

THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN SOMALIA:

A Historical Evolution with a Case Study of the Islah Movement

(1950-2000)

This dissertation is submitted to the Institute of the Islamic Studies, McGill University, in partial fulfillment of the requirement of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Islamic history

By

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ABSTRACT

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This research constructs the historical evolution of the Islamic movement in Somalia from 1950 to 2000, focusing on the Islah (Islaax) Movement as a case study. The thesis is divided according to four chronological phases: the Islamic revival, the growth of Islamic consciousness, the Islamic awakening, and the Islamic movements. The first chapter provides background and deals with the revival of the Sufi Brotherhood in the nineteenth century and its encounter with colonialism. The second chapter examines the rise of Islamic consciousness during Somalia's struggle for independence after the return of Italy to Somalia to administer the UN trusteeship in 1950. The third chapter, the Islamic awakening, deals with the early formation of Islamic organizations such as Nahdah, Ahal, and Waxdah and their confrontation with the military regime. This chapter also provides a case study of the secular family law adopted by the military regime in 1975 which fragmented and radicalized the Islamic awakening into Islaax, Takfiir, and Itixaad by the 1980s. The fourth chapter looks at the emergence of the Islamic movements starting in 1978 with the foundation of Islaax. In view of the significance of this organization as a symbol of moderation in turbulent war-torn Somalia, this research focuses on it as a case study in two of its historical periods. In examining the first formative period (1978-1990), the nature of Islaax and its challenges, limitations, achievements, and activities are explored in the context of the military regime, armed oppositions and competing Islamic organizations. The second period (1990-2000) examines the interaction of Islaax with the collapsed state and the impact of the civil war on this movement, culminating in its organizational restructuring in 1992. It further explores the political and social strategies that Islaax implemented in the 1990s, most noticeable in the education sector and the National Reconciliation Conference held in Djibouti in 2000.

RÉSUMÉ

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 Titre: L'Mouvement islamique en Somalie: Évolution historique avec étude de cas du Mouvement de l'Islah
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Cette recherche construit l'évolution historique du Mouvement islamique en Somalie de 1950 à 2000, en se concentrant sur l'Islah (Islaax) comme étude de cas. Outre le chapitre d'introduction, il est divisé en quatre phases: le renouveau islamique, la conscience islamique, l'éveil islamique, et les mouvements islamiques. La première phase, le renouveau islamique, fournit des renseignements généraux et traite de la renaissance de la Confrérie Sufi dans le XIXe siècle et sa rencontre avec le colonialisme. La deuxième phase porte sur la montée de la conscience islamique pendant la lutte de la Somalie pour l'indépendance après le retour de l'Italie à la Somalie pour administrer la tutelle de l'Onu en 1950. La troisième phase, l'éveil islamique, porte sur la formation des premières organisations islamiques telles que le Nahdah, l'Ahal et le Waxdah et sur leur confrontation avec le régime militaire. L'étude de cas du Droit laïc de la Famille de 1975 est produit comme un moment historique défini avec son impact sur la fragmentation et la radicalisation de l'éveil islamique. À la suite de la proclamation de cette loi, l'Islaax, le Takfiir et le Itixaad apparurent sur la scène de la fin des années 1970 et début des années 1980, en plus d'autres petits groupes, avec différents cadres idéologiques et agendas. La quatrième phase, les mouvements islamiques, a commencé en 1978 lorsque le fondement de l'Islaax a été proclamé. En raison de l'importance de cette organisation comme un symbole de modération dans une Somalie turbulente et déchirée par la guerre, cette recherche se concentre sur l'Islaax comme étude de cas dans deux périodes historiques. En examinant la première période de formation (1978-1990), la nature de l'Islaax ainsi que ses enjeux, ses limites, ses réalisations et ses activités sont explorés dans le cadre du régime militaire et de la concurrence des organisations islamiques. La deuxième période

(1990-2000) examine l'interaction de l'Islaax avec l'état effondré et l'impact de la guerre civile sur l'Islaax, qui a abouti par la restructuration de cette organisation en 1992. Depuis lors, l'Islaax a adopté de nouvelles stratégies politiques et sociales mises en œuvre dans les années 1990, dont les fruits sont visibles dans le secteur en plein essor de l'éducation et de la Conférence de réconciliation nationale à Djibouti en 2000.

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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

The system of transliteration of the Arabic words in this dissertation follows the system adopted by the Islamic Institute, McGill University, which are Unicode diacritic characters. Besides Arabic transliteration, Somali names and words are written according to Somali language orthography. Following is the sample of the Latinized Somali alphabet where long vowels are written by doubling the vowel. There are no diacritics or other special characters, although it includes three consonantal digraphs: DH, KH, and SH.

'	B b	T t	J j	X x	Kh kh	D d	R r	S s	Sh sh	Dh dh
[ʔ]	[b]	[t]	[ɗ]	[ħ]	[x]	[d]	[r]	[s]	[ʃ]	[ð]
C c	G g	F f	Q q	K k	L l	M m	N n	W w	H h	Y y
[ʕ]	[g]	[f]	[q]	[k]	[l]	[m]	[n]	[w]	[h]	[j]
A a	E e	I i	O o	U u	Aa aa	Ee ee	Ii ii	Oo oo	Uu uu	
[a]	[e]	[i]	[o]	[u]	[a:]	[e:]	[i:]	[o:]	[u:]	

To differentiate between Arabic and Somali names, Somali geographical locations and common names are underlined while Arabic locations and common names are *italicized*. Exceptions are names which are very common such as capital cities. For example, Mogadishu and Hargeysa remain without change. Moreover, Using Arabic, Somali and English language sources may create some confusion in the transliteration of the authors' names. Thus, the spelling of the name of the author will follow the language of the work cited. This may result however, different transliterations of the name of one author who, for example, authors more than work in different languages. For instance, Ali Ahmed as an author of Arabic sources is written as 'Ali Aḥmed, and as Cali Axmad in the case of Somali sources.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ASWJ	Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaaca (Sufi brotherhood organization)
AFIS	Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia (Italian UN Trust administration for Somalia)
AMISOM	African Union Mission for Somalia
BER	Bottom-up Educational Revolution
MBA	British Military Administration
CC	Consultative Council
EB	Executive Bureau
EPLF	Eritrean People's Liberation front
FPENS	Formal Primary Education Networks
GSL	Great Somali League party
GSP	Great Somali Party
HDMS	Hisbiya Dastur Mutaqil Somalia
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
NBC	Native Betterment Committee
MM	Mennonite Mission
NFD	Northern Frontier District
NIPE	National Institution for Private Education
NUF	National United Front
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PLGS	Liberal Somali Youth Party
RCC	Roman Catholic Church
SAFE	Schools' Association for Formal Education

SDM	Somali Democratic Movement
SIM	Sudan Interior Mission
SNF	Somali National Front
SNL	Somali National League
SNM	Somali National Movement
SNU	Somali National Union
SOBA	Somali Old Boys Association
SODAF	Somali Democratic Action Front
SPM	Somali Patriotic Movement
SSDF	Somali Salvation Democratic Front
SSF	Somali Salvation Front
SYC	Somali Youth Club
SYL	Somali Youth League
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation front
UIC	Union of Islamic Courts
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
USC	United Somali Congress
USP	United Somali Party
USC/SNA	United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance
USC/SSA	United Somali Congress/Somali Salvation Alliance
WSLF	Western Somali Liberation Front



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Political Map of Somali Republic

Chapter One

Introduction and Overview

Introduction: The Paradox of Somalia

Last year, Somalia celebrated the 50th anniversary of its independence gained in 1960, while also remaining entangled in more than almost 20 years of civil war.¹ During these years, the country became known as the quintessential failed state and an emblem of the collapsed state, topping the world index in this category for several years in a row.² Moreover, it scored as the most corrupted country in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of 2010³ and ranked at the top of the World Terrorism Risk index in 2010, surpassing even Iraq and Afghanistan.⁴ This dismal state of affairs is somewhat of a paradox given the fact that in previous decades Somalia represented what many thought to be one of the most unified states in Africa and one of the first democracies on the continent. Specifically, Somalia was considered to possess a good measure of elements “which have in the past been assumed to be the essential ingredients for the nation.”⁵ Somalia’s peoples share the same language, adhere to the same faith (Islam), and despite the plethora of different clans, belong to the same ethnic group. In the context of early modernization theory, these factors were thought to serve as ingredients vital to nation building in the developing world. Hence the collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s and the self-proclaimed independence of Somaliland in the northwest, not to mention the increasing intra-clan conflicts in many parts of the country that pose such a grave challenge to reconstituting the state, are difficult to explain.

¹ The other two collapsed states in the 1990s, Sierra Leone and Liberia, were restored in 2000 and 2003, respectively. On Somali state collapse, see Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Perspectives on the State Collapse in Somalia,” in *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State*, ed. Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Soure (London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007), 40-57.

² The 10 top failed states are ranked as follows: Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Dem. Rep. of Congo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Central African Rep., Guinea, and Pakistan. See the list of the countries measured based on 12 indicators, available from

http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=452&Itemid=900.

³ See Corruption Perception Index of 2010, available from

http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/results (accessed on October 28, 2010).

⁴ Somalia experienced 556 terrorist incidents, killing a total of 1,437 people and wounding 3,408 between June 2009 and June 2010, available from <http://www.maplecroft.com/about/news/terrorism.html> (accessed on November 15, 2010).

⁵ Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), v.

Moreover, Somalia has represented a challenge to the conventional scholarship on state formation and nation building in late developers.⁶ Indeed, contrary to earlier modernization theory on the social and cultural prerequisites that underpin cohesive nation building, some scholars have highlighted the challenges faced by Somalia in terms of state formation and national unity. These scholars have noted that while Somalia has long represented a rare case of cultural, religious and ethnic homogeneity (i.e. key attributes of nation-building) in the African context, this picture of a unified nation represented more of an ideal than a reality before and after the colonial period. Said Samatar and David Laitin succinctly pointed out in their writings on the challenges of the Somali state that Somalia has long represented a “nation in search of a state,” in which, “the relationship between nationhood and statehood remains problematic as ever.”⁷ The insightful observation of these scholars is evidenced by historical reality in which the Somali political system before colonialism remained a collection of small kingdoms, city-states, and segmented clan entities. Moreover, political disunity also persisted even after the colonial rule in which three European powers—Britain, France, and Italy—occupied Somali coastal territories. Moreover, the expanding Ethiopian Empire in the nineteenth century also seized a vast part of Somali interior provinces.⁸ Because of this colonial legacy, Somalis were separated into five colonial entities and remain scattered in four countries: Somali Republic, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

Therefore, as a consequence of this historical legacy, Somalia faces three major dilemmas: the geographic dilemma; the mismatch between the state and the nation; and the disjunction between state and society. The geographical dilemma stems from its strategic position connecting Asia, Europe, and Africa (see the map of Somalia at xiv).

⁶ Nation-building relates to the building of a national identity through creating national paraphernalia. However, it has taken a new dimension after the collapse of the state and means “ending military conflict and rebuilding political and economic structures.” See, Mary Hope Schwoebel, “Nation-building in the Land of Somalis” (Ph.D. thesis, George Mason University, 2007), 16.

⁷ Sally Healy, “Reflections on the Somali State: What went wrong and why it might not matter,” in *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, ed. Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst&Company, 2010), 369. Also, see David D. Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press), 1987.

⁸ In 1887, Ethiopian Emperor Menelik took over Harrar, the historic center of Islam in the Horn of Africa, and extended his rule to other surrounding territories. See Laitin and Samatar, 53.

This strategic crossroads attracted competition among the various colonial powers to dominate Somalia. Also, being so near to the Suez Canal and the oil-rich Gulf region, the Horn of Africa was incorporated into the Cold War Theater of operations by the 1950s. Moreover, because of geopolitical tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia involving the Nile River politics, Somalia was drawn into regional conflicts too.⁹ Furthermore, due to geographical implications, Somalia became a place where the double identity of “Arabness” and “Africaness” compete and conflict with each other.¹⁰ It is where the Christian-Muslim borders are drawn, and Somalia, in championing the Muslim cause in the Horn of Africa, conflicts with Ethiopia and Kenya, where Christianity is dominant.¹¹ Presently, because of this strategic importance, global terrorism designated Somalia one of the suitable locations to wage global Jihad, while sea piracy took the advantage of geography and has been threatening international shipping lines.¹²

The second dilemma, i.e., the mismatch between the state and nation, alludes to the division of the cultural nation into five colonial entities, which has stirred nationalist sentiment and caused a continuous drive to accommodate the Somali state with the territory of the nation. Three factors in particular contributed, according to Saadia Touval, to the rise of Somali nationalism.¹³ These are the resentment against multi-colonial governments, religious antagonism towards both Christian European powers and Ethiopia and “deliberate encouragement by various governments”.¹⁴ As a result, nationalist sentiment has fuelled strong irredentism aspiring to create a “Greater Somalia” state in the Horn of Africa. This venture was in fact designated the top national priority on the agenda of two Somali regimes, civilian (1960-1969) and military (1969-1991). It

⁹ Osman Abdullahi, “The Role of Egypt, Ethiopia the Blue Nile in the Failure of the Somali Conflict Resolutions: A Zero-Sum Game” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, March, 2005).

¹⁰ See Ibrahim Farah, “Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990” (Ph.D. diss., University of Nairobi, 2009), 187.

¹¹ Ibid, 190.

¹² See Donna Nincic, “The state failure and re-emergence of Maritime Piracy,” (paper presented at 49th annual convention of International Studies Association, San Francisco, California, March, 26-29, 2008).

¹³ Touval, 76-78.

¹⁴ The Somali nationalist sentiment was also instigated by external actors and modern elites for different purposes and was misused in many destructive ways. For example, Italy with its “la Grande Somalia” program during its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, the British ambition of a “greater Somalia” in 1946, and Egypt’s revolutionary influence in the 1950s, all contributed to the rise of Somali nationalism in one way or another. See Touval, 62.

also positioned Somalia on a collision course with international conventions on the inviolability of the colonially inherited borders.¹⁵ Additionally, it also embroiled Somalia in continuous conflict with its neighbours. Nonetheless, Somali nationalism began to degenerate with the defeat of Somalia in the war with Ethiopia in 1977/78 and proclamation of the independent Republic of Djibouti in 1977 (counted as part of the great Somalia project). What is more, the repressive policy of the military regime and the armed opposition movements organized on a clan-basis further weakened Somali nationalism.¹⁶ Therefore, the centrifugal forces of Somali clannish particularism overwhelmed the centripetal forces of nationalism that were substantially weakened during long years of dictatorship (1969-1991) and the Somali state collapsed in 1991. Since then, Somalia remains the emblem of the longest collapsed state in the modern era.

The third dilemma is the disjunction between state and society. The fact that Somali society is based on the clan system and Islam while the modern nation-state is founded on secular ideology and the European model of statehood has greatly strained state-society relations.¹⁷ The pervasive state penetration in the society ineptly collided with the clans and Islam and kindled a self-defense mechanism that provoked rebellious approaches. Thus, strained state-society relations instigated the emergence of three competing ideologies – clanism, Islamism, and nationalism - even though these ideologies are dynamic, crosscurrent, and often overlap each other.¹⁸ However, in the absence of reconciliatory arrangement through appropriate social contract and policies, the notion of

¹⁵ Somalia did not endorse the declaration of the Organization of African Unity on the sanctity of the borders in Cairo, 1964. See Saadia Touval, "The organization of African Unity and Borders," *International Organization* 21, no. 1 (1967): 102-127.

¹⁶ The armed movements such as Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC), and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) were established with the support of Ethiopia.

¹⁷ The state-society relations can be described in six possible scenarios ranging from extreme cooperation to extreme conflict: 1) mutual collaboration; 2) mutual engagement; 3) conflictual engagement; 4) mutual disengagement; 5) enforced disengagement; and finally 6) resistance-revolutionary disengagement. See Tracy Kuperus, *Frameworks of State-Society Relations*, available from http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1994-Su/S&P_VIII-4/state_society_relations.html (accessed on February 14, 2011)

¹⁸ This division is purely theoretical and ideal. The possible six scenarios are Islamist/nationalist or nationalist/Islamist, clanist/nationalist or nationalist/clanist, and clanist/Islamist or Islamist/clanist. The first and the second categories are Islamists and secularists, although within each category, the emphases are different. The third category represents non-state actors that are not aiming at a national state at all. For details on conflicting loyalties in Somalia, see Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: Crisis of the Political Loyalties in Somalia" (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992).

their incompatibility, conflictuality and eventuality of their mutual exclusion had prevailed. Hence, in every historical juncture, one of these ideologies had triumphed while the other two had retreated, waiting for a favorable time to reemerge. For example, nationalism prevailed during the struggle for national independence and in the subsequent years of nation-building (1960-1991). Likewise, armed political clanism strongly emerged in the 1980s due the erosion of state legitimacy and claimed utter victory by collapsing the state in 1991. Finally, Islamism has publicly articulated its various ideological trends after the collapse of the repressive state in 1991, and its militant persuasion claimed victory in 2006 when the Union of the Islamic Courts took over Mogadishu.¹⁹ Indeed, this ideological polarization of the society started manifestly with the enforced secular reforms of the military regime, which provoked the emergence of the insurgencies under the banners of Islam and clan. Therefore, one could argue that Somali society has been systematically subjected to radicalization since 1969.²⁰

Literature Review on State Collapse and Islamism

Indeed, in recent years, a number of scholars have advanced a more sophisticated analysis of the Somali predicament by addressing the domestic, regional and international factors that have led to the collapse of the Somali state and the tragic clan-based conflicts that have determined its political trajectory for the past two decades. In terms of explaining the collapse of the Somalia state, scholars have highlighted different causes to explain the state disintegration and to understand the timing and severity of inter- and intra-clan conflict that ensued following the complete collapse of the nation-state. These various perspectives were well studied by this author classifying them into original, operational and proximate causes.²¹ In fact, the dominant perspective in explaining Somali history and politics is the anthropological perspective that focuses primarily on primordialism. This perspective stresses the role of cultural factors to explicate both the cause and

¹⁹ Cedric Barnes, and Harun Hassan, "The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts." Chatham House Briefing Paper (April, 2007): AFP BP 07/02. Islamic Courts Union was not purely "Islamic." It combined Islamism with nationalism and clanism, creating a strong appeal to a wider Somali audience.

²⁰ Exceptions are Somaliland and Puntland, which had developed a consensus-based administration after the collapse of the state. In particular, Somaliland has shown the culture of tolerance and political development toward democracy.

²¹ Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Perspectives on the State Collapse*.

consequence of civil conflict in Somalia. Most notable scholars of this perspective are I.M. Lewis, Said Samatar, Anna Simons and Okbazghi Yohannes who emphasized primordialism as the important factor in Somali history and politics, and argued that Somalia's pastoralist and nomadic mode of life combined with its clan structure has long determined political and social life in the country.²²

Nonetheless, the plethora of literature produced by the proponents of this perspective has been criticized for the limitations of its scope and the flaws in its interpretations, as well as for its lack of "historical specificity in the use of key concepts."²³ Prominent scholars in this "transformationist" perspective are Lidwien Kapteijns, Ahmed Samatar, and Abdi Samatar.²⁴ Abdi Samatar, for example, taking a more structural and economic approach has argued that cultural analysis of Somalia's conflicts are descriptive and fail to explain change over time. For Samatar, the reification of Somali "tribalism" is a fairly new phenomenon that has its origins with the role of colonial rule, the divisions of the territory among a number of European powers, and the politics of divide and rule that impacted Somalia's modern politics in ways that explain best both the collapse of the state as well as the persistence of clan conflict in the country.²⁵ Moreover, Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar, the main proponent of the "transformationist" perspective agree on a more comprehensive analysis of the Somali society within the triangular model comprising clan attachment (*tol*), traditional law (*heer*), and Islamic Shari'a.

Both these two perspectives represent an important measure of analytical validity. Lewis' work has pioneered the study of the role of Somali culture in politics. However, whereas

²² See I. M. Lewis, *Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society* (Lawrenceville, Nj: Red Sea Press, 1994), 233. Also, Said Samatar, "Unhappy Masses and the Challenges of Political Islam in the Horn of Africa", available from www.wardheernews.com/March_05/05 (accessed on February 14, 2011). Also, Okbazghi Yohannes, *The United States and the Horn of Africa: An Analytical Study of Pattern and Process* (Westview Press, 1997), 225. Also, Anna Simons, *Networks of Dissolution: Somalia Undone* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995).

²³ Abdi Samatar, "Destruction of State and Society in Somalia: Beyond the Tribal Convention," *The Journal of the Modern African Studies* 30 (1992): 625-641

²⁴ Lidwien Kapteijns is Associate Professor of History at Wellesley College, Massachusetts and has written many works on Somali women. Ahmed Samatar is Dean of International Studies at McAlester College, St. Paul, Minnesota and has written a number of works on Somalia. Abdi Samatar is Professor of Geography and Global Studies at the University of Minnesota, USA.

²⁵ Abdi Samatar, *Destruction of State*.

the cultural approach is useful in this respect, it does indeed fail to explain the forces of change or the very timing of state collapse in Somalia. Nevertheless, while Samatar and Lewis differ in their explanation of the causes of the Somali predicament they do agree on their unit of analysis. That is, the preponderance role of the internal cultural factors. Other scholars have emphasized the role of external political and economic factors to explain both the causes of state disintegration as well as the changing pattern of civil conflict in Somalia. For example, Terrence Lyons, Walter S. Clarke, Robert Gosende, Ken Menkhaus argue that the collapse of the Somalia state is the result of the Cold war and the withdrawal of the foreign patronage and assistance at the end of the Cold War.²⁶ Other scholars, such as Terrence Lyons, Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, and Peter Woodward, focus on the effect of Somali irredentism and war with Ethiopia, which formed part of Cold War politics.²⁷ For instance, Lefebvre observes “Ironically, Siad's demise and the disintegration of the Somali state were not only a consequence of clan politics but are attributable in part to Somalia's irredentist foreign policy principally that aspect of it aimed at Ethiopia”²⁸. Moreover, Khalid Medani has argued that economic globalization, and specifically the role of labor remittance inflows in Somalia beginning in the 1970s, helps to explain the timing of state disintegration and why clan identity has come to

²⁶ See Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction* (Washington: The Brookings Institution Occasional Paper, 1995), 1. Also, Walter S. Clarke and Robert Gosende, “Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute itself?” In Robert I. Rotberg (ed.), *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 129-158. Also, Ahmed Samatar, “The Curse of Allah: Civic Disembowelment and the collapse of the State in Somalia” in Ahmed Samatar (ed.), *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 117. Also, Ken Menkhaus, “US Foreign Assistance Somalia: Phoenix from the Ashes?” *Middle Eastern Policy*, 1: 5 (1997), 124-149.

²⁷ Terrence Lyons, “Crises on Multiple Levels: Somalia and the Horn of Africa” in Ahmed Samatar (ed.), *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994), 193. Also, Jeffrey Lefebvre, “The US Military in Somalia: A hidden Agenda?” *Middle Eastern Policy*, 1: 2 (1993), 47. Also, Peter Woodward, *The Horn of Africa: State Politics and International Relations* (New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996), 82.

²⁸ Jeffrey A. Lefebvre, “The US Military in Somalia: A hidden Agenda?” *Middle Eastern Policy*, 1: 2 (1993), 47.

represent the most important political and economic institution for most Somalis.²⁹ These remittances sustained the insurgencies that toppled the state.

After the collapse of the state in 1991, a revisionist perspective emerged that criticized the modernization and dependency perspectives as sharing an acceptance and “utilizing official narratives”³⁰ that “had contributed the construction of old Somalia”.³¹ This perspective emerged as an academic reaction to the collapse of the state in Somalia and the crisis of Somali nationalism. The proponents of this new perspective advocate demystifying the conventional image of Somaliness. They argue that the nationalistic explanation of Somali history was devised to suit the narrow interests of some privileged dominant segments of the society and does not offer comprehensive account that is relevant to the country as a whole.³² Their major argument is the call to re-examine conventional national symbols and myths, such as those relating to racial homogeneity, linguistic unity, common historical experiences, and gender relations and roles. This perspective has the merit in questioning basic sources of Somali history, its authenticity and comprehensives. Its proponents propose a comprehensive historical coverage to include all segments of Somali society in order to rectify mistakes committed in the name of national unity against the history and culture of the communities in southern Somalia.³³ Prominent scholars in this group are Mohamed Mukhtar, Ali Jumale, Abdi Kusow, Hassan Mahadallah, and Catherine Besteman.³⁴

²⁹ See Khlid Medani, “Globalization, Informal Markets and Collective Action: The Development of Islamic and Ethnic Politics in Egypt, Sudan and Somalia” (PhD Thesis submitted to the University of California, Berkeley, 2003).

³⁰ Ali Jumale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia*. Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1995, xii.

³¹ Ibid., xiii.

³² Awes Osman Hagi and Abdiwahid Osman Hagi, *Clan, Sub-clan and Regional Representation in the Somali Government Organization 1960-1990: Statistical Data and Findings* (Washington, DC, 1998).

³³ The major themes of this perspective can be traced in two works edited by Ahmed Jumale and Abdi Kusow. See Ahmed Jumale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia*. Also, Abdi Kusow (ed.), *Putting the Cart before the Horse: Contested Nationalism and the Crisis of the Nation-State in Somalia* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 2004).

³⁴ Mohamed Mukhtar is Professor of African History at Savannah State University. He received his PhD from Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt, and has written extensively on the revisionist historiography of Somalia. Ali Jumale is Associate Professor, Department of Comparative Literature, Queens Collage, New York. Abdi Kusow is Associate Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan. Hassan Mahadallah is Associate Professor of Political Science, Southern University, USA. Catherine Besteman is Associate Professor of Anthropology at Colby College, USA.

Ironically, the common denominator of the three perspectives is the paucity of references to and analyses of Islam as an important agent of historical change. This trend is evident from the major historical works that situate Islam in the peripheral role in their researches and analyses limiting it merely as part of the traditional structure and culture.³⁵ However, new literature on the rising Islamic movements sprang up as part of the security studies literature that grew exponentially after 9/11, which was an academic campaign to discover what is termed the greatest threat to the Western civilization – “Islamic fundamentalism”.³⁶ Indeed, Western scholarship on Islam and Islamism has increased in the two historical periods in which Somalia was engaged in a conflict with Western powers. The first period was the years of Jihad against British colonialism, waged primarily by Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan in the British protectorate of the northern Somalia (1900-1921). Colonial scholarship showed particular interest in the study of this anti-colonial movement and produced ample literature on this topic. Among these works, two colonial works have particular relevance to the study of this movement: Douglass Jardine’s work *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* and Italian author Francesco Caroselli’s book *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia*.³⁷ Moreover, nationalist historiography followed suit to immortalize national symbols and offered special attention to the armed resistance against colonialism represented by the Darawiish movement of Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan. In this venue, the works of Said Samatar and Abdi Sheikh-Abdi are paramount.³⁸ Comparatively, nonviolent Islamic works that majority of the Islamic scholars were

³⁵ These studies include: Ali Hersi, “The Arab Factor in Somali Society: the Origins and Development of Arab Enterprise and Cultural Influence in the Somali Peninsula” (PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1977); Mohamed Nuh Ali, “History in the Horn of Africa, 1000 BC to 1500 AD” (Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1985); Lee Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982); Ahmed Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality*. London: Zed Press, 1988; Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism*; and David Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

³⁶ See Karim-Aly Kassam, “The Clash of Civilization: The Selling of Fear”, available from <https://dspace.ucalgary.ca/bitstream/1880/44170/1/Islam.pdf> (accessed on February 14, 2011).

³⁷ These two works are: Douglass Jardine, *The Mad Mullah of Somaliland* (London: Herbert Jinkines, 1923) and Francesco Caroselli, *Ferro e Fuoco in Somalia: Venti Anni di Lotte Contro Mullah e Dervisc* (Roma: Sindicato Italiano Arti Grafiche, 1931).

³⁸ See Abdi Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993). See also, Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

engaged received less Western academic interest except in a few anthropological works.³⁹ Moreover, there are some historical chapters on individual Sufi scholars produced by B. G. Martin, Said Samatar, and Scott Reese.⁴⁰ Therefore, as a general trend and a common denominator among all this scholarship, history of Islam and its role are marginalized, unless recognized as posing a security threat to the Western powers.

Exceptions to the above-stated trend are works in the Arabic language, authored by Islamist scholars. Four works could be placed at the top of this category of literature. Two of them were authored by 'Alī Sheikh Aḥmed Abūbakar, the third by Aḥmed Jum'āle "Castro," and the fourth by Ḥassan Makkī. 'Alī Sheikh's first work *Al-Da'wah al-Islāmīyah al-Mu'āsīrah fī al-Qarn al-Ifriqī* is a good introduction to the Islamic call in the Horn of Africa. The work offers historical depth and overviews challenges to Islamism that include secularism, illiteracy, tribalism, and policies of the military regime in Somalia. The second title, *Al-Somāl: Judūr al-Ma'āsāt al-Rāhinah* seems to complement the first book and focuses on the Islamic awakening and its encounter with the military regime. This book is unique in that it provides a detailed description of the execution of Islamic scholars in 1975 because of the Family Law confrontation between the regime and Islamists. It also provides the reaction of the Muslim world to these executions. In addition, it offers an Islamist critique of the above-mentioned secular Family Law. Moreover, Ahmed Jumale describes the history and development of Islamic scholars in the Banaadir region where Mogadishu is located. His PhD is a useful source on the history of Sufi orders.⁴¹ On the other hand, Ḥassan Makki produced an indispensable work as a PhD thesis "*Al-Siyāsāt al-Thaqāfiyah fī al-Somāl al-Kabīr* (1887-1986)." This work is a very useful source of the cultural history of Somalia, in particular in that it

³⁹ I. M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in a Clan-based Society* (Lawrenceville, N.J. : Red Sea Press, 1998).

⁴⁰ Bradford G. Martin, "Shaykh Uways bin Muhammad al-Barawī, a Traditional Somali Sufi," in *Manifestations of Sainthood in Islam*, ed. G. M. Smith and Carl Ernst (Istanbul: ISIS, 1993), 225-37. Reese, Scott S., *Urban Woes and Pious Remedies: Sufism in Nineteenth-Century Banaadir (Somalia)* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). Said Samatar, "Sheikh Uways Muhammad of Baraawe, 1847-1909: Mystic and Reformer in East Africa," in *the Shadows of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa*, ed. Said S. Samatar (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1992), 48-74.

⁴¹ Moḥamad Aḥmed Jum'āle "Castro", "Dawr 'Ulamā Junūb al-Somāl fī al-Da'wa al-Islāmīyah (1889-1941)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Umm Durman, Khartoum, 2007).

traces cultural competition between Arabic/Islamic and Western education, covering all Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa.

A similar academic interest with the emergence of Islamic Jihad by Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan in the first quarter of the twentieth century is noted after 9/11 and the declaration of Global War on Terrorism. In this period, many research centers have been producing occasional reports and briefings on Somalia as being a possible haven for terrorists. Somalia also appeared in headlines of major newspapers, TV networks, radios, and electronic communications. Hundreds of Somali websites have been reporting on Somalia. The academic interest experienced an unprecedented growth and numerous papers and articles were published in many languages; of these, three works particularly stand out. These works were authored by an Ethiopian scholar Tadesse Madhene,⁴² an Israeli Intelligence officer Shay Shaul,⁴³ and an American scholar Andre le Sage.⁴⁴ These works are in the field of security studies and counter-terrorism measures and focus on Itixaad, even though some background studies were made on other organizations.

Shaul Shay's book *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* focuses on Somalia as a possible haven for terrorist organizations. The book examines Islamic movements in Somalia with a special focus on Itixaad and its connections with Al-Qaida, *Hassan al-Turabi* of the Sudan Islamic Movement, and Iran during the USA intervention in Somalia in 1992-1995. The last chapters are dedicated to the rise and the fall of the Islamic Courts, the Ethiopian intervention, and its aftermath. This analysis of the challenges of the Islamic Courts and potentiality of Al-Qaida terror in Somalia concludes with remarks on ways to prevent the emergence of a radical Islamic state that harbors terrorism in the Horn of Africa. This work is mainly descriptive and lacks academic depth and analysis.

On the other hand, Tadesse Medhene authored the book of *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia*, the first comprehensive academic analysis of its kind of this

⁴² Medhane Tadesse, *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black economy in Somalia: Religion, Clan, Money, Clan and the Struggle for Supremacy over Somalia* (Addis Ababa: Meag Printing Enterprise, 2002).

⁴³ Shaul Shay, *Somalia between Jihad and Restoration* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2008).

⁴⁴ Andre Le Sage, "Somalia and War on Terrorism: Political Islamic Movements& US counter Terrorism Efforts" (Ph.D. thesis, the Jesus College, Cambridge University, 2004).

Islamist movement after 9/11. The author provides a brief background of Islamism in Somalia during Siyad Barre (1969-1991) rule and moves on to examine extensively the role of Itixaad during the civil war and its interaction with the UN intervention in Somalia. It offers special attention to the issue of the ideological, political, and economic foundation of Itixaad that weakened the warlords. The last chapters deal with the Djibouti Peace Process in 2000 and the role of the international and regional actors. The author also offers policy guidelines for future actions to thwart the takeover by Islamists in Somalia. However, the timing of this research, its author, sources, and the main thesis call for suspicion of this study's motives. Tadesse wrote from the Somali opposition's perspective supported by Ethiopia; this opposition conferred in Ethiopia to mobilize their agenda against the Transitional National Government (TNG). The major theme of the book is that Itixaad is the umbrella terrorist organization shared by all Islamic organizations and that the TNG was built by Itixaad. Therefore, the TNG, as a product of terrorists, should be opposed and replaced by other national institutions with the support of the international community. The recommendations of the author were implemented later in Kenya in 2004 by establishing the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) headed by the former warlords who befriended Ethiopia. However, the consequence of this policy was disastrous and caused deteriorated security in the Horn of Africa. It instigated the emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), Ethiopian military intervention, and the upsurge of the extremist organization of Shabab and piracy in Somalia.

Moreover, Andre le Sage's *Somalia and the War on Terrorism* undertook a field research on Islamism and counter-terrorism in Somalia. The author made his research in Mogadishu, where he met various local actors such as warlords, Islamic movement leaders, traditional elders, and members of traditional Sufi orders. In particular, he focused on Islaax, Itixaad, Islamic charities, *Hawāla*-business, and the Islamic Courts. Providing an in-depth analysis of the Islamic movements, he concluded that political Islam is not monolithic, and doctrinal differences and competition exist between the various Islamist movements. Le Sage is credited with predicting the rise of Shabab, a new extremist derivative of Itixaad, and warning against it. Considering his dissertation as an

initial study and admitting various limitations, he provided a number of recommendations such as continuing research and monitoring, opening dialogue with the moderate Islamists, and addressing social strains that push the population toward extremism. However, this moderate voice did not receive attention during the Bush administration which was entangled with the war on terrorism.

There are also many other valuable researches on this topic; for instance, relevant papers include Roland Marshal's study titled "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War" that outlined the general developments of the ongoing Islamic revival in Somalia.⁴⁵ As one of the early studies, the paper carries some errors and misconceptions, which does not belittle its merit and academic value. Also, Adam Hussein's paper "Political Islam in Somali History" offers a brief historical survey of the development of the Islamic movement and offers the four possible options of its future development. The study recognizes the inevitable role of moderate Islamism and criticizes counter-terrorism policies.⁴⁶ Moreover, the International Crisis Group (ICG) produced a unique study of Islamist movements in Somalia, classifying them into three categories: Jihadist Islamism, political Islam, and missionary activism. This report also offered a brief background of the Islamic movements.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Hansen and Mosley authored a research paper "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa."⁴⁸ The study explored the general question of whether the MB in the region could act as a partner in the quest for development and peace in the Horn of Africa. It includes a historical section on the Islaax Movement and its developmental organizations. Finally, the work of Afyare Elmi "Understanding the Somalia Conflagration" produces an informative chapter on the role of Islam and Islamic awakening in the peace building in Somalia. Writing from insider's

⁴⁵ Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War," in *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, ed. Alex De Waal (Indiana University Press, 2006), 114-146.

⁴⁶ Hussein M. Adam, "Political Islam in Somali History," in *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics*, ed. Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst&Company, 2010), 119-135.

⁴⁷ International Crisis Group, "Somalia's Islamist" (African Report No. 100, December 12, 2005), available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/100-somalias-islamists.aspx> (accessed on 22 June, 2010).

⁴⁸ Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa" (Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) Report 2009),33.

perspective, Elmi concludes with strong statement of inevitability of an Islamist movement's rule in Somalia.⁴⁹

The Main Argument: Understanding Islam in Somali Politics

The increasingly rich scholarship on Somalia in recent decades has contributed greatly not only to our understanding of the history and political dynamics of Somalia, but it has also made important theoretical contributions to the literature on state building in Africa, the causes and nature of state collapse across cases, and the important role of transnational flows of labor and capital in determining local political developments. What is noticeable, however, is that the great emphasis on economic and political factors and, especially, on clan politics in Somalia has obscured one of the most important cultural and political factors that have long played a key role in the country's history: the role of Islam, and especially Islamist politics. While some scholars have begun to address the rise of political Islam and Islamist militancy in Somalia,⁵⁰ and advanced important insights as to some of the political objectives of movements such as *Itixaad*,⁵¹ the Islamic Courts Union,⁵² and *Shabaab*,⁵³ there is very little scholarship on the history of political Islam in Somalia that takes seriously both historical forces as well as the very ideas and internal organization of these movements. Indeed, reading the scholarship on the now voluminous literature Islamist militancy and media and policy analysis of the proliferation of Islamist groups in Somalia, it often appears as if "Islam" was only recently discovered in Somalia. In reality, the rise of Islamism in Somalia, while sharing a great deal of similarity with other movements in the Muslim world, has roots in Somali history and the very particular local context of Somalia and its peoples. Moreover, while the nascent scholarship on Islamist politics in Somalia has tackled the important role of politics and regional factors in the rise of an Islamist organizations in the country, this

⁴⁹ Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace building* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 72.

⁵⁰ Roland Marchal, "Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11," In *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex De Waal (Indiana University Press, 2006), 114-146. Also, Cedric Barnes, and Harun Hassan, "The Rise and fall of Mogadishu's Islamic Courts." Chatham House Briefing Paper, April, 2007. (AFP BP 07/02).

⁵¹ Andre Le Sage and Ken Menkhaus, "The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas." A Paper presented to the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 17-20, March, 2004.

⁵² Barnes and Harun, The Rise and fall.

⁵³ Marchal, Islamic Political Dynamics.

dissertation departs from this analysis by providing a detailed and empirically rich narrative of one of the most influential Islamist movements in the country, and one which has influenced and impacted other Islamist organizations in recent decades.

This dissertation tackles this neglected issue of the role of Islam and politics in Somalia within a historical context that is rare in recent scholarship. Moreover, while most scholarship on the subject of Islamist politics in Somalia has focused on structural and political factors to explain the attraction and rise of Islamism in the political trajectory of Somalia, this study focuses closely on the interplay of both Islamic and clan identification to discern both the political and ideational factors that have gained ascendancy in the context of Somalia in recent decades. Such an ambitious undertaking requires parsimony, and so this study focuses on the Islaax Movement -- the official part of MB global network in Somalia -- in order to tackle some key questions having to do with the different factors that have underpinned the political salience of Islamic movements in general, and the Islaax Movement in particular. Thus, the primary argument is that in order to fully understand the trajectory of Islamist politics in Somalia, one must examine the evolving nature of state-society relations within a historical context that is specific to the Somali case. Moreover, this research maintains throughout this dissertation that the factors underpinning changes in state-society dynamics in Somalia are rooted in how the interplay between Islamist and Clan politics (i.e. ascriptive identities) has impacted local political dynamics prior to the collapse of the Somali state. In addition, it goes further by detailing how the prior history of the Islamist movement has resulted in both the development and diversification of Islamist politics in Somalia. Using Islaax as a unit of analysis, this study demonstrates how Somalia's Islamist movement, while originating in what many have termed traditional, Sufi Islam, has evolved into a contested terrain represented by the emergence of Islamist modernism, Salafism, and even Islamist militancy. Consequently, any understanding of the tension between state and society in Somalia has to take seriously the role of traditional Islam, the legacy of the Muslim Brotherhood and the effects of Salafism for organizations such as Itixaad and its offshoots, and the tense and contested relations between Islamist movements such as

Islaax and other Islamist organizations harboring distinctly different understandings of the role of Islam in politics and social life.

The Narrative: State – Society Relations in Somalia

The evolution of the relationship between Islam and Politics in Somalia cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of the historical tension between political authority and Somali society. In addition to the geographical diversity of the country, and the divisive legacy of multiple colonial administrations in the pre-independence era, Somalia has long been challenged by the mismatch between the state and the nation and strangeness between the state and society. The constant tension between the state and the society characterized as extreme conflict caused the collapse of the state after 30 years of its inception in 1960. After the collapse of the Somali state in 1991 and weakening of nationalism, clan-based armed factions and various Islamic movements, which had operated underground since the 1970s, came out publicly. Hence, in the dearth of the national state, clanism, represented by armed factions, and Islamism, embodied by various Islamic organizations, took the central stage in Somalia. Clan, with its organization and culture, and traditional Islam are the two basic elements lay the foundation of what Hassan Keynan called “the Somali Equation.”⁵⁴ This equation signifies “the complex of ideas, values, beliefs and institutions that define and underpin the Somali society.”⁵⁵ On the other hand, nationalism and state institutions are the superstructural new element for the Somali equation that has not gained sufficient ground in the minds of the majority of the population. As a consequence, most Somali people offer strong loyalty to their clans and Islam instead of becoming loyal citizens of a secular nation-state. In fact, the cosmology of the Somali society is centered on clan particularism and Islamic universalism, which are marked with microscopic and telescopic perceptions, respectively. This means that clan particularism often pushes communities to bigotry and narrow-mindedness, while Islam, unless it is given an extremist interpretation, calls for

⁵⁴ See Hassan Keynan, “Male Roles and Making of Somali Tragedy: Reflections on Gender, Masculinity and Violence in Somali Society,” in *Variations on the Theme of Somaliness*, ed. Muddle Suzanne Liluis (Turku, Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001), 241-249, 241.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

peace, brotherhood, and broad-mindedness.⁵⁶ Having given a general overview of the Somali state and challenges, we explore clan identity and the genealogy of traditional Islam, and its relations with modern development of Islamism.

The State versus Clan Identity

The Somali state is a child of colonialism in terms of its structure, laws and policies and does not accommodate sufficiently the culture and values of the society. Hence, complex tension has developed between the state and clan system which severely curtailed the development of the modern state institutions. Moreover, Somalist scholars failed to develop a comprehensive theory capable of reconciling all components of the Somali equation – clan, Islam and nationalism- in order to create a stable and sustainable system of governance. Understanding state relations with the clan system provides insights to the dilemma of state formation in Somalia. Amazingly, most Somalis belong to one Somali ethnic group which is sub-divided into four or five major clan families, even though it is short of encompassing all Somali citizens.⁵⁷ The effective basic social unit in the Somali clan system to which every Somali belongs is called the Diya-paying sub-clan.⁵⁸ This social unit functions in rural areas and cities and is founded on either primordial blood relations or alliances based on territorial attachments. Members of this unit act collectively through their clan elder in collaboration with the Islamic scholars of the clan. This unit's sustainability and resilience against pervasive Western modernity derive from its usefulness to its members and the services it offers. Diya-paying provides two important functions. First, it satisfies the basic human need for love, affection, and the sense of belonging and identity to such a level that it is extremely difficult to live in Somalia without this belonging. In fact, individuals who do not belong to strong clans are

⁵⁶ Such interpretation is used by extreme Salafism. Currently, it is the ideology of al-Qā'ida replicated by the Shabab in Somalia; both organizations use Islamic slogans to justify their violent actions.

⁵⁷ These four clan families are Darood, Dir, Hawiye, and Digil and Mirifle. Other classification includes Isaaq and Dir separately. However, many other Somali clans do not fall under this division. Examples of such clans are Jareer, Reer-Xamar, Boon, Tumaal, Yahar, and others.

⁵⁸ This unit is called *diya-paying* since its members participate in paying and receiving blood compensation for killed individuals collectively. The full blood compensation is equal to 100 camels for men and 50 camels for women, payable also in monetary values. Nonetheless, often, neighbouring clans may agree on lesser values, such as 50 camels for men and 25 for women. The concept is derived from Islamic jurisprudence.

despised and looked down upon.⁵⁹ Second, it generates solidarity among its members in providing social welfare and common security in the absence of state institutions capable of providing these services. Inter-clan relations are regulated by the customary law called Xeer, which resembles Shari'a law in most of its clauses. Clan attachments generate three major sentiments in the individuals that have some bearing on their behavior. First is the fame and the glory of an individual is derived from "the fame and the glory of his ancestor."⁶⁰ Accordingly, clan members glorify their forefathers, make annual sacrifices to them, build their tombs, and sometimes raise them to the level of saints. This culture is rooted in the "indigenous Cushitic religion, a monotheistic system of belief in which God was called Waaq."⁶¹ Glorification of the forefathers was used as an effective means of propagating Islam by sheikhs of the Sufi orders who annually brought together pastoral populations at the location of their ancestral tombs. Every year at these locations, Islamic programs are organized, conflicts are resolved, and religious functions are provided. Second is the inviolability of family duties and ties, which generates what *Ibn-Khaldūn* called 'Asabiyah (esprit de corps), a social bond that can be used to measure the strength and capabilities of social groupings.⁶² This localized loyalty sometimes creates chauvinism and bigotry among clans and ignites inter-tribal wars. Third is the blood revenge as part of deterrent security measures and the maintenance of the collective honor and dignity of the clan members. This latter conduct weakens individual responsibility for crimes committed and results in sheltering members from penalty, which, in turn, serves to present the entire community as responsible and, therefore, makes it susceptible to revenge killing. Tribal sentiment is dynamic and ambivalent in its scope and level. It rises up to a greater clan confederacy and descends down sometimes to a small family level, depending on the context and conditions.⁶³ In the pre-colonial era, clans were the only

⁵⁹ The cast groups in Somalia, called Nasab Dhiman, are nothing more than weaker or smaller clans and individuals cast out historically by other stronger pastoral clans for variety of their technical professions. These clans include Tumaalo, Yahar, Boon, Yibir, etc. See Asha A. Samad, "Brief Review of Somali caste systems: Statement of the Committee on the elimination of Racial discrimination," August, 2002. Available from <http://www.madhibaan.org/faq/somalia-brief-2002.pdf> (accessed on August 18, 2010)

⁶⁰ Ignaz Goldziher, *Muslim Studies*, vol. 1 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1910), 22.

⁶¹ Christopher Ehret, "The Eastern Horn of Africa, 1000 BC to 1400 AD: The Historical Roots," in *The Invention of Somalia*, ed. Jumale, 249.

⁶² Fuad Baali, *Society, State, And Urbanism: Ibn Khaldun's Sociological Thought* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1988), 43.

⁶³ Laitin and Samatar, 30.

existing socio-political unit and often functioned in small geographical areas because of the camel-based transportation system and lack of modern communication technologies. However, on occasions, larger units emerged with a rudimentary system of governance, which were much more encompassing than the current politicized major clan-families such as Darood, Digil-Mirifle, Dir and Hawiye.⁶⁴

The Somali clan system could be classified into pastoral, agro-pastoral and urban dweller groups. The social system of the pastoral clans is depicted as a classical segmented system where “cultural unity exists, but politically diffused and broken down into a number of smaller political units whose basis of membership is kinship.”⁶⁵ The nature of this system involves a high propensity among its members to compete with one another for political domination, fissiparousness at times of crisis, and a weak territorial attachment.⁶⁶ In agro-pastoral areas, the political structure emphasizes common socialization process, which requires official integration in the clan system. Clans in the agro-pastoral system cultivate mixed farming and therefore develop a stronger sense of territorial attachment.⁶⁷ The main distinction between the pastoral and agro-pastoral clans is due to their different ecological settings, which have produced distinct economic cultures and linguistic dialects.⁶⁸ The urban dwellers, “Banaderi and Barvani people,” have developed an identity linked to the Somali culture, on the one hand, and to the Arab and Persian merchants, on the other. This culture had also absorbed many urbanized

⁶⁴ In the Peace Conference in Djibouti in 2000, a clan-based power-sharing model of 4.5 was used. This formula sought to divide power among Somali people using traditional system. This system was based on dividing the people into four equal clans, namely, Darood, Digil-Mirifle, Dir and Hawiye and half quotas assigned to alliance of all other clans. This system was criticized by many scholars. See Mohamed Eno, “Inclusive but Unequal: the enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four Point Five (4.5) Factor,” in *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State*, ed. Abdullahi Osman and Issaka Souare (Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd., 2007), 58-81.

⁶⁵ This classical segmented system is not peculiar to Somalia, but is found in other African countries. For instance, the Kuru in Liberia, the Nuer in Sudan, just to name a few. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard pioneered the study of the acephalous societies in Africa. See Christian P. Pathlom, *The Theory and Practices of African Politics* (New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc., 1976), 14.

⁶⁶ The difficulty of uniting various segments in the face of an outside threat is well illustrated in works such as Chinua Achebe, *Things Fall Apart* (London: Heinemann, 1958) and Elechi Amadi, *The Great Bonds* (London: Heinemann, 1969).

⁶⁷ I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longmans, 1980), 13.

⁶⁸ Mainly pastoral Somalis speak the “Maxaay” dialect, while many agro-pastoral clans speak the “may” dialect of the Somali language. See Lee Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society: Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982), 23.

nomadic populations through intermarriages and socialization.⁶⁹ The major activities of the urbanized people were commerce, fishing, and small industries.

Clan divides are neither evil nor good, but are a neutral and natural social setting, prevalent in all societies and particularly among Muslims where family values are very strong. This neutral entity could be utilized either positively or destructively. However, it was portrayed by Somali nationalists during the struggle for independence as incurable cancer, pervasive and inescapable wrath on the national cohesion. This notion presupposed and emphasized the incompatibility and conflictuality of the tradition and modernity. The implication of such perception was very severe: it led to the development of the failed policy of “Dabar-goynta Qabyaaladda” (eliminating tribalism), adopted strongly by the military regime, which resulted in radicalizing clans and toppling the state. This form of clanism is different from the rural clanism and is signified as political clanism, an urban phenomenon that is a construction of colonial scholars and administrators during the formation of the Somali state. Its revival and construction were imperative for the colonial administrators, who also adopted a political system that encouraged clan divide and conflict. The political culture and mindset created during the formative period of the Somali state still contaminate political performance. Gradually, they became an inescapable nest praying every Somali politician because of clan-focussed political culture it inculcated through years. In the academia, scholars such as I. M. Lewis and Said Samatar advocated to consider primordialism as the contagious virus to be blamed for most Somali ailments. This viewpoint is lucidly expressed by Prof. Said Samatar, who wrote, “Somali polity is shaped by a single, central principle that overrides all others, namely the phenomenon that social anthropologists call ‘the segmentary lineage system.’”⁷⁰ This discourse may have taken upper hand during the civil war, when clan system became the only model for power sharing among Somali clans in Somaliland, Puntland, and national reconciliation conferences since 2000. The clan power-sharing formula based on the famous 4.5 system, recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC) in 2000, was a

⁶⁹ For details of the history of the Urban Dwellers of Banaderi, refer to Scott Reese S., “Patricians of the Banadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century,” (Ph.D. thesis, the University of Pennsylvania, 1996).

⁷⁰ Said S. Samatar, “Unhappy Masses and the Challenges of Political Islam in the Horn of Africa.” Available from www.wardheernews.com/March_05/05 (accessed on September 15, 2009).

temporary victory of the traditionalist approach over transformationist discourse.⁷¹ The formula of 4.5 quotas based to allocate equal shares to four major clan families: Dir, Darood, Hawiye, and Digil-Mirifle, and half of the quota for the remaining clans. Nevertheless, continuous change is occurring in the Somali political thought, and other identities such as Islamism and nationalism are re-emerging rapidly. The future may usher in a hybrid system that would amalgamate the Somali equation and avoid criminalizing or marginalizing one of its three identity elements: Islam, clan, and nationalism.

Traditional Islam and Islamism

The post-colonial nation-state is obviously secular maintaining the legacy of colonialism while Muslim societies adhere that Shari'a laws are part of their belief system and should be the source of the legislation. The strangeness of the nature of the state strained society and most traditional scholars lacked capacity to counter growing westernization and secularization. However, with the development of modern education, communication and cultural revival, new Islamic movements emerged to express grievances about the marginal role of Islam in the state. The new Islamic movement appeared to the scene aiming to reform both the traditional Islam and the secular nation-state. The following section addresses these dynamic interactions.

The Genealogy of Traditional Islam in Somalia

Traditional Islam in Somalia follows three main genealogies: the Ash'ariyah theology, Shafi'i jurisprudence, and Sufism. The Ash'ariyah theology was founded by Abu al-Hassan Al-Ash'ari (873-935) in reaction to the extreme rationalism espoused by the

⁷¹ The 4.5 formula of power sharing adopted at the Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000 was strongly criticized by many scholars such as Omar Enow, Mohamed Enow, Abdi Samatar, and Ahmed Samatar. However, these scholars failed to come up with an acceptable practical approach of power sharing in the absence of political institutions. Also, it is important to note that the 4.5 formula offered women and minority clans more seats in the parliament, while so-called dominant clans received fewer seats comparatively. In the final analysis, 4.5 was a temporary measure of democratization of traditional society and never intended to be used as a permanent approach for the future political model. See Mohamed A. Enow, "Inclusive but Unequal: The Enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four Point Five (4.5) Factor" in *Somalia at the crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State*, ed. Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare (London: Adonis and Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007).

school of Mu'tazilah.⁷² In developing its defense mechanism, the Ash'ariyah school employed the method of Ta'wīl, meaning interpreting some of the attributes of Allah. The Ash'ari theology and methodology were accepted as the standard for mainstream Sunni theology by the majority of the Sunni scholarly community.⁷³ This theology is based on seeking to defend Islam from the extremes of excessive literalism and excessive rationalism, retaining the middle and moderate way of Islam. Examples of the most contentious issues of the debate are the problem of how to understand the divine attributes and the way of consigning the meaning to Allah. The position of the Ash'ari theology is to validate whatever attributes Allah has affirmed for himself and negate what Allah has negated for himself, which is any resemblance between the Creator and creation. This concept is bluntly affirmed in the Qur'anic verse, "There is absolutely nothing like unto Him."⁷⁴ However, to avoid such similitude, Ash'arites opted to interpret metaphorically some attributes of Allah, which may appear to the public as similitude to the humans such as "His face," "His hand," "seeing," and "hearing." Among the most prominent scholars of Ash'arites is Abu-Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (1058-1111) who articulated moderate Sufism that combines it with al-Ash'ariyah theology.

The Shāfi'īyah School of jurisprudence is also one of the major four Sunni schools of jurisprudence and rooted in the methodology and teachings of Abū 'Abdallāh al-Shāfi'ī (767–820). He was a student of Malik ibn Anas (d.795), the founder of the Mālikīyah School of jurisprudence. Al-Shāfi'ī is famous for his development of the science of Fiqh in his illustrious book *al-Risālah*, in which he laid the foundation of *Usūl al-fiqh* (sources of jurisprudence): the Qur'an, the Sunnah, Qiyas (analogy), and Ijma' (scholarly consensus). With his systematization of Shari'a, al-Shāfi'ī provided a framework for deducing Islamic laws that permits independent and locally based legal systems. The four Sunni legal schools kept within the general framework and methodology that Shafi'i

⁷² *Mu'tazilah* is theological school founded by Wāsil ibn 'Atā (d. 748). The main assumption of this school is that reason is more reliable than tradition. See Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1983), 44-65.

⁷³ For instance, al-Azhar University teaches this theology. See, Yusuf al-Qardāwī, *Muḥammad al-Ghazālī kamā 'Araftuhu: Riḥlat Nisf Qarn* (Beirut: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2000), 82-86.

⁷⁴ *Glorious Qur'an* (42:11).

initiated. Somalia also adheres to the Shafi'i school introduced through its connection with Yemen.⁷⁵

Sufism appeared as a reaction against luxurious lifestyle that grew prevalent in the Islamic urban centers when Muslims became powerful and wealthy and plunged under the influence of other cultures. Its roots are argued to be linked to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad and early generations of the companions and followers. However, its systematization into organized brotherhoods appeared in the eleventh century. Abū Ḥāmed al- Ghazālī (1058–1111) is considered the scholar who best succeeded in combining Sufism and Islamic jurisprudence in his works, where he argued that Sufism originated from the Qur'an and was compatible with Islamic thought. In Somalia, Sufi Islam has long been the most important form of religious identification in the country. Sufism in Somalia belongs to the moderate Sufism rooted in al-Ghazālī's way, and it had a significant missionary impact throughout Somalia. Its tremendous influence is exercised through its two main brotherhoods: Qaadiriyah and Axmadiyah (see Chapter Two).

Therefore, traditional Islam espouses *taqlīd* (imitation) and follows strictly the above stated three genealogies. In doing so, it resists change and upholds to its historical heritage in the globalized world. In addition, these three genealogies are perpetuated through traditional Islamic institutions comprising educational establishments and Sufi orders' centers where the master-disciple intimate relationship is strictly nurtured.⁷⁶ This relationship is the core foundation of Sufism, preserved through various social functions. The most important functions are: Mawliidka (commemoration the Prophet's birthday), Xuska (offering alms to the souls of the deceased parents), and Siyaaro (paying homage to respected teachers and visiting their tombs). In a nutshell, this is the nature of the traditional Islam adhered to by the overwhelming majority of Somalis. Traditional establishment represented mainly by the Sufi orders do not carry any particular political agenda and reform programs focusing mainly on ritualistic and spiritual religious practices.

⁷⁵ The four main jurisprudence schools of the Sunni Muslims are *Māliki*, *Ḥanafī*, *Shāfi'i*, and *Ḥanbali*.

⁷⁶ For a general overview of the traditional Islamic scholars, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (Princeton University Press, 2002).

Islamism and its distinctiveness in Somalia

Islamism is a controversial term defined differently as part of the various terminologies coined by the Western scholars to signify modern development of Islamic movements. This work adopts the International Crisis Group's definition because of its broadness, that is, "the active assertion and promotion of beliefs, prescriptions, laws, or policies that are held to be Islamic in character."⁷⁷ It addresses multiple strains in the society inflicted by colonialism, Western modernity, and lack of capacity of the traditional Islamic institutions to counter these. Islamism challenges both the post-colonial secular state by advocating its Islamization and the traditional society through reforms and revivalism. Streams of ideas and groups belonging to this category are numerous and diversified. However, in Somalia, two main conceptions of Islamism are most visible.⁷⁸ These are Salafism and Muslim Brotherhood.⁷⁹ Even though the Islamic movements in Somalia share many features with similar movements throughout the Muslim world, they nevertheless have a number of distinctive elements that need to be accounted for in analyzing their development, growth, and activities.⁸⁰ These unique attributes that other peripheral Muslim countries may share some its parts, not as a whole, include some challenges and opportunities. The first challenge is that Somalia had never experienced in its long history the rule of the Islamic state.⁸¹ Notwithstanding its various communities' incorporation of selective parts of Shari'a in their customary laws known as Xeer, full application of Islamic Shari'a was never practiced. This means that there are no local memories of the Islamic rule or historical legacies from which contemporary Islamists

⁷⁷ See the International Crisis Group Report, "Understanding Islamism," Middle East/North Africa Report no. 37-2 (March, 2005), 1.

⁷⁸ Another organization, Tablig Jamaaca, is not included here, even though its growing role and influence is evident as a grassroots Islamic movement, because its political activism is marginal and is considered to limit its activities on missionary work. Interestingly, however, Somali Tablighi Jamaaca actively participated in armed conflict during the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. Ibid.

⁷⁹ The difference between traditional Salafia school and neo-Salafia could be summarized in a number of points: (1) Traditional Salafia supports the ruling establishment, while neo-Salafia are an oppositional movement. (2) Traditional Salafia belongs to a school and is not organized, while neo-Salafia constitutes an Islamic movement with a political program. (3) Neo-Salafia expresses itself differently, being closer to Jihadist groups and Da'wa persuasions.

⁸⁰ These similarities may be shared to a certain extent with other Muslim non-Arabic speaking and tribal countries.

⁸¹ The Egyptian rule of the Northern Somalia (1875-1885) was ephemeral, and the rule of Sheriffs of Mukha in Zayla and Oman Sultan of Banaadir was nominal.

can draw inspiration and examples.⁸² Therefore, this entails promoters of the Islamic agenda to depend on the theoretical principles of Islam and historical applications in other Muslim countries. The second challenge is that Islamic propagation and its institutions are handled by individuals and non-state institutions without state intervention. These institutions, such as Qur'anic schools, mosques, and education circles, are established by various individuals or groups and operate without any regulations. Besides unique merits of this system due to its sustainability and mobility, its limitations, nonetheless, remain, such as its small size, fragmentation, and lack of standardization. The third challenge is the leadership style of the traditional Islamic establishment, which is based on the authoritarian-submissive relations of master-disciple nature. In such societal organizational culture, the goal of modern Islamic movements to establish larger trans-clan organizations with modern organizational settings is hard to realize. It is very difficult to bridge the incompatibility of traditional organizational models and modern organizations based on hierarchical and institutional loyalties. These inherent organizational weaknesses haunt modern Islamic movements and are the primary cause of their recurrent fragmentation and splintering. Thus, the concept of a modern organization based on memberships that offer loyalty not to individuals but to the organization's principles, procedures, and policies are a new venture and, indeed, a revolutionary idea in Somalia. The fourth challenge is the low literacy rate and the issue of the Arabic language. The literacy rate is estimated to be 24% of the population, which is an obstacle for the development of the country and for grasping the accurate meaning of Islam.⁸³ The illiterate masses are easily incited by their clan, national, and Islamic sentiments and allow all forms of extremist groups (Islamist, clanist, and nationalist) to take advantage of it. In addition, despite the fact that Somalia is a member of the Arab League, its mother tongue is the Somali language. The Arabic language is learned in the early childhood of the traditional Islamic learning or in modern Arabic curriculum schools. In Somalia,

⁸² Imam Ahmed Gurey was the leader of the Muslims in the eastern part of the historical Abyssinia that included Somalia and other nationalities such as Afar, Oromo, and others.

⁸³ There is no reliable statistical data on literacy rates. Various statistics show that it ranges between 24% and 37%. See *Somalia: Somali Democratic Republic*, available from <http://www.hmnet.com/africa/somalia/somalia.html> (accessed on October 28, 2010). Also, see the *World Fact Book*, available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/so.html> (accessed on October 28, 2010).

learning the Arabic language is tantamount to learning Islam and considered indispensable to understand Islam from its original sources. Therefore, promoting and teaching the Arabic language is strategically imperative for Somali Islamic movements, and it is part and parcel of their Islamic call program.

Apart from the above-stated challenges, the Islamic movements take advantage of a number of opportunities. The first advantage is the absence of considerable religious minorities, which might pose an obstacle to the adoption of the Islamic Shari'a. For instance, the Roman Catholic Church reported having only 100 believers in Somalia in 2004, and the total reported Somali Christians are about 1,000.⁸⁴ Therefore, the overwhelming majority of the Somali people are united in their race and religion and do not disagree on the role of Islam in the state and society.⁸⁵ The second advantage is the lack of organized secularist elites that might oppose Islamic agenda on the domestic front. The existing small secularized elites are fragmented and too weak to pose any meaningful threat to the Islamic agenda unless supported by external actors. The third advantage is the freedom of operations the Islamic movements enjoy after the collapse of the repressive state in 1991. Indeed, Somalia is an unprecedented case in modern history, in which Islamists have been operating freely and openly without the intervention of the post-colonial secular state in the past 20 years.

However, internal and external challenges facing Islamic movements are severe and supersede available opportunities. The collapse of the state, the destruction of the state institutions, and the continuous civil war brought on the Islamic movement a great burden requiring that they provide social services such as education, health, security, and conflict resolution. Moreover, in this ideal environment, all Islamist groups freely promoted their various ideologies, including the most extreme forms of Takfiir and Jihadism. Thus, Somalia became a new front for global Jihadists, where the Global War on Terrorism is waged. Indeed, the upsurge of extremism creates a poisonous environment for Islamic

⁸⁴ See *Catholic Church in Somalia*, available from <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/diocese/dmgds.html> (accessed on October 30, 2010). Also, see *Christianity in Somalia*, available from http://www.museumstuff.com/learn/topics/Christianity_in_Somalia (accessed on October 30, 2010).

⁸⁵ On April 18, 2009, Somali Transitional Parliament unanimously endorsed the application of Shari'a in Somalia. See "Somalia Votes to Implement Shari'a," available from <http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/04/200941895049381692.html> (accessed on October 2010).

moderation to prosper and obstructs a prudent application of Islam in the society and the state. It is relevant to explore their fundamental differences and their relation with traditional Islam.

The Salafia Movement versus Traditional Islam

The terminology of Salafia is highly contentious and used differently by various schools and scholars. As a general rule, Muslim scholars accept to follow the understanding and methodology used to interpret Islam by the first three generations of scholars and look to them as their role models. In this sense, all Muslims cherish and adore Salafism; however, there are many groups that claim to belong to a particular school of “Salafia.” Detractors of this school call them Wahabiyah, linking them to the teachings of Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (1703- 1792), an Islamic scholar highly popular in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States. Sometimes, they also call themselves “people of Hadith” (*Ahl al-Hadith*) interchangeably with Salafism. However, “as a rule, all Wahabis are Salafists, but not all Salafists are Wahabis.”⁸⁶ The methodology of this school stands completely in opposition to traditional Islam and rejects *taqlīd*, claiming to follow directly the Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad. Its adherents identify the *bid‘a* (innovations) introduced to Islam as the primary impediment that caused the decadence of the Muslim civilization. Therefore, in placing principal importance on preaching idealized *Tawḥīd* (monotheism), they emphasize their criticism of many traditional Muslim practices as being innovations and *shirk* (polytheism). The theology of the Salafis is based on the refutation of any *Ta’wīl* (figurative interpretation) of the attributes of Allah, advocating instead the belief in these attributes as they literally appear in the Qur’an and Prophetic traditions, without asking how, a principle known as *bila kayf* (acceptance without further enquiry).⁸⁷ The most important difference between the Ash’arites and the Salafis is permissibility and refutation of interpreting divine attributes respectively.

⁸⁶ Ahmad Maussalli, “Wahhabism, Salafism, and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?” Available from <http://conflictsforum.org/2009/wahhabism-salafism-and-islamism-who-is-the-enemy> (accessed on November 8, 2010).

⁸⁷ See Ibn-Taymiyah, *Sharḥ al-‘Aqāidah al-Wāsiṭiyah*, translated and commented by Dr. Muhammad Khalil Harras (Riyadh: Dar-Us-Salam Publications, 1996), 32.

Salafism was introduced to Somalia as part of the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in global politics. Initially, the Saudis worked in partnership with all Islamic groups, created pertinent institutions, and advocated a common Islamic stand against growing Communism and secular Arab nationalism in the 1960s.⁸⁸ However, since the 1970s, after the triumph of the Iranian Revolution and perceived threat of a similar development in other parts of the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia revised its policy; it eschewed Islamism and restricted “the domain of the political Islamic activism.”⁸⁹ In Somalia, due to its being part of the Saudi geopolitical sphere, the influence of Wahabism was noticeably augmented through students educated in the Saudi Islamic universities and through Somali migrant labour during the economic boom of the 1970s.⁹⁰ These students were taught the teachings of Sheikh Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and copied his hostile approach of conflicting with the Sufi Brotherhoods in Arabia. Moreover, they have also introduced some aspects of Hanbali jurisprudence, mixing it with other jurisprudences under the pretext of not following a specific school of jurisprudence. Furthermore, they consider their principal duty to be spreading *al-‘Aqīdah al-Saḥīḥah* (the right theology), which eventually puts them on the collision course with the Islamic belief system and practices of the society. Certainly, they believe that their theology is the only right one because it is the theology of the first three generations of Muslims, from where they draw their name, *al-Salafīyah* (followers of the early pious generations of the Muslims). Apparently, this mode of thinking breeds religious intolerance and community conflict, as well as promotes bigotry and extremism.

Moreover, having been educated in Saudi Arabia, many of these students were employed after their graduation by various Saudi institutions to preach the “the right theology” (Salafia) in Somalia. It is worth noting that the Salafis consider Sufism a dangerous heresy and consider one of their duties to engage in a campaign against the adherents of

⁸⁸ In 1957, the Saudi sponsored the creation of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and in 1962, the World Muslim League and many non-governmental institutions were also established promoting the Saudi influence worldwide and its centrality in the Muslim World. See Noohaidi Hasan, *Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the quest for identity in post new Order Indonesia* (SEAP Publications, 2006), 36-39.

⁸⁹ Ibid., 39.

⁹⁰ Approximately 250,000 Somalis have migrated to Gulf countries after the Somali/Ethiopian war of 1977/78. See Laitin and Samatar, 145.

Sufism.⁹¹ In that way, Salafism is not simply a reform movement but a revolutionary approach that aims to completely change traditional Islam as practiced in Somalia. *Salafīyah* tendencies in Somalia are fragmented into four groups: academic Salafism (*Salafīyah al-‘ilmiyah*), political Salafism (*Salafīyah al-Harakīyah*), Jihadi Salafism (*Salafīyah al-Jihādīyah*), and new Salafism (*Salafīyah al-Jadīdah (La-jama‘a)*). However, they are in harmony with each other in their confrontation with Sufi Orders, and that conflict, at times, escalates to the point that these schools of thought render each other as infidels.⁹² The extremity of this conflict is evident in the Shabab’s destruction and desecration of the tombs of prominent Sufi scholars in Somalia.⁹³

The Muslim Brotherhood versus Traditional Islam

The MB was founded in 1928 by *Ḥasan al-Bannā* in Egypt and reached Somalia in the 1953 through Egyptian teachers and then via Somali students in Arab universities. It has inspired many Islamist organizations and individuals in Somalia; however, Islaax Movement is the organization that represents its international network. The MB stands in the middle of the two orientations: traditional Islam and neo-Salafism. *Ḥasan al-Bannā* postulated in the treatise of “*Al-‘Aqā’id*” (Creed) the following moderate position on the disputed Islamic creed.

We believe that the position of the *Salaf*, which was to refrain from enquiring into the meanings of Allah’s attributes and leave the explanation of their meanings to Allah (SWT), is safer and should be followed in order to avoid problems resulting from metaphorical interpretation on the one hand, and the nullification of Allah’s attributes on the other. ... On the other hand, we believe that the metaphorical interpretations of the *Khalaf* [ash’ rites] do not sanction any judgment on them as having gone outside Islam or to have

⁹¹ See Abdurahman M. Abdullahi and Ibrahim Farah. “Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia: Reordering Islamic Work and the Clan System”, available from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/15327358/Reconciling-the-State-and-Society-in-Somalia> (accessed on June 15, 2010).

⁹² Mustafa Abu Isway, “Salafism from theological discourse to political Activism”, available from <http://www.passia.org/meetings/rsunit/Salafism.pdf> (accessed on November 8, 2010).

⁹³ See “Somalia: Al Shabab Militia Destroys the Grave of Well Known Sheikh in Mogadishu”, available from <http://www.raxanreeb.com/?p=42206> (accessed on June 18, 2010).

strayed from the right path, nor do they justify that long dispute between them and others past and present, because Islam is vast and comprehensive enough to accommodate all of them.⁹⁴

Moreover, the MB, promoting the Muslim unity among various groups, adopted the slogan, “We should unite upon that which we agree, and excuse each other in that which we disagree.” The tolerance of the MB emanates from its worldwide program based on the reform of all Muslim societies that adhere to different schools of jurisprudence, theologies, and various forms of Sufism. *Ḥasan al-Bannā*, who belonged to Hasafiyah Sufi Brotherhood in his early years, wrote that “differences on the branch matters of Islamic Jurisprudence should not be allowed to cause division, contention, or hatred within the ranks of the Muslims.”⁹⁵ In that context, followers of the MB methodology avoid divisive Islamic discourses on doctrinal matters and legal aspects within its society. Being open to the diversity of Islamic theology and practices, they are tolerant to the different theological views on Islam and despise rigid obsession with nuances of the religious doctrine. They believe that Sufism and other traditional practices should be accommodated and that the focus in Islamic activism should be directed toward social and political issues, rather than theological quibbling that divides Muslim communities. This means that the MB does not contravene Ash’ari theology, Shafi’i jurisprudence, and Sufism, which constitute the basic components of traditional Islam in Somalia.⁹⁶ However, the MB does not hesitate to cleanse practices that contravene Islamic principles in the society through educational process that does not ruin community cohesion. Indeed, its main agenda is to create an atmosphere of collaboration between various Islamic groups and organizations for the advantage of the bigger goals – the promotion of the Islam in the society and its application at the state level.

⁹⁴ *Ḥasan al-Bannā, Risalat Al-‘Aqā’id*, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/the_creed/index.htm#salaf_khalaf (accessed on June 20, 2010).

⁹⁵ *Ḥasan al-Bannā, The Message of Teachings*, Article 8, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/index.htm#understanding (accessed on June 20, 2010).

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, see article 7, where he says, “Any Muslim who has not reached the level to understand the different branches of Islamic jurisprudence may follow one of the four great Imams of this religion.”

In the conclusion, besides the hostile relations with the traditional Islam, followers of the Salafia School, believing in exclusivity and absolutism of interpreting Islam, are also in conflict with the MB on a number of issues. Just to give some examples, Salafia adherents accuse the MB of accepting Ash'ariyah theology and tolerating *bid'a* (innovations) under the pretext of the graduality of their program. They also criticize the MB of accepting selective elements of the Western modernity such as democratic process and women's political participation. Moreover, Salafis condemn the ambitious goal of the MB based on "unity in diversity" among Muslims, many of whom are allegedly enmeshed in innovations.⁹⁷ On the other hand, the MB also cautiously criticizes Salafism in many aspects. For instance, they criticize them for their literalist interpretation of Islam and conflictual approach with other Islamic activists. Moreover, the MB frowns upon the apolitical attitude of the academic Salafism and their acquiescent attitude toward oppressive regimes.⁹⁸ Furthermore, the MB adherents criticise Jihadi Salafism in aborting peaceful transformation of the Muslim society and inciting devastating civil wars. Considering Salafia as extremist group, the MB accuses them of causing more harm than good to the Islamic reformism and tarnishing global image of Islam and Muslims. The following table indicates the dynamics of the three persuasions in Somalia.

Islamic persuasions	Theology	Jurisprudence	Sufism	Remarks
Traditional Islam	Ash'ariyah theology	Shafi'iyah school of jurisprudence	Qadiriyyah and Axmadiyah	Confrontational with Salafism
Salafism/Wahabiyah	Salafia theology (al-	Non-affiliation (they claim to	Intolerant, consider them	Confrontational with

⁹⁷ Ahmad Mausalli, "Wahhabism, Salafism, and Islamism: Who is The Enemy?", available from <http://conflictsforum.org/2009/wahhabism-salafism-and-islamism-who-is-the-enemy> (accessed on November 8, 2010), 15.

⁹⁸ MB accuse the Salafis that they tolerate what could be termed as "Shirk al-Qusur" (polytheism of the ruling place) and simply focus on the "Shirk al-Qubur" (the polytheism of graveyards). This notion is that they do not confront polytheism and deviation of the ruling class while they focus on the simple deviations from Islam such as Some Sufi practices in their visitation of the graveyards of the saints and seeking their blessing.

	aqidah al-Salafia)	follow directly the Qur'ān and the Sunna of the Prophet)	innovation (Bid'a)/apostasy (shirk)	traditional Islam
Muslim Brotherhood	Tolerant of Ash'ariyah and Salafia theologies	Tolerant to all schools of jurisprudence	selective acceptance/tolerant	Tolerant to Salafism and Sufism

Table 1. Islamic persuasions in Somalia and their relations

The aftermath of the State Collapse

The above stated state-society conflict and within society primarily caused the collapse the Somali state in 1991 and disallowed its reinstitution. Various forms of governments like liberal democracy in the period of (1960-1969) and military dictatorship that imposed Socialism and extreme secularism in (1969-1991) failed abysmally. The Somali state, in particular after 1969, suppressed both Islam and clans, which then became radicalized through years of oppression. However, after the collapse of the state in 1991, besides militant clan-based factions, various Islamic movements – the extension of the similar phenomena in the Muslim world – had come to light. Islaax, following peaceful bottom-up reform, and Itixaad, following the neo-Salafia approaches, emerged strongly.⁹⁹ However, Itixaad drifted toward a militant approach, encountering many setbacks that led to its disintegration into different factions by 1997. The ideologies of these splinter groups range from peaceful traditional Salafism to extreme militancy of Salafia/Jihadists. For instance, Shabab represents the extreme derivative of the Salafia/Jihadist movement in Somalia linked to Al-Qaida. Moreover, despite different attempts to recover Somalia's

⁹⁹ See Stig Hansen and Atley Mesoy, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa" (Norwegian Institute for Urban and Regional Research (NIBR) Report, 2009), 44-52. Also, see Islaax official website <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/Islox%20iyo%20Dowrkeda%20Somaliya.htm> (accessed on January 10, 2010).

state in the past 20 years, the national state of Somalia constituted in Djibouti Peace Conference in 2008 remains weak and dysfunctional.

Currently, Somalia is virtually divided into three main entities. Two entities that occupy about 55% of the Somali territory are peaceful and thriving. These two entities are Somaliland (22% of the area),¹⁰⁰ an unrecognized separatist state since 1981, and Puntland (33% of the area), an autonomous state since 1998.¹⁰¹ Other attempts of establishing smaller administrations in some regions, such as Galmudug, are in the process of formation since 2006. In southern Somalia, the political turmoil of armed factions since 1991 was further exacerbated after 9/11. Consequently, the U.S. counter-terrorism policy had provoked the emergence of the Union of the Islamic Courts in 2006 in supporting the anti-terrorism alliance of the warlords.¹⁰² The Islamic Courts that attracted so much support in 2006 were an Al-Qaida project countering USA policy in the Horn of Africa, even though most of the Somali supporters were not aware of it. The project was skilfully masked with Islamic sentimentalism, nationalism, clanism, and personal interests. Moreover, the Ethiopian military intervention and precipitated Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2008 have also served to further radicalize the Islamist Shabab and Hisbul Islam movements. Therefore, up to the last minute of concluding this dissertation, militant Islamism and the weak national state under the protection of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) remain at loggerheads.¹⁰³ In the meantime, a militant traditional Islamist group by the name of Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaaca emerged to counter militant Islamism. The latter group's militancy known for its peaceful culture is an indication of a growing tendency of militarization of Islamic groups.

¹⁰⁰ The area of Somaliland is 137,600 km² and constitutes 22% compared with the total area of Somalia, which is 637,561 km². See the official website of Somaliland at <http://www.somalilandgov.com/>

¹⁰¹ There are an overlapping disputed area between Somaliland and Puntland and therefore their total area is less than 55%. See Ministry of Planning and Statistics, Puntland State of Somalia, "*Puntland Facts and Figures*" (2003), 10.

¹⁰² Magnus Nurell, "Islamist Networks in Somalia," FOI Somalia Papers: Report 2 (Swedish Defence Research Academy, 2008), 11.

¹⁰³ AMISOM was established in early 2007 and mandated to constitute 8,000 troops to Somali peace support. However, it generated about 5,000 troops from Uganda and Burundi. See Cecilia Hull and Emma Svensson, *The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM): Exemplifying Africa Union Peace-keeping Challenges* (Swedish Defence Research Agency, 2008).

In concluding this introduction and overview, it is evident that geographical challenges, the mismatch between the state and the nation and the strangeness between the state and the society had ultimately collapsed the state and placed an immense obstacle to its recovery. These challenges are complex, with the three identities of Somali equation – Islamism, clanism, and nationalism – remaining conflictual. Additionally, within each identity element of the equation, internal conflicts also are mounting. For instance, the upsurge of Islamic extremism of Shabaab and Hizbul Islam further exacerbated the Somali challenge. What is more, it is apparent that Islamic and clannish sentiments – if aroused as political agenda – are capable of crashing the national Somali state. This is what had happened in 1991 regarding clan extremism, and the same scenario repeated itself in 2006 vis-à-vis Islamic extremism. How can these three identities coexist and collaborate within the broader scheme of peace building? What are the prerequisites for such historical reconciliation? How can Somalia deal with all forms of extremism? These are relevant questions to be answered in the quest for lasting solutions to the Somali challenges. However, this research project is focused on the Islamic component of the Somali equation and in particular its moderate persuasion, which is necessary component for any historic national reconciliation and particularly, Islamist politics in the country.

Theoretical Framework

Modern Islamic movements were given a variety of taxonomies by different scholars, which pose a dilemma for finding a common terminology, signifying the nature and definition of such movements. Proponents of the Islamic movements use friendly terminologies such as *Islamic revival*, *Islamic renaissance*, *Islamic awakening*, and *Islamic renewal*. On the other hand, most Western scholars use such terminology as *radical Islam*, *militant Islam*, *extremist Islam*, *Islamic terrorism*, *revolutionary Islam*, and *fundamentalist Islam*. Other soft definitions include *Islamism*, *political Islam*, and *Islamic resurgence*. The pros and cons of these terms were debated exhaustively without conclusive results, and such discussion will not be replicated here.¹⁰⁴ It suffices to note that this research uses the following terminologies. “Islamic revival” signifies here the

¹⁰⁴ See Martin Kramer, “Coming to Terms: Fundamentalists or Islamists?” *Middle East Quarterly* (Spring 2003), 65-77.

early period of the emergence of the organized Sufi Brotherhoods and spread of the Islamic learning centers in the nineteenth century. “Traditional Islam” is distinguished from modern development of Islam where high learning institutions and research centers were established and traditional ways of Islamic learning and practices attached to the rural ways of life and the dominance of the Sufi Orders were questioned. On the other hand, “Islamic consciousness” signifies the awareness of the dangers that other religions and cultures pose to Islam and provokes reactions to these dangers. “Islamic awakening” includes all movements that call to restore the role of religion in day-to-day public life and politics. Its major manifestation is the increase of public religiosity and a high increase in mosques attendance especially for young generations. “Islamism” is a movement aiming to restore Islam as a religion and state. “Islamic extremism” is contrary to “Islamic moderation.” Moderation is a general feature of Islam called “*al-wasadiyah*” that sets itself up against all kinds of extremism: *ghuluw* (excessiveness), *tanattu'* (transgressing; meticulous religiosity) and *tashdid* (strictness; austerity). The concepts of “moderation” and “extremism” are not newly coined terms used to classify Muslims since the 9/11 event and the Global War on Terrorism.¹⁰⁵

Generally, historical writings draw on some theoretical assumptions explicitly or implicitly. In Somalia, most of the academic discourses were informed by the modernization and dependency theories.¹⁰⁶ The modernization theory is a general theory that seeks to explain how society progresses, what variables affect that progress, and how societies react to that progress. It was used as a power tool during the Cold War era to attract post-colonial states to follow the Western model of development. This theory underlines the necessity of borrowing the experience of Western countries for developing countries to gain economic prosperity, as well as social and cultural development. Following this view, these developing countries “must obliterate their outdated cultural

¹⁰⁵ On the issue of Islamic extremism, see Yusuf al-Qardāwī, *Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism*, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/iabrae/index.htm (accessed on August 15, 2010).

