Elite Images and Foreign Policy

Nehru, Menon and India's Policies

Janice Gross STEIN

Elite Images and Foreign Policy

Nehru, Menon and India's Policies

by

Janice Gross Stein

Department of Economics and Political Science Ph.D.

This study examines the foreign policy images of two Indian decision-makers, Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon, from 1948 to 1962. It reviews the general foreign policy literature and outlines a research framework for foreign policy analysis. The literature on elite images is also explored and several hypotheses are selected for testing. The quantitative method of content analysis is employed in the research design.

The components of the foreign policy images of Nehru and Menon are analysed quantitatively. The salient actors, levels of the international system, domestic variables, symbols, values and issues are examined and patterns of intensity and association are explored. The views of the world of Nehru and Menon are systematically compared and contrasted.

Hypotheses from the literature are tested and several new hypotheses are generated from the data. Methodological techniques are evaluated and guidelines for further research are suggested.

Elite Images and Foreign Policy

Nehru, Menon and India's Policies

by

Janice Gross Stein

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, McGill University, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Economics and Political Science,
McGill University,
March 20, 1969.

© Janice Gross Stein 1969

CONTENTS

Part One

Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

Chapter I Introduction: Review of the Literature ... p. 1

Chapter II A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour ..... p. 40

Chapter III Elite Images ..... p. 69

Chapter IV The Research Design: Categories, Methods and Hypotheses ..... p. 115

Part Two

The Images of Select Indian Decision-Makers
A Content Analysis

Chapter V Jawaharlal Nehru's Foreign Policy Image ... p. 156

Chapter VI Krishna Menon's Foreign Policy Image ..... p. 255

Chapter VII Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon: Their View of the World ..... p. 348

Part Three

Conclusions

Chapter VIII Theoretical and Methodological Reconsiderations ..... p. 397

TABLES

Table I	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Actors	p.171a
Table II	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Levels of the International System	p.176
Table III	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Domestic Variables	p.179
Table IV	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Symbols	p.183
Table V	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Values	p.188
Table VI	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Issues	p.191
Table VII	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Strategies	p.193
Table VIII	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Hostility	p.213
Table IX	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Friendship	p.219
Table X	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Satisfaction	p.222
Table XI	Nehru: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Change of Status Quo	p.225
Table XII	The Contingencies of Components in Nehru's Image	p.238
Table XIII	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Actors	p.267
Table XIV	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Levels of the International System	p.276

TABLES (Continued)

Table XV	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Domestic Variables	p.281
Table XVI	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Symbols	p.284
Table XVII	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Values	p.289
Table XVIII	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Issues	p.291
Table XIX	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Strategies	p.294
Table XX	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Hostility	p.312
Table XXI	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects and Targets of Friendship	p.316
Table XXII	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Satisfaction	p.319
Table XXIII	Menon: Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Change of Status Quo	p.322
Table XXIV	The Contingencies of Components in Menon's Image	p.335
Table XXV	Frequently -Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image: Political-Diplomatic Issue-Area (General).....	p.373
Table XXVI	Frequently-Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image: Political-Diplomatic Issue-Area (Crises)	p.380
Table XXVII	Frequently-Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image: Military-Security Issue-Area	p.386

FIGURES

Figure 1	Components of the Foreign Policy System	p. 42
Figure 2	The Foreign Policy System	43
Figure 3	The Structure of the Image	71
Figure 4	Nehru: Occurrence of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	198
Figure 5	Nehru: Occurrence of high intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	202
Figure 6	Nehru: Occurrence of moderate intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	205
Figure 7	Nehru: Occurrence of low intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	208
Figure 8	Nehru: A Map of Functional Distance	231
Figure 9	Nehru: Cluster Analysis	250
Figure 10	Menon: Occurrence of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	299
Figure 11	Menon: Occurrence of high intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	302
Figure 12	Menon: Occurrence of moderate intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	305
Figure 13	Menon: Occurrence of low intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo	307
Figure 14	Menon: A Map of Functional Distance	329
Figure 15	Menon: Cluster Analysis	345

Part One

Theoretical and Methodological Considerations

Chapter I

Introduction: Review of the Literature

Scholars have pursued the study of international relations for centuries. Their contributions have been both many and varied, ranging from advisory treatises to princes to complex models of inter-state behaviour. Today analyses of international phenomena are pan-disciplinary; techniques employed are diverse. The historian, for example, studies sequences of action and interprets them to make more intelligible complex series of events. The lawyer, on the other hand, examines international behaviour within the framework of the global legal community. Alternatively, the political scientist analyses international relations from the perspectives of "power" and "national interest"; more recently, the sociologist has explored the impact of ecology and social structure on the external behaviour of states. The study of international relations now encompasses the detailed analysis of the international system -- its institutions, functions and processes, and a growing volume of sophisticated literature has added precision to our understanding of the dynamics of international politics.

A distinct task within the field is the study of foreign

policy. The term "foreign policy" by definition connotes the policy of one actor. Its analysis implies, however, not only the recording of actor behaviour, but also its explanation.

> We can therefore define the study of foreign policy....as the study of activities of individuals and groups within states, and involving the governmental machinery of states, which are designed to have an impact on the policies of other states or on individuals and groups within them. (By contrast)....the study of international politics centers on the processes and effects of interactions between foreign policy decisions, made by individuals and groups, and involving governmental institutions, in two or more states, and on the environment within which such interactions take place.[1]

The analysis of foreign policy has been characterized by two types of focus -- single country studies and general systems theory. The former are abundant in empirical data but are usually devoid of theoretical value.[2] General systems theory, on the other hand, contains little data but establishes a very high level of determinacy for unit behaviour. The task of for-

---

1. Fred A. Sonderman, 'The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Politics', in J.N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1961, p. 15.

2. There are exceptions; for example, Kenneth Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience, Little Brown, Boston, 1967.

eign policy theory is to overcome these lacunae. More precisely, it is to guide systematic inquiry into cause-effect relations among pertinent variables and to facilitate the search for patterns of regularity in state behaviour.

This study will employ a taxonomic framework to explain the sequence of foreign policy behaviour. The basic unit of analysis is the individual state, operating within the international system at any point in time and space; international agencies, blocs and supra-national actors are excluded. An understanding of these actors is necessary for the explanation of the functioning of any international system. However, the purpose of this study is more restricted, to explain and predict probable state behaviour within the international system. Before discussing our framework for foreign policy analysis,[3] it is useful to examine the major alternative approaches in the contemporary literature.

Theoretical Approaches

Preliminary attempts to analyse state behaviour systematically are a product of the last two decades. The literature of this early phase was essentially taxonomic, to develop categ-

---

3. See pp. 40-68 below.

ories to organize vast amounts of unordered data for meaningful study. It did not begin to select and distinguish the most crucial variables of the foreign policy process, nor did it posit relationships among these variables. Its categories were descriptive rather than analytic, and its major concern was the narrative of events which cumulatively form the flow of foreign policy behaviour of major actors. Its primary sources were biography and history. Three major schools may be discerned in the literature on foreign policy analysis: the "power" approach, the "decision-making" approach, and "input-output" analysis.

a. Power Theorists

The classic statement of the "realist" theory of state behaviour was provided by Hans J. Morgenthau:

> International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim....Whenever (statesmen) strive to realize their goal by means of international politics, they do so by striving for power. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power.[4]

He asserts that states pursue one goal, power, which determines

---

4. Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1966, p. 25.

all their foreign policy actions, and denies the relevance of any motive other than the pursuit of power.[5] The balancing of power thus becomes a universal law of history and characterizes every international system.[6]

Morgenthau focusses attention on actor behaviour in the international system but he provides a uni-causal explanation which permits no further breakdown and analysis. There is a corresponding lack of adequate discussion of ends: he postulates an objective and universal national interest without reference to empirical reality or to changing environmental conditions. In fact, the objective conditions of foreign policy are rooted in one specific international system, the nineteenth century balance of power. "Thus, behind the claim to realism, we find a reactionary utopia".[7]

Morgenthau's emphasis on power as the universal variable permits no interpretation of the dynamic processes of foreign

---

5. Morgenthau, in response to persistent criticism, modified his emphasis on power in this text. Nevertheless, it remains the core concept of his theoretical framework.

6. The post-1945 international system is described by Morgenthau as the "new balance of power". Op. cit., Ch. 20.

7. Stanley Hoffmann, 'International Relations: The Long Road to Theory', in Rosenau, op. cit., p. 424.

policy: "....the realist analysis fails because it sees the world as a static field in which power relations reproduce themselves in timeless monotony."[8] Third, Morgenthau ignores the relational content of "power". Power is employed to achieve defined purposes, and it is these objectives which are of crucial importance to the understanding and prediction of state behaviour. By obscuring the instrumental and relational nature of power, Morgenthau prevents the operationalization of his theory of state behaviour. As Stanley Hoffmann so cogently argues:

> ....The concept of power collapses under the burden. Power is a most complex product of other variables which should be allowed to see the light of theory instead of remaining hidden in the shadow of power. Otherwise the theory is bound to mean different things at different steps of the analysis, or to end by selecting for emphasis only one aspect of power;....Thus, instead of a map which simplifies the landscape so that we can understand it, we are left with a distortion.[9]

Finally, by postulating the permanence of "power politics", Morgenthau transforms empirical reality into normative theory and hopelessly blurs the lines between the two. There is no possibility of formulating hypotheses about state be-

---

8. Ibid., p. 423.

9. Ibid., p. 423.

haviour and, correspondingly, none of his postulates are susceptible to empirical testing. Morgenthau, in fact, requires that we accept the power motive on faith as an unprovable truth. Scholarly analysis of foreign policy does not permit such acceptance.

A refined version of the power theory is found in the work of Kenneth W. Thompson and Roy C. Macridis.[10] The authors distinguish between the ideological approach to foreign policy analysis, which classifies the policies of states by their political, social and religious beliefs, and the analytical approach, which assumes that policy rests on a multiplicity of factors to be analysed. Among these factors are "....objective requirements of the national interest (which) place certain irremovable limits upon any statesman seeking to formulate foreign policy".[11] Policy-makers must determine their own hierarchy of interests and those of other actors.

Macridis and Thompson then proceed to itemize the "elements" of foreign policy, which can be visualized in concentric

---

10. 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Roy C. Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 1 - 28.

11. Ibid., p. 4.

circles. At the centre are the permanent material elements. In the second circle are the less permanent material factors which are more responsive to change and to human manipulation. The outer circle consists of human factors -- population, national character, social structure, etc. -- which fluctuate most frequently. It is from these elements that the substance of foreign policy derives.

A diagrammatic presentation of the foreign policy factors is offered. It combines the study of objective factors in foreign policy with the study of processes by which decisions are reached and policies implemented. A tripartite division of the foreign policy process stresses the elements, the policy-making process -- through both governmental and non-governmental agencies -- and trends and issues. This latter category includes the national purposes of peace, security, prosperity, power and diplomacy.

It is instructive to compare the Thompson-Macridis approach with the assumptions of Morgenthau. The authors remark that

> ....the 'realist' theory in international relations claims that power considerations are of primary significance in the behaviour of the ruling groups of any nation-state, and that ideology and all other considerations are subordinate. This is undoubtedly true, and power objectives often conflict with welfare or even status considerations.[12]

12. Thompson and Macridis, op. cit., p. 12.

It is apparent that despite the proliferation of categories of analysis, the authors accept implicitly Morgenthau's fundamental assumptions -- the primacy of the search for power and the balance of power principle. Both of these are accepted as universally applicable; other patterns of international behaviour are treated as deviant. Though the framework of analysis appears to be significantly expanded, the essentials are strikingly similar. What Thompson and Macridis term "elements" of foreign policy are in fact equivalent to Morgenthau's components of national power.[13] What they term trends and issues corresponds directly to Morgenthau's concept of the struggle for power.[14] Macridis and Thompson have accepted his normative assumptions yet they demand an empirical approach to foreign policy analysis:

> One of our aims should be to find regularities in the behaviour of nations and to develop general propositions by setting forth carefully the conditioning factors that account for types of behaviour.... (But) to attempt generalizations and constructions of models that will give us a rigorous scientific understanding and prediction of foreign policy is a hopeless task.[15]

---

13. Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 97-160.

14. Ibid., pp. 25-96.

15. Thompson and Macridis, op. cit., p. 27.

Herein lies the underlying contradiction in their approach.

They advocate a modified empiricism, but their assumptions mitigate even limited empirical analysis. Their concept of power is non-relational; rather, power is treated as an absolute resource, unrelated to specific foreign policy goals. Further, there is no attempt to order the relative importance of variables nor to suggest meaningful relationships among them. Finally, their schema is static; it does not relate changing structures in the international system to the pursuit of constantly evolving goals and to the development of means.

Arnold Wolfers provides one of the most illuminating examinations of foreign policy objectives.[16] Attacking the power monism of the "realist" school, he stresses the relational concept of power:

> To treat the quest for power, positively or negatively, outside the context of the ends and purposes which it is expected to serve, robs it of any intelligible meaning and makes it impossible to judge its appropriateness or excessiveness.[17]

Policy-makers within the state must continually parcel out scarce means among a wide range of objectives, some of which may be contradictory. Decision-makers will seek to maximize

---

16. 'The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference', World Politics, IV, 1951, 39-63. Reprinted in Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 146-51.

17. Ibid., p. 146.

values and will therefore engage in a continuing re-appraisal of previous value positions.

Wolfers provides a three-fold classification of foreign policy objectives: goals of national self-extension, goals of national self-preservation, and goals of national self-abnegation. The first expresses a demand for additional values and thus for a change in the status quo. The second seeks the maintenance and protection of the existing distribution of values; that is, the preservation of the status quo. The third comprises all values transcending the "national interest".

Once the objectives have been chosen, actors will seek to acquire or preserve sufficient power to assure their attainment. A higher level of power imposes additional burdens, eliminates other objectives and tends to provoke counter-action. Less-than-adequate power, on the other hand, reduces the possibility of goal-achievement. Wolfers thus establishes a range of objectives to which power is applied. The objectives vary both in time and in space; and, power is both relational and instrumental.

The classification of goals suggested by Wolfers clarifies foreign policy by focussing on the purposes for which power is sought and employed. Yet certain ambiguities remain.

Wolfers asserted that the use of power depends on "whether a specific increment of security is worth the specific additional deprivations which its attainment through power requires".[18] Security, however, may be obtained by means other than the expansion of power -- by participation in co-operative ventures or membership in international organizations. As Roland Yalem argues,

> Security may be attained by a reduction of power involving slight sacrifices as well as by an expansion of power that would require large sacrifices. There are instances in which the pooling of power may be more significant in achieving security than unilateral expansion....[19]

Wolfers also ignores the problem of how conflicting nations perceive each other's objectives. Goals of self-preservation held by state A may be perceived by state B as goals of self-extension, and this perception may reinforce B's predisposition to shift from self-preservation to self-extension goals. It is necessary, then, to identify the factors that account for shifts from one policy goal to another. Finally, Wolfers pays scant attention to the factors that influence decision-makers' perceptions and, therefore, their choices of goals. The decision-making approach to foreign policy analysis

---

18. Ibid., p. 148.

19. 'The Theory of Ends of Arnold Wolfers', Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV, 1960, p. 422.

attempts to overcome this deficiency.

b. Decision-Making Theorists

A focus on the decision as the core unit of foreign policy analysis was inspired by modern theories of communication and organization. The basic assumption of decision-making theorists is that "action" in international relations can be defined as a set of decisions made by recognizable units. The decision is the point of input, where the influences that have shaped the decision can be detected and measured, and the point of output, where policies are authorized and formalized. The leading representatives of this school are Joseph Frankel,[20] and Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin.[21]

Frankel concentrates on the "essential component of foreign policy", the decision, and stresses the locus of actual decision-making power within the state which remains the primary decision-maker in international politics. Official or sanctioned authority cannot be equated with decision-making power; that is, participation in the decision-making process is not restricted only to those who hold official positions.

---

20. The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

21. Richard C. Snyder, H.W. Bruck and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1962.

Nevertheless, governmental authority remains a key indicator of decision-making power: "Actual power and formal governmental authority show a strong tendency to fuse".[22] The advantage of focussing on authorized decision-makers is that of strict comparability.

Following the Sprouts,[23] Frankel distinguishes between the psychological environment -- the setting as it is perceived by decision-makers -- and the operational environment -- or 'reality', which affects the outcomes of decisions. His primary concern is the psychological environment.[24] "It is.... our basic choice to take the recreation of the 'world' of the decision-makers as they know it."[25]

Frankel's concept of the operational environment is relatively unstructured: he deals mainly with institutional

---

22. Frankel, op. cit., p. 6.

23. Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 1957, pp.309-28.Reprinted in Rosenau, op. cit., pp. 106-19.

24. Aside from the two studies that will be discussed in connection with decision-making theory, several other scholars have dealt with the psychological environment. "Elite images", or the psychological environment of the decision-maker, is a core concept of decision-making theory. However, these scholars have dealt with elite perceptions without employing all the other concomitants of decision-making theory. Nor have they developed complete models of the foreign policy process. For this reason, I have decided to postpone discussion of their work until Chapter III, where I will treat the concept of elite images at much greater length.

25. Frankel, op. cit., p. 4.

factors and the constraints they impose on decision-makers. He gives some attention to "paucity of resources" and trans-national institutions and coalitions but he does not integrate these factors into a structured analysis of the environment. There is no attempt to gauge the impact and relevance of various levels of the international system; he does, however, consider at much greater length the factors shaping elite perceptions of their environment.

Three major variables influence the capacity of decision-makers to perceive their environment: information -- accessibility, assimilation and interpretation; image -- which is of crucial importance to decision-makers' appreciation of the external world; and values -- which play a central part in the organization of images. Frankel examines the influence of ideology, "value-systems" and predispositions on the formation of the psychological environment, on the elaboration of desired ends, and on the determination of objectives and the choice of means. Yet, he does not specify sets of complementary or contradictory images. Nor does he develop patterns of values which may lead to the selection of images which again influence policy choices. The relationship between these factors is only suggested; their inter-relationships are not delineated. Nor is there any structuring of the psychological

environment itself. The question -- images of what? -- is not satisfactorily answered. The failure to structure both the psychological and operational environments precludes the assessment of congruence or deviation and the resulting implications for foreign policy behaviour.

Frankel analyses the decision-making sequence in detail. In the pre-decisional stage there is initiative, planning, definition of a situation, prediction, advice and deliberation. In the choice itself alternatives are selected, incompatibilities are resolved or ignored and a decision is formulated. In the third and final stage the decision is implemented, usually for a trial period, and its relative success or failure is analysed and explained.

There is no discussion, however, of the impact of implemented decisions on the perceptions of decision-makers and of the factors which shape their perceptions. Does an operational change produce a corresponding change in perception? This difficulty is a product of a more serious deficiency: the notion of circular feedback, central to such a schema, remains relatively unexplored. The author accords it scant attention and does not raise the relevant series of questions flowing from the notion of circularity and reinforcement. Through this omission, his schema remains essentially static.

The processes of analysis, explanation and refinement are not focussed on the multivariate sequence of environment, images and choices. The framework of the model, therefore, rests on limited empirical grounds: the very form in which the hypotheses are stated precludes rigorous testing.

Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, in a seminal study of decision-making, focus on the "decision" as the common element of all actions in international relations. To understand the action-reaction pattern among states it is necessary to analyse the diverse forces which influence decision-makers. The crucial factor in explaining state behaviour in the international arena is the way "decision-makers as actors define their situation".

The major assumptions underlying the Snyder, Bruck and Sapin approach are first, that it is possible to analyse the complex determinants of international politics by focussing on behaviour at the state level; second, that it is possible to draw up an analytical scheme which is relevant and useful for the behaviour of any state in time and space; third, that the nation-state will remain the significant unit of political action in the indefinite future[26], and, finally, that action

---

26. For a contrasting assessment of the future of the state as an actor in the international system, see John H. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

in international relations can be defined as a set of decisions made by recognizable units.

Decision-makers are those "whose authoritative acts are to all intents and purposes the acts of the state".[27] Decision-making is "the process which results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical alternative projects, of one project intended to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers."[28] The authors recognize that several influences and variables are operative in any one decision. A distinction is made between the internal and external setting, which together constitute vital influences on decision-makers. The internal environment consists of major common value orientations, major institutional patterns, major social organizations, role differentiation and specialization, groups and relevant social processes. The external environment consists of the non-human environment, other cultures and societies, and societies organized and functioning as states -- that is, government action. In addition, the objectives desired by policy-makers

---

27. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., p. 65. This narrow gauge definition of the decision-making elite was later adhered to by Frankel and the general systems theorist, David Easton. See Easton, 'An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems', World Politics, IX, 3 (April, 1957), pp. 383-400.

28. Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., p. 90.

and the prevailing rules governing their behaviour are important determinants. These many and varied influences can all be subsumed within three major conceptual frameworks, each of which is an important determinant of decision-making action.

The first of these is "spheres of competence", which refer to the activities of a decision-maker that are related and necessary to the achievement of an organization's objectives. The second is "communication and information", which includes meanings, values and preferences actually available to the actors at the time of the decision. The third is "motivation", which embraces a number of psychological, personality and value factors that influence the actors, enter the process and affect its outcome.

The advantages of this focus on decision-making are immediately apparent. First, it provides comparable and uniform categories for the collection of data. Second, Snyder et al.'s analysis of the environment is wide-ranging; Frankel, on the other hand, stresses the institutional matrix of the political system. Third, Snyder et al. emphasize the pre-eminent relevance of the psychological environment in the explanation of state behaviour and offer a rigorous analysis of the decision-making process. They have provided the signposts along the path to research and generalization.

There are, however, several serious problems in the theoretical construct which diminish its research potential. The first and most important of these is the absence of sequential notion. The authors do not deal with the operational environment: there is, therefore, no possibility of measuring congruence between perceptions of the actor and operational reality.[29] In addition, there is no notion of a cumulative process of foreign policy behaviour. Snyder et al. systematically relate the variables of the decision-making process but they ignore outputs and feedbacks, essential parts of the foreign policy process. The decision, after it is formulated as a policy choice, remains an end-product, with no attempt to analyse and assess its impact on elite perceptions as a result of implementation. In fact, built into this schema is the implicit assumption that all decisions are implemented as efficiently as they are formulated.

A corollary is the absence of a typology of decisions: there is no attempt to differentiate between major, innovative decisions and those which are administrative in nature and are related to an on-going series of decisions in a particular foreign policy flow. Another drawback is the absence of weight-

29. A possible application of the social science concept of reality to foreign policy analysis is delineated in the framework for research below.

ing of the major determinants of choice among decision alternatives. The authors do emphasize spheres of communication, motivation, information and communication but they establish no hierarchical order of relevance to any particular decisional sequence. Nor are there any preliminary hypotheses which posit the importance of a determinant for a particular type of decisional sequence. It is these kinds of hypotheses which are essential if speculative "if-then" statements are to be made and then subjected to rigorous testing.

The most serious difficulties arise when the student of foreign policy behaviour attempts to apply the Snyder et al. model. The number of variables that affect decision-making is vast -- actors, perceptions, values, motivations, spheres of competence, the structure of the international system, etc. The amount of data that must be processed is enormous, and the categories themselves are not sufficiently refined to permit systematic collection of material. The one major application of the model was the analysis of the American decision to resist aggression in Korea.[30] The research obstacles proved substantial, even with highly favourable circumstances for

30. Richard C. Snyder and Glenn D. Paige, 'The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme', in Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, op. cit., pp. 206-49. For a more elaborate treatment of this case study see Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950, Free Press, New York, 1967.

data collection and access to participants. And despite the heavy investment of time, skills and financial resources, few of the categories were refined, and few testable hypotheses emerged. Very little published research has been done within this framework, due to its extraordinary complexity and the lack of rigorous categories.

c. Input-Output Analysis

A third school in the study of foreign policy is input-output analysis. This has progressed mainly in social sciences other than politics, and its adaptation to the study of state behaviour has raised many interesting theoretical questions.

Gabriel Almond was the first to suggest an input-output approach to the analysis of foreign policy.[31] Three fundamental changes had occurred in the international political system, he declared: the radical advance in military technology; the development of a bipolar international system with the corresponding emergence of non-European areas of the world as centres of initiative and objects of international competition; and Soviet penetration of the internal politics of other actors through the international Communist movement. These three

31. Gabriel A. Almond, 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Macridis, op. cit., pp. 1-8.

developments have challenged scholars in both comparative government and foreign policy. Almond's objective was to provide meaningful cross-fertilization between the two disciplines:

> Ideally, the comparative study of foreign policy would have as its major goal the discovery of the most significant types of foreign policy actors, and the conditions associated with their emergence, persistence, and their transformation.[32]

He assumes that the system will be shaped by its participants. Pressure will therefore flow from the unit into the system, underlining the necessity for rigorous analysis of foreign policy.

Almond stresses three dimensions of foreign policy: the historical background to the policy-making process, the foreign policy process and the substance of foreign policy. The historical background would identify the main factors or inputs conditioning the behaviour of an actor in the international system -- its economic resources and capabilities, its social stratification, its persistent cultural tendencies, its political structure and ideological tendencies, changes in its international position, and the principal historical tendencies in its foreign policy. The policy-making process refers both to governmental and non-governmental agencies. The third

---

32. Ibid., p. 3.

component -- the substance or outputs of foreign policy -- deals with the following question: how does a given actor define its foreign policy interests and objectives, and by what combination of means does it pursue these interests and objectives?

Almond thus presented implicitly the core concept of inputs, outputs and a circular dynamic process of foreign policy. However, the variables comprising both inputs and outputs and their inter-relationship are nowhere systematically stated. There is no ordering of variables within each analytic category, nor is there an ordering of the relationship across categories. Moreover, there is no attempt to apply structural-functional analysis to the foreign policy process. Finally, the impact of the feedback process is not explicitly stated or analysed.

This lack of analytic rigour precludes any meaningful comparison and generalization in the pre- and post-policy choice stages. In addition, the process of foreign policy-making is itself conceived in purely structural terms and is not analytically related to its environment. This precludes the possibility of formulating hypotheses about state behaviour and testing these generalizations.

George Modelski attempted to employ both input-output analysis and an equilibrium-centred construct of the social

system [33] derived from the work of Talcott Parsons. "The foremost task of foreign policy is to throw light on the ways in which states attempt to change and succeed in changing the behaviour of other states".[34] As a result, the student of foreign policy must focus on the relationship between policy-makers and their community, and between the community and the outside world.

The first basic concept of Modelski's model is power. Power is defined as "a community's present means to obtain the future desirable behaviour of other states". One must distinguish between governmental and national power, and between capacities and actual resources.

One of the major determinants of foreign policy is "power input", both internal and external. Internal power inputs include such factors as the quality of a nation's armed forces, the quality of its foreign policy organizations, human resources such as morale, and non-human resources such as military hardware, transportation and communication systems and currency reserves. External power inputs refer to supporting actions taken toward other states, legal or illegal inter-

---

33. George Modelski, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

34. Ibid., p. 7.

ference in another state's affairs, receipt of material or the use of another state's facilities and the feedback from past policies which constitute a state's reputation or image.

"Power output" consists of the resources available for meeting current needs and producing future benefits. Implied is the maintenance of present resources, technology and alliances, and the formation of new power resources through increases in power output and/or the sacrifice of existing outputs. Related to the importance of power output in the actual execution of foreign policy is intelligent power investment. The cost element must be considered, for the ingredients of power may or may not be interchangeable.

A second fundamental concept is aims, defined as objectives and interests. Interests are the product of a congruence of demands by foreign policy agencies, interest groups and political parties: they involve the gamut of ties that exist or are sought with other actors. Some interests embrace all sectors of the foreign policy flow, while others are more limited. Policy-makers will normally attempt to consolidate the support of their communities both through the use of symbolic gestures and by the satisfaction of interests.

The objectives states pursue may be either offensive or defensive; they may involve visible power outputs, as in

military operations, or symbolic outputs, as in United Nations' resolutions. In particular, policy-makers may embrace a set of principles as minimum objectives, the very generality and simplicity of which, however, mitigate careful consideration of all foreseeable consequences. Changes in such principles occur more slowly than changes in interests.

There are, then, four parameters of foreign policy -- power inputs, power outputs, interests and objectives. Changes in foreign policy which may be externally or internally induced will change as do these four elements. The main focus, therefore, must be on the adjustments which occur among the four elements and the links between internal and external equilibrium. From these four elements Modelski develops six dynamic relationships.

The first of these is the relationship between interests and power inputs. All expressions of interest carry the assurance of support or withdrawal of power input. An increase in power allows new interests to assert themselves and vice-versa. The second relationship is that of interests and objectives. Interests are couched in broad terms, while objectives may be more specific. The balance between the two significantly affects the position of the policy-maker <u>vis-à-vis</u> his community. The adoption of a new objective may or may not increase

support in the community. Third, a relationship exists between interests and power outputs. Power outputs necessarily determine the efficacy with which interests are converted into objectives. The fourth relationship is that of power input and power output. The extent of inputs sets the limits within which power output must fall. Output may also shape the requirements for input components. Normally, an increase in power input brings an increase in power output, and a decrease brings a corresponding decrease. The fifth relationship is that of power input and objectives -- the relationship between resources and objectives. Finally, there is the relationship of objectives and power output, that is, between objectives and costs.

A state's foreign policy attains stability when all four elements are in equilibrium, through the twin processes of internal and external adjustment. Changes in the interests of a state may result from a change in the interests of their own policy-makers; from the removal of unfriendly policy-makers from office; a change in the wishes and desires of their external or internal community; or, an alteration in the relationship of these communities to the policy-makers. Changes in power input can occur as a result of changes in current input, power resources, power liabilities or the services of

policy-makers. Changes in objectives can be brought about through changes in policies, in policy-makers, and in offensive and/or defensive actions. Power output can be changed through enlargement of power resources, annexation or (increased) mobilization.

Foreign policy behaviour can thus be analysed through the careful assessment of the equilibrium among the four basic elements and the balance among the six dynamic relationships. Lack of congruence can be predicted, and asymmetry forecast from careful analysis. Only a continuously readjusted equilibrium can produce a "rational" foreign policy.

Modelski provides one of the most logical and internally consistent models of the foreign policy process. Underlying this model is the concept of equilibrium, which is rigorously applied. From this rigorous application one can measure the internal consistency, or the rationality, of foreign policy. Modelski emphasizes the relationship between demands and outputs and provides one of the most sophisticated discussions of the relationship between decision-makers and their communities. His analysis does not focus on the decision-makers as the core variable; rather, they are at the vortex of his six relationships. Finally, Modelski offers a dynamic model of the foreign policy process: his notion of feedback is one of "cumulative

continuity". Feedback is not a circular process but is, rather, multi-dimensional.

Modelski offers many interesting and relevant theoretical insights into foreign policy but his model suffers from one overwhelming deficiency. This is a non-researchable model, with no research-directed questions. The categories themselves are not defined precisely, nor can they be operationalized to permit research. No testable hypotheses emerge, and the model permits little or no empirical verification. The concept of power is defined as an absolute quantity, rather than as a relational concept relative to specific goals and purposes. Ultimately, this construct can be accepted only on the grounds of inner logical consistency; its assumptions cannot be tested or verified.

James Rosenau presents one of the most intriguing approaches to foreign policy analysis.[35] He attempts to build an explanatory theory, with which factors can be weighted, if-then statements can be made, and behaviour can be predicted.

'Pre-theory' is "both an early step toward explanation of specific empirical events and a general orientation toward

---

35. James N. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in Barry R. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1966, pp. 27-92.

all events."[36] All pre-theories are five-dimensional and include the following variables: idiosyncratic variables, all those aspects of a decision-maker that distinguish his foreign policy behaviour from those of every other decision-maker; role variables, the external behaviour of officials that is generated by their roles and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncracies of the role occupants; governmental variables, those aspects of a government's structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers; systemic variables, those non-human aspects of a society's external environment conditioning choices made by officials; and societal variables, those non-governmental aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour, such as national unity, values, etc. To formulate a pre-theory one must assess the relative 'potencies' of these five major variables. The main determinants of potency are the size of a country, the state of the economy and the nature of its political system.

From this analysis Rosenau derives several interesting hypotheses. For example, the potency of the systemic variable varies inversely with the size of the country. In developed countries the role variable is greater, while the idiosyncratic

36. Ibid., p. 42.

variable is greater in under-developed countries. Finally, the societal variable is more potent in open polities, while the governmental variable is greater in closed societies. These hypotheses provide the researcher with preliminary guidelines about the probable foreign policy behaviour of the country under study.

Rosenau introduces the concept of the "penetrated political system", the hybrid polity which is characteristic of the contemporary international system. In certain issue-areas non-members of a national system may participate in the allocation of national values, this resulting in outside permeation of that system. The penetrated system is not static; it originates, develops and disappears as capabilities, attitudes and circumstances change. The penetrated society is characterized by a shortage of capabilities: non-member participation is an effort to compensate for this. Penetrated systems are, therefore, as permanent as the capability shortages which foster them. National societies can be organized as penetrated political systems with respect to some issues and as national political systems with respect to others, for the functioning of a political system varies significantly from one issue to the other.

A second crucial concept which Rosenau develops is

the "issue-area". An issue-area consists of "a cluster of values, the allocation or potential allocation of which leads the affected or potentially affected actor to differ so greatly over (a) the way in which the values should be allocated, or (b) the horizontal levels at which the allocations should be authorized, that they engage in distinctive behaviour to mobilize support for the attainment of their particular values".[37] Boundaries of vertical systems, then, are demarcated by distinctiveness of values and behaviour.

Rosenau establishes four main issue-areas -- territorial, status, human resources and non-human resources. He then attempts to distinguish the varying behavioural characteristics evoked by one cluster of values from the others. The motives, actions and interactions of political actors are crucially related to the degree of tangibility of both the values to be allocated and the means which have to be employed to affect allocation. From this Rosenau develops a number of hypotheses. The greater the tangibility of means, the more active and motivated the actors will be. Second, the more actors which are affected and active, the lesser the tangibility of the ends. Third, the greater the tangibility of both ends and

---

37. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', op. cit., p. 81.

means, the greater the tendency for affected actors to bargain. Fourth, the status area is likely to evoke the most uncompromising political behaviour. Finally, the boundaries of vertical systems in the status area would appear to be more capable of expansion than are systems in any other area.

In conclusion Rosenau ranks the five sets of variables in three issue-areas -- for developed and under-developed economies, open and closed polities and penetrated and non-penetrated systems. One can, therefore, quickly establish preliminary guidelines to predict with reasonable accuracy foreign policy behaviour in any political system for each of the three issue-areas.

Rosenau seems best able among foreign policy analysts to combine theory and hypothesis -- formation with categories which, if more rigorously defined and clarified, would be operational. His hypotheses are testable; his "pre-theory" transcends taxonomy, and suggests the operative inter-relationships among variables. There are, however, major problems of clarification and quantification.

In the same way as Modelski, he is not concerned primarily with decision-making but with the outputs of foreign policy. Rosenau's emphasis on the idiosyncratic variable reflects the greater scope of action which he accords the decision-

makers. However, his five basic variables are themselves the result of the complex interaction of several factors which remain unexplored. Yet it is on the rank ordering of these variables of behaviour that he claims the capacity to predict state behaviour in different issue-areas.

Idiosyncratic behaviour, for example, refers to that behaviour which distinguishes one decision-maker from his counterparts. This category is enormous in scope, embracing, for example, variations in style, content and efficacy; it emerges as the traditional 'catch-all' category which encompasses all those factors that cannot be classified within other variables -- the concealed stochastic variable. Role behaviour is implicitly treated as determined almost solely by the role under discussion; this contradicts most major studies, which stress the wide variations in role behaviour flowing from vaying sets of role perceptions. The societal dimension, as Karl Deutsch has persuasively argued, consists of many variables which themselves must be weighted in order to assess their potency.[38]

This pervasive imprecision seriously weakens the capacity of the model to predict. The categories themselves

38. Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, The Technology Press of the Massachusets Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1953, pp. 123-164.

are not mutually exclusive, making very difficult the formulation of hypotheses with precise empirical content. Second, the major determinants -- the size of a country, state of the economy and type of political system -- are not sufficiently clarified. This is a theoretical problem of a lesser order, but nonetheless confusing. Is size related to area or population? Further, the standards for measuring developed or under-developed economies are not clear. Finally, the criteria for open or closed polities are not made explicit. Are the Soviet Union and Pakistan both closed societies, or are there significant differences which will sharply influence their external behaviour? In conceptualizing the three major determinants, no spectrum is assumed; rather, they are treated as static and fixed, and their definition is ambiguous. In short, there is an analytic fuzziness which hampers rigorous analysis.

The concept of "issue-area" and "penetrated political system" are highly suggestive. By delineating vertical and horizontal boundaries for penetrated political systems Rosenau implicitly assumes fluid environments relative to issue-areas. Using these two concepts, along with that of tangibility of means and ends, he tries to operationalize the numbers of affected actors, the intensity of motivation to act, the frequency with which they act and the extent of their readiness

to bargain with each other. Although he does not refer to them, there are statistical techniques which could be employed to measure and compare frequencies, intensity of motivation and extent of bargaining.

All this provides valuable guidelines for research in state behaviour. Nevertheless, the concept of "penetration" poses several analytic problems. All actors in the contemporary international system are "open" to a greater or lesser degree, since they trade and have commercial relations with other countries. Rosenau establishes as the boundaries of a penetrated political system the participation of non-members. Does 'non-members' refer to non-nationals, commercial elites or foreign governmental officials formally participating in decision-making? The implications for the foreign policy process will differ in all three cases. Second, there are no criteria for distinguishing between cases of partial penetration and complete penetration. Complete penetration can be seen as a function of the number, scope and intensity of penetration by foreign political, social and economic groups. Does complete penetration imply total control of the decision-making process? What are the dynamics of the process of transition from "openness" to partial penetration to complete penetration? These and related questions are not explored.

Rosenau, moreover, does not analyse a system that is partially penetrated within an issue-area, as opposed to one which is penetrated for the entire spectrum of an issue-area: it is the former circumstance which will most likely occur with the greatest frequency. What is necessary is scaling within issue-areas themselves, in addition to comparison between issue-areas. Hypotheses dealing with intensity of motivation and frequencies of action would have to be modified in accordance with the location of an issue within its area.

Rosenau has presented a structurally and functionally oriented analysis of the foreign policy process -- the only such analysis in the contemporary literature. He develops some promising hypotheses dealing with actor behaviour in issue-areas. These, however, are not related to variable behaviour in any political system. And the impact of different types of political systems in which the policy-maker operates is not assessed. Further, there is no notion of an input-output flow, nor of feedback. Similar to Modelski, he implies cumulative continuity. He is concerned with the outputs of foreign policy.

We have now surveyed the major trends in foreign policy theory: input-output analysis, decision-making, and systems

analysis have enriched our understanding of the dynamics of the foreign policy process. Yet as Rosenau has observed:

> To identify factors is not to trace their influence. To uncover processes that affect external behaviour is not to explain how and why they operate under certain circumstances and not under others. To recognize that foreign policy is shaped by internal as well as external factors is not to comprehend how the two intermix or indicate the conditions under which one predominates over the other.[39]

The development of hypotheses about foreign policy behaviour requires a framework in which the interplay of different variables can be observed and measured. It is to this task that we shall now turn.

---

39. Rosenau, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', op. cit., p. 31.

Chapter II

A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour [1]

The research framework for this study is based on a simple proposition: the concept of 'system' is no less valid in foreign policy analysis than in the study of domestic politics. As with all systems of action the foreign policy system comprises an environment or setting, a group of actors, structures through which these actors initiate decisions and respond to challenges, and processes which sustain or alter the flow of demands and products of the system as a whole. The boundaries of the foreign policy system are vertical; that is, they encompass all inputs and outputs which affect decisions the content and scope of which lie essentially within the realm of inter-state relations. As such, the boundaries fluctuate from one issue to another. It is necessary, there-

---

1. This research design was originated by Professor Michael Brecher in a seminar on the Comparative Analysis of Foreign Policy at McGill University from 1961 to 1964. It was used by him as a guide to field research in India and Israel from 1964 to 1966. Refinements of the design were made in the Seminar in 1967 and 1968, and a draft article was prepared by Professor Brecher, Professor B. Steinberg and myself. This chapter is drawn in its entirety from that paper, but does not include its systematic empirical applications. See Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour", in Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, March, 1969.

fore, to explore the content and inter-relations of these key variables -- environment, actors, structures and processes -- all placed within a framework of demands on policy or inputs, and products of policy or outputs.

A foreign policy system may be likened to a flow into and out of a network of structures or institutions which perform certain functions and thereby produce decisions. These in turn feed back into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of policy demands, policy processes and policy products. All foreign policy systems, then, comprise a set of components which can be classified in three general categories, inputs, process and outputs. A system constantly absorbs demands and channels them into a policy machine, which in turn transforms these inputs into decisions or outputs: this notion of flow and dynamic movement in a system is portrayed in Figures 1 and 2.[2]

All data regarding foreign policy can be classified in one of the categories of Figure 1. Figure 2 represents in schematic form a research design for foreign policy behaviour. What is now required is to define the categories and variables in a rigorous fashion and to explain the ways in which inputs, process and outputs are inter-related.

---

2. See the following two pages for Figures 1 and 2.

FIGURE 1

I N P U T S

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

EXTERNAL - Global (G)
Subordinate (S)
Subordinate Other (SO)
Bilateral (B)
Dominant Bilateral (DB)

INTERNAL - Military Capability (M)
Economic Capability (E)
Political Structure (PS)
Interest Groups (IG)
Competing Elites (CE)

COMMUNICATION - The transmission of data about the operational environment by mass media and face-to-face contacts

PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

ATTITUDINAL PRISM - Ideology, Historical Legacy, Personality Predispositions

ELITE IMAGES - of the operational environment, including competing elites' advocacy and pressure potential

P R O C E S S

FORMULATION - of Strategic and Tactical decisions in 4 ISSUE-AREAS:

Military-Security (M-S)
Political-Diplomatic (P-D)
Economic-Developmental (E-D)
Cultural-Status (C-S)

IMPLEMENTATION - of decisions by various structures Head of State, Head of Government, Foreign Office, etc.

O U T P U T S - the substance of acts or decisions

FIGURE 2


OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
external
G
S
SO
B
DB
internal
M
E
PS
IG
CE
COMMUNICATIONS
DECISION-MAKING ELITE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT
ATTITUDINAL PRISM
external
ELITE IMAGES
internal
G
S
SO
B
DB
M
E
PS
IG
CE
FORMULATION
ISSUE AREAS
M-S
P-D
E-D
C-S
STRATEGIC
TACTICAL
Decision Implementation

The operational environment defines the setting in which foreign policy decisions are taken. The concept of setting refers to a set of potentially relevant factors and conditions which may affect a state's external behaviour. The operational environment thus sets the parameters or boundaries within which decision-makers must act, by initiation or response. The raw data of that environment are grouped into ten taxonomic variables and exist outside the decision-makers' minds as part of the natural world in which national actors operate.

Underlying this research design is the view that the operational environment has a profound and direct autonomous effect on the results of decisions, but influences the choice among policy options only as it is filtered through the images of decision-makers. The link between image and decision is indeed the master key to a researchable framework of foreign policy analysis.

This relationship between the two environments -- the operational and psychological -- also provides a technique for measuring 'success' in foreign policy decisions. To the extent that decision-makers perceive the operational environment accurately, their foreign policy acts may be said to be

rooted in reality [3] and thus likely to be 'successful'.[4] To the extent that their images are inaccurate, policy choices will be 'unsuccessful'; that is, there will be a gap between elite-defined objectives and policy outcomes.

An 'unsuccessful' choice among policy alternatives may arise from one of two gaps in the psychological environment: first, the inaccurate perception of the operational environment by the elite and second, the intrusion of new or changed data in the operational environment. Thus it is poss-

---

3. "Reality" is a term which may be applied to the analyst's observations of the operational environment. It can be questioned whether the social scientist is more capable of more accurate perceptions of that environment than is the participant decision-maker. This will vary with the particular analyst and the decision-maker. Generally the decision-maker has superior access to sources of information which can enhance his insight into reality. The social scientist however is normally less involved and therefore more likely to be objective. Moreover he possesses skills which enhance his objectivity and accuracy.

4. "Success" is measured by the degree of congruence between decision-makers' perceptions and reality. A successful foreign policy is one where decision-makers' objectives are realized, a condition only possible where there is a substantial degree of congruence between the operational and psychological environments. Empirical research will permit measurement of the degrees of similarity and difference; precise measurement, however, is exceedingly difficult. One can now offer only qualitative statements about that congruence, i.e., "greater-than -- lesser-than" statements.

ible to distinguish the unknowable from the unknown about the reality pertinent to foreign policy. Everything about the operational environment which can affect decisions can be classified within the ten variables. However, defective elite images or sudden changes in the content of any of these ten variables in the course of a decision flow may affect the outcome of a decision or, depending upon the time of entry of such new or altered data, will affect the 'success' of the policy. It does not merit classification as an autonomous variable for it is encompassed within the operational environment through the ten variables. The research design clearly envisages the possibility of inputs after the formulation stage of a decision and before the implementation stage, as well as in the implementation stage itself. Such inputs change the operational environment through feedback and thus affect both compliance and subsequent formulation. In short, elite images and the content of decisions may not always exhibit a 1:1 relationship.

The operational environment comprises two general types of variables, external and internal. The former refers to conditions and relationships which exist beyond the territorial boundaries of states and which operate at three distinct levels: global; subordinate (and subordinate other); and

bilateral, including a sub-variant, dominant-bilateral. The internal segment of the environment consists of five variables: military capability; economic capability; political structure; the specific demands on foreign policy made by interest groups; and the general demands advocated by competing elites.

The total web of relationships among all actors within the international system (states, blocs, alliances and international organizations) constitutes the global system. Not all actors, however, and not all interactions are equally important in shaping the external behaviour of an individual state; key patterns of interaction must be uncovered and explored. To illustrate, in the mid-twentieth century three types of interaction at the global level provide the most important set of parameters for state behaviour: the relations between the two power-ideology blocs, especially between the bloc leaders, the United States and the Soviet Union; the behaviour of the universal actor, the United Nations, and its affiliated agencies; and the relations between the super powers and the 'third world'.

These patterns of interaction serve as the most important dimension of the contemporary global system; there are others. As with all international systems, the myriad of data concerning the global system can be classified into twelve

features, eight of the structural variety and four of the textural type.

Structural: level of power; power stratification; political organization; military organization; economic organization; intensity of interaction; penetration of subordinate systems; penetration by subordinate systems;

Textural: level of communications; homogeneity of values; commonality of political systems; units' domestic stability.[5]

The content of these categories taken together constitute an over-view of the global system. To illustrate the nature of the research exercise, the following questions may be asked. How large is the capability gap between the most powerful states in the global system and the next order of states, or between the most powerful and the least powerful, that is, what is the configuration (the level and distribution) of power? Is the system bi-polar or multi-polar? How can the existing distribution and level of power, nuclear or

---

5. These features and a partial coding of seven international systems are examined in Michael Brecher, 'International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia', in World Politics, XV, 2 (January 1963), pp. 213-235. Reprinted in Michael Brecher, The New States of Asia, Oxford, London, 1963, pp. 88-110.

conventional, affect the behaviour of a given state? In short, the analyst of foreign policy behaviour must assess the impact of these and other features of the global system on policy outcomes.[6] Not all features of the global system impinge directly or with equal weight on the results of foreign policy acts. Nor do decision-makers perceive all features with equal intensity. The input role of the global system as a whole varies greatly from one issue and actor to another.

The subordinate system represents an intermediate level of interaction between the global system and the level of relations between any two states. A subordinate system may also set limits and provide inducements to foreign policy choices. Theoretically, there may be as many subordinate systems as there are foreign policy issues, but logically, they can be grouped into four categories: (1) geographic, with contiguous membership; (2) geographic, with non-contiguous members; (3) organizational, with contiguous membership; and (4) organizational, with non-contiguous members. The term

---

6. Some hypotheses about the impact of the contemporary global system upon state behaviour at various periods can be found in John Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959, Chapters 7 and 8; Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, John Wiley, New York, 1957, Chapter 2; and Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World Politics, Little, Brown, Boston, 1963, Chapters 11 and 12.

'subordinate system' in this chapter refers to the first type only, that is, a regional system of which the state under analysis is a member; the term 'subordinate other' encompasses the second, third and fourth types. Preliminary evidence suggests that the subordinate system exerts far-reaching pressure, influencing the behaviour of many states to a greater degree than other systems of which they are members.[7]

A subordinate system (type 1) is characterized by six conditions: (1) delimited scope with primary stress on a geographic region; (2) a minimum of three state actors; (3) recognition by the members themselves that they constitute a distinctive community, region or segment of the global system; (4) objective recognition by other actors that these states do, in fact, form an identifiable community; (5) relative inferiority

---

7. Various developments in recent international politics gave rise to this hypothesis. The enormous increase in the number of actors in the contemporary international system has fundamentally altered the character of the system. For the first time non-European regional alliances, coalitions and/or blocs participate in the global system. Regional structures have been established and they perform important mediating functions. These structures also serve as devices to limit the intrusion of outside actors into sub-systemic politics. Finally, members perceive themselves and are perceived to be 'Asian', 'African', 'Latin American', etc. For empirical evidence, see Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, op. cit., especially Tables II, III and IV, and the concluding hypotheses.

of sub-system units of power to those in the dominant system, using a sliding scale of power in both; and (6) greater effect on the subordinate system by penetration from the dominant system than the reverse.[8] In the present international system, there are at least six subordinate systems of that first type -- American, East European, West European, Middle Eastern, Southern Asian, and sub-Saharan African; others may emerge.

Subordinate systems can be analysed in the same way as the global system; that is, by grouping the relevant data within the same twelve structural and textural features, except that the last structural feature, 'links to the subordinate system', is replaced with 'links to the global system'. States may be members of one subordinate system, of more than

---

8. Brecher, op. cit., pp. 219-220. In a critique of this concept of subordinate system, Michael Haas retains the shell but suggests a drastic revision of its contents. He retains only the first condition intact, modifies the second to two actors, and eliminates the other four, substituting his own omnibus third 'criterion': "There is a relatively self-contained network of political interactions between the members, involving such activities as goal attainment, adaptation, pattern maintenance, and integration." Only one part of the critique is persuasive, namely, the need to operationalize the term 'objective recognition' (condition 3) and 'identify themselves as members' (condition 4); but the case for their elimination is unconvincing, especially in the light of empirical investigation into elite images. Michael Haas, draft chapter on 'Approaches to the Analysis of Systemic Factors', in proposed volume of International Conflict, Spring 1967.

one, or of none at all. Yet foreign policy choices may be influenced from pressures emanating from other systems as well as from one's own. This distinction is described by the terms 'subordinate' and 'subordinate other'.

