Two Revolutions:

A Comparative Historical Analysis of Empire, Nationalism, and Communism in China & Russia

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Submitted on March 28, 2018 ©

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Contents

Abstract

This manuscript-based thesis consists of four interrelated articles comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutions. It explains these revolutions' disparities by highlighting the differentiated paces of Russia's and China's transitions from empires to nation-states. Probing the factor of agency, including elites, institutions, and ideologies, this thesis reveals four vital differences between these two movements. First, while the Bolshevik elite used class ideology to negate the notion of nation, the CCP invoked class to cultivate and boost Chinese nationalism. Second, the Bolshevik loathed military culture, whereas the CCP embraced military culture in terms of its psychology and personnel who heavily overlapped with old army elite. Third, the CCP failed to replicate the Bolshevik's route of seizing power at cities, but rather started its civil war from rural areas. Fourth, ideological power was far more central to the CCP army- and state-building than to the Bolshevik's, which was manifested in the two parties' commissar systems. This thesis argues that all of these four differences stemmed from the fact that China moved faster than Tsarist Russia in the transition to nation-states. China had an ethnically homogeneous proper, which the CCP movement used to gain momentum. In comparison to Russia, China also suffered deeper geopolitical crises. Moreover, the CCP movement arose in the post-1919 world wherein the pursuit of nation-state had become a fashion that even the Soviet Union had to concede. Finally, in a more nationalistic environment, the CCP had to fight against the KMT, a nationalist force much stronger than the Russian Whites, which compelled the militarily weak CCP to heavily exploit ideological power. The entire thesis draws three contributions. First, it agrees with the fourth generation of revolutionary theories that agency matters, whilst adds that its

importance varies greatly across revolutions. Second, going beyond existing literature highlighting the general trend of empire-nation transition, it demonstrates the social outcomes of the pace of the revolution. Third, it creates a huge empirical biographical dataset covering the two communist parties and their counterrevolutionary rivals.

Résumé de la these

Cette thèse comprend quatre articles interdépendants qui comparent la révolution bolchevique avec celui de la partie communiste chinois (PCC), et expliquent leurs disparités selon les différentes étapes entre la Russie et la Chine dans la transition d'empire vers État-nation. En examinant les élites, les institutions, et les idéologies, cette thèse révèle quatre différences importants entre ces deux mouvements. Premièrement, alors que l'élite bolchevique utilisait l'idéologie de classe pour nier la notion de nation, le PCC ont invoqué la classe pour cultiver et renforcer le nationalisme chinois. Deuxièmement, les bolcheviks détestaient la culture militaire, alors que le PCC embrassait la psychologie militaire, mais aussi le personnel du mouvement a chevauché largement l'ancienne élite de l'armée. Troisièmement, le PCC n'a pas réussi à reproduire la succès des bolcheviks en prenant la pouvoir dans les villes, mais a plutôt commencé sa guerre civile à partir des zones rurales. Quatrièmement, le pouvoir idéologique était beaucoup plus central dans la construction de l'armée et de l'État du PCC que dans celui des bolcheviks, ce qui se manifestait dans les systèmes de commissariat des deux partis. Cette thèse soutient que toutes ces quatre différences proviennent du fait que la Chine s'est déplacée plus rapidement que la Russie tsariste dans la transition vers l'État-nation. La Chine avait un peuple ethniquement homogène où le mouvement du PCC prenait de l'ampleur. La Chine a également souffert de crises géopolitiques plus profondes. De plus, le mouvement du PCC est né dans le monde d'après 1919 où la poursuite de l'État-nation était devenue une mode que même l'Union Soviétique devait concéder. Enfin, dans un contexte plus nationaliste, le PCC a dû se battre contre le KMT, une force nationaliste beaucoup plus forte que les Blancs russes, ce qui a contraint le PCC, étant militairement faible, à exploiter massivement le pouvoir idéologique

Contribution of Author

All of the four essays are sole-authored by Luyang Zhou. Each of them is currently under review at peer-reviewed journals, including *European Journal of Sociology*, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, *American Journal of Sociology*, and *Europe-Asia Studies*.

Introduction

My doctoral thesis compares the Bolshevik and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutions and focuses on their leading elites. The analysis has two main goals. First, I seek to deepen our understanding of the two polities by examining new evidence and constructing new theories. Second, through theory-testing empirical exploration, I investigate gaps between reality and theories in order to revise and adjust the theories.

Empirical Findings

The first essay focuses on the leading elites who completed final power takeovers, comparing their understandings of nation and class, two concepts both communist parities continually confronted throughout their protracted revolutionary struggles. Employing a large body of biographical data, this essay demonstrates that whereas the Bolshevik used class to negate nationalism to preserve a universal empire, the CCP used class to cultivate nationalism to achieve a full-fledged Chinese socialist nation-state. This variation reflected a crucial difference between pre-communist Russia and China—the latter had advanced much further than the former in the transition from empire to nation-state. This disparity set different themes of political debates. In Russia, the question debated was whether an empire should be preserved while in China, the CCP questioned how a nation-state should be achieved. To interpret the social origins of these two patterns of Marxism, this essay draws broad comparisons to non-communists, who also saw the deficits of nationalism but rejected class – Kadets (Constitutional liberals), non-

Russian nationalists, Great Russian rightists, Chinese liberals, KMT fascists, and Confucian traditionalists. These comparisons show that the disadvantaged individual backgrounds of the communists (i.e., humble origins, low educations, weak attachments to national traditions, limited experiences of travel and military service) – predisposed them to embrace class ideology as an alternative to nationalism. The empirical contribution of this essay is twofold. First, it frames the Bolshevik-CCP difference in a more balanced way: imperial communism (simplified as "non-national") and national communism (i.e., "national). Second, to explain this variation, this essay analyzes concrete agencies especially the enemies of communists, in order to avoid the ecological fallacy that individual communists' thought is tied directly to Russia's and China's macro-level social features.

The second essay compares the formations of the two parties' military elites by exploring these people's relations with old armies. Using biographical method, it finds that at the opening period of Civil Wars, the Bolshevik lacked military cadres of its own, and thus had to call back officers of the former Tsarist army. While in China, many CCP generals came from the old army where they had converted to communism. My interpretation of this variation starts with an ideal thesis that did not fully occur in reality: according to Marxism, socialists should have denounced the military, viewing the latter as useless in making communism; meanwhile, the military, if carrying apolitical and professional ethics, should have distanced itself from socialist movements. My empirical analysis shows that such mutual alienation tended to be undermined by intense warfare and severe geopolitical crises. Russia was more geopolitically secure, which allowed its socialist movements to be preoccupied with domestic injustice and its military to have little interest in politics. On the contrary, China's precarious geopolitical status and

perennial civil wars, in the long term, produced a militarized intelligentsia and politicized officer corps. Sharing common psychologies and backgrounds, it was much easier for these two groups to penetrate each other and generate a militaristic communist movement. This essay bridges a gap in communist studies, explaining the historical origins of the CCP's more integrated party-army relation vis-à-vis the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The third essay compares the experiences of repression and exile of the early communist elite before Civil Wars, showing that the Bolshevik suffered much less violence than the CCP. The former faced the traditional Europeanized Tsarist state that preferred to use unlethal punishment, and long-term exile in liberal Europe. The latter underwent a high casualty of its leadership in 1927 at the hand of the Sovietized KMT regime. It also faced a more enclosed geographical environment – as anti-communist repression strengthened, Japan and Southeast Asia ceased to be outlets for political refugees, while the Soviet Union actively promoted its Chinese guests back home. Suffering unsustainable physical losses, the CCP had to abandon its initial plan of replicating a Bolshevik model of power seizure, and lapsed into a protracted guerrilla warfare. While historians have noticed the differences between Russia and China in their styles of repressions, this essay provides a detailed account of how such repressions were imposed upon by communist leaders. It examines how space is related to the issue of repression.

The fourth essay considers institutions. It goes beyond the pre-existing literature, which draws general comparisons of the role of parties in army, and puts a more centered focus on the formations of the commissar (political-director) systems of the two communist armies in Civil Wars. This essay first elaborates three commonalities between the Bolshevik and CCP

commissar systems, which distinguishes them from other means of controlling military in human history: 1) dual administration which enshrined a deep distrust of military professionalism; 2) man-to-man surveillance and institutionalized indoctrination, which implied insecurity of control through law and diffused cultural discourse; and 3) engagement of commissars in military commanding by the way of hybrid warfare, which differed from traditional ways of controlling armies through private agents at the expenses of combat capacities. This essay further elaborates the differences between the Bolshevik and the CCP underneath these commonalities – in general, the CCP relied more upon ideological power. Unlike the Bolshevik who blamed the Tsarist military bureaucracy for producing uncritical officers lacking concern for broad socio-political issues, the CCP, deeming that China's impoverished population had increasing material hardship, claimed that a charismatic ideology had to replace bureaucracy to ensure military's loyalty. The CCP also demanded a closer form of monitoring, as it made revolution at the sea of the peasantry rather than conquer the countryside from cities as the Bolshevik did. Moreover, with desperate inferiorities in weaponry and logistics vis-à-vis the KMT, the CCP sought to synthesize political, organizational, and ideological resources. This also differed from the Bolshevik, which after the threshold year of 1919 gained overwhelmingly material superiority against the Whites, and thus lacked the motivations to strengthen its commissar system.

In sum, these four essays, using revolutionary agencies as a prism to understand broader social systems, highlight a few vital differences between pre-communist modern Russia and China. Russia was ethnically more heterogenous, geopolitically more secure, culturally and geographically closer to the West. These factors made its communist revolution and state different from China's. In comparison with the Bolshevik, the CCP faced a much larger gap to

overcome between the national past and the communist modernism, which geared it to be more obsessed with ideological power, in the areas of nation-state building, military, and social mobilization. These historical legacies were crystallized into the CCP state and have heavily shaped China's development since 1949. Its impact to China's future is open to explore.

Methodological and Theoretical Contributions

A first contribution is to comparative historical method. There is a gap between the third and fourth generation of the sociology of revolutions. The second and third generations of theories primarily use macro-level comparative historical analysis to explain the causes of revolutions whilst viewing agency as dismissible, while the fourth generation descends to micro-level analysis to explore agency—ideology, leadership, organization, and network—but lapses to the dilemma of "agency for what". My research, using revolutionary elites as a prism to analyze the Russian and Chinese political systems, makes efforts to bridge this gap by probing agency without missing structure. To achieve this methodological innovation, all four essays, to different extents, combine inter-case comparison between Russia and China with within-case comparison between communists and non-communists. When competing ideological groups within a case are aggregated, their polemics and debates become clear, suggesting core structural problems, namely the most distinct comparative feature of the society. This aggregation allows for a concrete comparison to be made between two societies using real historical actors.

A second and more specific contribution is to the sociology of revolution and its sub-area issue of interaction, given that the interaction between the two revolutions cannot be ignored. While

most pre-existing literature, noticing the waves of revolutions, stress the positive impacts of earlier revolutions to later ones, predisposing the latter to imitate the former, this essay contends that early movements can make themselves un-replicable, as in the case that the CCP wanted to replicate the Bolshevik strategy of power seizure but failed. Three specific mechanisms are articulated. First, early revolutions convey strategies and symbols to copiers, but could also teach the old regimes, making the latter's repression more efficient. Second, early revolutions do indicate the vulnerability of the old system, but could also compel the latter to overreact, making mobilization of later movements more difficult. Third, successful revolutions might offer aids to followers, but after becoming an established state, may pursue its selfish interests often at the expense of junior movements. All these influences tend to locate follower-revolutionaries in a more closed political opportunity structure, which making them difficult to replicate the forerunner's strategy and path.

A third contribution is to sociology of empire and nationalism. Since Tilly, it has been widely accepted that in the long term empires will die out and be supplemented by nation-states. However, many scholars question this statement by pointing out that many non-national factors are still at work, such as superpowers, transnational corporations, and international organizations. My thesis contends that nationalism had its own defects, and thus, in some contexts, might be marginalized or distorted again by non-national political format – this might occur in our contemporary world. To gain insight into this issue, I use communism as my major case, as it provides a concrete and significant historical example which allows for the exploration of the specific mechanisms and contexts whereby nationalism can be enfeebled. Communism is selected as my prism also because its master frame – class – is becoming relevant again in

today's world, where inequality is re-emerging and expanding between and within nations. My thesis engages with this nation-class theoretical issue primarily through its first essay, while the remaining essays, to different extents, lay foundations for further extension detailed in the conclusion.

Two Usages of Class: Imperial Bolshevism and National Chinese Communism

Abstract

This article compares the Bolshevik and Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutions. While it has been widely argued that the CCP was more nationalistic than the Bolshevik Party, this article, by exploring the biographical data from the leading elites within each party, identifies this difference in a more nuanced way. Both groups continually confronted nation and class, but they configured these two concepts differently. The Bolsheviks used class to negate nation. Many Bolsheviks, being ethnic non-Russians, saw the trends of anti-imperial nationalism as undesirable. They thus invoked communism to retain a universal empire. In this future non-national state, they believed that the Great Russians' domination could be more covert and non-Russians may gain more equal statuses. On the contrary, the CCP employed the same class concept to cultivate and boost nationalism. Most being ethnic Hans, the CCP elites undoubtedly believed that the future socialist state should be Chinese. Unlike the Bolsheviks they used class as an instrument to overcome elite provincial fragmentations, to access illiterate masses, and to evade China's dark modern history. This article furthers existing literature in two ways. First, by invoking sociological theory of empire and nationalism, it frames the Bolshevik-CCP difference in a more balanced way: imperial communism and national communism, rather than non-national and national. Second, rather than trace difference directly to the national structures of the two polities, it extends this comparison to non-communist rivals (such as liberals, nationalists, chauvinists, fascists, and traditionalists who had different proposals for nation-state building) by showing that communists interpreted national structure through their individuals' backgrounds.

Comparisons between the Bolshevik and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Revolutions have produced a lengthy scholarship. In terms of the nationality question, many scholars have noticed that although both parties deviated from the cosmopolitan ideal of the original Marxism, the CCP was more nationalistic than the Bolsheviks. In explaining this difference, scholars tend to highlight China's weaker geopolitical position that geared its radical elites to embrace nationalism vis-à-vis Russia's status as a military power that allowed radicals to focus on domestic injustice (Deutscher 1966; Treadgold 1967: 380-86) and to be less sensitive to the existence of foreign economic domination (Smith 2008). This account is also derived from the disparate dynamics of the two revolutions, holding that the protracted Sino-Japanese War (1931-45) had made the CCP more nationalistic and militaristic (Johnson 1962; Mann 2012: 218), whereas the Bolsheviks' real march toward Russian nationalism came much later during the Second World War (Anderson 2010). A third account considers Russia's closer cultural proximity to the West that enabled the Bolsheviks to think in a less national manner while the CCP was more preoccupied with the Chinese "small world" (Wright 1961).

In light of the comparative biographical method (North 1952; Riga 2012), this article furthers existing literature by exploring how the leading makers of the two revolutions understood class and nation, two antagonistic concepts that they were continually confronted with. Invoking sociological theories of nationalism and empire (Tilly 1990; Wimmer and Min 2006), my research frames the national/non-national difference in a new way. The Bolsheviks were imperial communists (thus looked less national). Many Bolsheviks, being non-Russians, saw the trends of anti-imperial nationalism as undesirable, and thus invoked communism to retain a non-national

empire. This retention was seen to allow the Great Russians' domination to be preserved in a more covert and progressive way while allowing for non-Russians to gain more equal statuses. The CCP, by contrast, had moved farther away from an empire-state and sought to establish a full-fledged nation-state. Since most of the CCP elites were Hans, they had no doubt that the future socialist state should be Chinese, but instead understood class to be an instrument that could empower the still nascent and feeble state-seeking nationalism. To them, class offered the potential to overcome the fragmented provincial elite, access the illiterate masses who did not possess nationhood, and construct a nation without having to draw on China's humiliating modern history (*see Table A*).

Table A Two Patterns of Communism

	Sub-Groups	The Use of Class
Bolshevik: Negate Nation		
	Great Russians	Conceal and enlighten Great Russian domination
	Russified non-Russians	Reduce discrimination by dissolving ethnicity
	Un-Russified non-Russians	Obtain equality in the name of internationalism
CCP: Boost Nation		
	Veterans of the 1911 Revolution	Overcome elite provincial localism
	Grassroots agitators of the 1920S	Mobilize pre-national masses
	Intellectual-designer of ideology	Craft nation without referring to dark history

Moreover, this research introduces a new way of interpreting how these two patterns came into being by extending the comparison to non-communist rivals: in the Russian case, the Ukrainian, Latvian, and Jewish nationalists who proposed national separation, the Great Russian rightists who advocated for homogenization, and the liberals (Kadets) who trumpeted a liberal non-national

universal state; and in the Chinese case, the KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party), who also sought a Chinese nation-state but refuted the CCP's class-struggle approach. This comparison shows that macro-level social structures (ethnic compositions, geopolitical statuses, etc.) generated political proposals only through individuals' backgrounds, including ethnicity, family backgrounds, travel experiences, education, military experience, and age.

This article thus deepens existing accounts in three regards. First, conceptualization becomes more balanced. The two revolutions are analyzed as two paralleling transformative processes, focusing on how the two empires are transformed into nation-states with Marxist visions. Thus, they are no longer conceptualized as simply nationalist and non-nationalist states, but rather, as national and imperial communists.

Second, this comparison allows for a more focused subject by closely analyzing the two leading groups that completed the revolutions and state-building processes: the Bolshevik Central Committee members from 1917 to 1923 and the CCP's Seventh Central Committee members (1945-56) [1]. Third, this interpretation is more symmetrical. The communist understandings of nation are now drawn not from the remote macro social structures that actually also aroused non-communist visions, but rather from individuals' backgrounds. Through these backgrounds social structures were interpreted in communist ways, and structures became clearer when the

[1] The Soviet Union was formally established in December 1922, but the complete structure of the Supreme Soviet took shape, with the national chamber added in February 1923, and the first Soviet Constitution was sanctified by the Communist Party Central Committee in April of the same year. The CCP announced the foundation of the People's Republic of China in October 1949, but and civil war did not cease until 1955 while the economic nationalization completed in 1956.

contestation, polemics, and debates between competing ideologies were aggerated and contrasted with each other, but were not a mechanical mirroring of the latter.

Data and methods

This article compiles a biographical dataset that covers the makers of the two revolutions: the Bolshevik's ninety-four central committee members from 1917 to 1923 and the CCP's seventy-seven Seventh Central Committee members (1945-56)[2]. This research design entails justification. First, while 'making revolution' can be understood as a protracted process (especially in the CCP case)[3], I only concern the people that finally seized national power. I do this in order to sharpen the contrast with the West, where communist movements spread, but none took over power. I exclude the broad-sense 'revolution-makers' who participated but left or died before the final takeover also because the data regarding those people is incomplete[4]. Second, I focus on the top-echelon elites on the ground that ideology-making was peculiar to the leading elites, but also because biographical data of the lower-ranking elites is neither complete nor detailed enough to reveal people's internal working. I did not extend my analysis to the lower-ranking officials as this did not allow me to compare with non-communists whose biographical data is even more

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[3] For the most complete review of the definitions of revolution, see Rejai, Mostafa. 1977. *The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy* New York: David McKay Company. pp. 2-8.

[4] The Bolshevik, as an informal faction, did not have a separate central committee until 1917. Before takeover this faction's leading bodies took various informal forms such as temporary central bureaus, congress factions, Duma deputies, foreign and regional bureaus, and editorial offices of party organs. The members of these groups amounted to 102, but only 30 of them entered the central committees from 1917 to 1923. For the remaining, the data is rather simple. Before 1945 the CCP had six central committees, whose members amounted up to 76 in sum, but only seven of them entered the Seventh Central Committee. Among the remaining, 32 were executed or killed in opening period of the civil war at the turn of the 1930s when the CCP was switching to guerrilla warfare; 18 quit the party or were expelled for factional activities, mostly in 1927 and 1928 when the CCP suffered massacre and internal split. Given their short service period, there are few biographical compilations for them.

concentrated on the top echelon. Third, I identify leading elites with the central committee members while this is imperfect a narrower strategy would have made hypothesis-test comparisons unworkable, weakening this article's explanatory rationale[5]. For example, the size of the politburo members is too small for comparative analysis (eleven for the Bolsheviks of 1917-23 and thirteen for the CCPs of 1945-56).

There have been many attempts to use biographical methods to analyze revolutions. This article goes beyond them in four ways. First, I consider the subjective narratives as well as a broader range of social backgrounds, which allows for the interpretation and explanation of people's internal psychology in a more detailed way. This distinguishes my work from Mann's (1993), as well as Rejai and Phillips' (1988) works that concentrate on radicals' ages and occupations. Second, to derive the collective thinking that covered the two communist leadership which contained huge internal heterogeneity, I significantly expand the dataset, moving beyond small clusters such as the critics of Lenin, the CCPs returning from France, and the feminist Bolsheviks (to name a few, Levine 1993; McDermid and Hillyar 1999; Williams 1986). Third, I situate my analysis of individuals' backgrounds to the broad historical process of nationalization, which differentiates my work from other similar analyses which lack clear theoretical orientations on empire and nationalism, such as Haupt and Marie's (1974), Lane's (1969) analyses on leading Bolsheviks, and North's (1952) and Lee's (1968) on the CCP. Fourth, to better understand the variation of

[5] In both cases the focus on central-committee members misses some prestigious communists, but these people's disagreements with the power seizers were not over the question of nationality. Among the Bolsheviks the critics of Leninists competed with the latter on such issues as party fund distribution, philosophical basis of class consciousness, strategies in Duma participation, and whether or not to use terrorist tactics (see Williams 1986). On the CCP side, a major faction that did not enter the analyzed central committee was the Chinese Trotskyists, who after 1927 insisted in staying at cities instead of retreating to countryside. They boosted defeatism, but claimed that once the KMT had been defeated by Japan, the communists must take over the old army and command it to fight against the Japanese.

communist ideology in its eastward spread and to explain why communists particularly adopted class to address the widely perceived structural dilemmas, I go beyond Liliana Riga's analysis of the Bolsheviks (2012) by bringing together Russia and China, and also contrasting each group to their respective domestic rivals[6].

My approach has rarely been attempted before, partly because it entails massive use of original Russian and Chinese data: biographies in English are only available in the cases of a few prominent communists, such as Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Mao, Zhou, and Deng. To maximize coverage of the leading elites, this article uses published and unpublished biographical data in two languages, including primary (i.e., diaries, memoires, correspondences, party questionnaires, anthologies) and secondary data (i.e., biographies, chronicles, and research articles)[7]. This strategy of data setting also allows me to overcome the common shortcoming of existing culturalist scholarship of the revolutions that concentrates analysis on the ideological text rather than how the revolutionaries themselves understood it (see Jasper 2011).

[6] My article differs from Riga's book in several ways. First, I consider the CCP case and draw comparison. Second, within each case I contrast communists to their rivals. Third, in analyzing each communist individual, I consider not only class and ethnic backgrounds, but also broader experiences such as education, military, age, literary readings, travel at home and abroad, etc. Differences in specific argument will be elaborated in the footnotes of each Russian sub-section.

[7] Out of the ninety-four Bolsheviks, sixty-six left autobiographies in *Granat Encyclopedia* (1989), a narrative-style party questionnaire created in the 1920s, with their entire conversion processes reviewed; at least thirty-two published their own memoirs, interviews or collections of writings; and more than forty-four have biographies in book- or research-article format. Furthermore, almost all of them answered party surveys (see RGASP, Rossisskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-politicheskoi Istorii, Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History, Fond 41-51, Hoover Institution), where they self-reported ethnicity, education level, and social origins. For the seventy-seven CCPs, at least forty have published their collections of writings, diaries, and memoires that referred to prerevolutionary periods; seventy-two have biographies retrospective of their entire life stories, while the other five have biographical excerpts in complied collections of historical materials. There is no Chinese counterpart to Granat, but the eighty-seven-volume collection *Biographies of CCP Elites (EBCE)* published in 1980 and republished in 2010 somewhat offsets such absence. This collection contains biographies for fifty-five of the seventy-seven CCPs, the authors of which were official historians who had privileged access to the archive not open to the public. In many cases, authors even were allowed to interview the biographees or their relatives.

A major challenge in dealing with this dataset lies in how to extract pattern-level information from the unevenly rich data without cherry-picking – as Haydu says, pair cases appear to be incomparable as they are individualized (1998: 345). My strategy was developed in line with my theoretical model to fit the characters of the dataset. First, a considerable proportion of biographies provide detailed description of the calculations on the question of nation-building, either communist or non-communist. This allows to me to figure out the core intellectual-political concerns of pre-revolutionary Russia and China, which overarchingly shadowed most radical elites, including those who did not clearly give an opinion on the nationality question in their biographies. Thus, I show one base of the collective psychology – debates reflecting the macro-structural dilemmas in which everyone must engage. To bring this method to ground, I identify some sub-level debates that jointly delineate the common concern and separately reify it. In the Bolshevik case, I show that three categories of ethnic groups had their own concerns, out of which they disagreed with non-communists: how should Russia retain its periphery, how should Russified non-Russians achieve more equal statuses, and whether or not un-Russified non-Russians should build their separate states. In the CCP case, where most communists belong to the same ethnic Han group, I show the three themes where the CCPs disagreed with the KMT regarding nationalism: how to overcome regional fragmentation, how to instill nationhood into the illiterate masses, and how to craft an enlightened Chinese national identity.

My second strategy to capture collectiveness from internal variations targets concrete individuals. Most biographies provide detailed information of elites' early experiences, such as ethnicity, family, education, and overseas travel. Unlike nuanced narratives, such data is much easier to

convert into numbers, which allows for similarities of the supporters for each ideology to be found– as Bourdieu (1977: 79-81) says, similarities in early backgrounds might produce common habitus. In this way, I display the other base of collective psychology, on the class and group level.

Another major challenge comes from ideological bias. Given that most data are created in the original language, the producers could have consciously adapted their narrative to communist parties' official myth or may have simply failed to escape from the discipline of the official discourse. The Russian dataset has less risk in this regard, as the materials were created during a long historical period spanning from the early Bolshevik regime to post-Soviet era. For example, the *Granat Encyclopedia* was created before the rise of Stalinism, when a unanimous official myth had not yet taken shape. The Chinese data warrants more caution. Most biographies are created by historians affiliated with state-own research institutions with a privileged access archive. These historians are also in charge of 'editing' the memoirs and diaries of the revolutionary elites.

My strategy to minimize potential bias is to contrast communist data to their enemies'. While both the communists and non-communists competed to tell potential readers of how the social system worked and should work, the aggregation and comparison of their narratives help build the map of the core debate, 'the most basic agreement' in Bourdieu's term, which reveals the social structure behind it. Such structure becomes even clearer when I bring Russia and China together. The strategy of contrasting can also reveal the relative social status of the communists. As Lukacs said, "section can be recognized only when it is situated as part of the whole" (Muller 2002). For example, communists depicted themselves as diligent and smart students, but Kadets and KMTs

indicated that hardworking students would not be as enthusiastic on campus radicalism as the CCPs were and often achieved higher level of education.

A minor method to minimize bias is to diversify the sources of biographies. This method is most efficient when multiple genres of biographies are available to the same person. For example, anthologies contain more details on internal psychological activities as the editors often come from the corps of professional historians who wanted to maintain scholarly quality, while chronicles published by official preservers of party archives, contain sensitive information because such institutions are at the higher level of the party-state and thus face less intervention from above. In terms of regional variation, the room for exploitation is limited. There have been some CCP memoirs or biographies published in Taiwan and Hong Kong, but they are confined to the most prominent ones, and often focus on their activities after the foundation of the PRC. As for nationality question and social backgrounds, these biographies provide much the same information as the ones published in China mainland. It is similar in the case of post-Soviet Russian historiography, which, in terms of early life, provided little new information than the Soviet old books that were often created by privileged historians.

Bolshevism: Communism to Preserve Non-national State

The Tsarist Empire at the turn of the twentieth century, suffering from its enormous ethnic heterogeneity, promoted Russification, but its efforts yielded mixed outcomes. Russification saw successes in some regions, creating highly russified non-Russian populations. In other regions and periods, however, it went against the empire's earlier efforts of creating non-Russian nations to

defend the borders, and thus brought about backlashes. Moreover, this project, because of its conservative monarchist and theological cultural characters, aroused alienation among the Great Russians.

The Bolshevik movement arose in and embodied a unique multinational setting. The composition of the leading Bolsheviks was clearly multiethnic. The ninety-four elites came from more than fourteen nationalities, with up to a half (forty-six) being ethnically non-Russian, primarily the Jews, Ukrainians, Baltics, and Transcaucasians (Goriachev 2005). Moreover, before conversion, nearly thirty-nine percent of them were working or studying at Petersburg or Moscow, while another forty had similar experiences at multiethnic cities like Kazan, Kiev, Kharkov, Vilno, and Tiflis (*see Table B1*). A few, such as Grigorii Zinov'ev, Lenin's oldest disciple since 1903, grew-up in small towns, but for long-time lived in the multiethnic Russian émigré communities in Western Europe (Granat: 143-44).

Table B1 Migration

Imperial Capitals: 38%			
Petersburg	21	Moscow	15
Non-Russian Capital Cities: 18%			
Tiflis	6	Vilno (Vilnius)	4
Kiev	3	Riga	2
Almaty	2		
Industrial or Commercial Centers: 29%			
Odessa	3	Ivanovo-Vozneshchenskii	3
Kazan	4	Kharkov	3

Saratov	2	Nizhni Novgorod	2
Samara	2	Rostov	1
Omsk	1	Chita	1
Lugansk	1	Kursk	1
Ufa	1	Orel	1
Simferopol	1	Briansk	1
Foreign Cities: 2%			
L'viv	1	Geneva	1
Counties: 13%			
			Total: 94

Sources: coding from biographical data

Note: this table considers the largest city the Bolshevik had been working or studying before their conversion to socialism. Given that many had stayed in more than one, I consider only the first city he or she had been to.

Given the uneven extents of Russification, each ethnic group had its own concerns regarding the process of nationalization. The following three sub-sections will elaborate these considerations.

'Reactionary' Nationalization

The Tsarist state, like many premodern empires, used to be opposed to conduct any assimilationist projects. Yet, during its final two decades, especially after the war with Japan, Petersburg turned to become more decisive in seeking an 'imperial ethnicity', as having seen the increasing cost of coping with the enormous ethnic diversity. However, this move aroused unrest at the core nation, the Great Russians (russkie).

