MANAGING THE TENSIONS FACING INDIGENOUS SOCIAL CHANGE ORGANIZATIONS THAT COMBINE SERVICE & ADVOCACY:

THE CASE OF THE ARAB JEWISH CENTER FOR EQUALITY, EMPOWERMENT & COOPERATION IN THE NEGEV, ISRAEL

A Dissertation Presented

by

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DEDICATION

I dedicate this dissertation to my family and to my parents Abed Alkarim and Hajar. My parents always recognized the value of education and community activism. They always believed in me and were my source of inspiration to continue this journey of making the world a better place for women in particular and for the whole world in general.

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ABSTRACT

MANAGING THE TENSIONS FACING INDIGENOUS SOCIAL CHANGE ORGANIZATIONS THAT COMBINE SERVICE & ADVOCACY:

THE CASE OF THE ARAB JEWISH CENTER FOR EQUALITY, EMPOWERMENT & COOPERATION IN THE NEGEV, ISRAEL

The tension between providing services to marginalized groups and organizing them for advocacy to challenge the power structure is a fundamental dilemma for Social Change Service Organizations. This dilemma exists in many civil society organizations, especially among organizations that work with marginalized and oppressed communities such as the Bedouin indigenous minority in Israel where providing immediate services and advocating for policy change are equally crucial. There is abundant literature on the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy, as these approaches each require their own organizational structure and resources. There are very few studies, however, showing how these organizations manage and overcome these tensions. This study applied an exploratory case study using The Arab Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment, and Cooperation (AJEEC) in the Naqab-Negev as an instrumental single case. This study explores the tensions and approaches/strategies used to manage the tensions between providing service and advocacy and how AJEEC was able to survive and thrive in the long run. The findings of this study pointed to the social and political contexts as the main factors that shaped the tensions and the strategies the organization developed to manage them. The case provided an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of these tensions and revealed AJEEC's unique approach, strategies, and long-term solutions implemented to manage these tensions effectively and sustainably within the social, political, and cultural context in which AJEEC operates. The study presents implications for future research, policy, and management, along with recommendations for social work practice.

GESTION DES TENSIONS RELATIVES DES ORGANISATIONS DE CHANGEMENT SOCIAL DES INDIGENES QUI JOINT SERVICES ET REVENDICATION

LE CAS DU CENTRE JUDÉO-ARABE POUR L'ÉGALITÉ, L'EMPLOI ET LA COOPÉRATION DANS LE NEGEV, ISRAËL

La tension entre la fourniture de services aux groupes marginalisés et l'organisation des revendications afin de défier les structures de pouvoir est un dilemme fondamental pour les Organisations de Services de Changement Social. Ce dilemme existe dans de nombreuses organisations de sociétés civiles, en particulier parmi les organisations qui travaillent avec des communautés marginalisées et subjuguées telles que la minorité indigène Bédouine qui demeure en Israël, où la prestation de services immédiats et la promotion de changements politiques sont tout aussi prépondérantes. Il existe une littérature riche concernant les tensions qui proviennent du groupement des services de disposition et revendication, car ces approches nécessitent chacune leur propre structure organisationnelle et leurs ressources. Cependant, il existe très peu d'études exposant la façon dont ces organisations gèrent et surmontent ces tensions. Cette étude a employé une étude de cas exploratoire utilisant Le Centre Judéo-Arabe pour l'Égalité, l'Emploi et la Coopération (AJEEC) dans le Naqab-Negev en tant que cas unique instrumental. Cette étude explore les tensions et les approches / stratégies utilisées pour gérer les tensions entre la disposition de service et de revendication et la façon dont AJEEC a pu survivre et prospérer à long terme. Les résultats de cette étude ont mis en évidence les contextes sociaux et politiques en tant que facteurs principaux qui façonnent les tensions et les stratégies développées par l'organisation afin de les gérer. Le cas a permis une compréhension approfondie de la dynamique qui est provoqué par ces tensions et révèle l'approche unique, les stratégies et les solutions à long terme mises en œuvre par AJEEC pour gérer ces tensions de manière efficace et durable dans le contexte social, politique et culturel dans lequel AJEEC opère. L'étude présente des implications pour la recherche, la politique et la gestion futures, ainsi que des recommandations pour la pratique du travail social.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS v

ABSTRACT vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS viii

LIST OF TABLES xiv

LIST OF FIGURES xv

LIST OF ACRONYMS 1

CHAPTER 1: INTRODCUTION 2

- Problem Statement 3
- Theoretical Perspectives 6
- Purpose of the study 8
- Research Questions 9
- Scope of the study 10
- Significance of the Study 10
- Significance to Society 11
- Significance to the Social Work Profession 11
- Dissertation Overview 12

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 14

- Overview 14
- Theoretical Perspectives on Civil Society Organizations 14
  - Sub-Categories of Civil Society Organizations 14
  - SCSOs: a Sub-Category of Civil Society Organizations 17
- Social Change Service Organizations (SCSOs) 18
  - The Definition of SCSOs 18
- The Rise of SCSOs 19
- SCSOs' Integrative Approach 21
  - Service Provision 22
  - Advocacy 23
- Characteristics of SCSOs 24
  - Tensions and Dilemmas that Arise from Combining Service Provision and Advocacy 28
  - Institutional Theory 29
  - Resource Dependence Theory 29

Organizational Structure 30
Professionalization 31
Bureaucratization 32
Resource Availability and Funding Choices 34
Inter-Organizational Relations 38
Networks and Coalitions 38
Partnerships 38
Franchises 38
SCSOs and the Challenges of Dual Identity 39
Dual Message 40
SCSOs in Coalitions 40
Mission and Ideology 42
Strategies for Managing the Tensions 45
Conclusion 48

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 50

External Environment 51
Social context 51
Institutional Environment 52
Internal Environment 52
Operational Environment 52
Non-linearity, Adaptability, and Complexity 53

CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 55

Overview 55
Political context 56
Social context 57
The Evolution of Bedouin Social Change Organizations (BSCOs) 59
The Concept of Civil Society 60
Pre-State Bedouin Community and its Institutions 61
Bedouin Political Institutions 61
Bedouin Social Institutions 62
Development of Present-Day Bedouin Civil Society 63
Leading Factors: External Factors 63
Ethnic state 63
Jewish Civil Society Organizations 65
Leading Factors: Internal Factors 68
Political Parties and the Islamic Movement 68
Rise in Education Levels 69
Military Government (1949-1966) 70
Land Day (1976) 71
The Flourishing Period (1992-2000) 73
Political opportunities 74

Resource Mobilization 74
Unrecognized Villages Organizations 74
Bedouin Women's Organizations 75
BSCOs' Institutionalization and Professionalization (2000–2009) 76
Political Events 77
Impact on Civil Society 78
New opportunities 79
Unrecognized Villages 80
Women's Organizations 80
From NGOs to Social Movements (2010-present) 81
The Prawer Plan 81
Civil Society Response 81
General Trends: The Data 83
Challenges Facing BSCOs 85
Political Challenges 85
Social Challenges 86
Financial and Managerial Challenges 87
BSCOs: Impact 88
Conclusion 90

THE CASE: AJEEC 91

Overview 91
Origin and Mission Stage: 2000 91
AJEEC's mission 93
Start up and Design stage: 2000-2003 93
AJEEC's Integrative Approach to Social Change 94
AJEEC's Model of Operation 95
Programs 97
Funding Model 97
Growth and Scale-up: 2003-2010 98
Programs 98
Scale-Up and Expanding the Programs' Scope 99
The Volunteer Tent (VT) 99
Early Childhood PP program 100
Economic Empowerment Programs 101
New Department: Health Promotion and the Environment 102
Consolidation Phase: 2010-2016 105
The Volunteer Tent 106
Early Childhood PP Program 106
Health Promotion and the Environment Department 107
Economic Empowerment Programs 107
Funding Model 107
Organizational Structure and Management 109
AJEEC's Organizational Structure 110
Collaboration System 111

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 115

Overview 115
Research Questions 115
Research Design: a Qualitative Case Study 116
The Case Study Method 117
The Case Selection: AJEEC 119
Identifying AJEEC'S Major Events 119
Interviews 121
Sampling of Interview Participants 122
Description of the Research Participants Interviewed 123
Interview Procedures and Navigating Language Issues 126
Interview Structure 127
AJEEC's Case Study Documents 128
My Experience and Personal Notebooks 130
The Researcher Position: My Own Space 131
Initial Concerns and Considerations 132
Advantages 133
Disadvantages 135
Ethical Issues 136
Data Analysis 137
Step 1: Organizing the Data 138
Step 2: Generating Categories, Themes, and Patterns 139
Step 3: Developing Cross-Cutting Themes 140
Step 4: Establishing Trustworthiness of the Data and Results 140

EVENT I: Community Volunteerism Versus National Service 142
Background 142
The Bedouin Volunteer Tent 143
Opening the National Service to all Citizens 144
The Palestinian Minority's Opposition 145
Building the Herakuna Coalition 147

EVENT II: Global Financial Crisis 2008 150
Background 151
Cost-Effective Budgeting 152
The Emergency Plan: Long-term 152
Scaling-up the PP program 152
Expanding Israeli Financial Support 154
Self-Generating Income Models 154
Outcome 155

EVENT III: Women's Empowerment Programs—The Case For Social Advocacy 155
Background 156
The Linkage Model 157
Linking vocational training with entrepreneurship 157

External Tensions....158
Internal Tensions....159
Campaign Against Polygamy....159

EVENT IV: The Gaza War 2009—the Case of Political Action....162
Background....162
Impact within the Organization....162
Unearthing tensions between the Arab and Jewish staff....162
External Tensions....164
Partnerships with the Government Threatened....164

EVENT V: The Prawer Plan - September 2011....166
Background....166

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS I—IDENTIFYING THE TENSIONS....169
Overview....169
AJEEC's Complexity....170
Contextual Tensions....175
1. Mission and Ideology....175
1.1 Social Services vs. Political Rights....176
1.2 Competing Powers....182
2. Resource Availability....187
2.1. Funding Barriers and Political Restrictions....188
2.2. Conflicting Legitimacies....194
3. Multifaceted Accountability....199

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS II—MANAGING THE TENSIONS....207

Overview....207
1. Strategically Linking Service Provision and Advocacy....208
a. Services as Rights....210
b. Service-Based Empowerment....211
1.2 Three Advocacy Approaches....213
a. Advocacy-based Alternatives....213
b. Social Advocacy....216
c. Political Action....217
2. Selecting Competent Leadership....218
2.1. Local Staff....218
2.2. Joint Arab and Jewish staff....220
2.3. Multidisciplinary and professional leadership and staff....221
2.4. Staff Development....223
3. Re-Setting the Policy Agenda....225
3.1. Setting the Agenda....225
3.2. Framing the message....226
3.3. Seizing political opportunities....228

4. Balancing Legitimacies....229
4.1. Balancing Legitimacy within the Community....230
4.2. Balancing Legitimacy with Government Institutions....231
4.3. Direct and Open Communication....232
4.4. Synergetic Partnerships, Coalitions, and Linkages....233
5. Resource Diversification....238
5.1. Flexible Government Funds....238
5.2. Self-Generating Income....239
Conclusion....241

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION....242
Overview....242
Shifting Dichotomist Relations to Complementary Connections....243
Advocacy-based Alternatives....244
A Shared Arab-Jewish Mission....246
Gender Equality....247
State-Indigenous Minority Relations....249

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS....251
Overview....251
Research Limitations....252
Implications For Future Research....253
Implications for Policy....255
Implications for Social Work Practice....257

APPENDICES....258

APPENDIX A....258

APPENDIX B....260

APPENDIX C....261

APPENDIX D....262

APPENDIX E....264

APPENDIX F....266

APPENDIX G....268

APPENDIX H....269

BIBLIOGRAPHY....270

LIST OF TABLES

Table Page

Table 1: Foley and Edwards' (1996) Classification of Civil Society Organizations Including Hasenfeld and Gidron's Contribution (2005) 18

Table 2: Korten's (1999) Classification of Civil Society Organizations: Organizational Generations 19

Table 3: Theoretical Issues Arise from Combining Service Provision and Advocacy 44

Table 4: Summary of AJEEC's Growth from 2000-2015 113

Table 5: Type and Utility of Data from each Data Collection Activity 121

Table 6: Characteristics of Study Participants 124

Table 7 : Major Themes Abstracted from the Tensions that Arose during AJEEC's Five Events 205

Table 8: Summary of Tensions and Strategic Responses 241

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure

Page

Figure 1. The Emergency Of SCSOs-Hybrid organizations (Minkoff, 2002)..... 21

Figure 2. Continuum of Organizational Approaches and Strategies (Minkoff, 1999) 22

Figure 3. External and internal factors and their impact on tensions formation and management 53

Figure 4. The Interlinked Relations between the Socio-Political Context, the Institutional Environment, and the Operational Level..... 54

Figure 5. Growth of Registered BNGOs in the Negev from 1976 to 2009. Data retrieved from Israeli Association Registrar Report 2011 84

Figure 6. AJEEC's operational model 96

Figure 7. Comparison of Income Distribution between 2009 and 2016..... 108

Figure 8. AJEEC's Organizational Structure..... 111

Figure 9. AJEEC's Revenue Growth from 2000-2016..... 112

Figure 10. AJEEC's Total Growth from 2000-2015 114

Figure 11. AJEEC'S Accountability System..... 203

Figure 12. Activating "Service" through Empowerment..... 210

LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSO	Civil Society Organization
SCO	Social Change Organization
SCSO	Social Change Service Organization
BSCO	Bedouin Social Change Organization
JISCO	Jewish Israeli Social Change Organization
PSCO	Palestinian Social Change Organization
PISCO	Palestinian Israeli Social Change Organization
AJEEC	Arab Jewish Centre for Equality, Empowerment, and Cooperation
NISPED	Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development
CV	Community Volunteering
NS	National Service
GY	Gap year
VT	Volunteer Tent
PP	Parents as Partners
RDC	Resource Development Centre
SCI	Students Community Involvement
SMC	Single-Mothers' Catering
SME	Small-Medium Enterprises
YLC	Youth Leading Change
ACRI	Association for Civil Rights in Israel
ADP	Arab Democratic Party
ALS	Association of Laqiya's Sons
ASDBR	Association for Support and Defense of Bedouin Rights in Israel
CEDAW	Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CANS	Campaign Against National Service
CPI	Communist Party in Israel
FUAC	Follow-Up Arab Committee
FUBC	Follow-Up Bedouin Committee
MK	Member of Knesset
MAAN	Forum of Bedouin Women Organizations
ITAF	Inter-Agency Task Force on Arab-Israeli issues
RCUBV	Regional Council of the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Negev
SFUCAI	Supreme Follow-Up Committee of Arabs in Israel
URV	Unrecognized village
JDC	Joint Distribution Committee
SF	San Francisco Jewish Federation
VLF	Van Leer Foundation

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

I began my career as a community organizer at age thirteen. In the Bedouin village of Laqiya in the Negev desert (south Israel), I spent my adolescence organizing literacy classes for all the women in my tribe. Since then, I have spent many years developing programs and services for the indigenous Bedouin minority in Israel and advocating against exclusionary government policies and discriminatory regulations. My early years as an activist, ages 13 to 19, focused on nurturing solidarity and mutual support within the community through the creation of services such as water pipes, cleaning up the village by collecting the garbage, organizing classes for illiterate women, and organizing summer camps for children. At that time, I was not aware of how national policies impacted local issues and access to human rights. As a social work student at Ben Gurion University, I developed an awareness about how the absence of running water in my village is linked to the Bedouin's indigenous minority status within the state of Israel. During these years, my social work career centered on advocacy, including staging protests and engaging in other forms of political action to fight the Israeli government's policies of housing demolition, land confiscation, and the deprivation of basic utilities.

During one of the demonstrations I organized to promote equal education of Bedouin children, I arrived to find only twenty other people from my community, as opposed to hundreds of protestors demanding their rights. I was struck by the absence of committed Bedouins and I asked myself: "Where are my people? Why don't they come when they know that these issues directly impact their lives and future?" The week after the demonstration, I walked from home to home, from shack to shack, asking community members about their responsibility to take the lead to ensure equal education for their children. After many difficult conversations and challenging arguments, one woman said: "We don't have water to drink and you want us to run

around for nothing? At the end of the day, no one will hear you. The state is strong and we are weak. The hand can't fight the needle." At that moment I was torn between two commitments: the commitment to providing access to basic necessities and the commitment to changing the communal, institutional, and political structures responsible for providing access to these necessities. These two commitments—to service provision and to advocating for social change—frequently demand contradictory actions and, as such, underlie my dilemma as a social worker. My drive to resolve this dilemma led me to establish the Arab Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment, and Cooperation (AJEEC), a social change service organization (SCSO) that operates on a holistic approach to social change where advocacy and services compliment rather than contradict one another. As AJEEC's Co-Executive Director for 12 years, the organization's work successfully provided both service provision and advocacy, effectively creating innovative programs to serve the community while actively changing exclusionary governmental policies. When it came time to go back to school and begin my own research, I returned to this moment and decided that the best work I could do would be to make these types of civil society organizations visible. This dissertation is an in-depth exploration of fifteen years of community work, the values of what I have learned about managing service provision and advocacy work, and the constant work to maintain both functions.

Problem Statement

Civil society organizations operating within the context of marginalized indigenous populations are required to engage in service provision and advocacy. Theoretical and practical accounts have shown that engaging in both functions creates tensions internally within the organization and externally with the organization's stakeholders because the organization necessarily relies on external resources to survive. Moreover, these two functions—service

provision and advocacy—require different structures and resources. Internally, this refers to organizational structure, staffing, and activities. Externally this refers to financial resources, human resources, legitimacy as a resources, and partnerships. For these organizations, these different needs create an ongoing dilemma of how to simultaneously provide services to marginalized groups and organize them for political action in order to bring about sustainable social change (Brooks, 2005; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Megan, 2010; D. C. Minkoff, 1994; Mosley, 2012).

Civil society organizations can be distinguished from each other by their theory of change. Lewis (2006) argues that no authentic social change organization can operate without a theory that directs the organization's approach and strategy. Advocacy organizations very often are concerned with the underlying causes of a problem and aim for structural change whereas service delivery organizations are oriented towards the target community's immediate needs and thus deal with the symptoms of the problem.

Due to an opening of the political arena during the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, civil society organizations shifted their focus towards more advocacy (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Another shift occurred during the 1980s' global decline of the welfare state and subsequent privatization which led civil society organizations towards providing more services, principally as contractors to the government. The growing role of civil society organizations in the 80s led to the creation of a wide range of civil society organizations. From social change organizations, NGOs, international development organizations, or member-run organizations, these organizations operate within different socio-political contexts, encompass different theories of change and, consequently, engage in different activities to bring about change. These activities include promoting civic engagement, engaging in advocacy work, leading anti-discrimination

campaigns, and providing direct services to marginalized communities (Bendaña, 2006; C. A. Hyde, 2000; Minkoff, 2002).

Social change service organizations (SCSOs)—a sub-category of civil society organizations—combine service provision and advocacy work (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). SCSOs grew in popularity within oppressed marginalized communities such as indigenous minorities, women, and immigrants. SCSOs within these groups compensated for governmental neglect and offered an avenue for self-advocacy within a setting of discriminatory policies. Within the context of oppression, minority groups have no choice but to create organizations that simultaneously provides services and engage in advocacy (C. A. Hyde, 2000; Debra C Minkoff, 2002; O'Connell, 1994).

In the literature, organizations that combine service provision and advocacy appear under different names such as service advocacy hybrid organizations multi-purpose service organizations (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; C. Hyde, 1992; Mosley, 2012), social movement service organizations (SMSOs), and human service advocacy organizations (Donaldson, 2007; O'Connell, 1978; Brooks, 2005; Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Megan, 2010; D. C. Minkoff, 1994; Mosley, 2012).

In this study, I call these organizations Social Change Service Organizations (SCSOs). Studies on organizations that combine service provision and advocacy in a single organization discuss the various factors that may lead SCSOs to face multilayered tensions. The literature provides countless examples of advocacy organizations losing their militancy and advocacy mission after accepting government funding for service provision activities (Bobo, Kendall, Max, Bobo, & Kendall, 2001; Perlman, 1979; F. Piven, 1966). Conversely, organizations that provided services lost government funding and financial support from a committed donor base

after engaging in advocacy and political action (Brooks, 2005; Hopkins, 1992; Megan, 2010). Shifting from advocacy to service or vice-versa is a question of internal and external dynamics. The literature on organizational studies largely uses Resource Dependence Theory and Institutional Theory to discuss these dynamics.

Theoretical Perspectives

According to Resource dependence theory and Institutional theory, the strongest factors motivating organizations are survival and growth. SCSOs are influenced by their choices during resource mobilization and funding choices (J. C. Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), proposes that the more organizations depend on resources controlled by external bodies (governments, foundations, private donors), the greater the influence of these bodies on these organizations (Candler & Dumont, 2010; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012). Institutional theory proposes that organizational behaviour is determined by their institutional environment (political pressure, social norms, and regulations).

These theories illustrate the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy. Resource dependence theory stipulates that delivering services depends on a stable flow of resources. In response, organizations tend to adopt bureaucratic structures to become more effective at mobilizing money and resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This need for stability creates the following cycle: the organization is pulled towards generating more resources which requires more contracts with external bodies, and thus creates more commitment to service provision. This cycle results in fewer resources for advocacy and less autonomy. Institutional theory suggests that the demands of maintaining and sustaining an organization pressures organizations into formalizing and professionalizing their structure. Pressure towards

institutionalizing the organization comes in the form of regulations and normative rules, which if adopted, enable an organization to better manage its resources. SCSOs must continually negotiate a balance between service provision and political action, as well as monitor their own activities for compliance with legal and normative expectations, which requires much work and energy that could be devoted to their cause (C. Jenkins, 2006). To honour these regulations, organizations do away with their outsider tactics that they need to achieve their original advocacy goals (Piven & Cloward, 1991). In support of this idea, Piven and Cloward (1991) argue that formalization and professionalization in response to funding regulations imposed by the government or donors come at the expense of organizations' social change mission. Both of these theories suggest that for their long-term survival, organizations that are focused on advocacy should avoid engaging in service provision while organizations engaged in service provision should avoid engaging in advocacy. In both cases, the literature concludes that organizations face difficulties in managing both functions and will have to give up on one of them in order to survive and thrive (C. Hyde, 1992; Minkoff, 2002).

The literature demonstrates that SCSOs that operate within oppressed minority groups such as ethnic groups, indigenous populations, women, and the LGBTQ community adopt service provision and advocacy as their fundamental approach to social change. These organizations fundamentally need to access basic services and to advocate against the political system that denied them these services in the first place (Charleston, Mulally Minkoff, 2002;Chambre, 1995; Gronbjerg, 1992; Perlmutter, 1994; Rios, 2000; Rodgers & Tartaglia, 1990; Salem, et al., 2002; Weil,1995). According to Resource dependence theory, the dual advocacy and service components of SCSOs also exert pressure on the organization's ideology and mission (Greenhalgh, 2005). SCSOs' dual role as advocates and service providers

continuously threatens their legitimacy (a key resource for these organizations) within their constituencies and with the government.

According to Institutional theory, Piven and Cloward's (1979) suggest that bureaucratization constrains the actions of marginalized groups. Organizational action that is tightly structured around procedure may signal constituencies to conform to conventional norms of interest participation, rather than encourage activities associated with grassroots action. These theories predict that the tensions that minority-based SCSOs face while providing service provision and advocacy are magnified because these organizations have no choice but to maintain their integrative social change approach. Using a single-case study methodology, this research aims to explore these tensions and the strategies developed to manage them.

Purpose of the study

The literature has explored the tensions SCSOs face and how these tensions manifest within the organizational structure, resource mobilization, inter-organizational relations and the organizational mission and values. The studies show how SCSOs are torn between the two approaches (service provision and advocacy) as they require different structures and impose different funding choices and decisions. These decisions ultimately affect how the organization maintains or abandons one of its mandates.

The literature has not explored the ways in which these organizations manage these tensions. The many studies provide a comprehensive picture of the tensions and the dilemmas, but the proposed solutions are few and meager. Moreover the literature is limited in exploring SCSOs within a context of indigenous minorities and provides limited explanation of the impact of the contextual (political and social) factors on how these tensions are formed and the subsequent development of strategies to manage these tensions. The few studies that do explore

how organizations manage these tensions focus on identity-based, women, and minority group organizations (Minkoff, 2002).

The aim of this study is to understand the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy. More specifically, this study aims to explore how indigenous minority SCSOs manage these tensions, how the socio-political context shapes the tensions, and how the socio-political context shapes the organization's response to them. To carry out this study, the following questions were proposed:

Research Questions

The purpose of my study is to address these two main questions and two supporting questions:

- What tensions arise from combining service provision and advocacy in SCSOs?
- How do SCSOs manage these tensions?

Supporting questions:

- What strategies do SCSOs develop to manage these tensions?
- What factors (contextual and operative) shape SCSOs capacity to manage these tensions and to survive in the long-run?

Given the limited empirical research on SCSOs within the contexts of indigenous minorities and the limited studies on how these organizations manage the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy work, I intended to perform an exploratory case study to conduct this research. This study focuses on AJEEC's 15 years of promoting social change by combining service and advocacy for Israel's indigenous Bedouin population in the Negev. I employed a qualitative methodology that provided a detailed examination of five major events in the life of AJEEC. The study used primary qualitative data collection methods which included 31 open-ended interviews with a diverse range of participants, AJEEC's documents, and records. As

the founding director of the organization, I employed my own experience with careful attention to the disadvantages and the advantages of the insider researcher's unique position.

Scope of the study

The focus of my work is on indigenous minority SCSOs that combine both services provision and advocacy as their fundamental components to social change. Nevertheless, this study is limited to AJEEC within the context of the Bedouin indigenous minority in the Naqab-Negev in the south of Israel. This study explored the tensions that AJEEC faced and the strategies the organization used to manage these tensions. Special attention was paid to the impact of AJEEC's socio-political context, namely Bedouin indigenous rights within the state of Israel. Five major events in the life of AJEEC were selected to be the focus of this study.

Significance of the Study

The importance of this study relies the following: First, this study is the first research on civil society organizations within the Bedouin minority in Israel. Second, this is the first study that deals with the tensions arising from combining service provision and advocacy and the ongoing dilemma of maintaining both functions within this unique political and social context. Third, unlike prior research which focuses on the tensions (problem-oriented research), the significance of this study is its analysis of the ways in which these tensions were managed (solutions-oriented research).

SCSOs operate on behalf of oppressed minorities and, as such, their socio-political context constitutes one of their defining features. Indigenous minority organizations have no choice but to create organizations that simultaneously provide services and engage in advocacy. As these organizations continue to grow and occupy more space within the civil society sector,

there is a need to produce more knowledge to help these organizations run effectively. The study of these organizations may help to determine the most effective and appropriate management and funding strategies, and provide the means for SCSOs to manage the tensions arising from combining service and advocacy instead of giving up one of their essential functions.

Significance to Society

SCSOs address inequality in societies and promote justice and have frequently taken on tasks that result from governments discrimination and or neglect (Oliver & McShane, 1979; Perlmutter, 1988a; 1994: Powell, 1986). In addition, because of their unique approach of integrating service and advocacy as a complementary approach to providing needed services and changing policy, SCSOs may be in a better position to play a role in negotiating with the government, to narrow the social gaps especially in the context of a majority-minority in conflict. Moreover, these types of organizations are in a position, as community-based organizations, to bring employment opportunities to their communities (Diaz, 2002). They employ local staff, volunteers, and community members in various capacities in the organization (Oliver & McShane, 1979; Perlmutter, 1994;Powell, 1986). SCSOs may also provide opportunities that empower participants, and give community members the tools they need to solve their own problems through active participation, social and political awareness and engagement. This study provides insights to strengthen the long-term sustainability of these organizations.

Significance to the Social Work Profession

The study of SCSOs is important to the profession of social work for several reasons: 1) social work and SCSOs have compatible values, such as providing service to clients, supporting social justice, the dignity and worth of individuals, self-determination, and empowerment of clients (NASW, 1997); 2) SCSOs are consistent with the social work profession's rights-based

focus. In this study, attention is focused on the strengths and challenges of SCSOs, not their failures; 3) findings may serve as a catalyst for the social work profession and SCSOs in reevaluating their relationship; and 4) social work may develop methods to enhance SCSOs. Many SCSOs have evolved from various social and political movements throughout the world, such as those for women rights, indigenous minority organizations, and environmental justice movements including and, most recently, equal rights for the LGBTQ community.

These movements have emphasized social change, advocacy, empowerment, and political engagement (Perlmutter & Kramer, 2001). The social work profession has also been connected to these movements with compatible values and principles (NASW, 1997). However, the profession has focused separately on clinical and individual social work on one hand and promoting policy change through community advocacy and lobbying on the other. Despite the social work profession's belief in comprehensive solutions, community and clinical social work have become increasingly compartmentalized. For these reasons, it is important for social workers and SCSOs to re-assess their relationship with the aim of providing more effective services to their common constituencies.

Dissertation Overview

This chapter introduced the dissertation as a whole, presented an overview of the background and problem statement, outlined the purpose of the study, stated the research questions and the scope of the study, presented the method used during the course of this dissertation research, and presented the study significance.

Chapter 2 reviews the literature on SCSOs, focusing on the tensions SCSOs face and the way these tensions manifest throughout the organizational dimensions. The review specifically focuses on the main organizational theories applied by most of the researchers who studied the

phenomena, namely Resource dependence theory and Institutional theory. The chapter ends by providing the conceptual framework and operational definition of the organizational dimensions used in this study.

Chapter 3 presents the context in which the case operates, including the political and the social contexts in which Bedouin social change organization emerged. The chapter ends by providing a detailed description of the case (AJEEC) under study: its origins, mission, approach, operational model, programs, and funding model.

Chapter 4 presents the methodology used in this qualitative case study, as well as the research design and site, participant information, data collection methods and analysis, researcher positionality and limitations. The chapter ends with the description of the five major events selected to be the focus of this study.

Chapter 5 and 6 present the findings for this study. Chapter 5 focuses on identifying the tensions AJEEC faced throughout the five events. Chapter 6 presents the five strategies AJEEC developed and applied to respond to these tensions.

Chapter 7 discusses the findings and re-examines the theoretical assumptions outlined in the literature review and compared them against the empirical results of this study. The chapter explains the dominance of the contextual factors and their impact on the case's tensions and the case's ability to manage them.

Chapter 8 concludes with the implications of the study's findings, and recommends directions for future research, SCSO best-practices, and government policy.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

This literature review draws on the theoretical and empirical literature on the following: 1) civil society; 2) civil society organizations; 3) social change service organizations (SCSOs); 4) organizational social change approaches and strategies; and 5) organizational theories within the open systems paradigm. The literature review comprises of five main sections: Section 1 identifies SCSOs as a sub-category of civil society organizations; Section 2 hones in on SCSOs and their unique characteristics; Section 3 outlines these organizations' tensions and dilemmas according to the two following organizational theories—Institutional theory and Resource dependence theory—that provide the theoretical underpinning for the study of the tensions that arise from SCSOs' social change approach; Section 4 outlines the strategies for managing these tensions; and Section 5 concludes with the gaps in the literature.

Theoretical Perspectives on Civil Society Organizations

Sub-Categories of Civil Society Organizations

Civil society is the sphere of social interaction between the market and the state (Katz, 2006; Salamon, Sokolowski, & List, 1999). Within civil society, there are various movements and organizations that encompass different values and perceptions of change, reflect different socio-political contexts and, consequently, pursue different activities to bring about change. For example, SCOs, NGOs, international development organizations, trade unions, member-run organizations, community- based organizations and social movement organizations (SMOs) are all sub-types of civil society organizations. These organizations' activities include promoting civic engagement, leading anti-discrimination campaigns, and providing direct services to marginalized communities (Bendaña, 2006; C. A. Hyde, 2000; Debra C Minkoff, 2002). Given this range of activities, aggregating these organizations under the umbrella term "civil society organization" obscures some very real differences between them (Chambers & Kymlicka, 2002; Edwards, Foley, & Diani, 2001;

Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; Robert David Putnam, 1996).

In "The Civil Society Paradox," Foley and Edwards (1996) distinguish between 'Civil Society I' and 'Civil Society II' in order to clarify these differences. Civil Society I, stems from the Tocquevillian tradition exemplified by Berger et al. (Berger, Neuhaus, & Novak, 1996) and Putnam (1995) which refers to volunteer-run associations and networks of civic engagement that produce social capital, foster collective trust, and ultimately strengthen democracy (Robert D Putnam, 1995). Civil Society I purposefully exclude associations and networks that generate conflict or challenge the state.

Alternatively, Civil society II is based on Gramsci's definition "civil society" and therefore refers to groups that do challenge the state. Examples of organizations located within Civil Society II include movements that might use extra-institutional means to achieve social change such as human rights movements as further explored by Jenkins (2006), McAdams, McCarthy and Zald (1996). Beyond movements against authoritarian regimes (Cohen & Arato, 1992; Zald & Berger, 1978), Civil Society II also includes newer social movements that are concerned with social, cultural, and quality-of-life issues such as minority rights, human and citizenship rights, globalization, and the environment see (Craissati, 2005; Kriesi, 1995) and (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1992). As opposed to the liberal view's focus on balance and harmony, the Gramscian view considers civil society as the location for independent state resistance (Lewis, 2006). Similarly, MacDonald's work (2016) defines civil society as a zone of conflict that draws attention to how class and gender restrict people's actions. According to this perspective, power relations, conflict, and diversity must be acknowledged in the discussion of civil society (Macdonald, 2016).

Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005) expanded Foley and Edwards' framework to include Civil Society III. This category includes state-sponsored human service organizations that provide services that are neglected by the state (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). In the non-profit sector research tradition, scholars such as Salamon and Anheier (1992) have studied

legally recognized and tax-exempt, non-profit service organizations that depend on the state for resources in order to conduct their service provision work (Salamon & Anheier, 1992). Within the context of civil society, these organizations are implicitly aligned with the state given their reliance on state resources.

In practice Civil Society I, II, and III are not mutually exclusive and the boundaries between the three dimensions of civil society are fluid, meaning that some organization can start off as service providers and over time engage in advocacy (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). It is also common for social movements (Civil Society II) to become incorporated as SCOs or NGOs (Civil Society III) (Cress & Snow, 2000). With this fluidity in mind, the fourth strand of research added by Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005)—Civil Society IV—builds on all theoretical traditions and refers to hybrid organizations that pursue service provision and advocacy simultaneously (Minkoff, 2002), therefore locating them at the intersection of Civil Society II (social movements) and III (service provision organizations).

Korten (1990) also deals with the issue of classifying civil society organizations, theorizing that civil society organizations evolve through a series of 'generations'. For example, an organization may start off as a relief agency whose mandate is to meet immediate needs and then mature into a social movement organization (SMO) which works to address wider structural concerns (Korten, 1987). Korten provides four generations of organizational evolution to demonstrate how the organization's structure, actions, and strategies evolve in each generation. In the 'first generation', the organization prioritizes meeting immediate needs through relief and welfare work; in the 'second generation', characterized by an awareness of 'development', the influence of outside agencies such as aid donors promotes a new set of objectives to build small-scale and self-reliant local development. These small-scale developments lead to a preoccupation with sustainability in the 'third generation' organization and a desire to change the wider institutional and political context. Finally, the 'fourth generation' aims to support wider

social movements for action on a national or global level to bring about these wider institutional, social, or political changes.

Korten's 'generations' schema is useful because it shows that social change organizations rarely stand still, illustrating how organizations may combine several roles or activities at any one time to respond to their complex and changing environments. Nevertheless, David Lewis (2006) suggests that Generation theory should not be taken to imply that all NGOs and SCOs pass through these stages. Moreover, this theory may not accurately address the evolution of an NGO in a more politicized context such as in Israel and Palestine.

SCSOs: a Sub-Category of Civil Society Organizations

As we move towards understanding social change service organizations (SCSOs), it is helpful to recognize how the sub-categories of civil society relates to Korten's Generations theory; namely, how organizations within the various sub-categories of civil society adopt certain strategies depending on their generation. For example, the Civil Society II tradition and third generation organization adopt protest and reformative advocacy strategies. The Civil Society I and III along with first generation organization conduct welfare and service-delivery. The Civil Society IV of hybrid organizations combines the first and third generation and consists of organizations that either pursue social advocacy and service provision simultaneously or that combine business models to promote social goals (Billis, 2010). Finally, SCSOs are located within the tradition I call Civil Society V. This tradition consists of organizations that promote social change through service provision and advocacy as their fundamental approach to social change. Unlike hybrid organizations that start off with one and then add the other, SCSOs combine service provision and advocacy from the start to meet the immediate needs of their constituencies and, at the same time, challenge the root causes of social, political, or economic inequalities.

Social Change Service Organizations (SCSOs)

The Definition of SCSOs

The term "SCSO" does not frequently appear in the literature on civil society organizations (CSOs). Instead, academics use the terms "NGOs", "non-profits", and "community-based organizations" when discussing CSOs while the term "SCSO" is more common amongst practitioners and activists. SCSOs perceive themselves as integral to the promotion of systemic social change and choose an intervention model that combines development work, advocacy, and service provision (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006; C. A. Hyde, 2000). Given their multifaceted intervention model, SCSOs neither fit within nor flow between any of the aforementioned civil society categories. Instead, SCSOs rest on the common ground between all four. By looking at the interlinked causes of a problem, SCSOs deliberately work towards holistic social change thus addressing the systemic root causes of social, political, and economic inequalities by combining service provision with advocacy as their fundamental approach to transform society as a whole. Chetkovich and Kunrehther (2006) define SCSOs as a sub-category of civil society organizations: they are non-profit and non-governmental, they engage in social justice issues, and they address inequalities within societies (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). SCSOs are predominantly geared towards policy change and improving the quality of life of marginalized people such as indigenous groups, minority groups, and women. Within this mandate, SCSOs engage in a wide range of activities such as individual empowerment and civic participation, as well the promotion of access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, and employment. Moreover, these organizations are also mission-driven and operate within context-specific challenges. A more comprehensive look at their characteristics will be discussed below.

Table 1: Foley and Edwards' (1996) Classification of Civil Society Organizations including Hasenfeld and Gidron's Contribution (2005)

Category	Approach and Characteristics	Type of Organizations	Leading Authors
Civil Society I	Foster social networks and increase civic engagement	Volunteer-run associations Mutual aid associations Sport clubs Social clubs	(Ferguson & Oz-Salzberger, 1995; Robert D Putnam, 1995; Robert D Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1994) (Berger et al., 1996; Portney & Berry, 1997)
Civil Society II	Engage in advocacy, political action, and extra-institutional means to achieve social change	Social movements Human rights movements SMOs SCOs	(Melucci, 1989) (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) (Tarrow & Tollefson, 1994) (Bayat, 1997) (McAdam & Scott, 2005)
Civil Society III	Community organizations that depend on state funds Politically neutral	Non-profits, NGOs Human service organizations	(Salamon, 1995) (Hasenfeld, 2009) (Smith & Lipsky, 1992)
Civil Society IV	Hybrid organizations that engage in service and advocacy simultaneously	Social enterprises Social business organizations	(Billis, 2010)
Civil Society V	Organizations that use service provision and advocacy as their fundamental approach to social change	SMOs, SCSOs Minority organizations	(Chetkovich and Kunrehther, 2006)

Source: Foley and Edwards' (1996), Hasenfeld and Gidron (2005)

Table 2: Korten's (1999) Classification of Civil Society Organizations: Organizational Generations

Generation	Purpose and Activity	Organization
First	To meet immediate needs through relief and welfare	Human Service Organizations First Aid NGOs Welfare and relief NGOs
Second	To promote self-reliant and locally sustainable development	Community development NGOs International NGOs International organizations
Third	To seek change within the wider institutional, social, and political context	Advocacy NGOs SCOs
Fourth	To support social movements for action on a national or global level in order to bring about wider institutional, social, and political change	SCOs Social movements Human rights, gender, environment, and conflict resolution organizations

Source: (Korten,1999)

The Rise of SCSOs

Given the lack of literature that focuses specifically on SCSOs, studies that focus on hybrid organizations (Billis, 2010), multi-purpose service organizations that combine

political action with services (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005; C. Hyde, 1992; Mosley, 2012), human service advocacy organizations that promote policy change (Donaldson, 2007; O'Connell, 1978), and social change organizations produce more knowledge on SCSOs in general. SCSOs fluid identity makes it difficult for scholars to estimate the growth of these organizations. There is consensus, however, that the non-profit sector as a whole, where human service organizations constitute a large sector, has been flourishing since the 1960s because of an opening of the political arena and the decline of the welfare state (figure 1).

Advocacy by human service organizations has increased tremendously in the last five decades, creating an "advocacy explosion" in the non-profit sector. McCarthy and Zald (1973 and 1977) argue that this growth is a result of an "opening of the political arena" after the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s, referring to this period as "the cycle of protests". In their study on the conditions that led to the emergence of multi-purpose hybrid voluntary organizations, Hazenfeld , Gideron and Katz (2002) agree that it was political opportunity that gave rise to social change service organizations that engage in service and advocacy. These scholars suggest that SCSOs are likely to emerge when 1) the political system is open and competitive, 2) the political elites are divided, and 3) the organization has access to elite allies (Hasenfeld, Gidron, & Katz, 2002). As a result, many groups that were in competition with the state, such as community organizations, social change organizations, and social movement organizations, have jointly benefitted from the outcomes of this mobilization because they have been able to establish themselves as legitimate actors in the field[1] (Minkoff 1994). For example, in the 1970s, Mizrahi Jews were inspired by the Black Panthers and created their own movement and organizations to challenge the oppressive system (Bernstein, 1984).

[1] In their study on peace and conflict resolution organizations, Hasenfeld and Gideron (2002) find that in Israel, the change in the ruling government coalition in 1994 towards a more pro-peace administration left a space for the voices of peace advocacy and activism. Jenkins (2003) finds the same phenomenon of political opportunity in her research on the African-American protests during the Civil Rights movement: as protests increased, the government became more divided, eventually forcing the Republican presidents to take a pro-Civil Rights position. These political changes helped third sector organizations become legitimate actors not only in the provision of services, but also as actors in changing policy and political discourse, using advocacy and lobbying as their approaches to promote social change.

During the 1980s, two forces gave rise to the popularity of SCSOs. First, the global decline of the welfare state and subsequent privatization that pushed civil society organizations toward providing more services, principally as contractors to the government (Megan, 2010; Gidron 2005). Second, many organizations started to include advocacy by adapting an empowerment approach in their service provision (Minkoff, 2002). Moreover, SCSOs grew in popularity within oppressed marginalized communities such as indigenous minorities, women, and immigrants. SCSOs within these groups compensated for governmental neglect and offered an avenue for self-advocacy within a setting of discriminatory policies. Within a context of oppression, minority groups have no choice but to create organizations that simultaneously provide services and engage in advocacy (Mullaly, 2007; Minkoff, 2002; C. Hyde, 2000).

Figure 1: The Emergency Of SCSOs-Hybrid organizations (source: Minkoff 2002)



SCSOs' Integrative Approach

This section reviews the different strategies that make up the SCSOs integrative social change approach, namely service provision and advocacy. Here, "strategy" is

defined as the focal point of an organization and the specific function that the organization intends to perform (Minkoff 1999). Minkoff provides a continuum of organizational strategies based on Jenkins's formative (1987) study on advocacy. The following diagram represents these strategies: on the left, strategies conform to institutional models set by the state; in the middle, organizations pursue reformative advocacy strategies through accepted institutional channels; on the right, organizational strategies oppose institutional models set by the state through outside institutional channels. The strategies are presented as a continuum and, as such, are not exclusionary, contained, or isolated. This diagram presents strategic options that might be combined, as is the case with SCSOs (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Continuum of Organizational Approaches and Strategies (Minkoff, 2002)



Service Provision

Service provision responds to the immediate symptoms of a social problem by providing a set of services to individuals, usually in a structured manner. According to Minkoff (2002), services are "tangible goods and/or benefits, such as health care, financial aid, individual legal representation, vocational training and leadership training" (Minkoff, 2002, p. 398). In the case of SCSOs, services are provided to individuals to facilitate individual transformation and empowerment[2] (Gutierrez, 1995). This type of service provision enables people to understand the link between their personal reality (of lacking essential services) and the policy that created this reality. For service provision to facilitate individual empowerment and transformation, it must include the use of existing local human resources whenever possible, a situation where most people in the community understand the rationale behind the services being offered, community participation in the

[2] Empowerment is defined here as "a process of increasing personal, interpersonal or political power so that individuals, families and communities can take action to improve their situations" (Gutierrez, 1995 p.229)

decision-making process underlying service delivery, and a continuous flow of information between service providers and the end-users of the services, enabling the latter to be equal partners in identifying, defining the need, participating in the design, delivery, management and evaluation of those services. When these conditions for service delivery are met, people stop being passive recipients of services. Instead, they demand responsibility for themselves, taking part in both the decision-making process and in the delivery mechanisms (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006; C. Hyde, 1992).

Despite the evidence for service delivery engendering personal empowerment, the literature also expresses the concern that this type of service delivery is unsustainable and undermines the state's accountability towards its citizens (Korten, 1987; McDonald, 1999). Furthermore, SCSOs might turn into service providers and lose the advocacy component—a core component of their identity—and become vulnerable to cooptation by governments or donors (Piven & Cloward, 1979; Thomasson, 2009). The major struggle for SCSOs is to conduct service delivery as a means to influence policy and not as ends in itself (Megan, 2010; Debra C Minkoff, 1999).

Advocacy

From the Latin definition of "coming to someone's aid", Jenkins widely defines advocacy as "any attempt to influence the decisions of an institutional elite on behalf of a collective interest" (C. Jenkins, 2006, p. 297). Recent literature presents new definitions that relate specifically to activities in the political arena such as Hopkins's: "addressing legislators with a view to influencing their votes" (Hopkins, 1992, p. 32). Nevertheless, advocacy does not only relate to the promotion of policies, in many cases, advocacy is about resisting new policies that, "if implemented, would conflict with the social, cultural, political or economic interests or values of other constituencies and groups" (Andrews & Edwards, 2004, p.481). Through advocacy, organizations represent underrepresented interests that political or social systems structures exclude. Moreover, advocacy organizations enhance people's participation in order to change policies and influence the

decisions of state and society institutions, thereby promoting a collective goal or interest (Boris & Mosher-Williams, 1998; C. Jenkins, 2006) as well as to protect basic civil rights (McCarthy & Castelli, 1994).

McCarthy and Castelli, cited in (Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008), categorized the wide range of non-profit civil society organizations' advocacy activities, strategies, and tactics into two main areas: direct advocacy and indirect advocacy. Direct advocacy aims to shape public opinion and policy**;** indirect advocacy aims to build grassroots constituencies and mobilizing citizens for policy change.

SCSOs engage in both direct and indirect advocacy including political action, program advocacy, self-interested organizational advocacy, and progressive advocacy. Political action is characterized by a set of an unconventional actions such as demonstrations, protest, marches, boycotts, civil disobedience—generally known as "outside tactics" (Debra C Minkoff, 1999)—employed by those who are relatively powerless toward the objection of one or more policies or conditions. Alternatively, program advocacy consists of advising public officials on policy design and providing information to policymakers. SCSOs often develop pilot programs based on new models and then transfer the implementation and funding of these programs to the government. Not only do SCSOs engage in self-interested organizational advocacy (to protect funding contracts, for example) but they also engage in progressive advocacy which "seeks to advance the interests of non-profit constituents rather than the organization's interests," (Donaldson, 2008, p. 26). Progressive advocacy includes collective political action that might encompass confrontational activities, such as protests, demonstrations, and strikes (Debra C Minkoff, 1999).

Characteristics of SCSOs

Since these organizations sit at the intersection of various civil society organizations, SCSOs combine features and approaches from all four sub-categories. Moreover, SCSOs include a diverse range of organizations such as feminist health and

rape crisis centers (Matthews, 1995) human-service advocacy organizations (Gidron 1994; Donaldson, 2007) social movement service organizations (Megan, 2010), peace and conflict organizations (Hazenfeld, Gideron (1995); Katz (2002)), and minority and ethnic organizations (Minkoff, 2002). Despite this variety, SCSOs share many characteristics (Megan, 2010).

First, SCOSs exist within a context of marginality: SCSOs come from or work on behalf of marginalized groups and oppressed minorities such as ethnic groups, indigenous populations, women, and the LGBTQ community (Mulally, 2000; Minkoff, 2002; Perlmutter, 1994; Melucci, 1989; Bayat, 1997; Tarrow and Tollefson, 1994). An SCSO's mission and values are often the result of exclusion from basic rights, services, and decision-making power within their local communities (Chambre, 1995, Oliver & McShane, 1979). SCSOs therefore work to provide a voice in the political process, to advocate for social change, and to fill the gaps in the mainstream social services delivery systems (Oliver & McShane, 1979; Powell, 1986). These organizations exist primarily within oppressed minority groups because oppressed groups simultaneously need to access basic services and to advocate against the political system that denied them these services in the first place. For example, an indigenous minority SCSO such as the Jamyiat Aljalil (the Galilee Association) provides vaccinations and home accident prevention and awareness training in the unrecognized Bedouin villages as a means to confront the institutional discrimination that contributes to the poverty and alienation of these communities (Amal Jamal 2009; Campbell, Baker, & Mazurek, 1998).

Second, SCSOs organize their activities around explicit, substantive values, and social goals (Hasenfeld & Gidron, 2005). These values and goals usually oppose the status quo and challenge the dominant political structure, aligning SCSOs with advocacy organizations and social movements, whose goals often conflict with the socio-political

interests of the ruling government (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). SCSOs resemble social movements in that they engage in confrontational moral claims and may use extra-institutional tactics to defend or promote these claims. Moreover, SCSOs are often staffed by leaders who maintain an ideological commitment to the cause (Perlmutter, 1988a) and who largely consist of members of the target population (Oliver & McShane, 1979; Perlmutter, 1988a, 1994). SCSOs differ from social movements, however, in that they do not rely on extra-institutional devices alone (Megan, 2010) (Chetkovich and Kunreuther 2006). SCSOs seek to bring about their social change goals through service provision, in what Chetkovich and Kunreuther (2006) call change-oriented service or service-oriented empowerment. **S**CSOs' uniqueness lies in their commitment to empowerment, social change, self-determination, human interaction, and inclusion of people (Oliver & Me Shane, 1979; Perlmutter, 1988a, 1994; Powell, 1986) which is one factor of their more client-focused and client-responsive services (Powell, 1986). In this vein, SCSOs have been characteristically poised to develop innovative programs and strategies that empower oppressed minorities to enact structural and systemic change (Salem, et al., 2002).

Third, empowerment of the target population underpins SCSOs' service provision and advocacy work. Empowerment is rooted in the tradition of the organizations that work with vulnerable and oppressed groups. In this vein, SCSOs promote social change through empowerment-centered services (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). Further, advocacy has also been consistently linked with empowerment (Adams, 2003) and the advocacy work of SCSOs seeks to empower their constituents. According to Paulo Freire (1970) the process of empowering oppressed people requires *conscientizacion* or "the development of critical consciousness". Freire suggests that developing a critical consciousness allows for reflecting upon the specific problem, identifying the problem's root causes, and developing an action plan (Freire & Mellado, 1970). Thus, empowerment permits people to assume control over their lives and gives

them the opportunity to make decisions for themselves (Brager, Specht, & Torczyner, 1987). Similarly, increasing their capacity to define, analyze, and act upon their problems, empowerment is a continuous process of allowing people to understand, enhance, and act on the power they have within themselves (O'Connell, 1994; Pilisuk, McAllister, & Rothman, 1996). The social change and advocacy work of SCSOs see empowerment as crucial to developing empowered people and empowered organizations that can influence social and political policies (Speer & Hughey, 1995).

