries on form-based websites).[33] Every instance of donor contributing to a federal political party is considered a "record of donation" or RoD. Elections Canada's records date back to 2004, so these data represent 14 years of records. This web scraping collected 529,243 RoDs in Elections Canada database from 2004 through 2019.[34] A decision was made to include 15 years of political donations to capture as much relevant political contribution data as possible during this phase of research collection, as it was difficult to determine how many partisans would be excluded if an arbitrary "cut-off" date was established. As indicated in Table 13, the majority of RoDs were from the more recent past, with just under 59% occurring after January 1, 2014.

Table 13 – Date ranges of federal contributions from RoDs

Date of Federal Contribution	All RoDs	Percentage of RoDs
2004 - 2008	88,343	16.7
2009 - 2013	130,189	24.6
2014 onward	310,434	58.7
No date from Elections Canada	277	0.1
Total N/Total Percent	529,243	100

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[32] There has been some work done on quickly connecting two donor databases. Yoder (2020) employed fastLink, an R-based program to merge political contribution records and property records for voters in Texas and California. Employing such a program may be beneficial in the future.

[33] Elections Canada maintains a regularly updated database of financial records here: https://www.elections.ca/wpapps/WPF/EN/CCS/Index?returntype=1

[34] The RoD collection period extends into 2019 as candidates were legally permitted to solicit and collection donations until their financial returns were submitted, particularly if they faced a campaign deficit following election day. Campaigns were not required to list when donations had been received, so it is difficult to tell if donations were collected in 2018 or 2019.

The pool of RoDs was then filtered to identify unique donors who were affiliated with multiple RoDs. This created a new pool of 63,106 "donor profiles". Donor profiles were created by merging distinct RoDs based on identical names and postal codes. These profiles were then matched to the 23,313 donations made to all municipal candidates in the five case cities in Ontario, except the 85 candidates "in default" (those who did not submit financial paperwork to their respective cities), who were excluded from analysis.

The process by which federal donor profiles were matched with municipal donors required a multi-step process (see Figure 12). If the full donor name and full postal code for a federal donor profile and a municipal donation matched, they were considered a "full match" and accepted. Of the total number of donor profiles, 4,142 or 6.6% were considered a "full match". If a federal donor profile had no similarities to any municipal donor (all names and all postal codes did not fit), they were considered "not a match" and discarded. These "not a match" profiles were the largest pool, constituting 43,418 or 68.8% of all federal donor profiles. The remaining 5,546 or 8.8% of federal donor profiles had some similarities to municipal donors and required a "manual check". This step of the process was the most labour- and time-intensive, as it could not be automated. The profiles requiring a "manual check" were analyzed for the level of similarity between it and a municipal donor.

If the full name and Forward Sortation Area (FSA)[35] of a federal donor profile matched with that of a municipal donor, said match was examined to determine if it could reasonably be considered a full match. In this context, "reasonable" implies that the name is not so common that it could be easily misapplied to a municipal donor, that it is not the case of a family member with the same name (Jr., the Second, etc.), and that the last three digits of the federal donor's postal code were similar to the ones listed on the municipal donor list. In some instances, the final three digits of the postal code were very slightly different from one record to the next. Errors of these sorts can occur during the donation process when a donor or a campaign Chief Financial Officer

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[35] Canadian postal codes, which are all six digits long, are broken into segments. The first two digits of a postal code is called the FSA Family. With the addition of the third digit, the first three digits become the postal code's FSA. This is used to direct mail to groups of neighbourhoods or larger regions in rural areas that can be served by distinct mail sorting facilities. FSAs, due to their size and shape, are also considered a census level unit and can be used for demographic analysis. The final three digits are the postal code's Local Delivery Unit (LDU). The LDU is part of the "route" a postal worker serves to perform the physical act of delivering the mail.

enters information incorrectly. In some instances, postal codes attributed to the same name differed by as little as a single digit (eg: L8P 1L*4* and L8P 1L*5*).

If the last name and full postal code of a federal RoD matched those of a municipal donor, this match was examined to see if short forms of names were used or if multiple family members at a single address were captured in the web scraping process. While a donor of the former instance would generally be accepted as a match (Bob and Robert, Liz and Elizabeth, Jude and Judith, etc.), the latter instance (multiple members of the Marcuse family, for example) would not necessarily be considered a match. Finally, if only the last name and FSA of a donor profile corresponded with the last name and FSA of a municipal donor, I examined the record in detail to determine its acceptability. Weak matches of this type were generally family members of a municipal donor contributing to a federal campaign or individuals with very common names with no discernable relation contributing to different campaigns. Only those "weak match" donor profiles that could be properly verified were included. Of the 5,546 donor profiles that required a manual check, 4,238 (76.4% of profiles requiring a "manual check" or 6.7% of all donor profiles) were discarded as not being a match and 1,308 (23.6% of profiles requiring a "manual check" or 2.1% of all donor profiles) were added to the final dataset as being a match.

6.3.4 – Shadow party candidates

The data identifying donors who contributed to both federal and municipal candidates is the key to determining shadow party support. I used support from federal party contributors ("partisans" or "partisan donors") as evidence of shared donor networks and hence as a proxy for organized but informal party support. Donors from the created dataset (END POINT 1 in Figure 12) were classified based on the level of support given to each party. If a donor contributed between 100% and 66.7% of their total contributions to one party, they were considered a "Concentrated Partisan", in that they focused between two thirds and all their financial support at the candidates and entities affiliated with a single party.[36] As shown in Table 13 these donors constituted the plurality of those partisans identified. Donors who spread their donations between two parties (66.7% to 33.3% of their donations split only two ways) were considered "Dual Partisans". Among

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[36] The reason for setting a threshold of 66.67% was to include those donors whose political affiliations may have changed, those who may have supported a friend or family member seeking election with a party other than the one to which they regularly donate, or those who made a one-time donation to help a particular party or candidate based on an issue, their performance in an election, or another matter of political importance.

Dual Partisans, nearly 63% split their donations between the Liberal and Conservative parties. Donors who spread donations across more than two parties and where no party received over 66.7% of that donor's support were considered "Diluted Partisans", as their intention may be to encourage electoral competition, support specific individuals running for office, or to "diversify" their chances for a connection to power by cultivating influence with multiple parties.

Schematic representation of the process by which federal campaign finance data was matched with municipal campaign finance data

Total Records of Donation (RoDs)

Toronto	181,010
Ottawa	207,028
Mississauga	44,853
Brampton	86,857
Hamilton	9,495
TOTAL	**529,243**

Filtered and merged to create donor profiles — STEP 1

Total Donor Profiles

Toronto	25,674
Ottawa	16,931
Mississauga	6,976
Brampton	12,551
Hamilton	974
TOTAL	**63,106**

If donor profile is a "full match" — STEP 2a

Full Match Donor Profiles

Toronto	2,388
Ottawa	724
Mississauga	288
Brampton	454
Hamilton	288
TOTAL	**4,142**

Included in dataset — STEP 3a

No Match Donor Profiles

Toronto	19,680
Ottawa	5,144
Mississauga	6,452
Brampton	11,630
Hamilton	512
TOTAL	**43,418**

STEP 2b — **If donor profile is "not a match"**

STEP 2c — **If donor profile is a "partial match"**

Manual Check

Toronto	3,606
Ottawa	1,063
Mississauga	236
Brampton	467
Hamilton	174
TOTAL	**5,546**

END POINT 1 - Final Dataset

Toronto	3,247
Ottawa	804
Mississauga	415
Brampton	592
Hamilton	392
TOTAL	**5,450**

Merged with municipal campaign finance data

Discarded — STEP 3b

END POINT 2 - Discarded Donor Profiles

Toronto	22,427
Ottawa	16,127
Mississauga	6,561
Brampton	11,959
Hamilton	582
TOTAL	**57,656**

STEP 5b — **Discarded**

Manual Check Fail

Toronto	2,747
Ottawa	983
Mississauga	109
Brampton	329
Hamilton	70
TOTAL	**4,238**

STEP 4b — **If manual check fails**

STEP 4a — **If manual check passes**

Manual Check Pass

Toronto	859
Ottawa	80
Mississauga	127
Brampton	138
Hamilton	104
TOTAL	**1,308**

Included in dataset — STEP 5a

Figure 12 – Schematic representation of how RoDs were turned into datasets [37]

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Diluted partisans were not included when determining shadow party support, while Concentrated and Dual Partisans were included. The decision to include Dual Partisans was thanks to their small overall number (445 or 1.9% of donors – see Table 13) and the impossibility of determining the intent behind their spreading of donations among many parties. Each candidate's donations were manually checked to ensure Dual Partisans did not constitute a disproportionate number of that campaign's backers. The largest number of Dual Partisan donors to a single campaign was 23 to a Toronto city council candidate, constituting 6.8% of that candidate's total donations. That candidate would not have been identified as having shadow party backing with or without the consideration of Dual Partisan donations.

Table 14 – Distribution of partisan status of donors for case study cities
(The number of partisan donors exceeds the number of matched donor profiles as many donors contributed to more than one candidate in the election and a small number contributed to candidates across many cities)

Partisan Type	Number of Donors	Percent of Partisan Donors	Percent of Overall Donors
Concentrated Partisans	6,016	92.5	25.8
Dual Partisans	445	6.8	1.9
Diluted Partisans	42	0.6	0.2
Non-partisans	16,810		72.1
Total N/Total Percent	23,313	100	100

First, the matching data allowed me to identify donors from five major federal parties – the Liberal, Conservative, New Democratic, Green, and Communist parties – to municipal candidates. The average percentage of contributions from partisans was 29.75%, among candidates who received any partisan donation. Given my restrictive criteria, I classify any candidate with more than 30% partisan donations as having shadow party support. Significant cross-party support was rare; only two candidates had donations over 30% originating with donors from two different parties.

Second, I excluded candidates who fell under the 33rd percentile of the total number of donors in their race. This was done to exclude any candidates who may have received support from

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[37] Brampton has a high number of RoDs and Donor Profiles thanks to the city's ethnic make-up. As of the 2016 Census, 44.3% of Brampton residents are of South Asian origin (Statistics Canada, 2017b). The last name "Singh" was part of 13.4% of donor profile last names for Brampton and five common South Asian names – Singh, Gill, Grewal, Dhaliwal, and Sandu made up 25.2% of donor profiles. Extra care was taken to ensure matches in Brampton, as the prevalence of common last names meant that a municipal donor (J. Singh, for example), may have a similar name to a large number of federal donors, but may not necessarily be a federal donor themselves.

partisans but who were unlikely to have been given support by a shadow party network. Such cases would include a candidate who received donations from friends and/or family who may have, coincidently, donated to a federal party but who do not constitute a network formed around partisan activities.

Finally, there is the special case of Progress Toronto, an Incipient Party in Toronto. Progress Toronto acted like a semi-formal party, endorsing candidates publicly (though nominations occurred in a clandestine manner) and working to support them through legal, albeit nonconventional, channels. Consequently, I classified any Progress Toronto-endorsed candidate who did not also have the backing of a partisan shadow party network as being endorsed by a party.

In sum, I classify a shadow party candidate as one who is above the 33rd percentile in number of donations and who received 30% or more of their campaign donations from Concentrated and Dual partisan donors (and/or who had the backing of the Progress Toronto). By these criteria, 111 of the 1042 candidates received support from a shadow or Incipient Party.

