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**ISLAM AND POLITICS IN THE THOUGHT OF TJOKROAMINOTO
(1882-1934)**

by

Hasnul Arifin Melayu

A thesis

**submitted to the Institute of Islamic Studies
Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University
in partial fulfillment of the of the requirement for the degree of
Master of Arts**

**Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
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Résumé

Les Gommes d'Alain Robbe-Grillet, *L'Emploi du temps* de Michel Butor ainsi que *La Bataille de Pharsale* de Claude Simon sont tous des Nouveaux Romans présentant des mythes gréco-latins dont nous nous proposons de définir le rôle dans le processus de réception du texte par le lecteur. À travers plusieurs possibilités et difficultés de reconstitution du récit mythologique d'origine, le lecteur remarque que les mythes forment, par rapport à l'intrigue du roman, une sorte de «récit second» qui reflète cette intrigue et en gère la complexité. De la sorte, les mythes équilibrent le niveau de compréhension du lecteur. Toutefois, les problèmes qu'ils entraînent demeurent considérables: ainsi, le lecteur est témoin de l'éclatement de certains concepts classiques familiers et il est confronté à une multiplicité de choix interprétatifs et prédictifs. Il devient donc, grâce aux mythes, le spectateur privilégié du déplacement de l'horizon d'attente.

ABSTRACT

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Title: Islam and Politics in the Thought of Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934)
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Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) was one of the leading Indonesian Muslim political figures in the early twentieth century. He was one of the prominent leaders in Sarekat Islam. Beginning in 1912, when he firstly joined Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto devoted all of his attention to the development of this organization as well as to the political movement in general at that time. This thesis deals with a number of Tjokroaminoto's conceptions of Islam and politics, which reflect his involvement in the political discourses of his time, especially with Communist and secular nationalist groups. His life and his works as well as the political conditions of his time are discussed in order to trace the sources that inspired his vision. In his political ideas, Tjokroaminoto expressed his conceptions of the worth of Indonesian people, socialism and education, as well as the way in which all these ideas are interrelated. His ideas on Islam, which are mainly inspired by his aspiration to create a united Indonesian Muslim community, were highly influential and provided a relatively early definition as to what political Islam should encompass. These ideas are more clearly expressed in his conceptions of the separation between Islam and politics, nationalism, pan-Islamism and the Ummah. Finally, his discussion of Islam and politics marked a new stage in the self-awareness of Indonesians. As such, his ideas were of key importance to the formulation of the movement's goals and its strategies.

RÉSUMÉ

Auteur: Hasnul Arifin Melayu
Titre: Islam et politique dans la pensée de Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934)
Département: Institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill
Diplôme: Maîtrise ès Arts

Hadji Oemar Saïd Tjokroaminoto (1882-1934) fut l'une des figures marquantes de la politique musulmane d'Indonésie du début du vingtième siècle alors qu'il était l'un des principaux leaders du Sarekat Islam. À ses débuts en 1912, alors qu'il rejoignait les rangs du Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto a consacré toute son attention au développement de cette organisation, de même qu'au mouvement politique de cette époque. Ce mémoire aborde plusieurs concepts de Tjokroaminoto portant sur l'Islam et la politique et qui reflétait son implication dans les discours politiques de son époque, tout particulièrement au sein des groupes communistes et nationalistes séculiers. Sa vie et son oeuvre, de même que les conditions politiques du moment seront analysées afin de retracer les sources qui ont inspiré sa vision. À l'intérieur de ses idées politiques, Tjokroaminoto a exprimé ses conceptions portant sur la valeur du peuple indonésien, le socialisme, l'éducation, de même que sur la manière dont toutes ces idées furent reliées entre elles. Les idées de Tjokroaminoto sur l'Islam, qui sont principalement inspirées par son aspiration de créer une communauté musulmane indonésienne unifiée, furent très influentes et ont fourni une relative première définition de ce que l'Islam politique devait contenir. Ces idées sont exprimées plus clairement dans ses conceptions de la séparation entre l'Islam et la politique, le nationalisme, le pan-islamisme et la Ummah. Enfin, son analyse de l'Islam et la politique ont marqué une nouvelle étape dans la prise de conscience des Indonésiens. Ainsi, les idées de Tjokroaminoto furent d'une importance capitale dans la formulation des objectifs et des stratégies du mouvement Sarekat Islam.

TRANSLITERATION

The Arabic transliteration in this thesis follows the system used by the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University. Indonesian terms are written according to the *Ejaan Bahasa Indonesia yang Disempurnakan* (EyD) 1972, but individual name and the titles of books and articles will remain as quoted. The following is the translation table for Arabic alphabet.

ا = a	ز = z	ق = q
ب = b	س = s	ك = k
ت = t	ش = sh	ل = l
ث = th	ص = ṣ	م = m
ج = j	ض = ḍ	ن = n
ح = ḥ	ط = ṭ	و = w
خ = kh	ظ = ḏ	ه = h
د = d	ع = ' (ayn)	ي = y
ذ = dh	غ = gh	
ر = r	ف = f	

To indicate long vowels of اَ اِ اِى, these are typed by placing a macron above characters: ā, ī, ū

The *Tā marbūṭah* (ة) will be transliterated as "h" rather than "a", e.g. *al-Siyāsaḥ* rather than *al-Siyāsa*.

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Finally, completing this thesis brings to my mind my father's last words, "I will pray for you", just prior to my departure to Montreal; he had always motivated me to continue my studies. He died shortly after my departure. I dedicate this work to my mother, my wife and to the memory of my father.

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INTRODUCTION

From the founding of Batavia in 1619 to the final conquest of Bali in 1908 Dutch sovereignty in Indonesia never ceased to be contested by Indonesian groups. As the result of the strategy used by the Dutch, known as *divide et impera*,¹ the revolts were isolated and there was no basis for a permanent opposition embracing the whole archipelago. That changed in the late nineteenth century with the Acehese war when the Dutch were severely challenged and this opposition took on new meaning in the new century with the advent of the nationalist movement.

One of the clearest manifestations of the new challenge to the Dutch came with the formation of Sarekat Islam (Muslim Association) or the SI. The SI was the successor to the Sarekat Dagang Islam (The Muslim Trade Association), founded in 1911 by Hadji Samanhoedi, a *batik* trader in Solo, Central Java. The Sarekat Dagang Islam was originally a Muslim commercial organization formed to oppose Chinese competition in the *batik* industry. The association organized anti-Chinese boycotts and propaganda but such actions led the government to ban it. Hadji Samanhoedi subsequently turned to Hadji Omar Said

¹ *Divide et impera* was a political practice of encouraging the formation of two opposing parties in an enemy camp so that it can be more easily dominated.

Tjokroaminoto for help in rebuilding the association², this time encompassing broader goals and strengthen.

The subsequent steps of Sarekat Islam were intimately tied to the actions of Sarekat Islam leaders including Tjokroaminoto. Under his leadership the S.I. was quickly transformed into a mass organization with a political agenda. His success in making the S.I. into the biggest national party of the time could be seen at the first congress of the S.I. in 1913, where he was instrumental in defining its ideology and in defining the nationalist mission of the organization. Indeed, this had far-reaching implications and provided new concepts and ideas for all Indonesians, such as nationalism, democracy, religious modernism, and modern economics.³

As a pioneer of the nationalist movement, Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics influenced subsequent Indonesian nationalist activity, particularly within Sarekat Islam itself. His ideas had a great impact on both the political activities of the organization as well as its distinctive goals. He held that Indonesians had the same rights as the Dutch, both in politics and the economy, which made Indonesians aware of their poor position in the country. Furthermore, while there was strong agreement that the ultimate goal of the movement was to gain independence Tjokroaminoto argued that this could only

² Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun, Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945*. (New York: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1958), 42-3. Ahmad Syafil Maarif, *Islam dan Masalah Kenegaraan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 79-85.

³ J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam". in *Encyclopaedië van Nederlandsch-Indië*. (EN) Vol. III (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1918), 696.

be done in stages. The key stage, according to Tjokroaminoto, was "self-government" when Indonesians would govern their own state and, indeed, free from Dutch interference; he argued that Indonesian had an inherent right to do so. But to reach that stage Tjokroaminoto believed, Indonesians had necessary to be well educated.⁴ Consequently, Tjokroaminoto placed special emphasis on national education.

Like most Muslim leaders and thinkers throughout history, Tjokroaminoto regarded Islam as more than just a religion but as a way of life. But he was also one of the first Muslim leaders in modern times to "proclaim Islam as 'a binding factor and national symbol'"⁵, which would ultimately lead to complete independence for Indonesia. He argued that Indonesian Muslims would be able to apply their Islamic ideals if they held unity and power in their hands. In his conceptualization of Islamic thought, he saw Islam broadly, as concerned with politics as they affected economics, the state and government. These ideas flowed from his concept of the Islamic community (*Ummah*).

Furthermore, within the Javanese culture from which he emerged, certain ideas regarding important figures came to be applied to him, particularly the belief in the messianic *Ratu Adil* (the Just King). Even though

⁴ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto Hidup dan Perjuangannya* (H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto His Life and His Struggle), (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952), 68.

⁵ Donald Eugene Smith (ed.), *Religion, Politics, and Social Change in the Third World* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 109. See also Robert van Neil, "From Netherlands East the Indies to Republic of Indonesia 1900-1945", in *The Development of Indonesian Society From the Coming of Islam to the Present Day*, Harry Aveling, ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), 126.

he ultimately denied any connection between this concept and his political, it became an important part of the mystique that surrounded his political persona.

The objective of this study is to analyze the ideas of Islam and politics presented in the thought of Tjokroaminoto. It will devote particular attention to the following issues: 1) His thought, which will be divided into two parts; politics and Islam; 2) factors that influenced Tjokroaminoto to formulate and put forward his ideas; and 3) his involvement in various political discourses during his life time. In particular, this study attempts to show that Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics were influential and provided a definition in early twentieth century Indonesia as to what political Islam should encompass that had a strong effect on Muslim in Indonesia at that time.

The significance of this study lies in the fact that there has not yet appeared any particular landmark study dealing scholarly with Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics although some general biographical work has been done. While there has been many studies about the Sarekat Islam by both Indonesian and Western scholars, such as Jaylani⁶, Von der Mehden⁷, Korver⁸, Blumberger⁹, and to some extent Noer¹⁰, there are only a limited number of

⁶ Timur Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism". MA Thesis, (McGill University, Montreal, 1959).

⁷ Fred Robert Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism in Indonesia", Ph.D. Dissertation (University of California: California, 1957).

⁸ A.P.E. Korver, *Sarekat Islam, Gerakan Ratu Adil* (Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1985).

⁹ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam," in *ENI*.

works discussing Tjokroaminoto's ideas specifically. At the time of this study, the writer found only three studies dealing with Tjokroaminoto written by Indonesian scholars. The works of Amelz¹¹, and Anhar¹² focused only on the biography of Tjokroaminoto without dealing specifically with his ideas; significantly both lacked scholarly references. The only academic study of Tjokroaminoto's ideas is by Amin¹³. However, Amin hardly deals with Tjokroaminoto's thought in a critical manner and the references are scholarly inadequate, as he relies mainly on translated books and unpublished articles. It is intended that this study will fill this gap in the study of Tjokroaminoto by bringing together the record concerning him that can be ascertained from the reliable sources that do exist.

In approaching the subject matter, this study will apply a historical method of analysis. Tjokroaminoto's ideas will be related to some of the influential factors of his time. Such factors include the emergence of nationalism and the development of political Islam in Indonesia in the first third of the twentieth century. Through this method, it will be seen how his ideas are connected to the real conditions in Indonesia of his time and are

¹⁰ Dellar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973).

¹¹ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto Hidup dan Perjuangannya*, 2 vols. (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1952).

¹² Anhar, Gonggong, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto* (Jakarta: Depdikbud, 1985).

¹³ M. Masyhur Amin, *HOS Tjokroaminoto: Rekonstruksi Pemikiran dan Perjuangannya* (Yogyakarta: Cokroaminoto University Press, 1995).

different from his contemporaries, including Muslim leaders, secular nationalists and communists. The comparison is used to show the significance of Tjokroaminoto activism and his thinking, and place him in political context.

The data for this study is derived from both primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include works written by Tjokroaminoto himself, such as *Islam dan Socialisme* (Islam and Socialism)¹⁴, *Tarich Agama Islam: Riwayat dan Pemandangan atas Kehidupan Nabi Muhammad dan Perjalanan Nabi Muhammad SAW* (Islamic History: History of the Life and the Journey of the Prophet Muhammad)¹⁵, *Program Asas, Program Tandhim Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (Declaration of Principles and Action Program)¹⁶, and *Reglement Umum Bagi Ummat Islam* (General Regulations for the Muslim Ummah)¹⁷. The secondary sources include materials from other authors who have written on subjects connected with the issues discussed in this study. Some other references, though not directly related to the topic but useful for this study, are included in the attached bibliography.

This study consists of three chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The first chapter will deal with the early life of Tjokroaminoto and

¹⁴ H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Sosialisme* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1924).

¹⁵ H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, *Tarich Agama Islam, Pemandangan atas Kehidupan dan Perjuangan Nabi Muhammad S.A.W.* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1955).

¹⁶ H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, *Tafsir Program Asas dan Program Tandhim Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia PSII* (Jakarta: Badan Pekerja Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia, 1952).

¹⁷ H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto, "Reglement Umum Bagi Ummat Islam", in Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. II, 87-142. The writer only found the original copy of this work in Amelz's work volume 2.

the roots of Indonesian Nationalism. This part will give a biographical sketch of Tjokroaminoto, including his family background, his education and his early career before he was active in the SI. It will also discuss the emergence of both Indonesian and Islamic nationalism as well as the rise of Communism and the factors that influenced its emergence in Indonesia, as all these trends had great impact on his ideas.

The second chapter will discuss his vision of politics. This part will analyze Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics and look at the different factors that influenced his ideas. This chapter will be divided into three parts; ideas of the worth of Indonesians, which is related to his concept of self-government. This will also discuss the strategy he adopted to implement his ideas. The second part will elaborate upon his ideas on socialism and give a brief account of the policies taken by the SI toward the Communist group in the party. The last part will deal with his concept of education and provide some information of the conditions of education at his time.

The third chapter will take note of his ideas on Islam and is divided into four parts. The first part will discuss his ideas on the separation between Islam and politics, including the debate between religious and Communist groups in Sarekat Islam. The second part will deal with Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and nationalism, particularly as it was described in the polemic between secular nationalists and Islamic group leader. Pan-Islamism will be discussed in

the third part of this chapter. Finally, this study will focus on the basic requirements to build a Muslim *Ummah* particularly in Indonesia, as described by Tjokroaminoto. This part will conclude with a discussion of some of the regulations for Muslims in accordance with the building of the *Ummah* itself. The study will conclude with an analysis of Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics as well as his contributions to the nationalist movement in Indonesia.

CHAPTER ONE

THE EARLY LIFE OF TJOKROAMINOTO AND THE ROOTS OF INDONESIAN NATIONALISM

Tjokroaminoto's ideas cannot be discussed detached from his background, his childhood, education and career or from the social and political context of his thought. This chapter deals specifically with those factors. It also discusses the rise of Islam, nationalism in Indonesia, and the cultural concept of *Ratu Adil*, which constitute the milieu in which he operated. The last portion of this chapter will explain the rise of socialism in Indonesia, particularly during the early twentieth century, which had a marked impact on Tjokroaminoto and his confederates in the SI.

A. His Life and Educational Background

Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, better known as Tjokroaminoto, was born on August 16, 1882 in Bakur, Ponorogo East Java¹. He was descended from

¹ In 1882, when the volcano of Krakatau erupted, there was a belief among Javanese people that anyone born at this time would have special powers. 50.

a religious, aristocratic family and had the Javanese title of *Raden Mas*². His great grandfather, Kyai Bagoes Kasan Basari was a well-known *kyai*³ in Ponorogo-East Java and ran an Islamic boarding school (*pesantren*) in Tegalsari. This *kyai* married the *Susuhunan* (the King of Surakarta in Central Java) daughter and thus joined an aristocratic family. As his great grandfather preferred to use *Kyai* over the title of *Raden*, Tjokroaminoto also never used the title *Raden Mas*. He preferred to use the title *Hadji* (for one who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca) before his personal name.

As a *ningrat* (a Javanese aristocratic family), his family worked primarily within government. His grandfather, Raden Mas Adipati Tjokronegoro was a *bupati* (regent) in Ponorogo and once received the *Ridder der Nederlandsche Leeuw* (Knight of the Netherlands Lion) medal from the Dutch government for his loyalty and devotion to the Dutch government. His father, Raden Mas Tjokroamiseno, was a *wedana* (chief district officer) in Madiun. Tjokroaminoto was the second child of eleven brothers and sisters.

In the Dutch period, members of the *priyayi*⁴ were entrusted with the administration of *kabupaten* (regencies). Their duties were to furnish revenue to the *keraton* (Royal palace), accompany the ruler to war and pay homage at

² *Raden Mas* or *Raden* is a title for a Javanese aristocratic man, as *Raden Ayu* for a woman.

³ A *Kyai* is one whose knowledge of Islam surpasses that of the ordinary man, he usually devote himself to teaching. The word *kyai* is usually used in Java. In Sumatra it is well known called *syekh*.

⁴ *Priyayi* denotes nobility, in traditional Java those connected with administration and can be contrasted to the common people.

certain times. The *bupati* had under them officials belonging to the lesser nobility. They visited *desa* (villages) to dispense justice, raise taxes and supervise the performance of labor duties. At the turn of the century, Java and Madura, which formed a single administrative unit, contained altogether 90 regencies divided into districts and sub-districts administered by *wedanas* (head of an under-district) and *assistén-wedana* (sub-district head or chief). In his job, a *wedana* was assisted by a *patih* (chancellor) *jaksa* (judicial official), secretaries and *jurutulis* (clerks), the last being the rank in which the *priyayi*s generally began their career. Here, the *bupati*'s position was higher than that of *wedana*.

During his childhood Tjokroaminoto was regarded as intelligent, but was not well behaved. For instance, he liked fighting. Gonggong Anhar mentioned that once Tjokroaminoto won a fight against four Chinese men.⁵ However, he was able to survive the repercussions of such misbehavior because of the father's social position; after all, he was a *priyayi* and a *wedana*'s son. Amelz also stated that in his childhood Tjokroaminoto liked playing "horsey" with his friend. In this game his friends pretended they were horses and Tjokroaminoto would ride on their back horses. Through this game, it seems that Tjokroaminoto attempted to make his friends aware of how bad their life as a colonized people really was.⁶

⁵ Gonggong, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, 5.

⁶ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 50.

