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Religion and Nationalism in Iran, 1951-1953:  
Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq and Āyatullāh Abul-Qāsim Kāshānī

by

Minoo Derayeh

*A thesis presented to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and  
Research, McGill University, Montréal, in partial  
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of  
Arts.*

Institute of Islamic Studies  
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## ABSTRACT

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Title: Religion and Nationalism in Iran, 1951-1953: Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq and Āyatullāh Abul-Qāsim Kāshānī

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In the history of modern Iran, religion and nationalism often converge to bring about social and political change. The people of the bazaar and the religious leaders, who consistently supported each other on many important occasions, joined forces with the intelligensia to bring about change. This alliance was dissolved after the accomplishment of the original goal. This configuration came into existence during the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 and at the time of the movement to nationalize the oil industry. During 1951-1953, under the umbrella of the National Front, the intelligensia, led by Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, along with the merchants and religious leaders under Ayatullah Kashani, formed an alliance to implement nationalist economic policies. In this instance, too, the alliance did not last long, especially as it threatened the interests of the major powers.

## RESUMÉ

Auteur: Minoo Derayeh

Titre: Religion et Nationalisme en Iran, 1951-1953: Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddīq et Āyatullāh Abul-Qāsim Kāshānī

Département: L'institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill

Niveau: M. A.

Dans l'histoire contemporaine de l'Iran, souvent la religion et le nationalisme se convergeaient pour amener des changements politiques et sociaux. Les chefs religieux et les gens du bazaar, qui avaient collaboré ensemble à maintes reprises dans le passé s'unirent avec l'intelligentsia afin de provoquer des changements. Cette alliance fut dissoute suite à la réalisation du but initial. Ce regroupement vit le jour lors de la révolution constitutionnelle de 1906-1908 et lors de la période de la nationalisation de l'industrie pétrolière. De 1951 à 1953, sous la tutelle du Front National, l'intelligentsia, menée par Muhammed Musaddiq, ainsi que les commerçants et les chefs religieux sous Ayatollah Kashani, créèrent une alliance pour mettre en oeuvre des politiques économiques nationalistes. Mais encore une fois, cette alliance sera de courte durée, principalement en raison de sa menace envers les intérêts des grandes puissances.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT .....	i
RESUMÉ .....	ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .....	iii
INTRODUCTION .....	1
CHAPTER 1 .....	7
THE TOBACCO MOVEMENT .....	9
THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT .....	13
CHAPTER TWO .....	29
MUŞADDIQ'S FAMILY BACKGROUND .....	29
MUŞADDIQ'S EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND CAREER .....	32
ABUL-QĀSIM KĀSHĀNĪ'S FAMILY BACKGROUND .....	47
KĀSHĀNĪ'S EARLY RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL CAREERS (1897-1921).....	48
CHAPTER THREE.....	57
FROM DICTATORSHIP TO REVIVAL OF FREEDOM 1926-1951 57	
EMERGENCE OF REZĀ KHĀN TO POWER.....	59
THE NEW ARMY .....	59
MODERN STATE BUREAUCRACY.....	60
REFORMS AND MODERNIZATION .....	61
THE POWER OF THE ULAMA .....	66
EDUCATIONAL ROLE OF THE ULAMA IN THE FACE OF REFORM .....	67
ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE ULAMA .....	69
THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY OF THE ULAMA AND GOVERNMENT REFORMS.....	72
MUŞADDIQ AND REZĀ SHĀH.....	74
ĀYATULLĀH KĀSHĀNĪ AND REZĀ SHĀH .....	78
WORLD WAR II, A NEW ERA.....	79
THE COMMUNISTS AND THE TUDEH PARTY .....	82
FEDĀ'İYĀN-I ISLAM .....	85
ĀYATULLĀH KĀSHĀNĪ AS POLITICAL LEADER.....	88
DR. MUŞADDIQ: RETURN TO POLITICS .....	91

CHAPTER IV .....	100
1947-1950 .....	101
THE FIRST NATIONAL FRONT .....	105
THE SIXTEENTH MAJLIS AND THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE OIL INDUSTRY.....	113
THE ISSUE OF OIL AND ITS NATIONALIZATION.....	115
CONCLUSION.....	149
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	152
SOURCES IN FARSI .....	152
SOURCES IN OTHER LANGUAGES .....	154
APPENDIX 1 .....	156
APPENDIX 2 .....	157
APPENDIX 3 .....	158
APPENDIX 4 .....	159
APPENDIX 5 .....	160
APPENDIX 6 .....	161
APPENDIX 7 .....	162



## INTRODUCTION

The term "nationalism" is usually manifested as "patriotism" in the history of Iran. The concepts of *millat* (nation), *mīhan* (home-land), and *ḥukumat-i markazī* (central government) have significantly influenced many revolts, resistance movements and various other forms of opposition against foreign powers in the social and political history of Iran.

The geographic and strategic position of Iran has resulted in numerous conflicts between that country and the Great Powers of every age. Often defeat helped the Iranians to unify against the foreign domination of their country. The invasion of Alexander the Great ended the Achaemenid Empire, which was soon after replaced by the Parthians (Arsacians). Once more the united and centralized Parthian Empire revived the glorious Achaemenid era. Later the Sassanids established a powerful empire in 226 A.D..<sup>1</sup>

The Arab invasion in 637 A.D., and the fall of the Sassanids were the result of long wars between the Sassanids and the Eastern Roman Empire, increasing corruption in the Sassanid political system and its rulers, and the consequent weakness in the society and its religious leaders. The simplicity and attraction of the Islamic doctrine, undoubtedly also played a role.<sup>2</sup>

Despite resistance and revolts, Islam was gradually established in Iran and the Arabs ruled for nearly two hundred years. The period of Arab domination over Iran, which is

referred to as “two centuries of silence” (*dow qarn sukūt*) by the prominent Iranian historian ‘Abdul-Ḥusain Zarrīn-kub,<sup>1</sup> reveals many struggles and resistance against a foreign empire which made every attempt to hold on to its political and cultural domination in Iran. Revolts like those led by Beh-Āfarīd, Sinbād, Abū-Muslim, Ostādsīs, Afshīn and Māziyār were all manifestations of Iranian patriotism. Nevertheless, Iranians quickly learned the Arabic language and Islamic jurisprudence, with some even achieving great proficiency in Islamic studies. Moreover, many Iranian philosophers and poets continued to play significant roles in keeping the sense of patriotism alive amongst the Iranians. The great Iranian poet Abul-Qasim Firdowsī for example, is regarded as the reviver of Iranian culture and literature for having addressed his work to Iranian pride. These patriotic sentiments were later directed towards Shiism. As Ibrāhīm Mīrānī says: “Shiism is an outstanding manifestation of the Iranians' Nationalism in their struggle against Arabs' domination.”<sup>4</sup> Centuries later, Shiism would be declared the official religion of Iran by the Safavids, as will be discussed later in chapter one.

In Islamic political theory, the ultimate authority after Allah (God) is the Caliph of Islam. The Caliph is both the temporal and the spiritual head of Islamic society. In Iran, however, the Caliphs were more religious figures than political ones. In 1057, Baghdad was conquered by the Saljuqs (1047-1187), and Caliph al-Qāim gave Tughril the title of Sultan, granting him secular authority over the Islamic lands. Gradually, the pre-Islamic belief in the spiritual authority of the King as “Shadow of God” (*Sāyeh-e Khudā*) was accepted and supported by the Saljuqs.<sup>5</sup>

The Safavid Dynasty (1502-1736) expanded this belief; in fact the founder of the Safavids, Shah Ismā'īl claimed to be a descendant of Imam Mūsa Kāzim and declared Shiism as the official religion of Iran. The Safavids had managed to institute a state religion which was very similar to what the Sassanids had done with Zoroastrianism. Moreover the Safavids established a strong and united state with a powerful central government.<sup>6</sup>

Meanwhile the ulama were effectively organized. They became a very important group with the functions of interpreting and formulating the *shari'ah*. The government, however, held a large measure of control over the ulama through their religio-political officials known as *şadrs*. *Şadrs* had authority over two major spheres: the religious, by virtue of their power to nominate religious judges; and the financial, through their role in overseeing the *awqāf* (religious endowments). Consequently, politics and religion were dominated by the powerful Safavid kings.

The dynasties which followed the Safavids, such as the Afshārs (1736-1749), the Zands (1750-1794) and the Qajars, did not enjoy the degree of legitimacy which had been granted to the Safavid rulers by the religious groups, despite the fact that the rulers of all these dynasties sought to revive the old Persian belief in the king as "Shadow of God."<sup>7</sup>

During the Qajar era, Iran underwent many religious and socio-economic changes. These changes, along with occasions of foreign interference, prepared the ground for later protest movements, such as the Tobacco Movement and the Constitutional Movement. These movements of political and socio-economic discontent would later lead to the fall of the

Qajars and the advent of Reza Shah to power in 1925. Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq and Ayatullah Abul-Qasim Kashani<sup>T</sup> lived through this period, and later in the century played a significant role in the oil dispute of 1951-53, which led in turn to serious political turmoil. Therefore the first chapter offers a brief review of this period which will help to provide an understanding of the ideological evolution of these men, and which will show the factors which affected their moments of cooperation and conflict.

The second chapter deals with the family, educational, religious, social and political backgrounds of Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq and Ayatullāh Kāshāni during the formative years of 1882-1925. It will attempt to demonstrate the influence of their different backgrounds on their political activities.

Chapter three covers the period between 1926 and 1949. During this period Reza Khān emerged onto the political scene, and a period of modernization and centralization which embodied secularization commenced. Religion and liberalism were oppressed by Reza Shāh's authoritarian rule and his despotism continued until he was forced to abdicate by the Allied Forces in 1941. During the Allied occupation Iran underwent economic hardship on the one hand and a political awakening on the other. Many parties and groups with different ideological agendas appeared. Dr. Muṣaddiq's and Āyatullāh Kāshāni's relations with Reza Shāh will be also covered in this chapter.

Chapter four covers the period between 1947 and 1953. This chapter discusses briefly the events that led to the nationalization of the oil industry, the creation of the

National Front and a series of alliances and disagreements between Dr. Muṣaddiq and Ayatullah Kāshani. The alliance between the two men for instance contributed to the successful nationalization of the oil industry, whereas the conflicts between the two resulted in the *coup* of 1953, the fall of Dr. Muṣaddiq's government and the end of Ayatullah Kāshāni's political life.

Thus the two streams of Liberalism in early 20th century Iran formed alliances based on common goals, irrespective of where the movements had their power bases. Nevertheless, the success or failure of these alliances often depended on factors beyond the control of the liberals, factors such as the shah's despotism and foreign interference. These will be investigated in this study.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Ibrahim Mirānī, Nāsiōnālism va Junbish-i Mashrutīyat-i Iran (Tehran: Ārmānkhawh, 1358 [1979]), pp.60-61
- <sup>2</sup> For more information on Iran before Islam, see: Richard N. Fryc, The Heritage of Persia (London: William Clowes and Son, 1962).
- <sup>3</sup> Abdul-Ḥusain Zarrin-Kūb, Dow Qarn Sukūt (Tehran: Intishārāt-i Amīr Kabīr, 1969)
- <sup>4</sup> Mirānī, Nāsiōnālism, p.62.
- <sup>5</sup> I. Petroeshewski, Tārīkh-i Iran, trans. Ḥamid Kishāvarz (Tehran: Intishārat-i Payām, n.d.).
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., pp.477-478.
- <sup>7</sup> James A. Bill, The Politics of Iran: Groups, Classes and Modernization (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1972), p.21.

# CHAPTER 1

## Iran, Movement and Revolution

The Qajar regime was the continuation of over two thousand years of various authoritarian governments in Iran. The founder of the Qajar dynasty, Aqā Muḥammad Khan was of Turkomen origin, defeating the Zands in 1794 and establishing a powerful and dictatorial regime which lasted until 1924.<sup>1</sup> This era can be divided into three periods: the first forty years comprising the reigns of Aqā Muḥammad Khan and Fath 'Alī Shah; the second period the reigns of Muḥammad Shāh and Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh; and the third period, those of Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh and his successors Muḥammad 'Alī and Aḥmad Shāh.<sup>2</sup> It was during the second period that the ulama's position was strengthened and they were pushed to the forefront of political life. The oppressive rule of the Qajars as well as the widening of foreign influence brought about this change.<sup>3</sup>

Also during this period, nationalism, which until then had an anti-foreign (anti-colonial) face, gained a new characteristic, one which manifested itself in modernization and reforms. This was partly due to the influence and prevalence of European ideas in Iran, and partly the result of economic and social changes which had occurred over the decades.<sup>4</sup> Farahānī, Amīr Kabīr, Ākhound-zādeh and Tālbov were among those who advocated modernization and reforms, many along Western lines, although they all were also known for their anti-foreign sentiments and activities.<sup>5</sup>

Iran's strategic position was the first element which interested Britain and Russia. In the nineteenth century, Russia had expanded her territory so that it would border Iran, first on the Caucasus side of the Caspian Sea, and then in central Asia. On the other hand, the British fear of any threat to her most prized colony, India, and her desire to protect the trade routes to that region led them to take over two major islands off the south coast of Iran in 1856. The seizure was confirmed by the Paris Peace Treaty on 4 March, 1859. Subsequent to this treaty, the British government and some British subjects obtained numerous concessions in Iran. Britain and Russia alternated in obtaining these concessions, and by the turn of the century they were competing in granting government loans to Iran. In addition to these economic and financial activities, the two powers advanced their interests through other means. In 1878-79, Russia organized and staffed the Cossack Brigade, which remained the most efficient unit in the Iranian Army for many years and played a significant part in the "short despotism" (*istibdād-i ṣaghīr*) period of 1908-1909. British interests on the other hand were furthered when Baron Julius de Reuter, a British citizen, signed the Reuter concession with Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh in 1872. According to the concession, the exclusive rights to finance a state bank, exploit all minerals (gold, silver and precious stones were excepted), build railways and tramways for seventy years, and establish all future canals, irrigation works roads, telegraph lines and industrial factories, were purchased by Baron Reuter. Although the concession was canceled due to opposition in Iran and Russia, Reuter retained mining and banking privileges, the latter eventually developing into the Imperial Bank of Persia.<sup>6</sup>



Several factors came into play before the Constitutional Revolution of Iran: the lack of internal security; famine; foreign interference; and the Tobacco Concession. These were among the most important issues in the pre-Revolution period.

### The Tobacco Movement

The first important movement against foreign interference and governmental concessions to outside interests took place in regard to the Tobacco Concession of 1890. In March 1890, a British subject, Gerald F. Talbot, was granted full control over the production, sale and export of all tobacco produced in Iran. Despite the cautious measures taken by Iran and Britain in keeping the concession confidential<sup>7</sup> the news reached the Iranian people through reports in two Iranian newspapers published outside of Iran, namely *Akhtar* and *Qānūn*. *Akhtar*, which was published in Turkey, had interviewed the concessionaires, compared the concession with the one in Turkey and clarified the position of the Iranian cultivators, merchants and the consumers with respect to the concession. On the other hand, *Qānūn*, which was published in London and had an Islamic orientation, called upon Iranians to form a united Islamic front against the government and the Tobacco Concession.<sup>8</sup>

The Tobacco Concession concerned every town and village where tobacco was planted, bought, or consumed. Tobacco merchants, finding themselves working for an English owner, formed a delegation under the leadership of Amin al-Dowleh. They submitted a petition to the shah, offering him a new tax on tobacco which would have

provided more income for the shah than the concession. Naṣir al-Dīn Shah did not consider the petition seriously and ordered that the opponents of the concession be treated harshly. The merchants took sanctuary (*bast*) in Shāhzādeh 'Abdul-'Azīm,<sup>9</sup> thus attracting the support of the ulama. Among the religious figures present was, Sayyed Jamāl al-Dīn Afghani.<sup>10</sup> Afghani visited Mīrzā Ḥassan Shīrāzī, the chief *mujtahid* of the 'Atabat and informed him of the concession. Mīrzā Ḥaṣan issued a *fatwā*, prohibiting the use of tobacco until the concession was abolished. He also sent a letter to Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, stating:

.....permission to foreigners to interfere in the internal affairs of the country and their cooperation and friendship with the Muslims and bank and railroad operation and tobacco concession etc....., are against the direct benefits of the holy Quran. They (foreigners) destroy the independence of the country and the organization of the government and also upset the people.<sup>11</sup>

Shortly after the issuance of this *fatwā*, demonstrations were held in Tehran and many other big cities. *Bazaars* were closed and many refused to sell, purchase or consume tobacco. The shah's troops retaliated against the demonstrators and many were killed. Mīrzā Ḥaṣan Shīrāzī declared a *jihād* against the concession and although Shīrāzī's *jihād* was contested by the Imām-i Jum'ah of Tehran, who argued that any *jihād* against a Muslim ruler of a Muslim country had no foundation, the people continued their revolts; finally by the end of January 1892, the concession was abolished by the shah.<sup>12</sup>

The success of the movement had been due to the cooperation between the merchants and the ulama. This alliance between the two powers, based on religious and economic interests, continued mainly because of their shared distrust of foreigners and

reached its peak in the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1906.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore the movement's outcome paved the way for the campaign for abolition of arbitrary rule *ḥukūmat-i zūr* and in favor of a system based on the rule of law *ḥukumat-i qānūn*.

Moreover, the thirst for freedom, distrust of foreign influence and socio-economic factors contributed to the formation of a liberal, social, and *milli* (nationalist) movement which came to be called the Constitutional Revolution (Inqilāb-i Mashrūṭeh).<sup>14</sup> In order to understand the reasons behind the emergence of this revolution, a brief review of the religio-political and socio-economic situation of Iran in the late 19th and early 20th centuries follows.

By this period, Iran's economy had for a long time been agrarian-based, thus making the land the main source of income. During the nineteenth century, more than eighty percent of the population was engaged in agriculture and cattle production, while the rest of the population lived in the cities. Among the latter were the *ashrāf* (nobles), *aṣṇāf* (merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen), government employees and clergy.

The land too was divided into three categories: *khālisijāt* (land under government management), *awqāf* (endowment) and *arbābī* (private lands). A large proportion of the lands fell into the category of *khālisijāt*. Profit from these lands belonged to the shah. The expenses of the mosques, religious shrines and the income of the *mujtahids* were funded by the profits from the *awqāf*/lands, while the *arbābī* lands belonged to the big land owners.<sup>15</sup>

The tax collection system was very inefficient. The big landowners did not pay their share of taxes, thus leaving the burden to fall on the shoulders of the peasants, shopkeepers and craftsmen. Raḥīm Ra'isīnīā makes the following statements concerning the unsystematic tax collection: "This is how taxes were collected; the taxes of different parts of the country are put out to tender and they [government officials] accepted gifts [*pīshkesh*] and bribes [*rishveh*]." He continues: "When the government was in need of money and could neither provide it by promoting a concession to the foreigners nor by obtaining a loan from them, it would engage itself in replacing or changing a governor in order to receive bribes and gifts."<sup>16</sup>

As was mentioned above, among taxpayers it was the peasants who were under the most pressure. They lived under difficult, almost inhuman conditions, very similar to those of the "serf" in Europe during the Middle Ages. Bāqir Momenī has these words concerning the Iranian peasants: "The peasants, hopeless and shelterless, were falling to pieces under the pressure. The *Khān* (land owner) plundered him, the newly-arrived land-owner drains him of his livelihood, the *mulla* emptied the food from his table and the government deprived him of his last penny."<sup>17</sup>

In studying the social foundations of pre-constitutional Iran, it becomes clear that the *rūhāniyyūn* (ulama) were of great significance. They played an important role in the maintenance of the dictatorial regime on the one hand and motivated the people to seek freedom and oppose foreign influence on the other.

The ulama were divided into two groups: one pro-government and the other independent. The pro-government group was rich and influential, and many of its members were landowners. The other group was made up of mostly poor and deprived ulama, and received the support of the lower and middle classes. It was from this latter group that distinguished ulama such as Āyatullāh Sayyed Muḥammad Bihbahānī and Āyatullah Sayyed Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṭabāṭabā'i emerged to lead the Constitutional Movement to victory.

The Constitutional Revolution can also be regarded as a rebellion against the corrupt and oppressive ruling authorities, self-centered royalists and governors from the *ashraf* group. The latter were divided into two factions: Anglophile and Russophile. The competition between the two groups and their supporters contributed to Iran's unstable economical situation.<sup>18</sup>

### The Constitutional Movement

In the years following the Tobacco Movement, Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh increased his political repression by taking reactionary steps against the educational sector. He forbade the opening of new schools, banned the import of liberal newspapers, and prohibited people from coming in or leaving Iran in order to study. The shah also established a secret police system and opponents of his rule were dealt with severely. Nevertheless, many newspapers were published in and outside of Iran and were distributed among the middle class. Meanwhile the intellectuals and members of the various religious groups were raising awareness amongst the peasant class of the existing situation and were having some success

in motivating them to stand up for their rights and their welfare. The *mullas* for their part were in direct contact with the people in the villages, and informed them of the news in the capital and other big cities.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, many *anjumans* (societies or gatherings of like-minded people) came into existence as well. These *anjumans* were formed along political lines and were often highly organized. The *anjuman* came to play an increasingly important role in the Constitutional Revolution. Among them there were two which stood out in this regard. One was the society of the Farāmūsh- Khāneh or the Freemason's Hall, under the leadership of Mirzā Malkom Khān.<sup>20</sup> Its members believed in establishing a republic in Iran in keeping with Islamic principles

The other organization was that of the Anjuman Makhfī or Hidden Society, which aimed at keeping the people politically informed. The members of this society were called Fida'i (devotee), who had to adhere to a strict code of regulations. The founder of the Anjuman-i Makhfī was Sayyed Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'i. Ṭabāṭabā'i was raised and educated by his father Sayyed Ṣādiq. He avoided having any relationship with the government and chose a life of abstinence. He founded the Madreseh-ye Islamiyyeh (Islamic School) in Tehran and encouraged zealous Muslims to send their children<sup>21</sup> to it. Ṭabāṭabā'i was made aware of the Farāmūsh-Khāneh by his father Sayyed Ṣādiq and Sayyed Jamāl al-Dīn Afghani. According to Mehdi Malik-Zādeh, Ṭabāṭabā'i was affiliated with the Freemason Hall and, after the success of the Constitutional Revolution, received the Medal and the Sword of Honor from the London branch of the Freemasons.<sup>22</sup> However Algar does not agree with Malik-Zādeh's evaluation and limits the affiliation to some slight influence of

Malkom's thoughts on Ṭabaṭaba'ī, acquired through his father Sayyed Ṣadiq. Algar states: "... whatever impression Malkom produced on Sayyed Ṣadiq may well have been passed on to Sayyed Muḥammad, and thus left its imprint on the constitutional movement. With evidence lacking one is reduced to speculation."<sup>23</sup>

Ṭabaṭaba'ī supported *ḥukūmat-i millī* (national rule), enforcement of law or *qanun* and the establishment of the 'Adālat Khāneh (House of Justice). He joined Sayyed 'Abdullah Bihbahānī in the Anjuman-i Milli (National Society), an underground society with some sixty members. The members of the Anjuman-i Milli aimed at uniting the other *anjumans* into one body. It was for this purpose that Malik al-Mutakallimīn (an active member of this *anjuman*) arranged the meeting between Ṭabaṭaba'ī and Bihbahānī.

