

## THESIS ABSTRACT

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Standard works on A. S. Khomiakov consider that the idea of unity was central to his thought, and that this idea is based exclusively in religion. Consequently, these works contradict themselves in regard to his historical thought. Considering that religion dominated Khomiakov's thought, historians conclude that according to him the historical process is determined by faith. Finding that Khomiakov's interpretation conflicts with religious determinism, they accuse him of falling into confusion and tend to dismiss his historical writings.

This thesis suggests that unity was an independent and universal idea for Khomiakov. He applied it in religion, history, and other fields, but did not base it exclusively in any one of them. If approached with this in mind, Khomiakov's historical thought appears not contradictory but coherent and original. The idea of unity is seen permeating it. Religion appears as only one historical factor, not always dominant. After outlining his general historical views, the thesis examines his interpretation of Russian history. On both levels, his ideas on history are seen to contain much more of interest and value than previously thought.

RUSSIA IN KHOMIAKOV'S HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION

Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the M.A. degree, McGill University, by Joseph Gough

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#### INTRODUCTION

Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (1804-1860) wrote more about history than about anything else. A stress on history is one of the two main features of his intellectual approach to problems, the other being a stress on unity. Yet his historical thought has received little attention.

In his own time, the opposite was true. The Slavophile-Westerner dispute from which sprang so much of Russian thought was primarily on the historical nature of Russia, her past and lesting. Khomiakov was one of the leading Slavophile spokesmen. On history in general, and on specific historical points, he became embroiled in disputes between the two camps.

No comprehensive plan shaped Khomiakov's work. Most of his important essays were argumentative responses to the views of others. His work lacks organisation, to the point that students of his thought universally complain of this handicap. His eight volume collected works comprise one volume of longer general essays, one of religious essays, one of shorter articles on various subjects, one of plays and poems, three which contain his Notes on Universal History, and one final volume which contains correspondence. His Notes and the articles touch a multitude of subjects. His writings leap in mid-paragraph and mid-generalisation to join the most disparate matters.

The three volumes of Notes on Universal History represent Khomiakov's only sustained writing effort. History receives the most attention in his other works as well. The indexes of the two volumes of general articles have a number of headings indicating the content of each article. A survey of these headings finds history most present. A detailed analysis of his best-known articles shows them treating history above all other subjects. In Khomiakov's religious articles as elsewhere history stands high. His two plays, making up most of Volume Four of his works, treat historical subjects, as do many of his poems. Beside forming the subject matter of the three-volume Notes on Universal History, history frequently recurs in his final volume of correspondence. In all his work, concern with historicophilosophical matters, with pattern and causation, accompanies his more specific historical interest of the moment. Philosophy, religion, and particular social and political matters, usually given the main emphasis in works on Khomiakov, appeared as separate major interests only toward the latter part of his life; history stood as such throughout his writing career.

Khomiakov valued his historical writing most of all his work. Only his historical ideas prompted him to expressions of personal pride. Several times he referred to past events or historical principles as "not understood up till now", that is, until his treatment of them. Referring to a major point in his article "On the Possibility of a Russian Artistic School", he asked the reader to realise that scientific analysis would fully

grasp this idea only in the future. "The whole field of history",

4 he asserted, "awaits reworking". Khomiakov felt that Russia

would rescue Europe in historical thought, pointing out Western

errors and revealing to the world the proper path to historical

understanding. Furthermore, he held that the learning most

instrumental in bringing reconciliation and greatness to Russia

would be historical learning. In this he clearly meant the

historical learning that he, with some of the other Slavophiles,

was pioneering.

Asserting history to be Khomiakov's main interest raises complications. Could he have been pursuing history because of deeper concern with some other problem? Should the other problem be called his main interest? To clarify the matter, one must separate interests, values, and motivations. In the realm of values, Khomiakov seemed to place Orthodox Christianity, and what it stands for, above all. His motivations for historical study, in addition to simple inclination, probably were his concern to defend Orthodoxy, to assert Russia's value vis-a-vis the West, and to point the way to future greatness for Russia. The statement that history was his main interest means only that it took up more of his written thought than any other question, that he seemed to like historical study most, and that he valued his historical work more than his other work.

But works on Khomiakov value it least. He gathers praise for philosophy and theology, his social thought gains attention, he receives credit for helping to develop Russia's national consciousness. Various authors employing various approaches stress various "fundamental characteristics" in his wide-ranging and disorganised work. In nearly all of these treatments, his historical thought finds little place.

It receives correspondingly small value. Treatments of 8
Khomiakov in English, by Christoff and Riasanovsky, seem to deal with it only enough to dismiss it. Russian works find basic 9
flaws and much of fantasy in it. The one West European work on Khomiakov, A. Gratieux's biography of him, gives his historical thought more attention than others, but fails to deal with its 10 fundamental structure. And the difficulties that have produced varied approaches to Khomiakov's work in general seem to have allowed no clear depiction of his historical thought.

Studies on Khomiakov above all stress the importance of religion in his work. When his historical writing is mentioned, a predominantly religious view of history is attributed to him. Starting from this premise, studies find contradictions in Khomiakov's historical views. This is little wonder, for neither in his treatment of Russian history nor in his philosophy of history was Khomiakov's thought dominated by religion.

The contradictions are not really there. Although
Khomiakov treats wildly varied subjects in a generally disorg-

anised manner, his approach remains simple and consistent. One basic idea is fundamental in his work from beginning to end. It dominates his work on Russian history as it does his writings on religion, philosophy, and society. This is the idea of unity, contrasted to division.

The frequency with which the word "unity" appears in Khomiakov's work is astonishing. 11 He often uses other terms for the same idea, such as "wholeness", "totality", and "integrity". In context, these words denote a synergistic unity, where the parts actively contribute to the greater whole.

The stress on unity characterises both Khomiakov's approach to problems and the solutions he finds. In his approach, he seeks to combine, to relate things, to find truth or value in reciprocal relationships. He continually reverses ideas, and even terms of speech, with disdain for the straight-line cause and effect style of thought. His solutions resemble his approach, and wholeness appears as objective value. The unity principle he explores is the highest of principles to him. Khomiakov asserts unity's value in his first article, dealing with Russian history. Thereafter, its manifestations appear as goal in each field that he treats.

With this fundamental idea goes a basic concern with history. Above all his interests, it is in all his interests. He uses historical evidence, examples, and analogies in writing on religion, philosophy, society, and a host of minor matters. But mainly, he is concerned with history itself; with universal history and with Russian history, the great question of his day.

He seeks to discern historical principles by which to explain Russia's past and guide her future.

Historical ties appear in the goals he seeks. Organic historical continuity usually figures as a necessary element in unity. Wholeness is Khomiakov's main idea, history his main interest. He thinks about each in terms of the other, and of things in general in terms of both. Both are universal, this is why they are connected, and both are universally applied. They dominate his work from beginning to end.

In history itself, unity appears as both process and goal. Khomiakov postulates an ideal and perfect unity, which rests on love and freedom. Besides this ideal unity, he treats the unity principle active in history. This principle motivates a society mainly characterised by wholeness in its composition and activities. If the unity principle should develop to completely dominate a society, that society would then express ideal unity. Until this occurs, however, man finds ideal unity most accessible in its contemporary living expression: the true 12 Christian Church.

With time, Khomiakov's stress on unity in the historical process gave itself to elaborations in many different fields. In the Church, especially, the ideal of unity, and the implications of freedom and love that he explored, were explicitly stressed. 13

But Khomiakov made it plain that the unity principle appeared in

history long before the coming of Christianity. The coming of Christ, and his teachings, only brought to ideal unity its

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clearest definition and expression. Khomiakov may have found
the unity ideal and the whole idea of unity in religion. Whether
or not he did, he formulated and applied it as something
independent and universal.

Studies on Khomiakov show a different picture. Before examining his general historical framework and his interpretation of Russian history, a closer look at previous work on Khomiakov is necessary.

For Khomiakov's critics, religion dominated all his thought. To the idea of ideal unity, writers on Khomiakov have attached the name "sobornost'", a word which he used, on a very few occasions, in connection with the Russian Orthodox Church.

From this dubious beginning, they proceed to assert that "sobornost'" is a specifically religious conception, and that therefore religion determined Khomiakov's thought in all the fields where the idea of unity appeared. Among other things, this assumption produces the idea that Khomiakov felt that religion determined all history.

These writers take an application of a universal principle in a particular field, that of religion, and say that the particular field of application determined all of Khomiakov's thought. They confuse unity in its ideal form with the general principle of unity active in all history, and give both a religious basis.

It seems likely that the stress on religion in treatments of Khomiakov stemmed from the first works on him in Russia, which were written by men concerned with religion. The publication of Khomiakov's theological works in Russia, which was permitted only in the last part of the century, provoked much theological interest, as shown in early treatments of Khomiakov. <sup>15</sup> The religious note was very strong in V. Zavitnevich's fundamental biography of Khomiakov, and it remained so in later interpretations of his thought. Another factor perhaps contributing to the exaggerated stress on religion is the tendency of modern writers to look for a completely religious world-view in former writers treating the problem of religion. It leads to an oversimplification, which in Khomiakov's case is misleading.

Of the more important modern interpretations, N. Berdiaev's book on Khomiakov continued the trend of giving religion first place in his thought. The opening pages assert that the main contribution of the Slavophiles consisted in first realising and formulating the truth that the Russian spirit is religious, and that Russian thought has a religious calling. Slavophilism rose from collective religious experience, he asserts, not from literary or philosophical influences and ideas. Khomiakov's strength lay in his church consciousness and church feeling. Slavophilism, Berdiaev states, had its source and living nourishment in Khomiakov's religious thought, and it signified the expression of Orthodox Christianity, as a special type of culture and a special religious experience. 16

Berdiaev finds the religious motive force apparent in Khomiakov's philosophy. He feels that Khomiakov affirmed the dependence of philosophical understanding on religious life and religious experience. Slavophile philosophy was not theological so much as it was religious. <sup>17</sup> Khomiakov's philosophy could not be understood unless it was seen as stemming from his membership in the church. <sup>18</sup> The originality of Khomiakov's gnosiology was that it was church gnosiology. <sup>19</sup>

When it comes to Khomiakov's views on Russia and on history, Berdiaev displays dissatisfaction. Regarding the Russian state, he begins by saying that Khomiakov and the Slavophiles were anti-state; this was because Russia had a religious mission that demanded freedom from political power for its fulfillment. Yet, he soon asserts that Khomiakov opposed any church-state division, not understanding that the state power is imbued with anti-Christian spirit. Khomiakov and the Slavophiles didn't realise that the patriarchal-family elements in society are more pagan than religious. Khomiakov's overvaluation of the commune, Berdiaev maintains, contradicted his own religious doctrine of society. 22

Khomiakov's treatment of Russia's history and her mission greatly dismays Berdiaev. The main interest of all his historical work, Berdiaev says, was to substantiate the Russian and Slavic mission.<sup>23</sup> But, according to Berdiaev, Khomiakov uncritically

confused scholarly and religious bases in his historical justification of Russian messianism. He seemed to deduce Russian messianism from Russian history, Berdiaev complains, as an empirical fact. As in the Notes on Universal History, he wrote as though history were not ceaselessly subjected to Divine Providence. He confused the natural characteristics of the Russian people with the religioprophetic basis of Russia's mission. Khomiakov gave historical conditions altogether too much importance. Berdiaev takes issue with the idea that the spirit of the Russian people could be placed in dependence on social and economic conditions. For religious mission, he asserts, depends on prophecy, while the Slavophiles fell almost into economic materialism. Berdiaev feels that Khomiakov's confusion of religious and scientific history, of religio-mystical and scientifico-historical reasoning, marred his whole interpretation of Russia.

According to Berdiaev, the same trouble arises regarding Khomiakov's philosophy of history. Berdiaev found difficulty in deciding if the fundamental principles of his philosophy of history were from a religious or a scientific source. Most of his historicophilosophical affirmations were double, and herein was his philosophy of history's basic fault. In Berdiaev's opinion, he established religio-philosophical prerequisites for it, but at the same time pretended to be scientific and scholarly. Reluctantly but firmly, Berdiaev keeps pointing out Khomiakov's confusion.