Still such misbehavior forced him to move from one school to another, but because of his intelligence and social position, Tjokroaminoto finished his Western-style education at a Dutch school (the OSVIA, or Opleidingsschoolen Van Inlandsche Ambtenaren) and the Training School for Native Civil Servants at Magelang in 1902.⁷ OSVIA was a seven-year course which opened the way to a *priyayi* career. It was considered to be advanced education for Indonesians who had attended the ELS (Europeesch Lagere School) or European Primary School. It was understandable that most *priyayi* families, or B.B. (Binnenlandsch Bestuur), would try to gain access to OSVIA so that they could work at government offices.⁸

His OSVIA certificate provided him with the opportunity to work in the Dutch administration. The Dutch offered some Indonesians from the *priyayi* class the chance to study at European schools in the hope of producing people who would embrace Dutch values and could be recruited to work in the local administration. Known as the "association", this policy was one of many "reform" policies undertaken by the Dutch government that the famous Dutch administrator-scholar Christian Snouck Hurgronje had introduced.⁹

⁷ See Bernhard Dahm, *History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Praeger Publisher: 1971), 18.

⁸ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 50.

⁹ Christian Snouck Hurgronje was a prominent civil servant who held the position of Adviseur voor Inlandsche Zaken (Advisor for Native Affairs) to the Dutch government from 1889 to 1906. His activities and writings reflect the changing policy of the Dutch government towards Islam in Indonesia. He also advocated the separation of politics from religion. Snouck Hurgronje's idea was to make the best in European culture available to Indonesians through an extensive educational program. It would create among Indonesians a sense of enlightened self-interest that would enable them to understand what Western culture could do for them.

After graduating from OSVIA, at the age of twenty Tjokroaminoto became a clerk at the *Pangreh Pradja* (local government office) where *jongkok* (a humble, crouching walk) and *sembah* (a gesture of obedience with hands held before one's face) when in the presence of seniors were still common office practice. This unpleasant working environment was one reason he quit Pangreh Pradja in 1905 after only three years and moved to Surabaya. This was at a time when white-collar jobs were becoming available to the Western-educated in major urban centers. He then worked at the Cooy & Coy Firm while completing an engineering course at night school - the *Burgerlijke Avondschoon Afdeeling Wertuigkundige* (BAS) or Civil Evening School, which he undertook from 1907 to 1910. After finishing this course he relocated as an engineer to the *Rogojampi* sugar factory in Surabaya.¹⁰

Tjokroaminoto was well known for his radical attitude toward the customary practices he considered as demeaning; this was one reason why he quit his job as a clerk at the *Pangreh Pradja*.¹¹ He was also known to consider himself an equal with Dutch and Indonesian officials at a time when this was

Through this "association" of Indonesians with European culture, a progressive, efficient Indonesian society loyal to the Dutch motherland would emerge. Since the plan was too extensive for full and immediate application, it was to begin by providing the Indonesians administrators with better education. Carel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950* (Amsterdam: Atlanta, GA, 1993), 87-91.

¹⁰ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 51

¹¹ Tjokroaminoto once even became a coolie in Semarang. This was an unusual culture for *priyayi* family to acquire, but Tjokroaminoto did not care about this social status. For this reason, Tjokroaminoto's father-in-law, who was also a *priyayi*, did not like him and even asked his daughter to divorce Tjokroaminoto, but she refused to do so. Anhar, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, 16.

not a common viewpoint. He was said to have the courage to sit on a chair when meeting any Dutchman or official, to speak to his superiors without looking down on the floor, to cross his legs when sitting on a chair in front of these superiors - all small matters, but which, in his time, were considered taboo.¹² He was called *the gatotkaca* of the Sarekat Islam, a reference to a heroic *wayang* (shadow play) figure known for his rough character, but innate goodness.¹³

Tjokroaminoto was well known as an orator. His appearance gave the impression of an extraordinarily strong personality. His great power as an orator could attract people as if by enchantment, while his almost magical low voice gave listeners a sense of confidence. Sukarno, later the first President of Indonesia, was his disciple¹⁴ learned much of his skill from Tjokroaminoto; in fact Sukarno delivered his speeches in a way very similar to Tjokroaminoto's.¹⁵

¹² Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 108.

¹³ Rinkes, as cited in *Ibid.*

¹⁴ When Sukarno studied in Surabaya, he stayed in the home of Tjokroaminoto. There were also some students staying in Tjokroaminoto's house, such as Muso, Alimin, Kartowisatro, Abikoesno and others. In the house Tjokroaminoto was often discussing political movements with the students. Sukarno himself acknowledged that Tjokroaminoto was his teacher in politics. He was also interested in Tjokroaminoto's broad-minded ideas on Islam. He stated, "Tjokroaminoto taught me what he was, not what he knew nor what I should be. A person with creativity and high ideals, a fighter who loved his country, Tjok (Tjokroaminoto) is my idol. I was his student". Cindy Adams, *Sukarno An Autobiography as told to Cindy Adams* (New York: The Hobbs-Merril Company, 1965), 38. See also Soebagiyo Ilham Notodijoyo, *Harsono Tjokroaminoto Mengikuti Jejak Perjuangan Sang Ayah* (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1985), 7-11. Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 11, 53.

¹⁵ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam" in *ENI*, 370.

With his identification with the Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto quit his job as an engineer in the sugar factory in Surabaya and became the first leader of his age to make his livelihood as a professional politician - that is, he was the first to earn his income through leading the Sarekat Islam and running its commercial company named the *Setia Oesaha* (the faithful efforts).¹⁶ After its establishment, the *Setia Oesaha* founded its own printing house and started to publish the newspaper, *Oetoesan Hindia* (the Indies Messenger) in December 1912, which was to become an important organ of the Sarekat Islam. Hasan Ali Soerati remarked at the Sarekat Islam's general meeting that, "any association should have its organ as the Indische Partij (IP) has *De Express*."¹⁷ Initially, Hasan Ali Soerati had offered the job of editor-in-chief to Dr. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo but Tjipto became an editor at *De Express*. Tjokroaminoto was then offered the position at *Oetoesan Hindia*. Since editing was new for Tjokroaminoto, R. Tirtodanoejdo, a former editor-in-chief of *Sinar Djawa* (the light of Java), and a former official of *Volkslectuur*, became coeditor. *Oetoesan Hindia* thus became a *de-facto* Sarekat Islam organ and *Setia Oesaha*, the office for the Surabaya branch of the Sarekat Islam. To consolidate his

¹⁶ The *Setia Oesaha* was a limited-liability company in Surabaya, founded by native Muslim merchants together with Arab traders. It was founded after the Chinese market strike in February - when street fighting between Chinese, on the one hand, and Javanese and Arabs, on the other, repeatedly took place. Arab and Javanese merchants no longer wanted to place commercial advertisements in Chinese newspapers. Instead, they planned to publish their own newspaper and to set up a medical clinic for Muslims. To this end the *Setia Oesaha* was founded under the leadership of Hasan Ali Soerati. Takashi Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion: Popular Radicalism in Java 1912-1926* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), 52.

¹⁷ *De Express* was a Dutch-language newspaper established by the Indische Partij (IP). The IP was the first political party in the Indies that appealed to "the Indies for the Indies", the independence of the Indies from the Netherlands. The driving force behind its establishment

position in the Sarekat Islam and to run the Sarekat Islam and the *Setia Oesaha*, Tjokroaminoto gathered his friends and protégés around him and led them to expand the Sarekat Islam under the Surabaya leadership.¹⁸

In *Oetoesan Hindia*, Tjokroaminoto developed his journalistic skills. His writings not only appeared in this journal but also in *Soeara Soerabaya* (the Voice of Surabaya), another leading journal of the city. His writings were critical of Dutch government policies and called for self-determination for the Indies.¹⁹ Later, as a product of Sarekat Islam's actions, he also founded *Fadjar Asia* (the Dawn of Asia) and *Al-Jihad* (the Holy War) which all served as supporters of the SI position on politics.

Tjokroaminoto was interested in the West and Western culture, sometimes learning about it directly from Dutch writers at other times as it was filtered through other Asian writers. This is evident in the books he read, mostly in Dutch and English such as *The Spirit of Islam* by Ameer Ali, *The Prophet* by Muhammad Ali, *Islam and Socialism* by M. Mushi Hoesain Kidwai, *Zut Kiritiek der politichen Oekonomie* (Commentary on Political Economy) and *Das Kapital* (Capital), both written by Karl Marx. Using these references in his own writing Tjokroaminoto elaborated his ideas on Islam concerning politics and socialism. In particular he expressed himself fully in *Islam dan Socialisme*

was E.F.E. Douwes Dekker, an Eurasian journalist who presided over *De Express* in 1912. *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁸ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. 1, 51 and Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*, 52-4.

¹⁹ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. 1, 27.

(Islam and Socialism), *Tarich Agama Islam: Riwayat dan Pemandangan atas Kehidupan Nabi Muhammad dan Perjalanan Nabi Muhammad SAW* (Islamic History: History of the Life and the Journey of the Prophet Muhammad), *Program Asas, Program Tandhim Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia* (Declaration of Principles and Action Program), and *Reglement Umum Bagi Ummat Islam* (General Regulations for the Muslim Ummah).

In *Islam dan Socialisme*, Tjokroaminoto discussed at length the concept of socialism in Islam, which was written to answer the criticisms launched by socialist groups in Sarekat Islam. In particular, Tjokroaminoto addressed the assumption made by the communists of the age that Islam was not able to regulate economic, political and social matters. He insisted that Islam and socialism were compatible and drew heavily on a Muslim Pakistan writer named S. Mushir Hoesain Kidwai in his study *Islam and Socialism* who maintained the same point.²⁰

Another book of his, *Tarich Agama Islam: Riwayat dan Pemandangan atas Kehidupan Nabi Muhammad dan Perjalanan Nabi Muhammad SAW* covers the history of the Arab people and the time of the Prophet Muhammad. In this book, Tjokroaminoto hoped to motivate Muslims to take lessons from the Prophet Muhammad for their own struggle against the forces arrayed against them. In the introduction, he mentioned that his book relied mainly on *The*

²⁰ Solichin Salam, "Peranan dan Jasa H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto dalam Pergerakan Nasional" (Jakarta, Seminar Nasional, 1991, unpublished), pp. 4-6, as quoted by M. Masyhur Amin, *HOS Tjokroaminoto*, 30.

Spirit of Islam by Amir Ali,²¹ *The Ideal Prophet* by Khwaja Kamaluddin²² and *The Prophet* by Muhammad Ali. Indeed, Tjokroaminoto seems to have drawn heavily and sometimes literally on those sources to present his view of the prophet as suited to the challenge of modern times.

In *Program Asas, Program Tandhim Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, Tjokroaminoto proposed his concept of the Muslim community (Muslim *Ummah*), which included discussions on Islamic unity, freedom, state and government, socialism and economics. His concept of the *Ummah* was later completed when he wrote his monumental work, *Reglement Umum Bagi Ummat Islam*, published in February 4th, 1934. Its twenty chapters elaborate the general framework of guidance for the Muslim *Ummah* in Indonesia.²³

B. Influential Factors.

Several factors influenced Tjokroaminoto's ideas. First is the rise of nationalism, which resulted from changing political, economic and cultural conditions that marked the early years of twentieth century Indonesia. Second is the rise of education among the Indonesian cultural elite which opened those

²¹ Syed Ameer Ali, *The Spirit of Islam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1902). Syed Ameer Ali was a noted Indian writer, who had some impact in Western circles.

²² Khwaja Kamaluddin, *The Ideal Prophet* (India: The Basheer Muslim Library, 1925).

²³ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. II, 80.

trained in Dutch schools to modern Western ideologies such as nationalism, democracy and self-rule. Significantly Islam became important in the emergence of this nationalistic outlook. Third, two great historical events were influential. The Japanese success in its war against Russia in 1905 encouraged the view that Asians could triumph against Europeans through effort. Pan-Islamism arising in the Middle East spread throughout the Islamic world including Southeast Asia and asserted that Muslims had powers to control their own countries. The fourth factor was the development of Communism in Indonesia, which apparently influenced the political thought of Tjokroaminoto. Finally, a widely held belief that Tjokroaminoto was the *Ratu Adil* (Messiah) furthered his cause especially among the uneducated. Let us look at these factors in turn.

The Dutch strategy of *divide et impera* resulted in isolated revolts of Indonesian against Dutch sovereignty. Even Islam, as strong as it was in the last decades of the nineteenth century, had not as yet brought about a sense of genuine solidarity among its followers in the Indies. In Minangkabau, for instance, the Dutch took advantage of the conflict between *ulama* and *adat* party, which led to the Padri War (1803-1838).²⁴ On Java, the most wide-scale Muslim resistance was led by Diponegoro (1825-1830).²⁵ There was also a series

²⁴ See Taufik Abdullah, "The beginning of the Padri Movement," in *Papers of the Dutch Indonesian Historical Conference* (Jakarta/Leiden: Bureau of Indonesian Studies, 1987), 143-53.

²⁵ Although the war was probably incited by Diponegoro concerned with freeing to free his kingdom from Dutch intervention, it nevertheless had broad popular support. Van der Kroef mentions that fundamental to understanding the people's role in the war was the inhuman exploitation of merchants by Dutch toll-keepers. See Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Prince

of wars and uprisings led by local rulers in Borneo and Celebes. In Sumatra the latter was led by the Batak priest-king in 1870. This also happened in Aceh, in which the conflict between the *uleebalangs* (the aristocratic leaders) and the *teungkus* (traditional ulama) raged on during their common war against the colonial power. This war, the longest war undertaken by the Dutch in the region, was finally concluded through an agreement with the *uleebalangs* and by hunting down the *teungkus*.²⁶

Dutch exploitation was not only political but also economic in nature. Viewed chronologically, the conduct of the Dutch East Indies Company from 1602 to 1798 included the transitional rule of the Batavian Republic from 1795 to 1806; the iron hand of Governor General Daendels (1808-11); marked by forced labor and a system compulsory deliveries in kind; the liberal rule of the British interregnum from 1811 to 1816, followed once more by the Dutch transitional government of Commissioner-Generals until 1830, when Governor General J. Graaf van den Bosch came to power and promulgated the exhausting forced cultivation system.

The figures show that the exploitation of the cultivation system under the Dutch government brought to the Netherlands home treasury a tribute of no less than 664.5 million guilders, of which 236 million were used for the

Diponegoro: Progenitor of Indonesian Nationalism," *The Far Eastern Quarterly* 8, no. 4 (August 1949): 425-50.

²⁶ In the case of Aceh, *devide et impera* was promoted by Snouck Hurgronje, the Dutch advisor on Muslim affairs, in order to counterbalance Islamic political influences in the region.

reduction of the Netherlands' public debt, 115 million guilders for the reduction of Dutch taxes, 153 million guilders for the construction of the Dutch State Railways and 146 million guilders for the improvement of fortifications in the Netherlands.²⁷

The Chinese had been in an economically strong position since the establishment of the Dutch East Indies Company in 1602.²⁸ In the beginning of the twentieth century, one century after the East Indian Company had ceased to exist, the economic power of the Chinese in the Indies was still increasing. Although they did not obtain legal authority in economic affairs, they did obtain functional control over native cropland. This put at their disposal the marketable products derived from the lands, namely, rice and other cash crops.²⁹ The increasing volume of export crops grown by the Indonesian population did not increase the welfare of the peasants since the substantial part of its value went to Chinese entrepreneurs, which came to be the major

For a good account of the Aceh War, see Ibrahim Alfian, *Perang di Jalan Allah* (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1987), especially chapter 6.

²⁷ See Bouman, H. *Enige Beschouwing over de Ontwikking van Indonesisch Nationalisme op Sumaterans Westkust* (Some Consideration about the Development of Indonesian Nationalism on the West coast of Sumatra (Minangkabau)), (Gronigen: J.B. Wolters, 1949) as quoted by Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam Movement," 12. See also H.M. Vlekke, *Nusantara A History of Indonesia* (The Hague and Bandung: W. van Hoeve Ltd., 1959), 291.

²⁸ Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 343.

²⁹ George McTurnan Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (New York: Ithaca, 1952), 8.

share.³⁰ This monopoly role in the economy was one of the reasons for the establishment of Sarekat Islam.

After centuries of living under an economic and political system that was controlled by the Dutch and favored the Dutch and Chinese, Indonesians became thoroughly dissatisfied. There was a pervasive feeling of dependence on and inferiority to foreigners, especially the Dutch and the Chinese. The Dutch maintained political power in their hands, often looking down at Indonesians, whom they called *Inlanders*, or "natives". This was a derogatory term, since the word "Vuil", or dirty, was often attached to it. The Indonesians had to pay public homage to their European or native masters, while foreign Asians did not. Racial discrimination prevailed and the administration of law favored Europeans.³¹ Police action, trial, and punishments were not always justified and were imposed unjustly on natives. Private property was insecure, and justice was chancy. Indeed, there were cases of robbery in which the victim preferred to say nothing in court rather than risk becoming a victim again of the unpleasant methods of the authorities.

In the twentieth century, however, democratic changes took place first in the Netherlands itself and this change was reflected to some extent in the Indies. Many Dutch leaders aspired for a more humane policy towards people under Dutch control, thanks to pressure in the area of colonial policy by

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ J.S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* (Cambridge: University Press, 1944), 295-6.

Christian party leaders like Abraham Kuyper, and other liberals (E. Dowes Dekker and Conrad T. van Deventer), during the Liberal Era (1870-1900). The pressure of the "ethical" school was probably influenced by the humanitarian strain of nationalism that prevailed towards the end of the nineteenth century. Abraham Kuyper, a Christian party leader who had long denounced the policy of exploitation, pleaded for self-government as a moral obligation.³²

Multatuli (E. Douwes Dekker's pseudonym) wrote an autobiography called *Max Havelaar*, where he described his experiences as a colonial civil servant. The work was a "devastating exposure of the oppressive and corrupt state of the Dutch rule in Java".³³ More important perhaps was the work of Conrad T. Van Deventer, a lawyer who spent 17 years in Indonesia. He wrote an article in *de Gids* (1899), entitled *Een eereschuld* (A Debt of Honor), where he argued that the Dutch, having drained millions out of Indonesia, were morally obliged to restore at least a part of the sum, since Indonesia suffered from a lack of funds sorely needed for the development of the people. This "Debt of Honor" could not be settled all at once in the form of money, but by giving primacy to a colonial policy designed for the needs of the people of Indonesia.³⁴ In a

³² Robert van Neil, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1970), 63.

³³ Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia since c. 1300* (Bloomington: Indiana University, 1981), 24.