¹⁰⁶ “All history writing is, whether historians acknowledge this or not, an intrinsically theoretical as well as empirical enterprise.” See Marry Fulbrook, *Historical Theory* (New York: Routledge, 2002), 4. On the academic discourses and debates of the modernization and dependency school, see Abdullah Mohamoud, *State Collapse and Post-Conflict Development in Africa: The Case of Somalia (1960-2001)* (Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2006), 32-46.

traits, traditional values and belief system, and instead establish a modern social system that would be participative, pluralistic, and democratic.”¹⁰⁷ This stream of scholarship dominated Somali studies and was pioneered by Orientalists and anthropologists.¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, the dependency theory was a reaction to the modernization theory, having originated from Latin America, and was heavily informed by neo-Marxist theories. Its persuasion was adopted by the military regime that took power in Somalia in 1969; in the academia, it was advocated by brothers Ahmed Samatar and Abdi Samatar.¹⁰⁹ However, with respect to the role of Islam, both the modernization and dependency theories, being rooted in secular Western views of the modern world, agree on pushing Islam out of the political space. Thus, both theories failed to explain the emergence of modern Islamic movements and participation of Islamic parties in the democratic processes in many Muslim countries.

Moreover, the Islamic movement is studied within social science theories of social movements as the product of specific strains, grievances, and crises. These stresses were the result of colonialism, modernization, and secularization projects of the post-colonial Muslim states. The consequences of these tensions are so pervasive that they encompass social, political, economic, and cultural aspects. Breaking with early academic Islamic exceptionalism, there is a growing tendency to utilize theories of the social movement in the study of the Islamic movements.¹¹⁰ Accordingly, while there exists a necessity for a crisis environment for any movement to be instigated, it is not sufficient for the movement to emerge and, therefore, other factors have to be examined. These factors include organizational capability of the movement in terms of formal, informal, and social networks, as well as opportunities and constraints with respect to the capacity available to

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., 33.

¹⁰⁸ On the application of the modernization theory to the Islamic movement, see Megan Madison, “Islamism Sui Generis: Probing the West’s construction of the Islamic Threat,” paper submitted to the College of Literature, Science and the Arts, The University of Michigan, 2009. Moreover, pioneers of Somali studies are a British intelligence officer Richard Burton, Italian ethnologist Enrico Cerulli, and British social anthropologist I. M. Lewis.

¹⁰⁹ Ahmed I. Samatar is the dean of International Studies at McAlester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, and has written a number of works on Somalia. Abdi Samatar is a professor of Geography and Global Studies at the University of Minnesota, USA.

¹¹⁰ For examples of such literature, see Quintan Wiktorowicz (ed.), *Islamic Activism: A Social Theory Approach* (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004). Also, see Mustafa Abdelwahid, *The Rise of the Islamic Movement in Sudan (1945-1989)* (Edwin Millen Press, 2008).

the movement. Finally, it also covers the way the movement articulates its rationality and the necessity of its action, the solutions it brings forth, and its motivational frames.

Three theories will inform our historical construction of the Islamic movement in Somalia. The first is the theory of state, based on the assumption that national solidarity (nationalism) or tribal solidarity (clanism) in tribal societies have deficiencies and do not guarantee the survival of the state. One of the preeminent modern examples of such a society is in fact the collapse of the Somali state. Such societies can establish functional states only by making use of some religious coloring.¹¹¹ *Ibn Khaldūn* states, “Arabs [nomads] can obtain royal authority only by making use of some religious coloring, such as prophecy, or sainthood, or some great religious event in general.”¹¹² Accordingly, I would argue through historical examinations that moderate Islamism is a political reality, and Somalis will not be able to recover their collapsed state without incorporating Islam in the state-building project. This means that all elements of the Somali equation (nationalism, clanism, and Islamism) have to be recognized, respected, and reconciled instead of marginalizing and criminalizing each other, as it is currently the case in Somalia. Practically, what is needed is what this author terms “the MEGA reconciliation of the Somali equation.” Second, this thesis distances itself from the modernization and dependency theories informed by Somali history and instead applies the post-colonial theory that enables to write the native history based on the narrations of its proponents. Post-colonialism is a post-modern intellectual discourse that holds together a set of theories in reaction to the cultural legacy of colonialism. Third, this historical construction of the Islamic movement will be guided by the social movement theory as a general roadmap, without delving into its details. This approach will be demonstrated in addition to analyzing the crisis factors; organizations that emerged in reaction to various crises will be examined; opportunities and constraints within the context of local, regional, and global realities will be explored; and the system of framing will be depicted.

¹¹¹ See Demian Esteban, “Religion and State in Ibn Khaldun’s *Muqaddimah*” (MA thesis, the Islamic Institute, McGill University, 2004), 30.

¹¹² Ibn-Khaldun, *Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, 2nd ed., trans. Franz Rosenthal (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 305.

Research Problem and Questions

History is a subjective process of recreating past occurrences and also a matter of perspective. Somali history was approached from the perspectives of the modernization and dependency theories. Both theories agree in essentializing the demise of tradition, which means Islam and clan in the Somali case. Accordingly, the dichotomous clan versus the state (Qaran iyo Qabiil) approach, one representing local tradition and the other alien Western modernity, has received a substantial academic interest and popular awareness in Somalia through songs, plays, and speeches. In this battle of ideas, clanism was excessively vilified and nationalism was extremely romanticized.¹¹³ Moreover, Islam was addressed from the margins of history, through Orientalist and secularist discourses and security perspectives. It was looked on as having only social values and functions, whereas in the political arena, it was considered apolitical. However, that conception has been changing since the collapse of the state in 1991 and the public emergence of the Islamic movements. In particular, the orientation of Itixaad toward militancy and its clash with other power contenders in many regions have changed the way the Islamic movement was perceived. Subsequently, this sparked a new interest within intelligence and security studies, and early journalistic articles and rudimentary studies on this issue were produced. That interest has grown substantively after 9/11 when Somalia was identified as a possible haven for terrorism, and the Islamic movements were treated as part of the threat to the Western civilization.¹¹⁴

In that context, the perceived threat resulted in the actors not volunteering to provide information to researchers, and local detractors were offering hearsay and inaccurate, politically motivated information. In security studies, hearsay evidence is not discarded but is used to dig more information. Given these constraints, a few studies were produced but lacked in-depth historical background and accurate information, despite their obvious merits. These early sources are credited with discovering a few important facts such as

¹¹³ The most famous poetic description of clanism was produced by Cabdullahi Suldaan Tima-cadde, who said: “dugsi ma leh qabyaaladi waxey dumiso mooyaane,” which means, “*Clanist politics provide no solace, it only destroys*.”

¹¹⁴ Former NATO secretary general William Casey issues a statement considering “Islamic fundamentalism” the major threat to the western civilization. See Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (University of California Press, 2002), 3.

that the Islamic movements in Somalia are not monolithic and that they ranged from peaceful evolutionaries to militant revolutionaries.¹¹⁵ Moreover, it became clear through these studies that these movements had doctrinal and methodological differences. These facts were crucial in clearly identifying the enemy and discovering its most dangerous component, “the global Jihadism.” Despite the studies of these movements and their historical evolution, roots of their ideologies and methodologies remain puzzling. It remains a dark hole in the history of Somalia in general and in the development of the modern Islam in particular. Deciphering this puzzle would provide a better conceptualization of the Islamic movements within the historical context of Somalia. However, decoding this puzzle is not an easy task. It requires putting together its pieces through extensive fieldwork in order to come up with a more accurate and complete picture. This research will address this problem.

In particular, this research aims to explore the historical evolution of moderate Islamism since the return of Italy, as a country administering UN trusteeship, to Somalia in 1950 until the formation of the first national state after the civil war in 2000. It covers 50 years of turbulent Somali history, in which civilian governments, military dictatorships, armed opposition factions, and Islamic movements were interacting and shaping the Somali history. At times, these confrontations were peaceful and ideological, and at others, they were brutal and violent. Understanding the historical evolution of Islamism provides a better conception of its present implications in Somalia. The scope of this research is limited, however, to the study of the moderate component of Islamism represented by Islaax. The main questions of this research project are:

- What are the main factors that provoked Islamic consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s?
- What instigated the emergence of the proto-Muslim Brotherhood organizations at the end of the 1960s? How did they contribute to the Islamic awakening and how did they confront the military regime in the 1970s?

¹¹⁵ Andre Le Sage’s work was the first substantive field study of the Islamic movements. Even though this work contains some flaws, it was an important milestone in understanding Islamism in Somalia. See Andre Le Sage, *Somalia and the War on Terrorism*.

- Why did Islamic awakening that shared characteristics with proto-Muslim Brotherhood become fragmented by the end of the 1970s?
- Why was the Islaax Movement formed; what factors contributed to its formation; and what was the reaction of other organizations and governments to it?
- What is the nature of Islaax, including its philosophy, objectives, structure, and recruitment process?
- What were Islaax's challenges, limitations, achievements, and activities in its formative period of 1978-1990?
- How did Islaax deal with the civil war? What strategy did it develop and implement in 1990-2000?

Research Methodology

This study draws on the historical method based on an exhaustive search for sources of information, studying them through critical evaluation, and presenting them in the form of a synthesis.¹¹⁶ However, finding reliable information is not an easy task since Somalia's infrastructure has fallen apart after the collapse of the state in 1991, and with that, its archives, research institutes, museums, and even many of the witnesses and actors have disappeared. With respect to the Islamic movement, it should be noted that it was underground and dealing with unfavorable environments. As a result, most of these organizations' activities and plans were not recorded, and their documents were either destroyed or kept in secrecy. However, this study is fortunate to be able to discover valuable primary sources of the Islamic organizations such as Nahdah, Waxdah, and the Islaax Movement.¹¹⁷ Besides that, interviews were conducted with founders of Nahdah and Waxdah.¹¹⁸ Moreover, early members of Ahal were also interviewed at different

¹¹⁶ Louis Gottschalk, *Understanding History: A Primer Of Historical Method* (New York: University Of Chicago, 1963). Also, see Gilbert J. Garraghan, *A Guide to Historical Method* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1946).

¹¹⁷ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi, one of the founders of Waxdah, is credited for preserving some of these documents. Also, Sheikh Cabdiraxman Koosaar, one of the early members of Waxdah, provided the by-law of Waxdah, which was identical with the one kept by Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi.

¹¹⁸ The only two persons who are alive are Sheikh Maxamad Axmad Nur (Geryare) and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xusseini Samatar. The author succeeded in interviewing both of them at length.

times and in different places to reconstruct the history of this organization.¹¹⁹ Founders of the Islaax and other prominent leaders were also interviewed individually. The most important encyclopedic asset for this research is Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, one of the founders of Nahdah and the first chairman of Islaax. He was an eyewitness of and participant in the development of the Islamic movement from its inception in the 1960s. Thus, the method of elite interviewing is used by identifying well informed persons who participated in the particular activities and events and offering them a VIP treatment to be interviewed.¹²⁰

Interestingly, while focusing on the modern development, the researcher discovered that traditional Islam also is not well recorded. There is no comprehensive work on Sufi Brotherhoods, although a few episodic studies exist. For example, most of the studies consider Saalixiyah as an independent Sufi order, while it is a branch of the Axmadiyah/Idrisiyah Order. Perhaps, Saalixiyah was singled out because of the prominence of Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan, who was a national icon for Somalia. Thus, substantial fieldwork and extensive interviews were conducted with the leaders of the Sufi orders to provide background setting from the development of the Sufi Brotherhoods.

Organization of the Research

This research work consists of seven chapters. The first is the introductory chapter, which provides an overview of the dynamics of Islam, the clan, the state and the strategic geographical location that has made Somalia the epicenter of conflict in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, a genealogy of Islam and relations of its traditional components with Islamism are offered. Furthermore, research problems, questions, and methodology are presented. Finally, scholarship on Somalia and Islamism is studied, and notes on the theoretical backdrop conclude this chapter.

¹¹⁹ Yusuf Axmad Nuur and Axmad Cali Axmad, interviewed by the author on June 14, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹²⁰ On elite interviews, see Lewis Dexter, *Elite and Specialized Interviewing* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

The second chapter provides a historical background of Islam in Somalia until 1950. It navigates through the early impulse of Islam in the Horn of Africa and its spread in Somalia through massive migration from Arabia. This chapter in particular explicates the revival of Islam in the nineteenth century and the use of the Islamic scholars' inventive systems and effective techniques to educate the population through Qur'anic schools, Islamic circles, and Sufi settlements. The two main Sufi orders – Qaadiriyah and Saalixiyah – are examined. In addition, the way these Sufi orders countered colonialism is studied, and their early militancy and moderation are analyzed. The modern anti-colonial institutions emerged after the Second World War, which united the Somalis; they are also discussed.

Chapter Three examines the rise of Islamic consciousness after Italy's return to Somalia in 1950 as a UN trusteeship administrator. In this period, cultural foundations for the emergence of the Islamic awakening were laid. This chapter explores the role of Islam and its revival in the period from 1950 to 1967 in the context of changing political and cultural conditions in Somalia. This includes the formative period of the Somali state and the early years of independence (1960-1967). Specifically, this chapter delves into the underlying factors for the emergence of Islamic consciousness. These factors include the strengthened capacity of the Islamist elites and provocations of Christian missionaries and the debates on the selection of the Somali language script. In this context, cultural competition between Egyptian Arabic schools and Western education through local schools and scholarships is demonstrated. This chapter concludes by depicting the process of elite formation and the beginning of their ideological divide that gradually marginalized Islamic elites.

Chapter Four examines the Islamic awakening and its early institutions from 1967 to 1978. It reconstructs the history of three pioneering organizations, namely, *Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah* (the Organization for Islamic Renaissance) or "Nahdah," *Ahl al-Islām* (the People of Islam) or "Ahal," and *Wahdat al-Shabāb al-Islāmī* (the Union of Islamic Youth) or "Waxdah." Moreover, the conflict between the Islamic awakening and the military regime is examined, and the case study of the Family Law and its role in fragmenting and radicalizing the Islamic awakening is presented.

Chapter Five contains a case study of the Islaax Movement. It explores this movement's historical development from 1978 to 1990 in three stages. The first stage is the early period of the introduction of the MB ideology to Somalia and Somali students' contacts with the MB in Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia. The second stage explores the establishment of the Islaax Islamic Society, its nature, objectives, structure, and recruitment strategies. The third stage examines the programs of Islaax and its activities from 1978 to 1990 in the light of the Somali socio-political realities during the dictatorial regime. This chapter depicts challenges, limitations, achievements, and major activities of the movement before the collapse of the state.

Chapter Six explores the history of the Islaax Movement in Somalia during the civil war (1991-2000), dividing this period into three sections. The first section sets the stage and provides a brief background on Somalia after the collapse of the state (1991-2000). It also explores the Islaax Movement during 1991-1992, its survival strategy, policies, and interactions. Moreover, it explores the conference of Islaax leadership in 1992 in Djibouti and strategy developed for the stateless Somalia. The second section examines the political strategy, theoretical challenges, and reconciliation programs of the Islaax Movement. The third section investigates the social development strategy of Islaax with a special focus on education. The concept of developing a popular educational revolution and its implications are explained.

Chapter Seven offers the final summary and conclusions in the form of general themes of historical construction and analysis since the 1950s. It looks into the implications of the 9/11 U.S. Global War on Terrorism for the resurgence of the Islamic extremism that challenged Islamic moderation and complicated the political conditions of Somalia.

Chapter Two

Historical Background

Somalia has had close relations with the Arabian Peninsula since ancient times, relations that grew even stronger with the advent of Islam in Arabia in 610 AD. Because of religious-political turmoil and ecological calamities in Arabia, successive waves of immigrants fled to the Horn of Africa for safety, economic opportunities and propagating Islam. Detailed historical records of the Islamic influx and its expansion into the Somali coast remain controversial; nevertheless, historians agree that Islam reached Somalia peacefully through trade and migration in the first century of the Muslim Calendar (700-800 AD).¹ The process of Islamization was intensified by continual migration, interactions, and preaching; and with it urbanization and changes in the modes of production took place all along the Somali coast.² Interactions between the new immigrants and local Somalis have continued through intermarriage and common bonds of faith. As a result, many coastal cities, such as Banaadir, and including Mogadishu, Marka, Barawe, and Warsheik, were established and flourished. Manifestly, mass conversion of Somalis to Islam occurred between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries AD.

With Islamization, some successful states emerged in different parts of the Horn of Africa. In the northern regions, the cities of Saylac and Berbera were connected with the Ethiopian plateau and the historical Islamic city of Harrar. Saylac is famous for being the capital city of the Sultanate of Ifat, which was inherited after its collapse in 1415 by the Adal Sultanate, a multi-ethnic Muslim state inhabited by Somalis, Oromo, Afar, and Harrars. This Muslim state was in conflict with Abyssinia during the reign of Ethiopian Emperor Negus Yeshaq (1414-1429). This state is remembered for its legendary leader Imam Ahmed Ibrahim Gran (Gurey), who captured most of the Ethiopian highland saved only by the Portuguese military intervention. On the other hand, the southern part of

¹ 'Ali Sheikh Aḥmad Abūbakar, *Al-Da'wa al-Islāmiyah al-Mu'āsira fī Al-Qarn al-Ifriqī* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Umayya Publishing House, 1985), 9. Also, David D. Laitin, and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 8.

² I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), 20.

Somalia interacted with early Arab and Persian migrants and later with the Sultanate of Oman, linking them with the Kiswahili hybrid civilization in East Africa. In the late fifteenth to mid-seventeenth centuries, the first centralized state of Somali ethnic origin was established by the Ajuran clan-family, termed by Professor Cassanelli as a “pastoral power.”³ After the disintegration of this dynasty, southern Somalia remained under a variety of local powers until the arrival of Oman dynasty in the seventeenth century.

Although Somalia was connected with the Islamic world culturally and commercially, it remained politically peripheral and independent until the seventeenth century. The expansion of the Ottoman Empire into Egypt in 1517, and its subsequent seizure of the ports of Eden (1538) and Sawakin (1557) on the Red Sea was the beginning of Somali political integration with the world of Islam. From these ports, the Ottomans were able to extend their influence into the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. However, when the Ottoman power declined and the Suez Canal was opened in 1869, Egypt showed interest in the Somali coast. As a result, it established its presence in the northern Somali ports of Berbera and Saylac and the religious center of Harrar in 1875.⁴ However, the emergence of the *Mahdiah* movement in Sudan in 1884 resulted in a hasty Egyptian withdrawal in 1885. In the southern part of Somalia, in the seventeenth century, Mogadishu declined economically because of the long-lasting Portuguese sea blockade and nomadic encroachments from the interior. It was ruled by the Omanis until 1871. In 1889, Italy established its presence there and finally purchased Mogadishu from the Omanis in 1905.⁵ After this brief historical sketch, we now turn to the revival of Islam in the Somali peninsula, the advent of colonial powers, and Somali reactions.

³ Lee Cassanelli, *The Shaping of Somali Society, Reconstructing the History of a Pastoral People, 1600-1900* (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982), 84, 98.

⁴ Harrar was the capital city of the Islamic emirates where Muslim leader Ahmed Ibrahim Gurey launched a war of conquest in the sixteenth century to the Ethiopian highlands. Harrar is the holiest city of Islam in the Horn of Africa.

⁵ “On January 13, 1905, Italy purchased the Banaadir Port for 3.6 billion lire and acquired the right to maintain commercial installations at [Kismayo] in the British Jubaland”. See Daniel William Puzo, *Mogadishu, Somalia: Geographic Aspects of its Evolution, Population, Functions and its Morphology* (PhD Thesis submitted to the University of Los Angeles, 1972), 60. See also, Edward Alpers, “Mogadishu in Nineteenth Century: A Regional Perspective,” *Journal of African History*. Vol. 24, No. 4, 1983, 441-459.

The Revival of Islam in the Nineteenth Century

In the nineteenth century, the Muslim world was experiencing reform and revival of Islam associated with the emergence of the new revivalist movements and reorientation and renaissance of the Sufi Orders. Somalia as part of this reform and revival, its Islamic scholars initiated inventive and sustainable system of education, using effective techniques to educate the population. These techniques deserve an in-depth academic research that we will not be able to include in this brief description. We can argue, however, that prior to the modern school system that came with colonialism, traditional education in Somalia was “community-centered and locally administered.”⁶ It was also an Islamic-centered system that was based on partial or full memorization of the Qur’an in early childhood. This basic school, termed Dugsi or Malamat, was usually established collectively by the community. The Somali way of learning the Arabic alphabet, so as to easily memorize the Qur’an, was invented by the Somali scholar Sheikh Yusuf al-Kawneyn, who introduced around the 13th century the notation system for Arabic alphabets in the Somali language known as Higaadda.⁷ In general, children join this system at the age of five and graduate at the age of ten or eleven, with the second revision of memorization called Nakhtiin.⁸ Every school is independently run by a highly respected teacher in the community called Macalin. These teachers are paid fairly for their service in a variety of ways by individual members who send their children into their custody.⁹ These schools are spread throughout Somalia, even in the pastoral areas, providing basic Islamic education and subsequently contributing to the elimination of

⁶ Abdinoor Abdullahi, *Constructing Education in the Stateless Society: The Case of Somalia* (Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Ohio, 2007), 25.

⁷ Sheikh Yusuf al-Kawneyn (Aw-Barkhadle) is one of the oldest known Islamic scholars who propagated Islam in Somalia. Little is known about his biography; however, I. M. Lewis reconstructed some insights from oral traditions and findings of Cerulli in Harrar. His tomb is located at Dagor, about 20 km from Hargeysa. See I.M. Lewis, *Saints and Somalis: Popular Islam in the Clan-Based Society* (The Red Sea Press, Inc., 1998), 89-98.

⁸ Qur’an is normally memorized in two processes. The first process is a bottom-up process until all the Qur’an is memorized, on average within 3-4 years. The second phase is to repeat memorization using a top-down methodology. During this time, some students become “kabir”, which means “Qur’anic teacher under training,” and while helping the teacher, also reaffirm their memorization. This author experienced this process, being raised in a family famous for teaching the Qur’an.

⁹ Among the pastoral nomads, teachers are paid in kind such as goats, cows, and camels and in the agricultural areas with different crops. In the cities, teachers are paid cash. Orphans and vulnerable students are provided with scholarships.

illiteracy. They adjust to the different conditions of the nomadic population by repositioning themselves with the roving pastoral nomads in their seasonal settlements. The Qur'anic school sites are very simple and environmentally friendly. Generally, students gather beneath a shady tree or in a shelter constructed from local wood and grass and sit on the ground or on woven-grass mats. They use local materials such as wooden slates and ink made of milk mixed with powdered charcoal as educational materials. The wooden slates are made from special wood that is washable and reusable for many years. Every student must have at least four such wooden slates, using one slate each day to write certain verses of the Qur'an to be memorized during that day. The other three slates are reserved with the previous three days' lessons to be revised every day. In addition to that there is a continuous process of affirming memorization through collective recitation techniques of the Qur'an called Subac.¹⁰



¹⁰ "Subac" is from the Arabic Sab'a that means seven, designating the seven chapters of the Qur'an recited in the seven days of the week. It is one of the many ways of reciting the Qur'an in Somalia. Memorizers of the Qur'an sit in a circle and everybody recites one verse in a loud voice and passes to the next person to recite the next verse, continuing in that way like a relay race. From time to time, they all join in at the end of a verse in a loud chorus. This form of reciting is also used as a demonstration by the teachers of the Qur'an to the parents of the students that their children memorized Qur'an.

Figure 1. Rural Qur'anic school in Somalia where students are sitting on the ground and hold wooden slates used as environmentally-friendly educational material.

These schools provide an opportunity for mass education that is accessible and affordable for the general population. This community-supported system remained sustainable for centuries and functions well until today. Almost all Somali children in villages, towns, and cities go through some form of Qur'anic schooling. As a result, Arabic is the first alphabet taught to every Somali child so that they are at least able to recite the basics of the Qur'an. Consequently, it could be speculated that the number of the Qur'anic schools are an indication of the Islamic penetration in a particular community and in the society at large.

The second level of Islamic education is assigned to the mosques and small prayer sites called Mawla. Some dedicated graduates from the Qur'anic schools proceed to the higher level of Islamic learning, which aims to produce Islamic scholars of different calibers. Since opportunities for higher education are confined mostly to specific locations in urban centers, it was not affordable to all students. Thus, a self-supporting system of scholarships to promote Islamic education was established by the communities. This scholarship package encompasses free education offered by the learned scholars and free accommodation provided by the community members. This system, called Jilidda Xer cilmiga, in which dwellers of cities provided food for the rural students of Islamic studies, was the most prominent factor in the success of early education and Islamization in Somalia. These students, upon their return to their original homes, established Islamic education centers and provided Islamic services to their communities. Its integrative societal impact is immeasurable; it is beyond our limited scope to elaborate on it here. Moreover, some of these students remain in the urban centers, establish new villages, and initiate the process of settlement and urbanization of the pastoral population. The curriculum of "mosque schools" constitutes the Arabic language, Shafi'i jurisprudence, Tafsir, and Hadith. This form of education is a life-long learning without age constraint. It

has no hierarchy of subjects and at any stage of learning, a student might have only one teacher and one subject, and the duration of the courses was not fixed.¹¹

This type of education has produced different levels of Islamic scholars, with a few becoming prominent scholars all over Somalia. Some of these scholars focused on the studies of jurisprudence and became judges and teachers while belonging to one of the Sufi orders. Others combined their studies with Sufism at an early stage and focused on spreading Sufi orders. Students join and leave the course at will and few of them reach the highest level of “teacher Sheikh, offered Ijaasa (a permission to exercise the authority of being a sheikh or Sufi master) by their teacher. Those who are more committed are sent back to their clans to propagate Islam, as recommended by the Qur’an.¹²

The third level of the Islamic education is Sufism, dispensed by the masters of the Sufi orders. Sufi orders, which mean way, path, and method in Islam, focus on spiritual purification under the guidance of a spiritual master. Followers of Sufism seek a closer personal relationship with God through special disciplines and spiritual exercises. Generally, a Sufi order takes the name of its founder, such as Qaadiriyah for the Sufi order founded by Sheikh Abdulqadir al-Jeylani. Although it is beyond our topic to delve into its details, it should be understood that Sufism in Somalia is an extension of the similar phenomenon in the Muslim world with the added Somali specificity. Islamic learning focusing on the Qur’an and the basics of jurisprudence had a limited impact on the clannish non-Arabic-speaking and pastoral societies. Nonetheless, Sufi orders, with their symbolical activities and closeness to people’s culture, contributed greatly to the revival of Islam among the masses, using innovative mobilization techniques. The most popular techniques are called Dikri in which religious poems Qasaaid are created and chanted in a chorus and in an artistic manner, blessing people, reciting the Qur’an for the sick and diseased, annual remembrance of deceased parents (closer and distant), the commemoration of the birth of the Prophet Mawliid, visiting the blessed sheikh’s tombs

¹¹ See Ibrahim Mohamud Abyan and Ahmed Gure Ali. “Non-formal Education in Somalia” (A document produced for the United Nations Education and Cultural Organization at a meeting of experts on alternative approaches to school education at the primary level, held in Addis Ababa, 6-10 October, 1975).

¹² See the verse from the Qur’an (9:122), “and it is not proper for the believers to go out to fight (Jihad), all together. Of every troop of them, a party only should go forth, that they may get instructions in Islamic religion, and that they may warn their people when they return to them, so that they may beware (of evil).”

Siyaaro, etc. These techniques create collectiveness and a sense of belonging and mutual support for the adherents of the Sufi orders. They also create a web of trans-clan networks in society, diluting clan polarization and segmentation. Moreover, these networks enable their members to create business contracts and marry each other's daughters to bolster their relations.

The Revival of Sufi Brotherhoods

Although Sufism existed and was practiced since the early Islamic history, most of the organized brotherhoods emerged in the eleventh, twelfth and thirteenth centuries AD. For instance, Qaadiriyah was founded by Sheikh 'Abdulqādir al-Jeylāni (1077-1166); Rufaiyah was founded by Sayid Aḥmed al-Ruf āi (1118-1182); and Shaadaliyah was founded by Abu- Ḥassan al-Shādali (1196-1258). In Somalia, the advent of Sufism has been recorded since the early fifteen century with the arrival of 44 Islamic scholars under the leadership of Sheikh Ibrahim Abu-Zarbai in 1430. It also reported that Sheikh Jamāl al- Addīn bin Yusuf al-Zayli'i (d. 1389), the author of the book *Nasbu al-Rāya li Ahādīṭh al-Hidāyah*, was one of the Sufi Sheikhs in Somalia. However, this remains a speculation, since there are no more accounts of him.¹³ Nevertheless, its renewal and reform as an organized movement was noted from the last quarter of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. Indeed, Said Samatar wrote, "These years between 1880 and 1920 can be described as the era of the Sheikhs in Somali history."¹⁴ Revival is an important dimension of the historical experience of Muslims; Sufi reformation entailed shifting from individual Islamic activities to institutionalized orders.¹⁵ Traditionally, Sufi order masters belong to all three categories of Islamic scholars in Somalia, the Culumo or Wadaado. In their communities, they are easily identified by the titles attached to their names: Sheikh (Islamic jurist and teacher), Macallin (Qur'anic teacher), and Aw (a person with an elementary Islamic education). After joining a Sufi order by taking the oath of

¹³ See Moḥamad Aḥmed Jumale, *Dawr 'Ulamā Junūb al-Somāl fī al-Da'wa al-Islāmiyah* (1889-1941) (Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Umm Durman, Khartoum, 2007), 84.

¹⁴ Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayid Mohamed Abdulle Hassan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 97.

¹⁵ Scott Steven Rees, *Patricians of the Banadir: Islamic Learning, Commerce and Somali Urban Identity in the Nineteenth Century* (Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Pennsylvania, 1996), 306.

allegiance called *Bay'a* and receiving a banner, a chain, and the litanies (Awraad) of the order, some of them retain their original titles, while others may change to the title Khaliif, the marker of the Sufi masters.¹⁶ The stimulus for their revival, as described by Trimingham, was the emergence of charismatic spiritual preachers with a talent for mass mobilization during this period.¹⁷ However, this *raison d'être* is not enough to explain the phenomenon. It seems that this revival is not an isolated occurrence in Somalia but could be related to similar revivalist movements in the Muslim world that could be linked with the increased awareness of external threats and the decline of morality in Muslim societies.

Traditional Sufi orders have taken mainly peaceful approaches to socio-religious reform through Islamic propagation and spiritual revitalization.¹⁸ As such, they dominated religious life, reaching out to populations in the urban and rural areas alike, most of who had identified with one of the Sufi orders by the nineteenth century. Sufi sheikhs, besides their complementary role in running community affairs, established Islamic commonwealth centers Jamaacooyin whose dwellers gave their allegiance only to their Sufi masters/sheikhs.¹⁹ Moreover, in contradiction to conventional historiography that considers Sufi orders to be mainly apolitical, many leaders of the Sufi orders and their disciples became the supreme leaders of their communities. In this way, clan allegiances and loyalties were diluted and at times transformed into ideological loyalties.

¹⁶ Since there is no certification system in traditional education, the minimum requirement to bear the name of "Sheikh" is the capacity to contract marriages and administer the law of inheritance. On the other hand, the title of "Macallin" is carried by those who have dedicated their life to the teaching of the Qur'an, and "Aw" is a less significant title demonstrating simply that a person went through some kind of elementary Islamic education. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness" in *Variations on the Theme of Somaliness*, edited by Muddule Suzanne Liluis (Turku, Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001), 233.

¹⁷ See Rees, *Patricians*, 302-303.

¹⁸ The nature of peacefulness of Sufi Orders may be interrupted because of external provocations, such as colonialism in the case of many scholars, exemplified by Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan, and internal doctrinal conflicts, such as the conflict between Bardheere Jamaaca and Geledi Sultanates and current fighting between Shabaab and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaaca.

¹⁹ Certainly, all Jama'a communities in Somalia, estimated by I.M. Lewis in the 1950s to account for more than 80 communities, are under the leadership of a master/sheikh, and the clan factor has not much space. Of these, over half were Axmadiyah, and the remaining was distributed almost equally between Qaadiriyah and Saalixiyah (note here Lewis is not including Saalixiyah in Axmadiyah which is not true). See Lewis, *Saints*, 35. Moreover, Professor Mukhtar produces 92 Jama in 1920s in the Italian colony, where 50 Jama were located in the upper Juba, 30 in Banaadir, 4 in Lower Juba, and 8 in Hiiraan. See Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary of Somalia*. African Historical Dictionary Series, 87 (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 127.

Occasionally, both religious and secular authorities are combined in one leader creating a strong Sufi master or sheikh. Moreover, most of the Islamic education centers were located in settlements in agricultural areas and around water wells and many of these were later transformed into villages, towns, and cities. In this way, the Sufi orders transformed pastoral society into settled communities engaged in agriculture and/or trade.²⁰

These Sufi orders remain active across Somalia with popular support, despite the fact that modern non-affiliate elites have emerged with the development of modern education and modern Islamic movements eschewing Sufism. Briefly, the main characteristics of Sufi orders in Somalia are as follows. They are affiliated with the wider networks of Sufi brotherhoods in the Muslim world. Their leadership is absolute and authoritative, and succession is not necessarily based on heredity; however, the Khaliif designates his successor in his lifetime. Often, Khaliifs nominate their sons, believing that their Baraka is dormant in them, and members of the order will pay great respect to the son derived from respect for his father. Every Khaliif has an official Sufi genealogy connecting him to the founder of his order. Membership is acquired by new aspirants through direct formal initiation (allegiance). Every member has to comply with the policies and procedures of the orders that include regular recitation of litanies. Finally, members take the common name of Ikhwaan (brethren) that connotes their relation to pan-Islamic brotherhood.²¹

There are two main Sufi orders in Somalia: Qaadiriyah and Axmadiyah. Each Sufi order has its local offshoots.²² Qaadiriyah has two main branches, Zayli'iyah and Uweysiyah. Zayli'iyah was founded by Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Saylici (1815-1882), who was based in Qulunqul near Dhagaxbuur in the Western Somalia (Somali State of Ethiopia). Uweysiyah was founded by the spiritual master Sheikh Aweys ibn Axmad al-Barawe (1846-1907), and its seat was located in Balad al-Amiin near Afgooye, about 40 km south of Mogadishu. Axmadiyah also has three offshoots in Somalia: Raxmaaniyah, Saalixiyah,

²⁰ Laitin, and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 45.

²¹ Spencer Trimingham, *Islam in Ethiopia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952), 236-237.

²² Most scholars fail to distinguish between the original Sufi order and their later derivatives. Sometimes these Sufi orders are said to be three, making Saalixiyah a separate order from Axmadiyah and also neglecting the existence of the Rufaiyah Order. See Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 45.

and Dandarawiyah. Raxmaaniyah was founded by Maulana Abdurahman ibn Mohamud (d. 1874). Saalixiyah has two branches: southern branch introduced by Sheikh Maxamad Guuleed al-Rashiidi (d.1918) and northern branch by Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan (1856-1920). Dandarawiyah was introduced by Sayid Aadan Axmad and has a limited following in northern Somalia.²³




Figure 2. Historical Islamic learning centers: Banaadir region (Mogadishu, Marka & Barava) and Harar & Jigjiga region. Direction of the arrows shows directions of the emissaries and scholars graduated from the Islamic centers.

²³ Cabdirisag Caqli, *Sheikh Madar: Asaasaha Hargeysa* (biographical work on Sheikh Madar written in Somali Language, no date or publishing house).

In gathering together the pieces of the early history of the Sufi orders, it is important to note that there were two regional centers of Islamic learning in the Horn of Africa in pre-colonial Somalia. These centers were connected with Yemen, Zanzibar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. One of these centers was in the Banaadir region, where the cities of Mogadishu, Barava, Marka, and Warsheik are located. In these centers, famous Islamic scholars and prominent Sufi sheikhs have been spreading Islam to the clans of the interior. They also established pan-clan networks through common affiliation to one of the Sufi orders. Students traveled to Banaadir via trade routes connecting this area with the southern and middle regions of Somalia.²⁴ The other Islamic education centers were located in the historical cities in western Somalia (Somali state of Ethiopia) such as Harrar, Jigjiga, and surrounding areas. In particular, Qulunqul is renowned as the Qaadiriyah Sufi center and had its special importance as the site of the founder of Zayli branch of Qaadiriyah, Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici. Islamic scholars and students of Islamic studies were traveling between Harrar, Jigjiga, and surrounding areas and the northern and northeastern Somali regions that include the current Somaliland and Puntland states of Somalia. In particular, western Somalia was the champion of the Qaadiriyah Orders, vigorously spreading it in the northern Somalia and Puntland areas. Other Sufi orders were marginal late-comers. The two main Sufi orders, Qaadiriyah and Axmadiyah, and their offshoots were spreading their messages along with Islamic education centers.

The Qaadiriyah Sufi Brotherhood

The oldest order in Islam was founded in Baghdad by Abdulqadir al-Jeylani (d. 1166) and was brought to western and northern Somalia in the early sixteenth century by *Abūbakar b. ‘Abdallah al-‘Aidarūsi* (d. 1502) from Hadramout in Yemen.²⁵ Followers of Qaadiriyah in Somalia are roughly estimated by Professor Said Samatar to be as many as 75% of the population, and this order is unmatched in terms of popularity and dispersion

²⁴ See trade routes in early Somalia in Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 9-10.

²⁵ See Moḥamed ‘Abdallah Al-Naqīra, *Intishār al-Islam fī sharq Ifrīqiyah wa munāḥadat al-Garbi Lahu* (Riyadh: Dar al-Marikh, 1982), 160.

in every region.²⁶ It grew first in the historic city of Harrar, the metropolis of Islam in the Horn of Africa, and spread, through Arab immigrants from Yemen, to Mogadishu and surrounding cities. It remains obscure, however, when and how the Brotherhood spread from there to other parts of Somalia until nineteenth century. The city of Harrar, being the center of Islamic learning for the entire region, was clearly the place where many Somalis resided and were educated. Moreover, historical records show that after Egypt withdrew precipitately because of military pressure from the Sudanese *Mahdiah* movement, Ethiopia conquered Harrar in 1887. The Ethiopians massacred the population and the city's Islamic scholars, closed learning centers, and desecrated Islamic shrines.²⁷ In this juncture, Menelik, the Ethiopian Emperor, boasted: "I hoisted my flag in [Amir Abdullaahi's] capital and my troops occupied his city. Gagne (Garan) died. Amir Abdullaahi in our day was his successor. This is not a Muslim country, as everyone knows".²⁸ As a consequence of this conquest, some surviving Islamic scholars moved to locations distant from Harrar. Thus, from the Somali side, the town of Jigjiga replaced Harrar and became a new thriving center of Islamic learning in the area.²⁹ The two most prominent scholars, Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici and Xaaji Jaamac made their residence in Jigjiga and Qulunqul respectively. Sheikh Saylici focused on spreading the Qaadiriyah Order, while Xaaji Jaamac established an Islamic learning center in Jigjiga. From these two centers and their satellite sub-centers, Islamic education and the Qaadiriyah Order spread hand in hand in the surrounding regions. Moreover, even before the time of Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici, Islamic communes Jamaacooyin were established in many parts of western and northern Somalia. The most famous was Jamaaca Weyn founded by Sheikh Madar Axmad Shirwac (1825-1918), the founder of Hargeysa city, along with other centers in Gebiley and Borama. In the following

²⁶ There is no exact statistical data on Sufi affiliations, but this high percentage reflects that majority of the Somalis belong to the Qadiriyah Order. See Said Samatar (ed.), *In the Shadows of Conquest: Islam in Colonial Northeast Africa* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1992), 8.

²⁷ For more details on the implications of the Ethiopian conquest of Harrar see Abubakar, *Al-Da'wa*, 25-26. A notable example is that the historic Mosque in Harrar was converted to Church and remains as such until today.

²⁸ This quotation is recorded in Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 53.

²⁹ The renowned Qaadiriyah Islamic scholars in Jigjiga were Sheikh Cabdiraxman Axmad Gole (af-Guriye), Sheikh Cumar al-Azhari, Sheikh Cabdullahi al-Qutubi, Sheikh Cabdisalam Xaaji Jaamac, Sheikh Maxamuud Macallin Cumar, and many others. Sheikh Cabdullahi Sheikh Cali Jawhar interviewed on July 29, 2009, Borama, Somaliland.

discussion, we will trace the development and revival of the Qaadiriyah Order in western/northern and southern Somalia separately. There were also independent Islamic education centers in Gal-Cusbo in Hiiraan region, Roox in Nugaal region, and Xaafun in Bari region that do not belong to Sufi brotherhoods. Although it is outside the scope of this panoramic overview, it is crucial to note that these centers produced famous scholars. For instance, Gal-Cusbo produced Sheikh Cabdalla Qoriyow and Sheikh Cabdalla Migaag, who were judges for the Darawiish Movement led by Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan (1900-1921).³⁰ In addition, Roox, located 50 km north of Gaalkacyo, was the center of Xaaji Yusuf Maxamad Fiqhi Idris, the teacher of Sheikh Cali Majertain and other prominent scholars.³¹ Moreover, Xaafun education center was well connected to the Arabian Peninsula and from there Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow, the modern founder of Salafia School in Somalia was educated.³²

Qaadiriyah in the Northern Somalia

In northern Somalia, the Qaadiriyah Order was directly linked to Harrar and later to Jigjiga and Qulunqul. Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici (1920-1882) was born in Kidle, near Mubarak, a town in the Bakool region, about 100 miles northwest of Mogadishu.³³ After finishing his basic education in his home district, he pursued further Islamic education in Mogadishu. He frequented the famous Islamic education center of Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar and received Sufi training from his Qaadiriyah master Sheikh Ismaciil al-Maqdishu.³⁴ Later, he traveled for pilgrimage and met with the Qaadiriyah Sufi master, Sheikh Fadal al-Qādiriyah, who offered him Ijaasa and pointed him to return to Somalia. Upon his return via Berbera, he taught Islam in Harrar for many years and then traveled

³⁰ Hassan Haji Moḥamūd, *Al-Somāl: al-Hawiyah wa al-Intimā* (unpublished work).

³¹ Aw Jāma‘ ‘Umar ‘issa, *Safahāt min tārīkh al-‘allāma al-Ḥāji ‘Ali ‘Abdurrahman Faqīh (1797-1852)* (Sana: Markaz Ibadi li dabat wa nashri, 2009), 13.

³² In 1928, Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow had moved to the town of Xaafuun, which used to be a center of Islamic learning, to further his Islamic education. During this period, the town was a thriving trade center that exported salt. It was a center of Islamic learning with three mosques populated with the students of Islamic knowledge. The most prominent Islamic scholar was Sheikh Maxamad Aw-Suufi who, according to accounts, studied in Sudan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow and Cabdirisaaq Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow interviewed by the author on May 8-10, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

³³ Reese, *Patricians*, 309.

³⁴ See Yāsin ‘Abdirisāq al-Qardhāwī, *Dhukhāir al-Nukhba min Tarājim ‘Ulamā Sharq Ifrīqiyyah* (n.p), 2005), 29.

to Mogadishu in 1850. The purpose of his Mogadishu trip was to receive the permission of his Sufi master Sheikh Ismaciil al-Maqdishu to establish a Qaadiriyah center in Qulunqul, near Dhagaxbuur. Sheikh Cabdiraxman became the unchallenged master of Qaadiriyah in Somalia, and his disciples include prominent scholars such as Sheikh Maxamad Ismaciil Timacade, Sheikh Aadan Mustafa al-Hobyi, Sheikh Axmad Gole (Af-Guriye), Sheikh Cabdisalam Xaaji Jaamac, Sheikh Yusuf Dubad, and many others.³⁵ Here we produce short biographies of Sheikh Madar Axmad Shirwac, who lived earlier and is one of the first known reformers in northern Somalia, and Sheikh Cali Jawhar, an Islamic scholar unparalleled in his drive for Islamic education. They exemplify the role that the traditional Islamic scholars in pre-colonial and early colonial periods played in reforming society and renewing Islam.

Sheikh Madar Axmad Shirwac (1825-1918) was a Sufi guide, social reformer, and jurist. He was born in Hadayta near Berbera into a pastoral family. In his early childhood, he memorized the Qur'an and learned the Arabic language in a pastoral Qur'anic school, a mobile school moving with the pastoral seasonal movements. Berbera was the commercial port connected with the historic Islamic city of Harrar, and Islamic scholars, students, and business people were frequently traveling between these two cities. Other cities did not develop in this area during this period. While Berbera was the regional trade hub, Harrar was the regional seat of Islamic learning. After Britain's takeover of Aden in 1939, Berbera was supplying livestock to the British garrison in Aden. Consequently, pastoralists in the area, benefiting from the lucrative business opportunity, became more affluent, and trade between Berbera and Harrar was also thriving. As a result, many Somalis lived in Harrar for business, work, and as students of Islam. By 1855, as related by Richard Burton, the British intelligence officer, about 2,500 Somalis lived in Harrar, one third of the total population of the city.³⁶ Two of the three most prominent scholars were ethnic Somalis, namely, Xaaji Jaamac and Kabir Khalil. Kabir Khalil most likely

³⁵ The successor of Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Saylici was designated to Sheikh Abubakar bin Yusuf al-Qutubi. See al-Qardhāwī, *Dhukhāir al-Nukhba*, 31. On the biography of Sheikh Cabdiraxman Al-Saylici, see Martin, B.G. "Sheikh Zayla'i and the Nineteenth-century Somali Qadiriya," edited by Said Samatar, *In the Shadows of Conquest*, 11-32.

³⁶ Caqli, *Sheikh Madar*, 26.

originated from the Berbera area and, after residing in Harrar, had a resounding influence on the people from his home area.

In contrast to the community-supported education system in other parts of Somalia, students in Harrar had to be able to support themselves and be capable of buying expensive Islamic textbooks. Therefore, poor students had a very slim chance for higher education in Harrar. The father of Sheikh Madar was among those affluent pastoralists who benefited from the lucrative business in Berbera and was capable of supporting his son's education in Harrar. Sheikh Madar studied in Harrar for 20 years, becoming an authoritative Islamic scholar and Qaadiriyah Sufi master. He was assigned by his Sufi master Kabir Khalil to return to his home area and spread Islam, Qaadiriyah Order and to resolve conflicts between clans disturbing trade routes between Berbera and Harrar.³⁷ Sheikh Madar had founded Jamaaca Weyn (the big commune) as the seat of Islamic learning in the 1860s. He also mobilized other sheikhs in the area, built homes for his commune, and constructed his Grand Mosque in 1883. From there, Islamic education began to boom, the Shari'a was applied in the community, and reconciliations between feuding clans were initiated. Sheikh Madar was assisted by other fellow sheikhs who returned with him from Harrar, e.g., Sheikh Haarun Sheikh Cali and Xaaji Faarax Ismaaciil, whom he sent to the cities of Berbera and Bulaxaar to teach Islam.³⁸

Sheikh Madar, benefiting from his experiences gained in Harrar, introduced three reforms in the way of life of the pastoral communities, according to Cabdirisaq Caqli. First, he introduced permanent settlement, reforming nomadic life based on following after the rains and pastures. Second, he brought together members from various clans in affiliation of brotherhood, changing the culture based on clan loyalties. Third, he promoted and directed his followers toward agriculture, changing the culture of nomadic pastoralism.³⁹ In the era of Sheikh Madar, the Turkish rule was extended to northern Somalia, and Sheikh Madar had good rapport with the Turkish rulers and, subsequently, Egyptians who took over Somali coastal ports and conquered Harrar by 1875. Egypt's

³⁷ Ibid., 48-49.

³⁸ Sheikh Madar sent Sheikh Axmad Boon to Berbera and Sheikh Kabiir Cumar to Bulaxaar. Ibid.

³⁹ See Caqli, *Sheikh Madar*, 184.

sudden withdrawal from Harrar and Somalia coast created a strategic vacuum that was filled by Ethiopians, who captured Harrar in 1887. Ethiopians threatened the divided and unprotected Somali clans, and Sheikh Madar repeatedly appealed for British authority to help counter the Ethiopians. However, the British had good relations with the rising Ethiopian Empire and responded with a cold shoulder. The choice for Somalis appeared very limited, being conflicting clans without a common authority and facing threats of Ethiopian expansion from the West and the British colonialism from the east. Lacking domestic political leadership, Somalis preferred the British rule to that of their Ethiopian neighbors. The reason for this hard choices are numerous, however, one of the most important for the pastoral Somalis was that Ethiopians frequently looted their livestock to feed their soldiers while Britain was engaged in livestock business with them through the city of Berbera.⁴⁰

Qaadiriyah in Southern Somalia

In southern Somalia, historical records show that in 1819, Sheikh Ibrahim Hassan Yabarow, claimed belonging to Qaadiriyah Order, established the first Islamic center in the Juba valley.⁴¹ However, the Sufi affiliation of Sheikh Ibrahim Yabarow is highly controversial. As the founder of the town of Baardheere where Baardheere Jamaaca was spreading its Islamic reformist propaganda, he belonged, according to some scholars, to the Axmadiyah Order. Others even think that he belonged to Wahabiyah School (Salafia) that was prevalent in Saudi Arabia.⁴² Besides, oral collections show that Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar is considered an early known scholar of the Qaadiriyah Order in Banaadir. Titled *Sheikh al-Shuyūkh* (the teacher of the teachers), he was the teacher/mentor of many famous sheikhs in Somalia, such as Sheikh Cabdiraxman Suufi, Sheikh_Axmad Xaaji Mahdi, and Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici.⁴³ The history of Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar is

⁴⁰ See Ibid. 156-162.

⁴¹ Historical literature uses the Italian misspelling “Gebero” instead of Yabarow. See Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur and History of Southern Somalia* (Cairo: Nahda Book Publisher, 2009), 29. See Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 35-36.

⁴² See Jum‘āle, “*Dawr ‘Ulamā Junub al-Somāl*”, 40-41.

⁴³ See Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 215-216. Also, see Al-‘Eli, Sheikh ‘Abdirahman ibn Sheikh ‘Umar. *Al-Jawhar al-Nafīs fi Khawās al-Sheikh Aweys* (Mombassa, Kenya: Sidik Mubarak & Sons, no date). Also, Xassan Xaaji Maxamad, interviewed by the author on June 30, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

not well recorded; however, he is buried in Warsheik, where he migrated (made Hijra) from Mogadishu, shunning immoral dancing rituals known as Manyas that were rampant in Mogadishu.⁴⁴ Another prominent scholar is Sheikh Cabdiraxman bin Cabdullah Suufi (1829-1904), who graduated from the Islamic education center of Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar in Warsheik and joined both the Axmadiyah and Qaadiriyah Orders.⁴⁵ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Sufi succeeded Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar after the death of the latter and became the most prominent Islamic scholar in Mogadishu. He heralded a new era of improved quality of Islamic education in Banadir, since he did not travel to the outside world to complete his education as was the custom of the sheikhs before him. Another prominent scholar in Banaadir was Sheikh Axmad Xaaji Mahdi (d.1900), also a disciple of Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar. He was an ardent critic of the Italian colonialism and was intolerant to living in Mogadishu under the rule of the Italians and to decadent dance rituals; he migrated to Nimow, 20 km south of Mogadishu. There, he established his Islamic learning center called *Dār al-Hijra*.⁴⁶ However, after the Lafoole incident in 1896, when an expeditionary force of 13 Italians were massacred, angry Italians shelled his village, and he subsequently moved to Day Suufi in the deeper interior areas, influencing different clans to resist the Italians.⁴⁷ He was also stationed for many years in Baarmaale near Rage-Ceele, about 100 km north of Mogadishu, and established his teaching center there.⁴⁸ Later, Sheikh Axmad established his learning center at

⁴⁴ Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar migrated first to Nimow (a village near Mogadishu) nine times and then finally moved to Warsheik. See Al-'Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafīs*, 120. Also, see Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 216. The immoral dancing rituals were one of the problems of Mogadishu, and Islamic scholars tried to stop it but failed until Sheikh Aweys arrived and ended these rituals. See also, Mohamed Qassim. "Aspects of Banadir Cultural History: The Case of the Baravan Ulama" in *The Invention of Somalia*, edited by Jumale Ahmed (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1995), 29-42.

⁴⁵ Sheikh Suufi gave his allegiance to Sheikh Aweys al-Barawi after he solved the problem of immoral dancing in Mogadishu.

⁴⁶ Jum'āle, *Dawr 'Ulamā*, 193.

⁴⁷ Lafoole is located between Mogadishu and Afgoye, about 20 km from Mogadishu. It was the first site of armed confrontation between the Italians and Somalis. This event is commemorated by establishing University College of Education at Lafoole. For more information on this event, see Robert Hees, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (University of Chicago Press, 1966), 63.

⁴⁸ Baarmaal was a famous center of Qur'anic studies among the Maxamad Muse sub-clan, where the famous Sheikh Walaal established his school, and many students from the region memorized the Qur'an there. As late as 1907, the acting Italian governor considered Sheikh Ahmed Mahdi the most listened-to propagandist in this area of Shabelle region.

Waraabaale, between Mogadishu and Afgooye.⁴⁹ One of his disciples was Sheikh Ibrahim Cali Gacal (1887-1965), known for his strong Islamic propagation programs.⁵⁰

In southern Somalia, the name of the Qaadiriyah Order is associated with the legendary Sufi Master, Sheikh Aweys al-Barawe (1847-1909), the founder of the Qaadiriyah branch of Uweysiyah. He was born in Barava, and his most notable teachers and mentors were Sheikh Maxamad Tayni and Sheikh Maxamad Jenai al-Bahlul, who recommended that he travel to the Qaadiriyah Order headquarters in Baghdad.⁵¹ As he went on pilgrimage, he visited Baghdad and received there the Ijaasa and the mantle of Qaadiriyah from the head of the order, Sheikh Mustafa bin Salman, who offered him the responsibility of spreading Qaadiriyah in the Horn of Africa. Upon his return in 1882, he introduced himself to Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici and visited his center at Qulunqul on his way to Mogadishu. His best known hagiographer, Sheikh Cabdiraxman Celli, relates that the disciples of Sheikh Aweys numbered 500 and records the names of 150 of them.⁵²

Qaadiriyah/Uweysiyah is not confined to Somalia but extends to East African countries, such as Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Mozambique, and Malawi. His prominent disciples in Somalia include Sheikh Faraj (d. 1925), known as Sufi Baraki, the first successor of Sheikh Aweys; Sheikh Qaassim al-Barawi (1887-1921), famous scholar in Barava and the author of the famous Qaadiriyah collection of biographic accounts of Sheikh Aweys and Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici;⁵³ Sheikh Cabdullahi al-Qutubi (1879-1952), an erudite scholar of theology and philosophy, who authored many works, though most of them remain unpublished;⁵⁴ and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Celli (1895-1962), a prolific poet and reciter of Qaadiriyah poems Qasaaid, who authored the famous hagiographical book of

⁴⁹ At Warabaale, Sheikh Axmad Mahdi received Sheikh Aweys al-Barawi upon his return as Qaadiriyah Sufi Master in 1882. Al-‘Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafis*, 122.

⁵⁰ Sheikh Ibrahim was a servant of Sheikh Axmad Mahdi, responsible for washing clothes and bringing fish from Mogadishu. He later established his center of education at Garasbaaley near Mogadishu for about 50 years. Xassan Xaaji Maxamad (Hassanley) interviewed on June 30, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. Xassan Xaaji was one the close disciples of Sheikh Ibrahim and married to one of his daughters.

⁵¹ Al-‘Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafis*, 8.

⁵² Ibid., 17-25. Also, See Reese, *Patricians*, 216.

⁵³ Sheikh Qassim authored numerous Sufi poems. See Qasim, *Aspects of the Banadir*, 33-34.

⁵⁴ Sheikh Cabdullahi al-Qutubi was born on the night of the death of Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Saylici in Qulunqul. Among his famous Qaadiriyah disciples were Sheikh Cabdiraxman Celli and Sheikh Maxamuud Abgaalow. See Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical dictionary*, 201. Also, see al-Qarḍ hāwī, 40, and Al-‘Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafis*, 236.

Jawhar al-Nafis.⁵⁵ The historic visit of Sheikh Cabdiraxman Celli, in 1380 H, to the tombs of many Islamic scholars indicates the extent to which Qaadiriya was rooted in the Banaadir region. During this visit, he and his companions visited more than 40 important tombs of famous Qaadiriya Islamic scholars in Banaadir, Baay, and Bakool regions.⁵⁶ Finally, in Mogadishu, the traditional family of Reer Fiqhi has produced Islamic jurists and scholars for centuries. During the colonial era, Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Muxyidin and his brother Sheikh Abikar Sheikh Muxyidin were teachers of Islamic jurisprudence, and many students graduated from their education center.

Axmadiyah Brotherhoods

The Axmadiyah Brotherhood was founded by Ahmad Ibn Idris al-Fasi (1760-1837). Its derivatives in Somalia are Raxmaaniyah, Saalixiyah, and Dandarawiyah. In general, Axmadiyah and its branches combine Sufism with reformism, putting greater emphasis on intimate knowledge of the Qur'an and Shari'a.⁵⁷ They have also shown more militancy in Somalia compared with the Qaadiriya orders.

Axmadiyah/Raxmaaniyah

Most of the written literature mistakenly states that Axmadiyah was brought to Somalia by Sheikh Cali Maye Durogba of Marka after he returned from Mecca in 1870.⁵⁸ Yet, oral narrations and some unpublished work unanimously tell it differently. These oral tales confirm that Axmadiyah was brought to southern Somalia by Mawlaanaa Cabdiraxman bin Maxamuud (d. 1874), who is the founder of Axmadiyah branch of Raxmaaniyah.⁵⁹ He

⁵⁵ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Celli was born near the Islamic center of learning of Warsheik in 1313 H, studied the basic Islamic principles with Sheikh Maxamad bin Faqi Yusuf, Sheikh Aadan Maxamuud, Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Xussein. He also took Ijaazah (ordination) from his Sufi masters, Sheikh Cabdullahi al-Qutubi, Sheikh Axmad Macallin Cusman al-Gandarshiyi, Sharif Xassan Cusman. See Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical dictionary*, 200.

⁵⁶ The towns visited were Warsheik, Mogadishu, Balad al-amiin, Baidoa, Buura Hakaba, Biyooley, Gandarshe, Marka, Jaziira, Jawhar, Gololey, Afgooye, and Warabaale (near Afgooye). For the route of the journey and locations visited, refer to Al-'Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafis*, 155-185. In these 40 tombs, the only woman mentioned was the mother of Sheikh Aweys, Faduma bin Baharow.

⁵⁷ Trimigham, *Islam in Ethiopia*, 242.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Trimigham, *Islam in Ethiopia*, 242. Also, see Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 195.

⁵⁹ See Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, *Tarjumatu Sayidī Aḥmed* (unpublished manuscript). Also, see Jum'āle, *Dawr 'Ulama*, 85.

was born in the village of Araa-moog near Afgooye.⁶⁰ After acquiring a basic Islamic education, he traveled for further studies to *Zabaid* in Yemen, where he remained many years. During his pilgrimage to Mecca, he met with Sayid Ahmed Bin Idris who, after intensive spiritual training, appointed him the representative of Axmadiyah in Somalia. Upon his arrival, Mawlaanaa Cabdiraxman appointed five disciples Khaliifs, known in the Axmadiyah circles “the five stars,” and sent them to various locations and clans.⁶¹ These emissaries included Sheikh Xassan Macallin, the acknowledged head of Axmadiyah in Somalia, who settled in Basra village between Afgoye and Balcad. The other four were Sheikh Maxamuud Waceys, Sheikh Yahye Cadow (known as Xaaji Weheliye),⁶² Sheikh Maxamad Yusuf, and Sheikh Xassan Barrow. Sheikh Cali Maye (d. 1917) was a disciple of Sheikh Xassan Macallin and became a prolific scholar. He spread the Axmadiyah Order from his Islamic center in Marka through teaching and sending emissaries to many regions in Somalia. He was later erroneously assumed to be the founder of Axmadiyah because of his immense popularity. Sheikh Cali Maye received all his Islamic teaching in Marka and represented the new home-grown generation of Islamic scholars demonstrating the improved quality the Somali educational institutions. He also demonstrated the capacity of local Somali scholars, as epitomized by his distinguished teachers Sheikh Abu-Ishaq al-Shirāzi, Sheikh Moḥamed Bin ‘Ali Al-Budasiye, Sheikh ‘Abdurahmān Hāji al-Dāroodi, and Sheikh Nur Samow al- Ḥamadāniyi.⁶³

To implement the outreach program to distant clans, Sheikh Cali Maye sent 44 scholars/emissaries to various regions and sub-clans. Their task was to propagate Islam and the Axmadiyah teaching among their clans, and they gained great success “especially from the tribes of Middle Shabelle region.”⁶⁴ For instance, the most prominent among these scholars were Sheikh Axmad Abikar “Gabyow” (1844-1933), a gifted poet-sheikh known for his religious poetry, Sheikh Muse Cigalle, the grandfather of the president Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Axmad, and Sheikh Daauud Culusow, the founder of coastal town

⁶⁰ Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, *Tarjumatu*, 113.

⁶¹ Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, interviewed by the author on July, 30, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁶² As related, Haji Weheliye recommended to the father of Sheikh Aweys, Sheikh Mohamed bin Mahad, that he name his son Aweys and foretold him that the boy would have an important role in spreading the Qaadiriyah Order. See Al-‘Eli, *Jawhar al-Nafis*, 114-115.

⁶³ Jum‘āle, *Dawr ‘Ulamā*, 85, 222. Also, Trimigham, *Islam in Ethiopia*, 242.

⁶⁴ Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, interviewed by the author.

of Mareeg in the district of Ceeldheer. More than 12 emissaries were sent to Middle Shabelle and Galguduud area.⁶⁵ Most of these emissaries established Islamic education centers, became supreme leaders of their sub-clans, and formed small emirates where they ruled according to the Islamic Shari'a law.⁶⁶ Through the establishment of new education centers in many places, new generations of scholars were also produced, and the process of Islamization and reorganization of the society took on further strides. Many of these centers have been working for generations and are still functioning.⁶⁷

One of the brilliant disciples of Sheikh Cali Maye was Sheikh Daaud Culusow, who founded Mareeg in 1891, a town on the Indian Ocean coast. Young Daaud left his native area in the district of Ceeldheer about 300 km north of Mogadishu and traveled to Banaadir, seeking Islamic knowledge. He memorized the Qur'an in Baarmaale, which is about 100 km north of Mogadishu, and then studied for a while in Cagaaran, a village near Marka. Cagaaran was the seat of Islamic learning established by the famous Sheikh Cali Majertain who migrated from Mudug region. Daaud finally joined the school of Sheikh Cali Maye in Marka, from which he later successfully graduated. Sheikh Cali Maye sent him to his clan, Waceysle, with two other disciples from the area, namely, Xaaji Cumar Muudey and Macallin Cusman Kulmiye. He told them, "I made my son Daaud the neck and you are the two hands." Sheikh Cumar Muudey became the judge of the city while Macallin Cusman initiated the Qur'anic school. Sheikh Daaud founded a mosque, opened an Islamic court, and invited his people to a new era of Islamic rule. In the first organized congregation of the clan members held at Mareeg, he ordered them to swim in the sea, as related in the story known as Maalinta Bad-galka (the day of entering

⁶⁵ Sheikh Cusman Xidig. Also, Sheikh Axmad kadare interviewed on April 16, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁶⁶ Some of the emissaries were Sheikh Daaud Culusow and Sheikh Ibrahim Maxamuud who were sent to Waceysle sub-clan of Abgaal. Moreover, Xaaji Aadan and Xaaji Yusuf were sent to Habargidir sub-clans of Cayr and Suleyman, respectively. Furthermore, Sheikh Muse Cigale and Sheikh Axmad Gabyow were sent to Harti sub-clan of Abgaal. Also, Sheikh Cali Sheikh Muse and Sheikh Cali Matan were sent to Wacbudhan sub-clan of Abgaal. From the southern clans, Sheikh Salax Dahir was sent to Bagadi sub-clan and Sheikh Xassan Duubweyne was sent to Irdho/wanleweyn area. Sheikh Cusman Xidig interviewed by the author.

⁶⁷ One example of these centers is Ceeldheer Islamic Education Center administered by Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig. Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig was born in 1942, and his Sufi genealogy from top-down is as follows: (1) *Sayid Afmed bin Idris*, (2) Maulana Sheikh Cabdiraxman Maxamuud, (3) Sheikh Xassan Macallin, (4) Sheikh Cali Maye, (5) Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Cali Maye, (6) Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Daaud, (7) Sheikh Cusmaan Sheikh Cumar "Xidig". Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, interviewed by the author.

the sea). This event was intended to clean the bodies and clothes of people before a collective prayer was conducted.⁶⁸ Since that day, Sheikh Daaud opened Qur'anic schools, declared the supremacy of Islamic Shari'a, resolved conflicts, reorganized clans, and founded a standing army. The principality founded by Sheikh Daaud was facing two local military threats. One threat was emanating from the neighboring Sultan Cali Yusuf of Hooby, and the other from the Darawiish headquarters in Beletweyne, the capital city of Hiiraan region. Both of these principalities were attempting to extend their frontier to the constituency of Sheikh Daaud. To counter these threats, Sheikh Daaud mobilized his people, established standing army, and eventually eliminated these threats after many bloody confrontations.⁶⁹ Besides his numerous sons who became prominent Islamic scholars and numerous disciples who took his mantle after his death, such as Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Daaud, other prominent scholars educated in Marka came to the scene. A young Islamic scholar, Sheikh Ibrahim Maxamuud, who graduated from Marka School, established his headquarters in the town of Messegaway, 25 km from the district of Ceeldheer to the south. He continued the reform program initiated by Sheikh Daaud and later became famous for his modernizing approach, in which he established modern school and hospital and lobbied that children should be sent to receive modern education.⁷⁰ As a result, most of his children and grand children are comparatively highly educated.⁷¹

Axmadiyah/Saalixiyah

Saalixiyah was founded by Sudanese Sheikh Moḥamed Sālah who was the disciple of Sheikh Ibrāhīm al-Rashīdī, the founder of the Rashidiyah branch of Axmadiyah. Other branches of Axmadiyah, such as Sanuusiya (1787-1859) and Marganiyah (1793-1852),

⁶⁸ Sheikh Cusmaan Xidig, interviewed by the author.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Sheikh Ibrahim, nicknamed "Yare," was a true reformist scholar of his age. In 1959, before the Somali independence, he constructed in his home town an elementary school, dispensary, and court with the funds he collected from his sub-clan Cali-Gaaf. Then, he demanded that the government send teachers and health personnel. Moreover, he mobilized Qur'anic teachers to allow their Qur'anic students to attend modern school. As a result of his vision and actions, people of Messegaway are more educated compared with those in its surroundings. Yahye Sheikh Amir interviewed by the author on June 23, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁷¹ Among them Professor Yahye Sheikh Caamir, the Dean of the faculty of Management and Economic of Mogadishu University and the famous medical doctor Dr. Ilyaas Sheikh Ibrahim and so on.

dissented and founded their own branches. In Somalia, Saalixiyah was first introduced by Sheikh Moḥamed Gūleed al-Rashīdī (d. 1918), appointed by Sheikh Moḥamed Sālah as his representative. Sheikh Moḥamed Gūleed al-Rashīdī settled in the agricultural area of Misra Weyn, near Jawhar, 90 km north of Mogadishu, among the Shiidle people and established there the first agricultural community. However, within a short period of time, more than 15 other affiliated Jamaaca were established along the banks of the Shabelle River.⁷² The Saalixiyah Jamaaca applied strict Islamic rules that every member should attend congregational prayers and participate in the recitals of litanies. Also, women were required to wear modest Islamic dress. The other important elements were that all members should participate in social solidarity programs and charities and comply with Islamic values and norms. Every community has a mosque and a Qur'anic school with its Islamic leaders; the latter, besides providing Islamic education, engage in conflict resolutions and reconciliations in their community and surrounding clans. In the far south near Bardheere, Sheikh Ali Nairobi (d. 1920) was active in spreading the mission of Saalixiyah.

To illustrate the southern Saalixiyah, we will explore Sheikh Bashiir's Saalixiyah commune in the Region of Middle Shabelle. This Jamaaca is one of the 15 Jamaaca settlements along the banks of Shabelle River. It was founded in 1919 by Sheikh Bashiir Xaaji Shuceyb, who moved from Jamaaca Macruuf, located near Bulo-Burte district of Hiiraan region, after a devastating epidemic in 1917 and 1918.⁷³ After the death of Sheikh Bashiir, Sheikh Xanafi (d. 2002) succeeded as the sheikh of the Jamaaca and, currently, Sheikh Maxamad Amiin took the mantle of the Sheikh of the Jamaaca. Traditionally, there are four consultative members, called shuruud, who assist the Sheikh/leader of the Jamaaca in administrative matters. The Jamaaca constitutes a small principality in which all members are required to comply with a set of rules and a value system. For instance, all members should regularly frequent congregation prayer and Friday prayer in the Jamaaca Mosque, and those who fail to do so should leave the

⁷² The most prominent of Saalixiyah Jamaaca are: Macruuf, Mubaarak, Shiin, Sabya, Raxaale, Buqda, Nisra Weyn, Mirsa Yarey, Sheikh Bashiir, Jilyaale, Basra/Aw-Mubaarak, Bald-Amin, and Jama'at Nuur. Axmed Rashid Xanafi interviewed by the author on July 30, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁷³ Axmad Rashid Hanafi interviewed through email on November, 18, 2009.

Jamaaca.⁷⁴ The Jamaaca Sheikh undertakes functions such as conflict resolution, provision of legal services, conducting marriage contracts, as well as performs occasional functions such as festivities for the birthday of the Prophet Mawliid, Ciid celebrations, annual commemoration of deceased dignitaries Siyaaro, etc. Members of the local community are known as *al-Ansār*, while those who arrive from other regions as called migrants *al-Muhājirūn* emulating the era of the Prophet Mohamed. In contrast to the Jamaaca in northern Somalia, which converted nomads into settled communities and pastoralists into agricultural cultivators, the Jamaaca in southern Somalia are established within settled agricultural communities. However, they share with all other Jamaaca communities the duty of creating a new pan-clan community whose allegiance is only to their Islamic leader.⁷⁵

Other prominent Saalixiyah Sheikhs in the southern resistance against Italian colonialism were Sheikh Cabdi Abiikar “Gaafle” (1852-1922) and Sheikh Xassan Barsana (1853-1928). Sheikh Gaafle, after finishing his basic education in his home village of Carmadobe, advanced his Islamic education in Ceel-Gaal, near Marka. After the Lafoole incident in 1896, he became a prominent leader and warrior against the Italians. He forged alliance with Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan to create a common front against the infidels and received some firearms from him. He continued to fight until a disastrous end of his resistance in 1908.⁷⁶ The other leader, Sheikh Xassan Barsana opposed the Italian expansion policy in 1924 and refused to accept their domination. The Italian fascist governor, Mario de Vecchi, estimated that Somalis possessed “more than 16,000 rifles or six times as many as those assigned to the local defense forces”.⁷⁷ This situation was unacceptable to the Italian military ruler. Therefore, de Vecchi ordered the surrender of these rifles; however, when most of the clans complied with the order, Sheikh Xassan Barsana decided to confront the governor. Italian authority depicted Sheikh Xassan Barsana simply challenging their authority and refusing to accept their anti-slavery

⁷⁴ Conditions for membership are: (1) accepting the Saalixiyah Order, (2) recommendations from other three members, (3) allegiance to comply with the value system and regulations of the Jamaaca.

⁷⁵ Jeylani Hanafi interviewed by the author on December 21, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁷⁶ Italian forces took full control of Middle Shabelle area and Biyamaal resistance were broken. See Robert Hess, *Italian colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 91.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 151.

policies, nevertheless, he bluntly argues in his letter, his total rejection of their laws appealing to his abidance to the Islamic law.⁷⁸ After many bloody encounters, Sheikh Xassan was captured on April, 1924 and later died in the prison. Sheikh Xassan is remembered for the last attempt of armed resistance in the Banaadir region of Somalia. It is noteworthy that colonial resistance in Banaadir lacked unifying leaders and was mainly conducted through segmented pockets of resistance organized by various clans and local Sheikhs.

In a parallel development, Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan (1856-1920) introduced Saalixiyah into northern Somalia in 1895. He was born in northern Somalia and in his early childhood studied Islam in Harrar and Mogadishu, returning home in 1891. Three years later, he traveled to Mecca for pilgrimage, and returned to Somalia a completely changed man after he came under the charismatic influence of Sheikh Mohamed Salah (1853-1917), the founder of the Saalixiyah Order. Sayid Maxamad became a dedicated Saalixiyah representative in Somalia. He initiated work to criticize the Qaadiriyah Order, British colonialism, Ethiopian invasion, and Christian missionary activities. Having emigrated from Berbera after the conflict with the Qaadiriyah Order and the British authority, he established his own center in Qoryaweyne in the Dulbahante country. He recruited fresh followers, mobilized a strong army, resolved clan conflicts, and began to wage relentless wars against the British, Italians and Ethiopians for more than 20 years. On the other hand, he also fought against his own people who repudiated to accept his authority and to follow his Saalixiyah Order or ignored his call for Jihad or sided with the British authority. Having developed an authoritarian behavior, he was engaged in relentless diatribe and conflict with many segments of the society. However, as a symbol of Somali nationalism and for an unchallenged poetical polemic and pioneering the anti-colonial movement, his Darawiish movement has been the focus of many academic studies. Many works have been published on this subject, and so this short background will not go further into his biography.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ See the letter written By Sheikh Hassan Barsana to the Italians, Hees, *Italian colonialism*, 151.

⁷⁹ Abdisalam Issa-Salwe, *The Failure of the Daraawiish State: The Clash between Somali Clanship and State System* (paper presented at the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies, December 1993). Abdi

Axmadiyah/ Dandarawiyah

Dandarawiyah was founded by Sayid Mohamed al-Dandradawi, another disciple of Sayid Ibrahim al-Rashid. This order is less popular in Somalia and is confined to certain towns in northern Somalia. After the death of Ibrahim al-Rashid, the order's succession was disputed between the followers of Sheikh Mohamed Salah and disciples of al-Dandradawi. Sayid Aadan Axmad followed Dandarawiyah and introduced it into northern Somalia.⁸⁰ Sayid Aadan embarked at Bulaxaar port located in the south east of Berbera at the Indian Ocean coast and then established his first Jamaaca center in Xaaxi near the town of Oodweyne. One of the founders of this Jamaaca was Sheikh Muse Cabdi, the father of the erudite Islamic scholar Sayid Axmad Sheikh Muse.⁸¹ After many years, Sayid Aadan moved to the town of Sheikh where he established the second center. The town of Sheikh became the headquarters of the Order, and Sayid Aadan and many of his disciples were spreading Islam from there to neighboring communities and were connected with similar orders in Egypt, Zanzibar, and Syria. The Jamaaca was renowned for its modernist ideology and its good rapport with the British authorities. For instance, it allowed the opening of one of the first modern schools in the town, while most Somaliland territories were opposing such schools. As a result, the famous Sheikh College School, the first of its kind in British Somaliland was opened in 1943.⁸² The impact of this school on Dandarawiyah was tremendous in the way that the strength of the order was weakened and children of its early disciples became early elites in Somaliland politics. For instance, the first Somali civil engineer in Somaliland, Cali Sheikh Jirde, is the son of the Dandarawiyah leader Sheikh Maxamad Hussein. Other prominent Dandarawiyah

Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993). Douglas L. Jardine, *The Mad Mullah of Somalia* (London: Jenkins, 1923 and New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969). Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁸⁰ See Caqli, *Sheikh Madar*, 192, 185. No detailed studies have been done about this order. Caqli's book on Sheikh Madar provides an unpublished reference work of Ibrahim Xaaji Cabdullahi, "*Gamgam*", the *Ahmadiyah Dariiqa of Sheikh*. Also, see, Sayid Mohamed Yusuf, *Somaliland: Sooyaalka Somaliland ka hor 26 Juun 1960* (Dariiqo Publisher, 2001), 25-27.

⁸¹ Sheikh Muse studied in Mecca and returned to his home area in Oodweyne district (near Burco town). Axmad Ibrahim Xassan interviewed by the author on December 21, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁸² Suldaan Maxamuud Axmad Sheikh Ciise interviewed by the author on December, 16, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

members included Axmad Sheikh Maxamad Cabsiye (Speaker of Parliament in 1964-66).⁸³

Name of the Order	Founder of the Order in Somalia	Center of the Order
Qaadiriyah		
Zayliciyah	Sheikh Cabdiraxman al-Zaylici (d.1882)	Qulunqul (dhagaxbuur)
Uweysiyah	Sheikh Aweys al-Baraawi (d.1909)	Beled al-Amiin (Agooye)
Axmadiyah		
Raxmaaniyah	Mawlaanaa Cabdiraxman Maxamuud (d. 1874).	Basra (Afgoye)
Saalixiyah (south)	Sayid Maxamad Guuleed Al-Rashid (d. 1918)	Misra weyn (Jawhar)
Saalixiyah (north)	Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan (d.1920)	Qoryaweyne (L/Canood)
Dandrawiyah	Sayid Adan Axmad (the second half of 19 century)	Xaaxi, Sheikh town

Table 2. The Sufi Brotherhoods in Somalia

Militancy and Moderation in the Sufi Brotherhoods

Militancy means here the use of violent approaches to achieve doctrinal objectives and to impose leadership within Sufi brotherhoods, while moderation simply signifies tolerance and the avoidance of all forms of violent behavior to achieve political and doctrinal objectives. In general, Sufi brotherhoods are moderate and use peaceful means of propagating Islam that offer due consideration to the norms and customs of the people. Sometimes they use innovative means to assimilate and absorb pastoral and illiterate masses and mobilize them into common action. With blood-shedding being in principle the most heinous crime in Islam, Somali scholars usually abstain from clan fighting in the harsh pastoral environment. Their role is limited to conflict resolution, community education, and conduction of religious functions. However, there were four historical

⁸³ The former speaker of the parliament is the father of Sultan Maxamuud, whom the author has interviewed.

events when militancy emerged, and Islamic scholars led internal fighting to gain politico-religious hegemony. These events constitute historical precedents for current militancy and extremism in Somalia and offer lessons that doctrinal differences may develop into violent confrontation between Islamists.

The first incident occurred in the town of Bardheere as a confrontation between the Baardheere Jamaaca and the Geledi Sultanates at Afgoye.⁸⁴ The Baardheere Jamaaca was founded in 1819 by Sheikh Ibrahim Yabarow, introducing some reforms such as outlawing tobacco and popular dancing and prohibiting ivory trade.⁸⁵ The Jamaaca began to implement some elements of Islamic Shari'a, such as the wearing of decent Islamic dress for women. In the mid-1830s, after receiving strong adherents among new pastoral immigrants, the Jamaaca decided to expand its sphere of influence to other regions during the era of Sharif Cabdiraxman and Sharif Ibrahim, who originated from Sarmaan area in Bakool.⁸⁶ By 1840, the Jamaaca warriors reached Baidoa area and Luuq and finally sacked Barava, the historic seat of the Qaadiriyah Order where both Sultan Yusuf Maxamad of Geledi and Sheikh Maadow of Hintire had studied.⁸⁷ Barava accepted capitulation conditions that included prohibiting tobacco and popular dancing, adopting Islamic dress code, etc. They also agreed to pay an annual tax of 500 Pessa.⁸⁸ This action provoked a concerted response from the clans of the inter-river areas under the charismatic leadership of Geledi Sultan Yusuf Maxamad. The Geledi sultanate mobilized an expedition force of 40,000 from all clans in the reverine areas, stormed Baardheere, and burned it to the ground. Cassanelli characterized this conflict as one between the rising power of Islamic reformists and the established traditional power of the Geledi.

⁸⁴ The narration of this event was misnamed as "Baardheere Jihad" by most historians and, in particular, professor Cassanelli. In fact, internal wars between Muslims should not be called *Jihad*. It is a misnomer that militant Baardheere Jamaaca used to justify their war with the other Muslims. Note that Sultan of Geledi did not call it *Jihad*. See details of this event in Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 136-139.

⁸⁵ Baardheere was founded in 1819 by Sheikh Ibrahim Xassan Yabarow, a native of Daafeed, a town between Afgooye and Buur-Hakaba, who was refused to establish a reformist religious community in his home district. Daafeed sources claim that Sheikh Ibrahim was affiliated with the Axmadiyah Order. See, Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 136. However, the nature of Jamaaca is highly disputed as a Qaadiriyah settlement, as Trimingham argued. See Trimingham, *Islam in Ethiopia*, 240-41. Moreover, it was also labelled as being Wahabiyah by many European explorers. See, Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 136.

⁸⁶ Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 137.

⁸⁷ Suldaan Yusuf Maxamad and Sheikh Maadow were the most powerful leaders who together reacted to the Baardheere militant expansionists.

⁸⁸ Aw Jama Omar Issa. *Safahat*, 124.

Moreover, he adds the economic factor of curbing the lucrative ivory trade as well as a clan aspect, which stemmed from the armed immigrant nomads, the followers of the Jamaaca, being perceived as a threat to the local population.⁸⁹ The external actors' role in this conflict was not well researched; however, it is said that Sayid Bargash, the Sultan of Zanzibar, was on good terms with the Geledi Sultanate in the confrontation to the threat perceived to be a Wahabiyah penetration into Somalia.⁹⁰

The second incident is connected with the arrival of Sheikh Cali Cabdiraxman (Majertain) (1787-1852) in Marka in 1846 and his confrontation with the dominant Geledi sultanate. Sheikh Cali Majertain was born in Nugal region between Groowe and Laascaanod in the current Puntland State of Somalia. He traveled to Mecca and Baghdad for further studies where he met and studied “with the disciples of Muḥammad ‘Abdulwahrāb” and came back to his home area.⁹¹ He established an Islamic education center at Xaliin wells near Taleex in Nugaal region. However, he emigrated from his home after conflicting with his clan and moved to the eastern region under the tutelage of Majertain Sultan Nuur Cusman. Here also, Sheikh Cali found it unacceptable to live with the overt violation of Islamic Shari’a by the Sultan Nuur of Majertain and formed an alliance with Xaaji Faarah Xirsi, a rebel sultan of Majertain. Xaaji Faarah attempted to establish a new sultanate or to overthrow his cousin. Under the arrangement between Sheikh Cali and Xaaji Faarah, Xaaji Faarah would take political responsibility and Sheikh Cali would administer religious affairs.⁹² To achieve this goal, Sheikh Cali sent a letter to the ruler of Sharja Sheikh Saqar al-Qāsimi offering his allegiance and requesting his support.⁹³ However, Sheikh Saqar could not respond promptly and, dismayed, Sheikh Cali traveled to India and then Zanzibar and remained there for 15 months under the custody of Sultan Said al-Bu-Saīdi. Having in mind to establish an Islamic Emirate, Sheikh Cali arrived Marka in 1847, four years after the defeat of Baardheere Jamaaca and the dominance of Geledi

⁸⁹ Cassanelli, *Shaping*, 140-14. Also see, Virginia Luling, *Somali Sultanate: The Geledi City-State over 150 Years* (London: Haan Publications, 2002), 23.

⁹⁰ Jum‘āle, *Dawr ‘ulamā*, 41.

⁹¹ Aw-Jāma, *Safahāt*, 12.

⁹² This form of alliance is similar to the alliance of King Saud and Sheikh Mohamed Abdul-Wahhab in creating Saudi Kingdom.

⁹³ See the letter in Aw-Jāma, *Safahāt*, 110-117. The writer of this letter is controversial and other report informs that it was written by one of the Isaq sultanate.

Sultanate over the vast territories of the southern regions. However, the Biyamaal clan, the major clan of Marka was rebelling against the Geledi Sultanate and always was in conflict. Sheikh Cali Majertain arrived in Marka in alliance with the Biyamaal clan, with five boats, 150 followers, and substantial quantities of firearms and ammunitions estimated to be 40 rifles and 4 cannons.⁹⁴ He settled in area near Marka with the consent of the Biyamaal clan and began his activities and education programs. According to Luling, it is believed that “he himself had had plans to form a colony at the port of Mungiya, and has obtained a permission to do so from Sayid Sa’id of Zanzibar.”⁹⁵

However, initially, he attempted to play the role of a peacemaker between Sultan Yusuf of Geledi and the Biyamaal clan and sent a letter to Sultan Yusuf requesting him that he accepts his reconciliation proposal. However, when Sultan Yusuf refused his offer, he arbitrarily declared war against him and seemingly “have raided some of Yuusuf’s dependent villages near the river” like Golweyn.⁹⁶ The reaction of Geledi Sultanate was rapid and Sheikh Cali’s followers confronted the Geledi Sultan in 1847 and were easily defeated. Sheikh Cali’s expectation of receiving assistance from the Sultan of Zanzibar was dashed; instead, it is thought that the Sultan of Zanzibar helped the Sultan of Geledi to confront what was perceived as the threat of the Wahabiyah. The doctrinal inclination of Sheikh Cali Majertain is evident in the letter he sent to the clans of Barava, showing that he considered the Geledi Sultanate to be a deviated sect (*firqa al-Ḍālah*).

