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COLLUSION AND CHALLENGE
Major Wars, Domestic Coalitions And Revisionist States

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A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies
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of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the emergence of revisionism in the foreign policies of the great powers: it is concerned with the rise of 'challenger' states. Current approaches to the rise of challengers (arguments from 'structure', 'prudence', and 'historical sociology') are if generally useful also incomplete, leaving the emergence of several great power challengers not fully explained. This dissertation offers a new explanation, not as a replacement but as a complement to these theories, and in doing so accomplishes two tasks: first, it explains cases previously unaccounted-for; and second, it does so in a fashion that acknowledges the co-determination of domestic and international politics. The new model suggests that the seeds of challenges to international orders are often found in the wartime experience itself, in social pacts between elites and societal groups struck to achieve mobilisation requirements. Violation of these pacts in the postwar period can in turn generate powerful political movements for the overthrow of both the domestic and international postwar orders. The explanation offered by this model is then applied to five cases of great power behaviour after major wars. While imperfect in its ability to account for great power behaviour in all these cases and thus requiring refinement, the model obtains sufficient support to warrant further exploration of these and other cases in future studies.

RÉSUMÉ

L'émergence d'une politique extérieure révisioniste des grands puissances est le sujet principal de cette thèse. Elle porte sur la croissance des états «provocateur». Les arguments courants qui tentent d'expliquer la croissance de ces états provocateurs (de point de vue «structure», «prudence», et «sociologie historique») sont en generale utiles, mais insuffisants. Ils laissent sans explication, l'apparition d'une politique révisioniste de plusiers des grands pussances. Cette thèse offre une nouvelle perspective, non pas pour remplacer, mais pour offrir une analyse complémentaire des théories préalablement proposées. Elle rempli ainsi deux objectifs. Premièrement, elle éclairci le comportment de plusiers états qui étaient auparavant sans explication satisfaisante, et deuxièmement, elle les explique d'une manière qui reconnait l'influence réciproque de la politique intérieure et de la politique extérieure. L'approche proposée suggère que les causes primaires des défis a l'order international se trouve dans l'experience de la guerre même. Elles se trouvent dans les accords sociaux entre les élites et autres groups sociaux, créés pour maximiser la mobilisation. La violation de ces accords, durant la période après-guerre, peut provoquer des mouvements politiques importants, qui ont pour buts de bouleverser l'ordre politique intérieure et extérieure. L'analyse offerte par l'approche proposée est appliqué au comportement de cinq grandes pussances après les guerres majeures. Toutefois imparfaite dans sa capacité

d'éxpliquer le comportement des grandes puissances dans tous les cas étudiés, et ayant besoin de raffinement, l'approche qu'on propose est suffisament bien soutenue pour mériter plus d'exploration de ces et autres cas dans des études futures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

MAJOR WARS, POSTWAR ORDERS AND THE RISE OF CHALLENGERS

It is a widely held assumption in international relations that in the aftermath of a major war, the peace is made by the victors. Major wars, according to this view, are conflicts of great structural significance. They are alleged to resolve fundamental contradictions in relations among the great powers, including conflicts between leading states and their challengers, and between revisionist states and states committed to defend the status quo. Victory in such a conflict, it follows, presents the triumphant power or powers with an opportunity to remake the rules of the game, to reorder the expected pattern of relationships in the international system. In short, the ability to construct a new international order rests with the victors.

However, the events subsequent to the three most recent major wars cast doubt on the ability of the victors to so dictate the content of the postwar order. The reactionary designs of the Congress of Vienna were followed by three decades of revolutionary upheaval which, if ultimately unsuccessful, came close to disrupting the form and content of the postwar settlement. The failure of these revolutions was due in large measure to the dynamics of domestic political coalitions, and only partly to efforts at internationally coordinated counter-revolution. A century later, the peace conference at Versailles saw attempts

made to ensure the pacification of Germany, the payment of reparations, the construction of a new Europe based on national self-determination, and the regulation of international disputes through an institutionalized system of collective security. The ensuing two decades saw the almost-unchecked rise of three revisionist states, regular violations of the principles of national self-determination and sovereignty of smaller states, and the often unilateral abrogation by Germany of its Versailles commitments. Finally, the crushing defeat of the Axis in 1945 led to an order that was in essence two orders. Both the United States and the USSR were able to construct and enforce new patterns of interaction within their own geopolitical spheres -- generally speaking. But the presence of rivals model of the international system occasionally provided small powers and some great powers -- in particular, China -- with opportunities to challenge the *status quo*, a situation which led to massive expenditure of resources by the superpowers in pursuing issues whose strategic significance was often exaggerated and on which the effect of great power coercion was minimal.

The Cold War is now retreating into history, but its conclusion saw a reorganisation of the rules and alignments of world politics commensurate with the aftermaths of most major wars. Is our current situation analogous to that faced by state leaderships and publics in 1815, 1918, or 1945? Does the end of the 'cold' conflict mirror the end of real wars? Although the past five decades have been called a 'long peace' amongst the great powers, if we take in to consideration measures of hostility other than open warfare between the great

powers — for example, international crises, proxy wars, alliance configurations, or ideological competition — the protracted conflict of the period from 1948 to 1989 seems anything but peaceful.[1] Indeed, many of the characteristics of domestic politics seen during major wars, such as high levels of military mobilisation and expenditure, suspension of individual rights, and propagandistic depictions of other actors' goals and characteristics, were defining features of the Cold War.

For the West after the Cold War, as for the victorious states in 1918 and 1945, the incentives to construct a world in which such trials need not be repeated are many. The victors of the World Wars shared with contemporary policy-makers a broadened scope of possible action due to the defeat and temporary (or permanent) incapacity of powerful antagonists. Finally, the contemporary international scene is witness to a burgeoning of new political agendas, movements, and conflicts, many of which found no room for expression in the Cold War context; a similar mushrooming of political demands can be seen in the aftermaths of the World Wars. With the conclusion of this conflict there was much talk of a 'new world order', which some claimed to see and others expected to arrive: in seeking to understand our own circumstance, I believe that

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[1] Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "Crises, International Instability, and the Myth of the Long Peace". In Charles W. Kegley, ed., *The Long Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections.* New York: Harper Collins, 1991.

we may gain insight from the study of previous attempts at establishing order after major wars.[2]

The focus of this dissertation is the emergence of systemic revisionism in the foreign policies of the great powers. In other words, how can we account for the rise of 'challenger' states? Central to this work is the belief that the mutually-constitutive dynamics of domestic politics and international outcomes have been overlooked in the study of such states: existing approaches have instead relied too heavily on monocausal, unidirectional accounts. Current explanations of the rise of challengers (arguments from 'structure', 'prudence', and 'historical sociology') are thus if generally useful also incomplete. Specifically, they leave the appearance of several great power challengers essentially unaccounted-for -- namely China after 1945, and Germany and Italy between the two world wars -- about which more will be said in later chapters.

I hope not to replace but to complement these theories, and in doing so accomplish two tasks: first, to explain cases previously unaccounted-for; and second, to do so in a fashion that acknowledges the co-determination of 'domestic' and 'international' politics and thus accents the linkages rather than the separateness of these domains. As a contribution to our understanding of revisionist foreign policies, I offer a model which suggests 'postwar challenge' as a companion to the other patterns identified in the other explanations alluded to

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[2] cf. remarks by George Bush, "Transcript of President Bush's Address on the End of the Gulf War", *New York Times*, March 7, 1991, p. A8.

above. My core argument is that the seeds of challenges to international orders are often found in the wartime experience itself, in social pacts between elites and societal groups struck to achieve mobilisation requirements. Violation of these pacts in the postwar period, perceived as a consequence of collusion between illegitimate elites and foreign powers, can in turn generate poweful political movements for the overthrow of both the domestic and international postwar orders. This argument is contrary to the explanations offered by structural realism, historical individual-level accounts, regime-type theories, and others. However, my contribution should be seen as an attempt to augment, rather than replace in any purportedly 'Lakatosian' fashion, our current understanding of these issues. I hope to add to a growing literature which draws on standard realist conceptions of international relations but develops a greater sensitivity to historical change in the states system, and to the mutually-constitutive relationship between international and domestic politics.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to a review of current explanations of challengers and the breakdown of international orders. First, I assess those arguments most commonly associated with structural realism, which I bunch together accordingly as the 'structural' or 'rising power' thesis. Second, I examine approaches stemming more from case-studies in the tradition of diplomatic history, which I will term the 'argument from prudence'. Third, I explore the contribution made by the branch of inquiry most commonly termed historical sociology. This approach I term the 'sociological' argument. The

reader should note at this juncture that the argument drawn out is implied rather than explicit: the questions implicit in this literature's exploration of the 'social origins' of regime types are, I argue, of great significance in explaining the rise of challengers, yet they remain largely unaddressed. Finally, I provide an overview of the goals and organisation of the remainder of the dissertation.

Postwar orders and challengers: conventional views

Why have a number of 'challenger' states sought to overthrow international orders? How did those orders emerge after major wars in the first place? In general, the international relations literature on international order has paid considerable attention to the first question, but much less to the second. The literature on war has avoided the consequences of war, focusing instead on the origins and proximate causes of wars, as if the two were somehow unrelated.[3] Such has been the Cold War concern with avoiding major war that the historical minutiae of crises, 'misperceptions', and group decision-making have now been exhaustively documented through interdisciplinary efforts, as has the universe

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[3] Jonathan H. Turner and Norman A. Dolch, "Classical Statements on Geopolitics and the Aftermath of War", *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 64, No. 1, 1994; Keith Jaggers, "War and the Three Faces of Power: War and State Making in Europe and the Americas", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1992; John Modell and Timothy Haggerty, "The Social Impact of War", *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 17, 1991; Arthur A. Stein and Bruce Russett, "Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences", In Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict*, New York, Free Press, 1980.

of plausible 'ecological variables'; still others have sought to derive 'issue-based' explanations of war.[4] While the 'scientific' nature of some aseptic attempts to analyse, control, manage, and prevent conflict as if it were a virus rather than a conscious and deliberate act may be questionable, there has been no lack of industry in this regard -- it is probably true that very few stones lay unturned in this endeavour. Consequently, causal statements regarding war's origins abound.[5] But what should we expect the structure of world order to look like in the aftermath of a major war, and how do we account for challenges to these orders? In the disciplines of international relations and comparative politics, three general categories of response can be found, roughly corresponding to systemic, state, and societal levels of analysis. There is not, however, the degree of specificity in accounts of major wars' consequences found in the 'causes' literature.

A number of authors have explored the possible causal impact of major wars on the structure of world politics, creating a new power structure with new opportunities for the leading state to reorder the patterns of international

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[4] K.J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Jack S. Levy, "The Causes of War: A Review of Theories and Evidence", in Philip Tetlock *et al.*, eds, *Behaviour, Society & Nuclear War*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1989; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton University Press, 1976.

interaction. This approach I will term the 'structural' argument, as it finds the origins of challenges to postwar orders in structural characteristics of the system.[6] Others have made intensive studies of diplomatic behaviour at the conclusion of major wars, rooting the development and durability of each postwar order and the origins of challenges in the quality and 'good sense' of this behaviour: I term this the 'argument from prudence'. Finally, studies in the tradition of historical sociology suggest that the timing and nature of political development (and thus the emergence of regimes likely to challenge the existing international order) may have an internal logic exclusive of international influence, deriving instead from peculiarities of class strategy and configuration. In the following three sections I will assess each of these sets of approaches.

Structural arguments

Generally speaking, we may sub-divide the structural literature into three categories: uneven-growth theories, long-cycle theories, and world-system

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[5] Even if few take as their focus the historically-situated wishes and goals of warring leaderships and publics. Holsti's approach is an exception.

[6] As the chief concern of the dissertation is the emergence of challenger states in peacetime, rather than the related but separate question of the recurrence of major war, the following discussion is limited to those existing contributions which make explicit claims regarding the participants of major wars, the outcomes of those wars, and the resulting global-political (and/or state) structures. I do not discuss authors concerned solely with the occurrence, frequency or periodicity of major wars (for example, the work of Ludwig Dehio, Arnold Toynbee, or Charles Doran).

theories. The *uneven-growth* or *rising power* approach sees major wars resulting from uneven rates of growth amongst the more powerful states in the international system, and argues that the state emerging victorious from these conflicts is in a position to construct a postwar order in accord with its own political and economic interests. Robert Gilpin[7] is a leading exponent of the uneven-growth approach. Drawing on Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, Gilpin identifies what he terms the 'theory of hegemonic war', based on the idea that "the uneven growth of power among states is the driving force of international relations". The theory consists of three propositions. First, a hegemonic war is distinct from other categories of war in that it is caused by broad changes in political, strategic and economic affairs. Second, the relations among individual states can be conceived of as a system, and the behaviour of states is thus determined in large part by their strategic interaction. Third, a hegemonic war threatens and transforms the structure of the international system; whether or not the participants in the conflict are initially aware of it, at stake is the hierarchy of power and relations among states in the system.[8]

According to Gilpin, a stable, hierarchic order is disturbed when a state growing in power comes to rival the dominant state in the system. Polarisation,

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[7] Robert Gilpin, "The Theory of Hegemonic War," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* XVIII:4, Spring 1988; *The Political Economy of International Relations*, Princeton University Press, 1987; *War and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

crisis, and "hegemonic" war between the dominant state and the challenger are the inevitable result. We can distinguish a hegemonic war from other lesser conflicts by its scale, war aims, and war measures. Such a war "generally involves all of the states in the system; it is a world war".[9] Moreover, hegemonic wars are total: "they become pure conflicts or clashes of society rather than the pursuit of limited objectives".[10] Gilpin initially identified five such wars in the history of the modern states system, later narrowing the list to three -- the Thirty Years' War, the French Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars, and the period of the two World Wars).[11]

With respect to the consequences of such wars, Gilpin is quite clear (though he is less explicit regarding the causal mechanisms at work). In a hegemonic war, "the fundamental issues to be decided are the leadership and

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[8] Gilpin, "Hegemonic War"; pp. 591-92.

[9] *Ibid.*; pp. 595-97.

[10] *Ibid.*; pp. 600-01.

[11] In his initial formulation, Gilpin included the wars of Louis XIV (1667-1713), and treated the two World Wars separately (1914-18, 1939-45). By 1987 he argued for the classification of the World Wars as one event separated by a twenty-year interregnum, claiming that the Second World War flowed logically from the failure of the Versailles peace settlement to reflect the actual balance of forces in the interwar period. As such, it is a continuation of the previous struggle. See *ibid.*, p. 610.

structure of the international system".[12] The distribution of power and hierarchy of "prestige" in the system are redefined, and the war produces a new dominant state (or set of states), determining "who will govern the international system and whose interests will be primarily served by the new international order".[13]

For the newly emergent dominant state, or hegemon, governance of the new order entails rule-making not only in the relationships among system actors, but also within those actors. In the international realm, the question of military dominance is resolved by the war. However, the close relationship between economic and military strength means that each postwar global economy should also clearly reveal the influence and reflect the interests of the hegemon. Gilpin argues that in the modern states system, "the structures of the international political economy have been the consequence primarily of the actions of successive hegemonic nation states".[14] In constructing a new order, the hegemon is not restricted to regulating patterns of interaction, but may also redefine the internal characteristics of other states. As hegemonic wars are in part ideological struggles, the combatants seek to "reorder other societies in terms of their own political values and socioeconomic systems" as did the antagonists in the Peloponnesian War; the outcome of a hegemonic war "profoundly affects the

[12] *Ibid.*; pp. 601.

[13] Gilpin, *War & Change*; p. 198.

[14] Gilpin, *Political Economy*; p. 92.

internal composition of societies because, as the behaviour of Athens and Sparta revealed, the victor remolds the vanquished in its image".[15]

A.F.K. Organski also presents a model of major war based on the logic of uneven growth amongst the leading powers, but draws conclusions significantly different from Gilpin regarding the consequences of these wars for world order.[16] Organski's conception of the states system is hierarchical. The state at the apex of the power hierarchy dominates the existing international order — defined as the "distribution of power and wealth" and "the rules of trade, diplomacy, and war" — and "receives the greatest share of the benefits that flow from the existence of the international order".[17] Below this are a variety of greater and lesser powers, exhibiting varying degrees of "satisfaction" with the international order according to the benefits they accrue from it. The structure of the international system is largely shaped by the dominant state actor, which is by definition

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[15] Gilpin, "Hegemonic War".

[16] A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, New York, Knopf, 1968; Organski and Jacek Kugler, *The War Ledger*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1980; Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation", in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston, Unwin, 1989; see also Woosang Kim, "Power Transitions and Great Power War from Westphalia to Waterloo", *World Politics* 45, October 1992.

[17] Organski, *World Politics*; pp. 354, 364.

"satisfied" as it has "already used its power to establish a world order to its satisfaction".[18]

Dissatisfied challengers to this status quo arise through dynamics of internal growth, a process Organski terms the "power transition" (which he links exclusively to the period subsequent to the industrial revolution).[19] Major wars in the industrial era can be traced to conflict between dominant powers and challengers. When challengers sense that their level of power is nearing that of the dominant state, they precipitate a conflict, usually resulting in war, in order to effect a new international order, and hence a redistribution of benefits. For Organski, there have been five major wars in the industrial era: the Napoleonic Wars, the Franco-Prussian War, the Russo-Japanese War, and the two World Wars.[20]

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[18] *Ibid.*, p. 369.

[19] In Kim's reformulation, the strength of challengers can also be augmented through alliance formation.

[20] Organski & Kugler, *War Ledger* p. 46. The selection criteria for "major war" status used are: major-power participation in opposing coalitions; a higher number of battle deaths than in any previous war; and that the stakes include loss of territory/population for the vanquished. As with Gilpin, the selection criteria appear to cast doubt on the cases actually examined (see below). Kim (1992), using alliance data to extend the power transition model to the 17th century, and employing the same selection criteria, includes the Dutch War of Louis XIV (dated 1672-78), the War of the League of Augsburg (1688-97), the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-13), the

Paradoxically, argues Organski, as the dynamics of power are internally-generated, the dissatisfied challenger could achieve even greater power (and thus greater military strength or political influence) through being patient, rather than through initiating military hostilities. Challengers are generally overmatched in major wars, yet their defeat does not render them helpless; on the contrary, war seems only temporarily to retard the growth of states. Defeated challengers rebound according to the workings of a 'phoenix factor'.[21]

As with Gilpin, Organski tells us little regarding the causal mechanisms whereby the dominant state can create and benefit from a new international order. We are told that a newly dominant state is able to "redraft the rules by which relations among nations work".[22] Since the industrial revolution only two new dominant powers have risen to the fore, England replacing France in 1815, and the United States replacing Britain in this century. Of these two cases, in only one was the challenger "dissatisfied": the United States, according to Organski, was supportive of the "Anglo-French order", and "did not upset the working rules".[23] Thus there is only one case in which the newly dominant power needed to recreate the international order along different lines. After the

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Seven Years' War (1756-63), the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802), and the Napoleonic Wars (1802-15).

[21] Organski & Kugler, *War Ledger*.

[22] Organski, *World Politics*, p. 371; Organski & Kugler, *War Ledger*, p. 23.

[23] Organski, *World Politics*, p. 362.

defeat of Napoleon, Britain in the 19th century was able to use its control of the seas and its undisputed economic might to ensure a new set a military and economic expectations.[24] However, unlike Gilpin, Organski does not assert that newly dominant powers have the intention or the ability to reorder the domestic societies of other states.

The *long-cycle* approach sees major wars as playing a functional role in a recurrent cycle of world politics, serving to produce a leader endowed with sufficient relative power to both dominate and innovate as it implements a new global agenda. The long-cycle approach is most closely associated with the work of George Modelski.[25] Modelski relates the issue of the systemic consequences of major wars to the causes of subsequent similar wars. His argument is a more elaborate and imaginative account of structural processes than that of the uneven-growth school. However, the argument presented about the consequences of major war is very similar: "global" war acts as a "macrodecision" to resolve the issue of leadership in the system. The systemic outcome is more than one of simple leadership, but is characterised by a phase of

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[24] Organski, *World Politics*, p. 355.

[25] George Modelski and William R. Thompson, "Long Cycles and Global War", in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies*, Boston, Unwin, 1989; Modelski, "Is World Politics Evolutionary Learning?" *International Organization* 44, no. 1, Winter 1990; Modelski, "The Long Cycle of Global Politics and the Nation-State", *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, April 1978.

"implementation" or "world power," in which the state finding itself in a dominant position at the conclusion of a global war implements "major new programs".[26]

The new order constructed during the period of implementation by the new global leader provide it with "monopoly rents" through security, privileged access to trade and wealth, and further rule-making abilities.[27] Consistent with Organski's account of British domination, Modelski sees control of shipping and trade as necessary conditions for the construction of a new order by an emergent leader.[28]

Modelski identifies five periods, or cycles, of global leadership, each punctuated by a major war, all of approximately one hundred years' duration. The ascendancy phase in each cycle is characterised by an innovation pioneered by the emergent leader, always the dominant sea power, which resolves the global problem of previous phase of global conflict. For instance, according to Modelski the Netherlands' period of leadership in the seventeenth century was characterised by the Dutch pioneering international capitalism, resolving the earlier global problem of insufficient integration.[29]

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[26] Modelski & Thompson, "Long Cycles", p. 24.

[27] Modelski, "The Long Cycle", pp. 227-28.

[28] Joshua S. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1988; Modelski, "The Long Cycle".

[29] Modelski, "Evolutionary Learning", pp. 12-15.

Challenges to postwar orders occur as the leadership status of the world power is delegitimized through its inability to provide innovative solutions to new problems, which may arise as a consequence of previous innovations. Thus the German challenge to British dominance was a consequence of British inability to satisfactorily incorporate other major industrial powers in the late nineteenth century world order; one might infer that the German ability to challenge as a mercantilist late industrialiser stemmed from earlier British innovations, namely the industrial revolution and the liberal state. However, the question of why some states challenge postwar orders and others do not is not fully explored in Modelski's work.

The *world-system* approach shares the cyclical beliefs of the long-cycle school, and draws as well on the logic of uneven patterns of development, but sees major wars as stemming from capitalist rivalry, each war serving to consolidate the hegemonic status of the victor and thus further the development of the capitalist world-economy. According to Immanuel Wallerstein, the concentration and diffusion of relative power among states has moved in a regular rhythm since the emergence of the European 'world-economy' in the seventeenth century.[30] The periods of concentration have seen long, intense stretches of war culminating with the emergence of a new hegemon exhibiting an edge in agro-industrial, commercial, and financial power, as well as dominant sea power and strong land forces. Hegemons pursue global liberalism in each

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postwar period: that is, as the leading 'core' state they are "defenders of the principle of the free flow of factors of production.... throughout the world economy".[31] In periods of economic expansion, the hegemon is able to "coordinate more or less the political responses of all states with core-like economic activities to all peripheral states, maximising thereby the differentials of unequal exchange".[32]

Wallerstein argues that each major war is followed by "a major restructuring of the interstate system....in a form consonant with the need for relative stability of the now hegemonic power" which generally takes the form of liberalism.[33] However, the liberalism pursued by the hegemon is later the source of challenges to that hegemony. Free trading is likely to favour later developers, who eat into the hegemon's productive advantage; domestically, the competitiveness of the hegemon is eroded by rising real wages. Struggles for market share in periods of Kondratieff 'downturns' erode the coordinating ability of the hegemon and lead eventually to major war, in which the state having improved its relative competitiveness the most will emerge as the new hegemon.

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[30] Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Modern World-System*, New York: Academic Press, 1974, pp. 406–407.

[31] Wallerstein, *Politics of the World-Economy: the states, the movements and the civilizations: essays*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 41.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

However, it is not necessarily the future hegemon which initiates the military challenge leading to major war, nor is it necessarily the military challenger that succeeds the declining hegemon. Wallerstein's model suggests the emergence of two challengers, both of which have profited from enhanced productivity during the postwar period of liberalism promoted by the hegemon. The challenger emerging successfully from major war – not necessarily the most militarily powerful, but certainly the most economically competitive of the two – becomes the new core zone of the expanded capitalist world-economy.[34]

Thus in the world-system approach challenges to postwar order are rooted in global economic downturn: productive advantages developed by lesser states are deciding factors in their eventually military conflict with the hegemon and other states over scarcer resources. The short-term interests of new hegemons in creating and maintaining free trade work in the long run to promote challenges stemming primarily from material, not political-military, considerations.

There are four problems with this set of approaches. First, as suggested earlier, while all these theories contain similar beliefs regarding the consequences of major wars, they are primarily theories of cause. Less energy is devoted to demonstrating the alleged ability of the victor to construct a post-war order replete with benefits for itself, be they institutional, commercial, ideological, or religious. This is understandable, given the Cold War academic preoccupation with conflict avoidance. But in stepping back from the proximate causes of war

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[34] *Ibid.*, p. 45.

to deal with the interaction of conflict and system structure, the cause-effect linkages from wartime to the post-war system are poorly documented. In general, the consequences of war have not been subject to rigorous empirical research, in light of the assumptions made by a wide range of authors.[35] In the case of theories of hegemony, John Ikenberry has found neither compelling theoretical reasons nor strong empirical support for the assertion that aspiring hegemons are able to dominate postwar rule-making and institution building simply by virtue of their predominant power.[36]

Second, as Jack Levy has pointed out, problems of case selection plague these and other efforts.[37] Modelski and Thompson exclude the Thirty Years' War from consideration, despite its severity. They, Wallerstein and Gilpin both treat the two largest wars of this century as one war, despite differences in the lineup of the protagonists, the diplomatic setting, the scale and scope of the conflicts, and both long-term and proximate causes and war aims. And Organski and Kugler violate their own selection criteria, including the Russo-Japanese and Franco-Prussian wars as major wars despite contrary operational definitions.[38]

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[35] Arthur A. Stein and Bruce Russett. "Evaluating War: Outcomes and Consequences", in Ted Robert Gurr, ed., *Handbook of Political Conflict*, New York: Free Press, 1980.

[36] G. John Ikenberry, "Rethinking the Origins of American Hegemony", *Political Science Quarterly* 104:3, 1989.

[37] Jack S. Levy, "Theories of General War", *World Politics* 37, April 1985.

[38] PMH Bell, *Origins of the Second World War in Europe*, London: Longman, 1986, ch. 3.

Historical fit presents these models with a number of other unresolved challenges, leading the reader to question the strength of the evidence presented. Gilpin's model suggests that the emergence of a new hegemon is directly linked to the outcome of the war, which seems a questionable assertion with respect to the case of Britain in the nineteenth century.[39] Modelski's reliance on naval strength as his indicator of global power leads to the identification of Portugal as the world's leading power during the sixteenth century, despite near-consensus among historians that the Habsburg dynasty came far closer than Lisbon to establishing a position of dominance amongst the leading states in that period.[40]

Third, the suggested systemic motivations for challengers to upset the postwar order are often less than persuasive. The largest question looming in this regard is that of the different roles played by the United States and Germany during the period of British leadership. According to Organski's logic of challenge fuelled by internal growth, America ought to have been a prime candidate to contest for leadership of the system by the late nineteenth century, just as Germany was: America's failure to do so is explained largely through its lack of willingness to accept the mantle of leadership, which is a tautology. As Mark Brawley has pointed out, the motivations of challengers in such circumstances cannot be derived from a systemic perspective which ignores domestic

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[39] Timothy McKeown, "Hegemonic stability theory and nineteenth-century tariff levels in Europe", *International Organization* 37, Winter 1983, pp. 75-82.

influences, given the structurally similar position of states which have demonstrated divergent patterns of behaviour.[41] Wallerstein's analysis displays shortcomings on this issue as well. The occurrence of major war may in fact be heavily dependent on the particular domestic political characteristics of the challengers, not simply on their emergence. Hypothetically, if the challengers to British economic dominance in the nineteenth century had included France, rather than Germany, it seems less clear that phase transition in the expansion of the capitalist world-economy must necessarily include major war as a catalyst.

The question of historical accuracy brings up a fourth weakness of the structural thesis. With consistent operational case selection, it is apparent that victory has *not* proven to be a sufficient condition for the victor to establish an order beneficial to itself. Using war severity as an operational criterion for selection, a survey of the five most severe major wars since 1500 yields at least two cases where the victors have encountered significant difficulty in creating a postwar order reflective of their interests: the decades following the Napoleonic Wars, and the period between the two World Wars.[42] Despite significantly

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[40] Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, London, Fontana 1989.

[41] Mark R. Brawley, *Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, pp. 3-26, 123.

[42] The five most 'severe' wars are the Thirty Years' War, the War of the Spanish Succession, the French Revolutionary & Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. See Levy, "General War".

superior capabilities and resources, the victorious powers were unable in the twenty years following Versailles to ensure any of their several aims: the democratisation and self-determination of European society, the implementation of an effective multilateral mechanism for conflict resolution, or a balance-of-power arrangement to contain Germany. The case of the post-Napoleonic period appears to yield at best ambiguous results for the conventional wisdom: while the victorious coalition was successful in controlling French territorial ambition, it is unclear (as I argue below) that the victorious powers themselves had much to do with that outcome. Furthermore, the conservative domestic order sought at the congress of Vienna and of the Holy and Quadruple Alliances was regularly shaken by political challenges from below. Holsti argues that of the five cases mentioned above, only the settlements of 1815 and 1945 made significant inroads into the problem of warfare; both, however, had significant shortcomings in terms of assessing the destabilizing potential of ideas.[43] To view Vienna as a success is to ignore the central place of domestic factors among the goals of the peacemakers, and to ignore the linkage between domestic and international conflict which was explicitly made at the time.

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[43] Holsti, *Peace and War*.

There is an alternative to the structural argument in the tradition of diplomatic history. As with most historical writing, the approach which I will term the 'prudence' argument is not always expressed in abstract theoretical terms, but emerges nonetheless from the works of several writers who have addressed the question of postwar orders and their durability. The resilience of postwar orders, according to this view, is related primarily to the wisdom and foresight of the peace settlement, the premises on which it is based, and the legitimacy accorded to it by all relevant actors; structural considerations, while obviously relevant, are by no means determining factors.

Henry Kissinger's case study of the Vienna settlement attributes the outcome to the nature of the peace settlement and in particular the foresight and personal qualities of the postwar diplomats, rather than to any particular structural characteristics of the system. For Kissinger, the goal of any peace settlement after a major war is that of legitimacy — the construction of a new order which is recognized as legitimate by all major parties to the treaty, such that disputes concern "the adjustment of differences within an accepted framework," not "the legitimacy of the framework itself".[44] For an order to be legitimate it must be accepted, not imposed, "so to relate the claims of legitimacy to the requirements of security that no power will express its dissatisfaction in a

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[44] Henry A Kissinger, *A World Restored*, New York, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1957, p. 4.

revolutionary policy".[45] According to Kissinger, this principle was violated in 1919: the short-sightedness of the peacemakers at Versailles and the injustice of the treaty itself were the principle causes of the breakdown of the postwar order. On the other hand, he argues that the Congress of Vienna in 1815 produced a century of peace, primarily due to the wisdom of Castlereagh's negotiating and the shrewd manner in which Metternich legitimized and implemented. For Kissinger, the brilliance of Metternich was in developing a legitimate order which allowed for change but resisted revolutionary tides; similar wisdom was lacking in 1919.[46]

E.H. Carr places the blame for the unravelling of the peace of Versailles with the misguided nature of the settlement, rather than with structure; more particularly, he is highly critical of liberal theories of international relations politically popular at the time, which he terms "utopianism". The inherent logical flaws in utopian thought, the belief that "right reasoning about one's own or one's nation's interests is the road to an international paradise," created a set of conditions in the interwar period where a second cataclysm was practically inevitable. For Carr, the collapse of the Versailles order under challenge from a variety of fronts "was too overwhelming to be explained merely in terms of international action or inaction. Its downfall involved the bankruptcy of the

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[45] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 172-73.

postulates on which it was based".[47] The possibility of constructing a lasting peace was obscured through the subconscious identification of the material interests of the victorious states with an allegedly objective social morality, which served to cloak an unjust and untenable settlement in the garb of apparently universal right, at least as far as the most powerful signatories were concerned.[48] The dissatisfaction on behalf of those whose interests conflicted with the 'morality' of the treaty, and the quick unravelling of the settlement, should therefore come as little surprise. Structural considerations in Carr's argument are secondary to the founding principles of the postwar order. Similar currents are to be found in the work of Edward Vose Gulick, while in a recent comparative study, K.J. Holsti roots the uneven record of postwar order creation in the degree of wisdom exhibited by various cohorts of peacemakers, by assessing their actions against a set of ideal criteria.[49]

This approach is an improvement on the structural thesis in terms of historical sensitivity, and it would be illogical to deny a link between unfair or imprudent settlements and subsequent revisionist behaviour. However, it is unclear whether the prudence thesis is capable of explaining all that is attributed to it, or whether diplomacy itself has the power to control the forces it confronts.

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[47] E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, London, MacMillan, 1951, p. 40.

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 79.

[49] Edward Vose Gulick, *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1955; Holsti, *Peace and War*.

First, the prudence thesis connotes a primarily reactive notion of foreign policy formulation, assuming that with the correct external conditions, challenges to the status quo can be minimized. As I have argued above, however, structural conditions alone are insufficient to account for varying behaviour among the great powers. Moreover, such an approach excludes the possibility of revisionism as a consequence of political dynamics *internal* to the former combatant states: with little justification, the assumption is made that challenges to each postwar order will come solely as reactions to the peace, rather than as a result of domestic political alignments, or the interaction of the latter with the former.

Second, peace settlements are generally concluded at somewhat artificial moments of history. The victors are in a position of considerable, temporarily exaggerated advantage, and the temptation and the political pressure to impose a one-sided settlement are extremely high. The defeated signatories are representatives of states usually undergoing a great degree of social and political unrest. Under these conditions it is probably unreasonable to expect immediate postwar diplomacy to anticipate the source of future challenges to the postwar order. Even if the challenges are correctly anticipated (as they were in 1815), their outcome may well hinge on factors external to the peace settlement.[50]

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[50] For instance, the success of the reactionary coalition in mid-19th century Europe in delaying or blunting the advance of the forces of nationalism and republicanism was probably the primary goal of many of the participants at the Congress of Vienna. However, the reason for the overall defeat of the revolutionary challenges in the generation after Waterloo rests ultimately with

Third, the standard of 'success' for peacemakers is sometimes unclear, or applied somewhat anachronistically across time periods with resulting unreal expectations of peace settlements. Holsti's work, for example, asks how the peacemakers in each of the last five attempts at establishing postwar order in the Westphalian system addressed the 'problem of peaceful change'. While the notion of war as something to be avoided in seeking change has resonance in this century, it is unclear whether the peacemakers at Utrecht, Osnabrück, or even Vienna were concerned as much with removing war from the repertoire of change as with not letting its exercise escape their control.

Finally, the suggestion that an imprudent or harsh peace settlement will reap revisionist consequences implies that there should be a way to identify those states for whom the settlement is unacceptable at the time. As events examined below will show, the appearance of harshness or magnanimity can be deceiving: dissatisfied states can come from the ranks of the defeated but also from those of the victors, and challenges can emerge from states profiting as well as suffering from the treaty. In essence, perception, highly unpredictable, is a key factor in these outcomes. Italy, just as did Germany, rebelled against the Treaty of Versailles, despite being a member of the victorious coalition. China sought to break the Cold War mould of international relations despite making gains and

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choices of class alignment in those conflicts, rather than with treaty provisions. See Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 715-718.

gaining recognition in the postwar settlement completely at odds with its contemporary international standing. This, then, is the chief problem with such an approach: we may not know a prudent or just settlement when we see one. The centrality of perception at various levels in the evaluation of peace settlements has meant variable responses to apparently prudent (or harsh) treaties.

Historical sociological accounts

The third approach I wish to discuss, that of comparative historical sociology, does not deal directly with the main question we are exploring here, namely the reasons for the failure and success of postwar orders in the aftermath of major wars. Nevertheless, I believe that this literature can shed valuable light on our efforts to understand this question; conversely, our question may serve to highlight some of the unexplored implications of this literature.

The starting point for what I shall term sociological approaches is in some respects remarkably similar to that of the structural and diplomatic history approaches discussed above. The cataclysm of the period of the World Wars and the subsequent struggle between superpowers led many to explore beyond immediate causes of these conflicts to search for distant and even remote origins. Yet while students of politics attempted to develop abstract, universalist explanations for conflict, other scholars departed in the direction of more

contextual theories. In particular, the repeated clashes of the Western

democracies with states possessing quite different regime types led some to

question how societies with broadly similar historical roots could have evolved

in such markedly different fashions. The initial results of this research provided

strikingly domestic explanations for the emergence of the twentieth century's

leading revisionist regimes.

The earliest exploration along these lines was that of Alexander

Gerschenkron.[51] Paying particular attention to German fascism, Gerschenkron

argued that an explanation of German regime development in the twentieth

century required an understanding of agrarian land ownership, capitalist

development, and the historical political-sectoral bargains struck between landed

elite and industrialists. Late industrialisation was seen to contain its own

particular problems, notably that of the rapid incorporation of national

populations into the political realm.

However, the best-known early elaboration of the sociological approach is

of course that of Barrington Moore.[52] Moore builds on the work of

Gerschenkron, but constructs a more explicit and self-conscious theory of the

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[51] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Bread and Democracy in Germany*, Berkeley: University of California

Press, 1943; *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective: A Book of Essays*, Cambridge, Belknap

Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.

[52] Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making*

of the Modern World, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.

emergence of differing regime types. In Moore's analysis, the differing twentieth-century end points of communism, fascism, and capitalist democracy can be accounted for by differing combinations of key domestic-level variables. These variables include the role of capitalist agriculture in the economic development of states; the relative strength and sizes of crown, landed elite, and peasant mass; the nature and timing of class coalitions; and the existence and scope of revolutionary watershed points in a state's political development.

Moore's work had a revolutionary effect on the study of political development and regime types. Yet if one accepts that the international behaviour of non-democratic states in this century implicitly provided Moore's work with much of its relevance, then one finds a strange silence on key questions: there is almost no discussion of how the social origins of dictatorship manifest themselves as foreign policy. Were this issue to remain unaddressed, the reader would be left to draw one of two conclusions: either the foreign behaviour of Soviet Russia, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy is such an obvious corollary of domestic political developments that no commentary is necessary, or alternatively that domestic political development can tell us nothing about foreign policy choices. Clearly, neither is the case, and what is required is a discussion of the relationship between domestic political development and international politics.[53]

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[53] Brian M. Downing, *The Military Revolution and Political Change*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992; Theda Skocpol, "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's *Social Origins of Dictatorship*

Subsequently, this has been provided in part by a number of scholars whose work flows clearly from that of Moore. In particular, Charles Tilly, Theda Skocpol, John Hall, Brian Downing, and Michael Mann have drawn causal linkages between international conflict and domestic political development.[54] Tilly's examination of the development of the nation-state in Europe as a political form suggested two connections. First, involvement in external war appears to be the largest single explanatory factor with respect to growth in the size, extractive and coercive capacity of states -- a point developed further by Mann. Second, revolutionary upheavals (identified by Moore as central to variance in regime outcomes) find their origins either in resistance to onerous state extraction of individuals and materiel in war, or in the dilution of a government's coercive

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and Democracy", *Politics and Society* 4, 1973; Gabriel Almond, "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" (review of Moore, 1966), *American Political Science Review*, vol. 61, no. 3, 1967, p. 61.

[54] Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making", in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975; *Coercion, Capital, and European States*, Cambridge, Blackwell, 1990; *European Revolutions, 1492-1992*, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979; John A. Hall *Powers and Liberties, The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1986; Downing, *Military Revolution*; Michael Mann, *States, War and Capitalism*, Cambridge, Mass., Blackwell Publishers, 1988; *The Sources of Social Power, Volume I: A History of Power from the Beginning to AD 1760*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986; *The Sources of Social Power, Volume II: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States 1760-1914*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993.

capacity and ability to meet domestic commitments during war. On this point, Skocpol has argued that the state's position at the nexus of international and domestic politics provides significant cross-linkages between revolution and military struggle: most revolutions occur in part due to external crises, and are often consolidated, exported, or defeated as a consequence of the state's involvement in an international conflict.

With respect to German fascism, one of the less appealing alternatives explored in Moore's work, Mann and Hall have respectively offered remote and immediate explanations involving international factors. Hall suggests that the social origins of national socialism provide an incomplete picture if no reference is made to the effects of defeat in 1918: a defeat which when mixed with an abortive revolution produced a generation largely unwilling to accept the legitimacy of liberal democracy.[55] Mann's discussion of the pattern of national formation undergone by the eventual German state in the nineteenth century sees the antecedents of the *Kaiserreich*'s protectionism and militarism in international competition. The victory of Prussia, with its markedly authoritarian political structure, over other contenders for German hegemony legitimized militarism and authoritarianism as part of the "crystallisation" of the new German state in the Darwinian climate of late nineteenth-century Europe (in much the same kind of historical accident as in Moore's suggestion that dependence on sea-power rendered the English state comparatively weak in

terms of a domestic repressive apparatus).[56] Mann argues that German

protectionism had its roots not simply in rational economic calculus, but also

(*inter alia*) as a policy of state-making and creation of a cohesive German identity,

as reaction and in opposition to (British) liberal universalist economics.[57]

Of all recent arguments suggesting geopolitical competition as central to

explanations of domestic political development, perhaps the most explicit and

best-traced is that of Brian Downing. Downing takes as his starting point

Moore's interest in the early modern origins of regime types. However, whereas

Moore relies primarily on materialist explanations, such as the degree to which

rural elites turned to commercial agriculture, and the consequent size and

strength of different agrarian classes, Downing explores the effects of the military

revolution in early modern Europe. Downing argues that this revolution in army

composition, tactics and weaponry forced states to develop new methods of

resource extraction and mobilisation. Many (e.g. Poland) were swallowed up by

more powerful expansionist states. Those states which survived did so through

two avenues to augmented power. The first was through a mixture of more

efficient internal extraction combined with a number of more-or-less manipulable

exogenous factors: alliance formation, geographic circumstance, economic

wealth, and/or an ability to raise resources on foreign territory.

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[55] Hall, *Powers*, pp. 166-68.

[56] Moore, *Social Origins*, p. 444.

The second, for those states unable to benefit from such external or circumstantial factors, was to develop a centralized administrative structure capable of waging war on modern terms. Downing terms such a structure the "military-bureaucratic absolutist" state, and argues that such a development could only take place at the expense of the medieval constitutional pluralism common to all states of Western Europe prior to the early modern period. This was the fate, he argues, of Prussia and France. Conversely, those states surviving by following the first route (England, Sweden, the Dutch republic) retained many of the features of that early constitutionalism, including parliamentarism, local privileges, and the rule of law.[58]

Downing's work is a valuable one, pursuing for the first time the effects of mobilisation on political development in a broad historical-comparative study. However, as an attempt to explain outcomes appearing in the nineteenth century at the latest, it can only be suggestive of the effects of mobilisation for major war in more recent times. Downing speculates that military-bureaucratic absolutism is obsolete as a threat to constitutional government in wartime, and offers "populist-militarism" as a more likely modern outcome of such mobilisation. To pursue this and other possibilities, it will be necessary to direct our attention more closely to the politicizing effects of mobilisation in more recent conflicts, and this is one of the primary tasks of this dissertation.

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[57] Mann, *Sources Vol. II*, pp. 308-312.

On the whole, one may observe that despite the considerable contributions of these writers in establishing links between international politics and conflict as cause and domestic political development as consequence, the reverse relationship remains largely a mystery. The international and domestic origins of regimes may still be debated, but we are fairly sure of where the answers will be found. However, why should non-democratic regimes, and in particular fascist ones, have been the ones to shake the world order to its foundations in the 1930s? In what way was the international order no more legitimate to these regimes than domestic regimes had been to fascists in the 1920s? Here, as noted, the initial literature on social origins was silent, both on the nature of foreign policy pursued by regimes and the timing of the actions taken.

But if the position of nation-states within the realm of geopolitical competition can shed light on the origins of regimes, as the second wave of sociological writers has argued, can we not also look in that direction to find sources of foreign policy? If victory and defeat in war, and revolutionary developments in resource mobilisation, have combined with class coalitions and balances, commercial agriculture, and the survival of landed elites and peasant masses to produce distinctive regime outcomes, should we not expect the resulting regimes to have foreign policy, as well as domestic, "crystallisations" rooted in these initial conditions? These are questions which I hope to answer at

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[58] Downing, *Military Revolution*, pp. 239-46.

least partially, through a closer examination of the politics of mobilisation in major wars, and the postwar consequences of wartime politicisation.

Ultimately, the question of revisionist behaviour and challenges to the status quo is one of how a state, which behaves initially in accordance with the requirements of the new order, comes to alter its policy. Structure, and relative power position, can provide only a partial answer to this question. Models of foreign policy which rely on good judgement and magnanimity as methods of forestalling revisionism are unable to account for varying responses to similarly magnanimous or harsh settlements. Finally, models of political development which explain the emergence of (some) expansionist regimes are unable to account for the external actions of these regimes -- or indeed the timing of such behaviour. To discover the sources of challenges to postwar orders, closer attention to domestic politics is necessary, but so is attention to the interaction between domestic and international politics. If different domestic coalitions can create alternative foreign policy outcomes, international events may also alter the nature of domestic coalitions.

How might these two levels of politics interact? Is there a traceable 'rebound' effect originating with and eventually resulting in significant international conflict, but moderated by domestic political factors? In Chapter 2, I will outline an alternative model to those assessed above, which may serve to augment our understanding of the incidence of challenges to international orders. This in turn will be followed by a series of case studies (Chapters 3

through 6), in which the suppositions of the model will be evaluated in light of historical experience. In Chapter 7, I return to the questions posed at the beginning of this chapter, drawing conclusions from the case-histories, and suggesting how the understandings developed in the dissertation may be of relevance to the current international situation.

CHAPTER 2

MOBILISATION BARGAINS, COLLUSIVE ILLEGITIMACY, AND CHALLENGER STATES: A MODEL

In exploring the domestic and social origins of postwar order, it will be necessary to probe the relationship of each postwar settlement to the pattern of social relations during the war. Stated simply, the relevant questions are: what are the effects of the war on domestic political interaction? and how, if at all, do these war-related issues play out with respect to the postwar order? I shall attempt to provide at least a partial answer to these questions by examining the political legacies of what I term wartime 'mobilisation bargains'. The model I develop here has two main external-internal linkages. The first posits the impact of an event at the systemic level (major war amongst the great powers) on domestic politics. The second suggests how those domestic political configurations result in either acquiescence to, or challenge of, the postwar order.

Major wars and mobilisation bargains

During a major war, the requirements of unprecedented levels of mobilisation often force great-power elites into offering bargains to societal groups in exchange for their increased (or even continued) support of the war effort. This support is usually in the form of accepting material sacrifices or

heightened likelihood of military service, and the concessions offered by the regime are often promised as a dividend of the coming victory.

Mobilisation bargains are thus

explicit promises of a) current or future extension of fuller participatory rights of citizenship, or b) future material or territorial benefit, offered by state elites in wartime to politically or economically disadvantaged domestic groups, in exchange for maintenance of (or increase in) the level of wartime mobilisation of these groups.[59]

Mobilisation bargains should not be expected to occur in every state participating in a major war, as there can obviously be varying degrees and duration of involvement in such struggles. We should only expect to observe them in periods of total mobilisation: where the war effort requires substantial dislocation of a state's productive capacity combined with a significant reallocation of

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[59] Note that the groups identified as being the targets of government bargains are those normally excluded from the centres of political power. Why should this be so - what of monied interests, military castes, or business groups? I would argue in response that the latter are typically already in a position of influence during normal (peacetime) political interaction, benefiting most from the normal allocation of rents. The requirements of wartime cause governments to attempt to obtain greater levels resources; they therefore turn to groups normally considered politically expendable or manipulable.

individuals into the military directly and into war production, in a process affecting most of the state's major populated regions.

These bargains have two general consequences. First, they create a set of expectations on the part of previously excluded, politically dormant, or partially incorporated groups regarding the specific postwar intentions of the current regime. Second, they expand the degree to which these groups view themselves as contracting parties, rather than objects, in the political arena; they therefore act to raise perceptions of political efficacy on the part of these groups. The very existence of mobilisation bargains points to the fact that major war is a politicizing experience, its mounting level of destruction regularly requiring hitherto-unknown degrees of deprivation and commitment on behalf of the population. Whether as cause or as consequence, the increasing intensity and social scope of major war have required the provision of ever-more persuasive reasons for people to consider themselves citizens and thus inheritors of the collectivity whose interests they are asked to defend or project.[60]

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[60] Typically, the bargains of which I write would be struck not at the outset of a major war - for, after all, the leaderships of states in the First World War could hardly have been expected to anticipate that the struggle in which they became embroiled would take on the dimensions it did, or that it would provoke severe constitutional crises in a majority of the participating states. It is far from uncommon for leaders and publics to underestimate, rather than overestimate, the challenge posed by international conflict. Thus we should expect such bargains in mid-war, as it were.

