

McGill University

The role of scriptural testimony, reason and spiritual practice in
the Upadeśasāhasrī: a non-commentarial work of Śaṅkara

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Christine Marguerite Fillion

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Abstract

The thesis is an examination of the prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, a non-commentarial work of Śaṅkarācārya (8th century CE). The introduction deals with several issues concerning the structure and content of the text itself, as well as a critique of the manner in which the text has been interpreted by recent researchers. The main body of the thesis is sectioned according to an eight-fold *therapeutic* model of interpretation suggested by Vetter (1979). The thesis concludes with an examination of the three-fold discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana*, and *nididhyāśana*, as viewed by the Vedāntic tradition. The complete text of the prose part (*gadya-prabandha*) of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* in Roman script follows the thesis.

Résumé

L'objectif de cette thèse est d'explorer la problématique autour de l'*Upadeśaśahasrī*, un texte en prose de Śaṅkarācārya du VIII^e siècle. L'introduction de la thèse est consacrée à quelques questions ayant rapport à la structure et au contenu du texte lui-même, ainsi qu'un compte rendu de quelques stratégies d'interprétation récentes liées à ce texte. La thèse est divisée en huit chapitres suivant un modèle *thérapeutique* d'interprétation proposé par Vetter (1979). Elle se termine par un examen de la triple discipline de śravaṇa, manana, et nididhyāsana selon la tradition vedāntique. Le texte complet de la partie en prose (gadya-prabandha) de l'*Upadeśaśahasrī* se trouve en annexe.

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Introduction:

The *Upadeśasāhasrī*, which could be rendered in English as "A Thousand Teachings" consists of two parts: a metrical part (padya-prabandha = USP) composed of nineteen chapters (prakaraṇa), and a prose part (gadya-prabandha = USG) which is made up of three individual chapters. The title suggests that the combined text consists of a thousand didactic verses, but the metrical part is made up of 671 verses (according to the extant manuscripts). Mayeda (1973) brings the total number of verses up to 1047, since he recalculates the prose part as if it were in *śloka* form, thus the prose part being *hypothetically* composed of 376 ślokas (counting thirty-two syllables to a śloka).

The different chapters of the *metrical* part are arranged—with the exception of the first prakaraṇa which has 26 verses, and the last prakaraṇa which has 28 verses—in *ascending* order of the number of verses. Thus, the second prakaraṇa is made up of four verses, while the eighteenth prakaraṇa—which is the often quoted "Tattvamasi-prakaraṇa" is composed of 230 verses. It may be noted here that each individual prakaraṇa of the metrical part is complete in its contents and has no close connection with any other prakaraṇa. Mayeda (1973) suggests that the each prakaraṇa of the metrical part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* was originally composed independently, i.e., at a different time by Śaṅkara. The metrical part was then edited later by a follower (or followers)—or even by Śaṅkara himself. Mayeda states that it appears more likely that the work was edited by followers, due to the "somewhat mechanical manner"¹ of compiling the individual prakaraṇas in terms of ascending number of verses.

The *prose* part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is composed of three prakaraṇas: firstly, the śiṣyapratibodha-prakaraṇa (USG I.1-44: translated by Mayeda as "How to enlighten the pupil"); secondly, the avagati-prakaraṇa (USG II.45-111: "Awareness"); and thirdly, the parisamkhyāna-prakaraṇa (USG III.112-116: "parisamkhyāna meditation"). If the prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is also a compilation of three independent tracts composed at different times by Śaṅkara, then it is most probable that the titles given to the individual prakaraṇas are also later additions.

The *Upadeśasāhasrī*, is generally accepted to be an *authentic work* of Śaṅkarācārya, who *by definition*, is the author of the commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana. The authenticity of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is assured due to the presence of quotations from the metrical part of the text by Sureśvara in the *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, as well as by quotations from it in Bhāskara's commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Since the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is by definition a work of Śaṅkara, it is used as a *standard* to authenticate other independent non-commentarial texts, as well as commentarial works attributed to Śaṅkara on śruti and smṛti scriptural texts. This method has been developed in relatively recent times by Hacker (1950), who in his article: "Eigentümlichkeiten der Lehre und Terminologie Śaṅkaras: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Īśvara" attempts to define the manner in which certain essential concepts are employed (or are perhaps noticeably absent) by Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, subsequently correlating their definition to other commentarial and non-commentarial works attributed to Śaṅkara for authentication purposes.

This method was later adopted by Mayeda (1965), who used the doctrinal categories which Hacker suggested in order to prove that the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is indeed a genuine work of Śaṅkara. In a later article, Hacker (1968) gives his stamp of approval of the conclusions of Mayeda's research on the authenticity issue of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, stating: "By the investigations of Sengaku Mayeda, who made use of my method,² the authenticity of this work is proved." Western scholarship tends to generally praise the Hacker-Mayeda dual method of Śaṅkaran authentication, which is evident from comments such as the following by Malkovsky (2001): "The authenticity of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* has been convincingly argued by Mayeda, and it is the only independent non-commentarial treatise which has so far passed Hacker's *method of authenticity*."³

Indian scholarship, on the other hand, is a bit more reluctant to accept the ultimate validity of the authentication method developed by Hacker-Mayeda: "The criteria of Hacker and Mayeda are themselves unconvincing" states Pande (1994) in his work "*Life and Thought of Śaṅkarācārya*", since the *Upadeśasāhasrī* "hardly needs

¹ Mayeda's point is well taken, since creative minds do not work in a clerical manner.

² emphasis added

these tests—except perhaps for the verification of the tests themselves—because the text was apparently known to Sureśvara in whom references to [the *Upadeśasāhasrī*] may be seen."⁴ Pande goes on to say that the gadya-prabandha of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is referred to in the *Vedāntadesīka*, which testifies to the authenticity of the prose part as well—which in any case, greatly resembles Śaṅkara's *Brahmasiṁhābhāṣya*.

More recently, Sundaresan (2002), in his article, "What Determines Śaṅkara's Authorship?" also questions the value of the Hacker-Mayeda method to determine authorship of the very large and indefinite number of independent tracts which are attributed to Śaṅkara, according to tradition Indian scholarship. According to Pande (1994)⁵ Kaviraj lists seventy-six prakaraṇas which are ascribed to "Govindabhagavatpāda-śiṣya-Śaṅkara", while Upadhyaya accepts the authenticity of about thirty-nine independent tracts. Belvalkar believes that five prakaraṇas are authentic works, while Western scholarship rejects the authenticity of all the prakaraṇas—except of course, the *Upadeśasāhasrī*—which "passes the test devised by Hacker and applied by Mayeda". Sundaresan pleads in favour of the authenticity of the *Pañcikaraṇa*, an independent tract which is rejected by Mayeda (1992) on the basis of the original Hackerian judgement criteria.

It should be mentioned here that Hacker is responsible for an excellent translation of the three prose parts of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* into German in his 1949 volume: "*Upadeshasāhasrī: Unterweisung in der All-Einheits-Lehre der Inder von Meister Shankara: Gadyaprabandha oder das Buch in Prosa, aus dem Sanskrit übersetzt und erläutert von Paul Hacker*" (Bonn: Ludwig Röhrscheid Verlag). At the beginning of his career as an *Indologist*—as the Germanic tradition has it—Hacker was very much interested in Śaṅkaran authorship questions, and the translation of the gadya-prabandha of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* issued from this period of his indological interests. The translation is indeed a very fine one⁶, and it may be added here that

³ Malkovsky (2001), p. 33.

⁴ Pande (1994), p. 114.

⁵ Ibid, p. 113.

⁶ Hacker (1949) bases his translation of USG on two editions: the first, from volumes 3-5 of "Pandit" Benares (1868-1870) and the second being the edition by Hari Raghunath Bhagavat in the volume "Works of Shankaracharya, vol. IV, Minor Works", published in Poona in 1925, Hacker states that his translation follows mainly the Poona edition.

Mayeda (1979) certainly was of the same opinion, since his translation of the three prose parts of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* closely resembles Hacker's original translation from the Sanskrit. Indeed, one may perhaps view Mayeda's contribution more as a translation from the German text, than from the original Sanskrit text.

In Hacker's introduction to his translation of the USG (1949), he states that: "the three parts [of the *Upadeśasāhasrī-gadya-prabandha*], from the standpoint of the traditional practice of the Vedāntic path to liberation, represent a coherent unity ("ein zusammenhängendes Ganzes")."⁷ Hacker justifies this by referring to the famous quotation from the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (II.4.5 = IV.5.6) which reads:

"O, Maitreyī, it is the self that should be seen, *heard of, reflected on and meditated upon*.⁸ Verily, by the seeing of, by the hearing of, by the thinking of, by the understanding of the self, all this is known."⁹

ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ maitreyi ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam

Based on this famous quotation from Śāṅkara's beloved Upaniṣad¹⁰, Hacker concludes that the three prose parts of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* were conceived as a single unified work structured after the three-fold discipline of śravaṇa (hearing), manana (thinking about), and nididhyāsana (contemplating); that is, the three Vedāntic stages to attainment of final release (mokṣa). Mayeda (1965), in his article: "The Authenticity of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* Ascribed to Śāṅkara", supports Hacker's view that the three prose

⁷ Hacker (1949), p. 8-9.

⁸ emphasis added

⁹ Radhakrishnan (tr.) 1994, p. 197.

¹⁰ It is generally considered that the Advaita Vedānta which Śāṅkara subscribed to and developed has the closest affinity to the ātmology of Yājñavalkya in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*. Śāṅkara's commentary on this Upaniṣad is about two times more abundant than his commentary on the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, the other great Upaniṣad which is most esteemed by Bādarāyana in his *Brahmasūtra*. Note that the word "ātmology" which is here employed is an interesting lexical creation of the German Indologist P. Hacker.

prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasūtras* are, in fact, a unified *Gesamtkunstwerk*, contributing several arguments of his own to this effect¹¹.

Shortly thereafter, Hacker (1968) *retracted* his original position concerning the unity issue of the USG: "Die *Upadeśasūtras* ist ja kein einheitliches Werk—ich halte sie für eine Sammlung aller selbstständigen Schriften des Śaṅkara-Bhagavatpāda—diese sind zu verschiedenen Zeiten entstanden."

That the three prose parts represent a *compilation* of three independent prose prakaraṇas, written at three different periods with three different goals in mind, seems to be a more valid point of view. It is probably the case that over time, Hacker became more and more aware of the broad spectrum of the world of ideas which Śaṅkara drew from and incorporated into his Advaita Vedānta—from the Early Vedānta of the *Brahmasūtras*, the legal and normative texts of the *Dharmasūtras*, the Sāṃkhya-Yoga darśanas, the bhakti movement, not to forget the influence of the Gauḍapāḍian sub-school of Advaita Vedānta, which was greatly influenced by the contemporaneous Buddhist schools of thought, and looked admirably upon the various logical methods of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti tradition. Upon closer analysis of the three prose parts, Hacker was no longer willing to view the prose prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasūtras* as "simply" the gradual advancement of the pupil through the phases of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana towards the attainment of liberation in the Advaitic scheme.

In fact, when one looks at the long tradition of written testimony in India, one finds that the strategy of binding independent texts accounts for a substantial portion of the corpus of extant texts, be it the earlier sūtra literature, or the later prakaraṇas in prose form. In the case of the prose prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasūtras*, it would appear that the organising framework of the later "compilation strategy" is indeed a strategy based on the three-fold discipline of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. Among other collections (kośa) whose independent texts or verses (subhāṣita) fit this description, are the compilation of verses attributed to a single author (such as Bhartṛhari) and there are

¹¹ Mayeda's own argument for the unity of the three prose prakaraṇas of the US are that the first of the three prakaraṇas opens with the word "atha" and the third ends with a repetition of the last word "vistaraśaḥ samīkṣatavyāni samīkṣatavyāni"—this of course, could simply represent a later accretion by the editor/compiler of the three individual tracts.

several that utilise the *puruṣārthas* (such as the *Tirukkural* of the traditional Tamil literature) as an organising framework. By applying such organisational strategies, compilers—and not just authors—*create texts*, and these texts possess a form that shapes the ultimate meaning and reception of their component texts.

As Vetter (1979) has convincingly pointed out, the individual prose *prakaraṇas* of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* appear *each* to be associated with a different period in the life of Śaṅkara, although certain problems of chronology concerning them—as well as the chronology of all the authentic commentarial works, for that matter—remain yet to be solved in a satisfactory manner. In fact, a lot of work of primary significance is yet to be done in the area of Śaṅkaran research., as for example, as Sundaresan (2002) remarks, in the form of the preparation and publication of *critical editions* of Śaṅkara's undisputed texts.¹²

In this thesis, since it is considered that the *gadya-prabandha* of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is most probably a compilation of three separate and independent tracts, it was decided not to adopt a methodology which would *accentuate* the concept of the three-fold discipline of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, even though it is true that scriptural testimony (*śravaṇa*), logical argument (*manana*) and spiritual practice (*nididhyāsana*) are extremely important issues in the Advaita Vedānta enterprise of Śaṅkara. But there are also other topics which are of central importance, if one wishes to grasp the significance of Śaṅkara's path to liberating knowledge. For example, the concept of nescience (*avidyā*) is of utmost importance in understanding the ways of the world, and is the key to both Śaṅkara's epistemological and metaphysical positions.

In Tilmann Vetter's 1979 publication: "*Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śaṅkaras*", a *therapeutic model*¹³ for textual interpretation of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is presented which has definite affinities to the Four Noble Truths (*ariyasaccaṃ*, Pāli), which form the central conception of Buddhism: *dukkha*, *samudaya*, *nirodha* and *magga*. According to Vetter's method based on this therapeutic model, the following

¹² Sundaresan (2002), p. 25.

¹³ Vetter (1979), p. 17.

eight questions serve as a foundation for an analysis of the gadya-prabandha of the *Upadeśasūhasrī*:

- i. Should one be liberated?; and from what should one be liberated?¹⁴
- ii. What is liberating knowledge based upon?
- iii. How can one be liberated?
- iv. What is the content of liberating knowledge?
- v. From what source(s) does the content of liberating knowledge come?
- vi. How should one mobilise this knowledge so that it may lead to liberation?
- vii. What are the requisites (and/or pre-requisites) for the attainment of this knowledge?

The main body of this thesis is sectioned according to this eight-fold method which Vetter proposes, and it is a particularly useful framework, since Śaṅkara was primarily concerned with questions involving the nature of the human suffering, and the possibility of obtaining release from saṃsāra, even in this lifetime. Since both Indian and Western scholarship have often considered that Śaṅkara advocated the notion of the three-fold discipline of śravaṇa, manana, and nididhyāsana, the thesis will included a section on the appearance of these three terms as they appear in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, as well as by looking at some of the early *interpretations* of these three terms. It will then go on to look at Śaṅkara's somewhat ambiguous attitude toward śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana as a spiritual method, and conclude with the notion that it is scripture and reason acting together which plays a much more significant role in the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara.

It may be noted here that the abbreviation "USG" will often be used in this thesis, and obviously refers to the three prose prakaraṇas (gadya-prabandha) of the *Upadeśasūhasrī*, followed by the roman numeral I, II or III, which indicates each of the

¹⁴ As Vetter (1979) himself presents the eight questions, the first two are placed together. I have followed Vetter in this thesis by groupin them together in section i.

three individual prakaraṇas, followed by the section-passage number(s). When the metrical part is mentioned, the abbreviation "USP" (padya-prabandha) will be employed. Śaṅkara's name will be often employed in the thesis, but will not be abbreviated. References to the scriptures will be given in full, with no abbreviations. References to the secondary sources in the main body of text will mention the name of the author, followed by the date of publication of the article or book. When the secondary source appears in the footnotes, the same method will be employed, followed by the pagination. The bibliography gives complete information concerning the article or volume in question.

It may be further noted that Mayeda's English language translation of the *Upadeśasāhāsrī* (1979) has been employed in this thesis whenever the primary text is quoted (USG or USP). Sanskrit quotations from the primary text follow the Jagadānanda edition (1970).

Section 1: Nescience (*avidyā*) as the root cause of *saṃsāra*; nescience as the matrix of all endeavour and its cessation

In section 9 of USG I, the dialogue between teacher and pupil is opened with the following question which the teacher asks the pupil: "*Who are you, my dear?*" (*kastvamasi somyeti*). This is the point of departure of a long journey which the pupil must undertake in order to realise that the *kastvamasi* may be transformed effortlessly into the *tattvamasi* of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VI,8,7), a state which, according to Vedāntic beliefs, is the highest end of unconditioned spiritual freedom. It is the commonly accepted situation of subject-object polarity in human experience which Śāṅkara holds to be that nescience (*avidyā*), which is the root cause of all *saṃsāric* suffering. In section 12 of USG I, the pupil informs the teacher that he is aware that he is caught in the "wheel of transmigratory existence" and seeks ultimate liberation (*mokṣa*):

"The body is born, dies, is eaten by birds, turns into earth, is destroyed by weapons, fire and so forth, and suffers from disease and so on. I have entered this body as a bird enters a nest, by force of the merit and demerit accumulated by myself. Again and again by force of the merit and demerit, when this body, perishes, I shall enter another body as a bird enters another nest when its previous one has been destroyed. Thus I am in beginningless (*anadi*) transmigratory existence. I have been abandoning [old] bodies which have been obtained one after another in the spheres of gods, animals, men, and hells by force of my own *karman* and I have been getting other new bodies over and over again. I am forced by my own *karman* to rotate in the incessant cycle of birth and death as in a water-wheel. I have obtained this body in the course of time. I am tired of this rotation in the wheel of transmigratory existence, so I have come to you, Your Holiness, in order to end the rotation in the wheel of transmigratory existence."¹⁵

According to Śāṅkara, *avidyā* has two forms. From his commentary on the *Brahmasiṃhāra*, it becomes evident that there is a form of *avidyā* which is the cause of rebirth and suffering, and secondly, there is another form of *avidyā* which causes the appearance of the world, which is of cosmogonic proportion. In the above-quoted passage from USG I, it is obvious that Śāṅkara is here referring to *saṃsāric* suffering—a form of *avidyā*—which involves the false identification with certain limiting factors (*upādhi*) such as the body, the sense organs, the mind and so on. *Saṃsāra* is considered

to be a somewhat metaphysical entity, since it is termed to be beginningless in nature: "Thus I am in beginningless transmigratory existence", states the pupil in this section of USG I (evamevāhamanādaṁ saṁsāre). It is significant to note that in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, as in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, anādi is used as an attribute of saṁsāra, though this attribute is not applied to avidyā.

The pupil declares in the above passage that it is precisely *transmigration* which he seeks to overcome since he is weary of existence in time. The kind of saṁsāra which Śāṅkara is describing appears to consist of the cycle of works (*karman*) as the result of actions in previous existences, one's connection with the body, the experience of pleasure and pain, passion and aversion, actions (*kriyā*) and finally, the duo of merit and demerit. Śāṅkara is willing to raise saṁsāra to a near metaphysical thing since he considers it to be a continuously recurring process of the performance of actions, and the experience of the fruit of action. In his commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* I.2, Śāṅkara states that saṁsāra is: "without beginning or end, and fit to be discarded by everyone, since it is of the nature of misery—when looked at in its entirety, it is of the nature of unbroken continuity like the flow of a river."

In USG II, section 51, saṁsāra is also described as possessing the characteristics of agency and experiencership (*kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-lakṣaṇa*). The pupil states:

"My nature is transmigratory existence which is characterised by agency and experiencership, since it is known by *perception* and other means of knowledge (*pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ*)"

As shall be seen in section 2 of this thesis, it is of utmost significance that Śāṅkara relegates *pratyakṣa* to the realm of *loka-vyavahāra* (conventional reality), and thus *pratyakṣa* does not function as a valid source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) to arrive at ultimate truth.

Śāṅkara's notion of saṁsāra is reflected in the compound "avidyā-kāma-karman" which he often employs in his writings; *avidyā* causes *kāma* (desire) from which *karman* (action) results. In Śāṅkara's introduction to many of the Upaniṣad

¹⁵ As stated in the Introduction, the English translation of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* employed throughout the thesis is that of Mayeda, Sengaku (1979), *A Thousand Teachings: The Upadeśasāhasrī of Śāṅkara* (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press).

commentaries , such as the *Isopaniṣad-* and *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣadbhāṣya-s*,¹⁶ grief and misery are considered to be definite characteristics of saṃsāra.

It is indeed the concept of avidyā which is central to Vedāntic philosophy and is considered to be the *root cause* of all saṃsāric suffering, characterised by grief and delusion, as Śaṅkara himself states. In his introductory commentary to *Brahmasūtra* I,1,1, Śaṅkara gives his definition of avidyā. He first of all defines superimposition (adhyāsa) as the appearance, in the form of remembrance, of one thing previously experienced in another (smṛtirūpaḥ paratra pūrvadr̥ṣṭāvabhāsaḥ). In other words, adhyāsa consists in attributing qualities *not* immediately presented to consciousness to a thing *that is* immediately given to consciousness. Śaṅkara's definition of adhyāsa is followed by relating avidyā to superimposition, and he states that "learned men regard this superimposition so defined as avidyā" (*tam etam evaṃlakṣaṇam adhyāsam pañcātā avidyeti manyante*)¹⁷. Śaṅkara elaborates on this definition by stating that avidyā is mutual superimposition (itaretarādhyāsa) of subject (viṣayin) and object (viṣaya). In order to express the notion of mutual superimposition of self (ātman) and non-self (anātman), Śaṅkara uses a sexual metaphor: "satyānṛte mithunīkṛtya" which may be translated as the coupling of the true with the false, i.e., the superimposition of the falseness of body, sense organs, inner organ (antaḥkaraṇa), and so on, on the true self (ātman).

In USG II.51, the teacher defines nescience as the superimposition of the qualities of one [thing] upon another" (avidyā nāma anyasmin anyadharmādhyāropaṇā), followed by two illustrations of superimposition: one being the "silver, mother-of-pearl" and the other being the "person, tree-trunk" illustration, both drawn from the sphere of psychic afflictions, the first, greed (dhanalobha), and the second, possibly fear (bhaya)—forests being what they were in those days¹⁸.

The pupil who enters into dialogue with the teacher in USG II remarks in section 45 that the saṃsāric suffering which he experiences in the waking state and the dreaming

¹⁶ For example, quoting from Śaṅkara's introduction to the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* commentary: "so the self labouring under misapprehension, owing to identification of itself with misery" in Nikhilananda, Swami (tr.) (1995), *The Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama), p. 2.

¹⁷ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, (I,1.1, Introduction).

¹⁸ Furthermore, in Sanskrit, the word "vṛkṣa", m. signifies tree, tree-trunk, as well as coffin.

state is due to some cause, and that final release is possible only after this cause has been removed. The pupil then inquires into the nature of this cause of suffering by posing the following questions to the teacher (USG II, 47):

"What is the cause? And what will remove it? And what is my own nature (mama svabhāva)? When the cause is removed, the effect due to the cause no [longer] exists; I will attain to my own nature like a sick person [who recovers his health] when the cause of his disease has been removed."

It becomes clear here that although therapeutic metaphors play a significant role in the Buddhist tradition, they are also employed in other Indian philosophical traditions as well. The above passage illustrates that according to Śaṅkara's Vedāntic enterprise, the major concern is the removal of the essential cognitive affliction of avidyā in order to reveal the true identity of the self. What results is a state of health, identity, and self-understanding. One of the Sanskrit terms for health *svasthatā* has the sense of a natural, original state. Śaṅkara refers to this natural state as the goal of medical therapy (cikitsā-śāstra) as well as the goal of spiritual endeavour in the introduction to his commentary on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*:

"As a man stricken with disease regains his normal state (svasthatā) with the removal of [the cause of] the disease, so the self, owing to identification of itself with suffering, [recovers] its normal state with the cessation of [the illusion of] duality."

rogārtasya iva roganivṛttau svasthatā tathā duḥkhātmakasya ātmano dvaitaprapaṅcōpaśame svasthatā".

In USG I, Śaṅkara refers to the fundamental eye-disease (timira) which is the false way of seeing caused by avidyā:

"ātman is one alone and [only] appears as many through the vision [affected] by nescience just as the moon [appears] as many to sight [affected] by timira eye-disease." (USG I, 40)

The Vedāntic teaching is considered to be a "treatment by the medicine of knowledge and dispassion (jñānavirāgabheṣaja) which brings about the removal of the fever of desires", according to USP XIX, 1. It is interesting to note that the medical metaphors employed in both USG II, 47, and in the metrical part of the

Upadeśasāhasrī, refer essentially to the cause of saṃsāric suffering and its alleviation through right knowledge (samjak jñāna), but do not overtly refer to continuous practices which may lead to liberation. This is very much in the spirit of the philosophical position of Śaṅkara's Vedānta, which frowns upon any premeditated ritual action in view of salvation. And as Śaṅkara reminds the reader in USP XIX, 4: "O mind, you make useless efforts."

In his 1968 article: "*Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen*" Hacker forwards the opinion that Śaṅkara is the author of the *Yogasātra-bhāṣya-vivaraṇa*, a sub-commentarial text on the *Yogasātra* of Patañjali. In the introduction to the *Vivaraṇa*, the Yogic path of liberation is compared to *therapeutics* (cikitsā-śāstra). The therapeutic programme is divided into four individual sections or stages (vyūha):

- I. Saṃsāric suffering is to be eradicated, where saṃsāra is compared to the sickness (roga)
- II. Suffering is defined as the connection of the subject with the object which is due to nescience (this is the cause of the sickness, roga-hetuḥ)
- III. The means to eradicate suffering is the correct awareness of discrimination between subject and object (the cure—bhaiṣajya)
- IV. If the above is recognised, nescience is eradicated and thus the connection between subject and object no longer occurs, from which results health: ārogya)

It is quite clear that the teacher presented in USG II does not present the pupil with a *practical treatment* to eradicate saṃsāric suffering—nothing is promised to the pupil other than samyak jñāna (right knowledge):

"the remover of this nescience is knowledge. And so you have reached fearlessness."

tasyā avidyāyāḥ vidyā tivartikā ityevaṃ tvaṃ abhayaṃ prāpte'si (USG II.110).

Again and again in the various commentarial and non-commentarial works of Śaṅkara, liberation (mokṣa) is defined as the *mere removal* of nescience

(avidyānivṛttimātra), as for example, in Śaṅkara's commentary on Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad IV,4,6:

"Thus as we have also said, it is but the removal of nescience which is commonly called liberation; just as the removal of the snake from the rope, upon the removal of the misunderstanding (ajñāna) regarding the snake."

tasmādaavidyānivṛttimātre mokṣa-vyavahāra iti cāvocāma yathā rajjvādaḥ sarpādyaajñānanivṛttau sarpādinivṛttiḥ

It becomes clear from such a comment that for Advaita Vedānta tradition of Śaṅkara, liberation (mokṣa) brings about *no essential transformation* of the knower. Liberation is nothing more than the cessation of avidyā.

Avidyā is considered to be the first member of a series of afflictions *which causes all the others*, in the same manner that avidyā gives momentum to kāma and karma in the compound "avidyākāmakarma" (USP XV,21). In Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* (I.3.2), the compound "-avidyā-rāga-dveṣādi-doṣa-" is employed. Nescience *causes* passion (rāga) and anger (dveṣa), and other psychic afflictions referred to in the compound (ad I.3.2) appear later on in the same commentarial passage, those being, bhaya (fear) and moha (illusion). Avidyā is hereby considered to be the foremost member of a dangerous series of psychic afflictions (kleśa or doṣa). As stated earlier, Śaṅkara does not wish to elevate avidyā to the level of a metaphysical and separate entity, since this would contradict the essential non-duality of his philosophical enterprise. It remains part, though causal in nature, of the wider concept of psychic afflictions. USP III.112 expressly states that "nescience *causes* faults" (avidyāhetavo doṣā), although a listing of the various kinds of faults is not given in the third prose part of the *Upadeśasūtrasrī*.

Mayeda (1965) also refers to the cause-effect relation of avidyā and he presents an extensive list of the various effects of avidyā which Śaṅkara mentions throughout the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. These effects of avidyā may be placed in several broad categories:

- I. those dealing with false identification with the body (ahaṃkarṭṛ) and intellect (buddhi); self appearing to be the size of the body (tāvanmātra); desire (kāma); faults (doṣā); pain experienced in the waking and dream states (svapnajāgrat-duḥkha); transmigratory existence characteristic of waking and dream states (saṃsāro jāgratsvapnalakṣaṇa)
- II. those somewhat more abstract in nature, referring to the false notion of difference (bheda); plurality or manifold character of the one self (anekatva); duality (dvaitam)
- III. those effects which are critical of other darśanas such as the Mīmāṃsaka injunctions on the importance of ritual action: i.e., that the agent, means and objects of actions are experienced or taught in the scriptures (etaḍ yad idaṃ dr̥śyate śrūyate vā)¹⁹; all the rites and their requisites (sarvakarmaṇām tatsādhanāṇām ca)

Both USG I and USG II deal with the effects of avidyā which fall within the category of false identification with the body, mind, etc. According to Śaṅkara, a fundamental error occurs in that empirical consciousness normally takes itself to be a distinct ego individuated by the body, mind, sense organs and so on, which is expressed by the notion of the 'I'. This empirical 'I-self' functions as cogniser, agent and experiencer (pramātṛ-karṭṛ-bhokṭṛ). As Sinha (1996) aptly states: "[avidyā] is not meant to be treated just as equivalent to absence of knowledge although bearing the negative implications, epistemologically and otherwise. The legitimacy of the alogical principle does not arise merely through the antinomies of the epistemic situation arising from the phenomenon of erroneous perception. More significantly, it is necessitated by an originary analysis of human consciousness in terms of a critique of experience."²⁰

In USG I, if the pupil responds to the teacher's question: "Who are you, my dear?" in the following manner: "I am a Brahmin's son belonging to such and such a family. I was a student,...but now I am a paramahansa wandering ascetic." (USG I.10). The false identification in this case is one of name, caste, and stage in life. In USG II,

¹⁹ This particular effect of avidyā will be considered later on in Section 3 of the thesis.

²⁰ Sinha (1996), p. 166.

this false identification is presented in a somewhat more abstract manner, though the false notion of ego (ahaṃpratyaya) remains the essential error:

"If one says: 'I am white', 'I am dark', this is [the superimposition] of qualities of the body upon ātman which is the object of the 'I'-notion."

gauro'haṃ kṛṣṇo'hamiti dehadharmasya ahaṃpratyayaṇiṣaye ātmani (USG II.52)

Śaṅkara's straightforward appeal to common empirical usage (loka-vyavahāra) in such statements as 'I am white' or 'I am dark' indicates what he believes to be the deep-rooted confusion embedded in human nature. His didactic approach implicates the stratum of bodily subjectivity, which is represented in terms of the body-self superimposition (dehātmaḍdhyāsa). Śaṅkara's notion of *dehātmaḍdhyāsa* may be seen not only as a case of "I am the body", but also "this body is me". This concept of *reciprocal superimposition* (itaretarāḍdhyāsa) is presented in USG II, 52 since statements such as 'I am white' or 'I am dark' are followed by the equally false statements of superimposition of self on the physical body, such as "*ayamasmi*".

