

Community Worth Having: A Social Capital Perspective

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A Thesis

in

The Department

Of

Culture and Values in Education

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Master of Arts at
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec, Canada

July 2001

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Abstract

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The relationships between various civic virtues and participation in community groups were explored. The present thesis was not an exhaustive integration of theories on Civic Virtue. Rather, it highlighted virtues (i.e., authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity and tolerance) selected for their value in educating members of social capital groups toward a broader understanding of the self and others in a deliberative, pluralist democracy. This thesis relied primarily on theories from the disciplines of political philosophy and philosophy of education. Three major conclusions emerged from the present investigation. First, schools are not the only venue in which education for civic virtue occurs. Indeed, social capital groups provide a vital context for civic learning. Second, the existence of diversity within social capital groups enhances the educational potential of participating in civic life. And third, social capital groups can potentially have a socially progressive impact in a liberal, deliberative democracy.

Résumé

Une communauté qui en vaut la peine: Une perspective capitale sociale

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Cette étude explore les relations entre plusieurs vertus civiques ainsi que la participation aux groupes communautaires. La présente thèse n'intègre pas toutes les théories se rapportant aux vertus civiques. Plutôt, elle vise à mettre en valeur certaines vertus (c.-à-d. l'authenticité, la sagesse morale, la confiance, la réciprocité et la tolérance) sélectionnées pour leur mérite éducatif envers les membres de groupes sociaux capitaux afin de promouvoir une compréhension plus approfondie d'eux-mêmes et des autres dans une société démocratique délibérément pluraliste. Cette thèse est basée sur des théories de disciplines politiques, philosophiques et éducatives. Trois conclusions majeures ont surgies de cette présente investigation. De prime abord, les écoles ne sont pas les seuls endroits où les vertus civiques peuvent être enseignées. Les groupes capitaux sociaux fournissent un contexte pour l'apprentissage civique. Deuxièmement, l'existence de la diversité à l'intérieur des groupes capitaux sociaux met en valeur le potentiel éducatif de la participation à la vie civique. Et finalement, les groupes capitaux sociaux peuvent potentiellement avoir un impact social progressif à l'intérieur d'une société libérale délibérément démocratique.

Acknowledgments

I would like to acknowledge all of the people who provided assistance in the completion of this Master's thesis. My thesis advisor, Kevin McDonough deserves special thanks for doing an amazing job of keeping me focused and for offering insightful and detailed feedback. He maintained a good balance between pushing me toward a complex, thorough final product and keeping up morale. I offer thanks to Caroline Mueller for her help with the French translation of the abstract.

I would like to recognize the community groups of which I have been a part and to social activists, in general, for providing much of the inspiration for this thesis. They teach us through their passion and dedication that "...we have voices and we are each of us unique; and so if we don't bear witness as citizens, as people, as individuals, the right we have to life is sacrificed" (Rule, 1995). Thanks to all of you who "bear witness".

I would like to acknowledge my father for providing me with the intellectual *rigour* and self-discipline I needed to complete this thesis and to my mother for setting forth solid moral values from which to seek my own path. Also, thanks to Maria Karavasilis for her thoughtfulness in providing the many meals that would miraculously find their way to my desk day after day. I owe gratitude to all of my friends who provide both the intimacy and diversity to assist me on my own quest for authenticity. Your living examples helped to make writing this thesis very real. Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Leigh Karavasilis, who is not only the best editor a girl could ever ask for, but who has also provided enduring love, support and wisdom throughout this process.

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COMMUNITY WORTH HAVING: A SOCIAL CAPITAL PERSPECTIVE

Chapter I: Introduction

This work concerns how community groups hold the potential to teach citizens lessons in civic virtue. Political philosophy has recently focused upon the need for a shared conception of civic virtue, particularly in a society that is characterized by diverse definitions of the good. The need for civic virtue as a form of ‘social glue’ that binds people of diverse faiths, cultures, social groups, etcetera, is now firmly entrenched in scholarly literature (e.g., Nussbaum, 1997; Macedo, 1999; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; McDonough & Feinberg, in press, Callan, 1997, Feinberg, 1998, Rawls, 1993). In this thesis, I draw upon and extend recent discussions on the nature of education for civic virtue to determine how social capital acts as a form of ‘schooling’ in civic virtue. Moreover, I focus on showing how and why such an education can and should be conceived as compatible with, and necessary for, citizenship in pluralist, deliberative, liberal democracies.

The main purpose of chapter I is to introduce the central concepts of this work; these provide the backdrop for subsequent ideas throughout the thesis. I first delineate my usage of “civic virtue”. Second, I discuss the notion of social capital and the reason why it has received such a high degree of attention in recent years. Third, one’s conception of what is civically virtuous depends entirely on one’s ideal version of, in this case, democracy. In the section entitled “Social capital and democracy”, I explore Amy Gutmann’s and Dennis Thompson’s (1996) interpretation of “deliberative democracy” and how its social and political aspects mesh with the civic virtues I discuss. Fourth, I explain the personal perspective I bring to the topic of community involvement; this is in

the section entitled “Personal location”. Fifth, I address how this thesis contributes to the scholarly literature and finally, I conclude this brief chapter with an outline of the thesis as a whole.

What is Civic Virtue?

The civic virtues I elucidate in the next chapter are virtues that are necessary for practicing democratic civic engagement, or qualities and skills citizens need to meaningfully interact with one another in a diverse liberal democratic society. Usage of the word “meaningfully” characterizes my intention. For citizens might interact with each other in a variety of ways—from interactions that are impersonal or positive to ones that result in affirmed negative stereotypes and furthered distrust between groups in society. The virtues I identify--authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity and tolerance--are selected precisely according to their suitability for promoting meaningful interactions in which citizens emerge with a deeper understanding of the self and/or the other. In this way the aforementioned virtues illuminate the civic educative function of social capital and embody the ideals of a deliberative democracy. Thus, my discussion of civic virtue does not present a complete theory of civic virtue. Nor does it include an attempt to justify the inclusion of particular civic virtues over others in a program of civic education. Rather, I draw selectively upon the theories of others in order to describe a series of civic virtues. The virtues I have selected are to some extent arbitrary in that I could have chosen others--for example, courage or patience--that are also important for civic education in pluralist societies. Nevertheless, the virtues on which I focus are especially prominent in the recently burgeoning theoretical literature on civic education.

They are also particularly well suited for portraying the civic educational function of social capital.

Social Capital and Civic Virtue

Your corn is ripe today; mine will be so tomorrow. 'Tis profitable for us both, that I should labour with you today, and that you should aid me tomorrow. I have no kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; and should I labour with you upon my own account, in expectation of a return, I know I should be disappointed, and that I should in vain depend upon your gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone; you treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and both of us lose our harvests for want of mutual confidence and security. --David Hume¹

Given the global trend toward urbanization and rapid technological advances, life as most individuals are now living it is a radical departure from the way humans have traditionally organized themselves. People's connections to each other and to society have dramatically loosened since the industrial revolution and the subsequent modern, and post-modern periods. This resulting fragmentation of many North American communities is leading many to yearn for a return to community-mindedness and to act on their sense of civic involvement (Wuthnow, 1998). Although the full meaning of civic engagement will emerge over the course of this paper, the following definition provides a useful starting point: "Broadly conceived, civic involvement consists of participation in social activities that either mediate between citizens and government or provide ways for citizens to pursue common objectives with or without the help of government" (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 7). A strong civil society has the potential to teach its members how

to enact and perpetuate a functioning democracy and it is the source and continuing nourishment of what Robert Putnam and others have called “social capital”. The plight of Hume’s farmers, referred to above, illustrates the potential results when social capital is missing or insufficiently strong, at which point certain civic virtues required for cooperative action may be in very short supply. In short, Hume’s example suggests that social capital is the soil from which certain fundamental civic virtues may grow which, in turn, plant seeds for renewed social capital.

The term “capital” is expressed in varying currencies, from physical to human, financial to social, which are renewed by various means. Physical capital draws on physical objects (e.g., a hammer); human capital draws on properties of individuals (e.g., a person’s labor productivity/potential); financial capital, or “any form of material wealth used or available for use in the production of more wealth”², draws on itself; while social capital draws on relations between individuals and the benefits (e.g., civic virtue) that may be derived from those connections. The various currencies are interrelated in that they carry the potential to be mutually beneficial. For example, a college education (human capital) tends to increase likelihood of participation in social groups (social capital), while someone who is in a highly civically engaged community benefits from the increased financial capital which allegedly results from a high degree of social capital (Putnam, 1995, 2000), although the reverse relationship has been called into question³.

While the term “capital” has been traditionally used in reference to economic

¹ In Putnam (2000), p. 134.

² The American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd College Edition (1985). Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

³ Some theorists have linked the erosion of social capital to economic prosperity and increasing self-sufficiency, posing the question of whether Americans have retreated into “private happiness”, a phenomenon which Tocqueville predicted in the previous century. In the book Why is There No Socialism in the United States?, its most memorable line replies that the socialist dream was “wrecked on the reefs of

productivity, the current usage of social capital serves to broaden and expand the notion of capital beyond merely economic justifications⁴. Although Putnam does argue that economic benefits accrue from the social and civic virtues under discussion⁵, both Putnam and I agree that social capital has other, arguably much more important benefits as well. Thus, the ‘currency’ in question in my discussion of social capital is not primarily economic but civic. In other words, its value lies in the function civic virtue plays in enabling citizens to learn skills of cooperation, compromise, dialogue, self-reflection, perspective-taking, etc. from their interactions with others who may be morally, culturally and religiously different from themselves.

An explanation of the title of Robert Putnam’s recent book, Bowling Alone: The collapse and revival of American community (2000) helps to illustrate more concretely the nature and significance of the ‘civic currency’ that underwrites the character of social capital. Among the findings which inspired the title of Bowling Alone, is the observation that bowling in organized leagues has had a rapid decline in recent decades even as overall participation in bowling has increased. In other words, more people are bowling, but they are doing it as individuals rather than as members of organizations. Putnam contends that the significance of this seemingly whimsical bit of information is the loss of broader social interaction, and perhaps civic conversation, which non-member bowlers

roast beef and apple pie” (Sombart in Ryan, 2000, p. 8), adding further credence to the connection between economic prosperity and decreased interest in getting involved in the lives and needs of others.

⁴ Interestingly, the term social capital appears to have been independently invented at a minimum of six times over in this century, a testament to its usefulness as a concept. The inventors of the term “social capital” all shared a similar meaning: the ways in which lives are enhanced by social ties, although they approached it from varying perspectives. They are as follows: L. J. Hanifan (1916); Jane Jacobs (1960’s); Glenn Loury (1970’s); Pierre Bourdieu (1980’s); Ekkehart Schlicht (1980’s); and James Coleman (1980’s) (Putnam, 2000, p. 19-20).

⁵ In fact, Putnam has been criticized by many for trying to justify the values of civic and social community in economic terms: “Putnam’s tract is thus perfectly calibrated to the dot-com moment, when every virtue—even the fuzziest—must justify itself in the language of economics” (Robin, 2001, p. 1).

relinquish. This news in itself is barely noteworthy, however, this trend in “bowling alone”, metaphorically speaking, is repeated in organization after organization. This is according to Putnam’s statistical measures such as polls, membership reports and election surveys (1995, 2000). The reason why this is cause for alarm is because voluntary associations, such as bowling leagues, promote skills of citizenship and other qualities beneficial to liberal democratic societies such as authenticity, moral wisdom, social trust, reciprocity and tolerance. In addition, Putnam and others argue that social capital has the potential to broaden and deepen our own identities, particularly in a highly diverse society (Putnam 2000; Wuthnow, 1998; Taylor, 1991). Thus, when the social groups that constitute a society’s stock of social capital are threatened or in decline⁶, so are important preconditions for civic and personal identity. If social capital is a vital crucible for civic education, then educators have good reason to be concerned with social capital. An adequate conception of civic education requires a solid understanding of what social capital is, how it educates for citizenship, and how its educational potential can be enhanced or subverted. Of course, one’s foundation for civic education rests heavily on one’s interpretation of democracy.

Social Capital and Democracy

In what sense of the term “democracy” is the existence of civic life—that intermediate space which resides between the government, on one hand, and personal lives, on the other--desirable? In their book Democracy and Disagreement (1996), Amy

⁶ In "The Strange Disappearance of Civic America" (1996), Putnam thoroughly explores numerous explanations for declining social capital, ranging from the loosening bonds of the family and increase in geographical mobility to the rise of women in the workplace. He concludes that the major culprit has been the impact of television watching. Alternately, others have criticized Putnam’s “apolitical” analysis and have instead offered political repression (i.e., union busting) and economic inequality as explanations for the retreat from civic life (Robin, 2001). Although the present essay will not explore Putnam's or his critics' reasons for the decline in social capital per se, some outcomes (e.g., the decline in social trust) will

Gutmann and Dennis Thompson explore the notion of “deliberative democracy” which involves citizens engaging in dialogue over important moral conflicts that, as they argue, should not only be left for the courts or policy-makers upon which to decide. This is based on the premise that even in a highly homogenous state moral disagreement between members of society is unavoidable. Gutmann and Thompson assert that the process of deliberation remains beneficial to democracy even if it does not end in agreement. “The core conviction of Gutmann and Thompson’s version of deliberative democracy is the belief that our shared political life would go better if we encourage a wider discussion of moral values by citizens and their representatives” (Macedo, 1999, p. 6-7). Thus, if one ascribes to the underlying principles inherent in a deliberative democracy, social capital groups greatly aid in this process. For instance, based on Putnam's 20-year study of local governments in varying regions of Italy (1993a), he concluded that networks of civic engagement impact the actual performance of representative government. Polls, surveys and membership rosters have shown that, controlling for education and income, members of voluntary associations are more likely to vote and follow politics (Galston & Levine, 1997; Putnam, 2000). This serves to reinforce the correlation between social affiliation and political participation. “A healthy, vibrant civil society is both the fullest indication of and a precondition for a healthy democracy” (O’Connell, 1999, p. 25).