Commenting on the outcome of war, Sheikh Cali stated that “in reality ours [deaths] are in the paradise and theirs are in the hell” and “if you are among the deviated sect which Sultan Yusuf leads, there is no relation between us, and your blood will not be saved from us.”⁹⁷ The intolerance of Sheikh Cali to the propagation of Islam among his people, his mobilization of armed followers, and his siding with the Biyamaal clan against the Geledi Sultanate all indicates that he belonged to a militant ideology akin to that of Bardheere Jamaaca, a new militant tendency that was emerging during this period in many Muslim countries.

⁹⁴ See Luling, *Somali Sultanate*, 24.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Aw-Jāma Omar Isse, *Safahāt*, 152.

The third significant event was the arrival in Berbera in 1895 of Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan. This was not only the beginning of armed encounters with the colonial powers but also the initiation of an internal conflict among Somali Sufi Orders. Upon his arrival in Berbera, Sayid Maxamad challenged the authority and credentials of the Qaadiriyah establishment, setting up the competing Saalixiyah Order and building his own mosque, the center of Saalixiyah. He publicly criticized some practices of Qaadiriyah Sheikhs and introduced new verdict fatwas on some controversial issues, such as the prohibition of chewing Qaad and tobacco, although these were tolerated by other scholars.⁹⁸ However, Qaadiriyah scholars succeeded in overcoming Sayid Maxamad's challenges through religious debate. Scholars such as Aw Gaas and Xaaji Ibrahim Xirsi invited Sheikh Madar from Hargeysa, head of the Qaadiriyah Order in the region, and Sheikh Cabdullahi Caruusi, the teacher of Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle, to participate in a meeting held in Berbera in 1897 to discuss the issues of what is lawful and what is prohibited in Islam raised by Sayid Maxamad. However, after heated discussions on the major disputed issues, followers of Qaadiriyah in Berbera rebelled against Sayid Maxamad, and the British authorities intervened to maintain public order. As a result, Sayid Maxamad was compelled to emigrate from Berbera, carrying with him doctrinal enmity against Qaadiriyah. This deep-rooted conflict between Qaadiriyah and northern Saalixiyah had two dimensions, political and doctrinal. First, Sayid Maxamad was aiming to establish an Islamic Emirate under his leadership without consulting other prominent scholars. His unilateral, authoritarian, and violent approach annoyed many scholars and clan leaders. Second, Saalixiyah questioned the doctrinal credentials of the rival Qaadiriyah Order, condemning them as heretical and claiming that only Saalixiyah was authentic and original. This theological controversy escalated into a polemic exchange and then developed into bitter propaganda against each other.⁹⁹ For instance, Sheikh Aweys wrote poems vilifying the Saalixiyah Order. Here are some selected excerpts from the poem, translated by B.G. Martin.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Khat (*Catha edulis* Forsk.), known in Somalia as Qaad or Jaad, is a plant whose leaves and stem tips are chewed for their stimulating effect. Its lawfulness and prohibition in Islamic jurisprudence is highly disputed.

⁹⁹ See Sheikh Aweys's poems in Said Samatar (ed.), *In the Shadows of Conquest*, 55.

¹⁰⁰ See complete translation in *Ibid*, 55-56.

The person guided by Mohamed's law,
 Will not follow the faction of Satan [Salihiyah]
 Who deem it lawful to spill the blood of the learned?
 Who take cash and women too: they are anarchist
 Do not follow those men with big shocks of hair,
 A coiffure like the Wahabiyah!
 Publicly, they sell paradise for cash, in our land; they are a sect of dogs
 They have gone astray and make others deviate on earth,
 By land and sea among the Somalis
 Have they no reason or understanding? Be not deceived by them
 But flee as from a disaster, from their infamy and unbelief.

This verbal polemic was countered by a similar diatribe of poems by Sayid Mohamed, which concluded: "A word to the backsliding apostates, why have gone astray, from the Prophet's way, the straight path? Why is the truth, so plain, hidden from you?"¹⁰¹ This developed into physical attacks on the leaders of Qaadiriyah, and on April 14, 1909, followers of Saalixiyah murdered Sheikh Aweys al-Barawi at Biyooley village. When Sayid Maxamad heard of the death of Sheikh Aweys he recited a victory hymn saying, "Behold, at last, when we slew the old wizard, the rains began to come!"¹⁰² The implications of this conflict in Somalia were tremendous, affecting anti-colonial resistance and tarnishing the image of the Saalixiyah Order among the southern population.

The fourth incident occurred among Saalixiyah and Dandarawiyah in the northern Somalia. Before the arrival of Sayid Maxamad in northern Somalia, there was the Dandarawiyah Order, an offshoot of Axmadiyah, in the towns of Sheikh and Xaaxi. Sayid

¹⁰¹ Samatar, *Shadows of Conquest*, 59.

¹⁰² The Somali version is "Candhagodoble goortaan dilaa roobki noo da'aye." See Samatar, *Shadows of Conquest*, 61.

Maxamad demanded from the Dandarawiyah Order to follow him claiming absolute authority over the Order. After refusing Sayid's initiative, the conflict between the Dandarawiyah and Sayid Maxamad escalated. Sayid Maxamad dispatched to the town of Sheikh, the seat of the Dandarawiyah, about 80 cavalry troops with the message that they should participate in the Jihaad against the British infidels. Sending an armed mission without consultation was perceived as a threat by the Dandarawiyah, and therefore they captured most of the soldiers and surrendered them to the British forces stationed in Laylis between Sheikh and Berbera.¹⁰³ In reaction, Sayid Maxamad dispatched a strong military expedition and razed Sheikh to the ground.¹⁰⁴ Sayid Maxamad's bright points were romanticized by the Somali nationalists in their efforts to nurture national consciousness by narrating glorious past and reconstructing symbols, heroes, and myths. In this approach, self-inflicted wounds, civil wars, massacres, and human atrocities are downplayed and belittled.¹⁰⁵ However, in tracing the background of the current extremism in the name of Islam, it is necessary to bring up other episodes of Sayid Maxamad that suggest the historical roots of the current extremism in Somalia.¹⁰⁶ The roots that are similar to the early militancy between the Sufi Orders and modern Islamists – that is the influence of the Wahabiyah ideology based on “exclusivity and absolutism”, and the use of violent means to impose their Islamic interpretation on other Muslims.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Sultan Maxamuud Axmad Sheikh Ciise interviewed by the author on December 16, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

¹⁰⁴ The leadership genealogy of the Dandarawiyah in Somalia is as follows from top-down; (1) Sheikh Adan, (2) Sheikh Nur, (3) Sheikh Mohamed Hussein (d. 1964), (4) Engineer Ali Sheikh Mohamed Hussein (d. 2009), (5) Sultan Mohamud Ahmed (collective leadership). See Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Adeed Dawisha, *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair* (Princeton Press, 2003), 63.

¹⁰⁶ There are resemblances between Sayid Maxamad's activities and slogans and Current extremist organizations like Shabab and Hizu al-Islam. These are (1) personal rule; (2) exclusion of other Islamic organizations and monopoly of religious legitimacy; (3) excessive use of violence against other Muslims; and (4) selective and haphazard application of Shari'a. All these actions are disguised under the slogan of *Jihad* against the enemies of the Islam and infidels.

¹⁰⁷ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Recovering the Somali State: the Islamic Factor.” In *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa*, edited by A. Osman Farah, Mammo Mushie, and Joakim Gundel (London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007), 196-221, 211.

Colonialism and Somali Encounter

In the late nineteenth century, as part of the colonial scramble for Africa, Somalia was colonized by four countries: Italy, Great Britain, France, and Ethiopia. Colonial historiography stresses that colonial interest in Somalia was stepping stone to other vital interests in various other countries. Britain claimed, for example, that its interest in Somalia was simply to supply fresh meat to its garrison in Aden after their occupation in 1839.¹⁰⁸ However, historical records show earlier British strategic interests in Somalia, imposing a commercial treaty on the people of Berbera in 1827 and signing a similar treaty with the governor of Saylac in 1840.¹⁰⁹ Similarly, France claims that it just needed the Somali coast to establish coaling facilities for its ships on their way to French colonies in Indo-China and Madagascar; the two countries were admittedly vying for global supremacy by capturing more foreign lands and communication routes. Therefore, both these countries took over areas that were later termed British Somaliland in 1885 and French Somaliland in 1887, demarcating their colonial borders in 1888. Furthermore, Britain possessed another Somali-populated tract of land, called the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D), adjacent to its colony in Kenya. The Italian interest was clearer in aiming to boost its image as one of the great European powers in the scramble for Africa. It also aspired to extend its sphere of influence in Eritrea to the Ethiopian highlands. However, after its defeat at Adwa in 1896, it acknowledged that the occupation of Somalia was in support of their strategic plan in Ethiopia.¹¹⁰ Italy's colonial venture was supported by Britain so as to thwart the French colonial plans. It started with a commercial treaty in 1885 and taking over the total administration of Banaadir, leased from the Zanzibar dynasty in 1892. Italy gradually expanded its possessions through direct administration until the creation of a fully-fledged Italian colony by 1927.¹¹¹ Finally, Ethiopia was an emerging African empire in the nineteenth century and, being recognized as an independent African state on good terms with the major Western

¹⁰⁸ Samatar, *Socialist Somalia*, 16.

¹⁰⁹ Mohamed Osman Omar, *The scramble in the Horn of Africa: History of Somalia (1827-1977)* (Mogadishu: Somali Publications, 2001), 28.

¹¹⁰ Robert Hees, *Italian Colonialism*, 172.

¹¹¹ The creation of the fully fledged Italian colony occurred during fascist rule after capturing the last independent Somali sultanate, and the submission of Cusman Maxamuud, the king of Majertain in November, 6, 1927. See Robert Hess, *Italian colonialism*, 156.

powers, it pushed its claim for part of Somali territory. It also impressed other powers that it was a local power to be reckoned with in grappling and sharing the Somali booty. Consequently, the Somali people, who were one of the most homogeneous nations in the world, entered the twentieth century divided into five parts among four powers. The colonial domination and division of the Somalis has inflicted an enormous psychological distress and touched their nerve and heart, provoking uncoordinated spontaneous resistance.

The Somali encounters with colonialism may be divided into two stages. The first stage (1889-1927) concluded with the Italian defeat of the Majertain Sultanate at Baargaal in current Puntland State of Somalia in 1927. Leaders during this period were traditional leaders and, in particular, Islamic scholars. During the second stage (1943-1960), the Somalis were led by the new nationalist elites. The difference between the two periods is that the first encounter was a complete rejection of the Christian invaders of Muslim lands, and people were mobilized under the banner of Islam. The second struggle was founded on gaining the status of a legitimate independent state, in line with the established world order of nation-states. The 15-year gap between 1927 and 1943 is regarded as the years of disorientation, a transitional time from the dominance of the traditional elites to the emergence of nationalist elites. During these years, the Somali people went through harsh experiences such as participating in the Italian-Ethiopian war (1935-1941) and the Second World War (1941-1945) as colonial soldiers of the warring sides. For instance, historical records show that “Somali colonial troops eagerly fought against Ethiopians, their traditional enemy” and more than 6000 participated in the war.¹¹² Likewise, in the Second World War (1941-1945), the Somali colonial soldiers fought on both sides, for Britain and for Italy. First, we will examine the role of the ‘*Ulama* in the first encounter and explore their diminishing role in the second period though planned marginalization and exclusion.

The initial Somali reaction to the rule of the colonial powers was led primarily by the religious leaders. Sufism is known to have formed an obstacle against colonial

¹¹² Robert Hees, *Italian Colonialism*, 174.

administration and westernized system of education.¹¹³ The assumption that the Saalixiyah Order was anti-colonial while the Qaadiriyah Order remained acquiescent and even collaborated with the colonizers has no historical basis. The well-known historical fact is that “Sheikh Aweys promoted resistance to the European colonizers in German-occupied Tanganyika, and even Uganda and eastern Congo.”¹¹⁴ The evidence of this encounter with colonialism is circumstantial, and any singular approach or prioritization of militancy is simply not borne out. These approaches should be seen as complementing each other, depending on the situational analysis and evaluation of the available options. For instance, Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan led a Darawiish Movement for roughly 21 years (1900-1921), against British, Italian, and Ethiopian forces. Many other active anti-colonial movements had also been witnessed in many parts of Somalia. Examples are the Lafole massacre (1896), where disciples of Sheikh Axmad Mahdi, who belong to the Qaadiriyah Order, were accused for anti-colonial activities and have been retaliated by the Italians. The Biyamaal revolt (1896-1908) led by Mocalimiin (Islamic teachers) continued resisting colonization for 12 years and ultimately networked its resistance with the northern one of Darawiish Movement, demonstrating the unity of purpose and nationhood. Moreover, revolts led by Sheikh Xassan Barsana (d.1926) and Sheikh Bashir (d.1945) demonstrate their uncompromising attitude toward colonial programs. Unfortunately, most of these movements had been suppressed by 1924, and their leaders were either eliminated or contained. Finally, the independent Majertain Sultanate was brutally suppressed in 1927, finalizing the Italian occupation of Somalia. Since then, the era of independent leadership in the Somali society was over. It took 100 years to conquer Somalia totally, since the British agreement with the Somali clans in Berbera in 1827 to the Italian conquest of the Majertain Sultanate in 1927. Traditional elders were contained and integrated by a variety of means, including persuasion and intimidation, while Islamic scholars were oppressed, marginalized and excluded. Somali Islamic scholars confronted colonial incursion by different means, including both armed and non-violent means. Those who opted for violent means have been recorded widely in the Somali history, while the peaceful activists were neglected and marginalized. It seems that Somali

¹¹³ Qaadiriyah in the north strongly opposed attempts by the British administration to open secular schools. Lewis, *A History*, 37. Also, Lewis, *Saints*, 9.

¹¹⁴ Lewis, *Saints*, 36.

nationalists, who appropriated all forms of armed encounters as part of the history of Somali nationalism, were tilted toward militarism in the struggle against hegemonic Ethiopia. Perhaps, for that reason, Islamic scholars who engaged in cultural activities and reform programs, invigorating internal resilience to the colonial cultural hegemony as a whole, have not been given enough attention in the Somali historiography.¹¹⁵

How did the colonial states deal with the traditional leaders? Traditional leaders, comprising clan elders and Islamic scholars, were the supreme leaders of their communities before the colonial states reshaped the societal equation and changed the praxis of power. The colonial regimes dealt with these leaders through “bureaucratic integration” of the clan elders. At the outset, clan elders signed agreements with the colonial powers and were recognized as local partners. What facilitated their commonality was that the “man-made” secular laws of the colonial states were by their nature closer to the “man-made” Somali customary law known as Xeer, administered by the clan elders. Putting into practice a policy guideline, colonial states employed clan elders, provided them with salaries, and used them as official representatives of their communities. In the late 1950s, there were 950 salaried clan elders in the Italian Somaliland and 361 in the British Somaliland.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, Islamic scholars, through the policy of containment, were oppressed and marginalized, although some of them were later incorporated. For instance, Sorrentino, who was the Italian commissioner in Mogadishu in 1896, distributed 296 Thalers to the notables and Islamic scholars “to gather friends for Italy.”¹¹⁷ Islam was perceived by the colonial power as a menace to the colonizers’ so-called “civilizing mission” and cultural hegemony, and therefore, had to be sidelined. Most of these scholars were either actively resisting colonial incursion through violent means or sought to persuade the masses against collaborating with the infidels (gaalada). However, after the failure of an armed resistance and the triumph of colonialism, a new approach was gradually developed. Colonial powers also adopted more sensitive methods to satisfy the religious sentiments of the population and initiated a

¹¹⁵ Exceptions are the interest of Professor Mukhtar in this issue in the *Historical Dictionary of Somalia* and the work edited by Said Samatar, who questions conventional historiography in re-examining the Qaadiriyah and Saalixiyah and emphasizes the need for more research.

¹¹⁶ Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Tribalism and Islam*, 229.

¹¹⁷ Robert Hess, *Italian Colonialism*, 33.

policy of winning people's hearts and minds. This approach led colonial government in particular the Italian fascists, to construct mosques, respect Islamic scholars, accept Islamic laws in their most sensitive aspects such as in the family affairs, and establish Islamic courts employing Islamic scholars as magistrates and judges.

The second stage began with the long process of creating elite with a new vision for the society and the state. The colonial powers endeavored to employ more Somalis in the lower echelons of the colonial civil and military labor force and opened selective schools, in which children of the traditional elite were given priority and privilege.¹¹⁸ In line with this strategy, Somalia was gradually incorporated and absorbed into the colonial economic and political system. However, the anti-colonial sentiment of the early years did not die out entirely but was transformed into a modern and peaceful political struggle for independence.¹¹⁹ In practice, the modern state formation in Somalia had begun with the establishment of social organizations that were different in form and functions from the traditional institutions such as the religious establishments of mainly Sufi orders and clan leadership. These organizations initially began in British Somaliland and later in southern Somalia, under the rule of the British Military Administration (BMA) in 1941. Indeed, the Italian fascist rule prohibited all forms of organization in Somalia.¹²⁰ These new social organizations began with the formation of the Somali Islamic Association 1925 in Aden by the exiled Xaaji Faarax Omaar to support his political activism and advocacy for the improved conditions of the Somalis.¹²¹ Gradually, other organizations appeared, such as Khayriyah in 1930, which promoted welfare and education, the Officials' Union, founded in 1935 to lobby for equal rights with expatriates for Somali employees, and the offshoot of the latter, the Somali Old Boys Association (SOBA). The earlier social organizations in southern Somalia were *Jamiyat al-Kheyriyah al-Wadaniyah* (Patriotic Beneficiary Union), founded in 1942,¹²² the Somali Youth Club (SYC),

¹¹⁸ See Pankhurst, Sylvia. *Ex-Italian Somaliland* (London: Wattas & Co., 1951), 212, 214.

¹¹⁹ On the development of Somali nationalism see Saadia Touval. *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

¹²⁰ Lewis, A History, 121.

¹²¹ See Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 65.

¹²² Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical dictionary*, 106. Also, Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur and the History of Southern Somalia* (Cairo: Mahda Bookshop Publisher, 2005), 340.

founded in 1943, and Native Betterment Committee (NBC), founded in 1942.¹²³ The modern political development of Somalia began in the early years of the Second World War, after the 1941 defeat of Italian Fascism in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of the BMA in most parts of the Somali territories. The BMA, although it completely destroyed existing small economic projects and infrastructures, brought an improved political environment by abolishing the “restrictions of the Italian regime on local political associations and clubs.”¹²⁴ The destroyed or removed projects include the railway line connecting Mogadishu, Afgoye, and Villagio Della Abruzzi; Afgoye Bridge; salt production machinery in Hafun; and Maggiajan and Kandala mines.¹²⁵ This new policy encouraged advances in the political consciousness of the Somalis after many of them had participated in the two wars: the Italian–Ethiopian War of 1935 and the Second World War. As a result, the Somali Youth Club (SYC), a pan-Somali youth organization, was formed on 15 May 1943 in Mogadishu with the encouragement of the BMA. From its founding membership of 13 men, this club developed into political party in 1947 and was renamed the Somali Youth League (SYL).¹²⁶

A comparable rise in political consciousness was appearing in the British Somali Protectorate, and this led to the establishment of the party known as the Somali National League (SNL) in 1951. These two major parties, the SYL and the SNL, adopted corresponding nationalist platforms by the 1950s. At the same time, other particularist parties were shifting toward a similar nationalist course. In 1950, the former Italian colony was returned to Italy under the UN trusteeship after a five-year debate on the future of the Italian colonies defeated in the war. According to the UN mandate, Italy had to manage the colony and bring it to full independence in 1960. This episode concludes

¹²³ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Non-state Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations during the Civil War (1990-2002).” *Darasat Ifriqiyah*, 31 (2004): 57-87. See Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur*, 361.

¹²⁴ I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History*, 121.

¹²⁵ See Poalo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 45.

¹²⁶ The founding fathers of modern Somali Nationalism are: Haji Maxamad Xusein, Maxamad Xirsi Nuur (Sayidi), Cabdulqaadir Sakhaa-Uddin, Cali Xassan Maxamad (verdure), Dheere Xaaji Dheere, Maxamad Cali Nuur, Dahir Xaaji Cusman, Maxamad Cabdullahi Faarax (Xayesi), Khaliif Hudow Maxamad, Maxamuud Faarah Hilowle (Farnaajo), Yaasin Xaaji Cusman, Maxamad Cusman Baarbe, and Cusman Geedi Raage. See, Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim “Xildhiban”, *Taxanaha Taariikhda Somaaliya* (London: Xildhiban Publications, 2006), 13.

one chapter of southern Somalia's experience in changing administrations from early attempts of creating Italian colony (1889-1923), Italian fascist rule (1923-1941) and British Military Administration (1941-1950) to a post-war Italy (1950-1960).¹²⁷ Italy took responsibility to prepare southern Somalia for independence in a very short time, with a significant shortage of financial resources.¹²⁸ During this formative period, some prominent Islamic figures were incorporated into the process for the trusteeship to gain popular support and legitimacy. However, most Islamic scholars were focusing on socio-cultural activities, watching suspiciously for the rise of the new elites and colonial domination. Northern Somalia remained in the British protectorate since 1884 until the Somali independence 1960 except 8 months under Italian occupation (August 1940- In March 1941) in the Second World War.

Finally, the new era of nationalistic fervor had begun in Somalia as part of changing world after the end of the Second World War, and there ensued the rise of national liberation movements in the colonized territories. As Saadia Touval examined, three main factors were the cornerstones of such national consciousness in Somalia.¹²⁹ These are the religious contradiction between Somali Muslims and Christian colonizers, state borders that divided the Somali territory, intervening natural posture of Somali nomads, and the fact that colonial powers were subverting each other, which sometimes worked for the benefit of the Somalis, invigorating the consciousness of their unity. Somali Islamic scholars were not only reviving Islam but also have laid the foundation of the national identity. They infused Islamic and national identities into their binary distinction of "Muslims versus Christians" in their confrontation with neighboring Ethiopia and their encounters with the European colonial powers.¹³⁰ They had also maintained genealogies linking many Somali clans to their Arab ancestry. However, in the era of nationalism, the monopoly of Islamic scholars as the only educated group in society was over and a new

¹²⁷ Sally Healy argues that perhaps "frequently shifting colonial administrations", Somali nationalists envisioned the possibility of new territorial arrangement. See Sally Healy, "Reflections on the Somali state: What Went Wrong and why it Might not Matter." In *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics* edited by Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst&Company, 2010), 271.

¹²⁸ In 1951, the budget of the Italian administration was cut by a quarter. See Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 60-61.

¹²⁹ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 61-84.

¹³⁰ Ibid., 62.

generation that was educated in the colonial schools was taking the lead. These new elites, encouraged by the colonial states and establishing their own systems of laws and different cultural values, were mimicking the Europeans. As a result, rising nationalism, secularism, and westernization were spreading rapidly to the annoyance of Islamic scholars, who were marginalized in the process. This background is aimed to provide the historical dimension to the account of the modern Islamic movement and its dislocation within the modern state and society.

Conclusion

Although there is no precise date for the advent of Islam in Somalia, historians generally agree that Islam reached Somalia peacefully through trade and migration in the first century of the Muslim Calendar (700-800 AD). It was a safe refuge for the oppressed groups from the continuous conflicts in Arabian Peninsula and beyond. These groups, upon their arrival, established coastal towns and introduced new technologies and ideas. Islamization of the Somali peninsula was gradual through assimilation and cultural infusion, and provided the Somali people with a worldly outlook, vibrancy, and changes in their modes of production. As a result, a new form of governance emerged among the Muslim population in the Horn of Africa, particularly in the Adal emirates that were headquartered in Saylac and Harrar. In the sixteenth century, the two superpowers of the world, the Ottoman Empire and Portugal, were in loggerheads in the Indian Ocean, and both Somalia and Ethiopia were drawn into the superpower rivalry, played out in religious sentiments. In the late fifteenth century, beside the coastal city-states and small clan-based units in the interior, local Somali sultanates began to appear. The strongest of these was the Ajuran dynasty that thrived for more than 300 years, to decline later with Portugal's blockades of the coast, nomadic incursions from the interior, and due to its dictatorial political culture. Consequently, Somalia began to slightly integrate into the Islamic world. The Ottoman Empire, Egypt, and Oman were Muslim countries that attempted to incorporate parts of Somalia into their sphere of influence.

Islam has taken long strides in Somalia since the eighteenth century with improved systems of Islamic education, increased settlement and urbanization, and revitalization of

the Sufi orders. The process of Islamic education, in keeping with tradition, begins with the memorization of the Qur'an, followed by a community-supported system of higher Islamic studies and Sufi order affiliations. Two major centers of Islamic learning have developed: the Banaadir coastal cities and the Harrar and Jigjiga areas in the western parts of Somalia. From these centers, Islamic education and Sufi orders were revived, reorganized, and spread throughout Somalia. These orders were also linked with Mecca, Yemen, and Baghdad. The impact of the Sufi orders in Somalia has been enormous; their emergence diluted the rigid clan divisions and proved the irrelevance of clan affiliations for Sufi leadership. Sufi orders were generally interconnected and focused on their economic viability through establishing agricultural colonies and converting roving groups of nomads into settled communities. The overwhelming majority of Islamic scholars were anti-colonial but acted differently. Islamic scholars and Sufi orders were in agreement that Islam begins with education and, therefore, focused on spreading knowledge of the Islamic sciences. The result of their concerted efforts and legacy is that Somalia remains an orthodox Sunni territory with unified Shafi'i jurisprudence.

Islamic scholars have left a lasting imprint on the history of Islam in Somalia, and their disciples, scattered in different locations and clans, are continuing to convey the message of Islam and the rituals of Sufism. In the colonial encounter, they responded with either militancy or moderation, as the situation in the northern and southern regions required. Nevertheless, Somalia was completely incorporated into the colonial system by 1927 when the last local dynasty was conquered and native leaders were assimilated into the colonial system of governance. After 15 years of disorientation from 1927 to 1943, a new social and political organization emerged, led by the new elites. The traditional system was gradually declining, and a new era dawned in which Somalia became more fully implicated in the world system. Within this system, a new form of Islamic movement progressively emerged. The next chapter will deal with the first stage of this evolution.

Chapter Three

The Rise of Islamic Consciousness

(1950-1967)

In Somalia, Islam and Somaliness were harmonious terms, used to signify pan-clan anti-colonial ideologies resisting both Christian colonialism and growing westernization.¹ As was noted in the second chapter, Islamic scholars were alienated from leadership positions in the 1930s and the new elites were steadily taking over national leadership. During this period, the role of Islam as a common faith and belief system was plainly understood by the general public, regardless of their level of Islamic commitment, personal piety, or Sufi order affiliation.² However, consciousness of the political aspect of Islam as a system aimed at creating a state and society based on definitive references to scripture had not yet developed. The common vision and strategic priority of the Somali people before independence was centered on the liberation of the country from the colonial yoke, whereas after independence, this vision evolved to include bringing together a divided Somali nation colonized by different European states. Indeed, a general Islamic consciousness was always present because of the role of the faith in championing the Muslim cause in the Horn of Africa and due to Somalia's geographical location at a point of convergence of Christian-Muslim interests.³ Moreover, as a strategic region connecting the oil-rich Arabian Peninsula with the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean, it had attracted European colonialism and Cold War superpower rivalry, further provoking both Islamic and nationalist consciousnesses.

Thus, both national and Islamic identity and consciousness were intertwined in the historical development of Somalia, offering supra-clan identity to the traditional society for which primordiality was a key factor. What these two ideologies had in common was

¹ Historically, Somalia was fighting against Ethiopia and European colonialists, considered to be Christian states. This conflict is rooted in the 15th century wars in the Horn of Africa between the Ethiopians and Muslim emirates. In the 19th century, European colonialism and the Somali response were manifested in religious terms.

² In Somalia, Islam is a common identity; therefore, Somaliness became synonymous with Muslimness.

³ Somalia was in conflict with Ethiopia and Kenya because of the colonial legacy that attached parts of Somali territories to Kenya and Ethiopia. In both of these countries, Christianity is dominant. For more details on the Somali conflict with its neighbours, see Saadia Touval, *Somali Nationalism: International Politics and the Drive for Unity in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963).

their influence on the people to reject foreign domination and to resist it. Because of this commonality, both Islamic and nationalistic slogans were used indiscriminately to mobilize the masses for anti-colonial campaigns. These dual ideologies and forms of struggle gave rise to a successive chain of methods for liberating the nation from the colonial yoke in diverse conditions and contexts. At the same time, the nationalist elites, besides eliminating colonialism, aimed to create a national ideology and national symbols that would conform to the accepted norms of established world order that would in turn lead to an independent Somali nation-state. Consequently, Somali nationalists, although not openly advocating secularism, were aware of global trends and were very selective in their ways of employing Islam within nationalist aspirations. Thus, they set up Islamic leaders, such as Imam Aḥmad Ibrāhīm and Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan, as national heroes and symbols.⁴ Both of them played a crucial role in leading historical wars with Ethiopia and other European powers.⁵ Other elements that prompted the development of the national and Islamic consciousness were religious antagonism between the “Christian infidels” and Somali Muslims, given that it is “exceedingly difficult and humiliating for Muslim society to accept non-Muslim rule.”⁶ Christian missionary activities had been resented in earlier times by the Somalis; as such activities were considered a threat to the Islamic faith. The earliest missionaries were French Catholics, who began activities in British Somaliland in 1891, as well as the Roman Catholic Church in Mogadishu and the Swedish Overseas Lutheran Church in Kismaayo, established in 1896. Furthermore, the Mennonite Mission and the Sudan Interior Mission joined the Christian venture in the

⁴ To eternalize their historical memory as great leaders of the Muslim nation, their statues had been erected in the capital city of Mogadishu. During the civil war, both sculptures were destroyed in claiming that Islam prohibits statues that are complete and solid figures. On the Islamic viewpoint, see Al-Qardawi, *al-halal wa al-Haram fi al-Islam* (International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations, 1989), 97-104. However, there were also economic reasons as well as deliberate destruction of all artefacts in Somalia.

⁵ Imam Ahmed fought against Ethiopian and Portuguese intervention forces, representing Christian superpowers of that time, from 1531 until he was killed in 1543. Ahmed’s war with Ethiopia is described in detail in the *Futuh al-habaša* (“The Conquest of Ethiopia”), written in Arabic by Ahmad’s follower *Shihāb al-Addin Aḥmad ibn ‘Abdulqādir*. Sayid Maxamad fought against Ethiopia and Britain in 1900-1921. References on Sayid Mohamed are many; however, two academic works stand out: Abdi Sheik Abdi, *Divine Madness: Mohammed Abdulle Hassan (1856-1920)* (Zed Books Ltd., London, 1993), and Said S. Samatar, *Oral Poetry and Somali Nationalism: The Case of Sayyid Mahammad Abdille Hasan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

⁶ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 62.

1950s, with the return of Italy as the UN trusteeship administrator. Details of the Somali responses to these will be elaborated on in later sections.

Besides the commonalities between Islam and nationalism stated above, the rising Islamic consciousness was specifically linked with the development of Arabic education and connections with the Arab/Islamic world. The Arabic language is the language of the Qur'an, the language of the Prophet Muhammad in which his traditions are recorded, and the language of Islamic jurisprudence and business transactions in pre-colonial Somalia. Somali nationalists, however, were divided on the importance of the Arabic language and relations with the Arab world. Their polarization into pro-Western and pro-Arabic/Islamic factions was gradually developing in the 1950s, along with the development of modern education. Moreover, because of Somalia's strategic location during the Cold War era, this country witnessed strong competition between the Eastern block, represented by the Soviet Union and China, and the Western block, represented by the former colonial masters and the USA. Within these local, regional, and international dynamics, Islamic consciousness began to emerge and grow.

The development of Islamic consciousness in general should be seen as a historical evolution and as a response to the challenges of various tensions. The early Islamic revival, pioneered by the emerging Sufi orders, had played on the preservation of Islamic faith and its advancement to new frontiers and countered early colonial incursions militarily and culturally. When the first confrontation failed to fend off European challenges, modern Islamic consciousness emerged for a new round of encounters. This chapter will examine the cultural and political foundations of the emergence of this Islamic consciousness. It examines the role of Islam and its revival in the period from 1950 to 1967 in the context of changing political and cultural conditions in Somalia. This takes place in the formative period of the Somali state and the early years of independence (1960-1967). Specifically, this chapter will explore factors underlying the emergence of Islamic consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s. These factors will be classified into two categories: Factors strengthening capacity of Islamic consciousness and factors provoking Islamic consciousness.

Strengthening Factors of the Islamic Consciousness

Somalia's strategic location and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula resulted in a strong linguistic and cultural Arabic influence, carrying with it the Islamic faith. The impact of this influence reached a pinnacle when Somalia joined the Arab League in 1974, although its Arab identity remained weak.⁷ Most Somali clans claim Arab descent, although Arabism and Arab nationalism had not developed adequately, perhaps because of Somalia's peripheral geographic location, language barriers, and competitive Somali nationalism.

Five Arab countries in particular have had direct historical links with Somalia: Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Yemen, and Sudan. The cultural influence of these countries was swinging from time to time, proportional to their socio-economic development and strategic goals. For instance, the influence of Oman was limited to its nominal rule over parts of Somalia in the nineteenth century, which ended in selling its "property" to the Italians in 1905.⁸ On the other hand, Yemen had the strongest connection with the Somalis in terms of reciprocal settlements of the populations and commercial linkages.⁹ In 1956, the Yemeni community in Mogadishu was so numerous that they were offered four seats in the legislative assembly, consisting of 70 seats.¹⁰ Conversely, according to the statistics of 1955, 10,600 Somalis lived in Eden among 103,900 Yemenis, which

⁷ Arab nationalism did not develop in Somalia, although most of the Somali clans attach their genealogy to Arab ancestry. One of the reasons may be internal division of the Somalis and their entanglement in attempts to unite the Somalis through Somali nationalism. Joining the Arab League was primarily motivated by economic reasons and was the accumulative impact of Arab education since the 1950s. The Arab League is a regional organization of Arab states formed in Cairo on March 22, 1945; it currently has 22 members. See official website available from <http://www.arableagueonline.org/las/index.jsp> (accessed on June 16, 2009).

⁸ On January 13, 1905, Italy purchased the Banaadir Ports [Mogadishu and its environs] for 144,000 pounds or 3,600,000 Lire and began to administer over Somalia directly in place of the earlier Banaadir commercial company. See Robert Hess, *Italian colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 86.

⁹ Edward Alpers, *The Somali community at Eden in the Nineteenth Century* (North-eastern Studies Volume 8, No. 2-3, 1986), 143-168.

¹⁰ I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), 145.

means almost 10% of its population.¹¹ Moreover, *Zabīd*, the famous Islamic learning center in Yemen, was where many Somali Islamic scholars were educated. These students frequented these places during the annual Hajj pilgrimage and brought back Sufi Orders and Islamic knowledge.¹² Indeed, *Shaaficiyah* jurisprudence and the *Qaadiriyah* Order were introduced to Somalia through Yemeni scholars who propagated their ideas in Harrar and Mogadishu. Yemen, through its historical migrations and settlements in Somalia, injected a major cultural influence and provided Islamic education for generations.¹³ Somalis of Yemeni origin in Mogadishu were custodians of the Arabic language and Islamic culture, pioneering its role in education and society. However, their political and cultural influence in the period 1950-1967 was comparably insignificant. With respect to the role of the Sudanese, it is important to note that Sudan does not share a border with Somalia, and its early influence was indirect. The Sufi masters Ibrahim al-Rashid and Sayid Mohamed Salah of Sudanese origin, living in Mecca, introduced *Axmadiyah* and its *Saalixiyah* offshoots through Somali disciples. In addition, both countries promoted anti-colonial Islamic *Jihaad* with the same ideological background as the *Mahdiah* movement in Sudan and the *Darawish* Movement in Somalia.¹⁴ In the modern era, however, relations between the two countries were bolstered through their shared British colonial experience and working within British colonial establishment. Moreover, modern education in British Somaliland was rooted in the British-established Gordon College in Sudan and *Bakht al-Riḍāh*, so that modern elites from British Somaliland were educated primarily in Khartoum and co-educated with their Sudanese colleagues. These elites who pioneered modern education in Somaliland are exemplified by the father of modern education in British Somaliland, Maxamuud Axmad Cali, and

¹¹ Najmi Abdul-Majid, *Eden (1839-1967)* (Markaz Ubadi li darsat wa Nashr, 2007), 259.

¹² Zabid is a town on Yemen's western coastal plain and is one of the oldest towns in Yemen. It was the capital of Yemen from the 13th to the 15th century and a center of the Arab and Muslim world due, in large part, to its being a center of Islamic education. *Zabid* was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO. See *Zabid* on the website available from <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/655227/Zabid> (accessed on January 2, 2010).

¹³ Early Islamic scholars in Banaadir originated from Yemen and Hadramout in particular. Sheikh Abiikar Muxdaar, known as "Sheikh al-Shuyuukh" (the teacher of teachers), and other prominent Islamic scholars originally arrived from Yemen.

¹⁴ The *Mahdiah* Movement was founded by Muḥammad Aḥmad Al Mahdi (1844-1885) who proclaimed himself the Mahdi (the prophesied redeemer of Islam who will appear at the end of times) in 1881 and declared a *Jihad* against Anglo-Egyptian authority in Sudan. He raised an army and led a successful religious war to topple the Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan.

many of his colleagues who were educated in Sudan.¹⁵ Maxamuud Axmad Cali was the first Somali student to join the school and the *Salāḥ al-Addīn* Club founded in 1932 by Moḥamed ‘Ali Luqmān al-Muḥāmi, a Yemeni scholar who worked for a business company Antonan in Eden. As al-Muḥāmi relates in his letter:

In Berbera, I have opened a school and a club of *Salāḥ al-Addīn* with the contribution of the Arab and Indian Muslim businessmen. Then, I organized [a] football team. I made a speech in the mosque about the backwardness of Somalis and Arabs in the country. Many youth surrounded me and among them was Maxamuud Axmad Cali whom I convinced him to leave his village and to accept a scholarship to Sudan.¹⁶

In addition to that, it is said that the first modern school in British Somaliland was opened in the 1930s by the Sudanese teacher Kheyr al-Allah, an employee of British protectorate; nevertheless, this teacher worked in the school opened by Moḥamed ‘Ali Luqmān in Berbera.¹⁷ The Sudanese government’s role was marginal in the period under investigation, despite the fact that its role increased after the 1970s with the emergence of the modern Islamic movement in Sudan.¹⁸ As for the Saudi Arabian influence, that country was lagging behind economically and educationally during this period. Therefore, beyond being the abode of the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina, where Somali Muslims traveled frequently for pilgrimage, with some of them remaining there, Saudi Arabia did not have much influence to offer in the 1950s and 1960s. A few prominent Islamic scholars were educated there and the Salafia/Wahabiyah school of Sheikh Moḥamed Bin

¹⁵ Most likely, Ḥassan Makki made a mistake in stating the school was opened in 1872. It was probably opened in the 1920s since Sheikh Cali Xaaji Ibrahim who later became the principle of the Islamic institute in Burco in 1952 was educated there. See, Sheikh Cali Xaaji Ibrahim, *Al-Murshid fi mā Marra fi al-Ma‘ārif al-Somaliyah fi al-Iqlim al-Shimāl min al-Ma‘ārik al-‘ilmiyah wa al-Munadarāt al-Dīniyah* (Mogadishu, (no date), 5. Also, see, Hassan Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt al-Thaqāfiyah fi al-Somāl al-Kabīr (1887-1986)* (Al-Markaz al-Islāmi li al-Buhūth wa Nashri, 1990), 86-87.

¹⁶ See Moḥamad Ali Luqmān Al-Muḥāmi. *Rijālun wa Shu’ unun wa Dikriyāt* (Yemen: 2009), 177. Also, collected works of Al-Muḥāmi, Moḥamad Ali Luqmān (Nov. 6, 1898-March 22, 1966). *Rāid al-Nahdah al-Fikriyah wa al-Adabiyah al-Hadīthah fi al-Yaman* (collected works, Yemen, 2005), 483.

¹⁷ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 87.

¹⁸ The Muslim Brotherhood was introduced to Sudan in 1949; however, its effective organizational establishment took place in 1954. Passing through many name changes and political maneuvering, it took over power by a military coup on 30 June, 1989.

‘Abdiwahhāb was introduced to Somalia. However, the strong Saudi influence on Somalia began in the 1970s after the opening of the first Saudi-sponsored Institute of Islamic Solidarity in Mogadishu and subsequent confrontation with the Soviet influence in Somalia.¹⁹ Moreover, the oil economic boom attracted thousands of Somali laborers and students who were admitted to the Saudi universities to challenge the socialist military regime in Somalia.²⁰ In the period 1950-1967, Egypt exercised the strongest influence on Somalia among all Arab states, and it left a lasting imprint on this country. On these grounds, focus will be directed to the role of Egypt in the development of Somali nationalism and its cultural competition with Western countries. The Sudanese factor in modern education in the British Somaliland will also be explored.

Egyptian Cultural and Political Influence on Somalia

Somalia always constituted one of the Egyptian strategic areas of interest, its connection being historically based; Egypt even temporarily occupied parts of Somalia and attempted to annex it in the nineteenth century.²¹ Moreover, the centrality of Egypt in the Middle East and Africa was unquestionable. Egypt was taking the leading role in the Arab world in the 1950s and was also one of the founding countries of the Non-Aligned Movement of positive neutrality.²² The prestige of the Egyptian Revolution and the charismatic image of Jamāl ‘Abdi al-Nāsser; as well as the ideology of Arab nationalism with its strong propaganda machine, was influencing every country in the Arab world. In addition, the Islamic activism of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and its ardent opposition to the popular regime, with the consequent repression of its members, also inspired and attracted some people. The clash between the Egyptian revolutionary regime and the MB in the 1950s represented a developing ideological conflict in the Arab world that was being replicated in other countries.

¹⁹ The Institute of Islamic Solidarity was opened in 1968 by the Islamic League. See ‘Abdi-shakūr ‘Abdulqādir, “*Lamḥatun ‘an al-saḥwa al-Islamiyah fi Al-Somāl*.” Available from <http://www.aljazeera-online.net/index.php?t=9&id=31> (accessed on 23 June, 2010).

²⁰ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author on June 17, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

²¹ Mohamed Osman Omar. *The Scramble in the Horn of Africa: History of Somalia (1827-1977)* (Mogadishu: Somali publications, 2001), 72-92.

²² The Non-Aligned Movement was an international organization of the third world countries organized to safeguard their sovereignty in the polarized world during the Cold War. It was founded in April 1955, and Jamāl ‘Abdi Nāsser was one of the founders demonstrating leadership at the global stage.

The modern Islamic Revival in the Arab Middle East evolved at the beginning of nineteenth century, when Jamāl al-Addīn al-Afghānī and his disciple Moḥamed ‘Abdou called for the reform of Islamic thought. Their movement was in response to foreign intervention in Egypt and offered a formula for Muslims to be selective in adopting some elements of Western civilization while maintaining their faith and value system. Moreover, by 1928, the MB, founded by Hassan al-Banna, emerged and provided organizational setting and programs aiming at application of Islam to politics and public life.²³ However, the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, which brought Jamāl ‘Abdi al-Nāsser to power; later sought to modernize Egypt through Arab nationalism and socialist transformation. Wishing to foster a closer alliance with the Soviet Union, ‘Abdi-Nāsser perceived the MB as his regime’s biggest ideological threat. Hence this organization was banned and thousands of its members imprisoned. As a result, MB members went underground and many of them migrated to other countries, vehemently spreading their ideology. Gradually, in connection with locally created similar institutions, the Egyptian Islamic phenomenon was transformed into a worldwide Islamic movement. This Egyptian cultural influence, through written literature and radio broadcasts, has introduced to Somalia ideologies of Arab nationalism and MB, influencing Somali nationalists and Islamists respectively.

In general, the major Egyptian external policies during Nasser’s era were shaped by considerations of this country’s relationship to Western dominance, Egypt’s homogenizing role in the Arab world, and its challenge of Israel. In addition to Islamic solidarity and historical links, relations between Somalia and Egypt had strategic dimensions and developed into reciprocal geopolitical and ideological imperatives in the 1950s, applied at both state and non-state levels. At the state level, the underlying dynamic was that Egypt’s interest in the Horn of Africa became contingent upon its strategic interests in the River Nile and the Suez Canal.²⁴ These two waterways constitute

²³ On the academic history of Muslim brotherhood in English language see Richard Mitchell, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969). Also, see Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: The Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement* (Reading, UK: Garnet, 1998).

²⁴ Abdullahi Osman, “The Role of Egypt, Ethiopia the Blue Nile in the Failure of the Somali Conflict Resolutions: A Zero-Sum Game” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu, Hawaii, 2005).

economic arteries through which flow the lifeblood that has long shaped Egyptian history and its relations with other nations. Somalia, being located at the southern outlet of the Red Sea into the Indian Ocean, stands as a strategic backdrop to the Suez Canal politics. Moreover, Somalia has a disputed border with Ethiopia, a country that is the major source of the Nile water and one with which Egypt has uneasy relations. This locates Somalia within the vital sphere of the Nile politics as well. On the other hand, the strategic imperative of Somalia's relations with Egypt has emanated mainly from its drive for pan-Somali irredentist politics of the "Greater Somalia" and its strategic relations with the Arab countries. Integral to this drive was the demand that Somali-inhabited region of Ethiopia must be united with the Somali Republic. Consequently, the Somali foreign relations and domestic politics have been doggedly focused on seeking all possible avenues of support for its nationalistic aspirations.

Bearing in mind the strategic considerations stated above, Egypt became an active member in the discussions on the future Italian colonies such as Eritrea, Libya, and Somalia that have been conducted by the four powers and other interested countries since 1947.²⁵ Moreover, Egypt became an active member of the UN Advisory Council, consisting of Egypt, Columbia, and the Philippines, acting as a watchdog in Somalia under the UN trusteeship.²⁶ Consequently, the Egyptians used the opportunity of their direct presence in Somalia to take forward their connections with the Somalis and their emerging nationalist leaders. Egyptian special space among the Somali people was directed at arousing Islamic sentiment and nationalistic solidarity, linking Egypt with nationalist elites as well as with Islamic preachers and scholars. In particular, Egyptian Ambassador Kamāl al-Addīn Salāḥ played an important role in networking Somali nationalist movements with Egyptian Arab nationalism, opposing writing Somali language with the Latin alphabet, and pushing the Somali Youth League (SYL) leaders

²⁵ "On 19 September 1945, Mr. Bevin had declared that Egypt substantially contributed to the allies' victory in Africa and that Egypt's interest on settlement on former Italian colonies was understandable". The Egyptian position was closer to the British position in a number of points. Quoted from Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur and History of Southern Somalia* (Cairo: Nahda Book publisher, 2005), 294.

²⁶ The first Egyptian representative in Somalia was Mr. *Moḥamad Rajab*, who was replaced by Ambassador *Kamāl al- Addīn Sālāh* in 1953.

toward Egypt through education and scholarships.²⁷ Because of Ambassador Kamal's impressive success in achieving many of these goals, adversaries to the Arab/Islamic trend eliminated him by assassination in April 1957.²⁸ Nonetheless, by 1957, Egypt had been advancing its Somali engagement on two main fronts and had already shown some tangible progress. The first front was the coaching and nurturing like-minded pro-Egyptian politicians among the rising political and Islamic leaders. The second, complementary program was to make education the breeding ground for future leaders and the priority for the development of the country and its cultural linkages.²⁹

Regarding the coaching and nurturing of political leaders, Egypt had good relations with the SYL, being the only Arab country that was a member of the interested governments in the 1947 conference with the big four powers on the issue of Somalia's future.³⁰ It also responded positively to the demands of the SYL to provide early educational assistance. The SYL opposed the return of Italy to Somalia, and, therefore, its relations with Italy were marred by tensions after the UN mandated Italy to administer Somalia.

Revolutionary Egypt under Nasser with its anti-imperialistic propaganda was regarded as a role model whose footsteps should be followed. The powerful "Voice of Arabs" Radio Sawt al-'Arab in Cairo, established a Somali section and hosted many fervent Somali nationalist leaders, such as Xaaji Maxamad Xussein, Maxamuud Xarbi, and Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Muse.³¹ The speeches of these leaders were heard in Somalia, and during

²⁷ One such example is the scholarship offered to Saxaa-uddin, the prominent leader of the SYL.

²⁸ *Kamāl al- Addin Sālah* was assassinated in April 1957 by Maxamad Sheikh Cabdiraxman known as "Wiilow". The assassin was sentenced to a life term in jail. *Kamāl al- Addin* was given first-class honours; the Egyptian Cultural Club in Mogadishu bears his name. See, Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary of Somalia* (African Historical Dictionary Series, 87. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 130. Also, Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 117. For a detailed description of the role of *Kamāl al- Addin* and his assassination, see Aḥ med Bahā al-Addīn, *Mu' āmaratūn fī Ifrīqiyah* (Cairo: Dar Ihyā al-kutub al- 'Arabiyah, 1956).

²⁹ The Egyptian member of the Advisory Council, Moḥamed Ḥassan Al-Zayāt, articulated in the beginning of the mandate the necessity to "fight illiteracy, adopt good educational plans, and create schools, more schools with better teachers." See Poalo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: From Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 51.

³⁰ These countries included Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, China, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Netherlands, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Italy and Pakistan. See Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur and History of Southern Somalia* (Cairo: Nahda Book Publisher, 2005), 365.

³¹ Maxamuud Xarbi was an ardent Somali nationalist and campaigned throughout his political career for Djibouti to unite with Somalia. After a controversial referendum in Djibouti in 1958, he had a conflict with the French authorities and left the country to live in Cairo. He later moved to Mogadishu. However, in September 1960, he and several of his associates died in a plane crash on a return trip from China to

their time in Cairo, they made acquaintance with similar liberation movements in the Arab World. To counter the Egyptian anti-colonial propaganda of the “Voice of Arabs” Somali-language program, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Somali program was established in 1957. However, when the SYL gradually drifted toward Italy and was contained through a variety of means of persuasion, its enthusiastic nationalist orientation began to moderate; indicating the effect of what Okbazghi called “Political domestication” and Maxamad Sharif Maxamuud the “wisdom and insightfulness of some leaders of SYL.”³² This trend did not please some factions in the party, such as Xaaji Maxamad Xussein, who was elected as the party chairman in 1957. Xaaji Maxamad represented the Nasserite model of a non-aligned movement of positive neutrality and, as such, was considered by Italy and USA to be anti-Western and pro-Communist. The categorization of party leaders into moderates as pro-Western and radicals as anti-Western had begun within the Cold War atmosphere and political vocabulary of the time. Xaaji Maxamad’s strong articulation of the “Great Somalia” issue, using his exceptional communication skills and mastery of the Arabic language spiced with Somali poetry and Qur’anic verses had captured the imagination of the masses and religious circles. In particular, Xaaji Maxamad received the support of many Islamic scholars for his strong Islamic tendency and support for the Arabic language and culture. However, in an orchestrated conspiracy with the participation of the USA and Italy, he was expelled from the SYL party in May 1958.³³ Xaaji Maxamad and other prominent politicians represented competing ideologies in Somalia and established the Great Somali Party (GSP) characterized by the West as “extremist and anti-Italian position of the SYL”, “an

Somalia. See Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 127. Moreover, Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Muuse is the founder of *Hizbu Allah* in Burco and one of the first Islamic scholars who graduated from al-Azhar University.

³² USA and Italy orchestrated a policy of keeping Somalia aligned with the West. Their approach was to cultivate pro-Western orientation in the dominant SYL party. Reciprocally, this had warranted the SYL the support of the West to overshadow other parties in 1956. See, OkbazghiYohannes, *The United States and the Horn of Africa: An Analytical Study of Pattern and Process* (Westview Press, 1997), 204-212. Moreover, the moderate SYL leadership, in particular Aadan Cabdulle Cusmaan, convinced the majority of party central committee to follow a peaceful path and to cooperate with Italy to smoothly gain the independence within the mandated date. On this matter, see Moḥamed Sharīf Moḥamūd, “*al-Ra’is Ādan Abdulle Osmān – Awal Raīs li al-Jamhūriyah al-Somāliyah*,” 2009, available from See <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/1458> (accessed on June 6, 2010).

³³ Paolo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 87.

old-time nationalist rabble-rouser,” and the advocate of the “pro-Egyptian policy.”³⁴ Indeed, as later events reveal and contrary to conventional rhetoric, Western powers prevented the emergence of a democratic political culture in Somalia under the pretext of confronting communism.³⁵ However, the Egyptian influence on Somali politics was not weakened. Egypt kept good relations with Somalia against all challenges and after its independence signed agreements on economic, culture, and military cooperation.³⁶

Introduction of Arabic Schools into Somalia

The second wave of Egyptian intervention in Somalia was in the field of education, which was experiencing exponential growth. The first direct Egyptian involvement in the education sector started in response to a request from the SYL party in 1950 for Egyptian assistance in the field of education. This request was prompted by the fear that the Italian return to Somalia might result in the closure of the SYL schools that offered basic education.³⁷ The party was not on good terms with Italy and, with the encouragement of the BMA (1941-1950), was running successful schools that were in breach of the educational monopoly of the Roman Catholic Mission. The Egyptian response to the party's request was swift and affirmative, and the offer of the first 25 scholarships to the graduates of the SYL Arabic schools subsequently annually increased.³⁸ Moreover, Egypt dispatched two Islamic scholars from the al-Azhar establishment, Sheikh ‘Abdalla al-Mashhad and Sheikh Moḥamūd Khalīfa, to propagate Islam and to explore possibilities of further Egyptian engagement in Somalia. With their report, supported by the Egyptian UN Advisory Council member, Egypt signed an agreement with the Italian UN trusteeship authority to establish al-Azhar Mission schools in Somalia. Subsequently, a team of al-Azhar scholars, initially consisting of six teachers and preachers, was

³⁴ Tripodi characterises Xaaji Maxamad Xussein policies as “extremist,” while Touval considers him as merely pro-Egyptian. See Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 91; and Tripodi, *Colonial Legacy*, 87. Also, the *Time Magazine* branded Xaaji Maxamad as “an old-time nationalist rabble-rouser,” quoted from Elby Omar, *Fifty Years, and Fifty Stories: the Mennonite Mission in Somalia, 1953-2003* (Herald Press, 2003), 31.

³⁵ See Yohannes, *The United States and the Horn of Africa*, 211.

³⁶ See Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 178.

³⁷ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 142.

³⁸ Moḥamad Sharīf Moḥamūd, “Tarjumat li Sharīf Moḥamūd ‘Abdiraḥmān, Ra’is al-Rābiṭah al-Islāmiyah,” 2009. Available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/650> (accessed on April 21, 2010).

dispatched to Somalia in 1953.³⁹ These scholars were well received by the SYL party that issued the following statement: “The Arabic language is the official language of the SYL party and all the Somali people and Arabic language is the endowment from Allah to the people of Somalia who is part of Islamic world”.⁴⁰ For many SYL members and Islamic scholars in Somalia, the arrival of the prestigious al-Azhar was a major encouragement toward a better Islamic future.

The first task of the al-Azhar Mission was to set up Institute of the Islamic Studies in 1953, called in the Italian language *Scoula Disciplina Islamica*.⁴¹ The objective of the institute was to train Islamic judges and teachers in Arabic language and Islamic studies. These qualifications were in short supply and badly needed for the Italian trusteeship administration to expand educational programs in which Arabic language and Islam had to be taught beside the Italian language. Also, parts of the court system were applying the Islamic law, which required judges qualified in Islamic jurisprudence. The Egyptian drive in the field of education was also bolstered in terms of secular education. The second Egyptian educational mission under the Egyptian Ministry of Education arrived in Somalia in 1954. This mission promoted the Arabic language and sought to provide modern education up to the secondary education using Egyptian curriculum, in line with Egyptian state schools. Within this framework, schools were opened in collaboration with the Somali Islamic League, a non-state organization founded by Islamic scholars. By 1958, with the assistance and encouragement from the Islamic League, 15 schools were built and opened in successive years in many regions of Somalia.⁴² It was reported that the number of students enrolled in these schools in 1958 was about 1,200.⁴³ Furthermore, some of the graduates of these schools were granted scholarships from Egyptian universities. In the period 1952-1959, according to Axmad Maax, Egypt provided more

³⁹ These scholars are: *Sheikh Abubakar Zakariya (the chairman), Sheikh Ismā'īl Ḥamdi, Sheikh Yūsuf 'Abdul-mūnīm Ibrāhīm, Sheikh Moḥamed Qa'ida Aḥmad, and Sheikh Moḥamad al-Mahdi Maḥmūd*. See Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 142.

⁴⁰ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 142.

⁴¹ Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: Crisis of the Political Loyalties in Somalia* (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 105.

⁴² These schools were opened in Galkacyo, Beletweyne, Bossaso, Kismaayo, and Baidoa. Moreover, other schools were opened in Eil, Barava, and Marka.

⁴³ See Moḥamed Abdul-Mumin Yūnus, *Al-Somāl Wadanan wa sha 'ban* (Cairo: Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1962), 67.

than 86 scholarships in different fields; however, Daily Telegraph, quoting from one Italian Member of Parliament puts exaggerated number of 300 scholarships.⁴⁴ Most likely, these scholarships were in the vicinity of 200, as reported by Aḥmad Bahā al-Addīn.⁴⁵ The growth of these schools and their impact on the infusion of Arab/Islamic culture were remarkable. Moreover, the SYL published a weekly newspaper in the name of *al-Waxdah* in Arabic in 1957-1969.⁴⁶

In British Somaliland, development of education in general was slow due to people's suspicions of the possibility that Christianity, disguised in education, would be introduced. Islamic scholars blocked all British attempts to introduce modern education. However, when the British authority reviewed its policy and with the emergence of the new Somali elites educated in Sudan in Arabic and Islamic curriculum, modern education was launched smoothly. In contrast to Italian Somaliland, therefore, modern education in British Somaliland was directly connected to Sudan, which was also under the British rule. In this way, modern education in the Arabic language was introduced by the returnees from Sudanese scholarships in 1942.⁴⁷ The first two elementary schools in the Arabic language were opened in Berbera and Burco by Maxamad Shire Maxamad "Gab" and Yusuf Ismaciil Samatar "Gandi," respectively, both of whom were educated in Sudan. These schools used Sudanese curriculum and textbooks.⁴⁸ Schools in other regions followed the suit. In addition, more students were successively sent to Sudan and later to al-Azhar. By 1944, the British authority had re-engaged in modern education and adopted Arabic for elementary education. By 1949, it had assisted more than 29 Qur'anic schools with an enrollment of 1,250 students. This policy contrasted with the Italian system that

⁴⁴ See Aḥmed Barkhat Mah, *Wathā'iq 'an al-Somāl wa al-Ḥabasha wa Eriteriya* (Cairo: Shirkat al-dhawbagi li Daba'āt wa Nashr, 1985), 308. Also, see Bahau Addin, *Mu'āmaratūn*, 150.

⁴⁵ Bahāu al-addīn, *Mu'āmaratūn*, 102.

⁴⁶ SYL weekly newspaper *Al-Waḥdah* was edited by Moḥamad Sabri, Cabdiraxman Faarah (Kabaweyne) and Cabdiraxman Xassan. See Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 150.

⁴⁷ The first Somali returnees from the *Bakht al-Riḍā* institute were Yusuf Ismaciil Samatar, Maxamad shire Maxamad, and Cabdisalam Xassan Mursal. See Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 154. Details on the history of education in the British Somaliland see Fawzia Yusuf Xaaji Aadan, Geedi *Nololeedkii Yusuf Xaaji Aadan (1914-2005): Taariikhdiisii Halgan ee Waxbarashada, Siyaasadda, Dhaqanka, iyo Suugaanta* (London: African Publishing, 2007).

⁴⁸ Sudanese textbooks and Egyptian books were also used in some schools in the Italian Somaliland. Salah Mohamed relates that Hudur School built in 1954 used textbooks imported from Sudan. The school also used textbooks borrowed from the Egyptian elementary curriculum, imported probably by the SYL party for its schools. See Salah Mohamed Ali, *Hudur*, 255.

never supported traditional Islamic education. Therefore, though education was very limited, the Arabic language flourished in northern Somalia. Moreover, there were political party schools, such as those of the SYL and Somali National League (SNL) promoting Arabic/Islamic education. Furthermore, specialized schools of Islamic studies began in 1959 with the establishment of the Burco Islamic Institute, which later became part of the chain of the al-Azhar schools in Somalia.⁴⁹ Another important factor for raising national and Islamic awareness in British Somaliland was the opening of Radio Hargeysa in 1943, which broadcasted in the Arabic and Somali languages. Moreover, the first modern newspaper in Arabic language appeared in 1948 under the name *Jarīdat al-Somāl*, meaning Somali Journal, published by Maxamad Jaamac Uurdoox and printed in Aden.⁵⁰ By 1958, other newspapers in Arabic language had a strong presence. The most important was the weekly journal *Qarn-Ifrīqiyah* (Horn of Africa) edited by Cumar Maxamad Cabdiraxman (Cumar-dheere), which continued until 1960. This journal was famous for its strong nationalist rhetoric and advocacy for the “Greater Somalia.”⁵¹ Another celebrated weekly newspaper in Arabic language was *al-Lewā*, edited by Axmad Yusuf Ducaale and Axmad Jimcaale. All the above points demonstrate that the Arabic culture was more rooted in British Somaliland than in Italian Somaliland, although education in the Arabic language was more advanced in the Italian part.

After the independence and the unification of the former Italian Somalia and British Somaliland in July 1960, state schools became unified under a common curriculum. However, the non-state education system continued and remained free. In northern Somalia, Egyptian Arabic schools similar to those of the south were not available. Only a few Egyptian al-Azhar teachers were teaching at the two Islamic institutes in Hargeysa and Burco. Some of these teachers were also teaching Arabic and Islam at state high schools. There were also three non-governmental elementary/intermediate schools with Arabic curriculum: Sheikhada School (*al-Ḥuda li al-Banāt*), *al-Falāḥ al-Wadaniyah* school, and *al-Barawe* school. These schools were pioneers of the Arabic/Islamic

⁴⁹ The Burco Islamic Institute was one of the two al-Azhar secondary schools in Somalia. See ‘Abdiraḥmān al-Najjār, *al-Islāmu fī Al-Somāl* (Cairo: Madba’at Al-Ahrām Al-Tijāriyah, 1973), 45.

⁵⁰ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 151.

⁵¹ Ibid, 152.

education in Somaliland beyond elementary level. Moreover, the Egyptian library in Hargeysa played an important role in spreading Arabic/Islamic culture and became the center of Islamic awareness in northern Somalia. The library, besides providing extracurricular reading material for students of the Arabic schools, was also engaged in specific cultural activities. For instance, it imported Egyptian newspapers *al-Ahrām* and *Akhabār al-Youm* and occasionally organized Islamic lectures and screened Egyptian films. Similar cultural programs were conducted in the Mogadishu Egyptian Cultural Center. The library, with its rich supply of Arabic books and Egyptian newspapers, occasional film shows, Arabic concerts, and seasonal series of lectures, was an established part of Egyptian cultural manifestations in Somalia.

Integrating Traditional and Modern Education

Arabic-curriculum schools succeeded in solving the problem of parallel modern and traditional education. As the previous chapters described, the traditional Islamic education in Somalia begins with the memorization of the Qur'an in early childhood. In urban areas, while children are still in the Qur'anic schools, they also join modern schools at the age of six, and parallel education continues for a while; colonial governments and successive Somali regimes have failed to unify these education systems. On the other hand, in the pastoral areas where there are no schools, or where the children are from poor families that cannot afford to send them to modern schools, the option is either to drop education or continue in the traditional line of education. The first social stratification begins at this early stage, and many children drop out of education or never have an opportunity for it. Aside from many children who drop out of the modern education for various reasons and join the unqualified work force later, those who continue education pursue two clearly demarcated divergent routes. The first route is modern education, taught in Italian, Arabic, or English, at three levels: elementary, intermediate, and secondary. This route mostly leads either to government jobs or to the pursuit of higher education. The second route is the traditional higher Islamic education in mosque circles, which does not provide certificates and is not recognized by the state education system, thereby rendering scholars educated in the traditional system unqualified for government jobs. The latter route is taken by the majority of students in rural areas or by those who are not happy

with modern education. The question worth addressing is: What will be the future of these traditionally educated Somalis? Their education is not recognized, and their fate is marginalization. Obviously, since these students are older than 15, when they reach a certain level in the traditional education and they do not speak Italian or English, they have no hope in modern schools. The only avenue for them is the limited adult education aimed at the elimination of illiteracy.

This challenge has been dealt with in the Arabic language school system. Because of the mastery of the traditionally educated students of the Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence, they could be considered for entry into Arabic schools. A way of dealing with this educational parallelism was introduced by Sheikh ‘Abdiraḥmān al-Najjār, the head of the al-Azhar mission in 1957-1963. To integrate the two systems without eliminating each other, he introduced a special institute for the traditional Islamic students called the Mogadishu Islamic Institute. The institute gives an opportunity for these students to be admitted after qualifying tests in Arabic and Islamic subjects. Students are admitted at either intermediate or secondary level, depending on evaluation process. They are offered a one-year intensive program, and those who qualify are allowed to be admitted to either intermediate or secondary al-Azhar schools. The integrative program has been very successful, and all Arabic schools established such programs in which students who qualify are admitted to the general Arabic high schools. This integration also encouraged the traditional education and offered hope for many students from rural areas or from poor families. In this way, the traditional education and modern education were networked only through Arabic-curriculum schools. Other schools with an Italian or English curriculum could not accommodate these students because they represented a complete break from tradition. In conclusion, Arabic language education was growing and by 1971 in Mogadishu alone, there were nine elementary schools, two intermediate schools, and two high schools. The famous Jamāl ‘Abdi al-Nāssir high school alone has a total enrolment of 925 students.⁵² There were also eight al-Azhar Islamic institutes (six intermediate- and two secondary-level schools) in the eight regions of Somalia.⁵³ In total,

⁵² Al-Najjār, *al-Islām fī al-Somāl*, 47.

⁵³ Ibid., 45.

in 1971 there were 35 Egyptian-administered schools across Somalia and about 655 teachers working in these schools and government schools with an annual budget of 1.5 million Egyptian pounds.⁵⁴ Finally, Egyptian teachers and Arabic textbooks of the Arabic language and Islamic studies were provided to the government schools, so the Egyptian influence on Somali education was tremendous, although it still fell short in competing with the major languages of Italian and English used as the languages of administration in the country.

The Emergence of Early Islamic Organizations

Although Islamic parties did not succeed much in the political arena, they exerted major cultural influences. The Somali Islamic League and *Hizbu Allah* parties represent southern and northern versions, which, nonetheless, carried similar views on creating a closer link with the Arab/Muslim world and promoting Arabic language and Islam. The Somali Islamic League, established in 1950 in Mogadishu, was the first effective organization in Somalia after the Second World War. “Its program could be summarized as follows: (1) to work towards realizing the independence and unity of Somalia, (2) offering priority to the educational development and preservation of the cultural and Islamic identity of the country and (3) strengthening relations and cooperation with the brotherly Arabic countries.”⁵⁵ The most prominent leaders of the Islamic League were Sharif Maxamuud Cabdiraxman “Mara-Cadde” and Sharif al-Caydarusi.⁵⁶ To understand the role played by Sharif Mohamud in the Islamic movement, this study will produce here his short biography.

Short Biography of Shariif Maxamuud Cabdiraxman (1904-1994)

In his early childhood, Shariif Maxamuud lived in Luuq where he memorized the Qur’an. Then he traveled to Egypt to further his education. He was in Egypt during the Urabi

⁵⁴ ‘Ali Sheikh Aḥmad Abūbakar, *Al-Da‘wa al-Islāmiyah al-Mu‘āsira fī al-Qarn al-Ifīrīqi* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: Umayya Publishing House, 1985), 68.

⁵⁵ Moḥamad Sharīf Moḥamūd, “Tarjumat li Sharīf Moḥamūd”.

⁵⁶ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Hussein Samatar interviewed by the author on October 30, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. Also, see Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary*, 199.

Revolt and the Egyptian independence in 1923.⁵⁷ He was greatly influenced with the Egyptian politics and ideologies of Arab nationalism and MB during these years. He returned Somalia in the 1930s during the Italian Fascism rule where he protested fascist policies and humiliating practices against the Somalis. As a result, he was exiled to Bander Qaasin (now Bossaso). Moreover, during the Italian–Ethiopian war where many Somalis were soldiered in the colonial army, Sharif Maxamuud refused to issue the *fatwa* allowing fighting soldiers to break fasting of the Ramadan. His rationale was that the war was between two Christian countries, and Muslims had nothing to do with it. His refusal enraged Italian colonists who were trying to propagandize the war as a legitimate war. Furthermore, when the MBA tried to impose the Kiswahili language in Somalia, he mobilized Islamic scholars and aborted the attempt, insisting on preserving the role of the Arabic language. He was again exiled to the town of Barava in an attempt to contain his continuous agitation against colonial policies. In the early years of SYL, Sharif Maxamuud was one of their leading members and its spokesperson during the visit of the four-power commission in 1948. His oratory and articulations were prominent in putting forth national issues and explaining the wishes of the Somali people. However, he resigned from the SYL in the late 1940s for unknown reason and founded the Somali Islamic League (SIL) in 1950. The main focus of this organization was the preservation of Islamic /Arabic heritage against westernization, secularization, and Christianization.

The conviction of Shariif Maxamuud that Somalia belongs to the Arab world was unparalleled. For instance, during the Great Palestinian Revolution led by Sheikh Amīn al-Ḥuseini in 1936-38, he mobilized Somali masses for support and assistance. His sermons and speeches in the mosques have been raising the awareness of the Somali masses for the plight of the Palestinian people. Moreover, he established an intimate relation with Arab countries and in particular Egypt. He devotedly supported Egypt in the tripartite invasion in 1957 of Israel, France and Britain and collected donations from the Somali people which were delivered to the Egyptian authorities. In addition, he met the President of Egypt Jamāl Abdi al-Nāssar and Anwar al-Sādāt who was during this time

⁵⁷ This short biography is based on writing of the son of Sharif Maxamuud in his brief biography, Moḥamad Sharīf Moḥamūd, “Tarjumat li Sharīf Moḥamūd”.

chairman of the Islamic Solidarity. Sharif Maxamuud's connections and relations with the Arab countries annoyed Italy, and he was accused of lobbying to make Somalia a member of the Arab League, a dream that was realized in 1974. In that same direction, he also lobbied to block Israel from establishing relations with the new state of Somalia by agitating the public to refuse the arrival of the Israeli delegation that was invited to participate in the commemoration of the Somali independence in 1960, the objective that was realized successfully.⁵⁸

On the role of Islam in the Somali state, Sharif Maxamud also worked with many of his colleagues to oppose any secular views in the constitution of Somalia of 1960. The constitution included clauses that make Islam the basic source of the legislation.⁵⁹ After the independence, Shariif Maxamuud focused on education and promotion of the Arabic language seeking the assistance and support of the Arab League in establishing a university in Somalia. This request was approved finally in 1971, and the news was welcomed by the President Siyad Barre. However, the project was aborted by Italy's friends in the government. Upon hearing the news, they contacted Italy and proposed an alternative project, according to which the university would be funded by European Common Market (later the European Union) through Italy and Italian language would be the language of instruction.⁶⁰ During the military rule, the Islamic League and Islamic work were prohibited. Nevertheless, Sharif Maxamuud's struggle produced Islamic elites who pioneered the Islamic awakening in Somalia and confronted all efforts of secularization, Christianization, westernization, and socialism. During the civil war, Sharif Mohamud moved to the town of Barava and then to Mombassa. From there, he traveled to Cairo, where he died in 1994.

The role played by the Islamic League was tremendous in preparing the cultural ground upon which the modern Islamic awakening was founded and flourished. Along with many

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Sheikh Geryare interviewed by the author on July 24, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland

⁶⁰ Maxamad Aadan Sheikh, former minister during Military regime credited for initiating the Somali National University claims that only Italy was ready to provide higher education assistance to Somalia. Other countries that Somali government requested assistance were not forthcoming. Maxamad Aadan Sheikh interviewed by the author on August 5, 20110, Helsinki, Finland.

other scholars and politicians, the League's leaders undertook the task of protecting Islamic heritage against the challenges of Christianization and westernization. They continued the ideals of earlier attempts to establish in the British Somaliland similar organizations to the one founded by Xaaji Faarax Omaar in Aden in 1925.⁶¹ The leaders also inherited the anti-colonial position of early Islamic scholars, utilizing new means and strategies. Moreover, they were promoting early years' program of the nationalist SYL party in lobbying to make the Arabic language the official language of the state.⁶² The SYL wrote to the Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Nohās, requesting educational assistance for Somalia. The initial objectives of these early leaders of the Islamic consciousness in the 1950s were to promote Arabic education in order to compete with the growing Italian language schools after Somalia's return to that Western country's administration under the UN trusteeship. The Somalis were always suspicious of colonial education, fearing Christianization of their children. Moreover, Islamic scholars were also encountering increased activities of Christian missionaries, engaged in spreading their missionary work through educational institutions. Furthermore, one of the major tasks was to oppose the writing of the Somali language in the Latin script, or in the locally invented Osmaniya, perceived to be the beginning of the secularizing of the society.⁶³ To implement their objectives, SIL took two steps. Firstly, it advocated making Arabic the official language of the country. To pursue this step, SIL submitted a signed petition to the Italian authorities and the UN Advisory Council in November 1950, seeking to affirm that the official language of Somalia is the Arabic language. Below are key excerpts of this petition, signed on behalf of Somali leaders and scholars by Sharif Maxamuud Cabduraxman "Mara-Cadde", the chairman of the Islamic League.⁶⁴

We, the Somali Islamic scholars, clan leaders and elders, prominent personalities and leaders of the political parties, submit to the administrative

⁶¹ The "Somali Islamic Organization" is considered to be the first of its kind, and its founder, Faarah Omaar, was exiled by the British authorities to Eden and later to Ethiopia, charged with anti-colonial campaigning and agitation. See, I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History*, 114.

⁶² See Sayid Omar Abdullahi, *al-'Alāqāt al-Somāliyah al-Misriyah* (MA Thesis, submitted to the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies in Cairo, 2006).

⁶³ The Somali language was not committed in writing until 1973 when the military regime unilaterally issued a decree to use the Latin alphabet without any opportunity for public dialogue.

⁶⁴ See the original Arabic version of the petition in al-Najjār, *al-Islām fī al-Somāl*, 99. It is translated by the author.

authority of Italy what we have agreed ultimately with respect to the popular official language of the country. We have selected Arabic language as their official language for the following reasons.

1. The Arabic language is the language of religion and the Qur'an.
2. The Arabic language is the language of Islamic courts in all regions of the country and remains as such until today.
3. The Arabic language is the language of trade and correspondence since the spread of Islam and until today.
4. The Arabic language is the language spoken by the majority of the population.
5. The Arabic language has been chosen by the people in consensus to be their official language.

Secondly, SIL lobbied Egypt and the Arab League to open competitive schools with instruction in the Arabic language and to provide scholarships to the Somali students in their universities.⁶⁵ To realize this objective, the Islamic League needed a competent partner with common interests and aspirations. That partner was the revolutionary Egypt under the charismatic leader Jamāl 'Abdī al-Nāssir and the Egyptian member in the UN Advisory Council for Somalia. With the cooperation of SIL and the great desire of the Somali Islamic leaders and nationalist political parties, these schools were established and flourished, as will be seen in the next section.

In northern Somalia, comparable efforts were made by Sayid Axmad Sheikh Muse (d. 1980), a graduate from the al-Azhar University in the 1950s. As related by Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi and others, Sayid Axmad had some initial contact with the Egyptian MB and was also influenced by the Nasserite ideology.⁶⁶ As a partner of Xaaji Maxamad Xusseini during their study in Cairo and working on the Somali "Voice of Arabs" radio program, he lobbied for the Arabic language, which resulted in the establishment of the

⁶⁵ The earlier fruits were that Saudi Arabia provided 10 scholarships in 1954 to the Somali students. Sheikh Cabdiraxman Hussein Samatar, a former secretary of Nahdah who worked in the World Muslim League in Somalia since 1981 was among these students benefited from the Saudi scholarships. Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xusseini Samatar interviewed by the author on November 1, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁶⁶ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi, interviewed by the author on November 14, 2009, Djibouti.

first Islamic institute in Burco.⁶⁷ In 1956, he established an Islamic political party called “*Hizbu Allāh*” (Party of God), which carried the ideology of MB, based on applying the Islamic Shari’a to all aspects of the life of the Muslims, including political aspects. To spread his ideology, Sayid Axmad authored a book titled *Hizbu Allāh wa Hizbu al-Shaydān*, which means “the party of God and the party of the Satan.” Besides his cultural connections, Sayid Axmad was a businessman who exported Somali livestock, particularly camels, to Egypt and was organically connected to Egypt through marriage to his Egyptian wife.⁶⁸ Later, *Hizbu Allāh* and the Khayriyah Charity constituted the foundations of the Somali National League (SNL). Moreover, among the earlier graduates of the Al-Azhar University who closely worked with Sayid Axmad were Sheikh Cusman Dubad from the town of Borama in northern Somalia, who later became the director of the Islamic Institute in Burco, and Sheikh Cali Ismaciil Yaquub, who became prominent member of the Parliament in the 1960s. Although there is no conclusive proof of their membership in the Egyptian MB, there is little doubt that they were influenced by its ideology, at least to a certain extent.

Stimulating Factors of Islamic Consciousness

These factors include increased activities of Christian missionaries, the spread of Italian-language schools, and disputes over the selection of orthography of the Somali language between the camps of the Arabic language and the Latinized alphabet. Moreover, increasing westernization of the urban elite and the growth of un-Islamic value systems and norms were also causing concerns.

The Growth of Christian Missionary Activities

One of the major factors that provoked Islamic consciousness in the 1950s was the growing activities of the Christian missionaries after the return of Italy. Fierce competition was growing apace between the Egyptian Islamic Missions and the Christian Missions. The founding of the first al-Azhar Mission in 1953 coincided with the arrival of

⁶⁷ Cabdirisac Caqli, interviewed by the author on November 22, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁶⁸ Axmad Ibrahim Xassan, interviewed by the author on November 22, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

the Mennonite Mission (MM) in the same year, while the introduction of the Egyptian modern school system was matched by the arrival of the Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) in 1954. As part of this competition, the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) increased its educational programs. Italy licensed Christian missionaries under the pretext of the UN charter granting “religious freedom”, a controversial principle which has different means in different religious communities. In Europe, religious freedom includes freedom to apostasy and conversion while in the Islam freedom of religion means accepting religious pluralism and does not include freedom to apostasy.⁶⁹ Looking back over history, comparable activities had instigated earlier encounters with British colonialism, which remained in the collective memory of the people who opposed the introduction of modern education. The introduction of Christianity in Somalia was done by the French Catholic Mission, which opened an orphanage at Daymoole in 1891, a few kilometers from Berbera. The presence of this mission was one of the factors that provoked Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan’s Jihaad against Britain and Ethiopia. It is related that Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan, infuriated with his squabble with the Qaadiriyah Order and with British authorities’ siding with them in 1897, passed Daymoole on his way out of Berbera. Out of curiosity, he stopped to question one of the 69 children in the Mission’s orphanage boarding school with three priests and three sisters.⁷⁰ Sayid Mohamed asked the boy, “What is your name?” and the boy replied, “John Abdillahi.” Then he asked, “What clan are you from?” and the boy answered, “I belong to the clan of the father.”⁷¹ The name of the boy and his clan affiliation demonstrated a total change in the culture and religion of these boys. Subsequently, as Sayid’s historiography explains, his antipathy toward colonialism and the tolerant Qaadiriyah Order grew out of proportion. Professor Lewis explains the reaction of Sayid as follows: “This fired his patriotism and he intensified his efforts to win support for the Saalixiyah, preaching in the mosques and

⁶⁹ See “There is no compulsion in religion, for the right way is clear from the wrong way. Whoever therefore rejects the forces of evil and believes in God, he has taken hold of a support most unfailing, which shall never give way, for God is All Hearing and Knowing”. Glorious Qur’an (2:256).

⁷⁰ Said Samatar, *Oral Poetry*, 107.

⁷¹ There are many versions of this conversation, though all convey same meaning. See another version in, Abdisalam Issa-Selwe, *The failure of Daraawiish state: The clash between Somali clanship and state system* (paper presented at the 5th International Congress of Somali Studies, December 1993), 3. Also, see http://www.somalimission.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9:the-persecuted-christian-church-in-somalia&catid=3:articles&Itemid=3

streets that his country was in danger and urging his compatriots to remove the English ‘infidels’ and their missionaries.”⁷² However, in reaction to Sayid’s propaganda expressed in poetic literary form, all Christian missionary activities were banned in 1910 in the British Somaliland and strict rules were enforced afterwards.⁷³

In southern Somalia, the Swedish Overseas Lutheran Church also established its first station in Kismaayo in 1896 and expanded its activities to Juba Valley villages such as Jamaame, Mugaambo, and Jilib. The Mission also set up health clinics and elementary schools as well as local churches in these areas. It preached the Gospel mainly to plantation workers of what was originally the “Bantu population of the Juba Valley” and attracted some adherents.⁷⁴ During this period, Jubaland was under British administration, and the Mission enjoyed unlimited freedom of work under state protection. However, after Italy annexed Jubaland in 1925, the church was expelled from Somalia in 1935, forever leaving behind its properties accumulated over more than 30 years and its small Somali Christian congregations. The eviction of the protestant church was triggered by the Swedish government’s position toward Italian designs for the Horn of Africa and went well with the rival RCC. It was a policy intended to win the hearts and minds of the Muslim Somalis during the Italian campaign against Ethiopia.⁷⁵ As for the RCC, it worked under a less hostile environment during the Italian colonial period and was mostly confined to the Italian community, orphans, and freed slaves. “It drew no designs for traditional Christian missionary work among the Muslim Somalis. Her most direct attempt at proselytizing was to get orphans off the streets into boarding schools and instruct them in the Catholic faith.”⁷⁶ During Italian Fascist rule, the church was able to build in 1928 a large cathedral that became the symbol of the Muslim city of Mogadishu under Italian administration. Besides providing religious services to the Italians in Somalia, the RCC by 1939 was running, with government subsidies, 12 elementary

⁷² Lewis, *A History*, 67.

⁷³ Lewis, *A History*, 103. The Swedish Church wanted to return to Somalia after the Second World War but was refused entry by British Military Administration. See, Omar Elby, *Fifty Years*, 13.

⁷⁴ Robert Hess, *Italian Colonialism in Somalia* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1966), 170.

⁷⁵ Omar Elby, *Fifty Years*, 8.

