THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF LOCKE'S 'IDEAS'

by

Darrell Anthony Larivière

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Department of Philosophy
McGill University
Montreal

August 20, 1984

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to determine what kind of thing a Lockean "idea" is. The argument is divided into two main sections. In the first, taking a cue from John W. Yolton's influential paper "Ideas and Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century", I survey what I take to be some of Locke's main influences. I argue that Yolton's reconstruction, as representative of a general tendency to repudiate the traditional view of Locke's position is not supported by a study of the major figures in the history of perceptual and concept-acquisition theories. I also argue that the history of such theories reveals at least two distinct approaches to the problem of the awareness of things. In the second section, I lay out my positive thesis, i.e. that ideas for Locke are physically-real intermediates, which are both caused by and are representative of external objects. I support this thesis, first, by detailing the various uses to which Locke put the term 'idea'. Second, I examine Locke's criticisms of competing representationalist theories. Third, I examine Locke's materialist tendencies. Taken together, these disparate aspects leave very little room for doubt. I accept the fact that Locke is considered to be vague on key issues, but argue throughout that the texts, taken as a whole, point in only one direction.

Résumé

L'objectif de ce mémoire consiste a déterminer ce qu'est une idée selon Locke. L'argumentation se divise en deux parties principales. En premier lieu, prenant comme point départ un important article de John W. Yolton "Ideas and Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century", je parcours ce que je crois etre quelques unes des influences principales de Locke. Je soutiens que la reconstruction par Yolton, représentant une tendance generals a repudier l'entendement traditionel de la position de Locke, n'est pas supportée par une étude des figures principales de l'histoire des théories d'acquisition perceptuelle et conceptuelle. Je soutiens aussi que l'histoire de ces théories nous révèle deux approches distinctes par rapport a la question de la conscience des choses. En second lieu, j'avance une thèse positive, c'est-a-dire que les idées sont, pour Locke, des intermediares physiques réels, representant et causés par les objets exterieurs. Le support de cette thèse se retrouve premierement dans l'étude détaillée de l'emploi varié, par Locke, du terme "idea". Deuxiement, j'examine les critiques faites par Locke concernant les differentes theories de la representationalisme. Et troisiement, j'explore les tendances materialistes de notre auteur. Pris ensembles, ces trois aspects ne laisse plus de place au doute. J'accepte que Locke soit consideré vague sur les questions clefs, mais je soutiens toujours ques les textes, pris en entier, ne visent qu'en une direction.

Acknowledgements

There are so many people that have contributed to this thesis, in a variety of important ways, that I cannot hope to mention all of them. I would like to thank, first and foremost, Professor Thomas M. Lennon, of the University of Western Ontario Department of Philosophy, whose rigorous scholarship and boundless energy have been an inspiration to me. I would also like to thank Professor Harry M. Bracken, my supervisor, who, in addition to supervisory duties, always opened new doors and was instrumental in providing much valuable research material without which this thesis could not have been written. For many discussions of sticky points, and for many fruitful suggestions,I would like to acknwledge my debt to Michel Brouillette, Brian MacPherson, and Jean-Pierre Marquis. Last, but by no means least, for moral support and for pushing me when I would have preferred to have given up, I am eternally grateful to Miss Olga Koutsouris.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

This thesis will be concerned with an allegedly intractable issue in Locke scholarship: What kind of things are ideas? If we consider Locke a representationalist, and I will argue later that in spite of much argumentation to the contrary we must, then it seems obvious that ideas are things of one sort or another. But for a long time this issue was considered unimportant, since I can find very little mention of it in the literature, and recently it has been considered undecidable.[1] I take issue with both points. First, it is important to decide what kind of things ideas are in order to decide what Locke had in mind in the notion of 'human understanding' (of course, one could decide this independently of a discussion of ideas, but given Locke's emphasis on the term this seems to me a difficult and roundabout means when another avenue is open.) Second, the question is, as I will argue, decidable, perhaps not within the compass of the Essay alone, yet at least within the corpus of Locke's philosophical works.

I begin, then, with the assumptions that the ontological status of ideas is important for understanding Locke generally, and that the issue can be decided, within an allowable degree of accuracy, by appeal to a variety of texts in which it comes up.[2] One thing to be emphasized at the outset is this: that an appreciation of the term 'idea' necessitates a fair bit of backtracking, of tracing the history of the term. Locke, like any philosopher, is heir to a large number of philosophical problems and solutions to those problems,

and, while he may be in the minority in not acknowledging his heritage, the debt he owes his predecessors is readily apparent to anyone who will take the time to look for it. As such, any exegesis involves unpacking Locke's presumptions (presumptions precisely because they would have been obvious, or nearly so, to his contemporaries,) into an explicit form. For this reason, my plan of attack is to build up to Locke's theory of ideas in the manner in which he would have done so himself, by a survey of the uses to which 'ideas' (and related terms like phantasm) were put by his philosophical creditors. While this methodology entails exegetical problems in its own right, it is a necessary evil.

With this material in hand, it will be far easier to decide what Locke meant to refer to by the term 'idea'; what he meant in spite of the fact that it seems he meant many things. Delineating Locke's ontology generally will make it possible to narrow down the field to a very few possibilities, and, given the context described above, it will be possible to settle on a single alternative. My next move, then, is to lay out those general principles which govern the ontology of ideas. Throughout, I will be concerned with the question: What is a thing? This question has different answers for the Aristotelians, the Cartesians, and for Locke. The problem that I will be wrestling with is this: if we include in 'thing' all the things we can speak of, that is everything from my copy of Homer's Illiad to the number 1, then ideas will be things but in a very trivial sense; if we restrict the application of 'thing' to what we might be tempted to call

'common-sense objects', then we are forced, in many cases, to talk either about 'higher-order objects' or different levels of 'being'. In this case, ideas may not turn out to be 'things', but then neither will many others. We will be concerned with what exists, but it seems that apart from fictions (e.g. unicorns) everything we speak of exists, in some sense or other. I don't pretend to answer this puzzle, in fact, I take it for granted throughout that a 'thing' is a common-sense object, for instance a table or a chair. My approach here will be to delineate, for Locke, those features of a 'thing' which make it so, with the aim of demonstrating that ideas share essential features with things like tables and chairs. Rather than answering the question -- What is a thing? -- I will be attempting to show that an 'idea' is a 'thing' in exactly the same way that a table or a chair is a 'thing'. This is to say, in short, that how it is that any given object is a thing is so problematic that our time will be better served here if we assume that tables and chairs are paradigmatic 'things' and decide whether ideas are like these paradigms in enough respects to consider them so also.

I

A short history of perceptual andconcept-acquisition theories

My interest in this topic was stimulated by a paper by John W. Yolton, entitled "Ideas and Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century"[3], which seems to me to be both interesting and wrong. Yolton had argued, by setting out several distinct theories of ideation form Aristotle to Arnauld, that Locke should not be seen as a representationalist. This thesis seemed to me patently false, but I had very little evidence then with which to refute it. It has been the search for such evidence that has led me to this thesis. Throughout this search, I discovered that in order to do justice to Yolton's arguments I would have to retrace his footsteps, so to speak, and lay out exactly where and in what way Yolton went wrong. And this seemed to me necessary also because the ontological status of ideas is directly connected to the question of whether ideas are entities distinct from the 'mind', i.e. whether they are things or not. My claim is that if Locke is a representationalist, then ideas are tertia quid (which is not yet to say whether they are material or immaterial things); if he is not, then ideas may be mental dispositions, or linguistic entities, or heuristic entities introduced for pragmatic reasons,[4] in any case, they will not be things. I believe that this representationalism question must be clarified at the outset. I do that by retracing the history

that Yolton offers, filling in what I take to be major gaps in his story, correcting what I take to be his misunderstandings; and, with this amended picture, thus showing Locke to be the indirect realist, the representative realist, that Thomas Reid[5] took him to be the paradigm case of.

1.Plato: Yolton begins his history of 'idea' with an account of Aristotle's views. There are certain good reasons for starting here, not the least of which is the fact that the scholastic account, and thus the account most likely to have been the target of 17th century versions, depends heavily on Aristotle's. Admittedly, Plato does not figure prominently in the scholastic debates, but Leibniz for one thought the difference between his position and Locke's could be characterized as that dividing Aristotle and Plato.[6] I don't think one should take Leibniz's characterization lightly. The so-called rationalists share many features with the account of ideation and perception given in the Meno and the Theaetetus, and thinkers of the time were not unfamiliar with the general form of the Platonic program (witness the strength and popularity of the Cambridge Platonists.)[7] In particular, I will argue later that two other figures of importance here -- Descartes and Malebranche -- are substantially Platonistic in addition to being influenced by the Aristotelian/scholastic account. Furthermore, this will tend to undermine Yolton's account even more. But I get ahead of myself.

In the Theaetetus, Plato has Socrates outline the follo-

wing theory of perception (attributed by him to Protagoras but by all appearances accepted by Plato as well):

> The point is that all these things are, as we were saying, in motion, but there is a quickness or slowness in their motion. The slow sort has its motion without change of place and with respect to what comes within range of it, and that is how it generates offspring, but the offspring generated are quicker, inasmuch as they move from place to place and their motion consists in change of place.(the preceding seems to be Plato's crude mechanics of perception) As soon, then, as an eye and something else whose structure is adjusted to the eyecomes within range and give birth to the whiteness together with its cognate perception -- things that would never have come into existence if either of the two had approached anything else -- then it is that, as the vision from the eyes and the whiteness from the thing that joins in giving birth to the color pass in the space between, the eye becomes filled with vision and now sees, and becomes, not vision, but a seeing eye, while the other parent of the color is saturated with whiteness and becomes, on its side, not whiteness, but a white thing, be it stick or stone or whatever else may chance to be so colored.[8]

Plato here gives an account of perception in causal terms which involves four explanatory entities: two 'parents' and two 'offspring'. In more modern terms, the parents are 1)a perceiving subject and 2)a thing perceived; the offspring of their union are 3)an act of perception (i.e. a 'seeing' in the above example) and 4)a percept (which here appears to be some one determinate property e.g. whiteness). The account given seems rather straightforward: a subject suitably disposed (i.e. 1)) encounters a suitably structured object (i.e. 2)), which meeting gives rise to an act of perception (i.e. 3)) and

a percept (i.e. 4)) such that the subject perceives some object O with some determinate property P, say the colour white. The caveat, that these things (i.e. the offspring) "would never have come into existence if either of the two [parents] had approached anything else", implies that 3) and 4) are private objects i.e. they are unique to a given perceiver. What is left open here, and which is not answered at least not in this text and not unambiguously anywhere else, is whether 3) and 4) are the same objects whenever the same 1) and 2) encounter each other. This question need not bother us for the time being, but I will return to it later. All we really need to know is what status 4) has. From the above, we know that 1) and 2) are public objects, say Socrates and a white stick for example, that 3) is an act, a power of 1), but 4) does not fit into any convenient category. It is not an object, since it cannot be assigned a place; it is not a property of the thing perceived since the thing does not take on the property, rather it is what, in virtue of which, a thing is said to have a property but is not that property itself. Socrates says, a little further on, that, with respect to 3) and 4), the "conclusion from all this is...that nothing is one thing just by itself, but is always in the process of becoming for someone, and being is to be ruled out altogether."[9] Plato clearly does not want to admit that 4) is in any sense, only that it 'comes about' or 'becomes' as a result of an interaction between existing things; that "what you call white color has no being as a distinct thing outside

your eyes nor yet inside then, nor must you assign it any fixed place."[10] Readers familiar with Plato's theory of knowledge will not be surprised by this, since knowledge as Plato describes it is only of what is, and what is never suffers change.[11] In the Theaetetus his argument is that, since perceptual features are not, they cannot constitute knowledge; for my purposes it is enough to point out simply that they are not. Thus, there are for Plato two distinct areas of human cognition, one in which we perceive things as being such and such but they are not in fact, and another in which things are such and such but these features (i.e. forms) are not perceived, they are intuited or remembered.[12] For the time being, I will not deal with Plato's 'reminiscence' theory, other than to point out that there is some debate as to how to interpret it and that there is at least one reading of the theory as a dispositional theory of the mind.[13]

2.Aristotle: I find it strange that Yolton ignored Plato when there are obvious parallels with theories propounded in the 17th century (particularly those involving innate ideas). On the other hand, Aristotle's influence is well-documented and, if he is not uniquely the major influence or target of the 17th century, he is at least one of very few. We find, in the De Anima, Aristotle using a metaphor that Plato used in the Theaetetus, namely that of the wax receiving an impression from a signet ring. Plato had used it to illustrate how knowledge could be clearer in some cases than in others (the

impression is sharp or blurry as the wax is either hard or soft) and not as analogy of sense-perception. Aristotle does use it as a model of sense-perception, and I think it is useful to consider why. Of sensation in general, he says:

> By a 'sense' is meant what has the power of receiving into itself the sensible forms of things without the matter. This must be conceived of as taking place in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; we say that what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or gold, but its particular metallic constitution makes no difference: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent what in each case the substance is; what alone matters is what quality it has, i.e. in what ratio its constituents are combined.[14]

Form, as Aristotle construes it both here and elsewhere, is matter-independent; it exists, unlike what we would call properties or attributes, independently of the matter in which it exists. It also exists in different ways, i.e. both in an object and in a 'soul', and these two ways of existing can be simultaneous. "We are in the habit," says Aristotle, "of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this', and b) in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this', and thirdly c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both a) and b). Now matter is potentiality, form actuality."[15] Since, by the above definitions, a particular is of a determinate kind in virtue of its form, it makes no sense to demand, at least not for Aristotle, that numeric

identity, of form at least, be restricted in the way in which we normally do restrict it. Aristotle would not argue that A≠A, but he would argue that the model of sensation he advances (i.e that the same form exists both in the object and in a soul perceiving it) is in contradiction to the law of identity. What makes A an individual is its matter, what makes it of a definite kind, and this is the relevant consideration for Aristotle both in cases of perception and of knowledge, is its form. Since the soul has the same form as the object perceived, the form in the sensitive soul is identical with the object sensed. Given his criterion of individuation, i.e. matter, this does not violate the law of identity. To put this simply, I think it correct to say, with Yolton, that "it is the **form** of the object, not the **object**, which is in the soul."[16]

The immediately noticeable difference here from Plato's model of sense perception is that what is sensed (I mean the form since the individual, the matter, is not sensed) is not unique to the perceiver. And this accounts to some extent for the reluctance to use the wax-impression model for sense-perception -- Plato's 'cognate perception' is not 'in the mind', but where it is, on the other hand, cannot be discovered from what Plato tells us in the Theaetetus. Whereas Plato's model undermines any empirical basis for knowledge, Aristotle's is meant to do just the opposite. The relevant similarities are that both Plato and Aristotle take knowledge to be of universals and not particulars. But all similarities pretty well end here. While Plato allows that knowledge of

forms is independent of sense, Aristotle explicitly denies this -- "no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense".[17] And this perhaps not for the reason that sense is the occasion for understanding, but that sense is the source of intelligible things; this distinguishes sharply the Platonic and the Aristotelian notions of concept acquisition. Also, for Aristotle, "when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image", where image is construed "as like sensuous contents except that they contain no matter".[18]

Given that this definition seems to correspond exactly to that given of form, it seems an obvious move to identify these images with the form of an object as it exists in a soul. We should say then that we are aware of an image of an object rather than the object itself. But what of the phrase "along with"; is Aristotle saying we are directly aware both of an image and an object (this seems unlikely; the redundancy has no justification) or is he saying that we are directly aware of an image and indirectly aware of an object? I do not answer this question since it involves more textual searching that I can afford at the present time; it is enough to point out that one could read it either way, i.e. one could read Aristotle either as a direct realist or as an indirect realist.

What ontological place do we assign to Aristotle's forms in the sensitive soul and to the images present in intellection (since they are both forms, they should have the same

ontological status regardless of whether they are identical or not)? First, Aristotle construes matter, as was noted above, as potentiality and form as actuality, where matter is potentially a this (always, however, a 'what') and form is actually a 'this'. In respect of being, however, they are equivalent. Since both the forms appprehended in sense and the images present in intellection are 'actualities', they are in a sense substances (what sense is not clear), and ought to be given equivalent places in Aristotle's ontology. To be sure, they are not 'things' in the way in which this page is a thing (i.e. in Aristotle's terms a combination of form and matter). They are not particulars, as we would use the term, but they do particularize things.

I have spent this time with Aristotle's account of knowledge or concept acquisition since the distinction between it and sense perception will resurface with the scholastics. The problem that will give them the most trouble, and which will lead in a roundabout way to the realism/nominalism debate over universals, is the objection that, in virtue of the above analysis, we are not aware of particulars but only of universals (which seems to contradict our experience), but more on this later. Yolton does mention in a footnote[19] that this is relevant to the debate between Arnauld and Malebranche but does not develop it, to the detriment of his account. What I find unusual also is that he does not deal with Ockham's treatment of this, and related problems, especially since the disagreement between Locke and the Cartesians is a version of the realism/nominalism debate. For the 17th century, it is

not just Aquinas's reconstruction of Aristotle that is important, but also Ockham's ficta and Suarez's objective reality. Both of these notions, so important when we turn to Descartes and Locke, are hardly mentioned by Yolton. We will see that it is in the context of a scholastic debate, using scholastic notions (not simply thomistic ones) that the Cartesian program gets off the ground.

3.Ockham: Ockham is remembered chiefly for his razor and the realism/nominalism debate over universals, but he is a watershed figure in another area as well: he seems to be one of the first to list systematically the various merits of two competing theories of cognition -- the objective-existence theory and the mental act theory. The first of these is more popularly known as Ockham's ficta theory, and for a long time this was considered the one which he espoused; but Boehner has shown that Ockham changed his mind in favour of the mental act theory, and this for the reason of ontological parsimony.[20] He considered both of these in response to a question which we will see arising in other contexts: What is it that I am aware of when either I am thinking of or I am perceiving something which does not exist? M.M. Adams[21] and Stephen Read[22] have both dealt with this issue in Ockham and the following borrows a lot from their reconstructions. From the little that I have said about Aristotle, it can be seen that there is a problem for him with non-veridical perception and conception. Since whenever I conceive, my mind takes on

the form of an object without its matter, what is happening when there is no such object? Adams points out that:

> Ockham assumes that whatever is thought of must have some sort of ontological status. When we think of something that really exists, its ontological status is straightforward. What about when we think of things that do not and/or cannot really exist? Ockham insists that even these must be something that is not nothing. Otherwise, we would be thinking of nothing. He says that such unreal objects of thought have "objective", "intensional", or "cognised" existence as opposed to "subjective" or real existence.[23]

Notice how similar this 'intensional existence' is to Aristotle's substantial form (not surprising since Ockham accepts the Aristotelian account of substance.) But since Ockham takes very much to heart the principle that everything which exists is a particular, or is singular, he finds it difficult to admit, with Aristotle, that the thing having 'intensional existence' is identical with some external object (i.e. in respect of form.) Since, for Ockham, "no universal is a substance that is single and numerically one"[24], then "no singular substance [i.e. no object in the world] is a universal".[25] Further, universals as objects of knowledge, exist only in the mind. The "universal is a mental content of such a nature as to be predicated of many things."[26] To sum up:

> a proposition is either in the mind or in spoken or written words. Consequently, its parts are either in the mind or in speech or in writing. Such things, however, are not particular substances. Therefore, it is established that no proposition can be composed of

> substances; but a proposition is composed of universals; hence universals are in no way substances.[27]

So, in what way do such 'ideas' exist? Ockham considers two alternatives: 1) a universal is a thought-object; 2) a universal is an act of the intellect. His account of 1) is as follows:

> The intellect, seeing a thing outside the mind, forms in the mind a picture resembling it, in such a way that if the mind had the power to produce as it has the power to picture, it would produce by this act a real outside thing which would be only numerically distinct from the former real thing.[28]

This 'thought-object' seems quite a bit like Aristotle's image and Locke's idea, especially given the notion of resemblance (here construed as specific identity.) But it should be noted, in contrast, that Ockham is here talking about cognition and not perception; no account is given of the latter, and it is only the role as universal that is being considered. Thought-objects exist insofar as they are known [esse est esse intellectus], and not insofar as they are perceived [esse est percipi], so that some other account would be needed to supplement the one given here.[29] That is, Ockham's thought-object has the same function as Plato's idea of form, but not the same function as Aristotle's form in the sensitive soul (which seems to fulfill both cognitive and perceptual roles.) This will turn out to be important by Descartes's time, when the preponderance of theories will attempt to explain both cognition and perception in terms of a single principle, or a set of related ones. In any case, the thought-object theory

implies a plethora of 'things' (e.g. chimeras, unicorns, round squares, etc.) which stand (as is implied in the notion of immediate cognition) in the relation of effect to cause to the things known, but which are numerically distinct both from the mind and the external object.[30] This, as was pointed out above, is deemed necessary in order to avoid a problem of the cognition of non-existent things.[31] Problems associated with this view seem to be: a world of mental entities, two 'levels' of existence, real and mental, as well as the fact that the Aristotelian problem of the cognition of singulars is not circumvented -- the individuals which cause these pictures are not themselves known.

