Spaces and Geographies of the "Smart Border:" Technologies and Discourses of Canada's Post-9/11 Borders

by

Aaron Andrew Gordon B.Hum (Hon)
Art History and Communication Studies
McGill University, Montreal

August 2006

A thesis submitted to McGill University in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of

Master of Arts

Your file Votre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-32520-9
Our file Notre référence
ISBN: 978-0-494-32520-9

Abstract

This study investigates Canada's border security policy, practices and technologies and the discourses in which they function, to better understand the U.S-Canadian "Smart Border" and the post-9/11 geographies of the nation-state. With the erasure of economic and military borders and the erection of new security-oriented police borders, Canada's "Smart Border" is no longer at the edges of territory but is a series of spaces reproduced in and outside of Canada through technologies such as the passport, immigration and anti-terrorism legislation, security agencies, monuments, and maps. The "Smart Border" perpetuates colonial distinctions and projects as a site of tension between the national construction of Canadian identities, policing technologies and the enforcement of a global apartheid that restricts access to political and economic resources by enforcing a regime of differential access to mobility. As a site of resistance, the "Smart Border" is also a space from which to displace colonial-national genealogies.

Résumé

Cette étude examine les politiques de sécurité de la frontière canadienne, les pratiques et les technologies et les discours qui les alimentent, afin de mieux comprendre la «frontière intelligente» canado-américaine et les géographies de l'État-nation post 11 septembre. Avec la suppression des frontières économiques et militaires au profit de nouvelles politiques frontalières de sécurité, la «frontière intelligente» s'étend à l'intérieur et à l'extérieur du Canada par diverses technologies: passeport, lois anti-terroristes et lois sur l'immigration, agences de sécurité, monuments et cartes. La «frontière intelligente» perpétue les distinctions coloniales et devient lieu de tension entre la construction intra-nationale des identités canadiennes, les technologies utilisées par la police et la mise en place d'un apartheid mondial restreignant l'accès aux ressources politiques et économiques par l'application d'un régime où tous ne peuvent se déplacer également. La «frontière intelligente» est aussi un lieu de résistance, à partir duquel sont délogées les généalogies coloniales et nationales.

Acknowledgements

I would like to wholeheartedly thank my advisors and friends Jennifer Burman and Carrie Rentschler for their guidance, encouragement and patience in bringing this project together. I wish to extend many thanks to my parents for their support and assistance over the years. Thank you to my friends in Montréal and the faculty and students at McGill's department of Art History and Communication Studies for challenging me and putting up with my ramblings. As well, I extend my gratitude to the Social Science and Humanities Research Council for bankrolling me this past year. I am also unendingly grateful to Emily Raine whose emotional support, affection and critical, intellectual combativeness allowed me to see this project to the end.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Following the events of September 11, 2001, Canada and the United States agreed to work towards creating a policing regime that would balance the needs of businesses and national security at the border. The "Smart Border Declaration" was negotiated so that border crossers could be more effectively screened without creating long line-ups at the border. Emphasis on pre-clearance and away from the border checkpoints have been the primary means, as Prime Minister Chrétien said in 2002, of keeping the "border open for business, but closed to terrorists."[1] However, if the drive behind the "Smart Border" is economic gain and political stability, then neo-liberal and national security initiatives behind the border must be understood as continuing colonial projects that still thinks according to centres and peripheries, civilization and savagery, and the racist, sexist, and classist differences that these distinctions create and maintain.[2] This study is primarily concerned with the racialized discrimination carried out on and through the neo-liberal, neo-colonial "Smart Border." To better understand this discrimination I will examine the spaces and geographies of the "Smart Border."

With international treaties and agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) cementing a global economy where multinational investment seems to know no bounds, borders are being reconfigured to accommodate the easy movement of capital around the world. This "debordering" of the world is backed by international economic and political forces that

---

[1] "Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of the Canada-U.S. Border Summit" *Office of the Prime Minister,* 9 September 2002, <http://www.pco.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=archivechretien&Sub=Speeches&Doc=border20020909_e.htm> (August 2006).

[2] Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2000), 21-2.

work with national and local groups to make the world's many regions agreeable to the demands of global capitalism.[3]

One result of this global economy and efforts to erase economic and military borders is an increase in the number of persons migrating within and across state borders as millions leave their homes because they can no longer make a living where they are or because they have been forcibly displaced. Particularly since restrictions on travel were lifted in Eastern Block countries with the dissolution of Soviet Russia, the world has witnessed unprecedented increases in the number migrating across the globe in search of work, education or to abandon areas where state and sub-national forces clash over territorial, religious, political and economic differences. In general, the trend of these migrations is a movement from the "Global South" to the "Global North" and from poor areas to affluent centres.[4]

After what can be dangerous journeys to arrive in affluent countries like Canada, most migrants are made to feel unwelcome by xenophobic citizens who accuse these migrants of stealing local jobs or abusing state welfare systems. Governments fan the flames of this xenophobia and racism with discriminatory immigration policies and border security to curry favour with their electorate. As well, in trying to keep many migrants from leaving their home countries by closing their borders, these policies and policing work to secure a supply of cheap labour in particular places around the world that can then be exploited by affluent states and, in effect, maintain a global economy that

---

[3] Peter Andreas, *Border Games* (London: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), 140-1; Avtar Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 152, 179-80; Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Afterword," in Mahasweta Devi, *Imaginary Maps,* trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (New York: Routledge, 1995), 198; Mathew Sparke, "Passports into Credit Cards," in *Boundaries and Belonging,* ed. Joel S. Migdal (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), 253.

[4] Teresa Hayter, *Open Borders* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), 8; Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 179.

sees the unequal distribution of wealth around the world. Therefore, complementing the present "debordering" of the world are efforts by states and international organizations to "reborder" the world to arrest the movement of migrants. In the words of Jaggi Singh, it is the making and maintenance of a global apartheid – a system where the rich get rich and the poor stay poor where they are.[5]

As opposed to seeing the debordering and rebordering of the world as a process of erasing borders to build them anew, a key strategy of this international and national politico-economy is the control and reconfiguration of existing borders with new technologies and discourses. As military and economic border concerns become or seem less relevant, policing is the primary technique and discourse of these new borders.[6] Technologies such as biometric scans; "smartcards;" walls; border security agencies; anti-immigration and anti-terrorism laws; and so on, support a regime of policing that responds to but also shapes the threats these borders are meant to arrest. The discourses of criminality that frame these threats, in turn, demand these policing regimes.[7]

One of the main concerns and aims of border policing is to "open" and "close" the border to the right people at the right time.[8] The new "Smart Border Declaration," a bilateral agreement signed between Canada and the U.S. in December 2001, was set up for this very purpose. Framed in the security language of post-9/11 anti-terrorism, the "Smart Border Declaration" is meant to create a "zone of confidence" that will securely facilitate the "free flow of people and commerce" in a world under threat from terrorists.

---

[5] Jaggi Singh is an activist researcher and co-ordinator for *Solidarity Across Borders* and *No One Is Illegal.* Cf. Anthony H. Richardson, *Global Apartheid* (Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1994) xiv-xv; Hayter, *Open Borders,* 2; Daniel Drache, *Borders Matter* (Halifax: Fernwood Pub., 2004), 23; Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 199-201.

[6] Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the line," *International Security* 28, 2 (Fall 2003), 78.

[7] Andreas, *Border Games,* 7.

[8] Raka Shome, "Smart Matters," *Communication Theory* 13, 1 (February 2003), 52; Sparke, "Passports into Credit Cards," 260.

To do this, both federal governments will work together to coordinate and share information and resources so as to police these flows and build a "secure infrastructure" through which joint policing will function.[9] The Canadian and U.S. governments hope that this border will be a border for the "21st century;" a border of the future that will keep terrorists out and stabilize Canadian and U.S. interests in an emerging world geography in which the very limits of territorial sovereignty are being redefined. Not the least of the changes wrought by border security is the redrawing of distinctions between foreign and national interests as the lines distinguishing inside from outside the territory become blurred.

Given the massive amounts of resources allocated by the government to police its borders, one would believe that Canada is threatened with the lion's share of the world's displaced people. As of 1999, North America was exposed to only about five percent of the total number of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced person in the world.[10] Teresa Hayter points-out that although many migrants aim to make it to the "Global North" or affluent centres, most end up in neighbouring states or in refugee camps in their home countries.[11] Indeed, this relatively small percentage of migrants making it to North America is not due to the continent's geographic distance from the primary source countries for migration but shows the success of restrictive immigration policies. The high cost of immigrating to Canada prevents many who would otherwise have qualified under the immigration "points" system from applying to immigrate to Canada. As such, many migrants cannot come to Canada through "regular" government-approved channels.

---

[9] "Smart Border Declaration" *DFAIT*, 12 December 2001, <http://www.dfait.gc.ca/can-am/main/border/smart_border_declaration-en.asp> (August 2006).
[10] Anthony H. Richmond, "Global Apartheid" *Refuge* 19, no.4 (February 2001), 9.
[11] Hayter, *Open Borders,* 8.

One of the primary aims of the "Smart Border" is to reduce the number of migrants who are smuggled into Canada or arrive using false documents so as to limit access to Canada's refugee determination system and the "back door" to Canadian citizenship. As opposed to seeing border security as a new and independent operation, national security and immigration policy work together. As I will show, "Smart Border" policing can only function within a regime of powers and procedures for detaining and deporting migrants legitimated under the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* and *Anti-terrorism Act.*

Given Canada's concern with refugees, there are limits to applying the majority of current border studies' scholarship that focuses on the U.S.-Mexico border – a border many scholars use metonymically to address global inequalities – to Canada's borders.[12] This does not mean that much of what has been written about the drug and labour economies of the U.S.-Mexico border cannot be applied to the U.S.-Canadian border. Indeed, the examinations of racist narratives of contamination and chaos that surround Mexican migration to the U.S. are helpful in framing similar responses towards refugees and "illegal immigrants" in Canada.[13] So too are political economies of American border policing and security agencies a good foil for understanding the powers of the post-September 11th Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA) and Public Security and Preparedness Canada (PSEPC). However, these two North American borders are very different borders.

Within border studies the growing literature concerning the European Union's (E.U.) borders broadens the focus of border scholarship. Comparative examinations

---

[12] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 199-200;
[13] Cf. Shome " Space matters," 39-56; Maria V. Ruiz, "Border Narratives," *Feminist Media Studies* 2, no.1. (2002), 37-62; Lisa A. Flores, "Constructing Rhetorical Borders," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 20, no.4. (December 2003), 362-87, Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 200-2.

between the U.S.-Mexican border and the E.U.'s borders and the Schengen Agreement that secures them are invaluable in grasping strategies of newly emerging "thick" (away from the border) and "thin" (on the border) border policing.[14] Indeed, my understanding of the political, economic and racialized construction of the Canada-U.S. border and Canadian border policy situates the "Smart Border" within these two models. However, there are a number of concerns that need to be addressed when it comes to understanding Canada's borders within a border studies discipline dominated by North American (primarily U.S.) and European models.

Much of the literature concerning the "Smart Border" and Canada's border policies fit the "Smart Border" within European and U.S.-Mexico border framework. Canadian studies scholar and political scientist Daniel Drache incriminates the "Smart Border" policy, pointing to the racial discrimination of Bill C-36, Canada's *Anti-Terrorism Act,* and the 2002 "Safe Third Country Agreement."[15] Underlying Drache's critique is a narrative of U.S. pressure and coercion that is forcing Canada to align its policies with the more discriminatory American immigration and national security policies. It leads Drache to ask, "Are we in charge of our side of the border any longer? Can we be? What policies and models of the border are best suited to *our* needs?"[16] As much as I appreciate Drache's critique I am concerned about whose needs are considered "*our* needs" when Canadian sovereignty and other needs are framed as primarily anti-American in nature.

I am unconvinced that an anti-American framing of Canadian border policy does not necessarily provide a foundation from which the current global apartheid can be

---

[14] Andreas, *Border Games,* 138-9.
[15] Drache, *Borders Matter,* 9, 115.
[16] Ibid., 3 (emphasis added).

disrupted or displaced. Indeed, an anti-American thesis creates many impediments for those demanding that a Canadian border policy abide by social justice principles. In his book on the Canadian-U.S. border, Canadian leftist political scientist James Laxer complements Drache's thesis and critiques the increased discrimination towards immigrants as the result of this alignment of Canada and U.S. policy through the "Smart Border Declaration." Laxer tells us that this discrimination is anti-Canadian, as historically Canada has always been more welcoming than the U.S. [17] Laxer believes Canadians are being taken unawares toward "Fortress North America." By way of waking Canadians up, Laxer wants Canadians to remember that Canada is:

> ...a deeply loved, but still unknown, country. It is North American, having thrown off European modes of judging people according to their accents and other external cultural trappings. In the vastness of our country, we have no appetite for empire. Canada is a country of generous space, and that space is not merely physical, although physical space should never be discounted as a factor in making us who we are. The deepest instinct of Canadians is towards tolerance, towards acceptance that no single synthesis that works for everyone is available among cultures and lifestyles.... Among all nations of this hemisphere, Canada has been the most successful in creating an egalitarian life for its people... Canada is one of the few countries on earth in which all of the elements needed to create a civilization are present.[18]

Reading Laxer's anti-American sentiment and his panegyric on Canadianness together I am unwilling to just dismiss his thesis for creating a "Canadian" border as simply "irrational Anti-Americanism."[19] I am also unwilling to accept his call for a Canadian border. Instead, I am intrigued by Laxer's interweaving of geographical, social

---

[17] James Laxer, *The Border* (Toronto: Double Day, 2003), 252, 256. For similar views regarding a comparatively more open Canadian immigration policy, cf., Erin Kruger *et al,* "Canada After 11 September" *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15, 4 (2004), 72, 76, 85.
[18] Laxer, *The Border,* 323.
[19] Cf. Fred McMahon ["Malign Sense of Sovereignty," *SAIS Review* (Summer-Fall 2005) p.116] for a neo-conservative critique of leftist Canadian anti-American nationalism. Interestingly, such critiques are not outside an anti-American discourse but function within it by framing their political and economic projects of deeper integration with the U.S. as a moderate anti-anti-Americanism.

and political expressions to create a complex anti-American, Canadian nationalist conjuring of the border. I am intrigued because this nationalist border recreates the divisions that fundamentally create and separate a Global "North" and "South" while purporting to offer an alternative to the U.S.-created world of inequalities.

The problematics posed by anti-Americanism are complex. If, in answer to Drache's question "What policies and models of the border are best suited to *our* needs?" we oppose *ourselves* to the U.S. and view discrimination as an American influence, a history of racist Canadian border and immigration policies that worked to "keep Canada white" is obfuscated and often lost in calls for a truly Canadian border. In this anti-American centred discourse, authors like Laxer resurrect a truly Canadian ethos that hails all Canadians as equal persons and, thus, persons equally Canadian and invested in Canada. Occluded by the need to mobilize true Canadians are the very inequalities among Canadians created by truly Canadian policy. According to Laxer the increasing inequalities between "Global North" and "Global South" – inequalities in which Canada is implicated as part of the "Global North" – were done while Canadians were asleep at the wheel so to speak. Canada can work for equality globally only when Canadians remember and revive a national spirit. The need to unite as racially, gendered and sexually indeterminate Canadians against this national and international problem silences those who would impede this project by contesting the claims of an innately just and indiscriminate Canada. Laxer and other nationalists' calls for a revived division between Canada and the U.S. reify both a homogeneous nation-state, and insist on a Canada that speaks as one voice: *our*. The reforms demanded by Laxer do not admit non-nationalist

voices and continues to silence those who belong to the "Global South" and "Third World" parts of Canada.

Working within European and U.S. dominated border discourses also limits the appeal to alternative geographies of Canada. Working from Laxer's panegyric of Canada, a Canada that is neither European in its North Americanness nor American in its Canadianness appears to be a wholly new Canada. In effect, Laxer is asking Canadians to reject the "Smart Border" – a border tied to both European and American designs – so Canadians can realize the possibilities of this newness. This idea of newness compliments narratives of progress in which Canada will transcend its own colonial history of oppressing aboriginal populations without actually working towards ending, or even calling for an end to, that oppression. This transcendence neither provides a space for critiques of Canada's exclusive and racist immigration policies, nor addresses non-white, non-European immigrants only recently allowed to immigrate as agents in building and protesting Canada. Canada's newness, in Laxer's nationalist thesis, is still defined according to Eurocentric ideal of "civilization" that erases non-European agency in founding Canada, and marginalizes histories of dissent to the colonial nation-state project. As Eva Mackey writes: "It is [the nationalist's] historically constituted authority to define when and how others may be similar *or* different that people defended with the discourses of reason, rationality, equality and progress."[20] As such, within Laxer's rallying cry we can hear the expression of a complex post-colonial nationalism that perpetuates neo-colonial power relations.

Anti-American Canadian nationalism has a long history that begins with the "Canada First Movement;" a pro-British group active in the latter half of the nineteenth

[20] Eva Mackey, *House of Difference* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2002), 161.

century. The "Canada First Movement" constructed Canada as the strong and robust North against a weak and degenerate U.S. South.[21] Within this anti-American discourse the Eurocentrism of "North" and "Canadianness" persisted unmentioned against a demonized America. Today, an anti-American Canadian nationalism is not limited to "North" and "South' but, as Laxer's example shows, takes many variable forms that interweave geography and narratives of progress with political philosophies of sovereignty and ideas of cultural and social distinctiveness to create a Canada that is neither American nor European but still bound up in Eurocentric histories and geographies. Thus, when using Euro- and North American-centric models of borders, we must listen for and rally against the echoes of colonial projects and desires in framing a "Canadian" border.

When framing the "Smart Border" we must be alert to a Canadian border of margins and a marginalized Canadian border. A Canadian border that continues a Eurocentric discourse of "reason, rationality, equality and progress" recreates world geographies of centres and margins, re-centring a homogeneous nation and the idea of a uniform national space. At the same time, an anti-American Canadian nationalist border marginalizes a history of colonial violence and racialized inequality perpetuated by Canada's immigration and national security policies. Neither a border of margins nor a marginalized border are spaces across which and through radical, post-colonial solidarities can be formed and social justice take root. My project will consider how geographies of social justice can be built that contest the U.S.-Canadian "Smart Border."

The result of this border of margins and marginalized borders are politics of a nationalized "Third Space," a politics that counters the productivity and possibilities

[21] Ibid., 30.

Homi Bhabha attributes to the enunciation of a radical Third Space. The Third Space is "an intervention" Bhabha writes, that "challenges our sense of historical identity or culture as a homogenizing, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past, [and] kept alive in the national tradition of the People."[22] In postcolonial critiques such as Bhabha's, framing the border as a Third Space opens up the border as a space *in between* and *hybrid* space from which a Eurocentric colonialism and capitalism can be displaced.[23] The border as a radical Third Space is a space from which we can begin to envision "national, anti-national histories of the 'people,'"[24] histories of anti-colonial agency and alternative geographies of the nation.

However, as a nationalized space the Third Space of the border, as Himani Bannerji and others would argue, is an ideology similar to a Canadian multicultural policy.[25] Like multiculturalism, the nationalist border is a "progressivist" space in which the practice of racism "was/is somehow conducted 'unintentionally' or, alternatively, with 'the best intentions.'"[26] The border as a nationalized Third Space separates communities within and without Canada according to ethnicist notions of heritage and originary pasts, creating centred "white" nation-cultures and fragmented, peripheral and "non-white" multi-cultures.[27] Like the discourse of multiculturalism, the "unintentional" and "the best intentions" of nationalist agents protects these same agents from charges of actively working for, and even desiring, their privileged place within this geography of inequality and violence.

---

[22] Homi K. Bhabha, "Commitment to Theory," in *Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 53-6.
[23] Edward W. Soja, *Third Space* (London: Blackwell Pub., 1996), 125-6.
[24] Bhabha, "Commitment to Theory," 56.
[25] Himani Bannerji, "Paradox of Diversity" in *Dark Side of the Nation* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2000), 17-55; Kogila Moodley "Canadian multiculturalism as ideology" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6, 3 (July 1983), 320-31
[26] Radhika Viyas Mongia "Race, Nation, Mobility," *Public Culture* 11, 13. (1999), 546.
[27] Bannerji, "Paradox of Diversity," 41-55.

As I discuss further in Chapter Two, the nationalized Third Space uses the language of conditional hospitality, the language of a host who does not wish to relinquish control of the house in the company of guests. In this framework, the host invents and controls the distinctions between host and guest and attempts to maintain the social relations that permit guests to remain here in Canada but prevents guests from making any claim to being Canadian. The intelligent technologies and secure future that the "Smart Border" promises buttresses this hospitality, and it is in this framework of host and guest that the detainment of non-citizens for indeterminate periods of time and the deportation orders handed down by judges who acquiesce to the secrecy and suspicions of national security are being carried out. It is this framework that the very term "Smart Border" is offensive.

Given the dearth of existing analysis of borders, immigration, technology and space – although not all analyses are concerned with any more than one of these topics – my project applies several methodologies conjointly. The foundational critiques of racism and violence carried out at the Canadian border and through immigration and national security policies were worked out through engagements with the scholarly activism of Himani Bannerji, Eva Mackey, and Sherene Razack and their analyses of Canada's political, cultural, and social economies. Although Bannerji, Mackey and Razack's interventions into Canadian politics, law and culture are not entirely congruent, their attacks against the practices and discourses of the colonial, settler nation-state of Canada outline the need to fracture nationalisms "from above" to create nationalisms

"from below" built on a politics of solidarity that contests the divisive communities perpetuated by the state.[28]

In the first chapter, I use Michel Foucault's term "governmentality" to characterize technologies of the state employed at the border and the discourses in which these technologies function. "Technology," here, encompasses institutions as well as the products of these institutions so that both the passport and Passport Canada, or detention centres and the CBSA, are technologies of the state.[29] With regard to investigating these technologies my analysis crystallizes around critiques of nationalist discourses of ethnic and political congruency that enunciate a nation-and-state totality,[30] and discourses of risk and surveillance outlined by Ulrich Beck and David Lyon that construct these technologies in terms of security and policing. My investigation into the spaces of the "Smart Border" follows from Henri Lefebvre's conception of space as the product of social relations and the ideologies of class, race, gender, sexuality and so on that

---

[28] Himani Bannerji, "A Question of Silence," in *Dark Side of the Nation* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2000), 158. I am also indebted to the activist scholarship of groups such as *No One Is Illegal* (NOII) and *Solidarity Across Borders* (SAB). I believe the demands of NOII and SAB complement and dialogue well with Bannerji, Mackey and Razack's scholarly activism. Cf., "About Us, Our Demands," *No One Is Illegal,* <http://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/about> (August 2006) for NOII's demands:

-National Regularization Program for non-status people;
-An end to detentions and deportations;
-An immediate end to security certificates and secret trials;
-An end to racial or religious profiling;
-Recognition of the right to free movement;
-Recognition of Indigenous sovereignty;

[29] Technologies are similar to what Foucault would call a "regime of practices" with "practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect" [Foucault, "Governmentality" in *Foucault Effect* eds. Graham Burchell *et al.* (Toronto: Harvester Weathersheaf, 1991), 81].

[30] Given the dearth of analysis concerning the hyphen of the nation-state – a hyphen that separates and sutures the divide between culture, ethnicity, and emotional sentiment *and* politics, bureaucracy and rationality – I am drawn by the grammatical model of nation-and-state. This model plays off of Mathew Sparke's configuration of Nation-(and)-State which he uses to intervene in the incompleteness of the link between nation and state but also the incompleteness of both nation and state as separate but joined projects [Mathew Sparke, *In the Space of Theory* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2005), xi-xvii]. This configuration also plays with the hyphen that has been so prominent in discussion of Canadian multicultural identity [Cf. Monica Kin Gagnon, "Can-Asian, eh?" in *Other Conundrums.* Vancouver: Arsenal Pulp Press, 2000, 127-43].

condition these relations.[31] What I call the "deterritorialized" space of the "Smart Border" in Chapter One is the product of capitalist and neo-colonial social relations at play within the "time-space compression" of late capitalism in which physical space is reconfigured by communication and information technologies that transmit information across physical space to the point of nullifying the limitations of distance.[32]

In Chapter Two, I take up the overlapping discourses of nation-and-state and geographies of the "Smart Border." My analyses in this chapter are, in part, guided by critical geographers and historians of cartography David Harvey and Brian J. Harley and their political and economic readings of modern geographical sciences, maps and map-making. I also take from post-colonial critiques made by Walter Mignolo, José Rabasa and Thongchai Winichakul, who address the racial, colonial and historical implications of colonial-turned-national globalized geographies. By focusing on the discourses behind the map produced by the CBSA (Image 1), I employ a form of "border thinking" that I believe will provide what Mignolo calls "the moments in which the imaginary of the modern world system cracks."[33] To do this, I address and apply Bhabha's notion of the stereotype to better understand this modern geographical and cartographical "imagination," in order to create what Avtar Brah would call a "diaspora space" and, what I, after Bhabha, call a radical Third Space of the border.

I wrote the following chapters as two distinct essays and, as such, Chapter Two does not directly follow from or address all the points raised in Chapter One. I will address and flesh out the links between the two chapters in the Conclusion. As well, although I show that the historical precedents for the present anti-terrorism government

---

[31] Henri Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* trans. Donald Nicholson Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 85.
[32] David Harvey, *Conditions of Postmodernism* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 2006), 240-2.
[33] Mignolo, *Local Histories,* 23.

strategies and policies cannot be limited to a post-9/11 time frame, my primary concern and the focus in this thesis is to understand the latest constellation of policy and racism in Canada so that Canadian racism can be displaced. Indeed, a great deal of effort has been expended by many world leaders in the years after the attacks to frame 9/11 in such a way as to make it intelligible within, and to support, continuing colonial projects.

In post-9/11Canada there have been and continue to be political matters that effect border security that make the task of putting the blame on the Canadian government difficult. Not the least of these matters concern changes to Canadian governmental ministries and ministers with the transitions from a Jean Chrétien to a Paul Martin Liberal government and then from Liberal to Conservative governments in January 2006. Although my examination is not framed according to party politics or a single party's policies, I am cognisant of the fact that Canada-U.S. relations under the Conservative government has altered the discourse of "friendship" between these two countries. However, neo-colonial border security policies are neither the outcome of one party and not the others, nor can they be critically evaluated by limiting them to a spectrum of party politics. While I do not overlook what some would consider the serious limitations to my project of not comparing the policies and agreements signed by the Liberals after 9/11 against the current changes to immigration and national security policy under the Conservatives, this thesis addresses the political context and security practices prior to the elections in 2006.