Fourth, SCSOs' hybrid social change approach is reflected in their hybrid organizational structure. These organizations adapt semi-formal organizational structures that incorporate elements from both collective and bureaucratic organizations (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; Young, 2012). Participatory and egalitarian governance is an integral feature of SCSOs governance structure that grew out of 1960s social activism and liberation movements and the 1970s Feminist movement (C. A. Hyde, 2000; Markowitz & Tice, 2002). In keeping with this philosophy, the leadership structure of the organization comprises program participants, staff and other constituencies either directly from or involved with the target population. The necessity for participatory and egalitarian governance rests on the following theoretical underpinnings: First, the belief that people are reasonable and can wisely contribute to the decision-making process especially when they are aware that their contribution matters (Bordt, 1997; Karl, 1995). Therefore, a participatory democratic structure is essential for people to recognize their power to determine their own destiny and to develop a political awareness (Potapchuk, 1996). Second, maximizing people's involvement ensures that people's options and choices are being addressed regarding a range of services (Mosley, 2012). Operating the organization according to participatory democracy implies that service participants have a right to make decisions on their own behalf (Katan & Prager, 1986). Third, it is believed that participatory democracy can enhance individuals' roles in the organization thus increasing

their knowledge of and participation in their role as citizens of a community, a state, and of the world. SCSOs hybridity is also reflected in its diverse membership usually comprising of representatives of the target population, local communities, staff, and various stakeholders. Members may be attracted to SCSOs because they agree with the organization's mission and values or because members may have leadership and decision-making responsibilities and may be involved in the organization on various levels such as direct service, advocacy, and organizational development (Bordt, 1997; Schwartz, Gottesman, & Perlmutter, 1988). At the same time, SCSOs also maintain some formal governance structures in order to fulfill their service provision function. This function often relies on support from the government or donors who often require formal processes such as consistent correspondence, reporting, and paperwork. These partnerships and contracts with the government have the potential to lead to greater regulation (bureaucratization) and increased pressure for accountability (Antlöv, Ibrahim, & van Tuijl, 2006; Batley, 2011; Mosley, 2012). In short, SCSOs' organizational structure reflects the structure of social movements (upholding participatory governance) and of human service organizations (employing bureaucratic systems and adhering to external regulations). Both of these structures are necessary to preserve an SCSO's integrated social change approach.

Tensions and Dilemmas that Arise from Combining Service Provision and Advocacy

Research on organizations that combine service provision and advocacy within a single organizational structure discuss the multilayered tensions SCSOs face as they become increasingly formalized, less independent, and more hybrid in nature (Billis, 2010; Brooks, 2005; Megan, 2010; D. C. Minkoff, 1994; Nicholson-Crotty, 2011). To understand the theoretical issues that arise from combing service provision and advocacy, this study relies on two dominant theories: Institutional theory and Resource dependence theory. While most of the literature deals with organizations that evolve from service provision to

advocacy or vice versa, these studies are still relevant for understanding the tensions SCSOs face and the strategies they use to maintain their integrative approach.

Institutional theory and Resource dependence theory provide two distinct frameworks from which to view the forces driving organizational behaviour. Institutional theory assumes that organizations are, to a large extent, determined by their environments and have little choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the environmental players who hold power within the systems of service delivery. Resource dependence theory, on the other hand, suggests that organizational change is primarily driven by resource acquirement. Both theories identify a set of factors that challenge SCSOs' ability to maintain an integrative social change approach. These theories are not meant to be the sole source of explanation but instead provide two different perspectives on the challenges that arise from SCSOs' integrative approach.

Institutional Theory

Institutional theory emphasizes the direct impact of the organization's institutional environment, demonstrating the impact of institutional rules, pressures, and sanctions on the organization's mission, performance, and structures (DiMaggio & Anheier, 1990; Guo & Acar, 2005; Schmid et al., 2008). Much of the literature on institutional theory demonstrates that as organizations adopt accepted norms, values, and myths of their environments, they tend to become isomorphic or similar over time. Isomorphism occurs through coercion, in the form of regulation, certification, accreditation, and tax laws, through mimetic behaviour, a form of organizational modeling, and through normative pressures, resulting from standards established primarily from professionalization (Ramanath, 2008).

Resource Dependence Theory

Alternatively, resource dependence theory, outlined by Pfeffer and Salancik (2003) and Pfeffer and Leong (1977), views resource availability as fundamental to the

organization's survival and therefore suggest that organizational behaviour is largely determined by the organization's ability to obtain resources. Moreover, this theory stipulates that since organizations do not control all the elements they require to function, acquiring resources requires the organization to interact with and rely on other players within their environment that control those resources. Within this context, entities that provide resources frequently seek accommodations that shape an organization's actions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). For example, a significant funder may provide funds to a non-profit on the condition that the non-profit organization expand its services which would require the organization to accommodate the funder at the expense of the organization's advocacy work. According to this theory, an organization's likelihood of responding to the demands of a given environmental actor is contingent on the importance of the resource provided, the extent of control the actor has over the resource, and the number of alternative channels that exist to obtain the necessary resources. Naturally, if few alternatives exist, compliance becomes more likely (Guo & Acar, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Saidel, 1991; Verschuere & De Corte, 2014)

In summary, both Institutional theory and Resource dependence theory illustrate how environmental factors challenge SCSOs ability to maintain their service provision and advocacy social change approach. Institutional theory suggests that SCSOs are pressured to conform to more bureaucratic and professionalized processes while Resource dependence theory suggests that SCSOs are pressured to conform to the agendas of resource-granting agents. The following section demonstrates how these pressures impact the organizational structure, resource availability, inter-organizational relations, and the organizational mission and values.

Organizational Structure

"Organizational structure" refers to organizational design: the relations between groups of people within organizations and their placement along patterns of resource

allocation, authority, incentives, division of work, and information flows (Billis, 2010). Combining service and advocacy influences SCSOs' organizational structure through professionalization and bureaucratization.

Professionalization

According to Institutional theory, professionalization hinders SCSOs from engaging in advocacy. Since the 1980s, civil society organizations, especially those involved in service provision, have undergone significant professionalization (Salamon, 1995) —not in small part due to the external demands of governments for quality control and impact measurements. Professionals create an institutional way of thinking as well as shape organizational structures and decision-making. Adding professional management increases the organizational complexity, which can bring about tensions amongst and between the different levels of management, staff, and volunteers. Professional managers, for example, are officially "obedient" to the demands of any governing boards (Markowitz & Tice, 2002). Furthermore, professionals define their long-term career interests in terms of the profession. Thus, professional managers have an interest in shaping their organizations' activities not only in terms of what would please the institutions that employ them, but also in terms of how those activities would be viewed by the profession. These factors may result in the following tensions: professional managers removing volunteers from the organization's decision-making processes; professional managers choosing to focus on services that further their professional goals and, in doing so, shy away from advocacy activities that may be viewed negatively by the profession (the other major issue of professionalization that arises within SCSOs, is the issue of personnel management and whether those who carry out the work of the organization are mostly paid professionals or volunteers (Salamon, 1995).

The degree of an SCSO's professionalization can often impact the organization's ability to pursue advocacy in the following ways: First, professionalized staff tend to formalize organizations as strategic protection against threats and challenges, which have the ability

to destabilize the system of core production. Second, professionalized staff are also more likely to use institutional tactics and display adeptness at coalition-building (Batley, 2011; J. C. Jenkins & Halcli, 1999). While the latter may be a favorable condition for advocacy, the others are problematic: paid staff may displace organizational goals in deference to system maintenance and career advancement which may in turn hinder the attention given to advocacy activities; Highly professionalized organizations may not be able to represent the interests of its constituencies because professionals may grow out of touch with the true needs of their clientele (Piven & Cloward, 1979); and, moreover, Salamon (1995) suggests that when non-profits depend more heavily on voluntary labor as opposed to professional staff, organizational leaders are perceived as more accessible to the people they serve, and that this connection enables them to truly represent their interests in the political arena (Mosley, 2012).

Bureaucratization

"Bureaucratization" is the extent to which the organization is managed through hierarchical authority, systems of rules, procedures, and disciplined chains of command (Mosley, 2009). As with professionalization, organizational bureaucratization can cut two ways. On one hand, bureaucratization may help incorporate the advocacy function more fully into core organizational routines. For instance, some non-profits have written statements of purpose for policy participation or have formal positions or departments expressly for the purpose of liaising with governments and policymakers (Portney & Berry, 1997). On the other hand, Piven and Cloward's (1979) study of social movement organizations suggests that bureaucratization constrains the actions of marginalized groups. Organizational action that is tightly structured around procedure may signal constituencies to conform to conventional norms of interest participation, rather than encourage activities associated with grassroots action. Similarly, in her study of political advocacy by non-profit organizations, Mosley (2010) finds that bureaucratic structures

within organizations prevents public charities from engaging in activities secondary to their core mission. In other words, bureaucratization decreases advocacy. Alternatively, empirical studies show that the bureaucratic structures can provide a vehicle for increased advocacy by integrating advocacy activities into organizational routines (LeRoux & Goerdel, 2009; Schmid et al., 2008)**.** One explanation for this discrepancy may be that different definitions of advocacy are being used. Therefore, the findings on the impact of bureaucratization on organizations that engage in case advocacy or self-advocacy may differ from the findings on those that engage in advocacy that includes political action.

Since SCSOs are primarily mission-driven, the technical aspects of the work should inform structural choices relating to the grouping of activities and the centralization of authority (Chetkovich and Kunreuther, 2006). The main structural aspect that varies in conjunction with the organization's work is the level of constituent participation. Among SCSOs, there is a direct relationship between the organization's approach to the work of social change and the structure of constituent influence. Organizations with strong structures for constituent participation operate with an approach that links individual transformation to collective action and advocacy (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006).

Organizational theories have tested the "iron law of oligarchy" proposed by Michaels (1958) and the related theory of institutional isomorphism an cited by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). These theories suggest that the demands of organizational maintenance and survival over time, pressure organizations into formalizing and professionalizing their structure. Pressures towards isomorphism come in the form of regulation and normative rules, which, if adapted to, enable an organization to manage resources. Therefore, organizations tend to adopt bureaucratic structures to become more effective at mobilizing money and resources (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For SCSOs, these pressures create the "classic dilemma" of survival described by many scholars and practitioners. In her study of women's groups, Freeman (1975) states that the "tightly organized, hierarchical structures necessary to change social institutions conflict directly with the participatory style

necessary to maintain membership support and the democratic nature of the movement's goals" (Freeman, 1975, p.233). In support of this idea, Piven and Cloward (1991) claim that formalization and professionalization in response to funding demands come at the expense of an organization's social change mission. Realizing these demands essentially dampens the governmental disruption that was originally their goal (Piven & Cloward, 1991). Moreover, increased bureaucratic processes might constrain an SCSO such that it becomes coopted by the state as a vehicle for public service delivery and policy implementation (Smith & Lipsky, 1992). Another concept that relates to the institutionalization of an SCSOs organizational structure is outlined by Megan 2010 who uses Kriesi to describe "commercialization" wherein an SCSO increasingly emphasizes the provision of services as an end in itself and, therefore, becomes more of a business enterprise than an agent of social change (Megan, 2010). The literature provides growing evidence that institutionalization, more often than not, results in tactical conservatism that can threaten an SCSO's integrated social change approach.

Resource Availability and Funding Choices

As discussed by Resource dependence theory, the strongest factors motivating organizations are survival and growth and, therefore, SCSOs are influenced by resource mobilization and funding choices (J. C. Jenkins, 1983; McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The political economy perspective recognizes that the organization must garner two fundamental types of resources in order to achieve its goals: first, legitimacy and power; second, production and resources (Hasenfeld, 2009). For SCSOs, "legitimacy" fuels the organization's survival and is the resource that underlies the organization's ability to act within their environment. "Power" is the means by which authority is distributed within the organization. Resources (money, clients, and personnel) are necessary for engaging in service provision. Moreover, service provision is a more resource-intensive strategy than advocacy. Advocacy groups tend to have "paper" memberships and employ a limited staff, relying on modern technologies of resource mobilization such as social media, direct mail

advertising, and foundation funding (C. Jenkins, 2006). Service provision organizations, on the other hand, are more likely to require official operating premises, professional program personnel, and more investment in volunteer efforts. Service organizations are therefore more likely to be dependent on the availability of external funding.

The Political economy theory highlights the role the environment plays in shaping the organization's service provision functions. According to this theory, "environment" refers to other organizations and interest groups that have a potential stake in the organization, either because they control the resources it needs, or because it can advance their interests (Billis, 2010). Similarly, Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003) proposes that the more an organization depends on resources controlled by external bodies (governments, foundations, private donors), the greater the influence of these bodies on the organization (Candler & Dumont, 2010; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012). In the case of SCSOs, the capacity for service delivery depends on the availability of production (money, clients, and personnel) and the need for a stable financial situation pulls the organization toward generating more resources. Ensuring financial stability requires more contracts with external bodies and thus more commitment to service provision. This theory stipulates that the more SCSOs engage in service provision, the less resources they have for advocacy work because not only are more resources being channeled in that direction, but seeking resources from external bodies results in constraints and contingencies imposed by those who are providing these resources (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012). Given these forces, SCSOs struggle to ensure the stable flow of external resources while still maintaining as much autonomy as possible. For example, donors who see advocacy as the main strategy might be reluctant support the organization if it partners with the government to provide services. Alternatively, other donors may be reluctant to commit resources if the organization deviates from clearly defined models of service delivery. These contingencies also signal SCSOs' multifaceted accountability to often conflicting players including their target community, governments, donors, and other constituencies (Verschuere & De Corte,

2014; Zhan & TANG, 2013). In addition, resource overlap between SCSOs and service-oriented or advocacy-oriented organizations may deter funders from allocating resources to an organization that is pursuing both functions (Moulton & Eckerd, 2012).

From the institutional perspective, coercion in the form of government authority is another likely inhibitor of the advocacy function. For SCSOs that operate in the context of marginality and seeking to challenge the status quo, government authority takes the form of political restrictions, licensing, contract regulation, and other forms of public power. While Minkoff (2002) finds that identity–based organizations have greater bargaining power and room to pursue advocacy because, to some extent, the public agencies are dependent on them for service provision, other studies found that one way critics have acted out their displeasure with advocacy NGOs is by passing laws that limit fundraising options among the sector, the public, and the government (Chavesc, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004; Donaldson, 2007; Silverman & Patterson, 2011). In order for SCSOs to maintain their tax-exempt status, they must adhere to these laws. As such, many SCSOs elect not to participate in advocacy activities in fear of jeopardizing their financial exemptions (Mosley, 2012).

According to institutional perspective, non-profit service organizations tend to be isomorphic with established agency structures which provide advantages with respects to external funding opportunities. These structures will pull the organization towards service provision and away from potential advocacy. Funding agencies (such as the state, foundations, and donors) may be hesitant to support any form of politicized action even if it is combined with more conventional service activities, thus intensifying the hybrid form's vulnerability to resource uncertainties (D. C. Minkoff, 1994). Typically, SCSOs are incorporated as charitable organization (501[c][3])[3] or (46A)[4] in Israel. SCSOs face direct

[3] "501(c)(3)" means that a particular non-profit organization has been approved as a tax-exempt, charitable organization. "Charitable" is broadly defined as being established for purposes that are religious, educational, charitable, scientific.

4 Se'if 46 [Paragraph 46] – It is "Paragraph 46" status that is comparable to the non-profit 501(c)3 status in the United States. This status is granted by the Finance Committee of the Knesset on the recommendation of the Finance Committee

and indirect limitations on the amount or the type of advocacy or political action they can pursue. For example, the Quebec government caps advocacy-related expenses at 5% of the organization's total budget and Israel's NGO Law[5] limits the advocacy work of NGOs that receive the majority of their funding from foreign state entities (Payes, 2013). Reliance on public funding generates internal organizational tensions that are often difficult to resolve. For example, Matthews's (1994) analysis of Los Angeles rape crisis centers demonstrates that grassroots organizations that enter into funding agreements with the state face enormous pressures to formalize their operating procedures and professionalize their approach to service delivery. In many cases, convergence towards the more dominant models of service delivery results in a trade-off between commitment to a political cause and financial stability—a trade-off that does not go without a great deal of internal conflict. On the other hand, groups that "sacrifice" public funds and remain committed to a political approach tend to be less viable in the long run, although in some cases they are able to maintain a dual focus (Matthews, 1995).

These tensions in acquiring resources demonstrate that SCSOs often engage in a contradictory relationship with the political environment. By virtue of their political nature, SCSOs may be as vulnerable as advocacy organizations to downturns in political opportunities, and, therefore, in funding. As already noted, if SCSOs incorporate as charitable organizations, their political lobbying or advocacy activities are consequently constrained. The implication is that these organizations must continually negotiate a balance between service provision and political action, as well as monitor their own activities for compliance with legal and normative expectations which requires much work and energy that could be devoted to their cause (C. Jenkins, 2006).

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to organizations that have obtained status as a public institution. Individuals that donate to charities that have Paragraph 46 status can receive up to a 35% refund on their taxes.

[5] The law mandates that NGOs that receive more than half their funds from foreign governments or state agencies disclose that fact in any public reports, advocacy literature, and interactions with government officials. See more: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/israel-passes-law-to-force-ngos-to-reveal-foreign-funding

Inter-Organizational Relations

Like all organizations, SCSOs' growth and survival relies on building and working within partnerships. Inter-organizational collaboration is particularly crucial for SCSOs given their combined approach and commitment to systemic impact. Inter-organizational collaboration is defined as "the process by which two or more groups work together to accomplish something that cannot be done – or not done as effectively – by a single group" (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). The literature provides three forms of collaboration: networks and coalitions; partnerships; and franchises

Networks and Coalitions

In this form, organizations work together on clearly defined projects that are either ad hoc or long term. Organizations within networks and coalitions enjoy high autonomy, functioning independently of each other but nevertheless cooperating when it is suitable for their purposes. Within this collaborative structure, organizations are autonomous in their allocations of resources, strategies, and governance (Kaufman, 2001).

Partnerships

Within partnerships, organizations initiate alliances in which they commit to share or transfer decision-making power through some type of formal agreement. Partners remain consistent with their core values and committed to their constituency while maintaining mutual trust and interest with each other (Brinkerhoff, 2002). Partnerships imply less autonomy than networks and coalitions; partners remain independent in their allocation of resources, strategies, and governance, except for issues related to the shared project, in which case they are settled by agreement.

Franchises

Franchises are a cross-over from business organizations and are common among service delivery organizations. Franchises share the following three characteristics: first, franchisors transfer the rights to use a program they have developed over a defined

territory, sometimes for a fee[6]; second, franchisors provide technical assistance and maintain quality control; third, franchisors impose rigid rules on and instructions to their franchisees (Oster, 1992). Service delivery organizations typically become franchisees when their service delivery programs successfully provide a wide scope of services for a large number of clients. To maintain this success and scale-up, service delivery organizations will join a franchise. This form offers the least autonomy as organizations' resource allocations, program choices, operational procedures, and quality control are externally defined (Oster, 1992).

SCSOs and the Challenges of Dual Identity

SCSOs work with other organizations in many ways, from coordinating services and holding joint fundraisers, to leveraging policy change efforts. Funders will, in fact, mandate these collaborations in instances where there are many organizations devoted to the same cause within a limited geographical area. Mosley (2010) has found that increased collaboration promotes access to resources and knowledge and facilitates ties between decision-makers. Organizations that are part of active coalitions enjoy more legitimacy within the social change milieu and with the authorities, allowing for more opportunities for advocacy work (Mosley, 2010). For all these reasons, SCSOs often choose to participate in networks or coalitions. However, SCSOs dual identity (as both service providers and advocacy proponents) constitutes a source of conflict within systems of collaboration (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). The constant demands of service provision often push SCSOs to consider joining franchises to sustain their services, as the provision of services is the basis of an organization's legitimacy within a community (Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). By joining a franchise, however, organizations lose the control and autonomy that are essential to maintain their innovative character and advocacy work.

[6] For example, the Jewish Distribution Committee - Israel does not charge organizations for implementing their service delivery models. However, they impose sharp quality controls.

Dual Message

An SCSO's message communicates the organization's work within the community. This message influences the SCSO's credibility among its various constituencies including public opinion (Joachim, 2003). One of the tensions that arise from an SCSO's dual identity is the question of how to communicate a message that presents both faces—advocacy and service provision—as the "true" face of the organization. Furthermore, SCSOs must delicately frame their message in a way that accurately reflects the organization and, at the same time, maintains trust among the organization's various stakeholders who have distinct, and often conflicting, expectations from the organization (Benford, 2000; Joachim, 2003). The organization's constituency, alliances, and outside audiences will each interpret the message distinctively so that the organization's reputation is at stake on multiple fronts (Haines, 2006). In short, SCSOs struggle to frame their message in a way that will satisfy all parties: a radical message may hinder government support, while a moderate message may discourage their target population from engaging in political action and advocacy. Even within the target population, a radical message may divide the community.

SCSOs in Coalitions

SCSOs dual identity presents a source of tensions for SCSOs that enter in to advocacy or service coalitions. While joining an advocacy coalition can help support and promote an SCSO, this type of partnership does not buffer against the SCSO losing funding for their service activities—as these activities are often state-sponsored. At the same time, advocacy coalitions may not trust SCSOs who maintain any links with the government, as advocacy coalitions' fundamental mandate is to challenge the government. This situation may constitute a catch-22: SCSOs may choose to abandon advocacy coalitions to maintain their funding, or maintain funding but be forcibly removed from the advocacy coalition for "being in bed in with the enemy".

Alternatively, advocacy coalitions will sometimes seek out SCSOs to join them since the SCSO's service component often brings the coalition the necessary credibility within the target population. SCSOs are perceived as dealing with people's problems of the "here and now," and therefore have the moral legitimacy that advocacy coalitions need to maintain their long-term organizing goals. Furthermore, SCSOs' knowledge of and even relationships with the government provide another advantage for advocacy coalitions to approach the political system.

Service coalitions, on the other hand, are most often formed to advance policy changes in their specific service area (Shier & Handy, 2015). For this reason, service coalitions welcome SCSOs for their knowledge on organizing people into mass movements. Conversely, SCSOs will join service coalitions in order to facilitate their service provision activities without sacrificing their engagement in advocacy. By joining a service coalition, SCSOs often lead the more radical political actions and thus protect pure service organizations from being on the front line of protests. At the same time, service organizations may decide to sever their ties with SCSOs if they decide that associating with the latter's activist and critical leanings threatens their alliances with funders.

Anheier (2005) argues that taking on different roles simultaneously can hinder the performance of the organization. Within a collaborative system, hierarchical and centrally supervised service delivery is hard to combine with decentralized and horizontal advocacy. SCSOs' dual role as advocates and service providers continuously threatens their legitimacy within their constituencies and within their political contexts. SCSOs must consistently walk a thin line and accept some compromises in order to continue pursuing their integrated social change model such as shifting from a militant and confrontational collective advocacy model to a case-based and staff-led one. The SCSO's dual identity also threatens these organizations' moral legitimacy. As SCSOs are mostly active within structurally marginalized communities, they attend to constituencies that traditionally do not trust the government and whose services, neglected by the state, are financially

supported by external and international donors. As such, any service program with obvious governmental alliances, independently or through a coalition, has the potential to create a rift between SCSOs and their constituencies.

Density dependency also affects SCSOs' survival. In an ecological context where, for example, advocacy organizations and coalitions are numerous, advocacy becomes the dominant and more legitimate approach to social change and thus threatens to subsume service provision. The inverse is also true. Within a more heavily populated service-oriented or advocacy-oriented organizational environment, SCSOs are therefore faced with pressure to choose between advocacy and service provision. It is therefore difficult to find a partnership in an ecological context dominated by one field over another without losing their component that belongs to the weaker field. To compound this difficulty, SCSOs' dual identity makes it harder for them to be accepted, and sometimes even trusted, by potential coalition partners. In this environment, SCSOs that do not have innovative and creative strategies and approaches either choose one component of their organization over the other and lose their identity, or simply fold. The innovative organizations that survive in this environment create a new ecology of SCSOs that now must compete or collaborate. Minkoff (2002) indicates that "the increase in both service and protest organizations promoted the expansion of service advocacy groups, as this middle-of-the-road strategy becomes more legitimate, competition became the pre-dominant mode of inter-organizational relationships" (Minkoff, 2002, p. 28).

Mission and Ideology

Beyond practical and tactical tensions, the dual advocacy and service components of SCSOs also exert pressure on their mission and ideology (Greenhalgh, 2005).

We have established that SCSOs are mission-driven and aspire to structural change that rests on full participation of its constituents. As such, SCSOs decision-making structure strives to be collective and democratic in nature, with a horizontal internal distribution (Chetkovitch and Kunreuther, 2005). In reality, SCSOs adopt a variety of

decision-making structures that mix elements of bureaucracy and democracy, resulting in a range of configurations that include traditional multi-level hierarchies and democratic membership collectives (Debra C Minkoff, 1999). SCSOs combine various decision-making processes because of service provision and advocacy's distinct structural needs: the provision of services requires a hierarchical structure to maintain standards while advocacy activities requires a horizontal structure to maintain accountability. The former can lead to the exclusion of constituents from the decision-making cycle, which presents a glaring ideological contradiction in an organization whose aim is to empower marginalized people and encourage them to have an active participation in the decision-making process at all levels (Minkoff, 2002).

The relationship with the government presents another source of ideological tension for SCSOs. We have established that an SCSO's goal is to promote the government accountability to *all* its citizens by providing equal rights and services. However, SCSOs provide services to their constituencies to help their survival, particularly in the case of severely marginalized communities (Matthews, 1995). When SCSOs provide services through government funding, they act as intermediaries and run the risk of simply replacing the government instead of holding the government accountable to its responsibilities toward all its citizens. Should the organization wish to stay independent from the government by relying on private donors or foundations, it essentially absolves the government of all responsibility. In both cases, the SCSO has all but failed at achieving the very structural change that constitutes its core mission. For example, Israel's Ministry of Education's funding of youth movements is allocated almost exclusively to Jewish youth movements. Therefore, organizations that wish to promote equality for the Arab minority must seek private donors and funds (Haklai, 2004). In this example, these organizations' desire to provide services to a marginalized population encourages governmental complacency (Fleischer & Gal, 2007). As a result, these organizations provide services but fail to change government policy thus implicitly supporting a regime

of inequality. This example illustrates the challenge of providing services while simultaneously attending to the larger goal of instigating systemic social change (Chetkovich and Kunreuther, 2006). Finally, one of SCSOs strategic approaches to force the government to fulfill its social mandate is to request funding for a program that is often attending to the needs of a marginalized community. Nevertheless, governments may choose to fund the program in order to discourage political action rather than to fulfill their social responsibility mandate (Donaldson, 2007).

Table 3: Theoretical issues arise from combining Service provision and Advocacy

	Organizational structure	**Resources and funds opportunities**	**Inter-organizational relations**	**Commitment**
Service Provision	- Institutionalization - Isomorphism - Mini bureaucrats - Professionalization - Centralized authority - Hierarchical decision making structures - bureaucratic decision-making structures - Clear working Procedures - Clear job descriptions - Clear division of work - Structured constituencies' participation mechanism - Effectiveness - Preferred by governments and foundations to partner with - "Internal normative processes" such as "Professionalization", increase a sector's strength allow substantial resistance to outside forces - Resistance to new ideas	Government: - Resource dependence - Increased mechanisms to ensure increased accountability for measurable service outcomes, such as business plans and performance indicators, which are built into funding contracts (ACOSS, 1997) - Turn the power relations between governments and the community sector upside down. - "Purchaser model", the government as the "customer" is essentially in a position to "choose" which services to purchase - Explicit market oriented practices - Demands for worker with higher levels of skills and abilities - Changed legislation increases pressure on community organizations to comply, stretching already scarce resources	- Franchising form of inter-organizational relations. - Control and dependency - Quality control - Access to knowledge and resources (governmental and donor funds) - Scaling-up - Professionalism - Policy change by forming service coalitions - Quality of services maintained along with diversity and cultural differences - Jointly planning for the service, locally implemented by partner - Time consuming - Resource and staff availability - Increase accountability and transparency to the partner	- Long term commitment to clients - Service-dependency - Empowerment through service - Constituencies participation through services /passive or active /consumers or part of the production process - Structural change/ socio-economic change (instrumental change) - Power sharing structures or exclusion

Advocacy	- Collectivist decision-making structures - Power sharing-decentralized authority. - Flexible and responsive to outside factors. - employ limited staff members, relying - Use modern technologies for resource mobilization such as direct mail - Professionalized staff in advocacy lobbying - Open to new ideas - Challenging structure for long term – organizing and advocacy	Government: - Restrictions - (503)c 42 A on Advocacy activities. - Organization lose their ability to resist governments - Fear of being "used" by political bodies - electoral power - Setting a new agenda for the government - Blocking harmful policies - Forcing the government to change its priorities by working with the government - Open communication channels with the governmental agencies - Hard to mobilize resources for the long run - Resource dependence on outside funders who might impose their vision on advocacy organizations	- Coalitions for long term-advocacy and organizing to promote policy or to stop legislation. - Ad hoc coalitions - Autonomy - Effective process to mobilize maximum participants (mass mobilization) - Leveraging resources for advocacy (foundations and donors) - Leveraging the outcome - Need flexibility and availability of staff - Flexible decision making mechanism (here and know)	- Collective action - Power sharing - High participation and inclusion - Collective identity power - Political awareness - People as "means" or people are the change - Long- term participation/ad hoc activity - Difficult to mobilize people for long term activity - Link the reality of the people to the big picture

Strategies for Managing the Tensions

The growing role of CSOs in the past 20 years has lead to abundant literature concerning the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy within a single organization. The majority of scholars in this field have applied Institutional and Resource dependence theory to describe how these tensions are managed.

Institutional theory provides the following three strategies that CSOs may use to respond to environmental pressures: mimicry, compliance, and buffering. Mimetic behaviour is defined "either conscious or unconscious mimicry of successful organizations" (Oliver, 1991, p. 152). From the institutional perspective, CSOs will engage in the same level of service provision or advocacy produced by other similar organizations that are perceived to have achieved a high level of environmental legitimacy. For example,

when successful organizations do not participate in advocacy activities, then CSOs will consciously or unconsciously abandon their own advocacy functions. Mimetic behaviour is considered a relatively simple and inexpensive tool to use (DiMaggioa and Powell, 1983). It has the added benefit of being perceived favorably by those who control the environment because it implies responsible management, pleases other external organizations, and avoids potential claims of accountability if something goes wrong (Eisenhardt, 1988)

The second strategy "compliance" is defined as "conscious obedience to values, norms, or institutional requirements" (Oliver, 1991, p.152). Since complying with external norms increases an organization's legitimacy, resources, and survival capabilities, organizations face tremendous pressures to conform (Greening & Gray, 1994). In order to secure resources, non-profits, for example, have obtained a reputation for willingly modifying internal structures, operations, and personnel to satisfy government regulators. This type of conformism is particularly true of organizations that experience greater levels of fiscal uncertainty. Nevertheless, research on Feminist, environmental, and peace movements has identified compliance to internal norms such as member ideology and organizational egalitarianism as a crucial factor for moderating the potential risks of bureaucratization. Freeman call such commitments an "ideology of structurelessness" (Freeman, 1975, p. 237) in which organizations distinguish themselves from others in that they consider the process through which they conduct their work to be as important as the political goals of that work. Bordt (1997) describes these types of organizations as "pragmatic collectives," wherein the organization successfully overcomes the tension between advocacy's need for flexibility and service provision's need for a professional bureaucracy and thus maintains a combination of bureaucratic and collective forms (Bordt, 1997).

The third strategy "buffering" or "de-coupling" (Scott, 1987) is designed to reduce the extent to which an organization is externally inspected, scrutinized, or evaluated. Organizations de-couple internal work activities from formal structures and external

assessments as a way of maintaining organizational legitimacy and managing external regulators. For example, an organization might de-couple its advocacy work from government agencies as a way of distancing the organization from government scrutiny and maintaining their government legitimacy.

Resource dependence theory provides the following two strategies—diversification and mission-oriented funding—that non-profits use to minimize their dependence on government funds and to protect their ability to freely engage in advocacy. Studies found that in order to defend themselves from resource constraints, non-profits commonly employ a strategy of securing alternative funding. Indeed, the literature confirms that non-profit organizations engage in a wide variety of activities to provide the financial support necessary for continued pursuit of their charitable missions (Froelich, 1999). Diversification also includes minimizing an organization's over-reliance on any one particular source (Carroll & Stater, 2008). Private funds, in contrast to public funds, expand the variety of management options that non-profits can pursue because they are easier to manage, less subject to external control, and give managers more authority over their financial resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). The second strategy encourages CSOs to seek out funders who share their mission to pursue systemic social change (O'Connell, 1994). A CSO can accomplish this by pursuing funding from governmental organizations that share similar interests and that encourage advocacy.

While these theories offer strategies for CSOs to manage the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy, these theories do, however, contain the following limiting assumptions. The institutional perspective places an inordinate amount of power on the organization's environment. According to this theory, the organization has a significantly limited ability to define, create, or shape its environment (Perrow, 1972).

As SCSOs have emerged to play significant roles in shaping the political structures, particularly in the past three decades, I will argue that these organization can indeed impact their environments and are not merely reactive, but proactive. Via strategic management,

networks, coalitions and associations, SCSOs are constantly shaping their environments to their promote their own social change agenda.

A second limiting assumption of Institutional theory stipulates that an organization's engagement in advocacy decreases as the organization becomes more professional and reliant on government funds. Social movement theorists, however, appropriately note that advocacy cannot easily be sustained by spontaneous volunteer activity alone. To be effective, advocacy requires, among other essentials, office space and staff with the skills to prepare position statements, establish communication links, and prepare policy papers that can credibly put forth the organization's agenda. The availability of these assets and professional expertise significantly determines the extent and success of advocacy activities. According to some literature, government funding and the sector's professionalization have in fact fostered rather than limited these organization's engagement in advocacy (Zald & McCarthy, 1987).

In the same vein, Resource dependence theory also makes a major contribution to our understanding of how non-profits are influenced by their dependencies. This theory is especially useful in explaining the primary issue CSOs confront: how to balance the pursuit of their social missions with funding needs when funding comes from sources that discourage this type of mission. This theory, however, assumes that Resource dependence is the key factor driving organizational change. To apply such a notion to CSOs makes the theory controversial since many CSOs place ideology, morality, and identity above resource needs and thus defy institutional pressures to conform. Take, for example, the Women's Coalition in Israel, which worked to change governmental policy regarding violence against women. The coalition refused to receive government funds and yet still mounted a campaign against the government (Safran, 2005).

Conclusion

The purpose of this literature review was to understand the theoretical issues that arise from combining service provision and advocacy work within a single organization and to

examine the organizational strategies employed to manage these tensions. Most studies conclude that SCSOs are torn between service provision and advocacy since each approach requires distinct organizational structures, alliances, and funding choices. As discussed, the tensions that arise in preserving both approaches typically manifest through organizational structure, resource availability, inter-organizational relations, and organizational mission and values.

The limitations of the literature on my topic of study include the following: first, the organizational theories that have been used extensively (institutional and resource dependence theory) do not discuss the social and political context in which organizations operate. Within the indigenous minority context this fact may especially limit our understanding of SCSOs since these organizations operate on behalf of oppressed minorities and, as such, their political and social contexts constitute defining features. Second, there is a gap in the literature on organizations that are founded as dually committed to service provision and advocacy. The literature mainly focuses on the tensions that arise from organizations that start off with one function and shift towards the other. These organizations are presented as evolving as a means of survival adaptation which is often the result of a political opportunity and or funding availability. There is very limited knowledge, however, on organizations that combine service and advocacy as integral features of their approach to achieving systemic change, and not as a result of their survival process. These organizations perceive service and advocacy to be two complementary dimensions, as opposed to separate components. Minkoff (2002) and Hyde C. (2000) are among the few to have explored these organizations. Finally, the literature on managing the tensions that arise from SCSOs integrated social change approach outlines coping mechanisms rather than sustainable solutions.

In response to these gaps, this dissertation will be the first research on SCSOs within Israel's Arab-Bedouin minority taking into account the potential political and social factors that lead to the tensions that arise from service provision and advocacy. Moreover,

by using a case study, this study intends to provide sustainable solutions to address these tensions. The following section outlines the conceptual framework for this study.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This conceptual framework is guided by the question of how Social Change Service Organizations (SCSOs) manage the tensions that arise from engaging in service provision and advocacy. By framing SCSOs within the broader paradigm of organizations as open systems (Anheier, 2005), organizations are faced with many situations that require response, often in the form of organizational change. The forces that drive these changes are known as the internal and the external environments (Scott, 1987, Anheier, 2005). This study will explore how both the internal and the external environments of SCSOs foster change. I will explore first, the external environment consisting of the socio-political context second, the institutional environment, third the organization's internal environment consisting of the organization's operations and strategies.

My study looks at these three levels and the interlinked relations between them, thus Mullaly's framework of analysis is helpful for this study.

Mullaly (1997) offers a way to explore three main dimensions of a structural framework: 1) The foundation of the state/society, which is composed of the dominant ideology which, in this case, refers to the state–indigenous minority relations and the male domination structure; 2) Political and social institutions that carry out the state/society's functions; 3) Social relations amongst people within the organization, and more specifically those that are superordinate-subordinate relations (Mullaly, 2007). In this case superordinate-subordinate relations refers to the majority (Jews)-minority (Arabs) relations and the gender relations within the organization.

The following section will define the three dimensions (external: the political context and institutional context; internal: the operational environment). This study looks at the relationships between SCSOs and their institutional environment within a specific socio-

political context and the ways in which SCSOs respond in their operations. In this vein, the operative level deals with the organization's everyday operations (governance, structure, mission, staff, organizational culture and management).

External Environment

Political context

The political context refers to the state-minority relationship where the minority context is the margin in which those "who suffer injustice, inequality and exploitation live their lives" (Kirby & McKenna, 1989, p.33). Jenson (2000) states that marginalization refers to groups of people who may be marginalized economically, politically, and socially (Networks & O'Connor, 1998). Within this context, marginalization refers to the indigenous Bedouin minority. The power relations between the state and various minority groups result in minorities having less influence in the decision-making processes that directly affect their wellbeing. These groups have less access to rights and services and they suffer from poverty, unemployment, and self-victimization (Mullaly, 2007; Jamal, 2009).

Social context

Social context refers to the structure of male domination and patriarchy of the Bedouin minority. The Bedouin internal structures remain rooted in the patriarchal values and social relations of the clan (Barakat, 2005). Gender relations and the dominance of the father or elder brother exemplify a central feature of this system perpetuated through status codes, social structures, and traditions (El Saadawi, 2007). The social context and political context do not exist in isolation but rather shape one another. The Bedouin community, for example, is a patriarchal society in which gender relations are a loaded issue (social context). Further, these issues are compounded by the ongoing Arab-Jewish conflict (political context). Both these contexts impact how an organization provides for this community. These dynamics demonstrate that the social and political factors determine how the institutional environment reacts to the organization and how the organization

interacts with its outside environment.

Institutional Environment

The institutional environment refers to the institutions that carry out state and society functions such as regulatory structures, public agencies, laws, courts and the professions (Scott, 2008). The institutional environment also includes social actors such as tribal institutions in addition to donors, NGOs, and community organizations (formal and informal), identity groups, Jewish community, Arab community, the Palestinian-minority and the Jewish majority, essentially all players and stakeholders within the organization's political, social, and economic environment.

Internal Environment

Operational Environment

The operational environment refers to an organization's daily management, mission and ideology, resource availability, and intra-organization relationships (staff diversity and the socio-political relations within the organization). This dimension considers how organizations manage their daily activities, decide over their resources, determine the organizational strategies, culture, structure (board, staff, constituencies), and decision-making processes (Scott, 2008).

As discussed in the literature review, organizational theories reveal that the tensions that arise from the dynamics of combining service provision and advocacy mostly manifest within four internal dimensions of the organization and the way these dimensions respond to the external environment (socio-political and institutional environment).

Thus, my conceptual framework looks at:

- **The organizational mission and ideology**: the set of values and beliefs held by the organization which make up the organization's mission, vision, and motivations.
- **The organizational structure**: the decision-making structure, including the organization's governance, the participation level of its constituencies, and the organization's accountability structure.

- **The inter-organizational relationships**: the relationships the organization chooses to engage in with other organizations (partnerships, franchises, and coalitions) in order to fulfill different goals (such as gain more resources or solve problems more efficiently).
- **The organization's resource availability**: the organization's ability to secure resources such as financial and human resources and legitimacy.

Figure 3. External and internal factors and their impact on tensions formation and management



Non-linearity, Adaptability, and Complexity

SCSOs' survival depends on their ability to adapt to their constantly changing environments; these organizations are complex and cannot be understood in a linear manner (Scott, 1998). Furthermore, SCSOs cannot be limited to certain factors and causal relationships (Anheier, 2005). Environmental complexity refers to the heterogeneity of

elements in the environment, and stipulates that organizational environments are not unified or coherent (Scott, 2008). These organizations are exposed to complex, fragmented environments—such as multiple sources of funding and various authority structures—and therefore, these organizations develop more complex administrative structures (Scott and Meyer, 1983 in Scott, 2008), strategies, structures, and activities. Since SCSOs operate within a socio-political context of challenging the status quo, this conceptual framework highlights the transmission mechanism and interlinked relations between the socio-political context, the institutional environment, and the operative level.

Figure 4. The Interlinked Relations between the Socio-Political Context, the Institutional Environment, and the Operational Level



The institutional environment is determined by the social (for example: attitudes towards women) or political context (for example: government policy and the pervading political ideologies concerning minorities) and it consists of institutions that are influenced by this context. This environment, in turn, influences an organization's internal operations. The context thus creates certain dynamics within the institutional environment and thereby

hinders or facilitates SCSOs management of tensions that arise from their commitment to providing both service and advocacy.

Chapter 4 details the methodology this study takes to explore the dynamics of the external and the internal factors in a way that allows us to explain the tensions that arise from service provision and advocacy work and how AJEEC managed these tensions.

In the next chapter I turn to the explanation of the background of the context of this study.

CHAPTER 3: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Bedouin Minority of Southern Israel's Naqab-Negev Region

Overview

This chapter focuses on the development of Bedouin civil society organizations in Israel. Included in this chapter is a comprehensive discussion and analysis of the main variables influencing the emergence and evolution of Bedouin civil society organizations. In addition, this chapter will identify important events in Bedouin history within Israel, including specific events and processes that have led to ideological, social, and political changes. The chapter is divided as follows: First, I situate the Bedouin community within the Palestinian minority within Israel and offer an explanation of the relevant political and social contexts. Second, I provide a comprehensive review of the historical development of Bedouin civil society and an overview of the current state of Bedouin civil society. Such a review requires consideration of the external and internal social, economic, and political developments affecting the environment in which Bedouin civil society has evolved and currently operates. I will introduce four factors that affected this development: the ethnic state, Jewish civil society, the Islamic movement and political parties, and the rise in education levels. I then discuss Bedouin society in different time periods in order to emphasize the structural changes that occurred within the Bedouin community regarding its relationship with the state of Israel. Finally, I will provide data on the current landscape

and impact of Bedouin Social Change Organizations (BSCOs) and end with presenting the current political and social challenges these organizations face.

Political context

According to a 2017 study initiated by the Israel Center Bureau of Statistics, Palestinian Israelis[7] number 1.7 million people and comprise 21 percent of Israel's total population. As such, Palestinian Israelis are a national minority within a primarily Jewish state and face numerous challenges within the political, social, economic and cultural spheres (As' ad Ghanem & Ozacky-Lazar, 2002; Lavie, 2010). The Bedouin minority, as part of Israel's Palestinian minority, consists of 250,000 members living in the Naqab-Negev – the southern part of Israel. Bedouin Israelis represent 30% of the total population of the Naqab-Negev and 16% of the Palestinian-Israeli minority in Israel (Amara, Abu-Saad, & Yiftachel, 2012; Rudnitzky, Ras, & Fund, 2012).

The Bedouin are the country's poorest population. They suffer from severe discrimination as well as high rates of unemployment and poverty (Rudnitzky et al., 2012; Swirski, Hasson, & Center, 2006). The social, economic, and cultural structure of the Bedouin community has been drastically undermined due to the rapid transition from a traditional lifestyle to an urban one (Meir, 1997). Further, the Bedouin population that lives in unrecognized villages are lacking public services such as electricity, running water, and infrastructure (Swirski et al., 2006).

The Bedouins living in the Naqab-Negev consist of two main subgroups: those living on their historic lands in villages unrecognized by the state of Israel (43% of the Bedouin Israeli population) and those urbanized into modern, state-planned townships (the other 57%). Since the establishment of the state of Israel, the Bedouin minority has suffered ongoing re-locations and state-sanctioned violence that perpetuates a tense relationship between the Bedouin minority and the State as well as contributes to the

[7] Palestinian- Israelis refers to Palestinians who are citizens of the state of Israel. Sometime known as the Arab Israelis.

community's chronic marginalization (Amara, 2008; Rudnitzky et al., 2012; Swirski et al., 2006).

The political factors that contribute to this minority's chronic marginalization are: First, the Bedouin minority is an indigenous minority whose land rights have not been recognized by the State. Consequently, the State declared their villages illegal. In an effort to force them to relocate, the State prevented the provision of many essential services, including roads, water, electricity, clinics, and city planning (Amara et al., 2012; Champagne & Amara).

Second, the Bedouin community is part of the Palestinian national minority in Israel, a country that defines itself as a Jewish state privileging a Jewish majority over the Palestinian minority (Ganim, Rouhana, & Yiftachel, 1998; Smooha, 2002). Official and popular attitudes towards the Bedouin and Palestinian minority are marked by suspicion, more specifically, by the notion that these populations constitute a demographic and/or state security threat (N. Rouhana, 1998). These suspicions, along with the Jewish definition of Israel, are used to justify Israeli policy of unequal budget allocations and discriminatory laws on issues such as employment, housing, education, culture and political participation (N. N. Rouhana & Sultany, 2003).

Finally, a major tool in the Judaization[8] policy is forced urbanization. All unregistered lands were declared as belonging to the state. To take over the land, the government forcefully urbanized the Bedouin, forcing them to abandon their nomadic lifestyle and provoking a bitter and ongoing land conflict between the Bedouin and the State. Thus, the Bedouin lost their main sources of production (land and water) (Amara et al., 2012; Yiftachel, 2010, 2012).

Social context

Given the political tensions, such as forced relocation, housing demolition, and denial of

[8] Judaization refers to a process by which Israel has sought to transform the physical and demographic landscape of the Naqab-Negev to correspond with the Zionist vision of a united and fundamentally Jewish state (Yiftachel, 2009a)

services, the Bedouin community's social structure has changed drastically—and continues to do so. State domination has disrupted the Bedouin way of life, leading to severe consequences for the community's most vulnerable members—women and children (Bailey, 2009a; Meir, 1996).

According to the socio-economic ranking of 400 localities in Israel, the three lowest-ranking local councils are Bedouin townships. Moreover, all Bedouin towns receive the bottom socio-economic rankings. These rankings take into account per capita income, unemployment and poverty rates, levels of education, and public infrastructure (e.g. schools, roads, public transportation etc.). Naqab-Negev Bedouin have the highest reproduction rate in Israel with families consisting of 6.5 children on average, and a median age of 16 (Rudnitzky et al., 2012).

The unrecognized villages lack basic services such as electricity, running water and public transportation. The rate of at-home accidents and accidental deaths among Bedouin children is significantly higher than among Jewish children. In 2013, 50% of all children who died of accidents in Israel were Bedouin and accidental injuries among Bedouin children were 3.3 times higher than among Jewish children. The rate of infant mortality (per 1000 newborns) within the Bedouin community is more than three times that of Jewish infants (Rudnitzky et al., 2012).

Bedouin women are recognized as one of the most disadvantaged groups in Israeli society; they are considered "a minority within a minority" (Dahan-Kalev & Le Febvre, 2012). Bedouin women simultaneously navigate issues related to the traditionally patriarchal elements of Bedouin society and their status as minorities within the state of Israel. Numerous socio-economic indicators illustrate the impact of these barriers: Only around 17% of Bedouin women participate in the labour market compared to 76% of Jewish women and 73% of Arab men (Rudnitzky et al., 2012). Within the Bedouin community, women continue to be affected by violence against women (including the extreme example of killing in the name of family "honour") and the prevalence of

polygamy. Since the 2000s, killing in the name of family “honour” and polygamy rates are on the rise (Meltzer, Rokayak, & Alassad, 2017).

As an indigenous minority, the Bedouin are under constant threat of cultural disentitlement (Abu-Rabia-Queder & Weiner-Levy, 2008). Hisham Sharabi provides the concept of neo-patriarchy to further explain the interplay between state domination of a particular group and that group’s patriarchal structures (Thompson, 2013). The dominance of the father or elder brother perpetuated through status codes exemplifies a central feature of this system. Any individual’s attempt to fight patriarchal oppression within the tribe often leads the tribe to question an individual’s loyalty and to view this insurrection as alignment with the state—an issue dealt with by many Bedouin women’s organizations (further discussed in the following section) (Barakat, 2005; El Saadawi, 2007; Thompson, 2013). Moreover, as an ethnic-democratic state, Israeli domination structures often fuel oppressive traditional practices by accepting them in the name of “cultural sensitivity”. For example, the upholders of the Israeli legal system hesitate to condemn polygamy—a practice considered illegal by Israeli law—in the name of “cultural sensitivity” to the Bedouin community. In the shadow of these political and social contexts, Bedouin civil society emerged to respond to the complex Bedouin reality (Arvin, Tuck, & Morrill, 2013).

The Evolution of Bedouin Social Change Organizations (BSCOs)

The Bedouin minority has established a wide variety of Social Change Organizations (SCOs)—a sub category of civil society organizations—to challenge the political marginality and promote civic and political equality.

When reviewing the history of the emergence of Bedouin civil society organizations, the concept of a "civil society” in its Western definition—as formal organizations with structural and legal status—is relatively new among the Bedouin community. Civil society organizations have always existed in the community, albeit in an informal and indigenous state, fulfilling a variety of functions. Nevertheless, Bedouin civil society as a standalone

topic has not receive any attention from researchers (Antoun, 2000). Of the hundreds of publications that have been written about Israeli civil society (the term used in Israel is "third sector organizations"), most discussions have primarily focused on Jewish civil society organizations (Gidron, 1997; Gidron, Bar, & Katz, 2004a; Haklai, 2009; Jamal, 2008; Payes, 2003; Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000). Among the few that focused on Palestinian Israeli civil society (Haklai, 2004, 2009; Jamal, 2008; Payes, 2005; Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000), Bedouin civil society has received limited attention.

The Concept of Civil Society

For many Western scholars (and some indigenous ones as well), civil society does not exist in the Middle East. The reasoning provided by these scholars is that, up until recent history, the region did not have the institutions (labour unions, political parties, professional associations, and of course NGOs) necessary to constitute a civil society (Gellner & Gellner, 1994; Ibrahim, 1998; Norton, 2001). These researchers assumed that in such authoritarian regimes there was no place for citizens to organize and discuss public matters. Conversely, a number of scholars argue that, in fact, the Middle East has the ultimate civil society or, at least, a viable one characterized by a range of "informal interpersonal practices" (Hann & Dunn, 1996) that contribute to social cohesion and community building (Al-Zuabi, 2012; Antoun, 2000; Hann & Dunn, 1996). Antoun (2000) argues that the Middle East has its own resilient civil society organizations undergoing their own transformations within a global society, and that traditional tribal institutions play the role of promoting justice and human welfare (Antoun, 2000).