The members of the Anjuman-i Milli represented a cross-section of social strata in Iranian society; in addition to the two prominent sayyeds mentioned above, distinguished merchants, landowners, government employees and one Zoroastrian participated in the society.<sup>24</sup>

These *anjumans* disappeared after the victory of the Constitutional Movement due to the fact that their mutual objective or goal was to motivate the people to protest against the *ḥukūmat-i zūr* then prevailing in the country and to establish a *ḥukūmat-i qānūn* instead.

To achieve these objectives an alliance was made between the *ruhaniyyun*, merchants, trade guilds, intellectuals (poets, writers and graduates of foreign universities)

and the more radical members of the peasant class. One of the most drastic actions taken was the assassination of Naṣir al-Dīn Shah by a disciple of Sayyid Jamal al-Dīn Afghani in May 1896. Iran was left in a state of anarchy, corruption and poverty.

Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shah succeeded his father in June 1896 and the expenses of his coronation were paid by a loan secured from the Imperial Bank. Government finances were weak due to the extravagance of the previous shah and the new shah, who was ill. To counter this situation *ṣadr-i a'azam*, Amin ul-Sulṭān obtained loans from various foreign countries, particularly Russia, thus adding to Iran's debt and causing the situation to worsen. Amin ul-Sulṭān tried to gain the support of the *ruhāniyyūn* for his efforts. His cabinet's meetings were held in the presence of the ulama and the appointment and dismissal of the provincial governors or other officials were determined by the ulama's *fatwās*. However Amin ul-Sulṭān did not last long in his post and in November 1896 was replaced by Ghulām Ḥusain Farmānfarmā. Shortly afterwards, Amin al-Dowleh replaced Farmānfarmā. Amin al-Dowleh was a secularist and a reformist. He believed in the separation of political and religious powers, and therefore he opposed the intervention of the religious class in the governments' affairs. Consequently, the conflicts between the ulama and the government recommenced. Moreover, Amin al-Dowleh encouraged the foundation of the Anjuman-i Ma'ārif<sup>25</sup> (Council on Education) and also established primary schools on the European model. With a secularist *ṣadr-i a'zam* in the office and Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh's liberal policy, censorship was unbent, the ban on travel was removed, the schools of agriculture and political science were opened and, most importantly, the formation of commercial,



educational and cultural associations was permitted. Consequently many associations were formed, among them the Shirkat-i Islāmī (Islamic Company), Iran's first joint-stock company, founded by a group of merchants in Isfahan and dedicated to protecting traditional handicrafts and preserving national independence.

Another was the Anjuman-i Ma'arif (referred to above), formed by a group of intellectuals in Tehran. This group was responsible for establishing the first National Library (Kitābkhāneh-i Millī) and fifty five modern secondary schools besides.

Hoping to satisfy the opposition, Muzaffar al-Dīn Shah chose to implement a liberal policy, which in turn encouraged the opposition to establish and participate in different political associations. Some of these associations came into being before the liberal era, whereas others were established during that period. Many played an important role in the forthcoming revolution. These included the Markaz-i Gheybī (Invisible Center), formed in Tabrīz by twelve young writers and merchants under the leadership of 'Alī Karbalā'ī.<sup>26</sup> It published a journal entitled *Ganjīneh-ye Funūn* (Treasury of Arts), which featured contributions from such authors as Sayyed Ḥaṣan Taqīzādeh, Mīrzā Ḥusain Khan, 'Adalat, I'tisām al-Mulk and Mīrzā Muḥammad 'Alī Khān Tarbiyat. These four had also been members of the first group of *āzādīkhawh* (freedom seekers) from Tabrīz.<sup>27</sup>

Another significant group was the Ḥizb-i Ijtimā'iyyūn-i 'Amīyyun (Social Democratic Party), established originally in Baku by a group of Iranian immigrants from Azarbāyjān. Their programs were circulated by the Markaz-i Gheybī in Iran.<sup>28</sup> An even

more influential association was the Jami'eh-ye Adamiyyāt (Society of Humanity), headed by Mirza 'Abbas Qulī Khan Qazvīnī, later surnamed Adamiyyat. He was a follower of Malkum Khan. His son, Feraidun Adamiyyat is a well known historian. Ervand Abrahamian quotes F. Adamiyyat concerning the main aims of the Jami'eh-ye Adamiyyat: "To use social engineering for national development; to secure individual freedom so that human reason could 'blossom'; and to obtain legal equality for all citizens, irrespective of birth and religion."<sup>29</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddīq was active in this society for a very short period of time. This subject will be covered in more detail in the next chapter.

The reforms undertaken by Amin al-Dowleh in line with his secularist policy created a tremendous enmity between him and the ulama, a situation which finally forced him to resign from office in June 1898. Amin ul-Sultān replaced Amīn al-Dowleh and shortly after obtained a loan from Russia to cover the expenses of the shah's trip to Europe for medical care. Meanwhile a Belgian citizen by the name of Joseph Naus was appointed as the director general of customs. In 1900, when Amin ul-Sultān accompanied the shah to Europe, Joseph Naus was promoted to the post of minister of customs with full power and responsibilities. Joseph Naus brought in new customs tariffs which adversely affected merchants. This and other instances of foreign domination provoked the ulama, and an alliance came into being between the ulama and the merchants, who led protests against Amīn al-Sultān and Joseph Naus. Meanwhile Joseph Naus' picture, disguised as a clergyman was distributed among the people.<sup>30</sup> Moreover two respected sugar merchants were arbitrarily accused of speculative activities and were sentenced to be flogged by the authorities. This led people to publicly

demand the establishment of an 'Adalat Khaneh. By then three prominent religious figures, Tabataba'i, Bihbahani and Sheikh Fazlullah Nuri came to support the protest. They left Tehran for Shāhzādeh 'Abdul-'Azīm (a Shiite religious shrine near Tehran) where they took sanctuary. A number of seminary students (*tullab*) who supported the trio subsequently started a riot in the vicinity of the shrine. 'Abdul-Majīd Mirza 'Ayn al-Dowleh, the *sadr-i a'azam*, ordered the soldiers to force an end to the sanctuary attempt and to control the riot. One student was killed. The body of this first martyr, 'Abdul-Hamid, was carried round the bazaar by the merchants, chanting: "once again Husain has been martyred by Yazid; 'Abdul - Hamid has been killed by 'Abdul- Majīd."<sup>11</sup>

Following that incident many people took sanctuary in different government offices such as the telegraph office, mosques and the British embassy, demanding the dismissal of Joseph Naus and 'Ayn al-Dowleh and the establishment of the 'Adalat Khaneh and the implementation of constitutional (*mashrū'ch*) government.

Finally Muẓaffar al- Din Shāh asked the ulama to a meeting in Tehran, at which he agreed to their demands. The ulama came back from Qum at the shah's invitation on August 1906 at which time a meeting was convened with government officials, various merchants and guild-members. They prepared a draft electoral law based in the rules on the Belgian constitution, a document which received the shah's assent on 10 September 1906.<sup>12</sup>

Arbitrary government had finally been replaced by constitutional government, and soon after deputies were elected to the first Majlis (Parliament), which opened on 7 October

1906. However, the situation changed with the death of the shah in January 1907 and the accession to the throne of his son Muḥammad 'Alī.

The new shah had no sympathy with the constitutional government, and finally in June 1908 staged a coup d'etat with the help of the Cossack Brigade. The Majlis was bombarded and closed and many political figures arrested. The reason for the fall of the constitutional government included not only the enmity of the shah and interference by foreign countries, but also such reasons as the deputies' lack of experience, the inadequacy of the Constitution and its Supplement, and conflicts among the ulama which recalled the controversy between the supporters of *ḥukūmat-i mashrūḩeh* (constitutional government) and *ḥukūmat-i mashru'eh* (Islamic government).<sup>33</sup>

*Ḥukūmat-i mashru'eh* was a concept first mentioned by Sheikh Faḡlullāh Nūrī and was later supported by the shah. Sheikh Faḡlullāh was the most learned among Tehran's *mujtahids*. He spent most of his life in the Atabat (shrine cities of Iraq). He was not a member of the rich, notable religious families, nor did he earn much revenue from *waqf* property or bazaar connections, he preferred to live off the fees earned from his religious duties. He was very active in pursuit of the ideal of *ḥukūmat-i mashru'eh* and later argued that the constitution had established an institution which had no legitimate basis in *shari'ah* law, and was therefore a conflicting source of authority.<sup>34</sup>

Sheikh Faḡlullāh repeats the views of Mīrzā Ḥaṣan Shirazī (who led the opposition to the Tobacco Concession in 1891) on the mutual dependence of religion and state and

stresses their close relationship in his book *Sual va Javab* (Question and Answer). He states the following in his book:

During the periods when the government (*dowlat*) and (the leadership of) the community (*millat*) was mixed in one person, as in the time of the Prophet, the duty of regulating this part of the community was in the charge of that person. Now, through the exigencies of the divine ordinances, each of these duties is in separate hands, so it is the responsibility of each, with the assistance of the other, to guard and preserve the religion and the world of worshipers so that the roots of Islam may be protected in the absence of the Imām.<sup>35</sup>

The conflict between Sheikh Fazlullāh and the constitutionalists hinged on the legitimacy of Article 25 of the Supplement to the Constitution. This article states that the monarchy is a trust, assigned to the shah himself by the nation as a gift from God. This was contrary to Sheikh Fazlullāh's belief. He was a member of the school of thought which emphasized "sovereignty belongs to God, neither to the nation nor to the shah."

Sheikh Fazlullāh's ideas were welcome to the anti-constitutional group which numbered among them the shah, the *Ṣadr-i A'āzam*, Mushir al-Dowleh, the *ashraf* and the *a'ayans* who made up the upper class of Iranian society, and who were known as supporters of *istibdād* (despotism). Another group which supported the constitution consisted of certain intellectuals, various educated persons and some prominent religious figures like Bihbhani and Ṭabāṭabā'i. The idea of *ḥukūmat-i mashrū'eh* was first propounded in the Majlis by Mushir al-Dowleh, however, the constitutionalists, among them Taqizadeh and other representatives from Azarbāyjān, strongly disagreed. Nevertheless, Sheikh Fazlullah succeeded in bringing about the formation of the Assembly of Five Mujtahids to supervise

the legitimacy of the laws passed by the Majlis, in spite of the fact that, according to the constitution, all the laws passed by the Majlis were to be in accordance with the *shari'ah*. However, Sheikh Fazlullāh was still not satisfied, objecting to the fact that the Majlis representatives had no authority over the nomination or the approval of the Assembly of Five Mujtahids, a prerogative reserved for the ulama alone.

The constitutionalists fought in the Majlis for freedom of the press, secular justice and education, freedom of religion and the liberation of women. Sheikh Fazlullāh and certain other ulama opposed these reforms since they would lose their influence and interest in the justice and educational systems. They also believed that reforms not in accordance with *shari'ah* law would lead the country into corruption. Each group was supported by different newspapers.<sup>36</sup> Finally, Sheikh Fazlullāh declared the Majlis *haram*.<sup>37</sup> In June 1908, Sheikh Fazlullāh organized a group consisting of his religious students, various of his followers and farmers from the city of Varāmīn (Muḥammad 'Alī Shāh owned most of its lands), and marched with them to Tehran shouting "We want the Prophet's religion- We do not want the Constitution."<sup>38</sup>

The shah, who was against the Constitution from the beginning, ordered the bombardment of the Majlis and the 'short despotism' (*istibdad-i ṣaghīr*) began. In August 1908, some religious constitutionalists joined Sheikh Fazlullāh and they openly manifested their opposition to constitutionalism, giving for this the following reasons:

- It undermined Islam;
- It was contrary to the Islamic *Shari'ah*;

- It was impractical in a land in which the majority were uneducated;
- It caused corruption and anarchy; and
- It was ineffective in solving the country's problems.<sup>39</sup>

They also criticized the freedom of the press and declared their complete support for the shah.

Subsequently, Tehran became a favorable ground for supporters of despotism, owing to the absence of pro-constitutionalists, since most of the latter had been arrested or had fled the country. Tabriz however erupted in rebellion against the despotic regime and two constitutionalists, Sattār Khān and Bāqir Khān, took over the city. Revolts and uprisings started all over Iran. Lār and Nayrīz, under the leadership of Sayyed 'Abdul-Ḥusain, Ṣamṣām al-Saltāneh, Zarqām al- Saltāneh and Sardār As'ad from Isfahan and Sipahdar A'azam from Rasht, joined the constitutionalists and fought against despotism and for freedom (*āzādī*). These people became known as *āzādī-khawh* (freedom seekers).<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile, the position of the pro-despotism forces and the royalists began to deteriorate due to the foreign banks' refusal to extend credits to pay salaries to the Cossacks, with the result that, on 13 July 1909, Sardār As'ad Bakhtiyārī seized Tehran. Muḥammad 'Alī Shāh took asylum in the Russian embassy, while Sheikh Faḡlullāh was arrested and after a short and arbitrary trial, was sentenced to death by the so-called "High Court of Justice" and hanged immediately.<sup>41</sup>

In conclusion, the Constitutional Revolution was waged against the existing political system; it never aimed at changing that system. It was a movement of reform, a movement against Qajar despotism. The action was not against the unjust socio-economical system; quite the contrary, in actual fact it resulted in increased political power for the *ashrāf* and the *a'fayāns*. They obtained a parliamentary position and thus making it impossible for intellectuals and the religious elements to take any serious action for the well-being of the country or the people. The first Majlis had no control regarding the 1907 Russo-British Agreement, which divided Iran into three zones: one in the south under British control, another in the north under Russian supervision, and a neutral zone in the center. Clearly the external forces had a disintegrating influence on Iran.

Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh was both a weak and sickly ruler, and his Crown Prince, Muḥammad 'Alī Mīrzā, was famous for being a Russophile. They encouraged the British government not to support the constitutionalists and yet the British provided sanctuary for over 20,000 constitutionalists in their embassy in Tehran during the Constitutional Movement.



## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Petrocsheviski, Tārikh, pp.617-618.
- <sup>2</sup> Homa Katouzian, Iqtisād-i Siyāsī-ye Iran, trans. Muḥammad Reżā Nafisi (Tehran: Nashr-i Markaz, 1366-1368 [1987-89]), p.71. Katouzian classifies 19th century Iranian history into three periods: 1) 1800-1850, a stable period, in spite of the Russo-Iranian wars; 2) 1850-1870, a time of famine, decline in the silk market and silver prices; 3) 1870-1896, the rest of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh's reign, ending with his assassination. My research however focuses on the religio-political background of the late 19th and early 20 centuries.
- <sup>3</sup> Vida Garusian, "The Ulama and Secularization in Contemporary Iran" Ph.D., (Southern Illinois University, 1974), p.7.
- <sup>4</sup> Mirānī, Nāṣionālism, p.60.
- <sup>5</sup> Qaim-Maqam Farahānī, Ṣadr-i A'azam of 'Abbās Mīrẓā Qajar, crown-prince, was known for his military reforms. For more information see: H. Farmānfarmāian, Modernization in Iran, ed. W.R.Polk and Richard Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968). Mīrẓā Taqī Khān Amīr Kabīr, Ṣadr-e A'azam of Nāṣir al-Dīn Shāh, was a political and social reformist, a famous patriot and anti-imperialist. For more information on him see: H. Farmānfarmāian, Modernization in Iran. Mīrẓā Faṭḥ 'Alī Ākhūndzādeh, born in 1812, was a patriot and nationalist, and believed that religion was not strong enough to fight against colonialism and imperialism. For more information see: H. Farmānfarmā, Modernization. Mīrẓā 'Abdul-Raḥīm Tabrizi known as Tālbov, was the author of 10 books on philosophy, sociology and the natural science. His book, Aḥmad, is a summary of his thought on many issues. He was much influenced by the writings of J.J. Rousseau's work Emile. For more information see: H. Farmānfarmā, Modernization.
- <sup>6</sup> Mirānī, Nāṣionālism, pp.124-125.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp.124-125. For more information on these events see: Firuz Kazimzadeh, Russia and Britain in Iran: 1864-1914, (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1968).
- <sup>8</sup> Nikki R. Keddie,Religion and Rebellion in Iran, (London: 1966), p.39.
- <sup>9</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, "The Cause of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran," International Journal of Middle East Studies 10 (1979), p.399.

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- <sup>10</sup> Sayyed Jamāl al-Dīn Afghani, known to Iranians as Asad-Ābādī, was born in 1839. He was of Sunni background and education, and afterwards went to live in Afghanistan. Later he travelled to India, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. During the Urabi's movement in Egypt he was deported by Haidarabad, India by the British and was kept under surveillance until the movement was suppressed. He then went to Paris and began publishing the influential newspaper al-'Urwah al-Wuthqā. His ideology was based on Islamic nationalism. His views on the situation in Iran can be seen from the following messages he wrote to Iranian people during the Tobacco Movement: "O, You Iranians, you are not free. You are slaves; the curse of Allah be upon those who made you slaves of the foreigners. O, you Muslims, you must know and appreciate first Islam and second Iran." Afghani emphasized four principles; equality, security, privilege of knowledge and freedom. For more information see: Avery, Tārikh, pp.190-195; see also, N.R.Keddie, Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al- Afghani, (University of California Press, 1972).
- <sup>11</sup> Mirānī, Nāsiōnālism, pp.132-133.
- <sup>12</sup> Peter Avery, Tārikh-i Mu'asir-i Iran, trans. Muḥammad Rafiei Mehrabadi, vol. I, (Tehran : Chapkhaneh-ye Haidari, 1369[1990]), pp.195-200. See also: Vanessa Martin, Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1989), p.41.
- <sup>13</sup> Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969), pp.207-208.
- <sup>14</sup> Homa Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and the Struggle for Power in Iran (London, New York: I. B. Tauris, 1990), p.3.
- <sup>15</sup> Mirānī, Nāsiōnālism, pp.119-121.
- <sup>16</sup> Raḥīm R'aisinā, Zamīneh-ye Ijtimā'ī va Iqtisādī -ye Inqilāb-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran (Tabriz: Intishārat-i Ibn-i Sinā, 1347 [1968]), p.11 and 13.
- <sup>17</sup> Bāqir Momenī, Iran dar Āstāneh-ye Inqilāb-i Mashrutiyyat (Tehran: seda-ye Iran, 1352 [1973]), p.14.
- <sup>18</sup> Mirānī, Nāsiōnālism, pp.123-124.
- <sup>19</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp.73, 75; see also: .P. Avery, Tārikh, pp.218-226.
- <sup>20</sup> Mirzā Malkum Khān, of Armenian parentage, was born in Julfa, Iran in 1833 or 1834. He studied in Paris, and later worked as an interpreter in the Dar al- Funun School in Tehran

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- and also as part of the delegation to the Paris Peace Treaty in 1894. He published the newspaper *Qānūn* in London. For more information see: Hamid Algar, *Mirza Malkum Khān* (California 1973); see also: Denis Wright, *The Persians Amongst The English*, (London:1985), pp. 160-161.
- <sup>21</sup> Manṣūreh Ittīhādīyeh, *Paydāyesh va Tahavvol -i Ahzāb-i Siyāsī-i Mashrutiyyat* (Tehran: Ofsit, 1361 [1983]), pp.58-60; see also: Nazim al-Islam Kirmani, *Tarikh-i Bidari-ye Iraniyan* (Tehran: Intishārat-i Ibn-i Sina, 1324 [1945]), pp.28-51.
- <sup>22</sup> Mehdi Malikzadeh *Tārikh-i Inqilāb-i Mashrutiyyat-i Iran* (Tehran, 1338 [1959]), vol.1, p.217.
- <sup>23</sup> H. Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, p.192.
- <sup>24</sup> Ittīhādīyeh, *Paydāyesh*, pp.60-62.
- <sup>25</sup> The first school on a European model was opened in Tabriz in and immediately faced opposition from the *ḥullāb*. For more information see: Aḥmad Kasravi, *Tarikh-i Mashrūteh-ye Iran* (Tehran: 2537 [1978]), pp.18-21.
- <sup>26</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.76-77.
- <sup>27</sup> Yahyā Āriyānpur, *Az Sabā tā Nīmā, Tārikh-i Sad-o panjah Sal Adab -i Farsi*, (Tehran : Intishārat-i Navid), vol. I, p.249.
- <sup>28</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, "The Cause of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran" pp.399-402; see also *Iran Between*, p.77-79.
- <sup>29</sup> Ervand Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.77-79.
- <sup>30</sup> Algar, *Religion and State in Iran*, pp. 224-225.
- <sup>31</sup> Aḥmad Kasravi, *Tārikh-i*, p. 37.
- <sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.34-118.
- <sup>33</sup> V. Martin, *Islam and Modernism*, pp.100-102; see also: M. Reżā Ghods, *Iran in the Twentieth Century* (London: Adamantine Press Ltd.), pp.58-62.
- <sup>34</sup> V. Martin, *Islam and Modernism*, pp.58-62; see also; Ittīhādīyeh, *Paydāyesh*, pp.108-112
- <sup>35</sup> .V. Martin, *Islam and Modernism*, p.28.

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<sup>36</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between, pp.90-92.

<sup>37</sup> A. Kasravi, Tarikh, pp.358-361; see also; Martin, Islam and Modernism, pp.117-119.

<sup>38</sup> Iraj Afshār, Khātirāt va Asnād-i Mustashār al- Dowlch, Asnād-i Mashrutiya, (Tehran: 1359 [ 1980]), vol. 2, p.231.