Schematic representation of the process by which partisan supported candidates were identified

Final Donor Profile Dataset
Toronto	3,247
Ottawa	804
Mississauga	415
Brampton	592
Hamilton	392
TOTAL	**5,450**

Donor profiles are linked with municipal donations — **LINK**

Concentrated donors
Toronto	3,479
Ottawa	1,131
Mississauga	418
Brampton	588
Hamilton	401
TOTAL	**6,016**

Diluted donors
Toronto	9
Ottawa	10
Mississauga	7
Brampton	8
Hamilton	8
TOTAL	**42**

BROKEN DOWN

Municipal donations
Toronto	14,547
Ottawa	3,221
Mississauga	1,746
Brampton	2,270
Hamilton	1,529
TOTAL	**23,313**

Dual donors
Toronto	241
Ottawa	54
Mississauga	40
Brampton	84
Hamilton	26
TOTAL	**445**

No match
Toronto	10,819
Ottawa	2,026
Mississauga	1,281
Brampton	1,590
Hamilton	1,094
TOTAL	**16,810**

Donations were matched with candidates — **APPLIED TO**

Candidates
Toronto	501
Ottawa	189
Mississauga	149
Brampton	132
Hamilton	156
TOTAL	**1,127**

Candidates in default (with no financial records) were excluded — **SUBTRACT**

In default
Toronto	33
Ottawa	13
Mississauga	11
Brampton	2
Hamilton	26
TOTAL	**85**

Only candidates who collected over the 33rd percentile of donations in their race (city + office) were included — **EXTRACT**

Over 33rd percentile
Toronto	244
Ottawa	57
Mississauga	36
Brampton	47
Hamilton	46
TOTAL	**430**

IF BOTH TESTS FAILED

Only those candidates who received 30% of their donations from partisans were included — **EXTRACT**

Over 30% donations from partisans
Toronto	56
Ottawa	27
Mississauga	6
Brampton	4
Hamilton	9
TOTAL	**102**

No identified partisan support
Toronto	403
Ottawa	149
Mississauga	132
Brampton	126
Hamilton	121
TOTAL	**931**

Partisan supported candidates
Toronto	65
Ottawa	27
Mississauga	6
Brampton	4
Hamilton	9
TOTAL	**111**

Candidates who received support from Progress Toronto (an Incipient Party) were added to the final list — **ADD**

+ 14 Progress Toronto-affiliated candidates (9 of whom did not have shadow party affiliation)

IF ALL TESTS PASSED

Figure 13 – Schematic representation of how partisan supported candidates were identified

The Number of Partisan-Affiliated and Un-Affiliated Municipal Candidates in Each of the 10 Final Case Municipalities

Ottawa
No Affiliation - *149*
Partisan Affiliation - *27*

Brampton
No Affiliation - *126*
Partisan Affiliation - *4*

Hamilton
No Affiliation - *127*
Partisan Affiliation - *9*

Toronto
No Affiliation - *403*
Partisan Affiliation - *65*

Mississauga
No Affiliation - *132*
Partisan Affiliation - *6*

Legend

Indigenous Lands

Case Study Municipalities

Other Municipalities

0 20 40 60
kilometres

N

Vancouver
No Affiliation - *51*
Partisan Affiliation - *106*

Burnaby
No Affiliation - *10*
Partisan Affiliation - *30*

Richmond
No Affiliation - *27*
Partisan Affiliation - *35*

Victoria
No Affiliation - *43*
Partisan Affiliation - *8*

Surrey
No Affiliation - *24*
Partisan Affiliation - *59*

Legend

Indigenous Lands

Case Study Municipalities

Other Municipalities

0 20 40 60
kilometres

N

Figure 14 – Map of case study municipalities with number of candidates holding partisan affiliations

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6.4 – Hypotheses: Candidate diversity and minority electoral success

The following sections use the data on candidate identity and shadow party affiliation to empirically test three claims related to the Lightbody assertion: that formally non-partisan Canadian municipal politics creates a disadvantage for women, racialized minorities, and (by implication) members of the Queer community. The assertion rests on the assumption that members of marginalized groups are more likely to seek office and to win elections if they have the structural supports (financial, organizational, etc.) provided by formal political parties. I state three formal hypotheses:

- Hypothesis 1: Women, racialized minorities, and Queer candidates will be positively associated with formal and shadow political parties. In other words, such political organizations will increase the diversity of candidate pool.

Participation and electoral success are separate issues. While the first hypothesis asserts that party and shadow party groups will aid women, racialized minorities, and Queer people in "stepping up" to run for office, electoral success – obtaining votes or winning an election – is also associated with party backing. The same organizational supports that aid participation through candidacy would also provide an advantage over similar candidates who *do not* have the support of a formal party or shadow party group.

- Hypothesis 2: Candidates from historically marginalized communities supported by party/shadow party groups will be more "successful" (earning a higher percentage of the vote or winning) than similar candidates who did not have the support of formal or shadow parties.

There is a long-standing tradition of partisan involvement in British Columbia's municipal politics, particularly in the province's largest cities. Elector Organizations have operated informally since the 1930s and formally since 1992, although the levels of party transparency vary, many organizations are short-lived, and there is a strong "anti-party" sentiment among some candidates and electors (see Chapter 5; Miller, 1975). Regardless, while municipal parties may not have the same longevity and structure as existing federal and provincial parties, they nonetheless serve the same purpose: acting as ideological containers, fundraising, recruiting candidates, and coordinating professional election campaigns. Their status as formal organizations gives them more influence than the informal shadow party networks in Ontario.

- Hypothesis 3: As formal organizations, I expect that municipal parties in British Columbia to have stronger effects on all groups than shadow parties in Ontario.

Both Hypothesis 1 and 2 can be tested with intra-provincial and pooled data. Based on the results for Hypotheses 1 and 2, a third hypothesis that is tested is a comparison between British Columbia and Ontario, which will be present through each of the models.

6.5 – Results

I ran several sets of models to test each of the three hypotheses. The first set identifies factors related to candidate diversity while the second set focus on electoral success. The Stata code for these models is in Appendix B.

6.5.1 – Candidate diversity

To test the first hypothesis, I ran a series of logistic regression models with each candidate identity (either women, Queer people, racialized minority status)[38] as a categorical dependent variable. Shadow party support, incumbency status, and previous candidacy for any office (local, provincial, federal, or nomination contestant) were the core independent variables, as each of these – incumbency in particular – have historically proven to be the strongest indicators of candidate success at the municipal level (see Section 2.5). Two indicator ("dummy") variables were also included: one for office, with "Mayor" set as a baseline (respective to mayoral candidacy, are members of each group more or less likely to stand for other positions), and one for "province", with Ontario set as a baseline (thanks to that province's larger "N" size), which was included in the final, pooled model. For office, this is to control for any districting or geographic concentrations, as mayor is the only office elected city-wide in both provinces. For province, Ontario is used as a baseline to control for the more general structural differences that exist between Ontario and British Columbia, namely the universal at-large vs. mayoral at-large and the ward-based electoral systems for all other offices employed in each province.

In both provinces, women were more likely to run for "down-ballot" races than for mayor. Indeed, women are far more likely to seek the office of school trustee in both Ontario and British Columbia, which was strongly significant in all models (see Table 14). While the endorsement of

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[38] It was difficult to consider the notion of "intersectionality" among candidates. As some of the groups' numbers were small, considering candidates who had two or more characteristics would have rendered the modelling inconclusive. With a more detailed dataset incorporating multiple elections, this may become a future possibility.

a formal party did not impact women's candidacy in British Columbia, the support of a shadow party group or IP in Ontario was positive and strongly significant. Incumbency and previous candidacy were not significant. Interestingly, women's political participation was more closely associated with British Columbia than Ontario.

As shown in Table 15, the results for Queer candidates were also mixed. Notably, shadow party/IP support had a positive, significant impact of for Queer candidates in Ontario, but a negative effect in British Columbia (albeit at a low level of significance). Due to the small sample size of Queer candidates in both provinces, an explanation for this may be the higher proportion of Queer candidates for Mayor in BC. Queer candidates constituted 10.2% of all mayoral contenders and 21.7% of Queer candidates stood for mayor. This was the office where the fewest candidates – 28.6% – had the backing of formal parties (also see Appendix E). This was also echoed in the model. While the result was not significant, Queer candidates seem less likely to run for councillor and school trustees compared to mayor. Again, the low number of Queer candidates makes it difficult to achieve statistical significance, so this pattern warrants further consideration (see Section 6.6).

Like women but unlike Queer candidates, racialized minorities seek the office of school trustee more than higher-order offices in Ontario (Table 15). Otherwise, however, the impacts of partisan support for candidates from racialized minority communities show very different results compared to women and Queer candidates. The models indicate that incumbency and prior experience running for office has a negative impact on racialized minority candidates. While the support of a formal party had no impact on women and a slight negative impact on Queer candidates, the analysis shows a strong positive relationship between candidacy and formal party backing among racialized minority candidates in British Columbia. This will be considered in detail in Section 6.6.

Separate models (not shown here) were run examining the extent to which *specific* shadow party backing would encourage or impact the candidacy of historically marginalized people. The specific party backing candidates was considered and found to have no significance except in the case of Queer candidates. Queer candidates were more affiliated with the NDP, a correlation that was positive and highly significant, and were interestingly also likely to be affiliated with the Conservative Party, albeit at a low level of significance. These results may come from the small number of Queer candidates overall and certainly point to the need for further research. As few

patterns could be ascertained, it appears that, despite dramatic differences in partisan support at the federal level for women and racialized minority candidates (see Black, 2008; Young, 2013).

Table 15 – Model 1: Logistic regression for impacts on the candidacy of historically marginalized groups
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 1: Effects on Candidacy								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Women	Queer	Racialized Minority	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority
Supported by a party/shadow party		0.141	-0.907 *	0.631 **	0.737 ***	1.369 ***	-0.267	0.448 ***	0.200	0.163
Incumbent		-0.083	-1.504	-0.932 **	0.241	-0.308	-1.322 ***	0.148	-0.632	-1.201 ***
Previously a candidate		-0.131	0.664	-0.504 *	-0.099	0.568	-0.285 *	-0.110	0.604 *	-0.345 **
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor	0.776 **	-0.197	-0.165	0.625 *	-0.468	0.331	0.641 **	-0.458	0.174
	Trustee	1.183 ***	-1.206	0.286	1.382 ***	-0.550	0.689 **	1.299 ***	-0.814 *	0.562 **
	Parks Board Commissioner	0.314	1.274	-0.742				0.215	0.809	-0.327
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC							0.353 **	0.391	0.152
Observations		393	393	393	1047	1045	917	1440	1438	1310
Pseudo R-squared		0.025	0.091	0.053	0.043	0.045	0.053	0.039	0.044	0.048

6.5.2 – Electoral success

I distinguish two measures of candidate success: electoral victory and electoral performance. Electoral victory is straightforward: did a candidate win their race or not? I measure electoral performance by the percent of the vote obtained. The latter may be more sensitive to the efficacy partisan networks because it would recognize – for example – a strong second or third place finish rather than a simple win/lose binary. In these models, electoral victory or performance are the dependent variables, and candidate characteristics (including gender, sexuality, and racialized status) are independent ones.

Two models were used when testing electoral victory. In Table 16, Model A holds all candidates together without distinguishing between office sought and, in the combined model, province. Model B controls for office, setting "Mayor" as the baseline and, in the final model, also controls for province, setting "Ontario" as the base.

Table 16 shows that incumbency is the most significant indicator of electoral success. In both Ontario and British Columbia, incumbency is highly correlated with success and is strongly significant. This works to expand upon Moore et al. (2017)'s observation, in that across many municipalities, incumbents "are king". Another striking finding is the negative correlation between electoral success and status as a racialized minority. Indeed, in both provinces, racialized minority

candidates had a very low likelihood of electoral success. In that the observation held true for provinces where formal parties do and do not operate, this challenges Lightbody's assertion regarding the homogeneity of specifically non-partisan councils.

Notably, the results regarding formal parties confirm Hypothesis 2 for parties in British Columbia. Candidates endorsed by formal parties performed much better than their independent counterparts, though the effect was less than that of incumbency. While the relationship between shadow party support and electoral success in Ontario was positive, it was not significant in either model.

Table 16 – Model 2: Logistic regression of electoral victories
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

	Model 2: Winners		
	British Columbia	Ontario	All
Supported by a party/shadow party	1.239 ***	0.252	0.628 ***
Incumbent	3.060 ***	3.680 ***	3.492 ***
Previously a candidate	-0.092	0.338	0.174
Women/Non-Binary Candidates	0.290	0.663 ***	0.502 ***
Queer Candidates	-0.548	-0.073	-0.282
Racialized Minority Candidates	-1.328 ***	-0.566 **	-0.814 ***
Observations	393	915	1308
Pseudo R-squared	0.299	0.393	0.355

The next set of models (Models 3A and 3B – Tables 17 and 18) considers women and racialized candidates individually to understand the effect of different variables on their electoral success. Unfortunately, there are too few Queer candidates and winners in my data to run meaningful models. Understanding the impacts on Queer electoral success at the local level is important, and will require further study, though these studies should include qualitative components (interviews, case study reviews, etc.) and possibly a larger sample pool (more cities, multiple elections over a longer time period).