The examples of body-self identification which are forwarded in USG I.10 and USG II.52 reflect the superimposition of the self on the entities which may be termed "evolved name-and-form". In the case of 'I am white, I am dark', implied is the superimposition of name-and-form on the self by means of the external sensory object of sight, which is often the sensory object of predilection whenever the logical form of illustration is employed. In USG II.74, this same notion of superimposition is applied to the (false notion of) cognisanship. The pupil forwards the following example: "I am a perceiver of notions which have the forms [of the external objects] such as blue and yellow."

In the case of the organ of reflection (buddhi), the adjunct (upādhī) which is most closely (and also falsely) identified with the self, no illustration is given in USG II, though the two-fold antaḥkaraṇa (consisting of manas and buddhi²¹) is as falsely identified with the self as is the body, the sensory organs, and their functions.²² Advaita

²¹ Śaṅkara often distinguishes between manas and buddhi in attributing the functions of "saṃkalpa and saṃśaya" to manas, and "niścaya or adhyavasāya" to buddhi.

²² According to Śaṅkara, the individual consists of the following six components: 1. body, gross (sthūla) and subtle (sūkṣma) 2. the five senses (buddhīndriya) 3. the five organs of action (karmendriya) 4. the

Vedānta is inclined towards regarding that aspect of mind which is related to cognitive functions as a *subtler form* of the body and the term 'antaḥkaraṇa', which expresses the internality of the functions of buddhi and manas, is not considered to be 'interior enough' to be associated with the innermost self, termed the pratyagātman. In the third prose prakaraṇa of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, the following statement concerning mind and intellect is made (USG III.116):

"Whatever sound and the other external [objects of the senses] may be, they are changed into the form of the body, and into the form of the ear and the other [senses] which perceive them, and into the form of the two internal organs and their object, since they are mutually connected and composite in all cases of actions."

kiṃca ye eva bāhyāḥ śabdādayaḥ te śarīrākāreṇa saṁsthitāḥ tadgrāhakaiśca śrotrādyākāraiḥ
antaḥkaraṇadvayatadviśayākāreṇa ca anyonyasaṁsargitvāt saṁhatatvācca sarvakriyāsu

Here, the antaḥkaraṇadvaya, consisting of mind and intellect, functions within the realm of loka-vyavahāra, and since cognitive act is considered to be composite in nature (saṁhatatva), mind and intellect cannot possibly be part of the realm of paramārtha-sat, which is non-dual (advaita), and "partless" by definition. Though a more subtle form of body-self identification, the antaḥkaraṇa is nonetheless considered to be an associational condition or adjunct (upādhi) of the self.

Suffering in the waking and dream states is also considered to be one of the effects of avidyā. In USG II.45, the relation of the self to the body and mental functions within different states of consciousness is expressed in the following manner:

"I experience pain in the waking state, and I experience it in the dream state after getting relief again and again by entering into the state of deep sleep again and again."

jāgarite duḥkhamanubhavāmi tathā svapne'anubhavāmica punaḥ punaḥ suṣuptipratipattyā
viśramya viśramya

In USG II.86-90, the teacher informs the pupil that the states of waking and dream are effects of avidyā because they are non-continuous, intermittent states of

internal organ (antaḥkaraṇa) 5. principal vital airs (mukhya prāṇa), considered to be five according to the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*, and 6. ātman

consciousness. Since waking and dream states are considered to be discrete states, they are but another example of the false notion of plurality of selves and objects in time and space. According to Śaṅkara, avidyā is also the cause of all manifestations of plurality, also termed (anekatva), which is expressed by Śaṅkara in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (II.1.6) as related to the false notion of mutual exclusion of various states of consciousness:

"Because the dreaming state (svapnānta) and the waking state (buddhānta) exclude each other, the self is not associated with those."

svapnāntabuddhāntayor ubhayor itaretaravyabhicārād ātmano'nanvāgatatvam

It may be mentioned here that Śaṅkara places great emphasis on this concept that avidyā is the efficient cause of a whole series of false notions, and is never considered to be an abstract, transcendental entity. According to Śaṅkara, if avidyā were considered to have a *real* or *essential* nature, this would amount to the recognition of a discrete truth-value called 'avidyā'. This recognition of a separate truth-value would obviously go against the fundamental Advaitic belief that "all this is brahman". If on the other hand, one would assume that avidyā is but an *imaginary* entity, how could one justify the real belief that the removal of avidyā is the very definition of liberation? In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* IV.1.3, the following statement is made:

And should you ask, "Who then is characterised by the absence of true knowledge?", we reply: "You yourself who ask this question!", and if you retort, "But I am the Lord as declared by the scriptures", we reply, "Very well, if you have arrived at that knowledge, then there is nobody who does not possess such knowledge."

This provocative statement "You yourself who ask this question!" (yastvam prcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmaḥ), illustrates that Śaṅkara is shying away from abstract theories about the nature of avidyā. His approach is to simply state that the removal of obscurations due to avidyā, revealing the substratum of non-dual consciousness, *remains within the sphere of the individual seeker*. Śaṅkara's position is also evident in his commentary on chapter XIII of the *Bhagavadgītā* (XIII.2.16):

Senseless is the question—'Whose is avidyā?'

How?

If nescience is perceived by you, him also you perceive, has it. And, perceiving him, the question who has it, is senseless, just as the question 'Whose are the cows?' is senseless, after perceiving the owner of the cows.

To a certain extent, this question of the nature of avidyā is *inconsequential* to Śāṅkara, and it appears that for him, abstract metaphysical speculation on this particular issue is of lesser value for a true seeker of enlightenment (avidyā kasya dṛśyate iti praśnaḥ nirarthakaḥ). Ad *Bhagavadgītā* XIII.2.16, Śāṅkara says that avidyā obviously belongs to the person who is bothered about it and poses such questions about its essential nature. It would appear that for Śāṅkara, avidyā is something which belongs to the empirical subject, and is rather *an immanent condition of phenomenal experience*. Avidyā is but an obscuration inherent in empirical consciousness, which eclipses the "light of pure consciousness". Śāṅkara's approach to truth may perhaps well be primarily psychological and religious, metaphysics and pure logical argument tending to play a subordinate role to these primary interests²³. There is a certain unwillingness to construct a concept of avidyā based on inferential argument since according to Śāṅkara, anumāna has validity only with the realm of vyavahāra, and is ultimately incapable of yielding knowledge of the non-difference of ātman and brahman.

Nevertheless, there does remain the problem of attempting to grasp an entity *never said to be real, never said to be unreal*, when one is supposedly a victim of the whole process. This human dilemma is actually staged by Śāṅkara himself in USG II.65-66, which clearly shows Śāṅkara's awareness of the human predicament:

"...the teacher responded: "If you know that the false superimposition is the seed of [every] calamity, then do not make it!" [The pupil then said]. "Your Holiness, I cannot help it. I am driven [to do it] by another; I am not independent."

ityukto gururuvāca anarthabījabhūtām cet mithyādhyāropaṇām jānīṣe mā kāṛṣṭarhi || 65 ||

²³ It is for this reason that Śāṅkara has been compared to the Buddha (Ingalls; 1953), for whom theoretical metaphysical questions were also considered to be inconsequential. (See the story of the Buddha, who compared Mālunkya to a man struck by an arrow but would not let the surgeon extract it until he found out the name of the man who shot it, etc.) On this question, Hacker (1950) states that Śāṅkara's answers to the problem of the nature of avidyā are "not philosophically exact, but pedagogically impressive.", in Schmithausen (ed.), (1978), p. 78.

naiva bhagavan śakomi na kartum | anyena kenacit prayukto'haṃ na svatantra iti || 66 ||

In spite of the differences in perspective concerning the nature of avidyā in the above-mentioned commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* and USG II.65-66, it may be stated that the premise of both arguments is that there must be a *realisation* that avidyā is not an inherent characteristic of ātman.

Due to this somewhat *alogical* definition of avidyā in Śaṅkara's philosophical enterprise, rival schools such as the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā schools aimed their arrows at what they considered to be the weak point of this important theory of avidyā, that is, the problems of the *nature* and *locus* of avidyā, which Śaṅkara was unwilling to address. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, in the *Śloka-vārttika*, criticised the Vedāntic position concerning avidyā in the following manner:

"Further, since [brahman] itself is of pure nature and there exists nothing else [but brahman], how could nescience (avidyā) like a dream and so forth work on that [brahman]? If one says that [brahman] is invaded by something else, [his position] would become dualism. On the other hand, if [one says that] nescience belongs to [brahman] by nature, nobody would be able to remove it."

The argument hits at the heart of the problematic of finding a locus (āśraya) for avidyā in the Advaita Vedāntic philosophy: if one contends that only brahman is real, then nothing else, not even avidyā, can exist. Kumārila's blow is very well dealt, and subsequent adherents of Advaita Vedānta felt obliged to transform Śaṅkara's avidyā as *causa-efficiens*, into avidyā as *causa-materialis*. These later Vedāntins, forced to construct a metaphysical system of logical coherence due to outside criticism, would employ new terms which tended to *substantiate* avidyā. From now on, avidyā would be given the attribute 'jaḍa' (inanimate), according to Padmapāda; 'bhāvarūpa' according to Jñānottama, and would also subsequently be defined as either a cosmic power (*śukti*) or as a projection of śakti (vikṣepaśakti).

Maṇḍanamiśra, the older contemporary of Śaṅkara, in his *Brahmasiddhi*, did indeed elevate avidyā to the level of an independent truth-value, since the term

'*anirvacanāyuta*' was applied to it. This term was employed in the sense of something about which "*one can neither say that something is like this, nor different from this*".

It may be stated that Śaṅkara's initial definition of avidyā as *mutual superimposition* (*itaretarādhyāsa*) gradually lost favour with later Advaitins, who sought more and more to substantiate avidyā, and felt the need to formulate a theory which would permit the understanding of the world as appearance or illusion (*māyā*²⁴). In later Advaitic thought, avidyā becomes the material from which all false notions (*kalpanā*) are constructed. It would therefore appear that on the essential definition of avidyā, Śaṅkara remains much closer to the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, since both Śaṅkara and the Sāṃkhya-Yogins share the belief that avidyā is primarily afflictive in nature.

But it should be mentioned here that certain post-Hackerian researchers have expressed doubts that the Śaṅkaran concept of avidyā is restricted to that of efficient cause (*causa-efficiens*), and that there are certain references to avidyā as *causa-materialis* which crop up now and then in certain of the commentarial and non-commentarial works. According to Sundaresan (2002), Hacker's opinion concerning the non-substantiality of avidyā as a determining factor for authenticating other texts of Śaṅkara should be re-evaluated. He states:

"It should be appreciated that Śaṅkara's own view of avidyā is not merely an individual psychic affliction (*kleśa*) and that he does implicitly impart material causality to avidyā. If later Advaitins, beginning with Śaṅkara's own disciples, further materialise avidyā, this is because Śaṅkara himself leans sufficiently toward it."²⁵

According to Hacker (1950) and Mayeda (1979), a *significant difference* between the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara, and that of later adherents, is one concerning the mechanism of the creation of the phenomenal world. For Śaṅkara, it is *unevolved*

²⁴ Māyā, in the sense of cosmic illusion, is not employed by Śaṅkara in his definitive work, the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Śaṅkara never refers to his own philosophical doctrine as māyāvāda; in the BSBh, māyā is used on occasion, having the general meaning of fraud or magic; in USG I, māyā is employed having this sense of fraud, in that the teacher of Vedānta should be one free from faults such as wickedness, fraud (*māyā*), jealousy and so on.

²⁵ Sundaresan (2002), p. 392.

name-and-form (*avyākṛte nāmarūpe*), which is the *seed* of the world, while for later Advaitins, the primary cosmogonic material is either *avidyā* or *māyā*, and not unevolved name-and-form. In the writings of Śaṅkara, the term *vyākṛte nāmarūpe* refers to the manifestations of the phenomenal world, that is, to the plurality of the products of transformation of unevolved name and form (*avyākṛte nāmarūpe*). In USG I.18, highest ātman is considered to be:

"the Evolver of the unevolved name-and-form, merely by being existent since it is possessed of inconceivable power. The unevolved name-and-form is different in essence (*vilakṣaṇa*) from this [ātman] and it is the seed of the world, abiding in it, indescribable as this or something else, and known to it."

svātmavilakṣaṇayoḥ nāmarūpayoḥ jagadbījabhūtayoh svātmasthayoh tattvānyatvābhyām-
anirvacanīyayoḥ svayaṃvedyayoḥ sadbhāvamātreṇācintyaśaktitvād vyākartā vyākṛtayoh"

The description of unevolved name-and-form in USG I corresponds to its description in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, which in turn can be traced back to passages from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (VI.3.4):

"That divinity thought, "Well, let me enter into these three²⁶ divinities by means of this living self and let me then develop names and forms."

seyam devataikṣata hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenā'tmanā'nupraviśya nāmarūpe
vyākaravāṇīti

As has been stated earlier, the Hackerian argument is that Śaṅkara is somewhat reluctant to accept *avidyā* as that which is at the origin of the evolution of material elements. But it may be noted that the metrical part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* speaks of the universe which evolves from *avyākṛte nāmarūpe* as *avidyā-prabhava* (USP XVII.20), i.e., as the outcome of *avidyā*. In addition, Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* VII.4 links nescience with the unevolved (*avidyāsaṃuktam avyaktam*).

²⁶ *The three divinities*: The *Chāndogyopaniṣad* here refers to three material elements (*mahābhūta*), namely, fire, water and earth. However, other scriptural texts, for example the *Taittirīyopaniṣad* mentions five material elements, as having evolved from the Evolver (highest ātman), and USG I.19-20 gives the same order of five material elements as found in the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, though in USG I's case, *via* *avyākṛte nāmarūpe*. The theory of quintuplication (*pañcīkaraṇa*) advocates that all five elements (space, air, fire, water, earth) contribute to the formation of the phenomenal world—they are distinct from each other, are limited by time and space, and are impermanent.

These passages seem to indicate that Śaṅkara does indeed, as Sundaresan suggests, imply that avidyā is responsible for material nature, and that the notion of substantiality play some part in Śaṅkara's concept of avidyā. The notion of potential energy, expressed by the term *seed* (bīja) is also used by Śaṅkara in USG I.18, in that avidyā is considered to be the seed of the world (jagadbīja).

It is evident that Śaṅkara's doctrine of avyākṛte nāmarūpe corresponds to the satkārya-vāda in which nothing can be created from absolute nothingness and that all matter already exists before its creation in some potential and original form. This doctrine is useful in that it can introduce an intermediate phenomenon so that brahman may conserve its pure nature. USG I.18 states that unevolved name-and-form is "indescribable as this or something else" (tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīya), which allows a certain amount of freedom in the somewhat enigmatic process of explaining how the plurality of the material world can arise from a non-differentiated pure consciousness. The expression 'tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīya' characterises the *indeterminate nature* of the primary condition of unevolved name-and-form which has the potential to become determinate and material (vyācikīrṣita). Furthermore, the expression describes the uncertainty in that one can neither say: "It is so (tat), nor is it something else (anyat)", since it is in a state of potentiality, and therefore, not abiding in nature.

Metaphors and illustrations involving *indeterminate nature* are commonly used by Śaṅkara. Something may have qualities of two different entities, though it remains indeterminate, since it is neither one nor the other. Śaṅkara comments on the state of *swooning*, which is a somewhat elusive state of consciousness between the waking and dream states. In USG I.19, evolved name-and-form (vyākṛte nāmarūpe) is likened to foam, while its Evolver is like pure, clear water:

evam paramātmā nāmarūpābhyāmanyah phenasthānīyābhyām śuddhaḥ prasannaḥ tad-
vilakṣaṇaḥ

Probably foam, just as cloud and waves, were used as metaphors to represent indeterminate nature, since such entities possess a certain amount of consistency, yet are unable to serve as substrates for created objects, as clay can for the creation of pots.

USG I.42 forwards the notion of the origination (utpatti) and dissolution (pralaya) of the world from brahman. USG I. 42 states that:

[The scriptures] uproot nescience which is the view that [ātman] is different [from brahman], the root of saṃsāra, by showing the reasonableness of the oneness of the origination, dissolution, etc. [of the world].

tadbhedadr̥ṣṭimevāvidyāṃ saṃsāramunmūlayati utpattiḥ pralayādyekavopapatti pradarśanena

It was believed that the phenomenal world evolved *via* unevolved name-and-form from the Evolver, continued for a very long period of time, and then returned to the Evolver to become extinct. Thus the five gross elements (ether, air, fire, water and earth), as mentioned in USG I.20, eventually return to the Evolver in inverse order to that of the creation of the world. This was believed to be an endless process—the cycle continuing from the beginning past and continuing to the endless future.

Govind Chandra Pande, in his work: "*Life and Thought of Śāṅkarācārya*", states that avidyā is the *logical linch-pin* in the Śāṅkaran enterprise—in that avidyā is like the pin which keeps the wheel of the appearance of plurality of the phenomenal world in place²⁷. It is the removal of nescience, equated with liberation in the Advaitic scheme, which is the coming to rest of this rotating saṃsāric wheel. As Śāṅkara states in his commentary on *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI.3.2:

"The empirical self (jīva) is but the reflection of pure consciousness, caused by the contact with the material elements, just as the image of a person may appear in a mirror or of the sun, etc. in water. Pure consciousness has infinite power surpassing thought but through its contact with buddhi, etc²⁸., there is reflected consciousness (caitanyābhāsa) which does not apprehend the real nature of pure consciousness and thinks of itself as "I am happy, unhappy, or uncomprehending".

In Śāṅkara's Advaitic scheme, it is correct awareness (samyagdarśanam) which causes the removal of identification with the empirical adjuncts (upādhi), as well as the

²⁷ Pande (1994), p. 208.

²⁸ On the purely psychological level, the 'I-notion' (ahaṃpratyaya) occurs to the buddhi and thus the subject of the sentence jānāmi or jānāti is that which is called the ahaṃkarṭṛ. Words are applicable to the ahaṃkarṭṛ and may express generic attributes (jāti), action (kriyā), etc. which are ultimately absent in

elimination of saṃsāric suffering and transmigratory existence. This notion is central to Śaṅkara's belief that it is indeed possible to attain liberation, and is shown in comments such as the following from USG I.43:

...the only knowledge of one who sees the highest truth established right in this [ātman]

atraiva ekā prajñāpratiṣṭhā paramārthadarśino

The expression 'prajñāpratiṣṭhā' employed here, refers to the establishment in the understanding of the concept of non-difference of ātman and brahman (abheda), and perhaps also to the establishment of final realisation as a state in itself. Śaṅkara's allusion to prajñā as a state of final realisation may well originate in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.4.21a.b., which states:

tam eva dhīro vijñāya prajñāṃ kurvīta brāhmaṇaḥ

Let a wise Brāhmaṇa after knowing him alone, practice wisdom.

Although the dhātu kṛ in this *Upaniṣadic* quotation may appear as somewhat injunctive in nature, Śaṅkara interprets the optative form (saptamī) of the verb according to his belief that *there indeed is a path to liberation*, which is accessible to the seeker of truth. According to the very last sūtra of the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana (IV.4.22), *non-return (anavṛtti)* is offered to those who have attained liberation. Commenting on this sūtra, Śaṅkara states that it is "a settled matter that those who through samyak jñāna have dispelled all mental darkness, and are devoted to the eternally perfect state, *do not return*." The ideal of the Mahāyāna bodhisattva, who elects to remain in the world of saṃsāra for the sake of all beings, finds no recognition in Śaṅkara's commentary on this last sūtra of the *Brahmasūtra*.

ātman. On the purely conventional level of reality (saṃvṛti-sat), this 'I' or 'he' is (falsely) considered to be the self.

Section 2: The sources of knowledge in the early Advaitic tradition

Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta is often considered to be idealistic in nature, and that the world of ordinary experience is but an illusion. Many of his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* and on the *Brahmasūtra* indicate quite the contrary. In fact, Śaṅkara does indeed recognise the practical reality of the world authenticated by valid sources of knowledge (pramāṇas). In spite of Śaṅkara's view of the practical reality of the phenomenal world, it must not be forgotten that for him, this reality is a lesser one, which is transcended upon realisation of another higher reality (paramārtha-sat), based on samyak jñāna (right knowledge). Thus, he states in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.2.31:

"The world of conventional usage whose reality is attested by all the pramāṇas cannot be downgraded except on the basis of the realisation of another higher experience. A rule reigns supreme until an exception is discovered to it."

na hyayaṃ sarvapramāṇasiddho lokavyavahāro 'nyattattvamanadhigamya
śakyate'pahnnotumapavādābhāva utsargaprasiddheḥ

In this particular statement, Śaṅkara mentions the standpoint of conventional reality (vyavahārāvasthā), here called loka-vyavahāra²⁹, and that of "another reality" which in this particular text is called anyat-tattvam, though the term signifying the realm of ultimate truth (paramārthāvasthā) is also commonly employed. By accepting two standpoints³⁰, Śaṅkara is able to explain contradictions and anomalies between daily experience and ultimate truth. It appears that the word 'paramārtha' is not employed in the earlier *Upaniṣadic* literature, but is a borrowing from the oldest Buddhist texts in Pāli, such as the *Suttanipāṭa* and the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*—the Pāli word being 'paramattha'. Such a two-level system of truth came to be a very important concept in Mahāyāna Buddhism³¹, and it appears that the concept was introduced into

²⁹ loka.vyavahāra: For Śaṅkara, the term "loka" refers to ordinary life or daily experience where truth is yielded by the employment of the valid sources of knowledge. Thus the conceptions of ordinary life (loka-prasiddhi) have validity in their own realm of activity.

³⁰ A *third* level of reality is often mentioned which is that of hallucination, dream and so on—this level of reality is called the illusory or pratibhāsa.

³¹ It should be noted that the *Upaniṣadic* literature does recognise a two-level system, but here to distinguish between aparā vidyā (lower knowledge) and parā vidyā (higher knowledge) as in

Early Vedāntic philosophy through the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā* on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*. For example, kārika 73 of the fourth and last prakaraṇa (*Alāśānti-prakaraṇa*) of the *Gauḍapāda-kārikā*, which is the prakaraṇa commonly accepted to be the one most influenced by Mahāyāna Buddhism, states the following:

"Whatever exists in empirical truth (saṃvṛti) which is imagined (kalpita) does not exist in absolute truth (paramārtha) for one that is dependent (paratantra) [for its existence or origination] may exist in empirical truth which is the cause and not in absolute truth."³²

yo'sti kalpitasamvṛtyā paramārthena nāstyasau |
paratantrābhisamvṛtyā syānnāsti paramārthataḥ || IV.73 ||

For Śaṅkara, the valid sources of knowledge do indeed have relevance, yet it is significant to note that at the level of conventional reality, the empirical cognitive processes (manas and buddhi) belong to the realm of nescience. This is obvious from statements such as the following from the introduction to the *Brahmasūtra*, where perception, and so on, are said to belong to the sphere of avidyā: avidyāvadviṣayāny-evapratyakṣādīni pramāṇāni śāstrāṇi ca. Śaṅkara's comment reveals that valid knowledge gained through the scriptures (śāstra) is also ultimately transcended, along with pramāṇas such as perception, which will be considered in a later section of this thesis.

In USG II.59, Śaṅkara does not enumerate the recognised valid sources of knowledge in his Advaitic scheme, but states, in a manner similar to the introduction to the *Brahmasūtra* (BSBh I.1.1, intro.): "tasmānna pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ" (therefore there is no contradiction with perception *and the other* [pramāṇas]). The expression 'pratyakṣādi' crops up in several passages of USG II, and no attempt is made by Śaṅkara to forward the complete list of the valid sources of knowledge.

Muṇḍakopaniṣad I.1.4: tasmai sa hovāca | dve vidye veditavya iti ha sma yad brahmavidō vadanti parā caivāparā ca ||

The *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* on this particular Upaniṣadic passage is the following: "Which are the two [kinds of knowledge]? The higher being the knowledge of paramātman and the lower related to the means and fruits of dharmādharma."

³² translation: Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara, (reprinted 1989) "*The Āgamaśūtra of Gauḍapāda*" (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers).

In fact, unlike the later Advaitins who clearly outlined what they believed to be the valid sources of knowledge, Śaṅkara was rather inconsistent in his analysis of the pramāṇas. In his commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* I.2.12, Śaṅkara states: "pratyakṣānumānopapānāgamaiḥ sarvato yathātmyenādhārya", thus here mentioning *four* valid means of knowledge, that is, perception, inference, comparison (upāmana) and scripture (āgama). In his commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* III.3.1, Śaṅkara includes one other pramāṇa, as well—postulation (arthāpatti). This acceptance of *five* pramāṇas is in agreement with the Prabhākara school of the Mīmāṃsakas.³³ As Nakamura points out (1962), Śaṅkara's unfixed notion concerning the number of valid sources of knowledge was shared by the Early Mīmāṃsakas. Nakamura also states that both the Early Vedāntins and the Early Mīmāṃsakas tended to increase the number of their recognised pramāṇas with time.³⁴

Significantly, Śaṅkara's *Brahmasiṁrabhāṣya* posits a *three-fold* pramāṇa system, made up of pratyakṣa, anumāna and śabda (scriptural testimony), which is in agreement with the position of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga schools. For example, the *Sāṃkhyā-kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa states in kārika.IVa.b. that:

"perception (dṛṣṭa), inference (anumāna) and right affirmation are admitted to be the three-fold proof." dṛṣṭamanumānamāptavacanam ca sarvapramāṇasiddhatvāt

That Śaṅkara recognises a three-fold pramāṇa system in the *Brahmasiṁrabhāṣya*, is a mark of respect which he shows for the Sāṃkhya school, and it may be noted here that he also held the school of Yoga in particular esteem, since he often quoted directly from the Yoga-śāstras. For example, commenting on *Brahmasiṁtra* II.4.12, Śaṅkara includes a quotation from the *Yogasiṁtra* of Patañjali concerning the "five functions of manas which are known from the Yogaśāstra, i.e., right knowledge, error, imagination, slumber and remembrance":

³³ The Bhaṭṭa school of the Mīmāṃsakas recognise a sixth pramāṇa--non-perception (anupalabdhi) and later Advaitins recognise these six pramāṇas of the Bhaṭṭa-Mīmāṃsaka school.

³⁴ Nakamura (1962), p. 161. Nakamura's comment could indicate a method for the chronological dating of the works of Śaṅkara, an area open to much speculation.

ihāpi yogaśāstraprasiddhā manasaḥ pañcavṛttayaḥ parigrhyante pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ nāma

In this passage ad *Brahmasūtra* II.4.12, Śaṅkara quotes *directly* from Patañjali's work, since sūtra I.5 of the *Yogasūtra* states: "vṛttayaḥ pañcatayaḥ klišṭa-aklišṭāḥ" (the functions are five-fold—afflicted and non-afflicted), and Yogasūtra I.6 reads: "pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtayaḥ" ([being] the pramāṇas, misconception, mental construct, sleep and memory). Yogasūtra I.7 further states that the pramāṇas are *three in number*, namely, pratyakṣa, anumāna and āgama (scripture).

In addition, Śaṅkara's *definitions* of the individual pramāṇas are also somewhat vague. Looking at different commentarial sources, it may be stated that Śaṅkara believed that perception could either be either *external* or *internal*. In the case of *external* perception, the external objects of perception (such as sound or smell) are material and unconscious, not having any knowledge of themselves nor of others. The five senses (buddhīndriya) are necessary for the perception of external objects, and serve to discern the object (viṣaya) of each sense.

Śaṅkara's position is not clear whether the senses *have to go out* and reach an object (i.e., have contact with an object) for the sake of perception, and it is only stated that the senses are *directed towards* (bahirmukha—in *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.3.6) the external objects. *Internal* perception, on the other hand, refers to psychological and mental events, such as the feelings of pleasure and pain (sukhaduḥkhavedanā), as well as the already discussed doṣas such as passion (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and desire (kāma, icchā). While for example, a pot is considered to be an external object of perception, so too, a mental occurrence, such as aversion, is viewed as an object of perception, though in this case as an object of internal perception.

For Śaṅkara, the sources of knowledge retain their validity within the realm of loka-vyavahāra and are to be accepted as true unless they are contradicted by other sources of knowledge. This is not the case for paramārthāvasthā where no pramāṇas can serve to realise the non-difference of ātman and brahman (abhedatva). In fact, in Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra* I.1.4, the expression "na heya na upādeya" is

frequently used, which signifies that within the realm of paramārtha-sat, knowledge of brahman/ātman *cannot be rejected or accepted*, since there can be no valid source of knowledge in this higher realm. In USG II.109 (which is the point at which the pupil has finally realised the truth of the Advaitic teachings), the pupil states:

"If so, your Holiness, *apprehension* (avagati) is transcendently changeless, eternal, indeed of the nature of the light of ātman, and self-established, since it does not depend upon any means of knowledge with regard to itself..."

yadyevam bhagavan kūṭasthanityāvagatiḥ ātmajyotiḥ svarūpaiva svayamsiddhā ātmani
pramāṇanirapekṣatvāt

This particular passage of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* which forwards the belief that the essential nature of paramārtha-sat *cannot depend upon any valid sources of knowledge* is one belief which Hacker (1968³⁵) finds rather difficult to deal with, since one may be tempted to pose the following question, how then, is it possible to realise this *other higher experience*? This question concerning the *means* of attaining liberating knowledge is also posed in a very astute manner by Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad in his work "*Advaita Epistemology and Metaphysics: An Outline of Indian Non-Realism*" (2002):

"Since the pramāṇa theory is understood as being about the world from which its causal authority is derived, the legitimacy of the theory is limited to the currently experienced world. The reality putatively behind the world would legitimately and coherently be known only according to the standards derived from it—but those standards, the standards of the liberated self—are unavailable to ordinary subjects. It is clear that the standards required to know it are simply unavailable to us because we are not consciously in that reality."

It would appear that the world of conventional usage, whose reality is attested by all the pramāṇas, cannot be downgraded except on the basis of the *realisation of this other higher experience*. And as Śaṅkara states in the commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.2.31, "a rule reigns supreme until an exception is discovered to it." This statement clearly indicates that the Early Advaitins subscribe to the Mīmāṃsā theory of epistemic validity (svataḥ-prāmāṇya-parataḥ-apramāṇya). In this theory, every cognition is to be considered valid knowledge (yathārthajñāna), so long as it is not contradicted

(bādhita)—that is, proved to be false—by some other truth claim. A cognitive event or occurrence becomes invalid only when defects in the instrument of knowledge (karaṇadoṣa) are found, or when another cognitive event or occurrence arises which is not *in harmony* with the former. It becomes clear that for Śāṅkara, cognitive validity remains within the lesser realm of the *determination* of relative truth and falsity, that is, within the realm of avidyā. The realisation of "another higher reality" (anyattattvam) is a move, as Sinha (1996) points out: "not in the direction of the conceptual possibility of objective truth, but rather towards the fulfilment of Being, on the horizon of self-understanding."^{36 37}

³⁵ Hacker, Paul (1968), in Schmithausen, L. (ed.), p. 214: "Das einzige Argument für den Monismus bei Śāṅkara ...ist schwach."