<sup>39</sup> Muḥammad Mehdi Sharif Kāshāni, Vaq'iyāt-i Ittifāqīyeh, ed. Manṣūreh Ittiḥādīyeh, (Tehran: Nashr-i Tārikh-i Iran, 1362 [1983]), vol. 2, p.146 and 156.

<sup>40</sup> P. Avery, Tārikh, pp.256-261.

<sup>41</sup> Martin, Islam and Modernism, pp.164-165.

## CHAPTER TWO

### Muhammad Muşaddiq And Abul-Qasim Kashani

#### The Formative Years : 1882-1925

In the recent history of Iran, two individuals have played a particularly important role in the life of the nation: Dr. Muḥammad Muşaddiq and Ayatullah Abul-Qasim Kashani. These two men came from entirely different backgrounds; together they guided Iran to a great victory, particularly in the matter of the nationalization of the oil industry. Their different careers however necessitate a separate review of the first thirty years of their lives.

#### Muşaddiq's Family Background

Dr. Muḥammad Muşaddiq was born on 20 May 1882 to a wealthy family of the *ashrāf* class which had historically been involved in national administration. His mother Najm al-Saltāneh was a Qajar princess and a descendant of crown prince 'Abbas Mirza, a militant and a reformist.<sup>1</sup> She was a woman of strong will and of an exceptional public spirit. Actively involved in charities and religious activities, she gradually bestowed almost all her properties and assets on religious shrines and mosques. She transformed her palace into a hospital, named the Najmīyeh, the financial responsibilities of which were taken on by Muşaddiq and his children.<sup>2</sup> Muşaddiq's early speeches show the significant influence of his mother over him as a young man. He often criticized the huge differences between the social

classes, and demonstrated a concern for social welfare and workers' benefits which were later embodied in the programs of the National Front. In his first radio message as prime minister, Muṣaddiq manifested his concern for this matter:

My dear people, I love you as much as I love my own children. I know you are working in order to support your families and yourselves by the money you earn. And you never abuse the system and do not abuse others. ....My dear respected workers, you know, ever since the establishment of the National Front, serious efforts have been made in order to provide welfare and peace for deprived Iranians and to save those people who suffer from the tyrannic system of this society.<sup>3</sup>

Muṣaddiq believed that the solution to the existing problems was the economic independence of Iran. He went on in the same radio speech to invite people to achieve their national goal, which was control over national wealth.

According to his son Dr. Ghulām-Ḥusain, Muṣaddiq's great loves were, firstly, Iran, and secondly, his mother Najm al-Salṭaneh. Muṣaddiq always remembered his mother's advice in the midst of his political battles: "The value of individuals in society is determined by the amount of hardship they endure for the sake of the people."<sup>4</sup>

Muṣaddiq's father Mīrzā Hidāyatullāh, was also from a *dīvānī* (administrative) family. He started his career during the premiership of Mīrzā Taqī Khān Amīr Kabīr, serving first as a *mustawfī* (tax officer), and thereafter being promoted to *vazīr-i daftār* (finance minister).<sup>5</sup> Mīrzā Hidāyatullāh was a religious man who was also interested in the Islamic sciences, and he had a great love, which he expressed in poetry, for Prophet Muḥammad and his family, the *Ahl-ul- Bayt*.<sup>6</sup> Muṣaddiq was not much influenced by his

father since he was only ten when Mirza Hidayatullah died. However, he inherited his father's position in the provincial finance office in Khurāsān, according to the customs and regulations of the Qajars. He was trained to work as a *mustawfi*, a post which he occupied until 1906. Afzal al- Mulk, a chronicler of the Qajar era, has the following words concerning Muşaddiq:

Mirzā Muḥammad Khān Muşaddiq al-Saltāneh, is at the present, so far as the employment is concerned, the chief tax officer and auditor of Khurasan. But the class, the family relation, the talent, the intelligence, the expertise as auditor and tax officer of this new babe who treads a hundred-year path [*cin till-i yek-shabeh rah-i sad sāleh miravad* ], is greater than the chief tax officers of all the provinces and districts. An able and worthy person with some expertise in fiscal matters can make a tax officer and provincial auditor, but he has other qualities which add to his greatness. ..such an impressive man is bound to become one of the great ones....<sup>7</sup>

Afzal al-Mulk continues with Muşaddiq and states: "Perhaps because of his young age, he has ignored some finance ministers and office directors, but he has treated other people with respect and a high degree of compassion."<sup>8</sup>

Muşaddiq did not continue his job as a *mustawfi* for long and resigned for two reasons, the first being the negative propaganda against the *mustawfis* during the Constitutional Movement, and the second his decision to continue his education in political science.<sup>9</sup>

At the age of twenty, Muşaddiq married Zīyā al- Saltāneh, daughter of Sayyed Zāin ul-‘Ābidīn, the *imām-i jum‘eh* of Tehran, an official religious dignitary. Zīya al-Saltāneh was beautiful, graceful and an extremely loyal wife. At her death Muşaddiq cherished her

memory as the most influential person in his life, after his mother, and his loyal companion.<sup>10</sup> In a brief reply to the expressions of condolence that he received, he wrote the following:

I am deeply in pain from this tragedy. Because for more than sixty four years, my dear wife put up with every thing I did, and after my mother, she was my only hope for living. I longed to depart this world before her and now I pray God to take me soon and relieve me from this pathetic existence.<sup>11</sup>

Two years later, on 5 March 1967, Muşaddiq's wish was to come true, and he died in the Najmyeh Hospital at the age of 85.

#### Muşaddiq's Educational Background and Career

Dissatisfied with his job as a *mustawfī*, Muşaddiq decided to pursue his education in political science. The School of Political Science in Tehran had already been established through the efforts of Amin al-Dowleh, but although Muşaddiq had hoped to enter that school, as an ex-government employee this turned out to be impossible. He therefore undertook to read all the required books in the subject, employing the tutoring services of certain famous professors such as Sheikh Muḥammad 'Alī Kāshāni and Ghulām-Ḥusain Rahnama.<sup>12</sup>

Muşaddiq grew to maturity during the period when there was increasing hostility towards the Qajars' policy of granting concessions to the European powers. He was a child when the Tobacco Movement (1890-1891) guided the Iranians to their first victory against



the Qajar's policy of *istibdad* (arbitrary power), and was too young to participate actively in the Constitutional Revolution. However he did become involved with the Adamiyyat Society, described above in chapter one.<sup>13</sup> Muşaddiq left this society after attending a few meetings and subsequently joined the Insaniyyat Society, which was a radical and revolutionary organization.<sup>14</sup> His political stances provoked Haşan Ayat to say this about him: "He had been a British agent all along."<sup>15</sup>

In 1906 Muşaddiq was elected as deputy to the first Majlis from the *ashraf* class by the people of Isfahān. However he was not allowed to take his seat in the assembly, since he did not meet the minimum age requirement for Majlis deputies. This setback encouraged him to continue his education. Meanwhile the constitutional era came to an end with Muḥammad 'Alī Shāh's shelling of the Majlis which marked the start of the "short despotism."<sup>16</sup> Muşaddiq, who was known for his activities in the Insāniyat society, feared for his life and sought refuge in the house of Mirzā Yahyā Khān-i Sarkhush. Muşaddiq's half brother Hishmat al-Dowleh, who was the shah's secretary at the time, engineered a plan for his brother's rescue. He invited Muşaddiq to become a member of an assembly known as the State Council, which had been formed by the anti-constitutionalists who supported the shah's despotism. Hoping that by attending a few meetings of this assembly he would not be harmed and that his brother would be able to provide him with a passport, Muşaddiq joined the State Council, and shortly afterwards (1909) he was on his way to Paris.<sup>17</sup>

In Paris, Muṣaddiq registered himself in a course in finance, but two years later he became very ill and returned to Iran. By then the constitutionalists had defeated Muḥammad ‘Alī Shah, and Muṣaddiq was no longer in danger. He stayed at home, rested and regained his health and strength. Soon afterwards, he went back to Europe and pursued his studies in Neuchatel, Switzerland. He obtained a degree in law and began to work in a law firm, all the while pursuing research for his doctoral dissertation entitled “The Law of Last Will and Testament in Islam.” By then he was qualified to apply for Swiss citizenship, which would have qualified him to practice law in Switzerland. However he decided to seek supervision for his thesis from experts on Islamic jurisprudence in Iran, most especially Sheikh Muḥammad ‘Alī Kāshāni. Dr. Muṣaddiq was the first Iranian ever to receive a doctorate in law. He returned to Iran on the eve of the first World War.<sup>18</sup>

Although Iran declared itself neutral at the outbreak of war, because of Britain's and Russia's historical domination of Iran all the nationalists and even the radicals chose to support German cause. Muṣaddiq joined the Zidd-i Tashkīlāt (radical) wing of the Democratic Party and in the meantime was invited to teach in the School of Law and Political Science by Dr. Valīullāh Naṣr, the director of the school.<sup>19</sup> Muṣaddiq gladly accepted the invitation. In his memoirs he writes: “This invitation defined my research area and was a matter of a great satisfaction to me. There had been a time that I had longed to join that school as a student, but circumstances had not permitted me to do so.”<sup>20</sup>

He continued teaching in that school, later on publishing his lecture notes under the title "Procedures in Civil Courts." In the interval Turkey had repealed the system of Capitulations, and Muşaddiq decided to write a treatise under the title *Kāpītulāsiyūn dar Irān* (Capitulation in Iran).<sup>21</sup> This treatise signifies the early formation of Muşaddiq's views on the Iranian approach to social progress and modernization. In this treatise, Muşaddiq uses legal language to argue on topics of a political nature. For example Muşaddiq analyses article 15 of the Iranian Constitution: "No proprietor can be deprived of his property, except by *shari'ah* law." Muşaddiq then addresses the following question: "Should the State seek a *fatwā* from a *shari'ah* court?" He does this in relation to "the compulsory purchase of a property in the public interest." Muşaddiq's answer was: "there should be a law consistent with the *shari'ah*, which would be generally applicable without any need to refer to a *shari'ah* court in each and every case." Muşaddiq used this as the background to his argument for the abolition of the capitulation agreements of the 19th century.<sup>22</sup>

Soon afterwards, Muşaddiq was visited by a group of merchants led by Ardishīrjī (the representative of the Zoroastrian community in Iran), who suggested to Dr. Muşaddiq that he should write a book on company law which could be used by Iranian merchants dealing with foreign companies. Muşaddiq accepted the suggestion and wrote a treatise entitled "Joint Stock Companies in Europe." Later Muşaddiq wrote an article on the "Statute of Limitations." This article was published in the periodical *Majallah-ye 'Ilmī*. This journal was published by a group of European-educated intellectuals, amongst them Yahya Dawlat-

Abadi, Mūsā Shaibani, Zukā al-Dowlah, Nuṣrat al-Dowleh, Nizām Māfi and Muṣaddiq himself.

Muṣaddiq's article on the "Statute of Limitations" expressed some criticism of the existing court procedures in Iran, particularly their practice of accepting false or inauthentic documentation and of allowing people to instigate litigation against others. As soon as the article was published, Muṣaddiq became known to the ulama. He was criticized by some ulama for the reason that any suggestion of time limitation was entirely contrary to Islamic law. The strong opposition of the ulama, and the lack of common interest among members of the group made the continuation of the *Majalleh-ye 'Ilmi* impossible.<sup>23</sup> This perturbed Muṣaddiq, as he writes in his memoirs: ".....after all the education I received, I was not able to express my opinions about a single legal principle, and I was being subjected to misplaced and unjustified criticism. I wondered how on earth I could use my knowledge to serve my country."<sup>24</sup>

Soon Muṣaddiq was to face another devastating event. The credentials of one of the Majlis deputies became subject to an investigation and Muṣaddiq was accused of rigging this deputy's election, even though he had not been in Iran for years. He became very depressed and ill. Muṣaddiq's mother visited him and was informed by Muṣaddiq of the conspiracy. Wishing that her son had studied medicine instead of law, she told him:

Do not you know that any one who studies law and enters politics, must be ready for all types of slander and insult and should be prepared to suffer any unpleasant experience? I know you only wish good for people, therefore I tell you; the weight of

individuals in the society corresponds to the difficulties that they are prepared to undertake for the sake of people.

Muṣaddiq was deeply touched by that statement and wrote the following:

This statement particularly coming from my mother who loved me greatly and had good of the society in her heart, was very effective. I accepted that as my life plan. After that the more insult I faced, the more prepared I was in serving my country.<sup>25</sup>

In spite of these misfortunes, Muṣaddiq continued to be very much interested in politics. He joined the *I'tidāl* (moderate) Party which was very active and counted some prominent figures among its members, among them Sayyed Haṣan Mudarris (a cleric, a constitutionalist, and later an opponent of Reḡā Shāh who eventually had him executed), Mīrzā Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṭabāṭabā'ī (son of the famous constitutionalist), and "Alī Akbar Dehkhudā (a writer and journalist who later compiled the Dehkhuda Encyclopedia). Muṣaddiq tried to smooth out the differences between *I'tidāl* and the democratic parties. He organized some meetings in his home and invited the more influential members of the two parties to resolve their problems. He did not succeed in his efforts however, and later most of the members went to Europe and stayed there until the end of World War II. Muṣaddiq, for his part, becoming increasingly aware of the inclinations of the *I'tidāl* Party toward Russian policy and those of the Democratic Party toward British policy, resigned from both parties<sup>26</sup> and avoided any involvement with other parties or political organizations until 1949 when he formed the National Front (*Jibhe-ye Milli*).<sup>27</sup>

In 1918 Muşaddiq was appointed as assistant to the minister of finance and as director of the chief Accounting Office. One year later, Aḥmad Shāh dismissed Şamşām al-Saltāneh's cabinet, appointing Vuşūq as the new prime minister, and then took advantage of the fact that the Majlis was in recess to declare martial law. Muşaddiq was proposed as a candidate to head the Department of Tax Assessment. However he did not want to work with the new cabinet and therefore personally apologized to the shah for his refusal, expressing his desire to visit his children in Switzerland. On 9 August 1919, Muşaddiq left Iran for Switzerland. While he was in Neuchatel, the 1919 Agreement was concluded between Wuşūq and the British Government. Under the terms of this agreement the British were granted the supervision of both the Iranian Army and the Iranian financial system.<sup>28</sup>

The 1919 Agreement infuriated Muşaddiq. He referred to it as "The agreement to turn Iran into a protectorate." He contacted and corresponded with the other prominent Iranians in Europe, published leaflets and wrote to the League of Nations protesting against the Agreement. He was frustrated and angry and so depressed over the situation in Iran that he decided to ask for Swiss citizenship and practice law in Switzerland. However, because of the numbers of war refugees, the Swiss immigration law had been tightened and Muşaddiq did not qualify for quick naturalization. Consequently, he decided to proceed with seeking permanent resident status and open an export-import company in Switzerland. To do so, he had to go to Iran to raise the capital to start his business.

In the meantime, massive campaigns against the Vusuq cabinet had resulted in the latter being replaced by Mushīr Al-Dowleh. The new prime minister invited Muşaddiq to come back to Iran and accept the position of minister of justice. At that time the civil war in Russia had made it impossible to travel to Iran via the Caucasus; therefore, in order to get to Iran, Muşaddiq would have had to go to Bombay via Marseilles. Muşaddiq was left with no other option but to apply for a transit visa for India. When his application was denied by the British embassies in Switzerland and Italy, Muşaddiq decided to accept Mushir al-Dowlah's proposal, since that seemed to be the best solution for him to get a transit visa. Muşaddiq arrived in Bushehr (regarded as a British port then) and went to Shīrāz. While in Shīrāz, he was invited by the locals to accept the governorship of the province of Fars.<sup>29</sup> Homa Katouzian says the following concerning this matter:

The provincial magnates united as they seldom did, to keep Muşaddiq in Shiraz as the new governor. They contacted the Prime Minister and obtained his agreement to exchange Muşaddiq's portfolio for the governorship of Fars, if Muşaddiq was himself agreeable.<sup>30</sup>

The locals wanted Muşaddiq as governor because they knew he would not accept any bribes (*rishveh*), they therefore offered to pay him 68,000 tumans a year from their own pockets in order to entice him to accept the position. Muşaddiq's reply to their offer was as follows:

You say you want to have a fair governor. A governor who treats everybody with justice and equality. A governor who maintains safety in the cities and on the roads. Yet you offer me a lot of money which would be collected and funded by the people. This is contradictory to your demands.<sup>31</sup>

Muṣaddiq not only refused the gift offered by the locals but also the salary provided by the State. He nevertheless accepted the post of governor on 25 September 1920 and then promptly reduced the annual provincial budget from 72,000 tumans to 24,000.

In the meantime the central government expressed its readiness to send armed forces to Fars, if Muṣaddiq deemed it necessary, in order to establish security on the roads. Muṣaddiq replied: "My armed force is the national force."<sup>32</sup> This was the first time Muṣaddiq had used the word "national." One may wonder what Muṣaddiq meant by "national force." The answer is to be found in his accomplishments as governor, which consisted largely of controlling and minimizing the authority and activities of the British security forces in Fars known as the South Police, and of establishing a local police force.

Muṣaddiq tried to prevent British interference in local affairs. The British had executed Sheikh Ḥaṣan Khān Chāhkūtāhī, who was the leader of the Tangistani group (an anti-British faction), along with his sons. That action had caused much grief and anger among the people, and resulted in Muṣaddiq's policy toward the British being accepted with respect and appreciation. However, Muṣaddiq's governorship did not last long. Mushir al-Dowlah's government fell to a *coup* engineered by the British in February 1921. This *coup d'état* succeeded with the help of pro-British elements, among them Sayyed Ṣayyā al-Dīn, the editor of the *Ra'd* newspaper and also a moderate nationalist, and the Cossack Brigade under the leadership of Reṣā Khān. Sayyed Ṣayyā installed as prime minister as a result of the *coup*, ordered the arrest of all anti-British elements, prominent nationalists, the rich and notables.



Among those apprehended were Mudarris, Qavām al-Saltāneh (the leader of the Democratic Party), and Farman-Farmā (Muṣaddiq's uncle).<sup>33</sup> Muṣaddiq also received a telegram from Sayyed Ṣīyā, instructing him to report to Tehran immediately and informing him of Ṣīyā's self-appointment as the new prime minister. Muṣaddiq refused to answer Sayyed Ṣīyā and sent a telegram to the shah informing him of the consequences that he would face if he continued supporting the new prime minister. Sayyed Ṣīyā took it upon himself to answer Muṣaddiq's telegram and ordered him to leave Shiraz at once and report to Tehran. Muṣaddiq, realizing that his life was in danger, left Shiraz and took asylum with the Bakhti-yāris.<sup>34</sup>

Soon after the *coup*, an opposition movement started and underground newspapers were published and distributed to the public. The Democratic Party, assisted by the intellectuals, launched mass demonstrations against the *coup*. Aḥmad Shāh, despite Sayyed Ṣīyā's British support, was obliged to replace the latter as prime minister with the leader of the Democratic Party, Qavām al-Saltāneh. The Democratic Party, having previously inclined towards the British, immediately changed its political direction and condemned Britain for its role in planning the *coup*. Sayyed Ṣīyā's cabinet, which is known in Iranian history as the Kābīneh-ye Sīyāh (the Black Cabinet) lasted for 100 days. Qavam al-Saltāneh in fact received his portfolio in prison. He introduced his cabinet to the shah and the Majlis, naming Muṣaddiq to the post of minister of finance and Reżā Khān to that of minister of war. Prime minister Qavam al-Saltāneh had no choice but to keep Reżā Khān in his previous position due to the latter's absolute power, influence and also popularity within the Cossack Brigade.

Qavām al-Saltāneh's cabinet however attracted majority support in the Majlis in spite of the fact that the minority group, made up of the Socialist Party headed by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ṭabāṭaba'ī (son of the constitutionalist Āyatullāh Muḥammad Ṭabāṭabā'ī) and Sulaymān Mirzā Iskandari (founder of the Tudeh Party), had their own candidate Mustawfī al-Mamālik for the premiership and voted in his favor.<sup>35</sup>

Muṣaddiq, as Finance Minister, introduced his plans to the Majlis and the shah. He proposed the following programs for the improvement of the financial situation:

- The re-establishment of the Bank-i Istiqrā'ī (The Loan Bank) which was previously owned by the Russians, and which was released to Iran according to the February Treaty of 1921;
- Using internal loans for the government if needed;
- Using internal capital for economic growth;
- The establishment of new companies and developing mineral resources; and
- Budget cuts.<sup>36</sup>

Shortly afterwards Muṣaddiq was dismissed from office and was appointed to the governorship of Azarbāyjān. The reason given for the dismissal was his budget cuts. He had even gone so far as to cut the salary of the crown prince, Muḥammad Ḥaṣan Mirzā. Muṣaddiq describes the incident in his memoirs thus:

In the government budget announced to the Majlis, the income was more than the expenditure. I myself directed the Commission of Financial Laws to cut the salary of the Crown Prince from 14,000 tumans to 4,000 tumans. The Commission accepted my proposal, but the life of my ministry was ended.<sup>37</sup>

While in Azarbayjan, Muṣaddiq's authority was challenged by Reza Khān. The head of the provincial army had been instructed to report only to Reza Khān, and Muṣaddiq's inability to resolve this situation ended with his dismissal from the governorship.<sup>48</sup> In fact after the *coup* of 1921, no government officials were able to last more than couple of months, due to Reza Khān's interference. Consequently, Qavam al-Saltāneh's cabinet resigned and Mushīr al-Dowlah Pīrnā took office in his stead, although he lasted only one month. At that time, Aḥmad Shāh was in Europe, and he invited Qavam al-Saltāneh to take up the premiership. Qavam al-Saltāneh accepted the portfolio and introduced his cabinet to the Majlis, a cabinet which included Muṣaddiq as minister of foreign affairs. The new cabinet faced the same struggle as before and finally lost power to Reza Khān, who had been patiently waiting for the right moment, and who became the prime minister in 1923.<sup>49</sup>

The election for the 5th Majlis was held in 1924 and Muṣaddiq was sent there as the deputy for Tehran. Despite Muṣaddiq's and a few other deputies' opposition, Reza Khān was appointed by the Majlis as prime minister, keeping his additional portfolio of minister of war. Meanwhile Aḥmad Shāh was still in Europe; this and the fact that he showed no desire to return to Iran provoked demonstrations against and opposition to the monarchy. People were demanding a republican government. In the summer of 1924 a bill was presented and read in the Majlis calling for the establishment of a republic. The bill created disorder and confusion in the Majlis. Apparently during the debates between monarchists and republicans, Mudarris was slapped by one of the latter. This incident was interpreted by the conservatives and the religious figures as "the attitude of republicans toward religion and religious

leaders.”<sup>40</sup> Without a moment's hesitation, Reżā Khān took advantage of the situation and demanded that the Majlis transfer to him the commandership of all the armed forces, which according to the constitution was a prerogative that belonged only to the shah. Reżā Khān's demand faced strong opposition on the parts of Muşaddiq and Mudarris alone, which allowed him to succeed once again and to organize his next move. In November 1924, he prepared a statement and invited all the Majlis deputies, except his few opponents, to his home to hear him read it. In his statement he proposed transferring the monarchy from the Qajar dynasty to the Pahlavi. All the deputies signed the text of the statement. Mirzā Ḥusain ‘Alā, Mushīr al-Dowlah Pīrnā, Muḥammad Taqī Bahār *Malik ul-Shu‘arā* (Poet Laureate), Mutamin al-mulk, Mustawfī al-Mamālik, Mudarris and Muşaddiq were not invited but they were informed of Reżā Khān's plan. Some decided not to attend the Majlis the next day. However Muşaddiq persuaded them to change their decision.