That said, the arrest of seventeen men on terrorism-related charges in and around Toronto in June of 2006 needs to be addressed because it is a twist on the narrative and geography of border security that I work out in the following chapters. This twist – not to

be confused with an about-face of policies and discourses – is what many are calling a wake-up call for Canadians about the threat of "homegrown" terrorism. "Homegrown" is a complex term that, when it comes to defining terrorism in Canada, refers to events happening within the Canadian territory by persons born here but in a manner different from how other things "homegrown" are discussed. For starters, "homegrown" does not mean that these men are carrying out a Canadian brand of terrorism like, to take one example, our "homegrown" comedians dish out a Canadian style of comedy. Instead, "homegrown" terrorism is largely viewed as the result of outside influences and forces taking seed in Canada.[34]

Since these arrests, a great deal of public discussion has focused on figuring out how these Canadians came to want to take up a foreign brand of terrorism. Who or what is to blame for these events? Are the accused to be blamed? Is Islam or Islamic fundamentalism to blame for perpetuating violence and hate? Are Canada and Canadian immigration policies to blame for isolating and marginalizing Muslim communities in Canada and thus limiting the access these communities have to economic and social resources? Or, regarding Canadian policy, have Canadians been too welcoming and trusting? Has a blind faith in state multiculturalism allowed the wrong people in to Canada?

In a recent talk at McGill University, Sherene Razack considered this sentiment of a naïve and trusting Canada and the condemnation of multiculturalism it has wrought. As

---

[34] "Actual and Potential Links Between Terrorism and Criminality" *CSIS*, 12 July 2006, <http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-5.asp> (August 2006). Cf. Prime Minister Steven Harper's speech marking the arrests: "*We* are a target because of who *we* are and how *we* live, *our* society, *our* diversity and *our* values...*Their* alleged target was Canada: Canadian institutions, the Canadian economy, the Canadian people" ["Overview" *CBC Online*, 4 August 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/toronto-bomb-plot/index.html> (August 2006). emphasis added].

someone who has been and remains very vocal concerning the inequalities perpetuated through multiculturalism and other discourses of Canadian "benevolence" towards non-white, non-European immigrants, Razack points out that the right-wing critiques of multiculturalism's failure to impede terrorism does not disrupt but, indeed, continues the racist Eurocentrism that underwrites state multiculturalism. Both state multiculturalist discourse and these recent critiques are narratives of a Canada that is first and foremost "white" and of European descent. In this sense, the distinction between "Canadian" and "homegrown" terrorism reproduces a definitively "white" Canada and reinforces the unbroken borderline that Eurocentric nationalists draw around the Canadian territory to divide it from the rest of a chaotic world. Cries condemning this line's ineffectiveness and demanding yet another line to stave off mounting pressures pushing in on Canada obfuscates and perpetuates the colonial divisions border maintains. The following chapters consider what this tracing and retracing of colonial borders has wrought and how such lines might be displaced.

Chapter One

"The Canadian Passport: A Trusted Document" Motto of Passport Canada

In this chapter I examine Canada's post-9/11 border security regime of practices to better understand the series of spaces that make-up the "Smart Border." This chapter is in three parts: the first part analyzes a history of the passport in Canada to better grasp the biometrics of the current passport; the second part critiques the overlapping agendas of Canada's immigration and national security policies to identify the discourses that underwrite "smart" border policing; and in the third part I characterize and comment on the type of spaces being constructed through "Smart Border" technologies. I show how these border spaces are both new by differing physically from the territorial limits of former nation-state borderlines, and old by reproducing the racialized differences of colonial-national social relations.

On Monday September 9, 2002 Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and United States President George W. Bush met at the Detroit-Windsor border crossing to discuss U.S.-Canadian relations and border security. On this day, two days shy of the one-year anniversary of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, these two leaders delivered speeches framed in post-9/11 rhetoric of securing the world from terrorist threats. Among other issues, Prime Minister Chrétien's speech mentions the expansion and improvements to the NEXUS program, one of the security initiatives outlined in the bilateral 30 point "Smart Border Action Plan" signed in December 2001. On this day

Jean Chrétien announced that the U.S-Canadian "Smart Border" was" a border that is open for business, but closed to terrorists."[1]

What do the phrases "open for business" and "closed to terrorists," mean? If "closed to terrorists" means that the border will arrest the movement of terrorists going from one country to the next, this claim must be understood within a framework in which neither Canada nor the U.S. at the time perceived terrorism to be a "homegrown" threat.[2] Terrorism and the terrorist were something and someone that comes from elsewhere. Closing the border to terrorists meant preventing terrorists from attacking the U.S. through Canada and vice versa. Closing the border to terrorists was probably the PM's way of addressing the allegations of U.S. administrators that the 9/11 hijackers entered the U.S. through Canada. The PM may also have been promising that there would be no more Ahmed Ressams, the "Millennium Bomber" who tried to smuggle explosives from Canada into the U.S. to blow up the Los Angeles Airport on January 1, 2000.

As part of Canada's Bill C-36, the *Anti-terrorism Act* passed in 2001, closing the border to terrorism has meant compiling a list of charities and individuals believed to fund terrorists and then freezing their assets. In this way, Bill C-36 distinguishes the "illegitimate" business of terrorism from other "legitimate" international businesses, and allows only the latter to benefit from the cross-border transportation infrastructure like the tunnels and bridges of the "Windsor-Detroit Gateway." However, post-9/11 anti-terrorist security checks carried out at border crossings resulted in increased wait times

---

[1] "Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien."

[2] The distinction of "homegrown" terrorists, since the arrest of 17 individuals in June 2006 on terrorist related charges, is a confusing term. None of the papers I read called these men "Canadian" terrorists but, instead, questioned Canada's multiculturalism policy and Canadian "tolerance" for allowing terrorists to come to Canada and recruit. In effect, even though there are "homegrown" terrorists, Canada is not necessarily a place in which terrorism is taking root but is a place where terrorist groups operate.

for border crossers. The new "Smart Border" security measures the P.M. introduces in his speech are meant to ensure, among other things, that the just-in-time auto industry production schedules that account for much of Southern Ontario and Michigan's economies continues to function. Reinstituting NEXUS – a fast-lane program that expedites border-crossing times for registered members – is good news for the legitimate businesses that count on a fast and efficient border to carry out business. Thus, although the language of the "Smart Border" is security-oriented, the economic interests of the capitalist state are a priority. As the PM says, the "Smart Border" will permit "businesses to get back to business."[3]

In his speech, the PM makes the cross-border economy understandable by figuratively referring to the Ambassador Bridge that connects Detroit and Windsor. This bridge allows the many millions of dollars of capital to cross the border daily and, when this flow of capital is reliable and expedient, the bridge exemplifies the good order and strength of this cross-border economy. With the disruptions that have occurred as a result of increased policing, the "Smart Border Declaration" is going to put the bridge back in good order. A border that is "open for business" is, above all, a border that is back in business. The business of the "Smart Border" is efficiency and order, and is a regime that keeps goods and people moving *and* stops terrorism. The business of the U.S.-Canadian "Smart Border" is to arrest some and make "fast-lanes" for others or, in other words, open and close the border at the same time.

The border will have to be "smart" to be open and closed at the right times and for the correct persons. To be and do as much the "Smart Border" is not limited to border crossings or other points along the international boundary line. The four priorities of this

[3] "Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien."

declaration: The Secure Flow of People; The Secure Flow of Goods; Secure Infrastructure; and the Coordination and Information Sharing in the Enforcement of these Objectives, will be carried out in spaces away from border bridges and the 49th parallel. Security checks carried out away from the border, and a variety of new technologies used by agencies like Passport Canada will prevent terrorists from reaching the border and reduce the chance of there being any more Ahmed Ressams obtaining a Canadian passport with a forged birth certificate and entering the U.S.[4]

In no small way is the "smart" of the "Smart Border" a matter of better and more intelligent technologies. The ability to police the border at and away from the borderline will be facilitated by new high-tech security devices. Indeed, the border will be redrawn in these other spaces through these technologies. "Smart" also characterizes the various institutions that are working to "smarten" up the border. As much as "smart" policing refers to the use of this technology, but security agencies are only able to act "smart" in a field of laws passed in the wake of September 11th. In fact, the "Smart Border" demands, and can only function within these new security oriented policies.

In light of the intersection of technologies and laws, the "Smart Border" is what Michel Foucault would call a new "regime of practices" with "practices being understood here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the planned and the taken for granted meet and interconnect."[5] The "Smart Border" is a technique of Canadian "governmentality," a science of political economy of the networks of "continuous and multiple relations between populations, territory and wealth"

---

[4] Brian D. Salter *Rights of Passage* (London: Lynne Rienner Pub. Inc., 2003), 35.
[5] Michel Foucault, "Governmentality," 81. CF. Craig Robertson, "Ritual of Verification?" in *Thinking With James Carey,* eds. Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson (New York: Peter Land, 2006), 178.

employed by a government to intervene into the economy and population.[6] As an examination of a Canadian governmentality, in this chapter I will outline the new networks between populations, territory and wealth in the deterritorialized[7] space of the "Smart Border."

By first examining a history of the passport in Canada, the Canadian passport and the international politics in which it operates and then considering Bill C-11, the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*, Bill C-36, the *Anti-Terrorism Act*, and the new cadre of security agencies, in this chapter I will outline the regime of practices that comprise Canada's national security policies and procedures and the discourses of power that underwrite them. I will show how this regime of practices is set up to limit the access non-white, non-Europeans have to Canada's territory and to restrict their legal rights when in Canada. Although this type of "national security" is neither new nor limited to Canada, these "regime of practices" are key to Canada's role in the international system responsible for the current economic and political "global apartheid" – securing the unequal division of wealth in the world by maintaining a system of differential access to international mobility.[8] As such, I will trace a genealogy of Canadian border security that takes it out of 9/11's shadow to consider the manner in which national security perpetuates a "rule of colonial difference." The third part of this chapter examines the space of the border and how the border is deterritorialized and reterritorialized through security technologies, techniques and policies of national

---

[6] Foucault, "Governmentality," 101.
[7] Through this chapter I use the term "deterritorialization" in somewhat of a literal sense to mean to detach or remove from the physical territory. As I discuss at the end of this chapter, in being de-territorialized the border changes in what can be described as both an expansion and fragmentation of border policing. The meaning of "deterritorialization" in this chapter is to be distinguished from a Deleuzean deterritorialization that is taken up in the conclusion to this thesis.
[8] Richardson, *Global Apartheid,* xiv-xv; Hayter, *Open Borders,* 2. Drache, *Borders Matter,* 23.

security. In this section, I will show that the spaces of the "Smart Border" can rightfully be called national spaces even while they participate in global networks that disturb the national geographic boundaries of Canada. In short, I will show that the new business of the "Smart Border" is, in many ways, the same old business of Canada's borders: to keep Canada "white."[9]

Bridges, Boats and the Canadian Passport

According to Jean Chrétien, the Ambassador Bridge means a lot to Canadians and Canadian-American relations, spanning as it does not just economic partners but "two great cities - Detroit and Windsor - two great peoples and two great nations."[10] This bridge has contributed to the friendship of these "two great nations" and is, indeed, a sign of this friendship. In the spirit of the PM's speech, policing the flows of people and goods across the border is being done to make this friendship stronger.[11]

The Ambassador Bridge is an impressive structure. For two brief years after its completion it was the world's longest suspension bridge and, for better or worse, this hulking mass of metal is visible from almost anywhere in Windsor. Still, with so much talk of bridges and friendship the mention of boats is conspicuously absent. I am interested in boats, and this lack of attention paid to them in discussing border policing

---

[9] Deputy-Minister of Labour and future Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King said in 1908: "...that Canada should remain a white man's country is believed to be not only desirable for economic and social reasons but highly necessary on political and national grounds." "Canadian Opinion of Immigrants," *Marianopolis College,* May 2006 <http://www2.marianopolis.edu/quebechistory/readings/CanadianOpinionsofImmigrants.html> (August 2006).

[10] "Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien."

[11] Jean Chrétien is not alone in lauding the Ambassador Bridge. The bridge's name was chosen by the bridge's promoter, Joseph Bowler, who saw the bridge in a diplomatic light and as a means of strengthening the links between countries and friends. [in Robert M. Stamp *Bridging the Border* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1992), p.98] An inscription etched on either side of the bridge reads: "The visible expression of friendship in the hearts of two peoples with like ideas and ideals." [Patricia Zacharias, "The building of the Ambassador Bridge" *The Detroit News,* <http://info.detnews.com/history/story/index.cfm?id=13&category=business> (August 2006)].

because it is with the safer, faster and more economical transoceanic travel ushered in by the steamship that the Canadian government first stumbled into the world of international affairs and issues of national security.[12] If bridges are particular to Canadian-American friendship then boats – and now airplanes – speak to Canada's relations with places farther a field and efforts to bring about greater immigration controls. In short, if border bridges are a testament to inter-national friendship, then boats speak to what Himani Bannerji calls the "dark side" of the nation in which "dark" refers to both the lives of non-white Canadians and the shadowy-side of Canadian nationalism tied to colonial and racist ideologies.[13]

Boats from India, not bridges to the U.S., spurred Canada's desire for immigration control. Radhika Viyas Mongia traces the demand for a passport regime in Canada to the Laurier government's efforts in the first years of the twentieth century to arrest the flows of Indians coming to Canada.[14] The Laurier government proposed and developed several strategies for preventing Indian immigration, including the requirement of a passport for Indian migrants coming to Canada and the mandatory possession of two hundred dollars upon arrival in Canada. These demands may seem comparably insignificant coming at a time when Canada enforced a five hundred dollar Chinese head tax and, later, the outright ban on Chinese migration. But, unlike restrictions placed on Chinese migrants, Canada's demand for a passport regime contradicted the idea of the universal "British subject, " a

---

[12] Mongia, "Race, Nationality, Mobility," 536.
[13] Himani Bannerji, "On the Dark Side of the Nation," in *Dark Side of the Nation* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2000), 87-124.
[14] Mongia, "Race, Nationality, Mobility," 533-4

person who could travel freely within the empire and who was, ideally anyways, Indian as well as Canadian.[15]

Although the demand for passports went against the spirit of universal equality enjoyed by imperial subjects, it certainly did not go against the practice of restricting the movements of colonials – particularly non-white, non-European colonials – by both the colonies and metropole.[16] However, the demand for passports and attempts to establish an immigration policy also contravened colonial politics in which Canada's foreign policy and international interests came under the rubrics of the Colonial Office in London. Even Canada's trade and border negotiations with the United States were negotiated through London.[17] By attempting to arrest Indian migration, Canada was overstepping its colonial bounds. This is not to say that the plight of the Canadian government in this matter fell on deaf or unsympathetic white, British ears in India or elsewhere in the Empire. However, the Canadian government was counseled to come up with other means of exclusion that would not appear to be racially motivated even though the racist beliefs of the English and French Canadian communities towards "Orientals," and a desire to keep Canada "white," motivated Indian, Chinese and other exclusions.[18]

Mongia points to two results of the Laurier government's negotiations for an Indian passport: first, Canada learned to act and, indeed, began to act internationally.

---

[15] Despite certain Chinese ports being under British control there was a great deal of ambiguity and inconsistency in recognizing the Chinese as "British subjects." As well, the marginalized position of Chinese leaders in international affairs reduced the risk of international upset with the imposition of Chinese exclusion (Daniel Gorman "Wider and Wider Still?" *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 3, no.3, 12-3).

[16] Gorman, "Wider and Wider Still?" 15.

[17] Cf., "Relations with Americans" *DFAIT,* 11 February 2003, <http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/department/history/canada3-en.asp> (August 2006).

[18] Mongia "Race, Nation, Mobility," 538. Cf. Ali Kazimi, *Continuous Journey,* (Toronto: VTape, 2005); Himani Bannerji, "Geography Lesson" in *Dark Side of the Nation,* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2000) 65, 77-8, 106; Sherene H. Razack, "Making Canada White" *CJLS* 14, no.1 (Spring 1999), 161.

Managing the migration of Indians instigated "the eruption and use of a variety of mechanisms for generating, obtaining, and collating knowledge on every aspect of the movement of Indians to Canada."[19] This knowledge and the apparatuses created to acquire and use it, allowed the Canadian government to manoeuvre within and also get around the restraints (i.e., universal equality) of the British imperial system. The passport proposal, although it was never carried out, was a hands-on learning experience of how to rule. With knowledge-in-hand, so to speak, Canada passed the "Continuous Journey" requirement that stated "immigrants may be prohibited landing, unless they come from [their] country of birth or citizenship by continuous journey, and on through tickets purchased before starting." With the liberty the word "may" afforded, the force of law behind this requirement created "legitimate" grounds to refuse entry to Indians, while in its enforcement the law was never applied to white, European immigrants.[20]

The second result of these negotiations was the construction and use of "culture" and "nation" to enforce racial distinctions and discrimination.[21] To distinguish individuals according to "national" origins was a means of differentiating within the universal category of "British subject" and discriminate against non-white British subjects according to place of birth without ever having to mention race. The distinction of "nationality," as Etienne Balibar would note in this case, continues racist conduct although it does not work from a biological notion of race.[22] Canada's policing of race according to "national" and "cultural" criteria was and remains a form of differential racism. At the turn of the twentieth century, and with its strong British sympathies, the

---

[19] Mongia "Race, Nation, Mobility," 539.
[20] Mongia, "Race, Nationality, Mobility," 545; Kazimi, *Continuous Journey.*
[21] Ibid., 529. Cf. Bannerji, "Paradox of Diversity" 51-2 for the continuance of this "culturalism" within a multicultural Canada.
[22] Etienne Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in *Race, Nation, Class,* 22.

desire for a Canadian nation was less about asserting Canadian sovereignty in the face of English interests than it was a strategy to continue colonial, racist politics in a post-colonial world that professed a belief in universal, human equality.[23] Constructing a Canadian nation-state within a discourse of culture facilitated what Partha Chatterjee calls "the rule colonial difference" – the enforcement of racialized distinctions and hierarchies between colonial subjects under, and in-spite-of, the insistence of a universal, imperial subject – to operate within the postcolonial world of international equality of all national citizens.[24] In short, a nationalist rhetoric allowed Canada to continue to discriminate against Indian citizens despite changing affiliations of Imperial equality, membership in the Commonwealth, the League of Nations and now the United Nations.[25]

Although nations may see themselves as homogeneous ethnic groups, as Benedict Anderson points out, the idea of the nation-state theoretically allows all races, ethnicities, religions, etc., to become "naturalized" citizens.[26] Thus, ideally speaking, anyone and everyone looks Canadian. Policing the border of the Canadian territory and allowing only Canadian citizens to enter could neither be effectively nor legitimately accomplished by restricting entrance according to criteria of language, race, or religion. As John Torpey points out in discussing the United States' Chinese Exclusion policy of the

---

[23] This contradicts many who claim that Canada was becoming fed-up with British interference in what was seen to be "Canadian" affairs - such as the Alaska border dispute - and wished to distance themselves from England. Cf. DFAIT "Relations with Americans" 11 February 2003 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/canada3-en.asp> (August 2006).

[24] Partha Chatterjee, *Nations and Its Fragments* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1993), 10, 18.

[25] Canada has been a leader in facilitating the racist policies of the British government towards non-white colonials who wished to assert their British subject status and move to the metropole after World War II. The determination of "place of birth" as opposed to parental lineage as the means of determining national citizenship in Canada's 1947 *Immigration and Citizen Act* was quickly applauded and adopted by England to create multi-tiered immigration and passport policies. This new system created racialized categories of British citizenship that could be policed through the passport office in England. Black British subjects were refused passport that would have allowed them to enter England as British citizens because they were born outside the metropole and, instead, were admitted on temporary work visas. White, colonial subjects were usually granted dual citizenship. Cf., Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 88-92.

[26] Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* (New York: Verso, 1991), 148-9

nineteenth century, distinguishing between Chinese nationals and Chinese-American citizens by birth was impossible to accomplish merely on sight or by interview.[27] As with all nation-states, controlling entry to Canadian territory requires documented proof of citizenship.

The passport is one of the primary means of distinguishing between citizens and non-citizens and thus makes border policing possible.[28] Yet, because differential racist notions of authenticity inform the distinctions between citizen and non-citizen, as Mongia states, the passport not only *reflects* certain understandings of race, nationality, and state "but was central to *organizing* and *securing* the modern definitions of these categories."[29] Although the Canadian citizen could look like anyone, as is evident with the detainment of Arab-Canadians and non-white permanent residents after 9/11, the authenticity of Canadian citizenship is conditioned by the assumption that a person's loyalties are determined by the "place of birth" documented in the passport. The passport is not only a means of excluding non-citizens but of differentiating between Canadian citizens.

Of course, this is not the history of the Canadian passport as told by Passport Canada. Instead, Passport Canada boasts that Canadians, as the bearer of a "trusted" passport, know his or her "passport gives them entry to almost every country in the world."[30] Perhaps what is most surprising about this boast is that guaranteeing entrance into another country is exactly what the passport cannot do. The passport is part of an international system of states that privileges the inviolable territorial sovereignty of

---

[27] John Torpey, *Invention of the Passport* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000), 96-101.
[28] Ibid., 1; Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 2.
[29] Mongia "Race, Nation, Mobility," 528.
[30] "History of the Passport" *Passport Canada*, 6 May 2006 <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/about/history.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).

individual nation-states.[31] In this system, of which the League of Nations and later the United Nations (UN) are a product and a guarantor, no state's citizens have the right to intrude upon another state's territory. Contrary to Passport Canada's claims, the passport guarantees the bearer very little, neither entrance into another country nor protection while they are within that country. The issuing state can only request that the host state protect the passport bearer. The only guarantee the passport affords the bearer is the right to re-enter his or her own state. Of course, the basis for this guarantee has less to do with protecting the individual then guaranteeing the host state that all non-citizens are deportable because the issuing country is obligated to accept their own citizens.[32]

The internationalism the passport reflects benefits and secures the legitimacy of state rule over their own territory and the dominance of territorial states in international matters. Brian Salter argues that the state secured its rule over a territory by extending the legitimacy of that rule outside its own borders, a strategy that also created and secured an internationalism that privileged the state over and above other institutions.[33] States accomplished this by securing its exclusive right to use violence within its own territory and extending that right into international space, a feat the passport was instrumental in securing. According to Salter, the first "passport" was a 1670's document that certified the nationality of a ship so as to protect that ship from privateers employed by the same or ally governments.[34] The issuance of ship passports worked in tandem with anti-piracy measures in international waters enforced by state militaries. This regime secured the distinction of nationality in international affairs and set up state agents as the legitimate

---

[31] Hayter, *Open Borders,* 151-2.
[32] Torpey, *Invention of the Passport,* 163; Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 4.
[33] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 11, 16-7.
[34] Ibid., 18-9, 143.

law enforcers in international space. As opposed to corporate or religious-political institutions becoming the guarantors of safe travel, the modern passport regime facilitated and is the result of the state's monopoly over a territory and international mobility.[35]

Since World War I and the emergence of the now-familiar passport, the state's borders have become the definitive markers at which international space begins for all its citizens.[36] The international institutionalization of the passport in 1920 by the League of Nations and again in 1946 by the UN reflected the individual member states' unwillingness to give up their passport regimes. Passport regimes allowed these states to distinguish foreign nationals from citizens while providing these states access to their own population for reasons of administering, monitoring and extracting resources.[37]

After the wars, the passport was also a means of dealing with the large number of "stateless" persons created by the upheavals of the fighting and post-war politics. In a state-centred internationalism peaceful, orderly politics depends on an individual belonging to a particular national territory. In this geography, stateless persons cannot be accounted for and, as such, threaten the sovereignty of the state because they can neither legitimately apply to enter a country nor be removed from the one they are in.[38] "Nansen Passports" were issued by the League of Nations after World War I to stateless persons and UN travel documents or "Refugee Passports" were issued by UN member nations to refugees following the 1952 UN Convention on Refugees to allow these people to move

---

[35] *Ibid,* 143, 157.
[36] Torpey, *Invention of the Passport,* 8-9.
[37] Ibid., 11. Cf. Robertson, "Ritual of Verification?" 177-8.
[38] I have chosen this threat of the "stateless" person rather than highlight the threats *to* the "stateless" person who did not have a passport in this new world order. The most popular examples of this threat *to* the "stateless" concern those who fled post-revolutionary Russia and whom the Soviet government refused to recognize as Russians (thus negating the guarantee on their Russian travel documents), and German Jews within Nazi Germany who had their passports confiscated so that they were unable to legally enter the safety of another country.

and be moved. Yet, much like the "Nansen passports," "Refugee passports" do not guarantee entrance into a "safe" space but provides only the legitimate means to apply for entrance.[39] Further, re-entrance to Canada is not guaranteed with the Canadian issued "Refugee Passport," thus making the person "undeportable" by any other host country.[40] Instead of being a remedy to displacement by being the guarantee of a safe place for persons persecuted by their home countries, "Refugee Passports" and UN travel documents are a means of managing the stateless person and refugee by making them countable and accessible to state institutions. In other words, these documents are a form of risk management by constructing, classifying and documenting the risk these persons are believed to pose.

Risk, according to Ulrich Beck, is the "systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by modernization itself."[41] An economy of risk – with its basic unit of "safety" – influences international financial markets and politics, informing and, at times, reinforcing the class, gender, and differential racist inequalities by labelling something or someone "unsafe."[42] As such, "risk management" – the assurance of "safety" by enforcing strategies to eliminate, deny or reinterpret risk – has come to characterize the functioning of states and corporations in modern capitalist societies.[43] In part, this has meant outsourcing harmful production processes to poor countries to make affluent countries "safe" but has also demanded accumulating vast amounts of information concerning populations and economies. This information is used to assess the risk these populations and economies pose so that governments can secure

---

[39] Torpey, *Invention of the Passport* 127-8; Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 77.
[40] Torpey, *Invention of the Passport* 128-31; Salter, *Rights of Passage* 4-5.
[41] Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society* trans. by Mark Ritter (London: SAGE Pub., 1992), 21.
[42] Ibid., 41
[43] Ibid.,19-20. François Eswald, "Insurance and Risk" in *Foucault Effect,* 198-9, 206-10.

their political and economic position nationally and internationally, and so corporations can exploit the smallest discrepancies in production costs within the flexible model of capitalist accumulation.[44] Surveillance by government and non-government entities is a key technique that provides the information needed to manage risk.[45]

To manage risk in the name of safety, various surveillance techniques accumulate information about individuals and correlate it with other information within and across numerous, usually pre-existing, departmentalized, databases.[46] As opposed to being a solely clandestine economy and practice, surveillance is usually carried out by evaluating data obtained when the individual comes into contact with state or corporate apparatuses. In spite of the hopes for the predictive capabilities of surveillance, much of a security organization's efforts are aimed at increasing the number and efficacy of these moments of contact. The goal is not just more information, although that is a goal, but better information through a greater number of sources from varying sections of society.[47] As a means of acquiring information and correlating that information with other databases, the passport is a prime technology of risk management, and the economy of surveillance of which the passport is a part is essential for national security.