Through the use of the operational concept, 'subordinate system', systems comparison is facilitated. In addition to increased horizontal comparison, additional vertical comparison of actors is now possible.

A bilateral system refers to the total pattern of interactions between any two states except for relations involving super powers or pre-eminent powers within the global system.

A dominant-bilateral system refers to the total pattern of interactions between any state and a super power or pre-eminent actor in the global system; at present this refers to relations with the United States or the Soviet Union.

International systems -- global, subordinate and subordinate other, bilateral and dominant-bilateral -- constitute the five external variables of the operational environment for state behaviour. They create one of the two types of objective boundaries for the range of foreign policy options open to decision-makers. The other type is set by the internal

variables of the operational environment; it must be reiterated, however, that the boundary limits to choice are operationalized only through the filtering of that data into the decision-makers' perceptions.

Two of the internal variables may be dealt with briefly, for their meaning and content have been elaborated at length in the literature.

Military capability can be defined as the ability to wage war or to deter other actors from attacking. Crucial tangible indices are geography, the general level of technology, military manpower, financial resources available for defence, and weaponry. To these must be added such intangibles as leadership, training, and morale.

Economic capability can be defined as the total of all material and human resources available to the state for external behaviour. These range from natural resources such as food and raw materials through industrial plants to scientific and technical skills, etc. Important indices include demography, gross national product, balance-of-payments position, and the levels of production and employment.

Methods of classifying the data of military and economic

capability are available to students of foreign policy.[9] The research task is to explore in specific foreign policy situations the real and potential capacity of the actor under investigation. Crucial to this kind of analysis is the recognition that neither military nor economic capability can be defined in absolute terms. They must be assessed in relation to the capability of super powers, of other actors in their own subordinate system, and of specific rivals; moreover, this assessment must be made with reference to the issue being examined.

Political structure denotes in part the political institutions and the constitutional matrix within which authoritative decisions are made. It refers, as well, to various traits of the political system which may influence the decision process in foreign policy: the type of political regime (authoritarian or consensual); the character of the party system (one-, two- or multi-party); civil-military relations of control; and the extent of continuity and stability of the authority structures within the system. It is the task of research to uncover the relative influence of these characteristics in the specific issues under analysis.

---

9. One may utilize the categories set out in Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, Knopf, New York, 1967, Part III; or the more carefully investigated analysis of Klauss Knorr, The War Potential of Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1956.

Various interest groups exist within the internal sector of the operational environment. These perform two analytically distinct functions in a foreign policy system: they communicate information about the environment to the decision-making elite and they may also advocate policies to those who wield authority in the system.[10] Viewed from the decision-makers' perspective, this advocacy role facilitates the application of real or potential pressure upon them to act or to refrain from acting in a particular way. The pressure exerted by these groups flows from their advocacy which in turn derives from their images of the environment and their goal preferences. In any foreign policy system, there may exist a multiplicity of interest groups; on any issue, however, there will be only a limited number of groups generating pressure for action or inaction.

---

10. Although these two functions are analytically distinct, it is often difficult to distinguish empirically between them, for they frequently overlap. Interest groups communicate information about the operational environment to the elite, in addition to advocating policy alternatives. The less identified an interest group is with a specific policy alternative, the greater the likelihood that the decision-making elite will perceive the content of its communication as well as its advocacy. In any case, perception by the elite of both manifest content and advocacy will vary among political systems and interest groups. The determining factors will be the strength of the interest group, real or potential, and elite predispositions.

As in domestic political systems, there are four types of interest groups which attempt to influence foreign policy behaviour -- institutional, associational, non-associational and anomic.[11]

Institutional interest groups comprise military establishments, bureaucratic organizations, and religious institutions. Not all have constituencies with interests pertaining to foreign policy. Most important are the military, especially the officers corps; the segment of the bureaucracy whose jurisdiction relates to external issues, the Foreign Ministry and the departments of Finance, Trade and Commerce, etc.; and those religious institutions with trans-national members and claims.

Associational interest groups are those which exist specifically to advocate interests. They include trade unions, business organizations, peasant associations and ethnic and

---

11. This classification was first suggested by Gabriel Almond in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton, 1960, pp. 3-64. This approach to interest groups was more fully elaborated in G. Almond and G. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little, Brown, New York, 1966, Chapters III and V. Professor Almond's term to describe the function of interest groups is 'articulation', which he distinguishes from 'aggregation' by political parties. The distinction may be valid in a domestic political system but it obscures more than it reveals in a foreign policy system -- in the light of empirical research. The term 'advocacy' is more precise to describe a function performed by both interest groups and competing elites.

civic groups. In some foreign policy systems these groups play neither a communication nor an advocacy role; in others they range from relevant to crucial. The research task is to establish which associational groups participate in the foreign policy system and to indicate the issues and issue-areas in which they operate.

Non-associational interest groups refer to kinship and lineage groups, regional, status and class groups, and others of this type, which advocate their interests intermittently through individuals, cliques, families and religious leaders. Most of these are marginal to foreign policy analysis. There are, however, other non-associational elements which more immediately influence the foreign policy decision process. These include commentators and journalists of the mass media, and academics who advocate specific and general foreign policy goals.[12]

Anomic outbursts are more-or-less spontaneous penetrations by unorganized parts of society into the political system in such forms as riots, demonstrations and assassinations,

---

12. Almond and Powell, op. cit., do not treat commentators etc., as non-associational interest groups but essentially as part of the communications network. While they do communicate information, their significance for decision-making lies in their advocacy of policies, based on their perceptions of the operational environment.

where these are not simply the use of unconventional or violent means by organized groups. As in the domestic political system, latent discontent may be sparked by an incident and may impinge upon foreign policy in the form of unpredictable and uncontrollable demands.

Closely linked to interest groups, both structurally and functionally, are those competing elites which vie for authority to make political decisions within the system. Interest groups tend to advocate specific foreign policy demands; competing elites also propose alternative general sets of foreign policy demands. In a competitive party system, competing elites may play a significant role in the foreign policy process. Their images of the operational environment, the content of their policy demands, and their capacity to generate pressure are likely to influence the incumbent elite image and thus help to shape decisions. In a single-party authoritarian system, pressures on policy will be channelled through competing political factions within the monopoly party or through various interest groups.[13]

---

13. It is recognized that scholarly access to articulated demands on foreign policy by interest groups and competing elites will vary among political systems, with consequences for the range of accuracy in their definition of the internal operational environment. This is a facet of a more general methodological problem, namely, the relative importance of unarticulated, as distinct from articulated, images in decision-makers' foreign policy choices. This point is treated at length in Chapter III, below, pp.69-114.

While the operational environment exists independent of its perception by decision-makers, it can have an impact on the foreign policy process only to the extent that it is communicated to the elite. Information may be communicated in a variety of ways: the mass media -- press, radio, books, and television; face-to-face contact and direct observation of the environment. Decision-makers may also receive information from competing elites and institutional, associational, and non-associational interest groups, the members of which process their information about the environment through the prism of their own perceptions.

In the analysis of a foreign policy issue, it is necessary to examine the communication network within the political system and to assess the adequacy, accuracy, degree of completeness and objectivity in the flow of information about the operational environment to the incumbent elite. In this way the degree of congruence between reality and elite images can be given first approximation.

In foreign policy analysis it is also essential to identify the person(s) and/or group(s) whose images of the operational environment shape foreign policy decisions. Stated generally, the foreign policy decision-making elite consists of those individuals who perform the function of political

authorization within the foreign policy arena. Political authorization may be defined as authorization sanctioned by the conventions of the system; this may or may not coincide with legal authorization.

The core decision-making group in any foreign policy system consists of the head of government and the foreign minister; its size and composition will vary with the issue. The scope will, of necessity, be narrow: many may influence decisions but these actors are operationalized in this research design as interest groups and competing elites. Moreover, a narrow-gauge definition of the foreign policy elite permits more fruitful comparisons.

The psychological environment for decision-makers consists of two closely related sets of data. One may be designated as the 'attitudinal prism', the other as 'elite images'.

Every decision-maker in foreign policy operates within a context of psychological predispositions. These comprise (a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy, and (b) personality factors, or the idiosyncratic qualities of decision-makers, that is, those aspects of elite attitudes which are not generated by role occupancy. Together these influences

constitute the screen or prism through which elite perceptions of the operational environment are filtered.

'Elite image' is the decisive input of a foreign policy system in the research framework presented here. The reason for this pivotal role is that decision-makers act in accordance with their perceptions of reality rather than in response to reality itself.[14] Image and reality may coincide or diverge: to the extent that they diverge, and as a consequence of decision-makers' misunderstanding and distortion of the reality of the environment, policy acts will be 'unsuccessful'. Their images may be partial or general. They may be sub-conscious or may be consciously stated. They may be based on carefully deliberated assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgements. In any event, all decision-makers may be said to possess a set of images which condition their responses to foreign policy demands as well as

---

14. "Cognitive behaviourism" is the term that Harold and Margaret Sprout use to designate the simple and familiar principle that a person reacts to his milieu as he perceives it -- that is, as he perceives it and interprets it in the light of past experience. It simply draws a sharp distinction between the psychological environment (with reference to which an individual defines choices and takes decisions) and the operational environment (which sets limits to what can happen when the decision is executed). Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, p. 109.

to domestic issues. Indeed, elite images are not less real than the reality of their environment and are much more relevant to an analyst of the foreign policy flow.

The term 'elite image' is a creation of scholars; few practitioners of foreign policy think and act as scholars do. They have neither the time nor the inclination to form an elaborate and well-integrated image of their environment. The task of the foreign policy analyst is to construct from words and deeds the operative elite perceptions of their environment, along with their views of the desirable or proper roles for their state at the three levels of foreign policy interaction -- global, subordinate and bilateral. Thus the elite image comprises a number of closely related perceptions: 1) of the external environment -- global, subordinate, and bilateral; and 2) of the internal environment -- military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups, and competing elites. From these perceptions flow the elites' definition of their state's proper role in foreign policy. This creates a general psychological framework for decision-making.[15]

---

15. For an exploration in depth of one prominent decision-maker's images and their effect on foreign policy decisions, see Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford, London, 1968.

The link between elite image and foreign policy decisions was admirably summarized by Kenneth Boulding in a pioneering paper on this topic:

> The 'image' must be thought of as the total cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure of the behaviour unit, or its internal view of itself and its universe....A decision involves the selection of the most preferred position in a contemplated field of choice. Both the field of choice and the ordering of this field, by which the preferred position is identified, lie in the image of the decision-maker.[16]

The systematic analysis of state behaviour in international relations has been retarded by an undifferentiated concept of foreign policy issues. The sheer volume of decisions requires more precise classification and more careful demarcation of boundaries between types of issues. This task is facilitated by employment of the concept of '<u>issue-area</u>'.[17] It is a demonstrable fact that, within the realm of foreign

---

16. Kenneth Boulding, 'National Images and International Systems', in <u>The Journal of Conflict Resolution</u>, Vol. III, 1959, pp. 120-121.

17. The concept of 'issue-area' was developed by Rosenau in 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in R. Barry Farrell, ed., <u>Approaches to Comparative and International Politics</u>, Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 27-92, and it was further examined in 'Foreign Policy as an Issue Area', in James Rosenau, ed., <u>Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy</u>, The Free Press, New York, 1967, pp. 11-50.

policy, the allocation or potential allocation of values as well as the behaviour of the relevant actors will differ, depending on the nature of the foreign policy issue. More specifically, it is suggested that the similarities are greater between issues in a single-issue area than between two issues from differing issue-areas.[18]

All foreign policy issues may be allocated to four issue-areas, though empirical probings indicate that overlapping does exist. The criterion adopted in this research design for classifying issues within issue-areas is substantive content rather than the motives of decision-makers: content is self-evident, whereas motive may be discerned only after the analysis has been completed. To attempt prior designation by motives would be mere speculation without analytic value. For example, a decision by State A to conclude a trade agreement with State B may have been motivated primarily by political considerations; that is, the need of State A for State B's diplomatic support in the attainment of other goals. The substance or content of the decision is clearly economic,

---

18. The assumed similarity between issues in the same issue-area is a logical outcome of the concept -- for an 'issue-area', as noted below, is defined by the substantive content of the issues within it. In other words, it is the similarity in the substance of issues which in fact defines the boundaries of the issue-area. A principal research objective is to determine the degree of variance of foreign policy behaviour across issue-areas.

however, and it is therefore placed in the economic-developmental issue-area, even though, in terms of the significance of input variables in shaping this decision, economic considerations (the desire to enhance the economic capacity of State A) may well be far down the list of factors.

The military-security issue-area comprises all issues which focus on questions of violence -- actual or potential -- including alliances and weaponry, and those which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as constituting a security threat.

The political-diplomatic issue-area covers the spectrum of foreign policy interaction at each of the three levels of the external environment -- global, subordinate, and bilateral -- except for those dealing with violence, material resources, and cultural and status relations. Empirical probings suggest that most foreign policy issues fall into this issue-area.

The economic-developmental issue-area comprises all those issues which involve the acquisition and allocation of material resources,such as trade, aid, and foreign investment.

The cultural-status issue-area consists of those foreign policy issues involving cultural, scientific, and educational exchanges. It also includes status issues which relate primarily to self-image. Self-image may be defined as the decision-makers' perception of their state's legitimate

place in the global and/or subordinate systems.[19]

The allocation of a decision to an issue-area has the merit of assisting comparative analysis and of facilitating the formation of hypotheses. It is insufficient, however, to explain decision-making only in terms of general images, for these merely suggest probable preferences among various alternatives. Foreign policy issues are usually specific in content. Only some of the ten variables of the operational environment may be relevant to a decision in a specific issue-area, and the content of these variables will itself vary from one decision to another. Classification by issue-area, therefore, permits a more flexible analysis of the interplay of different variables in different kinds of foreign policy issues.

It is not suggested that the link between elite images and all decisions is rigid. Rather, decisions may be divided into three analytic types -- strategic, tactical and implementing. Strategic decisions may be defined as broad policy acts, measured by significance for the state's foreign policy system as a whole, duration of impact and the presence of a subsidiary cluster of decisions to operationalize that policy. Those subsidiary clusters constitute tactical decisions.

---

19. Self-image, it may be added, is not merely the product of internally generated pressures; it may also involve the elite's perception of how other foreign policy elites view their state.

Implementing decisions are those which are made to operationalize a tactical decision in the field. They are usually made by non-political participants who are professionally involved in implementing policy decisions. While the time lag between the making of a strategic and tactical decision may be large, the gap between the making of a tactical decision and an implementing decision is much narrower, tending to be telescoped in time. Once a decision to implement a tactical decision is taken, this implementing decision can be evaluated in terms of the reaction to it; it can be scaled along a spectrum of full-compliance, semi-compliance and non-compliance.

It is at the level of tactical decision-making that strategic decisions undergo constant change and reformulation in response to the myriad of competing demands within the political system. Implementation of strategic policy acts through tactical decisions will also affect the entire foreign policy system by changing in varying degrees the operational environment and elite images. This will produce new strategic decisions, which, in turn, lead to new tactical decisions and their implementation. In short, there is a continuous flow from the operational environment to elite images to decisions.

This, then, is the framework of foreign policy analysis

that will be used in this study; it is complex and multi-dimensional. Each of its several components must be explored and tested and their inter-relationships must be operationalized. Explicit hypotheses about state behaviour in the international system must be derived. Both these objectives can be pursued simultaneously; the totality of such a research effort, however, is beyond the scope of this study.

The objectives of this study are much more limited: to explore in depth the concept and content of elite images and to generate and test hypotheses about state behaviour flowing from the perceptions of selected decision-makers. This in itself requires a precisely delimited area of research. The methodology must be made explicit and the indicators of elite images must be operationalized. Before turning to this task, it is relevant to explore both studies which use the concept of elite images and their hypotheses about state behaviour.

Chapter III

Elite Images

a. The Concept

The term 'elite image' was created by scholars, and it is only recently that analysts of foreign policy have begun to develop the links between images of policy-makers and foreign policy decisions. Kenneth Boulding, who pioneered this effort, stressed the importance of the perceptions of decision-makers in the behaviour of complex organizations:

> Generally speaking, the behaviour of complex organizations can be regarded as determined by decisions, and a decision involves selection of the most preferred position in a contemplated field of choice. Both the field of choice and the ordering of this field by which the preferred position is identified lie in the image of the decision-maker....The image is always in some sense a product of messages received in the past. It is not, however, a simple inventory or pile of such messages, but a highly structured piece of information -- developed partly by its inputs and outputs of information, and partly by internal messages and its own laws of growth and stability.[1]

The Sprouts used the term 'cognitive behaviourism' to underline the difference between the operational environment as it exists and the perceptions that decision-makers have of it.[2]

---

1. 'National Images and International Systems', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, 1959, pp. 120-31.
2. Harold and Margaret Sprout, 'Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', The Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 1957, pp. 309-28. Reprinted in James N. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961, pp. 106-19.

The underlying principle governing this distinction is similar to that of Boulding: states will react to their environment as they perceive it and they will perceive it and interpret it in the light of past memories and experiences.

Both theorists have raised the problem of the precise structure of elite images. Implicit in their definitions is a structured and inter-related set of perceptions which together constitute the image of the decision-makers. Charles McClelland attempted to increase the operational content of the concept by stressing that image includes all the accumulated organized knowledge that the perceiver has about himself and his world. "It includes everything that the....(perceiver) has learned -- his values as well as his facts, organized by whatever concepts, images, or relations he has been able to master."[3] McClelland thus underlines the importance of analysing the structural components of the decision-maker's image -- his image of his environment, his value structure and the symbolic tools he uses to organize his perceptions.

Ole Holsti develops perhaps the most intricate system for analysing the structural components of perceptions. His basic premise is that a vital relationship exists among 'belief systems', perceptions and decision-making. He establishes two important relationships -- one direct and the other

---

3. 'Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: the Quemoy Case', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 3, 1962, p. 206.

indirect -- between belief systems and decision-making:

> The belief system may be thought of as the set of lenses through which information concerning the physical and social environment is received. It orients the individual to his environment, defining it for him, and identifying for him its salient characteristics....In addition to organizing perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour, the belief system has the function of the establishment of goals and the ordering of preferences. Thus it actually has a dual connection with decision-making.[4]

The 'belief system' guides the establishment of goals by presenting an image of what ought to be. Indirectly, the belief system filters, scans, selects, links, re-orders and organizes perceptions in conformity with previous perceptions and expectations. In other words, the perceiver, through his belief system, attempts to avoid cognitive dissonance by reinforcing his predispositions and expectations. Figure 3 illustrates this process:

Figure 3



4. 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 3, 1962, pp.245-52.

The analyst of elite images must perform three separate but related functions. He must analyse the perceptions the decision-maker has of his environment and attempt to discover which factors are most significant. He must analyse the decision-maker's value structure and discover its relation to the perceptual framework. And he must analyse the symbolic structure of the policy-maker and establish the inter-connections among the three mutually-reinforcing frameworks.

Holsti emphasizes the necessity of detecting points of salience, or 'signals'. To understand the process whereby decision-makers detect and assign meaning to environmental inputs and formulate their objectives, it is necessary to use some preliminary guidelines. These guidelines, or signals, attract the decision-maker's attention, permitting him to focus on selected areas and issues in vast and comprehensive fields. It is the combination of both signals and an operational code (a set of images) that permits the decision-maker to interpret the meaning of the stimulus he perceives.

Holsti's scheme for the analysis of images is of considerable value. He does not, however, make explicit the components of the decision-maker's belief system, nor does he delineate the specific elements of elite images. We are told that beliefs and images interact both directly

and indirectly, but the patterns of interaction are never specified. For research purposes Holsti's belief system can best be operationalized by examining the decision-maker's 'attitudinal prism'[5] and by exploring the values and symbols in the image which interact continuously with other components.[6]

The most comprehensive discussion of the nature of images, however, is found in a volume on international behaviour edited by Herbert Kelman.[7] He defines image as the organized representation of an object in an individual's cognitive system. The core is the perceived character of the object, the individual's conception of this object's nature. Images are, therefore, inferred constructs rather than explicit designations. They vary in intensity and in emotive content: "The individual's conception of an object is encompassed by the points on various descriptive and evaluative dimensions at which he would place it." Kelman stresses not only present conceptions but past and future conceptions as well. Finally, images differ in the way in which they are inter-related.

---

5. See pp. 60 - 61 above.

6. See pp. 115-53 below for the construct of elite images that will be used in this study.

7. International Behaviour: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966.

"Images may vary in the number of elements of which they are composed, and particularly in the number of details and nuances; they may be more or less rich and refined, and more or less complex and differentiated."

Kelman emphasizes the necessity of examining the interrelatedness of the components of elite images. His is a more useful construct than Holsti's, for it underlines the continuing process of interaction of both value and content components of perception, which together shape the decision-maker's images.[8] It avoids, moreover, the artificial separation between general orientations and specific images.

William Scott ascribes three fundamental components to the content of international images.[9] They consist of (1) the cognitive component, the individual's understanding of the perceived object; (2) the affective component, the liking or disliking of the perceived object; and (3) the action component, a set of responses in the light of perceptions.

In stressing these three components of international images, Scott also underlines the necessity of exploring both the attitude and the manifest content component of decisions.

---

8. See pp. 115-53 below for the construct of elite images to be used in this study.

9. 'Psychological and Sociological Correlates of International Images', in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 71-103.

Implicit in his analytical framework, however, is the assumption that cognitive attributes can be separated from affective attributes, that is, that a decision-maker's understanding of the global system is analytically independent of his attitudes toward it. This is a doubtful assumption, for attitudes and perceptions are inextricably interwoven in the content of images. It is necessary to explore perceptions and attitudes within a dynamic rather than static context.

Each analyst emphasizes a different component of elite images but all share several common conceptual and operational threads. All agree on the necessity to structure the elements of elite images. Most stress four inter-related components -- perceptions, analysed in terms of salience, values, symbols and action-response. Few, however, begin to explore the precise dynamics of the relationships among the four principal components. Nor do they suggest methods of analysing the internal structure of these components.

Three major conceptual problems remain to be dealt with. The first is the problem of validation: how do we know that decision-makers believe what they say? The second deals with the internal consistency of images, or cognitive dissonance: are decision-makers, in fact, consistent in their image structure or are there underlying contradictions? Finally,

one must explore image-change: do images remain constant over extended periods of time or are they constantly fluctuating?

David Singer raises the fundamental research problem of validation:

> Without contradicting the notion that beliefs and attitudes are clearly influential in the foreign policy process, we might nevertheless ask such questions as whose beliefs are influential; how do we know that they believe what they say they believe; and if there are contradictions in statements of belief, which statements are to be used? In other words, there is a genuine problem of validity in any research design that seeks to identify beliefs.[10]

Two separate questions are posed. First, whose beliefs do we analyse, or who, in fact, are the influential decision-makers participating in the foreign policy process? It is difficult to answer this question in terms that will apply to every actor in the international system: the influential decision-makers vary with the type of political system and the particular foreign policy issue. Nevertheless, there is a consensus in the literature. Kenneth Boulding focusses on "the few powerful individuals in a state -- the chief executive, the prime Minister, the secretary of state or the minister of foreign affairs, and the chief of staff of the armed forces".[11]

---

10. 'Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. VIII, 1964, p. 429.

11. Op. Cit., p. 121.

Robert North suggests the head of state, the head of government, and the minister of foreign affairs.[12] Our own research design focussed on the head of government and the foreign minister.[13] Singer uses the elite press as a primary source of attitudes,[14] but we have classified the press as a non-associational pressure group. For our purposes, then, the decision-making elite will be operationalized to include the head of government and the foreign minister.

Singer raises, as well, the more difficult question of internal consistency of beliefs. Are there not unarticulated beliefs which underlie the nature of images? Can images contradict one another? How does the researcher gain access to unarticulated and sub-conscious images, which may, in fact, be self-contradictory?

Several alternative assumptions and approaches are available to the researcher. He may assume that unarticulated beliefs will manifest themselves in the content of articulated images; the close relationship between beliefs and images

---

12. Robert North, Ole Holsti, M. George Zaninovitch and Dina Zinnes, Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1963, p. 39.

13. See Chapter II above, p. 60.

14. 'Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations', op. cit., pp. 430-434.

makes it probable that articulated images will provide a mirror reflection of underlying or unarticulated or sub-conscious beliefs.

We have suggested that unarticulated images are distinctly secondary in delineating the psychological environment.[15] The repeated public expression of elite perceptions, even when consciously distorted, creates public commitments and expectations which decision-makers will feel compelled to fulfil or divert. Otherwise, the credibility of the decision-makers' statements will decrease. In short, it is argued, decision-makers are likely to become prisoners of their articulated images.

The political constraints operating on decision-makers are indeed effective inducements to maintain image consistency. It is also a logical assumption that articulated images will mirror underlying beliefs over a selected period of time. The use of rigorous techniques of content analysis will permit a careful and systematic analysis of both the accuracy and consistency of elite images.[16]

Alternatively, one can begin from a rather different assumption -- that images are both distorted and inconsistent;

---

15. Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, op. cit.

16. See Chapter IV for a detailed exposition of techniques of analysis.

inconsistency here refers to both logical and psychological inconsistency. The latter phenomenon has been variously termed imbalance, incongruity and/or dissonance.[17] Holsti assumes the existence of such inconsistencies and suggests that decision-makers attempt to minimize their impact by reinforcing predispositions and expectations.[18] Festinger maintains that, where a major inconsistency in an image cannot be resolved, action is likely to be inhibited.[19] Moderate contradictions, however, need not induce such inhibitory tendencies or apathy.

Robert Abelson argues that in any belief system there are innumerable instances of dissonance, which lie dormant and are rarely considered.[20] When cognitive dissonance becomes apparent, however, the decision-maker will engage in a hierarchy of resolution attempts -- denial, bolstering (the smoker worried about lung cancer tells himself how enjoyable and relaxing smoking is), differentiation and finally, transcendence. The mechanisms of bolstering and differentiation

---

17. Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Row, Peterson and Co., Evanston, Ill., 1957, pp. 156-8.

18. Op. cit., pp. 245-52.

19. Op. cit., p. 157.

20. 'Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, 1959, pp. 343-52.

are most commonly used by decision-makers in the foreign policy arena. Bolstering increases the intensity of affect; in other words, Abelson maintains, there is a close relationship between cognitive dissonance, bolstering and extremity of attitude. Those individuals who do not invoke bolstering will generally be the ones with moderate attitudes of low intensity. We shall explore the validity of this postulated relationship between dissonance, extremity and intensity later in the study.

Herbert Kelman suggests that images, though organized, are not necessarily consistent and well-defined.[21] The term 'organized' merely conveys that images have some coherent structure and are not just an accumulation of discrete components. Kelman implies that there will always be some push toward consistency but that the degree of consistency will vary widely. "The representation of an object can be coherent and organized even though it contains contradictions and ambiguities".[22]

The concept of cognitive dissonance between articulated images necessarily involves the concept of interdependence between them. If two images are completely unrelated it is

---

21. 'Socio-Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope', in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 3-39.

22. Ibid., pp. 24-5.

unlikely that any contradiction between them would be perceived as salient; on the contrary, images are important to the degree that other images depend upon them. Techniques of analysis are now available which attempt to measure the degree of inter-relatedness of images.[23]

Deutsch and Merritt stress the varying degrees of interdependence among images: "Images are combinatorial constructs and are interdependent to varying degrees, both in the sense that the structure of some images can be inferred or predicted from the structure of others, and in the sense that changes in some images produce imbalances tending toward change in others....[24] Thus, as images vary in their interdependence and their internal consistency, so they will vary in their operational content. Boulding assumes that images have a strong behavioural content, that they lead directly to action. Some images, however, may lead to no action at all, and others may be ambivalent, resulting,as Festinger suggests, in psychological cross-pressures that inhibit action and leave behaviour unchanged.

In summary, the analyst of elite images, by assuming dissonance or inconsistency, can analyse both the degree of

---

23. See Chapter IV for a description of the techniques of cluster and contingency analysis.

24. Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, 'Effects of Events on National and International Images', in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 132-33.

salience of particular images and the extent of their inter-dependence. The greater the degree of inter-relatedness, the more important the image in the total structure. The analyst can then explore the action component of salient images and the effects of inconsistency and cognitive dissonance.

The researcher also faces the problem of attitude change: do images remain constant over extended periods of time or are they subject to refinement and change as a result of feedback from the operational environment? Further, do psychological inconsistencies produce inducements to change?

Again it is difficult to provide both a simple and a general answer to such a complex problem. Nevertheless the analyst can draw on the research findings of several studies focussing on the question of attitude change.

Most theorists assume that elite images change as a result of the continuous feedback from the operational environment. Messages about external events, as they are communicated to the decision-maker, may, indeed, have several kinds of effects upon his images.[25] These messages may reinforce his images; they may produce no significant change in his images if he does not perceive these messages as salient; they may add information which supports his image without altering it

---

25. Deutsch and Merritt, op. cit., pp. 132-187.

in any significant way; they may clarify the image by reducing uncertainty and ambiguity; they may reorganize the image by increasing its internal consistency; or they may change the importance of the image, that is, the dependence of other images upon it.

Change may also come as a result of psychological inconsistencies.[26] An important variable in assessing the likelihood of image change is the degree of inter-relatedness of the components of the image: the greater the number of related cognitive elements, the harder it is to change the image. Moreover, the more consistent the elements supporting an image, the less flexible the image. Images that are based on the evaluative dimension are likely to be relatively inflexible since their supporting elements are likely to be fairly consistent. Finally, the flexibility of an image seems to be an inverse function of the extremity of its level: the more extreme an image is, the less likelihood that it will change.

Image change is thus a highly complex and inter-related process, dependent both on external messages and internal psychological structures. We know that events are filtered through perceptions and are usually interpreted to reinforce existing predispositions. In addition, images that are intense,

---

26. Dean G. Pruitt, 'Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action', in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 393-432.

well-organized and highly interdependent are the most difficult to change. Students of attitude change usually emphasize the difficulty with which images are changed: "Images tend to be self-supporting and self-reinforcing. Once established, they have a dynamic of their own, enabling them to generate more and more supporting cognitive elements".[27] The process of change usually lags behind "reality" or changes in the operational environment, sometimes by as much as a generation. Rather, the operational environment is generally re-interpreted to reinforce, support and confirm existing images. As Deutsch and Merritt put it: "Our findings....attest to the resilience of human thinking and imagining to sudden environmental pressures. Men cling to their earlier memories and character. They call upon the support of their social groups to defend their images and beliefs. They distort many of their perceptions and deny much of reality, in order to call their prejudiced souls their own".[28]

Students of elite images emphasize the structured nature of images. They focus on perceptions, symbols, values and action-response. But they must also examine the interrelatedness of all these components. Through this examination

---

27. Ibid., p. 411-412.

28. Op. cit., pp. 182-183.

they will be able to analyse dissonance and inconsistency, and determine the relative salience of images. By exploring the intensity of images they will also be able to estimate which images are least likely to change. Before describing in detail the precise dimensions of the concept of elite images that will be used in this study, it is useful to examine research projects which have employed the concept of elite images and to summarize their findings, as they are relevant to state behaviour.

b. Elite Images - Application

Studies of elite images fall into three main categories: those which analyse conflict behaviour;[29] those which explore foreign policy attitudes of decision-makers in super powers; and those which probe foreign policy attitudes of decision-makers in 'middle' powers and/or 'developing' countries.

George Zaninovitch attempted to study the conflictual-integrative tendency in a system of relationships.[30] He constructed analytic models that suggest which patterns of variables represent a conflict situation perceived as 'critical'

---

29. The emphasis here is on the relationship of the perceptions and emotional reactions of authoritative individuals to policy outcomes. This contrasts with the Snyder et al. decision-making model which stresses interactional and organizational variables.

30. 'Pattern Analysis of Variables within the International System: the Sino-Soviet Example', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 253-68.

and which patterns represent one perceived as 'uncritical', that is, which tend toward conflict and which tend toward integration.

Zaninovitch based his models of conflict situations on six attitude variables -- change of status quo, general affect, hostility, friendship, satisfaction, and frustration. 'Change of status quo' refers to the extent to which a given policy seems calculated to alter the existing relations between nation-states. 'General affect' represents the degree to which emotive, impulsive and highly charged language is associated with a given policy. 'Hostility' suggests an action calculated to do injury to another state. 'Friendship' involves the generally supportive nature of an action or policy. 'Satisfaction' indicates the sense of approval in an action or of a situation. And 'frustration' suggests a sense of displeasure in an action or with a situation. Selected policy statements of decision-makers were coded for the six attitude variables. A similarity index was developed to measure both the directional movement of curves and the comparative placement of curves on the vertical plane which represented the intensity scale.[31]

---

31. An extensive description of coding and all other techniques of analysis, as well as statistical methods, will be found in Chapter IV.

Three summarizing concepts which organize the above attitude variables are essential to interpretation: the 'peripheral' variable, which most differs in function from the other variables; the 'focal' variable -- the most similar to other variables within the field, and the 'constellation' of variables, the concerted functioning of a series of variables.

Zaninovitch developed three model types, one in which the variables are so arranged that perception is 'critical' or tending toward violence. In this general model the focal variable will be hostility, general affect and/or frustration. The peripheral variable will be friendship and/or satisfaction. The constellation of variables will include hostility, general affect, change of status quo and frustration. Friendship and satisfaction will indicate a relative lack of functional similarity.

Stated in hypothesis form the pertinent relationships in the 'critical'model are as follows: if hostility and general affect are more closely related to change of status quo than is friendship; if frustration is more closely related to change of status quo than is satisfaction, and, thirdly, if friendship and satisfaction do not closely relate to each other, then the perception by the decision-makers of a given situation is critical, that is, tending to conflict.

In the pattern-type for a perceived situation designated as 'uncritical' the focal variable will be satisfaction and/or friendship. The peripheral variable will be general affect, hostility and/or frustration. The constellation of variables will include friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo. On the other hand, hostility, frustration and general affect will indicate a comparative lack of functional similarity in relation to one another.

Stated in hypothesis form, the pertinent relationships in the 'uncritical' model are as follows: if friendship is more closely related to change of status quo than are hostility and general affect; if satisfaction is more closely related to change of status quo than are hostility and general affect; and, thirdly, if general affect, hostility and frustration do not closely relate to one another, then the perception by decision-makers of a given situation is classified as 'uncritical'.

In both these generalized models change of status quo is always found near the heart of the field of variables. The significant problem of analysis concerns which combinations of variables within the pattern are found in association with change of status quo.

These two types of pattern suggest a spectrum of per-

ceived conflict, which ranges from 'critical' to 'uncritical' on a uni-dimensional continuum. Therefore the intermediate point between the 'critical' and the 'uncritical' polar ideal-types can be defined statistically and theoretically in terms of 'equi-functional' distance of all variables to all other variables; that is, the similarity index of all relationships between variables within such an intermediate hypothetical pattern would be equal, with the variable 'change of status quo' the analytical focal point of the pattern. The three ideal-type models are based on the analysis of decision-makers' perceptions. By discovering the relationships between the variables present in the image of a decision-maker, it is then possible to predict tendencies toward violence or conciliation.

Zaninovitch applied these models to Sino-Soviet perceptions for the two months of January 1960 and May 1960. For coding and analytic purposes the 'behaving state' was defined as the titular head of state, the prime minister and the foreign minister. The documentary sources for official pronouncements by decision-makers included: Pravda, Jen-min jih-pao (People's Daily), Peking Review and Hung ch'i (Red Flag). Fifteen hundred policy statements were randomly selected from slightly larger populations of coded statements for each of the two months; these two sets of statements formed the basic

data for measurement and analysis. This universe of fifteen hundred combined Communist Chinese and Soviet Russian perceptions was treated analytically as an aggregate and any inference could be made legitimately only within the context of joint Sino-Soviet perception.

The January 1960 pattern of variables was classified as an 'uncritical' period; it suggested that the Communist Chinese and Soviet Russians were not greatly concerned about developing events this month. The relationship between variables for May 1960 tended to fit the criteria of the 'critical' model, indicating that the Communist Chinese and Soviet Russians perceived the world situation as one of great concern.

Some difficulties were found in the definition of the attitude variables: they did not always clearly relate to attitudes or images but rather, sometimes, to action. Zaninovitch also suggested that preliminary investigation has shown that the six variables can be reduced to four without appreciably affecting the implications drawn from the pattern. This study will not employ either 'general affect' or 'frustration'. Nevertheless the three models developed are very suggestive and a rare attempt to explore attitudes toward conflict and conciliation and to predict the likelihood of their occurrence.

Dina A. Zinnes has attempted to explore the extent to which a state's expression of hostility, by word or by action, is a function of its perception of a hostile environment.[32]

The 'state' refers to the group of key decision-makers who, by virtue of their governmental position, have the authority to make and to implement decisions binding on the population of their state. A state behaves when its key decision-makers issue threats, declare war or negotiate treaties. Hostile behaviour is manifested when decision-makers attempt to injure the inhabitants of another state, regardless of whether the attempt is successful.

Zinnes builds her analysis on two variables: a state's expression of hostility toward another state, and a state's perception that it is the target of another state's hostility. From these two variables Zinnes develops four inter-related hypotheses:

(1) If x perceives itself to be the object of hostility, then x will express hostility. Any of five situations could occur within the framework of this hypothesis:

a. state x, incapable of determining the apparent source of hostility, might express hostility at

32. 'The Expression and Perception of Hostility in the Pre-War Crisis: 1914', in David J. Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, The Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 85-121.

random toward any other state;

b. state x, having determined the apparent source of hostility, might still express hostility at random;

c. state x, incapable of determining the source, might express hostility toward a specific state;

d. state x, having perceived itself the target of y's hostility, might, in turn, express hostility toward a specific third state z in a process of displacement; and

e. state x, having perceived itself the object of y's hostility, might express hostility toward y.

If xP indicates that x perceives itself the object of hostility, and xE indicates that x expresses hostility, then hypothesis 1 can be stated as follows: If xP then xE

(2) If x perceives that it is the object of y's hostility, then x will express hostility toward y: If xPy then xEy

(3) If x expresses hostility toward y, then y will perceive that it is the object of x's hostility: If xEy then yPx

(4) If x expresses hostility toward y, then y will express hostility toward x: If xEy then yEx

The first two hypotheses especially interest us, for they deal with decision-makers' perceptions: if a state perceives hostility it will express hostility, regardless of whether it is, in fact, the object of such hostility. The latter two hypotheses are based on occurrences within the operational environment as well as decision-makers' perceptions of these occurrences. Since our study analyses only the psychological environment of decision-makers the latter two hypotheses are of less direct relevance.

Each of these four hypotheses were tested within the framework of three models, each based on different assumptions. In model 1, the no-memory model, each succeeding day in a selected time period was completely isolated, with no memory spill-over. In model 2, the imperfect memory model, the memory span was assumed to extend four days, not all remembered equally well by the decision-maker. In model 3, the perfect memory model, all previous days equally affected a decision-maker's behaviour on any given day.

The results of the study confirmed the validity of the first two hypotheses: when a state perceives itself the object of another state's hostility, it, in turn, expresses hostility toward the offending state. The correlations were highest under model 2 -- that of 'imperfect memory'. The third and fourth hypotheses were not substantiated within

any of the three models.[33]

Holsti, North and Brody analysed perceptions and behaviour in the 1914 crisis.[34] They define foreign-policy making as "a search for satisfactory alternatives from among the range of those perceived by leaders who choose for their respective nation-states". The key concept of this approach is perception, "the process whereby decision-makers detect and assign meaning to inputs from their environment and formulate their own purposes and intents".[35]

The authors designed a two-step mediation model. A stimulus (S) is an event in the environment which may or may not be perceived by a given actor and which two or more actors may perceive and evaluate differently. A stimulus can be described in terms of its clarity and its salience. A response (R) is an action taken by an actor, without regard to his intent or how either he or other actors may perceive it. The perception (r) of the stimulus (S) corresponds to the 'definition of the situation' in the decision-making literature. The actor's expressions of his own intentions, plans, actions or

---

33. It is impossible to present here all the detailed results of the Zinnes study. The exact construction of the models, the limiting conditions and the correlations obtained can be found in Zinnes, op. cit., pp.85-121.

34. Ole R. Holsti, Robert C. North and Richard A. Brody, 'Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis', in Singer, op. cit., pp. 123-58.

35. Ibid., p. 128.

attitudes toward another actor is represented by (s). Thus the two-step model can be represented as follows: (S-r; s-R).

In their analysis of the six-month period preceding the outbreak of World War I Holsti and his colleagues found that the decision-makers of each nation most strongly considered themselves to be the victims of injury precisely at the time when they were making policy decisions of the most crucial nature. The authors further discovered that a significant difference appeared at the S-r link in the two major alliances: the leaders of the Dual Alliance consistently over-perceived the actions of the Triple Entente, while the decision-makers of the Triple Entente tended to under-perceive the actions of the Dual Alliance. The authors found, moreover, that if perceptions of anxiety, fear, threat or injury are sufficiently great, even the perception of one's own inferior capability will fail to deter a nation from waging war. Finally, they maintain that intense multi-variant analysis has revealed that hostility is the best indicator for prediction of action.

The findings of the Holsti, North and Brody study can be summarized in the following hypotheses:

(1) The correlation between input action (S) and policy response (R) will be higher in a situation of low involvement than in one of high involvement;

(2) In a situation of low involvement policy response (R) will tend to be at a lower level of violence than the input action (S), whereas in a high involvement situation the policy response (R) will tend to be at a higher level of violence than the input action (S);

(3) In the low-involvement situation, perception (r) will tend to be at a lower level than input action (S), whereas in the higher-involvement situation, policy response (R) will tend to be higher than policy inputs (S);

(4) To the extent that there is a difference between perceptions of the other's policy (r) and statements of own intent (s), perceptions of hostility in (r) will tend to be higher than (s) in both the low involvement and the high involvement situations; and

(5) In the situation of low involvement, statements of intent (s) will tend to be higher than action responses (R), whereas in high-involvement situations, statements of intent (s) will tend to be lower than policy response (R).

These hypotheses suggest valuable ideas about the relation of images and perceptions to foreign policy behaviour in both crisis and non-crisis situations. The authors' experiments underline the central importance of perceptions in the foreign policy system. Only in situations of low involve-

ment is there a significant direct correlation between stimulus and response; in situations of high involvement, or greater intensity, perceptions intervene significantly to escalate the level of violence. Finally, perceptions of hostility will be higher than statements of intent to do violence in both crisis and non-crisis situations. In other words, they are suggesting that there is little probability of a 1:1 relationship between perceptions of hostility and demands for change in the status quo. This lack of symmetry, however, is meaningful only in situations of low intensity; where intensity is high, the probability of violence increases as do perceptions of hostility. We shall test some of these hypotheses in our own research.

Zinnes, North and Koch have explored the relationship between perceptions of capability and violent foreign policy behaviour.[36] They suggest that (a) a state will not go to war if it perceives that its power (or the power of its coalition) is 'significantly' less than that of its enemy at the time of the decision; and (b) if a state's perception of injury (or frustration, dissatisfaction, hostility or threat) to itself is 'sufficiently' great, perceptions of insufficient capability

36. Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North and Howard E. Koch, 'Capability, Threat, and the Outbreak of War', in Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 469-82.

will be offset, and it will become a much less important factor in the decision to wage war.

The authors analysed four types of perceptions of key decision-makers: (1) a perception of capability -- or a statement concerning the power or changing power of another state or coalition of states; (2) a perception of hostility -- or a statement by one country about the hostility directed toward it by another country, or about the hostility directed by a second country toward a third country; statements of hostility are defined to include all statements of threat, fear or injury; (3) a perception of coalition -- or a decision-maker's statement that certain states will combine or ally, or that they are committed to an alliance if threatened by another state; and (4) a perception of the significance of a conflict -- or a statement of intensity or severity or magnitude or consequence.

The authors then coded selected statements of all six actors in the six-month period prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. They found almost four times as many perceptions of hostility as those of capability. For example, a perceptual profile of Austria along a continuum is as follows:

	Significance	Capability	Coalition	Hostility
Austria	6	26	54	179

Extreme perceptions of hostility by decision-makers far outweighed the combined perceptions of significance of the conflict, of capability and of alliance and alliance potential. In all cases hypotheses were substantiated. This again underlines the central role played by the perceptions of decision-makers, especially in high intensity situations.

Dina Zinnes analysed the general relationship between perceptions and expressions of hostility and offered the following hypotheses:[37]

(1) The more state X sees itself as the object of hostility, the more often it will make hostile statements; this hypothesis was not substantiated.

(2) The more often X perceives itself as the object of hostility, the more hostile states it sees; this hypothesis was substantiated.

(3) The more often X sees itself as the object of hostility, the more states it sees as being hostile toward himself; this hypothesis was also substantiated.

(4) The more often X sees himself as the object of hostility, the less often he will make statements of goals or policy; this was not statistically significant, but the correlation was in a positive direction rather than in a negative

37. 'Hostility in International Decision-Making', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 3, 1962, pp. 236-43.

direction as is postulated by the hypothesis; therefore, the correlation seems to indicate that the more X sees himself as the object of hostility, the more policy statements he will make.

(5) The more hostile statements X makes, the more hostility he will perceive in his environment. This was statistically significant.

Zinnes has demonstrated that perceptions of hostility and expressions of hostility are related: the perception of hostility by a decision-maker creates a multiplier effect, for perception leads to increased expression, which results in intensified perception.

In a related but not directly comparable study, Dean Pruitt examined three aspects of a decision-maker's perceptions: threat perception, trust or distrust and responsiveness.[38] He suggested that in times of 'national stress', (a) decision-makers will be less aware of the complexity of their environment; (b) they will consider fewer policy alternatives; and (c) they will choose among alternatives more impulsively with less adequate review of their consequences.

Pruitt found that the greater the degree of distrust

---

38. 'Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action', in Kelman, op. cit., pp. 393-432. This is a superb study of those elite images directly related to strategic and bargaining behaviour. Its data are too specific for full treatment in this context, but it is an outstanding treatment of the psychological aspects of bargaining.

and threat perception, the less the degree of objective interpretation of evidence, with greatest attention being paid to evidence suggesting a threat. He detected a circular process in the formulation of elite images in times of 'stress': distrust produces predispositions to perceive threats which in turn heightens the level of distrust. In essence, then, Pruitt confirms the multiplier effect of the hostility variable.

The Stanford University Studies in International Conflict and Integration (by North et al.) have provided many valuable insights into the process of image formation by decision-makers during crises. They have produced, moreover, many testable hypotheses, some of which will be examined later in this study. They have underlined the singular importance of the hostility variable as an inducement to violent foreign policy behaviour and have established its utility as a predictive tool. Their focus, however, has been on conflict behaviour, based on a two-nation interaction model, which is but only one aspect of foreign policy behaviour. The very nature of their research design, moreover, inhibits the development of substantive material both about the policy situation itself and about the specific content of decision-makers' images. In short, they focus exclusively on the dynamics of image-formation, thereby neglecting the substantive data of image content. Processes

are analysed but structures are ignored.

We turn now to an examination of studies which explore the images of super powers.

David Singer undertook a major analysis of foreign policy attitudes of the contemporary super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.[39] Within the framework of four basic issues delineated below, Singer explored thirty-five dimensions of the attitudes of foreign policy elites.

(1) How does each foreign policy elite perceive and evaluate the international political system, the environment within which the deterrent relationship must be maintained? Under this heading Singer examined (a) whether harmony or conflict is perceived as the dominant attribute of the international system; (b) whether their mutual relationship is viewed as a struggle between ideologies, social systems or power centres; (c) whether war is perceived as most likely to arise, if at all, out of one state's aggressiveness, the normal clash of national interests or accident and miscalculation; (d) whether they believe that nations with differing socio-political characteristics must clash, may compete or can co-

39. 'Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations', op. cit., pp. 425-85.

operate; (e) whether they think of prediction about international events as highly possible or almost impossible; (f) whether they think nations have much or little control over their own destinies; (g) whether the broad trends in the distribution of power are favourable or unfavourable to them; and (h) whether limited war is susceptible to restraint or is more likely to escalate into general war.

(2) What is each foreign policy elite's evaluation of the contemporary and predictable balance of power? Here Singer explored such dimensions as the perceived vulnerability of strategic strike-back capacity, the perceived limitations and effectiveness of the deterrent posture, the relative progress in military technology and production, the perceived over-all military capability vis-à-vis the enemy, the strengths of their own alliances, the effectiveness of the other's decision-making process, the dominant forces in the other's decision-making process, the impact of arms expenditures on the other's economy, vulnerabilities of the other's socio-political structure, and the perceived outcome of general nuclear war.

(3) How does each elite evaluate the foreign policy operational code of its adversary? Singer assumes that each player's strategy is a function of its perception of the other's

strategy. He researched states' ultimate and dominant political goals, their relative preference for physical security or ideological inconsistency, their relative preference for various foreign policy techniques and instruments, their basis for attributing aggressive designs to their adversary, their dominant military doctrine, the purposes of their outer space program and the purposes of their foreign aid programs.

(4) What are the main characteristics of each elite's articulation of its own operational code? Here Singer examined the general criteria used in making foreign policy decisions, the pre-requisites for successful negotiations, the way in which peace can best be maintained, the applicability of limited war in pursuit of strategic interests, the political settlement-disarmament sequence, the arms reduction -- inspection-control sequence, decision-making procedures in international organizations, the various disengagement proposals, the motivation for foreign aid programs and attitudes toward free international trade.

Singer then identified those written materials which he felt most faithfully reflected the assumptions, beliefs and expectations of the elite. He chose three newspapers from each side: Foreign Affairs, The New York Times and the State Department Bulletin; and Pravda, Kommunist and International

Affairs. He drew a small sample from each of them; his method of analysis was complex. Categories were refined and each of the periodicals was then assigned to two independent coders. The data are presented in tabular form, showing frequency of occurrence, in both percentage and absolute terms.

This is by far the most structured and comprehensive research project on elite images. The reader is provided with very valuable data on the precise content of super-power elite images. Unfortunately, however, there was no interpretation of the project's results. Neither was an attempt made to inter-relate any or all of the categories of image that were explored: each component is treated as an independent variable. Singer's measure of salience is simply frequency of occurrence and there, too, he does not attempt to discover which dimensions occur together and why. This then is a valuable collection of primary data, but no hypotheses are generated. Singer's concluding remarks are normative: "both major powers have been appallingly slow to discover the strategies that may enable them to survive the present while shaping the future." He fails to generalize about the content of decision-makers' images which may be characteristic of super powers.