They all agreed and decided that it was better to try to buy some time in order to prepare themselves to contest Reżā Khān's plan. One of their tactics was to prepare a letter of resignation signed by Mustawfī al-Mamālik, the speaker of the Majlis, hoping thereby to postpone the Majlis session until a new speaker could take his seat. Reżā Khān, aware of his opponents' plans, called upon Mustawfī ul-Mamālik to fulfill an emergency commission. Despite the opposition of Muşaddiq and Mudarris and their attempts to postpone the session, the rest of the deputies voted for the signed statement.<sup>41</sup> Muşaddiq tried to explain to the deputies the consequences they would face by accepting the statement. He declared that it was contrary to Iranian interests, Iranian nationalism and Islam. He lectured on the real meaning of constitutional government. He explained the differences between the respective authorities of a shah, a prime minister and the Majlis in a constitutional government. He talked about the Constitutional Revolution and those who had given their lives for it. He stated that to place a prime minister on a throne would only result in a reactionary government. In spite of all his arguments, the deputies gave their blessing to Reżā Khān, since they feared the consequences of a republican government. The religious group in the Majlis strongly supported Reżā Khān and their leader Sayyed Ya'qub even publicly announced their support in the Majlis.<sup>42</sup>

Muṣaddiq also tried to demonstrate the consequences of Reza Khan's accession to the throne in terms of foreign policy. He warned the deputies of the liberties taken by imperialist powers in despotic regimes. However, despite Muṣaddiq's insistence, Reza Khan's proposal was passed by a vote of 115 in his favor, 30 abstentions and four against. Taqizadeh, Husain "Alā, Yahyā Dowlatabadi and Muṣaddiq voted against the proposal."<sup>43</sup>

Muṣaddiq was re-elected to the 6th Majlis in 1925. Reza Khan, by then officially known as Reza Shāh, tried to get Muṣaddiq's support. Unsuccessful in his attempt, Reza Shāh summoned Muṣaddiq to the royal court. At that meeting Muṣaddiq strongly criticized Reza Shāh over the expenditures made by the Royal Court for different ceremonies. Although Reza Shāh was stung by this criticism, he did not take any immediate action against Muṣaddiq since he was a Majlis deputy and fairly popular among the people. By the end of the sixth Majlis the conflict between the two men had reached its highest point. On 4 January 1926, the minister of the royal court asked the parliament to provide him with 135,000 tumans in order to make repairs on the royal palace. Based, however, on article 10 of the Constitution, Muṣaddiq rejected the Minister's application, saying:

Article 10 of the Constitution states: "Properties belonging to the Shah, are the responsibility of the Shah and their maintenance is to be paid by him also. People do not pay the shah, and nor does the Shah ever inherit any properties from people." Therefore if this money is required for the Shah's palace, it would be contrary to article 10 to provide such a budget. And if this money is needed to make repairs on the state's palaces, then it would not be up to the Court Minister to apply for such a budget.<sup>44</sup>

That was the end of Muṣaddiq's political career under Reza Shah. He was aware of that fact but he believed, as a deputy of the people, that he had a duty to meet his responsibilities for the sake of the people and their Constitution.

The election for the seventh Majlis was held under the absolute control of the military, the deputies having been chosen by Reza Shāh before the election. Muṣaddiq, not being an ally of Reza Shah, lost his seat in the parliament and was finally arrested and imprisoned by the shah, even though he had chosen to abstain from political life.<sup>45</sup>

Muṣaddiq stayed in his village of Aḥmadābad and spent his time writing and farming. In 1930 he wrote a book on ancient civilization in French entitled Fostel du Kulanj which was published in Iran and later translated into Persian by Dr. Nasrullah Falsafi. At the end of 1936 he became very ill and went to Berlin for medical treatment. He came back to Iran, but soon after his arrival, he was placed under house arrest, first in Tehran and later in his village Aḥmadābad, until 1941.<sup>46</sup>

Meanwhile Reza Shāh, busy with destroying his opponents, ordered the arrest of Dr. Taqi Arāni, the leader of the Communist party and his 52 followers. Arāni was murdered in prison, and although there was no connection between Arāni and Muṣaddiq, three days later Muṣaddiq was arrested and incarcerated in Tehran prison for 11 days and was later transferred to Birjand Prison, the same place where Arāni and Mudarris had been killed. The hot weather, his poor health and fear for his life made Muṣaddiq very depressed and sick. In the meantime, Ernest Peron, a Swiss citizen who was a close friend of the crown prince,

Muhammad Reza, was treated in the Najmyeh Hospital by Dr. Ahmad Musaddiq, Musaddiq's son. The latter asked Peron to intercede with Muhammad Reza in order to obtain his father's release from prison on humanitarian grounds. As a result Musaddiq was released, but remained under house arrest until Reza Shah's abdication in 1941.<sup>47</sup>

### Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni's Family Background

Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni was born in Tehran in 1882. In contrast to Musaddiq's family, that of Kāshāni had a prominent clerical background. Kāshāni's father and grandfather were teachers of *fiqh* and *shari'ah* in Iraq. His grandfather Haji Sayyed Husain was known by the titles Uṣūl al-Udabā al-Māhīrīn (Source of Skilled Literary Men) and Zubdat al-Muḥaqqiqīn (Cream of the Researchers). Haji Sayyed Husain participated in politics, but not as much as did his son Haji Sayyed Muṣṭafā, Kāshāni's father. Sayyed Muṣṭafā was born in Kashan, Iran in 1844. He went to Iraq where, following his father's example, he joined the clergy. He studied in Najaf and Kāzīmain (the two centers for Shiite literary and religious learning), and achieved the rank of *mujtahid*. He soon became very famous in Iraq for his knowledge of the Arabic language, poetry, *fiqh* and *Shari'ah*. Sayyed Muṣṭafā's life was significantly changed when he met Āyatullāh Shīrāzī, who had a record of anti-imperialist activity in both Iran and Iraq. Sayyed Muṣṭafā joined the circle of Āyatullāh Shirazi and turned to politics. In 1874 he returned to Iran and continued the fight against the imperialism of the European powers. He organized many demonstrations against the tobacco concession and supported Shīrāzī's *fatwā* forbidding the consumption of tobacco. In 1900 Sayyed Muṣṭafā took his son to Iraq. Abul-Qāsim received his education in Najaf under the supervision of

Mirza Husain Khalili and Muḥammad Kāẓim Khurāsānī. Kāshānī achieved the rank of *mujtahid* at the age of 25 and became Khalili's secretary. Later he joined his father and fought the British in Iraq. During the siege of Kut al-'Amara, Kāshānī's father was killed by the British, and Kāshānī himself sentenced to death in *absentia* by the British. Kāshānī escaped to Iran in 1921. His father's fate added to the hatred and enmity that Kāshānī felt against British imperialism and influenced his thought and behavior throughout his entire life. Nevertheless, he abstained from politics until 1941, and devoted himself to study.<sup>48</sup>

#### Kāshānī's Early Religious and Political Careers (1897-1921)

As stated before, Kāshānī achieved the rank of *mujtahid* at quite an early age. He was invited to teach *fiqh* and *uṣūl* in the 'Ilmiyah school in Najaf. However, he chose not to accept this invitation. Instead, he decided to follow his father's example, and proceeded to engage in a more ambitious and pragmatic life, becoming very much involved in political activity against foreign domination in Iraq. It is of fundamental importance to analyze Kāshānī's immediate environment in order to understand this religious man's conversion to political activism.

Iraq had been the scene of intense Russo-British competition since 1830. Russia tried to gain a base in this region through its influence in Iran. On the other hand the British had vital economic, political and strategic interests in Iraq and in general held an upper hand over the Russians. Economically, the British Empire's success would have been increased by trade with or via Iraq. Politically, the conversion of Iraq into a British zone would have



blocked Russian expansion, whereas strategically, the region could be used by the British as a short route to India.

In the early 1830s, the British government planned a communications link via the Euphrates to India. The plan was to establish a trade route between England and India via the Mediterranean Sea, the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile the British Navy had constructed new steamboats which were suitable for river navigation. Several British companies owned by the British government or by private citizens established offices in major ports and cities over a period of thirty years. By 1860 the entire region had been converted into a British zone of influence. The Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company was formed to administer the affairs of the British companies and to supervise commercial activities. The company grew rapidly. It started with a total capital of 1500 pounds sterling and by 1914 its capital had increased to 100,000 pounds sterling and to 300,000 pounds sterling by 1919.

Although Britain blocked Russian expansion in Iraq, her influence was not left unchallenged. Towards the end of the 19th century, German commercial activities began to penetrate that region, and developed successfully as well. Germans established regular trade with Iraq by 1906, and by 1907 total German exports to the port of Basra were worth 168,000 pounds sterling. The British government was forced to meet commercial competition on the one hand, and the consequences of German influence on the other. The pro-German faction, finding Germany an acceptable alternative to Britain, formed many

associations. Among those who were the most avid supporters of the Germans were the Shiite *mujtahids* of Najaf and Karbalā. It should be mentioned that Germany's popularity among the ulama was influenced by two important factors: firstly the Germans had expressed their support of Islam and Pan-Islamism; secondly, Germany was a newcomer to the political scene in the Middle East and as such had no colonial reputation in the Muslim world, whereas British colonial interests and aims were already apparent throughout the Muslim countries.<sup>49</sup>

Social leadership throughout the region was generally in the hands of communal and religious leaders. The Shiite ulama, mostly Iranian, wielded a great deal of authority over the Shiite population. In the late 19th century, the majority of the tribes in the middle Euphrates were Shiite and, due to the heavy taxes imposed on them by the Ottoman empire, generally had a hostile attitude towards the latter. This factor contributed to the influence of the Shiite *mujtahids* in the region. However, the expansion of the British and their economic influence created an even greater hostility towards foreign influence and paved the way for a temporary alliance between the Ottoman authorities and Shiite *mujtahids*. This alliance came into being after the British occupations of Cyprus in 1878, and of Egypt in 1882, actions which made the inhabitants of Iraq feel as though a similar fate awaited them as well. In 1910, the Ottoman officials and the Shiite ulama issued a manifesto in which they advocated Muslim unity against any encroachment of the European powers against the Ottoman empire and Iran. This agreement, along with the anti-British propaganda of German elements and the provocative policy of the British authorities, gave rise to a very strong anti-colonial and

especially anti-British sentiment throughout the Middle East. These sentiments grew to such an extent that by 1915, the Shiite *mujtahids* had begun to preach *jihad* in the mosques, and to send influential Shiite *'alims* to the tribes. This made possible the formation of an alliance between the tribesmen and the Ottoman empire early in that same year.

Kāshāni was among those religious figures who was active in unifying the tribes with the Ottoman empire. That was his first direct involvement with politics. In 1914 he was directed to mobilize the tribes of the lower Euphrates. Within a year he had succeeded in arming a large body of tribal forces and volunteers. Meanwhile, the British moved to take all of Iraq under their control in order to prevent German and Ottoman penetration. However, despite significant opposition on the part of the population of this region, no serious resistance was offered to British expansion, with the exception of Kut al-'Amarah, where the Shiite population and Turkish soldiers gathered a considerable force and resisted the British Army. The British Army surrounded the city and the garrison for 140 days (December 1914 through April 1915), before finally taking over the city. Ten thousand Turkish soldiers and Muslim volunteers were killed. Sayyed Muṣṭafā Kāshāni (Kāshāni's father) was, as we have noted above, among the dead. Prominent Shiite *mujtahids* such as Ayatullah Khawnsārī, Āyatullāh Shahrīstānī and Āyatullāh Shīrāzī were wounded and captured along with Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni. Kāshāni was held in a steamship destined for Basra, but at Kut he managed to jump overboard and swim to safety.

Later, the Mandate regime, established in Iraq by the British, brought a new spirit to the nationalist movement which had flagged during the war years. This time the young educated elite, along with the *mujtahids* of the holy cities, showed strong opposition to British policy. The *mujtahids* also expressed their opposition to the Anglo-Iranian Treaty of 1919. Meanwhile Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni was active in uniting the tribal groups, which prompted the British to issue a death sentence against him. Kāshāni escaped to Iran via the Kurdish mountains, arriving at the time of the *coup* of Sayyed Ṣiyā and Reḡā Khān, which was covered earlier in this chapter. While in Iran, although at first supporting Mudarris and the Majlis opposition to the transfer of the monarchy from the Qajars to the Pahlavis, he later changed his political allegiance and supported Reḡā Khān for two reasons: first, his hostility towards the pro-British policy of the Qajars; and second, his fear of a republican government which brought with it the threat of secularism. Consequent to his change of policy, Kāshāni was appointed as a member to the Constituent Assembly and voted for Reḡā Khān's accession to the throne in 1926.<sup>50</sup>

In conclusion, despite different family, educational and career backgrounds, Dr. Muṣaddiq and Āyatullāh Kāshāni learned to distrust foreign powers especially Britain. Kāshāni supported Reḡā Shāh out of respect for the latter's policy towards Britain, and Muṣaddiq opposed Reḡā Shāh for the Shah's despotic and authoritarian regime. However their mutual hatred for British actions in Iran in the case of Muṣaddiq, and in the Middle East in the eyes of Kāshāni, created the possibility of an alliance between the two men and opened a new page in the history of Iran by 1949.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> 'Abbās Mirzā, crown prince of Fath 'Alī Shāh fought against the Russians from 1813 to 1828, and was the first to take steps to modernize the army. He also sent the first group of students to Europe for further education, in such fields as medicine, chemistry, engineering, foreign languages and military training.
- <sup>2</sup> Iraj Afshār, Muṣaddiq va Masā'il-i Huquq va Siyāsāt (Tehran: Intisharat-i Payam 1358 [1979]), pp.13-14; see also, Dr. Ghulām Ḥusain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinār-i Pedaram Muṣaddiq ed. Ghulām Riza Nijati (Tehran: Rasa, 1990), pp. 23-25.
- <sup>3</sup> Ḥusain Makki, Doktor Muṣaddiq va Nutqhā-ye Tārikhī-ye U (Tehran: intisharat-i 'Ilmī, 1985), vol. 2, pp. 2-3.
- <sup>4</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Khātirāt va Taalumat-i Doktor Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, ed. Iraj Afshār, (Tehran: 'Ilmī 1365 [1986]), p.84.
- <sup>5</sup> Farhad Diba, A Political Biography, (London: Croom Helm 1986), p.3.
- <sup>6</sup> Ma'ṣum 'Alī-Shāh, Taraq al-Haqaiq, ed. Muḥammad Mahjub, (Tehran: Nashr, 1345 [1966]), p.589.
- <sup>7</sup> Ghulām Ḥusain Afzal al-Mulk, Afzal al-Tavārikh, ed. Mansurah Ittihadiah (Nizam Maf) (Tehran: Nashr-i Tarkh-i Iran, 1361 [1982]), vol.6, pp. 82-83. Translation derived from: Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Muṣaddiq's Memoirs, trans. Homa Katouzian, (London: JEBIII, 1988), p.2.
- <sup>8</sup> Afzal al-Muluk, Afzal al-Tavārikh, p.83.
- <sup>9</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.54-55.
- <sup>10</sup> Homa Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and the Struggle for Power, (London: I.B. Tauris 1990), p.2.
- <sup>11</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Muṣaddiq's Memoirs, p.80; see also, Dr. Ghulām Ḥusain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinār-i, pp.150-151.
- <sup>12</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.54-55.
- <sup>13</sup> Homa Katousian, Muṣaddiq and the, p.4.

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- <sup>14</sup> Ghulam Husain Muşaddiq, Dar Kinār-i, pp.62-64.
- <sup>15</sup> Haşan Ayat, Chehre-ye Haqiqi-ye Muşaddiq al- Saltaneh, (Tehran: Intisharat-i Islami, 1984), pp.15-17.
- <sup>16</sup> Katouzian Muşaddiq and the, pp.4-6.
- <sup>17</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.62-64.
- <sup>18</sup> Katouzian, Muşaddiq and the, pp.6-7.
- <sup>19</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.62-83.
- <sup>20</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Muşaddiq's Memoirs, p.161.
- <sup>21</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.82-83.
- <sup>22</sup> Katouzian, Muşaddiq and the, pp.9-11.
- <sup>23</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.82-83.
- <sup>24</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Muşaddiq's Memoirs, p.163.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.164.
- <sup>26</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.85-87.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid., pp.100-101; see also, Katouzian, Muşaddiq and the, p.12.
- <sup>28</sup> Husain Makki Tārikh-i Bistsaleh-yi Iran, (Tehran: Intisharat-i 'Ilmi, 1944), vol. 1 pp. 4-5.
- <sup>29</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.110-120.
- <sup>30</sup> Katouzian, Muşaddiq and the, p.15.
- <sup>31</sup> Muḥammad Muşaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.121-123.
- <sup>32</sup> Ibid., pp.123-126. The roads and the cities were very unsafe due to highway robberies and anti-British activities. Few seemed to be interested in taking the position of governor, and those who were willing to accept the job were asking for armed forces from the central government and also a high salary.
- <sup>33</sup> H. Makki. Tārikh-i Bist, pp.33-35.

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- <sup>34</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.121-131. The Bakhtiari tribe is native to Fars and Isfahan. Later, in 1953, the Bakhtiaris helped Muḥammad Reza Shah to overthrow Muṣaddiq's government.
- <sup>35</sup> H. Makki, Tārikh-i Bist, pp.87-225.
- <sup>36</sup> I. Afshār, Muṣaddiq va Masa', pp.132-133.
- <sup>37</sup> Muḥammad Muṣaddiq, Khātirāt, pp.142-143.
- <sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.145-147.
- <sup>39</sup> Muḥammad Taqi Bahār Malik al- Sho'arā, Tārikh-i Mukhtasar-i Ahzab-i Siyasi-yi Iran, (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1984), vol. 2, pp.38-39.
- <sup>40</sup> H. Makki, Tārikh-i Bist, pp. 253-267.
- <sup>41</sup> Muḥammad Taqi Bahār, Tārikh-i Mukhtasar, pp.317-347.
- <sup>42</sup> H. Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and the, pp.23-25; see also: Ḥusain Makki, Nutqha va Maktubat-i Muhammad Musaddiq dar Dawreh-ha-yi Panjum va Shishum-i Majlis-i Showra-ye Miili, (Tehrn: Muṣassiq, 1350/1971).
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.24-25. For detailed information concerning Reza Shāh's path to power, see; Donald Wilber, Contemporary Iran, (New York: Praeger, 1963), and Donald Wilber, Reza Shāh Pahlavi: The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, (New York: Exposition Press, 1975).
- <sup>44</sup> Ḥusain Makki, Nutqhā va Maktubat-i, vol. 1, p.53
- <sup>45</sup> Farhad Diba, Mohammad Mossadegh, pp.58-60.
- <sup>46</sup> Ghulām Ḥusain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinār, pp.47-51.
- <sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.47-54; see also, H. Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and the, pp.32-34.
- <sup>48</sup> Mohammad Hassan Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran With Particular reference to Ayatullas Sayyid AbulQāsim Kāshāni" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1978), pp. 116-129; see also, Zaki Sāleh, Mesopotamia (Iraq) 1600-1914, A Study in British Foreign Affairs, (Baghdad: Al-Ma'aref Press, 1958), pp.160-180. For more information concerning British and Britain in Iraq see: Hugh Purcell, Stephen h. Longrigg, Iraq 1900-1950: A Political, Social and Economic History (Beirut: Librarie du Liban, 1968).

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<sup>49</sup> Sāleh, Mesopotamia, p. 213, and pp.222-225. For detailed information concerning German activities in Iraq, see: Ulrich Trumpener, Germany and the Ottoman Empire, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

<sup>50</sup> Faghfoory, "Role of Ulama," pp.125-137.



## CHAPTER THREE

### From Dictatorship to Revival of Freedom 1926-1951

The unpopular Qajars, largely responsible for the country's corruption and backwardness, along with the religious elements who were hesitant to consider any changes to the existing political system which in their view might endanger Islam, together created a turbulent and refractory situation in Iran. Meanwhile, Reżā Khān, a military officer enjoying the full support of the army and having an excellent understanding of the nation's psychology, seized his opportunity in 1926 and climbed the ladder of power to establish himself and his family on the throne. A self-educated man, Reżā Khān was conscious of the power of religion in Iran and aware of the need for a change in the political system. His success in gaining the support of the majority allowed him to found the Pahlavi Dynasty, which lasted until 1979.

Reżā Khān hated the West and its political and economic influence in Iran, although he was astonished by its technology. He took Iran through a series of secular reforms and modernization and in the process managed to establish a powerful central government. He constructed new roads and railways and formed the police force in the cities and the *amniyeh* (security force) on the highways and brought internal security to the country.

Reza Khan faced some powerful political opposition throughout the fifth and the sixth parliaments. However he managed to defeat his opponents by 1927 and was able to control the elections from then on.

In this chapter the socio-economic, educational and judicial changes which resulted in the introduction of state capitalism into Iran will be discussed. Various modernization efforts during Reza Shāh's reign will also be analyzed.

Since the process of modernization brought with it a movement toward secularization, there will be an attempt in this chapter to bring out the ulama's opposition to this process. The extent and nature of their power will be discussed as well as the measures which were undertaken by Reza Shāh to eliminate that power. Moreover, the reasons and the nature of Dr. Muṣaddiq's and Āyatullāh Kashāni's relations with Reza Shāh will be examined.