³⁴ Bernard H.M. Vlekke, *Geschiedenis van den Indischen Archipel* (Roermond-Maaseik: J.J. Romenand Sons, 1974), 390, Amry Vandenbosch, *The Dutch East the Indies Its Government, Problem, and Politics* (Berkeley and Long Angeles: University of California Press, 1944), 64, Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian*, 32, J.M. Van der Kroef, "Dutch Colonial Policy in Indonesia 1900-1941". Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1953,

speech in 1901 he said, "A Christian empire, the Netherlands are obliged to imbue the whole of the government's policy with the conviction that the Netherlands have to fulfill a moral vocation toward the population of their regions."³⁵

Thus, with the speech from the throne in 1901, the Dutch turned towards a policy of benevolence known as the Ethical Policy. This expression was first introduced by P. Brooshooft, in 1901 in a pamphlet called *De Etische Koers in de Koloniale Politiek* (The Ethical Course in the Colonial Policy).³⁶ At the same time, the Indonesian reaction to the Dutch began to change from sporadic and diffuse armed struggle to the reorganized resistance of large groups, which was largely in the form of non-violent mass organization. This shift was initiated by the birth of organized movements in the first quarter of this century, whether religious or nationalist. This showed a new local concern for the well-being of indigenous people.

At the turn of the century, this awakening grew as a result of an accumulation of factors both inside the country and overseas. Fundamental to the rise of the organization was probably the enactment of the Ethical Policy, which was designed to replace the old policies of 19th-century Dutch colonialism. There were two particularly significant changes. First, the

20-2, Yusmar Basri, ed., "Jaman Kebangkitan Nasional dan Masa Akhir Hindia Belanda" in *Sejarah Nasional Indonesia*, Jilid V, Marwati Djoened Poesponegoro and Nugroho Notosusanto, ed. (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1990), 14, 30-2.

³⁵ Vlekke, *Geschiedenis*, 390.

educational program was extended. This had been introduced during the Liberal Era, a move that encouraged the emergence of a new Indonesian elite alongside of the old caste-based élites (*priyayi*). Through this policy, many Indonesians were exposed to new knowledge, including science, especially those who had the opportunity to study in the Netherlands through the merit program offered by the government.

Second, given that the policy was designed to reinforce colonialism, the many shortcomings that occurred in the application of the policy, ironically, allowed young intellectuals to voice their concerns about the social and political condition of the Indonesian people. According to Vlekke, the Ethical Policy did not succeed in:

- 1) abolishing the *particuliere landerijen* (privately owned land),
- 2) changing the economic system, which still tended to stifle business enterprise among Indonesians, eliminating most of the indigenous merchant class,
- 3) eliminating entirely the reluctance to allow Indonesians to gain experience in self-government,
- 4) providing a broad basis for the educational system,
- 5) opening jobs for Indonesians commensurate with their dearly-gained training.³⁷

All these shortcomings were, in fact, strong stimuli to increase the national consciousness of the Indonesians. The small number of Indonesians who succeeded in obtaining higher education established Boedi Oetomo (Noble

³⁶ "The Ethical Course in the Colonial Policy" in Vlekke, *Geschiedenis*, 390n.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 391.

Endeavor) in 1908, to voice their nationalist aspirations. From this point we will move to the second influential factor.

Boedi Oetomo was established on May 20, 1908, by STOVIA³⁸ students. Significantly, the movement's original impetus came from a retired Javanese doctor, Wahidin Sudiro Husodo. He recruited among the STOVIA students, particularly those from the Jogjakarta princely house of Paku Alam. Most Boedi Oetomo members were from the *priyayi* class, and by 1909, there were almost 10,000. Initially, it was largely controlled and led by the older, more conservative *priyayi*, who naturally took on this role and were accepted in it because of the traditional respect of the youth for their elders.³⁹

This nationalist movement was, however, much more concerned with cultural rather than political goals. It was anxious to find a way to preserve Javanese values while accommodating them to the needs of the modern world. This was why Hatta called the organization a cultural nationalist movement.⁴⁰ Boedi Oetomo found its first adherents among the Javanese aristocracy, government officials and Indonesian intellectuals. Its initial program was essentially nonpolitical and called for the development of traditional and Western forms of education among the people of Java and Madura, and the

³⁸ STOVIA (School Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Arsten) was a school for the training native doctors. STOVIA was a reorganized educational institution formed from *Dokter Djawa*, which was founded in 1851. See Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, 18.

³⁹ See Alisa Zainu'ddin, *A Short History of Indonesia* (New York: Praeger Publisher Inc., 1970), 174-5.

⁴⁰ See Hatta, *Awal Pergerakan Nasional* (Jakarta: Idayu Press, 1977), 9.

advancement of agriculture, industry and commerce among them. In the first congress, this program stated that: (1) Boedi Oetomo would not involve itself in politics, (2) its activities were primarily concerned with education and culture, (3) its activities were limited to Java and Madura.⁴¹

With respect to the role of Islam in Boedi Oetomo, in its early years this organization showed little interest in Islam. It tended to reflect more the attitude of the nobility and the Western-educated élite.⁴² Before Boedi Oetomo's ideology had crystallized, however, there was some interest in Islam. Hadji Moedjitaba, for example, gave a lecture on the idea of membership in Islam.⁴³ This idea, however, was opposed by the Javanese-aristocratic leaders of Boedi Oetomo like Dr. Radjiman, who said in a conference that "equal rights are for all religions without favoritism." He argued that Boedi Oetomo should maintain a neutral standpoint in the area of religion.⁴⁴ In 1924, the issue was seriously debated, but it became apparent that the Muslim only a minor influence in this organization.

The role of Islam in Indonesian nationalism has been clearly apparent since the establishment of the Sarekat Islam. While this organization will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter, one aspect showing the

⁴¹ L. M. Sitorus, *Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia* (Jakarta: n.p., n.d.), 10-11.

⁴² Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 52.

⁴³ "Vergadering van Boedi Oetomo," *Indische Gids*, XXXII: 2 (1910), 1541 as quoted by Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 52.

⁴⁴ C.C. Berg, "Indonesia" H.A.R. Gibb, ed., *Whither Islam?* (London: Gollanz, 1932), 296-97.

importance of Islam's role in this organization lies in the fact that it became a binding factor and a symbol of nationality.⁴⁵ The word "Islam" itself had a special connotation among the Indonesians population in general. It was a point of identity that distinguished them from their Dutch overlords. It became a means of self-assertion before the colonial regime, by which Indonesians Muslims flouted their faith as a sign of identification with the national community. Being a Muslim became synonymous with belonging to the native group. Islam thus became more than a religion and its adherents bearers of the national consciousness of the Brown man against the White.

This role made Islam a binding element and a symbol of nationalism. It could reduce the feeling of belonging to a clan, which was very strong among most Indonesians. Hazeu, the government adviser for native affairs, reporting in the first congress of the 'Jong Sumateran Bond' (Young Sumatran Association) in 1919, pointed out that the Minangkabauer felt "infinitely higher" than the Tapanulian, and *vice versa*. These conflicting sentiments between those ethnic groups were animated, or at least left to prevail, by the Dutch colonial authorities as part of their policy of *divide at impera*. This phenomenon, however, changed particularly after those groups became aware that they had a common enemy: the Dutch imperialists. Afterwards some concluded that Islam was a symbol of nationalism.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Smith (ed.), *Religion, Politics, and Social Change*, 109.

⁴⁶ See Bouman, H., *Enige Beschouwing*, as quoted by Jaylani, "The Sarekat Islam," 27.

The third influential factor involved two significant historical events. First, Japan's victory over Czarist Russia in 1905 played a part in national awakening. According to the Singaporean historian Gungwu, Japan's victory encouraged many nationalist movements in Asia. By extending the idea of struggle against a specific Western power to all Westerners and questioned Western superiority itself.⁴⁷ This was followed by other changes; the decline of Manchu rule and the proclamation of the Chinese Republic by Dr. Sun Yat Sen; and the end of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, with the attendant revolution and American occupation at the turn of the century. Indonesians did not ignore all these events. On the island of Java, they glorified the Japanese victories in remote villages.⁴⁸ Although there was little press at home then, this did not necessarily isolate the Indonesians from the significant events in the world. Muslims in Indonesia were able to follow important development through newspapers or the reports of returning pilgrims. News spread widely and became a topic of conversation among people in village restaurants and mosques. According to one writer:

In 1904, when many Mohammedan set all manners of hopes upon the Russo-Japanese war, the speedy expulsion of the Dutch from Sumatra was the topic of eager conversation among the Mohammedan Bataks on the East coast of Sumatra... At the time people otherwise quite ignorant of politics asked questions about the state of things in Japan.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See Wang Gungwu, "Nationalism in Asia," in *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea*, ed. Eugene Kamenka (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), 88.

⁴⁸ See Timur Jaylaní, "The Background of Indonesia Nationalism" in *Mizan*, 1986, 23.

⁴⁹ See Gottfried Simon, *The Progress and Arrest of Islam in Sumatera* (London, etc.: Marshal Brothers, Ltd., 1912). Benda also said that all these events "did not go unheeded in Indonesia". Also see Harry J. Benda, *The Crescent*, 35.

Nationalist sentiments were felt once more when the colonial government granted the Japanese equality with the Europeans. On this historical event Hatta wrote: ".....the thunder of cannons in Port Arthur, where the Japanese succeeded in blowing back the gigantic Russian attack, it was as if this thunder of victory waved to the eastern islands and overflowed the coasts of Indonesia."⁵⁰

The second event was the rise of Pan-Islamism. In the early years of the twentieth century an influential Islamic reform movement took root in Indonesia and became an intrinsic part of the contemporary struggle for nationalist self-identity in the archipelago. Inspired by modernist Islamic thinkers like Muhammad Abduh (1849 - 1905) and Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839 - 1897) in the Middle East, the Indonesian reform movement strove to do away with many of the local traditions and beliefs which, in the course of time, had been grafted onto the core of the Islamic religious system, clouding the force and simplicity of Islamic teachings.⁵¹ This movement could not be separated from the Islamic movement in West Sumatra in the late nineteenth century.⁵²

⁵⁰ Amelz, H.O.S., *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 87.

⁵¹ Korver, A.P.E., "The Islamic Movement," *Born in Fire: The Struggle for Independence: An Anthology*, ed. Colin Wild and Peter Carey (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1986), p. 17.

⁵² For more details about this movement, see Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 38-66.

The idea of a pan-Islamic movement, which Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had originally introduced, was also a challenge to the Dutch government. Dutch concern over this challenge was reflected in their policy towards Islam in Indonesia, as summarized by its adviser, C. Snouck Hurgronje.⁵³ The ideology that began to take shape was a kind of nationalism which had Islam as a symbol of inspiration, serving as a uniting bond, and thus could be designated as *Islamic Nationalism*. The Dutch government, which was concerned that modernist Muslim ideas like pan-Islamism might disturb the "peace and order" of colonial rule, banned "dangerous" Arabic books from entering Indonesian territory. These books were nevertheless "smuggled" through the fishing harbor of Tuban and through Indonesian Muslims studying at al-Azhar or in Mecca. They included *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* (The indissoluble Bond), *al-Siyāsah* (The Politics), *al-Liwā* (The Flag), *al-'Adl* (The Justice).⁵⁴ These books had a great influence in shaping Islam into an ideology to fight colonialism.

The fourth influential factor was the rise of Indonesian Communism.

H.J.F. Sneevliet Hendrik Sneevliet founded the Indische Sociaal Democratische

⁵³ C. Snouck Hurgronje advised the Dutch government to grant complete freedom of religious worship. On social questions, the government had to respect existing national institutions while offering the opportunity of a "desirable" evolution in the Dutch government which had to make efforts to promote this evolution. In matters relating to politics, the government had to suppress all kinds of pan-Islamic ideas, which aimed at inviting foreign powers to manipulate relations between the Dutch government and its Eastern subjects. Aqib Suminto, *Politik Islam Hindia Belanda* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1985), 12-5. See also Benda, *Crescent*, 23-4; H.J. Benda, "Christian Snouck Hurgronje and the Foundation of Dutch Islamic Policy in Indonesia," in *Continuity and Change in Southeast Asia: Collected Articles of Harry J. Benda* (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1972).

⁵⁴ Oemar Amin Hoesin, "Sedjarah Perkembangan Politik Modern di Indonesia" (History of [the] Modern Political Development in Indonesia), *Hikmah*, Vol. VIII, p. 21, 24-26, as quoted by "Abdul Mukti 'Ali, The Muhammadijah Movement, MA thesis, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, 1957, 15.

Vereeniging (Indonesian Social Democratic Association) in 1914.⁵⁵ Sneevliet's organization was under the influence of communist efforts in Russia that emphasized unity with a like-minded liberal force. The ISDV wanted to propagate its socialist ideas among the Indonesians. However, since it had only a few members, all of whom were Europeans, who knew little about Indonesian affairs, Sneevliet approached the SI, which commanded the greatest popularity in the Indies, as an obvious choice for transmitting his socialist ideals to the masses.⁵⁶

As a result, the ISDV succeeded in infiltrating the SI. This success was partly realized because its program was similar to that of Sarekat Islam, in that both organizations were opposed to capitalism. They emphasized similarities between Communism and Islam and down-played Communism's anti-religious elements. Its importance lay in the fact that several important members of the I.S.D.V. were also members of the Sarekat Islam. In fact, it was their radicalism that pushed Sarekat Islam more to the left. Semaun and Darsono, both Marxist leaders, were the two chief advocates of a more revolutionary approach by the Sarekat Islam. The influence of Communism in the Sarekat Islam later on pushed the organization into two factions, Red and White Sarekat Islam, which will be discussed in the next chapter.

⁵⁵ Zainu'ddin, *A Short History*, 188.

⁵⁶ Ruth McVey, "Early Indonesian Communism," in *Born in Fire The Indonesian Struggle for Independence*, Colin Wild and Peter Carey, ed. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1988), 22.

In May 1920, the Semarang socialists formed the Perserikatan Kommunist di India, the P.K.I., or the Indies Communist Party. By that time, Sneevliet was no longer active in Indonesia, as he had been ordered out of the colony after an aborted mutiny of Indonesian soldiers and sailors for which he was held responsible. These tiny socialist movements were highly sectarian and although the Insulinde party and the I.S.D.V. co-operated for a short time, ideological conflicts broke up this alliance quickly.⁵⁷ It showed that even the tiny socialist movement in Indonesia was vulnerable to the sectarianism of their big brothers in Europe.

Finally, it is important to consider the significance of the local animistic and legendary aspect of Islam and their influence on the nationalist movement. The superstitious beliefs of the vast majority of rural Indonesians, especially Javanese villagers, had been developing for centuries. One belief that should be emphasized was that of the *Ratu Adil* (the just king). The basis of this belief was the expectation of a messianic, righteous monarch who would appear to save the people from suffering. This belief consisted of a mixture of Muslim and Javanese legends that varied throughout Indonesia according to local custom. Although it was not part of mainstream Indonesian life, it was associated with a

⁵⁷ Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (New York: Cornell University Press. 1965), 18-19.

religious-like mystical experience which was not far removed from the daily religious view of the common man.⁵⁸

Moreover, the expectation of *Ratu Adil* was seen by some as having been fulfilled in the person of Tjokroaminoto.⁵⁹ He was the first figure to be seen as the expected messiah since Prince Diponegoro, who had fought in the Java War (1825-1830). As such, he was adored as that ideal figure because of his dramatic and charismatic personality as well his name, which was similar to that of *Ratu Adil*, Prabu (King) Heru Tjokro. The idea of *Ratu Adil* was clearly attached to Tjokroaminoto during the rallies around Java to campaign for the Sarekat Islam when thousands of people attended his speeches.⁶⁰ It may account for Tjokroaminoto becoming the first modern Indonesian to achieve recognition on a national scale.

The connection between the idea of *Ratu Adil* and Tjokroaminoto is indicated by the fluctuating number of members of Sarekat Islam. This is clear from a comparison of the number of S.I. members before and after this idea began to influence its members. The number of S.I. members in the early stage of this organization increased dramatically when the idea of *Ratu Adil* was

⁵⁸ Men associated with this belief periodically appeared in Indonesia. One of the persons who claimed to be the savior of the people was Diponegoro, the hero of the Java War. He took the messianic title of *Heru Tjakra*. However, he was not the first person considered to be the *Ratu Adil*. As early as the seventeenth century the fall of Mataram and Bantam brought reactions from the Muslim community and the claims of one Ibn Iskandar, who claimed to be a descendent of Alexander the Great and a prophet of Islam. Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 162.

⁵⁹ Van Niel, *The Emergence of Indonesian*, 105-6.

⁶⁰ See Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* (New York: Ithaca, 1969) and Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 78-79.

espoused by some S.I. leaders. When the S.I. disowned the connection with *Ratu Adil*, it lost its mythical significance in the eyes of the masses, and many people withdrew their membership.

Nevertheless, although the messianic belief may have changed because of the extensive propaganda of Agus Salim, a Sumatran, who attempted to emphasized the Islamic nature of Sarekat Islam instead, the *Ratu Adil* ideals did influence the appearance of Tjokroaminoto in his political career, and undoubtedly was important when he began his work.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL CONCEPTUALIZATION OF TJOKROAMINOTO'S THOUGHT

Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics cannot be separated from his varying roles in the S.I. because many of his ideas, along with others as well, were directly connected to S.I. activities. It is not only Tjokroaminoto himself who controlled the political movement of Sarekat Islam but there are many others who were of key importance to this organization. Men like Agus Salim and Abdul Moelis, both from Sumatra, were also important leaders of the SI. Indeed Agus Salim and Tjokroaminoto were called *dwi tunggal* (duumvirate), or the "solid team", due to their close cooperation in Sarekat Islam.

In discussing Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics, it must be considered that in addition to proposing his ideas, he also attempted to implement those ideas as strategies. It is also important to look at the background of his ideas since many of his ideas were responses either to Dutch policies or to some other events. This thesis will attempt to apply this method in order to get a complete picture of Tjokroaminoto's conception of politics as well as his efforts to carry out those concepts.

Tjokroaminoto became a member of the S.I. on May 1912,¹ and officially became a leader after the First Congress of the SI on 26 January 1913. He led Sarekat Islam as "a national umbrella organization for all Indonesians regardless of sectional or political orientations...".²

His first task in the S.I. was to gain the official recognition of the party, so that it could be legally incorporated. In September 10, 1912, statutes of the S.I., as drawn up according to legal advice, were presented by Tjokroaminoto to the Dutch notary in Surakarta and were subsequently registered by notarial act.³ The programs of the Sarekat Islam as stated in the new statute included the following points:

- 1) the promotion of commercial enterprise among Indonesians,
- 2) the organization of mutual economic support,
- 3) the promotion of the intellectual and material well being of Indonesians,
- 4) the promotion of Islam.⁴

Under his leadership, the party soon became a mass movement whose membership extended far beyond the elite group responsible for its foundation. It was also led by a Western-educated executive which included men like Agus

¹ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, 94.

² Howard M. Federspiel, "Democracy as a Theme in Indonesian Muslim Thinking" (paper presented at the Research Seminar Series on Islam and Democracy, McGill University, Montreal, March 10, 1992).

³ This action bore many important implications because through it, although it was only a commercial and social organization, the Dutch government had to acknowledge the rights of the people in the S.I. It is also one of the reasons why the S.I. membership increased dramatically during the early stages of its development.

⁴ Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 350.