⁷⁶ Omar Eby, *A Whisper in a Dry Land: A Biography of Merlin Grove, Martyr for Muslims in Somalia* (Herald Press, 1968), 7.

schools, in which 1,776 pupils were enrolled.⁷⁷ Italy granted considerable freedom to the RCC while at the same time demonstrating its support and promotion of Islam in constructing mosques, shrines, and Hajj convoys. During the BMA, the church maintained its activities, and its orphanages received British support of 0.65 shilling per day per orphan.⁷⁸ It also boasted having 8,500 followers in 1950, almost all of whom were expatriate Italians.⁷⁹ According to the UN 1957 report, “Italian Catholic missionaries operated more than 20 institutions in Mogadishu alone during that time.”⁸⁰ However, after the independence and departure of many Italian expatriates from Somalia, the Church started losing followers, claiming only 2,623 members in 1970.⁸¹ Nevertheless, it maintained its activities and administered churches, hospitals, schools, orphanages, and cultural centers.⁸²

The most zealous missionary activities that triggered most of the resentment among the Somali population were the protestant denomination of Mennonite Mission (MM) and Sudan Interior Mission (SIM), which joined the Christian venture in the 1950s. MM interest in Somalia had begun in 1950, when the secretary of Eastern MM and Charities, Orie O. Miller, visited Mogadishu. Wilbert Lind and his family were sent to Somalia in January 1953 to represent the Protestant presence, since the Swedish Overseas Lutheran Church had been banned in 1935. Opening their headquarters in Mogadishu, the Mennonites were running programs in Mogadishu, Jawhar, Mahadaay, Jamaame, Bula-Burte, and Kismaayo by 1968. As recorded by Abdirahman Ahmed Nur, the MM was focusing on converting people in riverine areas. As was related, the “Church was enjoying a trend towards the Gospel among the people of riverine communities in the South. On occasions, hundreds of people would come together to hear the Gospel. Then,

⁷⁷ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 73.

⁷⁸ Salah Mohamed, *Hudur*, 360.

⁷⁹ After the civil war of 1991 and the destruction of the Diocese of Mogadishu, Catholics estimate the number of their adherents in Somalia as about 100 persons. See this information available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roman_Catholicism_in_Somalia (accessed on May 11, 2009).

⁸⁰ Abdirahman Ahmed Noor, *Arabic Language and Script in Somalia: History, attitudes and prospects* (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1999), 63.

⁸¹ See detailed statistics of the activities of the Diocese of Mogadishu available from <http://www.catholic-hierarchy.org/diocese/dmgds.html> (accessed on May 12, 2009).

⁸² The last Roman Catholic Bishop of Mogadishu, Salvatore Colombo was murdered in 1989 followed by successive demonstrations and conflict between growing Islamists and the government and bloody demonstrations occurred on July 14, 1989.

the government moves enforced the cessation of all church activities.”⁸³ The mission expanded rapidly and, by 1969, its six locations had more than 30 missionaries. It administered several language and elementary/intermediate schools, a clinic and hospital, and a bookshop.⁸⁴ However, March 24, 1962 became the turning point in the mission’s expansion when the Somali government ordered cessation of all their missionary activities such as schools and hospitals because of their rigorous proselytization activities.⁸⁵ This was followed by the assassination of Mr. Merlin Grove in July 1962, which occurred after the government allowed the reopening of the mission schools.⁸⁶ This event prompted the adoption of Article 29 of the Somali Constitution prohibiting the spreading of other religions in Somalia.⁸⁷ Moreover, three months later, the government issued a directive requiring “teaching Islam in private schools as well as public.” The MM complied, while the SIM closed its schools and left the country.⁸⁸ The military regime of 1969 nationalized all private schools and institutions in October 1972, including mission properties, and, finally, mission personnel were expelled from Somalia in 1976. Nationalization of the private schools and expulsion of religious missions were not confined to Christian missionaries; these measures also included the al-Azhar Mission and the Egyptian Educational Mission.⁸⁹ However, after the Somali-Ethiopian war in 1977-78 and following a massive refugee influx, the MM was allowed to return to provide relief assistance to the refugee camps.⁹⁰

⁸³ Abdirahman Ahmed Noor, *The Arabic Language*, 54.

⁸⁴ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 143.

⁸⁵ “Rumours swept the towns: Wesselhoeft had baptized 21 Somali School boys in the Shabelle River. The mission had ordained Somali priest in Jamama. New Somali believers distributed Arabic Gospel tracts in Mogadishu.” See Omar Elby, *Fifty Years*, 32.

⁸⁶ Mr. Merlin Grove was assassinated by Yasiin Cabdi Axmad Ibrahim who was angry at the distribution of Christian literature written in the Arabic language at the Cabdulqaadir mosque in Mogadishu.

⁸⁷ See Somali Constitution of 1960, article 29, which states, “Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience and freely to profess his own religion; however, it shall not be permissible to spread or propagandize any religion other than the religion of Islam.”

⁸⁸ See Omar Elby, *Fifty Years*, 37.

⁸⁹ *Ibid*; 64-65.

⁹⁰ See brief history of Mennonite Mission in Somalia available from <http://www.gameo.org/encyclopedia/contents/S6586.html> (accessed on May 12, 2009).

The second ardent mission was SIM operated by Canadian Missionaries who arrived in Somalia on September 15, 1954, although had requested to enter Somalia in 1948.⁹¹ This mission is one of the international, interdenominational Christian mission organizations united under the name of Serving in Mission.⁹² The goals of SIM include planting, strengthening, and partnering with churches around the world. When it arrived in Somalia in 1954, SIM established a number of schools. Although it closed them after being prohibited to teach the Gospel by the 1963 constitution, it claimed to have 30-40 Somali converts. Through its strong language school, it attracted more than 350 students by 1965.⁹³ The most important accomplishment of SIM was translating the New and Old Testaments into the Somali language using Latin alphabet in 1966. It is noteworthy that the Somali language was not committed to a written form until 1972, and the conflict over selecting an alphabet was one of the major conflicts between Islamic scholars and secular groups. The use of the Latin alphabet by SIM offered more weight to the secular agenda over the Islamic scholars' drive. Probably, SIM acquired experience in working with Muslim communities by avoiding establishing churches. Instead, it organized its Somali adherents into the Somali believers' fellowship orders and secretive congressional teams. Finally, besides all its stated activities, SIM was also running two hospitals and three clinics until 1969, after which it abandoned its open activities.

Protestant Christian missionaries were attracting Somalis by a variety of means. They were offering good English programs that were in high demand in Somalia, and provided education that led to scholarships at prestigious universities in the USA.⁹⁴ As a result, most of the Somalis claiming to be Christians were in the category of "rice Christians" or "scholarship Christians," as celebrated Somali writer Nuruaddin Farah calls them.⁹⁵ In his literary article titled "The Skin of the Dog," Maxamuud Siyaad Togane, a Somali

⁹¹ Helen Miller, *The Hardest Place: the biography of Warren and Dorothy Modricher* (Guardian Books, 1982), 166

⁹² Four major churches are united in the Serving in Mission organization. They are the Africa Evangelical Fellowship, Andes Evangelical Mission, International Christian Fellowship, and Sudan Interior Mission, available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Serving_In_Mission (accessed on May 12, 2009).

⁹³ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 144.

⁹⁴ Many Somali students who claimed to be Christians were admitted in the Goshen College in Indiana, USA, supported by the Mennonite Mission scholarships.

⁹⁵ "Rice Christians" are people who formally declared themselves Christian for material benefits. Nuruddin Faarax, a prominent Somali novelist called them "scholarship Christians". Mohamud Siyad Togane interviewed by the author on November 3, 2009, Montreal, Canada.

Canadian poet and writer, characterizes the motivations of these Somalis as mostly seeking worldly lucre, and to illustrate this, he quotes the Somali proverb “dantaada maqaar Aybaa loogu seexdaa” meaning, “To achieve your goals, you may sleep in the skin of a dog.”⁹⁶ The focus of Christian missionaries on education evolved from their perceptions of schools as important avenues for conversion.⁹⁷ According to Bishop Shanahan, one of the pioneers of the Catholic missionaries in Nigeria; “those who hold the school, hold the country, hold its religion, holds its future.”⁹⁸ Some ambitious students in the mission schools founded the Somali Christian Association in 1963 to receive these privileges until they had achieved their career goals and then most of them reclaimed their Islamic faith.⁹⁹ One such example is Professor Said Samatar, who was from a family of well-known Islamic scholars and joined a mission school in the town of Qalafo. Interviewed by Professor Ahmed Samatar on how to negotiate being from religious family background and Christian missionary connection, he replied: “Well, basically I went from one *kitāb* (book) to another. [Laughter] And now I am returning to the original *kitāb*” [Qur’an]. Remembering his father’s advice on this sensitive issue, he said: “I remember him [his father] saying that with the missionaries, I should practice the Shi’ite doctrine of *Taqiya*, meaning dissembling, the art of artful deception. That’s what he encouraged me to do.... So that is basically what I practiced!”¹⁰⁰ Another example is Maxamuud Togane, who was closely associated with the MM but affirms that he remained Muslim and believes that majority of the so-called Somali Christians are in this category.¹⁰¹

⁹⁶ See Mohamud Togane, “*The Skin of a Dog*.” *Zymurgy Literary Review* 6, Volume III, Number 2, autumn 1989, 95-100.

⁹⁷ Magnus O. Bassey, *Western Education and Political Domination in Africa: A Study in Critical and Dialogical Pedagogy* (Bergin & Garvey, 1999), 53.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Professor Said Samatar was the chairman of the Somali Christian organization and Mohamud Siyad Togane was the vice-chairman. Two interviewees professed to be Christians reclaimed publicly their Islamic faith after graduating from the university. They requested anonymity. I have also interviewed Togane who confirmed this information on November 3, 2009, Montreal, Canada.

¹⁰⁰ See Ahmed Ismael Samatar’s interview with Professor Said Sheikh Samatar at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, Washington, D.C. Bildhan: *An International Journal of Somali Studies* (Volume 6, 2006), 1. Moreover, this quote is also in the footnote 52 of the unpublished poem of Mohamud Togane “In Memory of Wilbert Lind (1920-2007).”

¹⁰¹ Mohamud Siyad Togane, interviewed by the author on November 3, 2009, Montreal, Canada.

The strongest Christian provocation of the Muslim faith that stirred emotions in Mogadishu was the event that led to the assassination of Merlin Grove of the MM. The incident exploded when Warren Modricker from SIM had made what could be considered a “spiritual assault” by arranging the distribution of scripture leaflets in Arabic at Abdulqadir Mosque after the Friday prayer.¹⁰² The distributor was a Somali claiming to be Christian, who, when was caught, stated that he was sent by the Christian missionaries.¹⁰³ There were two missions located near each other in Mogadishu: the MM and SIM. In reaction, a Somali man decided to avenge his religion and assassinated the Mennonite Mission’s Merlin Grove on July 16, 1962.¹⁰⁴ The rage of the public upon hearing the news of distribution of Christian literature and subsequent murder of Marlin Grove was out of proportion, and the issue of converting Somalis to Christianity became top of the national agenda. The first government action was swift, ordering missions to comply with a set of policies, such as ceasing any forms of spreading Christianity, including Islamic teaching and Arabic language in their curriculum, and building mosques in their boarding schools.¹⁰⁵ This event had also called for the enactment of Article 29 of the constitution prohibiting the propagation of other religions in Somalia.¹⁰⁶

In the conclusion, Christian missionary activities in Somalia were linked to five countries; namely, France, Sweden, USA, Canada and Italy. It is notable that British missionaries never attempted to introduce itself in Somalia even though Britain ruled parts Somalia about 80 years. Moreover, it worth mentioning that missionary activities were prohibited three times in Somalia: two of the events were undertaken by British and Italian fascist authorities mainly to win the hearts and minds of their Somali subjects. The closed down missionaries were French Catholic Mission in 1910 and Swedish Lutheran Overseas

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ The distribution of Christian literature to the Somali public was ascertained by the Mission. As Omar Elby writes, “Later they learned that only the last charge was true; zealous new [Somali] believers gave out Christian Literature in Mogadishu Markets.” See Omar Elby, *Fifty Years*, 32.

¹⁰⁴ See Eby, Omar, *A Whisper in a Dry Land* (Herald Press, 1968). Warren Modricker predicted such a response in 1958 when he wrote a letter to the director of SIM saying, “Islam will not sit idly and take it on the chin without a ‘fight’, but by the Grace of God through the victory of Calvary, let us as a mission go forward.” Miller, Helen, *The Hardest Place*, 180.

¹⁰⁵ Togane interviewed in Montreal on November, 3, 2009.

¹⁰⁶ See Somali Constitution, Article 29 which states, “Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience and freely to profess his own religion; however, it shall not be permissible to spread or propagandize any religion other than the religion of Islam.”

Church in 1935. On the other hand, the third action was carried out by the revolutionary Somalia in 1972 as part of general nationalization policy of the educational institutions in the country. As a result, all Christian institutions were closed and the Missions were expelled in 1976. The continuous disruption of the missionary activities minimized the presence of Christian minority in Somalia. Moreover, the collapse of the state in Somalia and civil war that broke afterwards caused the destruction of Christian properties and institutions along with many state institutions. Furthermore, some Christian believers in Somalia were targeted by armed clan militia or armed Islamic extremists and were persecuted and murdered. Following are the list of Christian missionaries operated in Somalia.

Name of the Christian Mission	Denomination	Home Country	Year of arrival in Somalia (current status)
French Catholic Mission	Catholic	France	1891 (expelled 1910)
Swedish Lutheran Overseas Church	Protestant	Sweden	1896 (expelled 1935)
Roman Catholic Church	Catholic	Italy	1904 (closed 1991)
Mennonite Mission	Protestant	Canada	1954 (expelled 1976)
Sudan Interior Mission	Protestant	USA	1954 (expelled 1976)

Table 3. Christian Missions in Somalia

Selecting Somali Language Orthography

The Somali language is spoken by the Somalis settled in the vast areas in the Horn of Africa and was not committed to writing until 1972. The question of language in terms of the official language and which orthography should be used was one of the provoking factors in the Islamic consciousness. It was one of the contested arenas between Islamic scholars and emerging modern elites. Captain Richard Burton, the British Intelligence officer who visited parts of Somalia and Harrar in 1854, was the first to use Latin script to write the Somali language. Other attempts were initiated in 1897 by Christian missionaries, as represented by de Laragasse and de Sampont who devised Latinized

alphabet for Somali and wrote the first Somali-English and English-Somali dictionaries.¹⁰⁷ These missionary activists claimed, “The great desire, not the will, of the propaganda of Rome notwithstanding, the Roman characters should be used for all classical works which missionaries publish on the language of the people they are sent to. Therefore, we are for writing Somali phonetically, employing the Roman characters with their Latin pronunciation.”¹⁰⁸ Moreover, a number of Western scholars and Orientalists also attempted to develop Somali grammar and a Latinized script. The most noted among them was Kirk, who in 1905 wrote a grammar book of the Somali language using the Latin script.¹⁰⁹ Andrzejewski also published a number of papers and books in the Latinized Somali language.¹¹⁰ Abraham published Somali-English and English-Somali dictionaries in 1964 and 1967, respectively.¹¹¹ Moreover, Italian scholars Enrico Cerulli and Mario Moreno published books and articles in the Somali language with the Latin script.¹¹²

The first Somali reaction to the growing trend of marginalizing Arabic and replacing it with the Somali language written in the Latinized alphabet was noted in 1941. Sharif Maxamuud Cabdiraxman, the distinguished advocate of the Arabic language, who was one the first pioneers of modern education in Somalia, confronted Mr. Colin Wood of the MBA in Mogadishu. Mr. Wood had been striving to commit the Somali language into a written form. However, Sharif Maxamuud met with Mr. Wood and argued that “Arabic was the language of the land and it is the duty for the British Government to make it

¹⁰⁷ Evangeliste de Larajasse, *Somali-English and English-Somali dictionary* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Trubner, 1897).

¹⁰⁸ Abdurahman Ahmed Noor, *Arabic Language*, 139.

¹⁰⁹ J.W.C. Kirk, a British infantry soldier and rifleman stationed in British Somaliland, published a grammar of Somali, Yibir, and Madhiban in 1905.

¹¹⁰ Andrzejewski (1922-1994) was a scholar of Somali linguistics and professor of Cushitic languages and literature at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

¹¹¹ Roy C. Abraham is the author of a Somali-English dictionary (1964) and an English-Somali dictionary (1967).

¹¹² Mario Martino Moreno is the author of *Il Somala della Somalia* (The Somali of Somalia) (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello stato, 1955). Enrico Cerulli was an Italian scholar of Somali and Ethiopian studies and a politician. From January 1939 to June 1940, he was Governor of East Shewa and later of Harrar, two provinces of Italian East Africa. He also headed the political office for East Africa in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He authored a voluminous body of works including *Somalia: scritti vari editi ed inediti*. 3 vols.

official.”¹¹³ The issue of the language in Somalia loomed everywhere and was debated even at United Nations headquarters, since Somalia was under the UN trusteeship.¹¹⁴ Most Somalis preferred Arabic to be their official language and believed that if the Somali language had to be committed into a written form, Arabic script should be used. On the other hand, colonial administrators, Christian activists, and Orientalists were poised to isolate Somalia from the Arabic/Islamic world and make Italian or English the official language of the country. Moreover, they sought to affirm the use of the Latin alphabet in cases where the Somali language was to be committed to writing. The language debate continued for years, deliberating on three proposals: the Latin alphabet, the Arabic, and Cusmaaniya, the latter being invented by the Somali scholar Yassin Cusman Kenidiid.¹¹⁵ The majority of the Somalis supported the Arabic alphabet because it is the first language they learn in early childhood to enable them to recite the Qur’an and understand Islam. Second, they considered themselves belonging to the Arab nation, having genealogies connecting them to Arab ancestors. At the same time, they were fearful that the Latin alphabet would affect their Islamic education and culture.

Against the wishes of the people, the Italian UN trusteeship administration AFIS (Amministrazione Fiduciaria Italiana in Somalia) advocated writing the Somali language in the Latin script, and in 1952, the daily newspaper of AFIS, *Corriere Della Somalia*, published a page in the Latinized Somali language. Also in the 1950s, the British government financed a project for developing a script for the Somali language, and B.W. Andrzejewski, who worked on that project, proposed the Latin script. Furthermore, in 1955, AFIS, with the collaboration of the British Protectorate authority and UNESCO, held a conference on the Somali language in Mogadishu, where the participants recommended the Latin script. In their strong drive to write the Somali language in the Latin script, its proponents argued that “Latin characters are economical, technically superior, less time-consuming and more international than merely Western. It is also

¹¹³ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 119.

¹¹⁴ This debate occurred in session in the UN headquarters in 1955, with the representatives of Somali political parties, two ministers from Italy, and the representative from the UN Trusteeship Council participating in the deliberations. The decision was to develop local Somali language instead of debating on other languages. See Noor, *Arabic Language*, 125.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

compatible with the modern technology and communicating with outside world.”¹¹⁶ In 1954, the SYL resolved to make Arabic the official language of the country, and, pursuing that policy, Aadan Cabdulle Cusman, the first president of Somalia after the independence in 1960, expressed to the Advisory Council that “the only language which the people of Somalia can use easily is the Arabic language – the language of the Qur’an which they learn in their early childhood in the Qur’anic schools”.¹¹⁷ The issue was not resolved and, after Somalia gained independence, the conflict continued among the two mutually antagonistic proponents of the Latin and Arabic alphabets.

After the independence in 1960, the government formed another language committee, but conclusive decisions were not made because of religious sensitivity and the strong opposition by Islamic scholars. One such example of the opposition was the demonstration organized by mosques after the Friday congregational prayer in 1966 against the three-member committee sponsored by UNESCO for the introduction of the language.¹¹⁸ The visit of the committee and their proposal to use the Latin alphabet coincided with the translation of the Gospel into the Somali language by Mennonite missionaries in the same year, which very much annoyed many Somalis. Proponents of the Arabic alphabet had a great influence on the population since they appealed to their faith. In 1962, Sharif Maxamuud said, “As Latin script, its relationship to Somalia is a relationship to colonialism. The colonial powers had brought it and imposed on us. Today, we get rid of the political colonial ghost. So, we must also get rid of its traces and cultural legacy. The adoption of Latin script will always remind us the activities of the colonial power and the existence of their psychological domination over our lives.”¹¹⁹ Ibrahim Xaashi Maxamuud, another ardent advocate of the Arabic language, articulated the same points, saying, “Somalia came in contact with Latin script as a result of colonialism. We are compelled to learn it. Now that we are free, we must get rid of all

¹¹⁶ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 143.

¹¹⁷ Hamdi al-Sālim al-Sayid, *al-Somāl Qadīman wa Ḥadīthan* (Cairo: Dar al-Qawmiyah li Dabā‘at wa Nashr, 1965), 380.

¹¹⁸ Three European scholars namely, Andzrejewski, Strelcyn and Tubiano were hired by UNESCO to advise the Somali government on the appropriate script for Somali language. And, of course they recommended the Latin script.

¹¹⁹ Abdirahman A. Noor, *Arabic Language*, 149-150.

colonial roots. And Latin will remind us of the dark deeds of colonialists.”¹²⁰ Moreover, in 1967, in a public debate on written Somali held in Mogadishu, General Maxamad Abshir Muse, one of the devoted supporters of the Arabic script argued, “How can you differentiate the Muslim identity from the Somali identity? To me, being a Somali and being Islamic is one and the same thing. The terms ‘Somali’ and ‘Muslim’ are synonymous in my mind. Islam provides our code of life. It is our state religion. Hence, the question of a script for our language puts our basic cultural and spiritual values at stake.”¹²¹ Maxamuud Axmad Cali, Father of Education in the northern Somalia, was also one of the ardent advocates for the Arabic script for Somalia.

Thus, proponents of the Arabic script regarded the Latin script as a means of Christian infiltration and continuance of the colonial legacy. The debate on the language script was temporarily halted when President Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmarke announced, “As long as I am in power, I shall never permit the adoption of Latin.”¹²² Thus, he maintained the status quo until it was broken by General Maxamad Siyaad Barre, who in 1972 issued a presidential decree to write the Somali language in the Latin alphabet. This controversial issue, debated for more than 30 years, was concluded with the triumph of the Latin script, an indication of the supremacy of secularism over the Islamic agenda. Yet, this debate had created awareness among Islamic scholars of the rise of secularism and the necessity for Islamic confrontation. The impact of this awareness would become evident in the future development of the Islamic Awakening.

Westernization and the Emergence of Modern Elites

The introduction of modern education in Somalia was the most important factor in the rise and spread of Somali nationalism and the emergence of modern elites. In the pre-colonial era, political and religious power was in the hands of the traditional elites that

¹²⁰ Ibrahim Xaashi was a graduate of the al-Azhar University in 1957 with Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad. He was also influenced by Nasserite ideology and founded the *Nasru Allah* organization, the liberation movement of western Somalia which later was renamed Western Somali Liberation. Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar, interviewed by the author on December 1, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. See also, Ibrahim Xaashi, *Al-Somāl bi Luqat al-Qur’ān* (Mogadishu, 1962).

¹²¹ See Hussein M Adam, *Historical Notes on Somali Islamism* (paper prepared for the International Somali Studies Association conference in Djibouti, December 2007).

¹²² Abdirahman A. Noor, *Arabic Language*, 151.

included clan elders and Islamic scholars. The traditional elites were systematically marginalized with the rise of modern education and its production of modern elites. However, modern education was comparatively recent in Somalia because the Christian missions that pioneered education in colonial Africa were challenged and their educational activities were blocked.¹²³ Also, because of political unrest and volatile security and the lack of vested interests, colonial governments did not allocate enough resources to develop modern education. With such slow process, the elite formation was sluggish, deficient, and divergent, mired within the Cold War atmosphere and Muslim-Christian tensions.

Indeed, educational systems in Somalia could be classified into traditional and modern, state and non-state education. The traditional education was described in Chapter Two and remains essentially Islamic, with Qur'anic memorization and the studies of the Arabic language and jurisprudence as its core subjects. Most of the modern elites passed, in their early childhood, through the first stage of the Qur'an memorization. Modern education was introduced during the colonial era and was taught in colonial languages, adopting colonial curriculum that promoted Western world outlook. Thus, Italian and English became the official languages of education, adding to the insignificant role given to Arabic. Moreover, modern non-state education embodied a hodgepodge of different schools and curricula, such as Christian Mission schools, Egyptian Arabic schools, Italian schools, and others.¹²⁴ Moreover, some graduates from these schools, since higher education was not available in Somalia, were granted scholarships to study overseas.¹²⁵ In examining elite formation in Somalia and its impact in creating an ideologically conflicted society, our focus will turn to the state education system, since Arabic education and missionary activities have already been explored.

¹²³ As late as 1942, they controlled 99 percent of the schools, and more than 97 percent of the students in [Africa] were enrolled in mission schools. By 1945, there were comparatively few literate [Africans] who had not received all or part of their education in mission schools. Magnus O. Bassey, *Western Education and Political Domination in Africa: A Study in Critical and Dialogical Pedagogy* (Bergin & Garvey, 1999), 27. In Somalia, Christian missionaries were either expelled or were very conservative, fearing the resentment of the Muslim population.

¹²⁴ Some of these schools are: Russian Banaadir High School, Italian schools, and Saudi Islamic Solidarity School.

¹²⁵ After 1960, many Somali students were sent to Russia, Eastern Europe, China, Italy, Egypt, USA, Syria, Iraq and many other countries.

Modern elites are a product of modern education that started with the colonialists and was necessarily secular, which meant that it introduced and nurtured Western values and the separation of religion and politics. This is a value and governance system that is in disagreement with the mainstream Islamic doctrine. The early involvement of Christian missionaries in education created the idea in the minds of the Somali population that modern education is correlated with Christianity and that it has to ensure permanent colonial domination through Christian conversion and cultural assimilation. As Abdirahman Ahmed Noor noted, “The amount of education offered by colonial government depended on (a) African people’s level of religious conversion and cultural assimilation; (b) the nature of trained labor required by colonial administration, and (c) the degree of people’s acceptance of, or resistance to that education.”¹²⁶ Therefore, before the Second World War, minor education programs in the former Italian colony were bequeathed to the RCC with the objective limited to providing qualified workers for jobs unsuitable for the “superior race” of Italians.¹²⁷ Moreover, the Italian Fascist regime that took power in 1923 prohibited modern education in all Italian colonies.¹²⁸ A document discovered in 1939 after the defeat of Italy in the East African war states, “The goal of education was to train the pupil in the cultivation of soil or to become qualified workers in the jobs not admissible for the Italian race.”¹²⁹ Moreover, this goal was discriminatory in that “cultural” schools were reserved only for the sons of “obedient” notables; these children were expected to succeed their fathers in serving colonial masters as interpreters, clerks, and office “boys”.¹³⁰ In the British Somaliland, the expulsion of the Christian Mission in 1910 and the subsequent atmosphere of suspiciousness, as well as the impact of the Jihad of Sayid Maxamad Cabdulle Xassan, delayed all attempts of introducing modern education until after the Second World War.¹³¹ Indeed, a combination of the Somali resistance to taxation, suspicions of mixing Christianity with modern

¹²⁶ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 48.

¹²⁷ Italy, from 1922 to 1943, was ruled by a fascist regime, a far right ideology based on racism and authoritarianism.

¹²⁸ Moḥamed Sharīf Moḥamūd, “‘*Abdirizāq Hāji Hussein, Rais Wasāra al-Somāl (1964-1967)*’, 2009”, available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/6110> (accessed on April 21, 2010).

¹²⁹ Pankhurst, Sylvia. *Ex-Italian Somalila* (London: Watts & Co., 1951), 212.

¹³⁰ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The crisis of the political Loyalties in Somalia” (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 63.

¹³¹ Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 64.

education, and insufficiency of colonial financial allocations contributed to postponing the introduction of modern education in British Somaliland. However, a new trend transpired with the concerted efforts of small educated Somali elites in Sudan and tremendous Somali participation in the Second World War. As a result, in 1945, 400 students were attending seven elementary schools, besides numerous Qur'anic schools supported by the authority. Growth of modern education was very slow because of resource deficiency, and only in 1950 were the first two intermediate schools opened. However, modern education expanded gradually afterwards and, according to the records of the public office reproduced by Ahmed Samatar, the total number of students had increased from 623 in 1948 to 6,209 in 1959.¹³²

In the former Italian Somali colony under the BMA, modern education began “without ceiling.”¹³³ For a variety of reasons after the Second World War, the Somalis took great interest in modern education through local initiatives of social activists and political parties. Emerging political parties were competing with each other in attracting public support by investing in the field of education. A pioneering role in this race was taken by the Somali Youth League, which made the advancement of modern education one of its major objectives.¹³⁴ The party had opened many adult night classes with the generous contributions of its members, and by 1948, 65% of its classes were taught in English, compared with 35% in Arabic.¹³⁵ These schools proliferated in the major cities such as Mogadishu, Marka, Kismaayo, Baidoa, Bossaso, and Hargeysa.¹³⁶ Other political parties were also following suit and conducting similar education programs, albeit smaller in scope and magnitude. In 1947, in the former Somali Italian colony under the BMA, besides various non-state schools, there were only 19 state-funded elementary schools that taught basically in Arabic, with English as the second language. Their budget was

¹³² Samatar, Ahmed Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Zed Press, 1988), 47.

¹³³ This terminology used by Salah Mohamed means that freedom of establishing schools and even local organizations was granted. During the fascist rule, these activities were prohibited. See, Salah Mohamed, *Hudur*, 358.

¹³⁴ The Somali Youth League (SYL) was the first political party in Somalia. It was founded as youth organization in 1943 and transformed into a political party in 1947. Being the major nationalist party, it became the ruling party (1956 -1969).

¹³⁵ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 63.

¹³⁶ Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 141.

£16,198 out of a total BMA expenditure of £1,376,752, or 1%.¹³⁷ During this period, Macallin Jaamac Bilaal became famous as director of one of the early schools in Mogadishu.¹³⁸ The trend was spreading horizontally, and within three years, by 1950, there were 29 schools with an enrolment of 1,600 students and employing 45 teachers.¹³⁹ It is noteworthy that the first secondary school in the history of Somalia was founded by Shariif Baana Abba in the Xamar-Jajab district of Mogadishu in 1949, with the support of the NBC, a local charitable organization.¹⁴⁰ Shariif Baana was a benevolent Somali merchant and a chairman of NBC, which was receiving sugar from the BMA and selling it with the aim of using its profits to finance social developmental projects in education, orphanage development, and humanitarian assistance.

When AFIS was mandated in 1950 to prepare Somalia for independence within 10 years, the aims of education were radically changed. As related by Tripodi, these aims were: “To provide the majority of the Somalis with at least primary education; to offer the small intelligentsia already existing in the country higher education; and to promote the formation of new, well-educated elite.”¹⁴¹ Accordingly, a five-year development program was launched in 1952 in collaboration with UNESCO. Within this plan of action, modern schools, technical institutes, and teacher training programs were established. As a result, according to Professor Lewis, “by 1957 some 31,000 children and adults of both sexes were enrolled in primary schools, 246 in junior secondary schools, 336 in technical institutes, and a few hundred more in higher educational institutions.”¹⁴² Indeed, this was a notable advance in modern education compared with the conditions before the 1950s, when fewer than 2,000 students were receiving education. However, there were only eight intermediate public schools, and for seven of these, Italian was the language of

¹³⁷ The policy of teaching the Arabic language in elementary schools had been in line with prevalent practice in British Somaliland. See, Salah Mohamed, *Hudur*, 358- 359. The first intermediate school was opened by the SYL in Mogadishu in 1949, and Mr. Ismael Ali Hussein was appointed the principal of this school. See Makki, *Al-Siyāsāt*, 141.

¹³⁸ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 52.

¹³⁹ Lee Cassanelli and Farah Sheikh Abdulkadir, “*Somali Education in Transition*” (*Bildhan*, vol. 7, 2007), 91-125. There is a discrepancy with the statistical data of the numbers of student enrolment. This paper gives 1,600 while Tripodi gives 2,850. See Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 59.

¹⁴⁰ In 1948-49, the charity constructed a school with the capacity of 500 students and building for orphanages. See Salah Mohamed, *Hudur*, 361-62.

¹⁴¹ Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 59.

¹⁴² Lewis, *A History*, 140

instruction.¹⁴³ Besides the general trend in expanding public education, other specialized schools such as the School of Politics and Administration were established in Mogadishu in the 1950s. The main objective of this institute was to train Somali officials and political leaders and integrate them into the Italian system. Many of the students admitted to the institute were either members of the SYL, a nationalist party strongly opposing Italy, or members of other political parties. Some of the graduates of this institute were offered scholarships for further studies at Perugia University in Italy. Others were employed during the Somalization program in the budding government administration mainly after 1956 where more than 5,000 officials, of whom 4,380 Somalis (88%), were employed. Indeed, this was a large number compared with that of the British Administration in Somaliland during the same years where only 300 were employed in the state administration, with only 30 (10%) of them being Somalis.¹⁴⁴ Other institutes were also opened in 1954, the most important of which was the Higher Institute of Law and Economics, later to become Somalia's University College. It subsequently developed into the Somali National University in 1960s.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, scholarships, seminars, and official visits to Italy were provided to the elites to familiarize them with the Italian language and culture. Gradually, through better modern education and improved employment privileges, new Somali elites with an Italian culture emerged. These elites became leaders of political parties, senior administrators, district councilors, and provincial governors. They were also employed in the security apparatus of the state.¹⁴⁶ The role of the new elites was growing even more rapidly as they emerged as the ruling elite by 1956, when they replaced Italians in all senior administrative positions to prepare

¹⁴³ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 59

¹⁴⁴ Somalization of administration was a program giving Somalis responsibility in administering the country through training and coaching by Italian administrators. The great difference in administrative style and nurturing of the new elites is evident in the two colonies of the British and Italians under the UN trusteeship. See Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 75.

¹⁴⁵ Lewis, *A History*, 141.

¹⁴⁶ The first eight police officers were sent to Italy for training in 25 August, 1952. They were Maxamad Siyaad Barre, Xussein Kulmiye Afrax, Maxamad Ibrahim Maxamuud (Liiq-liiqato), Maxamad Abshir Muse, Cabdalla Cali Maxamad, Daauud Cabdulle Xirsi, Maxamad caynaanshe Guuleed and Maxamad bin Khamiis. Also, first 13 civilian officers were sent in 1953. They were Xaaji Cumar Sheegow, Xaaaji Bashiir Ismaaciil, Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmarke, Dahir Xaaji Cusman, Cali Shido Cabdi, Cali Cumar Sheegow, Nuur Axmad Cabdulle (Castelli), Axmad Cadde Muunye, Cusman Cumar Sheegow, Xassan Maxamad Xassan (Waqooyi), Cabdi Sheikh Aadan, Maxamad Sheikh Gabyow and Aweys Sheikh Maxamad. See Maxamad Ibrahim Maxamad "Liiq-liiqato", *Taariikhda Somaaliya: Dalkii Filka Weynaa ee Punt* (Mogadishu: 2000), 127

Somalia for the independence in 1960. Nonetheless, in the higher echelons of education, there was not much development to boast. “According to UN report on Somalia, three years prior to independence, there was not a single Somali medical doctor, professional pharmacist, engineer, or high school teacher in Somalia.”¹⁴⁷ However, there were 37 Somali students in the Italian universities in 1957-58, among whom 27 were expected to graduate in 1960.¹⁴⁸

With the Somali independence in 1960 and unification of British and Italian Somaliland, the modern elites became the national leaders of the Somali state. This time, the issue of competing Arabic and Italian languages was expanded to include the English language, the official language of elites from British Somaliland. Therefore, the language problem became even more complicated, and the adopted education policy was based on a mixed system of three languages: English, Arabic, and Italian. Arabic became the language of elementary education, and English took precedence in intermediate and secondary education. However, Italian was still the language of administration, and it also maintained its role through specialized Italian schools and scholarships to Italy, and later took over the university level in the 1970s. Moreover, after the independence, Somalia’s future political orientation was taking shape. Stiff competition between the East and the West was tearing Somalia apart. This competition focused on three major intervention areas: education, military, and economic development. In the education sector, it was mainly focused on providing scholarships to shape the elites’ socio-political orientations. For instance, there are incomplete statistical data that show the following trend: in the 1960s, about 500 civilian students were studying in the Soviet Union, 272 in Italy, 152 in Saudi Arabia, 86 in USA, 40 in Sudan, 34 in UK, 32 in France, and 29 in India.¹⁴⁹ These statistical data indicate that the total number of scholarships in Western countries was less than that in the Soviet Union alone. However, these data are incomplete as Arab nationalist countries that provided generous scholarships, such as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq,

¹⁴⁷ Noor, *Arabic Language*, 52.

¹⁴⁸ “In 1960, the year of independence, only 27 seven Somalis would receive university degrees in Italy; one in medicine, six in political science, one in social science, nine in economics and business administration, one in journalism, three in veterinary medicine, two in agronomy, one in natural science, one in pharmacy, and one in linguistics.” See Mohamed Osman Omar, *The Road to Zero: Somalia’s self destruction* (HAAN associates, 1992), 45.

¹⁴⁹ Luigi Pastaloza, *The Somali Revolution* (Bari: Edition Afrique Asie Amerique Latine, 1973), 350.

are missing. Moreover, scholarships from China and other Eastern block countries such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and East Germany are also unaccounted for. These data indicate that Somalia was turning its face to the East, and the new elites trained in the socialist countries and their allies in the Arab world would play a major role in the future Somali politics. Looking into the military sector, this trend is even more evident. After the Somali dissatisfaction with the small size of Western assistance for military purposes, in 1962, the Soviets agreed to help the Somalis build a strong army, as part of a Cold War strategy to balance the USA presence in Ethiopia. According to Laitin and Samatar, “a joint western countries’ proposal for the military assistance to Somalia was \$10 million for an army of 5,000 persons. However, the Soviet offer was a loan of \$52 million and an army of 14,000 persons. Thus, the Soviets succeeded in taking over training of the Somali army”.¹⁵⁰ As a result, Somali military officers trained in the Soviet Union alone were estimated at more than 500 by 1969, and, thus, the majority of modern elites were in some way indoctrinated with the socialist ideology.¹⁵¹ These data demonstrate that the modern Somali elite, though initially educated in Western education system, was being influenced by socialist countries. However, in the spectrum of modern secular elites and the modern Islamic elites, those trained in socialist countries were adding a far left drift to the growing westernization; the ramifications of this phenomenon would be experienced during the military regime in 1969.

The Modern Elites and Political Clanism

The colonial policy of selecting sons of clan elders to be educated in cultural schools was aimed at establishing a line of genealogical continuity of the ruling elites. The traditional elites now had the opportunity of dwelling in the cities, towns, and the villages because most of them were salaried and were connected with the colonial administrations. Moreover, many traditional Islamic scholars were also settled in urban areas or even founded their own settlements and villages.¹⁵² Dwelling in the cities and towns offered

¹⁵⁰ See Laitin and Samatar, *Somalia: Nation*, 78.

¹⁵¹ Ahmed Samatar, *Socialist Somalia*, 78.

¹⁵² Towns in Somalia were established near water sources. These sources can be rivers, sea, and wells. Early traders were those literate people who received the traditional Islamic education. Moreover, in every settlement, a mosque, a Qur’anic school, and Islamic education circles were established.

children of these traditional elites the opportunity to be educated in modern schools and get an early employment at the state institutions. Of course, another competitive line of urbanized Somalis were those who had early contact with the Italians and British or were former irregular warriors who participated in the Italian-Ethiopian war and Second World War and afterwards settled in the cities. Moreover, there were small merchant elites that, in combination with the original urbanized people of the Banaadir coast, constituted a majority in urban areas. Educated children of the traditional elites provided continuity, through blood relationship, between the traditional and modern elites. It seems that the marginalization of the traditional elites had been compensated by empowering their progeny within the modern state institutions. In this way, blood-related elites with clearly demarcated roles were created, where fathers and cousins managed social affairs and their children dominated the modern political landscape.¹⁵³ It is also worth mentioning that the traditional elites had a long history of intermarriage for a variety of reasons, including bringing about a harmonious society, and, therefore, many clan elders and Islamic scholars had next of kin relations with one another. Furthermore, the early Somali elites were mainly new immigrants to the urban cities or soldiers recruited during the colonial era; thus, the gap between the traditional and modern elites was very narrow; some of them even represented traditional elites that were transformed into modern ones. This process took place after 1951, with the establishment of the Territorial Council, where among its 35 members, the traditional elites were dominant. In the British Somaliland, this phenomenon was even stronger, and the Advisory Council consisted of clan elders.¹⁵⁴

The gap between traditional and modern elites was expanding, however, along with the expansion of modern education and urbanization. When educated children of the traditional elites became urbanized, they acquired urban culture and norms. This is an area where change occurred gradually or sometimes even through a cultural breach. Modern education provided universal education for the entire population, and the earlier privileges of the notables' sons were thus distributed to other social segments as well. In an urban setting, children tend to interact with their neighborhoods not with the members of their clans. They play differently, watch films, and frequent cinemas. Some of them

¹⁵³ On the formation of modern elites, see Abdullahi, *Tribalism*, 62-75.

¹⁵⁴ Lewis, *A History*, 144.

even go to night clubs, smoke, drink alcohol, and have extramarital sexual relationships. They dress in European dress, read European books and journals, and eat European food. This process of acculturation began to transform the urbanite Somali generation by inducing them to mimic the dominant white European cultural norms. However, this process was never complete, although during the colonial presence, there was a growing trend toward westernization. With the influx of pastoral migrants to the cities after the independence in 1960, rapid social mobility and a hybrid culture were developing. This hybridization had created a tolerant system, the conservative pastoral Somali culture and the urbanized European culture. During those years, the nationalist elites were seemingly at a crossroads between their inherited outlook and the emerging elite values; between a conservative religious education and liberal modern education; and between inter-clan dependency and self-reliance of urban life. This growing westernized culture that was affecting social life provoked resentment among conservative Islamic scholars.

In political activities, modern elites failed to overcome traditional cleavages and allegiances. Most of the political parties in the 1950s were based on clan divides, except the SYL, although they were articulating nationalist ideals and sentiments.¹⁵⁵ The main parties in Italian Somaliland in the 1950s were the SYL, Hisbiya Dastur Mutaqil Somalia (HDMS), the Somali National Union (SNU), the Great Somali League (GSL), and the Liberal Somali Youth Party (PLGS).¹⁵⁶ On the other hand, in the same period, the main political parties in British Somaliland were the Somali National League (SNL), the United Somali Party (USP), and the National United Front (NUF).¹⁵⁷ All these political groups were advocating against clanism and were campaigning to discredit it on every

¹⁵⁵ The SYL was a nationalist party; however, most of its members were drawn from Darood (50%) and Hawiye (30%), failing to recruit other major clans, such as Digil and Mirifle, that had formed their own party, HDMS. See Lewis, *A History*, 146. However, this statistics seems highly speculative and only indicate that early years of SYL was dominated by these two clan families.

¹⁵⁶ These five parties participated in the municipal and general elections of 1954, 1958, and 1959. In these elections, the SYL received an overwhelming majority, while HDMS was registered as the second opposition party. For details on the performance of these parties in these elections, see Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 88.

¹⁵⁷ The SNL was formed in 1951 with the same nationalist program as the SYL and with the development of the Haud question where Somali territory was given to Ethiopia. The NUF emerged as a convention and common platform for all parties and organizations; however, it developed later into a political party with a strong nationalist agenda. The USP appeared in 1960, attracting former members of the SYL in British Somaliland. See Touval, *Somali Nationalism*, 104-108.

occasion. They were attempting to speak in the language of modernity, promoting a national ideology disdaining clanism, and calling for its elimination. Nevertheless, during political elections, political clanism usually brought out its ferocious clout without ignominy, since there was no way to hold political office in the parliament or in the government other than through first passing the knotty test of political clanism. Political clanism was the only place where everybody mobilized his/her clan to get elected by their home constituency. During early years of the political experiences in the 1950s, the foundations of the Somali political culture were developed.¹⁵⁸ This culture was partially implanted within the political system and partially emanated from the traditional Somali culture. It could be mainly summarized in the following points: the imperativeness of clan affiliation and subsequent nepotistic behavior; the commoditization of politics for economic gain; falsification, fraud and violence as political means, ambivalence and dependence on foreign patronage. This ambivalent political culture that depends on clan attachment and personal interest breeds endless proclivity and personal voracity extinguished only through raiding national coffers and seeking external patronage.

As a result, the new urban phenomena of political clanism developed within the modern Somali elites during their early political participation in the 1950s. This phenomenon is distinct from clanism in the traditional clan system dictated by the ecological setting and mode of life based on subsistence and collectivism. It has developed in the urban milieu as a continuation of extended family networks. It is a form of cooperation and socialization among clan members dwelling in the cities. These clan members cooperate and socialize in assisting new rural immigrants and vulnerable members of the community and in organizing marriage festivities and burial services. Clan members create informal organizational networks with recognized representatives in the urban setting. In this way, in an urban setting, sub-clans sustain their clan networks by reorganizing them and collaborating with the sub-clans based in their original home territory. However, this network gradually develops a particularistic political

¹⁵⁸ Details on political clanism refer to Aweys Osman Haji and Abdiwahid Osman Haji, *Clan, sub-clan and regional representation 1960-1990: Statistical Data and findings*. Washington D.C., 1998. Also, Maryan Arrif Qasim, *Clan versus Nation* (Sharjah: UAE, 2002).

consciousness and results in comparing the political role of its sub-clan members with that of other clan members. The leaders of the sub-clan take stock of the employment, economic well-being, and political role of the clan members; this bookkeeping is very important in collecting contributions called Qaaraan. Therefore, this web of networks functions effectively, each seeking privileges and developments of his particular community networks. These networked clan organizations were used by the political elites vying for elections in their home districts, and thus, clans were extremely politicized. The electoral system introduced by the Italians also promoted the emergence of political clanism and weakened nationalistic agenda. Mario d'Antonio, criticizing electoral system in Somalia, as quoted by Tripodi, writes:

Even in this circumstance, it was necessary to proceed carefully in introducing radical innovative measures. Two tendencies with different social structures, style of lives and mentality in Somalia had to be reconciled. On the one side, old Somalia, tribal, traditionalist, pastoral, strongly tied to the past and to its ethnicity and religion, and on the other side modern developing Somalia, with its working people of cities and small villages, which created elective municipalities, organized in several political parties, which quickly adopted a modern style of life and tend to introduce the productive techniques of West.¹⁵⁹

Such reconciliation did not occur institutionally, though the traditional clan system and political parties were accommodating each other; beyond the nationalistic rhetoric, political clanism was sprouting its roots deep into the new elites.

Moreover, instead of exploring some form of reconciliation and accommodation, modern elites were pushing to confront what they considered the greatest threat to nationhood: the virulent effect of political clanism or “the cancer of Somali state.”¹⁶⁰ They attempted in vain to apply three methods. The first was the proportional representation of the tribes in

¹⁵⁹ Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy*, 77-78.

¹⁶⁰ Abdalla Omar Mansur, “Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of the Somali State,” in Jumale (ed.), *The Invention of Somalia* (Lawrenceville: The Red Sea Press, 1995), 106-116.

the government and rank and file of the public service to create a balanced society where all citizens would not be based on clan differentiation. However, maintaining this balance was not easy in practice. Some clans that received better economic and educational opportunities and benefited from these privileges occupied important government positions. This situation created resentment of the other marginalized clans. The second method was the glorification of the Somali nation and denying and shaming clans and clanism. In so doing, nationalist elites entertained the notion that the less is said about tribalism the easier it would be to eradicate it. Therefore, nationalism was praised and glorified in the public mass media and through songs and poetry, while tribalism was depicted as the greatest national challenge and malady. The third method suggested that clanism should be dealt with through legislative powers and laws intended to curb the influence of tribalism. These laws were intended to reduce the authority of the clan elders and to lessen tribal solidarity. In applying this legislation, political parties' use of tribal names was banned. The military regime of 1969 employed an even more radical approach by abolishing the *diya* system (blood compensation paid collectively clan members), renaming clan elders, and introducing compulsory insurance system for vehicles to eliminate collective diya-paying system in urban settings. This means that in the case accident occurs, the insurance pays damages instead of the clan. Finally, during the military regime, modern elites buried the effigy of clanism publicly within socialist propaganda, and elimination of insidious clanism became a priority program called Dabar-goynta qabyaaladda meaning "eliminating clanism." However, none of these approaches produced tangible results. According to another perspective advocated by the Islamic scholars, clan cleavage could be diluted, but not eliminated, and the Somali people could be united by reviving Islamic values of brotherhood and solidarity, an argument which has strong historical backing and doctrinal guidance through Sufi Islamic Jamaaca. From that point of view, Islamist elites were putting forth different agenda for Somalia.

The Emergence of Islamist Elites

Modern Islamist elites were developed through two processes. The first is formal education in Arabic/Islamic schools where some graduates of these schools had an

opportunity to further their studies at Arab higher education institutions in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. This does not mean, however, that these students were automatically subjected to an Islamic agenda, since most Arab institutions of higher learning had also been secularized during the colonial period and through the subsequent Arab nationalist movements. Nevertheless, students of Arabic schools were imbued with Islamic/Arabic culture and some of them, either through direct contact or by reading published literature, became aware of the new Islamist trends in the Muslim world. The second process is through those who, after becoming traditional Islamic scholars in Somalia, traveled abroad and joined Islamic higher learning institutions. These scholars contacted Islamic scholars from countries with revivalist ideologies and were influenced by them. They could be called “transitional Islamic scholars” since they bridged divide between the traditional education system and modern education. Indeed, these scholars were the pioneers of the modern Islamic movements in Somalia. The most notable among them are: Sheikh Cali Suufi, Sayid Axmad Sheikh Muse, Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad, Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow, Sheikh Maxamad Axmad Nuur Geryare, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin Xassan, Cabdullahi Macallin and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar, Sheikh Cali Ismaaciil, Sheikh Ibrahim Xaashi, Shariif Maxamuud and others.

Marginalization of the Islamist elites begins from the unequal job opportunities. For instance, graduates of Arabic high schools and universities could not compete for local jobs with graduates from the government schools or other non-state schools because of the language barriers. The language of the administration in Somalia remained either Italian or English until the Somali language was committed into writing in 1972. Moreover, Arabic high schools were limited in scope and were offering a general high school diploma in arts and science, while the al-Azhar schools focused on Islamic jurisprudence and Arabic language. In comparison, the two Italian high schools in Mogadishu were offering both a general high school scientific diploma and specialized technical education.¹⁶¹ This technical education aimed at providing a trained workforce for the government civil service and private companies. Such schools offered

¹⁶¹ These two schools were “liceo scientifico” and “Scuola Regineria and Geometro”. Graduates had a high potential for finding local jobs. Axmad Cali Culusow, interviewed by the Author on June 120, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

specialization in the fields of accounting, administration, and technical training in civil engineering. Consequently, Arabic education could not compete in the local market either linguistically or qualitatively. The language used by the administration was Italian, marginalizing those students with an Arabic education. Moreover, since Arabic schools did not provide technical training, their graduates could not even compete successfully in the private sector. Therefore, the only jobs available for graduates of Arabic schools and universities were low-paying jobs of either teachers of Arabic and Islamic subjects in the schools and judges; alternatively, such students could join the national army.

This structural inequality through diversified curricula and languages created a bifurcation of the elites. Discrimination against the elites educated in Arabic in otherwise equal-opportunity jobs for all citizens forced many of them to explore alternative ways and contemplate changing the system. These students were seeing that their colleagues who graduated from the Italian and English schools were given more opportunities, either to be sent to USA and Europe or to be given high-salaried jobs in government institutions. Because students educated in Arabic were likely to find only low-paying jobs, the only equal opportunity alternatives for them was to join the national army or explore scholarships in the socialist countries such as the Soviet Union, East Germany, or China. In these countries, all Somalis were equal, since new languages had to be learned. Exceptions were a small number of civilian scholarships and cadet officers sent to Italy who had to be graduates from Italian schools, while at the same time, civilian scholarships and cadet officers sent to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq had to be conversant in Arabic.

The trend of sending young Somalis to Eastern and Western countries with either Socialist or capitalist ideologies eventually brought a cultural and ideological schism orchestrated through the Cold War fever. A significant number of professional Somalis graduating from many universities in the world could not get jobs in government institutions upon their return in the 1960s. They were unemployed because of the corruption and nepotism in the government. In this situation, only those of them who had strong clan backing or knew an influential political leader were able to get a good job and be easily promoted. Therefore, there were all forms of marginalization: linguistic,

clannish, and those due to country of education. This marginalization ultimately created numerous strains that necessitated a change in the system. Countries that had trained military forces (in the Somali context, this was the Soviet Union) used their army to change the regime and introduce a new ideology of Socialism. However, Islamic scholars with their meager resources and capacity were simply advocating the revival of the Islamic culture and respect for the Arabic language.

The bifurcation of the elites and their development, as illustrated in the figure (3), demonstrates the four types of elites in Somalia. The traditional elites consist of clan elders and Islamic scholars, which constitute traditional leaders. Modern elites consisting secular elites and Islamist elites, the two superstructural elites created mainly through modern education. As the diagram indicates the dynamics of Islam (traditional and modern), clan (represented by elders) and the state (represented by secular elites) is the most challenging issue in Somalia.




Figure 3. The diagram of development of the elites in Somalia

The relations between the traditional elites are cordial and collaborative in order to maintain community cohesion, however, secular elites and the Islamic elites are antagonistic because of their different position on the nature of the state. Secular elites, the inheritors of the post-colonial state, resolutely covet to retain secularity of the state

whereas Islamists advocate zealously for its Islamization.¹⁶² The free choice of the citizens through democratic process, as peaceful resolution of the conflict, is blocked by the secular elites with the support of the western powers, the consequence of which is the breeding extremism and curtailing moderate Islamism in general.

Islam and the State in Somalia (1960-1969)

One of the most prevailing provocations for the Islamic consciousness is the tension between the secular state legislation and the demand by Islamic elites for implementing the Islamic Shari'a. However, these two issues were not evident in Somalia in the 1960s. On the one hand, people were not much aware of legal matters, and the legal issues that touched their lives directly were in accordance with Islam. Moreover, the Islamic elites were not developed enough to demand complete Islamization of the state and society. Indeed, Somalia had a long history of application of parts of Shari'a, as interpreted by the Shafi'i school, in conjunction with a variety of local customs and laws. Successive colonial administrations avoided interfering in issues that had a direct social impact and religious sensitivity. However, after the introduction of the modern idea of the nation-state and the development of the Somali national identity, secular ideas started to emerge. These secular laws were looked upon as being similar to the Somali customary law that sometimes contravened Islam. In the Constitution of the Somali Republic adopted in 1960, Islam was declared "the religion of the state," and accordingly, Somalis were to be governed in compliance with "the general principles of Islamic Shari'a."¹⁶³ Moreover, "the doctrine of Islam shall be the main source of laws of the state"¹⁶⁴ and "laws and provisions having the force of law shall conform to the Constitution and to the general principles of Islam."¹⁶⁵ According to these Articles, "a law might be declared null and void by the constitutional court not only if it contravenes a specific provision of the

¹⁶² Detailed description of the elite development and their relations refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: The crisis of the political Loyalties in Somalia (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 92-101.

¹⁶³ See Article 1, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution of Somali Republic of 1960. See also Article 30, Paragraph 2 that states, "The personal status of Muslims is governed by the general principles of Islamic Shari'a."

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, Article 50

¹⁶⁵ Ibid, Article 98, Paragraph 1.

Constitution but also if it contravenes the general principles of Islam.”¹⁶⁶ Moreover, family and property laws remained in the realm of the Shari’a and were subject to strict interpretation by selective Shafi’i jurists.¹⁶⁷ Also, the penal code had clear Islamic inclinations in prohibiting drinking and selling alcohol and banning gambling, prostitution, abortions, etc.

Based on the above, it could be said there were no obvious legal issues that provoked the Islamic consciousness. The concept of the Islamic state was not at stake during those years. Moreover, political leaders had close relations and networks with prominent Islamic scholars, and Islamic conflicts were avoided. A clear example is Dr. Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmarke who was prime minister and president and belonged to the Qaadiriyah Order and was a disciple of Sheikh Muxyiddin Celli. Moreover, most of the leaders were on good terms with Islamic scholars, at times frequenting their education circles or inviting them to their homes. Furthermore, Islamic credentials and records of the state, relations with the Muslim world, and positions on the issues of Muslim *Umma* were good. Somalia became a founding member of the Islamic Conference and was also a member of the World Islamic League. Moreover, al-Azhar scholars were frequently offering Friday sermons in major mosques, and Islamic propagation was given unrestricted freedom.

In the 1960s, the MB’s Islamic activism was extended to Somalia. Two events in 1967 were particularly disturbing. The first was the persecution of Sayid Qutub, the preeminent ideologue and prolific theoretician of the modern Islamic revivalism. The second was the disastrous defeat of the Arab countries in the war with Israel in 1967. The explanation given for the defeat was the curse of Allah befalling the secular states, and so Islam emerged in the forefront as the national collective identity capable of healing the emotional breakdown of the society. The impact of the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 was the establishment of new organizations and solidarity with the Islamic call for revival and reform. Moreover, with the growing role of Saudi Arabia as the main challenger of the radical Arab states and its offer of refuge for the persecuted MB, it became the

¹⁶⁶ Paolo Contini, *The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration* (London: Frank Cass & Company, 1969), 59.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., 35. The main reference law book for the Islamic judges in Somalia is *Kitāb al-Minhāj Li al-Imām Al-Nawawī*.

champion of Islam and custodian of the holiest shrines. In the 1960s, there was no clear differentiation between the ideology of the MB and Salafia teachings in the eyes of the general public. The issue was Islam against the secular oppressive military regimes claiming Arab nationalism, connected with Socialist countries and attempting to overthrow what they considered as conservative reactionary Arab states. Therefore, Saudi Arabia was endangered by the revolutionary Arab regimes, and in alliance with Western countries during Cold War era, Islam was employed against socialist regimes. The employment of Islam in fending off the Socialist ideology was manifested in the establishment of numerous Islamic higher education institutions and charities to promote Islam globally. These institutions included the Islamic University in Medina, the Muslim World League in Mecca, Dar al-Ifta, World Muslim Youth, etc. These institutions built mosques and Islamic schools, sponsored Islamic scholars, provided scholarships, and held Islamic conferences. Somalia received a good share from the services of these institutions.

Conclusion

The development of the Islamic consciousness should be seen as historical evolution and a range of responses to the challenges from specific tensions. It was concurrent with the growing nationalism in the second half of the twentieth century; both of these ideologies constitute the identities that shaped the modern history of Somalia. They provided a supra-clan identity in a traditional society and shared in being indistinguishable from anti-colonial resistance ideologies. However, with the introduction of a modern education system and competition between Western education in the Italian and English languages and modern education in Arabic in the 1950s, the trends of westernization and Arabism began to emerge. The culture of westernization, carrying with it secularization of the state and society, and Arabism, delivering the Islamic consciousness, nationalism, and anti-colonialism, were fiercely competing with one another. In the 1950s, the Egyptian regime and the MB were promoting Arab nationalism and Islamism, respectively. Somalia, besides its Islamic solidarity and historical link with Egypt, became the strategic and geopolitical backyard of the Egyptian Nile River and Suez Canal waterways politics that was also in harmony with the priority agenda of the Somali irredentism. Consequently,

Egyptian cultural influence on Somalia took an added momentum in the 1950s and 1960s within the Cold War politics and mutual strategic cooperation.

Specifically, two broad sets of factors had contributed to the growth of Islamic consciousness in the 1950s and 1960s. The first set contributed to the increased capacity of the society and its resilience in withstanding the torrent ideas of westernization and western modernization. These factors included the introduction of the Egyptian system of schools, the formation of early Islamic organizations, the provision of scholarships to Somali students in the civil and military higher institutions in Egypt and other Arab countries, and other cultural means. These developments had created a new Arabic-speaking Somali elite, political leaders, and Islamic scholars who advocated against westernization and secularization and lobbied for Arabism and Islamism. Some of these scholars were influenced by the MB ideology and the Salafism of Saudi Arabia and introduced them to Somalia. The second set of factors was involved in provoking the Islamic consciousness. They included the activities of Christian missionaries, in particular, the Protestant MM and SIM, which arrived in Somalia in 1953 and 1954, respectively. Moreover, the choice of the Somali language orthography was a battleground for the Islamists and westernized elites. The popular demand for the use of the Arabic alphabet to write the Somali language was supported by Islamist scholars, while the Latinized script was advocated by the westernized elites and was supported by Western institutions.

After independence in 1960, within the local, regional, and global context of the Cold War, regional competition, and the transformation of Somali society, Islamic consciousness was gradually keeping pace with the growing westernization of the elites. The manifestations of this growth were the appearance of modern Islamist scholars educated in Arab universities and but later marginalized in the job market and the proliferation of Arabic schools, books, newspapers, and libraries. Nevertheless, in the first nine years after independence, there were no tangible conflicts between Islamic scholars and the new elites, with the priorities of the entire nation seemingly focused on consolidating its independence and pursuing the “Greater Somalia” project. Islamic

scholars of these years became the pioneers of a new era of the Islamic awakening, in which Islamic activities took on new dimensions.

Finally, in Somali society, where tradition and modernity used to coexist, where the state and Islam were not in direct conflict, and where tolerance and dialogue once were exercised, things began to falter. The growth of the Islamist elites and their rejection of marginalization led to increased Islamic activities and eventual establishment of more robust organizations. At the same time, westernization and secularization were also growing. Thus, the gap between the two camps was gradually widening. This widening gap and the conflict will be analyzed in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Upsurge of the Islamic Awakening

The awakening of Islam started to take off after Somalia's independence in 1960. This process took advantage of the opportunities afforded by the granting of freedom and civil liberty during the first nine years of the independence. Since its inception, the Somali state has been facing great challenges such as poorly trained human resources, a politicized clan system, low economic performance, and pressure from hostile neighboring countries. And, although Somalia was a basin of democracy and freedom during the first seven years after independence, these challenges strained and marginalized many segments of society. They in fact triggered the propensity of the elite to compete for political power. During the 1960s, two parliamentary and presidential elections were held peacefully, and various social organizations started to emerge.¹ However, the hasty introduction of an alien model of democracy to the Somali society brought about clan divisions and political anarchy and turmoil.

Within this socio-political context, spurred on by the earlier rise of Islamic consciousness in the 1950s, there emerged a broad-based Islamic awakening that made its presence felt at the end of the 1960s. This trend was an outcome of the cultural divide promoted by multi-curriculum education programs, in Arabic, Italian, and English, and links with conflicting actors in the Cold War atmosphere. The split of the elites into non-Islamist and Islamist factions slowly began to emerge, challenging social cohesion and the unifying aspects based on race, religion, and national aspiration. The roots of this division can be found in the clash between the nature of the state and that of society. The post-colonial nation-state was nationalistic, hierarchical, centralized, and quasi-secular, while the society was clannish, egalitarian, decentralized, and Islamic. With these strained conditions, the society as a whole was torn apart by the elites who gravitated toward

¹Apart from political parties, during 1960-1969, there were several active civil society organizations. The most prominent of these were the General Confederation of Somali Labour, Somali Youth Council, Organization of Somali Women, and Somali Student Solidarity Organization. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during the Civil War," *Darāsāt Ifrīqiyyah* 31 (1994): 57-87.

competing ideologies such as liberal Western democracy, Socialism, and Islam. Although they possessed a strong cultural foundation, the weaker and less developed elites during this time were Islamists.

Consequently, in 1967, the country was in search of a new ideology, having been embarrassed by malpractices in liberal democracy; thus, socialism and Islamism were luring. Socialism was promoted by the socialist countries, and thousands of the Somali students were offered scholarships and indoctrinated in those countries. These students became later the elites that challenged the workings of liberal democracy. On the other hand, Islamists were not happy with the entire secular foundation of the nation-state and opposed the growing leftist ideology, as well as the liberalist malpractices. They were dissatisfied with the state policy on Islam that remained very similar to the inherited colonial approach based on the existence of two separate spaces: public and private. Islam which Islamists advocated as comprehensive and applicable to all aspects of life was relegated to the private realm. They were not satisfied with Islamic window dressing such as establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs and occasional gesture of the politicians during Islamic festivities.

In 1967, after the pitiful political and social harvests of the first years of independence, Dr. Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmarke was elected President of Somalia, and he appointed Mr. Maxamad Ibrahim Cigaal as the Premier. The new regime adopted two new policies that enhanced the fragmentation and conflict in the Somali society. In the domestic front, the regime planned to curb budding democracy by sowing dictatorship through transforming the ruling SYL party, the only political party in the country. This new trend was supported by Western countries and conservative Arab regimes, in particular Saudi Arabia which offered considerable financial assistance.² The goal of this undertaking was to curb the Soviet influence in Somalia and to reverse previous policies geared toward the Eastern blocks initiated by Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in 1963. Therefore, the regime initiated policies intended to encourage the fragmentation and clanization of other parties.

² Saudi Arabia offered a loan of \$50 million to Somalia designated to cover the election expenses in support of the SYL regime. See Moḥamad Sharīf Moḥamūd, “*Faṣḥun fī al-‘Alāqāt al-Somāliyah al-Sa‘ūdīyah*”, 2010 (Somali-Saudi relations), available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/8598> (accessed on February 6, 2010).

Consequently, more than 60 clan-based parties competed for 123 seats in the parliament during the 1969 election.³ As planned by the state, all Members of Parliament from the small, clan-based parties were absorbed within the SYL after the election.⁴ In the process, the National Army was implicated in rigging the election to dent its nationalistic image and weaken its credibility. At the same time, the Somali masses became utterly dismayed with the government because of widespread corruption, economic stagnation, rampant unemployment, and clan fighting caused by the rigged election. This state of affairs was characterized by Cabdalla Mansuur as “democracy gone mad.”⁵

The second step taken by the regime was aimed at changing national policies on “Greater Somalia” that was the foundation of the Somali foreign policy. Since the independence, Somalia supported Somali liberation movements in the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya, Western Somalia in Ethiopia and French Somaliland (Djibouti) as missing three parts of “Great Somalia”.⁶ The new policy was based to improve the relations with the Western countries and to curb Soviet influence in Somalia embodied, in their technical support for the Somali army. Prime Minister Cigaal undertook the soft foreign policy approach of *détente* which was aimed at alleviating Somalia’s political, military, and economic ailments. He established congenial neighborly relations with Kenya and Ethiopia and restored the severed relationship with Britain in 1962. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain “when the special British NFD Commission determined that, despite the fact the majority of the Somalis in the region wished to join the Somali Republic, Britain should grant Kenya independence and announced that Kenya will

³ The new parties included *Hizbu Allāh*, a political party founded, among others, by Sheikh Xassan Sheikh Cabdullahi (Af-Guriye) and Sheikh Cumar Sheikh Cabdullahi Al-Qutubi in 1969. Besides these two traditional scholars who founded the party, two students from the traditional Islamic circles were included in the central committee of the party. These students were Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman and Cabdullahi Cali Axmad. In the 1969 elections, the party fielded Sheikh Axmad Shire, brother of the President Cabdirashid Cali Sharmarke, as candidate. However, the party did not gain any seats in the parliament and was disbanded after the military coup of 1969. Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman interviewed by the author on February 19, 2010, Kuwait.

⁴ In 1969, all MPs joined the SYL except one person, the former Prime Minister Cabdirisaaq Xaaji Xussein.

⁵ Cabdulla Mansur, “Contrary to a Nation: The Cancer of Somali State” in Ahmed, Ali Jimale (ed), *The Invention of Somalia* (Lawrenceville, NJ, Red Sea Press, 1995), 114.

⁶ NFD is the region in Kenya populated by the Somali people, while Western Somalia or Ogaden is a Somali territory annexed by Ethiopia. Both parts have Somali populations and are in the Horn of Africa. They had been divided by the colonial powers and then reclaimed by the Somali state as part of the “Greater Somalia.”

decide on the matter.”⁷ The new Somali foreign policy was welcomed by Western powers and Somalia’s neighboring countries but was perceived as a sell-out for the cause of Somali nationalism by domestic political opponents such as leftists and Islamists.⁸ Thus, the two policies of the regime were unpopular, and their ramifications lead to the subsequent political uncertainties. The political gambit that started with the assassination of President Sharmarke on October 15, 1969 and Prime Minister Cigaal’s overt clannish maneuvering in the parliament to elect a new president were the preludes to the military coup on October 21, 1969.

Against this background, the year 1967 was the culmination of the Arabic cultural influence and the maturation of Islamist elites. In this year, the first organization for Arabic educated elites was established under the name *Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah* (The Organization of the Islamic Renaissance) “*Nahdah*” and soon other Islamic organizations followed. The climate was ripe for change, and such organizations were responding to various internal and external tensions. The Somali Islamic awakening was not an isolated phenomenon; it was part of a worldwide Muslim upheaval after the defeat of the Arab forces during the war with Israel in 1967. This defeat set off a wave of soul-searching and the demand for a new ideology to replace the defeated secular Arab nationalism. The answer to the national cataclysm was to seek solace in Islamism, which was until then suppressed by the Arabic nationalist/socialist regimes. Therefore, Islamist movements inspired by *Ḥassan al-Banna*, *Mawlāna al-Maudūdī*, and *Sayid Qutub* were gaining ground and amassing support. This awakening had been simmering since the suppression of the MB in Egypt in 1954 and the execution of the famous Egyptian Islamic scholar *Sayid Qutub* along with two other members of the MB in 1966.⁹ This event greatly shocked and inspired Muslims all over the world. Many Somali Islamic

⁷ See Ibrahim Farah, “Foreign Policy and Conflict in Somalia, 1960-1990” (Ph.D. diss., University of Nairobi, 2009), 107.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 117.

⁹ Sayid Qutub (1906-1966) was an Egyptian Islamist scholar and the leading intellectual of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s and 1960s. He was imprisoned (1954-64) and then hanged in 1966 by the Egyptian regime under President Nasser’s rule. The other two members of MB were Muḥammad Yūsuf Ḥawāsh and Abd al-Fattāḥ Ismāīl. See Zafar Bangash, “Remembering Sayyid Qutb, an Islamic intellectual and leader of rare insight and integrity”, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/milestones/remember.htm (accessed on January 28, 2010).

scholars changed their positive views on the Egyptian regime that they had held because of its earlier provision of educational opportunities for Somalia and its ardent support for the Somali nationalistic cause.¹⁰ As a result of this incident, the MB literature garnered immense interest and attracted huge readership. In particular, two of Sayid Qutub's works became extremely popular: *Ma'ālim fi al-Ṭarīq* (Milestones) and *Fī Ḍilāl al-Qur'ān* (In the Shade of the Qur'an), the latter being a 30-volume commentary on the Qur'an with an innovative method of interpretation.

The Islamic awakening in Somalia acquired a new momentum with the military coup in 1969 and the adoption of Socialism as the national ideology. The military regime had adopted modernization policies in line with Socialism which went against the culture of the people and Islamic laws, thereby widening the fissure and ideological polarization in the society. This chapter will examine the Islamic awakening since 1967 and, in particular, will focus on the first period of the military regime (1969-1977). It will explore the institutions created to foster the Islamic awakening, which in this study will be called "Proto-Muslim Brotherhood." These organizations are *Nahdah*, *Waḥdat al-Shabāb al-Islāmi* (the Union of Islamic Youth) "*Waxdah*", and *Ahl al-Islām* (the People of Islam) "*Ahal*." The impact of other institutions, such as the Salafia organization *Jam'iyat Ihyā al-Sunna* (Revivification of the Prophet's Tradition), was negligible during this period and will, therefore, not be discussed in this study.¹¹ Moreover, Sufi organizations such as *Jam'iyat Ansār al-Addīn* (The Association of Helpers of Religion) in Hargeysa and *Jam'iyat Himāt al-Addīn* (The Association of Protectors of Religion) in Mogadishu are not also included here. The military regime, its Socialist programs, and confrontation with the Islamic awakening will be also examined. The watershed conflict between the Islamic

¹⁰ The Egyptian Embassy in Mogadishu attempted to explain to some traditional Islamic scholars that the execution of Sayid Qutub was in defence of Islam. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare related that during these days, he saw a group of Somalis in the mosque reading a pamphlet in Arabic. One of them was translating the following from Arabic to Somali: *Sayid Qutub huwa dālun muḍlūn*, which means Sayid Qutub, had deviated from the true Islamic path and was leading people astray. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author on August 5, 2008, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

¹¹ *Jam'iyat Ihyā al-Sunna* was founded in 1967 by Sheikh Nur Ali Olow (1918-1995), a pioneer and prominent scholar who relentlessly preached the methodology of Salafism in Somalia for 60 years (1935-1995). This organization's activities included a school for adults and Islamic circles in the biggest mosques in Mogadishu. Also, it held specialized Islamic education circles for politicians and prominent personalities in the house of General Maxamad Abshir and Yaasin Nuur Xassan. Sheikh Maxamuud Axmad, interviewed by the author, May 1, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

awakening and the military regime was in the secularization of the Family Law in 1975, which will be explored as a case study of the confrontation between the military regime and Islamic awakening. Finally, the fragmentation and the emergence of the new tendency of extremism within Islamic awakening will be presented.

Institutions of the Islamic Awakening: The Proto-Muslim Brotherhood

Apart from traditional Sufi brotherhoods and institutions of Islamic consciousness that were established in the 1950s, the late 1960s ushered in three organizations that took the Islamic call to a new stage: Nahdah, Waxdah, and Ahal. Furthermore, the rift between Islamists and non-Islamists was also correlated with internal divisions within each group. In the non-Islamist camp, the conflict was between leftists and liberal democrats, while in the Islamist camp, it was between the Sufis and Salafis on the one hand, and Salafis and the MB on the other. These conflicts exacerbated the traditional clan tensions in Somalia and spurred the emerging class conflict. This chapter focuses on tracing the dynamics in Islamic activism by reconstructing the history of these institutions in the modern history of Somalia.

Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah (Nahdah)

The first Islamic organization to bridge the Islamic consciousness and Islamic awakening was Nahdah. Its founders included what could be termed “transitional Islamic scholars,” meaning those scholars who were initially educated in the traditional way and later graduated from universities in the Arab/Islamic world.¹² These scholars were exposed to both traditional and modern systems of education and were well equipped to deal with both the traditional society and modern issues. The history of Nahdah is not recorded and, therefore, in reconstructing it, three primary resources encountered during field research for this study will be used as a basis. The first significant source is the bylaws of the

¹² The founders of Nahdah are: Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad (President), Sheikh Maxamad Axmad Nuur Geryare (Vice-President), Cabdiraxman Faarah Ismaciil “Kabaweyne” (Secretary-General), Sheikh Cabdullahi Macallin Cabdiraxman (Deputy Secretary-General), Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar (Treasurer), Sharif Calawi Cali Aadan (Deputy Treasurer), and Bashir Macallin Cali Maxamuud, Maxamuud Cusman Jumcaale, and Maxamad Axmad Xussein (members). These names were recorded in the Article 4 of the bylaws of Nahdah.

organization written in the Arabic language, kept in the custody by one of the founding members.¹³ The two other sources are oral narratives from two founding members: Sheikh Maxamad Geryare and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar. The bylaws consist of 31 articles encompassing all aspects of the organization. Most notably, the bylaws offer a detailed legal basis for acquiring and revoking membership, as well as for financial matters. For example, there are five articles that regulate membership: from eligibility and acquiring membership to conditions for its revoking, and disciplinary action taken against members and the discretion of the disciplinary committee.¹⁴ Moreover, regulations on financial affairs are wide-ranging and include sources of income, financial management, disciplinary measures to be taken against members with outstanding membership fees, and the determination of the financial year. Furthermore, the bylaws regulate the process of financial allocations and the discretion of the treasurer.¹⁵ In the preamble, the rationale of Nahdah is clearly expressed as follows:

In these difficult conditions in which Islamic society is facing a number of diverse adversaries and raids allied against its religion and its existence, in which it wrestles also with poverty and illiteracy and all other signs of backwardness, it is compulsory for its sincere sons to rush to work and rescue it from these obliterating threats. In order to fulfill this duty, *Munadamat al-Nahda al-Islamiyah* was launched with the grace and guidance of Allah in Mogadishu on 1387 H (1967).¹⁶

The main objectives of Nahdah were threefold: “(1) Making the Qur’an the constitution of the Muslims and applying Islamic Shari’a law in all aspects of their lives. (2) Struggling against all states of affairs and ideologies that do not comply with Islamic Shari’a law. (3) Strengthening brotherly relations between Muslims and reinstating their [lost] unity.”¹⁷ It is striking to note that these objectives were very general and that none

¹³ This copy of the bylaws was retained by Sheikh Cabdiraxmaan Xussein Samatar, the Treasurer of Nahdah. Sheikh Cabdiraxmaan Xussein Samatar, interviewed by the author on December 1, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁴ The Bylaw of Nahdah, articles 4, 5, 6, 7, and 30.

¹⁵ Ibid, articles 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, and 27 of the bylaw.

¹⁶ The exact date is not recorded in the bylaws.

¹⁷ See Article 3 of Nahdah bylaw.

of them targeted specific local issues. They also do not provide a strategy for realizing these broad objectives in their own environment. In fact, such strategy was not even mentioned in the bylaws. Moreover, the influence of the MB was clear in the bylaws, as evidenced by such slogans as “*al-Qur’ānu Dastūruna*” (Islam is our constitution) and the mention of the strengthening brotherly relations among Muslims.¹⁸ Such influence is expected as Nahdah’s president, Sheikh Cabdulqani, the vice president, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, and its Secretary General Cabdiraxman Faarax (Kabaweyne) were all members of the MB.¹⁹ There were also other founding members who sympathized with the MB.²⁰

Membership in the organization was severely restricted, and only people with specific qualities were targeted for the membership. These qualities included being a “conscious” Muslim with good manners and commitment to Islam. Although it is difficult to define and measure what being a “conscious” Muslim constituted, it is probably signified a Muslim who was aware of the glorious Muslim civilization and the deplorable state of affairs of Muslims in the contemporary world. Such person would have believed in the necessity of struggle to rectify and reverse this situation. Technically, to acquire membership, an aspirant would have been required to submit an official written application and pay 10 Somali shilling as admission fee with recommendations from three

¹⁸ This is part of the famous motto of the Muslim Brotherhood: *Allāh Gāyatuna, al-Rasulu Za’imunā, al-Qur’ānu Dastūrunā, al-Jihādu Sabīluna, al-Mawt fī Sabīl al-Allāh Asmā Amānīna* [translation: God is our goal, the Qur’an is our constitution, The Prophet is our leader, the struggle is our way, and death in the service of God is the loftiest of our wishes]. See Hassan al-Banna. *The Message of Teaching*, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/index.htm (accessed on January 28, 2010).

¹⁹ Sheikh Abdulqani (1935-2007) was born in the Bakool region of Somalia. After memorizing the Qur’an at an early age, he underwent a traditional Islamic education and was subsequently offered admission to the al-Azhar University, Egypt, in 1951, from where he graduated in 1957. He returned home to Somalia and worked as a lecturer at the Somali University Institute and also joined the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs. In 1967, he was one of the founders of the Nahdah Islamic organization. During the military regime, he became Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in 1970, but was imprisoned in 1973. In 1982 he traveled to Kuwait and worked on an Islamic encyclopedia project until his death in 2007. See his short biography “*Al-Sheikh ‘Abdulqani Sheikh Ahmad Ādan: Mu’asas al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah intaqala ilā Rahmat Allāh*” published on September 1, 2007, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/Sh%20Abdulqani.htm> (accessed on October 14, 2009).

²⁰ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author on May 10, 2009, Toronto, Canada; and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar interviewed by the author on December 13, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xussein Samatar confirmed that the MB and Salafia had been vying for winning the graduates from Arabic universities, and most of them sympathized with the MB including himself.

members.²¹ The final decision about membership was taken by the Executive Bureau or the local executive branches.²² Two important requirements for retaining the membership were paying monthly fees and remaining a devoted Muslim. The bylaws did not require more than that from members. For example, they did not require of members to participate in specific activities or programs. Expelling a member from the organization was somewhat more complicated and called for a long process of verification and, in the end, a majority vote of two-thirds by the Executive Bureau.²³

The organizational structure of *Nahdah* comprised *Majlis al-Shūra* (Consultative Council “CC”), *Maktab al-Tanfīdi* (Executive Bureau “EB”), chapters, and various other committees. The number of members of the CC was not specified and could be determined for each term. Conversely, the number of the EB members was limited to nine executives.²⁴ These are the president, the vice-president, the secretary-general, the deputy secretary-general, the treasurer, the deputy treasurer, and three other members without portfolios. Although this structure seems very modern, the absence of a fixed number of the members for the CC and terms for them were the deficiencies in the bylaws. Moreover, important portfolios for similar Islamic organizations, such as external relations and Islamic activities, are entirely missing. The bylaws also demonstrate a certain lack of dynamism by not addressing issues such as membership drives and policies to expand membership. Finally, it is not clear from the bylaws how many founding members there were. Only the names of the executive members were recorded. In relation to this, it is impossible to estimate *Nahdah*’s membership. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare confirmed that the founding members were nine Executive Bureau members and the Consultative Council was not been formed, although the bylaws contained such a provision.²⁵ Moreover, despite the increase in membership, neither Sheikh Maxamad Geryare nor Sheikh Cabdiraxman Samatar could reliably estimate how many members *Nahdah* had it was abolished in 1969. However, both of them confirmed that Sheikh

²¹ The exchange rate of the Somali shilling to the US dollar from 1960-1971 was 7.14286: \$1. Accordingly, the admission fee was equivalent to \$1.40. See Maxamad Husein Amin, *Taariikhda Bangiyada Somaaliyeed* (Sharjah: UAE, Amazon Printing Press, 2004), 65.

²² See Article 4 of *Nahdah* bylaws.

²³ See Article 6 of *Nahdah* bylaws.

²⁴ See Article 18 of *Nahdah* bylaws.

²⁵ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author on January 7, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

Maxamad Macallin and Sheikh Cali Xaaji Yusuf joined Nahdah. After the organization was banned as part of the general policy of the military regime, informal networking continued between its members and activities were sustained in their personal capacities.

Nahdah had engaged in various Islamic activities, but here will depict only two programs that left a great imprint on the Islamic awakening. The first was the establishment of Islamic libraries and the bringing of the MB literature to Somalia. The second includes the activities presented at the *Da'wa* programs in the mosques and the Islamic centers. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare said the following about the first program:

After the formation of Nahdah, I wrote a letter to *Sheikh 'Abdallah Aqīl* telling him about our new organization and explaining to him the lack of Islamic literature in Somalia.²⁶ I requested his help on that matter and he replied promptly saying “*la taḥmil haman*,” meaning “don’t worry”. *Sheikh 'Abdallah 'Aqīl* was well aware of my membership with the MB in my early student years in Saudi Arabia. Within a month-and-a-half, he sent a complete library of selected modern Islamic books and reference works which included textbooks used in the special training and education programs of the MB. These Islamic books arrived in multiple shipments and were shelved in the library of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the library of Nahdah, my home and the home of Sheikh Cali Xaaji Yusuf.²⁷

During these years, students in Egyptian Arabic high schools and students of the Islamic Solidarity Institute, established by the World Muslim League in 1967, were frequenting these libraries.²⁸ Graduates from these schools played prominent roles in the Islamic

²⁶ Sheikh Abdallah Aqil was a member of the MB and Director of Islamic Affairs in the Ministry of Religious Affairs, Kuwait.

²⁷ Cali Xaaji Yuusuf is the son of Xaaji Yuusuf, the disciple of Sheikh Cali Maye sent to his sub-clan, Suleiman of Habargidir settled in the Galgudud region. Cali Xaaji worked extensively with the Egyptian Cultural Center in Mogadishu and became a member of Nahdah. Cali Xaaji Yuusuf interview by Said Cumar Cabdullahi on December 27, 2009, Mogadishu, Somalia.

²⁸ The Muslim World League (*Rābiṭah al-‘Ālam al-Islāmī*) was founded in Mecca in 1962 as a non-governmental organization concerned with Islamic affairs. Its worldwide headquarters were in Jeddah, and the organization was sponsored and financially supported by Saudi Arabia.

awakening and Islamic movements.²⁹ Moreover, some dedicated students who frequented general Islamic circles in mosques were encouraged to read specific books that were internally circulated. The effect of these books was great, and an entire generation of high school students was gradually converted to the ideology of the MB without acquiring actual membership. It was the era of recruiting people to the idea, not to the organization, which was also the general case in Egypt during this period.