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If concessions are promised, these promises may well be honoured in the postwar period. If they are, we should expect little inter-group conflict or challenges to regime legitimacy as a result of wartime grievances; what conflict there is can be assumed to have other causes (although it is possible that the keeping of promises may also in itself upset existing political relationships).

However, not all mobilisation bargains may be kept, and there are a number of reasons why this is the case. First, some incentives offered by governments to garner additional support in wartime may be predicated on a victory never achieved, particularly in the case of material considerations such as land or resources in to-be-conquered territory. Moreover, even victory may not bring the influence required to achieve a state's war aims: a leadership's promises to its population may be frustrated through postwar coalition politics amongst erstwhile allies. Second, defeat may bring regime change, with a new set of leaders who refuse to consider themselves bound to honour the bargains entered into by their immediate predecessors. Third, elites may have the option of changing their minds, or deferring realization of the promised concession. It should also be clear that regimes offering bargains may sometimes have no intention of honouring their commitments. Either way, and especially in the case of victorious states, the conclusion of the war may bring regimes a more solid political footing than when the outcome was in doubt, allowing a return to reliance on narrower societal support.

It is important to note at this juncture that the honouring of bargains is not necessarily a function of victory or defeat. If it was, the implications of the model would be extremely uninteresting. As it is, regimes which are militarily victorious may be unable or unwilling to respect their commitments; equally, defeated states may encounter domestic intervention by victorious states which satisfies the expectations of bargain-mobilised groups, or renders wartime political aspirations and dialogue irrelevant by introducing new incentives and constraints.

As suggested above, at the conclusion of a major war it is safe to say that not every state elite will be in a position to honour the bargains made during the war. For the purposes of this study, it is those which fail to meet their commitments which are of most relevance, and it is these cases I address in the following paragraphs.

Domestic coalitions, collusive illegitimacy and challenges to postwar orders

Regardless of the objective ability of the state to comply with its wartime bargains, if substantial portions of the population expect certain concessions or benefits from the state which are not forthcoming, it is reasonable to expect that this situation will have adverse effects on the relationship between those groups and the regime.

There are three different situations in which the terms of mobilisation bargains can be breached, with differing consequences for postwar domestic politics. The first condition occurs when the regime fails to meet its side of bargains struck in wartime, but is perceived by bargain-mobilised groups as doing so of its own will exclusive of any interference by outside powers: I will term this an instance of *duplicity*.

The second occurs when the regime is perceived as failing to meet its commitments as a consequence of an arrangement with outside powers, whereby other powers induce the regime to sacrifice war aims according to certain domestic and international norms of behaviour; or, when the regime appears to act in tandem with outside powers to frustrate demands arising as a consequence of mobilisation bargains. This occurrence I will designate *collusion*.

The third occurs when the regime is completely supplanted by a foreign occupational-administrative force, rendering commitments of the outgoing regime moot; I term this outcome *occupation*. These three outcomes are represented in the table in figure 1.

**Figure 1: Domestic perceptions of responsibility for
postwar regime's failure to honour mobilisation bargains**

	Perceived foreign influence/responsibility	
Perceived regime influence/responsibility	high	low
high	collusion	duplicity
low	occupation	n/a[61]

Each of these circumstances will have different consequences for regime-population relations in the post-war era, and for the attitude of individuals in groups subject to mobilisation bargains towards the domestic and international components of the postwar order. In the case of duplicity, where the regime acts to renege on or roll back its wartime commitments independently of the influence of other states, we should expect the postwar political activity of groups affected by these actions to directly challenge the postwar domestic order and thus the legitimacy of the regime. We have, however, little reason to suspect

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[61] While logically possible, it is extremely unlikely that a regime's failure to deliver on its commitments would result in no blame being directed at authority structures.

a priori that there will be any direct challenge of the legitimacy of the postwar international order.

In the case of occupation, few are likely to expect the occupying power(s) to honour bargains made by the departed regime. Moreover, indigenous political activity approximating the pre-war level is likely to be proscribed for a considerable period of time, especially in the case of potential regime opponents. In this case, then, a challenge of the regime in the postwar period is unlikely.

The second case, collusion, offers rather more potential for international as well as domestic unrest than either postwar duplicity or occupation. In such a case, the targets of domestic discontent are found at both the regime level and at the international level simultaneously, and it is in these cases that the concepts of international order and domestic order become difficult to separate. The regime will likely be viewed by aggrieved groups as excessively acquiescent to the demands of foreign powers, or as having actively frustrated elements of its own population through an international accommodation. In practice, both of these perceptions may coexist and be mutually reinforcing, each situation rendering the regime complicitous in an unsatisfactory postwar order that manifests itself both in relations among states and in relations within states. Dissatisfied groups are therefore likely to assail the legitimacy not simply of regimes but of the postwar international order itself. This perception of *collusive illegitimacy* is the precondition for the emergence of a international-revisionist movement amongst domestic groups.

Of course, the mere fact that a group (or groups) feels aggrieved by the domestic and/or international order and seeks to challenge the legitimacy of that order is no guarantee that anything will come of the political activity undertaken by such a group. We are not dealing with small or marginal groups, as regimes forced to make domestic concessions in wartime are likely to court groups of sufficient number to make an impact on the war effort, and of a degree of political moderation such that cooperation with the war effort is in the realm of possibility. On the other hand, groups offered bargains in wartime but then denied them in peacetime are unlikely to be the most powerful political actors in a society, as regimes must perceive such groups as politically expendable except in the most extreme circumstances. The outcome will depend not only on the group's desire to challenge the postwar order, but also on the particular allies the group makes or fails to make in the course of its challenge.

Let us assume, then, that the failure of the regime to make good on its wartime promise to a particular segment of society has created a moderate-sized group which considers both the domestic regime and the postwar order to be mutually reinforcing and equally illegitimate. The obstacles that such a group faces are twofold. First, as stated above, the group is unlikely to be large enough to mount a challenge to the domestic regime on its own: it will require allies, other groups willing to overthrow or at least reconstitute the ruling elite, with whom it will be required to logroll. There may be a number of junctures in the political history of a state where such groups will be more common. However,

gaining allies willing to employ extra-constitutional means to achieve political change is most likely under conditions of limited political institutionalization[62], yet also under conditions of rising expectations of political inclusion and political efficacy. In order to challenge the state through mass movements, members of different societal groups must have little faith in current constitutional channels for redress, yet have enough experience of popular (as opposed to elite) politics that the concept of mass organization is familiar. Thus if the primary independent explanation of movements for domestic and international challenge is a societal perception of collusive illegtimacy, the most important intervening explanation is that the society has recently undergone an incomplete process of mass political inclusion, which I will term *abortive incorporation*.

Second, any attempt at overthrowing the domestic regime will of course have to either defeat or ensure the abstention of the state's organized coercive forces: in the face of military opposition, few political coalitions are likely to be able to effect an extra-constitutional transfer of power. I would argue that there are three circumstances under which the opinion of the military regarding the overthrow of the postwar domestic regime would range from neutral to positive. The first is where one or more groups within a logrolled anti-regime coalition overlap considerably with current and former military personnel: where the anti-regime coalition includes a significant portion of veterans of the previous war.

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[62] See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1968.

The second is in the event that the postwar regime has made a deliberate attempt to limit the role and influence of the military, causing the officer corps to view regime change as favourable to the military's sectoral interest.[63] The third possibility would arise when the military leadership is in ideological conflict with state elite.

Should conditions of political development provide fertile ground for anti-regime coalitioning, and should any of the three conditions regarding the military apply, regime overthrow is the likely result. But another question arises here: if bargain-mobilised groups find it necessary to form logrolled coalitions to gain power, why should we expect their particular agenda to dominate the new foreign policy of the state? Why should a challenge to the postwar order be the necessary result of the overthrow of the previous regime?

The answer lies in the peculiarities of logrolled coalitions. As Jack Snyder has argued with respect to imperialist coalitions, theories of collective action predict that coalitions composed of heterogeneous interests will produce policies orchestrated such that each group within the coalition gets what it most desires, at the expense of collective self-restraint.[64] A significant group within such a coalition, bargain-mobilised groups are

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[63] See Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback*, second edition, Boulder: Westview Press, 1988; pp. 20-53. For a counter-argument which suggests that institutional constraints rather than sectoral interest may be a determining factor, see Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Practice of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1957.

[64] Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991, pp. 17, 47.

most likely among anti-regime groups to have strong foreign policy preferences. We should therefore expect that while concessions will be made to the domestic preferences of other groups, foreign policy will be the preserve and primary concern of groups perceiving collusive illegitimacy. Accordingly, regime change in such circumstances should be followed by the adoption of a foreign policy intended to conflict with or subvert the rules of the postwar order.

Thus, the model suggests four stages, or conditions to be satisfied, for the emergence of a state challenge of the postwar international order, represented in figure 2.

Key concepts

At this stage it is necessary to establish working definitions of some of the main phenomena under consideration. In this section I will elaborate my understanding of *great power, postwar order, aftermath, major war*, and *victor*.

Which states have historically held claim to 'great power' status? In a study of war involving great powers in the modern states system, Jack Levy argues that this commonly-used concept suffers regularly from imprecise definition (or even non-definition).[65] Attempts to establish objective operational indicators, while useful, have encountered problems in the weighting of different components of power (for example, the importance of naval versus land forces).

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[65] Levy, *War in the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975*, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1983.

Figure 2: the emergence of postwar challengers

MOBILISATION BARGAIN NOT HONOURED
(group's perception of unjust outcome)

If yes
⇓

PERCEPTION OF COLLUSIVE ILLEGITIMACY
(blame both state and international order)

If yes
⇓

ABORTIVE INCORPORATION
(poor institutionalisation, conducive to allies, anti-regime logroll)

If yes
⇓

MILITARY ACQUIESCENCE
(military has institutional interest in regime change)

If yes
⇓

REGIME CHANGE, REVISIONIST FOREIGN POLICY

Moreover, the use of intuitively appealing material standards of power often leads to classifications which defy common-sense judgement.

Levy argues that an adequate definition of the term must draw on both objective and perceptual criteria. Accordingly, great powers exhibit a high level of military power relative to other states; they have interests which extend far beyond their borders and include issues of honour or prestige; they have distinct patterns of behaviour which include frequent threats or use of force, regular interactions with other great powers, and involvement in underwriting major geo-strategic settlements; they are perceived and treated as equals by other powers with respect to such issues as alliances, negotiations, and general attention; finally, they are formally differentiated from other states through distinct voting privileges or membership in international organizations or treaties.[66] These criteria provide Levy with the following list of great powers between the years 1495 and 1975:[67]

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[66] *Ibid.*, pp. 16-18.

[67] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-43.

Figure 3: Great powers from 1495 to 1975

France:	1495 - 1975
England / Great Britain:	1495 - 1975
Habsburg Dynasty:	1495 - 1918[68]
Spain:	1495 - 1519; 1556 - 1808
Ottoman Empire:	1495 - 1699
Netherlands:	1609 - 1713
Sweden:	1617 - 1721
Russia / USSR:	1721 - 1975
Prussia / Germany / FRG:	1740 - 1975
Italy:	1861 - 1943
United States:	1898 - 1975
Japan:	1905 - 1945
China:	1949 - 1975

What are postwar international orders? In the following analysis this phrase will signify an attempt by a victorious power (or powers acting in concert) to establish and enforce a set of political and economic norms at both the interstate and state levels. At the interstate level, the realms in which new norms are promoted will typically include one or both of trade policy and alliance behaviour, and will certainly include acceptance and adherence to the new geopolitical status quo. At the state level, postwar orders typically include expectations regarding the domestic political organization and ideological outlook of individual states.

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[68] Levy collapses the Habsburg dynasty and Spain into one entity from 1519 to 1556.

The importance of expanding the conception of order beyond interstate relations to include domestic politics cannot be overstated. Hedley Bull developed two conceptions of order in world politics: world order and international order. The latter is "a pattern of activity which sustains the elementary or primary goals of the society of states," whereas the former is a pattern sustaining the goals of social life among humanity as a whole.[69] While this distinction highlights the possibly contradictory relationship between the two forms, the peacemaking efforts of victorious states often address aspects of international and world order in a complementary or overlapping fashion. While past order-creation efforts are often seen as being directed primarily at constructing international order, questions of human political relationships other than state-to-state contact regularly appear on the agenda.

Why not define postwar order as simply the avoidance of major war, i.e. peace? A definition of postwar order linking its existence and duration to the phenomenon of a 'long peace' is tempting but problematic. To take peace as the problem of order-creation *a priori* is to overlook the fact that in previous periods of history war was not considered a pathology. Recent research suggests that the concerns of international policy-makers have fluctuated considerably in their content and themes over the longer term.[70]

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[69] Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, London, MacMillan, 1977.

[70] Holsti, *Peace and War*; John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in international relations", *International Organization*, v. 47, no. 1, 1992.

How do we know a challenge of a postwar order when we see one? One measure of challenge might be the occurrence of another major war. However, linking the duration of postwar orders to the phenomenon of a 'long peace,' while tempting, is problematic. To take peace as the problem of order-creation *a priori* is to overlook the fact that in previous periods of history war was not considered a pathology. Moreover, the fact that a state demonstrates a willingness to challenge the postwar order does not pre-ordain the outbreak of a large-scale war between the great powers (although this may be a probable consequence): there are a number of alternative possible outcomes. The non-occurrence of war may also be a false guide to stability, as it would exclude the consideration of 'near-misses'. The question here is thus not the outbreak of another major war but the appearance of a challenger, by which I understand the following: a great power whose leadership pursues a foreign policy in direct conflict with the rule content of the postwar order.

What does 'in direct conflict' mean? First, and most obviously, it can mean a direct military attack by a great power on one or more other great powers who are acting as constructors and guarantors of the postwar order, or on the allies of those powers. Second, it can mean a flagrant violation — that is, openly committed — of key postwar treaty provisions applying specifically to the great power in question. While providing an exhaustive list of provisions conceivably falling under this rubric would be difficult, we can include in this category arms limitation stipulations, the agreed-upon boundaries of the state in question, and

the binding nature of decisions made by international organizations regarding security issues. Third, it can mean a concerted attempt to undermine the territorial settlement established at the peace conference as it pertains to third parties, such as giving substantial aid to secessionist or nationalist movements in territories nominally under the control of other powers.

Over what time period should one assess attempts at order creation? I propose to define aftermath as the generation subsequent to the conclusion of the war in question — a period of no more than thirty-five years. As a definition this is inevitably arbitrary, but it does contain at least two merits. First, in this period the war is still a part of the adult experience of majorities of the populations of the countries involved, and a part of the formative experience of postwar political leadership: it is reasonable to assume that throughout this period (although perhaps to a declining extent) the wartime experience will still exert influence in domestic debates over foreign policy problems.[71] Second, and conversely, this time period should be sufficiently long to get a sense of the longer-term implications of post-war policies. If, as authors such as Gilpin and Modelski suggest, major wars are fought to determine the rules of the system, the distributive benefits of the system, or the modal form of domestic political organization, a generation seems a reasonable length of time over which to measure the ability of the victors to maintain a stable order with these characteristics.

The definition of the victor of such a war is problematic. First of all, identifying the winners of wars through a set of universal criteria has pitfalls: were one to use membership in a winning coalition as a criterion, for instance, one would arrive at the somewhat counter-intuitive coding of Poland as a 'winner' of the second World War.[72] Second, as order is an interactive and social phenomenon, subjective perceptions of victor status by contemporary observers must be central to the question of who is attempting to create a new order. Thus while adhering to standard historical accounts of the outcomes of wars, I will rely on a simple decision rule: victors are those combatant states in a winning coalition who make a substantial contribution to victory in a major war, or who are considered by contemporaries to be in a significantly more powerful class at the conclusion of the war than other coalition members. It is important to note that victory and defeat are often highly perceptual categories. Technical membership in a militarily victorious coalition is *a priori* no guarantee that a state will realize even a majority of its war aims: the perceived beneficiaries of the postwar settlement and the members of the winning side need not be identical.

This study considers the aftermaths of major wars only. Is this justified — are they analytically distinct from other wars? While there is considerable debate

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[71] Dan Reiter, *Learning, Realism and Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1996.

[72] Melvin Small & J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980*, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1982, p. 91; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *The War Trap*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1981, p. 209.

on the merits of treating large wars as a separate category[73], my concern is with

consequences of war, where there is a clear distinction to be made. Major wars

provide numerous opportunities for positive structural change which are not

provided by smaller conflicts. Through their very severity, they provoke the

leading actors to seek changes in the axioms of world politics and in the

behaviour which derives from them. The consequences of the two types of war,

at least in their potential for change, are sufficiently different to warrant separate

treatment.

If this is true, then we should expect the largest wars to provide the

greatest opportunity -- or at least the greatest incentive -- for order-creation.[74]

According to this logic, and the logic of much of the systemic, realist literature on

the topic, it should be after the most wide-spread, severe major wars that the

victorious great powers are most likely to effect new sets of systemic rules and

attempt to enforce those rules. If the degree of warfare varies with the systemic

importance of the issues at stake, major wars are clearly the testing ground for

the pattern of order-creation asserted by numerous theorists. I adopt Levy's

definition of major war (or as he terms it, general war). Levy suggests that a

distinction may be made if the war includes the leading power, most of the other

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[73] See the symposium on this question in *International Interactions* 16, no. 3, 1990.

[74] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and hegemonic power," *International Organization* 44, Summer 1990, pp. 313-14.

great powers, and is sufficiently severe in terms of casualties.[75] He identifies ten

such wars in the modern states system.[76]

Which of these wars are most relevant to this study? Most studies of

major wars, their causes and their consequences take the mid-seventeenth

century as their starting point, usually arguing explicitly that this point marks the

origin of the modern states system. While I have no disagreement with this

judgement, I would also argue that there is a second watershed point in the

history of major wars to which rather less significance is generally attributed in

international relations literature, but which nonetheless marks a great shift in the

character of international conflict. This is the end of the eighteenth and the

beginning of the nineteenth century, a brief period which marks the end of

absolutism and the beginning of the 'republicanization' of warfare. After 1815,

no absolutist regime won another great-power war against a more republican

regime.[77] States, regardless of their form of government or legal

acknowledgement of the concept of citizenship, were forced during the

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[75] Levy, "General War", pp. 368-71.

[76] Levy's measure of severity is recorded battle deaths per one million European population; the

ten wars in order of decreasing severity are: World War II, World War I, French

Revolutionary/Napoleonic, Thirty Years, Spanish Succession, Seven Years, League of Augsburg,

Austrian Succession, Dutch War of Louis XIV, and Dutch Independence. See *ibid.*, p. 372.

[77] The lone exception being the Franco-Prussian war: for this to be an anomaly one must judge the

Second Empire to have had better republican and/or democratic credentials than the

Hohenzollern regime.

Napoleonic Wars and after to resort to new measures to achieve the great levels of mobilisation required in modern warfare. From the dawn of republicanism, the questions of the individual's role in warfare and the state's responsibility to its inhabitants were tied together in a way they had not before the French Revolution.

As a consequence, the arguments outlined in the model above should be most relevant and most apparent in the aftermaths of the three most recent major wars: the Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the First World War, and the Second World War. It is therefore on these three case-periods that I will concentrate my research efforts. However, in the interests of comparison, an attempt will also be made in future works to trace the differences and similarities these three periods exhibit with respect to the two largest major wars in the earlier period, the War of the Spanish Succession and the Thirty Years' War.

Problems of selection bias must be considered at this juncture. First, by choosing to examine only the three most recent wars, it is possible that I have selected those cases where my argument dealing with elite-mass bargains and mobilisation will perform best. The French revolution was a particular watershed in the historical development of world politics, one might argue, denoting a point after which the commoner had increasing political influence on the waging of wars and the formulation of foreign policy. As such, I have eliminated cases from more absolutist periods where postwar foreign policy may

have been less likely to be constrained in any way by the dissatisfaction of domestic actors.

Second, by selecting only the three most severe major wars, this study may end up identifying a pattern which may not obtain after less severe major wars. That is, these wars and their aftermaths may be *sui generis*, locating a chain of events unlikely to be replicated in instances where the demands of mobilisation are less intense, and hence where elite-mass bargains may be non-existent or insignificant. Where these bargains are not a factor in influencing or constraining postwar foreign policy choices of combatant states, the model specified above will have little or no explanatory power.

If my intention was to generalize about the postwar behaviour of great powers after major wars, regardless of historical epoch, this criticism would be well-founded. But this is not my intention. If some aspects of conflict between states are timeless and universal, as realism claims, we must also be aware that others are necessarily time-bound. Recent studies in historical sociology, for instance, have demonstrated how warfare between states has led to a ratchet-effect extension of control over domestic societies by central states.[78] War has over time altered the internal composition of the units which conduct it.

In fact, it is just those factors which render the three most recent major wars different from earlier campaigns -- the degree of involvement in foreign policy of publics, and the unprecedented, mounting severity of those conflicts --

which point to the possibility that there is a qualitative difference in the nature of domestic political mobilisation and its postwar effects on policy between the last three major wars and earlier examples of these conflicts. If this is the case -- and there seems to be good reason to believe that it is -- then generalizing to other periods would not simply be untenable methodologically; it would be pointless. The model specified above is posited upon a world in which state leaderships must trade off the costs of expanded political incorporation to receive its benefits in the form of enhanced military mobilisation. In earlier periods where mass political incorporation or its possibility was not part of state discourse, these dynamics should not be expected to apply.

I am therefore seeking to identify a phenomenon which is likely unique to more recent times: it is not my intention to generalize from the outcome of these recent case studies back through the history of the Westphalian states system. However, this does not mean that it is not worth applying the argument to these earlier periods at some later juncture, and it is my eventual goal to expand this study in just this manner. But for the moment, I believe it is worthwhile to determine whether in fact the pattern my model suggests does in fact exist in the time period where, if I am right, it ought to.

Thus we have criteria for selecting the states involved in this study, the wars whose aftermaths will be examined, and the length of time of which the

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[78] Cf. the work of Michael Mann and Charles Tilly on this issue.

case studies will be comprised. Unfortunately, this still yields a number of cases too great to examine in-depth in this dissertation, as Figure 4 demonstrates.

Figure 4: Great powers in three major wars & postwar periods

Post-1815	Post-1918	Post-1945
Prussia/Germany	Germany	Germany
France	France	France
Britain	Britain	Britain
Russia	USSR	USSR
Austria	USA	USA
	Italy	China

One should note that there are two important categories of exclusions from this list, when compared with Levy's chronological specification of great powers above. The first is comprised of those states which had great power status during a major war but lost that status as a consequence of the course of the war. States falling into this category are Spain after the Napoleonic Wars, Austria-Hungary after World War I, and Italy after World War II. Even if revisionist, such states are unlikely by definition to have much chance of disrupting the postwar order. The second includes states which are great powers and were involved in the war, but which for unusual circumstances such as delayed entry never underwent total mobilisation. States falling into this category include the United States and Japan in World War I, and France in

World War II.[79] Japan's participation was not of the magnitude of even the

Dominions: the United States was a late entrant, its troops seeing combat only in

the waning months of the conflict, and it suffered little in the way of economic

dislocation in comparison with its European allies. There was, not surprisingly,

little in the way of mobilisation bargains offered by the Wilson administration.

The early French departure from the last major war did not, of course, alleviate

the burdens of war for the French people. But the nature of occupation again

hindered bargains between ruling elites and societal groups; those bargains

which did occur under either the Nazis or Vichy were vitiated by the fact that

both the regimes and groups that benefited from interaction with them were

rendered fundamentally illegitimate by the war's outcome.

One *inclusion* which may not be obvious is that of states which were

involved in the war but only obtained great power status in its aftermath. Thus

China, which most certainly underwent significant societal upheaval and

mobilisation from the early 1930s through the second world war, and thus

experienced imperatives for national survival similar to those experienced by

major power combatants, was not accepted as a major power until the

consolidation of the revolution and the ensuing stalemate with the United States

in the Korean peninsula (although many of the trappings of great power status

were bestowed on Nationalist China immediately upon conclusion of the

Japanese war.

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[79] On the exclusion of Japan as a case, see Chapter 7, fn. 1.

Returning to the problem of case selection, certain other cases may be excluded from further consideration. First, there are those states whose defeat was of such magnitude, and whose regime was in consequence so politically discredited through national ruin (and possibly morally discredited through revelation of wartime atrocities), that no politically tenable arguments could be made in the postwar period regarding the injustice of the wartime regime's broken promises. That is to say, in total defeat, the outcome I described above as 'occupation', the promises of the ousted regime are moot. In this category, there are grounds for the exclusion of Germany and Japan after 1945; one may also make a good case that the revulsion exhibited towards the Vichy regime after the liberation of France also rendered remote the possibility of any political action based on bargains struck with the Pétain government. In all these three cases, I would argue that it was the moral rejection of the wartime regime which curtailed the chances for rebellion against the domination of the occupying forces. A second category of state to be excluded is any case where another theory provides a convincing explanation, and such is the case with Japan after 1918.

The cases I will examine are those of Germany and Italy after the first world war, France and Prussia/Germany after the Napoleonic Wars, and China after the second world war. With fifteen potential cases, and a practical limit of no more than five case studies in a work of this length, I can make no claim to be

'testing' a theory as that practice is normally understood. However, there are some reasonable justifications for my case choices:

1. Rather than a general theory of challengers, I am only attempting to provide an explanation which addresses a gap in the literature: that of challenges in the immediate postwar period, where other theories fail to account completely for the emergence of the challenger. Consequently, the three anomalous 20th century challengers (Germany, Italy, and China) must be included over others.

2. By including the two cases from the post-Napoleonic period, I add two cases where no challenge occurred. Yet in both cases mobilisation bargains were extended and then rescinded, satisfying the early conditions of the model. With contrary outcomes, these cases thus allow exploration and refinement of causal suppositions.

3. The inclusion of cases from all three time periods and from separate cultural settings frees the analysis from a more parochial focus.

4. The cases represent every box in a matrix plotting success in war against subsequent revisionist behaviour; that is, there exist in this limited set two victors that challenged (Italy and China), one victor that didn't challenge (Prussia/Germany post-1815), one loser that challenged (Germany post-1918), and one loser that didn't challenge (France).

Thus, while imperfect, the research design gives what I believe to be the maximum breadth and depth of material in such a small number of cases. If not

'testing' a theory, I am through a series of structured, focussed comparative cases engaged in theory *development*.[80] Beyond these concerns, I hope through the case analysis simply to refine and broaden understanding of the origins of revisionism and of challenger states, through the contribution of a new type and a model to complement existing understandings. Thus, this dissertation is *not* an attempt to explain all challengers, past, present and future, by reducing the universe of possible causes to one master variable – that goal is likely unattainable. It is an attempt to identify and explain parallel circumstances in a number of cases of challenge unexplained by other theories, and is thus only the search for one piece of a general puzzle.

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[80] See Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison", in *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory and Policy*, edited by Paul G. Lauren, New York, Free Press 1979; "Case Studies and Theory Development", an address to the Workshop on Political Economy & International Security, McGill University, October 1994.

CHAPTER 3

CHALLENGE ATTAINED: GERMANY & ITALY AFTER THE GREAT WAR

In November 1918, Germany was a defeated state. Its army had surrendered unconditionally to the Entente powers at Compiegne, its economy was in a shambles, the living standards of its population had dropped to near subsistence in many areas, and socialist revolutionaries had replaced the imperial regime days before the armistice, leaving German domestic politics in turmoil. There was soon to follow even greater economic dislocation: a period of unheard-of inflation, occupation of key German industrial areas by a foreign power, and the payment of reparations to the victorious states as part of the peace settlement.

Italy presented a different picture. Though temporarily on the defensive in the fall of 1917, the Italians had driven their primary antagonists, the Austrians, back into Austrian territory by the end of the war, capturing portions of the northern Adriatic coast and the South Tyrol, including several major towns, in the process. Moreover, Austria-Hungary as a political unit was on the verge of collapse, leaving a political void and thus opportunities for expansion into long-claimed territory in the north-east.

Yet in the next two decades, these two states — the one politically divided, defeated, and in economic ruin, the other victorious and strategically secure, were both (together with Japan) to challenge by force of arms the terms of the

Versailles peace settlement and the authority of its offspring, the League of Nations. In this chapter, devoted to both the German and the Italian cases, I will explore the origins of these challenges of the postwar order. I hope to show that knowledge of the societal political expectations deriving from the wartime experience is critical to an understanding of these two states' later behaviour. In demonstrating this, I also hope to illuminate the ways in which structural theories are unable to account in full for the events of the 1920s and 1930s. Finally, I wish to suggest that the events in both these countries in the interwar period are but two instances of a more general pattern.

These are perhaps the 'easiest' cases for the model presented here. They are easy because it would be surprising if the model did not hold true in these instances. There is a wealth of documentation regarding the experience of the First World War in German and Italian society, much of it pointing to extreme dissatisfaction with the postwar regime on the part of large social groups. There is ample evidence that in both states aggrieved groups mobilised due to the wartime experience, and that their goals were subversive both with respect to the domestic postwar regime and to the international postwar order. Finally, it is clear that democracy was partly but insufficiently institutionalised in both countries by 1918.

Yet these two cases also provide interesting contrasts. Germany was defeated and lay at the mercy of the victorious powers. Italy was one of the war's victors, at least nominally; and this nominal status allowed the Italians to

take their place amongst the winning coalition at the Congress of Versailles.

Another area of difference is timing. While the Fascists seized power in Rome a decade before the Nazis did so in Berlin, the revisionist elements of Mussolini's foreign policy were slow to reveal themselves. Within months of assuming power Adolf Hitler had made his intentions regarding the provisions of Versailles perfectly clear.

I hope to show that in both cases there are four commonalities. First, during the war there were specific bargains made between the state and societal groups, whose expectations regarding the fruits of participation were raised accordingly. Secondly, in both cases these bargains were not honoured because (at least in terms of public perception) the postwar regime willfully damaged or sacrificed the interests of domestic groups for the benefit of foreign actors, through weakness or duplicity. Third, this attribution of blame and resentment led to the formation of coalitions dedicated to the overthrow both of domestic and foreign arrangements. Fourth, such an overthrow became possible because while recent incorporation and politicisation had served to mobilise unprecedented portions of the population, the political forms designed to bear the weight of mass participation were insufficiently institutionalised.

Why, and how, did Germany re-emerge as a challenger state less than two decades after being subject to the peace terms of the victorious Entente powers? The literature on this topic is, to say the least, considerable. However, we may sum up the major responses to this question as resembling one of the following:

A. The rise in German economic might was only interrupted temporarily by the First World War. German relative power in the interwar period became increasingly incommensurate with the country's abject international standing, ultimately leading to military clashes with established, status quo great powers.[81]

B. By imposing harsh peace terms, identifying Germany as primarily culpable for the war, and by choosing to isolate the Germans and strip them of their status as a great power, rather than reintegrating postwar Germany into the international system, the Entente powers sowed the seeds of the postwar order's own destruction. Magnanimity at the peace

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[81] See the work of Gilpin, e.g.

table, rather than the creation of a pariah state, would have been a more prudent course for the British, French, and Americans.[82]

C. The fundamentally illiberal nature of German development, combined with the immediate and indirect economic consequences of the first world war, led to the emergence of reactionary authoritarian responses to the crises of the 1920s and 1930s. The fascist regime which emerged was intrinsically hostile to both liberal democracy and state socialism.[83]

In sum, we are presented with the three standard explanations for the emergence of a challenger state: rising power, exclusion, and domestic/systemic dissonance. I believe none of these arguments are fully satisfactory, and I shall deal with them in turn.

Rising power. The plainest objection one can make to this argument is to raise the question: if so, then why Germany and not other countries? and indeed, why Germany at all? If rising power on its own is to account for the emergence of a German threat to the international system in the 1920s and 1930s, then one must establish several things. First, it must be clear that German economic

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[82] E.g. Carr, Holsti and/or Kissinger; this argument emerges through an economist's lenses -- somewhat indirectly -- in John Maynard Keynes' contemporary critique of the Versailles settlement, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace.*

[83] On this point, see Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979. This argument is also inherent in Moore, *Social Origins.*

power had rebounded sufficiently from the effects of the first world war to

become once more a significant threat to the position of the leading economic

powers, Great Britain and the (increasingly dominant) United States. Upon

examination, this would not appear to be the case. The currency/inflation crisis

of 1923 was the most devastating in the history of the modern industrialised

world, and had lasting effects on German capital reserves, investment and

industry. While the slackening of reparations demands and improved fiscal

management in the later 1920s, combined with a global economic upswing,

produced improved German economic performance, German economic

performance and positioning relative to the two other large industrial Western

economies was far less impressive at the end of the decade than it had been prior

to the war.[84] It is true that at the outbreak of war in 1939, the German economy

had achieved greater levels of productivity and output, and had completed a

significant program of rearmament. Most of this increase in output, however,

was obtained at the cost of massive deficit financing, and was unsustainable

under peacetime conditions.[85] This is to say that in fact, the resurgence of

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[84] See Charles F. Doran and Wes Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 74, 1980.

[85] Doran and Parsons (p. 957) note that "to the extent that relative capability is accurately depicted [by their measures of power], the German *revanche* under Hitler was remarkable not for its proximity to victory but for its recklessness and high probability of defeat in the face of overwhelming latent military capability elsewhere in the system".

German economic power that did occur prior to WWII was the result of the conscious placement of the German economy on a war footing. An economic boom as the consequence of an externally aggressive agenda can not in turn be identified as the root cause of that revisionism.

However, even if one were to accept the assertion that German economic resurgence was responsible for the shift in German foreign policy between 1927 and 1937, one would be required to enquire whether the same was true of other countries whose economies were advancing relative to the international economic hierarchy of the time. In particular, if it is growth in the power of the German economy which is identified as the root cause of German revisionism in the interwar period (or as is even more commonly argued, in the first half of the twentieth century), the trajectory of the United States becomes problematic. If Germany was challenging Britain's industrial dominance and global reach in this period, then the United States should have presented the British with an even greater security threat. By the eve of the first world war it was the US, and not Germany, which ranked with Britain as one of the two leading economies (export, industrial, or otherwise) of the developed world. Yet for the British the Americans posed no security threat. By the mid 1920s the US had passed Britain as the world's industrial leader, and New York had supplanted London as the centre of world finance, in perhaps the most peaceful leadership transition in the history of the western states system. In fact, so little was the American threat to Britain's international stature acknowledged, policy-makers in London continued

to behave as if British international economic predominance had been maintained.[86]

While German recovery might have made possible the Nazi rearmament program of the 1930s, it is not evident that the recovery was of such magnitude as to precipitate a struggle between Germany and the dominant economic powers of the day.

Exclusion. Just as the great powers were magnanimous in their treatment of France at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, so did they deal harshly with Germany at Versailles. It is commonly argued that this harshness is a central cause of subsequent German revisionism.[87] Despite the fact that Germany's military defeat in the field was ambiguous, the Germans were denied adequate voice in the international arena. German resources were confiscated or redirected through reparations requirements, and Germany was prohibited from maintaining a military commensurate with its size and security needs. Accordingly, the German leadership drew on widespread domestic antipathy to the terms of the settlement to embark on a program of international redress.

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[86] Brawley, *Liberal Leadership*; Stephen Rock, *Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989.

[87] Kissinger, in explaining the power of 'legitimacy' as an ordering principle, suggests that it "implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least

There is much substance to this claim, and I have no wish to dispute the assertion that domestic dissatisfaction with the terms of the Versailles settlement was a leading contributor to subsequent German international behaviour. It is completely consistent with the argument I will advance below. However, by itself this claim is incomplete for one reason, which I shall pose as a question: if the terms of the settlement made German revisionism inevitable, why was a change of regime required before a revisionist foreign policy emerged?

This objection relates to the "levels of analysis problem" in international relations.[88] When this argument is made, the usual explicit or implicit point of comparison is that of France in 1815 at the Congress of Vienna. Magnanimous treatment of France, it is argued, kept that state from seeking an overthrow of the Concert system of early-mid nineteenth-century Europe. Yet the model of the states system employed is almost exclusively that of billiard-balls: *France* did not respond aggressively or renew *its* previous aims of European dominion because *it was treated* as an equal. Distinctions between regime views of the settlement and societal views of the settlement are not usually considered, despite the fact that considerable differences did exist.[89]

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to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that, like Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy". See *A World Restored*, pp. 1-2.

[88] See J. David Singer, "The Levels of Analysis Problem in International Relations", *World Politics*, 1961.

[89] As will be argued in the next chapter.

If differences between societal views of the settlement and regime views of the settlement are unaddressed or considered unimportant, we cannot explain why it was that the Nazi regime almost immediately set about altering the international status quo within which its Weimar predecessors had been operating. Nor are the differences in foreign policy minor. The Weimar regime conformed with or tolerated many of the most humiliating conditions of the Versailles treaty, whereas the Nazis were consistent in their condemnation of this acquiescence and were quick to violate the treaty's terms in blatant fashion. Weimar politicians sought and received admission to the League of Nations and other postwar international organizations; Hitler acted with utter contempt for the concerns and goals of the league. In this case, then, the second postwar regime acted in accordance with the predicted behaviour of an excluded, defeated great power. The first did not. Why it didn't, and how that may have affected the behaviour of the regime that replaced the Weimar system, are questions which are more fully addressed in the discussion below.

Domestic/system dissonance. This argument is found more in implicit than in explicit form, and in fact my discussion of it stems more from my derivations from the political development literature than from any direct thesis. Twentieth-century challenges to the security of the Western liberal states system and the survival of the individual states composing that system have come primarily from states whose domestic political development followed a markedly different trajectory, eventually arriving at a non-democratic, authoritarian outcome. The

majority view, to be found mostly in particular case histories rather than as a general statement, is that these states have then actively sought confrontation with liberal democracies. A minority would suggest that the liberal democracies have sought confrontation with these states to at least an equivalent degree.[90]

This argument can also be found with reference to the case of France in the years subsequent to the French Revolution. Whether due to the ideological imperialism of revolutionary elites or the reaction of conservative monarchies to their regicidal regime, France' s constitutional status was at the core of the major military conflicts on the European continent in the ensuing two decades. One may also say the same of the Soviet Union and China in the aftermaths of their

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[90] For example, the literature on the origins of Soviet foreign policy is vast, falling roughly into three schools: ideological (antipathy to capitalism), reactive (defensive, nationalist), and essentialist (historical continuity of Russian expansionism). See, e.g., Adam B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1973*, New York, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1974; R.N. Carew-Hunt, "The Importance of Doctrine", and Samuel L. Sharp, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics", in Alexander Dallin, ed., *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1960; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure, The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, New York, Scribner, 1989. Richard Pipes' numerous works have long upheld the essentialist view; Stephen Cohen's equally numerous, the defensive.

revolutions. The point is the same: constitutional and ideological divergence from the norm is a root cause of conflict between normative and deviant states.[91]

I will leave aside the question of whether in the individual cases referred to above this approach is an adequate explanation of state behaviour, and concentrate simply on the German case. Can we account for the emergence of a revisionist German foreign political agenda in the 1930s by examining the implications of ideology and regime change in Germany? Several things are clear. First, National Socialist antipathy towards bourgeois democracy, and even more towards Bolshevism, is well-documented. Second, we know from much recent research that while democracies tend not to fight each other, they do fight often and vigorously against non-democratic states.[92] Why this occurs is a subject of much debate, but in accordance with this argument, it may well stem from an inherent antithesis between the foreign policy goals of democratic and non-democratic states.

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[91] See J. Samuel Barkin, "Legitimate Sovereignty and Risky States", in Schneider and Weitsman, eds., *Enforcing Cooperation: "Risky" States and the International Management of Conflict* (under review at time of writing).

[92] See Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", *American Political Science Review*, vol. 80, no. 4, 1986; R.J. Rummel, "Libertarianism and International Violence", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 27, March 1983; Carol R. Ember, Melvin Ember and Bruce Russett, "Peace Between Participatory Polities: A Cross-Cultural Test of the 'Democracies Rarely Fight Each Other' Hypothesis", *World Politics*, vol. 44, July 1992..

In general, there is much to be said for this approach to the question, and rather than suggesting major flaws in this argument I will only say that the argument by itself is incomplete. Certainly there appears to be much evidence suggesting that states whose constitutional makeup makes them unorthodox are involved at the heart of numerous system conflicts. But if simple dissonance between Germany's domestic political and ideological characteristics and those of other states is to explain the rise of German revisionism, there needs to be specified a causal mechanism. Even if un-like constitutional entities pose intrinsic existential threats to one another, which seems possible but doubtful, there still needs to be explored the question of how those threats come to be, and which way the causal arrow points. Is it the case, for instance, that some sort of evangelical urge exists within some/many/all ideologies which leads inevitably to conflict with others? Or do new ideologies form hostile policies toward outside societies because of the initial treatment they receive from traditional/dominant political actors and structures? I have suggested in Chapter 1 that in fact this linkage, while implied, remains to be specified, and hope to explore this area more thoroughly in this case study.

The wartime experience

Germany entered the war as an autocratic society possessed of relatively minimal democratic forms and a highly restricted suffrage. The decades

preceding the war had seen considerable class conflict. However, as in many other European states, the German labour movement, which had previously been engaged in highly antagonistic relations with both employers and the state, fell in line with other social groups in supporting the war effort. Its political arm, the Social Democratic Party (or SPD), threw its parliamentary support behind the government in the initial debates on war financing.

With German society caught up in a patriotic fervour, the first months of the war saw the formation of the *burgfrieden*, or internal truce. Socialist leaders, persuaded by Bethmann Hollweg that Germany had been forced into a defensive war, and keen to derive greater legitimacy in the eyes of the larger world of potential domestic political support, came quickly to support the military, economic and social requirements of a war that most assumed would be over in weeks or months.[93]

The war, of course, was not over by Christmas. The German offensives to the east and west faltered in the face of Russian, French and British counter-attack, and a relentless war of attrition set in which was to bring concentrated slaughter to Europe in a manner not previously seen. In Germany shortages emerged in the first winter of the war, leading to the introduction of rationing by February 1915. Poor harvests in 1916 and 1917 and shortages of fuel for heating and transportation led to greater hardships, with the winter of 1916/17 bringing

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[93] V.R. Berghahn, *Modern Germany: Society, economy and politics in the twentieth century* (second edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987; pp. 41-42.

a wave of deaths due to hypothermia and starvation (as well as a large rise in infant mortality).[94]

By the second year of the war the sacrifices and privations being endured by both the civilian population and those in the military were gradually eroding the spirit of collective effort which characterized the early period of the conflict. In particular, the initially remarkable degree of solidarity achieved in industrial relations began to give way to higher degrees of labour unrest (see table below). By the 'turnip winter' of 1916/17 there were increasing numbers of strikes and demonstrations of open hostility on the part of sections of the working class against those groups seemingly unaffected by the crisis: the rich, the real or alleged war profiteers, and privileged workers in strategic industries,[95] who themselves were exploiting their own situation. Wartime strikes typically involved higher numbers of employees but were settled much more quickly than were stoppages in peacetime (primarily due to the significantly higher bargaining power of workers in key industries).

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[94] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, pp. 49-50. Berghahn notes that "according to some estimates more than 700,000" deaths occurred due to starvation & hypothermia in the winter of 1916/17.

[95] Jurgen Kocka, *Facing Total War, German Society, 1914-1918*, (Barbara Weinberger, trans.) Leamington Spa, Berg, 1984, pp. 41-43.

Figure 5:
Labour unrest in Germany, 1913 - 1917[96]

Year	Strikes/lockouts	Strikers	Work days lost
1913	2,464	323,400	11,761,000
1914	n/a	n/a	n/a
1915	141	15,200	46,000
1916	240	126,900	245,000
1917	562	668,000	1,862,000

For the middle class, dissatisfaction manifested itself in protest against the narrowing gap between segments of the working class and themselves, as well as in discontent over the inequitable distribution of food. In particular, the phenomenon of relative class standing is a key to understanding German politics both during and after the war. Never great in real economic terms, class and status differences between industrial labourers on the one hand, and white-collar workers, small artisans and shopkeepers on the other, were an inordinate source of pride amongst middle and lower-middle class groups in the early decades of this century. The rising power (and earnings) of the working class had shrunk the gulf in real power between the two groups substantially. During the war, the relative shortage of labour accelerated this trend, such that the real earnings and

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[96] Adapted from Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, p. 304.

living standards of key groups of labourers far exceeded those of many middle-class sectors.

The traditional anti-confrontationist and statist perspective of the *mittelstand* gave way to both leftward and rightward radicalisation.[97] On the left, a number of middle class groups cooperated with elements of the left in seeking a compromise peace, with a return to the *status quo ante* and the introduction of domestic political reforms. White-collar employees' associations for the first time began to resort to strike tactics and collective bargaining to shore up their position. Radicalism amongst middle-level employees was felt sharply in many of the largest German firms, among them Siemens and AEG, and white-collar unions joined with manual unions in support of anti-annexationist (pro-compromise peace) political groupings such as the *Volksbund für Freiheit und Vaterland*.[98]

On the right, middle and upper class groups called for a victorious peace (*siegfried*), the motivation for which was twofold: a resounding German victory would certainly provide the immediate benefits vocally demanded by these

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[97] Gerald D. Feldman, *Army, Industry and Labor in Germany 1914-1918*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966, pp. 283-291; Kocka, *Total War*, pp. 98-110.

[98] Kocka, *Total War*, pp. 91-98, provides a far more detailed discussion of this phenomenon.

actors, but would also forestall the momentum for domestic political changes sought by the left.[99]

The bargain

To combat the potential unravelling of the war effort, and in the absence of sufficient material resources to lighten the burden of the aggrieved groups, the regime was forced to make concessions of a political variety. It is clear in retrospect that the politicising experience of the trenches was not lost on German political and industrial leaders at the time, and was central to domestic policy thinking early on. The fears of the German elite may perhaps best be summed up by remarks made by Krupp director and industrialist Alfred Hugenberg to the *Kriegsausschuss* (War Board of German Industry) in late 1914:

> The consequences of the war will in themselves be unfavourable for the employers and industry in many ways. There can be no doubt that the capacity and willingness of the workers returning from the front to produce will suffer considerably when they are subordinated to factory discipline. One will probably have to count on a very increased sense of power on the part of the workers and the labour unions which will also find expression in increased demands on employers and for legislation.[100]

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[99] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, p. 54.

[100] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

The possibility of reform in exchange for participation in the struggle was raised

in the earliest days of the war by the Kaiser's message of 4 August 1914, in which

he had remarked that 'I recognize no more parties; I know only Germans,' – a

speech instrumental in securing the allegiance of the SPD in voting war credits.[101]

However, at Bethmann Hollweg's urging the Kaiser's Easter message of 1917 was

more substantial, promising the abolition of the blatantly exclusionary Prussian

three-tier franchise, long the focal point of resentment amongst the working

class.[102]

For his part, however, and to forestall the need for such reform,

Hugenberg advocated a different strategy: "We would therefore be well advised,

in order to avoid internal difficulties, to distract the attention of the people and to

give fantasies concerning the extension of German territory room to play".[103]

And in fact it turned out to be the middle class, as much as the working class,

whose support was lured through promises of territorial expansion and national

aggrandisement. The Supreme Command, eager to create a counterweight to the

political concessions wrought by the workers' strike tactics, sought to establish an

anti-reformist coalition around the question of war aims. In 1917, at

Ludendorff's instigation, a right-nationalist party favouring large-scale

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[101] Kocka, *Total War*, p. 43.

[102] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, p. 54.

annexation of foreign territory (the *Vaterlandpartei* or Fatherland Party) was established under Tirpitz, attracting strong middle class support in the latter stages of the conflict — it boasted a membership in 1918 of 1.2 million — especially amongst higher-grade civil servants. One should note that this platform was not universally appealing to the middle class: as noted above, other segments of the middle class, in particular white-collar employees, were driven leftwards in the demand for the extension of political rights for themselves.[104]

Thus through a combination of promises regarding political inclusion, the removal of class barriers, and postwar imperial expansion, the Hohenzollern regime maintained (if barely) the mobilisation of the German middle and working classes, despite the plummeting popularity of the ruling caste itself. After the initial euphoria of 1914 had evaporated, tenuous adherence of the broad mass of German society to the *burgfrieden* and the promise of social and national advance was nursed through the promise of a future golden age, whether conceived in bourgeois-nationalist or social-egalitarian terms. This situation prolonged the life of the imperial regime through the winter of 1917-1918 until the last months of the war, when the last hope of victory (and thus of the

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[103] *Ibid.*, p. 52.