Scholars who explore the phenomenon of civil society among Palestinian society in Israel (including the Bedouin) use the establishment of the state of Israel as their starting point (Gidron et al., 2004a; Haklai, 2004; Jamal, 2008). By doing so, they apply the Western assumption that no pre-Israeli-state social structure constituted civil society. According to these scholars, the evolution of Bedouin civil society began only with the

establishment of the state of Israel.

Pre-State Bedouin Community and its Institutions

As considered part of Israel's Palestinian minority, the Bedouin community shares some characteristics with this community while also maintaining its own unique characteristics. Both the Bedouin community in particular and the Palestinian society in general derive the value of philanthropy from both a cultural and religious basis. The Islamic, Christian, and Druze religions all stress the importance of charity, as is borne out in their rules and customs (cf. Islam's "al-zakat"). The roots of this tradition stretch back to the ethical code of nomadic Arab society even before the emergence of Islam. The traditions such as *Aluna*, *Aljaha*, and *Alfazah* are values of giving and volunteering in the Arab traditions[9] (Bailey, 2009b; Cole, 1981). After the First World War, these organizations grew both in number and scope—as other organizations emerged alongside religious organizations—to tackle the poverty and destruction left by the First World War, and to strengthen Arab-Palestinian identity and independence against the British Mandate and Zionism. After the Arab Uprising of 1936-1939, these organizations declined (Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000). From the 1948 War until the late 1960s, the Palestinian minority was in the shock of defeat, religiously and geographically fragmented. There was a breakdown of Palestinian civil society organizations (Zaidan & Gaṭas, 2005) as political organizations and unions fell apart (Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000).

Bedouin Political Institutions

The Negev was inhabited for centuries by Bedouin tribes that were mainly semi–nomadic pastoralists (Bailey, 2009a; Meir & Ben-David, 1989; Mansour Nasasra, Richter-Devroe, Abu-Rabia-Queder, & Ratcliffe, 2014). In 1946, there were 65,000 to 90,000 Bedouin in the nine tribal confederations under the Ottoman Empire and the British

[9] *Al Auna* as a form of social activity; the tradition of mutual help and support is deeply ingrained in Bedouin culture and it is a central value in the community.
Al Jaha is a practice that guarantee justice for individuals and groups using the Bedouin law and legal system .

Mandate. Since the sixteenth century, the Bedouin have been governed by a series of different regimes: the Ottoman Empire (1516-1917), the British Mandate (1917-1948) and since 1948, the Israeli state (M. Nasasra, 2011). These regimes oppressed the Bedouin in order to control and colonize Bedouin land. The Ottomans used interventionist policies affecting the Bedouin way of life such as tax collection, while the British Mandate ruled the Bedouin through a network of military governors employing the power of the sheikhs over their tribes to control the Bedouin people, thus reaffirming traditional power structures within the community (M. Nasasra, 2011). The sheikhs[10] ran the external affairs of the tribes, acting as intermediaries between the people and the authorities, mainly to ensure freedom of movement, trade, as well as social and political networking. They were also responsible for upholding the law and collecting taxes on behalf of the authorities (Bailey, 2009a). During the British Mandate there were five main tribal schools where boys were sent for formal education and these schools played a crucial role in educating the generation who led the Land Movement in 1936-1947 (M. Nasasra, 2011).

Bedouin Social Institutions

As semi-nomadic people, the Bedouin moved with the seasons for grazing purposes, always returning to the same traditional lands. In this nomadic lifestyle, survival means self-reliance, and the creation of social, economic, and political means to help survive in the harsh environment (Cole, 1981). Bedouin communities did not rely on government welfare or social services. However, on the basis of reciprocal respect, throughout history Bedouins were loyal to the governments that controlled their territory (Cole, 1981; Khaldun, 1958).

To understand the tribal social institutions that managed Bedouin lives, Hann (1996) suggests shifting away from formal organizations, as for him civil institutions comprise "the specific patterns of generating trust in human community" (Hann, 1996

[10] "Sheikh" is a political and social position within the tribal structure of the Bedouin community. Structurally this is the highest authority with the tribe.

p.444). For instance, Bailey, in his book *Justice without Government*, presents different case studies that show how the Bedouin in the Negev and in the Sinai guarantee justice for individuals and groups using the Bedouin law and legal system (through, for example, *Jaha*) (Baily, 2009). Another example is the concept of *Al Auna* as a form of social activity; the tradition of mutual help and support is deeply ingrained in Bedouin culture and is a central value in the community (Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000). In practice, *Al Auna* takes place in non-hierarchical groups that share responsibility (Gamdi, 2010). All these indigenous institutions show that the Bedouin community had their unique civil society institutions (Antoun, 2000; Hann 1996), or at least a viable civil society characterized by a range of 'informal interpersonal practices' that contributed to social cohesion and community building, and that played a role in promoting justice and human welfare. Antoun argues that these indigenous forms of civil society served as the foundation for transforming the society and bringing about change (Antoun, 2000)

Development of Present-Day Bedouin Civil Society

In the last 30 years, civil society in Israel has become a leading player in Israel's social and political spheres. The number of Palestinian Israeli SCOs (PISCOs) including Bedouin SCOs (BSCOs) has been also increasing. These organizations emerged under different circumstances, with PISCOs being influenced by Jewish Israeli Social Change Organizations (JISCOs). BSCOs along with PISCOs evolved under a combination of internal and external social and political factors and formed to challenge the discriminatory state policies and to promote civil equality and social change.

Leading Factors: External Factors

Ethnic state

Israel is an ethnic state; a state which links citizenship and full participation in society to ethnicity and descent, in contrast to pluralistic civic statues that aim to grant all their citizens full participation in society (Smooha, 2002; Yiftachel, 2006). In ethnic states, the

protection of law and citizenship rights do not apply equally to all citizens. Scholars suggest that disadvantaged minorities choose to establish predominantly ethnically exclusive organizations, believing that these organizations are more effective than inter-ethnic organizations at empowering their communities within an ethnic state (Haklai, 2004; Jamal, 2007). In the case of Israel, although democracy is not fully restricted to the dominant ethnic group, it is marked by 'master privileges', which are partly denied to Palestinians within Israel, including the Bedouins in the Naqab-Negev (Payes, 2005). Smooha regards Israel as an *ethnic democracy*, a state that "combines the extension of civil and political rights to individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with the institutionalization of ethnic majority control over the state" (Smooha, 2002). Laws such as the "right of return" and the "right of land ownership" are exclusive to Jewish citizens. According to these laws, only Jews are granted return to Israel and the right to own land (N. Rouhana, 1998; Yiftachel, 2006).

With the establishment of the state, a series of laws and policies were passed that worsened the dependence of the Bedouin community upon the Jewish economy and the domination of the latter. Most significant was the confiscation of 92% of historically Bedouin land, which introduced serious challenges to the Bedouin lifestyle as traditionally, the main source of income for the Bedouin community depended on land use (Yiftachel, 2006; Zuabi). Today the Bedouin have 3,200 legal claims regarding expropriated land (Tamari, Katoshevski, Karplus, & Dinero, 2016).

A number of laws have been used to take over Bedouin land (Amara et al., 2012). One of the most permanent is the "Law on the Acquisition of Absentees' Property" (1950), which entitles the state to property left unoccupied on September 1st 1948. This measure applied to 90% of the Bedouins who either fled or were expelled from their land during the 1948 War, and the Bedouins who were displaced to the "Syag" area under the military regime (Swirski et al., 2006). While the Bedouin have campaigned for land rights during the last three decades, to this day not one Bedouin land claimant has received

recognition by the state of Israel (Mihlar, 2011).

The tension between the democratic and ethnic components of Israeli ideology has had far-reaching implications for the development of Palestinian and Bedouin civil society in Israel. For example, democratic practices such as the Associations Law encouraged the emergence of Bedouin civil society organizations in Israel while discriminatory policies and laws have constituted a major motivation for the their development (Haklai, 2004; Jamal, 2007).

Jewish Civil Society Organizations

Although the BSCOs along with the Palestinian-Israeli social change organisations (PISCOs) and the Jewish Israeli social change organizations (JISCOs) (the term used in Israel is "third sector organizations") share similar characteristics, they have emerged under very different political and social circumstances. Moreover, these different political and social circumstances hinder their establishment and operation in different ways. Israel's civil society is considered one of the largest in the world as measured by its contribution to gross domestic product (GDP) and number of people employed. From 1995 to 2008, the share of GDP contributed by civil society organizations more than doubled (increasing from 6.5% to 13.5%) thus ranking Israel's civil society fourth in size after the Netherlands, Ireland, and Belgium. According to a 2009 World Bank study, almost 12% of the economically active population in Israel worked in the non-profit sector (coming only after the Netherlands, Belgium and Canada, and before countries like the UK, Ireland, and even the US) (N., 2013).

Jewish civil society organizations in Israel are rooted in the associations and voluntary organizations of the Diaspora, which were motivated by the religious precepts of charity and benevolence. This system has been in existence in various forms since the Middle Ages (Galnoor, 2007) and has historically provided welfare services for various groups in need (widows, wayfarers, brides, the sick, etc.) as well as education services. These Jewish organizations included Histadrut, Maccabi, Leumit (health funds), Amal

(vocational schools), and WIZO, the Working Mothers Association, Na'amat (women's organizations) (Fund, 2011).

Upon the establishment of the State in 1948, an extensive system of welfare services was already in place throughout the country. At that time, many of these organizations became semi-governmental institutions and others were very often connected with government ministries, which supported them financially. These organizations were perceived as complementing, not replacing or challenging, the activity of government ministries, and were mostly supported by public funds. The growth of the third sector in Israel in recent years is the result of both external influences and internal changes. Over the past twenty-two years, 30,000 new associations have been registered (an average of 1,600 per year) (Galnoor 2007). The third sector "explosion" has facilitated the government's privatization policy and has contributed to the decline of the welfare state. In many fields, third sector organizations have become an alternative or complement to state services, acting as sub-contractors in providing services that were previously provided for by the state (Galnoor, 2007).

Nevertheless, within the current civil society landscape, civil society organizations are not exclusively service-provision agencies. Some are advocacy organizations that were inspired by the civil rights movement of the 70's. Some of these advocacy organizations emerged among more marginalized communities including Mizrahi Jews, Palestinian-Israelis, women, immigrants, and indigenous communities.

The diminishing power of political parties as mediators between society and government, and the development of electronic media, have also contributed to the proliferation of new, extra-parliamentary organizations (Gidron, 1997). However, by far the most important factor in this process is a growing awareness of civil rights and the importance of organized self-expression, as well as the emergence of new social forces. All these factors have shaped the structure and nature of Israel's third sector, and have contributed to the growth of civil society (Galnoor, 2007).

Most of the funding of Jewish civil society organizations in Israel comes from public resources. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2009 JISCOs received 47.3% of their income in the form of government transfers whereas sale of services to the public and private sector amounted only to 31.9%. Moreover, in 2009 8.6% of SCOs' income came from donations abroad, whilst 9.9% was the result of local donations, including both individuals/households and corporations. These fields of activity (service provision) are mostly government-funded. In sum, the Jewish third sector is highly dependent on government funding (N., 2013).

In the mid 90s, the new wave of civil society organizations that emerged are referred to as *social change organizations*. These organizations, unlike the traditional civil society organizations, challenged the reality of injustice. Moreover, these organizations specifically spoke out against the discrimination in budget allocation among the various Jewish ethnic groups (Gidron, Bar, & Katz, 2004b). Jewish sub-groups such as Mizrahi Jews, women, new immigrants, and especially the Ethiopian Jewish community (who suffer invisible discriminatory policies with regards to housing, education, and employment) became the voice for the marginalized Jewish communities, advocating against the government's structure of oppression (Galnoor, 2007). These minority and ethnic-based organizations found themselves on the same path as the Bedouin social change organizations, though they enjoyed wider operational space compared to BSCOs (Fund, 2011). In the last 15 years, this new wave of organizations joined the Bedouin coalitions, campaigns, and protests providing minority and ethnic-based organizations with more opportunities for political influence and increased success, such as women's rights and the campaign for people with disabilities. BSCOs hired professional Jewish staff that could offer their expertise in areas such as grant writing and financial management. Such collaboration exposed Jewish employees to the ongoing suffering and discrimination of the Bedouin community. The combination of these two factors created new platforms for activism and social change in the form of joint Arab-Jewish organizations and coalitions

such as the Coexistence Forum in the Negev and AJEEC - the Arab Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment and Cooperation (the organization that is the focus of this study)

Leading Factors: Internal Factors

Political Parties and the Islamic Movement

Political movements have played a central role in mobilizing the new generation of educated, young Bedouins in Israel and in contributing to the creation of grassroots organizations (Jamal, 2005; Payes, 2005). Until the end of the Military Government, the Communist Party in Israel (CPI) served as the only legal political institution among the Palestinian minority. The CPI played a central part in the constitution of many grassroots organizations, especially among Palestinians in the north, where Bedouin students received their education in the 70s and 80s due to the absence of high schools in South Israel's Negev region. Bedouin students became involved with the CPI and were inspired by grassroots activities. The first three organizations in the Negev between the years 1976-1982 were established by this educated elite with the help of the CPI. These organizations mobilized the first wave of protest among the Bedouin community (Dahan-Kalev, Le Febvre, & El'Sana-Alh'jooj, 2012b).

Scholars point out that the political parties set the foundation for political participation and the evolution of BNGOs (Jamal, 2008; Payes, 2005). In the late 1980s, the first Arab party, the Arab Democratic Party (ADP), was created, and in 1992 the party was elected. At this time, the first Bedouin MK (Knesset Member) was also elected. The fact that this was the first time that the Bedouin had a political representative encouraged the majority (83%) of the community to vote (Parizot, 2006). In 1994, when Rabin needed the Arab MKs to support his government, the Bedouin MK agreed and utilized this opportunity to generate political and financial support for the Bedouin in the Negev. He was able to help establish service BSCOs to sub-contract with the government and provide services to the Bedouin in the townships. In addition, his party, the ADP played a critical role in organizing people in the unrecognized villages. This process of political opening

(Hooghe, 2005) created the second generation of politically involved Bedouins and increased the political awareness among young people.

In the 1980s, the Islamic movement started to gain power. This organization played an increasingly important role in mobilizing different groups in the Bedouin community. Scholarly debate on the inclusion of religious movements within civil society in the Middle East has been ongoing (Makarov, 1997). Scholars point to religious movements' reliance on grassroots associations as the main channel for activity and their long-term influence on the democratic society by imposing a religious agenda. Since the 1990s, the Islamic movement in Israel has followed the model of similar Jewish movements elsewhere in Israel (Shass party and Chabad) and in the Arab world by forming local committees, service or welfare organizations, and earning a considerable degree of influence and support through local SCOs. The increasing impact of the Islamic movement is seen in the growing proportion of religious organizations of the total BSCOs, as the services provided by the Islamic movement were those that the government ignored, namely education and financial support for families in need (Peled, 2001). These organizations quickly gained legitimacy and support, resulting in the election of five Islamic Movement mayors and 45 seats on 11 local councils in the 1989 local elections. In the first election to local councils in the Bedouin community, the Islamic movement won the election in Rahat, the largest Bedouin city counting some 50,000 residents.

Rise in Education Levels

The 90s saw an increase in general education levels, and a growing number of Bedouin professionals and academics. Significantly, the number of Bedouin women in university rose from 2 female students in 1993 to 378 in 2001 (Pessate-Schubert, 2003) a sign of changing attitudes with regards the education of women (Marteu, 2009). Many Bedouin who studied abroad returned as social agents with new ideas and projects for the community's pressing needs (Dahan-Kalev et al., 2012b; Payes, 2005). This academic elite became the founders and leaders of the new service or advocacy-oriented BSCOs

established during this period. Notably, founders of advocacy-oriented BSCOs are more educated than founders of service-oriented BSCOs, which directly linked advocacy work to the level of political awareness (Jamal, 2008).

Thus, the ethnic state, the Palestinian Israeli political parties including the rise of the Islamic movement, increasing education levels, and growing cooperation between JISCOs and BSCOs shaped the nature of the BSCOs.

The main historical periods or events that impacted the development of BSCOs are the Military Government (1949-1966), Land Day (1976), the Flourishing Period (1992-2000), the Institutionalization and Professionalization Period (2000-2009) and the contemporary transition from Social Change Organizations to Social Movements (2010-Present).

Military Government (1949-1966)

During the war in 1948, 90% of the Bedouin fled the Naqab-Negev and their numbers dropped from 100,000 to 11,000. This minority was in the shock of defeat, weak, and religiously and geographically fragmented. Entire tribes were forcefully moved to Jordan, Gaza, or the West Bank, while others were internally split in similar ways. Political organizations and unions fell apart (Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000) and until the late 1960s, there was a breakdown of civil society institutions among those that were left behind (Payes, 2005; Zeidan & Ghanem, 2000).

In the 1950s and throughout most of the 1960s, the military was able to restrict mobility through its authority over travel permits and its power to impose administrative detentions, thus limiting the rights of Bedouins to freedom of movement, expression, and political resistance[11] (Lustick, 1980). As a result, a deep fear was instilled within the Bedouin tribal structure; protest was sporadic and generally non-institutionalized (Payes,

[11] For example, three Bedouin men tried to support the Palestinian struggle by joining the P.L.O Movement (Palestinian Liberation Organization). The military government dissuaded even such a small-scale protest by threatening the sheikh of their tribe with a choice between expelling the men to Jordan or handing them over to the Shin Beit. The initiator of the small group chose to exile himself to Jordan.

2005).

Land Day (1976)

The breakdown of the traditional society and the decline of the role of the sheikhs in the towns also meant the weakening of the traditional civil society structures such as the *Jaha* and *Al Auna* that had so far supported the Bedouin. The Bedouin made few land claims against the state because of their lack of familiarity with how to claim their rights within a governmental system. However, there were also positive outcomes: the grievances over the confiscation of lands and the sense of betrayal provided the motivation necessary to fuel mobilization. The young men that were sent to study in the north of the country were able to reconnect with other displaced Bedouin and Palestinians, bridging the rift that had opened in 1948 and developing a shared political agenda (Zaidan & Gaṭas, 2005). Those that studied abroad returned to their communities with new ideas on oppression, organization, and colonialism, many of which were a direct result of involvement with the then-powerful Israeli Communist Party (CPI). By popularizing the ideology of struggle, these newly politically-aware Bedouin started to create a civil society with a new purpose: that of being a counter-hegemony to the state, closely following Gramsci's conception of civil society. This increased political awareness fostered greater self-confidence (Jamal, 2008). Two particular events deepened these changes: Land Day and the First Intifada.

Land Day in 1976 marked a turning point in the development of Palestinian civil society in Israel (Haklai, 2004, 2009; Jamal, 2008; Marteu, 2009; Payes, 2003). Land day marks the Palestinians first national organized protest in opposition to a large-scale land expropriation in the Galilee that was to happen on March 30th. Strikes and demonstrations took place and the police killed six demonstrators – but the decision to expropriate the land was cancelled. Since then, Land Day 1976 has stood as a landmark of Palestinian political activity in Israel, the moment when the minority's attitude towards the State was transformed "from consent to activism" (Payes 2005 p.88). Land Day inspired a small

group of educated Bedouin to engage in community organizing and the establishment of formal civil society organizations as a means to communicate with the state of Israel.

The Bedouin struggle in the south lagged behind its northern counterpart, both in time and organization. During the late 1970s, the first two organizations in the south were established in the Bedouin community: The Association for Support and Defense of Bedouin Rights in Israel (ASDBR) and the Association of Laqiya's Sons (ALS)[12]. By focusing on community building and by reproducing self-help mechanisms at the village level the ASDBR and the ALS were able to build the social capital (Putnam, 1995;Antoun, 1996) that set the ground for the village to be the leading actor in activism and political participation in the 1990s[13].

In 1980, the Israeli government established the "Green Patrol" military unit to "protect the land from the Bedouin" (Mansour Nasasra et al., 2014) by demolishing new houses, uprooting olive trees, and spraying Bedouin farms and harvests. The mobilization of the Bedouin community against land confiscation started in the village of Laqiya and marked the beginning of a period that witnessed protest campaigns more frequent than at any previous time since the establishment of the state. These protests included a campaign for the status of the village of Laqiya and eventually protests against the Israeli occupation that finally linked the Negev Bedouin to the Palestinian national struggle[14] (Parizot, 2006). The first big operation took place in Laqiya in October 1980. The Green Patrol forces attacked the village, uprooted thousands of olive trees belonging to the Abu Karen tribe, and destroyed 12 houses. This brutal act spurred the people in Laqiya to confront the

[12] The ASDBR was the first grassroots organization focusing on advocacy for the Bedouin unrecognized villages in the Naqab-Negev, while the ALS was established to empower the community by jointly producing and sharing services such as water and electricity for the community in Laqiya and surrounding unrecognized villages.

[13] Laqiya was the first Bedouin village to have generators for electricity and running water as a local development project, as well as a community clinic and library, the result of the local civil society's activities.

[14] The ALS led the campaign for formal recognition of the village, succeeding in 1989. The organization organized a major protest against the Israeli occupation of Lebanon after the massacre of Palestinians at the Sara and Shatilah refugee camps in 1982. 27 Bedouin men were arrested during this demonstration, and six Bedouin students were asked to leave BGU because their action was perceived as against the security of the state of Israel. More restrictions were put on Bedouin students studying in Israel and abroad.

police forces, and later that day many Bedouin joined a massive demonstration. For the first time, Bedouin women participated in a political action (Dahan-Kalev et al., 2012b; Marteu, 2009). These actions, however, were met with increased restrictions and surveillance from the State. Organizations that were established between the years 1980 and 1990 consequently focused on service provision by taking advantage of the new Association Law[15].

The Flourishing Period (1992-2000)

The flourishing period of BSCOs in Israel began with the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles at Oslo, in September 1993. The Oslo Declaration excluded the Palestinian minority in Israel from any direct role in the negotiations. The exclusion of this group thus frustrated the long-held expectation that Palestinians in Israel could serve as a bridge for peace between Israelis and Palestinians (As'ad Ghanem & Ozacky-Lazar, 1999). The Oslo declaration witnessed both the consolidation of Palestinian Israeli NGOs in Israeli civil society, and their disappointed hope that peace between Israel and the PLO would bring about equality for Palestinians within Israel (Payes, 2005). This period witnessed growing confidence on the part of the minority to use state channels along with growing responsiveness of state institutions to the civil rights demands of Palestinian NGOs in Israel (Ghanem & Ozacky-Lazar, 1999; Haklai, 2004). Consequently, more nation-wide SCOs were established, such as Adala and Mossawa. These organizations emphasized the national agenda of Palestinians in Israel and led them to promote such issues as fair budget allocations, human rights issues, and policy change.

In the Naqab-Negev, this period witnessed the flourishing of BSCOs—a response to increased political opportunities, funding availability, a growing number of Bedouin men and women in academia, and increased political awareness among the Bedouin community. From 1996-2000, 130 Bedouin organizations were registered, more than in any other two-year period (Marteu, 2009).

[15] *Law of Association: Amendment. S.H. 1395*

Political opportunities

As suggested by Political opportunity theory, organizations seek to take advantage of opportunities created by political changes (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow & Tollefson, 1994). In Israel's history, the Labour administration was arguably the most responsive government to Israel's Palestinian minority due to its dependence on support for the first Bedouin MK in Israel representing the Arab Democratic Party, whose decision to support Labour ushered in a new era of government openness. BSCOs took advantage of this opportunity to put issues facing the Bedouin community on the government's agenda (Parizot, 2006).

Resource Mobilization

According to Resource dependence theory, organizations need funding, people, information, and recognition from the outside world in order to survive (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The proliferation and institutionalization of BSCOs in this period was influenced by the availability of external resources from organizations such as the New Israel Fund (NIF), the European Union, and Jewish foundations in North America. The NIF, an American-based Jewish fund that supports organizations for social change in Israel, opened a Shatil[16] branch in Beer Sheva in 1994. The establishment of Shatil facilitated the establishment of 80% of the Bedouin non-profit organizations (BNGOs) registered between 1996-2000 (Shatil, 2003). The NIF supported these new organizations and has since become one of the most important donors for BNGOs in Israel. Two distinct marginalized groups were the first to utilize this opportunity: the Bedouin living in the unrecognized villages and Bedouin women.

Unrecognized Villages Organizations

The establishment of the Regional Council of the Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the

[16] Shatil is the New Israel Fund's Initiative for Social Change. Shatil offers professional and administrative support to organizations in the early stages of their activity such as capacity building programs leadership training and fundraising workshops.

Negev (RCUBV) constituted a major breakthrough in Bedouin civil society. On May 17, 1997, the residents of 22 unrecognized villages in the Negev elected their representatives to an organization consisting of the villages' local committees (Payes, 2005). The organization follows the municipal model of Israeli regional councils: its members elect local committees in their respective villages, and the regional council coordinates these committees' work and promotes the region's common interests. The regional council campaigns for two goals: 1) legal recognition of the villages in their current locations, and 2) the immediate provision of services, irrespective of the recognition process. One of its central achievements to date was the drafting of a Master Plan for the unrecognized villages in the Naqab-Negev—an alternative to the existing municipal Master Plan of the Negev and the Beersheva metropolis[17]. This step marks a new approach in the Bedouin community: by establishing the RCUBV through democratic direct elections and by producing an alternative plan to the one imposed by the government to settle land claims, the community was able to create a counter-hegemony (Payes, 2005;Jamal, 2008). Because the RCUBV is a registered association, Israeli authorities did not stop the election process to the regional council, nor did they object to its registration with the Ministry of Interior, and did not interfere with the Council's work. Nevertheless, to date, the RCUBV did not achieve any official recognition that would allow it to function and receive state budgets like a formally recognized regional council.

Bedouin Women's Organizations

The 1980s saw an international interest in gender issues. By the 1990s almost all countries were party to the CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women), including Israel. The involvement of young educated women within their community became essential in the so-called democratization of the Arab world (Marteu, 2009). In the Bedouin community in Israel, tens of women's organizations developed in

[17] The plan to establish a joint council for the residents of the unrecognized villages in the region first emerged as an idea in the strategic plan entitled The Arabs of the Negev 2020.

the mid-1990s and early 2000s. Furthermore, the increasing number funding sources dedicated to "gender and development" played a significant role in growth of Bedouin women's organizations. Since the mid 1990s, various international organizations or foundations have funded Bedouin women's initiatives in the Negev, and this process has increased dramatically since the early 2000s. Three types of Bedouin women's organizations emerged during this period. The first is grassroots social welfare organizations that are locally active within the framework of one tribe or one village. Within these organizations, women collect money and clothes for the needy in their village, the West Bank, or Gaza. These types of organizations do not consider themselves as part of the feminist movement and do not conceptualize their work through the framework of women's rights activism.

The second type is religious women's organizations. These organizations focus on religious education, welfare, and *Zakah*, and are linked to—even directly incorporated within—the Islamic movement in the Naqab-Negev. They do not constitute an Islamic feminist movement and their only active political role is the mobilization of women for the Islamic party during Israeli elections (Marteu, 2009).

The third type of women's organizations is one with a cross-village and cross-tribal focus on women's rights in education, employment, and political participation. These organizations coordinate activities for women's leadership through training and empowerment programs.

BSCOs' Institutionalization and Professionalization (2000–2009)

The years 2000-2009 were significant for BNGOs and characterized by major national, regional, and local political events and socio-economic processes that affected the Bedouin community.

Political Events

The Bedouin continued to occupy the bottom of the socio-economic ladder in Israel. The issue of the unrecognized villages is still unresolved, daily house demolitions continue, and this conflict between the government and the Bedouin continue to deepen the rift between the government and the Bedouin as well as between the Bedouin and the Jewish communities in the Negev, as most of the latter supported the government's actions (Swirski et al., 2006). The expression of these feelings found its way during the October events of the second Intifada in 2000, when the Israeli-Palestinian peace process collapsed into the al-Aqsa Intifada[18]. In light of the Or Commission Report criticizing the government for its consistent discrimination of Palestinian citizens of the state, a group of North American Jews established the Inter Agency Task Force on the Arab Israeli issues (ITAF)[19] to support civil society organizations in Israel who focus on empowering Palestinian Israeli society, with a focus on the Bedouin community in the Negev.

In 2003, the Office of the Prime Minister under the tenure of PM Ariel Sharon launched a new Development Plan for the Negev, allocating budgetary and institutional resources to accelerate the dispossession of the Naqab-Negev Bedouin[20]. In September 2003, the new "Abu Basma " regional council was formed, unifying a number of unrecognized Bedouin villages, in theory giving them official recognition, providing them with municipal status, and consequently basic services and infrastructure. In reality, the villages still lacked infrastructure, water, and electricity, and only have a few new buildings to show for this so-called recognition (Yiftachel, 2008). The government's failure to deliver on its promises further intensified mistrust between the authorities and the

[18] During the first days of the al-Aqsa Intifada, Bedouins in the Naqab-Negev joined the demonstrations that broke out across the Green Line in protest against the political visit of Ariel Sharon, then head of the opposition, on the Temple Mount. Israeli police killed 13 Palestinian Israeli demonstrators and wounded many more. 22 young Bedouin men were arrested during the demonstrations in Laqiya village and Rahat city.

[19] http://www.iataskforce.org

[20] 1.1 billion NIS were allocated for this six year plan, with an additional 55 million NIS for expanding police units and the Green Patrol, to further empower and authorize arbitrary demolition of Bedouin homes. All budget items of the 6-years Sharon Development Plan suggest transferring the population into seven new planned towns and destruction of their home villages without any budget items allocated to or suggesting new construction.

communities in theses villages, who believed the state was taking a serious step towards the Bedouin, even as the right-wing government intensified housing demolitions and violent repression of formal and informal protests[21].

In 2008, the Israeli war in Gaza started. Arabs and Jews joined together to lead demonstrations and strikes all over the country, protesting against the war. The issue was particularly complex amongst the Bedouin as many Bedouin families had lost relatives in Gaza, and seven Bedouin families had lost their sons who served in the Israeli army. Following the publication of the Goldstone Report[22] in 2009, the Israeli government introduced several laws targeting human rights NGOs. In November 2011, the Knesset proposed the "NGO Bill" that restricts human rights NGOS from foreign funding[23].

Impact on Civil Society

These circumstances have had a major impact on BSCOs, which now evolve in a dramatically changed environment. New forms of BSCOs, new social change strategies and the reconstruction of power relations between the state and the Bedouin community were necessary. First, despite restrictive legislation on human rights and social change organizations and the new regulations regarding foreign funds, some of the BSCOs were able to survive by combining different approaches such as social business[24] and community fundraising campaigns[25] (Gidron & Hasenfeld, 2012).

Second, the aggressive practices, the oppression, and the daily suffering of the people created a new generation of male and female activists, academics and professionals

[21] First, the number of house demolitions has gone up: while in 2002 the state demolished 112 houses, more than the annual average, in 2003 140 houses were already demolished by October. Second, since October 2000, police shot dead 16 young Bedouin men in various incidents. Only in one case has an investigation been opened.

[22] The United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, also known as the Goldstone Report, was established in April 2009 by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) during the Gaza war as an independent international fact-finding mission to investigate alleged violations of international human rights law in Gaza.

[23] Amongst other measures restricting the right of NGOs to access funding, the new legislative provisions introduced a limit of 4,000 euros on international funding contributions.

[24] See AJEEC's Catering Project

[25] The RCUV used one such fundraiser to gather funds to rebuild destroyed homes.

with a "new consciousness" that were able to articulate their case before national and international institutions. Third, these years witnessed an increase in the number of BSCOs who increased their advocacy and political action work (Yiftachel, 2009). The density of Bedouin advocacy organizations created great competition that led to the merging of the small and young organizations into more solid ones.

New opportunities

Organizations increased their professionalization through coalition building, adapting new approaches, combining service with political action and collective advocacy, linking with international social movements, and expanding areas of activities to include all aspects of life[26]. To generate real impact and change government policies, BSCOs had to appeal to the international community, which they did by networking with international advocacy organizations and building alliances with national Jewish and Palestinian human rights organizations and activists[27].

The publication of the Goldberg Report[28] provoked a split in the political system regarding the solution to the Bedouin land issue. Out of this split grew new political opportunities that influenced the professionalization and institutionalization of BSCOs. The political structure and the establishment of the Authority of Economic Development for the Arab sector generated more budget allocations for local Bedouin municipalities and for new social businesses such as the Wadi Attir Project and the shared industrial zone between Rahat and Lahavim. These developments support the political opportunity theory and the resource mobilization theory that suggest that the correlation between the existence of political opportunities, resources, and levels of NGO activism are the ultimate ground for the emergence of social movements (D. S. Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow &

[26] Examples include AJEEC-the Arab- Jewish Center for Equality Empowerment and Cooperation, The Negev Coexistence Forum for Civil Rights-NCF and MAAN-the Forum for Bedouin Women Organizations.
[27] They established new forums and coalitions such as the Yakhad: The Arab –Jewish Coalition, The Recognition Forum, the Coalition Against Racism, the Campaign for the Bedouin's Rights in the Negev and The High Steering Committee for the Arab-Bedouin of the Negev, which is a coalition of Bedouin mayors, Palestinian MKs, leaders of civil society organizations and the Islamic Movement.
[28] http://www.moch.gov.il/SiteCollectionDocuments/odot/doch_goldberg/Doch_Vaada_Shofet_Goldberg.pdf

Tollefson, 1994).

Unrecognized Villages

The Regional Council of the Unrecognized Arab-Bedouin Villages in the Negev has been active in coordinating activities against Sharon's Plan, to which most of the residents in the Unrecognized Villages are opposed, and against the policy of housing demolitions. The Council enhanced its advocacy strategies, working at the national level and tightening its cooperation with other national Palestinian and Jewish NGOs (Payes, 2005). The funds it raised has been crucial to the Council's activities, and in particular for the conduct of research towards the alternative Master Plan for the villages. The legal department of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI)[29] has also been consistently involved in the struggle of the unrecognized Bedouin villages through a series of court appeals on behalf of the Negev residents. At the international level, in 2005 Bedouin activists submitted a petition to the U.N. asking for the Bedouin to be recognized as having indigenous communal rights[30] (Mansour Nasasra et al., 2014).

Women's Organizations

The social symptoms of forced urbanization, unemployment, and the exclusion of women and children are internal issues that exacerbate the many external challenges outlined above (Rudnitzky et al., 2012). Political oppression (external) and patriarchal oppression (internal) feed each other creating "double marginalization" for Arab women. Arab women's organizations in general must play into a game of constraints and opportunities that pits feminism against nationalism, professional accountability against grassroots legitimacy, resistance against protest, and community involvement against political participation (Abdo, 1994).

[29] ACRI was established in 1972 to bolster Israel's commitment to civil liberties and human rights through legal action, education, and public outreach.

[30] The subject was examined in the context of the worldwide recognition of indigenous rights that culminated in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was adopted on the 13th of September 2007 (Yiftachel, 20010)

While the first and the second waves of BSCOs organizations focused on external political and internal welfare issues, the institutionalization period changed the focus of women's organizations from community development to social change, shaking both the external and internal structure by addressing taboo issues such as polygamy and violence against women (Dahan-Kalev, Le Febvre, & El'Sana-Alh'jooj, 2012a). Bedouin women's organizations established MAAN in 2000[31], a coalition of 11 organizations, to unite and create a solid base for their social change agenda.

From NGOs to Social Movements (2010-present)

The Prawer Plan

In September 2011, the Israeli government approved the Prawer Plan, a five-year settlement plan whose major policy implication was the relocation of some 30,000-40,000 Naqab-Negev Bedouin from the unrecognized villages to the townships, requiring that the Bedouin give up land ownership in return for compensation (Amara, 2013). The result of this plan would be the concentration of all the Bedouin of the Negev on 1% of the Negev land while they compose 30% of the Negev's population (Rudnitzky, Ras & Fund, 2012). The plan originally sought to translate the Goldberg recommendations into a practical plan for a lasting solution to the Bedouin issue (Amara, 2008). However, it ignores every positive aspect of the Goldberg recommendations and was produced without consulting with the Bedouin community.

Civil Society Response

Activists and leaders organized marches, demonstrations, strikes and protests. October 6th, 2011 was the biggest day of Bedouin demonstrations since the state's establishment.

[31] Since 2000, MAAN member organizations have been involved in advocacy and lobbying for social and political change. They provided the first telephone hotline in Arabic for Bedouin women victims of domestic violence. Today MAAN runs tens of projects oriented towards women's awareness and empowerment, women's rights, and leadership training. The coalition is part of the Working Group on the Status of Palestinian Women in Israel, which every four years submits a shadow report to the CEDAW committee alongside the official governmental report describing Arab women's status and situation in Israel. MAAN's activity at multiple scales of work and protest in local, national, and international spheres affects the ways they act and are perceived.

November 30th

2013 was an organized "day of rage" in which demonstrations took place in Hura, Haifa, East Jerusalem, Ramallah, Jaffa, and many other cities around the world. As the result of a confrontation between Israeli police forces and young protesters, many protesters were wounded and arrested. Since then, the police violence in the Naqab-Negev has dramatically escalated (Yiftachel, 2012). During the past three years, the Israeli government demolished more than 3,400 houses (Nyhan, 2014). The context of structural oppression, the complexity of people's daily suffering, and the limitations faced by individual SCOs to engage in processes of social and political change have created a demand on BSCOs to engage in a process of change beyond independent activity from development-oriented to empowerment-oriented (Payes, 2005). BSCOs have become involved in political action, mobilization, and protest. Advocacy work has increased significantly, including networking with global social movements (as with the land rights movement), drafting reports, increasing media visibility, and lobbying within institutional settings such as the Israeli Knesset and the Israeli Supreme Court, the European Union, and the United Nations. Scholars have indicated several ways in which NGOs have transformed into social movement or contribute to socio-political change (Bobo, Kendall, Max, Bobo, & Kendall, 2001; Chetkovich & Kunreuther, 2006). These include the flourishing of SCOs, the process of political awareness among the Bedouin community, the rise of a politically articulate generation, and the evolution of collective identity where people share a sense of "we-ness"—a shared cognition, set of beliefs, and emotions among a group actively pursuing social and political change (Melucci, 1995; Mullaly, 2007). All these developments, along with the availability of external funds from the EU and the NIF, set the conditions for Bedouin social movements to take off in recent years. During the Prawer Plan period, the Bedouin succeeded to bring the Bedouin issue center stage within the political discourse. On December 12, 2013, Benny Begin, the minister in charge of the plan resigned and the government announced that the plan would be halted.

General Trends: The Data

Based on the available data on Palestinian social change organizations there are 1,517 registered PISCOs currently active in Israel (Haklai, 2009; Jamal, 2008) Among them, 213 are BSCOs (N., 2013) who pursue diverse mandates and utilize various approaches. There are numerous organizations active in the field of development, empowerment, advocacy, and lobbying. In this regard, According to Galnoor (2008) the proportion of PISCOs engaged in activities related to human rights (10%) is higher than the proportion of Jewish organizations engaged in this field (6%). The percentage of PISCOs that are engaged in advocacy is also slightly higher (11%) than the proportion of JISCOs (9%) (Galnoor, 2007). The development of BSCOs in Israel shows seven trends. First, the number of BNGOs has increased dramatically since the mid 1990s (see Figure 1). Second, the activities of BSCOs in Israel have expanded to cover a diverse range of issues such as education, welfare, women's empowerment, employment, economic development and housing (rebuilding state-demolished houses). Third, three main dominant organizational categories are women's organizations, religious organizations affiliated with the Islamic movement, and the organizations and the local committees who represent the unrecognized villages (N., 2013).

The fourth trend is that BSCOs adopt various strategies and social change approaches ranging from conformist strategies such as services provision (where Islamic movement's organizations are leading actors), to outside tactics such as political action, mass mobilization, and advocacy (Jamal, 2008). Some organizations combine service provision with advocacy and political action, focusing on empowerment and social change policy. Examples of such organizations include the Arab-Jewish Center for Equality Empowerment and Cooperation (AJEEC)—the case for this study—the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCURV), and the Forum for Bedouin Women organizations (MAAN) (Foundation, 2010).

A fifth trend is that the daily conflicts with the State over land and housing issues have pushed all BSCOs–including service-oriented organizations–to take part in political actions and advocacy activities, muting the differentiation between advocacy and non-advocacy organizations. Nonetheless, most of the BSCOs are registered as service provision as to avoid governmental restrictions (Galnoor, 2007).

In the last nine years, BSCOs have grown more willing to partner and to build coalitions with JISCOs and PISCOs as the majority of these coalitions are devoted to human rights, land issues, and to the recognition of the unrecognized villages and have branches in the Negev.

Finally, BSCOs suffer from state discrimination, which their Jewish counterparts do not. This discrimination explicitly manifests itself in the much lower state funding for BSCOs. According to a Knesset's report on financial support to Palestinian Israeli SCOs (including BSCOs), only 3.5% of applying organization receives financial support from the government[32] compared to 53.4 % in JISCOs. This is also explained by the fact that BNGOs do not meet the criteria of tax exemptions under the Israeli Association Law (46A)[33]. As such, most of the BSCOs receive funds from international bodies such as the NIF, the EU, the UN, and foundations and private donors based mainly in North America (Haklai, 2008; Payes, 2005).

Figure 5: Growth of Registered BNGOs in the Negev from 1976 to 2009. Data retrieved from Israeli Association Registrar Report 2011

[32] http://www.knesset.gov.il/mmm/data/pdf/m02431.pdf

[33] http://www.sheatufim.org.il/webSite/Modules/database/PoolItemPage.aspx?PoolItemType=2&PoolItemID=504



Challenges Facing BSCOs

Political Challenges

The main problems hindering the establishment and operation of Palestinian Israeli social change organizations are as follows: The State considers many Palestinian Israeli social change organizations, together with Jewish human rights organizations, as "hostile elements" to the State. Recently, the Israeli government passed the so-called 'transparency,' law (NGO Bill #5766-2016) targeting organizations working for human rights and democracy, mainly Palestinian Israeli organizations. "The only thing transparent about this law is its true purpose: to intimidate and silence the civic sphere and those advocating for an end to the occupation in particular," wrote Daniel Sokatch, CEO of the New Israel Fund (2016). Furthermore, in 2016, the Israeli security cabinet decided to outlaw the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel. Such legislation demonstrates how the government limits NGOs work by shrinking the civic society space. In line with these intentions, Palestinian Israeli social change organizations are subjected to severe and sometimes aggressive inspections concerning their goals, structure, and activities (Vardi, 2015). Frequently these inspections are discriminatory in that they differ from and are significantly more exhaustive than those required of Jewish sector organizations (Galnoor, 2007).

Social Challenges

Social challenges refer to the internal issues facing BSCOs in contrast to the political challenges delineated above and regarding state-BSCO relations.

Fragmentation: BSCOs tend to be very divided reflecting the community in general (tribes, townships, unrecognized villages, political parties affiliations) and thus lack a unified platform to promote collective action (Jamal, 2006). For instance, the Regional Council for the Unrecognized Villages (RCURV) founded in 1997 no longer represents all the unrecognized villages and copes with a drop-out dynamic whereby many URVs abandoned the organization to establish their own local committee. Not only do the different sectors within Arab civil society operate separately but they may also even boycott one another or compete fiercely, based on personal grounds or party affiliation, thereby hindering collective civic action.

Competition: many organizations promote similar agendas and compete for scarce resources, particularly in the fields of advocacy, empowerment and women's issues. Furthermore, there exists a clear-cut division between the sphere of secular organizations and the Islamic movement organizations (Jamal, 2006).

Political Parties' Affiliation: Several prominent BCSOs are affiliated with political parties. This phenomenon is particularly prevalent among PISCOs (Jamal, 2008), especially prominent PISCOS which also have branches in the Negev. Thus PISCOs with party affiliations highly affect BSCOs who work with them in coalitions.

Tribalism and Personalization: PISCOs, including BSCOs, tend to be highly personalized. The RCURV provides the most prominent BSCOs example of this issue: an election results in a new leader, the previous leader will encourage his constituents (those in his village or tribe) to abandon the organization and establish a new local one. As Jamal (2008) indicated when examining PISCOs, certain traditional norms and patterns of authority continue to dominate. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the personalization of institutions and leadership roles is by no means unique to the Bedouin community and

its significance has begun to decline with the rise of political awareness and the creation of new collective identities such as women's organizations (Rubin, 2017).

Financial and Managerial Challenges

BSCOs suffer from serious financial problems namely due to minimal government support. Government funding provided for PISCOs including BSCOs is very limited compared to what is received by Jewish organizations. For example, for service provision the government subcontracts Jewish organizations even if the service is intended to serve the Bedouin community. Only 3 out of 213 BSCOs do have the approval as "public institutions under paragraph 46a of the Income Tax Ordinance." and thus can't apply for government funds or donations. Additionally the financial support from Palestinian community is also minimal (Fund, 2011)

BSCOs rely heavily on resources from either Jewish foundations and federations (e.g. the New Israel Fund) or donors such as the EU (i.e. the European Commission and several Member States) and other European actors and funds (e.g. the Norwegian Embassy and several European foundations). This high dependency on external funding puts BSCOs in a vulnerable position, not least the danger of falling into the 'trap' of survival, developing 'upward' accountability to its donors rather than 'downward' accountability to the community the BSCO intends to serve (Payes, 2013). For example, some prominent Arab CSOs are being criticized for not being sufficiently connected to their constituencies, lacking transparency and openness in their operations (Galnoor 2008).

BSCOs face several management challenges. They lack established management systems for financial management and reporting, thus leading to limited transparency. Second, their leadership transition paradigm is problematic, leading to sustainability challenges. As mentioned earlier the pattern of organizational personalization and the lack of established management systems may result in collapse once the founder leaves. Very often, the founder is not willing to leave or refuses to plan for efficient leadership

transition. There is a lack of succession plans to successfully move from founder to professional management (Payes, 2013). Third, personal patterns of leadership, where leaders control the decision-making process and centralized power are very common in BSCOs. Often donors prefer to work with leaders who they know and thus contribute to the failure of successful leadership transition (Jamal,2008). Despite these restrictions, BSCOs succeed at promoting social change on two levels: policy change and community empowerment. Palestinian civil society inside Israel – including the Bedouin civil society – is now one of the most active, in numbers and scope, in Israel (Jamal, 2008; Marteu, 2009; Payes, 2005).

BSCOs: Impact

When we look at the Israeli public agenda we cannot ignore the dominant role played by Palestinian Israeli social change organizations, including the BSCOs, in bringing Palestinian minority issues to the forefront, providing services to the Palestinian minority, and advocating on behalf of their communities (Galnoor, 2007; Jamal 2008; Gidron, 2002).

Several analysts also highlight the cornerstone role played by BSCOs and PISCOs in re-structuring Bedouin community politics, shifting from a formal and single-agent system (i.e. the head of the tribe or/and the political parties) to a multi-channel and multi-stakeholder system were BSCOs become an important mobilizer, offering meaningful avenues of action.

Achievements and failures of BSCOs in challenging systematic oppression and promoting equality and recognition are tangible. Despite political restrictions and state domination, BSCOs effectively "utilize" the limited space (Haklai, 2009). For example, the campaign for recognition of unrecognized Bedouin villages achieved its formal aim: 9 of the 45 unrecognized villages received official recognition in 2003, and the Prawer Plan was halted in 2013 (Massalha, Kaufman, & Levy, 2017).

Moreover, in the process of campaigning, local organizations inspired a debate over

issues that were previously excluded from Israeli and Palestinian political and public discourse. Not only have Bedouin concerns been elevated from the periphery to the center, but women's issues were upgraded to a more central position within the national agenda (Massalha et al., 2017). BSCOs in the Negev provide a means for national movements to trickle down to community grassroots. Facilitated by the Law of Associations, they provide a channel for effective and legal activity which has proven important especially for the development of those movements deemed threatening by the authorities such as the Islamic movement. Large-scale BNGO collaborations have proven significant in facilitating effective national campaigns such as the campaign against the Prawer Plan. In this respect, BSCOs in Israel, together with national-scale Palestinian organizations and Jewish human rights organizations, create a wide basis for top-to-bottom activity (Payes, 2013).

On the other hand, BSCOs provide an important bottom-up aspect to the struggle. The campaigns of MAAN (the Forum for Bedouin Women's Organizations) as well as Bedouin SCOs have demonstrated this role by organizing national campaigns against polygamy. These campaigns have challenged the double marginality of Bedouin women in Israeli society. Moreover, they have encouraged a political debate over concepts that were previously excluded from political discussion – most prominently, politicizing the private sphere in the context of gender activism.

BSCOs in Israel play a role in challenging the fundamental social, political, and economic structures that have created inadequate living conditions among the Bedouin community, beginning with the option of engagement with 'politics of interest' within the existing system; through campaigning for reform of the system; and, finally, to demands of regime change (Kaufman, 1997). The activities of most local Palestinian NGOs in Israel, when acting on their own, are located closer to the 'politics of interest' end of the continuum. As they joined into coalitions, their demands amounted to a clearer campaign of system reform (Kaufman, 2001). As BSCOs have more immediate relations with their

communities, in comparison to their national counterparts, they are under greater pressure in providing tangible and immediate achievements for their communities. These expectations fuel their need to come up with technical solutions which in turn fails to solve root problems. The most explicit example of this weakness is the campaign for the recognition of the Bedouin unrecognized villages. The campaign demanded a technical solution to what seemed to be a technical problem: official recognition for officially unrecognized villages. When 9 out of 45 villages were recognized by the State, this recognition remained on paper; it became obvious that the problem was not in fact technical but ideological and political (Payes, 2013). It should be noted, however, that the failure did not stop SCOs from participating in the campaign. The flexible nature of SCOs enable them to change their goals and methods of activity in light of the understanding that formal recognition would not suffice to secure their rights. Hence, an activity that was clearly a demand for reform but touched the most fundamental inequality in Israel – namely, land allocation – developed into a more challenging demand for change in the system as a whole.

Conclusion

This chapter commenced with an overview of the Bedouin community of the Naqab-Negev from the pre-State period until the present. Furthermore, it documented the historical, social and political evolution of BSCOs within Israeli society. Considering external and internal social, economic and political developments, the chapter delineated the key influences that shaped the development of BSCOs. Furthermore, the chapter addressed the present-day political and social challenges facing BSCOs as well as their vast impact on the Bedouin community of the Naqab-Negev in particular and on the broader Palestinian and Jewish minorities in general. This chapter outlined the activities of BSCOs and the relatively recent trend towards a social change approach. In addition, the chapter discussed the impact and the challenges including those of a political, financial, and social nature. Thus, this chapter enables us to proceed to an analysis of this study's

main focus: AJEEC (The Arab Jewish Center for Equality, Empowerment and Cooperation). AJEEC's establishment, development, and activities are a direct outcome of the political and social context presented here. In the coming section, I will provide a detailed description of the case.

THE CASE

The Arab-Jewish Center For Equality, Empowerment, And Cooperation (AJEEC)

Overview

This section provides a description of AJEEC according to four stages of development: 1) The Origin and Mission 2) Start up and Design 3) Growth and Scale-up, and 4) Consolidation. In each stage I include a description of the four organizational dimensions: programs, funding models, organizational structure, and collaboration system. A table summarizing this information is provided at the end of this section.