Not only does community involvement improve the workings of government, it also helps to solve common problems that would otherwise have to be confronted by the government⁷. Of course, one could argue that if citizens left everything to governments,

be discussed peripherally.

⁷ The role of government vis a vis social capital is a subject of much debate. It has been argued that social

perhaps we could get on with other, more personally fulfilling aspects of our lives. One of the overriding themes of this thesis is that such personal fulfillment is gained through the process of interaction with groups of diverse others. For example, Michael Walzer put forth the metaphor of the “democratic play”, or making judgments about politicians in solitude or in concert with others (Callan, 1994). The observation and possible participation in this ‘play’ is essential for citizens to make sound political decisions and is something that will ensure the vitality of civic life and should be a source of “delight” for citizens. The famous quip attributed to Oscar Wilde to the effect that “The problem with democracy is that it takes too many evenings” stands in sharp contrast to Walzer’s conception of democracy. For, as I explore throughout this thesis, civic involvement should also provide the ‘actors’ with valuable self-knowledge. Similarly, John Dewey’s aphorism: “Democracy is more than a form of government, it is a mode of associated living” (Dewey, 1944, p. 87) speaks to the naturally social aspects of a participatory democracy. For Dewey, democracy and its accompanying civic associations are a form of social life that, as I argue, benefit not only citizen self-development, but also define the very meaning of democracy. Thus, at the barest minimum, the mere existence of social capital groups is beneficial to a deliberative democracy in the sense that they encourage political participation and provide an intermediate space in which diverse groups of citizens can work together toward common goals and concerns.

Personal Location

My interest in this topic stems from a combined passion in the areas of community involvement and its more intense cousin, social movement activism. Living

capital's emphasis on local, rather than national, interdependence has been seized by those with a political agenda of social conservatism and reducing social spending (Riessman & Banks, 1996).

in an urban environment and having moved often in my adult years have made me realize my intense need for community, or the sense that one's life is intertwined with the lives of others. My own experiences in the women's movement and the gay rights movement have played a vital role in how I view civic participation and its intersection with identity and world-view formation. As I write of civic virtues in this thesis, my own civic engagement serves as a reference point to ground me in the qualities and capacities that I have developed and which have, in turn, altered who I am. Self-transformation of this sort is inherently educational. Hence, for the purposes of this thesis, the use of "education" applies mainly to civic virtues learned within the context of community groups.

I have a deep interest in social activism and methods of promoting social justice; it is a part of my value system. Therefore, my research approach stresses the necessity for social change and seeks the voices and examples of others who are taking action toward that end. As a gay female in this society, I am aware of the vulnerable nature of allowing certain barriers (sometimes physical, sometimes psychological) to be lowered. Opening one's doors to others in the form of community involvement often opens the self to the judgment of others; it is allowing one's self to be known. Depending on the intentions of others, greater openness does involve a certain element of risk; however, this thesis will mainly be comprised of the benefits civic engagement may bestow. I will explore how community involvement can help in dissolving some of the socially constructed hierarchies and barriers such as race, class, gender, sexual orientation, etcetera as someone who has experienced being on the disadvantaged end of some, though not all, of these hierarchies. My experiences greatly influence my academic

perspective because, while I feel the need for social change through community involvement, others might not so urgently feel those needs. I draw inspiration from the experiences of people who are civically engaged and these examples are what I have chosen to seek. "What we come to see depends upon what we seek..." (Eisner, 1991, p. 46). The meaning expressed in this quotation can be applied to my own process in writing this thesis as well as to citizens who, in the process of seeking to create a world that corresponds to their version of the good, enact a better society. The active process of developing the civic virtues of authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity and tolerance influences the self and the worldviews of those who allow themselves to be affected.

Scholarly Contributions of the Thesis

The main scholarly contribution of my thesis is threefold. First, it corrects what I take to be a serious under-emphasis on the civic educational role of social capital in Putnam's thesis and in the critical scholarly literature that has recently emerged in response to that work. While a main theme in Putnam's work is the role that social capital plays in promoting civic virtue, he rarely mentions and never develops this theme in light of recent theoretical literature on civic education. My thesis aims to correct this omission and to bring these two areas of scholarship into dialogue. Second, and relatedly, recent civic educational theory is almost entirely preoccupied with civic education in schools, and particularly in school curricula (White, 1996; Spinner-Halev, 2000; Macedo, 1999; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Callan, 1997, Feinberg, 1998). My discussion of this theoretical literature in connection with social capital shifts the focus to an important but heretofore neglected arena of civic education in democratic societies—

that of civil societies and voluntary groups and associations. Third, my discussion of Putnam's work highlights an important tension in his theory, namely, of that between a conservative and nostalgic celebration of traditional forms of social capital, on the one hand, and a salutary stance towards recently emerged and newly emerging progressive and socially radical forms of social capital on the other. My contribution here relies heavily on Putnam's critics who have criticized him for everything from lamenting the decline of illiberal⁸, homogenous groups to neglecting the ways in which the government has discouraged political participation. However, while I acknowledge the current of conservatism that runs through Putnam's work, I choose to focus here on the progressive potential that social capital carries for democratic civic education.

Outline of the Thesis

Chapter II is an exploration of certain civic virtues that are suited to citizenship in a pluralist, liberal democracy. I first make the distinction between two broad categories of civic virtue, capacities and qualities, before exploring each of the following civic virtues: authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity and tolerance. In chapter III, I argue that Robert Putnam's notion of social capital offers a conceptually rich framework for understanding how the civic virtues under discussion might be developed in non-formal (i.e., community group) contexts. Specifically, chapter III will focus on an explanation of how these civic virtues hold the potential to be enhanced and developed through participation in civic organizations, or in other words, through the norms and

⁸ An illiberal society is defined as "...one which denies its members an education for autonomous moral agency" (Tamir, 1995). Susan Okin (in press), defines illiberal cultures as those which deny some members (e.g., women) meaningful rights of exit from the group. The two definitions are closely linked since the meaningful right to exit depends upon one's having a sufficiently expansive conception of one's identity from which one can autonomously explore and evaluate ways of life that extend beyond those offered by one's local cultural group.

networks of social capital. At the outset of chapter III, I discuss two key objective features, face to face interaction and diversity, which maximize the educational potential of social capital groups. The remainder of chapter III is concerned with how the capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom (which are discussed throughout the chapter, rather than in separate sections) and the qualities of trust, reciprocity and tolerance are enhanced by civic involvement. Finally, chapter IV begins with a discussion of three major conclusions found in the thesis thus far. The chapter concludes with a brief, speculative exercise which demonstrates how others, using the framework I have established, might further explore the intersection between civic virtue and social capital groups. The research for this thesis relies in particular on the philosophical theories of Charles Taylor, John Kekes, Patricia White, Eamonn Callan, Robert Wuthnow and Robert Putnam.

What are the main features of the civic virtues under discussion and what is their relationship to one another? How might citizens actually exercise and use these virtues in democratic, pluralist societies? How are certain civic virtues capable of utilizing, rather than ignoring, cultural differences to the benefit of individuals and society⁹? Given the multitude of conflicting values in a democratic society, the notion that there is one static “public good” that exists and is simply waiting to be fulfilled by dutiful citizens is, of course, vastly oversimplified. Are we living in an age that reveres freedom of choice to the point where the concept of common goods has become an impossibility?¹⁰ How can

⁹ In light of sensitivity to value pluralism, some might take issue with the fact that I am putting forth the civic virtues under discussion as beneficial to society as a whole. In my defense, they do garner widespread social acceptance as civic virtues. Furthermore, I am not attempting to develop a full-fledged theory of citizenship wherein I would justify my chosen civic virtues against competing conceptions.

¹⁰ The issue of cultural pluralism, values, and education is a subject of much debate in contemporary liberal democracies. One of the many questions it poses is: how should we teach values without infringing on the rights of minorities but still maintain our liberal commitments? This thesis does not truly enter into this

individuals, education, and ultimately democracy benefit from a detailed exploration of civic virtue? The structures through which these virtues may be realized and perpetuated—social capital—and its educative potential is the central concept of my thesis.

debate, but does keep its arguments in mind when defending certain civic virtues in light of the pluralist society in which we live.

Chapter II: Civic Virtues

Thus the most democratic country on the face of the earth is that in which men have in our time carried to the highest perfection the art of pursuing in common the object of their common desires, and have applied this new science to the greatest number of purposes (Tocqueville, 1961, p. 129).

Tocqueville's enthusiastic reference to the fledgling United States' "new science" contains two important insights. First, that people pursue goals "in common", or together, and second, that these ends are "common desires". In an increasingly diverse democracy, the process of deciphering 'our' common desires and then actually acting on them in concert places a high demand on citizens. In the present chapter I explore how authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity and tolerance are all civic virtues that are desirable ingredients in establishing a participatory democracy in which the "orchestra" of society is more harmoniously tuned to render *common* pursuit of *common* interests a more attainable reality. I will argue throughout this thesis that the qualities of citizenship I adduce are valuable precisely because they are well-suited to address the reality of value pluralism, conflict, and disagreement. Further, they serve to strengthen a pluralist, liberal democracy. These issues, among others, will constitute the body of Chapter II and will serve to inform us regarding how certain civic virtues help to answer the question of what kind of community is worth having.

A veritable laundry list of civic virtues inherent to being a good citizen have been suggested by both classical and contemporary political philosophers. Classic democratic qualities such as justice, tolerance and personal autonomy have been explored at length (e.g., Dworkin, 1977, 1985; Rawls, 1973, 1993; Raz, 1986; Taylor, 1985). Contemporary

theorists such as Patricia White (1996) argue that educators must inspire students to possess “democratic dispositions” that extend beyond justice and autonomy to encompass such virtues as hope, courage, self-respect, honesty, trust, friendship and decency. The virtues of honesty, integrity, humility, and a desire to serve others have also been suggested (Wuthnow, 1998). “Civility”, as a broad concept under which both tolerance and restraint fall, has had lasting historical significance (Goldwin, 1992). Although some virtues I will be exploring overlap with the above, I have chosen to highlight the civic virtues of authenticity, moral wisdom, trust, reciprocity, and tolerance. This is not because I view them as a comprehensive theory of civic virtue, but rather because they are particularly useful in my later analysis of the educative role of social capital. Finally, it should be noted that these virtues are meant to work in conjunction with each other. Although the virtues, as set forth in the following thesis, are explored individually, the major absence of any one of them in a given situation diminishes their potentially rewarding benefits.

Capacities versus Qualities

The elements of civic virtue under discussion draw upon varying propensities in human beings; thus, I offer a distinction between ‘capacities’ and ‘qualities’ in order to clarify the relationships between the civic virtues that will be explored. For instance, authenticity is the process by which humans are motivated to know themselves affectively and is facilitated by relationships with others (Taylor, 1991). Moral wisdom refers to an exercise in self-reflection that appeals to one’s cognitive and critical capacities (Kekes, 1995). Both authenticity and moral wisdom are broad capacities which are developed over a lifetime and are core features of the self. Alternately, the

qualities of trust, reciprocity and tolerance are virtues that are more specifically applied. For example, one might teach children that the quality of tolerance toward others is a desirable trait. However, perhaps a more effective means of promoting a tolerant citizenry is through encouraging the development of affective self-knowledge, or authenticity, in order that a child might explore the underlying meanings of intolerance toward a given group. If the general capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom have been cultivated and integrated into one's identity, individuals are enabled to assess for themselves why, when and how specific qualities should be applied. Thus, capacities and qualities are best utilized in partnership with each other. Authenticity, an essential ingredient in this union, is elaborated upon below, mainly using the theories of political philosopher Charles Taylor.

Authenticity

According to Taylor (1991), the idea of authenticity is based on the hypothesis that humans are endowed with an intuitive moral sense that is anchored in one's emotional responses. Therefore, being in touch with, and generating a self based on one's moral feelings is fundamental to acting morally and, thereby, good citizenship. In turn, shared citizenship in the form of civic groups holds the potential of furthering self-knowledge through interaction with others, particularly others who hold differing worldviews. In short, authentic identity formation and civic participation are mutually reinforcing. While I am mainly concerned with how authenticity relies on connections with others as a source from which to derive aspects of one's identity, it is noted that authenticity relies on individual autonomy in order to push the boundaries of one's

current self and worldviews forward¹¹. I choose to emphasize the pivotal role of connectedness in the development of authenticity partly because of a general societal shift toward autonomy at the expense of connectedness, but mainly because this conception of authenticity is central to shared citizenship in a pluralistic society.

An example will serve to shed more light on the above relationships between authentic self-development, connectedness and diversity. A young woman from a fundamentalist Christian background who leaves home for university might begin to question the beliefs transmitted to her in her upbringing and begin seeking a more authentic self. Does she reject the values taught to her and break off ties to her past? Does she become fearful of the difference in others that she encounters and retreat to the company of those with similar backgrounds? How she goes about the process of seeking “authenticity” is crucial to the outcome of her identity and her role as citizen.

Taylor distinguishes between two opposing interpretations of the term authenticity: the first is authenticity as a moral ideal, whose virtues he defends throughout the book. The second is authenticity as the single-minded pursuit of self-gratification, a definition which he contends cheapens the true potential of authenticity (1991). Taylor argues that there is an often ignored or forgotten moral force behind this latter interpretation of self-fulfillment or, to use his term, "the contemporary culture of authenticity"; his work is a study in retrieval in order to remind us of what he considers to be the moral origins of authenticity. In The Malaise of Modernity, Taylor (1991) focuses on areas where the widespread "culture of narcissism" is believed to be taking its toll, resulting in an overall loss of meaning, lack of moral ideals, and an emphasis on a purely

¹¹ The original formulation of authenticity as put forth by Jean Jacques Rousseau stressed the idea that “I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me” (Taylor, 1991, p. 27), rather than being shaped only by

inward focus. The once radical notion of self-determining freedom (i.e., "I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me") is useful only to a point, after which it becomes a self-serving form of the ideal of authenticity. As Taylor asserts:

Self-determining freedom is in part the default solution of the culture of authenticity while at the same time it is its bane, since it further intensifies anthropocentrism. This sets up a vicious circle that heads us towards a point where our major remaining value is choice itself (1991, p. 69).