Unlike the British government that used politically neutral symbols such as ‘oceanic ties’ to forge the Commonwealth identity (Darwin 2010), the Tsarist state boosted icons that were reminiscent of Russia’s medieval despotic roots. The last Tsar Nikolai II overtly trumpeted absolutist monarchism. Influenced by the outdated Slavophile thought of the eighteenth century, he attributed the empire’s decline to the weakening of the throne’s power and the diminishing of the Orthodox religiosity. He also wanted to retrieve the undermined martial spirit (Freeze 1996; Lieven 2015). If we consider that the dynasty’s performance legitimacy had been depleted in slow economic modernization and military humiliations (Lieven 1983: 15-20), it is not difficult to understand that the card left to Tsar was no more than political and ideological rectification.

The social responses to the state-led Russification were mixed. Tsar was not alone, but rather could hear consents from many social circles. As Russian nationalism became an intellectual fashion, the groups such as the Eurasianist thinkers, Silver-Age writers, and Neo-Slav scholars may have endorsed the religion-driven assimilationist projects, on the ground that Russia had been undergoing moral degeneration brought by industrialization and urbanization (Pinchuk 1974; Shlapentokh 2007: 22-24; Tolz 2015). Another group of supporters, who were more overt, were the Russian rightists who came into being as a movement in the aftermath of the 1905 Revolution. They envisioned a Russian national state where the misery of the lower-class Russians could be relieved through the intensifying exploitation of non-Russians (Rawson 1995).

The Great Russian Bolsheviks shared somewhat of a consensus with the Tsarist state: they by no means wanted to see the empire’s domain to dissolve. Verbally trumpeting national self-

determination, Lenin never softened his insistence in maintaining a centralized communist movement by not allowing any nationalities to form their own sub-sections (Holdsworth 1967: 278, 285). As for the linguistic issue, he claimed that in the new socialist state Russian would remain the dominant language, given that the common market and communicative convenience were embedded in the language (Lenin 1971: 13). Moreover, Lenin claimed that the development of capitalism in old Russia would guarantee Great Russians more dominance than a socialist regime (Szporluk 2006: 614). Such willingness of retaining the unified Russia would become much more visible when the Bolsheviks seized power.

Although seeking to retain the imperial borders, the Bolsheviks denounced the idea of nationalization, but in an anti-nationalist way: they viewed the officially defined 'Russianness' as outdated, reactionary, and corrupted, but also refused to raise an alternative concept of 'progressive Russianness'[8] – what they boosted instead was class and internationalism. Such a non-national frame could allow the Russian dominance to be organized in a more enlightened but cloaked way.

Loathing the officially-defined Russian nationhood can be seen in the Bolsheviks' literary taste—the obsession with the dissident Russian writers of the 1860s and 1870s, so-called 'revolutionary democrats', including but not confined to Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Nikolai Dobroliubov, Alexander Herzen, Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin, and Dmitrii Pisarev (Kirilina 2001: 16-7; Kramarov 1974: 5; Kubiak and Usova 1982: 18; Kuibyshev 1988: 10-1; Levidova and Salita 1969: 20; Loginov 2005: 80-1, 90-1). These authors shared commonality in negating the Russian

[8] Lenin mentioned 'Russian patriotism' only occasionally, defining it as 'the love for the Russian people's revolutionary traditions'. The Bolshevik did not further develop this concept to a discourse embedded in the party program and everyday propaganda.

national culture as politically reactionary and intellectually irrational. It is well-known that Vladimir Lenin borrowed the title of Chernyshevsky's novel to name his influential pamphlet *What is to be Done?* (1971: 11-12; 51-54). Besides, Nikolai Bukharin, the leading ideologue of the 1920s, who had been a fan of Dmitrii Pisarev since his childhood (Cohen 1973: 10-11) scorned that Russia, soil barren of enlightened culture, could only breed the evil flower of Asiatic despotism.

The Russian Bolsheviks also cursed the state attempt of revitalizing the Orthodoxy religiosity. Such resistance was, at the time, in line with the rapidly proliferating secularization among the working class. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, some communists mentioned in their biographies that Darwin and Buffon were widely circulated in Russia (Frunze 1977: 25-26; Kliuchnik and Zav'ialov 1970: 16; Kol'iak 1981: 7). With the help of radical students, such works were interpreted in a crude atheist way and instilled into the workers through Sunday Schools, Evening Schools, and other self-educational groups (Pipes 1963). Religiosity also diminished in the massive migration to cities (*also see Table A1*). To the young workers who had indulged in material entertainment, religion felt suppressive and was reminiscent of the rigid control from their home villages (Lieven 1983: 13).

The anti-monarchist and atheist thought captured the Russian Bolsheviks thanks to the state-led Russification, especially at the empire's western and southern borders, where linguistic assimilation was hastily promoted to counterweigh the expanding influences of the Polish, German, and Turkish cultures. To overcome the acute shortage of Russian-speaking teachers, the state lowered its standard of selection, which allowed large amounts of radically-minded intellectuals to flow into the teacher corps (Eklof and Peterson 2010). For example, Aleksei Badaev, the head

of the Bolshevik Duma section, recalled that his chemistry teachers talked of Lavoisier's political ideas and geography teacher digressed to Engels' *The Conditions of British Working Class* (Pochebut and Malkin 1962: 12-14). Educated in such a radical system, most Russian Bolsheviks abandoned religious faiths early, such as Nikolai Bukharin, Evgenii Preobrazhensky, Aleksandr Tsiurupa, Kliment Voroshilov, and Aleksandr Shliapnikov. Their biographies contain rich plots on conflicting with clerks, skipping religious rituals, or watching iconoclastic events (Allen 2015: 17-23; Davidov 1961; 8; Day, Gorinov and Preobrazhenskii 2014: 31; Granat: 26, 399, 437; Voroshilov 1968: 69-74).

The reassertion of religion aroused backlash also among the female socialists. Unlike their male comrades, the most prominent Bolshevik women, such as Aleksandra Kollontai, Varvara Iakovleva, and Elena Stasova, came from descent families. Their intense exposure to western culture endowed these women with modern feminist mindset, which made them less tolerate of the patriarchal thought enshrined in the religious doctrines (Clements 1997: 22-23; Granat: 784-85; Levidova and Salita 1969: 10-20; Porter 2013).

Why did the Russian Bolsheviks stand outside of and even against the prevailing trend of nationalization? One reason might be age. Russian society underwent a profound value reconstruction in the wake of the 1905 Revolution. The massacre of 'Bloody Sunday' smashed Tsar's longstanding image of 'little father,' putting the norm of monarchy into question. Yet, the psychological strike brought about by this crackdown varied, depending on the age of the person in 1905. In this year the Russian Bolsheviks were on average twenty years old, at the very formative moment of political values. They were more likely to accept the rapidly spreading anti-

monarchist thought. In contrast, the generation of 'father', the Russian rightists, had been on average aged at forty-one. Even if some of them might feel the shooting as brutal, they were too old to have their entrenched monarchist values replaced. The effect of age holds as comparison extends to the liberal Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), who were younger than the rightists but significantly older than the Bolsheviks, which explains the Kadet's moderate request for an improved monarchy within the restriction of the constitutional framework (*see Table B2*).

Table B2 Age

Year of Birth (%)	Russian Bolsheviks	Kadets	Russian Rightists
1835-1844			6.1
1845-1854			9.1
1855-1864		31	33.3
1865-1874	10.4	51	33.3
1875-1884	29.2	17	6.1
1885-1894	58.3		6.1
1895-1904	2.1		
Total	48	47	33

Sources: see the notes of Table B1

Note: the total number of Great Russian Bolsheviks is 48 out of 94. Only 33 Russian rightist leaders have clear information regarding their birth year.

A second explanation is that the Bolsheviks lacked the experiences of military service. The Tsarist army further intensified its monarchist and theological teaching after the war with Japan, based on the learning that the Russian soldiers were not as motivated as their Japanese counterparts (Wright 2005). Nonetheless, such military-patriotic education did not reach the Russian Bolsheviks. Only

five of the forty-six had served in the army, but most as soldiers, including Andrei Andreev, Grigorii Eudokimov, Daniil Sulimov, and Nikolai Uglanov (Andreev 1985: 280; Granat: 727; Grechko 1976 12: 592; 25: 226). The sole exception was Valerian Kuibyshev, a major founder of the Soviet Army's commissar system, who studied at military corps, but left the army after graduation (Kuibyshev 1988: 11-13). No Russian Bolshevik took part in the War with Japan, a major event boosting the rise of the late-imperial Russian nationalism.

Now, we return to the question asked at the outset of this section of why the Bolshevik refused to craft a 'healthier' Russian nationalism. It might result from the combination of the deficit cultural capital, as some materials have implied (Holdsworth 1967: 290; Valentinov 1968: 49-57, 70-76), and the barrenness of the Great Russian popular cultural soil (Riga 2012: 229-35). Moreover, whereas many non-state leading Russian nationalists, who were arduously developing new alternative national ideologies were prestigious historians, anthropologists, ethnographers, archeologists, and theologists, the Bolsheviks, who were much less educated (*see the second column of Table B3*), lacked such capacity.

Table B3 Education

Highest Levels of Education (%)	Bolsheviks	Kadets
Doctoral degree		2.9
Master degree		2.9
University (completed)	13.8	52.9
University (uncompleted)	5.3	2.9
Gymnasia (completed)	9.6	1.5
Gymnasia (uncompleted)	1.1	1.5

Vocational school (completed)	22.3	2.9
Vocational school (uncompleted)	3.2	
Primary School	17.0	
Lower	29.8	
Unknown		32.4
Total	94	68

Sources: the data of the Kadets are drawn from Bolobuev 1993 and Shelokhaev 1996 . The names of the leading Kadets of the 1916-1918 were obtained from Pavlov 1994. The volume does not provide a complete list of names, but specifies the names of attendants of each conferences. I collected these names and found their biographies in Shelokhaev's dictionary. The same method is used to collect the data of the Russian rightists. The names of the most active leading elites can be seen in the document collection GASRF 1998.

Finally, comes the question of why the Bolsheviks adopted class frame. It is reasonable that with little concrete knowledge of Russian history and culture they resorted to universalistic frames that evaded any forms of particularity. However, in this regard, they might also have become liberals (Kadets), who boosted a non-national universal state, but also underscored individual rights, regardless of nationality, as the base of such state (Fischer 1958: 33-38; Miller 2014: 336-37; Rosenberg 1974: 14-15; 19-20; 31). The turn to socialism is understandable. The liberals were opposed to the Marxist notion of class warfare from below, which largely reflected this party's nobility, gentry, and professional background (*see Table B4*). For the same token, the Bolsheviks, most of humble social origins, felt uncomfortable with embracing a class-collaboration liberal ideology.

Table B4 Class Background

Father's Occupation (%)	Bolsheviks	Kadets	Russian Rightists
Peasant	30.9		3.4
Worker	11.7		
Artisan or housekeeper	8.5		
Businessman	13.8	5.9	6.9
Teacher, priest or clerk	18.1	4.4	6.9
Low-ranking official	1.1	2.9	3.4
Lawyer, professor or doctor	6.4	8.8	3.4
High-ranking official	2.1	7.4	3.4
Capitalist or landowner	1.1	5.9	13.8
Nobility	6.4	27.9	55.2
Unknown		36.7	3.4
Total	94	68	29

Note: a fully convincing comparison should be drawn to the liberals in Transcaucasian and Polish-Lithuanian regions, but the biographical data of the Kadets rarely contains information regarding ethnicity. Only 43 of the 68 Kadets have clear information regarding class background.

Successful Russification

Although Russification aroused resentment among the Great Russians, it did have forged pro-Russian cultural identity in other segments of the population. The assimilated non-Russians had lost their national identities and wanted to stay within the Imperial borders; the same as Russians. What they further wished to achieve was to reduce the discrimination against their ethnic roots, namely, to shape a genuine universalistic state where ethnic boundary was defined as irrelevant.

This put them into conflict with their un-Russified co-nationals who sought to develop a distinctive national culture, and logically, to achieve political autonomy or separation.

The first theatre was Ukraine, wherein the russification policies created a group of radicals who were ethnically Ukrainians but had lost their national identity. Unlike Austro-Hungary that ruled Western Ukraine with the strategy of 'making Ukrainians', in Eastern Ukraine the Tsarist state conducted a harsh policy of russification (Miller 2004: 10-11; 17-18). Petersburg banned nationalist associations and publications (Magocsi 1992: 98-100), but also forbade the use of Ukrainian language in education – the first array of Ukrainian elementary schools came into being only in the 1920s when the Bolsheviks had seized power (Pauly 2014: 66-67).

These policies were efficient, in the sense that they contrived to keep elite nationalist movements and mass social unrests separated from each other. Before 1917, peasant rebellions and worker riots were frequent in Ukraine, but few carried nationalistic characters (Kuromiya 1998: 65; Subtelny 2000: 233). Repression also confined the nationalist movement to a very narrow circle of literati, which made nationalism a privileged club not open to common people. Until the end of the Romanov Dynasty, Ukrainian nationalism remained an enterprise of gentry-background intelligentsia. Immersed-in and exploring Ukrainian language, history, and literature, these people possessed the cultural capital to resist the assimilationist effect of Russification. Such capacity was vital, because Ukrainian culture was so mingled with Russian that demarcating boundary between them entailed intellectual sophistication.

The Bolsheviks were not the men who had such sophistication. They were poorly educated. The Ukrainian Bolsheviks often ended education at low levels: Grigorii Petrovskii had only two years of formal schooling. Both Dmitrii Lebed' and Vlas Chubar' completed technical schools (*uchilishche*). Matvei Muranov stopped even lower (Granat: 491; Haupt and Marie 1974: 172; Kol'iak 1981: 5-6). As to those who had longer schooling, they turned to Bolshevism much earlier. Nikolai Krestinskii did possess a bachelor's degree, but he grew up in a Russified family with the tradition of admiring Russian revolutionary heroes (Granat: 462). Dmitrii Manuil'skii, similarly, turned to socialism at the gymnasium stage (Granat: 793).

For these individuals of little consciousness of 'Ukrainianness', russification was easy and natural, given that Russian language and culture was overwhelmingly pervasive. As Petrovskii showed, laboring migration to industrial centers such as Kharkov could easily transform an ethnic Ukrainian to a Russian (Kliuchnik and Zav'ialov 1970: 4-5). In these cities, national cultural materials, such as Shevchenko's collections, were hard to find. Even if available, people who lacked taste could not recognize its finesse. Poorly educated individuals could achieve the appreciation only if they were fortunate to encounter some advanced instructors (Kaganovich 1996: 27; 46-47). This occurred to the sole exception, Nikolai Skrypnik, who overtly claimed himself as a national communist. Although never accessing high education, Skrypnik had advanced informal instructors who inspired his interest in the Ukrainian culture: a knowledgeable veteran of the Polish uprising and a former Decembrist who generously opened his private library to the knowledge-thirsty pupil (Granat: 668).

In contrast, the education levels of the Ukrainian nationalists were significantly higher. Out of the nineteen leading Ukrainian rightwing separatist leaders of the 1917-18 periods, at least fourteen achieved bachelors or higher-levels of degrees. Two were graduates of advanced seminaries. Others, despite lower education, were either literati or cultural activists[9]. The intellectual background of the nationalists was different too. The leading ideologue Dmytro Dontsov, son of a wealthy merchant, received education in many countries, which enabled him to compare the social thought across Ukraine, Russia, Austria, and Germany. The icon of Ukrainian literature Oleha Teliha inherited nationalism from her family. She was daughter of a nationalistic-minded Tsarist minister who hurried back to Ukraine soon after the fall of the empire (Shkandrij 2015: 80-82, 176-77). Viacheslav Lypynsky (Motyl 1985: 33-36), whose idea embodied Ukrainian nationalism, viewed the independence as more important than such issues as which ideology the independent state should carry.

A different theatre was Latvia, where linguistic Russification proceeded in a zigzag way over time, and thus rendered ideological boundaries to coincide with generations rather than social status. Unlike Ukraine, Latvia was entitled with a relatively free period that allowed its intellectuals to complete an early wave of cultural nation-building. The cultural efforts to modernize and spread Latvian language started in the 1840s and saw initial fruits in the 1870s (Raun and Plakans 1990: 134; Zake 2007: 313-18). In the 1880s, however, this process was interrupted. The state-led linguistic Russification intensified, and in the 1890s, penetrated to the elementary level of

[9] I collect the names in Motyl 1980, which analyzes the activities of the Ukrainian rightist nationalists in the 1917-18 periods. The detailed data about these people's education background is drawn from the biographical dictionary edited by Hohut, Nebesio and Yukevich in 2005.

education system (Plakans 1981: 208-09; 245-46). Such a switch created two generations of radicals who harbored different national identities.

The Latvian Bolsheviks were of the younger generation, not yet to be influenced by the nationalist fashion that perished in the 1880s. Six of the seven Latvian Bolsheviks (Ian Berzin, Karl Danishevskii, Ivan Lepse, Ian Rudzutak, Ivar Smilga, and Ivan Tuntul) were born around 1887 (Goriachev 2005). Receiving elementary education in the 1890s, these people were simply socialized into Russians. The sole exception was Petr Stuchka, a man of 1865. His pre-university experiences were unclear (Granat: 677), but he migrated to Petersburg at very early age, where he developed firm friendship with Lenin.

On the contrary, the leaders who led the Latvian separation during the Russian Civil War (1918-21) belonged to the older generation who received Latvian national education. Insofar as the generals, ministers and major party activists of the 1918 Republic are concerned, the majority were born prior to 1880. Like in the Ukrainian case, many were cultural professionals such as writers, journalists and historians[10]. Although most of these people commanded Russian, their Latvian identities had been forged before the linguistic acculturation.

A more important theatre was the Jewish. Jewry possessed distinct history, religion, and languages, but lacked their own territory. This galvanized many to seek cultural autonomy or even political

[10] Few books or articles provide complete information regarding the Latvian nationalists. I make the name list and collect the biographical data from Roszkowski and Kofman 2008. People who assume government ministers or above, generals, and major party leaders during the period from 1918 to 1923 are selected. There were in total 12 nationalists, on average aged 13.3 in 1890; while the average age of the Bolsheviks in this year was 5.4.

separation, but others to accept assimilation in exchange for security, job, and political rights (Gassenschmidt 1995; Karlip 2013; Rabinovitch 2014). Such bifurcation occurred in Russia too.

Tsarist Russia saw strong Jewish nationalism, from the leftist Bundists who sought political autonomy, to the Zionists who wanted to build independent states. These movements derived from the Jewish populaces, whose national identities survived the encroachment of the state Russification. The leading socialist-Zionists, for example, had received traditional education that allowed them to preserve the Jewish identities. Some studied in *heder*, special schools teaching Hebrew, Yiddish, and Jewish history. Others, ubiquitously having Rabbi-fathers, came from the families that professed Jewish enlightenment or Orthodoxy Judaism[11]. Such intellectual strands were then at the very moment of taking shape. Engagement thus meant invention, entailing decent cultural capital.

The family backgrounds of the fifteen Jewish Bolsheviks, on the contrary, indicate weak ties with national traditions. Very few of these youths came from intellectual families. The three exceptions were Sergei Gusev, Emel'ian Iaroslavskii, and Karl Radek. Gusev had a teacher-father but grew up with his worker-aunt (Granat: 398-99). Radek's parents, living in Austrian Western Ukraine and feeling ashamed of their Jewish roots, made every effort to Germanize their son. Iaroslavskii's father was a feverish admirer of the Russian populist tradition (Fateev and Korolev 1988: 15-16;

[11] I collect data of the leaders of the four major leftist Zionists forces: the Jewish People's Group, the Folkspartei, the Jewish Democratic Group, and the labor Zionists. The names are the ones commonly mentioned by Gassenschmidt 1995, Karlip 2013 and Rabinovitch 2014. The biographical data are primarily drawn from these three books/chapters, as well as the encyclopedia edited by Branover, Berlin and Wagner 1998. Out of the 17 people mentioned, at least 11 had strong family backgrounds in the Jewish traditions. I also thank Morton Weinfield for suggesting a few names.

Tuck 1988: 5-7). Both Radek and Iaroskavskii were brilliant kids, speaking a number of European languages, but had no knowledge of either Yiddish or Hebrew. In some other cases, parents did have the will of maintaining Jewish traditions, but simply lacked capacity for execution. Lazar' Kaganovich was first sent by his father to a Jewish school, but soon transferred to a Russian one, as the former's quality proved poor (Kaganovich 1996: 38). Moisei Uritskii's mother, a merchant, wanted her son to maintain religiosity. However, lacking knowledge of this regard and preoccupied by her business, she simply employed an atheist-minded Russian student to teach her son, which brought about unexpected outcome (Skriabin and Gavrilov 1987: 6-7).

For the Russified non-Russians, socialism was adopted because ethnic discrimination often coincided with disadvantaged class statuses. For example, Ukrainian language was traditionally despised as a rural dialect, which must be abandoned if one wanted to transit from a peasant into an urban citizen. Likewise, Latvians, as well as Estonians, Belorussians, and Lithuanisn, were viewed as uncivilized Slavs engaging in arduous physical labor, thus interior to the Baltic Germans who occupied well-paid positions and sectors (see Henriksson 1983). Jews' suffering, differently, were not in geographical discrimination or job market, but spread in education system (Trotsky 1970: 86-92) and military conscription (Haupt and Marie 1974: 259). The Russified non-Russians wished to stay in a Russian-speaking society not accentuating individuals' ethnic roots, an ascription that had lost meaning for them but still kept producing troubles.

Unsuccessful Russification

In other non-Russian regions of the Tsarist Empire, Russification started rather early, but achieved little. This was largely because Russification ran into conflict with the imperial government's earlier policy in these regions – cultivating nationalism among the non-Russians so as to counterweigh the political inventions from the adjacent powers. As geopolitical situation became relieved and the fashion of nationalization arose, the position of the government toward non-Russian nation-building switched from supporting to containing, which aroused backlash among local populaces. The Empire's western and southern borders, thus, saw real and aggressive anti-Russian nationalist movements, but most of them were easily put down. This led many non-Russians to envision a new political framework of internationalist character under which they could achieve more equal status with the Russians.

A major theatre of non-Russian nationalism was Transcaucasia, a region with a long history before Russia's incorporation, which made it relatively easier for Russia to modernize the pre-existing Georgian and Armenian proto-national identities. To counterbalance the rising influence of the Ottoman and Persian Empires, Petersburg also deliberately created a caste of national nobility that culturally retained distinct identities but politically collaborated with Russia (Swietochowski 1996). The turning point was the 1860s. The serf emancipation of 1861 led to the bankruptcy of Georgian nobles, which led the upper- and lower-classes to coalesce and a united Georgian national movement to take shape. In Armenia, Russia's confiscation of church asserts aroused a massive nationalist surge (Suny 1996: 62-63). Armed insurrections arose, but soon fell repressed. Except for the Armenian guerilla that hided in remote mountains in the hope of winning some international sympathy, the resistant movement ceased (Reynolds 2011: 53-55). The repression period following the 1905 Revolution further demoralized Transcaucasian separatism. Even the

most radical nationalist party ‘Dashnaktsutiun,’ softened its program by removing its request for independence. The Iranian and Turkish Revolution of 1908 offered new lessons: resistance against despotism must resort to transnational cooperation, as single small nation could not cope with the overwhelmingly ruling empires (Minassian 1996: 184-85).

Most of the nine Transcaucasian Bolsheviks conceded their nationalist experiences or identities, framing such radical position as a critical attitude toward Tsarism. Anastas Mikoyan secretly joined the Tsarist army at the outset of the Great War, believing that he was defending fatherland against the Ottomans (Mikoyan and Mikoyan 1988: 37-38). Joseph Stalin, a fan of poetry composition, often voiced national nostalgia and homesickness in his works (Stalin 2013: 17-29). He also rioted against his seminary teachers, because the latter forbade students to write in Georgian and insulted Georgians as dogs (Montefiore 2007: 46). Grigorii Ordzhonikidze grew up reading the Georgian patriotic literature that adored the ancient slave heroes who rebelled against alien rulers (Ordzhonikidze 1967: 11). Ivan Orakhelashevili led protests against the army’s rigid schedule and physical abuse against minorities when he studied at the Petersburg Military Medical Academy (Hoover 1986: 11). Aleksandr Miasnikov, albeit not telling details, admitted the heavy affection of Armenian nationalism (Granat: 558). Safarov might derive nationalism from his Polish mother who harbored Russophobe sentiment (Goriachev 2005: 358).

Two other Transcaucasian Bolsheviks nuanced the reasoning of why Transcaucasians should not seek separation. Stepan Shaumian used to be an Armenian nationalist, but shifted to Bolshevism while he was studying in a Russian-language university (Granat: 765). Shaumian asserted that nationalism of small nations had no future, on the ground that the Armenian masses were mostly

illiterate, having little sense of nationhood. Moreover, brutal cultural repression encouraged harsh self-censorship on part of the Armenian writers, impelling them to evade any public topics and narrowly focus on apolitical romance. Shaumian would have debated with Benedict Anderson, contending that such writings in national languages, even if widely spread, would be useless in forging nationalist consciousness (Shaumian 1978:17-28). Shaumian's opinion heard echo from Nariman Narimanov, the sole Azerbaijan Bolshevik and founder of the first modern Azerbaijan nationalist party. Before October 1917 Narimanov was an active cultural worker engaging in wide ranges of careers such as composing dramas, translating literature, founding libraries, managing theatres and teaching at elementary schools. He was committed to the naïve idea that continuous cultural activities would create an enlightened Azerbaijan nation immune to Islam 'superstitions'. Yet, year after year his efforts met ruthless repressions, which led him to conclude that cultural work within a single nation could not persist (Akhmedov 1988: 22-24, 42-49,62-69, 75-77).

A second theatre where Russification failed was Poland, the former territory the defunct Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Here Russophobe Polish nationalist movement, thanks to the check-balance between powers, had been active for centuries, but came to see its end in the first-half of the nineteenth century. The failure of the 1831 uprising marked the gradual extinction of armed insurrection. Having seen Russia's overwhelming military power, most Polish elites lapsed to pessimism and did not openly challenging Russia. Devoting themselves to professional work such as education, science, and arts, they persuaded themselves that such activities would be able to preserve the Polish national identity until some exogenous crisis hit Petersburg (Blejwas 1984). Pessimism deepened and became consensus after 1861, from then on the Poland Question became Russia's internal affair. Prussia and Austria, two other players of Poland partition, stood

in line with Russia during the 1863 uprising (Snyder 2006: 173-80). Neither did France and Britain offer substantial aids, because toward the Great War London and Paris were becoming the allies of Petersburg. Seeing no reliable friends in Europe, in 1905 the stubborn Polish patriot Jozef Pilsudski had to attempt conspiring with the Japanese (ibid: 182).

Both Polish-Lithuanian Bolsheviks were nationalists by identity. Felix Dzerzhinskii, the prominent founder of the Soviet secret police, grew up in a Russophobe noble family. Receiving education in Russian language, he did not liquidate his Polish identity, but rather joined the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party, a leading Polish nationalist force. However, he eventually came to view the separatist program as unrealistic (Granat: 407-09), reasoning that narrow Polish nationalism would solicit immediate state crackdown, but also arouse aversion among the Jewish and German populaces who conventionally harbored hostility to the Poles. Accordingly, Poland's liberation could only be based on the replacement of the Tsardom by a federalistic state wherein previously oppressed nations could gain equal status. This goal entailed an empire-wide and transnational revolution, wherein narrow nationalism must give way to universal ideology. Dzerzhinskii also argued that narrow-minded nationalist arrogance would impede the Poles from learning from and the 'more experienced' peoples, for example, Germans (Dzerzhinskii 1977: 27-8, 90-3). Such posture fit well with the experience of the other Polish-Lithuanian Bolshevik Vincas Kapsukas, who was expelled from gymnasium for taking part in Lithuanian nationalist movement and then escaped to Switzerland, where he made acquaintance with socialists from other countries and became an internationalist (Granat: 545-46).

The general trend of high repression, albeit having extinguished the attempts of armed insurrection, did not produce pessimistic attitudes toward nationalism in every case. Exception did exist. A major example was Joseph Pilsudski. He stubbornly insisted that Poland's complete independence must be accepted first, on the ground that Russia would treat Poland as its slave even if Tsarist state was replaced by a socialist regime. He would be proved correct in 1945. This anachronistic posture, however, was a result of age. Pilsudski belonged to the generation of 1863. This generation, many of whose parents and siblings were deported or killed for participation in the armed struggles, harbored irreconciled hatred toward Russia. Moreover, in their period urban working-class movement had not arisen. Using the old-fashion terrorist attacks as major means, the nationalists of this generation did not consider such issues as mass mobilization and transnational coordination. Some did survive, like Pilsudski, but from very early years lived in exile abroad, which caused them unable to closely follow the new trends inside of Poland (Humphrey 1936: 24-25, 35-36). Understandably, as pessimism came to dominate, Pilsudski's influence at home steadily declined.

In sum, among the Bolshevik there were the three lines of imperial communism, which the future Soviet state would blend not without tensions. In the 1920s and 1930s, the USSR implemented its indigenization project, whereby each titular nation gained the autonomy to use (and invent) its own language and nationalize its territorial cadre corps, whereas Russian as the official language was universally used across the entire Union (Martin 2001). This policy would ultimately forge a chocolate-bar-like imperial structure, similar to Austro-Hungary, wherein national and political borders were well congruent, and thus could easily dissolve. Nonetheless, the Bolshevik's obsession of building a universal framework never diminished. By intuition they never allowed a

separate Russian Communist Party to be established, afraid that this would cause the USSR to collapse from core like the Ottoman Empire. The Soviet rulers also vigilantly watched against Russian nationalism.

CCP: Communism to Cultivate Nationalism

Unlike in Tsarist Russia, in China the communist movement arose in a post-imperial era. Nation-building was still incomplete but proceeding in a way that channeled communists to promote rather than reverse it. When the communist movement arose at China proper in the early 1920s, the multiethnic Qing Empire had disintegrated decade before. The former imperial peripheries Tibet, Xinjiang, and Mongolia had achieved de facto or semi-independence, while the China proper itself was lapsing to warlordism after 1916. This confined the elites at China proper to focus on seizing the core rather than recovering the former imperial borders. Second, unlike in Russia where various ethnic groups inhabited the same territory, throughout the Qing Dynasty the Han-dominated China proper, was deliberately and effectively isolated from the non-Han borders, which generated a homogeneous Han populace at the imperial core. This mosaic demographic pattern survived the revolution of 1911, and thus various political forces of China proper did not to have to deal with ethnopolitics (Liu 2004).

The leading CCPs were overwhelmingly ethnic majorities. Seventy-two were Hans from China proper or the highly Hanized Manchuria, while the remaining five were assimilated Mongolian, Manchurians, Dong, and Miao from the interior of China proper or its nearest border. This group's experience of pan-imperial travel was rather limited. Before the power takeover of 1949 none had

ever traveled to Tibet and Outer Mongolia, although two were dispatched to Xinjiang at the turn of the 1940s as the CCP's local liaison men. The long civil war (1927-49) was completed in China proper and extended into former imperial borders after the foundation of the PRC. During the two decades only amid the Long March (1934-36) and at the northwestern base did the CCP have to cope with local minorities, in a very practical way not entailing any ideological realignment (Liu 2004). Therefore, ethnopolitics was not central to the CCP's concern.