[104] Kocka, *Total War*, p. 99.

realization of the regime's promises) disappeared, and defeat finally appeared inevitable.[105]

Postwar perceptions

The German revolution culminating on 9 November 1918 brought a coalition of leftist and left-centre politicians to power in place of the imperial Hohenzollern regime, the Kaiser having abdicated that same day. Initially supported by a large number of Workers' Councils which had emerged in the waning days of the war, the coalition (led by SPD leader Friedrich Ebert) soon distanced itself from the councils, which it suspected of attempting to replicate the role of the Russian soviets as autonomous power sources.[106] The revolutionary regime itself was, in comparison to Russian Bolshevism, moderate, and moved relatively swiftly to occupy the centre ground. By 1919 Ebert had allied his government to a variety of conservative forces in order to forestall the demands and activities of radical left revolutionary movements such as the Spartacists (whose own uprising was forcibly put down with the aid of the Free Corps, right-wing volunteer paramilitary units composed mainly of veterans).[107]

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[105] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, pp. 56-57.

[106] In fact, the *rate* (councils) were originally dominated by moderates, but misinterpretation of their intent by the Ebert regime led to their increasing radicalisation. See *ibid.*, pp. 63-65.

[107] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

The revolution itself was greeted initially with cautious favour in middle class circles. It represented a repudiation of the now thoroughly-discredited imperial regime and the stratified, deferential society of the pre-war period. Animosity towards the discord of party politics, and longing for the emergence of a genuine 'people's state' and a bourgeois-led *volkspartei* were common themes in middle class German politics, and the bourgeois press were often enthusiastic in their initial assessments of the revolution.[108] Among those groups of the middle class most radicalised by the wartime experience, particularly white-collar groups, there was broad if tacit approval: Jurgen Kocka writes that among these groups "the effect of inflammatory, partly radicalising wartime experiences and rapid adaptation to changing conditions appears to have been a relatively passive but basically tolerant and affirmative attitude towards the Revolution".[109]

However, many of these attitudes were soon to change with the initial republican attempts at socialisation. Moreover, while by the early 1920s the socialist wave had crested, it was replaced by a corporatist accommodation between capital and labour that was to characterize both the economics and the

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[108] Peter Fritzsche, *Rehearsals for Fascism, Populism and Political Mobilisation in Weimar Germany*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 23-28.

[109] Kocka, *Total War*, pp. 97-98

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politics of the mid-to-late Weimar era.[110] The middle class, its representatives

split into numerous single-issue or protest parties, or subsumed under

aristocratic party leadership, found itself squeezed between capital and labour as

it had been in the war. The nominal political inclusion gained in November 1918

was more than offset by the fundamental corporatist exclusion of the *mittelstand*

in the 1920s.[111]

The Weimar period in German politics is often characterised as one of

fragmentation. According to this thesis, the multiplicity of parties in the

Reichstag, many of whom were explicitly anti-republican and/or anti-

democratic, rendered coherent democratic government impossible: in particular,

this was true of bourgeois parties. While there is much to be said for this thesis,

it does not mesh particularly well with the judgement of numerous historians

regarding German middle class antipathy towards political discord.[112]

Peter Fritzsche, in his study of middle-class nationalism and pre-fascist

movements in Weimar Germany, squares the circle. Fritzsche contrasts the well-

documented anomic characteristics and trend towards the political fragmentation

of narrow economic interests that characterised bourgeois politics in the Weimar

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[110] Charles S. Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe, Stabilization in France, Germany and Italy in the*

Decade after World War I, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1975. This remarkable work

remains the definitive treatment of the postwar decade in Europe.

[111] *Ibid.*; Fritzsche, *Rehearsals.*

[112] Dahrendorf, *Society & Democracy.*

period with another feature: that of increasingly united bourgeois para-political movements, and attempts to achieve bourgeois unity in the face of the elitist traditional middle class parties,[113] the republic and the socialist working class. Rather than as a disintegration, Fritzsche sees the Weimar period as an era of disillusionment and subsequent redirection of the energies of the middle class. The gradual decline of support for the traditional parties and the proliferation of splinter groups, along with the huge popularity of groups such as the Stahlhelm and the Landvolk, stemmed from the promise of wartime and revolutionary events leading middle class Germans to expect and desire inclusion and representation in a genuine *volkspartei*; expectations shattered by the actual republican outcome:

> Throughout the Weimar period, burghers championed their political ambitions with greater resolution, but wavered between voicing them as constituents of occupational and economic interests or as partisans of a nationalist, antisocialist cause. The collapse of the traditional parties and rise of the National Socialists can be comprehended only by shifting back and forth between the forces that disassembled and reconstructed the bourgeois polity.[114]

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[113] Of which the three most significant were the German National People's Party (*Deutschnationale Volkspartei* or DNVP), the German Democratic Party (*Deutsche Demokratische Partei* or DDP), and the German People's Party (*Deutsche Volkspartei* or DVP).

[114] Fritzsche, *Rehearsals*, pp. 230-31.

Of the two groups aggrieved by the war, the middle and working class, the latter was mollified to a greater extent than the former by the domestic settlement, for several reasons. First, the revolution, though in eventual substance little more than liberal-democratic in nature, was in name a socialist revolution, with SPD elite members forming much of the central administrative core and occupying the Reich presidency. Left-wing dissent was defeated in spirit by the fact that many former socialist opposition members were now in government, and in practice by the repression of the Spartacist uprising, the assassination of key radical leaders Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky, and the greater street strength of rightist paramilitary groups and veterans. Second, whatever Weimar consensus existed was created as industrial elites came to a corporatist accommodation with the working class. The Stinnes-Legien agreements, reached just days after the toppling of the imperial government, had established a series of cooperative measures between a number of the largest Ruhr unions and employers' groups. The major institutional outcome of the Stinnes-Legien pact was a cooperative labour-management association (the *Zentralarbeitsgemeinschaft* or ZAG). Initially conceived by managerial elites as a method of containing working class activism in the early days of the Revolution, for left-moderate trade unionists the ZAG was soon preferred to the government or the radical workers' councils as a tool for achieving concessions favourable to workers. Charles Maier notes that as much as it represented industrialists'

concessions by providing a method for industrial workers to advance their own interests, the ZAG was a "critical moderating force" in the early period of the revolution.[115]

This is not to say that the Weimar period was one of unblemished labour peace. The early 1920s were ones of enormous upheaval, and industrial unrest continued at high levels through the years of the great financial crisis of 1922-24.[116] However, left-wing dissatisfaction and political activism was divided into three different channels, which by working against each other were ultimately self-defeating. Co-opted (if cynically) by industry, the large industrial unions ultimately found corporatist accommodation with capitalists of greater efficacy in achieving their goals than democratic political routes. The government, largely populated by socialists and their moderate allies, was pushed to the right by leftist violence in the early stages of the republic, yet found itself unable to deal effectively with its traditional opponents in the business community who preferred to deal directly with the workers. Finally, the extreme left, weakened by the failure of the Spartacists, and faced with right wing opponents who were quite willing to top any leftist show of force, remained committed to opposing the republican leadership as having betrayed the revolution, thus distancing themselves decisively from their only conceivable allies.

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[115] Maier, *Recasting*, pp. 59-65

[116] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, pp. 304.

The differences between the experiences of the right and left in wartime and Weimar Germany can be summarised in three ways. First, the goals of the right were more intimately tied to the outcome of the war than were those of the left. Second, while for the left the revolution generated a postwar regime which (while presenting different problems) was less objectionable than its predecessor, for the right the new regime was soon rejected as fundamentally illegitimate. Third, under Weimar's corporatist arrangements, middle-class interests were grossly underrepresented in societal pacts and bargains. Fourth, the left viewed with ambiguity its role in seeking liberalisation at home and a compromise peace during the war; for the right, the role of domestic wartime opposition, combined with a mistaken belief that the German army was undefeated in the field, led to the (widely-exploited) myth of the 'stab in the back', conveniently holding the republic responsible not only for middle class Germany's contemporary woes but for the failure to achieve victory and its promised fruits.[117] Fifth, the reliance of a large portion of the middle class on fixed incomes, pensions, bonds, and rents, meant that they were hit hardest by the inflation of the mid-1920s; many never recovered their prior socio-economic position despite the economic recovery later in the decade.[118]

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[117] Richard Bessel, *Germany after the First World War*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993, p. 263; Fritzsche, *Rehearsals*, p. 24.

[118] Berghahn, *Modern Germany*, p. 70.

How these characteristics interacted, and the consequences of their interaction for politics in Weimar, is of critical importance. The main point I wish to make is that the timing of the revolution and the unfortunate international position of Ebert and subsequent republican politicians led to a confluence of international and domestic politics in the minds of middle-class opponents of the Weimar republic. If reparations and the war-guilt clause were evidence of the vindictive character of the liberal democracies, then the willingness of Weimar politicians to agree to Allied demands rather than resist (however futile such a strategy may have been) was evidence of republican politicians' complicity in the plight of the nation. In anti-republican mythology, the left had weakened the state from within during the war, and refused to advance its international interests in the postwar period.

In the analysis of this period in German politics, the "facts" of Weimar politicians' behaviour towards the terms of the Versailles treaty are open to interpretation. The judgement of the German right that republican politicians were unwilling or unable to act aggressively on behalf of German national interests need not be accepted uncritically.[119] What matters more, however, is the

[119] Consider the judgement of one historian of Stresemann's foreign policy: "When Gustav Stresemann was first placed in charge of German foreign policy, defeated Germany was unable to offer anything but passive resistance to the policy of strict enforcement of the peace terms by France and her Allies. The Treaty of Versailles, backed by the combined military might of the victor states, loomed as an insurmountable barrier preventing a return of Germany to a position

perceptions prevalent at the time. Here there is little doubt that the elected leadership of Weimar suffered greatly at the hands of public opinion. The Dawes plan and the treaty of Locarno were viewed by much of the anti-republican middle class as evidence of republican complicity in the impoverishment and humiliation of Germany under the terms of the treaty of Versailles.[120] The treaty was not popular with any segment of German society, certainly. However, for many the issue was the extent to which German politicians would allow themselves to be bullied.

The German foreign minister of the time, Gustav Stresemann, found it politically necessary to make the most of the revisionist characteristics of the Locarno treaty.[121] Primarily, however, Locarno was a recognition of the finality of German defeat in the west. Above all, the border settlements reached implied a renunciation of any German claim to Alsace-Lorraine and greater economic integration with the western democracies, policies which were both abhorrent to German nationalist groups.[122]

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of power and equality. When Stresemann left the political scene, Germany was once again an equal member of the community of nations, and the Treaty of Versailles was but a hollow shell." See Henry L. Bretton, *Stresemann and the Revision of Versailles: A Fight for Reason*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1953, p. 155.

[120] Gordon A. Craig, *Germany 1866-1945*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1978.

[121] E.J. Feuchtwanger, *From Weimar to Hitler, Germany, 1918-33*, London, MacMillan, 1993, p. 174.

[122] *Ibid.*, pp. 170-172.

Stresemann's other major foreign policy accomplishment was German entry into the League of Nations. For the opposition, comprising middle-class parties (DNVP, DVP), the rightist press, and societal groupings such as the *Stahlhelm* and *Reichsbanner*, such a move seemed to solidify the intention of republican politicians to cement Germany's participation in an international system designed to suppress German nationalist aspirations. The DNVP left the government over the issue, and Stresemann was until his death vilified by members of the right opposition and *völkische* groups.

Thus for many on the right, both middle class nationalists and traditionalist conservatives, there were enemies within and without. The common view was that the revolutionaries had brought Germany to its knees in the last year of the war, denying the *Reichswehr* victory in the field. Domestically, the erosion of social and economic distinctions between middle and working classes, begun during the war, continued through policies and circumstances broadly more favourable to the working class. Externally, the Weimar regime through agents such as Ebert, Stresemann and Erzberger seemed content to acquiesce in the creation of a new international system which denied Germany its rightful place as an independent great power, and tolerated such indignities as Locarno and the Ruhr occupation. Together, the international system created by the victorious powers and the liberal domestic regime which tolerated (and even seemed to promote) German subordination presented these groups with an

intertwined structure of illegitimate authority over middle class, conservative German national aspirations.

Revisionist politics

The mindset described above was in evidence from early in the history of the Weimar republic. Before it could be articulated at the national level, there remained the questions of leadership and interest aggregation. Though condemnation of the republic, liberal democracy, and the Versailles system were nearly universal in some quarters, the middle class (while organizing socially through veterans' groups and nationalist-imperialist organizations, most notably the *Stahlhelm*) remained splintered in official political circles.[123] Leadership of the DNVP, DDP, and DVP, the three largest middle class parties, was occupied for the most part by members of the traditional, aristocratic elite, who while bitter in their denunciations of the republic were at least temporarily willing to confine their activities within its institutional parameters. Industrial leaders, another potential source of opposition to the regime, found greater short-term benefit in cooperation with moderate trade unionists, rather than the increasingly impoverished and disempowered middle classes. The unity found by middle class opponents of the regime in the private realm was mirrored by fragmentation in the political sphere.

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[123] Fritzsche, *Rehearsals*.

National Socialism in Germany presented the middle class with one

solution to three separate frustrations of wartime expectations. First, the Nazis'

somewhat superficial appeal to broad segments of German society, combined

with their decidedly petty-bourgeois roots, tapped burgher discontent with the

inefficacy of the older, aristocratically-led bourgeois parties and single-issue

splinter groups, and echoed wartime *mittelstand* demands for a single *volkspartei*.

Second, the NSDAP's implacable opposition to the terms of the peace treaty

allowed for renewed optimism regarding Germany's international position.

Finally, the Nazis' proclaimed distaste for the power of capital and of labour

seemed to promise the economic rehabilitation of the middle class, combined

with defeat of the corporatist compact which had kept the villains of the 'stab in

the back' in or close to power for much of the 1920s.[124] The republic had come to

serve as the scapegoat for defeat: its removal presumably would herald a rebirth

of Germany's international fortunes. With the collapse of the moderate

prosperity of the later 1920s, and heightened dissatisfaction with the domination

of the traditional bourgeois parties by industrial interests unwilling to alter the

status quo, the Nazi electoral fortunes rose significantly.

As it turned out, Hitler's arrival in power in January 1933 was anything

but a certainty. The NSDAP's electoral popularity had in fact crested the

previous year, and Hitler's own strategists had already decided that a new

approach would be needed to shore up support, when he was offered the

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[124] Maier, *Recasting.*

chancellorship.[125] Disaster threatened through the possibility of an open breach in the NSDAP between Hitler and the head of the party bureaucracy, Gregor Strasser. Yet Hitler was able to maintain the unity of the party, if only through Strasser's ineptitude;[126] moreover, he was to profit in the first few months of 1933 from the inability of conservative political parties and politicians, as well as leading military figures, to maintain a degree of cooperation sufficient to deny him the chancellorship he demanded.

As the 1920s had progressed, the republic had come to be dominated by forces hostile to its institutions yet equally fearful of challenges from the left. As a consequence, the conservative forces were not able to forge a coalition with the centre and centre-left, who would not work with such anti-democratic figures as von Papen, to save the republic, despite their distaste for Hitler; on the other hand, some senior officers and most of the lower ranks of the army and the police were unwilling to take action against the SA (the Nazi's primary weapon of the streets) in any violent confrontation, given the influence of Nazi propaganda in these circles and the mutual antagonism of the Communists and the security forces. Thus, the ruling elite could rely neither on erstwhile parliamentary allies,

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[125] Childers "The Limits of National Socialist Mobilisation: The Elections of 6 November 1932 and the Fragmentation of the Nazi Constituency," in Thomas Childers, ed., *The Formation of the Nazi Constituency 1919-1933*, Totowa, New Jersey, Barnes & Noble,1986, pp. 232-255.

[126] Craig, *Germany*, pp. 565-66.

nor on its traditionally willing arm of repression, and the Nazis swiftly capitalised on their opportunity.[127]

Much is made of the twin economic shocks of the inflation and the depression when accounting for the rise of National Socialism, and rightly so. The point I wish to make is that the essential political world-view which sustained the Nazis through their rise, that of middle-class resentment regarding collusion of big labour and big capital, and of the complicity of the republic in the fall and continued humiliation of Germany, has its origins in the wartime experience. Hitler's unique combination of nationalism and extreme revisionism with anti-communism and apparent anti-capitalism tapped discontent with the symbiotic domestic failure and international subjection that had characterised Weimar. The inflation hardened the opinions of the middle class, and the depression clarified in the eyes of the middle class the industrialist sympathies of the traditional bourgeois parties, hastening their decline. Yet without the sense of wartime promise denied that the republic evoked in the minds of the middle class during the entire history of Weimar, the NSDAP would have been deprived of much of its mission, its own origins lying in the myth of victory betrayed.

Two factors were central to the success of the Nazis. The first was their ability to enlist the support — active or tacit — of key actors with whom they shared a common enemy in the republic. The general staff, while representative

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[127] *Ibid.*, pp. 560-68; Andreas Dorpalen, *Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic*, Princeton, Princeton University Press 1964, pp. 397-446.

of the most elitist segments of German society and thus suspicious of the hooliganism and lower class demagoguery found in the NSDAP and its supporters, was committed to the rebuilding and reassertion of German armed might, so long the foundation of Prussian elite domination. The Nazis, through their strong support from veterans' associations and para-military groups, their revisionist foreign policy goals, their respect for and veneration of imperial military history, and their active opposition to the left, presented themselves to the Wehrmacht as useful if distasteful social allies. The industrial elite, though wary of the Nazis' anticapitalist propaganda, came to recognize and value the ability of the Nazis to confront and neutralise, through both legal and extra-legal means, threats from the extreme left, whose presence became ever more menacing after the onset of the depression.

As one would expect from a log-rolled outcome, certain goals of each group were abandoned in pursuit of more central aims. Hitler, once in power, directed Germany towards full re-armament and overt challenges of the international postwar order, while initiating a domestic reign of terror and ultimately genocide. However, while extensively corporatist practices characterised Nazi economic and industrial policies, the anti-capitalist rhetoric employed in mobilising middle-class support prior to 1933 never materialised in hard policy form: there was much national but little socialist about National Socialism. Industry, relieved of the threat of a genuine socialist challenge, yielded much of the freedom from state direction it had enjoyed under Weimar.

And the military, emancipated from the constraints of Versailles, also relinquished some autonomy Its senior officers ultimately subordinated themselves under oath to Hitler and his associates, an act tenable only in light of the starkly perceived alternatives in German politics at the time.

In addition to the opportunity to logroll presented by the existence of other anti-system groups -- in particular the military -- there was one other key factor in the fall of the republic and the rise of an overtly revisionist Germany. As argued above, regime change was critical to the redirection of German foreign policy. The Weimar Republic and its leading politicians were in many ways creations of the Versailles system. The Western powers had been adamant that the Hohenzollerns depart, and what legitimacy the republic was able to derive came as much from outside sources as from within. Republican politicians had signed both the Armistice and the treaty, and it may be fairly stated that although attempts were made at Rapallo and elsewhere to assert an independent German foreign policy in the Weimar era, Weimar politicians primarily sought negotiated change rather than outright violation of treaty stipulations. Thus a change in regime was central to a redirection of foreign policy.

How was this possible in Germany? French right-wing and British left-wing groups mounted challenges of their respective postwar governments in the interwar period as well.[128] Neither movement, however, was able to enlist the

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[128] On activities of the French right in the 1920s and 1930s, see Edward R. Tannenbaum, *The Action Française: Diehard Reactionaries in Twentieth Century France*, New York, John Wiley & Sons,

support of key centralist actors in their domestic struggle. Clearly, the existence of anti-system allies for the Nazis within *mainstream* German politics was central. But this in turn implies a low degree of commitment to the existing political system in-and-of-itself. Low levels of political institutionalisation were a hallmark of Weimar, and enabled the various domestic movements seeking a national realignment not only to emerge, but to prosper. While political parties, many with relatively lengthy pedigrees, were in existence, the life span of mass democracy at the time of the Nazi assumption of power was less than two decades. Few, if any, political achievements of the middle or working classes were associated with legislative accomplishments.

On the other hand, while commitment to or experience of the democratic political process was poorly internalised amongst citizens of Weimar Germany, the experience of mass political participation – and confrontation – was not. The war had performed a critical role in breaking down the German tradition of consensus politics.[129] Social changes wrought by the conflict had brought an end to the security historically derived by the middle classes from the imperial

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1962; David Thomson, *Democracy in France Since 1870*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1964; Eugen Weber, *Action Française, Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962. On the foreign policy goals of the right see Charles Micaud, *The French Right and Nazi Germany 1933-1939*, New York: Octagon Books, 1964; and a polemical attack on this tendency in Yves R. Simon, *The Road to Vichy 1918-1938*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1988.

regime's authoritarian paternalism, which had provided life chances, status, and protection from the proletariat; the *mittelstand* had been mobilised, promised a golden future, then deprived and excluded. The working class had gained a new sense of legitimacy and incorporation from its role in the war, and had tasted real successes through industrial organisation and action.

In Weimar Germany there was, therefore, as in any late developer, a limited commitment to democratic forms of government in and of themselves. However, it was also true that mass mobilisation and politicisation were no longer alien to political action and discourse. In this circumstance, the conditions for overthrow of the regime in the postwar period were more favourable than they might otherwise have been.[130] Traditional German conservatism survived well enough through the war to preside over the death of democracy in Weimar Germany. Yet it could not survive the massed forces of the extremist right which it had awakened in its bid to triumph in the senseless struggle of 1914-18.

Thus in the case of Germany, elements of the population radicalised by the wartime experience yet frustrated by its denouement, and their continued

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[129] Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy.*

[130] I should point out that in describing in the abstract conditions leading to the overthrow of the Weimar system, I am not seeking to identify a "revolutionary" situation, inasmuch as that phenomenon is discussed in the literature on revolutions (cf. Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions,* e.g.). Rather, I am identifying a set of conditions which, combined with a particular societal wartime experience, make regime change likely in the postwar period.

postwar subjection at the hands of corporatist collusion, were eventually to challenge and capture the state, using it to revise the domestic and international stipulations of the treaty of Versailles. It might well have been otherwise: the revolution might have followed the armistice, not preceded it; the conservative elite might have played their cards better in the first months of 1933; the NSDAP might have split into two. Nonetheless, Germany's rebellion against the postwar order the victors attempted to impose has its origins in domestic politics. Any attempt to explain the German shift from grudging compliance to outright defiance in terms of a model of the unitary state, or as a simple reaction to external grievances, cannot account for the dynamic nature of German policy over time. Instead, the model outlined here obtains considerable support.

Italy

In the case of Germany between the two world wars, there are generally three competing (or perhaps complementary) explanations for the emergence of a revisionist foreign policy: rising economic power, the harshness of the peace terms, and the domestic origins of Germany's extremist regime. In the preceding section I provided a fourth explanation which drew on elements of the first three. I argued that wartime politicisation of societal groups, combined with key opportunities for anti-system coalitioning and an insufficient degree of political institutionalisation, led to challenges of both the Weimar and Versailles systems.

Turning our attention to Italy, there are obvious similarities with the German case, which by themselves invite comparison. As in Germany, the democratic regime governing the country in the aftermath of the war was overthrown by a mixture of constitutional and extra-constitutional practices, giving way to a right-nationalist, fascist dictatorship. As with German foreign policy, the new regime acted in blatant defiance of the wishes of the great power guarantors of the postwar settlement, eventually overrunning another member state of the League with impunity.

Yet there are also considerable dissimilarities between the two cases. Perhaps the most significant of these is the fact that Italy was not a defeated state, but one of the victors. Less than two decades after Italian representatives signed the peace treaty concluding the first world war, the Italian government was actively undermining the provisions of the settlement. This reversal of policy is more striking than the German case, where a government forced to accept peace terms was replaced by a government unwilling to abide by those terms. In the Italian case, a major power member of the victorious coalition became one of the authors of the postwar settlement's demise.

How was this possible? Explanations of the rise of Italian revisionism are less frequently found than those seeking to explain German aggression in the same period. There are perhaps three reasons for this. First, it is possible to make the argument that Nazi Germany posed an existential threat to both liberal democracy and state socialism, on the continent of Europe if not throughout the

world. It is more difficult to make this claim on behalf of Italian fascism, if only because Italian military achievements against great-power opposition in the second world war were few in number. Second, while the Fascists instituted a repressive, cruel, imperialist, and often racist regime, the crimes perpetrated in the name of Italian Fascism pale in comparison with the genocidal brutality of National Socialist Germany. For this reason alone the rise of German aggression — domestic and foreign — has seemed to demand the attention of scholars more urgently. Third, Italy (rightly or wrongly) is seen as having been swept along in the German slipstream during the critical period of the late 1930s. Charles Doran has suggested that Italy's historical relationship to the core system in causal terms is largely tangential:

> Always brushed aside, always on the outskirts of the central system, the Italian role has always been poorly defined. Italy has been influenced by structural change emanating from the system more than it has been a source of influence upon the system.[131]

Alexander de Grand identifies three factors contributing to the formation of Italian foreign policy in the Fascist years. The first is the groundswell of Nationalist support for Mussolini, which sought territorial gains in Europe and

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[131] See Charles F. Doran, *Systems in Crisis: New imperatives of high politics at century's end*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 74-75.

Africa and struck a revisionist posture with respect to Versailles. The second is Mussolini's own political persona and leadership style, which was both opportunistic and aggrandizing. Finally, de Grand argues that the Fascists had given little thought to foreign policy prior to their taking power. Consequently, "Fascist foreign policy initially bore the imprint of professional diplomats" and was cautious with respect to European security questions, adventurous only in non-European settings.[132]

However, the *ad hoc* nature of early Fascist diplomacy identified by de Grand was a temporary situation, largely conditioned by the demands of domestic political consolidation encountered by the Fascists from 1922 through 1925. As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, the tenor of Italian foreign policy became aggressively nationalistic. Alan Cassels, in a study of the early diplomacy of the Fascist regime, argues that it was not until Mussolini had survived the crisis of the murder by Fascist squads of Giacomo Matteotti, a prominent Socialist politician, that he was left with a relatively free hand in foreign affairs. The Fascist leader had stated as early as 1921, however, that "our preoccupation is primarily with matters of foreign policy".[133]

Cassels identifies four phases of Mussolini's early foreign policy. The first was from October 1922 until the spring of 1923, during which time the old guard

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[132] Alexander De Grand, *Italian Fascism: Its Origins & Development*, 2nd edition, London: University of Nebraska Press, p. 92.

at foreign ministry still held sway. From the summer of 1923 until June 1924, Italy engaged in small expansionist ventures, and experimented with alliances with Soviet Russia, Spain, and Germany. From June 1924 through the following winter the Matteotti murder and domestic crisis led to a primarily conciliatory foreign policy. By May 1925 Mussolini had recovered from the Matteotti affair, and cemented his control over foreign policy by appointing Dino Grandi (a ranking Fascist) as undersecretary for foreign affairs.

Cassels makes the point that while occasionally forced by tactical concerns to appear supportive of the status quo in Europe during the 1920s, the aggressively nationalist and ideological nature of Mussolini's foreign policy was evident from early on, and marked a distinct shift from the conservative style of the senior diplomatic corps.[134] The bombing and occupation of Corfu in 1923, the (re)acquisition of Fiume in 1924, the threats made regarding a possible invasion of Turkish-held territory in the Middle East in 1926,[135] and Mussolini's deliberate escalation of the *fuorusciti* issue,[136] each demonstrate that Italian foreign policy

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[133] Alan Cassels, *Mussolini's Early Diplomacy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1970, p. vii.

[134] However, at the junior level Mussolini's blustering, aggressive foreign policy style tapped into much frustrated nationalism: "Whatever the apologists may suggest in their memoirs, the nationalist temper of Mussolini's diplomacy gratified many of the career diplomats and more than made up for Mussolini's neglect of the Palazzo Chigi leaders." See *ibid.*, p. 389.

[135] Considered a very real possibility in 1926. *Ibid.*, pp. 396-97.

[136] The *fuorusciti* were anti-fascist Italian exiles, operating primarily in Paris and other European capitals, but also in the United States. Mussolini repeatedly made their activities, of little

under the Fascists viewed the status quo with disfavour well before the invasion of Ethiopia. These actions, according to Cassels, "make the verdict 'a decade of good behaviour' a relative one at most".[137]

Moreover, Italian attempts at gaining influence denied them at Versailles were not limited to the periphery. During the crises over reparations and the Ruhr occupation, Mussolini made attempts to install himself as the key intermediary, but was rebuffed. In Austria, the Fascists attempted to gain influence through the offer of a reconstruction loan, overriding the provisions of the Geneva protocols signed by Mussolini's predecessors in the summer of 1922. By November 1922 Mussolini was offering Austria an immediate loan of $400,000 in return for "a position of pre-eminence in the control of her finances".[138] The Austrians, perhaps wisely, refused immediate the cash for the greater promise and freedom of an international loan. Mussolini, who had wanted to control the Vienna bank which would handle the loan, eventually upped the price to $1,000,000, but the Austrians still refused. The Fascists also took a hard line *vis-à-vis* reparations from former portions of the Austro-Hungarian empire, seeking

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consequence to his regime, an issue with French authorities, and made great efforts to infiltrate their circles with his own spies. *Ibid.*, pp. 365-76.

[137] *Ibid.*, p. 397. Martin Clark also concludes that the relative quiescence of early Fascist foreign policy was tactical rather than innate. See Clark, *Modern Italy, 1871 - 1982*, London, Longman, 1984, pp. 280-82.

[138] Cassels, *Early Diplomacy*, p. 70.

financial recompense for agreeing to adjustments to Hungarian and Bulgarian payments, and attempting to negotiate increased influence in the case of the latter.[139]

How can we explain this emergence of Italian revisionism? To borrow explanations often employed in the case of Nazi Germany, is it attributable to rising economic power, harsh treatment by other central actors, or some outward-directed manifestation of Italian political development? Or following de Grand, should we identify the Italian nationalist movement and/or Mussolini himself as the primary engine of the Italian challenge of the postwar order?

There is more than a grain of truth in many of these arguments. With respect to the rising power thesis, there is no doubt that in the decades following the *risorgimento*, Italy underwent a process of industrialisation leading to significant changes in the absolute power potential of the state. Moreover, while Italy underwent a severe banking crisis in the early 1920s[140] the fiscal crisis was not as severe as in Germany, and in the economic recovery which followed Italian exports expanded despite low global demand and trends toward protectionism.[141]

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[139] *Ibid.*, pp. 74-77.

[139] Christopher Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism 1870-1925*, London: Methuen & Co., 1967, pp. 601-602.

[141] Jon S. Cohen, "Economic Growth", in Edward R. Tannenbaum & Emiliana P. Noether, *Modern Italy*, New York, New York University Press, 1974, pp 180-82.

On the other hand, the various actors agitating for a revisionist foreign policy (primarily those containing self-described Nationalists or war-time Interventionists) began to do so well before the Italian economy started to recover from the dislocations of the war and subsequent inflation. In addition, many of the most dissatisfied agitators were representatives of social groups with little economic clout or hope for improvement.

In fact, it is clear from the incidents alluded to above that the foreign policy of the Fascists proved markedly different from that of liberal Italy. Of the groups represented under the broad roof of Italian nationalism, Mussolini and his followers were distinct from the traditional, conservative foreign policy elite in that they were able to seek unconventional solutions to Italy's (real or perceived) international problems. They were willing to contemplate alliance with Germany, or at least to play the French and the Germans off against each other for Italian benefit. They were willing to threaten or to use military force in a variety of contexts to achieve even minor diplomatic ends. Furthermore, bolstered by Fascist contempt for the indecisive nature of the democracies, they were willing to openly defy the wishes of the other great powers in achieving these ends.

It would seem that the change of regime is central to an explanation of Italian revisionism. Certainly, the moderate stance of the liberal Italian regime prior to 1922, its accession to the terms of the treaty of Versailles, and its refusal to support the revisionist goals and actions of nationalist groups (in particular,

the followers of Gabriele D'Annunzio, and the Fascists), contrast sharply with the policies pursued by Mussolini. This stark reversal and its association with regime change brings into question any assertion that rising Italian power was the primary factor underlining Italian revisionist behaviour: if it was, why then and not at some other point? Specifically, why did Italian adventurism commence not after a sustained period of growth but at a time of economic hardship, when by no standard could Italy have claimed parity with the more advanced states of Western Europe?

Furthermore, if Italy was the victim of unequal or undeserved treatment at the peace conference, and that was the primary force behind the Italian challenge of the postwar order, why did the challenge only commence with the coming-to-power of the Fascists — why were the Liberals unwilling to act in a provocative or aggressive fashion? As with the rising-power thesis, the billiard-ball model implicitly employed by those who would suggest that the Italian state simply reacted to an external stimulus fails to provide us with any notion of the internal dynamics of the decision-making process, facts critical to our understanding of the timing and sequence of events.

As for the dynamics of political development and their impact on foreign policy, it seems clear that in Italy, as in Germany, the evolution of the polity is intimately linked to the emergence of the fascist regime. However, for reasons more fully elaborated in a previous chapter, it is not, *prima facie*, evident why the emergence of Mussolini's regime should necessitate a revisionist foreign policy,

in the absence of any consideration of the country's international political situation and recent military history. If one can conclude that Mussolini's foreign policy was largely driven by Fascist ideology, one must recognise that that same ideology was forged in a relatively short period of time and in response to international as well as domestic events.

As with the German case, there is a paucity of theoretically-driven explanations of Italian revisionism which provide a satisfactory linkage of international and domestic politics, when it is apparent that both external and internal sources provided impetus to Mussolini's challenge of the international postwar order. In the following section, I shall attempt to develop such an explanation, assessing the Italian case in terms of the model outlined earlier.

The wartime experience

Italy was a late entrant into the war, and emerged a member of the victorious coalition. Yet with respect to the other members of the Entente, the Italians carried relatively little clout at the peace table, and were more subject than contributing to the settlement: in the eyes of many Italians, their government had won the war but had then quickly lost the peace.

Just as German nationalists constructed from a series of partial truths the myth of the 'stab in the back', so did Italian nationalists come to see the conclusion of the war and the results of the peace conference as a 'mutilated

victory'.[142] The sense of 'mutilation' stemmed from the failure of Italian diplomats to achieve the goals previously laid out by international agreement. In 1915, the negotiations leading to Italian intervention on the side of the Entente had resulted in the Treaty of London, discussed more fully below. By the conclusion of the peace negotiations, the sentiment that Italy had been failed by its allies and by its diplomats was overwhelming. The political developments which followed were linked intimately to this perception.

The bargain

Italy's late entry was the subject of considerable rational strategic calculation on behalf of the Italian liberal regime. The initial Italian position, announced on July 31, 1914, was one of neutrality, and was at the time a reflection of the general mood of the country -- with the exception of certain nationalists and conservative public figures.[143] Within months, however, a significant movement in favour of intervention arose, ranging elements of nationalist, futurist, left-revolutionary, democratic, masonic, and republican

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[142] The phrase was Gabriele D'Annunzio's, but the impression was widespread, and was shared by elements of the socialist and liberal camps, as well as the nationalists. See Adrian Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929*, 2nd edition, London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1987 (1973), p. 30; Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 204; Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, pp. 535-36.

[143] Including, for a few days, Sonnino. See Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, p. 416.

groups against the governing liberals, who remained committed to neutrality,[144] as well as mainstream Socialists and the Catholic church. Among those newly converted to intervention was Mussolini, making a rapid intellectual departure from his socialist background.

Through the press, such as Mussolini's *Il Popolo d'Italia* and Albertini's *Corriere Della Sera*, and through public demonstration, the interventionists brought considerable pressure to bear on the government. The decision to adopt neutrality had not been one of principle but one of calculated advantage. However, by early 1915 the issue had become one of survival of the Liberal regime and perhaps of the nation's political institutions. Under Giolitti, the dominant political figure in Italian early-20th century politics, the Italian state's system of bourgeois domination underwritten by a limited suffrage was gradually being reformed. However, in the delicate balancing act of modernisation the expansion of the franchise in 1912 and again in 1918, to universal manhood suffrage, had begun to weaken the axioms of Liberal political hegemony, and rivals to bourgeois stability had begun to emerge both to the right and to the left.

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[144] The motivations of all these groups were diverse, but it may be safely said that the first two groups were driven by the promise of advancing Italian interests through militarism, the last three by their ideological sympathy with France, and the interventionists amongst the revolutionaries by a loathing of the reactionary Habsburg empire.

The opposition to neutrality voiced in the *piazza*, therefore, carried a greater significance than it might have done under other circumstances. Antonio Salandra, the successor to Giolitti as prime minister in 1914, was keen to limit any further erosion of conservative dominance.[145] For Salandra (whose view was not widely shared amongst elected members of the governing coalition), the war presented itself as an opportunity to bolster support for the regime while at the same time halting or reversing the progressive, democratising tendencies of recent years.[146]

By May 1915 negotiations with the Austrians regarding the ceding of territory as a condition of Italian neutrality had given way to secret negotiations with the Entente powers, resulting in the Treaty of London which laid out Italy's conditions for entering the conflict. The terms of the treaty offered nationalist opinion the prospect of considerable territorial gains at the conclusion of the war, largely at the expense of Austria-Hungary. When Italy's entry into the war was announced, the effect regarding the political opposition was instantaneous: the interventionists hailed the government and launched riotous celebrations; the left and other neutralists wilted before the fait accompli and the exultation of the interventionists.[147] The three hundred (traditionally neutralist) supporters of

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[145] Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, pp. 21-22.

[146] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[147] A general strike in Turin immediately prior to the declaration of war seemed to augur broader working-class opposition than eventually emerged: the national strike called for the 19th of May

Giolitti in parliament, without their leader who had absented himself, fell in line behind Salandra and approved the declaration of war.[148]

As the war proved to be of longer and longer duration, in Italy as in most of the combatant states disillusionment grew as privations mounted – a process accentuated by the disastrous defeat suffered at the hands of the Austrians by the Italian forces at Caporetto in 1917. Rural unrest was particularly pronounced, as interventionism in the countryside common only amongst the land-owning class; the peasantry found itself drafted in large numbers into the infantry and suffered heavy casualties.[149] Propaganda campaigns in the countryside promised "land to the peasants," and in 1917 a veterans' association (the *Opera Nazionale per i Combattenti*) was formed by the government to oversee the postwar redistribution of land to veterans' cooperatives.[150] The peasantry's hunger for land redistribution was played upon in order to win the acquiescence of the

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1915, four days before an ultimatum was given to the Austrians, was "hardly noticed": Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, pp. 448-49.

[148] The final vote in parliament was 407 to 74 in favour. *Ibid.*, p. 449.

[149] Maier, *Recasting*, pp. 47-48.

[150] Maier, *Recasting*, p. 49; Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 190.

primary source of infantry, and expectations were raised drastically[151]; the future

was painted by the government "in rosy colours".[152]

As in Germany, the domestic social group gaining most in material terms

during the conflict was the industrial working class, coincidentally the home of

the most vociferous sources of neutralist opinion. And as in Germany, previous

ideological cleavages between middle-class groups and workers were

exacerbated by two phenomena. First, the neutralist tendencies of the left-

leaning industrial workers resulted in lower rates of volunteering. Combined

with the necessity of keeping much of the workforce in key industries at home

during the war, this resulted in the embitterment of middle-class nationalists

who saw the industrial employees as shirkers (*imboscati*). Second, the value to

the state of skilled labour was so great that the traditional income differential that

white-collar workers, artisans, and shopkeepers had enjoyed over industrial

workers was significantly eroded.

Thus while for numerous groups the conflict brought either expectations

of future gains or (in the case of the industrial workers) genuine improvements in

living standards and status, the deep political division which had emerged

between interventionist-nationalist and neutralist opinion prior to May 1915 did

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[151] Clark notes that it ought to have been "easy to predict that when the vast peasant army went

back home there would be a tremendous agitation for land throughout Italy"; *Modern Italy*, p. 194.

[152] Federico Chabod, *A History of Italian Fascism*, (trans.), London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1963,

pp. 26-29.

not disappear with the onset of the conflict. The industrial workers remained largely neutralist, as did large sections of the agrarian working class — when the prospects for victory looked bleak in the aftermath of Caporetto, many in the revolutionary left hoped (in vain) to follow the Russian example and turn defeat on the battlefield into revolution at home;[153] nationalist groups responded to the national crisis provoked by the catastrophic defeat by following the call of Mussolini and other radical leaders by organizing at the local and parliamentary level, and in claiming that the defeat was the consequence of a "military strike":[154] an episode of deliberate treachery (even a 'stab in the back') on the part of disloyal troops.[155] Cleavages between interventionists and neutralists, between *fasci* and *imboscati*, and between middle class nationalists and the urban and rural working classes, grew and solidified in the crucible of the war.

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[153] Nunzio Pernicone, "The Italian Labour Movement", in Tannenbaum & Noether, eds, *Modern Italy*, pp. 208-09; Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, pp. 470-71.

[154] The term was used by General Luigi Cadorna (commander in chief of the Italian forces). See Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, p. 27.

[155] Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, p. 30.

When the war ended, however, neither the territorial gains desired by the nationalists nor the reallocation of land desired by the peasantry was achieved to the extent that had been promised. With respect to the aspirations of the former, the nationalists soon came to believe that the promise of the treaty of London and the sacrifices, victories and (romantically claimed) galvanization of the country during the war, had come to nothing at the Paris peace negotiations.

As one observer has remarked, Italy had won the war but "bungled the peace, and bungled it spectacularly and publicly".[156] The situation was one where perception was clearly of greater relevance than any 'real' outcome one can conjure from historical examination. The Treaty of London had made provision for a number of Italian territorial gains in Austrian territory, including much of the South Tyrol, Istria, Trent, Trieste, and Northern Dalmatia. In light of subsequent interpretations by Italian political figures, it is ironic that most of these provisions were fulfilled at Versailles. Dalmatia, however, was denied the Italians by Wilson, as was the additional claim made on the Adriatic port of Fiume.

The Italian delegation departed the peace conference in anger at this rejection. Despite their initially warm reception in Italy, however, the delegates Sonnino and Orlando, along with the rest of the democratic interventionists in

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[156] Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 203.

government, were soon being vilified by the nationalist press as *rinunciatari* for having swallowed Wilson's rhetoric regarding national self-determination and having failed to stand up for Italy's rightful claims.

The anger of former combatants and nationalists was further roused after 1919 by the liberal regime's apparent policy of appeasement towards left-radical worker and peasant movements, which "fatally antagonised" the middle class.[157] The former involved food riots, the sacking of government buildings and cooperatives, and ultimately a general strike in July 1919, although the striking workers and their socialist leadership stopped short of genuinely revolutionary activity.[158] The peasant agitation, involving widespread unrest and land seizures, was a response by returning veterans to the lack of promised agrarian restructuring,[159] which Charles Maier has suggested was always "at best a pious hope and at worst a hoax" on the part of the government.[160]

The working class in particular, the nationalists felt, had been staunch neutralists, and had been sheltered from the war through the requirements of industrial production. The failure of the Liberal government under Nitti to take decisive action against the *imboscati*, and against the rioting peasants who were (unjustly) blamed for the disaster at Caporetto, further weakened the credibility

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[157] Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 207.

[158] Pernicone, "The Italian Labor Movement", p. 209.

[159] Pernicone, "The Italian Labor Movement", pp. 209-210.

of a regime and a system that was already staggering under its inability to convert military victory into the peace it had promised.

Right-radicals of varying shades combined to take matters into their own hands, first with the seizure by the poet Gabriele D'Annunzio of Fiume on the Adriatic coast, a bizarre episode of freelance nationalist aggression and proto-fascist constitutional experimentation[161] which came, oddly enough, to symbolise the dynamism of the non-democratic interventionists in light of the paralysis of the Nitti regime. The invasion was hugely popular in Italy and the Liberal regime felt it could do little; most certainly, the army could not be relied upon to oust D'Annunzio,[162] and it took a year of posturing and propaganda from the poet for the government to finally move against him and evict the occupation force. The less symbolic and perhaps more important development was the substantial rout of the syndicalist movement and agrarian workers' collectives by the *fasci*. Despite the traditional animosity between conservative rural forces and the peasantry, the rural *fasci* were able to erode the power of socialism in the countryside by exploiting the peasants' reluctance to embrace the collectivism espoused by the leading rural socialist organisations, and by promoting an

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[160] Maier, *Recasting Bourgeois Europe*, p. 49.

[161] Many of the staples of daily political life under Fascism were developed by D'Annunzio, ranging from early corporatism to straight-arm salutes, castor-oil purges, demagoguery, and the use of paramilitaries. Clark, *Modern Italy*, pp. 204-05.

[162] Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 205.

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alliance between new landholders amongst the peasantry and the old, decaying rural bourgeoisie.[163]

The urban *fasci* found themselves, much as the SA were to do, in direct confrontation with the labour movement and other socialist groups. As in Germany, the strategy employed by the Fascists entailed both propaganda and violence, and was abetted by the general lenience shown by the judicial system towards politically motivated crimes when committed by the right.[164] Furthermore, in the towns as in the countryside the Fascists were not lacking for financial support or platforms to disseminate their ideas; while Mussolini had outright control of his own newspaper, there was no shortage of support (active or tacit) for his aims in the national press. By 1921, the void of local authority created by the government's unwillingness to move against socialist agitators was being willingly filled by the Fascists, now acting in better-organised paramilitary political groups (*squadristi*). In many towns and large tracts of the countryside, the Fascists, and not the government, were the actual rulers.[165]

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[163] Maier, *Recasting*, pp. 310-313.

[164] Maier, *Recasting*, p. 315-20. Maier notes that even when there was not outright official complicity with fascist outrages, there was very often to be found "official winking at lawlessness".

[165] Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, pp. 605-06.

In 1921 the Fascist movement had been marshalled by Mussolini into a party, and were making electoral gains to match their largely successful battle with urban and agrarian socialism. Their ability to unite the disparate opposition factions from 1917 on, their greater willingness to use force, and their access to the press had made Mussolini a central figure on the national political stage. Once subjected to party discipline by Mussolini, the Fascist party (PNF) made considerable electoral gains, and their direct action against socialist threats to property had boosted their popularity beyond its early radical base with more moderate bourgeois electors previously content to support Liberals. These new voters flocked to the party in the 1921 elections, quickly making the Fascists the "party of the middle class".[166]

The story of the Fascist seizure of power is a familiar one, and I shall highlight only the most salient points here. While the March on Rome was perhaps the most dramatic incident in the creation of Mussolini's new regime, it was hardly a bold and daring assault on national power. It was instead a sham (in that the numbers involved and their actual intentions were greatly exaggerated), and an invited coup (in that those in opposition to Mussolini with

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[166] Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 217.

the power to halt his accession to power were more concerned about the alternatives.[167]

Far more important than the March on Rome was the set of political alliances Mussolini was able to forge in the heated political atmosphere of postwar Italy. The split in the socialist camp in 1921 led to the emergence of an externally-financed communist party, important for propaganda purposes if not as a genuine threat to the regime.[168] In a series of events that neatly foreshadow the demise of Weimar Germany, Mussolini was able to position himself in the minds of key political figures as someone who could threaten political disorder, yet who paradoxically was the only one who could avert that threat.

The accession of Mussolini to the premiership in 1922 was not so much a seizure as an invitation. Finding it impossible to impose order over a country bitterly divided, the traditional elite gambled on the absorption of the Fascists into government. By co-opting Mussolini and his movement, the threat (real or not) from the left might be averted. While the seizures of towns, political murders, and general threat to law and order posed by the fascists were of great

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[167] At the time, Mussolini claimed to have had (variously) from 100,000 to 300,000 men at his disposal. In fact, the number was closer to 25,000, who were moreover mostly poorly armed, tired, wet, hungry and generally demoralised. See Roger Absalom, *Italy since 1800: A Nation in the Balance?*, London, Longman, 1995, pp. 117-18; and F.L. Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1976, pp. 64-66.

[168] Clark, *Modern Italy*, p. 220.

concern to the traditional governing class, the Fascists had gained important allies who, if not active supporters of the movement, were at least unwilling to act in opposition.