Gilbert Winham has analysed American decision-makers' images during the Marshall Plan period to suggest reasons for

American post-war aid to Europe.[40] His basic material was the speeches and testimony of leading decision-makers; from these he drew inferences about the decision-makers' perceptions of the global political situation of 1947-48 and analysed their decision to institute the Marshall Plan.

Winham covered a time period of twelve consecutive months, from May 1, 1947 to April 30, 1948, and analysed the content of speeches, testimony and other public communications of fourteen decision-makers. His unit of measurement was an adjusted ratio of number of themes to number of words within a particular document. He was thus able to measure the relative occurrence of each theme independently over the time period. He tested the hypothesis which postulates that 'nations give aid in response to security crises'; that is, as a result of perceived threats to security or to significant national values. For this hypothesis to be confirmed, he would have to find (a) a high overall frequency of the threat theme; (b) that decision-makers perceived the United States as the target of this threat; and (c) that this perception of threat would occur early in the formative stages of the aid policy.

---

40. An Analysis of Foreign Aid Decision-Making: The Case of the Marshall Plan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967. See also, The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis, unpublished paper delivered at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1968.

Winham's data did demonstrate a high perception of threat, but it seemed directed against Europe and after it had been decided to grant Marshall Plan aid. Thus the hypothesis was not confirmed, for 'if security crises become so broadly defined as to include threats to a donor's allies, then the motivation for aid-giving behaviour is far more complicated than a simple response to perceived threat to the donor nation's security'.[41]

Winham provided both substantive material and the testing of an hypothesis. The reader is given a detailed picture of the perceptions of American decision-makers during the period under study, and a hypothesis, current in the literature, was found to be untenable. However, Winham dealt with only one aspect of foreign policy, the granting of aid. He too neither inter-related the various components of the decision-makers' image nor attempted to establish their interdependence; it is possible that intervening perceptions not isolated in this study may have been influential in shaping the decision.

Studies that deal directly with the images of 'developing states' and/or 'middle powers' are of much greater relevance

41. Gilbert A. Winham, 'The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis', op. cit., p. 20.

to the specific concerns of this inquiry.

In an analysis of the non-alignment of Afro-Asian states, non-alignment is seen as a policy, or more generally, as behaviour, that is, patterns of interaction ranging from co-operation to conflict, and as an attitudinal orientation, namely, the perceptual assessments that national leaders bring to bear on their general environment.[42] The central hypothesis is that perceptual orientation and behaviour of non-aligned states are consistent with official policy, which is non-participation in the general conflict system. More specifically, with respect to perceptual orientation, (1) the non-aligned states evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms, and (2) the non-aligned states perceive the actions of both groups also in similar terms. With respect to overt behaviour, (3) the non-aligned states' actions toward East and West do not differ significantly, and (4) the non-aligned states' actions toward East and West do not display differing levels of co-operation. With respect to the relationship between policy, perceptions and actions, (5) the actions of non-aligned states are congruent with their attitudes, and (6) overt behaviour and perceptual assessments are not incongruent with official policy.

---

42. Nazli Choukri, 'The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States', forthcoming article in The Canadian Journal of Political Science.

Choukri employed content analysis to examine the speeches of Nehru, Nasser and Sukarno at the Bogor meeting in 1954, the Bandung conference in 1955 and the Belgrade meeting in 1961. The speeches were coded and processed along three dimensions of perceptual orientation: affect (good or bad), potency (strong or weak) and activity. The data were presented in two forms -- summary indices of three separate ratios, each indicating orientation along the particular dimension, and analysis of variance for each dimension as a statistical test of significance for differences in expressed orientation.

The first two hypotheses, dealing with perceptual orientations, were substantiated, though there were differences in frequency of expression: Afro-Asian states voiced greater concern over the actions of the West than those of the East. Apart from the issue of salience, however, there was a marked absence of perceived distinctions between East and West.

To test the third and fourth hypotheses, which dealt with overt behaviour, the author examined 500 discrete acts. They were ordered along a scale of conflictual interaction ranging from 'nations initiate joint sovereignty' to 'nations escalate fighting'. It was found that the non-aligned group's behavioural orientations toward the major powers fell primarily within the low conflict range. Statistically, the average difference in the non-aligned nations' behaviour toward East

and West was not significant. When analysing the separate scores of each state, however, significant differences were found.[43] For this reason both the fifth and sixth hypotheses were negated.

There are some serious methodological questions which challenge the reliability of the data. Choukri used only speeches delivered to formal conclaves of the non-aligned states -- a dubious source from which to operationalize the perceptions of non-alignment: had some speeches addressed to domestic audiences been included, some of the contradictions between perceptions and behaviour might have been reduced.

Nevertheless, this study contains some interesting data on the relationship between official policy and elite perceptions. It measured the intensity as well as the substance of non-aligned states' attitudes toward the two blocs and it began to relate perceptions to behaviour. The first two hypotheses will be tested in our own study.

Finally, we turn to a study of the images of decision-makers of eight 'middle powers'.[44] In the contemporary inter-

---

43. One reason for the significant differences found was the extended concept of 'bloc' employed in the study. The inclusion of China as a member of the Soviet bloc severely distorted measurement in the Indian case. It is difficult to view the Sino-Indian border dispute as directly related to Indian conflict with the Soviet bloc. Again, special features characterize the relationship of India and England, which are not bloc-determined.

44. Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', op. cit., Part II.

national system state actors can be differentiated by their capacity to influence the behaviour of other actors and the dynamics of the system as a whole. This capacity can be measured by a combination of four variables -- size, population, military capability and economic capability. Four broad categories suggest themselves -- super powers, great powers, middle powers and small powers. 'Middle powers' are those whose foreign policy decisions influence either their own subordinate system as a whole or some facet of the global system.[45]

The source materials were articulated images of the foreign policy elites of eight middle powers: speeches, press conferences, interviews and other writings. The material was sampled and then coded for the ten variables of the operational environment.[46] The authors focussed on sixty-four issues -- two in each of the four issue areas [47] in the foreign policy system of the eight middle powers.[48] The ten variables of the operational environment were then ranked for each decision, based on the results of the frequency count. The results were

---

45. For a more extensive treatment of all four types of actors, see Ibid., Footnote 35.

46. See pp. 44-58 above.

47. See pp. 65-66 above.

48. The developed 'middle powers' were Canada, Israel, Poland and Sweden; the developing 'middle powers' were India, Nigeria, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic.

then totalled and hypotheses generated about the foreign policy behaviour of 'middle powers'.

In some thirty observations and hypotheses, rich substantive data are provided about the images of the elites of developing and developed middle powers.[49] This material is broken down both by issue-area and by developed/under-developed actor. The precise contents of the images of selected decision-makers are specified in accompanying tables.

The authors found that the elites of developed states have a much sharper awareness of the global system and of dominant-bilateral relationships in military-security issues. By contrast, decision-makers of developing states perceive their own subordinate system as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security. In the political-diplomatic issue area, too, decision-makers of developing states perceive the setting for decisions primarily in terms of their regional system characteristics and pressures.

Decision-making elites of both developed and under-developed middle powers have an acute perception of the pressure exerted by interest groups within their own political system; in contrast, the pressures of competing elites are of

---

49. It is impossible here to treat all the results of the study. Only those which are particularly relevant to this project have been cited.

extremely low salience. In addition, decision-makers of middle powers are marginally influenced by their own political structures and other subordinate systems. Finally, the high salience of the global system tends to confirm the proposition that in a bi-polar international system, middle powers perceive the maintenance of super-power stability as an important policy objective. The elites of middle powers have a much sharper perception of the external environment than of their internal environment.

This study provides both precise content of elite images and testable hypotheses about the foreign policy behaviour of middle powers, drawn from the comparative analysis of images of decision-makers in sixty-four policy decisions.

This survey of the literature on the concept of elite images and its empirical applications has underlined the necessity of exploring the multi-dimensional nature of elite images. It is necessary to examine the content of elite perceptions, symbols, values and action-responses or strategies. The inter-relations of all these components of elite images must then be explored, and estimates made of the degree of dependence of one component of an image on others. The intensity of perceptions must be explored and measured, and inconsistencies extrapolated and made clear. As a result of

this analysis it should be possible to develop a precise understanding of the structure and components of elite images, to assess the likelihood of image change and to predict within probability limits the parameters of foreign policy behaviour.

In addition, wherever possible, relevant hypotheses must be extracted from the existing literature. These hypotheses will vary: some deal with the kinds of perceptions of decision-makers of particular types of actors; others deal more directly with the relationship between types of images and foreign policy behaviour. In the present stage of development of the study of international relations it is important to test and reconfirm hypotheses about foreign policy behaviour.

This study will attempt to perform two analytically separate but linked functions -- hypothesis generation and hypothesis testing. From the rigorous analysis of selected elite images it should be possible to generate hypotheses about the structure, content and process of elite image formation. Secondly, the data which emerge from this analysis of elite images should be used to test some of the current hypotheses of the literature on foreign policy behaviour. It remains now to delineate the categories of analysis, the methods to be used, and the hypotheses to be tested.

Chapter IV

The Research Design: Categories, Methods and Hypotheses

"The foreign policy decision-making elite consists of those individuals who perform the function of political authorization in the foreign policy arena. Political authorization may be defined as authorization sanctioned by the conventions of the system....The core decision-making group in any foreign policy system consists of the head of government and the foreign minister...."[1]

The choice of the head of government and the foreign minister is particularly apt when applied to the Indian foreign policy process, for Jawaharlal Nehru was both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs from 1947 until his death in 1964. Nowhere did one man dominate foreign policy as did Nehru in India. From the early years of the independence struggle Nehru alone made the Congress Party conscious of world politics. In the post-independence period his monopoly of foreign policy decision-making was the logical continuation of the earlier pattern. The Prime Minister's role was not confined to the planning of policy; his widespread travels made him decisive in the execution of policy as well.

---

1. See p. 60 above.

He was "Minister, chief (foreign) policy planner and roving Ambassador".[2]

At different times Nehru relied on advisors for specific policy issues: the Mountbattens for the Commonwealth; Madame Pandit for the West; Dr. Radhakrishnan for the Soviet Union; Maulana Azad for the Middle East; and Sardar K.M. Panikkar, who was India's first Ambassador to Peking ,on China. However, their advice was usually restricted to particular foreign policy issues; they did not participate in the formulation of policy across a broad spectrum of issues.

Only one person did so -- V.K. Krishna Menon. Since independence Menon was the only minister whose primary interest was foreign policy. He was, in fact, the Prime Minister's right hand in this sphere. The basis of Menon's influence was his personal relationship with the Prime Minister which dated to the early 'thirties. He had also shown a capacity to understand and to implement Nehru's objectives in the international system. Menon was consulted on most issues of foreign policy by the Prime Minister, and his views carried considerable weight because of Nehru's respect for his intellectual ability and his personal integrity. "There is no doubt that Menon

---

2. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 565.

occupies the position of chief foreign policy advisor to Nehru. Indeed....he has been the adjunct Minister of External Affairs."[3] And so, for purposes of this project, the Indian foreign policy decision-making elite will consist of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon.

Section 1

a. The Components of Elite Image

Elite images are a complex combination of perceptions, values, symbols and action-responses. For the purposes of this study seven interrelated components of elite image will be isolated and analysed.

The first component is the elite's image of other actors in the contemporary international system. This includes states, the universal actor (the United Nations), blocs and formal alliance structures which function as autonomous actors within the contemporary system. The elite's image of other actors provides flesh for the skeletal structure of international images. The second component refers to the various levels of the contemporary international system, that is, to the variables of the external operational environment. As noted, these comprise the global level, the bilateral level and the

3. Brecher, op. cit., p. 568. It is generally difficult to gauge the pattern of influence in foreign policy decision-making. Professor Brecher's biography of Nehru examines in detail the role of Indian decision-makers in the foreign policy process.

subordinate system level.[4] The third component refers to the domestic operational environment and includes such variables as non-associational pressure groups, associational pressure groups, institutional pressure groups, competing elites and public opinion.[5]

The fourth component is the symbols used by the decision-makers. Symbols express and inculcate perspectives. They are almost always value-loaded and are usually short references for highly complex and intricate phenomena. The choice of particular symbols and the manner of their use are important clues to both the content and structure of decision-makers' images.[6]

The fifth component refers to the values of the decision-making elite. The typology of values is drawn from Harold Lasswell [7] and is grouped under two broad headings -- welfare and deference. The welfare values include well-being, or the health and safety of the person or group; wealth, or

---

4. See pp. 44-51 above.
5. These terms were defined on pp. 53-58 above.
6. See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950, pp. 103 ff for a general discussion of symbols. See also the discussion of Holsti and Scott on pp. 70-75 above for an analysis of the relevance of symbols to the images of foreign policy decision-makers.
7. See Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit., pp. 55-56 for definitions of values. See also the discussion of Holsti and Scott on pp.70-75 above for an analysis of the relevance of values as an essential component of decision-makers' images.

increments in income and material resources; skill, which is proficiency in any practice; and enlightenment, or knowledge, insight and information. The deference values include power, which refers both to physical capabilities and the capacity to influence others; respect, which is status, honour, recognition, prestige, glory and reputation; rectitude, which comprises the normative values of virtue, goodness and righteousness; and affection, which includes the values of love and friendship. This particular typology of values was selected because of the broad range of general values which it spans.

The sixth component is issues -- the policy issues in connection with which statements and assertions are made and policy responses advocated. The seventh component is strategies.[8] This refers to the action-response component of the decision-maker's image; it focusses on the policies advocated by the decision-maker for use by his state in relation to any international problem. The purpose of this part of the analysis is to determine the content and the relative salience of components and sub-components of the decision-makers' image.

b. The Intensity of Images

In this section we will deal with the affective and

8. See pp. 69-83 above for a discussion of the component of action-response.

evaluative aspects of elite images.[9] Intensity of images, or "the average favourable or unfavourable loading of evaluative terms"[10] will be explored. Four variables will be examined in depth; expressions of hostility, friendship, change of the status quo and satisfaction. Hostility suggests an action calculated to do injury to another state and/or a sense of displeasure with an action or with a situation. Friendship involves the generally supportive nature of an action or policy, and expressions of friendship and liking for another state and/or its decision-makers. Change of status quo refers to the extent to which a given policy and/or a given demand is calculated to alter the existing pattern of relations between actors. Satisfaction indicates the sense of approval in an action or with a situation.

The relationships among these four variables of intensity will be measured by the statistical tool of 'functional distance'.[11] It will be possible then to estimate both the

---

9. For a discussion of the importance of the affective and evaluative dimension see Chapter III above, especially the treatment of McClelland, Holsti and Scott on pp. 70-75 and the research projects of Zaninovitch on pp. 85-90, Zinnes on pp. 91-93, Holsti, North and Brody on pp. 94-97, Zinnes, North and Koch on pp. 97-99 and Zinnes on pp. 99-100 for the research findings relevant to the intensity dimension of images.

10. Charles Osgood, 'Representational Models and Relevant Research Methods', in Ithiel de Sola Pool, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1959, p. 20.

11. See Section 2 below for a precise explanation of how functional distance is calculated.

content of these variables, for example, the initiators and the targets of hostile statements and the inter-relationship among the four variables.

Three models will be used in interpreting the data which emerge from this analysis: 'critical' conflict, tending to violence; 'uncritical' conflict, tending to integration; and an intermediate type which can be defined in terms of equi-functional distance of all variables to all other variables.[12] From this analysis it is possible to predict the probability of violent foreign policy behaviour. It is also possible to designate the possible targets of such behaviour. Finally, it is possible to measure the likelihood of the eruption of conflict and violence through the use of an 'index of tension'.[13] This is equivalent to the ratio of the satisfaction-change of status quo dimension to that of the hostility-change of status quo dimension. If the quotient is 1.00, then a conflict system is functional; that is, it serves to maintain the system. If it is above 1.00, the system is in a state of high tension and will tend toward disruptive conflict.

These techniques of analysis permit the researcher to

---

12. These three models of conflict systems are taken directly from Zaninovitch, op. cit., as summarized on pp. 85-90 above. See also 'Pattern Analysis and Factor Analysis' in North et al., op. cit., pp. 105-118.

13. Zaninovitch, 'Pattern Analysis and Factor Analysis', op. cit., pp. 116-17.

measure varying intensities of attitudes and to isolate the targets of these intense attitudes. It will also be possible to locate the salient images on these attitude dimensions, thus adding depth to our understanding of the structure and content of elite images.

c. The Association Structure Within Images

In addition to the content, the relative salience and the intensity of elite images, it is necessary to analyse the association structure within the image.[14] This involves the measurement of the inter-dependence of the components of the decision-makers' image.

Several techniques of analysis are available. We have chosen the technique of contingency analysis.[15] An inference about the association structure of a decision-maker may be made from the 'contingencies' or co-occurrences of symbols within the content of a message. This inference is largely independent of either 'attention level' (frequency) or intensity. It is based on the assumption that greater-than-chance

---

14. For a discussion of the importance of the association structure of decision-makers' images see Chapter III above, especially Boulding, p. 69; McClelland, p. 70; Holsti, pp. 70-73; and Kelman, pp. 73-4. See also the discussion of cognitive dissonance on pp. 77-82 and the problem of attitude change on pp. 82-84.

15. Osgood, op. cit., pp. 33-88.

contingencies of items in messages would indicate associations in the source. Correspondingly, less-than-chance contingencies of items in messages would indicate disassociations in the thinking of the decision-maker. If, as in the former case, two items are associated or contingent, the occurrence of one logically facilitates the other. Contingency analysis does not provide us with information about the direction of the associations, that is, whether they are positively or negatively associated. Contingency analysis depends only upon the location of symbols, not upon how they are linked. Moreover, this method does not take into account the intensity with which assertions are made; indirectly, however, the stronger the decision-maker's association of two ideas, the more regularly one's occurrence conditions the other's. Thus, the magnitude of the contingency relation will indirectly indicate the intensity of association.

This method of analysis permits the measurement of the degree of association of every sub-component of the decision-maker's image with every other sub-component. It is then necessary to determine which are statistically significant, for contingency analysis does not facilitate the discovery of patterns of association, that is, clusters of symbols which are all highly related and interdependent. For this purpose the technique of cluster analysis is used.

Cluster analysis is a laborious technique in which data is manipulated by hand until several clusters appear. These clusters comprise groups of symbols which are significantly related to one another. This pattern, or cluster, permits more sophisticated interpretation of the association structure of the decision-maker.

After deriving both the degree of association of every sub-component of the image to every other sub-component and larger clusters of association and inter-dependence, it will be possible to offer a more sophisticated interpretation of the decision-maker's image. It will be possible to predict both the likelihood and the area of image change, for those components of the image which are most highly inter-related and most intense are least susceptible to change. In addition, it will be possible to add depth to the content of components of the image, for many of the contingencies may in fact be subconscious and the decision-maker himself may be unaware of them. For example, in addition to knowing that the United States is a highly salient actor and that it is the object of extreme hostility, it will now be possible to discover what other sub-components of the image are contingent upon it. Is 'imperialism' contingent? Is power or peace? The answers to this kind of questions will enrich our understanding of both the structure and linkages in elite images.

This part of the study will be principally concerned with what has been termed 'hypothesis-generation'. At that stage,

> the investigator begins a project with an area that he wishes to investigate, describes his data, and then sets down a series of possible hypotheses to be tested in future research. In this type of analysis, a descriptive phase usually proceeds the hypothesis-generating phase. The interplay with theory at this stage of research is very important; the investigator is in the process of inventing a set of theoretical constructs that can later be put to empirical test.[16]

This is the principal objective of the detailed analysis of the images of two Indian foreign policy decision-makers. Moreover, wherever possible, we shall try to test relevant hypotheses from the current literature. Before listing these hypotheses, however, it is necessary to describe more rigorously the analytical and statistical methods which will be used.

Section 2

The principal research technique to be employed in this study is content analysis, "a research technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specified characteristics within a text".[17] It is a quantitative method of studying recorded communication. It uses a

---

16. Philip J. Stone, Dexter C. Dunphy, Marshall S. Smith and Daniel M. Ogilvie, The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach To Content Analysis, The Massachusets Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1963, p. 237.
17. Ibid., p. 5.

range from simple description of communication content to inferential analysis of the originator. The initial step in content analysis is simple: a unit of measurement is chosen and its frequency in the material being analysed is recorded. The result of this process is that non-quantified, verbal material can be reduced to quantitative data and can then be manipulated for the purposes of description or hypothesis-testing.

Content analysis can be useful in describing and analysing foreign policy in depth. Initially it was used during World War II as a means of studying Nazi propaganda. Lasswell then used content analysis in his surveys of political symbols.[18] In the early 1960s content analysis was extensively employed in studies of international decision-making during crisis situations.[19] As a result of these studies substantial methodological innovations were introduced into the technique itself.

For the foreign policy analyst the technique of content analysis offers many advantages. The standard methods of attitude measurement -- the personal interview, the question-

---

18. H. Lasswell, N. Leites and associates, eds., The Language of Politics, George W. Stewart, 1949, and H. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Comparative Study of Symbols: An Introduction, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1952.

19. The Stanford University Studies in International Conflict and Integration. For reports of the studies undertaken see pp. 85-100 above.

naire, or the direct observation of decision-makers in action -- can only rarely be used by the social scientist seeking to study human behaviour at the international level. The analysis of manifest content to determine underlying attitudes therefore becomes important.

The more sophisticated techniques of content analysis now permit examination both of the content of images and their intensity and association structure. In addition, the research use for which the document is collected and analysed is usually unknown to the source before and during the generation of data. This is a distinct advantage over the standard administration of questionnaires and interviews, where the source is usually aware of the potential uses of the material, a situation that may affect his responses.

Content analysis also achieves parsimony in the methodological approach to research problems, a striking contrast to the historical methods of foreign policy study. Content analysis provides a means for selecting and limiting what will be studied from a vast universe of data; the researcher then faces a more manageable task. Data limitation is carried out systematically by pre-defined rules and not by the unrecorded judgements of the researcher.

Like any other research method, content analysis has drawbacks which limit its utility in empirical research. The use of recorded communication poses the problem of incomplete information. Of the communications that occur in political events, much remains unrecorded or is inaccessible to the researcher. The content analyst is thus generalizing about the whole process from only a part of it. This is a generic problem, however, and is found in other types of research as well.

Second, the researcher must determine whether the communications he selects are genuine and valid.[20] This too is a problem faced by survey analysis and other types of research. Methodological checks, however, which test the consistency of recorded communications and which alert the researcher to contradiction and inconsistency in the material, are now available.[21]

The basic procedures of content analysis can be summarized in the following five steps:

---

20. For treatment of the generic problem of validation of elite images see pp. 76-82 above.

21. For an excellent analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of content analysis as a research technique in foreign policy analysis, see Gilbert R. Winham, The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis, op. cit.

(1) Define the target for eventual measurement, that is, the set of documents to be analysed. In this study personal interviews and foreign policy speeches are the basic source material.

(2) Define the theoretical framework in terms of categories containing symbols of the defined language community and develop a set of rules for applying these categories to verbal data. The categories employed in this study are the seven components of elite image defined earlier. The categories are mutually exclusive and easily operationalized.

(3) Ascertain by appropriate methods a measure of category consistency and content validity. In all cases within this study categories were rechecked for consistency. In some cases sub-categorization originated from the source; the categories of actors, symbols, strategies and issues were developed from the analysed material. The other categories of external and internal environment and values employed schema of classification that were both mutually exclusive and carefully operationalized.

(4) Determine the degree of inter-coder agreement and reliability. At several stages in the coding procedure, statistical tests of inter-coder agreement were run, and the results were satisfactory.

(5) Determine the correspondence of the objects of measurement to the theoretical constructs. The analysed data were used both to generate and to test hypotheses. In the latter case, some difficulties arise when categories are not constructed specifically for the testing of particular hypotheses. Generally, however, the objects of measurement and the theoretical constructs corresponded to each other.

Having explored the general procedures of content analysis,it is now necessary to discuss their specific application to our categories of analysis.

a. The Components of Elite Image

The basic technique of analysis used here is the frequency count. The source material was interviews in one case (Menon) and collected foreign policy speeches in the other (Nehru). The material which was selected focussed on the most important foreign policy issues in India over a fifteen-year period, 1947-1962. Insofar as possible the same issues were analysed for both decision-makers.

The length of speeches and interviews varied between the decision-makers and among the issues analysed. In an effort to provide maximum depth the units of analysis were not reduced initially to comparable length. After the raw frequency totals were computed, however, the results were weighted

according to the length of the particular unit compared to the average length of all the units analysed for the decision-maker. This adjusted frequency count appears in the tabular analysis. Results are therefore comparable within the data for each decision-maker but not across each.

One of the lesser methodological objectives of this study is to determine the relative value of in-depth interviews and formal speeches as source material for foreign policy studies. Both are used in this project: the foreign policy speeches are drawn from Government of India collections of the speeches of Prime Minister Nehru; the interviews are taken from Michael Brecher's twenty-four interviews with Krishna Menon.[22] Conclusions about their relative utility will be drawn after the results of the content analysis have been reported.

After the material was selected it was coded for analysis. The basic rule of content analysis was used -- no sentence can be left in a compound form. The most widely accepted breakdown of sentences comprises (1) the perceiver of the action or affect expressed; (2) the actor whose affect

---

22. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, the Government of India, New Delhi, 1961, and Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, Part I.

or action is being perceived; (3) the target or the recipient of the action or expressed affect; and (4) the descriptive-connective, or the nature of the action or affect expressed between actors.[23] No assertion must have more than one perceiver, one perceived, one target and one descriptive-connective. In some cases sentences or assertions may not have all four - for example, 'the war is being fought vigorously'. In this case neither a perceived nor a target is immediately apparent. This type of situation is handled by labelling both the perceived and the target as either 'general' or 'unspecified', whichever is more appropriate. Generally, then, all unit statements will contain all four and only four components. If, for example, a unit-statement should contain two targets, the statement is broken down and coded as two separate assertions.

In this study all the coding was done by one judge.[24] This does not alleviate the problem of inter-coder reliability, for the single judge may himself be inconsistent during various stages of the coding. Therefore checks on reliability are necessary at various intervals during the coding process

---

23. North et al., op. cit., pp. 38-51.

24. It is more desirable to have at least two coders analysing content data. Given the fact that this is a doctoral dissertation, however, all coding was done by the student.

to assess intra-coder reliability. Reliability checks were computed both during the pre-testing phase and at the beginning and end of each set of coded materials.

Reliability may be computed by one of several formulas, each designed for specific situations.[25] The simplest to compute is the formula for the two-coder situation:

$$R = \frac{2\ (c_1,\ 2)}{C_1 + C_2}$$

The number of category assignments on which all coders agree is divided by the sum of all category assignments by all coders. This was adapted to the one-coder situation by computing agreement on coding done at two spaced intervals. The level of intra-coder reliability ranged from .73 to .80 which is considered acceptable.[26]

The frequencies of occurrence were then totalled for each unit and presented in tabular form. The material is presented horizontally by components of elite image so that

---

25. The Pearson product-moment correlation will merely measure aggreement without necessarily measuring substantive placement in categories. For this reason the above reliability formula was chosen. Dina Zinnes also used only one judge and tested consistency twice within one week. See 'The Expression and Perception of Hostility in Pre-war Crisis: 1914', in Singer, Quantitative International Politics, op. cit., pp. 85-121.

26. The range of acceptability has varied from .65 to .98 in various studies using content analysis.

comparisons can be made across units. The degree of salience within the components -- actors, symbols, external and internal environment, values, issues and strategies -- is derived both from high frequencies of occurrence and from patterns of distribution across units.

Interpretation of the results of frequency analysis must be made with care. Underlying frequency analysis is the assumption that important information is communicated; further, that the more important information is communicated more frequently. Simple frequency analysis, however, provides us with no insight into sources' attitudes toward material being communicated nor the way in which components are associated. Despite these limitations, however, frequency analysis is extremely useful in isolating the most important components of a decision-maker's image which must then be further investigated. The results of frequency analysis permit the construction of the skeletal frame.

b. Intensity of the Images

"The written record has been traditionally analysed for overt content. But language reveals more than overt content; behaviour is shaped not only by what decision-makers say but also by the manner in which they say it, and the words

express something of the inner feelings of their author...."[27]

In order to measure the intensity of the images of decision-makers, four variables were chosen: hostility, friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo. The technique of analysis used here is that of 'pair-comparison' scaling.[28]

From the total universe of statements which must be scaled for intensity of expression, eighteen statements are selected at random. These are transferred to a sheet of paper and each statement is given an identifying number. Then, all possible pairs of statements are listed; however, this will not include pairs consisting of the same item twice. For example, statements 1-2 and 2-1 do not constitute two distinct pairs, even though the order of the identifying number has been reversed. The formula to compute the number of pairs generated by n number of statements is: $\frac{n(n-1)}{2}$

Hence, for eighteen statements, there will be 153 pairs.

Each pair is considered separately, and the question is asked: which statement of this pair represents a more intense expression of a specific variable -- hostility, for example? The more hostile statement will receive one 'vote'.

---

27. Ole R. Holsti, 'The Value of International Tension Measurement', in The Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, p. 609 (italics mine).

28. D.A. Zinnes, 'Pair Comparison Scaling in International Relations', in North et al., op. cit., pp. 80-89.

This procedure is followed for every pair, and the votes for each statement are then totalled.

If the variable was scaled along one dimension, that is, if the judge has consistently scaled every item using the same definition of the variable, then the votes of the statements will hierarchically order the set of statements. In other words, it should be possible to rank order the statements on the basis of these 'votes' with few, if any, ties occurring between two or more statements. With a sample as large as eighteen statements it is reasonable to conclude that the judge is sufficiently consistent even should as many as three ties occur.

This eighteen-point scale is then collapsed to a nine-point scale of increasing intensity of the variable.[29] There are then two examples for each level of the nine-point scale. This is the yardstick by which all the remaining statements are scaled. These scale values are relative to the entire set of statements. In pair comparison-scaling the items are scaled relative to each other through the medium of the initial sample of eighteen statements. Since this sample was chosen randomly from the population of statements to be scaled it is reasonable to assume

---

29. The selection of a nine-point scale is obviously arbitrary since any appropriate scale can be used. However, there is some consensus that a nine-point scale represents an optimal number of discriminations. A fifteen-point scale is too large, and a three-point scale does not permit sufficient gradation.

that they are representative of the entire population. Pair-comparison is, then, a technique which produces a relative scale without a forced distribution.[30]

This procedure was repeated for each of the four variables for both decision-makers. For example, all statements of hostility were extracted from the source material. Eighteen statements were chosen, a scale constructed and intra-coder reliability checked twice, with a one week interval. The remainder of the extracted statements were then scaled by the nine-point collapsed yardstick.

After all statements of all four variables had been scaled, each statement was then recoded. The breakdown used in the frequency count was adapted slightly to explore more carefully the attitude dimension. In virtually all cases the perceiver was the

---

30. A major alternative scaling procedure is the Q-Sort scale. This is a forced distribution scale of 1 - 9 developed by Jack Block. It provides a rank order of classes of statements in relation to the particular universe of assertions which is set before the scaling judge. The judge is required to place the entire universe of statements into nine categories, with a distribution approaching normality: 5% - 8% - 12% - 16% - 18% - 16% - 12% - 8% - 5%. The forced distribution of the Q-Sort compels the judge to work hard at making discriminations. See Jack Block, The Q-Sort Method in Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1961.

    Clearly the Q-Sort is inapplicable in instances where the assumption of quasi-normal distribution is unnecessary and inhibiting. To analyse the intensity of four variables it is not necessary to make the assumption of quasi-normality. On the contrary, it would be impossible to analyse the pattern of variables since the distribution of each variable is predetermined. For these reasons the 'pair-comparison' scaling method was used here.

decision-maker himself; for this reason this category was dropped. Each assertion was analysed for (1) the actor whose affect or action is being perceived; (2) the descriptive-connective, or more precisely, the symbol around which the statement revolved; and (3) the target or the recipient of the action or expressed affect. This data was further broken down into three gradations of intensity: high intensity, or statements scaled from 7 to 9 on the scale; medium intensity, or assertions scaled from 4 to 6; and low intensity, or statements scaled from 1 to 3. Aggregate totals were then presented for all coded items. The normal intra-coder reliability checks were run twice. The results of this analysis permitted us to give added depth to the preliminary suggestions of salience based purely on the frequency of occurrence.

Finally, concepts of <u>functional distance</u> and <u>pattern analysis</u> were employed to organize and synthesize the scaled data for convenient interpretation. 'Functional distance' represents a measure of the relationship between variables which describe sets of phenomena. It affords a quantitative technique for determining the similarity of decision-makers' perceptions. In addition, 'functional distance' permits a diagrammatic representation of relationships among a set of variables or a 'pattern of variables'.[31]

31. For a description of the three types of pattern-variable models, see pp. 85-90 above.

This technique requires a common differentiating scale for determining the behaviour of two or more variables -- in our case, the 'pair-comparison' scale.

The measure of functional distance [32] may be viewed as the deviation of two curves from possible congruence or perfect similarity. A relationship of perfect similarity between variables is defined as a congruence or identity of two curves, which can only be attained if 0.00 is the computed functional distance; any value above 0.00 signifies some degree of difference between the expression of any two measurable variables.

The determination of functional distance is predicated upon two qualities which any two curves representing variables possess. The first of these suggests an index of MVD, or the mean vertical distance. The MVD may be defined as the index of closeness or discrepancy between two curves on the vertical plane which represents the intensity scale. It is possible to calculate the MVD by the following formula:

$$MVD = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (x_i - y_i)$$ where n refers to the number of time units in which two variables are related.

---

32. Zaninovitch, 'Pattern Analysis and Factor Analysis', in North et al., op. cit., pp. 105-128.

The second of the two qualities is designated as the MTD, or the mean transitional distance, which serves as the measure to which two curves representing variables move in the same or the opposite directions. It is possible to calculate the MTD with the following formula: $$MTD = \frac{1}{2n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} (d_i - \Delta_i)$$ in which n represents the number of 'transitional points'. The degree of functional distance is computed by summing the values of MVD and MTD for a relationship between two variables.[33]

To illustrate the technique for determining functional distance, suppose a given variable x possesses a series of values -- 4, 6, 3, 4 and 1 -- from t_1 through t_5, and another variable y has values of 3, 5, 4, 1 and 2 for the same series of time-units. The distribution of values for the two variables and the values plotted over time are as follows:

Variables	Time-units				
	1	2	3	4	5
x	4	6	3	4	1
y	3	5	4	1	2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	

33. The Spearman Rank correlation formula would be inappropriate for this analysis since it expresses relationships in terms of comparative directional movement of curves and suggests little with respect to comparative placement of curves on the vertical plane which represents the intensity scale. In determining a statistical measure for the meaning of 'distance' between variables, correlation coefficient formulas share this inadequacy. See Charles E.Osgood, George J.Suci and Percy H.Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1957, p. 90 ff.

The algebraic expression which is used for determining the value of MVD reads as follows:

$$MVD = \frac{1}{5} \sum_{i=1}^{5} (x_i - y_i),$$

with 1 and 5 representing the time-units which establish the limits of this equation. Therefore, the MVD_{xy} index-value of 1.40 would be computed by summing the absolute values of the difference between x and y for each time-unit, which is 7, and dividing by 5 which represents the number of time-units.

To calculate the MTD index-value the following algebraic expression is applied: $MTD = \frac{1}{8} \sum_{i=1}^{4} (d_i - \Delta_i)$,

in which the limits of the calculations, 1 and 4, are set by the 'transitional points' [34] in the above table. In this formula, $d = x_i - x_{i+1}$, and $\Delta = y_i - y_{i+1}$, the symbol i refers to successive periods. Therefore, the MTD_{xy} index-value of 1.25 is calculated by (1) the calculation of the difference for both x and y separately between t_1 and t_2 , t_2 and t_3 , and so on; (2) the subtraction of the 't_1-t_2' value for y from that of x, and so on; and (3) the summation of the absolute values resulting from the computation performed under (2) which gives a value of 10; and (4) the division of 10 by 8 which represents the total number of 'transitional points' for the two variables.

---

34. 'Transitional points' simply distinguish the statistical relationship between the values of any two successive time-units.

The computed functional distance value would then be 2.65 or the sum of the MVD and the MTD. The greater the functional distance between variables or the higher the combined MVD-MTD value, the less the similarity in the two curves representing these variables; and, the lower such functional distance, the greater such similarity.[35] Functional distance values, then, permit a rank-ordering and a comparability of variables.

If the functional distance value of two variables = 0.00, then the two variables tend to behave as if they were one. The more closely the two variables are located to one another the more closely the variables converge. It follows, then, that the 'distance' between variables is a measure of the association of specific phenomena.

The six functional distance values of the four variables can then be represented in diagrammatic form. Accurate plotting of six relationships on two-dimensional paper is impossible; there will inevitably be distortions, and the diagrammatic presentation is intended to be only suggestive of the 'pattern of variables'.

By using these derived values it is also possible to discern precisely the level of tension in a decision-maker's system of perceptions. Operationally, an 'index of tension'[36]

35. The term 'similarity index' simply refers to the quantitative expression of functional distance.

36. Zaninovitch, op. cit., pp. 116-117. His index is based on frustration, satisfaction and change of status quo. We found that hostility was the better predictive tool and had greater operational content.

may be defined as a quotient derived from a specific ratio of dimensions which reads Sa-CSQ : Ho-CSQ. If this ratio is approximately 1:1, and therefore the quotient is above 1.00, then a conflict system is defined as functional; that is, it serves to maintain the system. If the quotient value is exactly 1.00, the hostility and satisfaction variables must be equidistant from change of status quo within the pattern of variables. If this ratio is $\frac{1}{n}$:1, where n is any value greater than 1.00, and the quotient, therefore, is less than 1.00, then the system is one of low tension which,in its extreme form, represents the danger of decay. In this case satisfaction is closer than hostility to change of status quo. Finally, if the ratio is 1:$\frac{1}{n}$, and the quotient is greater than 1.00, then the system is in a state of high tension and will tend toward conflict and violence. Here hostility will be more closely related to change of status quo than is satisfaction.

Through the use of these three related techniques -- pair-comparison scaling, functional distance and pattern variable analysis -- it is possible to explore in depth the intensity of decision-makers' images. One can examine attitude variables, explore their inter-relationships and plot the points of highest salience along the attitude dimensions. This adds to the understanding of both the content and the structure of elite images.

c. The Association Structure Within Images

We wish to explore as well the association structure of elite images and the inter-dependence of components and sub-components. Several techniques of analysis are available; the two most widely used are factor analysis and cluster analysis.

"Factor analysis starts with a set of observations obtained from a given sample by means of a priori measures. It is a method of analysing this set of observations from their inter-correlations to determine whether the variations represented can be accounted for adequately by a number of basic categories smaller than that with which the investigation was started. Therefore data obtained with a large number of a priori measures may be explained in terms of a smaller number of reference variables".[37]

Factor analysis can be used for two purposes: the first is to reduce voluminous and complex materials to manageable proportions by the isolation of a set of meaningful variables; the second is to determine which 'factors' acting as underlying forces account for the common variance of established variables. It is in the latter capacity that factor analysis is relevant to the study of foreign policy.

Factor analysis requires a matrix of correlation coefficient values and then the construction of a symmetrical matrix of corre-

37. Benjamin Fruchter, Introduction to Factor Analysis, D. Van Norstrand Co. Inc., Princeton, 1954, p. 1.

lations of variables. Generally, the centroid method of factoring has proven the most practicable and is preferred. The extracting of factors serves to derive a loading for each variable in the matrix: a 'loading' is a statistical measure of the degree to which a given factor explains the behaviour of a given variable.

Factor analysis was applied to the components of the image of one decision-maker. However, the technique depends on both correlation coefficients and interval data; it was questionable whether our data met these requirements strictly. The results were promising but in view of the procedure's experimental nature and the lack of information as to its effectiveness in this kind of study [38] it was decided to find alternative analytical techniques. Contingency analysis and cluster analysis were chosen.

The fundamental logic of the statistical contingency method is quite simple; it is nothing more than the application of the law of association by contiguity. If one idea or concept appears in consciousness, other ideas or concepts associated with it will also tend to appear.

There are five major steps in a contingency analysis of content. The first is the selection of categories; our categories

38. Very few studies of international behaviour have employed factor analysis. One exception is Rudolph J. Rummel, 'The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behaviour', in Singer, Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, op. cit., pp. 187-214.

consist of those sub-components of the decision-maker's image which occurred with moderate or high frequency throughout the units of analysis. The second step involves the selection of units; the units of this study had already been chosen -- the speeches and interviews of the decision-makers.

The coding of material is the third task. This had already been done when the data were prepared for the frequency analysis. It was necessary, however, to discover whether each sub-component occurred above or below its own median frequency. This is a relatively simple task: the occurrences of a variable are listed in descending order and the middle category in the number of occurrences is the median of occurrence. All occurrences above the median level are then rescored as plus (+) and all occurrences below the median level are rescored as minus (-). This technique of scoring is particularly useful since it does not depend on the absolute levels of occurrence; each variable is treated independently.

The fourth step is the determination of significant contingencies. Chance contingency is simply the product of the percentages of occurrence. The contingencies obtained can then be evaluated against the chance contingencies in terms of the significance of differences in percentage.

In order to obtain both chance and expected contingencies, the percentage of occurrence of categories is listed under each column. The expected or chance contingency for each pair of columns is obtained by multiplying together the rates of occurrence of these two categories. Thus, if A occurs 40% and B occurs 20%, we would expect them to occur together -- be contingent -- in only 8% of the units on the basis of chance. The actual or obtained contingencies are simply the percentage of units where A and B occur together, that is, where both are scored +.

If the obtained contingency is greater than the expected contingency, these variables are co-occurring together more often than by chance; if the obtained contingency is less than the corresponding expected value, these events are occurring less often than by chance.

To illustrate the technique of contingency analysis, suppose there are ten units of analysis and three variables. The pattern of occurrence of variables A, B and C is as follows:

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
A	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	+	.50
B	+	+	-	+	+	-	+	-	+	+	.70
C	+	-	+	-	-	+	+	-	+	-	.50

A occurs 50% of the time, B occurs 70% of the time, and C occurs 50% of the time. To obtain the expected contingencies

of A and C, one multiplies .50 by .50 -- the expected contingency is .25. To calculate the actual contingency one calculates the percentage of plusses occurring together -- the actual contingency is therefore .20. They are then occurring together less often than by chance.

The fifth and last step is the evaluation of the significance of the difference between expected and obtained contingencies. A possible test of significance is the chi-square, but its application becomes laborious with a large number of units. In addition, the frequency of entries may often be below five, a number usually accepted as a lower limit in applying the chi-square. For these reasons, we have expressed contingencies as ratios which have some of the properties of correlation coefficients. The index used is the ratio: $\frac{A_B + B_A}{A + B}$ where A_B is the number of units on which A's are contingent upon B's, B_A is the number of units on which B's are contingent upon A's. A is the total number of units for this A item and B is the total number of units for this B item. If there are no instances of contingency, the ratio will be .00, and if all occurrences are contingent, the ratio will be 1.00. All ratios above .75 are treated as significant. In the hypothetical illustration above, the A with B contingency ratio is $\frac{5 + 5}{5 + 7}$ or .83. A and B would be interpreted as occurring together significantly more often than by chance.

There are a number of ways in which the results of a contingency analysis can be represented. First, we can produce a table of significant contingencies, a listing for each category of the other categories with which it has significant associations or disassociations. Second, the analyst would want to know something about the inter-relationships among the entire set of items measured. Which content categories are associated in patterns? Using the results of the contingency ratios, it is possible to obtain a matrix of relations which can then be treated to yield a cluster analysis.

The technique of cluster analysis is a method of hand manipulation of the significant contingency ratios.[39] All the significant ratios are listed on a two-dimensional table. The variables are then shifted and rotated by hand, based on the initial observation of clusters or groups of variables that are all significantly related to each other. This process is repeated several times, until observable patterns form along a single axis.

From these clusters it is possible to make more general comments about the association structure of the decision-maker. The analyst can report both the contingencies of individual variables and the inter-relationships between contingent variables

39. For an example of cluster analysis see Leroy N. Rieselbach, 'Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly', in International Organization, 1960, pp. 291-303.

which form patterns. The salient components of the decision-maker's image can be located within these clusters, as well as subjects and targets of intense feeling. From this multi-faceted analysis a composite picture of the decision-maker's image should emerge.

Section 3

From our survey of empirical studies of elite images several testable hypotheses emerged. These vary in relevance to the purposes of this study. In some cases it will be possible to test a hypothesis directly with data that emerge from our analysis. In other cases only general comments will be offered since the data were not specifically designed to examine any particular hypothesis. The relevant hypotheses can be grouped into three categories.

a. The Components of Images

1. Decision-makers of developing states will perceive their own subordinate system as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security and on the general range of political-diplomatic foreign policy issues.[40]

2. Decision-makers of middle powers will perceive the pressure exerted by interest groups; the pressures of competing

40. Brecher, Steinberg and Stein, op. cit.

elites will be of extremely low salience.[41]

3. Decision-makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced by their own political structures and other subordinate systems.[42]

4. Decision-makers of middle powers will have a much sharper perception of the external environment than of their internal environment.[43]

b. The Intensity of Images

1. There is a positive relationship between cognitive dissonance, extremity of attitude and intensity.[44]

2. The flexibility of an image is an inverse function of the level of intensity. Images that are intense, well-organized and highly inter-dependent are the most difficult to change.[45]

3. The more hostility a state perceives, the more hostility a state will express. This hypothesis has been tested and confirmed.[46]

4. If State A perceives that it is the object of State B's hostility, then A will express hostility toward B. This hypothesis has been tested and confirmed.[47]

---

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Abelson, op. cit., pp. 343-352.
45. Pruitt, op. cit., pp. 393-452.
46. Zinnes, 'The Expression and Perception of Hostility in the Pre-War Crisis: 1914', in Singer, Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, op. cit., pp. 85-121.
47. Ibid.

5. In both high-involvement and low-involvement situations, perceptions of hostility will tend to be higher than statements of intent. In situations of greater intensity, perceptions of hostility intervene significantly to escalate the level of violence.[48]

The asymmetry between perceptions of hostility and demands for change in the status quo will only be meaningful in situations of low intensity; in situations of high intensity the probability of violence will increase as do the perceptions of hostility.

6. Non-aligned states will evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms. They will perceive the actions of both groups in similar terms.[49]

c. The Association Structure of Images

1. The more supporting and inter-dependent the elements of an image are, the less flexible the image.[50]

In summary, the research objectives of this study are two-fold: to analyse the content and structure of the images of decision-makers and to generate hypotheses about elite images and foreign policy choices; and secondly, wherever possible, to test hypotheses which have emerged from the recent literature of image studies.

---

48. Holsti, North and Brody, 'Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis', in Singer, Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, op. cit., pp. 123-158.
49. Choukri, op. cit.
50. Pruitt, op. cit., pp. 393-452.

In Part Two we shall analyse the images of Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon; in the concluding chapter we shall systematically compare their differences and similarities. In Part Three we shall re-examine some of the conceptual and methodological assumptions in the light of the empirical data.

*

Part Two

The Images of Select Indian Decision-Makers
A Content Analysis

"When we conceive the same things differently we can hardly avoid different naming of them. For though the nature of that which we conceive be the same, yet the diversity of our reception of it, in respect of different contributions of body and prejudices of opinion, gives everything a tincture of our different passions. And, therefore, in reasoning a man must take heed of words; which besides the significance of what we imagine their nature, have significance also of the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker."

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 1651.

Everyman's Library, J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1928, pp. 17 - 18.

Chapter V

Jawaharlal Nehru's Foreign Policy Image

a. Introduction [1]

Jawaharlal Nehru was born on November 14, 1889 in the city of Allahabad. His father, a member of the Kashmiri Brahman community, one of the most aristocratic sub-castes in the Hindu social system, was a distinguished and wealthy barrister who practised law at the High Court of Allahabad. Until Jawaharlal was three his family lived in the heart of the city's commercial centre. As his father's practice grew, they moved to the exclusive residential area known as the 'Civil Lines', in which only one other Indian family lived. When Jawaharlal was ten, his father bought a palatial home, which became the cultural and social centre of the district. At home the atmosphere was more European than Indian.

As an only son, and the only child for eleven years, Jawaharlal was the focus of concentrated attention and affection.

---

1. It is unnecessary to delineate any but the broad outlines of the life of Jawaharlal Nehru. His own writings, especially Glimpses of World History (Allahabad, 1936), Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (New York, 1941), and The Discovery of India (Calcutta, 1946) provide a rich source of Nehru's thinking and development. The biography of Nehru by Michael Brecher interpreted and analysed the political context of Nehru's life and assessed the political implications of Nehru's career. Our purposes are more limited: to extract those elements of Nehru's life which shaped the content of his attitudinal prism.

He was educated at home until the age of fifteen by a succession of English tutors. Only one, Ferdinand T. Brooks, had any significant impact and he was a devout follower of theosophy. This was Nehru's first introduction to the theosophic movement, but he was only ten at the time, and it had no lasting effect.

Jawaharlal grew up amidst lavish comfort and affection. The security of his environment and the dominance of his father's personality together created an atmosphere of overwhelming paternalism. "There was no inducement to make decisions, for his father provided the symbol and substance of security. Doubt and vacillation date from this early association with his father. So, too.... does his respect for decisive and strong men....Thus too, the duality in his later years, of lucid thought along with constant doubt about the appropriate course of action".[2]

When he was fifteen Nehru went to Harrow in England. In the autumn of 1907 he enrolled in Trinity College at Cambridge. His formal studies were in the natural sciences -- chemistry, geology and botany -- but he read widely in literature, philosophy, economics, politics, history and Greek poetry. In the summer of 1910 Jawaharlal took his degree with second class honours in the natural science tripos. In the autumn of that year he read for the Bar at the Inner Temple in London and was called to the Bar in 1912. With his formal education completed, Nehru returned to

2. Michael Brecher, Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London, 1959, p. 41.

India after seven formative years in England.