Having credited all of Khomiakov's thought with a religious basis, Berdiaev finds exceptions to this in his historical work. Instead of questioning his own assumption, he 29 attributes fatal flaws to Khomiakov's historical thought.

Western writers, perhaps influenced by Berdiaev, display the same error regarding Khomiakov's historical views, and severely criticise him for deviating from what they establish as the basic determinant of his thought. Professor N. Riasanovsky, who gives much space to Khomiakov in his book Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles, treats some major aspects of Khomiakov's thought in his article "Khomiakov on Sobornost'". He begins by stating that the concept of sobornost' was of the most fundamental importance for Khomiakov, even though he hardly ever used the word. In a footnote, he continues:

Actually, Khomiakov uses the terms "sobornyi" or "sobornost' " on remarkably few occasions. [Beside what Riasanovsky calls his one "explicit discussion and definition"] one may cite examples, ibid. [in Volume II], pp. 5, 12, 25, 70-71. In the first three cases the adjectival form of the word is included as a part of the set description of the Church taken from the Creed. The last instance is more interesting: the usage is more individual, and the key term is the noun "sobornost' ". "Sobor" is, of course, used often throughout Khomiakov's writings to denote a church council. Because Khomiakov discussed the term sobornost' only once, and that in the year of his death, one is tempted to suggest that he had not realized

its full potential value for his own theological doctrines until he began to compose his rebuttal of Gagarin's speech [in which the Russian Jesuit Gagarin had attacked the Russian Church's standard use of "sobornyi" as the translation of "catholic"], and that he would have employed it more often had he lived longer. 30

Khomiakov, it appears to Riasanovsky, didn't realise what was of fundamental importance for his thought. He literally did not know what he was talking about.

Riasanovsky then quotes in part the major discussion to which he refers. This occurs in a brief letter in which Khomiakov defended the use of "sobornyi" as the translation of "catholic". In discussing "sobornyi", Khomiakov used the phrases "unity in multiplicity", "the Church according to all", "the Church according to the unity of all", and "the Church according to free unanimity". Riasanovsky fails to note that Khomiakov did not here use the noun form "sobornost'". At any rate, a few paragraphs after this rather vague "explicit definition", Riasanovsky refers to sobornost' as the organic unity of love and freedom.

This concept, as the essence of the Church for Khomiakov, determined 31 his whole thinking about Orthodoxy, according to Riasanovsky.

To use <u>sobornost'</u> in this sense, as a term applied to the Church, whether or not Khomiakov did so, would be perfectly acceptable. The organic unity of love and freedom was indeed the

essence of the Church for Khomiakov. But the trouble comes when Riasanovsky gives the whole idea of unity, together with its implications and various applications, a purely religious basis.

The concept of sobornost' belonged properly to the domain of theology, but Khomiakov's use of his favorite idea was by no means limited to that realm. ... Khomiakov employed sobornost' to criticize Roman Catholicism and Protestantism and ... in the process of this criticism he drew a complete and necessary outline of Western history. Khomiakov also used sobornost' to explain world history, to assail everything he disliked in life, to promote all the institutions and all the doctrines he championed, in short, for every purpose. In the process the Church was at least partially replaced by such alien entities as the Iranian principle, Slavdom, Russia, or the peasant commune. 32

Here as before, Riasanovsky implies that faith totally determines history for Khomiakov, without recognising Khomiakov's assertion that history also determines faith. Not Khomiakov, but Riasanovsky, is confusing religious and other matters.

Riasanovsky then attacks Khomiakov's philosophy of history. Ascribing religious determinism to Khomiakov, Riasanovsky simply identifies his philosophy of history with his historical scheme of the development of faiths. Khomiakov, as will be seen later, divided faiths into two families. The Iranian group, culminating in Christianity, gave freedom to the spirit. Societies holding an

Iranian faith displayed creativity and life. In contrast to this, the Kushite family of faiths gave not freedom but "necessity", as Khomiakov called it, inculcating compulsion and constraint in spirit and society. Although he previously stated that sobornost' dominated all of Khomiakov's thought, including that on history, Riasanovsky now suggests that the "Iranian principle" preceded the idea of sobornost' in Khomiakov's thought. He adds that Khomiakov tried and failed to bring together Iranianism and Orthodoxy in his interpretation of human history. Still, according to him, Khomiakov's attempt to associate the two linked Orthodoxy with all sorts of prejudices which may be found in Khomiakov's treatment of Iranianism.

historical framework, Riasanovsky points to some specific matters. Khomiakov sinned by crediting the Slavs with peaceful, brotherly, communal qualities, because these qualities are associated with the religious idea of <a href="mailto:sobornost">sobornost</a>. Riasanovsky indignantly asks where Christianity begins and Slavdom ends, and how the two are related. But it is Riasanovsky, not Khomiakov, who has stated that religion explains all history in Khomiakov's work. Lastly, according to Riasanovsky, Khomiakov saw pre-Petrine Russia as a land of "spontaneity, freedom, and brotherly love". In fact, Khomiakov's interpretation of it more closely resembles the negative of this picture.

The latest Western book on Khomiakov, by P. K. Christoff, proceeds on the same assumption as the others, and develops the same contradictions. Christoff makes <u>sobornost'</u>, as a religious idea, Khomiakov's central conception and the fountainhead of his ideas in general. He gives a short summary of different attempts at defining this term as used in Khomiakov's work; most of them include the elements of freedom, unity, and love present in what is here called ideal unity.

Christoff makes the statement that although sobornost' is seldom mentioned before 1848, references to it become frequent 35 and bold after that year. This statement is twice wrong. First, 36 as Christoff admits, Khomiakov hardly used the word sobornost'. Christoff is referring to the concept that he himself identifies as sobornost'. Second, even before 1848 Khomiakov associates unity 37 with freedom and love. It is true that the implications of ideal unity, i.e. freedom and love, get more frequent and explicit mention in his later work, but they are present before. The concept of ideal unity, however, never becomes particularly identified with the word sobornost'.

Christoff goes to great lengths in the attempt to identify the ever-present idea with the almost totally absent word. Perhaps this is because when Khomiakov does mention <u>sobornyi</u>, it is in a religious application; if unity can be connected to <u>sobornyi</u>, it will also be connected to religion. Christoff clutches at straws

in this effort. As noted, Khomiakov's one short letter on sobornyi defended the word as a translation of "catholic" in Russian church usage. This letter, Christoff notes, was written in French, but the word sobornyi was rendered in Russian. This procedure seems normal enough in discussing a translation; Khomiakov uses the word "catholic" in the original Greek in the same letter. But Christoff finds great significance in the use of sobornyi in Russian. It shows not merely the untranslatable character of the word, he asserts, but also shows that to Khomiakov the word defied definition because sobornost' symbolised the indefinable spirit of Christianity.

Unity operates in history, as will be seen, and is expressed in its ideal form by the Christian Church. But this does not mean that the Church dominates history all by itself. Failing to see that unity is an independent and universal idea, Christoff like the others criticises Khomiakov for confusing Church and non-Church ideas. He also fails completely to understand Khomiakov's philosophy of history, and consequently condemns it. Khomiakov, he says, showed his inability to build a historical outlook in "strictly theological, Christian, or philosophical 39 terms". As usual, Khomiakov is judged in the light of what the critic wishes to find in his work.

Riasanovsky's criticism of Khomiakov depended partly on some others, such as G. Florovsky. Florovsky criticises the

Slavophiles for failing to differentiate sufficiently between the 40 spheres of Church and society. As his opinion shows, the idea that religion permeates Khomiakov's thought has persisted in Russian interpretations as in Western ones. Florovsky does appear to feel, however, that history was nearly as great a concern 41 as religion for Khomiakov. A. Gratieux's biography of Khomiakov also gives his historical work a stronger emphasis than other treatments, but he fails to fully show its structure and basis. The emphasis is more of quantity than depth.

In general, works on Khomiakov display the opinion that his historical thought reveals basic faults in its structure. This judgment stems from the view that religion was the center of all Khomiakov's thought.

Most, if not all, of those writing on Khomiakov stress the dominating importance of <u>sobornost'</u>. They make this a specifically religious term, and associate it with the ideal unity. Yet Khomiakov hardly used the word, did not equate it with the unity ideal, and, most important, did not make unity an exclusively and fundamentally religious idea. The word <u>sobornost'</u> does not deserve the place attributed to it in Khomiakov's thought. Use of the word in works on Khomiakov hinders clarification of his historical thought and of his thought in general.

Berdiaev, Riasanovsky, Christoff, and others, vainly trying to show that a specifically and totally religious idea is

fundamental to Khomiakov's thought, and that those of his writings failing to fit this dictum represent confusion, demonstrate only their own confusion. They find Khomiakov's mention of history influencing the fate of religions particularly troublesome. They consequently tend to dismiss the biggest part of his work, his historical thought, as some sort of aberration, not really corresponding with what supposedly dominated all of his thought, i.e. religion. Khomiakov's interpretation of Russian history draws especially violent attacks, for his alleged confusion of religious, racial, and nationalist elements.

These writers fail to see that unity is a universal idea; that as a universal idea it is connected with history; that history receives the major stress in Khomiakov's work; that his work reveals an original and independent philosophy of history, with religion reciprocally relating to other historical factors that can thwart or change it; and that his interpretation of Russian history is built not on religion but on his unity-based philosophy of history.

The contradictions and ambiguities they note generally disappear, once it is realised that unity is a universal idea. Khomiakov writes about the nature of history and about Russian history in terms of unity. He writes in similar terms about the Church, and about other matters as well. Christianity exemplifies wholeness, the ultimate ideal unity is associated with it, but it does not have the idea of unity locked up within itself. In Khomiakov's thought, unity extends everywhere, not just to religion and not just

to the history here treated. Remove the label "religious" from Khomiakov's idea, and his work falls into harmony.

This thesis proposes to take a new look at Khamiakov's historical thought. First, his general historical framework will be outlined. In it, his fundamental idea will appear as neither secular nor religious, but universal: the idea of unity. In the light of this general picture, the thesis will examine his interpretation of Russia's history, and his ideas on her nature and destiny. Like his philosophy of history, his views on Russian history will be seen to vary considerably from versions previously attributed to him. Some of the authors who point to contradictions in his basic premises of general and Russian history accuse Khomiakov also of idealising pre-Petrine Russia, and of a high degree of nationalist or racist bias. These errors, they say, make his interpretation of Russian history dangerous as well as doubtful. On such specific matters, too, Khomiakov's work will be examined.

## **FOOTNOTES**

Century Russian Slavophilism, Vol. I: A. S. Xomjakov ('S-Gravenhage, The Netherlands, 1961), p. 191; J. Billington, The Icon and the Axe (New York, 1966), pp. 314 ff.

A. S. Khomiakov, <u>Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenii</u>, 8 vols. (Moscow, 1900).

3 Khomiakov, I, 79, 79 fn. Cf. also I, 38, 40, 68, 88-90, 204.

4 Khomiakov, I, 40.

5 Khomiakov, I. 37-38.

6 Khomiakov, I, 28, 68-69.

For example, in Khomiakov's 'Message to the Serbians': 'Your first, most important, and invaluable good fortune, Serbians, is your unity in Orthodoxy, i.e. in the highest knowledge and highest truth, in the root of every spiritual and moral growth". (Khomiakov, I, 384.) Unity and Orthodoxy are connected in Khomiakov's thought, in that true Orthodox Christianity presents unity's highest manifestation.

N. V. Riasanovsky, Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study in Romantic Ideology (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), pp. 66-83, and Appendix. Cf. also the same author's article, "Khomiakov on Sebornost'", in Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought, ed. E. J. Simmons (Cambridge, Mass., 1955), pp. 191-192; hereafter referred to as Riasanovsky, "Sobornost'".