The events that occurred during World War II eventually forced Reza Shāh to abdicate. During this period of political instability and economic disaster, the shah's dictatorship was weakened. Many parties with socialist, Communist, nationalist and religious leanings came into being. This period is of great significance since the seeds of freedom of speech and free elections were planted during this short yet vital era in the history of modern Iran.

### Emergence of Reza Khān to power

Reza Khān was born in about the year 1873 in Alasht in the province of Mazandaran. When he was of age he followed his father's example and joined the army. He was actively involved in the 1921 *coup*, already described in the previous chapter. Following the *coup*, Reza Khān was named Commander of the army (*Sardar Sepah*) and was appointed as the Minister of War. During the following two years, Reza Khan succeeded in suppressing several revolts and resistance movements in Iran.<sup>1</sup>

In 1922 Reza Khān abolished the Cossack Brigade and the South Police (a British-organized security force) and established a new army and also an air force, both of which later constituted the main pillars of his regime. Reza Khān, who upon mounting the throne took the name Reza Shāh, established a new order in Iran. According to Ervand Abrahamian, Reza Shāh based his power on three foundations: the new army, government bureaucracy and the support of the royal court.<sup>2</sup>

### The new army

In 1927 a compulsory military service bill was introduced in the Majlis, and the annual defense budget was increased. Over the next ten years an additional budget was provided for the army which was derived from oil revenues and new taxes on sugar and tea, taxes which ranged from 30 to 35 % value added.<sup>3</sup> Consequently the armed forces grew from five divisions, totaling 40,000 men, to eighteen divisions totaling 127, 000 men. A

small air force was added to the army in 1922, and a navy in 1929.<sup>4</sup> The army's mobility improved due to the building of railroads. Heavy machine guns and automatic rifles were purchased from Czechoslovakia. Career officers were paid higher salaries than other government officers, and were given the additional benefit of being able to purchase state lands at discount prices. Top graduates of the military academies were sent to St. Cyr in France for further training. Reza Shah based one military headquarters in the royal court and personally controlled the entire officer corps from the chiefs of staff down to the field commanders.<sup>5</sup>

#### Modern state bureaucracy

Reza Shah established ten ministries: those of the interior, foreign affairs, justice, finance, education and endowments, trade, post and telegraph, agriculture, roads and industry. The Ministry of the Interior was the most important of these in providing a stable centralized government. Furthermore, the old administrative divisions of a few large provinces (*ayālat*) and small districts (*vilāyat*) were abolished. The country was instead divided into eleven provinces (*ustān*), and their borders were based on the strategic goals of the government. Forty nine counties (*shahristān*), many municipalities (*bakhsh*) and rural districts (*dehestān*) were created as well. Provinces were administered by a military governor (*farmāndār-i nizāmi*), and by a governor-general (*ustāndār*). Counties were controlled by a governor (*farmāndār*), municipalities and rural districts by a *bakhshdār*, and all were supervised by the Interior Ministry. This ministry was also in charge of the police, medical services, elections and military conscription. Consequently the state strengthened its power

over the provincial towns, counties and even some large villages. Reza Shah also hired new employees in the ten different ministries. This new bureaucracy was an invaluable support to the new King.<sup>6</sup>

The Shāh accumulated enough wealth by forced sales or by confiscating fertile lands and other properties. Those properties financed the establishment of royal palaces hotels, casinos, companies, charities and foundations. Court positions were created and salaries and pensions provided. This newly-hired personnel made up the third foundation of Reza Shah's power.<sup>7</sup>

#### Reforms and modernization

Between 1909 and 1925 different cabinets tried to take steps towards modernization and introduced certain reforms to the parliaments of the day. Muḥammad Vali Khan Sepahdār<sup>8</sup> was in charge of the first cabinet. He recognized the establishment of law and order as the first priority of his government. He proposed that the major portion of his government's budget be used to reform the regular army, to establish a police force in the cities and an *amniyeh* on the highway in order to provide security in the country. He also promised a series of reforms of the financial administration and judicial system. To execute these reforms he proposed hiring a number of foreign advisors. Sepahdar's successor, Mustowfi ul-Mamālīk was later to support the same policy. Furthermore Sepahdar instituted certain educational reforms and began the practice of sending students to Europe to receive western training in various fields. A year after Sepahdār took over the cabinet he hired a

group of American financial advisors headed by Morgan Shuster. The Russians however protested Shuster's employment and sent their troops into Tabriz to show their displeasure. Consequently, Sepahdar's cabinet as well as Shuster were dismissed. Mushir al-Dowleh also presented a further set of reforms aimed at modernizing Iranian society to the third session of the Majlis. Some of these were:

- Neutrality in foreign affairs;
- establishment of commercial code;
- enactment of bankruptcy laws;
- establishment of a teacher's college for women;
- gradual transformation of the religious schools (*maktab Khāneh*) into regular elementary schools;
- a uniform series of textbooks and curriculum in the schools; and
- formation of chambers of commerce.<sup>9</sup>

Unfortunately, the Majlis went into a recess until 1921 due to the First World War. Therefore, Reẓā Shāh chose to proceed with a number of these reforms on his own initiative. One reform which he chose not to carry out was the new penal code drafted with the help of Adolph Perni, a French jurist employed by the Ministry of Justice. Originally submitted to the Majlis in 1912, this draft code consisted of 506 articles, and although based on the Napoleonic code, it conformed to the *shari'ah* and was approved by the *mujtahids* as well.<sup>10</sup>

In the early 1920's, the process of modernization once again got underway in Iran and by 1941, Iran had been transformed into a relatively modern society with new politico-economic institutions and socio-cultural values. This process however embodied in itself a great deal of secularization and drew the ulama's opposition. However, their opposition was nullified both by force and by the drastic changes in the existing judicial, educational and economic situations which, for centuries, had been the foundation of the ulama's power.

The ulama nonetheless constituted an important factor when Reza Khan emerged onto the political scene in Iran. Reza Khan recognized their power over the populace and the merchants. Although he personally was indifferent toward religion and regarded the ulama with hostility, he managed to cover his intentions and successfully gained their support for a while. To win this support, Reza Khān, then Minister of War (*Sardar Sepah*), undertook a series of maneuvers in order to prove his devotion to Islam. These were two occasions in particular on which Reza Khān made a show of his religious faith. In June of 1922 Reza Khān arranged a ceremony of mourning for Imām Ḥusain in the Cossack mosque in Tehran. He invited the public to attend and to remember the martyrdom of Imam Ḥusain. The clergy were also invited to preach, and were paid for their services at the end of the ceremony. On the 10th day of Muḥarram ( *Āshūra*) Reza Khān, along with a large number of high ranking military officials, marched to the *bazaar* and participated in the public mourning. That was the first time in Iranian history that a senior official of ministerial rank had associated himself with the common devotees of the martyred Imām Ḥusain. This demonstration impressed a large number of ulama in Tehran as well as the merchants, and resulted in a

petition signed by prominent merchants and addressed to the Qajar king demanding Reza Khan's appointment to the premiership.

The second occasion was shortly after Reza Khan spread a rumor throughout the country that in a dream, his holiness 'Abbas (2nd son of Imām 'Alī and Imam Husain's half-brother) who was martyred on 'Ashura day in Karbalā by the Bani Sufyan, gave him his sword. This sword, which was reportedly in Karbalā, was transferred to Iran at Reza Shāh's demand and given to him in his capacity as *Sardār Sepah* during a ceremony.<sup>11</sup>

It has to be mentioned that the true nature of Reza Khān's religious tactics were known to some ulama such as Mudarris. However, he gained the support of many other anti-republican ulama, especially after the crisis over republicanism in the 4th Majlis.

Reza Khān at one time looked with favor upon republicanism and perhaps hoped to be the first president of Iran. However, he changed his direction when he became aware of the ulama's opposition to republicanism, a sentiment which was supported thoroughly by the merchants and the populace. The alliance between the ulama and the merchants played a significant role in the Tobacco Movement, the Constitutional Revolution, the liberal nationalist movement against despotism, the oil nationalization movement of 1951-53 and finally the Islamic Revolution of February 1979. According to H. Algar, this alliance was mutually beneficial due to the ulama's fear of being challenged by the government and the merchants' fear of change in the economy, especially high taxes.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, republicanism at the time was interpreted as a threat to the interests of Islam, especially due to the secular



changes in Turkey. Reza Khān sent a telegram to Qum declared his absolute support for the ulama.<sup>13</sup>

Rezā Khān was successful in gaining the support of some anti-republican ulama like Ayatullāh Kāshāni, Sheikh Muḥammad Khālīsī-Zādeh and Sheikh Ḥaṣan Lankarānī, which finally resulted in Rezā Khān's assumption of power as shah on 6 December 1925.<sup>14</sup>

During the following two years, Rezā Shāh tried to appease the ulama by meeting with them, arranging prayer ceremonies in his palace, visiting the holy city of Qum, etc. However, Rezā Shāh had other plans in mind, such as reform, modernization and centralization and therefore the alliance between him and the ulama had to be ended

In 1927 a compulsory military service bill was introduced to the Majlis.<sup>15</sup> According to the bill, theology students and *mullas* were exempted from service only after they passed an examination before an official board. The ulama expressed their resentment of the conscription law. They declared that the duties of the religious class consisted in preserving the integrity of Islam, interpreting the Quran and maintaining the religious nature of the society, nothing more. Once again the merchants allied themselves with the ulama and declared a boycott against the government. Rezā Shāh sent his prime minister to Qum and promised to the ulama certain modifications in the conscription law.<sup>16</sup> This was the first and the last victory for the ulama over the government and marked the end of the era of friendship between them and Rezā Shāh, although the confrontation ended peacefully.

Beginning in 1927 the government began to modernize the judicial, educational, social, administrative and industrial systems and in the process the power of the ulama was eliminated and their opposition effectively suppressed. To understand the significance of this development it is important to examine the sources of the ulama's power and their religious and socio-political status in Iran before 1921.

### The power of the ulama

The adoption of Shiism as the official religion by the Safavids (1502-1736) was a turning point with regard to the authoritative position of the Shiite ulama. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Safavids tried to subordinate and incorporate the institution of the ulama into the state bureaucracy. However great numbers of them denied the legitimacy of any connection with the Safavids and continued to regard the state as illegitimate.<sup>17</sup>

The authority of the 'Ithnā 'Ash'arī Shi'i ulama is derived from the occultation of Imām Mahdi in 874. Due to the absence of any legitimate successor, the ulama gained the power of *hidāyat* (guidance) by *ijtihād* (interpreting Islamic law and its provisions) until the hidden Imām Mahdi, who is the rightful one, reappears and inaugurates a new era for mankind. Thus the ulama became intermediaries between Imām Mahdi and the people. Consequently Shiite doctrine legitimized the position of the ulama by recognizing them as the representatives of the Hidden Imām. As the Imām's representatives, the ulama were entrusted with certain functions, e.g. judicial, educational, control over *awqāf* (endowments) and *masajid* (mosques), etc. In brief the ulama obtained a semi- autonomous position in the

society and they became the natural leaders and spokesmen of the majority of Iranians as well.<sup>18</sup>

### Educational Role of the ulama in the Face of Reform

The association between education and religion has deep roots in Iran, for education was once monopolized by the Zoroastrian religion. After the victory of Islam in Iran, education gained a more Islamic orientation since it was largely the province of those who had mastered Islamic studies and the Arabic language. Consequently mosques became centers of education as well as of prayer, and the ulama came to dominate the educational system until the late 19th century.

There were two formal educational institutions: the *maktab* (elementary School) and the *madreseh* (advanced schools), the latter offering courses in religious studies, Islamic philosophy and law. In the early 20th century, a group of intellectuals came together in Tehran to establish the Anjuman-i Ma'ārif (Society for Education) which eventually founded the national library and fifty-five modern schools. Prior to the opening of these modern schools Mr. Haşan Rushdīyeh opened the first European-model school in Tabriz. This modern school attracted the outrage of the *ḡullāb* (students of Islamic studies), who went so far as to burn the school to the ground. However, during the premiership of Amin al-Dowleh, Mr. Rushdīyeh was provided with some facilities by the government and, supported by the reformist prime minister, he reopened the school in Tehran.<sup>19</sup>

From 1925 into 1941 there was an impressive increase in the number of modern primary, secondary and higher educational institutions. In 1925 there were six higher secular institutions of learning and colleges, namely, Medicine, Agriculture, Teachers Training, Law, Literature, and Political Science. In the 1930s these colleges were amalgamated into the University of Tehran. By 1941, five new colleges, those of Dentistry, Pharmacology, Veterinary Medicine, Fine Arts, and Science and Technology were added to Tehran University.<sup>20</sup> The number of the enrolled students increased considerably and in 1941, 450 students graduated from Tehran University. Meanwhile, the government had sent some 100 qualified graduate students abroad on scholarships. Training courses were provided in the different ministries in order to improve professionalism of their employees. Evening literacy classes were established and by 1941 there were almost 174,000 students enrolled in this program. However, illiteracy in the rural population remained at a level of 90 percent. The following chart, which is based on information found in Iran Between Two Revolutions by Ervand Abrahamian, demonstrates the changes that happened over 16 years:

	students enrolled	primary students	students secondary	secondary schools	students in institution	higher institutions	students in maktab	theology students
1925	55,960	648	14,488	74	600	6	28,949	5,984
1941	287,245	2,336	28,194	351	3,300	11	32,287	7837

Students abroad, the 3,200 trainees in governmental offices and banks and 173,907 adult students in the evening literacy schools (*akaber*) are not included in these statistics.<sup>21</sup>

The above chart shows that although there was an impressive increase over this period in the number of students in the religious primary schools (*maktab*), there was a dramatic decrease in the number of students attending the higher religious schools (*madresch*).

The increase in the number of schools and colleges made it possible for members of the younger generation, no matter what their social class, to profit from and enjoy an opportunity which until 1925 had been the exclusive preserve of the nobility and the rich, and of the more prominent clergy and merchant. In 16 years a new intelligentsia came to life, indebted for their social status to the changes and reforms provided by the new government. Since this new group had not been educated by religious teachers, their loyalty was to Reżā Shāh. The ulama thus lost a great deal of influence with this group.<sup>22</sup> However the same group appreciated Reżā Shāh's abdication from power and some even became involved with new ideas and beliefs which flew in the face of the oppression and dictatorship imposed on them by Reżā Shāh's authoritarian regime. This matter will be discussed later in this chapter.

#### Economic decline of the ulama

The majority of ulama were economically independent. Their income was derived from the following sources:

- Pious endowments (*awqāf*) and the administration of these endowments attached to the shrines and mosques (for example: lands and shops and other properties endowed to the shrines of Imām Reżā in Mashhad, Hazrat Masumeh in Qum, Shāh Chiragh in Shiraz and many mosques in Isfahan, Tabriz and other cities).
- Administration and management of the property of orphans
- *Zakat* (alms)
- Voluntary contributions by individuals and charitable donations

In 1939, *waqf* lands and buildings were brought under the control of the Ministry of Education. The shrine of Imām Reḡā was placed under administration of the governor of Mashhad. With the changes in the educational system and the religious schools, the *maktab*s were brought under the supervision of the Ministry of Education in 1931, and many clergy thus lost their income from teaching as well.<sup>23</sup> However the ulama's main loss of income was caused by the economic changes in the country. Communication and transportation were improved. The Trans-Iranian Railway Project linked the Caspian port of Bandar-i Shāh to the city of Sārī in the central part of the Province of Māzandarān. In the Gulf, Bandar-i Shāhpūr was connected by rail to northern Khuzistān, and by 1941 Tehran was linked to Mashhad via Simnān and to Tabrīz via Zanjān. In addition, 14,000 miles of highways were built, connecting almost every city to Tehran. The expansion of communication and transportation helped the government to centralize state capitalism. This, however, affected the prosperity and independence of merchants, especially in Tabrīz and Mashhad. Although the improved security and the communication expansion should have permitted the bazaar merchants expand their trade, the government system of monopolies almost destroyed the big merchants by confiscating their businesses and properties. Many were arrested in the process and some even died in prison. Thus the regime's control over freedom of enterprise caused the old merchant class to lose its previous socio-economic status on the one hand and the ulama to lose the economic support of the merchants on the other.<sup>24</sup> In addition a new class was formed as a result of industrialization. New factories of every size were opened and many people from outlying towns and rural regions immigrated to Tehran and a few

other big cities like Tabriz, Isfahan and Shahi. The following chart shows the increase in the numbers of the factories and the new workers between 1925 and 1941.

	Large industrial plants	small industrial plants	number of workers	number of workers in oil industries	Caspian Rail & Fisheries Road
1925	5	15	1,000	20,000	
1941	146	200	50,000	31,000	140,000

There were 62 plants in Tehran employing 64,000 workers, and 9 plants with 11,000 workers employed in Isfahan. In 1922 Tehran had a population 196,255; this had increased to 700,000 by 1941.<sup>25</sup>

The middle class was also adversely affected by Reza Shah's policy of state capitalism, which had an inevitable impact on society. A new middle class came to life which consisted of the junior officers of the army, teachers, graduates of colleges and universities and government employees of the 11 newly established ministries. This new middle class later became the social base for Dr. Muşaddiq's National Front (to be discussed in the next chapter).<sup>26</sup>

The ulama thus lost the support of merchants and the middle class. In addition the government tried to control the numbers of the clergy by imposing on them the necessity of obtaining a special license. To obtain this license, the clergy, had either to pass a test administrated by the government or, be recognized as clergy by government-approved ulama. Moreover, the clergy were forbidden to wear their clerical garb unless they had license.<sup>27</sup>

Furthermore, as was stated earlier, the religious endowments became the responsibility of the Ministry of Education in 1934. The ministry's advisors subsequently

recommended the sale of *waqf* lands in order to obtain money for general education in 1939.<sup>28</sup>

### The Judicial Authority of the ulama and Government Reforms

The ulama had a similar monopoly over the judicial system and frequently functioned as judges (*qāḍī*). In theory the governors of the different provinces appointed the ulama as local judges but in practice the former could hardly reject an *alim* selected either by his peers or by the local population. In the cities, the Imām-i Jum'eh and the Sheikh ul-Islam had judicial authority. In villages and small cities the head of the clergy undertook that authority. In the capital, the position of the Imām-i Jum'eh and Sheikh ul-Islam were usually held by one person. The Imām-i Jum'eh often provided religious and judicial advice to the shahs; however, at times they acted as the monarchs' puppet.<sup>29</sup> For example, as was mentioned before, during the Tobacco Movement the Imām-i Jum'a of Tehran tried to challenge the *fatwā* of Āyatullāh Shīrāzī, but he was not successful.<sup>30</sup>

The position of Imām-i Jum'eh was equal to that of the Grand Mufti in Egypt. In the Ottoman Empire, the judicial system was based on Islamic law; however, it was influenced by the secular law of *Qānūn* issued by the Sultan. In Iran, according to Banani, due to the lack of secular law and the strength of the ulama, the judicial system remained in accordance with Islamic law or *Shari'ah*. Consequently every aspect of daily life such as commercial transactions, marriage, divorce and inheritance were regulated by the *shari'ah* until the early 1930s, when Reḡā Shāh initiated extensive judicial reforms.<sup>31</sup>



However the reforms had already started before this time. In 1906 steps were taken to produce a new civil code. According to Peter Avery, the office of public prosecutor (Mudda'i al- 'Umumi or Dadsitani) was established in 1910,<sup>32</sup> although Dr. Matin-Daftari reports the date as 1906 (1285 hijri). Matin-Daftari also mentions the establishment of four courts: the Court of Property and Financial claims (Dādgāh-i Amlāk va Iddi'āhā-ye Mālī); the Criminal Court (Dādgāh-i Jinā'i); the Appeals Court (Divān-i-Tamīz) and the Supreme Court of Appeal (Dādgāh-i 'Āli-i Istīynāf) in the same year. In 1911 the Ministry of Justice (Vizārat-i 'Adliyyeh) was established by Mushir al- Dowleh's cabinet and a series of experimental laws were compiled and codified in accordance with the second article of the Supplement to the Constitutional Law,<sup>33</sup> which stated that no law may contradict Islamic laws and regulations.<sup>34</sup> In 1919 the first school of law with a mostly French curriculum was opened in Tehran, and graduates of this school later helped Reza Shah to reorganize and to secularize the judicial system in 1927. From 1928 to 1932 many secular laws and regulations were passed by the parliament resulting in a lessening of the ulama's authority. The final stroke came in 1932, when the requirement came into effect that all legal transactions be registered in secular courts. Therefore the clergy lost their legal authority as well as another source of income. In 1936 a new law was introduced requiring all judges to hold a degree in law from a secular university. This law eliminated almost all the clergy from holding judgeships since almost none of them held such a degree. The clergies were virtually restricted to dealing with matters of personal law such as marriage, divorce, alimony, and inheritance; these matters remained within the purview of the *Shari'ah* until 1967. However

all marriages and divorces were to be registered by offices under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice.<sup>15</sup>

Furthermore Reza Shah outlawed the *t̤āziyeh* and *dasteh* (public march and mourning for the martyrdom of Imam Husain) in the month of Muḥarram. The government also prohibited the practice of *bast* (taking sanctuary in shrines or mosques to protest against the government), which often resulted in the closing of the bazaars. The main mosques were opened to foreign tourists, and exit visas were denied to pilgrims bound for Mecca, Madina, Najaf and Karbala.<sup>16</sup>

The gradual elimination of the ulama's power was completed by the government through control over elections, which resulted in the ulama losing their seats in the parliament. In actual fact the only clerical opponent to Reza Shāh was Mudarris, who was later arrested and killed by the shah.<sup>17</sup> Reza Shāh was however faced with a number of other opponents, the most enthusiastic of these being Dr. Muṣaddiq.