Salim, who were influenced by the currents of Islamic reformism. The party also derived its main support from white-collar workers and from the urban middle-class. At the village level, in addition to concentrating on the peasantry, Sarekat Islam's popularity rested primarily on the traditional leadership of the *kyai* and the *haji*, whereas at the urban level, the organization's support was concentrated upon urban and estate workers. Sarekat Islam grew phenomenally and drew in diverse elements: not only the few Muslim entrepreneurs from whom the founders had been drawn, but also Muslims from the mosque schools, Islamic reformists, and increasingly, the peasant masses. Already by 1914, the SI claimed over 360,000 members and by its first national congress in June 1916, it had recruited more than 80,000 members outside of Java.⁵ The increasing size and ethnic diversity of its membership indicates that its orientation was not only commercial but also political. The influence of an idea of *Ratu Adil* was also evident.⁶

During his involvement in Sarekat Islam, Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics could be categorized along three different lines; the concept of

⁵ Takashi, *An Age in Motion*, 77. However, it is difficult to obtain an exact number for that membership because of contradictory figures and a lack of concrete evidence on the percentage of active followers. In 1913, the Indonesian press reported that the membership of the SI was more than 300,000 in Java. "Press Overzicht," *Kolonial Tijdschrift*, II: 2 (1913), 1206 as quoted by Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 97. In 1914, the *Locomotief* stated that the Union had 76 divisions and 366,913 members. "De centrale S.I. opgericht en schakeeringen in de Sarekat Islam," *Indische Gids*, XXXVI: 2 (1914), 1004. In 1915, *Oetoesan Hindia* stated that it had 600,000 members. "Pers Overzicht," *Kolonial Tijdschrift*, IV: 2 (1915), 664 as cited by *Ibid.*, 97. Blumberger even declared that at the first National Congress in 1916, the SI already had 80 divisions and 360,000 members. J.P. Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam," in *ENI*, 697.

⁶ The influence of the idea of *Ratu Adil* will be discussed in 55.

Indonesian self-esteem, socialism and education. Let us deal with each of these conceptions in turn.

A. Indonesian Self-esteem

After living under Dutch control for a long period of time, Indonesians became thoroughly dissatisfied, physically and psychologically. There was a pervasive feeling of dependence on and inferiority to foreigners, especially the Dutch, who promoted the status of Indonesians. This situation was even worse, particularly when *priyayi* identified lay people as the lowest class in society. The term *wong cilik* (low people) and slavish images were always attached to them. This condition consequently created a feeling in which they were always felt they had to accept a subordinate position and were fearful of standing up for their rights.

Tjokroaminoto criticized that feeling and argued that these people had the same rights as others. He argued that the term *wong cilik* was no longer suitable for Indonesians who were trying to regain their sense of dignity. There were no differences between people before God. He also argued that Indonesian people had to be aware of their rights in terms of politics and economic matters.

The establishment of Sarekat Islam marked the emergence of Indonesians' self-awareness. At the first National Congress, Tjokroaminoto delivered a speech, saying that:

This congress is one of the indications of the revival of the Indonesian, who has been assessed as a quarter human being for such a long time... [that] whenever people have wakened from slumber, there is nothing which can stop their movement; [that] the birth of the S.I. is the will of God alone; [that] the Muslim community in Indonesia must unite themselves with the bond of their religion...; [that] the S.I. association is like a small stream of water in the beginning, but which within a short time becomes an enormous flood.⁷

On another occasion, Tjokroaminoto was more specific as to what the relationships between Indonesia and the Netherlands should be. He argued that for a long time the Indonesian was considered a slave working for his master. He stated that it was unreasonable that Indonesians were ruled by the Dutch government as "a landowner who controls his lands" (*Zoale een landheer zijn percelen beehert*). He also used an analogy of how the Dutch treat Indonesians in their own country. He mentioned that:

It is not decent to regard Indonesia as a milk cow which is given food only because of its milk (*een melkkoe, die slechts teeten krijgt ter wille van haar melk*); it is not proper to regard this country as a place where people go with the intention of fetching its fruits (*een plaats, waar de mensen slechts heengaan met doel om voordeel te behalen*), and at present it is also no longer justifiable that its population, especially the native, one does not have the right to participant in political affairs which are concerned with its very fate..⁸

⁷ Ibid., 98.

⁸ See Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 59.

In addition to criticizing the Dutch, his criticism was also leveled toward SI members whom he always felt accepted a subordinate position and were fearful of standing up for their rights. One example was the way lay people gave honor towards *priyayi* or the Dutch. It was done by *merangkak* (crawling on hands and knees), *jongkok* (a humble, crouching walk), sitting on the ground and *sembah* (a gesture of obedience with hands held before face) before the *priyayi* or the Dutch. Another example was the manner of dressing. Only the Dutch or *priyayi* might wear pants or other 'European' styles, such as coats and ties.⁹ Even though giving honor towards superiors was a custom in most Javanese kingdoms, Tjokroaminoto criticized it as no longer appropriate. At the Sarekat Islam congress he stated:

Because we were colonized for a long time, there grew a feeling that we always stand on a lower level and have no respect toward our own identity. It is a duty of Sarekat Islam to criticize terms that are meant to lower our dignity. People living in *kampung* (villages) were always called as *de kleine men* or *wong cilik* (lower people). Is this term appropriate? To whom do we have to feel subordinate? Is it to God? No. This term is not appropriate to us who are now fighting to raise our dignity.¹⁰

His concept of the worth of Indonesian people was also more clearly articulated when the *Comité 'Indië Weerbaar'* (Committee for the Defense of the Indies) was established.¹¹ Although he supported this action, he also

⁹ Ibid., 48-9.

¹⁰ *Sarekat Islam Congress (le Nationaal Congres) 17-24 Juni 1916 te Bandung* (Djakarta: Landsdrukkerij, 1916), 11-12.

¹¹ This committee was originally initiated by Dutch businessmen who feared that the spread of World War I to Indonesia would ruin their position and capital. The committee sought

criticized the Dutch by making some political demands. First, he expressed that Indonesians were disappointed by the arrogance shown by Dutch government officials and businessmen. If the Dutch could not address this disappointment, Indonesians would not support the Dutch in defending the country. Second, the Dutch had to fulfill the political rights of the people that in fact were not equal with their duties. Finally, Tjokroaminoto also put forward many comments concerning the adverse economic condition experienced by Indonesians.¹²

Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Indonesian self-esteem were the direct result of the colonial system, which denied the concept of equality for Indonesians. It was therefore Tjokroaminoto and other Sarekat Islam leaders who attempted to change this condition, in addition to achieving rights, status and power. Strikingly Tjokroaminoto did not believe that this could be accomplished through revolutionary tactics, so he chose cooperation with the Dutch. This was clearly evident in the early years of his leadership (1913-1916), which was the period from the first Congress of Sarekat Islam to the first National Congress.

His cooperative attitude toward the Dutch government can be detected throughout in his speeches and writing.¹³ At the first Congress of the Sarekat

the support of the people to press its demands for Indonesia's own defense capability and invited Indonesian organizations, including the Sarekat Islam, Boedi Oetomo and the Prinsenbond (Union of Princes), to participate. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 118-9.

¹² S.I. Van der Wal, *De opkomst van de staatkundige beweging in Nederlands Indie, Een Bromeenpublicatie* (Werk doer: Groningen, 1967) 469 and 479, as quoted by Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 60.

¹³ The cooperative attitude of the Sarekat Islam was also indicated by the SI leaders, which are evident in many phenomena. The SI congresses often listened to the *Wilhelmus* (the

Islam in 1913, he declared that the Sarekat Islam rejected all forms of anti-government activities. In a speech Tjokroaminoto declared that the S.I. was loyal to and satisfied with the Dutch Government and that it was not true that the S.I. wanted to fight. He said "it [Sarekat Islam] is not a political party; it is not a party that wants revolution, as many think."¹⁴ Further, Blumberger notes, on the basis of Tjokroaminoto's speech:

"...We must, when we are oppressed, call upon the Governor General for aid. We are loyal towards the government, and we are content under the Dutch regime! It is not true that we are causing trouble: it is not true that we are going to fight. He who says that or thinks of that is mad. We do not want that, a thousand times no."¹⁵

Sinar Djawa reports his speech at a rally held in Semarang:

It [the Sarekat Islam] is on the basis of religion that we will find the strength to hold high our worth as Natives by legitimate means...As the book says people must obey the commands of their King. Who is it now that commands us Natives? Indeed it is the kingdom of *Ollanda* (the Dutch). Thus according to the religious law of Islam we have to obey the laws of the kingdom of *Ollanda*. Therefore, we must also obey the commands of the kingdom of *Ollanda*. We must fully and loyally comply with the laws and regulations of the Dutch, which have been for the people of the kingdom of *Ollanda*...¹⁶

There are two reasons why Tjokroaminoto maintained a cooperative attitude toward the Dutch. First, he was more inspired by the fear of government retaliation than by conviction; at that time, based on Article 111

Dutch national anthem), flew the Dutch flag and gave honor to the Queen and the Dutch government. See Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 63.

¹⁴ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", in *ENI*, 695.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

of the ordinance of 1854, the Dutch government forbade any political association.¹⁷ Second, this attitude could not be separated from the political environment created by the Dutch government. A moderate attitude shown by Governor General Idenburg created a sympathetic attitude among the SI leaders toward the Dutch.¹⁸

But this cooperate attitude did not mean that Dutch policies or dominance would all be accepted or that the Indonesian position was regarded as acceptable, consequently at the first S.I. congress, Tjokroaminoto began redefining the political landscape:

- a. The congress brought into being new conceptions of life for Indonesians, such as nationalism, democracy, religious modernism, and economic schools.
- b. There arose a movement for constitutional change; a transitional legal order began to be developed. The native element of Indonesian society was forming itself into groups outside of official channels. The Managing of the SI Committee was putting itself between the government and the people, and beginning to undermine the power of the government.

¹⁶ *Sinar Djawa*, 18 March 1914.

¹⁷ Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, 45.

¹⁸ It could be said that Idenburg's attitude toward Sarekat Islam had been open-minded and sympathetic and this gave an opportunity to the organization to survive. He held an opinion that the SI was the expression of the native population's aspiration for better economic and living standards.

- c. Religious sentiment among the Muslims influenced the emergence of a democratic tendency that touched the very foundations of the colonial system.
- d. The S.I. proved to be in accordance with the social evolution created by the change in the psychological conditions of individuals.¹⁹

In general Tjokroaminoto encouraged SI members to be aware of their political rights despite a declared policy of cooperation with the Dutch.²⁰ In a meeting at Surabaya on 26 January 1913, he made it clear that the Sarekat Islam aimed to 'build nationalism, get back human rights which have been a grant of God, elevate the inferior [the Indonesians], improve the present unsatisfactory conditions...'²¹

Furthermore, the Sarekat Islam definitely worked for the general improvement of conditions on the behalf of the people through support of a reform movement. Together with the two Surabaya SI leaders, Tirtodanoedjo and Tjokrosoedarmo, Tjokroaminoto led the *Djawa Dwipa* (Noble Java) movement, founded in March 1917, which took as its task removing serious obstacles from the path to the development of a new self-confidence among the Javanese people. The obstacle was the "caste system" in the Javanese language, through which the medieval *Kawula-Gusti* (master servant) relationship had carried down into the twentieth century. It required the most

¹⁹ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", in *ENI*, 695.

²⁰ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 111.

²¹ *Oetoesan Hindia*, 7 March 1912.

Javanese to use *kromo*, a language of studied politeness and obsequiousness, in every relation with a superior, whereas a superior speaking to an inferior used *ngoko*, a language of command, lacking concern for the feelings of the listener. As examples of this movement, there was an instruction issued to its members not to use *Raden*, *Raden Mas* or *Bendoro* in their daily communication with *priyayi*. After the *Djawa Dwipa* had been founded, the SI, by systematically promoting *ngoko* as the language of all Javanese attempted to remove the most obvious symbol of oppression.²² With this particular movement, solidarity among SI members was greatly increased.²³

In addition, Tjokroaminoto believed that Indonesians should have rights to govern their own state. He proposed his ideas of self-government in the first National Congress of Sarekat Islam in 1916.²⁴ Self-government, according to Tjokroaminoto, implied rule over the Indies by its own population, irrespective of race, color of skin or religion. The right of self-government was a vital question for the Indies, because if it was not fulfilled, the Indies would undoubtedly fall to outside attackers. In order to be able to acquire self-

²² For the *Djawa Dwipa* movement, see Benedict R. Anderson, "Sembah-Sumpah: The Politics of Language and Javanese Culture." Paper submitted for the Conference on Multilingualism in Modern Indonesia, Aug. 1981.

²³ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 114.

²⁴ The use of 'National' in its congress indicated the political character of the association. While the first and second meetings were only called 'congresses', the meeting held in Bandung was called 'national' congress. This did not merely indicate the spread of the party over the whole country and that the congress were thus participated in by delegates from all over the country, but also reflected a conscious attempt by the leaders to spread and uphold the idea of nationalism, of which Islam was regarded as the most important basis.

government, the natives should be well trained for that purpose.²⁵ Self-government would only be perfect when the people's representative stood close to the government like in the Netherlands, where the 'Staten Generaal' represented the Dutch people. People's representation means a gathering of persons who really act in the interests of the country. The constitution leaves no room for disputes between the King (Queen) and the 'Staten Generaal'.

For Tjokroaminoto, self-government was no longer a distant mirage, but something real and attainable. To implement this idea, however, Indonesians had to go through a long process because it would not come immediately but would happen within a measurable distance of time. He also believed that Indonesians would not easily gain their political rights and that was why he was motivated to strive to obtain it. He added, "we must always take into account the conditions in which we find ourselves. Therefore, when we do not feel mature enough for self-government, we must have patience and wait until we obtain the ability, for when we obtain our freedom at an inconvenient time, such would ruin our country."²⁶

For Tjokroaminoto, both the Indonesian people and the Dutch government had to take part in the actualization of self-government. The former had to be well prepared so that they would be able to govern their own state and the latter had to be willing to stand in equality with the Indonesian

²⁵ Tjokroaminoto later elaborated his ideas on education, as discussed on page 56-60.

²⁶ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 120.

people. His consideration that self-government could not be created without any preparation was reasonable because Indonesia at that time was still under colonialism and only a small number of the people were well educated. The idea of self-government could only be implemented when the Dutch had the political will to acknowledge that Indonesians had political rights. The Dutch also had to eliminate the assumption that Indonesians should always be in a subordinate position.

However, when it was judged after four years that the cooperation method of Sarekat Islam toward the Dutch was not successful, Sarekat Islam leaders argued that the method had to be changed. At the second National Congress on October 1917, together with other Sarekat Islam leaders, Tjokroaminoto's political attitude became more aggressive and the emphasis was placed on political and economic questions. Although he still spoke of his desire to live alongside the Dutch and draw closer the bonds between "our Queen" and the "Children of the land," voices were raised in bitter condemnation of the administration's policy. Tjokroaminoto's public support of autonomy stood in marked contrast to this position of cooperation.

The 1917 congress marked the culmination of Tjokroaminoto's works in developing the SI into an independent minded, political and economic-oriented peoples' movements. This was indicated by the acceptance of Islam as the basis of the Sarekat Islam movement, the condemnation of capitalism and the demand for political rights for the people.

The political character of the SI, which reflected Tjokroaminoto's ideas, was officially formulated in a Declaration of Principle and an Action Program. Both were approved by its second National Congress in 1917. The Declaration of Principles expressed the party's belief in Islam as "the preacher of democratic ideas" as well as the "religion par excellence for the spiritual education of the people". The party regarded the intellectual as well as the moral development of the individual as essential for the proper functioning of civil rights. The state or government should not interfere in religious matters and should treat all religions on an equal basis. The party demanded the increased participation of the people in politics in order to achieve 'self-government'. It rejected racial domination and demanded from the government equal protection of the rights and freedoms of all citizens 'with powerful assistance for the weak and the needy...' The Sarekat Islam 'fights sinful capitalism which is the origin of the present deteriorating economic condition of the largest part of the Indonesian population'. Finally the Declaration expressed the party's willingness to cooperate with all organizations and persons who agreed with its principles.²⁷

As mentioned in the Declaration of Principles and the Action Program, Tjokroaminoto vigorously attacked capitalism and supported autonomy. He wanted to fight 'sinful capitalism' - in other words, "the colonial capitalism which exploited Indonesia for the benefit of foreign countries."²⁸ Foreign

²⁷ *Neratja*, 25 October 1917.

²⁸ W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition* (W. van Hoeve: Den Haag, 1956), 216

capitalism, according to Tjokroaminoto, was different from Muslim capitalism. This statement was basically a compromise made on behalf of Muslim merchants, who were fearful that they would be included in Tjokroaminoto's definition of sinful capitalism, and the radical socialists who declared that 'Capitalism is always sinful, even Muslim and that class war must also be carried out against Muslim capitalists, to free the oppressed classes, indifferent of which religion the capitalists followed. B.M.H. Vlekke notes that:

This is the first time that a Marxist slogan was introduced into the speeches of the Sarekat Islam Congress, but its true Marxian character was curiously modified by local interpretation. 'Sinful capitalism' is, from a Marxist point of view, of course, a contradiction in terms, for it leaves open the possibility of righteous capitalism, which does not find a place in the Marx's theories. Tjokroaminoto was asked to explain when capitalism is sinful and his reply was, "Foreign capitalism is always sinful." In this succinct statement the identity of the struggle for social and political aims was perfectly expressed.²⁹

On this occasion, the idea of attacking capitalism was also stated by Semaun, a leftist, and by Moeis, an Islamist. Semaun demanded a quicker pace toward social democracy and Moeis proclaimed the ideal of "Indies for the Indonesians".

B. Ideas on Socialism

At the second National Congress, there was a further turn toward a revolutionary socialistic inclined program, especially through the efforts of

²⁹ Vlekke, *Nusantara*, 355.

Semaun, a young leader of ISDV in Semarang, who espoused communist policies and solutions, first as S.I. representative at Surabaya and later on as chairman of the Semarang-S.I. Tjokroaminoto, Agus Salim, Abdul Muis and other "Muslim" leaders became alarmed by this communist challenge. Salim and Moeis argued that the intrusion of communism threatened the organization and they urged expulsion of Communists from the party on the basis that members of other parties (i.e., communist organization) could not be members of Sarekat Islam at the same time. For Sarekat Islam members, this meant that they had to choose between membership in the Sarekat Islam or the other party. This "party discipline", as it was called later, was approved at the Seventh National Congress in 1923. This allowed the Muslim group to expel those members who they regarded as followers of Semaun and the radical approach to nationalism. The elimination of the extreme left-wing was marked by a change in name when Sarekat Islam became the Partai Sarekat Islam or PSI.³⁰

In terms of acknowledging the influence of socialism on this organization, Tjokroaminoto initially showed a neutral attitude. This neutrality was his strategy to preserve the unity of the organization and prevent it from splitting. But when the split could not be avoided, Tjokroaminoto agreed with the disciplinary measures.