Cf. N. A. Berdiaev, Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (Moscow, 1912), pp. 144-185, and G. Florovsky, Puti Russkago Bogosloviia (Paris, 1937), pp. 249-254. V. Zavitnevich, in his admiring biography in two large volumes, Aleksei Stepanovich Khomiakov (Kiev, 1902-1913) is mostly at pains to give a suitable religious justification to Khomiakov's interest in history.

A. Gratieux, A. S. Khomiakov et le Mouvement Slavophile, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); cf. the foreword to Volume I, and pp. 64-67 in Volume II.

While "unity" constantly recurs, the word "sobornost",
generally stressed in treatments of Khomiakov, hardly ever appears
in his work. Cf. Christoff, pp. 141-142, and Riasanovsky, "Sobornost",
p. 183.

12 Khomiakov, II, 72, 192.

13
Cf. Khomiakov, I, 233; II, 72, 192. See also Khomiakov's
article "On Humboldt", in Russian Intellectual History: an Anthology,

ed. M. Raeff (New York, 1966), p. 212. Hereinafter, Raeff, "Humboldt".

14 Cf. Khomiakov, Vii, 447-448.

Cf. V. Liaskovsky, A. S. Khomiakov, ego zhizn i sochineniia (Moscow, 1897), and Father P. Florensky's criticism in Okolo Khomiakova (Moscow, 1916). A number of articles written around the turn of the century, listed in Christoff's bibliography but unavailable to me, have titles which address themselves to religious and philosophical aspects of Khomiakov's thought. Cf. also the chapter on Khomiakov in R. Hare, Pioneers of Russian Social Thought (London, 1951), regarding the nature of early treatments of Khomiakov.

16 Berdiaev, pp. 1-23.

17 Berdiaev, pp. 123-124.

18 Berdiaev, pp. 141-143.

Berdiaev, pp. 127-129. Berdiaev exaggerates the importance of the Church to Khomiakov's gnosiology. For Khomiakov, knowledge came from inside man. It could be affected and extended in the best possible way through Christian unity, but not made better in an epistemological sense.

20 Berdiaev, pp. 185-187.

21 Berdiaev, pp. 205-208.

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22
   Berdiaev, pp. 197-199.
   Berdiaev, pp. 148-151.
  24
   Berdiaev, p. 152.
  25
   Berdiaev, pp. 175-177.
  26
   Berdiaev, pp. 178-181.
   Berdiaev, pp. 208-211.
   Berdiaev, pp. 148-151.
  29
   Berdiaev's mistakes are not limited to errors regarding
Khomiakov's historical thought. In contrast to Berdiaev's opinion,
Khomiakov strongly apposed any political connection for the
Church. (Cf. Khomiakov, II, 83-84.)
   Riasanovsky, "Sobornost' ", P. 183.
   Riasanovsky, "Sobornost' ", p. 185.
  32
   Riasanovsky, "Sobornost", pp. 189-190.
  33
   Riasanovsky, "Sobornost" ", pp. 190-191.
    Riasanovsky, "Sobornost", pp. 191-192.
    Christoff, p. 142.
  36
    Christoff, p. 143.
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Cf. Khomiakov, I, 83; III, 27-29. In addition to these references, most of his longer general articles derive their main direction from the idea of unity, whether or not they were written before 1848.

Christoff, p. 147. It is not clear why Christoff feels that the spirit of Christianity defied definition for Khomiakov. In fact, Khomiakov habitually defined Christianity and the Church as unity in freedom and love.

39 Christoff, p. 195.

40 Riasanovsky, "<u>Sobornost'</u>", pp. 193-194.

41 Cf. Florovsky, pp. 248-254.

#### CHAPTER ONE

## KHOMIAKOV'S HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

Khomiakov's general views on history are only partly revealed in his Notes on Universal History. This three volume work is more descriptive than analytical. While the main historical stress in his articles is on Russia and the West, in the Notes Khomiakov gives his attention mostly to origins and early history in all lands. He treats scarcely anything within the last thousand years. Despite errors in historical interpretation, the Notes give a vivid and original picture of early history. The work is truly as universal as he could make it, and its worldwide scale makes a refreshing change from books which give a "world history" of one or two continents. Khomiakov displays a broad historical knowledge in the Notes, but his writing is very digressive. He produced no organised and comprehensive history as it is usually presented. As the title indicates, the work is a collection of notes.

In the Notes, Khomiakov remarks that a capacity for 1 visualisation and for empathy is all-important to the historian.

The work reflects this attitude. In it, Khomiakov synthesised from the works of others, using standard primary and secondary sources.

This is also true of his work in Russian history; Khomiakov was

very familiar with the Russian chronicles and other source material. Though not so much his Russian history, his <u>Notes</u> show him drawing as well from the evidence of myths, philology, stories preserved in religions, and whatever else he could find to possibly justify his speculations.

Opponents and proponents alike have accused Khomiakov of writing history which is close to fantasy. The charges are frequently justified regarding his speculations on early history. Even for a diligent man, which Khomiakov was not, an effort in the enormous field of universal early history would preclude close investigation of every question. Khomiakov practiced the visualisation that he considered marked the true historian. He was familiar with established facts, but he often weaved an insubstantial web between them. As in his treatment of Russian history, his subjective views in the Notes are of greater interest than his historical investigations.

In the <u>Notes</u>, Khomiakov attaches great importance to faith as a historical factor, emphasising its influence on social development. The life of a people, he says, must be studied together with its religion. Religion, in its turn, is treated by Khomiakov in conjunction with the whole life of a people and its historical development. In addition, Khomiakov stresses socioeconomic factors, geography, language and race. It would be difficult to rank them in importance. All factors were relative,

none absolutely dominant, in Khomiakov's philosophy of history, for they acted in combinations of reciprocal influences, and history could overpower any one of them.

In treating the important factor of faith in his Notes. Khomiakov elaborated a historical scheme of religions. He characterised faiths according to their veneration of freedom or necessity, qualities associated with unity and division. The type of faith which fostered spiritual freedom received the generic name of "Iranian". It first appeared in Judea and Iran, and tended to be monotheistic. The necessitarian type of faith, first seen in Ethiopia, was termed "Kushite", and was generally pantheistic. Kushite faiths gave encouragement to logical development and logical philosophy, but they handicapped free creativity. Kushitism was associated with the development of the state and the production of huge material monuments. Iranism created the world's great literature and poetry. Minglings of the two types of faith produced all the religions that appeared in history. Christianity crowned the Iranian faiths, culminating the tradition of freedom. That Christianity manifested a previously present principle apparently did not deny its special divinity for Khomiakov, but this certainly made his view of Christianity different from that of the traditional religious writers, such as St. Augustine, for whom Christianity was a completely new beginning.

It must be noted that Khomiakov's historical scheme of

the development of faiths is <u>not</u> his philosophy of history. The latter is far more complex than anything he presents in the <u>Notes</u>, which do contain many historical generalisations. Khomiakov supports these by examples drawn from the most diverse regions and periods. But the complex picture revealed in his articles is not fully developed in the <u>Notes</u>. Generalisations are made, but not fully interrelated. Patterns are discussed, but not the whole process of causation. Sources are evaluated, but not the nature of historical truth itself.

While the historical picture presented in the <u>Notes</u>, and the conclusions drawn, fit the principles of his philosophy of history, this is mainly developed in his other writings.

Most of the references here come from the latter, especially from his longer general and religious essays. His historico-philosophical views are scattered throughout these works. Most often they appear in connection with particular subjects, especially Russia and the West, and Russian and Western Christianity. At other times, he makes important statements without direct reference to any specific historical problem.

Reflecting that the present must judge history with present means, Khomiakov notes that the close, almost uninterrupted tie of past and present makes this acceptable. But whatever the methods used, no absolute certainty in historical judgment can be attained. Speaking of Russia's past, he points out that

opposed interpretations. Historical data alone give no great assurance of anything. Misunderstandings can be passed from generation to generation; there is no absolutely certain truth bequeathed by time. However, insight into historical principles can give a steadfast, valuable understanding. Only thus can one raise historical probability to a degree of logical trustworthiness.

The idea of historical principles is the basis of Khomiakov's philosophy of history. Principles develop organically, connected with a society's past and present. Principles comprise characteristic patterns of socio-economic phenomena, as well as mental phenomena, joining them in one whole. The primary principles are those of division and unity.

In speaking of principles in history, Khomiakov frequently seems to be saying that all historical phenomena follow a predetermined path. Yet, in the full development of his philosophy of history, he asserts man's freedom in history.

With the idea of principles Khomiakov links faith, but in a subordinate relation. Sometimes they are closely connected, 12 as with Orthodox Christianity and the unity principle in Russia. Sometimes faith is more separated, or referred to in conjunction with other aspects of a principle. For example, Khomiakov states in one essay that the law of social development lies in a society's

origins, and that the law of intellectual development lies in the national faith. <sup>13</sup> Faith is for Khomiakov a conscious and willing spiritual inner conviction, <sup>14</sup> while a principle may dominate a society with beliefs that are much less conscious. Normally, but not always, a faith corresponds to the general spiritual and social principle of a society.

As the following statements show, faith wields great historical power.

Faith permeates the whole being of man and all his relations with his neighbours. As if by invisible threads and roots it envelops and interlaces all his feelings, all his convictions, and all his endeavours.

... Faith is also a high social principle, for society itself is nothing but the visible manifestation of our inner relationship with other people and our union with them.

# And again:

The fate of a society of citizens depends on what spiritual law is recognised by its members and on how high is the moral sphere from which they take lessons for their own life in relation to positive law. 16

Such statements might prompt the classifying of Khomiakov as a religious determinist. He might seem to be saying that religion always dominates, as economics ultimately controls all in Marxist theory, or else that the principles with which faith is associated

inevitably and eternally rule historical phenomena. But examination reveals modifications which allow freedom of choice and action for man. Furthermore, it will appear that Khomiakov's whole philosophy is directed toward what he considers a still greater freedom, that of ideal unity.

There is no real substance to the idea that Khomiakov espouses religious determinism. Faith, a conscious acknowledgment, may sometimes differ from the deeper, less conscious, but more important intellectual-spiritual principles that are held by a society, and which generally correspond to the principle of the social structure. When this occurs, these deeper elements can overpower conscious faith. For example, the Western mind, influenced by the division principle dominating Western society, distorted 17 Christianity.

Although religion shapes humanity, Khomiakov held, it 18 can do so only slowly, over the centuries. Meanwhile, history can undergo a multitude of its own deep changes, and can shape religion as well. The tenor of the people's mind [narodnaia mys1'] can stamp gods, as when the Roman gods quickly lost any true similarity with the Greek gods on whom their pantheon was based. History can thus change religion in its essentials. A country, it appears, must be suited to a religion or spiritual principle, 20 or it will change it. Early Russian Christianity provides a good example of religion's weakness before history. The material

obstacles created by disumity, and the mental barriers of ignorance, Khomiakov says, could not be conquered by the new illuminating principle. In this reference, we see not only the historical conditions prevailing over the acknowledged inner conviction, but also material factors closely associated with this dominance. Faith and general intellectual-spiritual principles, as well as socio-economic principles affect each other, and none is inevitably dominant.

A principle, the Western religious example shows, carries unconscious beliefs that may be stronger than consciously defined ones. These beliefs, making up a general world-view, influence society and history, and are influenced in turn by social and historical phenomena. Conscious faith can succumb to the greater general principle, even though the latter may be unconscious. However, of all the factors active in history, faith is most stressed by Khomiakov.

A limited determinism does appear in connection with the faith or intellectual-spiritual principle displayed by man. This is not a general determinism that directs all history along a certain course. Writing on Orthodoxy, Khomiakov asserts that faith can absolutely compel certain actions. Without the manifestation, he says, faith would be only logical knowledge.

So long as a faith is deeply held, then, it may involve

inevitable consequences. The same determinism is inherent in the deeper spiritual-intellectual principles posited by Khomiakov, which may shape faith or which may, if faith is strong enough, be shaped by it. Any determinism, however, always depends on the faith or spiritual principle being strongly and firmly held. It is thus a determinism which is determined by man. Regarding faith, man must freely choose and securely hold it, and, being man, he finds great difficulty in doing so.