Besides direct Islamic summons, many Islamic circles were established in mosques, and weekly lectures were held in the Nahdah center, regularly attracting hundreds of students. The most popular Islamic circle was the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin Xassan. In this section, a short biography of him will be provided and comments of witnesses about the effect that his circle had in the Islamic awakening will be presented. Sheikh Maxamad was a distinguished Islamic scholar and exceptional Qur'anic commentator who succeeded in attracting people from all walks of life to his Islamic education circle, held in the Mosque of Cabdulqaadir, Mogadishu, in the 1970s. He was born near Buur-Hakaba in 1934 where he memorized the Qur'an in his early childhood.³⁰ In 1942, he traveled to an area near Jigjiga and Harrar, where he frequented Islamic education centers for about 10 years.³¹ In 1952, he started teaching Islam in the city of Hargeysa at the Grand Jami'i Mosque. After five years, Sheikh Maxamad decided to travel to Egypt to further his Islamic studies and finally joined the al-Azhar University in 1958. He obtained his Bachelor of Arts and Master's degrees in Islamic theology and philosophy and returned to Mogadishu in 1968.³² The years of Sheikh Maxamad's education in Egypt were a difficult period of brutal suppression of the MB, and although

²⁹ The role of this institute is crucial in the development of the Islamic awakening. Many of its former students later became prominent scholars in the Islamic movements. For instance, Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad, Dr. Maxamad Yusuf, Sheikh Cabdulqaadir Faarah (Gacamey), Sheikh Cabdullahi Diriye Abtidoon, Sheikh Cumar Faruuq, Sheikh Yusuf Aadan, and many more.

³⁰ The date of his birth is an approximation as he was born in a rural area. According to the testimony of Sheikh Mohamed in an interview with the BBC, his passport indicates that he was born in 1936.

³¹ When Maxamad Macallin arrived in the area of Jigjiga, he met Sheikh Maxamad Cabdullahi who became his first teacher. Later, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin became Qur'anic teacher. Then, he frequented the education circle of Sheikh Cali Jawhar and Sheikh Baraawe. See Maxamad Xaaji Cabdullahi "Ingiriis", *Taariikh Nololeedkii Sheikh Maxamad Macallin (the biography of Sheikh Mohamed Moallim)*, available from <http://www.himilo.com/?pid=content&aid=4> (accessed on December 17, 2009).

³² One of his sheikhs was Sheikh Abdul-Halim Mohamud, the famous Sheikh of al-Azhar in Egypt.

he was influenced by the teachings of the Brotherhood, he did not join the organization.³³ When Sheikh Maxamad returned to Mogadishu, he received a heartfelt welcome at the Nahdah Headquarters, where he later joined the organization. He became a pivotal figure in the *Da'wa* program, as enunciated by Sheikh Maxamad Geryare:

When Sheikh Maxamad Macallin returned to Mogadishu, we welcomed him at the Nahdah Headquarters. The top executives of Nahdah discussed what role Sheikh Maxamad Macallin could play in the *Da'wa*. We knew that he was very talented Islamic scholar who combined traditional Islamic education with experience in teaching and a higher degree from al-Azhar University.³⁴ Finally, we decided that Sheikh Maxamad has to start Qur'anic commentary in Sheikh Cabdulqaadir Mosque. Sheikh Cabdullahi Dirir was the administrator of the mosque who belonged to the Qaadiriyah Order.³⁵ Sheikh Cabdulqani, who was close friend of Sheikh Cabdullahi, convinced him to allow Sheikh Maxamad Macallin to conduct Islamic education circles in the mosque. Sheikh Cabdullahi finally accepted on the condition that he should not teach "Wahabiyah" as Sheikh Nur Cali Colow does. Sheikh Maxamad was educated by Qaadiriyah Sheikhs and was well aware of their concerns.³⁶ As a result, Sheikh Maxamad accepted the conditions and started the historical Islamic circle that took Islamic awakening to higher strides. We advised him to use the exegesis of "In the Shade of the Qur'an," the Qur'anic commentary by Sayid Qutub, as the main reference. Sheikh Maxamad superbly succeeded in attracting all types of Somalis, including prominent politicians and higher ranking officers from the former regime, employees of

³³ Sheikh Maxamad Macallin interviewed by Maxamuud Sheikh Dalmar of the BBC in 1994 published on August 21, 2009, available from http://www.bbc.co.uk/somali/news/story/2009/08/090821_falangeynta21082009.shtml (accessed on December 17, 2009).

³⁴ This discussion was held between Sheikh Cabdulqani, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, and Cabdiraxman "Kabaweyne." Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, 2009.

³⁵ Sheikh Cabdullahi Dirir worked in the Ministry of Education, Department of the Scholarships. He was the vicegerent of Sheikh Cabdullahi al-Qutubi, the famous Qaadiriyah scholar who founded the mosque. Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author on January 12, 2010, Toronto, Canada. Also, Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman interviewed by the author on February 29, 2010, Kuwait.

³⁶ One of his teachers was Sheikh Cali Jawhar who was a disciple of Sheikh Cabdisalam Xaaji Jaamac, a renowned family of Islamic scholars belonging to the Qaadiriyah Order in Jigjiga.

the notorious National Security Service, high government officials, traditional Sufi scholars and high school students.³⁷

Sheikh Maxamad started his first education program in the last months of 1968 at the Mosque of Sheikh Cabdulqaadir, while also being employed at the Ministry of Religious Affairs. After a few years, he became the deputy director working with Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who was director of the Department of the Islamic Affairs. The popularity of the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Maxamad was unprecedented because he introduced a new methodology for Qur'anic commentary. This innovative method was based on reciting certain verses from the Qur'an and translating them directly from Arabic to Somali according to a system called laqbo (translating Islamic text from Arabic to Somali) in Somali traditional education. He also offered free commentary in the Somali language to emphasize the meaning of the concepts of Islam.³⁸ The instruction was held between the afternoon prayer and Isha prayer, a convenient time for most people. However, his popularity annoyed the military regime and, as Sheikh Mohamed himself says, the regime attempted to persuade him to stop the program by promoting him to the position of director of the Islamic affairs in 1973. In order to make him leave the country, the regime also tried offering him an ambassadorial position.³⁹ However, with the growth of the leftist influence and after the Family Law of 1975, Sheikh Maxamad and 60 other high-ranking government officials were dismissed from their positions. Subsequently, he was sentenced to seven years (1976-1982) of solitary confinement in the notorious maximum security prison of Labaatan Jirow, and again four years (1984-1988) in the main prison of Mogadishu.⁴⁰ As evident from this short biography, Sheikh Maxamad was imprisoned at the end of the Islamic awakening period and remained in prison at the beginning of the formation of the Islamic movement in 1978. Sheikh Maxamad is held in

³⁷ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author on July 5, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

³⁸ The traditional methodology in dealing with Qur'anic exegesis consisted of simply reading the commentary of the Qur'an, in particular the simple commentary called "Tafsir al-Jalāleyn". There were no substantial comments on the variety of contemporary issues.

³⁹ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare was demoted and transferred to the Appellate Court in 1973 to serve as a judge.

⁴⁰ Labaatan Jirow is a maximum security prison about 60 kilometres north of Baidoa. See the description of the prison by Dr. Maxamad Baaruud Cali. "Remembering the unsung and forgotten hero's of Labaatan Jirow," available from <http://www.somaliawatch.org/archive/000409631.htm> (accessed on 25 June, 2010).

high esteem for his contribution to Islamic education during the early years of the Islamic awakening. Although his disciples later had various disagreements when they came into contact with different Islamic ideologies, they were always respectful of him and considered him their supreme educator. What follows is the testimony of Professor Yusuf Axmad Nur who frequented Sheikh Maxamad Macallin's Islamic circle during his high school time:

I started attending Sheikh Maxamad Macallin Qur'anic study circle in September or October, 1970. The Sheikh revolutionized Qur'anic exegesis in the Somali language. I attended the study circle during all four years of high school. The Sheikh taught me almost everything I know about the Qur'an or about Islam for that matter. If it were not for that fateful evening when I prayed after sunset prayer (*Magrib*) in Sheikh Cabdulqaadir Mosque at the suggestion of a friend of mine who knew about the study circle and who thought that I would like to listen to the Sheikh, I don't know how my life would have turned out. For sure it would have been completely different from what it is today. Arguably, the Sheikh influenced, directly or indirectly, every Somali who is part of the Islamic reawakening which had its beginnings in the late 1960s.⁴¹

Besides many former politicians and bureaucrats of the ousted civilian regime, the circle attracted mostly high school students and those opposed to the socialist programs. A dissident Islamic organization called Ahal was instrumental in mobilizing these students in order to recruit them as members. The following section will examine this historical development.

Ahl al-Islam (The Family of Islam) “Ahal”

The historical roots of Ahal go back to a youth group of the Qaadiriyah Sufi order that expressed their anger at the society's condition in the 1960s. They could be considered a

⁴¹ Yusuf Axmad Nur, interviewed by the author, January 12, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

neo-Sufi group with an inclination to reform traditional Sufi orders that directly addressed social and political concerns. What provoked this youth group is not clear; however, it could be speculated that one of the factors may be to counter young Americans sent to Somalia as members of American Peace Corps who arrived in Somalia in 1961 as voluntary teachers. The 1960s was a decade when youth counterculture emerged worldwide, and likewise in Somalia. The American Peace Corps introduced that counterculture to Somali students in the schools and streets of Mogadishu. The Somali youth reacted in one of two ways to this culture. One reaction was to mimic Western culture, while another was to create a defensive counterculture. The early group was headed by Cabdikarim Xirsi and presented this defensive counterculture of the Somali youth, as will become evident in the exploration of the development of Ahal. To achieve their objectives, founder of Ahal were closely engaged in the Islamic awareness activities using innovative Sufi poems in the Somali language, which proved very attractive for the youth. The leader of the group was Cabdikarim Xirsi, supported by Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud “Ganey” and Xassan Indho-ceel.⁴² The group was seemingly related to the Jaberti Mosque in Mogadishu, and as reported, its members might have been disciples of Sheikh Ismaciil or Sheikh Maxamuud Ciise, the administrators of that mosque.⁴³ Moreover, it seems that the group was spurred on by those who lobbied to make the Cusmaaniya script the official script for the Somali language.⁴⁴ There are two indications for this speculation. First, although most Sufi poems are in the Arabic language, the group was focusing on the Somalization of these poems, supported by the Cusmaaniya followers. Also, the secretary for the Cusmaaniya group, Cabdiraxman Axmad Nuur, became a prominent leader in the organization, second only to Cabdulqadir Sheikh Maxamuud.

⁴² Cabdikarim Xirsi is the brother of a famous tuberculosis medical doctor in Mogadishu, Dr. Yusuf Xirsi, and Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud was their close relative. Cabdikarim joined the Institute of the Islamic Solidarity and was expelled from it because of his incomppliance with its norms and policies. Maxamad Yusuf interviewed by the author in Kuwait.

⁴³ Axmad Cali Axmad interviewed by the author, December 28, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁴⁴ The Cusmaniya script was invented in 1918 by Cusman Yusuf Kenidid and Xirsi Magan, a graduate of Columbia University who was the most active supporter of the Cusmaniya script. See Abdirahman Ahmed, “Arabic Language and Script in Somalia: History, attitudes and prospects” (PhD diss., Georgetown University, 1999), 136.

Beyond their emotional attachment to Islam, the group members were not well versed in Islam. Below are excerpts from a poem, demonstrating the style and content of their short rhythmic poetry. This part of the poem was chanted to voice their rejection of the national election held on March 26, 1969.

26 Maarsoo, waa la kala miirmayaa maanta [on 26 March! Will be the day of disjointing]

Murtad iyo munaafaq maanta [When] apostates and hypocrites
Midigta u casaane maanta will have red [ink] on their right hand⁴⁵

Another part of the poem was repeatedly cited during their demonstrations: “*Wallāhi, Bilāhi, qad kafaru al-Qur’āna,*” which means, “I swear to Allah, they disbelieved the Qur’an.”⁴⁶ This poem regards those who voted in the March 26 elections as apostates and hypocrites, which is a display of lack of understanding of Islam and a sign for extremist tendencies. The group has been demonstrating the first sign of Takfiir (the practice of declaring oneself an unbeliever) in its early development, a belief that many of its followers will adhere later. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare said he knew Cabdikarin and his group and described them as follows:

I met Cabdikarim in 1966 and he was very enthusiastic young man. I participated in the meeting of his group several times and delivered some lectures. At other times, Sheikh Cabdulqani was with me. We tried to improve their comprehension of Islam and they were very dedicated. The relation of Nahdah with them was very good. They held their own regular meetings and were highly organized.⁴⁷

However, when Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud assumed leadership of the group, he found the best opportunity to educate the group and mobilize new recruits was through the Qur’anic commentary of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin that began in 1968. Within this

⁴⁵ The red hand signifies the red ink used to identify persons who had voted in the election. This poem was related by Axmad Cali Axmad, interviewed by the author on December 23, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁴⁶ Axmed Rashid Xanafi, interviewed by author on January 11, 2010, Ottawa, Canada.

⁴⁷ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, interviewed by the author on July 5, 2009, Toronto, Canada.

Islamic circle, Ahal was established and nurtured. Although there is no reliable source to authenticate the date of Ahal establishment, all indications suggest that it was established in 1969. None of those interviewed had seen any bylaws of the organization or had heard of it, so, most likely, its bylaws were not committed into writing. When Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud took over the organization, he provided strong leadership and transformed it into an organization mainly targeting high school students.⁴⁸ The ideological transformation of Ahal members occurred, while its leaders and members were studying Islam from the Qur’anic commentary by Sheikh Maxamad Macallin. Also, the Islamic library established by Nahdah was offering additional educational opportunities. With this transformation, the organization was heading in a new direction. The speed of transformation accelerated when the military coup of 1969 banned all political and social organizations and adopted Socialism in 1970, which further provoked Islamic sentiments. In all likelihood, Ahal went underground and furthered its work by increasing its leadership and recruitment.

The organization did not have an official name or formal bylaw. The name of Ahal was used as a code name between members of the organization when they meet in public. Members asked each other, according to Somali tradition, “Ahalka ka waran?” which means, “How is the family?” signifying their organization. Therefore, the objectives of Ahal are not written down anywhere; however, there is a speculation that they were not different from the objectives of similar Islamic organizations whose ultimate goal was to make the Qur’an, the basics for the constitution of the state and to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. The interim programs and strategies were probably founded on opposing Socialism and intensifying the Islamic Da’wa by targeting young generations. Naturally, continuing this process for years provided an atmosphere of social acceptance. However, in repressive regimes such as Somalia, the climate was right for alternative options. Ahal provided such an alternative and began to work toward realizing it. The intention was to

⁴⁸ Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud graduated from Italian schools and worked in ENE “Ente Nazionale Electrica” (National Electrical Authority). His Islamic education was minimal and therefore, as many interviewees reported, was very sensitive to include in his organization persons who are older than him or better educated in Islam. See Al-Shahid, *Qadiyat al-Shahr: al-Irhāb fī al-Somāl*, *Wahmūn am Ḥaqīqah?* Special report on terrorism in Somalia published on January 15, 2010, available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/monthly-issue/7789> (accessed on May 25, 2010).

encourage, or even make it obligatory for, certain members of the organization to join the national armed forces, infiltrate national intelligence service, and prepare for overthrowing the regime. This plan had two components. The first was to carefully select and recruit officers of the armed forces who were sympathetic to Islam and who were opposed to the socialist ideology. The second component was to identify individuals from within Ahal and direct them to join the armed forces. The implementation of this plan started in 1974. Two witnesses were interviewed about this plan. The first said the following:

I graduated from 15 May High School in Mogadishu in 1974. I was recruited in 1973 to be a member of Ahal. We normally met once every month after completing reading of the whole Qur'an in the houses of the prominent leaders. One day, our Amiir Cabulqadir called me for special meeting and directed me to join the army. I never thought of joining the army, however, I complied. After joining the army, I was sent to the Soviet Union and was trained as an officer. I remember we were about 10 members who joined the army in 1974 and in the following years the numbers increased drastically. Interestingly, however, when we returned from the military training abroad, the same person who directed us to join the army ordered us again to leave the army after being converted to Takfiir ideology, which prohibits working in the institutions of the un-Islamic (Jahiliya) governments.⁴⁹

The other witness commented on the work of Ahal in high schools and on their activities and recruitment process:

In the 1970s, it was very normal for high school students to frequent Islamic circles in the mosques. It was a growing trend that many brilliant students were attracted to. I was a student in the Hawl-Wadaag high school in Mogadishu and was fascinated with some very religious and brilliant students in our school. They used to explain to us some verses from the 30 parts of the

⁴⁹ Yusuf Axmad Nuur, interviewed by the author on December 24, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

Qur'an during break times. They were also active in delivering short talks at the student gatherings. I remember one student named Axmad Nuur Carab who was very active. They were recommending students to join the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin. There we met many enthusiastic students from other schools and I joined Ahal in 1975. Our leader was Abdulqadir Sheikh Maxamuud, called the Amiir, and executive members included Cusman Cabdulle Rooble, Xussein Cali Xaaji and Cabdulqaadir Maxamad Cabdullahi. I was ordered to join the army in 1975; however, after 10 days of petitions and convincing reasons, I was later relieved from that assignment.⁵⁰

Both these testimonies demonstrate Ahal's focus on high school activities, recommending to these students to join the Qur'anic commentary of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin and to attend regular monthly meetings of the members, reading and memorizing of the Qur'an. They also confirmed the important role of the Islamic library founded by Nahdah and, finally, the militaristic tendency of the organization in 1974. Moreover, the two testimonies confirmed that there was a required procedure for taking an oath of allegiance to the organization that included shaking hands. They further related that women were allowed to become members of the organization and women's wing was established during early years. Some prominent female leaders included Marian Xaaji Cabdiraxman, Marian Yusuf, and Marian Diini. Both testimonies also conveyed that the first branch of Ahal was established in Beletweyne, and the town became an early center of the Islamic awakening.⁵¹ Early members of the Beletweyne branch of Ahal included Adan Xaaji Xussein, Cabdiraxman Sheikh Cumar and his brother Cabdixakim Sheikh Cumar, as well as Xassan Mahdi and others.⁵² The brutal execution in 1975 of Islamic scholars due to the Family Law confrontation resulted in an unprecedented reaction that converted many people to the Islamic cause; however, it also created havoc within the nascent Islamic movement. Many Islamic scholars and prominent activists were either imprisoned or fled the country in the state security campaign of 1976. This massive confrontation was a

⁵⁰ Axmad Cali Axmad, interviewed by the author on December 23, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁵¹ Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud, interviewed by the author on April 10, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁵² Ibid.

prelude to the preparation for the second phase of the military regime, during which the Socialist Revolutionary Party was established in 1976 as the leading ideological party of the country. During these years, the Islamic movement continued underground and was administered by younger and less educated members. Most of the known activists such as Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud fled the country to Saudi Arabia because of the economic boom and education opportunities they offered to the Somali students.

In Saudi Arabia Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud was welcomed by members of Ahal, e.g., Yusuf Foodcade and Cabdulqaadir Aw-Muse. Some women's group members were also present, e.g., Madina Macallin.⁵³ During this time, the home of Xusseini Cali Diirshe, located in the district of *Nadwa al-Yamaniyah* in Jeddah, became the new headquarters for Ahal. Gradually, most members in Saudi Arabia were admitted to Saudi universities by 1977; for example, Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud joined Um al-Qura University in 1978, from which he graduated four years later. Cabdulqaadir traveled to Egypt in 1979 and many believed he met with the leaders of Takfiir in Egypt. Many interviewees believe that he was converted to Takfiir ideology in Saudi Arabia in the early 1977 and traveled to Egypt to meet Egyptian leaders and to preach his new ideology to Somali students of Ahal members in Cairo.⁵⁴ Upon his return, the new Takfiir organization was founded, and the ideological and organizational division of Somali Islamism became a reality. There are various speculative reasons why Cabdulqaadir converted to Takfiir. Among these are that he had lost his leadership role of Ahal when students contacted other great scholars from the Islamic world and some of them became more educated than him.⁵⁵ Nonetheless, the seed of Takfiir was implanted in the early year of Ahal and its militancy tendency is clear from directing its members to join the army. Therefore, Ahal members were divided into followers of Takfiir and those who refused that ideology and founded a new organization called Jamaaca Islaamiyah. Jamaaca Islaamiyah was founded in 1979 and designated a new leader: Sheikh Maxamuud Ciise. It recruited students who graduated from the Saudi universities and became influenced by Salafism. As a result, it

⁵³ Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, interviewed by the author on January 10, 2010, Ottawa, Canada.

⁵⁴ Shukri Mustafa was the leader of Takfiir in Egypt who was accused of being responsible for murdering Egyptian Minister *Muhammad al-Dhahabi*. He was captured and executed in 1978.

⁵⁵ Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, interviewed by the author on January 12, 2010, Ottawa, Canada. Also, Axmad Cali Axmad, interviewed by author on December 23, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

gradually drifted from being proto-MB to being neo-Salafia organization. Jamaaca Islaamiyah and Waxdah were unified in 1983 and formed Itixaad.

Wahdat al-Shabab al-Islami (The Union of Islamic Youth)

Wahdat al-Shabab (Waxdah) has left great legacy and an imprint on the Islamic awakening in northern Somalia and is considered one of the great movements that shaped Somalia's modern history.⁵⁶ Following patterns similar to other Islamic organizations, it pushed for underground activities during the military regime (1969-1991). The history of this organization is also mostly unrecorded, as far as we know, and to reconstruct it, four basic documents were consulted: the founding bylaws of Waxdah and three letters sent to the civilian and military government authorities in 1969.⁵⁷ In addition to that, these written sources are complemented by oral sources. Waxdah was officially formed by 13 members in Hargeysa on June 6, 1969.⁵⁸ The name of the organization, number of its founding members, number of executive officers, and number of articles in the bylaws all resembled those of the first nationalist party which was established in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1943 by 13 young men. But, contrary to the SYL, Waxdah emphasized Islamic identity as their ideological orientation. The initial thinking, tendencies, and activities of the organization were unofficially begun in 1967 without a legal status, according to Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi Dubad, one of its founders.⁵⁹ Its creation was

⁵⁶ Cabdirisaq Caqli, interviewed by the author on November 29, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁵⁷ The first letter was sent to President Cabdirashid Cali Sharmarke during his visit in Hargeysa before his assassination at Laas-Anood on October 15, 1969. The second letter was addressed to the Revolutionary Military Council on November 8, 18 days after the coup. The third letter was sent to the Revolutionary Council in Hargeysa. These documents were received from Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi, one of the founders of Waxdah, who currently resides in Djibouti. Another source for the documents was from Sheikh Cabdiraxman Koosaar, one of the early members of Waxdah, currently living in Hargeysa.

⁵⁸ The date of establishment is recorded in the letter sent to the Military Governor of Hargeysa after the military takeover. It requested a continuation of its overt operations. The names of the founding members are: Sheikh Cumar Xussein (Arabic language teacher, graduated from al-Azhar) currently residing in the UK; Cali Ibrahim Idle (Arabic language teacher), deceased; Xussein Baraawe (businessman); Maxamuud Xaaji Ducaale (was employee of the Ministry of Animal Husbandry), currently residing in the UK; Sheikh Cabduraxman Xaashi Dubad (working and living in Djibouti); Dr. Cumar Axmad Xaaji Xussein (worked in the Saudi Arabian University and became president of Burco University); Cabdiraxman Cabdullahi; Saciid Nuur (teacher); Dr. Maxamuud Muse (aw-saliid); Sheikh Cabdiraxman Yusuf (ina-Xananside), resided in Canada. Cabduraxman Koosaar interviewed by the author on May 20, 2008, Hargeysa, Somaliland. Also, Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on July 27, 2009, Nairobi and confirmed by email, January 6, 2010.

⁵⁹ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi Dubad, interviewed by the author on November 14, 2009, Djibouti.

mainly provoked by internal and external political and social upheaval in the Muslim world and Somalia. Its objectives, according to its bylaws, were simply “to realize Islamic principles” and its constitution was based on “The Qur’an and the Sunna of the Prophet Mohamed, peace and blessings be upon him.”⁶⁰ In particular, a number of interviewees on the history of Waxdah agreed that two factors stimulated the formation of the organization. These factors were (1) the increasing westernization and the presence of the American Peace Corps and (2) the social dislocation of people and conflict after the elections of 1969.

The roots of the Peace Corps can be traced to 1960 when then Senator John F. Kennedy challenged students at the University of Michigan to serve their country in the cause of peace by living and working in developing countries. From that inspired appeal grew an agency of the US Federal Government devoted to world peace and friendship.⁶¹ Members of the Peace Corps arrived in Somalia in 1961 as voluntary teachers in intermediate schools, carrying with them the American youth counterculture of the 1960s.⁶² This cultural movement had its origins in the United States and Britain and spread through large parts of the world during the 1960s and 1970s. It gained momentum during the Vietnam War and expressed itself in many ways, including through music, dress, and sexual freedom.⁶³ Some of these young students embraced the hippie ethos by preaching the power of love and the beauty of sex as a natural part of ordinary life.⁶⁴ Other Western cultural influences, besides the counterculture of the Peace Corps, also were rapidly spreading among students in the intermediate and secondary schools in

⁶⁰ See Articles 4 and 2 of the Waxdah bylaws.

⁶¹ See the background history of Peace Corps in the official website of the Peace Corps, available from <http://www.peacecorps.gov/index.cfm?shell=learn> (accessed on 25 June, 2010).

⁶² Aw Jāma ‘Umar ‘isse, *Al-Sarā’ Bayna al-Islām wa Nasrāniyah fī al-Sharq Ifrīqiyyah* (n.p., 1999), 54.

⁶³ Some of these youths became prominent personalities in the US. For example, Charles Banquet, Director of the Center for Intercultural and International Programs, Xavier University of Louisiana (Somalia 1965-67), Robert Laird, opinion page editor for the *NY Daily News* (Somalia 1962-63), Thomas Petri, US Representative for Wisconsin (Somalia 1966-67), and R. Barrie Walkley, former ambassador to Gabon and the Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe (Somalia 1967-69). See this information from its official websites available from <http://www.peacecorps.gov> (accessed on January 19, 2009).

⁶⁴ The hippie subculture was originally a youth movement in the US from the 1950s to the late 1960s. A person belonging to this culture opposed to and rejected many of the conventional standards and customs of society, especially in socio-political attitudes and lifestyles. Adherents created their own communities, listened to psychedelic rock, embraced the sexual revolution, and used drugs to explore alternative states of consciousness. See Sam Binkle, *Hippies 2002*, available from http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_glepc/is_tov/ai_2419100587/ (accessed on August 11, 2009).

Somalia. In this way, the Somali counterculture was expressed in dress, particularly women's dress, and growing prostitution, listening to Western music, an increase in the number of night clubs, smoking, and drinking alcohol. This culture was very much frustrating for the traditional conservative Somali society. It provoked a resistance ideology against this intrusive alien culture, a resistance that could only be expressed by Islamic slogans and counter activities. The search for an Islamic awakening was driven by inspiration from the MB literature.

The annoyance of the founders of Waxdah with the westernization was clearly expressed in the two letters mentioned earlier. One of the letters was handed to the President Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmarke in October 1969 during his official visit to Hargeysa, and the other was sent to the Supreme Revolutionary Council in November 8, 1969. Both letters expressed the same concerns about social maladies and called for Islam to be made the ultimate legal reference and solution in countering the mounting westernization. The letters expressed three major concerns regarding westernization: sexual freedom, drinking alcohol, and Christianization. In their petition against sexual freedom, the members of this group expressed their shame and antipathy about growing open prostitution. Prostitution had become so prevalent that a brothel in Hargeysa was named "the Faking Quarter" while a similar one in Mogadishu was called "*Tumbuluq*".⁶⁵ They demanded closing down public prostitution and assigning a special branch of the police to monitor such misconduct. They also expressed their frustration that alcohol was increasingly sold publicly under the state license and demanded its total prohibition. Regarding their fear of Christian missionary activities by foreigners, Waxdah demanded that the government closely monitor activities of the foreigners and Christian activism. The second letter sent to the Revolutionary Council titled "Our opinion on the forthcoming constitution" speculated that a new constitution would soon be developed. It repeated the same three major concerns and added another demand: banning "freedom of religion" which allowed

⁶⁵ The quarter of Tumbuluq in Mogadishu was destroyed by the Military regime in 1971 because of its location in the center of the city, being old wooden buildings and becoming water pool during rainy seasons. However, this undertaking was not meant to curb prostitutions since big hotels had night clubs and prostitutions were exercised openly.

Muslims to be converted to other religions.⁶⁶ It is not clear what prompted this demand as the Somali constitution already outlawed spreading other religions except Islam in Somalia in 1963. These four issues were clearly phrased in the Arabic language and Islamic terms, and Qur'anic verses and Prophetic traditions were used to support these views.

Considering social dislocation and conflict, the fissure in society was widening after the election of Cabdirashiid Cali Sharmaarke as president and the subsequent political developments. The policies implemented under the Prime Minister Cigaal, who was from the northern constituency, provoked anger. Prime Minister Cigaal's policies, which fragmented political parties and marginalized specific clans and personalities in the north, caused social dislocation and clan conflict. In Hargeysa alone, 17 political sub-clan parties competed for 6 parliamentary seats. Reacting to this disorder and anger, the founders of Waxdah were convinced that Islam is the only way to bring brotherhood and unity to the divided society. To deal with growing clan conflicts, the letters from Waxdah to the government demanded the application of the Shari'a law in cases of deliberate homicide instead of the customary law of clans, or Xeer, which envisioned only the *diya* paying system (material compensation for a homicide). Shari'a introduced the concept of Qisaas, which literally means retaliation. It envisions the right of the heirs of a murder victim to demand execution of the murderer instead of seeking compensation.⁶⁷ Introducing themselves to the new military governor of Hargeysa in 1969, Waxdah stated the following in a letter sent to him:

We are the Union of Islamic Youth; we initiated our Islamic movement early this year when the election rows were rattling Somalia and the clan system succeeded in dividing the one nation into sects and parties because opportunists, who call themselves politicians of the country, employed this

⁶⁶ According to the Somali Constitution of 1961, missionary activities are prohibited in Somalia. See Article 29.

⁶⁷ See the Qur'anic verse, "O you who believe, equivalence is the law decreed for you when dealing with murder - the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. If one is pardoned by the victim's kin, an appreciative response is in order, and an equitable compensation shall be paid. This is alleviation from your Lord and mercy; anyone who transgresses beyond this incurs a painful retribution" (2:178).

clanism. And, therefore, we formed our organization [immediately] after the [national] election on June 6, 1969 in Hargeysa. Our movement is not political [party], but is an Islamic organization.⁶⁸

One of the strengthening capacities of Waxdah was the development of Islamic and Arabic system of education similar to those in southern Somalia. The growing impact of the Egyptian cultural center in Hargeysa, the Arabic language schools, and the Radio of the Voice of Arabs in Cairo were encouraging. Besides that, they were influenced by the general trend of Islamic awakening in other parts of the world after the execution of Sayid Qutub and the defeat of the Arab forces in the war with Israel in 1967.⁶⁹ As in other places, a lot of Islamic literature produced by the Islamists reached Hargeysa. The first letter sent by Waxdah to the civilian government demonstrates the importance that the new organization was attaching to non-state schools, most of which had an Arabic language curriculum. They demanded that the state should support these schools by improving their facilities and training their teachers. They also advocated more hours of Islamic studies for state schools and called for improved quality of Islamic teachers.⁷⁰ Furthermore, they demanded the establishment of Islamic institutes and Islamic universities in the country.⁷¹ The second letter sent to the Revolutionary Council proves influence of Sayid Qutub's works in the thinking of the Waxdah. In this letter, they cited the concepts of *ḥākimiyyah* [all earthly sovereignty belongs to Allah alone] and *Jāhiliyyah* [ignorance], which were part of the central discourse espoused by Sayid Qutub and eloquently articulated in his celebrated book *Ma 'ālim fī al-Darīq* (The Milestones).⁷²

⁶⁸ Excerpts from the letter to the Governor of Hargeysa [no date], though most likely it was written in the last month of 1969. Waxdah considered itself an Islamic social organization, as is evident from the letter "Munadama Islamiyah."

⁶⁹ Sheikh Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on July 27, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland. Sheikh Ismaciil joined Waxdah in 1971 and became one of its leaders in 1975. Also, Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi Dubad interview by the author on November 14, 2009, Djibouti.

⁷⁰ See the letter was sent to the Supreme Revolutionary Council in 1969.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² The Milestones is Sayid Qutub's major work considered to be the manifesto for Islamic activists. See Sayid Qutub, *The Milestone*, available from <http://majalla.org/books/2005/qutb-nilestone.pdf> (accessed on June 24, 2010).

According to the bylaws, the organizational structure of Waxdah was hierarchical and consisted of 13 executive officers. These included the chairman and his deputy, the secretary-general and his deputy, the secretary of Islamic Call and Guidance, the secretary of Cultural Awareness, the secretary of Sport, the secretary of the Treasury and the inspector general.⁷³ The bylaws clarify the duties, responsibilities, and eligibilities of all these offices. For example, the chairman had to “be knowledgeable about Islamic jurisprudence, be virtuous and have a good manner” and all other office holders had to have the same qualities. The bylaws affirm the process for electing the office holders, thereby illustrating the internal democracy of the organization. The term for office holders was five years, and the chairman, at his discretion, could dismiss any office holder after consulting with his executive officers, while he himself could be removed from office with a two-third majority vote of no confidence by the office holders. No details of the process of the removal from office are given. It seems that during this early stage, there were only members and executive office holders and that a consultative council did not exist. According to the bylaws, membership was restricted to persons who “should be faithful, committed to Islam and comply with the Islamic obligations. He has to be devoid from aiming personal gains [in joining the organization], meaning to be sincere, genuine in religious beliefs.”⁷⁴ Members had to pay a monthly contribution of three shilling to the Treasury.⁷⁵ As a rule, members of Islamic organizations had to be sworn by reciting special text, an allegiance pledge or “*Bay’a*”. On becoming a member of Waxdah, a person had to say aloud, while shaking the hand of the leader, “*Āmannā bi Allāhi, wa kafarnā bi Dāqūt*”, which means, “We believe in Allah and reject the ‘Tagut’.”⁷⁶

Waxdah rented its headquarters in the city center of Hargeysa in 1969 and initiated Islamic education programs. These programs included studies of the prophets’ biography,

⁷³ See Article 9 of the Waxdah bylaws.

⁷⁴ See Article 8 of the Waxdah bylaws.

⁷⁵ See Article 13 of the Waxdah bylaws (which was equivalent to \$0.5 at the time).

⁷⁶ “Tagut” means “false God” or tyranny. This oath is derived from the Qur’anic verse “Whoever disbelieves in ‘taghut’ and believes in Allah, then he has grasped the most trustworthy handhold which will never break” (2:256). Cabdiraxman Koosaar interviewed by the author on August 15, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland. It is noteworthy that this statement of *Bay’a* is invented by Waxdah and does not follow MB *bay’a* statements.

Islamic jurisprudence, commentary of the Qur'an (Tafsir), and Arabic language courses. Since most of its founding members were teachers of Arab and Islamic subjects in the schools, they attracted students from these schools. Initially, all students were boys, with a girls' program starting later.⁷⁷ There was also a weekly radio program on "Islamic manners," produced by Sheikh Cabdiraxman Xaashi, and public lectures at the headquarters every Thursday night.⁷⁸ These programs presented by Waxdah were very successful and attracted many people. They also opened an English-language private school to attract more students and to generate funds to finance the expenses of the center.⁷⁹ The initial Waxdah program was pioneered by teachers of Arabic and Islamic studies as a form of modern Sufism.⁸⁰ Most of the founding members used to chew Qaat, a tropical evergreen plant whose leaves are used as a stimulant and widely used in northern Somalia. They also recited *Qaṣīdat al-Burda*, the ode of praise to the Prophet Mohamed, composed by the reputed Sufi poet *Imām al-Būsiri*.⁸¹ The activities of Waxdah had continued without interruption even after the revolutionary regime decreed a new law on January 10, 1970 (Law No. 54 of national's security). This law warranted death penalty for accusing a person in exploiting religion to create national disunity. The impact of this law was so great that most state employees abandoned Waxdah.

The ideological transformation of Waxdah from a modern Sufism to proto-MB transpired in 1974 as a result of two important events. The first was the establishment of the MB library that contained many Islamic reference books and Islamic revivalist literature. This library was sent from Kuwait by *Sheikh 'Abdallah 'Aqīl* through Saciid Sheikh Maxamad, one of the founding members.⁸² These books included the works of Hassan al-Banna, the

⁷⁷ Sheikh Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on August 14, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁷⁸ See the letter sent to the local Hargeysa authority requesting the renewal of these programs.

⁷⁹ Cabdiraxman Koosaar interviewed by author on August 15, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁸⁰ The organization rented a small location where older members used to chew *qat* and recite the *Burdah and Munaqab*. It seems that the combination of traditional ways and those of the Sufis were attractive to the young.

⁸¹ The poems' actual title *al-Kawākib ad-Durriyya fī Madḥ Khayr al-Barīya* ("Celestial Lights in Praise of the Best of Creation") is famous throughout the Muslim world. It is in praise of Prophet Mohammad who cured the poet of paralysis by appearing to him in a dream and wrapping him in a cloak or scarf.

⁸² Saciid Sheikh Maxamad, living during this time in Kuwait, had shipped these books to Hargeysa in 1974. These books were presented to Waxdah by the Sheikh Mana al-Qadan with the compliments of Sheikh Maxamad Geryare who was his disciple, former member of Nahdah and the director of the Ministry of

founder of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, and books by *Sayid Qutub* and his brother *Moḥamed Qutub*. There were also books by Syrian scholar *Said Ḥawa*, Lebanese MB scholar *Fathi Yakun*, Pakistani Islamic thinkers, such as *Abu al-A 'lā al-Mawdūdī*, and Indian scholar, *Abu al-Ḥassan al-Nadawī*. Members of Waxdah eagerly read these books, which greatly transformed their thinking. They became followers of the MB methodology in their way of understanding Islam. Members moved from general attachment to Islam to following a specific direction in Islamic activism.

The second factor in Waxdah's transformation that had a negative impact on the organization's activities was the establishment of the Public Relations Office (PRO) by the military regime in preparation of the formation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in Somalia. The followers of leftist ideology of the regime had been campaigning to eliminate all other ideological groups. Consequently, they spread hearsay about alleged dangerousness of Waxdah, including that it engaged in anti-revolutionary activities and were anti-Islamic, which frightened many members. As a result of this, some experienced members were transferred to other regions or traveled overseas. This meant that the leadership of Waxdah fell into the hands of the young students who had the opportunity to get enough training in the first five years of activism. The new young leadership was more committed to Islamic activism and recruited like-minded peers.⁸³ In the 1970s, Waxdah began to spread to other northern regions where they opened chapters in the regional capitals of Burco and Borama⁸⁴ as well as a third chapter in Djibouti.⁸⁵ The women's program was instituted in the early 1970s; however, Waxdah began to recruit women as full members in 1975. The impact of the Islamic call was evident in the streets of Hargeysa, Burco, and Borama, and in particular in high schools and among female

Justice and Islamic affairs. There were two shipments of books: one shipment went to Nahdah in Mogadishu and the other to Waxdah in Hargeysa.

⁸³ The well-known leaders of Waxdah during this time were: Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Jaamac, Cabdiraxman Yusuf Abokar, Maxamad Cabdi Daaud, Xassan Cabdisalam and Muse Axmad Jaamac. Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Jaamac was their Chairman. Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on August 14, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁸⁴ Sheikh Xassan Cabdisalam worked as a national service teacher in 1977 in Burco and recruited the first members of the Burco chapter, such as Mustafa Xaaji Ismaciil, Cabdi-Xakim Maxamad Axmad and others. Ibid.

⁸⁵ The first recruited members in Borama included Cabdullahi Mu'min and Mahdi Saciid and Cabdalla Nuux.

students where the veil and proper Islamic dress began to appear. This occurrence, which was parallel to the happenings in other parts of Somalia, alarmed the regime, which launched a campaign against Islamic activism in 1976.

As a result of the continued campaign to curb Islamic activism, Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Jaamac, the leader of Waxdah, was imprisoned in 1978.⁸⁶ Also, Xaaji Cumar Hilowle (Hadrawi) and many others suspected of belonging to Waxdah were put behind bars. Sheikh Xassan Cabdisalam was also detained and jailed in Burco. In the end, the military regime took over the Waxdah headquarters in Hargeysa and appointed Said Muse as the administrator. However, most of the leaders of the Waxdah were in Mogadishu to complete their Halane training program in 1977.⁸⁷ Some of them returned after completing their training, such as Sheikh Ismaciil Dheeg, who returned to Hargeysa, and Sheikh Xassan Cabdisalam, who returned to Burco, while others joined the Somali National University. After the state took over the Waxdah center in Hargeysa, activities were relegated to mosques, and the organization went underground. During these years, *Da'wa* was intensified and a number of Qur'anic schools were opened. Waxdah was gradually being transformed into an Islamic movement. Although it was based in northern regions and recruited most of its members from there, it was not isolated from other Islamic activities in Somalia and the rest of the world. By 1983, Waxdah and Jamat formed Itixaad; however, many members of Waxdah who abandoned or abstained from Itixaad began to reorganize themselves and continued Waxdah as independent proto-MB organization. By 1990s, Waxdah were also divided by repeatedly attempting to unite with other Islamist organizations under various pretexts and finally, it had completely disappeared in 1999 when its former members joined different organizations or preferred independent Islamic work. Besides former incorporation with Itixaad, the organization of Tajamuc confined to the Somaliland Islamists was created and later it also was incorporated with Itixaad under the name of and Ictisaam- a neo-Salafia organization.

⁸⁶ From his prison, Sheikh Cabdulqaadir wrote a letter to Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre requesting him to tell him about a girl with the name "Nuura" (the light), meaning the *Da'wa*. Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on August 14, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁸⁷ The Halane training program comprised three months military training for high school graduates, where after then; they joined the university or were offered jobs in different departments of the government. These leaders were Maxamad Cabdi Daauud, Cabdulqaadir Yusuf Abukar, Abdo Maxamuud, Maxamad Xaaji Cawad and Xassan Cabdisalam. Ibid.

Members who abstained to join Tajamuc joined Islaax in 1999 completing the total disintegration of Waxdah.

It could be concluded at this point that all three organizations, Nahdah, Ahal, and Waxdah, established after 1967 as part of the growing Islamic trend in the Muslim world, were enthusiastically engaged in Islamic activism in line with the MB methodology. As indicated, they were dealing with the challenges of westernization, secularization, and Socialism by employing Islam as their resistance ideology. They coordinated their efforts and shared roles; for example Ahal and Waxdah focused on recruiting high school and university students in their respective geographical locations, south and north. Nahdah assumed the role of providing Islamic education and supplied Islamic literature. The relationship between these organizations and the military regime gradually developed into an open confrontation which had a lasting impact on the historical evolution of Somalia. In the next section, will examine how these relations evolved.

The Military Regime and the Islamic Awakening

When the military regime took power in Somalia in a bloodless coup on October 21, 1969, there was little sympathy for the corrupt civilian government, and the people of Somalia, who were eager for regime change, celebrated joyously. During the civilian regime, democracy “had lapsed into commercialized anarchy and a new type of strong rule was urgently required if the country was to be rescued from the morass of poverty, insecurity and inefficiency into which it had sunk.”⁸⁸ However, the new military regime was gradually shifting its policies toward socialist ideology and dictatorship. In that atmosphere, relations between the military regime and the Islamic awakening were developed in three stages. They began with mutual confidence, but steadily regressed to mutual distrust and, ultimately, overt confrontation.

⁸⁸ I. M. Lewis, *A Modern History of Somalia: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa* (London: Longman, 1980), 206.

The First Period: Mutual Confidence

The period of mutual confidence was the early period of the regime when most Somali people welcomed the military coup, as they were dismayed by the ousted civilian regime. The military coup was seen as saving the Somali state from complete collapse.⁸⁹ The first symbol of the military coup was the Qur'an, the gun, an army helmet, and swearing hand, symbolizing its Islamic tendency. In the first years, the military regime undertook popular steps such as nationalizing many foreign enterprises, offering jobs to unemployed elites, focusing on merit in public employment, expelling the Peace Corps, and continuously vilifying colonialism and imperialism.⁹⁰



Figure 4. The symbol of the military coup of 1969

⁸⁹ Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Perspectives on the State Collapse in Somalia." In *Somalia at the Crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives in Reconstituting a Failed State*, ed. Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Soure (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers Ltd., 2007), 43.

⁹⁰ In December 1969, the military regime "gave US Peace Corps Volunteers notice to leave the country in two weeks. Siyaad pointed out that these youths, through their poor dress and their use of illicit drugs, were a threat to Somali value" see David Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 79.

The regime also gained support by improving economic performance, expanding social services, and projecting more sound governance culture. The regime articulated high respect for Islamic values, as was evident in a speech by the president a few months after seizing power:

Our Islamic faith teaches us that its inherent values are perennial and continually evolving as people progress. These basic tenets of our religion cannot be interpreted in a static sense, but rather as a dynamic source of inspiration for continuous advancement.⁹¹

The new regime also assigned Sheikh Cabdulgani Sheikh Axmad to the position of Minister of Religious Affairs and Sheikh Maxamad Geryare became Director of Islamic Affairs. These scholars were the former leaders of Nahdah and pioneers of the Islamic awakening in Somalia. Nonetheless, with the first anniversary of the military coup, October 21, 1970, Scientific Socialism was adopted as the guiding ideology of the regime.⁹² From that moment, the regime instituted policies designed to curb clanism vehemently and overtly – and the Islamic ethos covertly – and embarked on the road toward dictatorship. The dictatorial course of the regime became clearer with the enactment of repressive laws and the establishment of repressive institutions in 1970.⁹³ In particular, the law known as Law No. 54 on national security listed a number of serious crimes against the state as warranting death penalties and life imprisonment. Such crimes included “exploiting religion to create national disunity or to undermine and weaken the powers of the state.”⁹⁴ The initial policy of the regime with respect to Islam was to

⁹¹ See quotation in I.M. Lewis, *A History*, 219.

⁹² As narrated by Professor Maxamad Cali Tuuryare, a high-ranking delegation from the Soviet Union paid a visit to Mogadishu before the promulgation of Socialism in 1970. He and Colonel Yusuf Dheeg were assigned to accompany them. The mission aimed at discouraging the Somali military regime from adopting Socialism so early. However, President Maxamad Siyaad had ignored their advice. The argument of the delegation was that the socio-economic environment in Somalia was not yet ripe for socialist transformation. Maxamuud Cali Tuuryare interviewed by the author on July 11, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁹³ These laws are: Law No. 1 of January 10, 1970 on the power of arrest, Law No. 3 of January 10, 1970 on the creation of the national security court, Law No. 14 of February 15, 1970 on the creation of a national security service, Law No. 54 of September 10, 1970 on national security, Law No. 64 of October 10, 1970 on the promulgation of the right to habeas corpus, and Law No. 67 of November 1, 1970 on socialist defence. See Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim “Xildhiban”, *Taxanaha Taariikhda Somaaliya* (London: Xildhiban Publications, 2006), 105.

⁹⁴ See Luigi Pastaloza, *The Somali Révolution* (Bari: Édition Afrique Asie Amérique Latine, 1973), 318.

emphasize its complementary relationship with Socialism regarding the notions of social justice.⁹⁵ In 1972 speech, the President declared:

Ours is the religion of the common man. It stands for equality and justice. Consequently, Socialism as applied to our particular condition cannot identify religion as the obstacle to the progress of the working class and therefore cannot negate it.⁹⁶

Occasionally, Islam was used as an instrument for furthering socialist goals, as evidenced by the declaration, “Anyone opposing Socialism should at the same time be considered acting against the principles of Islam and against its very system of life.”⁹⁷ After the first few years of Socialist rhetoric campaigns, the real nature of the dictatorial regime was unveiled, and resistance, expressing itself in variety of ways, began to mount. The first explicit form of opposition came during an internal rift within the ruling junta, when two prominent generals of the Revolutionary Council (Generals Gabeyre and Aynaanshe) and a former Colonel (Colonel Dheel) were accused of organizing a counter-coup. These officers were accused, among others, of introducing “Islamic Socialism” and were publicly executed in July 1972.⁹⁸ Since the adoption of Socialism, former members of Nahdah speculated on the notion that the president was not a Socialist but a group of leftist activists who surrounded him were pushing him toward Socialism. To counter the influence of the leftists on the president and in an attempt to win him over, they organized a meeting with the president in April 1971. The delegation of five scholars included Sheikh Cabdulqani, Sheikh Geryare, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, Sheikh Cali Xaaji Yusuf, and another person.⁹⁹ This meeting was held one-and-a-half years since the military coup. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare narrates the event as follows:

At the beginning of our meeting, the President opened his talk by teasing and,

⁹⁵ I.M. Lewis, *A History*, 219.

⁹⁶ See this quotation in Ahmed Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Zed Press, 1988), 108.

⁹⁷ See Pastaloza, 138.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 150.

⁹⁹ The fifth person was a clan elder from the Hiiraan region but his name was not remembered by Sheikh Maxamad Geryare.

looking at Sheikh Maxamad Macallin and said: ‘you took from us all the people’; then, smiling, he glanced at me and said: ‘Sheikh Geryare, you are Wahabi’. Sheikh Cabdulqani was not sitting with us because he was a minister; he just accompanied us to the office of the President. As we agreed, I opened the talks and expressed the aim of our meeting which focused on two issues: (1) to offer an Islamic position on the relations between the ruler (*al-ḥakim*) and ruled (*al-maḥkumin*); and (2) to express our concerns about growing leftist activities which were attempting to create conflict between Islam and the Revolutionary regime. We detailed these points from different perspectives and the President was listening attentively. One of the points we tried to emphasize was that the revolution and Islam were not conflicting and whoever try to create such hostility is the enemy of the nation. We also explained explicitly how the group of leftists was trying to create such a rift between the people and the revolution. The President replied and I remember exactly some of his words: ‘Jaalayaal (O comrades), the revolution now is one year and six months old. The enemies of the revolution are still looming. You have advised me, and I don’t need advice because I am rightly guided (*waa hanuunsanahay*), so advise those who need your advice. Moreover, the persons whom you are talking against are the real patriots of this country’. Disappointed, we left the office of the President totally changed and convinced that our previous assessment about him was wrong. It was clear that the President and the leftists were on the same page.¹⁰⁰

In the continuation of the confrontation with the leftists, the second major event occurred in 1972 when the Ministry of Religious Affairs was assigned to prepare the speech of the president on the birthday of the Prophet *Maḥammad*, celebrated every year at Maxfalka site in Mogadishu.¹⁰¹ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare relates:

I was assigned to write the President’s speech and was later instructed to

¹⁰⁰ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, interviewed by the author on May, 2008, Toronto, Canada.

¹⁰¹ Maxfalka is a square in Mogadishu in the Shibis district where celebrations of the Prophet’s birthday were annually held and government authorities participated in the event. The square was established by Shariif Caydaruus.

deliver it on behalf of the President. I was the Director of Religious Affairs of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The speech was approved by the President and we had distributed it to all Muslim embassies. However, the speech contained clauses which said that Somali Socialism is “Islamic Socialism”. The speech was widely reported in the local media which angered the leftists and lead socialist country embassies to protest. As a result, the President made another speech. This was the historic speech in which the president said: “our Socialism is not Islamic, is not African, it is Marxism-Leninism”.¹⁰²

The onerous task of the Islamic scholars to advise the president and challenge leftists within state institutions was over. The revolution was inexorably slipping toward Socialism where city streets, offices, and orientation centers were decorated with portraits of Marx, Engels, and Lenin alongside the picture of Maxamad Siyaad Barre. The initial symbol of the revolution that focused on the Qur’an was gone forever.

The Second Period: Mistrust

The years 1972-74 could be considered the period of suspicion between the regime and the leaders of the Islamic awakening. After the execution of some military officers in 1972, the so-called “enemies of the socialist revolution and reactionary forces” were identified. These included wadaad xume (bad Sheikhs), signifying Islamic scholars who did not subscribe to Socialism and Marxist-Leninist ideology. In one of his speeches, the president reiterated:

As far as Socialism is concerned, it is not a heavenly message like Islam but a mere system for regulating the relations between man and his utilization of the means of production in this world. ...However, the reactionaries wanted to create a rift between Socialism and Islam because Socialism is not in their interest.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author by telephone on June 12, 2009. Toronto, Canada.

¹⁰³ See the quotation in I. M. Lewis, *A History*, 220.

A story narrated by Sheikh Maxamad Geryare demonstrates the mounting mistrust between the regime and the leaders of the Islamic awakening. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare was demoted from the position of the director of Islamic Affairs in 1972 and was sent to the training camp of Halane, a military camp designated to indoctrinate civil servants with the ideology of Socialism. After finishing the training program, he was not assigned to any new position, due to a system known in Somalia as Buul, which means staying on without a specific job. During this period, Sheikh *Moḥamed Moḥamud al-Sawāf*, the adviser of Islamic Affairs to King Faisal of Saudi Arabia paid an official visit to Somalia carrying a letter from King Faysal to President Siyad Barre.¹⁰⁴ Sheikh Geryare was assigned by the minister of foreign affairs, Cumar Carte Qaalib, to accompany him. The minister requested Sheikh Geryare to act as translator for the president. Relating this event, Sheikh Geryare said the following:

In the meeting with the President, Sheikh Sawaf submitted a letter from King Faysal to the President, and then explained the content of the letter. Sheikh Sawaf read the letter and, in recollecting the main themes and some wording of the letter, he said: ‘The letter started after the greeting: Islam is our common bond, and this is very important to all of us. You have announced that you have adopted the Marxist-Leninist ideology which is contrary to the Somali Muslim people’s faith. The Prophet said: “A guide can never lie to his people”’.¹⁰⁵ Arab countries before you who adopted Socialism are reconsidering their position... I advise you, Mr. President, to turn away from adopting Socialism which corrupts the faith of the Somali people. We know that you are facing Ethiopia as the enemy of your country, if you wish weapons; the Kingdom will provide funds to purchase modern weapons from wherever you desire. And remember that the Soviets are not granting you

¹⁰⁴ Sheikh *Moḥamūd Al-Ṣawāf* was the founder of the Iraq MB in the 1940s during his student years in Egypt; he met with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the MB in Egypt in 1928. See David Romano, “*An outline of Kurdish Islamist Groups in Iraq*”. Occasional paper issued by the Jamestown Foundation, September, 2007, available from <http://www.ikhwanweb.com/uploads/lib/2C7GYEP2AMRGB65.pdf> (accessed on April 12, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ This is part of the Prophet’s speech in the meeting with his kinspeople. See Safiur-Rahman Al-Mubarakpuri, *The Sealed Nectar: Biography of the Noble Prophet* (Riyadh: Darussalam Publishing, 2002), 99.

weapons for free. Moreover, we guarantee you other assistance and investment packages and will encourage our friends to do the same. As you know, we are not a country seeking domination and we are doing all this to safeguard the faith and Islamic character of the Somali people. If we agree on these issues, we will visit you and kiss your head'. President Siyad replied briefly and spontaneously, and said: 'We are a free country and we accepted Socialism as our own choice. We believe that with Socialism we can mobilize our people and rebuild our country. Somalia is a 100% Muslim country and does not need any preaching about Islam. We are not engaged in spreading propaganda against you and will not speak against you. If we can cooperate while we are on our socialist path, we welcome it. Otherwise, if you desire to cooperate in spreading Islam, many people in Africa needs our support and we can cooperate with that.' Discouraged by the answers of the President, *Sheikh al-Sawāf* left the country.¹⁰⁶

However, the impact of that event did not subside. Sheikh Abdulqani, the Minister of Religious Affairs, visited Sheikh Geryare in his home and told him that he had a meeting with the President and informed him that he will be imprisoned for anti-revolutionary activities. Sheikh Abdulqani said as narrated by Sheikh Geryare:

I came here to warn you on that matter and I suggest that you try to meet the President and to face him directly instead of leaving him to believe rumors. If you are imprisoned in this way, I will resign and both of us will be meeting in prison. In this way, we agreed that I have to meet the President and the next night I was notified that I have an appointment with him. When I arrived at his office, he was playing tennis and many people were awaiting his audience. He told them that tonight he will only meet with Sheikh Maxamad Geryare and told the name of another person. I was received first and he began by saying, "Why do we not see you these days?" I said: "It is very difficult to come to your office." He said teasingly, while smiling: "My security guards

¹⁰⁶ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author by telephone on June 12, 2009. Toronto, Canada.

know those who are not happy with us and do not allow them to enter our offices!”

We were seated under a tree, and I said: “I have requested your audience and thanked Sheikh Cabdulaqani who arranged our meeting. I come here for two reasons: to greet you and to give you advice. I know you are very sensitive on security matters since you have taken power at gunpoint. And I am sure that you receive a lot of information and some of this information is not true. I advise you to validate this information.” Finally, I briefly told him about my life, my educational background and the reasons I had returned to Somalia. The President said: “Jaalle (comrade), listen to me carefully, if the leaves of this tree under which we sit reverberates, we fire on it first and then we ask why. I tell you the truth, you are treacherous man of this blessed revolution and we see you in that light. Be aware! You politicize Islam in your office; instead of improving relations between the people and revolution you create enmity between them. You love the Arabs, and in particular Saudi Arabia and you always tell them about our misdeeds and never about the achievements of the revolution. These are your dark points. Moreover, the Sheikh who, after committing treason against his country Iraq, was expelled and employed by the king of Saudi Arabia, I believe what he said is what instilled in him”. The President allowed me to answer and I said: “I do not understand what you mean by politicizing Islam, I proclaim Islam as I was taught. Regarding the love of Arabs, Mr. President, you are right. I love Arabs because they are our brothers, they are Muslims and most Somalis love them. In particular, I love the Saudis because I was educated there”. And finally I told him, “I swear you in the name of Allah, do you really believe that the man you have seen with his exceptional education and experience who is the adviser to the Saudi King, who came here with an official letter from him that I was behind all these things?” At the end of our discussion, the President changed his tone and said: ‘Be ware! We scrutinize information brought to us, and from the day you arrived in this country we have known everything about you. In

reality, you have not many faults, your country needs you and you need your country, we are ready to offer you a better position, but Jaalle, demonstrate your loyalty”.

Perhaps, the meeting between Sheikh Maxamad Geryare and the Somali president succeeded to diffuse temporarily immediate confrontation between the regime and leaders of the Islamic awakening. Yet, it also indicates simmering mistrust and growing suspicion of the regime against these Islamic scholars—a trend that escalated to the course of collision.

The Third Period: Confrontation

The confrontation between the regime and Islamic awakening germinated in many fronts. It includes what is termed “the Battle of *Hijāb*” (modest Muslim women’s dress).¹⁰⁷ This battle was the result of the impact of the Islamic awakening on women and took place when *Hijāb* appeared in all walks of life. Wearing *Hijāb* was not common in Somalia, and only a few did so in the urbanized centers. Its appearance in the market, in the workplace, in the schools and universities was one of the remarkable successes for the Islamic awakening. This was in stark contrast to the unisex school uniform contradicting modest Islamic dress instituted by the military regime.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, to control Islamic activism, the regime regulated activities in mosques, unified Friday sermons, licensed Islamic *Da‘wa*, and banned unauthorized Islamic education circles.¹⁰⁹ However, the breaking point in the relations was the adoption of the secular Family Law. To exemplify this, a case study of the Family Law and its implications for the Somali state and Islamic awakening are provided below.

¹⁰⁷ See the Qur’an (33:59) “Those who harass believing men and believing women undeservedly, bear (on themselves) a calumny and a grievous sin. O Prophet! Enjoin your wives, your daughters, and the wives of true believers that they should cast their outer garments over their persons (when abroad). That is most convenient, that they may be distinguished and not be harassed”.

¹⁰⁸ ‘Ali Sheikh Aḥ med Abūbakar, *Al-Somāl: Judūr al-Ma’sāt al-Rāhina* (Beirut: Dār Ibn al-Hazm, 1992), 95-105.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid, 109-112.

The Islamic Awakening and the Regime: A Case Study of the Family Law

The military regime promulgated the new Family Law on January 11, 1975. President Maxamad Siyaad Barre promulgated this controversial law in a publicly broadcasted speech at the stadium in Mogadishu, which offered “equality between men and women,” including in matters of inheritance. The speech caught the public by surprise and caused frustration and fear. Nonetheless, public reaction was timid and cautious because of the overwhelming presence of the repressive security apparatus. However, five days later, on January 16, a few Islamic scholars found the courage to overtly criticize the law. These scholars condemned the law from the pulpit of the famous Cabdulqaadir Mosque in Mogadishu.¹¹⁰ The location and timing selected for the protest were strategic. The Cabdulqaadir Mosque was the epicenter for the emerging Islamic movement, where readings of Qur’anic commentary (*tafsīr*) based on Sayid Qutub’s *In the Shade of the Qur’an* was regularly given by Sheikh Maxamad Macallin.¹¹¹ Moreover, the Friday prayer in this mosque was attended by many Islamic activists and individuals unhappy with the regime and its socialist ideology. At the same time, the mosque was under the watchful eye of the security apparatus of the regime that was suspicious of any signs of opposition under the guise of Islam. This resulted in the regime being able to quickly unleash its security apparatus and detain these scholars and hundreds of activists and sympathizers, although some were able to escape. Subsequently, on January 18 and 19, the National Security Court put on trial the first group of detained Islamic scholars and imposed death sentence on 10 scholars, jailed six for 30 years, and jailed 17 others for 20 years.¹¹² In addition, hundreds detained from all regions were kept in prison without due process. The execution of the 10 scholars took place hurriedly within three days of the court ruling as the scholars abstained from applying for pardon and the president

¹¹⁰ The issue of the new secular family law was criticized in many mosques all over Somalia and about 10 mosques in Mogadishu alone. See *ibid*, 158.

¹¹¹ Sheikh Maxamad completed his postgraduate studies at al-Azhar University and returned to Somalia in 1967. He was employed in the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. He is famous for his Qur’anic commentary during the 1970s in the Cabdulqaadir Mosque where most young Islamic activists of that time were educated. He was imprisoned for many years by the regime and died in Rome in 2000.

¹¹² The National Security Court was established by the Military Regime to deal with matters considered to be a threat to national security and its rulings were final. Its long-standing Chairman was Colonel Maxamuud Geelle Yusuf. See Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma’sāt*, 163.

dismissed all appeals for clemency.¹¹³ On January 23, 1975, at the Police Academy in Mogadishu, the military regime executed these 10 scholars.¹¹⁴

The military regime's justification for adopting the new Family Law was founded on the president's claim that he was seeking to modernize the society and promote women's rights. He argued that socialist transformation would be deficient unless women were liberated, through revolutionary legal reform, from the shackles of culture and the traditional interpretation of religion. The regime was also claiming that the new Family Law was not contradicting Islam but that it simply offered a modernist interpretation.¹¹⁵ Conversely, the focus of the Islamic scholars' counter-argument was that the new Family Law set the stage for increasing secularization of the society by engaging with its most sacred domain: the family. For them, family was one of the areas that had detailed rules dictated by Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore, they considered the law a transgression of Shari'a and a refutation of the Qur'anic verses, which was tantamount to explicit apostasy.¹¹⁶ An intense mêlée between the Islamic scholars and the military regime broke out, centering on the role of Islam in the state and society. The issue of women was merely the theater of confrontation between the two parties that were suspicious of each other because of the regime's orientation toward Socialism. The regime may have

¹¹³ Institutions that begged forgiveness from the President included al-Azhar and the Islamic university in Jeddah. Some individuals also appealed for leniency, including Ministers like Cusman Jaamac Kaluun and Cabdisalam Sheikh Xussein and Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Aadan Sheikh Cabdullahi and others. Maxamad Haji Axmad, the former Deputy Minister of the regime interviewed by the author on July 5, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. For the report on the refutation of the scholars' appeals for pardon, see Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 159.

¹¹⁴ The names of the 10 executed scholars are: Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Maxamad, Cali Xassan Warsame, Xassan Cisse Calbi, Sheikh Axmad Iimaan, Sheikh Muse Yusuf, Maxamad Siyaad Xirsi, Cali Jaamac Xirsi, Aadan Cali Xirsi, Suleimaan Jaamac Maxamad, and Yaasiin Cilmi Cawl. See Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 136.

¹¹⁵ Modernism departs from secularism in that it recognizes the importance of faith in public life. It also departs from Islamism in that it does accept most of the modern European institutions, social processes and values. Sometimes, its adherents stretch the meaning of the Qur'an and Sunna beyond their traditional limits. They draw conclusions and adopt laws that have no precedent in the Islamic Shari'a, and are considered anti-Islamic by the majority of scholars. Such phenomena are evident in the speech of the President at the stadium in which he concluded: "I hope that those who are listening to me now on the radio will guide those who do not understand anything or those who are ignorant about these principles. And to those who did not understand anything about the meaning of the Glorious Qur'an and those who are demeaning Islam in their wrong understanding" (Translated from Arabic by the author). Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 126.

¹¹⁶ There are 10 verses in the *Qur'an* that deal with inheritance. These are 2:180, 2: 240, 4:7-9, 4:19, 4:33, and 5:16-18. See Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 126-132.

miscalculated the implications of the new Family Law, as many secular laws earlier enacted by the state had not attracted any substantial reaction.¹¹⁷ Also, conceivably, Islamic scholars were not expecting such harsh treatment for clearly stating their Islamic position.¹¹⁸

In Somalia, the traditional family law is based on Shafi'i jurisprudence, akin in some respects to the traditional clan laws known as Xeer, which vary from place to place. Indeed, Islamic jurisprudence has the capacity to absorb some elements of Xeer, as long as they do not go against the general principles of Islam. Moreover, it is permissible for the various Islamic schools to borrow rules from one another. These two sources, the viewpoints of the various jurisprudence schools and local customs, could have been used as a guide in the reformation of the Family Law. Following such a roadmap, any new legislation could have been adopted as long as it did not contravene the explicit rules of the Qur'an and the authenticated Sunna of the Prophet. The new Family Law, under investigation here, however, directly contravenes the Qur'anic verses in some of its articles, and thus deviates from the accepted methodologies of Islamic Jurisprudence.¹¹⁹

The colonial administration, through imposing their legal systems on Somalia, nevertheless respected the local family law based on Islam. The British administration undertook the first codification of the traditional family law in 1928, by promulgating the Native's Betrothal and Marriage Ordinance, followed by the *Qadis'* Courts Ordinance in 1937. The latter was repealed in 1944 by the subordinate Courts Ordinance, which retained the jurisdiction of the Islamic jurists only in matters of personal law.¹²⁰ In Italian Somalia, the family law remained a local issue in accordance with selected Shafi'i jurisprudence. In accordance with the modernization theory, the post-colonial state of Somalia continued to adopt further policies and laws that curbed the role of traditional institutions, introducing a framework founded on state hegemony. As a result, Somali

¹¹⁷ One example of these laws is the abolition of the *diya* payment system by the military regime in 1970.

¹¹⁸ The Islamic methodology in correcting wrongs is made up of three steps: correction by action, by tongue and by heart. Most Somalis opted to deny the secular Family Law in their hearts, while scholars had chosen the second option of expressing their views by tongue.

¹¹⁹ Articles that contravene the *Qur'anic* verses, as analysed by Professor Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar, are: 4, 13, 31, 36, 158, 159, and 161. See Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 127-130.

¹²⁰ Mahmood Tahir, *Personal Law in Islamic Countries* (New Delhi: Academy of Law and Religion, 1987), 253.

women gained more power and benefits, including equality in citizenship, voting rights, equal opportunities in social services and jobs, and paid maternity leave.¹²¹ However, the family law remained unchanged, consistent with constitutional provisions.¹²² Family and property laws remained in the realm of the Shari'a.¹²³ Beyond this, the main "feminist" issues hotly debated in the Muslim world – such as the veil, seclusion, work, and education – were not an issue of public concern and debate in Somalia until the era of the military rule (1969-1990). Overall, Somali women enjoyed enormous freedom in comparison with many Muslim societies in the Arab world.

After consolidating power in the first five years, by 1974, the military regime had realized a number of important achievements. For example, in July 1974, Somalia signed a friendship agreement with the Soviet Union during an official visit of the Soviet leader to Mogadishu. This agreement and subsequent establishment of a naval Soviet base in Berbera annoyed conservative regimes in the region and, in particular, Saudi Arabia, which perceived the agreement as a national security threat.¹²⁴ Somalia also joined the Arab League in 1974, securing important political and economic support from the Arab world, a first step toward pushing Somalia out from the Soviet block.¹²⁵ Moreover, the annual summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was held in Mogadishu in 1974, with the Somali president becoming the chairman of the OAU and thereby boosting the image of the regime on the world stage.¹²⁶ Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution that was started in 1972 adopted the Latin script for the alphabet of the Somali language, finalizing debates on the appropriate script, Arabic or Latin, to the triumph of secular elites. The literacy campaign that began in July 1974 allowed more than 30,000 high school students and teachers, both male and female, to travel to rural areas to instruct the rural population in writing and reading in their own language.¹²⁷ On the other hand,

¹²¹ Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women's Political Participation during four Decades (1959-2000)," *African Renaissance* 4, no. 1 (2007): 34-54, 41.

¹²² See Article 50 of the Somali Constitution of 1960. Also, see Paolo Contini, *The Somali Republic: An Experiment in Legal Integration* (London: Frank Cass & Company, 1969), 58.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 35.

¹²⁴ Moḥamed Sharīf Moḥamūd, "*Faṣḥun fī al- 'Alāqāt al-Somāliyah al-Sa'ūdiyyah*", available from <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/analysis/8598> (accessed on April 21, 2010).

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*

¹²⁶ Lewis, *A History*, 227.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 216.

Somalis strengthened their connection with the Arab world as Somali migrant labor flocked to the Gulf States during the oil price boom of the 1970s. These migrant workers and students in the universities spread the new revivalist Islam that was gaining momentum in Somalia. This Islamic movement alarmed the regime, which was poised to implement the Marxist ideology. Moreover, a new challenge to the regime emerged in neighboring Ethiopia, where the Marxist revolution had triumphed in 1974. During this period, Ethiopia did not pose a military threat to Somalia, having been weakened during the revolution; however, it was competing with the Somali regime in soliciting Socialist countries' patronage in the Horn of Africa. This competition pushed the Somali regime to undertake more programs and reforms geared toward Marxism.

The idea of the new Family Law took shape when the United Nations adopted resolution 3010 on 18 December 1972, proclaiming 1975 as International Women's Year, calling on all member states to promote equality between men and women. The military regime offered new opportunities for Somali women to become more vocal and to participate in grassroots revolutionary programs. They became more visible in public, particularly in the Socialist Orientation Centers. They participated more actively in education programs and took up higher positions in public service. There were women of high rank among the officers in the army and the air force, and they took up positions as general managers, ambassadors, and director-generals. The military regime issued a number of laws designed to promote women, such as ensuring equal salary for equal jobs and providing for paid maternity leave. Moreover, by abolishing the *diya* payment system, the penalty for murdering a woman became the same as that for murdering a man.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the military regime had even established a women's mosque to show its commitment to the advancement of women in all aspects since they did not have their own prayer spaces in the traditional mosques in Somalia.¹²⁹ It was in the context of the Socialist program of the

¹²⁸ In the Somali traditional Xeer that accords to Islamic Jurisprudence, the *diya* of women is half that of men. However, there are emerging minority voices within Islamic jurisprudence that adhere to the equality of *diya* for all genders.

¹²⁹ This mosque was located near the Italian Club and National University City Center in Mogadishu. Sheikh Aadan Sheikh Cabdullahi, a well-known scholar who delivered Qur'an commentary on Radio Mogadishu, used to run women's Islamic teaching circles in the mosque. Sheikh Ciise Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author, July 20, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

military regime, which had matured and strengthened over the preceding five years and did not confine itself to Islamic boundaries, that the Family Law was introduced.

Establishment of the Family Law

The codification of the Family Law was initiated in 1972 by the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs, closely following the UN's proclamation on promoting gender equality. The available literature does not say much about the process of the codification; therefore, we must depend on an oral source. Nuurta Xaaji Xassan, a drafting commission member, related the history of the codification of the Family Law in an interview in Toronto, Canada, as follows:

Sheikh Cabdulqani, the Minister of Justice and Religious Affairs in 1971-73, was attempting to introduce codified Islamic family law in light of the Egyptian Family Code. Perhaps that was the reaction of the Minister to the increased awareness of women's issues in the United Nations General Assembly. The Minister provided me with copies of Egyptian family law that comply with the Islamic law to share them with the Somali women employed in the different ministries and to solicit their support. During this time, many of these women were stationed in the Halane Military Training Camp.¹³⁰ We selected a committee of five women and I was one of them.¹³¹

The selected group had been closely connected with the Italian Communist Party.¹³² These women received ardent support and encouragement from Dr. Maxamad Aaden Sheikh, Dr. Maxamad Weyrah, and Dr. Cabdisalam Sheikh Xussein – known leftists and

¹³⁰ Halane Camp is a military training school in Mogadishu that was used to train and inculcate civil servants of Socialist ideology.

¹³¹ Nuurta Xaaji Xassan interviewed by the author on October 15, 2007, Toronto, Canada. Nuurta was a member of the commission assigned to draft the Family Law and was a legal adviser to President Maxamad Siyaad Barre.

¹³² Italy reinstated its influence in Somalia after the establishment of the National University, funded by an Italian cooperation program, by adopting the Italian language as the language of instruction and Italian lecturers as the main faculty members. Most of the younger generations of Somalia were educated there. The members of the committee were Italian-speaking women who had graduated from the National University. See Poalo Tripodi, *The Colonial Legacy in Somalia: Rome and Mogadishu: from Colonial Administration to Operation Restore Hope* (London: Macmillan Press, 1999), 116-119.

cabinet members who were very close to the President. Later, the president appointed a seven-member commission in 1974 to draft the Family Law, directing them that it should be “progressive”. The commission submitted the draft to the president in December 1974.¹³³ Following this, the Family Law was publicly proclaimed by the president. The president publicly announced, “As of today, Somali men and women are equal. They have the same equality, the same rights and the same share of whatever is inherited from their parents.”¹³⁴ The president openly stated that the era of “one half, one third, one quarter” was gone forever.¹³⁵ Moreover, the president stressed that the new law would change the “unjust law of inheritance” ordained by the Qur’an that assigns different shares of the inherited wealth to the rightful heirs of men and women.¹³⁶ The Family Law consists of 173 articles and, according to Tahir Mahmood, “has the character of the dominant Shafi’i jurisprudence and adherence to the general principles of the Islamic law, however, on marriage, divorce and filiations, it had many commonalities with the amended Syrian Personal Code of 1975. On the issue of inheritance, the Somali Family Law had no equal in the Muslim world except Turkey.”¹³⁷ Although the Law contained a number of articles that went against accepted Islamic Shari’a law, the most provocative ones were the articles on inheritance. They offered “equal rights for men and women under the rules of inheritance; a drastic curtailment of the list of heirs, and application of new rules for the division of the estate of a deceased person.”¹³⁸

As a general procedure, the regime mobilized public support for the new Family Law by organizing demonstrations, where state employees and students were forced to demonstrate and listen to Vice-President Xussein Kulmiye Afrax’s speech at the

¹³³ The designated commission included Maxamad Sheikh Cusman (High Court), Cabdisalam Sheikh Xussein (Minister of Justice), Maxamad Aadan Sheikh (Minister of Information) and four women, namely, Nuurta Xaaji Xassan, Marian Xaaji Cilmi, Faduma Cumar Xaashi and Raaqiya Xaaji Ducaale.

¹³⁴ Maxamad Siyaad Barre, *My Country and My People: Selected Speeches of Jaalle Siyaad* (Ministry of Information and National Guidance, 1979), 3.

¹³⁵ See synopsis from the speech of the President at the stadium. Ali Sheikh Ahmed, *Judur al-Ma’sat*, 125.

¹³⁶ The law was not passed in the Council of Ministers and it was a unilateral decision of the President. This is the testimony of the former minister Cabdullahi Cosoble Siyaad interviewed by the author on July 12, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. Also, former Minister Jaamac Maxamad Qaalib interviewed by the author on December 26, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya. Moreover, the former Minister Cabdiqaasim Salaad (lately, the President of Somalia (2000-2004)) interviewed by author on November 13, 1999, Mogadishu, Somalia.

¹³⁷ Mahmood Tahir, *Personal Law*, 225.

¹³⁸ See Articles 158-169 of the Family Law. See Tahir, *Personal law*, 256.

Unknown Soldier's Square near the old parliament building in Mogadishu.¹³⁹ Even so, after five days public anger was expressed in the Cabdulqaadir Mosque in Mogadishu. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who was present that Friday in the Cabdulqaadir Mosque, narrates the events as follows:

After the Friday prayer in the famous Mosque of Cabdulqaadir, at about 1:00 pm, Sheikh Axmad Maxamad stood up and began to deliver his critical speech against the Family Law considering it “arrogant and a transgression of the borders of the Law of Allah that is unacceptable to the Somali Muslims.” Successive speeches by other Islamic scholars continued until the afternoon prayer at about 3:30 pm where as many as nine other Islamic scholars criticized the Law. Most of the people [who had] prayed in the mosque also remained listening enthusiastically. Moreover, many people gathered in the surrounding areas of the mosque in a show of support for the scholars. However, the event was perceived by the regime as an anti-state protest and a threat to the revolution. After the afternoon prayer (*salat al-Asr*), security forces encircled the mosque from all sides, cut off the electricity to silence the scholars, and arrested hundreds of people in the mosque. There were no violent confrontations with the security forces inside the mosque and the people dispersed angrily.¹⁴⁰

Indeed, the protestation of the Islamic scholars was a spontaneous expression of anger and frustration. The Friday sermon was delivered by Sheikh Abdulaziz from the al-Azhar Mission in Somalia, who explained the “rights and fallacies” in Islam.¹⁴¹ Analyses of the

¹³⁹ The Vice-President's speech at the state-sponsored demonstration is remembered for his use of the following expression: ‘*Yeere yerre yam, Yaxaas qaade Yam*’ (Whoever speaks up will be eaten. The crocodile will take him and eat him). This expression is used in children's games and means that any attempt to confront the family will meet the strong hand of the revolution. Nurta Hagi Hassan interviewed by the author on October, 15, 2007, Toronto, Canada.

¹⁴⁰ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare. Also, see Abubakar, *Judūr al-Ma'sāt*, 158.

¹⁴¹ Islamic scholars from al-Azhar University were engaged in Islamic activities in Somalia and taught in many schools. Sheikh Abdul-Aziz was ordered to leave Somalia within 24 hours after the incident. The first speaker after the prayer was Xaaji Cilmi known as Xaaji Dhagah who briefly expressed how the words of Sheikh Cabdul-Aziz were relevant to the Somali situation, most likely provoking the subsequent Islamic scholars' speeches. Sheikh Isse Sheikh Ahmed interviewed by the author, July 21, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

affiliations of these scholars demonstrate that most of these scholars belonged to the traditional jurists and Sufi orders. The initiator of the protest was Sheikh Axmad Sheikh Maxamad, a prominent jurist from the town of Ceynaba in northern Somalia, who came to Mogadishu at the invitation of Ismaciil Cali Abokor, a prominent member of the Revolutionary Council.¹⁴² Other scholars came to the Cabdulqaadir Mosque for the Friday prayer. Sheikh Axmad considered the law “a transgression of Allah’s law” and requested others to speak up in defense of Shari’a. Other scholars followed the same line in denouncing the Family Law. Most of these scholars were not part of the Islamic awakening that was then in its early development. Moreover, prominent scholars of the modern Islamic revival, such as Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, Sheikh Cabdulqani, and student activists belonging to Ahal were not among the these scholars.¹⁴³ On Saturday, the second day, after the noon prayer, other scholars delivered supporting speeches, and the demonstration proceeded to the Municipality Headquarters where many others were imprisoned.¹⁴⁴ The military regime’s use of such strong-arm tactics demonstrates that it perceived the peaceful protestation as a threat and a challenge to its authority and to Socialist ideology. Certainly, all forms of public protestation were prohibited, according to Law No. 54 on the national security enacted in 1970.

The Family Law and Execution of the Scholars

There are three main perspectives to explain why the regime adopted the Family Law and executed the scholars. The first thesis claims that these actions were foreign-assistance-driven and denies any ideological motivation; it was simply a theatrical show of the regime’s strength and a commitment to secular socialist ideology, competing with the new “Marxist Ethiopia” for assistance from socialist countries.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, Ethiopia had

¹⁴² See Abūbakar, *Judūr al-Ma’sāt*, 165.

¹⁴³ For example, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin did not attend Friday prayer in the mosque. He related to me in 1985 that “his students who were seemingly working with National Intelligence, Xassan Qaman, did not allow him to go out of his house”. On the other hand, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare prayed in the Mosque and he did not participate in delivering speeches. Moreover, none of the leaders of the student activists were evident there. All these facts indicate that the protest was not planned.

¹⁴⁴ Sheikh Ciise Sheikh Axmad narrated that he personally participated in the demonstration and was only saved from imprisonment by his Egyptian teacher Ibrahim al-Dasuuqi who met him accidentally and recommended that I have to leave.

¹⁴⁵ Maryan Carriif Qaassim, a prolific writer and a politician interviewed by the author on November 12, 2007, Djibouti.

adopted Socialist programs and attracted substantial assistance from the Socialist block in competing with Somalia. Siyad Barre, who was playing the role of key friend to the Socialist block in the Horn of Africa, was losing that monopoly. Therefore, he aimed to prove that he was a “more committed socialist in the Horn of Africa who deserved to be considered as such and to be provided with generous support by the socialist countries.”¹⁴⁶ The second thesis is founded on the dictatorial ambition of the Somali president. Some observers consider the Family Law event a purely pre-emptive strike on the emerging Islamic movement, perceived by the regime as one of the two “enemies of the Revolution,” the other one being clanism. The earlier execution of Generals Maxamad Caynanshe Guuleed and Salad Gabeyre Kediye and Colonel Cabdulqadir Dheel Cabdulle in 1972 was considered a blow to the centers of clan power in Somalia. Thus, according to the regime’s plan, it was the turn of the Islamists to be harshly suppressed in order to remove all potential obstacles thwarting revolutionary programs. The third thesis is that the motivation was ideological, assuming that the adoption of the Family Law and the crushing of Islamists was “part of the preparatory tasks to be accomplished before the formation of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in Somalia.”¹⁴⁷ This party, established in 1976 as the second phase of the revolution, was considered to be a pioneer and vanguard for the Socialist transformation of the society. In conclusion, the adoption of the Family Law and the crushing of its proponents were intended to accomplish all three perspectives.

Impact of the Family Law on the Islamic Awakening

With the crackdown on Islamists after the Family Law proclamation, most leading scholars were either imprisoned or fled the country to Saudi Arabia. The Islamic awakening, hitherto united in its ideology and leadership, was fragmented and the ideology of extremism emerged strongly. This was provoked by the harshness of the regime in dealing with Islamic scholars, the encouragement and support by the conservative Arab regimes of the Islamists, and their contact with the varieties of Islamic

¹⁴⁶ Cawad Axmad Casharo, a Member of Parliament and former director of the Ministry of Trade during the Siyaad Barre regime interviewed by the author on June, 30, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁴⁷ Cabduraxman Cabdulle Shuuke, former Minister of Education during the Siyaad Barre regime interviewed by the author on June 30, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

ideologies and activism that changed the Islamic landscape in Somalia. In August 1975, six months after the Family Law fiasco, 60 prominent, high-ranking officers were removed from their positions. Included in these were the leaders of the Islamic awakening: Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, and Sheikh Cabduqani. Both Sheikh Maxamad Macallin and Sheikh Cabdulaqni were imprisoned, while Sheikh Maxamad Geryare fled the country via Kenya to Saudi Arabia.¹⁴⁸ In addition to those imprisoned some of the activists of the Islamic awakening fled to Saudi Arabia and Sudan and began to regroup there. Importantly, this occurred during a time of booming economies and Islamic revivalism throughout the Arab Muslim world. This economic well-being and education offered the emerging Islamic movement the impetus to reorganize themselves again. Among those who succeeded to flee was the leader of Ahal, Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud. Also, students at Saudi universities who joined the MB in Sudan and Saudi Arabia were secretly working among new immigrants in Saudi Arabia, trying to recruit them into their underground organization. On the other hand, Ahal leader Cabdulqaadir was trying to regroup his members in Saudi Arabia. In spite of the different ideologies present in Saudi Arabia, he seemingly lost his leadership role, and a new period of searching for the reorganization of the Islamic awakening dawned.