Chief amongst these was the armed forces, where pro-fascist support ran high. It had proven an unreliable weapon in early attempts to control Fascist violence. Moreover, the overlap in social background between Fascist leaders and the junior officers and NCOs was considerable: and the fascists had drawn much of their membership from veterans embittered by the government's apparent unwillingness to stick up for Italian interests abroad and to put down socialism at home.[169] For soldiers and fascist veterans of the war, the fasci and squadristi conjured up positive associations with the bold escapades of Italian shock troops (*arditi*) in the war, and stood for direct action against the existential threat of internationalist socialism. As such, in the crisis days of late October 1922, the king was unwilling to invoke martial law, in large part because of the likelihood that the troops would refuse to combat the Fascist marchers: his generals assured him that the army would be loyal to his commands, but that "it would be well not to put it to the test".[170]

Thus, in combatting real or perceive threats from the left, Mussolini found numerous allies, many within the existing governing structures, who were willing to accept the end of bourgeois Liberal rule as a quid pro quo for the re-

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[169] *Ibid.*, p. 214.

establishment of order, however brutal. As one leading observer of Fascism has remarked,

> The march on Rome succeeded largely because there was no one to oppose it. All the forces of the state — the army, the police, the civil service, the judiciary — supported it in one form or the other, just as they had condoned Fascist violence and lawlessness during the preceding years. Without this collusion the enterprise could never have succeeded.[171]

Having gained executive power, the Fascists were only able to consolidate their capture of the state when the Matteotti crisis of 1924-25 provoked a split between the traditional liberal elite and their industrialist allies. The murder of Matteotti, a leading Socialist deputy, breached the three-year accommodation between Liberals and Fascists, during which time the Liberals had ignored Fascist excesses in the streets for the sake of stability. The murder also led to the temporary alienation of leading industrialists in the *Confindustria* employers' organisation from the Fascists, an alienation exacerbated by Mussolini's failure to limit the labour activities of the syndicalist wing of the PNF.[172]

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[170] *Ibid.*, p. 221.

[171] Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, p. 66.

[172] Lyttelton, *The Seizure of Power*, pp. 255-56.

The withdrawal of industrialist support for Mussolini was short-lived, however, as a number of influential owners, including Gino Olivetti, argued that abandoning Mussolini would be tantamount to opening the door for the syndicalist extremists in the PNF and on shop floors, and successfully sought renewed support for Mussolini on the condition that the syndicalists be controlled.[173] Mussolini also owed his survival through the crisis, as in 1922, to his perceived monopoly of control over the *squadristi*.

In the final analysis the defection of a number of key representatives of industry from the Liberals (now part of Mussolini's governing coalition through an election pact in 1924) and the opposition parties was critical in December 1925, as Salandra's attempt to bring Mussolini down from within the government failed.[174] The obvious split in opposition to Mussolini allowed the *Duce* to step into the breach and assume full dictatorial powers within weeks, virtually unchallenged. Again, as in 1922, the weakened elite chose fascism out of fear of challenge from the left. The monarchy, the military, and much of industry logrolled with fascism to overthrow a regime unwilling to act against the threat from labour in 1919-22, and again in 1925. Whether or not the traditional leftist labour movement in fact posed much of a threat is certainly debatable — the *squadristi* had effectively reduced union membership by a factor of ten in a few

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[173] *Ibid.*, p. 256.

[174] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

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years.[175] But the threat to industrial peace posed by syndicalism, under only the loose control of the PNF, was central in explaining the support ultimately given by the industrialists to Mussolini. Moreover, while the traditional unions were weaker as a consequence of their battles with the Fascists, the labour upheavals of the immediate postwar period were not soon forgotten, and the propaganda activities of the PCI (and the PNF) made the threat of revolution loom large in the political calculations of the day.

The nationalist and expansionist foreign policy of Mussolini had its roots in the interventionism and the wartime nationalism of D'Annunzio and others. When the PNF absorbed the Nationalist party in 1923, "the Fascists inherited the far-reaching nationalist aspirations in the field of foreign policy".[176] Moreover, as I have argued above, the distinction between fascist and nationalist was often blurry, and Fascist foreign policy showed distinctly aggressive, nationalist and revisionist tendencies from the early days of Mussolini's ascendancy.

Mussolini's followers were in large part those who had been bitterly disappointed by the snub Nitti and Orlando had suffered at Versailles, nullifying the promised payoff of Italy's calculated entry. They considered the peace to have been a "French peace" and were openly hostile to what they saw as the

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[175] I.e., from a CGL membership of 2.2 million in 1920, to 201,049 in 1924. See Pernicone, "The Italian Labor Movement", p. 211.

[176] Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, p. 67.

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desire of the Allies under Wilson to limit Italy's place in postwar Europe.[177]

These tendencies had emerged in Italian political discourse upon Wilson's appeal during the peace conference to the Italian people, asking for moderation, which backfired, creating a highly xenophobic mood. The suspicions of many nationalists regarding the Liberals' acquiescence at Versailles were reinforced when Nitti acted against D'Annunzio. D'Annunzio's comment that Italy had an "anti-Italian" government was echoed by Mussolini and others.[178] The Fascist nucleus thus shared a disdain for the democratic interventionists, particularly those associated with the Liberal postwar governments, that had failed to act on Italy's behalf and had thus earned the epithet *rinunciatari*. Yet in their eyes the same regime that oversaw this failure also proved irresolute in postwar confrontation with those 'unpatriotic' elements of society which had in large part remained neutralist. The combination of international and domestic failure, and more importantly a perceived unwillingness to act in the face of direct challenges, rendered the Liberal regime illegitimate in the eyes of the Fascists. Together with the desire of the Americans, British and French to maintain the international status quo despite Italian interests, these factors gave the Fascists both a domestic and an international agenda which had its roots in the wartime confrontation between neutralists and interventionists.

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[177] Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, pp. 529-43.

[178] *Ibid.*, pp. 541-42.

The overthrow of the old regime would not have been possible, however, without the willingness of key societal groups to ally with Mussolini in the face of common threats. The army had an interest in expansion, and rather than cut back the military as numerous Liberals wished to do, the PNF's militaristic beliefs were evident from the start and were bolstered by their absorption of the Nationalists. As Carsten put it, "[t]he only effective answer to Fascist violence could have come from the army — and too many of the army leaders sympathized with the Fascists".[179] The king, primarily interested in the preservation of the monarchy in a divided political atmosphere, was ultimately willing to accede to Mussolini's demands both in 1922 and 1925 upon assurances that the Fascists would not declare a republic. The church was unwilling to countenance an alliance of Catholics either with the socialist movement or with the Liberals, with whom there had been a series of long-standing disputes over anti-clericalism, modernism, and the question of territory in Rome. Mussolini was seen (perhaps rightly) by Pius XI as the most likely chance of solving the questions of Rome and church-state relations.[180] Finally, industry wanted labour quiescence, whether the threat came from socialism or syndicalism, and was ultimately prepared to gamble on Mussolini as the sole figure able to achieve control over both elements. The remarkable thing about this logroll was that in the end it was nearly unopposed. By the end of the Matteotti crisis the only

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[179] Carsten, *The Rise of Fascism*, p. 66

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serious opposition to Mussolini at the state level came from various disaffected and disillusioned figures within the Liberals, such as Giolitti and Salandra. Nearly all the potential replacements for Mussolini, however, were tainted by previous failures to achieve anything other than a precarious stalemate in Italian postwar politics.

With Mussolini's assumption of power, the various actors in this drama achieved their primary goals. The early months of 1926 saw the outright abolition of free trade unions and the practical defeat of syndicalism as an independent source of power and political threat. The army, though 'fascisticised' after 1925,[181] clearly had a greater and more active role to play under Mussolini. The Fascist regime concluded the long-sought (and vastly popular) Lateran Accords with the Vatican in 1929. The monarchy was permitted to survive, although Vittorio Emmanuele's acquiescence was to seal the fate of the crown in the long run.[182]

But despite the gains of these groups and institutions, the fascists retained control over their central concerns: state reform, public discourse, and especially foreign policy, where the influence of the traditional diplomatic corps waned considerably after 1925; Roland Sarti observes that there can be "little doubt ...

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[180] Seton-Watson, *Italy from Liberalism to Fascism*, p. 664.

[181] *Ibid.*, p. 702.

[182] For a brief discussion of the PNF's willingness to bargain with diverse groups see Roland Sarti, "Politics and Ideology in Fascist Italy", in Tannenbaum & Noether, eds., *Modern Italy*.

that the conduct of foreign affairs rested ultimately in Mussolini's hands".[183]

Having overthrown the craven regime of the Liberals, Mussolini undertook

reform on both the domestic and international fronts. While the international

agenda of the fascists may have been to a certain extent ad hoc, this is in large

part the nature of foreign policy. One cannot avoid the conclusion, however, that

the external aggressiveness shown by Italy under Mussolini is consistent with the

demands and frustrations of the nationalists stemming from debates at the outset

of war. Both the domestic regime and the international settlement were

illegitimate in the eyes of Mussolini, D'Annunzio and their followers. Allies

were available to the fascists in overthrowing the previous regime, but control of

foreign policy in the post-Matteotti era lay with the Fascists alone. Their

approach was distinctive, and rooted in years of opposition.

With respect to the various actors involved, the remaining question is,

perhaps, why they behaved as they did. That is to say, the Italian military was

not the only military in Europe with institutionally-derived interests; the Italian

monarchy was not the only monarchy in jeopardy; Italian industry was not alone

in facing threats from organized labour. The interesting fact in the Italian case is

that these institutions acquiesced in the destruction of parliamentary democracy

at all.

The answer lies most probably in the degree of political institutionalisation

of liberal democracy in Italy at the time, which despite appearances of stability

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[183] Sarti, "Politics & Ideology," p. 68.

was actually considerably low. It is possible to argue that broad social conditions paved the way for the Fascist takeover and the demise of liberal democracy. And, as I have argued at length, it is most useful to view Fascism in light of the Italian wartime experience. Without attention to either the long term social-structural enabling causes or the proximate causes of social conflict in postwar Italy, Fascism makes little sense as a phenomenon.

However, it is also of critical importance that when the Fascists pushed against the political institutions of Italy in the early 1920s, those institutions collapsed. A comparison with France is illustrative. In France, as in Italy and Germany, the war polarised domestic politics; cleavages emerged or were solidified between middle and working classes, right and left, nationalists and internationalists, monarchists and republicans, clericals and anticlericals. Elements of the right, heavily anti-Semitic and anti-republican, fought pitched battles in the streets of Paris against the left throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The rightist press launched vitriolic tirades against Jews, Socialists, and republicans, and demanded harsher treatment of Germany. Later, with the establishment of a left-wing coalition government in the mid-1930s, and the formation of a Franco-Soviet alliance, the right agitated for alliance with the Nazis and a foreign policy of solidarity against Bolshevism. Moreover, since the days of the Dreyfus affair the constitutional reliability of the military had been in question.

Yet at critical moments in the life of the Third Republic, the strength and roots of republicanism withstood the concentrated attacks of the right, both on

the night of 6 February 1934 when massed rightist veterans groups and student agitators marched on the national legislature, and again in 1936 with the formation of the National Front government.[184] While the right triumphed over the left under Vichy, it was only under conditions of Nazi occupation that this could occur.

The Third Republic, often vilified for its inherent instability, had advantages unavailable to the Liberal regime of postwar Italy. First, the allegiance of industrial interests to republican parliamentarism was far stronger in France than in Italy or Germany. Moreover, the French revolution and its numerous aftershocks had led to the intertwining of mass politics (of which the history in France was clearly greater) with a political template of atomistic behaviour: political opposition in France, as interpreted by numerous generations, involved the actions of like-minded individuals. The institution of individualism was to constrain the French right's ability to organize against the centre and the left in the 1920s and 1930s, whereas given Italy's short-lived

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[184] On the French right in the *entre-deux-guerres*, cf. fn. 127. On French wartime experiences see Jean-Jacques Becker, *The Great War and the French People*, Berg, Leamington Spa 1985; Patrick Fridenson, ed., *The French Home Front 1914-18*, Berg, Oxford 1992. See also Nathanael Greene, *From Versailles to Vichy: The Third French Republic, 1919-1940*, Thomas Y. Crowell Co., New York 1970.

experience with popular politics the masses were far more easily mobilised into collective political groupings by their own leaders.[185]

Second, the recent expansions of the suffrage in 1912 (to all men over 30, all literate men over 21, and all men having served in the armed forces) and 1918 (universal male suffrage) left Italian society with political institutions, frameworks, and parties representing a nineteenth century regime, yet with an electorate possessed by markedly twentieth-century concerns. France had had various experiments with universal male suffrage since 1789, the upshot being that the political institutions and interest representation of the Third Republic encompassed, however imperfectly, mass politics and the range of social classes, and were the fruit of political battles fought throughout French society in 1830, 1848, 1870-71, and through the crises of the Dreyfus Affair. By contrast, with near-universal suffrage, the first political challenge faced by bourgeois Italy was the First World War: that the war spawned groups and movements uncommitted to the old regime's political institutions should not be surprising. Nor should it be surprising that capitalist interests, the clergy, the monarchy, and the army were willing, ultimately, to abandon parliamentary democracy when new political conditions rendered it less useful as a method of protecting their own interests.

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[185] See Maier, *Recasting*, p. 590-91.

Conclusion

The broadest conclusion one may draw from this study of Germany and Italy between the two world wars is that the sources of revisionist international behaviour in the interwar period, and the ultimate causes of the breakdown of the Versailles settlement, do not simply have their origins in the harshness of the peace treaty. The causes of the breakdown of the postwar order are rooted in complex domestic political interactions between various groups in the defeated states, and the emergence of revisionist challengers was by no means inevitable: in Germany and Italy in particular, the shifting political alliances which resulted in fascist domination of the state could well have produced alternative outcomes.

Yet the coincidence of several key factors in both cases led to the emergence of a revisionist foreign policy. In both countries, the expectations of a number of groups were raised *vis-à-vis* the fruits of victory. For some of these groups, in particular rightist, middle-class, nationalist groups, overlapping with veterans, the peace settlement came to be seen as a crime visited upon their society by more powerful international forces. Their own goals, offered as incentives or as political tools by wartime governments, were unfulfilled. Moreover, their own governments, aided and abetted by left-wing internal treachery, seemed to be complicit in the denial of the nation's rightful destiny in the international postwar settlement.

While both left-wing and right wing groups, working class and middle-class, emerged from the war in Italy and Germany with grievances against the state due to dishonoured mobilisation bargains, right-radical revisionists had allies in both countries unavailable to the working class. They had allies in the armed forces with respect to promoting foreign militarism. They had allies in industry with respect to social attitudes. They had allies in the judiciary and police regarding the treatment of right-wing and left-wing political violence. And they had crucial allies amongst returning veterans, hardened in conflict and susceptible to suggestions that their sacrifices had been undone by weak government and leftist traitors.

Finally, they had an important ally in historical political circumstance: in neither case was the regime the revisionists were assailing bolstered by deep political institutionalisation or a long investment in parliamentary democracy. Instead, both Weimar Germany and postwar Liberal Italy were burdened with universal male suffrage as a recent innovation, yet with a highly politicised and previously docile electorate, thrust into the political arena by the exigencies of the war.

In both cases the aggressive, revisionist foreign policy ultimately pursued by these groups was in direct contrast to the conciliatory and relatively *status quo* policies of the postwar regime. Their international choices were not continuations of past policy. They were not simply the natural reactions of states to unfair treaties – if so, why was a change in regime necessary? Nor were they

the consequences of rising economic power — the evidence does not sustain this judgement any more than it explains the international quiescence of the United States. Instead, the revisionist challenges of Italy and Germany in this period had their roots in unfulfilled wartime bargains, in perceptions of a dual betrayal and of a duplicitous domestic regime, and in weak political institutions.

As I stated at the outset of this chapter, however, these were perhaps the simplest and most obvious cases to explore. In turning my attention to the events of the previous century, I now hope to show that the same dynamics at play in the interwar period very nearly ruptured the Concert of Europe.

CHAPTER 4

CHALLENGE THWARTED: PRUSSIA & GERMANY AFTER 1815

If the history of the period after 1918 is one of an international order challenged and destroyed, the impression one receives from accounts of the period beginning at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars is of relative tranquillity, of 'a world restored'.[186] Within the discipline of international relations, the 'restoration' involved is conceived of primarily in terms of the avoidance of interstate conflict and the emergence, however brief, of voluntary consultation and policy coordination amongst the leading states of Europe. Thus, Robert Gilpin is able to speak of the post-Napoleonic period as one where "the status quo was preserved" through the balance of power.[187] Gilpin offers his verdict that Europe emerged from the Congress of Vienna "relatively stable until the unification of Germany".[188] Kissinger writes admiringly of the victorious powers' achievement, declaring it to be in the end too much of a good thing,

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[186] Kissinger, *A World Restored*.

[187] Gilpin's actual words refer both to Britain's "role as balancer" and to "the distribution of power among the major states" as reasons for the stability he sees in this period. As with most power-balancing explanations, the balance of power appears to be either a practice or a condition. Gilpin, *War and Change*, p. 136. See also Ernst Haas, "Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?" *World Politics*, vol. 5, no. 4, 1953.

[188] Gilpin, *War and Change*, pp. 134-36.

yielding as it did "a stability so pervasive that it may have contributed to disaster. For in the long interval of peace the sense of the tragic was lost".[189] Gordon Craig writes of a "golden age of harmony", due to "a happy combination of determination to avoid war, self-restraint when opportunities for unilateral aggrandizement presented themselves, and skillful diplomacy".[190]

While this might, strictly speaking, be accurate in terms of major power war, it is equally true that the security concerns of the leading European states in this period were domestic as much as external. It seems not particularly sensible to ignore domestic conditions, downplay them, or define them as falling outside the realm of systemic 'stability' when these conditions were at the forefront of strategic discussions at Vienna, and the system itself was posited on the maintenance of traditional domestic political and social arrangements. In fact it would not be an exaggeration to suggest that this was the primary motivation of the architects of the postwar order. Even if one could parse military threats to security from domestic instability as distinct threats to the status quo, the regicidal origins and proselytizing behaviour of the defeated Napoleonic regime blurred that same distinction.

The events of 1792 to 1815 had given the statesmen gathered at Vienna ample reason to seek a peace settlement which would avoid another major war.

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[189] Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 6. Another significant homily to the post-Napoleonic settlement can be found in Gulick's *Europe's Classical Balance of Power*.

Yet their attention was focussed not only on the objective of major power peace, but on domestic stability – and most importantly for the three victorious continental powers, on the preservation of the *ancien regime* and the avoidance of revolution. The international order which emerged from Vienna, and the motivations of its chief architect, Austria's Prince Clemens von Metternich, have been described as follows:

> Metternich strove to uphold the interests of an aristocratic, European social order through maintaining the 1815 settlement by means of a repressive alliance of monarchical states, whose *internal and external* security were to be preserved by military and police cooperation as well as by efficient and centralised bureaucratic rule. In this way he hoped to exorcise the threat of revolution and so maintain the status quo.[191]

Yet even when domestic politics is given close attention in an examination of this postwar settlement, the accent is often placed on the 'stability' allegedly achieved, rather than on the instability resulting from the series of revolutionary and counter-revolutionary struggles which conditioned the course of European

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[190] Craig, *Europe since 1815*, p. 3.

[191] Alan Sked, "The Metternich System, 1815-1848", in Alan Sked, ed., *Europe's Balance of Power, 1815-1848*, London, MacMillan, 1979, p. 98 [emphasis added].

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politics until mid-century. Consider the following characterisation of the Concert system:

> It may not have fulfilled all the hopes of an idealistic generation, but it gave this generation something perhaps more precious: a period of stability which allowed their hopes to be realized without a major war or a permanent revolution ... The period of stability which ensued was the best proof that a 'legitimate' order had been constructed, an order accepted by all the major powers, so that henceforth they sought adjustment within its framework rather than in its overthrow.[192]

Thus the sense one derives from much of the literature on this topic is that since the domestic unrest which followed the 1815 settlement did not result in the emergence of any new, revolutionary, revisionist powers, nor in any major power wars, the postwar order must be pronounced stable and the efforts of the peacemakers successful.

I am not convinced. This same period witnessed the emergence of numerous domestic revisionist groups, several revolutions, and concluded with a continent-wide upheaval which saw the chief architect of the postwar order driven from his capital by a mob. It is certainly true that there were no major power wars between 1815 and 1856: that is in large part due to the lack of revisionist regimes. Was the lack of such a regime a consequence of an

orchestrated international system of interstate cooperation in diplomatic conciliation and domestic repression? Or was it the consequence of historical accident, of an un-foreseeable combination of factors which in the end caused domestic revisionist movements to falter or be defeated? That is to say, was the ultimate failure of the revolutions of 1848 inevitable, or was it (as had been said of a recent watershed in international relations) a 'near run thing'?[193]

To eliminate further suspense, in this chapter and the next I will dwell not upon how stable Europe actually was in this period, but upon how unstable it very nearly ended up being. Examining the cases of Germany and Restoration France, I will argue that the pattern of domestic and international revisionism exhibited by various domestic groups in both cases exhibit considerable similarities. Chief amongst these similarities are four: first, that involvement in the continent-wide wars of the preceding two decades had produced high levels of politicisation amongst previously quiescent groups, and had generated new forms of political discourse and new expectations regarding the content of the postwar era; second, that these expectations, raised by government actions and promises in wartime, were dashed in the aftermath of war in a wave of

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[192] Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 5.

[193] The remark "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life" was that of the Duke of Wellington to a British MP before a crowd in Brussels, regarding the recent battle of Waterloo. Wellington added: "I don't think it would have done if I had not been there." *Oxford Book of Quotations*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 567.

repression; third, that the crushing of expectations was perceived by aggrieved groups to have both domestic and international origins; and fourth, that the revisionist movements that sprang from this set of circumstances had goals which may be conceived as international as well as domestic.

In enumerating these similarities it is evident that I am identifying a pattern in these cases similar to that identified in Italy and Germany after the first world war. There is, of course, a clear difference between the two sets of cases: the later cases resulted in the emergence of revisionist challenger states, while the earlier ones did not. However, it is my contention that the causal relationships leading to emergence of revisionist groups in all these cases are fundamentally alike: they are rooted in wartime politics, in frustrated expectations, and in a corresponding decline in the legitimacy of both the domestic regime and the postwar international order. The difference is in the *denouement*, in the alliances these groups were able to forge and in the attitudes of other members of logrolled coalitions.

It is obvious from the title of this chapter that I do not intend to treat the experience of Prussia in isolation from the experiences of the numerous states of western and south-western Germany. In assessing the various histories of the territories involved as a collective narrative I am going beyond the general purview of the dissertation: namely, cases of great powers in the aftermath of major wars in which they were involved. Prussia is normally included in this category for the period in question; Baden, Hesse, Wurttemburg, and other

principalities were not. They were minor states, buffers created between powerful neighbours, with little control over their own foreign policy.

I think there are four reasons to proceed in treating the experience of Prussia and the remaining German states collectively under the rubric of 'Germany' (and separately from Austria). First, though Prussia and the Rhenish states may have been nominally and juridically separate entities through the Napoleonic era, the postwar era linked their political worlds intimately through simple geography. In the final boundary agreements of the peace conference, Prussia gained direct control over most of the German Rhineland. The re-acquisition of this swath of territory, together with Prussia's traditional eastern lands, meant that the Prussian state in physical terms cut directly through the non-Austrian lands of the German confederation. This meant a greater role for Prussian troops in the German confederation's internal politics,[194] and greater economic interaction through sheer proximity between the German confederation and Prussian territory.[195] Second -- and related to the first point -- politics and economics in Prussia and the western Germanies were bound together through economic modernisation as a market, ultimately represented

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[194] Mary Fulbrook, *A Concise History of Germany*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 103.

[195] The early Rhenish industrialists, for instance, shared a number of administrative links through the bureaucracies of Prussia, Bavaria and Hesse. See Hagen Schulze, *The course of German nationalism*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 62.

and furthered by the formation of the *Zollverein* customs union.[196] The *Zollverein* only confirmed the contrast between the increasing rationalisation of the Prussian and Rhenish economies on one hand, and the persistence of Austrian particularism on the other.[197] For this Metternich's success at shielding Austria from the revolutionary ferment of France and the German lands to the north was largely to blame: resistant to reform, the Austrian empire proved equally resistant to modernisation, adding weight to the conclusion of one observer that "nothing was efficient except the diplomacy and the police".[198]

Third, and more intangibly, one may argue that the political experiences of Prussia and the other non-Austrian states of the German confederation were directly linked in a way that the Austrian one was not, both with respect to wartime events and regarding the intellectual development of radical politics.[199]

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[196] See Clive Trebilcock, *The Industrialization of the Continental Powers, 1780-1914*, London, Longman, 1981, pp. 29-41. Trebilcock argues that the *Zollverein* was responsible not for the process of industrialization, but for the definition of an internal market which created an "embryonic sense of unity" and which was "coterminous with an entity ripe for nationhood".

[197] J.G. Lockhart, *The Peacemakers, 1814-1815*, London, Duckworth & Co., 1932, pp. 110-11.

[198] Trebilcock, *Industrialization*, p. 337; Lockhart, *The Peacemakers*, pp. 108-11.

[199] Friedrich Meinecke argued that the Prussian reforms of 1808 broadly conditioned German politics beyond Prussian boundaries for generations to come: the period of genuine reform was brief, "but this one year nurtured all of Prussian and German history in the nineteenth century". See Meinecke, *The Age of German Liberation*, (Peter Paret, ed.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977; p. 70.

Paradoxically, by replacing a policy of reform with one of reaction, the Prussian state drew the attention, ire, and energy of radicals in the German states as well as within its own boundaries, as the repository both of liberal potential but also of reactionary betrayal.[200]

Fourth, the general point must be made that given the confederal status of the German states, the complexities of the map of Germany after 1815, and the inclusion of portions of Prussia and Austria in the confederation, any attempt to suggest that a study of domestic politics in this period must confine itself to the inner boundaries of the Prussian state would be to impose an arbitrary, abstract concept of international relations on a subject with many subtle distinctions. Prussia and the German confederation were not one state in 1815; nor, however, were they entities alien to each other. The Prussian and Austrian monarchs rightly considered liberal radicalism in the German principalities a threat which, if not by definition domestic, was certainly not foreign.

The wartime experience

The experiences of Germany as a whole in the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars differed from those of France's other opponents in one crucial aspect: they were not only defeated in the field, but occupied for considerable

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[200] Frederick Hertz, *The German Public Mind in the Nineteenth Century*, Totowa, N.J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1975, pp. 97-104.

lengths of time. Golo Mann has noted three broad influences the conflict had on Germany. First, the Rhineland itself was incorporated into France for 20 years, and governed directly from Paris, thus being subject to the full gamut of political and social reforms of the era. Second, the states conquered by the French but allowed nominal independence in the 'Confederation of the Rhine' modelled their own political reforms on those of the French. Third, after the crushing military defeat of Jena in 1806, Prussia did not imitate but rather reacted against the forces unleashed by the French, in France, in western Germany, and in Prussia itself. Thus the impact of, and politicisation inherent in, French conquests had different effects in Prussia than in the smaller German principalities.[201]

The Prussian experience of the conflict divides at one critical watershed, Jena. The bloody end of absolutism in France had failed to make much impression in Prussia, itself a bastion of autocracy, at least in terms of concrete policy. In the conflict with revolutionary France in 1793-94 Prussia had been defeated by the mass-conscripted French army, and had remained neutral despite British attempts to enlist its support in a coalition against Napoleon. By 1806 Prussia was again at war with France, having failed to enact either the societal or the military reforms necessary to generate a fighting force capable of

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[201] Golo Mann, *The History of Germany Since 1789*. Penguin: Harmondsworth, Middlesex, 1968, p. 58.

matching Napoleon. Under an aging officer corps, Prussia's army in 1806 "had become the most dangerous manifestation of her political vulnerability".[202]

The Prussian army was badly beaten at Jena, leaving Prussia firmly in the orbit of France, and many of its soldiers seconded to Napoleon. Yet partly due to troop requirements elsewhere in Napoleon's new empire, the French dominated Prussia indirectly; through the peace treaty Frederick William III was permitted to remain on the throne, and allowed a reasonable degree of discretion regarding internal politics. This provided a window for reform of the Prussian state, long debated in court circles but until that point only the subject of discussion (or of minor experimentation).[203]

The defeat at Jena was catastrophic. The treaty signed at Tilsit in 1807 saw Prussia lose all territories west of Rhine (which became the kingdom of Westphalia under Jerome Bonaparte), in addition to its recent Polish acquisitions; an indemnity was agreed upon of 120 million francs, plus the costs of French occupation forces required contributions towards other Napoleonic campaigns (including the attack on Russia in 1812). Yet the defeat, however disastrous for

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[202] James J. Sheehan, *German History: 1770-1866*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 295.

[203] The content of reformist discourse in Berlin in the years prior to 1806 included tax reform, emancipation of the serfs, and reform of the army. See Sheehan, *German History*, pp. 294-96.

Prussia in the short term, had been widely anticipated by reformers within and outside the military.[204]

The bargain

The consequence of defeat was that the impetus for reform, previously marginalised, now moved to the forefront, with the knowledge that the mobilisation capacities of the Prussian state were far below those required to liberate the state from French dominance, or even to survive as a great power. Two individuals, Karl Freiherr vom Stein and Karl von Hardenberg, previously excluded from the inner circle of advisors to the king, were as first minister in turn given substantial control over the method and nature of reform. Wilhelm von Humboldt, an intellectual on the progressive edge of the elite, was entrusted with reform of the Prussian educational system. To undertake direct reforms of the military, two relatively liberal officers, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, were appointed.

The primary period of reform lasted from the Peace of Tilsit in 1807 only until roughly 1810, but included a basket of societal, military, and administrative changes to the Prussian state. Under Stein, the reform program included the emancipation of Prussian serfs, undertaken over a three-year period (1807-10); initiatives in municipal self-government (1808); the abolition of archaic and

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[204] Martin Kitchen, *A Military History of Germany*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1975, p. 35-36.

particularistic restrictions on personal mobility, land sales, and the practice of trade; the abolition of the widely-detested system of corporal punishment in the military; and substantial reform of the educational system, including a humanistic curriculum and the expansion of the universities.[205]

At the urging of the French who sensed in the Prussian reforms a renewed preparation for war, Stein was dismissed and replaced in 1810 by Hardenberg, who continued the process of reform but was markedly less radical.[206]

Stein and the other leading reformers sought, within the context of Prussian authoritarian rule, to generate from above the same impulses for defense of the state exhibited by the French *citoyen*, without fanning the corresponding flames of popular, liberal discontent with monarchical rule, or any genuine sense of popular sovereignty. The *revolution von oben*, by denting class privilege, adopting the principle of universality in certain realms, and reforming some of the most odious characteristics of the absolutism of the past, went some distance in accomplishing precisely that. In doing so, the hope was that the image of a more rational society, composed of free individuals, rewarding of

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[205] Ironically, the Prussian educational system of the day was by some standards more merit-based than those of Britain or France (a higher percentage (20%) of lower middle-class children were in school at the turn of the nineteenth century); it was, however, considerably more hierarchical and authority-centered. On this point and the content of the reforms in general, see Eda Sagarra, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Germany*, London, Longman, 1980, p. 33.

[206] William Carr, *A History of Germany*, London: E. Arnold, 1979, pp. 8-9.

talent and allowing mobility, would direct the energies of key groups in the middle class, the towns and the countryside away from unrest and towards – among other things – a larger, more reliable and more proficient military.

The reforms initiated were numerous. Many were too radical for Frederick. Stein wanted to replace cabinet government by a ministerial system, such that the Council of Misters would make decisions in council rather than in the monarch's office. This represented a significant revolt against autocratic absolutism, and while it was not successfully implemented, Stein did ensure that ministers were no longer responsible for separate provinces, but now had jurisdiction over separate departments which covered the entire Prussian state, an important move in the direction of rationalised government.[207] Stein also presented in June 1807 a plan to reform provincial governments, giving representation to different estates, with significantly decentralised authority. Town and village representatives were to combine with local landowners in a county diet, and to elect county councillors directly. This scheme was to disappear with the replacement of Stein by Hardenberg, under whose formulation each district director was to be appointed directly by the state.[208]

The reforms which were successfully implemented were, in light of the era, a significant revamping of the absolutist order, if not nearly as profound as

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[207] Meinecke, *The Age of German Liberation* (Peter Paret, ed.), Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p. 72

those of the French revolution. In October 1807 Prussian serfs were emancipated, an act of fundamental importance not because of any reshuffling of the Prussian social hierarchy (the agrarian elite emerged from this episode somewhat better off than before), but as an emblem of the relative freedom of Prussian society under the new order.[209] Still in the social realm, Stein's projects of the abolition of guild monopolies, and the removal of all occupational barriers, were promulgated by Hardenberg on 2 November 1810 and 7 September 1811, respectively.[210] Further attempts at rationalisation saw Jews in the old provinces of Prussia given equality before the law in 1812. Hardenberg regularly discussed with Frederick the possibility of a Prussian constitution, the prospect of which caused considerable excitement in reforming circles.[211]

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[208] Meinecke, *Age*, pp. 73-75.

[209] The emancipation edict offered compensation to landowners, unlike similar legislation in France. In the long run, land sales by the peasantry to the minor nobility increased landholdings and power of the agrarian elite, contrary to the intent of the law and Stein's wishes. Clive Trebilcock notes that "the largest [practical] effect of the wartime reforms was to create a measure of economic mobility in the rural sector. But it was a partial mobility only". Most serfs did not experience anything like genuine emancipation until the 1850s-60s. See John L. Snell, *The Democratic Movement in Germany, 1789-1914*, Chapel Hill, N.C., University of North Carolina Press, 1976, p. 16; Trebilcock, *Industrialization*, p. 34; and Meinecke, *Age*, pp. 82-83.

[210] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 86.

[211] William Carr, *History*, p. 17.

Of greatest consequence for Prussia's international destiny were the military reforms of the period. Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and von Boyen were the main movers behind these reforms, which included near-elimination of corporal punishment, universal conscription (in 1813), and the easing of the passage for middle-class Prussians to become officers. The third of these constituted an assault on one of the great bastions of Prussian conservatism, the aristocratic exclusivity of the officer corps. Stein, Scharnhorst and others were convinced this needed to be broken down, and "scope given to talent and to justified ambition".[212] As an attempt to erode the perceived (and real) relationship between high birth and a commission, a system of examinations was introduced in August 1808: commission candidates now entered not as officer-cadets but as privates, and had to pass two examinations to reach the rank of lieutenant.[213] As a consequence of these reforms the composition of the officer corps was not changed substantially, yet the symbolism of the change was critical.

In the same month the brutal system of corporal punishment in the Prussian army was overhauled substantially, if not completely. Universal conscription, long considered by the reformers to be a central component in the creation of a "People's Army" capable of defeating the French,[214] was urged upon

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[212] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 96.

[213] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 97.

[214] Kitchen, *Military History of Germany*, p. 47.

the king at same time, but due to fears of raising French suspicions, Frederick

declined to sign the proposal into law in 1809 and again in 1810.[215]

The reformers were under continual attack from conservative court circles,

who together with the French regularly persuaded Frederick to rein in the

process of reform. In 1812, the treaty of alliance with France (dictated by

Napoleon), and Frederick's decision to send half the Prussian army with

Napoleon against Russia, caused many reformers to abandon hope of

maintaining their existing changes and furthering their cause, and there were

widespread defections from the king's government.[216] Gneisenau himself

resigned and offered his services to the Russians.

However, the terrible defeat inflicted on the imperial French armies by the

Russians and the elements that winter gave a new breath of life to the reform

movement. The alliance with the French was discredited, and the liberation of

Prussia from French control now seemed a very real possibility. Stein, in

Konigsberg to greet the triumphant Russians in January 1813, persuaded the

commanders of the Prussian forces to establish a territorial army in the region

based on the principle of universal conscription. The months that followed saw

Frederick finally agree to the establishment of new recruitment practices and

military organization based on the same principle. The *Landwehr*, a conscripted

force, and the *Jäger*, an elite set of detachments drawn from middle-class

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[215] Meinecke, *Age*, pp. 100-101.

volunteers, were created by edict in the following months; so was the *Landsturm*,

a guerrilla force for those neither in the regular army nor conscripted into the

Landwehr, whose radical potential so horrified conservatives that it was

implemented only by certain resourceful peasant groups and intellectuals.[217]

Universal conscription itself (3 years' active, two years' reserve) was formally

passed into law in 1814, with the provision that after one year in the regular

army, sons of non-noble but educated and well-to-do families were given first

crack at commissions in the Landwehr, a key concession to middle-class

aspirations.[218] In the view of Meinecke, these innovations were critical in

achieving the popular mobilisation sought by the reformers since 1806:

> Until 1813 it was still possible to doubt whether the 'people' on whom the
>
> patriots counted in their plans for reform and uprising, did in fact exist, or
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> whether it was merely a reflection, a postulate, of their ideals. The spring of 1813
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> removed all doubts.... In accordance with Scharnhorst's ideas, the volunteer *Jäger*
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> detachments provided the officers for the *Landwehr*, while the *Landwehr* became a

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[216] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 109.

[217] Such as the professors of Berlin University. On the creation of the new army units, see
Kitchen, *Military History*, pp. 53-56.

[218] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 123.

truly national institution by the very fact that the creation of its units was entrusted to local committees on which all classes were represented.[219]

By the fall of 1813 the Prussian army had made great strides towards becoming a popular force, the *Landwehr* a huge reserve army to which "many volunteers flocked to join",[220] and the reforms had combined with the activities of nationalist intellectuals, such as Fichte, to create a novel mood of patriotism in Prussia.

The German nationalism which burgeoned in this period, particularly amongst the middle class, intellectuals, and artisans, and which led to a number Prussian victories over the French after 1813, can be seen simply as a response to French nationalism and occupation. Yet had the reformers not rationalised and broadened the popular appeal of the central institutions of the Prussian state, there would have been no effective means of articulating that nationalism as a means of 'liberation'. The reforming ministers under Frederick offered previously excluded groups in Prussian society greater social mobility, destroyed symbols of particularism, hierarchy and oppression, and offered avenues for popular and individual expressions of patriotism: perhaps the most critical of these latter innovations was the opening of government to middle-class intellectuals and rationalisers. In return, the regime drew on a wave of popular support and improved military moral in the 1813-14 War of Liberation, and again

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[219] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 110.

in the final conflict of Napoleon's Hundred Days. Idealistic students in particular

flocked to the *Landwehr* and von Lutzow's *Freikorps*, urged on by leading

intellectuals such as Herder, Fichte, and the patriotic poet Turnvater Jahn.[221]

The reforms effected in areas in which French control was more direct

were more radical. The primary casualty of the old order in the Rhenish states

was the legal particularism endemic in the former territories of the Holy Roman

Empire. Two decades of experience of revolutionary and Napoleonic reforms,

such as the principle of equality before the law, affected the Rhineland

profoundly. Those states permitted to survive intact in the Confederation of the

Rhine, such as Bavaria and Wurttemberg, made reforms modelled on new French

principles such as 'careers open to talents', the *code Napoleon*, and administrative

centralisation.[222]

The various portions of the Napoleonic Empire felt the effects of French

restructuring differently, but the Rhineland and the states of the *Rheinbund* were

amongst the regions most heavily affected. Under French governance, the

smaller German states began to reform along French lines. Baden, Wurttemberg

and other states eliminated serfdom, and made inaugural steps towards

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[220] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 76.

[221] The latter was a key figure in the foundation of gymnastic societies which sought to train

young men to fight against the French, and was later to become a rallying figure for the all-

German student movement. See William Carr, *History*, p. 15.

[222] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 59.

constitutional government.[223] Seigneurial privilege was severely curtailed, ecclesiastical lands were regularly sold off, and the termination of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 rendered the decline of the old order official. Under the *Reichsdeputationshauptschluss* of 1803 the number of political units in western and southern Germany was whittled from over a hundred to sixteen.[224]

It would be correct to conclude of this particular set of reforms that the acts involved were those of a conquering and occupying power with a taste for administration, rather than a bargain between a government requiring greater levels of wartime mobilisation and its population. The reforming era in the *Rheinbund* was thus of a somewhat different character than that in Prussia. Yet the reforms undertaken in French-controlled Germany are directly relevant to the dynamics of wartime politics examined in these pages. For in addition to the extension of French ideological innovation, one of the principal motivations of the reforms (at least under the Empire) was to gain the allegiance of key local elites, town leaders, and others, whose collaboration was essential to maintain French administrative control. Crucially, those who benefitted most from French reforms were rather more middle than upper-class, and rather more educated than not. Stuart Woolf notes in his study of Napoleonic administration that "collaboration came early and was widespread at the middling ranks of the civilian administration". The sale of Church and *émigré* land went further in

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[223] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, pp. 14-15.

creating a bond between the occupying regime and the middle class and small-holding peasantry.[225]

Yet while the French reforms dislodged the indigenous, traditional socio-political relationships of the western and south German principalities under direct Napoleonic control, and while this upheaval created new allegiances and ruptured old, the reaction to French rule had a paradoxical effect: though novel and in many ways progressive, the behaviour of the occupying forces was all too often heavy handed and oppressive. Thus, as has been observed by numerous students of the era, French national expansion and ideology rid Germany (temporarily) of its old order, but also presented a foil for a budding German national assertiveness. Part of the German nationalism which sprung from the Napoleonic period was liberal, yet another part was illiberal, and came to view the proclaimed egalitarian social aims of the invader as particularly French, rather than humanist. For many in Germany, "the concepts of revolution, emancipation, equality of all citizens, came to be associated irrevocably with the experience of conquest, of exploitation and of national humiliation".[226]

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[224] Fulbrook, *History of Germany*, pp. 97-98.

[225] Stuart Woolf, *Napoleon's Integration of Europe*, London, Routledge, 1991, pp. 187-206.

[226] Eda Sagarra, *An Introduction to Nineteenth Century Germany*, London, Longman, 1980, p. 3.

Whether or not any German *sonderweg* emerged from this collision of the new and the old has been explored extensively by others;[227] as a question it falls outside the purview of this dissertation. Of relevance here is the fact that the French occupation had two great effects on German politics. It introduced liberal ideas and made revolution, or the promise of revolution, a tangible local phenomenon. Yet in introducing the notion of nation into German political discourse, the French triggered reaction as well as emulation. Breaking the bonds of Habsburg, Prussian or other local autocracies and particularisms did not necessarily imply liberalism, as many of the original French radicals thought it must. This tension continued to cross nationalist and liberal lines throughout the postwar era in Germany.

Postwar perceptions

The impact of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars on Germany as a whole was varied, but we may identify several themes. First, the privileges and ruling style of the old elite were modified, if not directly by the French, then (as in Prussia) by the elites themselves. In both variants, the outcome was similar: liberal groups on the outskirts of power moved closer to the centre, methods of

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[227] For example, see D. Blackbourn & G. Eley, *The Peculiarities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984; David Calleo, *The German Problem Reconsidered*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.

administration and governance were rationalised and centralised, and most of the most exploitative aspects of elite-mass relations were abandoned. Second, new (or stronger) currents of German national self-consciousness arose in response to French ideology and in reaction to French domination.

Third, the victories of progressive elements in society were incomplete, due in part to the fact that they had been brought as a consequence of extraneous pressures the wars had visited on German society. In areas of direct French domination, the old elites had had their power curtailed by the invader, who was by 1814 driven from German soil. In Prussia, the liberal faction had gained the upper hand as a consequence of the defeat at Jena, but there remained large numbers of conservatives close to Frederick at the conclusion of the war. The grip of the reformers on the rudder of Prussian policy had been tenuous in any event, as the frequent dismissals of Stein and other progressive advisors between 1807 and 1814 demonstrate.

Thus in 1815, with the final defeat of Napoleon assured at Waterloo, French rule (or the menace thereof) had disappeared from German territory, and with it much of the impetus for reform. Prussia and the states of the German confederation had changed considerably in the preceding decade, but the conservatives' hands were strengthened: no longer was it necessary to combat French liberalism and republicanism on similar terms. Instead, the agenda at Vienna was clearly directed towards attacking similar innovations *in embryo*. Metternich's intentions with respect to Germany were plain: "I hope with the

help of God to strike down the German revolution, as I have defeated the conqueror of Europe".[228]

The restoration of the old order desired by Metternich had an ally in the relatively backward conditions of much of Germany. When the French armies had departed, interest in public affairs declined sharply. The chiefly agrarian, immobile structure of German society, emancipation of the serfs notwithstanding, had led to an ingrained devotion to ruling families, many of whom were returning émigrés.[229] As a consequence the once-deposed agrarian elite dominated restoration Germany, largely at the expense of the middle class which had been relatively advantaged under Napoleon. During French occupation of the Rhineland and south Germany, equality before the law and 'careers open to talents' had become accepted principles, and particularistic restrictions on trade and industry had been altered or removed. Most of these actions were rescinded; despite the reversal, the beneficiaries of Napoleonic rule,

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[228] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, p. 22. Alan Sked identifies the practical manifestations of Metternich's policy regarding central Europe as the Carlsbad decrees (1819); the Final Act of the Vienna Congress (1820); interventions in Naples (1821), Spain (1823), and the Papal States (1830); the Berlin and Munchengraetz agreements (1833); the annexation of Cracow (1846); and the occupation of Ferrara (1847). See Sked, *The Decline and Fall of the Habsburg Empire 1815-1918*, Longman, London 1989, p. 9.

[229] On traditional attitudes see Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 6. The population of the German confederation at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars was 75% rural, and that which was urbanised was barely so, with only 14 towns of 100,000+ inhabitants in 1815.

such as middle class bureaucrats and shopkeepers, were too few and too

dependent on princely courts for their livelihood to make effective protest.[230] In

Prussia, Hardenberg's repeated suggestions to Frederick regarding the granting

of a Prussian constitution, which Frederick had considered some years earlier,

were now resolutely ignored,[231] and Hardenburg's first postwar cabinet was

primarily composed of conservative bureaucrats at the king's wish.[232] Prussia's

proximity to its even more conservative allies Russia and Austria, and its

relatively weak position, meant that its ability to pursue an independent policy at

the peace conference was severely constrained in any event.[233] Thus, at the state

level the impetus for reform in Germany lost nearly all the momentum it had

acquired in the war years.

The decline of the French threat freed the hand of German conservatives.

The aristocracy had rewon its prestige through its recent success on the

battlefield. Thus, as Hamerow notes, the liberal advances made during the war

could now easily be rolled back by the old regime, who "little by little suppressed

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[230] *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

[231] In 1815 Hardenberg suggested Frederick grant a Prussian constitution, but direct pressure on

the king from Metternich and representatives of the Junkers led to Frederick rejecting the

proposal. No constitution was granted until 1823, and then only in the most conservative form: it

provided not for a national assembly elected by estates (Stein's original idea) but for regional

estates dominated by landowners. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

[232] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 122; Carr, *A History of Germany*, pp. 8-9.

the patriotic movement in the universities, suspended projects for constitutional reform, abandoned plans for the introduction of local self-government, and forced the retirement of the reformers themselves".[234]

Active dissatisfaction with the restoration of the ancien regime and the general European settlement came neither from the ranks of state 'reformers *von oben*' (now marginalised with the defeat of the republican threat), nor from the still miniscule commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, but from two (largely overlapping) groups whose expectations had been raised in the war and shattered in the peace: nationalists and liberals. The ranks of both were drawn largely from professional and intellectuals groups, and in particular from the universities. Many had fought in the liberation struggles of 1813-15. As Golo Mann notes, the disparity between the patriots' aims and military achievements, and the apparent goals of the Vienna diplomats, left the patriots bitter.[235]

When discussing liberalism in restoration Germany, one may identify two main streams of thought around which activists coalesced. *Historical* liberalism, the weaker of the two strains, was most commonly found in north Germany and Prussia, was anti-egalitarian, profoundly romantic, and had a fascination with evolving, organic constitutions (that is, a preference for the English model as

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[233] Meinecke, *Age*, p. 121.

[234] Theodore S. Hamerow, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction, Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1958, pp. 25-26.

opposed to the French). The 'organic' nature of historical liberalism led to an accent on perpetuating medieval estates and the monarchy as 'living' parts of political society. Its attention to tradition and legend were closely associated with German national myth-making of time, as was historical liberalism's fascination with past. Its association with traditional forms was also its primary weakness, and rendered it dependent on intellectual supporters from the upper reaches of the middle class.[236] *Theoretical* liberalism, strongest in the Rhineland and south Germany, was for obvious reasons much more heavily influenced by French rationalist constitutionalism. It tended not to rely on historical reference, but on appeals to political wisdom, and was much less attached to any view of the institutions of the ancien regime as 'organically' connected to Germany as a nation. This stream drew broader support, extending its appeal beyond intellectual groups to urban artisans and professionals.[237] Thus, the primary pressure on restoration rulers in liberal terms came from this second strand, the most pressing demand of which was the granting of constitutions, if not practically then symbolically a check on traditional absolutism. In this environment, in south Germany a number of rulers granted constitutions between 1814 and 1820 to consolidate new territories, and in creating a bond

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[235] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 77.