As much as the passport facilitated national security and policing historically – in the case of an "Indian passport" – and now as the requirement for most international travel, concerns about the security of the passport itself have shaped the modern passport. Passport Canada's boast of a "trusted" document functions within contemporary "systems

---

[44] David Lyon, *Surveillance Society* (Philadelphia: Open Univ. Press, 2001), 38. Cf., David Harvey, *Conditions of Postmodernism,* 141-72 for a discussion of flexible accumulation.
[45] Lyon, *Surveillance Society,* 6.
[46] Kevin D. Haggerty, "Seeing Beyond the Ruins" *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 30, no.2. (2005), 170; Lyon *Surveillance Society,* 2.
[47] Haggerty, "Seeing Beyond the Ruins," 173-4; Lyon, *Surveillance Society,* 34, 38.

of trust" that allow impersonal economic and political transactions to take place.[48] Contrary to the impression given by Passport Canada that "trust" has to do with the international good reputation of Canadians, the "systems of trust" in which the Canadian passport operates is built on the security of the document and the technologies that guarantee both the passport's authenticity and access to security databases.

The belief that being "Canadian" vouches for the bearer abroad speaks to the classist ideas of pre-World War I Europe in which a "trusted" aristocratic signature on letters of introduction or letters of safe passage would go a long way towards accruing safe passage through foreign lands. In this system, the signature of a respectable person assured foreign officials as to the good character and intentions of the bearer of the document.[49] However, even these letters were not received without concerns about the authenticity of the document and bearer, concerns assuaged with the introduction of various special forms, stamps, and paper that were meant to make forgeries more easily detectable. Attempts to make these letters and early passports "fraudproof" and "foolproof" were efforts to create standards that would assure the international community that the passport was issued by the state and to the person bearing it.[50] The "trust" of the Canadian passport speaks to a history of passport security, and Passport Canada's boast of creating a "trusted" document stems from their continuing efforts to make the passport "fraudproof" and "foolproof."

Unlike nineteenth century aristocratic precedents, the national passport no longer ensures or even speaks to the good intentions of the bearer. As Benedict Anderson points

---

[48] Richard V. Ericson *et al.*, *Insurance as Governance* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2003), 54.
[49] Andreas Fahrmeir, "Governments and Forgers," in *Documenting Individual Identity* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 220.
[50] Ibid., 218-34.

out, in a world where locally organized "terrorists" act internationally, nationality says nothing of the bearer's intentions to foreign officials even if the passport is legitimate.[51] The nationality of the person is important, but nationality alone assures nothing. As opposed to guaranteeing that the person is of a particular, trusted nationality, the passport's security features are an attempt to guarantee that the bearer is the person the passport was issued to so that the information read off of, and accessed through, the passport applies to the person carrying it.[52]

Even if the passport cannot assure the bearer's intentions, the detection or even suspicion of forgeries and false identities puts into question the character and intention of the document's bearer. By not being who the passport says they are in a security regime that depends on accessing information about the individual in national and international databases to assess the risks posed by that individual, dissemblers pose a threat to security by not being the person who exists in the database. This detection of forged passports, falsified identities and producing "trusted" passports has demanded investment in new information and communication technologies to keep ahead of the forgers. Passport Canada has invested heavily in machine-readable passport with digitally imbedded identification that can be checked against national and international databases simply by swiping it. [53] The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) – the non-governmental organization that regulates passports internationally – demands that its member states comply with certain security features. As a member of ICAO, and under obligations outlined by the "Smart Border Declaration" to secure the flow of people

---

[51] Benedict Anderson, "Exodus" *Critical Inquiry* 20, no.2 (Winter 1994), 323-4.
[52] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 93.
[53] "History of Passports" Passport Canada Website, http://www.ppt.gc.ca/about/history.aspx?lang=e. Cf. "Controls at the Canada-US Border," http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040109.aspx?lang=e.

across its border with the U.S., Canada is investing in new biometric identifier technologies such as face recognition units, and iris, hand or finger scanners.[54]

In many ways, biometrics – reading the body or a particular body part to confirm information stored in a passport or other "smartcard" carried by the person – is a high-tech continuation of earlier means of identification. Reading the body for identifying signs, as opposed to writing on the body as was sometimes done, and comparing these signs against information about the bearer recorded in the passport, is meant to secure the link between document and bearer. The introduction of the passport photograph was meant to make this link between document and bearer more readily apparent to police who may not understand the language of the issuing country.[55] Since 1985 and the advent of the machine-readable Canadian passport, the passport, photograph and bearer are compared against information stored in the passport or in databases. Within this practice of reading the body/passport, autobiography and the acting subject are considered unreliable sources of an individual's identity compared to the authenticity of the document and the "speechless 'truth'" of technological scans and reproductions.[56] In other words, it is the identification and not the person that legitimates that person's identity. With the biometric scan, a discrepancy between the bio-measurement and the encoded information and databases – like discrepancies between the photo and the person – is meant to reveal the fraudulent passport and the falsified identity. But as much as biometric technology verifies the body of the traveller much like the passport photograph

---

[54] Cf. "Biometrics in the International Travel Context," *Passport Canada*, 5 May 2006, <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040201.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
[55] Fahrmeir, "Governments and Forgers," 232.
[56] David Lyon, "Reading the Body" *Documenting Individual Identity* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 2001), 306-8; Robertson. "Ritual of Verification?" 187; John Tagg, *Burden of Representation* (London: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1988), 78.

does, unlike photographic technology the body is "a source as well as a site of surveillance" with biometrics. [57]

Biometrics is the new standard by which a passport is "trusted," and it is this investment in technology that secures Passport Canada's boast. A passport that does not work in conjunction with biometric scans and cannot access the ICAO or other security databases makes the bearer of the document untrustworthy. Under Canada's *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,* in instances where a border agent is not "satisfied of the identity of a foreign national," a situation that depends heavily on the trustworthiness of the traveler's identification to identity them, the agent can detain the person.[58] In other cases, as Kevin D. Haggerty points out, the information accessed by the Canadian Border Services Agent (CBSA) when swiping a passport may reveal details that make that person a security risk, such as when, how and where they purchased their airline ticket, or even place of birth.[59] This information may also lead to passport bearer's detainment, search and deportation.

The effectiveness of the new border security measures depends on the CBSA and other security agencies' ability to legitimately refuse entry, detain and deport individuals by simply swiping the passport and, thus, make security the act of verifying the passport and not evaluating the person. The reliance on the technological and thus supposedly impartial process of scanning the passport goes a long way to obfuscate the racial, classed and sexual discrimination carried out in this new security regime. That the majority of persons being refused access to Canada for lack of sufficient or satisfactory identification

---

[57] David Lyon, "Reading the Body," 91-3. Cf. Salter *Rights of Passage,* 71.
[58] "Fact Sheet: Arrest and Detention," *CBSA* 29 August 2005, <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/ 2004/0311ArrestsDetentions-e.html> (August 2006).
[59] Haggerty, "Seeing Beyond the Ruins," 182.

are non-white bodies from Africa, South America, Asia and the Caribbean, the new biometric regime clearly continues strategies like the "Continuous Journey" requirement that restricted the movement of non-white colonials. However erroneous it may be, Passport Canada's boast of "trust" echoes the racialized language of "civilization" that underwrites policies designed to keep Canada "white." As Mongia reminds us, given the history of racial exclusion facilitated by the passport, it should come as no surprise that the division between different nationalities' differential access to mobility follows a "rule of postcolonial difference."

It is no surprise, then, that much of the impetus to gain Canadian citizenship is to acquire "trusted" documents and the international mobility they provide. As well, the danger posed by security-risk Canadian citizens can be assuaged through the programs and technologies set up by state agencies. Registering for the NEXUS program and other "fast-lane" programs that rely on pre-clearance and biometric technology can ensure that delays and searches at the border experienced by Muslims, Arabs, those who just look Arab can again cross the border unmolested. Through the new passport and biometric technologies these security risk persons may also become "trusted" individuals. However, based as it is on a particular technology, this trust is shaken and the racialized person again scrutinized each time the guarantees underwriting that technology are put into question. Because the "zone of confidence" will always be upset by the racist fears that draw Canada's borders, the trusted individual guaranteed by "smart card" based risk management will only ever be temporary.

The Bills and Declarations and the "New" White Knights

Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley and U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge signed the "Smart Border Declaration" on December 12, 2001. This declaration has four guiding pillars: The Secure Flow of People; The Secure Flow of Goods; Secure Infrastructure; and the Coordination and Information Sharing in the Enforcement of these objectives – pillars that, together, are suppose to make the border an effective tool in fighting terrorism.[60] Since December 2001, "smart" has become the new catchall word for the government's border restructuring. Where something is secure it is, in the government scheme of things, smart. A year after the "Smart Border Declaration" signing, the "Smart Border Action Plan" – a thirty-point list outlining the joint initiatives both governments would work towards – was put together to create nothing less than a "secure and smart border."[61]

The "smart" of the "Smart Border" certainly refers to the various gadgets and intelligent technologies such as the new and improved passport and other "smartcard" identification needed to bring about the desired regime of biometric verification. In a sense, a technologically enhanced border is a border that is more intelligent and thus able to carry out the demanding job, as Prime Minister Chrétien put it, of keeping the border "open to business but closed to terrorists." The "Smart Border" is a border that is smarter than it was before, and a "smarter" border is a border that is the epitome of progress. The notion of technological progress permeates the language of border security, obfuscating the legal and privacy concerns of biometrics in a language of more exact and failsafe

[60] "Smart Border Declaration."
[61] "Smart Border Declaration Action Plan," *DFAIT*, 7 February 2003, <http://maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp> (August 2006).

techno-science.[62] Similarly, policing practices permeated with differential racist notions of risk are being reorganized within the language of intelligence and by these technologically enhanced practices.

In addition to referring to new technologies, in policing national security "smart" refers the creation or rearrangement of agencies and government ministries that will better administer the border. Bill C-6, the *Act to Establish the Department of Public Security and Preparedness Canada* (PSEPC) brought PSEPC into being on November 17, 2004, and saw the position of the Solicitor General annulled and that position's duties transferred to the Minister of PSEPC. The portfolios under the PSEPC Minister's care were those formerly supervised by the Solicitor General, including: the Canadian Security Intelligence Services (CSIS); the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP); Correctional Services of Canada; and the Parole Border of Canada, with the additions of The Canadian Firearms Centre and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA).[63]

The creation of CBSA is indicative of this new arrangement of security portfolios under PSEPC, not least of all because Bill C-26, *An Act to Establish the Canadian Border Services Agency,* was introduced by the PSEPC Minister only six days after the creation of their own department. The CBSA is a new agency, but it also replaces and expands on duties formerly carried out by Canada Customs and Revenue Agency (CCRA), a portfolio that was under National Revenue. Although CCRA was primarily a collections agency, as former CCRA employee and historian Dave McIntosh states:

> [The] customs officer has long been and is today Canada's first line of protection, not in military terms of course, but in economic, social, and

---

[62] "Backgrounder" *Passport Canada*, 13 January 2004, <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040109.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
[63] "Law Enforcement in Canada," *PSEPC*, 15 May 2005, < http://www.psepc.gc.ca/media/bk/2005/bk20050515-en.asp> (August 2006).

> other senses. Contrary to the political rhetoric of more than a century, our border, commercial as well as geographic, *is* defended.[64]

Even though the physical defence and policing of the border is seen as something of a secondary concern compared to collecting duties, McIntosh's history is full of instances of overlap between customs collecting, policing, immigration enforcement, militia and military activity at the border that secured Canada from the treats of organized crime and illegal border crossers. The Customs officer has often been the enforcer of laws and moral values by arresting criminals when the police were absent and confiscating pornographic and obscene materials.[65] Thus, it is not surprising that post-9/11 the CCRA, those on the "first line" of protecting Canada, should work with security agencies to secure the border against terrorist threats until the CBSA came to be.[66]

Although CCRA carried out policing activities, the CBSA and the PSEPC cadre of agencies constitute a new security constellation. With the creation of the CBSA as a PSEPC portfolio, border security is prioritized and, consequently, the space and functioning of the border has changed. The CBSA mandate states that first, the "[CBSA] is responsible for providing integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate the free flow of persons and goods;" and second, the CBSA may supply support to other PSEPC portfolios.[67] Although there is hardly any mention of their responsibility to collect customs, the new security regime has not erased the economic border. With this change of border agencies and the new configuration of security portfolios under PSEPC, the economic, security and immigration practices of the

---

[64] Dave McIntosh, *The Collectors* (Toronto: NC Pres Ltd., 1984), 11.
[65] Ibid., 153.
[66] Cf. "News Release," *CBSA*, 29 July 2005, <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/release-communique/2001/oct/security-e.html> (August 2006).
[67] "Bill C-26 (Section 5)," *Parliament of Canada,* 13 June 2005, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-26/C-26_3/C-26_cover-E.html> (August 2006).

border have been reconfigured. Customs, particularly the crackdown on smuggling, has not disappeared but has been reintroduced as a "security" concern.[68] This change is largely due to post September 11th budgets in which "security" is the password to vast government resources.[69]

Contrary to the claims of CBSA and PSEPC concerning the clarity of their mandates under Bills C-11 and C-36, "smart" policing is complex, with very few balances and checks limiting the actions of security agencies or making them accountable for these actions. "Security Certificates" are a good example of this "smart" policing. Used to detain and deport foreign nationals and Canadian non-citizens believed to be a threat to Canada's security, "Security Certificates" allow for the indefinite detention of individuals based upon secret evidence not even the accused or their council are privy to. Such measures are intended to assist PSEPC to act quickly in defence of Canadians. Although currently upheld under Division 9 of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act* and therefore under the jurisdiction Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), both the Minister of CIC and PSEPC must sign the certificate before it can be referred to a Superior Court Judge. Because CIC has neither the expertise nor the resources to obtain information concerning security threats, CSIS and/or the RCMP provides the ministries and court with the "proof" needed to sign the warrants of arrest, warrants which are then handed back to the RCMP to arrest and detain the accused. The CBSA assists these agencies and the judiciary by deporting those who are remanded for deportation.[70]

---

[68] Cf., Andreas, *Border Games,* 149.

[69] Budget increases have been greatest in areas that are security oriented. These increases fund investment in biometrics and initiatives that create links between government ministries. Cf. "CIC Final Report 2003" *CIC*, 9 January 2003, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/evaluation/public-safety.html> (August 2006); "Department Of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness comes into force," *PSEPC*, 2 February 2004, <http://www.psepc.gc.ca/media/nr/2005/ nr20050404-en.asp> (August 2006).

[70] Cf., "Certificates Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act," *CSIS*, 14 November 2005,

Although PSEPC provides a centralizing framework in which security can be carried out, national security is still very much made up of what Haggerty and others have called surveillance assemblages.[71] That is, effective national security is not the realization of "Big Brother" but the bringing together of various resources and organizing them to meet a particular goal. To better police migrants, those agencies that come in contact with migrant populations share resources but also remain distinct so as to retain their access to varying parts of society. To coordinate information these surveillance assemblages arrange themselves around common goals such as "anti-terrorism."

New policies and laws focused on anti-terrorism were an impetus for the "smart" reconfiguration of economic, immigration and security practices. "Security Certificates" speak to a national security regime that effectively blurs the line between immigration and security – migrants and terrorists – when policing the border. In fact, if creating PSEPC was a "smart" move by the government, then the framework in which the logic of PSEPC policing seems "smart" was created by Bill C-36, the *Anti-Terrorism Act,* and CIC's Bill C-11, the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.* In short, the "Smart Border" can only be effective and, thus, considered "smart" within a field of laws laid out in these policies.

The greater latitude of powers to fight terrorism under Bill C-36 greatly impinges upon individual freedoms and privacy. According to Audrey Macklin, the *Anti-Terrorism Act* is unprecedented in the history of Canadian Law because until Bill C-36 "terrorism as a discrete legal category of conduct only existed within the confines of the immigration

---

http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder14.asp?print (August 2006).

[71] Haggerty: "Seeing Beyond the Ruins" 173-4. David Lyon [*Surveillance Society,* 35] calls these assemblages "disorganized surveillance."

legislation."[72] This criminalization of terrorism has, among other effects, legitimated the policing of the entire population and not just migrants, and justified the increased reliance on police discretion to detain individuals that has effectively blurred the line between terrorism and lawful forms of dissent and protest.[73] As well, with the militaristic language and hardware with which security agencies fight terrorism, the criminalization of terrorism has resulted in the militarization of border policing and agencies.[74]

Although the *Anti-Terrorism Act* marks the move of terrorism into the realm of criminal law – thus, making terrorism a matter for the courts to decide[75] – as was the case before Bill C-36, the non-citizen is still the primary target of these laws and is most vulnerable to anti-terrorism policing. As Macklin writes, before Bill C-36, "locating terrorism exclusively in immigration legislation institutionalized in law the figure of the immigrant as archetypal menace to the cultural, social, and political vitality of the nation."[76] Bill C-36 does not counter or stymie the policing of migrants by removing the stigma of terrorism from migrant populations and their descendants. If anything, the criminalization of terrorism reinforces and reinvents the threat of violence posed by the "illegal immigrants." With the enforcement of Bill C-36, the "illegal immigrant" – a non-status person who arrived in Canada through "irregular," non-governmental means or

---

[72] Audrey Macklin, "Borderline Security" in *Security of Freedom,* eds. Donald J. Daniel and Patrick Macklem (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2001), 391-2.
[73] Tony Clarke, "The Recriminalization of Dissent" *Policy Options* 23, no.6 (2002), 49-50. Macklin, "Borderline Security," 393.
[74] Cf. Peter Andreas, "Redrawing the Line, 79; Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 156. Although the most common examples of a militarized policing regime is American and European, a militaristic rhetoric and use of military hardware permeates Canadian border security and the new joint Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBETs). Cf., "Canada-United States Integrated Border Enforcement Teams," *CBSA*, 2 May 2005, <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/general/enforcement/ibet-eipf-e.html> (August 2006).
[75] Making "terrorism" a matter for the courts theoretically protects the rights of the accused from abuse by security agencies. Yet, as Sharryn J. Aiken ["Manufacturing Terrorists," *Refuge* 19, no.3 (2001), 117] points out, the reticence of judges to question the privileges granted the RCMP and CSIS under national security policies makes the court complicit in the increased marginalization of non-citizens and the violence carried out against them.
[76] Macklin, "Borderline Security," 392.

entered Canada legally or overstayed their visa – casts the non-status Canadian as a potential source of violence.[77]

The figure of the migrant-as-terrorist has not been displaced by the criminal-ization of terrorism. The increased powers to detain, interrogate, and deport non-citizens granted security agencies under Bill C-11 speaks to the continuing focus on migrants as security risks. Many of these same powers were first proposed in June of 2000 as Bill C-31. Before dying on the floor of Parliament with the call of an election, MPs and jurists criticized Bill C-31– the first attempt to replace the 1978 Immigration Act – for granting CIC and security agencies the very powers now found in Bill C-11.[78] With the passing of Bill C-11 these voices were largely silent. The proposed increase of powers for national security purposes outlined in Bill C-31 were the result of decades of amendments that increasingly limited immigration to certain classifications of people and impinged on the rights of refugees under international law.[79] It is enough to remember that, although "Security Certificates" are currently in the spotlight as the Supreme Court reviews their legitimacy under Canadian law, they have been on the books since the 1978 *Immigration Act* and that 27 individuals have been detained since they were first enforced in 1991.[80]

The national security concerns and precautions that underwrite Bill C-11 are not anomalies within a history of Canadian immigration policy that some have labelled to be

---

[77] Sean P. Hier and Joshua L. Greenberg, 'Constructing a discursive crisis," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no.3 (May 2002), 290-513. For a definition of "illegal immigrant" see Michael Bossin, "Bill C-31" *Refuge* 19, no.4 (2000), 56. At the time "terrorist" was added to immigration law the Department of Immigration was made a portfolio under the Department of Public Security, a move protested because it was seen to criminalize immigrants and refugees. Richmond, *Global Apartheid,* 140.

[78] "Commentary on Bill C-31," *Parliament of Canada*, 6 April 2000 <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-31/C-31_1/C-31_cover-E.html> (August 2006).

[79] Razack, "Making Canada White," 178; Richmond, *Global Apartheid,* 137; Aiken, "Manufacturing "Terrorists," 65.

[80] "Fact Sheet" *CBSA* 29 July 2005, <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/2005/certificat-e.html> (August 2005).

increasingly equitable, and exemplified by the introduction of the "points system" in 1967 and the Immigration Act of 1976 that would no longer discriminate according to race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion or sex.[81] To counter this understanding Lisa Marie Jakubowski points out that Canada's immigration policy is increasingly non-discriminatory *in principle* only.[82] National security and racialized discrimination is carried out through, and flourishes in, the increasingly individualizing and labour oriented policies of the immigration "points system." The "points system," as opposed to former immigration policies that limited immigration to people of certain national and cultural categories, focuses instead on filling labour shortages with pre-approved, individually vetted applicants. The application process allows Canada to fill its labour needs with the most desirable candidates based on criteria of education, wealth and occupation. This process also allows officials to assess the risk each candidate poses and reject claimants before they arrive in Canada. Although this risk assessment has been largely concerned with the economic risk a person poses and, thus, largely classist by accepting the most educated and financially secure candidates from abroad, the bureaucracy of the "points system" allows security agencies to more efficiently screen on a person by person basis. Therefore, through the points system security agencies are able to act upon the individual in addition to policing whole diaspora communities, and thus greatly increasing the vulnerability of immigrants to surveillance, coercion and exclusion while living with Canada.[83]

---

[81] Richmond, *Global Apartheid,* 132. Cf. Erin Kruger *et al.*, "Canada After 11 September," 72-4 for discussion of a current regression to a more discriminate immigration policy with Bill C-31 as opposed to a continuation through reinvention of existing discriminate policies.
[82] Lisa Marie Jakubowski, *Legalization of Racism* (Halifax: Fernwood Pub., 1997), 10.
[83] Richmond, *Global Apartheid,* 207; Michelle Lowry, "Creating Human Insecurity," *Refuge* 21, no.1 (2002), 36.

If, as Robert F. Harney notes, Canadian immigration policy has always tried to strike some kind of balance between labour and population requirements and concerns about a changing "racial and ethnocultural composition" of Canada, then the balance struck has not allowed more non-white migrants to immigrate to Canada but, instead, resulted in the issuance of temporary work permits that prevent non-white labour from settling in Canada. [84] The racialized separation of citizen and non-citizen accomplished by these work permits is the "balance" achieved by government management of migration.[85] This managed balance which always favours the demands of racial exclusion is what Himani Bannerji would consider the result of a coexistence of liberal democracy and colonial state principles, or the qualification of equality by a desire for a "white" Canada.[86] This coexistence is also articulated in national security concerns and the demonization and criminalization of migrants.

The threats to Canada that "Security Certificates" combat are categories defined by immigration policy and policing. The term "terrorist" and "terrorism" entered immigration law in 1992 with Bill C-86, but the inconsistency with which these terms were applied by the courts in particular cases – and the reticence of judges to criticize national security policy – has contributed to its invaluable currency for security agencies to detain and deport suspect individuals without the restrictions of the due process of law. "Terrorist," Sharryn J. Aiken writes, "has become the post-modern substitute for the 'vicious class' that nineteenth-century immigration laws constructed as a tool of

---

[84] Robert F. Harney, "So Great a Heritage as Ours," in *In Search of Canada* ed. Steven R. Graubard (London: Transaction Pub. 1989), 52; Richmond, *Global Apartheid,* 133.
[85] Manuel Garcia y Greigo, "Canada: Flexibility and Control in Immigration and Refugee Policy," in *Controlling Immigration,* eds. Wayne A. Cornelius *et al.* (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1994), 139.
[86] Himani Bannerji, "Geography Lesson," in *Dark Side of the Nation* (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press Inc., 2000), 75.

immigration control."[87] As such, in addition to posing a physical danger, the "terrorist" is believed to threaten the economic, social, and moral stability of Canada by coming here to steal *our* jobs and healthcare and disturb *our* sense of order.

The negative construction of the immigrant as "illegal," "terrorist" or "vicious" justifies the "firm but fair" solutions that stop all flows, illegal or otherwise, of migrants. Along these same lines, the "Safe Third Country Agreement" that came into effect in December 29, 2004 further restricts refugees from claiming asylum upon arrival at Canada's land border. As part of meeting "point 5" of the "Smart Border Action Plan," asylum seekers must make their claim in the first "safe country" – Canada or the U.S. – at which they land.[88] The CIC Minister at the time, Denis Coderre, claimed that this agreement would reduce the number of fraudulent claims made by "asylum shoppers" who pose as refugees to profit economically by gaining access to Canada.[89] There are, indeed, advantages for certain foreign nationals to claim asylum in Canada and not the U.S and vice versa that have nothing to do with supposed "selfish" economic gain. Discrepancies between U.S. and Canadian foreign policies that inform the legitimacy of a refugee's claim or the different rights afforded claimants under either system are not considered in this agreement.[90] In effect, charges of asylum shopping are being used to

---

[87] Aiken, "Manufacturing Terrorists," 55.
[88] "Safe Third Country Agreement," *CIC* 5 December 2002 <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/safe-third.html> (August 2006).
[89] "Minister Coderre seeks government approval of Safe Third Country Agreement" *CIC* September 10, 2002 <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/02/0226-pre.html> (August 2006). Reducing the number of "Asylum Shoppers" was the impetus behind Bill C-55's "Safe Country" provision passed in 1988 that considered a refugee's claim void if that person passed through a country in which they could have claim asylum before arriving in Canada [Jakubowski "Immigration and the Legalization of Racism," 82-3].
[90] Haitians claiming refugee status in the U.S. are usually immediately detained and returned to Haiti so as to dissuade other Haitians from coming [Cf. Michelle Lowry, "Creating Human Insecurity," 36]. Comparatively, the asylum systems differently, and while claimants in the U.S. can appeal their cases and stay deportations, claimants in do not have this right thus leaving them vulnerable to the racism which permeates the non-judicial, Immigration and Refugee Board hearings. Cf. "The Refugee Appeal Division," *CIC*, 3 November 2005, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/refugees/radmenu.html> (August 2006).

undermine the rights of refugees to claim asylum under international law and legitimate the right of the state to determine what qualifies as a legitimate asylum claim.