The legacy of these years alienated Nehru from his own society, "a queer mixture of the East and the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere".[3] The exclusive schools that Nehru attended reinforced his own aristocratic Brahman background: "....I returned from England after a long stay there....I had imbibed most of the prejudices of Harrow and Cambridge and in my likes and dislikes I was perhaps more an Englishman than an Indian. I looked upon the world almost from an Englishman's standpoint.... as much prejudiced in favour of England and the English as it was possible to be...."[4] Nehru's education also strengthened the secular atmosphere of his early upbringing. At this time, too, the literature of science became his favourite reading: this was later to give his socialist philosophy a scientific underpinning. Nehru returned to India without any strongly developed political philosophy; events in India were to forge his political education.

Nehru began to practise law in Allahabad soon after he returned from England. He remained a junior in his father's firm for eight years, rarely pleading a case on his own, and not distinguishing himself in the profession. At the end of 1912 he attended for the first time an annual Session of the Congress Party, and in 1913 he joined the United Provinces Congress but

---

3. Jawaharlal Nehru, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru, op. cit., p. 353.

4. R. Dwivedi, The Life and Speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Allahabad, 1930, pp. 4-5, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 50.

remained inactive; two years later he served as secretary for a fund drive for Indians in South Africa. These activities were, however, largely peripheral in Jawaharlal's life, and this period was one of placidity.

Nehru was first stirred by the imprisonment of Mrs. Annie Besant in the summer of 1917. She had become an intimate friend of the Nehru family, and as the leading theosophist, she had exerted considerable influence on the young Nehru, and encouraged him to become joint secretary of the Allahabad branch of the Home Rule League. The previous summer Jawaharlal had married Kamala Kaul, the young daughter of a prosperous Kashmiri Brahman businessman.

Then Nehru met the Mahatma. Immediately, he came under the influence of Gandhi's magnetic personality. The Mahatma's personal influence was remarkable: Jawaharlal gave up smoking for five years and became a vegetarian. He began re-reading the Hindu classics and his faith in the importance of means dates from this period, as does his emphasis on the moral implications of politics. "In the broadest sense, Nehru's life was simplified and spiritualized".[5]

Both father and son began to participate actively in the Congress movement, and this further strengthened the already strong bonds between them. Throughout the first civil disobe-

5. Brecher, op.cit., p. 76.

dience campaign (1920-22) Jawaharlal was General Secretary of the United Provinces Provincial Congress Committee. Both Nehrus were arrested in the first round-up of prominent Congressmen and were sentenced to six months imprisonment. This was the first of nine times that Jawaharlal was imprisoned by the British.

Nehru was released from Lucknow District Jail in March 1922 after only three months of imprisonment. He returned to Allahabad where he participated in the boycott of foreign cloth; he was arrested again, given an eighteen month sentence, and finally released in January 1923. During this period Jawaharlal had strengthened his ties to both his father and to Gandhi and had become a full participant in the struggle for independence.

In 1924 Nehru was appointed General Secretary of the Congress. The previous autumn he had been elected Chairman of the Allahabad Municipality, a post which he held for three years. Here Nehru had his first direct experience with administration and with local government. In the next two years he was also to see the outbreak of widespread communal violence in India. This crystallized his aversion to orthodox religion and underlined his commitment to a secular state.

In 1926, after the health of Nehru's wife had deteriorated, he took her to Europe. Most of his time was spent in Geneva, where his wife was recuperating, but he managed to visit France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, the Soviet Union and England. The

highlight of his trip was an anti-imperialist conference in Brussels in February 1927. It was there that he first came into contact with communists, socialists and radical nationalists from Asia and Africa. Here for the first time the goals of national independence and social reform became inextricably linked in Nehru's thinking. Here too the possibility of Afro-Asian co-operation was first conceived. This was a turning-point in the development of Nehru's thought, for socialism and nationalism became compatible within the framework of Afro-Asian co-operation.

Nehru was elected to the presidium of the conference and later served on the nine-man Executive Committee of the newly-formed League against Imperialism. The most striking feature of Nehru's role at Brussels was his attraction to communism, an attraction which almost immediately was qualified. He was emotionally attached to the humanist goals of Marxism but he was emotionally repelled by the repressive and totalitarian methods of Communism. Gandhi's stress on the morality of means permitted Nehru to accept the goals and reject the methods of Communism.

In 1929 the League circulated criticisms of Gandhi for 'reformism' and 'betrayal of the workers and the peasants', and Nehru was condemned for his deviationism. Nehru was enraged by the criticisms of Gandhi and he severed all connections with the League. This experience confirmed Jawaharlal's dichotomous attitude toward communism.

On his return to India Nehru plunged fully into Congress activities. At the end of 1927 he moved a resolution demanding complete self-rule for India. In 1928 he presided over five provincial party conferences and was elected president of the All-India Trades Union Congress. Whenever he spoke he emphasized that the twin goals of the nationalist movement must be independence and socialism: the struggle against British rule must be waged on both the economic and political front; imperialism and capitalism must be defeated in India. But violence was an unacceptable means to that end.

In 1928 the radicals within Congress formed an 'Independence for India League' to press their demands for complete independence. As Secretary of the All-India Council, the younger Nehru was the dominant figure. He opposed his father, who had drafted the 'Nehru Report' which called for Dominion status, and the Mahatma, who disapproved of the radical tone of Nehru's speeches. This was one of many clashes and disagreements between Gandhi and Nehru. The bonds that united them, however, were strong enough to permit sharp disagreements over strategy and tactics within the framework of an enduring friendship. When Congress accepted the goal of complete independence in 1929, the League disappeared.

With Gandhi's support, Nehru was first elected President of the Congress at the 1929 Lahore session. A few months later

he was sentenced to six months imprisonment for violation of the salt law -- the focal point of the second civil disobedience campaign (1930-33). He was released in September but remained at liberty for only eight days. He was re-arrested and sentenced to twenty-eight months. During this fifth term in prison Nehru began a series of letters to his daughter, which were later published as Glimpses of World History (1934). This was the first of three major works to be written in prison which would explore the progress of history and illuminate Nehru's development and thought. He emphasized an optimistic belief in perpetual progress, sociological analysis with a strong infusion of Marxian thought, and the importance of the concept of the great man in historical development. What emerged was a panoramic sweep of historical progress.

It was during this fifth prison term, too, that Motilal Nehru died. His son's respect for and dependence on the Mahatma increased and became almost filial in character.

Early in 1934 Nehru was released from prison. Almost immediately he was reinterned. During a period of almost four years he had been free only six months. It was during this sixth long period of imprisonment, from February 1934 to September 1935, that Nehru wrote his second major work, The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru (1936). From broad historical analysis Nehru turned to introspection and self-discovery and wrote of his own

experiences in India's struggle for freedom. It revealed Nehru to himself and to others, the development of his ideas and the constant search for answers to personal and political questions. During this period Kamala grew worse and was sent to Europe again for treatment. In September 1935 Nehru was released so that he could visit her in a sanitorium in Germany.

Kamala's condition worsened daily. For a very brief period there were signs of improvement, and Nehru decided to visit England for two weeks. It was during this trip that Nehru met V.K. Krishna Menon and the roots of a deep friendship were struck. In February 1936 Kamala died and Nehru returned to Allahabad to plunge once more into the struggle for Indian freedom.

In 1936 he was again elected Congress President, with Gandhi's support. The following two years were spent in Congress activities and in widespread travels throughout India. By the spring of 1938 Nehru again felt the need of a change and early in June he sailed for Europe. In Marseilles he was met by Krishna Menon and together they went to Barcelona to observe the Loyalist war front in Spain. The Spanish Civil War had an enormous impact on Nehru: all the values he cherished were at stake -- democracy, socialism, human dignity, self-determination and individual freedom. Much of his stay in Europe was devoted to pleading the twin causes of anti-fascism and Indian freedom; for Nehru these two objectives were inseparable. After visiting London and

Paris, he returned to India in November 1938.

In August 1939, after an internal party fight over the presidency, Nehru accepted a long-standing invitation to visit China as the delegate of the Indian National Congress. This was not his first trip to an Asian neighbour, for he had visited Burma and Malaya in 1937 and Ceylon in 1939. Nehru intended to spend a month in Nationalist China, but the war intervened to shorten his visit. This was his first discovery of a re-emerging China, which was to leave a profound impression on him. Enthusiastic, he identified the Indian struggle with the profound changes taking place throughout the Asian continent.

In September 1939 war broke out in Europe, and India was declared a belligerent by the Viceroy. With Japan at the gates, Congress proclaimed civil disobedience once more. Nehru was tried for sedition and sentenced to four years of rigorous imprisonment. He was to remain in prison from August 1942 until June 1945, his last and longest imprisonment. Immediately prior to his internment, Gandhi had indicated that he regarded Nehru as his successor in the Indian freedom struggle. As so often in the past, these three years of prison provided leisure for contemplation and writing. From this period emerged the third part of the trilogy, The Discovery of India (1946). In it, Nehru examined his own heritage and explored the cultural, social, philosophical, economic and political history of India. It highlighted Nehru's new

awareness of the specifically Indian influences on his own perceptions and outlook.

All Congress leaders were released in June 1945, when the British expected India to become the principal base of Allied operations in East Asia. Nehru, with the direct intervention of the Mahatma, was again elected Congress President. After prolonged negotiations with the British, an interim government was formed with Nehru as the de facto Prime Minister and Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Nineteen forty-seven was a fateful year in the life of Jawaharlal Nehru. Independence became a reality, and so did the nightmare of partition. And on January 30, 1948 the Mahatma was assassinated.

When Nehru became Prime Minister in 1947 he was a lonely and solitary leader, above group loyalties. Unlike most Congress leaders, Nehru represented no particular region or caste or language group. Unique among his colleagues, his constituency was all of India. He commanded the loyalties of the radicals, the working class, the minorities, the youth, and a large part of the Westernized intelligentsia. He was the outstanding exponent of socialism within Congress and a staunch defender of the secular state. He was an agnostic in a Hindu environment and a firm believer in equal rights for all religious minorities. He alone had both a broad international outlook and a deep interest in foreign policy.

Nehru held many positions of responsibility in both the Government of India and the Congress Party. He was Prime Minister and Foreign Minister from 1947 until his death in 1964. He was also head of the Atomic Energy Commission. From 1950 on, he was Chairman of the Planning Commission, and from 1951 to 1954 he held the post of Congress President as well. He also served continuously on the party's Working Committee, its chief policy-making body. In addition, he held the Defence portfolio in 1953 and the Finance portfolio in 1956 and 1958. Several times Nehru expressed a desire to relinquish his heavy burden of office (1951, 1957, 1958) but he was prevailed upon by the Congress leadership to remain.

In his capacity as Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Nehru travelled extensively -- to America (1949 and 1956), China (1954), Russia (1955), Southeast Asia (1950 and 1955), Great Britain (annually since 1948, usually for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference), and to every country in Europe. He was thus chief policy planner and a roving ambassador.

Nowhere did one man dominate foreign policy as did Nehru in India. "Indeed, Nehru....(was) the philosopher, the architect, the engineer and the voice of his country's policy toward the outside world".[6] He had prepared for this role long before the coming of independence. From the mid-'thirties he was the ack-

---

6. Brecher, op.cit., p. 564.

nowledged Congress spokesman on international affairs. It was he who made the party conscious of world politics during the struggle for independence. Throughout the pre-independence period Nehru dominated and monopolized the policy-making process in international relations. After independence his overlapping occupancy of the prime-ministership and the Ministry of external affairs made his control of Indian foreign policy unique among decision-makers.

Nehru's psychological predispositions, as those of any decision-maker, comprise (a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy, and (b) personality factors, the idiosyncratic qualities of a decision-maker.[7] Both contribute directly and indirectly to the structure and content of a decision-maker's world view.

The societal factors which had the greatest influence on Nehru's thinking and development were India's lengthy experience with British imperialism and her status as a colony. Almost two centuries of foreign rule had produced an instinctive antagonism to any form of Western/white rule over African and Asian/non-white nations. Anti-colonialism dominated his perceptions of the new states of Asia and Africa and of the West European nations.

Closely allied to anti-colonialism was a passionate dislike of any form of racial discrimination. This undoubtedly

7. For an analytical treatment of the 'attitudinal prism' and its relationship to elite images, see pp. 60-6 1 above.

influenced his perception of the United States where the Negro is inferior in status. Another corollary was a deep antipathy to renewed imperialism, whatever its form.

As a reaction against the indignity of the prolonged colonial experience, Nehru stressed the central importance of dignity and independence for the new states. This led logically to a policy of non-alignment with either of the two major power blocs. Non-alignment had the merit of satisfying a deep inner urge for recognition. To achieve dignity in the new states it was necessary to achieve economic development. The strategy of non-alignment enhanced the opportunities for economic assistance and secondarily helped to create a 'climate of peace' which permitted the new states to concentrate their scarce resources on development.

These societal stimuli were strengthened by ideological influences. As a youth Nehru was attracted to classical liberalism with its emphasis on individual rights. At Cambridge he was drawn to Fabian socialism. And on his return to India he was deeply influenced by the Gandhian stress on the purity of means and the moral imperative of non-violence. In his late twenties and early thirties he was attracted to Marxist theory and its promise of a classless society, and to the classical precepts of Hindu philosophy and its emphasis on tolerance. Underlying all these was a passionate devotion to national self-expression and racial equality.

Nehru was influenced by all these ideological strands. Western liberalism expressed itself in his unshakeable commitment to political democracy and individual freedom. Socialism provided the stimulus for the eradication of class differences and the stress on social and economic equality at home and abroad. Gandhism provided the basic approach to morally-sanctioned non-violent change. And nationalism underlay India's claim to national recognition and the right to independence for all colonial peoples. Nehru was "a liberal and a democrat, a socialist and an individualist. Most of all, he....(was) a humanist in the best tradition of East and West. His creed is best defined as democratic socialism and refined and humane materialism".[8]

Nehru's personality is more difficult to define and describe, as are the idiosyncratic traits of any decision-maker. The strong influence of both his father and Gandhi marked his development well into middle-age. It has been suggested that his dependence upon them created a tendency to indecision and inaction. He was a man of great courage and integrity, and his sincerity of purpose and loyalty to his colleagues are frequently attested to. He was explosive in speech yet deliberate in action. His charm and his intellectual tolerance were often observed, as was his self-discipline and his warmth. Perhaps his most defining characteristic was his rejection of absolutes and his scepticism

8. Brecher, op.cit., p. 606.

of all totalistic philosophies. He was "....an aristocrat in love with the masses, a nationalist who represents the culture of a foreigner, an intellectual caught up in the mealstrom of an emotional upheaval".[9] His biographer described him as "Indian by birth, yet Western by education; modern in outlook, yet influenced by the heritage of his native land; a staunch patriot yet a man with international vision; he was the symbol of a new society -- liberal, humanist and equalitarian".[10]

His experiences, his education, his ideology, and his personality all contributed to an integrated and structured view of the world. Let us turn now to a precise examination of the components of his image.

b. Components of the Image

Table I below provides a summary of the number of references to seventeen actors throughout the fourteen Nehru speeches analysed.[11] The last column gives us the total of occurrences for each actor, that is, its cumulative frequency.

---

9. Krishna Kripalani, Gandhi, Tagore and Nehru, Second Edition, Bombay, 1949, p. 73, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 596.

10. Brecher, op.cit., p. 596.

11. Source material for this chapter is taken from Jawaharlal Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, The Government of India, New Delhi, 1961. An effort was made to select material dealing with the same subject matter as that in Chapter VI, so that the results would be comparable. The speeches selected were delivered to a wide variety of audiences. Each unit of analysis contains at least two speeches delivered to different groups. The speeches were coded and the results were then weighted by average length.

Table I

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Actors

Units

Actor	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
India	120	64	110	37	16	47	41	73	10	113	159	93	144	57	1084
United Nations	19	0	39	5	6	14	10	94	31	0	2	31	27	9	287
China	1	0	45	10	5	0	0	0	0	9	99	7	0	0	176
United Kingdom	23	8	5	3	2	46	3	2	3	11	3	3	7	4	123
Pakistan	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	3	10	97	0	113
Egypt	1	0	0	0	1	87	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	95
Soviet Union	6	1	5	3	1	6	37	0	0	0	9	5	0	16	89
United States	10	1	14	6	3	8	1	3	0	7	5	5	7	16	86
France	2	0	0	14	1	34	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	56
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	35	0	3	0	0	39

Table I (continued)

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Actors

Actor	Units														
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
the West	7	2	3	2	9	2	3	0	0	0	1	2	1	1	33
Commonwealth	16	10	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	29
Belgium	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	0	1	0	0	21
Israel	0	0	0	0	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	18
Indonesia	0	0	0	0	5	4	1	0	0	1	1	2	0	0	14
NATO	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	0	0	0	2	13
Burma	3	0	0	0	4	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	11
Ceylon	1	0	0	2	2	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
North Korea	1	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
	215	86	232	83	56	274	108	191	44	182	283	164	283	106	2307

The cumulative frequency column reveals the preponderance of references to India. This is not unexpected since the speeches were delivered by an Indian decision-maker on questions of Indian foreign policy. What is striking, however, is the high level of occurrence of references to the United Nations: it was mentioned in almost every unit, regardless of issue. Indeed, it was the single most salient actor in Nehru's image; no other actor approached its volume of occurrence.

Morton Kaplan [12] has suggested in his model of a loose bi-polar system that non-bloc actors will tend to co-ordinate their national objectives with those of the universal actor -- the United Nations. Nehru frequently referred to the United Nations in his discussion of non-alignment, Korea, the Congo Crisis, and in his evaluation of general trends in world politics. Even in the context of essentially bilateral problems -- Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir, and China -- the United Nations was frequently mentioned. The United Nations was a pervasive component in Nehru's foreign policy image.

China followed the United Nations in frequency of occurrence. It occurred in seven out of fourteen units but more than half of the references were accounted for in the discussion of China itself. It occurred significantly in only one other unit, Korea; occurrences were sparse in the other units. It appears

12. System and Process in International Politics, New York, 1957, especially Chs. 1 & 2.

that Nehru perceived China within a narrowly-circumscribed frame of reference.

The United Kingdom followed China in total number of occurrences. However, it was the only actor mentioned in every one of the fourteen units. It was cited most often in the discussion of non-alignment and the Suez Crisis. It occurred more frequently than either of the two super powers. This frequency does not correspond to Britain's objective capability and influence. The United Kingdom, in short, occupied a prominent position in Nehru's foreign policy images.

Pakistan was the fifth most salient actor. Its occurrence, however, was almost exclusively concentrated within the unit dealing with Partition and Kashmir. It occurred as well in the discussion of world politics and, marginally, in four other units. Like China, then, Pakistan was perceived by Nehru within a narrow context.

The U.A.R. had a high overall level of occurrence but ninety per cent of its references were concentrated in the discussion of Suez. It occurred only marginally in three other units. Israel had a low level of occurrence and was concentrated exclusively within the one unit. This suggests that Nehru had a sharply unequal perception of the two regional participants in the Suez Crisis.

The Soviet Union and the United States followed in total

level of occurrence. There was no sharp discrepancy between their cumulative frequencies. The United States occurred in all but one unit, while the Soviet Union was not mentioned at all in three units: the United States, thus, had a wider pattern of distribution despite a slightly lower volume of occurrence. The Soviet Union occurred significantly in the discussion of Hungary and the Bomb, while the United States occurred most frequently in the discussion of the Bomb and Korea. This suggests that Nehru perceived both the super powers equally, and that they too were an important component of his foreign policy image.

In summary, the high level of occurrence of the United Nations supports Kaplan's suggestion that non-aligned actors will co-ordinate their objectives with those of the United Nations. Second, despite its importance in India's foreign policy, Pakistan was perceived within a very specific and narrow frame of reference. Third, the attention accorded Great Britain suggests that a former colonial power will occupy a disproportionately important position in the perceptions of decision-makers in the new states. Finally, the remarkable similarity in the cumulative frequency of the Soviet Union and the United States conforms to the classic pattern suggested for decision-makers of non-aligned states.

These actors were important in Nehru's foreign policy image, but we must still explore the intensity of his attitudes toward them and the patterns of association in which they were significant.

Table II below indicates the frequency of occurrence of various levels of the international system in the fourteen units, with the last column providing the cumulative frequency.

The pre-eminence of Asia is striking. There were more than twice as many references to the Asian subordinate system than to any other level of the international system. It was mentioned in all but one of the fourteen units, with a heavy concentration of references in the unit dealing with Bandung and a significant number in the discussion of non-alignment, Korea, Indo-China and world politics. The Asian subordinate system impinged on almost every issue and was clearly the most salient level of the international system in Nehru's foreign policy image.

References to the African subordinate system were also widely distributed, though Africa had a much lower cumulative frequency. References to Africa were concentrated in the units dealing with Bandung, the Congo Crisis, and the general discussion of world politics but they occurred in all but four units. Nehru perceived the new nations of Asia and Africa as the most significant arenas of world politics.

The global system followed the two subordinate systems in volume of frequency. It was mentioned less than half as often as the Asian subordinate system. References to the global system were concentrated in two units, Korea and the Suez Crisis. It did not occur significantly, for example, in the discussion of non-alignment, or Bandung. It was clearly less salient than the

Table II

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Levels of the International System

Levels	Units														
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Asia	11	2	20	18	51	8	1	4	2	1	7	17	0	2	144
Africa	5	1	0	0	22	4	1	13	4	1	0	15	0	1	67
Global	1	0	18	4	0	13	2	5	3	0	7	3	0	0	56
Bilateral	1	4	10	2	2	3	0	0	0	1	10	0	9	0	42
Dominant-Bilateral	1	0	6	2	0	5	7	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	22
Arabs-Middle East	1	0	0	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	10
Latin America	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
	20	7	58	26	76	38	11	22	9	3	24	39	9	3	345

African and/or Asian systems.

The bilateral level of interaction had a relatively low frequency of occurrence. It occurred significantly only in the Korean Crisis and in the units dealing with China and Pakistan. It occurred only marginally in six other units and not at all in the remaining five. Nehru perceived the foreign policy challenges of his near-neighbours primarily on a bilateral level; all other issues are either global or sub-systemic.

The under-representation of the dominant-bilateral level is striking. It had the lowest level of occurrence of all the major levels of the international system and did not really occur significantly in any unit. It did not occur at all in half of the units. Clearly, Nehru did not perceive the super powers primarily within the bilateral context. We noted earlier that neither of the two super powers were among the most salient actors in Nehru's foreign policy image. This helps to explain the low frequency of the dominant-bilateral level. It also suggests that the super powers were perceived primarily within the context of the global system; that is, their relations with each other.

Finally, we notice the low level of occurrence of the Middle East, European and Latin American subordinate systems. It is especially surprising that Nehru should have paid so little attention to the Arab-Middle East which was perceived almost exclusively within the framework of the Suez Crisis and was not

discussed within the context of the United Nations. Only marginal mention was made of the Arabs in the discussion of non-alignment and contemporary trends in world politics. This is unexpected, given the close personal relations between Nehru and Nasser.

The Latin American subordinate system was virtually non-existent in Nehru's foreign policy image. It was mentioned only briefly in the discussion of Korea and not at all in the units dealing with the United Nations or world politics. It had the most limited pattern of distribution. This is surprising given the prominent role played by Latin American states in the United Nations. Europe was equally marginal in Nehru's image; it was mentioned only within the context of the Commonwealth.

The Asian subordinate system was the most salient level of the international system in Nehru's foreign policy image. The high cumulative frequency of Africa complemented that of Asia to produce an overwhelming emphasis on the subordinate system level. Subordinate systems were referred to four times as often as the global level of the international system, and ten times as often as the dominant-bilateral level. Nehru emphasized the regional implications of global crises.

Table III below indicates the frequency of occurrence of components of the domestic environment in the fourteen units, with the last column providing the cumulative frequency.

Table III

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Domestic Variables

Units

Domestic Variables	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Competing elites	8	2	5	0	0	0	2	0	1	14	7	3	2	3	47
Non-associational Pressure Groups	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	0	0	0	10
Public Opinion	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	1	0	5
Incumbent Elite	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
	9	3	10	0	0	0	2	0	1	19	11	3	3	3	64

The sharply disproportionate frequency of occurrence of competing elites is immediately apparent. It occurred in ten of the fourteen units, more than four times as often as any other domestic variable. The heaviest concentration was found in the units dealing with Goa, non-alignment and China. Nehru clearly perceived the pressures of competing elites in connection with the majority of foreign policy issues. This disproportionate perception of the demands of competing elites may be partially due to Nehru's prolonged experience as Prime Minister with the opposition parties, and his frequently expressed concern to make parliamentary democracy a reality in Indian political life.

Non-associational interest groups had a much lower level of occurrence and their pattern of distribution was very limited: they occurred only in the units dealing with Korea, Goa and China. Two of these foreign policy issues are of immediate concern to the Indian public at large. Its cumulative frequency was so low, however, that it appears that Nehru did not perceive non-associational interest groups as significant constraints on, or inducements to foreign policy action.

Two other domestic components -- public opinion and the incumbent elite, defined here as the Congress Party -- occurred only marginally. Public opinion occurred in the discussion of Goa and China, and mention of the incumbent elite was made in the units dealing with non-alignment and China. Their cumulative

frequency, however, was very low; therefore, they can be considered insignificant.

Institutional interest groups and associational interest groups did not occur at all in any of the fourteen units. The Prime Minister did not appear to attach any importance to the demands and pressures of these two types of interest groups.

The hypothesis that "decision-makers of middle powers will perceive the pressure exerted by interest groups; the pressures of competing elites will be marginal" (Brecher, et al.), is clearly not confirmed by the Nehru data. Competing elites emerged as the most salient domestic pressure. If we sum the frequencies of the occurrences of the three types of pressure groups, their total volume of occurrence is less than one-quarter of that of competing elites. The second most important domestic variable is public opinion. The Prime Minister paid almost no attention to the demands of pressure groups on questions of foreign policy.

In Table III we notice that references to domestic pressures were concentrated in two of the fourteen units. Four types of domestic forces were alluded to in the discussion of Goa and China. Both these issues were of great concern to the Indian public -- they involved India's near neighbours. This suggests that domestic pressures become significant in the perceptions of foreign policy decision-makers when issues 'close to home' arise.

Table IV indicates the frequency of occurrence of symbols in the fourteen units, and the last column provides the cumulative frequencies.

The high level of occurrence of the symbol 'war' is immediately apparent. There is a considerable gap between this symbol and all others except 'peace'. Moreover, its distribution was widespread -- it occurred in thirteen of the fourteen units. It was most heavily concentrated in the units dealing with the Commonwealth, trends in world politics, non-alignment, Indo-China and the United Nations but it appeared consistently throughout the speeches. The high occurrence of 'war' is not surprising, given Nehru's ideological perspectives. War was perceived as the greatest threat to India's independence and economic development. It is also the paramount problem of the contemporary global system.

Following in absolute volume of occurrence is the symbol 'peace', the only symbol which occurred throughout the units. Its highest occurrence was in the context of non-alignment, and it was also mentioned frequently in the discussion of Indo-China and the United Nations.

The two symbols of 'war' and 'peace' occurred at a significantly higher level than any other symbol which was coded: they had a paramount position in Nehru's perceptions. This underlines the central importance of problems of war and peace in his foreign policy image.

Table IV

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Symbols

Units

Symbols	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
War	24	33	19	22	2	6	7	6	21	15	15	32	2	0	204
Peace	27	12	10	19	13	13	4	4	16	11	9	11	7	9	165
Independence	4	4	3	5	4	0	1	5	8	7	6	13	2	0	62
Colonialism	7	1	0	5	6	2	1	2	0	2	0	12	0	0	38
Non-Alignment	13	1	9	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	38
'Two blocs'	24	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	0	38
Aggression	1	1	8	1	1	8	1	0	0	1	1	1	9	0	33
Democracy	0	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32
Freedom	0	0	2	4	4	0	7	2	4	5	0	0	0	0	28
Imperialism	11	8	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	22
Nationalism	0	1	0	7	0	0	3	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	13
Communism	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	2	1	2	11
Economic Development	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	9
	112	97	51	70	31	29	27	20	49	41	38	95	21	12	693

'Independence' followed in frequency of occurrence but its level of occurrence was significantly lower than either 'war' or 'peace'. It occurred significantly in the discussion of world politics but its pattern of distribution was wide, occurring in twelve of the fourteen units. This again is not surprising, given the intimate relationship between international peace and national independence.

'Colonialism' follows 'independence', again at a much lower level of occurrence. Its pattern of distribution was much more limited, occurring in nine of the fourteen units, with its heaviest distribution in the discussion of world politics; it was distributed thinly in several other units, and in no unit was it the paramount symbol.

'Non-alignment' occurred at the same level of frequency as 'colonialism' but its pattern of distribution differed markedly. It was heavily concentrated in the discussion of non-alignment, trends in world politics and Korea, but at no time was it the dominant symbol; at all times it was equalled or surpassed by 'peace' and/or 'war'. This suggests that the occurrence of 'non-alignment' is a function of the occurrence of war and peace. Its absence in several major units is surprising, given the heavy emphasis in the literature on non-alignment as the central characteristic of Indian foreign policy.

'Two blocs' occurred at the same level of frequency as 'non-alignment' and had a very similar pattern of distribution. It too was most heavily concentrated in the discussion of non-alignment and world politics. It occurred marginally in two other units and was not mentioned at all in ten of the fourteen units. This pattern of occurrence suggests that some of the current assumptions about Indian foreign policy must be modified. Indian foreign policy is usually characterized as a non-aligned response to a bi-polar world. In fact, both the symbols 'two blocs' and 'non-alignment' occur at only a moderate level and have a very concentrated pattern of distribution.

'Aggression' followed closely in volume of references. It was concentrated in the discussion of Korea, Bandung and Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir and occurred marginally in eight other units. 'Democracy' occurred at the same level and was concentrated exclusively within the discussion of the Commonwealth. Neither of these two symbols seemed to play an important role in the Prime Minister's image formation.

'Freedom' had a lower cumulative frequency but was moderately distributed: it occurred in half the units but was not pre-eminent in any. 'Imperialism' also had a low cumulative frequence with a fairly wide pattern of distribution: it occurred in five units. The low level of occurrence of 'imperialism' is surprising, given Nehru's extensive participation in the prolonged Indian

struggle against British imperialism. This suggests that Nehru no longer perceived imperialism as a fundamental aspect of global politics. He focussed much more heavily on colonialism and the continuing threat of war.

It is worth noting the extremely low salience of the symbol 'economic development'. It had one of the lowest cumulative frequencies of any of the symbols coded in the analysis. This is a major concern for most new states and generally impinges directly on both their domestic and foreign policy. One-third of Nehru's references to 'economic development' were found in the discussion of the Commonwealth; the rest were thinly distributed in five other units. The problem of economic growth clearly did not impinge directly on any major foreign policy issue; it was not a significant component of Nehru's image.

As depicted in Table IV, the highest number of symbolic references were made within the context of non-alignment: eight of the ten most pre-eminent symbols occur, and their cumulative frequency is the highest of any unit. Nehru referred most widely and most frequently to symbols of value-loaded expressions in the context of non-alignment. This suggests that non-alignment had the highest emotive content of all the issues discussed. His discussion of the Bomb, on the other hand, evoked the lowest number of symbolic references: the only symbol which appears is 'war' and its frequency is low. Surprisingly, the issue of the Bomb appears to have the least emotive content.

In the pattern of occurrence of symbols, then, 'war' and 'peace' clearly predominated, followed by 'independence'. 'Colonialism', 'non-alignment' and 'two blocs' had significantly lower cumulative frequencies. 'Aggression', 'democracy', 'freedom' and 'imperialism' had lower cumulative frequencies and generally narrower patterns of distribution. These are the ten most salient symbols in Nehru's foreign policy image.

Table V deals with the frequencies of occurrence of the eight values.

Noteworthy is the pre-eminence of the deference values: three deference values had higher cumulative frequencies than any welfare value. Affection, the most cited value, was distributed quite evenly throughout the units, with some concentration in the discussion of Bandung. Respect also occurred in twelve of the fourteen units but was concentrated in the unit dealing with non-alignment. Power occurred in all but one unit and was evenly distributed throughout the rest; and rectitude was mentioned in twelve of the fourteen units, with some concentration in the discussion of non-alignment.

The welfare values had much lower levels of occurrence. Enlightenment occurred in all fourteen units but one-fifth of its total frequency was found in the discussion of non-alignment. Skill was mentioned in twelve units and its pattern of distribution was quite even, while well-being occurred in ten units and was also heavily concentrated in the unit which deals with non-

Table V

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Values

Units

Values	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Affection	7	5	3	6	12	3	0	2	3	0	7	6	3	1	58
Respect	12	5	6	2	2	2	0	3	5	0	6	5	1	4	53
Power	5	0	2	1	3	2	9	4	7	6	1	7	1	5	53
Enlightenment	11	6	4	4	2	3	2	1	1	3	5	5	1	3	51
Rectitude	10	6	6	2	3	2	0	0	6	3	2	3	5	2	50
Skill	7	4	14	2	2	1	0	0	6	1	2	2	1	3	45
Well-Being	11	9	4	6	1	1	0	0	0	0	2	2	4	2	42
Wealth	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	7
	64	36	42	23	25	14	11	10	28	13	25	32	16	20	359

alignment.

The low cumulative frequency of wealth is particularly striking. It was mentioned only one-sixth as frequently as well-being, the least salient of the other seven values. It did not occur at all in ten units and was mentioned only marginally in the other four. This is entirely consistent with the sparse references to the symbol 'economic development'. Wealth was a low priority value in Nehru's foreign policy image.

Surveying the columns of Table V we notice that the largest number of value references, constituting almost one-sixth of the total, were concentrated in the discussion of non-alignment. Of the value references within that unit, almost two-thirds are deference values. Value references also occurred heavily in the unit dealing with Korea; here welfare values were preponderant. There was also a high number of value references in the discussion of the Commonwealth and contemporary trends in world politics. In the former welfare values predominated and in the latter the deference values were more significant.

Deference values clearly were more significant in Nehru's image: the four most salient values were all deference values. However, when analysing the four units in which values occurred most heavily we find that the welfare values were more significant in two of them -- Korea and the Commonwealth. In almost all other units the deference values were more significant.

Table VI deals with the frequency of issues, in which actors, levels of interaction, domestic pressures, symbols and values are mentioned. Though the units themselves are organized around issues it is useful to explore the salience of particular issues throughout the interviews. Here the pattern of distribution will be particularly important.

The three issues with the highest cumulative frequency -- the Congo, Hungary and Goa -- were all heavily concentrated within their own units. The Congo Crisis occurred only marginally in the discussion of world politics, while Hungary was mentioned sparsely in connection with the Suez Crisis and the United Nations; Goa was also mentioned in the context of the United Nations. None of these three issues occurred significantly in other units. Tibet, which also had a high cumulative frequency, was mentioned solely within the unit dealing with China.

Indo-China, which had a moderately high cumulative frequency, had a wider pattern of distribution. References to it were heavily concentrated but it was mentioned in five other units. Of all the salient issues it had the widest pattern of distribution. Korea and Kashmir, two other issues with moderately high cumulative frequencies, were also heavily concentrated within their respective units. The issue of atomic weapons, which had a relatively low cumulative frequency, had a fairly wide pattern of distribution; it occurred in six of the fourteen units. The cold war, which

Table VI

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Issues

Units

Issues	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Congo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77	1	0	0	11	0	0	89
Hungary	0	0	0	0	0	4	58	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	65
Goa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	51	0	7	0	0	58
Tibet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	53	0	0	0	53
Indo-China	0	0	1	39	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	3	0	1	47
Kashmir	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	41	0	44
Korea	1	0	36	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	40
Bomb	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	38	38
Cold War	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	12	1	4	4	0	3	28
Atomic Weapons	2	0	9	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	7	0	3	23
Suez	0	0	0	0	0	19	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	23
Racial Discrimination	0	1	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	9
	6	1	46	41	7	23	58	77	21	54	57	39	41	46	517

also had a relatively low cumulative frequency, had an even wider pattern of distribution; it occurred in seven of the fourteen units.

Table VI illustrates that the unit dealing with world politics has the highest number of references to other issues; this is not surprising. Generally speaking, this table demonstrates a very low level of inter-relationship between foreign policy issues; only three issues -- Indo-China, the cold war and atomic weapons -- were moderately well-distributed throughout the units. The mention of one foreign policy issue did not tend to produce associations with other issues. This suggests that the dynamics of the association structure within Nehru's foreign policy image did not depend on the issues of foreign policy.

Table VII sets out the frequencies of occurrence of strategies to be used by India in the international system.

Two strategies predominated -- disarmament and negotiation. Disarmament had a high cumulative frequency and it occurred in five of the fourteen units. It was most often mentioned in the discussion of the Bomb and trends in world politics but it also occurred significantly in the unit dealing with the United Nations. Negotiation also had a high level of occurrence and a very wide pattern of distribution: it was mentioned in eight of the fourteen units. It occurred most heavily in the discussion of Indo-China and the Suez Crisis.

Table VII

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Strategies

Strategies	Units														
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Disarmament	0	0	0	0	4	0	2	0	10	0	0	15	0	14	45
Negotiation	0	0	16	4	0	11	0	0	1	2	4	1	2	0	41
Non-Alignment	13	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	7	5	0	0	29
Dialogue	0	0	7	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	16
Mediation	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	7
Recognition	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	2	2	0	0	7
	13	4	28	5	5	12	3	1	11	3	20	23	3	14	145

Non-alignment and dialogue both occurred at moderate levels. Non-alignment was concentrated in the unit of that name but it is mentioned in seven of the fifteen units. Dialogue occurred in four units but it was heavily concentrated in the discussion of Korea and China. Mediation and recognition both had low cumulative frequencies and were thinly distributed in three and four units, respectively.

In Table VII, we find that only in the discussions of Korea, China and world politics are three or more strategies mentioned. These three units together account for almost fifty per cent of all references to strategies. In units dealing with Hungary, the Congo and Pakistan the total number of references to strategies is three.

References to strategies, notably disarmament, negotiation and non-alignment were thus heavily concentrated within three units. They were neither frequent nor widely distributed; they were of strikingly low salience.

We can now return to the four hypotheses dealing with the components of image that emerged from the foreign policy literature.[13]

1. "Decision-makers of developing states will

---

13. See pp.150-51 above.

perceive their own subordinate systems as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security and on the general range of political-diplomatic foreign policy issues" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is confirmed. Perceptions of the Asian subordinate system were paramount in Nehru's foreign policy images, and most foreign policy issues were perceived within the 'Asian' context.

2. "Decision-makers of middle powers will perceive the pressures exerted by interest groups; the pressures of competing elites will be of extremely low salience" (Brecher et al.). The Nehru data negates this hypothesis. Nehru was almost impervious to the advocacy of interest groups yet he displayed sharp perception of the pressures exerted by competing elites.

3. "Decision-makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced by their own political structures and other subordinate systems" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Certainly, Nehru was not influenced directly by his political structure, but it can be suggested that his acute awareness of competing elites is indirectly related to a structural feature, a parliamentary democratic regime. However, he displayed little awareness of any other

structural factors and not much more of any political group except competing elites. Second, the Prime Minister displayed sharp perception of the African subordinate system: it was more salient than any other level of the international system except the Asian subordinate system. The perception of the African subordinate system cannot be termed marginal.

4. "Decision-makers of middle powers will have a much sharper perception of the external environment than of their internal environment" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is confirmed. We have noted the low salience of the symbol 'economic development', and the minimal perception of domestic political forces.

We have thus far examined the incidence of attention of Jawaharlal Nehru to components and sub-components within his image. We must now examine the kind of attention he accorded them.

c. Intensity of the Image

In order to measure the intensity of Nehru's attitudes we selected the following four variables: expressions of hostility -- "I doubt if there is any country in the world which cares less for peace than China today";[14] friendship --

14. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 370.

"We intend co-operating fully with the United States of America";[15] change of status quo -- "Let us by all means put an end to what remains of colonialism....";[16] and satisfaction -- "We have....avoided foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other".[17]

We shall look first at absolute levels of occurrence, then at the actors, symbols and targets involved in all four variables, and finally at patterns of intensity.

Figure 4 provides a graphical representation of the absolute levels of occurrence of the variables of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo through each of the fourteen units of analysis.

Immediately apparent is the very high incidence of hostility statements relative to the other three variables. One hundred and forty-one (141) hostility statements were discovered, while there were only seventy-five (75) statements of friendship, sixty-six (66) statements of satisfaction, and twenty-four (24) statements demanding a change in the status quo. Hostility was clearly predominant in the Prime Minister's

---

15. Ibid., p. 28.

16. Ibid., p. 57.

17. Ibid., p. 25.

Figure 4

Nehru

Occurrence of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



foreign policy image. In eleven of the fourteen units hostility occurs more frequently than any other variable. Only in the discussions of Indo-China, the United Nations and the Bomb is hostility exceeded by other variables. At all other times the distance between hostility and any one of the three remaining variables is as great as the combined distance among the three variables. Especially striking is the high incidence of hostility in the units dealing with non-alignment, the Korean Crisis, Suez and Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Friendship, occurring at approximately the same level as satisfaction, shows significant deviation from the graph of satisfaction. Statements of friendship occur predominantly in the units dealing with Korea and the Geneva Conference on Indo-China; statements of satisfaction are most heavily concentrated in the units dealing with non-alignment and Korea.

The total number of statements concerned with a change in the status quo is extremely low -- hostility statements occur six times more frequently than do demands for a change in the status quo. The distance between the graphical lines representing these two variables is the greatest between any two variables; only once do they cluster together, in the

discussion of the United Nations, and here at a very low level. Hostility, the dominant variable, appears to be diffuse and is not translated into precise demands for change.

The four variables cluster together in only one unit, the United Nations. In all others, change of status quo is significantly lower than the other variables; the only exception is the discussion of the Bomb, where all variables occur at low levels. The general pattern, then,is the pre-eminence of hostility, with friendship and satisfaction occurring at lower levels with some significant differences in their patterns of occurrence, and change of status quo statements occurring almost marginally.

Before interpreting the results of this analysis, it is useful to break down further the absolute levels of occurrence into the frequency of statements of high, moderate and low intensity. The distinction among three levels of intensity is important because it provides a key to qualitative differences in probable behaviour. Thus, a concentration of high intensity statements of hostility and change of status quo would suggest a high probability of violence in foreign policy acts. A clustering of low intensity statements by contrast would imply the probability of non-violent change.

Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of statements of high intensity.

There are several changes from the general pattern of intensity occurrence. The most intense statements of hostility are found in the discussions of non-alignment, Bandung and Suez. By contrast, the unit dealing with Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir, which has a cumulatively high total of hostility, has significantly less intensely high hostility. We note too that the discussion of the Korean Crisis contains significantly less intensely high hostility. The unit dealing with the Commonwealth, which had a moderate cumulative frequency of hostility, has a relatively high frequency of intense hostility. In the four units in which high intensity hostility is concentrated none of the other three variables occur significantly at high intensity levels. This supports the conclusion we drew earlier, that hostility is not focussed.

In the discussion of non-alignment, where the most intensely hostile statements occur, the United Kingdom was the dominant actor, and 'peace' was the pre-eminent symbol. In the unit dealing with Suez, Egypt and the United Kingdom were the dominant actors, and 'aggression' and 'war' were the pre-eminent symbols. In the discussion of the Commonwealth

Figure 5

Nehru

Occurrence of high intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



the United Kingdom was the dominant actor and 'war' was the pre-eminent symbol. And in the unit dealing with Bandung, the United Nations and China were the dominant actors and 'peace' was the pre-eminent symbol. In three of the four units, then, the United Kingdom was the dominant actor, and in all four units 'war' or 'peace' were the pre-eminent symbols. It seems clear that the war-peace continuum was the basic dynamic underlying hostility in Nehru's foreign policy image and that the United Kingdom was a focal point of hostility.

There are very few highly intense demands for a change in the status quo. They occur most significantly in the discussion of the Bomb but even there the cumulative level is very low. The marginal occurrence of high intensity demands for change underscores the low probability of violence in foreign policy responses. There is one significant deviation from the general graph of variables: despite the high cumulative occurrence of statements demanding a change in the status quo in the discussion of the United Nations; there are virtually no high intensity demands for change. Change directed at the United Nations will probably be of a moderate nature.

Intense statements of friendship are made in the dis-

cussion of non-alignment and Korea. Intense statements of satisfaction occur only in the discussion of Bandung. In none of these units is the frequency of high intensity statements very great. When we compare these findings with Figure 4, we notice that the high occurrence of friendship statements regarding non-alignment and Korea is paralleled by the high intensity of occurrence of friendship in these units. On the other hand, the high cumulative occurrence of satisfaction statements is not paralleled by the occurrence of high intensity satisfaction statements in the discussion of Korea. This satisfaction variable is a function of moderate or low intensity.

Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of statements of moderate intensity. The highest incidence of moderate hostility statements occurs in the units dealing with non-alignment, Korea, China and Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir. In the discussion of non-alignment, then, the high cumulative occurrence of hostility is a function of both high and moderate hostility. This underlines the central position of the symbol, 'peace', and the actor, England, in the hostility dimension of Nehru's image. Non-alignment is the only unit which contains both high and moderate hostility.

The discussion of Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir,

Figure 6

Nehru

Occurrence of moderate intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo

Units



which had a cumulatively high incidence of hostility, has a high level of moderate hostility. It appears that occurrence of hostility here is largely a function of moderate rather than high hostility. Pakistan is the dominant actor in this unit, and 'aggression' the most important symbol.

The same findings apply to the discussions of Korea and China. In both cases the cumulative incidence of hostility is a function of moderate rather than high intensity hostility. In both these units China is the pre-eminent actor, and 'war' is the dominant symbol. It appears that China was the object of moderate hostility.

In none of these three issues do the hostility and change of status quo variables cluster closely together. Since hostility is moderate, and there is almost no incidence of either high or moderate intensity change of status quo demands, the probability of violent behaviour in these areas is very low.

Only in the discussion of non-alignment is there a high occurrence of moderate intensity friendship statements. Moderate intensity satisfaction statements occur in the units dealing with non-alignment and the Commonwealth. The cumulative incidence of both friendship and satisfaction statements in

non-alignment is a function of moderate intensity statements. The presence of all three variables -- hostility, satisfaction and friendship -- at moderate levels in the discussion of non-alignment underscores the multi-dimensional attitudes Nehru has toward the policy of non-alignment.

Only in the discussion of the United Nations do we find moderate demands for a change in the status quo. The cumulative incidence is a function of moderate statements, underscoring the benign nature of the changes which Nehru would demand of the United Nations. It is interesting to note that nowhere else do moderate demands for a change in the status quo occur. Generally speaking, the Prime Minister never expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo in moderate terms; the vast proportion of these statements were highly intense.

Figure 7 presents the graphical representation of expressions of low intensity for all variables throughout the fourteen units.

The marginal occurrence of low intensity statements is striking: nowhere is there a high level of low intensity statements dealing with change of the status quo. This confirms the observation that the Prime Minister articulated demands

Figure 7

Nehru

Occurrence of low intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



for change at a high level of intensity. Statements of satisfaction occur in the units dealing with non-alignment and Korea: the cumulative incidence in both is a function of moderate and low intensity statements. Low intensity hostility occurs only in the unit dealing with Korea; however, its volume is not sufficiently high to outweigh the moderate intensity statements.

Having looked in detail at the three intensity levels of each of the variables in all fourteen units we can now return to the overall picture presented in Figure 4 and make more meaningful statements about the composite levels of intensity of each of the variables.

In Figure 4 we noticed that hostility occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Non-Alignment	the results of high and moderate intensity statements
Korea	the results of moderate and low intensity statements
Suez	the result of high intensity statements
Pakistan and Kashmir	the result of moderate intensity statements
China	the result of moderate intensity statements

From this compendium one can deduce the following probabilities of extremism in policy choices: high probability in issues related to non-alignment and such crises as Suez; moderation in response to Pakistan and China; and great moderation in such issues as Korea.

Statements of friendship occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Korea	the result of high intensity statements
Non-Alignment	the results of statements of high and moderate intensity

This suggests that India will identify very closely with its policies on non-alignment and on Korea.

Statements of satisfaction occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Non-Alignment	the results of statements of moderate and low intensity
Korea	the results of statements of moderate and low intensity

Finally, statements concerning a change in the status quo occurred most often in the units dealing with:

the United Nations	the result of moderate intensity statements
the Bomb	the result of statements of high intensity.

The evidence drawn from satisfaction and change of status quo statements suggests that India will not attempt to revise her policies on non-alignment or Korea but that there is great likelihood that she would try to alter the existing level of disarmament, and a moderate likelihood that India would try to change the United Nations.

Non-alignment is the only issue in which hostility, friendship and satisfaction all occur at high and moderate levels. It was in the context of non-alignment that the highest number of symbolic and value references occurred as well. This suggests that it is the central policy issue within Nehru's foreign policy image.

Now that we have measured the level of intensity of expression we must modify the importance of absolute levels of occurrence. What is important for the prediction of foreign policy behaviour is not only the volume of expression, but the intensity as well. It remains to explore briefly the actors and symbols involved in statements of hostility, friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo. This will enable us to give added depth to our preliminary suggestions of salience based purely on frequency of occurrence.

In order to obtain the necessary data we subjected all

the statements of the four variables to analysis. For each statement we listed the main agent or actor of the statement, the symbol around which the statement revolved, and the target of the statement.

Table VIII provides the frequency of occurrence of actors, symbols and targets in high, moderate and low intensity hostility statements.

Britain is the actor most often mentioned in the Prime Minister's hostility statements. References to the United Kingdom abound throughout the interviews and a significant proportion of them are hostile: "....(British) threats.... to enforce her views by....use of force is the wrong way";[18] "....British policy was one of expansion....";[19] "The kind of....arguments used by....Britain....were so far from the truth...."[20] and "....obstructions were placed in our way (by Britain)".[21] Britain accounts for more than one-seventh of the hostile statements; she is the principal actor in twenty-one. This explains much of Britain's high frequency of occurrence throughout the units.