The CCPs were Chinese nationalists, in the sense that they sought to achieve China's political unification and full sovereignty. Nationalist sentiment first stemmed from education. Most CCPs completed schooling in the transitional period of the Qing Dynasty and early post-imperial Republic, when the Confucian universalistic doctrines were being replaced by national education that aimed to forge "modern citizens" (Jiang 2017). Nationalist sentiment also derived from the CCPs' broad travel experiences within the Chinese core across regions. Educated in central or regional cities (see *Table B1*), they had direct perceptions of the people and cultures from other parts of China, which enabled them to transcend local identities in order to recognize the Chinese national universe. Furthermore, the collective nationalist identification stabilized during the general political dynamics, primarily the Northern Expedition (1926-28) aiming at eliminating warlordism and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931-45).

TABLE C1 CCPS' EDUCATION PLACES

National Capitals: 26%			
Beijing	3	Nanjing	3
Shanghai	7	Guangzhou	7

Provincial Capitals or equivalents: 45%			
Changsha	10	Xiamen	1
Wuhan	6	Chengdu	1
Taiyuan	3	Xi'an	1
Chongqing	3	Nanchang	1
Tianjin	3	Guiyang	1
Shenyang	2	Dalian	1
Kunming	2		
Regional Education Centers: 8%			
Changde	3	Suide	2
Hengyang	1		
Foreign Cities: 3%			
Tokyo	1	Paris	1
Others: 18%			
			Total: 77

Source: coding from biographies.

Though situated in a historical process of national revolution, the CCPs felt it as too slow, plagued by internal fractions, floating above the population, and somewhat carrying a reactionary cultural character. They thus turned to invoked socialism to make Chinese nationalism inherently stronger.

Fragmented Nationalism

To the oldest generation of the CCPs, the veterans of the 1911 Revolution, Chinese nationalism was sick in the sense that it was stretched and overweighed by aggressive local identities-networks.

Such centrifugalism somewhat resembled ethnopolitics in Tsarist Russia, but was rooted in regional fragmentation within a homogeneous ethnic culture. Such fragmentation derived strength and resilience from two sources. The first was linguistic diversity. While Russian language held almost constant in the vast space from Volga to Vladivostok, Mandarin, despite its common written script, was a mosaic of enormously diverse dialects, the pronunciational differences among them were no less than that between major European languages. Second, unlike in the Russia where the imperial authority remained centralized and unified until the final days of the Romanov dynasty, in the Qing Dynasty from the 1850s to the 1910s a process of power decentralization had been assigned to relieve the central government's financial and defensive burdens (Powell 1955). As power lapsed into the hands of local military men, the institutional foundation for warlordism was laid.

The nationalist revolution of 1911 took place in such a fragmented political domain, and thus became fragmented itself. In October 1911, a small group of KMT officers, similar to the Young Turks, seized power in the central province Hubei, which touched off a political avalanche. Most local governors immediately followed to declare that they supported the revolution, and the Qing Dynasty collapsed almost overnight. This revolution was honored as nationalist, in the sense that the alien Manchurian Dynasty had been overthrown. However, in reality the new national state was at best a disparate patchwork of provincial autocrats. The provincial rulers competed with each other, but also faced challenge from below, as many regions in their provinces were in the control of local strong men such as garrison commanders, gentry, and bandit heads. It was hence becoming clear that the national revolution was incomplete and must be continued. To achieve this goal, the KMTs organized several campaigns in the 1910s. However, lacking armed forces of their

own, they had to be reliant on local military strongmen, which opened door for existing aggressive local factionalism and allowed it to plague and paralyze the efforts of seeking unification.

At least nine senior CCPs completed their conversion amid the reinitiated 1911 revolution at the turn of the 1920s. They commonly reported aggressive sub-national anarchism in the military operations against warlords. Zhu De (EBCE 2010: 339-345) and Liu Bocheng (EBCE 2010:Vol.5, 316-21; NDU 2007:Chapter 2), both prominent war heroes, left the army because they were exhausted by ceaseless battles between officers in competition for territories and resources. Dong Biwu (EBCE 2010 2: 615-20) and Wang Weizhou (EBCES 1984:233-34) quit their positions in the post-imperial government after keeping suffering or witnessing bloody plots conspired by warlord officers, who had no ideological commitment and changed positions in a volatile way. Other veterans of the 1911 Revolution shared similar experiences, such as Liao Chengzhi, whose father – a nationalist revolutionary too – was assassinated in an intrigue within the revolutionary camp (Liao 1990 1: 2-3), Lin Boqu, who suffered prosecution after unconsciously getting involved in a conspiracy between warlords (Lin 1984: 194-96), Wu Yuzhang (EBCE 2010: 172-80; Li 1978: 31-103) and Zhang Yunyi (EBCE 2010 5: 553-554; Li 2005:10-11; Yu 1999: chap.1-2), who proposed trans-provincial military alliances saw their plans aborted due to behind-scene deals and the lack of institutionalized discussion, and He Long, a bandit-originated nationalist war hero who lost his troop in unpredictable realignments between local strongmen (EBCE 2010, 6: 464-74; Li 1996: 62-64). In addition to these nine persons, two CCPs came to perceive aggressive provincialism later at the expanded stage of the Second Sino-Japanese War (1931–45). Lv Zhengcao (Lv 1987: 75-76) and Wan Yi (Wan 1998: 54-55), then officers of colonel rank, switched from the KMT army to the CCP side in 1937. Both complained that local factionalism had plagued

the KMT army to the irredeemable extent that its officer corps refused to suspend internal fighting even at the moment when China's capital was to be sacked by the Japanese.

Younger CCP elites observed the rampant localism in the devastation caused by the warlordist anarchy. Social dislocations amid warfare could be seen in many provinces, especially evident in China's central province Hunan, a strategic hub that many military strongmen sought to seize. The student-CCPs from this province were the direct victims. Some of them reported this in their biographies, such as Mao Zedong (Mao 2002: 33), Chen Geng (Chen 1982: 229), Li Lisan (EBCE 2010 8: 124-25; Tang 1999: 9-10) and Ren Bishi (EBCE 2010: 413; PDRO 2004: 9-10). To them, whose houses and schools were destructed by looting soldiers, the political promise of the 1911 Revolution to build a unified and stable Chinese nation-state had fallen bankrupted.

Apart from through suffering naked military antagonism, the CCPs also saw localism in civilian cloak, primarily at the education system, the institution considered by sociologists to be the carrier of nationhood. For example, Mao complained that the mutual discriminations among students from different areas were overt to the extent that even at a county-rank school one can only engage in the students from his own areas (Mao 2002: 17-18). Mao's suffering could be inferred as ubiquitous, given that most of the seventy-seven elites studied in national/provincial capitals or regional educational centers, where people from different localities aggregated (*also see Table B1*). These people saw Chinese national universal in such cultural sense as common written script and literary tradition, but also its thinness in political and institutional levels. Such localism was evident among the overseas Chinese students too, where most student associations were divided along provincial or sub-territorial boundaries (DCHTU 1979: 723-37; Sanetō 1983: 423-37).

To the CCPs antipathetic of sub-national fragmentation, the appealing of class lay in its universalistic and populist spirits. The CCPs believed that the common people, albeit from various regions, belonged to the same laborer class, which as a common underlying background could be consciously made to create a solid national universal free of local factionalism. From such a lower-class perspective, the populist consideration stemmed. This was reminiscent of Machiavelli's obsession with 'citizen army' (Winter 2014). By directly recruiting fighters from the mass, class mobilization provided the opportunity to develop a new political force that could counterweigh the corrupted warlords and politicians that had slackened to promote nationalism. The ongoing nationalist movement did have well-elaborated rules and disciplines copied from the West or Japan, but only on paper. A class army mingled with the masses, as the CCP thought, could provide common identity so as to make these institutions work.

The CCPs were not alone. Regional fragmentation was also conceded as a major problem by the KMTs. Although some KMTs said that cultivating localism ought to be the first step of nation-building, they harbored loathing to factionalism. It was the party founder, Sun Zhongshan, that coined the well-known phrase 'the Chinese people were a sheet of loose sand'. Sun's successor Jiang Jieshi, who led the Northern Expedition of 1926, viewed the elimination of internal fragmentation to be a prerequisite for successful military operation. Even the warlords, beneficiaries of division, felt the imperative to contain localism when their conquests began surpassing provincial borders and developing into a campaign to unify China.

Yet, the KMTs did not move so far to embrace communism. Their proposals were much more moderate. Elite intellectuals preached liberalism, expecting that the accentuation of individuals' rights and a general cultivation of civic spirit could liberate people from their narrow focus of various small-group identities, such as commune, lineage, and region (Weng 2010). Apart from liberalism, toward the late 1920s in line with the rise of rightist movements in Europe and Japan, fascism started gaining momentum within the KMT. A few activists, often with military or police backgrounds, advocated to transform the KMT into a Nazi-like party. According to these fascists, a ultra-nationalism must be promoted so that all sub-national identities and networks, be region, class, sector, or individual, would be dissolved (Chang 1985).

This divergence between the CCPs and KMTs derived from many factors. One was that the two groups' disparate overseas experiences, which shaped different widths of ideological horizons. The CCPs had limited travel records, and thus fewer ideological options. Almost none of the leading communists studied in liberal societies such as Britain and the United States[12]. Fifteen stayed in Japan or France in the 1910s, but very shortly and did not obtain real degrees – some completed crash courses designed for Chinese, while others simply quitted schooling due to political reasons. Mostly staying within Chinese circles, these CCPs did not command local languages before they left. In comparison, the most persistent and penetrative foreign influences on the CCPs came from the Soviet Union, either through training in or the instruction of the Comintern delegates to China, which explains why most CCPs embraced class socialism.

[12] Zhang Wentian stayed in California for nearly one year, but he did not register for any universities. Zhu De audited a few courses in Germany but never studied as a formal student.

The KMT elites, in contrast, possessed intense exposure to foreign influences, which enabled them to engage in the ideological alternatives other than soviet socialism. A considerable proportion of the KMTs completed degrees of university or above in the United States, Canada, Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Japan, and Turkey (*see Table C2*), most of which were well-established nation-states. Some KMTs did study in Russia, but unlike the CCPs, they simply turned down the Soviet socialism (Li 2011, 2: 1092-93; 3: 1586-88; 8: 5324).

Table C2 Abroad (Non-Russian) Experiences

	CCPs	KMTs
France and Belgium	9	8
Britain	0	6
United States and Canada	1	19
Germany	1	4
Japan	7	33
Italy	0	1
Turkey	0	1

Sources: the KMTs are the members of the Six Central Executive Committee which was elected in 1946. The biographical data is primarily drawn from Li 2011 and Liu 2005.

Floating Nationalism

The CCPs' second reason for introducing class to strengthen nationalism was that the notion of nation was too abstract to reach the illiterate masses. In imperial China, a well-established homogeneous high-culture elites coexisted with an illiterate populace. Such separation became a problem only in the late 1910s, as some patriotic elites had concluded that the masses must be

incorporated into the career of national liberation so as to gain stronger leverage against the Western powers and their Chinese agents (Han 2005). Yet, contrary to this naïve romantic belief that national spirit was naturally rooted in the populace, the common masses proved indifferent to any politics beyond their communal interests. It is well known that the massive riots of the post-imperial 1920s rarely carried political orientations beyond local grievances (Bianco 2001).

The CCP elites had firsthand experiences of the masses. Nearly sixty percent of the CCPs came from peasant, artisan, or low-ranking officer families (*see Table C3*). Moreover, by conversion the CCPs had gained experiences of grassroots agitations, amid boycotts, riots and strikes, or soldier mutinies, which told them that such abstract words as "nation" and "fatherland" had confused rather than motivated the illiterate masses.

Table C3 Class Background

Father's Occupations	CCP (%)	KMT (%)
Peasant	59.7	10.1
Rural school teacher	9.1	5.5
Peddler or artisan	11.7	1
Small landlord	11.7	0
Low-rank officials	5.2	3.7
High-ranking officials	0	4.1
Lawyer, professor or doctor	1.3	1.4
Businessmen	0	8.7
Large landlord	1.3	6.4
Professional revolutionary	1.3	0.5

Unknown	0	58.7
Total	77	218*

Source: see the note of Table C2

Note: The data of KMTs' family background was very incomplete. Information is available for only 90 out of the 218 CEC members. Even the available information is very brief. The same problem is met in the case of the KMTs whose fathers were businessmen. A compensation can be seen for the education levels, which reflect family backgrounds.

Seeing the decline of morale and discipline in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution, military-background CCPs came to suspect that there was a gap between nationalism and the psychology of peasant soldiers. For example, Peng Dehuai, then a regiment commander in warlord troops, attempted to promote patriotism through clandestine soldier freemasonry, but saw few fruits (EBCE 2010 7: 384-85; Peng 2002: 31-49). He Long, a legendary war hero, realized that the mental volatility of the peasant soldiers often overpowered commander's charisma, especially when defeats loomed. Chen Geng, a pupil who abandoned his schooling to join the army, soon confronted deep depression when he witnessed soldiers' demoralization and universal lack of nationalism (EBCE 2010, 6: 3). Zhu De recalled that he felt nationalism like insufficient to motivate the rank-and-file officers as his soldiers were exterminating bandits on complicated topographies where the life was boring and logistics was poor (Zhu 1946: 5-13).

Another group of CCPs saw the thinness of nationalism among workers or peasants when these masses were being agitated to protest colonial authorities, foreign employers, or rural warlord-states. Chen Yu, a sailor activist, once wanted to channel sporadic strikes to a political campaign against the British authorities of Hong Kong, but the trade union could not move for being besot

by internal factionalism (EBCE 2010 11: 468-70; Zhou et al. 1985: 25-46). Similar experience was shared by Chen Shaomin, a textile worker in China's Germanized industrial city Qingdao (EBCE 1980 14: 65-67; Wo 1987: 1-7). As shown in the CCP documents of the early 1920s, the weak sense of nationhood among the masses was taken seriously by the Party as a major problem. It was reiterated that class consciousness must be inculcated so as to overcome the aggressive regional factionalism within the worker movement (CA 1989 1: 170, 259, 560).

Peasant-activists saw that the thinness of nationalism came from lineage cleavages. It was through radical mobilizations that many CCPs figured out the formula they should employ—class to bridge clan-based grievance to national one. For example, Li Xiannian (EBCE 2010 11: 86-87), Ye Jianying (AMS 2007, 1: 37) and Zhang Zongxun (Zhang 2008: 2-3) had been active in rural protests against taxation before their conversions. They became convinced of the communist ideology after having seen the CCP's successes in overcoming the kinship antagonism and channeling the peasantry to fight against local authorities.

Student protesters saw the apathy for nation amid boycott activities. Bo Gu said that the anti-Japanese demonstration merely heard mock from the witnessing crowds 'Don't get trouble for yourself' (Wu, Li and Zhu 1997: 18). Deng Yingchao, a middle-school pupil then, recalled that she used to be blocked by the dwellers outdoor when she attempted to propagate patriotism to them (PDRO 2014: 9-10).

These experiences led the CCPs to conclude that the nationalism, which did not target the common people's concrete interests, could not reach the masses. Zhou Enlai, for example, said that in such

an illiterate society as China, the abstract notion of nation and state would have no audience, because people could not understand these notions as they were beyond their direct horizons (PDRO 1979: 351-52). Following this argument, another prominent ideologue, Zhang Wentian, viewed class ideology as a bridge, on the ground that it enshrined the contention for the very concrete things the masses did long for, such as housing, food, and children's education (Zhang 1990b:108-09). Later comers to the CCP, like Zhang Jichun, adored Mao's interpretation of Marxism for its style of articulation that linked a grand worldwide ideal to the very specific demands of individuals (Zhang 1990a: 1-3).

Therefore, the CCP was seeking an ideology that could swiftly have the lower-class masses mobilized without slowly teaching them nationalism, which in practice might tear-up rather than integrate the nation. Such a proposal met contests from the KMTs. The KMTs not only opposed the mass-mobilizational proposal, but also insisted that the lack of nationhood could be addressed by promoting a patient, gradualist mass education project (Kirby 1984: 175-91).

The disparity in the attitude toward the mobilization from bottom reflected the two Parties' social backgrounds. Toward the 1930s and 1940s the KMT was increasingly becoming a multi-class party. As far as the KMT leading elites whose family-origin data is clear are concerned, nearly one third were sons of businessmen and landlords. Another one fifth grew up in the families of governors, generals, high-ranking officers and Court judges. In contrast, the absolute majority of the CCPs were of lower-class origins, whose parents were peasants, workers, rural teachers and urban artisans (*also see Table B3*). Some CCPs had middle-class standings at home villages, but

quickly came to identify with the low-class after migrating to cities amid physical labor and low payments.

As for the cultivation of nationhood, the KMTs' commitment to developing mass education largely derived from this group's relative successes in obtaining academic achievement. A significant proportion of the KMT elites completed high education, often in the West. Among the remaining, very few stopped studies before middle schools. By the same token, the CCPs' impatience on gradual education stemmed from their frustration. The overwhelming majority of the CCPs dropped school at middle or even lower levels. At least twenty-three of the seventy-seven had experiences of school dropping, either due to shortage of funds or warfare (*see Table C4*). Such frustrations yielded pessimism. As Zhou Enlai said, in a country plagued by poverty and civil wars, 'crafting nation through education' was an illusion (PDRO 1979: 351-52).

Table C4 Education Levels

Education Level	CCP (%)	KMT (%)
PhD	0	3.7
Master	0	7.3
Bachelor	1.3	34.9
Complete Confucian Education	1.3	2.3
Middle School (Gymnasium)	29.9	6.0
Normal School	20.8	3.2
Military-Police School	11.7	27.5
Special Secondary School	14.3	2.3
Primary School	15.6	2.3

Less than Three Years	5.2	2.3
Unknown	0	8.3
Total	77	218*

Source: KMTs' data is drawn from Li 2011 and Liu 2005.

Note: There are 18 KMT elites whose information of education is unavailable.

Reactionary Nationalism

The third reason for substantiating nationalism with communism was to evade the dilemma of building national pride out of a 'dark history'. Using the norm "class" that concerned the present, the CCP wanted to build a patriotism based not on the attachment to the past, but rather the motivation to fight for the nation's general future. This thinking took shape in a long historical process. It originated with the generation of the foundation who completed education in the late 1910s and viewed Chinese traditional culture as the cause of China's successive military humiliations. Later, the younger student cohorts, who completed schooling in the second half of the 1920s under the KMT regime, developed such thinking in the contention against the KMT state nationalism. At these two stages, the CCP resembled the Great Russian Bolsheviks, sharing some political and geographical notions of the nation with the state, but fought against the latter's cultural definition. During the Sino-Japanese War of the 1930s and 1940s, however, the CCP's became more determined to craft a healthy nationalism, which deviated from the Bolshevik route before 1917 – the latter openly boosted defeatism during the Great War.

The CCPs' anti-traditionalism was elaborated in their early writings formed during the 'New Cultural Movement' in the 1910s, the culmination of the anti-Confucian intellectual atmosphere. For instance, Zhou Enlai, then a pupil, criticized the traditional arts and romanticized such medieval values as patriarchy, despotism and patrimonialism (PDRO 1979: 24-27). Zhang Wentian, a translator of Anglo-American literature, argued that schools should not offer any courses on Chinese history, reasoning that these courses were inevitable to poison the youths and hence reproduce Asiatic despotism (Zhang 1990b 1: 106-07). As for research, he suggested that institutions must hire faculties exclusively from the people who 'had the background of modern scientific training', namely, the ones who graduated from Western universities. According to Zhang, those who had been trained by traditional Chinese methods would idealize China's dark legacy (ibid: 12-13).

The CCP's anti-traditional psychology reflected their ages. These people were young. growing in the period when China's cultural self-negation was culminating. More than a third of the CCPs were born in or after the threshold year 1905, when the Imperial Civil Service Exam (*Keju*) was formally abolished by the imperial state. These pupils thus completed education at Western-style schools. The remaining two-thirds did not have deep engagement in the imperial culture either, as they were too young (on average only seven years old) in 1905. Very few of them achieved official academic titles under the Keju (with the only exception Dong Biwu). In this regard, the CCPs were in stark contrast with the KMTs, the absolute majority of whom were born before 1905 and already twenty-two years old on average when the Exam was closed (*see Table C5*). At least thirteen KMTs passed the highly competitive Imperial Civil Service Exams and obtained honorary titles such as *Xiucai* and *Juren*. It is thus understandable that the CCP's attack on Chinese culture was

contested by the KMT, accused of ruining the national tradition and preaching the ideology of the Russian invader (Jiang 1943: 49).

TABLE C5 AGE

Year of Birth	CCP (%)	KMT (%)
1874 or earlier	0	0.04
1875-1884	2.6	12.4
1885-1894	9.1	40.4
1895-1904	50.6	38.6
1905-1914	36.4	6.0
1915 or later	1.3	0
Total	77	218*

Source: see the notes of Table C2

Note: There are five KMT elites whose information of birth year is unavailable.

The CCP's contention became clearly targeted in the protest against the KMT regime, which toward the second half of the 1920s began crafting a state-led nationalism asserting order and solidarity. Given that the KMT elites mostly came from the old imperial literati and had diverse ideological positions, they demanded not only that the Party craft nationalism by bringing back native Confucianism and Buddhism but also by incorporating other cultural icons from foreign sources such as Christianity, liberalism, and even German-Japanese statism (Wells 2001).

The CCPs disliked this approach, refuting it as intellectually deficient and lacking consistent logic. Xu Xiangqian, then a student-officer of the Huangpu Army Academy, recalled that the KMT instructors' lectures were a hotchpotch of statist slogans, Confucian jargons and Christian sermons.

Lacking coherence in their teaching, these instructors were often booed down by students (Xu 1987 1: 33-35). Chen Yun, then an apprentice in a prestigious press, said that his KMT instructor simply repeated the words such as nation and state but did not provide any systematic articulations, while the CCP activists at the same institution not only introduced him to political economy and philosophy, but also organized workers to obtain welfare (PDRO 2000 1: 19-26). Likewise, Deng Xiaoping mocked that the KMT statist activists were 'seeking national salvation through balls and banquets', and criticized that these people boasted themselves as a political party but offered no concrete programs (Yang 1998: 42-43). Such perception was ubiquitous during the First CCP-KMT united front (1922-27) whereby both parties could openly compete with each other, and thus provided the young participants with the opportunities for comparison.

Another young CCP cohort made conversion later under the established KMT regime, such as Peng Zhen (PDRO 2012, l: 1, 11-13), Bo Yibo (Bo 2008: 32-40), Gao Gang (Dai and Zhao 2011: 8-10), Liu Lantao (Sitao 2010: 1-4), Ma Mingfang (Qiang and Li 1990: 1-5), and Xi Zhongxun (PDRO 2005, 1: 33-34). These people were academic siblings of almost the same schools in Northwestern China and thus shared similar understanding of Marxism. They denounced the KMT nationalism as overt hypocrisy, on the ground that the massive embezzlement and nepotism in recruitment and funds distribution never ceased. These students also asserted that the KMT nationalism lacked intellectual finesse, not as well-articulated as Marxism.

The CCP started making its own nationalism during the Sino-Japanese War, when it forged the public image as the defender of the Chinese nation. Unlike the KMTs who arduously made-up the concrete contents of nationalism but aroused backlash, the CCPs purposively evaded this pitfall,

defining ‘Chinese Nation’ in a very vague way. Mao’s conceptualization of Chinese culture, for example, did not contain much specification. It only invoked the most general enlightened terms such as science, democracy, and mass (1993 2: 697-709). Mao underscored that a progressive culture must be ‘national’ and conceded that to be national the communists should absorb ‘positive’ elements of the traditional culture. Nonetheless, he did not move forward to define what ‘national’ was, except for indicating that the ‘inspectors’ returning from Moscow must be excluded from the power center because they had little knowledge of China’s domestic conditions. Once formed, such ambiguousness persisted and institutionalized into the cornerstone of the CCP state nationalism. As Pye (1993) said, after power seizure the CCP still faced the dilemma that they must frame themselves simultaneously as both the defender of the nation and the ender of the nation’s dark history, which geared the Party to craft a nationalism by preaching internal class struggle. This dilemma became relieved in the 1990s when state-led marketization had de facto negated the Marxist ideology while the CCP having survived the Global 1989 needed more to invoke nationalism.

Conclusion

This article offers a nuanced interpretation of how the Bolshevik and CCP leading elites understood nation and class. The Bolsheviks used class to negate nationalism, so as to create a communist empire wherein the Great Russians’ dominance could be covert and non-Russians could gain a more equal status. On the contrary, the CCP invoked class to boost nationalism, using it to overcome provincial identities and access the illiterate masses. They also used class to craft nation in a manner that did not rely on referencing China’s humiliating modern history. The

difference between the Bolshevik Party and the CCP was part of a broader trend. As Marxist class ideology spread eastward, it engaged with local contexts, and thus presented different facets: in the West internationalism, in Russia a communist empire, and in China a class-based nation-state.

While pre-existing comparative literature mostly frames the CCP as national in contrast to the Bolsheviks as non-national, this article, by invoking the sociological theories of empire and nationalism, shows that both parties dealt with questions of nationality, though they followed different definitions and approaches. Such a balanced interpretation allows us to identify two ways of understanding communism that have wider implications. In the Soviet bloc, class ideology carried anti-nationalist color, in that many Eastern European states were themselves multiethnic but also had to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. By contrast, in East Asian communist states – China, North Korea, Vietnam, and Lao – class was more of an instrument in drafting "progressive" nationalism. It also appeared that the latter pattern of communism contained more flexibility, offering more space for economic reform that involved decentralization.

Extending analysis to communists' domestic rivals, this article also suggests a new approach to understanding culture and ideology. These two versions of Marxism should not be directly derived from Russia's and China's structural features as most existing literature contends, because these same structures also animated other responses: liberal, chauvinist, non-Russian nationalist, fascist, Confucian, etc. Rather, a symmetrical analysis should aggregate all rivalries to figure out what a society's core debate was – nation-state or empire, and what type of nation-state. Such debates can indirectly reflect social structure through the ideological makings of individual actors. Thus, such

an analysis can further our understanding of the influence of structural factors on social processes while also taking into account concrete agencies.

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Historical Origins of the Party-Army Relations in the Soviet Union and China

Abstract

There is a consensus that the party-army relation followed a "separated" pattern in the Soviet Union as opposed to a "fused" pattern in China. This article explores the historical origin of these two different patterns. By analyzing the biographies of communist military elites, it argues that this discrepancy had taken shape before the revolutionary takeover and resulted from the differentiated intensities of warfare across Russia and China. Defeats and civil wars, by radicalizing the old military structure and boosting societal militarization, eroded the mutual exclusion between the military and revolutionaries. Such effect was lesser in Tsarist Russia than in China, which made party-army relations different.

Many have argued that the party and army were more separated in the Soviet Union than in the People's Republic of China. This article explores the historical origins of this discrepancy. By analyzing the biographical data of the military elites who made the revolutions, it finds that such discrepancy had been in existence long before power takeover. It then further traces the difference to the war experiences of pre-revolutionary societies. In China, the incessant military defeats and intense civil war eroded mutual hostility between the old military and societal radicals, promoting them to join each other. Conversely, in Russia there were few defeats, which proved insufficient for forcing radical reforms of the old military and boosting pervasive patriotism. Without radical reform of the old military, the Bolsheviks and the old officer corps were separated. This separation was not overcome by the short civil war.

The interest in comparing the Soviet and CCP armies is long-lasting. However, how scholars understand the armies action differs. In the Soviet case, debates revolve around how the party and the army interact with each other, rather than discussing their separate existence. For example, some view the Soviet army as group with isolated interests whose involvement in civilian affairs was rigidly banned and whose interests in politics simply diminished after long-term of depoliticizing education (Colton 1979; Taylor 2003). Others, who hold the "conflict pattern" perspective, identify the army as a challenger with distinct ideology, organizational principles, and material interests that drove the army to influence and dominate politics (Kolkowicz 1967; Stone 2002). A third group argue for isomorphism, a theory which argues that both the army and party were forged by Leninist principles. These Leninist principles are seen to enable the army and party to act independently, but with the same goals (Odom 1998). This coalitional relationship is argued to stabilize as the single-sided dependence transformed into mutual reciprocal ties (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982).

In the Chinese case, scholars agree on the integration pattern between the army and the party, but focus on different arenas where integration was realized. The symbiosis thesis emphasizes how the top elites were interchangeable, arguing that at least throughout the Mao era there was no clear boundary and professional differentiation between military and party leaders. The lack of clear boundaries and professional differentiation resembles the model of premodern European armies (Joffe 1996). Another view argues that the CCP army massively engaged in politics, especially during the "Cultural Revolution" period, but merely on behalf of the party rather than in pursuit of its sectoral interests (Colton 1979: 254-57). The dualist thesis concerns institutional fusion in

regular periods: military commanders participate in local party committees, governments, and People's Congresses, while the party installs political commissars into the army (Adelman 1980; Chu 1998). Scholars also argue that the CCP's efforts to separate the army from the party during the 1980s was frustrated after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, when certain officers, in the name of military professionalism, refused to follow the party's order to shoot the students (Shambaugh 1991).

This article derives insights from sociology of war, which argues that continuous and intensive warfare can promote social transformation. In order to win wars, state elites must reform their armies. This reformation is hypothesized to bring about fundamental changes in broad political and social relations (Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Finer 1975; Hall 1987; McNeill 1983; Tilly 1990; Zhao 2015). Moreover, military defeats, causing state collapse and social dislocation, are thought to be a major source of mass nationalism and militarization (Greenfeld and Chirot 1994; Kohn 1950; Malesevic 2016; Mann 2004; Tilly 1994; Weber 1976). This article furthers this arugment of military transformation, arguing that mechanisms such as reformation and defeat tend to erode the alienation between the old military, which embraced professionalism (Huntington 1957), and the societal leftists, who followed classical Marxism harboring anti-military psychology (Berger 1977). This erosion, I argue, depends on the intensity of warfare.

This article consists of six parts. The first section reviews plausible explanations of the historical origins of post-revolutionary patterns. The second part considers data and methods. The third describes the varied relations between the military and radical elites across Russia and China. Then the fourth and fifth sections analyze Russia and China respectively, revealing how war experiences

shaped two old armies and communist parties. The conclusion discusses the long-term consequences of differentiated militarization in post-revolutionary periods and further elaborates the contributions of this article.