"Asylum shopper" is akin to the "illegal immigrant" and "terrorist" as a label employed to undermine the legitimacy and rights of non-citizens in Canada. Of all non-citizens, the asylum seeker is perhaps the most vulnerable and, indeed, "terrorist" is a term often applied to refugees. Due to the violence that often forces refugees to flee their homes – conflicts the refugee may have been a part of – their unsolicited arrival and the rights guaranteed them under international law to a hearing and protection from refoulement [91] makes security agencies weary of refugees. According to the UN Convention on Refugees, a history of involvement in violent political organizations and active ties to revolutionary groups do not preclude a legitimate refugee claim.[92] Indeed, the refugee with a violent and political past is not a recent phenomenon. A politically active but anti-communist individual was considered the ideal refugee by the signatories of the 1952 UN Convention. During the Cold War, refugees fleeing communist countries legitimated their claims within a framework that played to Canada's anti-communist policies.[93] With the demise of the Soviet Union, the "us vs. them" mentality no longer frames the plight of the refugee, and in many cases the state the refugee fled may very well be a friend and ally of Canada. The refoulement of persons to friendly countries based on allegations of terrorism have been invaluable in maintaining Canada's alliances.

"Asylum shopper," "illegal immigrant" and "terrorist" also speak to a history of pathologizing the refugee and a rhetoric that frames refugees, essentially or by circumstance, as immoral and untrustworthy because they fall outside the boundaries of

---

[91] Refoulement refers to repatriating a person who faces persecution in their home country.
[92] Aiken, "Manufacturing Terrorists," 60.
[93] Reg Whitaker, "Refugee" *Citizenship Studies* 2, no.3 (1998), 418-9.

trusted national citizenship and belonging. The "rootlessness" of the refugee is not just a political problem but is seen as a moral problem, a form of deviance, or kind of illness that must me corrected through therapy. [94] The "Safe Third Country Agreement," by focusing on the problems posed by the refugee as opposed to the causes of displacement, is a form of therapy that seeks to educate those who have lost hold of their moral bearings and who must again learn the meaning of responsible citizenship and human decency if they are to be admitted into Canada.

In a post-cold war world new narratives are being constructed to legitimate a refugee's claim to stay in Canada but, as Sherene Razack points out, these new narratives do not break the colonial divisions of civilized and barbaric that morally and politically distance Canada from Third World conflicts.[95] As opposed to seeing the refugee as the result of irresponsible Canadian foreign policy, refugees are seen by many to come from uncivilized parts of the world and to threaten Canada with their barbarity when they arrive. In this discourse of civilization and savagery, if refugee claims are to be successful they have to play to narratives that hail Canada on grounds of pity and compassion, not justice and responsibility.[96] Maria V. Ruiz argues that the disorder "asylum shopper," "illegal immigrant" and "terrorist" is the result of the first world's fear of the third world, and that these tropes help to channel that fear into border policies.[97] When illness, crime and terrorism threaten the good order of civilized places like Canada, the border is constructed to combat or contain these threats. As well, border policy plays a large part in constructing these narratives through interdiction strategies and PSEPC

---

[94] Liisa Malikki, "National Geographic," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (February 1992), 32-3.
[95] Razack "Making Canada White" 175
[96] Sherene H. Razack, "Policing the Borders of Nation," in *Looking White people in the Eye* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1999), 126.
[97] Maria V. Ruiz, "Border Narratives," 39.

agencies that blur the lines between migrant and criminal while they also take advantage of the moniker "illegal immigrant" to legitimate their actions and budgets.

Against the image of the immoral, migrant criminal, the notion of a kinder and just Canada persists. The language of security that protects Canadians from moralized political threats also oppositionally constructs Canada and Canadians as civilized, again normalizing the idea of a territorially bound nation and national citizen. In this light, Canada's polices and strategies are not seen as violent or illegal but as a form of common sense and good governance. The notion of a benevolent Canada that grants the privilege of remaining in Canada to the right kind of migrants cannot be anything but implicated in the global apartheid as rhetoric that perpetuates and legitimates the rule of colonial difference and maintains inequalities between First and Third Worlds, colonizer and colonized. The border imagined in this rhetoric, institutionalized by Bill C-11, Bill C-36 and enforced by PSEPC is a space that joins Canada to the world but also distances *us* from others and their problems.

Spaces of the border

When Jean Chrétien and George W. Bush met at the border they did more than merely announce new border programs and security restructuring; their visit reaffirmed the borderline as the limits of their respective sovereignties. By visiting the border, each leader asserted their claim to their respective sides of this line. The international friendship the Prime Minister lauds is formed and exists in this border space. It is a friendship ideally represented by the Ambassador Bridge – a bridge linking the two fixed

spaces of people, cultures, and sovereignties, which span the equally fixed space of the border.

The concept of a fixed border bounding the Canadian state speaks to the territoriality of the nation-state that Radhika Mangia links to the modern passport. As Benedict Anderson notes, the territorialization of cultural identity that came about with the nationalization of culture localized culture within a geographically defined nation-state.[98] As many scholars point out, Anderson among them, this imagined space is tied to various institutions and government strategies.[99] The tethering of a self-identifying nation to a geographical-cultural space was and is facilitated by differential racist notions of "culture" and "nation" organized and secured by the passport regime.[100] Bridges are built, ships turned away, and people are detained at the edges of Canada's political territory to support and defend the ethnicist and culturalist national body.[101]

However, a passport regime also brings about a "deterritorialization" of power relations that no longer restricts border policing to the fixed geographical space of the state's territorial limits. Some have called this a type of "remote-control" border; characterizing the "Smart Border" policing that takes place at a distance from the state's territory according to the remote-control technologies that facilitate this "smart" policing.[102] The "remote-controls" of the border are the new technologies of surveillance and identity verification exemplified by the mobile technologies of passports and the security checks taking place in such places as Passport Canada's downtown offices.

---

[98] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 16-8, 19.
[99] Ibid., 159-60; Mackey, *House of Difference,* 50; Robertson, "Ritual of Verification?" 178-9.
[100] Mongia "Race, Nation, Mobility," 553.
[101] Razack "Making Canada White" 161.
[102] David Lyon, key note speech *Technology and Citizenship Symposium,* McGill University, Montreal June 9-10, 2006; Lyon, *Surveillance Society,* 89, 100.

Even when the passport is swiped at the border, the security assemblages it accesses are not localized at the border but link up to networks of national and international databases and institutions.

The debordering of the world and the deterritorialization of the border by the passport – removing the border from the physical restrictions of a particular place on the ground – is effectuated in tandem with a *re*territorialization of space or *re*bordering of the world. This rebordering takes place in a world that accommodates a time-space compression in which the "remote-control" communication and information technologies are all but annulling the amount of time it takes for information to traverse space.[103] The borders of this new geography differ from the borderlines of the nation-state and create a new understanding of territorial limits.[104] As CIC states regarding their "Multiple Borders Strategy," one that places CIC officers in foreign airports;

> [A] "border" is any point at which the identity of a traveler can be verified. This maximizes Canada's effectiveness in detecting potential terrorists by linking the person, the documentation and all known intelligence at several locations along the person's route."[105]

Since a person's route may begin in another country or within Canada, the border can no longer be conceived of as the physical edge of a territory but is more properly understood as a series of social and political relations carried out through various technologies that take place both inside and outside of Canada's territorial limits that exposes the individual to the state's authority.

---

[103] David Harvey, *Conditions of postmodernism,* 240-2.
[104] John Pickles *History of Spaces* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 91; Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson, "Beyond Culture," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (1992), 9.
[105] "Multiple Borders Strategy" *CIC,* 1 September 2003, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research/evaluation/public-safety.html#section2> (August 2006).

Space is not and never has been the uniform field represented on a map. That is to say, space is not and never has been a container in which events take place. Space, according to Henri Lefebvre, is a social relationship. The institutions and ideologies that enforce social differences produce spaces by conditioning social relations.[106] The overlapping economic, political, and social ideologies embedded in the capitalism, patriarchy, and racism that underwrite nationalism condition the social relations that take place to produce nationalized spaces. The spatial practices that produce and reproduce spaces of "white" privilege are often achieved through the social institutions of law, policing and so on that re/produce - although always incompletely - the unequal social relations of race, class, gender, sex, ability that characterize colonial-national social relations. Thus, within the space constituted by Bills C-11 and C-36, the powers of the CBSA and technologies such as the passport, the "Smart Border" is a unique space or series of spaces within a network of nationalized spaces.[107]

The deterritorialized "Smart Border" and the "remote-control" policing that characterizes it have not brought about a post-national space, a space beyond the social relations of the territorialized nation-state. Although this border cannot be drawn on a map as the 49th parallel is, the policing practices carried out at the border produce spaces that buttress the territorial sovereignty of the nation-state. In the technologies of the "Smart Border," we can see the state's struggle to reconstitute the power relations of the nation-state and, as such, we see the state's struggle to reconstitute nationalized spaces. Although no longer bounding a territory, the spaces of the "Smart Border" are both

---

[106] Henri Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* 85.
[107] Sherene Razack, "Gendered Racial Violence," in *Race, Space, and the Law* ed. Sherene H. Razack (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 129.

outside the "normal" functioning of the nation-state and within the constellation of nationalized spaces that reproduce the nation-state.

Matthew Sparke documents how the burgeoning regional and corporate controls of border security before 9/11 were reconstituted through national security policies that effectively brought the border under the supervision of U.S and Canadian federal governments.[108] Much like a century ago, when a passport regime secured the state monopoly over international mobility, present-day national security strategies consolidate the state's influence over its own borders, international mobility and economics. The privatization of or corporate involvement in many of these security initiatives does not negate the nationalization of the border. Indeed, neo-liberalism helps frame national security in the corporate language of beneficial economic efficiency and competitiveness as in the case of Passport Canada's "special operating status," which sees this agency function much like a private interest.[109] Although this neo-liberal business model qualifies national "citizenship" by making "economic security" a criterion of a risk evaluation,[110] the aim of border business is to regulate access to Canadian territory and to reconstitute international relations within a state-centred system.

The "Smart Border" effectively redraws the geography of the nation-state so that it will persist in a globalized world that defies stable representations. This is achieved in part by realigning the local, the national, and the state within geographies of global

---

[108] Matthew Sparke, "Passports into Credit Cards" in *Boundaries and Belonging* ed. Joel S. Migdal (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 280.
[109] "Special Operating Status" *Passport Canada*, 5 May 2006, <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/about/products .aspx?lang=e#td> (August 2006); Sparke, "Passports into Credit Cards," p.269. Michael Bossin ["Bill C-31" 56] also points out that obfuscated in a business language that suggests interview rooms and offices in overseas policing, policies are usually enforced through impromptu interrogation and the policing airport line-ups. Cf, Macklin ("Borderline Security,") 385 for a discussion of the ill effects of privatized, security policing.
[110] Sparke, "Passports into Credit Cards" 254.

networks that blur the limits of territorial sovereignty. Realigning a local and nation-state nexus does not mean fixing the local within a geography fixed by the boundaries of the nation state. Realigning the local, national and state means a reterritorialization of the local within a nation and state dominated frame of reference. As a strategy to reconstitute the nation-state the "Smart Border" nationalizes the local and localizes the nation.

In policing the border, the distinctions between "citizen" and "foreign national" are made according to state defined status, but detention, searches and refusal of entry under the banner of "national security" are also local distinctions. Craig Robertson points out that the border agent who represents the state also works on the border and, as such, is most familiar with the people and places nearest the border. At play in the border guard's judgement of citizen and foreigner is the distinction of "alien" or someone who is not familiar.[111] A person may be a foreign national yet be familiar to a border agent by being a local resident and frequent border crosser. Within the security regime in which the passport must be swiped to track all border crossings, national security distinctions reform local relationships when the database trumps the familiar.[112]

Local distinctions may also inform the category of the citizen. When Canadianness – the feeling of belonging to the nation – is expressed through celebrations or identification with the local, the national is reframed within local historic and culturalist narratives. As Eva Mackey points out in her look at small town Canada Day celebrations, "Canadian-Canadians" – "white" Euro-Canadians who distinguish themselves as normative Canadians against other multicultural, non-white Canadians –

---

[111] Robertson, "Ritual of Verification?" 88.
[112] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 158.

identify their familiar, local narratives with notions of Canadianness.[113] Since 9/11, with the large number of Arabs or Arab-looking persons being stopped and searched at the border, the means of identifying dissemblers is clearly being informed by overlapping national and local distinctions of race and belonging.[114] This intersection of "alien" and non-whiteness has resulted in the detainment of many non-white Canadian citizens.

In some respects, the spaces of the "Smart Border" are not significantly different from other, earlier border spaces. The foreign national is still the primary focus of state efforts to secure the sovereignty of the state, and racism, patriarchy and capitalism continue to inform these efforts.[115] However, the technologies of the "Smart Border" – the biometric identifiers, Bills C-11 and C-36 and PSEPC – constitute a different border, which functions within a reterritorialized network of spaces of the nation-state. Although the border is no longer the line that bounds the nation and the nation-state is not a container bound by this border, the "Smart Border" is a means of locating and, if need be, containing bodies.

Within the passport regime, the identity of the individual is located in his or her identification. By swiping the passport, identity is found in the databases accessed. The identity produced is not of the bearer but a "digital persona" constructed by compiling the various traces this persona has left in various databases. According to David Lyon, the state and corporate interests track the digital persona because the "remote-control" technologies that facilitate their relationship with citizens or customers at a distance has created a world of disembodied citizens and customers.[116] The "disappearing" physical

---

[113] MacKey *House of Difference,* 20, 88-9.
[114] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 130.
[115] Ibid., 157.
[116] Lyon, *Surveillance Society,* 15.

bodies of these disembodied relationships are only visible in the traces left by a person's digital persona.[117] In this framework of digital personae, the border is no longer a space a physical body comes to. If, as CIC puts it, "[A] "border" is any point at which the identity of a traveler can be verified," then the digital persona is produced in the space of the border when an identity is checked against security databases. However, this does not mean the "Smart Border" is not a physical space in which the bearer of the passport finds him or herself when it is his or her digital persona that interests the state.

David Lyon states that the monitoring of ephemeral traces left by the digital persona across various databases that characterize a surveillance society does not bring the body into view and, as such, a surveillance society does not contain the body but instead tracks movements.[118] Similarly Brian Salter argues that former policies of quarantine and arresting mobility have been replaced in a surveillance society with strategies that manage flows of people and goods.[119] However, within the Canadian surveillance society, discourses of "contaminated" migrants persist, as do practices of exclusion and detention. In Canada, the CBSA detains non-citizens in "Immigration Protection Centres" in places like Laval, Quebec or within regular correctional facilities. At the time of writing, over four hundred migrants are detained in various corrections facilities, and are in some cases part of the general prison population.[120]

In the "Smart Border" regime of biometric identifiers and scans in which the passport does more than track and manage digital personae, containment is not limited to prisons and detention centres. Being a technology through which the border is

---

[117] Ibid., 15-7
[118] Ibid., 89.
[119] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 56.
[120] Catherine Gauvreau and Glynis Williams. "Detention in Canada" *Refuge* 20, no.3 (2002), 68-9.

reproduced in different locations, the passport is a means of keeping a person outside of the protection of the nation-state by remanding that person to the space of the border. This space, by being geographically inside and outside the territorial limits as a space set apart from that territory, is one that makes the person accessible to the state but also separate or easily separable from the general populace. Separation and containment do not necessarily make one physically immobile and, as such, a person may be able to move about within the territory. However, the security marked body never leaves the border. In being made vulnerable to the violence and coercion of security agencies or remaining non-status after many years of living in Canada is to be kept in the space of the border. The "Smart Border" is a border of surveillance and containment.

"Smart Border" surveillance and containment takes on a new meaning within a regime of biometrics. With a biometrically enhanced passport regime, the body must be surrendered along with the passport to scans, and the "smartcard" is itself incomplete without the body to back it up and vice versa. In this regime, the passport contains the body as much as the passport makes the body visible by keeping track of a digital trace. Thus, while Lisa A Flores points out that "suspect bodies carry the border on them" by remaining vulnerable to the emotional and physical violence of border policing that happens in the spaces where the identity of the traveller is verified, the biometric passport makes the body part of the border regime.[121] If the body is a "source of surveillance" through biometric scans, the body is also being made a source of the border.

In conjunction with the reconstruction of a federalist border, the reformation of a national space – the imagined national links between local communities, and the localization of the national – is taking place. Given the differential access to mobility

[121] Lisa A Flores, "Constructing Rhetorical Borders," 381.

along lines of race, class and gender and the differential geographies of the nation that toe the same lines, the reterritorialization of the border carried out through border security technologies continues what Radhika Mongia, following Partha Chatterjee, calls the "rule of postcolonial difference" in which the non-citizen is synonymous with non-white and non-European persons. With the "Smart Border" the privileges and protections of citizenship are denied to non-status persons living in Canada, while the technologies through which the border is reproduced keep non-citizens accessible and vulnerable to the state. Being kept out of Canada no longer means that one is not already here in Canada. Being kept out of Canada is a matter of being "out of place" in Canada and living on the border.

"Before it's a geography, Canada is an idea."
Awad Ibrahim, *Ebony Roots, Northern Soil* Conference 2004

"What an impure and worldly geography!"
Aime Césaire, "Discourse on Colonialism" 57

"The International Boundary: A Visible Line Between Friendly Neighbours"
International Boundary Commission Slogan.

In this chapter I examine the geographies produced by Canada's post-9/11 border security practices to better understand how the "Smart Border" reproduces a world geography divided along overlapping geographical and essentialist lines. Working from critical geographers, historians of cartography and post-colonial scholars, I look into how the disaggregate spaces of the "Smart Border" are plotted to form an unbroken borderline according to national narratives of an "undefended border" that separate Canada from the world and its problems. I end by considering how cartographies of diaspora might fracture this borderline to produce radical, post-colonial geographies of Canada.

Two reports of border security caught my attention in the summer of 2005: first, in *Borderline Insecure,* the "Interim Report by the Senate Committee on National Security and Defence," the committee outlines the importance of investing heavily in border security and the Canadian Border Services Agency (CBSA). According to this committee, border crossings and check points are an ideal place for monitoring the flows of goods and enforcing security related matters. The committee notes two obstacles to effectively enforcing national security in present day Canada:

> The first is the rights and freedoms guaranteed to everyone in Canada: without reasonable and probable cause, the police generally do not probe

> and question a person's behaviour. The second is that law enforcement resources are limited.[1]

Border crossings offer a unique solution to overcoming these obstacles because the investment in the CBSA will not just go to more security technologies and personnel but will go to creating a unique space where security can be policed without the restrictions of the Charter of Right and Freedoms. For the committee, the border can be a space that is a part of Canada but also a space apart from the rest of Canada.

Complying with the committee's recommendations would involve overhauling border crossing infrastructure and the CBSA'a organizational structure,[2] and, as the tabloid-like title of the report suggests, there is no time to waste. Perhaps it was this urgent need to get to the heart of the matter that the background information and histories of the border and the CBSA that would have provided a context in which to understand the current situation were relegated to the appendices at the end of the report. Of these, "Appendix V" is a map prepared by the CBSA at the request of Senate Committee for this report. The map shows all land border crossings and most of the CBSA offices across Canada (Image 1).

According to the CBSA map most CBSA offices are in the southern part of Canada, with a smattering of offices in the North and at major ports. There are so many offices on this southerly edge of Canada – on the U.S.-Canada border, in airports, downtown offices, ports, and so on – that they cannot all be labelled in the space provided but are, instead, listed in the margins of the page and marked with locational arrows. Perhaps it is because there was no room left on the page with all these arrows and

---

[1] Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Borderline Insecure,* June 2005, <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintjun05-e.pdf> (August 2006), 6.
[2] Ibid., 9-14.

lists of offices that the U.S is entirely absent from this map save for the Alaskan panhandle. Indeed, in comparison to other maps of Canada, this CBSA map is of little geographic value as it lacks a specific or consistent scale and any other information (roads, railways, altitude, latitude or longitude) that might more specifically situate these offices. In all, the CBSA map is little more than an iconic image of Canada.

Second, in early September 2005, the front page of the *Globe and Mail* read: "It was hyped as a TERRORIST map; it was cited by Egyptian TORTURERS; it is a VISITOR'S GUIDE to Ottawa" (Image 2). The story concerns Mr. Ahmed El Maati, a Kuwaiti-born Canadian citizen who underwent two years of torture in Egypt and Syria after September 11th. According to Mr. El Maati, the Canadian government was complicit in his torture.

In August 2001, Mr. El Maati, a truck driver who regularly travelled between Canada and the United States, was halted at the border, interviewed and had his rental truck searched. The border officials discovered a map in the cab of the truck and asked Mr. El Maati about it. Mr. El Maati said it was not his, but that it was in the truck when he picked it up. The map was a layout of the government complex at Tunney's Pasture near Ottawa. Border official made a photocopy of the map and released Mr. El Maati. After September 11th Mr. El Maati was approached and questioned by Canadian intelligence agents about the map. Then in November 2001on his way to Syria to get married, Mr. El Maati was singled out by officials in Germany and later detained in Damascus because his name was considered "suspicious."[3]

---

[3] "Ahmad Abou El Maati: Chronology" prepared by Mr. El Maati and legal council Barbara Jackman, www.amnesty.ca/english/main_article_home/elmaatichronology.pdf.

Over the next couple of months Syrian officials systematically tortured Mr El Maati. In January 2002, shortly after Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade admitted to knowing of Mr. El Maati's whereabouts, Mr. El Maati was moved to Egypt where he was brutally tortured by Egyptian officials and questioned about the map photocopied by Canadian border officials. The Egyptians demanded to know what targets on this map Mr. El Maati's terrorist group intended to attack. Although Canadian officials finally visited Mr. El Maati in August 2002 and after nine months of torture, he was not released until January of 2004.[4] The map at the centre of his misfortunes was, as the *Globe* headline mentions, a tourist-style map that helps delivery trucks navigate the maze of government offices outside Ottawa. The *Globe* reports that Syrian and Egyptian official's knowledge of this map points to the complicity of Canadian officials in Mr. El Maati's arrest and torture.[5]

I chose these two reports about the border because I believe they speak to the political situation in a post-9/11 North America, in which security is enforced at the expense of legal rights and freedoms. Reading them together, I wonder if torture is part of the Senate Committee's border proposal? I also wonder if the spaces of Canada's "Smart Border" include the prisons in Syria and Egypt? As such, I am left wondering if the CBSA map adequately represents the new geography of national security that takes place as much outside as inside the state's borders? On the other hand, if I take the CBSA map

---

[4] Ibid.

[5] Syria, the *Globe* goes on to explains, has emerged as one of the CIA's most effective intelligence ally. Although the *Globe* does not say so, one can assume this relationship is beneficial to the CIA as it allows for the use of torture as a means of interrogation, a tactic illegal in the U.S. As the case of Mr. El Maati demonstrates, Canada may have hit upon the same deal. The protection and secrecy afforded the RCMP and CSIS under claims to "national security" prevents their operations being scrutinized.

as a map of the "Smart Border," how does the iconic nature of this map figure into a "smart" geography?

I contend that the map complements the passport, laws, security agencies and other security technologies outlined in the previous chapter and is itself a technology of border security. Following from Henri Lefebvre, maps are *representation of space,* and as such are "tied the relations of production and to the 'order' which those relations impose."[6] As part of a triad that includes *spatial practices* and *representational space,* maps as *representations of space* embody the various intersections that produce the social/spatial relations of the Canadian nation-state. In this chapter, I argue that there is a connection between Canada's borders and maps that speaks to both a colonial nationalism and racist border "security" initiatives. As such, in this chapter I turn my attention from the actions of the CBSA, PSECP and Passport Canada to the International Boundary Commission (IBC) to show the extent to which the map is a technology though which Canada's state borders and national boundaries are produced. In short, I will show how the imagined boundaries of a Canadian identity are tied to the state's border by examining IBC's border and the geographic science that plotted it.

Following from Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul, the nation-state of Canada could not have been mapped without its borderline.[7] In that Canada's borderlines and maps are underwritten with geographic discourses and national narratives, in this chapter I investigate cartographies of the nation-and-state's border to understand the geography in which the "Smart Border" is plotted. My examination of the mapped border is an attempt to understand nationalized space and how it might be disrupted and displaced.

---

[6] Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* 33; Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernism,* 219.
[7] Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped* (Honolulu, Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1997), 55-6.

The latter part of this chapter will address the potential of Avtar Brah's notion of "cartographies of diaspora" in such a project. Among other goals, I want to know if the CBSA map might be used productively as a catalyst for change. To reach this point, this chapter is laid out in sections that address: the distinction and overlap of state borders and national boundaries; The IBC and colonial cartographies of state and nation; and finally, contentious cartographies and "diasporic borders."

Canada's Borders and Boundaries

On July 25, 2005, a month after the Senate released its report and a month or so before the story on Mr. El Maati ran in the *Globe,* Canadian Foreign Affairs minister Bill Graham raised the Canadian flag over Hans Island, challenging Danish minister Tom Hoeyem who flew the Danish flag there in 1984. In the time between Mr. Hoeyem's and Mr. Graham's triumphal acts of patriotism, passing ships loyal to either of the two nations have left bottles on the island's shores; brandy – if they are Danish – and bottles of rye whisky – if they are Canadian.[8] All these acts of patriotism revolve around a dispute concerning the ownership of Hans Island that began in 1973 when the International boundary line that separates Ellesmere Island (Canada) from Greenland (Denmark) was drawn through Hans Island. This international boundary, like the infamous 49th parallel, was decided based on references to latitude and longitude and, like many of Canada's borders, the line that bisects Hans Island was most likely first drawn on a map.

On July 27, 2005, the *Toronto Star* ran a story on the Danish-Canadian dispute, listing suggestions on how Canada could bolster its proprietary claims. Submitted by

[8] As reported by the *Toronto Star* July 27, 2005 (A7)

schoolteacher John Stevens, these suggestions ranged form renaming the island after hockey celebrities to erecting a Tim Horton's on it as a means of symbolically reasserting Canada's claim. The amused tone of Mr. Stevens' list is a good indicator of the importance of this international affair for many Canadians: the incident is funny more than anything else. [9]

Lack of enthusiasm for the annexation of Hans Island has not dampened the government's interest in this affair. The Canadian government is eager to assert its claim to Hans Island and other disputed border territories, particularly in the north where the effects of global warming are opening up new transportation routes.[10] Yet, this episode in the arctic should not simply be seen as a matter of global *realpolitik* because, with the planting of flags, putting-a-shore bottles of booze, and the humour of Mr. Stevens' list, the incident is run through with nationalist symbols and performances of Canadian identity. In my reading of the Hans Island affair, Minister Graham and Mr. Stevens are competing nationalist voices, each vying for the right to speak for Canada and Canadians. Although the sardonic tone of Mr. Stevens' response may be read as a means of reprimanding the state and Mr. Graham for acting in what, I assume, he considers an un-Canadian manner, Mr. Stevens' list positions one national narrative over another. Mr. Stevens' list can be seen as an attempt to reposition the image of a jocular, hockey-loving and donut-eating nation over and above the actions and rhetoric of a power-hungry state.