Each model is broken into three sub-models: "i" considers the stand-alone effects of party/shadow party support, incumbency, and previous candidacy. Model "ii" then adds the other two identities to understand support for candidates with varying intersectional identities. Model "iii" controls for office with mayor as a baseline and, in the final combined model, controls for

province with Ontario as a baseline. Adding office as a control creates an issue caused by the number of candidates per seat. While the addition of this variable helps to control for differences among the races, the meaning of the coefficients is likely impacted by the larger number of candidates for council and trustee seats when compared to those running for mayor, rendering the meaning of the coefficients trivial.

Among women (Table 17), incumbency was the most important and consistently significant factor associated with winning across both provinces. In British Columbia, support of a formal party was also positive and strongly significant while those candidates with intersecting marginalized identities – racialized women specifically – were more closely correlated with loss. In Ontario, women's electoral success was negatively associated with shadow party support, but the results were not significant. Indeed, in Ontario, only incumbency and office were important, with a strongly significant and positive association between women incumbents and electoral success, and electoral success in trustee races.

Incumbency was again the most important and consistently significant factor for electoral victories across both provinces for racialized minority candidates (see Table 18). While there was a positive impact of formal parties on the electoral success of racialized minority candidates in British Columbia (albeit at a low significance level) in the first two sub-models, there was no significance in Ontario.

The final models examined impacts on the percent of the vote earned by candidates. For multimember races, such as council and trustee elections in British Columbia, candidate vote totals were divided by the total number of valid ballots cast by electors, not by the total overall number of votes. The final linear regression models follow the same pattern as those in Tables 17 and 18.

As expected, more variables were significant in these models. As shown in Table 19, party/shadow party support and incumbency were both strongly significant, with incumbency being observed again to be strongly correlated with a candidate earning a higher percent of the popular vote. Women with party support earned higher vote percentages in Ontario while racialized minority candidates did the same in both provinces. Trustee candidates earned higher vote percentages as well, indicating fewer candidates per seat. In Ontario, the same was true of council candidates. This is supported by observational analyses of mayoral ballots in Ontario and both mayoral and council ballots in British Columbia (see Appendix E for descriptive statistics regarding the number of candidates per office).

Table 17 – Model 3A: Logistic regression of electoral victories (women only)
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 3A: Winners - Women Candidates								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Supported by a party/shadow party		1.181 ***	1.282 ***	1.257 ***	-0.026	-0.143	-0.130	0.473 *	0.395	0.438 *
Incumbent		3.056 ***	2.963 ***	2.811 ***	3.382 ***	3.220 ***	3.175 ***	3.216 ***	3.021 ***	2.912 ***
Previously a candidate		-0.024	-0.178	-0.093	0.402	0.301	0.530	0.218	0.123	0.307
Queer Candidates			-0.177	-0.037		-0.152	-0.209		-0.166	-0.119
Racialized Minority Candidates			-1.501 ***	-1.570 ***		-0.494	-0.564		-0.827 ***	-0.902 ***
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor			0.729			1.898			1.391 *
	Trustee			1.221			2.766 **			2.117 ***
	Parks Board Commissioner			0.444						1.646
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC									-0.015
Observations		167	167	167	350	315	315	517	482	482
Pseudo R-squared		0.212	0.266	0.277	0.314	0.312	0.341	0.272	0.281	0.303

Table 18 – Model 3B: Logistic regression of electoral victories (racialized minority candidates)
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 3B: Winners - Racialized Minority Candidates								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Supported by a party/shadow party		1.531 *	1.544 *	1.482	-0.141	-0.419	-0.397	0.258	0.190	0.431
Incumbent		4.125 ***	4.098 ***	3.764 ***	4.473 ***	4.712 ***	4.493 ***	4.257 ***	4.368 ***	4.103 ***
Previously a candidate		-0.261	-0.237	-0.216	0.318	0.327	0.584	0.144	0.163	0.307
Queer Candidates			*Omitted*			1.658	1.340		0.931	0.891
Women Candidates			0.131	-0.017		1.069 **	0.930 **		0.685 *	0.550
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor			-0.545			-0.920 *			-0.799 **
	Trustee			*Omitted*			*Omitted*			*Omitted*
	Parks Board Commissioner			*Empty*						*Empty*
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC									-0.251
Observations		165	161	132	355	355	335	520	520	470
Pseudo R-squared		0.333	0.331	0.323	0.336	0.365	0.378	0.324	0.335	0.344

Table 19 – Model 4: Linear regression for impacts on percent of the popular vote earned
*\- p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 4: Impact on Percent of the Popular Vote					
		British Columbia		Ontario		All	
		Model i	Model ii	Model i	Model ii	Model i	Model ii
Supported by a party/shadow party		7.720 ***	7.415 ***	4.398 ***	4.124 ***	3.526 ***	5.470 ***
Incumbent		16.720 ***	15.282 ***	37.58 ***	36.134 ***	31.719 ***	30.007 ***
Previously a candidate		0.673	1.247	0.883	2.171 *	0.659	1.730 *
Women/Non-Binary Candidates		1.846 *	1.055	5.000 ***	3.261 ***	4.012 ***	2.790 ***
Queer Candidates		-3.458 *	-2.380	-1.991	-1.673	-2.614	-1.467
Racialized Minority Candidates		-3.374 ***	-3.816 ***	-5.013 ***	-5.949 ***	-4.546 ***	-5.212 ***
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor		2.836		6.458 ***		4.700 ***
	Trustee		7.069 ***		13.435 ***		10.698 ***
	Parks Board Commissioner		1.162				4.824 **
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC						-3.512 ***
Observations		393	393	891	891	1284	1284
Pseudo R-squared		0.397	0.430	0.532	0.569	0.465	0.5068

Table 20 – Model 5A: Linear regression for impacts on percent of the popular vote earned by women candidates
*\- p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 5A: Impact on Percent of the Popular Vote earned by Women Candidates								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Supported by a party/shadow party		6.499 ***	6.475 ***	5.766 ***	3.410	2.097	2.169	2.795 **	2.175	4.679 ***
Incumbent		16.459 ***	15.382 ***	13.909 ***	38.088 ***	35.822 ***	34.127 ***	31.645 ***	29.890 ***	27.985 ***
Previously a candidate		0.245	-0.261	0.418	1.179	0.043	1.823	0.536	-0.510	0.916
Queer Candidates			-3.923	-2.593		-0.611	-1.214		-1.997	-1.322
Racialized Minority Candidates			-3.826 **	-3.910 **		-7.602 ***	-7.987 ***		-6.295 ***	-6.369 ***
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor			6.761 **			6.160			5.719 **
	Trustee			10.893 ***			13.019 ***			11.584 ***
	Parks Board Commissioner			5.516						7.724 **
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC									-5.01 ***
Observations		167	167	167	342	307	307	509	474	474
Pseudo R-squared		0.319	0.346	0.407	0.455	0.478	0.506	0.387	0.407	0.456

Table 21 – Model 5B: Linear regression for impacts on percent of the popular vote earned by Queer candidates
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 5B: Impact on Percent of the Popular Vote earned by Queer Candidates								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Supported by a party/shadow party		11.914 **	11.397 **	9.380 *	-5.672	-5.865	-6.823	1.710	1.338	0.067
Incumbent		22.856 ***	24.962 ***	17.771 ***	41.125 ***	37.506 **	39.579 ***	38.836 ***	36.884 ***	36.837 ***
Previously a candidate		-0.965	0.018	0.680	4.758	7.265	6.392	2.309	4.019	4.009
Women Candidates			3.679	2.327 *		9.327	5.631		7.311 *	4.636
Racialized Minority Candidates			3.229	-0.888		2.972	-0.496		5.041	2.847
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor			12.990 ***			0.450			7.991
	Trustee			5.164			9.659			12.598
	Parks Board Commissioner			0.349						3.020
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC									-0.115
Observations		23	23	23	29	29	29	52	52	52
Pseudo R-squared		0.500	0.524	0.755	0.543	0.586	0.617	0.487	0.530	0.571

Table 22 – Model 5C: Linear regression for impacts on percent of the popular vote earned by racial minority candidates
* - p < 0.1; ** - p < 0.05; *** - p < 0.01

		Model 5C: Impact on Percent of the Popular Vote earned by Racialized Minority Candidates								
		British Columbia			Ontario			All		
		Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii	Model i	Model ii	Model iii
Supported by a party/shadow party		7.341 ***	7.329 ***	6.501 ***	6.616 ***	6.073 ***	5.627 **	5.553 ***	5.251 ***	5.972 ***
Incumbent		17.047 ***	17.192 ***	14.227 ***	39.973 ***	39.678 ***	37.885 ***	31.543 ***	31.466 ***	29.232 ***
Previously a candidate		1.892	2.097	3.334 *	-0.285	-0.340	0.873	0.679	0.722	1.796
Queer Candidates			1.710	3.327 *		5.605	4.550		5.511	5.760
Women Candidates			2.012	1.267		2.952 **	2.215 *		2.669 **	2.040 **
(Indicator variable, Mayor as baseline)	Councillor			6.492 ***			7.338 ***			6.678 ***
	Trustee			10.482 ***			11.231 ***			10.457 ***
	Parks Board Commissioner			4.476						5.726 **
(Indicator variable, Ontario as baseline)	BC									-0.934
Observations		165	165	165	351	351	351	516	516	516
Pseudo R-squared		0.374	0.383	0.465	0.490	0.502	0.540	0.428	0.440	0.487

As was the case with those women who were electorally victorious, incumbency status is highly correlated with higher vote percentage. While formal party support is a positive and significant factor for vote share in British Columbia, shadow party support is more complicated. In both models examining electoral victory and electoral support, shadow party participation was not significant, though there is a slight positive association for electoral support while shadow party support had a slight negative association with electoral victories. As neither are significant, nothing can be said about these results other than that further study is required.

Table 20 shows that women who sought some down-ballot offices, particularly the office of school trustee, earned higher vote percentages than women who ran for mayor, though this again may be a reflection on the smaller number of school trustee candidates per election. Women who ran for the office of school trustee in Ontario also earned higher vote percentages and, similar to their counterparts in British Columbia, incumbency was the most important factor.

As shown in Table 21, although there were very few Queer candidates (fewer than 30 in each province), incumbency has a positive significant effect across all models, as does formal party support in British Columbia. There is a slight negative effect of shadow party support on electoral performance for Queer candidates in Ontario, but, as with women, the impact is not significant. The small numbers included in these case studies highlight the need to expand such studies, either in geographically or in time.

The patterns for racialized minority candidates are similar to those present among women. Table 22 shows that incumbency is, again, the most important factor across all provinces. Unlike other historically marginalized groups, partisan network support has a positive and relatively uniform significance for candidates in both provinces, indicating a slightly different trend.

Importantly, Tables 17 through 22 show a stronger partisan effect in British Columbia than in Ontario, particularly in the case of women's electoral success and performance and notably with regard to the electoral performance of racialized minority candidates.

6.6 – Discussion

The results of the logistic and linear regression models generally support the three hypotheses, but also reveal the complicated role parties – formal, liminal, and shadow – play in influencing the electoral participation and success of historically marginalized groups.

6.6.1 – Candidate Diversity

The first hypothesis predicted a positive relationship between women, racialized minorities, and Queer candidates and formal and shadow political parties. In Ontario, women and Queer candidates were more likely to be supported by shadow parties as candidates, while the same was true of racialized minority candidates in British Columbia. There were some challenges to the first hypothesis, though. In British Columbia, Queer candidates were less likely to be supported by a formal party and, in Ontario, racialized minorities were less likely to be supported by shadow party/IP groups, though the effect was not significant.