[236] On historical liberalism see Carr, *A History of Germany*, pp. 12-13.

[237] *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

between ruler and subject to forestall the further advance of progressive, republican ideas.[238]

The other major source of pressure came from nationalism, the movement whose logical consequence was the amalgamation of the various German states into a greater Germany. The most prominent groups in this movement were the *burschenschaften*.[239] The first of these groups was founded at the university of Jena in 1815, by student veterans who had been influenced by Turnvater Jahn.[240] Composed primarily of students, the great majority of whom were veterans of the War of Liberation, *burschenschaft* members believed that the postwar settlement represented a betrayal of the ideals for which they had fought. While romanticism lent Byronic qualities to the nature of their demands, the basic goal of the *burschenschaften* was unambiguous: a united German nation, unfettered by alien control.[241] As Snell observes, "the reality of 1815-16 was terribly

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[238] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[239] Literally, student associations.

[240] *Ibid.*, p. 15

[241] Primarily, the alien control resented by the *burschenschaften* was that of the Habsburgs and the Tsars. Yet the nationalism of many of the student activists of the day was also heavily tinged with anti-Semitism, disguised either heavily or thinly under a cloak of opposition to "cosmopolitanism". The hate literature of the day is echoed in spirit by Treitschke's own commentary on the period. See Heinrich von Treitschke, *History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, edited by Gordon A. Craig (selections from the translation of Eden and Cedar Paul), University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1975, especially pp. 104-07.

disappointing to those who, during the national rising of 1813, had hoped for the

unity of a free Germany".[242] Both the terms of the domestic postwar settlement,

which confirmed the continuation of a fractured and particularist Germany, and

the fact that the chief guarantors of this settlement were the absolutist regimes of

Russia and Austria, combined to render a perception of dual illegitimacy. The

nineteenth-century German historian Treitschke saw this duality of resentment in

the relationship between the young generation's sacrifices in the war and the

disappointments of the postwar settlement:

> It was inevitable that this patriotic enthusiasm should flame up more fiercely
>
> when the young warriors now returned to the lecture theatre, many of them
>
> decorated with the iron cross, almost all still intoxicated with the heroic fury of
>
> the great struggle, filled with ardent hatred of 'the external and internal
>
> oppressors of the fatherland.'[243]

The primary political method of the *burschenschaften* in the immediate

postwar years was symbolism, revolving around attempts to organize student

life and political discourse along national lines. The Wartburg festival in 1817,

marking the anniversary of the battle of Leipzig and the tercentenary of Luther's

rebellion against Catholicism, was widely attended by nationalist student

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[242] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, p. 23.

[243] Treitschke, *History*, p. 98.

groupings, and was the site of speeches and demonstrations against the postwar settlement in general and Prussian institutions in particular.[244] In October 1818 the *Allgemeiner Burschentag* (the leading national student committee) met at Jena to form the *Allgemeine deutsche Burschenschaft*, the first all-German student organisation, and adopted red, black and gold insignia (colours alleged to be old imperial colours but which were in fact worn first by the *Freikorps*, then by Jena students).[245]

While the immediate political significance of the *burschenschaften* was limited, they were of considerably broader historical significance as a formative political experience for a generational cohort of intellectuals. Bound by an idealistic nationalism which transcended provincial identities, many of these same individuals were to occupy leading positions in German society at the critical revolutionary junctures of the coming decades.[246] Parenthetically, it may be useful in comparative terms to observe that the activities of the anti-republican right in Weimar Germany, while often violent, dealt heavily in symbolism and in ostensibly non-political social activities.[247]

Yet if symbolic politics was the primary focus of the intellectual community, it was not without impact. Student agitation, combined with the

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[244] Craig, *Europe Since 1815*, p. 56.

[245] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 16.

[246] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

contrasts between Restoration politics and the changes achieved or promised in wartime, created a political climate in much of Germany and Prussia which was hostile to Metternich's vision (and reality). By 1819 Metternich had come to believe, and told the Emperor Francis I, that the German confederation was threatened by nationalist agitation in Prussia, representative constitutions in South Germany, and the advocacy of both nationalism and republicanism by the German press, and that moreover a democratic constitution in Prussia would result in "the complete overthrow of all existing institutions".[248]

The assassination of a conservative playwright, suspected of spying for Russia, by the young theologian and Jena *burschenschafter* Karl Sand[249] in March 1819, provided Metternich with a pretext for stamping out the liberal protest movement in Germany. Hardenberg, who had remained in administration in hopes of persuading Frederick to pass a constitution, had lost further political momentum as a consequence of the assassination, and was forced to accept Metternich's demands at their meeting in July, which laid the groundwork for

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[247] Fritzsche, *Rehearsals, passim.*

[248] Robert Billinger, *Metternich and the German Question: states' rights and federal duties, 1820-1834,* Cranbury, NJ, Associated University Press, 1991, p. 21.

[249] The assassination was of extremely limited political utility, and Sand was widely considered to be mentally deranged.

the Carlsbad decrees of the same month.[250] On July 29th, Metternich and Frederick met at Teplitz, where the Prussian king agreed to the crackdown desired by Metternich.

The Carlsbad decrees were a series of repressive instruments designed to crush liberal opposition in Prussia and the German confederation. They symbolised the cooperation of the Austrian and Prussian states in putting down dissent, and marked the end of a period of considerable influence of liberal intellectuals, political activists, and other previously marginal groups brought into decision-making orbit as a consequence of the Stein-Hardenberg reforms and the French occupation. The cooperative element was considered most important by Metternich, who ensured that the Confederation's federal diet was given power to send troops to quell rebellion wherever they might occur, despite (or deliberately infringing upon) the supposed sovereignty of individual states.[251]

The decrees, together with the Vienna Final Act of late 1819, bound princes not to offer republican constitutions, allowed for federal military intervention in the domestic concerns of individual states, enshrined the principle of monarchic legitimacy, ordered many university teachers dismissed or imprisoned for subversion, suppressed liberal newspapers, instituted broader censorship of books, pamphlets, and journals and gave the government full control of all

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[250] In any event, Hardenberg's hands were tied by the conviction of Frederick that Metternich's approach was now the correct one.

publications of less than twenty pages,[252] provided for the surveillance of university life, and ordered the Burschenschaft dissolved.[253] An Austrian idea to which Prussia assented, it confirmed the allegations of malfeasance and collusion, within and without, which the Burschenschaften had been making since 1815.[254]

The remarkable thing about the Carlsbad decrees and the Vienna Final Act as acts of repression was that, for a decade at least, they were highly successful. The more progressive states of the Confederation, in particular Wurttemburg and Bavaria, had initial objections and were recalcitrant, but were swayed eventually by Metternich into acknowledging the threat he alleged. By 1824, the Federal Diet had approved unanimously the indefinite renewal of the Carlsbad decrees.[255]

The Carlsbad decrees succeeded in keeping Germany "quiet for a decade".[256] No new constitutions were conceded after 1820, and Frederick William III of Prussia abandoned all thoughts of granting a representative

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[251] Billinger, *Metternich*, p. 23.

[252] Which led to the practice of writing extremely lengthy political tracts, as well as the use of misleading titles (an example of the latter being an attack on conservative secret societies, entitled *Correction of an Item in the Bredow-Venturi Chronicle for 1808*). See Sheehan, *German History*, p. 421.

[253] Many of the members continued clandestine meetings.

[254] Billinger, *Metternich*, p. 25; Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 17; Sagarra, *Nineteenth-Century Germany*, p. 44; Sked, *Decline and Fall*, p. 21.

[255] Billinger, *Metternich*, pp. 33-34.

constitution by 1823, having promised one five times since Jena.[257] The fears

many monarchs had of revolution faded significantly after 1824, but

paradoxically the influence of Austria waned as well. As their fears of unrest

diminished, German princes sought to expand their political power through

economic reforms, and increasing their degree of economic union, eschewing

Austrian solutions in favour of expanding their contacts with a growing

bourgeoisie.[258] Bavaria and Wurttemberg signed a preliminary tariff convention

in April 1827, while Prussia and Hesse established economic ties the next year.

Metternich was opposed to both actions but unlike German unity at the mass

level, this was a development he was unable to oppose, tied by his own domestic

concerns to a need to maintain good relations with Prussia.[259]

Why the opposition to the postwar order faded so quickly is primarily a

question of numbers and vocation, as well as the new strength gained by the

aristocracy in the war. The anti-French forces in the Wars of Liberation

(*Erhebung*) were composed of a) nobles and upper-level civil servants, who had

little interest in overthrowing the established order, and b) artists, intellectuals &

university students. The latter, though active opponents of the post-war regime,

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[256] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 18.

[257] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[258] Billinger, *Metternich*, pp. 38, 48.

[259] *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

were few in number, and were forced through economic necessity and lack of allies to acquiesce in the requirements of Carlsbad.[260]

Numerous commentators remark on the political apathy prevalent in Germany in 1820s. Berlin itself was a hotbed of assent, lacking any genuine urban political life, other than being simply the seat of central government.[261] Economic depression, bad harvests in 1816-17 causing food shortages for some years, and the crisis caused by the removal of Napoleon's Continental system of protection from cheaper British competition, were all contributing factors. Moreover, the British Corn Law of 1815 restricted future markets for German wheat. Carr states bluntly that for the years after Carlsbad, "the Germans were too preoccupied with the problems of economic survival to bother much about politics".[262]

Yet as Hamerow notes, if the 1820s were tranquil on the surface, underneath a struggle between capitalist and precapitalist modes of production was creating new classes with new political concerns.[263] Twice in the next two decades, challenges to Metternich's postwar order would occur in Germany. In

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[260] Sagarra, *Nineteenth-Century Germany*, p. 43.

[261] Jonathan Knudsen, "The Limits of Liberal Politics in Berlin, 1815-48", in Konrad H. Jarausch and Larry Eugene Jones, eds., in *Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present*, New York, Berg, 1990, p.113.

[262] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 19.

[263] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 21.

the second of these clashes, these new groups would prove willing to ally with the liberals and the nationalists in a logroll aimed at toppling the old regime. For the liberals and the nationalists, "the memory of what the Prussian state had achieved never died completely and was revived in very different times and conditions; it was then coupled with the legend that in 1814 a great hope had been betrayed, and that the omissions of the past must now be made good".[264]

Revisionist politics

The political quiescence of the 1820s was shattered in 1830 by the outbreak of revolution in France, although the impact of events in Paris varied considerably over German territory. The Austrian and Prussian capitals and hinterlands were not heavily affected. However, in the lands of the German Confederation, which had been subject to far greater French influence during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, the effect was far greater.

In September of that year anti-absolutist riots broke out in Hamburg and Leipzig. In Braunschweig, Duke Karl II was forced to flee by moderate nobles and middle class leaders who replaced him with his brother, but circumscribed royal powers with a parliament and constitution.[265] In Dresden and Cassel, liberal demonstrators intimidated local governments into promising more

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[264] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 81

[265] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, p. 44.

representative constitutions. In October, unrest in the border areas of Hesse led the Diet to arrange military intervention.[266] The four states most affected in 1830-31 were Brunswick, Hesse-Cassel, Saxony and Hanover. In Brunswick, the existing government was toppled, replaced by Duke William on the condition of a constitution. New constitutions in the other three states averted further revolutionary disturbances.[267]

The revolts of 1830 ultimately petered out, partly through a lack of coordination amongst the various rebellions (in turn perhaps a typical consequence of the fragmentation of German politics), partly through timely reforms undertaken by local elites, and partly through limited military intervention by the Confederation and the threat of Austrian invasion.[268]

Yet the general psychological impact of the 1830 revolutions on the liberal opposition was profound. It marked the rebirth of liberal and nationalist

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[266] Billinger, *Metternich.*, pp. 58-61.

[267] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 19.

[268] Ironically, the Austrians were in no condition to intervene, being in very shaky financial shape; in the judgment of some observers Austria was effectively unable to maintain a viable army between 1815 and 1848. In 1830, when war with France was likely, Austria could mount an army of only 170,000, compared to Prussia's 250,000. And in 1831 Metternich's desire to invade France was refused by Archduke Charles due to the financial condition of empire and the army. *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 22.

intellectual life in Germany.[269] New groupings emerged as critics of the regime and champions of the reformist cause, chief amongst them the Young Hegelians and Young Germany. Both of these fell squarely in the theoretical liberal camp, and were bitter critics of romanticism and reaction, dismissing the common belief that change should occur only when rulers ready.[270]

The Hambach festival of May 1832 was in practice the culmination of a number of demonstrations in the Palatinate, amongst which were mostly demands for liberalisation. Its size alone (estimates are generally in the range of 20,000 participants) suggests that it was a source of concern for the authorities. However, the speeches and pamphlets which emerged from the gathering were the clearest articulations to date of an agenda of change at both the domestic and international levels. Not only did the demonstrators call for a *Rechtsstaat* (effectively, a set of personal freedoms, equality before the law, the proclamation of a German republic, and popular sovereignty), but there were also repeated calls for a free Poland independent of Prussian, Russian or Austrian control, the overthrow of European monarchs, and a confederation of national European

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[269] This intellectual awakening was most pronounced in Baden and the Palatinate, and was symbolised by the publication by Professors Rotteck and Welcker, of Freiburg University and members of Baden's lower house, of the *Staatslexikon*, a major theoretical liberal work, between 1834-44. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[270] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

republics.[271] Liberals, proto-democrats, and nationalist participants came from

Saxony, Prussia, and from the Confederation. The three most common

professions of those attending the festival were small farmers, students, and

professionals; many of the latter two groups were former members of the

burschenschaften, and many would in turn be heavily involved in the 1848

revolutions.[272]

The reaction to Hambach was swift. The "Six Acts" passed by the German

Diet in June 1832 were a full re-assertion of monarchical legitimacy. The Acts

obligated princes to uphold legitimist principles *vis-à-vis* local diets, whose

powers were in turn restricted; a commission was established to report on

infringements of these and other laws; press restrictions were reinforced; and

there was further suppression of the *Burschenschaften*. The real response,

however, came in the form of the "Ten Acts" of the same month, which renewed

the Carlsbad decrees, and banned *inter alia* clubs, assemblies, and the display of

unauthorized flags (the object of which was the revolutionaries' tricolor).[273]

Several state diets and universities were closed. Most immediately, however,

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[271] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[272] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, p. 46.

[273] Billinger, *Metternich*, pp. 117-23.

thousands of the participants were imprisoned, and hundreds put to death, in a violent suppression of dissent.[274]

The effect of the crackdown was markedly similar to the repression of the liberal movements of 1820. A limited aftershock occurred the following year, when a coup attempt in Frankfurt saw a group of students storm the city guard house, hoping to arm the townspeople and proclaim a republic; however, the coup failed at winning any degree of popular support, and the revolt was easily put down.[275] In general, the repressive tactics employed were sufficient to quell the most serious manifestations of dissent. Despite the broader base of support enjoyed by liberals in this era, and their more sophisticated, cosmopolitan message, the radicals who attended Hambach were no more successful than the *Burschenschaften* in altering state orientations towards the German "nation" and its place amongst others of its kind in Europe.[276]

The social characteristics of the polities of Restoration Germany were such that any movement which drew its strength primarily from middle-class intellectuals must be considered handicapped, at least in comparison with similar movements in the twentieth century. The achievements of Humboldt's reforms in increasing public literacy notwithstanding, both romantic nationalism and liberal, cosmopolitan nationalism were of limited resonance in a society which

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[274] Golo Mann, *Germany*, pp. 115.

[275] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 21.

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was still broadly agricultural, and whose town life bore the enduring marks of the guild system (which despite being abolished in the reformers' era had been widely reinstituted by 1830).[277]

Moreover, as Sagarra points out, the very bureaucratic, intellectual, and middle-class callings of most of the radicals endowed the opposition with a severe structural impediment: the state was repressive but was paradoxically a source of order and security, and a major provider of employment, for the middle class. While there were various attempts in the 1830s by followers of Heinrich Heine and the Frankfurt journalist Ludwig Borne to develop a critical press tradition, these efforts were stymied by the repressive measures passed by the Bundestag in the middle of the decade. In 1935, a significant number of liberal writers were imprisoned, and censorship re-imposed and reinforced.[278]

Another significant impediment to the German radical opposition in this era was the lack of a genuine cultural centre, considered by many to be as important a factor as repression: in short, Germany had no Paris.[279] This was in

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[276] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 114.

[277] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 26. The degree to which German daily political society was a small world was reinforced by the extremely limited franchise. In Berlin from 1828 to 1848, on average only 5-6% of population was enfranchised in city elections. The electorate in 1828 was 8,200, and had risen by 1848 to just 19,000. See Knudsen, "Limits", p. 121.

[278] Sagarra, *Nineteenth-Century Germany*, p. 50.

[279] *Ibid.*, p. 50. See also Knudsen, "Limits".

large part due to the enduring impact of Stein-Hardenberg reform era. As one observer has concluded, "the continuing presence in the capital of survivors from the reform period dictated that into the 1840s much of the visible political debate was still formulated in terms of the tradition of enlightened bureaucratic reform." Moreover, the dominance of this group greatly limited the impact of more radical opponents of the regime, as the old bureaucratic reformers "maintained a group cohesiveness in and out of power through which they dominated the formulation of liberal political attitudes in the capital".[280] As a consequence, for many years Berlin had liberal institutions, and individual liberals, but no general liberal politics, and witnessed a general acceptance and internalization of tradition of paternalistic domination.[281]

1848

Of the two overlapping strands of opposition in this period, liberalism had flourished at expense of nationalism in early part of 1830s, but nationalism reemerged as a potent force with growing economic power of the various states

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[280] Knudsen, "Limits", pp. 115.

[281] *Ibid.*, p. 129-31. Knudsen argues that Berlin did not react as did the rest of Germany to the revolutions of 1830, and that the death of Frederick William III, rather than events in Paris, marked more a more significant break with the Restoration, leading as it did to the marginal liberalisation of political life in Berlin in the early 1840s.

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of the *Zollverein* in later 1830s.[282] However, it was external events which gave greater impetus to nationalist, rather than cosmopolitan or internationalist, revisionism. France, outmanoeuvered by Britain over Egypt in the summer of 1840, sought redress in an activist European policy. Thiers, the foreign minister of the day, prepared the army for war, most probably against Germany. The Paris press printed a series of heated denunciations of the 1815 treaties, and called for the reconquest of Rhineland, Thiers making claims to the Rhine as the 'natural frontier' of France, sparking the emergence of conflicting 'river cults' in France and Germany.[283] These actions were central in killing most friendly sentiments for France in Germany, and in crippling cosmopolitan liberalism. Thus unification, not struggle against tyranny, became the dominant issue for the revisionist opposition in the 1840s.[284]

The 1840s witnessed rapid social change. In the combined German states and territories the population increased from 25 million at the time of the Congress of Vienna to nearly 35 million in 1845.[285] This was also the period of

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[282] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 23.

[283] Golo Mann, *Germany*, p. 126-30.

[284] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 26.

[285] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 19.

Germany's initial industrial development,[286] which brought considerable

urbanisation and changes in the productive roles of individuals. The fortunes of

two groups, *handwerker* (artisans) and industrial workers, diverged significantly

as a consequence of these developments. The *handwerker*, who were fighting

against encroachment by larger-scale modern industry, saw their standard of

living drop as their numbers increased through the population boom.

Conversely, the wages of industrial workers, who profited from the growth in

industry combined with existing restrictions on labour mobility, rose continually

through the Restoration period.[287] Despite the exhortations and expectations of

contemporary socialists (and twentieth century Marxist observers), in 1848 the

industrial proletariat *per se* constituted a labour aristocracy and were not

significant actors in the revolution.[288]

Thus to the extent that an emiserated proletariat existed in Germany in the

1830s and 1840s, it was the handwerker rather than the better-off industrial

workers who better fit the description.[289] This showed in the degree to which it

was artisans, and not factory workers, who were the most likely to engage in

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[286] The actual period of industrial 'takeoff', however, was some years away, occurring after the

reorganization of German capital markets in 1850 and again in the 1870s. See Trebilcock,

Industrialization, p. 44.

[287] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 18.

[288] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p.35.

[289] Snell, *Democratic Movement*, pp. 62-63.

social unrest. Hardenberg's appointment itself had hastened the decline of handwerker by 1810, with the promulgation of a decree allowing practice of several trades at once.[290] The *Zollverein* was also a blow, eroding as it did the long-protected local markets of artisans. In January 1832 armed groups of *handwerker* protesting the customs union attacked toll houses and threatened customs officials in Hanau, the disorders spreading to neighbouring Frankfurt.[291] The activism of the handwerker, unlike the liberals and the nationalists, was almost exclusively backward-looking, and had a heavy Luddite element, as found in the revolt of the Silesian weavers in 1844.[292]

Thus neither the artisans nor the industrial workers held socially radical viewpoints, and it was only the former group that actively expressed any discontent, which when it appeared was anti-modernist. In part this is due to the reasons outlined above; in part, it was also due to the tremendous impact emigration had on the political landscape of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. The increase in population of this time might have been even greater but for the large population and talent loss of the 1830s and 1840s: as news of religious and political freedom in America filtered back through the letters and writings of German émigrés, many of the most progressive elements among the

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[290] Hamerow, *Restoration, pp.* 24-25.

[291] *Ibid.,* p. 33.

[292] Snell, *Democratic Movement,* pp. 62-63.

disadvantaged classes took the opportunity to begin anew across the Atlantic.[293]

From both the proletariat and the artisan classes, the talented and ambitious

emigrated along with the down-trodden in the hundreds of thousands.[294]

The revolution of March 1848 had a number of proximate causes. A

famine in 1847 had exacerbated the rural situation, in which growth in the

population of the countryside had meant smaller and smaller plots for the

peasantry. The land reforms and emancipations of the previous decades, in

particular in the states of the German Confederation, had been done by fiat

without reflection on the social impact of such moves. Many peasants found

themselves landless, and left adrift, were eventually susceptible to revolutionary

agitation.[295] The agricultural depression, in a reflection of the still heavily

agrarian nature of German society, led in turn to an urban commercial

depression,[296] which further eroded the living standards of already-impoverished

handwerker and *kleinhandler*. As Hamerow notes, if the depression led to the

emigration of the proletariat, it also meant the radicalisation of the peasantry and

handwerker, and thus gave middle class intellectuals a new mass following for

their constitutionalism. "The economic crisis thus prepared the way for the

spring uprising of 1848 by endowing the political opposition with popular

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[293] *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.

[294] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 81.

[295] Sagarra, *Nineteenth-Century Germany*, p. 55.

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support and forcing it to adopt more radical tactics".[297] And as in 1830, events in Paris proved a spark for revolutionary groups across Germany.

The cooperative network of repression designed earlier in the century was overwhelmed by the number of revolutionary outbreaks. Metternich or Frederick William IV would have sent troops to contain revolutions in places such as Bavaria or Wurttemberg in 1848, were they not confronted by their own revolutions. By the spring of 1848, Mann observes, the collusive powers of Germany's own domestic regimes and their outside guarantor were failing: "the dynasty was in no position to obstruct revolution in the states of the German Confederation, and it appeared that Austria could no longer stand in the way of German unity".[298] Prussia's was the most violent revolution of all the north German states, and Frederick found himself unable to intervene in other state capitals in the spring of 1848. Upon hearing of Metternich's fall he abandoned resistance, and offered the revolutionaries a constitution and a parliament. The royal couple paid respect to the graves of dead rebels, the king forced to wear the black-red-gold colours the liberals had copied from the *Burschenschaft*.[299]

The revolutionary coalition which briefly achieved success in 1848-49 was highly heterogeneous. It leadership was a composite of the progressive spectrum

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[296] Trebilcock, *Industrialization*, p. 42.

[297] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 75.

[298] Mann, *Germany*, p. 81.

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of the day: nationalists, liberals, and to a lesser extent socialists. The continuity

between the ideas and leadership of the 1848 revolution, and the earlier outbursts

of dissent, was considerable. Golo Mann observes that many of the senior

leaders of the revolution "were men of the Napoleonic era whose ideas were

those of the Germany of 1818".[300] The ranks of the revolutionaries in the streets

of German cities, however, were populated primarily by artisans and peasants,

whose concerns were at once anti-regime yet also essentially reactionary. Rather

than any class consciousness, the handwerker were possessed of 'guild

consciousness', the implications of which were to have important consequences

for the course of the revolution.[301]

Conclusions

There is not the space here to recount in detail the various changes in

fortune of the 1848 revolutions in Germany. In light of the argument of the

dissertation, I feel three points are most relevant: the continuity between wartime

politicisation and 1848, the ability of aggrieved groups to form an anti-regime

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[299] *Ibid.,* p. 84.

[300] *Ibid.,* p. 112.

[301] James G. Chastain, in Rudolph Stadelmann, *Social and Political History of the German 1848 Revolution* (translation of the original 1948 edition by James G. Chastain), Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1975, p. xv.

logroll, and the essentially domestic reasons for the lack of emergence of a German revisionist challenger.

First, it is possible to trace a lineage from the disappointments of the liberals of earlier decades, regarding the postwar order within Germany and across Europe, to the foreign policies sought by the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848-49. Moreover, this lineage is accentuated by the fact that the personnel of the dissatisfied wartime generation produced much of the leadership of the revolution in 1848, in which many of the symbols of the earlier protests of the Hambach festival and the *Burschenschaften* were employed. In the parliament's attempt to conduct an independent foreign policy, there is ample evidence of efforts made to establish a novel pattern of relations, distinct from the expectations of Metternich's system. This tendency had two manifestations, one oriented towards German national unification, the other less strong and with an accent on a liberal universalist world-view. The best example of the former was the conflict with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein. The Frankfurt parliament's radical wing wanted a militant foreign policy, and wished Prussia to prosecute the war, and censured the armistice signed by the Prussians at Malmo which committed the Prussians to evacuate the disputed territory. Under radical influence Parliament refused to ratify the armistice, but then reversed its decision

as dissension amongst the leftist factions of the revolutionary leadership strengthened the counter-revolutionaries' hand.[302]

The more cosmopolitan elements of the Frankfurt parliament's foreign policy saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with United States. More significant in terms of European revisionism was the parliament's sympathy for Polish national aspirations, the *cause célèbre* of progressive liberalism in mid-nineteenth century Europe. The parliament declared that Germany had "a sacred duty" to promote Polish unification and freedom from Prussian, Austrian and Russian control. The duchy of Posen, annexed by Prussia in 1793, was to be granted greater autonomy, a position held publicly by Frederick William IV under pressure from leftist parliamentarians.[303]

Ultimately, the revolutionary elite overestimated the willingness of German society to tolerate the degree of social change some of their number, in particular the socialists, were proposing. With the defection of the revolution's mass following, and — perhaps most critically — the lack of any real control over the state's coercive instruments, the revolutionaries were unable to achieve any concrete action to match the rhetoric of their desires. The decision of Frederick to reject the (proffered) crown of a united Germany in April 1849, in light of such a

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[302] Carr, *A History of Germany*, pp. 46-47.

[303] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

move's provocative revisionist symbolism,[304] was critical: the very dependence of

the revolution on the behaviour of the monarch speaks to the ultimate fragility of

the resolve of contemporary German subversives.

In the end the radicals drove moderates in the working class and the

urban middle class into the arms of reactionaries, and with the declaration of

martial law in Prussia, the counter-revolution was soon to triumph.[305] Yet the

international revisionist impulse was as plain as the domestic in the deliberations

of the Frankfurt parliament, and was recognised as such by the counter-

revolutionaries and moderates who feared the great power confrontation that

such moves would surely provoke.[306]

Was the revisionist posture of the 1848 radicals towards the domestic and

international aspects of the Vienna system an important variable in the history of

nineteenth-century international relations? In arguing that it was, I take issue

with the view of skeptics who have cast historians of liberalism in *Vörmarz*

Germany as apologists for later German behaviour. Karl Wegert has argued, for

instance, that "the significance of the radical in Germany has been

exaggerated".[307] With respect to the *democratic* nature of the 1848 revolutions,

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[304] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[305] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[306] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

[307] Karl H. Wegert, *German Radicals Confront the Common People: Revolutionary Politics and Popular Politics, 1789-1849*, Mainz, Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1992, p. 328.

this is true. Much of the radicalism of the era, especially after the 1840 Rhine crisis, was aggressively nationalistic, and domestically was characterised by an affinity for order. Moreover, whatever the democratic nature of the leadership, the revolutionary following was possessed of limited vision and reactionary attitudes; attacks by peasants on Jewish merchants in the midst of the revolution demonstrate an altogether different type of historical continuity.[308] The point remains, however, that whatever the democratic credentials of the radicals, whether in the Burschenschaft, at Hambach, or in 1848, their anti-absolutist and nationalist beliefs and actions were in direct opposition to both the domestic and the international provisions of the Vienna settlement: what separated them from initiating a challenge to the international postwar order were contradictions in domestic policy amongst the coalition membership, which swept the rug out from under the revisionists.

This is the second point I wish to make. As in Germany and Italy between the two world wars, the groups aggrieved by the Restoration's rollback of wartime social gains and promises were able to exploit the socio-political concerns of other social groups to form an anti-regime logrolled coalition. However, unlike the first two cases examined in the dissertation, the goals of the various groups in the coalition were in critical areas mutually exclusive, a fact which brought the revolution (and any chance of a revisionist foreign policy) to its knees. The coalition was at best a short-term partnership of bourgeois

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[308] Stadelmann, *Social and Political History*, p. 83.

liberalism and "proletarian" artisans.[309] The revolution was limited by the fact that liberals did not genuinely conceive of political society as extending beyond educated circles; moreover, had the liberals been successful in retaining the support of radical *handwerker*, this support was concentrated in urban settings in an otherwise largely rural society. In essence, Germany's semi-feudal class structure, aggravated by emigration, limited the possibilities for a liberal revolution.[310] The conservatives were ultimately victorious due to their ability to exploit differences over economic development between artisans and bourgeois liberals.[311]

Third, the revolution was defeated from within. The old regimes of Prussia and Austria were in no condition to put down the revolution but for the defection of the peasantry and artisans to the conservative camp. In turn, therefore, the primary reason for the "success" of the Congress of Vienna — inasmuch as the major states of Europe did not act to challenge the conservative postwar order desired by Metternich — lies not with the "reasonableness" of the peace treaty, with the balance of power, or with economic factors of rise and fall amongst the great powers, but with the particular characteristics of class configuration and historical political development in Germany: a conclusion which will receive greater attention below.

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[309] Hamerow, *Restoration*, p. 78.

[310] Carr, *A History of Germany*, p. 58.

In the cases of Italy and Germany between the two world wars, I argued that the sudden expansions of the scope and intensity of political life and participation associated with the war years, combined with political institutions which were poorly institutionalised, rendered the situation one of mass politics and instrumental political behaviour. In turn, these factors contributed to the ability of groups aggrieved by the postwar settlement to capture the levers of state power. In early nineteenth-century Germany there was no extension of the franchise along the lines of the Italian reforms of 1911 or the Weimar constitution. There was, however, an episode of substantial political inclusion of previously excluded groups: in particular, the Stein-Hardenberg reforms and the actions of the French invaders led to the political advancement of middle-class professionals, and especially liberal intellectuals, at the expense of the nobility. The Restoration brought an end to that period of incorporation. However, in doing so, it created a situation which mirrors that found in the two twentieth-century cases, in three ways. First, the Carlsbad decrees and other repressive acts were interpreted by the objects of that repression as a blatant betrayal of their wartime gains and sacrifices. Second, the culpability for that betrayal resided with a collusive relationship between conservative domestic German governments and a repressive international cartel. Finally, while political participation was increasingly denied to the idealistic wartime generation after 1815, the memory of that participation and of an expanded political world could

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[311] *Ibid.*, p. 59.

not be erased. As the German political economy changed to reflect the advances of initial industrialisation, the urban liberal bourgeoisie and its intellectual wing grew more powerful. Yet to extent that the political institutions of the day remained absolutist in character, the political framework of German society was an anachronism, and could hardly be expected to contain a generation whose own experience spoke of broader possibilities.

One difference between this case and the later cases, which seems salient, is the role of the military. With the exception of the *burschenschaften*, who while partly composed of combat veterans were small in number and given to idealistic symbolism rather than direct physical challenge, the liberal and nationalist opposition in *Vörmarz* Germany could not count either the professional military or a mass of veterans on their side in any of the confrontations with the old regime. This may indicate that the direction of the domestic challenge (that is, from the left, rather than from the right) was central to explaining the outcome of the German case after 1815. The following examination of Restoration France may shed further light on this issue.

CHAPTER 5

CHALLENGE THWARTED II: FRANCE AFTER 1815

The experience just examined, that of Prussia and the German Confederation in the aftermath of 1815, is perhaps loosely analogous to the Italian situation after the first world war. Although the German states liberated themselves from French rule and were ultimately victorious in the systemic conflict, significant social groups within these states soon came to believe that the content of the international postwar settlement was a betrayal of the sacrifices they had made in the conflict, and of the gains they had either achieved or been promised. Furthermore, this betrayal was perceived to be the responsibility of external as well as internal authority structures, who appeared to collude in the frustration of the aggrieved groups' goals.

If the German-Prussian experience was similar to the later Italian case, inasmuch as both witnessed the emergence of a revisionist movement within a victorious state, then the story of France after 1815 bears at least a passing resemblance to the German experience after the first world war. Both countries had fought alone against, and had been defeated by, a coalition of great powers. In each of these defeated states, the immediate postwar period saw the replacement of the wartime government by a different regime, of the type preferred by the victorious states. And in both cases, the defeated state was considered by the victors to be the primary potential security risk of the coming

decades, prompting a policy of war indemnities, encircling alliances, and preventive diplomacy.

The obvious difference is that while Germany rebounded from defeat in 1918 to overthrow the international postwar settlement two decades later, Restoration France did not initiate any such overthrow. In terms of direct military actions since 1815 — or lack thereof — French foreign policy shows a decided drift in favour of the status quo, through the Crimean conflict, until the debatable origins of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870.

Yet within even the limited purview of this analysis, that is, the period of the postwar generation, it would also be reasonable to suggest that there were those in France who wished otherwise. In examining the "golden age" recorded by Kissinger and Gulick, it has been equally possible for scholars to conclude that the peace of Europe, and the international quiescence of the French, often seemed likely to collapse: thus as one historian notes, "for the fifty years after Napoleon's defeat Europe trembled every time France seemed on the verge of overturning the treaties imposed on her in 1815".[312]

In the remainder of this chapter I will examine the case of France, as that society moved from Napoleon's peculiar mix of dictatorship and revolutionary consolidation into the era of the Bourbon Restoration and the "age of

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[312] Lough, John and Muriel, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century France,* London, Longman, 1978, p. 23.

revolutions".[313] I will argue that as in the other case examined in this period, many of the conditions necessary for the emergence of a revisionist challenge of the post-1815 international order were satisfied. This analysis will also explore those factors which prevented groups in favour of a revisionist foreign stance from making a lasting impact on mid-nineteenth-century French foreign policy, making the reemergence of a French challenger a threat rather than an actual occurrence. To anticipate the conclusion to this chapter, I will argue that a lack of complementarity in the domestic policy goals of the various revolutionary coalitions in this period eroded the likelihood of an emergent revisionist foreign policy; more broadly, it seems that this constellation of domestic factors is of greater significance in accounting for the course of French systemic behaviour than are the usual explanations given for the events of the era.

The wartime experience

The great upheavals in French society from 1789 through the revolutionary wars and the wars of Napoleon cannot be packaged neatly into a single statement. The divisive nature of French politics since the late eighteenth century is a major source of distinction between France and the Anglo-Saxon bourgeois democracies. This tradition speaks to the fact that the social changes wrought by the revolutionaries, the counter-revolutionaries, and by Napoleon,

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[313] E.J. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848*, Toronto, Penguin, 1962.

brought losses or gains to many different segments of society. Moreover, as each

political foray (radical liberalism, reactionary monarchism, and Bonapartism)

through temporary success created perceptual links amongst its adherents

between their own political goals and the general ascendancy of the nation, the

cleavages that emerged from the era were deep and enduring, and were to

condition French politics in large measure from then on.[314]

The revolutionary background is interwoven with the wars beginning in

1792. The initial successes of the revolution in limiting absolutist authority and

developing a bourgeois parliamentary regime soon faced pressures from below.

As peasant revolts overthrew the existing agrarian system of seigneurial

privilege, the more conservative portions of the bourgeois revolutionary elite

proved increasingly willing to align on certain issues with reactionary

monarchists and nobles, leading to a durable right-left polarisation of

republicanism. Repeated attacks on and destruction of rural authority structures,

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[314] In one of the chief contributions of the much-abused political development literature, Seymour

Martin Lipset and Stein Rokkan lay out a general model of European historical development, based

on societal reaction to three sequential circumstances—the Reformation (state church vs.

Catholicism), democratisation (secular modernity vs. Catholic allegiance), and industrialisation (the

balance between urban and rural interests). The French case after 1815, while bearing its own

particular characteristics, is riddled with examples of the salience and intractability of such

cleavages. See Lipset & Rokkan, "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments", in

Lipset & Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*, New York, Free

Press, 1967.

venal offices, and ecclesiastical property and privilege led to large-scale emigration by the French nobility, many of whom became energetically involved in counter-revolutionary activity abroad. Prior to the French declaration of war on Austria in 1792, the polarisation of the revolutionary elite came to mirror a broader polarisation of French society.[315]

Divisions and mutual suspicion between revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries were accentuated by the war and by the ambiguous role of the peasantry, who while having seized the opportunity to destroy traditional patterns of authority in the countryside were at times unwilling to subscribe to the modernising and centralist tendencies of the revolutionary elite. The rumoured introduction of conscription led to the peasant revolt in the Vendée in 1792. The emergence of opposition to the revolution from below as well as from above gave the upper hand to the most radical revolutionaries. Under the Committee of Public Safety, the *Montagnard* Jacobins drew on the support of urban artisans, small merchants and journeymen (the *sans-culottes*) to pursue an increasingly coherent, violent (and regicidal) egalitarian program.[316]

The Vendée notwithstanding, the extent to which the revolution had created a contractarian spirit in French society, a sense of popular sovereignty, can be seen both in the increased willingness of middle-class men to volunteer for military service (with the departure of the noble officer corps) and in the reaction

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[315] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 181-85.

to the *levée en masse*, the edict of mass conscription issued by the Jacobins in August 1793. From an army of moderate size, dependent on mercenaries and officered by the nobility, the revolution's new opportunities and self-concept had provided France with a formidable force of near-uniform national origin, considerable mobility of military rank, and tremendous size, which was "bourgeois and petit bourgeois and highly literate".[317] To an extent, the way had been prepared by Rousseau, whose writings by that time enjoyed a popularity that crossed class lines in a manner unknown to most Enlightenment philosophy. But the physical break with old authority structures and the incorporation of the male individual as *citoyen* was clearly a watershed for French military mobilisation. As a bargain, the causal sequence appears at slight variance with the model outlined in this work: the mass political incorporation of the revolution predates the declaration of war. Yet at the same time one may argue that in attempting to preserve the grip of the *Montagnard* revolutionaries on the reins of power, the Jacobins found it politically expedient to combat their opponents (and maintain the support of their only real power base, the *sans-culottes*) through a posture of radical egalitarianism, and an accentuation of the

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[316] *Ibid.*, pp. 187-89.

[317] See Michael Mann, *Sources Vol. II*, pp. 203-04; and Samuel F. Scott, "The French Revolution and the Professionalization of the French Officer Corps", in Morris Janowitz and Jacques van Doorn, eds., *On Military Ideology*, Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971.

identity of individual and national interest (and benefit). Thus, the *levée* edict was phrased in the most inclusive (and purple) terms:

> The young men will go to fight; the married men will forge arms and carry supplies; the women will make tents and uniforms and will serve in the hospitals; the children will shred the old clothes; the old men will be taken to the public squares to excite the courage of the combatants, the hatred of royalty and the unity of the Republic.[318]

The revolution saw gains made and political influence attained at various times by the new commercial bourgeoisie, the rural peasantry, urban artisans and shopkeepers, and the liberal intelligentsia; under the Directory, the conservative bourgeoisie temporarily reestablished their hold on the republic. If the first decade after the revolution saw a variety of social groups rally to the defense of a republic which had brought new freedoms, the nature of those freedoms, the groups which benefitted, and the durability of reforms remained in doubt. So long as the rivalries between republicans and monarchists, and Girondists and Jacobins, ensured that the balance of government alternated between revolution and counter-revolution, the mobilising potential of the revolution would remained only partly fulfilled.

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[318] Cited in Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* p. 189.

The first genuine glimmer of lasting, centralised control of the French state emerged with Napoleon's assumption of power, which heralded the beginning of genuine revolutionary consolidation, if in a manner unforeseen by the radicals of 1789. As a general Napoleon had already established his particular brand of populist militarism in the Italian and Egyptian campaigns, exploiting his own (allegedly if not particularly) humble background and directly exhorting his men in a fashion unknown to the eighteenth century. He gave an impression of moderate republicanism. In northern Italy he had presided over a subordinate but liberalised Italian republic; but despite having achieved fame in the suppression of the Vendémiaire royalist rising in Paris, and having published an early pro-*Montagnard* pamphlet, in Italy he was careful to distance himself from local Jacobins, as a loyal servant of the Directory.[319]

Brumaire, and Napoleon's subsequent consolidation of power, were initially acceptable to revolutionary moderates amongst the bourgeoisie as the only realistic guarantee of their economic and political position in the face of monarchist counter-revolution and Jacobin extremism. As Martyn Lyons argues, the Directory "no longer provided a sufficient guarantee"; needing to entrench the eclipse of the old order yet in a moderate economic and political climate, the revolutionary bourgeoisie "turned to a new set of institutions to protect the legacy of the French Revolution." Thus, the advent of Napoleon may been seen

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[319] Martyn Lyons, *Napoleon Bonaparte and the Legacy of the French Revolution*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 5-28.

as having substantive, if not institutional, continuity with the Girondist political tradition, at least in terms of class interest: "The coup of Brumaire may best be interpreted not as a rupture with the immediate revolutionary past, but as a new attempt to secure and prolong the hegemony of the revolutionary bourgeoisie".[320]

Yet Napoleon's rule obviously consisted of more than domestic revolutionary consolidation, and the question remains as to how he was able repeatedly to extract the societal support and military manpower sufficient to complete the most rapid and successful campaign of conquest Europe had yet seen. Most certainly, as an individual and as a military leader Napoleon had powers of inspiration equalled by few; these powers were reinforced by the success he enjoyed on the battlefield. Moreover, his legend was of even greater proportions than fact: a key part of the Napoleonic myth was that he shared the common soldier's sufferings, and his followers had an anachronistic degree of identification with their leader.[321]

However, there were a variety of concrete policies from which Napoleon was able to derive both rural and urban support for his leadership in spite of the hardships of conscription and the near-constant state of war: support which was to endure in large measure through the setbacks of 1812-13. The chief components of the Napoleonic system included: the further rationalisation of

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[320] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

judicial and administrative structures through the *Code Civil*; the embedding of liberal property rights and the provision of guarantees against a restoration of the old rural order, acts embodied by the Rural Law Code; the use of plebiscites; and the partial reconciliation of church and state through the *Concordat* of 1801.

Who benefitted from Napoleon's years in command of the republic, and his later years as emperor? Clearly, the beneficiaries were not the royal or noble representatives of the old regime, who were dealt a double blow: first, through the *Code Civil* which ended the chances of a feudal or seigniorial revival that had appeared in the later years of the Directory, and second, through Napoleon's establishment of his own rival dynasty in 1804. Nor were they the émigré clergy, whose ouster from local political power was confirmed under Napoleon, and whose own legitimacy was sapped by the *Concordat*. At the other end of the political spectrum, the leadership of the radical revolutionaries found themselves isolated by the new regime's co-optation of moderate bourgeois interest, then imprisoned or executed in the aftermath of an abortive attempt on Napoleon's life in 1800.[322]

There were a number of social groups which made advances or consolidated old gains under Napoleon. In the countryside, Napoleon enjoyed remarkable support among the peasantry, despite high levels of conscription. The Consulate restored a degree of normalcy to village life, with a particular mix

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[321] *Ibid.*, p. 182

of egalitarianism and respect for the pattern of land use and ownership which had evolved from the revolutionary upheavals. The wealthier peasants (*coqs de village*) resumed their dominant position within the social life of villages. Not all of this group were smallholders — some were landowners, large lessors, owners of horse-teams, or employers — but this class found general benefit and renewed political authority in the regime's entrenchment of post-revolutionary ownership patterns. Bonaparte guaranteed that neither would seigneurialism return nor the sale of the *biens nationaux* be revoked.[323]

Napoleon fared less well amongst poorer peasants, yet the property-less still stood to benefit from the absence of feudal and ecclesiastical levies. The Rural Law Code, while theoretically accepting bourgeois individualist principles of property (and thus presenting a threat to common pasture rights desired by peasants), was in reality mitigated by large concessions to rural collectivism.[324] Conscription was never popular, and became more intimidatory after 1812, when defeat threatened. But nor was it considered a total evil: it was never evenly applied, exemptions could be obtained or bought, and military life in a conquering army offered certain attractions to landless individuals. Moreover,

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[322] *Ibid.*, pp. 129-38.

[323] *Ibid.*, p. 143.

[324] Peter Jones, "Common Rights and Agrarian Collectivism in the Southern Massif Central, 1750-1880", in G. Lewis & G. Lucas, eds., *Beyond the Terror: Essays in French Regional and Social History, 1794-1815*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983.

labour shortages due to conscription led to higher peasant wages, and agricultural shortages led to higher prices, rendering peasant prosperity relatively high by the Imperial period.[325]

For the bourgeoisie, the Consulate's rationalisation and expansion of the military, the civil service and the judiciary, provided greater opportunities for socio-economic advancement and stability of position than had obtained either under the Directory or the *ancien régime*; opportunities which were to multiply with the conquests of the early Napoleonic years. It fell to the lawyers, proprietors and merchants of the bourgeoisie to populate the political institutions of the Napoleonic consolidation. If illiberal, the administrative and judicial hierarchy of Napoleon's early bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, dominated by the Council of State, preserved and deepened the property and careers-open-to-talent aspects of the revolution, as well as the bourgeois hold on the burgeoning state bureaucracy. As Lyons concludes, "the status given to Napoleonic elites of landowners, functionaries and soldiers consecrated the triumph of the revolutionary bourgeoisie", helping "to answer, in social terms, the question of who 'won' the French Revolution".[326]

As for the radical urban classes, including workers, artisans and petty bourgeois, the Napoleonic regime offered little in the way of incentive in exchange for support, and in the purge of the Jacobins had deprived these groups

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[325] Lyons, *Napoleon*, pp. 143–45.

of much of their leadership. The plebiscite system was accepted by some as evidence of the regime's continued egalitarian-democratic heritage, yet the secret ballot was not available in the most important of these, the vote of 1802, and the voting tally was subject to widespread manipulation and falsification; moreover, Paris contained some of the highest abstention rates in the four plebiscites, in a system where abstention, rather than a negative vote, was the more likely symbol of protest.[327] Discouraged and routed by the political police under Fouché, the former *sans-culottes* emigrated in large numbers, others being deported in the early years of Napoleonic control.[328] There were some urban, non-bourgeois elements who saw gains under Napoleon, most notably amongst the working class, for whom the consequences of war and conscription generated a familiar pattern of labour scarcity and high wages. For this segment of urban society, regime repression and discipline was more difficult to accomplish: through economic necessity repression fell less harshly, with strikes occasionally succeeding despite official attempts to limit worker organization and mobility.[329] Thus through a mixture of repression, the co-optation of democratic-populist

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[326] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 200-202. Lyons, *Napoleon*, pp. 127-28, 160.

[327] Lyons, *Napoleon*, pp. 111-115; F. Bluche, *Le Plebiscite des Cent-Jours, avril-mai 1815*, Geneva, Droz, 1974.

[328] Lyons, *Napoleon*, pp. 136-37.

[329] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

symbols, and the economic fortunes of conflict, dissent from the urban, pro-Jacobin left was absorbed neatly by the Consulate and Empire.