³⁶ Sinha (1996), p. 80.

³⁷ In a recent article by Marcel Conche entitled "Héraclite avec et contre Bouddha" in *Le nouvel observateur* (May 2003), Conche states: "Le Bouddha est, si l'on veut, un sage, mais ce n'est pas un *vrai* philosophe. Et il est toujours beaucoup plus difficile d'être un philosophe que d'être un sage. Qu'est-ce qu'un *vrai* philosophe ? C'est celui qui préfère la vérité au bonheur, qui veut la vérité même s'il doit la payer par l'absence de bonheur—au cas où garder ses illusions serait la condition du bonheur."

Although written in a somewhat conversational manner, Conche is referring to something which is of utmost importance in our understanding of Śāṅkara's two-level system of reality. As Hacker considers Śāṅkara's logical argument for monism to be unconvincing, it becomes clear that Śāṅkara's ultimate goal is not "philosophy for its own sake" but a programme directed toward the attainment of liberation from saṃsāric existence, much in the manner of the Buddha's in ending suffering.

Section 3: The notion of "attainment of liberation" in the Early Vedānta tradition and Śaṅkara's attitude toward ritual act

Returning once again to the initial question: "Who are you, my dear?" which the teacher asks the pupil in USG I.9, we are told that two different categories of 'unenlightened' answers to this question are possible from the pupil. The first is the answer forwarded by a pupil in USG I.10 who states: "I am a Brahmin's son, etc., but now am a paramahaṃsa wandering ascetic, [and] wish to get out of the ocean of transmigratory existence." According to the teacher's response, who states in USG I.11: "My dear, when you are dead your body will be eaten by birds or will turn into earth right here...", it is obvious that this pupil is rather naïvely exhibiting an overriding identification with the ahaṃkarṭṛ. That which is "me" or "mine" appears to be the acute affliction of this type of pupil.

Different is the response of the teacher to the pupil who responds to the question "kastvamasi somya?" in the following manner, concerning what he believes to be the true nature of his being (USG I.12): "Again and again by force of *merit and demerit*, when this body, perishes, I shall enter another body..." (punaḥ punaḥ śarīravināśe dharmādharmavaśāt śarīrāntaram), states the pupil.

It is probable that the first kind of pupil who comes to the teacher for instruction has not been introduced to *any path* of liberating knowledge. The second pupil, on the other hand, significantly mentions that his stage of spiritual development depends upon the *merit or demerit* (dharmādharma) he has accrued in past lives and in the present life due to actions of all kind. This second pupil is probably typical of the kind of student which Śaṅkara himself had contact with, that is, the pupil who had some instruction into the nature of ātman and brahman, and who was seriously observing a certain number of ethical laws prescribed for his particular caste (varṇa) and stage of life (āśrama).

It is most probable that the first prose section (USG I.1-44) is primarily concerned with issues surrounding the Mīmāṃsa notion of attainment of liberation, since this second pupil further inquires: "Your Holiness, how have I spoken wrongly?" (USG I.14). The Advaitic teacher responds to this question in the following manner:

"...[because] you have identified the ātman, which is free from caste, family, and purifying ceremonies, with the body, which has different caste, family, and purifying ceremonies."

yatastavam bhinnajātyanvayasamśkāraṃ śarīraṃ jātyanvayavarjitasyātmanaḥ pratyabhyajñāsīt

That the very last section of first prose part (USG I.44) reiterates the necessity of abandoning "all the rituals and their requisites such as the sacred thread", considered by Śaṅkara to be but the effects of nescience, is another indication that USG I was conceived in order to uphold the Advaita view of highest truth (samyak jñāna) in view of the orthodox tradition which emphasised the reliance on ritual action to attain mokṣa. According to USG I, the source of liberating knowledge is definitely *not* to be found in the performance of ritual action.

Since USG I is ethically and philosophically linked to the ideas expressed in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, as Mayeda (1965) has well pointed out, it is interesting to turn to the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* for insight into this matter. In *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.1.4, Śaṅkara states that: "liberation is a state of existence in which the self is neither an agent of action nor the enjoyer of the fruits of action. It is an unembodied state (aśarīratva) untouched by pleasure or pain." It is also stated that: "liberation is eternal in the highest sense; it is all-pervading like space, devoid of all change, eternally satisfied, without parts, and self-luminous in essence." Śaṅkara's comment that 'liberation is eternal' is an important one in his philosophical enterprise. If liberation were considered to be the effect of some kind of ritual action, then liberation would have a beginning, i.e., be time-related—and therefore, non-eternal. This notion recurs again and again in many of Śaṅkara's various commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* as well. For example, in his commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.6, Śaṅkara states that:

"Motion limited by space pertains only to this saṃsāra as it is reached by limited means. But as brahman is everything, is not to be reached in some limited place. If brahman is limited by space, then like all objects with form, it would have a beginning and an end, be dependent on another, have parts, be non-eternal and be a product....the knowers of brahman desire by liberation only the removal of the bondage of saṃsāra due to ignorance etc., and not something that is produced."

Furthermore, Śāṅkara's comment on *Brahmasūtra* I.3.30 that the "arrangement of caste, stage of life, merit, demerit and their results (varṇāśramadharmādharmaphalavyavasthānām) are all fixed in this beginningless (anādi) universe" indicates that merit and demerit are oriented toward results (phala), and are part of the network of means and end which hold the gods, humans and animals in the bondage of beginningless saṃsāra. Śāṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad* III.2 associates bondage with means and ends: "sādhyasādhana-lakṣaṇo bandhaḥ", and he also states that final liberation is nothing to be attained nor produced by any mental, vocal or physical act. A three-member dvandva compound "avidyā-kāma-karman" is employed in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.2.17, and indicates that action (karman) arises from desire (kāma) within the sphere of saṃsāra due to ignorance (avidyā). This dvandva compound is not directly employed in USG I, yet the individual members of the compound are directly referred to in the following continuous passage of USG I.20-21:

"...blood and sperm are produced, related respectively to the bodies of women and men. Both blood and sperm, produced by churning with the churning stick of sexual passion driven by nescience (-avidyāprayuktakāma-) and sanctified with sacred formulas, are poured into the womb at the proper time. Through the penetration of fluid from the womb, they become an embryo and it is delivered in the ninth or tenth month." (USG I.20)

"When it is born it obtains its name-and-form, sanctified with sacred formulas by means of a birth ceremony and other [purifying ceremonies], etc..."(USG I.21)

In this particular passage, there is a certain sense of saṃsāric pre-destination, and it comes across quite well that Śāṅkara considers that those participating in the activities of the manifested world are but victims of their psychological afflictions, possessing no ultimate freedom. That kāma is considered by Śāṅkara to be an important linking element in this sequence, which is ultimately caused by nescience, is not novel in the Indian philosophic tradition. Much earlier, the *psychological nature* of activity was identified by Praśastapāda³⁸ of the Vaiśeṣika school in his work entitled the *Vyomavatī*. Praśastapāda lists six essential psychological occurrences which are

³⁸ According to the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies*, Praśastapāda (Padārthadharma-saṃgraha) may be dated to the early sixth century CE.

fundamental to the understanding of the human condition. These are: cognition, pleasure, pain, attraction or will (icchā), repulsion (deṣa), and effort to act. Praśastapāda also says that it is icchā which leads one to act (kṛti). The Naiyāyikas, for their part, believe that a mental effort (yatna) is required to set a physical activity in motion which is propelled by the will to act.

USG II.76-81 proposes an interesting dialogue between the teacher and pupil which leads to the ultimate rejection of the notion of "mental act" in the Advaitic epistemological position. It may be stated here, that there is a *definite correlation* between Śāṅkara's *metaphysical* position of the inactivity of pure consciousness (caitanya), as reflected in his introductory commentary on *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* VII : "[turīya³⁹] cannot be known by any activity as in the case of a cook, because it is devoid of all actions", and his *epistemological* position concerning the two-fold level of reality—saṃvṛti-sat and paramārtha-sat.

According to Vetter (1979), the second prose section of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (USG II) presents Śāṅkara's most comprehensive exposé of his theory of cognition where prose sections 76 to 81 ultimately lead to the Advaitic rejection of "mental act":

Then [the pupil] said, "Perception (upalabdhi) is what is meant by the verbal root (dhātvartha), that is, nothing but change; it is contradictory [to this fact] to say that [the nature of] the perceiver is transcendently changeless."

tatrāha upalabdhirnāma dhātvartho vikriyaiva upalabdhau kūṭasthātmatā ceti viruddham || 76 ||

[The teacher said], "That is not right, for [the term] 'perception' is used figuratively (upacārāt) in the sense of a change which is meant by the verbal root; whatever the notion of the intellect may be, that is what is meant by the verbal root; [the notion of the intellect] has change as its nature and end, with the result that the perception of ātman falsely appears [as perceiver], thus the notion of the intellect is figuratively indicated by the term perception.

For example, the cutting action results [in the static state] that [the object to be cut] is separated in two parts; thus [the term 'cutting' in the sense of an object to be cut being separated in two parts] is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the verbal root."

na | dhātvarthavikriyāyām upalabdhyupacārāt | yo hi bauddhaḥ pratyayaḥ sa dhātvartho vikriyātmakaḥ ātmanaḥ upalabdhyābhāsaphalāvasāna iti upalabdhīśabdena upacaryate | yathā chidikriyā dvaidhībhāvaphalāvasāneti dhātvarthatvena upacaryate tadvat || 77 ||

³⁹ *turīya* refers to the realisation of non-difference of ātman and brahman (abheda).

To this the pupil objected, "Your Holiness, the example cannot explain my transcendental changelessness."

"Why not?" [asked the teacher]

[The pupil responded] "Cutting which results in a change in the object to be cut is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the verbal root; in the same manner, if the notion of the intellect, which is figuratively indicated by the term 'perception' and is meant by the verbal root, results also in a change in the perception of ātman [the example] cannot explain ātman's transcendental changelessness."

ityuktaḥ śiṣya āha nanu bhagavan mama kūṭasthatvapratipādanam prati asamartho drṣṭāntaḥ |
katham chidiḥ chedyavikriyāvasānā upacaryate yathā dhātvarthatvena tathā
upalabdhiśabdopacarito'pi dhātvartho bauddhapratyayaḥ ātmanaḥ upalabdhivikriyāvasānaścet
nātmanaḥ kūṭasthatam pratipādayitum samarthaḥ || 78 ||

The teacher said, "It would be true, if there were a distinction between perception and perceiver. The perceiver is indeed nothing but eternal perception. And it is not [right] that perception and perceiver are different as in the doctrine of the logicians."

gururuvāca satyamevaṁ syāt yadi upalabdhyupalabdhroḥ viśeṣaḥ | nityopalabdhimātra eva hi
upalabdḥā na tu tārīkasaṁmaya iva anyā upalabdhiḥ anya upalabdḥā ca || 79 ||

[The pupil said] "How does that [action] which is meant by the verbal root result in perception?"

nanu upalabdhīphalāvasāno dhātvarthaḥ kathamiti || 80 ||

[The teacher] answered, "Listen, I said that it ends with the result that the perception [of ātman] appears (ābhāsa) [as perceiver]. Did you not hear? I did not say that it results in the production of any change in ātman."

ucyate śṛṇu upalabdhyābhāsaphalāvasāna ityuktaṁ kiṁ na śrutaṁ tat tvayā na tu ātmā
vikriyotpādanāvasāna iti mayoktaṁ || 81 ||

In USG II.76 quoted above, the pupil considers perception (upalabdhi) from the Mīmāṃsaka standpoint as an *act of perceiving*, indicated by a verbal root (dhātu), thus implying change (vikriyā). The hypothetical position of the pupil staged by Śāṅkara may well represent the epistemological position forwarded by Śābara in his Mahābhāṣya (III.2.84), which defines dhātvartha as kriyā. This view is inconsistent with the Advaita position of the immutability (kūṭasthatā) of an '*Ultimate Perceiver*' (upalabdhr), since if *Perception* involves the notion of change or motion, it would be contradictory to assert that ātman/brahman is transcendently changeless.

In section 77 of USG II, the teacher corrects the pupil in stating that perception *on a certain level* can exist, though figuratively, since it is only the consciousness-notion (pratyaya) of the buddhi that a verbal root can refer to, which has action as its nature. Thus, the teacher explains, the reflection (ābhāsa) of ātman is in the buddhi and the doer-ship (kartṛtva) of the buddhi is merely superimposed by nescience upon ātman. It falsely appears as the perceiver since, according to Śaṅkara, the entire process of cognition ends with the result that 'ultimate ātman-perception' merely *appears* as perceiver. The Advaitins differed from the Mīmāṃsakas in that they did not subscribe to the doctrine of cognitive act and Śaṅkara was obliged to resort to this somewhat complicated theory that perception is an *appearance* of ultimate ātman-perception which cannot involve any activity, since activity implies change which is contradictory to the notion of immutability of ātman. For Śaṅkara, cognition (jñāna) *reveals* the object—it does not *act upon* the object.

It would appear that Śaṅkara's *epistemological* position is closer to that of Yāska, who in his work *Nirukta* (I.1), defines a verb as bhāvapradhāna, i.e., that the *result of action* is that which is predominant in the meaning of a verb. In USG II.77, Śaṅkara may well be referring to Yāska's concept of bhāvapradhāna, since the teacher informs the pupil that:

"...the cutting action results [in the state] that [the object to be cut] is separated in two parts; thus [the term 'cutting' in the sense of an object to be cut being separated in two parts] is used figuratively as [the cutting action] which is meant by the verbal root."

Returning to the initial statement of this section of the thesis that the source of liberating knowledge is definitely *not* to be found in the performance of ritual acts in the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, it may be mentioned here that his view differs dramatically from the point of view forwarded by the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini(I.2.1):

"The purpose of the Vedas lies in enjoining action and therefore those portions of the Vedas which do not directly or indirectly fulfil that purpose *will be of no use*."

āmnāyasya⁴⁰ kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām

The long tradition of the Mīmāṃsā school was in agreement with its fundamental source text, the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (first century CE), that it is indeed the karmakaṇḍa, which deals with action enjoining religious and secular duties in the form of injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (niṣedha), which is the principal import of Vedic and Upaniṣadic texts. Śaṅkara refutes this position, and many of his commentaries on the *Upaniṣads* and well as on the *Brahmasiṁhāra* deal with this very issue.

According to V. Bhattacharya (1943), the early Upaniṣadic teachers of the orthodox schools considered it to be of utmost importance to harmonise, compromise, and connect the numerous conflicting, obscure or dubious statements of the ancient sages and seers of the *Upaniṣadic* texts. The Vedānta school and the Mīmāṃsā school both share the philosophy peculiar to orthodox brahmanism that since the śruti is considered authoritative for all knowledge, they seek to unify and harmonise—from their own particular standpoint—all the contradictions and anomalies which exist in the scriptures. This led, on the one hand, to the creation of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which focussed on questions relating to karman, and on the other hand, to the *Brahmasiṁhāra* which emphasised jñāna⁴¹. This is not to say that Śaṅkara is not in agreement with the Mīmāṃsakas that the Vedic and Vedāntic texts are the authoritative source of knowledge of *dharma*, though as Pollock (1989) points out, Śaṅkara is at loss to find a place in the philosophy of non-duality for the Mīmāṃsaka belief that "dharma is posited without argument as a transcendental entity".⁴²

It becomes clear that for Śaṅkara, knowledge (jñāna) is the predominant content of the Vedāntic texts. In USG I.31, Śaṅkara's strong recommendation that rituals ought to be abandoned by the seeker of liberation is backed up by a number of quotations from both the *Chāndogya* and the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣads*. Since the *Upadeśasūhasrī* is non-commentarial in nature, Śaṅkara need not resort to complicated reasoning, as he occasionally must do when commenting on scriptural texts, such as the *Bhagavadgītā*—that masterpiece of inclusivism—which in certain verses advocates, in

⁴⁰ āmnāya, m. = tradition, sacred text

⁴¹ Bhattacharya (1943), Introduction, p. cvi.

⁴² Pollock (1989), p. 608.

a somewhat injunctive manner, the performance of works to attain liberation. Commenting on *Bhagavadgītā* III.3, Śaṅkara states:

"even so, the discipline of works may promote life's ends by endowing the agent with the fitness to adopt the disciplines of knowledge..."

eva puruṣārthahetutve prāpte karmaniṣṭhāyāḥ jñānaniṣṭhāprāptihetutvena puruṣārthahetutvaṃ

In such *reconciliatory* commentarial passages, Śaṅkara suggests that ritual act is subsidiary, and may serve to prepare the seeker of liberation for the path of knowledge (jñāna-marga). Another tactic which Śaṅkara employs when obliged to comment on scriptural passages which refer to rituals and ritual action, is to simply *not respond to the challenge*. For example, the first chapter of *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* explores the different Atharvaveda rituals in common practice. While the *Upaniṣad* proclaims (I.2.4): "The seven moving flames of fire, called its tongue, are Kālī, Karālī, Manojavā, Sulohitā, Sudhūma-varṇa, Sphuliṅginī and Viśvarucī Devī.", Śaṅkara's commentary on this verse is to simply repeat the above-mentioned series of names, and to comment that they are "the seven moving tongues of fire meant for swallowing the oblations which are offered"—nothing more. In such cases, Śaṅkara prefers to restate the components of the scriptural passage and to refrain from extensive commentary on the passage.

It appears that the later Advaitic tradition upheld Śaṅkara's fundamental position that ritual action should be abandoned by the mumukṣu. Ānandagiri's sub-commentary on the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* of the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* (introduction to first Muṇḍaka) exemplifies this fact, since Ānandagiri somewhat humorously states: "One cannot remove the ignorance of mother-of-pearl appearing as silver even if one were to perform a hundred prāṇāyāmas!".

Section 4: Is logical argument (*nyāya*) the foundation of *samyak jñāna* ?

Uddyotakara, in the *Nyāyavārttika* on the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (ca. 610 CE), defined philosophy (*ānvīkṣikī*) as "that branch of learning which is separately established by means of doubt, and so on, and whose goal is to answer questions using reasoning and logic (*nyāya-vidyā*)". Uddyotakara and other adherents of the Nyāya school agreed that philosophy is the "fourth learning" (*caturthī vidyā*) of the four-fold learning which is taught in the *Kauṣṭhīya-Arthaśāstra*. The Naiyāyikas considered the Early Vedānta school to be concerned merely with theological questions, and that the Vedāntin's main interest was the "study of inner ātman" based on the *Upaniṣads* (*upanīṣad-vidyā*). In consequence, the Nyāya school was reluctant to give the name of philosophy to the Early Vedānta school.

In the introduction to his admirable work "*The Āgamaśāstra of Gauḍapāda*" (1943), Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya lists a number of teachers of the Early Vedānta school who flourished before Śaṅkarācārya—most of them writing glosses (*vṛtti*) or commentaries (*bhāṣya*) on the *Brahmaśāstra* of Bādarāyana. Bhattacharya considers the *Āgamaśāstra* (also called the *Kārikā on the Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*), to be the most important independent work on Vedāntic philosophy before Śaṅkara's time, and represents one of the most remarkable phases of the Vedānta school. In spite of Uddyotakara's dismissal of the Early Vedānta school as being merely concerned with theology, close examination of the arguments presented by Gauḍapāda in favour of the position that "*advaitam paramārtho hi*" (III.18), indicates that Gauḍapāda relies on both *scriptural evidence and logical argument* to justify his somewhat illusionist notion of Advaita Vedānta. For example, in the second prakaraṇa, wishing to establish the unreality (*vaitathya*) of the external world, Gauḍapāda concludes (II.5): "proceeding, the teacher says, on the authority of a scripture (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.3.14), *supported by reasons*, that the two states of waking and dream are the same on account of the fact that the things experienced in them are of the same kind."

It would appear that Śaṅkara's attitude toward logical argument to determine truth is similar to that of his Vedāntic predecessor Gauḍapāda. For both, reason is called into service *as a support* for the primary claims of scriptural testimony (*śruti*).

Consequently, reason (tarka) and argumentation (yukti) play a significant role in truth-claims, but it is believed that reason may never contradict the revealed truths of scripture⁴³. According to Nakamura (1989)⁴⁴, even the earliest adherents of the Vedāntic school, beginning with Bādarāyana, author of the *Brahmasūtra*, placed a great deal of emphasis on the absolute nature of the scriptures, but at the same time recognised that reasoning (yukti) together with scriptures is the source of valid knowledge. Nakamura further states that while the Early Vedānta school began basically as hermeneutics, involved with *interpretation of scriptural testimony*, it later developed into *philosophical thought* with rational arguments which supported the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological categories. In fact, it was probably Gauḍapāda (or at least, the Gauḍapāda school of Advaita Vedānta), responding to the criticism of Uddyotakara and other Naiyāyikas, who wished to substantiate the Advaitic position by greater use of logical argument.

Nonetheless, as Nakamura suggests, arguments based on logic are already employed in the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana, which dates from the first century CE. In this work, there is frequent use of pure logical forms, the most common methods employed being prasaṅga, hetu-vidyā, and pariśeṣa. The method of prasaṅga functions by initially affirming the opponent's position and then drawing a conclusion not desired by the opponent, in order to point out the error in the opponent's initial thesis. The prasaṅga logical form is employed in the *Brahmasūtra* primarily as a tool to eliminate criticism of the Vedāntic position by opponents of the Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Buddhist and Jaina traditions.

Upon examination of the commentarial and non-commentarial works of Śaṅkara, it would also appear that he tends to employ pure logical argument *primarily* as an instrument to counter criticism of other schools and traditions, and not as an internal technique of analysis of truth claims. While USG I employs mainly the method of quoting scriptural passages to support the validity of the Advaitic path to liberation, this is, by no means, the pedagogical method employed in the second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. In no section of USG II (45-111), does Śaṅkara rely on scriptural

⁴³ Yukti, tarka, upapatti, puruṣabuddhi as well as anumāna are terms commonly employed by the various schools of Indian philosophy in reference to logical argument.

⁴⁴ Nakamura (1989), p. 478.

quotations from the śrutis and the smṛtis—all arguments presented are either purely logical ones (prasaṅga method, primarily), or logical arguments backed by the utilisation of parables and illustrations (dṛṣṭānta). According to both Hacker and Vetter, the fact that there is no reliance on scriptural testimony to justify truth claims in the second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is highly remarkable, and it is perhaps for this reason, that Hacker (1968) considers USG II to be Śaṅkara's most significant *philosophical* endeavour⁴⁵, arguably, in the sense of ānvīkṣikī of the Naiyāyikas. Halbfass (1992), on the other hand, is reluctant to admit that it is yukti alone which accomplishes liberating knowledge in this second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, since he believes that scriptural testimony runs like a red thread throughout the complete Śaṅkaran textual corpus. Accordingly, Halbfass states that "legitimate reasoning [exists] within the *horizon of revelation*, as something not independent in its rationality, but revealed as a pedagogical device and as a means of explication."⁴⁶

As mentioned earlier, Śaṅkara's use of the prasaṅga logical form is often coupled with the use of illustration (dṛṣṭānta). Many of the illustrations and metaphors he employs are commonly accepted ones, derived from the earliest sūtra literature of both orthodox and heterodox systems of belief. Śaṅkara often employs the "yathā...tathā" form which functions as an abbreviation of a formal logical argument. For example, USG II.109 employs the rope-snake illustration as the dṛṣṭānta:

"Just as it is experienced in this world that a snake [superimposed] upon a rope does not exist, nor water in a mirage, and the like, unless they are apprehended [as a notion], so it is reasonable that duality in the waking and dreaming states also does not exist unless it is apprehended [as a notion]."

Though the three members of the argument are not stated outright, they are presupposed, and it is often only the dṛṣṭānta-member which is cited. Thus, the thesis (pratijñā) is assumed to be the fact that the only independent existent (i.e., ātman) is consciousness; the reason being because the world of multiplicity depends for its existence on being apprehended as a notion (hetu)—like the rope-snake (dṛṣṭānta).

⁴⁵ Hacker (1968), in "Śaṅkara der Yogin und Śaṅkara der Advaitin. Einige Beobachtungen" in Schmithausen, p. 214: "Es ist die ausführlichste zusammenhängende Darlegung der Ātmologie, die in den Werken Śaṅkaras zu finden ist."

⁴⁶ Halbfass (1992), p. 178.

It is interesting to note in passing, that the various illustrations which Śāṅkara selects from the large body of traditional illustrations issue from the realm of "avidyā-kāma-karma", and span the entire spectrum of feelings or sensations (vedanā), considered to be desirable, undesirable or neutral. USG II.70, for example, employs the duo of sandalwood paste (desirable) and a thorn (undesirable). A neutral example employed would be the "dark colour of the earth's surface in the sky" (i.e., why the sky appears blue) forwarded in USG II.55. Śāṅkara's statement that the examples and reasons (dr̥ṣṭāntair hetubhīṣca) are drawn from the world, which is a modification of the highest self, illustrates the fact that the accepted pramāṇās related to loka-vyavahāra (such as perception, anumāna and so forth) are perfectly valid.

An examination of passages which do indeed employ pure logical argument in Śāṅkara's *commentarial* works reveals that scriptural quotation is often *absent* from argumentative segments which address extra-Vedic groups such as the Buddhists and Jainas, as may be seen in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.3.7. Here Śāṅkara attempts to refute the Buddhist's conclusion that there can be no permanent witness of cognition (upalabdhr̥) since, as the Buddhist concludes, this would lead to a situation of infinite regress. The following response illustrates Śāṅkara's use of pure logical argument against Buddhist attack:

- i It is not always the case that if b reveals a, c is needed to reveal b [and therefore that there is an infinite regress] (here, the pratijñā is essentially the Buddhist's conclusion or *nigamana*)
- ii because different situations are seen to exist
- iii like in the following examples: to see a jar, the perceiving self requires the additional means of a lamp for light but to see a lit lamp, no additional means is needed to see it
- iv Accordingly, no general rule can be deduced
- v Therefore, it is not the case that there is an infinite regress

Unlike the pupil portrayed in USG I, the pupil who approaches the teacher in USG II is acquainted with many of the logical arguments of the opponents of the school of Vedānta. In USG II.55, the pupil *rejects* the argument that "the body and ātman are mutually superimposed through nescience—since it would result that neither

the body nor ātman exist", this being the position of the 'nihilists' (vaināśika-pakṣatvāt). The 'nihilists' referred to in this passage are none other than the Buddhists, and according to Śaṅkara, the Buddhist doctrine, as a whole, was reducible to "the doctrine which asserts the nihilism of everything" (sarvavaināśikarāddhānta).

The pupil then forwards another argument which appears to be consistent with the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya school that the body and ātman are "permanently connected with each other like bamboo and pillars" (vaṃśa-stambhavan-nitya saṃyuktam). Hacker translates the dvandva-compound (vaṃśa-stambha-) as "post and lintel"⁴⁷. While suggesting the form of a house, this compound refers metaphorically to the mutually supportive nature of puruṣa and prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya system⁴⁸. This dualistic position is refuted by the Advaitic teacher, since that which is composed (saṃhata) cannot be the object of its own existence (svārtha), but exists "for another" (parārtha).

Later on in the second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, the pupil advances the Mīmāṃsaka point of view concerning cognition as act (USG II.76-85). It would appear that the 'pupil' staged by Śaṅkara in USG II is but a rotating crystal, representing a series of philosophical viewpoints—both of the orthodox schools and the heterodox extra-Vedic traditions—the pupil is finally unmasked, all his different viewpoints defeated by the teacher of Advaitic truth.

In consequence, it may be stated that the *target audience* of the first prose part, and the second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is not the same—while the pupil of USG I comes to the teacher established in ritual Mīmāṃsaka practices, the second pupil represents *the opinions* of a certain number of opponents to the Advaitic enterprise, whose contrary views are not only defeated, but is ultimately converted to the Advaitic cause.

⁴⁷ Hacker (1949): the dvandva-compound translated as "Pfosten und Querbalken"

⁴⁸ The mutually supportive aspect of puruṣa (self) and prakṛti (materia prima) in the Sāṃkhya school is reflected in the parable of the relation existing between a lame man, and a blind man who carries the lame man—the first cannot walk and the second cannot see. Matter is blind, while the spirit can see but is unable to move.

Śaṅkara furthermore develops a logical defence strategy for the Advaitic position against the attacks of the rational schools, using the same weapons as they used. In his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.5, Śaṅkara states:

"Now the maitreyībrāhmaṇa is introduced, which represents a conclusion (nigamana). And this is the rule adopted by the experts in dialectics: "The restatement of the thesis, after giving the reason, is the conclusion."

atha-idānīm nigamanasthānīyaṃ maitreyībrāhmaṇam ārabhyate ayam ca nyāyo vākyakovidaiḥ parigrhīto hetvapadesāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanam nigamanam iti

In another commentarial passage on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (II.1.20), Śaṅkara's use of terminology of the classical theory of inference is evident:

"In all the Upaniṣads, ultimate unity is first presented as a thesis and then it is demonstrated, by means of examples and reasons that the world is a modification, part, etc. of the absolute self, and that unity appears again as a conclusion."

sarvāsu hy upaniṣatsu pūrvam ekatvaṃ pratijñāya drṣṭāntair hetubhiḥca paramātmāno vikāraṃsāditvaṃ jagataḥ pratipādyā punar ekatvaṃ upasaṃharati

Although logical argument is not commonly used by Śaṅkara as an internal device for ascertaining truth, it is sometimes employed in this manner in some of the commentarial texts, functioning as a mediator of disputes between conflicting interpretations of the scriptures. In his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* XVIII.66.10, Śaṅkara states:

"Even a hundred statements of śruti to the effect that fire is cold and non-luminous won't prove valid. If it does make such a statement, its importance will have to be interpreted differently."

na hi śrutiśatamapi śītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti bruvat prāmāṇyaṃ upaiti | yadi brūyāt śītaḥ agniḥ aprakāśo vā iti tathā'pi arthāntaram śruteḥ vivakṣitaṃ

This comment is interesting since it shows that Śaṅkara's exegetical method concerning the validity of the principle of non-contradiction must also apply to scriptural testimony. All passages from the scriptures must be consistent, and any contradiction of scriptures within "the world as a modification of the highest self", must involve a *re-evaluation* of scripture. This appears to be a definite concession to critical

thinking on the part of Śāṅkara; the coherence of scriptural texts must be examined in conjunction with epistemological sources of knowledge, such as perception and anumāna. In USG II.44, Śāṅkara also uses the same dṛṣṭānta of "the coldness of fire":

"...for a conception (buddhi) that fire is cold, or that the body is not subject to old age and death, does not exist."