Ockham seems to have been aware of the difficulties just-intimated and offered an alternative: the mental act theory. Boehner has provided both textual and extra-textual evidence to support the claim that Ockham did in fact reject 1) at a later date in favour of 2). Given Ockham's concerns, simplicity of explanation as well as an eye more for cognitive than for perceptive functions of the mind, this is not surprising. He gives a brief declaration of the theory as follows:

> The mind's own intellectual acts are called states of mind. By their nature they stand for the actual things outside the mind or for other things in the mind, just as the spoken words stand for them by convention...[32] (emphasis added)

Ockham again construes the applicability of a universal as a function of its nature, of a greater or lesser degree of resemblance to its object (i.e. "this is so because of some specific likeness between these individuals that does not

exist between others.")[33] While this relation is no clearer here than in 1), Ockham gains at least two advantages over 1): his ontology includes only minds and common-sense objects, namely tables, chairs, etc., and doesn't involve non-existent (and especially not logically impossible) objects; there is only one kind of existence, namely the 'real' kind. Mental acts are also mental states which, in virtue of an undefined but incontestable nature, represent or make known to the intellect those things external to it, as well as those things proper to it, i.e. its own operations. Here we have a complete parity between world-order and mind-order, i.e. things in the world are bearers of properties (accidents), minds are bearers of some other (related and resembling) properties. And Ockham has provided what will become the standard formulation of the act/object distinction, as well as the fundamental virtues and vices of placing the 'idea' in either of these two places.

From the above, it might seem that Ockham is not concerned with problems of perception, but this is not the case. He is not concerned with the problems that we might be tempted to deal with. But one question he does raise and does give an interesting answer to. To the question -- What is it that I am perceiving when what I perceive does not exist? -- Ockham brings a notion of 'intuitive cognition'. Abstractive cognition is an act of the mind which apprehends the universals considered above; it concerns things but without consideration as to their existence or non-existence, i.e. is purely conceptual.[34] Intuitive cognition, on the other hand, is what

allows us to say whether something exists or not; its function is similar to the modern 'sense-data' of sense-data or phenomenalist theories in its incorrigibility. He puts it this way:

> Intuitive cognition of a thing is cognition that enables us to know whether the thing exists or does not exist, in such a way that, if the thing exists, then the intellect immediately judges that it exists and evidently knows that it exists, unless the judgement happens to be impeded through the imperfection of this cognition.[35]

Further on he says:

> ...intuitive cognition is such that when one thing known by means of it inheres as an accident in another, or is locally distinct from the other, or stands in some other relation to the other, then non-complex cognition of these things gives us an immediate knowledge whether a certain thing inheres or does not inhere in another, or whether it is distant from it or not, and so on for other contingent truths...[36]

How does this answer the above question about non-veridical perception? Quite simply, by appeal to definition: "It is a contradiction that an act of seeing should exist while that which is seen neither exists nor can exist in reality."[37] But Ockham is not insensitive to the issue here, i.e. that there are such 'seeings'. His resolution is two-fold: first, he argues that God can cause me to have a perception without a secondary cause;[38] yet, he argues, this is an extraordinary case, and for the most part:

> So far as natural causes are in question, an intuitive cognition cannot be caused or preserved if the object does not exist. The reason is this. A real effect cannot

> be caused, or brought from nothing into being, by that which is nothing. Hence, if we are speaking of the natural mode of causation, it requires for its existence both a productive and a preservative cause.[39]

While this does not seems to really resolve the issue, inasmuch as it still leaves us in the dark as to how to distinguish the two cases, Ockham points out that error is a function of judgement, not of perception, and gives the following argument:

> You may object: 'If someone sees the sun and then enters a dark room, it appears to him that he sees the sun in the same place and of the same size. Hence a sight of the sun remains, when the sun is absent; and for the same reason would remain, even if it did not exist.' To this I answer: 'No sight of the sun does remain; but there does remain a quality, viz. the light-impression in the eye, and it is this quality that is seen. And if the intellect formulates such a proposition as "Light is seen at the same place, etc." and gives its assent to it, it is deceived by this quality or impresssion which it sees.[40]

To sum up, then. We have discovered the following about Ockham's cognitive theory:

1) a thought-object theory of cognition
2) a mental act theory of cognition
3) two kinds of cognition: a) abstractive (conceptual) whose 'object' is a universal;
   b) intuitive, whose 'object' is a sense-datum (I leave it open what this sense-datum is, but from the above a likely candidate, at least for vision, is the image on the retina.)

We've found that, for Ockham, 1) implies the existence of mental entities, objects which have 'borrowed' existence, that 2) involves an undefined relation between a given mental state

and some object, such that the mental state is said to be 'of' or 'about' that object. Note that both 1) and 2) involve a notion of resemblance;[41] that while 1) is ontologically more complex than 2), an account of the 'idea's' relation to its object can be given in relatively simple terms, i.e. on a picture model; and that 2) while ontologically simpler, has less explanatory power, i.e. it solves the given problems more by fiat than anything else. Note also that 3) is compatible with either 1) or 2), but that 3)a) seems intuitively to have a better fit with 1) than with 2) since there is some entity of which one could say that it either does or does not exist.

4.Suarez: Two notions that Suarez contributes to this history of the theory of ideas are a formulation of the notion of "objective existence" that we met above in Ockham, and three important kinds of distinction: modal, real, and mental. Both of these features are borrowed wholesale by Descartes and they are central to his theory. How different Descartes's theory is, and how differently he uses certain key terms, is only brought out in contrast with the use of the same terms by Suarez.

The term objective existence (or reality) is for Suarez not a term denoting the ontological status of ideas, concepts, or universals in the mind, as it seems to be for Ockham, but is a denomination of the thing known or perceived by their means.[42] While Suarez was sympathetic to the claims of the nominalists, and ceded to them to some extent by advocating

the mental act theory of cognition, his advocacy was more for Thomistic-Aristotelianism than it was for ontological parsimony. This is apparent in his distinction of formal and objective concept, which throws a considerable light on his cognitive theory. The distinction is made out as follows:

> The formal concept is said to be the very act, or what is the same, the word by which the intellect conceives a common meaning (ratio)...The objective concept is said to be that thing or meaning (ratio), which is properly and immediately known or represented through the formal concept.[43]

The formal concept here plays the role of Ockham's mental act, but the objective concept (having objective existence) is the object itself (Ockham's singular). The reason for Suarez's designating the object understood via the formal concept an objective concept (it does seem, on the face of it, a useless designation since Suarez himself points out that it adds nothing to the object) seems to be that he is focusing attention here on what is understood, not the object in its entirety (never its unique singularity), but some aspect of it. So, when we speak or think of some object, says Suarez, the formal concept (i.e. the mind acting in such and such a manner) picks out some object, and that object only insofar as it comes under the scope of that particular formal concept.[44] It might be useful to think of this as analogous to Davidson's "object under a description".[45] Why this should be important for Suarez will become clearer through an examination of the three kinds of distinctions.

In the Disputatione Metaphysicae[46] Suarez argues for the

admissibility of a third kind of distinction than the ones that had been generally recognized (i.e. real and mental), namely a modal distinction. A real distinction is that "between thing and thing";[47] a mental distinction (sometimes called a distinction of reason) "does not formally and actually intervene between the things designated as distinct, as they exist in themselves, but only as they exist in our ideas, from which they receive some denomination."[48] The first of these is relatively straightforward, we can construe it as that distinction which allows for numerical distinctness, the second requires some explication. One can have a mental distinction only between two aspects of a given thing which do not, and cannot, really be distinct in nature. Thus, there is a real distinction between this page and the last one, but only a distinction of reason between the existence of this page and its duration. These two, real and mental distinctions, seemed enough for some to seperate real from chimerical existences and real from chimerical properties of existents. But Suarez points out that there is some intuitive basis for the opinion that attributes or accidents of things are distinct in some sense both from the each other (distinct in a stronger sense than existence is from duration) and from the things of which they are attributes. It is this kind of distinction that Suarez means to capture in his 'modal distinction'. A mode "considered precisely in itself, is not properly a thing or entity",[49] nevertheless "there are..certain real modes that are something positive and of

themselves modify the very entities by conferring on them something that is over and above the complete essence as individual and as existing in nature."[50] Modes, as here construed, are qualifications of some general property such that the individual is said to be in some determinate state. Suarez gives the following example:

> ...in quantity, for example, which inheres in a substance, two aspects may be considered: one is the entity of quantity itself, the other is the union or actual inherence of this quantity in the substance./ The first we call simply the thing or being of quantity...The second aspect, inherence, we call a mode of quantity...[51]

By this means, Suarez introduces a category between real and fictional; tables, say, exist in nature and are to be denominated real; duration, say, distinct from an enduring thing, does not exist in nature and is a fictional entity (or no entity at all). But determinate properties, say being a cubic metre in volume, can be construed as something positive and real; not existing on their own but not identical with existing things either (since there is no necessity that they should have one volume rather than some other.)

Objective existence, as was pointed out, refers to some aspect of a cognized object (further, some aspect which stands in a resemblance relation to another aspect of some other object,) and this existence seems to correspond rather nicely to Suarez's mode, i.e. objective existence refers to some mode of an object that is under consideration by the intellect. When that mode is being considered by the intellect, it is said to have objective existence. In this sense, objective

existence adds nothing to the 'reality' of the thing known. The formal concept has a modal interpretation as well: it is a mode of the soul, i.e. a modification of the mind's existing power to act such that the mind represents to itself some thing.

Suarez's ontology with respect to the mind is then rather easy to reconstruct given the above clues. The following picture emerges: all things which exist, exist either as matter, form, or a combination of both (this Suarez shares with all the Aristotelians); in addition to these, there are some quasi-existents (it might be better to call them, paraphrasing Suarez, realizers,) namely modes, which determine the exact nature of a particular thing, as well as real relations existing between things (e.g. knowing.) If my characterization of the formal concept is correct, it fits into the modal category. If it is correct to call it an idea, and there seems to be no reason not to, then it is clear that, for Suarez, ideas are not things, they are modifications of things (granted, such modifications have a status between real and fictional, but in the case of ideas such queerness is desirable.) Objective existence, in turn, is also such a modification (but considered as known); it is that feature of an object that the mind apprehends when it knows or perceives the object. It is not a mere mental relation since it is more than a conceptual one; it is a real relation in the sense that the mind is really related to (in contact with, aware of) some object, but more properly called a modal relation in that what

is picked out is a mode of the thing known, and that via a mode of the intellect (the formal concept.) In brief, it could be said that talk of modes, for Suarez, is on the level of ontology, objective existence talk on the level of epistemology. Note, in particular, that when speaking of the mind, one could construe the formal concept itself as having objective existence since it is a determinate property of an existing thing -- the mind. But this is not a line developed by Suarez; rather, it is a consequence that is picked up, and carried through, by Descartes.

5.Descartes: With these Suarezian notions in hand we have a proper sense of the context in which talk of ideas occurs in the Meditations. There is a mixture of Platonic (Augustine and Plotinus) and Aristotelian (the scholastics like Aquinas and Suarez) influences, as well as a tradition of metaphysical speculation (Duns Scotus and Ockham to name just two). In addition to this, the rediscovery of classical texts (particularly those of the Greek atomists and of Sextus Empiricus) forced a re-evaluation of matters already taken for granted or considered beyond reproach. The Reformation plays no small part in this in terms of motivation, but the philosophical underpinnings of it are far older. Descartes's methodological doubt is a sign of the times;[52] and everyone from Gassendi and Hobbes to Pere Mersenne was infected with it. It's not inappropriate to say that Descartes's forced the discourse on cognition to be approached in a different manner, such that

the scholastic solutions (including the ones considered here) seemed inadequate and new questions seemed increasingly more pressing.

What we need to get clear on for the purposes of my argument is Descartes's use of the term 'idea' (idee, similitudinem). It's through this term that Descartes most influenced not only Locke but all of his contemporaries. It is a Herculean task to trace the use of mentalistic terms that culminated in Descartes's choice of 'idea' (from the Greek ἰδέα, ἔδος, but also φαντασία, and from the Latin similacrum and similitudinem), a task larger in scope than that I've allowed myself here. But some sense of that history should already have been grasped by the selections I've chosen to deal with. Descartes calls an idea "a word by which I understand the form of any thought, that form by the immediate awareness of which I am conscious of that said thought."[53] Here he seems to be distinguishing a definite feature of consciousness, namely its content; and this fits well with the definition of thought given in the Principles: "By the word thought I understand all that of which we are conscious of operating in us. And that is why not alone understanding, willing, imagining, but also feeling, are here the same thing as thought."[54] Here, it seems almost impossible not to construe the thought/idea dichotomy as the act/object distinction of Aristotle and the scholastics. But just as Ockham maintained this distinction without allowing a mental-entity in the place of the object (here, idea), Descartes takes idea and thought to be aspects of the same 'thing' (i.e. thinking substance.) This is borne

out I take it merely by the language he uses in the above passages: the mind has certain ideas, and exercises certain functions.

The way in which the mind has ideas, or, which is the same, the way in which ideas are 'in the mind', will indicate to what extent Descartes borrows from Suarez and to what extent he does not. But to that end, it's best to go over some of the principles involved. First, there are the distinctions inherited from Suarez: real, modal, and of reason. Of real distinctions he says: "The real is properly speaking found between two or more substances; and we can conclude that two substances are really distinct one from the other from the sole fact that we can conceive the one clearly and distinctly without the other."[55] Of modal distinctions, he notes that there are two kinds: "the one between the mode properly speaking, and the substance of which it is the mode, and the other between two modes of the same substance."[56] The real distinction corresponds closely to Suarez's ("between thing and thing"); the second, however, while clearly based on Suarez's, makes explicit two considerations which do not seem to be presented in the Disp. Met., i.e. the relation between a mode and its substance is not the same as that between two modes of the same substance and that the distinction between two modes of different substances is not a modal distinction. Descartes writes: "As for the distinction whereby the mode of one substance is different from another substance, or from the mode of another substance, as the movement of one body is

different from another body or from mind, or else as movement is different from duration; it appears to me that we should call it real rather than modal; because we cannot clearly conceive these modes apart from the substances of which they are modes and which are really distinct."[57] We can see this as Descartes's expansion of Suarez's principles, so long as we recognize how important it is for Descartes to talk about conceivability as a basis for distinctness. There is some problem with Descartes's distinction of reason though. Where Suarez's mental distinction is clearly mere conceptual difference, Descartes's has some interesting ontological twists. He says the distinction "is between substance and some one of its attributes without which it is not possible that we should have a distinct knowledge of it, or between two such attributes of the same substance."[58] At first, there seems to be no real difference between this and a modal distinction. And Descartes himself points out that in the Meditations and the Replies to the first set of Objections he did not distinguish them.[59] The relevant difference is the following: "...we cannot have a clear and distinct idea of such a substance if we exclude from it such an attribute; or we cannot have a clear idea of the one of the two attributes if we seperate from it the other."[60] Descartes seems here to be trading on the notion of essential properties, i.e. we can distinguish in thought duration or quantity from a substance but we cannot have a clear and distinct idea, not even a clear idea, of a substance without including in that idea attributes of a certain kind. We can, however, have both a clear and a

distinct idea of a substance without its various modes (e.g. being a cubic metre in volume). It is essential to corporeal substance that it endure through time (hence a distinction of reason only between duration and the enduring substance,) but it is not essential that it have a certain volume, it must have some volume or other but not necessarily this one (hence a modal distinction between corporeal substance and being a cubic metre in volume.)

These distinctions can be applied mutatis mutandis to the above-mentioned definitions of thought and idea. Keeping in mind the arguments leading up to "je pense, donc je suis" in the Meditations, it should be clear that there is a distinction of reason between any given operation of the mind (e.g. willing, imagining, etc.) and the mind itself, or thinking substance. We cannot have a clear and distinct idea of the mind without including in that idea the attribute of thinking, which, as has been noted, includes "understanding, willing, imagining" and also "feeling" (there is no indication that this is a complete list, however) since Descartes says these are "the same thing as thought". Further, given Descartes's distinction of thought and idea (i.e. "the form of any thought",) no great leap is needed to see the distinction between thinking substance and idea as a modal one, since, while it is essential to the mind that it be thinking, it is not essential that it be engaged in thinking about any particular idea (e.g. an idea of the sun.)

We have already in hand some essential negative features

of Descartes's 'idea', namely that it is not an act of the mind (like Ockham), that it is not an object (intentional or otherwise) or some feature of an object (like Aristotle and Suarez respectively.) The only positive features so far enumerated is that it is a mode of thought; and Descartes defines mode as follows: "...when we...speak of modes we mean nothing more than what elsewhere is termed attribute or quality."[61] He distinguishes the latter two from modes in the following way:

> ...when we consider substance as modified or diversified by them [i.e. attributes or qualities], I avail myself of the word mode; and when from the disposition or variation it can be named as of such and such a kind, we shall use the word qualities (to designate the different modes which cause it to be so termed); and finally when we more generally consider that these modes or qualities are in substance we term them attributes.[62]

In the Notes, he says also that: "the nature of a mode consists in this, that it can by no means be comprehended, except it involves in its own concept the concept of the thing of which it is a mode";[63] "it belongs to the theory of modes that, though we can easily comprehend a substance apart from a mode, we cannot, conversely, clearly comprehend a mode unless at the same time we conceive the substance of which it is a mode."[64]

With respect to the mind, then, we can say that, insofar as ideas are considered in themselves, they are modes, but more generally they are qualities of thinking substance. And since it is just insofar as they are in themselves that the

notion of representation is important, I will use mode exclusively when talking about ideas.