If the high-water mark of societal support for Napoleon occurred around 1802, and declined thereafter, it is also true that the tremendous military successes of the regime had created an allegiance between the Napoleonic state and various social groups which was to survive the regime itself -- as witnessed by the speed with which the Emperor's supporters rallied to his call in the Hundred Days. As the most likely guarantee against a Bourbon restoration, Napoleon extended benefits to his core bourgeois support and olive branches to much of his real or potential opposition. The groups which had prospered under the Empire were to form different and contrary political traditions after 1815. Most significant, however, is the degree to which the Napoleonic era consolidated the incorporation of broad sectors of society into state life, and provided concrete advantages to a variety of social groups.

Of additional note is the Napoleonic continuation of the fusion of French nationalism with the revolutionary tradition. While it is true that Napoleon's personal ambition ultimately betrayed French interests, the support he derived stemmed in large measure from the interaction of domestic consolidation and French gains abroad. In part, this connection was made by representation in the increasingly imperial and historically-oriented propaganda of the regime, in which Napoleon became increasingly prone to adopt the mantle of

Charlemagne.[330] Yet as a mixture of belief it was very real, a consequence of the

coincidence of complementary goals. As Sudhir Hazareesingh observes, the

revolutionaries' faith in the superiority of French values "inevitably yielded the

belief that these values had to be exported to the rest of the world":

> Hence the paradoxical conflation, in the justificatory language of French military
>
> adventures of the 1790s, of the principle of nationality with that of political
>
> liberation. The messianic message of the Republic assumed both a universalistic
>
> and a nationalist character...[331]

In the upheavals which gripped French society sporadically through the

nineteenth century, the terms of the domestic settlement were to be disputed

with regularity. Yet both republicanism and Bonapartism carried from their

origins not only a set of domestic preferences but important associations with an

assertive French foreign policy as well; and both traditions were uncomfortable

with a subordinate European role. The Revolution and Napoleon had for many

of the French changed the nature of political legitimacy in two decades, from

dynastic inheritance to an assertive expression of popular sovereignty. As an

attempt to turn back the clock, the Bourbon Restoration and Metternich's sought-

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[330] As in, for instance, David's portrait of Napoleon crossing the Alps. *Ibid.*, ch. 13.

[331] Sudhir Hazareesingh, *Political Traditions in Modern France*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 73.

after revival of monarchical legitimism were at odds with this development. The Restoration foundered ultimately in endeavouring to shrink a political world expanded significantly since 1789, and in trying to exclude groups having enjoyed decades of political incorporation. Both the postwar regime and its external guarantors were to endure repeated revolutionary challenges in the generation to come. However, no revival of French revisionism on the scale of 1792-1815 was to occur. To understand why this is so, an exploration of the politics of the Restoration is necessary.

Postwar perceptions

Installed by the victorious coalition in 1814, Louis XVIII's tenuous hold on popular allegiance was amply demonstrated in the Hundred Days of the following year.[332] Yet whatever the personalistic nature of Napoleon's public appeal, the deficiencies of the new regime in public perception had little to do with the personality of the restored Bourbon monarch. Instead, opposition to the regime related directly to the domestic and international sources of Bourbon support.

The Second Treaty of Paris was considerable harsher than the settlement it replaced. Among its chief provisions were the restriction of France's boundaries

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[332] William Fortescue, *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in France, 1815-1852*, London, Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 18.

to the borders of 1789, the imposition of an indemnity of 700 million francs, and the stationing of a 150,000 strong Allied occupation force in France until the indemnity was paid in full. Much of the booty confiscated by the French was returned to its previous owners. Louis XVIII, who had fled Paris upon the return of Napoleon, was reinstalled as monarch at the wish of the victorious powers. Metternich had insisted that the only possible choice for government of postwar France was the rightful Bourbon heir, as reliant as the Habsburg dynasty was on dynastic, rather than popular, legitimacy. Over Russian objections (Alexander's suspicions of the Bourbons led him to suggest a republic and/or a Russian military government as alternatives) and the British government's reticence at being seen at home as having fought a war for the Bourbon king, the *ancien regime* was revived once more.

In Kissinger's view, despite the increased harshness of the Second Treaty, it was from a broader perspective nevertheless an instrument of moderation:

> It ... was not so severe as to turn France into a permanently dissatisfied power. The territories lost were of strategic rather than of commercial or symbolic significance... [W]ithin the space of fifteen months, the temptations of total victory were successfully withstood twice.

Through this moderation, Castlereagh and Metternich resisted the wishes of advocates "of a peace of vengeance which would have exposed Europe to unending political strife."[333]

Yet in France the political impact of the treaty was hardly as benign as Kissinger seems to conclude. For with one stroke, the victorious powers had defeated a regime which still enjoyed considerable legitimacy and installed in its place a representative, not only of the domestic political order which had been overthrown and de-institutionalised in the preceding decades, but — through his very reliance on outside support — of the abject condition of France as a nation. In this light the conditions of the treaty could not be viewed as magnanimous, but instead became symbolic of French decline. Moreover, the acceptance by Louis of the first, far more generous peace, had already been cast in public discourse as "a national humiliation."[334] Noting the conflation of foreign and domestic reaction and defeat in the public mind, William Fortescue has observed that rather than being seen as the end of Napoleon's particular view of France's role,

> the Battle of Waterloo came to be regarded by Frenchmen as a national defeat. This reinforced the tendency already common before 1815, to associate Napoleon and Bonapartism with nationalism and patriotism, and Louis XVIII and the

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[333] Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 184.

Restoration Monarchy with defeat and humiliation at the hands of France's enemies.[335]

Thus the legitimacy of the restored monarchy was in doubt from the very beginning, and that doubt applied to the regime's international, as well as domestic, sources of legitimacy.[336] "Louis XVIII's acceptance of those Treaties, and the accusation that he owed his throne to French defeats and to the intervention of France's enemies, inevitably counted against him".[337] It became common to refer to Louis as having arrived 'in the baggage train of foreign powers'.[338]

Domestically, the most immediate consequence of Napoleon's defeat and the Restoration was the so-called 'White Terror', in which royalist supporters and other counter-revolutionaries (*chouannerie*), as well as the population of areas

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[334] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 7.

[335] *Ibid.*, p. 12

[336] On the importance of external sources of legitimacy, see Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990.

[337] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 7.

[338] André Jardin and André-Jean Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction, 1815-1848*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 21.

such as Marseilles which had fared poorly under the Continental system,[339] attacked republicans, Protestants, and Napoleonic notables. This series of popular disturbances was matched by the imprisonment or execution of many of the 'accomplices' of Napoleon's return, including Ney, a process overseen by Fouché.[340]

The government and administration which emerged from 1815 under Louis was highly conservative. The charter which served as the ostensible constitution of the regime provided for a hereditary house of peers and an elected lower house, the suffrage heavily restricted by personal wealth. The electorate thus composed some 75,000 men, and in the elections which followed Louis' second restoration the demographics of the vote combined with widespread list-fixing and republican fear of White reprisals to return a lower chamber which was nine-tenths royalist.[341]

Under the Duc de Richelieu, a returned émigré royalist who had spent his years abroad in the service of the Russian monarchy, the Restoration government introduced a variety of repressive measures directed at the 'accomplices' in particular and against liberal-republican opposition in general. Among these were laws allowing the arbitrary arrest of suspected conspirators, the censorship of dissident publications, and the withdrawal of amnesty for many of those

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[339] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 12.

[340] Jardin and Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction*, pp. 24-25.

previously pardoned who had rejoined Napoleon in 1815. The establishment of special courts to deal with political opponents of the regime contributed to the incarceration or execution of some 6000 defendants. Finally, administrative purges removed up to one-third of the state bureaucracy, including the bulk of residual Napoleonic support.[342]

Revisionist politics

The Restoration's reliance on legislative institutions and a (highly circumscribed) degree of popular sovereignty demonstrate the extent to which the return of the Bourbons was tempered by the strengthening of the bourgeoisie (and weakening of the old elite) in the period since 1789. In the period from 1815 to 1820, this synthesis kept opposition to the regime at bay, partly through the resounding defeat inflicted on the left by the White Terror in the early days of Louis' reign, and partly through the mixed use of repressive and liberal legislation (while outright opposition to the regime remained politically risky, press controls were gradually relaxed over the five-year span). Yet several factors were to alter the fortunes of the liberal opposition in the years before 1830. The first was the growth in the power and size of the urban bourgeoisie. The number of qualified voters (paying over 300 FF annually in tax) rose by nearly

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[341] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 26.

[342] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

forty percent between 1815 and 1830,[343] the bulk of this growth occurring

through the rise of commercial fortunes,[344] rather than any increase in the

numbers of wealthy royalists.[345] From the initial successes of the ultra-royalists,

bourgeois liberals and Bonapartists came increasingly to challenge the grip of the

royalists on the legislature. The sole bond of cooperation between bourgeois

elites and the Restoration royalists had been minor accommodation over

conservative social policy. Not only did the bourgeoisie's rise in strength erode

this aspect of Restoration politics, it also brought to the fore divisions amongst

the ruling elite previously stifled by royalist dominance. The most pronounced

of these were foreign policy, censorship, clericalism, and constitutional issues.

This cleavage was exacerbated by the continued rightward movement of

the regime itself, both in 1820 after the assassination of the Duc de Berry, second

in line to the throne, and again in 1825 with the death of Louis XVIII and the

ascension to the throne of his brother, Charles X. The assassination of the Duc by

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[343] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 16.

[344] Whatever growth there was in the French economy at this time was mercantile rather than
industrial, as Trebilcock points out. See Trebilcock, *Industrialization*, pp. 140-150.

[345] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 16; The Liberal and Bonapartist representation in the lower chamber
rose from 25 to 90 of a total of 258 seats in the period from 1815 to 1820, prior to changes in the
property qualifications of the electoral law. See J.P.T. Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, third edition,
London, Methuen, 1959, p. 27.

a young liberal,[346] and the regime's response, mirrors the behaviour of the German states in the aftermath of the murder of the playwright Kotzebue the previous year. Prior to the assassination, there had been considerable concern amongst the royalists and in the royal circle over the wave of liberal unrest which had occurred in a number of other European capitals that year. Yet the legislative program of the immediate postwar years had been, if not liberal, at least more moderate than might have been expected given the composition of the lower chamber. Liberal representation had been increasing, to outnumber the *ultras* by 1819, and there was some liberalisation of the laws of 1815, including a relaxation of press restrictions. With respect to constitutional disputes, the ultra-royalists had paradoxically become defenders of parliamentary responsibility, due to the fact that the king's conservative ministers were often more moderate than the elected extremists.[347]

The crackdown on liberal and Bonapartist dissent occurring after 1820 forced much of the radical opposition to the regime underground. In an atmosphere of official anti-liberal hysteria the new government, led by Richelieu,

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[346] Named Louvel, and considered by twentieth-century historians to be – true to form – insane. Bury refers to him as a "lunatic"; Fortescue, as "deranged". Meanwhile, a contemporary account of the 1830 revolution refers only to Louvel as "an assassin". See D. Turnbull, Esq., *The French Revolution of 1830: The Events Which Produced It, and the Scenes by Which it was Accompanied*, London, Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley, 1830, p. 7.

[347] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, p. 23.

re-introduced arbitrary arrest and detentions, actively repressed even moderate newspapers, and further concentrated the voting powers held by the richest quarter of the electorate.[348] Rightist gains in subsequent elections opened the door for those in the left who had been calling for subversive tactics. Moreover, the ranks of the radical opponents of the regime were strengthened by the behaviour of the French government towards the 1820 revolutions, particularly those occurring in Spain and in Naples.

In the Neapolitan case, Louis decided against sending French troops to head off an imminent Austrian crackdown. In doing so, the government demonstrated to its critics a willingness to abandon not only the cause of constitutional monarchy — which was the minimum hoped for by much of the bourgeois opposition — but also traditional French security interests in Naples. These goals were abandoned, angering nationalist and liberal sentiment simultaneously, and ceding to the Austrians control of the situation, which they exploited in both Naples and Piedmont.

Richelieu's hold on whatever moderate support had been his collapsed, and the reactionary trend was cemented with his replacement by a government dominated by *ultras*.[349] From this point, the political themes of the 1820s were the increasingly arbitrary and reactionary nature of government behaviour — in

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[348] Jardin and Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction*, p. 48.

[349] *Ibid.*, p. 49.

particular the near-total eclipse of representative government under Charles X –
and the corresponding radicalisation of the opposition.

In its most organised form the liberal opposition took the form of secret
societies. Typically, these societies were formed around the interests of particular
social groups, often defined by class or occupation, and for whom the Restoration
had come to represent a frustration of gains achieved in the Napoleonic era. As
in Germany, student groups were among the most active. As with the
burschenschaften, many of the members of groups such as the *Société diablement
philosophique* provide us with a direct human link between the active participants
in Napoleonic campaigns and subsequent revolutionary leaderships. In
particular, many of the most prominent student radicals of the day had been (or
claimed to have been) volunteers in the Hundred Days, and many, such as the
two co-founders of the *Société diablement philosophique*, were to play leading roles
in the revolution of 1830.[350] Other groups whose fortunes had waned with the
restoration organised in similar fashion. Of considerable significance was the
existence of secret societies and Bonapartist conspiracies such as the *Bazar français*
and the *Epingle noire* within the army, whose loyalty to the regime had in any
event been suspect since the performance of the Hundred Days. The
membership of opposition groups in the military was fuelled by the
reintroduction of aristocratic privileges, and the closing of the window of
promotion to the officer corps previously available to non-noble soldiers. In the

capital, lawyers, journalists and other professionals joined clandestine opposition groups.[351] Typically, then, the membership of the secret societies was middle-class, composed of those having found advancement under Napoleon but repression under the Restoration; it extended also to the intellectual leaders of the liberal bourgeoisie, including individuals of national stature such as Lafayette and Manuel.[352]

The aspirations of these groups included liberalisation of the domestic arena and increasingly the overthrow of the monarchy. There were also widespread protests and acts of vandalism against symbols and institutions of clericalism.[353] The chief liberal conspiracy of the early 1820s, however, was that of the *charbonnerie* – modelled after the Italian liberal revolutionaries, the *carbonari*. Its membership a mix of disillusioned members of the military, veterans, liberal bourgeois and students,[354] *the charbonnerie* operated as a hierarchical vanguard, composed of ten-strong cells, dedicated to the replacement of the counter-revolution once more with liberal republicanism. Yet in addition to the domestic liberal agenda of many of the conspirators, there was

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[350] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

[351] *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

[352] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, p. 29.

[353] Fortescue, *Revolution*, pp. 19-20.

[354] Alan Spitzer, *The French Generation of 1820*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987, p. 281; *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes*, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 262-63

an equally strong element of Bonapartism in the membership, which — combined with some of the more universalistic aspirations of the liberals — gave the *charbonnerie* a decidedly revisionist agenda in international as well as domestic terms. In concrete fashion this tendency is found in the willingness of numerous members of the conspiracy to enlist in revolutionary conflicts abroad, particularly in Spain and Greece (which preceded Poland as the leading universalist liberal *cause célèbre* of the nineteenth century). In an era of foreign-installed repression, the regime united against itself in this early logroll disparate forces favouring both liberalisation and the restoration of France as the active champion of leftist and Bonapartist ideals in Europe: Alan Spitzer, in observing the conflation of republican and progressive-nationalist opposition in the secret societies, suggests that by the early 1820s "patriotism was the refuge of the revolutionary".[355] In particular, the self-concept of the soldier bore both anti-Restoration traditions.[356] In the words of one historian of the period, the *charbonnerie* embodied in its mixture of Bonapartism and liberal philosophy

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[355] See Spitzer, *Old Hatreds*, p. 278.

[356] Spitzer, *Old Hatreds*, pp. 278-79.

a vast dream at once vaguely humanitarian and passionately nationalist, the deliverance of the oppressed nationalities and the reconquest of the natural frontiers, peace proclaimed among peoples and war declared against kings.[357]

Yet as with the *carbonari* and the *burschenschaften*, the *charbonnerie* were in the end undercut by their reliance on Romantic gestures rather than on coalition-building, a reliance which rendered the movement underpopulated and burdened it with an unrealistic strategy and few allies. A series of attempted insurrections were either put down or halted *in embryo*, and the regime was never in jeopardy;[358] radical opposition to the Restoration returned to the sidelines, and the crushing of the conspiracy movement rendered Bonapartist tendencies in the military temporarily dormant.[359]

1830

The potential for a revolutionary logroll of these opposition groups with more moderate allies improved with the increasingly reactionary drift of the regime. The announced reimbursement of assets lost by *émigré* nobles in the Revolution and Empire (set at one billion FF) in 1824-25, coinciding as it did with

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[357] Raoul Girardet, *La société militaire dans la France contemporaine, 1815-1939*, Paris: Plon, 1953, pp. 22-23; quoted in Spitzer, *Old Hatreds*, p. 278.

[358] Jardin and Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction*, pp. 52-54.

an economic downturn, created the perception of "a penalty for the Revolution" and alienated many moderate bourgeois.[360] This alienation was furthered under Charles X (1824-30), whose initial flirtations with increasing the ratio of function to form in the Restoration led eventually to an outright attempt at an absolutist renaissance. Under Charles royal authority and clericalism were revived to an even greater extent, including the reintroduction of the laws of primogeniture.

The reorganization of the liberal opposition provided the impetus for the increasingly reactionary behaviour of the monarch. In 1827, under Guizot and through the (decreasingly secret) society known as *Aide-toi, le ciel t'aidera*, the liberals orchestrated an election strategy which circumvented the regime's attempts at creating legal barriers for opponents of the government wishing to stand as candidates. The election results returned a liberal opposition equal in size to the governing royalists, and the coalition which emerged was in terms of the limited franchise left of centre.[361]

By the end of the decade, fear of the liberals' possible revolutionary aspirations created for Charles the outcome he sought to avoid: as the momentum of the regime's reactionary agenda increased dramatically, the formation of a revolutionary coalition became the genuine possibility it had not

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[359] As seen in the French intervention in Spain in 1822-23. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[360] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

[361] David H. Pinkney, *The French Revolution of 1830*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1972, pp. 3-5.

been in 1822. Having developed secret plans to appoint an arch-reactionary government from early 1829, in August the king installed a new cabinet, which included most notably the Prince de Polignac as foreign minister and the Comte de Bourmont as minister of war.

As catalysts for the unification and resolution of republicans, liberals, and Bonapartists, the consensus of historians of the era is that these two appointments were critical. There could be few individuals who better symbolised the dual frustrations of the opposition: uncompromising reaction at home, and identification with the interest of France's enemies in foreign policy. Bourmont had fought against the Revolution with an émigré army in 1791 and had deserted Napoleon four days before Waterloo,[362] returning to testify against Ney.[363] Polignac, as foreign minister, was as a red rag to a bull, as an anglophile émigré, who like Bourmont had fought and plotted against Napoleon, and had spent much of his life in England, where he had married.[364] Some elements in the press speculated that both were part of a British-backed counter-revolutionary plot,[365] and linked the new ministry with the symbols of revolutionary and Napoleonic defeats, both home and abroad:

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[362] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 24.

[363] Pinkney, *The French Revolution*, p. 9.

[364] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[365] Fortescue, *Revolution*, pp. 24-25.

Coblentz, Waterloo, 1815, there are the three principles, there are the three

personalities of the ministry. Turn it to any side you wish, on all sides it irritates.

It has no aspect that is not sinister, not one face that is not menacing.[366]

The Polignac ministry, and Charles' subsequent attempt in the spring of

1830 to achieve total control over selection of ministers, was central in the

creation of a revolutionary logroll amongst opposition elites. Liberals (including

bourgeois, professionals and office holders) were the most dominant group in

opposition groups such as the *Aide-toi*, but significant numbers of Bonapartists

had become increasingly active opponents of the regime, as had many

republicans (whose numbers are harder to determine due to official

repression).[367] Amongst moderate opponents of the regime the royal claim of the

Duc d'Orleans was proposed as embodying constitutional monarchy.

The cooperation of opposition elites was one condition which allowed for

the overthrow of the Restoration monarchy in July; the accidental absence of

most of the French army from the vicinity of Paris was another, and the general

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[366] *Journal des débats*, Paris, August 15 1829; cited in Pinkney, *The French Revolution*, p. 10. The

three terms symbolized the emigration, the defeat of Napoleon, and the White Terror,

respectively.

[367] Pinkney, *The French Revolution*, pp. 46-49.

unreliability of the army a third.[368] A fourth was the occurrence of a significant economic downturn after 1828, stemming from an agricultural crisis and quickly spreading to urban commercial sectors and nascent French industry. Urban workers were affected considerably, their hardship through unemployment exacerbated by high food prices throughout the harsh winters of 1829 and 1830, leading to widespread food riots.[369] Urban opposition to the regime grew as the population of Paris endured increasing miseries of overpopulation, crime and unemployment, yielding a mass of potential support for the elite opposition.[370]

The revolution of 1830 and the July Monarchy which was its outcome produced a government less reactionary and more prone to govern constitutionally. Yet despite the aspirations of the radical wing of the revolutionary coalition, which became known as the *parti du mouvement*, it did not produce an assertive or revisionist French foreign policy, of either a republican or a Bonapartist tendency. The chief reason for this development was the existence of cleavages and incommensurate policy preferences amongst the revolutionary elites themselves. The *mouvement* (which drew most heavily on Bonapartist and republican support), "united in desire for an aggressive foreign policy, confident in the belief that absolute monarchs would be dethroned by

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[368] Collingham, *The July monarchy : a political history of France, 1830-1848*. London: Longman, 1988, p. 240.

[369] Pinkney, *The French Revolution*, pp. 62-68.

their subjects if they dared fight democratic France", was opposed by the more

conservative *parti de résistance*.[371] The larger *résistance* (composed primarily of

moderate bourgeois) called for a foreign policy which was assertive rather than

confrontational or revisionist; and domestically, the two groups differed over

whether the revolution had been a complete repudiation of the Restoration or

simply a change of monarch.[372]

The victory of the moderates, or Orléanists, over their Bonapartist and

republican revolutionary rivals was partly fortuitous. In the initial days of the

revolution it was the Bonapartists who assumed leadership in the Parisian

insurrections, and Bonapartists filled many key posts in the months to follow.

Yet they were hampered by the lack of a credible alternative to Louis Philippe: as

Pinkney observes, Napoleon II was little-known and resided abroad at the time;

meanwhile, no domestic military leaders were prepared to step into their former

leader's shoes.[373] Republicanism, for its part, had a large following in Paris and

in student circles, but was aside from Lafayette underrepresented in the

governing coalition and was able only to petition for a renewal of the

international revolutionary crusade.[374] The July Monarchy, despite its earlier

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[370] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[371] Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, p. 186.

[372] *Ibid.*, pp. ix, 186.

[373] Pinkney, *The French Revolution*, p. 294.

[374] *Ibid.*, p. 302.

promise and the aspirations of many of its originators, ultimately "stood for little more than constitutional monarchy and the monopoly of political power by the wealthier classes",[375] and the revolution "split the elite in political rather than social terms".[376] Revolutionaries in Poland expected support from the new French regime, but none was forthcoming. Many of the leaders of the Belgian revolt suggested union with France or at a minimum dynastic linkage, both of which were refused.

The conservative foreign policy of the July Monarchy owes a considerable amount to the belief in Paris that the limited gains of the revolution could only be consolidated with the appeasement of the other great powers. The new regime considered itself trapped between radical domestic revisionism and the suspicions of external powers, in particular Metternich's Austria. Prudence, and the pursuit of peace at the expense of perceived national interests, marked French foreign policy under Louis Philippe; the *parti de résistance* was committed to adopt a policy of external placidity and internal moderation to avoid intervention from the signatories of the Holy Alliance[377] and another heavy defeat. Yet as I have argued earlier in this chapter, this belief was more important as perception than as reality. Metternich's desire to declare war on France in 1831 was denied by his Habsburg superiors precisely because the Austrians were in no military or

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[375] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 36.

[376] Pamela M. Pilbeam, *The 1830 Revolution in France*, London, MacMillan, 1991, p. 134.

fiscal condition to engage in such a conflict.[378] Moreover, while the Russians were hostile to Parisian developments the British were rightly perceived by the Orléanists as constitutionally sympathetic to the July Revolution, if not to French expansionism.[379] Finally, events in Belgium in 1830-32 suggest that the threat of French intervention was sufficient to keep the conservative guarantors of the 1815 settlement from putting down the revolt and restoring Habsburg rule.[380]

This is not to say that in the absence of this perception Louis Philippe would have led an actively revisionist foreign policy along republican or Bonapartist lines. It is to say that the conservatism which emerged from the confusion of July, the victory of the *résistance* over the *mouvement* and of the Orléanists over Bonapartism, was due in large measure to the probably exaggerated belief of moderates in the revolutionary elite that the relatively minor constitutional gains of the 1830 revolution were better than no gains at all: that to strike at the social position of the nobility and establish a truly bourgeois monarchy and an assertive (if not revisionist) foreign policy would be to invite invasion. Metternich agreed with them, but there was less substance to the threat than was imagined.

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[377] Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, pp. 186-87.

[378] William Carr, *A History of Germany*, pp. 14, 22.

[379] Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, p. 187.

[380] *Ibid.*, pp. 187-93.

Republicans and Bonapartists were marginalised in 1830 through their failure to capture the middle ground amongst the incoming elite. The Orléanists were better organised, led, and more numerous. Fundamentally, however, the failed outcome of the 1830 revolution for the revisionists contrasts with the later success of the Fascists and Nazis with respect to the aims of coalition partners: whereas the various groups responsible for regime change in 1922-25 and 1930-33 were willing to yield secondary goals in exchange for the attainment of their primary objective, the opposition in 1830 was comprised of groups with a common enemy in royalist reaction but holding contradictory views of the future development of domestic and foreign policy.[381]

The French left, frustrated at the defeat of the *mouvement*, turned increasingly to new forms public protest throughout the following decade. Funerals in particular became occasions for republican protest against the regime, the most notable early example being that of Lamarque. A general who had suppressed the royalist rising in the Vendée, who had been an opponent in exile of the Restoration Monarchy and a supporter of the reattachment of Belgium to France and the re-establishment of Poland, Lamarque symbolised the frustrated domestic and foreign political traditions of the left. His funeral in June 1832 became an insurrection, leading to armed clashes, riots, barricades, and the

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[381] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 34.

placing of Paris under martial law.[382] The experience of 1830 had put many bourgeois republicans in contact with lower-class radical elements, leading the republican movement further to the left. This broadening of the spectrum of political debate was furthered by the lifting of press controls under Louis Philippe until 1835, and survived for some time after that point despite the limited re-establishment of censorship and the regime's practice of bribing editors.[383]

The regime's conservative sell-out of the revolution led both republicans and their erstwhile *sans-culottes* allies, workers and artisans, to stage repeated, ineffectual attempts against government authority or on the life of the monarch himself. The following are only examples: in 1834, radical textile workers in Lyons battled troops in a week-long revolt; in 1835, a radical republican group under Joseph Fieschi killed eighteen people in a botched attempt on the life of Louis; in 1839, the *Société des Saisons* (an anarchist republican sect) launched an abortive coup, temporarily occupying the *hôtel de ville* before being routed by government troops.[384] For its part, Bonapartism (in obvious ways a personalistic movement) had been hampered in 1830 by the absence of a prominent leader. The return of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte gave new impetus to this tradition, and yet his own early attempts at power, at Strasbourg in 1836 and Boulogne in 1840,

[382] Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, pp. 132; Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 43.

[383] Collingham, *The July Monarchy*, pp. 164-89.

had much in common with those of the republicans: occurring in isolation, they were put down with relative ease.[385]

1848

As in 1830, the potential for a revolutionary coalition to emerge as France moved into the 1840s increased both through social change and through increasing governmental intransigence, while in foreign policy the regime continued to pursue conciliatory relations with the perceived guarantors of French subordination. The near-confrontation with Britain over Egypt, pursued by the Thiers government in 1840, was the consequence in large measure of Thiers' exploitation of Napoleonic sentiment in the country – a policy which had also seen the construction of the *Arc de Triomphe* and the interment of Napoleon's ashes in Paris. Incurring the displeasure of Louis Philippe, the Egyptian episode had led to Thiers' downfall and the installation of Guizot, formerly a champion of the liberal opposition to the Restoration who had moved significantly rightwards in service of Louis Philippe's government. Despite the changes in French society increasingly being wrought by industrialization (the 1840s saw considerable developments in railways, textiles, and metallurgy), Guizot consistently refused to consider the possibility of constitutional reform. As a

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[384] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 43.

[385] *Ibid.*, pp. 44-45.

consequence, the growing economic power of the middle classes and the burgeoning urban workforce of the 1840s remained underrepresented under a regime that had rejected the political forms of its predecessor, but had changed next to nothing in terms of class access to political influence.[386]

The very futility of violent opposition attempts at seizing power in the 1830s had had a paradoxical effect: their failure had diminished bourgeois fears of revolt, and increased old resentments regarding monarchical concentration of power. By the later 1840s this tendency, together with the social consequences of six years of uninterrupted economic growth and urbanisation, renewed the diversification of moderate bourgeois opinion and sparked new interest in reform.[387] The Guizot government, however, resisted all appeals to address the disparity between new social and political pressures and the existing franchise, which was based on a system of property qualification in absolute terms only slightly more liberal than its predecessor.[388]

In terms of foreign policy, the July Monarchy ultimately fared little better than the Restoration governments in public perception. Despite public sensitivity to appearances of French external servility, which on repeated occasions since 1815 had proven to be a key weakness of government policy, the

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[386] Roger Price, ed., *Revolution and Reaction: 1848 and the Second French Republic*, London, Croom Helm, 1975, p. 8.

[387] Price, in *ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

Guizot government followed the humiliation of Thiers with a conciliatory foreign

policy almost guaranteed to alienate liberal opponents of the regime, as well as

more moderate nationalist opinion. In the immediate wake of the crisis over

Egypt, which had renewed hostility towards the treaties of 1815 and the role of

foreign powers in the press and in public discourse,[389] Guizot pursued a

restoration of the Entente Cordiale with Britain. British objections ended French

attempts to establish a customs union with Belgium. Numerous royal visitations

between Louis Philippe and Queen Victoria reinforced public impressions of a

monarchy tied more to outside interests than to French national concerns. French

clashes with Britain over influence in the Pacific, even when successful, were

marked by conciliatory behaviour.[390]

Despite widespread public objection to the alliance with England, the

situation was to worsen, paradoxically, with the breakdown of that relationship.

Palmerston, as incoming foreign secretary in 1846, objected to the dynastic

agreement concluded between Guizot and Aberdeen over the succession to the

Spanish throne. Guizot's pursuit of the original arrangement split the alliance

apart, driving French policy away from Britain and towards accommodation

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[388] Jardin and Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction*, pp. 128-29.

[389] *Ibid.*, p. 156.

[390] One of the chief flashpoints of opposition outrage over French foreign policy in this period

was the 'Pritchard affair' in which the Guizot government paid an indemnity to an English

missionary ousted with the establishment of a French protectorate in Tahiti. See *ibid.*, p. 167.

with the more conservative European powers. In the last years of the July

monarchy, French deference towards Austrian wishes in particular was plain:

most notably, Guizot was careful not to protest at Metternich's occupation of

Krakow, and refrained from offering any support to liberal nationalism in Italy,

despite press demands for such action.[391]

Domestically, the revolution of 1848 was made possible by a combination

of the early phases of industrialisation (with its concomitant demographic, urban,

and ideological effects), by the resistance of the regime to accommodate

politically the social changes underway, by a series of elite-level scandals, and as

in 1830 by the exogenous trigger of a crisis of agrarian production. Traditional

opponents of the regime, republicans, Bonapartists, and the extremist legitimists,

were able to exploit new sources of unrest: in particular, the urban working class

-- increasingly under the new-sprung influence of socialist agitation -- was central

to the overthrow of Louis Philippe. Moderate bourgeois support of the

monarchy also evaporated with the onset of economic crisis; the increasingly

drastic conditions in Paris and other major cities sapped bourgeois confidence in

the ability of the regime to prevent a major social upheaval.[392] Moderate

alienation from the regime expressed itself in a novel form of protest, the "reform

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[391] *Ibid.*, pp. 156-158.

[392] Price, p. 12.

banquet" movement, from July 1847 on.[393] The reform banquets comprised a series of large but orderly protest meetings. Thematically, the protesters moved from moderate demands in the summer of 1847 to increasingly revolutionary rhetoric by February 1848; the primary themes included electoral reform, an end to official corruption, an improvement in the condition of the working class, and calls for an assertive and progressive foreign policy.[394] The reform banquets served to place republicans, whose concerns could increasingly draw on the sentiments of the mobilised lower orders of society, at the forefront of opposition to the regime. Bourgeois liberals and constitutional monarchists, having been identified with the regime since 1830, registered their disapproval of the July monarchy by withdrawal of support, rather than active opposition, a strategy which initially produced a radical post-revolutionary government.

In the February revolution, Louis Philippe's attempt to crack down on the banquet movement provoked a wave of street violence, which might have ended in the suppression of the revolt had it not been for the intervention of the Parisian National Guard on the side of the demonstrators and against the army. The Guard, though constituted as the regime's primary internal instrument of defense, was as a bourgeois institution politically moderate and had drifted away from active support of the regime, many of its officers becoming involved in the banquet movement. Its loyalty to the Orléanist regime was also compromised by

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[393] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 50.

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a significant Bonapartist tendency within the aged officer corps, many of whom had served first under Napoleon.

The provisional government that emerged in February was a coalition of moderate and left-wing republicans, of whom the former were the larger group. While in the substance of domestic reform, the 1848 revolution provided a more complete break with the past than in 1830, (the reforms undertaken by the Second Republic included freedom of association, manhood suffrage, and an attempt at redistributive taxation), as in 1830 the revolution produced a governing elite split by divergent views of domestic and foreign policy.[395]

Was a revisionist foreign policy a possibility in 1848? Certainly, there is ample evidence that a large portion of the revolution's supporters anticipated — as they had in 1830 — a renewal of the French revolutionary crusade. Through the disputes and mutual recriminations surrounding the failure of the radical republicans to consolidate their vision of the revolution (the elections of May 1848 returned a majority of conservative candidates, in large part due to clerical influence over the peasant vote), calls for a revisionist, republican foreign policy became a rallying point for the left.[396]

The chief objectives of the left-republicans in foreign affairs surrounded opposition to the repressive tactics of the conservative eastern powers in their

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[394] Jardin and Tudesq, *Restoration and Reaction*, p. 201-202.

[395] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, p. 73.

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attempts to put down the disturbances of 1848. News of Prussian and Austrian repression in Poland led many on the left to agitate for intervention.[397] Radical parliamentarians called for intervention in Italy against the repression of the liberal movement in Rome by the Austrians, and managed to secure the provision of such a force (the mission of which was eventually subverted to suppress the liberals by Louis Napoleon as president). Mass demonstrations in 1848 and 1849, encouraged by the radical members Blanqui, Barbès, and Ledru-Rollin, in addition to protesting the regime's apparent sell-out of its commitment to the working class, echoed parliamentary calls for support of Polish and Roman uprisings.

Amongst the supporters of the revolution it was widely believed "that the proclamation of a Republic would inevitably lead to war and a crusade to tear up the 1815 treaties".[398] However, such was not the case. After the bloody suppression of the radical insurrection of June 1848, the presidential election of December marked the effective end of the possibility of a newly revisionist France emerging from the revolution. The election of Louis Napoleon over his two closest rivals, the conservative Cavaignac and the left-republican Ledru-Rollin, was resounding. The distinctly un-Napoleonic direction taken in foreign policy by the new French leader, soon to consolidate his position in a coup three

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[396] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 59-65.

[397] *Ibid.*, p. 65.

years later, re-emphasised the "overwhelming victory of the Counter-Revolution over the Revolution" of June 1848.[399]

Conclusion

In 1848 (and in the imperial plebiscite of 1852) the magnitude of Louis Napoleon's electoral support — and the low number of ballots cast for Ledru-Rollin[400] — seems to call into question any argument which suggests that significant support for a radical foreign policy existed in 1848. Yet several factors mitigate such doubts. First, while Louis Napoleon soon proved himself to be a supporter of bourgeois stability and of the external *status quo*, much of his electoral support was drawn from the countryside, a region in which the Napoleonic legend was still strong (and where the clergy had actively lobbied on his behalf due to his support of the papacy and domestic support of clericalism).[401] Thus the extent to which the peasantry recognised — in the first-ever election by manhood suffrage — that Napoleon's policies were not to be followed by his nephew must be questioned. Louis Napoleon certainly exploited the political legacy of the Empire to its fullest extent in his campaigns, which

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[398] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, p. 83.

[399] Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 70.

[400] The tally was 5,534,520 votes for Louis Napoleon, 1,448,302 for Cavaignac, and 371,431 for Ledru-Rollin. Lough & Lough, *An Introduction to Nineteenth-Century France*, p. 110.

were widely directed at the rural voter.[402] It should also be noted that electoral

support amongst the peasantry drifted significantly to the left in the first election

subsequent to Louis Napoleon's investiture as president; whatever potential

there was for an electoral repudiation of the counter-revolution was rendered

moot by the disenfranchisement of migrant workers and the urban poor in

1850.[403] Finally, while the support received by Ledru-Rollin and by the radical

left in general was relatively small, it was heavily concentrated in urban settings.

The role of the *sans-culottes* in the two earlier revolutions, and the threat posed to

the moderate republicans by the June insurrection, suggest that if the radicals

were a minority, they were a minority very close to power. Unlike 1789,

however, the spectrum occupied by the republican revolutionaries had

broadened. The impact of industrialization and urbanization meant that beyond

the overthrow of the monarchy, the goals of the moderates and radicals were

more contradictory than complementary. For the most part, the bearers of the

revolution had a greater stake in the economic growth wrought by

particularism's demise: fewer of them now believed in export, more of them in

consolidation. The potential for the French revolutionary tradition to produce a

revisionist France in 1848 stemmed from the beliefs and frustrations of 1815,

which created movements hostile to domestic reaction and foreign

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[401] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, p. 84; Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 76.

[402] Fortescue, *Revolution*, pp. 74-75.

submissiveness: that such potential was unfulfilled is in large measure a consequence of internal political development and the divided legacy of the first revolution.

Both the Restoration and July monarchies were susceptible to overthrow for two reasons. First, in neither case could the military be relied upon to support the regime. The Napoleonic tradition had created a politicised officer corps. In a move the Prussians were to emulate, the military under Napoleon became a powerful emblem of egalitarianism and social mobility. Loyalty to the Bonapartist legacy (and to a certain extent to its revolutionary origins) remained after 1815, both in the army and in the rural regions whose sons had followed a path of career advancement under the Emperor. The Restoration's persecution of the 'accomplices' of the Hundred Days compromised the support it could draw from the military. The July Monarchy's increasing rightward drift lost Louis Philippe his most valuable support, in the politically moderate and bourgeois National Guard. Many soldiers, therefore, were either willing or tacit accomplices in 1830 and 1848.

But the instability of both regimes may stem more from attempts to perform the near-impossible constitutional feat of excluding a mass of people recently brought into the state. The revolution of 1789 had changed political discourse in France from that of an absolutist monarchy to nationhood, and the self concept of French inhabitants from subject to citizen, a transformation which

[403] Bury, *France, 1814-1940*, pp. 84-85; Fortescue, *Revolution*, p. 77.

endowed the French public with a sense of political efficacy unknown to their forebears or the inhabitants of neighbouring reactionary regimes. Together with the Napoleonic destruction of the old order, and the introduction of the mass ballot, the events of 1789-1815 introduced the concept of popular sovereignty to the French mass. While the restorations of monarchical, hierarchically-conceived visions of society were able to survive through relatively stable periods, the organizing potential bestowed on the opposition by economic crisis was able to draw on public recollections of a previous period of greater incorporation, such that the defeat of the revolutionary tradition and of Napoleonic France was always tenuous.

Therefore, the verdict regarding France as a challenger state, as with Prussia, is ambiguous. There was no challenge if we measure by the standards of the next century or by earlier French history. Yet France demonstrates many of the conditions exhibited by Italy and Germany in the period after the first world war. Those who had gained or stood to gain through Napoleonic success, both domestically and in terms of foreign policy, commonly suffered losses of power, position, or economic advantage under the Restoration. For these groups, the Restoration appeared to contain a double evil: not only did it represent a repudiation of the revolution by the *ancien regime*, but the representatives of reaction were backed by France's enemies and in many cases had actually fought against the French in the preceding wars. There was, moreover, little in the foreign policy of Louis XVIII, Charles X, or Louis Philippe to suggest otherwise.

Domestically, military culture and recent history, as well as economic circumstances, combined to make a revolutionary logroll possible on at least two occasions, and it is possible to draw linkages —both individually and as social groupings — from early republicans and supporters of Napoleon to the older revolutionaries of mid-century. The lone distinction is in outcome. Like the Fascists and the Nazis, radical republicans were a minority in 1830 and 1848, and commanded significant support in the streets of the capital, without which the existing regime could not have been overthrown. But unlike the later revisionists, their political wishes were anathema to their revolutionary allies. And unlike Mussolini or Hitler, the left's methods of consolidating its gains upon reaching power became more, not less, democratic. Having won the battle of the streets, radicalism then banked on the ballot box and lost.

CHAPTER 6

CHALLENGE PRE-ORDAINED? CHINA AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The 'long peace'[404] between the great powers since 1945, which for much

of that time was characterised by the initially consensual division of the

developed world into spheres of interest, saw little in the way of overt challenge

to US and Soviet hegemony from the remaining great powers. There were, of

course, challenges mounted by minor powers of Soviet domination, most notably

in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Had these revolts been successful at the

national level, a reorientation of foreign policy was the most likely result;

however, as these challenges occurred in minor powers they were unlikely to

make much difference to the global strategic-political map, and fall outside the

scope of this study.[405] Amongst the major powers, Britain and the defeated

European states fell largely into step with US foreign policy.[406] French

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[404] John Lewis Gaddis, "Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International

System", in Charles Kegley, ed., *The Long Postwar Peace*, 1991.

[405] It may be the case, however, that the postwar domestic dynamics in these countries (and in

Poland) parallel those observed in the case studies described herein.

[406] The question of Euro-communism raises the question of potential reverses in French and

Italian policy, and as with Communist partisans in Eastern Europe, the experience of resistance in

the second world war provides clear parallels with the model outlined here. On the other hand,

there is little evidence to suggest that pro-Soviet policies could ever have brought either the PCI

iconoclasm, while disturbing to Western coalition-builders, did not present a fundamental challenge to the basic presuppositions of strategic planning in the Cold War.[407] The rise of Japanese economic power after 1945 was accompanied by a near-complete abstention by Tokyo from international political debate, save in those realms which may be considered exclusively economic. An independent foreign policy was eschewed in Japan, as was any questioning of the US-dominated international system's structure and characteristics, in favour of compliance with American strategic wishes.

The lone exception to this generalisation is the case of China. In the quarter-century after the war, Chinese troops, advisors, and ideologues — and their proxies — clashed directly with their American (and later Soviet)

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or the PCF to power, the former having gained popularity through distancing itself from Moscow and traditional Leninism, the latter having marginalised itself by failing to do so. For a (somewhat triumphalist) assessment see Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Scribner, 1989, pp. 204-09.

[407] Some Gaullists were certainly hopeful that the *force de frappe* might spark a rupture the hold of the Americans and Soviets on Europe. Yet the policy was arguably more posture than direct challenge — in comparison with the Chinese case — and beyond considerations of nuclear coordination there was little Franco-American disagreement over the nature of post-war Europe, its domestic politics and international institutions, nor over the likely target of their respective deterrents. Ultimately, the French independent deterrent made US domination of Europe simpler; see Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, London, MacMillan, 1981, pp. 320-24.

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counterparts, in what can only be described as a challenge of US-Soviet domination of world politics. This challenge manifested itself in a variety of ways. In strategic policy, an independent Chinese nuclear force was developed, eventually deployed for use against both dominant powers. In direct military terms, Chinese troops engaged first American and then Russian forces in both active combat and in hostile counter-position and could be counted as aggressors on a number of occasions. In the diplomatic arena, Chinese attacks on American — and after the late 1950s, Russian — positions were characterised by unprecedented degrees of suspicion and ideological vitriol; furthermore, it was largely due to Chinese influence at Bandung and elsewhere that coalitioning emerged as the developing world's leading strategy in attempting to break the global dominance of the industrialised nations.

In this chapter I will assess the history of the Chinese case in light of the model and theoretical focus outlined in earlier chapters. Prior to this analysis, I will address a variety of possible explanations for Chinese behaviour. Two of these are rarely advanced but are worth exploring as plausible extensions of theories outlined in earlier chapters, seeing Chinese revisionism as a consequence of the terms of the postwar settlement, or as a result of rising economic power. Two others — more frequently encountered — see post-revolutionary Chinese foreign policy as either the logical externalization of the revolution's ideological nature, or as the continuation of the anti-foreign tradition in modern Chinese history.

To again anticipate my own conclusions, I will seek to establish two

points. First, while the 'externalization' and 'continuity of anti-foreignism' theses

have much to recommend them, there is considerable evidence to suggest that

the pattern of post-1949 Chinese foreign relations also bears the mark of

interaction between foreign powers and domestic groups in the Chinese civil war

and in the immediate aftermath of the conflict with Japan: this evidence has been

advanced in revisionist scholarship which places an accent on the 'lost chance' of

US-Chinese relations in the formative years of the revolution.[408] Second, this

interaction took the form of betrayal of wartime commitments, on behalf of the

state (an expected outcome for the Communists) but also on behalf of the external

guarantors of the domestic settlement (a partly unexpected outcome). The nature

of this betrayal in turned produced for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)

perceptions of collusive illegitimacy, perceptions which through symbiosis with

pre-existing ideological predilections served to increase the likelihood and scope

of Chinese revisionist behaviour in the postwar period.

Like some of the foregoing cases I have examined in this dissertation, the

Chinese as a state were nominal victors of the recent global conflict, a fact which

renders subsequent Chinese behaviour even more puzzling -- at least from some

realist perspectives. An explanation of Chinese behaviour as a reaction to the

settlement is probably not tenable. In negotiating the primary institutional

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[408] John Esherick, ed., *Lost Chance in China: The World War II Despatches of John S. Service*, New

York, Random House, 1974.

outcome of the settlement, the United Nations, the victorious coalition at the conclusion of the conflict bestowed on Nationalist China permanent representation on the Security Council, a degree of power and prestige which far outstripped that nation's recent influence.[409] Furthermore, the informal postwar settlement contained little that was objectionable and much that was desired in light of Chinese nationalist[410] traditions or recent aspirations: the global war had intruded on a pre-existing civil conflict, and had been fought primarily as a campaign to drive the Japanese out of Chinese territory. Superpower rivalry in postwar China ensured that control over Chinese territory was nominally restored to the government of the day. Thus purely in terms of 'state interest', it seems less than profitable to pursue the terms of the settlement as an explanation of post-1949 Chinese policy.

How, then, to explain the Chinese transition from victor to challenger in such a short period of time? Two more possible explanations rely on changes in Chinese domestic attributes. First, is it possible to explain Chinese behaviour as a

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[409] The inclusion of the Chinese at the highest levels of postwar decision was at the insistence of the Americans and over the objections of the British and the Soviets; see Hugh Thomas, *Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-46*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1986, pp. 174-78. Churchill himself considered China to be 'very over-rated'; see Martin Gilbert, *Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill, 1941-1945*, London, Stoddart, 1986, p. 936.

[410] Throughout this chapter, the term *nationalist* (uncapitalised) shall refer to the generic ideology, while *Nationalist* (capitalised) shall refer specifically to the adherents of Chiang Kai-shek and members of the Kuomintang.

consequence of rising Chinese economic power: as a clash first with old patterns of quasi-colonial subordination in trade with the West, and subsequently with an exploitative, hierarchical relationship with the Soviets? There seems little evidence to support such a claim, partly because of the rapid nature of the shift in China's foreign orientation between 1949 and 1950, which casts doubt on the role of long-term economic processes as causes, and partly because the most substantive growth in the relative economic power of China has coincided with the period of relative normalization of relations with the West.[411]

However, the chief objection to such an argument must come from the timing of Chinese foreign policy moves. The rising-power explanation carries weight in cases such as Germany's challenge of British naval dominance prior to the first world war, or Japan's challenge of America's Pacific role in the first half of the twentieth century, where -- as Jack Snyder has suggested -- long periods of growth and the search for markets led to cartelized politics and the emergence of a war party.[412] Neither Germany nor Japan suffered any undue outside or domestic political interference in their economic development in these periods. In the Chinese case, the splits with the West and with the USSR were both preceded by significant industrial disruption. The Chinese industrial heartland

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[411] Mark Mancall, *China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy*, New York, Free Press, 1984, pp. 459-64; John Gittings, *China Changes Face: The Road from Revolution, 1949-1989*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 104-26.

of Manchuria had been disputed militarily or occupied by foreign powers almost continuously from 1931 until the revolution, and the economy was generally "in serious disrepair".[413] In the late 1950s, the desirability of lessening Chinese dependence on Soviet industrial and military assistance prompted the Great Leap Forward, an economic fiasco of monumental proportions which included the decentralisation of industry, the start and rapid demise of thousands of under-capitalised and technologically backward village enterprises, and the general squandering of human and material resources as political imperatives overrode economic logic.[414] The disastrous results of the Great Leap caused the temporary waning of Mao's political fortunes. Yet the Chinese leadership pursued their ideological and strategic differences with the Soviets with increased vigour in the immediate aftermath of this failure. The fact that they did so, after the failure of a program which by design was intended to provide the industrial strength desirable for an independent foreign policy, suggests that vectors of economic growth are of little use in explaining Chinese revisionism.