As Halbfass states (1992), "there is no systematic and comprehensive discussion of the relationship between reason and revelation in Śāṅkara's works; but there are many explicit statements, as well as casual remarks and symptomatic phrases."⁴⁹ In the commentarial and non-commentarial works of Śāṅkara, there is the recognition of the need for both reason and scriptural testimony to ascertain truth claims. Scripture and reason often appear together in dvandva-compounds, such as śāstra-yukti, tarkāgama or with the addition of smṛti in dvandva-compounds such as śruti-smṛti-nyāya (as in USG I.43). That reason is coupled with scripture is not uncommonly stated in other works as well.

On the other hand, Śāṅkara's attitude toward *independent* rational argument is somewhat different. He states that reason without scripture is "unfounded" (apratīṣṭhita) in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* II.1.11, and his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.1.6 makes it clear that independent reasoning cannot have exegetic validity:

"In such a spurious fashion, *dry reasoning* (*śūṣka-tarka*) cannot be established, since only such reasoning which is approved by the scriptures is here referred to as being conducive to true experience."

In another passage of the same commentary, he states that reason is based on mere opinion, being relative and ultimately fraught with error:

"We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown, by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how arguments of the latter, again, are refuted in turn by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation."

⁴⁹ Halbfass (1992), p. 145.

These particular arguments against reasoning alone which Śaṅkara presents, may well go back to Bhartṛhari (ca. 450 CE), a staunch supporter of scripture, and who was strongly opposed to those who based their philosophical position on logical argument alone. In the *Vākyapadīya* II.492, Bhartṛhari states:

"Only through the teachings of various scriptures can the mind reach clear understanding. How much can those who follow their own reasoning discover?"

prajñā vivekaṃ labdhate bhinnair āgamadarśanaiḥ | kiyad vā śakyam unnetuṃ svatarkam
anudhāvatā

Mentioning "those who follow their own reasoning", Bhartṛhari may well be referring to the Sāṃkhya, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and a number of Buddhist schools⁵⁰ which conducted philosophical activity independent of the scriptures. In fact, philosophical debate during the first half of the first millennium (1-500 CE) had no direct link with the Vedic-Upaniṣadic textual corpus or with its ritual traditions. The early texts of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools—although later considered orthodox schools—showed little evidence of having any particular link with Vedic practices, and it would appear that the earliest Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika texts were linked, rather, to worship of Śiva.

Commenting on the role of logical argument, Bhartṛhari claims that "tarka which does not contradict the scriptures (vedaśāstra) is *as an eye* to those who have not yet seen the truth" since the meaning of the mahāvākyas cannot be understood "from the material contents of the sacred texts alone":

veda-śāstra-avirodhī ca tarkaścakṣurapaśyatām |
rūpamātrād dhi vākyārthaḥ kevalān nāvatiṣṭhate || (*Vākyapadīya* I,8).

Tarka is thus seen by Bhartṛhari as a means to an end by which the seeker of enlightenment may *approach* truth, although he considers that truth ultimately transcends all phenomenal methods of knowledge. As Nakamura points out (1989), this attitude, which is prominent in all the Vedāntic schools, is not that of the

⁵⁰ Other systems: the sceptical opinion about human thinking was partly shared by both Mahāvīra and the Buddha.

philosopher, but that of the theologian. Nakamura also states that: "even the idea that one believes because it is irrational is not found in the *Brahmasūtra*, for one must believe without any reason."⁵¹ Taber (1981) has also made a similar comment in his article: "*Reason, Revelation and Idealism in Śāṅkara's Vedānta*". He states:

"In emphasising philosophical relativity, Śāṅkara may well have had a practical rather than a strictly logical point in mind: that rational argument goes on almost endlessly until a conclusion is reached, and the goal of liberation may be thereby missed because one never gets around to it."⁵²

⁵¹ Nakamura (1989), p. 476.

⁵² Taber (1981), p. 301.

Section 5: Śāṅkara's reliance on scriptural testimony as a source of knowledge

The testimony of word (śabda) is accepted as a distinct and independent source of knowledge (pramāṇa) by the Advaita Vedānta school. Commenting on *Brahmasūtra* II.1.6: "dṛśyate tu" ("but it is seen"), Śāṅkara elaborates that brahman is only revealed through śabdapramāṇa:

"As for the argument that, since brahman is existent, other means of knowledge should apply to it, that is only wishful thinking. This [brahman] is not an object of perception since it is devoid of form, etc., and it is not a subject of inference as it is devoid of all grounds of inference. It is known only through the scriptures (āgama) like [the knowledge] of dharma [which also can only be obtained from the scriptures and not through other means]."

yattūktaṃ pariniṣpannatvādbrahmaṇi pramāṇāntarāṇi sambhaveyuriti | tadapi manoratha-
mātram | rūpādyabhāvāddhi nāyamārthaḥ pratyakṣasya gocaraḥ | līṅgādyabhāvācca
nānumānādinām | āgamamātrasamādhigamya eva tvayamartho dharmavat |

In another passage, Śāṅkara states that brahman is known through scriptural tracts of the tradition (here, śāstra), which are a valid source of knowledge (śāstrād eva pramāṇāt brahmā'dhigamyate).⁵³ Śāṅkara's acceptance of scriptural testimony as a valid source of knowledge, is in agreement with Bādarāyana's work,⁵⁴ which claims that the nature of brahman can only be expressed by the scriptures, which are the source of knowledge of truth beyond perception and inference. The scriptural texts which Śāṅkara refers to in his commentarial and non-commentarial works are *śruti* and *smṛti* texts; the first, literally "that which is heard of", which includes the body of Vedic and Upaniṣadic scripture; and the second, *smṛti*—"that which is remembered", which is comprised of such tracts as the *Bhagavadgītā*, as well as the vast amount of normative literature, such as the *Dharmasūtras* and the *Manusmṛti*.

In USG I, there are many passages in which multiple references to the scriptures are given as evidence of brahmanavidyā according to the Advaita scheme—in all cases,

⁵³ here *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* I.1.3

⁵⁴ That the *Brahmasūtra* has a single author named Bādarāyana is considered by Nakamura (1989) to be but a myth: as most early scriptural texts of this nature, the *Brahmasūtra*, according to Nakamura, was compiled by reactionary scholars of the orthodox brahmanic lineage, who regarded the *Upaniṣads* as absolute authority, p. 475.

the śruti texts are quoted first, and then, are either followed by the smṛti quotations, or the smṛti texts are dealt with separately in a subsequent passage. This clearly indicates that for Śaṅkara, the authority of smṛti is ancillary to that of śruti. According to the *Böhtlingk-Roth Unabridged Sanskrit Dictionary*, the term '*aupaniṣada*' appears relatively late in the writings of the Advaita school of Vedānta, though it must have been in common usage by the time of Śaṅkara, since he named his own school "*aupaniṣada*" in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* II.2.10, and called the doctrine of his school "*aupaniṣadam darśanam*" (*BSBh* II.1.9).

For the Early Vedāntins, it is quite clear that smṛti does not have to be completely reconciled with śruti, since their relation is based on the 'veda-mūlatva' principle, which implies a subordination of all other sources, including the smṛtis, to the authority of the Vedic and Vedāntic texts.

Mohanty (1992) makes an interesting comment about the difference between śruti and smṛti texts in that "the former have a plasticity that permits new understanding, the words, have a reservoir of meaning, a power of evoking and challenging thought, whereas the words of the smṛti (although not entirely devoid of hermeneutic possibilities) are relatively fixed in their connotations, and ask you to obey rather than to understand. It is no wonder that the former were regarded as 'apauruṣeya', the latter not."⁵⁵

Guéron (1945) states that *śruti* is described by a word bearing the primitive meaning of *hearing*, in order to indicate its intuitive character and because sound hold the primordial rank among sensorial qualities according to the Hindu cosmological doctrine.⁵⁶ Śruti is considered to be meaningful sound or word, which carries its message to the hearer, though it is ultimately the entire sentence (vākya) that becomes the semantic unit of verbal testimony in the Indian tradition. Thus the validity of scriptural testimony pertains essentially to the attainment of knowledge generated through sentence (vākya-janyajñāna), and it is the hearer's point of view which is emphasised, whether at the level of saṃvṛti-sat or paramārtha-sat.

⁵⁵ Mohanty (1992, p. 275.

⁵⁶ Guéron (1945), p. 19.

Based on a doctrine expressed in the *Nirukta* of Yāska, the grammarians of the school of Pāṇini were of the opinion that śruti, in the form of *verbal revelation*, was first produced in an undifferentiated form, understood only by the ancient seers and sages. In a later phase, a transformation occurred in that words and sentences of śruti became accessible to all in the form of language—and not in just any language, but in the Sanskrit language. To a certain extent, many of the orthodox darśanas raised the Sanskrit language to the level of a near metaphysical entity, and it is *śabda*, which leads to knowledge of the Absolute. Śaṅkara states that "[brahman] is knowable, although being above the senses, since it is solely accessible by word as a valid source of knowledge" (idaṃ tu jñeyaṃ atīndriyatvena śabdaikapramāṇagamyatvāt).

According to Bhartṛhari, in his work entitled the *Vākyapadīya*, the highest brahman can be reached *through scholarship in grammar*, and he considers Sanskrit grammar to be the path leading to spiritual liberation (*Vākyapadīya*, I.16):

"It is the truly royal road for those who deserve enlightenment."

iyam sāmokṣamāṇānam ajihmā rājapaddhatiḥ

In his writings, Bhartṛhari recognised three pramāṇas—pratyakṣa, anumāna and 'āptavacana'. The third pramāṇa, āptavacana, is, in fact, the same as śabdapramāṇa. If one considers the employment of the verbal root "*āp*" in the term āptavacana to signify knowledge which was originally *accessible* to the ancient sages and seers alone who were united with brahman, the scriptures are thus ultimately based on this concept of āptavacana. Indeed, śabda as a valid source of knowledge plays a significant role in the various darśanas, and systems as diverse as Vedānta and Nyāya claim affiliation to it. Of course, the extra-Vedic schools could not possibly recognise Vedic-Upaniṣadic scriptural texts as the source of right knowledge, and the Buddhists, for example, were unwilling, for profound doctrinal reasons, to replace the content of śabdapramāṇa with the sacred texts of the Buddhist Canon. Mohanty (1992) points out that the belief that language can yield truth is a unique philosophical stance, though he does not consider it to be a naïve or blind acceptance of scripture as authority:

"The mere recognition of śabda as a means of knowing is itself a novel feature of the Indian epistemologies. The Western epistemologies recognise one or more of the following sorts of knowledge: perception, reasoning, introspection, and memory. Many, in more recent philosophy, have come to emphasise the decisive role that language plays in shaping our knowledge. But to the best of my knowledge, no one recognises language—or verbal utterance—as by itself a means of generating knowledge about the world. The Indian epistemologies consequently not only recognise śabda (i.e., hearing the utterances of a competent speaker) as a means of knowing, but as the decisive source of our cognitions about all those matters that transcend the limits of possible sensory experience."⁵⁷

Mohanty emphasises here the *uniqueness* of scriptural testimony as a valid means of yielding knowledge in the traditional schools of Indian philosophy, although one may question whether śabda indeed may be defined as "hearing the utterances of a competent speaker", as Mohanty states in this passage. This notion appears to be more in keeping with references to the *cultured people* (śiṣṭa), mentioned in the Dharmasūtras, that is, those who dictate proper conduct. It is stated in the very early *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* (II.29) that "it is difficult to gain mastery of dharma by means of scriptures alone" and consequently, one should model one's conduct after that "which is unanimously approved in all regions by Āryas who have been properly trained..."

According to the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā view, a sentence is *true*, not because it is a reliable person's statement, but rather because the knowledge it gives is *uncontradicted*. The Mīmāṃsakas divided testimony into two kinds—that which is personal (pauruṣeya), that is, testimony, whether written or verbal which has its source in a human author; and that which is impersonal (apauruṣeya)—i.e., of non-human origin or authorship, and which consequently can be considered to be an infallible authority. The Advaitins were in agreement with the Mīmāṃsakas that the śrutis were of non-human authorship. The Mīmāṃsā school also considered that the tradition of the recitation of the Vedic texts must have been beginningless⁵⁸ (uktaṃ tu śabdapūrvatvam), and in order to prove the infallibility of Vedic and Vedāntic texts, it was therefore argued that

⁵⁷ Mohanty (1992), p. 231-232.

⁵⁸ The tradition of the beginningless recitation of Vedic texts implies that śruti is eternal from the practical point of view. The Mīmāṃsaka's view is different from the historically-based forms of scripture found in other religious traditions which are said to have been revealed to specific persons at specific times and places.

they were (are) of the nature of transcendence because of their anonymity (apauruṣeyatva).

It is interesting to note that the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana refers in several different sūtras to śruti as "*pratyakṣa*", and smṛti as "*anumāna*". For example, *Brahmasūtra* III.2.24 states: "And moreover [brahman is experienced] in perfect meditation, [as we know] from the śruti and smṛti", which according to the original Sanskrit scriptural text reads: "api ca saṃrādhane *pratyakṣanumānābhyām*".

The utilisation of epistemological categories in order to define valid scriptural categories may well be a case of logical correlative thinking, since for the Early Vedāntins, śruti is the direct and immediate source of metaphysical knowledge, and smṛti derives its authority from the texts of revelation in the same manner that anumāna, is considered to be a derivative cognitive function from primary cognitive perception. As in the case of śruti, it was also considered that error is not found in pratyakṣa, but may exist in anumāna, due to faulty reasoning, hallucination, and so on. The epistemological parallel was therefore transferred to the question of infallibility vs. the problem of human error in scriptural testimony. Thus the Vedic-Upaniṣadic texts, as already noted, were viewed as *infallible* due to their non-personal origination, while smṛti texts, such as the *Bhagavadgītā*, possessing the character of discursive or reflective knowledge, were considered to be *not necessarily free from error*, due to their human authorship.

Scriptural contradiction, error and inconsistency are all difficult issues, and were a real dilemma for the various traditional schools of Indian philosophy. In order to unify and harmonise such contradictions and anomalies in the śrutis, Śaṅkara's Vedānta proposed a scheme which involved the dual notions of avidyāvasthā and paramārthāvasthā in order to deal with such contradictions in the scriptures. If a scriptural passage presented an idea which was incompatible with Advaitic doctrines—such as scriptural passages which dealt with the notion of differentiation (bheda) in the nature of the absolute, Śaṅkara would explain such passages away, as having validity merely in avidyāvasthā—the realm of conventional (and ultimately nescient) reality. Hence, statements of śruti and smṛti which appear to involve the concept of bheda are forwarded by the ancient sages and seers as an aid in comprehension for those who are

tangled in avidyā. This attitude implies that the scriptures are considered to be adjustable to different levels of understanding.

A related method which Śaṅkara employs whenever a passage from the scriptures cannot be accepted as is, is to interpret the passage as a *parable*, or as one having a *secondary meaning* (gauṇa). The utilisation of such hermeneutic devices points to the fact that, for the Early Vedāntins, it was considered essential that there be full reconciliation or concordance (samanvaya) of the scriptures. Of course, in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara has no need to resort to the dual notions of avidyāvasthā and paramārthāvasthā as a concordance strategy. Since this work is non-commentarial in nature, he is not confronted with the problem of potential anomalies or contradictions which must be dealt with, as is often the case when commenting on scriptural passages, and Śaṅkara has the freedom to select scriptural passages which are in harmony with Advaitic principles.

One of the main purposes of the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (USG I) is to illustrate the nature of brahman, as well as the Advaitic doctrine of non-difference (abheda) of ātman and brahman as reflected in scriptural texts of the śrūtis and the smṛtis. As Śaṅkara states in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* I.3.25 as well, it is important to "set forth the *nature of the highest self*, and that which teaches the *unity of the individual self with the highest self*." This dual scheme is presented in the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* in the following manner:

1. *That which sets forth the nature of the highest self:*
 - i. "First of all, he should teach the śrūtis which are concerned primarily with the oneness of ātman [with brahman], for example..." (USG I.6)
- *what follows are six extracts from the Upaniṣads (four from the Chāndogya, one from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka and one from the Aitareya Upaniṣad)*
 - ii. "And after teaching [these śrūtis], he should help [the pupil] by means of the śrūtis to grasp the marks (lakṣaṇa) indicative of brahman, for example..." (USG I.7)

this comment is followed by seventeen extracts from the Upaniṣads (two from the Chāndogya, ten from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, two from the Taittirīya, two from the Muṇḍaka and one from the Kena Upaniṣad)

- iii. "[He should also help him grasp the marks (lakṣaṇa) indicative of brahman] by means of the smṛtis, *if they are not incompatible*⁵⁹ with the marks indicative of brahman described by the śrutis..." (USG I.8)

*this comment is followed by eight extracts from the Bhagavadgītā*⁶⁰

2. That which teaches the unity of the individual self with the highest self:

- i. "It is reasonable to realise that I (= ātman) am the highest ātman according to such śruti passages as..." (USG I.37)

here, twenty-nine (29!) extracts from the Upaniṣads-Vedas (four from the Chāndogya, six from the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, three from the Taittirīya, two from the Taittirīya-ānandavallī (second introduction to the Taittirīyopaniṣad), two from the Muṇḍaka, one from the Praśna, two from the Aitareya, three from the Kaṭha, one from the Śvetāśvatara, one from the Kauṣṭhikī Brāhmaṇa, two from the Īśa, one from the Mahānārāyaṇa and one from the Rgveda.)

- ii. "From smṛti passages as well it is established that, being one alone, you (= ātman) are the highest ātman..., for example..." (USG I.38)

seven smṛti passages are referred to: (one from the Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra, one from the Manusmṛti and five from the Bhagavadgītā)

According to Halbfass (1992), scriptural testimony is the source of liberating knowledge for Śaṅkara: "[it is] a universe of meaning in which human reasoning can

⁵⁹ *if they are not incompatible*: In other words, Śaṅkara recommends that incompatible texts be simply left out.

exercise its potential without having to proclaim its autonomy, and to which it can subordinate itself without having to sacrifice itself."⁶¹ Upon examination of the examples of śruti and smṛti texts which Śaṅkara employs to illustrate the nature of brahman and the essential concept of 'abheda' in the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, it becomes clear that he has a definite predilection for the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, and also much consideration for the *Chāndogyaopaniṣad*. The frequency and proportion of quotations from these two early *Upaniṣads* in the first prose prakaraṇa (USG I) is in accordance with their frequency and proportion of quotations in his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. Among the smṛti texts, the numerous references to the *Bhagavadgītā*, well over and above all other texts of this category, is also significant. The older Vedic texts (i.e., pre-Upaniṣadic texts) do not frequently enter into Śaṅkara's Advaitic strategy, since in USG I, there is but a single quotation from the Ṛgveda (USG I.37) in the section dealing with the identification of ātman and brahman: "I am Manu and the sun" (Ṛgveda IV.26.1), which itself appears as a quotation in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (I.4.10), and is therefore sanctioned by Śaṅkara's favourite *Upaniṣad*.

In USG I.37, Śaṅkara lists twenty-nine short quotations from śruti texts in order to support his comment: "It is reasonable to realise that I (= ātman) am the highest ātman", that is, to support the Advaitic notion of the non-difference of ātman and brahman. It is interesting to speculate on his pedagogical method—why such a long list of śruti quotations? Besides the obvious reason that Śaṅkara wishes to point out that all the *Upaniṣads* are founded on the ultimate principle of jñāna-vidyā, one special reason may be the underlying belief that all words and concepts are irreducibly plural. The notion of plurality, which would explain this use of multiple examples, appears to be central to Śaṅkara's pedagogical method, in that he wishes to demonstrate that different means converge towards final unity. In this way, by the juxtaposition of a large number of related texts, their differences and irrelevancies can be stripped away, revealing the *essence*, that is, Advaitic truth which transcends all notions of duality. This concept

⁶⁰ Śaṅkara's respect for all the scriptures, whether śruti or smṛti, is illustrated here, since the extracts from the *Bhagavadgītā* listed in USG I.8 are in *ascending numerical* order: II.20, V.15, IX.6, XIII.2, XIII.12, XIII.31, X.III.27 (an anomaly), and XV.17.

⁶¹ Halbfass (1992), p. 180.

does seem to enter into Śaṅkara's Advaitic enterprise, since the final śruti quotation in USG I.37 is the fundamental mahāvākya: "tattvamasi" of *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI.8.7. In the first prose prakaraṇa, this mahāvākya is rendered in its extended form as: "That is the real, that is ātman, thou art that" (tatsatyam sa ātmā tattvamasi). This particular method of 'plurality leading to unity' is also employed in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (IV.4.25), although in this case, the *various means* ultimately culminate in the exposition of another crucial Vedāntavākya: "neti netīti":

"And so here the reality of brahman has been made known through various means, such as origination [of the world] and so on. Again, in order to strip away the differences caused by the means projected onto brahman, the reality is summed up as 'not thus, not thus'."

tathā cehotpattyādyanekopāyam āsthāyaikaṃ brahmatattvam āveditam punas tatkalpitopāya-janitaviśeṣa-pariśodhanārthaṃ neti netīti tatvopasaṃhāraḥ kṛtaḥ

As Halbfass (1992) points out: "The Vedas, as understood by Śaṅkara, teach the ultimate truth by reaching down into the world of appearance, by relating its statements and its methods of instruction to the way reality appears to those who are still in ignorance. By pointing out examples and inferential methods in the Vedas, and by using such devices himself, Śaṅkara appeals to what the world accepts as proof and demonstration; but in terms of his understanding of the Vedas, these are only illustrations, basically didactic devices, and there is no claim on his part of additional proof and validity to what the Vedas teach."⁶² If Halbfass is correct in his analysis, it would appear that Śaṅkara employs inferential methods, and scriptural examples from śruti and smṛti texts in his commentarial and non-commentarial texts, in order to *enhance* his pedagogical approach to truth. In certain passages, the scriptures are even considered to play a role similar to that of the mother teaching the child, as in the metrical part of the *Upadeśasūhasrī* (USP XVIII.3) in which he states:

"If the understanding, "I am ever free, the existent" could not arise,
for what purpose does the śruti teach thus zealously like a mother?"

In the first prose part of the *Upadeśasūhasrī*, it is the use of *scriptural testimony*, which is all important for the understanding of the nature of brahman and of the non-

⁶² Halbfass (1992), p. 160.

difference of ātman and brahman. In USG I.42, the teacher states that it is indeed the scriptures that "uproot nescience which is the view that [ātman] is different [from brahman], the root of transmigratory existence, by showing the reasonableness of the oneness of the origination, dissolution and so on [of the world]."

But the scriptures were not only useful as a teaching device, and as a key for the elimination of avidyā. Śaṅkara's conscious reliance on scriptural testimony was an effective method of "*re-vedāntising*" Indian philosophy at a time when many rival schools and sects were flourishing on the Indian sub-continent. In his lifetime (early to mid-eighth century CE), Śaṅkara was confronted with excellent theoreticians of the rival Mīmāṃsā school such as Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Prabhākara and Maṇḍanamiśra⁶³, who approached epistemological, ethical and metaphysical questions from another standpoint, i.e., relying on logical argument on the one hand, and on injunctive Vedic statements on the other. In addition, Śaṅkara saw the effects of the wave of popular bhakti Hinduism which arose from centres such as Mathurā in the North during the late Kushan dynasty, where the Vaiṣṇavas, for example, began to absorb and syncretise the doctrines and central figures of the śramaṇa religions into their own systems. As part of the orthodox brahmanic tradition, it is no surprise that Śaṅkara's major strategy for the attainment of liberation would be to stress the importance of the study of Vedic and Vedāntic texts, and to declare śabdapramāṇa as "the decisive source of our cognition about all those matters that transcend the limits of possible sensory experience"⁶⁴

In addition to the above-mentioned rival systems and sectarian popular religions, Śaṅkara had to deal with the highly-developed logical systems of the two main schools of Mahāyana Buddhism—the proponents of śūnya- and vijñāna-vāda; the second, with its refutation of scriptural testimony as a valid source of knowledge (pramāṇa). Śaṅkara also had to reconcile his school of "Vedāntic Advaita" with that of other Advaita Vedāntins, notably, those who relied heavily on Buddhist theories and

⁶³ Maṇḍanamiśra actually spans both the Pūrva- and the Uttaramīmāṃsā schools

⁶⁴ quoting J. N. Mohanty (1992), p. 232.

forms of logical argument, exemplified in such works as the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* of Gauḍapāda, and the Gauḍapāda school in general, for that matter.^{65, 66}

It has been argued by Suthren Hirst (1996), that Śāṅkara's Advaitic position bears a certain amount of resemblance to the Madhyamaka position, and that, for a number of reasons. The most important for our argument being that both schools deny that ultimate reality can be characterised or described in any manner, and secondly, that both agree on the vocabulary on the constructed nature of loka-vyavahāra.⁶⁷ Śāṅkara bases his position on the *Upaniṣads*, in which there are frequent descriptions of paramārtha-sat in negative terms, such as the famous "adṛṣtam...avyapadeśyam" series of *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* VII.

Biardeau (1959) speaks of the *apophatic characterisation of brahman* in Upaniṣadic passages of this kind—that is, that verbal denial nonetheless indicates the existence of brahman in an indirect way, or secondly, which uses negative inference involving reduction so that ultimately, presence can be inferred. In his commentary on Discourse VII of the *Chāndogyopaniṣad*, Śāṅkara presents an excellent apophatic illustration which serves to explain how it is that ātman can be denoted by the very term "ātman" if, as the *Upaniṣads* state, the self is beyond words ("wherefrom speech recoils"—*Taittirīyopaniṣad* II.4.1):

"For instance, when an army with the king is seen marching along, with umbrellas, flags, standards—even though the king is actually hidden by all this paraphernalia and hence, not visible, yet the expression is used 'the king is seen'; and when it is asked: 'Which is the king?', and people come to look for the particular person who is the king—every one of the other persons that are actually visible being rejected [as not being the king], there follows [as the result of elimination] that the person who is not visible is the king—and thus the idea of the 'king' is secured."

⁶⁵ For a sensitive reading of the Advaita Vedānta of Gauḍapāda with its strong Buddhist influences, see Bhattacharya, Vidhushekhara (1943), *The Āgamaśūtra of Gauḍapāda*, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers). Bhattacharya's point of view was later greatly criticised by a certain number of Indian scholars who wished to maintain the "purity" of the Vedāntic tradition, i.e., not defiled by extra-Vedic (in this case, Buddhist) influences. See Mahadevan, T.M.P. (1954) "*Gauḍapāda, a study in early Advaita*" (Madras: University of Madras Press).

⁶⁶ Bhattacharya argues that Gauḍapāda is not really an individual author due to the non-homogeneous nature of the four prakaraṇas of the *Āgamaśūtra*, and refers rather to a school of Gauḍapāda which flourished in the northeastern part of India in the 6th and 7th centuries CE, and partially as a response to the Buddhist school of logic of the same period.

⁶⁷ Suthren Hirst (1996) p. 72.

This charming parable, which by means of the presence of the *entourage* of the king, which is eliminated as not being the king himself, nevertheless indicates, in an apophatic manner, the presence of the king himself, even though his person is absent from sight. But the fact that the king is *indeed present*, is the crucial point which separates the Vedāntic scheme from the "*deluded end*" of the Madhyamaka school of Buddhism, as Śāṅkara is quick to point out.

But what *guarantee* is there that the negation of all adjuncts or attributes will culminate in reality and not terminate in a mere void or śūnya? Śāṅkara's response to this question is advanced in his introductory commentary on *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* VII:

"No, because it is impossible for imagination to exist without a substratum (āśraya). The illusion of silver, a snake, a man or mirage etc., cannot be conceived as existing without the substratum of the mother-of-pearl, rope, stump or desert, etc."

The recognition of a substratum is absolutely essential since Śāṅkara is in no way willing to sacrifice āśraya which, as Bilimoria (1997) states⁶⁸, "he ultimately needs for his absolute principle on the bottomless altar of nothingness."

It is possible that in works subsequent to his early commentary on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*⁶⁹--such as his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* and the three prose prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*--being somewhat discontented with the results achieved by strictly negative inferential analysis, Śāṅkara would slowly turn towards more concrete methods of ascertaining truth—the method of logical argument, and that employing scriptural testimony. Śāṅkara would develop the strategy of the use of complex logical arguments to validate the doctrine of 'self-establishment of the ultimate' (as for example, in the *second prose part* of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*⁷⁰) to defend his view that the ultimate can be defined in a positive manner, that is, as 'transcendentally changeless, eternal and non-dual'. Secondly, by the employment of scriptural testimony, Śāṅkara would develop a more positive characterisation of the nature of brahman. Biardeau (1959) has pointed out that in certain passages of the

⁶⁸ Bilimoria (1997), p. 260.

⁶⁹ Śāṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad* is considered by some—for example, Hacker (1968), and particularly Vetter (1979)—to belong to the earliest period of Śāṅkara's writings.

⁷⁰ USG II.94-109

Brahmasiārabhāṣya, Śaṅkara intentionally juxtaposes quotations from the scriptures which indicate *both* the negative, as well as the positive aspects of brahman.⁷¹ For example, in his commentary on *Brahmasiātra* II.1.26, Śaṅkara first quotes from *Bhagavadgītā* II.25a.,b. to point out the nature of brahman using *negative* terminology: "[Brahman] is said to be unmanifest, imponderable and immutable" (avyakto'yamacintyo'yamavikāryoyam-ucyate), which is immediately followed by another quotation from the *Gītā* (X.2a.-d.), which characterises brahman in *positive* terms—here, in the sense of real existence which transcends *knowability*: "The hosts of gods know not my origin; neither do great seers, for in all respects, I am the origin of gods and the great seers" (na me viduḥ suragaṇāḥ prabhavaṃ na maharṣayaḥ | ahamādirhi vedānāṃ maharṣīnāṃ ca sarvaśaḥ).

Since the first prose part of the *Upadeśasūhasrī* (USG I) is so closely related to Śaṅkara's *Brahmasiārabhāṣya*, it is no surprise that the same method of quoting from the scriptures which juxtaposes statements about the nature of brahman/ātman using negative and positive terminology is employed, which is the case in USG I.43. In the sections immediately preceding USG I.43, the pupil is made aware of the nature of brahman, and the non-difference of ātman and brahman, but is still unable to free himself from the "objects, means, etc., of actions" (USG I.41). The teacher concludes his argument against "sādhyasāadhanādibheda" in USG I.43 by saying that after having uprooted avidyā "by means of the śrutis, smṛtis, and reasoning" (avidyāyāmunmūlitāyāṃ śrutismṛtinyāyebhyaḥ), one sees the highest truth and becomes established in brahman. The teacher then quotes from śruti texts by first giving the *negative aspects* of brahman: "Without an inside and without an outside" from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II.5.19 and "Without and within, unborn", from *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* II.1.2, which is then followed by two śruti quotations which define brahman in *positive terms*: "like a lump of salt (saindhavaghana⁷²),...a mass of knowledge" loosely quoted from *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.5.13, as well as a non-

⁷¹ Biarreau (1959), p. 97.