Descartes's use of idea to refer to the content of thought aroused some controversy in his time, and the replies to the objections afford us a unique opportunity to discover what features of cognition that he was concerned with. Descartes also picks up from the scholastics, again likely Suarez, the notions of formal and objective reality or existence. Formal reality pertains to substance(s), and by extension to modes, qualities and attributes,[65] but objective reality is a feature of a certain kind of mode -- ideas. Descartes, at least in the Meditations, is not clear as to exactly what he's getting at with the notion of objective reality; in the Principles, he says only that "when we reflect on the various ideas that are in us, it is easy to perceive that there is not much difference between them when they are considered only as modes of thinking, but they are widely different in another way, since the one represents one thing, and the other another;"[66] and this on the subject of "the objective perfection of our ideas." In the replies to the first set of objections, where Caterus is most likely working within a Suarezian notion of objective reality ("Objective existence in the mind is the determination of the act of mind by a modification due to an object, which is merely an extrinsic appellation and nothing belonging to the object."), Descartes replies:

> Now, here it must be noticed firstly that he [i.e. Caterus] refers to the thing itself, which is as it were, placed outside the understanding and respecting which it is certainly an extrinsic

> attribute to be objectively in the understanding, and secondly, that what I speak of is the idea, which at no time exists outside the mind, and the case of which 'objective existence' is indistinguishable from being in the understanding in that way in which objects are wont to be there.[67]

and a little further on, by way of example:

> ...the idea of the sun will be the sun itself existing in the mind, not indeed formally, as it exists in the sky, but objectively i.e. in the way objects are wont to exist in the mind.[68]

Caterus, arguing Suarez's line i.e. that objective existence is a feature of the object under a given viewpoint, provokes Descartes's response that it is rather the object itself existing in the way objects 'exist' in the mind. Thus, objective existence stands for that thing which the mind is aware of via an idea, not that the idea is an extra entity ("a thing existing in the mind through an idea, is not an actual entity."), but that the idea is a vehicle, a determinate feature of consciousness which accounts for being aware of this rather than that. Ideas are nothing else but the mind modified in a certain way, but the objective existence of ideas are the things known by their means. And this is borne out by this passage from the Arguments: "By the objective reality of an idea I mean that in respect of which the thing represented in the idea is an entity [entitatem rei representatae per ideam], in so far as that exists in the idea."[69]

From all of the above, both from the notion of ideas as modes and from the account (ultimately unsatisfying) of objective existence, we can conclude that, at the very least,

Descartes wants to avoid giving the idea any ontological status in its own right. The relation of mind to thought seems straightforwardly substance/attribute; the relation of idea to mind, while not so unproblematic, is at least plausible on a non-essential property basis. The mind exercises its faculties (thinking) in the same way that body exercises its functions (motion);[70] it has ideas in the same way that body has a given extension. This much I think will be allowed on all sides. The relation of idea to object is, unfortunately, left no better explained by Descartes than it had been by his antecedents. Louis de la Forge put it nicely when he complained that all the obscurity in Descartes's system stems from the obscurity surrounding ideas.[71]

6. Arnauld and Malebranche: It was this same obscurity that engendered the by now infamous controversy between Antoine Arnauld and Nicolas Malebranche. Both cited Descartes as an authority in the matter, but their conclusions could not be further apart. And the controversy is important for us for two reasons: 1) because Malebranche argued for a representative theory of perception, and 2) because Locke dealt explicitly with this theory in his An Examination of P. Malebranche and Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris's Books, two texts which have been marshalled in support of the thesis that Locke was not a representationalist. For these reasons, I find it unusual that Yolton did not deal with Malebranche in his paper, yet did pay close attention to Arnauld.

Malebranche contrasts perceiving things by themselves and by ideas i.e. "through things different from themselves,"[72] but by itself this makes very little sense. In section 1, Part II, chapter I of The Search After Truth, Malebranche takes it as obvious that "we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves", but the reason he gives for this is a strange one: "We see the sun, the stars, and an infinity (sic) of objects external to us: and it is not likely that the soul should leave the body to stroll about the heavens, as it were, in order to behold all these objects."[73] It seems here as if Malebranche thinks an object must be co-present and co-spatial with the mind perceiving it (which also has a location of sorts i.e. in the body to which it is united) in order for perception to take place, i.e. it must be in the head. The naivete of this view should give us pause, and engender some doubt as to whether this is the reason behind Malebranche's representationalism. Certainly, the ridicule he received at Arnauld's hands, who accuses him of "infantile prejudices" and a "confusion between local and objective presence" among other things, shows that his contemporaries appreciated the absurdity of the position so-expressed. But I think there is a more fundamental principle at work here (although the notions of local and objective 'presence' are important, and I will return to them later) and one not so open to criticism (at least, not from a self-avowed Cartesian.) It revolves around the radical separation of mind and body. At the very least, Malebranche is sensitive to the implications of this dualism. Aside from God, there exist minds and modes of mind,

extension and modes of extension, where a mode is construed as only conceptually distinct from the substance of which it is a mode. It is partly on this basis that Malebranche argued against the efficacy of secondary causes: since modes are particular to a given substance, they cannot be transferred (this is a logical as well as a physical constraint.) While Malebranche's example is most often the billiard-ball one,[74] the case applies *a fortiori* to any transfer of modes between *kinds* of substance. This accounts to a large extent for Malebranche's rejection of the causal theories of perception prevalent in his time,[75] since it also makes it impossible to account for how a mental mode can be like an extended mode. Malebranche's move is to deny that mental modes represent the external world. Modes of thinking substance "represent to the soul nothing different from itself."[76] In order to avoid cutting us off entirely from the world, Malebranche counts as such modes only sensations (*sentiments*); but puts ideas of extension, duration, number, and God outside of the mind, specifically, in God's mind. This move does three things which Malebranche finds satisfying: it makes man immediately dependent on his God for enlightenment, it getsaround the problem of mind/body interaction by denying any interaction, and it provides a solution to the problem of intentionality inherent in the Cartesian substance/mode distinction as applied to the mind. But it also entails that some non-material entity goes bail for the external world, and through the intermediary of which we come to have knowledge of it. Since

similarity of structure seems to be ruled out by the radical division between mind and body, ideas represent their objects in a very narrow and precise sense. In Bk.3, Pt.II, chpt.VI of the Search, Malebranche lists four possible ways of perceiving things:

> The first is know things by themselves.
> The second is to know them through their ideas, i.e. as I mean it here, through something different from themselves.
> The third is to know them through consciousness, or inner sensation.
> The fourth is to know them through conjecture.[77]

Here, Malebranche would seem to be denying the possibility of representation by resemblance since an idea is "something different from" the thing of which it is an idea. But Malebranche equivocates on the use of the term idea, sometimes taking it to mean any kind of perception, clear or obscure, sometimes meaning only clear ideas such as when he says that we have no idea of our soul, and sometimes for representative entities. Arnauld is sensitive to this equivocation but does not seem to able to elicit any elucidation from Malebranche on this point.[78] One thing is clear, however, and that is that Malebranche consistently uses the term 'represent' in the sense of 'to make known' or 'to be present to consciousness', and in more attenuated versions 'to be able to manipulate or make predictions'. The reasons for this, with a little reflection, are few. Malebranche distinguishes two broad categories of perception (following Descartes's lead in bringing all the activities of the mind under the rubric of perception) -- inner sensation (sentiment) and ideation. Un-

der the former fall all those mental modes I mentioned earlier which cannot, in virtue of being modifications of the soul, represent anything outside of it; under the latter fall those things which are 'true of' the external world and which cannot, in virtue of fulfilling this function, appertain to mind.[79] Malebranche sees the necessity of representationalism as an entailment of Cartesian dualism. Note in particular the importance of the distinction between sentiment and ideas in leading Malebranche to this position, and the similarity of this distinction, at least epistemically, with the primary/secondary quality distinction.

In my reconstruction of Malebranche's position, he seems to be bothered by certain implications of the notion of two radically different kinds of substances in the world -- mind and body. For him, if an idea is just a mode of the mind (an assumption he never questions,) then "we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves," but only by or through the mediation of some idea. It's clear from passages such as the following -- "...the immediate object of our mind, when it sees the sun, for instance, is not the sun, but something which is intimately joined to our soul, and this is what I call an idea."[80] -- that Malebranche sees this difference as implying the necessity of a third thing standing between the perceiver and the object perceived, something which brings a spatial object into an intelligible place. Malebranche appeals to the same Cartesian texts that Arnauld does when the latter attempts to refute him. But note that the terms that Malebranche uses in the above passage mirror those in the

passage quoted from the replies to Caterus, where Descartes says the objective existence of the sun is the sun itself. Arnauld thinks he can resolve the difficulty by a careful exposition of what it means to say that I perceive things directly by means of representative ideas. Arnauld thinks it is correct to say that I perceive a thing 'by means of' an idea when we consider that "notre pensee ou perception est essentiellement reflechissante sure elle-meme: ou, ce qui se dit plus heureusement en latin, est sui conscia."[81] Since the mind is aware of itself, and through itself, of some object, we perceive via ideas (i.e. modifications of the mind) without those ideas being entities in their own right. Arnauld seems to conquer in virtue of the ontological simplicity he appeals to. For this reason, Arnauld thinks Descartes's theory of ideas does not imply the Malebranchean tertium quid. And this seems very plausible since Malebranche's 'two ways of knowing things' (i.e. sentiment and ideas) is nowhere to be found in Descartes. On my reading of Descartes, we know objects in only one way: via clear and distinct ideas and the benevolence of an omnipotent God. What Malebranche seems to be picking up on here is Descartes's assertion that "the perceptions of the senses do not teach us what is really in things, but merely that whereby they are useful or hurtful to man's composite nature",[82] but this is not knowledge. Arnauld is clearly arguing the case I made out earlier when he says: "If faut neamoins remarquer que cette chose, quoique unique, a deux rapports: l'un a l'ame qu'elle modifie, l'autre a la

chose apercue, en tant qu'elle est objectivement dans l'ame, et que le mot de perception marque plus directment le premier rapport, et celui d'idee le dernier."[83]

Arnauld's postive contribution to this history, aside from any light he sheds on Descartes's cognitive theory, is the distinction he makes, in arguing against Malebranche's representationslism, between "presence locale" and "presence objective".[84] He makes the point that Malebranche takes a term used in talking about physical objects (presence) and confuses 'being there in the world' with 'being there in the mind'. Malebranche is, according to Arnauld, confusing the fact that an idea must be (in virtue of the theory of modes) 'a part of', or inhere in, a mind, with the fact that an object must stand in some spatial relation to a body (in virtue of the theory of optics in the Dioptrique) in order for perception to take place. Further, Arnauld argues that a theory of perception cannot properly answer the questions which a theory of cognition responds to. Given the radical division of mind and body, which both Arnauld and Malebranche accept, an account of how an object causes changes in the brain of a perceiver can have nothing to say about how certain features of the mind (i.e. ideas) are directed towards, or are about, things in the world. And this for the reason that the brain is not the mind.[85] What Arnauld says about retinal images in the following passages applies equally well to any corporeal state whatsoever that has to do with perception: "...il est certain neamoins que nos yeux ne voient pas ces petites images peintes dans la retine, et que ce n'est pas en cela qu'elles servent a

la vision, mais d'une autre maniere, que M. Descartes a explique dans sa Dioptrique.[86] I want to bring to your attention here Arnauld's reasons for drawing this distinction, i.e. because there is no parity between states of matter and states of mind; there is nothing in an account of perception (here construed as an essentially mechanical account and not the mental operation known as 'perceptivity') which can be of use in accounting for how the mind is about something.

Yolton argues that "spatial or local presence has nothing to do with cognition",[87] and for Arnauld this is correct; but he fails to point out that this is a function of Arnauld's Cartesianism (in particular, mind/body dualism). What Yolton has gotten right in his history is the point that, for the most part, there is little recognition in the period of the differences that Arnauld tried to bring attention to.[88] But what he should have pointed out, and didn't, is the very obvious point that someone who was not a Cartesian, in particular someone who was not a mind/body dualist (i.e. did not recognize the existence of two distinct, non-interacting kinds of substance), would find nothing of value in Arnauld's distinction between spatial and cognitive presence. The distinction bears on Malebranche's theory just because Malebranche is working with many of the same metaphysical assumptions that Arnauld is. I would point out that a materialist would reject the distinction as spurious, however sound he might consider Arnauld's arguments against representationalism. This point will become important in a very short while,

when I turn to Locke's theory of ideas.

7.Hobbes: The last stop on this tour will be Thomas Hobbes. As a contemporary of Descartes and Locke's immediate predecessor in England, Hobbes is important historically. Considering also that Locke's debt to Hobbes is enormous, though he never acknowledged it, we might find Hobbes's theory of ideas illuminating when we turn to Locke's. The similarities between the two philosopher's metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical views is at times so striking that I again find it difficult to understand how Yolton could have ignored Hobbes's contribution. While there are many differences, the points of similarity are often at such a fundamental level that it is difficult to understand the historical context of Locke's philosophical works without taking a look at Hobbes. Hobbes is important also for the reason that he is our earliest example (if we omit the Greek atomists) of a thorough-going materialist. The contrast both with the Aristotelians (form/matter dualists) and the Cartesians (mind/body dualists) is essential for understanding Locke.

Conveniently, for us, Hobbes was one of the "learned gentlemen" Mersenne sent copies of the Meditations to for comment prior to publication. Some of the objections that were returned we've already looked at (i.e. the 1st set by Caterus); Hobbes's are enlightening. He makes a remark early on to the effect that thinking and having images are the same thing ("From the fact that I think, or have an image..."[89])

which already sets him head to head with Descartes who denied that corporeal images were ideas. This is brought out even more sharply later when, responding to Descartes's talk of the two distinct ideas of the sun (one from astronomical observations, the other from sensory information), he says:

> It seems that at one and the same time the idea of the sun must be single whether it is beheld by the eyes, or is given by our intelligence as many times larger than it appears. For this latter thought is not an idea of the sun, but an inference by argument that the idea of the sun would be many times larger if we viewed the sun from a much nearer distance.[90]

To which Descartes replies: "Here too what is said not to be an idea of the sun, but is, nevertheless, described, is exactly what I call an idea."[91] Here the contrast is very clear; for Hobbes, ideas (idees, phantasma) are images, whereas for Descartes the range of application of the term is much larger. Hobbes is at odds with Descartes on the whole of the theory of ideas. Denying that the acts of the mind are themselves objects of thought, or constitute any kind of thinking, he says:

> When a man wills or fears, he has indeed an image of the thing he fears or of the action he wills; but no explanation is given of what is further embraced in the thought of him who wills or fears. If indeed fearing be thinking, I fail to see how it can be anything other than the thought of the thing feared. In what respect does the fear produced by the onrush of a lion differ from the idea of the lion as it rushes on us, together with its effect (produced by such an idea in the heart), which impels the fearful man towards that animal motion we call flight? Now this motion of flight is not thought; whence we are left to infer that

> in fearing there is no thinking save that which consists in the representation of the thing feared. The same account holds true of volition.[92]

This objection to the notion that willing, fearing, imagining, etc. are the same thing as thinking, Descartes finds unintelligible. Hobbes's behaviouristic account of action goes right by Descartes, who says that he "sees nothing here that needs an answer"[93], as if Hobbes's account were not merely wrong but incoherent. And this should not be surprising if we consider how far apart these two are on a very basic level. Throughout these objections, what is implicit is that the notion of action is borrowed from that of corporeal motion;[94] that thinking may very well be a property of matter;[95] that essences are linguistic entities;[96] all of which deny much common ground for the two to argue from. And what should be clear is the extent to which both theories of ideas are products of basic metaphysical principles and categories.

Hobbes is very explicit in other places about his own theory. "Sense", he says, "can be nothing else but motion in some of the internal parts of the sentient."[97] While Descartes admitted a role for the mechanical theory in an account of cognition, a role which Arnauld and Malebranche disputed over but did not reject, Hobbes here speaks of the <u>identity</u> of the mechanics of perception with perception itself. This is clearer in other places:

> ...there be in our minds continually certain <u>images</u> or conceptions of things without us, insomuch that if a man could be alive, and all the rest of the world annihilated, he should nevertheless retain the <u>image</u> thereof, and all those

> things which he had before seen or perceived in it;...This imagery and representations of the qualities of the thing without, is that we call our conception, imagination, ideas, notice or knowledge of them.[98]

And later:

> ...upon every great agitation or concussion of the brain...whereby the optic nerve suffereth any great violence, there appeareth before the eyes a certain light, which light is nothing without, but an apparition only, all that is real being the concussion or motion of the parts of that nerve; from which experience we may conclude, that apparition of light is really nothing but motion within.[99]

And again further on:

> ..colour is but an apparition to us of that motion, agitation, or alteration which the object worketh in the brain or spirits, or some internal substance in the head.[100]

His disagreement with Descartes is over whether there is anything in thinking other than the succession of ideas (phantasms), i.e. the perception (which Descartes's inspectio mentis is a species of) of things other than sensory particulars. Hobbes is concerned to point out that the mechanical theory of perception completely accounts for both what we are aware of and how, which the Cartesian theory does not. The mechanical theory is, for Hobbes, also a theory of mind. This is evident in the following:

> The perpetual arising of phantasms, both in sense and imagination, is that which we commonly call discourse of the mind, and is common to men with other living creatures. For he that thinketh, compareth the phantasms that pass, that is, taketh notice of their likeness or unlikeness to one another. And as he

> that observes readily the likenesses of things of different natures, or that are very remote from one another, is said to have a good fancy; so he is said to have a good judgement, that finds out the unlikenesses or differences of things that are like one another. Now this observation of differences is not perception made by a common organ of sense, distinct from sense or perception properly so called, but is memory of the differences of particular phantasms remaining for some time; as the distinction between hot and lucid, is nothing else but the memory both of a heating, and of an enlightening object.[101]

Though Hobbes is willing to admit that "all phantasms are not images"[102] (where images are construed as pictures,) and that "the object of sight, properly so called, is neither light nor colour, but the body itself which is lucid, or enlightened, or coloured;"[103] the thing which is immediately present to the mind is a phantasm. That all phantasms are not pictures is obvious (though we might like to call other sense givens, like sound for instance, auditory pictures) and does not imply that non-imagistic phantasms are not things. The above talk about the proper object of sight is Hobbes's statement of an indirect realism. But what is immediately 'compared' or 'observed' is the phantasm (of colour, taste, or whatever) itself. Now, it might seem a misnomer to call the phantasm a thing, since phantasms are nothing but motions in the sentient, but given Hobbes's identification of motion with the mobile thing[104] the move is not implausible.

It is important to note here again, how the ontological status of Hobbes's 'phantasm' is found to derive from broader metaphysical claims. His nominalism is well-known, and

clearly motivates much of what he says about language and the theory of knowledge. It motivates also this talk of phantasms; they are, on this account, material particulars, whose universal character (in knowledge claims) derives from their use. They are not uiversal naturaliter (as was the case with Ockham), they could not be because they are entities (or the properties of entities) on an exact par with entities (or their properties) in the external world. And this for the reason that phantasms are motions, as for instance fire is a motion.

Hobbes sees no necessity in introducing any other category of 'substance' other than matter, and what is explained with spirit (or soul, or mind) is explained well enough without it. He joins Descartes in rejecting scholastic Aristotelianism, but feels that this rejection entails the wholesale acceptance of the hypothetico-deductive model of 'natural philosophy'. Given the science of his day, Hobbes can be seen as attempting to lay the philosophical foundation for natural science, among other things. This Descartes tried to do as well, but his theory of mind demonstrates that he thought no science of mind was possible. This opinion Hobbes did not share. The essential difference between Descartes and Hobbes can be seen in the fact that both had inherence doctrines, the identification of mode and thing modified, but Descartes's dualism led him to reject corporeal motions in the brain as cognitive activity, while Hobbes took the exact opposite line. Not impressed by the Cartesian conceivability arguments for the real

distinction of mind and body, Hobbes felt there is just as much reason to argue for thinking matter as for immaterial substance, and moreso for the former given the success of the materialist hypothesis of the New Science. Book I of Leviathan is just the science of mind that Descartes argued was impossible; and it is psychophysiology, pure and simple. Hobbes saw Cartesian dualism[105] as obscurantism. His fundamental principle is that progress could only be made on the assumption that the 'mind' operated in the same way as the physical system in which it is found. It's this emphasis, I want to argue, that Locke champions against some of Hobbes's own targets (e.g. Descartes), using a more sophisticated scientific language than that available to Hobbes, that of Boyle and Newton. Thus it is Hobbes rather than Descartes who marks the turning point in the philosophy of mind. While Cartesianism would remain the dominant force on the continent for a hundred years yet, it is Hobbes's championing of Baconian empiricism that will win out in the end.