Thus, although a basic, unquestionable, but conditional inevitability appears in Khomiakov's philosophy of history, it depends on belief, on its strength and duration. In these terms, even faith is difficult to hold, as it will be seen later, and deeper general beliefs yet harder to grasp firmly.

Khomiakov imposes severe conditions on any extension of determinism into history. In the first place, not only can history overpower religion, but it also creates and can change the deeper historical principles. It creates them at the beginnings of societies. For example, Khomiakov states that anyone at all acquainted with the laws of history must recognise that contemporary conditions in the West originated as logically inevitable consequences of the historical situation found at the beginning of the Western world.

In an established and stable society, barring stresses, the original principle is likely to remain dominant and strong. Despite his strong assertion of the influence of origins, Khomiakov allows for a good deal of change in the principle originally dominating a society. While the law of the relations between principles remains immutable, new principles may produce new and different phenomena. Such changes are most likely to appear through interaction between different principles.

The interaction of principles may bring about war.

Indeed, Khomiakov sometimes seems to view war more as an aspect of the struggle of principles than as a distinct state opposed to peace. Conversely, the very reaction of war can threaten peaceful principles. Thus, early Germanic tribes, peaceable and family-based, through collisions with Rome changed into a people based on division, expressed in their external, conqueror-conquered style of social relations. Khomiakov notes in this connection that a war fought in defence of one's native land can be without the 25 harmful consequences of an unjust war for conquest.

Khomiakov treats war as a generator of evil and division, and in this treatment he reveals a notable characteristic of his thought: a connection between ends and means. "Fatal seeds produce 26 fatal fruits...". Evil methods will make evil appear ultimately 27 in the very good they may have sought. That the Slavs weren't greatly successful in their age-long struggle with the Germans was a blessing in disguise; they might have become hereditarily

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branded with the stamp of violence. For according to Khomiakov, acquired social characteristics can be inherited.

Peaceful influences also are dangerous. In his 1860

'Message to the Serbians', which sets forth many of his social

views, Khomiakov warns the Serbians that what is good for one

people may become an evil and ruinous principle when adopted by

another people. A nation like other living creatures has its own

laws of existence, its own order and harmony. A foreign principle,

however good in its birthplace, can become a principle of disorder

29

and discord when introduced into a nation based on different laws.

Drastic change may also occur even without a clash with foreign principles. Within a society based on a division principle, full development brings collapse. For this reason, Khomiakov holds, a realistic historical consciousness will seek the cause of a society's collapse not in the immediately preceding epoch, as is usually done, but in the basic principle 30 moving this society.

Even the unity principle can be threatened from inside.

As Khomiakov warns the Serbians, the most noble principles, through vague definition or one-sided development, may be corrupted and 31 endanger a nation. Without freedom, especially freedom of 32 opinion, all good principles fade and disappear.

Although principles and faiths make history, history in turn develops and disposes of principles and faiths. Khomiakov

rejects the concept of their imposing a predetermined and complete pattern of development on a society. He also rejects the idea that man is completely helpless before the interplay of these greater forces.

One of Khomiakov's major essays reflecting on history is "On Kireevsky's Article 'About the Character of the European Enlightenment and its Relation to the Russian Enlightenment' ".

This essay demonstrates Khomiakov's tendency to make statements that appear contradictory except in the context of his whole historical framework. The whole article seeks to guide Russians toward the best path of historical development. The choice is within their power. Within the article, however, he states in one place that individuals can only stimulate, not change, the general development of the principle lying at the root of a society.

By this statement, it would appear that man collectively makes history but cannot change it by his own volition. He appears to have responsibility without power.

Remarks made elsewhere by Khomiakov also point to man's helplessness. History can change man's innermost being. Human organs according to Khomiakov develop as much under historical 34 as under material influences. And the soul itself can be reshaped by history, as happened through the false development of 35 Christianity in the West.

But Khomiakov also asserts man's counter-influence on the

historical principles that shape his ends. In the first place, the assertion of freedom appears clearly in faith, so closely associated with principles and so influential in history. Man must choose to recognise a faith, and in doing so he demonstrates 36 freedom. "Faith is an act of spiritual freedom..." Man believes at his choice. Furthermore, Khomiakov holds, the power of free investigation stands behind this freedom of choice. Even if God himself moves a man's soul toward conversion, man in recognising his voice would begin his conversion in "an act of free investigation".

However, his ability to best use this freedom depends on his degree of reasoning consciousness. Although consciousness exists at all levels of activity, only at the highest level does 38 it become a truly independent clarifying force. This consciousness serves not only man but also faith. To be strong and secure in man and society, faith needs the free investigation and logical definition that reasoning consciousness provides. According to Khomiakov, free 39 investigation "constitutes the single foundation of true faith".

Beset by problems and passions, man needs a strong logical defining 40 consciousness to strengthen his grip on faith. Speaking of faith on this best, most conscious level, Khomiakov often uses the 41 term "thinking faith" [smisliashchaia vera].

Faith can affect history. In theory, then, the choice of faith provides a good method for man to consciously change his historical destiny. This is possible but unlikely. The extent of

preconceptions and prejudices among the masses makes such a willed change difficult, says Khomiakov in speaking of the possibility of the West's conversion. He does not emphasise this as a method of changing history.

In Khomiakov's opinion, man's best chance to shape history lies in dealing with the more general principles, in their more malleable aspects. Khomiakov's interpretation of the past, and his exhortations in the present, give the greatest importance to change or resistance to change in varied aspects of intellectual life, social conditions, and general characteristics of a people's way of life. Khomiakov directs attention to matters which are widely important, but which often lack concentrated support such as a faith would have. The dominance of a principle can be ended by changing those aspects of society which express the principle. Without vigilant protection, principles may fade Leaving faith mostly aside, Khomiakov stresses the great influence of changes in manners, traditions, law, dress, customs, language, etc., matters which affect all of society but which often have no powerful group or factor behind them to protect them. The principle is no superhuman force, but a social and intellectual phenomenon, dependent on man and within his power to change. But this power to be useful depends on his having a good historical consciousness.

That principles are so vulnerable when viewed in connection with their various widespread manifestations is due to lack of consciousness. Principles have tended to be less consciously perceived and defended than faiths. Without conscious definition, a principle stands on shaky ground. Its manifestations and its dominance are threatened from within and without.

A society fully permeated by any one feeling or thought can manifest it without full consciousness; but in such a case, it acts as a living and whole person. But a society consisting of elements which are unequally or weakly permeated by any moral law can't yet manifest it, if consciousness hasn't achieved ripeness and definition.... Reasoning force remains almost fruitless, if it is not accompanied by a clear and defining consciousness.

In consciousness, Khomiakov feels, lies the answer to man's weakness and society's instability. Important above all in this is historical consciousness. With this, man can discard the 45 false and evil, and achieve the true and good. Analysis of historical principles, Khomiakov feels, will more than any other 46 learning pave the way for future greatness in Russia. This learning will also point the way to love as necessary to unity.

Mutual love can be part of society's development and 4g society's final norm as well. The preservation of historical ties

is also necessary to the attainment of unity in society. One must guard the unity principle by guarding all the religious, social, national, or individual manifestations of it that the past has bequeathed. By this, it seems wholeness is kept between past and present. In thus choosing and holding unity, man is free

On its surface, Khomiakov's historical framework sounds deterministic. In reality, it shows a great deal of historical uncertainty, and a certain amount of human freedom. The various elements scattered throughout his work do present a coherent picture of the historical process when they are pieced together. One can reconcile his more extreme determinist statements with his more extreme assertions of uncertainty and freedom. It is necessary to remember that although principles always motivate history, the dominance of one principle can be changed by the invervention of another. A certain determinism does exist, but it depends on man's holding to his beliefs. However, Khomiakov notes that man is such a weak plaything of his passions that he never reaches a secure spiritual harmony. A determinism that depends on man is as weak as he is.

Although, through consciousness, man gains influence over history, he can never banish the two basic principles of unity and division. Even if he had complete and perfect historical consciousness, he could do no more than choose one or the other,

or some combination of the two. The two basic principles express themselves, clearly or obscurely, in pure or mixed form, in 50 everything.

One can freely choose the principle of unity, through choosing a faith which expresses the principle of wholeness, or through conscious acknowledgment of the very principle. Those who choose it must live according to the principle by having a whole relation with each other in society. The ideal unity that Khomiakov wishes for society, the goal to which he hopes a society mainly dominated by the unity principle in history may proceed, is the same unity that exists in what he holds forth as the true conception of Christianity and the Church. This ideal unity involves love, and brings man his greatest freedom.

To freely enter unity is an act of love. God suggests

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mutual love to man, but only man can give it. It is a "free and

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intelligent love" that must bind a united society. Keeping a
faith that stresses unity based on love preserves the unity which
society needs. This faith is above all Christianity. Unity based
on love is the essence of the Christian Church; the "moral law of

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mutual love" is its one true foundation.

To gain unity, men should willingly love each other, willingly love the principle of unity, a principle which demands mutual love, and willingly love what manifests this principle.

There cannot be real unity without love; any spiritual principle 54 not permeated by love shows division and exclusiveness. When

Khomiakov speaks of ideal unity, love must be understood as an element of it. Although the Orthodox Christian Church in its true conception best manifests it, this unity in love between men is Khomiakov's ideal for all society, without regard to faith.

Ideal unity's necessary implication of love has been mentioned at such length because Khomiakov's terminology has caused much confusion. It is not necessary to keep saying "unity, love, and freedom", for Khomiakov's "unity" means, in its ideal form, all three. Not realising that a basic principle implies many manifestations, some have given to the derivations of a principle the importance of the principle itself. For example, Christoff feels compelled to keep listing rationalism, formalism, legalism, and individualism as the basic faults of the West, although for Khomiakov these are only manifestations of the basic Western principle of division.

Unity, if true and complete, also implies freedom. This is the ultimate freedom toward which Khomiakov's thought aims. It means more than rational freedom of choice, where man is bound to make his decisions taking into account external circumstances. In ideal unity, there is no externality. Man is united by willing love to others as to willing love itself. As long as he subscribes to the love-including principle of unity, he is free to act as he wishes.

He cannot act wrongly or falsely, for love is the highest moral law. He thus gets moral freedom as well as freedom from rational

externality. Unity in its ideal form necessarily implies love and 57 freedom; rejecting unity means rejecting freedom.

Unity manifests a multitude of blessings, such as cultural development, mental ability, strength in war and peace, etc. For Khomiakov, practically everything good is a manifestation of unity, and everything bad a manifestation of division.

The principle of unity in history has one great weakness.

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It is so full and many-sided that man finds it hard to grasp.

Not having a firm and defined consciousness of a principle, man may under stress fail to hold it firmly.

However, provided a society can retain a dominating unity in its life, the advantage lies with it. Real force exists only where love and freedom are. Khomiakov does not mean that complete and total unity is required for strength; such ideal unity is attainable only in the Church, and remains a far-off ideal for society. But the society which has gone farthest in that direction, i.e. which has more of the elements of unity, love, and freedom, as shown by class relations, peaceability, and such qualities, is the stronger society. For Khomiakov, this explains why the Christian states have spread so in the world. And among the Christian states, he claims, those that grow largest are those which best keep the Christian law. Finally, while societies based on

division collapse with full development, those built on Christian unity simply keep growing stronger to their fullest possible 61 manifestation.

Before it can achieve such success, a society needs consciousness of the principle of unity, and willing love for it. As noted above, this conditional aspect mitigates any determinism. It provides a sort of reciprocal relation, one might even say an inseparable wholeness, between freedom and determinism. Khomiakov's view that principles always dominate, but that any one principle can be superseded by another, also shows that his philosophy of history is basically non-deterministic.

Unity in a society requires love between its members, love of the past which made it, and love of the ties with this past.

The conscious mind, asserts Khomiakov, must be linked by loving faith to the force of life and creation inherent in the whole 63 body and past of a society. To belong to a people, one must with conscious and rational will love the laws, moral and spiritual, which have taken shape through the people's historical development.

Members of a whole society must not only love each other and love unity, or a faith expressing unity, but also love the historical life of the society and the principle it expresses. To gain wholeness in the present, society needs wholeness between past and present.