Origin and Mission Stage: 2000

AJEEC—an acronym that in Arabic means "I am coming toward you"—was established in 2000. Two motivations led to establishing this organization: one political and the other one professional. The political motivation was driven by the following: the institutionalized discrimination against the Palestinian minority (including the Bedouin community), the ongoing rift between Israel's Palestinian minority and Jewish majority and, more specifically, by a set of incidents that occurred in October 2000[34] that revealed

[34] The former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Al-Aqsa compound on September 28th 2000. This visit resulted in the killing of seven Palestinian protesters. This tragedy brought the Palestinians Israeli minority, including the Bedouins in the south, to organize massive demonstrations on October 1st 2000. Thirteen Palestinia-Israelis were killed during these demonstrations.

the serious challenges of granting equality and justice for the Palestinian minority in Israel and for promoting Arab-Jewish partnerships. These events encouraged many civil society organizations and activists to rethink their work and strategies for promoting equality and justice for the Palestinian minority in Israel. AJEEC was established to create a better future for the Bedouin indigenous minority with the belief that this future could not be achieved in isolation from the Jewish majority and that "justice, equality for the Bedouin minority is a joint responsibility for both the Arabs and the Jews alike… Fighting the inequality and segregation does not only belong to the minority" (See appendix A: Annual Report, 2002).

My professional motivation for establishing AJEEC arose from one particular experience during my 12 years of advocacy work fighting the Israeli government's exclusionary policies. During one of the demonstrations I organized next to the Knesset in 2000, protesting for equal education for Bedouin children, I arrived to find only twenty other people from my community as opposed to hundreds of protestors demanding their rights. At that moment, I asked myself: "Where are my people! Why don't they come? This is their future!" The week after, I walked from home to home, shack to shack, asking my community about their responsibility to change this unbearable situation. After many difficult conversations and challenging arguments, one woman said to me: "We don't have water to drink and you want us to run around for nothing?... At the end of the day, no one will hear you. The state is strong and we are weak. The hand can't fight the needle." These words made me rethink my approach for social change and to think about what would be the best strategy to help my people not only by providing these women with water but also to changing the structure and the policy that created this lack of water.

In 2000, I was working as a free-lancer with the Negev Institute for Strategies of Peace and Development (NISPED). I shared my idea of creating an Arab-Jewish organization to empower the Bedouin community and promote equality and partnerships between Arabs and Jews in the Negev. NISPED's leadership welcomed the idea and

offered to partner with me in creating AJEEC. AJEEC initially started as a department of NISPED, and then later became its own organization.

AJEEC's mission

AJEEC is an Arab-Jewish social change and service organization (SCSO) based in Israel's Negev. AJEEC strives to advance cooperation between Arabs and Jews based on equality and empowerment of the Bedouin community of the Negev in particular and of Israel's Palestinian minority in general. AJEEC focuses on the following three central issues facing the Arab and the Jewish community in Israel:

Equality: The achievement of actual, as well as legal, equality in all areas of life: the economy, education, health, housing, as well as full participation in the centers of political, bureaucratic, and institutional power.

Empowerment: The promotion of the economic, social, and political empowerment of Israeli Palestinians, enabling them to achieve equality actually and effectively.

Cooperation: Cooperation between Arabs and Jews based first on achieving equality and empowerment of the Bedouin minority. Joint efforts will make it possible to lay the foundation for the development of a true democracy in Israel and foster the advancement of both populations.

Start up and Design stage: 2000-2003

In this stage, AJEEC established its local board and steering committee consisting mostly of Bedouin members, raised the seed capital, and hired its first staff members. We started with a consultation process with the local community to identify the opportunities and the needs of the people, first in the unrecognized villages (as the most marginalized group). The staff came to the conclusion that the main three groups that we wanted to work with were: *children, youth,* and *women.* Together with the steering committee, we started putting together the theory of change and the strategies for AJEEC's Theory of Change. The first six months were focused on the process of identifying the opportunities, the

needs, and the right approach to address the both the community's immediate needs and the structural issues.

AJEEC's Integrative Approach to Social Change

AJEEC seeks to advance a process that moves people from a situation of dependence to one in which they see themselves as entitled to rights and in which they have a sense of capability to take responsibility for their lives and their future. AJEEC's dominant approach to social change is rooted in the assumption that change should be systemic and holistic, altering the political, economic, social, and cultural institutions that are at the origin of a particular problem and encourage people to dig below the surface of social life to uncover the assumptions that keep people from attaining a full understanding of how the world works. AJEEC is founded on the principle that "combining service provision and advocacy are fundamental components to promoting holistic and systemic social change" (AJEEC' annual report 2003). AJEEC's social change theory emphasized AJEEC's holistic approach that addresses their constituents' "here and now" problems and the system that produces them. The following phrase, which appears in most of AJEEC's documents, demonstrates the complementary relationship between service and advocacy:

> Arabic: لا تغيير المجتمعي الدمجي التكاملي الشمولي انهج
>
> Hebrew: גישה כוללנית-אינטגרטיבית: התייחסות למכלול רב של היבטים המשפיעים על פיתוח אנושי וקהילתי ושילוב, ביניהם: ההיבט הכלכלי, החברתי-פוליטי, הסביבתי, התרבותי ועוד

This sentence directly translates to: "A holistic, complementary integrative approach to social change" (AJEEC's Doc, 2002).

AJEEC's Management Committee (composed of heads of departments and the organizations co-executive directors) provided contextual and professional reasons for selecting an integrative approach to social change. Contextually, this approach stems from the ideological belief that the Bedouin community deserves equal rights based on their

Israeli citizenship and, more importantly, justice based on their status as an indigenous minority whose lands were unlawfully confiscated. Data shows that AJEEC's integrative approach stems from the need to provide services to constituents, who are suffering from the lack of basic services such as water and healthcare and, at the same time, are acting to change governmental policies of exclusion and discrimination.

"We can't focus our work and energy only to try and change the policy of the government towards the Bedouin community, while people are living under this deprivation…we have to tackle policy and people's daily life at the same time…we have no choice" (AJEEC's doc, narrative report, 2003). Professionally, AJEEC's Bedouin co-executive director explained that focusing solely on service provision without linking policy change would lead to dependence, passivity, and disempowerment of people while focusing solely on advocacy might create distance between the people and the organization as effective advocacy work requires a lot of time. AJEEC's staff emphasized the need to engage people in the advocacy work while at the same time provide for immediate needs so "people know what they are fighting for" and "they are not fighting on an empty stomach". These contextual and professional rationales were the bases of AJEEC's integrative approach of service and advocacy as two fundamental components to promoting social change. To implement their integrative approach, AJEEC developed a unique model of operation.

AJEEC's Model of Operation

AJEEC's strategic model for operations is based on a holistic and integrative approach. This model is comprised of 5 stages (figure 6).

First stage: Mapping the assets and the needs of the community *with* the community. This stage is based on community outreach where the staff reach out to the community through informal gatherings in villages and the community settings (such as the "Dewan"—the men's gathering place—or the "Mdafa"—the women's gathering place—or in schools, marriage tents, and other natural community gatherings). At this stage, the community plays a central role in identifying their needs and assets while AJEEC's community organizers facilitate these informal communal assessments.

Second stage: At this stage, AJEEC invites relevant stakeholders to form the program's elements that were identified in the first stage. The steering committee's role is to direct and follow the project through from conception, implementation, evaluation, and scale-up. This steering committee must include: a government representative from an office implicated in the issue identified in stage one, a community representative, an expert in a relevant topic, and a representative from a partner organization (usually another SCO) that is active in the same issue or in a complementary one. Donors are also invited to join the steering committee.

Third stage: In this stage, AJEEC, together with the steering committee, focuses on designing programs based on the integrative approach of service provision and policy change. Empowerment sessions and self/community awareness are integral parts of the program. This stage aims to develop an appropriate and effective program to respond to the immediate needs identified in the first stage and to set the stage for advocacy work by presenting the program to the government as alternative or new initiative (depending on the context of the issue).

Fourth stage: The Implementation Cycle comprises of implementation, evaluation, and modification, then repeat.

Fifth stage: Expansion and scaling-up. This stage aims for the program to be adopted by the government in order to receive funding and the necessary infrastructure to scale up to the national level. Throughout these stages, the government representatives on the steering committee act together with the other committee members to also advocate and change the policy around the relevant issue.

All of AJEEC's programs are designed according to this model and emphasize designing and implementing community-owned, holistic, empowering, and culturally appropriate programs. The program's success is measured by the government's adoption of the program and any resulting policy changes.

Figure 6. AJEEC's operational model

Source: AJEEC's Social Change Approach (Elsana & Dloomy, 2009)

Programs

In 2001, AJEEC started its first community program in the area of early childhood education and mother empowerment. This program was called Parents As Partners (PP). The pilot program started with three locations. In 2002, AJEEC started developing the Volunteer Tent and its programming including the Gap Year (GY) program focusing on youth between 18 and 20 years old (after high school and before university) aiming to empower these young adults through volunteering and community involvement. In 2003, the third program was initiated in the area of economic development for women—the Linkage Model for Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)—to train the first Bedouin women photographers and videographers. AJEEC then partnered with MATI (a government unit responsible for promoting small and medium-sized enterprises) marking AJEEC's first government partnership.

Funding Model

In 2001 AJEEC started raising funds from donors. The first three grants received from private donors were for the development of AJEEC (general support) and the two other grants received from the Van Leer Foundation (VLF) and the San Francisco Jewish Federation (SF) were used to support the Parents as Partners program. The organization's

revenues increased on a yearly basis (see figure). Private donors and the VLF were the only sources of funding. In this stage government representatives involved in the steering committee did not fund any part of AJEEC's programming.

Collaboration System

In this stage the Ministries of Education, Welfare and Labour and Employment joined the steering committees of each program to provide professional support and to study the program. In addition to the community representatives, the local public committees from three unrecognized villages were engaged in the consultation and implementation processes.

Growth and Scale-up: 2003-2010

Programs

After the success of the three pilot programs in Community Volunteering (GY progarm), Early Childhood (PP program) and Economic Empowerment (SME Linkage Model), AJEEC expanded the scope of the programs.

In 2005, AJEEC witnessed major developments that took place as a result of political opportunity and resource availability:

1. As part of the Israeli government's efforts to become a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the government approached AJEEC to take the lead in preparing a master plan for economic development for the Bedouin community in the Negev. In addition, the government adopted AJEEC's Linkage Model and asked the organization to expand the SMEs to new fields which resulted in 11 new programs focused on women's education to be implemented from 2005 to 2008.

2. The Minister of Interior Affairs asked AJEEC to design a special program to train newly elected mayors in community development work and strategic planning.

3. After the 2005 local council elections in the Bedouin community, three new mayors (out of seven) asked AJEEC to expand its programs to their towns and welcomed AJEEC to partner with them in new initiatives. One of the mayors said:

The first thing I did before even going to any government office was come to AJEEC…AJEEC was one of the key players in the Bedouin community and I said to myself if I want to be re-elected next time I have to work with these guys

As a result of the political opportunity and the resources made available to AJEEC, AJEEC was able to bring new partners and strategic donors and was able expand its scope and scale. Corresponding with the expansion of the programs, AJEEC invested most of its energy and resources to advocate for the adoption of the programs by the government.

Scale-Up and Expanding the Programs' Scope

The Volunteer Tent (VT)

AJEEC expanded the VT's scope to include a new age group with the "Young Leaders for Change" program and Student Engagement program. AJEEC expanded the CV programs to the seven townships and to 13 unrecognized villages. For example, new CV programs were established in Rahat, Segev, and Hura, partnering with the local municipalities who provided the funds for the program coordination and also the location of the activities. Due to the presence of AJEEC's Volunteer Tent programs, volunteering started to take off in all Bedouin communities.

In 2005 The Arab-Jewish Volunteer GY program expanded to reach 8 Arab-Bedouin schools and communities**,** as well as 6 Jewish primary schools in Beer Sheva**.** Working together in mixed Arab-Jewish teams, the volunteers mentor primary school pupils in need of support and encouragement in core subjects in the mornings and organize after-school enrichment groups (drama, computers, nature study, arts &crafts, learning centers, dance, etc.). In 2008, 1,240 children participated in the morning educational enrichment program and 500 in the after-school social and educational enrichment activities**.**

The Student Engagement Program grew from 52 students in 2005 to 170 students in 2007. Arab-Bedouin university and college students volunteer six hours weekly for 6 months (January to June), following an initial 56 hours of training. These volunteers conduct a range of weekly after-school enrichment, mentoring, and support programs for children and youth in 7 Bedouin townships and in 5 of the unrecognized villages. Some 1,500 children and adolescents are participating in these programs.

In 2008 through the "Young Leaders for Change" program, 220 tenth grade high-school students volunteered four hours weekly throughout the school year in a peer guidance program. After an initial 30 hours of training, they collect, prepare and distribute information to their peers on rights and entitlements, study and training programs, provisions for children and youth with special needs and so forth, and organize workshops devoted to character building, civil society values such as active citizenship, volunteerism, and leadership training. Their activities reach an estimated 2,200 youth.

In 2009 'Shabibat El Taliyah' Youth Movement was established. The program operates in 4 locations with 2 groups in each: a junior (4th to 6th grade) and senior (7th to 10th grade) group.

Early Childhood PP program

The PP program expanded from 3 to 12 villages in three years. In addition, newly elected mayors decided to bring the model along with AJEEC's training curriculum for caregivers to their municipality. One of the mayors explained that "what we liked about the PP program is that it addresses women employment and early childhood education at the same time …we wanted AJEEC to train our caregivers because they understand the culture and traditions." In 2006, the PP program was adopted by the government and entered to the Government's Projects Book [35]

In 2008, a unique program was initiated by AJEEC called "Educational Activity Centers and Playgrounds". This program expanded the scope of the early childhood to include outdoor educational centers combined with a playground. The aim of this project is to provide safe and enriching activities for the children in the unrecognized villages during leisure hours. Two such "Educational Activity Centers" were established in the villages of Ghaser Elser and Hashem Zaneh following a survey of the needs and desires of children in unrecognized villages for leisure time activities. Each Activity Center provides three activity frameworks: a program for pre-school children; training, enrichment and empowerment activities for mothers; and a program of social initiatives for school-age children and youth.

AJEEC's Early Childhood Resource and Training Center was established in 2009. The Center, which develops early childhood educational resources in Arabic and provides professional training in this field, was established in order to meet the lack of, and need for training materials and educational resources based on and relevant to the culture content world and culture of the Naqab-Negev Bedouin society and its young children. Among the Center's initial activities was the production of a variety of training manuals and the design of a family literacy program for parents, focused on the first years of the child's life.

Economic Empowerment Programs

AJEEC trained Arab Bedouin women as DJs—a 'first time ever' initiative—to meet the need for entertainment in the women's tents during Bedouin weddings. These women subsequently opened their own businesses. In addition, AJEEC trained women to establish their own hairdressing enterprises. This type of business grew from 7 businesses in 2004 to 92 in 2016 (AJEEC's impact report). In 2008, using their linkage model, AJEEC initiated other economic empowerment programs for women to become fitness instructors, fashion designers, and seamstresses. In 2009, a joint sewing enterprise was established by a group of course graduates in the town of Tel Sheva.

In 2007 the Food Security Act presented a financial opportunity for AJEEC to establish a catering program for Bedouin single-mothers. This program was designed according to AJEEC's five stages strategy to create service and then advocate the government to support the project. The *Hura Single-Mothers' Catering Enterprise: Alsanabel* trained 32 single mothers from the town of Hura in preparation for the establishment of a catering enterprise in the town. In 2009, the enterprise provided hot meals for some 3,000 school children daily.

New Department: Health Promotion and the Environment

In 2007, the Soroka Hospital and Ben Gurion University with the support of Yad Hanadive Foundation approached AJEEC to help design and implement public health programs. AJEEC conducted a comprehensive health promotion agenda for Bedouin mothers and their families. Benefiting thousands of women and children, the program aims to secure the basic conditions of healthy and safe living environments for Bedouin children and to increase health awareness among all members of Bedouin society, with particular attention to mothers and children, providing them with tools to increase their health and well-being.

In 2007, AJEEC became recognized as one of the leading organizations in the Bedouin community. AJEEC gained credibility and legitimacy from its stakeholders because of its innovative programs and pioneering role in volunteerism and women's economic empowerment. The community represented by the mayors and the local community leaders saw AJEEC as their strategic partners in education, health, economic development, and volunteerism. The government saw AJEEC not only as a service provider but also as an organization that can speak for the community and play a role in bridging the government and the Bedouin community. For example, AJEEC represented the Bedouin community in several government committees, cross-sectors forums (such as the Prime Minister's Round Table in Cross-Section Partnerships) and even in foundations'

consultation meetings (such as the High Steering Committee of the Bedouin Community of the Negev).

Funding Model

At this stage AJEEC attracted many governmental agencies and foundations: The VLF tripled its support for the PP program from $100,000 in 2003 to $450,000 in 2009. For the Volunteer Tent, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) and the social security foundation (both semi-governmental organizations who work closely in partnership with the government in the area of service provision) provided funding. The October events presented new channels for resources mainly because of the OR report that was established right after the October events and as a result of the integration committee put forth by the government to explore the involvement of Palestinian citizens in these events. One of the conclusions of the report was that "many years of neglect and exclusion created frustration and anger among the Arab citizens of Israel that lead to violent demonstrations in the streets"(OR Report 2003). The recommendations of the committee were to "work hard (as government offices and NGOs) to bridge the gap between the Arab and Jewish community by investing in the Arab community" (OR Report 2003). As shown in the graph, revenue increased on a yearly basis. The government's funding grew from 18% of the total budget in 2009 to 34 % in 2015 (see figure 7).

Organization Structure and Management

Due to the rapid growth in the number of programs, AJEEC hired new staff almost every month. The staff increased from 10 employees (some part time) to 136 employees (36 permanent full time employees, 42 instructors, and 58 volunteers and summer camps instructors). Moreover, the organization started holding general staff meetings with all the staff once a month.

This stage was characterized by great growth for AJEEC but at the same time it was a phase of crisis and tensions (the major events that occurred in the organization's life are presented in the chapter four). These crisis required new arrangements.

AJEEC's primary tasks during the years 2006-2008 were to rethink its structure and management. AJEEC adopted the strategic management perspective to be able to construct its internal and external environments. In 2006, they organized their first strategic planning meeting. The organization dealt with important questions about the types of services they will provide, the way advocacy work will be decided, the populations they will work with, the quality of staff they hire, and the structures that will inevitably come to define the way the organization manages their internal arrangements. The strategic management model was adopted and a new organizational structure including new regulations were formalized.

The new structure included four departments: the Volunteer Tent, The Economic Empowerment Department, The Early Childhood Department, and the Public Health Department. Each department is headed by a staff member called the head of the department. Each department runs its staff meeting once a week and is responsible for program implementation and the department's daily activities. Once a month all department staff meets for updates and learning sessions. For internal managerial responsibilities, AJEEC created a management committee made up of the two co-executive directors, the programs general manager, the directors of the financial department and of the fundraising department.

Collaboration System

In this stage, AJEEC worked on managing its collaborations and system of accountability. AJEEC entered into three types of partnerships: partnerships to promote the programs and evaluate the implementation process, partnerships with the community to identify the

needs and present ideas, and partnerships with funders. For example, VLF, SF, and other large foundations entered into five-year partnerships with the organization.

AJEEC was the founder of three coalitions, a leading member of advocacy forums, and a member of many government forums. Involvement and leadership roles in national coalitions extended the impact of AJEEC's flagship programs in volunteerism, Arab-Jewish cooperation, community development, early childhood education, health promotion, and economic empowerment. Examples of such partnerships include:

Musharaka: A collective group of non-governmental organizations united to promote and enhance the field of early childhood education in the Arab community in Israel

Negev Forum for Multi-Sector Leadership: This forum was established in order to create significant and sustainable change in the Negev using a comprehensive regional vision. The forum comprises of 60 members, including senior members of local councils and municipalities, business leaders, representatives of the third sector, and academics.

Herakuna: An umbrella organization for the advancement and development of young adult volunteerism and leadership in Arab society in Israel.

Consolidation Phase: 2010-2016

During this stage (2010-2016), AJEEC continued to expand, professionalize, and institutionalize its operations including its relationship with the government. All departments expanded locally and nationally. According to the data, during 2010-2016, AJEEC became a primary player within the Arab society in general and the Bedouin community in particular. Today, AJEEC's PP program, and most of the Volunteer Tent programs are partly funded by the government. Although all departments expanded, the Public Health department doubled its programs and opened new fields of interventions in partnership with Soroka Hospital and Ben Gurion University.

The fact that AJEEC was able to scale up programs initiated by the Bedouin community—the most marginalized community in the country—was an important step in formalizing AJEEC as a national actor for both the Arab and the Jewish community. This

step also affected the power relations of minority-majority where historically projects and programs are developed in the Jewish community and then introduced or duplicated in the Arab one. This was the first time that a minority-run organization introduced a project that was adopted by the majority.

Second, this expansion happened in partnership with the government where the government approached AJEEC to bring the model to other communities in the north. According to AJEEC's Annual Report: "Our success here is doubled. First because we demonstrate that our model works—socially and financially—in the Bedouin and the Jewish community. This program up scaled geographically, crossing cultures and national identities" (AJEEC Annual Report 2015).

The Volunteer Tent

In 2010, the Volunteer Tent expanded its Youth Leading Change program to 20 groups including establishing new partnerships around the program. The VT also opened a new project called "Living Together" to bring together Arab and Jewish high school kids from 6 cities and towns to work together to promote the common interests of both communities. The number of volunteers grew to 5,619 including the youth movement. In 2014, the CV program was expanded to new 5 locations to become a national program for community volunteering for the Arab community in Israel.

Early Childhood PP Program

In addition to the PP programs, AJEEC initiated new innovative projects such as "AJEEC on Wheels," a mobile classroom that conducts trainings on a bus to work with children and youth in the recognized and unrecognized Bedouin villages. In 2013, this department also launched the first Arabic Language Parents Hotline staffed by Arabic-speaking professionals to provide a resource for parents of young children.

Health Promotion and the Environment Department

The Health Promotion conducted new programs such as opening the first Bedouin women's gym in the city of Rahat in 2014. In 2015, AJEEC employed the Imams Forum as trusted religious source for conveying health messages about AJEEC's Diabetes Prevention Program and Breast Cancer Awareness.

Economic Empowerment Programs

This stage was the time for "big scale" projects and saw the initiation and implementation of two major projects lead jointly by AJEEC, several municipalities, and the government. The first project was the opening of the first joint "Arab-Jewish Employment Zone" starting with one factory that employs 300 Bedouin women. The second is the "Anchoring the Negev" joint venture between AJEEC and the Negev Development Authority that aims to harness the potential of regional anchor institutions (institutions that, once established, tend not to move location). This initiative brings together diverse Jewish and Arab communities, businesses and individuals, for the purpose of community wealth creation and ensuring local economic stability via asset ownership. This initiative created local jobs and expanded the provision of public services. In addition in 2015, AJEEC was able to expand the program and opened a new enterprise in Megdal Hamek (a Jewish town near Haifa) in partnership with the government.

In 2013, AJEEC established the Sheep Farmers' Cooperative to transform the traditional business of raising sheep in Bedouin society from a financial burden into an asset. Seven sheep farmers have formed a purchasing cooperative that enables them to lower costs and increase profitability. In the same year, AJEEC established the Marketing Center for Traditional Bedouin Handicrafts in cooperation with Bedouin artisans in the village of Laqiya.

Funding Model

In 2010, AJEEC received $1,000,0000 from VLF to promote health programs. This grant ended in 2013 and created a need to invest more time and effort to raise funds from the

government. AJEEC's goal in 2008 was to increase its government funding by advocating for the programs to be adopted by the government.

The government funding increased from 18% in 2009 to 34% in 2015 thus indicating real policy changes since all government funding is contingent on the implementation, scale-up, and government adoption of AJEEC's programs. Private donors and foundations remain the main source of income for AJEEC. Among these funders are the VLF, the UJA (Jewish Federation of New York), the Embassy of the Netherlands, the Levi Lassen Foundation and others.

Figure 7: Comparison between Income Distribution between 2009 and 2016





Organizational Structure and Management

The organizational structure became more departmentalized with each department having its own steering committee of experts, community representatives, constituency representatives, and government representatives directed by a staff member with a separate administrative support and weekly department staff meetings. Every two weeks, all department directors would meet to provide an update on their department's progress, challenges, and administrative affairs.

In response to this this rapid growth, AJEEC went through a strategic planning process that focused on AJEEC's core issues relating to management and the theory of change of combining advocacy and services in one approach. According to one of AJEEC's former Co-Executive Directors: "This year we spent a tremendous amount of time and energy on internal development. The organization became the primary address for 'working with the Bedouin community. We have to re-think our internal capacities and also our external environment." In 2012, AJEEC went through a process of re-organization and adopted the following organizational structure:

AJEEC's Organizational Structure

AJEEC is a tax-exempt, legal entity, which comprises of four sub-structures of decision-making and operation. These structures are responsible for the organization's overall behaviour and activities.

General Assembly (GA): The GA is the highest governing and membership body of AJEEC and is comprised of all of AJEEC's staff, activists, volunteers, and professionals. This body is responsible for defining AJEEC's focus areas and general strategic directions. This body elects the board of governors, the financial oversight committee, and the chair of the GA.

Board of Governors: The members of the Board of Governors must be members of AJEEC's GA. The board's main task is to govern and oversee the operations of the organization by acting as fiduciaries. In other words, the board is legally, financially, and morally responsible for the organization. In addition, the board determines AJEEC's mission statement and yearly strategic plan as well as hires the organization's Co-Executive Directors.

Co-Executive Directors: The Co-Executive Directors must be an Arab-Israeli and a Jewish-Israeli. Both have equal authority and equal responsibility for the management of the daily life of the organization.

Management Committee: The management committee is comprised of former executive directors, the program departments' directors, the financial director, the fundraising

director, and the human resources directors. This committee meets twice a month to deal with the organization's operations and daily performance.

Figure 8: AJEEC's Organizational Structure



Collaboration System

During this stage, AJEEC increased its work on the national level by consolidating its partnerships with governmental institutions. The number of government agencies partnering with AJEEC increased to include: the Ministry of Education (3 departments) the Ministry of Welfare (the community work unit), the Minster of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of Labor and Employment, and the Ministry of Health.

AJEEC partnered with several organizations including Social Finance Israel and the Clalit Health Fund. Moreover, in 2011 AJEEC led the Cooperative Development

Forum to include diverse organizations and activists committed to designing viable alternatives for community wealth building.

Furthermore, AJEEC is now a leading member in four national coalitions and forums including Herakuna, Musharkah, Shotafut-Sharakah and Kolanah. The first two coalitions are focused on advocacy and policy change while the other two coalitions are Arab-Jewish organizations whose main focus is to promote a shared community.

In 2013, AJEEC was also able to institutionalize its work with Imams. The partnership with Imams started in 2008 as individual consultations and then developed into a strategic partnership.

Figure 9. AJEEC's Revenue Growth from 2000-2016



Table 4: Summary of AJEEC's Growth from 2000-2015

Organizational Stage	**Origin and Mission (2000)**	**Start Up & Design (2000-2003)**	**Growth & Scale Up (2003-2010)**	**Consolidation (2010-2015)**
Programs	Mapping the community needs and opportunities, Fundraising	PP (3 locations), VT, CV, GY Programs	VT (23 programs) PP (11) Economic Empowerment (16) Health promotion (9) program, 56 locations / villages	VT (42) PP (11) EE (17) HP (22) National regional programs (79)
Funding Model	Private donors	Private donors (SF, VLF, Bracha Foundation) Government funds (Ministry of Welfare Ministry of Education)	Private donors (SF, VLF NYF, BF, J DC, Goldman, FF FORD, EU, Foreign Goverments, 5 Family foundations) Government funds (Ministry of Welfare, Education, Employment, Labour, Trade, Negev Galilee)	Private donors SF federation V Leer BF,JDC,GoldmanFF FORD,EU, F. governments, 8Family foundations, Government funds (Welfare, Education, Employment, Labour, Trade, Negev Galilee)
Organizational Structure	Department within NISPED	Department within NISPED	Independent organization's structure; Departmentalized Co Ex directors Management committee Steering committees for each program	General Assembly Co-Executive Directors Management Committee, Steering committees for each program
Collaboration System	NISPED, AJEEC'S steering committee	Ministries of Education, Welfare,	Ministries of: Employment, Education, Trade, Labour, Welfare, Herakuna, Musharkah,	Shotafut-Sharakah and Kolanah,Minister of trade and industry Ministries of: Employment, Education, Trade, Labour, Welfare, Herakuna, Musharkah

Figure 10. AJEEC's Total Growth from 2000-2015



	2003	2007	2009	2012	2015
#Programs/projects	9	32	40	66	83
#Employees*	4	85	87	110	97
#Volunteers	42	218	345	842	3041
Budget US $	370,850	2,635,048	2,176,452	3,358,010	2,904,610

CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

This chapter presents the research methodology for this study that explores how SCSOs manage the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy. First, I discuss the reasons for selecting the case study method. Subsequently, I describe the reason for selecting AJEEC as a case for this study, then I explore the advantages and disadvantages of my position as an insider researcher. I also outline the research process: identifying AJEEC's major events, the sampling process of the research participants, and the empirical data gathered based on AJEEC's major events, the interview protocol, data processing and analysis. Finally, ethical considerations of the research are discussed.

Research Questions

This study addresses two main questions and two supporting questions. The first question addresses the contextual and environmental levels of the organization. It aims to identify and understand the external factors that shape the tensions and how these tensions came about:

What tensions arise from combining service provision and advocacy in AJEEC?

The second question deals with the operative level, exploring how AJEEC manages the tensions that arise from the organization's integrative social change approach of combining advocacy work and service provision.

How does AJEEC manage these tensions?

The supporting questions hone in on this integrative approach and how the organization's internal factors and the external factors shape the tensions that arise and the ways in which these tensions are managed.

- How do contextual factors shape AJEEC's capacity to manage these tensions and survive in the long term?
- What is AJEEC's integrative approach and how do relevant stakeholders (board, staff, funders and partners) define it?

Research Design: a Qualitative Case Study

I chose a qualitative, multi-method research approach because first, Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend that research take place in communities and not in artificial environments because "realities are whole [and] cannot be understood in isolation from their contexts" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 296). Realities are thus constructed, multiple, and holistic. Communities can be defined in multiple ways: physical, political, social, historical, economic, cultural and spiritual, and even on the level of sharing common interests (Smith, 2013). Thus, it was important for me to conduct my research in the community setting where participants naturally live and interact.

Second, the location or the position of the researcher affects the entire research process, from conception to conclusion, because the researcher is the measuring instrument (Tanesini, 1999). Also the researcher approaches the research process with his/her worldviews. According to Kirby and McKenna (2004) pointed that what knowledge the researcher able to observe and reveal is directly related to his/her vantage point, to where he/she stands in the world (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Flick (2006) suggests that, "researchers' reflections on their actions and observations in the field, their impressions, irritations, feelings and so on, become data in their own right" (Flick, 2006, p. 16). This reflexivity is not intended to eliminate biases, but helped me deal with and be aware of them throughout the course of the study (Padgett, 2008).

Third, qualitative researchers choose purposive, non-representative sampling methods because these approaches allow for an increased range for multiple realities (Lincoln and Guba 1985). For example, I recruited participants who have some kind of involvement in one or more of the events/issues chosen to be the focus of the research. I was also interested in sampling a diverse group to address AJEEC's complexity as an Arab-Jewish organization that employs men and women from different backgrounds and ethnicities.

Fourth, inductive analysis from the data is a characteristic of qualitative research

(Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). I was interested in people's experiences and perceptions of AJEEC's integrative model and the tensions it presented in their daily lives working in the organization, not from already written theories. I was also interested in understanding their perspective on how well, if at all, they understood the tensions and the way the organization dealt with them and how they linked these tensions and their management to the organization's socio-political context. Thus, it was their reality and constructions that I wanted to document (Lincoln and Guba, 1985).

The Case Study Method

Case studies complement the qualitative approach because they have the advantage of being particularistic, exploratory, inductive, and holistic, with an emphasis on processes rather than ends (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2009). Moreover case studies are as close to the studied subject as possible and are interpretive in context. Stake (1994) suggests that case studies are useful when the opportunity to study is of primary importance. A case study thus provides a mode of inquiry for an in-depth examination of a phenomenon.

I chose a case study design because I wanted to "investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context... when the boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident" (Yin, 2012). The phenomenon is AJEEC and its integrated model of operations. However, AJEEC's work does not unfold in a vacuum; its work is highly influenced by what goes on in the socio-political context. Indeed, case studies emphasize an in-depth analysis of the context within which phenomena is situated. Context, also known as "setting", has a major impact on the phenomena (Creswell, 2012; Marshall & Rossman, 2011).

To explore the case of AJEEC I had to be aware of the significant role of the setting, environment, or "complex social context" and the impact it has on phenomena and people's behaviour (Creswell, 2012). AJEEC is a complex organization because it has been active for the last 12 years and has been able to combine service provision and advocacy

despite the tensions this combination presents. AJEEC's setting is also complex, first as an organization that operates within a conflict zone, and second as a indigenous minority organization that represents the Bedouin community who, as indigenous peoples, have an ongoing conflict with the State over land rights. Furthermore, the organization has Arab and Jewish staff whose ethnicities also shape the ongoing internal tensions.

My desire to study AJEEC therefore arose from a "distinctive need" to understand its complexity (Yin, 2009). I decided to do an "embedded case study design" (Yin, 2009) in order to include more than one unit of analysis. AJEEC represents one unit of analysis, but there are also several sub-units including the five departments such as the Volunteer Tent, AJEEC's sub-structures such as the governor board, the management committee, and the staff members, as well as the other organizations and individuals who work with AJEEC.

Case study also offers multiple sources of data and enables the use of multiple methods for data collection and analysis (Yin, 2013). Understanding the complexity of AJEEC required multiple sources of evidence and different data collection techniques to improve the study (Patton & Patton, 1990). I therefore chose several methods that guided me to answer my research questions. These sources included in-depth interviews, the organization's documents, its website and social media channels, and my personal notebooks chronicling twelve years worth of my experience as the organization's founder-director, my experience in the field of social change organizations in Israel—as a founder of several organizations, as a board member, and as an activist. As an insider to the case under study, I have access to primary source materials and documents, as well as the opportunity to interview key players.

In summary, my case is a single, instrumental and holistic case selected for exploratory purposes. It is single because I am talking about AJEEC as the focus of my study; instrumental because it is intended to shed the light on dilemmas and issues that are common to other SCSOs. It is holistic, because it aims to focus on AJEEC's work on

socio-political and operational levels. It is exploratory because my aim is to explore the ways in which SCSOs deal with the issues arising from combining service provision and advocacy. I did not limit myself to any pre-assumed hypothesis (Padgett, 2008; Yin, 2003).

The Case Selection: AJEEC

I selected AJEEC as my case for the following reasons: 1) AJEEC is an organization that combines service provision and advocacy as its fundamental approach to promoting social change. 2) AJEEC has used this approach for over a decade and therefore has rich data and materials to analyze. 3) As its founding director for 12 years, I was responsible for program development, staff mentoring, fundraising, and training. This positioned me as an "insider-researcher". This familiarity with the organization provided me with access to the organization's documents, staff, activists, volunteers, funders, and constituencies.

I decided to do an "embedded case study design" by focusing on five events that were identified in the first stage of the research, as described below. Yin and Stake write about the importance of setting boundaries on the case study and that limiting the parameters of the case study is part of conceptualizing the object of the study. To embed the case helped me to manage the complexity of AJEEC's projects that take place in diverse fields and are run by hundreds of employees and volunteers. Furthermore, Patton (1990) points out that the "researcher does not enter the field with a completely blank slate…some way of organizing the complexity of reality is necessary" (p.218).

Identifying AJEEC'S Major Events

The first phase of my study focused on identifying the major events that elicited serious tensions within the organization and that led to an organizational crisis. The literature on organizational behaviour and management reveals that organizations are exposed to numerous tensions, conflicts, and crises during their life cycle (Avina, 1993). Not every

crisis threatens the very existence of the organization. In fact, some conflicts create opportunities for the organization to grow, learn, and build its resilience.

For the purposes of my case study, I chose events with high tensions that led to an organizational crisis. To define crisis, I adopt Hermann's (1972) definition as "situations that threatened the high priority goals of the organization, restrict the amount of resources available for response the decision makers" (Herman & Hulin, 1972).

This study covers the time period from the establishment of AJEEC in 2001 up until 2016, focusing on specific events (social, political and financial) where the tensions that arose from combining service provisions and advocacy was acute. To identify the major events in the life of AJEEC, I decided to use two main sources of data: the organization's documents and records my own experiences and notebook. These sources allowed me to develop a detailed overview of the organization and a detailed description of the five events that I selected to be the focus of my study. I chose five events based on the following criteria:

- Times where the crisis posed a real threat to the organization's survival. By "survival" I mean that the crisis threatened the loss of one of the fundamental components (service and advocacy) of AJEEC's integrative social change model.

- These events presented diverse tensions that would provide an opportunity to explore the case from different angles (ex. a political event, social event, financial event). I chose four events based on these category and chose a fifth one that includes all angles and shows the interrelations between social, political, and financial dynamics.

- These events present either a one-time crisis or ongoing tensions. This diversity would provide insights on how AJEEC dealt with tensions that were dynamic, shaped and reshaped throughout the life of the organization versus those that were situation specific.

- I chose events that I had enough data sources to rely on for my study, as in access to people who played a role in these events or access to written data such as

proposals, meeting minutes, annual reports, and protocols related to the event.

After the identification of the five events, I sent the document describing my selection to AJEEC's former Jewish co-executive director with whom I worked with for 12 years and asked her to validate the events. After receiving her validation, the research data was collected through the following: 31 open-ended interviews with participants with different roles in and relationships with the organization, AJEEC's documents and records, and the notebooks I used during my twelve years as AJEEC's founding director. The relative contribution of the three sources of data are summarized in the table below:

Table 5: Type and Utility of Data from each Data Collection Activity

Data Source	Type of Data	Utility of Data	Purpose
Primary sources; Materials, and Documentary Evidence	Official Records; Letters, annual reports, Historical and Chronological Data; Administrative procedures; Minutes, Proposals, PR documents	Provide official and semi-official accounts of AJEEC's mission and development, management, and activities	Help discover patterns and processes that influence the development of AJEEC and its ability to manage service provision and advocacy.
Semi-structured Interviews	Participants' perceptions, and current constructions and reconstructions of previous events and their projections of the future. Historical and contextual information. Operative and management information	Provide participants own words, their interpretations and understanding of the tensions and the issues related to combining service and advocacy	Help discover patterns and processes that influence the development of AJEEC and its ability to manage service provision and advocacy.
Researcher notebook and experience	Researcher's Field Notes. Observations and Experiences of Events, Activities and Processes	Provide researcher with experience of AJEEC's work in the natural context of the people and the activities involved. Provide "outsider" insights and reconstruction of the previous experience	Help in collecting descriptive details about AJEEC's current situation (holistic an operative levels). Help make sense of the data gathered from other sources.

Interviews

Interviews are considered the most important, commonly recognized, and widely used data source in qualitative research (Creswell, 2012; Yegidis, Weinbach, & Myers, 2012) and one of the most important data sources for case studies in particular (Yin, 2013). An in-depth, one-on-one interview method was chosen for several reasons. First, this method was ideally suited my exploratory study, where the nature and range of participants'

perspectives about the research topic were not well known (Marshall & Rossman, 2011).

Personal interviews were conducted with people who were AJEEC members or who had worked with AJEEC at some point during the five events selected as part of the case study. I interviewed participants who had meaningful involvement in one on the events identified and from various categories including: long-term involvement (eg. founders, directors) versus short-term involvement (eg. program coordinators), junior versus senior members, long-term funders versus one-shot funders, and staff focused on service provision versus those focused on advocacy work.

Based on the identification of the five major events and the issues that threatened AJEEC's survival, I started to recruit and select the study participants for the in-depth interviews. During this phase, I intended to gather detailed descriptions of participants' experiences and perceptions of the organization's major events and issues to gain an in-depth understanding and perception about the outcome and impact of these events and issues that fuelled the tensions.

Sampling of Interview Participants

AJEEC is a complex organization run by two full-time co-executive directors, a full-time project manager, and department heads for each of its four departments: Volunteer Tent, Department of Health Promotion and the Environment, Department of Economic Development, Department of Early Childhood Education. AJEEC runs 82 projects, employs 186 people, and counts one thousand activists and volunteers.

I used purposeful sampling to select the participants and collect data related to my five events. Creswell defines purposeful sampling as when "researchers intentionally select participants who have experience with the central phenomenon or the key concept being explored" (Creswell, 2013, p. 156). In qualitative inquiry, we choose purposive, non-representative sampling methods because these approaches allow for an increased range for multiple realities (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005). Purposeful sampling aims to identify

authoritative sources for data and enables the researcher to maximize the range of information collected.

The 31 interview participants included: AJEEC board members, department directors, fundraising directors and administrative staff. To understand the external factors, I also interviewed representatives of government agencies, funders, executive directors of SCOs who worked in partnership with AJEEC and environmental institutions such as school principals, mayors, and community leaders.

Description of the Research Participants Interviewed

My goal was to sample for diversity around the organisation, its institutional environment and socio-political context. Table 6 shows the characteristics of the 31 participants. I recruited participants with diverse perspectives based on their position in the organization, their work experience, nationality, and gender.

Participants' position - In order to gain the greatest insight into the tensions, it was important to speak with those who carry out the organizations' service and advocacy programs, those who make decisions about how the organization manages the tensions that arise from combining service and advocacy, and those who were present during or involved in the events under study. In many instances, the administrative staff of organizations controls the expertise and power necessary to secure the agency's day-to-day survival. I also prioritized interviewing executive directors who were involved in the organization around the time of the crisis or who exerted a great amount of influence and control over the successes and failures of how the tensions were managed. As such, special effort was made to interview board members, co-executive directors, departments' directors, program coordinators, foundation representatives, government officials, and partners who worked directly with AJEEC.

Years of employment - Long-term employees often experience an organization differently than newer employees. For that reason, I recruited participants who have substantial experience in the organization that would provide rich and in-depth accounts.

Age - It was important to capture the perspectives of different generations within the Bedouin community. Yiftachel (2009) has identified three generations of activists and SCO leaders within the Bedouin community—the traditional Bedouin leadership, the

professional leadership, and the young generation of activists—who each have a different view on services and advocacy. The research participants represent the three generations of activism in the Bedouin community. In addition, age and experience were important factors that shaped the professional identity of each participant that appeared though out the study. This was also an important element that shaped the participant's perspectives concerning tensions between service and advocacy work.

Ethnicity – based on the political events identified in this study, ethnicity plays an important role in shaping the tensions. AJEEC's staff consists of Arab-Bedouin and Jewish employees. Every effort was made to include both ethnicities.

Gender – AJEEC's social advocacy work is concerned with gender relations in the Bedouin community and the events chosen in this study demonstrate the tensions and diverging perspective that arose within the Bedouin community on the status of Bedouin women. To that end, I made sure to select both women and men to get their perspectives on the topic under study.

Table 6: Characteristics of Study Participants

Interviewee	Education Level, Field	Position, Years working with AJEEC	Age and Gender	Ethnicity (A/AB/J)
STAFF				
1	Graduate, Social Work	Co-executive director, 5	53 M	Arab-Bedouin
2	Graduate, Political Science, Conflict Resolution	Co-executive director, 5	44 M	Jewish
3	Graduate, Education	Former Resource Development director, 8	45 M	A
4	Graduate, Business	General Manager, 11	38 M	AB
5	Graduate, Conflict Resolution	Department Head, 8	32 F	AB
6	Graduate, Public Administration	Dept. Head, 11	35 M	AB
7	Graduate, Business	Board Member, 4	67 M	J
8	Undergraduate, Social Work	Program Director, 5	28 F	A

9	Graduate, Law	Department Head, 7	48 F	J
10	Undergraduate, Management	Former co-executive director, 14	68 F	J
11	Undergraduate, Education	Program Director, 8	28 M	AB
12	Graduate, Accounting	Financial Director, 10	43 M	A
13	Undergraduate, Social Work	Coordinator, 4	26 M	J
14	Undergraduate, Social Work	F.acilitator, 9	52 F	B
15	N/A	Board Member, 16	71 M	J
PROGRAM PARTICIPANTS				
16	Elementary school graduate	Economic Development (Catering program), 7	50 F	B
17	High school graduate	Early Childhood Program, 14	35 F	B
VOLUNTEERS				
18	High school graduate	Volunteer Tent, 4	20 M	B
19	High school graduate	Volunteer Tent, 7	18 F	B
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS				
20	N/A	Ministry of Education, 10	F	J
21	N/A	Ministry of Employment,11	F	J
22	N/A	Prime Minister's Office, 6	M	B
ORGANIZATIONAL PARTNERS				
23	N/A		M	J
24	N/A	Mayor of Hura, 11	M	AB
25	N/A	Director of an SCO, 4	F	AB
26	N/A	Organizational consultant, 9	M	A
27	N/A	Director of an SCO, 12	M	AB
FOUNDATIONS				
28	N/A	8	F	J
29	N/A	15	M	J
30	N/A	11	M	N/A
31	N/A	14	F	J

Interview Procedures and Navigating Language Issues

The interviews took place in AJEEC's offices in Beer Sheva, Rahat and Hura. The interview with government officials took place in their offices in Beer Sheva, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv. Five interviews were conducted via Skype with foundation representatives and private donors located in Europe and the United States. The interviews lasted from 45 minutes to 2 hours. The interviews were audio-recorded with the participants' informed consent.

During the interviews, the interviewees raised the language issue and asked if they may use their own language to better express and explain themselves. Researchers who explore the role of language and the ethical dilemmas of translations in qualitative inquiry have pointed out that language is not merely a technical component in research, especially if the method of the study is language-based such as in-depth interviews (Dhoest, 2012; Small, 2008; Young & Temple, 2014). For example, Temple and Young (2004) in their study examined the translation dilemmas by exploring three questions: 1) methodologically, does it matter if the act of translation is recognized? 2) What are the epistemological implications of the translator? 3) How far can the researcher choose to involve a translator in research? They and other researchers who explored the role of language in indigenous research found that there are methodological, epistemological, and ontological consequences in choosing a particular language (Kovach, Brown, & Strega, 2015). For example, English may mean that the ties between language and identity and or culture are cut to the disadvantage of non-English speakers (Young & Temple, 2014). The language and the words that the participants choose to use in a given time and or place have meaning and implications, as "language constitutes systems of thoughts" (Small, 2008, p. 1) . For example, the Arab-Bedouin dialect is rich with metaphors, proverbs, and quotes and generally people will use indirect ways to tell a story. In addition, concepts are used differently in each language. Therefore, it was essential to conduct the entire process

in each participant's language, including the analytical stage. Only after completion did I translate the quotes into English for the dissertation.

Interview Structure

McCranken (1998) suggests three types of questions that I found helpful to incorporate into my interview guide: Biographical questions, grand-tour questions, and probes (McCracken, 1988).

Biographical questions were asked as a way to engage the participants in the interview process as well as to send the message to the participants that their experiences and perspectives were the focus of the interview. For the interviewees with whom I had a working relationship from my former position as Executive Director, we exchanged personal questions (such as: "how are you?" ,"how is your family?", "how are your kids?") in order to reconnect and welcome each other, as I had been away for over 3 years. I used this conversation to set the ground for my new "role" as a researcher. I also allowed myself to share my experience being a student, going back to school after 13 years, and living away from the Negev and the community. This was very helpful and paved the way to move easily to the next questions of the interview that focused solely on the interviewee. For example, my first question asked the participant to talk about themselves. Questions two and three asked participants to talk about their past and present relationship to the organization and their views on AJEEC's social change approach and work. This process not only relaxed the interviewee but also served to put the participant in the role of authority, rather than being "tested". I was asking them questions about what they knew best. This served to create a calm atmosphere and to re-position me as the researcher rather than as the founder and previous director of AJEEC. Although these questions seemed simple, they revealed useful historical information about the interviewees' relationship to the organization. Many staff members began their careers as volunteers and therefore have a rich personal history with the organization and an in-depth understanding of its work.

The **grand-tour questions** of the interview protocol were designed to "spring interviewees to talk without over-specifying the substance or perspective of the talk" (McCracken, 1988, p.34). For example, some questions asked interviewees to consider the general challenges and tensions facing AJEEC and the way AJEEC managed these tensions (without focusing specifically on the tensions between advocacy and service provision). This type of question allowed the interviewee to freely discuss the issues and helped minimize the bias inherent in more directive questioning. The non-directive grand-tour questions were followed up with probes.

Probing questions gave interviewees an opportunity to discuss and focus on the five events that I chose to study. They were designed to draw specifically on the tensions that arose from combining service and advocacy. Then I followed up with several probes that asked the interviewee to consider other sources of tensions, such as those outlined in the resource dependence or institutional perspectives. Thus, the interview process moved from the general to the highly specific, and each step allowed further modification in understanding the interviewee's perception of the tensions and they ways AJEEC managed them.

AJEEC's Case Study Documents

Documentary information is considered relevant to every case study, as it reflects different periods, aspects or dimensions of the case. This documentary information can be retrieved through "reading" a document or an artefact in a purposeful and careful way (Yin, 20013; Flick, 2006). My first goal was to understand AJEEC's life cycle and to identify major events that could shed light on my research questions. To achieve this, I collected various documents that, when taken together, tell the story of the organization. The documents included AJEEC's board meeting minutes, annual reports, letters, protocols and staff minutes, evaluation reports, grant applications, proposals, brochures, website and social media and newspaper articles about the work of the AJEEC. These documents are in

three languages: Arabic, Hebrew and English. With documents from a variety of sources and languages, I learned to pay attention to the nuances each language brought to my analysis. My use of data from all three languages was important because it assisted in creating a complete story of the organization, from a diversity of perspectives (Yin, 2013).

In order to obtain these documents, I contacted AJEEC's current co-executive director and explained the purpose of my research first by letter (see appendix) and later by phone. Given my insider position, they openly shared with me AJEEC's files through Google docs and I was able to search for any document anytime during my data collection and analysis. I also asked them to scan and send by email documents such as official letters received from the government.

I created a file in my laptop and saved all documents related to AJEEC, putting them in chronological order. The search for and analysis of the contents of written documents such as AJEEC's annual reports, official letters and proposals allowed me to look at my case study within an historical context in order to better understand how and why the present came to look the way it does (Creswell, 2012). I did not simply collect a list of events and facts about each of tensions that occurred during the life cycle of AJEEC, but rather I sought to understand both literal and underlying meanings within their historical time frames. For example, AJEEC's Hebrew documents contain the term "Arab-Bedouin" to refer to the Bedouin community in the Naqab-Negev, whereas English documents such as proposals sent to the EU and Palestinian organizations used the term "Palestinian-Bedouin" to refer to the same community. Moreover, the "Palestinian-Bedouin" term was used for the first time in documents sent to the government in 2008. Therefore, looking into the past with the help of these documents helped me to investigate AJEEC's social change and integrative approaches. As well, Smith (1991) explains, "how our political discourses and texts organize relations among us" (Smith, 1991, p. 211). Smith (1991) emphasizes that power and ruling relations are mediated through texts. The data I collected from each annual report included AJEEC's mission/ focus area /objectives,

issues of the day as indicated by departmental divisions, collaborative system, steering committees, funding model for various AJEEC's functions, and description of service programs and the advocacy work connected to it. These documents, including my notebook, facilitated the selection of the five events that demonstrate the tensions between advocacy and services work. In addition, I was able to re-create AJEEC's story.