This completes my whirlwind tour of the history of 'ideas' up to Locke. What should be apparent, since I have not covered any of the variations on the above themes, is that 'ideas' were many things to many people. Thus it is no surprise that 'the way of ideas' should have generated controversy in Locke's own time and persisted in some measure to this day. But this is not to say that nothing can be gleaned here. Far from it. Let us recap exactly what kinds of uses that the terms 'idea', 'notion', 'phantasm', and 'species' were put to.

Plato we found used the term 'idea' (ἰδέα) to refer to the immutable and eternal forms. These forms existed somewhere outside of the phenomenal world (not, however, outside of the 'receptacle'; Cf. Timaeus). They were the objects of thought but not mental entities. All phenomenal properties, on the other hand, result from the interaction of perceivers and things perceived (thus their being is to be perceived.) Plato divides awareness into the perceptual (of phenomenal properties) and the cognitive (of forms); if there are any extra entities, they are the forms, but note these are not, strictly speaking, mental entities though we have access to them via some peculiar mental operation. Given that sensations are not 'true of' objects, Plato is not a representationalist. He is, in some sense, a direct realist.

Aristotle, for whatever reasons but primarily because of an emphasis on empirical science, rejected Plato's theory of forms (ἰδέα) and the theory of mind that went with it. While there is a division between the intellective and the sensitive soul, all awareness including sensation is of particular forms. While there is some ambiguity in Aristotle's theory, it is not implausible to construe him as an indirect realist. The images, without which thinking is impossible, are the very forms of the objects of which they are images. They are, however, qualitatively and not numerically identical. Aristotle's images are paradigmatic representative mental entities, i.e. they stand in a comprehensive one-to-one correspondence with their objects. On his own terms, they are

not entities in their own right (but note this depends on the acceptance of the form/matter distinction), but I have already pointed out that they were taken to be entities of a special kind by some individuals (Ockham is an example.) If Aristotle's images (forms in the sensitive soul) are taken to be entities in their own right, then he is a representationalist, if they are not so construed, then he can be seen as a direct realist (yet there will be very little common ground with later versions of this position.) It is not important for me to establish either of these interpretations since historically both of these have been espoused by so-called Aristotelians. The Aristotelian act/object distinction is much more important and produces, by following through its ramifications, both the thought-object and the mental-act theories of ideas. This is the significance for this history of Ockham and Suarez.

The debate, as Descartes cast it and as Locke found himself embroiled in, is very much a continuation of the above contrasting theories. Descartes saw himself as lifting the philosophy of mind out of the mire which scholastic Aristotelianism had floundered in. But as we've seen his theory not only is permeated through and through with Aristotelian assumptions but, in replacing form/matter dualism with mind/body dualism, Descartes fails to disambiguiate the status of ideas. The radical move that he does make is to bring all awareness under the rubric of perception, some of these perceptions are veridical (clear and distinct ideas) and

some not (obscure and confused ideas.) The concern is, as Yolton argues, with epistemological rather than metaphysical issues, but these latter could not be ignored. It is Descartes's failure to satisfy his contemporaries on this score that fueled controversy for many years after his death. He is clear on at least one issue of concern to us here, that is that ideas are not mental entities. He hedges his bet somewhat, however, in the doctrine of modes. It's this last scholastic vestige that Locke will attempt to purge from the theory of ideas.

The systematic pursuit of the implications of basic Cartesian principles led inevitably to the debates between Arnauld and Malebranche. Arnauld argues for a direct realism, interpreting "representation" of ideas as a function of the mind's action on its own actions, that is, by reflection on perception. Malebranche, on the other hand, argues for a kind of Platonic idealism. Since sensations are unique to a given perceiver, they cannot represent anything real and permanent outside the mind (this is a consequence of the Cartesian doctrine of modes.) Ideas are entities of a special kind existing in God's mind, to which we have direct access, and through which we are said to have knowledge of the external world. The necessity of making ideas entities is construed by Malebranche as a consequence of their representative function, that is, they must share certain features with the external world in order to represent it, features which are inconsistent with the essential properties of mind. Arnauld sees Malebranche's representationalism as engendered by a confu-

sion between spatial and cognitive (or local and objective) presence; but, if I'm correct in my reconstruction of Malebranche's position, this is somewhat off the mark. The question for Malebranche is: how can a property of the mind be like a property of body when there is absolutely no parity between mind and body? He answers this by denying that ideas are properties (or acts) of the mind. If Malebranche's problem were explaining how the cognized object, or some aspect of it, happens to arrive at the bodily place where the mind acts (i.e. the brain), Arnauld's distinction would be conclusive. It would because, as we've seen, the Cartesian mind/body dualism prevents any purely mechanical explanation from removing the difficulties a theory of ideas is addressed to. This is the single most important thing to remember about the Arnauld/Malebranche debate when I turn to Locke's theory of ideas.

Finally, Hobbes was found to be important both for his influence on Locke and the contrast his views on ideas present to the Cartesian. Hobbes is not only a nominalist but a materialist, and the immediate consequences of these positions are the identification of mental states with brain states, and the construal of ideas ("phantasms") as material particulars. Hobbes's view is a paradigm representative of the picture-original theory of ideas; and it's important to note about Hobbes that he presents this view in opposition to the Cartesian model. This will be important for assessing Locke's criticisms of Malebranche's position. It will be important

because both Hobbes and Malebranche are indirect realists, one is a nominalist/empiricist, the other a Cartesian-rationalist. It's important to keep in mind that Hobbes could reject a Cartesian account implying indirect realism (this is how he construed Descartes's position, rightly or wrongly) while maintaining a similarly indirect realism himself. It's also important to keep in mind about Hobbes that the primacy of physical explanation and the rejection of realism concerning universals are the primary motivations for his theory of ideas. This too will be central to my account of Locke, since, while most will accept that Locke is a nominalist, some argument will have to be given for that fact that, like Hobbes, he is a materialist as well.

The following, then, are my major criticisms of Yolton's reconstruction of the history of 'ideas':

1) he ignores the Platonic account, which bears a close affinity to Malebranche's. It is also extremely influential on Locke's other contemporaries, notably the Cambridge Platonists (part of the target of Locke's polemic against innate ideas in Book I of the Essay.)[106]

2) he ignores the medieval nominalists, particulary Ockham, and consequently underplays the importance of nominalism in determining the form of a theory of ideas.

3) his account of Arnauld's theory, upon which much of his argument depends, is inadequate and in some respects misleading. This tends to undermine his picture of an Arnauld/Locke theory of ideas.

4) he ignores Malebranche's account, important both be-

cause Locke explicitly deals with it and because it is a representationlist account, precisely the view at issue.

5) he ignores Hobbes's account, important again because it is a representationalist account, but also because it is distinct from the Cartesian version, and perhaps most importantly because Hobbes may be the single most influential of Locke's sources for the theory of ideas.

The above reasons, taken together, seem to me enough to reject Yolton's history as support for his claim that Locke is not a representationalist. We must reject his reconstruction first because, even if Locke were following through some of the Cartesian resolutions, we've seen that there are at least two divergent views of those resolutions and Yolton has not demonstrated which of these Locke was adopting. Second, the failure to treat of Malebranche and Hobbes would tempt a hasty reader to accuse Yolton of stacking the cards in his favour, but if not that at least force us to say that he has not presented an adequate case for the opposing side, by not dealing with the immediate antecedents to, if not the influences of, Locke's views on ideas. Third, the history that I've reconstructed here, if it shows anything at all, shows that theories of ideas in general deal with two, distinct kinds of question -- i) what exactly is the individual's relation to an object when that individual is said to cognize, know, or perceive that object?; ii) in what way do the effects (causal or otherwise) of an object guarantee that the individual in question truly perceives, knows, or cognizes that

object? Historically, answers to both i) and ii) have taken the form of 'having an idea of', but what is important about ideas may be vastly different depending upon which of i) or ii) is considered most important. An answer to i) need not appeal to entities of any kind, the question is rather more epistemological than ontological. But answers to ii), while not necessarily metaphysical, have more often than not taken the form of discourses on the form, properties, or attributes of a certain class of objects, namely ideas. Thus, the question of whether or not Locke is a representationalist is best answered by considering whether it is i) or ii) that Locke's theory is answer to; and if both, whether representationalism is implied by the conjunction. This too Yolton failed to consider, and his account is the weaker for it.

All of this, however, does not establish that Locke is a representationalist. It only establishes that he is not a direct realist on the grounds that Yolton provides. To establish the positive claim, I must show that Locke's theory entails talk of ideas as entities, and, if there is an absence of strong textual evidence either way, to show that his answer to ii) leaves very little room for doubt. To this task, I turn in the next chapter.

NOTES

1 Cf. Kathy Squadrito, "The Ontological Status of Ideas in the Essay", Indian Phil Quart 10, 173-82, Ja 83.

2 These texts are: the Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1979), (throughout this thesis I will refer to the Essay in the following way: Book.chapter.section, e.g. IV.3.4 should be read as Book IV, chapter 3, section 4.), "First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester", in The Works of John Locke, vol. iv (Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963.), An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, in Works, vol.iii, Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris's Books, in Locke's Philosophical Works, vol.2, ed. U. A. St. John (London: George Beill & Sons, 1877), and Elements of Natural Philosophy, in Works, vol.iii..

3 John W. Yolton, "Ideas and Knowledge in the Seventeenth Century" JHP 13, 145-165, Ap 75.

4 I am not arguing that these are the only options, rather I present them as a list of options that have been taken by commentators wishing to avoid treating ideas as things. Later on, I will deal with what I take to be an exhaustive list of possible Lockean options.

5 Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, in Thomas Reid: Philosophical Works (Berlin: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967), pp.275-79.

6 Cf. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais sur l'Entendement par l'Auteur du Systeme de l'Harmonie Preetablie, in Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, C. J. Gerhart ed. (Berlin: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1960).

7 Cf. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956), chapter 1.

8 Plato, Thaetetus, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, eds., Edith Hamilton & Huntington Carins (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), p.858.

9 Ibid., p.862.

10 Ibid., p.858.

11 Cf. Phaedo, Parmenides, and Republic.

12 Cf. Meno,

13 Cf. Gregory Vlastos, "Anneais in the Meno", Dialogue 4, 13-167, 1965.

14 Aristotle, De Anima, transl., J. A. Smith, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, Inc., 1941), 424a, 17-25.

15 Ibid., 412a, 7-10.

16 Yolton, "Ideas and Knowledge", p.147.

17 Aristotle, op. cit., 432a, 5-6.

18 Ibid., 432a, 7-9.

19 Yolton, op. cit., p.147.

20 Boehner, "The Realistic Conceptualism of William Ockham" Traditio, vol.4, 1946, pp.320-25.

21 M. M. Adams, "Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities" Phil Rev 86, Ap 77.

22 Stephen Read, "The Objective Being of Ockham's Fieta" Phil Quart 27, Ja 77.

23 Adams, op. cit..

24 William of Ockham, Philosophical Writings, transl., Philotheus Boehner (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964), p.38.

25 Ibid..

26 Ibid., p.39.

27 Ibid., p.40.

28 Ibid., p.44.

29 That is, his notion of intuitive cognition. For a discussion of this see John F. Boler, "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition", in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed., N. Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, & Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

30 In certain respects, this object seems rather like the intentional object, having intentional inexistence, of Brentano and Husserl, though its application is more restricted.

31 Ockham, op. cit., pp.28-30.

32 Ibid., p.47.

33 Ibid., p.48.

34 Cf. Boler, op. cit..

35 Ockham, op. cit., p.26.

36 Ibid..

37 Ibid., p.30.

38 He seems to have undermined his own position by admitting this, however.

39 Ockham, op. cit., p.29.

40 Ibid., pp.29-30.

41 This for the reason of Ockham's nominalism; there is no relation of participation, no sharing of form.

42 Cf. James C. Doig, "Suarez, Descartes, and the Objective Reality of Ideas" New Scholas 51, Sum 77.

43 Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, vol. 1, disp.II, sec.1, n.1, pp.64-65 Opera Omnia, quoted in Doig, op. cit..

44 Cf. Doig, op. cit., pp.351-54.

45 Donald Davidson, "Agency" and "Actions, Reasons, and Causes", in Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

46 specifically, Disp. VII de variis distinctionum generibus, transl., Cyrill Vollert (Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964).

47 Ibid., p.16.

48 Ibid., p.18.

49 Ibid., p.32.

50 Ibid., p.28.

51 Ibid..

52 Cf. Robert Lenoble, Mersenne: Ou la naissance du mechanisme (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947).

53 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, in two volumes, transl., E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979) [hereafter I will refer to this in following way: volume, page, e.g. HRI;22

should be read as volume 1, page 22.], vol.2, page 52.

54 HRI;222.

55 HRI;243.

56 HRI;244.

57 HRI;244-45.

58 HRI;245.

59 Ibid..

60 Ibid..

61 HRI;241.

62 HRI;241-42.

63 HRII;440.

64 HRII;436.

65 HRI;162-63.

66 HRI;226.

67 HRII;9-10.

68 HRII;10.

69 HRII;52.

70 Not in exactly the same way, since the mind is undertermined with respect to at least one faculty -- the will. But, again, this is not unproblematic; consider that, with respect to clear and distinct ideas, the mind cannot help but give its assent, and so seems not to be at liberty.

71 Louis De La Forge, Traite de l'esprit de l'homme (Paris: Michel Bobin & Nicolas Le Gras, MDCLXVI), Epistle to the reader.

72 Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, transl., T. M. Lennon & P. J. Olscamp (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), p.217.

73 Nicolas Malebranche, Oeuvres de Malebranche, ed., Andre Robinet & Ginette Dreyfus (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966), p.60.

74 Cf. Elucidation 15, in Elucidations of the Search After Truth, transl., T. M. Lennon (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980).

75 See his list, Bk.3, Pt.II, chpt.II, section 2 of the Search.

76 Malebranche, Search, p.236.

77 Loc. cit..

78 Antoine Arnauld, Oeuvres Philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld, ed., Jules Simon (Paris: Adolphe Delahays, Librairie, 1843), pp.174-80.

79 Cf. Elucidations 6, 10, and 11, as well as chapter 7 of the Reponses.

80 Malebranhce, Search, p.217.

81 Arnauld, op. cit., p.58.

82 HRI;255.

83 Arnauld, op. cit., p.51.

84 Ibid., pp.73-4.

85 This should be obvious. The brain is a corporeal substance, but the mind is wholly an incorporeal substance.

86 Arnauld, op. cit., p.46.

87 Yolton, "Ideas and Knowledge", p.157.

88 And this is clear from the fact that Malebranche seldom appreciates the force of Arnauld's objections. He fails to recognize the lack of parity in Descartes's account of the mechanics of perception and the operations of the understanding, which Descartes unfortunately also calls a species of perception.

89 HRII;61.

90 HRII;70.

91 Loc. cit..

92 HRII;68.

93 HRII;69.

94 HRII;62.

95 HRII;62.

96 HRII;77.

97 Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body, transl., Wm. Molesworth, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, vol.1, ed., Sir William Molesworth (London, John Bohn, MDCCCXXXIX), p.390.

98 Thomas Hobbes, Tripos, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, vol.4, ed., Sir William Molesworth (London: John Bohn, MDCXL), pp.2-3.

99 Hobbes, Tripos, p.6.

100 Ibid..

101 Hobbes, Elements, p.399.

102 Ibid., p.396.

103 Ibid., p.404.

104 Cf. Elements, Part IV, chapter 24.

105 Note, mind/body dualism, not thinking/non-thinking dualism, which Hobbes accepts but which is essentially a methodological distinction.

106 Cf. Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas.

II

Locke's Theory of Ideas

The welter that Locke inherits is also the well he draws from; and this is why the preceding history is so important. We know that Locke was familiar with classical authors, his education would have included Plato and Aristotle, and he was also familiar with Sextus Empiricus, Lucretius, Democritus, and Epicurus. He had Descartes in his library[1], though he mentions him by name on very few occasions in his published works. Many of the leading scholastics, including Ockham and Suarez, were also in his library. His familiarity with the Arnauld/Malebranche controversy has already been attested to. Hobbes he could not have been unfamiliar with, though only one of Hobbes's works is to be found in his library; he met the British philosopher of the preceding generation on only one occasion and then only briefly.[2] He was conversant with all of the major scientific as well as philosophical issues of the time; while in Holland he edited and wrote for the Bibliotheque Universelle[3]. His knowledge of and admiration for the works of Boyle and Newton is well-known, and their influence upon him has been shown by a number of scholars.[4] All of this speaks for a well-read man, aware of both the perennial and contemporary issues. The fact that Locke published the Essay late in his life, though he worked on it for many years, and that it went through several editions before his death, argues for the view that Locke waited, as Descartes mentions of himself in his Meditations, until he had

sufficient experiential material to work with to give a considered opinion on the topics he dealt with. Of course, the Essay is more than considered opinion, but Locke deals with so many issues in it that it sometimes appears to be more a compendium of philosophical issues than a systematic treatment of 'human understanding'. As such, the scope of the Essay reveals the years that went into its making; and the often painstaking collecting of examples with which to illustrate his arguments. From the appearance of the Essay, it's clear that Locke was concerned to demonstrate the applicability of his general theory through examples and to make the work itself an example of the theory by depending more on empirical observation than on conclusions from a priori reasoning. The concern with the meanings and functions of words falls under this general plan. Locke's choice of the term 'idea', then, must be considered in the light of this.

Locke introduces the term as "whatever is the Object of the Understanding when a Man thinks", and " whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is, which the Mind can be employ'd bout in thinking."(I.1.8) What is apparent about Book I of the Essay is Locke's unwillingness to become embroiled in a controversy over a choice of terms, and a desire to avoid implicating a particular theory in which terms like 'phantasm' or 'species' figure prominently. Book I is meant to clear the air before embarking on the positive program.[5] As such, Locke is careful to avoid tipping his hand too soon. The ambiguity of the above passage has been commen-

ted on many times[6], but notice one interesting feature of his language: he says "whatever it is which the Mind can be employ'd about in thinking"(my emphasis). Had Locke been speaking of what might be called the 'proper' object of the senses (i.e. an external object), the key phrase should have been "is employ'd about". The emphasis here is on what is possible, though whether this is logical or physical possibility cannot be deduced from this passage alone. I point this out because it does not seem to have been noticed before, and will turn out to be important for my reconstruction. It seems unlikely that Locke would bring our attention to logical possibility, since he takes it for granted that there is an external world; but, again, this is not conclusive.

It is in Book II that Locke begins to give us his positive theory of ideas, but it takes several chapters before a clear sense can be gotten from the term. Many have argued that Locke uses the term in several distinct ways[7], but in what follows I will argue that there are only two legitimate senses, and that only one of them is of real concern. Locke begins with this passage:

> Every man being conscious to himself, That he thinks, and that which his Mind is employ'd about whilst thinking, being the Ideas, that are there, 'tis past doubt, that Men have in their Minds several Ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, Whiteness, Hardness, Sweetness, Thinking, Motion, Man, Elephant, Army, Drunkeness, and others.(II.1.1)

The language is somewhat liberal in this passage, since the

examples given are of simple and complex ideas, and of mixed modes. But since Locke's purpose here is to talk "of Ideas in general, and their Original", this is to be expected. The next crucial passage does not occur until chapter 8, after "of simple Ideas", "Of Ideas of one Sense", "Of Solidity", "Of simple Ideas of Reflection", and "Of simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection", all of which deal with examples of various atomic ideas. In chapter 7, he says: "Whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding, that I call Idea."(II.7.8); a passage which demonstrates as uncommitted a stance as the previous one. Passages such as these, and they are many, lend some support to the thesis that Locke was simply not concerned with the question of what kind of thing an idea is. This is an ill-considered view, however, because Locke was not so much insensitive to the question as he was aware of the possibilities that were open to him.