#### Muṣaddiq and Reza Shāh

In October 1925 a bill was introduced to the Majlis calling for the removal of the Qajars and their replacement by Reza Khān. A few opponents like Mudarris, Mustawfi (the speaker of the Parliament), Bahār (the poet-laureate), Mushir and Muṣaddiq publicly demonstrated their disagreement in the Parliament. Muṣaddiq's speech, according to Homa Katouzian, was the longest, best reasoned and most emotional one. Muṣaddiq produced a

copy of the Quran from his pocket and asked the deputies to rise to show their respect for it. He reminded them of the oath of allegiance to the state and the constitution that they had taken when they were sworn in. Later he spoke of his appreciation of Reza Khan's service to Iran in providing security and order. He praised Reza Khan as a minister of war and also as a prime-minister. Finally however, he stated that to change such an able man into a powerless head of state and constitutional monarch was not in the best interest of the country; moreover to give him the authority of a monarch would be contrary to the Constitution and would bring about dictatorship.<sup>38</sup> He then raised his voice, saying:

Very well. If we say Mr. Prime Minister can be a shah, then he will interfere in the affairs of the country. He will absolutely dominate everything in the future, because he is a king, he is a prime minister and he is also the head of the Army. If they were to behead me and cut me in pieces or if Mr. Sayyed Yaqūb were to curse me a thousand times, I would never accept it.. After twenty years of bloodshed. Mr. Yaqūb you were a constitutionalist, a freedom seeker, I myself was a witness to you; preaching. You were inviting people to revolt and fight for their freedom. Now you say you believe that one person can be a king and a prime minister and a head of state. If that is the case, then he would be an absolute reactionary and a despot....<sup>39</sup>

Muṣaddiq's argument was not effective and the bill was passed with a majority of votes. However Muṣaddiq continued his opposition. He refused to take the conventional oath of allegiance to the new shah and throughout the 6th parliament (1926-1928) he tried to identify Iran with Islam, emphasizing the qualities of *Irānīyyat* (Iranianism) and *Islāmīyyat* (Islamism).<sup>40</sup> Muṣaddiq challenged and debated almost all the bills presented to the parliament, but his arguments were always ignored by those deputies who were pro- Reza Shāh.

One such debate revolved around the Trans-Iranian Rail Bill, which was presented to parliament in 1926. Muṣaddiq raised serious questions about the proposal contained in the bill, which was to connect the Caspian Sea with the Persian Gulf by rail. Using both economic and technical arguments he proposed instead the construction of a modern road network, pointing out the low cost of such a project in comparison with the cost of a railway. Muṣaddiq further suggested the construction of an international rail link connecting the Turkish railways in the northwest to the Indian railways in the southwest, pointing out that such a link would be more economical in cost and more beneficial, due to more domestic and international demand for the passenger service.<sup>41</sup>

On another occasion, Muṣaddiq used the same approach in opposing a bill designed to modernize the judicial system. Muṣaddiq emphasized that while there was a need for modernization, there were many faults in the proposed procedures. Davar,<sup>42</sup> the Minister of Justice, recommended the complete closure of the machinery of justice while his French legal advisors proceeded to set up a new and modern legal system. Muṣaddiq strongly disagreed and reasoned that the French advisors would be unable to provide a system which would be based on *Irānīyyat* and *Islāmīyyat*, and that a complete closure of the current system would result in tyranny and injustice.<sup>43</sup>

Muṣaddiq also criticized the way towns and cities were modernized and the fact that the historical buildings and monuments were being destroyed in the process.<sup>44</sup>

Throughout the sixth parliament Muṣaddiq continued his opposition and, although he was convinced that the election for the seventh parliament would be held in the midst of state interference, nevertheless he stood as candidate along with Mudarris. As he had expected, neither one of them was elected. Mudarris, who had obtained 14,000 votes in the election for the previous parliament, said to the chief of police, Dargahi: "I assume all the 14,000 people who voted for me in the previous election changed their mind; but what happened to the vote which I cast for myself?"<sup>45</sup>

Reẓā Shāh tried on various occasions to enlist Muṣaddiq's support, but his attempts were not successful and Muṣaddiq continued to protest against him and his policy of secularization. In one instance Muṣaddiq stayed at home for eight months, expressing his opposition to the official order of the government prohibiting traditional head-gear and making mandatory the wearing of the French military cap (the so-called Pahlavi hat). Muṣaddiq also disagreed with forcing women to go bareheaded, a policy introduced in 1936. Meanwhile Reẓā Shāh had started to eliminate his opponents. Mudarris for instance was arrested, beaten up and jailed in 1928. In view of this situation Muṣaddiq chose to abstain from political as well as social life and stayed in his village of Ahmādadābād. In 1936 he went to Germany to seek treatment for an illness. His doctors did not find any physical reason for his hemorrhaging in the mouth, and advised him to see a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist after asking Muṣaddiq about his education and his profession, diagnosed him as suffering from depression. On his return to Iran in 1940, Muṣaddiq was arrested by the police and was jailed. However, he was released by crown prince Muḥammad Reẓā few months later.<sup>46</sup>

### Ayatullah Kashani and Reza Shah

Kashani returned to Iran from Iraq in 1921. In 1925 he was elected as a deputy to the Constitutional Assembly which approved the transfer of the throne from the Qajars to the Pahlavi Dynasty.<sup>47</sup> There is no information available as to the stance which Kashani adopted on this issue; however a short period of friendship commenced between him and Reza Shah. This friendship was based on the two men's hatred of British interference: Reza Shāh severely critical of the British involvement in Iran, and Kashani in the Muslim world in general. Kashani attended the royal court's religious ceremonies and festivals. According to Muḥammad Ḥaṣan Faghfoory the friendship ended because of Kāshāni's conflicts with Taymurtash, the powerful court minister; however, the nature and reasons of this conflict are not mentioned.<sup>48</sup>

It may also be no coincidence that the end of their friendship followed upon the start of Reza Shāh's policy of modernization and secularization. Although Kāshāni never publicly denounced Reza Shāh's policy while Reza Shah was in power, nevertheless as soon as the latter abdicated in 1941, Kāshāni released a public statement condemning the state's secularization policy. He criticized the modern secular schools and considered the employment of unveiled women as a scandalous practice.<sup>49</sup> Faghfoory mentions that, in Kashani's view, Islam was compatible with progress, knowledge and reform; for this reason he may therefore be said to have had a positive attitude towards modernization and certain aspects of western institutions and technological innovations.<sup>50</sup> This may be questioned.

There is no information available on Kashani's affiliation with the clerical opposition to Reza Shah. He denounced fanatic *mullas* and fanaticism in general. He was not popular among the ulama,<sup>51</sup> even though he was supported by the *bazaaris* and the middle class. Kashani abstained from political life in order to avoid further conflict with Reza Shah, except on one occasion. In 1933 upon the conclusion of the oil agreement with the British, Kāshāni mobilized a nation-wide protest against the agreement and denounced the treaty. Thereafter Kāshāni, like Muṣaddiq, isolated himself in his home in Tehran and involved himself in teaching *fiqh* and *uṣūl* and in studying and thinking. His religious and political beliefs became as a result more consistent and coherent. He studied Sayyed Jamal al-Dīn al-Afḡānī's career and activities as well as those of other prominent Muslim thinkers like Kawākibī. Nevertheless, these years of seclusion and silence had no effect on his pragmatic approach and attitude towards religion and politics, and in fact made him an able political and religious leader after Reza Shāh's abdication and during post-World War II period.

Towards the end of Reza Shāh's reign, a friendly relationship began between Iran and Germany, thus creating an opportunity for rapprochement between Kashani and Reza Shah. The new development enabled Kāshāni to persuade Reza Shāh to provide refuge for two prominent ulama; Hājī Amīn al-Ḥusainī and Rashīd 'Alī al-Gīlānī.<sup>52</sup>

### World War II, A New Era

Reza Shāh tried to establish complete independence for Iran. He believed that there were two ways for Iran to enjoy her national independence with regard to foreign powers.

One was to improve relations with neighboring countries, which resulted in a treaty between Iran and Iraq in 1932. According to this treaty the frontiers between the two countries were defined in detail. In 1934 Reza Shah traveled to Turkey and was warmly received by Kemal Ataturk. Following that visit the S'ad Abad Pact was signed between Iran, Turkey and Iraq in 1937.<sup>53</sup>

Another foreign policy initiative was to find a third foreign power to balance Britain and the Soviet Union. That foreign power was Germany. Diplomatic and economic relations between Iran and Germany were expanded. However, some Iranians among the junior army officers and students were impressed by Nazism. They found Nazism to be an acceptable substitute to Reza Shāh's dictatorship. In 1937, a group of twenty university graduates headed by an army officer by the name of Mohsen Jahansuz were arrested for advocating a coup against the monarch.<sup>54</sup> Meanwhile World War II had started and Iran declared its neutrality on 4 September 1939. Iran repeated her neutral position once more on 26 June 1941 after the German invasion of Russia. Nevertheless the Soviets found the presence of German experts in the Iranian government and private institutions contrary to their interests and demanded the expulsion of a number of those who they considered to be a fifth column of German political and military interests. By the same token Britain was alarmed at the advance of the German forces in the Caucasus, which they saw as endangering the oil fields of southern Iran. The lines of communications from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet frontier were also considered as most suitable for Britain to send ammunition and arms. Therefore without regard for Iran's neutral position, Soviet and British forces invaded and



occupied Iran in the north and the south in August 1941. Soon after the United States entered the war on 7 December 1941, the first US naval unit arrived in Iranian waters. The text of the Tri-Partite Treaty of Alliance between Iran, Britain and Soviet Russia was signed in the Iranian foreign office on 29 January 1942.<sup>55</sup>

The Anglo- Soviet occupation created a panic throughout the country and ushered in major political and economic changes as well. On 16 September 1941, Reza Shah abdicated and his young and inexperienced son, Muhammad Reza succeeded him. The parliament and the prime minister became active. Older politicians re-emerged onto the political stage. Political groups and parties reappeared and the press became comparatively uncensored. Iran was subjected to heavy economic pressures which were mainly the result of the operation of the allied forces in Iran.<sup>56</sup> It should be mentioned that inflation was already a serious problem in 1936, and had continued to increase during the war years. As Peter Avery states: "Reza Shāh's order was a house built on inflation."<sup>57</sup> Every day the government and the Allies faced uprisings and demonstrations by a nation which had been suffering from poverty, hunger, disease and anxiety. Parties were formed and political slogans were heard everywhere. Among those political groups and parties was the re-emerged Communist Party (which had been outlawed by Reza Shāh in 1931) under the name Hizb-i Tudeh (Mass Party).

## The Communists and The Tudeh Party

After the October Revolution in Russia, the Communist Party of Iran came to life and opened its first meeting in Anzali (Pahlavi) harbor in 1920. This party was involved in the Gīlān Movement and the strike by the oil-field workers in 1927. The Communist ideology attracted many members of the new middle class and students throughout Iran. Reza Shah suppressed the party in 1926-27, but the party went underground and continued functioning. In 1929 the Communist Party organized a strike in the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company). Among the organizers were Yusif Isfandiyārī, Ardishīr Āvānisiyān, and Pishchvarī (veterans of the Gīlān Movement). The strike was suppressed by the government and the organizers were arrested. However the party led another strike at Isfahan Textiles in 1931, which was crushed again and ended with the arrest, imprisonment and execution of the leaders. Some members escaped to the Soviet Union, such as Sultānzādeh who was later executed by Stalīn. The government outlawed the Communist Party in 1932 and the party again went underground. However, a branch of the party still functioned in Europe under the leadership of 'Alavī. The party recruited many Iranian students abroad. One of the prominent members was Taqi Arānī. Arānī studied medicine in Berlin before returning to Iran and in 1933 he established the first cell of the new Iranian Communist party (later named Tudeh). He was assisted by Iraj Iskandari and Buzurg 'Alavi. Arānī was a powerful teacher and speaker. He attracted many students to his cause and organized two strikes in Tehran University and the School of Technology. Nevertheless the government suppressed this party as well and arrested Arānī and his 52 followers in 1937. All of the group were

prosecuted under the Act of 1931 (prohibiting Communist activities) and were sentenced to long-term imprisonment. Dr. Arani was later killed in prison.<sup>58</sup> In 1941 his followers were released and they re-formed the Tudeh Party. The party attracted many laborers, students, low ranking government employees and intellectuals. As was stated before, Iran was suffering at this time from economic hardship and the propaganda of the Tudeh Party deeply influenced the workers with low salaries who subsequently joined. By 1945 the party had organized two workers' syndicates with 300,000 members from all over Iran. The two syndicates were led by the United Assembly of Iranian Workers (Shawrā -ye Mottahideh-ye Kārgarān-i Iran [SMKI]). On 1 May 1946, 700,000 workers marched and demonstrated all over the country, culminating in the strike of 10,000 oil workers in the city of Agha Jari on 10 May 1946. Finally after two weeks the strike ended with victory for the workers. However the government formed a non-Communist syndicate in 1947, The Union of Syndicated Iranian Workers (Ittihādiyeh- ye Sindikāhā-ye Kārgarān-i Iran or ESKI) in order to challenge SMKI.<sup>59</sup> The Tudeh party achieved its first important victory in 1944 when eight party members were elected to the 14th parliament, and its second in 1946, when the party had three members in Qavam al-Saltaneh's cabinet. The party managed to attract those who believed in an independent Iran especially after Reza Radmanish, one of the party's deputies in the 14th parliament, strongly protested against the granting of a concession to the United States. He said:

I disagree with the granting of any concession to any country or any foreigner. I am certain we are able to exploit oil or any mineral of our country, with the help of our people and their capital as we established the railroad without having any foreign help.<sup>60</sup>

However three months later the party announced its support for granting a concession to the Soviets. Consequently the party lost its support from the nationalists in the parliament and suffered a further setback after the cabinet of Qavām al-Saltāneh fell on 16 October 1946. Another serious setback for the party was the fall of the Democratic Government of Azarbayjān in November 1946.<sup>61</sup> After an attempted assassination of the Shāh in February 1949, the party was declared illegal and it went underground until 1950, when Dr. Muṣaddiq became prime minister.

Although the world war ended on 15 August 1945, Azarbāyjān was still occupied by the Soviets; in fact in October the Soviets sent reinforcements to Azarbāyjān. Iran protested against the operations of the Red Army in the region and took the case to the United Nations in January 1946. In March, President Truman of the United States forwarded an ultimatum to Stalin asking the Soviets to evacuate from Azarbāyjān. In December 1946 the Iranian army was sent to the province, which resulted in the fall of the autonomous government and the return of the status quo.<sup>62</sup> Later in 1950 Azarbāyjān supported Dr. Muṣaddiq's movement.

Meanwhile the deep feelings of resentment against foreigners increased, especially against the Soviets for not withdrawing their forces from northern Iran- a violation of the Tehran Peace Conference. Anger was also directed against the British for increasing their control over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. On the other hand the decline in the economy had also created political and administrative corruption in the country. There was a need for

essential socio-economic and political changes. The unstable political situation, economic hardship and pressure, especially upon the poor, paved the way for the emergence of various religious and political groups, amongst which the Fedā'iyān-i Islam was the strongest.

### Fedā'iyān-i Islam

One of the strongest religious-political associations of twentieth century Iran was the Fedā'iyān-i Islam (Devotees of Islam). This organization was founded by a small group in south Tehran (Juntūb-e Shahr) in the early months of 1945. The organization made its ideas and programs known to the public and rapidly attracted many members and supporters from the lower class, the religious middle class, wealthy bazaar merchants, shopkeepers, artisans and some influential clergy like Āyatullāh Kāshāni. The Fedā'iyans were devoted to Islam and were prepared to sacrifice themselves for their faith and their organization. The founder of this organization was Muḥtabā Navvāb Safavī, who was born in 1923 to a poor and fanatically religious family who claimed to be descended from the Safavid dynasty. The organization heavily emphasized individual moral, religious and physical discipline. The volunteers' bravery and devotion were to be tested. The Fedā'iyān-i Islam protested against foreign influence and domination, domestic tyranny and ideas and innovations coming from the West. They believed Islam was inclusive and capable of organizing all affairs of life. This group was an extremist organization and they were ready and prepared to sacrifice themselves for their cause. Mohammed Hassan Faghfoory makes the following remark concerning them:

One could safely say that the emergence of the Fedā'īyan-i Islam and its subsequent political and terrorist activities was indeed a reflection of the social injustice and economic inequalities which prevailed in the country during those years

In an April interview with *Taraqqi*, a Tehran weekly, Mujtabā Navvāh Safavi outlined the Fedā'īyān program (a program which Mohammad Hassan Faghfoory believes was aimed at a wider audience than just Iran):

- Application of Islamic law in the day to day affairs of Muslims
- Unification of all Muslims of the world by bridging the gap between and different sects within Islam;
- Struggle against ignorance, disease and vice;
- Patriotic and nationalistic goals for the liberation of Iran and other Muslim states from foreign dominance and domestic tyranny;
- A return to the original form of Islam as it was practiced by the Prophet and his companions.

Accordingly the Fedā'īyān were against reforms and secularization. In this aspect they were also against individuals who supported such measures. In 1946 this group assassinated Ahmād Kasravi, the well known Iranian historian, nationalist and modernist.

On 4 February 1949, Muḥammad Reżā Shāh was attacked at Tehran University. The would-be assassin was killed by security forces. Later the government exploited that incident and outlawed its opponents, both groups and individuals. The Tudeh Party and the Fedā'īyān were declared illegal, and Āyatullāh Kāshāni was exiled to Lebanon, where he stayed for nine months.

The assassination of Razmārā (the pro-British Prime minister) by Khalil Tahmasibi played a very important role in Ayatullah Kashani's reemergence to power. Kashani denounced Tahmasibi's arrest and called him a "son of Islam", considering him as dear as his own son. When Muṣaddiq was prime minister Tahmasibi was released.

Following his support of Tahmāsibi, Kāshāni allied himself with Navvab Safavī (the Fedā'iyān's leader) on the basis of their mutual beliefs. They were both anti-imperialist and to some extent nationalist. They both regarded the decline of religious beliefs and foreign influence to be the cause of the socio-economic and political problems in Iran. Due to Kāshāni's anti-British and anti-Zionist stand, the Fedā'iyān found in Kāshāni the leader who could guide Muslims to victory. For Kāshāni, the Fedā'iyān were instrumental and would help him to mobilize the people to support him in achieving his goals. In 1948 Kashani and Safavi mobilized volunteers for a *jihād* against the establishment of the state of Israel. Consequently each side attempted to use the other side to strengthen his situation. Kashani use the Fedā'iyān to eliminate his opponents, such as Razmārā, while the Fedā'iyān hoped to use Kāshāni's influence in the Majlis and among the bazaar merchants to achieve their political objectives. Meanwhile the National Front appreciated the Kāshāni-Fedā'iyān alliance in its battle for the nationalization of oil. However as the Fedā'iyān grew more militant and violent and demanded official recognition of their organization and a share of authority with the government, conflicts arose between Kāshāni and the Fedā'iyān.

Losing Kashani's support weakened the organization. The government banned the Feda'iyān in 1951, and Safavi was subsequently arrested on 3 June 1951. The police found a list of prominent names marked for assassination in his possession. Although the organization shared certain aspects of Muṣaddiq's policy (e.g. a policy of no concessions to foreign countries and oil nationalization) in general they were against secularization, and Muṣaddiq, then prime minister, was considered a secularist. Hence, his name appeared on the list of those to be assassinated. With the party now banned, most Feda'iyān members joined the Anjuman Nihzat-i Sharq (Society of the Movement of the East). This society had been formed by Abul-Ma'ālī Kāshāni (Āyatullāh Kāshāni's son) and was active in mobilizing the support of different groups (the clergy, bazaar merchants and ex- members of Feda'iyān) for Kāshāni.<sup>63</sup>

#### Āyatullāh Kāshāni as Political Leader

Kāshāni came out of his seclusion in 1941, but shortly afterwards was arrested by the British and was sent from Tehran to Arak. In 1945, after the British left Iran, Kashani came back to Tehran. Although he was not a religious leader (the Iranian Shiite leader at the time was Āyatullāh Ḥusain Ṭabāṭabā'ī Burujirdi),<sup>64</sup> Kāshāni's anti-British reputation brought popularity for him and made him the center of attention. Newspapers started to interview him and to publish his views and ideas concerning the political and socio-economic situation. During the time that Kāshāni had gone into isolation his thoughts had been nourished by Pan-Islamism. After the independent state of Pakistan was established in 1948, Kāshāni took steps to create economic and cultural ties between the Muslim states. He



communicated with prominent Muslim leaders like Ḥājī-Amīn al-Ḥusaini in Palestine and the leader of the Muslim League in Pakistan. He hoped to establish an economic and political union composed of all Muslims. In a newspaper interview Kashani stated: "I am preparing grounds for the unity of not only the Muslims in the Middle East, but of Asia as well, so that a new and powerful bloc would be created between the Soviets, the British and the Americans."

While Kashani believed that such political unity was possible, he regarded religious unity as less so. Nevertheless he hoped that political unity could be the start of an eventual unification of the entire Muslim world. Therefore as a Pan-Islamist he limited his advocacy to political goals rather than religious ones. Kāshāni's Pan-Islamist principles were: Political unification of all Muslim countries and establishment of a united confederation among all.<sup>65</sup>

In a sermon delivered on 7 January 1948 at the Masjid-i Shāh, Kāshāni reminded the people of the victory of Islam over all Asia, Europe and Africa. He stated that the reason for that victory was the unity and brotherhood that once existed between all Muslims. He condemned imperialism and dictatorial regimes and pointed to them as the cause of Muslim disunity. He emphasized that Islam recognizes no geographic borders for Muslims and knows no specific land as homeland (*vatan*), for all Muslim states are a homeland: "All Muslim countries in the world are our homeland and we have to support and defend them with our lives and finances...."

During the same *khutbah* Kashani condemned the establishment of the state of Israel in Palestine and called on the people to provide moral and financial help to the Palestinians.<sup>66</sup>

Kāshāni took certain steps in order to make this unification a reality. He sent a delegation headed by Hujjat al-Islam Muḥammad Taqi Qumi to the Islamic conference in Karachi. He personally led a pilgrimage to Mecca and discussed the matter with some prominent Saudi officials. However, Kāshāni did not receive a very enthusiastic response to his call, except for two aspects of his economic proposals presented to the above mentioned conference, which were accepted by the Muslim countries attending, i.e.:

- 1) prohibition of female and child labor, and
- 2) a common policy toward oil production.<sup>67</sup>

As a result of these proposals, Iran signed a mutual assistance treaty with Iraq and a similar one with Jordan. However, during the early 1950s Kāshāni lost his chance for a universal Muslim alliance due to the emergence of nationalist movements in Asia and the Middle East. Nationalism for Kāshāni meant nothing more than unity and solidarity among Muslims, and as well as anti-imperialism.

The values of nationalism are secular and Islam as a rule rejects exclusively secular values. Nevertheless, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries alliances between religious and non-religious figures were formed against foreign influence (e.g. the Tobacco

Movement) and dictatorship (e.g. the Constitutional Revolution); in all instances, Shiism coexisted with nationalism.