Khomiakov says less about the division principle than about his favourite principle of unity. As the other basic principle in history, division constantly opposes unity. Division implies externality, and has many general manifestations: necessity, force, one-sided rationalism, and a multitude of particular evils.

Division has one strong point: less many-sided than unity, it more easily lends itself to conscious definition. A society may even achieve a temporary superficial unity in holding a division principle. Until it reaches full development, a division-based society can appear perfectly healthy. Conditional and rational, it can develop more quickly than one based on the "whole, all-sided 65 principle".

This health remains superficial. Division can never produce the great manifestations that unity can. For example, the division dominating the West severely stunted the development of 66 true folk art. "One-sided faith in logical knowledge", a 67 characteristic of division in society, "deadens true reason...."

High moral and spiritual development is a general social property, not an individual one, and it can exist only in societies of social and spiritual unity. The idea that division is inevitable, or that struggle shows society's vigor, is wrong. The real resolution of division is death. When a society based on division reaches its full development, it collapses, its lack of wholeness finally 70 exposing itself.

Division's relation to historical ties is opposite to that of unity. For Khomiakov, rejection of historical continuity usually approximates rejection of unity, and vice versa.

The unity principle, properly held to, will prevail over division. In addition, unity can reconcile other principles. Divisive principles in a society can be brought to harmony only within the higher, fuller principle. This law, Khomiakov asserts, 71 "is witnessed by history in all its periods".

For Khomiakov, new consciousness and learning, especially historical learning and in particular his own, could speed the final triumph of a whole society, in which

Each private person, no matter how high or low his rank, how humble or brilliant his abilities, feels that by the single moral worth of his life he made a significant contribution to the general treasure-house, and that, on the other hand, no matter how much he gives, he always receives from it a hundred-fold more than he is able to give. 72

## **FOOTNOTES**

1 Khomiakov, V, 21-31.

Cf. Berdiaev, pp. 150-151; Riasanovsky, Russia and the West, p. 71 fn.

3 Khomiakov, V, 131-136.

Unity and division receive less emphasis in the <u>Notes</u> than in his articles. The <u>Notes</u> do, however, connect unity and freedom, asserting that freedom and division are incompatible. (Khomiakov, V, 322.)

5 Khomiakov, VI, 36, 40, 359, 402, 410, passim.

6 Khomiakov, V. 530.

7 Khomiakov, VII, 447-448.

For instance, Khomiakov states that although a principle characterising a society may lose its dominance, it may later regain it. For this, he offers examples of recurring trends in various regions of France, Germany, Persia, India, and China. (Khomiakov, V, 125-128.)

9 Khomiakov, V, 21-31.

10 Khomiakov, III, 14.

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Cf. Khomiakov, II, 41-42.
  12
    Cf. Khomiakov, I, 230-231.
   Khomiakov, I, 68.
    Cf. Khomiakov, II, 62.
  15
    Christoff, appendix, p. 253. Khomiakov's 'Message to the
Serbians" appears in the appendix of Christoff's book.
    Khomiakov, I, 240.
  17
   Khomiakov, I, 203.
   Khomiakov, III, 28.
   Khomiakov, I, 203-204.
   Khomiakov, I, 82-83; III, 131. Cf. also III, 21-23; V, 152, 174 ff.
   Khomiakov, I, 242. Cf. also I, 221.
   Khomiakov, II, 54, 59-60.
   Khomiakov, I, 199.
    Khomiakov, I, 75.
   Khomiakov, I, 226-227; III, 133-135.
  26
   Christoff, appendix, p. 250.
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- 27 Christoff, appendix, p. 266.
- 28 Khomiakov, III, 140.
- 29 Christoff, appendix, p. 258.
- 30 Khomiakov, I, 233.
- 31 Christoff, appendix, p. 267.
- 32 Christoff, appendix, p. 267.
- 33 Khomiakov, I, 202.
- 34 Khomiakov, I, 9.
- 35 Khomiakov, I, 207.
- 36 Christoff, appendix, p. 253.
- 37 Khomiakov, II, 43.
- 38 Khomiakov, I, 250.
- 39 Khomiakov, II, 43.
- 40 Khomiakov, I, 254.
- 41 Cf. Khomiakov, II, 43.
- 42 Cf. Khomiakov, II, 89.

43 Cf. Christoff, appendix, pp. 256-264, 267; Raeff, "Humboldt", pp. 217-223. In Russian history, Khomiakov's great grievance is the upper classes' abjuring of the Russian principle. This provides the main theme of "On Humboldt". 44 Khomiakov, I, 253.

Cf. Khomiakov, I, 199-200; III, 14-15.

Khomiakov, I, 27-28, 85-86.

47 Khomiakov, I, 28, 91.

Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 220.

Khomiakov, I, 254.

50 Khomiakov, I, 74-75, 88.

51 Khomiakov, II, 59.

52 Christoff, p. 198.

Christoff, p. 144.

54 Khomiakov, I, 4-5.

Christoff, pp. 172-173.

Khomiakov, I, 54, 59-60.

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Khomiakov, II, 72.
    Khomiakov, I, 251-253.
  59
    Khomiakov, III, 28.
  60
   Khomiakov, I, 240-241.
   Khomiakov, I, 233.
 62
    Christoff feels that Khomiakov's stress on organic development
in history together with a stress on the 'pseudo-dialectic' between
principles presents an irreconcilable contradiction, as though
Khomiakov were saying that harmony dominates history at the same
time as he says that disharmony dominates it. In fact, in Khomiakov's
philosophy, societies develop organically as long as one principle
dominates. A change in the dominant principle interrupts organic
development.
   Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 215.
   Khomiakov, I, 9.
    Khomiakov, I, 220-221, 251-253. Cf. also Berdiaev, pp. 166-168;
Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 217.
  66
   Khomiakov, I. 95.
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Khomiakov, I, 254-256.

- 68 Khomiakov, I, 96.
- 69 Khomiakov, I, 94.
- 70 Khomiakov, I, 220.
- 71 Khomiakov, I, 80.
- 72 Khomiakov, I, 101.

## CHAPTER TWO

## KHOMIAKOV'S INTERPRETATION OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

Khomiakov's general historical views are usually found in conjunction with his treatment of particular problems in Russian history. Probably this indicates that his philosophy of history developed in connection with his interest in his country's past. The question of Russia's historical nature was of central importance in the Slavophile-Westerner dispute, and Khomiakov's interpretation of Russian history will show how his general views worked in application to a much-debated and crucial historical problem.

Khomiakov's stress on unity in history is straightforward and strong in his writings on Russia's past. He feels
that he shows the principle of unity to be the principle of
1
Russia. Understanding of history would help Russia to adhere
to her proper principle, and to present this principle to the
world.

Unity's slow triumph in Russian history comprised first the gaining of a certain degree of spiritual, Christian unity, followed by the unification of the state, and finally, after the Time of Troubles, by a coalescing of all that had been gained separately.

In the original stage, unity of language by itself was fruitless in producing unity. Nor did the Varangians provide unity. The Varangian federation, Khomiakov states, joined the towns together only as a guard force. They were war captains, not princes, and in their time the towns were still independent.

Russia's basic social conditions, however, contained sufficient unity to allow the early acceptance of Christianity by the people, and to enable its preservation in its true form of Orthodoxy as defined by the Byzantines. Khomiakov makes it clear that historical social factors allowed this acceptance of the spiritual unity principle contained in Christianity. The strength of family ties, the unspoiled individualism, the ancient customs of Russian life, the absence of any stain of conquest, the presence to an extent of the law of justice and mutual love, and, above all, the communal principle present in early Russian social and economic life allowed the adoption of the new faith. Unity fostered Christianity.

And Christianity in turn fostered unity. Without

Christianity, Khomiakov asserts, the unity principle would have had

little chance to express itself; "with Christianity began the

development of Russian life". Although most villages took Christianity

without a clear understanding of it, their already gentle mores and

family-communal way of life were to an extent permeated by it.

Khomiakov gives Christianity and the Church much of the credit for

creating the unity of the Russian land, but only over a period and in combination with other factors.

Christianity met great problems. The social wholeness and harmony necessary for its full and rapid development was not present in sufficient degree. Russia's lack of natural frontiers, leaving her open to hostile neighbours, worked against any 7 attainment of peaceful unity in society. Regional separations, too, worked against the unity of Russia, as did the freedoms enjoyed 8 by the towns.

The most basic obstacle appears to have been the rudeness and lack of defining consciousness associated with the material obstacles in early Russian society.

... The very enlightening principle, by its own all-sidedness and fullness, demanded for its development an inner wholeness in society, which was lacking, and ... it couldn't give that wholeness by peaceful paths because of the un-full conception of Orthodoxy in a significant part of the persons composing the Russian people, and the insufficiency of defining consciousness in all. [Emphasis Khomiakov's.]

As Khomiakov says, without Christianity Russia could not have raised herself, but it was not Christianity alone that raised 10 her. Social and political unification progressed by less exalted means. Since in their spiritual condition the independent districts allowed no secure and peaceful unity, says Khomiakov, "the

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The regions might want freedom, but appanages had to fall". reason demanded unity. The main instruments in obtaining it were the princes, joining the districts by their family, the druzhina, Khomiakov admits that the Rurikides tore and the priesthood. Russia apart while unifying it, but in the process, he asserts, the higher aspiration of unity won over division. Important in this triumph were the new towns, which lacked the tradition of local independence and egoism. But the Tatars really resolved the quarrel between unity and local division. Destroying what they touched in their wanderings, they unwittingly helped create one great and whole Russia, by bringing home to the people the great need of unity for protection. Thus, in Khomiakov's view, Rurikidean riot, Tatar terror, and the loss of independence by towns and principalities all contributed to the worthy cause of state unification.

The struggle between unity and division was long and disastrous. According to Khomiakov, both sides were equally strong, and they had "almost" equally legitimate demands. The endless civil wars, he asserts, were only the visible aspect of the deeper 14 struggle between the two principles.

Dealing with the mechanics of unification, Khomiakov says that northern Russia united under the Rurikides by the general will, but middle and southern Russia were brought into the union

unwillingly. Khomiakov stresses the <u>druzhina</u> as a unifying agent in this forced marriage. He speaks of it as one, with different branches. It moved with princes from city to city when the rule of succession ordered them elsewhere, or wandered independently from prince to prince, considering this a right. Khomiakov suspects that the <u>druzhina</u> members were mostly foreigners. Whether or not this was true, he says, the <u>druzhina</u> was, in its basic position and significance in society, foreign to the land and founded on different principles than the native way of life. When external attacks forced the princely <u>druzhina</u> members into the center of the land, they became a strong army for the ruling prince. The <u>druzhina</u> was highly instrumental in the victory over regional egoism and the rise of the Moscow princes.

In historical theory, Khomiakov opposes any justification of means by ends. In his treatment of Russian unification, however, this idea sometimes goes by the board. It seems almost that the more virtuous side loses. With living roots in the past, social wholeness, spiritual warmth, and cultural richness, the regional elements present a more attractive picture than the <u>druzhina</u> and the other groups working for unity. The latter leaned more to dead rationalism and formalism, not to mention violence.

The Rurikidean and Tatar destruction, the rise of lessfree towns, the loss of appanage rights, and the force used by



the <u>druzhina</u> left a harmful legacy to the state they unified.

The aspiration to unity was legitimate, Khomiakov says, but the means used introduced much distortion into Russian life. With passive dullness stamping the conquered, and pride and abuse becoming strong tendencies among the victors, division was recurring 17 in the life of Russian society. As tsardom grew in power, signs of the purer family-communal condition decayed. Vieche, "thousands" and town freedoms declined. People began to live alongside rather than with each other. Moral goodness in Russia remained more as form than as content. Above all these evils was the fastening of the people to the land, which Khomiakov sometimes refers to as 18 their enslavement.