³⁰ Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 123-5, Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 165.

In addition, Tjokroaminoto promoted his own ideas on socialism, which was formulated in his book titled *Islam dan Socialisme* (Islam and socialism), written in November 1924.³¹ In this book he stated that socialism was not merely a system of *stelsel* (rules) for the economy but that it contained a way of life as well. He stated further that the socialism that should be followed by Muslims was an Islamic socialism that was based on Islamic doctrines and aimed at reaching happiness in this world and the hereafter.³² He claimed that Islamic socialism was both earlier and better than the socialism described by Marx, in both theory and practice, because it had been applied by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions during their lifetimes. Regarding socialism Tjokroaminoto states that the Prophet Muhammad gave tacit approval to its concepts, especially in state control over land, soil, water and materials found in the soil. He also asserted that land rent has often been paid by Muslims to the government, and cites the practice of India in the time of the Mughals.³³

It also applied laws that were created by God for the needs of society itself. It was different from current conditions, he added, where laws were promulgated by parties or parliaments. In Islamic socialism, according to Tjokroaminoto, divine laws should be interpreted by people and that both men and women had the ability to interpret these laws. The people's representative was needed to apply divine laws to the needs of society. Simply put,

³¹ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 138.

³² Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Socialisme*, 13.

³³ *Ibid.*, 16

Tjokroaminoto added, the government should only be a tool to apply God's laws.³⁴

In this book Tjokroaminoto also discusses the exploitation of one person by another, a key point in socialistic and communistic thinking of the day. Exploitation, in his view, was at the heart of capitalism and it was prohibited by the Prophet. Therefore Islam was the enemy of capitalism. Capitalism, according to him, should be fought to its roots because it was not only a crime against humanity, but it was also not in accordance with God's will as written in the Qur'an. One of the solutions to the problems created by capitalism, he emphasized, was by distributing wealth through the institution of *zakat* (Alms). *Zakat* itself would then have an additional social meaning since through this equality and solidarity would emerge among Muslims. Equality in this sense meant that there would be no accumulation of excess wealth by certain people in society. Solidarity meant that mutual assistance would emerge among Muslims.³⁵

Throughout this book, Tjokroaminoto opposes secular socialism and proposes his own ideas on Islamic socialism. It is Islam that is important and socialism is made to fit with its doctrines, not the other way as Semaun and his colleagues would have it. What the Prophet Muhammad had desired, according to him, was a socialist society under the law of God. This "theocracy" in Islam is

³⁴ Ibid., 16-17.

³⁵ Ibid., 30-31.

superior to monarchy and also parliamentary government. He also said that the Prophet's version of socialism was far superior to Western social democracy. The latter only seeks physical or material advancement, while the Prophet Muhammad desired spiritual, inner development. By proposing Qur'anic passages, Tjokroaminoto attacked the accumulation of wealth and announced that transgressors would be condemned to hell because, he said, capital must be for the service of the public.³⁶ He wanted to introduce this meaning of socialism, because many Indonesian people did not understand much about the whole "socialism" taking place in the SI at that time. He hoped to show SI members that the socialism proposed by Semaun and other socialists was not at all Islamic and that they should not support it. Tjokroaminoto often said that "*Wie, goed Mohammedaan is, is vanzelf socialist en wij zijn Mohammedanen, dus zijn wij socialisten*" (whoever is a good Muslim, automatically or by nature is a socialist, [and furthermore he arrives at a conclusion saying] We are Muslim, thus we are socialist).³⁷ In 1918 when the *Volksraad* (People Council)³⁸ was established, Tjokroaminoto took this message to that body and expressed it clearly and forcefully.

³⁶ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 138

³⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. I, 115.

³⁸ In response to the people's needs of creating their own self-government, and to socialist agitation in the mother country, generated by the First World War and the Bolshevik Revolution, the Dutch Government was willing to make some concessions. In 1918, an advisory council or *Volksraad* (Peoples Council) was established. It was partially elected, partially appointed. Half of the seats went to Indonesians, of which several were appointed by the government. This council consisted of forty-eight members of which only twenty were native Indonesians. Five of which were appointed by the government and the rest by local councils.

In promoting the idea of Islamic socialism, Tjokroaminoto used the popularity of the idea of Ratu Adil as his vehicle. In one meeting he declared: "We await a new messenger of God, the successor of Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, who will drive all evil desires from the hearts of men. This is the messenger called *Ratu Adil*. All of us, whatever our religion, await him. But this *Ratu Adil* will not appear in human form; rather, he will appear in the form of socialism. It is to this that the SI looks forward."³⁹ Prior to this time on, the term had been applied to him personally, but here he attempted to use the term in a wide, symbolic meaning that would promote the Islamic ideas of the SI.

This attempt to change the public perception of the Ratu Adil concept had its roots in internal SI politics. Hadji Agus Salim continually warned Tjokroaminoto about the dangers of the people's adoration and their high expectations. Salim also wanted to disassociate the movement from the concept of *Ratu Adil* because he believed that this concept was dangerous for the movement, as it necessitated an external force quite beyond the power of the Sarekat Islam leadership.⁴⁰ Tjokroaminoto ultimately agreed and apparently this change to symbolic meaning was an attempt to give new direction that would be more fitting with the Islamic context.

The native members mainly represented native civil servants and the bourgeoisie. See Dahm, *History of Indonesia*, 45-51.

³⁹ Padjadjaran, April 29, 1921, in *Inlandsche Persoverzichten* (IPO) (1921), No. 21 400f, as quoted by Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle*, 19.

C. Ideas on Education

Education was one of the important issues discussed among Muslim leaders at this time. The need for education was considered to be in crisis since the number of Indonesians who were in school was very small. When the Ethical Policy was proclaimed in 1900, less than 75,000 natives from a total native population of over 40 million were in school.⁴¹ According to the census of 1930, the number of literate Indonesians was only 5.5 % of the total population in Java and Madura compared with 75.8 % for Europeans and 33.3 % for Chinese.⁴² Furthermore, the curricula of *sekolah desa* (village schools)⁴³, called for was "reading and writing in local language... and in Latin characters, reckoning up to 1,000 with decimal fractions..., a little bit of history and geography...."⁴⁴ Graduates from these schools were still barred from fuller participation in the social and economic life of the land.

The condition of the educational level of people at that time was one of the important issues open to discussion among the SI leaders. At a special

⁴⁰ Fred R. Von der Mehden, *Religion and Nationalism in Southeast Asia* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1963), 157-8.

⁴¹ I. Brugmans, *Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Batavia: Sluyters, 1936), 17 as quoted by J.M. Van der Kroef, "Dutch Colonial Policy", 216

⁴² J. A. Jonkman, *Indonesisch-Nationale Grondslag van het Onderwijs ten Dienste der Inlandsche Bevolking* (Leyden: Stoppel, 1926, 15, as quoted by Van der Kroef, "Dutch Colonial Policy", 215.

⁴³ This type of school was established in villages for native communities all over the Indies during the period of Governor General van Heutsz. M. Hutasoit, *Compulsory Education in Indonesia* (Paris: Unesco, 1954), 32.

⁴⁴ *Indische Staatsblad*, 1893, no. 125 in Van der Kroef, "Dutch Colonial Policy", 215.

meeting in Bandung in 1916, Tjokroaminoto argued that Indonesian society was far too rural and traditional and that it needed modernization and change. Education, according to him, was a very important tool to eliminate this backwardness and improve the economic condition of people.⁴⁵ Tjokroaminoto specifically raised the question of why villagers were reluctant to send their children to schools. He contended that the educational system in *sekolah desa* (village schools) was not suitable to the agricultural environment in villages. Many graduates were unwilling to go back to their rice fields because they wanted to apply their knowledge in towns. Such people consequently were lost from village life where they were needed as part of the general educational improvement of the entire countryside. As a result of this discussion Tjokroaminoto and other leaders of the S.I. asked the Dutch government to change the curriculum in the school villages. The curriculum he suggested included the subjects of agriculture and other practical skills designed to enhance life in the villages and to make the village appear as a logical place to live and work.⁴⁶

In addition, Tjokroaminoto also proposed that the portion of secular and religious subject matter in its curriculum had to be adjusted so that moral and religious training were give more emphasis. His ideas on education may be seen

⁴⁵ Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 104.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 104.

in detail in his article *Moeslim Nationaal Onderwijs* (National-Educational System for Muslims)⁴⁷.

In this article, Tjokroaminoto states that education was able to create "real nationalist Muslims".⁴⁸ In more detail, Tjokroaminoto mentioned that subjects taught in schools should aim to create; a) a spirit of independence and democracy, b) courage and honest, c) loyalty to Islam.⁴⁹ To gain the goals of education, therefore, some of those requirements had to be applied. Those included educational systems including both secular and religious knowledge, because both are needed in building a *natie* (state). As to more specific requirements, Tjokroaminoto stated that national education in Indonesia had to be undertaken by Indonesians themselves, subjects taught in the schools had to mention Indonesian history, philosophy, and their own culture because these would create loyalty to their own country among students and increase the spirit of independence.⁵⁰

In addition, Tjokroaminoto also stated that the system of education had to be free from matters that would not be accepted by Islam. He also demanded the abolition of discriminatory measures in admitting children into schools, compulsory education for those under 15 years of age, improvement in educational institutions at all levels, an increase in the number of schools,

⁴⁷ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 166-71.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 166.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 166-7.

especially law, medical schools and universities, and finally the granting of scholarships to Indonesian youths to study abroad.⁵¹

To help address problems in the field of education, Tjokroaminoto proposed some steps of learning that should be followed. Those steps were *Lager Onderwijs* (Basic Education), *Middelbaar Onderwijs* (Middle Education) and *Hooger Onderwijs* (University). Besides secular knowledge, such as politics and economy, he recommended that Islamic knowledge, such as Qur'anic teachings, Arabic language, Islamic Law and Islamic History should also be taught in those various schools.⁵²

Obviously the center of Tjokroaminoto's ideas on politics and its relation to education, rested clearly on Islam. Tjokroaminoto clearly believed that while secular knowledge was necessary, it was essential that Indonesians also have a good understanding of Islam. Both kinds of knowledge stood together in the curriculum because those were needed to create "real nationalist Muslims". Secular knowledge was important to make Indonesian Muslims politically and socially aware. Islam, in his view, was not only a faith but also a way of live as practiced by the Prophet in Medina. Through Islam, Indonesian Muslims could regain their dignity since the religion acknowledges equal rights for its

⁵⁰ Tjokroaminoto referred to results of Congress of "Society for the promotion of National Education" in India. *Ibid.*, 167.

⁵¹ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. II, 166-71; Gani, M.A. *Cita Dasar dan Pola Perjuangan Syarikat Islam* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 249-51.

⁵² Basic education for 5 to 7 years was only for twelve or thirteen-year-old students. Middle education, for 4 to 5 years, was a continuation of the basic education. The last stage was only for those below twenty or twenty one years in age. *Ibid.*, 169-71.

followers before God and it gave people respect for themselves. He used the analogy that, in Islam, a king would stand on the same level as a farmer before God. It was, therefore, emphasizing the point that Indonesians should have the same position as the Dutch in the government.

The SI efforts in education, however, were limited in comparison to *Muhammadiyah* and *Nahdhatul Ulama* (Renaissance of Ulama) that did the greater work in the educational field. It probably occurred because the SI focused much more on political movements than on education. Still Tjokroaminoto's views are important as an example of thinking at that time on the proper way to raise the educational level of a Muslim people without being trapped in a secular pattern of education then popular in western thinking.

CHAPTER THREE

TJOKROAMINOTO'S IDEAS ON ISLAM

The strong influence of communist groups on the Sarekat Islam, as already mentioned in the previous chapter, forced the group leaders to reconsider the role of Islam in that organization. This later marked a revolutionary change concerning the progress of Sarekat Islam movement. Tjokroaminoto and other Sarekat Islam leaders believed that 'independence on the basis of Islam alone is capable of releasing all the people any form of slavery'.¹ This chapter will assess Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and its relation to the background of his ideas.

From an historical perspective, the importance of Islam to the majority of the Sarekat Islam could be seen since its establishment. Tjokroaminoto argued that Islam was an important element for Sarekat Islam, which would

¹ *Neratja*, 30 March 1921. Regarding the Islamic base of the Sarekat Islam movement, some scholars argued that Islam did not have an important role in the Sarekat Islam. Snouck Hurgronje believed that Sarekat Islam was not a religious organization and Islam in this association, according to Hurgronje, was only a symbol that differentiated Indonesians from other races. See Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 65. Takashi argued that Tjokroaminoto uses Islam only as a tool to mobilize Muslims, as indicated in *Djawi Hisworo* case. See Takashi, *An Age in Motion*, 106. On the other hand, Von der Mehden criticized the arguments and mentions that '...it would be a serious error to believe that the Islamic pretensions of the former elite [of Sarekat Islam] had been forgotten completely...' See Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 111. Korver also criticized the arguments and believed that the role of Islam in the SI is not only a symbol. In the Basic Principles of this organization, it stated that only an eighteen years old Muslim can be accepted as a member of the Sarekat Islam and this is also valid for non-Indonesian Muslims. He also mentioned that the establishment of *Al-Islam* magazine had as a function to discuss Islamic matters in this organization. It was also indicated that religious activities in village mosques were increased in number after people became members of Sarekat Islam. See Korver, *Sarekat Islam*, 66-7.

bind people together. He mentioned this at a meeting held in Semarang in 1914:

First of all, I would like to explain what the name "Sarekat Islam" means. In short, Sarekat Islam means "association of people whose religion is Islam." This is not an ordinary association, but an extra-ordinary one, bound by the religion of Islam. The Natives have already established a number of associations with lofty purposes, but not one of them could become permanent and large. But once the Sarekat Islam emerged, thousands of people became members, bound by the rope of the religion of Islam. That is why the Sarekat Islam has become an extraordinary association.²

The process of development of the SI from the founding of the party up to the convening of its congress in Surabaya in 1918, showed that Islam had steadily grown in prominence for the party, commensurate with the challenges that had faced it from within and without. Within the ranks of the Sarekat Islam, for example, a sharp conflict had been going on between the socialist-oriented and the Islam-oriented group. This conflict marked the beginning of a definite split between the red Sarekat Islam (the communist group) and the white Sarekat Islam (the Muslim *santrīs*) and showed the growing importance of Islam in the party. Numerous other challenges were also presented from outside the party by secular nationalist groups.

However, in the 1920s and 1930s, the role of Islam in the Sarekat Islam became more complex. International changes deeply affected the political life

² *Sinar Djawa*, 18 March 1914.

of Indonesia. The revolution in Russia in 1917³, coincided with the optimism in the Islamic world raised by the Caliphate movement⁴. These phenomena gave new hope to both groups in the SI, the communist as well as the religious groups. These events also made both sides aware of their own characteristics and their particular ideological orientations. As a result of this process the relationship between Central Sarekat Islam, dominated by "Muslims", and its Semarang branch, controlled by leftists, deteriorated and eventually ruptured.

Another influential factor was the emergence of "secular nationalism" on Java in the mid 1920s. The establishment of study-clubs in Surabaya and Bandung gave way to the recruitment of intellectuals, who were more inclined to a nationalism based on secularism than on Islam. These new groups organized themselves into the Indonesia National Party, with Soekarno as the key leader. This proved to be a great challenge to the SI.

The role of Islam in Sarekat Islam could not be separated from the efforts made by two of the party's leaders, Hadji Agus Salim⁵ and Tjokroaminoto. It is no exaggeration to say that compared to Tjokroaminoto,

³ Ruth McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965), 29.

⁴ T.H. Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads Indigenous Churches, European Missionaries, Islamic Association and Socio-Religious Change in Java 1812-1936* (Leiden: De Zijl Bedrijfven, 1991), 226.

⁵ Deliar Noer has even argued that it was above all Salim, a Sumatran who was well read in western ideas and knew a great deal about Islam from its basic sources, who gave an Islamic stamp to the political character of Sarekat Islam. Noer, *Modernist Muslim Movement*, 298. There was no doubt that Salim also played an important role in the party. Of particular note were his efforts in expelling the communist group from the party and his moves to make Islam the basis of the SI.

who understood Islam from non-Arabic sources, mainly in English, Salim had a better understanding of Islam.⁶ This was evident in many places where Salim gave ideas and supporting evidence to Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam, for example Tjokroaminoto's writing on Islam and socialism.⁷ This comparison shows that the Islamic foundation of the Sarekat Islam movement was not merely a result of Tjokroaminoto's efforts but also due to the collective efforts of the group's leaders. Nevertheless Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam did contribute to the Sarekat Islam movement.

The varying roles of Islam in Tjokroaminoto's ideas were generally related to Islam as an ideology.⁸ This ideology had three features: 1) Separation between Islam and politics, 2) Nationalism, 3) Pan-Islamism and 4) the concept of the *Ummah*. Let us deal with each of these matters in turn.

⁶ Noer mentioned that the Dutch trained youth in general who joined the muslim modernist derived their knowledge of Islam mainly from secondary sources because of their ignorant of Arabic. In addition to books on Islam written in Dutch and other European languages, as well as in Indonesian writings, they also received information on Islam from lectures by people like Salim, Hassan and Natsir. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 298 and 310.

⁷ Federspiel mentioned that Islam and Socialism was more than Tjokroaminoto's views and actually reflected the thinking of a group of Muslim thinkers of the age, particularly that of Haji Agus Salim. Howard M. Federspiel, "Democracy as a Theme in Indonesian Muslim Thinking" (paper presented at the Research Seminar Series on Islam and Democracy, McGill University, Montreal, March 10, 1992).

⁸ Kuntowijoyo, an Indonesian historian, argues that from the early twentieth century Islam has developed from myth to ideology. He believed that Sarekat Islam was one of the pioneers in the second phase due to the fact that in the early years of the twentieth century this organization developed its movement based on Islam. For more details of this arguments, see Kuntowijoyo, *Dinamika Internal Umat Islam Indonesia* (The Internal Dynamic of Indonesian Muslims), (Jakarta: LSIP, 1993), 29.

A. Separation between Islam and Politics

The idea of the separation between religion and politics appeared when conflict between the socialist and religious group in the Sarekat Islam emerged. In this conflict, the socialist groups argued that Islam should be separated from politics since Islam was only concerned with private matters. On the other hand, Tjokroaminoto, who represented the religious group in the SI, strongly disagreed with the opinion. He maintained that Islam regulated not merely spiritual matters but also politics, the economy as well as social affairs. He also argued that in Islam there was no separation between religion and politics, as was indicated in the time of the Prophet.