Possible Explanations

Not all scholars overlook the issue of origins often citing the length of Civil War as a relevant explanation. Adelman (1980: 104-05), for example, argues that the prolonged Civil War (1927-49) enabled the CCP to establish its own officer corps. An analysis of biographical data, however, shows that length of the Civil War is not the only origin story as the discrepancies in party-army relations that Adelman (1980) discusses as important factors in establishing the CCP officer corps had been in existence since the onset of the Civil War.

Other possible explanations surrounding revolutionary origins come from scholars not directly engaging in this topic. A most straightforward account was ideology. The Bolsheviks, who learned from the French Revolution, worried that embracing military power would lead to a new Napoleonian dictatorship, while the CCPs, for unclarified reasons, seemed not concerned with this risk (Adelman 1983; Ascher 1988-92: 57-58; Jackson 1995; Schoenfeld 1995). While this interpretation may be historically accurate, it leaves unexplained why two communist parties read Marxism differently.

A second explanation concerns political opportunities. For example, topographical theory (Laitin 2007) argues that China's mountainous terrains predisposed the CCPs to embrace guerrilla warfare,

while Russia's vast steppe precluded the same idea for the Bolsheviks as the landscape prevented hiding. Another political opportunity explanation, state-breakdown theory, argues that the fragmented political system in warlordist China solicited the idea of a militarized revolution, while the intactness of the Tsarist repression system led most Bolsheviks to deem armed resistance as unfeasible (Skocpol 1979: 260-67, 294-303). This approach fails to explore why the Tsarist army did not, at least partially, side with the revolutionaries, and why the Bolsheviks refused to penetrate the high command so as to control the army [13](Tsvetaev 1960: 103-05).

A third explanation stresses the role of external aids in conflict escalation (Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009). While it is well known that China's Northern Expedition (1926-28) was sponsored by the Comintern, and that many CCP generals were trained by Moscow and armed by the Bolsheviks (Pantsov 2000; Price 1976: 66-67; Whitson and Huang 1973: 14-18), a close look at history suggests that this explanation is incomplete. For example, most Soviet aids were delivered to the KMTs, China's legal government, as the Comintern banned the CCP to possess its own armed forces, even in the aftermath of the massacre of 1927 (Brandt 1958: 145-46; CA 1989, 1: 608; Xu 1995: 70-71). After 1927 because the borders were blocked, Moscow lost the capability to send weapons (MCH 1982 23: 78). The CCP's pre-1927 militarization and switch to Civil War was largely a process independent of and even against the plan of the Comintern.

A fourth trend considers the continuity of pre-existing rebellious tradition, arguing that the CCP's militarization resulted from China's violent mass culture, particularly in the central provinces where the CCP's peasant movement was popular (i.e., Hubei and Henan) (Dai 1985; Harrell 1990;

[13] Hoover Institution: *Russia Department Politsii zagranichnaia agentura*, Paris (NIAPO), Box 214, Index XXIVj, Folder 2.

Perry 2002; Rowe 2007). However, this argument only partly explains reality. A biographical survey of the CCP's 10 marshals, 10 field marshals, and 57 generals shows that toward higher military rankings the proportion of people from the "violent regions" sharply decreased[14], suggesting that the origin of the CCP armed force was less a direct effect of the peasant violent culture.

Data and Methods

This article uses biographical analysis to examine the relationship between communist and old military elites. In the case of China where the radicals and the military were fused, the focus is on the CCP elites who had old military background, more precisely, the people who used to serve in the imperial, warlord or KMT armies. These elites established the CCP army. Their conversions from old military to communists or vice versa reflected the warfare experiences of the late Qing Empire and post-imperial China. The Russian case is more complicated. Before the Great War, the Bolsheviks and the Tsarist officer corps had almost no overlapping. For this reason, the analysis is twofold, probing not only why the Bolsheviks disliked army, but also why the high- and middle-ranking officers rarely became revolutionaries.

In addition to separate biographies, the analysis of the CCPs is primarily based on the 14-volume *Biographies of PLA Generals* (cited as BLAG 1986), which covers the CCP's military elites of the entire civil-war period, including those who established the army, but died in battles later. This dataset is biased in filtering people who defected or had the experiences of rioting against Mao,

[14] Xing huo liao yuan bian ji bu, *Zhong guo ren min jie fang jun jiang shuai ming lu* [Marshals and Generals of the People's Liberation Army], Beijing, Jie fang jun chu ban she, Volume 1.

such as Marshal Lin Biao and his disciples, but this does not bias the analysis, in that the available data has been sufficient to reveal crucial features of China's post-imperial military culture. The analysis of the Russian case focuses on the Bolshevik "military and combat activists" and the Tsarist officers who switched to the Red Army in 1918[15]. A potential bias of the Soviet military biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias is that they tend to neglect the martyrs that died before the revolution of 1917, but a close examination of the Bolshevik's pre-1917 central bodies suggests that very few military activists were sentenced to death, although most of them had the experiences of arrest.

Mutual Exclusion and Fusion

The military and radical elites of the late Tsarist Russia were two separated groups. Very few leading Bolsheviks had professional military backgrounds. Among the 94 central committee members from 1917 to 1923, only Kuibyshev (1988: 10-11) graduated from cadet corps (*kadetskii korpus*), senior military middle school. However, after graduation, he did not become officer as his parents expected. A number of Bolsheviks were mobilized into the army, but only after they had converted to socialism. In battlefield or barracks they continued conspiratorial agitations. For example, Andrei Andreev (1985: 79), Mikhail Lashevich (Granat: 490), Aleksandr Miasnikov (Granat: 588), Anastas Mikoian (Mikoyan and Mikoyan 1988: 37-38), Daniil Sulimov (Prokhorov

[15] Besides individual biographies, the collective dictionaries and encyclopedias this article cites include: *Deiateli SSSR i revolyutsionnogo dvizheniia rossii: entsiklopedicheskii slovar [Grant]* (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, 1989); Yu. V. Goriache, Tsentral'nyi komitet, KPSS, VKP (b), RKP, RSDRP (b), 1917-1991 (Moscow: Parad, 2005); Andrei Grechko (ed.), *Sovietskaia voennaia entsiklopedia* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976); A. M. Prokhorov, *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (New York: MacMillan, 1976); G. I. Kopanev, *Geroi oktiabria 1917: biografii aktivnykh uchastnikov podgotovki i provedeniia oktiabr'iaskogo vooruzhennogo vosstaniia v petrograde* (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967); S. S. Khromov, *Grazhdanskaia voina I voennaia interventsiia v SSSR* (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopedia, 1987); Joseph Wieczynski and George Rhyne, *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History* (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1976).

1976, 25: 226) and Nikolai Uglanov (Granat: 731) fought in fronts as soldiers during the First World War, whereas Mamia Orakheshvili (Hoover 1986: 3) and Khristian Rakovskii (Conte 1989: 25) served as military doctors in Rumania and Central Asia. Others titled as "combat experts", such as Aleksei Badaev (Pochebut and Malkin 1962: 19), Andrei Bubnov (Binevich and Serebriianskii 1964: 7-8), Seigei Gusev (Kramarov 1974: 31-34), Nikolai Kolotilov (Grechko 1976, 12: 592) and Timofei Krivov (Muratov and Lipnina 1968: 32-35) took part in urban uprisings of the 1905 Revolution; however, their experiences were confined to making bombs, organizing worker guards and providing security service for party conferences. People who later became the major leaders of the Soviet Army including Kliment Voroshilov, Mikhail Frunze and Leo Trotsky, had no professional military backgrounds at all.

Besides the leading elites, there was a large group of "military activists" (*voennye deiateli*). Having experiences either in conducting agitation amongst soldiers or organizing worker insurrections, this group was viewed as the most militarized Bolsheviks. However, even among the military activists, very few had substantial engagement in the old army. The Soviet textbook book *Military and Fighting Work of the Bolshevik (1903-1917)* provides a long name list, out of which nearly 45 had separate biographies (Pankratov 1973). Only Vladimir Antonov-Ovsenko, who accomplished Junker School before 1905, could count as professional, but before enrollment he had been engaged in Social Democratic circles, and after graduation, like Gusev, he did not enter officer corps (Granat: 349-50). At first, nearly 20 people became socialists. During the World War they were conscripted either as warrant, noncommissioned or reserve officers. Among them were Pavel Dybenko (Granat: 411-12) and Konstantin Mekhonoshin (Kopanev 1967, 2: 112-13), who played leading roles in the October coup. The only two exceptions were martyrs Andrei Emel'ianov and

Evgenii Kokhaskii, who graduated from military schools with low ranks whilst joining the Bolsheviks in 1905 (Grechko 1976, 3: 310, 411). The rest had neither military nor fighting experiences. Some were titled as military experts simply because they took part in the Bolsheviks' negotiation with Tsarist generals after the Kornilov Rebellion, or assumed the commissar positions during the Civil War.

The military elites lacked revolutionary enthusiasm. In early 1918, a large amount of former Tsarist officers switched to the Red Army. Yet, even these people had had no previous radical involvement. Their switch was not driven by ideological conversion, but largely for the sake of the security of families (Kenez 1973: 67; Mayzel 1976: 21-32). Almost all members of the Red Army's high command of 1920-22 moved to the Bolshevik side only after the Provisional Government had been overthrown, including the legendary red marshals, Semen Budenny and Mihkail Tukhachevskii (Granat: 371; Grechko 1976, 8: 151). Some senior military experts switched in 1918, but were to wait a long time to join the Communist Party, such as Aleksandr Kolenkovskii in 1940, Semen Pugachev in 1934 and Boris Shaposhnikov in 1930 (Grechko 1976, 4: 231; 6: 628; 8: 491). The only exception who had radical experiences before revolution was Vasilii Blyukher (Kondrat'ev 1965: 40-80). Before being conscripted in 1916, he had been arrested twice as a worker for taking part in strikes. He joined the Social Democrats after he had been dismissed from the army for irremediable injury.

The increase of the cases like Blyukhep toward the end of the Great War did not change either the army or the Bolshevik radicals. The separation between military and radicals did become weakened at the low-ranking level. As the casualty of officers increased, the state lowered its

standard and recruited many radicalized gymnasts, teachers and university students. After crash training these people, they were sent to the front. Never having been socialized by the imperial army's professional culture, they continued their antiwar propaganda as "revolutionaries in uniforms". Yet, the high- and middle-ranking posts remained monopolized by either noble-background generals or newly promoted military professionals (Grebenkin 2010: 56-57; Kenez 1973: 64; Shaipak 2012: 83-84; Zimin 1968). It is well known that the upper layer of the old officer corps, which was beyond the influence of wartime replacement, joined the Whites. Neither did the massive inflow of radicals into the officer corps alter the Bolsheviks' anti-Bonapartist psychology. Throughout the interregnum before takeover the Bolsheviks remained reluctant to resort to the military approach. Even when the Civil War had started, they still had the illusion that the regime could be defended by red guards (Erickson 1962: 11-13; Meyer 1962: 161-62).

The CCP's overall map was rather simple. After the rupture with the KMT in April 1927, the CCP immediately turned to establish its own regular army. By summer of 1930, it had managed to form a huge guerilla base system that covered nearly ten provinces. Unlike the Bolsheviks, the CCP was a communist party with a strong military background—a significant segment of its early elites previously served in China's old armies. Many of these people, before the formation of the Red Army, by virtue of their outstanding performance had been colonel- or general-level officers and had obtained the reputation of military talents. My database *Generals of the PLA* contains biographies of nearly 220 figures, most of whom were soldiers who were recruited into the CCP army as it proliferated. However, out of the army-building elites, at least 47 served in imperial,

warlord or KMT armies, while another twelve studied in Huangpu Military School before they joined the CCP[16].

Russia: Limited Defeats and "Reactionary Learning"

The defeats in Crimea and Manchuria did bring the Tsarist state huge humiliation, but far from the extent of threatening Russia's subsistence. In Crimea, Russia merely failed to achieve its presupposed geopolitical ambition, while the setback by Japan occurred in the very remote periphery Fast East. Both defeats aroused concern among the elites with Russia's likelihood of becoming a secondary power. However, lessons were drawn at limited magnitudes and carried reactionary characters. Adaptations were processed, but confined to technical levels, such as purchasing weaponry, revising strategies, and reinforcing officer education. Designed by people who aimed at defending rather than undermining the autocracy, these limited reforms further strengthened certain autocratic features of the Tsarist army, which made it not only immune to internal radicalization, but also resistible to external radical penetration. Unwilling and unable to channel an army to make revolution, the Bolsheviks were prone to embrace an anti-military interpretation of classical Marxism.

The Russian army used to be an active player of radical politics, but this interventionist tradition eventually faded after the reign of Nicolai I (Taylor 2003) once military failure put a formal end to it. One major response to the defeat in Crimea was to introduce officer professionalization, which gained momentum after the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78. This reform was aimed at

[16] Generals who converted to the CCP at the end of the Civil War in the late 1940s and activists installed by the CCP to Huangpu are excluded as they lacked analytical originality.

making officers apolitical as they were not encouraged to be concern with any political or ideological issues with the exception of obeying Tsar. This program was manifested by the foundation of the Academy of General Staff (Kenez 1973: 135-36) – as Stalin's marshal Boris Shaposhnikov (1974: 129-30) recalled, the academy valued professionalism to the extent that directors imposed from outside. Thus, nepotism never enjoyed genuine authority among faculties and students. As military schools mushroomed after the 1870s, the model of the Academy of General Staff was imitated widely. The entire army became apolitical as the graduates of these schools spread to occupy low- and middle-ranking command positions (Mayzel 1975: 315-16; Steinberg 2010: 73). Depoliticization continued in the new century. Around 1903, the special troops of the Interior Ministry were established. At least in formal institutions, domestic repressions started being separated out from the duties of the army (Bushnell 1985: 52-59). The defeat by Japan brought a heavy blow to the prestige of officer corps, further undermining their confidence of political participation (Kenez 1980: 59).

Depoliticization brought about desired outcomes. In the wake of the revolution of 1905, officers remained loyal, which was in stark contrast to the unrest among soldiers. At the onset of the period certain local military commanders, unaware of the overall situation, permitted the dissemination of weapons to worker units. However, they soon withdrew their orders after the government denounced the rebels illegal (Denikin 1991: 171-72). The officer corps remained immune from nationalists. Pilsudski and other Polish separatists attempted to exploit ethnic divisions in the officer corps to make mutinies, but most officers did not respond to them (Denikin 1991: 109-10). Neither did societal Russian rightists gain opportunity. It was rumored that the Great Russian rightists had penetrated into the army, but evidence has never been found (Chirkov 1968). Being

politically apathetic, the officers only obeyed Tsar, who assumed the supreme power. Apolitical culture was further strengthened during the first half of the Great War. As old noble officers died or retired, the "Genstabists" (alumni of the Academy of General Staff) replaced them, and apolitical culture was further spread. When revolution came, the consequences became evident. Except for obeying Tsar, the army had no political concern. With little knowledge of the dazzling ideological spectrum, the officer corps simply lost their direction, having no idea of where to go (Kozlov and Nazemtseva 2015). As Lazar' Kaganovich (1996: 91-93) recalled, in order to communicate with their apolitical army and to prevent them from siding with the counterrevolutionaires, the Bolsheviks used patriotic vocab such as "fatherland" "the people", the only political concepts the officers had heard of.

The responses to defeats made army more stable inside, but also immune from penetration from outside. Despite a call for expanding investment on professional military training, "political instruction," namely worship for Tsar and Eastern Orthodox Church, remained a core component of officer education. Lectures of theology were compulsory, and were given always alongside military courses. After the defeat of 1905, ideological instillation further intensified, as Russia attributed its defeat to the lack of patriotism among its military men, and thus wanted to copy Japan's imperial patriotism (Wright 2005). The Miliutin reform did achieve a larger opening for the non-noble people who wanted to enter the officer corps, but it confronted a stubborn resistance as touching the privileges of the hereditary nobles who had conventionally monopolized the middle and high command (Miller 1968: 135-36). The Emancipation of 1861 also did not penetrate the army. Due to shortage of funds, many military units were supposed to be autarkic, rendering soldiers and low-ranking officers routinely and freely preoccupied with manufactural production

or other profit-seeking business. The serf system survived: it proved the most efficient manner to treat soldiers as slaves and officers as landlords (Bushnell 1985: 15-17). Another "reactionary" feature that the defeats failed to remove was Tsar's arbitrary interference into military affairs, which were often unprofessional and counterproductive (Lieven 2015: chapter 3; Rich 1998: 219-24). For example, the Romanov rulers, out of their medieval psychology, had a special taste for grandiose parade, viewing well-organized parades as symbolic of order, discipline and efficiency. Such a formalism was often pursued at the expense of practically relevant projects like investment in weaponry and military games (Kagan 1999: chapter 1; Keep 1995).

Such "patrimonial" residue, which defeat-driven military reforms failed to remove, alienated revolutionaries away from the army. While the army stuck to religion, at the turn of the 20th century Russia saw a massive trend of secularization whereby many youths abandoned orthodox faith. The Bolsheviks' biographies contain a large amount of plots regarding smashing icons, reading illegal atheist pamphlets, skipping rituals and theological classes, and conflicts with clergy and bishops (Davidov 1961; 8; Granat: 26, 399, 437; Voroshilov 1968: 69-74). This transition manifested a broad social and intellectual transformation. Natural-science books such as *Origins of Species* and *Natural History* had been translated and were widespread (Frunze 1977: 25-26; Kliuchnik and Zav'ialov 1970: 16; Kol'iak 1981: 7). Instructed by radical university students teaching at the Sunday Schools, young workers could easily develop coarse atheist interpretation of these books (Pipes 1963). Anti-religious education even penetrated the state education system. The Tsarist state was strengthening its control over schools, but moved rather slowly, thus leaving teachers great autonomy in deciding the curriculum and readings (Eklof and Peterson 2010; Pochebut and Malkin 1962: 12-14). Tension between army and the population was expectable. People ridded of religious

psychology felt reluctant to be conscripted. For example, Alexander Shliapnikov, who used to be an old believer but later converted to atheism, refused to swear oath. For this reason he was dismissed from the army, fostering his radicalization to Bolshevism (Allen 2015: 33-34).

"Barrack order" (*kazarmennyi poriadok*), derived from the Romanov's premodern aesthetics, also distanced the army from the radicalizing populace. Preoccupation with counterproductive formalism aroused contestation among the officers who came from humble origins but had received solid educations. They wanted to achieve good positions by deploying their professional expertise. The rebellion against "barrack orders" were seen in the biographies of the Bolsheviks who had service experiences. Valerian Kuibyshev (1988: 12-15) and Mamia Orakhelashvili (Granat: 567) took part in protests against rigorous schedules when they studied at military academies, and both chose other professions after graduation. Mikhail Iaroslavskii (Granat: 785), the founder of the Red Army's commissar system, quit the army after several months' service, concluding that the rigid order had individuals demoralized. It was noteworthy that such loathing was not confined to the Bolsheviks and leftists, but also evident among officers who felt themselves impaired by the army's medieval culture (Shaposhnikov 1974: 66).

"Reactionary learning" from defeats also solicited ethnic exclusion, which rendered the army less accessible to non-Russian revolutionaries. In general, the Tsarist Army was very multiethnic. Transcaucasian and Baltic nobles, for example, had long traditions of assuming high command posts (Hagen 2004: 36-37; Zaionochkovskii 1952: 17). Yet, alongside with this multiethnic toleration, the program of russifying the officer corps was also gaining momentum (Lohr 2003). After the defeat by Japan, certain "politically unreliable" nationalities, especially Poles and Jews,

started facing more restriction in entering the officer corps. For example, in 1906, the Third Petersburg Duma passed a law, depriving Jews of the right to access all military medical academies. On the eve of the World War, Jews came to be defined by race rather than religion, which meant they could no longer evade ethnic restriction through conversion to Orthodoxy (Petrovskiĭ-Shtern 2009: 242-48). As Jews as a group had been officially defined as a scapegoat, anti-Semitist abuse in army went beyond control. Verbal and physical violence was less intervened by officers (Lohr 2003: 17-23). Frightened by such situation, many Jews gave-up their idea of joining the army (Haupt and Marie 1974: 259). As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned, ethnic exclusion played an important role in distancing the party from the military – Jews constituted the largest overrepresented minority group of the Bolshevik army leading elites (Riga 2012).

Emphasis on merit and education did undermine the big families' control over military positions, but yielded new class exclusion. The Miliutin reform separated military from general education, setting a prerequisite for the admission to military academies. Only people who had gymnasium-level diploma or its equivalents (Persson 2010: 28-43) could be accepted. This policy disqualified many Bolsheviks who came from disadvantaged family backgrounds and did not gain decent education. The reform did not block all old channels, but left open the children of military families, allowing them to enter academies without passing rigorous exams. This placed the Bolsheviks in a disadvantaged position too. As far as the leading Bolshevik elites are concerned, very few of them had military family backgrounds. Out of the 94 central committee members, for example, only Kollontai and Kuibyshev had officer-fathers.

The insufficient and reactionary reforms, deriving from the limit of military defeats, geared the Bolsheviks to be apathetic to Russia's geopolitical crises and overwhelmed by domestic class grievance. They viewed the army and the entire military culture as a reactionary fortress that buttressed the Tsarist regime, rather than a progressive force that defended Russia. Victories were often depicted from the perspective of tragedies of individuals and families, whereas defeats were accordingly celebrated as blows to the old regime rather than lamented as the humiliation of fatherland. Sergei Kirov attributed the impoverishment of his family to the death of his great grandfather in Russia's conquest of Caucasia (Kirilina 2001: 11). Kliment Voroshilov (1968: 13) recalled that his father was wounded twice in the 1877 Russo-Turkish War, but after demobilization gained no pension or material compensation, returning home only to find that his land had been appropriated by others. During the same war Vladimir Lenin's family was discussed critically, denounced as irrelevant to common people's welfare, and seen as a personal gift of governors and generals to the Tsar for their own promotion (Loginov 2005: 34-35). Patriotic expressions were rarely seen in Bolshevik biographies. Rather, there are many records that these people made every effort to escape conscription. In order to evade military obligation, Victor Nogin fled abroad (Podgornyi 1966: 10), while Grigorii Petrovskii exclaimed that he had been rejected by the army due to weak physical conditions (Kliuchnik and Zav'ialov 1970: 18-19).

It should be added that the indifference to Russia's geopolitical decline, associated with an intense interest in domestic injustice, was by no means confined to the Bolsheviks. Conservative-minded nationalists did cry that internal conspiracies must be terminated so that the entire nation could work like a man to cope with external rivals, but this was much different from a lament that Russia was approaching the abyss of partition as in the case of Poland, Turkey, or China. Even such

moderate patriotic voices were inundated by radical propaganda, coming from not only leftists, but also liberals, non-Russian nationalists, and even civilian technocrats. Upholding conflicting ideologies, these people commonly viewed defeats as great opportunities to restrict the autocracy (Guchkov 1993: 34-35; Katkov 2011:141-44, 459-60; Timirev 1998: 93-97). When the message of defeat by Japan reached Petersburg, the liberals even reminded people not to overly deplore, which would allow patriotic lament to distract criticism of the autocracy.

The mutual exclusion between army and societal radicals shaped the psychology and ideology of the Bolsheviks. Viewing officer corps as an increasingly "reactionary" group, the Bolsheviks turned to devote all their efforts to agitating soldiers and sailors, on the grounds that these people came from the laborer-masses and were essentially different from their officer superiors. Not envisaging to overthrow the old regime by waging a war, the Bolsheviks believed that the collective defection and sabotage of the rank-and-file would transform the old army to "commanders without soldiers" (Tsvetaev 1960: 92-93, 108-11). Military was never a sustainable topic on the Bolshevik agenda. Lenin did try to make insurrection in 1905, but soon returned to the classical Marxist cliché that the old state would implode due to economic depression and geopolitical defeats (Lowenthal 1967: 383-86). Misled by the 19th-century Russian writers' notes of the 1848 Revolution, the Bolsheviks assumed that once the revolutionary volcano erupted, the old army would be too cowardly to fight (Cole 1975). This illusion was preserved until March 1918, when the Bolsheviks in power came to realize that without a standing army they could not complete the revolution at all. Having no military backgrounds and facing the Whites' acute offensives, they simply coerced the defunct Tsarist officer corps to fight, establishing a communist army they could monitor but would never merge with.

China: Organic Crisis and Intensive Civil Wars

In China, organic crisis promoted the military to undergo profound reforms, which increased military men's political importance and the army's cultural exposure to the Western ideas. Both eroded the barriers between the military and the societal radicals. The first wave of defense modernization started in 1856, when the empire recovered its capital from the occupation by the Anglo-French armies while the South was being swept by the Taiping Rebellion. Local military strongmen from central provinces began dominating the imperial politics. To deal with the defensive crises, they projected China's first wave of military modernization, the cornerstone idea of which was improving the imperial military system by introducing foreign trainers and purchasing western weaponry. This reform persisted for nearly 30 years until Qing's defeat by Japan in 1895 (Platt 2007). Afterward, the Beiyang generals supplemented the central-province governors and promoted the military reconstruction into its second phrase, which was more radical. In order to westernize the army's organizational structures and even ideologies, students who were sent to study in the West formed a radical-minded officer corps similar to Young Turks. In this regard China fundamentally differed from Russia, wherein learning from foreigners took place only through textbooks. Thus, the cultural shock solicited was not as large in China (Persson 2010). The Beiyang military reform played a decisive role in ending the Qing Dynasty. Many military students, studying in Japan, became the leading makers of the Revolution of 1911, while the relatively conservative high command, manipulated a new military system that the old imperial nobles had little knowledge of forced the last emperor to abdicate. For this reason, all these military people gained the reputation as the founders of the republic. After 1916, when their supreme leader

General Yuan Shikai died, the centralized system collapsed and local commanders took over civilian governance, in the belief that only military rule could guarantee stability and reunification. Viewing themselves as "civilian rulers in uniforms", officers saw intervention into politics as a fashion but also a serious obligation (Chen 1980; McCord 2012). They spent time reading political books, newspapers, and pamphlets, corresponding with radical scholars, and debating against each other over the future of the country. Such politicization or de-professionalization increased their chance of encountering the communist networks which had been rapidly proliferating.

The deepening geopolitical crisis also formed a patriotic discourse which penetrated the entire society. The late nineteenth century saw a dramatic cultural shift, whereby intellectuals began to emphasize the significance of the military affairs, which they had conventionally despised. Confucius was reinterpreted as a sage that possessed military talent. Both Ban Chao and Wang Yangming, respectively living in the 1st and 16th century, came to be worshiped as model patriots in that their expertise arguably spanned both military command and civilian governance (Sutton 1980: 20-21). The abolishment of the Confucian exam in 1905 spurred young students to flock toward military academies and schools, which were mushrooming under the sponsorship of imperial state, local governors, and military units (McCord 1993). The army, previously a career that most educated youths tended to escape, came to be respected as the most progressive and westernized organization of the society, largely due to its wide exposure to western culture (Fung 1980: 77-86). After the Revolution of 1911, as the alien Manchurian rule had been removed, the army, at least nominally, became the incarnation of the nation (Rankin 1971). Inspired by China's ancient general-scholars, many youths dropped-off their academic career joining the army so as to "defend the fatherland". Even Mao, who throughout his life viewed military as a technical issue

not deserving fulltime commitment, affected by the then pervasive patriotic psychology, joined the army as a soldier in 1911 (EBCE, 1: 4). The CCP elites who missed the application deadlines or had rejections from military schools often restlessly appealed to the administrative so as to obtain exceptional arrangement, or simply took the exam again in the next year (BLAG, 3: 43-44; 4: 401; 8:112-13; 9: 328; 12: 69-70). This is in stark contrast to the Bolsheviks who felt excited on being expelled from the troops.

Differences between the CCPs and the Bolsheviks could also be found in their readings. The CCPs' childhood readings were often the novels, dramas, folklores, and operas that commemorated military heroes in Chinese history, such as *A Romance of Three Kingdoms*, *Water Margin*, *The Generals of the Yangs*, and *A Biography of Yue Fei* (BLAG, 2: 115; 7: 4; 8: 5; 13: 385). These readings repeated the discourse that a new regime could be created through massive wars, either led by peasant heroes or local strongmen. Conversely, the Bolsheviks' readings rarely covered military topics. In most cases they were romances, political economy, philosophy, aesthetics, and so forth – the central concern was with legitimating a revolution in a backward society rather than learning specific techniques to make a revolution. Leo Tolstoy, a major writer socialists read heavily and promoted, wrote much of wars, but was respected by for his antiwar stances (Kenez 1980: 60). Lenin's readings did cover war issues, but largely about the military structure and strategies of the western powers, which, as he supposed, contained the information of whether an "imperialist" world war would take place (Grinishin 1970: 57-67). His reading of Clausewitz and French Jacobins was superficial, rarely going beyond extolling militant heroism whilst denouncing the Menshevik moderates.

While the deepening geopolitical crisis and the military reconstruction facilitated the army's internal radicalization, the perennial civil wars synchronized the rise of the CCP movement, making the old army less immune to radical penetration from outside. The officer corps of China's post-imperial army eventually lost a centralized, bureaucratic structure and a clearly-articulated, intensively instilled ideology. The post-imperial Chinese nationalism proved incipient and soon fell overwhelmed by provincial identities, along which local military power had been structured since the final years of the empire (Horowitz 2012: 159-63; Powell 1955; Zarrow 2012). As central finance eventually ceased to exist after 1916, local armies, especially in the southern provinces, lapsed into fierce fighting against each other over territory and population, which made the nationalist idea of the 1911 Revolution look even more hollow and meaningless (Sutton 1980). Accordingly, most senior CCP generals came from southern warlord troops where civil wars were most intensive, such as Zhu De, Chen Geng, Chen Qihan, Liu Bocheng and Wang Weizhou (BLAG, 8: 380-81; EBCE, 1: 339-45; 5: 319-21; 6: 2; EBCES, 1: 233-35). The lack of solid ideology also made leftism more infectious. Having less memory of the imperial culture, young people proved less immune to radical propaganda – the military CCPs were also very young, on average aged at only 5.8 in 1905, the year when the imperial Confucian exam (*Keju*) was abolished. With weak attachment to the imperial culture, they could easily be captured by the Soviet propaganda.