⁷² lump of salt (saindhavaghana): It is salt from water which Śaṅkara has in mind, according to his commentary on *BĀU* II.4.12: "Such is the dissolution of water. Exactly like this process of an alternating disappearance of liquid and solid water, the salt-lump dissolves. Yājñavalkya states: "It would dissolve in exactly the way water itself disappears".

scriptural reference to the positive nature of brahman as being "all-pervading, like ether" (ākāśavat-paripūrṇa).

In view of the brevity of the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* which relies mainly on scriptural quotations to instruct the pupil about the nature of ātman/brahman and that the highest self cannot be known through ritual action of any kind, it is remarkable that Śaṅkara includes a passage which involves this very juxtaposition of negative and positive characterisations of brahman based on scriptural sources. What is the significance of this inclusion? This juxtaposition of the positive and the negative as an aid to transcend nescience which is 'vyākṛte nāma-rūpe', may well indicate a pedagogical method, which involves the concept of *nullity*, rather than the method of progressively subtracting all adjuncts to reveal the underlying true nature of ātman which is proposed in the third prose prakaraṇa of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. The concept and symbol of nullity represents a qualitative advancement of the human capacity of speculative thinking. It is an interesting fact that around 650 CE, the actual *symbol* of zero (śūnyam) was introduced to Indian mathematics, and some one hundred and fifty years earlier, the mathematician Aryabhata had devised a place-value system, wherein the symbol for zero was used to denote an empty place⁷³. These mathematical developments issued from the period of the Early Advaita Vedānta of the Gauḍapāda school, as well as of the Dignāga/Dharmakīrti school, who were both equally willing to contemplate on such abstract notions as nullity, which the mathematicians were pondering over in their own fashion. In spite of this fact, the question still remains how closely linked the centres of learning of the natural and abstract sciences were with those centres of learning concerned with pedagogical methods surrounding such metaphysical issues as ātman or anātman.

⁷³ The spiritual form of emptiness (śūnyatā) is also to be found in the earliest Vedic texts, though admittedly in an ill-defined manner. The earliest Buddhist sūtras placed much emphasis on emptiness (e.g., the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*), which, in turn, greatly influenced the Madhyamaka school.

Section 6: Is there a state of knowledge beyond śabdapramāṇa ?

In the *Pañca-kōśa-vivaraṇam*, which is the second section (praśna) of the *Taittirīyopaniṣad*, the ultimate inexpressibility of brahman is hinted at in the following manner:

"That from which words turn back along with the mind, not having attained the intended object, he who knows the bliss of brahman does not fear at any time."

yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha |
ānandaṃ brahmaṇo vidvān na bibheti kadācaneti ||

In spite of Śaṅkara's complete reliance on the scriptural testimony as that which reveals the truth of ātman/brahman, he was surely influenced by such statements of the scriptures themselves which characterise ultimate reality as that which is *beyond* the grasp of speech and mind—"that from which words together with the mind turn back"—implying that ultimate reality cannot be translated adequately into natural language, nor fixed in terms of well-defined categories of logical thought.

According to Śaṅkara, word is capable of asserting the presence of brahman in an indirect manner, though not necessarily in a direct written or the spoken word form (vācyārtha). In consequence, the words of scriptural texts are considered to have a more profound suggestive function, and are not merely limited to the definition or description of phenomenal reality. If considered in light of the notion of lakṣyārtha, it is not particularly surprising that when commenting on *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.3 which reads: "ātmeti tūpagacchanti grāhayanti ca", Śaṅkara makes reference to the *Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad* by stating, that when the final truth is realised, "even the Vedas are not the Vedas"—"vedāvedāḥ" (*Bṛhad-āraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.3.22). As Rambachan (1986) so aptly states: "Śruti is like the finger which points to an object, but disappears when that object is seen—for the realisation of brahman is said to be the culmination of all pramāṇas including śruti."⁷⁴ In his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* XIII.2, Śaṅkara states what may well be his ultimate position:

⁷⁴Rambachan (1986), p. 128.

"Similarly the Advaitin grants that his position entails the futility of the śāstras in the state of liberation, since the jīva has realised he is one with [brahman]. However the śāstras continue to be relevant in the sphere of nescience, of course. All dualistic schools, similarly, hold that the śāstras are relevant only in the state of bondage, and not in the state of liberation as well."

tathā naḥ kṣetrajñānām īśvaraikatve sati śāstrānarthakyaṃ bhavatu avidyāviṣaye ca arthavattvaṃ yathā dvaitavādinām sarveṣāṃ bandhāvasthāyām eva śāstrādyarthavattvaṃ na muktāvasthāyām evam

Śaṅkara is quite clear on one point: śruti, although an indicator of ultimate reality, operates and has validity only within the 'sphere of nescience' (avidyāviṣaya). Śābdapramāṇa, though a valid source of knowledge, nevertheless belongs to the world of aparāvidyā (lower knowledge) and is simply abandoned—like the Buddhist raft—when the further shore of insight has been reached. But it should be stated that it is not simply Śaṅkara alone who holds this belief that the śrutis are ultimately transcended upon the realisation of non-difference (abheda), since, as he states as well, not only the dualist schools of Sāṃkhya-Yoga hold a similar view, but this position is also sanctioned by the scriptures themselves.

Before Śaṅkara's time, Bhartṛhari, as well, states that the explanation of the scriptures is based on nescient reality, since brahman is a state which transcends words and the teaching of brahman is but the expediency of the imparting of truth to humans. In *Vākyapadīya* II.234, Bhartṛhari claims that scriptural testimony belongs to conventional reality (vyavahāra), which is none other than avidyā:

vyavahārāya manyante śāstrārthaprakriyā yataḥ |
śāstreṣu prakriyābhedairavidyāivopavarṇyate ||

Writing from the perspective of a linguist and grammarian, *word* for Bhartṛhari—even as it appears in the form of scriptural testimony—remains "*the world*"⁷⁵ Bhartṛhari's belief holds true for Śaṅkara as well, who claims that śābdapramāṇa is adequate for those for whom the light of brahmajñāna has not yet dawned. Apart from the various pramāṇas whose validity is ultimately relegated to the level of saṃvṛti-sat, Śaṅkara introduces a belief in a real condition, which is the

⁷⁵ See article by Aklujkar, Ashok (2001), "*The Word is the World: Nondualism in Indian Philosophy of Language*" in *Philosophy East & West* 51/4, concerning Bhartṛhari's linguistic approach to non-duality.

immediate apprehension (avagati) of the non-difference of ātman and brahman, a condition which requires no validation, since at the level of paramārtha-sat, all valid sources of knowledge are transcended, including śabdapramāṇa.

As stated earlier, Śaṅkara's bases this belief on scriptural evidence; not without significance here, is *Muṇḍaka* III.2.3 of the Upaniṣad of the same name, which clearly states that śabdapramāṇa cannot lead to 'the attainment of self', and that right knowledge is not achieved by repetitive hearing (bahunā śrutena) [of scriptural texts]:

"This self cannot be attained by instruction nor by intellectual power nor even through much hearing. [Ātman] is to be attained by the one whom [ātman] chooses. To such a one ātman reveals his own nature."

nāyam ātmā pravacanena labhyo na medhayā na bahunā śrutena
yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyastasyaiṣa ātmā vivṛṇute tanuṃ svām

Commenting on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.3, Śaṅkara specifically states that knowledge of ātman cannot be attained "by the elaborate study of the Vedas and śāstras", and towards the end of the bhāṣya states:

"Therefore, by renouncing everything else, a *wish to realise ātman* is alone the means of attaining ātman."

tasmādanyatyāgenātmalābhaprārthanaiṣvātmalābhasādhanaṃ ityarthah⁷⁶

This particular statement gives valuable information about Śaṅkara's opinion concerning the path to liberation. Mokṣa is to be attained by 'the renunciation of everything [else but brahman]' (anya-tyāgena), which implies the need for the seeker to be established in the saṃnyāsa tradition⁷⁷, and secondly, this renunciation of everything else, also points to the leaving behind of truth established in the scriptures. In the second part of this commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.3, Śaṅkara refers to another notion which is of interest to our argument—that the sole means of attaining ātman is to have the "*wish or desire to realise ātman*" (ātma-lābha-prārthana). The word which

⁷⁶ tasmāt anya-tyāgena ātmalābha-prārthana eva ātmalābha sāadhanam iti arthah

⁷⁷ This point will be dealt with in section 7 of this thesis.

Śaṅkara employs for 'wish' is "prārthana", which has nothing to do with "kāma", which is often translated as desire, since *Muṇḍaka* III.2.1 clearly states that:

"the wise, who are free from desires (akāma), and who worship the puruṣa, pass beyond the seed [of rebirth]"

The word "prārthana", which is related to the verbal root (arth) prefixed by (pra-) is employed in the *Kaṭhopanīṣad* in a verbal form signifying "to wish or long for". M. Monier-Williams defines "prārthana" (n.) as "wish, desire, entreaty, solicitation, petition for". Prārthanā (f.) is defined as "prayer". Furthermore, Śaṅkara appears to be interpreting the portion of *Muṇḍaka* III.2.3 which reads "[ātman] is to be attained by the one whom [ātman] chooses" (yam evaiṣa vṛṇute tena labhyaḥ) from the perspective of the seeker of truth—thus favouring *intentionality* of liberation, which attenuates the interpretation of this particular passage as a reference to the *bestowal of grace* by the highest self on the seeker of liberation. In fact, a personal god (īśvara) who might mercifully bestow grace on the seeker of liberation makes no appearance in the three prose prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*⁷⁸, even though the term 'īśvara' occurs very frequently in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. Of course, īśvara is the personal god mentioned in the scriptures, which Śaṅkara is obliged to include while commenting on scriptures, although as Ram-Prasad (2001) states:

"The good lord of the theologian is really not a part of the central project of advaita...Even more fundamentally, Śaṅkara argues that god is irrelevant to the advaitic path, regardless of whether that god is a supreme and transcendent entity distinct from the self or a particular expression of consciousness ultimately identical with the self."⁷⁹

Ram-Prasad's statement is very much to the point in light of Śaṅkara's commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.3. "Ātma-lābha-prārthana" is none other than the Advaitic path to liberation walked by the seeker of enlightenment, who is unassisted by a higher power. And as Ram-Prasad himself speculates: how can the Advaitic theory of liberation be considered a soteriological enterprise...when there is no saviour?

⁷⁸ On the other hand, Mayeda (1965), mentions that the term īśvara is used eight times in the metrical part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*.

The fifth section of the fourth chapter of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, concerning the essential non-dual nature of ātman and brahman, is perhaps one of the most important sections upon which Śaṅkara relied as scriptural foundation of his Advaitic project. In this fifth brāhmaṇa, Yājñavalkya instructs one of his two wives, Maitreyī, considered herself to be a discourser on brahma-knowledge (brahmavādinī), about the nature of life-eternal (amṛtatvam), before walking away into the forest. Śaṅkara was very sensitive to the transmission of brahma-vidyā, since in the Advaitic tradition, it was of utmost importance that knowledge be imparted to a deserving pupil, so that the continuity of the Advaitic tradition (sampradāya) could be maintained. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* I.1.4, Śaṅkara quotes the following passage from the fifth brāhmaṇa of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* (IV.5.15):

"When the self alone is realised as all this, then by what and whom shall one see,...by what and whom shall one know? ...Indeed, by what shall one know the knower?"

This notion of *self-interrogation*: "Indeed, by what shall one know the knower?" (vijñātāram are kena vijānīyāt), so that the "knots of the heart be untied"⁸⁰ is central to the Advaitic notion of liberation from saṃsāric existence. This manner of approaching the absolute is further indicative of Śaṅkara's belief that knowledge of brahman cannot be reduced to a prameya and cannot be ultimately validated by any pramāṇa which operates within the realm of vyavāhara. Although reason can show experience to be intrinsically and extrinsically consistent, it still cannot yield the experience itself, which goes beyond the strict bounds of reason.

According to Pande (1994), brahmavidyā is acknowledged as being knowable *by any relevant means*, and not necessarily by śabdapramāṇa which can only impart information about something independent of it. It is for this reason, that Śaṅkara accepts intuitive experience (anubhava) as *one such relevant means* of knowing brahman. This is evident by his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* I.1.2:

⁷⁹ Ram-Prasad (2001), p. 215.

⁸⁰ According to Muṇḍakopaniṣad II.2.8a.b.: "bhidyate kṛdayagranthiśchidyante sarvasaṃśayāḥ": all doubts are destroyed [and] the knots of the heart are untied.

"Rather the method here is scripture and so on, along with intuitive comprehension (anubhava) and so on, as may be required. For brahmajñāna culminates in experience, since it is a real object (bhūtavastu-viṣayatva⁸¹)."

kiṃ tu śrutyādayo'nubhavādayaśca yathāsaṃbhavamiha pramāṇam anubhavāvasānatvāt
bhūtavastu-viṣayatvācca brahmajñānasya

The Vedāntic scheme, therefore, recognises intuitive comprehension (anubhava)—also termed avagati or aparokṣānubhūti—as that which is the valid source of knowledge of brahman, and the latter exists as the real object of such intuitive comprehension (bhūtavastuviṣayatvāt). But as Mohanty (1992) points out, it is necessary to distinguish between intuitive comprehension and the valid sources of knowledge (pramāṇas) recognised as such, which Śāṅkara mentions separately in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2 quoted above, (here, termed: śrutyādayaḥ). For, as Mohanty states: "Where are intuitive experience and mystic experience? They are not pramāṇas: they are experiences."⁸²

That anubhava is considered by Śāṅkara to belong to a *different category* than the pramāṇas is a significant point, and should be kept in mind when evaluating comments made by modern scholars, such as Upadhyaya (1991), who states the following in favour of śabdapramāṇa as the *only valid means of knowledge* for final realisation of brahmajñāna:

"It is significant that [Śāṅkara] adds "and so forth" after anubhava (*concerning BSBh 1.1.2 quoted above*). This would suggest that no special significance is being attached to anubhava. The inevitable conclusion here is that anubhava is grouped along with all other pramāṇas whose roles are conceived by Śāṅkara as only subordinate and supplementary to śruti."⁸³

In response to Upadhyaya, it may be recalled that the exact words which Śāṅkara employs in this commentarial passage on *Brahmasūtra* 1.1.2 concerning relevant means are: "śrutyādayo'nubhavādayaśca". Respecting Mohanty's distinction between pramāṇa and intuitive experience, it is possible that Śāṅkara is juxtaposing

⁸¹ bhūta-vastu: This term is quite difficult to translate, but refers to a thing or occurrence which has a real existence, and thus is very much opposed to the Buddhist concept of reality as impermanent and non-abiding.

⁸² Mohanty (1992), p. 294.

⁸³ Upadhyaya (1991), p. 35.

śabdapramāṇa—which by the statement "śrutyādayaḥ", may be extended to include rational argument (nyāya), as of the dvandva-compound "śruti-smṛti-nyāya", of USG I.43—with the various nuances of intuitive and mystical experiences (anubhavādyāḥ), which may include other levels of intuitive experience such as avagati, aparokṣānubhūti, or even the level(s) of mystical receptivity of the Upaniṣadic seers and sages.

In the final analysis, it would appear that intuitive comprehension, the inner light (antarjyotis) of ātman, which is self-validating (svārtha), and needing no proof by reason or scriptural authority, is the final aim of Śaṅkara's philosophy. It is this intuitive comprehension, participating in Śaṅkara's doctrine of illumination, which is the light which reveals ātman⁸⁴. This is indeed the conclusion reached by the pupil of the second prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, who states (USG II.109):

"So ultimately, Your Holiness, *apprehension*, the *light of ātman* (ātma-jyotis), is uninterrupted, immutable, eternal, and non-dual in nature."

evameva paramārthataḥ bhagavan avagateḥ ātmajyotiṣaḥ nairantaryabhāvāt kūṭasthanityatā
advaitabhāvaśca

⁸⁴ According to Śaṅkara's doctrine of illumination, cognition is self-revelatory and ultimate ātman-perception (caitanya), which is changeless, appears (ābhāsa) as perceiver.

Section 7: "Where the task of philosophy ends": The pre-requisites for the attainment of liberating knowledge

The title of this section is inspired by a comment made by J.N. Mohanty in his work: "*Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought*" to the effect that reflection (manana) by itself does not lead to the immediate experience of truth—it is spiritual practice (sādhana) which is instrumental in producing that experience which supposedly brings about liberation (mokṣa). In the Advaitic tradition, that experience which produces liberation, is none other than the knowledge of brahma. This is clearly stated in USG I.2: "the means to final release is knowledge [of brahman]" (tadidaṃ mokṣasādhanaṃ jñānaṃ). On this particular point, the first prose part of the *Upadeśasūhasrī* illustrates yet again, its structural and contextual similarity to Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*.

Brahmasūtra I.1: "athāto brahmajijñāsā"⁸⁵, permits Śaṅkara in his commentary on this first sūtra, to explore the *prerequisites* for brahmajijñāsa, and it is this same methodology which he adopts in the first prose part of the *Upadeśasūhasrī*, he states in section USG I.2:

"[The knowledge of brahman] should be repeatedly related to the pupil until it is firmly grasped, if he is dispassionate toward all things non-eternal which are attained by means [other than knowledge]; if he has abandoned the desire for sons, wealth, and worlds and reached the state of a *paramahansa* wandering ascetic; if he is endowed with tranquillity, self-control, compassion, and so forth; if he is possessed of the qualities of a pupil which are well known from the scriptures; if he is a Brahmin who is pure; if he approaches his teacher in the prescribed manner; if his caste, profession, behaviour, knowledge [of the Vedas], and family have been examined."

Although Śaṅkara states that it is but knowledge of brahman which is the means to liberation (USG I.2), it is quite clear from the above passage that there exist a certain number of pre-requisites (adhikāra) or auxiliary requisites which accompany brahmajijñāna—this sole 'means' to liberation. One may therefore conclude that the Advaitic scheme of liberation admits that the seeker of truth must be properly prepared

⁸⁵ "Now, therefore, the inquiry [into the nature of] brahman."

to hear the authoritative texts; in so far that the attainment of liberation is dependent on the receptivity of the seeker to moral or religious truths upon which the notion of the desire to know brahman (brahmajijñāsā) is based. There are a certain number of fundamental qualities of the pupil (śiṣya-guṇa) that Śaṅkara mentions in this passage from USG I.2 and in USG I.4, which are important adhikāras for the 'one who has the desire for liberation' (mumukṣu):

- i. Pre-disposing factors of birth, environment, caste, past activities and education in the Vedas (USG I.2)
- ii. Acquisition of the means of tranquillity, self-control, compassion and so on (USG I.2 and I.4)
- iii. The pupil's dispassion with regard to the enjoyment of things present or remote (iha-amutrārthabhogavirāga) (USG I.2 and I.4)
- iv. The pupil's development of discrimination of things which are eternal and non-eternal (nityānityavastuviveka) (USG I.4)

An important point is that these qualities which are to be developed in the seeker of enlightenment presupposes the presence of a teacher (ācārya or guru). In both USG I and his commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, Śaṅkara quotes from the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* VI.14.2: "One who has a teacher knows...". This quotation appears in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (I.1.2) in the following manner:

"A learned wise person may reach the country of the Gandhāras; just so here the person *who has a teacher* attains knowledge."

paṇḍito medhāvi gandhārān evopasaṃpadyetaivam evehācāryavān puruṣo veda iti

Śaṅkara's pedagogical method, including his view of the importance of the relationship between the pupil and the teacher, may be studied throughout the entire *Upadeśasāhasrī*, although the first prose part (USG I), which is a dialogue between the teacher of Advaita and the pupil involved in ritual action in view to liberation, offers

very valuable insight into the Advaitic method of leading the pupil in the direction of right knowledge. Here, the teacher starts by questioning the pupil in a way which kindles a sense of dissatisfaction with all things non-eternal. Śāṅkara's pedagogical method also serves to encourage a sense of openness in the pupil's attitude, which increases his self-awareness and prepares him to embrace the Advaitic teaching. This method of disciplining and redirecting the mind based on dissatisfaction may be likened to the recognition of duḥkha in the Buddhist scheme. In addition, the qualities of the teacher are enumerated in USG I.6:

"The teacher is able to consider both sides [of an argument], is endowed with understanding, memory, tranquillity, self-control, compassion, favour and the like; he is versed in the traditional doctrine; not attached to any enjoyments, visible or invisible, he has abandoned all the rituals and their requisites; a knower of brahman, he is established in brahman, he leads a blameless life, free from faults such as deceit, pride, trickery, wickedness, fraud, jealousy, falsehood, egotism, self-interest, and so on; with the only purpose of helping others he wishes to make use of knowledge."

According to Malkovsky (2001), this particular passage which lists the qualities of the teacher is the most detailed of all references to the teacher's virtues in the works of Śāṅkarācārya.⁸⁶ Although there is a certain amount of overlapping of the required qualities of both the pupil and the teacher, there is one significant difference, in that the teacher must be "a knower of brahman", and is already "established in brahman" (brahmavit brahmaṇi sthitaḥ). In other words, it is fundamental that the teacher not only has an understanding of the scriptures, combined with a mastery of logical methods of reasoning (in USG I.6 termed stūhāpohagrahaṇa), but has already attained that knowledge of enlightenment (ātmabodha) through experience (anubhava). Furthermore, the true teacher must be of extremely high moral character and free from all common defilements, i.e., deceit (dambha), egotism (ahaṃkāra) and self-interest (mamātva).

To a certain extent, Śāṅkara relies on the Upaniṣadic sources for his knowledge of the virtues and qualities of the teacher and spiritual guide. One major source is *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.4.23, which states that the "auxiliaries" (aṅga), that is,

⁸⁶ Malkovsky (2001), p. 83.

calmness (śama), self-control (dama), repose (uparati), patience (titikṣā) and contemplation (sādhi), "have necessarily to be accomplished (avaśyānuṣṭheya):

"Therefore he who knows it as such, having become calm, self-controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the self in [his own] self, sees all in the self."

tasmādevaṃvicchānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvātmanyevātmānam paśyati
sarvamātmānam paśyati

Commenting on the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, Śaṅkara also refers to the Advaitic teachers as "those who know the [true] tradition" (sampradāyavidāḥ), and who through parable and scripture teach the nature of the highest self (BĀU II.1.20). In the same passage, he claims that śruti does not have the unconditional power to provide knowledge of brahman, because it only supplies information about things unknown, 'as they are': for the sake of attainment of mokṣa, it is necessary to find a spiritual guide or teacher from whom knowledge of brahman can be learned.

Śaṅkara also states that the Upaniṣad's own lineage of teachers (ācāryaparamparā) is founded in the self-born brahman, whether *interpreted as ultimate reality or the eternal Vedas* (BĀU II.6.3; VI.5.3). This interpretation of paramārtha-sat or scriptural testimony has certain important implications, in that the teacher or spiritual guide is considered to be the mediator of the teachings passed on before him from age to age in the Vedāntic tradition, which is, in turn, the *embodiment* (śarīratva) of the truth of the scriptures. It may be mentioned here that Gauḍapāda⁸⁷, commenting on kārika V.d. of the *Sāṃkhyakārika* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa: "right affirmation is true revelation" (-āptaśrutirāpta-vacanantu), states that "āpta means ācārya-s, and that *teachers and Vedas* are called āptaśruti, and that which is declared by them is true revelation." This statement from the Sāṃkhya tradition is very much in keeping with the Upaniṣadic concept that it is the lineage of teachers which actually *embody* the truth of the scriptures.

The importance of the lineage of teachers (ācāryaparamparā) is briefly mentioned in USG I.3:

⁸⁷ This Gauḍapāda, commentator on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, is probably not the same as the Gauḍapāda, who is the illustrious commentator (or school of G.) on the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad*.

"For when knowledge [of brahman] is firmly grasped, it is conducive to one's own beatitude and to the continuity [of knowledge of brahman]. And the continuity of knowledge [of brahman] is helpful to people, as a boat to one wishing to get across a river."

ḍḍhaghṛhītā hi vidyā ātmanah śreyase santatyai ca bhavati | vidyāsantatiśca prāṇyanugrahāya bhavati nauriva nadīm titīṣoh

In this passage, the concept of continuity of knowledge of brahman (vidyāsantatiḥ) refers to the need to maintain the lineage of teachers from age to age, since its maintenance is considered to be beneficial to people (anugraha)—good medicine. According to this passage, unless the scriptures are properly maintained and passed from teacher to pupil in an accredited teaching lineage, there can be no true knowledge of brahman—and ultimately, no liberation from samsāric suffering.

In USG II.74, Śaṅkara speaks of the grace (prasāda) of the teacher, without which liberation is impossible. After having explained to the pupil that his real nature is of the nature of pure consciousness, the teacher says to him: "Has this delusion left you now or not?" The pupil replies: "Your Holiness, the delusion has gone thanks to your gracious assistance." (bhagavan apagataḥ tvatprasādāt vyāmohaḥ). Śaṅkara also associates this notion of grace with the scriptures themselves, as for example, in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II.1.20, where he refers to his opponents ('the dialecticians'--tarkikas) as those who are "devoid of the grace of the śāstras, and a teacher" (śāstra-guru-prasāda-rahita).

In both USG I and USG II, the pupil approaches the teacher "in the prescribed or usual manner". This "prescribed or usual manner" of approaching the teacher is mentioned by Śaṅkara in his commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* I.2.12:

"In this way, disgusted, the Brahmin should approach the teacher alone who is possessed of tranquillity of mind, control of senses, etc. The expression "alone" indicates that even though learned in the Vedas, he (i.e., the pupil) should not independently try to acquire the knowledge of brahman but should approach the teacher alone. "Samit-pāṇi" means he must have the bundle of samidh sticks in his hands...To such a teacher, [the pupil] must duly approach, seek his grace and ask him about the imperishable true puruṣa".

In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, the *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya*, as well as in USG I.2, the pupil who approaches the teacher for instruction must be a Brahmin. Ad *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* III.5.1 and IV.5.15, Śaṅkara also states that it is only the

Brahmin who are entitled to *saṃnyāsa*. But as Mayeda (1979) points out⁸⁸, all the *smṛtis* are not in agreement whether the ascetic life (*saṃnyāsa*) is open to all the upper three classes, or only to Brahmins. According to the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyana (I.3.34-39), all upper three classes (that is all, except the Śūdras) are entitled to *brahmavidyā*. Later Advaitins as well, such as Sureśvara, tend to be more lenient than Śaṅkara and accept all the three upper classes as eligible for *saṃnyāsa*.

On this particular issue, Śaṅkara reflects the peculiar combination of orthodoxy and radicalism characteristic of an original thinker; he regretted the decay of the ancient Vedic social institutions, and upheld the orthodox view about restricted social eligibility to the institutionalised life of renunciation. On the other hand, he strongly criticised the claims of the ritualistic priest-caste, stating that spirituality is rooted in inner illumination not something to be obtained from exterior ritual works. Bilimoria (1997) would not necessarily be in agreement with Śaṅkara's notion of soteriological exclusivity, since Bilimoria appears to hold Śaṅkaran *advaitavāda* concerning the "denuded self" (as he states) as responsible for the subsequent failure of Indian culture to develop a realistic world based on rights and community solidarity. Bilimoria claims that Śaṅkara employed the Advaitic doctrine as the foundation for the establishment of the *saṃnyāsin* tradition which he hoped "would become the absolute denominator of the Hindu civilisation, as it was of the śramaṇic tradition, which brahmanism had by then successfully appropriated."⁸⁹

USG I.2 stipulates that the Brahmin who approaches the teacher for instruction must also be a *paramahaṃsa* wandering ascetic. Commenting on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.4a.b. "nāyamātmā balahīnena labhyo na ca pramādāttapaso vāpyalingāt", Śaṅkara equates the word 'līṅga' with 'saṃnyāsa':

"Aids like strength, heedlessness, austerity coupled with *saṃnyāsa* (līṅga) are to create a longing for ātman; for this ātman cannot be attained by one devoid of strength, nor by negligence due to adherence to worldly objects like sons, cattle, etc., nor similarly by austerity without līṅga. *Līṅga* means *saṃnyāsa*. But when the knower strives for ātman, with these

⁸⁸ Mayeda (1979), p. 228, fn.6.

⁸⁹ Bilimoria (1997), p. 272-273.

means of strength, heedlessness and jñāna coupled with saṁnyāsa, the ātman of such a knower enters the abode that is brahman."

It would appear that in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara accepts *two categories* of saṁnyāsa; namely, the vidvat-saṁnyāsa of the paramahamṣa, and the vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa as defined in the Dharmaśāstra normative tradition. The vidvat-saṁnyāsa (saṁnyāsa of a knower) would correspond to the position of the teacher; while the pupil of USG I.2, for one, would belong to the second category of the vividiṣā-saṁnyāsa (saṁnyāsa out of a desire for knowledge). Ānandagiri, in his sub-commentary on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* III.2.4a.b., is in agreement with Śaṅkara, that "līṅga means saṁnyāsa", yet Ānandagiri goes on to say that "in the case of Indra, Janaka and Gārgī (*i.e., those who had taken no—or had no access to—formal vows of saṁnyāsa*), internal renunciation was involved, and therefore external saṁnyāsa is not always intended."

Ānandagiri's comment which expands the notion of renunciation to include other categories of seekers of liberation who are not necessarily "brāhmaṇa paramahamṣa wandering ascetics", indicates the need for different generations to constantly re-interpret and re-evaluate scriptural testimony, and previous commentaries in light of their own particular reasoning practices, doctrines and ethical codes. Hence, it would indeed appear that *liberation cannot be liberated* from its social context, and each interpreter of scriptural testimony reaffirms his (eventually, her) own traditional values, and cultural programmes of training and transmission rights. The encounter with scripture is a dialogue; and that which is encountered gives rise to an essential question which requires an answer. It is each particular 'culture of liberation' which must enter into dialogue, and ultimately interpret scriptural testimony according to its own particular need. In the case of Śaṅkaran Advaita Vedānta, as Forsthofel (2002), in his interesting article, "*Retrieving the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi: The Poles of Religious Knowing*" points out, it is "the external circuitry of Advaita—text, tradition and teacher which reveals the most important context of all, that is, human relationship with a teacher and fellow seekers, a society which one renounces, an initiation that one accepts in the presence of another, and so on."

Section 8: Does spiritual practice play a role in the attainment of knowledge?