It is important to mention here that this idea originally emerged with the *Djawi Hisworo* affair of January 1918. This resulted in a wide range of reactions from Muslims that later on, led to the establishment of "The Lord Prophet and Apostle Muhammad's Army Committee".⁹ What was most significant

⁹ The journal *Djawi Hisworo* (Javanese of the King) which published from 1906 through 1919 in Surakarta published an article by a certain Djojodikoro, which some considered an insult to the Prophet Muhammad. In the article the author wrote, among other things, that "The Lord Prophet and Apostle had drunk gin and smoked opium." In the explanation he gave afterwards the chief editor, Martodarsono, insisted that what the author meant by "the Lord Prophet and Apostle" was not the Prophet Muhammad. The incident touched off a big controversy within the Sarekat Islam, with demands for protest and calls for action coming from various directions. Tjokroaminoto, for his part, organized a big rally attended by about 4,000 people in Surabaya. Letters of protests were sent to the Sunan of Solo, the native king who was acknowledged by many Javanese Muslims as having authority in religious affairs, and to the Governor General, over the article. A protest campaign developed, its target at first being limited to *Djawi Hisworo* but later on extended to include the Christian mission and Christianity in general. The party won sympathy and support from the Arab section of the population. With a view to institutionalizing the support from the *santris*, Tjokroaminoto set up "The Lord Prophet and Apostle Muhammad's Army Committee" (Komite Tentera Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad), whose task was to defend Islam against insults by people. The goals of the committee were to seek unity physically and spiritually among all Muslims especially those

about this affair and the establishment of the committee was the fact that it served as an illustration of the feelings of the Muslims in Indonesia about their religion. It also served as an indication of the power of Islam as a binding force among its adherents, in spite of the different ways in which Islam was practiced. This committee was also an indication of the importance to modern Indonesia of the crucial problem concerning the relationship between politics and religion. The establishment of this committee should also be understood in light of the fact that at that time, the pressure from both socialist groups and missionaries compelled the Sarekat Islam leaders to devote new attention to the Islamic aspect of Sarekat Islam.¹⁰ Through this momentum, Tjokroaminoto criticized the Dutch government that subsidized missionary work and demanded like subsidies for Islamic educational institutions. He pointed out that:

The Islamic religion in the Dutch East Indies used to be presented as the source of all evil mishaps, notably the disturbances in Cilegon, the resistance at Gedangan and, at first, also the uprising in Jambi. And in contrast with this abuse of the Muslim faith, the Christian belief has been benefited in every way by the government; the Christian missionaries are paid with tax-money, which has been brought in by the Muslim believers, while the Christian mission-run schools received subsidies from the government.¹¹

living in Indonesia', and 'to guard and protect the honor of Islam, the honor of the Prophet... and the honor of the Muslims. See *Neratja*, 13 February 1918.

¹⁰ Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 199.

¹¹ Kolonial Tijdschrift (1918) as cited by Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 200. Explaining the fact that the Committee was beginning to launch its attack on Christian missionaries, Abdul Moelis declared that the establishment of the committee was not only in response to the *Djawi Hisworo* affair but also to the policies that subsidized schools, a timely problem in light of the acute shortage of education in many places that consequently caused turbulence in the Muslim world.

The idea of the separation between religion and politics once again came up when the socialist group in Sarekat Islam put forth their own critical evaluation of the religious foundation of the party movement. The socialist group of the SI, under the leadership of Semaun, however, was not opposed to the development of Islamic religion, but they wished to situate and define the role of Islam as a religion that was only spiritual - not political - in character. To Semaun and his followers the religious question is a private one of faith, i.e., a 'personal affair'.¹² By placing religion in the personal realm, Islam was situated in the Western religious tradition that separated religion from politics.

In 1919, the socialists became increasingly aggressive and the struggle between the socialist and religious groups in the party became increasingly intense. The debate later moved from the practical level to the ideological level - religion and ideology had become the central issue. This conflict worsened, particularly when Alimin Prawirodirjo¹³ published an article entitled *Louteren Wij Ons* (Are We Purifying Ourselves?).

In the article, Alimin openly criticized the Sarekat Islam. He argued that the most serious problem in the party was the lack of contact between the intellectual and religious circles.¹⁴ He also believed that religion should be

¹² Th. Blumberger, *The Communistche Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie* (Harlem: Tjeen Willink, 1928), 38.

¹³ Alimin was a member of Boedi Oetomo and Sarekat Islam, and later became a member of ISDV and became the chair of its Batavia Branch. Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 230.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 230.

placed in the realm of one's personal life. It is a personal question, a private matter and has no connection with politics. In general he maintained the separation of religion and the state.¹⁵

Another attack was also launched by the Indië Lëague. It was evident in the thought of Douwes Dekker. Basically, Dekker was of the opinion that religion was the "narrow road" of unity; it even tended to break up unity. In its final development, he explicitly rejected the role of religion in the movement. A genuine movement, according to him, could not be based on religion, but must be religiously pluralistic.¹⁶ He expressed a view that became the dominant trend in the successful nationalist endeavors of the 1940's and later into the republic. It stood in stark opposition to the policies of Muslim groups which wanted a strong Islamic identification.

The conflicts between socialist and religious groups in Sarekat Islam became worse, particularly when *Perserikatan Komunis Hindia* (Communist Association of the Indies) was established in 1920. This marked the beginning of a definite split in the SI that reached its full magnitude during the subsequent congress, which took place in Yogyakarta from March 2 to 6, 1921. The main question posed to the SI leadership at the time was what the attitude it should adopt towards the Communist group, as a split seemed unavoidable. In the congress, the plan to institute a consolidated, regulated party response

¹⁵ Ibid., 231.

¹⁶ Ibid.

towards the PKI was discussed and in this Tjokroaminoto, Moeis and Salim emerged as the people who opposed the Semarang group. In 1921 Salim had planned a proposal to reorganize the Central body for three reasons:

1. The Sarekat Islam would not have developed very well if it were not under a leadership devoted only to its success, exclusive of other organizations. This meant to Tjokroaminoto and others that party discipline could enhance the success of the organization but preventing members from having conflicting membership in other, rival organizations.
2. Religion must become the "key stone" of the body's activities. Islam was the unifying force and all of the ideals of socialism were already included in Islam.
3. The PKI was a member organization of the Dutch Communist Party. It was thus a tool of Dutch colonialism and as such, did not have any true interest in Asian socialism. Sarekat Islam must become genuinely Indonesian, genuinely Islamic, and genuinely Communist.¹⁷

In justifying the discipline measures, Tjokroaminoto said that he did not think it proper that the SI, which, thanks to its principles, had grown into a great, earnest and spotless association, would lose to another association, "that would be disobedience toward God".¹⁸ Arguing that Islam was the sole foundation of the party movement, Tjokroaminoto felt he had no alternative,

¹⁷ McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*, 100.

¹⁸ Blumberger, "Sarekat Islam", in *ENI*, 378.

"it is appropriate that Sarekat Islam uses what has been granted by Allah, namely making Islam the only genuine foundation"¹⁹

The different ideas on the relationship between Islam and politics held by Communist and religious groups in Sarekat Islam forced the SI leaders to propose new interpretations. In his speech entitled "*Socialisme yang berdasar Islam*" (Socialism based on Islam) in 1922²⁰, Tjokroaminoto argued that Islam created happiness not only for Muslims, but also for all human beings. Islam was not merely a personal matter. It therefore did not merely regulate the relationship between man and God, but also between human beings themselves.²¹ He denied the words of people who said that Islam should not be engaged in addressing political, social, and economic issues.²² Basing his arguments on Islamic history during the life of the Prophet, Tjokroaminoto argued that Islam could deal with socio-political matters, as had the Prophet at Medina. The Islamic state at Medina, from the start, took on a political character when Muhammad, besides his function as prophet, served as a

¹⁹ When the conflict between Communist and Islamist groups was at its peak and despite his efforts, compromises between the two groups failed, Tjokroaminoto was confronted with a decisive choice. Which group should he choose? His choice subsequently fell on Islam. When Tjokroaminoto was released from prison, he swore an *sumpah pocong* (an oath to Islam) for his supporters. This was a most effective way of insuring his commitment to his Islamic choice. Amelz recounts the decisive story of the "pocong oath" in the life of Tjokroaminoto. In this ritual he wore the shroud for Muslim burial and swore that he would faithfully defend Islam. With this "pocong oath," his relations with the Communist groups were broken off completely: he never had to disavow his commitment to Islam or more precisely, Islamic ideology. This was the point of no return. Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 122.

²⁰ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 138.

²¹ Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Socialisme*, 77. See also Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 129.

²² Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 131.

political leader for the new community as well. It is a clear example, according to Tjokroaminoto, that Islam did regulate political matters.²³

Both Tjokroaminoto and Salim rejected the idea of the separation between religion and politics. They argued that Islam must be acknowledged as the basis of politics, and for Islam, there is no recognition of the separation of the state from religion. Tjokroaminoto stated: "there are no Muslims who are only taking care of *ukhrawi* (eschatological matters) without taking care of their every day matters in life. This is even evident in Islamic history where the Prophet Muhammad was a religious as well as a political leader."²⁴ Such ideas were backed by Salim, who argued that Sarekat Islam was the first movement of the people of Indonesia that opposed the erroneous ideas "separation of Church and State". There is no doctrine in Islam, he added, that states that religious affairs must be separated from political affairs.²⁵

Tjokroaminoto also criticized the arguments for such a separation as he believed that Islam addresses all aspects of life, including the social, economic and cultural. At the SI congress in Yogyakarta in 1925, he proposed his program of *tanzīm* (program of reform), i.e. the reform of social, economic and cultural life in accordance with Islamic principles.²⁶ The proposals for *tanzīm* were later

²³ Tjokroaminoto, *Tafsir Program Asas*, 24.

²⁴ Ibid., 74.

²⁵ Sumartana, *Mission at the Crossroads*, 237.

²⁶ A.K. Pringgodigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan Rakyat Indonesia* (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1994), 43.

formulated in his book, *Islam dan Socialisme*, which have already been mentioned in the previous chapter on "Ideas on Socialism".

In addition, The conflict between communist and religious groups in the SI finally ended by formalizing the party discipline at the Madiun Congress in 1923. Tjokroaminoto seems to have made himself the master of this turbulent last congress of the SI, which finally brought about the following decisions:

- 1) Confirmation of the party-discipline toward the PKI;
- 2) Non-cooperation with the Dutch colonial government;
- 3) Transformation of the SI movement into "Partai Sarekat Islam" (Sarekat Islam Party), abbreviated P.S.I.;
- 4) Renewing the *bay'at*, the oath-precept as a pledge of allegiance.²⁷

After the Madiun Congress, the Communist group was officially expelled from the P.S.I. But those who were expelled refused to accept the expulsion and continued to use the name. According popular designations were assigned to the two groups the *Sarekat Islam Putih* (the white Sarekat Islam), represented the religious groups in the party, and *Sarekat Islam Merah* (Red Sarekat Islam) represented the Communist groups.²⁸ It was a breach that never was healed.

²⁷ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 132-33.

²⁸ Since this time, the Communist groups launched their attacks against Sarekat Islam. In its congress in March 1923, the Communist group, under the banner of PKI, strongly reacted to the Madiun Congress. In every place where the P.S.I. established its branches, the Communist group also founded the Red the SI, which was named Sarekat Rakyat, in order to

B. Islam and Nationalism

Secular nationalist also questioned and attacked the connection between Islam and politics but from a different approach than the socialist. Here national identity and ethnic pride were the motivating factors. With regard to this criticism, Tjokroaminoto strongly maintained that nationalism had to be based on Islam since in this religion no distinction were made between races, regions and social status. He believed that Islamic nationalism could create a united Muslim community in Indonesia, and questioned whether simple "nationalism" could do the same.

The dispute began in the 1920's particularly when the Sarekat Islam gave strong emphasis to the religious foundation for its movement. Previously, this debate did exist, but was muted due to the dominant position of the Muslims within the SI which was major independence movement. To this point Islam had been projected as an ideal binding Indonesian together, without much thinking about the substance of the Islam being used.

The conflict was pointedly raised by some graduates of modern and western-style schools who were impressed with "the West's technical progress, its ideal of personal liberty and by socialist concepts of economic justice then

emulate the white SI as well as to gather the Sarekat Islam members to join the Communist group. Ibid., 133.

under considerable discussion in European schools".²⁹ These students tended to argue that religion, particularly Islam, was not able to deal with problems in modern times.³⁰ The number of Muslims "emancipated" from their own religion through Dutch training and education had multiplied.³¹ The members of this group apparently did not become members of the SI, like their predecessors who also studied in Dutch schools.³² Islam's status as the natural symbol of national feeling had deteriorated. The SI was apparently no longer the symbol of the native people, particularly when it was related with colonialism.³³ As a result, the Muslims lost their monopoly in formulating the foundation of the struggle.³⁴

This was not merely the result of western education, but also the consequence of the "ideologization" pursued by Muslims. Taufik Abdullah argued that ideologization seemed to have created new phenomena. First, it

²⁹ Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam, Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asian Program, 1970), 85.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 247.

³² For example, Suwardi Surjaningrat and A. Moelis were affiliated with the SI in Bandung in 1913, as is pointed out by Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 247. See also M. Dawam Rahardjo, *Intelektual Intelegensia dan Perilaku Politik Bangsa: Ritsalah Cendekiawan Muslim* (Jakarta: Mizan, 1993), 46-7.

³³ Taufik Abdullah, *Sejarah Ummat Islam Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 1991), 237.

³⁴ Several factors created this estrangement: the emergence of the concept of the Indies nationalism in 1922 which ran counter to the early dominant idea of identifying nationalism with Islam; the contest for leadership led to differences between the members of various parties; ideology, which, partly as a response to the challenge of communism and party due to a maturing of its leadership, had crystallized by the 1920's. The exercise of disciplinary measures in 1921 against their parties added to this estrangement. See Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 247

established Islam as the foundation of national and inter-ethnic political solidarity. Second, as a result of this process, cultural polarization occurred in which *santri* (devoted Muslims) and *abangan* (nominal Muslims) were clearly identified.³⁵ This polarization, he added, could also be viewed as the result of Islamization, which led to the polarization of socio-political orientation and commitment.³⁶

In defining and formulating the national ideology in this period, religious and secular groups, which may also be called *santri* and *abangan* groups, seem to have opposed one another. Debates occurred between the two groups on what the foundation of this ideology was going to be. The *santri*, unsurprisingly, proposed Islam as an ideology, while the *abangan* saw Islam as a foreign teaching imported into Javanese culture and they propagated

³⁵ The term of *santri* and *abangan* is especially used in Java. These terms are actually used to distinguish one's particular type of devotion to Islam. The *santri* or so-called *putihan* were devoted Muslims, usually trained in religious schools, who live in quarters close to the mosque, called *kauman*. Religious officials in Java were almost all recruited from their group. The *abangan* were nominally Muslims, who did not care much about religious practices and rituals and confined these usually to those connected with the most important stages in life: childbirth, marriage and death. On these occasions they felt the need for Islam and would thus call on the people from *putihan* group to perform the ceremonies concerned. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 19. Within the context of nationalism and Islam, the secular nationalist groups could be said belong to the *abangan* group and the Muslim nationalist group to the *putihan*.

³⁶ Abdullah, *Sejarah Ummat Islam*, 237. It could be recalled that in 1910s, the struggle between Islam and nationalism had been reflected in the question of the *Djawi Hisworo* affair, which produced the Committee for Javanese nationalism. The establishment of *Tentara Kanjeng Nabi Muhammad* produced among those who adhere to Javanism the *Comite voor het Javaansch Nationalisme* (Committee for Javanese Nationalism) which, although agreeing with the condemnation of the *Djawi Hisworo* article, expressed 'regret that it has created a big movement like the *Tentara Nabi Muhammad* and the circulation of the *Djawi Hisworo* is small'. The Committee revealed its Javanese character by accusing the *Tentara Nabi Muhammad* of an attempt to 'prevent all Javanese from holding Javanist and other beliefs above Islam'. It also accused the movement of having a foreign origin, i.e. of coming from the Arabs, and pointed out that 'politics and religion should be separated. See *Neratja*, 23 February 1918.

nationalism as if Islam ran counter to it. This group was later on recognized as a nationalist group not committed to Islam; it even sometimes appeared to be an anti-Islamic group.³⁷ The group held that Islam was tied to the past and was incapable of dealing with modern issues.³⁸

According to the secular nationalists, national unity was an end in itself and stood above other factors. They proposed what Gajah Mada and others of the Hindu-Buddhist period had done, that is, unified the archipelago under a single political, economic and cultural authority. Muslims were suspect of this approach regarding it as an attempt to reinstitute Hinduism.³⁹ Soekarno, one of the nationalist leaders stressing the love of the country, said that the fatherland is "*sangat indah dan memiliki kekayaan alam yang melimpah dari Ibu Indonesia*" (very beautiful and has great and rich natural resources which fall abundantly from Mother Indonesia). He maintained that Mother Indonesia gave birth to heroic people, like Gajah Mada and other leaders from the Hindu period. To create and maintain unity, he stressed the importance of love for

³⁷ Independence, according to their views, had to be achieved on the basis of Indonesian nationalism alone and Indonesians could not wait for help from an "airplane from Moscow or Caliph from Istanbul". Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution*, 91. See also Abdullah, *Sejarah Ummat Islam*, 237-8.

³⁸ Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam, Islamic Reform*, 85.

³⁹ In fact, it is not so much that they wanted reawaken Hinduism, only to show that there had been earlier models of Indonesia lying in the past; see Bung Karno (Sukarno), "Mencapai Indonesia Merdeka" (n.p., Bandung, March 1933), 1-45.

the fatherland, the sincere preparedness to serve and devote oneself to Mother Indonesia, and the willingness to set aside narrow party interests.⁴⁰

In addition, Soekarno believed that his idea of nationalism was not the same as Western nationalism. It did not come out of the pride of a nation. The nationalism was a tolerant one, which grew out of knowledge of the world and history. He said, adding that: "... it is not 'jingo-nationalism' or chauvinism, it is not a copy of or an imitation of the nationalism of the West. Our nationalism is one which accept its life as an inspiration and realizes its ideals as a service".⁴¹ He also argued that due to its tolerant attitude the nationalism gave broadness and the wideness of space which gave room for others who need it. The nationalism was Eastern nationalism, which was a competitive nationalism striving only after its own needs and which was similar to commercial nationalism based on terms of loss and profits.⁴²

According to Soekarno, this Eastern nationalism had inspired various Asian leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi of India, Mustafa Kamil of Egypt and Sun Yat Sen of China, made 'us a tool of God' and caused 'us to live in the Spirit. He also maintained that with this kind of nationalism, it would be assumed that Indonesia and its people was part of Asia and the Asian people, and part of the world and the world population. Indonesians did not consider as the servants

⁴⁰ *Fadjar Asia*, August 18, 20, 1928.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

only of their fatherland but also that of Asia, all suppressed people and the world.⁴³

These different conceptions of Islam and nationalism forced Islamic group leaders to clarify their concepts. In *Bandera Islam*, Tjokroaminoto explained the meaning of nationalism in Islam as practiced by the SI. He held that Islam did not in the least hamper or obstruct the creation and the course of real nationalism, but in fact promotes it. Islamic nationalism, according to him, was not narrow nationalism and was not dangerous to others, as was often assumed. Islamic nationalism, he added, led to Islamic socialism, i.e. socialism which creates mono-humanism (the unity of mankind) controlled by the Supreme Being, Allah, through the laws which had been revealed to his Apostle, the last of the Prophet, Muhammad.⁴⁴ In *Islam dan Socialisme*, Tjokroaminoto also stated: "*Kebangsaan* (nationalism) is based on Islamic socialism since this socialism will overstep limitations such as races, languages, regions and states. Wherever Muslims live, they are still part of the united Muslim community and they have to work to meet the needs of their society as well that of Islam."⁴⁵ It is Islamic nationalism, he believed, that would create solidarity, freedom and equality among Muslims.⁴⁶

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ *Bandera Islam*, 26 February 1925.