1. Different Senses of the Term 'Idea'

Stephen Nathanson[8] has distinguished five senses of the term 'idea' as used by Locke in the Essay; they are:

> a. By "idea" Locke often means what I shall call a percept. A percept is a mental object...[and] having an idea (percept) is the occuring of an event in the mind, and that event is the appearing before the mind of an idea (percept). [II.8.8; II.1.9; II.4.1]
> b. Locke often speaks of having ideas...when he is refering to certain mental capacities.[II.2.2; II.10.2; II.11.15]
> c. A third use of "idea" is one in which

> it is usually modified by words like "general" and "abstract". For this sense, I shall use the term "abstract concept."[II.9.9; III.3.13]
> d. "Idea" is often used by Locke to mean a belief or bit of knowledge.[IV.4.3]
> e. Locke often uses "idea" interchangeably with "quality."[II.8.8]

Lists very similar to this one are to be found in Aaron, O'Connor, Ryle, and Jackson[9], but Nathanson's is perhaps the most comprehensive, and for this reason I will treat it as representative. The first of these senses (a.) seems to me not so unproblematic as Nathanson seems to think. While there are numerous passages that support reading "percept" for "idea", the key phrase is always "object of thought", and this 'object' is not clearly either a percept or an external object. Yolton's argument is that this 'object' is not a mental entity but some physical entity, and on the face of it there is some plausibility to this view. While "having ideas" is clearly an event, process, or capacity (as the passage at II.1.9 indicates) this is consonant with either indirect (percept theory) or direct (external object theory) realism. However, I think Nathanson is essentially correct. As Locke himself admits, having ideas and perception are the same thing; the chapter entitled "Of Perception" (9 of Book II) is a crucial one for deciding whether Locke is a representationalist or not. There he says:

> ...whatever alterations are made in the Body, if they reach not the mind; whatever impressions are made on the outward parts, if they are not taken notice of within, there is no Perception. Fire may burn our Bodies, with no other effect, than it does a Billet, unless the motion be continued to the Brain, and

> there the sense of Heat, or Idea of Pain, be produced in the Mind, wherein consists actual Perception.(II.9.3)

Yolton would no doubt argue that the question here is not whether some mechanical operation is necessary for perception but whether this operation is itself perceived. The question posed by the above passage is whether the end-product of the bodily motions or alterations is perceived or whether these motions or alterations are merely necessary but not sufficient conditions for perception. Put this way, it must be admitted that the language implicates the former rather than the latter. When Locke speaks of clear and obscure ideas, he say: "a distinct Idea is that wherein the Mind perceives a difference from all other; and a confused Idea is such a one, as is not sufficiently distinguished from another, from which it ought to be different"(II.29.4), where what is being distinguished are the ideas themselves, not the objects of which they are ideas. This is quite clear in the following passage from "Of True and False Ideas":

> Neither would it carry any Imputation of Falshood to our simple Ideas, if by the different Structure of our Organs, it were so ordered, That the same object should produce in several Men's Minds different Ideas at the same time; v.g. if the Idea, that a Violet produced in one Man's Mind by his Eyes, were the same that a Marigold produced in another Man's, and vice versâ. For since this could never be known: because one Man's Mind could not pass into another Man's Body, to perceive, what Appearances were produced by those Organs; neither the Ideas hereby, nor the Names, would be at all confounded, or any Falshood be in either. For all Things, that had the Texture of a Violet, producing constantly the Idea, which he called Blue; and those

> which had the Texture of a Marigold, producing constantly the Idea, which he as constantly called Yellow, whatever those Appearances were in his Mind; he would be able as regularly to distinguish Things for his Use by those Appearances, and understand, and signify those distinctions, marked by the Names Blue and Yellow, as if the Appearances, or Ideas in his Mind, received from those two Flowers, were exactly the same, with the Ideas in other Men's Minds. I am nevertheless very apt to think, that the sensible Ideas, produced by any Object in different Men's Minds, are most commonly very near and undiscernibly alike. For which Opinion, I think, there might be many Reasons offered: but that being besides my present Business, I shall not trouble my Reader with them; but only mind him, that the contrary Supposition, if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it.(II.32.15)

Here ideas are spoken of as appearances existing in a particular place, i.e. the mind of him whose ideas they are (cf. II.32.20; II.32.25; II.33.5). In all of the passages here adduced, an idea is spoken of as an object. Whether or not this is loose talk on Locke's part, I will come back to in a moment. But let us take as established that, in a sufficient number of cases, Locke does use the term 'idea' to refer to a percept or an appearance, distinct from its causal antecedent or the thing of which it is an appearance.

The second sense of 'idea' (b.), is so often mentioned that I think it has been accepted uncritically. The first appearance of this sense is in Book I when Locke is attempting to refute innate ideas. Here Locke finds 'idea' being used by several to indicate either principles, propositions, or maxims

(Locke will eventually treat these as technical terms, having a very strict application. Cf. IV.6 & 7). I do not, at this time, wish to cover what Locke has to say aboutpropositions and maxims; suffice it to say that, in his use of these terms, the phrase 'innate idea' meaning 'innate principle' is not so much false as senseless. In any case, Locke argues that "if the Capacity of knowing be the natural Impression contended for, all the Truths a Man ever comes to know, will, by this Account, be, every one of them, innate; and this great Point will amount to no more, but only to a very improper way of speaking; which whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those, who deny innate Principles."(I.2.5) Here Locke admits that he too (as an opponent of the innate principle doctrine) uses 'idea' loosely in the sense of capacity, but also admits that this is an inappropriate way of speaking. In chapter 6 of Book II, he says: "The Mind receiving the Ideas...from without, when it turns its view inward upon it self and observes its own Actions about those Ideas it has, takes from thence other Ideas, which are as capable to be the Objects of its Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things."(II.6.1) He counts as such ideas principally pereception and volition, but also reasoning, judging, knowledge and faith. All of these admittedly are powers or capacities (the last two are more like conditions) of the mind, and Locke seems to refer to them as 'ideas'. When he speaks of memory, Locke again seems to equate 'idea' with 'capacity': "our Ideas are said to be in our Memories, when indeed, they are actually nowhere, but only

there is an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again."(II.10.2) Here again, however, Locke intimates that the language of ideas is inappropriate when speaking of powers of the mind; that we, strictly speaking, "have" no ideas in our memories, but we have a power to 'recreate' them.[10]

This is essentially all of the evidence there is for the claim that Locke uses 'idea' to refer to capacities, powers, or functions of the mind (I say 'essentially' because the passages quoted above are representative of the chapters in the Essay in which they occur; there are very few other places where Locke is this clear.) And what should be obvious to even the casual reader is that this evidence is thin and watery at best. In the passage from Book I, Locke is only admitting that supporters of a dispositional view of innate ideas agree with him in all relevant respects. He does not admit the he uses 'idea' in this sense, and in fact upbraids his 'opponents' for their misleading use of language (let's leave aside for the nonce whether this is an example of dramatic irony or not.) An Idea, he wants to say but does not until later, is the object of thought, and it is not equivalent to a mode of thinking.[11] As to the passage at II.6.1, Locke explicitly says that the actions (operations) of the mind which come to be ideas, upon reflection (another operation, notice), but not that these operations, by themselves, are ideas. He says they are "as capable to be the Object of its [i.e. the mind's] Contemplation, as any of those it received from foreign things." When the mind treats itself as

an object of thought, it merely observes the effects of one 'thing' (i.e. itself) upon another 'thing' (i.e. an idea), in the same way as it observes the effect of, for example, one billiard-ball in motion on another which is at rest. The distinction between ideas of sensation and of reflection, which after all is what sense b. of 'idea' turns on, is a difference in causal antecedent but not a difference in idea. To unpack Locke's language here in a consistent manner, it would be more accurate to say, rather than that the mind observes its own operations, that the mind observes the effects of its inherent powers.[12] Without entering into a debate about whether or not Locke is a mind/body dualist (I'll come back to this a little later), the relevant difference between minds and bodies for Locke is the fact that the former but not the latter can initiate change without prior causes. I say this guardedly because, as II.21 shows clearly, Locke's account of the will is strictly deterministic. If the mind can at all exercise what Locke calls "active power" (i.e. the ability "to make...any change" II.21.2), it can only be with respect to ideas, and not to bodily actions. It's clear from Locke's account of 'power', that the mind's own operations, as operations, are not ideas, but that effects of these operations can be. An example here might make my meaning clearer: Say I have a simple idea of blue. My mind can do various things with it, one of these being the ability to compare it to another idea of blue, for instance by calling it up from memory. I can now consider whether these two ideas "agree or disagree"; if they do agree, then I can say "These two shades

of blue are the same". After all this, I can review this succession of ideas, compare it to another 'idea' of a succession of ideas, perceive whether they agree or disagree, and judge that the process involved is either the same or different. I have done several things: I have had an idea, used the capacity of my mind to recall and compare, but I have not had access, nor will I, to those naked capacities themselves. I have only been able to consider them through their effects, i.e. the appearance of the idea from memory, the two ideas being side by side, the re-occurence of the original succession of ideas, and so on. The difficulty with this reconstruction is not the fact that it is not Locke's view, I am convinced that it is, but that it is impossible to account for my being aware of the operations of my mind <u>while I am using them</u>. I should not say 'impossible' because it is not implausible to assume that I would not recognize, on Locke's account, some given succession of ideas being manipulated by my mind, as a mental operation, if it was the first occurence of such an operation. If this is plausible, and Locke's empirical approach to every subject lends it some credibility, then we must reject Nathanson's construal of 'idea' as 'mental operation'. I think we must reject it also because the account that I give is simpler in contrast with Nathanson's. And Nathanson seems to agree with me because he distinguishes 'having' ideas or concepts from the ideas or concepts themselves, yet then goes on to speak of a mental capacity/idea as the 'having' of a concept or idea. From what

I've just argued, it should be clear that the passage at II.10.2 concerning the memory fits with my account. Even if Locke had not said that ideas in the memory do not, strictly speaking, exist, still the memory is "an ability in the Mind, when it will, to revive them again", and he nowhere unequivocally refers to it as an 'idea'.

Since sense c. of 'idea' is said by Nathanson to be "a capacity, but the capacity is...more sophisticated"[13], the arguments presented against b. should bear with equal weight against c.; and, in fact, we'll find that the case is even in stronger in this instance than it was in the former. Locke speaks of abstract or general ideas so often that it would be impossible to cover all, nor even a significant number of the passages in which the terms "abstract idea" or "general idea" occur. But it would be useful to consider the passage in which Locke introduces the notion of an abstract idea:

> The use of Words then being to stand as outward Marks of our internal Ideas, and those Ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular Idea that we take in, should have a distinct Name, Names must be endless. To prevent this, the Mind makes the particular Ideas, received from particular Objects, become general; which is done by considering them as they are in the Mind such Appearances, seperate from all other Existences, and the circumstances of real Existence, as Time, Place, or any other concomitant Ideas. This is called ABSTRACTION, whereby Ideas taken from particular Beings, become general Representatives of all of the same kind; and their Names general Names, applicable to whatever exists conformable to such abstract Ideas. Such precise, naked Appearances in the Mind, without considering, how, whence, or with what others they came there, the Understanding

> lays up (with Names commonly annexed to them) as the Standards to rank real Existences into sorts, as they agree with these Patterns, and to denominate them accordingly. Thus the same Colour being observed to day in Chalk or Snow, which the Mind yesterday received from Milk, it considers that Appearance alone, makes it a representative of all of that kind; and having given it the name Whiteness, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagin'd or met with; and thus Universals, whether Ideas or Terms, are made. (II.11.9)

We should note first that abstraction is motivated by a pragmatic constraint, that is, the fact that were we to give a name to every idea, the process of naming would be endless. It is because of this constraint also that propositions and maxims are possible (not, however, knowledge, because knowledge is the perception of "the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas", which perception is possible without any names whatsoever.) Second, we should notice that it is the use of a particular idea that makes that idea 'abstract'. It does not by this process become a new idea, and the use to which it is put could not itself be considered an idea. Locke's example makes this clear. I have, he says, three distinct simple ideas of white, derived from (i.e. caused by) chalk, snow and milk. Now, I want to make it known to someone else that I perceive an agreement between these ideas. Therefore, I pick one of these ideas, and any one will do, disregard the circumstances under which I received the idea, i.e. time, place, the fact that it was produced by some external object, and any other simple ideas that will have been received at the same time (such as a simple idea of texture, of

smell, and so on), and use the idea whenever I wish to think of the agreement I formerly perceived. If I wish to communicate this, I append the name 'whiteness' to the idea, and by this means can communicate my thought. Now, I will not argue that this account is free of difficulties, in fact it is rife with them, but I am arguing that it is Locke's view on the matter. Someone might argue against this that the abstract idea in question signifies the 'agreement' between ideas, and that this agreement is not an idea (in the sense of a percept), therefore Locke does use 'idea' in another sense than I'm here admitting. To this I can only respond that, for Locke, a train of ideas connected by agreement is like a string of words in a sentence; the individual words (ideas) can be manipulated (perceived, abstracted), but the connection between the words, i.e. the grammar or the logic of the sentence, is nowhere visible in the sentence. Similarly, the agreement of the ideas is not identifiable. The things which agree can be 'pointed to', but not the agreement. Again, I do not want to say that this is not problematic, in fact I am willing to admit that there is something irreducibly mysterious in "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas"[14], but it remains true that the "abstract idea" is an idea in the very same sense of 'idea' as a., it is an individual percept.[15]

Nathanson gives a different reconstruction, however. He argues that "having an abstract concept involves an intellectual recognition of what the instances of a concept have in common. Being familiar with this red and that red, I isolate

the common feature, disregard incidentals and thus get the abstract concept of redness. In the same way, I can form abstract concepts which correspond to the compound and relational concepts which have been previously acquired."[16] This account is seriously marred by one crucial mistake, and that is that Locke only says that the circumstances of real Existence, time and place, and <u>concomitant</u> ideas are what are disregarded. Yet to vindicate Nathanson's use of concept, everything particular about the particular idea would have to be disregarded (this is what Berkeley thought Locke meant also). And this is not supported by the text. To be fair to Nathanson, however, he bases his distinction between concept and percept on the fact that having a percept is a necessary but not sufficient condition for having a concept: "Thus, when Locke speaks of ideas as being both "furnished" (or "conveyed" or "imprinted") and "suggested" by the senses, it is the percepts which are furnished and the concepts which are suggested. As with all things suggested, the concept may or may not be taken up. It may require further percepts or the application of attention before the concept is acquired. It is, as Locke says, "by degrees" that we get our ideas. If we could recognize percepts automatically upon having them, this would amount to having innate concepts, something which Locke certainly rejects."[17] But the passage that he appeals to does not seem to me to support his claim: "He that has not before received into his mind, by the proper inlet, the simple idea which any word stands for, can never come to know the signifi-

cation of that word by any other words or sounds whatsoever...The only way is, by applying to his senses the proper object; and so producing that idea in him, for which he has learned the name already."(III.4.11) Locke here only says that having the requisite idea is necessary for knowing the signification of a word, i.e. knowing what idea is appended to it. It is not necessary to introduce concepts here, if we remind ourselves of the fact that a general term stands, via its mental representative, an abstract idea, for a cluster of ideas; otherwise it is just a proper name. The general term 'whiteness' refers to the particular simple idea of white that I have merely for convenience's sake.[18] The account that I give can accomodate the relevant passages without introducing concepts, and this seems reason enough to avoid doing so. As to Nathanson's charge that any other account would entail having Locke accept the existence of innate ideas, I contend that Locke would not reject the innate 'idea' of perceptivity, which is all that is contended for (cf. II.21.73).

Even Nathanson himself admits a problem with his interpretation. He says: "While I have spoken of concepts being learned, and not being possessed by the mind prior to acquaintance with instances, Lockes seems to speak of recognition as an unacquired capacity, calling it "the first act of the mind" and saying it occurs "as soon as ever" a man has ideas."[19] Nathanson's response is to offer two alternatives: <u>either</u> the inconsistency is only apparent (he appeals to the fact that the objectionable passages occur in Book IV while the relevant material is in Book II) <u>or</u> there is a real inconsistency.

Now, it is an accepted practice to accuse Locke of inconsistency, and to Nathanson's credit he chooses the former of the two alternatives. But my account is not faced with this dilemma, precisely because I take it that Locke does not mean by 'idea' a 'mental capacity'. To be sure, the powers of recognition and perception are 'hard-wired' in the mind, but they are not ideas on my account, therefore I have no difficulty with innate ideas. On my interpretation, Locke argues that we have two cognitive areas, ideas (in sense a.) and innate capacities to manipulate these ideas. Only if we turn these capacities into ideas do we encounter the difficulties that Nathanson for one (but others as well) has met.

The next sense of 'idea' which Nathanson lists, idea as "a belief or bit of knowledge" is actually the weakest case for the view that Locke used 'idea' in a variety of ways. Locke seems to turn to the use of the term in this way especially in Book IV. He defines knowledge as "the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our Ideas."(IV.1.2); and this is not an idea, but a condition. However, a bit of knowledge, a belief about the nature of things, say for instance that all swans are white, might be an idea. In all of chapter 1, however, Locke never refers to a "truth" as an 'idea'. Similarly, with chapter 2. In this chapter, Locke defines intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive knowledge; the first being the bare perception of a connexion between any two ideas, the second simply a more sophisticated version of the first (the agreement of two ideas via a third

idea which agrees with the original two in some relevant respect), the third, sensitive knowledge, concerns the perception of the fact that some idea has an objective counterpart in the real world.[20] But in all of this, not once does Locke refer to a bit of knowledge or a belief as an idea. Indeed we would be hard pressed to find a single instance of d.. If anywhere, we should expect to find an instance of d. in chapters 5 through 11, but no such instances are to be found in these places. Nathanson's argument is essentially that, since Locke views knowledge as a species of perception, and all perception is of ideas, he is committed to the view that beliefs and truths and the like are ideas. However, since my aim here is exegetical, this argument can have no force. Locke may well be so committed, but he does not see himself as so committed, and he never uses 'idea' in the sense of d..

The last sense of 'idea' (e.) Nathanson presents us with is obviously spurious. Locke himself admits that it is just loose talk to refer to a 'quality' as an 'idea' and begs our indulgence if perchance he refers to 'idea' when he means to say 'quality'. So, while Locke occasionally does slip into this usage, we can automatically make the appropriate changes. It makes no sense to me why Nathanson bothers to mention it at all.

From the reconstruction that I've given here, the only legitimate use of 'idea' for Locke is a.. I deliberately spent more time with b. and c., in order to show that, even if Locke does occasionally slip into these usages, they are dependent on a.. I also was brief with a. in order to spend

more time on it now.