Important in this decline in the Russian way of life were the development of aristocracy and mestnichestvo. The un-Russian druzhina was responsible for this. In contrast to the allodial [sic] druzhina of the West; which created feudalism, the druzhina of Rus' formed itself into the unprecedented mestnichestvo system. Its beginnings were in the serving ranks and in the family ladder. Both foundations, Khomiakov states, were similarly foreign to the general life of the land, and the seniority system of the cities was a separate matter. Ivan the Fourth ended any pretensions of the druzhina to independence, but druzhina and mestnichestvo formalism left traces. They deadened general life, introducing foreign principles and the seeds of petrification and

death, and weakening Russia before her enemies. They were harmful in their development, their fullness, and their fall, hindering Russia's 19 cultural development and the development of Christianity.

In the methods they used and the consequences they left, the agents of unification damaged Russian life. All this is justified for Khomiakov by the need of unity. He applauds the development of the Russian state with a full consciousness of the abuses committed in the process, and of the paradox that the agents working for unity proceeded with divisive means. Unification seems to absolve all evils for those working for it. Regardless pf. the morality of the princes, Khomiakov asserts, their aim was legitimate, for it involved the rescue of Russia from foreign dangers threatening her. In addition, Khomiakov gathers up some other justifications.

The aspiration [to unity] I have named the higher; and I named it so not only because external peace is a great thing and a condition of prosperity; and not because, to me, as a Russian, it is happy to look on the material greatness of my native land and consider that other peoples can fear and envy her: no. I say this because a great state more than others presents to the soul the realisation of that high and hitherto inaccessible aim of peace and good will among men, to which we are called; because the emotional union with millions, when it is realised, lifts the soul of man higher than even the closest tie among some thousands; because a visible and ceaseless animosity always roams around the close borders of a little society, and the removal of this ennobles and pacifies the heart; and because, finally, by the secret

(but, perhaps, intelligible) sympathy between the spirit of man and the extent of society, the very greatness of mind and thought belongs only to great peoples.<sup>21</sup>

Thus, Russia's forcible unification struck a blow not only for Christian peace and good will, prosperity, and security, but for intellectual development and emotional satisfaction.

Whatever the merits of this justification, Khomiakov's view of this period invalidates the charge that he idealised pre-Petrine Russia. To Ivan Kireevsky's picture of a former ideal Russia corrupted by formalism, Khomiakov replies that the ideal Russia never existed. No nation merits such praises as Kireevsky'lavishes on old Rus', let alone a land darkened by the bloody quarrels of princes, and by deeds such as blinding princely heirs and hiring pagan hordes to fight Russians.

The dark and bloody picture Khomiakov paints hardly conforms to the opinion that he saw pre-Petrine Russia as the 23 land of "spontaneity, freedom, and brotherly love". The fourth stanza of his poem "To Russia" better displays Khomiakov's particular type of love for Russia:

Smeared with dark injustice in the law courts.

And branded with the mark of slavery;

Full of godless flattery, foul lies,

Of deadly apathy and vice,

And every other known depravity!

Unworthy of your calling,

You are the chosen nonetheless! ...

Also false is the opinion that Khomiakov postulated an 25 Describing Christianity's effect on Russian mores, Khomiakov points to many Russian characteristics that the new faith encouraged, including humility, kindness, strength of spirit, patience, capacity for self-sacrifice, justice in general judgment, strong family ties, and loyalty to tradition. Others would do well to imitate these qualities, but he questions whether it is possible to imitate what is the "consequence of a 26 whole historical development". The Russian character, however great and however fortunate in the circumstances which developed it, is not immutable. History shaped it. Khomiakov's statement that "a Slav cannot be a complete Slav outside Orthodoxy" also shows attention to conditions of development rather than to an overriding 27 racialism.

Khomiakov's portrait of Russia's past depicts a good deal of division. He describes Russian history as full of blood and corruption. He admits that the local elements opposed to Russian unification displayed better qualities than those fighting for it. He refers to the aspirations toward unification and toward local isolation as almost equally strong. Such situations make it difficult for Khomiakov to support his view that Russia's history revealed unity to be her basic principle. He is forced to make numerous minor qualifications, such as his statement that the druzhina was largely foreign in membership and completely so in conception.

The basic answer on which he relies, however, is that division

was never acknowledged as a legitimate principle, through a division-based faith or otherwise. It was never supported by conscious acknowledgment and logical definition, as it was in the West's spiritual and intellectual history. Division was a consequence of chance and misunderstanding for Russia. Only "the principle of wholeness and unity" held indisputable right among the Russian people. Though many faults appeared in Russia, they were never accepted as right and good. If the law of mutual love did not always perfectly permeate social relations, still the people acknowledged no other law. No ideas of truth or justice contrary to Christian love ever gained support in the Russian land. His contention that Russia never freely acknowledged a different principle is the key point on which Khomiakov relies. He feels that this, more than the commune or any other social phenomenon, indicates that division in Russia was "accidental", the unity principle "basic".

The greatest triumph for the unity principle followed the Time of Troubles.

In the history of our Rus' the idea of unity always lay as the foundation stone of all social ideas; but there long took place a struggle of the small communes with the idea of a great commune. Finally, the idea of a great commune triumphed, after the bloody confusion, by the arming of all Russia for Moscow, and the choice of a tsaryoung Michael. Then it came out that unity, seeming the consequence of historical chance under the Rurikide tsars, was really the work of the Russian land. Sl

But even this blessed event, taken by Khomiakov as the final creation of Russia, failed to end her problems. And new ones joined them. The restricting influence of local customs and traditions at the time, Khomiakov admits, was hindering Russia's development. A move toward more dynamic freedom of action was justified. Unfortunately, this cause was taken up by Peter. The strong-willed genius led the trend to triumph, and in the manner and completeness of that triumph was tragedy.

One-sided development of the individual mind which has rejected the history and traditions of society - that is Whiggism ... in any country. ... Whiggism ... turned into a protest against the very essence of the people's life; it abjured the Russian principle and broke away from it. Impotent, as all outcasts must be ... it was compelled to cleave to another historical movement, the powerful intellectual movement of the West, whose disciple and slave it became. 32

When the leaders chose a different principle from that of the people, division thrust into society, and into society's relation with its history. The split in Russia stunted her development.

Khomiakov did not idealise pre-Petrine Russia, and neither did he blame only Peter the Great for the modern divisions. Khomiakov mentions the good aspects of Peter's reforms, and absolves him of the guilt for many evil developments. Servitude had existed as a permanent sore, though not yet legally strong, before Peter's time, and so did aristocracy. According to Khomiakov, the Eastern

bishops, not the emperor, established the Russian patriarchate and 33 then displaced it with the Synod. The development of material forces, the destruction of local rights, the repression of communal life, the submission of individual thought to the state and the concentration of state thought in the ruler's person all 34 preceded Peter. Peter struck like "a terrible and beneficial storm" at court corruption, pride among the boyars, and love of 35 power among the priests. Furthermore, he represented a general trend of thought. His fault was in his efficiency.

Khomiakov viewed Peter as a remarkable ruler who influenced history, but not one who single-handedly changed Russia's direction. Principles, not persons, dominated Russia's history. The rise of autocracy was the rise of Russia. In this, however, not the individual autocrats but the whole process and the whole system were what counted.

Khomiakov trod gingerly regarding the whole question of autocracy in Russia's present and future. He avoided any definite treatment of the problem. This may have been because he preferred to emphasise the social world over the political, or it may have been because of his uneasy relationship with the censor. He did not really carry his depiction of Russian history beyond Peter, except in the most general terms. In the pre-Petrine period, he awarded the autocracy a favourable judgment despite its faults. He seems to have felt it to have been a necessary evil in

Russia's past. In his own time, Khomiakov felt that the state which rose through autocracy still upheld the great and Christian principle of unity better than any other country. Some remarks indicate his attitude to have been one of loyal support. Yet he called for many freedoms, especially freedom of expression, which the autocracy prohibited. Only a few remarks indicate in what direction he thought the system of Russian government should progress as society moved toward unity.

It is significant that Khomiakov virtually identifies the state with force, a mark of division in society. Referring to the Teutonic lands, he states that collisions with Rome brought a "wild way of life, the predominance of force, the druzhina structure" - everything a state needs to build itself. Violence created the state in Russia as well. Freedom suffered as the Russian state grew. With Peter the Great a complete separation of government from the people's will ensued. This could be a benefit, Khomiakov asserts, External, material rule could go freely on its way, while the peaceful consciousness of the people's soul could develop free from temporary interests and from dry, Khomiakov calls for the joining of a practical rationality. good regional life with the sense of a moral, Christian state, but he does not urge common involvement in state action. An 1859 speech outlines his attitude.

The life of the state is primarily practical, constantly disturbed and altered....
Its nature ... contains in itself a preponderance of conditionality, materiality, and coercion. Social life, on the contrary,

is a life of thought, social self-education, free consultation...
The demands of the present, the contemporary, the daily, comprise everything which belongs to the state while the sphere of social activity consists almost entirely of a movement forward, of growth, of a look into the future...
The constant and the lasting easily give way to enthusiasm for the temporary and the accidental.
Therefore social activity could hardly preserve its purity if it coincided with the center of the state. 39

In accordance with such views, Khomiakov wishes education to be as far as possible entrusted to the general 40 upblic, and court judgments to the commune. He opposes any separation in authority between laity and clergy in the Russian 42 Orthodox Church.

Except for the commune, Khomiakov says little about specific political and economic institutions or about problems of government. Authors generally attribute to him views similar to those of the other Slavophiles on government. He seems to find ideal the government which least involves the people in its activities. "Centralisation is always ruinous for the free development of life in all its aspects...." Khomiakov stresses freedom from force, not freedom of action.

Khomiakov justifies the formation of the Russian state in large part for the protection it provided. In general he seems

to wish the government restricted to a peripheral, protective role. Health and progress should stem from the unity principle permeating society, through Orthodoxy, the commune, and whatever other means offer themselves. The government will be influenced by the general environment, and act accordingly. Freedom, especially freedom of expression, is essential for the people. When the people's voice is silent, the government becomes blind and self-destructive.

Khomiakov foresees a great future role for his favourite social institution, the commune. It, not the government, is Russia's great civic institution. Khomiakov opposes any active social role for the Church, which should restrict itself to matters of faith.

But from the commune he feels there might spring a whole new 45 civic order. Whether he expects the government to disappear with unity's future triumph in Russia, Khomiakov, perhaps with one eye on the censors, does not say.

Avoiding the problem of autocracy, Khomiakov also omits treatment of specific reigns or events in Russia's modern period. After Peter, he depicts Russia as essentially one vast split. This static picture forms his whole historical interpretation of the modern period in Russia.

The epoch Peter characterised, said Khomiakov, introduced the greatest division yet into Russia. The new power Russia developed brought pride, and this by itself distorted the Russian way of 46 life. But most important, a rupture opened between the national life and the national enlighterment, damaging both. The life of the

majority became dull and passive, for the new learning that came to Russia in Peter's wake was cut off from the life of the people. This learning was cut off from its historical Western roots as well. Without roots in life, learning could not flourish. It could, in Russia, only feed parasitically on the West. Limited to the upper classes, the new learning divided Russia more and more into two parts. Both scientific and instinctive knowledge of Russia declined among the educated. A deadly imitation flourished in higher society and in government. Meanwhile, cut off from learning and dynamic mental activity, the people withdrew into a plasma-like mass. The development of a real Russian enlighterment, drawn from the whole land, was impossible. Society was split in the present, and the present had split from the past. Neither learning nor life could thrive under such conditions of division.

If all had adopted the new enlightenment, Russia would have been completely cut off from her historical life. Fortunately, an obscure feeling of danger made the common people reject the new principles. Khomiakov regards the masses as the bearers of Russia's true principle and the source of her future greatness. Their life is Russia's life.

Our life is whole and strong. It was preserved for us ... by that much-suffering Rus' which never took into itself our poor half-enlightenment. We can restore this

life in ourselves: it takes only to love it with a sincere love. Reason and learning are bringing us to a clear consciousness of the unavoidability of this internal transformation....51

Learning and love would bring about union between classes, between learning and life, etc., and speed the progress toward a united society. When the educated class reunited with the people and with the principle that was expressed in the people's institutions and in their way of life, triumph would follow.