---

18. Nehru, op.cit., p. 529.
19. Ibid., p. 322.
20. Ibid., p. 487.
21. Ibid., p. 9.

Table VIII

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Hostility

Subjects	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
India	11	12	2	25
Britain	10	9	2	21
United Nations	8	4	-	12
France	6	4	-	10
the West	8	2	-	10
China	3	6	-	9
United States	2	4	1	7
Pakistan	2	3	1	6
Soviet Union	1	3	1	5
Symbols				
Colonialism	6	-	-	6
Imperialism	3	2	-	5
Aggression	3	2	-	5
Targets				
India	11	11	5	27
Egypt	8	4	-	12
Asia	10	-	-	10
Africa	5	4	-	9
United Nations	3	5	-	8
	100	75	12	187

Table VIII

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Hostility

Subjects	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
India	11	12	2	25
Britain	10	9	2	21
United Nations	8	4	-	12
France	6	4	-	10
the West	8	2	-	10
China	3	6	-	9
United States	2	4	1	7
Pakistan	2	3	1	6
Soviet Union	1	3	1	5
Symbols				
Colonialism	6	-	-	6
Imperialism	3	2	-	5
Aggression	3	2	-	5
Targets				
India	11	11	5	27
Egypt	8	4	-	12
Asia	10	-	-	10
Africa	5	4	-	9
United Nations	3	5	-	8
	100	75	12	187

The United Nations ranks third as the principal actor in hostility statements. The degree of hostility which Nehru expressed toward the United Nations is surprising: "....this structure (the United Nations) was not very fair to Asia....";[22] "(The United Nations)....has gradually become a protector of colonialism in an indirect way";[23] "The United Nations has swerved from its original moorings....";[24] and "....the United Nations has moved away from some of the ideals which led to its creation".[25] Hostility toward the United Nations also accounts for more than one-seventh of all hostility statements and most of this is of high and moderate intensity. This seems to contradict Kaplan's hypothesis that non-aligned nations will co-ordinate their objectives with those of the universal organization.

There is a qualitative gap between the degree of hostility directed at Britain and the United Nations and the hostility directed at other actors. France is the object of considerable hostility but it is concentrated exclusively within the context of the Suez Crisis: "This (France's action)

---

22. Ibid., p. 179.
23. Ibid., p. 64.
24. Ibid., p. 63.
25. Ibid., p. 465.

appeared to be a flagrant case of aggression....".[26] The West figures more prominently in hostile statements which are widely dispersed throughout the units: "The Atlantic Pact....has taken upon itself the defence of the colonial possessions of the nations concerned";[27] "Europe....exploited the rest of the world";[28] "The West....dominated the politics of the world";[29] and, "In the beginning, it (the Bandung Conference) invited ridicule (by the West)....".[30] Both of these are targets of Indian hostility because of their colonial behaviour.

Pakistan and China follow as agents in hostility statements. Again, most of the hostile statements are confined to the discussion of China, and of Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir: "I doubt if there is any country in the world which cares less for peace than China today";[31] "The (Chinese) charges made against India are....fantastic";[32] and "The Chinese have, as I said....a one-track mind....".[33]

---

26. Nehru, op.cit., p. 535.
27. Ibid., p. 64.
28. Ibid., p. 151.
29. Ibid., p. 149.
30. Ibid., p. 279.
31. Ibid., p. 370.
32. Ibid., p. 321.
33. Ibid., p. 367.

Hostility to Pakistan was also sharply focussed: "....the aggressor nation (Pakistan)....rejects and refuses a proposal for a cease-fire...."; [34] "....the way the Pakistani Government has reacted....is so extraordinary as to be hardly credible for a nation"; [35] and, "They (Pakistan) throughout denied that they had actually participated in it (invasion of Kashmir)". [36] However, only a small proportion of the cumulative occurrence of both China and Pakistan is explained by their presence in hostility statements.

Hostility directed at the super powers is marginal. There is no significant difference in the degree of hostility directed toward the United States and the Soviet Union; both are largely the subject of moderate hostility: "....the United States defence aid to Pakistan encourages....conflict between India and Pakistan" [37], or "....big conflicts in Budapest....were ultimately suppressed by the Soviet armed forces." [38] Only a very small proportion of the cumulative occurrence of the super powers is explained by their presence in hostility statements.

---

34. Nehru, op.cit., p. 456.
35. Ibid., p. 452.
36. Ibid., p. 453.
37. Ibid., p. 476.
38. Ibid., p. 557.

It should be noted that India herself is the highest ranking actor in hostility statements. Targets of Indian hostility varied with the issue under discussion: "....we (India) viewed with grave concern and distress the events in Hungary";[39] "We (India)....were shocked when we heard that Chinese armies were marching into Tibet";[40] and "....the proposal that they (the United Nations Commission on India) made was not welcomed by us....".[41] It is interesting that India expressed hostility twenty-five times and perceived herself the target of hostility twenty-seven times -- an almost perfect symmetry.

'Aggression' is the predominant symbol in hostility statements, along with 'colonialism' and 'imperialism'. Other symbols which appear in statements of hostility are 'non-alignment' and 'peace'. It is not surprising that any of these symbols should be associated with feelings of hostility, for all were essential components of Nehru's attitudinal prism.

Finally, we note that Asia, Africa and Egypt appear prominently as victims of hostility; they do not appear as

---

39. Nehru, op.cit., p. 555.
40. Ibid., p. 302.
41. Ibid., p. 455.

principal actors in hostile statements. The United Nations, Britain and China, the three principal actors in hostility statements were also targets of Indian hostility. The almost symmetrical relationship of Nehru's perceived and expressed hostility was noted earlier; this conforms to the earlier hypothesis that the more hostility a state perceives, the more hostility it will express.[42]

Table IX below provides the frequency of occurrence of actors and targets in high, moderate and low intensity friendship statements.

The evidence concerning actors in friendship statements is striking -- India is overwhelmingly dominant. India or Nehru himself account for 65 of the 75 friendship statements. Clearly there is no reciprocal relationship between perception of friendship and expression of friendship.

Britain and the United Nations also occur marginally as actors in friendship statements and as targets of friendship. The United Nations is the pre-eminent target of friendly sentiments. Both these actors also figured prominently in statements of hostility. This suggests an underlying ambivalence in Nehru's image of both these actors. While the Prime Minister

---

42. See p. 151 above.

Table IX

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Friendship

Subjects	High	Moderate	Low	Total
Nehru	27	7	2	36
India	8	20	1	29
United Nations	-	2	1	3
England	-	1	-	1
Symbols				
Respect	8	3	-	11
Affection	3	8	-	11
Peace	1	1	-	2
Targets				
United Nations	3	2	1	6
China	2	3	-	5
United States	-	3	-	3
Soviet Union	1	2	-	3
United Kingdom	2	1	-	3
Asia	1	2	-	3
Egypt	2	-	-	2
Africa	-	1	-	1
	58	56	5	119

sharply criticized the United Nations, he also remarked: "....the United Nations has shown that it can face problems courageously....".[43] Despite Nehru's frequently scathing remarks about Britain, he said: "....since the war years, I have nurtured considerable respect for England...."[44] and"I hope this House has respect for the way England has tackled her problems since the war....".[45] The evidence suggests that both these actors may be the object of some cognitive dissonance.

China also occurs prominently as a target of friendship: "....we (India) have endeavoured....to cultivate the friendship of the Chinese state and people"[46] and "We have every desire to maintain the friendship between India and China."[47] Nehru appears to have held conflicting images of China, hostility because of her violent behaviour and friendship for a fraternal independent Asian state.

The Prime Minister made exactly the same number of friendly references to both the super powers: this supports our earlier observation that Nehru perceived the Soviet Union and the United States equally. It is worth noting, too, that

---

43. Nehru, op.cit., pp. 173-174.
44. Ibid., p. 57.
45. Ibid., p. 57.
46. Ibid., p. 322.
47. Ibid., p. 325.

Egypt is the only specific middle power to appear as the target of friendly statements, suggesting a special relationship between India and Egypt.

Finally, both Asia and Africa appear as the objects of friendship. They are the only regional systems to be singled out with friendly remarks. This underlines the high salience in Nehru's perceptions of these two subordinate systems.

Friendship statements revolved almost exclusively around two of the major deference values, respect and affection, which were used by Nehru as symbols. The only other symbol which occurred is 'peace'. However, the pre-eminence of deference and status considerations in statements of friendship is striking.

Table X lists the subjects, symbols and targets of high, moderate and low intensity statements of satisfaction.

The data reveal, not unexpectedly, that India is the main actor. There is a qualitative gap between the occurrence of India and any other actor. The others are the United Nations, Egypt, the United Kingdom and the Bandung Conference. Nehru often underlined his satisfaction with the "spirit of

Table X

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Satisfaction

	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
Subjects				
India	4	14	9	27
Bandung	2	-	2	4
United Kingdom	1	-	3	4
Egypt	2	-	-	2
United Nations	1	1	-	2
Symbols				
Non-Alignment	2	3	-	5
Respect	3	-	-	3
Independence	-	2	-	2
Peace	1	-	-	1
Targets				
India	3	4	1	8
Commonwealth	1	5	1	7
Asia	2	-	-	2
China	-	1	1	2
Bandung	1	-	-	1
	23	30	17	70

Bandung": "....we have made history here (at Bandung)"[48] and "....(the Bandung Conference) represented the emergence of a new Asia and Africa".[49] He also stressed his satisfaction with the considerable achievements of the United Nations.

The appearance of one national actor in satisfaction statements, the United Kingdom, is surprising. One would have expected the occurrence of Egypt since it was the only middle power to occur in friendship statements. The references to the United Kingdom reflect again Nehru's ambivalent attitude. This is not atypical of leaders in new states who were educated in the former "mother" country.

Sentiments of satisfaction revolve around the three symbols of 'non-alignment', 'independence' and 'peace'. The occurrence of these together confirms the earlier suggestion that Nehru gave great weight to the emergence of new and independent countries which would form an area of peace.

India is the principal target of statements of satisfaction, followed closely by the Commonwealth: "It (the Commonwealth)....is something that encourages and helps peace...."[50] and "....we have survived....(the strains) as a Commonwealth."[51]

48. Nehru, op.cit., p. 272.
49. Ibid., p. 279.
50. Ibid., p. 150.
51. Ibid., p. 159.

Despite his frequently hostile criticisms of England, Nehru was unequivocal in his expressions of satisfaction with the Commonwealth link.

The subordinate system of Asia also appears as an object of satisfaction, as does the Bandung Conference. These two are related directly to the expressions of satisfaction with a newly-emergent, independent and non-aligned 'area of peace'. Finally, China appears very marginally as the object of satisfaction, but expressions of hostility far outweigh expressions of satisfaction.

Table XI presents the occurrence of subjects, symbols and targets of high, moderate and low intensity demands for changes in the status quo.

There is a very small number of actors involved in change of status quo statements, a reflection of the small proportion of demands for change expressed by Nehru throughout the units. As noted earlier, hostility was expressed seven times as frequently as demands for change. In approximately 190 pages of coded material only 24 demands for a change in the status quo emerged.

Almost no demands for change were articulated at a moderate or low level of intensity; virtually all were artic-

Table XI

Nehru

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Change of Status Quo

	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
Subjects				
India	5	1	-	6
Bandung	1	1	-	2
United Nations	1	-	-	1
China	1	-	-	1
Symbols				
Disarmament	4	-	-	4
Colonialism	3	-	-	3
Cold War	2	-	-	2
Targets				
Asia	2	-	-	2
Africa	2	-	-	2
Bandung	-	1	-	1
	21	3		24

ulated at a level of high intensity. This underlines the importance of the few demands for change that the Prime Minister did make.

India heads the list of actors -- and more than 80 per cent of her demands for a change in the status quo are highly intense. Both the United Nations and China appear in statements of satisfaction and in statements dealing with a change in the status quo. This underlines the ambivalence in Nehru's attitude toward both actors. The Prime Minister's dissonant attitude toward the United Nations has already been noted -- the United Nations occurs in statements of hostility, friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo. China is the only other actor to appear in all four attitude statements -- it too is the object of considerable cognitive dissonance.

Bandung appears both as an actor and a target of demands for change. This ambivalence is explained, however,by Nehru's satisfaction with the changes initiated by the Conference and by his strong feeling that this was merely the beginning of a series of changes that would permit the new nations to play their proper role in the international system. This is confirmed by the presence of both the Asian and

African subordinate systems as targets of demands for change.

The symbols which are associated with statements of change of status quo are 'colonialism', 'disarmament' and 'the cold war'. Colonialism appears both in statements of hostility and demands for change of the status quo. There is, therefore, a high probability that policy directed at 'colonialism' will be extreme. Nehru also demanded change in both the existing levels of the 'cold war' and 'disarmament'. Neither of these symbols, however, figures prominently in hostility statements.

We can now make more precise statements about the actors and symbols which had high frequencies.

1. The high cumulative frequency of the United Nations in Table I is explicable by the Prime Minister's ambivalent attitude towards the universal organization. Nehru had great respect for some of its achievements, but his overwhelming perception was hostile -- it is the third-ranking actor in hostility statements. Kaplan's hypothesis is negated -- <u>there is no co-ordination of Indian objectives with those of the United Nations</u>. The source of the cognitive dissonance was Nehru's predisposition to support and approve the actions of the United Nations, along with his inability to do so in many

specific instances, especially Kashmir and Pakistan. This unresolved ambiguity accounted for a significant part of the salience of the United Nations in the Prime Minister's foreign policy image.

2. China is the only other actor present in all four attitude dimensions. It also ranks second after the United Nations in cumulative frequency. There is a much more even balance, however, between hostile statements and statements of friendship and satisfaction. The Prime Minister was not able to reconcile his earlier friendly image of China with his perception of her later behaviour. China, too, was the object of considerable cognitive dissonance.

3. Britain ranks third in cumulative frequency and appears in statements of hostility, friendship and satisfaction. However, she is the object of far greater hostility than either satisfaction or friendship; the latter two are marginal by comparison. Nehru's perception of Britain was a function of his attitudinal prism and was inconsistent.

4. Pakistan ranks fourth in cumulative frequency; it appears marginally in statements of friendship and satisfaction and significantly in statements of hostility. The Prime Minister's image of his near neighbour was overwhelmingly hostile but his hostility was not translated into precise demands for action.

5. Egypt is among the most salient actors; in fact, it is the only middle power which ranks among the most important actors in Nehru's image. Although it is mentioned largely in the discussion of Suez, it does occur almost seven times more often than the other regional middle power, Israel. Egypt occurs both in satisfaction and friendship statements and as a target of hostility. Nehru clearly perceived the United Arab Republic as the victim of hostility and identified with her, but there was no component of action-response in this perception of Egypt.

6. Nehru perceived the two super powers equally -- one of the characteristics of a non-aligned decision-maker. However, their cumulative frequency is not especially high, nor do they figure prominently in statements of hostility or of friendship. The super powers were not among the most salient components of Nehru's foreign policy image.

7. Asia appears along all four attitude dimensions. There was no dissonance in Nehru's perception of the Asian subordinate system, however, for he saw Asia as the target of hostility and suggested that the new nations were only beginning to play their proper international role. The cumulatively high occurrence of the Asian subordinate system is a function

of Nehru's strong identification with the new Asia.

8. 'Colonialism', 'independence', 'peace' and 'non-alignment' are the most important symbols in the intensity statements. It is interesting that these four symbols occur most frequently in attitude statements -- for these are all inter-related within the framework of non-alignment and the role of the new states. This set of symbols was the object of Nehru's most intense emotions and attitudes.

Now that we have measured the level of intensity of expression and the actors and symbols which are the object of intense perceptions, we can compute the functional distance values for each of the four variables with each of the others. Figure 8 provides such a diagrammatic presentation. This diagram can only be properly represented in multi-dimensional space; inevitably there will be distortions in a two-dimensional figure.

Friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo are all closer to each other than to hostility. The peripheral variable is hostility, and the constellation of variables comprises friendship, satisfaction and change of status quo. This is an 'uncritical conflict system', in which there is a low probability of violence. In times of intense crisis,

Figure 8

Nehru

A Map of Functional Distance



Hostility - Change of Status Quo:	1.19
Hostility - Friendship:	.72
Hostility - Satisfaction:	.90
Change of Status Quo - Friendship:	.58
Change of Status Quo - Satisfaction:	.40
Friendship - Satisfaction:	.36

hostility will be more closely positioned to change of status quo. This reinforces the earlier theme that the Prime Minister, though hostile, rarely focussed his hostility on particular demands for change; that is, he did not relate strategies to objectives.

An "index of tension" has been developed to measure the probability of the eruption of conflict and violence. The ratio is that of the satisfaction-change of status quo dimension to that of the hostility-change of status quo dimension. If the quotient is 1.00 a conflict system is functional; that is, it serves to reinforce and maintain the level of tension. If it is above 1.00 the system is in a high state of tension and will tend toward disruptive conflict. In this case the quotient is only .34; Nehru's set of foreign policy images tended in the direction of extremely low tension. Thus he would be extremely unlikely to initiate violent or disruptive foreign policy behaviour. Generally, Nehru's image would produce integrative rather than disruptive foreign policy behaviour.

We can now evaluate the hypotheses dealing with the intensity of images,[52] which we extracted from the foreign policy literature.

---

52. See pp.151-52 above.

1. 'There is a positive relationship between cognitive dissonance, extremity of attitude, and intensity' (Abelson). This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Nehru displayed cognitive dissonance toward three actors -- the United Nations, China and the United Kingdom. The UN ranked third as an actor in hostility statements, in statements of satisfaction and in demands for a change in the status quo. This is a high level of intensity, but Nehru did not display a corresponding extremity of attitude. Rather, the dissonance appears to have produced ambivalence and hesitation. In this case cognitive dissonance relates both to frequent occurrence and to intense expression but not to extreme attitude.

China ranked fourth as an actor in hostility statements, fifth in statements of friendship and satisfaction and third in demands for a change in the status quo. Here cognitive dissonance does not seem positively related to either extremity or intensity. It is related, rather, to the frequency of occurrence.

Finally, Britain ranked first as an actor in hostility statements, second in statements of satisfaction and third in demands for change. This is high intensity, but again, Nehru did not express extreme attitudes toward Britain. Cognitive

dissonance produced rather a balanced and moderate evaluation of Britain's contemporary role in the international system. Here dissonance is related to cumulative frequency and intensity, not to extremity.

The evidence suggests that dissonance is also related to the Prime Minister's attitudinal prism. His ambivalence towards the United Nations arose from his ideological orientations -- his emphasis on anti-colonialism and independence -- and from his disappointment with the UN role in preserving peace in the system -- his second major concern. His ambivalence towards China was also a function of his ideological orientations; his sense of identity with the new China confronted his rejection of her expansionist international behaviour. In short, cognitive dissonance appears to be a function, first, of the decision-maker's attitudinal prism and, second, of the level of intensity.

2. 'The flexibility of an image is an inverse function of the level of intensity' (Pruitt). As noted, the three actors which are the object of the most intense attitudes are also the object of cognitive dissonance. The Prime Minister did change his image of each of these three actors, if only in part. On the other hand, his perception of Pakistan remained hostile. It is impossible, on the basis of this

evidence, to reject or confirm this hypothesis.

3. 'The more hostility a state perceives, the more hostility a state will express' (Zinnes). This had been previously tested in the literature and confirmed. The remarkable symmetry between Nehru's expression and perception of hostility supports the hypothesis.

4. 'If State A perceives that it is the object of State Y's hostility, then A will express hostility toward Y' (Zinnes). This hypothesis was not tested directly and cannot be confirmed or rejected. Nevertheless, the evidence of this study suggests that there is no symmetrical relationship. For example, the Prime Minister often expressed hostility toward Britain but only intermittently did he perceive Britain as hostile to India: often his hostility was due to more general British behaviour in the global or subordinate systems.

5. 'In both high involvement and low involvement situations, perceptions of hostility will tend to be higher than statements of intent. In situations of greater intensity, perceptions of hostility intervene significantly to escalate the level of violence' (Holsti *et al.*). This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. Perceptions of hostility outnumbered statements of intent seven to one. On the other hand, even

where perceptions of hostility were both frequent and intense, it was precisely the paucity of demands for change which indicated that violence was unlikely. Hostility itself, unaccompanied by more specific demands, did not escalate into conflict.

6. 'Non-aligned states will evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms. They will perceive the actions of both groups in similar terms' (Choukri). If we treat the Soviet Union and the United States as representative of their respective blocs, this hypothesis is unhesitatingly confirmed. Both actors occurred with the same overall frequency in the units. Both actors received almost the same number of hostile and friendly references, and neither appeared in statements of satisfaction or demands for change. In this respect, Nehru was a faithful adherent to the tenets of the policy of non-alignment.

We have thus far examined Nehru's <u>incidence</u> of attention to components and sub-components within his image and the <u>kind</u> of attention he accorded them. It remains to explore the <u>association</u> of the components in his image.

d. <u>The Association Structure within Nehru's Image</u>

Nehru's patterns of association were isolated through the use of contingency analysis. Table XII lists all the significant contingencies of each of the major sub-components of the Prime Minister's image.

India is associated significantly with competing elites and with the United Nations, China and the symbol 'independence'. This underlines the extremely important role of opposition parties in the Prime Minister's image and his objective of meaningful parliamentary democracy in India.

The United Nations is not associated significantly with any other sub-component,[53] though it is related at a lower level to the global system, to India and to the value of affection. Nehru associated the universal actor with the global system; this suggests that he emphasized the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations rather than its role in decolonization.

China is strongly associated with the strategy of non-alignment, with the Asian subordinate system, with the symbols 'independence', 'war' and 'aggression', with the issue of Indo-China, and with the value of enlightenment. This pattern of association highlights the dissonance in Nehru's

53. The degree of inter-correlation which we accept as significant is .75.

Table XII

The Contingencies of Components in Nehru's Image

India:	Competing Elites - .75; United Nations - .71; China - .71; and Independence - .70.
United Nations:	Global - .71; India - .71; and Affection - .70.
China:	Non-Alignment - .86; Asia - .86; Independence - .82; War - .80; Aggression - .78; Indo-China - .77; Enlightenment - .75; Skill - .75; and India - .71.
United Kingdom:	United States - .86; Enlightenment - .75; and Competing Elites - .75.
Pakistan:	Aggression - .70.
Soviet Union:	Dominant-Bilateral - .77; Competing Elites - .75; and Enlightenment - .75.
United States:	United Kingdom - .86; and Enlightenment - .75.
Asia:	Skill - .88; China - .86; Non-Alignment - .86; Affection - .82; Rectitude - .80; Negotiation - .80; Aggression - .78; Dominant-Bilateral - .77; and Enlightenment - .75.
Africa:	Power - .82; and Peace - .78.
Global:	Negotiation - .80.
Bilateral:	Affection - .82; and Aggression - .78.
Dominant-Bilateral:	Non-Alignment - .83; Soviet Union - .77; and Asia - .77.

Table XII (continued)

The Contingencies of Components in Nehru's Image

Competing Elites:	Well-being - .82; Aggression - .80; Enlightenment - .78; India - .75; United Kingdom - .75; Soviet Union - .75; and Respect - .75.
War:	Independence - .87; Skill - .82; China - .80; Respect - .80; Non-Alignment - .80; Affection - .78; Imperialism - .77; Peace - .75; Negotiation - .75; Rectitude - .75; Well-being - .75.
Peace:	Non-Alignment - .80; Colonialism - .80; Africa - .78; Affection - .78; Independence - .78; War - .75; and Rectitude - .75.
Independence:	War - .87; Skill - .84; China - .82; Non-Alignment - .82; Affection - .80; Peace - .78; Rectitude - .78; and Aggression - .76.
Two Blocs:	Imperialism - .88.
Non-Alignment:	Dominant-Bilateral - .83.
Colonialism:	Peace - .80.
Aggression:	Affection - .86; Enlightenment - .80; Competing Elites - .80; China - .78; Asia - .78; Bilateral - .78; Non-Alignment - .78; and Independence - .76.
Freedom:	Independence - .70.
Imperialism:	Non-Alignment - .83; Two Blocs - .88; War - .77; Enlightenment - .77; and Well-being - .77.
Affection:	Aggression - .86; Skill - .84; Asia - .82; Bilateral - .82; Independence - .80; War - .78; Peace - .78; Rectitude - .78; Well-being - .78; and Negotiation - .78.

Table XII (continued)

The Contingencies of Components in Nehru's Image

Respect:	Skill - .88; War - .80; Well-being - .80; Enlightenment - .75; and Competing Elites - .75.
Power:	Africa - .82.
Enlightenment:	Well-being - .82; Aggression - .80; Skill - .78; Competing Elites - .78; Imperialism - .77; China - .75; England - .75; U.S.S.R. - .75; U.S.A. - .75; Asia - .75; Respect - .75; and Non-Alignment - .75.
Rectitude:	Asia - .80; Independence - .78; Affection - .78; War - .75; and Peace - .75.
Skill:	Asia - .88; Respect - .88; Independence - .84; Affection - .84; War - .82; Well-being - .82; Enlightenment - .78; China - .75; and Non-Alignment - .75.
Well-being:	Enlightenment - .82; Skill - .82; Competing Elites - .82; Respect - .80; Affection - .78; Imperialism - .77; and War - .75.
Indo-China:	China - .77.
Negotiation:	Global - .80; Asia - .80; Affection - .78; and War - .75.
Non-Alignment:	Aggression - .88; China - .86; Asia - .86; Imperialism - .83; Independence - .82; War - .80; Peace - .80; Enlightenment - .75; and Skill - .75.

Table XII (continued)

The Contingencies of Components in Nehru's Image

Respect:	Skill - .88; War - .80; Well-being - .80; Enlightenment - .75; and Competing Elites - .75.
Power:	Africa - .82.
Enlightenment:	Well-being - .82; Aggression - .80; Skill - .78; Competing Elites - .78; Imperialism - .77; China - .75; England - .75; U.S.S.R. - .75; U.S.A. - .75; Asia - .75; Respect - .75; and Non-Alignment - .75.
Rectitude:	Asia - .80; Independence - .78; Affection - .78; War - .75; and Peace - .75.
Skill:	Asia - .88; Respect - .88; Independence - .84; Affection - .84; War - .82; Well-being - .82; Enlightenment - .78; China - .75; and Non-Alignment - .75.
Well-being:	Enlightenment - .82; Skill - .82; Competing Elites - .82; Respect - .80; Affection - .78; Imperialism - .77; and War - .75.
Indo-China:	China - .77.
Negotiation:	Global - .80; Asia - .80; Affection - .78; and War - .75.
Non-Alignment:	Aggression - .88; China - .86; Asia - .86; Imperialism - .83; Independence - .82; War - .80; Peace - .80; Enlightenment - .75; and Skill - .75.

image of China. It is significantly related to 'independence', a positive symbol, and to 'war' and 'aggression', two negative symbols. The association with enlightenment attests to Nehru's optimistic belief that greater understanding and information could resolve the difficulties between the two Asian states. Finally, Nehru perceived China primarily as an Asian power, for she is significantly related to the Asian subordinate system.

Nehru had no strong associations with Pakistan. It is related only to the symbol 'aggression', but this relationship is not significant. The Prime Minister's image of his near-neighbour was uni-dimensional and uncomplicated; Pakistan is aggressive. It was not integrated into the breadth of his foreign policy images.

One more interesting pattern emerges from this analysis. The United Kingdom is significantly related to the United States, to the value of enlightenment and to competing elites. The United States is closely associated with England and with the value of enlightenment; and the Soviet Union is strongly related to the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, competing elites and the value of enlightenment. All three actors are associated with enlightenment, as was China; this underlines

again the Prime Minister's fundamental optimism in his relations with the big powers. It is surprising, however, that the United Kingdom and the United States should be associated with each other; one would have expected the United States to be closely related to the other super power. Only the Soviet Union is significantly associated with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction. This suggests that the Prime Minister perceived the Soviet Union primarily within the framework of bilateral Indian - Soviet interaction. Moreover, neither of the two super powers are closely related to the symbol 'two blocs'. It appears then, that a highly structured bipolar international system, in which the two super powers with their attendant blocs dominate, was not the most significant component of this non-aligned decision-maker's image. Neither of the two super powers were perceived primarily as leaders of competing blocs.

Nehru associated Asia with the values of skill, affection, rectitude and enlightenment, with China, with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, with the symbol of 'aggression', and with the strategies of non-alignment and negotiation. Of all the levels of the international system

Asia has the highest number of significant associations with other sub-components of Nehru's image; it is both the most salient and the most integrated level of interaction in Nehru's foreign policy image. Both the dominant-bilateral level of interaction and the symbol 'aggression' are strongly related to Asia; he clearly perceived Asia as the arena of super-power penetration and aggression. He also emphasized the relevance of non-alignment and negotiation in the context of such penetration. Finally, the Asian subordinate system has the highest number of value associations; both welfare and deference values permeated Nehru's image of Asia.

Africa, the other subordinate system, is related only to the value of power and the symbol of 'peace'. It is not strongly associated with the Asian subordinate system. Clearly, Nehru distinguished sharply between the two sub-systems and was much more aware of the significance of India's regional setting. The global system is related only to the strategy of negotiation, and the bilateral level of interaction is associated only with the value of affection and the symbol of 'aggression'. None of these three levels of the international system emerged as highly integrated and significant components of his image. The dominant-bilateral level, however,

is strongly associated with the symbol of non-alignment, the subordinate system of Asia and the Soviet Union. It is through its association with the Asian subordinate system that the dominant-bilateral level is significant.

Competing elites emerged as the only domestic variable significantly related to other sub-components of Nehru's foreign policy image. They are associated with the values of well-being, enlightenment and respect, with the symbol of 'aggression', and with India, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Competing elites are a highly value-charged component and are strongly associated with issues of aggression and with two of the most salient actors. Generally speaking, however, the relevance of domestic factors was low: they were neither salient nor highly associated in Nehru's foreign policy image.

Symbols were much more highly integrated into Nehru's image. 'War', the most frequently occurring symbol, is associated with the values of skill, respect and affection, with the symbols of 'independence', 'imperialism' and 'peace', with China, and with the strategy of non-alignment. 'Peace' is associated with the values of affection and rectitude, with

the symbols of 'colonialism', 'independence' and 'war', with the African subordinate system, and with the strategy of non-alignment. Both 'war' and 'peace' are strongly related to moral and value questions; both are related to each other and to the symbol of 'independence' and to 'imperialism' or 'colonialism', and both are strongly associated with the strategy of non-alignment. War and peace were Nehru's overriding concerns. And they are strongly associated with the struggle for independence and with the strategy of non-alignment, which protects and enhances national independence.

This hypothesis is confirmed by the patterns of association of the symbols, 'independence', 'colonialism' and 'imperialism'. 'Independence' is closely related to the values of skill, affection and rectitude, to the symbols of 'war', 'peace' and 'aggression', to China, and to the strategy of non-alignment. 'Colonialism' is strongly associated with 'peace'. 'Imperialism' is closely related to the values of enlightenment and well-being, the symbols of 'two blocs' and 'war', and the strategy of non-alignment. The independence struggle, with its anti-colonial and anti-imperialist associations, is significantly related to 'war' and 'peace' and to the on-going strategy of non-alignment. This cluster of

values, symbols and strategy was the orienting framework within which the rest of Nehru's foreign policy image was structured.

The only other symbol which has a large number of associations is 'aggression'. It is significantly related to the values of affection and enlightenment, to China, to the Asian subordinate system and the bilateral level of interaction, to competing elites, and to the strategy of non-alignment. It is interesting to note that 'aggression' is associated with elements of the environment that are in close proximity to India: Asia, bilateral relations and her near-neighbour China. Moreover, even within the context of India's immediate environment, aggression is closely associated with the strategy of non-alignment. The strategy of non-alignment was an all-pervasive component in Nehru's foreign policy image.

Six of the seven values have a high degree of interrelatedness with other components in his image. Affection is closely associated with the values of skill, well-being and rectitude, the symbols, 'aggression', 'independence', 'war' and 'peace', the Asian subordinate system and the bilateral level of interaction, and the strategy of negotiation. Rectitude is also associated with the value of affection,

the symbols of 'independence', 'war' and 'peace' and the Asian subordinate system. These two values are thus related to the cluster of symbols we noted earlier and to the Asian subordinate system. It was questions of friendship and morality which dominated Nehru's perceptions of independence, war and peace.

The other four values -- respect, skill, well-being and enlightenment -- are all highly inter-related. Respect is strongly associated with skill, well-being and enlightenment; it is also closely related to the symbol 'war' and to competing elites. Enlightenment is also strongly related to the other three values, to the symbols, 'aggression' and 'imperialism', to the Asian subordinate system, and to China, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. The strong association of enlightenment with all four major actors is striking: the only exception is Pakistan. This attests to the Prime Minister's desire for greater understanding between nations.

Skill is also strongly associated with the other three values and affection, with the symbols, 'independence' and 'war', with the Asian subordinate system, with China, and with the strategy of non-alignment. Well-being, too, is related

to the same four values, to the symbols, 'imperialism' and 'war', and to competing elites. All four values, then, are significantly inter-related and all are related to war and/or imperialism and/or independence. Again, it was questions of war and peace, associated with the symbol of 'independence', that were most highly value-charged.

Although the seven most salient issues were tested for contingencies, only Indo-China emerged with a significant relationship -- to China. Clearly, issues of foreign policy were almost irrelevant in shaping the structure and content of Nehru's foreign policy image. Further, the Prime Minister perceived almost no inter-relationship among the issues themselves; nor did he associate actors, symbols, values, levels of interaction, domestic forces or strategies with particular foreign policy issues. His foreign policy image was not issue-oriented.

Finally, two of the four strategies showed significant contingencies. Non-alignment was strongly associated with the symbols, 'aggression', 'imperialism', 'independence', 'war' and 'peace', with the values of enlightenment and skill, with the Asian subordinate system and with China. This pattern

conforms to the cluster of symbols, values and strategy noted earlier. Negotiation is closely related to the global and Asian subordinate systems, to the value of affection and to the symbol of 'war'. Nehru perceived negotiation as an appropriate technique in both the global and his own subordinate system and underlined the necessity of friendship and good will.

In an effort to discover the most significant patterns of association with the highest degree of inter-relatedness, the data were subjected to cluster analysis. The results are presented in the matrix of correlations in Figure 9.

Several clusters emerged. The firstis the cluster of the symbols, 'peace', 'war', 'independence' and the values of affection and rectitude. A second related cluster are the three symbols, 'peace', 'war' and 'independence' and the strategy of non-alignment. We have already noted that problems of war and peace and the continuing struggle to preserve independence are inter-related with questions of morality and friendship and the strategy of non-alignment. This was one of the undergirding structures of Nehru's foreign policy image.

A third cluster is that of the symbol 'war' and the values of skill, well-being and affection. This underlined the central importance of the problem of war in Nehru's image.

Figure 9

Nehru

Cluster Analysis

	Peace	War	Independence	Affection	Rectitude	Non-Alignment
Peace	-	75	78	78	75	80
War	75	-	87	78	75	80
Independence	78	87	-	80	78	82
Affection	78	78	80	-	78	
Rectitude	75	75	78	78	-	
Non-Alignment	80	80	82			

	Skill	Well-Being	Affection	War
Skill	-	82	84	82
Well-Being	82	-	78	75
Affection	84	78	-	78
War	82	75	78	-

Figure 9 (continued)

Nehru

Cluster Analysis

	Respect	Skill	Well-Being	Enlightenment	United States	Soviet Union
Respect	-	88	80	75		
Skill	88	-	82	78		
Well-Being	80	82	-	82		
Enlightenment	75	78	82	-	75	75
United States				75	-	86
Soviet Union				75	86	-

	Skill	Enlightenment	Non-Alignment
Skill	-	78	75
Enlightenment	78	-	75
Non-Alignment	75	75	-

Figure 9 (continued)

Nehru

Cluster Analysis

	Independence	War	China	Aggression	Asia
Independence	-	87	82		
War	87	-	80		
China	82	80	-	78	86
Aggression			78	-	78
Asia			86	78	-

Posed antithetically to war were all the desired objectives — skill and proficiency, knowledge and information, and friendship and affection.

Skill and well-being also cluster with two other values, respect and enlightenment. The four values are highly interrelated. Enlightenment is also clustered with the United Kingdom and the United States, and again with the strategy of non-alignment, and the value of skill. The circle has closed, for the links among the six clusters are many. All six values are related, directly or indirectly, to the symbols of 'peace', 'war' and 'independence', and to the strategy of non-alignment. This in fact was the steel framework around which the rest of the Prime Minister's foreign policy image was constructed. It was the unifying theme throughout his perceptions.

There is a second series of clusters indirectly linked to the first. China clusters with the symbols, 'independence' and 'war' -- two essential components of the first cluster -- and also with the symbol, 'aggression' and the subordinate system of Asia. This highlights the importance of both China and Asia in Nehru's foreign policy image -- for the symbols of 'independence', 'war' and 'aggression' were given operational content in Asia. The regional setting and the presence

of neighbouring China was the primary arena in which Nehru's foreign policy image operated.

Having explored the association of the components of Nehru's image, we can now return to the hypothesis that 'the more supporting and inter-dependent the elements of an image, the less flexible the image' (Pruitt). We did not test this hypothesis directly and so it cannot be confirmed or rejected. Yet it does not appear that inter-dependence is the most crucial determinant of inflexibility. For example, the Prime Minister's image of Pakistan was relatively inflexible over time but it had few supporting elements. On the other hand, non-alignment was a constant and significant component of Nehru's image and it was highly inter-related with numerous supporting elements. The evidence is not conclusive.

In conclusion, Nehru's foreign policy image was ordered by a set of symbols and values which fall under the rubric of 'non-alignment' in its broadest sense. His over-riding concern was the preservation of peace and meaningful independence in the international system. His image of the global system was not rigidly structured; rather, it was fluid and flexible. Actors and actions were measured against the criteria of the

prevention of war and the preservation of independence. The Asian subordinate system was the most important level of interaction. The Prime Minister saw actors and behaviour through Asian lenses; even at the bilateral level Nehru perceived one of his neighbours through the same Asian prism of values and symbols. This highly inter-related and inter-dependent set of values, symbols and strategy is the framework which ordered Nehru's image. The substance and content of his foreign policy decisions flowed logically from it.

After we have examined the foreign policy image of V.K. Krishna Menon, it will be possible to compare the images of these two Indian foreign policy decision-makers, based upon all three dimensions that have been explored -- salience, level of intensity and inter-relatedness of the components of image.

Chapter VI

Krishna Menon's Foreign Policy Image

a. Introduction

Krishna Menon was born on May 3, 1896 at Panniankara in the district of Calicut in Kerala. His father was a prosperous lawyer and landlord who rejected many of the orthodox tenets of Hinduism. He belonged to a line of Rajahs and enjoyed royal privileges in North Malabar. Considerable luxury and comfort surrounded the young Menon. His mother, an accomplished musician and scholar, died when Menon was a child.

Menon began his education at Tellicherry. There he studied at the Municipal School and also for a year at the high school, a Christian missionary institution. His mother's illness forced the family to move to Calicut where Menon enrolled at the Native High School. He then attended his father's former college, Zamorin's college, for two years, where he studied history and logic. In 1915 he passed the intermediate examination and left for Madras and the Presidency College, again following in his father's footsteps.

At the Presidency College, one of India's illustrious institutions of higher learning, Menon first met the oracle of theosophy, Mrs. Annie Besant, one of two people who greatly influenced his thinking and development. He was a B.A. student in history and economics but much of his time was devoted to extra-curricular activities under the leadership of Mrs. Besant and the theosophic movement. In 1918 Menon received his B.A. degree, second class and, at his father's insistence, he went to the Madras Law College. He stayed only a few months; defying his father's wishes, he left to join Mrs. Besant's movement. This was the first major break in Menon's life.

Menon became heavily involved in scouting, which was Mrs. Besant's major organizational effort. He became a qualified scoutmaster and in 1920 went to Malabar to organize the scout movement and other youth activities in south India. During the three years Menon spent in the South, Mrs. Besant had begun to oppose the Indian National Congress and Gandhi because of his civil-disobedience tactics. She protested against the 'illegality' of the technique and demanded 'reciprocity' between India and England based on legal evolution. This emphasis on legality and due process was part of her

permanent legacy to Menon.

At the age of 28, on the advice of Mrs. Besant, Menon went to London to attend an educational conference. This marked the beginning of a second period of Menon's life -- a twenty-three year struggle for Indian independence fought in London.

Menon started his career in Britain by enrolling for a teacher's diploma. He taught history for a year at St. Christopher's School in Hertfordshire and obtained his London diploma in 1925. He then enrolled in the London School of Economics and studied political science for two years under Harold Laski, who was the second formative influence in his life. Laski's neo-Marxism profoundly affected the development of Menon's thinking. "Differing from the ideas of his father and Mrs. Besant in that it was scientifically oriented and ideologically complete, it came, moreover, during his years of maturity. It has therefore remained the most abiding influence on Menon's ideas."[1]

In 1927 Menon obtained his B.Sc. (Econ.) degree with first class honours, and became active in the Commonwealth of

---

1. T.J.S. George, Krishna Menon: A Biography, Jonathan Cape, London, 1964, p. 68.

India League, founded by Mrs. Besant. By 1928 he had been elected Joint Secretary. Menon led the radical wing: he became a follower of Gandhi and a firm opponent of Dominion status for India. Under his leadership the radical wing gained strength and the elders began to drop out. This was another painful break for Menon; despite his reverence and admiration for Mrs. Besant Menon was determined to convert the League into a powerful political instrument in the struggle for Indian independence. By the end of 1930 the Commonwealth of India League had ceased to exist, and a new organization, the India League, had emerged. Its object was to support India's claim to swaraj (self-rule). Menon lobbied extensively with other Labour MPs and delivered numerous speeches to local Labour Party associations.

In 1932 the India League decided to send to India a fact-finding mission, consisting of Labour MPs ; Menon was named the secretary of the delegation. It was his first visit to India since 1924. Eight impressionable years had been spent in London. The terrible conditions he saw in India strengthened his determination to fight for Indian independence. Menon was responsible for the research for The Condition of India, the report published by the delega-

tion after its return to London.

Frustrated by the lack of sympathy for Congress objectives on the part of some Labour leaders, Menon decided to participate directly in British politics. In 1934 he won a three year term in Ward 4 of St. Pancras and was re-elected continuously for fourteen years, increasing his majority in each successive election. Here Menon first faced an electorate and first participated directly in administration and government.

At the same time he was pursuing his studies. After receiving his B.Sc. (Econ.) in 1927, he turned to psychology at University College, London. His experimental study of the process of reasoning gained him an M.A. in 1930. By 1934 he had obtained an M.Sc. degree from the London School of Economics with a thesis on "English Political Thought in the Seventeenth Century". In the same year V.K. Krishna Menon was called to the bar at the Middle Temple.

In 1935 Menon first met the man who was to become the greatest single influence in his career -- Jawaharlal Nehru. Immediately a warm friendship developed between them. Both men had had early contacts with the theosophic movement and both had drifted away to become deeply involved in active

politics. Both men had received an intensive education in England and both were remarkably free of the variants of Indian religious and linguistic parochialism. Both detested British imperialism yet liked the British people: this was a result of their prolonged contacts with, and their participation in the life of England. Both were attached to the ideals of Socialism -- Nehru emotionally and Menon rationally -- and both deplored the dictatorial and repressive methods of Communism. Their shared attitudes formed the basis for an enduring friendship.

Menon, living in London, was perhaps more immediately conscious of the impact of world events on the Indian struggle and vice-versa. He wanted Congress to become active on the international scene. In September 1936 Menon was appointed delegate to the World Peace Congress held in Brussels and in 1938 he was the Congress delegate to the Peace and Empire Congress at Glasgow.

It was during this period that Menon first experienced serious physical and emotional illness. From 1936 on Menon was ill and medicines supplanted tea and buns as his staple diet. Menon had become a faithful adherent to the Gandhian tenet of austere living -- he is a vegetarian, a non-drinker

and a non-smoker. By early 1938 Krishna Menon was completely bedridden. With the help of the Laskis he slowly began to recover. Later on in his career, too, Menon was to be bothered by ill-health and frailty.

By the middle of 1938 Menon was sufficiently well to travel with Nehru to Loyalist Spain. Like Nehru, he saw the Spanish Civil War as part of the same struggle in which India was engaged, that between exploiter and exploited. The fights against Imperialism in India and Fascism abroad were, for them, inseparable.

Until the outbreak of war in 1939 Menon worked steadily among trade unions and local Labour party groups, hoping that the rank-and-file would pressure the leadership to support Indian independence. The War, however, pushed the Labour Party into a position on India indistinguishable from that of the Conservatives. In 1939 Menon became the official Labour parliamentary candidate for Dundee. But when the leadership equivocated on the issue of Indian independence he withdrew his candidacy and resigned from the Labour Party. The break was to last four years, and Menon sat on the St. Pancras Council as an independent member. Only in December 1944, when the Labour Party stood strongly committed to the cause

of Indian independence, did Menon rejoin the Party.

Menon had come to London at 28; when independence was achieved he was 51. He had been student, journalist, borough councillor, Labour party member, publisher [2] and barrister. He had spent most of his adult life away from India, working for Indian independence in London. Indeed, he was more at home in London than he was in India.

Krishna Menon was appointed India's first High Commissioner to the United Kingdom in 1947 and he remained five years. In the autumn of 1952 he became deputy to Nehru's sister, Mme. V.L. Pandit, the newly-appointed Leader of India's delegation to the United Nations. A year later Menon was asked to lead the delegation to the UN, and in the same year the Madras wing of the Congress Party elected Menon to the Rajya Sabha (Council of States), the upper house of India's Parliament. He achieved world repute for his role in the Korean settlement, at the Geneva Conference on Indo-China and at Bandung.

On February 3, 1956 Menon was named Cabinet Minister without Portfolio: after thirty-two years abroad he had returned to India. He managed the Health portfolio for a while and was also associated with education policy. But he devoted

2. Menon created the Penguin Series and edited Nehru's books for publication abroad.

himself principally to foreign policy issues, assisting the Prime Minister who was himself Minister of External Affairs. During this period Menon participated actively in the Suez, Hungarian and Kashmir debates at the United Nations.

In March 1957 Menon stood for election to the Lok Sabha. He had lost fluency in his mother tongue, Malayalam, the only Indian language he had known. Moreover, he had never directly experienced Indian political life. He was elected from North Bombay and, at the age of 61, became a significant political factor in India. Nehru appointed him Minister of Defence the following month. Menon initiated a programme of reshaping and modernizing India's armed forces. In February 1962 he was re-elected in North Bombay by an increased majority.

The Sino-Indian border conflict reached a climax in the autumn of 1962, and in November Menon submitted his resignation from the Cabinet. He was held responsible by many for the severe defeats suffered by the Indian army and was criticized for its lack of readiness to resist a Chinese attack. He resigned from Congress at the end of 1966 and was defeated in his attempt to gain re-election to Parliament in 1967 as an Independent. He is now a private citizen and a practising lawyer.

This brief survey highlights Krishna Menon's importance in Indian foreign policy. Nehru was the principal policy-maker but Menon provided many ideas and was the policy-implementor par excellence. He held two important ambassadorships and the Defence portfolio. Moreover, he had remarkable access to the Prime Minister and was one of the few Congressmen who shared Nehru's interest in foreign policy. Menon had both the experience and the intellect for the roles he played in India's foreign policy.

Menon's psychological predispositions, as those of any decision-maker, consist of (a) societal factors, such as ideology and tradition, which derive from the cumulative historical legacy, and (b) personality factors, the idiosyncratic qualities of decision-makers. Together they formed his 'attitudinal prism'.[3] The societal factor which had the greatest influence on Menon was India's experience with British imperialism and her colonial dependence. To this can be attributed a strong ideological antipathy to imperialism and colonialism, whatever their forms. Closely related was a passionate dislike of any form of racial discrimination.

---

3. For an analytical treatment of 'the attitudinal prism' and its relationship to elite images see pp. 60-61 above.

Together, these produced a strong emphasis on the dignity and independence of the new states.

These societal stimuli were strengthened by ideological influences. As a youth, Menon was attracted to the theosophic movement led by Mrs. Besant: this expressed itself in his commitment to democracy and the orderly process of law. Later Menon was influenced by Gandhi's stress on the purity of means and the moral necessity of non-violence. Individual dignity and non-violent change became part of his attitudinal prism. Finally, he was influenced by Harold Laski and his commitment to socialism and its humanist goals; this provided the stimulus for the eradication of social and economic inequality and the imperative for social and economic change. Anti-imperialism and socialist humanism are the twin pillars of Menon's ideology, a product of India's history and his own experience.

Menon's personality is more difficult to isolate and describe. The long years spent alone in London adversely affected his ability to operate effectively at home. Ill-health, over-work and over-strain contributed to his irascibility and arrogance. His firm convictions and fierce pride, a product of bitter personal experience, made him unwilling

to explain and defend himself. The depth of his commitment allowed little time for the acquisition of political skills; political considerations were always subordinated to the achievement of India's international objectives. His concern was not simply with India's foreign policy objectives but with these objectives as the archetype of goals of all states which had emerged from the degrading colonial experience. His experience, his education, his ideology and his personality all contributed to an integrated and structured image of the world. We may now turn to a more precise examination of the components of his image.

b. Components of the Image

Table XIII summarizes the frequency of occurrence of twenty-two actors in the fifteen interviews analysed.[4] The sixteenth column indicates the total number of occurrences for each actor; that is, its cumulative frequency.

4. The source material for this chapter is drawn from M. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, London, 1968, Part I, Chs. 1-14 and 16. The data were tabulated from the interviews after they had been subjected to one editing, that of Mr. Menon himself. His version was then re-edited twice by Professor Brecher. None of these changes were taken into account in tabulating frequencies of occurrence. Only the words of Mr. Menon were subjected to analysis; at no time were the words of Dr. Brecher included.

Table XIII

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Actors

Units

Actor	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
India	107	89	72	18	46	82	68	64	43	45	190	131	98	63	48	1164
United Nations	10	3	27	0	10	8	25	105	49	107	12	1	17	5	1	380
United States	33	10	23	19	13	36	5	44	15	20	49	9	74	17	12	379
China	12	1	10	21	76	5	0	1	0	4	0	50	28	1	10	219
Britain	7	50	4	20	6	41	4	2	2	2	6	12	19	21	10	206
U.S.S.R.	11	3	18	11	7	14	2	18	5	14	0	5	19	6	4	137
Canada	10	9	17	34	3	21	0	0	0	7	1	1	0	7	20	130
Egypt	3	0	0	0	9	61	51	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	128
Israel	0	0	0	0	3	10	111	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	127
Pakistan	0	5	0	0	28	0	7	11	0	2	9	4	1	29	1	97
Commonwealth	0	56	10	0	11	2	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	1	0	85

Table XIII (continued)

	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	77	0	0	0	0	77
the West	5	8	4	0	7	0	5	26	2	3	0	2	5	3	4	74
Indonesia	1	1	0	0	32	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	37
NATO	0	2	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	2	5	0	1	2	8	28
France	2	0	0	7	1	2	2	1	5	2	1	0	3	0	0	26
Australia	0	0	0	0	5	7	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	17
South Korea	0	0	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	17
Burma	2	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	0	0	13
Japan	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	0	0	9
Ghana	2	2	2	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9
North Korea	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7
	205	239	210	132	263	302	284	274	122	214	351	220	274	158	118	3366

The cumulative frequency column reveals the preponderance of references to India. This is not unexpected, since the focus of discussion is Indian foreign policy. What is surprising, however, is the high level of occurrence of the United States, which exceeds that of the Soviet Union by a ratio of almost 3 to 1. The United States is mentioned in every interview, regardless of the issue, and is, in each case, cited more frequently than the Soviet Union. Thus, Menon may perhaps see the world dominated by two power blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively, but his perception of them appears to be sharply unequal. Clearly, the United States is more salient and more central to his image of the global system. Thus Choukri's hypothesis that non-aligned states will perceive both blocs equally does not appear initially to be corroborated.