On the other hand, the military regime was drifting further towards leftist ideology, established Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party (SSRP) in June, 1976 and embarked on militaristic course in which it was defeated in the war of 1977/78 with Ethiopia. As the regime moved further towards socialist ideology and formed the vanguard ruling party, it curtailed freedom and liberty and distanced itself from the nature of the society and its Islamic faith. The regime raised a new slogan based on the loyalty to the socialist ideology and its military dictator Maxamad Siyad Barre classifying its citizens into friends and enemies of the revolution. In this categorization, Islamic awakening was placed as one of the strategic threats to the socialist revolution. The emblem of the SSRP

¹⁴⁸ Sheikh Geryare said: "I received the news of my arrest from General Axmad Jilacow, who was high officer in National Security Service. Therefore, I have planned my escape route from Mogadishu via Kenya. I updated my passport and received Xajj Visa. At the 8:00 AM, I have moved from Mogadishu. The security service had arrived to my home at 10:00 AM looking for me to arrest." Sheikh Geryare interviewed by the author, May 5, 2005, Toronto, Canada.

and its symbolism indicates the enormous departure of the military regime from the symbolism of its first paper that symbolized the Qur'an (see p.170). Following logo of SSRP represents the second stage of the military regime and its attempts to transform Somali people into socialist society, the dream that collided with the resilience of the society and the war with Ethiopia (1977/78).




Figure 5. The Emblem of Somali Socialist Revolutionary Party

This emblem demonstrates the map of “Great Somalia” that includes Somali Republic and other three parties such as Djibouti, Western Somalia in Ethiopia and NFD in Kenya. It also shows hoe and hammer, the symbols of peasants and workers, the proletarians exploited by the bourgeoisie class according to the Marxist theory. This symbol attests the total shift of the military regime towards Marxist ideology, an anti-thesis to the Islamic and traditional society and its early symbolism that included the Qur'an.

As a consequence of the migration of the Islamic activists to Gulf States because of the suppression of the regime after the adoption of the family law and forced secularization of the society was the bifurcation of the Islamic awakening when the Islaax Movement announced itself publicly on July 11, 1978. This was three months after the retreat by the Somali army that was defeated in the war with Ethiopia.¹⁴⁹ Islaax proclaimed representing an ideological continuation of the Nahdah and elected Sheikh Maxamad Geryare as its leader.¹⁵⁰ The second move toward the Islamist fragmentation was undertaken by Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Maxamuud, the former leader of Ahal since 1969. He professed Takfiir ideology in Saudi Arabia and later traveled to Egypt in 1979 to bolster his relations with the Egyptian Takfiir organization. Upon his return, he succeeded in convincing prominent leaders of Ahal to adopt his new ideology of Takfiir.¹⁵¹ As a result, the Ahal organization ultimately ceased to exist. Other members of Ahal who were hesitant to join Al-Islaax and the Takfiir established a new organization called Jamaaca Islaamiyah (The Islamic Congregation). This organization combined former Ahal members who considered themselves as belonging to the MB and many graduates from the Saudi universities who claimed adhering to Salafism. Gradually, however, the Salafia tendency gained the upper hand and the organization took on the character of a neo-Salafia movement. This organization evolved in 1983 to Itixaad when Waxdah and Jamaaca Islaamiyah were unified. Therefore, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, three organizations based on three different Islamic persuasions had appeared in Somalia: Islaax, Takfiir and Itixaad.

Conclusion

The Islamic awakening was the culmination of the rising Islamic consciousness in Somalia and part of a wider awakening that was taking place in the Muslim world. It had gradually begun in the 1960s with the founding of the organizations Nahdah, Ahal, and Waxdah that were actively preaching the new ideas of the Islamic movement, in line with

¹⁴⁹ The Somali government ordered its forces to retreat from Ethiopia on March 9, 1978, and the last significant Somali unit left Ethiopia on March 15, 1978, marking a disastrous end of the war.

¹⁵⁰ Many of the former members of Nahdah were in prison and others were made aware of the reorganizing of the organization under a new name.

¹⁵¹ Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud interviewed by the author, April 10, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

the MB's methodology.¹⁵² Five factors played a pivotal role in strengthening the Islamic awakening in Somalia in the 1970s. The first factor is the role of Islamic scholars in spreading modern Islamic-movement concepts and ideas through public education programs and lectures. The second factor is the activities of student organizations of Ahal and Waxdah, especially their enthusiasm and outreach programs. The third factor is the influence of the MB literature brought to Somalia by Nahdah. The fourth factor is the encouragement by conservative Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia. The fifth factor is the proclamation of the Socialist ideology and adoption of the secular Family law by the military regime, which ignited enormous Islamic sentiment.

Finally, even though the proto-MB institutions of the Islamic awakening were short-lived, their Islamic call and impact were significant and lasting. Nahdah operated for only three years, although its members remained prominent in the Islamic activism for a long period. Ahal ceased to exist in 1977 after about eight years of active work, and its members were divided into different new Islamic organizations. Waxdah ceased to exist officially in 1983 when it was united with Jamaaca Islaamiyah and became part of Itixaad.¹⁵³ It is important, however, to characterize this period of the Islamic awakening as immature with an emotional attachment to the Islamic ideology. It was a period with very low organizational capacity, meager economic resources, and romantic approach to social and political realities. Next two chapters will focus on Islaax Movement as a case study of the MB persuasion in Somalia.

¹⁵² Sheikh Nuur Cali Colow (1918-1995) was a prominent scholar who relentlessly preached the ideas of Salafism in Somalia for more than 60 years (1935-1995). He graduated from the al-Azhar University in 1963 and returned to Somalia, establishing *Ihyā al-Sunna al-Muḥamadiyah* (the Revivification of the Sunna of Mohammedans) in 1967. He became Director of Religious Affairs in the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs. He was imprisoned twice from 1969-1970 and 1973-1976.

¹⁵³ This unification did not last long, and many members of Waxdah quit Itixaad and reorganized themselves. This group have made a great effort in working with SNM during the difficult period of the civil war. They have focused their work on the refugee camps and later influenced the Somaliland Constitution and flag. Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre interviewed by the author on August 14, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

Chapter Five

The Emergence of the Islaax Movement in Somalia:

The Formative Period (1978–1990)

In August 12, 2008, the Islaax Movement publicly announced the results of its five-year term election, in which the *Majlis al-Shūra* (Consultative Council) had chosen its fourth chairman, demonstrating its firm commitment to the tradition of internal democracy even in these tumultuous times in Somalia.¹ Islaax boasts continuous Islamic work since 1978 in clan-based society under the conditions of an oppressive state, civil wars, and statelessness.² It represents the International MB network in Somalia, the “loose coalition” of national autonomies in many Muslim countries.³ Thus, Islaax derives its goals, objectives, and strategies from the ideology of the MB founded by Ḥasan al-Bannā in Egypt in 1928. Moreover, it takes into consideration the specificity of Somali society, its statelessness, and conflictual circumstances.⁴ Accordingly, its programs and activities are locally driven and adaptable to the ever-changing situations of the different Somali regions. This chapter explores the historical development of the Islaax Movement from 1978 to 1990. It examines this movement in three stages. The first stage is the early period of the introduction of MB ideology to Somalia, its spread through local Arabic schools, and the provision of scholarships to Somali students in Arab countries. Moreover, this stage includes Somali students’ contacts with the MB in Egypt, Sudan and Saudi Arabia. This stage also includes the early role of a few MB members in the period of renewed Islamic consciousness (Chapter Three) and period of the Islamic awakening (Chapter Four). The second stage explores the establishment of the Islaax Movement, its

¹ The four chairmen of Islaax are Sheikh Maxamad Geryare (1978–1990), Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim (1990–1999), Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad (1999–2008), and Dr. Cali Baasha Cumar Roraaye (2008–2013). The membership of Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim was revoked after he joined the Islamic Courts Union in 2006. The communique on revoking his membership is available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan21-6-06.htm> (accessed June 7, 2010).

² The result of the election was published in the official Islaax website available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/Dorashada%20muraaqikii%204%20Exarakada%20Islaax.htm> (accessed May, 1, 2010).

³ Islaax joined the International MB in 1987. See Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa* (NIBR Report, 2009), 42. Also, Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author on March 12, 2010, Toronto, Canada. See also, Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, “The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood,” *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2, (March/April, 2007), 115.

⁴ Ibrahim Dasuqi Sheikh Maxamad interviewed by the author on May 28, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

nature, objectives, structure, and recruitment strategies. The third stage examines the programs of Islaax and its activities from 1978 to 1990 as it interacted with the Somali socio-political realities during the dictatorial regime. It depicts challenges, limitations, achievements, and major activities before the collapse of the state.

Introducing the Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia (1953–1978)

The history of MB points out that the first chapter of MB outside of Egypt was established in Djibouti in 1933.⁵ The legacy of this chapter as reported by Sheikh Cabdiraxman Bashiir is identifiable to a certain point.⁶ They included Aḥmed al-Saqāf, the former Djibouti chief judge, Saʿīd Ba-Makhram, the former Imam of the Hamudi Mosque,⁷ Sheikh Cusmaan Waceys, an activist for the liberation movement of Djibouti, Sheikh Haaruun, the teacher the nationalist Maxamuud Xarbi, and Sheikh Cafar.⁸ All these Islamic scholars were active and left lasting imprint in the history of Djibouti before its independence in 1977. However, there is no indication of extending their activities to other parts of the region such as Somalia even though it could not be ruled out such possibility. The Horn of African region inhabited by the Somali speaking people was not isolated from each other. The influx of MB outside of Egypt intensified since 1954 when the oppressive Nasserite regime of Egypt undertook brutal policy against them. Since then, many of its members fled Egypt and established chapters in other parts of the world.⁹ In particular, conservative Arab countries struggling against Arab nationalists led by Jamāl ʿAbdi-Nāssir, welcomed MB immigrants and gave them residence and employment. In the Somali context, this period coincides with the UN trusteeship period

⁵ See ʿAbdallah Aqīl, *Min I'lām al-Da'wa wa al-Harakah al-Islāmiyah al-Mu'āsirah* (Dār al-Tawzi' wa al-Nashr al-Islāmiyah, Qāhira: 2000), 380 quoted from *Jarīdat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*, 24/6/1933.

⁶ Sheikh Cabdiraxman Bashiir, the famous Djiboutian Islamic scholar, interviewed by the author on August 30, 2010, Djibouti.

⁷ Ba- Makhram died 1976 while giving Friday sermon in the mosque and was accused belonging to MB by the French authorities. Sheikh Cabdiraxman Bashiir related that the newspaper Reveille reported this accusation (I could find the copy of the newspaper but was related that it is kept by the family member of sheikh Ba-Makhram).

⁸ He graduated from al-Azhar University and used to carry Sayid Qutub's book "in the shade of the Qur'an". He travelled to Eritrea in 1970s and never returned back.

⁹ The Muslim Brotherhood member, *Maḥmūd Abd al-Latīf* was accused of assassinating ʿAbdi Nāssir on 26 October, 1954. As result, more than 700 were accused of high treason, and finally six members of the MB were executed and thousands became political prisoners. See P.J. Vatikiotis, *Egypt from Mohamed Ali to Sadat* (London: Butler & Tanner Ltd., 1980), 384.

administered by Italy in 1950s. It also covers the period of the growing Islamic consciousness and the emergence of the Islamic awakening, examined in the previous two chapters. This period could be classified into three segments. The first is the introduction of the MB ideas in Somalia through Egyptian teachers and literature. These ideas were concomitant with the Somali nationalist movement for independence and the promotion of Islamic and Arabic culture against growing westernization, secularization, and Christianization. The consequence of the promotion of Arabic/Islamic education and scholarships provided to the Somalis resulted in some students meeting the MB members and embracing their ideology. The second segment begins with the return of the first Somali scholars who embraced the MB ideology and established Nahdah, which played a pioneering role in the Islamic awakening. The third segment begins when students, influenced by the Islamic awakening, traveling abroad and establishing direct contacts with the MB in Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. These students later became the stamina for establishing an autonomous Somali MB organization- the Islaax Movement.

The First Footstep of the MB in Somalia

Although “in the pre-independence Somalia, several of the founders of Somali Youth League (SYL), an organization that spearheaded the Somali struggle for independence, had personal connection with the [Muslim] Brotherhood,” the MB entered Somalia in 1950s.¹⁰ Egyptian Islamic scholar *Sheikh Moḥamūd Iid*, dispatched to Somalia among the al-Azhar Mission teachers in 1953, was the first known MB member to initiate activities in Somalia. Sheikh Mohamud attempted to create a network of disciples and friends among the Somali leaders in Mogadishu. As he related, he started a special instruction circle to form the MB chapter in 1954; however, he was suspected by the colonial authority and Egyptian intelligence and expelled from Somalia as *persona non grata* in 1955.¹¹ There is strong belief that some Egyptian teachers were also members of the MB or were influenced by their ideology. Some of these teachers were quietly injecting the

¹⁰ Stig Hansen and Atle Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 38.

¹¹ *Sheikh Moḥamūd Iid* visited Somalia in July 1990 and participated the symposium organized by the Somali National University. He was highly enthusiastic to meet some Islaax members who were professors in the university and related his early attempts and challenges he faced during the 1950s. See Ḥassan Ḥāji Moḥamūd, *Tārīkh al- Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah: Durūf al-Nashi wa ‘awāmil al-tadawur*” (unpublished draft).

idea of the MB among their students recommending extra-curriculum readings of books somewhat related to that ideology. For instance, Sheikh Cabdullahi Cali Xayle relates that he was a student in the Egyptian High School in Mogadishu when *Jamal 'Abdi-Nāsser* died in 1970. “Students were shocked, distressed and mourned, however, I remember how one of the teachers approached me and said: ‘do not worry; ‘*Abdi-Nāsser* was very bad leader who killed many Muslims belonging to MB’.”¹² Mr. Xayle joined the MB later and recalls that story, thinking his teacher may have been a member of the MB. Moreover, Xussein Sheikh Axmad Kadare testifies that in the 1950s, he was very sympathetic to the Arabic language and the Egyptians and developed intimate relations with them. “One day,” he said, “I was invited to weekly Islamic education circle held in a house of one of the teachers. Participants were few selected members and it continued for few months.”¹³ He also believes that he was offered initial training to become a member of the MB.

Other interviewees believe that *Kamāl al-Addīn Sālah*, the Egyptian Ambassador to the UN Consultative Council, might have been an MB member. They deduce their speculations in tracing his biography during his six-year tenure as Egyptian envoy to Palestine. During these years, he developed intimate relations with *Al- Ḥājjī Amīn al-Ḥusseini*, the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and the leader of the MB.¹⁴ Hassan Xaaji Maxamuud, a Somali researcher, stipulates, “There is high probability of *Kamāl al-Addīn* being a member or at least influenced by the MB.”¹⁵ Furthermore, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare affirms the presence of the MB among the Egyptian teachers of the al-Azhar Mission in Somalia. He bases his testimony on his experiences of meeting Egyptian teachers working in Somalia while he was a student in Saudi Arabia in the 1960s, “They came for Hajj and participated in one of MB educational sessions. I remember the last

¹² Cabdullahi Cali Xayle is a former colonel, an Islamic scholar, and a member of the *Islaax* Movement. See the communique of Islaax on the Ethiopian Intervention on July 27, 2006, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan26-7-06.htm> (accessed on May 5, 2010). Also, Cabdullahi Cali Xayle interviewed by the author on August 5, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

¹³ *Kamal Addin Salah* was the Egyptian representative in UN Trusteeship Advisory Mission to Somalia. Xussein Sheikh Axmad “Kadare” interviewed by the author on July 11, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁴ ‘*Abdirahmān al-Bannā*, brother of *Ḥasan al-Bannā* was sent to Palestine to establish the MB in 1935. See Azmul Fahimi Karauzaman, “The Emergence of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine: Causes, activities and formation of Identity,” *Journal of Human Sciences* 44, no. 7, (January, 2010): 2.

¹⁵ Xassan Xaaji Maxamad interviewed by the author on April 30, 2010, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.

name of one of them was *Al-Mahdi*.¹⁶ Moreover, in 1967, Sheikh Geryare related that he met a teacher of the al-Azhar mission while carrying one of Sayid Qutub's books, *The Milestones*. He said, "The teacher was gazing at the book and asked if I am aware of the writer of the book, and I replied affirmatively. Then, he stared at me with concern and said: 'Cling [persevere]; you are in the right course'."¹⁷ All these testimonies demonstrate the likelihood of the presence of members of the MB among Egyptian teachers and their engagement in some form of Islamic activities.

Somalis on the Trail of the MB

With the increased cultural connections between Somalia and the Arab world in the 1950s and the growing Islamic consciousness, some Somali students in Egypt and Saudi Arabia joined the MB organization. The first known Somali member of the MB was Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad, who joined in 1956 while studying in the al-Azhar University, from which he graduated in 1957. The second person was Ambassador Cabdiraxman Faarax (Kabaweyne), who also graduated from al-Azhar University in the 1960s.¹⁸ The third person was Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who also joined the MB while studying at the Islamic University in Saudi Arabia in 1963. As Sheikh Geryare relates, *Sheikh Manna' al-Qaṭān* and Egyptian Professor *Maḥamad Sayid al-Wakīl* played crucial roles in his training and joining the MB.¹⁹ Sheikh Cabdulqani returned to Somalia in 1957 and worked as a lecturer at the Somali University Institute, later joining the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs. These three members began their activities by establishing the Nahdah and promoting, guiding, and strengthening the Islamic awakening through lecturing and providing the MB literature. The MB team was very careful to recruit new members for a variety of unclassified reasons. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare did not provide a detailed explanation and simply replied: "Even though we did

¹⁶ Note that Sheikh Maḥamed Al-Mahdi Maḥamūd was among six Islamic scholars from the al-Azhar Mission in 1953. Accordingly, two of the six al-Azhar expeditions to Somalia in 1953 were belonging to MB. See Hassan Makki. *Al-Siyāsāt al-Thaqāfiya fī al-Somāl al-Kabīr (1887-1986)* (Al-Markaz al-Islāmi li al-buhūth wa Nasri, 1990), 142.

¹⁷ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author on February 10, 2010, Toronto, Canada.

¹⁸ Cabdiraxman Faarah "Kabaweyne" was one of the founding members of Nahdah and became its secretary general. See the bylaw of Nahdah.

¹⁹ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

not focus on recruiting new members, we started our general Islamic activities in many ways and we propagated the idea of MB passionately.”²⁰ When Nahdah was banned in 1969, an Islamic awakening was gaining momentum and the ideology of the MB was penetrating strongly the younger generation. The confrontation between the regime and members of Nahdah led to many of the members being imprisoned. The conflict between Islamism and Socialism exacerbated and culminated in 1975 with the proclamation of the secular Family Law and the subsequent execution of Islamic scholars (see Chapter Four). During this period, young Somali Islamists were fleeing the country, seeking refuge, education, and employment in the rich Arab Gulf countries.

The Establishment of Somali MB Unit in Sudan

The third stage of establishing the Somali chapter of the MB occurred in Sudan. The MB had been active and public in Sudan since its formation in 1949. It emerged from Muslim student groups that began organizing in the universities during the 1940s, and educated elites remained its main support base. Somali students in Khartoum University were part of the MB student activism struggling against Communists. Somali students shared with the Sudanese Brotherhood in their opposition to a similar Socialist military regime in Somalia. According to Dr. Maxamad Yusuf, in the May of 1973, five students at the Khartoum University who officially joined the MB in Sudan founded the first chapter of the Somali MB. Among this early group, three became founding members of the Islaax Society.²¹ The other two were Abdirizaq Sheikh Ciise and Burhaan Cali Kulane.²²

Two of the founding members were Cali Sheikh Axmad and Maxamad Yusuf, who graduated in 1967 from the Institute of Islamic Solidarity funded by the World Islamic League. They were among the 10 top students offered scholarships to Saudi Arabia every year. However, the military regime nationalized all non-state schools and banned all

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Members who participated in the foundation of Islaax were Axmad-Rashid Xanafī, Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar, and Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman.

²² Cadirisaq Cisse lived in Kuwait and worked for the Ministry of Religious Endowment and Islamic Affairs. Burhaan Cali Kulane migrated to Europe and came back to Kenya. He worked with his father in the transport business and died in 2000. Awale Kulane, the brother of Burhaan, interviewed by the author through email, Beijing, China, March 10, 2010. Also see Moḥamed Yusuf, “*Min dikriyāt al- Ḥarakah*”, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/Tasiis1.htm> (accessed on June 19, 2010).

scholarships to Arab countries and Europe in 1973.²³ The regime also restricted citizens' travel abroad by denying them travel documents. These two students were dedicated and committed to complete their higher education and decided to travel to Saudi Arabia via Ethiopia and Sudan without travel documents. Having experienced many risks and difficulties on their long journey to Sudan, they finally reached Khartoum and were welcomed by Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, the third founding member, who was a student in the University of Khartoum. Ahmed Rashid narrates this story as follows:

When Cali Sheikh and Maxamad Yusuf arrived to Sudan, fortunately, they became my guests. Then, we contacted Sudanese MB, and after three months we were admitted in the organization. Subsequently, we started Islamic activities among Somali students and recruited other two members.²⁴ We pledged to establish MB Branch in Somalia under a tree at the university. When Cali Sheikh and Maxamad Yusuf were traveling to Saudi Arabia in 1973, I was assigned to take the responsibility in Sudan while they took the responsibility in Saudi Arabia. From 1974–76, I have succeeded to recruit other six persons and after graduating in 1976, I traveled also to Saudi Arabia to join my colleagues and seeking job opportunities.²⁵

Cali Sheikh Axmad and Maxamad Yusuf received travel documents from the sympathetic Somali Ambassador in Khartoum and traveled to Saudi Arabia in September 1973 to join the Islamic University in Medina.²⁶ In 1973-1974, there was a severe drought in Somalia, and the local economy sharply deteriorated. However, “there was demand for labor in the Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia as the oil boom took off. The lifting of certain restrictions by the Somali Government helped to facilitate migration.”²⁷ Within this migrant labor force, Islamist students fleeing from state repressions also arrived in Saudi Arabia and started to join the Islamic universities. The Saudi government facilitated the

²³ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author on June 5, 2009, Nairobi, Kenya.

²⁴ These two students were Burhaan Cali Kulane and Sheikh Cabdirisac Cisse.

²⁵ Axmad Rashiid Xanafi interviewed by the author on February 15, 2010, Ottawa, Canada.

²⁶ They were not allowed to receive Somali travel documents being considered renegades and in opposition to the regime. General Hoolif, the Somali Ambassador in Khartoum, had close relations to these students.

²⁷ UNDP, *UNDP Report on Somali Diaspora: Somalia's Missing Million: The Somali Diaspora and its role in Development*, (2009), 12.

admission of Somali students in its universities to confront the military Socialist regime and as part of its strategic policy to spread Salafism/Wahabism in Somalia. This policy was part of a general Saudi foreign policy under King Faysal, who allied with Islamist organizations, offered refuge for the oppressed activists, and provided thousands of scholarships to the Muslim communities around the world. In particular, Saudi Arabia was furious about the Somali military regime's execution of Islamic scholars in 1975, its Socialist ideology, and considerable Soviet presence in Somalia. It considered the Somali regime under Maxamad Siyad Barre as a threat to the Saudi national security.

Subsequently, Saudi Arabia was poised to do whatever it takes through persuasion and pressure to eliminate the Soviet presence in Somalia.²⁸ One element of the Saudi pressure was to support all opposition groups, Islamists, as well other oppositions to the regime, through variety of means.

In this favorable environment and context, Cali Sheikh and Maxamad Yusuf joined the Islamic University in Medina and were welcomed by the MB chapter at the university. The MB activities at the university were very much public and tolerated by the Saudi establishment. During this period, Saudi Arabia was rebuilding its high education institutions and employed hundreds of professors from Arab countries, such as Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Sudan. Many of these professors were renegade members of the MB, who coached and mentored MB student activities at the university. However, the task undertaken by the two Somali members of MB was tremendous, taking the responsibility of recruiting more members from the Somali community and students. Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad, describing their major activities from 1973 to 1977, stated,

During these four years, besides graduating from the university and continuing post-graduate program, our work was focused on recruiting more Somalis to the MB. We succeeded to recruit about 10 new members and we held other 11 students in the pre-recruitment programs. It was a volatile

²⁸ Moḥamed Sharīf, “*Faṣḥūn fī al-‘Alāqāt al-Somālīyah al-Sa‘ūdīyah*” available at: <http://arabic.alshahid.net/columnists/analysis/8598> (accessed on April 21, 2010).

period, which Salafia, Takfiir ideology and emerging clannish factions were competing [with] our efforts vehemently.²⁹

However, when they tried to recruit these 11 members, they revealed their affiliation to the Ahal organization.³⁰ Even though they were convinced to join MB, these students prudently recommended to wait for the arrival of their leader, Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Maxamuud, whom they expected to join them. Cabdulqaadir fled the country in 1976 and arrived in Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, after several meetings with Cali Sheikh Axmad and Maxamad Yusuf, he shut the door for further dialogue and, in all probability; had in mind a new plan for the future of Ahal organization.³¹ This plan was made public later and aimed at transforming Ahal into Takfiir. In that way, the Somali MB group's vision for creating unified Islamic organizations affiliated with the MB was dashed.³²

On the other hand, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who fled from the Somali regime, arrived in Saudi Arabia on January, 1, 1976 and was very well received. His warm welcome was part of the Saudi policy to confront the repressive regime in Mogadishu and an expression of particular sympathy they held for Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who was the first Somali graduate from the Islamic University in 1965. He was offered a respectable job in the *Dār al-Iftā* (Scientific Research and Religious Edicts), in the capacity of an “expert of the Islamic call in Africa.”³³ Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, who graduated in 1976 from the Khartoum University, also got a job with Saudi Airlines in Riyadh. Therefore, by 1976, four of the founding fathers of Islaax were well established in Saudi Arabia and began to explore the possibility of establishing the Somali MB organization. During this period, the early Ahal student organization was faltering since Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud had reoriented to the ideology of Takfiir and was preparing to introduce it to his

²⁹ Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar interviewed by the author on June 23, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

³⁰ On October 15, 1975, at a meeting held in the Red Sea Hotel in Jeddah, attended by Xussein Cali Diirshe, Cabdiraxman Axmad Nuur, and Axmad Cusmaan Dheel from Ahal and Cali Sheikh Axmad, Maxamad Yusuf, and Axmad Rashiid Xanafi from the MB group, affiliations of the two groups were openly acknowledged. Ibid.

³¹ Axmad Rashiid Hanafi interviewed by the author.

³² Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, explaining the perspective of the founding members of Islaax states, “When the three of us [Cali Sheikh, Maxamad Yusuf and Axmad Rashiid] affirming our pledge to establish MB in Sudan, our slogan was ‘*la Harakatāni fi al-Somāl*,’ which means ‘there should be no two MB organizations in Somalia.’” Axmad Rashiid Xanafi interviewed by the author.

³³ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

followers. On the other hand, some former members of Ahal, after joining Saudi universities, were attracted to the Salafia ideology, strongly promoted by the Saudi institutions. The general condition of the Somali Islamists in Saudi Arabia in the period of 1975-1978 could be characterized as living in the ideological ambivalence in which many of the students were driven mainly by opportunism.³⁴ With these ideological disorientations among Somali students, the MB members of Somali origin in Saudi Arabia were considering establishing the Somali MB organization.

The Establishment of Islaax Islamic Society in 1978

It took 50 years from the time MB was established in Egypt in 1928 and 25 years since the first footstep of MB in Somalia to think of establishing Somali MB. The Somali MB by the name of the Islaax Islamic Society was launched on July 11, 1978 in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.³⁵ The founding members were Sheikh Maxamad Axmad Nuur (Geryare),³⁶ Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar,³⁷ Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman,³⁸ Axmad Rashiid Sheikh Xanafi,³⁹ and Cabdallah Axmad Cabdallah.⁴⁰ In their founding meeting, the bylaw of the society was adopted and Sheikh Maxamad Geryare was elected to the position of the first chairman of Islaax.⁴¹ In 1978-1989, the organization was called the Islaax Islamic Society and in 1989, it adopted the name The Islamic Movement in Somalia. The change of the name from Islaax to the general name of Islamic Movement was intended to attract many Islamists and prominent personalities. However, the abrupt collapse of the state aborted

³⁴ Many students were moving from one Islamic organization to another driven by opportunism, such as getting scholarships and jobs with Islamic institutions, which were highly rewarding during these early years.

³⁵ This date coincides with the Muslim Calendar, Sha'ban 6, 1398 H. See Ḥassan Ḥāji Moḥmūd, *Tārīkh al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah* (unpublished manuscript).

³⁶ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare (1935–), graduated from Al-Imām University, Saudi Arabia, in 1965 and returned to Somalia. He became director of the Islamic Affairs in the Ministry of Religious Affairs. He also became the first chairman of Islaax (1978–1990).

³⁷ Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad (1951–), PhD from the Islamic University in 1984, Saudi Arabia. He became a professor in the King Saud University (1984–1994). He also became chairman of Islaax (1999– 2008). Currently, he is the president of the Mogadishu University.

³⁸ Dr. Mohamed Yusuf (1951–), PhD from the Islamic University, Saudi Arabia. Currently, works on the project of the Islamic Encyclopaedia, Kuwait.

³⁹ Sheikh Axmed Rashiid Hanafi (1952–), MA in African Studies from Ohio State University, lecturer at the Mogadishu University.

⁴⁰ Cabdallah Axmad Cabdallah (1953–), graduated from the Khartoum University in 1978 and lives in Washington, D.C.

⁴¹ See <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/history.htm> (accessed on May 22, 2010).

its major goals.⁴² Although the organization continued to use the general name for years, its popular name remained Islaax. The popular name of the organization took the catchy word of Islaax, derived from the Qur’anic word *Al-Islāḥ*, signifying that all its activities is founded on the profound meaning of that simple word.⁴³ This word carries various meanings, such as “reforming, betterment reconciling and correcting.”⁴⁴ Its logo, consisting of four elements, symbolizes this basic philosophy of the organization. It features the descending light illuminating an open book under which a handshake is depicted; this is surrounded by an oval frame of banana leaves joined at the bottom, with a ribbon on which “*in urīdu ila al-Islāḥ ma Astada ‘atu*” is written. This means, “I decide naught save reform as far as I can able.”⁴⁵



Figure 6. Logo of Islaax Movement

The descending light signifies revelation that, by falling on an open book, transforms into the divine guidance of the Qur’an. This symbolism demonstrates that the ultimate reference of Islaax is transcendental and universal. The handshake represents the strategy of Islaax, based on peacefulness, dialogue, reconciliation, and cooperation. This notion

⁴² Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar interviewed by the author.

⁴³ See the Qur’anic verse (11:88), which states “I decide naught save reform as far as I can able.”

⁴⁴ See the Glorious Qur’anic verse (11:88) and verses (49: 8–9).

⁴⁵ See the Glorious Qur’anic verse (11:88).

may reflect Islaax's attitude in the war-torn Somalia, which completely contravenes violent and extreme approaches in the name of primordial sentiment or those under the Islamic banner. Finally, the two oval-shaped banana leaves represent the theatre of Islaax's operation, Somalia, known for its abundant banana plantations.⁴⁶ The cosmology of Islaax's logo is "Peace, Qur'an, and Banana." It defied the famous Somali dictum "*Nabad iyo Caanno*" (Peace and Milk) or "the Gun, the Hand, the Helmet, and the Qur'an," which symbolized the first white paper of the 1969 military coup.⁴⁷ Besides the agreed-upon Islamic symbol of the Qur'an, the Islaax logo snubbed two elements well attributed in the traditional Somali society: milk and weapons, the symbols of nomadism and war in the Somali context. Instead, Islaax chose banana leaves and a handshake, the symbol of settlement and peacefulness.

Why was Islaax established at this particular time in Saudi Arabia? Did the Saudi authority encourage its creation? These questions are relevant since the first chairman of Islaax, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, was a high-profile figure working for the Saudi Islamic Institution of *Dar Al-Iftā*. They are also more pertinent in the light that the second chairman of Islaax (1990–1999), Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, expelled from the organization after leading the Islamic Union Court delegation to Khartoum in 2006, had criticized Islaax for "precipitation." He bluntly stated that "there were a general agreement among all Somali Islamists to establish a unified Islamic organization, but leaders of Islaax had precipitated."⁴⁸ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare was asked in what way Islaax precipitated, and offered the following comment on this issue:

⁴⁶ Somalia was the largest exporter of bananas in Africa, with 12,000 hectares under cultivation and employing more than 120,000 people. However, it was affected by the civil war, and bananas ceased to be exported, though the potential remains. See E. Baars and A. Reidiger, "*Building the Banana Chain in Somalia: Support for Agricultural Marketing Service and Access to Markets (SAMSAM) experience*", available from <http://www.new-ag.info/pdf/SAMSAM-report.pdf> (accessed on May 18, 2010).

⁴⁷ See the symbol of revolution issued on 21 October, 1969 in Cabdulaziz Cali Ibrahim "Xildhiban", *Taxanaha Taariikhda Somaaliya* (London: Xildhiban Publications, 2006), 40.

⁴⁸ See Moḥamad 'Umar Aḥmad, "Ḥiwār Da'wa ma'a al-doktor Moḥamed 'Ali Ibrāhīm" available from <http://www.somaliatoday.net/port/2010-01-04-21-22-23/349-2009-12-10-22-50-16.html> (accessed on May 13, 2010). Dr. Mohamed Ali was expelled from the Islaax Organization after leading a delegation of Islamic Union Court to Sudan, in which Islaax rejected to participate. See the communiqué of Islaax on that matter, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan21-6-06.htm> (accessed on June 10, 2009).

We have been evaluating the progress of our outreach activities to Ahal individuals since 1974 and we have finally come to the conclusion that any more postponement from our part will not yield any better result. Ahal students though were ardent in their Islamic commitment, had deficiency in the organizational culture. Most of them were self-educated and lacked basic Islamic knowledge and sufficient training. History confirmed our assumptions since most of the former Ahal members who claimed belonging to MB have followed Salafia theology and founded Itixaad.⁴⁹

Moreover, he testifies that the timing of announcing Islaax was the most appropriate. One must note that the Saudi authority, although was generally tolerant to the Islamic activities, was not behind and was not aware of the formation of Islaax. Cali Sheikh Axmad concurred with Sheikh Maxamad Geryare regarding the appropriateness of the timing and described the conditions under which Islaax was formed:

It was the era of the Cold War and strong confrontation with communist ideology in many Muslim countries. It was the era of economic boom in the Gulf States and building Saudi infrastructure in all sectors. It was the aftermath of 1973 war with Israel where Arab countries succeeded to regain some dignity and changed political equations in the Middle East. It was the time when many leaders of the Egyptian MB were released from the prison and Muslim student activism was very high in the universities. It was the golden decade of 1970s which MB organization was revived and reorganized. In the Somali context, it was three years after the execution of the Islamic scholars in 1975 and immediately after Somali regime's defeat in the war with Ethiopia in 1978. The aftermath of this defeat set off the emergence of oppositional organizations to dictatorial military regime. In this circumstance, Islaax represented the Islamic opposition to the regime and Islamic political agenda in this particular historical juncture.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

⁵⁰ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

Three main factors were considered in establishing Islaax at this particular time. The first was the readiness of the local environment for an effective organization because of the accumulative effect of the Islamic consciousness and awakening since the 1950s. The impact of 25 years of continuous Islamic work; proliferation of Arabic schools; contact with the Muslim world; confrontation with westernization, secularization, and Christianization; and the battle for the Somali language script, all paved the way for the formation of the Islaax Movement. Moreover, the formation of Nahdah, Ahal, and Waxdah, the prominence of the MB ideology, the confrontation with the military regime and its secularizing program that culminated the issue of the secular Family Law were highly provocative for the Islamic sentiment. This environment lacked an effective MB organization connected to the wider MB, carrying the vision of internationalism (*al-Alamiyah*) and locality (*al-Maḥaliyah*), which Islaax aimed to provide.

The second factor was the growing opposition to the military regime. This dissidence was in reaction to the accumulative social and political strain from the military regime's policies. In particular, the execution of Islamic scholars in 1975, the economic crisis, the establishment of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in 1976, and the defeat of the Somali army in the war with Ethiopia in 1977-78, all provoked multiple crises.⁵¹ Moreover, the economic boom in the Gulf region had enabled thousands of Somali labor migrants to work and study in Saudi Arabia. Most of these Somalis thus received an improved awareness of Islam and supported the opposition to the Socialist regime. The Somali political situation of 1978 was very similar to the political situation of 1969, when one-party regime was established and political grievances were not addressed but rather exacerbated. The army that had saved the state from falling apart in 1969 was now fragmented, and its command structure lost its independence and professionalism,

⁵¹ Relations between Somalia and the Soviet Union had deteriorated and Soviet experts were expelled from Somalia on November 13, 1977. This author was among the expelled Somali military officers from the USSR reciprocally. This point was also related by Tadesse who wrote that "the formation of radical Islamic movements in Somalia in 1978 was partially political reaction to an Ethiopian Military Victory." See Medhane Tadesse, *Al-Ittihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia: Religion, Clan, Money, and the Struggle for Supremacy over Somalia* (Addis Ababa: Meag Printing Enterprise, 2002), 20.

becoming an inseparable part of the ruling socialist party and the regime.⁵² That is why the second attempted coup d'état of April 9, 1978 was easily foiled, resulting in the execution of 18 army officers and the detention of hundreds more.⁵³ Some coup plot officers who succeeded in fleeing from Somalia began to form armed oppositions and received welcoming hand from Somalia's hostile neighbors, particularly Ethiopia.⁵⁴ The terrified regime adopted extreme security measures and indiscriminate incarcerations, and pitted "friendly clans" against "inimical clans" to the regime. Thus, the politics of clan polarization and factionalism had intensified in 1978 when the first armed faction was established.⁵⁵ Moreover, Islamic oppositions were growing and needed an effective organization that could mobilize the population against the regime by carrying an Islamic political agenda. Founders of *Islaax* aimed at that particular objective, justifying the formation of their organization at this particular time.

The third factor was global connected to the growing role of the worldwide Islamic movement in the 1970s. In particular, this growth had begun with the defeat of Arab nationalism in the war with Israel in 1967 and the release of the MB members from the prisons in the 1970s. Moreover, the changing ideological orientation of Egypt during the reign of *Anwar al-Sādāt* compelled *Sādāt* to enlist the help of the MB against leftist opposition groups. He also needed the support of the vibrant religious groups during national mobilization for the war of 1973, where the strong Islamic slogan "*Allāh Akbar*" was used. This suitable environment enabled the MB to reorganize themselves worldwide, benefit from the Gulf economic boom, and recruit into its ranks a large number of student activists in Egyptian universities. Moreover, many Islamic books were published and

⁵² The top command of National Army consisted of members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, appointed because of their political allegiance rather than their military professionalism. This also brings in the clan factor, where certain clans were considered friendly to the regime and others inimical.

⁵³ Most of these officers belonged to the Air Defence Third Brigade in Mogadishu. The author, though was not part of this coup, was suspected and detained for two weeks for being an officer attached to the Brigade for a short training assignment.

⁵⁴ During this period, both Somalia and Ethiopia were supporting each other's armed oppositions. Somalia was supporting current leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea, while the Ethiopian regime was supporting the Somali clan-based factions that toppled the Siyaad Barre regime; nevertheless, they failed to re-establish Somali nation-state.

⁵⁵ The Somali Salvation Front (SSF) was the first opposition party founded in Nairobi in 1978. However, it was merged with other parties to form the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in 1981 in Eden. These three organizations were the SSF, the Somali Workers Party (SWP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Somalia (DFLS).

widely distributed at that time. The 1970s was the golden decade of the MB and continued until *Sādāt* signed an agreement with Israel in 1979. On the other hand, when General Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq took over Pakistan in 1977, he initiated “a period [which had] witnessed the Islamization of laws, public policy, and popular culture, producing a unique case of systematic propagation of Islamism from above.”⁵⁶ Zia’s policies of Islamization sought to establish better relations with Arab states and cooperation with Islamic organizations. The two main Islamic organizations, the MB and *Jamā‘at al-Islāmi* of Pakistan, were networked and expanded their activities and spheres of influence around the globe. However, the golden decade of Islamic moderation has been withering with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979) and the subsequent *Jihaad*, the triumph of Iranian Revolution (1979), the Iran-Iraq war, the capturing of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by Juhaiman (1979), and the assassination of *Sādāt* (1981). In the 1980s and after, the entire Middle East region was boiling with armed conflict, with Islamic slogans being excessively employed.

The Nature of Islaax

Islaax is a moderate Islamic movement that operates in Somalia and within its Diaspora worldwide. It adopts a bottom-up reform process and pursues non-violent approaches. At the same time, inspired by the MB methodology, it has developed a special approach in dealing with stateless society in conflict.⁵⁷ Islaax’s moderate approach is derived from the methodological Islamic framework called *al-Wasadiyah* (moderation) in the Arabic language. Moderation means centrism or being middle of the road, center of the circle, balanced with no extremism. Moderation is a fundamental landmark of Islam. Sheikh *Yūsuf Al-Qardāwi* states, “Islamic texts call upon Muslims to exercise moderation and to reject and oppose all kinds of extremism: *ghuluw* (excessiveness), *tanaṭu'* (transgressing;

⁵⁶ Vali Nasr, “Military Rule, Islamism and Democracy in Pakistan,” *Middle East Journal* 58, no. 2 (2004): 95.

⁵⁷ This new approach was developed to deal with clan-based society in conflict. Details of this approach are presented in Chapter Six.

meticulous religiosity) and *tashdīd* (strictness; austerity)”.⁵⁸ Moreover, *Ḥassan al-Banna* describes such moderation,

Islam liberates the mind, urges contemplation of the universe, honors science and scientists, and welcomes all that is good and beneficial to mankind:
‘Wisdom is the lost property of the believer. Wherever he finds it, he is more deserving to it.’⁵⁹

Islaax is not merely a conventional political party in the strict sense of the word, neither is it simply a typical religious social organization limiting its work to standard Islamic and social activities. It is a comprehensive movement that combines all aspects of social and political activism. Its multiple activities are guided by and derived from the comprehensive understanding of Islam articulated by *Ḥassan al-Banna*, “Islam is a comprehensive system which deals with all spheres of life. It is a country and homeland or a government and a nation... And finally, it is true belief and correct worship.”⁶⁰ The various activities carried out within the spirit and Islamic morality include political activities, social programs, training and recruitment, the public propagation of Islam, civil society actions, etc. Islaax pursues the main Islamic mission of the MB founded on raising the awareness of “*al-Ummah al-wāḥidah*” (one nation) among Muslim communities, clans, and ethnic groups to enable the reformation of secular states into Islamic states. Therefore, all its activities are rooted in the conception of Islam within the bounds laid by *Ḥassan al-Banna* in the treatise of *Risālah al-Ta’ālim* (The Message of Teachings), where “The Twenty Guiding Principles of Understanding Islam” are presented.⁶¹ These twenty principles furnish fundamental guidelines and constitute the methodological framework for the common comprehension of Islam among the members of the MB. The twenty principles lumped together under the pillar of “understanding” are

⁵⁸ See the Qur’anic verse, “Thus have we made of you an Ummah justly balanced, that you might be witnesses over the nations and the Messenger a witness over yourselves” (2:143). Also, see Yusuf Al-Qardawi, “*Islamic Awakening between Rejection and Extremism*”, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/iabrae/chapter_1.htm (accessed on June 19, 2010).

⁵⁹ See Hassan al-Banna, “Twenty Principles”, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/index.htm#understanding (accessed on June 25, 2010).

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

placed first among the ten basic pillars of the MB covenant on which pledges of allegiance (*Bai 'a*) are offered. These ten pillars are: understanding, sincerity, action, *Jihād*, sacrifice, obedience, perseverance, resoluteness, brotherhood, and trust.⁶² Explaining these ten pillars is beyond our scope here, nevertheless, it should be understood that they constitute the common values and guiding principles of every member in the MB.

The Aims and Objectives of Islaax

The main goal of Islaax is to transform the Somali society and the state into a society and state that adopt Islam as its ultimate reference using evolutionary approach that offers enough consideration to the local and international environment.⁶³ The local environment includes cultural specificity, economic conditions, and the political state of affairs in Somalia. International environment consideration means to deal prudently with the globalized world and the international system, avoiding conflicts and promoting peace and cooperation. Islaax developed 12 objectives in its bylaw that shed light on its orientation and course of actions. The first article emphasizes the centrality of the individual compliance to Islam as an agent for the Islamization of the society. Therefore, this article targets the way of transforming individuals through training and specialized programs.

To instruct Muslim individual through comprehensive Islamic education in which spiritual, corporal, ideological, cultural, and political aspects complement each other. The right environment of collective and individual activism which helps the individual to reach the higher level in these aspects should be provided until complete Muslim personality is shaped.⁶⁴

Accordingly, the critical priority is the training of individuals to the level that enables them to undertake the mission of the Islamic propagation. Such individuals should “right

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ See Yusuf al-Qardawi, *Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, available from http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_Priorities/index.htm (accessed on August 17, 2010)

⁶⁴ See the by-law of Islaax, objective one.

up Islam in their heart, in order to right up in the society.”⁶⁵ These individuals, in accordance with the program, should strive to establish harmonious relations compliant with Islamic principles in their homes and with their relatives, neighbors, and friends.

The second objective of Islaax is articulated as follows: “To establish Islamic family, caring [for] its affairs and invigorating it to be the right foundation for the aspired Islamic society.”⁶⁶ Presumably, this process gradually creates a number of families and communities that conform to the Islamic principles. Undertaking sustained Islamic work in all communities, districts, regions, and public spaces throughout years creates, according to this methodology, public opinion and communities that are more committed to Islam and supportive to the program of establishing an Islamic state. Following this logic, “Forming Islamic society and preparing the right Islamic basis” is the third objective. In this way, social Islamic values improve, individual piety increases, and community solidarity and charities grow. Via these long-term processes of social transformation through continuous Islamic education, the majority of the society is expected to accept Islamic principles and support a party with an Islamic agenda.

The fourth objective is “To strive [to create] the Islamic state which practically implements Islamic Shari’a...” Of course, this long-term process of Islamization of the society does not work in a vacuum, and other ideologies compete. In particular, the post-colonial secular state blocked this peaceful means of societal transformation. The denial of freedom of association and ban on activism in Somalia during the era of the military regime bred extremism in the society, which also created obstacles for any peaceful transformation. In the Somali case, although after the collapse of the state, freedom was warranted, anarchy also prevailed and extremism exacerbated.

The fifth objective of Islaax, which is distinctive from Arabic-speaking countries, is based on the promotion of learning the Arabic language in Somalia, without which Islamic propagation is defective. Somalia is a member of the Arab League; nevertheless, its people speak their own Somali language. Traditionally, Somali children study the Arabic

⁶⁵ The individuals should be dedicated enough to be able to claim the slogan.

⁶⁶ See objective two of the bylaw of Islaax.

alphabet in their early childhood as part of their Islamic education program. Therefore, most Somalis know the Arabic language to a certain extent and have memorized parts of the Qur'an. Islaax focuses on the Arabic language as part of its drive for more Islamic education and to integrate the Somali society into the wider framework of Arab/Islamic societies. This objective is affirmed in the organization's bylaw that states:

To spread Islamic call and Arabic language considering that it is the language of the Qur'an and the only means to the right comprehension of the Book [Qur'an], Sunna [of the Prophet] and Islamic heritage.

The next objectives (6, 7, and 8) focus on the social development issues. Two objectives are intended to promote material development in the society and social services such as education, health, and poverty eradication through encouraging charities and solidarities and to advocate for the compliance with the Islamic values.⁶⁷ The third objective, which is the most striking and pioneering among Islamic movements and traditional societies, is the issue of women's rights and development. This objective relates the issue of women as follows: "To care for the women and to revive [their] effective role in the society within Islamic framework." What does the Islamic framework mean? There are diverse interpretations of the role of women in the society, and their rights, particularly their rights to political participation, are widely controversial. However, the position of Islaax is very clear in this point. Islaax openly advocates the advancement of the rights of women and strongly supports their social and political participation in community affairs.⁶⁸ Moreover, Islaax promotes women's education in all its social development programs. The effect of these policies were so resounding that Somali women now play important roles in politics and social life that were hitherto believed to be in the domain of men.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See Objectives 6 and 7 of the Islaax bylaw.

⁶⁸ Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women's Political Participation during four Decades (1959–2000)," *African Renaissance* 4, no. 1 (2007): 34-54.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

Two other objectives (10, 11) are intended to address societal ailments such as clanism and sectarianism and to implant the value of freedom and consultation (*Shura*) or democratic culture in the society. These points are affirmed as follows:

Article 7:10. To fight clanism, sectarianism and separatist tendencies, in order to melt artificial psychological barriers, and, to strive spreading the spirit of tolerance and brotherhood, intimacy, cooperation and solidarity among the people of the region.⁷⁰

Article 7:11. To deepen the right meaning of the Islamic concept of *Shura* and to recognize freedom as a human value incarnated in Allah's dignification of the human being. For that [*Islaax*] has to support general and individual freedom and human rights through establishment [relevant] political, economic and social institutions.⁷¹

Finally, the remaining two objectives (9, 12) are aimed to affirm the support for the right of people under colonial occupation to resistance (*Jihaad*) and solidarity among Muslims to liberate Muslim countries under a colonial yoke, such as Palestine under Israeli occupation. Moreover, *Islaax* also vows to support the rights of Muslim minorities and the just cause of all oppressed people across the world.

The Organizational Structure of Islaax

The structure of *Islaax* has evolved through years; however, its current form was adopted in 1992.⁷² It is based on autonomous zones akin to a federal system that enables *Islaax* members dispersed in large geographical areas to operate effectively. The role of the center is confined to the coordination and preservation of organizational unity. Thus, the basic governing bodies of *Islaax* consist of: (1) the chairman of *Islaax* and his deputies; (2) *Majlis al-Shūra* (Consultative Council; CC) and *Mu'tamar al-Iqlimi* (Zonal Congress; ZC); (3) *Maktab al-Tanfidi* (Executive Bureaus; EB), *Martab al-Tanfidi al-Iqlimi* (Zonal

⁷⁰ See Article 10 of the *Islaax* bylaw.

⁷¹ See Article 11 of the *Islaax* bylaw.

⁷² Ali Sheikh Ahmed Abubakar interviewed by the author.

Executive Bureau; ZEB); and (4) Judiciary and disciplinary committees (Central and Zonal).⁷³

The chairman of Islaax chairs both the EB and the CC and is assisted by two independently elected vice-chairmen. The term of the chairman is limited to two five-year terms which offers room for leadership renewal. The eligibility conditions of the candidate are: to be at least 40 years old, a member of the CC, and an effective member in the organization for at least 10 years. He must have an experience of managing higher offices of the organization at least for three years and should not have been accused of any serious fault that called for disciplinary action.⁷⁴




Figure 7. Organizational Structure of Islaax.

The CC and ZC are two cameras of the Consultative Council that are elected consecutively. The effective members of the organization elect the ZCs in each Zone.

⁷³ See Article 12 of the Islaax bylaw. Also, see the organizational structure in Fig (2).

⁷⁴ See Article 12 of the Islaax bylaw.

Effective membership is acquired after three years of being full member and being promoted to such position in the process of the routine standard evaluations.⁷⁵ The ZCs numbers change from zone to zone and most likely are proportional to the number of their members.⁷⁶ The CC, consisting of 26 members, is elected from among members of the ZCs by the ZC members of each zone separately. The allocated number of CC members for each zone is mainly proportional representation of the members of the organization in each zone. Besides elected members of the CC, the National Chairman appoints two other members and the CC approves them. Five other members of CC are the founding fathers of Islaax who hold permanent positions besides *ex-officio*. Therefore, there are total of 34 CC members. The CC is the highest authority in Islaax, and its members have to offer the following pledge:

I offer my pledge to Allah, the exalted and magnificent, to be the protector and truthful for the Islamic principles and pledge to safeguard the MB call committing [myself]to [abide]its laws and systems, implementing its decisions even if it differ from my personal opinion. Allah is the Disposer of my affairs.⁷⁷

The third governing body is the EB and ZEB. The EB begins with the election of the Zonal chairman and his two deputies by the ZC from among the Zonal representatives of the CC.⁷⁸ Then, the elected Zonal chairman forms the ZEB, which the ZC has to approve. The chairman of Islaax and two deputies are also elected by the CC. The new elected chairman offers the following oath:

I offer my pledge to Allah, the exalted and magnificent, to uphold the Book of Allah and Sunna of His Prophet, to be the protector and truthful for the methodology of the MB and their constitution, executing their decisions of the CC and EB even if it differ from my personal opinion, striving to realize the

⁷⁵ Cali Baasha Cumar, the chairman of Islaax, interviewed by the author on July 26, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ See the bylaw of Islaax.

⁷⁸ Cali Baasha Cumar interviewed by the author.

exalted goals of the movement for the best of my ability, and give my pledge on that. Allah is the Disposer of my affairs.

After this procedure, the chairman forms the EB, which mostly consists of the CC members.⁷⁹ The EB consists of directors of the main departments and Zonal chairmen. The number of the EB members is flexible, and the chairman of Islaax has the power to increase or decrease it as required. However, the main permanent departments are the department of Islamic propagation, the department of training and recruitment, the department of international relations and Diaspora chapters, the department of reconciliation and political activities, the department of finance, and Zonal chairmen. The national chairman also nominates these office holders, and each of them has to pass the vote of confidence by the CC. This procedure is waived from the Zonal chairmen who are directly elected by their ZCs.

The fourth component of the governing body of Islaax is the judiciary and disciplinary committees (JDC), which include the Central Judiciary and Disciplinary Committee (CJDC) and the Zonal Judiciary and Disciplinary Committee (ZJDC). The CJDC is similar to the Supreme and Constitutional Court. Its responsibility is to explain the constitution and bylaws and to deal with the disciplinary actions of the CC and the EB. It comprises five high-ranking members who have legal qualifications. Similarly, the ZJDCs are responsible to carry out similar functions in their respective zones.

Membership and Recruitment

In principle, membership in the Islaax Movement is gained only by invitation. In general, an individual should pass through three phases: identification phase, training and coaching phase, and recruitment phase.⁸⁰ The first process of searching for new members is done through general *Da'wa* programs. Islamic organizations are engaged in *Da'wa* in many public spaces, such as mosques, schools, and universities. Potential members are identified through Islamic activities in these places through socialization and are targeted

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Ibid.

for future recruitment. Initially, the recruiters become acquainted with and befriend for potential recruits through variety of means, such as relative networks, classmate connections, neighborhood relations, and so on. The best and easiest recruitment opportunity is to target relatives of members of the organization or their friends, since they are already familiar to the recruiters. Other individuals who have a high potential for recruitment are those belonging to the traditional religious families who had acquired Islamic knowledge and are more committed to Islam.

After proper identification, the second process is to place a person in a special training program, termed the *Usra maftūḥa* (open circle), with other aspirants. In this program, the aspirants are offered the basics of Islamic knowledge and the principles of the Islamic movement. They are gradually convinced of the necessity to work within the organization and to be committed to the cause of Islam, according to the MB methodology. During this training program, their commitment and activities are continuously evaluated through practical activities, such as being given some *Da'wa* responsibilities and requesting to pay monthly financial contributions. Article 9 of the Islaax Constitution delineates that a regular preparatory period of three years for the aspirants should pass before full membership can be acquired. Special exceptions may apply in some cases, and the program may be shortened or prolonged. The age of a person acquiring membership should not be less than 18 years.⁸¹

The third process to acquire full membership in Islaax requires a set of rigorous bureaucratic procedures. After ascertaining that a person has fulfilled all requirements through the evaluation of the recruitment committees at the zonal or regional levels, the individual or a group of graduants are called to take the pledge of allegiance. New members recite the following text of the allegiance in the Arabic language after an Islaax representative. The translated text of allegiance pledge as follows:

I give my pledge to Allah, the Exalted and the Magnificent, to uphold the Book of Allah and the Sunna of the Prophet (SAW) and to uphold the principles of the MB and obey their leaders in hardship and easiness, unless I

⁸¹ Ibid.

was ordered to commit sinful acts. In that case, there is no obedience and Allah is the witness of what I declare.⁸²

The ranks of membership develop along the following progression: *Nasīr* (aspirant), *Muntasib* (full member), *‘Āmil* (effective member), and *Naqīb* (representative member). Each level of membership has its own training programs, responsibilities, and duties. A person is elevated from one level to another through the process of annual evaluation, measuring the individual’s organizational commitment and his activities. The general basic measurement of the commitment is the attendance of the weekly training program, regular payment of the monthly contributions, and participation in the other designated activities. Membership is regulated in the Article 10 of the constitution, which states:

Every member has to pay monthly financial contribution or yearly in accordance with the financial system of the region. In addition, members may contribute for the expenses of *Da’wa* through donations and Trust Fund and others. Moreover, the *Da’wa* has parts of the Zakat of the members as recorded in the financial regulation.⁸³

The ranks in the organization are very important since they play a major role during election processes where certain ranks are qualified to elect and to be elected to certain positions in the organization.

Generally, Islaax recruits young and educated segments of the society to its ranks during their last years of the high school or in the universities. These young generations is energetic and open, and because of his education grasps the message of Islam easily and convey it to others.⁸⁴ This means that majority of its members is from young educated generations who through years become the intelligentsia of the society, growing in activism and internalizing organizational culture. Moreover, Islaax began recruiting women to its ranks as equals to men in 1992, responding to the increased role played by

⁸² See the bylaw of Islaax.

⁸³ See the bylaw of Islaax.

⁸⁴ History of Islam shows that the age of the Prophet Mohammad (PBH) was 40 years when he was sent as a messenger and all his early believers were younger than him, except his wife Khadija. Sheikh Axmad Xassan Al-Qutubi interviewed by the author on July 255, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

women in the Somali society. This was in breach of the general policies of most MB organizations in the Arab world that were hesitant to recruit women to their ranks. The MB in Sudan was one of the pioneering organizations in recruiting women as full members.⁸⁵ It seems Deputy Chairman Sheikh Axmad Xassan al-Qutubi (1991–1995), who was educated in Sudan, transferred the Sudanese influence on women's role to Islaax. Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmed, the CC approved in 1992 the policy of recruiting women as equals to Islaax. As a result, the first six women members joined Islaax in 1992 in Mogadishu. Mustafa Abdullahi “Dheeg,” who was assisting Sheikh Axmad Al-Qutubi in the women's recruitment, relates this event as follows:

It was really a new beginning for our female activists who though worked with us in the Islamic activities, did not had the privilege to be recruited as equal members. However, after Sheikh Axmad al-Qutubi became deputy chairman, he promoted the role of women and the first six female members took the alliance oath and joined the organization in 1992. By the year 2000, women's membership in Islaax reached about 10% in Mogadishu.⁸⁶

In conclusion, it seems that compounded policies, such as careful screening of the recruitments, continuous training programs, and gradualism in acquiring leadership positions were the main reasons for the resilience of Islaax in the torrent and tumultuous situations in Somalia. Moreover, it is noted that whenever these strict policies were overstepped, organizational vulnerability and internal troubles ensued.⁸⁷ Such internal problems occurred occasionally in the history of Islaax but never in the higher leadership ranks.⁸⁸

The Formative Period of Islaax (1978–1990)

After grasping the nature of Islaax, its objectives, structure, and membership processes, we will now turn to the way Islaax interacted with its socio-political environment from

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Mustafa Abdullahi “Dheeg” interviewed by the author on July 24, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ For instance all the founding members, three out of the four chairmen and eight out of nine of the vice-chairmen remain in the organization.

1978 to 1990. Islaax began its activities inside Somalia during this country's difficult decade of the 1980s. The first decision after the official formation of Islaax was whether to keep the organization underground or to make it public. Finally, the policy of being partially public and partially underground prevailed.⁸⁹ This policy meant announcing the formation of the organization and its chairman, while keeping the rest of operations confidential. Accordingly, the public proclamation of Islaax was conducted during Hajj processions by distributing leaflets to Somali pilgrims. The leaflet was titled with the Qur'anic verse, "*Hāda Bayānun li al-Nāss*" (this is a proclamation for the people).⁹⁰ Islaax was also publicized in 1981 in the Kuwaiti *al-Islāh Magazine*, where Sheikh Maxamad Geryare gave a lengthy interview explaining the nature of his organization, its policies, and opposition to the military regime in Somalia.⁹¹ Moreover, Sheikh Maxamad also offered interviews to a Kuwaiti radio, explaining the Somali plight under the repressive rule of the military regime.⁹²

Various Reactions to the Formation of Islaax

The launching of Islaax provoked strong reactions from various groups, such as secular opposition, various Islamic organizations, and the Somali government. Some of these reactions had significant consequences to Islamism in general and posed particular challenges to Islaax.

Reaction of the Secular Opposition

The opposition to the regime had been simmering for a long period but lacked an appropriate avenue for expression. In Somalia, the regime outlawed all dissidents and

⁸⁹ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

⁹⁰ The verse titled is "This is a proclamation for the people, and a guidance and enlightenment for the righteous" (3:138). More than 10,000 leaflets were distributed during the Hajj. Axmad Rashiid Xanafi interviewed by the author on February 5, 2010, Ottawa, Canada.

⁹¹ In his interview, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare strongly criticized the military regime in the execution of the Islamic scholars and the adoption of socialist ideology. He requested Arab countries to assist Somali refugees through other means and to stop assisting them through the regime because that fund was diverted and used to oppress Somali people. See Sheikh Moḥamed Geryare. "Al-Masūl al-Awal 'an Jamā al-Islāḥ al-Islāmiyah fi al-Somāl yataḥadathu ila al-Mujtama," *Majalat al-Islāḥ*, no. 524 (1981): 19-21.

⁹² Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

issued a law conferring death sentence to any organized opposition.⁹³ According to this law, in 1975, Islamic scholars were executed. The first attempt to form an opposition movement occurred in Kenya, where some former politicians who fled to Kenya and Saudi Arabia were attempting to create the first organization opposing the regime. For the organizers of the opposition, the escape of Sheikh Maxamad Geryare from the regime on November 18, 1975 and his established relations with the Saudi Kingdom were seen as an opportunity. Therefore, members of the opposition groups, namely Cusman Nuur Cali Qonof and Baashar Nuur Iley, approached Sheikh Maxamad Geryare in early 1976 and requested him to join them. Sheikh Maxamad, who was obsessed with opposing the regime by any means, accepted their request wholeheartedly. Sheikh Mohamed explains that “this decision was not an Islaax decision since it was not formed yet. It was personal judgment.”⁹⁴ The organizing committee of the opposition was later enlarged to be more representative of the wider Somali audience and included 12 prominent personalities.⁹⁵ The opposition group developed strategic plan geared toward overthrowing the regime. Ostensibly, some foreign countries that were concerned with the regime’s connection with the Soviets, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, supported the group.⁹⁶ However, the first internal conflict within the group arose when the discussion focused on the role of Islam in the future Somali state.⁹⁷ The group consisted of all shades of the ideological spectrum, such as secular socialists, traditionalists, liberals, and Islamists, and clearly, they disagreed on the role of Islam. Sheikh Maxamad says that “he was dismayed and suspicious of their efforts and his relations with some of the members have deteriorated sharply.” Even so, suddenly, the plan was foiled because of a leak to the Somali intelligence, and members of the oppositions lost trust in each other.⁹⁸

The failure in organizing the first opposition and behavior of the politicians offered good lessons and experience to Sheikh Maxamad Geryare. As a result, he was convinced that

⁹³ Law No. 54 of September 10, 1970 on national security.

⁹⁴ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

⁹⁵ The names of the group are: Cabdulqaadir dholo-dholo, Cali Kulane, Bashiir Nuur Iley, Xussein Abukar, Duqsi, Yusuf Dhuxul, Muse Islaan, Cabdi Gaawiide, Cusman Nuur Qonof, Xirsi Magan, and Maxamuud. Ibid.

⁹⁶ The Iranian/Saudi connection was related by a source who requested for anonymity.

⁹⁷ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare related that he told the group: “There are no differences between us and Siyaad Barre if we do not make Islam our ultimate reference. However, they were not ready for that.”

⁹⁸ Ibid.

Somali secular oppositions lacked common ideology and national vision and they carried the virus of the clannish mentality and personal interests. Therefore, along with the other founders of Islaax, he focused on Islamic work and pushed for the creation of effective Islamic opposition to the regime. On the other hand, some other members of the secular opposition “founded the Somali Democratic Action Front (SODAF) in Nairobi in 1976.”⁹⁹ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who became the first leader of the Islaax, was a well-known member of the opposition and a former friend, although disagreed with them on their philosophy, strategy, and approaches. Despite these disagreements, many prominent individuals in the opposition had high regard for him and counted on his support.¹⁰⁰ This predisposition was indicated when Islaax was invited to participate in the founding conference of the Somali Salvation Front (SSF) in 1979 in Addis Ababa.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, Islaax vehemently refused to participate under the pretext that it does not accept Ethiopia as the base to oppose the Somali regime. Moreover, it believed the desired change had to come from within Somalia, opposing any military option coached by Ethiopia.¹⁰² Despite all these differences, the secular opposition welcomed the formation of Islaax, with the advantage of widening opposition against the regime. In that context, Islamic opposition and secular opposition movements, though differed in approaches, were contributing to weakening the power of the regime in many ways. On the other hand, even though Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, the chairman of Islaax, had a personal rapprochement with the secular opposition, the method of armed struggle, clan-based organizations, and connections with Ethiopia had contravened Islaax’s method of reform. Because of that historical tie, Islaax’s relations with many leaders of the secular factions were not hostile, and both sides accepted their differences.

Reactions of the Islamic Groups

Former members of Ahal were highly distressed about the proclamation of Islaax. Their first reaction emanated from Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud, the former leader of Ahal.

⁹⁹ See Ahmed Samatar, *Socialist Somalia: Rhetoric and Reality* (London: Zed Press, 1988), 139.

¹⁰⁰ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

¹⁰¹ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare and Ahmed Rashid interviewed by the author.

¹⁰² Ibid.

who haphazardly announced Takfiir ideology, hitherto circulated secretly. His primary objective was to restrain his members from joining Islaax. Nonetheless, even though he succeeded in persuading most members of Ahal to follow the Takfiir line in the beginning, he gradually confronted stiff resistance.¹⁰³ Some members who repudiated the Takfiir ideology were mobilizing an ideological rebuttal using the same literature as the MB during their confrontation with similar phenomena in Egypt in the 1960s.¹⁰⁴ The anti-Takfiir group was also reorganizing remaining members of Ahal, including those who were confused with the surprising occurrences and undecidedly remained in the grey zone. However, the Takfiir group and remnants of Ahal perceived Islaax as a potentially competitive organization with experienced leaders. Thus, former members of Ahal in Saudi Arabia, who refrained from the Takfiir ideology, discussed the way forward. Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmad, a former member of Ahal who was present in this meeting, testifies as follows:

We have discussed how to react to the new situation where from one side Takfiir ideology is biting off and Islaax was announced. There were two options to be discussed. The first option was to join Islaax since it adheres to the MB ideology. The second option was to establish new organization. Most members agreed to establish new organization which supposedly unifies concepts of MB with Salafism. The new organization has to adopt Salafism in theology and MB organizational setting and training style. This program gives them hybrid system and more competitive advantage in recruiting students in the Saudi universities and attracts financial support from the Salafia institutions in the rich Gulf countries.¹⁰⁵

According to this line of thought, Jamaaca Islaamiyah was formed in 1979 to take the mantle of Ahal, adding the new component of the Salafia theology. The new leader of Jamaaca Islaamiyah aimed to unify all Islamic organizations, disregarding

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ The most important literature they used to confront the Takfiir ideology was Hassan al-Hudeibi's *Naḥmu du'ātun lā Qudāh* (Preachers, Not Judges), available from <http://www.torathikhwan.com/savebook.aspx?id=7> (accessed on 24 June, 2010).

¹⁰⁵ Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author on July 24, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

methodological differences (Ikhwan/Salafia). Subsequently, they approached Islaax to carry out the unification project with them. Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, one of the founding members of Islaax, relates that a delegation from Jamaaca Islaamiyah arrived in Riyadh in 1979 to meet with Islaax. They proposed to dissolve both organizations and to create new organization that unifies all Somali Islamists.¹⁰⁶ Islaax expressed uneasiness about such instantaneous merging and instead proposed the option of collaboration in the beginning and to explore its development further in the future.¹⁰⁷ There were many reasons for Islaax's firm position as Sheikh Geryare relates such as previous unpleasant experiences with the Ahal members in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, Islaax was not convinced the possibility of uniting Somali Islamists for just being Somalis without giving consideration of their Islamic persuasion. Furthermore, combining MB methodology with Salafism Wahabism seemed tricky and unrealistic. The delegation of the Jamaaca Islaamiyah consisted of Cabdulaziz Faarax and Cabdullahi Abtidoon.¹⁰⁸ The impact of the failure of this negotiation for the future relations between Islamic movements was devastating. Islaax was accused of rejecting the unity among Muslims enshrined by Islam and taking devious divisive course. Consequently, it lost some members including Sheikh Cali Warsame who became later the Chairman of Itixaad. Moreover, propaganda campaign was unleashed against Islaax in all fronts which had poisoned the whole atmosphere of the Islamic work.¹⁰⁹ On the other hand, Islaax also developed its counter-discourse and argumentations, which in due course also, exacerbated relations between Islamic organizations. After this occurrence, Jamaaca Islaamiyah undertook a dynamic program in the spirit of isolating and competing with Islaax and reached out to other Islamic organizations. For that reason, it had contacted Waxdah, headed during this time by Sheikh Cali Warsame who joined it after quitting Islaax in 1979. However, in a raw deal, Jamaaca Islaamiyah merged with Waxdah adopting the new name of Itixaad in 1983. However, this precipitate merging did not last long and succeeded only in dividing and

¹⁰⁶ Their delegation composed of Cabdulaziz Faarah, Cabdullahi Abtidoon, and Cabdulqaadir Gerweyne, and Sheikh Cali Warsame was a member of Islaax, but seemingly was convinced for the agenda of Jaamaaca Al-Islaamiyah. Axmad Rashiid Xanafi interviewed by the author.

¹⁰⁷ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

¹⁰⁸ Research Center of the International Horn University in Hargeysa, Sheikh Ali Warsame interviewed by Sheikh Almis Haji Yahye, March 15, 2010, Burco, Somaliland.

¹⁰⁹ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

weakening Waxdah.¹¹⁰ Yet, this merging was a setback for Islaax which was championing the MB ideology but failed to persuade Waxdah to join hands since 1979. As related by Maxamad Yusuf and confirmed by Sheikh Ismaciil Dheeg, the Islaax delegation, consisting of Maxamad Yusuf and Cabdalla Axmad Cabdalla traveled to Hargeysa and succeeded in cutting a deal with Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Jaamac, the leader of Waxdah, based on which Waxdah would join Islaax. However, this agreement did not see the light, and Cabdulqaadir concealed it from the leadership of Waxdah.¹¹¹ Moreover, because of the fluidity of Islamists, Itixaad succeeded in persuading some members of Islaax to join them such as Sheikh Cabdullahi Makki, and Sheikh Cabdullahi Cali Cumar.¹¹² The establishment of Itixaad in 1983 was encouraged and supported by the Sudanese Islamic Movement under the leadership of *Hassan al-Turābi*. In 1982, the Sudanese Islamic Movement broke from the International MB, and *Hassan al-Turābi* planned to establish a network of Islamic organizations linked to Sudan in Africa. Somalia was given priority in this plan, and the Sudanese Movement opened a special office in Mogadishu for that purpose under the guise of charity organization. The Sudanese envoy organized a number of meetings between different Islamic organizations, excluding Islaax under the pretext that its connection with the International MB was problematic.

Other Islamic groups' reactions came into light when Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, the famous Qur'anic exegesis teacher for the Islamic awakening, came out of the prison in 1982. Both Islaax and Jamaaca Islaamiyah made efforts to persuade Sheikh Maxamad Macallin to join their organization. At the same time, some former members of Ahal who stayed in the grey zone, confused by the competing groups of Islaax, Takfiir, and Jamaaca Islaamiyah, had been organizing themselves and waiting for Sheikh Maxamad to take a different course. Sheikh Maxamad Macallin was a well-respected scholar and the main teacher of almost all Islamists, in particular, former Ahal members. However, during his

¹¹⁰ Waxdah was divided into two camps after merging with Jamaaca al-Islaamiyah in 1983. One camp remained in Itixaad and others began to reorganize themselves and restore former Waxdah, adhering to the MB ideology. Refer to Research Center of the International Horn University. Sheikh Ismaciil Cabdi Hurre "Dheeg," interviewed by Sheikh Almis Xaaji Yahya, March 20, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

¹¹¹ Maxamad Yusuf interviewed by the author on March 16, 2010, Kuwait. Also, Ismael Dheeg interviewed by the author.

¹¹² Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud interviewed by the author.

prison term since 1976, a drastic change had occurred in the Islamist landscape in Somalia. For instance, many of his former students had joined Saudi universities and were converted to the Salafia doctrine. Being graduates of the Islamic universities, hundreds of them were sent to Somalia as Islamic preachers, sponsored by Saudi Islamic institutions.¹¹³ These preachers were given the task of spreading the Salafi theology in Somalia and were routinely evaluated on their achievements. Moreover, a large amount of Islamic literature selected to spread Salafism was brought into Somalia, and a standard library consisting of hundreds of reference books was distributed freely to the individuals and libraries of the country. Furthermore, many Somalis were persuaded to join the Salafia movement through the provision of scholarships to Saudi universities and the promise of jobs after their graduation.¹¹⁴ All the above-stated programs were used to promote Salafism in Somalia. In that context, some former students of Sheikh Maxamad, who were converted to the Salafia theology, debated with their former teacher and alleged that their former Sheikh belonged to the *Ash'arite* theology and the MB, which they considered devious from the right Salafi theology. Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud relates that, for instance, “Maxamad Cabdi Daahir, a former student of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin made a sermon in one of the mosques in Mogadishu and said: ‘The prominent Islamic scholar in Somalia Sheikh Maxamad Macallin does not know the whereabouts of Allah,’ citing controversial theological discourse between Ash’arites and Salafia theologies.”¹¹⁵

Islaax’s attempt to persuade Sheikh Maxamad Macallin to join their organization also failed. Some interviewees speculate that Islaax’s local capacity to attract Sheikh Maxamad was insufficient and may be frustrating.¹¹⁶ On the other hand, former members of Islaax who had quit earlier were dissuading Sheikh Maxamad from joining Islaax and

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Ḥassan Ḥāji Moḥamūd, “*Man al-Mas’ul an al-Tadaruf fi al-Somāl?*” Available from <http://www.somaliatoday.net/port/2010-01-04-21-40-35/2-2010-01-04-21-38-42/1216-2010-06-03-12-29-35.html> (accessed on June 18, 2010).

¹¹⁵ Xassan Xaaji interviewed by the author.

¹¹⁶ The local leader of Islaax was Sheikh Nuur Baaruud. Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, the spiritual teacher of the Islamic awakening, was not comfortable to give his allegiance to Sheikh Nuur Baaruud as some interviewees argued. They entertained that he might have done so with Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, the former boss and friend with similar credentials. For instance, Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud adheres to such argument.

were encouraging him to lead a new MB organization.¹¹⁷ Islaax's interest in Sheikh Maxamad was great and many attempts were made to organize a meeting between Sheikh Maxamad Macallin and Sheikh Maxamad Geryare in Saudi Arabia to strengthen Islaax's engagement with Sheikh Maxamad. However, Islaax's plan to gain Sheikh Maxamad Macallin did not happen as expected, leaving behind the severe consequences of divided adherents of the MB.¹¹⁸

Moreover, Salafia debates with Sheikh Maxamad created a strong reaction of protecting Sheikh Maxamad from the Itixaad and many of his rebellious former students. Initially, Sheikh Maxamad attempted to advise his students to stay outside of these organizations. However, when many of his former students who were either members of Islaax or Jamaaca Islaamiyah quit their organizations and established new organization named *al-Ikhwān al-Muslim*, he accepted to be their guide and mentor.¹¹⁹ Therefore, although the followers of Sheikh Maxamad were adhering to the general ideology of the MB, they constituted local organization competing with Islaax in Somalia. The new local organization of MB persuasion claimed that Sheikh Maxamad Macallin Xassan was the founder and guide “*murshid*” of MB in Somalia looking Islaax as illegitimate and unauthentic.¹²⁰ Therefore, Islaax met strong opposition from all Islamic organizations, which posed great challenges to its outreach programs and its activities. The project of isolating Islaax was supported by the Sudan Islamic Movement, which was competing with the international MB in the Horn of Africa and was coaching all other Somalia Islamic movements. Following table indicates the developments of the various Islamic organizations in Somalia from 1950 to 1990 and their persuasions.

¹¹⁷ Cumar Iman Abubakar, *Tajrubah al-Maḥākim al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl: al-Taḥdīyāt wa al-Injāzāt* (Al-Cairo: Dār al-fikr al-‘Arabi, 2008), 66.

¹¹⁸ Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud interviewed by the author.

¹¹⁹ Among those former members of Islaax were Sheikh Yusuf Cali Caynte, Sheikh Maxamad Rashaad, Maxamad Cawl, and others. Ibid.

¹²⁰ See Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace Building* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 57.

Name of the organization	Date	Nature	First leader	Remarks
<i>Al-Rābidah al-Islāmiyah</i>	1950	MB/Arabism	Sharif Maxamud Cabdiraxman	disbanded in 1969
<i>Munadamah al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah</i> (Nahdah)	1967	Proto-MB	Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad	disbanded in 1969
<i>Ahl al-Islām</i> (Ahal)	1969	Proto-MB	Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud	divided (<u>Takfiir</u> , <u>Jamaaca Islaamiyah</u>) in 1969
<i>Waḥdah al-Shabāb al-Islāmi</i> (Waxdah)	1969	Proto-MB	Prominent leader Cabdulqaadir Xaaji Jaamac	United with <u>Jamaaca Islaamiyah</u> in 1983 and founded Itixaad. Some of Waxdah members revived the organization in 1986.
<i>Jamā‘at al-Islāḥ al-Islāmiyah</i> (Islaax)	1978	International MB	Sheikh Maxamad Geryare	Continues functioning
<i>Al-Jamā‘at al-Islāmiyah</i> (Jamaaca Islaamiyah)	1979	MB/Salafia (combined)	Sheikh Maxamuud Ciise	Transformed into <u>Itixaad</u> in uniting <u>Waxdah</u> in 1983.
<i>Al-Itiḥād al-Islāmi</i> (Itixaad)	1983	Neo-Salafia	Sheikh Cali Warsame	Divided into many groups after 1992.
<i>Al-Ikhwān “Aala-Sheikh”</i>	1983	Local MB	Sheikh Maxamad Macallin	Transformed into <i>Tajamu‘ al-Islām</i> in 2001.

Table 4. The Islamic Organizations in Somalia (1950–1990)

By 1990, there were four Islamic organizations: Itixaad, Islaax, Waxdah and Ikhwan. Indeed, the Islamic awakening and its institutions were inclined to the MB methodology though lacked much of the organizational expertise until 1980. However, in the 1980s, Itixaad became the strongest Islamic organization in Somalia, and the Salafia ideology took prominence. The other three organizations adhering to the MB methodology were fragmented and competing each other because of many local and external factors.

The Reaction of the Somali Government

The military regime of Maxamad Siyaad Barre was weakening after its defeat in the war with Ethiopia in 1978 and the emergence of the armed Somali opposition movements. Distancing itself from the Soviets and seeking improved relations with the conservative Arab countries and the USA, the regime's iron fist was softened to a certain extent. Moreover, many migrant laborers had been working in the rich and oil booming Gulf States, which provided economic liberation and cultural influences.¹²¹ The regime was facing opposition from its old friends, such as southern Yemen and Libya, which were supporting the Ethiopian regime and the Somali armed opposition groups in Ethiopia.¹²² Therefore, in the early years of 1980s, the regime attempted to make rapprochement with Islaax through numerous messages and envoys sent by the regime to improve relations without making any tangible concessions. However, the Islaax leadership perceived these messages as tactical maneuvering aimed to abort mounting Islamic awakening.¹²³ While the regime was focusing on confronting secular armed clannish opposition groups, it discovered the threat of the Islamic movements was beyond proportion. In particular, the regime accused Islaax of links with armed opposition groups and of being connected to the international MB, identifying it as the major Islamist threat of the regime. In addition, Islaax were accused of influencing negatively regime's relations with the conservative Arab states.

However, perhaps the "hostility between Barre and its first leader" [of Islaax] Sheikh Maxamad Geryare and its earlier involvement "as political and high regime-critical organization" had caused exceptional hostility of the regime to Islaax.¹²⁴ By 1985, the regime had developed a strategy to obliterate Islaax by eliminating its founding members living in Saudi Arabia.¹²⁵ The basic assumption of this strategy was "to expel founding members of Islaax from Saudi Arabia, return them to Somalia in order to put them on trial

¹²¹ Somali labour migration to the rich Gulf countries was huge. It was estimated that "approximately more than 250,000 Somalis were migrated to the Arab peninsula." See David Laitin and Said Samatar, *Somalia: Nation in Search of a State* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 145.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Some of these messengers included Xassan Xaashi Fiqi, Cali Xaaji Yusuf, Cabdiraxman Cabdi Xusseini (Guulwade), and Maxamad Xaaji Yusuf. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

¹²⁴ See Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 40.

¹²⁵ All founding members were living in Saudi Arabia, either working or studying in the Saudi universities.

under the legislation that gives them death sentence.”¹²⁶ The Somali Ambassador in Kenya during that period and some Somali Islamic scholars in Kenya were assigned to implement this strategy.¹²⁷ These scholars signed a letter accusing the founders of Islaax of “belonging to MB, disdaining Salafism and some of them to be part of the opposition factions in Ethiopia and some of them being Nasserite stooges and being threat for the security of Saudi Arabia.”¹²⁸ This letter was widely circulated to the Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia, such as *Dār al-Iftā*, *Rābidah al-‘Ālam al-Islāmi*, and others. Subsequently, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare was summoned by *Sheikh Abdulazīz Inb al-Bāzz*, chairman of *Dār al-Iftā*, and was questioned about the issue. Sheikh Mohamed, who was hesitant to testify on this issue because of his respectful to his Sheikh, stated the following:

I have great respect for *Sheikh Inb al-Bāzz*, he was my former teacher. In reaction to the letter signed by Islamic scholars, he asked me about the letter and the accusations such as hating Salafism, belonging to MB since it was signed by six supposedly trustworthy Somali scholars. I simply replied that, I come here seeking the protection of Saudi Arabia from the oppressive regime of Somalia, and the regime is behind all these accusations. On the other hand, you know what I stand for since 1960 and asked what is wrong being a member of MB! In this frosty mood, he opted for silence.¹²⁹

Seemingly, Sheikh *Inb al-Bāzz* believed the contents of the letter and temporarily suspended Sheikh Maxamad Geryare from the job. However, with the mounting pressure on him, he was compelled to reverse his decision and Sheikh Maxamad returned to his job. Being cornered by the regime and its allied Somali Islamic scholars, the Islaax founders explored possible ways to defend themselves from looming threat. They decided to write a letter to the Saudi authorities explaining the conspiracy of the regime against them. This letter was submitted to the Saudis through the networks of colleagues who

¹²⁶ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

¹²⁷ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare abstained to tell their names. However, other sources told me that their leader was Sheikh Xassan Cabdiraxman living in Kenya.