Taylor refers to this tension between the two forms of authenticity as "a struggle between higher and lower forms of freedom" (1991, p. 78), for we are generally at a loss as to what to do with our freedom given emphasis in Western civilization on the importance of the individual and, ultimately, it begins to consume us in its lowest, most self-centered form. Francis Fukuyama (1999) offers a vision of what the costs that extreme individualism can have on society: "A society dedicated to the constant upending of norms and rules in the name of expanding individual freedom of choice will find itself increasingly disorganized, atomized, isolated, and incapable of carrying out common goals and tasks" (p. 60). Jean Vanier (1998) also warns that in such a society "...an ethics of justice, solidarity, and cooperation, an ethics of the common good, can quickly fade into the background" (p. 52). These descriptions stand in stark contrast to a society in which citizens have common objective goals which are pursued, as Tocqueville remarked, "in common" and in which citizens possess a higher common denominator of values than merely that of self-determining choice.

To return to our previous example of the young woman from a fundamentalist Christian background who is at the threshold of her journey of self-determination, notice

external controls.

that the sort of choice involved in the 'higher' form of authenticity is dependent upon connectedness and relationships in a far more substantial way than the manner of choosing observed in Taylor's 'lower' form of authenticity. In the former instance, we cannot uproot or disconnect ourselves from all relationships; we must accept some as given and stable while we reflect on others (for example, I accept my role as a Christian as I reflect upon and challenge my identity as a fundamentalist Christian). Of course, later on I may turn around and challenge my Christian-ness, but then I will need to rely on some other aspects of my identity and relationships in order to do so. In the debased form of authenticity, no relationships or connections are needed in order to give value or depth to one's choices. One merely psychically 'moves' in one direction or another (e.g., chocolate or vanilla ice cream). One needs no independent value standards to adjudicate the choice in the same way one would when choosing between full-fledged acceptance of one's fundamentalist Christian roots or a modified version of the religious beliefs taught to one. Thus, the process of authenticity is rooted in our connections with others, rather than necessarily subversive to them.

In fact, Taylor would argue that by strictly expending our energies toward individual quests we are actually defeating our own purposes. Contrary to the culture of narcissism, we become full human agents (and therefore effective citizens) through interaction with significant others. The contemporary culture of authenticity would instruct us to form a purely personal understanding of self-fulfillment, whereas the moral ideal of authenticity encourages individualism in freedom for the self in conjunction with models for society. One example of this is obtaining equal recognition in society. The process of seeking equal recognition has most often been achieved through the combined

efforts of others in groups or social movements, such as the civil rights movement, the gay rights movement, the women's movement, associations for people with disabilities, etcetera. Such movements constitute social capital and work to further, not only self-knowledge, but also the aims of a pluralist, liberal democracy. This discussion will be taken up in chapter III.

Authenticity is necessary for shared citizenship and for common objective pursuits to emerge; indeed, authenticity and living in a diverse society have a mutually beneficial relationship. Related to the idea of "I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me", Jeff Spinner-Halev (2000) explores the connection between the autonomous aspect of authenticity and diversity. He argues that interaction with others who are different can only serve to increase the autonomy and individuality of citizens because they are exposed to different conceptions of the good life (i.e., connections with other individuals). After such interaction, citizens might feel further justified in their own beliefs or might incorporate some of the views of others into their own worldview. In this way, authentic people "use the resources of a pluralistic and tolerant culture critically to develop a valuable individuality" (Spinner-Halev, 2000, p. 75). Similarly, Taylor (1998) argues that citizens can bond, "not in spite of, but because of difference" (1998, p. 214). In other words, difference deepens and broadens the horizons of the individual who risks knowing different others. As Taylor states, "...we can only benefit from the full range of human achievement and capacity if we live in close association with people who have taken other paths. To attempt to force conformity is to condemn ourselves to a narrower and poorer life" (1998, p. 214). Therefore, even if citizens do not sway one another in their beliefs, individuals and society acquire a depth or richness

through the process of interaction with one another.

For example, if the young woman from a fundamentalist Christian background were to join a campus committee where she worked with others from varying backgrounds, perhaps she would encounter people who were pro-choice, a social position which runs counter to that which she was taught. For her to listen to their arguments, and to offer her own in return, is for each to personally witness the perspective of the other in what can often be a bitter societal debate. The exchange may also go a step further towards reaping the benefits of authenticity if each side is willing to let go of their own positions enough to empathize with the perspective of the other. In order to make “authentic” decisions, that is, decisions that are truly our own, we must formulate and defend our positions in light of points of view we may not share, even deeply disagree with, or perhaps which we are as yet completely ignorant but yet must willingly entertain. Empathy is a vital means of shedding light on the positions of others at the same time as it is self-revealing. “When we take the role of another, we are able to look back at ourselves from the other’s perspective (Vela-McConnell, 1999, p. 36). Whether or not either side definitively changes its position is irrelevant; for an exchange to have taken place at all is an exercise in both authenticity and democracy. In fact, Taylor (1998) asserts that, in terms of the decision-making process of liberal democracies, the very legitimacy of the pluralist state (with its foundation of popular sovereignty) is at issue. For joint decision-making rests on joint deliberation and this requires that the decisions of the state be based on active consideration of the views of all. Thus, Taylor concludes that in order for the state to legitimately claim that it takes into account all sides in the decision-making process, a level of “cohesion” and knowingness is required. “To some

extent, the members [of a society] must know one another, listen to one another, and understand one another” (1998, p. 220). As will be argued in chapter three, social capital groups can greatly facilitate this process.

If self-fulfillment requires relationships and moral demands that move beyond the self, effective citizenship requires one to be in touch with the intuitive moral sense and individual voice that, according to Taylor, we each possess. It is in this way that self-knowledge, active citizenship in a diverse society and self-fulfillment have the potential to be mutually reinforcing and interdependent. Living an authentic life inherently implies numerous qualities already mentioned as being beneficial to good citizenship, such as the courage necessary to confront oneself and express one’s autonomous views; a sense of self-respect; integrity; interconnectedness, including the ability to trust others; and the tolerance it requires to realize that others may have legitimate values which run counter to one’s own. The distinction between authenticity as self-gratification and authenticity as a moral ideal of self-reflection and self-development must be underscored. The former is grounded in the value of choice itself, rather than the quality of one’s choices or the ways in which one’s own authentic choices are shaped by and affirmed in relationships to others. Thus, authenticity is both rooted in and necessary for shared citizenship. If authenticity requires self-knowledge at the level of moral identity, the next capacity to be discussed, moral wisdom, the process of evaluating how the unique “I” proceeds in making moral decisions, requires self-knowledge of a different sort. These two capacities complement one another in that they draw on different features—expressive and evaluative—of the self. Where authenticity is primarily concerned with identity formation, moral wisdom lies in the realm of action—actions that are in line with one’s

moral identity.

Moral Wisdom

John Kekes (1995) defines moral wisdom as the virtue of reflection that is concerned with what human beings should do to live a good life.¹² A fundamental question that a reflective, thoughtful person striving to attain moral wisdom must ask is: "What should I do in this concrete situation, given my overall view of what a good life should be" (p. 5)? As Kekes notes, this question contains a double "should", the former regarding means and the latter regarding ends, and is particular to each individual. This mention of means and ends is not intended to create a stark separation between them, but rather to demonstrate how they work in concert with each other, for the moral character under present discussion would not be a coherent concept if an individual considered one without any concern for the other. Thus, the individual possessing moral wisdom evaluates both means and ends in order to determine what will bring them closer to the good life. This is already a complex endeavor for citizens to undertake, but it is further complicated by the fact that in liberal, pluralist democratic societies we need to undertake these projects while maintaining respect for multiple conceptions of the good, even those with which we currently disagree.

The logical questions that follow are how would one define the good and what is the process of striving toward it? John Kekes asserts that given that we can identify many common, undisputed physiological needs and capacities in healthy human beings (for example, the needs of food, safety, nurturance, etc.), then it is indisputably true that

¹² For Kekes, moral wisdom is aided by three modes: moral imagination or "the mental exploration of what it would be like to realize particular possibilities" (p. 101); self-knowledge or "...knowledge directed inward by the knower" (e.g., authenticity) (p. 118); and moral depth or "...to possess a deep understanding of some matter...hav[ing] a specific connection with truth" (p. 165-6). An in-depth exploration of these

any human life is better if it possesses the goods of self-possession, connectedness, and social order. Regarding the last of these, the lives of those living in war-torn or highly violent contexts demonstrate that social disorder renders self-development in relation to dissimilar others (i.e., authenticity) a much less likely possibility. This is for the plain reason that individuals are more bent on survival than on self-realization. Thus, a person striving toward the good life would aim at having the capacity to satisfy his or her psychological and physiological needs, establish close relationships, and live in a society which makes these goods possible, although how people choose to satisfy these needs will vary widely with each individual. Kekes refers to these ideas as "primary values", or human nature dictating that "...some things will normally benefit all human beings and, similarly, that some things will normally harm everyone" (1995, p. 19). Primary values are distinguishable from "secondary values" which are comprised of more variables and a greater range of goods, depending on one's life circumstances, disposition, and so on (Kekes, 1995, p. 19). For instance, an individual might have a passionate interest in anything ranging from political protest to yoga to wheelchair basketball; this might be felt to the degree that their lives would be seriously diminished without such goods. These can be characterized as secondary values since not everyone values yoga in the same way that the vast majority value the primary good of, for example, close connections with others.

However, it can be argued that both primary and secondary values can be conceived of in different ways. For example, if everyone must achieve the primary values of community and connectedness for their general well being, then presumably everyone should have it for the reasons Kekes makes clear (e.g., to satisfy needs for love,

concepts are beyond the scope of this paper.

safety, social order, etc.). But people may meet this need in very different ways and even conceive of its value and worth differently. For example, a Hasidic Jewish person may meet their need for community by living in an extremely tight-knit, highly traditional community that is as exclusive as possible to the larger society. In contrast, another individual might have much looser, but far ranging connections with others in her community by joining in common cause with others who hold varying conceptions of the good. At the level of secondary values, community may also play a differential role in people's lives. For example, a parent's concern for his disabled child may lead him to value connectedness with other parents in similar positions. This value cannot be fulfilled without community. However, this valuing of connectedness specifically with other parents of disabled children (distinct from the need for community per se) is secondary because not everyone needs it.

The exercise of moral wisdom requires an ongoing awareness of both one's specific situation and one's overall conception of the good. As an example, what if a parent's desire for more government resources for the education of disabled children has implications for other forms of valuable social life? A morally wise individual must also exercise a concern for the security and stability of society as a whole. Thus moral wisdom, like authenticity, does theoretically require a balance between autonomy and connectedness in that individuals must simultaneously reflect on how to best meet their own needs and on the type of society in which they want to live. In this way, individuals are confronted with the role they play, or in other words, the impact their actions have in creating the character of their society. For one's reflection on one's conception of the good is complexly and inextricably linked and interwoven with those of others'. Being a

morally wise citizen requires the initiative to "take responsibility for oneself and make difficult decisions as the need arises. This kind of strength does not necessarily precede civic involvement but emerges as people face the challenges it presents... " (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 169). Thus, a person possessing moral wisdom would retain an idea of what the good life entails as he or she makes "difficult decisions". In this way, good citizens will have thoughtful responses for the reasons underlying their actions, reasons that are imbedded in their philosophy of the good and which are often made apparent through interaction with others in civic life. A component of one's overall philosophy of the good that falls under the umbrella of moral wisdom is the quality of trust.

Trust

According to educational philosopher Patricia White, at the very least, "trust is a form of belief" (1996, p. 54) in the expectations that one has of another person or entity. In thinking about the relationship between citizens and their "expectations", what is both reasonable and necessary for citizens to expect of one another and the state in order for democracy to optimally function? Is distrust ever productive and if so, in what forms? How does trust affect the democratic process and, in turn, how might it be fostered and maintained? Trust can be broken down into two types--interpersonal and institutional trust. In this section I will first discuss the paradigm case of interpersonal trust in order to clarify in simpler terms the analogous, but less familiar notion of institutional trust. Both institutional and interpersonal trust are important for notions of civic virtue and in places where I do not make such a distinction, the intended meaning encompasses both forms of trust.

Interpersonal trust may be regarded as a degree of the “subjective probability” (Gambetta in White, 1996, p. 53) with which one might deduce if another will meet one’s expectations. Thus, if probability of met expectations or positive outcome is high, then, correspondingly, trust will also be high. This might also be characterized as reliance on another and, in certain cases, this could be extended to reliance on actual “goodwill” shown toward one (Baier in White, 1996, p. 53). In addition, if the risk, either due to previous negative experience or confronting the unknown is high, one’s consciousness of the trusting relationship will be very great. Whereas, if trust has been proven or is taken for granted, one’s consciousness of trust will generally not be as primed (White, 1996). For example, I do not expect my money to disappear each time I make a deposit in the bank in the same way that I do not expect my closest friends to gossip about the private things I reveal to them. In both cases, one institutional and one personal, I am trusting others because I have deemed them deserving of my trust, although it is not necessary for me to be vigilant of that trust. In terms of the commitment or feeling continuum, where trust is very deep and the commitment in a given relationship is high, the event of a betrayal will be devastating on a level that would not be comparable to a low trust, low feeling relationship. “Trust, then, involves the belief that you can rely on someone (e.g., specifically, their beliefs, dispositions, motives, goodwill) or something (e.g., the efficiency of a piece of equipment) where there is a greater or lesser element of risk” (White, 1996, p. 54).