---

[9] Although my own thesis does not deal with it, for an examination of, and the critical possibilities of humour and Canadian identity, see Jody Berland, "Writing on the Border", CR: the *new centennial review* (2001), 140-1, 142-3; Katarzyna Rukszto, "The Other Heritage Minutes" *Topia* 14, 73-91; Erin Manning, "I AM CANADIAN" *Theory & Event* 4, no. 4 (2000), <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.4manning.html> (August 2006).

[10] The Kennedy Channel, the straight between Greenland and Ellesmere Island, is likely to become important along with many other Arctic seaways and resources as they become more readily accessible with the decreasing ice cover due to climate changes. In short, sovereignty over Hans Island may be very important for Canada to assert its right over and above claims made by competing states to administer, tax and exploit the Arctic.

Border scholar Joel Midgal makes the distinction between state borders and national boundaries, distinguishing the former as a means of constructing and regulating the "status" of "citizen" or "permanent resident", and the latter as a means of constructing and policing social identities.[11] This distinction is useful but, as the distinction between state-borders and social-boundaries are never hard and fast. When it comes to the nation-state the distinction between boundary and border become blurred. As Ernst Gellner writes, nationalism "is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones."[12] Although neither political nor social boundaries are static limits, there is much invested in distinguishing inside from outside and insider from outsider at boundaries and borders.[13]

Although Gellner suggests a tracing of boundaries onto borders and vice versa, this tracing need not be taken literally. Instead, the uniformity of boundaries and borders of nationalism is the result of re-negotiating and re-constructing the political with nationalist narratives. Thus, when talking about the geography or space of the nation it is possible to speak of the nation as something other than a country-sized space. A nationalized territory is, instead, an ongoing project to overlap nation-and-state. Although the border and boundaries are not identical, the border, as well as being an especially contentious site for state sovereignty, is a site at which identity – particularly a national identity – is re/produced.[14]

---

[11] Joel Midgal, "Introduction" in *Boundaries and Belonging* ed. by Joel Midgal (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 18-9.
[12] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), 1.
[13] Midgal, "Introduction," 18-20.
[14] Cf., Adriana Kemp " Dangerous Populations" in *Boundaries and Belonging* ed. by Joel Midgal (Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 73-97; Jody Berland, "Writing on the Border" *CR: the new centennial review* (2000).

A Canadian national identity demands a particular understanding and conjuring of the border. In effect, the border must be imagined in a particular way to support what Thongchai Winichakul would call the "We-self" of Canadian nationalist narratives. This We-self is an identification of oneself with the nation-state, an identification that is not a counter-part or product of state policy, but is a social and collective self.[15] The We-self is framed within limits marked by the nationalist project of constructing nation-and-state borders. Underwriting the construction of this nationalist border is, as Homi Bhabha would put it, narrations of nation that inform the border writers' identities.[16]

Mr. Stevens is not alone in his attempts to construct the boundary of Canadian identity at the border, but he is perhaps one of the few to do so in a Canadian-Danish context. According to Jody Berland, Anglo-Canadian writers and philosophers are obsessed with the border. Mr. Stevens' departure from this norm is his choice of borders, in that it is the Canadian-American border that Canadians usually obsess about. In fact, the humour of Mr. Stevens's comments stem largely from his import of stereotypes more familiar in a U.S-Canadian context into the current dispute over Hans Island. The currency of this U.S.-Canadian model on any of Canada's borders suggests, as Berland states, that to write about Canada is to write about/on/across the US-Canadian border. Indeed, the currency of the U.S Canadian border stems from an anxiety Canadian have about this line.[17] Following Berland, for Canadian nationalists the disappearance of the

---

[15] Thongchai Winichakul, Siam Mapped (Honolulu, Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1997), 7-8.
[16] Homi Bhabha, *Narration and Nation,* 1.
[17] Jody Berland, "Writing on the Border", in CR: the new centennial review (2001), 141.

U.S-Canadian border spells a similar fate for "Canadianness" in the face of American culture and requires that this border get "rewritten a thousand times" by Canadians.[18]

Roger Giddens' argument that Canada is best described as a "borderlands society" is akin to Berland's own thesis, although Giddens characterizes the experience as characteristic of an entire society and not just a few writers. Giddens suggests that if, "we think of the "borderlands" as a region in which the international boundary is blurred at the same time that its salience is heightened," then Canada is exemplary.[19] For Giddens as for Berland, the border blurred and heightened for Canadians is the U.S.-Canada border. For these writers, the "transnational" character of the everyday Canadian's life is a transnationality that blurs the line between Canadian and American society. This transnationality is as much cultural as it is political, and living in this borderland means a Canadian's social and political boundaries overlap at the 49th. To reside in this Canadian "borderlands society" is to be caught up in a seemingly paradoxical relationship with the border because Canadians are caught up in a paradoxical relationship with the United

---

[18] Berland "Writing on the Border" 150. For examples of these 'border writings' see Russell Brown, "Borderlines and Borderlands" pp.13-70 in *Borderlands Monograph #4* (U.S.A Borderlands Project 1989-1991). For unabashed nationalist proponents for rewriting a national border see Ian Angus, *A Border Within* (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1987); George Grant, *Lament for the Nation* (Toronto: McClelland and Stuart, 1971). The absence of Francophone authors within this list of nationalist border writers suggests that the anxiety over the border is largely an Anglo-Canadian disposition, and I agree that the "undefended border" is largely an Anglo-Canadian affair. However, although there are numerous nationalism – especially Québécois nationalism – within Canada that do not use the U.S.-Canadian border as a dominant trope but instead focus on a French-English divide, bilingualism, biculturalism and multiculturalism are used by Anglo-Canadians to distinguish the Canadian from the American side of the border. As well, I cannot ignore that most Francophone writers do not contest the "undefended border," and, at the time of writing, Québécois nationalists do not even take a firm stance against Anglo-Canada in defence of non-white, non-European rights except to argue over who is a better host. Although I will admit there are problems with including a Québécois voice in the undefended border I believe it is politically productive to incriminate all nationalist voices within Canada as culpable in continuing colonial projects if they do not contest the differential access to Canada's territory policed at the border.

[19] Roger Giddens, "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border", in *Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World*, (Lanham: SR Books, 2005), 153; Roger Giddens, *Borderlands Society* (Orono: Borderlands Project, 1990), 12-3.

States and American culture.[20] In this anxious, national geography, where the border begins is unclear because American influence extends well into Canada. There is, so to speak, an ever-present spectre of the U.S. hanging over a nationalist, Canadian borderland.

Of course, the Canadian-U.S. border is neither "blurred" nor does it "loom large" for many persons living in Canada in the manner Giddens' suggests. The lives of many immigrants, refugees and other migrants are "transnational" in a way that links Canada and being Canadian across other borders and to other places. For many, the heightened sense of the border speaks to a reality of being detained, searched, and threatened with deportation at the border by Canadian officials. The border is not something that might disappear if ignored; the border exists in the face of many status and non-status Canadians. In fact, as opposed to it being a matter of wondering where the U.S. begins, the border is "blurred" for many people because it is unclear where the border ends, as they never leave the border upon entering Canada. It is not the "paradoxical" border they carry, but as in the case of Mr. El Maati and other "security risks," it is a border of surveillance built by government agencies.

In her essay "Geography Lessons," Himani Bannerji describes and critiques the limits of Canadian nation-and-state:

> My first encounter with Canada occurred during my geography lessons as a young girl. There, in an atlas of physical geography, coloured green, pink, and yellow, I came across Canada – a place of trees, lakes, wheat fields, ice caps, and an ancient rock formation cut through with glaciers. I don't remember reading anything of the history of this country in my geography book, but somehow there were faint echoes of people and nature blurring into each other … What I am trying to recount is what

[20] The idea of there being a paradox at the heart of a Canadian identity is quite popular and has been taken up productively and problematically. Cf., Mackey (*House of Difference*, 49) for a productive critique of this "paradox."

> Canada meant for me – all this jumbled-up information, …Certainly, "Canada" was a mental rather than a historical space. It was an idyllic construction of nature and adventure….
>
> Many years later… [w]hen I immigrated to Montreal, I stepped out of my romantic construction of Canada and into a distinctly political-ideological one – one which impressed me as being both negative and aggressive. From the insistence and harshness with which I was asked whether I intended to apply for "landing" – a term I did not understand and that had to be explained - I knew that I was not welcome in this "Canada." I told the officer defiantly that this would never be my country; I had come as a foreign student and would leave upon receiving my degree. That is how it has remained to this day. Had I been received differently, had I been mad to feel more "at home," would this be my home, my Canada?[21]

From the many issues that Bannerji touches on, there are two things I would like focus upon: first, the spatial-psychic boundaries of the national territory define inside from outside and an outside that is within.[22] Being "in place" and "out of place" is an experience of space conditioned by the play of various power relationships to produce that space. As opposed to being oppositional, "out of place" and "in place" are not exclusive, for one can be out of place while being in it. The distinction is more between "in place," which connotes various means of residing, and feeling "at home."[23]

In the case of the nation-state, the security and immigration policies that identify and categorize bodies do a great deal to maintain the distinction of being "at home" from "in place" here in Canada. The encounter Bannerji describes is, in part, the result of policies such as Bill C-11 that demands and enforces a distinction between "landed

---

[21] Himani Bannerji, "Geography Lessons" in *Dark Side of the Nation*, 63-4. Cf., Kazimi, *Continuous Journey* for similar experience of a Canadian welcome. One could argue that the cold reception Bannerji – an English speaking immigrant – received in Montréal might have stemmed from Franco-Anglophone language disputes and Québécois nationalism. However, whereas language and ethic national politics would certainly have played a part in Bannerji's encounter and exploring the multiple overlapping lines of race, ethnicity and gender in this instance would provide a more nuanced understanding of Bannerji's welcome, I am disinclined to delve into the political intricacies raised by the particularity of Montréal in Bannerji's narrative because "Quebec and the rest" debates concerning bilingualism, biculturalism and ethnicity too often silence and obfuscate issues of race within Canadian and Québécois politics.

[22] Shome, "Space Matters," 49.

[23] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 4, 180, 190-3.

immigrant," "refugee," and "citizen " – categories that make one far from "at home." The border she encountered is a border that works to severely limit the rights of migrants while in Canada. It is a border that prevents migrants from gaining the right to sponsor family members – let alone friends – to immigrate to Canada. In the language of host and guest, in which the host is "Canadian citizen" and "white" and the guest "non-citizen" and "not-white," the relationship is a "conditional hospitality," where the host controls the border and wishes to retain control when welcoming quests.[24] The border Bannerji encounters and continues to encounter is a border of conditional hospitality because it limits her right to, in turn, become a "host."[25]

The host's border is markedly different from the guest's, and it is constructed with different narratives. There is little or no consideration of being "out of place" for Canadians who feel "at home" here. When boundaries and borders overlap, the "outside" functions as an Other against which Canadianness can be defined. For Berland, Giddens and many others, the Other against which Canadians define themselves is the U.S, a cultural, social and political Other literally on the other side of the border. As I noted earlier, in this conjuring of the state border as national boundary, the boundaries of "Canadian" are "Canadian-American" regardless of where the boundary is drawn.[26]

It is in the shadow of this American spectre that the host extols the benefits of being Canadian and, as such, of having a "border mentality." The host's "border mentality" iterates a Canadian "double-consciousness" in which the hosts claim for

---

[24] Jacques Derrida, "Hospitality, Justice and Responsibility," in *Questioning Ethics,* eds. Richard Kearney and Mark Dooley (New York: Routledge, 1998), 69-70. Quoted in Brian Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 157-8.
[25] Mireille Rosello, *Postcolonial Hospitality* (Hartford, Stanford Univ. Press, 2001), 16-7.
[26] Giddens, *Borderlands Society,* 12-3.

themselves an archetypal "postmodern" subjectivity.[27] Against the spectre of the U.S., Canadian is construed as an ideal position from which to view the world, a position that affords a balanced and progressive view of things.[28] With this border mentality the host claims for him or herself a Canadianness that transcends a colonial history of conquest. The border of this "border mentality" is, then, not only the U.S.-Canadian border but also the "undefended border;" a border that reflects a Canadian willingness to remain vulnerable in the face of the U.S. rather than be aggressive or exclusionary.

The undefended border, as Robertson *et al.* remind us, refers to a demilitarized area between Canada and the U.S. and, as a place so dominated by two nation-states, the "undefended border" does not easily permit a discussion of the defences erected against non-Americans, non-Canadians and sub-national identities.[29] The language of the "undefended border" constructs "Canadian" as a benevolent but vulnerable position from which it can deflect criticisms from sub-national groups within Canada aimed at Canadian-made inequalities and violence. This strategic defencelessness runs contrary to Bhabha's hope of a radical, anti-national border, but instead allows Canadian hosts to "construct the *nation itself* as the 'Third Space' of hybridity, a hybrid space which nevertheless reshapes central and well-worn nationalist ideologies."[30]

Second, Bannerji's lesson is very much a "geography lesson," in that the spatial and psychic boundaries of Canadianness are informed by geographic – and in this case cartographic – discourses. I do not believe I am being overly literal by interpreting

---

[27] Russell Brown ["Borderlines and Borderlands," in *Borderlands Monograph Series* #4 (Orono: Borderlands Project, 1990), 33] suggests that an Anglo-Canadian border consciousness expresses a "doubleness" that resembles a "postmodern doubleness."
[28] Mackey, *House of Difference,* p.49.
[29] Arnold E. Davidson *et al, Border Crossings:* (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 2003), 16.
[30] MacKey, *House of Difference,* p.83.

Bannerji's childhood encounter with a map this way. In fact, the border's geography is often taken literally, as the popularity of Steven Leacock's quip about the 49th parallel – "by an odd chance, the forty-ninth parallel, an astronomical line, turned out to mean something" – among border writers attests.[31] In this respect, I take from Bannerji that the meaning of Canada's borderline must be addressed in a way that critiques the science that plotted it. In a nationalist geography where border and boundary overlap, what is imagined to be "outside" the nation is that found on the other side of the 49th parallel. In this respect, by being a border exclusively between and for Canadian and American hosts, the "undefended border" is a geographic and psychic line the Canadian host crosses along a single axis that goes from Canada to the U.S.

Himani Bannerji's "geography lesson" expresses a different spatial experience of the border, one that skews the geographical fixity of the host's border. Her story is not a movement across but an arrival at the border and an inhabitation of the border ever after. Her border does not imagine two geographically fixed sides, but is, instead, a multi-axial space connecting many spaces. If the maps we draw represent the geography we know, considering the disjuncture Bannerji describes between the maps of her childhood and her experiences of living in Canada, then her "geography lesson" is a lesson based on the new and critical maps. As such, if the maps Canadians know support the "undefended border," then different, non-national maps are needed to critique the nation-and-state.

What are these different maps? In her writing, although Bannerji's critique compares Canada and the United States, she refuses to engage in a stereotypical representation of Canada. By stereotype I mean two things: first, Bannerji's account

---

[31] Steven Leacock, *My Discovery of the West* (1937), as quoted in the National Film Board of Canada, *Between Friends/entre amis* (NFB, 1976), 212.

challenges claims of a kinder and gentler Canadian border by pointing to a history of racism and violence directed against non-white, migrants – particularly migrant women – carried out through the Canadian immigration system. Second, from her "geography lesson," one can build a critique that addresses and works to displace colonial representations at work on/at/across the border. Following from Bhabha, I read Bannerji as setting aside distinctions of true and mis-representations of the border, and engaging instead with the problem of colonial representation and essentialized difference: representing an identity that is always "in place" and known, and a representation that is anxiously repeated. [32]

The rest of this chapter will consider and explore the underlying mindset that vacillates between a border that is "in place" and known, and a border that is anxiously repeated. I will not only consider a true or mis-representation of the border but also the problem with a border fixed by Eurocentric, colonial, geographic discourses. To do this, the next section will address the geography that underwrites the border drawn by the International Boundary Commission (IBC). In short, in the next section I will pin down the geography of the "undefended border."

Drawing the State: Maps and the Border

As of 2004, the Hans Island affair was only one of seven border disputes in which the Canadian government was embroiled. Most of these disputes concern water boundaries and access to resources in those areas. The only other land border in addition

[32] Homi K. Bhabha, "The Other Question," in *The Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), p.95.

to Hans Island was Machias Seal Island in the Bay of Fundy.[33] This dispute, like the majority of disputes Canada has had over its borders, is with the U.S.

Disputes concerning the Canada-U.S. border have been ongoing for over two hundred years. The continental border with the U.S was first negotiated in 1783 by the newly autonomous government of the United States and Britain in the Treaty of Paris. The treaty describes in words where the border is to fall, tracing a narrative from east to west along various rivers and lakes that were to divide the Thirteen Colonies from British North America. Upon reaching the Lake of the Woods the treaty declares that the border will continue "on a due west course to the river Mississippi..."[34] Problems concerning the border arose within the year, and the Jay Treaty of 1784 was drafted to sort them out. Not the least of these problems was that the Mississippi was not where the Treaty of Paris thought it was. Article IV of the Jay Treaty states:

> Whereas it is uncertain whether the River Mississippi extends so far to the Northward as to be intersected by a line to be drawn due West from the Lake of the Woods...it is agreed, that measures shall be taken, in concert between His Majesty's Government in America, and the Government of The United States, for making a joint survey of the said River...[35]

One commissioner was employed by each government to jointly carry out these surveys, and received a mandate to resolve these and other future "uncertainties" and disputes that may arise concerning the location of the border.

Various disputes over the border arose leading up to the War of 1812, and even more disputes followed the fighting. Almost all of these disputes concerning the position of the border were resolved with joint commissions. Indeed, unlike the current

---

[33] *Canadian Geographic* 124, no.6 (November/December 2004), 50.
[34] "Treaty of Peace 1783," *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/cgi-bin/disp.pl/en/bsp.1.779.en.html> (August 2006).
[35] "Jay Treaty 1784," *DFAIT* 17 February 2003 <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/keydocs/keydocs_details-en.asp?intDocumentId=1> (August 2006).

governments' efforts to construct a joint, security oriented "Smart Border," joint commissions have managed the physical aspects of the border and border zones since the Jay Treaty. This predilection towards using joint commissions to resolve border matters is praised by many as the model for carrying out good, international, political relations.[36] Of the many present day border-related commissioning bodies, the International Joint Commission and the "Boundary Waters Treaty" it enforces win international praise for resolving disputes concerning the quality and quantity of water that makes up and flows over the border.[37] Perhaps less renowned internationally and even little known in North America by name, the International Boundary Commission (IBC) is responsible for clearly marking the border and making the line apparent to the eye. This Commission, created in 1908 and made a permanent agency in 1925, erects monuments to mark the border and is famous for maintaining six-metre wide "vistas" cut through the forests overgrowing the border (Images 3 and 4).[38]

The language of the boundary Treaties from 1908 onwards, including the Canadian government's 1985 *International Boundary Commission Act*, is consistent if repetitive. These treaties and acts stipulate that the IBC is to maintain an "effective" international boundary line. Looking at the tasks of the various commissioners, "effective" means that the boundary line must be both visible to the eye and determined such that the exact location of the border can be returned to and verified even if it lies in

---

[36] Daniel Drache, *Borders Matter,* 30.
[37] Cf. "International Joint Commission," *Government of Canada,* 25 July 2000 <http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/usa6_b_e.htm> (August 2006).
[38] "The Vista," *IBC,* 15 December 2005 <http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcpg2 .htm#ibcorg> (August 2006). Cf. *Between Friends/Entre amis.* Usually, wherever the IBC is mentioned there is an accompanying image of vistas and monuments.

the most remote parts of the wilderness. Since the Jay Treaty, an "effective" border has depended on geographical sciences to fulfil both of these demands.

Considering the number of surveys conducted by the various boundary commissions, an "effective" boundary is a boundary that makes as much sense on paper as it does on the ground. Maps have not only been a product of boundary commissions, but were instrumental in negotiating the border. A key map in determining the border as it was described in the 1783 Treaty of Paris was Dr. John Mitchell's 1755 *A Map of the British and French Dominions in North America.*[39] It is on Mitchell's map that the Mississippi extends far enough north to cross a line drawn due west from the Lake of the Woods. When the border was announced, the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) contested Mitchell's map, arguing that it was based on inaccurate information that did not work on the ground. In delimiting British and American interests, the border posed serious problems for the HBC – who were barred from operating in the U.S – by cutting off many outlying trading posts from depots and shipping centres like Montreal. This disjuncture between map and land also posed problems for the governments wishing to assert their authority over this territory, extract resources and organize settlement. Authority secured through treaties was and remains largely drawn on maps, and inaccurate maps lead to arguments over who controls what. Clarity on the ground has always meant a corresponding clarity on paper.

When clarity is a cartographical and surveying matter, then it is up to a geographer to make things clear. A clarity defined by the cartographical and geographical sciences underscores the "effective" border created and maintain by the IBC. The 1908 and 1910 Treaty that brought the IBC into being call for the appointment of an "expert

[39] Alan Morantz, *Where is Here?* (Toronto: Penguin, 2002), 72.

geographer or surveyor' to resolve several disputes concerning the position of the border.[40] In 1925, the ratification of the IBC in perpetuity came with the further clarification that the curvature of the 49th parallel made it impractical to attempt to mark a single continuous line on the ground. Instead, the more "effective" border this treaty cemented was and is one made of a series of straight lines running between adjacent border monuments.[41] In short, because it is "impractical" to draw a straight line as long as the Western boundary line on a sphere like the earth, the IBC maintains a line that does not follow the 49th parallel but passes through monuments that sit on this line. "Practical," here, means straight lines, and "clarity" literally means being able to see the adjacent border monuments (even if distance between markers makes this more a theoretical point than a realistic goal) as much as it means "seeing" the border when one comes to it.[42]

Since 1925, the "clear" and "effective" border is a border made up of 10,311 straight-line segments measured, plotted and cleared by the IBC.[43] Although the IBC was not the first boundary commission to erect monuments, since 1925 almost all the monuments the IBC maintains mark the axes, or deflection points, of the borderlines.

---

[40] Article I and VI "Treaty of 1908," *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1908.299.en.html> (August 2006); Article I "Treaty of 1910," *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1910.352.en.html> (August 2006).

[41] "Treaty of 1925," *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1925.515.en.html> (August 2006).

[42] "Seeing" the border definitely ties into the security oriented visibility that refers to a knowing-as-transparency model that is embodied in a Foucauldean 'panopticism'. [Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish,* trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York, Vintage Books, 1991), 201-2]. Gerald McGrath *et al.* notes [*Mapping a Northern Land* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1999), 67] that a Custom's house on the B.C. Washington border had to install removable window panels so that line of site could be maintained through the building. Although cartography and geography are part of state surveillance does not mean that the 'efficient border' is actually effective in realizing the goal of a panoptic eye.

[43] McIntosh, *The Collectors,* 211. The IBC maintains curveless line segements as short as 23.5 inches (in the Quebec-Main highlands) and one as long as 647.1 miles (the 141st meridian boundary between the Yukon and Alaska). The number 10,311 dates from the early 1980s and may have changed in the last two decades. Considering this possibility yet finding no more recent number, I have chosen to use the number 10.311. The exactness of this number still startles me.

The nearly 10,311 monuments mark the beginning and end of line segments and, together, mark the unbroken line at which sovereignties begin and end. It is my contention that these 10,311 deflection points do more than separate nation-states. Instead, these 10,311 points are part of the national boundary that delimits a space in within which the Canadian is "at home" and, as such, examining these points will help us better understand nationalized spaces. In short, these 10,311 monuments have come to stand for, and stand behind the undefended border and a host's Canada.

In *Mapping a Northern Land,* a book devoted to outlining the practice of the geographic sciences in Canada from 1947 to 1994, the editors explain that the word "geodesy" – a branch of mathematics that deals with the shape and area of the earth – argue that geodesy is the branch of science devoted to answering the question "where am I?"[44] Equally succinct, the Oxford English Dictionary's etymology of "geodesy" reveals that the word derives from Greek and means, "to divide the earth." Playing, for the moment, with Northrope Frye's definitive question "where is here?" – the starting point for unravelling national identity – and the two definitions of geodesy I have presented, we can begin to better understand a Canadian geodesy and its ties to both national identity and the state.[45] In short, I propose one way of starting to answer the question "what is Canadian?" – the question of so many border writers – is: "Canadians are Canadians by how they divide the earth."

What can be made of a nation-and-state that divides itself from, and connect itself to the world with 10,311 straight lines? Although maintaining and administrating such a border can be construed as the articulation of an overly particular and exacting

---

[44] Gerald McGrath *et al., Mapping a Northern Land* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's Univ. Press, 1999), 21.
[45] Northrope Frye, *Literary History of Canada,* as quoted in Morantz, *Where is here?* 1.

government agency, 10,311 lines is less an exception amidst otherwise moderate efforts to maintain the border than the outcome of a colonial nationalism that expresses a particular understanding of territory and the borders that bound it. This understanding of territory is tied to a Canadian geodesy.

In the three volume series *Men and Meridians*, of which *Mapping a Northern Land* is the unofficial fourth volume, the author traces a Canadian geodesy that is a wholly European endeavour.[46] In one sense, *Men and Meridians* espouses a Eurocentric history of Canadian surveying by underwriting the Canadian geodesy with a historical re-construction that links Canadian to ancient Greek thought through thousands of years of European sciences and practices of surveying. The continuation of a Greek intellectual heritage in Canada is the effect of a Eurocentric history that construes Greek thought as an origin of enlightened European thought and Canada as the inheritor of the European Enlightenment. At the same time, this genealogy of thought is also a geographical conceit, as both Greece and Canada are conceived of as "Western" in a Eurocentric view of the earth's geography. Canada and Greece are mapped as "Western" spaces despite alternative histories and geographies.[47]

The IBC realizes this Western geodesy with a border of 10,311 deflection points, each placed with "precise geographic positioning."[48] As *Mapping a Northern Land* attests, the ingenuity of the IBC in using and improving upon European surveying and mapping sciences testifies to scientific progress and the "European" ability to progress.[49]

---

[46] Don W. Thomson, *Men and Meridians* vol.1 (Ottawa : R. Duhamel, Queen's printer, 1966), v-vii.
[47] Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), 10, 15-24. In support of this claim that Canada's cartographic history is Western in origin, see Richard Ruggles, *A Country so Interesting* (Kingston: McGill-Queens Press, 1991); Donald P. Lemon, *Theatre of Empire* (Saint John, NBM Pub., 1987); and Joe C. W Armstrong, *From Sea to Sea* (London: Fleet Pub. 1982).
[48] McGrath *et al., Mapping a Northern Land*, 61-7.
[49] Ibid., 64-5.