Śaṅkara himself declares that "there is actually no difference between being liberated and not being liberated, for the self is always the same"⁹⁰. One could definitely argue that this statement nonetheless presupposes a transformative process which by no means is a gratuitous one, and that consequently, the Advaitic path toward liberation is strongly linked to socially established practices and normative behaviour. In his commentary on *Bhagavad-gītā* V.12, Śaṅkara indeed recognises the process through which a vividiṣā-saṁnyāsin must go to ultimately attain mokṣa. The various stages mentioned are the purification of mind, the attainment [of the means] of knowledge, the renunciation of all actions, and the establishment (niṣṭhā) of knowledge, all stages occurring gradually (sattvaśuddhijñānaprāptisarvakarma-saṁnyāsajñānaniṣṭhākrameṇa).

The notion of *contextualised transmission* makes it easier to understand certain anomalies between the Advaitic metaphysical *doctrine*, which advocates the renunciation of all ritual action (sarvakarmasaṁnyāsa), and certain *means*, including meditational techniques, that serve to purify the mind (sattvaśuddhi) which Śaṅkara mentions. Since it is ultimately the removal of nescience which leads to (or is) liberation, ritual acts of all kind, including mental acts (mānāsī kriyā) cannot lead to this end.

Therefore it would appear that Śaṅkara does indeed recognise that brahmavidyā can be approached in a step-wise manner (krameṇa), as his commentary on *Bhagavad-gītā* V.12 indicates. Furthermore, Śaṅkara mentions the need for *effort* (prayatna), in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* IV.4.6. Yet it would appear that injunctions (vidhi) to perform "works" apply only as long as right knowledge has not yet dawned. In his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.1, Śaṅkara recognises the *relative value* of the effort of repetition (āvṛtti) for those of slower understanding (mandamati). In USG I.2 as well, it is recommended that knowledge of brahman be "repeatedly related to the pupil until it is firmly grasped" (brūyāt punaḥ punaḥ yāvadgrahaṇam dṛḍhībhavati). The factor of repetition is often mentioned in Śaṅkara's commentaries concerning both

⁹⁰ "na hi vastuto muktāmuktatvaviśeṣo'sti" (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣadbhāṣya* IV.4.6)

upāsanā (focussing of the mind) and nididhyāsana (contemplation). In his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* III.4.26, Śaṅkara points out that upāsanā is the repetitive continuity of a single idea (upāsanam nāma samānapratyaya pravāhakaraṇam), and in the same commentarial section, states that both upāsanā and nididhyāsana are repetitive actions: "upāsanam nididhyāsana cetyantarñītāvṛtti guṇaiva kriyābhidhīyate".

Before examining the meditation practices which are recommended in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, it is interesting to look at some of the different attitudes toward spiritual practices of this kind (sādhana) in the major philosophic traditions before and during the time of Śaṅkara. According to Maṇḍanamiśra⁹¹, śruti is considered to be a valid source of knowledge, and upon hearing the truth about the 'non-difference of brahman and ātman' through the scriptures, all false notions cease. Nevertheless, he states, it may also occur that such false notions persist through the power of strong mental impressions due to the repetition of *beginningless wrong understanding*. In order to remove these accumulated erroneous impressions, Maṇḍanamiśra recommends *the repetition of the seeing of reality* coupled with the performance of rituals, etc., which are derived from Vedic texts. In addition, Maṇḍanamiśra holds that the knowledge gained from the hearing of the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas does not cause immediate realisation of brahman, but that repeated meditation on the mahāvākyas is necessary to convert such knowledge into ultimate realisation. It is obvious here that Maṇḍanamiśra's point of view spans two philosophic traditions, i.e., the Advaita Vedāntic and the Pūrvamīmāṃsā traditions, his leanings toward the latter tradition obvious by the claim that both repeated meditation and the performance of prescribed Vedic rituals is necessary to eliminate wrong understanding. The term "prasamkhyāna" meditation is often used to describe this repeated meditation practice enjoined by Maṇḍanamiśra and other jñāna-karmasamuccayavādins of the Vedāntic tradition.

In the metrical part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Śaṅkara voices his disapproval of this practice of prasamkhyāna meditation: in USP XVIII.15 and 18, the opponent who possibly represents the Vedāntic position of a jñānakarmasamuccayavādin, states that

⁹¹Maṇḍanamiśra (ca. 660-720 CE), the author of the Advaita treatise entitled the *Brahmasiddhi*, is believed to have been an older contemporary of Śaṅkara.

one "should perform *prasaṃkhyāna* meditation diligently" since "nobody, even if he knows the meaning of the sentence, is found to be free from pain." Śāṅkara obviously rejects this point of view in USP XVIII.19, by stating that "final release is not [an end to be attained by actions], since it is ever-existing." According to Śāṅkara, it is not correct that śruti would enjoin one to perform any repeated meditation practice, such as *prasaṃkhyāna* meditation, for to do so would be to presuppose agentship. This is indeed the position of the *Brahmasārabhāṣya* as well as the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* in that repetitive meditation practices, though they are not ritual actions in a literal sense, are nonetheless mental actions (*mānāsā kriyā*) oriented towards results, and *saṃsāric* suffering is directly related to this bondage of the nature of means and ends (*sādhyasādhana*lakṣaṇo bandhaḥ).

It is interesting to note that in the first prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (USG I.38), Śāṅkara supports his statement that ātman is identical with brahman by quoting—among other *smṛti* sources—from the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra*. The quotation in question being: "All beings are the bodies of him who lives in the hearts" (I.22.4)⁹². The *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* is considered to be one of the oldest extant law books, dating from about the third century BCE,⁹³ and is one section of the *Kalpa-sūtra* belonging to the Āpastamba school, a Black Yajurveda school of South India. The section of the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* which Śāṅkara quotes from is entitled the "*Adhyāmapaṭala*" (sections I.22.1-8 and I.23.1-6), which is translated by Olivelle as "Knowledge of the Self". In the *Adhyāmapaṭala* section, the origins of Early Vedāntic thought are already present, and it is especially interesting that the opening and closing sūtras of this section propose that "*one should practice* the discipline pertaining to ātman" (*adhyātmikayoga*). Since the *Adhyāmapaṭala* section quotes passages from Upaniṣadic texts which pertain specifically to the oneness (*ekatva*) of ātman/brahman, it may be the case that the author (or compiler) of this section of the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* was definitely sympathetic to the cause of non-duality. It is also true that this section is quoted by Śāṅkara, not only in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, but also in his

⁹² translation of "pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarvaguhāśayam" proposed by Mayeda (1979); Olivelle (1999) proposes the following translation: "All living beings are the residence of the one who dwells within the cave (cavity of the heart)."

⁹³ This date proposed by Olivelle (1999), p. xxxiv.

commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*. It may be mentioned here that there also exists a commentary attributed to Śaṅkara, entitled the *Adhyāmapaṭalavivaraṇa* (-bhāṣya), which is considered by Pande, as well as Hacker-Mayeda⁹⁴ to be an authentic work of Śaṅkara.

The *Adhyāmapaṭala* section of the *Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra* proposes that the attainment of brahman involves active spiritual practice combined with knowledge of brahman through śabdapramāṇa, and recommends that one "should practice the discipline pertaining to the inner self", involving both knowledge and action, which is the path dear to the jñāna-karma-samuccayavādinś such as Maṇḍanamiśra and Bhāskara. Many of the other early smṛti tracts of the tradition did, in fact, forward the belief in the dual path of jñāna and karma for the attainment of final liberation, as for example, this quotation from the *Hārīta-smṛti* VI.10.10 indicates: "Just as a horse devoid of a cart nor a cart without a horse [can carry a load], so are both austerity (tapas) and knowledge [indispensable] to the ascetic."

What is of particular interest to our argument, is that the *Adhyāmapaṭala* section of the *Dharma-sūtra* forwards a meditation practice or technique of meditating on ātman, by means of which a state of final release or bliss (kṣema) may be attained—even in the present lifetime: "In this life, the eradication of faults depends on discipline. The learned man who uproots these faults that torment creatures attains bliss" (I.23.3). The practice presented in this section involves a "casting away of whatever is called a sensory object" (I.22.5) so that one becomes "immortal and unchanging; has no limbs, voice, body or touch"⁹⁵. It may be noted that the meditation practice which involves the suppression of the senses is also advocated, though in a somewhat different manner, than that proposed in the third prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* (USG III), where the meditation practice called parisamkhyāna meditation (as opposed to the prasamkhyāna technique of the jñānakarmasamuccaya Advaitic sub-school) is recommended.

It is also interesting to consider Śaṅkara's attitude in regard to meditation practices proposed by the Yoga tradition. In several of his commentarial works,

⁹⁴ Hacker (1968); Mayeda (1979).

⁹⁵ The notion that one who becomes "immortal and unchanging" has "no touch" would later be incorporated by Gauḍapāda in his definition of spiritual discipline as "asparśa-yoga", wherein the mind never actually comes into contact with an external object.

showing his respect for the Yoga darśana, Śaṅkara accepts the "greatness of yoga" (yoga-māhātmya). In his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* V.26, he states that the Vedas authorise and encourage acts of inner discipline, upāsana and meditative concentration since they are auxiliary to liberating knowledge (samyagdarśanasyāntar-aṅgam) and that these acts have therapeutic value for overcoming afflictions (kleśa). In spite of the central doctrine of duality inherent in the Yogic system, Śaṅkara points out that the Vedāntic rejection of Yoga is only partial and praises the path of the Yoga-darśana for its practical methods which are useful for spiritual progress.

Śaṅkara himself does not employ the word 'samādhi' very often in his commentarial works. In the *Brahmasiṁrabhāṣya*, he makes only three references to samādhi⁹⁶, being that state of absorption or enstasis, but refuses to accept that samādhi alone can lead to liberation. Commenting on *Brahmasiṁra* II.1.9, he states: "Though there is the natural eradication of difference in deep sleep and in samādhi, etc., because false knowledge has not been removed, difference occurs once again upon waking just like before." Śaṅkara also refers to samādhi in his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* VI.20 and states: "He rejoices in his own self by means of the inner sense purified through samādhi." (samādhipariśuddhena antaḥkaraṇena)—in this particular context, it becomes clear that Śaṅkara considers the state of samādhi and certain disciplined practices to be purifying activities, and therefore *preparatory* to the dawning of liberating knowledge. The *Yoga-Sūtra* of Patañjali which defines yoga as the discipline involving "cessation of movement of the mind" (yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ in I.2) is nevertheless rejected by Śaṅkara, who once again states in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I.4.7, that disciplined practices cannot serve to achieve final liberation (mokṣa-sādhana-tvenānavagamāt). For similar reasons as his rejection of prasaṁkhyāna meditation, Śaṅkara here criticises the practice of methodic repetition (abhyāsa) and mental performance (ceṣṭita), and says that liberation is only possible through jñāna. If the Yogic practice involving cittavṛttinirodha is ultimately rejected by Śaṅkara, is there a method which Śaṅkara proposes in function of the Advaitic scheme of total transformation?

The third prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* deals exclusively with the method of *parisaṃkhyāna* meditation which is recommended "for seekers after final release, who are devoting themselves to destroying their acquired merit and demerit, and do not wish to accumulate new ones." (USG III.112). By focussing uniquely on meditation practice, USG III differs greatly from USG I and USG II in which there is utterly no mention of any meditation or other spiritual practices. The third prakaraṇa (USG III.112-116) of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is very brief, and is structured in the following manner:

- i. Sections 112-114 are introductory in nature, and serve to explain to the mumukṣu that the meditation practice hereby proposed serves to disassociate the possible pure essence from all the contextual conditions in which it is functionally immanent. To this effect, various steps of withdrawal from these associational conditions (upādhi) are proposed to the seeker of liberation. Section 114 ends with the statement that "the wise man should perform "parisaṃkhyāna meditation" (vidvān evaṃ parisaṃcakṣīta)
- ii. Sections 115-116 are written in the first person singular. Of course, this 'I' is equated with ātman who states, for example: "But for me who am endowed with discriminating knowledge, sound cannot produce even a hair's breadth of gain or loss." The second half of section 116 focusses more on smṛti and śruti passages to reinforce *discriminating knowledge* and ends with the somewhat injunctive statement that "all the sentences of the Upaniṣads concerning non-duality of ātman should be contemplated, should be contemplated"

It may be reiterated that the three prose prakaraṇas of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* are each structured in a different manner, having a different goal in mind. Yet, in spite of their differences, the first two prakaraṇas are both written in the form of a dialogue between an enlightened teacher and a pupil seeking release from the beginningless cycle of saṃsāric suffering. The third prose part (USG III), it may be admitted, has certain features which are not totally consistent with 'the Śāṅkara as defined by the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*'. For example, it is difficult to comfortably explain the injunctive

⁹⁶ ad *Brahmasūtra* II.1.9, II.3.39 and II.3.40

tone of the concluding statements of sections 114 and 116, as outlined above. In his admirable study of the structure of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. "*Studien zur Lehre und Entwicklung Śāṅkaras*", Tilmann Vetter scarcely mentions USG III, and perhaps would prefer to make a Śāṅkaran move by simply avoiding what he would rather not comment on. Nonetheless, this absence is notable—is Vetter perhaps unwilling to accept USG III as an authentic work of Śāṅkara? It is indeed the case that the third prose part does seem to reflect better the viewpoint of the Vedāntic sub-school, such as that of Maṇḍana, which emphasises the dual Advaitic path of jñānakarmasamuccaya. On the other hand, Mayeda (1965;1973;1979) does not doubt that USG III is an authentic non-commentarial work of Śāṅkarācārya. Nonetheless, in a 1976 article entitled "Śāṅkara's View of Ethics", he struggles with the "injunction issue" of USG III. Mayeda admits:

"And [Śāṅkara] advises the wise man to perform *parisaṃkhyāna*. It is unquestionable that this is not knowledge but a kind of action. It is certainly an expression of his own view that Śāṅkara insists on a complete renunciation of action and at the same time recommends the aspirant to perform it. How should we understand his self-contradiction? It is not likely that Śāṅkara contradicts himself unknowingly. Probably, he does so purposely. Then, to achieve what purpose does he knowingly sacrifice logical and theoretical consistency?"⁹⁷

Without going into Mayeda's response which attempts to justify Śāṅkara's "self-contradiction", it is interesting to observe that he is not willing to question the authenticity of this particular prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. It may be mentioned here that Potter⁹⁸, in his work "*Advaita Vedānta*" does indeed question the authenticity of certain portions of the *gadya-prabandha* of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, and it would appear that Vetter is in agreement with him.

On the other hand, it is true that when one examines the poetical works (stotra) which are traditionally accepted as authentic works of Śāṅkara, such as the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and the *Ātmabodha*⁹⁹, there is no doubt that there are definite formal and contextual similarities between the stotra-works and the third prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. As the second śloka of the *Aparokṣānubhūti* states:

⁹⁷ Mayeda (1976), p. 198.

⁹⁸ Potter's point of view is evaluated by Malkovsky (2001), p. 395.

⁹⁹ Of course, the Mayeda-Hacker followers would simply question the authenticity of these two stotra-works as well.

"Direct realisation is herein expounded as a means to liberation
It should be studied again and again, with great effort, only by the wise."

In addition, ślokas 24 to 28 of this same stotra suddenly shift to a first person singular: 'I' (equivalent to ātman) form as does USG III: while USG III states in section 116: "...I who am free from old age, death, and fear", *Aparokṣānubhūti* 28 claims: "I am stainless, without motion, without end, pure and devoid of old age and death.", whereas *Ātmabodha* 32, for its part, states that "birth, old age, decay, death and so on, are not for me, because I am other than the body. Sound and other objects of the senses have no connection with me, for I am other than the senses." Even though USG III is written in the gadya-form and the two works mentioned here are written in śloka-form, it is quite remarkable how greatly USG III resembles both the *Aparokṣānubhūti* and the *Ātmabodha*. The stotras are somewhat injunctive in nature, and the sections in "aham-form" most probably are meant to be memorised, and repeated over and over again...

The concept of *parisaṃkhyāna meditation* which is postulated in the third prose part of the *Upadeśasāhasrī*. As stated above, USG III.112 proposes this parisaṃkhyāna technique of meditation as an aid to destroying acquired merit and demerit (puṇyāpuṇya) and to eliminate accumulated *karmans* due to (nescient) activities of speech, mind and body. In other words, USG III proposes the parisaṃkhyāna technique in order to halt "prārabdha-karman" which has already begun to produce effects. As we know from USG III.115, this meditation technique is to be practiced by one who is *already endowed* with discriminating knowledge (mama vivekinaḥ), thus it is clear that even though the vidvat-saṃnyāsin may well be firmly established on the path to liberation, the effects of the actions of speech, body and mind (i.e., past karmic results) continue to operate until their momentum has been exhausted. This is the illness called the "Cognition of Two-Moon" disease which Śaṅkara mentions in his commentary on *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.15: "even though one *realises* there are no two moons, still for some time one *continues* to see two moons". Furthermore, he comments on prārabhdakarman ad *Bhagavadgītā* XIII.23 in the following manner:

"[They] are like discharged arrows; they have already started their operations. As an arrow shot at the target will keep moving even after hitting the target until its momentum is exhausted, so also though the purpose of the body has been accomplished, still the actions that have originated the present body will keep operating until the object of embodiment is realised, and their momentum is exhausted."

This notion of prārabdhakarman was already recognised in the Sāṃkhya darśana much before the time of Śaṅkara, since kārika LXVII of the *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (mid-fifth century CE) states:

"By the attainment of perfect knowledge, virtue and the rest become causeless, yet soul remains a while invested with body, as the potter's wheel continues whirling from the effect of the impulse previously given to it."

samyajjñānādhigamāddharmādīnāmākāraṇaprāptau |
tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāccakramramavaddhṛtaśarīraḥ ||

This paraśaṃkhyāna meditation technique which Śaṅkara proposed in USG III, permits the elimination of impurity in the form of residual karmic effects, and secondly, is a philosophical transformation which converts the knowledge of the non-difference of ātman and brahman into more vivid knowledge. In other words, the paraśaṃkhyāna method to cure the vidvat-saṃnyāsin from "dvacandrajñānaroga" is the contemplation on discrimination between self and non-self (ātma-anātma-viveka), coupled with the realisation of word conveyed by the Upaniṣadic mahāvākyas. In his commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* III.3, Śaṅkara states that this two-fold method is indeed the path of jñāna-yoga. In view of its importance for our argument, the quotation is given in full:

"Knowledge of the self itself is the discipline meant here. This has been promulgated for the followers of Sāṃkhya who have discriminating knowledge between self and non-self. From the stage of celibacy itself, they have embraced the life of renunciation. Through their mastery of Vedānta they have acquired an unshakeable grip over the principles of that śāstra. They are the renouncers of the paramahansa order who have established themselves in the ultimate reality."

tatra jñānayogena jñānam eva yogaḥ tena sāṃkhyānām ātmānātmaviśayavivekavijñānavatām
brahmacaryāśramāt eva kṛtasamnyāsānām vedāntavijñānasuniścītārthānām paramahansa-
parivrājakānām brahmaṇi eva avasthitānām niṣṭhā proktā

This commentary on *Bhagavadgītā* III.3 states that discriminating knowledge, combined with the knowledge of the śrutis (vedāntavijñāna) are considered to be the

basis of knowledge (jñāna). Discriminating knowledge (ātmānātmaviśayaviveka), for Śāṅkara, is a withdrawal from the particular (viśeṣa¹⁰⁰) towards identification with the general (sāmānya), leading to contemplation of self as pure consciousness. This method of *progression* (or *regression*, depending on the standpoint) which Śāṅkara refers to, finds its sources in the Upaniṣadic texts, as for example, Sanatkumāra's instruction to Nārada on progressive worship of brahman (*Chāndogyopaniṣad* VII.1-26). In addition, this method follows to a great extent the kind of discrimination between self and non-self which was originally associated with the Sāṃkhya tradition, not to mention the early Buddhist schools which practised discriminating meditation techniques based on "not this" and "this is not mine".

The method of progressive discrimination is clearly outlined by Śāṅkara in a portion of his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II.4.11, which forms part of the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dialogue 'As the ocean is the one goal of all waters' (sa yathā sarvāsām apām samudra ekāyanam...). He comments on this Upaniṣadic passage in the following manner:

"...'*as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch*'...by the word 'skin', touch in general that is perceived by the skin is meant...similarly, that touch in general...is merged in the deliberation of the mind (manas). The consideration by the manas also is merged in a general cognition by the intellect (buddhi)...becoming mere consciousness, it is merged in pure intelligence, the supreme brahman..there are no more limiting adjuncts (upādhi), only brahman..."

In USG III.16, a very similar method of progressive discrimination is outlined,

"...Whatever sound and the other external [object of the senses] may be, they are changed into the form of the body, and into the form of the ear and the other [senses] which perceive them, and into the form of the two internal organs (*antaḥkaraṇa*: *presumably, manas and buddhi*) and their objects (tadviśaya)...I am not its object according to the smṛti passage "Unmanifest he, unthinkable he [unchangeable he is declared to be]" (*BhG* II.25)"

Let us now compare the different stages of progressive movement from the "particular to the general" in both this portion of Śāṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II.4.11, as well as the method of progression which is proposed by USG III.116:

¹⁰⁰ The particular is considered to be merely accidental or adventitious (āgantuka) in nature, and is but a

Saṅkara's commentary on <i>Bṛhadāraṇyakoṇiṣad</i> II.4.1	USG III.116
touch as the external object of sense	sound as the external object of sense
merges into the form of the skin	merges into the form of the ear
merges in the deliberation of manas; merges in cognition by the buddhi	merges into the form of the antaḥkaraṇadvaya: (presumably manas and buddhi) and their objects of senses (viṣaya)
becoming mere consciousness...	
which is pure intelligence (= brahman)	which is the "unmanifest, unthinkable and unchangeable" (BhG II.25) (= brahman)

From the above diagramme, it is obvious that the method of gradual withdrawal from the particular (viśeṣa) to the general (sāmānya) is a method of contemplation common to both texts. There are some minor differences, in that the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī commentarial passage moves progressively through the two functions (manas and buddhi) of the antaḥkaraṇa, while USG III.116 does not. The meditation process involved is first of all, a recognition of each category, beginning with the most external, and then its rejection as being adventitious in nature, until the seeker's own self is arrived at. The seeker's self, by "merging into pure intelligence" is considered to have no constituents (agaṇa), and is free from all characteristics of the transmigratory world (sarvasaṃsārādharmavinirmukta).

In the Advaitic scheme, this particular method of discriminating knowledge which progresses systematically through the senses, the sense-objects, manas, buddhi and so on¹⁰¹ is that which serves to negate identification with the limiting adjuncts (upādhi) of the individual seeker of liberation by means of the "successive seeing of subtlety" (sūkṣmatāpāramparya-darśanena). This process of "successive seeing" negates the limiting adjunct merely through the knowledge that it is an object—and since it is but an object, cannot be identical with the "perceiver".

changing phenomenon of the various states of consciousness.

¹⁰¹ ad *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.2, Śaṅkara lists the false notion of 'I' (ahaṃ-pratyaya) as that "which is characterised by body, sensory organs, mind, intellect, object of senses, sensations and so on: (dehendriyamanobuddhiviśayaavedanādīlakṣaṇaḥ)

The *parisaṃkhyāna* meditation is also in accordance with Śaṅkara's view that no additional effort be expended or repetition be made for the gradual removal of the limiting adjuncts. And has already been stated, liberation (*mokṣa*) is only possible through *jñāna*, and cannot be achieved by any means or ends which involve effort or the suppression of mental activity (*cittavṛttinirodha*). Śaṅkara's approach is that *ātman-brahman* is not some end to be acquired since it one's own nature in the first place. His method is one of negation in order to "reveal the ever revealed".

This method of progressive dis-identification with the *upādhis* (*ātmānatma-viveka*) does have its dangers since this progressive movement detaches one from body-identification on its way to ultimate realisation of pure consciousness (*caitanya*). But when the external world as well as cognitive processes of sensation and intellect are sublated, is there not a danger that one is left with *sūnyatā*, the conclusion arrived at by the *Madhyamaka* school of Buddhism? Of course, Śaṅkara responds to this in a number of ways, one being the use of logical argument, as is the method employed in his commentary on *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* of Gaudapāda. But in the case of USG III, Śaṅkara relies rather on *śabdapramāṇa*, and the *Advaitic interpretation* of scriptural tracts of the tradition to avoid the danger that discriminating knowledge may lead to mere emptiness. Accordingly, this "successive seeing of subtlety" must be coupled with a realisation of the nature of the self in the Advaitic tradition, supported by scriptural testimony which identifies *ātman* with *brahman*. The realisation of the nature of *ātman/brahman* supported by scriptural testimony is arguably the final conclusion Śaṅkara reaches at the end of USG III:

"As duality does not exist, all the sentences of the Upaniṣads concerning non-duality of *ātman* should be fully contemplated."

ātmanaśca advayatvaviṣayāṇi dvayasyāsattvāt yāni sarvāṇi upaniṣadvākyaṇi vistaraśaḥ samīkṣitavyāṇi (USG III.116).

Sinha (1978) point out that in the Advaita philosophy of language, the actual words of scriptural texts are accepted as having a deeper suggestive function rather than just serving to describe a fact or an objective situation: "In the Vedāntic context, words (*śabda*) have an autonomous function of their own...and in the context of

cognitive reflection, terms symbolically convey the ideal possibility of perfected intuition. Accordingly, the issue of knowledge through verbal testimony takes on a very special role in the Vedāntic scheme."¹⁰² It may be argued that in Śaṅkara's teaching of total transformation, this knowledge through verbal testimony is indistinguishable from mystical experience (anubhava)—and the method consists of *directly experiencing* (anubhavitum) the primary and essential meaning (mukhyārtha) of words (śabda) like "those in whose mind the sense of the words is not obstructed by ignorance, doubt, and misconception, and [who are] able to intuit the sense of the sentence 'thou art that' on its first enunciation." (ad *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.2). The second part of this statement—"those who are able to intuit the sense of the sentence 'tattvamasi' on its first enunciation" (te śaknuvanti sakṛduktameva tattvamasivākyārthamanubhavitumiti) implies the spiritual level of vidvat-saṃnyāsa, that which is "not characterised by ignorance, doubt and misconception" (nājnānasamśayaviparyayalakṣaṇaḥ), by those who are able to directly experience (anubhavitum) the primary meaning of the key teachings of the Upaniṣadic texts. And as Śaṅkara himself states, the understanding of brahman (brahmāvagati) is achieved through thinking about and clarifying the meaning of the word (vākyārthavicāraṇādhyavasāna). For the vividiṣā-saṃnyāsin, on the other hand, Śaṅkara suggests this method of parisamkhyāna meditation:

"And although the self does not consist of parts, yet men wrongly superimpose upon it the attribute of being made up of many parts, such as the body, the senses, the manas, the buddhi, the objects of the senses, the sensations, and so on. Now by one act of attention we may discard one of these parts, and by another act of attention another part; so that a successively progressing cognition may very well take place. This however is merely an antecedent to the knowledge of the self [in which there can be no successive stages]." (ad *Brahmasūtra* IV.1.2).

To counteract the tendency toward action, Śaṅkara also recommends a steady recollection of self-knowledge (ātma-vijñāna-smṛti-saṃtati) in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* I.4.7, being equivalent to sustained attention to previously attained right knowledge. This is perhaps what Ramachandran (1969) is referring to, when he speaks of *meditation on nirguṇa-brahman*, defined as the constant contemplation of the truth of which one has been intellectually convinced that the self

¹⁰² Sinha (1978), p. 35.

is non-different from brahman.¹⁰³ The "steady recollection of ātma-vijñāna", or meditation on nirguṇa-brahman, may indeed be the point of junction between jñāna-yoga and bhakti-yoga. It may be pointed out that for Śaṅkara, there is no contradiction between bhakti and jñāna, as there is between karma and jñāna. In his commentary on *Bhagavad-gītā* XII.20, Śaṅkara speaks of bhakti as that which is characterised by highest knowledge (paramārthajñānalakṣaṇam bhaktim).

Abiding in the non-dual state, with the steady recollection of such upaniṣadvākyas as those which conclude the *Pañcikaraṇa*¹⁰⁴, the vividiṣā-saṃnyāsin recites:

*tat tvam asi brahma aham asmi
prajñānam ānandaṃ brahma ayam ātmā brahma
ityādi vākyebhyaḥ ||*

¹⁰³ Ramachandran (1969), p. 41.

¹⁰⁴ The *Pañcikaraṇa* is a short prakaraṇa text which is attributed to Śaṅkara.

Conclusion:

Having looked at the three prose parts of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* employing the therapeutic model proposed by Vetter which proves to be a constructive framework for analysis of Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, and may well be useful for the study of any number of other Indian traditions, it is now interesting to look at the three prakaraṇas according to the traditional belief that this work represents a gradual path toward liberation based on the three-fold discipline of śravaṇa (*hearing*; that is, reliance on a teacher and scriptural tracts of the tradition); manana (*thinking about*; the role of pure logical argument—tarkataḥ); and thirdly, nididhyāsana (*contemplation* or meditation practices).

Hacker's initial opinion (1949) that the gadya-prabandha of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* is a single unified text written in order to teach the three-fold discipline was also upheld at an even earlier date than Hacker's by Dasgupta (1922)¹⁰⁵, who wrote that the pupil following the Advaitic method "should try to understand correctly the true purport of the Upaniṣads (śravaṇa), and by arguments in favour of the purport of the Upaniṣads, to strengthen his conviction as stated in the Upaniṣads (manana), and then by nididhyāsana (meditation), which includes all the Yoga processes of concentration, try to realise the truth as one." It is clear from this passage that many traditional scholars of the earlier generations did in fact accept that the three-fold discipline was the main structuring element in this work and generally, an important consideration in Śaṅkara's Advaita Vedānta.

As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the three-fold discipline is an interpretation of a central śruti passage (*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* II.4.5), in which the sage Yājñavalkya teaches Maitreyī about the nature of ātman: "Indeed, my dear, by seeing, by hearing, by reflection, by understanding, the self is to be known as all this."

ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ maitreyi
ātmano vā are darśanena śravaṇena matyā vijñānenedaṃ sarvaṃ viditam

¹⁰⁵ Dasgupta, Surendranath (1922), *The History of Indian Philosophy* referred to by Suthren Hirst (1996), p. 59.

A first point to be made is that the three-fold discipline of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana is indeed *an interpretation* of the scriptures, since it is quite clear that in this particular passage, the sequence is composed of *four* parallel words—not three: draṣṭavyaḥ and darśanena; śrotavya and śravaṇena; mantavyaḥ and matyā, and finally, nididhyāsitavyaḥ and vijñānena.