The structural weakness of the old army also derived from its hodgepodge personnel composition. In order to win civil wars, local military strongmen became very flexible in officer recruitment. To make their armies larger in size and competitive in strength, they opened officer corps based on talent and loyalty regardless of social origins and diplomas. This definitely increased the chance

for the CCPs – most of the 60 CCP generals who had old-army backgrounds were from lower-class families, with only four exceptions whose fathers were officials and petty gentry. To avoid deadly fight and preserve force, warlords often incorporated bandits into rank. Green heads had little ideological commitment. Not possessing stable logistic system, they were prone to defect as failure was looming, and sided with the communists on their way. A prominent example was He Long, later a CCP marshal. He started as a bandit head well connected with secret societies. As his troops grew large, nationalists and local warlords competed to incorporate them. Toward the end of the KMT's Northern Expedition (1926), He had been appointed as a major-general in command of an army (BLAG, 2: 298-305). Yet, he never gained genuine trust of his patrons', and often saw that they were conspiring against him. This pushed He Long to search for reliable allies which in turn chaned his mindset so that he became a communist. Another case was Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo, the cofounders of the CCP's earliest rural guerilla base, who also started as bandits. They accepted the pacification by local warlords, joining the state officer corps, but soon defected. In order to evade the incoming repression, they turn to cooperate with Mao's men who had escaped from the provincial capital after a failed coup (BLAG, 5: 3-8; 6: 462-63). Agreeing to introduce a commissar system into their troops, they also taught Mao guerilla tactics (Xu 1995: 145). Green heads were essential to the formation of CCP's revolutionary model, not only by providing the CCP with first standing army, but also by opening their sites to serve as its earliest military base.

In 1916, having lost centralized authorities and unified logistic systems, China's officer corps became increasingly fragmented along informal relations. Loyalty was not based on ideologies and procedures, but largely on personal ties (Whitson and Huang 1973: 7-11). This further favored the spread of radicalization. Once a certain officer decided to switch to another camp, close

subordinates would follow him. Collective treason was ubiquitous in China during the 1910s and 1920s, to the extent that bribery and defection-incitation began to substitute for real fighting. This collective treason confirms the general model of Third-World state building (Migdal 1988: chapter 7).

The CCP definitely benefited from the poor bureaucratization of the old army. The Ningdu officer group, who collectively defected from the KMTs to the CCP side in 1930, had changed their camps at least three times before. A survey over the 60 elites reveals a number of networks with clear centers, such as Peng Dehuai's network in the Hunan troops, Chen Geng's network in Huangpu guard regiment, Zhang Yunyi's network in the Guangxi warlord troop, He Long's network in his own guards, and Li Xiangjiu's network in the Shannxi warlord troop (BLAG, 3: 3-5,133-34, 343-46;4: 301-08, 402-03, 439-45; 5: 243-45; 6: 374-88; 7: 474-75; 8: 381, 423-31; 9: 62-64,193-97, 411-14, 517-20; 12: 276-77, 504; 14: 301, 233-42). In Huntington's (1957: chapter 1) terminology, the Chinese army of the 1920s was degrading to medieval mercenary. This mercenary system was in stark contrast to Russia, wherein the army was arduously struggling toward bureaucratization.

The intensive civil war also promoted the overall militarization of the society. After 1916, China eventually lapsed into the state of jungle. Although the 1920s did not see old-fashioned peasant wars aiming at establishing new dynasties (except for Bai Lang Uprising), localized green riots never ceased (Bianco 2001). In addition to these riots were rampant atrocities perpetrated by bandits and undisciplined soldiers. For the sake of security, villages and clans organized boxing schools and armed guards, and practicing martial arts became a fashion. Early CCP military leaders, such as Zhang Ziqing and Hu Yun, gained their initial battle experiences in these self-defensive groups (BLAG, 2: 116; 5: 501). Students did not stand by outside of this trend. Mao, at that time studying in middle school, organized a guard to patrol the campus, in case that bandit-soldiers

around perpetuated robbery and sexual assaults. Political anarchism even promoted the militarization of the entire school system. In Shanxi, following the order of the governor Yan Xishan, the Province Pedagogy School was militarized. Drill and shooting became compulsory regular courses, and students were required to be dressed in military uniforms. The portraits of ancient Chinese war heroes were hung at the front of every classroom so as to motivate patriotism. Not surprisingly, this school created two top CCP military men, Marshal Xu Xiangqian and General Cheng Zihua (BLAG, 10: 271; 13: 388).

As has been revealed, ethnic exclusion contributed to impede the Bolsheviks from reaching high command. Similar mechanism worked in China, but in a subtler way. Both the warlordism and the CCP Revolution unfolded in China's proper, which was inhabited homogeneously by ethnic Hans; however, provincial fragmentation did exist. As wars increasingly occurred between provinces, warlords started minimizing the promotion of people who came from other provinces or regions, a process akin to "russification" However, the impact of such blockage was limited, undermined by the fact that every region had its own warlord – in certain provinces such as Sichuan, each brigade or division occupied a region and recruited soldiers locally (Hu 2001: 64-65). Moreover, boundaries between provinces were floating as particular warlords' jurisdictions kept expanding or shrinking. This made a rigorous regional exclusion unworkable. For example, Zhu De, born in Sichuan Province, obtained a brigade-level post in Yunnan provincial army. This was not surprising because the latter often occupied the southern part of Sichuan, and viewed the entire Southwestern China as its potential domain. A strong counter-factual hypothesis can be made that if the Tsarist Army had permitted each ethnic group to establish its own units, the future Bolsheviks would have had more chance to become commanders. This actually occurred among Latvians,

whose regiment played a substantial role blocking Petrograd from external assistance on the eve of the October coup (Page 1976; Page and Ezergailis 1977). However, this was almost the single exception.

The ensuing two-decade long civil war witnessed a persisting process of mutual fusion between the revolution and military. Viewing the use of unconverted warlord generals for revolutionary war as an unfeasible strategy, the CCP army from the beginning was committed to training "red commanders" to achieve this goal. Unlike in the Soviet military academies where worker-peasant cadres had no choice but to study from "bourgeois" professors, in China's guerrilla-war training camps, peasant-students worked under close instruction of senior communists, who had solid military backgrounds, but also understood communist ideology. As young commanders gained experiences in battlefields, they became new teachers. There was no clear boundary between commanders and commissars, as all people came from the same system and interchanging was ubiquitous in practice.

Conclusion

Many scholars, mostly comparative historians, have noted that in rhetoric the CCP Revolution was far more nationalistic than the Bolshevik one, and imply that this is because China suffered a deeper geopolitical crisis (Levenson 1968; Smith 2008; Wright 1961). This article argues that this consequence was more than rhetoric. A most important and far-reaching outcome was the post-revolutionary party-army relations, which contributed to the divergence in 1989. As a separate and apolitical professional group not created by the communists, but occupied by the latter, the Russian

army viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union with an apathetic attitude. Having outlived the Rurik Dynasty, Romanov Empire, and "bourgeois" Provisional Government, the army was simply again receptive to accept and obey a new regime regardless of its ideology. By contrast, at least the elder commanders of People's Liberation Army, created by the CCP and sharing an overlapping leading group with the political state, could not tolerate an apolitical position. They probably objected to massacre, but would never allow that the CCP state, which they themselves created, to fall into the hands of dissidents.

A second contribution of this article is analyzing civil war separately, contra to most literature which conflates it with revolution. The CCPs' militarization derived from deeper geopolitical crisis, but also incessant warlordist warfare, which never became available in Russia. Although disagreement had emerged between White generals (Smele 2014: 17-47), the interregnum between Tsar's abdication and the Bolshevik takeover was too short to escalate it into a Chinese-style civil war. By March 1918, the old officer corps was basically intact. They sided with the Bolsheviks not because of internal radicalization, but as a result of coercion. The division within them was more a function of geographical distribution – people whose relatives fell in the hands of the Bolsheviks switched to the Red Army – than ideology. Having occupied the state machinery and possessed the coercive power, the Bolsheviks did not see it necessary to adopt a CCP-style route, which took bricks from the old military tower eventually. If the Bolshevik had come into existence during the Time of Terrible (1598-1613), an interregnum when intensive warfare between boyars, Polish interventionist troops, false Tsars, and peasants was routinized and persistent, it would be hard to tell whether it would have become a second CCP.

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How the Bolshevik Revolution Made Itself Un-Replicable for Chinese Communists: A Comparative Historical Analysis of the Repression Regimes

Abstract

How do revolutions affect one another? Pre-existing scholarship has revealed three positive mechanisms: indicating the vulnerability of the old system; providing symbolic and strategic inspirations; offering substantial aids. Using a compiled dataset, this article, analyzes the experiences of repression and exile of the Bolshevik and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutionaries, and suggests a fourth but negative form of impact. A forerunner revolution can make itself un-replicable through (a) arousing transnational counterrevolutionary panic and reducing political opening; (b) teaching the reactionary regimes with new organizational models, enabling them to be more efficient in repression; (c) becoming an established polity with selfish interests, transferring higher risks to its foreign followers. These mechanisms put follower-revolutionaries in a position to suffer more violence, compelling them to abandon the plan of replicating the forerunner. Using comparative historical method to analyze inter-case interaction, this article shows how the three mechanisms worked differently so that to make the revolutionary CCP was unable to copy the strategy of power takeover of the pre-1917 Bolshevik.

Keywords: revolution, interaction, repression, exile, Russia, China

How do revolutions affect one another? Pre-existing scholarship reveals three positive mechanisms: indicating the vulnerability of the old system; providing morale, symbolic and strategic inspirations; and offering military, financial, and organizational aids. This article, by comparing the Bolshevik and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) revolutions, suggest a fourth but negative possibility: the forerunner revolution weakens its undergirding conditions and hence makes itself un-replicable for follower revolutions. A forerunner does this by (a) arousing counterrevolutionary panic, reducing political opening at a transnational scale; (b) teaching reactionary regimes with revolutionary organizational models, enabling the latter to be more efficient in repressing follower-revolutions; (c) becoming an established polity with selfish interests, exploiting followers whilst putting them into higher risk. These three mechanisms together tend to cause more violence over follower-revolutionaries, compelling follower-revolutionaries to abandon the plan of accurately replicating the forerunner. Using comparative historical method to analyze interaction, this article compares how differently the three specific mechanisms worked to the pre-1917 Bolshevik and the revolutionary CCP.

By compiling a comparative biographical dataset of the leading elites, this article focuses on the Bolshevik' and the CCP's experiences of repressions to understand why the CCP's initial attempt to duplicate the Bolshevik revolutionary path failed. Throughout the period from 1903 to 1917, the Bolshevik maintained an urbanist revolutionary model (i.e., based at industrial cities, conducting agitations among workers), which later the CCP would seek to replicate. Despite temporal variations in intensity and efficiency, this route persisted until the implosion of the Tsarist state in the Great War. My research reveals that such persistence was preconditioned by a relatively moderate repression regime in a world wherein totalitarian communism had not yet come into

being. Facing a traditional old regime preferring unlethal punishment, the leading Bolshevik elite was frequently arrested but rarely killed, which allowed them to easily return to movements or maintain contact with colleagues outside of prisons. Moreover, the Bolsheviks could continue their conspiratorial activities in exile in Europe, thanks to Europe's political liberty and geographical proximity to Russia.

This revolutionary path, however, became un-replicable as the first socialist state came into being. During the 1920s the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) state, viewing the Leninist model as a success, sought to transform itself into a party-state, wherein an ever-independent and fragmented punishment system would be subordinated to the arbitrary rule of the Party. This enabled the KMT to use unrestricted violence to kill oppositions, and thus deprived the CCP of the feasibility to maintain its stronghold at central cities. Furthermore, the success of the Bolshevik revolution aroused worldwide panic, the upgrading of anti-communist repression surrounding China. As repression intensified, Japan and Southeast Asia, the conventional destinations for Chinese overseas fugitives, became no longer accessible. Finally, Russia itself, now a sovereign polity under totalitarian rule, actively drove the CCP refugees back home to complete its grand strategy of making an Eastern revolution. To achieve solid control over the CCP, the Comintern also excluded the CCP's connections with European communists, which further reduced the number of outlets. All these factors rendered the CCP to be confined within an enclosed political space and to suffer intense violence. They thus had to adjust their strategies and deviate from the Bolshevik revolutionary route before 1917.

Drawing on this empirical comparison, this article coins the concept of "repression regime." This concept encompasses how repression was exerted at home and to what extent the repressed could escape outside. It is argued that repression shapes radicals' behaviors through the combination of these two factors rather than only through the exertion of repression is exerted. This two-factor approach is contrary to most existing literature in social movements.

The main body of this article includes six sections. The first part conceptualizes the research question, reviews major accounts and relevant sociological theories. The second considers data and methods. The third to sixth section are the core parts of empirical analysis. The conclusion summarizes this article's theoretical, empirical, and methodological contributions.

Theorizing the Two Revolutions

As sociology of revolution evolves into its fourth generation, the issue of inter-revolution interactions has come to be highlighted as a major topic (Goldstone 2001; Lawson 2017). Most literature, noticing that revolutions occur in waves, focuses on the positive effects of earlier movements on later movements. Three mechanisms have been identified. First, the occurrence of a revolution conveys the encouraging signal that the reactionary (e.g., national old regime, empire, world system) is not as strong as it seems, causing the cognitive inference to the broad masses so that the same outcome can be easily achieved in other regions (Beissinger 2002; Kuran 1995; Weyland 2012; Weyland 2016). Second, a revolution of historic significance, regardless of its success, can generate a huge repertoire, providing moral, symbolic, and strategic insights for later-comers. Through historiography, literature, and folklore, such transmission can even survive a long

temporal distance to shape revolutionary movements that occur after hundreds of years (Beck 2011; Selbin 2010; Shlapentokh 1996; Sohrabi 1995; Sohrabi 2002; Way 2011). Third, revolutionary movements can provide substantial aids to each other, including military, financial, organizational aid. This provision is especially the case when revolutionaries have seized power in a country and then are able to use state resources to export and make revolutions in another country. For example, liberals who have seized power can exert diplomatic pressure so that despotic regimes have to expand their political openings that might create opportunities for revolutionaries (Chen 2001; Markoff 1996; Regan, Frank and Aydin 2009; Ritter 2015).

Some scholars have noticed the negative effects between revolutions, yet revolutions do not always occur in waves and waves cannot persist endlessly. For example, when analyzing the breakup of the Soviet Union, Beissinger (2002) identifies several circles of nationalism and argues that early waves of nationalism exhausted international attention and sympathy, ultimately causing later waves to lack external support. Lawson (2016: 112) mentions that cognitive inference could mislead the masses to underestimate the power of local old regimes. Undertaking unrealistic strategies, they failed to copy the successful revolutions they had identified. More relevant, Weyland (2016) has pointed out that reactionaries could efficiently learn to combat revolutionaries and enforce successful counterattacks.

The Bolshevik and CCP revolutions are an outstanding case where conscious imitation and duplication largely failed, at least in the short term. The two revolutions did not achieve successes in close sequence to look like a wave. The CCP started its revolutionary movement in 1921, with the intention of replicating the success of the Bolshevik revolution in 1917, but did not complete

its takeover of national power until 1949. Moreover, toward the late 1920s, the CCP's trajectory came to deviate from the Bolshevik's. The Bolshevik stayed at cities until the collapse of the Tsarist state and then from the urban core conquered rural periphery, while the CCP, after a short-lived attempt to copy the Bolshevik model, fled to the remote countryside and lapsed to a two-decade-long civil war. This unique experience profoundly shaped the CCP's ideology, mindset, organizational structure, and composition of leading elites. It also made its post-revolutionary trajectories different from the Bolshevik's, especially in areas regarding peasantry and agriculture (Bernstein 1967).

This temporal lag and strategic discrepancy between the two revolutions have been understudied. In the area of case studies, most comparative scholars of the two revolutions underplay their interactions, but rather analyze them as if they were cases driven by internal dynamics (Dunn 1972; Moore 1966; Skocpol 1979; Smith 2008; Wolf 1969), although recently this trend has come to be criticized (Anderson 2010; Mann 2012). Interaction acquires more attention to single-case studies. Many works have revealed the ideological impact of the 1917 on the early CCP elite as well as the substantial aids provided by the Bolshevik through the Comintern, via the forms of training cadres, delivering financial and military resources, and networking (Boersner 1981; Brandt 1958; David-Fox 2016; Ishikawa and Fogel 2013; Luk 1990; Pantsov 2000). Also, unlike general theories of revolution, most case studies treat the negative face as a major topic. Detailed narratives have been developed revealing how the CCP paid with blood for Moscow's factionalism and miscalculations. However, most of these case studies are China-centered and only focus on the direct impact of the Bolshevik on the CCP, rather than how the Russian revolution changed the entire political landscape within which the CCP revolution unfolded.

This article attempts to overcome the shortcomings of neglecting this interaction. It moves beyond the focus of the Bolsheviks as only having unidirectional influence by using comparative historical methods to address the issue of interaction in a symmetrical manner. It does this by comparing how the first revolution interacted to a world without a socialist state to the second revolution's interactions to a world wherein an established socialist state existed.

This article coins the concept "repression regime," which adds a spatial and inter-societal dimension to mainstream academic literature in repression. This literature has been solely concerned with how repression style (e.g., covert or overt, violent or non-violent, discriminative or non-discriminative, state-organized or societal, etc.) channels the radicalization process of social movements (Almeida 2003; Khawaja 1993; Kurzman 1996; Lichbach 1987; Mason 1989; Mason and Krane 1989; Moore 1998; Opp and Roehl 1990; Opp 1994; Rasler 1996; Shadmehr 2014). As the Bolshevik-CCP comparison shows, external political landscape is no less important as repression style at home as it determines to what extent the repressed could escape and continue their radical activities.

Methods and Data

The analysis of the Russian part concerns the Bolshevik's entire pre-revolutionary history until 1917, while the CCP part focuses on the threshold period of 1927 with extension into the early and

mid-1930s[17], during which the CCP eventually deviated from the Bolshevik model of power takeover.

In terms of data, this article compares Bolshevik and CCP central bodies, in that strategic adaptation was a decision made by party leaders. The Bolshevik dataset covers the central bodies of the entire pre-revolutionary period between the party formation in 1903 and February Revolution in 1917. The CCP's, in line with the analytical focus on switch, covers the Party's first six central committees that formed before 1933 (i.e., 1921, 1922, 1923, 1925, 1927, and 1928), which overlapped with each other.

Being a faction within the Russian Social Democrat Labor Party (RSDLP or SD), before 1917 the Bolshevik lacked institutionalized central bodies. Thus, I incorporate all the groups of leading characters, numbering 102 individuals, including the Bolshevik members with seats in the SD central committees, the members of central and special bureaus, and the editors of the Bolshevik organs which often played the role of temporary faction center, such as *Iskra*, *Vpered*, *Pravda*, and *Proletariat*. These people's names and positions can be found in old Soviet party-history textbooks (Moskalev 1964; Ponomarev 1959). On the contrary, the CCP had institutionalized party center, the central committees. The first six central committees included 76 formal and candidate members, the full list of whose names can be found in the CCP's special dictionary of central committee members (CHP 2004).

17 By summer 1930 a nationwide system of guerrilla zones had been set up, although they were geographically separated from each other. In January 1933, the CCP central apparatus moved from Shanghai into a rural guerrilla base in the near Jiangxi province.

Analysis focuses on two clusters of materials, which are the most complete in the dataset: the records of repression, including arrests, deportation, exile, imprisonment, and execution; the records of escaping or exiling after repression, both at home and abroad. The dataset also contains clear information of most people's years of death, which suggests whether they outlived old regimes. Most Bolsheviks survived, leaving complete autobiographies in *Granat Encyclopedia* (1989) and separately published memoirs. In addition, I use the Archive of the Tsarist Secret Police (Okhrana) at the Hoover Institution, which contains details of the Bolshevik's exile abroad. As for the CCPs, given that many early leading elites died in the repression in and after 1927, I consult the *Biographies of Revolutionary Martyrs* (Revolutionary Martyrs Association 1985), a nine-volume encyclopedia that contains the biographies of the CCPs killed between 1927 and 1949. For those who survived, biographical data is available primarily in *Biographies of the CCP Elites* (CCP History Elites Research Association 1980, 2010), *Materials of CCP History* (CCP Party History Research Office) as well as separate biographies and memoirs.

Bolsheviks Before 1917

As many scholars have sensed (for example, Deutscher 1966; Pipes 1990), the Bolshevik achieved its triumph relatively easily through contingency and fortune, at least in comparison with its later followers in the Third World. Throughout the pre-1917 period the Bolshevik stubbornly stuck with cities, making agitations primarily among the industrial population which they came from and were familiar with (Bonnell 1983). Rather than lead a CCP-style guerrilla schedule, whereby sleeping and eating rarely occurred at a regular basis, many Bolsheviks spent a long time in prison, were deported, or exiled, whereby they continued reading, writing, and engaging with ideological

polemics. They also sent dictations to command outside conspiratorial activities. Furthermore, albeit verbally supportive of all forms of rural rebellions, the Bolshevik as an entity was never physically present in villages to engage with the peasantry, which seemed odd in an overwhelmingly agrarian society (Kingston-Mann 1983). The difficult work of waging civil wars, extracting grains, and mobilizing the populations only came after 1917, when the Bolshevik had already seized national power and commanded crucial resources that their White rivals lacked or kept losing (Mawdsley 1987).

Such a revolutionary path would not have been able to exist, let alone persist, under the Soviet regime the Bolshevik created. Under the Soviet Union, the dissident movement never gained chance to become a force with real power until Gorbachev's Glasnost', and the communist state ended with revolution from above (Kotkin 2009; Weir 1997). As an archetype of modern totalitarian party (Arendt 1966; Linz 2000), the Bolshevik created a brutal machinery of repression that saw few counterparts in other societies, which showed its full force first in the Civil War (1918-21) and then during Stalin's Great Terror of the 1930s (Getty and Naumov 1999; Leggett 1981). This repression regime was rigorous. There was not an independent judicial system, which meant that every punishment was perpetuated by the Party's dictation. Despite internal fractions, the system was also much more integrative than its Tsarist predecessor. During the interregnum from March to November 1917, the Bolshevik repression was conducted by mutual, not related bodies, including militias, old secret police, armed forces, and various types of temporal courts. Such fragmentation and autonomies were quickly eliminated during the Civil War by a process of centralization led by the Cheka, and the same process repeated when Stalin arose to supreme power in the late 1920s (Hagenloh 2009: 23-30). Moreover, the Soviet repression system was not as

restricted in violence. It massively perpetuated physical executions against suspected opposition, which caused a huge loss of lives, most of whom were high-ranking elites of the Bolshevik itself. Furthermore, this regime was isolated from the external world, where repression was exerted within an enclosed space. The persecuted had minimal opportunities to survive by fleeing abroad, let alone return to continue clandestine activities. Even such supreme leaders as Leo Trotsky was assassinated after being exiled to Mexico, while dissidents who had influences in the West such as Alexander Solzhenitsyn could not maintain effective contact with their disciples in Russia.

However, the repression regime at the turn of the twentieth century was far otherwise, as then totalitarian states were not yet existent. Before coming to power, the Bolshevik coped with a relatively soft regime of repression, under which this party, as well as other revolutionary groups, suffered little lethal punishment, but also had broad opportunities to escape and stay abroad. This generally loose political environment allowed the inefficient and somewhat disorganized Bolshevik revolutionary path to continue for a long time. The following two sections will explain the specific mechanisms.

Unlethal Repression

Conventionally, the Tsarist State was identified as an archetypal case of oriental despotism, but recent literature challenges this consensus. It is argued that in comparison with contemporary western powers, Russia held a moderate punishment system with minimal use of death sentences (Daly 2000). The imperial palace was arbitrary and brutal indeed, but its power was restrained by an Europeanized-minded elite circle consisting of liberal-minded aristocrats, professional judges

and lawyers, as well as radical public intellectuals. These people harbored admiration and sympathy for revolutionary heroism. When having to address arrested radicals, they tended to minimize the punishment (Shlapentokh 1999). This group thus often delayed, reduced or even rescinded the Tsar's orders to the extent that the autocrat had to bypass the regular judicial system so as to get his will to be realized (Walkin 1962). After the Revolution of 1905, reportedly around 3300 revolutionaries were repressed, but only one third of the original sentences were put into practice, mostly in significantly reduced ways (Daly 2004: 23). Moreover, in a broader sense, the entire Tsarist state was fragmented, trapped in infighting, and insufficient in repression. Departments related with modernization and economic development tended to promote pacifying polices toward mounting social protests, which brought them into conflict with conservative departments such as gendarme and secret police. As economic development diffused, local governors also joined the opposition to the omnipotent interferences of the police (Dowler 2010: 191-93). Many governors not only opposed to heavy punishment on radicals, but also claimed that the Siberian exile system should be abolished as it imposed excessive loads on local governments' finance and security maintenance (Beer 2017: 310-18).

My research further demonstrates that capital punishment was rarely used upon the leading Bolsheviks. The absolute majority of the 102 central leaders survived and saw the victory in November 1917 – over 40 percent lived long enough to witness Stalin's death in 1953 (*see Table 1*). Among the 96 Bolsheviks whose years of death are clear, only eight died before the collapse of the Tsarist state. None of them were formally sentenced to death. Two were killed at the height of the repression between 1905 and 1907 – one murdered by police provocateur and the other shot

by soldiers at a remote train station (Shmidt 1947 6: 182-83, 261-62). The remaining six died of poverty or disease, mostly during their exile to Siberia or abroad.

Table 1 Year of Death of the Bolshevik Leading Elites[a]

Periods	Pre-revolutionary		Post-revolutionary			
Years	1905-07	1907-17[b]	1917-21	1922-33	1934-53	1953-
Number	2	6	12	21	43	12

a. In total 102. Six people's death years are unclear.

b. Before March 1917, the collapse of the Tsarist state.

The Bolsheviks' low rate of death was not because of lack of repression by Tsarism. By contrast, arrest was intensive. Out of the 93 Bolsheviks whose records of arrests and exiles are clear, only three never suffered any forms of arrests. Before the downfall of Tsarism, on average every individual had been arrested for 5.4 times – this number is still underestimated, in that people tended to conceal their experiences of imprisonment as to avoid political investigation (*see Table 2*).

Table 2 Arrests of the Bolshevik Leading Elites before March 1917[c]

Times of Arrests	Number	Times of Arrests	Number
Never	3	Four	8
Once	12	Five	7
"More than once"[d]	8	Six	10
Twice	21	Seven	3

Three	16	More than Seven	14
		Total: More than 322	Total: 93

c. Nine cases are missing.

d. In original Russian source, this category is titled as “neodnokratno”, which literarily means “more than once”.

Many Bolsheviks continued to be arrested throughout their pre-revolutionary careers: Gleb Bokii was arrested 12 times, while Andrei Bubnov 13; Pavel Nogin claimed that he had been arrested for more than 15 times (Granat: 173, 370, 564). These numbers are consistent with the survey data collected on the RSDLP’s Sixth Congress of August 1917. The party questionnaires (*anket*) showed that the 150 attendees in total had been arrested for 549 times and nearly half were arrested more than four times (Institute of Marxism-Leninism 1958: 301, for details see *Table 3*).

Table 3 Arrest Records of Attendees to the Sixth RSDLP Congress

Times of Arrests	Number	Times of Arrests	Number
Never	21	Six	13
Once	22	Seven	6
Twice	38	Eight	7
Three	28	Nine	2
Four	21	Eleven	11
Five	10	Total: 546	Total: 150

e. Sources: Institute of Marxism-Leninism of Central Committee CPSU, *Shestoi S’ezd RSDRP (Bol’shevikov): Protokoly*, Moscow: *Izdatel’stvo Politicheskoi literatury*, 1958, 299

The regime's softness in exerting repression could also be seen in other regards. Evidence was extremely valued when measuring penalties. Even around 1905 many Bolsheviks were released soon after captures because no convincing evidence could be found (Granat: 300-01, 373-74, 509-10, 584-85, 677-79, 785-87; Kopanev 1967 1: 162-63; Shmidt 1947 6: 120-21). Although arrest was intensive, the penalty was not heavy. As the congress survey of 1917 shows, the 110 responders in total stayed in prison for only 245 years, whereas 55 responders stayed in deportation for 127 years (Institute of Marxism-Leninism 1958: 255). The short length of imprisonment and exile allowed people to return to radical activities fast. As Molotov and Nogin recalled, although after 1905 the government had undertaken serious measures to toughen imprisonment conditions, people sitting in prisons could still write, read, and even coordinate the conspiratorial activities outside (Granat: 553-54, 564). Arrest was not a lifelong stigma. It was not uncommon that people released from fortresses could still be enrolled in technical schools, colleges, or even attend Duma assemblies as legal delegates (Kopanev 1967 2: 138-39; Shmidt 1947 6: 219-20; 20: 221). Neither did the Tsarist state extend punishment to radicals' relatives, as most authoritarian governments do, even when the relatives did provide support. For example, Lenin's wife, brother, and sister for long time stayed within the reach of police, but they were not harassed or heavily sentenced (Granat: 373-74, 464-65; Shmidt 1947 44: 215).

A third facet of the repression's softness was the feasibility of escaping. The 102 Bolsheviks altogether reported 59 escapes – certain "expert-level" figures, such as Stalin, succeeded in every escape and never really lived in exile (Granat: 698-99). Most exile spots were on major river crosses – it was design so to facilitate logistic delivery, but, combined with Russia's special climatic and hydrological conditions, in practice often eased escaping. In winter as the river surface

was frozen, a dog-dragged cart could take escapees to the closest train station before policemen recognized them (Granat: 584-85). In summer, as long as there were no storms that caused steep surges, escapees could row a small boat either to land at a town close to railway or switch to a steamship that would take them to a major port (Granat: 636-38, 651-53). Escaping became easier after the 1890s, as the Siberian railway extended into the Far East (Beer 2017: 338-39). Motivation for escaping was strong. Biographical data suggests that the Bolshevik, mostly with urban backgrounds, lacked skills for agricultural labor and harbored aversion to peasant mentality (Dzerzhinskii 1984: 10, Granat -01, 406, 457-59, All-Union Association of Political Hard Labor and Deportation 1923, 7: 133-37). As Sverdlov (1957: 23-31) said, political exiles never studied local languages or married local women. Rather, they kept studying German and French as to read Marx and Kautsky, assuring that their "European minds" would not be polluted.

Although there was not yet a successful totalitarian revolution, a fair question is about whether the Tsarist repression system had been somewhat influenced by previous European Revolutions, for example, the French Revolution. The impact did exist. The French Revolution inaugurated modern nation-state building in Europe, the deepening of state penetration into populations. A major facet of such deepening was the expansion of police power. Rather than passively "reacting" to crimes as in the medieval times, modern police worked like sociologists and demographers. They conducted pre-emptive investigations to establish supervision over the entire population. These investigations enabled them to prevent or effectively respond to political radicalism. This wave of police modernization reached Russia, though only at a limited magnitude (Hagenloh 2009: 12-23). In 1913, four years before the Bolshevik takeover, a reform was proposed to unify the fragmented Russian police that had been divided into multiple mutually conflicting bodies including gendarme,

secret police, mounting police, river police, criminal investigations (Dowler 2010: 206-07). If this reform had achieved success, the Bolshevik would have encountered greater obstacles in maintaining its revolutionary route.