In the crucial passage at II.8.8, where Locke says that an idea is "whatsoever the Mind perceives in it self, or is the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding", the traditional view of Locke as a representationalist is considered to be vindicated in the use of the term 'object' to refer to an idea plus the fact that this 'object' is said to exist 'in the mind'. Now, much of the debate turns around the term 'object' in passages like these. Yolton's arguments[21] often turn on treating 'object' as 'content' in the manner of Arnauld and Descartes, rather than as 'object' in the fictum theory of Ockham or the image (εἶδος) theory of Aristotle. In all of these arguments, the act/object distinction is taken to be central, and the ontological twist given it by Descartes taken to be an indication that we cannot straightforwardly read for 'object of thought' 'mental entity' in theories such as Arnauld's and particularly, says Yolton, Locke's. There is a high degree of plausibility to this view, and this is a major reason why I have spent much of my time, by sometimes roundabout means, rebutting it. I take a frontal attack on this view to be possible by examining Locke's attacks on a paradigmatic idea/object theory, Malebranche's (and his English counterpart, John Norris.)[22] I will now deal with these. At the end of this, I hope to have shown that there is no possible way one can plausibly construe Locke as anything but a representationalist.

2. Locke's Criticisms of Malebranche and Norris

In An Examination of P. Malebranche's Veiw of "Seeing All Things in God", Locke's ostensible purpose is to show whether Malebranche's hypothesis, "concerning the nature and manner of ideas in our understanding", of seeing all things in God "when examined and the parts of it put together, can be thought to cure our ignorance, or is intelligible and satisfactory to one who would not deceive himself, take words for things, and think he knows what he knows not."[22] At the outset, it is clear that Locke, for one, does not take issue with Malebranche's use of 'idea', and, for another, is more concerned to show that Malebranche's view of seeing all things in God, not, notice, his representationalism particularly, does not relieve our ignorance about what ideas are and how they exist in the mind. It's important to keep this in mind, that Locke is taking issue more with Malebranche's notion of perceiving representative entities in the mind of God, than with anything else.

He first gives a brief synopsis of the theory, then goes on to criticize it point by point. Taking issue first with Malebranche's contention that corporeal motions cannot account for perception, Locke retorts: "If I should say, that it is possible God has made our souls so, and so united them to our bodies, that upon certain motions made in our bodies by external objects, the soul should have such perceptions or ideas, though in a way inconceivable to us; this perhaps would appear as true and as instructive a proposition as what is so

positively laid down.[23] To some extent, Locke is here both rejecting the Cartesian denial of causal interaction between mindand body and admitting his incapacity to account for how it is exactly that ideas exist. So, while he hedges his bet somewhat, it's clear still that his inclination is more towards a physical than a spiritual explanation (as his championing of the Aristotelian/Epicurean species doctrine as equally intelligible as Malebranche's in the passage just following the above demonstrates.) Locke next goes on to show how the mechanical explanation of perception is at least as plausible as Malebranche's; he points out:

> But when by this means [i.e. material causes] an image is made on the retina, how we see it, I conceive no more than when I am told we see it in God. How we see it is, I confess, what I understand not in the one or in the other, only it appears to me more difficult to conceive a distinct visible image in the uniform invariable essence of God, than in variously modifiable matter; but the manner how I see either, still escapes my comprehension. Impressions made on the retina by rays of light, I think I understand; and motions from thence continued to the brain may be conceived, and that these produce ideas in our minds, I am persuaded, but in a manner to me incomprehensible.[24]

Here there seems to be material for both Yolton's and my point of view. Locke argues for equal plausibility for mechanism and occasionalism, pointing out that both views are incapable of giving a deductive move from either motions or God's will to the existence of ideas. But the passage is interesting because Locke says at first that we perceive the image on the retina, fuel for the representationalist interpretation, but

then goes on to distinguish the light striking the eye, the modifications in the matter of the eye, the motions to the brain, the modifications in the brain, and finally the ideas produced in the mind, something which seems to argue for the Voltonian interpretation, inasmuch as ideas are not the Hobbesian motions, nor is the mind here identical with the brain. This can be accounted for somewhat by noting Locke's original purpose, which is to see whether Malebranche's view adds anything to our knowledge; as such, either view, since both are causal as opposed to Malebranchean occasionalism, is acceptable. But it is intriguing that Locke would admit as plausible that we see the image on the retina. We could remain in this equivocal position were it not for the fact that Locke, two paragraphs later, seconds the view that we see the retinal image. Responding to Malebranche's arguments against the Aristotelian species doctrine, he says:

> The change of bigness in the ideas of visible objects, by distance and optic-glasses, which is the next argument he [Malebranche] uses against visible species, is a good argument against them, as supposed by the peripatetics; but when considered, would persuade one that we see the figures and magnitudes of things rather in the bottom of our eyes than in God: the idea we have of them and their grandeur being still proportional to the bigness of the area, on the bottom of our eyes, that is affected by the rays which paint the image there; and we may be said to see the picture in the retina, as, when it is pricked, we are truly said to feel the pain in our finger.[25]

We could not ask for a clearer expression of Locke's position on this matter. If it is objected that Locke compares the retinal image to the sensation of pain, which pain is not an

affectation of an external object, I respond that the relevant difference is only that the retinal image represents while the sensation of pain does not, real qualities of the object which produces them. However, we are truly said to immediately perceive both of these object-ideas, as Locke clearly states.

Later, when Locke is considering Malebranche's resolution of Descartes's problem of explaining how a modification of thinking substance can represent a modification of extended substance, which, as was pointed out in the last chapter, is by moving ideas out of the mind, Locke seconds an objection made by Hobbes against Descartes: "I shall here only take notice how inconceivable it is to me, that a spiritual, i.e. an unextended substance, should represent to the mind an extended figure, v.g. a triangle of unequal sides, or two triangles of different magnitudes."[26] Admittedly, this inconceivability is no argument for seeing Locke as espousing a materialist position with respect to ideas, especially given the fact that he has already granted that he cannot conceive how we perceive retinal images (although we do;) yet, Locke is clearly leaning in this direction. This tendency is even more obvious when he considers Malebranche's notion of God "discovering ideas" to us. Granting Malebranche that he understands what it means for an idea to be "actually present to the mind", by which he means not cognitive presence (because this notion is supposedly to be found in the notion of 'discovering to') but some other kind of presence, he goes on to say:

> He [Malebranche] pretends to explain to us how we come to perceive anything, and that is by having the ideas of them present in our minds; for the soul cannot perceive things at a distance, or remote from it. And those ideas are present to the mind, only because God, in whom they are, is present to the mind. This so far hangs together, and is of a piece. But when after this I am told, that their presence is not enough to make them be seen, but God must do something farther to discover them to me, I am as much in the dark as I was at first: and all this talk of their presence in my mind explains nothing of the way wherein I perceive them, nor ever will, till he also makes me understand, what God does more than make them present to my mind, when he discovers them to me.[27]

We should notice two things here: first, that Locke, in the early part of the passage, considers the Malebranchean theory at least consistent; he accepts the dictum of not perceiving things at a distance, and he considers the notion that ideas exist in the mind of God and are present to our minds in virtue of God's ubiquity, as at least conceivable. This point is important since it seems to argue for the fact that Locke does not, contrary to Yolton's thesis about Arnauld, appreciate, or does not consider as relevant, the distinction between spatial and cognitive presence. Second, what Locke does take issue with is Malebranche's contention that something else, besides presence, is needed to explain how it is that some idea is perceived. It is not, and this should give us pause, that Locke rejects the notion of presence, he only rejects the notion that 'God' does any explanatory work, or that 'discovering to' makes things any more intelligible than simple 'presence' does.

Locke also has some difficulty with Malebranche's distinction between idea and sentiment. In the last chapter, I pointed out that the distinction, on an epistemological level, is equivalent to Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction; ideas represent real things, sentiments do not. Thus, if Locke were concerned only with epistemic problems, he should not have had any difficulty with the distinction whatsoever. I submit that he was concerned with the ontological features of it. However, Locke construes the distinction a little differently than Malebranche, i.e. as an act/object distinction rather than as a mode/entity distinction. Nevertheless, what he does say is interesting:

> If by "sentiment"...he means the act of sensation, or the operation of the mind in perceiving; and by "pure idea," the immediate object of that perception, which is the definition of ideas he gives us here in the first chapter; there is some foundation for it, taking ideas for real beings or substances.[28]

Here Locke notes that Malebranche defines 'idea' in the same way that he does (i.e. as "the immediate object of...perception"), and he admits, on this basis, that there is some "foundation" for construing ideas as "real beings". His difficulty is with the notion of sentiment. Locke does not understand what can be meant by this: "If by "sentiment"...he means something that is neither the act of perception nor the idea perceived. I confess I know not what it is, nor have any conception at all of it."[29] Locke has no conception of what sentiment is because he does not accept the Cartesian distinction between mind and body.[30] He can understand what

it is for an idea to be a distinct real thing representing the external world, but he sees no necessity of introducing another thing, sentiment (a mode of thinking substance), which does no explanatory work. For Locke, we need only distinguish between ideas which represent and those which do not (i.e. those of primary and those of secondary qualities respectively,) and we do not have to introduce an ontological difference between these sets of ideas by calling one "pure ideas" and the other "sentiments". We should notice that, throughout all these passages, Locke nowhere finds the notion of ideas as entities objectionable; in fact, we've seen that he is quite willing to concede this out of hand. This is perhaps nowhere clearer than when Locke rejects Malebranche's Platonic argument for the existence of 'transcendent' ideas. Since ideas must represent many particulars, they cannot be mental particulars or we would need an infinity of ideas in our minds to represent things external to us. Thus ideas exist in God's mind and are not mental entities. Locke rejects this by saying: "he [Malebranche] calls the ideas that are in God particular beings. I grant that whatever exists is particular, it cannot be otherwise; but that which is particular in existence may be universal in representation, which I take to be all the universal beings we know or can conceive to be."[31] Here he is concerned to argue that particular 'immanent' ideas can fulfill all the requirements needed of them.

What we can conclude from Locke's criticisms of Malebranche is this: 1) he does not take issue with the view that ideas are representative entities; 2) he argues that we

need only one category of such entities -- ideas -- and rejects entirely Malebranche's sentiment (the 'content' in Arnauld's theory). Given these conclusions, it's hard to imagine how anyone could construe Locke as anything but a representationalist. But to be fair to those who do not, the strongest case against my reconstruction is also to be found in this same attack on Malebranche. The argument is this: Locke could not have been a representationalist because he presents substantive arguments against this view in the Examination; and he could not have been unaware that the same arguments bore with equal weight on his own, alleged, representationalism. It must be admitted that this is a powerful argument, and it cannot be denied that Locke does raise just the sorts of questions about Malebranche's position that one would expect to find someone raising against any kind of representative realism. But I think this argument can be rebutted by examining Locke's arguments and the language he uses in stating them.

While I have omitted some passages which support my view, because they seemed redundant, I cannot afford that luxury with those that do not. There are four passages in the Examination in which Locke seems to attack representationalism as such. The first occurs in the context of Malebranche's Platonic argument for 'transcendent' ideas (mentioned above); Locke notes:

> He farther says, that had we a magazine of all ideas that are necessary for seeing things, they would be of no use, since the mind could not know which to

> choose, and set before itself to see the sun. What he here means by the sun is hard to conceive, and according to his hypothesis of "seeing all things in God," how can he know that there is any such real being in the world as the sun? Did he ever see the sun? No, but on the occasion of the presence of the sun to his eyes, he has seen the idea of the sun in God, which God has exhibited to him; but the sun, because it cannot be united to his soul, he cannot see.. How then does he know that there is a sun which he never saw? And since God does all things by the most compendious ways, what need is there that God should make a sun that we might see its idea in him when he is pleased to exhibit it, when this might as well be done without any real sun at all.[32]

From the rhetorical questions -- "how can he know that there is any such real being in the world as the sun? Did he ever see the sun? No.." -- it certainly looks as though Locke recognizes the skeptical problem inherent in representationalism. But when we consider that Locke here brings out attention to Malebranche's occasionalism, this seeming recognition vanishes. Locke is arguing here that if the sun has no causal role to play in the production of an idea of it, then there is no reason to suppose that there is a sun at all, since it is only in virtue of this relation that we know the existence of anything. Since, on Malebranche's account, the sun is not a sufficient condition for having an idea of it (plus the relevant factors concerning distance, the position of the eyes, etc.), and since God is not constrained by the existence of the sun (he can, if he wills, fail to 'exhibit' the idea of the sun when the sun is correctly positioned such that I 'should' perceive it), the existence of the

sun is not necessary on this account. This is the thrust of Locke's remark to the effect: "What he here means by the sun is hard to conceive, and according to his hypothesis...how can he know that there is any such real being in the world as the sun?"(my emphases). But Locke himself is not open to this objection because the sun (plus the other relevant conditions) is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for my having an idea of it (provided of course that God creates the world in the way in which he has; this extra factor is all that is meant by the admission of the inconceivability of the secret workings and connections which allow us to perceive.) On Locke's account, once God has created the world, nothing else is needed in order for it to work in the way in which it does; any other hypothesis, particularly one like Malebranche's, where God's hand is needed on the tiller at every instant in order to ensure that all goes well, destroys the necessary connection between idea and thing. The other three passages can all be given this same reading.

When considering Malebranche's account of our knowledge of God, he makes these remarks:

> First, I would know what it is to penetrate a thing that is unextended? These are ways of speaking, which taken from body when they are applied to spirit, signify nothing, nor show us any thing but our ignorance. To God's penetrating our spirits, he joins his discovering himself; as if one were the cause of the other, and explained it: but I not conceiving anything of the penetration of an unextended thing, it is lost upon me. But next, God penetrates our souls, and therefore we "see him by a direct and immediate "view," as he says in the following words. The ideas of all

> things which are in God, he elsewhere tells us, are not at all different from God himself; and if God's penetrating our minds be the cause of our direct and immediate seeing of God, we have a direct and immediate view of all that we see; for we see nothing but God and ideas; and it is impossible for us to know that there is any thing else in the universe; for since we see, and can see nothing but God and ideas, how can we know there is anything else which we neither do nor can see?[33]

Again here, Locke is objecting to Malebranche's failure to tie ideas to the world. As he says, if we see God directly, then we see ideas directly without the necessity of introducing the notion of God 'discovering' ideas to us. Admittedly, Locke does say "we see nothing but God and ideas", and it is on this basis that he objects that we cannot know there is anything else. But I submit, on the basis of the earlier passage (and the two to follow), that all Locke is objecting to is occasionalism and not representationalism, although it appears as if he is.

The next passage occurs in the context of Locke's objections to Malebranche's description of ideas. He notes:

> In his Eclaircissements on the Nature of Ideas, p.535 of the quarto edition, he says, that "he is certain that the ideas of things are unchangeable." This I cannot comprehend; for how can I know that the picture of any thing is like that thing, when I never see that which it represents? For if these words do not mean that ideas are true unchangeable representations of things, I know not to what purpose they are. And if that be not their meaning, then they can only signify, that the idea I have once will be unchangeably the same as long as it recurs the same in my memory; but when another different from that comes into my mind, it will not be that. Thus the idea

> of a horse, and the idea of a centaur, will, as often as they recur in my mind, be unchangeably the same; which is no more than this, the same idea will always be the same idea;but whether the one or the other be the true representation of anything that exists, that, upon his principles, neither our author nor anybody else can know.[34]

First, Locke attacks Malebranche for cavilling with words. Malebranche had put ideas in God's mind, as eternal, immutable essences (on a Platonic model), in order to ensure their representative function; but by so doing he had blocked any knowledge of the world. Locke tries to rescue Malebranche, but cannot do so because Malebranche denies any causal link between ideas and things. Granted, says Locke, you have ensured that an idea, once given, will always represent the same thing, but you have failed to produce a reason why I should believe it represents anything in the first place. Locke's argument is essentially that "upon his principles", knowledge of things is impossible; but, again, this cannot be imputed of Locke.

This reading is again possible with the last passage:

> I see the sun, or a horse; no, says our author, that is impossible, they cannot be seen, because being bodies they cannot be united to my mind, and be present to it. But the sun being risen, and the horse brought within convenient distance, and so being present to my eyes, God shows me their ideas in himself: and I say, God shows me these ideas when he pleases, without the presence of any such bodies to my eyes. For when I think I see a star at such a distance from me; which truly I do not see, but the idea of it which God shows me; I would have it proved to me that there is such a star existing a million of million of miles from me when I think I see it, more than

> when I dream of such a star. For until it be proved that there is a candle in the room by which I write this, the supposition of my seeing in God the pyramidical idea of its flame, upon occasion of the candle's being there, is begging what is in question. And to prove to me that God exhibits to me that idea, upon occasion of the presence of the candle, it must first be proved to me that there is a candle there, which upon these principles can never be done.[35]

Here the points that I made earlier come through loud and clear. Locke points out that the presence of the sun is not a reason for my having an idea of it ("God shows me these ideas when he pleases"). Also, he makes the distinction between a perception of a star and an dream-image of a star, where the relevant difference is the causal relation in the one case and the lack of it in the other; and argues that, on Malebranche's principles, I cannot be sure my idea is anything more than a dream. He also makes the very important point that the order of proof is first to prove that there is an external world (which Locke does via the causal relation between ideas and things), and then to show how I have ideas of it, while Malebranche does it the other way around.

While all of the above passages appear, at first glance, to argue against my position, when unpacked they are not so objectionable. It's important to keep in mind that Locke's ostensible purpose in the Examination was to see whether Malebranche's views explained what they purported to. His objections, given this aim, centre around superfluous and ambiguous language. But nowhere does Locke take issue with the view that ideas are representative entities. Given that

this is precisely what those who would view Locke as a direct realist must expect to find in an extended critique of an indirect realist, and what is not to be found, we must find the Examination to be support for, rather than evidence against, the view that Locke is a representationalist.

Essentially the same arguments are to found in Remarks. Since much of the material merely reiterates what Locke says in the Examination, I will not go over it in detail. I do, however, wish to point out a few passages which expand on points already made. As further support for the claim that Locke does not reject indirect realism but simply Malebranche's attempt to relieve our ignorance about the 'real nature' of ideas, consider the following:

> By "giving an account of the nature of ideas" is not meant that I should make known to men their ideas; for I think nobody can imagine that any articulate sounds of mine, or anybody else, can make known to another what his ideas, that is, what his perceptions, are, better than he himself knows and perceives them to be; which is enough for affirmations or negations about them. By "the nature of ideas," therefore, is meant here their causes and manner of production in the mind, i.e. in what alteration of the mind this perception consists: and as to that, I answer, no man can tell; for which I not only appeal to experience, which were enough, but shall add this reason, viz., because no man can give any account of any alteration made in any simple substance whatsoever: all the alteration we can conceive being only of the alteration of compounded substances, and that only by a transposition of parts.[36]

Locke here, as in the Examination, takes pains to point out that no theory can explain the mysterious connections between causes and effects, particularly between the causes of ideas

and ideas themselves. All that is needed, so far as Locke is concerned, is an enumeration of causes and effects, i.e. what objects cause which ideas, and a description (not an explanation, notice) of those ideas. Here he attacks Norris for pretending to give an explanation where none can be given. If, as Norris and Malebranche believed, knowledge is only possible on the model of a deductive science of nature, then we would need what they pretend to give in their theory of ideas; but, for Locke, no such science is possible ("no man can give an account of any alteration made in any simple substance"). But he does not attack the notion of 'idea' that Norris presents; in fact, he seems to accept it as a matter of course.

As further support for the claim that Locke is concerned to show that Malebranche's and Norris's theory cannot account for the existence of the external world, not because ideas stand between us and the world, but because no causal link exists, consider the following passage:

> He that understands optics ever so little, must needs admire the wonderful make of the eye, not only for the variety and neatness of the parts, but as suited to the nature of refraction, so as to paint the image of the object in the retina; which these men [i.e. Malebranche and Norris] must confess to be all lost labour, if it contributes nothing at all, in the ordinary way of causes and effects, to the producing that idea in the mind.[37]

Clearly Locke is arguing against Malebranchean occasional causation, and championing a mechanical explanation of perception against it.