This speaks to the need for a more nuanced approach. While women, racialized minorities and Queer people have all been historically marginalized in Canadian local elections, there may be degrees to this marginalization and unique local, cultural, and societal factors that impact whether partisan networks would be willing to support their candidacy. The results, proving the first hypothesis correct in some contexts and incorrect in others, show that partisan groups operate in different ways with regard to different potential candidates in different contexts.

6.6.2 – Electoral success

The models show similarly mixed support second hypothesis, namely that party support will make candidates more likely to win and will result in a higher vote share. Party support is clearly associated with electoral victories for women in British Columbia, although there are marginally significant positive impacts for racialized minority candidates as well. In contrast, there are no consistent effects other than incumbency for any group in Ontario. Indeed, shadow party backing has a negative, albeit not significant, effect on electoral success. For a possible solution, we can look to the third hypothesis which notes British Columbia's long-standing, diverse, and ambitious local political parties, which could explain the presence of positive and significant relationships between women and electoral success. Understanding the modest significance of racialized minority status and formal party backing will require further research.

Using vote share as the measure of electoral success reveals stronger, more consistent effects of partisan support. In British Columbia, party support is associated with higher vote shares for all three groups, while there is a positive impact for racialized minority candidates in Ontario. There is also a positive impact for women backed by shadow party groups in Ontario, though the result is not significant.

<u>6.6.3 – Formal and shadow party effects</u>

As suggested in the prior two sections, my analysis generally finds more significant, positive effects in British Columbia compared to Ontario. This tends to support the third hypothesis, namely that formal parties will exert a stronger influence than shadow parties. The most important exception is the significant and positive impact of shadow party support on the candidacy of women and Queer people in Ontario, but not in British Columbia.

Both provinces have histories of partisan involvement in municipal government to varying degrees (see Chapter 3), though the institutionalization of formal parties in British Columbia nearly 30 years ago has provided partisan groups structural legitimacy that has a clear and identifiable impact on election results overall and among historically marginalized groups to a greater degree than shadow party groups have in Ontario. The impact of the growing network of IPs may change the dynamic, but understanding this will require a long-term study.

This presents an alternative explanation: the political culture in British Columbia is such that parties are an expected aspect of municipal politics. Members of historically marginalized groups compete with white straight men for the nomination of these parties, but support for these individuals is uneven. Despite this, among those who win the nomination of a formal party, there are clear and identifiable positive impacts on electoral success and electoral performance. In Ontario, where clandestine networks of shadow parties select candidates through informal processes, the backing of a partisan network can motivate people to "get on the ballot", but the efficacy of these networks is diminished by their informal role, resulting in uneven results for those members of marginalized communities who have their backing. The results provide some indication this may be the case, and speaks to the notion that the two forms of partisan network are not the same.

<u>6.6.4 – Women Candidates</u>

The case of partisan networks supporting the candidacy and bolstering the electoral performance of women is interesting. Women are, as evidenced by history and contemporary statistics, notably underrepresented in mayor's chairs and around council tables. While the results provide uneven support for the hypotheses, there is some evidence pointing to a positive impact of partisan organizations. In Ontario, support of an IP or shadow party group was positively associated with women's candidacy. In British Columbia, formal party support was positively associated with

electoral success and higher vote percentage. It is important to note that, while formal party impact on women's candidacy was not significant, it was still in a positive direction and, in the case of Ontario, shadow party/IP support was similarly connected to an increased percent of the popular vote. There is a possible explanation for this: the political culture in British Columbia may be such that women's candidacy is more widespread and their electoral success is more normalized. Once on the ballot, women benefit from the support provided by formal parties that disadvantages non-aligned women candidates. In Ontario, alternatively, women need an extra "boost" in becoming candidates, but thanks to the absence of formal party structures, there is no observable impact on candidate success, though women backed by shadow party organizations will perform better in terms of vote percentage those women candidates without shadow party backing.

One notable pattern is the overwhelming tendency of women to stand for the office of school trustee. The office of school trustee is a highly "feminized" one. Historic gender roles in Anglo-Canadian settler society placed the responsibility for "child rearing" onto women and these imposed roles have rippled into contemporary Canadian society (Wu & Baer, 1996). While women's participation in school trustee elections has not been studied as intently in Canada as it has in the United States, cases from the United States point to more robust participation among women as candidates, in school board meetings, and with regard to local school-related referendums (see: Deckman, 2007; Rubenfeld, 1977; Sweet-Cushman, 2018; Tracy & Durfy, 2007).

A complementary explanation for the concentration of women in school trustee races follows the "farm team" theory (Davidson, McGregor, & Siemiatycky, 2020). This theory holds that school boards are treated as "farms" in two senses of the term: first, as "farm teams" (to use a sporting anaology), which sees the school board as a training ground for partisan-affiliated political officials to seek elected office elsewhere in the future, and second as a "pasture" into which useful, albeit less-reliable party "stalwarts" can be placed, still shaping policy and reflecting a party's ability to get people elected, albeit in a low-impact setting. This concept was articulated in 1970 by publisher and activist John Lorimer in reference to Toronto's school board:

> Toronto's Board of Education is a practice field for budding city politicians. The result is that most of its members fall into one of two categories – long-time trustees who were not good enough politicians to make the jump from the board to city council, and young politicians readying themselves for a promotion." (Lorimer, 1970, p. 132).

Thus, the school board may be a place for partisan connected women to prove their political worth to their party before readying themselves for candidacy for provincial or federal office, and/or where parties steer women seen as "reliable" but not worthy of higher office. This speaks to the highly gendered way in which political offices are viewed and, if true, displays a troubling political cynicality on the part of partisan elites. Further study is required to confirm this pattern.

6.6.5 – Queer Candidates

My research has found a negative, albeit not significant, relationship between Queer candidates and standing for down-ballot races when compared to mayoral candidacy. This runs contrary to previous research on Queer municipal candidacy which notes that areas around traditional "gay villages" feature more Queer candidates than elsewhere in large urban centres like Toronto and Montreal (Nash et al., 2019; Podmore, 2016; Thomlinson, 1997). But, as gay villages change thanks to market pressure and societal trends, could Button, Wald, & Rienzo's (1999, p. 190) assertion that the Queer community is moving away from relying on "indefinitely on sympathetic patrons" mean that Queer candidates no longer feel they need to seek elected office in areas with a perceived higher concentration of Queer voters? Given the small number of Queer candidates, could some be heeding Harvey Milk's call to serve as an inspiration for other candidates, standing for the office of mayor given the high-profile nature of head-of-council races? These possible explanations are challenged, though, by the higher percentage of the popular vote earned by Queer candidates for city council in British Columbia. All case study cities featured at-large council elections, meaning it is difficult to ascertain the relationship between Queer spaces and Queer electoral performance.

The small overall number of Queer candidates further complicates this analysis, which, once again, points to a need for a larger study. Future research could, for example, include the electoral performance of Queer candidates in a variety of large Canadian cities, or add the 2022 and 2026 rounds of municipal elections in Ontario and British Columbia to the analysis.

6.6.6 – Racialized Minority Candidates

The generally poor performance of racialized minority candidates is perhaps the most striking result for this group. Racialized minority candidates are both less likely to win and earn less of the popular vote than non racialized minority candidates in both provinces. While formal party support has a positive effect on the candidacy of racialized minority candidates in British Columbia, the

impact of partisan networks in aiding their electoral success is less obvious. In Ontario, there is no significance to shadow party/IP support for those from racialized minority communities becoming candidates or winning their races, though the relationship is negative.

Where party networks appear to provide observable support is in increasing the percent of the popular vote earned by racialized minority candidates in both provinces. An explanation for this may be that partisan networks provide uneven support to candidates based on province (as discussed in Section 6.6.3), but do have a role to play in boosting their profile, helping them earn a higher vote percentage. As there is a negative and strongly significant relationship between racialized minority candidates and earning a lower portion of the popular vote, it is evident that municipal politics in Canada continues to be dominated by white settlers. The results point to both forms of partisan network working to help "level the playing field", particularly as few other variables (incumbency and office sought aside) have a positive and strongly significant impact on percent of the popular vote earned by racialized minority candidates. The challenge is that positive electoral performance does not necessarily result in an electoral victory. As the identified relationship between racialized minority candidates and electoral victory is negative and strongly significant in both provinces, a precedent may have been set whereby partisan networks are hesitant to endorse someone from a racialized minority community in particular races, as expending time and resources on a campaign that may be competitive but, based on historical evidence, is unlikely to be successful may not be in the network's best interests. This is speculative, though, as other structural issues or general bias on the part of the municipal electorate that were not tested may prevent their overall electoral success, though. Once again, a more detailed study may provide more clear answers.

6.7 – Conclusions

This study considered the role of political parties and partisan networks in the municipal candidacy and both the electoral success and performance of historically marginalized people. Using a unique dataset and analysis of financial records, a profile of partisan-affiliated municipal candidates from 5 cities in both Ontario and British Columbia was generated. From this, a series of logistic and linear regression models were run to assess the validity of the generated hypotheses regarding the impact of partisan networks on women, Queer candidates, and racialized minority candidates.

The results showed one thing clearly: Ontario and British Columbia have distinct political cultures. As is the case with varying municipal regimes, rules, and regulations on a province-by-province basis in Canada, the results show differing impacts of all variables on municipal candidacy in their jurisdictions. Even the single unifying variable that had a positive and highly significant impact on a candidate's success, namely incumbency status, had differing levels of impact in Ontario than in British Columbia.

The results also provided some evidence in support of the three hypotheses, which asserted that partisan networks would empower candidates from historically marginalized communities to both seek office and improve their chances of success, and that more formal parties, such as those in British Columbia, would have a stronger impact than the shadow party groups and IP organizations that exist in Ontario. These hypotheses were derived from, in part, the Lightbody assertion that claims "Non-partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men," (2006, p. 257).

The models showed that women and Queer candidates were more likely to be affiliated with shadow party and IP groups in Ontario, while racialized minority candidates were more likely than not to be affiliated with formal parties. This provides some evidence for partisan networks encouraging some members of historically marginalized communities to put their names on the ballot. Women and, to a lesser extent, racialized minority candidates who had the backing of Elector Organizations won more than those in their communities who did not, but evidence from Ontario generated no significant patterns. In terms of higher percentage of the popular vote, affiliation with an Elector Organization had an identifiable and significant positive impact on a higher percent for members of all historically marginalized communities and, in Ontario, shadow party/IP backing also positively impacted the vote percent earned by racialized minority candidates. The latter point is particularly striking considering the across-the-board negative and significant relationship between racialized minority candidates and both winning their contests and earning a higher percent of the popular vote.

There are a few key results to note. First, women's electoral performance appears to be positively impacted by formal parties, though women are more likely to run for (and, thus, be successful in running for) "gendered" down-ballot offices, specifically that of school trustee. Further work needs to be done to understand why this is the case, possibly on a province-by-

province basis to exclude any possible impacts a regional political culture may have on women's local candidacy.

Second, there are too few Queer candidates for local office to understand electoral performance and motivations using purely quantitative methods. A longer-term study would help to understand changes in Queer municipal political participation over time, as well as using available demographic data to test claims about the political geography of Queer candidacy (examining if Queer people are running in districts with higher Queer populations). Similarly, a larger study, incorporating more cities may be helpful but would, again, need to be aware of possible regional political differences. A study that incorporates a qualitative element, specifically interviews and literature reviews, would provide some much-needed context.

Third, municipal government in both Ontario and British Columbia is characterized by overwhelming whiteness. Racialized minority candidates perform poorly, both in terms of electoral success and electoral performance. It remains unclear why cities defined by diversity and multiculturalism do not see racialized minority candidates earn higher percentages of the popular vote in the races they contest and why they do not win. Again, a demographic analysis of the electoral districts in which racialized minority candidates run may provide some answers, or a more detailed consideration of the impacts of things like the electoral system, at-large or ward-based elections, or community dynamics could offer insight into this issue.