Kashani believed that devotion to Islam and to the nation of Iran could coexist in the same individual. His nationalism had a Shiite structure and a high degree of patriotism. In order to preserve national unity among Iranians, Kāshāni tried to find a way to reconcile the differences among various ideological groups and parties. He saw this as necessary in order to protect Iran from European exploitation and domination over the political and economic affairs of Iran and all Muslim states.

Kāshāni viewed Islam as compatible with progress, knowledge and reform. He had a positive attitude towards modernization, as well as toward certain aspects of western institutions and technological innovations. In his view, the values that were most necessary in life were: activism, the search for knowledge and progress, political independence and military strength. However he emphasized that these values should be sought and could be found within the Shiite framework. He believed that Islam and Shiism could be transformed into a political ideology and that this ideology should be in harmony with the socio-political and economic needs of Islamic society and the international environment.<sup>68</sup>

#### Dr. Muṣaddiq: Return to Politics

As was mentioned before, during the years 1926-1941 Muṣaddiq spent the life of an exile in his home village, occupying himself with agriculture, medicine, carpentry and

private studies. The Allied occupation of 1941 however resulted in Muṣaddiq's return to politics. The years of exile had contributed to his popularity. This fact can be seen in his election to the 14th parliament (1944-1946) as Tehran's first deputy.

Muṣaddiq expressed his opposition to pro-British politicians in a speech delivered to the Majlis in November 1941. He began by attacking the 1921 British-supported *coup*, saying: "Reliance on foreign force revolting against people and drawing sword on fellow country men and insulting them and imprisoning them are not considered as patriotism and liberation." It was also in this speech that he challenged Sayyed Ṣayyā's right to hold a seat in parliament, based on section 10 of article 12 of the Constitution, which read: "State criminals who have revolted and taken steps against the foundation of democracy (*Hukumat-i Milli*) and independence of the country are not allowed to be elected."

In the same speech to the 14th parliament Muṣaddiq called Reṣā Shah a dictator and criticized his efforts at modernization and reform:

The Dictator wasted our money, built railways, spent 20 years providing accommodation for Allied transportation, destroyed our beliefs, our faith and our notable politicians, confiscated people's properties and lands, promoted corruption, reinterpreted article 82 of the Constitution, weakened and undermined the judges, enacted tyrannical laws in order to extend his power, considered quantity more important than quality and therefore increased only the number of the schools resulting in a decrease in the level and quality of education and knowledge, and sent a caravan of knowledge to Europe only to later weaken and destroy the best of them. What would have happened if the removal of the *Hijab* had been a choice instead of forced. What would have happened if the streets were not paved? What would have happened if buildings and hotels were not built? I would prefer to walk on soil than see my country occupied by others (foreigners). To possess a house is better than having a city ruled by strangers. A dictator is like a father who would seclude his son

from action and work and would leave an inexperienced son after himself. No nation has achieved success under dictatorship.<sup>69</sup>

Muṣaddiq campaigned against the Millspaugh mission of 1943-1945, indicating his strong belief in the ability of Iranians to administer their own affairs. The following is his statement to the 14th parliament: "There are experienced, educated and expert civil officials in the Ministry of Finance and there are Iranian engineers in the Ministry of Employment and Art who are better than them (Millspaugh's mission) and incomparably so."<sup>70</sup>

Muṣaddiq was opposed to granting oil concessions of any kind to foreigners. He considered such a policy as detrimental to national sovereignty, promoting instead a foreign policy of "negative equilibrium". In Muṣaddiq's view, this meant a foreign policy in the best interest of the country. Conversely, a "positive equilibrium" in foreign policy is one that operates in the interests of foreign countries.

Muṣaddiq also believed that "negative equilibrium" in domestic affairs was a policy which could provide the possibility for free elections. Negative equilibrium in this sphere does not allow any government to bring its supporters into the parliament, and would result in no interference in elections, amendments to the electoral law, and real representatives of the people sitting in parliament.<sup>71</sup>

In 1947 the elections for the 15th parliament got under way. The Democratic Party led by Qavam al-Saltāneh stage-managed the election. Muṣaddiq wrote open letters to the Shāh, to Qavam and to the newspapers. He took sanctuary in the royal palace with several

others asking for free elections; however Qavām paid no attention and continued his interference, with the result that Muşaddiq was not elected to the 15th parliament. Meanwhile the Qavam-Sadchikov oil agreement of 1946 was rejected by the parliament. A law was also passed which allowed the government to redeem the rights of the nation in its southern oil resources. This was the beginning of the oil dispute and also an invitation for Muşaddiq to return once again to politics. This matter will be covered in detail in the following chapter.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> Some of these movements were: Tangestani movement in Fars (Suppressed 15 July 1921); the Kurdish uprising in Azarbayjan (suppressed 22 August 1921); up-rising in Mazandaran (quelled August 1921); uprising in Mashhad (suppressed September 1921); and the Jangali and Mirza kuchik Khān movements (suppressed in November 1921). See Said Nafisi, Tārikh-i Mu'asir-i Iran, Reza Shāh, (Tehran: Furughi, 1345/ 1966), pp.10.
- <sup>2</sup> Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolutions, pp.135-136.
- <sup>3</sup> Hossein Amirsadeghi, Twentieth Century Iran, (London: Heinemann, 1977), p.33.
- <sup>4</sup> Said Nafisi, Tārikh-i Mu'asir, pp. 9-10. Also see; Hossein Amirsadeghi, Twentieth, pp.63-64.
- <sup>5</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p. 136.
- <sup>6</sup> Ibid., p.137.
- <sup>7</sup> Ibid., pp.137-138.
- <sup>8</sup> Muḥammad Vali Khān Sepahsālār, was the hero of the Liberal -Nationalist victory over Muḥammad A'li Shāh Qajar "Black Despotism".
- <sup>9</sup> Amin Banani, The Modernization of Iran 1921-1941, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), pp.31-35.
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., p.38.
- <sup>11</sup> Makki, Tārikh-i Bistsaleh, vol. 2, p.334.
- <sup>12</sup> Hamid Algar, in Nikki Keddie, "The oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth-Century of Iran," in Scholars, Saints and Sufis, Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle east since 1500, ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley: University of California, 1972), p.236.
- <sup>13</sup> English translation available in: Donald Wilber, Reza Shāh, p.79.
- <sup>14</sup> Faghfoory, "The role of the Ulama", p.65.
- <sup>15</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Mu'asir-i, vol. 2, p.41.

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- <sup>16</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," pp.70-71.
- <sup>17</sup> For more information concerning Safavids and Shiism see: Michael Mazzaoui, Shi'ism And the Origins of the Safavid State, (Wiesbaden: Sheiner, 1972); see also Ann K. Lambton, "A Reconsideration of the position of Marj'-e Taqlid and the Religious Institutions" in Studia Islamica, vol. 20, (1964), pp.115.
- <sup>18</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama", pp.76-77; see also: Avery, Modern, Vol. 2, pp.45-48; and Banani, Modernization, pp. 85-111.
- <sup>19</sup> Aḥmad Kasravi, Tārikh-i Mashrutiyyat-e Iran, (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1961), p 21.
- <sup>20</sup> 'Eisa Ṣadiq, Tārikh-i Farhang-i Iran, (Tehran: Dehkhoda, 1310), pp.472-473.
- <sup>21</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.144-145.
- <sup>22</sup> Homayoun Katouzian, Iqtisad-i Siyāsi-ye Iran, Trans. Muḥammad Reza Nafisi and Kambiz Azizi, (Tehran: Markaz, 1993), p.152-155.
- <sup>23</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama", pp.19-25.
- <sup>24</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolution pp.145-146.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.147.
- <sup>26</sup> Katouzian, Iqtisad-i Siyāsi, pp.152-155; see also: Abrahamian, Iran Between Two, pp.149-155.
- <sup>27</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Iran, vol.2, p.71.
- <sup>28</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama", p.79.
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., pp.21-23
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.23; and Amin Banani, Modernization, p.68.
- <sup>31</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Iran, pp.195-200; see also, Martin, Islam and, p.41.
- <sup>32</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Iran, vol. 2, p.67.
- <sup>33</sup> Aḥmad Matin Daftari, Acin-i Dadrasi-ye Madani va Bazargani, (Tehran: Deh-Khoda, n.d.), p.4.



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- <sup>34</sup> Article Two of the Constitution stipulates that laws should not be contrary to Islamic Sharia.
- <sup>35</sup> Banani, *Modernization*, pp.69-71; see also Matin Daftari, *Acin-i*, p.10-15.
- <sup>36</sup> Makki, *Tārikh-i Bist Sāleh-i Iran*, vol. 3, pp.285-288.
- <sup>37</sup> Abrahamian, *Iran Between*, p.138. For more information on Mudarri see: Forough Jahanbakhsh, "Sayyid Hasan Mudarris 1870-1938", M.A. Thesis (Montreal: McGill University, 1989)."
- <sup>38</sup> Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power*, p.25.
- <sup>39</sup> Husain Makki, *Doktor Musaddiq va notqha-ye Tārikhī-ye U*, (Tehran: Ilmii, 1985), pp.140-141.
- <sup>40</sup> Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle for Power*, p.28.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., p.28. and; Makki, *Tārikh-i Bist*, vol. 3, pp.406-412.
- <sup>42</sup> 'Alī Akbar Davar was minister of Justice during Reżā Shah's reign. He studied law in Switzerland. He believed that Reżā Shāh was the man who could solve Iran's problems. When he found out that the Shāh was going to arrest him and he would have the same fate as the rest of the Shāh's early supporters, he committed suicide.
- <sup>43</sup> Makki, *Tārikh-i Bist*, pp. 406-412; see also Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Stuggle for Power*, pp.28-29.
- <sup>44</sup> Ibid., pp.343-346.
- <sup>45</sup> Katouzian, *Musaddiq and the Struggle*, p.30.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., pp.33-34; see also Gholam Husain Musaddiq, *Dar Kinār*, pp.47-60.
- <sup>47</sup> Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni, *Majmu'e-ei az Maktubat va Payamhay-ye Āyatullāh Kāshāni*, ed. M. Dehnavi (Tehran: Ashina, 1982), vol. 1, p.3.
- <sup>48</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," p.137.
- <sup>49</sup> Dehnavi, *Majmu'e*, pp.5-7.
- <sup>50</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role Of Ulama," pp. 137-138.

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- <sup>51</sup> Haṣan Arfa' Under Five Shah, (London: 1970), p.361.
- <sup>52</sup> Faghfoory, "The rule of Ulama," pp.138-141. Haj-Amin Al-Husaini, Mufti of Jerusalem, He was charged by the British for cooperation with German. Rashid 'Alī al-Gilani, leader of the Shiit in Iraq.
- <sup>53</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Mu'asir, vol. 2, pp.143-146.
- <sup>54</sup> Wilfrid Knapp, "1921-1941: The Period of Reza Shah" in Twentieth Century Iran, ed. Hossein Amirsadeghi, (London: 1978), p.31.
- <sup>55</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Mu'asir, vol. 2, pp.147-149.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., pp.191-194.
- <sup>57</sup> Ibid., pp.107.
- <sup>58</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between two revolutions, pp.154-162.
- <sup>59</sup> Javad Ṣadiq, Milliyat Va Inqilāb dar Iran, (New York: Fanus 1352/1973), pp.21-23. For more information on the Tudeh party see: Jalal al-din Madani, Tarikh-i Siyasi-ye Mu'asir-i Iran, (Tehran: Islami, n.d.), vol. 1, pp. 299-302; see also: Iraj Eskandari, Khātirāt-I Siyāsī (Tehran: Ilmi, 1368/1989)
- <sup>60</sup> Kay-Ostovan, Husain Siyāsāt-i Muvazineh-i Manfi Dar Majlis-i Chahardahum, (Tehran: Intisharati-i Muṣaddiq, 1951), vol.2, pp.147-149.
- <sup>61</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions, pp.281-305. In October 1946, the Democratic Party of Azarbāyjan was formed by Sayyid Ja'far Pishchvari. This party was supported by the Soviets and the Tudeh Party branch in Azarbāyjan. This party declared its goals as: (1) To establish an autonomous Azarbāyjan, (2) to establish an autonomous government and ministries, (3) to Replace the Persian language with the Turkish as the official language, (4) to distribute cultivated lands among farmers, and (5) to abolition illiteracy.
- <sup>62</sup> Avery, Tārikh-i Mu'asir, pp.267-303.
- <sup>63</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," pp.164-196. For more on Feda'ian see Feda'ian-i Islam, Rahnamā-ye Haqiqat, (Tehran: n.o. 1950).

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<sup>64</sup> For more information concerning Ayatullah Burujirdi, see Aqiq Bakhshayeshi, Ten decades of Ulama's Struggle, (Tehran: Islamic Propagation Organization, 1985 ), pp. 181-191; also H.Algar. "The Oppositional Role of Ulama," pp.242-243.

<sup>65</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," pp.147.

<sup>66</sup> Kashani, Majmu'eh, pp.41-45.

<sup>67</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," pp.147-150.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp.155-161.

<sup>69</sup> Kay-Ostova, Siyasat-i Muvazineh-i Manfi Dar, vol. 1, pp.24-84.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., pp.89-97.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp.170-182.

## CHAPTER IV

### Iran 1947-1953

The 14th Majlis came to an end on 12 March 1946. Qavām al-Saltāneh, supported by the shah, stage-managed the election for the 15th Majlis. Muḥammad Reza Shah formally opened the 15th Majlis on 15 July 1947. This chapter covers in brief such events as the Qavām- Sadchikov Agreement, Gass-Gulshahriyan Agreement, the attempted assassination of the shah and the assassinations of prime ministers Razmara and Hāzhir, all of which occurred during the period 1947-1950. These and other events created the grounds for the nationalization of the oil industry and the creation of the National Front which saw the return of Dr. Muṣaddiq to political life.

The period 1950-1952 saw the emergence of an alliance between Dr. Muṣaddiq as Prime Minister and Āyatullāh Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni, who served as leader of the Majlis during this time. Since the nationalization of the oil industry was the main reason for this alliance, this subject will be examined in detail.

Between 1952 and 1953 there was increasing tension between the two leaders. This was caused by many factors, among them Muṣaddiq's requests for emergency powers in August 1952 and January 1953, which created a final rupture between Dr. Muṣaddiq and Āyatullāh Kāshāni.

The coup d'état of 1953 resulted in the fall of Muṣaddiq's government and ended the era of free elections, freedom of speech and liberalism. It also reopened the period of Pahlavi despotism. Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddiq was arrested, court-martialed, incarcerated and exiled. Ayatullah Kashani, in spite of his separation from Dr. Muṣaddiq, was forced to abstain from political life and spent the rest of his life in his home in Tehran.

#### 1947-1950

The 15th Majlis began its session on 17 August 1947. In October of the same year, Prime Minister Qavām al-Saltāneh submitted the "Qavām-Sadchikov Agreement"<sup>1</sup> to the Majlis. This agreement granting the Soviets the oil concession in the north of Iran had been signed between Qavam al-Saltāneh and Sadchikov, the Soviet ambassador in Iran, on 3 December 1946. After several days of discussions, the 15th Majlis voted to reject the "Qavām-Sadchikov Agreement" by virtue of a law passed in the 14th Majlis forbidding any Iranian government to discuss or to sign any agreement concerning oil concessions. In addition an article (section E) was inserted into this law charging the Iranian government with the duty of asking the AIOC (Anglo-Iranian Oil Company) to settle what financial compensation was due to Iran. Section E reads as follows:

The government is bound in all cases where the rights of the Iranian nation have been violated in connection with its national resources, whether underground or otherwise, and particularly concerning the oil field of the south, to make necessary negotiations and take steps for demanding the settlement of these rights, and to inform Parliament of the results.<sup>2</sup>

The reaction to the article varied between the Iranians and the British. Most Iranians, especially in the media and the political parties, considered it an attempt to create an equilibrium in foreign policy by rejecting any concessions to the Soviets and by affirming damages suffered by Iran with respect to the oil concession in the south held by the British. However others, including the British, regarded this law as merely a tactical move.<sup>3</sup>

Qavām al-Salṭaneh asked the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to send representatives to Iran in order to settle section E; however the company did not respond. Because of his failure to execute section E and his conflicts with the shah, Qavām al-Salataneh's cabinet lost a vote of confidence in the parliamentary session of 9 December 1947, and resigned the following day. The new cabinet was presented to the majlis on 27th December 1947, with Ḥakīmī as Prime Minister.<sup>4</sup>

Ḥakīmī was likewise unable to reach any agreement with the AIOC and on 8 June 1948 a new cabinet this time headed by 'Abdul-Ḥusain Hazhir, was presented to the parliament and obtained a vote of confidence.

Hazhir commenced negotiations with the AIOC and finally, on 17 July 1949, a new supplementary agreement was signed by Gulshāhīyān, the Minister of Finance and Mr. Gass, the representative of AIOC.

The Gass-Gulshahīyan Agreement met with opposition in the Majlis, and debates and discussions continued amongst the Majlis deputies until the term of the 15th parliament expired on 7 August 1949. Immediately afterwards, elections for the 16th Majlis underway<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile an attempt on the Shāh's life occurred on 4 February 1949 at Tehran University. The Fedāe'īan Islam and the Tudeh party were accused of being involved in the attempt. The two organizations were as a result banned by the shah, and Āyatullāh Kāshāni, having lost the support of the Ulama, was exiled to Lebanon for being affiliated with the Fedāe'īān Islam.<sup>6</sup>

The majority of the Iranian ulama were concerned with strengthening Shi'i institutions. Therefore, following the attempt on the shah's life, many prominent āyatullāhs, such as Fayz of Qum, Muḥammad Bihbahānī of Tehran and 'Abdul-Karīm Zanjānī of Najaf, sent telegrams and messages to the Shāh expressing their regrets. Āyatullāh Muḥammad Ḥusain Burujirdī, the leader of the ulama from 1946 to 1961, sent the following message: "May God Almighty preserve [your] kingdom." However, a more powerful reaction came from Ayatullāh Hibat al- Din al-Shahristānī of Najaf, who wrote: "a curse on every abominable criminal who makes an attempt against this crown, this throne and this young Shāh."

Two weeks later a conference convened in Qum. Two thousand clergy of every rank participated in the conference and agreed on a very important resolution forbidding clergy from participating in or joining political parties, or otherwise engaging in politics.<sup>7</sup>

The attempted assassination resulted in the suppression of the opposition on the one hand, and provided, on the other an opportunity for the shah and his followers to convene a Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly modified the constitution and granted the Shāh the right to dissolve parliament, established a new Senate (Sena) consisting of 60 representatives (30 chosen by the Shah and 30 elected by the people), and returned state-owned lands to the royal court.

The monarchy thereby regained almost as much power as it had had under Reza Shāh. The situation as it stood encouraged the shah and his supporters to interfere in the elections for the 16th Majlis.<sup>8</sup>

However this situation was deceptive, and vocal opponents were not ready to give up their goal of free elections. Moreover, the shah had also lost popularity amongst the people, and this for two reasons: one was for refusing to challenge Britain on the oil issue, and the second for his pro-American stance in depending on the US for economic aid to start the "Seven Year Plan." The shah decided to go to the United States and submit his demands personally; however a few days before his trip, Dr. Muṣaddiq led a crowd of politicians, students and bazaar merchants into the royal palace, protesting the lack of free elections. Muṣaddiq had learned that the elections for the 16th Majlis and the First Senate, which had gotten underway in the fall of 1949, were being manipulated by Hāzhir, the Court Minister, and Razmārā, the head of the army, in such a way as to prevent the election of Muṣaddiq and other vocal opposition deputies. The crowd elected a committee of twenty people,



headed by Dr. Muşaddiq, to negotiate with the shah. This committee later became the nucleus of the National Front.<sup>9</sup>

### The First National Front

Dr. Muşaddiq's aim in taking sanctuary in the royal palace was to force the court publicly to respect the cause of the constitution. The twenty bastis spent two days in the palace and later decided to intensify their protest by going on a hunger strike. Meanwhile, Hazhir tried in vain to win the support of the British Embassy in order to arrest the protesters. The shah refused to observe the protesters' demands; consequently, Muşaddiq decided to take the protest to the public. They left the palace and went directly to Muşaddiq's home, where they formed a front (jibheh) to fight with the government for the nation (millat), calling it therefore the National Front (Jibheh-ye Millî). The National Front was not a party. It was rather an umbrella organization with two goals: abolition of the internal dictatorship and elimination of foreign control and influence over Iranian affairs. The organization was open to any individual, party or group that espoused either of these two goals.<sup>10</sup>

The founders of the National Front came from three different backgrounds. The first group consisted of prominent anti-court politicians such as: Amîr Alaei who was an aristocratic lawyer and had previously participated in Qavām al-Saltāneh's government; Muḥammad Rāmīn, an independent senior civil servant who had also served in Qavām al-

Salṭaneh's cabinet; and Mushīr ʿAzam, a veteran politician and an old and good friend of Muṣaddiq whom Reṣā Shāh had forced out of politics in 1927.

The second group were the bazaar-connected politicians such as: Sayyed ʿAbdul-Ḥusain Hāerizādeh, who was a close ally of Ayatullāh Kashani from the 1925 anti-republican campaign; Muzzafar Baqāʾī, a European-educated lawyer from the conservative bazaar family of Kirmān; and Ḥusain Makki, a government employee from a bazaar family in Yazd, and author of the anti-Pahlavi book, *Tārīkh-i Bīst Sāl-e Iran* (Twenty-Year History of Iran). Makki, Baqai and Hāerizādeh had been elected to the 15th Majlis and were affiliated with the Democratic party of Qavām al-Salṭaneh.<sup>11</sup> However they left that party and formed a minority opposition group. Makki asked Dr. Muṣaddiq, who was not a parliamentary deputy at the time, to lead their campaign against the Gass-Gulshahīyan Agreement. Dr. Muṣaddiq agreed and sent a letter to Makki, from which the latter quoted at the beginning of his Majlis speech opposing the agreement.<sup>12</sup>

The third group, and perhaps the most important one in the National Front Committee, consisted of a number of young and Western-educated intelligentsia, among them Dr. ʿAlī Shāyḡān, dean of the Faculty of Law at the University of Tehran and Qavam al-Salṭaneh's minister of education in 1946; Dr. Karīm Sanjābī and Aḥmad Zarrīnkūb, two leaders of the Iran party (Ḥizb-i Iran); Aḥmad Razavī, a French-educated engineer from a very wealthy family and supporter of the Tudeh party and also the radical wing of the

Democratic party; and Dr. Husain Fātemī, a French-educated journalist who later became the main martyr of the National Front.<sup>13</sup>

The Committee elected Muşaddiq as the Front's chairman and also appointed an organizational committee to prepare a program and a charter. The Committee then made its first public declaration, putting forward three demands: free and honest elections; the lifting of martial law in order to limit the government's arbitrary authority over the opposition; and freedom of the press. A few months later, the organizational committee presented the Front's program. This program consisted of: the establishment of social justice and the implementation of constitutional laws; free elections, and hence amendment of the electoral laws in order to have a true representative government; freedom of the press and of expression of political opinions, which likewise required changes to the laws concerning the press; amendment of the martial law; and improvements in economic conditions which opened a window to the nationalization of the oil industry.