The importance of mechanism (and materialism) to Locke's theory is borne out by the following:

> Ideas may be real beings though not substances; as motion is a real being, though not a substance; and it seems probable that, in us, ideas depend on, and are some way or other the effect of motion; since they are so fleeting, it being, as I have elsewhere observed, so hard and almost impossible to keep in our minds the same unvaried idea long together, unless when the object that produces it is present to the senses; from which the same motion that first produced it, being continued, the idea itself may continue.[38]

Here Locke is clearly leaning towards materialism; ideas are "real beings", he's clear on this point, but in what sense he is not sure. They are dependent on, he thinks, motion (the sense here being as properties are dependent on substances), and are in some inexplicable way the effects of motion (and motion is clearly an attribute of material, as opposed to immaterial, substance.) Arguably, this does not straightforwardly support a reading of Locke as a representationalist, since the inexplicable manner in which material causes produce ideas mayjust be the same inexplicable manner in which body acts on mind (in the Cartesian sense.) However, given what Locke says about motion and power in Book II of the Essay[39], it is not implausible that this is just what is being implied here. This, it seems to me, is the only plausible way to construe Locke's talk of "real beings", since he is not borrowing the phrase from Norris. The only consistent reconstruction is to say that Locke is saying that ideas can still be representative entities, without being transcendent entities,

i.e. without the necessity of their existing in a Platonic heaven. This implies, quite straightforwardly, that he does accept the view that ideas are entities.

As final support for this thesis, I offer a curious statement Locke makes near the end of the Remarks. Commenting on what he considers an impious thesis, that we are directly aware of God's essence (since, according to Norris and Malebranche, ideas comprise God's essence), Locke asks this rhetorical question: "Is he [God], whilst we see through the veil of our mortal flesh here, intimately present to our minds?"[40](my emphasis). It is at the very least curious that Locke, who on Yolton's account cannot be accused of advancing the "veil of perception" doctrine, should use the very term that those who would see him as a direct realist find so objectionable. I do not think a clearer statement of his position is to found anywhere.

3. The Ontological Status of Ideas

I take it, then, that the thesis that Locke is a representationalist, where this is taken to mean that we do not perceive objects directly but rather through the intermediary of some other entities, which are proxies for objects, is now adequately established. As such, there remains but one task before it can be said what the ontological status of an idea is. I have established that an idea is an entity, but I have yet to establish what kind of an entity it is. Given that Locke is often construed as a mind/body dualist, and given

further that the material/immaterial substance distinction had more adherents in Locke's time than in our own, I have yet to establish whether an idea is a material (physical) or an immaterial (spiritual) entity. It's this task that has led many commentators to despair, because Locke is notoriously vague just when we need him to be clear. I plan to capture this slippery eel by successively penning him in, until such time as, even if he refuses to be handled (and this will happen), still the area within which he will be able to move around in will be sufficiently small that we shall be able to say that no serious harm will come if he does. I propose to do this by showing that, for Locke, ideas are 'things' in the sense that they are properties of some real essence (as changes in an object are the effects of that object's real essence). I will also argue that, while Locke is genuinely ambivalent about either materialism or dualism, when pressed (and we some evidence for this, as we shall see) he inclines towards the former. It is my view that, were circumstances different, Locke would have wholeheartedly accepted the materialist thesis, but I recognize that this must remain speculation. In any event, Locke's views on the soul commit him to saying that it does not have any observable properties (though it does have observable effects, i.e. ideas of reflection); and its on this basis, I take it, that, willy-nilly, he is committed to the view that ideas are properties of the man (more accurately the real essence of the man), rather than the person, in which they exist.

I take as my point of departure the distinction argued for earlier between ideas and the 'having of' ideas. I want to use this distinction to make the point that, even if Locke is a mind/body dualist, this will not affect the status of ideas. I take this to be so because, though an idea is the object of thought, it does not follow from this that it must be a mind-dependent entity.

While I do not take ideas to be mental entities, in the sense that they are immaterial, still, strangely enough, it seems obvious to me that Locke is a mind/body dualist. But he is a dualist in a very narrow sense.[41] Locke gives several characterizations of the mind or 'soul', one of the clearest of which occurs in chapter 23 of the Essay ("Of ourComplex Ideas of Substances"), where the soul is described as "a Substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting Motion in Body, by Will, or Thought."(II.23.22) A little later, he states that we have as clear an idea of spirit as we do of body (of body we recognize two primary qualities, solid coherent parts and impulse), and that spirit similarly has two essential primary qualities: "So likewise we know, and have distinct clear Ideas of two primary Qualities, or Properties of Spirit, viz. Thinking, and a power of Action; i.e. a power of beginning, or stopping several Thoughts or Motions."(II.23.30) In addition, as we have ideas of modes of body, "we have likewise the Ideas of the several modes of Thinking, viz. Believing, Doubting, Intending, Fearing, Hoping; all of which, are but the several modes of Thinking."(II.23.30) But Locke does not want to commit him-

self to thw view that thinking is the essence of mind (something apparent from his contention that the mind doesn't always think), which he puts this way: "I ask, whether it be not probable, that thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul? Since the Operations of Agents will easily admit of intention and remission; but the Essences of things, are not conceived capable of any such variation."(II.19.4) Still, Locke seems committed to the view that the mind is, in the sense of being describable as, the ideas we have of its operations; he only here wonders whether or not the mind might be in esse some substance of which we have no idea at all (in which case mind would be like body in the sense that we have no access to its real nature.) So, Locke has an operational definition of the self (in his sense of definition) and a substance doctrine of the mind. This is clear from his distinction of the bare 'power' and that 'power' in action: "This Power which the mind has, thus to order the Consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versâ in any particular instance is that which we call the Will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance is that which we call Volition or Willing."(II.21.5)

I have already pointed out how the 'having of' ideas is, but ideas are not, a capacity or 'power' of the mind, and the above passage bears this out. And the same is true of the other basic 'power' of the mind, understanding: "The Power of

Perception is that which we call Understanding. Perception, which we make the act of the Understanding, is of three sorts: 1. The Perception of Ideas in our Minds. 2. The Perception of the Signification of Signs. 3. The Perception of the Connexion or Repugnancy, Agreement or Disagreement, that there is between any of our Ideas."(II.21.5) The mind, for Locke, is a substance, having a real essence, which exercises two basic powers, will and understanding, but does not have as any of its consequences (in the sense that 180-degree-ness is a consequence of the real essence of a triangle. Cf.II.31.6 & 7) ideas of any kind. It does have as the effects of ~~its~~ operations, ideas of reflection, but these are no more properties of the mind than the consequent motion of a billiard-ball is a property of another billiard-ball in motion which strikes it. The only relevant sense in which the existence of ideas depend upon the mind is that, in order for me to 'have' ideas, I must bring my attention to bear on them; but this may only mean that the mind is a contributing cause for the 'having of' ideas, not necessarily that ideas depend on it.[42] And it could be plausibly maintained that ideas exist even when I do not notice them[43], though of what use they might be then Locke is dubious.

The point that I have been arguing for is this: if ideas do not depend, in any relevant sense, for their existence upon the mind, or if ideas are not properties of the mind (as solidity is a property of body), then it makes no difference to the determining the status of ideas whether or not Locke is a mind/body dualist. It makes no difference because answering

the one question will not contribute to the answer of the other. This, I think, has been established. I now want to show in what sense I take it that ideas are dependent on the man (as opposed to the person.)

In "Of Identity and Diversity", Locke lays out his compositional dualism in terms of the distinction between 'man' and 'person'. The identity of a man, he says, "consists...in nothing but a participation of the same continued Life, by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized Body."(II.27.6); also: "An Animal is a living organized Body; and consequently the same Animal...is the same continued Life communicated to different Particles of Matter, as they happen to successively to be united to that organiz'd living Body. And whatever is talked of other definitions, ingenuous observation puts it past doubt, that the Idea in our Minds, of which the Sound Man in our Mouths is the Sign, is nothing else but of an Animal of such a certain Form: Since I think I may be confident, that whoever should see a Creature of his own Shape and Make, though it had no more reason all its Life, than a Cat or a Parrot, would call him still a Man; or whoever should hear a Cat or a Parrot discourse, reason, and philosophize, would call or think it nothing but a Cat or a Parrot; and say, the one was a dull irrational Man, and the other a very intelligent rational Parrot."(II.27.8) A person, on the other hand, "is a thinking intelligent Being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking

thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive."(II.27.9) Person here seems identical to mind, but there are significant differences. Notable among these differences is the fact that Locke contends personal identity does not consist in identity of mental substance over time (cf.II.27.15 & 16), whereas this mental substance, or mental real essence, it seems clear, is the mind. Granted, personal consciousness may depend on the mind (though Locke admits a change of substance does not entail change of consciousness) but is not identical with it. This is important because it seems to show that consciousness is a capacity (specifically, a reflective capacity to perceive our perceiving) in exactly the same sense as bare perception or volition is a capacity. I point this out in order to block the move that would have ideas depend for their existence on the perception of them; since perceiving is a capacity, it can only act upon what is already existing, it cannot bring into existence anything since it is itself a dependent existent (dependent on the real essence of the mind). And since consciousness is the perceiving, ideas do not depend for their existence on the perception of them; their <u>esse</u> is not for Locke their <u>percipi</u>, they are not mere intentional objects. Of course, ideas might depend on a mental real essence, but in what follows here, I hope to make it clear that this cannot be maintained.

For Locke, a man is not identical with a body. A body is

identified with a collection of parts of a certain kind, having powers of a certain sort; but a man is also a "continued Life". A man is a body plus a functional principle. A corpse is a body but is not a man. A man is a body only in the sense that it continually produces the same ideas of shape, colour, texture, etc., to others, but is not the body insofar as that consists of "particles of matter". Just as consciousness depends on substance but is not tied to any one substance (not necessarily, but may be as a matter of contingent fact), so too the man depends on the body, but the same man survives changes in that body (not merely alterations, but also wholesale change of the particles of matter which constitute it.) The 'having of' ideas, it seems to me, is dependent on the existence both of the person (necessary for the experiencing of the ideas) and of the man (necessary for the producing of those ideas.) This is as far as I am willing to allow that ideas are, for Locke, dependent on any kind of mental principle. And note that I'm here only admitting that the 'having of' ideas is so dependent; but this says nothing of the ideas themselves. These it seems to me are obviously dependent on material causal conditions. There is an object X, it exerts certain influences on my body and consequently an idea of X appears to my mind. The material conditions are paramount. While it seems equally obvious that, were there no person to be conscious of the idea of X, I could not be said to 'have' it, no possibility exists for having ideas at all without the body. And it does not follow

from this that the idea of X does not exist. None of the material on personal identity goes against this interpretation. While the puzzle cases seem to argue for the fact that ideas could be transferred from one body to another (i.e. one man's memories in another's body) all that is implied is the ability to recall past experiences. This does not presuppose that the ideas are 'carried' with the person, for surely Locke did not mean that ideas in the memory literally exist there. Memories, for Locke, are new ideas in the sense that a memory-idea always carries the appended "this is not a new idea" with it, which the original did not. The puzzle cases do presuppose, on the other hand, that the person inhabiting the man received his ideas in virtue of the man. While I may have the power to reconstruct my ideas (though not while I am disembodied), the man is necessary for the idea in the first place. If I have an idea of this page, it is necessary that the man stand in some causal relation to this page, and <u>any</u> person inhabiting the man would have the <u>same</u> idea of this page were he to replace whatever person is contingently connected to it. If this is so, and all the puzzle cases presuppose that it is, then ideas (though not the 'having' of them) is tied to the man and not the person. Further, then, the existence of ideas is <u>a fortiori</u> not dependent on the mind.

Ideas, then, it seems by default alone, are dependent for their existence on the man. Can they be further identified with the man, i.e. are they one of the groups of "constantly fleeting Particles of Matter" which from time to time are

united to "an organiz'd Body" which makes a man? The short answer to this question is -- yes. The fuller answer will take a bit longer. The model that I propose is a simple one; it goes under various names, but the most accurate I think is the picture-original theory. Mackie gives a succinct description of it in his Problems from Locke:

> What if someone ever since birth had a large box attached in front of his eyes, on the inside of which, for him to see, fairly faithful pictures of outside, surrounding things were somehow produced? Apart from the sheer cumbrousness of the apparatus, this person would be no worse off than we are. Moving around, picking things up, conveying food to his mouth, and so on he would surely take himself to be visually directly aware of the very things he stepped on and picked up. Unconscious corrections would have grown up for any systematic distortions in the pictures on the inside of his box. If he lived for, say, twenty years without touching the box, without seeing himself in a mirror, and without anyone else's being so tactless as to comment on his non-standard appearance, it would presumably be a surprise to him if after all that time he learned that he had been visually so enclosed. But when he learned this, he (and the rest of us who would have known about the box all the time) would surely say that he was shut up in a private picture-gallery. But if he could be like this, and not know it, and practically speaking be no worse off than we are, if follows that we may be a bit like this all the time: we may be related to our retinal images in very much the same way that he would be related to the pictures on the inside of his box.[44]

With appropriate changes, this model is an accurate one for Locke. While the "private picture-gallery" is relatively unproblematic, we seem to have some difficulty in imagining a

similar "box" for the other senses. This is the reason, I think, for Locke's emphasis for the most part on vision rather than the other sense modalities, and the motivation for occasionally saying that we do see our retinal images. A more consistent view would have been for him to say that we see images in the brain, where images are construed pictorially as well auditorially, and so on. In the Examination, he seems intrigued by this notion, and from the tenor of his questioning, seems inclined to agree with it:

> One who thinks ideas are nothing but perceptions of the mind annexed to certain motions of the body by the will of God, who hath ordered such perceptions always to accompany such motions, though we know not how they are produced; does in effect conceive these ideas or perceptions to be only passions of the mind, when produced in it, whether we will or no, by external objects. But he [Malebranche] conceives them to be a mixture ofaction and passion when the mind attends to them, or revives them in the memory. Whether the soul has such a power as this, we shall perhaps have occasion to consider hereafter; and this power our author does not deny, since in this very chapter he says, "When we conceive a square by pure understanding, we can yet imagine it; i.e. perceive it in ourselves by tracing an image of it on the brain." Here then he allows the soul power to trace images on the brain, and perceive them. This, to me, is a matter of new perplexity in his hypothesis; for if the soul be so united to the brain as to trace images on it, and perceive them, I do not see how this consists with what he says a little before in the first chapter, viz. "that certainly material things cannot be united to our souls after a manner necessary to its perceiving them."[45]

Here Locke complains of the fact that Malebranche presents a plausible theory, but one which he cannot appeal to because he

has already blocked its admission; he has done so by denying that any sort of material thing can be "united to our souls after a manner necessary to its perceiving." Yet Locke obviously does not accept this principle; he says "this power [of tracing images on the brain] our author does not deny" as if to say that Malebranche comes close to, but falls short of, the truth.

Locke makes a more definite statement in Book IV of the Essay, when he says: "Diagrams drawn on Paper are Copies of the Ideas in the Mind, and not liable to the Uncertainty that Words carry in their Signification."(IV.3.19) It cannot be objected that Locke is here making the point that a Platonist or a mathematical realist would make, i.e. that diagrams are imperfect copies of ideal entities, because Locke's philosophy of mathematics and geometry is as radically empiricist as Mill's, perhaps moreso than Mill's.[46] And, were this not so, still we would not be entitled to read 'representation' for 'copy', since Locke contrasts diagrams with words, and the obvious basis for the distinction is natural versus conventional signification. Diagrams are copies in the sense that they resemble (the implication being that there is a perfect, one-to-one mapping) ideas in the mind.[47] If they so resemble, it seems correct to say that ideas have the properties which they exemplify, both secondary and primary, that is, they are coloured, extended, solid, and so on.

This view is seconded by comments that Locke makes on John Sargeant's Method to Science and Solid Philosophy. Some of the

marginal comments have been published[48], but several which have not are revealing. Sargeant presents a paradigmatically Aristotelian position *contra* Locke, and Locke made copious comments on passages which he felt either misrepresented his position or were false from his philosophical perspective. Sargeant throughout championed the scholastic 'notion' over the Lockean 'idea', but Locke points out that, on many occasions, Sargeantis reduced to treating a notion exactly like a Lockean idea. When Sargeant makesthe point that notions bear some of the properties of the things which they are notions of (on the Aristotelian model that the mind is qualitatively identical with its object), Locke makes this comment: "The *Idea* then of a stone in our mind is not hard. but the Notion of a stone in our mind is hard."[49] Locke is so often bitterly sarcastic in his private comments, and the context of this reply is so clear, that one cannot help but conclude that what he here says about a notion of a stone applies to an idea of a stone. And if an idea of a stone is hard, then it must also be coloured, figured, textured, and so on. In *Solid Philosophy*, he makes comments of a similar nature: "Soe yt by these 2 arguments JS has proved *Ideas* to be *Notions* & why then soe much quarrell about the name?"; "And soe the good Author has at last proved yt his *Notions* are Likenesses of things."[50] After having made this identity statement between 'notion' and 'idea', Locke says: "Sense ye same with *Notion* how then does *Notion* & phantasme differ?"[51] Considering how 'phantasm' is used by Hobbes and others, Locke can only mean here that an idea is an image of a certain kind.

This is borne out a little later in the text. WhenSargeant says "I pass by the Oddness of the Position, that the Idea, which is a Picture, should be a Picture of it self, or represent it self", which reference is to a fictitious idea, Locke responds: "May not colours put together in figures of plaster the painter make a picture w^ch shall have noe reference to any real thing?"[52] Here it seems that Locke is making a clear comparison of pictures and ideas; he does not object that his ideas are not pictures, and he gives an explanation of how a picture can remain one without representing anything. This seems an obvious statement of the picture-original theory of perception. The analogy between a sculpture or a picture which does not represent and an idea which does not represent, is a strong one. The positive analogy is that the representing thing shares a context with, i.e. is a bearer of at least some of the properties of, the thing of which it is a representation; and when it represents no existing thing, still it shares a context with a possible existent or previously-existing existent.

I have avoided until now the debate over thinking matter.[53] The reason I've done so, when it seems as if this debate might be supportive of my position, is this: I argued earlier that there is a great difference between thinking (i.e. the 'having of' ideas and the 'powers' exercised on them) and ideas. Thus, Locke's tendency to view materialism in a positive light[54], by arguing that it is possible that matter could think, cannot support my thesis. However, I do

have a few comments to make. The thesis of thinking matter does lend some ancillary support to my position since it shows that Locke was prepared to reduce his explanation to the simplest possible. He was not committed *a priori* to the existence of mind, so much is clear; and the implication is that, if he could have, he would have wholeheartedly accepted the materialist thesis. His only reservation was this thesis would not be able to explain how it is that we think, and so no gains were to be made by accepting it. God could well have 'super-added' thinking to matter (as he super-added gravitational attraction to matter), says Locke, and so the materialist thesis could well be true, but, so far as the connections, the cohesion of parts and the 'how' of two events (in this case, motion and thinking) are concerned, *no* theory can be adequate. Thus, for Locke, nothing central to *his* account hangs on a proof of thinking matter. Yet insofar as Locke was willing to accept the possibility of a single category of substance, so far was he willing to admit that ideas were physical entities. My approach here has been to show that the only irreducible element in Locke's philosophy of ideas is the thinking, the 'having of' ideas, but this does not imply that ideas themselves are irreducibly mental. The evidence, it seems to me, points in the other direction.