The final potential explanation for Chinese revisionism is of course the most common: that Chinese attempts to challenge the nature of the postwar

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[412] Snyder, *Myths of Empire*.

[413] Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China Under Threat: The Politics of Strategy and Diplomacy*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp. 25-28.

[414] Richard Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917-1972*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1973, pp. 241-43.

order were the consequence of beliefs held by the revolutionary leadership. This

argument breaks in turn into two strands whose respective advocates were to

define (in a fashion similar to students of Soviet foreign policy) the lines of

scholarly dispute regarding the origins of the cold war in Asia.

One strand, initially dominant, views the behaviour of the PRC in the

international arena as the necessary consequence of the internationalist ideology

of the Communist leadership. This was particularly true of American

scholarship, consistent with Stephen Walt's observation that ideological

interpretations of revolutionary foreign policy seem "especially popular with

opponents of the new regime".[415] W.W. Rostow's early assessment of the

situation concluded that pre-existing doctrinal positions were central as factors

leading to the re-orientation of Chinese foreign policy:

> It was Chinese Communist attitudes and policies which purposefully eliminated
>
> the possibility of even exploring terms for relatively normal diplomatic relations
>
> with the non-Communist world. This break with the western world ... set what
>
> the Communist leadership evidently believed was the necessary framework for
>
> the national indoctrination which took place after 1949.[416]

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[415] Stephen Walt, "Revolutions and War", *World Politics* vol. 44, no. 3, p. 325.

[416] W.W. Rostow, *The Prospects for Communist China*, New York, MIT Technology Press/John Wiley & Sons, 1954, p. 56.

This approach enjoyed much currency prior to the Sino-Soviet split, in an era when views of communism as a monolithic international conspiracy were regularly employed as blanket explanations of Soviet and PRC foreign policy. Rostow refers to the late 1940s and early 1950s as characterised by "a single wave" of communist aggression, arguing that "from some time in 1946 on, the fundamental strategy of international Communism was one of exploiting to the limit, short of major war, all possibilities for expansion which they perceived".[417]

More recent analyses of Chinese foreign policy from a variety of perspectives have embraced nuance as a tool, but variants of Rostow's judgement persist. Stephen Goldstein, while acknowledging a greater role for distinctively Chinese interests in PRC policy, argues that "for accommodation to have been reached in the late 1940s, the Chinese Communist movement would have had to behave as something other than what it was: a Marxist-Leninist party committed to achieving a national, anti-imperialist revolution".[418] Melvin Gurtov and Byong-Moo Hwang, dubious regarding the degree of aggression behind PRC foreign policy choices and viewing leadership concerns as ultimately domestically-oriented, agree with more hawkish accounts in considering China's revisionist behaviour to be driven primarily by ideological imperatives. Chinese

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[417] Rostow, *Prospects*, pp. 54, 56.

[418] Stephen Goldstein, "Sino-American Relations, 1948-1950: Lost Chance or No Chance?", in Harry Harding and Yuan Ming, eds., *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955: a Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade*, Wilmington, Scholarly Resources, 1989.

foreign policy is thus oriented towards "preventing imperialism, revisionism, capitalism, and other counter-revolutionary forces from threatening the very fabric of Chinese political life; and promoting the self-strengthening and self-reliance of the social system and its people".[419] Western Marxists have also, not surprisingly, seen ideological roots to Chinese behaviour. Greg O'Leary notes that at least until the 1970s, the CCP's commitment "to the struggles of national liberation movements and the international working-class movement ... had been a consistent feature of its foreign policy".[420]

For Western analysts, the Sino-Soviet split and the acknowledgement of Chinese strategic insecurities which accompanied it[421] led to a greater accent on the particularly Chinese, rather than the universally communist, nature of PRC foreign policy. From this second perspective, historical currents of Sino-centrism, xenophobia, and anti-imperialism are regularly paired or contrasted with ideology as explanations of Chinese foreign relations. According to this view, the century of humiliation at the hands of the West which preceded the Chinese revolution renders subsequent Chines hostility to a world order constructed by

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[419] Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, p. 17.

[420] Greg O'Leary, *The Shaping of Chinese Foreign Policy*, London, Croom Helm, 1980, p. 274.

[421] The potential for which was recognised by Dulles as early as 1953. See Gaddis, "The American 'Wedge' Strategy, 1949-1955", in Harding & Yuan, *Sino-American Relations, 1945-1955*.

Americans and Europeans quite easy to understand.[422] In its broadest

expression, PRC foreign policy has been seen as essentially congruent with a

millennial Chinese imperial outlook:

> The whole history of [China's] external relations ... seems to be based on a
>
> fundamental dichotomy between us" and "them". The dichotomy has persisted
>
> through changes in its more manifest context. In the traditional period, the
>
> dichotomy took the form of civilization *versus* barbarism, and the outsider who
>
> had not accepted the fundamental forms of sinitic culture was beyond the pale, a
>
> barbarian. In contemporary China, a similar dichotomy characterizes the
>
> construction of the world, with the category "them" sometimes occupied by the
>
> Americans and their allies, sometimes by the Soviets and their allies.[423]

Accordingly, the seeming reversal of Chinese policy in 1949 can be seen as the

attempts by a newly independent China to break the influence of other states in

countries and regions traditionally considered tributaries of Beijing, to restore an

objective basis for the Sino-centric tradition of Chines international thought, and

to punish or eject those actors responsible for the forced 'opening' of China in the

preceding century. Lucien Bianco argues that "the whole history of modern

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[422] See William C. Kirby, "Traditions of Centrality, Authority, and Management in Modern

China's Foreign Relations", in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh, eds,. *Chinese Foreign

Policy: Theory and Practice*, Oxford, Clarendon, 1994.

China can be seen as a reaction to imperialism, to an outside force that threatened the country's very existence". It follows that "the revolution inherited from Chiang the xenophobia that he himself had inherited from earlier regimes".[424]

As with the case of Germany after the first world war, the difficulty in assessing the origins of Chinese revisionism stem from a seeming overdetermination. Both the above arguments have merit, and the difficulties of assessing the strengths of each are compounded by the adherence by the revolutionaries to an openly internationally-revisionist ideology. The problem is therefore that it is "relatively easy to demonstrate that any specific international act by a Communist state may be explained by factors other than ideology"; by the same token, however, that ideology is so flexible that "it is equally difficult to maintain that it was not a factor in the making of a particular foreign policy decision".[425] This problem in mind, it seems somewhat fruitless to disentangle two streams of belief which seem perfectly complementary: not only were numerous Chinese foreign policy goals commensurate with both explanations, it

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[423] Mancall, *China at the Center*, p. 499.

[424] Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915-1949*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1971, pp. 140, 204.

[425] J.D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, p. vii.

is also possible to argue that in the Chinese case both nationalism and ideology

proved equally useful to the other as a vehicle.[426]

Yet if one accepts that the legacies of communist ideology and of a

nationalism steeped in anti-imperialism and xenophobia must contribute to an

explanation of postwar Chinese foreign policy, there remain some troubling

inconsistencies of timing and anomalous events which suggest that these

explanations are, even taken together, incomplete. If the nationalist/anti-

imperialist theses and ideological theses are held to be correct, it must follow that

the United States (as — by 1945 — the leading regional representative of Western

strategic and capitalist interests) could never have aspired to a relationship with

the Chinese Communists that was anything other than antagonistic in nature.

However, in the debate over the origins of the Cold War in Asia, the idea that the

Chinese Communists were from the outset the implacable opponents of Western

imperialism has been criticised by historians who suggest that critical

opportunities for a better beginning to the post-1949 relationship were missed.

Proponents of this 'lost chance' thesis argue that faulty analysis of the relative

strength and goals of the CCP led the US into support of a doomed KMT regime.

This choice, I will argue, furthered perceptions of collaboration between foreign

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[426] Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy*, p. 4; Bianco, *Origins*, pp. 140-66; Walt, "Revolutions and

War", pp. 325-26; Allan Castle, "The Role of Nationalism in Third World Socialist Revolutions:

China, Cuba and Vietnam", M.Sc. thesis, London School of Economics, 1988, pp. 4-8.

imperial powers and domestic compradore[427] elites which, while present in CCP

thought since the party's inception, had been eroded in brief periods of wartime

cooperation. To substantiate this claim, a review of the history of the period is

necessary.

The wartime experience

Reference to the Chinese experience in the second world war must

acknowledge that the conflict was both longer and more complex for China than

for most of the other combatant states. The initial Japanese violations of Chinese

territory occurred in 1931; full-scale invasion came in 1937, leading to an

occupation of large portions of China for a span of eight years, a period of

hostilities longer than that endured in any other theatre of that war. An

additional point to note is that the war against Japan was superimposed on a pre-

existing civil struggle between the Kuomintang[428] and the CCP. The fight with

the external threat was thus interspersed with periods of open hostilities between

Nationalist forces and Communists, a struggle which returned to full intensity

after peace was achieved in the Pacific war in 1945. The consequence of these

differences is that intrawar alliances, pacts and bargains made between societal

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[427] The term employed by Mao.

groups, and between the elites of the various interests involved -- Communist, Nationalist, Soviet, and American -- took place in a more volatile atmosphere than perhaps existed in other cases, creating and frustrating expectations with regularity. This is particularly true in the case of the CCP, who were to be betrayed by all three of the other major players in the course of the conflict. The relations between the CCP and the KMT thus merit some attention.

The revolution of 1911 in China had produced a society lacking a true central government, and in which a number of major regions were dominated by quasi-autonomous warlords. Of the various factions vying for power by the early 1920s, the only one which possessed both a unifying belief system and had a real chance of gaining national control was Sun Yat-sen's nationalist party, the Kuomintang (KMT). The CCP, founded in 1921, was handicapped by leadership of a lesser quality than that of later years.[429] The KMT remained the most likely unifying force in the country. Consistent with contemporary Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the Chinese situations, and with some opinion within the CCP leadership,[430] the Comintern in January 1923 ordered the Chinese Communists to merge with the Nationalists to further the completion of the national-bourgeois

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[428] In using both the Wade-Giles and Pinyin transliteration methods throughout this chapter, my aim has been to employ the more familiar spelling at the expense of consistency; hence, 'Chiang Kai-shek' is preferred over 'Jiang Jieshi', but 'Beijing' is preferred' to 'Peking'.

[429] Bianco, *Origins*, p. 54.

[430] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

revolution considered a necessary pre-condition for the victory of the proletariat. At that time the Soviet Union also took the step of reaffirming its previously ambiguous commitment to renouncing the unequal Tsarist treaties between Russia and China, undertook the training of selected KMT officers, and sent a contingent of military and political advisors to the aid of the Nationalists.[431]

Although much of the membership was initially reluctant, the CCP proved vital as a mobilising force in assisting the KMT, generating widespread support not only amongst urban workers but among the peasantry as well. The May 30th movement of 1925 (involving protests against mistreatment of Chinese workers by foreign companies) led to significant increases in the membership and mobilising capacity of the CCP, such that in the decisive struggles against the warlords in 1926 "it was the CCP, which organised 1,200,000 workers and 800,000 peasants, rather than the Kuomintang, that really ran the workers' and peasants' movements". Thus the fall of Shanghai occurred through a CCP-organized general strike, requiring no military action by the KMT forces.[432]

By 1927, the KMT (now under Moscow-trained Chiang Kai-shek) had established control over much of southern and eastern China. Chiang had also solidified and reorganized the army leadership under his command. In April, wary of the strength and intentions of the CCP as it operated within the KMT, the Nationalist leadership in a series of actions launched a purge of CCP leaders,

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[431] Immanuel Hsü, *The Rise of Modern China*, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 611-12.

Communist cells, trade unions, and suspected agitators. A break with Moscow

was sought subsequent to the purge, resulting in the departure of the Soviet

advisors and the rapprochement of Chiang's Nanking faction within the KMT

with the left-leaning non-Communist elements of the Wuhan faction.[433] The

Nationalist army, led by a representative of landed and mercantile interests in

Chiang, and with an officer corps composed of a similar class background,[434] had

been central to the liquidation of CCP influence in the cities. The Communists'

lack of a similar fighting force led to retreat, and a united KMT now controlled

much of the country from the new seat of government in Nanking, the CCP

limited to a small zone of operation in Kiangsi. Through the purge, the Stalinist

strategy in China was widely discredited, and "a devastating blow had been

dealt to China's proletarian vanguard".[435]

By 1929, with the surrender of Beijing's warlord, the Nationalists were in

nominal control of a united China. As Skocpol points out, questions regarding

the degree of social revolution and anti-imperialism in the KMT's program

became more pressing as the party moved closer to military unification and

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[432] Bianco, *Origins*, p. 56.

[433] These two wings of the KMT emerged briefly in 1926-27, and were manifest in the establishment of two separate KMT governments in Nanking and Wuhan.

[434] Mancall, *China at the Center*, p. 267; W.S.K. Waung, *Revolution and Liberation: A Short History of Modern China, 1900-1970*, London, Heinemann, 1971, p. 80.

[435] Hsü, *Rise*, p. 620.

domination of the country. The purge of the CCP led in many ways to the resolution of these questions: with the forced departure of the Communists, leftist elements within the traditional KMT were weakened, and opposition to imperial and domestic capitalist social forms lost momentum. The KMT turned away from mass worker and peasant support towards reliance on commercial and industrial interests, and in particular towards areas and sectors linked to foreign trade, based in ports whose prosperity was created by the treaty concessions of the previous century. The Nationalists were also increasingly the recipients of military aid from the West.[436] This shift was significant in two separate ways. First, as Skocpol notes, as a strategy for consolidation of state control, reliance on the coastal ports and trade economy was no substitute for power resting on industrialization and the development of infrastructure; neither of the latter was a hallmark of the KMT era, partly through the backwardness of the Chinese economy *circa* 1930, and partly through the regime's own mismanagement and inefficiency.[437] As a result, the Nationalists failed to make inroads into the countryside, where the levers of power still rested in many cases with warlord-like figures and the land-owning class, coexisting competitively with the state rather than being in a subordinate position. The regime's consequent inability and unwillingness to pursue agrarian social reform meant a lack of peasant support in a primarily agrarian country. Second, the KMT's

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[436] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, pp. 244–46.

reliance on the foreign-oriented coastal regions helped the Communists boost their own nationalist credentials, as new leaders such as Mao were increasingly able to identify Chiang's regime and its supporters as a 'compradore class' — lapdogs of China's traditional foreign exploiters.[438]

For the Communists, the net result of the split of 1927, with the loss of Communist power-bases in urban industrial and commercial centres, was the conversion of the CCP into a peasant-based movement. The elements of the CCP which had survived turned to a policy of agrarian recruitment and politicisation, strongest in the provinces of Hunan and Kiangsi. The coming of conflict with Japan in 1931, however, did not initially provide the CCP with any opportunity for re-entry and reincorporation into national politics, but rather further retrenchment: the encroachments of China's traditional Asian rival were deemed by Chiang to pose a threat less existential in nature than further revolution from below, and anti-Communist efforts accordingly received greater KMT attention than did resistance of the invader. Much as the fragmented composition of the Austrian empire in the Napoleonic era had precluded inclusive reforms similar to those in Prussia, so did the KMT's precarious and superficial hold on China prevent Chiang from considering mass mobilisation as a response to foreign aggression. The primary threat to the regime as conceived by the Kuomintang

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[437] *Ibid.*, pp. 246-50.

[438] George Botjer, *A Short History of Nationalist China, 1919-1949,* New York, Putnam, 1979, p. 153; Bianco, *Origins,* pp. 113, 125, 144-45.

leadership was manifest in the CCP;[439] according to Chiang, the Japanese were "an illness of the skin", the Communists "an illness of the blood. They kill the body".[440]

Accordingly, until the mid-1930s no concessions to the Communist opposition were made by the Nanking government. Pursuing a policy of repression against rural dissent and agitation, the KMT succeeded in alienating the peasantry in regions of suspected CCP influence. Through this focus on internal threat, Nanking rendered itself unable to address the problem of the virtual colonisation of industrial Manchuria by the Japanese, an action which provoked widespread popular demand for an internal coalition effort against the Japanese;[441] this policy of abstention from defense of national territory was to prove central in explaining the CCP's ultimately successful strategy fusion of nationalism and socialism -- and in explaining the corresponding decline in the KMT's hold on an aura of legitimacy.

The KMT policy of repression of the Communists led through its short-term success to the Long March of 1935, the details of which do not bear repetition here. The consequences of the CCP's westward trek, however, are of some importance. First, the Long March provided the CCP with an independent regional base from which to operate immediately prior to the full-scale invasion

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[439] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 250.

[440] Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, p. 86.

of China by the Japanese in 1937. By fighting the invader in separate battles and on a separate front, the Communists were able to establish nationalist credentials at least equal and ultimately superior to those of the KMT, whose own record of opposition to the Japanese prior to 1937 – a policy largely composed of appeasement to buy time for domestic consolidation of power – was feeble. Second, the Long March led to the further development of the direction of the party under Mao, whose strategy of peasant-based guerrilla warfare now rose in stature compared with the policies and tactics favoured by the 'internationalist' Politburo,[442] dominant in the period of the Kiangsi Soviet. Mao's tactics contrasted with those of the Politburo in their greater flexibility and accommodation with respect to the peasantry: where the pro-Moscow group pursued class warfare in the countryside and viewed the peasants as necessarily subordinate to the proletariat in the revolutionary struggle, Mao's approach was to treat rich and poor peasants equally in the redistribution of land, and to base the armed revolutionary struggle on peasant guerrilla tactics.[443]

The re-establishment of the Communist forces in Shensi province coincided with the further abandonment of previous policies of reprisals against

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[441] Hsü, *Rise*, p. 656.

[442] An ascendancy confirmed at the Tsunyi meeting of January 1935, the first policy session since the retreat from Kiangsi.

[443] See Hsü, *Rise*, pp. 654-59; Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power*, pp. 54-80; C.P. Fitzgerald, *The Birth of Communist China*, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Penguin, 1964, pp. 74-75.

landlords as the CCP undertook land redistribution and mobilisation. The other major policy development of the end of the Long March was the nationalist political offensive by the CCP with respect to the war with Japan. Although the cessation of hostilities between the KMT and the CCP had been a stated goal of the Communists for some time, under Mao there now appeared a nation-wide call for an internal truce, under the slogan "Chinese do not fight Chinese".[444] Nationalist, rather than Communist, rhetoric began to dot CCP documents, slogans and front organizations (such as the 'People's Anti-Japanese League' and the 'National Salvation Society'),[445] in a campaign directed chiefly if not solely at younger urban Chinese; in turn, the KMT's policy of suppression of the CCP fell considerably in popularity.[446]

Accordingly, by the middle 1930s the CCP under Mao's leadership had come some distance in establishing itself as an accommodative nationalist vehicle in a country increasingly threatened by all-out invasion, and as a party capable of progressive yet increasingly 'fair' land reform in a society where agrarian power structures still held the key to national unification.[447] The sinification of Marxism-Leninism was central to the party's new appeal: as C.P. Fitzgerald concludes, the CCP had "developed from a workers' party of theoretical

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[444] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, p. 76.

[445] Hsü, *Rise*, p. 661.

[446] *Ibid.*, p. 661.

Marxists, into an agrarian party of rural revolution – heretical Marxism in fact, if

not in name – and now appeared as the party of national resistance and

reconciliation".[448]

The 'bargain'

The internal rapprochement long-solicited by the CCP was achieved

finally through the bizarre 'Sian incident' of 1936. The largely Manchurian

troops of Chang Hsueh-liang (the 'Young Marshal'), warlord of Sian in Shensi

province and nominally allied to the Nationalist government, were refusing to

cooperate in the KMT's continued offensive against the Communists, whom they

viewed as more ally than foe due to the increasing threat posed by the

Japanese.[449] Chiang Kai-shek's visit to press for greater efforts against the

guerrillas resulted in his capture and imprisonment by Chang, who (with the

eventual intervention of Chou En-lai) in turn pressured the KMT leader into

accepting the Communists as allies in a new 'United Front' to pursue the struggle

against Japan. The Communists allowed the Red Army to be incorporated into

the KMT's army in the fight against the Japanese, agreed to downplay overt class

struggle in the countryside, and agreed to renounce their claim to have

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[447] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 247.

[448] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, p. 76.

[449] *Ibid.*, pp. 80-81.

established a rival national government in Shensi; in return, the KMT ceased the 'extermination' campaign against the Communists, and gave military subsidies to the Red Army (now the 'Eighth Route Army').[450]

In what way was this a mobilisation bargain as described in earlier chapters and cases? In many ways, it was not. Rather than being extended as an inducement for mobilisation, as was the Kaiser's promise to terminate discriminatory franchise provisions in 1917, the KMT's offer of a United Front and of a cessation of persecution was extorted from a kidnapped Chiang under vague threat of death.[451] Moreover, an offer of 'no extermination' is difficult to cast in the same light as the extension or promise of concrete benefits. On the other hand, the 'policy coup' of Chang served to illustrate the divisions within the Nationalist forces themselves, and suggest a willingness in certain quarters to compromise on a previous hard line to rally support against the external enemy. First, if the United Front commitment was extorted from Chiang, the extortionists were his own subordinates rather than the Communists (whose influence on the

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[450] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 256; Fitzgerald, *Birth*, pp. 80-81; Hsü, *Rise*, pp. 661-63; Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, pp. 90-91.

[451] The threat was probably not from Chang but from others under his command, and certainly from the Communists, who had, however, less control over Chiang's fate. Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, p. 90; Fitzgerald, *Birth*, p. 81; Wu Tien-wei, *The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History*, Ann Arbor, Center of Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976, p. 101 and *passim*.

incident was much less direct).[452] Chang, though holding Chiang prisoner, made

his allegiance to Chiang's person clear, suggesting throughout that the coup was

over the direction of KMT policy and not a question of personal leadership (he

himself surrendered voluntarily to the KMT leadership after the crisis).

Furthermore, in Nanking the KMT leadership was anything but united over the

question. Chiang's earlier policy of 'bandit-suppression' had been acceptable,

but the potential for a widened civil war now tipped the balance in favour of

domestic accommodation and united confrontation of Japan.[453] A view of the

KMT leadership as containing a set of competing interests thus makes it possible

to see the post-Sian United Front as the *quid pro quo* of those elements of the KMT

wishing to heighten resistance to invasion. This view is borne out in part by the

relatively lenient treatment of Chang Hsueh-liang upon his surrender to

Nanking,[454] and in part by the fact that Chiang's release led to the fulfillment of

the pact by the KMT, though they were now under no ostensible pressure to do

so.

Another objection to the identification of the Sian incident as a 'bargain'

must come from knowledge of the CCP's own attitude towards the KMT. The

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[452] Wu, *The Sian Incident*, p. 101.

[453] *Ibid.*, pp. 101-53. The KMT faction which sought a continued anti-Communist line during and after Sian was probably anti-Chiang as well: p. 186.

[454] His sentence of ten years' imprisonment was commuted to house arrest by Chiang. Hsü, *Rise*, p. 663.

Communists did not expect – as did groups encountered in earlier chapters – the government to live up to its promise over the long term. Furthermore, if the CCP accepted the terms of the Sian agreements, it was clearly a tactical rather than an orientational manoeuvre. The goal of the CCP was to wrest power from the Nationalists. That much had not changed, and the circumstances of power in China at the time – the Nationalists reliant on urban and coastal support, the Communists winning over the rural sectors with relative ease – meant that a United Front against the Japanese (who even with an invasion force in the hundreds of thousands were no more likely to be able to control the countryside than were the KMT) was bound to advance that goal.

> The Communists, who had ten years of experience in guerrilla warfare behind them, could be sure of being able to keep the field, for years if need be, till they, and they alone, represented Chinese resistance... Whether Mao expected a total Japanese conquest, and thus the disappearance of the Kuomintang, or a surrender to Japan, and the discrediting for ever of the Kuomintang, or a stalemate in which, as happened, the Nationalist government was deprived of three-quarters of its territory but managed to defend the remainder, in any case the Communists would win.[455]

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[455] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, p. 83; Hsü, *Rise*, p. 694 makes the same point.

A parallel point mitigates against viewing Sian as a bargain between the CCP and the KMT: the Nationalists were no more likely to believe in the good faith of the Communists than *vice versa*. If the CCP was pre-disposed to overthrow the KMT in the end, it is also true that the KMT leadership was as aware of this fact as any of the actors involved. To the extent that Sian was a deal struck with the CCP *per se*, it was from the KMT's perspective a method of buying time for a final assault on the Communists, rather than of garnering Communist support.[456]

More broadly, however, it is possible to see Sian as a genuine mobilisation bargain if consideration is given to the groups traditionally supportive of the KMT (and of the 1911 Revolution), and in particular the urban intellectual and scholarly classes. The support Chiang had derived by the early 1930s had been as a champion of Chinese nationalism: though mitigated by the failure to adequately confront the Japanese in Manchuria, there were achievements in foreign policy from which the KMT had gained considerable momentum. In particular, the revocation of several foreign trade concessions (as provisions of the 'unequal treaties' of the previous century) from 1927 to 1931 had proven highly popular.[457] From 1931 to 1936, however, Chiang's obsession with routing domestic Communists at the expense of confronting the Japanese slowly sapped KMT support in urban regions. A good measure of this is the activities of urban nationalist and student groups.

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[456] Hsü, *Rise*, p. 695; Mancall, *China at the Center*, p. 276, 285.

The Mukden Incident of September 1931 and the practically unopposed

Japanese occupation of Manchuria which followed were the first major blows to

Chiang's nationalist credentials. Canton, Shanghai, and Nanking all witnessed

riots and demonstrations led by students. Two nationalist organizations arose

from this period, the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Association (based in

Shanghai), and the National Students' Anti-Japanese Association (based in

Nanking).[458] Repeated Nationalist concessions, such as the Tangku Truce of 1933

which yielded railway privileges to Japan in the north-east, the Ho-Umezu

agreements of 1935 in which Nanking agreed to crack-down on anti-Japanese

youth movements, and the KMT's agreement soon after to the extension of the

demilitarized zone nearly to the gates of Beijing, furthered the erosion of the

KMT's nationalist credentials, and of the credibility of the government's avowed

policy of trading 'space for time'.[459] Urban nationalists, for many years the core

intellectual support of the KMT, became increasingly alienated from the regime

as the likelihood of further Japanese aggression mounted. Students participating

in mass riots in Beijing and Nanking in 1936 were unequivocal in their calls for a

United Front against Japan.[460] But as Bianco points out, it was the defection of

old guard Kuomintang supporters under the aegis of the National Salvation

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[457] Hsü, *Rise,* pp. 665-66.

[458] Botjer, *History of Nationalist China,* pp. 121-22.

[459] *Ibid.,* pp. 168-71; Bianco, *Origins,* p. 145-49.

Association formed in May of that year which demonstrated the distance Chiang had travelled: inspired by student agitation, the Association (with Sun Yat-sen's widow as titular leader) drew support from urban professionals, journalists, and academics as well as from youth organizations.[461] The significance of the intellectual basis of the patriotic movement was especially great in a society in which the support of the scholarly classes was traditionally central to the legitimacy of dynastic successions.[462] Thus in the months prior to the Sian incident, there was growing pressure on Chiang to reverse the KMT's policy of 'first unification, then resistance', both from urban circles outside the KMT and from those amongst Chiang's supporters who were either disaffected or feared the consequences of a loss of nationalist support.[463]

If Chiang's own opinion was changed at gunpoint, the wave of nationalist support for a United Front within, but especially outside, the KMT at that point makes it easy to understand his subsequent adherence to the policy. Chalmers Johnson suggests accordingly that Sian "was both the culmination of these popular efforts to influence the Central Government and the symbol of urban

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[460] Bianco, *Origins*, p. 145.

[461] *Ibid.*, p. 146; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 256.

[462] Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, pp. 1-14.

[463] Mancall, *China at the Center*, pp. 276-77.

China's refusal to tolerate further Japanese aggression".[464] It is probably sensible to conclude that it was the allegiance of nationalist urban sectors of society -- in whose eyes Sian represented a triumph of persuasion -- that the KMT sought to maintain subsequent to Chiang's acquiescence at Sian.[465] Thus with broader war with Japan now seeming inevitable, the KMT concluded a truce with its chief domestic rival and by doing so sought to bring its own traditional urban support back into the fold.

Yet if in one way this second goal was achieved (the following year saw a patriotic frenzy of voluntary mobilisation as the conflict with Japan neared and then broke out in full in July), in another way the outcome of Sian was catastrophic for the KMT. The circumstances leading to the formation of the United Front (and subsequent publication of accounts of the events in the west) made it clear that it had been the Communists and their sympathisers, and not the Kuomintang, who had actively sought a coalition of 'national salvation'.

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[464] Chalmers Johnson, *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945*, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1962, p. 32.

[465] Although Johnson's thesis concerns peasant nationalism, and nationalism is certainly central to the course of the Chinese revolution, the best-documented nationalism in his and many other works is in fact that of urban groups; Skocpol makes the point that the support derived by the CCP from the peasantry probably stemmed far more from concrete agrarian reform (never undertaken by the KMT). See Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 345, fn. 51.

Though Chiang's own popularity was restored to an extent,[466] the CCP's popularity leapt amongst a previously skeptical or hostile scholarly class.[467] While students, academics, and professionals left their posts to join the cause of resistance in the tens of thousands, it was often to Shensi that they travelled. The CCP's chief training centre for soldiers and cadres, the Northwest Anti-Japanese Red Army University at Yenan, was a major destination.[468] This tendency was compounded by the increasingly fascistic nature of KMT rule as the 1930s progressed. The rise of the so-called 'CC clique' within the KMT, and the concomitant introduction of widespread use of repressive tactics by political police (the 'Blue Shirts') against intellectual critics of the regime drove other young, urban Chinese into the arms of the CCP.[469]

The United Front endured for four years, although its deterioration was always a possibility.[470] Mao's cession of control over regular Red Army forces led to KMT command of the renamed Fourth and Eighth Route Armies, but Communist guerrillas continued to operate and grew in number. Clashes

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[466] Bianco, *Origins*, p. 148; Hsü, *Rise*, p. 663.

[467] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, pp. 81-82;

[468] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 257.

[469] Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, pp. 92-93.

[470] The Front's unity was eroded in part by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, which united the CCP's Soviet supporters with Nazi Germany, Japan's chief ally and the only major state to recognise the puppet government of Manchukuo.

between KMT regulars and guerrillas increased in regularity after 1940. Chiang's commitment to the alliance, always in question, was compromised by repeated attempts to score points with nationalist opinion over Red 'failures', usually occurring as a consequence of impossible objectives set knowingly by Chiang himself.[471] For their part, though the Communists had committed themselves to a cessation of class struggle in the areas they controlled, in fact this meant little: "big landlords found life very uncomfortable in areas held by the Eighth Route Army" through heavy taxation, the confiscation of land, and political harassment, while non-cooperative village leaders were often tried or simply murdered.[472] Hence, suspicions ran high in both camps from the beginning. While the proximate source of the Nationalist-Communist split of 1941 was the KMT's betrayal of the Fourth Route Army, in which Nationalist troops ambushed their nominal allies as the Red regulars retreated across the Yangtze under orders from Chiang, renewed confrontation and civil war was likely in any event.

In important ways the Chinese Nationalists lost the civil war which re-emerged ferociously after 1945 because of their combined unwillingness and (probably structural) inability to gain support from the peasantry, which contrasted sharply with the "unique synthesis between the military needs of the Chinese Communists and the social-revolutionary potential of the Chinese

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[471] As with, for example, Chiang's order that three Red divisions take Beijing against a superior Japanese garrison. See Botjer, *History of Nationalist China*, pp. 206-07.

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peasantry".[473] On the other hand, though the revolution owed its success in large

part to the socioeconomic appeal of Maoism, one may argue that neither the CCP

victory of 1949 nor subsequent Chinese foreign policy choices can be adequately

explained without reference to the relationship between domestic forces in China

and foreign powers, both during the Pacific war and in the critical period of the

renewed civil war. Several different observations have relevance: the failure of

the KMT to prosecute the war against Japan, the misguided post-war American

intervention on the side of the Nationalists, and the continued ambivalence of

Stalin towards the Chinese Communists and Maoist deviations from Marxism-

Leninism. Taken together, these factors helped create conditions favourable to a

successful revolutionary coalition, and generated perceptions of regime and

systemic illegitimacy commensurate with subsequent foreign policy choices.

Before addressing these outcomes I shall explore each factor individually.

First, Nationalist resistance to the Japanese invasion force after 1937 (and

thus the KMT's nationalist credibility) was regularly compromised both by the

renewal of anti-Communist tactics and by widespread collaboration with the

Japanese. Chief among the collaborators was Wang Ching-wei, until 1938 the

party chairman of the Kuomintang who had never approved of Chiang's policy

reversal at Sian. In 1940, with Chiang having retreated to Chungking, Wang was

installed by the Japanese as head of the puppet collaborationist government in

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[472] *Ibid.*, pp. 206-10.

Nanking – a city recently brutalized by the invader. Although Chiang himself never seriously considered the overtures made to him by the Japanese,[474] Wang's actions lent credence to other evidence regarding cracks in the Nationalist leadership's policy of national defense, as his defection had been preceded by broad rumours in Chungking of an imminent compromise peace.[475] Yen Hsi-shan, the warlord of Shansi province in the north who was allied to Chiang and a signatory of the United Front, was by 1940 actively trading with the Japanese, cooperating in routing Communist resistance to the invasion, and had ceased to fly the Nationalist flag; within a year he accepted Japanese offers to join Wang in the Nanking puppet government.[476] Meanwhile, the credibility of Chiang's own commitment to the defense of China was undercut by the KMT's deployment of its best troops to blockade the Communist strongholds of the Northwest.

Where the KMT did engage the Japanese, their treatment of the local population differed significantly in quality from that of the Communists. The cutting of the Yellow River dikes by Nationalist troops in 1938 as a defense measure caused horrific damage in Shantung, killing perhaps hundreds of thousands of peasants and rendering two million others homeless, and leaving "an unfortunate reminder to the inhabitants of North China that the Nationalist

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[473] Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 262.

[474] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, p. 87.

[475] Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, p. 98.

government seemed always ready to set them on the sacrificial block".[477]

Moreover, the armies Chiang commanded could often not be relied upon to defend Chinese peasants against the Japanese at all. As is suggested by the defection of Yen, the Nationalist armies were cobbled together with the assistance of various warlords and contained a hodgepodge of loyalties, and many viewed the Communists as a more significant opponent than the Japanese. Nearly seventy Nationalist generals and more than half a million troops defected to the Japanese between 1941 and 1943, to be deployed against Red guerrillas.[478]

Compounded by widespread economic disarray, government corruption, poorly-planned conscription and arrogant treatment of Chinese civilians, the Nationalist record in the war against the Japanese contributed greatly to unrest in both rural and urban regions. In the countryside, the situation was such that by 1944 Nationalist troops sometimes came under attack by farmers without notable Communist allegiances, and American observers could report that "the people

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[476] Botjer, *History of Nationalist China*, pp. 194-95.

[477] *Ibid.*, p. 185; Lloyd D. Eastman, "Nationalist China during the Sino-Japanese War 1937-1945", in John Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, eds., *The Cambridge History of China, Volume 13, Republican China 1912-1949, Part 2*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 555. As both authors point out, the scale of the disaster is revealed by the relocation of the river's mouth more than 150 miles southwards on the other side of the Shantung peninsula.

[478] Eastman, "Nationalist China" pp. 569-71.

are seething with unrest".[479] But it was not only the peasantry that the KMT alienated. In the cities, journalists, students, academics, and other critics came under heavy pressure from the KMT's repressive forces: arrest and detention were standard, and executions not uncommon, as the KMT maintained at least ten re-education camps for its domestic political opponents. As Eastman points out, it was urban liberal opponents of the regime rather than the CCP who bore this crackdown most heavily, as the Communists had the option of escape to Yenan. Among the groups organizing opposition to the breakdown of the United Front were the People's Political Council (a non-partisan intellectual nationalist group) and the Federation of Democratic Parties, both of whose operations were eventually repressed by the KMT.[480]

The KMT, according to CCP propaganda but also to many US observers, showed every intention of reserving what strength it had to defeat the Communists in the renewed civil war.[481] As the Nationalist regime continued to alienate broader potential societal support, and came to rely increasingly on narrower bases such as domestic capitalists and warlords (neither of whose allegiance was particularly steadfast), its credibility and legitimacy as the defender of Chinese national and material interests was sapped. This erosion

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[479] *Ibid.*, pp. 605-06.

[480] *Ibid.*, p. 602-05.

[481] John Garver, "China's Wartime Diplomacy", in James Hsiung and Steven Levine, eds., *China's Bitter Victory: The War with Japan, 1937-1945*, London, M.E. Sharpe, 1992, pp. 22-23.

took place not simply in the eyes of the regime's Communist opponents, but in those of groups the KMT could count as erstwhile supporters: in particular, the intellectuals who had in many ways been the foundation of the original 1911 revolution.[482] This class, along with the coastal commercial bourgeoisie, was also affected by economic hardship in a period of mounting inflation, and — after the retreat of the KMT government into the interior — cut off from direct influence on Chiang, whose regime began to behave more and more like "a ruling caste".[483]

Meanwhile, the Communists themselves took steps to facilitate cooperation with disaffected bourgeois groups in regions under CCP control. Mao's attacks on dogmatic Marxist views of class alliance (which he pronounced "less useful than shit") were paired with the implementation of the 'three-thirds system', in which provisional local governments were to be composed of Communists, non-CCP progressives, and 'intermediate sections who are neither left nor right' in equal parts.[484] The importance of enlisting the support of middle-class opponents of Chiang was underscored in 1940 by Mao, to whom non-party progressives and moderates presented a bridge to a broader revolutionary coalition:

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[482] On the social foundations and intellectual basis of the 1911 revolution, see Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, p. 243; Bianco, *Origins*, pp. 31-36.

[483] The remark of Sun Yat-sen's son in 1994; see Eastman, "Nationalist China", p. 607.

[484] Lyman Van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement, 1937-1945" in Fairbank & Feuerwerker, pp. 689, 696.

The non-party progressives must be allocated one-third of the places because they are linked with the broad masses of the petty-bourgeoisie. This will be of great importance in winning over the latter. Our aim in allocating one-third of the places to the intermediate sections is to win over the middle bourgeoisie and the enlightened gentry ... At the present time, we must not fail to take the strength of these elements into account and we must be circumspect in our relations with them.[485]

The Communists were to profit from these circumstances in the period after 1945, but the domestic policies of the KMT were only part of the story. Foreign-KMT linkages were also creating coalition opportunities for the CCP, as their primary opponents distanced themselves from urban and moderate bourgeois support, seeking the support of the great powers and in the process placing the legitimacy of their claim to Sun Yat-sen's nationalist legacy in question. John Service, one of the key US observers of the day, reported to Washington as early as April 1944 that the fortunes of Communist expansion in Asia were being advanced by Chiang's "*internal and external policies* which, if pursued in their present form, will render [Nationalist] China too weak to serve

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[485] Mao, "On the question of political power in the anti-Japanese base areas", cited in *ibid.*, p. 696.

as a possible counterweight to Russia".[486] A second point to be made is therefore

that urban nationalist sentiment also was cloven from the KMT as a consequence

of the activities of foreign powers, both during and after the war with Japan; it is

to these linkages I now turn.

Perceptions, wartime and postwar: foreign-Nationalist alliances and the 'lost chance'

The two great strategic events of 1941, Barbarossa and Pearl Harbour,

brought the United States and the Soviet Union into the war. The former became

an active combatant against the Japanese and thus an interested ally of the

Chinese. The Soviets, though now preoccupied with defending their own

territory against the German onslaught, returned to a more consistently pro-

Chinese posture and in doing so eased the strains caused by the Nazi-Soviet pact

and particularly by the Soviet-Japanese treaty of neutrality of April 1941.[487]

However, if both future superpowers sought to varying degrees to support the

Chinese against Japan, it is also apparent that both nations chose repeatedly to

support the Nationalists at the expense of the Communists, this despite growing

evidence that the KMT was able to command neither the allegiance nor the

compliance of the Chinese population. This pattern of relations not only

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[486] Message from Service to the US Department of State, cited in Thomas, *Armed Truce*, p. 416;
emphasis added.

survived but became more intense after the conclusion of the war in the Pacific, and is central to an understanding of post-revolutionary Chinese foreign policy.

The Soviet policy towards China from 1941 until the turning of the tide at Stalingrad was viewed through the lens of survival: as more Russian troops were required to defend the USSR's Eurasian heartland, the danger of a Japanese attack against a weakened eastern front mounted. Accordingly, it suited Moscow to promote united Chinese resistance and thus keep the Japanese occupied. The Chinese Communists' allegiance to the Comintern, though regularly asserted in public, had contained an ambivalent strain since 1927 and the subsequent KMT rout of the CCP's urban base. Moscow's continued support of both the CCP and the Nationalists had fuelled the rise in the party of those desiring a more independent foreign stance. The events of the war were to accentuate that tendency. Repeated Comintern directives for Red assaults on numerically superior Japanese forces met with increasing skepticism and non-compliance from the CCP,[488] and caused corresponding suspicion in Moscow. Mao's choice to resist Soviet demands led in turn to a confrontation with -- and purge of -- the rival 'internationalist' faction within the CCP,[489] a factor which lowered the

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[487] Garver, "China's Wartime Diplomacy", p. 15-18; Stephen Goldstein, "The CCP's Foreign Policy of Opposition, 1937-1945", in Hsiung & Levine, pp. 108-11.

[488] Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power*, p. 128.

[489] *Ibid.*, pp. 131-37.

likelihood of Sino-Soviet foreign policy congruence in the post-revolutionary period.

As the war progressed, direct Soviet military relief in the Chinese war of resistance against the Japanese did not materialise to any great extent. In the concluding stages of the conflict, however, the prospects of enhanced postwar international power for Moscow generated attention towards China smacking more of imperialism than of solidarity with the CCP and Chinese nationalism. At Tehran, Stalin sounded out Roosevelt on the prospects for Soviet access to a warm-water port in China; at Yalta, this along with joint Sino-Soviet control of the Manchurian railways was agreed amongst the Big Three without consultation with Chiang.[490] Despite the obvious ideological contradictions of this policy and the effect it was bound to have on the CCP, Stalin's apparent belief that Chiang was the only likely source of authority in China after the war led to a widening rift between alleged Comintern unity and actual Soviet-Chinese relations.[491]

The conclusion of the war brought further disillusionment for the Chinese Communists. The Soviet entry into the war against Japan occurred just days prior to the Japanese surrender. Although Soviet troops rapidly recaptured Manchuria, their victory over a practically vanquished opponent was hollow in the eyes of their Chinese counterparts. Moreover, once ensconced in Northern

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[490] Akira Iriye, "Japanese aggression and China's international position, 1931-1949", in Fairbank & Feuerwerker, p. 538.

China the Russians showed little inclination to leave: the Yalta summit and subsequent discussions amongst the big three had been suggestive of a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria in exchange for cooperation in the war against the Japanese.[492] This expectation found legal expression in the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance announced upon Japan's surrender, by far the most bitter pill for the CCP to swallow. In exchange for Moscow's recognition of the KMT as "the central government of China", complete with pledges of military aid and moral support and assurances that the Soviets would not interfere to aid the CCP, the Treaty required Chiang to cede greater control over the Manchurian railway system to the USSR and placed the port of Dairen in the Soviet military zone.[493] For the CCP, the sacrifice of their position for the benefit of Soviet strategic and economic interests was a shock. Mao's anger over this episode, which he saw as emblematic of the brakes Moscow had continually placed on the Chinese revolutionaries, lingered well into the post-revolutionary period; other party leaders were "hurt, angry, and bewildered".[494]

Of course, this was far from being the end of the relationship between the Russian and Chinese Communists. Despite the disappointments of the CCP's history with the Comintern, internationalism still enjoyed a degree of credibility

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[491] *Ibid.*, pp. 538-39.

[492] Van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement", p. 720.

[493] *Ibid.*, p. 720; Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power*, p. 176-77.

as a strategy which was to survive until the death of Stalin. There was no official

protest of Soviet policy, which quickly shifted to the benefit of Mao's forces.

With mistrust deepening between Moscow and the Western allies through 1945

and 1946 (and with the consequent emergence of Stalin's 'two camps' doctrine),

in Soviet thinking Yenan's interests soon outweighed the merits of cooperation

with the Nationalists. The CCP was to profit enormously from the Soviet

presence in China, with respect to both war *matèriel* and access to regions under

joint Soviet and Nationalist jurisdiction. In particular, Soviet assistance was

central to the Manchurian campaign of Lin Piao.

Yet Soviet assistance followed, rather than led, the CCP into renewed

struggle with the Nationalist government, waiting to be convinced that the

Communists were viable contenders for power (and that failure to support Mao

would mean a loss of influence). As much as a renewed sense of east-west

confrontation stemming from events in Europe, two other factors seemed to

suggest that Stalin's eventual support of the CCP was conditional: Nationalist

military advances in Manchuria against the People's Liberation Army which by

implication threatened Soviet interests in the region,[495] US troop withdrawals

and general signals regarding a lack of American strategic commitment to

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[494] Van Slyke, "The Chinese Communist Movement", pp. 720-21.

[495] Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power*, pp. 194-95.

China,[496] and independent Chinese Communist military successes. To its

chagrin, therefore, the CCP could not be certain of Soviet support for some time,

and probably not until early 1946. For their part, "the Russians were apparently

dominated by a wait-and-see attitude towards China". While Moscow allowed

the Communists to claim captured Japanese weapons, much of the best

weaponry and machinery in Manchuria was removed by Soviet troops; if no

longer actively eroding the CCP's position, the Russians "were certainly not

going all out on behalf of Mao".[497]

Does the chequered history of CCP-Soviet relations in the years of the

Civil and Anti-Japanese wars, in particular the belated Soviet abandonment of

Chiang Kai-shek, provide us with insight into the Sino-Soviet split of the

following decade? In important ways, the split of 1958-60 has its roots in genuine

doctrinal differences between the CCP and the CPSU over the course of Chinese

domestic development under socialism. Mitigating this conclusion, however, are

several other factors which together suggest more tactical motivations for the

Chinese. First, the period of true Sino-Soviet cooperation lasted perhaps only

seven years. The death of Stalin and the subsequent revelations by Khrushchev

of the Soviet dictator's often self-serving policy choices lent greater momentum

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[496] Aruga Tadashi, "The United States and the Cold War: The Cold War Era in American

History", in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*, New York,

Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 78-79.

to the Sino-centric elements of the CCP, who in any event had been since the early 1940s the dominant group in the party: the CCP were "national communists at heart, keenly aware of China's misfortunes".[498] The relatively short duration of Moscow-Beijing cooperation contrasts sharply with the preceding two decades, in which despite continual loyalty to the Comintern the CCP had regularly been the victims of Russian-KMT cooperation. Second, upon achieving power in 1949 the CCP found itself in much the same position as had the Nationalists in 1945 -- in need of foreign support in the face of considerable opposition. The 'lean to one side' policy of 1949, in tune with Stalin's 'two camps', "was prompted not only by ideological affinity but also by practical considerations" and endured as long as the Soviets were willing to provide the Chinese with massive military and economic assistance. Khrushchev's cessation of nuclear aid to China in 1958 marked the beginning of open Chinese verbal attacks on the Soviets,[499] whereas the earlier part of the decade had seen considerable Soviet largesse as a consequence of the post-Stalin leadership struggle. Third, the terms of Soviet support of Mao after 1949 were remarkably similar to those extracted from Chiang in 1945: a Russian zone of influence in outer Mongolia, Russian railway rights in Manchuria, and freedom of access for

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[497] Botjer, *History of Nationalist China*, p. 250.

[498] Hsü, *Rise*, pp. 756-57.

[499] *Ibid.*, pp. 757, 762.