In pluralist societies, especially in the contexts within which civic virtues come into play, the contexts within which we can have the sort of taken for granted trust we give to banks may be few and far between. Disagreement, conflict and strife are likely to

be the norm where pluralism is a fact of life. Thus, trust will always be under some significant threat. When we ask about trust in civic contexts this raises the question of what should (and should not) be the object of our trust in democratic societies? In other words, in what are we holding expectations? Trust does not require that common goals be found, or that all will find ways to work together that please everyone. Rather, as White (1996) puts forth, one should ideally expect that one's fellow citizens and the state at large generally have one's well-being in mind; this expectation includes the fairness of procedures (e.g., policies, laws) under which one lives.

The expectation of well-being is integral to White's definition of social trust¹³, which she defines as: "the widespread belief among citizens that the whole system is functioning to promote the well-being of all its members" (White, 1996, p. 57). On an interpersonal level, this entails an expectation that one's fellow citizens will have undergone a certain measure of self-reflection—both in regards to their moral identity (i.e., authenticity) and how their morals are enacted (i.e., moral wisdom). For example, I would be much more likely to trust in another citizen if I knew that she had authentically explored her feelings of intolerance towards particular groups in society, some of which may include me. In addition, if I knew that she made moral decisions in light of, not only her given situation, but also her larger view of the good, my expectations, and hence trust, in her would be increased. As will be further explored in chapter III, social capital groups provide an opportunity for individuals to explore their moral identities, ideally in relation to a diverse range of values and ideas. Thus, as citizens become 'schooled' in the art of civic virtues, others' trust in them has good reason to increase.

¹³ Social trust refers to general societal trust. It is especially useful in reference to social capital groups.

Overlapping with the expectation that fellow citizens (at the level of both individuals and groups) be disposed to one's general well-being is the necessity of structural fairness. For citizens to have trust in the state, they need to believe (trust ultimately being a form of belief) that the process by which policies, laws, etc. are enacted and upheld are just and will fairly represent all positions and perspectives. "...it seems to be a necessary condition for social trust that citizens do not regard their society as structurally unfair" (Dunn in White, 1996). For instance, one must believe that those who 'win' the result will take into account as much as possible the interests of the minority and that those who suffer a loss in a particular case will abide by the fairly achieved result.

What is the outcome of citizens' feelings of well-being on the part of each other and the state? Again, according to Patricia White, the result of widespread social trust is the feeling of "social confidence" in the system¹⁴. This entails being conscious of society's major values, affirmation of their importance, and implicit and explicit reinforcement of them (White, 1996, p. 57). White's definition of social confidence implies that people living within a liberal democratic society agree on its "major values", a task which becomes not only more challenging, but also more necessary, as liberal democracies become more diverse. I would alter White's definition of social confidence slightly to say that, rather than one needing to be "conscious" of society's major values, which sounds like a more passive process, one should be deliberating on and shaping society's major values. Through this process of jointly exploring society's major values, citizens potentially gain greater social confidence in the system. In this way, the

¹⁴ Social confidence must obviously be based on well founded and reasonable information, rather than the product of propagandizing and indoctrination.

relationship between the outcome of trust, and what further generates trust, is revealed to be a highly interactive process. For instance, if people are civically engaged with a diverse range of citizens, they are more likely to understand and accept decisions that are legitimate and worthwhile to others even if they are personally disappointing. However, if people's interactions with others have the opposite effect, and instead erode confidence (e.g., if one becomes more aware of society's injustices), the process of dialogue is still valuable in that one might be inspired to create a society in which one might have greater social trust.

How does distrust in the state affect a liberal, participatory democracy? White (1996) asserts that in fact, trust in institutions depends on distrust in the form of built-in, self-monitoring mechanisms in order to reassure the public that the government is deserving of overall trust. Examples of this are multiple political parties, the "checks and balances" system in the division of power, a free press, an independent judiciary, independent commissions of inquiry into matters concerning the government, and, importantly, an engaged public who is free to critically monitor the actions of its government. However, what are the consequences if social distrust becomes rampant? White makes a distinction between procedural distrust, or distrust in the state's means, and "fundamental distrust", or distrust in actual ends or aims¹⁵; she claims that a liberal democratic system is capable of sustaining large degrees of the former, but not of the latter. An example of fundamental distrust in the intentions of the government would be people, mainly in the Northwestern part of the United States, who stockpile their own weapons for potential use against the government and refuse to pay taxes; these groups

¹⁵ This can be compared to personal distrust in that one might distrust particular qualities in a person, but still have faith in her goodwill toward one (procedural distrust) or one might question the overall feeling in

seem to lack trust in either the procedures and/or the principles of the state. In contrast, social movements, which some might initially interpret as fundamental distrust (and hence destructive to the state), have historically served to actually raise social confidence in the long-run (Putnam, 2000).

Social movements demonstrate that trust can be displayed by oppositional behavior. For example, the current protests waged against international governmental trade deals might reflect distrust in the means of the current government, but they do demonstrate a deeper sort of trust in the very meaning of democracy on which the constitutions of the United States and Canada were founded. Many who are protesting share the belief that their government does not have the goodwill of all of its members in mind (e.g., the working class) but are making their dissatisfactions known in the hopes that their position will be taken into account and, consequently, some of their trust be restored. The Civil Rights Movement is another example of a large portion of citizens who, legitimately, held a fundamental distrust in the government and channeled that sense of distrust and betrayal into action. The latter two examples, unlike the instance of people who are distrustful in the government to the point where they organize their own militias, are still invested in and engaged within a democratic framework and, in fact, they are manifesting and demanding more of it. Thus, while social movement protesters do not necessarily trust in the current political regime, they do demonstrate a deep trust in the framework of democracy¹⁶. Further, social movement participants often use means which are intended to appeal to the consciences of their fellow citizens. This is in itself

another person (fundamental distrust) (White, 1996).

¹⁶ There are some factions in, for example the civil rights movement (i.e., Black Panthers) and the anti-globalization movement (i.e., anarchists) who did or do not support the fundamental framework of the state. However, their participation serves to add a different, needed, viewpoint to the dialogue over what

an exhibition of trust, although their appeals may at times have bordered on desperate hope¹⁷. For instance, those who took significant risks to call the nation's attention to the vast inequalities and constant threat of physical violence under which most Blacks in the Southern United States lived, were trusting in the civic virtue of their fellow citizens. Their goal was to enliven the moral conscience of the nation in the belief/hope that citizens would empathize with their plight. As has been discussed, the likelihood of this occurring would have been increased in citizens who had cultivated the capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom.

The above discussion illustrates how important the trust/distrust continuum is for the healthy functioning of a liberal democracy, particularly considering the extent to which individual freedoms are afforded in such a system. "Trust...is often called a device for dealing with the freedom of others... in the absence of which we are simply left with hope" (White, 1996, p. 59). This quotation alludes to the vulnerable nature of diverse, democratic societies in which people are generally free to champion the causes of others or to actively disdain them, to 'pull their fair share' in the form of civic participation, taxes, etcetera, or to allow others to take on the social costs and problems. In this sense, free societies do demand a greater degree of commitment on the part of citizens than do despotic societies¹⁸. Accordingly, Taylor offers "a continuing and constantly renewed mutual commitment" as an antidote to societal distrust (Taylor, 1998, p. 221). I will argue that social capital groups are a means to renew such commitment.

society's major values should be.

¹⁷ See particularly Doug McAdam's (1988) *Freedom Summer*, in which the (mainly Black) participants of SNCC (the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee) strategically relied on privileged White college students confronting the brutality of White Mississippi in order to finally attract the nation's attention.

¹⁸ "Thinkers in the civic humanist tradition, from Aristotle through to Arendt, have noted that free societies require a higher level of commitment and participation than despotic or authoritarian ones" (Taylor, 1998, p. 221).

In liberal democracies people who hold a wide range of values must work cooperatively and, as such, the role of institutions and civic groups becomes increasingly important, for they provide an intermediary in which different cultures can occupy the same space and exchange ideas and viewpoints. Implementing such an approach increases the potential for widespread social trust that, as White (1996) and Putnam (1995, 2000) suggest, has an “invigorating” effect on the institutional and social life of a society. As an example of this, varying theorists have noted that strong and warranted ties of trust are essential in order for reciprocity to function (Dworkin in Callan, 1997, p. 95).

Reciprocity

Reciprocity, or the act of making a “reasonable agreement on fair terms of cooperation”, draws on the combined efforts of empathic identification and reasoned dialogue and begins with the recognition that even if viewpoints might be opposing, they are equally important and valid (Callan, 1997, p. 27). In short, reciprocity is the mutual act of evaluating and discussing the claims of others on their own terms as opposed to one’s own.

I must provisionally suspend the thought that you are simply wrong and enter imaginatively into the moral perspective you occupy.... Empathic identification must be combined with a willingness to bring the shared resources of reason to bear on the conflict at hand (Callan, 1997, p. 26).

Thus, in demonstrating reciprocity, two parties with divergent claims will jointly explore the relative worth and implications of each of their positions. For example, let us say that a committee is making plans for that year’s annual gay film festival. After investigating the city’s movie theatres, they make an agreement with a theatre to hold all of the festival

films in that location; however, the theatre that they have chosen is not wheelchair accessible. After this fact is made public, there is an outcry from citizens who are wheelchair-bound and wish to see the films, as well as their supporters. In addition, those who identify as gay and disabled argue that they are doubly-disadvantaged in society and discriminated against by members of their own community. During the film festival many people who use wheelchairs picket in front of the theatre. How would the situation have differed if both parties had been exercising reciprocity?

First, the committee could have considered the possibility that people with various disabilities would want to see the films in an effort to meet as many people's needs as possible in choosing a site. This involves an act of empathetic identification with other members of society, or 'de-centering' one's self to the point where one imagines how people with disabilities will feel if they are denied access and realizing that someone in a wheelchair should have the same opportunity as someone who is able-bodied. If the theatre that the committee chose was the only possibility for the festival considering other key factors (e.g., the importance of a central location), then the two parties should combine their "shared resources of reason" to determine an outcome both consider acceptable. This requires that people who are disabled reciprocate by imagining how many factors are involved in planning a large community event and the limitations, such as the unavailability of theatres, that are imposed on the committee. For example, if the festival is not held at that particular theatre, does that mean that those without cars will be unable to access another location or perhaps even that the festival cannot take place at all? The two parties must collaboratively explore all possibilities and their implications in order to widen the possibility of reaching an agreement.

In order to derive the greatest benefit from this sort of dialogue, reciprocity works optimally in conjunction with other civic virtues already discussed. As mentioned earlier, reciprocity requires that both parties trust that the other is making the greatest effort to take the his/her position into account. For, “The absence of trust deprives us of the mutual regard we need if we are to interpret our moral differences charitably, as honourable disagreements that inevitably occur when reasonable people deliberate together in good faith” (Callan, 1997, p. 95). Reciprocity is also enhanced by authenticity and moral wisdom. If authentic people, or people who recognize the importance of connectedness and who are in touch with their moral positions, are embroiled in debate, the possibility that reciprocity will occur is increased because those people will have exercised their empathy ‘muscle’ in their own self-development. In addition, reciprocity is also aided by those who have nurtured the capacity of rationally evaluating their own values and viewpoints (e.g., moral wisdom). Finally, reciprocity would not be very successful unless the parties involved shared a level of tolerance for one another.

Tolerance

What is tolerance? Does it carry with it the implication of merely ‘tolerating’ someone in the same way that one would endure an annoying acquaintance or a screaming baby on a bus? In other words, does it connote merely grudging acceptance? Like trust, tolerance implies a range of possible behavior and thought. At the minimum, tolerance is allowing for the rights of others who are causing no harm in their actions or beliefs. Of course, “harm” can be broadly interpreted. For instance, some might believe that the existence of gay people is harmful for many aspects of society, including the

family unit and young people. However, through hard-won efforts, society has reached a point where at least some rights of gay people are protected (e.g., the right not to be arrested, lose one's job, or be verbally or physically harassed or assaulted under the law). The balance between the rights of gay people and the perceived harm they can cause to society has shifted. Thus one could say that, overall, society has become more tolerant of the existence of gay people even though there are many areas where there is still a perceived threat of harm (e.g., gay teachers, gay marriages, gays in the military, etcetera). Tolerance for other minorities in positions of power and influence (including women) has similarly increased in recent decades, largely as a result of the gains made by social movements.

At the other end of the spectrum, one finds a far different conception of tolerance. This type of tolerance is not based on fear of harm to self and society (although it is a consideration), but on recognition of the equality and legitimacy of other worldviews--in short, on respect. Indeed, one may even welcome the diversity of worldviews, as many Torontonians are doing upon recognizing that theirs is the most diverse city in North America and possibly the world. Thus, returning to our previous example, a heterosexual individual who approaches others in this sense would acknowledge that the lives of gay people are as equally legitimate as his own and may also recognize the benefits of interacting with this population such as enriching his own understanding of different worldviews, and, as was discussed previously, ultimately becoming a more autonomous self. Where this acceptance of other worldviews might become problematic is in drawing the line as to what one can recognize as 'equal and legitimate' and worthy of respect. Can such a society tolerate physical abuse of one's partner? In this instance, battering is

not a worldview that liberal democratic societies can tolerate because the harm incurred is too great. Thus, in instances where one has doubts as to whether or not to cast legitimate status on a given group or worldview one must return to the harm principle outlined above. Obviously, the worldviews that one will deem as worthy of genuine respect, and those that one will tolerate in the lower sense of the word, will vary with each individual. How one comes to these conclusions is where the role of authenticity and moral wisdom come into play, in addition to the opportunities one has to interact with others who possess world-views different from one's own. Thus, the difference in the degree of tolerance at one end begins and ends at 'allowing for' the rights of others based on whether or not they will cause harm to society. The other end of the continuum confers equal and legitimate status to others who are different from one's self, potentially takes advantage of the differences to enrich one's self and, only in cases of doubt, draws on whether or not a given worldview is harmful to others. How often, and for what reasons, an individual is on one side of the spectrum or the other will determine whether or not that individual can be deemed a "tolerant" person or not.