It is probable that already during the lifetime of Śaṅkara, the concept of the three-fold discipline was firmly rooted in the soteriological projects of the various traditions, since Śaṅkara comments on this passage by first instinctively separating "ought to be seen" from the other three "ought to's"—he glosses the text fragment "ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ" as: "*darśanārtho darśanaviṣayaṃ āpādayitavyaḥ*" (...is worthy (arha) of realisation, ought to be brought forward as the object of realisation), and then introduces the combined śrotavya-mantavya-nididhyāsitavya series. He concludes the commentary on *Brh.Up.* II.4.5 by stating that "true realisation concerning the oneness of brahman is established when these [three] form a unity, not otherwise, by hearing [scripture] alone." (*samyagdarśanam brahmaikatva-viṣayaṃ prasīdati nānyathā śravaṇamātreṇa*).

Śaṅkara is here literally stating that it is samyagdarśana which "ought to be seen" (draṣṭavya), and any sequential practical method is simply left behind once this is realised. Furthermore, Śaṅkara states that "draṣṭavya, śrotavya, mantavya and nididhyāsitavya" are not injunctive forms, since after realising samyagdarśana "there is nothing left to be done, either mentally or outwardly...an injunction is relevant where after hearing it, an additional activity on one's part is required as in such sentences as 'one who desires heaven must perform the new and full moon sacrifices, etc.'"

A predecessor of Śaṅkara, called Bhartṛprapañca suggested that sections II.4 and II.5 of the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* could be split up into three segments: śravaṇa would be represented by II.4.1-6 (conversation of Yājñavalkya and Maitreyī); manana represented by II.4.7-14 (drum, conch, lute, etc. metaphors); and nididhyāsana by II.5.1-19 (madhu-vidyā).¹⁰⁶ In this manner, Bhartṛprapañca proposed three entities which should be enjoined separately. This separation into discrete and disjoint entities

was very objectionable to Śāṅkara, since for him: "...that which is to reflected on (mantavyam) must be in accordance with what is laid down in the śrutis; and nididhyāsana should be performed as manana is...being determined by both reasoning and scriptural tradition. Therefore a separate injunction for nididhyāsana is pointless."

The division of the three-fold discipline to attain liberation into separate entities was also opposed by Maṇḍanamiśra. In his *Brahmasiddhi* I.13, Maṇḍana presents an imaginary opponent who criticised Bhartṛprapañca's argument by stating that śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana would therefore be based on *difference*, which contradicts the fundamental position of absolute non-duality of the Advaitic enterprise, and is therefore unreal—and since this three-fold means of knowledge is unreal, no real result (i.e. mokṣa) can be attained.

Suthren Hirst (1996) agrees with Halbfass (1992) that the triple scheme of śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana does not play a very significant part in Śāṅkara's Advaita Vedānta, and that it is rather the *duo of scripture and reasoning* which is of fundamental importance. In his introduction to the commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad* III.1, Śāṅkara mentions only *śrotavya* and *mantavya*, therefore supporting the fact that it is "...scripture and reason acting together, which serve to illuminate the oneness of the self, like a *bael* fruit on the palm of one's hand"¹⁰⁷

This journey through the gadya-prabandha of the *Upadeśasāhasrī* of Śāṅkarācārya is hereby concluded with the metaphor of the "*bael* fruit on the palm of one's hand", which illustrates how intimately linked *śabdapramāṇa* is to *interpretion*. I would like to leave the last word to J.N. Mohanty (1992), who is graced with this capacity of the "successive seeing of subtlety", beginning with the mātṛā, and up to the understanding of śabda in its significative, symbolic and intentional functions. He states¹⁰⁸:

¹⁰⁶ Referred to by Halbfass (1992), p. 162.

¹⁰⁷ āgamopapatti hy ātmaikatvaparakāśanāya pravṛtte śaknutaḥ karatalagatabilvamiva darśayitum śrotavyo mantavya iti hy uktam

¹⁰⁸ Mohanty (1992), p. 258; p. 277.

"An experience is interpreted, transformed into a thought, brought under a conceptual framework, to be put in words. Returning to the eminent texts of the śruti, I would like to say that those words *qua* words are available to the community, to members of the tradition, in terms of which experiences of its members are being interpreted, talked about, and understood. As made available by the śruti, they have defined, demarcated, constituted the horizon within which this tradition has understood itself.

I doubt if we can find anything but the text—the words of apauruṣeya śruti—*anything but texts behind texts*."

tasya tāvad eva ciraṃ yāvan na vimokṣye atha sampatsya iti *ChU* VI.14.2

"I shall remain here only so long as I shall not be released." *ChU* VI.14.2

Appendix: Upadeśasāhasrī-gadyaprabandha

The following transcription of the Upadeśasāhasrī (three prose prakaraṇas) from:

Swāmi Jagadānanda (1970), *A Thousand Teachings* (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math Press).

atha mokṣasāadhanopadeśavidhiṃ vyākhyāsyāmo mumukṣūṇāṃ

śraddadhānānāmarthināmarthāya || 1 ||

tadidaṃ mokṣasāadhanam jñānam sādhanasādhyādanityātsarvasmādviraktāya

tyaktaputravittalokaīṣaṇāya pratipannaparamahaṃ sapārivrājyāya

śamadamadayādiyuktāya śāstraprasiddhaśiṣyaguṇasampannāya śucaye brāhmaṇāya

vidhivadupasannāya śiṣyāya jātikarmavṛttavidyābhijanaīḥ parīkṣitāya brūyāt punaḥ

punaḥ yāvadgrahaṇam dṛḍhībhavati || 2 ||

śrutiśca parīkṣya lokān tattvato brahmavidyām iti | dṛḍhagrhitā hi vidyā ātmanaḥ śreyase

santatyai ca bhavati | vidyāsantatiśca prāṇyanugrahāya bhavati nauriva nadīm titīrṣoḥ |

śāstram ca yadyapyasmā imāmabhiḥ parigrhitām dhanasya pūrṇam dadyāt etadeva tato

bhūyaḥ iti | anyathā ca jñānaprāptyabhāvāt ācāryavān puruṣo veda ācāryāddhyeva vidyā

viditā ācāryaḥ plāvayitā samyagjñānam plava ihocyate ityādiśrutibhyaḥ upadekṣyanti te

jñānam ityādismṛteśca || 3 ||

śiṣyasya jñānāgrahaṇam ca liṅgairbuddhvā agrahaṇe hetūn adharmalaukika pramāda

nityānityavivekaviṣayāsamjātadṛḍhapūrvaśrutatvalokacintāvekṣaṇa jātyādyabhimānādīn

tatpratipakṣaiḥ śrutismṛtivilaitaiḥ apanayeta akrodhādibhirahiṃsādibhiśca yamaiḥ

jñānāviruddhaiśca niyamaiḥ || 4 ||

amānitvādiguṇam ca jñānopāyam samyak grāhayet || 5 ||

ācāryastūhāpohagrahaṇadhāraṇaśamadamadayānugrahādisampanno labdhāgamo

dṛṣṭādrṣṭabhogeṣvanāśaktaḥ tyaktasarvakarmasādhano brahmavit brahmaṇi

sthito 'bhinnavṛttodambhadarpakuhakaśāṭhyamāyāmātsaryānṛtāhaṅkāramamatvādidōṣa
varjitaḥ kevalaparānugrahaprayojano vidyopayogārthī pūrvamupadiśet sadeva
somyedamagra āsīdekamevādvitīyam yatra nānyatpaśyati ātmaivedaṃ sarvaṃ ātmā vā
idameka evāgra āsīt sarvaṃ khalvidaṃ brahma ityādyāḥ ātmaikyapratipādanaparā
śrutīḥ || 6 ||

upadiśya ca grāhayet brahmaṇo lakṣaṇam ya ātmā 'pahatapāpmā
yatsākṣādaparokṣādbrahma yo 'śanāyā-pipāse neti neti asthūlamanaṇu sa eṣa neti
adr̥ṣṭaṃ draṣṭṛ vijñānamānandam satyaṃ jñānamanantam adr̥śyo 'nātmeye sa vā eṣa
mahānaja ātmā aprāṇo hyamanāḥ sabāhyābhyantaro hyajaḥ vijñānaghana eva
anantaramabāhyam anyadeva tadviditādatho aviditāt ākāśo vai nāma
ityādiśrutibhiḥ || 7 ||

smṛtibhiḥca na jāyate mriyate vā nādatte kasyacitpāpam yathākāśasthito nityam
kṣetrajñaṃ cāpi mām viddhi na sattannāsaducyate anāditvānnirguṇatvāt samaṃ sarveṣu
bhūteṣu uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ ityādibhiḥ śrutyuktalakṣaṇāviruddhābhiḥ
paramātmāsaṃsāritvapratipādanaparābhiḥ tasya sarveṇānanyatvapratipādana-
parābhiḥca || 8 ||

evaṃ śrutismṛtibhiḥ gr̥hītaparamātmalakṣaṇaṃ śiṣyaṃ saṃsārasāgarāduttitīrṣu pr̥cchet
kastvamasi somyeti || 9 ||

sa yadi brūyāt brāhmaṇaputraḥ adonvayaḥ brahmacāryāsam gr̥hastho vā idānīmasmi
paramahaṃsaparivrād saṃsārasāgarāt janmamṛtyumahāgrāhāt uttitīrṣuriti || 10 ||

ācāryo brūyāt ihaiva tava somya mṛtasya śarīraṃ vayobhiradyate mṛdbhāvaṃ vāpadyate
tatra kathaṃ saṃsārādudhartumicchasīti | nahi nadyāḥ avare kūle bhasmībhūte nadyāḥ
pāraṃ tariṣyasīti || 11 ||

sa yadi brūyāt anyo'ham śarīrāt | śarīraṃ tu jāyate mriyate vayobhiradyate
śākhāgnyādibhiḥca vināśyate vyādhyādibhiḥca prayujyate | tasmin ahaṃ

svakṛtadharmādharmavaśāt pakṣī nīḍamiva praviṣṭaḥ punaḥ punaḥ śārīravinaśe
dharmādharmavaśāt śārīrāntaraṃ yāsyāmi pūrvanīḍavināśe pakṣīva nīḍāntaraṃ |
evamevāhamanāḍau saṃsāre devamanuṣyatiryañnirayasthāneṣu
svakarmavaśādupāttamupātta sarīraṃ tyajan navaṃ navaṃ ca anyadupādadaṇo
janmamaraṇaprabandhacakre ghaṭīyantravat svakarmanā bhrāmyamāṇaḥ krameṇedaṃ
śārīramāsāḍya saṃsāracakraabhramaṇāt asmānnirviṇṇo bhagavantamupasanno'smi
saṃsāracakraabhramaṇapraśamāya | tasmānnitya evāhaṃ śārīrādanyaḥ | śārīrāṇi
āgacchantyapagacchanti ca vāsāmsīva puruṣasyeti || 12 ||

ācāryo brūyāt sādhvavādīḥ samyakpaśyasi | kathaṃ mṛṣā'vādīḥ
brāhmaṇaputro'donvayo brahmacāryāsam gṛhastho vā idānīmasmi
paramahaṃsaparivrāḍiti || 13 ||

taṃ prati brūyādācāryaḥ sa yadi brūyāt bhagavan kathamahaṃ mṛṣā'vādīsamiti || 14 ||

yatastvam bhinnajātyanvayasamskāraṃ śārīraṃ jātyanvayavarjitasyātmanah
pratyabhyajñāsīḥ brāhmaṇaputro'donvaya ityādinā vākyeneti || 15 ||

sa yadi pṛcchet kathaṃ bhinnajātyanvayasamskāraṃ śārīraṃ kathaṃ vā ahaṃ
jātyanvayasamskāravarjita iti || 16 ||

ācāryo brūyāt śṛṇu somya yathedaṃ śārīraṃ tvatto bhinnam
bhinnajātyanvayasamskāraṃ tvam ca jātyanvayasamskāravarjitaḥ ityuktvā taṃ
smārayet smartumarhasi somya paramātmānaṃ sarvātmānaṃ yathoktalakṣaṇaṃ
śrāvito'si sadeva somyedaṃ ityādibhiḥ śrūtibhiḥ smṛtibhiḥca | lakṣaṇaṃ ca tasya
śrūtibhiḥ smṛtibhiḥca || 17 ||

labdhaparamātmalakṣaṇasmṛtaye brūyāt yo'sāvākāśanāma
nāmarūpābhyāmarthāntarabhūtaḥ āsarīraḥ asthūlādilakṣaṇaḥ apahatapāpmādilakṣaṇaśca
sarvaiḥ saṃsāradharmaīḥ anāgandhitāḥ yatsākṣādaparokṣādbrahma ya ātmā sarvāntaraḥ
adrṣṭo draṣṭā aśrutaḥ śrotā amato mantā avijñāto vijñātā nityavijñānasvarūpaḥ anantaraḥ

abāhyaḥ vijñānaghana eva paripūrṇaḥ ākāśavat anantaśaktiḥ ātmā sarvasya
aśanāyādivarjitaḥ āvirbhāvatirobhāvavarjitaśca svātmavilakṣaṇayoḥ nāmarūpayoḥ
jagadbijabhūtayōḥ svātmasthayōḥ tattvānyatvābhyāmanirvacanīyayōḥ
svayaṃvedyayōḥ sadbhāvamātreṇācintyaśaktitvād vyākartā avyākṛtayōḥ ॥ 18 ॥

te nāmarūpe avyākṛte satī vyākriyamāṇe tasmādetasmādātmana ākāśanāmākṛtī saṃvṛtte
| taccākāśākhyam bhūtamanena prakāreṇa paramātmanah sambhūtam prasannādiva
salilānmalamiva phenam | na salilam na ca salilādatyantabhinnaṃ phenam |
salilavyatirekeṇādarśanāt | salilam tu svacchaṃ anyat phenānmalarūpāt | evaṃ
paramātmā nāmarūpābhyāmanyah phenasthānīyābhyām śuddhaḥ prasannaḥ
tadvilakṣaṇaḥ | te nāmarūpe avyākṛte satī vyākriyamāṇe phenasthāniye ākāśanāmākṛtī
saṃvṛtte ॥ 19 ॥

tato'pi sthūlabhāvamāpadyamāṇe nāmarūpe vyākriyamāṇe vāyubhāvamāpadyete
tato'pyagnibhāvam agnerabbhāvam tataḥ pṛthvībhāvam ityevamkrameṇa
pūrvapūrvānupraveśena pañcamahābhūtāni pṛthivyantānyutpannāni | tataḥ
pañcamahābhūtaguṇaviśiṣṭā pṛthvī | pṛthvyaśca pañcātmikyo vrīhiyavādyā ośadhayo
jāyante | tābhyo bhakṣitābhyo lohitaṃ ca śukraṃ ca strīpuṃsaśarīrasaṃbandhi jāyate |
tadubhayamṛtukāle avidyāprayuktakāmakhajanirmathanoddhṛtaṃ mantrasaṃskṛtaṃ
garbhāśaye niṣicyate | tatsvayonirasānupraveśena vivardhamānaṃ garbhībhūtaṃ
navame daśame vā māsi
sañjāyate ॥ 20 ॥

tajjātaṃ labdhanāmākṛtikaṃ jātakarmādibhiḥ mantrasaṃskṛtaṃ punaḥ
upanayanasamskārayogena brahmacārisamjñam bhavati | tadeva śarīraṃ
patnīyogasamskārayogena gr̥hasthasamjñam bhavati | tadeva vanasthasamskāreṇa
tāpasasamjñam bhavati | tadeva kriyāvinivṛttinimittasamskāreṇa parivrāṭsamjñam
bhavati | ityevam tvatto bhinnaṃ bhinnajātyanvayasamskāraṃ śarīram ॥ 21 ॥

manaścendriyāṇi ca nāmarūpātmakānyena annamayam hi somya manah
ityādiśrutibhyaḥ ॥ 22 ॥

katham cāhaṃ bhinnajātyanvayasamṣkāravārjita ityetacchṛṇu | yo'sau
nāmarūpayorvyākartā nāmarūpadharmavilakṣaṇaḥ sa eva nāmarūpe vyākurvan
sr̥ṣṭvedaṃ śārīraṃ svayaṃ saṃskāradharmavarjito nāmarūpe iha praviṣṭaḥ anyairadr̥ṣṭaḥ
svayaṃ paśyan tathā'śrutāḥ śṛṇvan amato manvāno avijñāto vijānan sarvāṇi rūpāṇi
vicitya dhīro nāmāni kṛtvā'bhivadan yadāste iti | asminnartho śrutayaḥ sahasraśaḥ
tatsr̥ṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśat antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sa eṣa iha praviṣṭaḥ eṣa ta ātmā
sa etameva sīmānaṃ vidāryaitayā dvārā prāpadyata eṣa sarveṣu bhūteṣu gūḍhotmā
seyaṃ devataikṣata hantāhamimāstisro devatāḥ ityādyāḥ || 23 ||

smṛtayo'pi ātmaiva devatāḥ sarvāḥ navadvāre pure dehī kṣetrajñāṃ cāpi mām viddhi
samaḥ sarveṣu bhūteṣu upadraṣṭānumantā ca uttamaḥ puruṣastvanyaḥ aśārīraṃ śārīreṣu
ityādyāḥ | tasmāt jātyanvayasamṣkāravārjitastvamiti siddham || 24 ||

sa yadi brūyāt anya evāhamajñāḥ sukhī duḥkhī baddhaḥ saṃsārī anyo'sau
madvilakṣaṇaḥ asaṃsārī devaḥ tamahaṃ balyupahāranamaskārādibhiḥ
varṇāśramakarmabhiścārādhyā saṃsārasāgarāduttitīrṣurasmi kathamahaṃ
sa eveti || 25 ||

ācāryo brūyāt naivam somya pratipattumarhasi pratiṣiddhatvādbhedapratipatteḥ |
katham pratiṣiddhā bhedapratipattirityata āha anyo'sāvanyo'hamasmīti na sa veda
brahma tam parādādyo'nyatrātmano brahma veda mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti ya iha
nāneva paśyati ityevamādyāḥ || 26 ||

etā eva śrutayo bhedapratipatteḥ saṃsāragamanam darśayanti || 27 ||

abhedapratipatteṣca mokṣaṃ darśayanti sahasraśaḥ sa ātmā tattvamasi iti
paramātmabhāvaṃ vidhāya ācāryavān puruṣo veda ityuktvā tasya tāvadeva ciraṃ iti
mokṣaṃ darśayantyabhedavijñānādeva | satyābhisandhasya ataskarasyeva
dāhādyabhāvavat saṃsārābhāvaṃ darśayanti dr̥ṣṭāntena
bhedadarśanādasatyābhisandhasya saṃsāragamanam darśayanti taskarasyeva
dāhādidr̥ṣṭāntena || 28 ||

ta iha vyāghro vā ityādinā ca abhedadarśanāt sa svarād bhavati ityuktvā tadviparītena
bhedadarśanena saṃsāragamanam darśayanti atha ye'nyathā'to vidūranyarājānaste
kṣayyalokā bhavanti iti pratiśākhāḥ | tasmāt mṛṣaivaivamavādīḥ
brāhmaṇaputro'donvayaḥ saṃsārī paramātmavilakṣaṇa iti || 29 ||

tasmāt pratiśiddhatvādbhedadarśanasya bhedaviṣayatvācca karmopādānasya
karmasāadhanatvācca yajñopavītādeḥ karmasāadhanopādānasya
paramātmābhedapratipattiyā pratiśedhaḥ kṛto veditavyaḥ | karmaṇām tatsāadhanānām ca
yajñopavītādīnām paramātmābhedapratipattiviruddhatvāt | saṃsāriṇo hi karmāṇi
vidhīyante tatsāadhanāni ca yajñopavītādīni na paramātmano'bhedadarśinaḥ |
bhedadarśanamātreṇa ca tato'nyatvam || 30 ||

yadi karmāṇi kartavyāni na nivartayīṣitāni karmasāadhanāsambandhinaḥ
karmanimittajātyāśramādyasambandhinaśca paramātmanaśca
ātmanaivābhedapratipattiṃ nāvakṣyat sa ātmā tattvamasi
ityevamādibhirniścitarūpairvākyaiḥ bhedapratipattinindām ca nābhyadhāsyat eṣa nityo
mahimā brāhmaṇasya ananvāgataṃ puṇyenānanvāgataṃ pāpena atra steno'stenaḥ
ityādinā || 31 ||

karmāsambandhisvarūpatvaṃ karmanimittavarṇādyasambandharūpatām ca
nābhyadhyāsyat karmāṇi ca karmasāadhanāni ca yajñopavītādīni yadyaparitityājayaīṣitāni
| tasmāt sasādhanaṃ karma parityaktavyaṃ mumukṣuṇā
paramātmā'bhedadarśanavirodhāt ātmā ca para eveti pratipattavyo
yathāśrutyuktalakṣaṇaḥ || 32 ||

sa yadi brūyāt bhagavan dahyamāne chidyamāne vā dehe pratyakṣā vedanā
aśanāyādinimittam ca pratyakṣam duḥkham mama | paraścāyamātmā
ayamātmā'pahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyurviśoko vijighatso'pipāsaḥ
sarvagandharasavarjitah iti śrūyate sarvaśrutiṣu smṛtiṣu ca | katham tadvilakṣaṇaḥ
anekasaṃsāradharmasaṃyuktaḥ paramātmānamātmatvena ca mām saṃsāriṇam
paramātmatvena agnimiva śītatvena pratipadyeyam saṃsārī ca san

sarvābhyudayaniḥśreyasasādhane adhikṛtaḥ abhyudayaniḥśreyasasādhanāni karmāṇi
tatsādhanāni ca yajñopavītādīni katham parityajeyamiti || 33 ||

taṃ prati brūyāt yadavoco dahyamāne chidyamāne vā dehe pratyakṣā vedanopalabhyate
mameti tadasat | kasmāt dahyamāne chidyamāne iva vṛkse upalabdhurupalabhyamāne
karmaṇi śarīre dāhacchedavedanāyā upalabhyamānatvāt dāhādisamānāśrayaiva vedanā |
yatra hi dāhaḥ chedo vā kriyate tatraiva vyapadiśati dāhādivedanām lokah na vedanām
dāhādyupalabdharīti | katham kva te vedaneti pṛṣṭaḥ śirasi me vedanā urasi udare iti vā
yatra dāhādistatraiva vyapadiśati na tūpalabdharīti | yadyupalabdhari vedanā syāt
vedanānimittam vā dāhacchedādi vedanāśrayatvenopadiśeddāhādyāśrayavat || 34 ||

svayaṃ ca nopalabhyeta cakṣurgatarūpavat | tasmāt dāhacchedādisamānāśrayatvena
upalabhyamānatvāddāhādivat karmabhūtaiva vedanā | bhāvarūpatvācca sāśrayā
taṇḍulapākavat | vedanāsamānāśraya eva tatsaṃskāraḥ | smṛtisamānakāla
evopalabhyamānatvāt vedanāviśayaḥ | tannimittaviśayaśca dveṣo'pi
saṃskārasamānāśraya eva | tathā cuktam rūpasamskāratulyā''dhī rāgadveṣau bhayaṃ ca
yat | gṛhyate dhīśrayaṃ tasmājjñātā śuddho'bhayaḥ sadā || 35 ||

kimāśrayāḥ punā rūpādisaṃskārādaya iti | ucyate | yatra kāmādayaḥ | kva punaste
kāmādayaḥ | kāmāḥ saṃkalpo vicikitsā ityādiśruteḥ buddhāveva | tatraiva
rūpādisaṃskārādayo'pi kasminnu rūpāṇi pratiṣṭhitānīti hṛdaye iti śruteḥ | kāmā ye'sya
hṛdi śritāḥ tīrṇo hi yadā sarvān śokān hṛdayasya asaṅgo hyayam tadvā
asyaitadaticchandāḥ ityādiśrutibhyaḥ avikāryo'yamucyate anāditvānnirguṇatvāt ityādi
icchādvēṣādi ca kṣetrasyaiva viśayasya dharmo nātmana iti smṛtibhyaśca
karmasthaivāśuddhiḥ nātmasthā iti || 36 ||

ato rūpādisaṃskārādyāśuddhisambandhābhāvāt na parasmādātmano vilakṣaṇastvamiti
pratyakṣādivirodhābhāvāt yuktaṃ para evātmā'hamiti pratipattum
tadātmānamevāvedahaṃ brahmāsmi ekadhaivānudraṣṭavyam ahamevā'dhastāt
ātmaivā'dhastāt sarvamātmānaṃ paśyet yatra tvasya sarvamātmāiva idaṃ sarvaṃ
yadayamātmā sa eṣo'kalaḥ anantaramabāhyam sabāhyābhyantaro hyajaḥ brahmaivedam

etayā dvārā prāpadyata prajñānasya nāmadheyāni satyaṃ jñānamanantam brahma
tasmādvā tatsrṣṭvā tadevānuprāviśat eko devaḥ sarvabhūteṣu gūḍhaḥ sarvavyāpī
āsarīraṃ śarīreṣu na jāyate mriyate svapnāntam jāgaritāntam sa ma ātmeti vidyāt yastu
sarvāṇi bhūtāni tadejati tannaijati venastatpaśyan tadevāgniḥ ahaṃ manurabhavam
sūryaśca antaḥ praviṣṭaḥ śāstā janānām sadeva somya tatsatyaṃ sa ātmā tattvamasi
ityādiśrutibhyaḥ || 37 ||

smṛtibhyaśca pūḥ prāṇinaḥ sarvaguhāśayam ātmaiva devatāḥ navadvāre pure samam
sarveṣu bhūteṣu vidyāvinayasampanne avibhaktaṃ vibhakteṣu vāsudevaḥ sarvam
ityādibhyaḥ eka evātmā paraṃ brahma sarvasaṃsāradharmavinirmuktastvamiti siddham
|| 38 ||

sa yadi brūyāt yadi bhagavan anantaro'bāhyaḥ sabāhyābhyantaro hyajaḥ kṛtsnaḥ
prajñānaghana eva saindhavaghanavadātmā sarvamūrtibhedavarjitaḥ ākāśavadekarasaḥ
tarhi kimidaṃ dṛśyate śrūyate vā sādhyam sādhanam vā sādhaśceti
śrutismṛtilokaprasiddham vādiśatavipratipattiviśaya iti || 39 ||

ācāryo brūyāt avidyākṛtametadyadidaṃ dṛśyate śrūyate vā paramārthatastveka evātmā
avidyādrṣṭeḥ anekavat ābhāsate timiradrṣṭyā anekacandravat | yatra vā anyadiva syāt
yatra hi dvaitamiva bhavati taditara itaram paśyati mṛtyoḥ sa mṛtyumāpnoti atha
yatrānyatpaśyati anyacchr̥ṇoti anyadvijānāti tadalpam atha yadalpam tanmartyamiti
vācārambhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam anyo'sāvanyo'ham iti
bhedadarśananindopapatteravidyākṛtam dvaitam ekamevādvitīyam yatra tvasya tatra ko
mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ ityādyekatvavidhiśrutibhyaśceti || 40 ||

yadyevam bhagavan kimarthaṃ śrutyā sādhyasāadhanādibheda ucyate utpattiḥ
pralayaśceti || 41 ||

atrocyate avidyāvata upāttaśarīrādibhedasya iṣṭāniṣṭayoginamātmānam manyamānasya
sādhanaireveṣṭāniṣṭapṛāptiparihāropāyavivekamajānataḥ iṣṭapṛāptiṃ cāniṣṭaparihāram
cecchataḥ śanaistadviśayamajñānam nivartayitum śāstraṃ na sādhyasāadhanādibhedam

vidhatte | aniṣṭarūpaḥ saṃsāro hi sa iti tadbhedadrṣṭimevāvidyāṃ saṃsāramunmūlayati
utpattiḥ pralayādyekatvopapattiḥ pradarsānena || 42 ||

avidyāyāmunmūlitāyāṃ śrutismṛtinyāyebhyaḥ anantaramabāhyam sabāhyābhyantaro
hyajaḥ saindhavaghanavat prajñānaghana evaika ātmā ākāśavatparipūrṇaḥ ityatraiva ekā
prajñāpratiṣṭhā paramārthadarśino bhavati na sādhyasādhanotpattipralayādibhedena
asuddhigandho'pyupapadyate || 43 ||

taccaitat paramārthadarśanam pratipattumicchatā
varṇāśramādyabhimānakṛtapāṅktarūpaputravittalokaiṣaṇādibhyo vyutthānam
kartavyam | samyakpratyayavirodhāttadabhimānasyabhedadarśana-
pratiṣedhārthopapattiścopapadyate | nahyekasminnātmanyasaṃsāritvabuddhau
śāstranyāyotpāditāyāṃ tadviparītā buddhirbhavati | nahyagnau śītatvabuddhiḥ śarīre vā
ajarāmarāṇabuddhiḥ | tasmāda vidyākāryatvāt sarvakarmaṇām tatsādhanānām ca
yajñopavītādīnām paramārthadarśananiṣṭhena tyāgaḥ kartavyaḥ || 44 ||

iti śiṣyapratibodhanavidhiprakaraṇam ||

sukhamāsīnaṃ brāhmaṇaṃ brahmaniṣṭhaṃ kaścīdbrahmacārī janmamaraṇalakṣaṇāt
saṃsārāt nirvīṇo mumukṣuḥ vidhivadupasannaḥ papraccha bhagavan kathamahaṃ
saṃsārānmokṣiṣye śārīrendriyaviṣayavedanāvān jāgarite duḥkhamanubhavāmi tathā
svapne' nubhavāmica punaḥ punaḥ suṣuptipratipattyā viśramya viśramya । kimayameva
mama svabhāvaḥ kiṃ vā anyasvabhāvasya sato naimittika iti । yadi svabhāvaḥ na me
mokṣāsā svabhāvasyāvarjanīyatvāt । atha naimittikaḥ nimittaparihāre
syānmokṣopapattiḥ ॥ 45 ॥

taṃ gururuvāca śṛṇu vatsa na tavāyaṃ svabhāvaḥ । kiṃtu naimittikaḥ ॥ 46 ॥

iti uktaḥ śiṣya uvāca kiṃ nimittaṃ kiṃ vā tasya nivartakam ko vā mama svabhāvaḥ
yasminnimitte nivartite naimittikābhāvaḥ roganimittanivṛttāvīva rogī svabhāvaṃ
prapadyeyeti ॥ 47 ॥

gururuvāca avidyā nimittaṃ vidyā tasya nivartikā avidyāyāṃ nivṛttāyāṃ
tannimittābhāvāt mokṣyase janmamaraṇalakṣaṇāt svapnajāgradduḥkhaṃ ca
nānubhaviṣyasīti ॥ 48 ॥

śiṣya uvāca kā sā avidyā kiṃviṣayā vā vidyā ca kā yayā svabhāvaṃ
pratipadyeyeti ॥ 49 ॥

gururuvāca tvam paramātmānaṃ santaṃ asaṃsāriṇaṃ saṃśāryahamasmīti viparītaṃ
pratipadyase akartāraṃ santaṃ karteti abhoktāraṃ santaṃ bhokteti vidyamānaṃ ca
avidyamānamiti iyamavidyā ॥ 50 ॥