¹²⁸ Axmed Rashiid Xanafi and Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

¹²⁹ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author.

were upset by the developing scenario. In the end, Islaax won the case and the attempted deportation of its leaders was blocked.¹³⁰ Nonetheless, after many years of continuing the work with strained relations and unwelcoming mood, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare voluntarily quit the job at *Dār al-Iftā* in 1985. The freedom of movement gained after quitting the job offered him flexibility and an opportunity to focus on rebuilding Islaax inside Somalia and in the Diaspora and strengthening Islaax's international networking through active participation in the international Islamic conferences and linking with other organizations.

Moreover, the Somali government, in cooperation with the Egyptian security, was focusing on countering emerging Islamic movements, with a special focus on Islaax. Accordingly, Somali intelligence personnel dealing with Islamic movements were trained in Egypt and were provided expertise on countering the MB. Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud, a member of Islaax detained by the Somali National Intelligence Service in 1985, was accused of belonging to the MB. He was carrying a pocket-size Qur'anic book, the only evidence shown in his interrogation. He related, "During my interrogation by the head of the section, the officer was suddenly summoned and left his office with open files. I succeeded to glance one of the files and have seen the list of all names of the prominent members belonging Islaax."¹³¹ Moreover, he said that whenever Islaax initiated any program in one of the mosques, it was discovered immediately and the program was disbanded. During the early 1980s, it was difficult for Islaax to establish successful public programs while the rival Itixaad was openly propagating in numerous centers in Mogadishu, and hundreds of people were gathering every night to listen to the Qur'anic exegesis and commentaries of the Prophet's biography in the major mosques in Mogadishu.¹³² Based on this, Islaax believes that it was targeted by the regime more than other organizations because of its linkage with the International MB.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

¹³¹ Xassan Xaaji Maxamad interviewed by the author.

¹³² Ibid.

Challenges, Limitations, Achievements, and Activities

The above four major areas will be explored and evaluated in tracing the performance of Islaax during the military regime in Somalia.

Major Challenges

As has been examined earlier, Islaax faced immense challenges from the rival Islamic organizations, secular opposition groups, and the Somali government. Nonetheless, the main objective challenge was emanating from the incongruity of the nature of the MB, as voluntary and hierarchical modern organization that demands high loyalty and individual activism, and the traditional society founded on loose primordial attachments and Sufi sheikh-disciple relations. This challenge was that the MB programs and the organization's literature are highly intellectual and written in the Arabic language, whereas most Somalis are not Arabic speakers. Education in the Arabic language was sidelined by the military regime after the adoption of the Somali language as the main language of education in 1972. Grasping the essence and ideology of the MB was founded on extensive reading of the basic sources of Islam, the Qur'an, and the Sunna, which requires extensive knowledge of the Arabic language. These were some pedagogical and cultural challenges that set hurdles to the grasping of the core message of the MB and adopting its organizational style. As a result, many individuals who joined Islaax in the early years quit after a while because of the difficulty of compliance with the requirements of the organization, which were distinct from the cultural traits of the society.¹³³ Furthermore, early efforts of Islaax to recruit prominent Islamic scholars, former friends of Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, and members of Nahdah, such as Sheikh Ibrahim Suuley, Sheikh Cali Xaaji Yusuf, Maxamad Xaaji Yusuf, and Sheikh Sharif Sharafow, did not bear significant accomplishment.¹³⁴ Recruiting such prominent scholars was not inline with the general policy of MB recruitment, which recommend avoiding the recruitment of notables and Public figures "*al-A 'yān wa al-kubarā*" in the society.¹³⁵ The rationale behind that policy

¹³³ Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud interviewed by the author.

¹³⁴ On early recruitment to Islaax see Moḥamed Yūsuf, "*Min ḍikriyāt al- Ḥarakah*", available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/Tasiis1.htm> (accessed on June 24, 2010).

¹³⁵ Fathi Yakun, *madā ya 'nī intimāi li al-Islām* (Bairut: Mu'asasat al-Risālah, 1977), 117.

is that they have already shaped their world view and are difficult to reform. As expected, these prominent Islamic scholars could not accommodate themselves in the modern organizations in which institutional culture is strong and educated enthusiastic youth are its moving engine. Therefore, their organizational loyalty was ephemeral and their membership came to an end. However, within these complicated circumstances, the Islaax leadership firmly adhered to the MB ideology and its organizational setting in the traditional society, despite complex organizational challenges.

Major Limitations

The major limitation of Islaax during the military regime was the absence of the founding fathers and its top leaders from Somalia. Additionally, this limitation was augmented by the early leadership weakness inside Somalia. For example, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, the first chairman of Islaax, being a prominent political activist who fled from the military regime, could not travel to Somalia. What is more, his reputation and the regime's obsessive fear of the MB had complicated Islamic activities of Islaax in Somalia.¹³⁶ In this intricate environment, Islaax developed a plan of action based on sending various expeditions of students to Somalia during the summer break from the universities. For instance, Maxamad Yusuf and Cabdallah Axmad Cabdallah were sent to Mogadishu and Hargeysa in 1979. However, Cabdallah Axmad Cabdallah was detained and imprisoned in Mogadishu. Moreover, Cali Sheikh Axmad was dispatched to Somalia in 1980 and was detained in Hargeysa. His second trip in 1982 was to Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya, and he was detained in Mandera, Kenya.¹³⁷ His detention was related to the Somali intelligence's influence on their Kenyan counterparts, which was very active in the border areas. He was accused of belonging to the MB; however, with the intervention of Somali local leaders, he was finally released.¹³⁸ After 1982, the Islaax leaders could not travel to Somalia and were dependent on sending other less qualified members to network organizational activities in Somalia.

¹³⁶ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

Moreover, the weakness of leadership inside Somalia was another contributing factor to the difficulties encountered by Islaax in the early formative years. The leader assigned to set up the organization inside Somalia was Sheikh Nuur Baaruud. Sheikh Nuur had physical and organizational limitations, as he was blind and was a traditional Islamic scholar without prior organizational skills. He was expected to lead the modern MB organization in highly security-sensitive circumstances. His critics narrate that his leadership style was dictatorial as he was obsessed with secrecy. His extreme obsession with security concerns diminished the role of the members of the CC and the EB.¹³⁹ Moreover, these critics believe that this leadership style handicapped the development and the growth of the organization during first seven years.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, the security precautions did not help much since Sheikh Nuur Baaruud was imprisoned among other Islamic activists in 1986. Narrating about their detention, Sheikh Cabdirisaq said:

In 1985, the government launched a campaign against Islamic activism and nine sheikhs were given death sentence in 1986. Included in these scholars two belonged to Islaax,¹⁴¹ three to Itixaad¹⁴² and four for the non-affiliated Salafia working for Saudi institutions as preachers.¹⁴³

These Islamic scholars were accused of engaging in subversive activities against the state, which was punishable by death. Moreover, they were accused of distorting religious doctrines of Islam and working for a foreign country. Nevertheless, they were pardoned and released in 1989 because of the intervention of Saudi Arabia, which was providing large economic assistance to Somalia. It seems that the Saudi/Somali relations have

¹³⁹ Hassan Hāji Moḥamūd, “*Tārikh al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah al-Somāliyah: Durūf al-Nashi wa ‘awāmil al-tadawur*” (Unpublished manuscript).

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Four members of the Islaax movement were imprisoned, and two of them received death sentence. These four members were Sheikh Nuur Baaruud (death sentence), Sheikh Maxamuud Faarah Hassan (death sentence), Sheikh Abdirisaq Xussein Cisse (15 years) and Sheikh Maxamad Habarwa (5 years).

¹⁴² Members of Itixaad were: Xassan Dahir Aweys (death sentence), Cabdullahi Cali Xaashi (released), Cabdulaziz Faarah Maxamad (death sentence), and Maxamad Sheikh Cusman Sidow (death sentence).

¹⁴³ Four scholars who were given death sentence are: Sheikh Xaashi Colhaye, Sheikh Yusuf Macallin Cabdi, Sheikh Shaafici Maxamad Axmad and Sheikh Aweys Maxamad Ibrahim. Nevertheless, they were pardoned and released in 1989 because of the intervention of Saudi Arabia, which was providing huge economic assistance to Somalia. Six of the imprisoned scholars were working for *Dār al-Iftā* as Islamic preachers. Sheikh Cabdirisaq Xussein Cisse interviewed by the author on April 3, 2010, Bossaso, Puntland.

improved after the expulsion of the Soviets from Somalia in 1977 and Somalia's forging an alliance with conservative Arab countries and the West.

Responding to his critics, Sheikh Nuur Baaruud testified and described the situation as follows:

My responsibility was to make sure the welfare and security of the members of Islaax who were working underground in very difficult conditions. This had necessitated me to undertake extreme security precautions. At times, I felt that founding members outside Somalia were pressuring me to do more, unconscious enough to the tough conditions we were working in. I still believe the way I run the organization during these formative period to be right irrespective of the critics.¹⁴⁴

Early Islamic activities of Islaax started in Mogadishu in 1980. Sheikh Cabdirisag Xussein Cisse, one of the early preachers in Mogadishu, narrates how they initiated *Da'wa* programs. He said:

We have started the first public *Da'wa* program in 1980 in Xaaji Muse Boqor Mosque in the Waaberi district of Mogadishu, where three of us: Sheikh Nuur Baaruud, Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Faarax, and myself propagated Islam publicly. This mosque was also the center of recruitment for Islaax. The second center was established in 1981 in the Madiina district, where Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmad, Sheikh Muhyiddin Cumar Jimcaale, and Sheikh Cabdullahi Azhari were very active. Moreover, in 1982, the first Islamic school was opened in Madiina, and Mustafa Abdullahi became its principal. Even with the excessive security precautions, Islaax was gradually strengthening its activities.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Sheikh Nuur Baruud, as related by Xassan Xaaji, interviewed by the author, May 15, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya

¹⁴⁵ Sheikh Cabdirisag Xussein Cisse interviewed by the author on April 3, 2010, Bossaso, Puntland.

The alleged internal leadership weakness was being alleviated since 1986 because of the gradual relaxation of the regime's security grip with the appointment of a reform-minded new leader with administrative experience. After the short interim leadership of Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Rashiid, a former pilot in the Somali air forces Cali Maxamad Ibrahim (Dayaar) was appointed as the deputy chairman of Islaax in 1987. The change of leadership brought new activism and high organizational discipline. During this period, new members were recruited from different sectors, in particular from officers' ranks and the educated elite. Moreover, during this period, Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi returned to Somalia after completing medical training in Italy and the US and joined Islaax en route to Somalia via Saudi Arabia. Upon his return, he started delivering groundbreaking lectures that combined science and Islam. His popular lectures attracted mostly university students and the educated elite. As a result, many members of the educated elite and university students joined Islaax in 1987–1990.¹⁴⁶ Moreover, the new policy of openness and expanded consultations created an effective working team of scholars such as Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Rashiid, Cali Maxamad Ibrahim (Dayaar), Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmad, Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi, Sheikh Xassan Maxamad (Okiyaallo), and others. In 1989, Sheikh Nuur Baaruud and Sheikh Maxamuud Faarax were released from prison by presidential pardon. Moreover, Sheikh Axmad Xassan al-Qutubi also returned Somalia. Sheikh Axmad al-Qutubi combined traditional Islamic and modern education. He completed his post-graduate studies in Sudan and worked for many years in Yemen. Thus, he acquired extensive experience in the Islamic work in Sudan and Yemen, and after joining Islaax's Somalia team in Mogadishu, he became one of the organization's prominent scholars and preachers. His sermons are remembered for his strong criticism of Salafism and his confrontational approach. He was considered a student of *Moḥamed al-Ghazāli* and *Yusuf al-Qardāwi* in Somalia in their critique of Salafist *Da'wa* approach.¹⁴⁷ With the return of these new educated scholars and the emergence of the new leader of

¹⁴⁶ The first group recruited were former colleagues of Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi, like Dr. Cali Baasha Cumar, the current chairman of Islaax, Dr. Maxamuud Zaahid, Engineer Abdulwahab and Engineer Ibrahim. Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author on May 28, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁴⁷ These two scholars are famous for their bold critique of Salafism as it was projected by the Wahabis in Saudi Arabia and copied by Itixaad in Somalia.

the Islaax with military background who was known for his team-building qualities, Islaax became more vibrant and competent inside Somalia by 1990.

Major achievements

Most of interviewees agree that the major achievements of Islaax in 1978–1990 were setting working MB organization under the repressive regime and safeguarding it from the tumultuous Islamic and political commotions of the late 1990s. Another achievement was qualifying to join the International MB networks. Having earlier examined challenges of setting Islaax inside Somalia, here we will only examine the process of Islaax's membership in the International MB. Islaax's full membership in the MB, as an equal partner with all other organizations from the Arab/Islamic world, was considered a major achievement. It offered recognition and a platform to link to each other, exchange ideas, discuss Strategic issues, and adopt common policies, and share information. Article 49 of the International MB regulates all requirements and conditions of the membership in this international organization.¹⁴⁸ The three main conditions are the joining organization must have a bylaw compliant of with general MB vision, objectives, and methodology to be approved by the EB of the International MB. The second condition is to adopt *Manhaj al-Tarbiyah* (training curriculum) of the MB and to implement its training programs. The third condition is to have prominence and activities in its country. This means that the organization must experience and a track record of compliance with MB ideology. “Islaax society went through the best process of joining MB.”¹⁴⁹ It started from individual memberships in the MB in different countries and at different times. Then, Islaax was formed with the knowledge and coaching of the International MB while gradually growing, and it was evaluated and qualified for membership after 11 years. As a result, it acquired full membership in the International MB in the CC meeting held in Nuremberg, Germany, in 1987. Sheikh Geryare describes the process of acquiring membership and its advantages to Islaax as follows:

¹⁴⁸ See the bylaw of the International Muslim Brotherhood, available from <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=58497&SecID=211> (accessed on June 20, 2010).

¹⁴⁹ Sheikh Mohamed Geryare interviewed by the author.

We applied for membership in the International MB in 1980. We met with its Deputy Guide Mustafa Mashhur in Kuwait in 1984 to push for the approval of the application of our membership.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, we have visited Cairo and met with the MB leaders in 1986.¹⁵¹ Finally, a committee was appointed to evaluate our programs, activities, and progress towards membership requirement. The final report was submitted to the International MB Executive Bureau in 1987 held in Nuremberg.¹⁵² I also submitted my report to the Executive Bureau; and finally, MB in Somalia in the name of Islaax Society was granted full membership.¹⁵³

Islaax's membership in the International MB offered a great moral boost to its members everywhere as it became the only legitimate MB recognized as such by other similar organizations worldwide. It was the first organization that acquired such membership in the sub-Saharan Africa after Sudan.¹⁵⁴ Islaax benefited from its International MB membership in many ways besides realizing its general vision for the Islamic unity. Operationally, it networked with many experienced organizations around the world and learned from their activism and experiences. Moreover, Islaax immensely enlarged its recruitment opportunities since many Somalis who joined the MB in the Diaspora had to join Islaax as their country organization. Furthermore, Islaax acquired access to the international Islamic platform, where it explained the Somali debacle and through which, it reached out to charity organizations run by the MB or their sympathizers to seek assistance to the Somalis under the repressive military regime.

Major activities

Besides the initial focus on the internal construction of the organization through intensive recruitment and international connections, Islaax interacted with the main events that took

¹⁵⁰ The delegation of Islaax consisted of Dr. Maxamad Yusuf and Sheikh Maxamad Geryare. Ibid.

¹⁵¹ The Islaax delegation consisted of Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, Sheikh Axmad Rashiid Xanafi, and Sheikh Maxamad Sheikh Rashiid. Ibid.

¹⁵² The delegation designated to evaluate Islaax included *Sheikh Abdalla 'Aqil and Sheikh Mana Al-Qatan*, the two scholars who had been coaching Islaax for years. Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid. Also, see Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 42.

place in Somalia. These include the humanitarian assistance in the debacle of 1988 in northern Somalia and activities prior to the collapse of the state, such as issuing the Islamic Manifesto and attempting to form a unified Islamic Front.

Humanitarian assistance in northern Somalia

One of the major milestones on the road to the collapse of the state in 1991 was the conflict in northern Somalia. As a consequence of the defeat of the Somali regime in 1978, armed opposition groups emerged. One such faction was the SNM formed in the United Kingdom in 1981. This movement expanded its activities in the 1980s in northern regions of Somalia, and the military regime used its draconian iron fist to suppress the group. On April 4, 1988, Somalia and Ethiopia signed a joint agreement, which included “ending subversive activities.”¹⁵⁵ The SNM, which developed an effective guerrilla army and strategy, “overrun the main cities like Hargeysa and Burco in Northern Somalia during 1988–9.”¹⁵⁶ When the SNM launched a major offensive in the northern Somalia in May 1988, the regime responded ruthlessly and indiscriminately. This caused the considerable loss of lives and properties and more than 500,000 civilians of the urban population fleeing to Ethiopia as refugees.¹⁵⁷ During this difficult time, Islaax undertook three steps. First, it issued a communiqué denouncing the “barbaric actions of the regime against civilian population” and calling for international and Islamic organizations to provide humanitarian assistance to the refugees and displaced population.¹⁵⁸ Second, it directed its members in the military not participate in this savage war. Subsequently, Axmad Xassan, an Islaax air force pilot, refused to throw bombs on Hargeysa and landed the military Jet plane on the coast of Djibouti putting his live in danger.¹⁵⁹ Third, Islaax formed a committee to mobilize humanitarian relief assistance to the refugee camps located near the Somali/Ethiopian border areas. The Islaax CC decided this undertaking,

¹⁵⁵ Hussein Adam, “Historical Notes on Islamic movement” (paper prepared for the International Somali Studies Association conference in Djibouti, December 2007), 12.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ There is no precise number of the refugees, but UNHCR registered 381,369 Somali refugees in Ethiopia in 1990. However, many of the displaced went to many directions, including living with relatives, to migrate abroad, and to Djibouti. Mark Bradbury. *Becoming Somaliland* (London: Progresso, 2008), 73.

¹⁵⁸ The Islaax Movement, Communiqué no. (1) on the Military Regime’s attack of Northern towns, June 28, 1988.

¹⁵⁹ Axmad Hassan interviewed by the author on July 16, 2002, Mogadishu, Somalia.

aiming to take active action in mobilizing humanitarian assistance to the people in Somali refugee camps. Dr. Maxamad Yusuf, one of the founders of Islaax who was working in Kuwait, was given the responsibility to carry out the operation. As he related, the Islaax committee contacted major charity organizations in Kuwait and other Gulf countries, raised their awareness about the debacle in northern Somalia, and mobilized emergency assistance. Moreover, another committee consisting of prominent personalities from the northern community in Kuwait was organized to receive such assistance on behalf of the people. Another committee, consisting of Islaax members and members of Waxdah, was organized in northern Somalia to take the responsibility of distributing the aid to the refugee camps in Ethiopia. Dr. Maxamad Yusuf related this event as follows:

When the disastrous event occurred in the northern Somalia in 1988, Islaax took the initiative of mobilizing assistance to the people in the refugee camps inside Ethiopia. I was assigned to lead the operation and we have contacted many charities in Kuwait to mobilize humanitarian assistance.¹⁶⁰ I have worked closely with Brother Cabdulqaadir Xaashi from the Northern Somalia.¹⁶¹ Our operation was very confidential and we have trusted few individuals like Sheikh Maxamad Xirsi, Cali Maxamad Faarax, Maxamad Axmad Maxamuud and Ibraahim Sheikh Axmad Cali. The amount of assistance received was about half a million dollars. Some members of Islaax and members of Waxdah were distributing this assistance in the refugee camps; in particular, Xaaji Abshir Axmad was highly instrumental.¹⁶²

The impact of this assistance was great, and Haji Abshir, a member of Waxdah who actively participated in the distribution of humanitarian efforts relates it as follows:

It was very difficult period in the refugee camps and people were suffering. Waxdah established Da'wa program among the people and we were trying to mobilize humanitarian assistance from abroad. One of the major assistance

¹⁶⁰ The three Kuwait institutions that provided this assistance were *Abu-badar*, *Bait al-Zakāt*, and *al-Hay'a al-Kheyriyah*. Maxamad Yusuf interviewed by the author.

¹⁶¹ Cabdulqaadir Xaashi is a well-known figure in Hargeysa. He is the owner of the famous Hotel Maasoor in Hargeysa.

¹⁶² Maxamad Yusuf interviewed by the author.

was received from Kuwait in the form of cash money since in-kind assistance was impossible to reach there. Somali regime blockaded the border area and guerilla wars continued. We used to receive this assistance through trusted individuals since any allegation of belonging to SNM guerilla bore immediate danger of lives. I was told later that this assistance was sent by Islaax and in particular, Dr. Maxamad Yusuf was the main figure coordinating this program.¹⁶³

The positive contribution of Islaax and its interaction with Waxdah during this crisis have created an environment of rapprochement, the fruits of which have produced closer relations and cooperation.

Islaax and its reaction to the Collapsing Regime

The project of Islamic Manifesto. By 1989, the regime was further provoking Islamic sentiments. One of the major events in this regard took place on July, 14, 1989 when prominent Islamic scholars were detained after the assassination of the Bishop Salvatore Colombo, the Vatican representative in Somalia. This event occurred after the Friday prayer when demonstrations were organized from the mosques in protest against the detention of leading Islamic scholars; however, the Red Berets of the regime (special presidential guards) fired on the demonstrations. It was officially reported that 30 people were killed and 70 injured.¹⁶⁴ On the second day, on July 15, the regime summarily detained and executed 47 people suspected to be members of the SNM because of their clan affiliation.¹⁶⁵ In 1990, the situation in Somalia deteriorated further, and the war between the armed opposition groups and the government was intensifying. There were many attempts to save Somalia from collapsing. One of these efforts was issuing the second Manifesto in October 1990. This Manifesto was released in response to the deteriorating situation in Somalia and as a reaction to the first Manifesto signed by the 114 prominent Somali elders on May 15, 1990. Organizers of the first Manifesto

¹⁶³ Xaaji Abshir Axmad interviewed by the author on April 15, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

¹⁶⁴ See Mohamed Mukhtar, *Historical Dictionary of Somalia* (African Historical Dictionary Series, 87. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2003), 128.

¹⁶⁵ For example, Engineer Isse who was in pre-recruitment process was very active in initiating demonstrations at Sheikh Cali Sufi Mosque. Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

expressed “that they no longer remain passive spectators nor ignore the duties and responsibilities that we owe to our people and the country, both Somali and Islamic point of view.”¹⁶⁶ This Manifesto was addressing the intensification of the war between armed opposition factions and the government forces. It dealt with the growing concerns of the worsening security conditions, violation of human rights, corruption and mismanagement, and economic failure. Moreover, this Manifesto proposed holding a national reconciliation conference and nominated a committee for that purpose consisting of 13 members, including former president and speaker of the parliament, prominent Islamic scholars, former politicians, and traditional elders.¹⁶⁷ The reaction of the government to the Manifesto Group was ruthless and brutal; it detained most of its signatories.¹⁶⁸ This Manifesto was an expression of the nationalist voice, even though some Islamic scholars were on the list of the signatories. Other personalities like Sheikh Cabdirashiid Sheikh Cali Suufi declined to sign in the pretext that it was short of the demands for the application of Shari’a.¹⁶⁹ Consequently, many Islamic groups were dismayed by the rationalization of the organizers of the first Manifesto, who claimed that if they put the demand for the application of Shari’a, they would jeopardize the assistance of the Western countries. Thus, the issue of demanding application of Shari’a has polarized peaceful opposition to the regime into secularists and Islamists; the latter considered the first Manifesto as only representing a secular viewpoint. Retrospectively, this rift should have been avoided through dialogue and setting short term agenda limited only to safeguard the collapsing state.

¹⁶⁶ Abdulaziz Ali Ibrahim “Xildhiban,” “The Manifesto,” *Taxanaha Taariikhda Soomaliya*, 101-107.

¹⁶⁷ Among these personalities were: Aadan Cabdulle Cusman, former president; Sheikh Mukhtaar Maxamad, former speaker of the parliament; Xaaji Muse Boqor, former minister; Dr. Ismaciil Jumcaale Cosoble, former minister; Dr. Maxamad Raajis, former MP; Maxamad Abshir Muse, former chief of the police; Dr. Maxamuud Sheikh Axmad, chief of the high court; Suldun Duulane Rafle, prominent elder; Cali Shido Cabdi, former deputy chairman of SYL; Garaad Cabdulqani Graad Jaamac, prominent elder; Jirde Xussein Ducaalle, businessman; Sheikh Ibrahim Suuley, Islamic scholar; and Sheikh Sharif Sharaflow, Islamic scholar. Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ The signatories were 114 persons, including the former President Aden Abdulle Osman, former speaker of the Parliament, Sheikh Mukhtaar, business leaders, Islamic scholars, intellectuals, and others. See “Xildhiban,” 101-112. The *Islaax* movement issued a communiqué denouncing the government for the detention of these prominent personalities. See The *Islaax* Movement. Communiqué No (4) issued on the detention of the Manifesto Group, June 12, 1990.

¹⁶⁹ See The *Islaax* Movement. Communiqué No (5) on Islamic Manifesto “Sawt al-Xaq”, October 1, 1990. Also see ‘Abdirahmān Ḥussein Samatar, *Sanawāt al-‘ijāf al-ūlā fī al-Somāl* (Madbat Hamar, 2000), 27-27.

In reaction to the above-stated reluctance of the organizers of the first Manifesto to accommodate the demand of the Islamic organizations and personalities, Islaax undertook a plan to prepare the second Islamic Manifesto. It was intended to mobilize Islamic organizations in taking common position against the growing danger of the civil war. This Manifesto was a comprehensive document describing the regime's policies undertaken to curb Islam and the consequences of these policies. It demonstrated 11 points, which the regime used to tear down the Islamic principles and values. The harshest among them, according to the Manifesto, was adopting and spreading Socialism in the Muslim society.¹⁷⁰ Moreover, the second Manifesto accused the regime of curbing Islamic activism while promoting Christian missionary activities, allowing the latter to operate freely and enabling them to convert many Somalis to their religion. This Manifesto also related the dictatorial nature of regime and emphasized the deterioration of the political and economic conditions, as well as educational and security sectors of the state. After these detailed descriptions of the awful conditions in the country were elaborated from an Islamic point of view, the Islamic Manifesto, called *Sawt al-Haq* (the voice of rightness), made a number demands. These demands were: (1) abstaining from the referendum on the new constitution prepared by the regime that was not Shari'a compliant; (2) Demanding the resignation of the president and the government, (3) ceasing the ongoing fighting, (4) holding a reconciliation conference, (5) adopting a new Islamic-compliant constitution, and (6) holding free and fair elections. This Manifesto was prepared by the Islaax committee consisting of four members and was signed by about 120 Islamic scholars and supporters of the Islamic agenda.¹⁷¹ It was widely distributed in public places and government offices. Interestingly, other Islamic organizations such as Itixaad and Ikhwan did not participate in signing this Manifesto demonstrating that cooperation was also missing in the Islamist camps.¹⁷² The reaction of the government to the Manifesto was quiet since former signatories of the first Manifesto were released from detention due to strong international pressure. Nevertheless, this Manifesto was an

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ The Islaax committee assigned to draft the Islamic Manifesto included Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi, engineer Cisse, Sheikh Axmad Xassan Al-Qutubi, and Dr. Cali Baasha Cumar, current chairman of Islaax. Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi interviewed by the author on May 28, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

¹⁷² See Islamic Manifesto.

indication of the growing political activities of Islaax before the collapse of the state and its aim of rising Islamic political voice in this critical historical juncture.

The Venture of the Islamic Front

The year 1990 is considered the golden year of Islaax, and its growing political role and activities were evident attracting more membership.¹⁷³ After issuing the Islamic Manifesto in October 1990, Islaax was encouraged to work toward establishing an Islamic Front, where most Islamic organizations would speak with one voice. This plan was presented in November 1990 in a meeting organized in the house of Adan Barando.¹⁷⁴ During this time, armed factions were closing on the regime. The Islaax participants submitted their proposal, in which they alerted the Islamic organizations to the fact that the regime was falling apart and the secular armed factions were taking over. Islaax proposed to the Islamic organizations to unify their efforts and come up with a unified program of saving the country. Specifically, Islaax criticized the regime and armed factions and proposed to establish an “Islamic front.” The proposal received an overwhelming support, and a committee consisting of 12 persons was formed to prepare the common Islamic agenda.¹⁷⁵ Seven secretaries from all the Islamic organizations were also appointed.¹⁷⁶ After an in-depth situational analysis and laying out the Islamic foundations and justifications, the final document proposed an Islamic solution. The proposal was identical with the Islamic Manifesto based on the necessity of overthrowing of the regime, forming a transitional Islamic government, convening a general

¹⁷³ Members of Islaax in Mogadishu were estimated at about 60 in 1986, and by 1991 they were about 300. However, there were many members in the Diaspora and in other regions of Somalia. See The Islaax Movement, *Comprehensive Internal Report*. This report was submitted to the leadership in Saudi Arabia, July, 13, 1991

¹⁷⁴ The Adan Barando meeting was organized by some individuals belonging to Itixaad who initiated reconciliation between their two clans with the tacit support of the government. Ibrahim Dasuqi interviewed by the author.

¹⁷⁵ Four members were independent: Sharif Cabdinur Sheikh Aadan (chairman of the committee), Sheikh Cabdirashiid Sheikh Cali Suufi, Sheikh Ibrahim Muse, and Engineer Maxamad Cali Daahir. Moreover, from Majmac: Sheikh Maxamad Macallin and Sheikh Ibrahim Suuley. From Tabliq: Sharif Sharafow. From Islaax: Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi Sheikh Mohamed. From Itixaad: Sheikh Cali Warsame, Cabdullahi Cali Xaashi, Cisse Soofe and Sheikh Maxamad Xaaji Yusuf. See The Islaax Movement, *Comprehensive Internal Report*.

¹⁷⁶ Three members were from Itixaad (Maxamad Daahir Aweys, Xusein Cabdulle (Codweyn) and Cabdulwaxid Xaashi). Three other members were from Islaax (Engineer Cisse Maxamuud Cali, Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmed, and Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi).

reconciliation conference, and preparing Islamic constitutions. This program seems ambitious and having high political ceiling beyond available capacity for the Islamic organizations.

However, discussions on the final versions of the communiqués were long, and some members withdrew from the meeting defending the regime, while others were highly supportive to the armed factions.¹⁷⁷ The clan factor among Islamists had shown its teeth, and immense challenges were faced from the collapsing regime and the armed factions in taking a unified position. However, while these Islamic scholars were discussing trivial matters and could not agree on any substantive common action, the first gunfire of the civil war was heard in Mogadishu. At that historical moment, Engineer Cisse from the Islaax, disgusted with the Islamic scholars' indecisiveness, said, "This gun fire had responded to all of you," and the meeting of the Islamists was disbanded forever.¹⁷⁸ The concept of creating a unified Islamic Front dissipated indicating the immaturity of the Islamic organizations in Somalia during this period.

Major Events	Date	Remarks
The arrival of Sheikh Moḥamūd ʿīd in Mogadishu	1953	Sheikh Moḥamūd ʿīd was among al-Azhar Islamic scholars dispatched to Somalia in 1953. He was expelled from Somalia due to his Islamic activities in 1955.
The membership of Sheikh Cabdulqani Sheikh Axmad in MB in Egypt	1957	Sheikh Cabdulqani returned to Somalia, taught in the Somali University Institute, and became a member of the Supreme Court and a Minister in 1970s.
Founding of Munadamat al-Nahdah al-Islāmiyah in Mogadishu	1967	The three members of the MB in Somalia along with others founded this organization. These are Sheikh Cabdulqani, the chairman, Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, the deputy chairman, and Sheikh Cabdiraxman Kabaweyne, the secretary general.
Somali students joined	1973	Three of the founding members of <u>Islaax</u> joined the

¹⁷⁷ The Islaax Movement, *Comprehensive Internal Report*.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

the MB in Sudan		MB in Sudan. These are Cali Sheikh Axmad, Maxamad Yusuf Cabdiraxman, and Axmad Rashiid Xanafi.
The establishment of the <u>Islaax</u> Society in Saudi Arabia	1978	Five members who have been members of the MB established <u>Islaax</u> after the defeat of the Somali army in the war with Ethiopia in 1978.
<u>Islaax</u> joins International MB	1987	After 11 year of operation, <u>Islaax</u> was granted membership after meeting the requirements in a meeting held in Nuremberg, Germany.
Issuing Islamic Manifesto (<i>Sawt al-Haq</i>)	October, 1990	This Manifesto aimed to unify Islamic organizations and to propose an Islamic solution to the Somali conflict. It was signed by 120 scholars.
The Project of an Islamic Front	November 1990	<u>Islaax</u> proposed to all Islamic organizations and prominent Islamic scholars to create a unified Islamic Front to deal with the worsening situation in Somalia. However, the project did not take off and the war began in Mogadishu while Islamists debating on the proposal without reaching any agreement

Table 5. The Chronicle of Muslim Brotherhood in Somalia (1954–1990)

Conclusion

Even though the ideas of the MB, to which Islaax belongs, reached Somalia in the 1953, the establishment of an effective MB organization took a long process of gestation and faced many challenges. The early institutions of the Islamic awakening such as Nahdah, Waxdah, and Ahal succeeded in propagating the ideas of the MB and confronting the secular Socialist military regime. Nevertheless, these organizations were disbanded, fragmented, and radicalized because of the inherent organizational weakness in the traditional societies. The first step of establishing an effective MB organization began in Sudan when the first group of Islaax founders joined the MB's student activists. Since then, Somali MB members gradually acquired experiences of the MB and recruited many students. Efforts to establish a unified Islamic organization under the auspices of the MB

were unsuccessful. Therefore, the founding members of Islaax took a decision to form the Islaax Society in 1978.

The reaction to the establishment of Islaax was severe from the Islamist organizations and the government, though less problematic with the secular factions. Many former Ahal members did not acknowledge Islaax as the representative of the MB in Somalia and established a competing organization, Jamaaca Islaamiyah. This organization absorbed many students in the Saudi universities, influenced by the Salafia ideology, and united with Waxdah establishing Itixaad in 1983. Another organization, called Ikhwan, was established after the release of Sheikh Maxamad Macallin from prison in 1982; it became another challenge for Islaax. As evident, many leading individuals of the Islamic movements were quitting one organization and joining another, and as a result, these members blocked cooperation between these organizations. Moreover, the disagreement between the Sudanese Islamic Movement and the Egyptian-led International MB was another factor that contributed to the competition and conflict between the Somali Islamic organizations.

The Somali government's intelligence service, trained in Egypt, was focused on fighting the MB. They believed that the biggest Islamist threat was emanating from Islaax. The regime's strategy to uproot Islaax from Saudi Arabia was foiled; however, its repressive measures were frightening and containing Islaax's activities in Somalia. The reaction of the armed factions to the establishment of Islaax was positive as this organization was considered one more voice of opposition contributing to the toppling of the regime. Their relations and connections with Islaax were mostly friendly, and they even tried to invite Islaax to the conferences and absorb it within their ranks. Nevertheless, Islaax kept its independent role and friendly relations with these factions.

The major limitations of Islaax until 1990 were the absence of the founding leaders, a weakness of leadership obsessed with security in the first seven years, and strong competition from other Islamic organizations. The main achievements were adhering to its ideology in a volatile and turbulent society and gaining membership to the International MB. Moreover, major public activities were the issuance of the Islamic

Manifesto, the procurement of humanitarian assistance in the northern debacle, and the attempt to form an Islamic Front.

In the final remarks, the formative period of Islaax was hard and demanding. The early organizational weaknesses were evident, but throughout time, Islaax was improving and sharpening its programs. Its relations with other Islamic organizations were strained, and the regime focused on its eradication. “Islaax does not have tumultuous history” and “it is best to understand the development of Islaax as one of slow evolution.”¹⁷⁹ This tendency of evolution will be examined in the next chapter, which looks at Islaax’s role during the first 10 years of the civil war (1991-2000).

¹⁷⁹ Andre Le Sage, *Somalia and the war on terrorism: Political Islamic movements and US counter terrorism efforts* (DPhil Thesis, Cambridge University/Jesus College, 2005), 160.

Chapter Six

The Islaax Movement in the War-Torn Somalia: (1991–2000)

By the end of 1990, the situation in Somalia was gloomy; the military regime that had ruled since 1969 found itself so weakened that it was preoccupied only with its survival.¹ In contrast, clan-based armed factions were gaining popularity and capturing more territories. For instance, the United Somali Congress (USC), a Hawiye-based faction, was widening its grip from the central regions toward Mogadishu. The Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), an Ogaaden-based faction, was pushing its frontier from the southern regions of Baay and Bakool. Moreover, the Somali National Movement (SNM), an Isaaq-based faction, was preparing for a final assault on northern regions. Other factions such as Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and SSDF were also organizing themselves with fewer forces. Reduced in size and power, the popular uprising led by the USC easily overwhelmed the regime after four weeks of fighting sparked by clashes on December 30, 1990.² People in Mogadishu were not anticipating a disastrous scenario, and their expectations remained high for a new era without the dictator Maxamad Siyaad Barre in power. However, these hopes dissipated with the outbreak of a devastating civil war.

This chapter explores the history of the Islaax Movement during the civil war (1991–2000) and is divided into three sections. The first section sets the stage and provides a brief background on Somalia after the collapse of the state (1991–2000), its political development, security risks, international intervention, and implications. It also explores the Islaax Movement in 1991–1992, including its survival strategy, policies, and interactions. Moreover, the activities and policies of the Islaax leadership conference in 1992 in Djibouti are examined. The second section explores the political strategy, theoretical challenges, and reconciliation programs of the Islaax Movement. It examines

¹ Terrence Lyons and Ahmed Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies of Political Reconstruction* (Brooking Occupational Papers, 1995), 20. Also, Mohamed Sahnoun, *Somalia: the Missed Opportunities* (United State Institute of Peace, 1994), 6-7.

² Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl (Islaax): Taqrīrun Shāmil (Comprehensive Internal Report submitted to the Leadership in Saudi Arabia, July, 13, 1991), 9. Also, Roland Marchal, “The Islamic dynamics in the Somali civil war: before and after September 11” in *Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex de Waal (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004), 122.

the theory and model of political participation in the absence of the state. Moreover, the Somali Reconciliation Council (SRC) is examined here as a case study while the role of Islaax in the Djibouti Reconciliation Conference of 2000 is analyzed. The third section investigates the social development strategy of Islaax with a special focus on education. The concept of developing what is termed “popular educational revolution” and its implications are explained. At the end of the chapter, the Mogadishu University and Tadamun Social Society are projected as a case study and samples of developmental programs in war-torn Somalia.

Islaax in the early years of the State Collapse (1991-1992)

In retrospect, although Islaax became more active in 1990, its agenda to mobilize Islamic organizations and prominent Islamic scholars into an Islamic coalition was aborted.³ The civil war broke out while Islamic groups were still debating a feasible common action. Evidently failing to agree on anything, each organization responded to the situation in its own way. How did Islaax respond to the collapse of the state and flaring civil war? This section examines that account and provides background and context under which Islaax operated.

Somalia: Sliding into Civil War (1991–1992)

On January 26, 1991, President Maxamad Siyaad Barre fled the “Villa Somalia” presidential palace for southern Somali regions. The conflict between the regime and the armed factions rapidly transformed into warfare between the two clan families: Hawiye and Darood.⁴ Moreover, the capital city was engulfed in utter mayhem in which marauding and unbridled militias were engaged in plundering, looting, destroying, and killing. The situation vividly recalls a classical Khaldunite description of the behavior of nomads and their dominance of urban centers. In his “prolegomena”, Ibn Khaldun

³ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 10.

⁴ Although attempts were conducted earlier within the government and USC played clan affinity card in the conflict, total transformation of the conflict into Hawiye-Darood occurred in April 1991 when allied forces comprising all Darood attempted to recapture Mogadishu. These forces advanced to the outskirts of Mogadishu, and USC was caught in panic and mayhem, and launched a counter offensive to throw them out. See Terrence and Samatar, 22.

explains that “the Arabs [nomads] need stones to set them up as supports for their cooking pots. So, they take them from buildings which they tear down to get the stones, and use them for that purpose. Wood, too, is needed by them for props for their tents and for use as tent poles for their dwellings”.⁵ The USC political and military leadership lost control of its militia who were vying for prominence and capturing strategic locations such as the seaport, airport, and “Villa Somalia.” In this anarchy, all state property such as industrial complexes, historical monuments, national documents, administrative offices, as well as social service sites such as schools, universities, and hospitals were gradually destroyed and looted. Moreover, private property such as houses, businesses, land, farms, and livestock were also captured and plundered. Nothing was spared from destruction. It was a perfect example of the Khaldunite description, “it is their nature to plunder whatever other people possess... They recognize no limits in taking the possessions of other people”.⁶ Likewise, comparable behavior of pillaging and preying on the peaceful civilian population were witnessed from the SSDF, SPM and SNF militia in their push and pull fighting with USC forces. Xassan Cali Mire, a Somali veteran scholar describes these occurrences succinctly as though “all the pent-up frustrations of three decades of postcolonial independence exploded into the ugly rise of fratricide, which has made the barbaric killing of innocent members of other kin communities a worthy goal.”⁷

Within two days, on January 28, a provisional government was announced, and Cali Mahdi Maxamad was designated as the interim president. This undertaking was considered a precipitated decision of the civilian USC in Mogadishu “Manifesto Group” preempting Mustaxiil accord between SNM, SPM and USC- General Caydiid faction. Conversely, the reaction of the Mustaxiil stakeholders was swift in rebuffing the new government.⁸ In addition, General Caydiid considered the interim government a betrayal

⁵ Ibn-khaldun, *Muqaddimah: an Introduction to History*. Translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, (2nd ed.) (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1967), 303.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Hassan Ali Mire, “On providing for the future” in edited Ahmed Samatar, *The Somali Challenge: From Catastrophe to Renewal?* (London: Lunne Rienner, 1994), 22.

⁸ The three armed factions SNM, SPM, and the USC-Aidid wing were bound by the Mustaxiil agreement in June 1990 to form an alliance. Moreover, this agreement was consolidated in October 1990 and rejected any negotiated settlement with the regime. However, the civilian USC in Mogadishu were furious with General Caydiid and the possible return of military rule in Somalia. It seems that divided USC and Mustaxiil agreement with one its faction may cause the precipitate formation of the interim government.

of the USC goals and a return of the former regime through the back door. Therefore, the previously divided USC further polarized into two antagonistic armed camps that formed along clan lines: the Cali Mahdi camp and the General Caydiid camp.⁹ Moreover, the SPM and SSDF formed a coalition of Darood, allied with Maxamad Siyaad Barre's supporters in Gedo and Kismaayo. Contesting the USC, they mobilized military forces in Kismaayo and Gedo and assaulted Mogadishu on April 9, 1991.¹⁰ The situation in northern Somalia was developing into a separation of the North from the South. Even though the separatist tendency was previously strong, the public in the North was enraged by the USC's unilateral decision to form a government in Mogadishu. Consequently, the public forced political leaders to immediately break from Somalia. As a result, the SNM unilaterally revoked the act of Union of 1960 and declared the independent state of Somaliland on May 17, 1991.¹¹

In Mogadishu, the appointment of the interim government triggered a bitter feud between rival Hawiye clan factions and power contenders, and all efforts to reconcile them despondently failed. Djibouti President Xassan Guuleed undertook the first initiative for reconciling Somali factions in Djibouti in June 1991 and July 15, 1991.¹² However, neither conference produced significant development toward peace and national reconciliation. Consequently, in September 1991, when all efforts for peaceful political agreement were exhausted, severe fighting broke out between the two USC factions in Mogadishu.¹³ This fighting continued for about 100 days, destroyed the whole city and shattered its population. It was reported that this fighting caused more than 20,000–30,000 deaths and caused starvation in large parts of the country.¹⁴ The humanitarian

⁹ The two contesting leaders Cali Mahdi and Caydiid belonged to two Hawiye sub-clans: Mudulood and Madar-kicis, respectively, and clan mobilization was used for the power struggle.

¹⁰ See Lyons and Samatar, *Somalia: State Collapse*, 22.

¹¹ In the Grand Conference of Northern Peoples "Shirweynaha Beelaha Waqooyiga" held in Burco in May 1991, secession of Somaliland was pushed unplanned. The SNM leadership was negotiating for a new model of governance with the USC-Aidid faction in Mogadishu. Mark Bradbury writes: "*secession was not in the agenda of the SNM central committee*" in the Burco Conference. See Mark Bradbury, *Becoming Somaliland* (London: Progresso, 2008), 80. See also, John Drysdale, *Whatever Happened to Somalia?* (HAAN Publishing, London: 1994), 25.

¹² See Sahnoun, *The missed opportunities*, 10.

¹³ General Caydiid declared a military coup and a toppling of the Cali Mahdi government. See Hussein 'Abdi Osmān, "Malaf al-Sarā' Bayna 'Ali Mahdi wa 'Aidīd" (unpublished paper submitted to the Horn of African Center for Studies, Mogadishu, 1993).

¹⁴ See Sahnoun, *The missed opportunities*, 11.

relief food could not reach starving people, as it was hijacked by warlords and their militia who exchanged most of it for weapons. By the end of 1991, the fighting had divided Mogadishu with a green line between the two USC factions. The United Nations (UN) mediated a cease-fire agreement in March 1992 reduced the magnitude of the conflict to some extent.

The war between the Somali National Front (SNF) and the USC faction of General Maxamad Faarax Caydiid for control of the southern coast and hinterland brought devastation to the grain-producing region between the rivers of Shabeelle and Jubba, spreading famine throughout southern Somalia. All attempts to distribute relief food were undermined by systematic looting by militias. The epicenter of famine, the town of Baidoa that had exchanged hands between various militias many times, became the theater for the conflict, and a massive number of deaths occurred in the Baay and Bakool regions. It was estimated that more than 300,000 died and more than a million people suffered severely in 1991 and 1992.¹⁵

The collapse of the Somali state coincided with the Gulf War, which started in January 1991, in which the UN and large coalition forces led by the US were mobilized to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. Therefore, the attention of the world was deflected from the Somali crisis until January 1992 when Boutros Ghali, who was “more interested and engaged in Somalia”¹⁶, took the office of the UN Secretary General. Immediately, the UN became involved, and the international concern about the Somali debacle was growing and gaining the support of the US administration. As a result, US forces landed in Mogadishu in December 1992, leading a coalition of willing nations in accordance with UN Resolution 794, adopted on December 3, 1992. The aim of the intervention was to help create a secure environment for humanitarian efforts in Somalia. Thus, “Operation Restore Hope,” consisting of a multinational force of more than 37,000 troops from 22 nations (24,000 troops from US and 13,000 from other countries), was

¹⁵ The total cost of lives was never fully tallied. Lewis provides a statistic of 300,000, see Lewis, *A History*, 265. See also Rutherford, Kenneth: *Humanitarianism under fire: The US Intervention in Somalia* (Kumerian Press, 2008), 38. See also Ahmed Samatar, “Introduction and overview” in *The Somali Challenge*, 3.

¹⁶ See Rutherford, *Humanitarianism*, 20.

dispatched to Somalia.¹⁷ Among the providers of these forces were Arab and Muslim countries such as Pakistan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Morocco.¹⁸ However, the mission was aborted on October 3–4, 1993 when a fight erupted between peacekeepers and the General Caydiid militia, which resulted in the death of 24 Pakistanis, 19 US soldiers, and 500–1,000 Somalis.¹⁹ For that reason, the UN withdrew from Somalia on March 3, 1995 “in a state of violence and anarchy.”²⁰

Notwithstanding that the UN mission in Somalia was criticized on many aspects, the ramifications for Somalia was overall positive. The UN mission stopped famine, weakened the warlords; promoted civil society, and encouraged entrepreneurs and business ventures.²¹ Moreover, many educated elites returned to Somalia during this peaceful period, and some of them established social service programs and business ventures. In the aftermath of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) of General Caydiid disintegrated rapidly, and his clan-based coalition was severely damaged. Thus, in August 1996, General Caydiid died from gunshot wounds inflicted during a fight with a sub-clan faction led by Cusman Cali Caato.²² The death of General Caydiid further weakened Mogadishu warlords who were ushering in a new era of civil society prominence. The promotion by the UNOSOM of the civil society produced new dynamics in Somalia and

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The presence of forces from Arabic/Islamic countries provided some solace to the Somalis and belittled the suspicions of being new Western crusaders benefiting from the crisis. Moreover, the presence of Islamic forces attracted Islamic charities, which were very supportive of the Islamist agenda in Somalia. Roland Marchal considers that “to a large extent, when southern Somalia witnessed the departure of the last UN contingents, the balance of power in favour of Islamic groups was positive”. See Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War: Before and After September 11.” In *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex De Waal (Indiana University Press, 2006), 114-146, 131.

¹⁹ The number of Somali deaths was highly controversial. For instance, Rutherford reported 500 deaths and 700 wounded. See Rutherford, *Humanitarianism*, 160. Other sources provide 500–1000. See Luke Glanville, “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention”, *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, available from <http://www.jha.ac/articles/a178.pdf> (accessed on June 19, 2010), 11.

²⁰ The World Bank, “Conflict in Somalia, drivers and dynamics, 2005”, available from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOMALIA/Resources/conflictinsomalia.pdf> (accessed on June 31, 2010).

²¹ This author was a Somali living in Diaspora who went back to Somalia during the UNOSOM period to work in the humanitarian field.

²² Cusman Cali Caato belonged to same sub-clan as General Caydiid and was his right-hand man during the peak of the civil war. However, he broke from him in 1995. As a result, fighting between the two men sparked, and Caydiid was wounded and died in August 1996.

particularly in Mogadishu. The networked civil society organizations were engaged in numerous social service programs and undertook many local reconciliation initiatives.²³ Schools were reopened and many students frequented these schools and newly established universities.²⁴ Many of the displaced people returned to Mogadishu after the bloodshed was over. Mass media began to break the monopoly of the warlords, and new commercial radio stations were opened, local newspapers thrived, and electronic media began to flourish.²⁵ These media outlets raised the awareness of the population and supported civic transformation of the society. Moreover, business figures, the former warlord financiers, broke from them to create business ventures with individuals from other clans. Through this process trans-clan business ventures were created which necessitated coping with the growing business competition. As a result, business groups created their own trans-clan security apparatus. In particular, communication sector and money transfer companies, which required vast networking to all cities, mobilized shareholding businesses that included members of different clans.²⁶ Moreover, local security arrangements were initiated by establishing clan-based Islamic courts, which improved security in the respected area to a certain extent.²⁷ Gradually, Mogadishu was taking a new shape and regaining some resemblance of its glorious days when many people from all over Somalia were creating businesses and resettling.

The culmination of these developments was a change in national reconciliation and the growing role of the civil society. As a result, the National Reconciliation Conference

²³ Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of The Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during the Civil War," *Darsāt Ifriqiyah* 31, 2004, 57–87. Also, see NOVIB-Somalia, *Mapping Somali Civil Society*, Nairobi: Kenya, 2003, available from http://www.somalivilsociety.org/strength/phase1_Mapping%20somalivilsociety.asp (accessed on November 10, 2009).

²⁴ Abdullahi, Non-State Actors, 71–83.

²⁵ See Jamal Abdi Ismail, "Somalia: Research findings and Conclusions" (African Media Development Initiative) available from http://www.radiopeaceafrica.org/assets/texts/pdf/SOM_AMD_I_Report_pp4%201.pdf (accessed on June 30, 2010). Also, see Abdelkarim A. Hassan, "Somali Media, Ethics, Truth and Integrity", February 25, 2010, available from http://www.wardheernews.com/Articles_10/Feb/25_Somali%20Media_abdel.pdf (accessed on June 30, 2010).

²⁶ See Ken Menkhaus, "Remittance companies and money transfers in Somalia, 2001", available from www.Somali.jna.org (accessed on June 31, 2010).

²⁷ Shari'a Courts were established in North Mogadishu in 1994 and spread to other regions. It was supported by the business community and the clans. See Andre Le Sage, "Prospects of Al-Itihad and Islamist Radicalism in Somalia." *Review of African Political economy*, volume 27, number 89, 2001, 472, available from <http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/som-AllitihadBrief.pdf> (accessed on June 31, 2010).

driven by the civil society was held in Djibouti in 2000, after 10 years of failing warlord-driven conferences.²⁸ Indeed, this was a complete shift in the paradigm of reconciliation, driven by the warlords since 1991.

Islaax in the Early Years of the Civil War (1991–1992)

The first day of the civil war in Mogadishu coincided with the failed attempt of Islaax to create a common Islamic position among all Islamic organizations and prominent personalities.²⁹ These meetings were a litmus test for the Islamic groups' impartiality with respect to the clan-based factions supported by Ethiopia and clan-cloaked oppressive regime. The option of forming an Islamic coalition could have provided an exit strategy from the political and ideological deadlock. However, Islamic groups were "inefficiently developed to pose any meaningful challenge to political clanism," which was escalating violently.³⁰ Seemingly, Islaax was pushing the agenda for an Islamic Front since February 1990 when it changed its name from the Islaax Society to the Islamic Movement in Somalia (*al-Xaraka al-Islāmiyah fi al-Somāl*).³¹ In so doing, it was aware of its limited capacity to act alone and was searching for a common Islamic agenda. Hansen puts the case as follows:

By 1989, the Islax [Islaax] leaders understood that the end of the Barre regime was approaching but they also understood their organization's weaknesses and saw that it lacked membership. Al Islax [Islaax] saw the weakness of the Siyad Barre regime as an opportunity to reverse the secularization trend of Somalia, but knew that it had little chance to do so by itself. So it looked for help to another organization, the Al Ittihad Al Islamiyah [Itixaad]. The two organizations had their differences: Al Ittihad was closer to Turabi's Sudan and had a strong Wahhabi-Salafist element. Several former members of Al Islax, such as the Al Ittihad leader Sheik Ali Warsame, had left Islax to join

²⁸ Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women's political participation during four decades (1959–2000)." *African Renaissance*. 4:1 (2007), 34–54.

²⁹ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 9.

³⁰ Abdurahman Abdullahi "Tribalism, Nationalism and Islam: Crisis of the Political Loyalties in Somalia" (MA thesis, Islamic Institute, McGill University, 1992), 112

³¹ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

Ittihad, which led to some hostility between the two but also to better connections as former members stayed in touch with their friends in Islax.³²

During this time, Islaax was in a leadership transition because it had lost its founding father, *al-Murāqib al-‘ām* (general guide), Sheikh Maxamad Geryare, who immigrated to Canada in 1990. Sheikh Geryare relinquished the chairmanship position, and the leadership vacuum was not easily replenished. Sheikh Maxamad Geryare explained the reason for this hasty migration from Saudi Arabia:

I lived in Saudi Arabia as political asylum and after so many years when my children grown up, I decided to look for other opportunities. Because of the family pressure and the necessity of my personal security, I found that it was the right time to migrate to Canada. However, I was confident that Islaax was matured and there were many prominent leaders to take the responsibility.³³

During 1990, all founding members of Islaax were in the Diaspora. Sheikh Axmad Rashiid Xanafi and Cabdulla Axmad Cabdalla were in Canada and the USA, respectively. Dr. Maxamad Yusuf was working in Kuwait, and Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad was a lecturer at King Sa’ud University in Saudi Arabia. However, prudently, they decided to empower the CC members inside Somalia to make the choice of a new leader. Surprisingly, the CC members in Somalia elected Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, a PhD student in Saudi Arabia. Apparently, they failed to grasp the importance of moving the leadership to Somalia during the tumultuous period.³⁴ In this manner, Islaax maintained the culture of an absent leader and designated management of the organization inside Somalia to the deputy chairman. Thus, there was the new turbulent decade of the 1990s with the same leadership disadvantage of the 1980s, but this time, by Islaax’s free choice.³⁵ However, “some improvements were made in the governance such as adopting a culture of

³² Note here the spelling of Islaax (Islax). See, Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood in the Wider Horn of Africa* (NIBR Report, 2009), 45.

³³ Sheikh Maxamad Geryare interviewed by the author on July 23, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

³⁴ Hassan Hāji Maxamud, “Tārikh al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyah: Duruf al-Nashi wa awamil al-tadawur” (unpublished manuscript, 2009), 18.

³⁵ Xassan Xaaji argues that “if the absence of Sheikh Maxamad Geryare from Somalia was considered justifiable because of the security concerns from the oppressive regime, there was no obvious justification for electing a student to a top leadership position during this period”. Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud interviewed by the author on July 21, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

collective leadership and expanding CC.” There was a growing influence of modern elites educated in secular institutions such as physicians, engineers and military personnel.³⁶

The Reaction of Islaax to the Civil War

Most Somalis were not anticipating a dramatic collapse of the state and a transformation of the conflict into clan-lines. Similarly, Islaax did not develop a comprehensive emergency plan for a civil war except a plan for saving its members.³⁷ Therefore, the actual reaction to the civil war began on the second day, December 31, 1990, when the Mogadishu leaders of Islaax held an extraordinary emergency meeting in the al-Aqsa school. The civil war erupted in the northern part of the city on Sunday, December 30, 1990, and skirmishes continued between the USC militia and government forces. The first decision in this meeting was to evacuate Islaax members and their families from the affected area to more peaceful southern quarters of the city to be hosted by other members.³⁸ At the same time, Islaax moved its center of operations to the Cusman Ibn-Caffan Mosque in the Madiina district, located in the southern part of the city.³⁹ Furthermore, as part of ongoing efforts to stop the fighting, on January 4, 1991, Sheikh Axmad Xassan al-Qutubi made a highly emotional sermon at the al-Salam Mosque during the Friday congressional prayer, and a petition for stopping the war was suggested and immediately prepared.⁴⁰ The petition included a call for the immediate resignation of the president and the government, cessation of the war, the establishment of a transitional government, a national reconciliation conference, and a general election. The points raised in the petition were identical with the position of Islaax. In a demonstration led by Sheikh Axmad al-Qutubi, the petition was handed over to the interim Prime Minister

³⁶ Sheikh Axmad Xassan Al-Qutubi interviewed by the author on April 10, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

³⁷ In a side talk between Itixaad and Islaax at the Aden Barando meetings, they agreed to prepare a common plan based on encouraging their members to migrate from Mogadishu to peaceful areas. Also, they warned their members not to get involved in the civil war. However, those initial discussions did bear any results. See Comprehensive Report. Also, Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi interviewed by the author on May 22, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

³⁸ Ibid., 10

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Also, Sheikh Axmad Xassan Al-Qutubi interviewed by the author on July 21, 2010, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

Maxamad Xawaadle Madar. Regrettably, “the peaceful demonstration was disturbed by a car accident resulting in 12 deaths and numerous injuries.”⁴¹

Moreover, the Islaax leadership in Saudi Arabia continuously issued communiqués to clarify Islaax’s position on the developing situation, suggesting some solutions and appealing for humanitarian assistance. The first such communiqué was released at the beginning of the civil war in Mogadishu in which Islaax called for concerted efforts to topple the regime, to organize a national conference, and respond to the human suffering.⁴² The communiqué also suggested an initial agenda for the proposed national conference. This agenda included restoration of the rule of law, releasing all political prisoners, preparing an Islamic compliant constitution, adopting a multi-party system, granting freedom of the press, and conducting a free election.⁴³ Apparently, in this communiqué, Islaax also called for a new democratic Somalia in which the constitution would not contravene with the general Islamic principles. Based on this position, Islaax prepared comprehensive program guidelines intended to be submitted at the proposed reconciliation conference to be held in Mogadishu on February 28, 1991. However, the conference was boycotted by all armed factions.⁴⁴ The major activities of Islaax since the collapse of the state on April 28, 1991 were to emphasize Islaax’s firm adherence to a policy of neutrality toward warring factions, continued efforts to create a common Islamic front, and to aggressively seek humanitarian assistance desperately needed by Islaax members and the masses. Neutrality was emphasized even more when the civil war transformed entirely into a clan conflict. In April 1991, allied forces, comprised of Siyaad Barre supporters from his Darood clan-family, advanced to the outskirts of Mogadishu to recapture the capital. Nonetheless, the USC, represented by Hawiye, was caught in a panic and launched a counter offensive that thwarted these forces. This encounter further complicated clan sensitivity; innocent people were indiscriminately killed and property was seized by both sides because of their clan affiliations.

⁴¹ Ibid., Sheikh Axmad related that one of the Islaax members died in this accident. His name was Axmad Maxamad Hussein (Xanqi). See also, Islaax Comprehensive Internal Report, 11.

⁴² See *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl* (Islaax): Bayān (communiqué) no.7, issued on 5/01/1991.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ See *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl* (Islaax): Program for National Reconciliation issued on February 25, 1991.

Islaax was frustrated by the lack of receptiveness from Itixaad and “the idea was that the two large Islamist organizations could better withstand the coming storm together” was not being considered.⁴⁵ In fact, the turning point in the relations between the two organizations occurred when Itixaad took sides in the conflict between the USC and SSDF/SPM near Kismaayo.⁴⁶ This war destroyed the last hope for any Islamic coalition. Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi considers this war “the beginning of successive adventures of Itixaad who threw Islamic agenda in the clannish conflict.”⁴⁷ He further articulates that “Islaax was compelled to distance itself from all worrying factions including Itixaad.”⁴⁸ A report produced by Islaax in June 1991 characterizes the war as “clannish and unnecessary war which eventually is not a Jihad for the sake of Allah.”⁴⁹ This report ostensibly demonstrates the reaction of Islaax to Itixaad’s partaking in the civil war called by the latter the “Islamic Jihad.” Summing the main themes of these communiqués and reports from December 1990 to July 1991, Islaax supported toppling the regime, in principle, with the reservation of a possible development into a clan conflict. Therefore, Islaax consistently warned against mounting clan polarization and alerted its members to abstain from becoming involved. After the collapse of the state, Islaax maintained distance from the fighting factions and retained a neutral position with an emphasis on reconciliation. This position was completely different from the other Islamic groups. For example, Itixaad was drifting toward militancy and was busy establishing training camps, while the *Majma al-Ulama* were working closely with the USC in Mogadishu. Moreover, Waxdah was fully cooperating with the SNM in northern Somalia.

Evidently, the Islaax position during the civil war was not based only on the decision of the field leaders in Mogadishu; during 1990, the CC made a decision to abstain from the brewing war between the regime and the armed factions.⁵⁰ This decision was derived from the Islamic position of how to act during “*Fitna*” (tribulation) wars. From the Islamic point of view as interpreted by Islaax, the fight between the Muslim Somalis

⁴⁵ Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl (Islaax). *Al-Ḥāl al-Rāḥina* (The Current State of Affairs in Somalia), April 27, 1991. Also, see Stig Jarle Hansen and Atle Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 45.

⁴⁶ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 23.

⁴⁷ Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 23.

⁵⁰ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author, June 24, 2010.

belonged to a type of war termed “*Hurub al-Fitna*” in Islam. As a result, Islaax held fast to the Prophetic Hadith, “Verily Fitan [tribulations] shall take place. Fitan wherein the one setting is better than one walking and the one walking is better than the one hastening forth....”⁵¹ In view of that, Islaax made every effort, by maintaining internal cohesion and supporting displaced and overseas members, to protect its members from falling into the tribulation wars. Moreover, Islaax lobbied Arabic/Islamic charities in the rich Gulf countries for providing humanitarian assistance to the needy people of Somalia. Dr. Cali Sheikh, former chairman of Islaax, describes this period, “We did every effort possible to seek humanitarian assistance to our brothers inside Somalia and their family which was our priority. We also activated Islaax Charity to mobilize resources for the people of Somalia.”⁵² As a result, Islaax adopted its triple slogan in the first year of the civil war: “*al-Igātha, Islāḥ ʿat al-Bayn, al-Da’wat wa al-Irshād*” (humanitarian assistance, reconciling warring parties, and intensification of the Islamic *Da’wa*).⁵³

The Impact of the Civil War on Islaax

After losing its first chairman to immigration in 1990, Islaax also lost its deputy chairman in the first week of the civil war. Colonel Cali Maxamad Ibrahim, nicknamed Ali Dayaar, was killed in the government’s shelling of the civilian quarters in Mogadishu.⁵⁴ Moreover, Islaax’s chief political officer, engineer Cisse, was also killed in November 1991 while supporting the displaced people from Mogadishu. Dr. Cali Baasha, the current chairman of Islaax, relates the story of the killing of engineer Cisse as follows:

When the civil war began, I was injured and was evacuated to the town of Bula-burte about 180 Km from Mogadishu at the road connecting the capital with the central and northern regions. It was Engineer Cisse’s hometown and

⁵¹ Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi. *Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyah wa al-‘Amal al-Siyāsi* (Mogadishu: Markaz al-Qani al-Ifriqi li Darsāt al-Insāniyah, 1996), 9–10. See the long Hadith in Sheikh Muḥammad Ismā’ī Muqadam, *Basā’ira al-fitan (the Way out of Tribulation)* translated by Fahia Yahya (Alexandria: Dar Al-Tawhid, 2009), 39.

⁵² Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

⁵³ Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi. *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*.

⁵⁴ See Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah fī al-Somāl (Islaax): Bayān (Communique) no.8 on the killing of its deputy Chairman of Islaax on January 8, 1991.

I resided his house. Bandits used to loot traveling people in the anarchic period. One day, these bandits looted 10 vehicles carrying about 120 persons. Engineer Cisse mobilized the elders and succeeded to feed the people and to return their looted vehicles and other properties. However, looters sucked the fuel out of the vehicles. In order to get fuel, he traveled to Mogadishu. After securing the resources, he was injured while crossing the road near Gurguurte Hotel. He died at Madiina Hospital within days.⁵⁵

To fill the leadership vacuum, Sheikh Axmad Xassan Al-Qutubi was elected to the deputy chairmanship in January 1991. The situation under which Sheikh Axmad took office was volatile and worsened day by day in southern Somalia where the politics of guns and bullets, clan solidarity, organized robberies, and the humiliation of weaker clans was mounting. The transformation of war to clan-lines between Hawiye and Darood complicated Islaax's operation as a non-clan institution. Darood Islaax members in Mogadishu became a target in looming revenge killings by Hawiye clan militia. In these circumstances, the Islaax leadership decided to evacuate 50 members and their families to their original home villages and towns. Some of the evacuees included prominent leaders such as Sheikh Nuur Baaruud, Sheikh Maxamud Faarax, and Sheikh Cisse Sheikh Axmad.⁵⁶ Moreover, the war had caused a huge displacement of Islaax members, and the leadership, side-by-side with the rest of the population. The process of regrouping the people was difficult, as most did not know each other due to the underground nature of the organization.⁵⁷ The scope of the displacement was vast and covered almost all villages and localities in Somalia and neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti. Migration to Europe, USA, and Canada intensified.

How did Islaax cope with this situation during these difficult days? As related by Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi and Mustafa Cabdullahi, the Islaax organizational network had been

⁵⁵ Cali Baasha Cumar interviewed through email by the author on June 20, 2010.

⁵⁶ Ibrahim Dasuuqi and Cabdullahi Cali Xayle were assigned to accompany them until they crossed the border. They used a lorry belonging to one of the Islaax members, Sheikh Maxamad Dhaqane who lived in Beletweyne. Dr. Cali Baasha Cumar interviewed by the author.

⁵⁷ Mustafa Cabdullahi interviewed by the author on July 26, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

seriously disrupted.⁵⁸ The reason was that the Islaax organization was based on a clandestine cellular structure, in which only members of each cell (5–7), called “*Usra*” in the MB literature, meaning “family,” knew each other. In this system, leaders of a number of cells constitute the upper cell and know the others up to the highest hierarchy of the leadership. This cellular organizational structure was necessary to work under the repressive regime. Therefore, with the massive displacement of people during the early days of the war, many members were cut off from their cells. Some of them died unreported in the war. To cope with these conditions, Islaax leaders developed a new innovative method. The concept was based on establishing a general meeting place Barta Kulanka where members could spread the word to whomever they knew. As a result, all members were invited to attend a permanent open meeting held every week. The meeting was held in the al-Aqsa School near Sheikh Sufi Mosque, and people used to sit under a big tree named “*Al-Shajara al-Mubāraka*” (the blessed tree).⁵⁹ The objectives during this period were to raise the awareness of the members about current affairs, to conduct training and teaching programs on relevant Islamic topics, to recruit new members, and to debate current affairs. Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi characterizes the debates and discussion that took place there as follows:

It was an exercise of open and participatory democracy in a period of war and clan division. It was the epitome of brotherhood and pristine era. Moreover, under that tree, charities sent from the leaders in Saudi Arabia were evenly distributed to all members. Also, Islaax Charity was activated and began as voluntary medical unit. I initiated to offer free medical service until it was developed into comprehensive Charity in 1993.⁶⁰ Those who died or injured were reported and those who intend to travel passed there to farewell their brothers. Islaax members in Mogadishu drastically increased from about 100 persons due to huge displacement to about 600 in the period between

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ The school was one of the five schools in Mogadishu administered by Islaax, and its principle was Maxamad Faarah Buuh. Dr. Cali Baasha Cumar interviewed by the author through email on June 29, 2010.

⁶⁰ The Islaax Charity was founded in the last years of the military regime, however, the decision to activate it was taken in the congregational meeting in al-Aqsa school and Cabdulqaadir Maxamad Kutub was assigned as its director. Ibrahim Dasuqi was interviewed by the author.

Februarys/November, 1991. Indeed, this was a “golden period of Islaax” with all its challenges.⁶¹

Later in 1993, after conflict settled, the excessive recruitment during this period was criticized and some members termed it “*taħta al-Shajara*” (under the tree), having a pejorative connotation of a lack of commitment because of easy recruitment. Mustafa Cabdullahi, one of the leaders of that time, responded to such criticisms as follows:

The open meeting in al-Aqsa school was necessary for regrouping and continuing Islaax activities. It was important to minimize the damage of Islaax from the civil war. However, later, two schools developed within Islaax regarding recruitment. Those who believed to ease recruitment processes claiming they are following Hassan Al-Banna during early freedom yeas of MB. The other school belonged to later period of oppression where MB became underground and recruitment was tightened. Members belonged that the later schools used to criticize harshly the process of recruitment that was taking place in Mogadishu.⁶²

The displacement of Islaax members was an opportunity for Islamic activism to flourish and spread to remote areas to hitherto unthinkable locations. Moreover, Islaax encouraged students to travel abroad for higher education, particularly to Sudan.⁶³ Many students traveled through Ethiopia to reach Sudan and attended universities there. The displaced members in refugee camps, particularly in Kenya, were reorganized and began rigorous activities. In the Diaspora, migrant members of Islaax were actively reaching out and spreading the message of Islam. These members were reorganized and were connected with the International MB affiliates in Europe, Canada, and the United States of America. Many more students were joining universities in Pakistan, India, and Yemen.

Other dominant activities during this period were to be distinguished from Itixaad (*al-Tamayuz*). This was important for Islaax because the public could not distinguish between

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

Islaax and Itixaad and termed all Islamists Ikhwan to differentiate them from traditional Islamic scholars. Nevertheless, when the dream of establishing an Islamic coalition dissipated with the militaristic Itixaad approach in April 1991, Islaax began to overtly criticize Itixaad.⁶⁴ Both movements, disagreed on many issues, such as issuing the Islamic Manifesto, which Itixaad refused to sign; yet, they had many common positions during the early civil war period. The relationship between the two organizations was mended to a certain extent during the Aden Brando meetings when they developed a common plan for saving members of the two organizations from becoming involved in the war.⁶⁵ However, the entire rapprochement was frustrated when Itixaad drifted toward militancy and participated in the Kismaayo war on April 14, 1991. Apparently, Itixaad's hawks of the former Army officers, infiltrated by unknown members of Al-Qaida, steered Itixaad toward Salafia/Jihadism.⁶⁶ Moreover, the strong assistance from the Jihadist sympathizers in the Gulf countries in the form of relief assistance contributed to pushing Itixaad toward militancy.⁶⁷ Itixaad's new militant direction compelled Islaax to distance itself from any connections with Itixaad and to adopt a policy of distinction. This policy was based on educating the public on the difference between the MB represented by Islaax and the Salafia School represented by Itixaad.

Another development of Islamic activism was the establishment of *Majma' al-'Ulamā* (The Congress of Islamic Scholars; hereafter Majmac) on February 2, 1991 in a meeting at the Kaah Hotel in Mogadishu. The concept of Majmac was introduced during this meeting by famous Islamic scholars, including Sheikh Maxamad Macallin, Sharif

⁶⁴ Somali masses and external observers could not distinguish Islaax from Itixaad during this time. For them, they all belonged to Ikhwan, a general term used to signify modern Islamic movements. The term Ikhwan was used by media reporters, and this annoyed Islaax, which considered Itixaad to belong to Salafia.

⁶⁵ Aadan Barando is the name of the house owner where the meeting of the Islamic organizations were initiated.

⁶⁶ See Cabdi Shakuur Mire, *Koboca Islaamiyiinta*.

⁶⁷ Indeed, Abdurahman al-Qaidy, an alleged al-Qaida operative who was regional director of the Saudi International Islamic Relief Organisation (IIRO) was implicated in the provision of huge assistance to Itixaad disguised as humanitarian relief assistance. However, after the defeat of Itixaad in the Araare battle near Kismaayo in 1991 masterminded by Somali al-Qaida operatives, Al-Qaida infiltration in Itixaad was growing. It is alleged that representatives of Usama bin Ladin living in Sudan were regularly training, equipping and providing technical know-how to the Itixaad in Somalia.

See International Crisis Group, *Somalia's Islamists* (Africa Report N°100 – 12 December 2005), 6, available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somalias%20Islamists.ashx>. Also, see Cabdi Shakuur Mire, *Koboca Islaamiyiinta*.

Sharafow, Sheikh Ibrahim Suuley and Cali Xaaji Yusuf.⁶⁸ Their aim was to create a Supreme Islamic Council that would play the role of an umbrella organization for Islamic personalities and groups. The idea developed after these scholars met with Interim President Cali Mahdi Maxamad, who offered them a courteous reception. The interim president requested that they take the responsibility of implementing Shari'a in the country.⁶⁹ He also assured them that he was ready to work with them and to listen to their directions and advice. These scholars, who were imprisoned and humiliated by Siyad Barre, seemed satisfied with the president and believed his request wholeheartedly. Sharif Sharafow, in particular, was highly enthusiastic and considered their meeting with the president a golden opportunity for the application of Shari'a. Euphorically, while speaking to the audience, he uttered famous MB slogan: "Allah is our goal, The Messenger is our example, The Qur'an is our constitution, Jihad is our way, and martyrdom is our desire."⁷⁰ Moreover, Sheikh Maxamad Macallin told the audience that he was requested by the president to organize the participation of the Islamic scholars in restoring governance to the country. As a result, he said: "This meeting is intended to form an umbrella organization and to unify all efforts of Islamic workers."⁷¹

Nonetheless, Islaax was disappointed with the limited goal of the meeting and attempted to widen the agenda. The head of the Islaax delegation, Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi, explained the emerging clan conflict in the country and the great responsibility that was placed on the shoulders of the Islamic scholars. After that, he proposed to form an independent Islamic Front, prepare an Islamic Constitution, and participate in the reconciliation conference to be held in Mogadishu one month later, instead of creating a Supreme Islamic Council that would collaborate with the interim USC regime.⁷² Moreover, he warned against losing neutrality and supporting one side in the Somali conflict. Evidently, Dasuuqi's speech at the Kaah Hotel outlined the Islaax program during this period based

⁶⁸ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 13.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid.

on “neutrality, Islamic constitution, and Islamic coalition party.”⁷³ Dr. Dasuuqi describes this meeting as follows:

It was open and haphazard organized meeting. Scholars were invited via Radio Mogadishu. Many famous personalities who were the instrument of the collapsed regime to fight against Islamic organizations were present. Moreover, staunch supporters of USC were also there. Besides that, some opportunistic elements showed their face. We tried our best to reform the meeting, to change its agenda, and finally to put in its supreme council reasonable scholars. However, we finally convinced that we were entrapped in the USC show case and so, we decided to withdraw from it.

In that sense, Islaax considered the Majmac as an instrument of the new interim government intended to last only 28 days after which the reconciliation conference would be held in Mogadishu. As a result, Islaax withdrew from the Majmac and accused it of being a biased clan-based organization and an instrument of the USC provincial government.⁷⁴ Meanwhile, Islaax was accused by the supporters of the Majmac of breaking Muslim unity and dividing concerted efforts in the crucial period of Somali history.⁷⁵ In the footsteps of Islaax, Itixaad also withdrew from the Majmac, entertaining similar accusations to those of Islaax.⁷⁶ Nevertheless, as the French scholar Roland Marchal narrated, the “success and influence [of *Majma Al-Ulama*] were short-lived and it played no major role in the country or in the capital city afterwards.”⁷⁷ Majmac is remembered initiating the first Islamic court in 1991 which was initially was supported by Cali Mahdi Maxamad. As Professor Afyare reports, “according to the leaders and soldiers who worked for the first Islamic court, those in the power at the time [Cali Mahdi and Caydiid], undermined and then destroyed the efforts to create the lasting court.”⁷⁸ Evidently, Islamic groups and organizations were very much fragmented like the armed

⁷³ Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁷⁴ See Islaax, Comprehensive Internal Report, 19.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Roland Marchal, “Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War” In *Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa*, edited by Alex De Waal (Indiana University Press, 2006), 114-146, 125.

⁷⁸ Afyare Abdi Elmi, *Understanding the Somalia Conflagration: Identity, Political Islam and Peace building* (London: Pluto Press, 2010), 63.

factions. Although differences in Islamic ideology played a major role, clan attachments also played undeniable roles. Occasionally, beneath ideological facades, clanism and opportunism were not entirely absent. Evidently, the relationship among Islamic organizations of Islaax, Majmac, and Itixaad deteriorated sharply in 1991 because of the different visions, interactions with the civil war and agendas.

The Rebirth of Islaax: The Djibouti Conference of 1992

After the collapse of the state, communications between Somalia and the world were disrupted, and, as a result, it was very hard for the executive of Islaax in Saudi Arabia to communicate with the field leaders in Mogadishu. However, “expanded consultation and collective leadership had played a major role in harmonizing Islaax’s decisions and policies.”⁷⁹ This does not mean, however, that occasional disputes did not evolve into critical issues. To ease tension and enhance teamwork, the leadership in Saudi Arabia sent Cabdulaziz Xaaji Axmad, a member of the Executive Bureau, to connect the two leaderships.⁸⁰ Upon his arrival, he conveyed the message to the field leaders that six new members were included in the CC.⁸¹ The inclusion of these professional members in the CC ushered in a new era of diversified leadership in Islaax. They were medical doctors, engineers, and army officers. Besides that, Cabdulaziz Xaaji Axmad pressured for unification with one of the Islamic groups.⁸² Cabdulaziz, who was exceptionally enthusiastic about the project of uniting with other Islamic organizations, persuaded the majority of the leaders in Mogadishu to accept the unification project with a splinter group from Itixaad called *Ansar-Al-Sunna*.⁸³ However, the project was short-lived and failed during the 100-day war in Mogadishu before it could be carried out.⁸⁴ Moreover, another incident resulted in extreme pressure of Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, the chairman of Islaax, to form the Unified Islamic coalition with Itixaad, Waxdah, and Majmac,

⁷⁹ Sheikh Axmad Xassan al-Qutubi interviewed by the author.

⁸⁰ Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁸¹ The new members of CC were Ibrahim Dasuuqi, Cali Baasha Cumar, Engineer Cabduwahab, Colonel Cabdullahi Cali Xayle, and Mustafa Cabdullahi. These were the backbone of the Islaax leadership in Mogadishu. Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

sponsored by Sudan in 1992.⁸⁵ This meeting was held while Itixaad waged war with SSDF in Puntland, supported by *Usāma bin Lāddin* who was residing during this period in Sudan. Moreover, Sudan had major concerns about the US intervention in Somalia.⁸⁶ The Islaax delegation was pressured by its leaders, Islamist groups, and the Islamic movement of Sudan to sign a Memorandum of Understanding that lay the framework for creating a network of Islamic organizations. All Somali Islamic organizations, namely, Itixaad, Waxdah, and Majmac, were very enthusiastic about the agreement; however, Islaax delegation remained skeptical and believed that the project would serve short-term Sudanese Movement interest and Itixaad objectives at war in Puntland.⁸⁷ When this project failed, Islaax was accused by other parties of having derailed the deal. During this period, some top leaders of Islaax in Saudi Arabia communicated the leaders in Somalia pushing them towards militancy.⁸⁸ These personal preferences had created confusion and rift among the top leaders of Islaax before the conference in Djibouti. Subsequently, most of the field leaders in Mogadishu boycotted the conference as a sign of protestation. The conference was, nevertheless, successful, and many leaders from the Diaspora participated besides the CC, and part of the conference was moved to Mogadishu to resolve internal organizational discord.⁸⁹

By 1992, Islaax was isolated from the clan-based factions and Islamic organizations that were engaged in one way or another in the conflict. Islaax's position of neutrality and peaceful settlement was a minority voice during this period. Finally, the conference of 1992 was considered a new milestone in Islaax's work; in this conference, differences were resolved, activities were evaluated, and new strategies were developed. These strategies responded to two main questions: How should we reorganize Islaax in the new socio-political atmosphere? And, what will be the socio-political strategy for the coming years? The issue of organizational development has been discussed in Chapter Five. The

⁸⁵ Abdishakur Mire, *Koboca Islamiyiinta*.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author on April 5, 2010, Nairobi, Kenya.

⁸⁸ Furthermore, when Itixaad opted for militancy and opened training, Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, in a break from Islaax's adopted policy, sent a letter to Mogadishu leaders encouraging them to open such camps, while Cabduaziz Xaaji sent a similar letter to Cabdullahi Cali Xayle. Cabdullahi Cali Xayle and Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

⁸⁹ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

following two sections will address Islaax's social and political strategies and the way they were implemented during the period of 1992–2000.

The Political Strategy and Programs (1992–2000)

The Islaax Movement proclaimed its political philosophy from its inception, expressing its objective of reforming the Somali society in accordance with moderate Islamic methodology derived from the MB based on “democratic/constitutional Approach”.⁹⁰ During its formative period (1978–1990), political space was entirely blocked, a poisonous political atmosphere of the dictatorial regime was brewing, and armed clan-based organizations were wrangling and wrestling. Moreover, all Islamic organizations including Islaax were in their infancy and played no concrete roles in the political scuffling. Furthermore, with the collapse of the state and subsequent civil war, there was no room for peaceful political activism. Itixaad opted for taking up arms to compete with armed clans for power, whereas Islaax continued its peaceful reform approach in the tumultuous environment. From here arises a question of how Islaax contemplated political participation when society was divided into clans and was dominated by armed factions. What would be the entry point for such political participation? This section examines how Islaax developed its political prominence by 2000. The study begins by examining a theoretical framework under which Islaax operated and the model developed for political engagement. Moreover, institutions of political participation and practical models are studied here. Finally, the outcome of Islaax's political engagement that culminated in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000 is explored.