These 10,311 lines connect the IBC to the history of surveying and mapping Canada that is, according to John P. Lemon, nothing short of the "evolution" of precision. Lemon's history compliments *Men and Meridians,* characterizing cartography and surveying in Canada as the uninterrupted progress towards a more exact knowledge of Canada. This knowledge came about through a more rigorous practice of the science of surveying and cartography – as opposed to being waylaid by artistic flourish and decoration, – and the physical discipline of filling in *Terra Incognita* on the map through ever more heroic and rigorous explorations.[50]

There has been no shortage of Euro-Canadian heroes and explorers "discovering" the country. Canada – that "idyllic construction of nature and adventure" that Bannerji gleaned from her childhood maps – is, in many narratives of Canadian identity, a heroic and muscular feat accredited to the efforts of various men. In a Eurocentric history of mapping, over a century before Tom Thomson and the Group of Seven tamed the wilderness with their brushes, David Thompson ordered the wilds with his sexton for the North-West Company.[51] IBC surveyors continue this project and adventure dominated by narratives of men like Thompson.[52] These narratives of ordering space, based as they are on narratives of progress towards an ever more precise survey, map and border, are tied up in colonial-informed oppositions of civilization and savagery where "discovering" implies a civilizing process. In short, by turning wilderness into landscapes and maps,

---

[50] Lemon, *Theatre of Empire,* 22.
[51] Cf. D'Arcy Jenish, *Epic Wanderer* (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 2003) for an example of the mythic David Thompson.
[52] Cf. *Between friends/Entre amis,* 34 for the picture and story of a heroic, adventurous IBC surveyor.

Thompson like Thomson epitomize what nationalists like to call a truly Canadian relationship with nature and the roots of a Canadian identity.[53]

Indeed, obfuscated by these heroic yet politically benign acts of ordering, the actual marking of the border by various *ad hoc* survey teams throughout the eighteenth- and nineteenth centuries was tied to military and para-military campaigns. British militias and regiments supported the HBC to protect their landholdings, and later the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) enforced the laws and interests of Ottawa in quelling Native and Metis uprisings.[54] Marking the border was and still is tied to the needs of business, settlers and governments and essential for owning and working the land and raising revenue through excise and import taxes.[55] Despite nationalist narratives to the contrary, marking the border on the ground was and remains an act of maintaining the state.

The IBC does not connect their border work to conquest but, instead, see their role as coming at the end of a history of border negotiations and after all animosity concerning these negotiations have been "relegated to the history books."[56] In short, they do not see in their monuments and vistas the mass displacement of First Nations people by a land hungry, colonial state. In part, the IBC's belief in their own political benignity can be attributed to the favourable renown of commissioning bodies in carrying out international politics. However, their reputation and image are also due to their position as a surveying and mapping institution. As Ian Barrow notes in discussing colonial mapping projects in India, the currency of the map as a product of rational and scientific

---

[53] Bannerji, "Geography Lessons," 63; Mackey *House of Difference,* 44-5.
[54] McIntosh, *The Collectors,* 170, 182. Cf., Morantz, *Where is Here?* 78-80 for a discussion of surveying and state formation.
[55] McIntosh, *The Collectors*, 11.
[56] "Boundary History," *IBC,* 15 December 2005 <http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcpg2.htm#history> (August 2006).

endeavour left the colonial viewer in the metropole with the impression that conquest and control of India was done in a responsible manner.[57] In this respect, as a surveying body, the straightness of the IBC's 10,311 courses speaks to a Canadian civility and order that is detached and even opposed to the barbarity of conquest. The 10,311 lines that are, in fact, a testament to a history of colonial conquest and expansion are overshadowed by the tranquil images of monuments and vistas used to celebrate the border.[58] Pictures of the long, straight paths of denuded land that climb isolated mountains and traverse secluded valleys make the U.S.-Canadian border a picturesque landscape. In effect, the renown of commissioning bodies, the benignity of cartographic sciences, and the quietude of these images suggest more than anything else the idea that the IBC's border is truly the host's undefended border.[59]

Cartographies of Nation-(and)-State: A Cartography of 10,311 line segments

David Harvey writes, "[i]f a picture or map is worth a thousand words, then power in the realms of representation may end up being as important as power over the materiality of spatial organization."[60] Indeed, as a means of influencing as well as representing a particular worldview, maps are, as map historian Brian J. Harley writes, "never value-free images...[but] biased towards, promoted by, and exerts influence upon

[57] Ian J. Barrow, *Making History, Drawing Territory* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003) 184.
[58] Cf. *Between Friends*; Canadian Geographic 124, no.6 (November/December 2004), 50; McIntosh *The Collectors* (Toronto, NC Press Ltd. 1984).
[59] "[The border passes over] mountains, down cliffs, along waterways and through prairie grasses, the line snakes 8,891 kilometres or 5,525 miles across North America, tranquil, undefended but not uncared for." ["International Boundary," *IBC,* 15 December 2005 <http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/ibcpg2.htm#intro> (August 2006)].
[60] Harvey *Condition of Postmodernism,* 233.

particular sets of social relations."[61] Much has been written on the political relations secured through maps, and Harley himself wrote a good deal about the silences and gaps in the content of the map that speak to various material and social inequalities.[62] But this "bias" also works at the level of representation in so far as "Western" geographers assume that the earth is an object of study best known through observation. The particular bias expressed in Western geodesy is a scientific conceit that claims the earth is real and objective and through "systematic observation and measurement" can be expressed in mathematical terms to produce an independently verifiable cartographic truth.[63] Construed as a science, cartography is placed within discourses of progress and a bias that assumes improved techniques and technologies of the trade will lead to a greater precision in representing the land.[64] This precision is believed to be a superior and more exact knowledge of the earth itself and a knowledge only "Western" science is capable of achieving. In short, a Western geodesy is premised on the belief that one *can* map because the earth *can be* mapped, and Western maps are only maps that get it right.

The "West," as José Rabasa and Walter Mignolo tell us, is a product of a "Western" cartographic bias, and is a West that emerges with the beginning of what these scholars call a Eurocentric modernity.[65] The growing influence of this bias coincides with the "discovery" of the Americas and, what Hannah Arendt and others refer to as the

---

[61] Brian J. Harley, "Maps, knowledge, and power", in *Iconography of landscape*, eds. by Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988), 278. Cf. John Pickles [*History of Spaces,* 80] for discussion of "cartographic gaze" associated with this mathematical and metaphysical bias.
[62] Brian J. Harley, ""Deconstructing the Map;" *Cartographica* 26, no.2 (Summer 1988), 1-20; Brian Harley, "Silences and Secrecy" *Imago Mundi* 40 (1988), 57-76. Cf. Ian Taylor, "Official geography and the creation of Canada" *Cartographica* 31, no.4 (Winter 1994), 1-15.
[63] Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 4; Graham Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map," *Ariel* 20, no.4 (October 1989), 116.
[64] Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 2-3.
[65] José Rabasa "Allegories of Atlas" in *Inventing A-M-E-R-I-C-A* (London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993)*s*, 180; Walter Mignolo, "Misunderstanding and Colonization" *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 92, no.2 (Spring 1993), 237.

birth of a "modern" period.[66] Geography and cartography interweave with this notion of the "modern," so that Mercator's Atlas – what many recognize as the first "modern" maps – is not "modern" simply by being a product of an historical period marked in calendric time. "Modern" means, among other things, a belief that "European" is a unique and privileged identity in the world.[67] It is on and through Mercator's map that "America" and "Europe" were invented, in that the latter came to believe it discovered the former, thus making America the "new" world in relation to the newly-invented "old" world of Europe. As such, Mercator's Atlas privileges Europe by documenting a "new" European world as opposed to an old Amerindian world, and is itself a document used to construct a separate and unique European civilization.[68] Present day maps are "modern" in so far as they continue to inform and be informed by this Eurocentric worldview.

The "modern" world is also a finite world.[69] Mercator's mathematical projection of the earth's size permitted a division of the earth's surface into a grid, within which positions could be taken and plotted on a piece of paper proportionately divided. The "modern" map, as such, is considered a scientifically accurate mimetic representation, and the filling in of the grid is a realization of the total world. Like the space of the grid on which it is based, the mapped world is uniform, and in it all positions are defined by a set of longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates. The plotted points are located in a spatially uniform world that is defined by degrees that is so many metres by so many metres.

---

[66] Hannah Arendt [*Human Condition*, (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1971), 248-62] considers the Archimedean view point of Mercator's map an innovation, among others, that led to an "uprooting" of the world that has come to define the "Modern." Cf. Thongchai, *Siam Mapped*, p.129; and Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernism,* p.244 for similar definitions of the "modern."

[67] Rabasa "Allegories of Atlas," 207-8; Mignolo, "Misunderstanding," 255.

[68] José Rabasa, *Allegories of Atlas,* 207-8; Martin W. Lewis, *et al, Myth of Continents,* (London: University of California Press, 1997), 25-6. Cf. Huggan's ("Decolonizing the Map," 126) discussing of the fixing a European colonial identity.

[69] Harvey, *Condition of Postmodernism,* 243-4

Mercator's "flattening" of the earth on paper denotes a transformation of the earth into a profane space of horizontal relations.[70]

"Modern" borders define and cut through this uniform and profane space. The modern political world is a cobweb of borders overlaying a uniformly composed earth, or what Lewis *et al* call the "jig-saw puzzle" view of the world. This "jig-saw" view argues for a world made up of discrete pieces that are comparable and, when fit-together, create a stable world.[71] Each state, like a piece of this puzzle, is a wholly uniform political space bound by unbroken borderlines. Like the uniform space of Mercator's projection, this political world is drawn as a decentred whole where states are horizontally related, and in which no state is peripheral to any other. [72]

The limits of these states were and remain, literally, delineated. Early modern geographers used borderlines to outline the emerging territorial sovereignties that came to replace the patchwork of overlapping, medieval kingdoms.[73] The borderline is not just a new way of drawing existing borders but expresses a particular, political formation, and differs from those political territories bound by boundary zones. Thai historian Thongchai Winichakul characterizes the distinction between borderlines and boundary zones as a difference between the Thai nation-state and the "pre-modern" Siamese Kingdom. The power relations of the Siamese Kingdom were a spatially discontinuous, hierarchically arranged network of power relations, in which nodes were bound to the King of Siam and the capital by a system of reciprocal obligations. These vassal territories were the limits of Siamese influence and the limits of the kingdom. Because

---

[70] Ibid., 250; Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 171.
[71] Lewis *et al., Myth of Continents,* 10-1.
[72] Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 54-6; and Michael Shapiro "Triumphalist Geographies," in *Spaces of Culture,* eds. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash (London: SAGE, 1999), 169.
[73] Salter, *Rights of Passage,* 12.

nodes were often part of multiple networks of obligation, sovereignties tended to overlap one another in these zones, and land between nodes was often given away without viewing it as a loss or diminution of the kingdom.[74] On the other hand, borderlines characteristic of the Thai nation-state bound the homogeneous and horizontal spatial territory. The sovereign's power extends uniformly from the capital to this line, and everything and everyone inside these limits is exclusively of that territory and under one sovereign power.

Borderlines, both on the ground and on the map, speak to a new emphasis on place and, as such, are more than just political limits but expressions of a new territoriality. Robert David Sack defines territoriality as "the attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area."[75] As Thongchai's comparison shows, borderlines are the limits of particular Thai power relations between the sovereign, people and place, and refer to an "inside" and "outside" that differs from Siamese territoriality.

The different emphasis on place that accompanies a borderline territoriality creates a territory that means more than political affiliation.[76] Territory is always imbued with identity narratives that encapsulate an experience of the land that defines a truth about the "place" and the people that live there. As Benedict Anderson suggests in *Imagined Communities,* the territoriality of a national identity corresponds to a territorialization of faiths, language, and power that characterize the physical and psychic

---

[74] Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 74-6, 77.
[75] Robert David Sack *Human Territoriality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 19.
[76] Sack *Human Territoriality,* 19. Cf. Barrow, *Making History,* 13.

geography of the nation-state.[77] In Thongchai's example, unlike his or her Siamese ancestor the Thai national belongs to the nationalized territory, identifies and is identified with it. This territorialized identity that dominates the national imagination is not an attachment to a particular plot of land, but is the creation of space that intertwines with readings of "land" and belonging. As such, the national territory is an emotionally and symbolically charged, geographically defined place.

Following from what I have said, there are two notions of space in the geography of the nation-state. This nationally imagined space is, in part, the bounded, uniform and profane space of Mercator's projection but it is also "a source of pride, loyalty, love, passion, bias, hatred, reason, unreason."[78] Thongchai calls this longing for and belonging to a particular national territory imagined within a latitudinal and longitudinal grid the "geo-body."[79] The geo-body is "diabolically generative" in that feelings of belonging to a national territory stimulate the creation of variable spaces with a "modern" world delineated according to a uniform and profane grid. Thus, it is often the case that being within the borderlines of a national territory does not guarantee belonging to that particular place. Even though a territorialized identity suggests that being "here" is all that is needed to enjoy, identify and be identified with this place, an "outsider" can reside as much within as outside of the national territory. As such, relations of class, race, gender or other expressions of difference at play in this space determine "place" – being in place and being out of place.[80]

---

[77] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 17, 21-2. Cf. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism,* 2.
[78] Thongchai, *Siam Mapped,* 17, 137.
[79] *Ibid,* 16.
[80] Adriana Kemp, "Dangerous Populations," 81. Cf. Lefebvre, *Production of Space,* 81; Harvey, *Conditions of Postmodernism,* 223.

The contemporary world geography of uniform and variable spaces is not, in itself, new but continues earlier Eurocentric geographies in which the uniform space plotted on the map was read in conjunction with a hierarchical division of places and bodies. As I have stated, a Eurocentric bias of progress frames other earlier or foreign maps and mapmaking practices as inferior, construing the epistemologies on which they are based as simple, simply wrong or both.[81] Through colonial rule, this hierarchy took on racial distinctions in which "European" and "white" signified one another with white European spaces the location and epitome of enlightened civilization. Non-white, non-Europeans needed to be educated so that these uncivilized spaces could at least emulate civilization. Dividing the world according to this Eurocentric world of racial identity was part of, and legitimated, the violence of colonial rule. [82]

In this Eurocentric geography, bodies and places became interdependent, and through maps, bodies labelled according to a racial spectrum were given geographically defined places in the world.[83] The perceived geographical fixedness of some "races" was seen as both a lack of technological know-how to travel the world and an essential inferiority that prevented them from overcoming their place within the hierarchy of ability and culture. "Whiteness," as the embodied, colonial ideal, was the sign of being able to overcome physical and essential impediments.[84] The map, as a technology used by Europeans to navigate the world, was at once proof of Europe's superior science and a thing that allowed the viewer to know and overcome the world. The map allowed the

---

[81] Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 4; Pickles *History of Spaces,* 80, 83, 186.
[82] Barrow, *Making History,* 28; Lewis *et al., Myth of Continents*, 11-15.
[83] Lewis *et al., Myth of Continents,* 120.
[84] Harvey, *Conditions of Postmodernism,* 249-50, 252. Cf. Radhika Mohanram, "Cartography of bodies", in *Black Body: Women, Colonialism and Space* (Minnesota: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1999), .3-22; Carol Schick, "Keeping the Ivory Tower White," in *Race, Space, and the Law* ed. Sherene H. Razack (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2002), 115.

colonizers to imagine themselves detached from earthly spatial constraints and able to see with an Apollonian eye that can clearly order the world from a superior, Archimedean vantage point.[85] This transcendence was only possible through the geographic sciences, and every improvement to the practice of surveying and mapping a move towards greater transcendence.

To assume that a racialized geography has long been relegated to the past or, having reached its peak in seventeenth and eighteenth century imperial geographies, petered out with the decolonization of former colonies during the twentieth century is to echo narratives of progress that remove discourses of "precision" from the Eurocentric notions of civilization in which it was conceived. In many cases, when geographers characterize – even epitomize – racist geography according to seventeenth and eighteenth century geographies that produced maps depicting allegorical representations of the continents hierarchically organized according to notions of civilization, ability, beauty, and so on, that position "white," civilized Europe as an idealized perfection, these geographers fail or refuse to see "race" in the very lines of the map. As Rabasa and Mignolo argue, the inequalities of a Eurocentric world do not disappear simply because Europe is no longer clearly drawn in the centre of the map.[86] Colonial geographies persist when nationalist cartographies are used to assert the right of the colonizer to rule, and support the colonizer's claims as to the rightness of their rule.

As John Pickles points out, behind the present day world map is a history of cartography determined in part by the demands of capitalism and nation-states. The concern for private property as well as a territorialized community and sovereignty that

---

[85] Denis Cosgrove, *Apollo's Eye* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press, 2001), 5; Pickles, *History of Spaces,* 80.
[86] Rabasa "Allegories of Atlas," 180; Mignolo, "Misunderstanding," 232.

underwrites much of the last five hundred years of mapping informs definitions and our understanding of cartographic precision.[87] Capitalism and the nation-state, I argue, inform an understanding of title (ownership) and entitlement (belonging) that frames the host's narrative of Canada, and create maps that continue the colonial project of distinguishing host and guest. On the one hand, maps remain instrumental in securing title to the land and, on the other hand, are a means of legitimating the rightness of that title.[88] Title also confirms and creates a familiarity with places by depicting recognizable and already legitimate power structures in representations of foreign lands. In short, all places one can own are familiar on the map. However, possessing or being familiar with the land does not legitimate the host's entitlement to take possession of, and belonging to, a territory because entitlement means as much the rightness of control as it is the perceived right to control. Entitlement, as such, is a matter of rewriting history, and rewriting history becomes a matter of redrawing territory.[89]

"Nationhood, patriotism, and the like become," Thongchai writes, "burdens compelling us to read the past in one way rather than another."[90] Nations, as Benedict Anderson reminds us, are genealogical and their history is as much a "family history" as a list of dates. In the case of Canada, Canadianness is not created but is seen as an inheritance transmitted across time through the imagined familial ties that connect pioneers to present day citizens.[91] Drawing the Canadian family tree is a matter of writing backwards into the past. Inheritance is negotiated inversely, first by identifying what one

---

[87] Pickles, *History of Spaces,* 99-101.
[88] Harvey, *Conditions of Postmodernism,* 228; Pickles, *History of Spaces,* 116.
[89] Barrow, *Making History,* 16.
[90] Thongchai, *Siam Mapped,* 163.
[91] Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p.143, 196, 200-1; Rukszto, "Other Heritage Minutes," 80; Mackey, *House of Difference,* 77.

wishes to inherit, determining a point of origin for this heritance, and then connecting the past to the present. As such, in the genealogies of nation, there is nothing outside, nothing not-Canadian, in the nation's family tree.

The Canadian territory is the soil in which the Canadian family tree takes root. Through historical atlases and maps the Canadian "geo-body" is delineated in images of pre-confederation space.[92] As Thongchai writes, "[I]t is through this mediation of historical maps that the domains of space and memory, with knowledge and sentiment, are transgressed."[93] The Canadian "geo-body" haunts the reconstructed past, and past geographies are overlaid with the iconic image of Canada: a timeless, bounded space. This iconic image becomes a map-as-logo, an image that is "infinitely reproducible" and that penetrates deep into the popular consciousness by being consumed through various media: textbooks, placemats, stamps, and so on.[94] As such, Canadians feel "at home" here because, in their minds, "here" has always been the Canadian territory.

Comparatively, that which is not part of the Canadian family tree is believed to come from outside the national territory. For instance, although black communities are centuries old in Canada, and even though Mathieu Da Costa – an African interpreter and navigator – arrived with Samuel de Champlain, a history of black communities in Canada is a history of "absented presence."[95] In nationalist narratives of the Canadian nation, black persons and communities were here but not agents in the formation of the nation.

---

[92] Sparke, *In the Space of Theory,* 10.
[93] Thongchai, *Siam Mapped,* 154. Cf. Black, *Making History,* 54-5
[94] Anderson, *Imagined Communities,* 175.
[95] Cf. Rinaldo Walcott, "Caribbean Pop Culture in Canada," *Small Axe* 9, 129. "Absented-presence" is a term Walcott uses to describe the erasure of Black and Native persons in Canadian history by including them as non-actors in the events in which they participated. For example, although there were slaves in Canada who physically built the nation, as slaves black persons and Natives were not pioneers. Denouncing slavery or writing a history of slavery in Canada may not counter this absented presence. For information concerning Mathieu Da Costa, Cf. Canadian Heritage website, http://www.canadianheritage.gc.ca/special/mdc/dacosta/index_e.cfm.

By focusing on heritage, roots and lines of dissent, Canadian multicultural policy is instrumental in perpetuating this absented presence of black, not-quite, Canadian citizens.[96] In a sense, this national history and geography is re/produced when "multicultural" Canadians are asked about their place of origin, a heritage that is conceived as always starting and remaining outside Canada. In effect, a Eurocentric, nation-and-state history and geography is reaffirmed when non-white Canadians are made to feel "out of place" when pressed: "Yes, But where are you *really* from?"[97]

Returning to the CBSA map of Canada (Image 1), a map informed by the Senate committee's narrative of an insecure border, the iconic status of the image of Canada speaks to a Canada that is both a place of latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates and a place in which Canadians feel at home. As such, the CBSA map is a host's map and the border of this image is the undefended border – the benign border of monuments and vistas that obfuscate the colonial heritage of violence that delineated and continues to draw this territory. It is an image that legitimates the "Smart Border" defences and exclusions of the uncivilized, threatening, non-citizen.

Although geographies of national security and a "Smart Border" include prisons in Syria and Egypt – or Immigration Protection Centres in Laval Quebec – that do not appear on this map, the CBSA map is a map of the "Smart Border." The deterritorialized, national security border discussed in Chapter One is visible in the new border of CBSA offices – new in that it is away from the country's edges and not limited to Canadian territory. Yet, as places where the distinction between citizens and non-citizens is made

---

[96] Walcott, "Caribbean Pop Culture in Canada," 127, 129.
[97] Adrienne Shadd, "Where Are You Really From?" in *Talking about Identity,* ed. Carl E James and Adrienne Shadd. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2001), 11-12; Melanie C.T. Ash, "But Where Are You REALLY From?" in *Racism, eh?* ed. Camille A. and Charmaine A. Nelson. (Toronto: Captus Press, 2004), 398-409.

according to national security categories of risk that continue colonial and racist distinctions of civilized and uncivilized, this border is not new. Instead, the CBSA map reinforces the completeness of the IBC's 10,311 points, a completeness that separates "us" from "them," and delineates a Eurocentric, Canadian territory.

Similar to the manner in which new security legislation continues to displace non-white migrants in Canada, this iconic image speaks to a colonial geography of essentialized bodies and racialized places. Mr. El Maati is "out of place" in this cartography of Canada because he cannot transcend a violence that security agents believe comes with his Middle Eastern origins. Mr. El Maati is always a liability, always already suspicious, and a threat to the orderly life of Canada because he cannot transcend the violence believed to come from somewhere else. It is enough to ask, what would have happened if the "terrorist" map found in his truck was in the hands of a "white" Canadian? Would it have been worth photocopying?

The geographic positioning of the CBSA's 10,311 deflection points speaks to what can only be called a hyper-colonial geography reinvented in new policies and with new mapping technologies. For example, there is the case of Adil Charkaoui, a university graduate student, father, and husband now under house arrest after having been arrested and imprisoned by the RCMP using security certificates. Mr. Charkaoui is under curfew, is chaperoned by his parents if he leaves the house and wears a GPS tracking device monitored by police at all times. This insistence on fixing him in a space defined by lines of longitude and latitude continually marks him off from the rest of Canada and Canadians, making him "out of place" in the Canadian territory that is supposedly the epitome of democratic freedom. If, as Etienne Balibar writes, every map is already a

world map by representing a part of the world that locally projects the *universitatis* that is *omnitudo compartium absoluta*,[98] then the geography that fixes Mr. Charkaoui, Mr. El Maati, and Himani Bannerji alike while making them out of place projects a black(ened) and white(ened) world divided by hard and fast borderlines.

Stereotypes and Cartographies of Diaspora

> In the *Wretched of the Earth,* Franz Fanon writes:
> The colonial world is a world divided into compartments....Yet, if we examine closely this system of compartments, we will at least be able to reveal the lines of force it implies. This approach to the colonial world, its ordering and its geographical layout will allow us to mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized.[99]

Taking Fanon's "lines of [colonial] force" literally to be the lines of longitude and latitude, where will we "mark out the lines on which a decolonized society will be reorganized?" In short then, I want to know where can we draw these different maps?

In his history of the Canadian state's cartographic practices, Ian Taylor writes: "Canada was brought into being, and to international recognition, by its [colonial] maps."[100] Although not Taylor's conclusion, considering how I have characterized colonial geographies as racialized expressions of a Eurocentric worldview, the Canada created by this official geography can be little other than a racist and exclusionary nation-and-state. If maps of this official state geography represent and are responsible for the current Canadian racism, then it is necessary to draw our different maps with lines narrated by unofficial geographies. In this framework, if we want better or truer maps of

---

[98] Etienne Balibar, "Borders of Europe," in *Cosmopolitics,* eds. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins (London: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), 221.
[99] Franz Fanon, *Wretched of the Earth* trans. Constance Farrington (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968), 37-8
[100] Ian Taylor, "Official Geography," *Cartographica* 31, no.4 (Winter 1994), 7.

Canada, then we are compelled to look for unofficial maps to contest the official cartographies that function as tool for those who hold power.[101]

John Pickles warns that we should be wary of "reducing the map to a single narrative and giving it a single history."[102] If the single history of the map is one that tells a "modern" or "Western" narrative, in which "modern" and "Western" are singular and stable categories, then these very categories are again reified in the telling. At the same time, if we are compelled to find "not-modern" or "non-European" maps, then we risk reproducing the very inequalities and divisions Eurocentric maps perpetuate. Turning away from as much as working within a single narrative history ignores the Native and non-European cartographers who made the official mapping of Canada possible and thus, continues to silence an already silenced agency.