śiṣya uvāca yadyapyahaṃ vidyamānaḥ tathāpi na paramātmā ।
kartṛtvabhoktṛtvalakṣaṇaḥ saṃsāro mama svabhāvaḥ pratyakṣādibhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ
anubhūyamānatvāt na avidyānimittaḥ avidyāyāḥ svātmaviṣayatvānupapatteḥ । avidyā
nāma anyasmin anyadharmādhyāropaṇā yathā prasiddhaṃ rajataṃ prasiddhāyāṃ
śūktikāyāṃ yathā prasiddhaṃ puruṣaṃ sthānāvadhyāropayati prasiddhaṃ vā sthānuṃ
puruṣe । nā'prasiddhaṃ prasiddhe prasiddhaṃ cā'prasiddhe ।

nacātmānyanātmānamadhyāropayati ātmanaḥ aprasiddhatvāt | tathā ātmānaṁ anātmāni
ātmano'prasiddhatvādeva || 51 ||

taṁ gururuvāca na vyabhicārāt | nahi vatsa prasiddhaṁ prasiddha evādhyāropayatīti
niyantum śakyam | ātmanyadhyāropaṇadarśanāt | gauro'haṁ kṛṣṇo'hamiti
dehadharmasya ahaṁpratyayaviṣaye ātmāni ahaṁpratyayaviṣayasya ca ātmanaḥ dehe
ayamasmiti || 52 ||

śiṣya āha prasiddha eva tarhyātmā ahaṁpratyayaviṣayatayā dehaśca ayamiti | tatraivam
sati prasiddhayoreva dehātmanoritaretarādhyāropaṇāt sthāṇupuruṣayoḥ
śūktikārajatayoriva | tatra kaṁ viśeṣamāśritya bhagavatoktaṁ
prasiddhayoritaretarādhyāropaṇeti niyantum na śakyate iti || 53 ||

gururāha śṛṇu | satyaṁ prasiddhau dehātmānau na tu sthāṇupuruṣāviva
viviktapratyayaviṣayatayā sarvalokaprasiddhau | kathaṁ tarhi nityameva
nirantarāviviktapratyayaviṣayatayā | nahi ayaṁ dehaḥ ayamātmā iti viviktābhyāṁ
pratyayābhyāṁ dehātmānau grhṇāti yataḥ kaścit | ata eva hi momuhyate lokaḥ
ātmānātmaviṣaye evamātmā naivamātmā iti | imaṁ viśeṣamāśrityāvocaṁ naivaṁ
niyantum śakyamiti || 54 ||

nanu avidyādhyāropitaṁ yatra yat tadasat tatra dṛṣṭaṁ yathā rajataṁ śūktikāyāṁ
sthāṇau puruṣaḥ rajjvāṁ sarpa ākāśe talamalinatvamityādi tathā dehātmanorapi
nityameva nirantarāviviktapratyayatayā itaretarādhyāropaṇā kṛtā syāt taditaretarayoh
nityameva asattve syāt | yathā śūktikādiṣu avidyādhyāropitānāṁ rajatādīnāṁ nityameva
atyantāsattvaṁ tadviparītānāṁ ca viparīteṣu tadvat dehātmano'vidyayaiva
itaretarādhyāropaṇā kṛtā syāt | tatraivam sati dehātmanorasattvaṁ prasajyeta |
taccāniṣṭaṁ vaināśikapakṣatvāt | atha tadviparyayeṇa dehaḥ
ātmanyavidyayā'dhyāropitaḥ dehasyātmani sati asattvaṁ prasajyeta | taccāniṣṭaṁ
pratyakṣādivirodhāt | tasmādehātmānau nāvidyayā itaretarasmin adhyāropitau | kathaṁ
tarhi vaṁśastambhavannitya saṁyuktau || 55 ||

na | anityatvaparārthatvaprasaṅgāt | saṃhatatvāt parārthatvaṃ anityatvaṃ ca
vaṃśastambhādivadeva | kiṃca yastu parairdehena saṃhataḥ kalpita ātmā sa
saṃhatatvāt parārthaḥ | tena asaṃhataḥ paro'nyo nityaḥ siddhastāvat || 56 ||

tasyāsaṃhatasya dehe dehamātratayā adhyāropitatvena asattvānityatvādidoṣaprasaṅgo
bhavati | tatra nirātmako deha iti vaināśikapakṣaprāptidoṣaḥ syāt || 57 ||

na | svata evātmanaḥ ākāśasyeva asaṃhatatvābhyupagamāt | sarveṇāsaṃhataḥ sa ca
ātmēti na nirātmako dehādīḥ sarvaḥ syāt | yathā ca ākāśaṃ sarveṇāsaṃhatamiti sarvaṃ
na nirākāśaṃ bhavati evam | tasmānnavaināśikapakṣaprāptidoṣaḥ syāt || 58 ||

yatpunaruktaṃ dehasyātyantāsattve pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ syāditi | tanna |
pratyakṣādibhiḥ ātmani dehasya sattvānupalabdheḥ | na hyātmani kuṇḍe badaraṃ kṣīre
sarpitaḥ tile tailaṃ bhittau citramiva ca pratyakṣādibhiḥ deha upalabhyate | tasmānna
pratyakṣādivirodhaḥ || 59 ||

kathaṃ tarhi pratyakṣādyaprasiddhātmani dehādhyāropaṇā dehe ca ātmāropaṇā || 60 ||

nāyaṃ doṣaḥ | svabhāvaprasiddhatvādātmanaḥ | nahi kādācitkasiddhāveva adhyāropaṇā
na nityasiddhau iti niyantum śakyaṃ ākāśe talamalādyadhyāropaṇadarśanāt || 61 ||

kiṃ bhagavan dehātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāropaṇā dehādisaṃghātakṛtā athavā
ātmakṛteti || 62 ||

gururuvāca yadi dehādisaṃghātakṛtā yadi vā ātmakṛtā kiṃ tatra syāt || 63 ||

ityuktaḥ śiṣya āha yadyaḥ dehādisaṃghātamātraḥ tato mamācetanatvāt
parārthatvamiti na matkṛtā dehātmanoḥ itaretarādhyāropaṇā | athāhamātmā paro'nyaḥ
saṃghātāt citimattvāt svārtha iti mayaiva citimatā ātmani adhyāropaṇā kriyate
sarvānarthabījabhūtā || 64 ||

ityukto gururuvāca anarthabījabhūtāṃ cet mithyādhyāropaṇāṃ jānīṣe mā kārṣīstarhi ||
65 ||

naiva bhagavan śakomi na kartum | anyena kenacit prayukto'haṃ na svatantra iti || 66 ||

na tarhi acitimatvāt svārthaḥ tvam | yena prayuktaḥ asvatantraḥ pravartase sa citimān
svārthaḥ saṃghāta eva tvam || 67 ||

yadyacetano'haṃ kathaṃ sukhaduḥkhavedanāṃ bhavaduktaṃ ca jñāmi || 68 ||

gururuvāca kiṃ sukhaduḥkhavedanāyā maduktāccānyastvaṃ kiṃvā ananya eveti || 69 ||

śiṣya uvāca nāhaṃ tāvadananyaḥ | kasmāt yasmāttadubhayaṃ karmabhūtāṃ
ghaṭādikamiva
jñāmi | yadyananyo'haṃ tena tadubhayaṃ na jñāyāṃ kiṃtu jñāmi tasmādanyaḥ |
sukhaduḥkhavedanāvikriyā ca svārthaiva prāpnoti tvaduktaṃ ca syāt ananyatve na ca
tayoh svārthatā yuktā | nahi candanakaṇṭakakṛte sukhaduḥkhe candanakaṇṭakārthe
ghaṭopayogo vā ghaṭārthaḥ | tasmāt tadvijñāturmama candanādikṛtaḥ arthaḥ | ahaṃ hi
tato'nyaḥ samastamarthaṃ jñāmi buddhyārūḍham || 70 ||

taṃ gururuvāca evaṃ tarhi svārthastvaṃ citimatvānna pareṇa prayujyase | nahi citimān
para-tantraḥ pareṇa prayujyate citimataścitimadarthatvānupapatteḥ samatvāt
pradīpaprakāśayoriva | nāpi acitimadarthatvaṃ citimato bhavati
acitimato'citimatvādeva svārthasaṃbandhānupapatteḥ | nāpi acitimatoh
anyonyārthatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam | nahi kāṣṭhakudye anyonārthaṃ kurvāte || 71 ||

nanu citimattve same'pi bhr̥tyasvāminoḥ anyonyārthatvaṃ dr̥ṣṭam || 72 ||

naivam agneruṣṇaprakāśavat tava citimattvasya vivakṣitatvāt | pradarśitaśca dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ
pradīpaprakāśayoriti | tatraivaṃ sati svabuddhyārūḍhameva sarvamupalabhase
agnyuṣṇaprakāśatulyena kūṭasthanityacaitanyasvarūpeṇa | yadi caivam ātmanaḥ sarvadā

nirviśeṣatvamupagacchasi | kimityūcivān suṣupte viśramya viśramya jāgratsvapnayoh
duḥkhamanubhavāmi iti | kiṃ ayameva mama svabhāvaḥ kiṃ vā naimittikaḥ iti ca |
kimasau vyāmoho'pagataḥ kiṃ vā neti || 73 ||

ityuktaḥ śiṣya āha bhagavan apagataḥ tvatprasādāt vyāmohaḥ kiṃtu mama
kūṭasthatāyāṃ saṃśayaḥ | katham śabdādīnāṃ svataḥsiddhirnāsti acetanatvāt |
śabdādyākārapratyayotpattestu teṣāṃ pratyayānāmitaretaravyāvṛttaviśeṣaṇānāṃ
nīlapītādyākāravatāṃ svataḥsiddhyasaṃbhavāt | tasmādbāhyākāranimittatvaṃ gamyate
iti bāhyākāravat śabdādyākāratvasiddhiḥ | tathā pratyayānāmapi
ahampratyayālabhanavastubhedānāṃ saṃhatatvāt acaitanyopapetteḥ
svārthatvāsaṃbhavāt svarūpavyatiriktagrāhakagrāhyatvena siddhiḥ śabdādivadena |
asaṃhatatve sati caitanyātmakatvāt svārtho'pi ahampratyayānāṃ
nīlapītādyākārāṇāmupalabdheti vikriyāvāneva kūṭasthaḥ iti saṃśayaḥ || 74 ||

taṃ guruvāca na yuktastava saṃśayaḥ | yatasteṣāṃ pratyayānāṃ niyamena aśeṣataḥ
upalabdhireva aparināmitvāt kūṭasthatvasiddhau niścayahetumeva
aśeṣacittapracāropalabdhiṃ saṃśayahetumātha | yadi hi tava pariṇāmitvaṃ syāt
aśeṣasvaviṣayacittapracāropalabdhirna syāt cittasyeva svaviṣaye yathā cendriyāṇāṃ
svaviṣayeṣu | na ca tathā'tmanastava svaviṣayaikadeśopalabdhiḥ | ataḥ kūṭasthataiva
taveti || 75 ||

tatrāha upalabdhirnāma dhātvartho vikriyaiva upalabdhuḥ kūṭasthātmatā ceti viruddham
|| 76 ||

na | dhātvarthavikriyāyāṃ upalabdhyupacārāt | yo hi bauddhaḥ pratyayaḥ sa dhātvartho
vikriyātmakaḥ ātmanaḥ upalabdhyābhāsaphalāvasāna iti upalabdhiśabdena upacaryate |
yathā chidikriyā dvaidhībhāvaphalāvasāneti dhātvarthatvena upacaryate tadvat || 77 ||

ityuktaḥ śiṣya āha nanu bhagavan mama kūṭasthatvapratipādanam prati asamartho
dṛṣṭāntaḥ | katham chidiḥ chedyavikriyāvasānā upacaryate yathā dhātvarthatvena tathā

upalabdhiśabdopacarito'pi dhātvartho bauddhapratyayaḥ ātmanah
upalabdhiṅvikriyāvasānaścet nātmanah kūṭasthatām pratipādayitum samarthah || 78 ||

gururuvāca satyamevaṃ syāt yadi upalabdhyupalabdhroḥ viśeṣaḥ | nityopalabdhimātra
eva hi upalabdhā na tu tārkkikasamaya iva anyā upalabdhiḥ anya upalabdhā ca || 79 ||

nanu upalabdhiphalāvasāno dhātvarthaḥ kathamiti || 80 ||

ucyate śṛṇu upalabdhyābhāsaphalāvasāna ityuktam kiṃ na śrutam tat tvayā na tu ātmā
vikriyotpādanāvasāna iti mayoktam || 81 ||

śiṣya uvāca katham tarhi kūṭasthe mayi aśeṣasvaviśayacittapracāropalabdhṛtvamityāttha
|| 82 ||

taṃ gururuvāca satyamavocaṃ tenaiva kūṭasthatāmabruvaṃ tava || 83 ||

yadyevaṃ bhagavan kūṭasthanityopalabdhisvarūpe mayi
śabdādyākārabauddhapratyayeṣu ca matsvarūpopalabdhyābhāsaphalāvasānavatsu
utpadyamāneṣu kastvaparādho mama || 84 ||

satyam nāstyaparādhaḥ kiṃtu avidyāmātrastu aparādha iti prāgevāvocaṃ || 85 ||

yadi bhagavan suṣupta iva mama vikriyā nāsti katham svapnajāgarite || 86 ||

taṃ gururuvāca kiṃtu anubhūyete tvayā satatam || 87 ||

bāḍham anubhavāmi kiṃtu vicchidyavicchidya na tu satatam || 88 ||

taṃ gururuvāca tarhi āgantuke tvete na tavātmabhūte | yadi tavātmabhūte
caitanyasvarūpavat svataḥsiddhe santate eva syātām | kiṃca svapnajāgarite na tava
ātmabhūte vyabhicāritvāt vastrādivat | na hi yasya yatsvarūpaṃ tat tadvyabhicāri dṛṣṭam

l svapnajāgarite tu caitanyamātravāt vyabhicarataḥ l suṣupte cet svarūpaṃ vyabhicaret
tannaṣṭaṃ nāstīti vā bāhyameva syāt āgantukānāṃ ataddharmāṇāṃ
ubhayātmakatvadarśanāt yathā dhanavastrādīnāṃ nāśo dṛṣṭaḥ svapnabhrāntilabdhanāṃ
tu abhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ ॥ 89 ॥

nanvevaṃ bhagavan caitanyasvarūpamapi āgantukaṃ prāptam svapnajāgaritayoriva
suṣupte anupalabdheḥ l acaitanyasvarūpo vā syāmaham ॥ 90 ॥

na paśya tadanupapatteḥ l caitanyasvarūpaṃ cet āgantukaṃ paśyasi paśya l
naitadvarṣaśatenāpi upapattyā kalayituṃ śaknumo vayam anyo vā 'caitanyo'pi l
saṃhatastvāt pārārthyaṃ anekatvaṃ nāsitvaṃ ca na kenacit upapattyā vārayituṃ śakyam
l asvārthasya svataḥ siddhyabhāvādityavocāma l caitanyasvarūpasya tu ātmanaḥ
svataḥsiddheḥ anyānapekṣatvaṃ na kenacit vārayituṃ śakyam avyabhicārāt ॥ 91 ॥

nanu vyabhicāro darśito mayā suṣupte na paśyāmīti ॥ 92 ॥

na l vyāhatatvāt l katham vyāghātaḥ paśyatastava na paśyāmi iti vyāhataṃ vacanam l
nahi kadācit bhagavan suṣupte mayā caitanyaṃ anyadvā kiṃcit dṛṣṭam l paśyan tarhi
suṣupte tvam l yasmāt dṛṣṭameva pratiśedhasi na dṛṣṭim l yā tava dṛṣṭiḥ tat caitanyamiti
mayoktam l yayā tvam vidyamānayā na kiṃcit dṛṣṭamiti pratiśedhasi sā dṛṣṭiḥ
tvaccaitanyaṃ l tarhi sarvatra avyabhicārāt kūṭasthanityatvaṃ siddham svata eva na
pramāṇāpekṣam l svataḥsiddhasya hi pramātuḥ anyasya prameyasya paricchittiṃ prati
pramāṇāpekṣā l yā tu anyā nityā paricchittiḥ apekṣyate anyasya aparicchittirūpasya
paricchedāya sā hi nityaiva kūṭasthā svayaṃjyotiḥsvabhāvā l ātmani pramāṇatve
pramāṭṛtve vā na tāṃ prati pramāṇāpekṣā tatsvabhāvatvāt l yathā prakāśanaṃ uṣṇatvaṃ
vā lohodakādiṣu parataḥ apekṣyate agnyādityādibhyaḥ atatsvabhāvatvāt na
agnyādityādīnāṃ tadapekṣā sarvadā tatsvabhāvatvāt ॥ 93 ॥

anityatve eva pramā syāt na nityatve iti cet ॥ 94 ॥

na | avagateḥ nityatvānityatvayoḥ viśeṣānupapatteḥ | na hi avagateḥ pramāṭve anityā
avagatiḥ pramā na nityā iti viśeṣaḥ avagamyate || 95 ||

nityāyām pramātuḥ apekṣābhāvaḥ | anityāyām tu yatnāntaritatvāt avagatiḥ apekṣyata iti
viśeṣaḥ syāditi cet || 96 ||

siddhā tarhi ātmanaḥ pramātuḥ svataḥsiddhiḥ pramāṇanirapekṣatayaiveti || 97 ||

abhāve'pi apekṣābhāvaḥ nityatvāt iti cet | na | avagatereva ātmani sadbhāvaditi
parihṛtametat || 98 ||

pramātuścet pramāṇāpekṣāsiddhiḥ kasya pramitsā syāt yasya pramitsā sa eva pramātā
abhyupagamyate | tadīyā ca pramitsā prameyaviṣayaiva na pramātrviṣayā |
pramātrviṣayatve anavasthāprasaṅgāt pramātuḥ tadicchāyāśca tasyāpyanyaḥ pramātā
tasyāpyanya iti | evameva icchāyāḥ pramātrviṣayatve | pramāturātmanaḥ
avyavahitatvācca prameyatvānupapattiḥ | loke hi prameyaṃ nāma pramātuḥ
icchāsmṛtiprayatnapramāṇajanmavyavahitaṃ siddhyati nānyathā avagatiḥ
prameyaviṣayā dr̥ṣṭā | na ca pramātuḥ pramātā svasya svayameva kenacit vyavahitaḥ
kalpayituṃ śakyaḥ icchādīnāmanyatamenāpi | smṛtiśca smartavyaviṣayā na
smartrviṣayā | tathā icchāyāḥ iṣṭaviṣayatvameva na icchāvadviṣayatvam |
smartricchāvadviṣayatve'pi hi ubhayoḥ anavasthā pūrvavadaparihāryā syāt || 99 ||

nanu pramātrviṣayāvagatyanutpattau anavagata eva pramātā syāditi cet || 100 ||

na avagantuḥ avagateḥ avagantavyaviṣayatvāt | avagantrviṣayatve ca anavasthā pūrvavat
syāt | avagatiśca ātmani kūṭasthanityātmajyotiḥ anyataḥ anapekṣaiva siddhā
agnyādityādyuṣṇaparakāśavat iti pūrvameva prasādhitam | avagateḥ caitanyātmajyotiṣaḥ
syātmani anityatve ātmanaḥ svārthatānupapattiḥ kāryakāraṇasaṃdhātavat saṃhatatvāt
pārārthyam doṣavattvam ca avocām | katham caitanyātmajyotiṣaḥ svātmani anityatve
smṛtyādivyavadhānāt sāntaratvam | tataśca tasya caitanyajyotiṣaḥ prāgutpatteḥ
pradhvaṃsāccordhvaṃ ātmanyeva abhāvāt cakṣurādīnāmiva saṃhatatvāt pārārthyam

syāt | yadā ca tat utpannam ātmani vidyate na tadā ātmanah syārthatvam |
tadbhāvābhāvāpekṣā hi ātmānātmanoh svārthatvapārthatvasiddhiḥ | tasmāt ātmanah
anyanirapekṣameva nityacaitanyajyotiṣtvam siddham || 101 ||

nanu evaṃ sati asati pramāśrayatve katham pramātuḥ pramāṭṛtvam || 102 ||

ucyate pramāyāḥ nityatve anityatve ca rūpaviśeṣābhāvāt | avagatirhi pramā | tasyāḥ
smṛticchādi pūrvikāyāḥ anityāyāḥ kūṭasthanityāyā vā na svarūpaviśeṣo vidyate | yathā
dhātvarthasya tiṣṭhatyādeḥ phalasya gatyādipūrvakasya anityasya apūrvasya nityasya vā
rūpaviśeṣo nāstīti tulyo vyapadeśo dṛṣṭaḥ tiṣṭhanti manuṣyāḥ tiṣṭhanti parvatāḥ ityādi
tathā nityāvagatisvarūpe'pi pramātari pramāṭṛtvavyapadeśo na virudhyate
phalasāmānyāditi || 103 ||

atrāha śiṣyaḥ nityāvagatisvarūpasya ātmanah avikriyatvāt kāryakaraṇaiḥ asaṃhatya
takṣadīnāmiva vāsyādibhiḥ kartṛtvam nopapadyate asaṃhatasvabhāvasya ca
kāryakaraṇopādāne anavasthā prasajyate | takṣadīnām tu kāryakaraṇaiḥ nityameva
saṃhatatvamiti vāsyādyupādāne nānavasthā syāditi || 104 ||

iha tu asaṃhatasvabhāvasya karaṇānupādāne kartṛtvam nopapadyata iti karaṇam
upādeyam tadupādānamapi vikriyaiveti tatkartṛtve karaṇāntaramupādeyam
tadupādāne'pi anyaditi pramātuḥ svātanīye anavasthā aparihāryā syāt iti | na ca
kriyaiva ātmānam kārayati anirvartitāyāḥ svarūpābhāvāt | atha anyat ātmānam upetya
kriyām kārayatīti cet | na | anyasya svataḥ siddhatvāviśayatvādyanupapatteḥ | na hi
ātmanah anyat acetanam vastu svapramāṇakam dṛṣṭam | śabdādi sarvameva
avagatiphalāvasānapratyaya pramitam siddham syāt | avagatiścedātmano'nyasya syāt
so'pi ātmaiva asaṃhataḥ svārthaḥ syāt na parārthaḥ | na ca dehendriyaviśayāṇām
svārthatām avagantum śaknumaḥ avagatyavasānapratyayāpekṣasiddhidarśanāt || 105 ||

nanu dehasyāvagatau na kaścit pratyakṣādiprayayāntaram apekṣate || 106 ||

bāḍhaṃ jāgrati evaṃ syāt | mṛtisuṣṭyostu dehasyāpi pratyakṣādipramāṇāpekṣaiva
siddhiḥ | tathaiva indriyāṇāṃ | bāhyā eva hi śabdādayo dehendriyākārapariṇatā iti
pratyakṣādipramāṇāpekṣaiva hi siddhiḥ | siddhiriti ca pramāṇaphalaṃ avagatiṃ avocām
sā ca avagatiḥ kūṭasthā svayamsiddhātmajyotiḥ svarūpeti ca || 107 ||

atrāha codakah avagatiḥ pramāṇāṇāṃ phalaṃ kūṭasthanityātmajyotiḥ svarūpeti ca
vipraṭiśiddham | ityuktavantamāha na vipraṭiśiddham | katham tarhi avagateḥ phalatvam
kūṭasthā nityāpi satī prayakṣādipratyayānte lakṣyate tādarthiyāt | pratyakṣādipratyayasya
anityatve anityeva bhavati | tena pramāṇāṇāṃ phalaṃ iti upacaryate || 108 ||

yadyevaṃ bhagavan kūṭasthanityāvagatiḥ ātmajyotiḥ svarūpaiva svayamsiddhā ātmani
pramāṇanirapekṣatvāt tato'nyat acetanaṃ saṃhatyakāritvāt parārtham | yena ca
sukhaduḥkhamohapratyayāvagatirūpeṇa pārārthyam tenaiva svarūpeṇa anātmanah
astitvam nānyena rūpāntareṇa ato nāstitvameva paramārthataḥ | yathā hi loke
rajjusarpamarīcyudakādīnāṃ tadavagativyatirekeṇa abhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ evaṃ
jāgratsvapnadvaitabhāvasyāpi tadavagativyatirekeṇa abhāvo yuktaḥ | evameva
paramārthataḥ bhagavan avagateḥ ātmajyotiḥ nairantaryabhāvāt kūṭasthanityatā
advaitabhāvasca sarvapratyayabhedeṣu avyabhicārāt | pratyayabhedāstu avagatiṃ
vyabhicaranti | yathā swapne nīlapītādyākārabhedarūpāḥ pratyayāḥ tadavagatiṃ
vyabhicarantaḥ paramārthato na santītyucyante evaṃ jāgratyapi
nīlapītādipratyayabhedāḥ tām evāvagatiṃ vyabhicarantaḥ asatyarūpā bhavitumarhanti |
tasyāścāvagateḥ anyāḥ avagantā nāstīti na svena svarūpeṇa svayaṃ upādātum hātum vā
śakyate anyasya ca abhāvāt || 109 ||

tathaiveti | eṣā avidyā yannimittaḥ saṃsāro jāgratsvapnalakṣaṇaḥ | tasyā avidyāyāḥ
vidyā tivartikā | ityevaṃ tvaṃ abhayaṃ prāpto'si | nātaḥ paraṃ
jāgratsvapnaduḥkhamanubhaviṣyasi saṃsāraduḥkhānmukto'sīti || 110 ||

omiti || 111 ||

iti avagatiprakaraṇam ||

mumukṣūṇāṃ upāttapuṇyāpuṇyakṣapaṇaparāṇāṃ apūrvānupacayārthināṃ
parisaṃkhyānamidamucyate | avidyāhetavo doṣāḥ vānmanahkāyapravṛttihetavaḥ
pravṛtteśca iṣṭāniṣṭamiśraphalāni karmāṇi upaciyante iti tanmokṣārtham || 112 ||

tatra śabdasparsārūparasagandhānāṃ viśayāṇāṃ śrotrādiḡrāhyatvāt svātmani pareṣu vā
vijñānābhāvaḥ teṣāmeva pariṇatānāṃ yathā loṣṭādīnāṃ śrotrādidvāraiśca jñāyante | yena
ca jñāyante saḥ jñātrtvāt atajjātīyaḥ | te hi śabdādayaḥ anyonyasaṃsargitvāt
janmavṛddhivipariṇāmāpekṣayanāśasaṃyogāvīyogāvīrbhāvatirobhāvavikāravikārikṣetra
bijādy-anekadharmāṇaḥ sāmānyena ca sukhaduḥkhādyanekakarmāṇaḥ |
tadvijñātrtvādeva tadvijñātā sarvaśabdādidharmavilakṣaṇaḥ || 113 ||

tatra śabdādibhiḥ upalabhyamānaiḥ pīḍyamāno vidvān evaṃ parisaṃcakṣīta || 114 ||

śabdastu dhvanisāmānyamātreṇa viśeṣadharmairvā śadjādibhiḥ priyaiḥ stutyādibhiḥ
iṣṭaiḥ aniṣṭaiśca asatyabībhatsaparibhavākrośādibhirvacanaiḥ mām dṛkṣvabhāvaṃ
asaṃsargiṇaṃ avikriyaṃ acalaṃ anidhanaṃ abhayaṃ atyantasūkṣmaṃ aviśayaṃ
gocarīkr̥tya spraṣṭuṃ naivārhati asaṃsargitvādeva mām | ata eva na śabdanimittā hāniḥ
vṛddhīrvā | ato mām kiṃ kariṣyati stutinindādi priyāpriyatvādīlakṣaṇaḥ śabdaḥ |
avivekinaṃ hi śabdaṃ ātmatvena gataṃ priyaḥ śabdo vardhayet apriyaśca kṣapayet
avivekitvāt | na tu mama vivekino vālāgramātramapi kartumutsahata iti | evameva
sparśasāmānyena tadviśeṣaiśca śītoṣṇamṛdukarkaśādiḡvarodaraśūlādīlakṣaṇaiśca
apriyaiḥ priyaiśca kāścit śarīrasamavāyibhiḥ bāhyāgantukanimittaiśca na mama kācit
vikriyā vṛddhīhānilakṣaṇā asparśatvāt kriyate vyomna iva muṣṭīghātādibhiḥ | tathā
rūpasāmānyena tadviśeṣaiśca priyāpriyaiḥ strīvyāñjanādīlakṣaṇaiḥ
arūpatvāt na mama kācit hāniḥ vṛddhīrvā kriyate | tathā rasasāmānyena tadviśeṣaiśca
priyāpriyaiḥmadhurāmlalavaṇakatutiktakaṣāyayaiḥmūḍhbuddhibhiḥ parigr̥hītaiḥ
arasātmakasya mama na kācit hāniḥ vṛddhīrvā kriyate | tathā gandhasāmānyena
tadviśeṣaiḥ priyāpriyaiḥ puspādyanulepanādīlakṣaṇaiḥ agandhātmakasya na mama kācit
hāniḥ vṛddhīrvā kriyate | aśabdamasparśamarūpamavyayaṃ tathā'rasaṃ
nityamagandhavacca yat iti śruteḥ || 115 ||

kimca ye eva bāhyāḥ śabdādayaḥ te śarīrākāreṇa samsthitāḥ tadgrāhakaiśca
śrotrādyākāraiḥ antaḥkaraṇadvayatadviṣayākāreṇa ca anyonyasamsargitvāt
samhata tvācca sarvakriyāsu | tatra evaṃ sati viduṣo mama na kaścit śatruḥ mitraṃ
udāsīno vā asti | tatra yadi kaścit mithyājñānābhimānena priyaṃ apriyaṃ vā
prayuyunkṣeta kriyāphalalakṣaṇaṃ tanmṛṣaiva prayuyunkṣate saḥ | tasya
aviṣayatvānmama avyakto'yamacintyo'yam iti smṛteḥ | tathā sarveṣāṃ pañcānāmapī
bhūtānāṃ avikāryaḥ aviṣayatvāt | acchedyo'yamadāhyo'yam iti smṛteḥ | yāpi
śarīrendriyasamsthānamātramupalakṣya madbhaktānāṃ viparītānāṃ ca
kriyākriyādiprayuyunkṣā tājā ca dharmādharmādiprāptiḥ sā teṣāmeva na tu mayi ajare
amṛte abhaye nainaṃ kṛtākṛte tapataḥ na karmaṇā vardhate no kaṇīyān
sabāhyābhyantaro hyajaḥ na lipyate lokaduḥkhena bāhyaḥ ityādiśrutismṛtibhyaḥ |
anātmavastunaśca asattvāt iti paramo hetuḥ | ātmanaśca advayatvaviṣayāṇi
dvayasyāsattvāt yāni sarvāṇi upaniṣadvākyaṇi vistaraśaḥ samīkṣitavyāṇi
samīkṣitavyāṇīti || 116 ||

iti parisamkhyānaprakaraṇam ||

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