Overseas Outlets

A second factor that allowed the Bolshevik to suffer less violence from domestic regime was their broad opportunities to escape and stay in the liberal West, a world adjacent to Russia but not yet controlled or influenced by a totalitarian state. The entrenched ties of the Russian revolutionaries with the Western socialists has produced a long scholarship, most of which concern the activities of the pre-Bolshevik Russian radicals in major historical events or networks such as the 1848 Revolution, the First International, and the Paris Commune (Cole 1975; Edwards 1971; McClellan 1979). When it comes to the Bolshevik movement itself, emphasis is put upon the Leninists' polemics with Western socialists around the issue of "revisionism" (Agursky 1987; Cliff 2010; Hamilton 2000).

My research concerns the broader issue of how the Bolshevik benefited from the political opening of the West. The Bolsheviks had a no weaker record of emigration vis-à-vis their heroic resumes of arrest. Among the 102 central leaders, around 44 had the experiences of living abroad, in the forms of escaping arrests, attending party conferences, and working as semi-permanent party workers. There were 15 individuals who lived abroad for longer than five years, including the most well-known Bolsheviks such as Ian Berzin, Alexandra Kollontai, Vladimir Lenin, Maxim Litvinov, and Aleksandr Shliapnikov. Making lives in emigration was difficult but not impossible. A small

circle enjoyed the privilege of consuming party funds, while those with intellectual backgrounds and linguistic skills earned money by writing for local newspapers. Others supported themselves with their expertise as engineers or technicians (Granat: 355, 406, 408, 582-83, 766-78). In the worst cases, radicals could sell their physical labor, as there were many Russian emigre colonies that needed cheap moving services (Piatnitsky 193[?]: 177-78).

Moreover, broad support came from Western socialists, through the freedom of expression and association. In 1907, initiated by Karl Liebknecht and the German Social Democrats, a special fund was raised to support the Russian SD's publication in Europe. By consent, the French, Sweden, Austrian, Belgian, Czech SDs as well as the headquarters of the Second International contributed hundreds of marks at a month basis (The Russian Department of Police Agency Abroad, hereafter Okhrana, Box 190, XVIb (2), Folder 1). Likewise, in Britain a group was founded titled as "The Society of Friends of Russian Freedom." With the assistance of British socialists, it received funds from the local public, and in return, regularly published magazines to report Russia's domestic situation. Many British elite intellectuals and artists volunteered to offer presentations and lectures (Okhrana: Box 205 Index XVIIs Folder 2). Even leading media could be accessed by the Russians. For example, through the aid of a German medical doctor with socialist tendency as a broker, the SD succeeded in publishing anti-Tsarist essays in the *New York Times* (ibid: Box 205 Index XVIIt Folder 1). Seeing that the Western press and public showed tremendous sympathy of anti-despotic movement, the Russian SD founded the Informational Bureau in 1911, with the purpose of better contacting mass media and providing the latter with fresh sources (ibid) – the name of this institution would be retrieved by Stalin in 1947 to control European communist parties and to be expanded into the Warsaw Pact.

The Bolshevik had close collaboration with their European comrades. In the early 1910s, the Bolshevik managed to establish party schools in Paris and Capri and recruited workers from within Russia (Gorelov 1990: 103-04, 120-22; Scherrer 1999). Albeit located in liberal societies, these training schools could not avoid the harassment by the agents of Tsarist secret police. However, they acquired internationalist support to address this problem. While Italian socialists called upon local police to drive away Russian spies, the French socialists, using their seats in parliament, attempted to strengthen anti-espionage laws to limit the activities of the Tsarist Okhrana (Gorelov 1990: 106; Okhrana: Box 212 Index XVIVe Folder 2). Similar aids occurred during the First World War when European governments turned to contain anti-war socialist propaganda. Many Bolsheviks began to be arrested during this period, but they acquired help from European colleagues in obtaining defense service or paying bailment (Granat: 398-99; Haupt and Marie 1974: 54-59). Working closely with socialists of the Second International, many Bolsheviks joined the factions for parliament struggle and trade unionism (Allen 2015; Cliff 2010: 241; Piatnitsky 193[?]; Porter 2013), or even personally joined the French or German parties (Piatnitsky 193[?]: 175-76).

Finally, escaping from Russia was not difficult. Russia's industry centers were located at the western peripheries. Many sections of borders were open plains, which made crossing easy. Biographical data suggests two mostly adopted routes, which were also used to return home. First, people setting out from Petersburg and Baltic regions typically fled first to Finland or Poland, Russia's relatively liberal domains, and then switched to Switzerland or Germany, sometimes making transition in Scandinavian countries (Granat: 408, 700-02; Kopanev 1967 2: 272-73). Second, those departed from Ukraine and Transcaucasia crossed the Black Sea to Bulgaria, a

country sharing linguistic proximity with Russia, and then went upward entering Austria (Granat: 366, 387-88, 408-09).

Easy access to the European socialist movement and industrial civilization also reinforced the Bolshevik's urban mentality. The setback of 1905 taught the lesson that penetration into the working class must be further intensified (White 2011: 2-4), which was rather different from the lessons drawn by the Socialist Revolutionaries that focus must be transferred to the rural regions where state extermination had greater difficulties to persist (Gusev 1975: 53-63). The ensuing decade's conspiratorial activities would manifest this learning: the Bolsheviks set up the *Pravda*, developed evening schools, established cells in trade unions, and even used the double-agents who received salaries from the police (Bonnell 1983; Cliff 2010: 241). This stubborn urbanism would be replicated by the CCP in the 1920s.

CCPs in and after 1927

The CCP was founded in 1921 as part of the Comintern's program of making revolutions in the East. By 1927 this Party, worshiping its Russian tutor, had sought to replicate the Bolshevik model of power seizure as much as it could: based at major cities, conducting agitations among workers' and peasants' adjacent cities, and conquering warlords through civil war in alliance with the KMT. Meanwhile, within the united front it sought to use labor mobilization as a leverage to channel the KMT toward a socialist end. This plan was expected by the CCP to achieve a fast and cheap victory. However, it soon became bankrupt. As attack on landlords and factory owners became fierce, the KMT, having gained support from barons with Anglo-American backings, turned its policy from

alliance to repression. In April 1927, an anti-communist coup was made, wherein the CCP was massively arrested and killed. Armed resistances outbroke in a few cities but failed due to its disorganization. While the urbanists continued to fight in cities in a way like the Bolshevik in November 1917, from August 1927 on, many other CCP switched to rural areas, building guerrilla zones. This marked the starting point of the CCP's deviation from the Bolshevik revolutionary model – by summer 1930 an archipelago of guerrilla zones had taken shape.

In spite of its strong intention to imitate the pre-existing revolutionary model, the CCP as an entity failed to achieve this. Mainstream scholarship primarily attributes this failure to Moscow's miscalculation, while the CCP itself, similar to David Laitin's logic (2007), claimed that China's social structure did not allow repeating the Bolshevik model. Rather, they saw a feasibility in conducting guerrilla warfare, believing that China's political fragmentation and total underdevelopment would create opportunities for interstitial growth of the Red armed forces (Mao 1927).

Not against pre-existing accounts, my research introduces a third perspective: repression regime. Although the damages had been caused by the Comintern and favorable social conditions for rural guerrilla warfare were available, the CCP might have continued to follow the Bolshevik model. This was true of the Chinese Trotskyists, the leftist dissident minority of the CCP. These people, most of whom were students returning from the Soviet Union, viewed rural partisan warfare as technically unsustainable and ideologically heretical, prone to degrade the proletarian revolution to a traditional dynastic war (Schram 1992 3: lvi-lvii; 4:xxxi). Like the Bolshevik of 1906, they drew lessons from the setback of 1927 from a technical perspective – rather than transfer the focus

to rural areas, they proposed to intensify the model of urban mobilization by making the CCP conspiratorial activities better organized and more penetrative into populace (Wang 1981: 50-51, 85-86). In estimating the forces of the reactionaries, they harbored optimism that the KMT army, essentially a hotchpotch of warlords, bandits, and mercenaries, would soon fall into infighting (Zhang 2004 2: 138). Moreover, with the Bolshevik's windfall during the Great War in mind, they also deemed that Japan's invasion of China was coming and would bring down the KMT (Chen 2015 [1971]: 998; Wang 2015 [1973]: 1016-17). If this stubborn urbanist route had dominated the post-1927 CCP, the Chinese revolution would have looked differently.

However, the efforts to copy the Bolshevik neither remained dominant nor persisted for long, because the repression regime was far more brutal than the one the Russian communists had suffered prior to 1917. The intense violence persistently exerted within an enclosed space eventually compelled the CCP to retreat to the rural, rather than stay at cities and abroad. The following two sections will explain how this brutal repression system came into being as a consequence of the Bolshevik's victory in 1917.

Lethal Repression

Many years ago Deutscher (1966), when comparing the two revolutions, mentioned that the Tsarist state contained some liberties and decencies, while the late KMT regime was moving toward stronger and brutal despotism. A recently growing literature has revealed the relation between these two ends – the downfall of the Tsarist state paved the way for the rise of a Leninist-style KMT despotism. Toward the mid-1920s, as the alliance with the Soviet Russia deepened, the KMT

came to be obsessed with the Leninist political model, seeking to establish a similar Party-state system. Though skeptical of the Soviet proletarian ideology, the KMT was sincerely enthusiastic about the Leninist-style organization, believing that such a model could end the fragmentation and ineffability of the post-imperial Chinese political system and make the KMT nationalism more nationalistic.

In the realm of repression and punishment, the KMT's Leninizing efforts were known as "establishing the rule of the Party in justice" (sifa danghua), which meant subordinating the ever-independent judicial system, and in a broader sense, the entire punishment, to the KMT's arbitrary control, so that the Party could suppress its oppositions at will (Li 2012). This transformation would come to involve a couple of elements in practice as it achieved culmination on the eve of 1927, when the pro-Soviet KMT jurist Xu Qian was in charge of the Ministry of Justice. First, Leninization aimed at reversing the ongoing trend of judicial professionalization that had achieved progress under the KMT's predecessor, the Beiyang Government (1912-28). Not yet having a Totalitarian regime in mind as a positive model and lacking capacity to interfere with the intellectual professionals within the government, the Beiyang governors' behavior did not block the efforts of developing a system enshrining separation of power. In particular as they attempted to restore an enlightened Confucian cultural hegemony, they were vigilant over any moves of introducing party politics into public institutions such as the government, school, or army (SHAC 1991 3, wenhua: 31-32). Under Beiyang rule, the repression system, resembling that of the Tsarist Russia, was fragmented, fragile, and self-contradictory, wherein the motion of one department to repress communists often came to be rejected by another (ibid, minzhongyundong: 575-77), and military violence against social protests could be put to courts and punished for its illegality (ibid,

669). Such a favorable condition for revolutionary movement would diminish under the KMT's rule at the height of the KMT's collaboration with the Soviet Union. Within the judicial system, many senior judges and judicial officials, who viewed the massive executions against dissidents as illegal, were marginalized or deposed, while "People's Jurors", selected by the KMT following the Soviet model, was introduced with the purpose to undermine professional judges (Li 2012: 76-78).

Second, the KMT's Leninist transformation meant that many conventionally non-judicial institutions and bodies would come to fulfill the function of judgement and exert punishment by themselves, primarily the army, police, and intelligence, which had more personnel and ideological connections with the KMT. Apart from regular courts, the KMT added many other judicial bodies, including "confessional hospitals" (*fanxingyuan*), military courts, police courts, and other special courts (ibid: 110). This was understandable: since the Revolution of 1911, throughout incessant warfare against monarchist restoration and warlords, the KMT had transited from a small conspiratorial revolutionary group to a quasi-military government. Many of the KMT's leading elites were or used to be officers and generals. It was easier and more convenient for the KMT to militarize the judicial system when it wanted to exert control by placing its own staff in these positions (Chao and Su 2000: 537). However, such arrangement, like in many Third-World societies, led to violent abuse as these persons lacked civilian training and expertise to cope with social contentions (see Geddes, Frantz and G.Wright 2014). This was part of a broader trend in the 1920s, whereby the Soviet model also took root in the Chinese military. During the operations of the 1910s, having suffered from generals' independence, the KMT, in light of the Soviet experience, actively moved on to build a "party-army," whereby commissars were placed in

parallel with commanders to ensure that the army would execute any orders issued by the Party. Under the instruction of Soviet advisors, this Leninist transformation was completed during the KMT's preparation for its Northern Expedition. This preparation enabled the KMT leaders to possess their own armed forces. It was the same army that would massively shoot the CCP elites bypassing legal courts.

A third component of the Leninist transformation was the establishment of numerous temporal "revolutionary courts" which were run by every ad hoc social force except for professional judges, including mafias, mobs, partisans, local officials, and various special inspectors. These courts issued sentences almost at will, not following judicial procedures or professional ethics. This was also consistent with the KMT's political tradition. The KMTs, who originated as rebellious pupils against the Imperial educational system, terrorists against dynastic ministers, and collaborators with secret societies, were much less restricted by traditional ideologies or ethics, but rather quite open to embrace extreme ideologies and establish alliances with various social segments. By the end of 1930s, they would also embrace fascism after the fever for Leninism had faded. In this regard, the KMT was again different from the more traditional-minded Beiyang government. The latter was made up of former imperial bureaucrats and governors. These people received old education, which predisposed their political deeds to be more restrained by the Confucian ethics.

Like in the Bolshevik section, my analysis moves forward to reveal the concrete process whereby the KMT's repression hit the CCP leadership. Unlike in the Russian case wherein almost no leading Bolshevik was formally sentenced to death by the Tsarist court, a high proportion of the CCPs lost their lives (the situation was very similar to the Great Terror in the Soviet Union of the

1930s). At the height of massacre, at least 30 out of the 76 leading CCPs were executed, while another twelve, unable to withstanding brutal corporal torture, defected. Such brutality would have been banned if punishment had been exerted within the framework of regular judicial system. In reality, however, in most cases there was no formal court trial ("formal" in the sense of regular courts that only made judgements after carefully collecting and analyzing evidence and issuing sentences following codes and laws). The arrestees were directly transferred to army prisons or commands, where torture was exerted so that they could confess their networks – at least one CCP leader died before execution because the torture was too harsh, with many of his ribs broken and tissues damaged. In case of the armed rescue by the CCP partisans from outside, lethal punishment was processed as fast as possible. At least ten were killed within two weeks after the arrests, with four of them killed on the very night or the next day. For most of the remaining, the period between arrest and execution ranged from two to four months, depending on the geographical distances between the sites of arrests and the locales of executions, often Shanghai or Nanjing. To yield the effect of deterrence, killing was deliberately designed as of medieval style. Most arrestees were shot, but some were hanged, hacked, with eyeballs dug out, drowned, or nailed on city gate (Revolutionary Martyrs Association, hereafter RMA, 1985, 1: 188, 197-98, 242; 2: 32, 208-09, 237).

Even when formal judicial procedures were somewhat engaged with, the KMT regime, like the Soviet state of Stalin era, showed much less respect for law than the Tsarist state, as it had sufficient leverages – its own army, police, and intelligence – to defy these procedures. While Bolshevik arrestees were often released for the absence of evidence, the CCPs gained a heavy sentence even when no proof was detected. Their innocent relatives could also be harassed, detained, tortured,

and killed. Moreover, the KMT often went against its sentences and undertook heavier punishment. Illegally detained arrestees were poisoned or shot in secrecy (RMA 1985, 4: 154, 164, 303-04, 330; 6: 104; 7: 18).

Comparison shows that such totalitarian regime of punishment was not ubiquitous, but rather particular to the Sovietized KMT. Before the KMT achieved the national unification in 1928, the northern Chinese provinces were under control of the Beiyang Government. These governors, lacking knowledge of modern politics and naming communism as "minimalism," could not distinguish the CCP from traditional patriotic radicals. They thus thought harsh repression as unnecessary and backlash-arousing. Moreover, similar to the Tsarist state, the Beiyang government was on the weaker side of the state-society relation of that period (Zhao 2000). Being a semi-despotic state floating above various autonomous groups and corporates, it lacked real power to penetrate and behave against the society, but rather, often succumbed to mounting social pressure when coping with social protests. It was not uncommon for them to release arrestees that they wanted to imprison (CCP History Research Office 1980, 1: 250; RMA 1985, 2: 156-57, 223). A famous example was Liu Shaoqi, the CCP's General Secretary of the 1960s, who had been detained by the Beiyang warlord, but he was soon released because the court could not find any convincing evidence. Because the repression was exerted in a relatively decent manner, the CCP arrestees also preserved considerable freedom when they sat in Beiyang prisons, where they could continue to read, write, and practice their hobbies (RMA 1985, 1:217), which was reminiscent of the Bolsheviks after 1905 who continued their conspiratorial activities in Tsarist prisons (Granat: 553-54, 564).

Repression against communism was also more consistent with law in "concessions" (*zujie*), the areas in China's metropoles occupied by the Western powers. The CCP leaders arrested in concessions rarely suffered torture. Regular court trial was guaranteed, wherein the arrestees could be defended or self-defend, and penalty conformed laws (CCP History Research Office 1980, 8: 84; Revolutionary Martyrs Association 1985, 5: 13). If evidence was not found, release was simply issued (CCP History Research Office 1980, 4: 219; RMA 1985, 4: 193-94, 452; 5: 299; 7: 301).

Enclosed Political Space

The triumph of the Bolshevik in 1917 brought about a second global outcome, making China's revolutionary arena a geographically enclosed political space. With the chance of escaping abroad significantly reduced, the CCP were confined and suffer more violence, which compelled them to exploit the rural guerrilla conditions they had distained to touch. In comparison with the Bolshevik, the CCP lacked substantial experience of exiling abroad under liberal or semi-liberal systems.

The Soviet Union did function as a temporary and secure destination for refugee, but this overseas base was essentially different from Europe for the Bolsheviks before 1917. First and foremost, traveling to Russia was only by invitation. It was thus not surprising that out of the 76 CCP elites only twelve had somewhat experiences in the Soviet Union. For the remaining who survived the first wave of massacre, at least six submerged underground and continued clandestine work. Another four became Trotskyists and were soon expelled. A few others, represented by Mao, went home for rural partisan war. Second, reaching the Soviet Union was technically difficult. The geographical distance was enormous between Moscow and China's central provinces where the

CCP was based. Even if travelers could luckily pass all customs, they would need to cross vast deserts and wilderness, which was far different from the topography of the Russo-European borders.

Third and most importantly, being an established socialist state with its own geopolitical calculation, Moscow actively promoted their CCP guests back home. The Comintern did not want to make a revolution based on long-distance command, which was reasonable given those days' poor conditions of communication – because telegraph was cut off, people had to be physically present to deliver decrees and reports (MHC 40: 161), which often took months for the CCPs to hear from their superiors at Moscow, and vice versa (Schram 1992 3: lvii). Commanding revolution from afar via a few of Soviet delegates also proved unfeasible. After 1927, many Soviet advisors had been expulsed by the KMT, while the ones who stayed in secrecy, fearing the KMT's arrests and torture, rarely contacted their Chinese comrades (Brandt 1958: 145-46; Wang 2007 1: 280-89, 327). Because of the Comintern's push, most CCP stayed in Russia for less than two years. After finishing assigned crash training, they were sent back to China, where anti-communist violence was at its height. Many, represented by Deng Zhongxia and Qu Qiubai, simply died in battle. Even those who stayed in Russia for longer were ultimately sent back and at cases killed by the KMT (RMA 1985, 4: 173, 270; 5: 314; 8: 59).

The Bolshevik Revolution reduced the CCP's outlet also by arousing anti-communist fever around China. Two conventional refugee destinations – Japan and Southeast Asia – came to be closed. Japan used to be the overseas headquarters of the KMT's during the latter's fight against the Qing Dynasty – throughout the two decades between the first Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) and the end

of the First World War, studying in Japan to complete crashing courses was an intellectual fashion among the Chinese youth from lower-class families. Thanks to those years' relative loose environment, many Japanese radicals offered substantial aids but also joined the KMT revolution themselves as military and political advisors (Xue 1935[1996]: 467). Even many senior CCP elites used to travel back and forth between Japan and China when they were young, such as Zhou Enlai, Lin Boqu, Wang Ruofei, and Wu Yuzhang, staying there for periods varying from several months to a few years, as such travel occurred largely self-paid or funded individually by local governments. Like their senior KMT colleagues, in the 1910s these young CCP pupils tended to choose Japan as a place for refugee when they fell persecuted by domestic government, where they could have a brief relax, enroll into local schools, slowly recover their network, collect money, and then return to China (Li 1978; Lin 1984).

However, situation changed after 1917. Afraid of the diffusion of Bolshevism, throughout the 1920s, the Japanese authorities maintained intense repression against the communist movement. Tokyo and Nanjing reached an agreement in 1928, which stimulated that any captured CCP activists would be sent back to the KMT government (No author 1962: 10-12). In the late 1920s some CCP escaped to Japan in the hope that they could enroll into local colleges as to continue their clandestine activities, but only found they had been added to the police blacklist (RMA 1985, 4: 57, 105, 112-14). The CCP's Tokyo branch did manage to exist until the outbreak of the Sino-Japan War in 1937, but due to intensive repression their activities had reduced into sheer intellectual entertainments such as economics, Esperanto, woodblock painting, and foreign drama (RMA 1985, 4: 125-26; CCP Party History Research Office 1984, 10: 169-80).

Southeast Asia was no longer accessible. Since the 1890s, Singapore and Malaysia had become a major overseas base of Chinese anti-monarchist revolutionaries largely because of their intense concentration of ethnic Chinese and their geographical proximity to China's mainland. The KMT branch at Singapore used to be a legally registered organization under the British rule. However, such temperance also began to diminish after the Bolshevik Revolution. At the height of 1927 massacre, the CCP attempted to make Hong Kong a temporary base, like Finland to the Bolsheviks, but soon came into the issue of visa rejection and extradition (CCP History Research Office 1980, 6: 43-45; Revolutionary Martyrs Association 1985, 4: 3-4, 210; 7: 151-52, 329). The CCPs who escaped to Malaysia and Singapore founded an "Communist Party of South Sea" (Yu 2015), but the British authorities discerned this immediately. They arrested all the core leaders, and the party disintegrated. The CCP activists Luo Zhu, Tan Pingshan, and Wang Yazhang escaped to Southeast Asia and then left the party because they had no local networks to join (RMA 1985, 6: 61; Wang 2007 1: 355)

The impact of the Bolshevik Revolution also reached a least relevant potential destination for Chinese refugees, Western Europe, which was geographically and culturally remote from China. In comparison with at Japan and Southeast Asia, the CCP's previous activities in this region were weakest. Its sole collective experience had been shaped before the Party was founded in 1921 (i.e., the "Work-Study" program in France and Belgium of the late 1910s). This program was crafted by a few naïve anarchist university educators and partially funded by the Beiyang Government. It came to be cease in the early 1920s as governmental funds diminished, which caused most future CCP students from China's rural families unable to afford the high stipend in urban Europe. This

program fell bankrupted because at the end of the Great War, the market for physical labor, where most Chinese students who did not speak French were employed, failed (Levine 1993).

However, after the Bolshevik takeover, even such barren soil became un-accessible for Chinese refugees. To stay in Europe, seemed not only unnecessary given the geographical proximity of Russia, but also provocative in the eyes of Moscow. Having become the "Third Rome," Moscow sought to keep contact with its foreign followers separately, unhappy to see them dealing with each other without the supervision of the Comintern, which meant that the CCP would not be able to freely join the French or German communist parties as their Bolshevik forerunners did before 1917. The European route fell when it was totally intercepted after the Trotsky-Stalin split. Stalin was particularly unwilling to see the CCP's unsanctioned travel through Europe, where Trotsky's disciples were residing. Such concern was not groundless. Accusing Stalin as responsible for the CCP's unpreparedness for the KMT's anti-communist massacre, the exiled Trotskyists influenced many CCP students and converted them to join the oppositional forces against Moscow. As a CCP Trotskyist recalled, to prevent such ideas from further diffusing, the Soviet authorities stopped issuing passports via Europe, but rather ordered all their Chinese guests to travel across Siberia (MHC 1: 242).

In sum, given the enclosed political space, it was not surprising that there were almost no CCP counterparts of Lenin, Trotsky, and Bukharin who had stayed abroad for longer than one decade and still retained their unquestionable reputations. In the CCP, the pro-Soviet leaders Wang Ming and Li Lisan, who resided in the Soviet Union for a decade, simply lost their influences and became

stigmatized, while being the supreme leader of the CCP, Mao himself, had never left China before his visit to the Soviet Union in 1949.

Conclusion

While pre-existing literature emphasizes the positive effect of earlier revolutions on later ones in generating waves and cycles, this article, by comparing the Bolshevik and the CCP movements, contends that an early revolution can make itself un-replicable. Three specific mechanisms were elaborated. First, while existing literature shows that earlier revolutions can show the vulnerability of the old system and thus encourage followers, this article reveals that a first revolution arouses massive reactions, often at a transnational scale, from the counterrevolutionaries, which causes the political openings it has enjoyed to closed. Second, while existing scholarship emphasizes the copiers' symbolic and strategic learnings from forerunners, this article shows that domestic reactionaries can draw such learnings too, which enables them to become more efficient and brutal in preventing a revolutionary wave. Third, contrary to the thesis that forerunners can help followers, this article contends that the former's selfish exploitation of its followers can put the latter into fierce counterrevolutionary violence. In consequence of these three changes, follower-revolutionaries must adapt strategies and slow paces to address worsened situations and reduced resources, and abandon the illusion of replicating a successful model to achieve triumph overnight. Such adaptions will form inter-societal distinctions rather than resemblances between movements.

When it comes to the concrete cases, this article, by creating a comparative database on the two parties' experiences of repression and exile, shows how the Bolshevik revolution made its model

of conspiratorial activities un-replicable. The pre-1917 Bolshevik model– based in central cities, conducting agitations among workers, waiting, and someday hit by the implosion of the Tsarist state – used to be a route the CCP viewed as absolute and actively sought to copy. However, the conditions for this route – a mild old regime restricted in using violence and lacking an open political space suitable for long-term exile – had been demolished by the Bolshevik's triumph itself. Being captured by a Leninized KMT state, the CCP suffered enormous corporal losses of its leading cadres, to the extent that its central bodies were almost reconstructed. Moreover, as anti-Bolshevist repression strengthened in Japan and Southeast Asia, the CCP lost the conventional outlets for political refugee. They had to make choice between the cities where massacre was going and remote countryside. More sadly, the Soviet Union, supposed to be a selfless internationalist big brother offering a secure overseas base for its Chinese followers, calculated alongside realpolitik logic as a sovereign polity. It not only promoted CCP trainees back home to sustain its program of making revolution in the East, in spite of the great dangers, but also cut off the CCP's connections with other European parties. Given such conditions, although the Chinese Trotskyists after 1927 stubbornly continued to accurately copy the route of pre-1917 Bolshevism, the CCP as an entity eventually gave up and gained approval from Moscow. The divergence between the Bolshevik and the CCP emerged at this moment and would further enlarge in the next two decades. The CCP generated a peasant-based mentality and a more native-grown leadership, which laid foundation for the Sino-Soviet split after Stalin's death in 1953, a vital event that tore up the international communism that would have stormed the West.

Apart from theoretical and empirical contributions, this article also draws a methodological innovation. It initiates a new application of comparative method. Most comparative historical

analyses, obeying the rule of independent experiment, evades the issue of inter-case interaction. This path can be especially problematic in sociology of revolutions, as the impact among cases is too obvious to neglect. This article does not evade interaction, but rather uses comparative historical method to analyze it. Given that any revolution occurred in interaction with external world or tutor, my strategy is to make two cases symmetrical, analyzing the Bolshevik's impact on the CCP, but also the international impact on the Bolshevik before its power seizure. This strategy also allows strengthening the historical dimension by revealing how the Bolshevik revolution changed China's repression regime over time.

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Two Commissar Systems: Comparing the Bolshevik and Chinese Communist Armies during Civil Wars

Abstract

Unlike most comparisons of the Soviet and Chinese armies which compare general party-army relations after revolutions, this article focuses on commissar systems as they developed during civil wars. It identifies commissar as a dual administration, a man-to-man surveillance associated with institutionalized indoctrination, and a combat sector using ideology as a weapon. Three differences are hence elaborated: (a) while the Bolshevik denounced professional ethics for its lack of concern with socio-political issues, the CCP negated bureaucracy as a costly design; (b) whereas the Bolshevik continued to be replenished by an urban working class, the CCP commissars came from the old army and fought alone in an isolated rural environment; and (c) while the Bolshevik commissars were closer to traditional inspectors, the CCP engaged more deeply in fighting.

There are many comparisons between the Soviet and Chinese communist (CCP) armies. While most of this literature speaks of general party-army relations, this article focuses on the two armies' commissar systems, a concrete institution which embodies the roles of politics and ideology in revolutionary wars. This article moves beyond the existing literature by adjusting its temporal scope from post-revolutionary periods to revolutionary civil wars, the period when commissar systems initially took shape.

The comparison unfolds within a theoretical framework regarding civilian-military relations. Based on Huntington's classic typology, this article defines the commissar system in three regards. First, unlike ancient citizen army, the commissar system conceded the inevitability of separating the military and civilian, but counterweighed the authorities of military commanders with an additional administrative system of political directors. Second, unlike the modern bourgeois military regime, which controlled armies through invisible and diffused cultural hegemonies, the commissar system asserted man-to-man surveillance down to the most grassroots ranks. This surveillance was associated with institutionalized ideological indoctrination. Third, unlike medieval-style placement of private agents that assured loyalty at the expense of combat capacity, commissars were expected to expand army's military efficiency by using their ideological expertise.

Along these three articulated dimensions, this article highlights the differences between the Bolshevik and the CCP, showing that in general, the CCP relied more on the use of political and ideological powers, making its commissar system more central to military structure. First, in both cases, the commissar systems enshrined a distrust of the old military bureaucracies, but for different reasons. Unlike the Bolsheviks who blamed the Tsarist regime for producing uncritical officers who lacked broad socio-political concerns, the CCP deemed that bureaucracy based on material awards could not survive China's ever impoverished economic conditions, and thus ought to be replaced by a charismatic ideology. Second, although both communist parties were faced with the dilemma of making proletarian revolutions in overwhelmingly agrarian societies, the CCP needed a more rigorous monitoring and instilling regime, because it did not have a solid working class from the cities. Third, during the first Civil War with the KMT (1927-37) the CCP suffered

desperate inferiorities in weaponry and logistics, which compelled commissars to synthesize political, organizational, and ideological resources to compensate the army's weaknesses in military power. This synthesis also differed from the Bolsheviks, who started the Civil War from central industrial cities, and after the threshold year of 1919, came to gain overwhelmingly material superiority against the Whites.