Maps do not determine and are not absolutely determined by the nation-and-state. Indeed, outlining a single narrative of the map has not been my project. Instead, I have focused on the means by which cartography and histories of nation interweave through nationalist readings of maps to reproduce essentialized differences in the spaces of the nation-state. My focus has been on a cartographic bias and not a cartographic determinism. A deterministic reading of cartography does not acknowledge the haphazard and incomplete assemblages of the map, but treats both maps and the nation-and-state it represents as complete projects instead of as always already contested and contestable projects open to new interpretations.[103] As such, in looking for a place to draw these different maps, I am compelled to return to the CBSA map to draw new, anti-colonial lines. Of course, we cannot draw these lines on a CBSA map without contesting

[101] Pickles, *History of Spaces,* 37-40.
[102] Ibid., 89.
[103] Manning, "I AM CANADIAN."

the line plotted by narratives of security and civilization. To draw anti-colonial lines we must do nothing less than draw a new and different map that contests the CBSA and a Western geodesy. However, given the dominance of a colonial science of representation, how do we begin to draw new and different maps without reproducing this science?

J.B. Harley writes that because a map is embedded with a particular social vision, when that map is replaced by another type of map "the ambivalence of all stereotypes" is revealed.[104] In one sense, we can take the stereotype of the map to refer to its content and the particular social relations made apparent when confronted with a new set of maps. Take, for instance, a world drawn according to Mercator's mathematical projection and grid system in which Europe and other Northern continents are disproportionately large, stretched as they are when the spherical grid is laid flat. Compared to a world map based on Peter's projection, a projection that represents countries according to their measured-on-the-ground surface area, Mercator's Africa, South America and Southern Asia are represented in diminished proportions. Mercator's projection seems to flatter the Eurocentric stereotype of a dominant "north" and a less fortunate "south."[105] Against Peter's principle, Mercatorial "stereotypes" are apparent, and erroneous distinctions between "North" and "South" can be corrected.

As productive as revealing these stereotypes are, I do not think it gets at the "ambivalence of all stereotypes," but rather, it simply replaces one totalizing image of the world with another. Although Peter's projection deflates a northern ego, by replacing a faulty mathematical project with new measured accuracy and precision, the narratives of progress that support opting for this new and better representation continue to privilege

---

[104] Harley, "Deconstructing the Map," 14.
[105] Peter Linebuagh and Marcus Rediker, *Many-Headed Hydra* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000), 354.

the "modern," scientific mind that corrected the problem. As well, the bias of representation continues, for the earth is, again, held forth as a real and objective object that can be mapped. The ambivalence of all stereotypes is not revealed but again hidden behind a new, universal model.

What, then, is the ambivalence of the stereotype? Following from Homi Bhabha, colonial discourses are permeated with ambivalence or contradictory articulations of reality and desire, or a project of "not quite/not white."[106] It is an ambivalence brought about by the disavowal of differences in the Other. During colonial rule, this ambivalence allowed the colonizer to promise benevolently to educate and "whiten" the dark and downtrodden civilizations, while the racialized gaze held by the Europeans fractured the black body into essentially perverse and unredeemable fragments. It is against this fragmented Other that a whole, white body was enunciated. The construction of racially pure roots and of inherently degenerate black and transcendent white peoples and civilizations legitimated conquest and the violent control of colonialism.[107]

The colonial map is also a discourse wrought and fraught with the contradictory articulation of a finite, uniform and profane space *and* the transcendent and hierarchically organized spaces of belonging. The ambivalence of the colonial map ties racialized identites to geographical locations *and* is itself proof of the ability of a "European" consciousness to transcend the confines of this globe. These colonial divisions persist as national longing attaches racialized, transcendental qualities to a geographically delimited and cartographically represented national territory, while supposedly representing the uniformity of space and the horizontal relations between and within the nation-state. The

---

[106] Homi K. Bhabha, "Mimicry," in *Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 130-1.
[107] Bhabha, "Other Question," 101.

psychological forces of belonging to the national territory inspire an ambivalence that "produces a continual slippage of categories."[108] This ambivalence is expressed on and through the host's map when Canada is seen paradoxically as the centre of a decentred world. This ambivalence allows Canadians to legitimate their claim to manage a colonial project of culturalist divisions with the belief that the Canadian mapmaker transcends the limits of his or her own colonial history.

For Bhabha, a strategy for perpetuating colonial discourse is the stereotype. The stereotype is "a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', already known, and something that must be anxiously repeated."[109] Bhabha identifies the stereotype as a strategy of colonial discourses to fix and make known the Other and the self. To do this, the multiplicity of differences embodied by the Other and the self must be repeatedly negated so that an original and singular and authentic form of difference – race, gender, and so on – can be enunciated.[110] Because such a representation will always be negated by an encounter with the Other, the productivity of the stereotype is as a mode of representation that is a "process of ambivalence" and not its storehouse of representations that support some truth.[111]

The productivity of the stereotype is its ability to re/produce a representation of the Other that is fixed on a singular and supposedly authentic form of difference and perpetuating this representation of difference despite encounters with the Other that negate this fixity. The currency of the stereotype is the "daemonic repetition" that allows the stereotype to script an encounter with the Other. As such, attempts to displace the

---

[108] Homi K. Bhabha, "Dissemination" in *Location of Culture* (New York: Routledge, 1994), 201.
[109] Bhabha, "Other Question," 94-5.
[110] Ibid., 96, 108-9.
[111] Ibid., 95.

stereotype should not address the content of a misrepresentation, but address the stereotype as a mode of representation that is, in colonial discourses, a problem of representation.[112] Maps, in being read within a Eurocentric cartography, are a stereotypical form of representation.

In other words, the function of the stereotype, as Richard Dyer argues, is "to maintain sharp boundary definitions, to define clearly where the pale ends and thus who is clearly within and who clearly beyond it."[113] Dyer's geographical analogy is helpful as it shifts the focuses from the content of a representation to the construction of the pale as a boundary line and absolute limit. The stereotype is not the representation of those beyond the pale, but the process of ambivalence and repetitive force that constructs a hard and fast line that permits the "continual slippage of categories" like inside and outside, and here and there when drawing the nation-and-state. As such, the fixity of the national-colonial-settler imagination is re/produced by reiterating again the unbroken, single national boundary of 10,311 segments and defenceless monuments. The map presents Canada as something that can be arrived at, and yet, because it is also a transcendence that must also be earned, those believed to be unable to transcend their blackened origins never cross the border.

How, then, do we create different maps that re/produce multiple differences? Graham Huggan, among others, argues that multiple differences are possible through a deconstruction of the map. Deconstructing the map entails disrupting the "uniformity" of the map that implies a stable and complete representation achieved by closing it off to

---

[112] Ibid, 95, 108-9.
[113] Richard Dyer, *Matter of Images* (New York: Routledge, 1996), 16. Quoted in Rey Chow, "Brushes with the-Other-as-Face," in *Protestant Ethnic* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 2002), 59.

further interpretation.[114] Foreclosing of interpretation allows the "uniformity" of the grid and variability of racialized spaces to persist. Deconstruction opens up the map to further interpretation and leaves all interpretation open-ended. This openness is not a flattening of differences between interpretations but, as John Pickles states, deconstructing the map is a responsible reading of the map, in which responsible means "a postmodern turn whose goal is to relocate the map and the history of cartography in the context of a deepening of the project of democracy, that is, the project of determining who speaks for whom, about what, and with what authority."[115] Following from Avtar Brah, I will call the deconstruction of nation-and-state spaces "diaspora space" because, as James Clifford states, the concept of diaspora is, in essence, anti-national in as much as the nation re/produces a stereotypical fixity.[116] Diaspora space, according to Brah, references the global condition of "culture as a site of travel.... In other words, "the concept of *diaspora space* (as opposed to that of diaspora) includes the entanglement, the intertwining of the genealogies of dispersion with those of 'staying put.'"[117]

Of course, not all travel is diasporic. Travels that only reassert a feeling of being at home that is both title and entitlement to a particular territory are not diasporic. As Clifford puts it, diaspora is "dwelling-in-displacement" that qualifies if not negates a feeling of being "at home."[118] Genealogies of diaspora organize around configurations of power that differentiate within and between diaspora communities. As opposed to the multiculturalist conjuring of apolitical communities with specific and pure origins,

---

[114] Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map," 117-8.
[115] Pickles, *Histories of Space,* 91.
[116] James Clifford, *Routes* (London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1997), 254.
[117] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 208-9 compare to Clifford, [*Routes,* 251] "Diaspora discourse articulates, or bends together, both roots *and* routes to construct what Gilroy describes as alternative public spheres, forms of community consciousness and solidarity that maintain identifications outside the national time/space order to live inside, with a difference."
[118] Clifford, *Routes,* 254.

diaspora signifies "the confluence of economic, political and cultural specificities" and is a genealogy that defies the search for originary, pristine culture and tradition in a far off past.[119] Diaspora space is a site where the prohibited and permitted is perpetually interrogated and where unbroken genealogies of cultural inheritance fracture under the gaze. As Clifford writes, "Diaspora cultures thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place."[120] Diaspora space represents dis/locations and "diasporic borders" informed by a multi-axial locationality.[121]

Diaspora is not a "minority" identity that emerges to become the new universal centre around which peripheries and margins will form.[122] As Brah puts it, diaspora cartographies represent a multi-axial geography at the intersection of "diaspora, border and dis/location."[123] A multi-axial geography of the Canada-U.S. border is expressed by First Nations writer Thomas King, who characterizes the 49th parallel as a border that is "a figment of someone else's imagination," and yet whose writing is constantly re-engaging and re-imagining this line.[124] The young narrator of King's story "Borders" recounts how his mother and he lived on the border for several days after being refused entry to Canada and the U.S. when she declared her Blackfoot nationality at the border. By refusing to be either Canadian- or American-Blackfoot – the only options either country's border officials would accept – a third space is created that is between two

---

[119] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 183, 190, 194, 196.
[120] Clifford, *Routes* 255.
[121] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 208
[122] Ibid., 210; Clifford, *Routes,* 250-1.
[123] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 181.
[124] Thomas King, *The truth about stories* (Toronto: Anansi Press, 2003), 102. Cf. Davidson *et al.* [*Border Crossings,* 17] "In-between the traditional borders of the nation-state lie other nations, races, ethnicities, and cultures, such as those of First Nations peoples, which are divided by the traditional and imperialist demarcations. Native lands, in a sense, lie 'in-between' the borders of the nation-state – they are affected by them, but they are also independent entities."

countries but not determined by those two countries, but already outside within and without these countries on the "Blackfoot side."[125] I believe that Brah is proposing a similar geography when she turns her attention to the diaspora space of England.[126] Drawn from and on to a "Western" map, her diaspora space of England transforms this map with narratives and connections drawn through diaspora communities that contest the Eurocentrism of a "Western" geography in the process of drawing.

Inspired by King's multi-axial border narrative, I would like to return to the CBSA map and the story of Mr. El Maati with which I began this chapter. As much as the iconic image and plotted offices on the CBSA map are sites that perpetuate a Eurocentric cartography, these points are also sites of resistance. As coordinates on the map, these offices also plot places of protest and solidarity, and are sites of rallies or actions. On the map, these points connote different meanings, meanings that are always conditioned by the confluence of "economic, political, cultural, and psychic processes" that disrupt the supposed uniformity and universality of the mapped space. On this diasporic map reclaimed from the CBSA, new global relations are possible that imagine different time/space relationships that do more than shorten the distance between Toronto and Kingston Jamaica, Montreal and Algiers, or Goose Bay and Guantonamo Bay.

The diaspora CBSA map protests and re-imagines the colonial, national security world. In the space left blank at the bottom of the CBSA map, new neighbours are drawn along Canada's southern border that disrupts the longitudinal and latitudinal uniformity of 49th parallel. The border with these new neighbours is not, following from the IBC border and slogan, "A Visible Line Between Friendly Neighbours." It is a border that

---

[125] Thomas King, "Borders," in *One Good Story* (Toronto: HarperPerennial, 1991), 129-46.
[126] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 209-10.

represents, as Aimé Césairé put it, "an impure and worldly geography" drawn with complex and conflicting emotions of longing and fear. As in the case of Mr. El Maati's torture, across the diasporic border of the CBSA map Syria and Egypt are not just horrible places where things like torture simply happen. Crossing the border between Syria or Egypt and Canada is multi-axial trajectory, and the border between them negotiates governmental agreements that create situations of torture, feelings of nostalgia for home and family left behind, the solidarities between persons and groups working for the end of torture, and the efforts of "terrorist" groups to confront and attack their enemies. If, as Awad Ibrahim said, "before it's a geography, Canada is an idea," then changing the border will affect the idea of Canada and being Canadian. In contesting the nationalist ideas of Canada and by creating a diaspora space with multi-axial borders the single boundary line will fracture into its 10,311 pieces.

Conclusion

The distance between my refugee camp and my parents' village is my weakness and my strength. It is a geographical and psychological difference but it is a life force... The distance between St. Catharines (where I live at the moment) and Bet Hatikva is similar to the distance between my refugee camp and Beat Afa, my parents' village. The similarity and differences between both distances confirms one fact, that I am a Palestinian refugee.

Mahmoud Najar, "Prison" in *Montréal Planet*

This thesis has shown that the "Smart Border" operates within a colonial geography perpetuated through discourses that interweave with nation-and-state with border security. That is, the deterritorialized policing of the border carried out through the "remote control" technologies of the biometric enhanced passport regime, new immigration and anti-terrorism laws, and the cadre of security agencies under Public Security and Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) re/produce stereotypical spaces that are both plotted on the grid and underwritten with notions of Eurocentric transcendence. Although this post-9/11 border suggests a new experience of disaggregate spaces, by interweaving the boundaries of a colonial-national identity with technologies of the "Smart Border," geographies in which non -white, non-European migrants are made to feel "out of place" while "white," European Canadians belong and feel "at home" in Canada persist.

In Chapter One I considered how the series of spaces that make up the "Smart Border" are both new and old spaces. The "regime of practices" that make up "smart" policing afford the state access to an increasingly global-oriented population and again reconstitutes the dominance of the nation-state as the primary international and national authority in a globalizing world. The economy of risk and the notion of "trusted" persons and documents reiterate colonial notions of civilization, and the rebordering of Canada is

an effort to keep undesirable "illegal immigrants" and other demonized migrants separate or easily separable from Canadians and Canada. As such, the surveillance techniques and technologies of the "Smart Border" are discursively constructed to contain social contaminates from savage places in and through the biometric passport and detention centres as much as they track security risk persons entering Canada.

In Chapter Two I turned my attention to geographies of the "Smart Border," discursively situating this border in geographies of an "undefended border" and the IBC's 10,311 line segments. These border geographies reinforce each other and the notion of a fixed and benign borderline between Canada and the U.S. The notion of this defenceless line legitimates a progressivist, Euro-Canadian rule and history by constructing a Canadian identity that is both benevolent and vulnerable, allowing nationalists border writers to deflect charges of discrimination laid against this rule and history by sub-national groups. Much like the "undefended border" obfuscates the Eurocentric nationalism that underwrites it, the IBC's benign Canada-U.S. border is a complex narrative of political moderation, natural quietude and the geographical precision with which the IBC surveyed its 10,311 straight courses to maintain an unbroken, colonial borderline around Canada.

By way of displacing this constellation of an "undefended border" of 10,311 lines, I investigated and critiqued the geographic bias that fixes and normalizes colonial representations of space. Tracing a narrative through the works of critical geographers and historians of cartography, I identified this bias as the perpetuation of Eurocentric epistemologies of representation and power relations. As such, the geography of the IBC border speaks to a "Western" bias that reifies the earth by constructing it as a measurable

object best known and represented through mathematical techniques, *and* hierarchies of essential differences that confirms the superiority of Europe and European science. The result of this bias are 10,311 points plotted in uniform space within a grid of longitudinal and latitudinal lines *and* a border that separates Canada from other places according to a "whiteness" that transcends the limits of place. In this world geography, "whiteness" is never out of place because it transcends space and a limited humanity, while "non-whiteness" is always "out of place" because it signifies a geographically specific place on the map as well as the inability to overcome physical and essential limitations. According to this bias non-white Canadians are "out of place" because they can never fully arrive in a "white" Canadian nation-and-state.

Following Homi Bhabha I called this geographically fixed and transcendent border a stereotypical representation: a border constructed through national narratives that joins all 10,311 points to form one, unbroken borderline. As with Bhabha's notion of the stereotype, the currency of this line to fix bodies and places geographically and according to racialized notions of ability, is the daemonic repetition and process of ambivalence that represents a single, authentic identity by negating the multiplicity differences within and between Self and Other. Like the ambivalence engendered by psychological forces that "produces a continual slippage of categories...in the act of writing the nation," the symbolic power of such a line gives the impression that the categories of "us" and "them," "here" and "there" are separated by an unbroken borderline.[1]

To contest and displace this stereotypical representation, I proposed cartographies of diaspora because, as Avtar Brah says, such cartographies entangle and intertwine

[1] Bhabha, "Dissemination," 201.

"genealogies of dispersion with those of 'staying put.'"[2] Diaspora genealogies fracture the genealogies of nation that "whiten" the familial ties between the Canadian citizen and pioneer to the exclusion of "non-white" Canadian citizens and nation-builders. Diaspora cartographies have the potential to challenge and fracture both the borderline of the geo-body in which genealogies of nation are bound and the 10,311 line segments of the "undefended border" that legitimate the violence of national security.

As I pointed out in Chapter Two, a deterritorialized, national security geography can be plotted on the CBSA map. The language of anti-terrorist border security continues a colonial geography that believes Mr. El Maati is unable to transcend his originary place, a Middle Eastern place of birth that breed terrorism. The torture of Mr. El Maati speaks to this geography of suspicion and colonial divisions as much as it also draws a Canadian border that passes through prisons in Syria and Egypt and works on the belief that his acquired Canadian citizenship can never negate Mr. El Maati's security risk origins.

Yet, as opposed to assuming that the CBSA map is absolutely determined by colonial geographies, it is necessary to admit the incompleteness of this geography and acknowledge the non-European geographies and geographers that made the mapping Canada possible. To construct the CBSA map as a representation of diaspora space we must recognize the coherent and incoherent parts of nationalism, and unearth that which is subterranean to the nation – that which supports nationalism but also those narratives and histories that have always been there and have always been active forms of resistance.[3] Unearthing is not an attempt to discover more pristine roots, ideal pasts or true cartographies lying below the surface of the map. Unearthing means pulling up the

---

[2] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 208-9.
[3] Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map," 116. Cf. Malikki, "National Geographic," 26-8 for a discussion of genealogical roots of nation and territory.

roots of nationalized genealogies or, following from Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guittari, deterritorializing the nation. Unlike the "deterritorialization" of the state's "Smart Border," Deleuzean "deterritorialization" is not the removal of the border from the confines of territory characterized and accomplished through "remote-control" technologies. As Adrian Parr defines Deleuzean deterritorialization:

> In so far as it operates as a line of flight, deterritorialization indicates the creative potential of an assemblage. So, to deterritorialize is to free up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations.[4]

The potential of these assemblages make possible the "possibility of change immanent to a given territory," a possibility realized by keeping the map open to new interpretations. Following from Deleuze and Guittari, the possibilities of deterritorialization is a "rhizomatic" openness, an openness Graham Huggan characterizes as a shift from emphasising "mapbreaking to mapmaking."[5]

Of course it can be argued that all mapmaking is a form of mapbreaking in that every map creates new assemblages that do not reproduce preceding models. To flatten the differences of mapmaking and shy away from critiquing the mapbreaking carried out by national security cartographers counters the "creative potential" of a rhizomatic openness aimed at displacing this debordered-rebordered national cartography. Such a flattened "post-modern" politics is irresponsible and far from a tenable anti-racist politics.[6] An open-ended politics must always be a responsible reading characterized by

---

[4] Adrian Parr, "Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation," in *Deleuze Dictionary* ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univ. Press, 2005), 67.
[5] Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map," 126, James Corner, "Agency of Mapping," in *Mappings,* ed. Denis Cosgrove (London: Reaktion Books, 2002), 244.
[6] Cf. Gayatri C. Spivak: "If one wanted to *found* a political project on deconstruction, it would be something like a wishy-washy pluralism on the one hand, or a kind of irresponsible hedonism on the other" ["Practical Politics," in *Post-colonial Critic,* ed. Sarah Harasym, 104]. I would add to this an irresponsible "post-colonial" nationalized politics of the "undefended border" as I outlined in Chapter Two.

what John Pickles considers the project of deconstructing the map: "a deepening of the project of democracy, that is, the project of determining who speaks for whom, about what, and with what authority."[7]

In desiring a responsible reading of the map, I am not trying to synchronize the projects of a (Deleuzean) deterritorialization, deconstruction and decolonization of the map, although such a synthesis is not out of place among other efforts to frame a post-modern geography.[8] I am concerned with drawing a responsible border. Working within these projects, Matthew Sparke refers to a "geographical responsibility" as one that considers its own limitations in an effort to deepen the "project of democracy," and as a responsibility to acknowledge the mapmaker-mapbreaker as an agent of knowledge in re/drawing the world.[9] In short, it is a responsibility that speaks to an ethics and politics of anti-racism, social justice and a politics of representation that counters the "absented presence" of migrants in navigating the lines they use to plot Canada and the world.[10]

In drawing a diaspora space on the CBSA map, our mapmaking and mapbreaking must consider the incompleteness of Canada's national security geography, and recognize the fractured and always already impure national genealogy that not only refutes the notion of "white" Canada of European descent, but invalidates the ideal of a pure, enlightened tradition separate from and opposed to traditions of terrorism. This incompleteness is an admission that national security is not an ideal stymied by incompetence and violence. The incompetence of the RCMP and CSIS in carrying out

---

[7] Pickles, *Histories of Space,* 91.
[8] Cf. Huggan, "Decolonizing the Map;" Shapiro, "Triumphalist Geographies," 62-3; Sparke, "Between mythologizing and deconstructing the map," *Cartographica* 32, no.1 (Spring 1995); Pickle, *History of Spaces,* 91.
[9] Sparke, *In the Space of Theory,* xxxii; Sparke, *"Between Deconstructing and Demythologizing,"* 6.
[10] Cf. Walcott, "Caribbean Pop Culture in Canada," 129.

their operations is not the cause of or excuse for the violence of detention, intimidation, coercion, deportation and so on carried out in the name of protecting Canadians.[11] The violent actions of these agencies are the outcome of European Enlightenment and an ideal of rational progress that has always been violent and never been rational. An open interpretation of the CBSA map cannot work within a Eurocentric discourse that constructs the increasing violence of PSEPC agencies as the "stooping" of otherwise rational actors to the terrorist's level of barbarity. The attacks of September 11th did not disrupt a benign border. The Canadian-U.S. border has never been without defences and Canada has always been the product of violence.

Homi Bhabha writes that the wider significance of the postmodern condition is the recognition that the epistemological "limits" of ethnocentric ideas are also the "enunciative boundaries of a range of other dissonant, even dissident histories and voices."[12] As such, our "geographic responsibility" builds on these dissonant and dissident voices that can translate the "Smart Border" into the language of a radical Third Space of the border.[13]

At the end of Chapter Two I framed the potential of mapmaking and mapbreaking as a matter of drawing new neighbours in the space left empty below the 49th parallel on the CBSA map. Referring to the experiences of Mr. El Maati, I suggested these new

---

[11] Cf. "What's Wrong with Security Certificates?" [*Food Not Bombs,* 12 May 2005 <www.homesnotbombs.ca/Secret%20Trial%20brief.pdf> (August 2006), 12]: "CSIS has a record of incompetence and corruption. Its word cannot be trusted...The Law Union of Ontario recently presented a brief challenging the competence, ethics, and honesty of CSIS. Specifically related to Security Certificate cases, the brief said:

> In a number of cases before the Federal Court and/or SIRC it was the opinion of the Law Union lawyers involved in those cases that CSIS agents were not well informed, or well trained, that they relied on dubious and/or unreliable sources of information and that they did not understand the culture or political dynamics of the community they had under surveillance. CSIS agents, or their counsel, kept secret matters that did not need to be kept secret and withheld information that had been disclosed in other proceedings.

[12] Homi K. Bhabha, "Introduction" in *Location of Culture,* 6.
[13] Ibid., 8.

neighbours were as much Syria and Egypt as the U.S. Literally drawing these multi-axial border crossings disrupts the uniform space of the Mercatorial grid that plots the distance between Canada, Syria and Egypt according to lines of longitude and latitude. However, if this border is to be a radical Third Space then the diasporic border must facilitate a "processes of *multi-locationality across geographical, cultural and psychic boundaries.*"[14] As such, the open-ended politics of diaspora space negotiates the CBSA mapmaking and mapbreaking to draw a diasporic "Smart Border" through familial ties, networks of solidarity, and even terrorist organizations, in addition to the agreements between Canadian security agencies and Syrian and Egyptian officials.

As James Corner writes concerning the agency of mapmaking, "mapping *unfolds* potential; it re-makes territory over and over again, each time with new and diverse consequences."[15] Mapping a radical Third Space of the border refocuses attention on the space of the border as one that connects various places and people. It is a cartography that redraws the border as a space one arrives at and negotiates before they can know where the far side of the border lays and how it will be reached. In the national security geography that led to Mr. El Maati's torture, dissonant mappings plot Syria and Egypt as sites of torture but not, as colonial cartographies suggest, places separate from Canada where these things just happen. These dissonant mappings contest torture and the secret agreements between states that encourage its practice in these locations. These geographers negotiate the border to Syria or Egypt through familial relations, and networks that know and desire Syria as something more than just a place over there. As Liisa Malikki writes, "To plot only 'place of birth' and degrees of nativeness is to blind

---

[14] Brah, *Cartographies of Diaspora,* 194.
[15] Corner, "Agency of Mapping," 211.

oneself to the multiplicity of attachments that people form to places through living in, remembering, and imagining them."[16]

As much as a multi-axial border contests the colonial fixing of Syria or Egypt, neither is Canada a finished project or an enlightened model but a site of contestation. The legal and political actions Mr. El Maati is taking against the state through state and non-state institutions are part of various efforts to construct a Canadian politics of social justice. Just as the efforts to free Mr. El Maati from torture were not fights waged between an enlightened "West" against the violent non-Western traditions of Syria and Egypt, the efforts to fight for social justice within Canada are not efforts to restore Canada to its enlightened and benign place in the world's affairs. Geographies of social justice built in and through the radical Third Space of the border are geographies of networks of solidarity that run throughout and outside of Canada's borders, and are cartographies that redraw the borderlines that bind Canada.

[16] Malikki, "National Geographic," 38.



Image 1. "Canada Border Services Agency Offices" [Prepared by the CBSA for Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, *Borderline Insecure* Appendix V, June 2005, <www.parl.gc.ca /38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintjun05-e.pdf> (August 2005)]*

* This image was originally published in three sections. Assembly of images done by author.