There is no doubt that the Russian popular element will grow and will bring in all its outgrowths of knowledge and human activity a huge contribution, by which most previous shortcomings will be filled out. There is no doubt that the high principle of unity, which lies as the foundation of all our thought and all our national force, will triumph over our mental and domestic divergences. 52

Khomiakov claimed the few good cultural accomplishments appearing in Russia as manifestations of her basic unity principle, not of the presently divided environment. They merely foreshadowed the great achievments that would be possible when Russia more closely adhered to her basic principle.

Khomiakov's interpretation of Russian history cannot be fully appreciated without a sketch of his contrasting picture of the West. Russia and the West were inextricably tied together in the Slavophile-Westerner dispute and in Khomiakov's response to it. The West's faulty historical principle, he felt, made it evident that the future belonged to Russia. She should follow her own nature, guided by understanding of her own historical principle, and avoid the disaster which the division principle was bringing to the West.

The West's principle, Khomiakov said, is division.

Russia's is unity. Russia's is the greatest. She can never subordinate herself to the Western principle. It is alien to her past and nature. Those who seek to bring in not just knowledge but the whole system of enlighterment from the West are trying in vain to oppose the realities of the situation.

Western history expressed a double duality, in popular life and in spiritual conceptions. Germany distorted the communal principle. Her own society was originally a peaceable, family-based one, but collisions with Rome bred warlike ways and a conqueror-conquered division in society. Rome distorted the spiritual principle of unity. The Roman tendency to surface rationality, to externality, to juridical difinition, were strong enough to corrupt 54
Western Christianity. The two types of distortion remained characteristic of the West in general.

Already before the Schism theological differences reflected the different mentalities of East and West. This extended to the various heresies appearing in early Christianity. Western

heresies dealt with rights and laws, Eastern ones with questions of the essence of God and man. Not just a papal decision, but the nature of the whole Roman world, was responsible for the final 56 split. As in Russia, the prevailing historical conditions dictated the fate of Christianity. The schism that the conditions produced marked, in Khomiakov's view, the end of true Christianity in the West.

Along with the deadening division introduced into Russia in Peter's epoch, this "Western schism"draws Khomiakov's highest wrath. The Church until the schism had remained one and whole. The councils decided theological questions and the whole Church accepted or rejected their definitions, according to their agreement with the faith and traditions held by the great body of Christians. Then the West appropriated the right to decide ecumenical questions, to change what was entrusted to the Church in its totality. They insserted the <a href="filioque">filioque</a> in the creed without even warning the East, much less taking counsel. In doing so, they served notice that Eastern opinions were insignificant regarding matters of faith and doctrine. Papal infallibility did not yet officially exist, Khomiakov notes; it was Roman egoism that

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consecrated this action.

The Western Christian, formerly a participant in Church decisions, now became the subject of external authority. He and the Church ceased to be one. The internal tie was broken. External law, which is merely rational, replaced the moral, living

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law that embraces the whole being of man.

The schism ended true Church life for the West.

Western Christianity began to align itself with the prevailing social and intellectual principle of division. The deifying of political society was so tied with the Roman mind that the church\* soon became like a state. Unity by force marked it, together with characteristic aspects such as the one ruling language, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the monastic knights, and the Jesuits.

The church in its turn strengthened Western division.

Its external history, says Khomiakov, defined the development of society, of the private way of life, and of political and theological learning. Slowly but surely it recreated man's thought and soul in the West, forcing him into the rational, one-sided 60 mold. The development of law, of scholasticism, even of 61 architecture expressed this in their characteristics.

The appearance of Protestantism brought no real change to Western Christianity. In an ambivalent way, Khomiakov prefers Protestantism to Catholicism. It voiced a healthy protest against some glaring faults of the Roman Catholic church. At the same time, Khomiakov places what he defines as Protestantism at the very root of the sinful schism and at the base of Catholicism. When the West assumed the right to decide questions of dogma, it was legitimising the cardinal characteristic of

<sup>\*</sup> After the schism, Khomiakov reserves the capital C for the Eastern Church.

Protestantism - freedom of investigation which is "torm from the living tradition of unity founded on mutual love". The Protestant faiths showed only the growth and progressive revelation of the rationalism, and the faith in rationalsim, hidden in 62 Catholicism.

The crime of Protestantism, like that of the Russian "Whiggism" of Peter's period, involves the denial of historical continuity. Christian truth must be preserved, Khomiakov asserts, by preserving the Scriptures, which he calls written tradition, and preserving tradition, which he calls living Scripture. The denial of this historical element constitutes that Protestantism which appeared in the schism and destroyed Western Christianity.

Protestantism means the assertion of doubt in existing dogma; in other words, the denial of dogma as living tradition; more briefly: of the Church. 03

As usual, to reject the legacy of history means to reject unity.

When Protestantism took over the prevailing one-sidedness of thought from the Catholics, it further developed the confusion of juridical and spiritual ideas. This led finally to the creation of laws for the whole spiritual world. This development culminated 64 in Hegelianism.

At the peak of faith in external rationalism, the crowning accomplishment showed rationalism's limits. Hegel's

conclusion was the logical conclusion of the Western rationalist trend: the assertion that the subjective concept was a fundamental force, a source of reality. This ultimate statement made it clear that the whole Western development was an error. Hegel had added the "last stone" which completed and toppled the edifice of Western rationalism. The present Western crisis lay not in class or national or other clashes of interest, but in the final loss of a spiritual base. The thought which toppled the Western religions now was turning against itself.

Division in society and spirit had brought the contemporary West to near lifelessness. Only England fares relatively well in Khomiakov's estimation, especially in comparison with France and Germany. In these countries, "society created by history has been detached from it as <u>caput mortuum</u>". They have no organic historical continuity, Khomiakov complains, no wholeness with a common living principle.

Still, Khomiakov respected and admired much in the

West. In a poem, he calls it the "land of holy wonders". The West

was created from living activity; its institutions had been
67
developed in answer to its own questions. Social duality and onesided spiritual principles had now produced a mood of general
rejection among Western peoples. But her past exertions had greatly
benefitted human enlighterment, creating much that was great.

Russia could well imitate many Western developments. By the
limited, easily definable character of her principle, the West

had been able to keep people focused in their activity. Consequently, 69 she had been very productive. And the West had brought good, along with harm, to Russia. Part of this was the fund of useful knowledge from which Russia could continue to draw. More important, the various collisions with the West, peaceful and warlike, had perhaps been the providential means of awakening Russia's mental 70 forces.

Khomiakov mixes praise and blame for both Russia and the West. In his own time, he seems to have considered Russia to be in worse social shape, and in some ways in worse spiritual shape, 71 than the West. Any idea that Khomiakov's thought was dominated by nationalistic jealousy and hatred of the West seems of doubtful validity. He enjoyed visiting the West, and liked Western books. He spoke with regret of the development of mistrust and hatred of Western thought in Russian popular society. On the other side, he found hatred and fear of Russia appearing in the West. His article on "Foreigners' Opinion of Russia" has concrete examples of exaggerated Western accusations. He blames Russians, however, for spreading most of the Western misconceptions about Russia. The Western Russophobia of the period helps testify that any charges of nationalistic aggression might be laid elsewhere than at Khomiakov's door.

For Khomiakov, Russia's superiortiy was largely potential and derived from her still incompletely manifested principles. Having

enjoyed an apparent superiority, the West at last was approaching the full development of her principles. These were becoming clearer as the culminating collapse neared.

Western man had to seek a new faith, but he had nothing to build on. The vaunted social principle of self-interest couldn't 73 rise to the comprehension of right. The West had only a hopeless choice: to search for truth along paths already shown false, or to 74 reject their whole past and try to return to the true way.

Russia must take warning from this. She must reject the Western model. She escapes the Western dilemma, of course, by virtue of her higher principle. Her divisions resulted from 75 accidents and misunderstandings, not basic principles. Division's manifestations will disappear from the Russian land with time. But in the West, where division is basic, the present life's doom is sealed. Praise the West for its great deeds in the past, Khomiakov urges; pray for force and energy on the paths of truth such as the 76 West had shown in its false direction.

Knowledge and love will bring triumph for Russia. It may not be in this generation, Khomiakov says, but it will come. The high principle of unity will find fulfillment, manifesting itself in a rich art, learning, and way of life. Perhaps even the West may 77 receive the healing principle from Russia. It is worth noting that Khomiakov's exhortations to cultural and spiritual leadership lack any association with political dominance outside Russia. Even his

strong emotions during the Crimean War brought no such sentiments
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into his writings. But he firmly asserts that the life which
created huge Russia guards treasures for many, perhaps for all
79
peoples.

History calls upon Russia to take the lead in universal enlightenment; it gives Russia this right because of the comprehensiveness and completeness of Russian principles; and a right which history confers on a people is 80 an obligation imposed upon each of its members.

## **FOOTNOTES**

- Cf. Khomiakov, I, 83, and throughout this article "On the Possibility of a Russian Artistic School".
  - 2 Khomiakov, II, 26-27.
- Khomiakov, III, 28-29; Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 215; cf. also Khomiakov, I, 219-221, and Berdiaev, pp. 177-181.
  - 4 Khomiakov, I, 230-231.
  - 5 Khomiakov, I, 220.
- Khomiakov, I, 242. Regarding Khomiakov's term "family-communal": Khomiakov does not go into great detail about the early commune, but clearly considers it more communal than clan-like. In context, terms such as this are ascribing family virtues to the commune more than the opposite.
  - Khomiakov, I, 220-221.
  - 8 Khomiakov, I, 226-229.
  - 9 Khomiakov, I, 256-257; cf. also I, 220-221.
  - 10 Khomiakov, III, 21.

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    Khomiakov, I, 237.
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    Khomiakov, I, 225-226.
   Khomiakov, I, 226-227.
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   Khomiakov, I, 226.
   Khomiakov, I, 221-222.
   Khomiakov, I, 225-228.
   Khomiakov, I, 227-228.
   Khomiakov, III, 17, 27; Christoff, appendix, p.251.
    Khomiakov, I, 222-225.
   Khomiakov, I, 237.
    Khomiakov, I, 227.
   Khomiakov, I, 213-214.
   Riasanovsky, "Sobornost", pp. 191-192.
   Translated in Christoff, p. 106.
    Cf. P. N. Miliukov, "Chief Currents of Russian Historical Thought",
Annual Review of the American Historical Association (1904), 111-114.
  26
   Khomiakov, I, 242.
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  Christoff, appendix, p. 254.
- 28 Khomiakov, I, 221-222.
- 29 Khomiakov, I, 230.
- 30 Khomiakov, I, 245-246.
- 31 Khomiakov, I, 99 fn.; cf. also I, 230.
- 32 Raeff, "Humboidt", pp. 216-218.
- 33 Khomiakov, III, 17-19; II, 36-37.
- 34 Khomiakov, III, 25-26.
- 35 Khomiakov, III, 136-137.
- 36 Khomiakov, III, 133.
- 37 Khomiakov, III, 25-26.
- 38 Khomiakov, III, 28-29.
- 39 Christoff, pp. 210-211.
- 40 Christoff, p. 190.
- 41 Christoff, appendix, p. 266.
- 42 Christoff, p. 159.

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43
 Christoff, p. 212.
 Christoff, pp. 199-212, 267.
 Christoff, p. 210; Khomiakov, II, 83-84.
 Christoff, appendix, p. 250.
 Khomiakov, I, 33.
 Khomiakov, I, 23.
 Khomiakov, I, 17-20.
 Christoff, appendix, pp. 256-258.
 Khomiakov, I, 91.
 Khomiakov, I, 85.
 Khomiakov, I, 83.
 Khomiakov, I, 202-204; III, 136-137.
 Khomiakov, I, 205-206.
 Khomiakov, II, 50-51.
 Khomiakov, II, 48-52.
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Khomiakov, II, 53.