Finally, and importantly, it is evident that political parties are not a panacea. While in nearly all cases, any negative impact of partisan support for a candidate did not prove significant (a single exception being the slightly significant negative relationship between formal party support and the candidacy of members of racialized minority communities in British Columbia), it is too premature to say that formal parties, shadow party groups, and the IP group Progress Toronto were the singular factors that made it possible for some candidates to step up and earned them the victories or vote percentages that they earned. Indeed, such a claim would diminish the individual agency of candidates and the dynamic, complicated, and unique political circumstances in their province, their city, and their electoral contest. Though what are observed here are general patterns, spurred by an effort to understand the role of structures – social and political – and how they can explain the world of municipal government as presently constituted in Canada.

These general patterns did appear. These patterns, preliminary as they are, point to formal party networks potentially having an impact on pushing the candidacy of members of historically

marginalized communities and providing them some benefits in their races. If this is indeed the case, then it challenges the historic Canadian propensity toward municipal non-partisanship, particularly the claim that an absence of parties makes for a more fair electoral field. And while advocates of municipal non-partisanship may claim there is "no Liberal or Conservative way to pave a street," it cannot be said that a woman walking down a street that is not lit properly, or a Queer person unable to find stable housing thanks to historic prejudice, or a member of a racialized minority community observing a lack of investment in their neighbourhood does not have an opinion, based in their lived reality, on how cities can employ civic banality in a more fair way and that their voices would not add a necessary level of nuance and insight to local government.

If political parties boost the candidacy and electoral prospects of people from these historically marginalized communities, do the perceived benefits of municipal non-partisanship truly outweigh the possible benefits of civic partisanship? And should it not be said that, though there may be no Liberal or Conservative way to pave a street, there is a *fair* and *inclusive* way to pave a street?

7 – Conclusions

7.1 – Municipal matters

Why does local government in Canada matter? It is a question all too many voters and far too few researchers have asked in the past. And yet, as I have outlined in this dissertation, it is clear that local government matters for important, functional reasons. Municipalities are the scale of the state wherein civic banality – the prosaic, commonplace, often functional responsibilities of the state assigned to the municipal level – is managed and enacted. Civic banality impacts municipal residents' quality of life, economic opportunities, political expression, personal safety, social cohesion, and individual fulfilment. It is sidewalks and garbage collection, housing and policing, transit and employment.

Using civic banality, the state encourages Foucauldian self-regulation or the engendering of personal comfort as a member of the state project in the form of *geborgenheit.* The local state apparatus, tasked with overseeing civic banality, is organized along democratic lines. In Canadian cities, this takes the form of elected "representatives" of the people creating laws, as well as overseeing the implementation and managing the fundamentals of civic banality. Who these local elected officials are *matters*, as the personal experiences of individuals, when used to complement data-driven policy, can highlight the possible failings of the state when responding to the needs of the diverse communities they are tasked with serving.

In this dissertation, I asked a series of key questions to explain why local councils and ABCs are structured the way they are and what organizational aspects may improve the situation. In Chapter 2, I situated the municipality within political geography, making the case that local governments are a scale worthy of inquiry. In doing so, I developed the concept of civic banality to describe the prosaic functions of the state in the municipality. Based on this, I asserted that the composition of local councils and ABCs is important for the fair and equitable management of civic banality and that partisan networks can play a role in supporting the candidacy of those historically marginalized from positions of power in municipal government. This was built from, in part, what I call the "Lightbody assertion", which is a claim by the Canadian scholar of local

government that "Non-partisan councils across Canada, especially those elected from large districts, work to the advantage of middle-aged white men," (2006, p. 257). Based on this, the end of the chapter examines the political participation of members of historically marginalized communities, specifically women, racialized minorities, Queer people, and Indigenous people with a recognition that so little work had been done on the latter group that it would be difficult to include them in further study.

In Chapter 3, I argue that there are distinct eras in Canadian municipal political history, each of which serves as a foundational layer for the present situation. Each of these eras features a key struggle between groups vying for power: the establishment and reformers in the Victorian Municipality, organized partisans and reformers in the Reform Municipality, labour and business in the Battleground Municipality, scientific-rational managerialists and budding urbanists in the Renewal Municipality, and finally provincial authorities and local communities in the Reorganized Municipality. Each of these struggles paved the way for the present method of organizing Canadian cities, with the echoes of the past deeply influencing the composition of councils in the present.

In Chapter 4, I created a typology of partisan organizations in Canada to classify and categorize the diversity of partisan groups that have appeared in municipalities both historically and contemporaneously. Following this, I made the claim that non-partisanship is a tool of the status quo, used to secure power and ensure civic banality is employed for the benefit of business-oriented elites and more "conservative" actors in society. This further alienated historically marginalized people from power and made the application of civic banality less fair for all, reducing confidence in local government as a body with the power to fundamentally improve the situation of municipal residents.

These foundational chapters provided the groundwork for my two quantitative chapters. In Chapter 5, I outline the survey of municipal candidates I conducted in 40 of the largest cities in Ontario and British Columbia during the 2018 municipal elections in each province. The majority of candidates were white, men, and non-Queer, and the proportions of candidates with these characteristics were notably higher than the percentages of individuals with these characteristics in the general population. Candidates had higher levels of education than the general public and were more likely to work in education, law, community and government services, or in management positions. While a higher proportion of candidates identified as members of political

parties, they expressed an overwhelming level of disapproval regarding the participation of political parties in municipal elections.

Building on the dataset created in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 is a detailed examination of candidates in 10 key cities in Ontario and British Columbia. In this chapter, I find that shadow partisan groupings do exist where non-partisanship is mandated by law. Using this in conjunction with data from British Columbia regarding candidates backed by formal parties, I examined the impact of both forms of partisan support on candidates from historically marginalized communities. Evidence pointing to the practical benefits of either shadow parties or formal parties in local government for marginalized groups overall is inconclusive, with scattered results appearing on a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction and group-by-group level. Women and Queer candidates were more likely to be affiliated with partisan groups in Ontario and racialized minority candidates were more likely to be supported by formal parties in British Columbia. Evidence pointing to an electoral advantage was also scattered, with formal party support being positively associated with a higher percent of the popular vote for members of all historically marginalized communities and an identifiable positive relationship between formal party-backed Women and, to a lesser extent, racialized minority candidates and electoral success in British Columbia. Evidence was less clear in Ontario, with the only identifiable benefit to shadow party backing being in the form of a higher percent of the popular vote going toward racialized minority candidates. This points to a stronger case for formal parties having a more noticeable impact on historically marginalized candidates.

7.2 – Key theories and findings

Throughout my doctoral work and dissertation, I sought to better understand the role partisan networks play in local government and the impact such networks had on the diversity or lack thereof on local councils and ABCs. In doing this, I was able to develop some unique theories and concepts, and, by employing quantitative methods, shed light on the complicated electoral situation facing historically marginalized candidates in some of Canada's largest cities.

Central among the key theories is that of civic banality. This is a concept which situates municipal government into the field of political geography by drawing on Weberian, Foucauldian, and Marxist conceptualizations of the state and interpreting such theories in the context of present state operations. This concept is a synthesis of existing work on state functions at the local level

which centres the municipal government as the entity capable of wielding legitimate force, coercing individuals into acting in a particular way, and as a mechanism in the larger goal of capital accumulation.

A second key theory is that of the eras of Canadian municipal government. Little work has been done to understand the overall history of local government in Canada. Over the course of my research, I was able to develop a historical profile of the Canadian municipality, stretching back to 1837. This profile draws on work relating to the push for responsible government and how such a movement, born from the Rebellions of 1837/38, led to the development of early Canadian municipal authorities. It similarly recognizes American reformist influence, which imbued nascent Canadian municipal governments with a non-partisan spirit, the struggle between labour forces and business owners which more firmly formalized non-partisanship, the contested terrain of the municipality during the era of scientific-rational managerialism (which was itself a direct descendent of and supported by non-partisanship), and finally the subservient position of the amalgamated municipality.

A third key theory is my typology of Canadian municipal political parties. This typology takes historical records and contemporary observations into account, creating a party family which is interconnected, yet strikingly unique. This typology establishes that there are three general types of party: the Candidate Alliance, the Liminal Party, and the Formal Party. There are a number of sub-categories within these larger types. Candidate Alliances can take the form of Partisan or Ideological Alliances. Liminal Parties, the most robust category, include Ideological Pressure Groups, Identity Pressure Groups, Confluences, and Incipient Parties. Formal Parties are themselves broken into three unique categories: *Équipes*, Distinct Local Parties, and Branch Parties. These subcategories provide for the full range of partisan networks operating outwardly in Canadian municipal government. Adjacent to, but distinct from this typology is the "shadow party", which is a semi-organized group of partisans who seek to coordinate a municipal campaign in a clandestine manner in a province where partisan participation in local elections is forbidden or not accepted by the electorate.

Among the key findings are a number of points that help illuminate the present municipal political situation in Canada. First among these is the overwhelming opposition of candidates, in both Ontario and British Columbia, to the active participation of partisan entities in municipal elections. I note a lack of survey participation by partisan-affiliated candidates in British Columbia,

though 70.22% of candidates in Ontario and 59.18% of candidates in British Columbia were unsupportive toward partisan involvement in municipal elections. In reviewing candidate responses to the survey in stage one, it became evident that, particularly in Ontario, candidates were opposed to the participation of existing federal or provincial parties in municipal politics. Indeed, in Ontario it was clear that candidates rejected party politics (specifically the participation of Branch Parties) at the local level for abstract reasons and spoke about how they believed shadow parties participated actively.

One of the most important findings relates to the second stage of my research, specifically my initial hypothesis that formal party participation would have a noticeable and stronger benefit for historically marginalized candidates than shadow party participation. In reality, the evidence on the matter was scattered. While shadow party backing was correlated with the candidacy of women and Queer people, formal party backing was correlated with the candidacy of racialized minorities. Despite this, formal party backing was correlated with the electoral success of women and, to a lesser degree, racialized minority candidates. Shadow party backing only had a positive impact on racialized minority candidates earning a higher percent of the popular vote, but formal party backing did the same for members of all historically marginalized communities. There is some evidence to back my initial hypothesis, but the overall results require more study to fully understand the complicated dynamics at play.

Another important finding relates to Queer candidates. Despite a striking lack of academic work on the municipal candidacy of Queer people despite the apparent and historically harmful ways civic banality was used against the community, a noticeable number of out Queer candidates sought municipal office in Ontario and British Columbia. While estimates of the Queer population are hard to come by, based on available information, it appears a greater proportion of the Queer community seeks public office when compared to another historically marginalized community: racialized minorities. Though, as will be discussed in Section 7.3, further study is needed.

A final finding relates to the racial composition of local government in Canada. In Chapter 5, I note that among survey respondents, a smaller share of the candidate pool identified as a racialized minority than the share of those in racialized minority communities in each province. In the second stage of my research, I found that racialized minority candidates were less likely to be incumbents and less likely to have sought elected office before in both provinces. One of the most striking findings was the negative correlation between electoral success (both winning and earning

a higher percentage of the popular vote) and racialized minority status, once again in both provinces. While both formal and shadow party backing was correlated with a larger percent of the popular vote, the findings indicate that racialized minorities are disadvantaged in the municipal sphere. Fewer candidates and less success among those who do seek office speak to an incredible "whiteness" in municipal government in Ontario and British Columbia. Members of racialized minority communities cannot seem to break through in municipal government. This indicates a larger, societal, systemic issue with regard to racialized minority candidates/prospective candidates and local politics that must be addressed.

7.3 – Future areas of study

The one very clear and evident conclusion of this dissertation is one that has been echoed many times through the text: further research is required. Canadian municipal politics is dynamic, providing a platform for numerous leaders to impact the everyday lives of municipal residents while simultaneously facilitating their own goals and aspirations among an ever-changing melange of short-, medium-, and long-term issues. But that dynamism requires intellectual vigilance. It is necessary to visit and revisit elections and municipal political events after time has passed and within the context of other events that both precede and succeed them. I strongly recommend more detailed study that incorporates larger study areas, adding other Anglophone cities in Alberta, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia (home to some larger municipalities) and those cities unfortunately left out of this analysis in Ontario and Quebec. Examining elections in these jurisdictions over a longer period of time will be important going forward. In addition, comparative analyses between municipal elections in Quebec and Anglophone Canada will provide some context regarding the role of partisan networks, and a consideration of municipalities in the North will help with adding smaller, isolated municipal centres into the discussion.