Total frequency occurrence of the United Nations is the only other content category that rivals the occurrence of the United States. Yet its pattern of distribution is much less even: more than half is accounted for within two units, one dealing with the United Nations itself, the other with Hungary.

Morton Kaplan [5] suggests in his model of a loose bi-

5. Morton Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York, 1957, Chs. 1 & 2.

polar system that non-bloc actors will tend to co-ordinate their national objectives with those of the universal actor -- the United Nations. Menon's prolonged experience at the United Nations should have made it highly salient on a majority of issues. It is true that the United Nations is one of the few sub-components of his image to occur in almost every issue. Nevertheless, its distribution is so sharply skewed that its salience is limited to only a few issues. For example, Menon mentions the United Nations only five times out of a total of 158 actor references when he discusses Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir. Yet the United Nations has been very active in the Kashmir dispute; it has been one of the recurring items on the UN agenda. In his discussion of the Bomb, Menon refers to the UN only once; yet one of his major concerns is disarmament. In his treatment of non-alignment Menon refers to the UN only ten times, yet it is in the United Nations that non-alignment has been most effective. Kaplan's 'rule' that national objectives of non-bloc states are co-ordinated with the universal actor is not supported by the data.

China follows the United States and the United Nations in frequency of occurrence. It occurs in twelve of the fifteen

units but more than half of the references are accounted for in two units, Bandung and China itself. It also occurs significantly in Menon's evaluation of contemporary trends in world politics.

The United Kingdom follows China in total occurrence. Interestingly, it occurs more frequently than the Soviet Union. Almost half its references, however, is concentrated in the discussions on the Commonwealth and the Suez Crisis. Nevertheless, like the US but no other actor, Britain is mentioned in all fifteen interviews. Britain's high level of occurrence seems disproportionate to its level of capability and influence within the global system. No doubt this reflects Menon's ambivalence to the United Kingdom -- his hostility to its imperialist practices and his affection for the England that was his second home for almost thirty years. Moreover, it probably reflects the general tendency of new states to pay disproportionate attention to the former 'mother country': the long years of association and the economic, political and military ties have not been totally severed in the post-colonial era.

The pattern of occurrence for the Soviet Union reveals the sharply skewed nature of this decision-maker's image.

Though it appears in all units except Goa, the number of references to it are low. Without equating frequency of occurrence with importance, this pattern is striking for a country such as India, whose foreign policy is founded on ideological symmetry and is based on non-alignment between the two super powers. This suggests that the ideological symmetry implicit in non-alignment does not in fact conform to Krishna Menon's image. The striking disparity between the cumulative frequency occurrence of the two super powers indicates further that the United States is the object of much more intense perceptions.

Almost the same level of occurrence is evident for the United Arab Republic, Israel and Canada. The high frequency for Canada is striking but it must be noted that the interviewer is a Canadian and that this fact was known and alluded to by Mr. Menon. Thus the level of occurrence of Canada is probably inflated.

A very high proportion of references to Egypt and Israel is accounted for in the units dealing with the Suez Crisis and the Arabs, Israel and India. Both of these actors are mentioned in only one-fifth of the total number of interviews. It is interesting to note that while references to

Egypt are evenly divided between the two issues, the references to Israel in the discussion of the Suez Crisis account for less than one-tenth of the total number of references. This suggests that Menon's perception did not center on Middle East participants; the high frequency occurrence of Britain (41) confirms this observation. In his analysis of the Suez Crisis, Menon pays disproportionately little attention to France (2 references); the highest proportion of references are devoted to Egypt, Britain and the United States. The salience of these three actors in the context of the Suez Crisis suggest that the global system was the dominant variable in Menon's perception of that issue.

Equally striking is the level of occurrence of Pakistan. It has often been suggested that Indian foreign policy decision-makers are 'obsessed' with Pakistan. Preliminary content analysis does not support this, at least in the case of Mr.Menon. Although a full interview is devoted to problems connected with Pakistan, its overall level of occurrence is relatively low. One third is accounted for in the unit dealing with Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir and another third in the unit dealing with Bandung. The remainder is distributed among eight units.

The most noteworthy feature of this frequency count is the very high level of occurrence of the United States relative to the Soviet Union: in every unit the U.S. occurs more frequently than does the U.S.S.R.; in five of the fifteen units it is mentioned three times as often. In a discussion of non-alignment, for example, it is unexpected that the United States would be mentioned 33 times while the Soviet Union is referred to only 11 times; it is even more astounding that Menon should refer to the U.S. 44 times and the U.S.S.R. 18 times in his analysis of the Hungarian crisis of 1956. This indicates a sharp asymmetry in Krishna Menon's image of the global system.

Both the high level of occurrence of Great Britain and its widespread distribution suggest the importance of Britain as a pervasive component of Menon's image. The cumulative level of frequency for Pakistan was unexpectedly low, given its objective pre-eminence in the history of India's foreign policy in the last twenty years.

These actors, along with the United Nations and China, are important in Menon's perceptions. We must now explore the intensity of his attitudes towards them and the patterns of association in which they are significant.

Table XIV indicates the frequency of occurrence of the various levels of the international system in the fifteen units, with the last column providing the cumulative frequency.

The pre-eminence of the global system is striking: there are almost twice as many references as there are to bilateral interaction. Although references to the global system are concentrated in the unit dealing with non-alignment, there is a relatively heavy and even distribution in all fifteen units. Even in the unit dealing with Pakistan and Kashmir the global system impinges on Menon's perceptions. This clearly is the most salient level of the international system.

References to the bilateral level of interaction are also widely distributed: the heaviest concentration is found in the units dealing with the Commonwealth and the Arabs, Israel and India, but references occur in all fifteen units. References to the bilateral level, however, occur only half as frequently as to the global system. This corroborates the initial theme of <u>the pre-eminent importance of the global system in Menon's image</u>.

The relative under-representation of dominant-bilateral interaction is striking. It has a low level of occurrence, and a third of the references is concentrated in the units

Table XIV

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Levels of the International System

Levels	Units															
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Global	40	9	22	7	6	21	19	3	11	13	7	4	22	16	36	236
Bilateral	4	22	5	3	11	13	23	1	1	1	11	10	10	12	5	132
Africa	7	4	1	0	9	1	5	0	9	28	1	3	24	2	3	97
Dominant-Bilateral	20	0	12	3	1	13	3	0	0	0	10	3	15	3	7	90
Asia	0	1	1	2	24	1	7	0	1	14	1	3	3	1	2	61
Arabs-Middle East	2	0	0	0	4	2	36	0	1	5	0	0	0	0	0	50
Latin-America	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	7	0	0	1	0	0	10
	73	36	41	15	56	52	93	4	23	68	30	23	75	34	53	676

dealing with non-alignment and contemporary world politics. Moreover, it does not occur in four of the fifteen units. This is unexpected, given the high cumulative frequency of the United States, one of the super powers. It appears, then, that references to the United States are rarely made in conjunction with India; rather, the United States is salient as part of the global system. Only in the discussion of non-alignment do Indo-American relations emerge as significant. The high level of occurrence of both super powers is a function not of their bilateral interaction with India but rather of their pre-eminent position in the global system.

References to subordinate systems [6] taken together are more numerous than references to bilateral interaction and more than twice as frequent as those to dominant-bilateral relations. Africa predominates, with almost one-half its occurrences in the units dealing with contemporary world politics and with the United Nations; but Africa is mentioned in all but two units. References to Asia are heavily concentrated in the discussions of Bandung and the United Nations.

---

6. Initially Western Europe and Eastern Europe were included as subordinate systems but their cumulative frequency was so low that they were later omitted from the analysis. Menon does not perceive Europe, or regions of it, as significant autonomous variables in the international system.

The marginal attention paid by an Indian decision-maker to his own subordinate system is noteworthy: another subordinate system -- Africa -- has greater salience than his own. This is in striking contrast to the attention he devotes to the global system and to bilateral interaction. It appears that the Asian subordinate system has little relevance for Menon; the 'third world', an Afro-Asian grouping or an 'area of peace' operating in an ideologically-oriented international system is mentioned intermittently by Menon. But he is indifferent to the Southern Asian regional setting of India's foreign policy.

The total frequency of occurrence of Arabs-Middle East is not significantly lower than that of Asia. More than two-thirds of the references, however, are concentrated in the single unit dealing with Israel, the Arabs and India; and it does not occur at all in nine units. Surprisingly, there are 36 references to the Middle-Eastern subordinate system in Menon's discussion of the triangular relationship between Israel, the Arabs and India -- but only 2 references in his analysis of the Suez Crisis. On the other hand, there are 21 references to the global system, 13 to the dominant-bilateral level and 13 to the bilateral level in the unit dealing with

the Suez Crisis. It is clear, as noted earlier, that Menon perceived the global aspects of the Suez Crisis as pre-eminent and that he virtually ignored the subordinate system implications. Only when dealing with the generic problem of Israel and the Arabs is there a high frequency of occurrence of both the bilateral level and the Middle Eastern subordinate system. Again in the Korean Crisis, certainly an Asian problem as well as a global issue, Menon emphasizes the global (22 references) and the dominant-bilateral (12 references) levels; he virtually ignores the subordinate system (1 reference).

Finally, there is a very low level of occurrence of references to Latin America (10) and seventy per cent of the references are concentrated in the interview on the United Nations; in the same interview there are twice as many references to Asia and four times as many references to Africa. This is surprising in the light of Latin American activity at the UN and Menon's extensive experience there. Clearly Menon does not perceive the Latin Americans as salient; this may be partly explained by their non-membership in the 'area of peace' or the world of non-alignment, apart from Cuba since 1959 and Mexico and Brazil, occasionally.

In summary, <u>the global system is the most important</u>

level of the international system in Menon's image.References to subordinate systems, though cumulatively high, are uneven and concentrated, and Menon emphasizes the global implications of regional crises. The references to bilateral interaction are third in frequency but are widely distributed. Finally, Menon is indifferent to the dominant-bilateral level of interaction.

Table XV below indicates the frequency of occurrence of components of the domestic environment in the fifteen units, with the last column providing the cumulative frequency.

The exceptionally high frequency of occurrence of institutional interest groups is immediately apparent: they occur seven times more often than any other domestic interest group and in all but two of the units. The heaviest concentration is found in the discussion on Korea, and there the references are to the Indian army. They are also concentrated in the units dealing with the Commonwealth, the Congo, China and the Bomb. Menon most clearly perceived the pressures and demands of the army and the bureaucracy in connection with almost every foreign policy issue he discussed. This may be partly due to his direct experience for more than ten years with the Ministry of External Affairs and five years as Minister of Defence.

Table XV

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Domestic Variables

Domestic Variables	Units															
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Institutional Pressure Groups	0	16	46	1	5	1	0	3	21	4	10	14	1	1	17	140
Public Opinion	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	2	4	5	1	21
Incumbent Elite	8	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	19
Associational Pressure Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	2	0	0	1	8
Non-Associational Pressure Groups	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	2	2	0	0	0	7
Competing Elites	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	7
	12	25	46	1	5	1	1	12	21	4	21	20	5	7	21	202

Public opinion has a much lower cumulative frequency but its distribution is fairly widespread. It occurs mainly in issues that are relevant to the Indian public -- Goa, China, Pakistan and Kashmir, and world politics. Its overall level of occurrence is very low, however, and Menon declares in the interviews that he does not perceive public opinion as an important constraint on or inducement to foreign policy action.

The incumbent elite, defined here as the Congress Party, occurs significantly in two units -- non-alignment and the Commonwealth. Its very heavy concentration suggests that the Congress Party is not perceived as a generally significant pressure on foreign policy choices.

Menon devotes almost no attention to competing elites, or associational and non-associational interest groups. When asked whether he considered the press important in affecting policy-making, he tersely replied: "No".[7]

If we sum the frequencies of occurrence of the three types of pressure groups, their pre-eminence is clear and striking: they occur 20 times more frequently than do competing elites. This seems to confirm the hypothesis (Brecher

7. Brecher, op.cit., p. 256.

et al.) that 'decision-makers of middle powers will perceive the pressure exerted by interest groups; the pressures of competing elites will be marginal'. Menon perceived most sharply the advocacies of institutional interest groups, which were present in almost every issue.

Table XVI indicates the frequency of symbols in the fifteen units, and the last column provides the cumulative frequencies.[8]

The high level of occurrence of the symbol 'imperialism' is immediately apparent. There is a considerable gap between this symbol and all others except 'war'. Moreover its distribution is widespread: it occurs in twelve of the fifteen units. This emphasis on imperialism is not surprising given Menon's ideological perspective, India's historical legacy and his own personal experience based on twenty-five years in London. Menon's violent antipathy to imperialism is an essential part of his attitudinal prism, a product of historical, ideological and personality factors.

---

8. It should be noted that the absolute levels of occurrence should not be compared across the seven broad types of variables but, rather, within each type. Given the various components under analysis, it is only within each component that meaningful statements can be made. This is fully recognized when contingency analysis is undertaken, for each sub-component was scored only plus or minus relative to its occurrence above or below its own median frequency in order to obtain the matrix of correlations.

Table XVI

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Symbols

Units

Symbols	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Imperialism	3	12	0	3	8	4	9	0	1	2	14	1	9	5	0	71
War	0	0	0	0	0	2	11	3	5	3	29	4	7	3	3	70
Non-Alignment	32	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	1	8	52
Colonialism	5	0	0	0	12	1	0	0	3	9	6	0	5	1	4	46
Independence	13	16	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	1	3	4	2	0	45
Nationalism	7	0	0	0	3	2	3	4	1	0	1	1	7	2	5	36
Aggression	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	4	3	2	2	0	23
'Two blocs'	8	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	2	5	23

Table XVI (continued)

	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Peace	2	0	3	2	3	1	0	1	1	0	3	1	3	1	1	22
Economic Development	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	8	0	0	14
'Balance of Power'	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	16
Communism	2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	0	11
	77	32	8	6	26	10	38	8	15	22	58	18	55	19	37	429

Following closely in the absolute number of occurrences is the symbol 'war'. Unlike 'imperialism' it does not occur evenly throughout the interviews; it is heavily concentrated in the discussion of Goa. Both 'imperialism' and 'war' occur most heavily in the interview dealing with Goa. 'War' also occurs heavily in the interview on Israel, the Arabs and India but the remainder of its references is distributed thinly throughout eight interviews.

'Non-alignment'[9] follows both 'imperialism' and 'war' in its number of references. More than one-half, however, is accounted for in the unit dealing with that subject and it occurs only marginally in five other units. This is surprising, given the general emphasis on the connection between non-alignment and Indian foreign policy.

'Non-alignment' is followed closely by 'colonialism' and 'independence'; the total frequency occurrence is approximately equal. 'Colonialism' is heavily concentrated in the discussion of Bandung and occurs in eight other units. 'Independence' is heavily concentrated in the units dealing

---

9. 'Non-alignment' is treated as a symbol here. It is also used by Menon as a strategy and is so coded when its use is strategic rather than symbolic.

with Non-Alignment and the Commonwealth and it occurs in seven other units. It is not surprising that these two symbols should play a prominent part in Menon's image. Independence is merely the obverse of colonialism and both were the paramount concern of Menon's political life for thirty years.

It is worth noting the extremely low salience of the symbol 'economic development'.[10] This is a major concern for most new states and impinges on both their domestic and foreign policy. Half of Menon's references to 'economic development' are concentrated in the unit dealing with world politics. It does not appear to impinge significantly on any of the other issues discussed; 'economic development' is not a significant component of Menon's foreign policy image.

It is also noteworthy that the unit 'Non-Alignment' contains the highest number of symbolic references; all but three symbols are cited, and 'non-alignment' and 'independence' are mentioned frequently. In the context of Non-Alignment, Menon refers most widely and most frequently to symbols or value-loaded expressions. This suggests that, of all the issues discussed, Non-Alignment has the highest emotive content

10. There was a separate interview on 'economic development' which was not coded. We are interested in the inter-relationship between economic development and foreign policy images; for this reason, we did not code 'economic development' as a separate issue.

in his image.

It is surprising that, in his discussion of Bandung, Menon does not refer to 'non-alignment'; he emphasizes 'colonialism', 'imperialism', 'nationalism' and 'peace'. This suggests that Menon relates his 'area of peace' to the paramount problems of anti-imperialism and maintenance of peace, concerns which flow directly from his ideological and personal orientations.

In summary, 'imperialism' and 'war' predominate in Menon's image, followed by 'non-alignment', 'colonialism' and 'independence'.

Table XVII deals with the frequencies of occurrence of the seven values.[11] Two deference values, respect and power, are pre-eminent. Respect is distributed quite evenly in all but one interview. Power occurs in all but two units, but it is concentrated in the discussion on the Commonwealth. These two values are followed closely by another deference value, rectitude, and by a welfare value, well-being. Rectitude occurs in all but three interviews, while well-being occurs in all fifteen units.

---

11. The value 'skill' was coded but its frequency of occurrence was so low that it was dropped from the table and later from the analysis.

Table XVII

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Values

Units

Values	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Respect	7	5	1	2	4	3	7	1	0	8	3	4	10	1	0	56
Power	3	13	1	0	2	3	1	3	0	2	6	5	3	3	5	50
Well-being	4	3	6	5	7	1	1	1	1	1	5	1	5	5	2	48
Rectitude	3	2	0	1	0	5	5	0	1	1	7	3	8	2	8	46
Affection	0	4	0	0	0	1	4	2	1	5	1	4	6	0	0	28
Wealth	1	2	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	1	11
Enlightenment	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	2	7
	18	29	8	8	14	14	19	7	3	18	22	19	36	13	18	246

Taken together, the deference values have a much higher level of occurrence than do the welfare values. The strikingly sparse references to wealth, for example, are entirely consistent with the lack of salience of 'economic development'. Enlightenment is mentioned only 7 times out of a total of 246 value references. This seems to substantiate our earlier suggestion that problems of economic development and growth play no direct role in Menon's foreign policy image.

Indeed, deference values are clearly pre-eminent in Menon's image. They account for two-thirds of the value references in the discussion of the Commonwealth, three-quarters of the references in the analysis of world politics, and more than three-quarters of the references in the interview on Goa, the three most heavily value-laden units. The deference values of respect, rectitude and power characterize Menon's foreign policy images.

Table XVIII deals with issues in which actors, levels of interaction, symbols and values are mentioned. Though the units themselves are organized around issues, it was useful to explore the salience of particular issues throughout the interviews.

The three issues with the highest cumulative frequency

Table XVIII

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Issues

Units

Issues	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Hungary	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	66	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	71
Congo	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	55	0	0	0	1	0	0	59
Bandung	0	0	0	0	54	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	59
Goa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	1	0	0	44
Korea	7	0	25	4	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	42
Indo-China	1	0	1	24	4	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	40
Suez	5	0	0	0	2	15	15	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	39

Table XVIII (continued)

	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Atomic Weapons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	15	2	13	30
Bomb	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	17	23
Kashmir	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	3	1	4	0	0	8	0	22
Racial Discrimination	0	4	0	0	3	1	10	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	0	22
Cold War	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	20
Colombo Plan	0	2	0	0	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19
Tibet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	0	0	0	12
South Africa	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	7
	27	9	27	28	90	19	32	74	61	6	49	12	29	15	31	509

-- Hungary, Bandung and the Congo -- are heavily concentrated within their own interviews. Goa, with a lower absolute level of occurrence, is also heavily concentrated within its own unit. Korea, Indo-China and Suez, occurring at approximately the same level, are relatively widely distributed throughout eight, six and six units respectively. Finally, atomic weapons, with a lower level of absolute occurrence, is mentioned in three units.

The unit of Bandung, however, contains the highest number of references to issues as well as the highest cumulative total. In other words, it is in the context of Bandung that most of the other major foreign policy issues are referred to. Generally, however, this table demonstrates a very low level of inter-relationship between foreign policy issues: the mention of one foreign policy issue does not tend to produce associations with other issues. This suggests that Menon's association structure is not dependent on issues of foreign policy.

Table XIX delineates the frequencies of occurrence of strategies: these are strategies to be used by India in the international system.[12]

12. Explaining a strategy is very complex. Perhaps it does not lend itself well to an oral interview, and this may in part explain the low frequency of discussed strategies.

Table XIX

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Strategies

Strategies	Units															
	Non-Alignment	Commonwealth	Korea	Indo-China	Bandung	Suez	Israel, Arabs, India	Hungary	Congo	United Nations	Goa	China	World Politics	Pakistan, Partition, Kashmir	Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Negotiation	0	1	0	0	0	3	1	1	4	0	5	2	5	0	0	22
Mediation	3	1	7	0	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	0	0	19
Non-Alignment	15	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
Disarmament	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	2	4	5	15
Recognition	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	4	3	0	0	0	14
Dialogue	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0	2	5	0	0	0	0	12
	18	2	9	0	3	4	13	2	5	4	14	7	9	4	5	99

The most significant observation is the paucity of overall references to strategies. In the interview dealing with the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, for example, there is no reference to any strategy. The strategy with both the widest distribution and the highest frequency of occurrence is negotiation; it is followed closely by mediation, which occurs in eight of the fifteen units. Non-alignment, which has a relatively high absolute level of occurrence, is heavily concentrated in the interview dealing with non-alignment.

The discussions concerning Goa, China, Israel, the Arabs and India, and world politics are the only ones in which three or more strategies are mentioned. Goa and the Israel-Arabs-India triangle together account for more than twenty-five per cent of all references to strategies.

What emerges from this table is the strikingly low salience of strategies. References to strategies are neither frequent nor widely distributed in the interviews.

We can now return to four hypotheses dealing with the components of images that emerged from the foreign policy literature:[13]

---

13. See pp. 150-51 above.

1. "Decision-makers of developing states will perceive their own subordinate systems as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security and on the general range of political-diplomatic foreign policy issues"(Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is not confirmed by the Menon data. On the contrary, Menon revealed a strikingly low awareness of his own subordinate system.

2. "Decision-makers of middle powers will perceive the pressure exerted by interest groups; the pressures of competing elites will be of extremely low salience" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is confirmed. Menon was virtually impervious to the advocacy of competing elites and he displayed sharp perception of the pressures exerted by institutional groups.

3. "Decision-makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced by their own political structures and other subordinate systems" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is partially confirmed. Certainly Menon was not influenced by his political structure -- he displays little awareness of any structural factors and not much more of any political group other than institutional interests. However, he dis-

played sharp perception of the African subordinate system; it was more salient than his own.

4. "Decision-makers of middle powers will have a much sharper perception of the external environment than of their internal environment" (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis is confirmed. We have noted the low level of salience of the symbol 'economic development' and the minimal perception of domestic political forces.

We have thus far examined the incidence of Krishna Menon's attention to components and sub-components within his image. We must now examine the kind of attention accorded to them.

c. Intensity of the Image

In order to measure intensity of Menon's attitudes we selected the following four variables: expressions of hostility -- "The Belgians wanted to rule our liberated territory again"[14]; friendship -- "I was very close to Nehru"; change of status quo -- "India demanded total independence"; and satisfaction -- "India has made notable achievements since

14. This extract and all subsequent quotations from Menon are taken from the unedited first version of the Brecher - Menon Dialogue in 1964. For this reason, no page references can be provided.

Independence". We shall look first at absolute levels of occurrence, then at the actors, symbols and targets involved in all four variables, and finally at patterns of intensity.

Figure 10 provides a graphic representation of the absolute levels of occurrence of statements of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo through each of the fifteen units of analysis.

Immediately apparent is the very high incidence of hostility statements by Menon relative to the other three variables. Three hundred and eighty-eight (388) hostility statements were discovered, while only one hundred and thirty (130) statements of friendship, one hundred and twenty-seven (127) statements of satisfaction and ninety-six (96) statements demanding a change in the status quo were found. Hostility was by far the predominant dimension in Krishna Menon's foreign policy image.

The paths of the graphical lines, which represent the four variables, reveal the clustering of satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo, especially in the last eight units. Hostility, however, clusters with the other three only in the units dealing with the Commonwealth, Korea, the Congo, the United Nations and the Bomb. In all other issues

Figure 10

Menon

Occurrence of hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



hostility occurs with much greater frequency than the others, and the distance between it and any one of the remaining three variables is greater than the combined distance between the three variables. Especially striking is the high incidence of hostility in the units dealing with Bandung, Israel and the Arabs, Hungary, Goa, and Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Although friendship occurs at the same level as satisfaction, there are significant deviations between the two graphs. Statements of friendship occur prominently in the units dealing with Non-Alignment, the Geneva Conference on Indo-China, and Israel and the Arabs. Satisfaction statements occur prominently only in the context of Non-Alignment, Bandung and the Commonwealth.

The total number of statements concerned with a change in the status quo is extremely low. The under-representation of strategies was noted earlier; there is a corresponding paucity of statements demanding change in the status quo. Hostility, the dominant variable, appears to be diffuse and not translated into precise demands for change.

Before interpreting the results of this analysis it is useful to break down further the absolute levels of occurrence into the frequency of statements of high, moderate and low

intensity.

Figure 11 provides a graphical representation of statements of high intensity.

There are several sharp changes from the overall intensity occurrence. The most intense statements of hostility occur in the discussion of Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir, followed by the discussion of Bandung, Israel and the Arabs, and Goa. By contrast, Hungary, which has a cumulatively high total of hostility, has significantly less intensely high hostility. This suggests that high intensity hostility is concentrated on issues directly relevant to India -- Kashmir and Pakistan and Goa -- and that issues of the global system do not provoke the same level of intensity. The incidence of the other three variables in these units is generally low; these units are dominated by intensely hostile statements which are not translated into specific demands for change.

In the discussion of Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir, where the most intensely hostile statements occur, the United Kingdom and Pakistan were the dominant actors, and 'imperialism' was the pre-eminent symbol. In the Arab-Israel-India triangle, Egypt and Israel were the pre-eminent actors, and 'imperialism'

Figure 11

Menon

Occurrence of high intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



and 'war' were the dominant symbols. In the interview dealing with Goa, the United States and Portugal were the major actors, and 'imperialism' and 'war' were the most frequently occurring symbols. And in the discussion of Bandung, China was the pre-eminent actor and 'colonialism' was the dominant symbol. It seems clear, then, that 'imperialism' is a focal point of hostility in Menon's foreign policy images. Actors that are associated with imperialism become the targets of extreme hostility.

The highest occurrence of intense statements on change in the status quo relates to the Commonwealth. Interestingly, we notice a low level of occurrence of intensely hostile statements. In other words, there is an intense desire for change without the expected hostile attitudes. There the United Kingdom is the pre-eminent actor, 'independence' is the dominant symbol and power is the prevalent value. This underlines Menon's ambivalence to the United Kingdom: he strongly articulated the necessity of change within the Commonwealth structure accompanied by an independent status for India but England was not the object of hostile attitudes.

Intense statements of satisfaction are made within the context of Bandung and of Non-Alignment. In the latter, the

United States is the dominant actor and respect is the pre-eminent value. In the former, China is the predominant actor and well-being is the most significant value. Intense statements of friendship occur also within the context of non-alignment.

Figure 12 provides a graphic representation of statements of moderate intensity.

The highest incidence of moderate hostility occurs in the discussions about Hungary, Bandung, Pakistan and Goa. In the discussion of Hungary Menon perceives the United Nations as the pre-eminent actor and 'war' as the dominant symbol. It appears that a large proportion of the hostile statements made are only moderately intense and are associated with the symbol 'war'. There is almost no incidence of statements demanding a change in the status quo in this unit; once more, hostility is moderately diffused and unrelated to particular demands.

The high incidence of moderate hostility in the units dealing with Pakistan, Bandung and Goa underline the findings illustrated in the preceding graph. Hostile statements of both high and moderate intensity are substantially concentrated in these units. Those foreign policy issues which are directly

Figure 12

Menon

Occurrence of moderate intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo

Units



related to India -- geographically and substantively --are characterized by the most intense attitudes. Hungary, a global issue, provokes only moderate intensity. In three of the four units we again find the other three variables clustered together, all at low levels of occurrence. Only in the case of Bandung are there both statements of moderate hostility and moderate friendship; a pattern which reflects the multi-dimensional attitudes Menon has toward the Bandung Conference.

Only in the context of the Geneva Conference on Indo-China is there a high incidence of statements of moderate friendship. In the discussion of the Commonwealth there is á high incidence of moderate satisfaction, confirming Menon's ambivalent attitudes toward England, a strong antipathy to imperialist practices and yet a desire for continued association in the Commonwealth. Nowhere do we find a high level of occurrence of moderate statements dealing with a change in the status quo. This is a significant aspect of Menon's image: statements of change of status quo occur at a high level of intensity. Menon does not articulate moderate demands for change.

Figure 13 provides a graphic representation of expressions of low intensity for all variables in the fifteen units.

Figure 13

Menon

Occurrence of low intensity hostility, satisfaction, friendship and change of status quo



Here we find a high incidence of expressions of low intensity hostility in the units dealing with Israel and the Arabs, Hungary, and the Geneva Conference on Indo-China. Thus the Hungarian issue is characterized by statements of medium and low intensity hostility, a less potent combination than that initially revealed in Figure 10 which describes overall levels. The Geneva Conference is also characterized by statements of moderate and low intensity hostility. The behavioural implications are quite different when the major incidence of hostility is moderate and/or low.

Nowhere is there a high level of low intensity statements dealing with satisfaction, friendship or change of the status quo. This confirms the point made earlier that Menon articulates demands for change only at a high level of intensity. In contrast to the hostility variable, the major incidence of change of status quo statements are of high intensity.

Having analysed in detail the three levels of intensity of each of the variables in all fifteen units, we can now return to the overall picture presented in Figure 10 and make more meaningful statements about the composite levels of intensity of each of the variables. In Figure 10 we noticed

that hostility occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Hungary	the results of moderate and low intensity statements
Bandung	the results of high and moderate intensity statements
Israel and the Arabs	the results of high and low intensity statements
Goa	the results of high and moderate intensity statements
Pakistan and Kashmir	the results of high and moderate intensity statements

From this compendium one can deduce the following probabilities of extremism in policy choices: high probability in the cases of Goa and Pakistan-Kashmir; the possibility of extremism or moderation on the Arab-Israel issue, and moderation on Hungary. The Bandung Conference is not an issue of the same type; it did not pose continuing problems of policy choice.

Statements of friendship occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Non-Alignment	the results of statements of high intensity
The Geneva Conference on Indo-China	the results of statements of moderate intensity
Bandung	the results of statements of moderate intensity
Israel and the Arabs	the results of statements of low intensity

Probabilities concerning India's identification with these issues are as follows: very close identity with policies of non-alignment, moderate identity with the spirit of Bandung and the Indo-China settlement of 1954, and relative aloofness from the continuing Israel-Arab conflict, as contrasted with high identity with the Arabs in the Suez issue.

Statements of satisfaction occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Bandung	the results of statements of high intensity
Non-Alignment	the results of statements of high intensity
Commonwealth	the results of statements of moderate intensity

Finally, statements concerning a change in the status quo occurred most often in the units dealing with:

Commonwealth	the results of statements of high intensity
Korea	the results of statements of low intensity

The evidence drawn from satisfaction and change of status quo statements leads to the following assessment of probable revision of policy: very little likelihood with respect to Non-Alignment, Bandung and such issues as Korea; and moderate likelihood of change regarding the Commonwealth.

Now that we have measured the level of intensity of expression, it remains to explore briefly the actors and symbols involved in statements of hostility, friendship, satisfaction, and change of status quo. In order to obtain these data we analysed all statements of the four variables. For each statement we listed the main agent or actor of the statement, the symbol around which the statement revolved, and the target of the statement.

Table XX provides the frequency of occurrence of actors, symbols and targets in high, moderate and low intensity hostility statements.

The United States occupies the most prominent overall position as actor in Krishna Menon's hostility statements. The prolific references to America throughout the interviews are mostly hostile: "The Americans would not have us at the Geneva Conference (on Indo-China)"; "The Americans were jealous of us"; "The United States was most shame-facedly using the United Nations"; "The United States would come again to rule our liberated territory"; "The American attitude is interventionism"; and "American leaders play at brinksmanship". The United States is the agent in 126 hostile statements, that is, 25 per cent.

Table XX

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Hostility

Subjects (agents)	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
United States	17	66	43	126
India	64	37	22	123
China	56	43	8	107
Pakistan	23	26	6	55
Britain	15	15	14	44
Portugal	22	7	1	30
Israel	10	4	14	28
France	8	1	3	12
the West	1	8	2	11
Imperialism	9	1	-	10
Symbols				
Imperialism	11	4	-	15
American orbit	1	11	2	14
War	9	2	-	11
Targets				
India	59	46	18	123
China	12	7	5	24
Egypt	5	5	2	12
Soviet Union	4	7	-	11
the West	2	3	4	9
Portugal	3	-	5	8
United States	1	-	7	8
Arabs	-	5	2	7
Menon	-	4	3	7
Imperialism	4	2	1	7

India is the second ranking actor in the hostile statements; targets of Indian hostility vary with the issue under discussion. "India knew that Tshombe was a Belgian stooge"; "India is opposed to China's policy"; "We are opposed to great power involvement"; "My country should not take it (Stevenson's conception that the whole world is a satellite of the U.S.A.)"; and "We would not submit to Chinese aggression". India expresses hostility 123 times throughout the interviews.

China occurs twice as often as Pakistan as the agent of hostility, and both occur predominantly in statements of intense and moderate hostility. Menon remarked that "the Chinese position is pure expansionism"; "the Chinese killed our people"; "China committed aggression"; "the Chinese have assisted Western imperialists"; and "the Chinese wanted to undermine Indian economic development". In discussing Pakistan, Menon says: "Pakistan has been invading us for eighteen years"; "Pakistan claims our territories"; "Pakistan carries on subversive activity inside India"; and "Pakistan wants to take the whole of India". China occurs 107 times as the agent in a hostility statement; total references to China are only 219; almost half the references to China, then, are

hostile. Pakistan occurs 55 times as the principal actor in hostility statements; the references to Pakistan throughout the interviews total only 97. Again, more than half the total occurrence of Pakistan is explained by its presence in hostility statements.

Israel occurs 28 times as an agent in hostility statements, but the United Arab Republic occurs only as a target of hostility. Menon's hostility to Israel is striking in the interviews dealing with the Suez Crisis and the Arab-Israel dispute: "The Israeli invasion angered Asia and Africa"; "Israel treats the Arabs badly"; and "Israel's aggression made the resolution (UN) out of date".

The predominance of the symbols 'war' and 'imperialism' was noted earlier. We find that these are the two symbols which occur significantly in connection with hostility statements.

Krishna Menon perceives India as the principal target of hostile statements -- more than one-half of all the hostile statements in the interviews. It was suggested earlier that the more hostility a state perceives the more hostility a state will express (Zinnes). Menon perceives India as the target of hostility in 123 cases and he expresses hostility

on India's behalf in 126 statements. There seems to be an almost perfect symmetry between perception and expression of hostility.

The Soviet Union, the Arabs and Egypt occur only as the targets of hostility. The West, Portugal, and the United States all occur as targets of Indian hostility.

Table XXI provides the frequency of occurrence of actors and targets in high, moderate and low intensity friendship statements. India is the main agent, but there is a high proportion of personalities relative to the number of states. Interestingly, Nasser exceeds Nehru in the number of friendly references. This may be partly due to Menon's expressed reluctance to discuss his friendship with Nehru. The evidence confirms Menon's strong identification with the Arabs and hostility toward Israel.

We find as well that, while Britain is an agent in hostile statements, individual British public figures are agents in friendly statements. This confirms Menon's ambivalence toward Britain.

Chou En-lai occurs as an actor in friendship statements; this too suggests an ambivalence toward China -- displeasure at its recent expansionist activities, yet a personal regard

Table XXI

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects and Targets of Friendship

	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
Subjects				
India	18	9	13	40
Nasser	17	4	2	23
Nehru	12	7	-	19
British public figures	6	10	1	17
Menon	8	1	2	11
Canadians	-	8	1	9
Chou En-lai	-	9	-	9
Hammarskjold	3	4	-	7
Pearson	2	4	-	6
Soviet Union	1	4	-	5
Africa	2	3	-	5
Targets				
India	5	5	4	14
Menon	6	3	4	13
Africa	7	2	-	9
Pearson	2	2	-	4

for one of the senior Communist Chinese leaders. The only two countries or areas represented are the Soviet Union and Africa, neither of which figured prominently in hostility statements. It seems clear that Menon's image of both is pre-eminently friendly. In contrast, there were only two friendship sentences in which the United States wasthe agent: Menon, as noted, perceives the United States with hostility and the Soviet Union with friendship.

The targets of friendship statements are relatively restricted. India and Menon himself top the list -- references to the friendly reception Menon received are common throughout the interviews: "Mendes-France was extremely friendly to me"; "Paul Martin was very friendly to me personally"; "Hammerskjold was very friendly to me"; "The African delegates were very friendly"; and even "The Portuguese diplomats were nice to me personally". Menon often differentiates between a state and its diplomatic personnel or citizenry: frequently, while disapproving of the former, he expresses friendship for the latter. This is a typical distinction of the Left and accounts for the high proportion of individuals who figure in friendship statements.

The only geographic entity to occur as a target of

friendship statements if Africa. This underlines the high salience of Africa relative to all other subordinate systems. Menon clearly perceives Africa with friendship and warmth, which is not extended to his own subordinate system.

Table XXII lists the subjects, symbols and targets of high, moderate and low intensity satisfaction.

The data presented in Table XXII reveal, not unexpectedly, that the subject most frequently cited is India, closely followed by Bandung, by Menon himself, and by the United Nations. Menon underlines his satisfaction with the 'spirit of Bandung' -- its objectives and achievements, and with the achievements of the United Nations. The single state which appears here is China, a further demonstration of the fundamental underlying ambivalence in Menon's attitude toward China. China is the only state which figures prominently in both hostility and satisfaction statements. "Toward China there is still respect and a feeling of Asian and anti-colonial kinship, tempered by a sense of betrayal in 1962".[15] The pervasive tone in Menon's image is regret and disappointment, rather than the sharp hostility and anger he displays

15. M. Brecher, 'Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World', in Pacific Affairs, Vol. XL, No.s 1 & 2, Spring and Summer 1967, p. 81.

Table XXII

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Satisfaction

Subjects	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
India	18	13	13	48
Bandung	16	4	-	20
Menon	3	4	8	15
United Nations	3	12	-	15
Non-Alignment	8	2	1	11
China	-	10	1	11
Nehru	10	-	-	10
Commonwealth	-	9	-	9
Asia	5	-	-	5
Africa	5	-	-	5
'New nations'	3	-	2	5
Goa	-	2	3	5
Symbols				
Imperialism	4	2	-	6
Non-Alignment	-	2	2	4
Targets				
India	11	5	5	21
Independence	3	3	-	6
Peace	2	4	-	6
Africa	6	-	-	6
Commonwealth	-	5	1	6
Asia	5	-	-	5
China	-	5	-	5
Power	2	3	-	5

toward the United States and Pakistan. Given the effect of the Sino-Indian conflict on his own career, the restraint Menon shows is even more amazing. Despite the great transformation of India's operational environment, Menon apparently finds it very difficult to alter his basic image of China. This attests both to the lack of flexibility in Menon's images and to the difficulty of changing the images of decision-makers. There is a pronounced time-lag between image and reality.

Asia and Africa, as well as the category 'new nations', also appear as subjects in statements of satisfaction. We find also that Africa and Asia are targets of satisfaction. The symbols around which statements of satisfaction revolve are 'imperialism' and 'non-alignment'. Menon underlines his satisfaction that new areas of the world have emerged to play a real part through non-alignment and that imperialism has been halted and at times defeated.

The targets of satisfaction are India, and then the symbols 'independence' and 'peace'. The occurrence of these two symbols confirm our suggestion that Menon celebrates the emergence of Asia and Africa as a new 'area of peace' and as independent actors.

Power, a deference value, is the only value which is a

target of satisfaction. It is interesting that power is the only value which occurs in connection with any of the four intensity variables; it is the only one which Menon esteems intensely.

China is the only state other than India which is the target of statements of satisfaction. This confirms our earlier suggestion about the dissonance in Menon's image of China.

Table XXIII presents the occurrence of subjects, symbols and targets of high, moderate and low intensity demands for change in the status quo.

India heads the list and more than 50 per cent of her demands for a change in the status quo are intense. Both the United Nations and the Commonwealth appear as actors in statements of satisfaction and in statements dealing with a change in the status quo. This points to an underlying ambivalence in Menon's attitude toward both of these organizations. China's appearance as a subject of change of status quo statements merely confirms the previously noted ambivalence. From the evidence it is possible to suggest that Menon's attitudes toward the Commonwealth, the United Nations and toward China are dissonant and inconsistent.

Table XXIII

Menon

Frequency of Occurrence of Subjects, Symbols and Targets of Change of Status Quo

	High	Moderate	Low	Totals
Subjects				
India	22	8	7	37
The World	10	1	4	15
United Nations	6	3	2	11
China	3	3	2	8
Menon	6	-	2	8
United States	6	1	-	7
Commonwealth	7	-	-	7
Britain	1	2	2	5
Symbols				
United States domination	3	1	1	5
Imperialism	4	-	-	4
Targets				
United Nations	5	2	4	11
United States	6	2	2	10
India	6	2	1	9
Disarmament	6	-	-	6
Asia	3	1	1	5
Bandung	5	-	-	5

Britain and the United States appear as agents both in hostility statements and in change of status quo statements. It is in dealing with these two actors that Menon is most likely to be extreme. The symbols which are associated with statements of change of the status quo are 'United States domination' and 'imperialism', which also occur in hostility statements. Thus there is also a high probability that policy directed at 'imperialism' or American domination will be extreme.

The targets of statements dealing with change of the status quo, with two exceptions, demonstrate again the low probability that change will be violent in nature. The occurrence of the United Nations both as an actor and a target underscore Menon's ambivalence to that organization. Menon also expresses dissatisfaction with present levels of disarmament and demands immediate acceleration of the pace of arms reduction. Only the United States and India, however, are both targets of hostility and change of status quo.

Referring back to the initial analysis of frequency tables we can now make more precise statements about the actors and symbols which had high frequencies.

1. Menon perceives the United States and the Soviet Union very differently. The United States occurs three times

as often as the Soviet Union. The United States is pre-eminent in five of the fifteen units, while the Soviet Union is pre-eminent in none. The United States is the predominant actor in hostility statements, while the Soviet Union occurs only as a target of hostility. The United States does not occur at all in friendship statements, while the Soviet Union occurs principally in assertions of friendship. And the United States occurs as a subject of change of status quo statements, while the Soviet Union does not occur at all.

Clearly, Menon does not perceive the two super powers equally. He is intensely hostile to the United States and articulates demands for change in American behaviour. He is friendly toward the Soviet Union and perceives her as the target of hostility. The global system, as Menon perceives it, is characterized by two very different super powers, and Menon clearly distinguishes their behaviour. It is the extreme hostility to the United States which accounts for its pre-eminent position in Menon's foreign policy image.

2. The United Kingdom is the only other actor which occurred in every unit. It is a major actor in hostility statements and in statements demanding a change in the status quo, while individual Britons figure prominently in statements

of friendship. His attitude toward Britain as an actor in the international system parallels his attitude toward the United States. It is modified, however, by his warm feelings of friendship for particular British acquaintances. This attests to the dissonance in Menon's image of the United Kingdom.

3. The same can be said of Menon's image of China. In the interviews China occurred twice as often as Pakistan, which was surprising in view of India's twenty-year struggle with the latter. China occurred prominently as an actor in hostility statements, in statements of satisfaction and in demands for a change in the status quo. Chou En-lai figured prominently in friendship statements. China is the only actor to occur in all four types of intensity statements. This suggests that cognitive dissonance is greatest in Menon's image of China. He has not been able to reconcile his earlier friendly image with China's behaviour of the last five years prior to the interviews. It is possible that it is these inconsistencies and ambivalences which account for the frequent references to China throughout the interviews.

4. Menon is completely consistent in his image of Pakistan. It figures prominently as an actor in hostility

statements. Interestingly, there is little reference to Pakistan in change of status quo statements: Menon is consistently hostile to Pakistan without translating his hostility into precise demands for action. His policy choices with respect to Pakistan would likely be a function of his hostility, without, however, demands for a violent change in the status quo.

5. The other actor toward which Menon displays dissonance is the United Nations. It is the subject of statements of satisfaction -- "it survives; things get debated; it's better to talk at each other than shoot at each other; in that sense the United Nations has been a good safety valve and often delays crises". Menon also approves of its role in decolonization in Africa and Asia. On the other hand, the United Nations figures in demands for a change in the status quo -- he criticizes its failures in peace-keeping and its inactivity in the field of disarmament. Menon's image of the United Nations is clearly inconsistent -- without, however, the complicating factors of either extreme identity or extreme hostility. This makes the dissonance less important and less salient in the overall structure of Menon's images.

6. Menon's image of Israel and the Arabs is also consistent. He perceives Egypt as the victim of hostility

statements. Interestingly, there is little reference to Pakistan in change of status quo statements: Menon is consistently hostile to Pakistan without translating his hostility into precise demands for action. His policy choices with respect to Pakistan would likely be a function of his hostility, without, however, demands for a violent change in the status quo.

5. The other actor toward which Menon displays dissonance is the United Nations. It is the subject of statements of satisfaction -- "it survives; things get debated; it's better to talk at each other than shoot at each other; in that sense the United Nations has been a good safety valve and often delays crises". Menon also approves of its role in decolonization in Africa and Asia. On the other hand, the United Nations figures in demands for a change in the status quo -- he criticizes its failures in peace-keeping and its inactivity in the field of disarmament. Menon's image of the United Nations is clearly inconsistent -- without, however, the complicating factors of either extreme identity or extreme hostility. This makes the dissonance less important and less salient in the overall structure of Menon's images.

6. Menon's image of Israel and the Arabs is also consistent. He perceives Egypt as the victim of hostility

and Nasser is extremely prominent in statements of friendship. Israel, on the other hand, is frequently mentioned as a major actor in hostility statements. Once more, considerations of change in the status quo do not intrude significantly in this issue. Menon strongly identifies with the Arabs, without, however, any component of action-response.

7. Finally, Africa emerges as the most salient subordinate system. It is the only geographic area to figure in statements of friendship. Menon also expresses satisfaction at the emergence of Asia and Africa from their colonial status and applauds their achievement of independence. It is with Africa, however, that Menon identifies most strongly.

8. 'Imperialism' is the most important symbol in Menon's image. It occurs in hostility statements, statements of satisfaction, and demands for a change in the status quo. This is not, however, a result of dissonance, for Menon's satisfaction is always related to a defeat of imperialism. Imperialism is clearly the focus of many of Menon's demands for a change in the status quo. Non-alignment occurs in statements of satisfaction -- underlining Menon's continuing belief in the value of non-alignment as a general policy framework.

Now that we have measured the level of intensity of expression and the actors and symbols which are the object of intense perceptions, we can compute the functional distance values for each of the four variables with each of the others. Figure 14 provides us with such a diagrammatic presentation.

The peripheral variable is hostility, and the constellation of variables includes friendship, satisfaction and change of the status quo. This may be described as an 'uncritical conflict system'; that is, there is a low probability of violence. The index of tension is only 0.25; Menon's perceptions, therefore, tend in the direction of extremely low tension. He would be extremely unlikely to initiate violent or disruptive foreign policy behaviour. Generally, Menon's image will produce integrative rather than disruptive policies. In this respect, he is a faithful adherent to the policy of non-alignment.

We can now evaluate the hypotheses which were extracted from the foreign policy literature.[16]

1. "There is a positive relationship between cognitive dissonance, extremity of attitude and intensity" (Abelson).

---

16. See pp. 151-52 above.

Figure 14

Menon

A Map of Functional Distance



Hostility - Change of Status Quo:	2.65
Hostility - Friendship:	2.55
Hostility - Satisfaction:	2.54
Change of Status Quo - Friendship:	.98
Change of Status Quo - Satisfaction:	.71
Friendship - Satisfaction:	.82

This hypothesis is not confirmed. Menon displayed dissonance toward four actors -- China, the United Kingdom, the Commonwealth and the United Nations. China ranks third as an actor in hostility statements, seventh in friendly references, and third in statements demanding a change in the status quo. This is a high level of intensity. However, Menon does not display a corresponding extremity of attitude. In this case cognitive dissonance relates only to intensity of expression.

The United Kingdom ranks fifth in hostility statements, fourth in friendship statements and only seventh in demands for a change in the status quo. Here cognitive dissonance does not seem to relate positively to either extremity or intensity.

The United Nations ranks third in statements of satisfaction and third in demands for a change in the status quo. Menon's perceptions of the United Nations do not indicate any tendency to extremism.

Finally, the Commonwealth ranks only eighth in statements of satisfaction and seventh in demands for a change in the status quo. There is evidence here neither of extremity nor of deep intensity. In short, the hypothesis is not substantiated by the Menon data.

The evidence suggests, rather, that cognitive dissonance is directly related to Menon's attitudinal prism. The ambivalence to the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth flow from his twin pre-occupations with imperialism and its obverse -- independence. Similarly, his image of the United Nations is inconsistent due to its success in the crucial area of decolonization and its failure to maintain peace. Finally, the most deeply rooted ambivalence is found in his image of China -- a fraternal Asian state which also experienced humiliation at the hands of Europeans, but which engaged, nevertheless, in expansionist activity and victimized India. It is the relevance of these actors to Menon's ideology and to his personal experience which produces cognitive dissonance in his image.

2. "The flexibility of an image is an inverse function of the level of intensity" (Pruitt). This hypothesis is confirmed by the data. Menon's image of the United States, the most intense and the most extreme, was the least susceptible to change. So too is his image of Pakistan: it is intensely hostile and it did not change. The level of intensity seems positively related to the degree of rigidity of images.