My Experience and Personal Notebooks

As an insider researcher, I decided to employ my twelve years of leading AJEEC holistically and operationally. This knowledge benefitted my research (Voloder & Kirpitchenko, 2013). The insider experience provided me with deep knowledge that was documented for over 12 years through my personal notebooks that I used to keep with me during all meetings and field activities. Each notebook is rich and comprises my thoughts, ideas, dilemmas, drafts, minutes, and agenda items related to all organizations' dimensions including my personal issues. In the margin of each page I would have for example, my "personal reactions" to topics discussed, sharing them with someone around the table and the other notes I exchanged during the meeting. Moreover, I found relevant information related to controversial issues between the board and myself regarding issues that came up during meetings (board meetings, general assemblies, roundtables, conferences, and regular meetings with staff members). The wealth of information in my notebook not only reflected the content related to the issues but also my feelings and emotions. It also reflected part of the organization's culture. I found many pages focused on personal support for staff members where they shared with me their personal crises and family problems.

To be able to go over all the data in the notebooks I decided to choose three notebooks from periods of organizational crisis. I then read them carefully looking for the events and the issues that created tensions around the combination of service and advocacy.

The Researcher Position: My Own Space

This section describes how I leveraged the advantages and mitigated the challenges of being an insider-researcher. Breen (2007) defines the insider-researcher as "a researcher who chooses to study a group to which she belongs, as opposed to the outsider researcher who does not belong to the studied group. The insider-researcher's potential bias and compromised objectivity is widely debated (Van Heugten, 2004; Voloder & Kirpitchenko, 2013) and increasingly addressed within the empirical literature, notably within qualitative research. Often, the insider's knowledge is valued for the advantages it presents to the research. Greene (2014), for example, have identified the following three advantages: the insider researcher generally 1) has a greater understanding of the culture being studied; 2) avoids altering the flow of natural and genuine social interaction; and 3) has an established intimacy with the study's participants which promotes truth-telling. Further, insider-researchers are knowledgeable about the case under study and are generally aware of organizational politics, including the organization's formal and informal structures. In general, they have a great deal of prior knowledge, which takes an outsider a long time to obtain (Holian & Coghlan, 2013).

The biggest risk to the insider-researcher is the ways in which their familiarity with the research context and environment compromises the study's objectivity (Unluer, 2012; Voloder & Kirpitchenko, 2013). However, some scholars have interrogated the ideals of objectivity as impossible and possibly undesirable. Insider-researchers may also be confronted with role duality as they often struggle to balance their insider role (social worker, nurse, geographer, etc.) and the researcher role (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; Xu, 2017). Another risk includes the insider-researcher's potential access to private or sensitive information.

To address these issues, the thoughtful insider-researcher establishes an awareness of her potential biases when conducting data collection and analysis as well as respecting ethical issues related to respecting the confidentiality of some information related the

organization and individual participants. It is important to consistently address the insider researcher's risk of being coercive or accessing privileged information, at each and every stage of the research process (Holian & Coghlan, 2013). To that end, it is important for any insider researcher to critically and conscientiously develop an identity as a researcher. In order to create that role, Feminist scholars, for instance, use the concept of "the space in between." The space in between challenges the dichotomy of insider versus outsider, illustrating that this dichotomy oversimplifies the researcher's role to an "either/or", "you are in or you are out" paradigm. Nevertheless, the space in between is defined in the negative, as the researcher is neither an outsider nor an insider.

From my perspective, each position (insider and outsider) has advantages and disadvantages that take on different weights depending on the particular circumstances and purposes of the research (Breen, 2007). Rather than negate both roles, my understanding of my role in this research includes both of them. Throughout the research process, I situated myself as the insider or the outsider researcher, depending on the context. This was to ensure that whichever role I took would result in trustworthy, insightful and accurate data collection.

Initial Concerns and Considerations

In order to develop enough distance to pursue this research, I only began conducting my research after three and a half years of extricating myself from AJEEC, the organization, the staff, and the surrounding community.

In the process of determining the research questions, my insider status made it such that I had difficulties in developing questions to which I already knew—or I thought I knew—the answers. For instance, as the former director of the organization, I was aware of the main tensions that arose and the ways in which the organization dealt with them. I did not know, however, the complexities of these tensions and the extent to which external and internal factors affected AJEEC's ability to successfully or unsuccessfully resolve these tensions.

As an insider-researcher and former authority figure, I was concerned that the participants might feel as if they were being tested when, in fact, the purpose of asking the research questions were not to test the participants' knowledge but rather to understand their experiences and perspectives. Obtaining this information was necessary because the way in which the staff and stakeholders experienced the tensions directly impacted their actions, and the ways in which they managed the tensions that arose from AJEEC's work combining service provision and advocacy.

I held several meetings with my doctoral supervisor to develop strategies for avoiding the participants' potential sense of scrutiny and to encourage them, instead, to share their own personal experience. For example, during my data collection process some of the interviewees expressed that they felt they were being tested. I used wording that emphasized the participant's own experience such as "your standpoint", "your experience", and "your thoughts". Framing the interview questions in this way, I sought to ensure that the participants felt invited to share their own experience rather than feeling as if I was testing them on my beliefs.

Advantages

There were several advantages to collecting and analyzing data as an insider-researcher. It is important to note that I approached the site after three and half years of being physically absent from the organization and from the community. This distance tempered any sense of residual authority over the staff, a dynamic that can negatively affect the data collection process (Holian & Coghlan, 2013).

The obvious advantages of being an insider-researcher included that I speak the languages of the environment under study (Arabic and Hebrew) and I have intimate knowledge of AJEEC's organizational structure, its culture, and value systems. As a member of the Bedouin community and Arab minority within Israel, I am also versed in the value systems and formal and informal power structures that exist within these contexts.

The other major advantage was accessibility of data collection. My position as the former founding director and the fact that I had established relationships made it possible for me to collect data according to my own schedule without difficulty in acquiring permission from the organization. Furthermore, I could easily ask clarification questions to any of the participants by email or WhatsApp. This accessibility provided more involvement of the research participants in the process of the study. The continuity of data collection made it possible to collect more detailed and more diverse, and thus more trustworthy, research data.

My familiarity with the case and the pool of potential participants also facilitated the recruitment process for finding voluntary interviewees. When I first sent out initial inquiries for participants, the majority of the staff emailed me to express their desire to participate in the research. Each interview began with greetings and personal updates, which created an open atmosphere to engage in the interview. Moreover, after I conducted each interview, the research participants expressed willingness to be contacted for any follow-up clarification. Finally, my position as an insider allowed me to engage in spontaneous conversations with my former colleagues to discuss the study.

My prior knowledge of the participants facilitated our interactions as it allowed me to choose the most effective approach for gleaning insights relevant to my research and to distinguish between helpful and not helpful information. As an insider, I was also able to quickly grasp the implicit messages expressed during the interviews. For example, during one of the interviews, a Jewish staff member mentioned his reluctance to intervene in social advocacy issues related to the practice of polygamy in the Bedouin Community's. As an insider, I understood the implicit context surrounding this reluctance: his reluctance stemmed from frequent discussions within the organization regarding the extent of Jewish involvement in issues that involve Bedouin customs and traditions.

Disadvantages

The main disadvantage of being an insider researcher stemmed from my dual role as former director and current researcher. This duality led to three main risks: 1) information assumption; 2) personal bias; and 3) ethics regarding access to information, familiarity, and maintaining distance. I attempted to mitigate and overcome these disadvantages by taking a preventative approach (Holian & Coghlan, 2013; Unluer, 2012; van Heugten, 2004; Voloder & Kirpitchenko, 2013).

In order to maintain the systematic continuity of the research, to gain more trustworthy information, and to establish cooperation between the participants, I shared with my committee members and with my dissertation advisor all the issues associated with *my dual role* as the former director and the researcher. Mitigating my role as researcher and former colleague, with the interviewees I was careful to only discuss topics relevant to my research. I recorded my feelings, impressions and thoughts in my research notebook for the purpose of ongoing reflexivity. Creating this distance ensured participants' trust in me during the research process.

The second disadvantage was the risk of *information assumption*. For example, several participants said: "What do you want to know? You already know everything." This statement signalled to me the need to consistently ask for clarification by conducting follow-up interviews and cross-referencing interview statements with reference documents.

In order to see all the dimensions of the bigger picture, I also needed to confront my own *personal bias*. One practical step to minimize the impact of personal bias is to seek the help of academic colleagues and supervisors. Since my analysis relied on evidence-based criteria, my supervisor helped me to overcome my personal biases by reminding me to: "Give me the facts. The evidence". These reminders aided me to gain the self-awareness and reflexivity to interpret data more objectively. My committee's remarks and comments also allowed me to overcome my biases about my research data. My supervisor provided guidance and oversaw the qualitative data collection and analysis,

consistently asking questions that assessed my reflexivity such as: “Why do you need to know about this specific issue?” “Is it your own impression or the participant’s experience?”. Further, my ability to overcome my biases was also guided by the recommendation from scholars of insider-research that the more a researcher overcomes his/her bias as an insider, the more he/she is able to come up with a rich theme (Dwyer & Buckle, 2009; Xu, 2017)

In summary, my multiple sources of data and methods of data collection, consistent chronicling of my notes and reflections, sharing and assessing my initial findings and interpretations with my supervisor, all contributed to maximizing the rigor of the research and mitigating the potential for bias (Holian & Coghlan, 2013; Unluer, 2012; van Heugten, 2004; Voloder & Kirpitchenko, 2013; Zaidalkilani, 2010)

Ethical Issues

I considered the ethical issues such as honesty, privacy, responsibility, fair share, not causing harm nor putting the participants at risk in my thesis research, which are inseparable from any research effort. I took certain precautions required by the design of a case study (Yin, 2013). In case studies, the researcher tries to understand the current research subject without intervening except through data collection. Therefore, in my interviews, I was careful only to discuss questions relevant to my research. As an insider, I often needed to set boundaries with interviewees who deviated from the conversation to discuss unrelated topics. For example, during one of the interviews, one of the interviewees began complaining about current operational issues within the organization. Given my familiarity with the interviewees, I was easily able to curtail these discussions and steer the conversation back to relevant topics.

Maintaining my distance from the organization was a significant challenge during my data collection. As the organization’s founder, it is inevitable that I still cared for and hoped for the organization’s continued success. Although I have had no formal authority

over the organization's operations since leaving in 2012, I needed to keep my desire to interfere and help the organization in check. For example, during my visit, AJEEC was embroiled in a conflict with a Bedouin leader with whom I had previous experience in resolving conflict. I avoided consulting AJEEC's leadership on how to handle this issue because I was concerned that this kind of intervention would hinder the researcher's distance I had created by extricating myself from this organization, from the Bedouin community, and from Israel. During the research process, my only direct involvement with AJEEC was to help connect them with new funders in North America who would be interested in supporting the Bedouin community.

Another ethical challenge I faced was my desire to protect the organization from any findings that would undermine how the organization is perceived by its current funders. Through my research, I came across private issues that an outsider would probably not have had access to. While some of these issues presented valuable data, they also posed ethical dilemmas. Nevertheless, I conscientiously sought to present my findings without sacrificing the integrity of the study nor risking the ability of the organization to survive and to continue to providing services and engaging in advocacy within a complex, and often hostile social and political environment.

Data Analysis

In this section, I describe the analytical tools that I used for each of the three data collection methods as well as my methodological analytic research notes. As I collected data throughout the research process, I regularly went back to check what I had written earlier in the researcher's notes. According to Kirby and McKenna (2004), the act of interpretation triggers the entire research process. It is not something, which occurs only at one specific point. This was a constant iterative process of working in the present, while reflecting on my past thinking and assumptions, revising codes and categories, putting these aside and then looking at them again (Kirby & McKenna, 1989). Because most of the interviews were conducted in mixed languages (Arabic, Hebrew and English), I could not

find computer software that worked properly or that I trusted to help me in the analysis process. I analyzed all my data manually.

For each of the three methods of data collection, I applied specific analytic techniques. I used the source languages to develop initial codes, categories, and themes. I created an Excel table to organize each interview but I had to be careful when I moved across the methods and the interviewees because different people used different languages. I constantly had to check back into the primary documents through line by line reading and re-reading of paragraphs from which the data were taken; this was a process of "constant cross-comparisons and matching" (Kirby and McKenna 1989, p. 148). Also, some of the data were re-coded as a result of my perpetual evolving thinking reflected in my research notes. Each of these analytic processes is described in detail below.

Once the data were coded and themes were developed for each of the three methods, I conducted between-methods analysis. Between-methods data analysis is also known as "triangulation" of data sources or cross-methods analysis (Creswell 1998; Marshall and Rossman 2006; Yin 2003). Between-methods analysis is an analytic process of looking for convergent and divergent themes in the data (Creswell, 2012). Convergent themes share characteristics. Divergent themes are uncommon or contradictory. In my data analysis, I accounted for these divergent themes by saving and labeling them as such along with all the themes so they would not get lost.

Step 1: Organizing the Data

I coded and analyzed my data using Marshall and Rossman's (2006) four-step analytic procedure. To manage the data, I created three files:

AJEEC' documents and records: this file includes the entire electronic files, records, newspaper articles, photos, excel spreadsheets of financial statement, etc. In each file, I opened a sub-file under subtitles such as: annual reports, minutes, letters, proposals, PR materials, etc.

Research's notebook and research notes: In this file, I kept all the notes and thoughts I generated from my experience and my personal organizational notebook I kept for 12 years. My research notes included my methodological ideas and decisions about the evolving research process and analytic notes where I wrote about each interview and drew conceptual pictures and diagrams (Strauss and Corbin 1998), including my evolving assumptions, questions, analyses, interpretations and emerging results. I reviewed these notes often in order to check my assumptions, key decisions, and shifting interpretations.

Audio records and hard copies of hand-transcribed interviews: This includes 60 hours of audio records of the interviews and 23 hours of audio recorded discussion and Skype conversations with participants. In addition to the original interviews, there was a third file for interview transcriptions.

Step 2: Generating Categories, Themes, and Patterns

To analyze the interviews, I first listened to them. This step brought me back to the setting of the interview by "re-visiting" the participants through their own voice. In this step, I didn't take notes at all. The second time, I listened with the aim of looking for key words, codes, and various themes. Then, I transcribed all the interviews by hand.

This step in the data analysis was the most demanding. The process of category generating in this study involved creating excel sheets according to the table I suggested in my conceptual framework. I used that table to organize the key words, ideas, and themes. After the open coding, I started looking at how the codes illustrated which tensions were raised and how these tensions were managed. I did this by linking similar words and ideas expressed by the various interviewees. I grouped words, ideas, and codes that showed similarities and combined them under the following concepts: organizational structure, resource availability, inter-organization relations, mission and ideology. Words that did not fit into those categories were placed in the "parking lot" for future exploration and theme generation.

As categories emerged, I took the analysis a step further, searching for data that had

internal convergence or external divergence. I developed themes by searching for connections between categories. In order to develop themes, I used the criteria regarding the choice of themes as one moves from codes to categories to themes and back in a spiral way.

I used the following criteria to judge whether a category should become a theme: first, if the category is central, all other major categories should be related to it somehow. Second, if it occurs frequently, within all or almost all events, codes then point to this concept. Third, if it relates easily to other codes and categories. After generating the main themes, I started to look at the themes and re-connect them with the case as a hole by creating cross themes.

Step 3: Developing Cross-Cutting Themes

Yin (2003) cautions "embedded case study" researchers against analyzing the sub-units and forgetting to return to the case study. Before developing cross themes, I re-read the results from the three methods regarding AJEEC's case study, the themes that emerged from each event, and then created a conceptual relationship between the financial, political, and social aspects these events shared. I created major themes based on the crosscutting themes and sub-themes linked to each one. This method helped me put the case study back into the center of my analytic process.

Step 4: Establishing Trustworthiness of the Data and Results

Qualitative researchers must be able to show there is some "truth" to the results of a study, "given that objectivity cannot be established and that there is only interpretation" (Reid 2004b, p. 80). Lincolin and Guba (1985) state that there are four criteria for establishing the trustworthiness of the data and the results. First, one must establish credibility, as "the reconstructions that have been arrived at via the analysis are credible to the constructors of the original multiple realities" (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 296). In

order to establish credibility, I compared findings from the multiple methods, matched patterns, and addressed competing explanations (Yin, 2013). Moreover, I listened to diverse viewpoints and discussed my interpretations with participants and colleagues. I also relied on verification from third parties. For example, I sent my selection of AJEEC's major events to my former co-director and I sent the summary of the interview transcripts to the interviewees for them to verify.

Second, the findings must demonstrate transferability or applicability to other sites. As Lincoln and Guba (1985) state it is my "responsibility to provide the data base that makes transferability judgments possible on the part of potential appliers" (p. 316). I accomplished this through an in-depth description of the historical and political context demonstrated through systematic observations, document analysis, and interviews with AJEEC'S major stakeholders. I made sure that the sample was diverse and representative (Arab, Jewish, women, men, across all departments, decision-making structures, and all the governmental offices—education, employment, and welfare—with whom AJEEC worked). I also described AJEEC's four major events in as much detail as possible to accurately and clearly illustrate its process of combining service provision with advocacy.

Third is dependability, which ensures that "the findings of an inquiry would be repeated if the study was replicated with the same subjects in the same context" (Lincoln and Guba 1985). I maintained detailed methodology related field notes from the beginning of my research, which could be used by another researcher to replicate my study. Finally, Lincoln and Guba (1985) state the results must be confirmable. In other words, they must be grounded in the data and not the researcher's biases, interests, or perspectives. Since this type of qualitative research relies so heavily on the researcher's interpretation, there is a need to evaluate this. I believe that my multiple methods approach, detailed methodology notes, analytic notes, my notebook, and analyzed interviews, and documents provide a bolster against any potential bias and can be used to track the results I have gleaned from the data.

To conclude this section, the research methodology opened with a recap of the research questions then the reasons and methods of the qualitative case study, my reasons for selecting AJEEC as a case study, an overview of data collection methods and analysis of the interviews, AJEEC's documents, and the researcher's personal notebooks, a discussion on the challenges and advantages of the insider researcher, and overview of the ethical considerations, and finally the steps of data analysis were outlined.

The following section presents the five events that were referred to by the majority of the participants during the research process as constituting the major sources of tension that arise from AJEEC's integrative social change approach.

EVENT I

Community Volunteerism Versus National Service

Background

The National Civic Service (NS) program—two years of government mandated volunteering that provide an alternative to the compulsory military service—is a point of controversy within Israel. Military service in the Israeli Defense Force—mandatory for all Israeli citizens, including non-Jews—serves as an important socialization institution (Bar-Tura & Fleischer, 2004) and is a primary rite of passage for all Israeli citizens. Until 1953, Palestinian-Israelis were exempt from military service. Although this exemption ensured that Palestinian-Israelis did not have to fight against other Palestinians living in areas of frequent conflict such as Gaza and the West Bank, it also excluded them from this important socialization practice, and excluded them from receiving the numerous social benefits afforded by completion of military service (Rouhana & Sultany, 2003).

In 1953, the Israeli government enacted a Law of National Service for observant orthodox Jews (whose religious obligations formerly forbade them from participating in the military) to enroll in two years of National Service. The provision of a non-military service track for

religiously observant Jews created a mechanism to include this group in the national collective (Fleischer & Gal, 2007).

Citizens who serve in the army or national service receive numerous social benefits such as housing and education subsidies, as well as employment opportunities in the form of vocational training. Excluding Palestinian-Israelis from army or national service institutionalizes discrimination in the allocation of public resources and in the opportunities for employment since many higher education institutions require military or national service as a precondition to admission (Smooha, 2007).

The Bedouin Volunteer Tent

A pilot project for bringing volunteerism to Israel's Arab Minority

In 2002, the Volunteer Tent (VT) was established as one of AJEEC's flagship projects that strove to promote equal rights for the Bedouin community within Israel. The VT sought to achieve this goal by fostering community responsibility and active citizenship. By recognizing and institutionalizing traditional Bedouin forms of volunteerism such as *Al Auna*, the VT formalized volunteering within the Bedouin community. AJEEC established volunteering guidelines, built relationships with organizations, and developed formal volunteer training. The VT recruits, trains, and engages volunteers within their communities as activists and leaders of social change. The training is based on a holistic, integrative, active learning approach focusing on self-awareness, empowerment, and changing attitudes as well as on the attainment of practical skills geared towards knowledge of the Bedouin community (AJEEC annual report, 2016). Each year, the VT recruits more than 400 volunteers and engages them in 82 locations within the Bedouin community in Israel. Since its inception in 2002, more than 12,000 volunteers between the ages of 18 and 30 have volunteered through the VT (AJEEC's VT report 2015). Since the establishment of the VT, the long-term goal was to "to turn volunteerism into a lifestyle" and "to turn the human resources (time and knowledge) into

a catalyst for community empowerment to promote full equality between Arabs and Jews in Israel" (VT mission statement).

To accomplish this vision, AJEEC intended to bring their volunteering methodology and programming to the entire Palestinian community living in Israel. In AJEEC's strategic plan, the Community Volunteerism (CV) program would serve as a pilot project that would demonstrate to the government the importance of volunteerism for Arab youth age 18-20. The CV is considered as "the pioneering program of volunteerism in the Arab community in Israel" (Naftali ,2007). With this aim in mind, AJEEC invited representatives from Israel's Welfare and the Education ministers to join the CV program's steering committee.

Opening the National Service to all Citizens

Instigating controversy and unearthing the Arab minority's mistrust of the Israeli government

In 2007, the government implemented mandatory participation in the National Service (NS) for all Israeli citizens who were exempt from military service. This policy included religious Jews who received draft deferments, Arabs who were previously not called on to enroll in military service, and to anyone who was deemed inadequate for military service for health reasons. In 2008, the NS Administration was established to administer this program. AJEEC—given their position as the only professional volunteer organization within Israel's Arab community, according to the Ministry of Welfare—was asked to act as an intermediary between the government and the Palestinian minority in order to implement this new policy. The government wanted AJEEC to recruit and match volunteers with organizations, then provide relevant documentation to the Ministry of Defense who would then issue a certificate of completion to the volunteers, thus providing them access to the social benefits afforded to all Israeli citizens.

During a steering committee meeting, AJEEC explained the political sensitivity of this request to the representatives of the Minister of Welfare and Education. AJEEC

theorized that Palestinian-Israelis would reject any attempt to impose national service on their community because of the national service's direct affiliation with military service. AJEEC pointed out that the national service is first, a clear alternative to military service and second, administered by the Ministry of Defense, two conditions that AJEEC believed would foment resistance to this policy. AJEEC then explained that the best way to promote volunteerism within the Palestinian minority is by promoting AJEEC's Community Volunteering Program (CV) as an alternative to the government's NS program (AJEEC policy paper, 2007).

AJEEC and the steering committee agreed that, given the program's past five years of successful integration, the CV is well designed to meet the needs of Israel's Palestinian minority (Protocol 2007). Following this meeting, AJEEC met with general director of the NS administration to propose the CV as a politically intelligent and socially beneficial alternative to the NS as well as to shift the national service from the purview of the ministry of defense to that of the ministry of welfare. The general director reacted positively and promised to further explore the idea.

The Palestinian Minority's Opposition

As AJEEC foresaw, the Palestinian minority did indeed reject the NS on various grounds, primarily due to their belief that the NS program was motivated by an attempt to survey Palestinian movements within Israel. Other arguments expressed in the Arab public discourse against the NS were: the clear connection between national service and military service (only those exempt from the military are entitled to volunteer; veterans of civic service are granted benefits equivalent to the benefits given to military veterans, and furthermore these benefits are granted by the Fund for Military Veterans). Arab leaders also maintained that as long as the Arabs are treated as second-class citizens, that they are not obliged to render any duty to the state. Moreover, the Arab leadership criticized the fact that the provision of equal services (the social benefits afforded by participation in national or military service) is conditional on fulfilling an obligation to State that does not

grant equal rights in the first place; these leaders also expressed the fear that participation in the National Service might become a precedent to compulsory military service. They also expressed the concern that the National Service is intended to "Israelize" the national Palestinian identity of Arab youth; finally, they criticized the fact that the National Service is controlled by the state without giving any say to Arab leaders (Supreme Follow-Up Committee of Arabs in Israel (SFUCAI) position Statement, 2007)

A Committee Against the National Service (CANS) was appointed by the Supreme Follow-Up Committee of Arabs in Israel (SFUCAI)—a committee comprising of all Arab Knesset members, mayors, and Islamic movement representatives—to criticize the National Service's inclusion of Israel's Arab minority. This committee conducted a guerilla campaign within the Arab minority, publicly harassing and denouncing anyone who joined the National Service or who put forth an opinion that did not align with an outright condemnation of the National Service program. Ayman Odeh, chairman of the Committee Against National Service from 2007-2015, explained that "the link to the Ministry of Defense and other national security offices" is the main reason for opposing the program since it highlights that the National Service was created within a paradigm that views Palestinian-Israelis as a national security threat—rather than as fully equal citizens—and thus seeks to keep an eye on their activities[36].

The Arab leaders who object to national service attacked AJEEC from the start because of AJEEC's decision to refrain from participating in the campaign against the National Service[1] and to instead proactively propose an alternative model for providing volunteerism opportunities for Arab youth. The key criticism directed towards AJEEC was that AJEEC's work to promote their alternative model weakens the campaign against the NS because it divides the community. In response to this criticism, AJEEC organized its first volunteerism conference and framed issue around the slogan "Volunteerism is A Right". This conference attempted to shift the discourse that viewed volunteerism as an

[36] http://www.americantaskforce.org/daily_news_article/2011/07/26/1311652800_21

obligation to the state to a discourse that viewed volunteerism as a right to which every young Arab is entitled. The week before the conference, one of the weekly Arab newspapers accused AJEEC of cooperating with the State by "bringing military service to the Arab society through the back door" and warning that "this will be the second Nakba[37]". Despite this criticism, enrolment in AJEEC's CV program continued to rise. While the Arab leadership refused to publicly support AJEEC's alternative volunteering model, they continued to publicly criticize the NS program but did not take any steps to negotiate with the government to change the program.

Building the Herakuna Coalition

Mobilizing resources and generating community support

In 2008, the number of applicants to AJEEC's CV programs more than doubled among the Bedouin community from 187 applications in 2006-2007 to 462 applicants in 2007-2008. Parallel to this increase in participation, the number of Arab volunteers that joined the government's NS program also rose significantly: from 240 volunteers in 2005-2006 to 1,050 in 2007-2008, a substantial number of those volunteers joined after the NS administration was created in January 2008. This growth increased the tensions between AJEEC and relevant governmental institutions. AJEEC was facing financial pressure from its donor base, social pressure from the community, and political restrictions from the government. Two of the foundations withdrew their funding to the CV program: one foundation criticized AJEEC for not accepting government funds and the other saw AJEEC's continued engagement in the CV as weakening the Arab leadership's campaign against the NS. At the same time, AJEEC was also under attack on social media and was at risk of losing its legitimacy and community support.

AJEEC's strategy was to form a coalition of the most influential figures within Palestinian Israeli civil society organizations in order to: first, maintain AJEEC's

[37] Nakba Day is the Palestinians annual day of commemoration of the displacement that preceded and followed the Israeli Declaration of Independence in 1948.

legitimacy within the community and second, to push the government to adopt AJEEC's alternative volunteerism model. In 2008, AJEEC established the Herakuna coalition, comprising of seven organizations that, together, represented the Arab minority within the entire country (Herakuna's profile, 2008).

With the support of the Herakuna coalition, AJEEC was able to obtain financial support from both the Ford and the Foss foundations and regain community legitimacy. Herakuna's strategic plan focused on two parallel tracks: First, to introduce the alternative volunteerism model to the coalition members and assist them in implementing the model within their own communities. Second, to garner support for the model from the SFUCAI by mobilizing Arab communities to champion the model. Herakuna was able to partner with the mayors of various villages to organize national days that promoted volunteerism within the Arab community. A year later, the CV model was operating in eight locations serving Israel's Palestinian minority. At the same time, Herakuna was able to negotiate the model with the head of the Mayors' Committee and who expressed his willingness to promote the model to the SFUCAI as an alternative policy to the government's National Service.

In December 2008, Herakuna launched the first national conference on Volunteerism that aimed to present the CV model. The head of the Mayors' Committee opened the conference by expressing the Mayors' Committee's willingness to move forward with the CV Model as an alternative to the government mandated national service. This announcement created a rift within the SFUCAI. The Mayors' Committee and the southern clan of the Islamic Movement agreed with Herakuna and the idea of creating a government-supported volunteer service for Arab-Israelis through the Ministry of Education or Welfare so that Arab participants received the same social benefits as Jewish ones. Further, they believed that this service would promote youth involvement in their own communities and would decrease the alienation of Arab youth (Conference summary report). The opponents of Herakuna's vision declared that "this step will normalize NS"

and “will pave the road for compulsory military service for Arab citizens”. The Campaign Against National Services (CANS) expanded its anti-NS media campaign under the motto: “I Refuse. I am not a Servant” (Baladna 2008).

Immediately following the conference, Herakuna was also divided around their next strategic step: AJEEC wanted to continue promoting their alternative model even without the full agreement of the SFUCAI, while the rest of the coalition felt it necessary to have support from all SFUCAI members before moving forward.

In March 2009, Avishai Braverman was appointed as Israel’s minister for Minority Affairs. He approached AJEEC to promote the model and to resolve the political division between the government and the Arab leadership regarding National Service. AJEEC presented the alternative model to the minister and his general director emphasizing that the only way the Arab community can adopt this model is by removing volunteerism from the context of national security. AJEEC requested shifting volunteerism away from the Minister of Defense and towards a more neutral ministry. The minister agreed with this perspective and promised to negotiate this policy change with other government officials.

AJEEC tried for a year to convince the coalition to move fast as the mayors and the relevant ministers were willing to help promote the model. Nevertheless, the other coalition members decided that without the full agreement of the SFUCAI, the coalition should abstain from entering into any negotiations with the government. Some of the coalition members expressed personal fears about acting against the SFUCAI due to sustaining previous attacks from the CANS. One coalition member said “*we can’t move against the will of our people… we can’t fight these forces…I don’t want to lose my reputation*”. The coalition instead suggested using the coalitions budget to continue expand the volunteerism model to more locations. AJEEC reminded the coalition members that the funds were explicitly given to them to serve the ultimate goal of generating political support and the eventual political adoption of this volunteerism model.

AJEEC attempted to convince Herakuna to use the minister Braverman's support as an opportunity to lobby more ministers to support the alternative model. However, in 2011, the Minister for Minority Affairs resigned and this process was cut off.

In the meantime, the coalition focused its energy on training volunteers and organizing national activities to bring together all the volunteers in the Arab community for a substantial, visible event. In the meantime the government continued to impose the National Service. By 2012, there were 2,399 Arab youth enrolled in the program. Due to financial difficulties, Herakuna was unable to continue expanding its programs and by the end of 2012, AJEEC withdrew from the coalition and the Ford and Foss Foundations consequently withdrew their financial support. An e-mail from one of the Foundations explained that they were looking for ways to promote policy change in the area of volunteerism and felt that Herakuna was not adequately creating that change.

In 2013, AJEEC decided to promote the alternative model by establishing a new partnership with the Abraham Initiatives, an organization actively working on policy change in various streams. During the last two years, AJEEC and Abrahamic Initiatives along with the Mayors' Committee expanded AJEEC's alternative model to four new locations in northern Israel. Today, the government still operates the NS through the Ministry of Defense and AJEEC and Abraham Initiatives are still lobbying the government to fully adopt the community-volunteering model as an alternative. These efforts have succeeded, albeit on a small scale, to receive funds from the Ministry of Welfare to support the alternative model within Israel's Arab communities.

EVENT II

Global Financial Crisis 2008

Background

AJEEC was in its expansion phase when the 2008 global financial crisis weakened the global economy and threatened the organization's survival. From 2007 to 2009, AJEEC was facing a period of unprecedented economic, structural, and programming development: the organization nearly doubled its initiatives and staff members from 27 initiatives and 23 employees in 2007 to 43 initiative and 42 employees in 2009; four new departments were created to accommodate these initiatives; scholarships issued increased from 70 to 182 per year; and AJEEC was at the point of establishing partnerships with government officials and donors to scale-up initiatives such as AJEEC's Parents as Partners program (hereafter identified as PP program) (Annual report 2008 appendix).

82% of AJEEC's budget relied on private donors and foundations outside Israel, specifically in North America and the EU (Financial Report 2008-2009). During the 2008 financial crisis, many of these of donors lost substantial resources resulting in funding cutbacks. With these cutbacks and the devaluation of the US dollar, AJEEC lost 34% of its budget, pushing the organizations to the brink of being unable to fulfill its financial obligations to employees, contractors, and scholarship-designated students. The executive co-directors held a meeting with the entire staff—34 full-time employees—to explain AJEEC's financial situation and to discuss potential solutions in order to ensure the organization's survival. This meeting led to the creation of "The Emergency Plan", a two-stage plan that prioritized the provision of AJEEC's community initiatives over all other funding needs—including staff salaries. "The Emergency Plan" consisted of practical guidelines for dealing with the situation in the short run (the immediate response) and strategies to bolster the organization's long-term survival (the long-term response). The immediate response dealt with AJEEC's financial insecurity in three ways: cost-effective budgeting, scaled salary cuts, and expediting fund transfers from AJEEC's core financial supporters.

Cost-Effective Budgeting

First, more **cost-effective budgets** and formal reporting processes were implemented in each department. **Second**, AJEEC's staff unanimously agreed to incur salary reductions for a period of three months. The management committee developed a four-tier scale for **cutting back salaries**. Salaries were reduced based on the following: part-time and employees paid minimum wage incurred no salary loss, coordinators of programs incurred a 7% salary loss, department directors incurred a 10% salary loss, and the organization's co-executive directors incurred a 15% salary loss. **Third,** AJEEC requested their core donors to expedite fund transfers. For example, AJEEC asked the VLF, a foundation with whom they had a five-year relationship, to transfer their grants in advance, to which the foundation agreed.

The Emergency Plan: Long-term

AJEEC's strategy for long-term financial stability consisted of four components: Scaling up the PP program, moving the operations of the Community Volunteering from AJEEC's center to the villages, expanding Israel's financial support, and exploring self-generating income models. These measures were intended as multi-year projects that were not meant to necessarily address the organization's immediate financial needs but rather to bolster its potential for survival in the long-run.

Scaling-up the PP program

Prior to the financial crisis, AJEEC spent three years (2004-2007) advocating the government to implement its early childhood education program (the PP program) in the unrecognized villages. These villages receive no state-sponsored services such as education, healthcare, or public utilities because they are considered illegal settlements by the state and therefore any land development or infrastructure building is also illegal. Due to AJEEC's persistent advocacy and innovative PP program that did not directly conflict

with any government laws, the government finally adopted AJEEC's PP program in 2007, entering it in the government's book of public projects[38].

AJEEC's leadership saw this step as an opportunity to utilize government funding to implement this program in more Bedouin communities (townships and unrecognized villages).

Re-locating the operations of Community Volunteering from AJEEC's center to the villages

AJEEC further reduced its budgetary needs by moving the Gap Year program operations from AJEEC's central office into the communities of Rahat, Hura, and Shegev Shalom where these programs were already operating. AJEEC succeeded in making this shift by matching external donations with funding from local municipalities.

Several members of AJEEC's board expressed concern that by partnering with the municipality, the organization would lose control over the program. Further, board members were concerned that the nepotism and corruption of a few of the municipalities would tarnish the program's professionalism. Despite these concerns, AJEEC's leadership decided to draft an official agreement between the mayors and the organization in attempts to protect the program's professionalism. This tactic effectively protected the program in some villages and failed in others.

By relocating the CV program, AJEEC was able to do away with the cost of renting a central space and transporting volunteers from their communities to AJEEC's main center. In addition, this step also increased AJEEC's interdependence and, by extension, sustainability as this partnership increased the local community's sense of ownership since these initiatives were now being run on the local level.

[38] Program that recognized by the government will be included in the Government's Book, which means directing governmental fund towards the program.

Expanding Israeli Financial Support

In this component, AJEEC's leadership attempted to decrease the organization's dependency on external donors and foundations by expanding their Israeli donor base. In order to expand this donor base, AJEEC needed to obtain the 46a tax exemption (appendix). The application process took six months and in the end the government refused to issue the tax exemption because of AJEEC's work in the unrecognized villages. Some of the board members suggested establishing a separate legal entity that would only include AJEEC's work in the recognized villages as a way of working around the government restriction. The majority of the management committee members, however, disapproved of this suggestion, claiming that it would give credence to the government's refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of these villages.

Instead, AJEEC decided to advocate for their right to the tax exemption regardless of their work in the unrecognized villages and, after 5 years of extensive negotiations with the authorities (which included inviting them to visit the programs in the unrecognized villages), AJEEC received the 46a tax exemption in 2014 without giving up its work in the unrecognized villages and therefore was able to begin expanding its Israeli donor base.

Self-Generating Income Models

AJEEC developed The Single-Mothers' Catering (SMC) program as an alternative means of generating funds that could be used without government oversight. In this program, single-mothers prepare lunches for the schools in the surrounding communities.

AJEEC received the initial capital from foundations and used this money to build an industrial kitchen. Under the Hot Meals Act, the Minister of Education is mandated to provide a hot meal to every Israeli child. The government fulfills this mandate by contracting a catering company to supply and deliver the meals. AJEEC applied to and won the contract to provide meals in the Bedouin community. The SMC program also decided that any left over capital from the government grant would be reinvested into AJEEC's community initiatives. Leveraging the monthly payments from the government,

AJEEC reinvested all the program's profits as follows: 40% were given to the municipality of Hura to support other projects in the same village, 40% went to AJEEC directly, and 20% were specifically marked for supporting new initiatives within the Bedouin community. After opening in 2009, the program began to see profits in 2014. Today the catering program provides 8200 meals per day with a profit of $350,000 per year and provides for 12% of AJEEC's total funding.

Outcome

AJEEC was able to overcome the financial crises of 2008 and by 2009 AJEEC was expanding veteran programs and initiating new ones. In 2015, however, AJEEC faced another financial crises because the VLF demanded a reimbursement on one of its grants (as AJEEC was unable to fulfill its commitment to the foundation of bringing the government to partner in establishing the early childhood center in Segev Shalom). During the interview with the VL foundation's director, the director expressed:

we entered to this partnership with AJEEC and the government so the government would take over and we would draw back...Yet it took 3 years for AJEEC to negotiate with the government …we have new initiatives now and cannot wait any more for this project to succeed.

One of AJEEC's co-executive directors replied:

VL foundation was part of the process...They saw how challenging it is to move the government and the bureaucrats. We know that there always will be a price of linking these programs to policy change.

In that same year, AJEEC gave up negotiating between the government and the VLF and reimbursed the grant.

EVENT III

Women's Empowerment Programs—The Case For Social Advocacy

One of AJEEC's core mandates is to elevate the status of Bedouin women. All of AJEEC's programs include the following elements: personal empowerment sessions,

information sessions on topics relevant to women in the community, and the third session provides the tools for community organizing for social and political advocacy. In this section, I describe one example from each approach: the Women Photographer program is an example of policy change through service provision (advocacy-based services) and the Campaign Against Polygamy is an example of social advocacy.

The Women Photographer Program

Background

In 2003, AJEEC conducted an informal focus group with 18 Bedouin women to map their current and potential needs regarding their own economic empowerment. This focus group took place in the women's tent (traditionally, women and men have separate tents during celebrations) during a week of wedding celebrations. The focus groups centered on employment opportunities for women. Currently, the unemployment rate for women in the unrecognized villages is 82%, and lower for women in the townships at 67%. Within these communities, women are mostly teachers in local schools, secretaries in municipalities, or hold other traditional vocations such as sewing, catering, and embroidery (AJEEC's documents). One of the ideas that emerged from the focus group was a training program for female photographers and videographers (for full description see appendix). In the last two decades, there has been a growing demand for photographers to record special events in the Bedouin community. However, there is a dearth of qualified professionals, especially female ones, and since men and women are traditionally segregated during Bedouin celebrations, there are no professionals to take photos of women. Within this context, the focus group came up with the idea of a training program for female photographers. This project would provide women with opportunities to establish their own businesses within the community and contribute to the family income in a culturally appropriate way (El'Sana-Alh'jooj, 2005). AJEEC developed The Women Photographer Program driven by The Linkage Model that aimed to link vocational training with entrepreneurial development.

The Linkage Model

Linking vocational training with entrepreneurship

The Linkage model consists of five stages: 1) Recruitment of participants 2) Individual development, empowerment, and preparation for entrepreneurship 3) Training in entrepreneurship and business administration combined with vocational training—in the case of the Women Photography program, the training was in photography and videography 4) Design of a business plan and financial assistance in the form of loans 5) Ongoing support and professional guidance of newly established enterprises.

26 women successfully completed the photography and videography courses and 25 established their own small enterprises in the townships of Laqyia and Rahat, and in the unrecognized villages of Abu Quidar and Darjat. During the following summer months—the most popular season for Bedouin weddings—the women who had completed this program were in high demand. For example, one woman who completed the program reported that she had an agreement with a bridal salon in Rahat which provided her the opportunity to photograph four brides per week, earning her a total of 4,000 NIS—approximately 900 USD—per week.

The community responded in different ways to this new opportunity for women. Islamic leaders and more traditional community members initially reacted positively. For example, the leader of the community Islamic Movement explained "I appreciate that you [AJEEC] respect the tradition and the religion by creating job opportunities for women where they don't have to mix with men." These constituents were satisfied with the project because they believed that it would reinforce the community's traditions. Other women related that since they started working, their husbands and families had shown them greater respect. Another fascinating story is that of one of the participants from one of the unrecognized villages: unable to find a partner for her enterprise, she taught her husband photography

and today they are business partners, covering the events together (Evaluation Report, 2005).

Other community members reacted negatively to these women's newfound income and, by extension, independence. For example, one of the women (hereafter identified as "S") using the proceeds from her business was able to purchase a car in order to accept contracts in remote locations. One evening, one of AJEEC's coordinators received a phone call from S. Her brother had locked her in her room to prevent her from attending the wedding she was supposed to cover that evening. AJEEC facilitated a family meeting to discuss how S's business was affecting the family. Most of the family members were thrilled that S was helping them financially. S's mother pointed to her new bracelets and confessed: "I have been married for 29 years. This is the first time I was able to buy these for myself". The brother explained he is angry because "she [S] arrives late in the evenings after finishing her work. And, she has bought a car". He explained that he allowed her to participate in the program so she could earn money and help the family. He considered purchasing the car as "not acceptable", explaining that "she is not a man and should not drive a car and arrive back home after midnight". To resolve the conflict AJEEC's coordinator suggested that S's brother join the business as the designated driver and equipment handler. S and her brother agreed to this suggestion. Three months later, during a monthly in-service training and support session, S informed AJEEC that her had brother left the business because he felt overburdened by working four days a week until 2:00 am. S Continued her work and later hired a female employee to help with the business.

External Tensions

Despite initially positive reactions, conservative forces began to publically criticize AJEEC for "shaking the balance of the community." To minimize this conflict, AJEEC enlisted Imams within the community to demonstrate that Islam sanctions women to own businesses. AJEEC later formalized this process by establishing The Imams Forum. This

forum worked with AJEEC to promote female empowerment discourse in a culturally appropriate way.

Internal Tensions

Several tensions arose at AJEEC between male and female staff members regarding the organization's commitment to social advocacy. One of the male staff expressed concern about AJEEC's recent focus on women's issues, worried that AJEEC was transforming into a "feminist" organization that sought to exclude men's issues from their agenda. Alternatively, the Bedouin female staff stressed the importance of AJEEC's focus on women since women were more marginalized and therefore required more programs aimed at changing their situation.

From the perspective of the female Bedouin staff, AJEEC was acting in accordance to its mandate by favouring programs that specifically targeted women. To allay these rifts, AJEEC's leadership decided to create two new employment programs specifically targeting Bedouin men. One example of these programs was their program on sheep breeding. Although once an important economic activity, the lack of knowledge about viable sheep breeding had forced breeders to sell off their herds, without any alternative sources of income. In order to reverse this trend, two parallel courses of action were offered: (1) adoption of advanced methods of intensive breeding and economic herd management and (2) development of economic cooperation among the sheep breeders in order to lower costs and increase profits.

Campaign Against Polygamy

AJEEC's national and local partnerships granted the organization the credibility to tackle previously taboo topics within the Bedouin community.

Through its empowerment programs for women and children, AJEEC's staff learned that polygamy—a mainstay of Bedouin society—adversely affects the wellbeing of

Bedouin families. Within all Bedouin communities, it is common for a husband to marry and have children with more than one wife. Often, these families live together in the same household even though a clear preference hierarchy is established between the new wife and the old one. These dynamics create a slew of social problems for the now shunted wife and her children who, like their mother, are cast aside in favour of the new family (Daoud, Shoham-Vardi, Urquia, & O'Campo, 2014).

After consulting with other Bedouin women organizations, in 2009, AJEEC decided to join MAAN (the Forum for Bedouin women organizations in the Negev consisting of nine Bedouin women organizations) and launch the Campaign Against Polygamy to publically address the social issues stemming from this practice.

The campaign had three main goals:

1. **Internal and External Awareness**: Expose the Bedouin community and the government to polygamy's negative consequences for women's status and family health

2. **Internal Advocacy**: Advocate against the conservative forces such as the religious leaders and the traditional leaders of the Bedouin community who support the practice

3. **External Accountability**: Hold the government accountable to enforcing national law which forbids polygamy as a state offense

To initiate the campaign, MAAN organized a national conference on polygamy and invited all internal (within the community) and external (outside the community) stakeholders. External stakeholders included legal representatives and government officials. Internal stakeholders included local government representatives, religious leaders, representatives from the Islamic movement, and the heads of various Bedouin tribes.

The conference opened with a presentation from a Bedouin social worker and staff member of AJEEC who discussed the social repercussions of polygamy within the

Bedouin community. This presentation was followed by a testimony from a woman who approached the government when her husband had abandoned her for his second wife and had received no assistance for this grievance.

AJEEC invited all women who participated in AJEEC's programs to attend the conference and even organized transportation to facilitate their attendance. Many women from AJEEC's programs attended and actively criticized polygamy during the conference. The next day, local newspapers reported that AJEEC is inciting Bedouin women to rebel against Islam and community traditions. A week later, a second article in the national Arabic newspaper appeared accusing AJEEC's director of cooperating with the West to destroy Islamic traditions in the name of female empowerment.

The weeks following the conference, AJEEC's director and one of the women who participated in the conference received daily death threats from an anonymous caller. Furthermore, programs participants started calling the organization saying that their husbands or brothers forbade them from participating in any of AJEEC's programs or in social advocacy of any kind. One of the heads of the tribes threatened to close three of the early childhood centers operating in his community if AJEEC continued with their campaign against polygamy.

In addition, one of the Imams called the organization to disclose that several Imams had planned to preach against the campaign and against the women who organized it at the upcoming Friday service.

To minimize the conflict with the community, AJEEC held a consultation meeting with one of the mayors who was also a member of the Islamic movement and who works closely with AJEEC on other projects. This mayor invited an Imam to the meeting where AJEEC presented their position on polygamy, explaining that they are not fighting against Islam and traditional practices but protecting families—the mainstay of a healthy society and a tenet of Islam. The Imam then asked AJEEC to write this interpretation into a sermon for the Friday service and that he will encourage the other Imams to use this text.

The next Friday, this Imam and three others, used this sermon. One of the mosques, however, spoke out against women organizations and their campaign. In 2012, AJEEC formalized its work with the Imams by establishing the Imams Forum to facilitate AJEEC's work around women's issues. As for the practice of polygamy, although this issue is ongoing, it is now part of public discourse.

EVENT IV

The Gaza War 2009—the Case of Political Action

Background

The Gaza War, also known as Operation Cast Lead, was a three-week armed conflict that took place in the Gaza Strip that began on December 27th 2008 and ended in a unilateral ceasefire on January 18th 2009. As mentioned in the previous chapter, AJEEC's offices are located in Beer Sheva—40 kilometres from Gaza Strip—and were therefore under threat from the rocket fire from Gaza. This conflict triggered tensions within the organization between the Arab-Jewish staff members and between AJEEC and its partners.

Impact within the Organization

Unearthing tensions between the Arab and Jewish staff

As an Arab-Jewish organization, AJEEC's staff were personally invested in the war: three Jewish staff members' children were serving in the army and the majority of the Arab-Bedouin staff had family members living in Gaza. During the first two days of the war, AJEEC's operations were put on hold. On the third day, AJEEC's co-executive directors organized a day-long workshop with the aim of providing a safe space for the staff to discuss the situation, its implications for the organization, and to decide on how, in light of the situation, the organization should proceed.

The staff agreed to issue a position paper condemning acts of violence. Although intended to unite the staff, the policy paper provoked a debate about whether to call the conflict the "invasion of Gaza" or the "Gaza war" which unearthed deep-seated tensions

between the Arab and Jewish national narrative. These tensions led AJEEC to revisit the organization's basic tenets: equality and cooperation between the Palestinian minority and the Jewish majority in Israel, the need for Arab-Jewish partnerships, and AJEEC's vision of a pluralistic, democratic Israel that ensures equal rights for all citizens.

A core component of the discussion revolved around distinguishing between social rights and indigenous rights. Many Jewish staff members were concerned that granting indigenous Arab-Israelis land ownership would threaten the future of the Jewish state; many of the Arab-Bedouin staff were concerned that their citizenship status (their social rights) does not grant them the political equality that their Jewish counterparts enjoy. Most of the Jewish staff defined social rights as rights granted on the basis of citizenship status such as access to health services, education, employment, and political participation, and the right to vote. Indigenous rights refer to the right to land-ownership.

Most of the Arab-Bedouin staff explained that without providing full recognition to the unrecognized Bedouin villages based on their indigenous rights, services such health and education would not be enough to build shared societies. One of the Jewish staff who expressed disappointment at her Arab colleagues' position pointed out that political rights would mean the end of the Jewish state and "if Arabs and Jews want to live together you [Bedouins] should compromise these rights."

The discussion intensified and created deeper rifts between the Arab and the Jewish staff. One of the Bedouin staff members declared that he would not sit at the same table with a Jew. Another leading staff member left the discussion accusing AJEEC of "serving government interests by freeing the state from its responsibility towards the Bedouin community." This divisive atmosphere hindered the organization from reaching a mutual agreement on AJEEC's position statement about the ongoing war. The staff also posted politically sensitive content on their personal social media sites. For example, some staff members openly supported the Israeli Defense Force while others supported Hamas.

In attempts to ease these tensions, AJEEC organized a two-day retreat facilitated by one Jewish and one Arab professional conflict resolution coach. The aim of this retreat was to re-establish a sense of community by discussing the staff's common goals and the minimum level of understanding required for them to work together.

During this retreat, the staff recognized that they do not agree on the following: the definition of the Jewish state and the concept of "the right of return". The facilitators nevertheless helped the staff recognize their common goals: ensuring social rights and providing services in all the unrecognized villages, creating shared communities in Israel, encouraging active citizenship, and fostering equal rights for all citizens.

External Tensions

Partnerships with the Government Threatened

During this conflict, AJEEC received a call from the Ministry of Education asking AJEEC to refrain from sending any Jewish volunteers to Bedouin schools or any Bedouin volunteers to Jewish schools in order to "prevent furthering tensions between the volunteers and the school children.*"* (The Community Volunteering gap year program brings two recent high school graduates—one Arab and one Jewish—to volunteer together in Jewish and Bedouin elementary schools.) AJEEC ignored the education minister's request, arguing that the program aims to promote Arab-Jewish partnership and reduce segregation.