This article includes five parts. The first section reviews the existing literature, comparing the Soviet and CCP armies. It introduces the perspective of civil-military relations, wherein the distinctiveness of the commissar system is identified. It then puts a brief note on data. From the second to the fifth sections are empirical analysis, within which Russia and China are compared. A conclusion summarizes the analysis and suggests contemporary implications of commissar systems.

Commissar System and Civil-Military Relations

In this area of Sino-Soviet comparison, there is a long scholarship on the two polities' party-army relations. Despite specific disagreements, most scholars note that party-army relations in China were more infused than that of the Soviet Union, which implies that the two communist parties' primary representative bodies in armies, commissar systems, were different. In the Soviet case, it is of little controversy that the party and army were two mutually separated groups, while debates remain around how they interacted with each other. The isolation pattern depicts the army as an isolated interest group whose involvement in civilian affairs was rigidly banned and whose enthusiasm in politics diminished after years of de-politicizing education (Colton 1979; Taylor

2003). The conflict pattern, on the contrary, identifies the army as a challenger with distinct ideology, organizational principles, and material interests, which drove it to interfere into politics (Kolkowicz 1967; Stone 2002). A third thesis is isomorphism, which argues that both the army and party were forged by Leninist principles, which enabled them to act independently along same lines (Odom 1998). Such coalitional relation became further stabilized as the single-sided dependence transformed into mutual reciprocal ties (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982).

In the Chinese case, scholars totally agree on the integration pattern but focus on different arenas where such integration was realized. The symbiosis thesis emphasizes the elite interchangeability at the top, arguing that, at least, throughout the Mao era there was no clear boundary between military and party leaders (Joffe 1996). It is also argued that the CCP army massively engaged in politics, especially during the "Cultural Revolution" period, but merely on behalf of the party, rather than in pursuit of its sectoral interests (Colton 1979: 254-57). The dualist thesis concerns institutional fusion in regular periods: military commanders participate in local party committees, governments, and People's Congresses, while the party installs political commissars into the army (Adelman 1980a; Chu 1998). It is also argued that the CCP's efforts to separate the army from the party during the 1980s was frustrated after the Tiananmen Incident of 1989, when certain officers, in the name of military professionalism, refused to follow the party's order to shoot the students (Shambaugh 1991).

This article moves beyond pre-existing literature in two ways. First, unlike most scholars who seek to draw broad patterns of interactions between armies and parties, this article restrains comparison to a concrete focus, the commissar system, which not only reveals the civil-military relations in

detail but also offers insight into broader issues relevant to communist regimes such as ideology, indoctrination, and surveillance. Second, while most scholarship focuses on post-revolutionary army-party relations, this article probes history to see their origins, the formative stages of the two armies during revolutionary civil wars. In this regard, it echoes Adelman (1980b), who suggests that the in-power status imparted the Bolsheviks with a huge advantage that the CCP, who started in remote rural areas, did not possess.

Such a move situates the Russia-China comparison into a broader social-science theme, civil-military relation. The tension between civilian and military forces is ubiquitous throughout human history; it could always be challenging for men not mastering violence to control those who exercise it everyday (Feaver 1999; Finer 1962; Huntington 1957; Mills 1956; Moskos 1977; Perlmutter 1977, etc.). However, to address this problem of violence, communist states went extremely far, to the extent that they adopted commissars, a system that regularly placed political directors in close parallel with military commanders and soldiers throughout all ranks to monitor and discipline them. To clearly identify the distinctness of the commissar system, this article invokes Samuel Huntington's typology (1957), which classifies the means of civilian control over military into antique citizen army, medieval inspector, and modern professionalism. In the norm of the citizen army, there should not be any regular and standing armies, but rather all military tasks must be assumed by armed civilians. Given that there was no separation between civilian and military, a coup could never take place, either in theory or in practice. Medieval inspectors were also amateurs. They supervised regular armed forces in an ad-hoc manner but did not identify with the latter. Modern military professionalism was a more invisible way of controlling armies. Military men simply obeyed civilian authorities based on laws, whilst avoiding any involvement

in politics, even including voting. Situating commissar system into Huntington's typology, its three features become clear.

First, the commissar system was a dual administration embodying deep distrust of both regular bureaucracy and citizen army. Institutionally attached to standing army, it is a negation of the ancient norm of citizen militia, which both the Jacobin and Bolshevik had for a long time be obsessed with but finally abandoned. It also showed communists' insecurity about military professionalism, as this system embodied the effort to impose additional monitoring on regular military ethics that was sufficient to assure civilian authorities in liberal democracies (Rice 1984: 11; Z 1990: 303-04). Such insecurity was central to the communist system. As Konrad and Szelenyi (1979) mention, totalitarian regimes discarded professionalism, viewing it as the manifestation of selfish corporate interests. Rather, communist political philosophy highlighted 'totality', a never-be-codified term that could refer to a wide range of issues including security, balance, development, and legitimacy.

Second, commissar system, by its name, was characterized by tangible man-to-man surveillance and institutionalized, everyday-base indoctrination. In both Soviet and CCP armies, political instructors were placed in parallel with military commanders and soldiers at every rank ranging from army corps to squads. This differs from many ancient theocracies and modern liberal democracies wherein civilian control stems from not any concrete enforcement by the army, but rather an extensive power (Mann 1986: 7-10) that was diffused across school education, media discourse, and backed by broad political and judicial frameworks. As Mills (1956) stated, under capitalism, because the ruling power is widely diffused across many force centers, neither the state

nor the army possesses the real autonomy to challenge the bourgeois order, while under communism, all power is concentrated at the totalitarian state alone, which requires a direct presence of the state to control everything.

Third, commissars exerted monitoring but also played active military roles. They were expected to supplement regular military operations with non-military tactics, including diplomatic tricks, mass mobilization, information gathering, and psychological warfare, which nowadays is known as hybrid warfare. In this sense, commissars differed from traditional 'inspectors' (eunuchs, secret police, and para-military agents), who introduced military affairs' naked interventional power, arousing grievances among the army. By original design, the commissar system was also to replace the medieval dirty tricks such as 'divide and rule' and frequent rotations of officers, which might preclude rebellions but achieved this at the expense of weakening army's capacity for combat (see Kandil 2016). Accordingly, the weight of commissars depended on the military strength of a communist army vis-à-vis its major enemy. This embodies Mann's conceptualization of powers (1986) – military and ideological powers are in a complementary relation; weaker military power invites intense use of ideological power.

Therefore, this article compares the Soviet and CCP commissar systems along these three dimensions. Analysis seeks to demonstrate the evolution of commissar system from an amorphous network to a huge bureaucratic apparatus, the length of which spans from communists' pre-revolutionary activities in old armies to the fully waged civil wars. Data is primarily drawn from archival sources, most of which are written in Russian and Chinese, including leaflets, newspapers, bulletins, documents, memoirs, and officer manuals and textbooks.

Distrust of Bureaucracy and Professionalism

As has been previously conceptualized, commissar system was a dual administration that embodied the skepticism of bureaucracy. The birth of commissar systems claimed the death of the long illusion of "proletarian militia," which proved unfeasible in counterattacking the operations of military counterrevolutionaries. The problem then came to how to assure the obedience of the old military machinery that had been seized by communists. Unlike German sociologist Max Weber who viewed bureaucracy as an inanimate machine that could be run by any political force at will, communists questioned the existence of apolitical attitudes and therefore actively sought to replace bureaucracy with an "manufactured charisma," which they thought more reliable (Glassman 1984: 220-21). Scholars of Russian military history have mentioned that in late Tsarist Russia, a mutual hostility was growing between officers corps and societal leftist radicals (Keep 1995; Kenez 1980), while a reversed trend could be observed in China of the early 1920s. Aggressive warlordism and deepening national crisis were promoting a worship of violence within the intelligentsia, whereby they came to view the old military bureaucracy as inefficient and corrupted (Sutton 1980: 20-21).

The Bolshevik's antipathy of military bureaucracy originated in pre-revolutionary years when they conducted agitations among military men. Not yet possessing any military resources of their own for a direct civil war, the Bolshevik exploited their ideology to demoralize the old army so that the latter would not follow the government's orders to shoot revolutionaries. This tendency had been clearly demonstrated in their first confrontation with the Tsarist army in the Revolution of 1905.

The bulletins circulated at barracks and warships were written in a way of criticizing bureaucracy: officers should expand their mind, walk outside of their comfortable study rooms to know what the people are thinking and talking about; instead of indulging in their boring military textbooks like pedants, they should learn broad knowledge of the Russian state in history and in reality, social movements, and popular intellectual trends; they should question the rigid bureaucratic creed of absolute obedience, but rather cultivate a general humanitarian hatred of brutality and blood. To make their agitations more convincing, revolutionaries even reframed historical military heroes as statesmen who not only mastered the art of war operations, but also possessed extensive knowledge of political life and harbored deep sympathy of the people (*Okhrana: Box 214 XXIVk Folder 2*). Such tone was reminiscent of Max Weber's critique of bureaucracy, although the Bolsheviks had never read Weber. According to Weber, bureaucracy, through its strict power hierarchy and rigid division of labor, encourages uncritical thinking and leads its members to focus on parts and miss the whole. A second tide of such criticism was seen during the Great War toward the downfall of the Tsarist state, when anti-military propaganda gained international characters. In a widely circulated pamphlet *World War and Socialism*, the socialists attacked that the so-called military professionalism was not politically neutral as it self-claimed. Rather, by boosting the ethics of "iron discipline" and "blind obedience," it actually favored the upper class, though it never spoke overtly for the profits of the landlords and barons (*McGill Archive: International and War, 1916*).

The Bolshevik would soon be repentant on their attacks on professionalism and bureaucracy. Such propaganda did yield fruits the unarmed pre-1917 communists wanted to see – massive disobedience and desertion spread, ruined the Tsarist army on fronts and rears, and ultimately led to the downfall of the Romanov Dynasty. The formidable repressive machinery hence became

defunct. However, what followed was that the Bolshevik itself needed to launch an armed coup and overall civil war. It soon became clear that to achieve these goals the non-professional worker militia was not qualified to fight against the professional White militaries, which meant that the discredited officers had to be called back, and everything that the Bolsheviks had denounced in past decade up until July 1917 - discipline, obedience, authority, and expertise in operations – had to be restored (Drizul 1986: 109). Not surprisingly, such a self-negation aroused fierce grievances among the revolutionaries and put the Bolsheviks into its first major legitimacy crisis. To cope with this crisis, the Bolsheviks assigned commissars to disperse worker-soldiers' distrust of the old officers. While "bourgeois" commanders issued military orders, and commissars ensured worker-soldiers to obey these officers. They had to convince soldiers that these orders were for the sake of revolution, rather than the "plots of bourgeoisie experts" (Agafonov 1987: 171-72). The Bolshevik-commissars could achieve such work because they had accumulated authority in the long agitation before power seizure. In many situations, these commissars came from the agitators at factories. They were initially in charge of conscripting workers, and then became the commissar of the conscripted entities (Agafonov 1987: 62). This bottom-up approach was most efficient in navy, where the logistics and replenishment of warships were in the control of port and shipyard workers. Commissars were backed by people on shore and thus had great leverage to control the staff on ships (Khesin 1986).

Restoration of military bureaucracy did not mean vanishing of skepticism. The Bolshevik continued its distrust during the Civil War. The core concern now switched from obedience to reliance. According to a Red Army's organ, professional officer corps was not politically neutral as "bourgeois state" claimed. By appearance, they had become isolated from many social strata

and enclosed to a professional milieu, but by origins, they were selected from middle and upper classes, which essentially rendered this group psychologically close to the old regime. Mocking the alleged ignorance and political indifference, this organ's editorial even romanticized ancient knight as a positive model: medieval knights never separated from the people; they mastered outstanding martial spirit and operational arts but at the same time incarnated justice and rights; they were the brothers of the people and enjoyed respect and prestige from the latter (*Krasnaia armiia*, Jun 16, 1918, 1). Such opinion was mentioned earlier in an analogue, where the Bolsheviks viewed the old military bureaucracy not as an unthinking machine that could be operated by anyone, but rather an animate factory staff whose members possessed their own values and political positions. Therefore, to ensure this team to yield desired products, merely placing orders was not sufficient. Rather, worker-monitors had to be present to verify that every order was conducted and every product qualified. This article also alluded another reason for the unreliability of the bureaucratic hierarchy: officers possessed huge power while soldiers worked like blind and unskilled slaves (*Krasnaiia armiia* Apr 18, 1918, 1). The Bolshevik's lessons from their own conspiratorial history suggested that such an unbalanced hierarchy increased political risk in that once officers defected, soldiers would blindly follow them, and thus generate an avalanche. By the same token, if an egalitarian power structure could be projected, even counterrevolutionary plots among the upper-echelon elites could be easily thwarted by mobilizing the disobedience among the rank-and-file (*Krasnaiia armiia* Apr 26, 1918, 2).

The CCP learned its commissar system from the Soviet Union. However, there was a significant process of reconstruction based on China's native circumstances and experiences at the opening period of the Civil War with the KMT (1927-37), whereby commissars were transformed from a

board of liaisons floating above warlord troops to a team of educators present down to company-ranks and even lower. Thanks to such reconstruction, the commissar system, unlike many other learnings from the Soviet which were later abandoned, survived the prolonged revolution. In the CCP army up to day, the commissar made decisions together with commander in the framework of 'party committee,' rather than played auxiliary role under the "one-commander system" in the post-revolutionary Soviet army.

The CCP shared the Bolshevik's ingrained distrust of military bureaucracy, but grounded such a distrust on different reasoning. While the pre-1917 Bolshevik attempted to penetrate and control an integrated Tsarist state army that harbored a counterrevolutionary outlook, the CCP partisans struggled to control a fragmented post-imperial army that had lost centralized command and degraded to warlordist mercenaries. To the CCP, bureaucracy was apolitical, in the sense that it was a meritocracy wherein 'merit' was only rewarded by material benefits. Not possessing ideological commitment, officers switched from one warlord to another, depending on who could offer higher payments, reminiscent of the mercenary warfare of Medieval Europe. Battle thus often degraded to race of offering bribery and promising official positions. The CCP wanted to negate such apolitical professionalism, in that they, first not having their own bases and then hiding in impoverished rural areas, lacked the economic resources to win such races – if the materialist logic applied to the communist partisan army, massive desertion would take place. To avoid this problem, the CCP reshaped the commissar system so that it could instill a new military ethics: war for the sake of ideological faith rather than for material rewards. To fully negate mercenary-style meritocracy, the CCP army abolished regular salaries, but only offered slender subsidies, so that

concerns about material rewards could be marginalized (General Political Department, hereafter GPD 2001 1: 45).

The CCP also believed that military bureaucracy, an imported institution and culture, lacked fit with China's deteriorating native environment and would disintegrate on its own. This can be read from the CCP's analysis of the warlord politics in the 1920s. The general thesis was that rampant warlord warfare and the economic exploitation of imperialism would lead to massive social dislocation. In such an environment where primary economic and human resources had been destructed, the western-style military professionalism that heavily rested upon decent material rewards as the basis of its 'meritocracy' would disintegrate too. On the one hand, short of funding, warlords would increasingly incorporate untrained bandits and hence weakened normal military bureaucracies. On the other hand, losing their lands and families, peasant-originated soldiers and low-ranking officers would either desert (Central Research Office of Literature, hereafter CROL 2001 2: May 7, 1926; 3: May 25, 1928). Accordingly, since the general social soil had been unfavorable to military professionalism, the revolutionary army must figure out new ethics.

At the level of strategies and tactics, the CCP's negation of military bureaucracy was much more moderate than the Bolshevik's. This stemmed from two distinctions of the dynamics of the CCP revolution. First, unlike the Russian precedent, the CCP revolution possessed an incipient period (1921-27) when there existed some non-communist but 'progressive' armed forces led by the KMT or enlightened warlords, which the communists sought to penetrate and channel. Working in these armies, the CCP tended to consolidate rather than undermine the existing hierarchies and disciplines, in the hope that once these armies' heads completely switched to communists, their

subordinates would follow him, at least for the time of being (CROL 2001 2: Nov 14, 1926). Second, unlike in Russia, where antiwar propaganda in the old army and revolutionary civil war took place in succession, in China, the two largely unfolded simultaneously and intertwined. Eventually this created a backlash as the authorities and disciplines of the armies were negated. In order to provoke munities or desertions on the enemy's side, the CCP discreetly avoided demoralizing the communist partisans themselves. Facing Japan's incoming invasion, the CCP also did not want to speak against the rising worship of military culture and martial spirit that might destruct its popular image. To achieve this goal, anti-military propaganda was deliberately confined to denouncing economic impoverishment and social dislocation so that diffused class grievance could be aroused among counterrevolutionary soldiers.

Bolshevik and CCP revolutionaries had criticized bureaucracy and professionalism for many reasons: narrow focus alongside the division of labor led to meant ignorance of broader social and political context; blind obedience to superior curbed critical thinking of the system and blocked social change; meritocracy predisposed people to pursue material rewards and neglect ideological commitment, and therefore can be monopolized by privileged social forces in possession of wealth. They also denied that bureaucracy could be apolitical, in that within the seemingly neutral meritocracy the standards of promotion were set by ruling classes, which selectively promoted individuals with conservative values. Nonetheless, in the long term both communist groups were moving against themselves. The huge complex of commissars, the 'Political Department', became a bureaucracy itself, in charge of censorship, indoctrination, news collection, intelligence, discipline, and even novel and drama composition (Hooker 1996). Within this bureaucracy, its own professionalism also grew, independent of the communist party. Commissars increasingly

viewed their positions as regular jobs rather charismatic revolutionary careers. Identifying themselves as social workers, consultants, and even priests, they no longer saw communist state as indispensable for their living. Not surprisingly, during the breakup of the Soviet Union, Soviet commissars did not persuade soldiers to defend the falling regime. Rather, they were simply prepared to be transformed into a new institution know as 'Officer Society,' under which they would switch to propagate liberty, nationalism, Christianity and anything else the new state ordered them to preach (*Krasnaia zvezda*, Jan 10, 1992).

Making Revolutions in the Sea of Peasantry

Having institutionalized skepticism of bureaucracy, the commissar system also embodied lack of soft power. This lack was due to the communists, who had to use a tangible man-to-man approach to exert political surveillance. The lack of discursive power was common for modern revolutionaries, who were struggling to impose a new system of values and institutions onto 'unenlightened societies.' In the French Revolution, political monitors from revolutionary commissions were also placed into armies, though only on a partly institutionalized basis (Bertaud and Palmer 1988: 78-79). According to Gramsci, this type of direct surveillance occurred because communists took over power in backward societies, and thus they had no intermediate bodies – known as civil society – to penetrate. Without numerous societal bodies to offer voluntary political support, communists could only rely on naked state coercion, that is, exerting control on their own (Adamson 1980: 150-61).

The Bolsheviks did feel isolated at the moment of power seizure. Before 1917, they denounced everything related with state, claiming that the revolution would abolish all bureaucratic machinery. In order to repress counterrevolutionaries, after they seized power they had to engage with what they used to despise: army, police, intelligence, and civilian administration. Panic arose that such abrupt but overall exposure would engulf their revolutionary mind. This dread surfaced when it came to the Civil War. An article at the Red-Army organ advocated that since using the old army had been inevitable, it was time to seriously study the history of the Great French Revolution in an unbiased manner. It was this study, the article suggested, that would enable the Bolsheviks to avoid being contaminated by the 'corrupted, brutal, and promiscuous old officer corps' and the 'rude and ignorant' Russian society (*Krasnaiia armiia*, Jul 16, 1918). This fighting of the Tsarist state allowed for historical continuity in that the Bolshevik inherited the latter's European mentality, viewing Russia as a barbarian society and state a conqueror from outside, carrying the mission of creating civilization (Cliff 1990: 154). Feeling as if they were fighting the entire society, culture, and historical tradition, they had to send their trusted men, the commissars, to closely monitor each unit.

The Bolshevik's concern was not groundless. It was at least true that the proletarian discourse had little basis among peasantry-soldiery, to whom words like working-class discipline and bourgeois anarchism sounded alien. Since the problem of morale deterioration had prevailed long before the revolution, the simple restoration of old soldiery ethics seemed an unfeasible way to overcome such passivity. At the onset of the Great War, an official journal of the Tsarist army warned that the martial morale was absent among soldiers, which stemmed from the decline of religiosity. Many raw recruits reported that they had never attended confessionals before conscription. Some

even did not know who Jesus was, and in many rural areas, there were no churches at all (*Voennyi sbornik* Aug 1914, 134-35). It was also analyzed that the backbone of the Russian army – the military nobility – had flattened to a hotchpotch that every social stratus could be membered (ibid, Dec 1914, 35). An extended problem was the Russian peasantry. They did possess the tradition of riots and the motivation to seize landlords' assets, but this did not mean interests in making communist revolutions. Resisting levies and conscription, they provided little communal support such as punishing returning deserters or organizing local militias. In this regard, the Russian peasantry were different from the American pirates during the War of Independence, who shared common patriotic sentiment with the militia (Osman 2008), and the French citizens of 1789, who voluntarily established national guards to fight in accordance with the Revolutionaries (Bertaud and Palmer 1988: 72-73).

The lack of revolutionary moods among peasant conscripts warranted the sending agents to closely monitor the peasants and instill them with communist values. The Bolshevik apparatus thought that commissars were more important in the vast regions outside of the Northwest adjacent Moscow and Petrograd, where the majority of new recruits were peasantry rather than workers (Gavrilov 1986: 73-74). Commissars were also urgently demanded when the Soviet state entered Ukraine, where many local 'red partisans' incorporated into the Soviet army turned out to be peasantry-banditry with their own atamans (Afanas'ev and Gavrilov 1986: 45). Believing that the efficiency of socialist propaganda must be based on literacy, from December 1918 onward, commissars were assigned with the mission of teaching reading ('eliminating illiteracy'), in the forms of giving lectures, organizing dramas, founding on-camp libraries, writing pamphlets and newspaper articles (Karpenko 1972: 51). Such institutionalized political work in combination with

cultural education thus distinguished the commissar systems from the scattered religious work of the Tsarist army. Impressed by the bravery of Japanese soldiers during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russian army began to highlight the 'spiritual factor' and approached this by cultivating monarchist and religious values. Religious education was conducted in the format of 'priest conversation' (*beseda*) twice per week. Priests were invited from outside of the army, and they only focused on the issues of everyday deeds like drunkenness and theft (*Voennyi sbornik* Aug 1914, 139). As the education did not entail any complicated intellectual and political doctrines, it did not try to expand literacy. While religious conversion was completed based on illiteracy, becoming a socialist required becoming an intellectual (Slezkine 2017: 439-40).

Intensive indoctrination yielded desirable fruits. As the victory of the Civil War became clear, optimists within the Bolshevik Party claimed that an omnipotent proletarian discourse was taking root. A bold proposal was then raised that commissar system should be abolished (Iovlev 2017). This plan would be realized: in 1924, the one-command system was universalized, first in the army and then in the navy. In many troops commissar as a position was abolished, with its duties assigned to military commanders or 'political vice commanders,' who had joined communist party. In other cases, commissar was preserved, but no longer entrusted with the power of supervising commanders as during the Civil-War period (Stroitel'stvo: 156-66).

Nevertheless, like all radical breakthroughs in history, the Bolshevik revolution was faced with the Platonic question of where educators come from. In this regard, they were more advantaged than their later CCP counterparts. There was of course always a shortage of literature and qualified commissars. It was complained that the newspapers, delivered to fronts, were often back numbers

and that one piece had to be shared by fifteen or more soldiers (Agafonov 1987: 167-69). However, backed by central cities, the Bolshevik could easily draw commissars from the urban working class, among whom it had conducted decade of agitation and successfully created a revolutionary identity. Many commissars themselves were semi-illiterate, promoted from rank-and-file workers, but politically reliable and possessed rich experiences in agitation. A senior worker-background commissar recalled that when giving lectures, he could respond well to booing from the audience. He derived such sophistication from similar challenges he encountered before 1917, when Bolshevik orators' speech was often interrupted by Menshevik or Socialist Revolutionary rivalries (Kuchkin 1969: 44-45).

The Bolshevik also benefited from its urban strongholds in other ways. Having seized strategic infrastructures such as navy ports, railways, warships, and aircrafts (Kariaeva 1971: 204), the Bolshevik could offset the shortage of commissars by technology such as 'propaganda trains,' which could fast deliver the same groups of propagandists back and forth among various fronts mutually distant from each other (Afanas'ev and Gavrilov 1986: 176-78). To cope with the problem of poor techniques of propaganda, the Bolshevik made prestigious writers and drama directors work for the Red Army, given that most of these people were concentrated in cities. In other cases, troops were also allowed to 'purchase' service from theatres and museums when they lacked qualified staff for agitation (Agafonov 1987: 187-88).

The Bolshevik was also fortune in that its rivalry was weak in politics, and thus did not generate a race with the Reds to attract staff with propagandist expertise. Suffering poor discipline and low morale, the Whites once wanted to imitate the Reds to establish their own commissar system.

However, such move largely remained in plan. Under Denikin's Kuban regime in early 1919, an 'informative bureau' was established, but its function was limited. Essentially a loose alliance of liberals, officers, socialists, monarchists, and Cossacks, the Whites did not have a coherent ideology. A leading jurist complained that there was not even a specific political program to be propagated. Moreover, within the White camp, a strong hostility prevailed against intellectuals, because these people were either leftists or Jews, although many of them mastered literary techniques. Officers themselves refused to assume civilian positions. Furthermore, viewing non-military work superfluous, they appropriated the funds allocated for propaganda departments, deported or even killed the latter's staff (Karpenko 1992: 89-93). The Informational bureau did set local networks, but their activities were banned in many garrisons.

Whereas the Bolshevik largely contrived to offset its numerical disadvantage of proletariat vis-à-vis peasantry by massively mobilizing the urban resources in its hands, the CCP lacked such opportunity, and also faced a much larger pool of agrarian population to transform. Suffering an unexpected anti-communist coup in spring-summer 1927, the survivor-activists fled major cities to remote mountainous regions only accompanied by a few regiments and battalions. They, thus, had to heavily rely on commissars themselves.

The CCP, first and foremost, needed commissars to prevent soldier desertion. The potential for desertion was a major issue that plagued all types of Chinese armies of that period regardless of political stances. The issue of desertion was so central that it often headlined bulletins and newspapers published by communist guerrilla zones. Preventive work started as early as the stage of conscription. Like medieval tradition, commissars went to undeveloped areas so that they could

find people with simple peasant souls. Then they escorted these new recruits to barracks. On the way they closely monitored soldiers. In addition to ideological lectures, entertainment activities were organized. However brief and primitive, these programs were fresh to peasants who had never left their villages. Marching pace was carefully controlled, so that new recruits would not feel bored or physically exhausted (*Hongxingbao*, Apr 22, 1934, 2). On battlefields, commissars worked in a more brutal way. They led gendarme-like 'ten-men groups' to capture and shoot defectors. The army's organs listed common tricks of concealed defection so that commissars could be sensitive enough to discern these deeds: leaving front by the excuse of escorting wounded peers; seeking light injuries to withdraw from battles; pretending to be sick, etc (ibid, Apr 15, 1934, 4). It was reminded that special monitoring ought to be kept on logistic staff, because it was more difficult to fast find replacements for people in this branch and hence defection might cause the collapse of the entire unit (ibid, Feb 8, 1934). Moreover, the commissars' role as communist censorship system started in the Civil war. They were responsible to block enemy's propaganda in case that the latter might distract and panic soldiers (ibid). To eradicate the social root of defection, the commissars extended their duty outside of military affairs and even beyond the army. In order to prevent two major sources of desertion, mismanagement and embezzlement, they inspected hygiene in barracks and oversaw the use of funds for soldier ration (ibid, Jan 17, 1934). They organized clubs and parties, performing foreign dramas and military games, conferring soldiers with the impression that they were joining an advanced organization with an international background (GPD 2001 1: Dec 2, 1931). They also developed groups to monitor soldiers' families which generated a safety network (*Hongxingbao*, Dec 13, 1933). A campaign 'No Leave for Home' was launched to minimize soldiers' leave to see their families (ibid, Aug 20, 1934).

The CCP suffered a more severe problem in obtaining qualified educators than the Bolshevik did. It was reported that many political instructors themselves could not read and write at all. They thus had to be physically gathered to hear instructions from their superiors, which consumed enormous time that should have been used for political education for soldiers (*Hongxingbao*, Jul 10, 1934). For this reason, teaching literacy became a major component of the broadly defined political instillation, wherein commissars studied with soldier-pupils together. However, this method borrowed from the Bolshevik was more difficult to apply, given the CCP's guerrilla-war style. Crash classes were required to be given at the intervals between battles or after daytime march, but partisans needed to quickly move from one place to another and often felt physically exhausted (ibid, Jan 14, 1934; GPD 2001 1: Jan 17, 1932). This dilemma plagued commissars themselves. Commissars were required to be familiar with military affairs so that they could perform as concrete models. However, in situations of protracted partisan warfare, they themselves became exhausted (GPD 2001 1: Jun 1, 1929). It was true that the CCP had an existing model – the Soviet commissar system – to follow. Commissars learned the techniques of propaganda: leading conferences, making posters, decorating "Lenin rooms" (*Hongxingbao*, Dec 23, 1931). The problem lay in that after the framework was taken back from the Soviet Union and it was difficult to find qualified persons to make it work. After intense battles had caused huge manpower losses, requests for Russia-returning students mounted (ibid).

Unlike the Bolshevik commissars who came from worker-agitators, many CCP army-founders came from the middle and high ranks of the old military. Out of the 94 Bolshevik central committee members from 1917 to 1923 only one graduated from military school, while all the members of the Soviet high command from 1918 to 1922 switched to the Soviet state only after the Bolshevik

coup. Before the coup they had little involvement in radical politics. On the contrary, most CCP army-founding commissars converted to communism before the Civil War, during the CCP's first united front with the nationalist KMT (1922-27), and their allied expedition against warlords in North China (1926-27). Because this alliance was engineered by Moscow, its participants were exposed to intense communist propaganda. As early as the stage of preparing the Northern Expedition, the commissar system had been incompletely installed. Commissars did not possess formal power to command troops, but rather only performed the function of liaison with KMT commanders. They could conduct indoctrination among soldiers but had to obtain the permission of the KMT officers first. Therefore, in many units the priority of commissars was pleasing KMT generals rather than influencing soldiers (CROL 2001 2: Jul 1926). Nevertheless, since this period an embroiling proletarian military ethics, a hybrid of class idea, nationalism, and pro-Soviet internationalism, had taken root in the mind of future CCP generals. When the coup of 1927 stuck, most unarmed worker-leaders were immediately murdered. It was the communist officers, protected by their own regiments or battalions, headed for anti-coup uprising and then to rural guerrilla warfare. In this sense, the CCP shared more resemblances with the Young Turks than with the Bolshevik.