3. "The more hostility a state perceives, the more

hostility a state will express" (Zinnes). This hypothesis had been previously tested and confirmed. Our data support it. Menon's foreign policy image demonstrates almost perfect symmetry between perception of hostile action and expression of hostility.

4. "If State A perceives that it is the object of State Y's hostility, then A will express hostility toward Y" (Zinnes). There was no direct testing of this hypothesis in our study and it is therefore impossible to confirm or reject it. Nevertheless, evidence that exists suggests that there is no symmetrical relationship between perceptions of India as an object of hostility and expressions by India of hostility to the offending state. For example, Menon frequently expresses hostility toward the United States but only intermittently does he perceive the United States as hostile to India. Rather, his hostility to the United States is often based on America's behaviour in the global system rather than the Indo-American bilateral relationship.

5. "In both high-involvement and low-involvement situations perceptions of hostility will tend to be higher than statements of intent. In situations of greater intensity perceptions of hostility intervene significantly to escalate the level of violence" (Holsti et al.). This hypothesis

is only partly confirmed. Certainly, throughout the interviews perceptions of hostility far outnumbered statements of intent, operationalized as demands for change in the status quo. On the other hand, even where perceptions of hostility were both frequent and intense, there was no escalation in the level of violence unless commensurate reference to change of status quo statements were found. Menon is the example par excellence of a decision-maker whose perceptions are intensely hostile; yet his hostility is diffuse and unrelated to specific objectives. For this reason the policy implications of the hostility are not disruptive and violent.

6. "Non-aligned states will evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms. They will perceive the actions of both groups in similar terms" (Choukri). If we treat the Soviet Union and the United States as representative of their blocs, we must totally reject this hypothesis. As noted, Menon sharply differentiates between the two actors. He is intensely hostile to the United States, and many of his demands for specific changes are related to American behaviour in the global system. On the other hand, he is friendly to and uncritical of the Soviet Union.

We have thus far examined Menon's incidence of attention to components and sub-components within his image, and the kind of attention he accorded them. It remains to explore his association structure.

d. The Association Structure within Menon's Image

Through the use of contingency analysis, it was possible to isolate Menon's patterns of association. Table XXIV lists all the significant contingencies of each of the major sub-components of Menon's image.

Menon associates the United Nations with two actors, the United States and the Soviet Union, and with the strategy of mediation. The United States is associated with the Soviet Union, the United Nations and the issue of Indo-China; and the Soviet Union is associated with the United States, Indo-China, Korea, China and the strategy of mediation. This pattern suggests that Menon associates the two super powers with the universal actor, with global issues and with the strategy of mediation. This conforms to our hypothetical structure of the image of any non-aligned decision-maker. The most important association with the United Nations is its function as an intermediary in issues of conflict between

Table XXIV

The Contingencies of Components in Menon's Image

India:	Bilateral - .80; Negotiation - .80; Respect - .75; Rectitude - .75; and Dominant-Bilateral - .71.
United Nations:	Congo - .71; U.S.A. - .705; U.S.S.R. - .705; and Mediation - .705.
United States:	U.S.S.R. - .875; Indo-China - .80; and United Nations - .705.
U.S.S.R.:	Indo-China - .93; United States - .875; Korea - .75; China - .75; and Mediation - .75.
China:	Korea - .875; Indo-China - .80; Dominant-Bilateral - .777; United Kingdom - .75; and Non-Alignment - .71.
United Kingdom:	Power - .82; Rectitude - .82; China - .75; Dominant-Bilateral - .78; Public Opinion - .75; Non-Alignment - .71; and Imperialism - .705.
United Arab Republic:	Israel - .727; Arabs - .727; Suez - .727; and Respect - .71.
Israel	United Arab Republic - .727; Bilateral - .71; and Negotiation - .71.
Pakistan:	Bilateral - .75; and War - .705.
Global:	Dominant-Bilateral - .777; Colonialism - .705; Power - .705; and Rectitude - .705.
Bilateral:	Imperialism - .82; Respect - .82; Rectitude - .82; India - .80; Asia - .76; Pakistan - .75; and Negotiation - .75.
Africa:	Respect - .777; Independence - .75; and Asia - .727.

Table XXIV (continued)

The Contingencies of Components in Menon's Image

Dominant-Bilateral:	Rectitude - .888; England - .78; Asia - .78; and China - .777.
Asia:	Dominant-Bilateral - .78; Bilateral - .76; Institutional pressure groups - .76; Imperialism - .727; Colonialism - .727; Africa - .727; Respect - .727; and Rectitude - .727.
Public Opinion:	Power - .94; Rectitude - .82; England - .75; Non-Alignment - .71; and War - .705.
Institutional Interest Groups:	Asia -.76; and Africa - .705.
Incumbent Elite:	Power - .71.
Imperialism:	Bilateral - .82; Well-being - .82; Respect - .78; Rectitude - .78; Dominant-Bilateral - .74; and Asia - .727.
War:	Pakistan - .705; and Public Opinion - .705.
Non-Alignment:	Dominant-Bilateral - .75; England - .71; China - .71; and Public Opinion - .71.
Colonialism:	Asia - .727; and Global - .705.
Independence:	Africa - .75.
Respect:	Rectitude - .888; Bilateral - .82; Imperialism - .78; Africa - .777; India - .75; and Asia - .727.
Power:	Public Opinion - .94; Rectitude - .888; England - .82; and Dominant-Bilateral - .74.

TABLE XXIV (continued)

The Contingencies of Components in Menon's Image

Well-being:	Imperialism - .82.
Rectitude:	Dominant-Bilateral - .89; Power - .89; Respect - .89; United Kingdom - .82; Bilateral - .82; Public Opinion - .82; Imperialism - .78; and India - .75.
Korea:	China - .875; Indo-China - .80; Congo - .77; U.S.S.R. - .75; and Mediation - .75.
Indo-China:	U.S.S.R. - .93; China - .80; United States - .80; Mediation - .80; and Korea - .80.
the Congo:	Mediation - .77; Korea - .77; and United Nations - .71.
Mediation:	Indo-China - .80; Congo - .77; Korea - .75; and U.S.S.R. - .75.
Negotiation:	India - .80; and Bilateral - .75.

the super powers. It is interesting to note that the United Nations is not primarily associated with the problem of colonialism.

Two other interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. The United Kingdom is associated with China, with non-alignment and imperialism, and with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction. China is also associated with Britain, non-alignment, and the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, as well as with the issues of Korea and Indo-China. This suggests that Menon's image of the global system is multi-tiered: he clearly distinguishes the United States and the Soviet Union as the two super powers in the contemporary international system, but they are closely associated with both China and Britain as two other major actors in the global system. Menon does not perceive China primarily in its bilateral relationship with India; nor is China significantly associated with Pakistan, India's other hostile neighbour. Paramount in Menon's image of both China and Britain is their position in the global system -- a position second only to that of the super powers -- and the corresponding importance of the strategy of non-alignment.

Menon associates Egypt with Israel, with the Arabs,

the super powers. It is interesting to note that the United Nations is not primarily associated with the problem of colonialism.

Two other interesting patterns emerge from this analysis. The United Kingdom is associated with China, with non-alignment and imperialism, and with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction. China is also associated with Britain, non-alignment, and the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, as well as with the issues of Korea and Indo-China. This suggests that Menon's image of the global system is multi-tiered: he clearly distinguishes the United States and the Soviet Union as the two super powers in the contemporary international system, but they are closely associated with both China and Britain as two other major actors in the global system. Menon does not perceive China primarily in its bilateral relationship with India; nor is China significantly associated with Pakistan, India's other hostile neighbour. Paramount in Menon's image of both China and Britain is their position in the global system -- a position second only to that of the super powers -- and the corresponding importance of the strategy of non-alignment.

Menon associates Egypt with Israel, with the Arabs,

with the Suez Crisis and with the value of respect. He associates Israel with the United Arab Republic, with the bilateral level of interaction, and with the strategy of negotiation. Menon associates both actors with their continuing and recurring dispute. He is hostile to Israel, condemning her unilateral behaviour, and is sympathetic to and respectful of Egypt.

Pakistan's pattern of associations in Menon's image is very limited. It is associated with the bilateral level of interaction and with the symbol 'war'. This suggests that Menon sharply separates Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistani conflict from all other aspects of his foreign policy images. He draws no analogies and equates Pakistan with no other actor in the international system. This contrasts sharply with his image of China. Pakistan is perceived only along a single dimension -- that of bilateral conflict with India. This perception is sharp and is not qualified by integration with any of the other components of Menon's foreign policy images. The mention of Pakistan produces an immediate association with war.

Menon associates India with both the bilateral and the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, with the values of

respect and rectitude, and with the strategy of negotiation. This confirms Menon's image of the moral role played by India in the international system and the strong emphasis on negotiation as the proper strategy for India to pursue.

Menon associates the global system with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, and with the symbol 'colonialism'. He associates the dominant-bilateral level with the global system, with China and England, with the subordinate system of Asia, with the symbol 'imperialism', and with the strategy of non-alignment. Clearly, Menon's image of the global system is very closely integrated with the dominant-bilateral level. He isolates colonialism as the generic problem of the global system and imperialism as the defining characteristic of dominant-bilateral interaction. England and China, as well as the United States and the Soviet Union, are the major actors in contemporary international politics, and the strategy of non-alignment is the appropriate one for India in this system.

Menon's image of Asia and Africa is also highly integrated: the two subordinate systems are significantly associated with each other. The dominant association with Africa is independence; with Asia it is imperialism and colonialism.

In both cases Menon perceives domestic institutional pressure groups as a significant factor. His pattern of association for the Middle East subordinate system is much more limited; the Arabs are significantly associated with Suez and with Egypt. Apparently Menon perceives Asia and Africa within a global context, while he takes cognizance of the Middle East primarily within a regional context.

Domestic factors are not highly integrated in Menon's foreign policy images. Public opinion is associated with non-alignment and war, and with England. Institutional pressure groups are associated with Asia and Africa. The relevance of domestic factors is extremely low: they are neither salient nor highly associated with a significant number of the components of Menon's foreign policy image.

Symbols are much more highly integrated into the overall structure of Menon's image. 'Non-alignment' is associated with the dominant-bilateral level of interaction and with the two other major powers in his image, England and China. It is also related to public opinion, the only instance in which a domestic factor other than pressure groups is significant.

'Imperialism' is associated with the three most salient

values -- well-being, respect and rectitude. Of all the symbols, 'imperialism' alone is significantly related to moral and value questions. It is associated both with the bilateral and the dominant-bilateral levels of interaction and with the subordinate system of Asia.

As noted, 'colonialism' is associated with the Asian subordinate system and 'independence' with the African subordinate system.

Respect and rectitude, the two most salient deference values, are also highly interdependent. Respect is strongly associated with Africa, Asia, and India, and with the bilateral level of interaction. Rectitude is related to both the bilateral and the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, to the symbol 'imperialism', to England and to India, and to the value of power. These two deference values are associated with each other and with India; they are also both related to 'imperialism'. Menon perceives the position of Asia and Africa within the contemporary system in terms of status. The association of rectitude with the United Kingdom is not at all surprising, given Menon's ambivalent attitude.

Power, the other major deference value, is also associated with England and with rectitude. This underlines the

dissonance in Menon's attitudes to the United Kingdom. Power is also related to the dominant-bilateral level of interaction, revealing Menon's acute perception of this reality in the contemporary international system. It is also related to the domestic variable of public opinion. Well-being, the only welfare value, is related only to 'imperialism', underlining the signal importance in Menon's foreign policy images of 'imperialism' and all its variants.

This pattern of values shows a very high degree of inter-relatedness: three of the four values are significantly associated with each other, and three of the four values are related to 'imperialism'. India itself is associated with the two major deference values, as is the dominant-bilateral level of interaction. Menon's value system focusses on the behaviour of the super powers and of England and on the practice of imperialism at any level in the international system.

The contingencies of the three salient issues demonstrates a clear pattern. Korea is associated with China, the Soviet Union, the issues of the Congo and Indo-China, and the strategy of mediation. Indo-China is associated with the Soviet Union, China, the United States, the issue of Korea, and the strategy of mediation. The Congo is associated with

the issue of Korea and the United Nations. All these issues are perceived in their global context, rather than in their regional setting. China, the Soviet Union, and the United States are significantly associated with these issues -- confirming our earlier suggestion that Menon perceives China in a global as well as a bilateral context. The strategy of mediation is significantly related to all three issues.

Finally, the low degree of inter-relatedness of strategies is worth noting. Mediation is related to Indo-China, the Congo and Korea, and negotiation is related to India and the bilateral level of interaction. This confirms the low level of attention paid by Menon to strategies and their lack of importance in the over-all structure of Menon's foreign policy images.

In an effort to isolate the most significant patterns of association with the highest degree of inter-relatedness, the data were subjected to cluster analysis. The results of this analysis are presented in the matrix of correlations in Figure 15.

Only two clear clusters emerged. The first is the cluster of the United Kingdom, China and the dominant-bilateral

Figure 15

Menon

Cluster Analysis

	United Kingdom	China	Dominant-Bilateral
United Kingdom	-	75	78
China	75	-	77
Dominant-Bilateral	78	77	-

	India	Bilateral	Respect	Rectitude	Imperialism
India	-	80	75	75	
Bilateral	80	-	82	82	82
Respect	75	82	-	88	78
Rectitude	75	82	88	-	78
Imperialism		82	78	78	

level of interaction. We have already suggested that Menon has a multi-tiered image of the global system, in which the United Kingdom and China assume a position disproportionate to their objective capabilities. It is interesting to note that both the United Kingdom and China are the subject of considerable cognitive dissonance in Menon's image.

The second cluster to emerge was that of India, imperialism, respect and rectitude, and the bilateral level of interaction. This emphasizes again the signal importance of imperialism, both as a moral and a behavioural problem, in Menon's foreign policy images.

Having explored the association structure of the elements of Menon's image, we can return to the hypothesis that 'the more supporting and interdependent the elements of an image, the less flexible the image' (Pruitt). We did not test this hypothesis directly; therefore, only general comments can be offered. It does not appear that interdependence is the most crucial determinant of flexibility; rather, the level of intensity appears to be more significant in producing rigidity. For example, Menon's image of the United States has been inflexible over time; yet it has relatively few supporting elements. On the other hand, the United States

is the object of intense hostility. It seems that the higher the level of intensity, the less flexible the image. The level of intensity is related, directly or indirectly, to the decision-maker's attitudinal prism.

In conclusion, Menon displayed considerable gaps between image and reality at all three levels of the international system -- the global, the subordinate and the bilateral. He paid disproportionate attention to the global system and focussed heavily on one of the super powers; his foreign policy image reflected his over-riding concern with imperialism. He ignored his own subordinate system and continually misunderstood an important neighbour of India. Unfortunately, it was from India's neighbours and her subordinate system that the major challenges to India's foreign policy erupted. The dissonance and distortion in Menon's foreign policy image left him unequipped to meet those challenges and to adjust to changing reality.

Chapter VII

Jawaharlal Nehru and V.K. Krishna Menon: Their View of the World

We have examined the components of the foreign policy images of both Nehru and Menon. We have explored the salience of components, the patterns of intensity and the association structure of each image. It is now possible to compare and contrast their foreign policy perceptions at a more general level, both vertically, by exploring their view of the world, and horizontally, by issue area analysis.

A view of the world is a decision-maker's definition of his external environment. It consists of three closely related sets of images -- of the global system, of the subordinate system and of near neighbours.[1] Nehru's and Menon's foreign policy images will be compared at each of these three levels.

---

1. A view of the world has been defined as six closely related perceptions of the global, subordinate, and bilateral environment -- and of the proper or desirable role which a state should play in each of these three fields. See M. Brecher, 'Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XL, 1 & 2, Spring and Summer 1967, p. 63. The technique of content analysis did not, however, separate advocacy from the general foreign policy image. For this reason the second set of images will be omitted from the analysis.

a. Image of the Global System

The classical interpretation of Indian foreign policy as a non-aligned response to a bi-polar world must be qualified. The global system was not the most important level of the international system in Nehru's image; nor did the two super powers dominate his perceptions. For Nehru's image of the global system was less structured and more fluid. He recognized that the two power blocs were a major feature of the global system but he emphasized the importance of all nations in the international community. He spoke not of 'super powers' but rather of great powers: "....I should like the House" he declared in 1948, "....to turn its mind to any country today and think of its foreign policy -- whether it is the U.S.A., the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China or France. These are supposed to be the great powers".[2]

Nehru's perceptions of the United States and of the Soviet Union were strikingly similar: neither was the object of intense attitudes; both occurred in statements of moderate hostility and friendship. He recognized the importance of the two super powers but judged each of their actions independently. His overwhelming preoccupation was, however, with

2. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy, op.cit., p. 29.

the threat that their continual conflict posed to world peace: "Millions of people believe in what is called Western capitalism; millions also believe in communism. But, there are many millions who are not committed to either of these ideologies....I venture to make this appeal to the great leaders, more especially of America and Russia....to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus to show the world they are determined to end this menace...."[3] Even on such vital questions as nuclear disarmament, the Prime Minister distinguished the super powers from others in degree rather than in kind.

By contrast, Menon's image of the global system is highly structured and sharply asymmetrical. Menon views the world as dominated by two power blocs led by the United States and the Soviet Union: each is in continuous and dangerous conflict with the other. However, the responsibility for this conflict is sharply unequal, since the United States is seen as the major culprit. The United States has been, in fact, the major actor in Menon's perceptions. It occurred in every unit analysed and it was the most prominent target of Menon's hostility. Its pre-eminence was not a function of

---

3. Ibid., p. 202 (emphasis mine), (November 27, 1957).

direct Indo-American relations; rather, the United States was significantly associated with perceptions of the global system. The United States was perceived as both the major actor and the major threat in the international community. The Soviet Union also was present in all units; its frequency of occurrence, however, was much lower. It was one of the few countries to occur significantly in Menon's statements of friendship. In short, Menon perceived the United States with antagonism and hostility and viewed the Soviet Union with friendship. A large part of this image can be traced both to his acceptance of the Leninist theory of imperialism and to the lasting influence of Laski's neo-Marxism, imbibed during the 'thirties. Unlike Nehru, Menon emphasized the super powers' overwhelming superiority in the global system; however, he sharply distinguished the way in which they used their capability.

Neither of India's decision-makers confined their image of the global system to the US and the USSR; rather, they emphasized the role of the United Kingdom. Indeed, Nehru and Menon paid more attention to the United Kingdom than they did to the Soviet Union; both, moreover, had sharply dissonant attitudes toward Britain. This ambivalence was a

product of the long years of struggle against British rule in India, a struggle which created an intense hostility to colonialism and imperialism. On the other hand, Nehru and Menon acquired a deep admiration for the British parliamentary system and many British values: free speech, free assembly, respect for the individual and tolerance toward opposition. Nehru frequently expressed his respect for the path England had followed since the second world war: "....since the war years I have nurtured considerable respect for England, because I like brave people fighting against odds and the British people have fought against heavy odds."[4]

Both, instinctively antagonistic to any re-appearance of European troops in Asia, Africa or the Middle East, criticized British participation in the Suez War of 1956. Yet both tempered their criticism with reassertions of the value of Indo-British friendship. The other participant in the Suez invasion, France, was subjected to unqualified attack. Reference to France was restricted largely to the Suez crisis while references to Britain were frequent and widespread. It can be suggested that the high salience of Britain in their views of the world was a function both of highly dissonant perceptions and the disproportionate amount of attention

4. Nehru, op.cit., p. 57 (June 12, 1952).

accorded to former colonial powers.

A third component in the image of both Nehru and Menon was the United Nations. Nehru mentioned the universal actor more frequently than any other actor, even within the context of primarily bilateral issues such as China and Kashmir. His image of the United Nations was, however, sharply dissonant, as was Menon's. Dissonance arose from the dual function of the United Nations; both men expressed satisfaction with its role in decolonization but were sharply critical of its failure to preserve and maintain peace. Menon remarked that the most important contribution of the UN is 'that it survives' [5] and 'things get debated; it's better to talk at each other than to shoot at each other. In that sense the U.N. has been a good safety valve and often delays crises....I think the most important contribution of the U.N. is in the Trusteeship business, not because I am an ex-colonial but because it has helped to bring the old-style empires to an end."[6] However, Menon described peace-keeping operations, with the exception of UNEF, as "a dismal failure". "The name 'peace-keeping operations' was given afterwards to a number of ad hoc arrange-

5. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, op.cit., p. 114.

6. Ibid., pp. 114-15.

ments".[7] Nehru too perceived the United Nations primarily within the global context and emphasized its failure to perform its peace-keeping function. This dissatisfaction was compounded by the role of the international organization in the recurring Indo-Pakistani dispute and by its failure to promote effective arms control and disarmament. The United Nations, therefore, was an important component of the foreign policy image of both Menon and Nehru; but their perceptions of it were contradictory and dissonant. In neither case, however, was the cognitive dissonance complicated by factors of extreme identity or hostility.

A fourth component in Nehru's and Menon's image of world politics was the "third world", a vast and amorphous group of states which they designated an "area of peace". Intimately related to the idea of an area of peace was the policy of non-alignment, a fundamental tenet for both Nehru and Menon.

The basic criterion of membership in an 'area of peace' is non-association or non-alignment with any military bloc. Nehru remarked in 1949: "We have stated repeatedly that our

---

7. Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, op.cit., p. 115.

foreign policy is one of keeping aloof from the big blocs of nations -- rival blocs -- and being friendly to all countries and not becoming entangled in any alliances, military or other, that might drag us into any possible conflict".[8] He further states: "Sometimes it is suggested....that the small countries of the world should band themselves together. If that implies what has been called a Third Force, it is a contradiction in terms, because numbers do not create a force. They may create moral pressures but not a force....If it takes the shape of banding together, even the ability to exert moral pressure goes into the background, and the physical side comes up".[9] On another occasion Nehru said: "Some people use the word 'neutral'in regard to India's policy. I do not like the word at all, having myself been in the past.... not exactly a negative individual but a positive individual working for positive causes, and having....a certain contempt for a neutral person who has no views at all....Our present policy is not a question of balancing ourselves between groups or blocs of nations which have arisen. That kind of sitting on the fence or balancing has not occurred to us at all. We are adopting a positive policy which we think is right."[10]

---

8. Nehru, op.cit., p. 37.
9. Ibid., p. 78 (August 20, 1958).
10. Ibid., p. 85 (October 4, 1960).

Most of the members of the 'area of peace' are former European colonies or trust territories in Asia and Africa, but states which have joined bloc-sponsored alliances and those which are under the military protection of a bloc or bloc leader are by definition excluded. Menon underlined that the strength of the non-aligned nations was not physical but moral: "Third Bloc, never! The Third Bloc is a foolish idea. How can there be a Third Bloc? My understanding of non-alignment is that it cannot be a Third Bloc for a bloc means power....This (an area of peace) is a policy of independence and peace; that is, materially speaking, a weak man's policy. In a sense....it is like Gandhi's non co-operation. In his weakness he invented an instrument which was stronger than anything else".[11]

A comparative analysis of Menon's and Nehru's treatment of non-alignment reveals certain significant differences in their views of the global system. Both made the highest proportion of intense statements when they discussed non-alignment; for both it was the central tenet of Indian foreign policy. Menon, however, emphasized most strongly the continuing presence of imperialism and imperialist practices:

---

11. Menon, quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 8.

'imperialism' is the dominant symbol throughout his speeches. Non-alignment was perceived not primarily as a response to a bi-polar world but, rather, as a response in an international system in which imperialism continued to dominate. More particularly, non-alignment was perceived as a moral response to the imperialist practices of one bloc, that led by the United States.

Nehru de-emphasized the role of imperialism as a major force in the global system: "It is very easy to talk against imperialism...." he said in 1952. "I do not deny that imperialism exists but I would venture to say that imperialism, as it exists today, is hardly what it was in the past.... Surely, no one in this House can say that British imperialism, for instance, is the same thing that it was in the past.... British imperialism today is an exhausted thing." [12] Unlike Menon, Nehru mentioned 'imperialism' only sparingly.

Nehru emphasized the symbols 'war' and 'peace'. "I think that the biggest idea that has gradually evolved in people's minds all over the world is the futility of war -- that war does not solve any major issues and that, therefore, all problems, however difficult and intricate, should be approached peacefully";[13] and "Mahatma Gandhi made an out-

12. Nehru, op.cit., p. 57.
13. Ibid., p. 98 (January 15, 1960).

standing contribution not only to the freedom of India but to the cause of world peace. He taught us the doctrine of non-violence, not as passive submission to evil, but as an active and positive instrument for the peaceful solution of international differences".[14] "What is our purpose?" he asked in 1951. "Surely, today, it is the avoidance of war and the maintenance of peace....But something more is necessary than mere formulae. What we need is a passion for peace and for civilized behaviour in international affairs. It is the temper of peace and not the temper of war that we want".[15]

The central place of war and peace in Nehru's view of the world can be traced in part, perhaps, to his long and deep association with the Mahatma. This was strengthened by the necessity of peace for Indian independence and development. It is not surprising that 'independence' followed 'war' and 'peace' in cumulative occurrence in Nehru's speeches. In all units where a significant degree of high intensity hostility occurred, 'war' or 'peace' was the pre-eminent symbol. The war-peace continuum was the basic dynamic underlying hostility in Nehru's foreign policy image; in Menon's view of the world, imperialism was the focal point of hostility.

---

14. Nehru, op.cit., p. 182 (April 3, 1948).
15. Ibid., p. 187.

The cluster of symbols, values and strategy which has emerged from the analysis reveals the Prime Minister's perception of the global system. The association of 'war', 'peace' and 'independence' with six values -- affection, rectitude, respect, skill, well-being and enlightenment -- and with the strategy of non-alignment was the ordering framework for all Nehru's foreign policy perceptions. Particular actions, specific actors and foreign policy issues were all interpreted within this context. Non-alignment in its broadest sense -- the prevention of war, the maintenance of peace and the preservation of independence -- was a global, subordinate and bilateral strategy. Relatively few actors remained fixed in his perceptions; they were all tested and measured against the criteria of peace and independence. The structure of the global system was less important than the task of safeguarding the peace.

Menon, too, valued the strategy of non-alignment and frequently expressed concern about threats of war. His dominant pre-occupation, however, was imperialism, and this strongly influenced his perception of the United States. His view of the global system was thus more structured and more rigid.

It has been noted that neither the symbol, 'economic development', nor the value, wealth, was significant in Nehru's and Menon's view of the world. Nehru sometimes stressed the importance of economic growth but he rarely related it to a foreign policy issue or to his view of the global system. Menon, when asked if he considered non-alignment the most efficient path to economic development, replied: "....I don't think anyone thought about it that way at the time (1947), because the question of foreign aid and things of that kind, which are so prominent today, did not figure in our minds very much. We didn't think back from economics to politics."[16] Neither integrated his view of the global system with the goal of economic development.

b. Image of the Subordinate System

There are sharp differences in Nehru's and Menon's view of India's subordinate system: Nehru's view was well- and often-articulated; Krishna Menon was almost totally indifferent to the broad regional setting of India's foreign policy. Indeed, this is the most striking difference in their foreign policy images.

The Prime Minister often emphasized the new role for

16. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 4.

Asia in the international community: "Asia, after a long period of quiescence, has suddenly become important again in world affairs....This continent of Asia....has played a mighty role in the evolution of humanity....A change is coming over the scene now and Asia is again finding herself. We live in an age of tremendous transition and already the next stage takes shape when Asia assumes her rightful place with the other continents".[17] Further, "In this atomic age Asia will have to function effectively in the maintenance of peace. Indeed, there can be no peace unless Asia plays her part.... The whole spirit and outlook of Asia are peaceful, and the emergence of Asia in world affairs will be a powerful influence for world peace".[18] Nehru also underlined the importance of Asia in India's foreign policy: "The emergence of the independent nations in Asia naturally leads to what might be called an Asian way of looking at the world....India is unaligned, uncommitted. India's policy is influenced not only by factors like history and tradition but geography. We naturally look first to the countries around India, then further afield, because geography counts a great deal in such a matter. Therefore, there is this new approach, which might be called broadly an Asian approach".[19]

---

17. Nehru, op.cit., p. 248 (March 23, 1947).
18. Ibid., p. 251 (March 23, 1947).
19. Ibid., pp. 280-81 (February 18, 1958).

The Asian subordinate system was the most salient level of the international system in Nehru's view of the world. It impinged on almost every foreign policy issue and predominated in seven of the fourteen analysed. The Prime Minister strongly identified with the new Asia and demanded an increased role for Asia within the international system. Asia had the highest number of significant associations in Nehru's image: it was strongly related to four values -- rectitude, affection, skill and enlightenment -- to the symbol, 'aggression', to China, to the dominant-bilateral level of interaction and to the strategies of non-alignment and negotiation. It is through association with Asia that the dominant-bilateral level emerged as a significant component of Nehru's view of the world, for the Prime Minister perceived Asia as an arena of super-power penetration and aggression. The Asian subordinate system was the most salient, the most interdependent and the most value-charged level of the international system in Nehru's foreign policy image.

The Prime Minister also displayed an acute perception of the new role of Africa: "The Bandung Conference has been a historic event...." he declared in 1955. "(It) represented

the emergence of a new Asia and Africa, of new nations who are on the march towards the fulfilment of their independence and of their sense of their role in the world....Bandung proclaimed to the world the capacity of the new nations of Asia and Africa for practical idealism...."[20]. Nehru identified strongly with Africa in statements of friendship but he distinguished sharply between the two subordinate systems. Africa was associated only with the value of power and the symbol 'peace'. Asia was clearly the primary arena of interaction.

Menon's view of subordinate systems was sharply skewed. Africa emerged as a more salient level of the international system than Asia. Nonetheless, Menon's views of Asia and Africa were highly interdependent. They were significantly associated with each other while Asia was associated with 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' and Africa was associated with 'independence'. Menon perceived the global implications of the emergence of Asia and Africa and viewed their roles in status terms. By implication, he paid correspondingly little attention to the regional setting of Indian foreign policy.

Both Nehru and Menon virtually ignored the Middle East subordinate system. Nehru referred to it only when

---

20. Nehru, op.cit., p. 279.

discussing the Suez crisis but not in the context of non-alignment or the United Nations; Menon also mentioned it largely within the context of the recurring Arab-Israeli dispute. This is surprising, given Egypt's importance in the foreign policy image of both men. The Prime Minister perceived Egypt as the victim of hostility and identified strongly with the United Arab Republic in statements of friendship: "We have great respect and regard for the sovereignty and dignity of Egypt and for our friendly relations with her";[21] and "Egypt has been so intimately connected in cultural fellowship (with this continent of Asia)".[22] Menon also identified strongly with Nasser, while Israel was the object of intense hostility. Menon remarked that "(Nasser) is far more intelligent, far more honest, and a much bigger man than some people think. I have a great regard for him and faith in his integrity".[23] Egypt was the only middle power singled out by both Nehru and Menon; this suggests a special relationship of friendship and warmth between India and the sole Arab middle power.

---

21. Nehru, op.cit., p. 530 (August 8, 1956).
22. Ibid., p. 248 (March 23, 1947).
23. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., pp. 7-8.

c. Image of India's Neighbours

There were striking contrasts in Nehru's and Menon's views of India's near-neighbours. China was the object of considerable cognitive dissonance by both while Pakistan was perceived with stark uncomplicated hostility.[24]

Both Nehru and Menon viewed China not only within the bilateral context of Sino-Indian relations but also within the subordinate and global systems. Nehru remarked in 1950 that "....no one can deny China the status of a great power today. China is in a position to shape her own destiny.... The point at issue is that China is a great nation which cannot be ignored".[25] "The fact is, and it is a major fact of the middle of the 20th century, that China has become a great power -- united and strong".[26] The Prime Minister often referred to the long history of Sino-Indian relations: "The past two thousand years stand witness to our mutual relations. We have been neighbours during this long stretch of years and we have been vital countries throwing out our thought and culture to each other and to neighbouring countries.

---

24. Although Ceylon is a near-neighbour of India, neither paid significant attention to it. For this reason it is not included in the analysis.
25. Nehru, op.cit., p. 52.
26. Ibid., pp. 304-5 (September 30, 1954).

Our people have come into contact in many lands, more especially in South-East Asia; yet there is no record of war between us. This long period is of the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and of art and culture".[27] Nehru emphasized as well their common struggle for freedom: "Both our countries have recently succeeded in achieving freedom and the opportunity to work out our own destiny according to our will. We achieved our freedom under different circumstances and by different methods....Both our countries have placed the good of the common man before them and are aiming, in their different ways, to raise the millions who have suffered so much in the past...."[28]

Menon, too, emphasized the common history of India and China and their long struggle for freedom. He admired the goals of the Chinese revolution, if not the means, and empathized with a fellow victim of imperialism.Sino-Indian relations were viewed within a larger historical context: "Our relations with China and everything that has happened, and everything that will happen in the future, are rooted in our past approaches to China".[29] Menon stressed China's role

---

27. Nehru, op.cit., p. 306 (June 26, 1954).
28. Ibid., pp. 306-7 (June 26, 1954).
29. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 142.

as an Asian power: "It is tragic that two countries in Asia came into such conflict".[30]

The pervasive tone of both Nehru's and Menon's image of China after the traumatic events of 1962 was regret, disappointment and disillusion. China had betrayed India's friendship and trust and had undermined Asian solidarity. Menon remarked: "This is what I told Chou En-lai when he came here. I said, 'You may have hurt us, but you hurt yourselves more; you have strengthened every reactionary element in this country and the forces of tension in the world; you have made it impossible for reasonable people to talk and seek ways of settlement'."[31]

As a result of these conflicting images, both the Prime Minister and Menon had highly dissonant views of China. Nehru perceived China primarily as an Asian power and associated it with the symbols, 'independence', 'war' and 'aggression', with the value of enlightenment, with Indo-China and with the strategy of non-alignment. This pattern of association attests to the dissonance in his view of China: 'independence' was a highly positive symbol while 'war' and 'aggression' were highly negative. This dissonance was further

30. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 152.
31. Ibid.

complicated by intense hostility and strong identity. Menon too could not reconcile his earlier image of China with her later behaviour: "What reason had we to think China wanted to pick a quarrel with us?"[32] "I always found him (Chou En-lai) a very decent fellow".[33] Menon's dissonant view of China was also complicated by intense hostility and extreme identity.

The gap between image and reality was too great for both Nehru and Menon to ignore. They revised their image of China but only partly and reluctantly. Both refused to acknowledge that a hostile neighbour jeopardized their policy of non-alignment. Nehru remarked: "Some people ask: 'Do you still believe in this policy of non-alignment, in spite of the danger on your frontiers?' I am surprised at this kind of argument which shows a lack of understanding as to what this policy is. What has the danger on the frontier got to do with the policy of non-alignment? I do not see any connection. In fact, if I see it at all, this is the very moment when I should stick to the policy of non-alignment even more firmly...."[34] And Menon rationalized the lack of support from the non-aligned countries: "I think it is an error to

---

32. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 141.
33. Ibid., p. 155.
34. Nehru, op.cit., p. 83 (January 17, 1960).

say that the non-aligned countries didn't support us. They supported us to the same extent that we would defend any other country in similar circumstances....I mean, you cannot expect a non-aligned country to denounce China as an aggressor; China is too large a country for that."[35] The result of this gap between image and reality was cognitive dissonance which inhibited effective action.

No such contradictions complicated their view of Pakistan. Nehru associated Pakistan with 'aggression' and in discussing the issue of Kashmir, he frequently referred to the value of rectitude: "....their (the Pakistani) denial was false. That is an important matter....not only from the point of view of practical politics....but important also from the standards of morality, good behaviour and decency that should subsist between nations....The way the Pakistan Government have reacted....is so extraordinary as to be hardly credible for a nation."[36] In 1948 he said: "I think the fundamental factor is the aggression of Pakistan on Indian Union territory".[37] This combination of moral certainty and

---

35. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., pp. 159-60.
36. Nehru, op.cit., p. 452 (September 7, 1948).
37. Ibid., p. 455.

strong association of Pakistan with aggression created a sharp and unequivocal image of India's neighbour. The limited pattern of association indicated that the Pakistani problem was not integrated with other components of Nehru's foreign policy image: he had an internally-consistent image of Pakistan as a hostile and aggressive neighbour.

Menon was even more explicit. He condemned Pakistan as a theocracy and as a creature of British imperialism and he criticized her acceptance of American military aid and her participation in SEATO. Even the Chinese invasion of 1962 did not deflect Menon from his pre-occupation with Pakistan: "Even today, I maintain that our main enemy is Pakistan. China, even if she came here, could not stay here"[38] and "I have said that Pakistan is a danger to us: she claims our territories and she has taken them; she probes our frontiers and carries on subversive activity inside India; she means no good to us; we cannot afford to take a generous view of her".[39] Finally, Menon claimed, Pakistan wanted to swallow all of India: "In Pakistan's view the Partition is only the beginning. Her idea is to get a jumping-off ground to take

---

38. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 154.
39. Ibid., p. 170.

the whole of India. Their minds work in this way -- that it was from the Moghuls that the British took over. Now, the British having gone, they must come back. This is the attitude of the Pakistan extremists".[40] Menon had a very limited pattern of associations with Pakistan; it was related only to the bilateral level of interaction and to the symbol,'war'. He sharply separated Pakistan and the Indo-Pakistani conflict from all other aspects of his foreign policy image. Pakistan was perceived unequivocally by both Nehru and Menon along a single dimension, that of bilateral conflict with India.

In summary, certain significant differences and similarities emerge from a comparative analysis of Nehru's and Menon's views of the world. Before analyzing these differences, however, it would be useful to compare their foreign policy images at a horizontal level, in two broad issue-areas. It will then be possible to compare not only the differences in their general foreign policy image but also to assess the resulting implications on specific foreign policy issues.

d. An Issue-Area Comparison

The issues that were coded for analysis fell into

---

40. Menon, as quoted in Brecher, op.cit., p. 171.

two broad issue-areas -- military-security and political-diplomatic.[41] It was useful to subdivide the political-diplomatic issue-area into two categories: those specific crises which erupted periodically -- Korea, Indo-China, Suez, Hungary and the Congo -- and those policy issues which are continuing and recurrent problems of policy choice -- non-alignment, trends in world politics, the United Nations and the Bomb. The military-security issue-area includes Goa, China, and Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir.

Table XXV indicates the frequently-occurring components of Nehru's and Menon's image in the political-diplomatic issue-area (general). The last column provides the cumulative frequency.

In the discussion of non-alignment Nehru emphasized the United Nations and the United Kingdom; Menon accorded the greatest attention to the United States. Asia and Africa were the predominant arenas of interaction in Nehru's perception while the global and dominant-bilateral levels were pre-eminent in Menon's image. Nehru perceived competing elites as the most important domestic variable while Menon stressed public opinion, and Nehru emphasized the symbols of

---

41. See pp. 65-66 above.

Table XXV

Frequently-Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image

Political-Diplomatic Issue-Area (General)

ACTORS	Non-Alignment	United Nations	World Politics	The Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Nehru					
India	120	10	93	57	280
United Nations	19	31	31	9	90
United Kingdom	23	3	3	4	33
United States	10	0	5	16	31
Soviet Union	6	0	5	16	27
Pakistan	0	0	10	0	10
China	1	0	7	0	8
Menon					
India	107	45	98	48	298
United States	33	20	74	12	139
United Nations	10	107	17	1	135
China	12	4	28	10	54
Soviet Union	11	14	19	4	48
United Kingdom	7	2	19	10	38
Pakistan	0	2	1	1	4
LEVELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM					
Nehru					
Asia	11	2	17	2	32
Africa	5	4	15	1	25
Global	1	3	3	0	7
Dominant-Bilateral	1	0	1	0	2
Bilateral	1	0	0	0	1

Table XXV (continued)

Menon	Non-Alignment	United Nations	World Politics	The Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Global	40	13	22	36	111
Africa	7	28	24	3	62
Dominant-Bilateral	20	0	15	7	42
Bilateral	4	1	10	5	20
Asia	0	14	3	2	19
DOMESTIC VARIABLES					
Nehru					
Competing Elites	8	1	3	3	15
Non-associational interest groups	0	0	0	0	0
Menon					
Institutional pressure groups	0	4	1	17	22
Public Opinion	4	0	4	1	9
SYMBOLS					
Nehru					
War	24	21	32	0	77
Peace	27	16	11	9	63
Two Blocs	24	0	11	0	35
Independence	4	8	13	0	25
Non-Alignment	13	0	11	0	24
Colonialism	7	0	12	0	19
Menon					
Non-Alignment	32	0	7	8	47
Colonialism	5	9	5	4	23
Independence	13	3	4	0	20
Imperialism	3	2	9	0	14
War	0	3	7	3	13

Table XXV (continued)

VALUES	Non-Alignment	United Nations	World Politics	The Bomb	Cumulative Frequency
Nehru					
Respect	12	5	5	4	26
Power	5	7	7	5	24
Rectitude	10	6	3	2	21
Enlightenment	11	1	5	3	20
Skill	7	6	2	3	18
Affection	7	3	6	1	17
Well-Being	11	0	2	2	15
Menon					
Respect	7	8	10	0	25
Rectitude	3	1	8	8	20
Power	3	2	3	5	13
Well-being	4	1	5	2	12
STRATEGIES					
Nehru					
Disarmament	0	10	15	4	29
Non-Alignment	13	0	5	0	18
Menon					
Negotiation	0	0	5	0	5
Mediation	3	0	2	0	5

'peace', 'war' and 'two blocs' while Menon stressed 'non-alignment'. Deference and status considerations characterized the value patterns of both and Nehru placed heavy emphasis on the strategy of non-alignment. Finally, both men expressed intense hostility, satisfaction and friendship; the highest proportion of intense statements were made in the discussion of non-alignment.

In the analysis of the United Nations both foreign policy-makers naturally stressed the United Nations but Menon also emphasized the United States and to a lesser degree the Soviet Union. The asymmetry in his view of the global system is less here, however, than in other foreign policy issues. Both perceived Africa as the most important arena of interaction, but Nehru stressed the symbols, 'war', 'peace' and 'independence' while Menon referred most frequently to 'colonialism'. Although both emphasized status and power considerations, Nehru also referred frequently to welfare values. In general, Menon emphasized the structure of the international system -- its actors and levels -- while Nehru placed greater weight on the forces (or symbols) and values.

In the analysis of trends in world politics Menon referred most frequently to the United States: all other

actors followed at a much lower level. The disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union is striking. The United Nations was the only important actor in Nehru's articulated image. Menon stressed Africa and the global system while Nehru gave preponderant weight to Asia and Africa; moreover, there was a much heavier regional emphasis in Nehru's perceptions. Menon referred most frequently to 'imperialism' while Nehru placed a heavy emphasis on 'war'. Both stressed power and status considerations even though Nehru also mentioned the welfare values frequently. Neither made highly intense statements when evaluating world politics.

In the discussion of the Bomb Nehru emphasized the two super powers and the United Nations while Menon again gave preponderant attention to the United States, followed by China and the United Kingdom. The low salience of the Soviet Union is again striking. Nehru stressed Asia and Africa while Menon accorded greatest attention to the global system. Nehru perceived the advocacy of competing elites while Menon perceived institutional pressure groups, mainly the army. Nehru referred most frequently to 'peace' while Menon emphasized 'non-alignment', and both gave greatest weight to the deference values.

What general patterns of perception characterize this issue-area? Menon gave disproportionate attention to the United States while Nehru placed heaviest emphasis on the United Nations -- and only secondarily referred to the super powers and the United Kingdom. Menon emphasized the global system; Nehru, the regional systems of Asia and Africa, an inverted pattern. Menon referred most frequently to 'non-alignment', Nehru, to 'war' and 'peace'. Nehru perceived the advocacy of competing elites while Menon perceived the pressure of institutional interest groups. And deference values deminated the perceptions of both men. Finally, only in the discussion of non-alignment did Nehru and Menon make intense statements; the political-diplomatic issue-area as a whole did not evoke intense hostility or identity.

This pattern of perceptions does not deviate significantly from their general views of the world. It illustrates Menon's asymmetrical view of the global system and Nehru's pre-occupation with the subordinate systems of Asia and Africa, as well as the importance of deference values to both. It is interesting to note, however, that Menon's strong emphasis on imperialism is diluted here: it is not in general political-diplomatic issues that Menon perceived the most acute threat

as imperialism.

Table XXVI indicates the frequently occurring components of Nehru's and Menon's image in the political-diplomatic issue-area (crises). The last column provides the cumulative frequency.

In the discussion of Korea Nehru emphasized the United Nations and China while Menon again stressed the United Nations and the United States. Both referred frequently to the global system but Nehru laid heavy stress as well on the Asian subordinate system. The Prime Minister perceived the pressure of competing elites and non-associational interest groups while Menon paid a great deal of attention to the pressure of institutional interest groups, especially the army. The Prime Minister placed heavy emphasis on the symbols of 'war' and 'peace' while Menon made few symbolic references. Both referred overwhelmingly to welfare values. Finally, Nehru and Menon displayed varying degrees of involvement in the Korean crisis: Nehru made frequent statements of high intensity friendship and moderate and low intensity hostility and satisfaction while Menon made only a few low intensity demands for a change in the status quo.

Table XXVI

Frequently-Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image

Political-Diplomatic Issue-Area (Crises)

ACTORS	Korea	Indo-China	Suez	Hungary	Congo	Cumulative Frequency
Nehru						
India	110	37	47	41	73	308
United Nations	39	5	14	10	94	162
United Kingdom	5	3	46	3	2	59
China	45	10	0	0	0	55
Soviet Union	5	3	6	37	0	51
United States	14	6	8	1	3	32
Pakistan	0	0	1	1	0	2
Menon						
India	72	18	82	64	43	279
United Nations	27	0	8	105	49	189
United States	23	19	36	44	15	137
Britain	4	20	41	2	2	69
Soviet Union	18	11	14	18	5	66
China	10	21	5	1	0	37
Pakistan	0	0	0	11	0	11
LEVELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM						
Nehru						
Asia	20	18	8	1	4	51
Global	18	4	13	2	5	42
Dominant-Bilateral	6	2	5	7	0	20
Africa	0	0	4	1	13	18
Bilateral	10	2	3	0	0	15

Table XXVI (continued)

Menon	Korea	Indo-China	Suez	Hungary	Congo	Cumulative Frequency
Global	22	7	21	3	11	64
Dominant-Bilateral	12	3	13	0	0	28
Bilateral	5	3	13	1	1	23
Africa	1	0	1	0	9	11
Asia	1	2	1	0	1	5
DOMESTIC VARIABLES						
Nehru						
Competing Elites	5	0	0	2	0	7
Non-associational pressure groups	5	0	0	0	0	5
Menon						
Institutional interest groups	46	1	1	3	21	72
Public Opinion	0	0	0	1	0	1
SYMBOLS						
Nehru						
War	19	22	6	7	6	60
Peace	10	19	3	4	4	40
Aggression	8	1	8	1	0	18
Freedom	2	4	0	7	2	15
Independence	3	5	0	1	5	14
Non-Alignment	9	3	0	1	0	13
Colonialism	0	5	2	1	2	10

Table XXVI (continued)

Menon	Korea	Indo-China	Suez	Hungary	Congo	Cumulative Frequency
War	0	0	2	3	5	10
Imperialism	0	3	4	0	1	8
Colonialism	0	0	1	0	3	4
VALUES						
Nehru						
Power	2	1	2	9	4	18
Skill	14	2	1	0	0	17
Affection	3	6	3	0	2	14
Enlightenment	4	4	3	2	1	14
Respect	6	2	2	0	3	13
Well-Being	4	6	1	0	0	11
Rectitude	6	2	2	0	0	10
Menon						
Well-being	6	5	1	1	1	14
Respect	1	2	3	1	0	7
Power	1	0	3	3	0	7
Rectitude	0	1	5	0	1	7
STRATEGIES						
Nehru						
Negotiation	16	4	11	0	0	31
Menon						
Mediation	7	0	1	1	1	10
Negotiation	0	0	3	1	4	8

In the discussion of Indo-China Nehru emphasized China alone while Menon stressed China, the United Kingdom and the United States. Once more Nehru accorded highest importance to the Asian subordinate system while Menon emphasized the global system. Nehru referred frequently to the symbols of 'war' and 'peace' while Menon made passing reference to 'imperialism'. Both men stressed the welfare values and Menon expressed moderate intensity friendship.

In the evaluation of the Suez crisis Nehru and Menon emphasized the same actors -- the United Kingdom and Egypt. Both referred most frequently to the global system. The symbolic references were relatively low for both men: Nehru emphasized 'aggression' and 'war' while Menon stressed 'imperialism'. Nehru gave greatest weight to welfare values while Menon stressed questions of morality. Both foreign policy-makers advocated negotiation. Nehru expressed high intensity hostility while Menon made few intense statements.

In the analysis of Hungary Nehru and Menon differed sharply. Nehru emphasized the United Nations and the Soviet Union while Menon emphasized the United Nations and the United States. Nehru placed great weight on the dominant-bilateral level while Menon stressed the global system. Neither

decision-maker made many symbolic references, but both emphasized 'war' and agreed on the pre-eminence of power considerations. Finally, Menon frequently expressed moderate and low intensity hostility, generally directed at the United States, while Nehru made almost no intense statements at all.

In the discussion of the Congo both decision-makers emphasized the United Nations and the African subordinate system, though Menon stressed the global system as well. The Prime Minister perceived no significant domestic pressure while Menon gave great weight to the advocacy of institutional interest groups. Both stressed the symbol, 'war' but Nehru emphasized 'peace' and 'independence' as well. Finally, neither made any intense statements of any significance.

What general patterns of perception are evident in these crisis issues? Both Nehru and Menon laid heavy stress on the United Nations; Menon strongly emphasized the United States as well. Nehru gave great weight to the Asian subordinate system; Menon, to the global system. The Prime Minister perceived the advocacy of competing elites; Menon, the pressure of institutional interest groups. The Prime Minister referred overwhelmingly to 'war' and 'peace' while Menon emphasized 'war' and 'imperialism'. Nehru referred

most frequently to the welfare values while Menon mentioned both the welfare and deference values. Finally Nehru and Menon revealed inverted patterns of emphasis: Nehru expressed high and moderate intensity on the Korean and Suez crises while Menon made moderate intensity statements on the Indo-Chinese and Hungarian crises.