In this sense, the phrase "teach tolerance" takes on a vastly different meaning depending on one's orientation toward difference. In families where parents do not generally recognize the values of others as equal to their own, parents most likely would not encourage their children to interact with others whose worldviews are foreign to their own. If I am grudgingly allowing for the rights of others only because they, in turn, will allow me my rights, what motivation would I have to interact with them? In this sense, these parents might instead teach 'toleration'. Alternately, if a parent wishes her children to learn to respect and see the worth of other cultures and worldviews, she would be

encouraging both tolerance and autonomy. Tolerance is very amenable to being learned, since intolerance or barely tolerant is often perpetuated by ignorance and fear of dissimilar others. Thus, tolerance, in the 'higher' sense of the word does demand a high degree of interaction with different others in order to educate for empathy and respect for different perspectives. The potential rewards are to learn from the differences one encounters in others in order to further enrich one's own self.

Implications for Education

I do not think that the system of interest, as it is professed in America, is, in all its parts, self-evident; but it contains a great number of truths so evident, that men, if they are but educated, cannot fail to see them. Educate, then, at any rate; for the age of implicit self-sacrifice and instinctive virtues is already flitting far away from us, and the time is fast approaching when freedom, public peace, and social order itself will not be able to exist without education (Tocqueville, 1961, p.148-9).

As it was in Tocqueville's time, the concern over educating for civic virtues is most commonly expressed within the curriculum, structure and policies of the formal school. My interest, while it overlaps in the realm of how to educate for civic virtue, is somewhat different. I will explore alternate "schools for democracy" (Putnam, 1995), or the myriad forms of civic life that hold the potential to be highly educational for citizens in a liberal, pluralist democratic society. "...if you want education you must not cut it off from the social interests in which it has its living and perennial sources" (Jackson in Crowther & Shaw, 1997, p. 267). This thesis is embedded precisely in these "social interests", a powerful medium wherein learning can be take place. For instance, an

example explored in chapter III is how a portion of volunteers from the Northern U.S. learned the virtue of reciprocity (among others) during their experience of the 'Freedom Summer' campaign for civil rights in Mississippi in 1964.

Social movements are often built through existing social networks (e.g., social capital groups) and are a form of social capital themselves. I view social movements as essential to the continuation of social trust, the expansion of tolerance and the fundamental survival of a liberal democracy. I will continue to use the example of social movements as social capital, in particular the Civil Rights Movement, in order to illustrate how social capital educates for civic virtues.

The articulation of a vision which expresses the social nature of our experience, which aims to turn personal troubles into public issues and to support social movements which act to transform the world must be regarded as legitimate educational aims. Educational engagement with dissenting citizens starkly poses an enriched democratic culture against an impoverished participation (Crowther & Shaw, 1997, p. 274).

I assert that "dissenting citizens" are not only working to realize the "freedom, public peace and social order" to which Tocqueville referred, but are also renewing their sense of civic virtue. What concerned Tocqueville was those citizens who took their rights for granted and who, with each generation, became further and further removed from a sense of "implicit self-sacrifice" or acting to achieve their version of the greater good rather than their own private good. It is the descent into private happiness to the exclusion of the public domain that I believe education, in whatever form, can help to prevent.

Chapter III: Social Capital Theory

The previous chapter explored the capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom and the qualities of trust, reciprocity and tolerance. My focus was related to why and how these particular virtues are beneficial in the context of a pluralist, deliberative democracy. In such a democracy widespread citizen participation and debate is essential for the legitimacy and optimal functioning of the state. These virtues were discussed in the context of their usefulness for moral self-reflection (i.e., especially authenticity and moral wisdom), productive exchanges with others (i.e., social trust and reciprocity), and broadening the sphere of respect for one another (i.e., tolerance). However, it should be reiterated that these civic virtues work in conjunction with one another and the major absence of any one of them in terms of civic life diminishes the potential benefits. My primary aim in the current chapter is to explore how social capital can and does function as an agent of civic education and what forces might enhance or endanger this educational role. My own use of the term “social capital” is an extension of Robert Putnam’s work (1995, 2000). Throughout this chapter I will critically examine Putnam’s formulation of social capital, the ways in which my own use of the term differs and why I believe my distinctions are important for the attainment of civic virtue. Specifically, I emphasize the educational necessity of diversity within community groups (e.g., “bridging” social capital) and the added educational benefits of social activist groups. Therefore, I am de-emphasizing homogenous groups (e.g., people who share similar backgrounds, worldviews, etc.) in my usage of the term social capital. The reasons for this will be explored in the section entitled “The objective features of social capital”.

Putnam argues that the “civic crisis” we are currently facing is similar to the situation at the close of the nineteenth century when industrialization and its accompanying urbanization altered society’s sense of community and civic engagement. How did our predecessors respond? Putnam cites reforms from the Progressive era, settlement houses, and service clubs as the salvation of civic society well into the twentieth century (Putnam, 1995). It remains to be seen how our current post-modern society will respond to the alleged decline in social capital; however, there is little doubt that diverse social capital groups educate for the civic virtues of which pluralist, liberal democratic societies are sorely in need and which, in turn, further rejuvenate social capital.

The Objective Features of Social Capital

In the previous chapter the working definition of social capital, as put forth by Robert Putnam included “networks, norms and social trust” (1995, p. 67) among its features. It is useful at this juncture to distinguish between two different conceptual dimensions at which social capital operates and which are suggested in the above definition. The first is at the level of ‘objective’ features of social capital: social groups (e.g., the PTA), social movements (e.g., the women’s movement) or norms (e.g., the social norm of greeting one’s neighbor). The second is at the level of social-psychological qualities of character or values (e.g., social trust, reciprocity, tolerance, etc.). These dimensions are not, by any means, mutually exclusive; for example, social groups or movements are in some sense ‘glued together’ or constituted by the trust and reciprocity evinced by group members. In turn, social capital groups can further promote the aforementioned civic virtues. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine either how social

groups and communities can be held together in a stable and ongoing way without civic virtue or how civic virtue can be developed by individuals by themselves without cohesive social groups within which to develop these virtues. Nonetheless, they are not synonymous and it is important to distinguish between them, particularly where education is concerned. For example, adults may continue to display certain civic virtues or qualities of character even when the objective conditions for creating and reproducing these virtues in younger members of the group are threatened, neglected or gone altogether. Thus, over the long-term and across generations (as in this example) civic virtue would be difficult to sustain without strong and stable forms of social capital. We will be unable to understand the relationship between the objective and subjective conditions of social capital unless we first acknowledge the distinction between them. Once separated, further essential questions for exploration are exposed: What kinds of groups, networks, or norms are more or less likely to produce civic virtues and why? In other words, what particular objective characteristics of social capital optimize the cultivation of civic virtues?

Face-to-Face Interaction

One essential objective feature is social capital groups whose group members interact on a face-to-face level; this is necessary to educate for the virtues required for citizenship at larger, more anonymous levels. Benedict Anderson (1991) developed the notion of ‘imagined community’ (e.g., nations) that are enabled by modern technology such as printing presses, television, radio, etcetera. These are the means by which people come to be able to see others, whom they will never meet and have no concrete idea of, as fellow “citizens”. It is difficult to imagine civic virtue being developed directly

through the kinds of relationships citizens have with each other as members of ‘imagined communities’ of the kind Anderson describes. In what follows, I strive to illuminate the unique role that social capital can play in teaching civic virtues that cannot be easily replicated in more anonymous communities until first learned on a smaller scale. That is, I am unlikely to learn to trust my anonymous fellow citizen in British Columbia and to act accordingly unless I have first learned that trust is possible, and what the features of trusting another previously unknown to me involve in a face-to-face group¹⁹. One might interpret this to mean that learning civic virtues through face to face community involvement is merely a stage in one’s civic development after which time social capital groups are easily discarded. I assert that unless an individual continues to renew her commitment to small scale community groups and only interacts on the level of the personal (e.g., one’s close friends and family) and/or governmental (e.g., voting, paying taxes), the ‘lessons’ in civic virtue do not necessarily remain. An example will serve to clarify the issue.

A Black man who is a parent volunteer in his children’s multiracial school begins to build bridges with members of the White community. A certain measure of mutual trust and respect has begun to emerge and, through dialogue, each side has become more likely to consider the perspective of the other (e.g., reciprocity). After a few years he stops his volunteer work for lack of time and, living and working in a nearly all Black environment, continuously hears stories from friends and colleagues about lived experiences of racism at the hands of Whites. He hears news reports about institutionalized racism in everything from drug-offense laws to enforcement of the death

¹⁹ In gathering the statistical figures for his book Bowling Alone (2000), Robert Putnam has only included face to face social capital groups for reasons I explicate above.

penalty. While neither the sources nor substance of this are new to him, his perspective on White people has become almost completely one-sided. Although he might have begun to trust a few other White parents during his years as a volunteer, how do those experiences compare with the very real experiences of racism that he witnesses from members of his Black community and with his own eyes? Not to mention the deep-seated distrust on the part of Blacks as a result of the United States' history of slavery? Examining this example from the perspective of a White woman who, similarly, works and lives in a nearly all White environment, one can find many parallels. For example, this White woman's perceptions of Blacks might be almost entirely shaped and skewed by popular media reports of Black drug dealers, rap stars, or star athletes who (exceptionally) escape the horrors of poverty-stricken ghetto life only to end up 'reverting' to the uncivilized life of drug-taking, sexual histrionics, etcetera. Her own lack of interaction with Blacks and the deep-seated history of institutionalized racism in the U.S. combine to render this White woman's attitude towards Blacks as fearful, distrustful, and able only to view them as a very different Other. With such internal barriers, this woman is less likely to consider (or be aware of) the viewpoint of Blacks and to feel like their voice is of equal importance to her own or those of other Whites. Furthermore, she is limiting the authenticity or self-knowledge she could achieve by interacting with others who have a different perspective on society.

If either our Black man or our White woman had discovered an avenue, such as a face-to-face community group, in which to retain contact with people of different races, they may each have developed enough trust to discuss the matter of racial tension between them—whether generally speaking or regarding a specific instance. In the case

of the Black man participating in a multiracial social capital group, it is possible that, depending on the self-development of the White people in question, they could have helped to assuage some of the man's apprehensions such as "all Whites are like this". Or they may have been authentic enough to admit to and alter their own racist behaviors. As the section concerning the civic virtue of trust will explore, such acts of self-disclosure serve to increase trust. Alternately, through involvement with Blacks, the White woman could reflect on her feelings towards Blacks and simultaneously gain a better understanding of their perspective. In this way she would be exercising the virtue of reciprocity in her future interactions with Blacks which would tend to increase their overall trust in her.

Obviously, peoples' experiences with others who are different from them will not always have the happy ending of learning the valuable skill of reciprocity, deepening one's self-knowledge, and evincing greater mutual trust and tolerance. The preceding example was used to demonstrate the importance of face-to-face groups in acquiring and exercising these virtues throughout one's life. As the interracial scenario demonstrated, these particular civic virtues are particularly important for membership in a diverse society.

Diversity

Putnam (2000) defines "bridging" social capital as participation in a community group which contains people of varying races, ethnicities, religions, genders, sexual orientations, abilities, classes, etcetera. He distinguishes this from "bonding" social capital, which reinforces the bonds of a more homogenous group. The Black man in our example above was involved in a community group that could be described as bridging

(e.g., a multiracial school) and subsequently became active solely in his bonding community. While both are useful for self and civic development, it is bridging social capital, as per its name, which promises the greatest benefits to society at large. “From a collective point of view the scope of the social capital we need depends on the scale of the problems we face...for our biggest collective problems we need precisely the sort of bridging social capital that is toughest to create” (Putnam, 2000, p. 363). Of course, bridging social capital groups are not always productive for the cultivation of civic virtue. If people’s experiences with others who are different leave them with feelings of frustration and negative stereotypes confirmed, these experiences can be harmful from the perspective of civic virtue. Nevertheless, the fact that some bridging groups have negative outcomes should not blind us to the possible benefits they may have when functioning smoothly. As will be explored throughout this chapter, bridging social capital does help to unite disparate and often conflicting groups in society and furthermore, teaches lessons in civic virtues that cannot be learned in homogenous groups, as the following quotation testifies:

Civic virtue is the disposition to act for the good of the community as a whole; such a disposition can only develop in a culturally diverse society if students gain a realistic sense of how the members of their community differ from one another (Dagger, 1997, p. 127).

As an example, participation with a greater range of one’s fellow citizens can alter one’s perspective on national politics, for it is likely that after becoming acquainted with people whose identities and interests are the subject of national debate (e.g., Gays, First Nations people, those who have strong feelings about societal debates such as abortion, the death

penalty, gun laws, etc.), that one will take a greater interest in the politics affecting such groups. Thus, for the civics lesson inherent in social capital groups to be maximally educational, face to face interaction and diversity must be included as two key objective features.

How Does Social Capital Educate For Civic Virtues?

In this section I argue that social capital educates for effective citizenship in a liberal democracy by fostering the capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom, as well as the qualities of social trust, generalized reciprocity, and tolerance. Each quality will be explored in turn while the capacities of authenticity and moral wisdom will be interspersed throughout the chapter, the better to demonstrate their inherent flexibility in that they work in conjunction with the various civic qualities.