Soviet shipping in Dairen.[500] Soviet aid was also extended as interest-bearing lending rather than direct assistance; together with the northern concessions, "China had obtained a minimum loan with maximum interest".[501] The Korean War was also the subject of recriminations by the CCP with respect to the Soviet role: the conflict cost the Chinese dearly in men and equipment, while the Soviets avoided direct intervention despite their earlier role in bringing about hostilities.[502]

Thus, the terms of Soviet assistance to the Chinese Communists, while certainly better after 1949 than in earlier periods, were regularly the cause of misgivings amongst the CCP leadership. Though the evidence is somewhat circumstantial, the fact that the relationship was to survive only as long as significant amounts of aid were forthcoming seems to suggest that the Chinese alliance with the Soviets was largely one of contingency, and bore the memory of past relations with Moscow. Born of necessity, it is doubtful whether the Moscow-Beijing Axis was ever a positive choice for Mao.[503]

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[500] Fitzgerald, *Birth*, pp. 221-22; Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, pp. 125-26. The latter two provisions were abandoned by the Soviets in the aftermath of the Korean War.

[501] Waung, *Revolution and Liberation*, p. 126.

[502] Nakajima Mineo, "The Sino-Soviet Confrontation in Historical Perspective", in Nagai & Iriye, pp. 218-21.

[503] Thornton, *China: The Struggle for Power*, p. 239, suggests that Soviet domination of China was resisted at the earliest economically viable opportunity.

This becomes clearer if Chinese decision-making at the time of the split is examined in light of historical factionalism. Though the Maoists had generally been in a position to counter the more orthodox Marxist-Leninist stream of the party since the failure of Stalin's united front policy in the early 1930s, de-Stalinisation had empowered the pro-Moscow faction, as Khrushchev's need for allies in the Kremlin's power struggle had led to a surge in Russian military aid to China. When this surge subsided with Khrushchev's consolidation of power, the reservations of the Maoists regarding Soviet generosity led to growing hostility. The pro-Soviet group, now led by Liu Shao-chi, sought to heal the growing rift in 1958, but Mao seized the initiative at the Eighth Party Congress to push the CCP in the opposite direction. The manifestation of this policy was the Great Leap Forward, a doomed attempt at developing an independent industrial base (and development strategy) and a military base free of Soviet influence. Its failure proved a temporary setback for Mao, but the subsequent power struggle in Beijing led ultimately to Mao's ouster of Liu and the subsequent redirection of Chinese foreign policy away from the Soviet line.[504] Thus, the emergence of the Sino-Soviet split in its fullest form in 1960 required the political victory of the faction within the CCP which had been most circumspect in its view of Soviet behaviour towards China, and which had been most directly affected by Stalin's half-hearted (and occasionally treacherous) support of the Chinese Communists in their struggles with the Nationalists and Japanese. When Chinese economic

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[504] *Ibid.*, pp. 236-43.

growth no longer rendered the trade-off of national independence for Soviet aid politically necessary or expedient for Mao, the parting was swift and the new trajectory decidedly revisionist.

If the anti-Soviet direction of post-1960 PRC foreign policy can be traced in part to mistrust between the Maoists and Moscow dating from wartime alliances, the relationship between the CCP and the Americans was clearer, at least after 1946. US support for the Kuomintang at the highest levels of the Truman administration increased markedly with the onset of the Cold War, and rendered anything other than an antagonistic relationship with a newly-Communist China highly unlikely. For the KMT, however, US support was a mixed blessing. While Chiang was in desperate need of external support as his domestic power base shrank even further after 1945, American military assistance was never granted in sufficient quantity to achieve even a compromise peace with the Communists, let alone outright victory. Worse for the Nationalists, however, was the perception of reliance on foreign support as their domestic legitimacy shrank, a cycle which was self-amplifying. Thus if the substance of American support was less plentiful than it might have been, the US presence created an impression of Nationalist dependence on foreign powers which seriously eroded the KMT's remaining nationalist credibility.

Yet while eventually contributing much to the anti-western posture of post-1949 China, the US in 1941 was in a position which made a long-term rapprochement with an eventual Communist government a distinct possibility.

The initial American policy towards the Chinese domestic situation had been one of national conciliation in order to defeat the Japanese. As such, US aims fell more in line with the United Front goals of the CCP than with Chiang's own divided agenda of mild resistance to Japan combined with increasing repression of the Communists.

American frustration with Chiang's unwillingness to cooperate with the CCP, of which the most vocal embodiment was Stilwell, led to Roosevelt's demand in 1944 that Chiang cede control over Nationalist forces to Stilwell. For the Communists, this presented a greater chance of recognition and a lessening of Nationalist attacks on Communist positions. Stilwell's loathing of Chiang led to his replacement by Hurley, who kept up the pressure on the Nationalists to re-admit the CCP into government. Soon after his arrival in 1944 Hurley convened a meeting of the KMT and CCP leaderships, in which the Americans reiterated their demands that the KMT work cooperatively with Mao and recognise the "legality" of the CCP.[505] For their part, the CCP seemed willing to entertain the possibility of working with the Americans, until perhaps as late as 1946. With the wartime alliance of the Soviets and the western democracies in operation, and with the Americans' persistent objections to Chiang's anti-Communist activities, Mao's views of relations with the United States were relatively conciliatory

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[505] *Ibid.*, pp. 155-56.

through the end of the Japanese war.[506] If there are grounds to doubt the

potential for ideological convergence between Yenan and Washington — many of

Mao's pronouncements regarding America as the "ideal of democracy" are too

fawning to be taken at face value[507] — there is however considerable room for a

belief that in the charged strategic atmosphere of Chinese domestic and regional

politics, the continuation of pragmatic accommodation between the US and the

CCP was a distinct possibility.

However, between 1945 and 1949 the United States' relationship with the

Chinese Communists worsened dramatically. Furthermore, it is likely that this

worsening was due primarily to the relationship between the Americans and the

CCP, and not to any ideologically-necessary Chinese alignment with Moscow.

Okabe Tatsumi has shown that the period between the end of the CCP's

cooperative stance towards the US and the resumption of closer ties with

Moscow is marked by a distinctively independent CCP foreign policy of an

'intermediate zone' which foreshadowed the later PRC policy of 'three worlds':

as argued above, the Soviets were giving little succour to the Communists, and

only with the development of outright US hostility towards the CCP did Mao call

for the CCP to 'lean to one side'.[508]

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[506] See Okabe Tatsumi, "The Cold War and China", in Nagai & Iriye, pp. 224-27.

[507] *Ibid.*, pp. 226-27.

[508] *Ibid.*, p. 230-36. The CCP's desire to establish an anti-fascist international front had led it to

seek cooperation with the US as early as 1935: see He Di, "The Evolution of the Chinese

American allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek and Washington's failure to perceive (and exploit) differences between Yenan and Moscow was central to the drift of alliances in the renewed civil war. The arrival of George Marshall as Truman's mediating emissary in December 1945 was intended "to promote a unified, democratic China that would stand by the United States in the emerging Cold War".[509] By Marshall's departure in 1947 that mission was in tatters, and the remaining time prior to the Communist victory in October 1949 was to see the US write off Nationalist China as a lost cause. Yet the lack of nuance in American perceptions of Chinese Communism was to hobble the pursuit of options which might have borne more fruit: at least two crucial opportunities to establish a more cooperative relationship with the CCP were squandered between 1944 and 1947.[510]

How did the CCP-American relationship turn sour? In the first place, despite increasing entreaties to the contrary from better-placed envoys in the field, the Truman administration's preoccupation with what it saw as a creeping pattern of global Communist encroachment led to an increasing degree of support for Chiang against the CCP and a glossing-over of Chiang's weakening

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Communist party's Policy Towards the United States, 1944-49", in Harding and Yuan, *Sino-American Relations.*.

[509] Levine, "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria", *Diplomatic History*, vol., 3, no, 4, Fall 1979, p. 369.

[510] He Di, "Evolution", *passim*.

degree of legitimacy. This drift had begun under Roosevelt with the replacement of Stilwell by Hurley and Wedemeyer, both of whom had rapidly begun to shift in late 1944 towards a policy of outright support of Chiang against the Communists while the war against Japan was still underway. Strongly opposed by junior embassy staff in a report issued in February 1945, who argued that such a move would undermine US long-term interests in the region and throw the country "into chaos", Hurley nonetheless was able to persuade Roosevelt that Chiang was the Americans' sole hope in China.[511] A purge of recalcitrant embassy staff followed. The Communists, who months before had thanked Roosevelt for Hurley's role in bringing the KMT to the bargaining table, were outraged and seemed not to believe the about-face: Chou En-lai wrote to Hurley requesting assurances (not given) of continued US Army cooperation with the CCP, and the party requested direct talks with the US administration, to no avail.[512]

Despite the embassy purge, Hurley's position was considered increasingly untenable within the State Department, a situation which led to Hurley's resignation and the arrival of Marshall. Marshall's mandate was to achieve a peaceful settlement of the domestic situation; his initial demonstrations of even-

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[511] Tao Wenzhao, "Hurley's Mission to China and the Formation of US Policy to Support Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communist Party", in Harding and Yuan, *Sino-American Relations*, pp. 89-90.

handedness bolstered the views of those within the CCP leadership who had identified 'democratic' and 'militaristic thought' factions within US policy circles as opposed to an imperialist monolith,[513] and opened the door again for CCP-US cooperation. Marshall oversaw the convening of the multi-partisan Political Consultative Conference (PCC) and the achievement of a ceasefire by January 1946. The PCC passed a series of resolutions which if fully implemented would have severely limited the Nationalists' hold on state power. Yet the Marshall program was undercut by continuing US strategic support of the KMT, which (artificially) boosted Chiang's confidence in the Nationalists' ability to defeat the Communist forces in the field. By mid-1947 it was apparent that the KMT was using the peace negotiations as a smokescreen and was stepping up attacks on Communist positions in Manchuria — aided by US air transport of Nationalist troops.[514] Though Marshall was under no illusions as to the Nationalists' lack of democratic legitimacy as he understood the term,[515] CCP statements and feelers regarding a willingness to cooperate with US mediation efforts were roundly ignored as evidence of Communist aggression in other theatres began to

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[512] He Di, "Evolution", pp. 34-35.

[513] Tatsumi, "The Cold War and China", pp. 234-35.

[514] Suzanne Pepper, "The KMT-CCP Conflict, 1945-1949", in Fairbank & Feuerwerker, pp. 733-34.

[515] Levine, "Marshall Mission", p. 370.

mount.[516] Ultimately, the CCP found it necessary to back away from the bargaining table. Marshall's frustrations over the failure of his attempts to elicit cooperation from Chiang (and thus from the CCP) gave way to outright US support of Chiang as full civil war broke out for the last time -- support which was both insufficient and based on a perception of CCP-Soviet unity which was fundamentally flawed.

> Washington could not contemplate with equanimity the prospect of a
> Communist victory in China because it remained convinced of the links binding
> Yenan to Moscow. However exasperated Marshall and Leighton Stuart became
> with Chiang Kai-shek and his entourage, Chiang's leadership of China was not
> seriously questioned, even if in the final analysis his regime was judged not
> worth saving by any reasonable American effort.[517]

US policy was instrumental in ending whatever chance there was of maintaining non-conflictual relations between Washington and the Chinese Communists: the Truman administration's "long-term course of supporting

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[516] Tatsumi, "The Cold War and China", p. 234, notes that Leighton Stuart, US ambassador at the time of the Marshall mission, dismissed one key statement of CCP ambivalence towards the USSR out of hand, saying that it "might well have been written in the Kremlin".

[517] Levine, "Marshall Mission", p. 372.

Chiang had created deep mistrust on the part of the CCP".[518] This in itself might have been immaterial but for the victory of the Communists over the Nationalist armies in 1949. However, the American policy of increasing suspicion of the CCP and corresponding support for the Kuomintang, perhaps critical in pushing Mao into the arms of Moscow, was also a contributing factor in the waning of the KMT's own popularity amongst moderate societal groups.

Perceptions of KMT collusion with a foreign power which seemed bent on undermining Chinese national interests came to a head after the breakdown of the Marshall mission in 1947. For the intellectual class in the post-1945 era, the "dominant political preoccupation was opposition to the civil war".[519] The Anti-Civil War Movement developed a heavy anti-American accent as US backing of Nationalist forces — though limited and ultimately ineffectual — became increasingly apparent to urban non-Communist Chinese. Moreover, US support of Japan in the reconstruction period was offensive to much nationalist opinion. In 1947 and 1948 a series of student protests broke out in most major educational institutions in the country, in which the students demanded an end to the civil war and to US intervention on Chiang's behalf. The protesters were increasingly met with harsh tactics, as abductions, torture and execution by KMT troops and police became common threats. As Suzanne Pepper points out, the significance of this widespread movement was less in its swelling of the actual ranks of the

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[518] He Di, "Evolution", p. 45.

CCP, which was minimal, but in the signal that the intellectual class was no longer willing to support the KMT. The KMT's credibility had been sapped through its perceived lack of *bona fides* in the Marshall negotiations, its reliance on foreign military support, and through its dogged prosecution of the civil war, which was seen in urban moderate circles as a hopeless battle and one which created the conditions that fuelled left-extremism. "The political mandate extended to the CCP from urban China was thus ambivalent, coming not directly but as a vote of non-confidence for the KMT".[520]

> In the end, of course, the [US] policy of limited assistance pleased no one and gained nothing. It was unable to delay disaster for the KMT government on the Chinese mainland. Yet it also earned the condemnation of the non-Communist anti-war movement there, as an American attempt to promote its own interests by disregarding those of China through continuing support for the unregenerate Chiang Kai-shek.[521]

In what way did this outcome lead to a post-revolutionary foreign policy more anti-American than might otherwise have been expected? The probability that unmolested (or even accommodated) the CCP would have chosen a middle

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[519] Pepper, "The KMT-CCP Conflict, 1945-1949", p. 746.

[520] *Ibid.*, pp. 746-51.

[521] *Ibid.*, pp. 786-87.

road between Moscow and Washington upon taking power is, if debatable, certainly greater than zero, according to the evidence of Mao's earlier consistent willingness to cooperate outlined above. American support of Chiang (and consequently of Taiwan), blanket identification of Maoism as an obedient ally of Moscow, and unremitting hostility to the fledgling PRC rendered such a middle road impossible in any event.

Was an anti-regime logroll a feature of the CCP's overthrow of the KMT? Here the evidence is mixed. Unlike the other regime changes outlined in this dissertation, which for the most part were dependent on urban political conflict and key changes in class and sectoral alliances, the victory of the Chinese Communists was the culmination of a vast military mobilisation of a peasant army against a regime whose primary support and recognition was by the critical last years of the war drawn mostly from overseas. Does the abstention of the KMT's erstwhile support amongst the intellectuals and petty bourgeois in coastal urban areas, and the growth of anti-Americanism amongst those same groups, therefore matter at all? There appears to be some reason to suspect that it did.

First, while it is difficult to say that these groups did matter in light of the peasant-based nature of the conflict, it is also difficult to conclude definitively that they *did not*. Had the KMT retained a degree of legitimacy with urban groups through US enforcement of the Marshall ceasefire and political accommodations, Chiang's hold on cities such as Canton might well have been strengthened, and the China lobby in Washington may have won the allocation

of greater resources: ironically, Chiang's lack of popular legitimacy cost him as much support with the US as it did domestically.[522] Though the Communists eventually routed the Nationalists, the CCP was not considered a possible winner of the war by urban Chinese opinion until the winter of 1948-49, which suggests that the loss of urban support for Chiang may well have been critical. Second, in the transitions of the Long March and the subsequent war against the KMT, the CCP had become a peasant party. Having achieved national power, it was necessary to transfer the centre of political power to the coastal cities and build a bureaucratic power structure millions-strong.[523] In the initial period of Communist rule many urban intellectuals, petty bourgeois and other non-Communist groups alienated by KMT collusion with the US after 1945 were absorbed into the PRC's state structure. Given the delicate strategic situation of the new regime and the as-yet incomplete process of social revolution,[524] class unanimity regarding foreign policy was likely of considerable benefit to the CCP's consolidation of power.

Thus while greater circumspection is required in the Chinese case, there is some evidence to suggest that the formation of an anti-regime logroll contributed to the replacement of an externally compliant Chinese government by an externally-revisionist regime. KMT domestic policy was sufficient to generate

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[522] Levine, "Marshall Mission", p. 370.

[523] Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 262-63.

left-intellectual opposition in the form of Communism and to allow alliance between the CCP and the peasants. Soviet policy towards the KMT and the CCP between 1924 and 1949 facilitated a split in Communist ranks and the subsequent ascendancy of a Chinese-nationalist tendency in the movement. The KMT's repeated attentions to its internal enemies at the cost of territorial losses to Japan generated support for the CCP amongst urban intellectuals and petty bourgeois and sapped its own strength. US support of Chiang caused much of the Nationalists' remaining urban following to withdraw its support in the post-1945 period, and destroyed whatever opportunities there were for a 'middle road' Chinese foreign policy outcome after 1949. In this manner Communist social and anti-imperialist goals, peasant desires for agrarian reform and freedom from the KMT's heavy-handed and extractive rural policy, and urban intellectual and nationalist disappointments with Chiang Kai-shek's disastrous domestic policy and seemingly fascist-militarist sell-out of the aims of the 1911 revolution, combined to result in the overthrow of a regime weakened by its reliance on unacceptably foreign sources of support.

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[524] *Ibid.*, p. 263.

Stephen Walt has argued that revolutionary states, while often the source

of challenges to international orders, are rarely the initial aggressors. In the case

of China, he suggests that the PRC was prodded into adopting an aggressive

stance through US intervention in the Korean War.[525] While Walt is probably

correct to say that the Chinese revolution, like other revolutions, was despite its

public proclamations primarily national and not universalist in essence,[526] the

story of foreign involvement in Chinese domestic politics before 1949 suggests

that the external conditioning which gave rise to Chinese revisionism occurred in

the two decades prior to the revolution itself, during the civil conflict and the war

with Japan, and not in the immediate aftermath of the revolution. With respect

to the manifestations of the Chinese challenge – Chinese involvement in Korea,

Tibet, Vietnam, the Bandung movement, the Sino-Soviet split – it seems clear that

even if the PRC was provoked into any of these confrontations, pre-revolutionary

CCP interaction with the United States and the USSR rendered Chinese

revisionist behaviour more likely than not, doctrinal explanations

notwithstanding.

Ultimately, how well does the Chinese experience fit the model outlined in

earlier chapters? Put plainly, the answer is: not as well. The overlapping nature

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[525] Walt, "Revolutions and War", p. 326.

[526] This point is echoed by Gurtov and Hwang, *China Under Threat*, p. 3 and *passim*.

of the two main military conflicts in this period render it difficult to speak coherently of 'mobilisation bargains' and 'postwar perceptions' as found in other cases. Furthermore, the movement to overthrow the KMT predates the major war in question by a decade, and thus can hardly be called a consequence of dishonoured state commitments in the postwar settlement. Finally, the peasant mobilisation achieved by the CCP must take most of the credit for the overthrow of the KMT: what revolutionary logroll there existed was not of the same magnitude of importance as the coalitions found in cases such as interwar Italy.

On the other hand, if the revolution had a momentum unrelated to the international conflict of 1937-1945, the course of that conflict created foreign-domestic alliances which served to sap CCP and urban perceptions of the legitimacy of the postwar order, both domestically and internationally. If the revolution did not succeed *because* of the KMT's alliance with the US, it was certainly hastened by that linkage. And if the revolutionaries were disposed towards an assertively independent, *Chinese* socialism, those within the CCP favouring this path were assisted in their control of the party by Stalin's cynical support of Chiang.

It is also true that the Kuomintang repeatedly promised to work with the Communists to free China from foreign encroachment, and in doing so raised the expectations of significant sectors of the urban population who had been the original nucleus of the 1911 Nationalist revolution. The fact that this promise was broken during the war, rather than upon the morrow of a Nationalist

victory, is less a testament to the inaccuracy of the model's expectations than it is an indication of the extreme insincerity of the pledge, and of Chiang Kai-shek's repeatedly exaggerated view of his own security of position and legitimacy.

In other cases, the role of the military has been critical to the success or failure of revisionist postwar movements. In the Chinese case, this appears to have little applicability: as the domestic challenge of the regime took place in the context of a massive peasant war nested within an international conflict, one can hardly speak of a 'postwar' challenge, and veterans' groups are in consequence an inappropriate focus. What parallels there are derive from the Nationalists' difficulties with desertion. Chiang Kai-shek's military reliance on a coalition of former warlords and foreign support regularly circumscribed the degree of allegiance he could command at critical junctures, and defections were common: of officers to the Japanese and their Chinese puppet regimes, and of the ranks to the Communists or to desertion.

Another intervening factor which contributed to previous explanations of the success of domestic revisionist movements was that of political development. In earlier cases, the expansion and subsequent contraction of political incorporation rendered postwar regimes vulnerable to overthrow, creating societal demands for inclusion which perceived no expression in the regime's restrictive political forms. In the Chinese case, there are definite parallels to be noted, primarily in the Kuomintang's gradual exclusion of two of its former domestic allies, as Chiang Kai-shek's regime became increasingly militarist and

autocratic (and to some observers, increasingly fascist). The Communists,
previously partners of the KMT in the United Front of 1924-1927, suffered a
series of purges, and were readmitted into a governing coalition in 1937 only to
be betrayed with equal vigour in the midst of the war against the Japanese.
Urban non-Communist intellectuals and petty bourgeois, once the foundation of
the Nationalist regime, came under increasing repression from Chiang's regime
as it drifted towards a domestic policy of right-wing authoritarianism.

The results of this case study are mixed: while the events leading to the
emergence of China as a challenger state do not provide an exact match with the
relationships specified in the model, it is reasonable to conclude that the basic
dynamics contributing to the PRC's revisionism are similar in kind to those
discussed in earlier chapters, if not in exact shape and sequence. Expectations
generated from wartime accommodations were dashed: the regime which failed
to honour its commitments did so in cooperation with outside powers in a
fashion which compromised not only the legitimacy of the domestic order, but
that of the regional order and international order which emerged in 1945. These
parallel, collusive illegitimacies in turn furthered the prospects for a cross-class
and cross-sector alliance dedicated (or acquiescent) to the overthrow of the
regime and the prosecution of an independent foreign policy in contradiction of
the wishes of the great power guarantors of the postwar settlement. Far more
than in other cases, however, these dynamics must take their place beside a
number of exogenous factors in explaining Chinese post-war behaviour.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS: WAR, DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE RISE OF CHALLENGERS

This project began as a response to my perception of a discordance between the historical record — the linkages between major wars, postwar orders and the rise of challenger states — and existing explanations of these events. Two separate assertions in the literature were troubling, in particular. First, it was often alleged that, by virtue of major wars' capacity as 'decisions', the victors in such conflicts were consequently in a position to impose and enforce a new international order in accordance with their interests. As an assertion this seemed to me to be, if not entirely without foundation, at least questionable in light of the European experience from 1815 to 1848 and again from 1918 to 1939, and the experiences of the great powers after 1945. In each of these periods, the difficulties encountered in establishing a new order (if in fact anything durable was created at all), and the frequent emergence of challenger states about which little could be done short of renewed major war, seemed to suggest that victory presented the victors with a delicate balancing act as much as an opportunity to profit from a new and beneficial set of rules. Second, the explanations given for the rise of challenger states in these postwar eras, while in some cases reasonably satisfactory, were in other cases problematic — or at least, left as many questions

unanswered as answered. Specifically, there seemed to be several challengers for which there was no adequate theoretical account, all occurring in this century.

Three theories typically dominated the examination of this question, alleging that challenger states emerge because of a) shifting relative power differentials, b) responses to excessively harsh peace treaties, or c) indigenous political development which held corollaries of aggressive external behavior. Certainly, there exist cases of challengers in which these theories (alone or in combination) seem of greater use and relevance than my own model. Imperial Germany's revisionist stance in the decades prior to the first world war and Japanese expansionism after 1930 seem to fit well with the causal linkages and expectations expressed in theories of rising power.[527] While revisionism in

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[527] Japan was excluded as a case in Chapter 2, on two grounds: first, that the degree of mobilisation of Japanese society in the first world war was insufficiently great for one to speak meaningfully of 'mobilisation bargains'; and second -- as mentioned above -- that Japanese behaviour fit reasonably well with existing 'rising power' theories of challenge. However, there are aspects to the Japanese case which may bear fruit under further investigation. Like Italy, Japan was a member of the winning coalition in 1918. Yet Japanese success on the battlefield was not met with recognition in the postwar international arena: the Washington Conference of 1921-22 and resulting naval treaty confirmed instead Japanese diplomatic inferiority. Domestic difficulties of postwar inflation - and, after 1930, a decline in trade due to slackened US demand - led to domestic economic imperatives which paralleled growing antagonism towards Japan's one-time ally. While there was no direct overthrow of the post-1918 regime, attacks by militarist-extremists on moderate politicians throughout the 1930s contributed to a strengthening of hard-

France after 1815 conforms (as argued above) reasonably well with the expectations of my own model, the behaviour of the French state in the years after the revolution must — in spite of foreign provocation — be seen largely as the consequence of indigenous political development; perhaps the same might be said of Russia after 1917.

My point, however, is that together or separately these theories are incomplete. If, for instance, the relative harshness of peace treaties can explain the rise of challenger states, why do we observe the emergence of revisionist state elites whose nation by all accounts did quite well at the peace table? In this category, the example of China after 1945 seems the most appropriate case with which to refute the oft-cited example of Germany after Versailles. Moreover, the other cases presented here all pose difficulties for this theory as well. The Germanic territories conquered by Napoleon were compensated handsomely in territorial terms in 1815, yet strong revisionist movements sprung up there soon after. The treatment of France at Vienna, often held up as an example of magnanimity which might well have been followed at Versailles, led just as quickly to the emergence of social movements wishing to redress the terms of the postwar international settlement. In Italy and Germany after Versailles, the injustices (real or perceived) of the Treaty did create widespread resentment in each country. However, if the populations of these countries were relatively

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line expansionists within the government. Clearly, this is a non-European case which merits further attention. See Kennedy, *Rise and Fall*, pp. 385-92.

united regarding their opinion of the Treaty, there were divided as to how to respond. As I have shown, the reversals in foreign policy exhibited by these two states had as a necessary condition a set of domestic coalitions and strategic political choices conducive to the political fortunes of the revisionist factions and fatal to the interests of the postwar regime. The harshness of the peace treaty (if such a thing exists in terms other than the perceptual) was influential in the revisionist outcomes of these states' trajectories, it cannot be denied. But the qualities of the settlement were -- in the eyes of Germans and Italians -- filtered through the choices of postwar elites, domestic political actors, and foreign powers. The same set of filters conditioned these states' subsequent responses to the international postwar order. In the absence of considerations of domestic politics and the interaction of societal groups with external actors, the nature of the settlement alone can tell us little about the emergence of challengers.

With respect to historical-sociological arguments, there is an impression of similar incompleteness. There is little doubt that the emergence of constitutionally non-orthodox regimes has been accompanied by widespread international strife There is no doubt that the arguments of Moore, and others have considerable power when we ask where such regimes come from. But when we ask: why do they behave as they do in the international arena? the answers are slower in coming. Germany's *revolution von oben* and subsequent *sonderweg* help us to explain the rise of fascism as a middle class reaction to the crisis of authority and economic stability in the Weimar Republic. They do not,

however, by themselves help us to explain Germany's need to establish dominion over Europe in the late 1930s. For this, knowledge of German interaction with other states, and the effect of such interaction on German domestic politics, is required. It is apparent from the material presented in earlier chapters that the two post-1933 developments of domestic fascism and external revisionism, embodied in the ascendancy of the National Socialists, were also twined together in domestic politics as well. The rise of the Nazis in the 1920s owed as much but not more to foreign preconditions as it did to domestic political development. In explaining the rise of challengers, there is a clear need to supplement historical sociology with attention to international relations, and to the mutual perceptions and interactions between foreign powers and domestic groups.

If the two preceding sets of theories offer only incomplete explanations for the emergence of revisionist states, the 'rising power' explanation offers reasonably complete accounts of a number of challenger states: e.g., Japan, pre-1914 Germany, and more distantly Holland and England. On the other hand, with respect to other challengers such as post-1945 China and interwar Italy, this explanation is not so much incomplete as inapplicable (or if applied, inaccurate): these were not states whose power was cresting with respect to their great-power rivals when they chose to pursue a revisionist policy. Instead, like Germany in the early 1920s, the emergence first of revisionist movements and then of revisionist foreign policies in these countries appears to have coincided with

relatively inauspicious economic circumstances, whether one speaks in relative or absolute terms. The other example which gives this theory trouble is that of a non-challenger. The United States, like Germany, grew in relative power quite unmolested in the years leading to 1914, yet exhibited a far more conciliatory approach to the British-led international system – and especially to the other great powers – than did Germany. 'Why Germany, why not the United States?' is a question which, if in many ways obvious, is unanswerable in relative power terms.

The central problem was thus the existence of challenger states for whom there existed no satisfactory explanation in the literature. In this century in particular, there were five instances in which great powers sought to challenge the international order: Germany (twice), Japan, Italy, and China. As I have argued in the preceding paragraphs, three of these cases (Germany 1918-39, Japan, and China) are not well explained by rising power, domestic social history, the harshness of peace treaties, or any combination of these. The task of the dissertation was therefore to develop a model which, by acknowledging both the strengths and the shortcomings of existing explanations of the rise of challengers, could fill the gaps in current theoretical understanding.

I am at pains to stress that the model outlined in Chapter 2 and used to examine the historical material in Chapters 3 through 6 is in no way presented or thought of as a replacement for the other theories discussed above. First, it cannot replace them as its focus is not identical. With respect to 'historical-

sociological' accounts of the rise of differing regime-types, I sought not to conduct such approaches anew but to explore the questions the works of Moore, Tilly and others left implied but unanswered. Regarding 'rising power' theories, I limited myself to the consideration of the immediate postwar period and was concerned with the emergence of challenger states in this period alone. Authors such as Gilpin and Organski are concerned with the broader question of the rise of challengers at any juncture. It is not from their general success at doing so, but from the limited anomalies in their work, that my own research questions stem. Much the same can be said of the works of Carr, Holsti, and others whose 'arguments from prudence' have stressed the importance of judicious peace settlements. That peace treaties have themselves conditioned state responses to international orders is beyond doubt; that peace treaties alone have done so, in the absence of societal-level political and perceptual factors, is highly doubtful. My goal, therefore, has been to complement rather than replace existing theories.

Theory versus history

My argument, as formulated prior to conducting the case studies, was essentially as follows. Where postwar perceptions of collusive illegitimacy by societal groups exist, they may lead to the emergence of a revisionist foreign policy if two further conditions are met. The first condition is that a condition of abortive incorporation exists – that is, a partial extension of political inclusion

which either has been subsequently rescinded, or has been unaccompanied by corresponding institutional changes to reflect such incorporation. Such a situation, it was argued, renders regimes prone to overthrow, generating a public belief in the efficacy of mass politics but retaining an anachronistic or illegitimate institutional structure. The second condition is that of military acquiescence: does the military have an institutional interest in regime change? Such an interest was posited to result in either the active participation in, or the tacit toleration of, attempts to overthrow the postwar regime.

In light of the empirical research conducted in earlier chapters, and with respect to the cases studied, it is possible to draw number of conclusions regarding both the usefulness of the model and its apparent deficiencies. Regarding the strengths of the model, there are five points to be made.

1. *Mobilisation bargains in major wars were defining political moments in the emergence of international revisionism as manifested at the domestic and international levels.* In each case, the existence of a domestic group or groups who felt they had lost wartime gains, or that the promise of postwar benefits was left unfulfilled by the regime, was a central factor in the domestic politics of the postwar period. Liberal intellectuals, students and professionals in Restoration France and Germany, middle-class nationalists and veterans in Italy and Weimar Germany, and to a more limited extent the urban intellectual, professional and scholarly classes in China, were key players in the domestic rise (and occasional triumph) of revisionist factions.

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2. *Postwar perceptions of collusive illegitimacy were more important than the 'reality' of the settlement in determining the tenor of domestic politics.* Victory and defeat, profit and loss from wartime were very much in the eye of the beholder. There were numerous instances where the degree of betrayal and collusive activity undertaken by the postwar regime did not warrant the objections emanating from the regime's critics. The rise of 'stab-in-the-back' myths in Germany and Italy in the 1920s had enormous power in mobilising middle-class support for the revisionists (and against their socialist enemies). That the postwar situations of these countries were probably not the result of working-class behaviour during the war was inconsequential in the political atmosphere of the day. Where the public did not make ready associations between domestic and external enemies, the revisionist press often created the appropriate image. The Communist press in China never failed to underscore Chiang's links to foreign support and his generals' reluctance to fight the Japanese.

3. *The occurrence or non-occurrence of challenge depended in each case on domestic coalition politics.* What is clear from an examination of the three cases where challenge occurred (Germany and Italy after the first world war, China after the second) is that revisionism as a foreign policy outcome was never a certainty. Von Papen's decision to control Hitler by bringing him into the government, the decision of Italy's monarch to cede control of Rome to Mussolini upon assurances that there would be no proclamation of a republic, the failure of the CCP's internationalist faction to isolate Mao after the debacle of the Great Leap

Forward: all are testament to the fact that there were other possible outcomes for these states. By the same token, it is possible that had the veteran Bonapartists occupying key positions in 1830 been willing to ally with the liberals of the *mouvement*, rather than cast about for a new strongman, the triumph of the conservative *parti de résistance* might have been averted.

4. *Abortive incorporation was central to the domestic political progress of revisionist groups.* Dissonance between the degree of mass politicisation and contemporary political institutions was an important factor in a number of these case histories. The attempt to restore the hegemony of the old regime in France and Germany after 1815 met with resistance from broad segments of (primarily middle-class) society who had been brought into the state in periods of French revolutionary and Napoleonic domination. The middle class in Germany and Italy after 1918 were through corporatist state policies increasingly squeezed out of the central position in political life they desired and had been promised in the war. The urban intellectual base of the 1911 revolution in China found itself increasingly excluded from decision-making and subject to harassment as Chiang's regime drifted towards rightist-authoritarian solutions to Chinese domestic politics. In all, these conditions rendered postwar politics fertile ground for anti-system political movements, and rendered allies easier to obtain in such struggles than they might otherwise have been.

5. *Logrolled coalitions in postwar politics often allowed the emergence of a revisionist foreign policy as a consequence unanticipated by some coalition partners.* The various

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factions that acquiesced in Mussolini's assumption of power, the domestic groups that cooperated with Hitler in the overthrow of the Weimar Republic, and the peasant base of the Chinese Communist revolution, were in many instances either willing to acquiesce to the foreign policy desires of their coalition partners or alternatively possessed no coherent foreign policy objectives of their own. What they shared with the Fascists, Nazis, and Communists was a desire to rid themselves of the postwar regime. Thus while Rhenish industrialists valued Hitler's ability to counter organised labour, and benefitted from military build-up, their interests certainly did not include deliberate provocation of conflict with most of the other great powers, especially as their own gains were achieved without undue diplomatic disturbance. In Italy much the same can be said of industry, the Vatican, and the Italian monarchy. And if the Chinese revolution was based on peasant mobilisation, the evidence is also suggests that the foreign policy of the PRC did not stem from peasant demands.

There are, however, a number of areas in which the model was either at odds with the historical record, or requires further attention, particularly with respect to domestic coalition politics.

1. *Professional militaries were more likely to support right-wing than left-wing challenges.* There may be more to this than simply the conservative leanings of professional soldiers: it may have something to do with the fact that essential workers have regularly received exemption from military service in major wars. This was the case in Germany and Italy during and after the first world war,

where veterans were quick to blame industrial workers for national defeats and humiliations. Typically, too, left-wing challenges have been mounted against anti-democratic right-authoritarian or absolutist regimes, with whom politicised militaries may have an elective affinity. The officer caste in many of these cases was typically drawn from younger sons of the rural aristocracy, for whom the spectre of democracy promised greater disorder and loss of status than benefit. Possible exceptions to this generalisation include the case of China, where in many ways rural and urban societies generated their own elites in the CCP and the KMT, who were both able to draw on military support from their own constituency. The other exception may be Bonapartism, which as a peculiar mixture of imperialism and republicanism divided the allegiances of the French military in 1830 and 1848.

2. *Revisionist outcomes sometimes failed to occur where policy complementarity was lacking amongst the logroll partnership despite the successful overthrow of the regime.* This was the case in 1848 in both Germany and France, and was true for France in 1830 as well. In these cases, a coalition was formed dedicated to the overthrow of the domestic regime. Yet there were significant cleavages amongst the coalition members as to the nature of post-revolutionary policy. It was not so much disagreement over foreign policy which tempered the impact of these revolutions, but the fact that those advocating an outright challenge of the international system were also committed to domestic reforms considered excessive by more moderate opponents of the postwar regime.

3. *While bargains were usually found in the form suggested in the model, broader regime policies occasionally had effects similar to mobilisation bargains.* This suggests that the focus on mobilisation bargains as specific instances of regime-societal pacts involving over inclusion or material gain may be too narrow. Was the frustration of opponents of the Restoration of 1815 due to their associations with specific commitments such as the Stein-Hardenberg reforms or the Code Napoleon, or was it due to the demise of more general characteristics of that period, such as 'careers open to talents'?

General conclusions

The experiences of the great powers examined in the case studies have a number of implications for the understanding of international orders and challenger states. The findings of this study also have relevance to other sets of theory in international relations. Here I shall address some of the more salient points of interest.

What light does this study shed on our current understanding of war? There are a variety of conclusions one can draw with respect to this issue. The first relates to the causal impact of major wars on subsequent state behaviour. It has been suggested by others that major wars provide formative political experiences which serve to condition post-war foreign policy choices; for example, the alliance behaviour of many European states after both World Wars

can be shown to relate to alliance experiences in those wars.[528] This study

suggests that it is instructive to go beyond the billiard-ball approach of

discussing national experiences by examining the wartime experiences, postwar

perceptions and subsequent behaviour of sub-state groupings, sectors and

classes. The distinctions regarding levels of analysis raised by Singer three

decades ago are still salient.[529] If Germany challenged in the 1930s while France

did not in the 1830s, we may be able to account for the variation in behaviour of

these defeated states by looking simply at system-level phenomena – asking

whether these states were incorporated into, or excluded from, the new

international order. If at first blush this approach seems sufficient as an

explanation, delving deeper into the experience of these two societies tells us that

several very different reactions to defeat were present in both cases.

Furthermore, it is unclear that the eventual resolution of these conflicting goals –

in the German case, the victory of the pro-challenge element, in the French, the

repeated acquiescence of revolutionary regimes to the prevailing order – can be

attributed solely or even mainly to the behaviour of outside powers. Class

politics, the arbitrary political choices of coalition leaders, the experiences of

veterans, the relative degree of political modernization: all these 'domestic

variables' played central roles in the eventual foreign policy outcome in these

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[528] Reiter, *Learning, Realism and Alliances.*

[529] Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations". *World Politics*, vol. 14, no. 1, 1961.

and other cases. The conclusion drawn here thus mirrors the work of Snyder and others in explaining challenge at the system level.[530] If in international relations scholarship it is considered increasingly unacceptable to draw distinctions between 'domestic' and 'international' politics,[531] it is certainly imperative to look beyond the systemic level to explain systemic outcomes.

Second, one may make a few comments with respect to the questions of power transitions and power balancing. In the literature on this topic, we are told to expect challengers to exhibit a level of power which is rising and relatively equal to that of the leading state[532] – or, in a more complex statement of this relationship, at particular 'inflection points' on that curve.[533] Some of the states in this study that became challengers were certainly in relative power positions consistent with these arguments. However, there were others that were not,[534] and there were also states who passed through the supposed 'danger zones' of the power transition with little military consequence for their relationships with other powerful states. It seems evident that in addition to

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[530] Snyder, *Myths of Empire*.

[531] See, e.g., James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990; Ronald J. Deibert, *Altered Worlds: Communications Technologies and Changing Global Order*, Columbia University Press, forthcoming 1997.

[532] Organski & Kugler, *War Ledger*.

[533] Doran and Parsons, "War and the Cycle of Relative Power".

[534] cf. fn. 86.

objective capability, which on its own seems a poor indicator of outcome, the *intent* to challenge emerging from the soup of domestic politics must be studied as an important enabling condition for the emergence of challenger states. If there is one lesson to be drawn from the experience of the countries examined here, it is that the act of challenge is driven by the passions of political opinion; collective memories and differing interpretations of events and outcomes; or feelings of betrayal and dissatisfaction. The simple point made by Stephen Walt – that balancing power is futile without attention to where genuine threat exists – seems to receive considerable support here.[535]

There are also some more general reflections to be made regarding the relevance of politics to the rise of challengers. We may observe that while resource-based explanations have played a large part in the dominant accounts of challenge in the literature, more intangible factors seemed central in a number of the cases explored here. Symbolic political statements and collective political memory were a common thread in uniting the disparate groups in revisionist coalitions. The *Burschenschaft* and the *Carbonari* used poetry and individual acts of defiance in their cause, and adopted the mantles of patriotic historical figures to aid their cause. The *Stahlhelm* and other *völkisch* groups turned the veneration of Paul von Hindenburg into an art form, and repeatedly made it a point to employ the colours of the imperial regime rather than the republic. D'Annunzio's outlandish territorial exploits were the chief rallying point for

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[535] Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1987.

Italian revisionism in the bitter aftermath of Versailles. The reasons for this are varied, but probably prominent among them is the necessity of retaining a collective group memory of the injustice of the settlement. By employing symbols of earlier ascendancy and conquest, and through repeated reference to the betrayal of this promise, group members persuaded of their own victimisation saw that continuity of purpose survived. The intensity of the wartime experience and the disappointments associated with collusive betrayals were thus passed on, as the generations that came of age in these war sought to mobilise their own heirs.

Regarding the salience of complex domestic political sources of foreign policy, the same point regarding might be extended *ad nauseam* through much of the literature on conflict and war. Deterrence theory, for example, is built largely upon unitary-actor, rational models of decision-making, is as currently constituted poorly equipped to deal with the phenomenon of multiple recipients of 'signals' within the same state. Critics of rational models of deterrence regularly focus on factors inhibiting pure rationality of choice, but rarely explore deeper into the layers of domestic political activity: if it is possible for the rationality of state behaviour to suffer when decisions are filtered through committee decisions, for instance, it is also probable that rationality can be hampered by the vicissitudes of domestic coalitions. In attempting to deter potential adversaries, a state adopting a strong stance may well cause other state leaderships to reconsider any aggressive designs they may possess; on the other

hand, episodes of successful deterrence may convince revisionist groups within

the deterred state that the current leadership is too willing to be swayed by the

leading states in the system.[536]

Finally, this study contains implications for research into the 'democratic

peace'. Major wars generated more political demand than supply, within and

among states, but the effects varied with the degree of political development.

Stepping beyond the focus of this dissertation to speculate on the experiences of

great powers in major wars more broadly, it would seem that the states most

affected by surges in political demand following such wars are those which I

have identified as exhibiting abortive incorporation, and which modernisation

theorists might have considered to be states in transition from absolutism to

liberal democracy. The list of states in the three periods under review which

developed strong domestic international-revisionist movements does not include

Austria or Russia, perhaps because they were in 1800 still so distant from

anything resembling popular political consciousness that mobilisation bargains

were unnecessary: old-fashioned coercion sufficed. Nor do the advanced

democracies of the 20th century show any inclination in this direction, though

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[536] The literature on deterrence, rational decision-making, and critiques of same, is considerable.
For an introduction to the research, controversies, and issues involved, see Christopher H. Achen
and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies", *World Politics*
41, January 1989, and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, "Rational Deterrence Theory: I
Think, Therefore I Deter", *World Politics* 41, January 1989.

mobilisation bargains are readily apparent in France, Britain, and the United States. In part this is because these states were the guarantors of the settlements, and it would be logically difficult to sustain an argument which held, for instance, that British or American citizens were suffering repression because of the actions of foreign powers. As the working class in the countries believed full well in the aftermath of Versailles, their regimes' repression of socialist movements was easily explained in internal class terms. Major war thus seems far more threatening for regimes undergoing periods of transitional incorporation, which in turn may partly explain why it is these regimes which roll back wartime societal gains with the most vigour. There may, in fact, be a window of developmental history for any particular state in which the pattern identified in this dissertation is most likely. The implications of this conclusion for theories of the 'democratic peace' are significant, as it offers some cause for optimism regarding the stability of the international system in a world in which the great powers are increasingly democratic, most having closed this window of potential domestic instability.

Policy implications? The Cold War's aftermath

If states exhibiting partial transitions to full political incorporation and political institutionalisation have been the most likely candidates to emulate the pattern outlined in the model, the experiences chronicled in these case studies

may have considerable relevance for the contemporary international situation, where the state 'defeated' in the Cold War exhibits many of the characteristics of other transitional regimes. There are, in fact, a number of disturbing parallels between the Russian republic of today and the Weimar Republic. While there are also some obvious differences, if we are to derive anything from this analysis it is the similarities which should concern us.

Like Germany in 1918, Russia as the dominant state in the former Soviet Union has recently concluded a protracted conflict with the Western democracies which ended in a defeat viewed by large portions of the population as an unnecessary, self-inflicted capitulation. The post-conflict elite was composed chiefly of those elements which had cooperated with Mikhail Gorbachev in bringing an end to the strategic confrontation with the US. Like Weimar, Russia's experience with (relatively) genuine democracy is a few years old, and exhibits weak democratic institutions. State power is still viewed instrumentally, with numerous instances of extra-constitutional challenges of regime authority. A rightist coup failed in 1991; more recent was the alleged coup aimed at cancelling the presidential runoff elections in June 1996.

Like Weimar, the Russian economy contains economic sectors and other interest groups which were oriented towards and aggressive, internationalist foreign policy for decades, and which are now unhappily enduring a sudden period of retrenchment. Like Weimar, the waning years of the just-concluded conflict saw the regime demand increasing sacrifices from its population in

exchange for a future 'golden age': the Soviet institutionalisation of a mentality of deferred expectations has yielded only more frustration and hardship since 1989. Currency instability and general economic distress are common to both cases. Like Weimar, a large-scale demobilisation has accompanied the end of the conflict, pouring hundreds of thousands of veterans into a Russian economy ill-equipped to accommodate them.

My argument if applied to the Russian case would anticipate the fusion of domestic and foreign-policy resentments. At times in the last five years this has occurred. The emergent Russian nationalist movement and its extremist fringe have as their closest allies those who favour the restoration of economic collectivism and the abandonment of free-market reforms. Perceptions of collusive illegitimacy are commonly expressed in the nationalist press. It is true that recent events and electoral returns suggest the right-nationalist movement has ebbed somewhat. Yet many of the revisionist movements examined in this work also endured periods of eclipse. While the right-nationalist leadership has not appeared to possess sufficient mobilisational skill to win the allegiance and trust of more than small minority of the Russian electorate, the possibility of more sober leadership for this movement remains.

The implications of this study for contemporary Western relations with Russia are clear. Structural imperatives tell us little as to the likelihood of emergent Russian revisionism. There are instead different possible outcomes. If Russia is to emerge as a revisionist state, it will not be some inevitable process

deducible from its great power status, but from future choices made by domestic actors and foreign states. As with Stresemann and his heirs, for the West, a close relationship with the Yeltsin regime may be too much of a good thing. The West have good reasons for supporting liberalizing forces within Russia, but also have good reasons for preserving impressions of Russian independence and clout in foreign policy terms. Consequently, the incorporation by NATO of states typically in the Russian orbit, while motivated by concern for the welfare of those populations, may in fact undermine that very purpose by presenting Russian nationalism with a gross provocation. The more that moderates are squeezed between an interventionist West and an outraged nationalist foreign-policy lobby, the less auspicious are the chances for continued pacific relations. Tied economic aid, and economic pressure on in Russian interaction with the near-abroad (e.g., linkage of foreign policy with continued economic cooperation) may also be counterproductive.

This is not to say that the West should do nothing in the face of Russian aggression and violations of human rights, any more than it should abstain from addressing similar problems in China. It is, however, to caution. State choices between pacific and revisionist behaviour in the aftermath of conflict are often the result of domestic political struggles. The proximity of the conflict in the political memory of societal groups makes linkages between foreign powers and domestic factions even more significant in 'postwar eras' than otherwise. To collude with friends may still bring enemies to power.

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Support Chiang Kai-shek against the Chinese Communist Party". In

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IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (QA-3)

1.0 1.1 1.25 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.0

150mm

6"