Conclusion

The route to these conclusions has admittedly been torturous, but not, I think, without some benefits. The picture of Locke that emerges from this is in some ways of a more modern figure than some other accounts, though they pretend otherwise, would have it. To see Locke as a direct realist, to portray ideas as intentional entities (whose *esse* is their *percipi*), is not a view supported by the text, this has been a large part of my argument; but neither is it fair to Locke. Locke's scientific bent has been attested to so many times that I need only mention it here. The scientific plausibility of an imagistic theory of ideas is borne out by the fact that the debate still goes on today, and, strangely enough, probably has more adherents now than at any time in history.[55] Thus, it's not unlikely that Locke too recognized its plausibility.

Furthermore, when we consider the point that, if Locke was not a representationalist then it cannot be said that anyone was or is, the incentive to so consider him takes precedence over much argumentation to the contrary. The paradigm case argument must be allowed to have some weight. Locke, it seems to me, is a paradigm case of a representationalist; we judge others with reference to him, and should we find the traditional picture of Locke to be false, the term 'representationalism' becomes almost vacuous. This conclusion ought to be avoided.

The traditional picture of Locke as a dualist with materialist tendencies is here vindicated as well. I have shown to what extent Locke felt materialism answered his questions (so far as ideas, but not so far as thinking itself,) and to what extent it did not. In addition, my reconstruction of the text has the virtue of disambiguating much of Locke's talk of ideas. If we take 'idea' in the sense I've argued for, all of the talk of 'operations', 'capacities', and 'powers' of the mind can be seen to be of a piece. The difficulties lie not so much with ideas per se as with what is done with them. Turning ideas into concepts does nothing it seems to me to alleviate the real problems that are inherent in Locke's theory of signification, his theory of representation, and his general theory of language. I think it far better to leave well enough alone; and to admit that there are real problems without torturing the text or bending it to a task to which it is not suited.

The thesis presented here is obviously not radical in the sense that it flies in the face of most of Lockean scholarship. Yet it is radical in the sense that it goes much further than the traditional view of Locke does. What I've tried to do here, with some success I think, is to show that the traditional view does not go far enough. The traditional view is admittedly weak in that it admits of too many inconsistencies in Locke's account. I have tried to correct this fault by pushing the physically-real intermediate view of ideas to its logical conclusion. This approach gives as consistent an

account of the text as is in my view possible, given Locke's notorious vagueness on key issues and terms. It is not, I admit, a theory we should like to advance as entirely plausible from a modern perspective. But I remain convinced that it is what Locke was concerned to argue for. It has several virtues to recommend it, and it has no more faults I think than any other account.

I have not been able to cover all of the ground that I would have liked to. Many of Locke's scientific and metaphysical claims lend support to the view that I've advanced, and I would have like to have been able to present them. As it is, I can only hint at them. Locke's atomism, for one,has not been adequately studied; to give a consistent account of it necessitates, in my opinion, accepting many of the conclusions that I've advanced. His debt to the the Greek atomists, his acceptance of some of the features of the Aristotelian causal theory of perception (the so-called Aristotelian account, but more accurately the Epicurean), points unwaveringly to my thesis. Locke's nominalism, a motivation for his atomism, has also been largely ignored, and it too tends to support my thesis (I have hinted at how it does in several places in chapter II). As these accounts receive more attention, I am optimistic that the view I've presented will appear more and more the correct one. I expect the reader conversant with modern scholarship will perhaps remain a bit skeptical, but I am sure that the close reader of the text must, in the end, side with me on all of the really important points.

NOTES

1 For a list and a discussion of the works in Locke's library, cf. John Harrison and Peter Laslett, The Library of John Locke 2nd edition (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1971).

2 None of this bespeaks Locke's debt to Hobbes. There are several, compelling reasons for Locke's public repudiation of Hobbes, not the least of which is a healthy regard for the parliamentary censure Hobbes's radicalism brought him; but also the distaste with which 'Hobbists' were regarded generally.

3 See Maurice Cranston, A Biography of John Locke (London: Langmans, Green & Co, 1957), p.256, pp.289ff.

4 Cf. E. M. Curley, "Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities" Phil Rev 81, 438-64, O 72; L. Laudan, "The Nature and Sources of Locke's View on Hypotheses" J His Ideas 28, 67; T. M. Lennon "Locke's Atomism" forthcoming in Phil Research Archives; David Palmer, "Boyle's Corpuscular Hypothesis and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction" Phil Stud 29, Mr 76; also Yolton, John Locke and the Way of Ideas, op.cit..

5 Cf. chapter 1 of Yolton's John Locke and the Way of Ideas, op. cit..

6 Every major commentator mentions it, i.e. Ryle, O'Connor, Armstrong, Jackson, etc..

7 Cf. Reginald Jackson, "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception", in Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of Critical Essays, eds., C. B. Martin & D. M. Armstrong (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968); J. L. Mackie, Problems From Locke (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1976); R. S. Woolhouse, Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971).

8 Stephen Nathanson, "Locke's Theory of Ideas" JHP 11, Ja 73. The list just following is on pp.30-32.

9 Op. cit..

10 An interesting point is that Locke argues that such recreated ideas are "none of them new ones".(II.10.7).

11 Cf. II.19. This sharply distinguishes Locke from the Cartesians. Descartes and Arnauld both construe 'idea' as a mode of thinking 'substance'.

12 Cf. II.21. Comparing the operations of the mind, to the powers of bodies leads to some interesting conclusions. Notably, that the effects of bodies upon one another are as mysteriously connnected to their 'powers' as the mind's effects on its own ideas are to its 'powers'.

13 Nathanson, op. cit., p.31.

14 Cf. Margaret Wilson, "Superadded Properties: The Limits of Mechanism in Locke" APQ 16, Ap 79.

15 I have not, it will be noticed, inquired into the nature of 'percept'. For the time being, think of it as a mental entity, with the proviso that not until later will I develop Locke's views on the mental.

16 Nathanson, op. cit., p.33.

17 Ibid..

18 It's important to keep in mind through all this that Locke is a nominalist.

19 Nathanson, op. cit., p.35.

20 The skeptical problem with "sensitive knowledge" should be obvious, and Locke does not seem to have recognized it. At IV.2.14, he dismisses the Cartesian dream hypothesis as spurious, and this more than anything else supports the claim that Locke was not at all sensitive to some kinds of skeptical objections.

21 Yolton, "Ideas and Knowledge", pp.162ff.

22 John Locke, An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God, in The Works of John Locke, vol.iii (Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963 [reprint]), p.211.

23 Ibid., p.215.

24 Ibid., p.217.

25 Ibid., pp.217-18.

26 Ibid., p.219.

27 Ibid., p.228.

28 Ibid., pp.232-33.

29 Ibid., p.233.

30 I say the Cartesian distinction because Locke is in

some sense a dualist as well.

31 Locke, Examination, p.241.

32 Ibid., p.221.

33 Locke, Examination, p.239.

34 Ibid., p.250.

35 Ibid., pp.253-54.

36 John Locke, Remarks Upon Some of Mr. Norris's Book, wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of Our Seeing All Things in God, in Locke's Philosophical Works, vol.2, ed., U. A. St. John (London: George Beill & Sons, 1877), p.460.

37 Ibid., p.461.

38 Ibid., p.469.

39 "Power being the Source from whence all Action proceeds, the Substances wherein these Powers are, when they exert this Power into Act, are called Causes; and the Substances which thereupon are produced, or the simple Ideas which are introduced into any subject by the exertin of that Power, are called Effects. The efficacy whereby the new Substance or Idea is produced, is called, in the subject exerting that Power, Action; but in the subject, wherein any simple Idea is changed or produced, it is called Passion: Which efficacy however various, and the effects almost infinite; yet we can, I think, conceive it, in Intellectual Agents, to be nothing else but Modes of Thinking and Willing; in corporeal Agents, nothing else but Modifications of Motion."(II.22.11). See also "Of the Modes of Thinking" (II.19).

40 Locke, Remarks, p.471.

41 Cf. Douglas Odegard, "Locke and Mind-Body Dualism" Phil 45, 87-105, Ap 70.

42 What Locke has to say about the perceptions that animals have is relevant here. Cf. also Wilson, op. cit., p.145, where she argues agianst the immaterial soul on the basis that animals have perceptions and thoughts but not immaterial souls.

43 Locke's arguments against innate ideas depend to a large extent on the view that they are useless. Similarly, the mind does not, a la Descartes, need to be always thinking (or "having" ideas) in order to exist; otherwise, I "have" ideas but am not aware of them, which Locke calls a very useless sort of cognition. But he does not argue that this cannot be the case.

44 J. L. Mackie, Problems From Locke, p.44.

45 Locke, Examination, pp.218-19.

46 Cf. II.16; II.17.9-11; IV.7.15; IV.8.3.; IV.12,1-3,&15.

47 The fact that this is one of very few places where Lockes uses the term 'copies' ought to at least make us stop and consider what resemblance relation he is focusing our attention on.

48 John Yolton, "Locke's Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sargeant" J His Ideas 12, 528-559, O 51.

49 Locke's Annotations on Sergeant's Method to Science, transcript by Janet Laslett, August 1962. [I was lucky enough to get a copy of this from Prof. Harry M. Bracken] Page 2. Para.6. Line 8.

50 The following marginal replies are from a mircrofilm copy, which again I was lucky enough to obtain from Prof. Harry M. Bracken, of John Locke's copy of John Sargent's Solid Philosophy. I have adopted the following convention to refer to them: the page number refers to the page in the original volume, and the number followed by the # sign indicates the position of the comment in the series, e.g. p.35, #7 should be read as p.35 of Sargent, the seventh marginal reply. pp.36-7,#9; pp.37-8,#10.

51 Ibid., p.39, #11.

52 Ibid., p.343, #63.

53 As this thesis was very near completion, it was brought to my attention that Yolton had published a new book on the subject of thinking matter. While I did not get the chance to read it, I remain optimistic that it will not present anything of serious damage to the views advanced here.

54 Cf. IV.3.6 & 7. See also "First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester", pp.33-36.

55 For some sense of this, see Imagery, ed., Ned Block (Cambridge, Mass./London: The MIT Press, 1981).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Acworth, Richard. "Locke's First Reply to John Norris". Locke News 2, 7-11, Sum 71.

Adams, Marilyn McCord. "Ockham's Nominalism and Unreal Entities". Phil Rev 86, Ap 77.

Alexander, Peter. "Boyle and Locke on Primary and Secondary Qualities". Ratio 16, Je 74.

Arnauld, Antoine. Oeuvres Philosophiques de Antoine Arnauld. ed. Jules Simon. Paris: Adolphe Delahays, Librairie, 1843.

Aristotle. De Anima. transl. J. A. Smith. in The Basic Works of Aristotle. ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, Inc., 1941.

----------. Metaphysics. transl. W. D. Ross. in The Basic Works of Aristotle. ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, Inc., 1941.

Ashworth, E. J.. "Descartes' Theory of Objective Reality". New Scholas 49, Sum 75.

Ayer, A. J.. "The Causal Theory of Perception". Aris Soc 51, 105-125, 1977.

Ayers, M. R.. "The Ideas of Power and Substance in Locke's Philosophy". Phil Quart 25, 1-27, Ja 75.

Block, Ned, ed.. Imagery. Cambridge, Mass./London: The MIT Press: 1981.

Boler, John F.. "Intuitive and Abstractive Cognition". in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. ed. N. Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, & Jan Pinborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Bracken, Harry M.. "Some Problems of Substance Among the Cartesians". APQ, vol. 1, no. 2, Ap 1964.

Campbell, J.. "Locke On Qualities". Can J P 10, 567-585, D80.

Chisholm, Roderick M.. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. London: Cornell University Press, 1957.

Clatterbaugh, Kenneth C.. "Descartes's Causal Likeness Principle". Phil Rev LXXXIX, 379-402, Jl 80.

Cook, Monte. "Arnauld's Alleged Representationalism". JHP 12, Ja 74.

Cummins, R.. "Two Troublesome Claims About Qualities in Locke's Essay". Phil Rev 84, 401-418, Jl 75.

Curley, E. M.. "Locke, Boyle, and the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities". Phil Rev 81, 438-464, O 72.

Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes: vols.I-II. trans. E. S. Haldane & G. R. T. Ross. London: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Doig, James C.. "Suarez, Descartes, and the Objective Reality of Ideas". New Scholas 51, Sum 77.

Flage, D. E.. "Locke's Relative Ideas". Theoria 47, 142-159, 1981.

Geach, P.T., Ayer, A.J., and Quine, W.V.. "Symposium: On What There Is". Proc Aris Soc, Supp.Vol. 25, 1951.

Hobbes, Thomas. Elements of Philosophy: The First Section, Concerning Body. transl. Wm. Molesworth. in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury: vol.I. Sir William Molesworth, ed.. London: John Bohn, MDCCCXXXIX.

----------. Tripos: In Three Discourses. in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury: vol.IV. Sir William Molesworth, ed.. London: John Bohn, MDCCXL.

Henze, Donald F.. "Locke on "Particles"". JHP 9, Ap 71.

Jackson, Reginald. "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception". in Locke and Berkeley: A Collection of Critical Essays. ed. C. B. Martin & D. M. Armstrong. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame Press, 1968.

Kashap, S. P.. "Spinoza's Use of `Idea'". S W J Phil, 57-70, Fall 77.

La Forge, Louis de. Traite de l'esprit de l'homme. Paris: Michel Bobin & Nicolas Le Gras, MDCLXVI.

Laird, J.. "The `Legend' of Arnauld's Realism". Mind XXXIII, 1924.

Laudan, L. L.. "The Nature and Sources of Locke's View on Hypotheses". J His Ideas 28, `67.

Lovejoy, A. O.. "`Representative Ideas' in Malebranche and Arnauld". Mind XXXII, 1923.

Leclerc, I.. "The Ontology of Descartes". Rev Metaphys 37, 297-324, D 80.

Lennon, Thomas M.. "The Inherence Pattern and Descartes' Ideas". JHP 12, Ja 74.

----------. "The Controversy With Arnauld". n.p., n.d.

----------. "Locke's Atomism". forthcoming in Phil Research Archives.

Lewis, Douglas. "The Existence of Substances and Locke's Way of Ideas". Theoria 35, '69.

Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. ed. Peter H. Nidditch. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1979.

----------. "First Letter to the Bishop of Worcester". in The Works of John Locke, vol.iv. Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963 (reprint).

----------. The Second Treatise of Government. ed. Thomas P. Peardon. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1952.

----------. An Examination of P. Malebranche's Opinion of Seeing All Things in God. in The Works of John Locke, vol.iii. Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963 (reprint).

----------. Remarks Upon some of Mr. Norris's Books, wherein he asserts P. Malebranche's Opinion of Our Seein All Things in God. in Locke's Philosophical Works, vol.2. U. A. St. John, ed.. London: George Bell & Sons, 1877.

----------. Elements of Natural Philosophy. in The Works of John Locke, vol.III. Germany: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1963 (reprint).

----------. Locke's Annotations on Sergeant's Method to Science transcript by Janet Laslett, August 1962.

Mackie, J. L.. Problems From Locke. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1976.

Malebranche, Nicolas. The Search After Truth. transl. T. M. Lennon & P. J. Olscamp. Elucidations of The Search After Truth. transl. T. M. Lennon. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980.

----------. Oeuvres de Malebranche: t.VI-VII. ed. Andre Robinet. t.VIII-IX ed. Andre Robinet. t.V ed.

Ginette Dreyfus. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1966.

Matthews, H. E.. "Locke, Malebranche and the Representative Theory". Locke News, 12-21, Sum 71.

McRae, R. F.. "On Being Present to the Mind: A Reply". Dialogue (Canada) 14, D 75.

----------. ""Idea" as a Philosophical Term in the Seventeenth Century". JHI 26, 175-190, 1965.

Messnard, Burdo, Romeyer, Jarlot & Picard, eds.. Suarez: Modernite traditionelle de sa philosophie. Paris: Beauchesne et ses fils, MCMXLIX.

Miracchi, Silvano. "Locke, O'Connor, and Ideas in the Mind". New Scholas 50, Sum 76.

Nathanson, Stephen L.. "Locke's Theory of Ideas".JHP 11, Ja73.

----------. "Locke's Uses of the Theory of Ideas". Personalist 59, 241-256, Jl 78.

Ockham, William of. Philosophical Writings: A Selection. transl. Philotheus Boehner. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964.

----------. Ockham's Theory of Terms: Part I of the**Summa** Logicae. transl. Michael J. Loux. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974.

Obstfeld, Kaila. "Locke's Causal Theory of Reflection". S J Phil 21, 47-56, Spr. 83.

Odegard, Douglas. "Locke and the Unreality of Relations". Theoria 35, '69.

----------. "Locke and Mind-Body Dualism". Phil 45, 87-105, Ap 70.

Palmer, David. "Boyle's Corpuscular Hypothesis and Locke's Primary-Secondary Quality Distinction". Phil Stud 29, Mr 76.

Plato. The Collected Dialogues of Plato; Including the Letters. ed. Edith Hamilton & Huntington Cairns. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 9th printing, 1978.

Quine, Willard V. O.. Word & Object. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1960.

----------. "On What There Is". in From a

Logical Point of View. 2nd edition, New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961.

----------. "On Mental Entities". In The Ways of Paradox and other Essays. revised and enlarged edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.

Rabb, J. D.. "Are Locke's Ideas of Relation Complex?". Locke News 41-55, Sum 74.

Read, Stephen. "The Objective Being of Ockham's **Ficta**". Phil Quart 27, Ja 77.

Ring, M.. "Descartes' Intentions". Can J P 3, 27-49, S 73.

Searle, John R.. Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

Sellars, Wilfrid. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind". inMinnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: vol. I. ed. Herbert Feigl & Michael Scriven. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, .

Shanab, R. E. A.. "Locke on Knowledge and Perception". J Crit Anal 2, 16-23, Ja 71.

Specht, R.. "Les Idees Innees Chez Locke". Arch Phil 34, 245-264, Ap-Je 71.

Squadrito, K.. "Locke's View of the Likeness Principle". Dialogos 16, 25-32, N 81.

Strawson, P.F.. Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London: University Paperbacks, 1964.

Suarez, Francis. On Formal and Universal Unity (De Unitate Formali et Univerali). transl. J. F. Ross. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1964.

----------. On the Various Kinds of Distinctions (Disputationes Metaphysicae, Disputatio VII, de variis distinctionum generibus). transl. Cyril Vollert. Milwaukee, Wis.: Marquette University Press, 1947.

Trentman, John A.. "Scholasticism in the Seventeenth Century". In The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, & Jan Pinborg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.

Vlastos, Gregory. "Minimal Parts in Epicurean Atomism". Isis 56, 121-147, 1965.

Warnock, G.J., ed.. The Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967.

White, P. J.. "Materialism and the Concept of Motion in Locke's Theory of Sense-Idea Causation". Stud His Phil Sci 2, Aug 71.

Wilson, Margaret D.. "Superadded Properties: The Limits of Mechanism in Locke". APQ 16, Ap 1979.

Woolhouse, Roger. "Substance and substances in Locke's Essay". Theoria 35, '69.

Woolhouse, R. S.. Locke's Philosophy of Science and Knowledge. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971.

Yolton, John W.. "On Being Present to the Mind: A Sketch for the History of an Idea". Dialogue (Canada) 14, S75.

----------. "Ideas and Knowledge In the Seventeenth Century". JHP 13, 145-165, Ap 75.

----------. "Locke's Unpublished Marginal Replies to John Sargent". J His Ideas 12, 528-559, O 51.

----------. John Locke and the Way of Ideas. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1956.

Yost, Jr., R. M.. "Locke's Rejection Of Hypotheses About Sub-Microscopic Events". JHI 12, 111-130, 1951.