This pattern of perceptions does not differ significantly from that relating to general issues. The one noticeable change is the pattern of value references. In political-diplomatic crises status considerations became less important; welfare and status values were more evenly balanced. Moreover, each decision-maker exhibited greater involvement in some of the crises than they did in general political-diplomatic issues. Generally, however, this pattern mirrors the view of the world of both Nehru and Menon.

Table XXVII indicates the frequently occurring components of Nehru's and Menon's image in the military-security issue-area. The last column provides the cumulative frequency.

In the discussion of Goa Nehru perceived Portugal as pre-eminent while Menon emphasized the United States. The Prime Minister stressed the regional setting while Menon

Table XXVII

Frequently-Occurring Components of Nehru's and Menon's Image

Military-Security Issue-Area

ACTORS	Goa	China	Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir	Cumulative Frequency
Nehru				
India	113	159	144	416
China	9	99	0	108
Pakistan	0	3	97	100
United Nations	0	2	27	29
United Kingdom	11	3	7	21
United States	7	5	7	19
Soviet Union	0	9	0	9
Menon				
India	190	131	63	384
United States	49	9	17	75
China	0	50	1	51
Pakistan	9	4	29	42
United Kingdom	6	12	21	39
United Nations	12	1	5	18
Soviet Union	0	5	6	11
LEVELS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM				
Nehru				
Bilateral	1	10	9	20
Asia	1	7	0	8
Global	0	7	0	7
Africa	1	0	0	1

Table XXVII (continued)

Menon	Goa	China	Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir	Cumulative Frequency
Bilateral	11	10	12	33
Global	7	4	16	27
Dominant-Bilateral	10	3	3	16
Africa	1	3	2	6
Asia	1	3	1	5
DOMESTIC VARIABLES				
Nehru				
Competing Elites	14	7	2	23
Non-Associational Interest Groups	3	2	0	5
Menon				
Institutional Interest Groups	10	14	1	25
Public Opinion	3	2	5	10
SYMBOLS				
Nehru				
War	15	15	2	32
Peace	11	9	7	27
Independence	7	6	2	15
Aggression	1	1	9	11
Freedom	5	0	0	5
Menon				
War	29	4	3	36
Imperialism	14	1	5	20
Colonialism	6	0	1	7
Independence	1	3	2	6

Table XXVII (continued)

VALUES	Goa	China	Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir	Cumulative Frequency
Nehru				
Affection	0	7	3	10
Rectitude	3	2	5	10
Enlightenment	3	5	1	9
Power	6	1	1	8
Respect	0	6	1	7
Well-being	0	2	4	6
Skill	1	2	1	4
Menon				
Power	6	5	3	14
Rectitude	7	3	2	12
Well-being	5	1	5	11
Respect	3	4	1	8
STRATEGIES				
Nehru				
Negotiation	2	4	2	8
Non-Alignment	1	7	0	8
Menon				
Negotiation	5	2	0	7

concentrated on the bilateral level. The Prime Minister once more perceived the advocacy of competing elites; Menon, the pressure of institutional interest groups. Both decision-makers stressed 'war'; in addition, Nehru emphasized 'peace' while Menon underlined the importance of 'imperialism'. Both emphasized the value of power and Menon focussed on questions of morality as well. Both, too, emphasized the strategy of negotiation. Finally, Menon expressed high intensity hostility while Nehru made few intense statements.

In the analysis of China both foreign policy decision-makers emphasized China and the bilateral level of interaction. Nehru again stressed competing elites and Menon focussed on institutional interest groups. Both emphasized 'war' and Nehru stressed 'peace' as well. Nehru underlined the importance of welfare considerations while Menon focussed on deference and power. Finally, both expressed moderate intensity hostility.

In the discussion of Partition, Pakistan and Kashmir Nehru and Menon both emphasized Pakistan; Nehru also stressed the United Nations and Menon, the United Kingdom. Both underlined the importance of the bilateral level of interaction but Menon also heavily stressed the global system. The Prime

Minister perceived the advocacy of competing elites; Menon, the pressure of public opinion. Nehru referred most frequently to the symbol, 'aggression' while Menon emphasized 'imperialism'. Both stressed deference and welfare values and both expressed high and moderate intensity hostility.

In summary, both decision-makers focussed on China and Pakistan but Menon laid heavy stress on the United States as well. Both emphasized the bilateral level of interaction. There was a heavy proportionate emphasis on domestic variables: fifty per cent of Nehru's and twenty-five per cent of Menon's references to domestic forces were concentrated within these three units. Both focussed on the symbol, 'war' and Menon also emphasized 'imperialism' while Nehru stressed 'peace' and 'aggression'. Both strongly underlined the importance of the deference values and both advocated the strategy of negotiation. Finally, hostility appeared at high and moderate levels in all three issues in Menon's perception and in two issues in Nehru's foreign policy image.

This pattern of perceptions differs significantly from that of the political-diplomatic issue-area (general and crisis). Both decision-makers emphasized as prime actors their near-neighbours but Menon also focussed heavily on the

United States. Menon's disproportionate pre-occupation with the United States extended into the military-security issue-area. Both stressed the bilateral level of interaction, a significant departure from their general emphasis on the global or regional level. Both gave disproportionate attention to domestic variables; domestic pressures became significant in their foreign policy image when military-security issues 'close to home' arose. Finally, both decision-makers expressed a high level of intense hostility; it was military-security issues which had the highest emotive content.

In conclusion there was a high correlation between each decision-maker's view of the world and his pattern of perceptions in the political-diplomatic issue-area. The ranking of variables in the political-diplomatic issue-area can therefore serve as a preliminary guide to the decision-maker's priorities in his view of the world. In the military-security issue-area, however, differences between Nehru and Menon narrowed. The requirements of military-security problems modified the general foreign policy images of both men: they created a heightened awareness of bilateral relations and the influence of domestic political factors on Indian foreign policy.

We have now explored the foreign policy images of Nehru and Menon vertically and horizontally. Both decision-makers operated within the ordering framework of non-alignment; analysis of their patterns of functional distance has confirmed the low probability of violent or disruptive behaviour resulting from their foreign policy images. Their major differences stem from varying points of emphasis within the policy of non-alignment.

Nehru's over-riding concern was the prevention of war; non-alignment was the policy response to this challenge. This led logically to a less rigidly-structured view of the global system. A second and related objective was the maintenance of the independence of the new states which had just emerged from colonial rule. This led logically to a strong emphasis on the Asian setting of Indian foreign policy. Nehru's view of the world was filtered through Asian lenses.

Menon's view was filtered through Laski's neo-Marxism and Lenin's theory of imperialism. Within the framework of non-alignment this produced a more rigidly structured view of the global system in which the 'imperialist' forces were pitted against the 'progressive' forces. His major concern was not only the prevention of war but more particularly the

prevention of imperialist wars. This theoretical perspective created an imbalance in his view of the world, for he focussed on the global system to the virtual exclusion of the subordinate system level. Nehru's view of non-alignment as a policy designed to safeguard peace and preserve independence could cross-cut existing structures in the international system. Menon's view of non-alignment as a policy response to the threat of imperialism could only reinforce structural differentiation.

This difference in emphasis had several implications. It was almost impossible for Menon to reconcile his image of China as a victim of Western imperialism with China's invasion of India; cognitive dissonance produced inaction and indecision. It was also difficult for Menon to accept the emerging American-Soviet détente; bi-polarization flowed logically from his view of the world. These and other rigidities prevented Menon from reformulating his foreign policy in the light of changing conditions. This rigidity is not unique to Menon, for images are formed early in life and are deep-rooted and difficult to change.

Nehru's view of the world was less rigid and more easily adaptable. The war-peace continuum which served as his criteria for judgement was more elastic; actors and actions were not

immutable over time. Nehru was able to distinguish between pre-1945 and post-1945 Britain and to admire and respect British efforts in the last two decades. This respect arose from close personal friendships and from the ability to recognize that change was possible and probable. It is not that Nehru was able to change his image more easily than Menon; rather the structure of his foreign policy image was itself more flexible.

It can be suggested that the differences between Nehru's and Menon's view of the world reflect the progressive Indianization of Indian foreign policy. Menon was the example par excellence of a non-Indianized Indian decision-maker. His view of the world was a product of Western philosophy and Western experience. Nehru's view of the world reflected both Western and Indian influence: his long and deep association with Gandhi added a distinctively Indian component to his foreign policy image. His emphasis on Asia as the most important arena of international politics is a product of that non-Western component of his image; Menon's emphasis on the global system reflects the absence of an Indian component. Throughout Asia and Africa today new leaders are being trained and educated at home; their views of the world will probably

reflect a better balance between indigenous and foreign influences. In India, especially, as the post-independence generation of leaders begins to assume power, foreign policy will become more Indianized.

Part Three

C o n c l u s i o n s

Chapter VIII

Theoretical and Methodological Reconsiderations

This study has had a two-fold objective, to test existing hypotheses about foreign policy images, and to generate new ones. We are now able to use the data derived from our study of Nehru and Menon for these purposes. It is also possible to indicate modifications in the research design and methodology and to establish guidelines for future research on elite images and foreign policy choices.

a. The Testing of Hypotheses

From our survey of empirical studies of elite images several hypotheses emerged. The first set dealt with the components of elite images.[1]

1. 'Decision-makers of developing states will perceive their own subordinate system as the level of the international system most directly impinging on vital questions of security and on the general range of political-diplomatic foreign policy issues' (Brecher *et al.*). This hypothesis is partly confirmed. Nehru perceived most foreign policy issues within the 'Asian' context; indeed, the Asian

---

1. See pp. 150-51 above.

subordinate system was paramount in his image. Menon, however, revealed a strikingly low awareness of India's own subordinate system.

2. 'Decision-makers of middle powers will best perceive the pressure exerted by interest groups; the pressure of competing elites will be of extremely low salience' (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis, too, is partly confirmed: Menon was virtually impervious to the advocacy of competing elites yet he sharply perceived the pressures exerted by institutional interest groups. Nehru, however, did not perceive the advocacy of interest groups while he accorded much attention to competing elites. The difference in their pattern of perceptions may be largely a function of the role variable: a Prime Minister in a parliamentary system will be more aware of the advocacy of competing elites; a Minister of Defence (or a Minister of External Affairs) will pay greater attention to institutional interest groups.

3. 'Decision-makers of middle powers will be marginally influenced by their own political structures and by other subordinate systems' (Brecher et al.). The first part of the hypothesis is fully confirmed. Nehru was not directly influenced by the political structure. Menon, too, displayed

little awareness of any structural factor nor much more of any political group. But both decision-makers displayed sharp perceptions of the African subordinate system: in Menon's image it was more salient than the Asian subordinate system, and Nehru paid more attention to the African subordinate system than any other level of the international system except his own subordinate system. It can be suggested that decision-makers of developing states will be influenced by other subordinate systems when their members are also new states.

4. 'Decision-makers of middle powers will have a much sharper perception of their external environment than of their internal environment' (Brecher et al.). This hypothesis, too, is confirmed. We have noted the low salience of the symbol, 'economic development', and of domestic political forces in the foreign policy images of both Indian decision-makers.

The second set of hypotheses dealt with the intensity of images.[2]

5. 'There is a positive relationship between cognitive dissonance, extremity of attitude and intensity'

---

2. See pp. 151-52 above.

(Abelson). Although this hypothesis was not tested directly, it does not appear to be confirmed. Nehru had dissonant images of three actors -- the United Nations, China and the United Kingdom, while Menon had dissonant perceptions of the United Nations, China, the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth. The United Nations and the United Kingdom in Nehru's foreign policy image and China in Menon's image occurred at high levels of intensity, but neither decision-maker displayed corresponding extremity toward these actors. Cognitive dissonance is related not to extremity but rather to cumulative frequency and perhaps to the level of intensity as well. The evidence also suggests that dissonance is related to components in the attitudinal prism of the decision-maker.

6. 'The flexibility of an image is an inverse function of the level of intensity' (Pruitt). This hypothesis is only partly confirmed. The two actors which occurred at the highest level of intensity in Nehru's foreign policy image, the United Nations and the United Kingdom, were also the objects of cognitive dissonance. The Prime Minister did change his image of these actors, as well as of China, but only partly. On the other hand, Pakistan, which occurred at a high level of intensity, was the object of Nehru's unchanging

hostility. On the basis of the Nehru data it is impossible to confirm or reject the hypothesis. The Menon data provide stronger evidence for confirmation. His image of the United States, the most intense and the most extreme, was the least susceptible to change. So too was his image of Pakistan: it was intensely hostile and it did not change.

7. 'The more hostility a state perceives, the more hostility a state will express'(Zinnes). This hypothesis had been previously tested in the literature and confirmed. It is supported by our data as well. The foreign policy image of both Nehru and Menon demonstrated almost perfect symmetry between expression and perception of hostility.

8. 'If State A perceives that it is the object of State Y's hostility, then A will express hostility toward Y' (Zinnes). We did not test this hypothesis directly. Nevertheless, what existing evidence suggests is that there is no symmetrical relationship between perception of India as an object of hostility and expression of hostility toward the offending state. For example, Menon only intermittently perceived the United States as hostile to India, yet he frequently expressed hostility toward the United States. His hostility toward the United States often resulted from Ameri-

ca's behaviour in the global system rather than from the Indo-American bilateral relationship.

9. 'In both high-involvement and low-involvement situations perceptions of hostility will tend to be higher than statements of intent. In situations of greater intensity perceptions of hostility intervene significantly to escalate the level of violence' (Holsti et al.). This hypothesis was not tested directly but our evidence would confirm the first part of the hypothesis. Perceptions of hostility by Nehru and Menon far outnumbered statements of intent, operationalized as demands for change in the status quo. On the other hand, even where perceptions of hostility were both frequent and intense, there was no escalation in the level of violence unless significant reference to change of status quo statements were found. Menon was the example par excellence of a decision-maker whose perceptions were intensely hostile; yet this hostility was diffuse and unrelated to specific objectives. Hostility, unaccompanied by more specific demands for change, did not escalate into conflict.

10. 'Non-aligned states will evaluate the West and the Communists in the same terms. They will perceive the actions of both groups in similar terms' (Choukri). This

hypothesis is partly confirmed. If we treat the Soviet Union and the United States as representative of their blocs, the Nehru data clearly support the hypothesis. Both actors occurred at the same level of frequency and both were the objects of moderately intense attitudes. In this respect, Nehru represented the archetype of a non-aligned decision-maker. Menon, however, sharply differentiated between the two actors. He was intensely hostile to the United States and many of his demands for specific changes were related to American behaviour in the global system. On the other hand, he was almost entirely uncritical of the Soviet Union. The Menon data do not support the hypothesis.

The third set of hypotheses dealt with the association structure of images.[3]

11. 'The more supporting and interdependent the elements of an image, the less flexible the image' (Pruitt). This hypothesis was not tested directly and so only general comments can be offered. It does not appear that inter-dependence was the most crucial determinant of flexibility. For example, the Prime Minister's image of Pakistan was relatively inflexible over time, yet it had few supporting

---

3. See p. 152 above.

elements. On the other hand, non-alignment was a constant and significant component of Nehru's image and it was highly inter-related with numerous supporting elements. Menon's image of the United States has been inflexible over time, yet it, too, had relatively few supporting elements. The evidence is not conclusive but tends to negate this hypothesis.

12. 'The non-aligned states will co-ordinate their objectives with those of the universal actor' (Kaplan). This hypothesis is not confirmed. Although the United Nations occurred frequently in the images of Nehru and Menon, their attitudes toward the world organization were sharply dissonant. The dissonance arose from the dual function of the United Nations: both men identified with its role in decolonization but both were sharply critical of its failure to preserve peace. Contingency analysis revealed that neither Nehru nor Menon associated India with the United Nations. The United Nations was a significant component of their foreign policy perceptions but their images of it were more complex than the 'rule' of strong identification and co-ordination would suggest.

b. Hypotheses Emerging from the Data

Several new hypotheses emerged from the analysis of

the foreign policy images of Nehru and Menon. They must all be tested in further research.

1. The former colonial power will occupy a disproportionately important position in the foreign policy image of decision-makers of new states. Both Nehru and Menon paid more attention to the United Kingdom than they did to one of the super powers -- a level of occurrence not warranted by Britain's objective level of capabilities in the post-1945 global system. Moreover, they shared sharply dissonant attitudes toward the former imperial ruler. It can be suggested that the political, economic and cultural ties between a former colonial ruler and an ex-colony distort the images of decision-makers of new states. Indeed, 'special' relationships, personal and political, continue to shape foreign policy images in the post-colonial period.

2. Decision-makers of developing states will not perceive the super powers primarily within a bilateral context in the political-diplomatic and military-security issue-areas. It has been suggested that decision-makers of new states view the super powers as alternative sources of aid and support. This theory places heavy emphasis on dominant-bilateral inter-

action. The Nehru and Menon data do not support it. Although both men placed heavy emphasis on the super powers, neither stressed the dominant-bilateral level of interaction. Indeed, there is sharp discrepancy in the frequency of occurrence of super powers and the dominant-bilateral level. Both Nehru and Menon emphasized the role of the super powers in the global system. This pattern may be dramatically different in the economic-developmental issue-area, where aid and trade considerations are important; nevertheless, their views of the world underline the primarily global role of the super powers.

3. Decision-makers of developing states will be influenced by other subordinate systems whose members are also new states. Generally, decision-makers are only marginally influenced by other subordinate systems. Special factors operate, however, in the new states. A common colonial experience and participation in independence struggles generated interest in the eradication of colonialism everywhere and the safeguarding of the independence of all new states. This was reflected, for example, in Nehru's emphasis on independence and peace. In a few cases new states constitute the total membership of a subordinate system. Decision-makers

of other new states will nevertheless be sharply aware of this system and identify strongly with its objectives and difficulties. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for both emphasized the role of Africa and gave great weight to the emergence of independent African states. It is possible that this pattern of perception is short-term, the characteristic of foreign policy in a post-colonial period.

4. Domestic pressures will be most relevant in the military-security issue-area, especially where near-neighbours are involved. Otherwise they will not be salient or integrated into the general foreign policy image. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for both decision-makers placed disproportionately heavy emphasis on domestic political forces when discussing military-security issues; fifty per cent of Nehru's and twenty-five per cent of Menon's references to domestic variables were concentrated within this issue-area.

5. In a competitive, parliamentary system the Head of Government will be more aware of the advocacy of competing elites while the Minister of Defence and/or Minister of External Affairs will perceive the pressure of interest groups.

of other new states will nevertheless be sharply aware of this system and identify strongly with its objectives and difficulties. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for both emphasized the role of Africa and gave great weight to the emergence of independent African states. It is possible that this pattern of perception is short-term, the characteristic of foreign policy in a post-colonial period.

4. Domestic pressures will be most relevant in the military-security issue-area, especially where near-neighbours are involved. Otherwise they will not be salient or integrated into the general foreign policy image. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for both decision-makers placed disproportionately heavy emphasis on domestic political forces when discussing military-security issues; fifty per cent of Nehru's and twenty-five per cent of Menon's references to domestic variables were concentrated within this issue-area.

5. In a competitive, parliamentary system the Head of Government will be more aware of the advocacy of competing elites while the Minister of Defence and/or Minister of External Affairs will perceive the pressure of interest groups.

The role variable will determine the pattern of perception of domestic variables. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis.[4] Nehru referred to competing elites four times more frequently than any other domestic variable. This disproportionate perception undoubtedly reflected Nehru's prolonged experience as Prime Minister with the opposition parties. Menon, on the other hand, mentioned interest groups twenty times more frequently than competing elites; he most clearly perceived the pressures and demands of the army and bureaucracy. This emphasis reflected Menon's experience for more than ten years with the Ministry of External Affairs and five years as Minister of Defence.

6. The goal of economic development will not be integrated into the foreign policy image of developing states' decision-makers in the political-diplomatic and military-security issue-areas. It has been suggested by many writers that economic development is the paramount concern of the foreign policy decision-makers in new states. Indeed, it has been listed as a rationale for a non-aligned foreign policy;

---

4. The formulation of this hypothesis may at first glance be confusing, for Nehru was both Prime Minister and Minister of External Affairs until his death. His role as Prime Minister, however, was dominant, and Menon fulfilled the role of adjunct Minister of External Affairs. If the data are interpreted in this light, the hypothesis is supported.

the super powers and their blocs are viewed as alternative sources of aid. The Nehru and Menon data do not support this hypothesis; rather, the data suggest that the goal of economic development is not integrated into general foreign policy images. Alghough both Nehru and Menon referred to economic development as one of the principal goals of India, they rarely referred to economic growth in their discussion of political-diplomatic or military-security issues; the symbol, 'economic development', had one of the lowest cumulative frequencies of any symbol coded in the analysis.

7. Status considerations will be significant in the image of decision-makers of new states, especially in general political-diplomatic issues. This is not surprising given their newly independent status and their desire to safeguard it. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis. Nehru made fifty per cent more references to deference values than to welfare values while Menon mentioned considerations of status four times as often. This emphasis on status reflects their desire to play what they regarded as their proper role in the global system.

8. In political-diplomatic crises, status considerations will become less important; deference and welfare values

will be more evenly balanced. When confronted with the threat of war decision-makers will emphasize the welfare values which are in jeopardy. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for Nehru refers frequently to skill and enlightenment while Menon emphasizes well-being. The pattern of perceptions of both men reveals a much more even distribution between deference and welfare references. This undoubtedly reflects the desire of both to prevent the outbreak of a major war.

9. Foreign policy issues will be almost irrelevant in shaping the structure of decision-makers' images. Reference to one foreign policy issue does not tend to produce associations with other issues. The Nehru and Menon data confirm this. Only three issues were moderately well-distributed throughout the speeches of Nehru and no foreign policy issue was significantly associated with any other. Menon associated only three foreign policy issues; the dynamics of their association structure were not dependent on issues of foreign policy. Although the foreign policy analyst is able to isolate different patterns of perceptions in different issue-areas, the decision-maker seems unaware of the interconnections.

10. The military-security issue-area will be characterized by the most intense attitudes. This is not unexpected given the importance of military-security questions in foreign policy. Hostility appeared at high and moderate levels of intensity in all three security issues in Menon's perceptions and in two issues in Nehru's image. It was military-security issues which had the highest emotive content.

11. Decision-makers in new states will generally articulate intense demands for a change in the status quo. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis, for the Prime Minister and Menon rarely expressed dissatisfaction with the status quo in moderate terms; the vast proportion of the demands for change were highly intense. This underlines the importance of those demands for change which are articulated.

12. The higher the ideological content of foreign policy images, the greater their rigidity.[5] This hypothesis

5. This hypothesis has already been formulated in slightly different terms: 'Decision-makers in setting out foreign policy goals do not consciously articulate an image of the possible because they equate objectives with reality. This disposition is more pronounced in decision-makers with a high ideological motivation.' See M. Brecher, 'Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World', Pacific Affairs, XL, 1 & 2, Spring and Summer 1967, p. 90. We have not isolated the decision-maker's image of the possible or feasible, and are primarily interested in the impact of ideological content on the adaptibility of the image to environmental change.

is suggested by the data, for ideological content appeared to be the major differentiating factor in the foreign policy images of Nehru and Menon. Menon's view of the world, filtered through a lens comprised of Lenin's theory of imperialism and Laski's neo-Marxism, created a more rigidly structured image of the global system; Nehru's image was less ideological, more fluid and more loosely structured. This facilitated adaptation to change, for a non-ideological image permits greater flexibility in evaluating external stimuli. In order to test this hypothesis, however, an index of ideological content must be constructed and images must be ranked along the scale. Similarly an index of the adaptability of images to stimuli from the operational environment must be developed. It will then be possible to measure the relationship between ideological content and image rigidity.

13. Military-security problems will modify the general foreign policy images of decision-makers. The Nehru and Menon data support this hypothesis. Both men departed significantly from their general foreign policy images in ranking variables within the military-security issue-area. Both focussed on their near-neighbours, the bilateral level

of interaction and on domestic variables. The foreign policy images of Nehru and Menon were most similar in this issue-area.

c. Methodological Reconsiderations

The application of content analysis techniques to the study of elite images is relatively recent; as with other research methods there are drawbacks which limit its utility. Many methodological problems remain to be solved, among them problems of missing data and validation. In this study both speeches and interviews were used as primary sources. Each offers both advantages and disadvantages. Speeches are formal and structured and therefore less revealing; yet they are delivered to a variety of audiences and do not permit distortion of the past, as memories intrude on perceptions. Interviews are more revealing and forthright but the interviewer may affect the structure and content of the answers, thereby distorting the image of the respondent. An important research task is to analyse both speeches and interviews of the same decision-maker separately and to compare the extent of divergence.

The value of the results of frequency analysis has been

disputed. Underlying frequency analysis is the assumption that important information is communicated; further, that more important information is communicated more frequently. The Nehru and Menon data support this assumption. Frequency analysis extracted the components of their image which were the objects of the most intense attitudes and which figured prominently in their association structure. In this inquiry frequency of occurrence did serve as a reliable indicator of the importance of components of foreign policy images. The results of frequency analysis permitted the construction of the skeletal frame of the image. Ithiel de Sola Pool supported this conclusion in more general terms: "Frequency is only one of a variety of devices by which feeling is expressed. In fact, experiments with adding refinements in measuring intensity has proven that nothing much is added by measures other than frequency."[6]

New statistical tools of analysis must be developed, for traditional measures of significance have proven inadequate in the analysis of verbal communications. Very often levels

---

6. Ithiel de Sola Pool, 'Trends in Content Analysis Today: A Summary', in Ithiel de Sola Pool (ed.), Trends in Content Analysis, Papers on the Work Conference on Content Analysis of Linguistics and Psychology, Social Science Research Council, University of Illinois Press, 1959, p.194.

of occurrence are too low to satisfy the requirements of existing tests. Promising work is now being done but much remains to be accomplished if satisfactory interpretation of quantitative data is to be achieved.

The technique of content analysis is time-consuming and laborious. Recently new possibilities for research have appeared as computer technology is applied to verbal communication. These computers are not yet generally available and programs are few and inadequate. It is essential to construct a common dictionary valid for the analysis of foreign policy image and behaviour and to apply common coding techniques. This will facilitate comparative analysis and permit meaningful interpretation of broad series of data.

Content analysis, it should be stressed, is only one of various techniques which can be used to study elite images. There is need for experimentation with other methods -- the personal interview, the questionnaire, and the direct observation of decision-makers in action. The analysis of elite images through qualitative techniques is essential, for such analysis often provides a corrective, as well as insights and understanding lacking in quantitative techniques. Both the quantitative and qualitative approaches to image

analysis are necessary and valuable: each tests the relevance and accuracy of conclusions derived from the other.

d. Guidelines for Further Research

Research into the relationship between elite images and foreign policy choices has barely begun. And elite images are only part of the larger foreign policy system.[7] If the study of state behaviour is to become more rigorous, the operational environment must be analysed so that the outcomes of decisions can be explained and assessed; the communications network must be examined so that the sources of information available to decision-makers can be evaluated; the composition of the decision-making elite must be studied; and the process of formulating and implementing foreign policy decisions must be analysed. The relationships among all parts of the foreign policy system must be explored so that the dynamics of the foreign policy process can be understood and explained.

In the study of elite images many questions remain unanswered. One major research undertaking is to relate image directly to behaviour. Behaviour must be operationalized along a scale of intensity of conflict-co-operation. Such

7. See pp. 40-68 above.

a scale could be used to measure behaviour regardless of the historical period or the particular situation. The scale could range from 'Nation A and B initiate joint sovereignty agreements' to 'State A escalates fighting with State B'. Foreign policy acts could then be classified along the scale and direct comparison between image and behaviour could be undertaken. In addition, consistency of image and behaviour over time could be measured. Consistency may vary across issue-areas and types of decisions. Spectra of decisions from crisis to non-crisis and induced or initiating could be constructed. General patterns of image and behaviour may emerge. This is a major long-term research undertaking.

At the same time the concept of image must be further refined. For example, few studies have attempted to assess the impact of the role variable. It is necessary to examine the foreign policy images over time of successive heads of government in one state to explore the consistency in image content. It should then be possible to separate the idiosyncratic content from the role content.

The impact of the international system on image content must also be explored. The images of several decision-makers across political systems must be examined in order to

evaluate the impact of the international system. Such horizontal comparisons could assess the degree to which the international system sets the parameters of the structure of elite images.

It is also desirable to explore the dynamics of image change. Decision-makers perceiving stimuli from the environment will react in very different ways. Some will succeed in adapting their foreign policy images to changing reality; most will not. The adaptation process will also vary in time. What impact does the structure of the image have on adaptability? Or is the substantive content of the foreign policy image the crucial determinant of flexibility? Further, do rigid images produce more violent behaviour as the gap between image and reality grows? At the other extreme, do dissonant images inhibit or paralyse behaviour? These and other aspects of image change must be examined by relating image to behaviour over time and by exploring the consistency of the image itself over time.

Finally, patterns of influence in decision-making merit examination. The group context of decision-making must be explored if proper weight is to be assigned to each decision-maker. Generally speaking, the context of decision-

making is less complicated in the new states than in the more developed areas. Nevertheless, if meaningful prediction is to be achieved, it must be possible to weigh the influence of the decision-maker as well as to examine the content of his image.

Despite the theoretical and methodological obstacles to rigorous analysis, the study of elite images seems a viable and promising path to prediction of probable foreign policy behaviour. It removes, in large measure, the ethnocentric bias of the analyst and permits comparative analysis in the study of foreign policy. It penetrates the perceptions of the decision-maker and thus leads to a more sophisticated understanding and explanation of behaviour. The potential value of elite image study is high. A typology of foreign policy images may gradually be produced, enabling the deduction of probable behavioural patterns from each type. Such inquiries can enrich our understanding of foreign policy decision-making and thereby enhance our ability to predict probable state behaviour.

BIBLIOGRAPHY *

Primary Sources

Nehru, Jawaharlal, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1961.

Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford University Press, London, 1968, Part I, pp. 1-211 and pp. 225-33.

Secondary Sources: Books

Almond, Gabriel and Coleman, James, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960.

_____ and Powell, G., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, Little, Brown, New York, 1966.

---

* In addition to the materials cited in the bibliography, some fifty additional bibliographical sources were consulted to provide background knowledge about India's foreign policy from 1947 to 1962. These were not specifically related to the dissertation topic and are generally available secondary materials. For these reasons they are not cited here.

Berelson, Bernard, Content Analysis in Communications Research, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1952.

_____ and Steiner, G.A., Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings, Harcourt, New York, 1964.

_____ and Janowitz, Morris, eds., Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Second Edition, Free Press, New York, 1966.

Berkes, Ross N. and Bedi, Mohinder S., The Diplomacy of India; Indian Foreign Policy in the United Nations, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1958.

Block, Jack, The Q-Sort Method in Personality Assessment and Psychiatric Research, Charles C. Thomas, Springfield, Illinois, 1961.

Boulding, Kenneth, The Image, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1956.

Brecher, Michael, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon's View of the World, Oxford University Press, London, 1968.

_____, Nehru: A Political Biography, Oxford University Press, London, 1959.

Burt, Cyril, The Factors of the Mind, An Introduction to Factor Analysis in Psychology, University of London Press, London, 1940.

de Rivera, Joseph H., The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy, Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., Columbus, Ohio, 1968.

Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, The M.I.T. Press and John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1953.

Dwivedi, R., The Life and Speeches of Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehru, Allahabad, 1930.

Eckeleu, William Frederik van, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China, M. Nijhoff, the Hague, 1964.

Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P., eds., Image and Reality in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967.

Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, Illinois, 1957.

_____ and Katz, Daniel, eds., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, The Dryden Press, New York, 1953.

Frankel, Joseph, The Making of Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Decision-Making, Oxford University Press, London, 1963.

Fruchter, Benjamin, Introduction to Factor Analysis, D. Van Norstrand Co. Inc., Princeton, New Jersey, 1954.

Garvin, Paul L., Natural Language and the Computer, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1963.

George, Alexander L., Propaganda Analysis: A Study of Inferences Made from Nazi Propaganda in World War II, Row, Peterson & Co., Evanston, Illinois, 1959.

George, A.L. and George, J., Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, John Day, New York, 1956.

George, J.T.S., Krishna Menon: A Biography, Jonathan Cape, London, 1964.

Gupta, Sisir, India and Regional Integration in Asia, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964.

_____, Kashmir, A Study in India-Pakistan Relations, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1966.

Herz, John H., International Politics in the Atomic Age, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.

Hovland, Carl, ed., The Order of Presentation in Persuasion, Yale Studies in Attitude and Communication, Volume 1, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1957.

_____, Janis, I.L. and Kelly, H., Communication and Persuasion, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn., 1953.

Kaplan, Morton, System and Process in International Politics, John Wiley, Inc., New York, 1957.

Kecskemeti, Paul, Meaning, Communication and Value, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1952.

Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966.

Knorr, Klaus, The War Potential of Nations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1956.

Kripalani, Krishna, Gandhi, Tagore and Nehru, Second Edition, Bombay, 1949.

Lasswell, Harold D. and Kaplan, Abraham, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950.

_____, Lerner, D.N. and associates, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1949.

_____, Lerner, Daniel and Pool, Ithiel de Sola, The Comparative Study of Symbols, Hoover Institute Studies, Series C, No. 1, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1952.

Lazarsfeld, Paul, ed., Mathematical Thinking in the Social Sciences, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1954.

Lerner, Daniel and Lasswell, Harold D., eds., The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1951.

Martin, Laurence W., ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment, The New States in World Affairs, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

Mende, Tibor, Nehru: Conversations on India and World Affairs, New York, 1956.

Miller, D.C., Handbook of Research Design, McKay Co., New York, 1964.

Miller, G.A., Galanter, E. and Pribram, K.H., Plans and the Structure of Behavior, Henry Holt & Co., New York, 1960.

Modelski, George, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962.

Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, Fourth Edition, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1967.

Murty, K., Indian Foreign Policy, Scientific Book Agency, Calcutta, 1964.

Nafziger, Ralph O. and White, David M., eds., Introduction to Mass Communications Research, Revised Edition, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1963.

Nanda, Bal Ram, The Nehrus, Motilal and Jawaharlal, Allen Unwin & Co., London, 1962.

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Glimpses of World History, Allahabad, 1936.

_____, Independence and After: A Collection of Speeches, New York, 1950.

_____, India's Foreign Policy, Selected Speeches, September 1946 - April 1961, The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, New Delhi, 1961.

_____, The Discovery of India, Calcutta, 1946.

_____, Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru, John Day, New York, 1942.

North, Robert, Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovitch, George M. and Zinnes, Dina A., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1963.

Osgood, Charles E., Suci, George J. and Tannenbaum, Percy H., The Measurement of Meaning, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1957.

Paige, Glenn D., The Korean Decision: June 24-30, 1950, Free Press, New York, 1967.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, Papers of the Work Conference on Content Analysis of the Committee on Linguistics and Psychology, Social Science Research Council, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959.

Range, Willard, Jawaharlal Nehru's World View, A Theory of International Relations, University of Georgia Press, Athens, Georgia, 1961.

Ray, J.C., The Indirect Relationship Between Belief System and Action in Soviet-American Interaction, unpublished masters thesis, Stanford University, 1961.

Rokeach, M., The Open and Closed Mind, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1960.

Rosecrance, Richard N., Action and Reaction in World Politics, Little, Brown, Boston, 1963.

Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, The Free Press, New York, 1967.

_____, ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, A Reader in Research and Theory, The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961.

Schramm, Wilbur, Mass Communications, Second Edition, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1960.

Shannon, C.E. and Weaver, W., The Mathematical Theory of Communication, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1949.

Sigmund, Paul E., The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1965.

Singer, J. David, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965.

_____, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, The Free Press, New York, 1968.

Smith, Bruce L., Lasswell, Harold D. and Casey, Ralph, Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1948.

Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H.W. and Sapin, Burton, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1962.

Stephenson, William, The Study of Behavior: The Q-Sort Technique and Its Methodology, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1953.

Stone, Philip, Dunphy, Dexter, Smith, Marshall and Ogilvie, Daniel, The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Massachusets, 1966.

Waltz, Kenneth, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience, Little, Brown, Boston, 1967.

White, Ralph K., Value Analysis: The Nature and Use of the Method, Glen Gardner, New Jersey, 1951.

Winham, Gilbert, An Analysis of Foreign Aid Decision-Making: The Case of the Marshall Plan, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1967.

Articles

Abelson, R., 'Modes of Resolution of Belief Dilemmas', Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, 1959, pp. 343-52.

Almond, Gabriel A., 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Macridis, Roy, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Prentice-Hall Inc., New York, 1958, pp. 1-8.

Angell, Robert C., 'Social Values of Soviet and American Elites: Content Analysis of Elite Media', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII, 1964, pp. 330-85.

Armstrong, Robert Plant, 'Content Analysis in Folkloristics', in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 151-70.

Baldwin, A.L., 'Personal Structure Analysis: A Statistical Method for Investigating the Single Personality', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 37, 1952, pp. 168-83.

Bauer, Raymond A., 'Problems of Perception and the Relations Between the United States and the Soviet Union', Journal of Conflict Resolution, V, 1961, pp. 223-9.

Berelson, Bernard, 'Content Analysis', in Lindzey, Gardner, ed., Handbook of Social Psychology, Addison-Wesley, Cambridge, Mass., 1954, pp. 488-522.

Boulding, Kenneth E., 'The Learning and Reality-Testing Process in the International System', in Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P., eds., Image and Reality in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 1-15.

_____, 'National Images and International Systems', Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, 1959, pp. 120-31.

Brecher, Michael, 'Elite Images and Foreign Policy Choices: Krishna Menon's View of the World', Pacific Affairs, XL, 1967, pp. 60-92.

_____, 'International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia', World Politics, XV, 1963, pp. 213-35. Reprinted in Brecher, M., The New States of Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pp. 88-110.

_____, 'Neutralism: An Analysis', in Brecher, M., The New States of Asia, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, pp. 111-22.

_____, Steinberg, B. and Stein, J., 'A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behaviour', Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII, 1969.

Bronfenbrenner, Urie, 'The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social Psychologist's Report', Journal of Social Psychology, XVII, 1961, pp. 45-56.

Cartwright, D.P., 'Analysis of Qualitative Material' in Festinger, Leon and Katz, Daniel, eds., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, The Dryden Press, New York, 1953, pp. 421-70.

Choukri, Nazli, 'The Non-Alignment of Afro-Asian States', forthcoming article in Canadian Journal of Political Science.

Coombs, Clyde H., 'Theory and Methods of Social Measurement', in Festinger, Leon and Katz, Daniel, eds., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, The Dryden Press, New York, 1953, pp. 471-535.

Day, Fay, 'Content Analysis in Mass Communications', in Nafziger, Ralph, ed., An Introduction to Journalism Research, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1949, pp. 86-102.

Deutsch, Karl W. and Merritt, Richard L., 'Effects of Events on National and International Images', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 132-87.

Dollard, John and Mowrer, O.H., 'A Method of Measuring Tension in Written Documents', Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 42, 1947, pp. 1-32.

Easton, David, 'An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems', World Politics, X, 1957, pp. 383-400.

Garraty, John A., 'The Application of Content Analysis to Biography and History', in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 171-88.

George, Alexander L., 'Prediction of Political Action by Means of Propaganda Analysis', Public Opinion Quarterly, 20, 1956, pp. 334-45.

_____, 'Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches to Content Analysis', in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 7-32.

Goldsen, J.M., 'Analysing the Contents of Mass Communications: A Step Toward Inter-Group Harmony', International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, 1, 1947, pp. 81-92.

Haas, Michael, 'Approaches to the Analysis of Systemic Factors', in proposed volume on International Conflict.

Hoffmann, Stanley, 'International Relations: The Long Road to Theory', in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961, pp. 421-37.

Holsti, Ole R., 'Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy', in Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P., eds., Image and Reality in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 16-39.

Holsti, Ole R., 'External Conflict and Internal Consensus: The Sino-Soviet Case', in Stone, P., Dunphy, Dexter, Smith, Marshall and Ogilvie, Daniel, The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, the M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1966, pp. 343-58.

_____, 'Evaluative Assertion Analysis', in North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovitch, George M. and Zinnes, Dina A., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1963, pp. 91-102.

_____, 'The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 245-52.

_____, 'The Value of International Tension Measurement', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VII, 1963, pp. 608-17.

_____, North, Robert C. and Brody, Richard A., 'Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis', in Singer,J.David,ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 123-58.

Janis, I.L., 'The Problem of Validating Content Analysis', in Lasswell, Harold D., Leites, Nathan and associates, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1949, pp. 55-82.

_____ and Fadner, Raymond, 'The Coefficient of Imbalance', in Lasswell, Harold D., Leites, Nathan and associates, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1949, pp. 153-72.

Janis, I.L., Fadner, Raymond and Janowitz, Morris, 'Reliability of a Content Analysis Technique', Public Opinion Quarterly, 7, 1943, pp. 293-6.

Kaplan, Abraham, 'Content Analysis on the Theory of Signs', Philosophy of Science, 10, 1943, pp.230-47.

_____ and Goldsen, Joseph, 'The Reliability of Content Analysis Categories', in Lasswell, Harold D., Leites, Nathan and associates, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1949, pp. 83-112.

Kelman, Herbert C., 'Compliance, Identification and Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change', in Singer, J.David,ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965, pp. 232-41.

_____, 'Sociological - Psychological Approaches to the Study of International Relations: Definition of Scope', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 3-39.

Kris, Ernst and Leites, Nathan, 'Trends in 20th Century Propaganda', in Berelson, Bernard and Janowitz, Morris, eds., Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 267-77.

Lasswell, Harold D., 'Describing the Contents of Communications', in Smith, B.L., Lasswell, H.D. and Casey, R.D., Propaganda, Communication and Public Opinion, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1946, pp. 74-94.

Lasswell, Harold D., 'Why Be Quantitative?',in Berelson, Bernard and Janowitz, Morris, Reader in Public Opinion and Communication, Free Press, New York, 1966, pp. 247-59.

Lefever, Ernest W., 'Nehru, Nasser and Nkrumah on Neutralism' in Martin, Laurence W., ed., Neutralism and Non-alignment, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962, pp. 93-121.

Levinson, Daniel, 'Authoritarian Personality and Foreign Policy', Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 1957, pp. 37-47.

Lieberman, Seymour, 'The Effects of Changes in Roles on the Attitudes of Role Occupants', in Singer, J. David, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965, pp. 155-67.

Liska, George, 'The "Third Party": The Rationale of Nonalignment', in Martin, Laurence W., ed., Neutralism and Nonalignment, Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962, pp. 80-92.

MacLean, Malcolm, 'Research Planning', in Nafziger, Ralph O. and Wilkerson, Marcus M., eds., Introduction to Mass Communications Research, Revised Edition, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1963, pp. 29-50.

Mahl, George F., 'Exploring Emotional States by Content Analysis' in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 89-130.

March, James G. and Simon, Herbert A., 'The Concept of Rationality', in Singer, J. David, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965, pp. 340-3.

McClelland, Charles A., 'Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: the Quemoy Case', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 201-13.

McClosky, Herbert, 'Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation', in Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Free Press, New York, 1967, pp.51-109.

Miller, James G., 'The Individual as an Information Processing System', in Singer, J. David, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965, pp. 202-11.

Mintz, Alexander, 'The Feasibility of the Use of Samples in Content Analysis', in Lasswell, Harold D., Leites, Nathan and Associates, Language of Politics; Studies in Quantitative Semantics, George W. Stewart, New York, 1949, pp.127-52.

Namenwirth, J. Zvi and Brewer, Thomas L., 'Elite Editorial Comment on the European and Atlantic Communities in Four Countries', in Stone, Philip, Dunphy, Dexter, Smith, Marshall and Ogilvie, Daniel, The General Inquirer: A Computer Approach to Content Analysis, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966, pp. 401-27.

North, Robert C., 'Decision-Making in Crises: An Introduction', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 197-200.

Osgood, Charles E., 'Behavior Theory and the Social Sciences', in Young, Roland, ed., Approaches to the Study of Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1958, pp. 217-43.

_____, 'Suggestions for Winning the Real War with Communism', Journal of Conflict Resolution, III, 1959, pp. 311-25.

_____, 'The Representational Model and Relevant Research Methods', in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 33-88.

_____ and Anderson, Lois, 'Certain Relations Between Experienced Contingencies, Association Structure and Contingencies in Encoded Messages', American Journal of Psychology, 70, 1957, pp. 411-20.

_____, Saporta, S. and Nunnally, J.C., 'Evaluative Assertion Analysis', Litera, 3, 1956, pp. 47-102.

Peak, Helen, 'Problems of Objective Observation', in Festinger, Leon and Katz, Daniel, eds., Research Methods in the Behavioral Sciences, The Dryden Press, New York, 1953, pp. 283-96.

Pool, Ithiel de Sola, 'Content Analysis for Intelligence Purposes', World Politics, XIII, 1960, pp. 478-85.

_____, 'Trends in Content Analysis Today: A Summary', in Pool, Ithiel de Sola, ed., Trends in Content Analysis, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1959, pp. 189-233.

Pruitt, Dean G., 'Definition of the Situation as a Determinant of International Action', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 393-432.

Rieselbach, Leroy N., 'Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behavior in the UN General Assembly', International Organization, XXIV, 1960, pp. 291-306.

Robinson, James A. and Snyder, Richard C., 'Decision-Making in International Politics', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, pp.435-63.

Robinson, W.S., 'The Statistical Measure of Agreement', American Sociological Review, 22, 1957, pp. 17-25.

Rosenau, James N., 'Foreign Policy as an Issue Area', in Rosenau, James N., ed., Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, Free Press, New York, 1967, pp. 11-50.

_____, 'Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy', in Farrell, R. Barry, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1966, pp. 27-92.

_____, 'Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities', in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 17-50.

Rummel, Rudolph J., 'The Relationship Between National Attributes and Foreign Conflict Behavior', in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 187-214.

Sargent, S.S. and Saenger, G., 'Analysing the Content of Mass Media', Journal of Social Issues, 3, 1947, pp. 33-8.

Schutz, William C., 'On Categorizing Qualitative Data in Content Analysis', Public Opinion Quarterly, 22, 1958-59, pp. 503-15.

Schwartz, Benjamin I., 'The Maoist Image of World Order', in Farrell, John C. and Smith, Asa P., eds., Image and Reality in World Politics, Columbia University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 92-102.

Scott, William A., 'Empirical Assessment of Values and Ideologies', in Singer, J. David, ed., Human Behavior and International Politics, Rand McNally & Co., Chicago, Illinois, 1965, pp. 113-22.

_____, 'Psychological and Sociological Correlates of International Images', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 71-103.

_____, 'Reliability of Content Analysis: The Case of Minimal Scale Coding', Public Opinion Quarterly, 19, 1955, pp. 321-5.

Singer, J. David, 'Soviet and American Foreign Policy Attitudes: Content Analysis of Elite Articulations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VIII, 1964, pp. 425-85.

Snyder, Richard C. and Paige, Glenn D., 'The United States Decision to Resist Aggression in Korea: The Application of an Analytical Scheme', in Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H.W. and Sapin, Burton, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics, Free Press, Glencoe, 1962, pp. 206-49.

Sonderman, Fred A., 'The Linkage between Foreign Policy and International Politics', in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961, pp. 8-17.

Sprout, Harold and Margaret, 'The Environmental Factors in the Study of International Politics', Journal of Conflict Resolution, I, 1957, pp. 309-28. Reprinted in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961, pp. 106-19.

Stewart, Milton, 'Importance in Content Analysis: A Validity Problem', Journalism Quarterly, 20, 1943, pp. 286-93.

Tannenbaum, Percy H., 'Experimental Method in Communication Research', in Nafziger, Ralph O. and Wilkerson, Marcus M., eds., Introduction to Mass Communications Research, Revised Edition, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 1963, pp. 51-77.

Thompson, Kenneth W. and Macridis, Roy C., 'The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy', in Macridis, Roy, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, Second Edition, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962, pp. 1-28.

Verba, Sydney, 'Assumptions of Rationality and non-Rationality in Models of the International System', World Politics, XIV, 1961, pp. 93-117.

Weingast, David, 'Walter Lippman: A Content Analysis', Public Opinion Quarterly, 14, 1950, pp. 296-302.

Wheeler, H., 'The Role of Myth System in American-Soviet Relations', Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV, 1960, pp. 179-84.

White, Ralph K., 'A Quantitative Analysis of Hitler's Speeches', Psychological Bulletin, 39, 1942, pp. 486-7.

_____, 'Images in the Context of International Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of the US and the U.S.S.R.', in Kelman, Herbert, ed., International Behavior: A Social Psychological Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1966, pp. 238-76.

_____, 'Value Analysis: A Quantitative Method for Describing Qualitative Data', Journal of Social Psychology, 19, 1944, pp. 351-8.

Winham, Gilbert R., 'Developing Theories of Foreign Policy-Making: A Case Study of Foreign Aid', unpublished mimeo.

_____, 'The Use of Quantitative Indicators in Foreign Policy Analysis', unpublished paper delivered at the meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, Calgary, Alberta, June 1968.

Wolfers, Arnold, 'The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference', World Politics, IV, 1951, pp.39-63. Reprinted in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press, Glencoe, 1961, pp. 146-51.

Woodward, Julian L. and Franzen, Raymond, 'A Study of Coding Reliability', Public Opinion Quarterly, 12, 1948, pp. 253-57.

Yalem, Roland J., 'The Theory of Ends of Arnold Wolfers', Journal of Conflict Resolution, IV, 1960, pp. 421-425.

Zaninovitch, George M., 'Measuring the Intensity of Attitudes and Behavior', in North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovitch, George M. and Zinnes, Dina A., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1963, pp. 55-78.

_____, 'Pattern Analysis and Factor Analysis', in North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovitch, George M. and Zinnes, Dina A., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1963, pp. 105-28.

_____, 'Pattern Analysis of Variables within the International System: the Sino-Soviet Example', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 253-68.

Zinnes, Dina A., 'The Expression and Perception of Hostility in the Pre-War Crisis: 1914', in Singer, J. David, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence, Free Press, New York, 1968, pp. 85-121.

_____, 'Hostility in International Decision-Making', Journal of Conflict Resolution, VI, 1962, pp. 236-43.

_____, '"Pair-Comparison" Scaling in International Relations', in North, Robert C., Holsti, Ole R., Zaninovitch, Geroge M. and Zinnes, Dina A., Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis, Northwestern University Press, Evanston, Illinois, 1963, pp. 79-89.

_____, North, Robert C. and Koch, Howard E., 'Capability, Threat and the Outbreak of War', in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy, Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1961, pp. 469-82.