Another area of future study focuses on Queer candidates. Despite the identification of a large number of Queer candidates for local office, too few Queer candidates appeared in the second data set to allow for complete inclusion in statistical models. Between this, the apparent disproportionate number of Queer candidates for mayoral offices, and the need for a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between Queer candidates/potential candidates and partisan networks, it is evident that further study is required. As noted in Section 6.6.5, a larger dataset including Queer candidates for local office in many large and medium-sized cities across Canada

(including cities that have large Queer populations/business centres but were not included in this study such as Montreal, Halifax, Winnipeg, and Edmonton) across multiple elections would be beneficial. In addition, qualitative methods should be employed to fully understand the situation. Interviews in particular would be very helpful in this regard.

Similar to this, more understanding is needed regarding the impact of municipal policies, elections, and political cultures on the candidacy and electoral success of racialized minority and Indigenous candidates. As noted in the previous section, racialized minorities are placed at a significant and troubling disadvantage in municipal politics. More study is required to understand why this is the case and what policy options can be pursued to alleviate this imbalance. And, as noted in Section 2.4.4, Indigenous people are chronically under-considered in municipal politics. Despite over half of all those identifying as Indigenous in Canada and nearly 2/3 of those identifying as Métis living in urban areas (StatisticsCanada, 2017a), the experience of Indigenous people in municipal politics is one unexamined in academia. Steps must be taken to address this.

7.4 – Autumn, 2018

A little over a year shy of the Golden Anniversary of the momentous December, 1969 Toronto municipal election, the city once again went to the polls in a unique election. The unpopularity of the Ontario Liberal Party had seen them defeated by the PCs under the leadership of Doug Ford who, for a single term, served as the Ward 2 City Councillor. His main function was to serve as an advisor and handler for his younger brother, Rob, who had been elected mayor in 2010 after three terms in the same Ward 2 councillor's seat. The duo oversaw a chaotic and unproductive local government, with factions forming around support for or opposition to the Ford brothers and their brash brand of Canadian neoliberalism (Doolittle, 2014; Erl, 2021). After Doug's loss in the 2014 mayoral contest to the more moderate conservative, John Tory, he had skirted the sidelines of politics, waiting for an opportunity to jump back into the field.

Such an opportunity would appear when, less than six months before Ontario's provincial election, allegations of sexual assault were lodged against then PC leader Patrick Brown, leading to his swift resignation, expulsion from the PC caucus, and a mass purge of his supporters from the party's ranks (Platt, 2018). Ford quickly announced his candidacy for the PC leadership and won, beating Christine Elliot, the spouse of the former federal Minister of Finance, and Caroline Mulroney, the daughter of the former Prime Minister.

After Ford's victory in the provincial election, one of his first orders of business was to slash the size of Toronto city council, achieving something he had been unable to do during his time in local government (Benzie, 2018). Ford's decision came on the final day of nominations, throwing the city's election into chaos and leading to speculation the election could be cancelled over the mounting legal challenges to Ford's plan (Gray, 2018).

In 1969, voters in Toronto watched as organized wings of federal parties ran candidates in the city's municipal election openly for the first time in many years. In 2018, voters in the same city watched as municipal candidates, many of them incumbent councillors, battled each other in larger districts, all thanks to policies handed down to the city from the provincial government. Both elections saw attempts to fundamentally reorder and reorganize municipal politics in Canada's largest city, reminiscent of similar changes attempted, proposed, and enacted across the country in a variety of ways; amalgamations, abolishment of trustee seats, attempts to create ward boundaries where none had previously existed. Proponents and opponents of such changes debate vigorously about providing value and accountability to residents, fairness to voters and new candidates, and how the form and function of elections will impact the governing process. But few attempts had been made to study such issues.

In this dissertation, I sought to understand the role of partisanship in local elections and how partisan actors may help or hinder the candidacy of people historically marginalized from power in municipal government. I examined two distinct systems: a formally partisan system in British Columbia and a non-partisan/shadow partisan system in Ontario. While my results paint a scattered picture, they point to promising leads. Importantly, I embarked on this project to provide a personal and professional foundation onto which further study could be built because I know more municipal elections will be like those in Toronto in 1969 and 2018. Local elections will prove important in their own ways, in their own contexts, in their own times. Debates over style and structure, policy and priorities, tradition and the chance to try something bold and new will rage on during municipal elections. And it is important that scholarship recognizes the power in the municipality and the importance of employing rigorous effort to understand these contests as engaged and observant scholars. It is essential to do this to provide strong researched perspectives when the next election of great importance happens. And if, for nothing more, it is important to understand local government for one simple reason:

Municipal politics matters.

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Appendix A – Web scraping code

Web scraping code for Elections Canada donors database
(text that begins with # and is in *italics* is for reference and is not part of the code itself)

#loading settings and establishing basics
```
import selenium
import os
from selenium import webdriver
import time
import urllib
import requests
from selenium.webdriver.chrome.options import Options

chrome_profile = webdriver.ChromeOptions()
profile = {'download.default_directory': #location where downloads were sent
'download.prompt_for_download': False, #telling computer to auto-download
'download.directory_upgrade': True,
        'plugins.plugins_disabled': ['Chrome PDF Viewer']} #disabling Chrome's auto PDF
        viewer
        chrome_profile.add_experimental_option('prefs', profile) #bind new preferences to
        Chromedriver
chrome_profile.add_argument('--disable-extensions')
browser = webdriver.Chrome(executable_path= #location of webdriver
        chrome_options=chrome_profile)
        browser.implicitly_wait(60) #wait 60 seconds before calling an error
```

#beginning of scrape
```
url = 'http://www.elections.ca/WPAPPS/WPF/EN/CCS/Index' #Elections Canada's donor
website
browser.get(url) #command to go to website
element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="SelectAllEntities"]')
browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
time.sleep(1)  #sleep for 1 second
element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="SelectAllParties"]')
browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
time.sleep(1) #sleep for 1 second
element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="collapseExpandButton"]')
browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
time.sleep(1) #sleep for 1 second
browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="ContributorLastName"]').send_keys('Last Name')
browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="ContributorFirstName"]').send_keys('First Name')
time.sleep(2) #sleep for 2 seconds
browser.find_element_by_xpath('//SELECT[@id="ProvinceList"]/option[@title="Ontario"]').cli
ck()
time.sleep(2) #sleep for 2 seconds
```

```python
element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="SelectAllContribClasses"]')
browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
time.sleep(2) #sleep for 2 seconds
element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="SearchButton"]')
browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
try: # if the search has a result
    element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="DTDownloadLink"]')
    browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
    time.sleep(1) # SLEEP 1 SECONDS
    element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="Download"]')
    browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
    time.sleep(1) # SLEEP 1 SECONDS
    element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="CloseDownload"]')
    browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
except: # if the search does not yield a result
    browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="error_modal_window"]')
    element = browser.find_element_by_xpath('//*[@id="CloseError"]')
    browser.execute_script("arguments[0].click();", element)
    browser.get(url)
time.sleep(1) #sleep for 2 seconds
browser.get(url)

#Repeat with new name
```

Appendix B – Stata Code

#Models For Candidacy
#Women

```
logit Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2, vce(robust)

logit Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1, vce(robust)

logit Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate ib1.Province, vce(robust)
```

#Queer

```
logit Queer ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2, vce(robust)

logit Queer ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1, vce(robust)

logit Queer ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate ib1.Province, vce(robust)
```

#Racialized

```
logit RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2, vce(robust)

logit RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1, vce(robust)

logit RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate ib1.Province, vce(robust)
```

#Models for Electoral Success

```
logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority if Province==2, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority if Province==1, vce(robust)
```

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Success - Women

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Success – Racialized Minorities

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

logit Winner Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Performance

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority if Province==2, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority if Province==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Performance – Women

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1 & Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province if Woman_NB_YN==1, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Performance – Queer

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority if Province==2 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority if Province==1 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1 & Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority if Queer==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Woman_NB_YN RacializedMinority ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province if Queer==1, vce(robust)

Models for Electoral Performance – Racialized Minorities

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==2 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple if Province==1 & RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

regress Percent Party_Shadow_YN_v2 Incumbent PreviousCandidate Queer Woman_NB_YN ib2.OfficeSimple ib1.Province if RacializedMinority==1, vce(robust)

Appendix C – Survey for candidates in Ontario

Survey of Candidates for Municipal Office in Canada

This survey will help me better understand why candidates seek office, their identities, and their relationships to political organizations and groups. With this work, I hope to gain a better understanding of local government in Canada.

You are free to not answer any question and/or to stop the survey at any time.

No individually-identifying characteristics will be released and only aggregated responses to the questions will be presented. No one, other than myself and my direct supervisor, will know your specific answers. In line with standard academic practice, a modified dataset, excluding any individually-identifying characteristics, may be made available to similarly-situated scholarly researchers who comply with Canadian research ethics.

This information will be used only for scholarly purposes and will be held securely.

This work has been reviewed for compliance with ethical standards by McGill's Research Ethics Board. Questions or concerns about research ethics may be sent to McGill's Research Ethics Manager, Lynda McNeil (lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca) or 514-398-6831, referencing project file #: 8-0618.

By completing and submitting this survey, you are consenting to take part in the study. You are free not to answer any question.

PLEASE NOTE: This survey was developed prior to the provincial government's announcement on July 27, 2018 about the planned election. Please answer the questions as if your registration and candidacy status have not changed. You may click here to read a Government of Ontario press release outlining the proposed changes.

Please click "NEXT" if you consent to take part in this survey.

There are 31 questions in this survey

Introduction

Please indicate the city in which you are running for office.

Please select at most one answer

☐ Toronto
☐ Ottawa
☐ Mississauga
☐ Brampton

☐ Hamilton
☐ London
☐ Markham
☐ Vaughan
☐ Kitchener
☐ Windsor
☐ Richmond Hill
☐ Oakville
☐ Burlington
☐ Greater Sudbury
☐ Oshawa
☐ Barrie
☐ St. Catharines
☐ Guelph
☐ Cambridge
☐ Whitby
☐ Kingston
☐ Ajax
☐ Milton
☐ Thunder Bay

Part I: Motivations and Experience

These questions will address your motivations for seeking political office, your experience, and your opinions on the issues facing your community.

Please indicate the office you are seeking:

Please select at most one answer

☐ Mayor
☐ Councillor (City, Town, and/or Regional)
☐ English Public School Board Trustee
☐ English Catholic School Board Trustee
☐ French Public School Board Trustee
☐ French Catholic School Board Trustee

Please indicate if you were a candidate for any of the listed positions in the most recent past election (Municipal Elections, 2014; Canadian Federal Election, 2015; Ontario Provincial Election, 2018).

Please choose all that apply:

☐ Mayor
☐ Councillor (City, Town, and/or Regional)
☐ English Public School Board Trustee
☐ English Catholic School Board Trustee
☐ French Public School Board Trustee
☐ French Catholic School Board Trustee
☐ Member of Parliament
☐ Member of Provincial Parliament
☐ Nomination contestant
☐ Not previously a candidate

Please indicate any political experience you had prior to running for public office in this election:

Please write your answer here:

Please indicate any community service experience you had prior to running for public office in this election:

Please write your answer here:

In a few sentences, please tell me the main reasons you are seeking elected office.

Please write your answer here:

In a few sentences, please list the most important issues or problems facing your community and why you think so.

Please write your answer here:

In a few short sentences, describe any barriers you face in your candidacy due to any element of your personal identity (for example, your ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual identity, etc.)

Please write your answer here:

Part IIa: Demographics

The following set of questions ask for demographic information. In general, the questions are the same as the ones asked on the Canadian Census, and will allow for comparisons between the people who answer this survey to the general Canadian population.