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 Khomiakov, II, 49-50.
 Khomiakov, I. 206-208.
 Khomiakov, I, 208-209.
 Khomiakov, II, 51, 55-56, 74-75.
 Khomiakov, II, 44, 58.
 Khomiakov, I, 209-211.
 Khomiakov, I, 16; II, 87-88.
 Christoff, p. 180.
 Khomiakov, I, 47-48.
 Khomiakov, I, 82-84.
 Cf. Raeff, "Humboldt", pp. 217-218.
 Khomiakov, I, 258-259.
 Cf. Khomiakov, I, 51-52.
 Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 216.
 Khomiakov, I, 15.
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Khomiakov, I, 258.

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75
Khomiakov, I, 93.

76
Khomiakov, I, 211-212.

77
Khomiakov, I, 85.

78
Khomiakov, III, 178-195, and Christoff, appendix, p. 251.

79
Khomiakov, I, 22.

80
Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 229.
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#### CONCLUSION

Khomiakov prefers to combine things in his historical thought rather than to separate different historical factors from each other. For him, faith shapes history and history shapes faith. Principles make manifestations and changes in manifestations encourage new principles to grow. Principles may fade but they remain eternally ready to be born again in a society. History influences man and his world-views and these both influence history. The list of such combinations could go on. Relativity and reciprocity appear constantly in Khomiakov's historical thought.

The combinations he makes in considering man's freedom are especially interesting. Man is free in choice, yet determined by his choice, since adherence involves action; yet again, if he has chosen to live by unity, he is still freer in this determinism. There is no inevitable progress or regression, but man can, hopefully, help direct history through understanding of it. One can almost say that freedom and determinism merge for Khomiakov.

The same sort of polar amplitude appears in his coupling of ends and means. They cannot be separated, and they often seem to amount to nearly the same thing. Man achieves his own wholeness

by participation in the social whole. Mutual love is both the means to the ideal society and its final norm.

In Khomiakov's view of society, the general and the individual influence each other. Man finds his greatest expression in merging with society. Society in turn rests on the individual. It requires the force of the individual intellect for healthy levelopment. Khomiakov stresses groups, or, better to say, relations in the group, more than he stresses individuals. But for him, mutuality does not exclude individual importance.

Even the unity and division principles, seemingly so dualistic, continually combine in Khomiakov's interpretation of history. Outside the perfect society, manifestations of each are always present. The wholeness characterising his historical views marks even the relations of the two basic opposed principles.

Khomiakov's emphasis on ideological and social factors deserves note. Either can overpower the other, as history can overpower any factor. Ideology, or faith, receives by far the most emphasis as a factor, but Khomiakov also gives much attention to social and economic influences in history.

Another characteristic of his historical thought appears in Khomiakov's stress on the importance of the original formation of a society to its later development. This relates, of course, to his entire idea of historical principles, and to his idea of the connection between ends and means. His emphasis on the influence of origins surely helped foster his great interest in early history.

Noteworthy above his attention to any aspect of history is his stress on the importance of history itself. It affects man's body, soul, and fate. "The road already travelled determines the road ahead". Only by preserving an intimate relation with what has developed in its past can a society aspiring to unity hope to flourish.

Historical consciousness, and historical learning above all learning, are therefore vital to a healthy society.

New historical understanding, Khomiakov felt, was increasing man's freedom to influence history. He considered that Europe's historical learning had succeeded only in showing its worthlessness. Russia, he asserted, must deepen humanity's historical understanding. She had so far done little in this direction, but it seemed that from now on she would do great things. Khomiakov's writings leave no doubt that he considered himself a grand pioneer in this work.

Unity's future triumph in Russia would result from the development of love, learning, and the Russian popular life. No apocalyptic event was needed to bring it about. Khomiakov didn't visualise a completely different future era that depended on a completely new social principle or on a "new man". For him, the basic elements of the ideal society had already appeared. Man as he was had the potential to bring its triumph.

Upholding Russia's history as revealing her principle to be unity. Khomiakov faces the problem of explaining the frequent presence of division in her past. He forthrightly admits the weight of evidence contradictory to his thesis. Sometimes he seems almost to defeat his own case, as when he describes the proponents of Russian unification as displaying the worst characteristics of division. There are other troublesome points in his interpretation of Russian history. Khomiakov writes that Russia expanded because of the worth of her principle, a principle of peace and love. However, as he knows. Russia did her share of fighting in her progress to her huge boundaries. He holds that spiritual and mental greatness belong only to peoples great in size, advancing this as one justification for Russian unification. This implies that a small society has no great worth. But all societies, including the Russian, were originally small. If greatness appears only with size, how did early Russian society have the strength to grow? And why did Khomiakov find that as Russia continued to expand under Peter, Catherine, and other rulers, her enlightenment and quality of life declined?

In Khomiakov's remarks on specific aspects of contemporary Russian society, similar conflicting trends appear, with unity in one aspect working against unity in another aspect. The greater freedoms Khomiakov calls for would constitute a break with the historical pattern in Russia. Although history in its organic process placed

the non-Russian minorities in their situation, Khomiakov calls on them to abandon their past and merge with the greater Russian entity, meaning Ukrainians and White Russians also as part of the Russian people. And in order to guard unity in society, Khomiakov, despite his general stress on freedom, opposes freedom of office for persons holding a different faith.

Khomiakov's interpretation of Russian history and society shows that different aspects of unity may conflict with one another. His call to greatness and strength for Russia could lend encouragement to developments dangerous to love and freedom. A serious follower of Khomiakov would not accept any sinister direction from his work, for Khomiakov's emphasis on love and freedom is too strong. But a less discerning follower might hear only the call to greatness, and feel impelled to bring unity by force.

In his historical theory, Khomiakov makes no attempt to remove the potential for conflict between different aspects of unity. When a choice must be made, he seems to decide for whatever will best advance unity under existing conditions. Whatever the choices he makes at particular times, he generally stresses unity in terms of peace and love.

Leaving these matters aside, much in Khomiakov's interpretation of Russian history demonstrates bold and original historical thinking. Together with Ivan Kireevsky, he appears to have been the first to assert and elaborate the picture of Russia and the West serving two different principles, with Russia's principle superior. His ideas found some dim reflections in

contemporary historical thought. Western historians cared little to search for any different principle in Russian history, let alone a superior one. But in Russia the idea of a greater society based on communality appears in Herzen and later social thinkers. As for Khomiakov's portrait of the merits of Russia's past, it fell between that of the other Slavophiles and the "official nationalists", both of whom tended to idealise it, and that of the Westerners, who condemned it as gloom and grief unrelieved until Peter the Great's time. In this respect, Khomiakov presented what now seems a more balanced picture of Russia's earlier history.

After Khomiakov the idea of basic, far-reaching 7 differences between Russia and the West occurs more often.

Sometimes an emphasis on unity occurs, though not to the degree that it appears in Khomiakov's work. Danilevsky and Dostoievsky both asserted Russia's distinctive nature in terms somewhat reminiscent of those used by Khomiakov and the other Slavophiles. Although orthodox historians have dealt more with concrete matters than with such fundamental but nebulous points, in their work too there have appeared strong assertions of the distinctive character of Russians and of the Russian historical process. In the West, historians commonly allow that Russia has a strong communal tradition. However, no serious historical work has distinguished between Russia and the West in such basic terms as Khomiakov did.

Regarding less fundamental historical matters, other elements in Khomiakov's treatment of Russia have been supported

by later work. This is true, for example, of his contention that Christianity was no magical creator but was important even if shallowly understood in early Russia; his acknowledgment of foreign influence in Russian unification, and especially his opinion of the Mongols' importance in this; his assertion that great good and great evil both existed in Russia's past; his evaluation of Peter the Great as standing within the historical current but distinguishing himself and damaging Russian continuity; his stress on the split between the people and the priviliged classes. His views on the imperfections of early Russian Christianity finally won acceptance in church history textbooks. His historical interpretation of Russia proved successful in foreshadowing many of the views accepted in the future.

Originality and independence appear also in Khomiakov's historico-philosophical views. Among his own countrymen, Ivan Kireevsky of course formulated concepts similar to those of Khomiakov. But Khomiakov formed his world-view before Kireevsky 10 did. Khomiakov's philosophy of history was more elaborate, and he stressed reciprocal influences, freedom, and the power of historically conscious man somewhat more than Kireevsky.

His other Russian contemporaries deserve less notice. Khomiakov differed sharply from the basic views of the "official nationalists", which emphasised the role of the Russian rulers above all. As for the Westerners, except for Granovsky they

displayed little historical concern and less originality.

Khomiakov differed from the Westerners, as Florovsky notes, in finding society, not the state, to be the last reality in the lil historical process.

Khomiakov has been accused of drawing his ideas from the German philosophers whose thought dominated the period's intellectual climate. No doubt they gave Khomiakov stimulation, and perhaps some suggestions. His stress on organic connection reminds one of Schelling. However, it also reminds one of Orthodox Christian thought. In Schelling's philosophy of history all is unfolding toward an unseeable ultimate purpose. In Khomiakov's, ultimate values are always close at hand and accessible to man. Khomiakov differs from Hegel on this same point and on others.

12 Hegel saw contradiction as the root of all life and movement; Khomiakov saw no need of it in a healthy society. Hegel, according to Khomiakov, took formula, or concept, for the fundamental motive force. Khomiakov saw Hegel's historical system as "nothing but an unconscious transposition of the categories of cause and effect".

Khomiakov's historical thought shows many views of surprising modernity. His stress on modified determinism, reciprocal influences, relativity rather than absolutes, and the consequences of reckless breaking with the past, might find more support than opposition today.

He was also ahead of his time in advancing history as the bearer of a solution for social problems. If it was given proper

adherence, and if its historical manifestations were preserved, as historical learning was showing necessary, the principle of unity in history would express itself in an ideal society. This solution was not something far-off, as in the rationalist and Hegelian views of quasi-determinist progress in history, but definite, as in Marx's interpretation of history. Khomiakov left, however, more room than Marx for individual freedom in consciousness and action. He did not idolise history.

Khomiakov differed from future trends of thought in his assertion of man's access to freedom and value. He accepted man's relative malleability, but still strove to keep some ultimate values within his scheme of man. Ideal freedom and value were not negated by overpowering historical forces, or consigned to some future too remote to worry about. They were already partly present, and, with social love and unity developing encouraged by historical learning, they would be attainable in their fullness in the near future.

Khomiakov's history needed the good, i.e. unity based on love and freedom, to achieve the good. His implications of control in unity are comparatively small. Freedom is stressed. For Marx and others, historical consciousness and knowledge could sometimes permit violent externality. For Khomiakov they did not. Freedom itself was to be the means to freedom, love the means to love.

In Khomiakov's philosophy of history and society, there is more of freedom, more of man's value, and more historical sense than in some ideologies that later gained more followers. Both his philosophy of history and his interpretation of Russian history deserve more credit than they have previously received.

#### **FOOTNOTES**

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Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 215.

Christoff, p. 232.

Khomiakov, I, 37.

Khomiakov, I, 37-40. Quotation is from p. 38.

Khomiakov, I, 27.

Christoff, appendix, p. 254.
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Berdiaev feels that the Slavophiles first created the whole question of East and West, and speaks of it as the center of their thought. (Berdiaev, p. 146.)

Cf. for example P. N. Miliukov, <u>Istoriia Vtorci Russkoi</u>

Revoliutsii (Sofia, 1921), pp. 11-12; extract is in A. A. Adams, <u>The Russian Revolution and Bolshevik Victory</u>, in the D. C. Heath series, Problems in European Civilization, pp. 1-7.

P. N. Miliukov, <u>Outlines of Russian Culture</u>, ed. M. Karpovich, trans. V. Ughet and E. Davis (Philadelphia, 1942), Part I, p. 2.

V. V. Zenkovsky, A History of Russian Philosophy, trans. G. L. Kline, 2 vols. (New York, 1953), I, 180.

11 Florovsky, p. 249.

F. Thilly, A History of Philosophy, revised by L. Wood, third edition (New York, 1957), pp. 466-473, 476-489. On Khomiakov's relation to Hegel, see also D. I. Chizhevsky, Gegel' v Rossii (Paris, 1939), pp. 185-189.

13
Raeff, "Humboldt", p. 209.

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