In response to the ministry's request, the volunteers organized a protest against the war in which they criticized the IDF's acts of violence in Gaza. During the protest, the Palestinian flag was raised by one of AJEEC's volunteers. Later in the same week, AJEEC received a letter from the General Director of the Ministry of Education threatening to suspend their partnership with the organization—which would result in shutting down AJEEC's volunteer program in 32 schools—because "our mission and objectives [those of the Ministry of Education] are not aligned with your [AJEEC] objectives" (see appendix).

AJEEC then called a steering committee meeting to discuss ways to minimize the risk of ending the partnership. AJEEC also asked school principals to send emails and letters commenting on the importance of the program for their schools. Furthermore, AJEEC also organized a meeting with the general director of the Ministry of Education in order to explain AJEEC's position regarding the protest.

At the meeting the general director expressed her disappointment and sense of betrayal at the fact that the organization took a political stance on current events, an action she considered at odds with AJEEC's professionalism: "I know you are professional...I opened my door to you and usually I don't open the door for NGOs. I feel you betrayed me by doing this which is against our policy of criticizing the government…*"* She expressed that the ministry *"*can't work with any organization who would stand against the government since we are also part of the government."

In response, AJEEC began by explaining that the volunteers organized without AJEEC's direct support or involvement. Nevertheless, as an organization that promotes youth civil engagement, AJEEC could not, in good faith, stop the volunteers from protesting. In order to pacify the minister's threat, AJEEC outlined its partnerships with other ministers, the program's achievements in the past nine years (including improved academic performance in the 32 schools and other informal education initiatives such as leadership training, chess clubs, and soccer teams.) AJEEC also presented all the initiatives in which the Minister of Education is involved in including the single-mothers catering program (a program in which the General Director played a key role in launching). AJEEC also explained its theory of change, highlighting the importance of creating opportunities for both Jews and Arabs to critically explore their respective and collective identities as a sustainable means for coexistence. While the meeting was initially arranged to save the partnership, the General Director ultimately asked to expand the ministry's involvement with AJEEC. Strengthening this partnership later led to the initiation of a new program

called “Negev for All” that expanded the volunteer program to Bedouin and Jewish high schools.

EVENT V

The Prawer Plan - September 2011

Background

In September 2011, the Israeli government approved the Prawer Plan, a five-year policy plan to relocate 30,000 to 40,000 Bedouins from the unrecognized villages to the townships (in effect, concentrating 30% of the Negev’s population on 1% of the region). The cabinet approved 1.2 billion NIS for the implementation process, which included relocation, settlement, and monetary compensation for giving up land ownership in the unrecognized villages. Funding was also allocated to an economic development program focusing on Bedouin women and youth which included the development of industrial zones and the establishment of employment and professional training centers (Tamari, Katoshevski, Karplus, & Dinero, 2016).

Two years prior to the approval of the Prawer Plan (in 2009), AJEEC was approached by Ehud Prawer and his team to organize a consultation forum and a study tour in order to better understand the issues facing the Bedouin minority, and particularly those facing the Bedouin in the unrecognized villages. AJEEC agreed to cooperate with the Prawer team on the condition that the latter take the recommendations made by the forum into account. The Prawer team agreed not to draft any policies without directly consulting AJEEC and other stakeholders in the Bedouin community. After this agreement, AJEEC invested numerous hours consulting the Prawer team on problem identification, best-practices, and solutions for the Bedouin issue.

After a two-year hiatus in communication, AJEEC learned from the media that the Prawer Plan was being brought before the Knesset to pass as a law (Mihlar, 2011). Upon

reviewing the proposed plan, the organization was shocked that many of AJEEC's proposals were not taken into account. In response, AJEEC formed a coalition with Shatil[39] and the Follow Up Bedouin Committee (FUBC) to campaign against the implementation of the plan.

The aim of the campaign was to 1) raise awareness about the plan's implications 2) gain media attention in the hopes of pressuring the government to halt this legislation and 3) mobilize the community to demonstrate against the plan.

On October 6th 2011, this coalition successfully organized a massive demonstration, mobilizing the largest number of people in Bedouin history since the establishment of the State. In reaction to this demonstration, the government nominated Minister B. Begin to hold a hearing process to modify the plan so the Bedouins in the Naqab-Negev will accept it.

As the coordinator of the campaign, I suggested meeting with the Minister personally to present the plan's problematic components and to propose an alternative. The (Follow-Up Bedouin Committee) FUBC rejected this suggestion in favour of boycotting communication with the government altogether and consequently split off from the coalition. Nevertheless, AJEEC, Shatil, and the Association for Civic Rights in Israel (ACRI)[40] met with the minister as suggested.

In July 2012, I left the organization and the role of co-executive director was filled by Kher Elbaz. The FUBC and other forces decided to escalate the campaign, adopting outsider tactics such as demonstrations and massive protests. At this stage, AJEEC's leadership team resigned from its coordination role but remained in the coalition and continued proposing an alternative plan through official negotiations with the government. Externally, the Arab community leadership blamed AJEEC for "dividing" the Arab community and cooperating with the government. The head of the Supreme Follow-Up

[39] Shatil is the operating arm of the New Israel Fund whose mandate is to building a just, democratic, and shared society in Israel. http://english.shatil.org.il/our-vision/
[40] http://www.acri.org.il/en/

Committee of Arabs in Israel (SFUCAI) published a position statement warning the community not to cooperate with AJEEC. Internally, while AJEEC's the leadership refused to engage in outside tactics, AJEEC's staff and the volunteers, however, continued to play a crucial role in mobilizing the masses for political action and community resistance. Some of the staff and volunteers ignored the leadership's decision and continued to invest their office working hours in coordinating resistance activities. In addition, the staff financed ten buses to transport protesters to various demonstrations. Moreover, some of these demonstrations were organized without a license and put AJEEC at risk of losing its operating ("Amota") license. AJEEC received phone calls from Security Services warning the organization that it will lose its operating license and government funding. Then, the Education Minister contacted the organization threatening to revoke their partnerships and subsequent funding if AJEEC "continues to risk the volunteers' lives" by participating in "unlicensed and violent demonstrations." AJEEC's leadership then decided to help AJEEC's activists and volunteers establish their own organization in order for them to continue protesting against the Prawer Plan as a separate entity. In 2013, this organization entitled Al-Herak Alshbabi, was established. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's office contacted AJEEC's leadership to propose that AJEEC implement the employment and professional training components of the Prawer Plan. This offer again posed further tensions within the organization. This offer raised this main question: in spite of the organization's fundamental rejection of the Prawer Plan, should the organization cooperate with the government on implementing the employment components for which the organization had been advocating for years? The organization was divided into two main camps: one side encouraged AJEEC to "take the money" since "it is our right" or "take the money since it is only directed to projects and it doesn't have anything to do with the land ownership and the evacuation of the villages." The other voice, mainly that of the young Bedouin staff and activists, retorted with: "we can't support the policy of the "carrot" and the "stick" and "we can't stand against our people."

Finally, AJEEC decided to turn its back on the government's offer explaining to the general director that they cannot accept the funds as long as they are coming from the Prawer Plan administration.

CHAPTER 5: RESULTS I—IDENTIFYING THE TENSIONS

Overview

The findings of this study are presented in Chapter 5 and 6 focuses on the tensions that occurred during AJEEC's five major events (described in the previous chapter); Chapter 6 presents the responses and the ways in which AJEEC managed these tensions. These findings are presented according to the three organizational dimensions defined in the conceptual framework (missing and ideology, resource availability, and organizational structure).

Chapter 5 comprises of two main sections: the first section presents AJEEC's complexity as described by the study participants; the second section presents the *cross cutting themes* which I refer to as major themes that appear in at least *two* of the major events. These themes emerged from the 31 individual interviews, the organization's official and unofficial documents, and from my personal notebook detailing my experience as the founder and co-executive director of the organization. These tensions are presented in Table (7) in the end of this chapter along with related concepts for each. A presentation of the major themes and quotes from the data to support the themes are also provided. The

themes are presented according to the organizational dimensions defined in the conceptual framework.

AJEEC's Complexity

To grasp the depth of the tensions AJEEC faced, the staff emphasized the need to first understand AJEEC's mission, structure, and organizational identity. The findings showed that the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy work are shaped by AJEEC's complex internal and external environment. According to a 2009 Midot[41] report, AJEEC is "a complex organization that is dealing with a complex environment."

All 15 staff interviewees discussed the organization's complexity explaining that the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy are not the only tensions that the organization faces. The head of the economic development department explained that there are different sources of tensions within the organization.

He said:

…if it is not because of our advocacy work, it will be because of our women empowerment program, if it is not because of that then it is because we are an Arab Jewish team working together…

The co-executive directors confirmed that AJEEC is a microcosm of: Jewish-Arab relations, State-indigenous minority relations, and the internal relations within the Bedouin community.

The Bedouin co-executive director said:

We are not only a social change organization, we are an Arab-Jewish organization. We work internally to change our own community but also we are challenging the political structure.

[41] Midot is a non-profit organization (NPO) that rates NPOs according to their effectiveness and impact in order to provide social investors and NPO leaders with objective analysis reports. See: http://www.midot.org.il

The director of the Resources Development Center (RDC) explained the complex tensions that arise from AJEEC's internal complexities and the interlinked relations with the complex external socio-political context. He emphasized the organization's vulnerable position saying:

We are a very weird animal in the Negev. We are not an Arab organization nor a Jewish organization, we are not a women's organization nor a men's organization, we are not an advocacy organization nor a service organization, simply we do not fit anything people know and expect. We are all of these. And thus we offer too many doors for the storm [tensions] to break through.

The youth programs' director also expressed this sentiment. He said:

We are constantly under attack. One time they say people who are led by a women are not good, another time they say we are traitors because we are the "co-existence sellers", another time they say we are cooperating with the government while it destroys our people's houses. On the other hand, the government attacks us saying that we are producing extremism because we teach the kids about their Palestinian identity. Another time they [the community] said you worked with the government when we mobilized against the evacuation of Alaraqib[42] village…we are not safe in anyone's lap.

These quotes present the complex reality in which AJEEC operates. The tensions that arise from combining advocacy and service provision are embedded within four interlinked layers which underscore the organization's complexity.

First, AJEEC is an Arab-Jewish organization operating within an ongoing Arab-Jewish national conflict. By "Arab-Jewish", the data pointed to two elements; First, to AJEEC's mission of promoting Arab-Jewish cooperation as expressed by AJEEC's mission statement:

AJEEC seeks to promote cooperation between Arabs and Jews based on equality and empowerment of the minority that lives and works within the state and the society shaped by the Jewish majority. Joint efforts will make it possible to lay the foundation for the development of a true democracy in Israel and foster the advancement of both populations.

[42] An unrecognized village that was evacuated more than 90 times by the Israeli government.

The chairman explained the organization's commitment to promoting Arab-Jewish cooperation and how this joint mission, within the ongoing national conflict between both communities, gives rise to profound tensions. He said:

…we are Jews and Arabs here [in the Naqab-Negev]…we are sharing the same space …to make it better for both of us, we are convinced that we have to work together...but we are aware of the challenges that this idea creates.

The second Arab-Jewish element is the organization's staff, which consists of employees from the Arab-Bedouin and Jewish community, and the organization's leadership, which consists of one Arab-Bedouin and one Jewish director. The director of the RDC provided the following explanation as to why the organization works as Arabs and Jews together:

The times where Jews are "helping" the Bedouins are over now. AJEEC is providing a model were we [Arabs and Jews] work together to promote both communities…no one is doing any favour to the other...this is our shared responsibility.

Similarly, the head of the VT said:

We [Arabs and Jews] are in it together…there is no point to work separately. Yes, we do we fight …we disagree…but this is part of who we are.

Second, AJEEC has a feminist orientation. According to the head of the VT, AJEEC is an organization that decided from its inception to be feminist-oriented, meaning that the organization deals with gender relations and challenges the structures of patriarchal domination.

The head of the VT explained:

We are committed to women's issues because they [women] are the most marginalized and excluded. We are aware of the fact that we are dealing with one of the most sensitive issues in my community [the Bedouin community]… we know that we are playing with fire here and we have to make sure we don't burn our fingers.

According to AJEEC's annual reports, the major benefactors of AJEEC's programming are women and girls from the Bedouin community. The participation of women in AJEEC's programming is not only a consequence of the organization's feminist orientation but also due to the fact that women and girls are the most marginalized with regards to all the issues

that the organization actively targets (public health, economic empowerment, and early childhood education). The Community Volunteer Gap Year program's slogan is:

Look around you, who is ("Al-Daheia") the victim of housing demolitions…Women. Who is the victim of killing in the name of family "honour"...Women.

The interviewees from AJEEC's staff and stakeholders also agreed that elevating the status of Bedouin women is central to the organization's mandate. Following the arson of the Volunteer Tent in 2011—an act of retaliation against AJEEC for encouraging the girls in the community to stand up for their rights—the VT director stated:

We will never be able to promote our community [the Bedouin community] if we don't challenge our own patriarchy

The youth coordinator emphasized AJEEC's women empowerment agenda saying:

When I talk about changing policies that oppress me as a woman, I don't just mean the government…I also mean the community itself. Our mission is to challenge the structures of power and domination whether internally within the community or externally against the Israeli government.

Third, AJEEC's social change approach is based on an integrative model of combining service provision and advocacy as its fundamental approach to social change. AJEEC's operational model consists of dealing with the community's immediate needs while addressing the underlying issues that resulted in these needs not being met. This approach sits at the core of AJEEC's mission statement, which calls for, "…the achievement of holistic, sustainable change by linking the actual needs and issues to the policy level" (AJEEC's mission statement, 2005).

Advocacy and service provision are inseparable components of AJEEC's work as emphasized by the former director of the Early Childhood Department:

In the context in which we operate, we don't have the luxury of engaging only in advocacy…our people are lacking basic needs...we have to address these needs

The director of the RDC used his hands to show how it works. He said:

Our model is based on the idea of one hand working while the other hand is fighting. ("yad ta'amal w yad totaleb" (Arabic))

.

Lastly, AJEEC operates within the ongoing Arab-Jewish conflict zone. Whether it's the ongoing national conflict between Israelis and Palestinians resulting in violent outbreaks in Gaza or the West Bank, or confrontations between the Bedouin community and the Israeli government over land rights, AJEEC is operating under the daily threat of violence and war. Moreover, AJEEC's offices are located in the city of Beer Sheva, forty kilometres from the Gaza strip, and therefore at risk of rocket fire during especially tense times. In all these ways, the organization operates in a war zone.

The Jewish co-director explained:

We live under a constant threat…sometimes it's coming from outside [Gaza] …other times it's in the front yard during village evacuations.

The study participants described how these complexities simultaneously threaten the organization's very existence and how various tensions that arise from service provision and advocacy might be fuelled by one or more of AJEEC's elements described above.

The former co-executive director explained AJEEC's multifaceted—internal and external—challenges:

To run an organization like AJEEC, you have to be prepared for potential conflicts every day…sometimes it's the head of the tribe who is mad because we organized a women's conference, other times it's the government who is angry because we send kids to a demonstration, another time it is the donor who didn't receive the narrative report on time, or a staff member who feels we are not doing enough to stop housing demolition….. there is always another issue.

To summarize this section, AJEEC complexity rests on these four tenets: AJEEC as an Arab-Jewish organization; AJEEC as a organization with a feminist orientation; AJEEC's integrative approach of linking service provision and advocacy; and AJEEC operating within a war zone. Later in the chapter, I will demonstrate how these internal complexities play out and are fuelled by external factors.

The next section discusses the major themes and concepts that emerged within three organizational dimensions:

1. **Mission and Ideology**: 1. Social Services vs. Political Rights and 2. Competing Powers
2. **Resource Availability**: 3. Funding Restrictions and Barriers and 4. Conflicting Legitimacies
3. **Organizational** S**tructure**: 5. Hierarchical Accountability

Contextual Tensions

1. Mission and Ideology

We operate within a minefield:
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict,
the state's power over the Bedouin minority
and the patriarchal society
Bedouin co-executive director

The findings emphasized the role of the political and social contexts as the prime culprits shaping AJEEC's internal and external tensions, specifically the tensions related to the political ramifications of the Bedouin community within the national Israeli context and the social ramifications of the patriarchal social structure within the Bedouin community. The internal policies of oppression refer to the Bedouin patriarchy's formal and informal codes that oppress women (the social policies). The external policies of oppression refer to the Israeli government's formal and informal policies that deny the Bedouin community equal social and political rights and thus perpetuate the marginalization of the Bedouin community (the political policies). Ideological disagreements, restrictions in funding, government regulations on AJEECs' work, and fiscal uncertainty were identified as factors that altered the organization's internal and external structures, they also challenged AJEEC's ability to manage service provision and advocacy activities as one holistic approach to social change.

The contextual tensions and their resulting effects on maintaining the integrative approach are presented below:

1.1 Social Services vs. Political Rights

The concept of "equality" is one of the tenets of AJEEC's mission.

*AJEEC strives to promote **equality** and empowerment of the Bedouin community of the Negev in particular and the Palestinian minority in Israel in general, **equality** in all areas of life: economy, education, health, housing – and no less, inclusion in the main areas of focus of political, bureaucratic, and legal power.* (AJEEC's mission workshop, 2009)

The War on Gaza, the Prawer Plan, and the Community Volunteering versus National Service issue all revealed a fundamental disagreement amongst the staff members regarding the definition of *equality*. The diverse views brought up the following questions: *what does equality for the Bedouin minority in Israel entail? And, does equality include political rights?*

The disagreement centered around whether equality for the Bedouin minority meant access to social *and* political rights. This disagreement was a source of internal tension (between AJEEC's staff Bedouin and Jewish staff) and external tension (between AJEEC and its stakeholders).

According to an interview with the researcher in 2009, these tensions shook the base of AJEEC's mission and ideology:

When we first put together the mission, we included all the great ideas we envisioned for our communities. Also we wanted to make it as wide as possible so we don't leave anything out. We never discussed what does it mean exactly…we were so excited and eager to work together especially during that time [October events]… we wanted to present a more inclusive vision for Arabs and Jews in Israel. We wanted to show that there is hope...besides we didn't really know each other at that time…we knew that we are for Arab-Jewish equal rights but we didn't discuss what is equality, what form of rights…because if we do, we might lose each other. (Interview in Gawerc, 2010)

The Jewish chairman expressed that until the war hit, she took the fact that the staff had a shared mission for granted. She described how shocked she was when she discovered how diverse their views are regarding basic assumptions such as "equality". She said:

During the war I realized how deep the rift is between us … we say something but we mean another thing... for example, I never thought about the difference between political equality and social equality... I treated them equally until I heard the Bedouin staff's interpretations and aspirations…for me it [equality] meant equal services for the Bedouin but they strive for more than that…for them it's land ownership and other rights that they call "political rights".

Even though the mission statement includes "power sharing" and achieving political rights for the Bedouin community through advocacy, the staff fundamentally disagree that "equality" refers to securing social rights for the community which entails providing services while addressing the root causes of the Bedouin community's systematic oppression as an indigenous group.

The documents of the organization clearly stated the need for both forms of equality. The former Jewish chairman stated the following regarding AJEEC's commitment to social and political equality:

Equality means equality in all fields of life...the Bedouin community has the right to enjoy the same rights as the Jewish majority, including political rights. I know that this will be a great challenge for the organization to promote. (AJEEC mission documents, 2006)

The War on Gaza unearthed this issue and created a wave of anger amongst the Arab-Bedouin and Jewish staff. According to the Bedouin co-executive director, the source of tension is grounded in each sides' ideological beliefs. He explained:

The distinction between social rights and political rights stems from the indigenous nature of the Bedouin minority…there is an issue with granting the Bedouins political rights…for many people this means the end of Israel as a Jewish state…Many Jews in Israel understand equality for the Bedouin minority as providing social services...this is very challenging for us as an Arab-Jewish organization

The same notion appears in AJEEC's documents:

Political rights stem from the Bedouin's identity as both belonging to the Palestinian minority and also as an indigenous minority in Israel whose rights regarding land ownership and collective historical rights have been denied since the state of Israel was established. (AJEEC's workshop summary, 2009)

Despite the statements and the written documents that emphasize AJEEC's commitment to promote equal social and political rights, the data revealed that the staff

still hold different views regarding Bedouin indigenous rights, Bedouin ownership over land, and the institutionalized discrimination of the Bedouin.

The interviewees recognized that their different views around political versus social equality was one of the ongoing tensions they have been facing. The following quotations illustrate how these interviewees perceived the ideological tensions around political and social rights.

The fundraising coordinator who joined the organization just three days after the War on Gaza began said:

I remember that day...I just arrived and boom into this workshop. I saw a group of Arabs and Jews screaming at each other, fighting, crying...I said "oh my god where did I land?" … I always wanted to make Alyia but I was afraid…I didn't want to raise my kids in a place of segregation and war…but because of the Arab-Jewish school in Beer Sheva and AJEEC I decided that I want to be part of this…here I am sitting among people that I felt that day that they have nothing in common….[one of the Arab-Bedouin staff] wanted to change the definition of the State so it is no longer a "Jewish state" ...I felt not safe…uncomfortable …I wanted to leave…and after 9 years, I'm still here.

The facilitator of Arab-Jewish narrative exchange program commented on the disagreement regarding social versus political rights saying:

It has been always an issue when we bring Arabs and Jews together ...the Jews refuse to make a direct connection between full equality for the Bedouin minority including land ownership…they [Jews]speak to equality as equal social rights not including political rights

The Bedouin youth coordinator said:

I thought that my Jewish colleagues joined us because they believe in my rights… but they only wanted "industrial quiet" [passivity] they didn't mean real equality. What does equality mean if I can't enjoy the same rights as a Jewish citizen?

Although this unresolved issues does not disrupt the organization's daily operations, during moments of crisis, this deep-seated disagreement threatens the organization's ability to continue its integrative social change approach.

In the words of the Bedouin co-executive director:

We know that we work together to promote projects that sit on the common ground we do share, but we know also that we have disagreements around basic principles such as

"equality"… during conflicts and political crises, these unresolved issues come to the surface and we fall on right on one of those mines

Although the interviewees considered service provision as essential to achieving equal status for the Bedouin community, they also expressed that they have different perceptions of the concept of "political rights". For the Jewish staff who adhere to the ideology of Israel as a Jewish state, granting political equality to the Bedouin minority threatens the very notion of a Jewish state.

One of the Jewish board members of AJEEC argued that:

The Bedouin are entitled to full equality such as education, employment, and health services, just as any other minority in the world...such as the Turkish minority in Germany

This statement reveals another facet of the disagreement. 8 out of 11 of the Bedouin members of the organization who participated in the study do not see the Bedouin community as "any minority" but as a minority which is "indigenous to the land".

One of the Arab-Bedouin interviewees explained:

My Jewish colleagues are all for equal rights but God forbid if I ask for land ownership.

The Jewish coordinator of GY program pointed out that granting political rights to the Bedouin minority might violate her right for a Jewish State:

I was shocked when one of the Arab staff said that the Palestinian minority would never be granted full equality unless Israel becomes a state for all its citizens. For me this means that I give up on Israel as a Jewish state, which is hard for me to accept.

When the interviewees were asked whether this ideological disagreement impacted their ability to maintain their integrative social change approach, the director of the RDC answered:

Of course this has a huge impact on our integrative model, the government does not welcome our advocacy work that relates to the recognition of the unrecognized villages and promotes the issue of land ownership for the Bedouin minority. The government and some of the mainstream Jewish foundations refuse to give us money to build kindergartens in Awajan [unrecognized village] because the village is considered "illegal" by the state.

Nevertheless, both AJEEC's Bedouin and Jewish staff agreed that providing and advocating for equal *social rights* such as education, employment, housing, and health services was central to AJEEC's mission. One of the coordinators confirmed:

Our work has no meaning if we are not helping people receive basic services…there is no question about this...we can't allow for a situation where Bedouins are denied basic services

As for political rights, the interviewees from AJEEC expressed diverse views about engaging in the promotion of equal political rights. They explained that profound tensions arise mainly when AJEEC is leading political campaigns that focus on land and issues. The Bedouin co-executive director expressed:

When we focus on social rights—I mean services—everyone is happy… the problem is when we engage in political action, which that deals with the political rights and the political status of the Bedouin minority

The data showed that AJEEC "consciously" links social rights with advocacy work whereas political action applies for political rights. One of the interviewees said:

We are ready to negotiate and partner with the government in everything. It is the government who doesn't want to talk with us about land ownership.

The interviewees from AJEEC's staff reported that they mostly engage in political action (demonstration and protests) on issues such as housing demolition. The head of the VT said:

We know how to advocate for services. We always present an alternative to the situation and negotiate with the government but there are certain issues that we have to mobilize for political action…on these issues [the land issues] we have difficulties with the government.

Leading political action while advocating for policy change created tensions between AJEEC and the government. The representative of the employment ministry shared his concerns about AJEEC "wearing different hats":

I don't understand [f's] behaviour. Last week we had a great meeting and we agreed on everything, and yesterday I received a call telling me that [f] is participating in an aggressive protest against us [the government]…you have to choose. You can't dance at all the weddings...

Moreover, connecting the issue of land ownership to the greater issue of Palestinian identity further complicated the tensions between the Jewish and the Arab staff. Regarding

AJEEC's involvement in a demonstration against housing demolitions, one of the Jewish staff members asked:

Why do they [the Bedouin staff] have to raise the Palestinian flag during demonstrations?

Despite that the majority of the Arab-Bedouin staff linked social and political rights, one of the Bedouin staff expressed her discomfort with this position:

I don't understand why we complicate the situation. Why can't we just be grateful for what the state is providing us...why can't we focus on the work…I don't want to be engaged in demonstrations…I am here to help people

Even AJEEC's documentation reflects the tensions between political and social rights. The following paragraphs show different wording that the organization used to communicate with different stakeholders. This paragraph is from a proposal that AJEEC sent to the Ministry of Education:

*The project aims to promote the statues of the Bedouin **community** in all fields of life such as education, health, and employment and to **bridge the gaps** between Jewish society and the Bedouin community (translated from Hebrew)*

The same idea is presented here in a proposal sent to the EU:

*The project aims to promote the status of the **indigenous** Bedouin **minority** in Israel and to promote **human rights and equality** in all fields of life such as education…*

The grant writer commented on this point, saying:

When I write to the government, I don't talk about political rights...I don't use the term "indigenous minority". I use "social rights". When I write to a foundation that supports indigenous rights, I definitely use the term.

AJEEC's mission to link political with social rights presented many challenges for the majority of the Jewish interviewees who fully agreed with providing social rights but were reluctant to share the ownership of the land, a mindset which directly influenced their perception of the integration of advocacy and service provision. The majority of the Jewish staff were fully committed to providing services to the Bedouin community, however, were hesitant to advocate for political equality and thus address the root causes plaguing the Bedouin community issue as an indigenous group.

1.2 Competing Powers

The findings illustrated that AJEEC operates within two power structures: the social power structure (male domination) and the political power structure (State domination). Both power structures elicited contextual factors that hinder AJEEC's advocacy work and impact AJEEC's ability to maintain its integrative approach. One of the co-executive directors described the impact of these two power structures in the following way:

On one hand, we are dealing with the community. On the other hand, we work to change government policy but many times the most difficult issues to deal with are when these two reinforce each other at the expense of the people.

This section first examines each power structure and later demonstrates the interwoven relationship between the State domination structure and the male domination structure.

First, within the State domination paradigm, the Bedouin indigenous minority is viewed through two lenses: the demographic lens (the State's mandate to maintain a Jewish majority) and the security-threat lens. Governmental policies are enacted through these two lenses which, according to the interviewees, challenge the organization to address exclusionary policies. One interviewee explained:

The discrimination against us is not "by accident". There is a whole system making sure that Bedouins remain invisible. Every time we try to bring this up, the government and the right wing Israelis will try to de-legitimize our work.

Similarly, a staff member said:

We know that land and security are the foundation of the State so our advocacy campaign to stop the Prawer Plan was considered anti-government. The Ministry of Education called us twice to withdraw from the campaign. They said you can't work with us and at the same time protest against the government.

Confirming this point, the Bedouin co-executive director shared that the government representatives put him under significant pressure, threatening to discontinue AJEEC's programs if the organization did not cease its involvement in the anti-Prawer Plan

demonstrations.

Second, within the structure of male domination, women are the most marginalized and excluded (Abdo, 1994). For example, practices such as polygamy, gender-based violence, and killing in the name of family "honour" are common within the Bedouin minority.

The head of VT shared her own experience regarding the community's reaction when she led a discussion on polygamy:

Every time we touch such issues related to the status of women, we are under fire… even my mother is angry with me about raising these issues. It is very hard to change things that are so rooted in the community.

Within the social context, AJEEC's integrated service provision and advocacy approach provides women with services in order to empower them to advocate against the patriarchal institutions that oppress them in the first place. The coordinator of the economic development for women explained:

You are supervised 24/7. As a young girl, it is your father. You grow into a young woman, it is your brother. Then you get married and it's your husband. And even when you are steps from your final destination your are still supervised, this time by your son.

Interviewees described that in order to address these "rooted and institutionalized practices", the integrative approach requires changing society's practices and attitudes regarding women's rights. The interviewees from AJEEC emphasized that achieving sustainable change is not possible without addressing oppressive social traditions and practices.

Within the organization, the interviews demonstrated that female staff members tend to focus on social advocacy whereas the male staff tend to focus on service provision. For example, the campaign against polygamy created tensions, internally among the staff mainly between the Bedouin females and the Bedouin males. In the words of one of the Volunteer Tent activists:

The organization is empowering us [women]...they teach us about our rights and encourage us to speak up but when we participated in the campaign against polygamy, they were angry…they even didn't back us up when the community leaders ran after us

The Bedouin co-executive director commented on the female staff's involvement in the Polygamy Campaign, expressing his disagreement on the approach to these issues:

The female staff wants to push us towards radical positions but we are committed to our approach where social change is a long process and we can't expect changes to happen over night

One of the male staff members provided another position on this issue. He stated:

I know that women suffer in my community but this is not the right time to fight against each other...we have to be one front against the state policies

The coordinator of the economic development for women said:

The men always will find a "good excuse" to try to convince us not to fight against them...we see this in all fields, they are happy with us getting jobs and helping them...they are happy with us bringing the money but they don't want us to decide how to spend it…

The quotes above demonstrate that within the organization, the female staff members pull the organization's focus towards social advocacy whereas the men pull it towards service provision.

The community accepts and even encourages the organization to provide services such as education and employment, however, AJEEC's attempts to advocate against the formal and informal policies of oppression entrenched within the community are met violent pushback. The campaign against polygamy also created external tensions between AJEEC and the community, in particular with the traditional leadership and the Islamic movement. According to one of the program directors:

The community is satisfied with the programs that provide young girls and women with employment and scholarships but not happy to see these women actively change their situation and change the power relations rooted within the community.

One of the study participants who took part in the conference on polygamy explained:

They [men] want us to keep silent...when they kill us in the name of their "honour" and when they marry us off without consent, we are numbers not human beings…not any more

One of AJEEC's organizational partners commented:

The majority of the community, including some of the open minded males, fiercely advocate for political equality within the context of a Bedouin minority existing within a Jewish-majority state, but do not advocate for gender equality within the context of the marginalization of women within the Bedouin community. They [Bedouin men] are reluctant to deal with the "real" issues facing women… they don't want to lose power… fighting against the state gives them power…advocating for women's right means pulling the carpet from underneath them

The scale of participation shook the foundation of the community's traditional Islamic and patriarchal codes. Community leaders were struck by the fact that the Bedouin women who participated in the conference on polygamy represented different ages, tribes, and villages, indicating to community leaders that women issues are no longer taboo. One of the Islamic leaders expressed his concern:

What worried me really that you [the researcher] were able to mobilize all kinds of women groups not only the educated and young students…to see a 57 year-old speaking …I said "we are done"

As a reaction, the conservative leaders threatened to cease participating in AJEEC's programs if they continued with their work "against" the community's traditions. For example, a father of one of the female volunteers forbid his daughter from participating in AJEEC's Volunteer Tent. When the CV program coordinator asked him about it he said:

I send my daughter to volunteer for her community in exchange for a scholarship. I don't send her to stand in the road and to protest…this is not acceptable.

The Director of the Parents as Partners (PP) program provided another layer to the tension between men and women in the Bedouin community. The director explained that the men themselves are under pressure from the conservative leadership to keep their wives criticizing the status quo:

…I told the husbands that their wives will be participating in public events, in addition to their work at the daycares. When they saw the Islamic movement's reaction against the campaign [polygamy campaign], they told their wives not to go to work until they settled the issue with me [the PP director].

Third study participants reported that when State domination and the male domination contexts are interlinked, they threaten the organization's existence and make it difficult for the organization to continue its female empowerment work. The VT director described that this interlinked relationship produced a "double oppression" for the Bedouin women:

We [women] are captive in two cycles of oppression: the community and the government. The males treat us as their property and the government treats us as invisibles…the traditions destroy our souls and the government destroys our homes.

Another female coordinator put it in the following way:

They [the state and the Bedouin patriarchy] perform their fights on our shoulders… they use us as if we are their soccer ball…none of them really care about us

Within this context of "two cycles of oppression", AJEEC attempts to influence all policies of oppression, those that exist internally and externally. As expressed by the director of the Volunteer Tent:

When I talk about changing policies that oppress me as a woman, I don't just mean the government…I also mean the community itself.

The tensions that arise from social advocacy and service provision become even more politically and socially loaded when AJEEC's attempts to bring about social change are aligned with the Israeli government's projects or mandates. For example, the fact that the AJEEC's campaign against polygamy took off exactly when the Minister of Welfare published his policy agenda on raising the status of Bedouin women by enforcing anti-polygamy laws, increased the tensions between AJEEC and the community leadership. In addition, the fact that AJEEC receives money from Jewish foundations to fund its social advocacy work (including women empowerment programs) further fuels these tensions. During the campaign against polygamy, the community leadership used these facts to attack AJEEC for "serving the state's agenda" and "cooperating with the West" to destroy Bedouin traditions. One of the AJEEC's partner organizations said:

You [AJEEC] were attacked not only because you empower women but also because you cooperate with the government…people don't trust the government and yet the government uses you to enter the very private sphere of the community…this is why people are angry at you

Another interviewee pointed out ways in which the government encourages AJEEC to advocate for equal rights for women but is not willingly to change its policies of oppression that deny the Bedouin community access to basic services:

The government wants you to fight against your own people but not against their polices of house demolition…they use women issues to weaken the front against them

This quote was representative of the community leadership general mistrust of the government focusing on women's issues. One of the mayors explained:

[the Bedouin] people have the right to doubt the government's real motivations. If it was true that they care about women, why do they destroy their houses and prevent them from accessing basic services such as water?

Similarly, a statement in the Sawat Alhaq newspaper noted this double standard in North American Jewish Federations' support of women issues:

These organizations promote their hidden agenda in the name of women empowerment …the government has double standards ...when it comes to women issues they all of a sudden care about you. But how come they leave the same women without water and electricity in the unrecognized village…They [the government] focus on women issues so we are too busy to be able to fight against them. (Newsaper Sawat Alhaq, 2009)

In sum, most of the interviewees from AJEEC expressed the following sentiment: both power structures—the social oppression of Bedouin women at the hands of a patriarchal community and the political oppression of the Bedouin community at the hands of an exclusionist state—threaten AJEEC's ability to engage in service provision and advocacy as an integrated approach to social change. Both systems—the community and the government—are willing to accept either service provision or advocacy but not the integrated approach of service provision *and* advocacy. Furthermore, the state and the community both demand change from one another but do not allow for structural change within their own systems and thus constrain AJEEC from actually transforming the space that contributes to the marginalization of Bedouin women in particular and of the Bedouin community in general.

2. Resource Availability

The findings demonstrated that every revenue source constrains the organization. According to the Jewish co-executive director:

For us to survive and thrive we need all kinds of resources but anyone who give us something needs something in exchange. For example, funders place numerous demands on us…each one has their own requirements and expectations and we have to make sure that we don't forget who we are in this "marathon" of chasing money.

Within the dimension of resource availability, the data pointed to 1) funding barriers and political restrictions; and 2) conflicting legitimacies as the two factors that impacted AJEEC's ability to maintain advocacy and service.

2.1. Funding Barriers and Political Restrictions

Up until 2013, AJEEC's funding model relied heavily (87%) on external funds, mainly from foreign governments and foundations (mainly in North America and Europe) (see appendix). During the last three years, government funding grew to 30% by 2016 (mainly to support the Early Childhood and the Volunteer Tent programs).

During the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, AJEEC started to explore receiving money from Israel's business community. In order to apply for Israel-based grants, AJEEC required a charitable tax status. The Tax Agency, however, had a policy which prohibited them from granting this status to organizations involved in advocacy and political action. AJEEC's application to receive this status was rejected because of their work in the unrecognized villages. The political context stipulates that the Israeli government considers these villages as illegal and therefore AJEEC's work providing services to those villages constitutes a controversial political action (AJEEC's official documents, 2009).
The Tax Agency agreed to grant AJEEC the tax status on the condition that AJEEC cease their activities in the unrecognized villages. These political restrictions challenged AJEEC's mission of promoting political equality (land recognition) to all citizens, including those in the unrecognized villages. The director of the Financial Department expressed:

We can't accept this condition [not to work in the unrecognized villages] since it is against our values and beliefs. We can't leave out the unrecognized villages…they deserve the same as the townships.

Similarly, one of the Jewish staff said:

The Bedouin community has the right to own land and their villages are entitled to be recognized by the State and thus to be provided all services such as water, electricity, education, healthcare…

Although everyone within the organization was ideologically opposed to the condition put forth by the tax agency, the concerns about the organization's financial stability—particularly its reliance on foreign funds—led to an argument about whether or not the organization should comply with the tax agency's condition. This situation was expressed in an argument between the previous chairman and the former co-executive director (the researcher):

Chairman*: Why can't we take the money and spend it in the township? There is also a great need there.*

Bedouin co-executive director (the researcher)*: ...And what about the unrecognized villages? What about our commitment? By accepting the Tax Agency's condition we are cooperating with and reinforcing exclusionary government policies and practices against the people in the unrecognized villages* (Minutes from board meeting 2008).

A similar argument took place amongst AJEEC's staff when AJEEC proposed the Community Volunteerism (CV) initiative as an alternative to the National Service (NS) program. In response to AJEEC's rejection of the NS program, the government threatened to cease funding for AJEEC's volunteer training courses and to re-assess their partnership on other joint initiatives. One of the Jewish Board Members spoke out in favour of accepting the NS program on the following grounds:

Once we accept the NS program we will be the leading implementer and will receive all the funds we need from the government to run our Volunteer Tent programs.

Most of AJEEC's Arab-Bedouin (13 out of 15) staff however, were firmly against supporting the NS government program (Protocol, 2009). The general manager of AJEEC's programs said:

…the Bedouin staff understood the essence of why we can't go with the National Service program…they understand the context and the political reasons...but most of our Jewish staff don't really understand what is the different between Community Volunteerism and National Service…they are not from the community...they don't understand the politics

The Jewish interviewees were unclear as to the reasons why the Arab-Bedouin members of the organization were opposed to the NS program. From their point of view, the government was offering a stable financial opportunity which appeared much more

attractive than having to chase down funds through private donations. According to the minutes from one of AJEEC's staff meetings, one Jewish member expressed:

I don't understand why we can't agree to partner with the government and receive the funds for the volunteers…what's the worry? At the end of the day, we decide what to do with the money and how to invest it. Who cares about the source? Even if it [the funds] comes from the Minister of Defense…this is still government money that Arab kids are entitled to. We do what we want with the money and we all agree that we want to promote volunteerism and citizenship.

The Bedouin staff interviewees reported that their Jewish colleagues did not fully understand their opposition to the NS program. The Jewish coordinator said:

For me, there is no difference between the money we receive from the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Defense ...all are governmental institutions.

One Bedouin interviewee clearly expressed the importance of moving the program from one ministry to the other:

For us the Ministry of Defense represents the military and we can't be identified with it …as part of the Palestinian people

This debate between the Bedouin and Jewish staff took place every staff and board meeting from 2008-2012. These disagreements demonstrated the misunderstanding of the political context that fuels the issue of volunteerism. The tensions came to a head during the War on Gaza. The war highlighted how the issue of volunteerism in the National Service program was intertwined with the Ministry of Defense. One interviewee explained:

We can't cooperate with the Minister of Defense who is killing our people and thus we have to reject the funds coming from the Minister of Defense to support the National Service

Again, the Jewish members of the organization still did not fully grasp the political tensions around the NS program. One of the Jewish staff said:

My kids are serving in Gaza, putting their lives at risk and yet you [Arabs] don't even want to do national service because of simple semantics.

These events also created tensions between AJEEC and its external environment. AJEEC's decision to offer the alternative CV program—instead of outright rejecting the NS program—caused a rift between AJEEC and the Herakuna Coalition, between AJEEC and its funders including the government, and between AJEEC and the Arab leadership. The

advocacy organizations within the Herakuna coalition criticized AJEEC for "caring more about the alternative plan" and not "fighting enough" against the NS program. A member of the Herakuna coalition explained:

I didn't feel that AJEEC even had a political change agenda. They presented an alternative program and that's it...although we came together to change the political agenda that drives the government… they care about the alternative plan more than really changing the way the government approaches us…we joined efforts with AJEEC to pressure the government into "civicizing" the militarized program… we are citizens not enemies that the system needs to "watch" through the lens of security and the Ministry of Defense…AJEEC's focus is on promoting the alternative plan...our focus is first to fight against the NS program

Another member of the Herakuna coalition explained how the government's military-focused agenda makes it impossible for Palestinian-Israeli organizations to accept the funding and the NS program:

We can't accept any money coming from the Ministry of Defense...we have a political issue that we have to resolve first

According to AJEEC, Herakuna's mandate was to shift the NS program from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Education. As expressed by one of AJEEC's representative at the Herakuna coalition:

Volunteerism is not a simple service but rather an opportunity to advocate for policy change and to change the government's attitude towards the Palestinian minority in Israel… my problem with some of Herakuna's members is that they first want to invest all of our energy in saying "no" to the government and later to start putting the alternative plan on the table…

AJEEC and Herakuna also had different approaches to promoting the alternative CV program. Herakuna wanted to first garner support for the alternative plan within the community and amongst the Arab leadership and later promote the plan through them. The Herakuna coordinator explained*:*

We first have to convince our leadership to adopt the alternative plan and they have to move it forward through lobbying and political work...we are here to support them to do this.

The leadership of the Arab community, however, was more aligned with Herakuna's approach of harnessing a unified effort against the NS program. During a panel discussion organized by Herakuna, MK Ayman Odeh said:

It is not about the service and the money, it is about what kind of service and under which agenda…so first we have to stop the NS program and then we will promote the alternative plan…AJEEC's work is weakening our campaign...they first have to join the campaign against NS

AJEEC's refusal to participate in the campaign created political obstacles that led to funding barriers. One of AJEEC'S funders who was in favour of the campaign against the government's NS program was unwilling to support AJEEC's alternative CV program, believing that they first needed to stop the NS program before promoting AJEEC's alternative CV program. AJEEC's RDC director said:

The EU clearly rejected our proposal because they support the campaign against NS.

At the same time, AJEEC's rejection of the NS program also created funding barriers between the organization and its more conservative funders. For example, when AJEEC approached one of its longstanding foreign Jewish foundations to continue its support for the CV program as an alternative to the government's NS program, the foundation refused to continue donating funds. The foundation explained that although this program was aligned with its vision, it could not support AJEEC because of the foundation's alliance with the government. Moreover, since AJEEC's community volunteering program had more candidates from the Bedouin minority than the government's national service program, the foundation believed that granting more funds to AJEEC's CV program would actively weaken the government program, as explained in an email correspondence between the foundation's CEO and the former co-executive director (the researcher):

Despite the fact that we truly believe in AJEEC's Alternative Community Volunteering program, we will not be able to fund it. We will be glad to reconsider it once AJEEC decides to work side-by-side with the government to promote the NS program in Arab society (Email, May 2009).

For the foundation, AJEEC's CV program was the most aligned with their vision but they could not support it because they had a commitment to support the Israeli government, which constituted a conflict of interest with AJEEC's program. The foundation operated through complementary alliances and match-making with the Israeli government. ("Match-

making" refers to alliances with private funders or with the government created around a policy or project based on ideological agreement and financial collaboration.)

One of the foundation's board members pointed out:

We believe in your program. We like the fact that this program was 'born' in the community and designed by the community but we can't support your project since its success would weaken the government's program. We can't allow this to happen.

Furthermore, this foundation drew upon its match-making agreement with the government to attempt to convince AJEEC to join the NS program:

If you join the NS program, we can offer you financial stability. For every Teken [volunteer spot] the government will give you, we will match the second Teken.

The War on Gaza and the Prawer Plan presented more explicit political limitations leading to funding barriers. Following the War on Gaza, the government passed the NGO Bill, which affected NGOs ability to raise funds for advocacy by limiting the funds raised from foreign governments. This legislation pushed AJEEC towards service provision. The general programs' director shared his concerns:

The government is watching now…we don't feel safe to participate in demonstrations not only because of funds but we're also afraid to lose our license.

The other political crisis that threatened AJEEC's engagement in advocacy was the Prawer Plan. As the organization leading the campaign against the Prawer Plan, one of AJEEC's co-executive directors received a call from the Intelligence Agency a night before the "Rage Day" demonstration. The agent asked AJEEC not to take part in the demonstration and threatened that they will lose their funding and the organization's "Eshor Amota" (licence to practice) if they do not comply with these orders. This incident instilled fear amongst AJEEC's leadership, as expressed by one of the co-executive directors:

We can't be engaged any more with political action…we can't participate in demonstrations against house demolitions…I am afraid now that they will arrest someone from the staff.

One of the co-executive directors explained how the government uses its political power to restrict political action, saying:

In this antagonistic and hostile environment where the government and right wing organizations are harassing organizations who participate in any action against governmental policies, we have to think a million times before we take the street…I can't risk losing funds from the government

Staff who are engaged in fundraising shared that the government's political restrictions also curtail private funding through the government's strategic alliances with some of the Jewish federations in North America. As the Fundraising director explained:

Many Jewish foundations do listen to the government and follow its restrictions on who to support and on who is not "kosher"…they consult with the government before they make their decisions. You have to understand that money is political. Money has its color…there is no "innocent" funding in this world…some foundations and foreign governments would push us towards advocacy as part of their political agenda others will be mad at us if we criticize Israel.

When the government funds the service, it controls the organization's ability to engage in advocacy. In this case, the socio-political context of the ongoing national conflict sheds light on how the funding environment constrains the organization's ability to maintain its integrative social change approach.

2.2. Conflicting Legitimacies

"Credibility", "our right to act", "community legitimacy", "we speak on behalf of", "without our people we have no right to act", "in the name of", and "trust" were the words and concepts most often repeated by the study participants.

The interviewees placed legitimacy as the "cornerstone" (or *al-wasit* in Arabic) of the organization. As such, every aspect of the organization's existence and its ability to act rests on maintaining legitimacy in the eyes of the community. Without this legitimacy, the organization would not exist. Interviewees viewed legitimacy as fundamental to their existence and as the organization's primary resource. Moreover, the community in which they work grants legitimacy. One interviewee explained:

We breed our existence from our community

One of the board members said:

To do our work we need the community's permission…we can't act on behalf of the people without them opening the doors and welcoming our programs

According to one of the co-executive directors:

As long as the community perceives us positively, our actions we will continue to be perceived as "legitimate"

The other co-executive director said:

We are dependent on the community and the funders. Our credibility and good name are considered the prime resource of our existence

AJEEC is constantly seeking credibility from its environment—governments, donors, and members of the community—who hold conflicting political views and ideological beliefs. AJEEC's interviewees reported that the politically-loaded reality—the national conflict, daily housing demolitions, and internal community tensions—make it difficult to gain credibility from these diverse players. According to one of the co-executive directors:

…gaining support from all these players at the same time is challenging….To do our work we need the community, the donors, and the government. To please all of them at the same time is challenging.

The major events described in chapter four highlighted the interplay between AJEEC's legitimacy within the community and its legitimacy granted by the government. During the interviews, all 31 interviewees expressed the difficulty of securing AJEEC's legitimacy within its political and social context. One of the co-executive directors said:

To do our work we need the community, the donors, and the government…in our loaded reality where the different parties perceive each other as enemies…you can't really please all of them…you will have to go through difficult situations.

Another event that challenged AJEEC's legitimacy was when the Minister of Education expressed support for AJEEC's Volunteer Tent programs, believing that AJEEC had already adopted the government's NS program. This event created confusion within the community and waves of criticism that punctured the trust between AJEEC and the community. One of AJEEC's partners was certain that AJEEC had gone against its word with the community and chosen to support the NS program:

I couldn't believe that the Minister would support AJEEC's project without AJEEC accepting the NS program

This statement shows the community's mistrust of the organization, as they believed that the minister would not support AJEEC's program if it was not in fact the governmental program. Moreover, other community members believed that AJEEC was manipulating the community. For example the following statement was posted on social media:

AJEEC's volunteering program is that same governmental program. They are calling it CV not NS so you would join them. You have to be careful. (Social media, 2008)

The minister's announcement threatened AJEEC's community legitimacy. Another partner said:

I knew that the minister herself was confused and wasn't aware of AJEEC's position regarding the NS program… but the word is like a bullet ...if it is out, it is out.

The mistaken belief that AJEEC was supporting the NS program tarnished AJEEC's legitimacy within the community as demonstrated in the following statement that appeared in one of the national newspapers:

AJEEC is bringing the second Nakba through its support of the National Service….this is opening the backdoor for our youth to join the army (Sawt Alhaq, 2008).

The interviewee from the Herakuna coalition expressed a similar sentiment saying:

AJEEC had to decide whether they are with the community or with the government.

The Herakuna coalition and Arab community leadership spoke out against AJEEC's refusal to join the campaign against the NS program. Moreover, AJEEC's partnership with the government (in some of its service provision programs) were construed as actively disregarding the legitimate role of the Arab leadership as the representative that AJEEC had to follow. During a radio debate between the former co-executive director (the researcher) and one of the Arab community leaders, the community leader expressed:

You have to choose between going with us or with the government...you can't "play on two ropes". You're either with us or against us…we fight against the national service program where you are busy negotiating your own program and worried about your interests with the government. (Radio interview, 2008)

Furthermore, one mayor believed that AJEEC, given its expertise, was the best positioned to lead the campaign against the NS program expressing that:

"Dafka" because you are the only expert organization in volunteerism you could have placed great pressure on the government to take down the NS program and yet you chose not to do that.

Another example of how engaging in advocacy work requires harnessing competing legitimacies occurred during AJEEC's public campaign against polygamy. In this case, the situation was even more complex. In the previous example, AJEEC was only attempting to harness legitimacy from two players—the government and the community. With the campaign against polygamy, the community was not a unified front. Instead, the community was divided between those in support of gender equality and those against it. The data showed that external threats (such as housing demolitions) usually unite the community whereas internal issues (such as polygamy) divide the community. The head of VT explained:

In the case of housing demolition it is clear that we [AJEEC] and the community will stand against the government. We will be on the same front… but with issues like women empowerment, we are not on the same front as the community leaders...especially those who are against our [women's] rights…with all due respect …I can't work against my own will to please them.

The conservative forces within the community sought to dismiss the pro-gender equality voices by aligning a pro-gender equality stance with the government's agenda to oppress the Bedouin community. The head of VT said:

Because the issue of gender relations is also adopted by the government…the [community] leaders said that we can't partner with the government on this so long as the government treats the Bedouin community the way it does…[according to the community leaders] by working with the government, we women legitimize it [the government] and promote its policies of housing demolitions.