Which gender do you identify with?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Male
☐ Female
☐ Non-Binary/Other
☐ Decline to Answer

Please indicate the year of your birth:

Please write your answer here:

Please indicate your place of birth.

Please select at most one answer

☐ Born in Canada
☐ Born outside Canada
☐ Decline to answer

To what ethnic or cultural group did your ancestors belong? Please indicate as many groups as necessary. (As defined by Statistics Canada, ethnic origin refers to the ethnic or cultural origins of the person's ancestors. A person may have only a single ethnic origin, or may have multiple ethnicities. Ethnic origin refers to a person's 'roots' and is not the same as citizenship, nationality, language or place of birth. Ancestor refers to a relative more distant than your grandparents.)

Comment only when you choose an answer.

Please choose all that apply and provide a comment:
☐ Canadian
☐ English
☐ Chinese
☐ French
☐ East Indian
☐ Italian
☐ German
☐ Scottish
☐ Cree
☐ Mi'kmaq
☐ Salish
☐ Métis
☐ Inuit

☐ Filipino
☐ Irish
☐ Dutch
☐ Ukrainian
☐ Polish
☐ Portuguese
☐ Vietnamese
☐ Korean
☐ Jamaican
☐ Greek
☐ Iranian
☐ Lebanese
☐ Mexican
☐ Somali
☐ Colombian
☐ A cultural group not listed here (please specify)
☐ Decline to answer

Do you identify as an Aboriginal person, that is, someone who is First Nations, Métis or Inuk (Inuit)?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes, First Nations
☐ Yes, Métis
☐ Yes, Inuk (Inuit)
☐ Do not identify as an Aboriginal person
☐ Decline to answer

Part IIb: Demographics Cont.

CONTINUED: The following set of questions ask for demographic information. In general, the questions are the same as the ones asked on the Canadian Census, and will allow for comparisons between the people who answer this survey to the general Canadian population.

Do you identify as:

Please select at most one answer

☐ White
☐ Chinese

☐ South Asian
☐ Black
☐ Arab
☐ West Asian
☐ Filipino
☐ Southeast Asian
☐ Latin American
☐ Japanese
☐ Korean
☐ Multi-Racial
☐ Decline to answer

Are you a member of the LGBTQ+ community?

Comment only when you choose an answer.
Please select at most one answer

☐ Gay
☐ Lesbian
☐ Bisexual
☐ Trans
☐ Queer
☐ Other (please specify)
☐ No
☐ Decline to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education you have achieved:

Please select at most one answer

☐ No formal education
☐ High school diploma or high school equivalency certificate
☐ Certificate of Apprenticeship or Certificate of Qualification (Journeyperson's designation)
☐ College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma
☐ Bachelor's degree (e.g., B.A., B.A. (Hons.), B.Sc., B.Ed., LL.B.)
☐ Degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine, or optometry (M.D., D.D.S., D.M.D., D.V.M., O.D.)
☐ Master's degree (e.g., M.A., M.Sc., M.Ed., M.B.A.)
☐ Doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.)
☐ Decline to answer

Please indicate the industry in which you worked at the time of your candidacy for public office. If you held more than one job, please answer with regard to what you consider your most important form of employment. (Industry is based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used by Statistics Canada and means the broad category into which your profession falls)

Please select at most one answer

☐ Management occupations (eg: legislators/politician, senior management, retail or food service managers)

☐ Business, finance and administration occupations (eg: accountants, investment brokers, human resources specialists, executive assistants)

☐ Natural and applied sciences and related occupations (eg: agriculture scientists, engineers, architects, information technology specialists, urban planners)

☐ Health occupations (eg: doctors, nurses, dentists, dental technicians)

☐ Occupations in education, law and social, community and government services (eg: lawyers, teachers, professors, educational assistants, spiritual leaders, police, policy researchers, social workers)

☐ Occupations in art, culture, recreation and sport (eg: visual artists, authors, journalists, librarians, professional athletes)

☐ Sales and service occupations (eg: sales associate, salesperson, hotel employee, travel specialist)

☐ Trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations (eg: plumbers, joiners, construction, bus driver, subway operator, mechanics)

☐ Natural resources, agriculture and related production occupations (eg: farmers, forestry workers, miners, oil and gas workers)

☐ Occupations in manufacturing and utilities (eg: line workers, tool and dye makers, motor vehicle assemblers, furniture and textile workers)

☐ Student

☐ Full-time parent

☐ Retired

☐ Unemployed

☐ Decline to answer

Part IIIa: Political Organizations

These questions will address political parties and partisan affiliations. Keep in mind, registered political parties and elector organizations operate at the local level in some Canadian jurisdictions.

For the purposes of your present candidacy for local office, are you an endorsed candidate of any political advocacy group (such as ProudPolitics, Campaign Life Coalition, Courage, Progress Toronto, etc.) or affiliated with any electoral slate?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If yes, to which organizations are you affiliated?

Please write your answer here:

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any registered Federal or Provincial political party, including from a constituency/riding association, campus club, or affiliated group?

Please select at most one answer
☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which political parties have you received support?

Please write your answer here:

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any labour union or Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)-affiliated Labour Council?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which unions and/or labour councils have you received an endorsement and/or support?

Please write your answer here:

Part IIIb: Political Organizations CONT.

CONTINUED: These questions will address political parties and partisan affiliations. Keep in mind, registered political parties and elector organizations operate at the local level in some Canadian jurisdictions.

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any community group, such as a neighbourhood association, Business Improvement Area, Chamber of Commerce, or non-partisan advocacy group?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which community groups have you received support?

Please write your answer here:

Outside your involvement in municipal politics, are you presently a member of and/or donor to any registered Federal or Provincial political party?
Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, which political party/parties are you affiliated with? Please select all that apply.

Please choose all that apply:
☐ Alliance of the North (Federal)
☐ Animal Protection Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Bloc Québécois (Federal)
☐ Christian Heritage Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Communist Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Conservative Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Green Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Liberal Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Libertarian Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Marijuana Party (Federal)
☐ Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ New Democratic Party (Federal)
☐ Progressive Canadian Party (Federal)
☐ Rhinoceros Party (Federal)
☐ Canadian Economic Party (Provincial)
☐ Canadians' Choice Party (Provincial)
☐ Communist Party of Canada Ontario (Provincial)

☐ Consensus Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Cultural Action Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Freedom Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Go Vegan (Provincial)
☐ Green Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Multicultural Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ New Democratic Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ None of the Above Direct Democracy Party (Provincial)
☐ Northern Ontario Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Alliance (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Liberal Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Libertarian Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Moderate Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Provincial Confederation of Regions Party (Provincial)
☐ Ontario Social Reform Party
☐ Party for People with Special Needs (Provincial)
☐ Party of Objective Truth (Provincial)
☐ Pauper Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ Stop Climate Change (Provincial)
☐ Stop the New Sex-Ed Agenda (Provincial)
☐ The New People's Choice Party of Ontario (Provincial)
☐ The Peoples' Political Party (Provincial)
☐ Trillium Party of Ontario (Provincial)

In a few short sentences, describe your thoughts regarding the involvement of political parties in municipal government.

Please write your answer here:

FOR TORONTO CANDIDATES ONLY: On July 27, 2018, the provincial government announced their intention to change the city council wards in Toronto. Do you agree or disagree with this move?

Please choose only one of the following:
○ Strongly Agree
○ Agree
○ Neutral/Don't know
○ Disagree

○ Strongly Disagree
○ Decline to Answer

In a few short sentences, please describe your thoughts regarding the provincial government's plan to change the city council wards in Toronto:

Please write your answer here:

Thank you for your participation. I appreciate your time and effort. If you have questions about the survey or research project, please contact me at christopher.erl@mail.mcgill.ca; or my supervisor, Prof. Benjamin Forest, at benjamin.forest@mcgill.ca. If you have questions or concerns about research ethics, please contact McGill's Research Ethics Manager, Lynda McNeil at lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca, referencing project file #8-0618.

If you would like to share any comments, please do so below:
Please write your answer here:

Appendix D – Survey for candidates in British Columbia

Survey of Candidates for Municipal Office in Canada - British Columbia Version

This survey will help me better understand why candidates seek office, their identities, and their relationships to political organizations and groups. With this work, I hope to gain a better understanding of local government in Canada.

You are free to not answer any question and/or to stop the survey at any time.

No individually-identifying characteristics will be released and only aggregated responses to the questions will be presented. No one, other than myself and my direct supervisor, will know your specific answers. In line with standard academic practice, a modified dataset, excluding any individually-identifying characteristics, may be made available to similarly-situated scholarly researchers who comply with Canadian research ethics.

This information will be used only for scholarly purposes and will be held securely.

This work has been reviewed for compliance with ethical standards by McGill's Research Ethics Board. Questions or concerns about research ethics may be sent to McGill's Research Ethics Manager, Lynda McNeil (lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca or 514-398-6831), referencing project file #: 8-0618.

By completing and submitting this survey, you are consenting to take part in the study. You are free not to answer any question.

Please click "NEXT" if you consent to take part in this survey.

There are 40 questions in this survey

Introduction

Please indicate the city in which you are running for office.

Please select one answer

☐ Vancouver
☐ Surrey
☐ Burnaby
☐ Richmond
☐ Abbotsford
☐ Coquitlam
☐ Kelowna (includes Central Okanagan Public Schools)
☐ Saanich
☐ Langley

☐ Delta
☐ Kamloops
☐ North Vancouver
☐ Nanaimo (includes Nanaimo Ladysmith Public Schools)
☐ Victoria (includes Greater Victoria School District)
☐ Chilliwack

Part I: Motivations and Experience

These questions will address your motivations for seeking political office, your experience, and your opinions on the issues facing your community.

Please indicate the office you are seeking: *

Please select at most one answer

☐ Mayor
☐ Councillor
☐ School Board Trustee
☐ Park Commissioner (option only available to Vancouver candidates)

Please indicate if you were a candidate for any of the listed positions in the most recent past election (Municipal Elections, 2014; Canadian Federal Election, 2015; British Columbia Provincial Election, 2017).

Please choose all that apply:
☐ Mayor
☐ Councillor
☐ School Board Trustee
☐ Parks Board Commissioner
☐ Member of Parliament
☐ Member of the Legislative Assembly
☐ Nomination contestant
☐ Not previously a candidate

Please indicate any political experience you had prior to running for public office in this election:

Please write your answer here:

Please indicate any community service experience you had prior to running for public office in this election:

Please write your answer here:

In a few sentences, please tell me the main reasons you are seeking elected office.

Please write your answer here:

In a few sentences, please list the most important issues or problems facing your community and why you think so.

Please write your answer here:

In a few short sentences, describe any barriers you face in your candidacy due to any element of your personal identity (for example, your ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual identity, etc.)

Please write your answer here:

Part IIa: Demographics

The following set of questions ask for demographic information. In general, the questions are the same as the ones asked on the Canadian Census, and will allow for comparisons between the people who answer this survey to the general Canadian population.

Which gender do you identify with?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Male
☐ Female
☐ Non-Binary/Other
☐ Decline to Answer

Please indicate the year of your birth:

Please write your answer here:

Please indicate your place of birth.

Please select at most one answer

☐ Born in Canada
☐ Born outside Canada
☐ Decline to answer

To what ethnic or cultural group did your ancestors belong? Please indicate as many groups as necessary. (As defined by Statistics Canada, ethnic origin refers to the ethnic or cultural origins of the person's ancestors. A person may have only a single ethnic origin, or may have multiple

ethnicities. Ethnic origin refers to a person's 'roots' and is not the same as citizenship, nationality, language or place of birth. Ancestor refers to a relative more distant than your grandparents.)