⁴⁵ Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Socialisme*, 94-5.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 33-8.

Tjokroaminoto also questioned the ideas of nationalism proposed by the secular groups. "Should we leave the Islamic principles and change to or just follow other concepts? Islam contains complete teachings which regulate all aspects of life including politics, social and economy. Why, therefore, adopt other products when we have complete Islamic doctrines?"⁴⁷ He again argued that Islamic nationalism would prevent Indonesians from falling into schisms, which would result in increased feelings of regionalism, thus in turn, encouraging, for example, the Javanese to develop their own nationalism, Ambonese to develop their own nationalism and so on, throughout the islands. If this happened, he continued, Indonesia would break into small parts and it would be difficult to preserve its unity. It was therefore Islam, which had deep roots in Indonesia, which promoted Islamic nationalism based on the law of God and which united Indonesians regardless of their cultural background.⁴⁸

Tjokroaminoto's views were similar, but not identical, to the views of other Muslim thinkers of the time. Another Sarekat Islam leader, Salim, put forth his own ideas on Islamic nationalism. In a polemic with Soekarno, Salim argued that the love for the country is a nonsense slogan, which encouraged worshipping and idolizing one's nationality. He also pointed to the dangers dormant in nationalism, describing a number of misdeeds that nationalists were

⁴⁷ Tjokroaminoto, "Cultuur dan 'Adat Islam" (Culture and Tradition in Islam), in Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. II, 67.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 70-1.

prone to commit.⁴⁹ The PSI, however, did not abandon or ignore the love of country, but continued to regard it as an important principle. The PSI saw it rather as "emphasizing the fate and the situation of our people, putting them in priority rather than nationality. Love of country should be in favor of justice as it is fixed by God, meaning that it does not exceed the faith of God."⁵⁰

When the differences over national ideology arose, both Islamic nationalist groups who were committed to the structural orientation, and those who adhered to a cultural approach, worked together, in opposition to the secular nationalists. This could be seen in Ahmad Hassan and Muhammad Natsir's ideas⁵¹ on Islam and nationalism. A. Hassan criticized the views of the secular nationalists, labeling them '*assabiya* (tribal or sectarian), a sentiment suspect in Islamic law.⁵²

⁴⁹ Dahm, *Sukarno and the Struggle*, 175.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 175.

⁵¹ According to Natsir, Islam creates a brotherhood among the people who are on the same level and who are experiencing the same fate in a unified country. If "nationality" was proposed to be the foundation of national reformation, the necessary conditions could not be fulfilled. Islam, indeed, is more suitable and compatible to be the foundation of unity than the nationality proposed by the nationalist secularists. See Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 260-1.

⁵² A. Hassan, a Persatuan Islam (Persis) leader, identified nationalism or *kebangsaan*, with '*assabiya*, i.e. zealous tribal partisanship which was prevalent before the unification of Arabs under Islam, especially during the *jahiliyya* period, and which caused disorder in the Arab world. Referring to two traditions of the Prophet on '*assabiyya*, those of Abu Dawud (d. 888) and of Muslim (d. 875), respectively, A. Hassan expressed the view that to set up a

C. Pan-Islamism

Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Pan-Islamism were motivated by his inspiration of creating a united world Muslim community, as existed in the lifetime of the Prophet and his Companions. He argued that it was of vital importance that the Islamic world have a recognized leader.

As previously mentioned, in the 1920s strong communist influence in Sarekat Islam prompted Muslim leaders to reemphasize Islam as the basis of their movement. International changes also, to some extent, affected the political life of Indonesia. Those changes centered on the national assembly of Turkey in its abolition of 'Abd al-Majîd's Caliphate in March 1924, and the subsequent call by the Azhar 'ulama for an international congress in Cairo to elect a new caliph the following year. These events and the conquest of the Hijaz by Ibn Sa'ud in the same year, briefly caused feverish activity in Indonesia.

The intensification of interest in Pan-Islam was largely due to the efforts of the leadership of Sarekat Islam. After flirting with the left in the 1920s, Tjokroaminoto and Salim hoped to gain a double advantage by reuniting the Muslim groups behind the P.S.I. banner and by counter-balancing the secular

kebangsaan organization, or to invite and persuade people to join the *kebangsaan* party is forbidden by Islam. See Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam, Islamic Reform*, 90.

nationalists.⁵³ Their interpretation of Islamic unity meant not only the unity of Indonesian Muslim but also solidarity with the struggle of Muslims elsewhere. It was this attitude that made them responsive to the question of the caliphate. The first and most ambitious program installed by the Islamic Union was the establishment of a series of al-Islam Congresses representing various Muslim groups.⁵⁴

In 1922, the Sarekat Islam leaders invited representatives of all Muslim organizations to the first al-Islam Congress held in Cirebon, West Java. The Sarekat Islam itself, Muhammadiyah and al-Irshad were the major organizations taking part. Traditionalist Muslims, who were as yet unorganized, were represented by a number of individually invited ulama such as Haji Abdul Wahab Chasbullah of Surabaya and Kyai Asnawi of Kudus.⁵⁵ Altogether nine of these al-Islam Congress were to be held by the Sarekat Islam in cooperation with the Muhammadiyah and other Islamic organizations.⁵⁶

⁵³ Benda, *The Crescent and the Rising Sun*, 53. See also Martin van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East Indies and the Caliphate Question," *Studia Islamika*, vol. II, Number 3 (IAIN Jakarta: Jakarta, 1995), 125.

⁵⁴ Von der Mehden mentions that Sarekat Islam attempted to introduce the idea of Pan-Islam on three fronts through "a rallying of Indonesian people in Islam-wide religious congresses, the establishment of divisions of global Islamic organization and involvement in the Caliphate question." Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 180

⁵⁵ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 136. A few years later, these *ulama* and a number of associates were to establish the association of traditionalist Muslims, *Nahdhatul Ulama* (Renaissance of Ulama) in 1926.

⁵⁶ Von der Mehden mentions that Sarekat Islam attempted to introduce the idea of Pan-Islam on three fronts through "a rallying of Indonesian people in Islam-wide religious congresses, the establishment of divisions of global Islamic organization and involvement in the Caliphate question." Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 180

The al-Islam Congress took place in the period of the abolition of the caliphate and the search for alternatives.⁵⁷ The Ottoman empire had crumbled, while the power of its ruler, the Sultan of Turkey, who had been considered caliph of all Muslims, had been contested by Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal. In 1922 the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished the Sultanate and Turkey became a republic, but the same year the Assembly created a caliph (Abd al-Majid) without temporal power.⁵⁸ This had an impact on the Muslims of Indonesian. The al-Islam Congress in 1922, held by a Sarekat Islam Congress in 1923, voiced its support for a new caliph on the grounds that he would foster the international solidarity of Muslims. In 1924 however, the Assembly in Turkey abolished the caliphate altogether,⁵⁹ leaving Indonesian Muslims in a quandary about the situation.

This caused confusion in the Muslim world, which began to ponder the establishment of a new caliph. The Muslim community in Indonesia were not only interested in this problem but also considered it their duty to assist in resolving it. Salim argued the need for a caliph for the Muslim world. At a meeting in May 1924, just over two months after the abolition of the Caliphate by Turkey's National Assembly and Sharif Husayn's proclamation of himself as Caliph, Salim pointed out that relations among the Muslims of Turkey, Egypt,

⁵⁷ See Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies", *Studia Islamika*, 126.

⁵⁸ Martin Kramer, *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 78-9.

⁵⁹ Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 126.

the Yemen and the Hijaz had broken down. In Ankara, the Caliph had been deposed, he continued, and neither the new Caliph Husayn, nor any new Caliph in Istanbul could be ours. "Only the Caliph of the entire Muslim world can be ours," he added.⁶⁰

The active roles of Indonesian Muslims concerning the caliphate matter was shown particularly when Egypt planned to hold a caliphate congress in March 1924. In response to this plan, Indonesian Muslims decided whether a delegation should be sent and what position should adopt.⁶¹ Different opinions emerged concerning this matter.

At a special meeting in Surabaya⁶², Tjokroaminoto discussed the need for Muslims to have a Caliph. He argued that Muslims all over the world had to have a leader explicitly recognized as the worldly as well as spiritual head of all Muslims. However, Tjokroaminoto argued that to the Muslims of Indonesia, who lived under another government, the caliphate was only relevant in dealing with religious matters, not with politics.⁶³ While this may have seemed like Tjokroaminoto was arguing for the separation of church and state, this was

⁶⁰ Ibid., 127.

⁶¹ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 222.

⁶² Around mid-1924, several Arab personalities and associations in Batavia and Surabaya received invitations to the caliphate congress in Cairo. Some of them approached Tjokroaminoto and proposed sending a delegation. Tjokroaminoto's reaction was initially hesitant and at the SI congress in August, he just mentioned the invitation. Then on October 4 and 5, leaders of the SI, Muhammadiyah and Al-Irshad called a special meeting in Surabaya to discuss whether a delegation should be sent and what position it should adopt. Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 129.

⁶³ R.A. Kern collection, KITLV, Leiden, H 797 no. 316, as quoted by van Bruinessen, *Ibid.*

not so, for the separation here was not by choice, but by circumstance and that under ideal conditions the caliphate would provide leadership in both areas. In any event Tjokroaminoto believed firmly that the caliphate was still a vital institution to Muslims, even to those in Indonesia, and should be preserved.

A different opinion, expressed at the meeting, was that of Haji Fakhruddin, a Muhammadiyah leader from Yogyakarta. While Tjokroaminoto and others wished to take decisions on the delegation to Cairo at once, Fakhruddin "proposed setting up a caliphate committee to take care of this and other international Muslim affairs".⁶⁴ He argued that Indonesian Muslims had to play an active role in the great issues confronting the world of Islam and to establish closer ties with another Muslim community elsewhere.⁶⁵

Tjokroaminoto and Fakhruddin differed on who could become a caliph. Tjokroaminoto supported the caliphate in Turkey, but thought it was too early to judge "what the aims of Mustafa Kemal's secularization were".⁶⁶ On the other hand, Fakhruddin maintained that the caliph should have his seat in Mecca, because that city belongs to all Muslims and is free of non-Muslim powers.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ Ibid., 129.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 130.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 130.

The 1924 meeting resulted in the establishment of a caliphate committee, all from the Surabaya area.⁶⁸ The third al-Islam Congress in October 1924 decided *inter alia* to send a delegation to the Cairo conference, which consisted of Surjopranoto of Partai Sarekat Islam, Haji Fakhruddin of Muhammadiyah and K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah of traditionalist.⁶⁹ The Cairo conference, however, was postponed without a definite date being set.

Early in 1925, Ibn Sa'ud announced his intention to hold a gathering in Mecca. In Indonesia, this invitation was discussed in the fourth and fifth al-Islam Congresses in 1925 and 1926.⁷⁰ Salim, who played an important role, showed great enthusiasm for Ibn Sa'ud. He charged that the Sharif Husayn had robbed pilgrims during his period of control over Mecca, and expressed his belief that Ibn Sa'ud wished the holy land to be brought under the control of all Muslims.⁷¹

Salim's great enthusiasm for Ibn Sa'ud, however, sowed the seeds of discord in the Congress, since *Wahhabis* rule in Mecca threatened the religious beliefs and practices of many traditionalist Muslims.⁷² The frictions became

⁶⁸ The committee was chaired by Wondoamiseno of Partai Sarekat Islam and K.H.A. Wahab Hasbullah as vice-chairman. *Bandera Islam*, 16 October 1924.

⁶⁹ Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 130.

⁷⁰ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 223.

⁷¹ Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 130.

⁷² On behalf of the traditionalists, K.H.A. Abdul Wahab submitted proposals to the effect that traditional religious practices, such as the erection of the tombs, on graves, the reading of certain prayers, and the teaching of *madhahib* (schools of Islamic Law), must be respected by the new Arab King in his state, including Mecca and Medina. Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 223.

more apparent when the congress, particularly modernists, responded unfavorably to Abdul Wahab's proposals. This caused Abdul Wahab and traditionalist member of the congress to withdraw from the caliphate committee and take the initiative by holding meetings of prominent traditionalist leaders.⁷³

The 1926 Congress elected another delegation, consisting of Tjokroaminoto and Mas Mansur of Muhammadiyah, who would attend the Mecca congress, and perhaps also the Cairo congress.⁷⁴ In discussion at the Indonesian meeting, Tjokroaminoto mentioned rumors of machinations to have the Cairo congress elect King Fu'ad as the caliph. In response, he announced that "if such a thing should occur then, so long as I am a representative of Dutch India, I will never give my consent to the proposal, which would be in conflict with the Koran".⁷⁵ In the end, the delegation only attended the Mecca congress.⁷⁶

⁷³ Wahab gathered the traditionalist *ulama* of Central and East Java in a *Komite Hijaz* (the Hijaz Committee), to discuss the situation in Hijaz and the strategy necessary to plead the interest of traditionalist Islam with Ibn Sa'ud. They wished to send their own delegation to Mecca, but not to do this in the name of the al-Islam Congress. At a meeting in Surabaya in 1926, the Hijaz Committee decided to reconstitute itself as a permanent organization, choosing the name of *Nahdlatul Ulama* (abbreviated to NU). Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 131 and Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 223.

⁷⁴ Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 223. See Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies," *Studia Islamika*, 133 and Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 172.

⁷⁵ Kramer, *Islam Assembled*, 95-6. There might be three reasons why Tjokroaminoto was unwilling to elect King Fu'ad as a caliph. First, it might be probably because the Egyptians would consider Indonesian delegations "no more than flies" and looked down upon Indonesian people. The second reason might be because of Agus Salim's great enthusiasm for Ibn Sa'ud, which influenced Tjokroaminoto's considerations. Van Bruinessen also mentions that Tjokroaminoto would not take part in legitimating King Fu'ad whom he called "that imperialist stooge". Van Bruinessen, "Muslim of the Dutch East the Indies", *Studia Islamika*, 129-33.

After the Mecca Congress, Tjokroaminoto and Mas Mansur presented a detailed report on the conference to the sixth al-Islam Congress held in Surabaya in 1926. Significantly the Meccan Congress did not name a caliph which was put off to the future, although an Islamic world conference was created to deal with common Muslim problem throughout the Muslim world. In this regard the al-Islam Congress made a decision to change the Caliphate Committee to *Mu'tamar al-'Alam al-Islami far' al-Hindiyya al-Sharqiyyah* (the East the Indies Branch of the Islamic World Conference).⁷⁷

However, the Pan-Islam movement, as promoted by the PSI, ended in failure. On one level Muslims were not successful in forging an effective organization on the international level. On the national level there was a lack of consensus among Indonesian groups themselves that showed the splits, mentioned earlier among conservative Muslims, Muhammadiyah, secular nationalists and communists.⁷⁸

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⁷⁶ The appearance of an Indonesian delegation, however, did not impress the other participants. Kramer mentioned the report of chief of the Egyptian delegation, Zawahiri, saying that Tjokroaminoto and Mas Mansur were weak in every respect. They were likened to grasping, drowning persons, hoping to find something to support them, able to move neither hand nor tongue. They spoke little and avoided all commitment. *Ibid.*, 109-10.

⁷⁷ Amelz, H.O.S. *Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 173. See Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement*, 136-7 and Pringgodigdo, *Sejarah Pergerakan*, 43.

⁷⁸ For a good account of these factors, see Von der Mehden, "Islam and the Rise of Nationalism", 188-92.

D. Ideas on the *Ummah*

Tjokroaminoto's ideas on the *Ummah* was his aspiration for creating united Muslim community in Indonesia. In *Tafsir Program Asas Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia*, he discusses in detail the building of the *Ummah* he favored. He argued that the basic requirement to build an *Ummah* was unity and freedom.⁷⁹ This unity, according to him, must be based on Islam because Islam is 'Allah's religion', the most perfect regulation granted by God to mankind to achieve happiness in this world and bliss in the hereafter. Unity in the Muslim community can be achieved through complete submission to the commands of God and the Prophet in one's individual life as well as in the life of the community.⁸⁰

With regard to freedom, Tjokroaminoto pointed out that building of the *Ummah* could not be established if Muslims did not have national freedom (*Nationaal Vrijheid*). National freedom, according to him, was 'holding the power in our own country'. He stated that complete national freedom is a condition for the full realization of Islamic ideals, assuming that power is in the hands of Muslims.⁸¹ In this connection, he referred to the creation of the state in Medina by the Prophet as well as the preparedness of the early Muslims to

⁷⁹ Q. III: 102. Tjokroaminoto, *Tafsir Program Asas*, 28-29.

⁸⁰ Q XXIV: 55. *Ibid.*, 26.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4.

'fully participate in a war for the protection of religion'.⁸² He also expressed the view that 'international imperialism' and 'international capitalism' would undoubtedly end in failure and this would, in turn, accelerate the arrival of national independence.⁸³ By referring to the concept of Islamic government as practiced by the Prophet, Tjokroaminoto pointed out that the concept of the Muslim *Ummah* in Indonesia had to be based on three important elements; politics, the economy and equality before law.

In politics, the type of government that should be employed to build the Muslim *Ummah*, according to Tjokroaminoto, was a 'democratic government'⁸⁴, in which a representative body was to be equipped with rights and duties based on Islamic democratic principles. The laws issued in this body had to be promulgated and administered with the people's participation. Elections were considered an absolute requirement, while referendum and people's initiatives would also be recognized.⁸⁵ This type of democratic government, however, was not considered similar to the democracy in many western countries of that time, where the government was controlled by only one part of the property owning class. In an Islamic state, the government is "controlled by all the people or *Ummah* who are all subject to the only law... of God". The *Qur'an* and

⁸² Ibid., 14 and 22. Tjokroaminoto, in another book, *Tarikh Agama Islam: Riwayat dan Pemandangan atas Kehidupan Nabi Muhammad dan Perjalanan Nabi Muhammad SAW*, elaborated in detail the development of Islam during the period of Prophet.

⁸³ Ibid., 17.

⁸⁴ Q 27:38. Ibid., 24.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 25.