Moreover, the conservative community leadership often pointed to AJEEC's partnerships with the government (especially on women empowerment programs) as an example of AJEEC colluding with the government against the community. According to the coordinator of the GY program:

Within this context, your alliances with the government mean that you are not on the side of your own community.

In other words, the more the government supports the organization, the less the community grants the organization legitimacy.

To "re-unite" divergent opinions on the women issue, the conservative forces reinforced the discourse of "us versus the government". This strategy sought to obscure the women's issue by turning the community's attention away from the internal problems (gender equality) and towards the external problems (housing demolitions and other exclusionary policies). The director of RDC explained:

To keep the split between the government and the community, the conservative leaders are "politicizing" every issues including the women issue.

Moreover, the fact that the campaign against polygamy was funded primarily by Jewish foundations in North America furthered challenged AJEEC's legitimacy and credibility within the community. The following was published in one of the Arabic national newspapers:

Jewish funders are politicizing women SCSOs in the Negev. Through women's projects, in the name of empowerment, they promote the Jewish funders' hidden agenda which is to turn women against the community and its traditions. (Sawt Alhaq, 2009)

Finally, with regards to AJEEC's legitimacy towards the government, the findings indicated that the main tensions that surfaced were around issues of AJEEC's legality. This legality stems from the concept of regulatory legitimacy which refers to compliance with legal and regulatory norms (Edwards, 1996). Examples of regulatory legitimacy include AJEEC's registration requirements with the Associations Registrar that requires yearly reporting and compliance with the Association Law. These requirements constrain AJEEC's political action around land ownership and the recognition of the "unrecognized" Bedouin villages. As it was conveyed by one of the department directors:

The government will support us as long as we don't touch the "red lines". Once we do so, we might lose our license...this is the most important thing we need from the government. We can replace funding but we can't replace "permission" to act

In sum, legitimacy being AJEEC's primary resource, the interviewees demonstrated ways in which AJEEC's service provision and advocacy work required harnessing legitimacy

from competing constituents and stakeholders which was often a challenging process that threatened the organization's existence and mission.

3. Multifaceted Accountability

We have to dance in many weddings at the same time
and still please the mothers of all the brides
Bedouin co-executive director

AJEEC's multifaceted accountability refers to the organization's commitment to diverse players. These commitments refer to the organization's use of funding and the activities it engages in. The players to which AJEEC is held accountable can be categorized into three groups: upward accountability, downward accountability, and horizontally or internal accountability

AJEEC's upward accountability refers to the relationship between AJEEC and its key stakeholders, specifically donors and government. AJEEC's downward accountability refers to the relationship between AJEEC, its program participants and the community at large. AJEEC's internal or horizontal accountability refers to the relationship between AJEEC's employees, the structure of decision-making, and how the organization fulfills its own mission.

AJEEC's staff shared that they deal with diverse and often conflicting stakeholders—funders, regulators, and participants—on which AJEEC depends for resources. A staff member explained:

On one side of the spectrum...for some of our programs, we are committed to the government and the donors who fund those programs and to the people who participate directly in our programs. On the other side of the spectrum, we are accountable to the donors who fund our advocacy work.

Each party has different and often conflicting expectations, which heightens the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy. In the context of the state-

minority relationship, AJEEC's advocacy work responds to the expectations of the Bedouin community and to international organizations and funders who are focused on political action. These players expect AJEEC to increase its advocacy work particularly during political crises with the state. One of the former co-executive directors explained:

During the Prawer Plan, the expectation to lead the campaign came from the staff, the community leadership, and the international advocacy organizations. We felt that we had no choice but to do it.

On the other hand, the program participants—in addition to the government and the funders who finance service provision—expect AJEEC to continue providing services under any circumstance. One of the government officials expressed:

We don't expect AJEEC to be engaged in demonstrations against the government the way they did during the campaign against the Prawer Plan. We support them to provide services to the community and they have to keep their commitment.

Findings showed that AJEEC's multifaceted accountability is even more complex because it does simply fit into the upward (government/funders ← AJEEC) and downward (AJEEC → the community) structure. In many cases, the program participants, the government, and the funders, would be on one side while the community at large would be segmented into various interest groups, some demanding service provision and others demanding advocacy. For example, during the War on Gaza, the Bedouin leadership asked for strikes and demonstrations whereas the Bedouin women in the early childhood program insisted on continuing their work. A woman from the early childhood program asked:

Do these demonstrations and strikes bring us bread at the end of the day?

Another woman from the program said:

They [the politicians] asks us to come to demonstrations where they can give their speech and after that they "give their backs to us". I suggested to AJEEC not to participate in the strike and keep the daycare centers open…at least it is a place where the children are safe and not outside playing in the garbage.

The Follow Up Arab Committee (FUAC) meanwhile asked AJEEC to mobilize its extensive base of program participants to protest against the war. In this situation,

AJEEC's downward accountability was split between two groups: the women in the early childhood program who wanted to continue AJEEC's services and the community leadership who wanted the women to engage in advocacy.

The same issue of split accountability occurred during the Campaign Against the Prawer Plan. The community leadership decided not to engage in any discussions with the government. Nevertheless, AJEEC actively defied this stance and entered into negotiations with the government anyway. AJEEC's actions put the organization at risk. The head of the FUAC called me and accused me of "not obeying and respecting the decision of the FUAC" I argued that "I am doing what is right for the people in the ground, who are lacking water and electricity". Later the same day, the head of the FUAC issued and published a position statement that AJEEC'S position is not representing the community (M, 2011).

AJEEC's relationship with funders provides another example of the complexity of AJEEC's system of accountability. One representative from one of AJEEC's long-time supporters said:

We give the money for a specific program. I don't want to discover that AJEEC is using the program as a platform for advocacy.

In the same vein, a government official warned the researcher during the interview:

I hope AJEEC is not using our funds to support the campaigns against the Prawer Plan…

The co-executive directors reported that many tensions arise from the fact that AJEEC is held accountable by conflicting stakeholders, explaining that:

It is very hard to please everyone. Mainly because of the hostile relationship between our community and the government.

The staff shared that during the War on Gaza, for example, the Minister of Education's demand to segregate Jewish and Bedouin participants of one of AJEEC's programs created a tension between AJEEC's upward accountability to the government and to its donors, as

well as its horizontal accountability to AJEEC's own mission. The Minister of Education defended his position by saying:

The safety of the students is our responsibility. Sending them to Arab schools during the war is a risk that we can't take. (Personal notebook, 2009)

The general programs director who was the VT director at that time said:

The Minister of Education demanded that we stop sending our Jewish volunteers to the Arab schools during the war whereas we were convinced that this was the crucial time for our program to continue as an example of Arabs and Jews working together.

He added: *Our donors gave the money precisely for this [cooperation] work.*

According to one of the volunteers:

It is not for the government to decide whether we work together or not.

The minister's request to "secure" only the Jewish participants further fuelled tensions between AJEEC and the government officials as one of the Co-Executive Directors explained:

This behaviour exemplifies the government's exclusionary policies whereas AJEEC's mission is to integrate the two communities. We can't allow such a thing where the government is accountable to its Jewish citizens and not all its citizens… our mission is to fight this segregation...I don't have to be accountable to a government that treats its citizens differently.

AJEEC's multifaceted accountability demonstrates an inseparable relationship between accountability and legitimacy. AJEEC's team defined their primary accountability to the community that grants them their legitimacy. In the words of the general programs director:

We are accountable to the one who provides us with legitimacy.

The organization's accountability to a particular stakeholder is intricately linked with the amount of legitimacy that stakeholder grants the organization. According to the general programs director:

We are most accountable to the ones we are here for and that is the program participants …We can find alternative funding, we can give up on the government money, but we don't have any other community but our own…we can't replace it.

This system creates a hierarchical accountability in which AJEEC is first accountable to the program participants and to preserving the organization's mission, then accountable to the community that legitimizes or delegitimizes their existence, then to the funders that support the organization, and finally to the government (Figure 11). Government officials and some funders find it difficult to accept this hierarchical structure. One of the officials from the Ministry of Employment said:

If you want to do advocacy, do it without us...don't expect us to cooperate on things (protest and demonstrations) that delegitimize the government

Figure 11. AJEEC'S Accountability System

Internally, AJEEC's horizontal accountability was also a source of tension. After the NGO Bill was passed, AJEEC's board agreed that political action is important but should take place only during political crises such as village evictions and war. Moreover, the board stipulated that AJEEC should not lead the action. The co-executive directors explained the board's decision saying:

I can't put all the history of great work at risk just for the sake of one demonstration.

The young staff members rejected this idea and expressed during the interview that they consider advocacy as a crucial component of their mission and cannot separate their "personal", "professional", and "political" identities. One of the interviewees explained:

I can't do work as usual when the bulldozers are taking down my uncle's house. I can't work with the kids in the unrecognized villages on leadership training and close their eyes from seeing the evacuation of Al Aragib village…this is their village.

The staff emphasized that they believe in the integrative approach but it is very hard for them to maintain it given their conflicting loyalties and accountability to their national and professional identities. For the young staff members there is an inseparable connection between their professional and political work. The coordinator of "AJEEC on Wheels " put it in the following way:

As a community organizer, I must be loyal to my people's suffering. I am committed to the organization's mission but also to my people

These tensions came to a head when AJEEC's Management Committee decided to withdraw from the Campaign against the Prawer Plan. This decision created a rift amongst the staff as well as between the staff and leadership. The staff was concerned about losing their legitimacy and reputation as leaders in their community. Despite the organization's decision, some of the leading staff members took the lead in these demonstrations and one of them was arrested. One of the staff that led the protest expressed:

They [the co-directors] contradict themselves. They empower us to take risks and at the same time they block us.

When asked about this contradiction, one of the AJEEC's co-executive directors said, *"they [the staff] don't see the whole picture above their individual concerns,"* thus emphasizing the director's professional view of preserving AJEEC's integrative approach to social change. These two quotes summarize the tension between the staff and the leadership: the staff's whose commitment to the people pushes them towards political action at the expense of their commitment to the organization. Meanwhile, the leadership's

commitment to the organizational mission pushes them to protect the organization and the program participants.

Conclusion

As shown in Table 7, AJEEC has experienced a series of tensions in all its dimensions: mission and ideology, organizational structure, and resource availability. These tensions were complex and multilayered because of AJEEC's complex internal and external environments. Data showed that the contexts of the indigenous minority organization and the social male domination structure of the Bedouin minority were the main factors challenging AJEEC's ability to maintain its integrative approach of service and advocacy. The main issues that arose were competing powers, political rights vs. social rights, political restrictions, funding barriers and conflicting legitimacies. The context of power relations of state domination and male domination compounds these issues and threatens AJEEC's mission and integrative approach. The next section focuses on how AJEEC responded, resolved, or navigated these power relations, issues, and tensions in order to regain stability an maintain its integrative social change approach.

Table 7 : Major Themes Abstracted from the Tensions that Arose during AJEEC's Five Events

Org Dimension	Cross cutting themes	Major concepts
Mission and Ideology	1. Competing Powers	Indigenous minority vs. ethnic state, Mistrust, Ideological differences; us vs. them; national/ethnic conflict; exclusion; structures of power; patriarchy; state power; conflicts over legitimacy; polarization; politicizing
	2. Social Services vs. Political Rights	Political equality; indigenous collective rights vs. individual and social rights; rights as services; structural change; Advocacy ideological disagreements; internal conflict such as staff vs. board

Resource Availability	3 Funding Restrictions and Barriers	Funders' interest and restrictions; less money available for advocacy; funding cutbacks; control; Political money; Barriers to funding alliances and restrictions on advocacy and political action; Political alliances between the government and the foundation Restrictions in funding based on ideological disagreement
	4.Conflicting Legitimises	Government's legitimacy vs. community' legitimacy; Conflicting views and interests; trust; power relations; gaining power over people; politicizing the issue
Organizational Structure	5.Multifaceted Accountability	Upward, downward, and horizontal accountability; Commitment to the mission; program participants

CHAPTER 6: RESULTS II—MANAGING THE TENSIONS

Think like you are leading a movement and
Act like you are managing an
Organization.
Former Chairman of the Board

Overview

The socio-political context plays in a key role in shaping SCSOs' external and internal environments. Within the context of indigenous minority SCSOs, these forces play an even greater role and contribute to the tensions that arise in all aspects of the organization, as discussed in the previous chapter. The impact of the socio-political context on every aspect of the organization increases the complexity of understanding how these tensions are managed. AJEEC's response is similarly complex involving subtle and varied combinations of service and advocacy, permitting the organization to survive and thrive as a distinct indigenous minority organization committed to service provision and advocacy. This chapter answers my main research question: "How does AJEEC manage these tensions in the long run?

In this study, the interviewees from the staff provided information regarding the various strategies AJEEC developed to maintain its integrative approach amidst threatening political and social realities. The interviewees frequently used these words: "holistic approach", "strategic management", "strategic and strong leadership", "strategic choice", "strategic niche", "strategic alliances and partners", and "strategic framing".

Most of the staff interviewees highlighted the need for strategic action. One of the staff defined strategy as: "a comprehensive plan and activities developed by the organization in pursuit of its mission and objectives". Many of the strategies for promoting and maintaining advocacy were discussed in the interviews with staff and stakeholders, and found in program booklets, yearly strategic plans, and reports.

The findings revealed that AJEEC adopted the five strategies in order to manage the tensions discussed in the previous chapter: I organized these strategies according to five major themes. Each theme has a sub-theme:

1. **Strategically linking service provision and advocacy**
   Sub-themes: Multidimensional Service; Advocacy-Based Service
2. **Selecting competent leadership**
   Sub-themes: Local Staff; Joint Arab-Jewish Staff; Multidisciplinary professional leadership and staff; Staff development
3. **Re-setting the agenda**
   Sub-themes: Framing the message; Seizing political opportunities
4. **Balancing legitimacies**
   Sub-themes: Balancing legitimacy within the community; Balancing legitimacy with government institutions; Engaging in direct and open communication
5. **Diversifying resources**
   Sub-themes: Flexible funds; Self-generating income

One of the co-executive directors pointed out that AJEEC was able to maintain its integrative approach because the organization selected strategies that responded to both the fiscal and socio-political uncertainties:

If you know where are you going…you have clear direction…you know what you want to achieve...and you know what is the best way to go about it...then you don't have to worry even if something happens—and it will happen—you will always know how to stand on your feet again…but if you are "gasha fi mahab alreah"[straw in the wind] and you are not clear about the thing you want to do...then you will never arrive to do it.

1. Strategically Linking Service Provision and Advocacy

Viewing service provision and advocacy as complimentary rather than contradictory approaches served as a strategic response to effectively manage the tensions that arise from integrating both of these functions. The interviewees shared that most BSCOs that carry out advocacy and service provision are unable to put the same effort in both of these functions: they often lean towards one or the other. The program general manager and both co-executive directors emphasized that AJEEC has a unique ability to not only combine both of these functions but to create a strategic link between them. The program general manager explained:

We are not engaging in whatever advocacy or service—"yalla yalla, let's give the people toothbrushes" or "let's go to any protest that comes to our door"—we select the program

carefully and thoughtfully...within the program itself you have both our service and our advocacy objectives.

Three of the department's directors who have professional backgrounds in social work and education emphasized the importance of providing services that can serve as a platform for advocacy work and vice versa: scanning the opportunities for policy change and providing services that respond to these political opportunities. The directors explained that strategically selecting a political issue and a corresponding service is the main reason behind the organization's ability to maintain service and advocacy as complementary approaches. One of the directors said:

You know because we need both service and advocacy, we have to create the "thread" that ties them together... Here we created the link that shows that these elements actually complement each other…but to do that you have to strategically create the link.

The other director raised the issue that the organizational "context" (working within the Bedouin community in Israel) created the need to establish a complimentary relationship between service and advocacy:

Working with our community [the Bedouin], people expect you to help them with their immediate needs such as providing jobs and education and at the same time they want you to "lift" their daily oppression...so you can't really choose one over the other…discrimination and lack of services are intertwined and we have to respond to them in the same way.

Within this context, AJEEC developed a specific approach for combining service provision and advocacy. The following section will further explore the findings on the organization's unique approach to both of these functions. The findings indicate that service is seen as multidimensional (services are perceived as rights and as a form of empowerment) and the organization engages in three forms of advocacy (advocacy-based alternatives, social advocacy, and political action).

1.1. Multidimensional Service

The director of the Resource Development Centre (RDC) explained that the programs they implement in the community are not "typical" services. He called these programs

"multidimensional". Analyzing the data showed that "multidimensional services" comprise two key elements: services as rights and service-based empowerment.

a. Services as Rights

AJEEC maintains an ideological approach towards services. This stance was supported by the RDC director:

Our work is driven by our ideological beliefs. We are talking about a minority who, for many years, was and is still deprived of their basic rights. So we first have to "ideologize" the service so people understand that these services are actually their rights...these are not just some services offered to them.

During the interview, the youth coordinator protested that, "the word "service" doesn't exist in our jargon". Looking at AJEEC's documents and PR materials demonstrates a conscious effort to use "rights" instead of "services". During the interviews, most of the staff interviewees avoided the term "service" and instead used "rights", emphasizing that "service" denotes a passive benefit or suggests that the individual or group is entitled to the service and that these services are provided for without a struggle—a notion that does not represent the reality of the Bedouin minority. According to the director of the Volunteer Tent (VT):

You use "service" when you are served by choice. In our case we have to force the government to provide us with what we are entitled to, so we have to act. Once we act, we have to convince the government that this is our right…in Arabic we say, "the service is given, the rights you take"…we have to take it.

The staff discussed the notion of "activating" the term "service" in order to transform it into a "right". Transforming a service into a right requires a process of empowerment. The following figure demonstrates how services are transformed into rights through a process of empowerment.

Figure 12. Activating "Service" through Empowerment



b. Service-Based Empowerment

The Economic Empowerment coordinator spoke about the dangers of focusing solely on service provision without employing the service as a means of empowering people. He explained that without raising personal and political awareness, service provision leads to dependence, passivity, and disempowerment. One of the VT staff echoed a similar statement using a traditional Bedouin quote:

If you give a hungry man a loaf of bread, the next day he will stand on your door asking for another. If you teach him how to bake a loaf of bread, the next day he will bring some for you to taste.

This traditional Bedouin quote demonstrates the staff's awareness that providing services through the organization's programs is a tool for empowerment rather than as a ends in itself. The program developer explained:

What we do is provide the tools and the knowledge that people need to fight for their rights. In each program, you see all the components we are trying to implement. We use services as an incentive to bring people together and to empower them.

He added:

People won't come just to learn about their rights…if you are someone who lives in one of the unrecognized villages who does not have electricity and water and I ask you to come to hear a lecture about your rights ...would you come? No…you won't! But when we come to you and talk about electricity and help you install Solar Panels…believe me, you yourself will be happy to give the lecture about the program to other tribes around you.

The "thread" that connects service and advocacy is the notion of using service to meet the immediate needs of the community while at the same time preparing program participants to advocate for the rights connected to the service AJEEC is providing. The RDC director said:

The service component must comprise elements and principles that support their advocacy work and vice versa ...at the end of the day, your advocacy work has to be connected directly to the program participants, otherwise who is going to push for change?

To confirm this point, I noted that in AJEEC's programs booklets that all the programs include ongoing empowerment sessions. For example, the economic development programs for small and medium-sized enterprises include an empowerment phase of 40

hours and then ongoing follow-up sessions. In the following quote, one of the co-executive directors illustrates an example of AJEEC's service-based empowerment:

The programs such as the single mothers' catering program and leadership training are tools … we want to empower people. We want them strong and aware of their abilities….see for example how [f], who started with us five years ago, and at first she didn't even look at me …last week we had a presentation in front of the Employment Committee in the Knesset where she presented...she argued with the minister on behalf of Bedouin women...that's exactly what I mean by multidimensional service.

The head of the VT spoke about collective and personal empowerment as the most important aspects of their approach. She explained that personal empowerment leads to the collective empowerment necessary for everyone in the community "to reclaim control over their lives".

The problem of communal disempowerment was expressed by another interviewee in the following way:

The Bedouins are deprived of their basic rights… for many years and still they [the government] send Jewish mayors to run our local councils …treating us as illiterates who don't know how to read and write.

The majority of the 14 staff interviewees emphasized awareness and education as the main components of both personal and collective empowerment. For example, the head of the VT described AJEEC's programs in the following way:

Our programs meet the people's immediate needs, provide knowledge and tools. These are the essence of the empowerment processes and we organize people around these needs to act and advocate for their rights.

These interviewees also emphasized that when the process of empowerment is successful, people gain back the power and control to make conscious decisions over their own lives. The steps of this process are outlined in AJEEC's community approach:

We first map people's abilities, then recognize and validate them…for many years, people were treated as completely ignorant…no one valued their local strengths, looked down on their traditional practices, and wanted to replace them with modern resources…they [the Bedouin community] were pushed to believe that everything relating to Bedouin culture and traditions is primitive and inferior. The first step in the empowerment process is to recognize and validate these strengths [of Bedouin culture] to build up people's confidence so that they feel proud of themselves. (El-Sana Alh'jooj & Dloomy, 2010)

In conclusion, the staff's definition of "service" deviated from mainstream definition of services as a tangible need such as health services and food security. The staff's definition of "service" emphasized that services are a vehicle for social change: services are part of the process rather than an outcome, they have multiple dimensions rather than one face, and they are an interwoven process rather than a linear progression.

1.2 Three Advocacy Approaches

Interviewees from AJEEC explained that the organization developed three forms of advocacy—advocacy-based alternatives, social advocacy, and political advocacy—that they "strategically" applied to address specific issues.

When asked how they view "advocacy" in their daily work and activities, the members of the Management Committee spoke about how the different forms of advocacy are embedded within the programs' "service". One of the co-executive directors explained:

We carefully select the first the program and then develop our advocacy work around it. For example, we first developed the early childhood program PP without approaching the government. We knew that if we go to the government and ask them to build kindergartens for Bedouin kids in the unrecognized villages, that they would say no…so we first did a pilot program and then we asked the government to join in on the components that are not "buildings"[43], only the educational part. They agreed, and then three years later, they themselves thought that the program was important …then it was easy for us to advocate and push the government to recognize it and to allocate budget for it.

The early childhood director confirmed:

W*e said to the government: "Ok, you don't want to provide the building...you don't want us to build…fine…the community will donate the space and you take responsibility of the rest…you pay the mothers [the caregivers], you buy the equipment"…they did…it worked.*

a. Advocacy-based Alternatives

Providing advocacy-based alternatives was the central form of advocacy that the staff participants spoke about during the interviews. According to the staff interviewees, this approach focuses on "solutions" rather than on the current and past "problems". These interviewees contrasted AJEEC's approach with other BSCOs and PISCOs' propensity to

[43] The government cannot support the development of physical infrastructure in the unrecognized villages as these villages are considered "illegal" according to Israeli law.

engage in outside tactics such as demonstrations and protests. These interviewees pointed out that this form of advocacy hardly accomplished any substantial changes in government policies. The RDC explained:

Organizing demonstrations, protests, and marches to fight against government policy is important but my experience with this form of advocacy was that it didn't bring about change.

He explained why this form of advocacy did not work, saying:

The government is aware of the people's reaction. They know that after announcing a policy, we will get angry, quickly organize some reaction…some demonstration…say we are against it and that this is unjust and then go home…so they don't take us seriously …most of the time they ignore our demonstrations.

Another interviewee stated that:

People think that by one demonstration we solve all the Bedouin problems...today there are new ways to make your voice heard

Another respondent emphasized the same point:

The government is used to ignoring our protests and often blames us for our own situation. For example, they might say: "stop having 12 kids". With our new approach, they can't ignore us and they can't blame us because they see that we are working hard to solve our own problems.

The vast majority of the study participants explained how AJEEC's advocacy-based alternatives approach is the most effective approach for promoting policy change. The director of the RDC pointed to the fact that in most cases, the organization was able to employ this approach to provide a service and promote policy change:

We came with a new approach. We decided that the reactive approach is not the right way ...to change the attitude from "complaining about the problem" to the proactive one of presenting an "alternative solution".

He added:

Our approach is that we not only say "no" to the policy but we come up with an alternative solution and advocate for it…it is hard for the government to ignore us once we are taking responsibility and actively engaged in finding solutions.

The head of the VT confirmed the same point:

You are not presenting the problems. We came with the alternatives we proposed as solutions. Solutions that have evidence of success on the ground...that people decided over them…the people want them… when you approach the government, they are more willing

to listen to you…and if they don't, the community will be there to fight for it because now it's their program.

One respondent explained:

You will never see us advocating for the sake of advocacy...you see other organizations during demonstrations only …you see us everywhere all the time.

Externally, AJEEC'S stakeholders also expressed their understanding of AJEEC's strategic link between service and advocacy. A representative of the Employment Ministry described the approach as a win-win situation:

AJEEC shares responsibility with us …they don't just throw every thing on our shoulders…they come with their part, we bring our part, and we do it together... we both benefit from it.

Another government representative said:

We can't say no to AJEEC. They come with money and the community listens to them.

A representative of one of the foundations pointed out that the advocacy-based alternatives approach actually "challenges" the government more than traditional problems-focused advocacy. She explained:

Coming with solutions that are based on people's needs is more challenging. It will be hard for the government not to cooperate with the organization…if you ask me, this is, in my mind, more challenging than a massive demonstration against the government.

To confirm this point, the representative of the Ministry of Education said:

It is hard to turn your back on AJEEC. They come with solutions to the problems that we couldn't address for many years.

By offering solutions, the organization was able to minimize the tensions with the government. For example, during one of the meetings regarding AJEEC's rejection of the NS program, the director of the NS administration said:

We have been working with AJEEC since 2006 and we see how responsible they are...they are professionals, not politicians who want to gain power on the backs of poor people. Therefore, even when they lead demonstrations against the government, we take them seriously...we listen to them. When they presented the issue of volunteerism and said that they can't support our program...we understood that there must be a problem with our NS program and were ready to listen to their alternative approach to the issue. (Meeting notes, 2010)

AJEEC's advocacy-based alternatives approach has placed AJEEC in the position to actively propose and change policies that affect the community. One of the co-executive directors outlined a few of AJEEC's programs that were accepted by the government:

AJEEC's Community Volunteering program that proposed as an alternative to the government's National Service (2009), the PP program (2005), and the economic development master plan (2006) all got accepted by the government.

b. Social Advocacy

The heads of the AJEEC's departments included "social advocacy" as one of the forms of advocacy the organization engaged in. The head of the VT defined "social advocacy" in the following way:

Social advocacy deals with the community's internal issues such as gender relations, and tribal power relations.

AJEEC's engagement in social advocacy brought about tensions within the organization itself and created distrust between the organization and the community. However, external stakeholders such as government institutions and foundations viewed AJEEC's engagement in social advocacy as a source of trust and a manifestation of the organization's professionalism. One foundation director said:

We were happy to support AJEEC's social justice work because we believe that they have one message towards injustice, whether it is internally within their community or versus the government.

Similarly, another government official explained that:

AJEEC has the same demands from us and from their community, They don't have "Aen efah ve efah" [double standards].

One government representative who worked with AJEEC since 2005, said:

They [AJEEC] address the issues within their community with the same intensity as they advocate against the government… we feel they are true to their mission...they don't play games and we value this because we know how hard it is to fight in and out.

Within the community, one of the mayors expressed the following regarding AJEEC's commitment to fighting injustice "in and out" :

It is true that the community is not happy with AJEEC's work around polygamy and some might push back…but at the end of the day, the people want an organization that they can trust…a word is a word.

c. Political Action

The third form of advocacy that AJEEC is engaged in is "political action". As described by AJEEC's youth coordinator, political action is "our emergency response". He explained that:

W*e use this strategy only when we feel that it is a must… during political crisis we have to be with our people to protest. You can't just work as usual.*

AJEEC's PR materials confirm that this form of advocacy was used only during political crisis when the organization recognized the need to make a public statement. For example during the Campaign Against the Prawer Plan and the War on Gaza, AJEEC engaged in political action by organizing massive protests. According to AJEEC's Public Relations coordinator:

We do it [political action] when we feel that this brings added value...we know how to do it and when...we're the only organization who was able to bring thousands to the demonstrations. They [other BSCOs and community leadership] all know that…we don't do this very often because we don't really think that a demonstration by itself can change the situation…

When asked about AJEEC's engagement in political action against the government, the general director from the Ministry of Education expressed the following:

We are aware of this [political demonstrations]...we don't like it but we understand that their community is expecting them to be there….we "swallow" this and move on because our partnership with AJEEC is much bigger than one demonstration.

Reviewing the documentation demonstrated that political action occurs within the margins of the organization. Political action is not reported on in AJEEC's annual reports, therefore when a private funder was asked about AJEEC's social and political advocacy she said:

I don't know what you are talking about…I never knew that AJEEC was the leading organizer of the protests against the Prawer Plan...they never reported on that… I guess they don't have to report on it as I support only the economic development programs.

The findings showed that AJEEC was able to engage in political action because of its advocacy-based alternative approach that established a previous reputation and working

relationship with the government. In this way, the three forms of advocacy are strategically linked and complement each other: alternative-based advocacy provides services while setting the stage for a good working relationship with the government, social advocacy perpetuates AJEEC's professional reputation, and political action demonstrates that AJEEC's commitment is first and foremost to the community.

2. Selecting Competent Leadership

One way to manage greater environmental complexity is to confront that complexity with more qualified, committed, and flexible staff (Scott, 1992). The complex reality and the changes that SCSOs face require that those at the helm manage political and financial instability brought about by government regulations, funding barriers, and financial insecurity. To ensure survival and more, to thrive, AJEEC needed leaders who could navigate a politically and socially hostile environment, manage the social complexities, and financially stabilize the organization to protect it from the vagaries of change. The findings reveal that AJEEC's leadership diversity, professionalism, and commitment to the organization's mission are the main sources for its ability to successfully manage the tensions the organization faced. The mayor stated:

AJEEC is blessed by its strong and diverse leadership. They represent various professions, they are cross-tribes, and cross ethnicities.

According to this quote, three qualities of leadership stand out:

2.1. Local Staff

Many interviewees expressed that AJEEC's staff are "the sons and the daughters of our community". By this statement, the interviewees were referring to the fact that 80% of AJEEC's staff consist of professional Bedouins who are from the community—the townships and the unrecognized villages. According to AJEEC's various stakeholders, the fact that the organization's staff is primarily from the target community is a major asset that helped the organization to overcome the tensions that arise from its integrative social change approach. Externally, the staff's locality helped manage the financial tensions. For

example, foundations were ready to support and help AJEEC during its financial crisis in 2008 since foundations saw AJEEC as an "authentic, strategic" partner. One foundation representative said:

We were ready to transfer the money in advance because we have been working with AJEEC…we have learned they are the real representatives of the community…and it is very important for us that this organization grows and succeeds.

Another governmental official said about AJEEC:

No one can say that we don't know what the community needs because we are working with people who are from the community.

Another representative from one of AJEEC's supporting foundations echoed a similar statement:

In the past we used to see Jewish professionals who work with the Bedouins… we rely on this organization [AJEEC] for most of our work with the Bedouin community because we believe and see that they are the real representatives. They know their situation and they know how to deal with it.

One of AJEEC's organizational partners explained AJEEC's ability to organize a demonstration against the government while continuing to receive government funding because the "government has no choice". This representative explained:

Sometimes the government would "forgive" [AJEEC] when it step out against it because they have no choice ...if they want to work with the community and not through outsiders, the government needs you.

The staff's locality was also an important factor for decreasing social tensions between the organization and the community. During the campaign against polygamy, one of the leaders representing the more conservative voices said: "we trust them… they are our sons and daughters" (Personal notebook, 2009).

Another aspect of the staff's locality is their cross-tribal nature. The findings showed that the fact that the staff is cross-tribal enhanced the level of trust and faith in the organization and decreased tribal politics within the Bedouin community. The VT coordinator said:

I came to AJEEC because I like that we [AJEEC] don't belong to any tribe…no tribe can claim ownership over our organization… every tribe can see us as the legitimate face of the community.

The representative of the Minister of Education, confirmed that point, saying:

One of our challenges with the Bedouin community is their representation…who represents who? If we appoint a school principal from one tribe, the other tribe will not send their kids to that school…the fact that AJEEC's leadership and staff represent all tribes of the Bedouin community allows for real representation and a first-hand commitment to the community as a whole…it is easier for us to work through AJEEC than with one tribe…they are neutral yet representative.

Moreover, the cross-tribal nature of AJEEC's staff made it possible for the organization to develop and maintain relationships with a wider scope of Bedouin tribes. The staff shared examples of tensions that arose in different villages regarding AJEEC's programs and how the organization sent the staff member who belonged to that specific tribe to manage and handle the tension on the organization's behalf. One of the head's of the departments said:

We have "visas" for all the tribes. We have employees and volunteers from almost all the villages and tribes, and if we have an issue, these employees are the ones who open the door and solve the problems and explain our point view.

This finding strongly illustrates that AJEEC's cross-tribal leadership and staff strengthened its legitimacy within the community, increased the level of trust, and gave each employee the opportunity to represent the organization and promote its programs amongst his or her own people. This situation constitutes a mutually beneficial relationship: as an ambassador for the organization, the employee receives heightened credibility and reputation among his or her own tribe which in return strengthens the employee's commitment to AJEEC. One of the staff interviews expressed the situation in the following way:

AJEEC is me…when I sat in the Dewan[44] people call me… "Hey AJEEC"..I feel responsible for what we do in my tribe.

2.2. Joint Arab and Jewish staff

In addition to the tribal diversity, findings showed that the organization's ethnic diversity also played a crucial role in the organization's ability to manage the tensions that arise from AJEEC's integrated social change approach. For example, during the War on Gaza the organization's Arab-Jewish identity was crucial in resolving the crisis with the Ministry of Education. In order to resolve the crisis, AJEEC's former chairman

[44] *Dewan* is the tent where the male members of the tribe sit and discuss tribal affairs

emphasized this aspect of the organization in a conversation with the Ministry of Education's general director:

Our statement against the war is part of our commitment and our shared vision as Arabs and Jews for peace...our statement against war and violence is part of our mission… I believe that this is also your mission (Personal communication, 2009).

During the interview process, the ministry's representative discussed that crisis in the following way:

I am from the inside and I hear the conversations about AJEEC. The fact that you are Arab-Jewish helped you a lot…the left wing bureaucrats like you because you inspire them by presenting a mission of Arab-Jewish partnership and peace and you gain the trust of the right wing bureaucrats because you are Arabs and Jews together.

The staff confirmed that they enjoy more credibility and trust operating as an Arab-Jewish organization than they would as a purely Bedouin organization. The general manager of AJEEC's programs said:

We are aware of the fact that the government won't tolerate criticism coming from the Arab community because they don't trust us ...but when we come as a joint front…we are stronger and the fact that we are Arabs and Jews give us more credibility.

AJEEC's joint Arab-Jewish identity facilitated the process of courting and building trust amongst foundations, particularly amongst North American Jewish foundations. According to one of the representatives from a North American Jewish foundation:

What is helping AJEEC to receive money from Jewish federations is the fact that it is an Arab-Jewish organization that promotes an agenda of coexistence and cooperation.

2.3. Multidisciplinary and professional leadership and staff

The next component of leadership that helped AJEEC manage the tensions that arise from its integrated model is the organization's professional and multidisciplinary leadership and staff. AJEEC's leadership and staff are high-rank professionals with solid personal reputations and many years of professional experience in clinical and community social work, education, business management, third sector management, political science, and conflict resolution (see Table 6). When asked about the tensions the Ministry of Employment faced regarding up-scaling AJEEC's PP program, the general director of the Ministry of Employment said:

We partner with AJEEC because we highly value the staff there. They are very professional...they are experts in the areas they are involved in. This is why when we encounter any problem with them we know that we can sit down and have a professional discussion.

Another government official pointed out:

We know how hard it is to find professionals in the Bedouin community…every time I meet with this organization [AJEEC] I am amazed by the fact that all the employees are first rate professionals… they understand the culture and the traditional codes, and are able to navigate the internal tribal political structures. They are both committed to their community and also have the know-how.

Another indicator of AJEEC's professionalism was the way the organization dealt with deeply-rooted *wasta*—tribal nepotism—within the Bedouin community. Three of the staff members highlighted that during the up-scaling of the PP program, maintaining professionalism was an effective approach to combat the persistence of *wasta.* These interviewees cited the example of drafting formal contracts with local mayors in order to hire staff according to AJEEC's standards and hinder them from hiring staff based on tribal ties. One mayor spoke about AJEEC's professionalism in the face of *wasta*:

I was amazed by AJEEC's response, they said we can't give hands to the "wasta" practice…I am reminding you of this because I think this shows you that people respect organizations who stick to their professional criteria even if this organization does things that is hard for the people to accept

Further, the interviewees explained that AJEEC's ability to challenge deep-rooted practices such as *wasta* is due to AJEEC's leaders' solid reputation. Speaking of the founder, one of the mayor's said:

The community trusts your work even if sometimes you cross the "red line" and challenge rooted practices…they still support you because along the years you showed them your level of professionalism and knowledge … and that you are working to help your own people.

This reputation helped the organization manage tensions that arose between the organization and the community. In response to, for example, AJEEC's women empowerment programs, these tensions were peacefully handled because of the leaders' "good" name. The research participants reported that the founder's and the current co-executive director's solid reputations within the community is a result of their professional

standing, demonstrated expertise, and proven commitment to the community by way of bringing about positive change.

One interviewee explained:

People respect you [the researcher]…when we mention your name, people know that we are serious and that you can provide the work…AJEEC grew and succeeded because of the unique and strong directors who have the ability to resolve conflicts in the community and also scan opportunities and use them to open doors with the government.

During the organization's negotiations with the Islamic movement leadership regarding the participation of the women in the Campaign Against Polygamy, the reputation of AJEEC's leadership played a crucial a role in managing the social tension. One of AJEEC's partners explained:

After the Islamic movement called for a boycott of AJEEC's work, I believe that it is because of the reputation of AJEEC's leadership that the Islamic leadership not only ended up allowing the women who participated in AJEEC's service programs to engage in the public campaign but also formed the Imam's forum who agreed to share responsibility and help AJEEC advocate against Polygamy.

This example of transforming adversaries into allies illustrates the importance of the leadership's reputation in finding supporters and build alliances.

2.4. Staff Development

Almost all staff interviewees expressed that the professional development and social support offered by the organization strengthened their commitment to the organization's mission and integrative approach. The former director of the RDC pointed out the importance of the staff's ongoing learning process:

Organizations who choose to be innovative and unique must understand that innovation goes hand in hand with staff development. The world is changing rapidly everyday ...the funding environment is changing, the political context is unstable …all these factors force you to prepare the staff to come up with new ideas...to think out of the box …these can't be done without engaging ourselves in a serious processes of learning...this is what we did…learning is built within our organizations structure and culture.

The co-executive directors reported on two main areas of staff learning: content-focused learning relating AJEEC's specific areas of expertise and capacity building relating to social support and team building. One of the co-executive directors said:

Our organization is very challenging. We have Arab and Jewish staff, we work in different fields so we have to provide ongoing training to the staff, and we also have to support them socially and emotionally and to be there for them when they need us.

The volunteer coordinator said:

What I appreciate here is that we are allowed to take a day off to study and the organization will pay for that…They also sent me abroad for two weeks, to test a new model for community economic development.

A group facilitator said:

We invite speakers who are experts in our field to teach our staff what is new out there. We invite government representatives to hear from them about their future plans for the Bedouin minority so we try to affect their agenda setting and save future tensions between the government and the community.

The staff participants reported that their bi-annual internal workshops and bi-weekly staff meetings are essential for resolving ideological or professional disagreements such as the disagreement regarding political and social rights that arose during the War on Gaza. The bi-annual workshops foster the staff's sense of Arab-Jewish partnership by deepening the understanding of each narrative and strengthening the staff commitment to the organization's mission. The volunteer coordinator said:

I am not afraid to challenge my colleagues and myself by being honest and sharing what I feel or think…both Arabs and Jews feel safe to disagree. We share our disagreements and we work them out.

The financial coordinator shared her experience during the War on Gaza:

I was shaking walking from the bus station to the office…as soon as I stepped in the office, I felt safe…I felt that I had reached my "island of sanity" … whatever the disagreements between us[AJEEC's staff] I still believe that together we are able to overcome them...because we talk …we share. We are honest…I wait for every session to refill myself with hope.

Another staff member said:

When I feel lonely after fighting with my family over my political views, I call my colleagues at work and share my disappointment…I feel that our common mission and our strong commitment helps us to stand together even when our own families stand against us.

In summary, the diverse backgrounds and the professional reputation of AJEEC's leadership and the staff commitment to the mission helped the organization establish political and social alliances that fostered a sense of trust that AJEEC could rely on during

particularly tense events. AJEEC's professionalism and reputation positioned the organization as a main player in the decision-making process regarding the future of the Bedouin community in particular and of Israel's Arab community in general.

3. Re-Setting the Policy Agenda

The findings revealed that AJEEC employed the following three strategies—setting agenda, framing the message, and seizing social and political opportunities—to manage the tensions that arose. These strategies were often used in combination with one another. The former co-executive director explained that incorrectly "setting" and "framing" the policy agenda constitutes a major hindrance to effective policy change:

We have learned through our experience that the mistrust, the hostile environment, and lack of communication are among the major factors that influence what policy the government proposes and how the community reacts to it…in such a context, words and meanings matter and some great ideas would be dismissed because of setting and framing the idea incorrectly. In order to resolve this issue, we had to re-frame and redefine these "ill-defined and problematic situations" so that the new agenda and framing can resonate with the community and the government's desires.

The NS versus the CV event provided compelling evidence of how AJEEC employed these three strategies together in order to resolve the issues that arose during that event.

3.1. Setting the Agenda

Regarding "setting the agenda", a policy paper written by the co-executive director states:

In April 2008, when the government established the National Service administration, this policy created serious political tensions between the community and the government which affected our work in volunteerism. We *needed to quickly identify the essence of the tension between the government and the community regarding the national service program and pinpoint exactly what the community would oppose. After studying the policy, we saw three obstacles : first, the community would be angry since the government, over and over again, proposes programs for the community without consulting the community. Second, there is political opposition to the work with any military office including the Ministry of Defense. Third, the concept of national service naturally rings negatively in the ears of the Palestinian minority since they won't serve the state that oppresses them.* (AJEEC policy paper, 2010)

According to the findings, AJEEC re-defined this issue from "youth national service" to "youth community volunteering". In doing so, AJEEC was suggesting that the government

widen its agenda to address the greater problem of disaffected Arab youth. According to the general director of the NS administration:

AJEEC redirected our [government] focus from national service … to questioning what can be done about the situation of Israel's Arab youth…they helped us see the full picture of the Arab youth instead of focusing on why don't they serve.

By redefining the issue, AJEEC re-directed the focus from a politically loaded issue (national service, the Palestinian minority) to the one that focuses on a more mutually acceptable one (youth needs and wellbeing). According to one of the interviewees, this shift made it possible for AJEEC to, "draw the attention of the Ministry of Education and Welfare" because they recognized that "it is their issue…and shouldn't be on the minister of Defense's agenda".

In this way, AJEEC recruited the Ministers of Education and Welfare to advocate for transferring the youth community volunteering agenda from the minister of Defense's agenda to the agenda of the Minister of Education or Welfare. The head of the VT pointed out that by redefining the issue, "we created a cross ministerial agenda, and therefore it is no longer in the hands of the ministry of defense".

Recruiting these other Ministers also made it possible to get buy-in from the Arab community. MK Ayman Odeh who served as the head of the Campaign Against National Service (CANS) said in the panel discussion organized by AJEEC in 2010:

We can't work with the Ministry of Defense and the military services but if the government agrees to move it to a more civilian minister, we are ready.

3.2. Framing the message

Initially, CANS criticized AJEEC's willingness to negotiate with the government and even issued a public statement against the organization which jeopardized the organization's relationship with the community. In order to protect this relationship, AJEEC had to reframe the message to "free" volunteerism from the notion of national service that the community strongly opposed. AJEEC re-framed volunteerism in two ways: first, the organization reclaimed the concept of "volunteerism" as a traditional Bedouin practice;

and second, the organization re-framed "volunteerism" as a right of a citizen rather than as an obligation to the state. First, AJEEC reframed National Service as *Aluna*, the traditional Bedouin practice of community volunteerism. The youth coordinator explained that:

T*he people said they have no problem to volunteer …this is part of our Aluna traditions, but they said they won't serve in the NS program*.

To do this, AJEEC renamed the program "Commuunity Volunteerism" instead of National Service. In this way, AJEEC was able to ground volunteering as a traditional community practice. One interviewee explained:

We wanted our people to see this [the program] as part of our tradition and values such as Aluna.

AJEEC succeeded in framing the program in such a way that it resonated with the community context and experience.

Next, AJEEC reframed volunteerism from an "obligation to the state" to a "right as a citizen". The proposed government policy triggered the unresolved issue of how the Palestinian minority and the Israeli government define and differentiate between rights and obligations. As previously discussed, the Palestinian minority in Israel does not enjoy full and equal rights and, at the same time, they are not required to take part in military or national service—until this new policy requiring Palestinian-Israeli youth to take part in the NS program. By requiring Palestinian-Israelis to take part in the national service in exchange for equal rights, frames the issue of national service as an obligation to the state. Framing the issue in this way naturally incited a negative reaction from the Arab community. According to a member of the Herakuna coalition:

Conditioning our rights on our obligations to the state after years of discrimination and neglect of our basic human rights is not acceptable.

This quote suggests that connecting these two concepts (rights and obligations) constituted a big framing mistake on the part of the government.

When AJEEC organized a conference on volunteerism, AJEEC's staff consciously decided that the conference title should move volunteerism from the circle of "obligation" to the space of "rights". This point was confirmed through AJEEC's reports and publications:

In the shadow of a hostile environment between the government and the Bedouin community, words and names matter. Turning obligations into rights will encourage the community to act and demand volunteerism as a right and to avoid and reject it as an obligation. (AJEEC report, 2009).

In doing so, the organization succeeded in persuading the community not to perceive volunteerism as an obligation but instead to demand to volunteer as their "right" (see appendix).

One interviewee explained:

We wanted people to see volunteerism as a right and not as an obligation…once we did this people started to act differently…they saw that we are fighting for their rights… this new message "volunteerism is a right" became a slogan of the youth and generated support for our policy work

According to MK Ayman Odeh:

This was a smart strategy.. To reconstruct volunteerism within the discourse of rights reduced the antagonism towards AJEEC's efforts to present an alternative policy.

AJEEC's co-executive directors explained how reframing volunteerism as a right minimized the "politics of the issue", reduced the conflict over meaning, and created a shared focus on the practical needs of the community:

We know that each party [the community leadership and the government] is playing a game to gain power. Politicizing volunteerism by both parties made it impossible to advance the program…When we changed the name of the project and the source of the funding, the program was received as any social problem that needs a solution.

3.3. Seizing political opportunities

Both co-executive directors and one of the board members emphasized that utilizing political opportunities is an important way to "sneak your agenda in" and, according to one of the co-executive directors, "create shared interests among the different players in the political system".

Similarly, the other co-executive director said:

You know in Israel every Monday and Thursday you have a new government…in our case this really served us. Ministers want to accomplish something before they leave so we work fast and so they need to react even faster.

The co-executive directors and one of the former co-executive directors shared their experience of utilizing governmental changes to benefit the organization. Within the context of the NS issue for example, the 2008 election brought to power MK Avishai Braverman whose perspectives and beliefs were more aligned with AJEEC's agenda to advance community volunteerism. The appointment of MK Braverman created an opportunity for AJEEC and its coalition to propose policy changes regarding the NS program and to build bridges between the Ministry of Minorities, Welfare, and Education to convince the Prime Minister's office to transfer the NS program from the defense minister's office to one of the aforementioned ministers, and to change the program's name from National Service to Community Volunteering. One of the interviewees explained:

The minister [MK Braverman] was able to create a shared agenda between his ministry and that of the Ministry of Education and Welfare…this was a great step towards achieving the recognition of our alternative plan.

The NS versus CV issue provided a rich soil to unearth the strategies AJEEC employed to manage the tensions that arose. First the organization set the agenda from national service to community volunteering, then they re-framed the message in two ways (rooting volunteerism within the community and re-defining volunteerism as a right and not an obligation), third, the organization took the opportunity of the appointment of a open-minded minister to advance their agenda.

4. Balancing Legitimacies

AJEEC operates on a fine line between two players—the government and the community—who generally perceive each other as enemies. Moreover, these players consist of various segments and, therefore, do not hold unified views. Resolving

conflicting legitimacies required the organization to identify the segments within each party who's views are consistent with AJEEC's mission.

4.1. Balancing Legitimacy within the Community

AJEEC needed to establish and maintain their legitimacy within the larger community (the Palestinian minority) and among different segments in the Bedouin community such as women, youth, traditional leadership, and religious leadership. One of the co-executive directors explained:

Within the community, we have supporters and we have people who wish we were not around ...we need to break down the community into its component and to work with each separately…because "community" is not one thing and we can't treat it as one.

In order to maintain community legitimacy, AJEEC focused first and foremost on its relationship with its program participants. AJEEC considered this segment the organization's "primary source of legitimacy". One interviewee said:

We know that the program participants, the youth, and the women are the ones who support us…the [community] leadership is mostly the one who challenges us… for us it is clear that our program participants are the primary source of legitimacy and we have to empower them so they speak up and protect the programs when the leadership attacks.

The youth coordinator explained that they engage program participants in the process of building the program's legitimacy within the community. He reported that empowering the program participants supports AJEEC to be in a better position to negotiate with the community leadership. The youth coordinator explained:

When we sit with them [the community leadership] around the table and bring the program participants with us, they are in weak position to reject the program or to badmouth it….the program participants would share how this program improved their situation….after that nothing is left for them [the leadership] to say…by doing so we force them to put on the table what it is that they don't like about our work…if they don't have a practical reason, they won't say anything

As one of the co-executive directors pointed out:

The problem is that the community leadership speaks on behalf of the program participants without even knowing them or talking with them. So we need the program participants to have different views than the leadership's views so that they [the leadership] can't de-legitimize the program on the basis of their political interests…if they think the program is not good, they should explain it to us and mainly to the programs' participants.

For example, following CANS's attack on the volunteering model, the volunteering program participants wrote a position statement defending the program. One of the interviewees said:

When they started attacking AJEEC without really understanding what we are doing in the program, we decided to protect the program…it's not AJEEC's program, it's ours…I remember I told the mayor that "we are not your hostage" and that the leadership cannot "use" us to fight against the government so you count points at our expense.

According to the study participants, AJEEC was able to re-gain support from the community and community leadership through the active role the volunteers played in defending the organization. AJEEC's volunteers firmly opposed the leadership's position that by volunteering within the community they are "serving the enemy [the state]". One of the interviewees demonstrated this defiance when he said: "who do they [the community leadership] think they are…we are not stupid, we are serving our communities not the state." Despite the condemnations from the community leadership regarding AJEEC's volunteering program, as more volunteers joined the organization, and more volunteers spoke out in favour of the program, the community leadership could not de-legitimize the program.

4.2. Balancing Legitimacy with Government Institutions

AJEEC used a similar strategy to balance its legitimacy with the government. The organization first focused on developing relationships with the officials that AJEEC was already working with. One interviewee explained:

Government is not one thing…not all the ministers are racist, not all the officials are bad people…we first gained the legitimacy of the officials who worked with us on a daily basis…we were able to gain their support and trust…because they see our work first-hand. They were the first to understand why we can't go with the NS program and they were the first to protect our funding when the Ministry of Education threatened to cut it...they spoke for us and they explained our position better that we did.