Please choose all that apply and provide a comment:
☐ Canadian
☐ English
☐ Chinese
☐ French
☐ East Indian
☐ Italian
☐ German
☐ Scottish
☐ Cree
☐ Mi'kmaq
☐ Salish
☐ Métis
☐ Inuit
☐ Filipino
☐ Irish
☐ Dutch
☐ Ukrainian
☐ Polish
☐ Portuguese
☐ Vietnamese
☐ Korean
☐ Jamaican
☐ Greek
☐ Iranian
☐ Lebanese
☐ Mexican
☐ Somali
☐ Colombian
☐ A cultural group not listed here (please specify)
☐ Decline to answer

[]
Do you identify as an Aboriginal person, that is, someone who is First Nations, Métis or Inuk (Inuit)?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes, First Nations
☐ Yes, Métis
☐ Yes, Inuk (Inuit)
☐ Do not identify as an Aboriginal person
☐ Decline to answer

Part IIb: Demographics Cont.

CONTINUED: The following set of questions ask for demographic information. In general, the questions are the same as the ones asked on the Canadian Census, and will allow for comparisons between the people who answer this survey to the general Canadian population.

Do you identify as:

Please choose all that apply:
☐ White
☐ Chinese
☐ South Asian
☐ Black
☐ Arab
☐ West Asian
☐ Filipino
☐ Southeast Asian
☐ Latin American
☐ Japanese
☐ Korean
☐ Multi-Racial
☐ Decline to answer

Are you a member of the LGBTQ+ community?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Gay
☐ Lesbian
☐ Bisexual
☐ Trans
☐ Queer
☐ Other (please specify)
☐ No

☐Decline to answer

Please indicate the highest level of education you have achieved:

Please select at most one answer

☐No formal education
☐High school diploma or high school equivalency certificate
☐Certificate of Apprenticeship or Certificate of Qualification (Journeyperson's designation)
☐College, CEGEP or other non-university certificate or diploma
☐Bachelor's degree (e.g., B.A., B.A. (Hons.), B.Sc., B.Ed., LL.B.)
☐Degree in medicine, dentistry, veterinary medicine or optometry (M.D., D.D.S., D.M.D., D.V.M., O.D.)
☐Master's degree (e.g., M.A., M.Sc., M.Ed., M.B.A.)
☐Doctorate (e.g., Ph.D.)
☐Decline to answer

Please indicate the industry in which you worked at the time of your candidacy for public office. If you held more than one job, please answer with regard to what you consider your most important form of employment. (Industry is based on the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) used by Statistics Canada and means the broad category into which your profession falls)

Please select at most one answer

☐Management occupations (eg: legislators/politician, senior management, retail or food service managers)
☐Business, finance and administration occupations (eg: accountants, investment brokers, human resources specialists, executive assistants)
☐Natural and applied sciences and related occupations (eg: agriculture scientists, engineers, architects, information technology specialists, urban planners)
☐Health occupations (eg: doctors, nurses, dentists, dental technicians)
☐Occupations in education, law and social, community and government services (eg: lawyers, teachers, professors, educational assistants, spiritual leaders, police, policy researchers, social workers)
☐Occupations in art, culture, recreation and sport (eg: visual artists, authors, journalists, librarians, professional athletes)
☐Sales and service occupations (eg: sales associate, salesperson, hotel employee, travel specialist)
☐Trades, transport and equipment operators and related occupations (eg: plumbers, joiners, construction, bus driver, subway operator, mechanics)
☐Natural resources, agriculture and related production occupations (eg: farmers, forestry workers, miners, oil and gas workers)

☐Occupations in manufacturing and utilities (eg: line workers, tool and dye makers, motor vehicle assemblers, furniture and textile workers)
☐Student
☐Full-time parent
☐Retired
☐Unemployed
☐Decline to answer

Part IIIa: Political Organizations
These questions will address political parties and partisan affiliations. Keep in mind, registered political parties and elector organizations operate at the local level in some Canadian jurisdictions.

For the purposes of your present candidacy for local office, are you an endorsed candidate of an elector organization*? (*Elector organizations are defined by Elections BC as promoting "a candidate or group of candidates during a local election in one or more jurisdictions. Elector organizations are also known as civic political parties.")

Please select at most one answer

☐Yes
☐No
☐Decline to Answer
[]
To which elector organization are you affiliated?

In Vancouver:

Please choose all that apply:
☐Coalition Vancouver
☐Coalition of Progressive Electors (COPE)
☐Green Party of Vancouver
☐Independent Democratic Electors Alliance (IDEA)
☐Civic Non-Partisan Alliance (NPA)
☐OneCity
☐ProVancouver
☐VANCOUVER 1st
☐Vision Vancouver
☐Work Less Party
☐YES Vancouver
☐Decline to Answer

In Surrey:

Please choose all that apply:
☐ ACT Now Surrey
☐ GreenVote
☐ Integrity Now
☐ Independent Surrey Voters Association (ISVA)
☐ People First
☐ Progressive Sustainable
☐ Proudly Surrey
☐ Safe Surrey Coalition
☐ Surrey First
☐ Surrey First Education
☐ Surrey Students Now
☐ Decline to Answer

In Burnaby:

Please choose all that apply:
☐ Burnaby Citizens Association (BCA)
☐ Burnaby Green Party
☐ Burnaby First Coalition
☐ Decline to Answer

In Richmond:

Please choose all that apply:
☐ Richmond Citizens (RCA)
☐ Richmond Community Coalition
☐ Richmond Education Party
☐ Richmond First
☐ RITE
☐ Decline to Answer

In Abbotsford:

Please choose all that apply:
☐ AbbotsfordFIRST
☐ Decline to Answer

In Saanich:

Please choose all that apply:

☐ United for Saanich

☐ Decline to Answer

In Delta:

Please choose all that apply:

☐ Achieving For Delta

☐ Independents Working For You

☐ Kids Matter

☐ Team Delta

☐ Decline to Answer

In North Vancouver

Please choose all that apply:

☐ Building Bridges NV

☐ Decline to Answer

In Victoria:

Please choose all that apply:

☐ NewCouncil.ca

☐ Together Victoria

☐ Decline to Answer

For the purposes of your present candidacy for local office, are you an endorsed candidate of any other political advocacy group (such as ProudPolitics, Campaign Life Coalition, Courage, etc.) or affiliated with any other electoral slate?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes

☐ No

☐ Decline to Answer

If yes, to which organizations are you affiliated?

Please write your answer here:

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any registered Federal or Provincial political party, including from a constituency/riding association, campus club, or affiliated group?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which political parties have you received support?

Please write your answer here:

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any labour union or Canadian Labour Congress (CLC)-affiliated Labour Council?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which unions and/or labour councils have you recieved an endorsement and/or support?

Please write your answer here:

Part IIIb: Political Organizations CONT.
CONTINUED: These questions will address political parties and partisan affiliations. Keep in mind, registered political parties and elector organizations operate at the local level in some Canadian jurisdictions.

Have you received an endorsement or official support, including donations, from any community group, such as a neighbourhood association, Business Improvement Area, Chamber of Commerce, or non-partisan advocacy group?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, from which community groups have you recieved support?

Please write your answer here:

Outside your involvement in municipal politics, are you presently a member of and/or donor to any registered Federal or Provincial political party?

Please select at most one answer

☐ Yes
☐ No
☐ Decline to Answer

If so, which political party/parties are you affiliated with? Please select all that apply.

Please choose all that apply:
☐ Alliance of the North (Federal)
☐ Animal Protection Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Bloc Québécois (Federal)
☐ Christian Heritage Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Communist Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Conservative Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Green Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Liberal Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Libertarian Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ Marijuana Party (Federal)
☐ Marxist-Leninist Party of Canada (Federal)
☐ New Democratic Party (Federal)
☐ Progressive Canadian Party (Federal)
☐ Rhinoceros Party (Federal)
☐ B.C. New Republican Party (Provincial)
☐ B.C. Vision (Provincial)
☐ BC Citizens First Party (Provincial)
☐ BC Marijuana Party (Provincial)
☐ BC NDP (Provincial)
☐ BC Progressive Party (Provincial)
☐ BC Refederation Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Action Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Conservative Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Excalibur Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Liberal Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Libertarian Party (Provincial)

☐ British Columbia Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Peoples Party (Provincial)
☐ British Columbia Social Credit Party (Provincial)
☐ Cascadia Party of British Columbia (Provincial)
☐ Christian Heritage Party of British Columbia (Provincial)
☐ Communist Party of BC (Provincial)
☐ Cultural Action Party (Provincial)
☐ For British Columbia (Provincial)
☐ Green Party Political Association of British Columbia (Provincial)
☐ Platinum Party of Employers Who Think and Act to Increase Awareness (Provincial)
☐ Rural BC Party (Provincial)
☐ Unparty: The Consensus-Building Party (Provincial)
☐ Vancouver Island Party (Provincial)
☐ Your Political Party of BC (Provincial)

In a few short sentences, describe your thoughts regarding the involvement of political parties in municipal government.

Please write your answer here:

Thank you for your participation. I appreciate your time and effort. If you have questions about the survey or research project, please contact me at christopher.erl@mail.mcgill.ca; or my supervisor, Prof. Benjamin Forest, at benjamin.forest@mcgill.ca. If you have questions or concerns about research ethics, please contact McGill's Research Ethics Manager, Lynda McNeil at lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca, referencing project file #8-0618.

If you would like to share any comments, please do so below:

Please write your answer here:

Appendix E – Descriptive Statistics

	Total Number	
	Ontario	BC
Mayor	76	49
Councillor	572	201
School Trustee	481	111
Parks Board Commissioner		33
TOTAL	1129	394

	Percent Winning - Ontario		
	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority
Mayor	9.09	33.33	0.00
Councillor	19.08	11.76	7.03
School Trustee	29.47	36.36	16.67

	Percent Among All Winners - Ontario		
	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority
Mayor	20.00	20.00	0.00
Councillor	34.52	2.38	15.48
School Trustee	50.83	3.33	23.33

	Percent Winning - British Columbia		
	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority
Mayor	8.33	0.00	0.00
Councillor	24.42	27.27	9.88
School Trustee	32.20	0.00	20.37
Parks Board Commissioner	18.18	0.00	0.00

	Percent Among All Winners - British Columbia		
	Women	Queer	Racialized Minority
Mayor	20.00	0.00	0.00
Councillor	50.00	7.14	19.05
School Trustee	50.00	0.00	28.95
Parks Board Commissioner	28.57	0.00	0.00

	Ontario Shadow Party/Incipient Party Supported	British Columbia Elector Organization/Formal Party Supported
Mayor	2.74	28.57
Councillor	12.36	62.69
School Trustee	9.85	63.64
Parks Board Commissioner		84.85

Number of Candidates Per Office and City

	Toronto	Ottawa	Mississauga	Brampton	Hamilton	TOTAL
Mayor	35	12	7	7	15	76
Councillor	242	102	70	69	89	572
School Trustee	224	75	72	56	54	481
TOTAL	501	189	149	132	158	1129

Number of Candidates Per Office and City

	Vancouver	Surrey	Burnaby	Richmond	Victoria	TOTAL
Mayor	21	8	4	6	10	49
Councillor	71	48	23	30	29	201
School Trustee	33	27	13	26	12	111
Parks Board Commissioner	33					33
TOTAL	158	83	40	62	51	394

Appendix F – Municipal websites

Municipality	Election Financial Return Source
Toronto	http://app.toronto.ca/EFD/jsf/main/main.xhtml?campaign=15
Ottawa	https://ottawa.ca/en/city-hall/elections/previous-elections/2018/financial-statements-2018-municipal-elections-candidates
Mississauga	https://mississaugavotes.ca/infoforvoters/whosrunning
Brampton	https://www.brampton.ca/EN/City-Hall/election/Candidates/Pages/2018-financial-stmt.aspx
Hamilton	https://www.hamilton.ca/municipal-election/election-results-candidate-financial-statements/2018-candidate-financial

Municipality	Election Results Source
Vancouver	https://vancouver.ca/your-government/election-results-2018.aspx
Surrey	https://www.surrey.ca/sites/default/files/media/documents/2018FinalDeterminationOfOfficialElectionResultsSigned.pdf
Burnaby	https://pub-burnaby.escribemeetings.com/filestream.ashx?DocumentId=41630
Richmond	https://www.richmond.ca/cityhall/elections/2018results/results.htm
Victoria	https://www.victoria.ca/assets/City~Hall/Elections/OFFICIAL%20RESULTS_Declaration2018.pdf