The commissar system embodied the strive for creating a new cultural hegemony in late-developing societies where political revolution went far ahead of the advert of full-fledged industrialization. Commissars came to be less needed in established polities where a dominant discourse was omnipresent. One example is France, where through one century of vicissitudes between restorations and revolutions, the hegemony of 'bourgeois ideology,' the legacy of 1789, ultimately took root in the Republican army (Forrest 2009). A less contrasting case was Turkey

under Kemal, where the army was required to focus on enhancing its military expertise rather than engaging with politics. The reasoning lay in that since the Kemalist philosophy had become the general intellectual framework of the officer corps, there was no need to maintain additional indoctrination (Ulus 2011: 9-12). By such standards, communist revolution achieved deeper success in Russia than in China. In both polities, commissars outlived revolutions and persisted throughout the post-revolutionary armies, which demonstrates that the struggle of making a cultural hegemony never ceased. Yet, while in the Soviet army commissars soon lost equal statuses with commanders and descended to perform the pure role of political education, in the CCP army commissars never had their power weakened. During the Sino-Soviet honey month of the early 1950s a proposal was raised to imitate the Soviet army to install 'one-man command system.' This suggestion provoked fierce resistance among commissars and did not move forward (Li 2009). This proposal was unfeasible, as in the CCP army the roles of commissars and commanders heavily overlapped, which will be elaborated in the next section.

Hybrid Warfare to Defeat Strong Enemies

A commissar was far more than an inspector. Inspectors had a passive role. In many autocracies, they were selected either from people close to supreme rulers – their relatives, minions, and eunuchs – or from special agents outside of armies – diplomats, secret police, para-military guards. Inspectors were only concerned with army's loyalty, and thus put combat capacity, at best, to second place. To assure control, they provoked conflicts among generals, interfered into command, rotated officers to prevent their familiarity with soldiers, and informed against military leaders (Kandil 2016). Different from an inspector, commissar was expected to be a fighter actively

engaging with military operations, although counterproductive deeds were not occasional – to name the notorious Lev Mekhlis, the general political director of the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War, would be enough.

Communists were the forerunners of modern asymmetric warfare. Starting their power seizure in underdeveloped societies (often the most underdeveloped regions of these societies), they were faced with military offensives from domestic and foreign counterrevolutionaries who were superior in every comparable regard. Moreover, such military confrontations were serious: protracted, intense, impossible to scrape through by ad hoc tricks. To cope with this dilemma and effectively offset their disadvantages in hard power, communists resorted to their own strength – ideology. Ideology was cheap, non-material, and most importantly, not mastered by counterrevolutionaries. Following this logic, the commissar system, in the process of responding to changing warfare dynamics, evolved from a team of factory orators to a second but non-traditional officer corps.

In the Bolshevik case, the military function of its ideological apparatus had manifested itself in the interval period, the eight months between the downfall of the Tsar and the communist takeover, when the Bolshevik competed with other radical parties to control the defunct old army at the vital region around Moscow and Petrograd. The Bolsheviks possessed an extensive network of propagandists, most of whom were to be commissars soon in the Civil War. This network enabled the Bolsheviks to take the initiative to transmit latest intelligence to peer organizations in adjacent regions and industries, and thereby mount concerted collective actions ahead of most of their rivals, who were mutually isolated and retarded by scant or false information (Gal'perina 1986). Although

the Bolsheviks did not gain success everywhere to control the solider committees spontaneously formed during the Great War, they achieved an upper-hand in strategically vital regions and performed better in coordination.

During the Civil War, the commissars performed military functions as a way of extending many traditions that were underdeveloped or obliviated in the old Tsarist army. One was guerrilla warfare. Preoccupied with the memory of the Napoleon War, the Tsarist army viewed itself as a pioneer of modern guerrilla warfare. Yet, throughout the decades, up until the First World War, the Russian army published little to develop their existing knowledge in this area (Klembovskii 1919: V). It was the Bolshevik that retrieved this tradition. The Red Army republished many old brochures on guerrilla war written by Tsarist military writers. Under the revolutionary situation, this type of war was conducted by commissars. Squads and platoons of political agitators were delivered to the deep rear of the Whites for 'raid' (*nabeg*), where the agitators spread rumors, created panic, and fast retreated when psychological damaged had been completed. Such actions were often associated with actions of demolishing bridges, railways, and warehouses when conditions allowed (Kariaeva 1971: 111). Occasionally the Bolsheviks also attempted a more active manner of guerrilla warfare, 'search' (*poisk*). Partisans were recruited and stationed in a locality. They conducted secret agitation, cultivated local militia, and unleashed unrests to destruct the enemies' rear when the Red regular army was approaching (Glantz 1992: 25-27; Mawdsley 1987: 110-11). When the Red Army had to retreat from a town, partisans helped evacuate all experienced workers and left factories, railways, and ports paralyzed by the Whites (Kuchkin 1969: 21-22).

More importantly, the introduction of the commissar system into military operation marked the revival of a lost Byzantine tradition: hybrid war. This style of war was created by the Byzantines after the empire's territory and population had significantly shrunk. It combined the skillful uses of diplomacy, intelligence, popular mobilization, and psychological warfare in order to offset the militarily superiorities of their enemies. The small-size regular army thrust into battles only at last minute when enemies had been under desperate situations which consisted of being misled by false intelligence, panicked by allies' betray, exhausted by guerrilla attacks, and cut off from logistic supplies by local militia (Treadgold 1995). This military tradition fell to oblivion in the Tsarist Russia that claimed itself as the political successor of Byzantium, but saw the chance of revival ironically in the collapse of the Romanov Dynasty. Inheriting a bankrupted economy, a demoralized army, and a domain with many strategic territories lost, communist successors had to learn to fight with extremely limited resources. According to Trotsky, the Russian Revolutionary Civil War would be different from 'bourgeois' stubborn race of competing to invest physical materials as the First World War was, but rather a new type of warfare wherein flexible strategies and tactics were as vital as hard power (Cliff 1990). Facing offensives simultaneously from many fronts, the Soviet state could not evenly distribute its limited forces. In this situation, only people well informed of political changes could make a decision in which direction to put main thrust (Glantz 1992: 17-18). The same vicissitude would continue after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As the Russian army's hard force shrank, the weight of non-traditional tactics expanded again. A most recent version of such hybrid warfare is the annexation of Crimea (Monaghan 2016).

It has been argued that the Russian Civil War was not 'civil', but rather an international war that involved multiple powers with complicated relations with each other (Smele 2014: 17-47). This

situation meant that wise diplomacy could be maneuvered to divide enemies and retard some, whilst fighting the ones remaining. For example, in mid-November 1918, when the Soviet state was faced with fierce offensives from every front, the precarious Revolutionary-Military Commission dispatched commissars to the riskiest place, the Western front. This front is where the Soviets would start negotiation with the German Army, and thereby enable local Soviet troops to concentrate their forces on attacking domestic counterrevolutionaries (Daines and Kariaeva 1997: 107). When Germans and Whites were stationed intermingled, commissars played the role of scouts, assuring that the Red's military operations only targeted domestic enemies (Agafonov 1987: 116). Because most officers, steeped in an apolitical professional culture under the Tsarist regime, knew little beyond their technical expertise, such type of work had to been exclusively conducted by commissars whose training was primarily in general politics and communication with people. A curriculum of the commissar school from the Bolshevik's Fourth Army in October 1918 provides a contour of these people's training. This is a long list: 'Basics of Marxism' 'Capitalism in Russia and the West' 'Science and Working Class' 'Nationality Question' 'History of Revolution since 1905' 'Socialist Doctrines and System' 'Programs of the Communist Party and its Rivals' 'Grain and Famine' 'Separation of Church and State' 'Red Army and its Mission' (Karpenko 1972: 190). When war itself became a mixture of politics and military, commissars' expertise of knowing the overall situation came to be an advantage.

As the war penetrated into rural areas, the diplomatic role of commissar extended to mobilize the 'alien' peasantry, a social stratum that the Bolshevik had verbally agitated but rarely physically engaged (see Kingston-Mann 1983). Since January 1919, political departments of the Red Army started establishing special sections for peasant agitation (Karpenko 1972: 72). Bolsheviks

possessing rural origins were recruited to these branches. Before battles started, they penetrated the local peasantry to obtain horses and manpower, find people with good knowledge of geography, and seek intelligence support. When possible, they established volunteer-villager observation groups to track the activities of the Whites (ibid: 210-11; Agafonov 1987:73). In regions like Ukraine, where the Soviet regime largely entered from outside, commissars performed the diplomatic function of maintaining contact between regular Soviet troops and local peasant partisans (Daines and Kariaeva 1997: 148-49). Backed-up by a well-established political network, they also developed an approach of fast Bolshevizing newly incorporated non-communist troops: setting up libraries and 'political-literacy schools'; circulating organs and pamphlets; organizing clubs, choruses, and orchestras; and founding committees of poor peasants (Antonov-Ovseenko 2016 2: 54-55).

Nevertheless, in comparison with the CCP, the Bolshevik's experiment of hybrid war was initial. The Bolsheviks conceded that political and military components should be combined in war planning, but in practice these two elements were not as infused as the later CCP case. 'Politics' was largely confined to diplomatic maneuvers with Western powers and non-Russian armed forces. The efforts of retrieving guerrilla warfare was real but achieved little and thus never became a tradition as respectful as maneuver warfare. There were also grandiose political words at the level of general doctrines, such as the class character of war, the necessity of analyzing war from geopolitical perspectives, proletarian internationalism, and so on, but whether and how these 'communist' elements should enter operational levels of war planning remained disputed. The Trotsky-Frunze debate in 1924 did not fix this problem. Although Frunze's position was ultimately accepted that proletarian politics should make Soviet military doctrine unique, in practice few were

done to revise Trotsky's route that military science was classless and should not be restrained by laymen's naïve innovations (Glantz 1994: 447-48). Moreover, a major lesson the Bolshevik learned from the Civil War to dominate the post-revolutionary development was to mechanize the army so that it sustained 'deep operation,' that entailed little commissars' tricks and agitations. This was contrary to the CCP, who eventually forgot the lessons of the Korean War, and stuck with a fake revolutionary myth that the army's real strength lay solely in its 'political education' (Gittings 1967: Chapter 7-8).

In comparison with the Bolsheviks, the CCP's commissars were far more central to revolutionary wars, especially the first stage (1927-37). Two factors might explain this difference. First, at various stages of the protracted revolution, the CCP remained extremely inferior vis-à-vis its enemies: Beiyang warlords, the KMT, and the Japanese. This differed from the Bolsheviks, who first seized the central cities, industrial bases, and the bulk of professional officers and soon obtained a physical balance over the Whites after the threshold year 1919 (Ganin 2017: 325). Second, China was more underdeveloped. Many technical departments that were common in the armies of developed societies were absent in China, which meant that a party able to even partially bridge these gaps could gain some advantages over its rivalries. These two factors compelled the CCP to heavily exploit its ideological power, viewing it as a resource not possessed by any rivals – as Mao later concluded in 1944, 'Political work is the lifeline of our army' (Mao 1993). Such efforts crystallized into a power structure, wherein commissars shared almost equal status with commanders and infused the latter with personnel (Adelman 1980a; Chu 1998). This was marked by the fact that in 1955, one of the CCP's ten marshal ranks, the highest class, was conferred to a commissar, Luo Ronghuan (there is no counterpart in the Soviet army). In the Soviet case, all the

eight marshal ranks before the World War II (the cohorts of 1935 and 1940) were conferred to military commanders, whereas general commissars at best received the rank of colonel-general (*general-polkovnik*). Moreover, the CCP commissar system was far more stable than the Soviet one. The former, once established in the early 1920s, was never longer abolished, while the latter was abolished in 1924, 1940, and 1942. In the Soviet army, after the introduction of one-man command, commissar of the Civil-War period as a position sharing equal power with commander was never recovered (Karpenko 1972: 27-28).

A commissar was neither completely new nor imported. Ideas stressing the vitality of non-military elements can be easily found in ancient Chinese military culture. It was mentioned in *Arts of War* that a general should conduct some explanatory work to assure that his inferiors share the same understanding of goal of the battle they are to thrust into (Liu 1992: 44). In more recent military, thought also loomed the contour of political work: army marching without bothering the masses could obtain victory; soldiery should be first educated and then trained; a strong army can wisely borrow force from the people, and so on (GPD 1990: 67, 328, 444). Gaining insight from these historical precedents, the CCP's commissar was distinct at two points: it was institutional, at a regular basis rather than ad hoc; its underlying frame was 'proletarian revolution', which enabled the CCP to reassert many lost ancient military ethics – these clichés would have bored soldiers if they had been presented by their original appearance.

The military function of commissar had been visible before the Civil War started, during the CCP's allied expedition with the KMT against northern warlords. Similar to the Confederal Army of 1776, the expeditionary army was a loose alliance of local armed forces who lacked an experience of

cooperation. Nominally under the KMT's coordination, they distrusted each other, which often led to chaos and losses on battlefields. The installation of commissars to the commands of divisions and regimes somewhat solved this problem. Commissars were more institutionalized: trained at the same school, succumbed to the same network, and maintained routinized contact with their superiors during battles. Sharing same psychology and network, commissars were able to coordinate mutually distrusting forces, and thereby reducing the inconsistence within the command system (State Archive Administration, hereafter SAA, 1980: 23). Moreover, commissars contributed to improve logistic supplies. Moving far ahead of the principle forces, commissar teams reached destinations first and conducted intense propaganda among local residents, assuring that people would not panic and flee. To access the almost illiterate masses, they addressed the issues relevant to people's everyday life, and also used the most colloquial language, a style in sharp contrast to the old Chinese army's posters written in ancient scholarly manner citing numerous archaic classics. Because the population did not disperse, the main body of the revolutionary army was able to easily extract resources when they arrived (GPD 1989: 10-15). At the time of warlordism (1916-28), when the masses were universally intimidated by soldiers, the commissar increased the CCP's leverage vis-à-vis its enemies.

The commissar's military role expanded during the guerrilla Civil War, and manifested itself by organizing non-regular militia. As warlordism spread after the dissolution of the Qing Empire in the mid-1910s, rural banditry and self-defensive groups mushroomed. Commissars, who were trained in negotiation, agitation, and coordination, were assigned with the tasks of transforming these atomic mobs into militia so that they could support the CCP's regular Red Army. This role of commissar embodied a major strategy of the CCP's hybrid war: exploiting the variation within

the counterrevolutionary armies, evading those with military superiorities whilst attacking those who were weak. Semi-banditry militias, for its poor training and equipment, was never used to confront the KMT's regular army. However, they, possessing superiorities in size and levels of coordination, were sufficient to overwhelm landlords' private mercenaries. Scattered assaults could relieve the pressure on the regular CCP army so that it could focus on fighting the KMT elite troops, and also replenish the revolutionaries with seized weapons and materials (GPD 2001 1: 43). This strategy would be consistently used in future Sino-Japanese War (1931-45), when commissars combined political negotiation and military offensives to seize weapons from the relatively weak collaborative army (JSPHC 1990: 278). Of course, neither political-work could fully tame the military as the CCP was not desired, nor was commissar omnipotent. Banditry-militia were reluctant to leave their home areas; disputes often occurred over distribution of spoils; peasants were generally unwilling to be restricted by disciplines. Thus, overt and covert disobediences were common (GPD 2001 1: 108). If the invasion of Japan in 1937 had not occurred, it would be hard to tell that the CCP's odd hybrid war would have survived the KMT's strengthening extermination.

The commissar system was also central to the CCP's military philosophy that sought to dissolve the enemy's physical force by using sophisticated tactics. As CCP commanders understood, such tactics were not groundless, but rather based on superiority in 'spiritual force,' an ambiguous term denoting extraordinary courage, sufferance, and patience. According to this creed, commissars should train soldiers to withstand extremely difficult physical hardship, which would enable them to create successes where others fail. The CCP's elite troops were the ones that could hide in wild natures for months without receiving regular supply, uphold the capacity of raids when enemies

felt slacked, march on dangerous topographical conditions so that they would not be detected, proceed purely on feet successively for days, and reach some strategic spots ahead of enemies. While in Russia fast and massive transfer between fronts were accomplished through railway networks (Glantz 1992: 24-25). Moreover, model troops were the most patient ones, who could overcome their own frustration to repeatedly rebuild guerrilla bases ruined by counterrevolutionary expeditions. These qualities created secrecy, suddenness, and unpredictability, which allowed them to achieve fast victories, and also exhausted and demoralized their rivalries in a chronical way.

In charge of recruitment and conscription, the commissar system also fulfilled the function of census and state-building, which was a necessity for army founding and maintenance. Therefore, by Mann's (1986) terminology the commissar system embodies the primacy of political power over military power (Zhao 2015: 57-60). Unlike the Bolshevik Revolution wherein the seizure of state machinery and the command of army went in succession, in the Chinese case, these two processes were interwoven with each other. The CCP guerrilla partisans had controlled some troops when they came to rural areas, but needed a state to sustain and expand them. Here political power entered military. As a Soviet advisor said, China was too backward to develop a modern conscription system, because it lacked census and other forms of information gathering; however, the Communist Party possessed advantage to bridge this gap – by founding peasant associations, the CCP could obtain information about the rural population, and thereby, establish a standing army with stable manpower supply (SAA 1980: 5-6). It was again commissars who assumed this task of making the agrarian population 'transparent'. In guerrilla zones, land and population census was conducted by the 'General Political Department of the Red Army,' the supreme apparatus of

commissars (GPD 2001 1: 135). Investigation involved indication for potential soldier source. Individuals from 'unreliable categories' were excluded, such as rich peasants, landlords, but also vagrants and pedlars who were thought of as unable to obey military disciplines (ibid: 157).

As sociologists of war (Downing 1992; Ertman 1997; Hall 1986; Mann 1988; McNeill 1983) have argued, intense war did not necessarily lead to the rise of capitalism, bureaucracy, and democracy, but could also strengthen the opposite. The rise of commissar system confirms this general thesis. The militarized use of political work contributed to modern state building in some manners, but also brought about negative effects: conflicts between commissars and commanders, time and resources consumed by ideological indoctrination, factionalism in competition of controlling the ideological power, and so on. In the long term, the predominance of 'political work' would also block the development of professional sectors that were more efficient in addressing officers and soldiers' problems, such as military sociology (Obraztsov 2005).

Conclusion

While most comparative studies of the Soviet and CCP armies are concerned with general party-army relations, this article focuses on the two commissar systems. Based on Huntington's classic typology of civilian-military relations, this article identifies three features of the commissar system, which distinguished it from other means of military control in human history. The commissar system enshrined three concerns growing out of the process of communist revolutions: 1) containing bureaucracy, professionalism, and corporate interests in favor of a-never-codified 'total politics;' 2) upholding 'proletarian mind' against the cultural hegemony of the old regime and

agrarian society; and 3) effectively fighting counterrevolutionaries possessing superiorities in hard power. Accordingly, the commissar system was a dual administration wherein a corporate of political monitors was placed in parallel with military commanders, a man-to-man surveillance associated with institutionalized ideological indoctrination, and a special military sector designed to conduct hybrid warfare using non-traditional tactics.

Comparison unfolds within this threefold framework. The Bolshevik and CCP embraced dual administration for contrasting reasons. While the Bolshevik denounced professional military ethics for its lack of concern with broad socio-political issues, the CCP negated meritocratic bureaucracy as its costly design was unaffordable to the impoverished society. The two parties also faced differentiated difficulties in conquering overwhelmingly agrarian populations. Whereas the Bolshevik commissar system stemmed from and kept being replenished by an urban working class, the CCP commissars largely came from the old army and had to fight alone in an rural environment that was physically isolated from central cities. Moreover, the weights of ideological weapons varied across two revolutions. Confronting relatively weaker Whites, the Bolshevik commissars were closer to traditional inspectors whose major mission lay in assuring armies' loyalties, although they too engaged in fighting. In comparison, the CCP commissars were much more deeply involved in asymmetric warfare, striving to use ideological tactics to offset their enemies' huge superiorities in hard power. In general, the commissar system was thinner and more secondary in the Soviet than in the CCP army.

This article also qualifies that not all efforts of commissars achieved desired outcomes. Rather, in many regards these attempts were counterproductive as the commissar system became a second

bureaucracy, disenchanted revolutionary charisma, and involved conflicts within the dual administration. The efforts of creating a proletarian cultural hegemony largely failed, which led commissars to remain in existence until the end of communism. Endless indoctrination distracted officers and soldiers from military training. The idea of hybrid war encouraged non-military thinking, and hence somewhat blocked the enhancement of the army's military expertise. Because the commissar system was less entrenched in the Soviet army, the tension between military rationale and ideological tricks was less manifested. Nevertheless, the Soviets paid a cost for this – in the breakup of the Soviet Union, the army stayed passive, not rising to defend the Soviet state, which was a sharp contrast to the performance of the CCP army during the Tiananmen protest of 1989.

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Conclusion: Communism and Nationalism

My thesis explores the relations between two important processes of the twentieth century: the communist revolution and the transition from empires to nation-states. The major thesis covering all the four essays is that because Russia fell much more behind than China in nation-building, the roles of nationalism varied significantly across the Bolshevik and CCP revolutions.

Whereas the Bolshevik revolution unfolded in an autocratic empire, the CCP bid for power in a post-imperial national state primarily at its Han proper. This vital difference was manifested in many regards. Because of China proper's homogeneity, ethnic politics concerned the CCP far less. China's deeper geopolitical crises exerted greater pressure for the CCP to treat military patriotism positively. Moreover, the CCP had to compete with the KMT, a nationalist party, which was much stronger than the Russian Whites as it faced less ethnic fragmentation but possessed more ruling experiences and had formed solid legitimacy through national liberation war against Japan. Finally, the CCP was fighting in a post-1919 world where national liberational movement had become so mainstream that even the Soviet Union sought to encourage and support it.

These crucial facts made the CCP a communist party different from its Bolshevik's predecessor. The CCP's ideology took nationalism in a positive way, in that the class component largely stemmed from the desire to make nationalism stronger rather than diminish it. The CCP elite also embraced military culture, viewing it the cornerstone of communist revolution rather than the source of counterrevolutionary Bonapartism. Facing stronger competition and repression on part

of the KMT, the CCP had to deviate from the Bolshevik's route of urban revolution, and anchor its stronghold in the peasantry. Finally, the protracted armed confrontation with a much more superior counterrevolutionary compelled the CCP to develop its ideological expertise. The CCP was supposed to frame class Marxism into nationalism, and also transform ideology into a real weapon that could offset its inferiorities in hard power. These same efforts were much less central to the Bolshevik Civil War, wherein the White nationalists were fast smashed, and the foreign interventions were less persistent.

These empirical findings contain significant theoretical implications. In terms of revolution, it reveals concrete mechanisms whereby a universal ideology becomes localized as it spreads across societies, engaging with the question of why some components of a given ideology can be upheld as great traditions while others fall superseded by little traditions. In terms of nationalism, it considers empires' differentiated paces of transitions to nation-states, which could yield social outcomes. Empires do face the temptations and pressures of becoming nation-states, which has been argued by most literature. My thesis, however, further points out that while push was constant, feasibilities varied significantly, and were dependent on many factors including a society's ethnic structures, geopolitical statuses, pre-existing revolutionary legacies, and external influences.

Beyond my doctoral study, the next step is to expand this thesis into a book comparing the two revolutions over their relations with nationalism. Methodologically this book will continue the relational approach and biographical analysis, namely, analyzing the contestations between communist and nationalist elites within different societies to reveal their structural distinctness vis-à-vis each other. New chapters will be added to compare the Bolshevik's responses to the Great

War with the CCP's to the Sino-Japanese War, the two parties' empowerments vis-à-vis nationalist counterrevolutionaries during the final stages of Civil Wars, and their subsequent conquests of former imperial peripheries. This book will also continue analyzing the issue of inter-case interaction, focusing on how the Soviet Union' "Eastern Revolution" program of the 1920s and experiences during the War with Nazi Germany promoted Chinese communism to further infuse with nationalism. Moreover, this book will focus more on the long-term outcomes of the two revolutions. It will offer a theory: there are two types of communisms, one against nationalism and the other combined with and growing out of nationalism. The first was fragile, as the collapse of the Soviet Union had shown, while the second was much more resilient and dangerous, as this type of communism could retreat to nationalism to rescue itself, and thus become fascism.

Acknowledgements

My interest in the Bolshevik and Chinese communist revolutions started early, long before I came to Canada in pursuit of my doctoral studies. From novels, movies, music, and witnesses' memories, I sensed that there were huge differences between these two Marxist movements. It seemed to me that the Bolshevik was not so concerned with "fatherland" as the CCP claimed to be. Whereas the CCP veterans' glorious memories were associated with civil wars in China's most inland villages, the Bolshevik's heroism was more related with prison, torture, exile, and overseas refugee in Western Europe. Moreover, to me the CCP history was rosy, framed in a way of highlighting the Party's intense emotional attachment with peasants. On the contrary, Bolshevik men presented in Soviet literature and movies looked alien to local population, and rather focused on operational issues. I also generated the impression that though they were also Marxists, the Bolsheviks seemed preoccupied with the usage of technology and experts rather than with mass mobilization and "spiritual forces" … Nevertheless, being an undergraduate student with limited knowledge, I could not further figure out to what extent my sensed differences were valid, let alone further consider their causes and outcomes.

It is at McGill that I was fortune enough to acquire the opportunity to deepen my early thinking in the way of beginning transforming it into a serious sociological thesis. To this process, I gained three vital intellectual elements from McGill faculties. Sociology of nationalism enables me to establish the fundamental theoretical prism through which I observe these two revolutions. This was mostly important as these two processes spanned prolonged periods and involved so many details. Comparative historical method helps me to develop my analysis in a systematic and

coherent way. Such methodological imperative hence drives me to explore areas I was unfamiliar with and thus learn greatly – I started to accumulate serious knowledge about the two revolutions' enemies in Canada! Moreover, the ongoing debate on the Sino-Soviet divergence of post-communist transitions reminds me of the contemporary relevance of the two revolutions. This is especially important to China, where post-communist transition is not yet complete and has begun to see zigzags in recent years. Taking in these three components, I developed my thesis so that I could explore the relations between communist revolutions and the transitions from empires to nation-states; two of the most important historical processes of the twentieth century.

My greatest intellectual gratitude goes to my doctoral supervisor John A. Hall. While I brought an ambiguous and volatile interest in communism, it is John who taught me to anchor it to sociology of nationalism, an important theme. The reading course with him proved decisive. Taken in my first semester of doctoral program, it set the track along which all my future intellectual development would unfold. More broadly, it is from John's writings that I gained cardinal knowledge of the modern Western civilization, which is beyond concrete research issues: political decency, agree to disagree, importance of being civil. These writings are incredibly knowledgeable, covering extensive histories, synthesizing multiple disciplines, written in elegant language, and can be summarized into a few sharp words targeting the most important things about human nature and historical laws. To achieve such criteria, my thesis is at its very crude starting point.

I cannot thank enough my committee member Matthew Lange. It is from his books and seminars that I began to learn about the latest currents of comparative historical sociology. Principles enshrined in his writings later became the ones my own thesis strives to follow: breaking one case

into multiple sub-cases; testing mechanisms derived from single cases by numerical data; demonstrating temporal processes, and so on. He is also the person who introduced me to the most specific research techniques, such as visiting archives, planning research travels, using non-written materials, and writing responses to journal reviews. It is following his comments that I started making serious attempts to frame empirical data in a way of drawing dialogues with leading sociologists.

I am also greatly grateful to my committee member Juan Wang. It was in her seminar "Chinese politics in Comparative Perspective" where I began to connect my interest to the existing literature of comparing Russia and China. This seminar introduced me to the important topic that has gained broadest interest: how to explain Russia and China's divergence in growing out of communist political economy. Though this theme did not end up in my dissertation on revolution, it shows the direction along which I should build up the contemporary relevance of the thesis's future expansion – communism needed nationalism to survive, as China and Russia had shown in positive and negative ways.

My special gratitude is to Liliana Riga, who never formally sat on my committee but offered immense help. I was deeply impressed by her book *The Bolshevik and the Russian Empire*, which uses the classic method, engages with important theories, and reveals sharp facts. It is following in her footsteps that I formed my own prosopographical method. Riga's book was also an information-intense guide, which I used to navigate libraries and archives and established my own map for original sources and historical literature on Russia.

There are other people I am extending my gratitude to. I thank faculties both inside and outside of McGill, who generously contributed their time reading my manuscripts and offered helpful comments: Thomas Soehl, Barry Eidlin, Dingxin Zhao, Mark Harrison, Andreas Wimmer, Shizheng Feng, Bill Kissane, James Kennedy, Ryan Kelty, Sidney Tarrow, Krishan Kumar, Efe Pecker, Yang Zhang, Xiaohong Xu, and Yvonne Hung. At McGill I greatly benefited from my friendship with Rony Blanc, Matvey Lomonosov, Alex Miltsov, Emre Amasyali, James Falconer, Annie Gong, Ali Zeren, Jason O. Jenson, Mehri Ghazanjani, Skye Miner, Qiaoling He, Jie Ma, and Arc Han, who generously shared expertise in their own areas and knowledge of the societies they specialize in, which is vital to comparative historical analysis. I thank my three teachers at the Department of Slavic Studies, with whom I completed seven semesters of Russian language: Liudmila Klimanova, Vladimir Ivantsov, and Zora Kadyrbekova. My special gratitude goes to Tatiana Bedjanian, who is incredibly knowledgeable but also patiently instructed me to search Russian sources.

I thank my parents Wenjuan Lu and Xuli Zhou, who, though trained in medicine, tried their best to provide me with intellectual assistance. They helped me purchase and scan materials that were not available in North America. When I was at home, they actively introduced me to people from different areas: governmental officials, thinking-tank researchers, entrepreneurs, teachers in Party Schools, newspaper editors, and so on, which was vital to keep my general sense about China while I am living away from it. Talking with parents also proved a useful training – how to present my project to audience from other backgrounds, and how to discern the most important characters of historical events that might concern outsiders.

My acknowledgment finally goes to institutions and fellowships which supported my life and research: Clifford Wong Fellowship, McGill Arts Graduate Travel Grants, Chiang Ching-kuo Fellowship for International Academic Exchange, the Hoover Summer Workshop on Totalitarian Regimes at Stanford University, the Institute of Qualitative and Mixed Methods at Syracuse University, Renmin University of China, University of Chicago Center in Beijing, UC-Fudan Center on China Studies at San Diego, Canadian Association of Sociology, and Young Scholar Conference in Social Movement at Notre Dame University.

The thesis is a starting point. In the two next years during my postdoctoral period, I will expand my thesis into a book by further integrating the three intellectual components I acquired at McGill: to develop a general theory on nationalism and empire, to explore more specific methodological issues such as relational analysis and interaction, to situate the research of revolution to more contemporary concern about Russia's and China's transition. I hope the way generated at McGill can continue.