Trust

An increasing number of people regard their neighbors as inherently untrustworthy²⁰ (Putnam, 1995, 2000; Fukuyama, 1999²¹) and view their politicians as being unconcerned with their well-being (Putnam, 2000)²². Given the rising crime rate over the past 40 years, a certain amount of decreased trust is justified, especially in areas of high violent crime and theft, but this still does not correlate to the nose-dive of Americans who said that most people could be trusted (58% in 1960; 37% in 1993) regardless of education (Putnam, 1995). Trust in government has fallen more drastically than interpersonal trust, with much of the decline occurring from 1963-75, an era marked

²⁰ This statistic was garnered from a question posed in national surveys conducted for several decades. The question: "Some people say that you usually can trust people. Others say that you must be wary in relations with people. Which is your view?" (Putnam, 1993b).

²¹ For more detailed statistical information see <http://mason.gmu.edu/~ffukuyam/>.

²² The resources used for this work focus mainly on U.S. society, therefore, unless otherwise stated, all data cited in this paper is situated within the context of the United States.

by Watergate and the Vietnam War. Again, one could argue that some of this increased distrust is justified; however, one must distinguish between healthy skepticism and paranoia, the latter of which is detrimental to a liberal democracy and civic life in general. As Galston and Levine (1997) note, “Widespread fear of major public institutions not only creates generalized distrust, thereby discouraging group membership, but may also cause people to favor exclusive and inward-looking organizations” (1997, p. 26). Instances of paranoia and conspiracy theories may further prevent citizens from thinking rationally and critically about their political and social environment.

Putnam refers to these trends as generating “vicious spirals” or “virtuous circles” of distrust or trust. “...people who believe that others are honest are themselves less likely to lie, cheat, or steal and are more likely to respect the rights of others” (Putnam, 2000, p. 137). In short, if we have the impression that others are playing fair, then we will too. The opposite holds true as well. Exhibitions of social mistrust may make us less likely to join up with our neighbors in common causes or make us more likely to refrain from voting if we believe that politicians in general are only invested in their own self-interest to the detriment of the general good. Thus, widespread distrust in one’s government and fellow citizens is harmful to the goals of a deliberative democracy and a healthy community.

It must be noted that Putnam (2000) makes the important distinction between generalized reciprocity and generalized gullibility. “‘Honesty is the best policy’ turns out to be a wise maxim rather than a mawkish platitude, but only if others follow the same principle” (Putnam, 2000, p. 135). In other words, trusting others or the government in

an environment of continual dishonesty is not the type of trust of which Putnam is an advocate; the risk involved is too high, therefore the commitment invested will understandably be lower. One could use the term “thoughtful trust” to refer to trust that has been thought out in light of practical realities and is deserved.

How can social capital help to cultivate thoughtful trust in order to strike a balance between blind trust, on one hand, and unfounded paranoia, on the other? Robert Putnam makes the claim that those who are civically engaged tend to be more socially trusting; thus, the greater the density of voluntary associations in a society, the more trusting its citizens will be (Putnam, 1995). In the previous chapter, trust was defined as a form of belief with varying ranges of risk (based on probability of met expectations) and commitment. Institutional trust involves a basic need for citizens to believe that the system is just, works to promote the well-being of all of its citizens, and, importantly, that there are procedures whereby citizens can hold the state accountable to their interests and voices (e.g., social confidence). Thus, rather than individuals trusting that their specific desires will be satisfied, to trust in, not only the state, but also in one’s fellow citizens, is to expect that one’s voice to be heard and treated respectfully, even if the end result is not what they had hoped or wanted. In short, trust, whether interpersonal or institutional, requires a feeling of openness or a lowering of one’s internal barriers in relationship with another individual, group, or nation.

In the following I argue that joining together in common cause with others increases the likelihood of seeing the humanity of another; this is particularly necessary if there are deep divisions between certain groups in society. Once we are able to view and treat another as equal, we are more likely to evince trust in the other. In addition, the

process of acquiring social confidence, or determining society's major values together can form a basis for trust, whether interpersonal or institutional. Taylor points to "a continuing and constantly renewed mutual commitment" as a guarantee of social trust (Taylor, 1998, p. 221); social capital is an ideal venue through which to renew such commitments.

In 1964, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) spearheaded a project called the Mississippi Freedom Summer campaign in which approximately 1,000 men and women, most of them fairly privileged, White, college students from Northern Universities, journeyed to Mississippi²³. The main tasks of the volunteers were to teach in 'Freedom Schools' and to register Black voters, who, at that time, were barred from voting because of a very hostile climate towards Blacks (McAdam, 1988). The Freedom Summer Campaign was to be the first positive experience with Whites that many Blacks in the area had ever had. In the examples that follow, I will explore the reasons for the emerging trust between the project volunteers and members of the Black community in which they worked²⁴.

As mentioned earlier, many of the Blacks with whom the volunteers would be living²⁵ and working had only negative, or at the very best neutral, interactions with Whites. Most Blacks in Mississippi in 1964 were illiterate, unable to vote and living in

²³ For an excellent and thorough account of the effects of the Freedom Summer Campaign on the volunteers, see Doug McAdam's Freedom Summer (1988).

²⁴ Freedom Summer also altered the trusting attitude many of the White volunteers had previously held in their government. While a thorough investigation of this is beyond the scope of this thesis, such learned distrust is ultimately beneficial to the re-establishment of trust. By fighting for greater equality in the Civil Rights Movement (and other social movements), citizens create a space for themselves (and others) at the table of democracy and thereby are more likely to gain trust in the government in the long-term.

²⁵ Local Black families helped to house the Freedom Summer volunteers, often at considerable risk to themselves (McAdam, 1988).

poverty²⁶. In addition, they lived in constant threat of intimidation and/or physical violence on the part of Whites, who were rarely punished for their actions against Blacks. The following is a description from a White volunteer canvassing for voter registration. It is an indication of the deep fear and distrust that many Blacks held towards Whites.

When we walk up to a house there are always children out front. They look up and see white men in the car, and fear and caution cover their expressions. Those terrified eyes are never quite out of my mind; they drive me as little else could. Children who have hardly learned to talk are well-taught in the arts of avoiding whites. They learn “yassah” as almost their first words. If they did not, they could not survive. The children run to their parents, hide behind them. We walk up, smile, say howdy, and hold out our hands. As we shake hands I tell them my name. They tell me their names and I say Mr. _____, how do you do. It is likely the first time in the life of this farmer or housewife a white man has ever shaken hands with them, or even called them “with a handle to their names”. This does not necessarily bode well with them; they are suspicious (McAdam, 1988, p. 79).

The divisions of power between Whites and Blacks were strictly maintained by a variety of means, some institutionalized, many informal. As alluded to in the above quotation, one of the ways in which power was demarcated was in how people addressed one another. While language between Whites and Blacks was usually used to perpetuate dominance, the following example demonstrates how language can be used to reflect equality and camaraderie:

²⁶ Only 7% of the Black population had finished high school; 6.7 % of Blacks were registered to vote; and 86% of all non-white families in Mississippi were living below the federal poverty line (McAdam, 1988).

One day when I was canvassing I met Mr. Brown. I told him my name is Ann. He said yes, Miss Ann, pleased to meet you. He is a young Negro teacher in the all-Negro Temple High School and of course had had no contact with white people before, except as Mr., Mrs., “Massa,” – well, I said, please call me Ann... there was nothing so beautiful as the rest of the conversation. At every opportunity had had, he said Ann—he didn’t just say Ann—he rolled the name around his tongue, savored the taste and sang it, listening to the echo in the back of his mind. He played with the word as a child would play with a new and fascinating toy, as a person would delight in the ecstasy of a new-found love. And that conversation has left a mark on me. I hear the name—a loved word—the start of something so big, so beautiful, so new (McAdam, 1988, p. 80).

The powerful impact of this exchange on both parties is evident. The possibility of interacting as respectful equals increases the trust between parties. For, if one feels that the other has one’s well-being in mind, the risk inherent in trusting others is diminished. Thus, because these two individuals have occasion to interact in a meaningful way, they are able to transcend some of the socially-constructed divisions and begin to build a basis for trust.

Civic life has repeatedly been described as a place of mediation for diverse values or conceptions of the good to meet and for the unknown to become familiar. The importance of this common space has taken on a special urgency as a growing number of people regard ‘generalized others’ as inherently untrustworthy, and particularly so if they are of a different race or ethnicity (Fukuyama, 1999). This statistic implies a perception on the part of many citizens that the more different others seem (whether due to skin

color, religion, customs, etc.), the fewer values they must have in common, hence trust becomes much more difficult to foster if people remain strangers. Those who do not have their basis for distrust contradicted through interaction with others will default to a feeling that unknown others do indeed have very different values than themselves and therefore should not be trusted. Of course, on occasion it is certain that individuals will have their basis for distrust reinforced in practice, however the distinction is that the distrust will be directed toward an individual(s) rather than at groups in society or society as a whole. Thus, when citizens congregate together to act upon or embody a version of their good (among their “major values”), ideally, they are also deliberating on how their values intersect with and impact the values of the larger society and simultaneously constructing a web of trust from which both they and society benefit. The following is an example of a very tangible “web of trust” constructed between Freedom Summer project volunteers and members of a Black church:

There were more songs, and finally we stood, everyone, crossed arms, clasped hands, and sang “We Shall Overcome”... we sang out all fatigue and fear, each connected by this bond of hands to each other, communicating an infinite love and sadness. A few voices tried to harmonize, but in the end the one true tune welled up in them and overcame. It was not the song for harmony; it meant too much to change its shape for effect. All the verses were sung, and if there had been more to prolong it, it would have been prolonged, no matter how late, how tired they were. Finally the tune was hummed alone while someone spoke a prayer, and the verse struck up again, “We shall overcome”, with all the voice

emotion, hope, and strength that each contained. Together they were an army (McAdam, 1988, p. 92).

In the above example, Blacks and Whites are enacting the intersection of their common value: the vision of racial equality.

Diverse group members pursuing common goods is a powerful and effective means of increasing trust. This is particularly true when the goals of the group are to push for greater equality for some of its members (as in the above example). Before having contact with others who are unlike one's self, others might have been seen as entirely different and alien. Whereas after experiencing some areas where group members' values overlap, the differences that may exist are not as threatening and the risk to trust in others is lowered. For example, there was a certain degree of racial tension between White volunteers and Black co-workers during the Freedom Summer Campaign (McAdam, 1988). However, a basis for trust had already been (at least partially) established, so the risk to confront another known person would have been lessened. This is a crucial point for the reason that deliberation of conflicting values is essential for increasing awareness of others' perspectives. Both value affirmation and value deliberation are key for promoting greater understanding and trust.

Robert Putnam (2000) explores the distinction between "thick" and "thin" trust. The former is based on relations that are "strong, frequent, and nested in wider networks" and the latter rests on "the generalized other" or people who are associated through networks of social engagement. Thus, trust can be viewed as something that originates in family and close friend networks, local religious groups, etc. (thick trust) and works its way outward to encompass civil society (thin trust) and national institutions. Putnam

points out that thin trust can be more useful for society than thick trust, in that its radius and sphere of influence extends further, but it is only useful to the point before “the social fabric of a community becomes more threadbare” (Putnam, 2000, p. 136). By this Putnam presumably means that if opportunities for learning, exercising and reinforcing thin social trust become less frequent, it is an indication that citizens are abandoning the common space and retreating to the safety of thick trust and foregoing the advantages that thin trust can bestow. Therefore, social distrust is likely to rise as the opportunities and will to participate in such groups diminish.

Social capital thus offers people in a diverse society an environment in which to discover an overlap in at least a portion of the values they hold, whether through interaction with one another, affirmation or deliberation of values. In this process, citizens form a basis for trust and ultimately reap the benefits that more loosely woven networks can offer. In this way, although trust is learned in civic groups, it also reinforces a deliberative democracy since, according to Putnam, trusting people participate more often in politics and civic organizations (2000). Consequently, if the greatest number and variety of citizens are involved in deliberating what they believe is good for society, the greater quantity and diversity of voices are heard. At the core of this thesis lies the belief that a deliberative democracy is a more ideal principle than a democracy in which citizens leave society’s crucial moral decisions entirely to elected officials. Deliberative democracy’s key ingredient, as formulated by Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), is reciprocity.

Reciprocity

Returning to the experience of volunteers in the Freedom Summer Campaign, the tasks of the volunteers consisted mostly of voter registration and teaching. While this description might sound relatively benign, the reality of the project was that the vast majority of project volunteers encountered intermittent violence²⁷, fear for their own lives and grinding poverty for the first time upon arriving to Mississippi. In other words, they encountered the “Other America” which not only involved the poverty which the much publicized 1962 book of the same name recounts, but also the brutality inflicted on the Blacks of that state while the federal government looked on. The experience of the three month long project was to transform the volunteers to the point where, in interviews more than 20 years later, most described it as a ‘watershed’ experience in their lives and one which changed the direction of many of their life trajectories (McAdam, 1988). What accounts for this dramatic effect?

In “Notes toward a Politics of Location” (1986), Adrienne Rich questions how people can interact with the voices or perspectives of others without blindly focusing on those voices that have traditionally been at the center with their often thoughtless assumptions that everyone shares the same view of reality. Reflection on how we have all constituted our knowledge, beliefs and view requires listening to the voices of others who might challenge our “knowledge” in order to lead to fuller self and societal understanding. For example, in “Racism, Sexism, Knowledge and the Academy”, Himani Bannerji (1991) recounts her years of teaching in academia alongside her white

²⁷ Freedom Summer author Doug McAdam (1988) writes, “Just ten days into the project, three participants—James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Micael Schwerner—were kidnapped and beaten to death by a group of segregationists led by Mississippi law enforcement officers... One other volunteer died before summer’s end and hundreds more endured bombings, beatings, and arrest” (1988, p. 4).

colleagues who resisted this challenge to question their own claims to knowledge.