Theory and Model of Political Participation

Organizations face enormous difficulties during a transition period, in particular when they reform from an underground cellular setting into an open organization. This process

⁹⁰ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Islah Movement in Somalia: Islamic Moderation in the war-torn Somalia” (paper presented at the Second Nordic Horn of Africa Conference. Oslo: Oslo University, 2008), available from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/14642683/The-Islaax-Movement-Islamic-Moderation-in-Somalia> (accessed on June 30, 2010). Also, See Hussein M. Adam, “Political Islam in Somali History” in Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (edited), *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics* (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), 119-135, 131

requires not only changes in attitudes and mindsets, but also a clear set of rules and policies besides competent leaders at the top of the organization who believe in reform. Socio-political realities in Somalia changed radically after the collapse of the state in 1991, shifting from the rule of a dictator to anarchic clan supremacy. Dealing with the clans was something new to the members of Islaax. Their training programs were based on the normative Islamic thought and the MB method of reforming society ruled by a secular state. Studies of the local political dynamics were minimal, and Islaax's comprehension of clans and clanism was very much influenced by the nationalist discourse.⁹¹ Hansen observes, "The Brotherhood [Islaax] showed outright contempt for clan-based politics, and strongly maintained that Islam transcended clans."⁹² As a result, clans were projected as the cancer of the nation and were abhorred and vilified from the Islamic point view.⁹³ This concept of clanism weakened relations between Islaax members and their extended families and clans. Nonetheless, this concept departs from the moderate Islamic perspective based on judging actions of the people, not on their organizational setting. Indeed, societies can organize themselves as to what suits them, and there is no particular form of organization sanctioned by Islam. Certainly, Somali society was organized in the form of clans and sub-clans, and after the collapse of national institutions, clan organizations became the only available form for most people. This form of organization was the only one they knew and accepted before colonial powers introduced an alien form of organization. In such clan-based environment and poisonous political culture, how could a trans-clan ideological organization become involved in community affairs without making concessions in its ideology? Other than the organizational cultural barriers stated above, the issue was very complicated, as there are no historical precedents to draw lessons from, and the theory of social reform of the MB falls short in addressing that issue. In fact, the basic premise of the MB reform assumes

⁹¹ Somali nationalists glorified nationalism and rebuffed clan identities. Their approach was "don't pronounce its name, don't talk about it, and let us shame it as bad and evil." That was a simplistic approach of the Somali nationalists that could not be sustained over time. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Can we surpass clan-based organizations?" available from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/15420091/Can-we-surpass-clanbased-organizations> (accessed on July 6, 2010).

⁹² Hansen and Mesoy, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 40.

⁹³ Islam refuses all forms of 'Asabiyah and the Prophet says: "*Leave it. It is Rotten*". In another Hadith, the Prophet says: "*He is not one of us who calls for 'Asabiyah*." These 'Asabiyah includes all forms of solidarities and is not necessarily always negative. The forbidden 'Asabiyah is what causes transgression of the rights of others.

the presence of a secular state, which, through a gradual process, is transformed into an Islamic state. This proposition was completely changed in Somalia where there was no state to change, and society was at war with itself.

Moreover, Islaax had adopted a strategy of peaceful participation in politics in combination with social Islamic activities to achieve its projected reform. Isolation from political activism is against Islaax's basic doctrine that clings to the concept that Islam is a religion and the state.⁹⁴ Thus, the model and strategy of political participation is what required a new way of thinking and wisdom from Islaax. Accordingly, Islaax considered three possible options to actively participate in politics.⁹⁵ The first option was to form a shared political party with other members of the society. This option was rejected because of its impracticality in a country where parties were non-existent and people were cut off from each other in warlord-dominated enclaves. The second option was to transform the movement into a political party, an option which shares the first option on the absence of suitable ambiance. Moreover, after examining the human resources available and considering the domestic, regional, and international atmosphere and challenges, Islaax abstained from this venture too. The third option was to allow members of Islaax to individually participate in the existing political entities. This concept removed restrictions from the interested members for political participation in their clans or any political groups. This model of political participation was flexible, doable, and appropriate for Somalia in the chaotic situation. However, adopting such model required attitudinal change and significant reform within the organization. As a result, a policy of political realism known as “*al-Ta’āmul ma’a al-Wāqi’*” (dealing with the reality) was embraced. It was a practical approach guided by the objectives of the Islamic law “*Maqāsid al-Sharī’ah*”.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ For details on the relations between Islam and politics, see Yusuf al-Qardawi, *State in Islam* (Cairo: El-Falah Publishing and Distributions, 1998).

⁹⁵ Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi. *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*, 13.

⁹⁶ According to the objectives of the Islamic law, “*al-waqiyah*” is considered in all aspects of Islamic Shari’a. Liban Hussein Isse, professor of Islamic Shari’a interviewed by the author on July 28, 2009, Hargeysa, Somaliland.

The definition of “dealing with reality,” according to Islaax literature and interviews, could be summarized as follows.⁹⁷ It is to consider the existing socio-political realities and to push the clan-based organization toward the desired Islamic society and Islamic state. The core idea of this policy was to break with historical isolation promoted during the oppressive regime and clandestine operations and to open up to society at large. Its objectives included encouraging members of Islaax to participate in the existing socio-political organizations and to become involved in all such groups. Syndromes of both isolation from the society and assimilation with the clan culture were discouraged. Instead, prudent and positive engagement was promoted. The aim of this policy was to take the Islamic activities to all areas, without reservations, and to transform Islaax into a dynamic organization that changes its techniques with the changing conditions, time, and space. It is also meant to promote Islamic activism from its defensive position to more assertive one with innovative initiatives corresponding to the changing conditions. Moreover, the policy of “dealing with reality” rejects idealism and offers more weight to realism, differentiating the descriptive from the normative. This theory is one of the core principles of Islamic thought; nevertheless, it is less revived and developed. The difficulties of reforming organizational culture were evident once the policy was adopted in 1995 after five years of heated debates.⁹⁸ As a result, Islaax individuals who were capable of political participation were allowed to do so. Adopting this policy enabled Islaax to become more involved in politics and reconciliation processes. Accordingly, two programs were initiated to implement this policy effectively. In a collective manner, Islaax became engaged in a reconciliation program conducted through the Somali Reconciliation Council (SRC), a new institution created for that purpose. Moreover, certain individuals joined political entities to influence the policies of their entities toward reconciliation and peace

⁹⁷ Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi. *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*, 26-27.

⁹⁸ The issue of how the movement should deal with the new realities in Somalia was first discussed in Toronto, Canada, after the fall of the regime in January 1991. See Abdurahman Abdullahi, “The Islaax Movement: Islamic Moderation, available from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/14642683/The-Islaax-Movement-Islamic-Moderation-in-Somalia> (accessed on July 8, 2010).




Figure 8. The Model of Political Participation (1994–2000)

Reconciliation: The Entry Point for Political Participation

Although reconciliation between warring clans and factions, “*Islah dat al-bayn*,” was one of *Islaax*’s priority programs since the onset of the civil war, its approach was modified in 1992. While developing a political strategy, reconciliation was considered as the entry point for peaceful political participation. Moreover, it was considered to be the only peaceful way to recover the Somali state. Consequently, institutionalization of the reconciliation efforts was sought and initiated with the establishment of the SRC in 1994.⁹⁹ The main objectives under the reconciliation strategy were “to cease the war through reconciliation process and sustain such reconciliation by utilizing local Islamic courts.”¹⁰⁰ This meant that after initial reconciliation, communities should create local

⁹⁹ “The believers are brothers; therefore, make reconciliation between your brothers, and fear Allah, that you may find Mercy” 49:10. “No good is there in much of their intimate discourse except in enjoining charity, righteousness, or reconciling between people...” 4:114. “Shall I inform you about a deed which is higher in degree than prayer, fasting, and charity? The Sahaba said: ‘Yes, prophet of Allah.’ He said: ‘It is to end a dissension between people’” (i.e., to conciliate between them).

¹⁰⁰ These early Islamic courts were not infiltrated to extremist groups and were simply local institutions for security and arbitration of disputes. The SRC trained its judges and provided office material for most of the courts See Moḥamad Aḥmed Sheikh ‘Ali, “*Ittiḥād al-Maḥākim al-Islāmiyah: Al-Nash’a wa taṭawur wa āfāq al-Mustaqbal* (November 1, 2008), available from

Islamic courts to maintain order and to provide arbitration services to conflicting parties. To implement this objective, the SRC was founded by prominent Islaax figures. The role of the SRC was to provide logistical and organizational support and to raise awareness, utilizing traditional methods and Islamic principles. Moreover, the SRC played the role of the third neutral party necessary for the success of reconciliations, besides providing a neutral venue at the SRC centers, located in most southern regions. In particular, five main centers were very active in Mogadishu (two centers), Kismaayo, Beletweyne, and Baidoa.¹⁰¹ Reconciliation committees were also active in all regions where chapters of Islaax were functioning.

The main structure of SRC consisted of a Board of Trustees (BOT), an Executive Bureau, and regional chapters. The role of the BOT was to fundraise for the reconciliation and to oversee its activities. The types of reconciliation were divided into three complementary levels: grassroots, social, and political.¹⁰² Grassroots reconciliation focused on ceasing conflicts between clans. Naturally, in the absence of state apparatus, any conflict within clan groups easily developed into clan fighting unless traditional conflict resolution was employed. However, “traditional elders and Islamic scholars were drastically weakened in the southern Somalia and their legitimacy was curtailed by the faction leaders.”¹⁰³ Moreover, the conflicts became numerous with the proliferation of armies, and the scope of the conflicts widened with modern transportation and communications. Therefore, traditional leaders lacked both resources and organizational capacity to cope with the magnitude and frequency of these conflicts. Hence, the SRC intervened in support of these traditional leaders empowering them was necessary to contain the conflict and to weaken the authority of the warlords. The provided resources enhanced the capacity of the traditional leaders for local reconciliation, improved their image, and increased their authority. The implication of this undertaking and Islaax’s return in terms of the support

http://somalitodaynet.com/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=88&Itemid=31 (accessed on July 3, 2010). Also, see Bryden, Matt. “*Profile of Somali Islamic Courts*”, October 24, 2006 (unpublished paper).

¹⁰¹ See Andre Le Sage, “Somalia and the War on Terrorism: Political Islamic Movements and US Counter-terrorism Efforts” (PhD diss., Jesus College, Cambridge University, 2004), 171.

¹⁰² Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi, *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*, 20.

¹⁰³ Sheikh Axmad Abarone Amin, former director of SRC interviewed by the author on July 30, 2007. Mogadishu, Somalia.

for its ideology were impressive. This served as a practical learning process of social engagement and culture. Many members of Islaax were involved in the reconciliation, and interacting with the traditional elders improved their network of friends and sympathizers. Sheikh Axmad Abarone, the executive Director of SRC who led Caravan of Reconciliation to Hiiraan region, says:

Hiiraan region was devastated by wars between most of its clans. We have initiated regional approach for reconciliation and initiated comprehensive meeting in our SRC center in Mogadishu. We invited leaders of all eight major clan one by one and finally, held a common meeting of all clan elders and political leaders of Hiiraan clans. Finally, agreements were concluded to travel to Hiiraan and undertake comprehensive reconciliation. A Caravan of Peace carrying more than 100 persons left Mogadishu to Hiiraan and for about a month, we held reconciliation between all clans. All these clans became aware that Islaax was peaceful, promotes reconciliation and does not engage in religious conflict with the traditional Sufi Orders. The leaders of these clans remain friendly to Islaax.

Moreover, Cabdullahi Cali Xayle, one of Islaax leaders who led the Caravan of Reconciliation in the central region, says: “It was great experience to work with the traditional elders and learn their way of conflict resolution. Moreover, our relation with them became intimate and they will no longer confuse Islaax with Itixaad.”¹⁰⁴ Moreover, some of these elders joined Islaax, and some clans became sympathizers of Islaax and encouraged their people to join. Furthermore, while working closely with the traditional elders and scholars in the peace building program, Islaax distinguished itself further from Itixaad, which was engaged in the local wars. In the Somali society, customary law Xeer and Islamic Shari’a are used to manage conflicts between and among clans. Traditional agreements are based on codes designed to prevent conflict and avert an escalation of violent clashes.¹⁰⁵ The conflict resolution process is either mediated directly by the

¹⁰⁴ Sheikh Axmad Abarone, former director of SRC, interviewed by the author on July 4, 2006, Mogadishu, Somalia.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

traditional elders of the two parties or by an accepted third party. SRC followed the traditional conflict resolution mechanism, which included the initial cessation of hostility Colaad-joojin, disengagement of forces Kala-rarid/ Kala-fogeyn, and a ceasefire Xabbad-joojin.¹⁰⁶ Conflict prevention was rarely used; intervention began after conflicts flared, and clan elders from the confronting parties were mobilized to confer at the SRC centers. If these traditional elders failed to reach an agreement, the third accepted party intervened; the SRC always played the role of the third party.

The second level of reconciliation was called “social reconciliation.” Its aim was to conduct workshops, seminars, and lectures. Social reconciliation targeted the intellectuals marginalized during the civil war, most of whom were unemployed and excluded by the warlords from playing any role in the communities. Noticeably, the uneducated warlords and their militia chiefs abhorred the educated elite of their sub-clans and considered them potential competitors for political power. This group of intellectuals included university professors and teachers, government officials, and officers in the military, among others. Many of these intellectuals had no opportunity to meet and discuss social and political issues because of the clan divisions. Many of them were classmates, colleagues, and co-workers. There were no social and cultural activities, and everyone was living secluded in their clan ghettos.¹⁰⁷ The SRC targeted these intellectuals by organizing seminars, symposiums, workshops, and lectures. The reconciliation centers played the role of a social club that these intellectuals frequented and where they organized programs. Some services were provided by the libraries of the centers, such as tea service and reading materials. Of course, most of the materials in the centers were Islamic literature and, in particular, that propagating the MB ideology. For example, according to Abukar Sheikh Nuur, “there were books of Hasan al-Banna, Sayid Qutub, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Fathi Yakum, and many others. Moreover, audio and video facilities were provided to allow the people to listen to hundreds of lectures in the Somali language produced by Islaax scholars.”¹⁰⁸ The impact of social reconciliation was great and lasting. Abukar Sheikh

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Abukar Sheikh Nuur Jimcaale, former Executive Director of the Somali Reconciliation Council (SRC) interviewed by the author on July 15, 2009, Djibouti.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

Nuur Jumcaale, one of SRC directors says: “I remember the first workshop we held in northern Mogadishu where we invited intellectuals from the southern part of the city controlled by General Caydiid. Old friends from armed forces and professors had met in the first time in four years and tears were shed from many of them to see each other alive.”¹⁰⁹ Hundreds of these intellectuals became part of the SRC, and some of them participated in the reconciliation activities between the clans. Moreover, many of them were influenced by the work of Islaax and later joined this organization. As some of these intellectuals became the backbone of the emerging civil society,¹¹⁰ social reconciliation was very successful in mobilizing educated Somalis and connecting them with Islaax as sympathizers or members. As reports demonstrate, from 1994–1996, the SRC conducted 78 local reconciliations in 11 regions, in which 2,710 individuals participated. Moreover, during these three years, 132 lectures and 20 seminars and workshops were conducted.¹¹¹

Reforming Political Wing of the Clans

The third level of reconciliation was political reconciliation. The slogan of this program was “*Man Yuslih al-qaba’il yuslih al-Somal*” (whoever reforms clans reforms Somalia).¹¹² This means that Somalis constitute clans and if the leadership of the clans is reformed, the whole society would be reformed. It is based on a practical bottom-up process. Prior to initiating national reconciliations, local reconciliations had to be bolstered. To achieve that objective, some individuals of Islaax joined their clan-based factions, and others became prominent clan elders. For example, four Islaax members were in the executive of the United Somali Congress-Somali Salvation Alliance (USC/SSA) and were pushing hard for peace and reconciliation.¹¹³ As an example, Maxamad Axmad Beerey, the current vice-chairman of Islaax, became the secretary of education for the USC/SSA and played a great role in Islaax’s educational programs in the area under Cali Mahdi’s control. Maxamad Beerey says: “I learned great deal in joining USC/SSA and serving my community and my organization in very delicate

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Al-Maktab al-Siyāsi, *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*, 22.

¹¹² Ibid., 26.

¹¹³ Maxamad Axmad Beerey, former secretary of education of the USC/SSA, interviewed by the author in August 3, 2009. Hargeysa, Somaliland.

balance.”¹¹⁴ In fact, political reconciliation was the last part of the program and was initiated after acquiring some experience in understanding and dealing with clan culture. Its concept was derived from the practical application of the policy of “dealing with the reality.” In demystifying clans and eliminating clan-phobia, Islaax studied the internal political dynamics of the clans, their factions, and ways in which clans were transformed after the civil war. Of course, in the traditional system, clan elders and Islamic scholars dominated socio-political authority, and only recently have economic factors started playing a role in the urban centers.¹¹⁵ However, after the civil war, two new power centers within the clans emerged, namely the warlords and heads of the armed militia. Therefore, pentagonal power centers were observed in most of the armed clans. The social, economic, military, spiritual, and political groups in these power centers had a specific role to play within the clan. For instance, the social wing was represented by the clan elders, whereas the spiritual wing was represented by traditional Islamic scholars. The economic wing included business people and the Diaspora community, which provided financial contributions for defending the clan and advancing its political agenda. Finally, the most villainous wing was the armed militia responsible for waging various forms of war. The clan faction leader or the warlords were the top leaders and represented their clans in the political arena. When these clan-based factions created a form of administration in their area of influence, Islaax members could participate in such administrations and seek service portfolios in education, health, or reconciliation. Islaax members were banned from any activities that could engage them in war and conflict. The remaining wings were the traditional centers of power of every clan, representing peace and reconciliation. Islaax worked with these wings comfortably.

Reconciliation from Below: Shifting Paradigm

The Somali reconciliation was warlord-driven for 10 years (1991–2000) in a top-down process. These armed factions failed to reach any real peace and restore the state. They have been characterized as “a forgery of reality and a deceptive invention of the failed elites. ... It was observed that, wherever factions were weakened or dissolved, local

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

administration generally emerged.”¹¹⁶ This was the case in Somaliland and Puntland, which succeeded in establishing local administrations after disbanding their armed factions, the SNM and SSDF, respectively. Other than an early conference that was held in Djibouti in 1991, four conferences were considered serious. The first conference in which all faction leaders participated was held in Addis Ababa in March 1993 under the UN sponsorship and funded by the Peace and Life Institute of Sweden.¹¹⁷ The other three major conferences were held in Kenya (1994), Ethiopia (1996), and Egypt (1997). Participation in all these conferences was mainly limited to the warring political factions based exclusively on clan affiliations. Critics of these conferences argued that the reasons for their continual failure were the policy of subversion and sabotage that existed between vying regional actors and the absence of civil society.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, after the continuous failure of these conferences, the image of the factions was tarnished to a great extent, and any possibility of reconciliation was significantly curtailed. Moreover, they lost the support of local people and regional sponsors. On the other hand, modern civil society in Somalia emerged in response to the conditions of the state collapse in 1991. It was also stimulated by the worldwide tendency in the late 1990s toward democratization, which started after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the most significant threshold for modern civil society occurred during the US-led multilateral military intervention in Somalia in 1992 and the subsequent influx of hundreds of international NGOs.¹¹⁹ These NGOs required local partners to reach out to distant locations and to facilitate access to local populations, given the precarious security situation at the time. In addition, UN agencies also needed these partners to implement small-scale development projects. Hence, thousands of Somali NGOs mushroomed throughout the country, many of them as implementing partners. Most of these transient organizations were disbanded with the departure of the international forces and the international NGOs from Somalia in 1995.

¹¹⁶ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Tribalism and Islam: The Basics of Somaliness.” In *Variations on the Theme of Somaliness*, edited by Muddie Suzanne Liluis (Turku, Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001), 236.

¹¹⁷ At the conclusion of this conference, it was agreed that at the next conference, the participants would be representatives of the 18 regions of Somalia, each region sending four delegates, including one woman. However, the next conference failed, and women never participated.

¹¹⁸ Abdullahi, “Tribalism and Islam”, 237.

¹¹⁹ On the emergence of the local NGOs, refer to Abdurahman Rage, “Somali NGOs: A Product of Crisis,” in *Mending Rips in the Sky*, eds. Adam Hussein & Richard Ford (Asmara: Red Sea Press, 1997).

However, some dedicated local NGOs remained in the area of humanitarian operations, with their focus being primarily on education, health, peace advocacy, human rights, and professional networking. These NGOs depended mainly on locally-generated funds and advanced their organizational capacities by networking. Many such NGOs were established by Islaax members, in particular in the field of education and youth development. Therefore, coordinated efforts of the traditional civil society were mobilized under the auspices of the SRC, and modern civil society served to further weaken warlords and prepare Somalia for innovative reconciliation driven by civil society. Indeed, Islaax contributed much to the transformations that were taking place in all sectors of Mogadishu, which had created new dynamics beyond warlord domination.

The new socio-political dynamics in Mogadishu encouraged the Djibouti government to initiate a new reconciliation attempt driven by the civil society, a paradigm shift after 10 years of failed processes. This initiative was a remarkable milestone for political realism as the conference departed from the warlord-driven process, the concept of a “building block,” and radical nationalist perspective.¹²⁰ Consequently, the hitherto underestimated factors of political division such as clans, minorities, religion, and women were accounted for, recognized, and addressed within the power sharing arrangements.¹²¹ Djibouti President Ismail Omar Guelleh, in his capacity as the chairperson of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), articulated in his speech at UN headquarters on September 22, 1999 that any Somali reconciliation conference should be driven by Somali civil society. The Djibouti initiative coincided with the immense mobilization efforts in Mogadishu, which was pioneered by Islaax. Many intellectuals, clan elders, Islamic scholars, and civil society organizations combined efforts to make a difference in Mogadishu. Similarly, Islaax made a breaking-point decision in 1998 to

¹²⁰ For further information on Building Block, see UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network for Central and Eastern Africa (IRIN-CEA), “Somalia, are building blocks the solution?” July 17, 1999. Radical nationalist perspective rejects any form of power sharing on the basis of clans called “Traditional Democracy”. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Women and Traditional Democracy in Somalia: Winning Strategies for Political Ascendancy.” *African Renaissance*. 4: 3 & 4 (2007).

¹²¹ For more information on the women’s participation in the conference refer to Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women’s Political Participation during Four Decades (1959–2000).” *African Renaissance*. 4:1 (2007): 34-54, available from <http://www.scribd.com/doc/15418552/Penetrating-Cultural-Frontiers-in-Somalia-History-of-Womens-Political-Participation-in-four-Decades-19592000> (accessed on July 4, 2010).

work aggressively to recover the Somali state in an innovative way.¹²² As a result, a delegation was sent to Puntland and Somaliland to explore such an idea with the leaders of these two administrations.¹²³ Also, “Mogadishu Reconciliation” was initiated in 1999 before the proclamation of the Djibouti conference. Islaax was the backbone of this reconciliation conference that continued for about 10 months and participants were from all spectrums of people in Mogadishu. Subsequently, Mogadishu was prepared for a reconciliation driven by civil society. Islaax mobilized itself for aggressive participation in the Djibouti conference and reached out to the Djibouti Reconciliation Commission as early in December 1999. A delegation from Islaax visited Djibouti in December 1999 and had the opportunity to meet with President Ismael Omar Guelleh and exchanged ideas on the best way to conduct this conference.¹²⁴ The subsequent Somali Peace Conference was held in Djibouti in two phases. Phase one was inaugurated in March 2000 with the intention of mobilizing ideas and garnering support for the conference from a variety of Somali groups. The second phase was launched on May 2, 2000, and more than 2,500 Somalis participated.¹²⁵ The most difficult issue to be resolved was the criteria for acceptable participation in the conference. There were no political parties to share power, and all Somalis were divided into clans, which had no statistical data that could be considered in approaching power sharing. Therefore, after tedious discussions and consultations concerning all available options, the option of a clan-based representation ultimately prevailed. Although Islaax supported a non-clan approach developed by Cabdulqadir Aadan Cabdulle, this approach was turned down by most of the participants who opted for clan-based power sharing formula.

The formula for political power sharing of 4.5 was based on an accepted temporary agreement until general elections were held and “one person one votes” system replaces clan quota system. Until then, it is very difficult to come up with acceptable and

¹²² Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Islah Movement in Somalia: Islamic Moderation in the War-torn Somalia” (paper presented at the Second Nordic Horn of Africa Conference, Oslo University, 2008), 21.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi interviewed by the author.

¹²⁵ Official delegates numbered 810, consisting of four clan delegations of 180, each including 20 women, and 90 minority clan alliance representatives, including 10 women. Among the 810 delegates, women gained 90 delegate places, or about 9% of the delegates. In addition, more than 1,500 observers were allowed to attend the conference.

legitimate participatory system. The same system was used in Somaliland and Puntland, and, lately, Somaliland political participation transformed its clan-based system into political party system.¹²⁶ Women lobbied for separate clan status because the clans did not include them among their official delegates. Thus, women gained separate clan status with the strong support of the Djibouti President Guelleh, civil society groups and Islaax movement.¹²⁷ As a result, they were able to participate in all aspects of the conference as the sixth clan. The quota system adopted by the conference allocated 44 seats to each of the four major clans; 24 seats to the alliance clans, and 25 seats to women. In addition, 20 seats were designated for selected individuals as an adjustment and reconciliation gesture. Islaax members actively participated in this process and established an operation center in Djibouti. They considered that their major achievements would be: (1) participating in restoring national Somali state, (2) adopting National Charter compliant with the Islamic principles, (3) and gaining respectable number in the national assembly. Islamization of the constitution was a life-long project of Islaax. The new charter was regarded as the most Islamized Constitution in the history of Somalia. It included two important provisions. Article 2.2 states, “Islam shall be the religion of the state and no other religion or ideas contrary to Islam may be propagated in its territory.”¹²⁸ Article 4.4 affirms that “The Islamic Shari’a shall be the basic source for national legislation. Any law contradicting Islamic Shari’a shall be void and null.”

Besides gaining Islamization of the Constitution, members of Islaax became members of the parliament and cabinet ministers. Benefiting from their policy of “dealing with the reality,” they were selected by their clans. Thus, Islaax received 24 seats in the parliament out of 245, which is about 10%. For instance, Dr. Ibrahim Dasuuqi, a prominent medical doctor and Islamic scholar, became an MP. Moreover, Dr. Ali Baasha, a medical doctor and current chairman of Islaax, also became an MP. Nonetheless, Islaax was dismayed with the government in the first few months because of its internal conflicts and lack of

¹²⁶ Somaliland started its institution by clan power sharing; however, it was transformed into a political party system. The law permitted only three parties. Recently, free and fair elections were conducted in Somaliland. A presidential election was held on June 26, 2010.

¹²⁷ Abdurahman Abdullahi, “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of Women’s Political Participation during Four Decades (1959-2000).” *African Renaissance* 4, no. 1 (2007): 34-54.

¹²⁸ See the Article 29 of the Somali Constitution of 1960.

progress. Whatever caused the inaction of the interim government, such as backlash from the 9/11 or Ethiopian opposition, there was no doubt that the regime created in Djibouti failed to meet the high expectations of the Somali people. Nonetheless, the legacy of this conference in creating a new model for traditional democracy remains in history as the best reconciliation ever performed for Somalia. Islaax actively participated in this conference and became politically prominent. One of the ramifications of the conference was: “The Djibouti conference caused Islax [Islaax] to emerge on the political radar of Ethiopia and the United States.”¹²⁹ Probably, Islaax was given more weight because it was assumed that most of the prominent political and business personalities from Mogadishu belonged to Islaax. For instance, the idea was entertained that the elected President Cabdiqasim Salad was an Islaax member, a claim both the president and Islaax repudiate. Other observers characterized the conference, and exaggerated it, as a showcase for Islaax. Matt Bryden wrote, “In early 2000, the Djibouti government’s Arta conference became a showcase for al-Islaax, which threw its political and financial backing behind the peace process and the Transitional National Government that ultimately emerged.”¹³⁰ Therefore, the role of Islaax alarmed Addis Ababa, which considered Islaax an extremist organization affiliated with Itixaad. These concerns were expressed by Matt Bryden, who wrote, “Where Al-Islaax played a key role and managed to secure itself a significant share of seats in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was viewed by Addis Ababa with some alarm.”¹³¹ Discussing the consequences of the Djibouti Reconciliation Conference for Islaax is beyond the scope of this work; however, there is no doubt that the political profile of this organization improved substantially and subsequently exaggerated with its negative ramifications. This consequence is witnessed in the subsequent conference in Kenya in 2004 where Islaax and authentic civil society groups were targeted and excluded from the conference by the organizers dominated by Ethiopia.

¹²⁹ Hansen and Mosley, *The Muslim Brotherhood*, 53.

¹³⁰ Matt Bryden. “No Quick Fixes: Coming to Terms with Terrorism, Islam, and Statelessness in Somalia.” *Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 2003), 39.

¹³¹ *Ibid*; 47.

The Social Strategy and Programs (1992-2000)

With the collapse of the state, almost all national institutions were ruined. The society reverted to a pre-state period in which clan affiliation was the only organization available. There was no central authority to administer justice or provide electricity and water, basic education, or primary health care. In particular, Mogadishu, an urban metropolis, became a ghetto for various sub-clans under the warlords.¹³² In 1991–92, some international organizations and UN agencies provided limited services in the form of primary health care and relief assistance programs. The warlords cared less about essential services and frustrated humanitarian efforts by extorting and looting major part of the assistance. Thus, providing social services was left to the community networks, charity-minded individuals, and organizations. The strong Somali culture of social solidarity networks through relatives and religious communities was in place and saved many lives. Besides, voluntarism, which is part of modern Islamic activism, was revived to a certain extent. In that context, prior to the 1992 conference, Islaax was already managing five schools in Mogadishu and initiated a provision for free medical services.¹³³ The social development strategy or “civil society option strategy”, to borrow from Professor Hussein Adam “Tanzani”, adopted in the 1992 conference was ambitious and offered priority to education.¹³⁴ The major assertion of the strategy was not counting only on the potential capacity of Islaax but envisioned the possibility of mobilizing the entire society to address the education issue seriously and in an innovative way. Andre Le Sage writes, “The promotion of education is one key area of al Islaax activity.”¹³⁵ Dr. Cali Sheikh says, “Islaax’s role in this venture was propagating the idea and setting the role model.”¹³⁶ Providing modern education was seen as an indispensable means for the Islamization program as well for promoting peace and reconciliation in the society. Education aimed to nurture a new generation more committed to the values of Islam, peace, and national

¹³² After the collapse of the state, USC militia divided the city into sub-clan quarters in which every sub-clan militia dominated specific districts and levied an unregulated tax called “*Legio*”.

¹³³ Dr. Ibrahim Dasuqi interviewed by the author.

¹³⁴ See Hussein M Adam. “Political Islam in Somali History.” In *Milk and Peace, Drought and War: Somali Culture, Society and Politics* edited by Markus Hoehne and Virginia Luling (London: Hurst&Company, 2010), 119-135, 130. Also, Al-Maktab al-Siyasi. *Al-Ḥarakah al-Islāmiyah*, 11.

¹³⁵ Andre Le Sage, *Somalia and the War on Terrorism*, 170.

¹³⁶ Dr. Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

vision.¹³⁷ The question was how Islaax should approach this strategic option and raise the necessary financial resources. This section traces the educational initiative of Islaax and provides some examples of institutional models.

Educational Initiative of Islaax

This initiative derived its inspiration from the MB founder Hassan Al-Banna who stated, “Islam liberates the mind, urges contemplation of the universe, honors science and scientists.”¹³⁸ Accordingly, education was considered the central component “for forming human ‘cadres’ and Islamic vanguards bringing up the aspired generation of victory, whose members will understand and believe in Islam in full, including knowledge, work, call and struggle.”¹³⁹ This concept of education repudiates the delineation of human actions into secular and religious spheres. Instead, it emphasizes the concept of comprehensive religion, which addresses the metaphysical world as well as the temporal world. This concept is well articulated in the mission statement of the Mogadishu University, established by Islaax, which seeks “to integrate social and Islamic values, scientific knowledge and technical skills required for sustainable development of Somalia.”¹⁴⁰ Based on that concept, “the purpose of Islamic education is not to cram the pupil’s head with facts but to prepare them for a life of purity and sincerity. This total commitment to character-building based on the ideals of Islamic ethics is the highest goal of Islamic education.”¹⁴¹ It is a holistic educational system that promotes spiritual enrichment and critical thinking.

Accordingly, one Islaax’s objective is “to strive in providing social services like education and health care.”¹⁴² It also developed the concept of “Bottom-up Educational Revolution” (BER), which derives its inspiration from the traditional Somali education

¹³⁷ See Student’s Prospectus (2007–2008): *Ten years of achievement (1997–2007)* (Mogadishu University, 2007), 1.

¹³⁸ See Ḥasan al-Bannā, *The Message of Teaching: article 18*, available from http://web.youngmuslims.ca/online_library/books/tmott/index.htm (accessed on July 6, 2010).

¹³⁹ Yusuf al-Qardawi, *The Priorities of the Islamic Movement in the Coming Phase*, available from http://www.witness-pioneer.org/vil/Books/Q_Priorities/index.htm (accessed on June, 23, 2010).

¹⁴⁰ See Student Prospectus, Mission statement of MU.

¹⁴¹ S. N. Al-Attas, *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), 104.

¹⁴² See the objectives of Islaax, available from http://www.islaax.org/arabic/goals_objectives.htm (accessed on July 4, 2010).

system. This system showed considerable resilience, as it was based on faith and it was deemed necessary to educate children about their religion so that they could exercise Islamic rituals and duties. This education system was completely funded by the community. Therefore, the BER concept is founded to mobilize the entire society to consider the provision and funding of modern education similar to those of the traditional education.¹⁴³

How did Islaax ignite BER? Three elements were applied to mobilize BER: “raising awareness, setting a role model and generating competition.”¹⁴⁴ In setting the role model, Islaax members in all regions were encouraged to form non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and to open schools on a voluntary basis. Most of these schools began small at the perimeters of the mosques, and some were upgraded Qur’anic schools. Opening schools was a responsibility of the Islaax chapters and part of their voluntary Islamic call. Many small schools started through this process and grew with community and Diaspora support. Some of these schools were large and played a pioneering role in Mogadishu. For instance, the school of *Mujama Um al-Qura*, initially supported by the Muslim World League and administered by Islaax members, was the first of its kind in Mogadishu opened in 1993. The student population of the school exceeded 3,000 at all levels by 1995. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, the first 20 students from this school received high school certificates in 1995.¹⁴⁵

Moreover, traditional and modern forms of education were integrated in an innovative way. Two ways of the integration were sought: admitting students to the Qur’anic schools and sending those from the informal Islamic circles to modern schools after admission tests and evaluations. This was easier for such students, as the instruction language of the modern schools was Arabic, and traditional education focuses on learning the Arabic language. In this way, many of these students began their education at intermediate levels or higher. However, the modern education curriculum had to include strong Islamic education and introduce practical Islamic components into the schools such as prayer

¹⁴³ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid.

¹⁴⁵ Carabow Ibrahim, the principal of the school of *Mujama Um Al-Qura*, interviewed by the author on May 18, 2006, Mogadishu, Somalia.

places, safeguarding Islamic values and manners in all activities. Moreover, all types of schools openly benefited from community-funded education. In all ways, it served to promote the educational initiative of Islaax by combining secular and religious education into a new hybrid system that had complementary features. It also served to advance the idea that all segments of the society should participate in education.

The second approach that ignited BER was to generate competition from other Islamic organizations, secularists, and Western donors. In particular, Itixaad, which was entangled in armed conflicts from 1991 to 1997, thought that Islaax's advancement in the field of education was winning the hearts and minds of the society. Thus, in the spirit of competition, Itixaad established many educational institutions. Besides that, competition was making major strides in all regions where education became the new field of clan prestige. As a result, all Somali communities were competing with each other to construct schools and raise funds for education. Also, Diaspora communities contributed to the education projects immensely by providing financial and technical resources. Moreover, competition was ignited between Arabic and English curriculum schools and between Arab-phones and Anglophones. In other words, competition was created between Islamists and secularists. Anglophone schools were encouraged and supported by some Western donors in competition with the Arab-phone ones supported by Islamic charities.¹⁴⁶

The role of Islamic charities and education in Arabic language alarmed many Western circles, in particular after 9/11. Islamic charities “were accused of being a financial channel for terrorist groups, propagating extremist ideology, recruiting Islamic militants, and providing a safe haven for terrorists.”¹⁴⁷ Obviously, educational programs administered by the Islamic organizations attracted less support from Western donors who were promoting Western ideals of secularism. Moreover, Islaax was aware of the lack of sustainability of Arab/Islamic donations based mostly on Islamic emotionalism, as

¹⁴⁶ See Andre Le Sage and Ken Menkhaus. “The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas” (paper presented to the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention Montreal, March 17–20, 2004), available from http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/2/1/pages73214/p73214-1.php (accessed on July 6, 2010).

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 2.

most donors were interested in specific programs such as building mosques, helping orphans, and relief assistance.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, the strategy of Islaax, since its inception in 1992, was founded on self-reliance. Two local sources of funding were activated to establish sustainable education programs: voluntarism of Islaax members and community participation.

The voluntarism component was granted by the Islaax members everywhere, but how could communities be motivated to participate in self-reliance educational programs? The Somali society enjoyed free education from the basics up to the university level during 30 years of Somali state. Therefore, People were not psychologically prepared to pay for the education of their children in the modern schools, although they regularly paid for traditional education. Other than that, unemployed teachers were not prepared for privatization of education. Members of Islaax held successive meetings with teachers and community leaders. Nonetheless, verbal motivation alone without showing the case as a model did not help much. Islaax schools began to charge monthly fees of \$1 dollar per student in 1993. This system of charging fees attracted teachers and schools who considered it a source of employment. Gradually, the fee was increased to \$5–10 for all levels, and teacher salaries rose to \$100–150 per month.¹⁴⁹ The system was self-sustaining and expandable, and hundreds of teachers found employment. Schools opened in every corner, and the education sector became the biggest employer.¹⁵⁰ In that respect, BER had succeeded, and Somali communities were educating their children. Of course, there were great challenges in the form of the absence of a regulatory body, curriculum standardization and certification, and gaining recognition from other countries so that students could attend universities abroad.

¹⁴⁸ Most of the charity givers in the Muslim world knew only traditional means of providing donations such as building mosques, assisting orphanages, digging small wells and so on. Shuayb Cabdulatif Bashiir, the executive director of ZamZam Foundation interviewed by the author in July 2009, 2010.

¹⁴⁹ The self financing schools reached more than 25%. See Le Sage and Menkhaus, 13.

¹⁵⁰ Mogadishu University estimates that more than 50% of its students work in the education sector as part-time teachers. Ibrahim Maxamad Mursal, director of administration, interviewed by the author on May 22, 2009, Mogadishu, Somalia.

To address these challenges, Islaax mobilized institutions and schools to create a national educational network.¹⁵¹ According to Roland Marchal, “The main Islamic NGO at that time (and still today), al-Islaax [Islaax], contacted other schools that shared its orientation and set-up some kind of coordination mechanism.”¹⁵² As a result, Formal Primary Education Networks (FPENS) were established in September 1998 by 14 local and international NGOs that conferred in Mogadishu, and the number grew to 32 charity members by 2002.¹⁵³ Founders of this network were Islaax’s social institutions and other Arab-phone institutions and schools. FPENS played the role of the Ministry of Education in the stateless Somalia. Its mission demonstrated a clear Islamic orientation. Its aims were “to revive destroyed basic education in Somalia with the community initiatives through participatory approach and community ownership concepts. This education shall be internationally competitive, community value-oriented and comprehensive.”¹⁵⁴ By 2000, FPENS was administering 140 schools with a student population of 50,000, mostly from southern Somalia. This number grew to 100,000 by 2004.¹⁵⁵ Moreover, a unified high school certificate was issued, which was recognized everywhere in the world. Sudan was the first country to recognize FPEN’s certificate, and other countries followed suit. This recognition was acquired when the president of the Mogadishu University meet with the former Minister of Culture of Sudan *Abdul-Basid Abdul-Majid* who became instrumental to the Sudanese positive decision on this matter.¹⁵⁶ Indeed, Sudan and Syria were the only two Arab countries who opened their educational institutions for Somali students during the civil war without restrictions. Somali students were treated as equals to the citizens of

¹⁵¹ See Le Sage, *Somalia and the War on Terrorism*, 170.

¹⁵² Roland Marchal, *A Survey of Mogadishu Economy*, 2002, 100 (research commissioned by European Commission, Somali Unit, Nairobi), available from <http://www.delken.ec.europa.eu/en/publications/Mogadishu%20Economic%20Survey-Final%20Report.pdf> (accessed on July 6, 2010).

¹⁵³ Andre Le Sage and Ken Menkhaus, “The Rise of Islamic Charities in Somalia: An Assessment of Impact and Agendas” (Paper presented to the 45th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Montreal, 17–20 March, 2004), 18. For a good description of FPENS also see Saggiomo, *from charity to Governance. Islamic NGOs and Education in Somalia*. Manuscript from the author (to be published on Open Area Studies Journal, Bentham Publishers, in early 2011).

¹⁵⁴ Abdullahi, *Non-State Actors*, 81.

¹⁵⁵ Abdullahi, *Non-State Actors*, 81.

¹⁵⁶ See Inter-peace and Center for Research and Dialogue (CRD). *A dialogue for Peace*, 2006, available from http://www.interpeace.org/pdfs/Publications_%28Pdf%29/Current_Reports/A_Force_for_Change.pdf (accessed on July 5, 2010).

¹⁵⁶ Cali Sheikh Axmed Abubakar interviewed by the author.

these two countries in the field of education. Besides FPENS, a new English-curriculum educational network emerged and competed with FPENS. This network was called Schools Association for Formal Education (SAFE). It was established in 1998 and provided an English and Somali language curriculum “with 234 teachers and employees to an estimated 15,000 students in 30 schools.”¹⁵⁷ Moreover, there were hundreds of independent schools supported by the communities or international NGOs. The end-product of all this competition was a bottom-up educational revolution that took place in every corner of Somalia.

Higher education became a priority by 1995 with the success of establishing educational programs with community support. The problem was to absorb high school graduates to further their education and nurture new educated human resources for the country. The focus of Islaax since 1995 was geared toward establishing a higher education program considered by the community to be in the domain of the state. It was unimaginable, from the public’s point of view, to contemplate opening a university with non-state actors. However, with the dedication and commitment of Islaax, the Mogadishu University was established in 1996, the first of its kind in southern Somalia after the civil war. It generated various levels of competition in the field of higher education. Subsequently, every region opened a university.¹⁵⁸ The Mogadishu University was the biggest in terms of student enrolment, campuses, teaching staff, and international recognition.¹⁵⁹ Although the education quality may not have been satisfactory, the Somali people had established self-reliant programs in the field of education. The president of the Mogadishu University, the former chairman of Islaax, said: “The vision of Islaax is to continue playing the role model and to be the premier in the field of education. Let the competition continue and we push the horizon further. In this way, revolution in field of education is

¹⁵⁷ Le Sage and Menkhaus, *Islamic Charities*, 31.

¹⁵⁸ See 14 universities in Somalia and their ranks, available from <http://www.4icu.org/so/> (accessed on July 5, 2010).

¹⁵⁹ See Universities in Somalia: by 2010 University Web Ranking, available from <http://www.4icu.org/so/> (accessed on July 5, 2010).

taking off.”¹⁶⁰ Some examples of the educational institutions well-known for their leading role in this field are presented below.

Samples of Institutions founded by Islaax

Various organizations were established by Islaax members in all Somali regions; some of these were charities, while others were social organizations such as youth and women development organizations. Some of these organizations were small and regional, while others were national and prominent in the country. Hansen writes that Islaax’s charities “in general are fairly successful and fairly moderate.”¹⁶¹ He adds that these charities “are efficient, and its policies of pacifism almost unique in a Somali setting.”¹⁶² Below, we will depict two selected model samples of the successful institutions, namely, the Mogadishu University and the Tadamun Social Society (TASS).

Mogadishu University (MU)

The idea of establishing MU emerged along with reviving basic education through the community’s initiatives. The initial idea was discussed in 1993 when a number of professors from the former Somali National University and intellectuals belonging to Islaax congregated in Mogadishu. They explored the possibility of establishing continuing education program and to revive one faculty from Somali National University, in particular in Islamic and Arabic studies.¹⁶³ However, the initiative did not succeed at the time because of security challenges.¹⁶⁴ The idea was revived in 1995, and this time the National Institution for Private Education (NIPE) was established to promote community-based education and to further develop the idea of establishing a university by the year 2000. A committee under NIPE, which was formed to study the proposal, approved the creation of MU in 1996. The dream came true when MU was inaugurated on September

¹⁶⁰ Cali Sheikh Axmad interviewed by the author.

¹⁶¹ Hansen and Mesoy, *the Muslim Brotherhood*, 57.

¹⁶² Ibid., 58.

¹⁶³ For more details on the historical development of Mogadishu University, see, Abdurahman Abdullahi, *Non-State Actors*, 72-79.

¹⁶⁴ The University center was looted by militias, see Ibid.

22, 2007.¹⁶⁵ The opening of MU “was a defining moment for the recreation of a nation defiant to despair,” says Ali Sheikh, the president of the University.¹⁶⁶ The first MU campus was located in the former Maxamuud Axmad Cali Secondary School; however, the university constructed its own large campus in Mogadishu with the assistance of the Islamic Development Bank in Saudi Arabia and other donors. It also constructed another campus in Bossaso in 2009. Nevertheless, the road to establishing MU was not easy. Several times, MU was looted and destroyed by the militias; however, it survived against all odds.

MU is the largest university in the war-torn Somalia with seven faculties and 29 specializations.¹⁶⁷ It enjoys international recognition and is a member of a number of regional and international organizations.¹⁶⁸ It ranked among the top 100 universities in Africa.¹⁶⁹ It has two campuses in Mogadishu and Bossaso and runs post-graduate programs in collaboration with Sudanese and Malaysian universities.¹⁷⁰ During the past 13 years, more than 8,000 students were enrolled and about 2,000 students have graduated in different specializations.¹⁷¹ MU places a special emphasis on the education of women and has adopted affirmative action to increase their enrolment. Under a special program called “Young Women Leadership Scholarship (YWLS)”, hundreds of female students received scholarships, which increased their enrolment from 9% in 1997 to 35% by the 2009–2010 academic years.¹⁷²

Finally, MU operates in the epicenter of the Somali conflict and is considered one of the success stories in Somalia during the civil war. It was characterized as a “beacon of

¹⁶⁵ See the official website <http://www.mogadishuuniversity.com/>. Also, Student’s Prospectus (2007–2008), 5.

¹⁶⁶ Cali Sheikh Axmed interviewed by the author.

¹⁶⁷ Abdinoor Abdullahi, *Constructing Education in the Stateless Society: The Case of Somalia* (PhD thesis submitted to the University of Ohio, 2007), 80.

¹⁶⁸ The university is a member of the Federation of Islamic World Universities (FIWU), Association of Arab Universities (AAU), Islamic Universities League, and Association of African Universities (AAU). It had also established bilateral links with Aalborg University in Denmark, Kansas University in the USA, and many others. See Student’s Prospectus (2007–2008), 32.

¹⁶⁹ See 2010 University Ranking: Top 100 Universities and Colleges in Africa, available from <http://www.4icu.org/topAfrica/> (accessed on July 5, 2010).

¹⁷⁰ The post-graduate program is conducted in collaboration with Umm Durman University in Sudan and Open University of Malaysia. See student’s prospectus (2007–2008), 26.

¹⁷¹ See unpublished annual report of MU in the academic year 2009–2010.

¹⁷² Ibid.

hope.”¹⁷³ Without doubt, argues Le Sage, “the success of Mogadishu University has brought a significant degree of attention and prestige to the [Islaax] movement – both from within Somalia and internationally.”¹⁷⁴ Finally, Marian Warsame, a Somali medical doctor from the Diaspora who visited the university in 2002, wrote in the visitor’s book: “This is a group will, a group of Somalis who have vision, ambition and dedication.”¹⁷⁵ Besides providing educational opportunities to thousands of Somalis, MU also promotes Islamic moderation in line with Islaax’s moderate view of Islam. There are four general university requirement courses to familiarize all students with Islam and its contemporary development. These are Islamic Civilization, Contemporary Islamic Issues, Islamic Education, and Islam and State. These four subjects inform all students about Islam, in the same time aiming to diminish Islamic and secular extremism in abundance in Somalia.

Tadamun Social Society (TASS)

Based on the concept of providing services to the society, TASS was established in 1992 by Islaax members who escaped civil war in Mogadishu and returned to their original home in Puntland. Upon establishing this development institution, they distinguished themselves from Itixaad which was a formidable force to reckon with in Bossaso by 1992.¹⁷⁶ TASS was registered with the local SSDF authority and initiated development programs, while Itixaad was engaged in a war with SSDF. According to its profile, TASS is “a non-governmental, non-profit and non-political organization that was established in 1992 by national intellectuals who felt the importance and need in the region of such an NGO.”¹⁷⁷ Its vision is to participate in the building of the Somali society by improving livelihood and restoring the dignity and rights of the Somali people. Its mission is to work toward promoting peace and stability, social development through education, as well as health, water, and disaster preparedness. TASS’s main areas of intervention are education, health, water, youth, and women. It cooperates with a number of UN agencies

¹⁷³ See Abdulatif Dahir, “Varsity strives as beacon of a hope amid chaos”, available from <http://www.upiu.com/articles/varsity-strives-as-a-beacon-of-hope-amid-chaos> (accessed on July 5, 2010).

¹⁷⁴ Le Sage, *Somalia and the War on Terrorism*, 171.

¹⁷⁵ A note of Marian Warsame (MD, Ph.D.), visitor’s book at MU on July 28, 2002.

¹⁷⁶ Abdishakur Mire, *Koboca Islamiyiinta* (unpublished manuscript, 2010).

¹⁷⁷ See the official website of TASS available from <http://www.tadamun.org/> (accessed on July 3, 2010).

such as UNFPA, UNICEF, and ILO. It also partners with the International Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Novib Oxfam, and Mercy-USA. Through donors, TASS carries out projects with an annual budget of \$1.5 million –\$3 million, while 30% of these funds are raised by the Somali community through schools run by TASS.¹⁷⁸ TASS has offices in the main Puntland towns of Bossaso, Garoowe, and Gaalkacyo as well as projects in other regions. Their budget and scope of operations is unparalleled in Puntland.

The major activities of TASS are in the field of education. It runs 17 primary and five secondary schools in seven districts in Puntland, with a combined population of 9,800 students. TASS also promotes women's education and supports five schools in Bossaso through direct sponsorship to 200 female students as well as hires female teachers. Similarly, TASS has trains female school-dropouts in crucial trades such as tailoring, handcrafts, hygiene, first-aid, and cookery. Currently, TASS is training 40 females in computer courses. In the healthcare field, TASS focuses on tuberculosis, which is endemic to Somalia; TASS claims to have cured about 2,014 individuals since 1996.¹⁷⁹ In the field of water management, TASS has drilled 42 hand-dug wells and a number of boreholes. In the field of Islamic work, it runs a number of Qur'anic schools and mosques. TASS is a model of "Al Islaax's ability to provide these services on a private basis, using funds donated by activists and private sector business models, and with minimal foreign assistance, is a strong demonstration of the potential success of their platform for change."¹⁸⁰

Conclusion

In the turbulent time since the collapse of the Somali state in 1991, the entire society drifted into radicalism and was polarized into clans. Clan-based armed factions could not agree on any peaceful political settlement. The formation of an interim government was the beginning of successive fighting between various factions, including within the USC.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Andre Le Sage, "Somalia and the War on Terrorism: Political Islamic Movements and US Counter-terrorism Efforts" (PhD diss., Jesus College, Cambridge University, 2004), 182.

In the northern part, SNM proclaimed a separate state in May 1991. An unprecedented humanitarian effort in response to the disaster in southern Somalia aroused the international community, and UN forces were dispatched to Somalia in 1992. Without a doubt, the presence of the UN forces saved lives, weakened warlords, and promoted civil society and the business sector. Nevertheless, these forces were evacuated in 1995 without leaving behind any form of functioning governance.

During this difficult time, Islaax adhered to its principles of peaceful reform in a violence-tempting atmosphere. Islaax promoted an anti-war and pro-reconciliation platform in 1991–1992. Yet, its attempts to establish a common Islamic Front with other Islamic organizations failed. Therefore, acting alone, Islaax developed a new organizational style and remodeled its recruitment process. Moreover, it offered special care to its members through solidarity and charity networks and extended that service to the public. As a result, new branches were established in all regions and in the Diaspora. During its first conference in July 1992, some misunderstandings were resolved regarding safeguarding the internal unity of Islaax. The rebirth of Islaax brought a new political and social strategy and a decentralized form of organization.

The political strategy of Islaax consisted in an innovative model of political participation that was flexible, doable, and appropriate in a chaotic situation. Accordingly, a policy of political realism was embraced. The aim of the policy was to consider Islamic activities without restrictions and transform them into a dynamic process that changed with shifting conditions, time, and space. This policy alleviated the clan-phobia among the members of Islaax and emboldened them to participate in the social affairs of the communities. Two complementary programs were initiated for political participation. A collective program was conducted through the SRC and individual efforts of the members who joined existing political entities. The mobilization efforts of Islaax within traditional and modern civil society in 1995–1999 culminated in the Reconciliation Conference held in Djibouti in 2000. Islaax's role was prominent, and it had succeeded in effectively restoring the national Somali state and the Islamization of the charter, and had 10% of the deputies in the National Assembly.

The social strategy of Islaax formulated at the 1992 conference was to mobilize the entire society in a “Bottom-up Educational Revolution,” inspired by sustainable, traditional systems of education regarding ownership and financing. Three combined approaches were used for this venture: raising awareness, setting up a role model, and generating competition. However, the sustainability of these programs depended on the success of the self-reliance and prioritization of education within communities. Fierce competition that took place between various groups, and demand for education grew extensively, which further expanded the education sector. This sector became the biggest employer in Somalia. Islaax-established institutions advanced the horizon of competition further. The Mogadishu University, the largest higher educational institution in Somalia, and TASS in Puntland are clear examples of such successful institutions.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion and the Aftermath of 9/11

Conclusion of the Research

History is a subjective process of recreating past occurrences, but it is also a matter of perspective depending on some theoretical assumptions. Thus, modern Somali historiography is dominated by the schools of modernization and dependency theory, both of which offer perspectives that are rooted in secular Western philosophies. These two perspectives view Islam from the margins of history and through Orientalist and secularist discourses and security perspectives. This dissertation sought to reconstruct the history of the Islamic movement and its evolution in the period (1950-2000). The perspective employed departed from these two perspectives and adopted instead a post-colonial framework. Post-colonialism is a useful means of confronting the residual effects of colonialism on the cultures of the colonized people and provides space for multiple voices. It allows revisiting a formerly constructed history of Islam and narrating its modern development from the local viewpoint. Besides post-colonialism, this dissertation was informed by two other theoretical discourses. The first theory was the Khaldunite theory of Asabiyah, founded on the premise that tribal societies can establish functional states only by making use of some “religious coloring”, thereby giving a distinctive character to and exerting an influence on the society. “Coloring” is a general term that may be interpreted in different ways, but here we meant it to convey seeking legitimacy through making supreme reference to Islam. Thus, this dissertation argues that it is very difficult to recover the collapsed Somali state without addressing the hitherto conflicting Somali equation of clan, Islam, and the state in a new social contract. This social contract should provide comprehensive reconciliation between all the components of tradition and modernity. The second discourse in this dissertation was the road map of social movement theory applied to the Islamic movement as part of the similar global social phenomenon in terms of the mechanism of activism and collective actions. It traces the

multiple crisis factors introduced by the Western modernity during colonialism and in the post-colonial state, which provoked various Islamic responses in different historical contexts. These include the responses that grew radical whenever radical policies were applied in the form of external armed intervention or radicalized secularism. In particular, the theory of social movement is utilized in keeping the orientation of the historical reconstruction and analysis of the Islaax movement through difficult decades of social and political turbulence in Somalia.

Islam, according to the successive Somali constitutions, is the religion of the state and society. Its introduction to Somalia is argued to have taken place in the early years of the Muslim migration to Abyssinia. However, historians agree that Islam was practiced in Somalia and reached its different parts peacefully through trade and migration in the first century of the Muslim calendar (700-800 AD) registering mass conversion between eleventh and thirteenth centuries AD. Nonetheless, in the eighteenth century with improved systems of Islamic education, increased settlement and urbanization, and revitalization of the Sufi orders, Islam was revived strongly. Two major centers of Islamic learning have developed: the Banaadir coastal cities and the Harrar areas in western parts of Somali people's territory.¹ From these centers, Islamic education and Sufi orders were being revived, reorganized, and spread throughout Somalia. The impact of the Sufi orders in Somalia is enormous; their emergence diluted the rigid clan divisions and proved the irrelevance of clan affiliations in the Sufi leadership. In their countering the colonial regime, both militancy and moderation were used as they suited the conditions in the northern and southern parts. The result of their concerted efforts is that Somalia remains a mainstream Sunni territory with a unified Shafi'i school of jurisprudence. The modern development of the Islamic consciousness should be seen as historical evolution that includes a range of responses to the challenges from specific tensions – colonial incursion and its harsh policies. It was also concurrent with the growing nationalism in the second

¹ I use the term "Somali people's territory" as non-political term disregarding various names given by different countries and groups. This geographical area is inhabited by the Somalis, and was annexed by Ethiopia in the 19th century. It is had been given many names such as Ogaden (by colonial powers and Ogaden clan members), Western Somalia (official name used by Somali government), and, currently, after the establishment of the Ethiopian Federation, it is given by Ethiopia the name of the Somali State of Ethiopia.

half of the twentieth century. Both of these ideologies – Islam and nationalism – constitute identities that shaped the modern history of Somalia overtaking the traditional system that was gradually declining. Within this system, a new form of Islamic movement emerged in successive stages.

Modern development of moderate Islamism in Somalia began with the rising Islamic consciousness in the 1950s being a product of both Nasserism with its Arab nationalism project and the opposing Egyptian MB ideology. Nasserism offered Arabic-language-based education and Islamic culture, which strengthened Somali capacity to counter Western acculturation in the 1950s and 1960s and implanted the early Islamic consciousness. Somalia, being a geopolitically strategic backyard of the Egyptian Nile River and Suez Canal waterways, received special Egyptian consideration, reciprocated with Somali irredentism that needed to secure Egyptian support against Ethiopia. However, within Nasser's rigorous Arabization agenda, the MB has quietly introduced its ideology and Islamic activism by 1953. Moreover, moderate Islamism is also a reaction to the Christianization and Westernization of elite culture that became evident in the 1950s. It is not against modernity, broadening its definition from exclusively denoting Western European culture to cosmopolitan and acknowledging "multiple modernities," a post-colonial perspective.² Concerted activities of the Christian missionaries such as the Mennonite Mission, Sudan Interior Mission, and Roman Catholic Mission led to immense Islamic agitation and provoked various responses. The early reaction was pioneered in the 1950s by the organization of the Islamic League founded by Shariif Maxamuud Cabdiraxman in southern Somalia and *Hizbu Allah* of Sayid Axmad Sheikh Muse in northern Somalia. These organizations promoted Arabic and Islamic studies and invigorated Somali connections with the Arab world, in particular, Egypt.

The role of Islam in the state after the independence in 1960 remained much the same since the Somali nation-state inherited colonial system of laws and administration even though the new Somali constitution accepted Islam as the state religion. In practical

² See Gerard Delanty, "Modernity." *Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Sociology*, edited by George Ritzer. 11 vols (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2007). See also, Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. *Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities*, 2 vols (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2003).

application, however, Islam was not adopted as the ultimate reference for the state and played a peripheral role in the modern Somali state similar to that in other post-colonial Muslim nation-states. This means that despite the societal Islamic practice, the post-colonial state has been quasi-secular (cilmaani Uyaal), in the post-independence era and secular (cilmaani) during the military regime. The dissimilarity between the two periods is that Somali Constitution of 1960 indicated that the state was not secular; however, the way of life continued the secular trends prevalent during the colonial era. On the other hand, the ideology of Socialism adopted during the military regime that negated Islamic values qualifies the military regime as secular regime. After the independence, the secular trend of the state was challenged by the Islamic organization of Nahdah in 1967, which continued early Islamic scholars' efforts with more robust organization, wider activities, higher capacity, and closer attachment to the MB ideology. Moreover, besides mounting secularism and Christianization, American Peace Corps with their counter-cultural activities of the 1960s irritated many young Somalis. Some of the young generation mimicked Western cultures whilst others created defensive counter-culture organizations such as Waxdah in the north and Ahal in south in the late 1960s. The culmination of these defensive efforts produced the phenomenon known as "Islamic awakening" whereby young generation became more committed to the religious values and engaged in various Islamic activities.

With the growth of the Islamic awakening to counter Christianization, Westernization, and secularism by the mid-1960s, the harmonious Somali society in which religious and secular leaders collaborated, tradition and modernity coexisted, and tolerance and dialogue were exercised began to falter and fall apart. The seed of the new societal conflict implanted since the early colonial rule was bearing its sour fruits after long process of gestation in reshaping the society. As a result, traditional leaders were integrated into the colonial system and Islamic scholars were contained and marginalized. Thus, the resurgence of new Islamic elites in the 1960s was a revival of early Islamic resistance to the Western culture with new peaceful approach and modalities. Following the footsteps of similar movements in the Arab world, in particular in Egypt, Somali Islamists established the organization of Nahdah in 1967. It came out to the limelight after

the defeat of Arab armies in the 1967 war with Israel. This humiliating defeat set off a wave of soul-searching among Arabs and Muslims and demanded new ideology to take the place of the defeated Arab nationalism. Hence, the suppressed MB ideology took extraordinary prominence and received massive followers among Arab masses. The defeat also changed Egyptian political landscape inimical to MB after the death of '*Abdel Nāsser* in 1970 and the reign of *Anwar al-Sādāt*. President Sadat pioneered new more liberal period and released long-imprisoned MB members. As a result, the decade of the 1970s became a golden decade of Islamic moderation and revivification of the peaceful MB methodology of the Islamic call. Islamism in Somalia also was boosted and intensified because of the indirect influence of the Egyptian MB and generous literature published during the economic boom in the Gulf States. Likewise, the military takeover in Somalia in 1969, adoption of Socialist ideology, and secularization programs provoked Islamic awakening already in motion in the 1960s. The major milestone of Islamist reaction in Somalia was the adoption of the secular Family Law in 1975 and the subsequent execution of 10 Islamic scholars. This occurrence was a defining moment in the history of Somalia in creating severe fracture in the societal fabric and heralding the clash of the military regime with the embryonic Islamic movement. The ramifications of this tragic event were far-reaching in terms of the fragmentation and radicalization of the budding Islamic movements. Moreover, the shock of the defeat of the Somali army in the war with Ethiopia in 1978 became another factor that instigated soul-searching. Likewise, the defeat of the Arab forces in 1967 war with Israel, the aftermath of the defeat in the war with Ethiopia in 1978, Somalia crossed the threshold to new hard phase of its history. From there, internal upheaval commenced and armed opposition movements and Islamic organizations were rallying for public support.

In the local context, Islamic moderation was gradually challenged after the military coup of 1969. The implication of harsh military regime's policies of curbing moderate Islamic activism and imprisoning prominent Islamic scholars in 1975 led to the underground Islamic movement run by young generations cut off from the proper guidance of Islamic scholars. Hence, misunderstanding and misinterpretation of Islam occurred, and young Islamic activists were vulnerable to embracing looming Takfiir ideology. On the other

hand, many students who fled the country after 1975 were welcomed in Saudi Arabia and given admission in the Saudi universities where they received Salafia indoctrination. Within a couple of years, hundreds of the graduates from these universities were offered well-paid jobs as Islamic preachers and were sent back to Somalia carrying with them ample Islamic literature. This literature was aiming to implant Salafism and Hanbali jurisprudence creating Islamic conflict with the traditional Islam based on Ash'ariyah theology, Shafi'i jurisprudence, and Sufism. Salafia preachers called for what is termed the "Salafia theology" and considered Ash'ariyah and Sufism dangerous heresies. Moreover, new Islamic centers and mosques were built to serve as the staging sites for spreading Salafism. With its economic well-being, higher education opportunities, better and bigger mosques, and job opportunities, the Salafia movement attracted a large following in the 1980s. Moreover, connecting to the ideologies in the Muslim world, the extremist Takfiir ideology was introduced in Somalia and found a welcoming environment in the initial period. The reason was that, besides weak Islamic education among young Islamic activists, the higher echelon of leadership of Ahal such as Cabdulqaadir Sheikh Maxamuud and other prominent leaders embraced Takfiir ideology and induced young members of Ahal to follow suit. The Somali Islamic awakening could be characterized during the 1970s as immature with an emotional attachment to the Islamic ideology, very low organizational capacity, meager economic resources, and romantic approach to social and political realities.

In the global context, by the end of the 1970s, Islamic moderation was challenged with the triumph of the Iranian Revolution, which gave new hope for the possibility of establishing Islamic order through revolutions. This trend also was strengthened by the reign of General Ziaul-Haq in Pakistan in 1979, which came to power through military coup initiating rigorous Islamization programs. The success in establishing Islamic order by means of revolution or military coup compared with little progress made by the peaceful and gradual means had attracted many Islamists. Moreover, two other events in the 1970s and early 1980s were highly instigative for the radicalization of Islamism. First was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the beginning of the global Islamic Jihad against Communist expansion. The Jihad of Afghanistan was greatly encouraged and

supported by the conservative Arab countries, the Western countries, and Islamic movements. However, its impact in planting the seed of extremism and violence became unprecedented. From there, the idea of Al-Qaida was developed, nurtured, and spread to the entire world. Secondly, the other important radicalization factor of the Islamic response was the signing of a peace treaty with Israel by the late president of Egypt *Anwar al-Sādāt* in 1981. This unpopular treaty traumatized Muslim masses and divided Arab countries, eventually causing the assassination of *Sādāt* by militant Egyptian Islamic group. All above-stated occurrences had ushered in a new era of the upsurge of extremism in the Muslim world in the 1980s.

Within these local and global contexts of rising Islamic banners, revolutionary ideologies, Islamic armed groups, and extremism, the Islaax Movement was founded on July 11, 1978, 50 years from the time the MB was established in Egypt in 1928. It was germinating 25 years since the first footstep of MB in Somalia in 1953. The timing was appropriate, being immediately after the Somali defeat in the war with Ethiopia in 1978, and the organization proclaimed itself a peaceful Islamic opposition to the regime in contrast to the growing armed oppositions. Nonetheless, Islaax was challenged by the military regime, growing Salafism, and competing Egyptian and Sudanese Islamic movements since 1982. The military regime undertook a ruthless agenda of destroying the Islaax base in Saudi Arabia, where the founders of this movement worked and studied. It also offered special attention to its activities inside the country in partnership with the Egyptian intelligence which trained and coached its counterpart in Somalia. Nonetheless, albeit the regime's efforts curtailed Islaax's local activities, they failed to eliminate its base in Saudi Arabia and its activities in the Diaspora. Moreover, the Salafia movement initiated as successor organization of Ahal, renamed itself as Jamaaca Islaamiyah and transformed into Itixaad in 1983. The creation of Itixaad was encouraged by the Sudanese Islamic Movement and its prolific leader *Ḥassan al-Turābi* who deserted the International MB led by Egyptian MB in 1982. *Ḥassan al-Turābi* undertook a plan of creating an African Islamic movement attached to Sudan rivalling Egyptian MB. Somalia was given priority in *al-Turābi*'s agenda, and after numerous failed attempts to create a unified Islamic organization from all shades of ideologies, Islaax was singled out to be

isolated because of its linkage with the International MB. Moreover, moderate local MB organizations such as Ikhwan and Waxdah were weakened by either unifying with Itixaad or frustrating their potential unification with Islaax to bolster Islamic moderation. No doubt, the *Turābi* factor played destructive role in weakening Islamic moderation and promoting armed Islamic extremism, in particular when *Usāma bin Lāddin* lived in Sudan. It could be argued that while Ethiopia was encouraging, hosting, and fragmenting Somali secular armed oppositions, al-*Turābi* was following the same strategy with the Islamic organizations. Radicalization of clans, represented by numerous armed factions such as SSDF, SNM, USC, and SPM, and radicalization of Islamism, represented mainly by Itixaad, were the general features in Somalia since the 1980s.

The formative period of Islaax from 1978 to 1990 was hard and demanding. The early organizational weaknesses were evident, but throughout time, Islaax was improving its organizational capacity and sharpening its strategy and programs. Its main achievements in the first decade were adhering to its methodology of Islamic moderation in a volatile and turbulent society and gaining membership in the International MB in 1987.

Moreover, major public activities were the issuance of the Islamic Manifesto in 1990, the procurement of humanitarian assistance in the northern debacle in 1988, and the attempt to form a united Islamic Front. The latter project failed because of the continued fragmentation of the Islamic organizations and weakness in coping with the upsurge of extreme clanism. After the collapse of the state in 1991, Islaax undertook a strategic policy of abstaining from the roving civil wars, raising the awareness among the population and its members of the calamity, focusing on humanitarian assistance and developmental programs, and sustaining its peaceful reform programs in a very difficult terrain of conflict and fighting.

During the difficult decade of the civil war in the 1990s, Islaax adhered to its principles of peaceful reform in a violence-appealing atmosphere and promoted an anti-war and pro-reconciliation platform. Acting alone after the failure to establish an Islamic front, Islaax developed a new organizational style and remodeled its recruitment process. Moreover, it offered special care to its members through solidarity and charity networks and extended that service to the public. As a result, new branches were established in all regions and in

the Diaspora. Islaax's first conference after the civil war of 1992 is considered to be its second rebirth that brought a new political and social strategy and a decentralized form of organization.

The socio-political strategy of Islaax in 1992-2000 was flexible, doable, and appropriate in the chaotic and segmented societal conditions. The political component oozes from reviving the policy of "political realism" aimed to carry out Islamic activities more assertively and transforming this policy into a dynamic process changeable with the shifting conditions, time, and space. The policy of "political realism" alleviated habitual clan-phobia prevalent among members of Islaax through years of underground activities and emboldened them to participate in social and political affairs of the society. Islaax programs of institutionalized reconciliation, participation in the community activities and civil society work offered them experience that was tapped during the first National Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti driven by the civil society in 2000. The prominent role of Islaax in the Djibouti Peace process achieved primary strategic objective that is Islamization of the National Charter and offered respectable political participation of 10% of deputies in the National Assembly. In its social strategy, the "Bottom-up Educational Revolution," inspired by the sustainability of the traditional system of education in view of the fact that it is owned by the community was emulated and reproduced. The three approaches used by Islaax to promote grassroots education initiative was raising awareness, setting a role model, and generating competition among all groups. Because of societal cultural insights, educational initiative triggered fierce competition between various groups, and Islaax-established institutions advanced the horizon of that competition further. Mogadishu University, the largest higher educational institution in Somalia, stands as the symbol of this venture whilst Tadamun Charity ranks at the top of the non-state actors in Puntland.

Finally, despite the first half of the 1990s was very difficult in terms of the voracity of the civil war; the second half presents a different picture. In the first part of the decade, Islaax laid its organizational and strategic foundation of the social reform programs and political participation modalities. Nonetheless, the practical implementation of these programs occurred in the second half of the decade. The landslide change of the decade happened

with the international intervention of 1992-95, which promoted economic recovery, emergence of civil society networks, and weakening of the ruthless warlords. The end product of the accumulative effect of this decade was the weakening of all forms of extremism—Islamic and clannish, promotion of moderation, and establishment of some administrations such as Somaliland and Puntland. Moreover, the experience of establishing administrations in Somaliland in 1991 and Puntland in 1998 encouraged a paradigm shift of Somali reconciliation from warlord-driven to civil society-driven. In 1999, the time was ripe for a new round of Somali reconciliation held in Djibouti in 2000, which was highly successful in restoring Somali ownership, adopting comprehensive national Charter that integrated all Somali equations—Islam, clan, and the state and to recover the national Somali state. The role of Islaax in the reconciliation conference was prominent and complementary to the leadership and organizational skills of the Djibouti authority.

Finally, Islaax's peaceful credentials in tumultuous period of Somalia are credited to its approach of Islamic moderation, internal democracy, level of education of its members, and its culture of collective leadership. Following table illustrate the four chairmen of Islaax elected in the last 33 years and their qualifications.

Name of the Islaax leaders (1978-2010)	Term in the office	Qualifications and current status
Sheikh Maxamad Nuur Geryare	1978-1989	BA in Islamic Studies in 1965, Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. He was director of Islamic affairs, Ministry of Islamic affairs (1969-1973). Currently lives in Toronto, Canada.
Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim	1989-1999	PhD in Hadith Science in 1994, Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia, expelled from <u>Islaax</u> in 2006 after joining Union of Islamic Courts

		defying non-violence <u>Islaax</u> policy. Currently, he is a member of the Transitional Somali Parliament.
Professor Cali Sheikh Axmad Abubakar	1999-2008	PhD in Islamic Studies in 1984, Islamic University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. Currently, he is the President of Mogadishu University.
Dr. Cali Basha Cumar	2008-2013	Medical Doctor in 1976 specialized in ophthalmology and lectured in the Medical Faculty of Somali National University, former member of the Somali Parliament (2000-2008)

Table 6. The four chairmen of Islaax and their qualifications

Somalia in the Aftermath of 9/11 Terrorist Attack

In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Bush administration's proclamation of the Global War on Terrorism, Somalia was listed among the states that are potential havens for terrorism. Moreover, the United States included Al-Barakaat Group Co. (a Somali company), the *Al-Haramain* charity (a Saudi charity operating in Somalia), and the Itixaad Islamic Movement on its list of suspected terrorist organizations.³ The first victim of the Global War on Terrorism was the Transitional National Government (TNG) claimed to have in its ranks many Islamists. Moreover, the TNG, in which Islaax invested a great amount of

³ "On 23 September 2001, less than two weeks after the 9/11 terrorism attacks in the U.S., President George W. Bush signed Executive Order 13224, which blocked the assets of 27 organisations and individuals linked to terrorism. Tenth on the list was a little-known Somali organisation, *al-Itihaad al-Islaami* (AIAI)". See, International Crisis Group, *Somalia's Islamists* (Africa Report N°100 – 12 December 2005), available from <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somalias%20Islamists.ashx>. Also, see Abdurahman Abdullahi, "Recovering the Somali State: the Islamic Factor." In *Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa*, edited by A. Osman Farah, Mammo Mushie, and Joakim Gundel (London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007), 196-221, 196. However, on August 27, 2002, US removed from its list of designated terrorist list. See Terrorist Financing Staff Monograph, *Al-Barakaat Case Study: The Somali Community and al-Barakaat*, available from http://www.9-11commission.gov/staff_statements/911_TerrFin_Ch5.pdf (accessed on August 25, 2010), 85.

effort, became dysfunctional because of many factors, including low capacity of leadership and the opposition of the warlords supported by Ethiopia. Furthermore, the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the agenda of the Global of War on Terrorism assisted Ethiopia for a new round of reconciliation conference that would empower the warlords. In this situation, even though the TNG was falling apart and was not resisting enough to the Ethiopian/warlord agenda, Islaax, along with other civil society groups, were adamantly poised to defend the achievements of the Djibouti Peace process. Apparently, the political gambit was for the advantage of warlord domination and the Ethiopian agenda. As a result, the IGAD-sponsored Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process discriminated against and excluded Islamic organizations and prominent Somali civil society figures. Wrapping up, the exclusive warlord-dominated conference was concluded with the formation of the Transitional Federal Institutions and outright triumph of the Ethiopian agenda. Nevertheless, the warlord triumph proved short-lived with the internal conflicts of the assembly members and government, lack of governance capacity, and rampant corruption that paralyzed the recovery process of the state institutions.

Moreover, USA counter-terrorism covert operations offered financial and political support to the former warlords who established “The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism”.⁴ This alliance was aiming to uproot Mogadishu-based Islamists; notably the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in February 2006. However, this undertaking provoked an unprecedented upsurge of Islamic rage in Mogadishu under the UIC leadership, and the US-backed warlord program was aborted and dissipated. Thus, the political environment of Somalia changed dramatically with the outright victory of the UIC over the warlords and their uncontested power in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions. Nevertheless, the jubilation of the UIC was also short with the impasse of the peaceful dialogue in Sudan and escalation into a total war participated by the Ethiopian military with tacit US support. The UIC was defeated within a short time at the end of 2006, and a new round of resistance against Ethiopia began with various forces of different agendas.

⁴ The alliance consisted of 8 Mogadishu based warlords. See “[Somali warlords hold 'secret anti-terrorism' talks with US agents: witnesses](#)”, *Agence France Presse*, February 28, 2006.

Islamic moderation and peaceful reform of Islaax expressed by its approach and performance had been strongly challenged again with the triumph of the UIC in Mogadishu. All Islamic organizations and many clan-based forces in Mogadishu except Islaax and the Sufi orders had joined hands and participated in this venture. It had also been supported by the most Somalis in the Diaspora influenced by the skilful use of the media outlets by the UIC supporters. Nonetheless, Islaax, being an organization with a track record of peaceful Islamic work, had publicly turned down to join the Jihadist project. On the other hand, the UIC clever use of Islamic, nationalistic, and clan mobilization tactics had attracted great popular support, and Islaax was temporarily isolated and looked at as unfaithful to its Islamic and nationalistic agenda. Moreover, some members of Islaax, departing from the policy and the program of their organization, were fascinated by the impressive success of the UIC and joined it. This situation pressured Islaax leadership to take strong public action in distinguishing themselves from the UIC and to expel from Islaax's ranks all persons who joined the UIC, including its former chairman Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim.⁵ This undertaking caused Islaax high security risk to its members and institutions, and as a result, its activities were restricted, festivities banned, and some of its prominent members were assassinated or displaced.⁶ During this difficult period, Islaax continued its program of reconciliation and tried to broker peace between the UIC and the government; nevertheless, this effort failed miserably by the rejection of the UIC.⁷ Thus, Islaax with its insightful understanding of the situation, personalities involved in the UIC, and looming extremist ideologies, adamantly and consistently distanced itself from their venture.

After the defeat of the UIC, oppositions gathered in Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, and Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) was formed in September 2007. Islaax also refused to be part of ARS and while continuing condemning Ethiopian

⁵ See Islaax Communiqué on 21/6/2006 of the expulsion of Dr. Mohamed Ali Ibrahim from Islaax, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan21-6-06.htm> (accessed on August 14, 2010).

⁶ See Islaax Communiqué on 17/8/2006 on the banning Islaax festivities organized to commemorate its 28th anniversary, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan%2017-8-2006.htm> (accessed on August 14, 2010).

⁷ See Islaax Communiqué on 22/7/2006 on the formation of reconciliation committee between the UIC and the TFG, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan22-7-06.htm> (accessed on August 14, 2010).

intervention and Transitional Federal Government policies.⁸ It persistently remained firm in its policy of supporting Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) considered to be necessary for the existence of the Somali state. In maintaining this delicate balance of refusing to seek foreign power assistance to gain political power and objecting to all forms of violence among Somalis, which both the Transitional Federal government and the oppositions of ARS were exercising, Islaax remained true to its principles of moderation. Moreover, it also encouraged reconciliation between the TFG and ARS held in Djibouti in 2009, which finally produced new TFIs that combine former TFG and ARS. However, the precipitate reconciliation process sponsored by the United Nations proved ineffective, and TFIs remain dysfunctional under the protection of African forces (AMISOM). On the other hand, Al-Shabab, an extremist group ideologically affiliated with Al-Qaida, is in control in most regions of southern Somalia and extends its terrorist attacks to Uganda, threatening other African countries that are contributing troops to Somalia security mission.

In the final remarks, since its inception in 1978, Islaax had passed through four historical periods where its existence was endangered or its peaceful programs were in jeopardy; yet, all of these attempts had failed. The first period was in 1983 when the government of Somalia devised a plan to uproot Islaax leadership from Saudi Arabia. The basic strategy was to convince the Saudi authority that Islaax poses danger for its national security and the leaders of this movement should be extradited to Somalia. Undoubtedly, the aim was to be able to apply the national security law warranting them death penalty. The second period was when *Ḥasan al-Turābi*, the leader of the Sudanese Islamic movement, attempted to unify all Islamic organizations with different ideologies in 1992. If this strategy had succeeded, Islaax would have either been divided or become part of Islamic militancy in Somalia.⁹ Indeed, the tendency of rapprochement with the armed Itixaad and

⁸ See Islaax Communiqué on 26/7/2006 on the Ethiopian Intervention in Somalia, available from <http://www.islaax.org/arabic/bayaan26-7-06.htm> (accessed on August 14, 2010).

⁹ A similar process happened to Waxdah, which after uniting with Jamaaca Islaamiyah and forming Itixaad, was divided and weakened.

drifting toward militarism had some minority support within Islaax leadership.¹⁰ The third period was after 9/11 when Ethiopia attempted to put all Islamic organizations including Islaax under the umbrella of Itixaad listed among the terrorist organizations.¹¹ Finally, the most dangerous moment for Islaax was during the UIC uprising in Mogadishu, which Islaax snubbed to participate in. Subsequently, Islaax was depicted through propaganda machine of the UIC as having pro-government, pro-Ethiopian, and anti-Islamic agenda. This situation deteriorated drastically when some former Islaax leaders joined the UIC, led UIC delegation and were expelled from the organization.¹² During this difficult time, Islaax was in the bottleneck, caught between Somali Islamic extremists and Ethiopian strategic venture in Somalia. Nonetheless, through all these dangerous historical moments, Islaax has survived with its peaceful method intact and its organization sustaining and developing.

To conclude, the phenomenon of Islamic extremism in Somalia is part and parcel of the Jihadist worldwide project undertaken by al-Qaida and its associates. Somalia's extremism is thus simply an extension of that global Jihadist movement, which depends on the global sponsors for the leadership, inspiration, guidance, and resources. Reducing Islamic extremism in Somalia depends on success in the other fronts such as Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq. Indeed, extremism will not be solved by military might alone and requires concerted efforts of the countries in the region and a combined strategy that includes promoting Islamic moderation, raising the awareness of the population, establishing responsible state institutions, providing educational opportunities and jobs for the young generations, promoting a democratic system of governance, and minimizing provocative policies such as foreign military interventions. In these efforts, Islaax's vision of Islamic moderation, its inclusive approach to politics, its educational programs, and its long-standing track record in these spheres is great asset for Somalia's future recovery

¹⁰ Some leaders during this period, in particular the chairman of Islaax Dr. Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, his financial officer Cabdulcaziz Xaaji Axmad, and Sheikh Nuur Baaruud, were very supportive of establishing training camps and cooperating with Itixaad. Xassan Xaaji Maxamuud, interviewed by the author.

¹¹ See Medhane Tadesse, *Al-Itihad: Political Islam and Black Economy in Somalia: Religion, Clan, Money, and the Struggle for Supremacy over Somalia* (Addis Ababa: Meag Printing Enterprise, 2002).

¹² Former leaders of Islaax such as Maxamad Cali Ibrahim, Cabdulcaziz Xaaji Axmad, and Sheikh Nuur Baaruud, who joined the UIC and were expelled from Islaax, were the same persons who attempted in 1991 and 1992 to make Islaax deviate from its peaceful program by proposing joining hands with Itixaad and opening training camps which was rejected by Shura council of Islaax.

and civic transformation. On the other hand, the de-radicalization of an entire society living in anarchy and statelessness for more than 20 years and the establishment of functioning state institutions in Somalia is a formidable challenge. Yet, it is possible to overcome the odds with new approaches, resources, and dedication. This will further be possible if lessons are learned from previous reconciliations in the past 20 years, which were excluding one group or another, and from reconciliation tailored towards a power-sharing model that produced low capacity leaders who failed to attract public support and sufficient international assistance. Moreover, for the Somali state to recover, a pan-clan national civic movement is required that surpasses clan-based organizations, that invigorates the concepts of citizenship and democratic governance on the one hand and accommodates Islam and the clan system in a new social contract on the other. Only through this national movement, uniting multiple persuasions and organizations in the strategic goals of restoring Somali state and mutual tolerance, can there emerge a capable and qualified leadership. Only this kind of qualified leadership will bring Somalia back to the family of nations as a responsible state aimed at ensuring global peace and development.

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