Focusing on these relationships bolstered AJEEC's ability to engage in advocacy while maintaining its legitimacy with the government. The General Director of the Ministry of Employment, explained her relationship with AJEEC:

We understood that AJEEC is part of the community…we don't agree with everything they do but we understand… they have to dance on this thin line … I don't want them to fall…they are very important in what they are doing and the discourse the are promoting

These findings illustrate AJEEC's ability to pinpoint where they derive their legitimacy from and to focus their efforts on maintaining those relationships despite external criticism (from the community leadership or the government). By focusing their relationships in the right place, they are able to rely on these partners in times of crisis to ease tensions that arise.

4.3. Direct and Open Communication

The findings revealed that engaging in direct and open communication was a significant strategy that AJEEC used in order to balance their conflicting legitimacies. The director of the fundraising department expressed the following:

When things go wrong in the program, we don't hide from our funders …we call them, we share, and we ask for their advice…therefore when we face financial issues, they are there to help us.

Similarly, one of the foundations' representative said:

AJEEC is not the kind of organization that wants to show that they are perfect. Sometimes they can't provide us with what they promised but we negotiate and talk and explore other directions together…they are honest with us.

Another example of AJEEC engaging in open and direct communication to balance its legitimacy occurred when the organization participated in the demonstrations against the Prawer Plan. The programs manager said:

*I called … [one of the government officials] and explained to him that we can't turn our backs on our community in times of crisis and suffering…such as housing demolitions… if we do that, who are we? We would lose our credibility… to maintain our programs we have to engage in people's lives…their suffering is our suffering***.**

By candidly explaining AJEEC's situation and motivations for participating in the protest, the organization was able to maintain its legitimacy with the community and maintain its relationship with the government.

Direct and open communication was necessary to balance its legitimacy amongst all stakeholders (community, government, and funders). Promoting the understanding of

AJEEC's actions and behaviour created an atmosphere of transparency, the basis of trust, that facilitated managing tensions amongst all these players.

4.4. Synergetic Partnerships, Coalitions, and Linkages

One of the notable findings of this study is the number of substantial relationships that AJEEC built throughout the years. As emphasized by one of the board members:

It is not enough to have strong and professional leadership—which has been crucial for AJEEC's survival and growth—we also needed to position ourselves in such a way that would grant us a mutual relationship with the powerful political and social forces that have come to dominate our resources and activities.

According to the findings, AJEEC is the founder of three national coalitions and forums around advocacy and policy change: Herakuna, Shotafut-Sharaka, and MAAN. In addition, AJEEC is a member of almost all Bedouin community service and advocacy forums, Arab-Jewish forums, and think tanks promoting Arab-Jewish relations. Moreover, as AJEEC's models were scaled-up, the organization became nationally involved in volunteerism, social entrepreneurship, economic development, and women's empowerment. Due to their national presence and recognition, AJEEC served as a member of several governmental forums and round tables such as "The Prime Minister's Cross Sector Round Table" in which representatives from the government, business, and civil society sectors cooperate to address national social issues. Internationally, AJEEC consults foundations and private funders and presents at conferences on topics such as community development and women's issues. Examining the wide range of AJEEC's network and relations demonstrates that AJEEC has developed strategic relations consisting of a specific goal for the partnership. Commenting on AJEEC's extensive partnerships, one of the interviewees said:

We believe in partnerships… no one can do the work alone…but collaborations are time-consuming ...you need to make sure you nurture and sustain [partnerships]… thus we select partners and join coalitions based on our needs.

One of AJEEC's project managers who is tasked with maintaining partner relations underlined the importance of AJEEC working with and "weaving" relationships with people and institutions that share AJEEC's vision and values. He explained:

The role here is to work with everybody…we don't have a monopoly on the Bedouin community. Moreover, working in partnerships leverages our power, money, and influence and also widens our base of support…funders like this…government encourages this...it is good for everybody.

This model of "weaving" relationships is demonstrate in AJEEC's operational model. Each program's steering committee comprises of a diverse set of partners from the government, from the business sector, and from the community who are all invited to take part in the first stage of the program planning and who are then expected to take ownership and help AJEEC carry out the program. One of the program director's said:

If you look at all of our programs, we form a steering committee for each one whose role is to accompany the program from start up, to implementation, to evaluation and expansion…steering committees are very important and we see how this form of partnership helped the [PP] program all the way, including professional guiding and funding.

The general director emphasized that the programs' steering committees play a very active role that fosters a long-term engagement with the organization:

We are the tent where everyone is invited. But it is not like the Bedouin Tent…no one here is a guest…every member of our steering committees is here to work and do his part…not like other committees who serve as "decoration" but by being active members they stick with the programs for longer…we have members in our VT steering committee who have been with us since 2003...I am talking about serious people such as the representative of the Ministry of Welfare.

The Director of the Early Childhood office at the ministry pointed out that the long-standing partnership with the welfare ministry started in the first stage of the program:

We first invited them [the welfare ministry] to join the steering committee even before the government decided to fund it…they felt that we want them to be with us in a real way, not only because we want their money…we wanted their professional input...and this made them feel good.

The representative of the ministry confirmed this point saying:

We don't treat AJEEC as an implementer…they are real partners. They initiate the program… they ask us to join them and help with our agenda…they don't see us only as source of funding but also as professionals who can help and discuss professional

dilemmas. At first they came to us and asked us to join them… today after years of joint achievements, we go to them. We need them more than they need us.

Besides being considered a professional partner in the field, AJEEC is also seen as a "catalyst" that initiates, inspires, and facilitates the process of encouraging other actors to come together and affect change. According to a foundation representative:

AJEEC is a catalyst who initiates the program and was able to inspire other actors to join in. AJEEC is among the very few SCOs who is able to create a joint platform where all stakeholders bring their puzzle pieces into the whole picture.

One of the co-executive directors explained AJEEC's role as a "catalyst" in the following way:

AJEEC creates a mutually responsible relationship where all involved parties take ownership of the project and pull their equal share: the government provides part of the funding, this government support opens the door for other government and non-government donors. The relationship between AJEEC and the various government offices is not based on the implementer-contractor relationship but a partnership that is based on shared interests.

The RDC director pointed out how this type of "mutually responsible" partnership helped the organization:

This type of partnership was our major factor in helping us overcome the tensions between service provision and advocacy. All the conflicts we faced, whether it was because of our political stance or our social stance, were resolved because of the support and the help of our partners who sometimes opened new financial doors for us, other times they lobbied on our behalf—as the mayors' committee did for us to promote our alternative model of volunteering.

Another strategic partnership emphasized by the co-executive directors and the heads of the departments are AJEEC's partnerships with the community: with the Bedouin community on the local level and with Israel's Arab minority on the national level.

According to the findings, the organization distinguished between partnerships that promote AJEEC's specific target issues and partnerships that maintain AJEEC's legitimacy within the community.

According to one interviewee:

We initiate community forums to support our work in general…other partnerships with the community's different segments are usually aimed to promote one of our specific programs.

During the crisis with the Islamic movement regarding the Campaign Against Polygamy. AJEEC was pressured to continue providing services to women (such as employment training and scholarships) but to give up on addressing the structural oppression women due to the pervasive practice of polygamy. As described in previous chapters, the community leaders were angry with AJEEC's campaign against polygamy and asked women to boycott AJEEC's programs.

AJEEC managed these tensions by forming new partnerships with the Islamic Movement's leadership and inviting them to partner with the organization in fighting against polygamy. One of the interviewees explained:

We knew that the Imams have influence in the community...we wanted to share with them our concerns and why we are working on the issue of polygamy…once they buy into it they become your supporters.

AJEEC established its own Imams Forum to institutionalize their ongoing consultation with religious leaders. This action generated support and legitimacy for AJEEC's social advocacy work by aligning the organization with the Imams. Through these partnerships, AJEEC was able to influence the text the Imams provided on Friday services and actually change the discourse around women's issues to be fully aligned with AJEEC's mission of empowering women and promoting equality. During the interview with the Bedouin co-executive director, he expressed satisfaction and relief about working with the Imams forum:

You can't imagine, these days they [the Imams] are helping us not only in issues of polygamy but also they work with us in partnership with Soroka Hospital to encourage cross-tribal marriages to reduce genetic diseases among the Bedouin community. The Islamic movement representatives said to me, discussing women issues, that "we are in favour of women empowerment but it has to be done carefully and with respect to our religion."

Although the majority of the interviewees valued the partnership with the Imams, some expressed concerns about the "close" relationships between AJEEC and the Imams Forum. The Volunteer Tent Director said:

Some of the practices of these leaders [Imams] are conflicting with our mission and I am not comfortable with this partnership.

At the same time, the findings showed that AJEEC does not maintain relationships with all the players within the community. Instead, they select these partners strategically. One of the co-executive directors explained:

Sometimes we are responding to an invitation to join a coalition or forum which we understand as being crucial for expanding and strengthening our community base. Other times we initiate the coalition and invite people and organizations to join us… we invest in each collaboration system according to our needs and according to how close this partnership is to our core work and mission.

For example, when AJEEC established the Herakuna coalition to promote the CV program, AJEEC decided to step out of the coalition after four years once the organization's leadership believed that by remaining in this coalition would hinder AJEEC from achieving its advocacy goals. The program general manager explained this decision:

It [withdrawing from the coalition] was a risk worth taking rather than losing the political opportunity opened by nominating an open minded minister who knows us and was willing help us

The RDC director echoed a similar statement**:**

We understand that withdrawing from Herakuna wasn't the nicest thing to do but we had to move forward and cultivate the political opportunity and the willingness of the mayors to join us. In this stage, we needed a strong player in the government level who can open doors

After leaving the Herakuna coalition, AJEEC partnered with the Abraham Fund to promote the CV program, demonstrating that AJEEC forms strategic relationships that align with their integrative social change approach and that the organization engages in or terminates these relationships according to a careful risk-benefit calculation. Moreover, this example demonstrated AJEEC's ability to scan the environment and choose its partners strategically.

The data revealed AJEEC's two main partnership strategies: first creating synergetic partnerships with diverse players to promote their programs; and second, community-based partnerships that were strategically selected and maintained to promote AJEEC's goals and legitimacy.

5. Resource Diversification

AJEEC's co-executive directors pointed out that every revenue source constrains the organization. These constraints include: organization dependency, mission displacement and financial instability. In order to minimize these contraints, the co-executive directors strategized to segment the funding sources into three segments: foundations, government, and self-generating funds*:* "We figured that we needed to divide the funds 30, 30,40 where 30% comes from the government, 30% is self generated, and 40% comes from foundations." The organization diversified their resources by securing flexible government funds and developing opportunities for self-generating income.

5.1. Flexible Government Funds

Although the co-executive directors and the management committee members perceived government funding as one of the government's responsibility towards its citizens, they were also aware of its negative effects on advocacy and policy change work. One of the co-executive directors expressed his concerns regarding government funds:

It has been an ongoing dilemma of the organization. We want to make sure the government funds the programs and fulfills its responsibility towards the Bedouin minority but we have to maintain and ensure our autonomy. This is why we need to select funding opportunities carefully.

One source of flexible funding AJEEC went after was the government's unsolicited proposals and the inter-ministry support committee—a specific fund for new initiatives that is awarded for a minimum of three years. According to one of the co-executive directors, AJEEC went after these funds because:

This money is more flexible and we have good chances of winning it because of our innovative programs and our professional credibility.

Through these specific governmental channels, AJEEC was able to receive funds to start new programs (in public health and youth leadership) and to upscale its existing programs to new locations. Although this money was considered public, it was not restricted like

traditional governmental service provision funding. The director of development explained:

*This money is less stable than the money we receive through each ministry for our [service provision] programs **but** it is more flexible. That allows for start-ups and it's for three years so it is enough for us develop the project and test it while attracting new funders. Sometimes even the government itself, after evaluating it, will decide to adopt the program and upscale it…this is what we experienced with our early childhood program.*

AJEEC's leadership was aware of the dangers of being dependent on a limited number of funders regardless of whether they are public or private. The former co-executive director shared:

We are aware that the one who gives the money determines where it goes and thus we treat our fundraising efforts in a very serious way. We don't want our funders to determine our mission or to be over-involved in our programs.

To be able to have "flexible money", AJEEC's leadership emphasized the importance of receiving funding from multiple sources. The director of the financial department said:

we try not to rely on only one foundation, even for a single project

Similarly, one of the former co-executive directors said:

Soon after AJEEC's expansion phase, we realized that the expansion requires more money and that this money has to come partly from the government in principle but also from private foundations and many other sources.

In addition to the funds needed for the expansion phase, the programs developer emphasized the importance of flexible funds in order to maintain ownership over the program during the first stage, the development stage. He explained:

The development stage of the project is a crucial time for us. We invite the government to observe and learn, not to put money…the minute they put money, they would intervene in the process with all of their administrative criteria and regulations. That would affect the development of the program.

The findings showed that AJEEC's diversified its resources through special government funds and various foundations in order to minimize the constraints inherent in receiving external funds and to maintain ownership of their programs.

5.2. Self-Generating Income

In order to achieve their target of receiving 30% of their revenues from self-generating funds, the organization started the Social Enterprise Program and developed the "single mothers catering program". The organization developed a social business model around the Food Security Act and invested all profits back into the community through AJEEC's programs.

"The single-mothers catering program" won the contract with the Minister of Education in 2009 and reached its full capacity in 2013, providing 8700 meals daily to elementary schools in Hura and surrounding villages. Today the enterprise revenues compose 21% of AJEEC's yearly budget. As expressed by the former founder-director (the researcher):

With limited funds from the government, a shifting funding environment (where foundations changed their strategic direction every three years), we can't rely on any external money. We need to develop our own financial resources. Social enterprises are the best and most sustainable way especially because the market is secured by the Food Security Act. (Personal communication, 2008)

According to the business manager of the program, self-generating income is "good money" because*:*

21% of our total yearly budget is very valuable because this is good money that is flexible and not restricted by external funders…we can do with it whatever we want.

Since 2013, AJEEC was able to open another two branches, making this social enterprise a national-wide endeavour. The success of this program brought new donors to invest in duplicating AJEEC's model in another mixed Arab-Jewish city. With this self-generating income, AJEEC was able to develop a matching funding strategy in which AJEEC established new partnerships with academic institutions to provide scholarships for AJEEC's program participants. In 2015, this matching strategy allowed the organization to triple the number of scholarships they were able to provide to student volunteers with the Volunteer Tent. The deputy manager said:

This year [2015] we went to our academic partners who used to provide the scholarship and we offered them one-to-one matching. We increased the number of the scholarships from 220 in 2011 to 517 in 2015.

This statement shows the capacity of "good, flexible money" and how the organization leveraged this income to secure more partnerships, attract more donors, and ultimately raise more funds for the organization. According to the financial manager:

When I arrived eight years ago, we were relying on foreign foundations and governments such as the EU and Jewish foundations in North America for 87% [of the budget]. Today we are moving towards our 30, 30, 40 objective

Conclusion

The findings demonstrated that AJEEC was able to manage the tensions by developing and using the following strategies: 1) Strategically linking service provision and advocacy; 2) Selecting competent leadership; 3) Re-setting the agenda; 4) Balancing legitimacies; and 5) Diversifying resources. These strategies were not used in isolation. Rather, they were employed in combination with one another to more effectively respond to the challenges that arose due to AJEEC's integrative social change approach. The next chapter will discuss the main findings of this study.

Table 8: Summary of Tensions and Strategic Responses

Org. Dimension	Tension	Response
Mission and Ideology	1. Competing Powers	**6. Linking service provision and advocacy strategically.** **Sub themes:** Multidimensional Service, Advocacy Based Service
	2. Social Services vs. Political Rights	**7. Re-Setting the agenda** **Sub themes:** Framing the message, Seizing political opportunities,
Resource Availability	3. Funding Restrictions and Barriers	**4 Diversifying resources.** **Sub themes:** Securing Flexible Funds to Maintain Autonomy, Generating Self Income
	4. Conflicting Legitimacies	**8. Balancing legitimacies.** **Sub theme:** Balancing Legitimacy within the Community, Balancing Legitimacy with Government Institutions, Direct and Open Communication

Organizational S**tructure**	5. Multifaceted Accountability	**9. Selecting competent leadership** **Sub themes:** Staff Locality, Joint Arab Jewish Staff, Multidisciplinary professional leadership and staff, Staff Development**.**

CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION

Managing Paradoxes, Shifting Paradigms

Overview

This study confirmed that AJEEC's political context (of the State-indigenous minority) and its social context (of patriarchal structures) shaped the tensions that arise from AJEEC's integrative social change approach. Moreover, the findings illustrated that the complexity of AJEEC's external and internal environments shaped the degree of complexity of the tensions that the organization faced.

Complex context → Complex organization → Complex tensions

The study also confirmed that despite these complex tensions, AJEEC was able to maintain its integrative approach of promoting policy change while providing valued services to its target community. More than this, the organization fostered a stable community, financial, and professional base.

The research findings of this study point to complex interactions between the organization's external environment—the political context of the state versus an indigenous minority and the social context of a patriarchal society—and the organization's internal environment—its dual identity (Jewish and Arab) and its integrative approach of service provision and advocacy. The findings showed that this complex reality created

multifaceted tensions resulting from a combination of social, economic, and political factors. Moreover, these tensions were fundamentally centered around power relations, leading to: competing powers, conflicting legitimacies, multifaceted accountabilities, political and social restrictions, and control over resources.

A major finding of this study is that the very sources of the tensions that AJEEC faced were also a source of strength that made it possible for the organization to manage the tensions and survive. This paradox stems from AJEEC's approach of reframing contradictory forces as complimentary. AJEEC utilized this approach to develop complementary relationships between all its components, constituencies, and contexts: service and advocacy, Jews and Arabs, and men and women, the State and the Bedouin minority. By shifting from a power dynamic of competition to one of collaboration, AJEEC transformed its sources of tension into the basis of its organizational power and resilience. The explanation for these paradoxical findings rests with the organization's unique ability to turn dichotomist relationships into complementary connections by reconstructing the nature of service and advocacy and to develop strategies that served to sustain this unique approach for fifteen years.

Shifting Dichotomist Relations to Complementary Connections

Scholars and practitioners alike traditionally view service provision and advocacy (Brooks, 2005; D. C. Minkoff, 1994; Mosley, 2012), Arabs and Jews(Haklai, 2008; Jamal, 2009), men and women (Tanesini, 1999; Thompson, 2013), the State and the minority as inherently contradictory components. AJEEC's ability to manage the complex tensions it faced with regards to all these components stemmed from taking a different stance: According to the findings, AJEEC views these components as fundamentally complementary rather than contradictory. By reconstructing its core functions of service provision and advocacy, AJEEC was able to create complementary connections between all of AJEEC's different components. To fully understand this point, I will focus on each

of AJEEC's components and how AJEEC was able to build complementary connections: advocacy-based alternatives, a shared Arab-Jewish mission, gender equality, state-minority relations.

Advocacy-based Alternatives

Studies show that civil society organizations that deal with service, advocacy, or with both, often contradict one another, ideologically and practically. According to the literature organizations that provide service often require different organizational structures and resources than those that provide advocacy alone. The research suggests that combining the two threatens the organization's ability to sustain both functions (Anheier, 2014; Borys & Jemison, 1989; Brooks, 2005; Lewis, 2006).

One of the problems is based on the basic assumption of how we look and treat these two functions and how we deal with the tensions which arise from combining them. This dichotomy is fuelled by the notion that the two functions cannot coexist as a holistic model and by the fact that government funding has been restricted to function areas such as the youth-at-risk and disabilities. In response, schools of social work developed separate tracks for clinical or individual social work and for community work. Very often the first track focuses on services and clinical interventions, and the second is on community work, management and policy change. I am not arguing that the dichotomy came out of nowhere. There are factors which influence this dichotomy such as resource availability and institutional pressures. The constant struggle for resource, dependence on the external environment, and maintaining collaborative relationships extenuated the difficulty in connecting the service function and the organization's desire to promote policy change.

However, indigenous minority organization do not have the luxury to engage in one function over the over. Their reality is such that the organization has to simultaneously provide necessary resources and advocate for equal treatment and structural change (Hyde, 2000; Debra C Minkoff, 1999). In line with this need, my study demonstrated the

importance of developing a model that effectively combines both service provision and advocacy**.** My findings suggest that AJEEC did not "surrender" to the dichotomist paradigm of service provision or advocacy but rather treated these functions as complementary. AJEEC did this by redefining service as a mean not only to answer the immediate needs but also as a tool to empower people. As the findings indicated, this unique approach to service changed participants from *passive service recipients to active rights seekers* and *advocates.*

Advocacy-based alternatives provided an effective avenue for promoting policy change within the context of State-minority relations. While the dominant advocacy approach usually involves antagonistic political protest—the minority resists and refuses, and the state coerces and disregards—AJEEC redefined advocacy to create a complementary link between advocacy and service provision, and in doing so, redefined the relationship between the Bedouin minority and the State. AJEEC's approach of proposing solutions to and engaging in negotiations with the government created a system of collaboration between the organization and government. This collaboration generated trust between the two parties and legitimized AJEEC as a professional organization. In practice, this partnership enabled the organization to understand the political system and establish contacts with bureaucrats which ultimately opened doors for policy change. This approach is not unique to AJEEC. Recent studies explore how engaging in service provision provides opportunities for services organizations to promote policy change affecting their target communities (Donaldson & Shields, 2008; Mosley, 2009; Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008).

The research findings showed that despite the political tensions and general mistrust between the government and the Bedouin minority, AJEEC was able to cooperate with the government and maintain its legitimacy within the community. One of the main reasons AJEEC was able to maintain legitimacy with both parties was because AJEEC's

service provision made the organization trustworthy even when the organization cooperated with the government.

A Shared Arab-Jewish Mission

AJEEC's dual ethnic identity was one of the factors that shaped the tensions arising from combining service and advocacy. Its unique approach towards majority-minority relations helped AJEEC resolve these tensions and promote both policy change and service delivery. As Haklai (2004,2009) suggest, advocacy-led structural change is a more complex process for ethnically diverse organizations than it is for ethnically homogenous organizations. In his article on ethnic civil society, Haklai indicates that within Palestinian social change organizations, it is difficult to deal with structural change issues in joint Arab-Jewish organizations. Other SCOs scholars similarly address the failure of ethnically diverse SCOs to deal with root causes of systemic oppression. Darawshi, for example, cited in Hakalai's work, describes joint Arab-Jewish coexistence as "coexistence between the horse and its rider" (Haklai, 2009).

My research findings revealed that AJEEC, as an Arab-Jewish organization, experienced substantial conflict, namely regarding the ideological disagreement between political rights and social rights. Nevertheless, AJEEC also demonstrated that an Arab-Jewish organization is capable of leading policy change. In fact, AJEEC's dual ethnic identity *helped* AJEEC to lead campaigns and to bring politically loaded issues (such as the National Service program versus Community Volunteerism; the Prawer plan) into the public discourse. Findings showed that by maintaining a joint staff, the organization introduced an integrative rather than a divisive approach to Arab-Jewish relations. The emphasis on a joint responsibility for creating a safe space for both groups contributed a great deal to reducing the tensions due to ideological disputes between Jews and Arabs, and made them leverage what they had in common to deal with divisive factors. Creating

and constantly maintaining the two groups' shared vision and goal resulted in mutual commitment to joint work even during times of crisis, such as the War on Gaza. Moreover, the organizational joint identity generated trust with government ministries and helped AJEEC to build strategic partnerships with foundations and donors, making the organization stronger and enabling it to leverage its service provision towards policy change.

Most importantly, the organization's decision to integrate Arab-Jewish staff challenged the paradigm of segregation and shaped an organizational reality based on building trust and creating shared interests between the Jewish staff and the Bedouin staff. The findings showed that the staff coalesced around common goals, creating a discourse of common responsibility toward shared values of justice, equality, and mutual respect. AJEEC's joint Arab-Jewish approach shifted the discourse among the staff from blaming the minority and the majority for its problems to taking a shared responsibility towards actively shaping this reality. As the Jewish co-executive director indicated:

We as the majority are responsible for the minority's exclusion and neglect, it is not just the responsibility of the minority. It is only when we believe that we live in a shared space that we will understand we have a mutual responsibility to improve it.

Gender Equality

According to the literature on social change organizations working to improve the status of Arab women, despite modernization, women affairs are still considered taboo and pushed "under the rug" to be treated internally within a patriarchal system (Thompson, 2013) Arab women's organizations in Jordan and Syria, as well as in Israel, report the same challenge: SCOs that engage with taboo topics (polygamy, early marriage, killing in the name of family "honour") become delegitimize by the community leaders (Abdo, 1994; Arar, 2011; Lind & Farmelo, 1996; Rubenberg, 2001).

Tensions between the community and the organization peaked when AJEEC addressed gender based violence, polygamy and inter-tribal marriages and questioned the patriarchal structure that deprives women of power. The community leadership attempted to limit AJEEC's advocacy work and push the organization towards services provision in order to preserve the power structure. As discussed in the literature, community leaders silence gender equality work by appealing to the political context (in AJEEC's case, the ongoing national conflict or the housing demolitions) in order to push women empowerment agenda aside to tackle the "bigger" issues. This politicization strategy proved successful over the years. Social change organizations avoided inter-community issues because "there are more important things", including an "outside enemy" that must be defeated first. Only then will they find the time for inter-community issues like women's status. My study findings revealed that the same strategy: both the community leadership and state institutions attempted to delegitimize the organization's work by politicizing economic and social issues to pressure the organization to give up some of its activities.

Many studies showed that organizations that operate within a context of the patriarchal structure and only advocate against the government seem more legitimate to the community than organizations that deal with inter-community change, such as women's organizations (Arar, 2011; Rubenberg, 2001). Again, within the context of a patriarchal society, gender relations are treated within the paradigm of dichotomy creating separate camps of *us versus them* rather than focusing on the society as a whole. AJEEC's advocacy-based alternatives turned dichotomist relations into complementary connections. By embedding women's empowerment in the service itself and raising awareness among women to their rights transformed women from *passive participants* to *agents of social change* who enacted social change and led campaigns such as the campaign against polygamy. When tensions arose around AJEEC's social advocacy work, it was the service that helped manage the tensions. First because community leaders did not want to lose the

service (for example a wife's job and income, a daughter's scholarship) and also because women did not want to give up on the advocacy work because they became aware of the long term benefits.

The fact that AJEEC adopted a gender equality agenda and equally employed Bedouin women and men triggered criticism and tensions between AJEEC and the community leadership. On the other hand, the inclusion of Bedouin men and women in AJEEC prevented any substantial harm to the organization. The Bedouin men and women staff provided a safer space for women to act. Studies show that women's organizations are more vulnerable and subject to more attacks than organizations that deal with the same issues and that include both genders.

In summary, building a complementary connection approach by creating links between men and women, by expanding their vision beyond immediate needs, and by emphasizing men and women's joint work towards a holistic society, helped to overcome these tensions.

State-Indigenous Minority Relations

In the face of State-imposed political restrictions and funding barriers, AJEEC established a new discourse between the minority and State. AJEEC's unique approach relies on its ability to shift the paradigm from State-minority relations to a more complementary relation of a state and its citizens. Advocacy-based alternatives broke the "walls" that were built by the dichotomist paradigms between State and minority. This dichotomy was fed and reinforced by the State's policy and attitudes towards the Bedouin indigenous minority which was internalized by the minority itself. Within this dichotomy, the minority often only challenges the "rules" of the game instead of challenging the game itself. Aiming to actually change the game underscored AJEEC's approach.

Redefining advocacy by proposing alternative solutions was the basis for a new relationship where both sides changed their views of one another. The literature reveals

that the majority tends to view the minority as peripheral, primitive, weak and powerless. Advocacy-based alternatives fostered a new relationship between the majority and minority: the majority started to view the minority as rights-conscious citizens who can contribute to creating solutions while holding the government accountable to its citizens. Advocacy-based alternative also presented a challenge to government institutions. The findings showed that it was hard for the state to "avoid" AJEEC's alternative solutions. In line with the literature, the findings revealed that this advocacy approach allowed the community to more effectively claim its rights than through classical advocacy. As Oren explains, within the context of state indigenous minority relations, classical advocacy is less challenging and leaves the advocates with the feeling of powerlessness (Yiftachel, 2009).

This approach of advocacy-based alternatives also challenged the Bedouin program participants to move from passive protestors, "victims", and "complainers" to become "active citizens" and advocates for social change. This was evident in the words of one of the program participants who presented at the Knesset:

I felt powerful in front of the microphone... I wasn't about to discuss my problems as a single mother like I always thought myself to be and ask for pity, I was there to present the success of my business and to show everyone what women can do... I felt like a powerful single mother who any can learn from, even the government can learn from my business story...

In other words, advocacy-based alternative empowered the minority to focus on its strengths and thus transformed them into advocates who lead the process of policy change.

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Overview

This study explored the tensions faced by indigenous minority social change service organizations (SCSOs) face when combining service provision and advocacy as their fundamental approach to social change. In order to study these tensions, this study used AJEEC as a single case study, an Arab-Jewish organization operating within the Bedouin community of the Naqab-Negev (an indigenous minority in Israel) within the context of Israel's ongoing national conflict.

Findings from this study indicated that the external complexities (the political and social reality of the Bedouin community) as well as the internal ones (AJEEC's organizational structure and environment) produced complex and multifaceted tensions. The main factors contributing to these tensions were conceptualized as: competing powers, conflicting legitimacies, political restrictions, funding barriers, and multifaceted accountability. The study revealed that complex environments give rise to the necessity of both service and advocacy which produced more complex tensions. The organization consistently found ways of resolving these tensions by developing a model capable of integrating sevice provision and advocacy and made them complementary. AJEEC redefined the paradigm between these two approaches by engaging in service-oriented

advocacy or by offering advocacy-based services, highlighting the need to engage in both in order to simultaneously provide for the community and advocate for policy change.

Within this complementary approach, AJEEC viewed relations between Arabs and Jews, between men and women, and between the state and its indigenous citizens as fundamentally complimentary and consistently sought to create win-win situations. In doing so, AJEEC replaced the "us versus them" approach with a more holistic approach to social change. To maintain this unique approach, AJEEC developed strategies to cultivate and sustain this approach within the organization. These strategies included: the development of competent leadership and staff, strategic framing of the organization's agenda to align with both the government and the community, and the diversification of resources.

Along with these findings, the study pointed to the need for further research in the regarding the application of this approach to other indigenous minority SCSOs and their complex relationship with governments; and the need for additional theoretical models which go beyond Resource dependence theory and Institutional theory to conceptualize SCSO dynamics.

Research Limitations

Further research would be well served by examining these dynamics in other settings. As this study focused on only one SCSO within a particular context, the generalizability of these findings to other SCSOs is limited. Thus, future research should include more cases from similar contexts.

Second, the age and the size of the organization in this study offered an enormous amount of data. In order not to be overwhelmed by the data, I selected five major events as the foundation for my analysis and discussion. While I specifically chose events that showcased various tensions the organization faced—political, social, financial—it is possible that selecting other events would provide further insights. For example, selecting

purely financially-motivated crises might have shed more light on the financial aspects of these organizations.

Third, when I began my research, I assumed that the social and political contexts—namely the patriarchal society and the ethnic state—majorly constrained the organization's activities and impacted its behaviour. Although this initial interest shaped the research process, it is important to note that, in spite of this, I was able to move beyond this assumption and uncover ways in which some of the organizations actions were hardly influenced by these factors. For example, AJEEC's strategic decision to diversify its resources had nothing to do with the context, it was purely an organizational force.

Finally, being an insider researcher provided many advantages (the bulk of which are outlined in the methodology) namely privileged access to the community, the organization's staff, and the organization's documents. Nevertheless, this position also posed challenges mainly around the issue of subjectivity. In spite of this, I was aware of my own biases and was able to reflect on it aiming for maximum objectivity.

Implications For Future Research

Along with working to expand this study beyond these stated limitations, our knowledge of this topic can be expanded in the following ways:

First, despite the well-documented dilemma of combining advocacy and service provision, the greatest challenges researchers and practitioners face is finding a comfortable balance between these two approaches. Despite the pressing need for solutions, the vast majority of studies focus on *understanding* the tensions while few actually focus on their *resolutions* with the aim of providing directions in which SCSOs can overcome the tensions that arise from combining these approaches. Thus there is a need to explore more cases of SCSOs that successfully combine service provision and advocacy.

Second, scholars have explored SCSOs' behaviour primarily through Resource dependence theory. This theory greatly underestimates SCSOs independence and overplays the extent to which their need to secure external funds—primarily from the government—dictates SCSOs' behaviour. Much of the literature demonstrates ways in which an SCSO must curtail its advocacy or service provision activities in order to placate the government and maintain funding. This study, however, demonstrated that community legitimacy and organizational mission—not government funding—were the driving forces behind AJEEC's behaviour. In light of these findings, there is a need to unpack the concept of SCSOs' independence and uncover the real source motivating their actions.

Moreover, this study broke with the finding that an SCSO's engagement in advocacy was negatively correlated with the amount of government funding the organization received. In AJEEC's case, AJEEC's engagement in advocacy and its amount of government funding were positively correlated. These findings contradict the long-standing belief that government funding necessarily constrains the advocacy activities of civil society organizations. To that end, more research is required to understand how by providing "advocacy-based alternatives", and engaging in setting the agenda, framing the message or "reverse agenda", SCSOs have influenced government and donor policies and practices (Robinson and Ridell 1995, Lewis 2001b).

Third, SCSOs and their survival in complex environments are often discussed through Resource dependence theory and the Institutional theory. Theses theories frequently undermine the agency of civil society organizations and portray them as subordinate. According to these theories, the organizations must surrender to environmental financial, political, and social pressures to survive. Contrary to these theoretical perspectives, AJEEC clearly demonstrated an agency for promoting policy change while addressing its immediate needs. Within the context of a national conflict, a patriarchal and conservative society on one hand and reliance on external political and financial resources on the other, AJEEC was able to substantially preserve its

organizational independence and remain committed to its mission and goals. AJEEC demonstrates that the organization is not merely passive nor a captive of its environment. Given these findings, there is a need to incorporate other theoretical frameworks and develope new ones that more accurately portray the reality of SCSOs. There is, for example, Strategic choice theory or Strategic choice perspective (Ansoff, 1979; Chandler, 1962; Child, 1972; Rabin, Miller and Hildreth, 1989; 1985; Thomson, 1967). This theory suggests that SCSOs are capable of adapting to and altering events that take place in their external environments. Further, since SCSOs are similar to social movement organizations in terms of their philosophy, mission, and advocacy function there is an opportunity to apply Political opportunity theory and Resource mobilization theory. Analyzing SCSOs will create a bridge between the fields of organizational studies and social movement studies as theories of social movements would shed light on these organization's agency and mission while organizational theory would provide a better lens to explore these organization's management and performance.

Finally, the growing numbers of SCSOs around the world, particularly those of minority-based organizations, women's organizations, indigenous groups, and immigrant and refugee organizations, LGBTQ, and organizations of people with disabilities demonstrates a pressing need to conduct more research that focus on these organizations to provide knowledge. Understanding these organizations is necessary to their development and survival.

Implications for Policy

Over the last three decades the global community has delegated many responsibilities to civil society organizations in fields of development, relief, and service provision. Thus positioning civil society organizations among the leading players affecting the global agenda.

Within the context of indigenous minority SCSOs, SCSOs are more cost-effective,

flexible, innovative, and responsive to local needs (Lewis, 2006). Moreover, SCSOs contribute to social justice and equality for minorities by providing alternative solutions to old problems and proposing policy changes. From a policy perspective, there are important motivations for a closer relationship between governments and SCSOs. First, it is essential that governments respect SCSOs independence so that they remain sufficiently independent to retain their core values and competitive advantage (see Hailey 2000)—Governments should seek out ways to engage in partnerships and funding relations with SCSOs without undermining SCSOs independence so as to shape shared solutions which take advantage of SCSOs greatest assets: their innovative ideas; proximity to, understanding of, and legitimacy within the target group; and their culturally relevant and effective programming.

Second my findings demonstrated that SCSOs are able to play a role in policy making, not only as implementers of policy but as a partners in drafting policies. Governments can benefit from SCSOs' ability to represent the voices on the ground and by partnering with them in policy design, governments can more readily guarantee that new policies meets the aspirations of the target group. To facilitate this process, SCSOs should approach governments by actively providing alternatives—rather than solely advocating against a proposed policy—and demand that governments fund these alternatives. AJEEC's integrative approach and willingness to partner with the government placed the organization at the forefront of policy design. This approach might be found useful by other civil society organizations so that these organizations do not replace the government's role as service providers but result in partnerships that generate understanding, trust, and accountability.

Finally, in practice and in theory, the dynamic between state and civil society organizations often follows the script of the oppressor versus the oppressed: governments enact exclusionary policies, civil society organizations advocate against these policies, the government is willing to negotiate, but the CSO refuses to engage and the cycle continues.

Within this cycle, the marginalized community continues to suffer and their plight is used to maintain this power dynamic. This study's findings showed that if both parties (governments and civil society organizations) focus on common interests and engage in open communication, they can transcend this power dynamic and can be effective partners in promoting equality and justice for marginalized groups.

Implications for Social Work Practice

The social work profession and SCSOs have common values of self-determination and empowerment. They also have a common constituency: people in society who are less powerful and vulnerable. The findings of this study suggest several implications for social work practice and policy.

1. Re-assess the approach of teaching social work within separate streams and create a holistic approach that teaches clinical and community social work as an integrative model.

2. Schools of social work should lend their expertise in management to enhance social workers entering to the SCSO field.

3. Greater emphasis on innovation, government relations, leadership training, building partnership, negotiation and as well as participatory management can be of assistance to people entering the SCSO field, in particular, those who are working among indigenous minorities.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

Documents Reviewed for Data Collection and Analysis

Doc	Year	CONTENT	Language
AJEEC OFFICIAL DOC	2015	Official letters 46 Tax ex Financial management	Hebrew Hebrew Hebrew
Narrative reports	2003 2004 2005 2009 2011 2013	Mission documents Program description and reports to funders	English Hebrew Arabic English English English
Annual Report	2002 2004 2008 2009 2010 2015	Program reports budgets Organizational developments and progress	Hebrew Hebrew English Arabic Hebrew English
BD Minutes	2004, 2007 2009 2010 2012	Board meetings discussion and decisions	H H H H H
MC Minutes	2008 2009 2010 2011 2015	Ongoing management issues, follow up	H A H A H
Official letters Email communication	2008 2009 2010	Letters from funders, government's	H A H

	2015	institutions.	
Proposals	2002,3 2006 2008,9,15	EU proposal (2) Foundations proposals (4) Governmental Funding forms and proposals	A H E
Flyer and Brochures	2005,7,8 2010,12,15		A A E E
Ajeec publications	2009 2006 2008	Alternative CV Parents as partners model Volunteerisms a right	A A H
Evolution Report	Medot rating report Social insurance office VT Evaluation	2009 2005 2012	H H E A H H E
Newspapers art	Sawat Alahaq 2007, 8,9,11 Ynet Chanel 0ne and 10	2008,9 2009 2005	A A H

APPENDIX B



Map of Unrecognized Bedouin Villages in the Naqab-Negev

Unrecognized Bedouin Village

Housing demolition

Rahat, largest Bedouin city

APPENDIX C

AJEEC Growth of Programs, Employees, Volunteers, Budget from 2000 - 2016

Year	#Programs/projects	#Employees*	#Volunteers	Budget US $
2000	Early Childhood (CH)/volunteerism (V)	1		17,8885
2001	1Early Childhood/1volunteerism	1		58,630
2002	2Early Childhood/2volunteerism	2		280,148
2003	5 Early Childhood 3 volunteerism	4	42	370,850
2004	CH*7 V*12 Economic Development*3	7	89	438,963
2005	CH*22 V*40 ED*12	52	113	1,148,742
2006	CH*22 V*45 ED*12 Health Promotion*3	80	185	2,192,394
2007	CH44 V60 ED14 HP8	85	218	2,635,048
2008	CH44 V50 ED10 HP8	68	277	1,89,7351
2009	CH60 V62 ED8 H10	87	345	2,176,452
2010	CH62 V11 ED8 HP12	90	408	2,309,282
2011	CH60 V100 ED8 H13	86	442	2,363,618
2012	CH60 V106 ED9 H20	110	842	3,358,010
2013	CH58 V130 ED8 H15	96	927	2,758,063
2014	CH58 V150 ED8 H20	98	1234	2,960,236
2015	CH60 V170 ED8 H12	97	3041	2,904,610
2016		113	5619	3,216,726

*all employees including part time

APPENDIX D

Consent form
Informed Consent

Arabic and Hebrew translation of the consent will be provided to the participants

Title of Research:
Managing The Tensions Facing Social Change Service Organization Who Combine Service Provision and Advocacy.

Researcher: Amal El-sana Alhjooj, Ph.D. candidate, Social Work
Tel:5145062046
Email: amal.el-sana@mail.mcgill.ca

Supervisor: Prof. James Torczyner
McGill School of Social Work, 3506 University St., Rm. 113.
Montreal, Qc, Canada, H3A 2A7
Tel:514-398-6717
Email james.torczyner@mcgill.ca

You are invited to participate in a study conducted by Ms. Amal Elsana Alhjooj exploring how the SCSO AJEEC deals with the tensions that arise from combining service provision and advocacy. It is very important that you read all the explanations and ask all the questions regarding the research and the meaning of your participation before you start.
If you have any further questions please contact me Amal Elsana Alhjooj or my supervisor Prof. James Torczyner.

Purpose of the research:
The purpose of my study is to explore how do SCSOs such as AJEEC manage the tensions arise from combing advocacy and service provision. By address these the following questions
What tensions arise from combining service provision and advocacy in AJEEC?
How does AJEEC manage these tensions?
What mechanisms does AJEEC follow to manage these tensions?
What factors (contextual and operative) shape AJEEC's capacity to manage these tensions and survive in the long term?, I hope to provide in depth understanding of the dynamics of these tensions and reveals new models, mechanisms and long-term solutions for SCSOs to manage these tensions effectively and sustainably within the social, political, and cultural context in which they operate.

What is involved in participating: I will ask you a few questions relating to your experience ideas and thoughts regarding combining service and advocacy and how this combination affects the organization's performance and survival. The interview will between 45 minutes- an hour face to face . The interview will be audio- recorded. All recordings will be used for transcription purposes only and will be destroyed after the completion of this research.
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you can choose to decline to answer any question or even to withdraw at any point from the project. Anything you say will only be attributed to you with your permission otherwise the information will be reported in such a way as to make direct association with yourself impossible.

My pledge to confidentiality: all data will be securely stored and will be kept in a locked drawer at McGill. The only people who will have access to identifiable data are my supervisors Prof. Jim Torczyner and my committee members and myself. The data will be coded and stored in a way that makes it impossible to identify them directly with any individual. The tapes will be organized by number/codes rather than by name.
The intended dissemination of the study results will be presented in my dissertation and might be published in peer reviewed article. Your identity as a participant will be protected in any public presentation. I will use false names if I need to quote text.

Questions: If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights or welfare as a participant in this research study, please contact the McGill Ethics Officer at 514-398-6831 or lynda.mcneil@mcgill.ca

Agreement:

Your signature on this form means that you have read all the information on the consent and you agree to participate in this study and agree to be audiotape.

I agree to participate in this research: Yes. ☐ NO ☐

I agree to be audiotaped interview: Yes. NO ☐

Participant Signature: _____ Date: _____

Participant Name: _____

Researcher's signature: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX E

INTERVIEW GUIDE (draft)

Title of research:
Managing The Tensions Facing Social Change Service Organization Who Combine Service Provision and Advocacy.

- Time and location:
- Name/ Pseudonym:

Demographic questions

- Age
- Sex
- Position title
- Years of employment in AJEEC
- Department
- Level of education
- Past experience in employment
- Profession
- Nationality

General:
Roles of SCSOs: Change theory, strategies of social change service organizations (SCSOs)

1. What roles do SCSOs play nowadays in Israel?
2. In your opinion, what types of activities and roles of SCSOs are the right ones to promote social change in Israel in general and in the Negev in particular? Why? Provide examples.
3. What roles should (SCSOs) play in an ideal world in the Bedouin community?
4. Why? Provide examples.
5. What attributes and characteristics should (SCSOs) have?

Combining Serves provision and Advocacy (includes moral legitimacy)
There are NGOs that work only in services and others that work in advocacy.

1. What attributes would you use to describe the organization who combine serves and advocacy? Why? Provide examples.

Specific: profile of the AJEEC (facts')

2. When was the organization founded?
3. How many volunteers does it have?
4. How many paid human resources does it have?
5. Where is it located? Where are its offices? Are the offices rented or the organization's property?
6. How many offices does it have?
7. What is the structure or design of the organization?

Social change approach:

1. Tell me about your understanding of NGOs? Roles of NGOs in general and BNGOs in particular

2. Tell me about your understanding of social change approaches?
3. What are the primary components these approaches?
4. How do you define advocacy? What is the role of advocacy in social change?
5. How do you define services? What is the role of services in social change?
6. Tell me about your experience with service/ advocacy?
7. Tell me about the differences between advocacy and services and Which approach do you prefer as a strategy for social change? Why?
8. Do you think that service/advocacy complement or contradict each other? Explain?

Combining Service and Advocacy- establishing the tensions

1. What is AJEEC social change approach according to your experience?
2. What are the tension arise from combining A/S
3. Where and when do you see tensions time and events
4. How do these tensions manifest it selves? Explain and provide examples
5. Tell me about your experience with these tensions if any?
6. Where do you think these tensions are most severe?
7. How do these tensions affect the organization's holistically and operatively ?
8. What are the political and economic factors that lead to this tensions?

Managing the tensions

1. Based on your experience how does the organization deals with the tensions
2. What are the compromises the org make in situations of conflicts?
3. What are the balancing mechanisms of the organization?
4. Who fund the organization? Gov. foundations private donors
5. To whom do you think the organization is accountable?
6. What are the strengths and the weaknesses of the organization?
7. What role the leadership of the organization play in managing these tensions

APPENDIX F

January 19, 2016

Dear Amal Elsana Alhjooj
Phd candidate
School of Social Work
McGill University
Amal.el-sana@mail.mcgill.ca
Tel: 1(514)5062046

Based on our verbal agreement and understanding we are very pleased that you are doing your research on Social Change Service Organizations in the Bedouin Community and choose our organisation; AJEEC- NISPED as your case study.

As we understand, for the purpose of completing your PhD dissertation, you will collect data through interviews, observations and documents analysis. The aim of this data collecting is to explore the tensions arise from combining service provision and advocacy and the ways in which AJEEC adapt to manage these tensions. The interviews will be conducted with the organization's co executive directors, board members, staff, volunteers and beneficiaries. Some of these interviews are face to face, via Skype or Telephone. We also understand that you will need full access to our organization's files including the electronic documents and information. We understand that the participation in your study is voluntary and the participants will not receive any compensation of any kind for their participation. Also, they will be asked to sign a consent form if they agree to participate. We understand that the information gathered in this study will be confidential, and it will be only used for research purposes.

This letter is official approval to use the AJEEC-NISPED as a study case and we will provide you with full access to our staff, volunteers and our organisational records and documents in order for you to be able to conduct your research.

Our staff will be happy to help in disseminate the research proposal and recruiting the potential participants.

We wish you all the success in your study

Sincerely,

Ariel Dloomy

Co-Executive Director

Email: ariel@a-n.org.il

Tel. +972-54-7919340

Kher Albaz

Co-Executive Director

Email: kheralbaz@a-n.org.il

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Office: Yehuda HaNahtom 5, Beer Sheva | משרד: יהודה הנחתום 5 (בית סולוג) באר שבע

www.ajeec-nisped.org.il | info@a-n.org.il | 08-6731551 08-6711551

Smilanski 33 Beer Sheva , Israel 8421360 סמילנסקי 33 באר שבע

APPENDIX G

Letter of Interview Invitation (Arabic)

الى حضرة السيد/ة _____ المحترم/ ة
مرحبا,
في هذه الايام اقوم باعداد بحث في جامعة مكيجل, قسم العمل الاجتماعي لنيل اللقب الثالث.
البحث يتمحور حول موؤسسات المجتمع المدني. موؤسسات المجتمع المدني تنتهج توجهات متعددة لاحراز التغير الاجتماعي, مثل تقديم خدمات, مرافعة, مجموعات ضاغطة, تحشيد ومظاهرات.
هذا البحث يسلط الضوء على الموؤسسات التي تدمج بين التوجهيين:
تقديم خدمات ومرافعة كاليات لاحداث التغير. يهدف البحث للاجابة عن السؤال:
كيف تستطيع هذه الموؤسسات الدمج بين النهجين (الخدمة والمرافعة) وادارة الصراع الناتج عن هذا الدمج؟
للاجابة على هذا السؤال تم اختيار موؤسسة اجيك, المركز العربي اليهودي للمساواه التمكين والتعاون كحالة مميزه في هذا المجال.
تجربتك في هذا المجال تهمني. اذا كنت ترغب في المشاركة في البحث, الرجاء التواصل معي بواسطة البريد الاكتروني لتحديد موعد للمقابلة.
تستمر المقابلة حوالي الساعة, يتم من خلالها التسجيل الصوتي لاجاباتك. اتعهد بالسرية التامة وبأن يتم استعمال مضمون المقابلة فقط لاغراض البحث.
وشكرا على تعاونك

باحترام
امل الصانع- الحجوج
طالبة لقب ثالث- جامعة مكيجل
amal.el-sana@mcgill.ca

APPENDIX H

Letter of Interview Invitation (Hebrew)

לכבוד מר/ גברת _____ הנכבד/ת

שלום רב,

במסגרת ליומדיי תואר שלישי באוניברסיטת מקגיל, במחלקה לעבודה סוציאלית, אני עורכת מחקר שעוסק בארגוני החברה האזרחית.

החברה האזרחית בעולם בכלל ובישראל בפרט משחקת תפקיד מרכזי ביצירת תהליכים של שינויים חברתיים. ארגונים חברתיים מקדמים את המטרות שלהם באמצעות גישות שונות כמו: מתן שירותים, סענגור, לובי ומחאה חברתית. ישנם מספר ארגונים שמשלבים ששתי גישות ויותר לקידום המטרות שלהם. ארגונים שמשלבים בין גישות מתקשים להתפתח ולשרוד ונתקלים בהרבה סוגיות של ניהול וגיוס משאבים. במסגרת המחקר שלי בחרתי בארגון אג׳יק כמקרה בוחן. ארגון אג׳יק הוא ארגון חברתי העוסק בשינוי חברתי באמצעות שילוב שתי הגישות של מתן שירותים וסינגור.

במסגרת איסוף הניתונים, אני עורכת ראיונות עומק עם מספר אנשים העוסקים בעשייה, מאחר והיית ועודך מעורב בעשייה ישירה ולא ישירה בארגון אג׳יק, אני פונה אליך/ אלייך בבקשה להשתתף כאחד המרואיינים במחקרי. הראיון ימשך כשעה ויוקלט בהקלטת שמע. אני מתחייבת לשמור על סודיות וניתוני הראיון ישמשו אותי לצורכי המחקר בלבד.

במידה ותהיה מעוניין להתראיין, אשמח אם תיצור איתי קשר באמצעות הדואר האלקטוני לקביעת זמן ומקום הראיון.

תודה מראש

בכבוד
אמל אלסאנע- אלחג'וג'
סטודנטית לתואר שלישי- אוניברסיטת מקגיל
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