THE GLOBE AND MAIL
CANADA'S NATIONAL NEWSPAPER ■ FOUNDED 1844 ■ GLOBEANDMAIL.COM ■ TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 6, 200

It was hyped as a TERRORIST map
It was cited by Egyptian TORTURERS
It is a VISITOR'S GUIDE to Ottawa



PHOTOGRAPHY: BILL CRAIGHEAD / THE GLOBE AND MAIL; GRAPHIC: BERNARD DESNEIL / THE GLOBE AND MAIL

Ahmad El Maati was imprisoned and tortured when a map issued by the government

BY JEFF SALLOT, OTTAWA AND COLIN FREEZE, TORONTO

It is the map of Ottawa — with clearly marked federal nuclear facilities, a virus lab and other supposed terrorist targets — that fuelled an international panic and played into a chain of Middle East detentions of Canadians citizens.

The Globe and Mail has learned that the map — accurate numbers and all — was in fact produced and distributed by the Canadian federal government. It is simply a site map, given out to help visitors to Tunney's Pasture, a sprawling complex of government buildings in Ottawa, find their way around.

"All my problems started with

facilities and the virus labs at Tunney's Pasture was never a secret.

Moreover, they were gone from Tunney's Pasture long before the map aroused the suspicions of U.S. customs agents when they stopped Mr. El Maati's truck at the border at Buffalo in August of 2001.

Yet in the past four years, the "terrorist map" has taken on almost

the basis of their interrogations. He says this suggests the Syrians were fed information from Canada and that Canadian authorities were complicit in his torture. He's never been charged anywhere, despite more than two years in detention in the Middle East.

Mr. El Maati's lawyers inside a

Stronach's luxurious haven for victims of Katrina

BY ROY MacGREGOR

Frank Stronach has had wi visions before — but no one quite like this.

This improbable drea involves shifting evacuees fr the devastation of New Orlean the pampered world of Palm Bea Fla. — a vision that involves r American yachts from gated cor munities opening up so desperat poor American blacks and even l cludes the construction of a ne mobile-home community in Lo siana for more than 300 victims hurricane Katrina.

And so far, he's pulling it off.

But then, Frank Stronach on dreamed he could make a better l in Canada than his native Aust could give, and he made it happ to a point where the young m who arrived with $40 in his pock now regularly pockets more th $50-million in salary as the cha man of Ontario-based Magna I ternational, the $20-billion aut mobile parts giant he built fr scratch.

He once had a vision that would live to be 150, and today, he turns 73, is almost half way the — about the same point he expe to reach some time this morning his latest wild scheme.

At that point, the final plane w touch down at Palm Beach Inter tional Airport, bringing in the l group of evacuees selected by F MA and the American Red Cross.

See STRONACH on page A2

Zoo animal fared better than people

BY CHRISTIE BLATCHFORD
NEW ORLEANS

When wise men go to figu out what happened he after hurricane Katrin when based on the heels of great na ural disaster came a sudden ar shocking breach in the civil ord they may want to talk to Dan Ma ney.

Mr. Maloney, vice-president an general curator of the Audubon Zo located in a sprawling and lush cl park, was explaining yesterday wh as the enormous storm first ap proached, staff decided to leave th pink flamingos to their own d vices.

"We figured," he said with the b ological's rare logic, "that it was les risky to leave them out to bunk down on their own, and find the own safe places, rather than shov them into a small box somewhere.

See ANIMALS on page A10

■ Coverage of the devastation left by Katrina begins on A10

Full index, page A2

Image 2. "It was hyped as a TERRORIST map…" (Permission to reproduce granted by Bell Globemedia Publishing Inc., 2006)



Image 3. "International Boundary Commission employee maintaining a vista" [Source: Natural Resources Canada, 15 December 2005, <http://www.internationalboundary commission.org/ibccoordnad27.htm> (August 2006)]

Image 4. "International Boundary Commission Crest" [Source: Natural Resources Canada, 15 December 2005, <http://www.internationalboundarycommission.org/treaties.htm> (August 2006)].

Bibliography

"Address by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien on the occasion of the Canada-U.S. Border Summit" *Office of the Prime Minister,* 9 September 2002,<http://www.pco.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=archivechretien&Sub=Speeches&Doc=border20020909_e.htm> (August 2006).

Aiken, Sharryn J. (2001) "Manufacturing 'Terrorists:' Refugees, National Security, and Canadian Law" *Refuge* 19, no.3, 54-7

----- (2001) "Manufacturing 'Terrorists:' Refugees, National Security and Canadian Law, Part 2" *Refuge* 19, no.4, 116-133

Amin, Samir (1989) *Eurocentrism,* trans. by Russell Moore. New York, Monthly Review Press.

Anderson, Benedict, (1994) "Exodus" *Critical Inquiry* 20, no.2 (Winter 1994), 314-27.

----- (2003) *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Revised Edition). London, Verso.

Andreas, Peter (2000) *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide.* London, Cornell University Press.

----- (2003) "Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-first Century" *International Security* 28, no.2. (Fall), 78-111.

Angus, Ian (1997), *A Border Within: National Identity, Cultural Plurality, and Wilderness.* Montreal, McGill-Queens University Press.

Arendt, Hannah (1971) *The Human Condition.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Armstrong, Joe C. W (1982) *From Sea to Sea.* London, Fleet Pub.

Ash, Melanie C.T. (2004) "But Where Are You REALLY From? Reflections on Immigration, Mutliculturalism, and Canadian Identity" in *Racism, eh?* ed. Camille A. and Charmaine A. Nelson, 398-409. Toronto, Captus Press.

Balibar, Etienne (1991) "Is There a 'Neo-Racism'?" in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities,* eds. Etienne Balibar and Emamanuel Wallerstein, trans. by Etienne Balibar and Chris Turner, 17-28. New York, Verso.

----- (1998) "Borders of Europe," in *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation,* eds. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, 216-32. London, University of Minnesota Press.

Bannerji, Himani (2000), "Paradox of Diversity: The construction of Multicultural Canada and 'Women of Colour;'" "Geography Lessons: On Being an Insider/Outsider to the Canadian Nation;" "On the Dark Side of the Nation;" "A Question of Silence: Reflections on Violence Against Women in Communities of Colour," in *Dark Side of the Nation,* 15-62; 63-86; 87-124; 151-74. Toronto, Canadian Scholars' Press Inc.

Barrow, Ian J. (2003) *Making History, Drawing Territory.* New York, Oxford Univ. Press.

Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* trans. by Mark Ritter. London, SAGE Pub.

Belyea, Barbara (1992) "Images of Power: Derrida/Foucault/Harley", *Cartographica* 29, no.2, 1-9.

Berland, Jody (2001) "Writing on the Border", CR: the *new centennial review* 1, no.2, 139-69.

Bhabha, Homi K. (1994) "The Commitment to Theory;" "The Other Question: Stereotype, discrimination and the discourse of colonialism;" "Of mimicry and man: the ambivalence of colonial discourse;" "Dissemination: Time, narrative and the margins of the modern nation," in *Location of Culture,* 28-56; 94-120; 121-131; 199-244. New York, Routledge.

----- (1999) "Introduction" in *Nation and Narration.* New York, Routledge.

"Bill C-26" 13 June 2005<http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-26/C-26_3/C-26_cover-E.html> (August 2006).

Black, Jeremy (1997) *Maps and Histories: Constructing Images of the Past.* London, Yale Univ. Press.

Brah, Avtar (1996) *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities.* New York: Routledge.

Bossin, Michael, "Bill C-31: Limited Access to Refugee Determination and Protection" *Refuge* 19, no.4 (2000), 55-61.

Brown, Russell (1990) "Borderlines and Borderlands in English Canada: The Writen Line," in *Borderlands Monograph Series #4, 13-70.* Orono, Borderlands Project.

Canadian Geographic (2004) 124, no.6 (November/December), 50.

CBC (2006) "Overview," 4 August <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/ toronto-bomb-plot/index.html> (August 2006).

CBSA (2004) "Fact Sheet: Arrest and Detention" 3 November <http://www. cbsa.asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/factsheets/ 2004/0311ArrestsDetentions-e.html> (August 2006).

----- (2003) "Canada-United States Integrated Border Enforcement Teams," 2 May <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/general/enforcement/ibet-eipf-e.html> (August 2006).

----- (2005) "News Release," 29 July <http://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/newsroom/release-communique/2001/oct/security-e.html> (August 2006).

Chatterjee, Partha (1993) *Nations and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories.* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press.

Chow, Rey (2002) "Brushes with the-Other-as-Face: Stereotyping and Cross-Ethnic Representation," in *The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* 50-94. New York, Columbia Univ. Press.

CIC (2002) "Minister Coderre seeks government approval of Safe Third Country Agreement" 10 September <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/press/02/0226-pre.html> (August 2006).

----- (2002) "Safe Third Country Agreement," 5 December <http://www.cic.gc.ca /english/policy/safe-third.html> (August 2006).

----- (2003) "CIC Final Report 2003" 9 January <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/research /evaluation/public-safety.html> (August 2006).

----- (2003) "Multiple Borders Strategy" 1 September <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/ research/evaluation/public-safety.html#section2> (August 2006).

----- (2005) "The Refugee Appeal Division," 3 November <http://www.cic.gc.ca /english/refugees/radmenu.html> (August 2006).

Clark, Tony (2002) "The Recriminalization of Dissent" *Policy Options* 23, no. 6, 49-50.

Clifford, James (1997) *Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century.* London, Harvard Univ. Press.

Corner, James (2002) "The agency of mapping: speculation, critique and invention," in *Mappings,* ed. Denis Cosgrove, 211-52. London, Reaktion Books.

Cosgrove, Denis (2001) *Apollo's Eye: A Cartographic Genealogy of the Earth in the Western Imagination.* Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ. Press.

CSIS (2005) "Certificates Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act," 14 November, <http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder14.asp?print> (August 2006).

----- (2005) "Certificates Under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act," 14 November <http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/newsroom/backgrounders/backgrounder14.asp?print> (August 2006).

----- (2006) "Actual and Potential Links Between Terrorism and Criminality," 12 July <http://www.csis.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-5.asp> (August 2006).

Davidson, Arnold E., Priscilla L. Walton and Jennifer Andrews (2003) *Border Crossings: Thomas King's Cultural Inventions.* Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press.

DFAIT (2001) "Smart Border Declaration" 12 December http://www.dfait.gc.ca/can-am/main/border/smart_border_declaration-en.asp (August 2006).

----- (2003) "Jay Treaty 1784," February <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/keydocs/keydocs_details-en.asp?intDocumentId=1> (August 2006).

----- (2003) "Relations with Americans" 11 February http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/department/history/canada3-en.asp (August 2006).

----- (2003) "Smart Border Declaration Action Plan," 7 February <http://maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp> (August 2006).

Drache, Daniel (2004) *Borders Matter, Homeland Security and the Search for North America.* Halifax, Fernwood Pub.

Ericson, Richard V., Aaron Doyle and Dean Barry (2003) *Insurance as Governance* Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press.

Eswald, François (1991) "Insurance and Risk" in *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault,* eds. Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon and Peter Miller, 197-210. Toronto, Harvester Weathersheaf.

Fanon, Franz (1968) *The Wretched of the Earth,* trans. by Constance Farrington. New York, Grove Press, Inc.

Fahrmeir, Andreas (2001) "Governments and Forgers: Passports in Nineteenth-Century Europe"in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of state Practices in the Modern World* eds. Jane Caplan and John Torpey, 218-34. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press.

Flores, Lisa A. (2003) "Constructing rhetorical borders: Peons, Illegal Aliens, and Competing Narratives of Immigration," *Critical Studies in Media Communication* 20, no.4 (December), 362-87.

Food Not Bombs (2005) "What's Wrong with Security Certificates?" 12 May <www.homesnot bombs.ca/Secret%20Trial%20brief.pdf> (August 2006).

Foucault, Michel (1991) "Questions of methods;" and "Governmentality," in *Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality with two lectures by and an interview with Michel Foucault,* eds. Graham Burchell, Collin Gordon and Peter Miller, 73-86; 87-104. Toronto, Harvester Weathersheaf.

----- (1991) *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison,* trans. by Alan Sheridan. New

York, Vintage Books.
Gagnon, Monica Kin (2000) "Can-Asian, eh?" in *Other Conundrums: race, culture and Canadian Art,* 127-43. Vancouver, Arsenal Pulp Press.
Garcia y Greigo, Manuel (1994) "Canada: Flexibility and Control in Immigration and Refugee Policy," in *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective,* eds. Wayne A. Cornelius, Phillip L. Martin, and James F. Holifield, 119-42. Stanford, Stanford Univ. Press.
Gauvreau, Catherine and Glynis Williams (2002) "Detention in Canada: Are we on the Slippery Slope?" *Refuge* 20, no.3, 68-70.
Gellner, Ernst (1983) *Nations and Nationalism.*Oxford, Basil Blackwell.
Giddens, Roger (1990) *Canada as Borderlands Society.* Orono, Borderlands Project.
----- (2005) "Meaning and Significance of the Canadian-American Border", in *Borders and Border Politics in a Globalizing World,* 151-68. Lanham: SR Books.
Gorman, Daniel (2002) "Wider and Wider Still?: Racial Politics, Intra-Imperial Immigration and the Absence of an Imperial Citizenship in the British Empire," *Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History* 3, no.3, <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/toc/cch3.3.html#articles> (August 2006).
Government of Canada (2000) "International Joint Commission," 25 July <http://www.ec.gc.ca/press/usa6_b_e.htm> (August 2006).
----- (2000) "Commentary on Bill C-31," 24 October <http://www.parl.gc.ca/36/2/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-31/C-31_1/C-31_cover-E.html> (August 2006).
Grant, George (1971) *Lament for the Nation: The Defeat of Canadian Nationalism.* Toronto McClelland and Stuart.
Gupta, Akhil and James Ferguson (1992) "Beyond 'Culture': Space, Identity, and the Politics of Difference," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1, 6-23.
Haggerty, Kevin D., and Amber Gazso (2005) "Seeing Beyond the Ruins: Surveillance as a Response to Terrorist Threats," *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 30, no.2, 169-87.
Harley, Brian J. (1988) "Maps, knowledge, and power", in *Iconography of landscape: Essays on the Symbolic representation, design and use of past environments* eds. Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, 277-312. New York Cambridge Univ. Press.
----- (1988) "Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe," *Imago Mundi* 40, 57-76.
----- (1989) "Deconstructing the Map", in *Cartographica* 26, no.2, 1-18.
Harney, Robert F. (1989) "So Great a Heritage as Ours," in *In Search of Canada,* ed. Steven R. Graubard. London, Transaction Pub.
Harvey, David (2006) *Conditions of Postmodernism: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change.* Cambridge: Blackwell.
Hayter, Teresa (2004) *Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls.* London: Pluto Press.
Hier, Sean P. and Joshua L. Greenberg (2002) "Constructing a discursive crisis," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 25, no.3 (May), 290-513.
Huggan, Graham (1989) "Decolonizing the Map: Post-Colonialism, Post-structuralism and the Cartographic Connection", *ARIEL* 20, no.4 (October), 115-31.
IBC (2005) "Boundary History," 15 December <http://www.internationalboundary

commission.org/ibcpg2.htm#history> (August 2006).
----- (2005) "International Boundary," 15 December <http://www.internationalboundary commission.org/ibcpg2.htm#intro> (August 2006)].
Jackman, Barbara "Ahmad Abou El Maati: Chronology" September 2005, <www. amnesty.ca/english/main_article_home/elmaatichronology.pdf> (August 2006).
Jakubowski, Lisa Marie (1997) *Immigration and the Legalization of Racism*. Halifax, Fernwood Pub.
Jennish, D'Arcy (2003) *Epic Wanderer: David Thompson and the mapping of the Canadian West.* Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press.
Kazimi, Ali (2004) *Continuous Journey.* Toronto, VTape, 2005.
Kemp, Adriana (2004) " 'Dangerous Populations:' State Territory and the Constitution of National Minorities," in *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices,* ed. by Joel Midgal, 73-97. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
King, Thomas (1991) "Borders," in *One Good Story, That One.* Toronto, HarperPerennial,129-46.
----- (2003) *The truth about stories: A Native Narrative.* Toronto, Anansi Press.
Kruger, Erin Marlene Mulder and Bojan Kornic (2004), "Canada After 11 September: Security Measures and 'Prefered' Immigrants," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 15, no 4, 72-87.
Kumar, Amitava (2000), *Passport Photos.* London, Univ. of California Press.
Laxer, James (2003) *The Border: Canada, the U.S. and Dispatches from the 49th Parallel.* Toronto, Double Day.
Lefebvre, Henri (1991) *The Production of Space,* trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.
Lemon, Donald P. (1987) *Theatre of Empire/Ambitions imperialists* Saint John, NBM Pub.
Lewis, Martin W. and Karen E. Wigen (1997) *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography.* London, Univ. of California Press.
Linebaugh, Peter and Marcus Rediker (2000) *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic,* Boston: Beacon Press.
Lowry, Michelle "Creating Human Insecurity: The National Security Focus in Canada's Immigration System," *Refuge* 21, no.1, 28-39.
Lyon, David (2001) "Under My Skin: From Identification Papers to Body Surveillance," in *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of state Practices in the Modern World* eds. Jane Caplan and John Torpey, 291-310. Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press.
----- (2001) *Surveillance Society: Monitoring Everyday Life.* Philadelphia, Open Univ. Press.
Mackey, Eva (2002) *House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada* Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press.
Macklin, Audrey (2001) "Borderline Security" in *Security of Freedom* eds. Donald J. Daniel and Patrick Macklem, 383-99. Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press.
Malikki, Liisa (1992) "National Geographic: The Rooting of People and the

Territorialization of National Identity Among Scholars and Refugees," *Cultural Anthropology* 7, no.1 (February), 24-44.
Manning, Erin (2002) "I AM CANADIAN" *Theory & Event* 4, no. 4 <http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v004/4.4manning.html> (August 2006).
McGrath, Gerald and Louis M. Sebert (eds) (1999) *Mapping a Northern Land: the survey of Canada.* Montreal, McGill-Queen's Univ. Press.
McIntosh, Dave (1984) *The Collectors: A History of Canadian Customs and Excise.* Toronto, NC Press Ltd.
McMahon, Fred (2005) "A Malign Sense of Sovereignty: Canada's Debate Over U.S. Trade Relations" *School of Advanced international Studies Review*, 115-25.
Midgal, Joel (ed) (2004) "Introduction," in *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices,* 3-26. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Mignolo, Walter (1993) "Misunderstanding and Colonization: The Reconfiguration of Memory and Space" *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 92, no.2 (Spring), 209-60.
----- (2000) *Local Histories/Global Designs: coloniality, subalter knowledges, and border thinking.* Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press.
Mongia, Radhika Viyas (1999) "Race, Nationality, Mobility: A History of the Passport" *Public Culture* 11, no.13, 527-56.
Mohanram, Radhika (1999), "The Cartography of bodies," in *Black Body: Women, Colonialism and Space*, 3-22. Minnesota Univ. of Minnesota Press.
Moodley, Kogila (1983), "Canadian multiculturalism as ideology" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 6, no.3, (July), 320-31.
Morantz, Alan (2002) *Where is Here? The Maps of Canada and the Stories they Tell.* Toronto, Penguin Canada.
National Film Board of Canada (1976) *Between Friends/entre amis.* NFB.
No One Is Illegal "About Us: Our Demands," <http://toronto.nooneisillegal.org/about> (August 2006).
Parr, Adrian (2005) "Deterritorialisation/Reterritorialisation," in *The Deleuze Dictionary,* ed. Adrian Parr, 66-8. Edinburgh, Edinburgh Univ. Press.
Parliament of Canada (2000) "Commentary on Bill C-31," 6 April <http://www.parl.gc.ca /36/2/ parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-31/C-31_1/C-31_cover-E.html> (August 2006).
----- (2005) "Bill C-26," 13 June <http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/government/C-26/C-26_3/C-26_cover-E.html> (August 2006).
Passport Canada (2004) "Backgrounder" 13 January <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040109.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
----- (2004) "Biometrics in the International Travel Context," 1 February <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040201.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
----- (2006) "History of the Passport," 6 May <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/about/history.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
----- (2006) "Special Operating Status" 6 May <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/about/products.aspx?lang =e#td.> (August 2006).
----- (2006) "Biometrics in the International Travel Context," 5 May <http://www.ppt.gc.ca/newsroom/20040201.aspx?lang=e> (August 2006).
Pickles, John (2004) *History of Spaces: Cartographic reason, mapping and the geo-*

coded world. New York Routledge.
PSEPC (2004) "Department Of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness comes into force," 2 February <http://www.psepc.gc.ca/media/nr/2005/ nr20050404-en.asp> (August 2006).
PSEPC (2004) "Department Of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness comes into force," 2 February <http://www.psepc.gc.ca/media/nr/2005/ nr20050404-en.asp> (August 2006).
----- (2005) "Law Enforcement in Canada," *PSEPC*, 15 May <http://www.psepc.gc. ca/media /bk/2005/bk20050515-en.asp> (August 2006).
Rabasa, José (1993) "Allegories of Atlas" in *Inventing A-M-E-R-I-C-A: Spanish Historiography and the Formation of Eurocentrism*, 180-209. London, Univ. of Oklahoma Press.
Razack, Sherene H. (1999) "Making Canada White: Law and the Policing of Bodies of Colour in the 1990s," *Canadian Journal of Law and Society* 14, no. 1 (Spring), 159-84.
----- (1999) "Policing the Borders of the Nation: The Imperial Gaze in Gender Persecution Cases," in *Looking White People in The Eye: Gender, Race and Culture in Courtrooms and Classrooms,* 88-129. Toronto, Univ. of Toronto Press.
----- (2002) "Gendered Racial Violence and Spatialized Justice: The Murder of Pamela George," in *Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society,* ed. Sherene H. Razack, 121-56. Toronto, Between the Lines.
Richmond, Anthony H. (1994) *Global Apartheid: Refugees, Racism, and the New World Order.* Toronto, Oxford Univ. Press.
----- (2001) "Global Apartheid: A Postscript" *Refuge* 19, no.4, pp.8-13.
Robertson, Craig (2006) "Ritual of Verification? The Nation, The State, and the U.S. Passport," in *Thinking With James Carey,* eds. Jeremy Packer and Craig Robertson, 177-97. New York, Peter Land.
Rosello, Mireille (2001) "Introduction: Immigration and Hospitality," in *Postcolonial Hospitality: The Immigrant as Guest,* 1-22. Hartford, Stanford Univ. Press.
Ruggles, Richard I. (1991) *A Country So Interesting: The Hudson's Bay Company and Two Centuries of Mapping 1670-1870.* Montreal, McGill-Queen's Univ. Press.
Ruiz, Maria V. (2002) "Border Narratives: HIV/AIDS, and Latina/o Health in the United States: A Cultural Analysis," *Feminist Media Studies* 2, no.1, 37-62.
Rukszto, Katarzyna (2005) "The Other Heritage Minutes: Satirical Reactions to Canadian Nationalism," *Topia* 14, 73-91.
Sack, Robert David (1986) *Human Territoriality: Its theory and history.* New York, Cambridge Univ. Press.
Salter, Mark D. (2003) *Rights of Passage: the Passport in International Relations.* London, Lynne Rienner Pub., Inc.
Schick, Carol (2002) "Keeping the Ivory Tower White: Discourses of Racial Domination," in *Race, Space, and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society,* ed. Sherene H. Razack, 99-120. Toronto, Between the Lines.
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, (2005) *Borderline Insecure,* June <http://www.parl. gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/defe-e/rep-e/repintjun05-e.pdf> (August 2006).
Shadd, Adrienne (2001) "'Where Are You Really From?' Notes on an 'Immigrant' from

North Buxton, Ontario," in *Talking about Identity,* eds. Carl E James and Adrienne Shadd, 10-16. Toronto, Between the Lines.

Shapiro, Michael (1999) "Triumphalist Geographies," in *Space of Culture, City, Nation, Worlds,* eds. Mike Featherstone and Scott Lash, 159-74. London, SAGE.

Shome, Raka (2003) "Space Matters: The Power and Practice of Space" *Communication Theory* 13, no.1 (February), 39-56.

Soja, Edward W. (1996) *Third Space: Journeys To Los Angeles and other Real-and-Imagined Places.* London, Blackwell Pub.

Sparke, Matthew (1995) "Between demythologizing and deconstructing the map: Shawnadithit's New-found-land and the alienation of Canada,. *Cartographica* 32, no. 1 (Spring).

----- (2004) "Passports into Credit Cards: On the Borders and Spaces of Neoliberalism Citizenship" in *Boundaries and Belonging: States and Societies in the Struggle to Shape Identities and Local Practices,* ed. Joel Migdal, 251- 83. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

----- (2005) *In the Space of Theory.* Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty (1990) "Practical Politics of the Open End," in *Post-colonial Critic: interviews, strategies and dialogues,* ed. Sarah Harasym, 95-112. London, Routledge.

----- (1995) "Afterword," in Mahasweta Devi, *Imaginary Maps,* trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 197-205. New York, Routledge,

Tagg, John (1988) *Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographs and Histories.* London, Macmillan Education Ltd.

Taylor, Iain C (1994) "Official geography and the creation of Canada," *Cartographica* 31, no. 4 (Winter), 1-15.

Thomson, Don W.(1966) *Men and Merideans: The History of Surveying and mapping in Canada* vol.1.Ottawa : R. Duhamel.

Thongchai Winichakul (1997) *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation.* Honolulu: Univ. of Hawaii Press.

Torpey, John (2000) *Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State.* Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press.

"Treaty of 1908" (Treaty between His Majesty and the United States of America respecting the Demarcation of the International Boundary between the United States and the Dominion of Canada), *LEXUM* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca us/en/cus.1908.299.en.html> (August 2006).

"Treaty of 1910" (Treaty between His Majesty and the United States of America respecting the Boundary between Canada and the United States in Passamaquoddy Bay, &c), *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1910.352.en.html> (August 2006).

"Treaty of 1925" (Treaty between Canada and the United States of America to define more accurately and to complete the International Boundary between the two Countries), *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/en/cus.1925.515.en.html> (August 2006).

"Treaty of Peace 1783" (Definitive Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United

States, signed at Paris, 3 September 1783), *LEXUM,* 4 October 1999 <http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/ca_us/cgi-bin/disp.pl/en/bsp.1.779.en.html> (August 2006).

Walcott, Rinaldo (2001) "Caribbean Pop Culture in Canada; Or, the Impossibility of Belonging to the Nation, " *Small Axe* 9, 123-39.

Whitaker, Reg (1998) "Refugee: The Security Dimension," *Citizenship Studies* 2, no.3, 413-34.