Bannerji's colleagues lacked the empathetic identification to imagine that she might have a different experience of reality, living as a person of color; for, de-centering themselves in order to adequately hear her voice holds the threat of bringing to conscience their role as potential victimizers. Her fellow professors, who may have thought that they had already questioned their knowledge in regards to other facets in society, define too narrowly what it is they need to question. It can be startling to view oneself from another's viewpoint—especially if what is reflected back is not as complimentary as one might have thought, so the seeming solution is to deny the realities of others:

...it is a problem of the invisible center that is concealed in the objectification of discourse, seeming to speak of the world dispassionately, objectively, as it is...

Nothing will serve but the dissolution of objectified discourse, the decentring of standpoint, and the discovery of another consciousness of society... (Bannerji, 1991, p. 9-10).

In describing a similar phenomenon, Maxine Greene uses the expression “defamiliarization of the ordinary” (Greene, 1995, p. 4). How can social capital groups help to ‘defamiliarize’ people from their own realities—especially if they have traditionally been in the ‘centre’ of society’s power structure (e.g., white, male, able-bodied, heterosexual, educated, middle or upper class, etc.), as many of the Freedom Summer volunteers were? These initially idealistic volunteers were to embark on a journey in which their “thoughtless assumptions” of sharing the same reality were to be deeply challenged.

On the eve of the project, the majority of volunteers were “reformers rather than revolutionaries, liberals rather than radicals” (McAdam, 1988, p. 12). Most of them were not mentally prepared to, as Hamani Bannerji (1991) stated, discover “another consciousness of society”—one in which poverty, fear and disillusionment were daily realities:

One day has passed in Shaw [Mississippi] and the other America is opening itself before my naïve, middle-class eyes....I saw children today who bore the marks of the Negro in rural Mississippi. One had a protruding navel the size of the stone he held in his hand. Several had distended stomachs. Is America really the land the greets its visitors with ‘Send me your tired, your poor, your helpless [sic.] masses yearning to breathe free’?” (McAdam, 1988, p. 88).

Another volunteer writes:

Yesterday while the Mississippi River was being dragged looking for the three missing civil rights workers, two bodies of Negroes were found—one cut in half and one without a head. Mississippi is the only state where you can drag a river any time and find bodies you were not expecting... Negroes disappear down here every week and are never heard about. Things are really much better for rabbits here. There is a closed season on rabbits when they may not be killed. Negroes are killed all year round. So are rabbits. The difference is that arrests are made for killing rabbits out of season... Jesus Christ, this is supposed to be America in 1964 (McAdam, 1988, p. 97).

One particularly sheltered volunteer remembers “crying myself to bed at night... I was just seeing too much, feeling too much. Things weren’t supposed to be like this. I was

just a mess. I just remember feeling sad, guilty and angry all at the same time” (McAdam, 1988, p. 88). Through participation in this unique opportunity, these volunteers were quickly stripped of any illusions they might have had concerning the intentions of many White Mississippians, not to mention the complicity of the federal government, and were forced to question what they might have previously taken for granted. This process would have involved questioning their “common sense, knowledge, apparatuses, and politics” (Bannerji, 1991, p. 10).

For example, they had been raised in a time and place in which the phrase: ‘Send me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free’²⁸ mentioned by one of the volunteers above, would most likely engender feelings of pride in one’s country. What the volunteers encountered in Mississippi could only have made them feel that much more cynical and shocked (e.g., “Things weren’t supposed to be like this”, “Jesus Christ, this is supposed to be America in 1964”) given what they had experienced of their country from their privileged position in the “center”. They were put in a position where they could not only empathetically identify with the perspective of the Black population, but were also partially experiencing their reality, something which goes above and beyond the usual demands of reciprocity. However, the Freedom Summer campaign not only taught the volunteers empathetic identification with the Blacks of rural Mississippi and opened their eyes to some of the unfortunate political realities of the era, it was also self-revealing in regards to some of the ways in which they themselves could be, as Bannerji mentioned above, “potential victimizers”.

An ideology of racial superiority was (and I would add, still is) deeply entrenched in the national consciousness on the part of White Americans as a result of the history of

slavery in that country. However noble and idealistic the intentions of the mostly White volunteers might have been at the outset of their journey, any racial ‘baggage’ that they might have been carrying would certainly have come out during the course of the summer. McAdam (1988) notes that the volunteers “were not so much color-blind as supremely desirous of *appearing* color-blind” (p. 102-3). The letters the volunteers wrote home, accounts from Black co-workers and even the memories of the volunteers themselves all hint at a certain level of paternalism on the part of some of the White volunteers. “One black volunteer remembers his white counterparts as ‘generally a good bunch, but there were...a few who just came in and wanted to take over. Their attitude was ‘okay we are here, your troubles are over. We are going to put your house in order’” (McAdam, 1988, p. 104).

Educational philosophers such as Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996) and Eamonn Callan (1997), describe the notion of reciprocity as being able to anticipate that others will make claims “on terms that I can accept in principle” and in return “I make my claims on terms that you can accept in principle” (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, p. 55). Eamonn Callan (1997) extends the definition of reciprocity as one in which an individual evaluates the claims of others on his own terms while they reciprocate in turn. Whether making or evaluating claims, both involve taking the perspective of the other, or an act of empathetic identification²⁹. As we discussed with the virtue of authenticity and will explore with that of tolerance, interaction with generalized others in

²⁸ These sentiments were penned by Emma Lazarus and are inscribed on the base of the Statue of Liberty.

²⁹ James Vela-McConnell (1999) defines empathy as identification with the feelings, thoughts or experience of “the other” and the likelihood of this occurring is increased by contact with the aforesaid other.

social capital groups greatly aids the process of ‘de-centering’ one’s self to the point where one can empathetically imagine the perspective of the other.

The Freedom Summer Campaign is an example of Putnam’s “bridging social capital”, or groups that are constituted of people from different backgrounds who were, in this case, committed to a joint cause. If Black co-workers did point out paternalistic behavior on the part of Whites, it would have provided for an ideal opportunity for Whites to de-center themselves and see themselves from the perspective of the ‘other’—especially considering that a specific behavior was being pointed out to them by people with whom they had established a certain level of trust and camaraderie. The Whites could have responded in such a way which demonstrated an understanding of why their Black co-workers would be upset by condescending behavior on their part (i.e., evaluating the claims of others from their perspective). This empathetic identification on the part of White volunteers would have been attained in the process of being with Black people in the region and knowing something of the realities that they faced, which involved, at the very least, extreme paternalism on the part of most Whites of Mississippi. In this way, both parties would have been genuinely exercising norms of reciprocity.

In experiencing and empathizing with the realities of others in such an intense fashion, the Freedom Summer volunteers not only experienced one of reciprocity’s main ingredients, that of empathetic identification, but also shared in an experience that greatly impacted the Civil Rights Movement and other social movements struggling for greater tolerance in society.

Tolerance

In exploring the relationship between tolerance and social capital, I will focus on two main themes. The first is concerning the complexities around the very nature of social capital itself and its potential to increase *intolerance* in society, whether through its means, ends or both (i.e., the KKK is an example of an explicitly intolerant group which exhibits many features of social capital; many other examples are much more ambiguous). The second theme is related to how social capital, in the specific form of social movements, has helped to produce a more tolerant society.

Social Capital Groups and Intolerance. Is exclusion an inherent feature of social capital that must be accepted and if so, on what basis can one legitimately exclude others? In other words, must exclusion be synonymous with intolerance? Social capital groups do, by nature, exclude some members of the population; if they did not, there would be very little bringing and holding them together as a group. As sociologist Roger Waldinger notes, “the same social relations that enhance the ease and efficiency of economic exchanges among community members implicitly restrict outsiders” (Waldinger in Portes and Landolt, 1996, p. 2). His use of “economic exchanges” can be applied to the benefits derived from social capital. For example, the PTA is a group that is necessarily constituted of parents and teachers; if it were to open its doors to everyone in society, perhaps the interests of the school would not be as well represented. Another example might be a social group for young gays and lesbians who are struggling with societal issues surrounding their sexual identity. If this group were open to heterosexual youth, the function and possible benefits derived from such a group such as trust and identity development would be diminished. Thus, many social capital groups, for reasons

inherent to the coherence and intended goals of their organizations, can exclude segments of the population without expressing intolerance. However, how does one make distinctions between the examples just mentioned and the following: “The skeptic might wonder whether members of bowling leagues learned the sort of civic effectiveness that helped them to ensure that Black migrants to Chicago were shut out of city jobs and walled up in the high-rise slums of Cabrini Green. Might the American citizenry not be better off watching television or bowling alone?” (Ryan, 2000)? The author in this quotation is alluding to social capital’s potential to breed intolerance, especially since social capital’s alleged ‘heyday’ in mid-century expressed intolerance toward many groups in society.

It is important to note that Putnam ostensibly does not equate the declining social capital in recent decades to a nostalgia for earlier times, especially when it comes to forms of social capital that were illiberal and socially exclusive. He would agree that the decline of these types of organizations should be seen as a positive outcome of the hard-won gains of various societal movements (e.g., the civil rights movement, the labour movement, the feminist movement, etc.) (Putnam, 1995; 2000). However, one must consider whether Putnam is adequately sensitive to the social inequalities of the past and the intolerance they represented. In his loud praise of the “long civic generation”³⁰ one might ask, what was the face of that society? Putnam seems to contradict himself in his choice of voluntary organizations in which to bemoan lowered participation; the White Masons and White Shriners have only recently voted to accept Blacks while the Elks voted in 1995 to accept women (Rich, 1999, p. 22). Many theorists argue that it is

³⁰ Putnam defines the “long civic generation” as Americans who came of age during the Depression and WWII and who were particularly civically engaged in comparison with those who came before and after

misguided to mourn the loss of those groups who have failed to keep up with the pace of increasing tolerance in society. Commenting on the educational and professional successes of racial minorities and women in society, Claire Gaudiani (1996) notes:

American democracy did not really establish the possibility of democratic civil society until relatively recently when equal opportunity became law. We are not the same people we have been...Never before has so large a percentage of our population experienced as much higher education. Never before has such a large percentage of African Americans participated in or been above the middle income group. Never before have so many women entered the professions...There were no "good old days"-no golden age for democratic civil society during which we were all at the same table (Gaudiani, 1996).

In corroboration with the above remark, other researchers claim that the civic culture of the period between 1945 to the early 1970's (the same period which Putnam lauds as the 'golden age' of civic society) actually *deemphasized* political involvement and offer as proof the United States' general unconcern with vast numbers of disenfranchised southern Blacks (Welton, 1993; Offe, 1985). Welton instead asserts that such values as "social mobility, private life, consumerism, authority and order ruled the day" (1993, p. 154).

Despite the valid complaints that Putnam overlooks the flaws in the "golden age" and overestimates its benefits, Putnam's work remains useful for my purposes. There is little doubt that social capital can be used toward illiberal ends. However, the potential abuses of social capital should serve as a cautionary note rather than a dismissal of its

them (2000).

positive uses such as promoting civic virtues and increasing critically-minded democratic participation.

An essential question still remains: How does one distinguish between groups that are illiberal and harmful to a liberal democracy and those that are beneficial to both their members and society at large? In Democracy and Education, John Dewey states “There is honor among thieves, and a band of robbers has a common interest as respects its members” (1944, p. 82). In this statement Dewey recognizes the virtues and common values that can be found among even those segments of the population that are generally harmful to society. He addresses the question of how to evaluate the worth of a social capital group by putting forth the following two criteria: How extensive and varied is the overlap in consciously held values of a given group? And to what extent does a particular group recognize and interact with other groups? In regards to the first criterion, Dewey asserts that in order to share numerous and varied interests, all of the members of the group must be on equal footing in terms of reciprocity or have “an equable (sic) opportunity to receive and to take from others” (1944, p. 84). For the second criterion, Dewey again turns to the concept of reciprocity in his use of the phrase “reciprocity of interest” with other groups. The concept of reciprocity is far-reaching; it is not restricted to one’s particular group, ethnic enclave, or family, but ideally should be generalized to the common good. In short, legitimacy is judged by the degree of equality and openness both within and without a particular group. For example, if the aforementioned social/support group for gay and lesbian youth promotes equality between its members and recognizes the worth of other (equally democratic) worldviews, they would meet the above criteria. Their reasons for excluding heterosexuals from their

group are such in order to allow them to successfully meet their collective goals and not because of any discrimination of heterosexuals. Conversely, a trade union that excludes Black people from joining might promote equality among the (White) members, but it is not recognizing the equal worth of an entire segment of society and its reasons for exclusion are based on, and perpetuate, oppression. In educational terms, the point of the exclusive trade union is to exclude Blacks from an important common social good—protection of their interests as laborers. This is to treat Blacks as second-class citizens. However, no such discriminatory and intolerant educational implications flow from the gay and lesbian support group. Indeed, the intention may precisely be to educate gay and lesbian youths so that they can participate more securely and confidently in sexually-diverse civic settings. Thus, although Dewey's thieves might possess honor among them, they do not extend this virtue far enough to be considered a group of worth to society.

Social Capital Groups and Tolerance. Now that it has been established how one might distinguish illiberal from liberal social capital groups, how, specifically do liberal social capital groups educate for tolerance? In Loose Connections: Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities, Robert Wuthnow (1998) offers a few concrete examples that serve to illustrate the point that community involvement generally promotes tolerance³¹. "A White businessman who serves on the board of an inner-city development corporation was forced to confront racial tensions and consequently came away with a better understanding of his African American colleagues and a clearer sense of his own feelings about race" (1998, p. 176). Another woman with a long history of civic involvement welcomed the challenges which interaction with others who are

³¹ For example, in the literature regarding "homophobia" or stigmatization of gays, it has been shown that knowing someone who is gay generally decreases the homophobia one feels (D'Augelli, 1998).

different required and acknowledged the growth of her own character and tolerance level as the result of confronting difficult community issues: "It's good to be at the edge, on the margins...having to raise difficult questions" (Wuthnow, 1998, p. 161). As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, bridging social capital, although more difficult to create, is particularly helpful in educating for the civic virtue of tolerance. That which is toughest to create is also more rewarding for society and the individual based on reasons already explored at length such as promoting authenticity, providing opportunities to exercise moral wisdom, increasing civic involvement and trust, and extending reciprocity beyond one's thick trust community.