Hadith constitute the basis on which all laws and regulation should be founded.⁸⁶

Tjokroaminoto also mentioned that the system in which people are involved in such a body is parallel to democracy in Islam since *musyawarah* (counseling) is a way of solving problems. To support this, he quoted the Qur'anic verse 42:38. According to Tjokroaminoto, *musyawarah* in Islam was practiced by both the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs. The command that created a state based on *musyawarah* was sent to Mecca, where the Muslim population was small and where they lived under oppression and injustice. It indicated that although Muslims were under those conditions, it was important to create an organization to discuss people's rights and needs.⁸⁷

In the field of economics, Tjokroaminoto encouraged individual initiative in the economic field as long as it did not harm others. Referring his discussion on *zakat* in *Islam dan Socialisme*, Tjokroaminoto again argued that *zakat* should be encouraged and big enterprises should be in the hands of the state.⁸⁸ *Swadeshi* (self-help) was also considered as another means to this end.⁸⁹

In addition, with respect to equality before the law, Tjokroaminoto argued that in the construction of the Muslim *Ummah*, it rejected inequality in

⁸⁶ Ibid., 27.

⁸⁷ Ibid., 31-32.

⁸⁸ Tjokroaminoto, *Islam dan Socialisme*, 19, 30-1.

⁸⁹ Tjokroaminoto, *Tafsir Program Asas*, 42.

the law,⁹⁰ recognized the equality of all Muslims,⁹¹ and the equality of husband and wife.⁹² He also demanded that the needy and poor receive better protection under the law.

Providing a more specific explanation, Tjokroaminoto pointed out that there must be a regulation that had to be applied to the Muslim *Ummah* in Indonesia. As a request from the P.S.I. branches, Tjokroaminoto was charged to make a "General Regulation for the Muslim Community". This task was accomplished on February 4, 1934. The purpose of making this "General Regulation" was to build what he called "a United Muslim Community" or Muslim *Ummah* in Indonesia which, as one unit, would also become a member of the unit of the Muslim world community.⁹³

The "General Regulation" contains directive principles for the construction of the Muslim *Ummah* in Indonesia. It consists of twenty chapters and one concluding chapter. Chapter I to VII contain guiding principles illustrated with Qur'anic verses. These are outlined below:

- I. General Guide for the Muslim Socialist; based on the Qur'an XLIX.
- II. The Aims and Purpose of Worldly Life; based on the Qur'an III: 13 and XCII:19-20.

⁹⁰ Q XLIX-13. Ibid., 57-58.

⁹¹ Q XVI-97. Ibid., 59.

⁹² Q II-228. Ibid., 75-76.

- III. A Guide for Noble Behavior: based on Qur'an III:34.
- IV. A Guide for Justice and Objectivity; based on Qur'an IV:135.
- V. Guide for the Correct Speech; based on Qur'an LXI:2-3.
- VI. Guide for Good Conduct in the Broadest Sense; based on Qur'an IV:36.
- VII. Guide for Treaties and Witness; based on Qur'an II:282.

Chapter VIII to XX contains guide for every individual Muslim, namely:

- VIII. Guide for True Belief and Islam
- IX. Guide for Muslim Unity
- X. Guide for Electing Leaders and Following the Leadership.
- XI. Guide for Seeking the Right Path.
- XII. Guide for Exercising Worship.
- XIII. Guide for [the Right] View of Life.
- XIV. Guide for the Proper Treatment of the Family.
- XV. Guide for Marriage Relations.
- XVI. Guide for the Treatment and Care of Orphans.
- XVII. Guide for Giving Noble examples to others.
- XVIII. Guide of Advantages of Social Economy.
- XIX. Guide for the Enjoining of the Right and Prohibiting the Wrong.
- XX. Guide for Giving Preferences to the Needs of the Society above that of the Individual.⁹⁴

⁹³ Tjokroaminoto, "Reglement Umum Bagi Ummat Islam", in Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. II, 80.

⁹⁴ Tjokroaminoto, "Reglement Umum", in *Ibid.*, 81-85.

With the concept of the *Ummah*, it seems that Tjokroaminoto completed his ideas on Islam and politics. It was apparent when he discussed the unity of the Muslim Community, freedom, concept of state and government, economy and equality before the laws. In this concept, his ideas on Islam as an ideology were also clearly stated. Tjokroaminoto argued that Indonesian Muslims, though they were large in number, would not be a Muslim *Ummah* if they did not have a purpose to their life and did not live as one soul; the Islamic soul.

The 'General Regulation' was later presented in the Twentieth Congress of PSII in May 1934.⁹⁵ The regulations, however, outwardly did not effect the further development of the party. Although attention to Islamic affairs did not decrease, the party could no longer claim to represent the largest part of the Indonesian Muslim community. Consequently, the regulation formulated by Tjokroaminoto also did not influence its reception by other Muslims.

⁹⁵ This congress was the last congress attended by Tjokroaminoto. He passed away in December 17, 1934.

CONCLUSION

In the early years of the twentieth century Sarekat Islam played an important role in the political movement against the Dutch. This role could not be separated from the efforts made by the organization's leaders, such as Tjokroaminoto. Under his leadership the Sarekat Islam was quickly transformed into a mass organization with a political agenda. Together with the other leaders of Sarekat Islam, one can not fail to note that Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics influenced the political movement of the organization. This study has attempted to show how Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics influenced the establishment of Sarekat Islam as one of the pioneering of the political movements in Indonesia.

Economic and educational backwardness of Indonesians particularly in the period of the Dutch sovereignty created a pervasive feeling of dependence on and inferiority to foreigners, especially the Dutch. This situation was even worse for lay people who were recognized by the *priyayi* as the lowest class in society. The term *wong cilik* (low people) and slavish images were always attached to them. This condition consequently created a certain atmosphere and feeling in which they always accepted a subordinate position and were fearful of asserting themselves or insisting on mutual respect. Tjokroaminoto criticized this condition and argued that all people had the same rights as others. The term of *wong cilik* was no longer suitable for Indonesians who were

trying to regain their dignity. There were no differences between people before God. He also argued that the Indonesian people had to be aware of their rights in politics and in terms of economics.

In addition, Tjokroaminoto believed that this condition was not only the debilitating political and economic result of colonialism but also of intellectual backwardness. One of the ways to make people aware politically and economically, according to him, was through education. Tjokroaminoto believed that education was of paramount importance. However, he did not mean just any education, but the highest form of education, which necessitated academic institutions where Indonesians could acquire important skills and abilities useful to other people as well as for building a nation. Another important part of the educational system was a balance between the fields of secular and religious knowledge, since both were needed in creating "real nationalist Muslims".¹ This system had to make use of Islamic and Indonesian subjects, including Islamic history, laws, Indonesian history, philosophy and culture. These subjects, according to Tjokroaminoto, would create an undivided loyalty to their own country as well as to Islam, and could also increase the spirit of independence.

Regarding the use of Islam as a foundation for the Sarekat Islam, two reasons may be advanced: the universality of the faith and its emotional content. In Indonesia, Islam is the belief of the overwhelming majority of the

¹ Amelz, *H.O.S. Tjokroaminoto*, vol. I, 166.

population and as such, presented a recognizable entity which could bind the nation together. The Muslim faith could also supply the needed emotional content. Whereas a Javanese might not understand an Acehnese on the basis of race or nation, he could relate himself to a brother Muslim. Islam could reduce the sense of belonging to a clan, which was very strong among most Indonesians. Tjokroaminoto constantly referred to it as the rope, which would bind the movement together as a unit. Lacking a single language, history, social structure or ethnic background, Tjokroaminoto looked to Islam as the base of the party.

However, using Islam as the foundation of the movement was criticized by other groups, such as the Communist and secular nationalist groups. Those argued that Islam was not able to deal with political matters. Islam, according to them, was a personal matter that should be separated from political activities. However, for Tjokroaminoto, Islam was not only symbol of unity among Indonesians but also as way of life that had to be applied to every day matters, since it contained complete teachings that regulated all matters, including politics, social affairs and the economy. He argued that it is a well-known historical fact that Islam by its very nature recognizes a relationship between religion and politics. The first Islamic community (*Ummah*) at Medina from the very beginning, took on a political character when Muhammad, besides his function as prophet, acted as a political leader for the new community as well. These were clear examples which would form the nucleus of the ideal Islamic state in later Muslim history.

The Secular Nationalists also raised many criticisms questioning the connection between Islam and politics. The criticism that was focused on the relationship between Islam and nationalism forced Tjokroaminoto and other leaders of Islamic groups to propose and articulate their own concepts. Tjokroaminoto himself argued that Islam did propose the idea of nationalism, aimed at the creation of the unity of all human being controlled by the rule of God. This kind of nationalism, according to him, would prevent "regional nationalism", in which one region would propose their own nationalism. He argued that Islamic nationalism would unite Indonesians, regardless of their own regional identities.

With more complete arguments to respond to the criticisms of both the Communist and secular nationalist groups, Tjokroaminoto wrote *Islam dan Socialisme*. In this work, he formally opposed the form of socialism proposed by the Communist groups and put forth his own idea of Islamic socialism, which he claimed was not the same as the socialism conceived by Karl Marx. He argued that Islamic socialism was in fact, earlier and better than the socialism described by Marx, in both theory and practice because it had been applied by the Prophet Muhammad and his companions during their lifetimes. Tjokroaminoto also viewed Islamic socialism as "solidarity" and "equality". Equality meant that there would be no accumulation of excess wealth by certain people in society. What he meant by solidarity was that a mutual assistance and a close relationship among Muslims bound by the rope of God would emerge. Socialism in Islam, according to him, was not only a compilation

of theories but also the teachings that must be followed by Muslims.

His ideas on Islamic socialism were finally completed when he proposed his concept of *Ummah*. He argued that there were two basic requirements in building an *Ummah*. First was unity in the Muslim community that must be bound by the rules of God. Second, there must be freedom, since through this Muslims could realize Islamic ideals. In a more detailed explanation of the governmental system in the Muslim *Ummah*, Tjokroaminoto noted that it should be based on a democratic system, in which elections, referendum and people's initiatives were considered requirements. In this system, a government would be controlled by the people in the form of a council and would also be based on Islamic socialism. Furthermore, by referring to the practice of both the Prophet Muhammad and the first four Caliphs in Medina, Tjokroaminoto argued that *musyawarah* was also an important element in the governmental system for the building of the *Ummah*. Moreover, equality in the economic field was also an important element for the Muslim *Ummah*. He argued that *Zakat* (alms) and nationalizing big enterprises were methods to distribute wealth in society. The Muslim *Ummah* also recognized equality before the law for all Muslims.

Tjokroaminoto emphasized morality. This can be seen clearly in his discussion of Islamic sociology. He did not elaborate its methodology in terms of a system of production and distribution, but rather argued that the sociology he promoted was Islamic sociology, it was no more than 'the ideal of charity'. This is clearly stated when he noted Qur'anic exhortations prohibiting interest,

commanding aid to the poor, commending charity and brotherhood and damning the accumulation of excess wealth.

Furthermore, examples of the Prophet and his four companions, which Tjokroaminoto referred to, are only related to the good behavior of those people that Muslims should follow. Tjokroaminoto did not put those examples into a concrete system of socialism that would be useful to solve social problems of that time. He did not elaborate systematically how the Prophet and his companions applied socialism. The only example of Islamic socialism he notes is authorizing public land in order to meet the needs of society. Moreover, to support his idea of anti-capitalism, he simply proposed the idea of distributing *zakat*, without giving a more detailed explanation as to how *zakat* could be managed in order to fight against capitalism. In other words, his concept of Islamic socialism that is based on morality is too abstract and insufficient to deal with social and economical problems faced by workers and farmers of the time. These ideas seem utopian.

In addition, Tjokroaminoto's concept of the *Ummah* is vague. His argument that unity is the basic requirement of the *Ummah* is still questionable. It seems that he did not consider Indonesia a pluralistic society in terms of religion, culture and system of belief. He stated that unity is only for Muslims in line with Islam, although this raises the question, which Muslims would be included in this concept. It is undeniable that some Communists and secular nationalists were also Muslims, but they did not agree with the ideas of

Tjokroaminoto and Sarekat Islam. It seems that Tjokroaminoto's concept of the *Ummah* would create an exclusive society, meaning that the *Ummah* would only accept Muslims, according to Tjokroaminoto's explanations and understanding of what it meant to be Muslim.

It was the concept of the *Ummah* that made more sense for the religious group in Sarekat Islam, since it is mentioned in the Qur'an.² Compared to the concept of class, which was promoted by the Communists, the concept of the *Ummah* gave the religious group a sense of purpose. *Ummah*, as a concept, also took on a different meaning depending on the situation in which the concept was applied. It is clear that the concept of the *Ummah*, according to Nieuwenhuijze, is against individualism and focuses on social matters, but this could also lead to a closed society.³ Ironically, this emergence of the self-awareness of the Muslim *Ummah* resulted in the self-exile of the religious group in Sarekat Islam from politics.

Nevertheless, it would be unfair if only the criticism is directed towards Tjokroaminoto. His ideas on Islam and politics did contribute to the nationalist movement in Indonesia. His contribution was made possible by the role of Islam as a powerful binding force for the Muslim masses. Islam was an encouraging and animating factor, which played a decisive role in initiating the movement,

² Kuntowijoyo, "The Indonesian Muslim Middle Class in Search of Identity, 1910-1950," in *India and Indonesia from 1920s to the 1950s; the origins of planning*, INTINERRARIO series, No. 1 (Leiden: 1986), 10:186.

³ C.A.O. Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia*, (The Hague: N.V. Uitgeverij W. van Hoeve, 1958), 57.

although the country was still under the severe domination of a powerful and superior imperialist government.

Another contribution was his democratizing influence. The spiritual force of Islam, combined with Indonesian customs, helped to create a form of government based upon self-rule of the people, a government based upon representative institutions and an executive responsible to the people. His ideas on self-government also made the Indonesian people aware of the creation of a state consciousness, which was only one step away from a national consciousness. The idea of self-government does not work well without preparation and it requires well-educated people. This could be achieved through the application of national education that, according to him, had to contain both religious and secular subjects in order to create 'real Muslim nationalists'.

Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islamic nationalism, together with Salim and other leaders of Islamic organizations, helped to reconstruct an Islamic Nationalism in Indonesia. His thinking allowed some Muslims to build responses to the ideas of nationalism proposed by secular nationalist group in Indonesia and gave Muslim insights into how to adjust their own role in a modern state and into political practice.

In addition, the concept of the *Ummah* proposed by Tjokroaminoto would unite Muslims with 'one rope' and this also made them aware of their

political rights. Kuntowijoyo has subsequently argued that the concept of the *Ummah* indicated the change of identity of Indonesian Muslims from being *wong cilik* to becoming citizens in their own country.⁴

On the whole Tjokroaminoto's ideas on Islam and politics reflect the political condition of twentieth century Indonesia and point to the fact that he was clearly one of the important leaders of his time in the struggle against the Dutch.

⁴ Kuntowijoyo, *Paradigma Islam Interpretasi untuk Aksi*, (Jakarta: Mizan, 1991), 224-5.

GLOSSARY

abangan (Javanese)	Nominal Muslim.
adat	Tradition.
assistén-wedana	Sub-district head or chief.
acehnese	One of the ethnical groups in Indonesia.
BAS	Burgerlijke Avondschoon Afdeeling Wetuigkundige or Civil Evening School.
batik	Beautiful printed (sometimes written by hand) cloth manufactured in Indonesia.
bendoro	Title for a man in Javanese aristocratic families.
Boedi Oetomo	Nobel Endeavor; An association of Javanese character founded in Djakarta in 1908.
bupati	Regent, administrative head of <i>Kabupaten</i> or regency.
Djawa Dwipa	Javanese language reform movement against the submissiveness inherent in <i>Kromo</i> ; the language used in addressing Javanese of higher social status.
ELS	Europeesch Lagere School or European Primary School
desa	Villages.
hadith	Traditions, statements and/or actions of the Prophet.

hadji, haji	A Muslim who has accomplished the Mecca pilgrimage.
IP	Indische Partij
ISDV	Indisch Sociaal Democratische Partij (Indies' Democratic Party) established in Semarang in 1914. It developed into a Communist Party after the Russian revolution.
Comité 'Indië Weerbaar'	Committee for Defense of the Indies.
jaksa	Judicial official.
Jong Sumateran Bond	Young Sumatran Association.
jurutulis	Clerks.
kabupaten	Regencies.
kebangsaan	Nationalism.
keraton	Royal palace; usually used in Java.
kromo	A language of studied politeness, used in every relation with superiors.
kyai	Ulama, used especially in Java; also religious teacher.
madzahib	Schools of Islamic Law; in Indonesia the schools of Shafi'i is important.
minangkabauer	People in Minangkabau, one of the ethnical groups in Indonesia.
Muhammadiyah	The name of a social religious organization founded in Jogjakarta in 1912.
musyawarah	Deliberation, consultation.

NIP	Nationale Indische Partij: National Indies Party.
NU	<i>Nahdhatul Ulama</i> : Renaissance of Ulama. A traditionalist organization founded in 1926.
ningrat	An aristocratic family in Java.
ngoko	A language devoid of submissiveness.
OSVIA	Opleidingsschoolen Van Inlandsche Ambtenaren or Training School for Native Civil Servants.
PKI	Perserikatan Komunis Hindia: Communist Association of the Indies. A transformation of ISDV established in 1920.
PSII	Partai Sjarikat Islam Indonesia: Indonesian Muslim Association Party. The name of Sarekat Islam since 1929.
pangreh pradja	Local government office.
patih	Chancellor.
pesantren	Campus where religious education is given.
priyayi	Javanese nobility, usually connected with government administration.
Qur'an	The Holy Book of Muslims.
raden, raden mas	Title for a man in Javanese aristocratic family.
ratu adil	Just King (Messianic belief in Java)

SDI	Sarekat Dagang Islam: Muslim Trade Association. Founded in Solo in 1911. See also SI.
SI	Sarekat Islam: Muslim Association. A transformation of SDI in 1911. See also PSII.
STOVIA	School Tot Opleiding van Inlandsche Arsten; school for the training native doctors.
santri	Student; pupil, of a <i>pesantren</i> or religious school in Java. Also devoted Muslim.
Sarekat Islam	See SI.
sekolah desa	Village School.
Setia Oesaha	Faithful Efforts.
susuhunan	King of Surakarta.
tapanulian	People in Tapanuli, one of the ethnical groups in Indonesia.
tanzhim	Reform.
teungkus	Traditional Ulama used especially in Aceh.
ukhrawi	Eschatological matters.
ulama	Muslim scholar, especially in religion.
uleebalangs	Aristocratic leaders, used especially in Aceh.
ummah	Community; used especially with Muslims such as Muslim Ummah.
Volksraad	People Council. Established in 1918.

wedana

Head of an under-district; junior administrative officials under *patih*.

zelfbestuur

Self-government.

zakat

Alms or Charity, one of the Islamic pillars.

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