Exercising moral wisdom and the ideals of authenticity neutralize many of the criticisms aimed at social capital. For instance, those expressing intolerance toward perceived outsiders are not using the skills of perspective-taking or reflection with respect to the broad implications of their actions. Recall that both of these skills are characteristics of good citizenship as defined by authenticity and moral wisdom. In reference to Wuthnow's quotation above, many of those who have traditionally been "on the edge, at the margins" have joined voices in the past 50 years and have increased tolerance in society enormously from where it had been previously.

Social movements have the objective feature, not only of promoting tolerance within their own ranks, but also of sharing the broader goal of increasing tolerance within society. In comparison to the Feminist Movement, is the Rotary Club of equal worth with respect to promoting greater tolerance in society? The question may sound absurd, but Putnam does very little to differentiate between such groups in his account of the relationship between social capital and tolerance. An explicit feature of social

movements that distinguishes it from other forms of social capital is the promotion of a larger vision of human freedom and dignity. I argue that it is this objective feature that Putnam fails to recognize and give sufficient credit to in his discussion of the increasing tolerance in society over time despite the decline in social capital overall³².

Contemporary social movements help lead to social change in that they politicize realms of life that have previously been outside of the mainstream political attention: “the experience of everyday life and the common sense that informs it may become contested terrain which serves to politicize experience” (Crowther & Shaw, 1997, p. 268). In this sense, experience itself can become a basis for knowing and legitimizing knowledge from the margins opens up other ways of understanding reality. Thus, social movements provide a venue in which voices that have traditionally been silenced are able to break into the consciousness of the citizenry and widen the boundaries of tolerance.

³² Putnam claims that people who are more civically engaged are generally more tolerant despite the fact that social capital has decreased as tolerance has decreased. The reason he gives for this is “generational succession” and although he does make reference to social movements, he is more concerned with defending his own seemingly contradictory data. See Putnam, 2000, p. 357 for his argument.

Chapter IV: Conclusion & Future Directions

Conclusions

Three major conclusions have emerged from the previous three chapters of this thesis. First, social capital groups provide an important venue in which people can learn the skills that are necessary for good citizenship. Second, diversity plays a unique and important role (e.g., racial, religious, cultural, etc.) within social capital groups. Finally, social capital groups can potentially have a socially progressive impact in a liberal, deliberative democracy. Each of these conclusions, in turn, are discussed below.

Educating for Good Citizenship

The overarching conclusion of the present thesis is that schools are not the only venue in which education for civic virtue happens. Indeed, social capital groups provide a vital context for civic education. Through their objective features of diversity and face-to-face interaction, social capital groups provide a place of mediation or common space in which citizens interact with others who hold different perspectives and values as they work toward commonly held goals. Tocqueville's quotation illustrated this point: "pursuing in common the object of ...common desires" (1961, p. 129). It is this process of meaningful interaction whereby citizens can gain greater knowledge of both themselves and others. For a great deal of power underlying the educative potential of civic groups rests in its ability to utilize the social interests of its members as they pursue common goals and, both directly and incidentally, confront their differences.

In addition, groups whose goals are specifically geared toward increasing specific civic virtues, as can often be seen in social movements of the past and present, are more likely to facilitate the self-development of their members. The workings of such a

process were illustrated using the example of the Freedom Summer campaign which focused on increasing racial equality and tolerance.

De-centering ones' self from one's own vantage point in hopes of gaining a fuller understanding and awareness of others' perspectives was another means whereby social capital groups were shown to be educative for citizens. The civic benefits of this process have been discussed in relation to: making moral decisions based on the impact one's actions can have on the character of society (i.e., moral wisdom); increasing one's knowledge of others' perspectives in order to empathetically identify with them (i.e., reciprocity); and learning greater respect for others (i.e., tolerance). In addition, civic interaction with others who hold varying beliefs and perspectives provides an opportunity for self-reflection by offering a wider range from which to authentically formulate one's own moral identity. An individual who exhibits the qualities and capacities implicit in having explored her moral identity and also in exercising moral wisdom in relation to others, is well placed to encourage a more trusting and open response from others. In turn, others are offered an invitation and opportunity respond in kind, and hence enter into, as Putnam mentioned, a cycle of virtuousness.

The Importance of Diversity

The importance of diversity for learning civic virtue within social capital groups was highlighted with each civic virtue that has been discussed.

Authenticity. In order to develop the capacity of being an authentic person, the ways in which diversity can be used as a resource to deepen and further one's own autonomy and individuality were explored. The hallmark of authenticity is that it is through one's connections with others that autonomy emerges. By enriching one's

understanding of different worldviews, one is able to benefit from a wide range of human possibilities beyond one's own experience. In other words, it is by knowing and interacting with different others that the individual's self is broadened and deepened.

Moral Wisdom. Also based on self-reflection, moral wisdom is the process by which a citizen proceeds in making moral decisions. If one has gained an awareness of a wide range of conceptualizations of the good, one has greater knowledge upon which to base moral decisions that ultimately reflect a more comprehensive understanding of what is 'good' for society overall.

Trust. In discussing the civic virtue of trust, the issue of diversity was raised both at the interpersonal level and in the process of acquiring social confidence in the state. First, diversity within groups was shown to be especially useful where deep divisions in society exist. As incidences from the Freedom Summer campaign demonstrated, when Whites and Blacks interacted together in a meaningful way (particularly in the process of promoting greater equality for Blacks), the possibility of forming a 'web' of trust increased. Second, it was argued that social confidence can be derived through the process of deliberating society's major values together. If a diverse group of citizens is able to come together and see where their values both intersect and conflict, a fuller and truer picture of society emerges.

Reciprocity. Given that the virtue of reciprocity is structured to deal with opposing viewpoints, the existence of pluralism within social capital groups is essential in order for the features of reciprocity to be drawn out. The discussion of reciprocity focused on how interaction with different others renders one more able to empathetically identify with them and how, in turn, this act of identification evinces greater trust from

others. Examples from Freedom Summer demonstrated how the act of empathetic identification was attained in the process of gaining an understanding of and, in some way, partially experiencing the realities of others. This is especially important if one's position and power buffers them from being marginalized members of society. Interaction with those from the 'margins' (i.e., disenfranchised Blacks) illuminated a reality beyond their own direct experience for the majority of White volunteers in the campaign. Understanding the viewpoints of others is essential in order to be able to evaluate and/or discuss the claims of others on their own terms.

Tolerance. I also contend that diversity is the bedrock of tolerance. Tolerance has been discussed in terms of ranges: from grudging acceptance of difference to the recognition of the equality and legitimacy of other worldviews. Similar to the virtue of authenticity, individuals closer to the latter end of the continuum can derive greater benefit and self-development through their exposure to diverse points of view. Social movements, which often have the explicit goal of increasing tolerance in society, have served to give voice to different realms of society and thereby widen the boundaries of tolerance.

As the present thesis has demonstrated, the uses of the civic virtues in terms of diversity are taken to be as interdependent, not mutually exclusive. Further, the absence of any one of them renders the system of virtues put forth non-optimal and less likely to function, thereby diminishing the educative potential of social capital groups. In light of this caution, the parameters for each civic virtue were delineated so as to equip each of these principles, not only to be able to effectively handle diversity, but to use them to their ideal potential within a pluralistic democratic society. More homogenous groups

can educate for some of the virtues discussed; however, the existence of diversity within groups increases the opportunity for learning to take place as individuals pursue common goals. Although more challenging to create, it is contended that bridging social capital is more rewarding for both the development of the individual and the goals of a liberal democracy.

Social Capital Is Beneficial to a Liberal, Deliberative Democracy

The basic premise of deliberative or participatory democracy is that deliberation itself is beneficial to democracy. In order for the state to claim that it takes all views into consideration, decisions must be based on the views of all people. In this way, the state is relying on a greater number and variety of people to share in the responsibility of making important decisions that will affect all citizens. Stated simply, more citizen participation provides for a more legitimate democracy. Social capital groups, whether explicitly political or not, tend to increase such participation (Putnam, 2000).

Social capital groups provide a venue in which both to learn where citizens' values overlap and to debate where they conflict, as well as to learn about one's moral self in the process. All of the virtues that have been discussed provide a potentially more positive and productive means to dialogue with others and thus make political decisions from a broader viewpoint. For example, citizens will be more able to understand and accept governmental policies and decisions if they can empathize with the perspectives and situations of their fellow citizens (e.g., reciprocity). In addition, effective citizenship requires one to be in touch with one's moral identity, a capacity that is learned through forming connections with others who hold varying viewpoints. In other words, shared citizenship both relies on and encourages the process of seeking authenticity. Thus,

whether through increased understanding of various perspectives or becoming more in touch with one's own moral identity, greater interaction with others in the civic realm increases the possibility of good citizenship.

Social capital groups can play a socially progressive role as well, particularly if the goals of the group itself are explicitly toward this end. For instance, in order to possess social trust, citizens must legitimately believe that the government is functioning to promote their well-being (i.e., structural fairness). If, through greater contact with others, trust decreases as a result of witnessing structural *un*fairness, social capital provides the option of channeling this distrust into social change. Such exhibitions are more likely to increase trust in the long-term provided that their voices are heard and action is taken on the part of the state. Social movements were shown to be a prime example of the socially progressive role social capital groups can play in terms of increasing civic virtue and creating a more just society.

Future Directions

This thesis may take any one of a number of future directions. Rather than listing several areas for possible future research, I instead offer a brief entry into one realm: the argument that a broadened sense of self is an outcome of civic engagement and, in turn, further regenerates collective action.

Broadened Sense of Self

A quality that could arguably be said to result from all of the dispositions and capacities mentioned thus far is a broadened sense of self or a feeling of belonging. One need not seek to educate for a feeling of belonging in any direct sense; rather, it is a byproduct of civic involvement. "Feelings and opinions are recruited, the heart is

enlarged, and the human mind is developed by no other means than by the reciprocal influence of men upon each other” (Tocqueville, 1961, p. 131). Putnam (1995) argues that dense networks of interaction broaden an individual's conception of self, “...developing the 'I' into the 'we'” (1995, p. 67). Historically, the glorified ideal of “rugged individualism” in the United States stands in contrast to a human's need for others, emotionally or otherwise. For instance, most individuals could not have survived alone on the American frontier: “Community, not the lone gunslinger, is what really tamed the Wild West” (Charbeneau in Vela-McConnell, 1999, p. 226). Similarly, Francis Fukuyama (1999) argues that since human beings are naturally social creatures who seek a feeling of belonging, their “most basic drives and instincts lead them to create moral rules that bind them together into communities” (p. 56). His conclusion is that the “very powerful innate human capacity for reconstituting social order” will instinctually cause us to create new norms, for the situation of normlessness (or “anomie”³³) is extremely uncomfortable for human beings. Whether or not one entirely agrees that human beings instinctively seek moral order and a feeling of belonging (although Francis Fukuyama and John Kekes (1995) would agree that a sense of connection is a primary good), a broadened self emerges out of civic involvement.

Thus, civic involvement can potentially provide a structured space in which to extend beyond our own needs and desires to feel that we are part of something much bigger than ourselves. As one participant in the Freedom Summer campaign described it: “You felt you were a part of a kind of historic moment; that something very profound about the whole way of life in a region was about to change; that...you were...making history and that you were in some way utterly selfless and yet [you] found yourself”

³³ Sociologist Emile Durkheim was the first to coin this term (Fukuyama, 1999).

(McAdam, 1988, p. 3). The combination of “finding one’s self” and collective action has been a common thread throughout the thesis, especially in relation to the virtue of authenticity. This characteristic falls into a category of its own because it is at once an outcome of acting on civic virtues and a feeling that will further generate action.

Disposition Toward Collective Action

A meaningful connection to one’s larger community can cause one to be more likely to take action. Social networks are a resource for social movement organizers; in turn, they act to regenerate social capital by further extending networks and cementing feelings of solidarity and shared identity between members. “In short, social movements with grassroots involvement both embody and produce social capital” (Putnam, 2000, p. 153).

Literature from the field of community psychology supports the dynamic between collective action and social capital, although utilizing a different set of terms; the focal one being the concept of “empowerment” (Wolff, 1987; Rappaport, 1987).

Empowerment has been defined as a process whereby people, organizations and communities gain mastery over their lives and issues that are of concern to them (Rappaport, 1987). The term suggests both individual determination over one's life and democratic participation in the life of one's community, often through mediating structures such as schools, neighborhoods, and religious or voluntary organizations (in other words, the social capital network). A major variable that has been identified as playing a key role in empowerment is having a psychological sense of community (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990; Davidson & Cotter, 1989). This suggests that a sense of community may alleviate universal helplessness--or the belief that *all* people lack the

ability to influence outcomes. As citizens come to believe that individuals can effect change, they are more likely to participate in actions and organizations that address the needs and concerns of the community to which they belong, resulting in the development and empowerment of that community. Thus, a sense of relatedness and connectedness to the larger community can have a catalytic effect on local action, or in other words, community empowerment (Chavis & Wandersman, 1990) which, in turn, continues to deepen one's sense of community³⁴.

The above discussion exemplifies where one might further extend the relationship between civic virtue, social capital networks and social change. As shown, the concept that community can serve as a resource for self and civic knowledge is fertile ground for further research.

³⁴ I am grateful to Shari Maymen for her helpful input in the area of Community Psychology.

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