The National Front charter (manshūr-i Jibhe-ye Millī) established a central council (Shawṛāy-e Markazī) and invited organizations such as newspaper editorial boards, student unions, professional associations and political parties to join the National Front. Dr. Muşaddiq always insisted that Iran needed a general coalition of different organizations sharing a common belief. In Muşaddiq's eyes, a party with a series of elaborate programs, sharply defined goals and strict party discipline members could not fulfill the needs and

demands of the whole nation. His aim was to speak on behalf of the entire nation and not necessarily a single political group or party.<sup>14</sup>

In the months following its formation, four organizations joined the National Front, lending strong support to Muṣaddiq. These organizations were: The Iran Party; the Toilers' Party (Ḥizb-i Zahmatkishān); the National Party of Iran (Ḥizb-i Millī-ye Iran); and the society of the Muslim Warriors (Jāmi'eh- ye Mujāhidīn-i Musalmān).

The Iran party had grown out of an organization called the Iran Engineers Association. This Association had been established in 1942 with the initial purpose of gathering young and foreign-educated intellectuals and of breaking down traditional obstacles in order to achieve better jobs and positions for their members. The Engineers Association changed its name to the Iran party in order to recruit more members and also broaden its programs. It believed in social justice and in the need to redistribute the land owned by the aristocrats and big land owners amongst farmers, in order to establish a "just society" To establish this "just society" the members of the Iran party believed in the elimination of the conflict between rich and poor in order to form a uniform middle-class society. It also called for complete equality among citizens and full rights for women and minorities. The Iran party believed in the gradual social transformation of society into a democratic nation with respect for the integrity of Iran and its constitution. In this respect the party was closer to the Fabian Society<sup>15</sup> than it was to Marxist socialism. This however did not prevent the Iran party from entering into a coalition with the Tudeh party in 1946.

This move resulted in a minor split among the party's members. Two years later, the separatist movement in Āzarbāyjān caused a rupture in the coalition, with the result that the Iran Party split from the Tudeh Party; the events in Āzarbāyjān had made the Iran Party members realize the strength of their nationalist and religious beliefs. After their split from the Tudeh Party, they came to be known as God-loving socialists (*sushālisthā-ye Khudāparast*).<sup>16</sup> Due to the beliefs of its members in nationalism, the constitution and social justice, the Iran Party joined the Front in 1949, and supported Dr. Muṣaddiq in his battle to nationalize the oil industry and later echoed Muṣaddiq's slogan "The Nation Must Rule, The Shāh Must Reign."

The Toilers' party (*Hizb-i Zahmatkishān*), was founded by Baqai, a former Democrat and Khalil Maliki, a Marxist intellectual and a former member of the Tudeh party. The Toilers' party was anti-Communist yet socialist. Its members believed in true constitutional monarchy, the elimination of upper class privileges and class differences between employers and employees, support for small industries, and national independence from all kinds of imperialism, including Russian imperialism. The party gained the support of the labor unions, especially the oil workers. Through Baqāi's ties with the bazaar, the Toilers' Party connected itself with some of the merchant guilds. Mālikī on the other hand brought many university students and some civil servants to the party. Moreover the party obtained the support of a street organizer named Sha'bān Jafarī, known also as Sha'bān Bī-Mukh (brainless). He was feared by his opponents as a cut-throat (*chāqū-kish*), and admired by his followers as a *lūji*, (a folk religious preacher) and an athlete (*varzishkār*).

The National Party of Iran (Hizb-i Millat-i Iran), was founded by Dāriyūsh Furūhar, a young law student and the son of an army officer. His father was arrested by the British during the allied occupation on suspicion of having German contacts. Furūhar started his political activities as early as 1943. He became a Muṣaddiq supporter in 1944 and mobilized many demonstrations in high-schools for Dr. Muṣaddiq. He formed the National Party of Iran which was anti court, anti-Communist, anti-capitalist, anti-Semitic and anticlerical. The party proposed that the nation regain the “lost properties” of Bahrain, Afghanistan and the Caucasus in order to rebuild Iran. The party claimed that the “pure Iranian Race” was being threatened by Soviet communism, British capitalism and Arab and Turkish expansionism. Furuhar believed that Iran's backwardness was caused by foreign powers, “reactionary mullas”, “exploitive landlords”, and religious minorities like Jews and Bahāis.<sup>17</sup> The members of the National party consisted of a few hundred high-school students. The National party did not have much influence in the National Front; however Furuhar remained in the National Front after the fall of Muṣaddiq until the Islamic Revolution of 1977-1979.<sup>18</sup>

The Society of Muslim warriors (Jāmi‘eh-ye Mujāhidīn-i Musalmān) was not a political party but rather a group led by Āyatullāh Kāshāni and his family and a powerful preacher named Shams al-Dīn Qanātābādī. This society was anti-Western, and in that sense, nationalist; however it was also an anti-secularist organization and a religious one, although not dogmatically fundamentalist. This society was supported by the wealthy and religious bazaar merchants, shopkeepers and seminary students (ṭullāb). It supported the National

Front and Dr. Muşaddiq as long as its leader Ayatullah Kashani did so. They mobilized a large demonstration which played a very important role in the nationalization of the oil industry, and by not supporting Muşaddiq during the *coup* became a vital element in the fall of the nationalist government and the return of Pahlavi despotism.

According to Ervand Abrahamian the National Front represented two divergent middle-classes: the traditional middle-class consisting of the small merchants of the bazaar, i.e. elder guild members and clerics who had been educated by the clergy in the maktab and who believed that Islam was a way of life and the shari'ah the legitimate law and the modern middle-class, whose members were graduates of modern schools and believed that religion was a private matter, that the Napoleonic Code was a suitable basis for civil law and that the Western-educated intelligentsia were the best qualified organizers and modernizers of society. Abrahamian also mentions that three major reasons drew these divergent forces together within the National Front. These reasons were: the struggle against the court-military complex; the struggle against the British-owned oil company; and the political principles and charismatic personality of Dr. Muşaddiq. They found Muşaddiq to be a true patriot, an anti-imperialist who consistently opposed foreign concessions, a vocal opposition leader, an outspoken parliamentarian who opposed the 1921 coup d'etat, and a rare aristocrat who lived in his own village and treated his peasants well.<sup>19</sup>

The Front's formation was announced on 23 October 1949 and on the same day the Tudeh Party's secret newspaper described the Front's leaders as agents of imperialism as well

as of the royal court. The Front immediately organized a campaign to supervise the election so that the ballot boxes would not be replaced. The Sepahsalar Mosque was the central polling station in Tehran. According to Husain Makki, the police and the *jandārmeri* invaded the mosque in order to change the ballot boxes and succeeded in doing so despite Makki's and Narimān's efforts.<sup>20</sup> A few days after this incident 'Abdul-Husain Hazhir, then prime minister, was assassinated in the Sepahsālār Mosque by a Fedā'iyan Islam member. Although the Front had no knowledge of or involvement with Hazhir's assassination, the regime used the occasion to take measures against the Front, by arresting people like Makki, Baqai and Hāerizādeh. Dr. Muṣaddiq was for his part banished to his village of Aḥmadabad.

Meanwhile the US State Department was observing the election in Iran closely. Few days after Hazhir's assassination, four American senators visited Tehran. Their visit was followed by the annulment of the election, the dismissal of Saffari, the chief of police, and his replacement by General Zāhidī. Three days later, George McGhee, the young and liberal American under-secretary of State, visited Tehran and obtained the release of the detainees. New elections got under way and this time Muṣaddiq, Makki, Baqā'i, Nariman, Haerizadeh and Shaygan were elected to the 16th Majlis.<sup>21</sup> Āyatullāh Kāshāni who was on the Front's list and was in exile in Lebanon, was elected in absentia. The National Front and some prominent ayatullahs put pressure on the shah to lift the sentence of exile that had been placed on Āyatullāh Kāshāni. The request was granted and the āyatullāh returned to Iran, where he was welcomed by the National Front, various ayatullahs from Qum, many people from the bazaar and the *ṭullāb* (seminary students).<sup>22</sup>



## The Sixteenth Majlis and the Nationalization of the Oil Industry

The 16th Majlis began sitting in February 1950. It consisted of 131 deputies, 85 percent of whom were landlords, wealthy merchants and senior civil servants. Politically this Majlis was divided into four groups: a small delegation of the National Front; a pro-British group; forty independent notables, among them Abul-Qāsim Amīnī, Khosrow Qashqāī and Naṣīr Zolfaqārī; and a majority of royalist deputies. The first Sena was packed as well with veteran royalists like Isfandīārī, Matīndaftārī, and some prominent politicians such as Taqizādeh, Ḥakīmī, Malikzādeh, Farrukh and ‘Abbās Mas‘ūdī who supported the shah despite their previous opposition. Prime Minister Sā‘ed’s cabinet however was quickly deposed by the Majlis and ‘Alī Maṣṣūr (Reżā Shāh’s Prime Minister) in turn gained the support of Parliament, introducing a cabinet which for the first time excluded all groups except far trusted royalists. The National Front, although small in number, was extremely vocal. The leader of the Front, Dr. Muḥammad Muṣaddīq expressed strong opposition to Mansur’s cabinet and warned the deputies of the fact that the court was strengthening its power and influence to an extent that was contrary to the constitution. He attacked the Constituent Assembly, calling it fake and illegitimate. He argued that since Iran was not under threat from any foreign power, that the military budget should be cut. His speech of 20 June 1950 to the Majlis deputies reads in part:

The Constituent Assembly was fake and illegitimate. Fake because it did not represent the people, illegitimate because it altered the constitutional law. In saying this I do not claim that the constitution is sacred and beyond any improvements. But I do claim that changes can be made only by the true representatives of the people. I would like to take this opportunity to reveal to the public the advice I gave the young shah in August 1941, when I was freed from political confinement. I advised him not

to identify too closely with his father, since his father had made many enemies. I also advised him to follow the example of the British monarchy. The king of England is highly respected because he stands outside politics and avoids the dirty business of appointing and dismissing ministers, deputies, and governors. Moreover, Britain owes its greatness to its political system which nourishes capable statesmen as well as patriotic, self-sacrificing, and conscientious citizens. A country that lacks capable statesmen and patriotic citizens lacks everything. This is my main reason for opposing personal dictatorships. The country belongs to the people and the people have the inalienable right to choose their representatives. If they do not exercise that right, a small minority can gain control and work not for the interests of the majority but for its own selfish profit. The shah must stand above politics but remain in touch with the needs and feeling of the people. If the people wish to change the constitution, they have the right to do so-after all, the constitution belongs to them. But the recent changes in the constitution are illegitimate since they contradict the true wishes of the people.<sup>23</sup>

Meanwhile Āyatullāh Kāshāni, who had been elected to the Majlis but had never attended any sessions due to illness, received reports on the parliamentary proceedings from Dr. Muṣaddiq, and was inspired to send a message of protest to the Majlis:

....foreigners and their elements were aware of the devotion of the Millat-i Iran (Iranian Nation) to the constitutional law and to my beliefs. They planned to bring changes to the constitutional law in order to protect their treacherous purposes. They were aware that with my presence in Iran they would be unsuccessful in their attempt to change the constitution by a fake majlis which was hated by the spirit of the Millat-i Iran and was adored by the enemies of the country and the nation. Therefore they exiled me to Lebanon. ..a nation that has willingly spilled its own blood to obtain the constitution will never again fall victim to dictators and despots. ....Everyone knows that the Constituent Assembly, lacking the virtues of free elections and came to power by force and by the spear , is not valid and has no effect.<sup>24</sup>

The other deputies, such as Āzād, Ṣālih, Makki, and Hāerizādeh also bombarded the Parliament with their protests. Hāerizādeh stated "the failure to implement true justice,

social equality, and Islamic laws instigated one class against another, workers against industrialists, peasants against landlords, and intellectuals against religious leaders.”<sup>25</sup>

Meanwhile the government submitted to the Majlis proposals for revising the 1933 Oil Agreement. This shifted the focus of the Front from internal to external affairs. The Front denounced the Oil Agreement and called the proposal a sell-out, demanding the nationalization of the oil company. However before beginning our discussion of the nationalization of the oil industry, it is of great importance to bring forward the historical and economic background of oil as a natural resource in Iran.

#### The Issue of Oil and Its Nationalization

On 28 May 1901, the government of Muẓaffar al-Dīn Shāh granted an oil concession to a British citizen by the name of William Knox D'Arcy covering an area of 480,000 square miles, i.e. the whole of Iran except for five northern provinces. In return, and in accordance with article 10 of the agreement, D'Arcy agreed to pay the Iranian government 20,000 pounds sterling in cash, plus 20,000 pounds in paid-up shares of the first company founded and 16% on the company's net annual profits. D'Arcy also obtained the exclusive privilege to search, obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and oxokerite throughout Iran for a period of sixty years (article I).

The first exploration company was formed in London with a capital of 600,000 pounds. The first productive field was discovered in May 1908 in Masjid-i Sulaymān. On 28

May 1909 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was registered in London and all rights, obligations and articles of the D'Arcy concession were transferred to this company. Production started in 1912 and by 1914, 30 oil-wells had been erected in Masjid-i Sulayman. Meanwhile the APOC signed some agreements with the Bakhtiari tribe and Sheikh Khazal the leader of the Arab tribes in Khūzistān in order to provide security for the exploration teams in the lands occupied by these tribes. The central government of Iran was not informed of these agreements.<sup>26</sup> However by 1927, the APOC had ceased paying these tribes subsequent to their defeat by Reza Shāh, although Sheikh Khazal was militarily supported by the British during his campaign for an autonomous state. This created the impression in the country that APOC was being used by the British government to control Iran's external and internal affairs.<sup>27</sup> One scholar, Ronald W. Ferrier, believes that APOC was not instrumental in Britain's strategic interests.<sup>28</sup> However, according to Robert Graham: "The formation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) and the first production in 1912 was a major factor in the British Admiralty's decision to switch from coal to oil on the eve of the First World War."<sup>29</sup> In 1913 Winston Churchill acquired a 51% share of the company for the British government. Production subsequently increased from 90,000 tons in 1913 to 900,000 tons in 1918, and to 1,385,000 tons by 1920.<sup>30</sup>

After the war the government of Iran demanded that APOC pay the dividends owed for the country's shares, but the company refused to pay the 1,325,000 pounds due to Iran, claiming that damages amounting to 614,000 pounds had occurred to the pipelines during the war. The company declared that Iran was the sole responsible authority for providing

security for its oil facilities. The APOC also held the Iranian government financially responsible for the amount paid to the Bakhtiāris and to Sheikh Khazal for security purposes. Iran categorically rejected the APOC's claim and the dispute continued until Armitage Smith (treasurer in the British Government) was brought in as a financial consultant in 1919. Armitage Smith worked out a settlement which called for the company to pay 1,000,000 pounds to Iran, a figure to which both parties agreed. Although later elected governments in Iran did not find it fair, the company continued to operate under that agreement until 1933.

From 1927 to 1933 efforts were made by Taymūrtāsh (Reẓā Shāh's prime minister), Davar the minister of justice and Firuz the minister of external affairs to resolve the dispute between the company and the Iranian government. The negotiations were endless and in 1932 an angry Reẓā Shāh tore up the concession that had been granted to D'Arcy, thereby annulling it. The public celebrated this decision. Britain then took its case to the League of Nations. Davar represented Iran in that Forum. His representation however was ineffective, resulting the judgment going against Iran. A new agreement was subsequently arrived at in 1933 between Reẓā Shāh and Cadman, pending approval by Majlis and the Sena. According to this agreement the company's name was changed to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and the concession's period was extended a further 32 years. In return Iran obtained some marginal changes in royalties amounting to 4 shillings per ton and was able further to stipulate that benefits to Britain from the net income could not exceed 750,000 pounds and that AIOC should employ more Iranians.<sup>31</sup>

The 1933 Agreement was later passed by the Majlis; however the public was not informed of its provisions until 1941 when Reza Shāh abdicated. It was reported that Reza Shāh was not pleased with the extension of the concession, although he signed it.<sup>32</sup> Taqizādeh, who was the minister of finance at the time and was present during the signing, reported later to the 15th Majlis that Reza Shāh was angry about the conditions, saying: "this is impossible (prolongation of the concession). We cursed those responsible for the concession for forty years, and now you want us to be cursed by the people..." Reza Shah however went ahead and signed the agreement, although according to Taqizadeh he was in tears.

According to Colonel Ghulām-Reza Nijātī, the 1933 agreement, besides its economic and financial disadvantages, caused social and political upheaval in Iran. Colonel Nijati writes the following in his book entitled *Junbish-i Milli Shudan-i San'at-i Naft-i Iran, va Kuditā-yeh 28 murdād-i 1332*:

The destructive influence of the Oil Company and the British Intelligence Service shadowed the country. The Oil Company became a center for conspiracies, promotion of corruption and treachery in every affair and its elements influenced every basis of the country. In actual fact, the Oil Company was a power and a government inside the Iranian government, to the extent that the Iranians found the British responsible for every change in the country.<sup>33</sup>

The proposed changes which followed the 1933 agreement, suggested by Hazhir and known as the Gass-Gulshāhīyān Agreement, were refused by Parliament, and Razmara's effort to obtain a fifty-fifty share in profits was attacked by the National Front and Ayatullah Kāshāni. Dr. Mussadiq addressed a rally of 12,000 people in Tehran saying: "conflict will

not be resolved until the entire oil industry is nationalized.” Āyatullāh Kāshāni called upon all: sincere Muslims and patriotic citizens to fight against the enemies of Islam and Iran by joining the nationalization struggle.<sup>34</sup>

Meanwhile Prime Minister Razmārā was assassinated by Khalīl Ṭahmāsibī, a member of the Fedā’iyyān-i Islam on 7 March 1951 in Masjid-i Shāh, Tehran's central mosque. On 2 March 1951, Razmārā had addressed the Oil Commission on the benefits and advantages of the fifty-fifty agreement for the Iranian people and had made the following remarks: “Iranians are not capable or worthy of operating, exploiting and managing the oil industry.” He also claimed that, judges, engineers, economists and employees of the ministry of foreign affairs shared his opinions on this subject. Razmārā's speech was published in the newspapers and although it did not create any serious or immediate reaction, it caused a great deal of sorrow and left the people feeling humiliated and harboring a great hatred for him. Hence it was no surprise that his assassination was celebrated by the people and that many people and parties came under suspicion for having plotted it, such as the National Front, the Tudeh Party, Āyatullāh Kāshāni, and even the royal court and the Shāh who were very fearful of him. News of the assassination reached Dr. Muṣaddiq while he was in a confidential meeting with the Oil Commission. According to Ja'far Mehdī-Nīā, Muṣaddiq's reply to the news was: “he should not have made that speech nutq”; Haerizādeh's retort was: “the hell with it (be-darak), the answer to that speech was a bullet.” Āyatullāh Kāshāni was informed of the news by Navvāb Safavī (leader of the Fedā’iyyān-i Islam), while he was preparing himself for the prayer (namāz); he is reported to have looked up to the sky and

said "Praise God." Muḥammad Reẓā Shah heard the news from 'Alam, his court minister and an eyewitness to the scene. 'Alam's words were: "He is dead; they killed the dog." Mehdī -Nīā however believes that of all these suspects only Ayatullah Kashani was aware of and involved in the assassination. He bases his conclusion on two facts: firstly at a National Front meeting held at Dr. Muṣaddiq's house just prior to the event, the Ayatullah had expressed the following wish; "with God's help the windows of hope will be opened very soon." Second, in an interview with the press after the event Ayatullah Kashani referred to the assassination as a necessary measure and declared Khalil Ṭahmāsibī (the assassin) to be a savior of the Iranian nation.<sup>35</sup>

Further indications of Kāshāni's involvement may be seen in his answer to the Shāh, who had asked Kāshāni after the murder to discourage the Fedā'iyān from holding a rally and taking radical actions. The Āyatullāh replied: "I do not believe that the Fida'iyān have done anything but kill a mufsid fil-arz (a corrupted one on earth). The rally is already organized and I cannot cancel it. If the shah desires to be popular, he should support the people."<sup>36</sup>

There was general belief as well that Razmārā had engineered a plan to eliminate members of the opposition, Āyatullāh Kāshāni and the Shāh. He was said to have hired a group of ten professional assassins to fire upon the opposition at one of their rallies and arrest and kill the Āyatullāh and then stage a coup against the Shah. This was never proven, although neither the army nor the police ever denied it.<sup>37</sup>



On 8 March 1951, one day after Razmārā's death, the Oil Commission approved the oil nationalization plan and submitted their decision to the Majlis, also demanding that the latter extend their assignment for two more months in order for them to draw up practical procedures for the nationalization. The 16th Majlis immediately approved their decision and their demand for an extension. Meanwhile in the Majlis, pro-British and royalist deputies fearful of public opinion held three week-long closed meetings, finally agreeing to appoint 'Alā as prime minister and directing him to consult with Dr. Muṣaddiq and the Front in choosing his cabinet. Ḥusain 'Alā, with his anti-British reputation, brought Amīr 'Alāei, a National Front activist, into his cabinet and invited Āyatullāh Kāshāni back to Tehran in defiance of the Shah's orders.

The fears of the royalist and pro-British deputies turned into panic when the Tudeh Party held a public demonstrations against bad housing and low wages in the oil industry, and denounced the differences and discriminations that existed between the social classes. The shah, now fearful of a Communist takeover in Iran denounced class antagonisms and sought the solution in promoting religion and nationalism: two strong enemies of Communism. On national radio he appealed to the people saying: "These antagonisms poison our social attitude and political life. The best way to alleviate them is to apply the laws of Islam. If we live as true Muslims, class conflict will give way to class harmony and national unity."<sup>38</sup>

The oil workers nevertheless went on strike and stopped working in the refineries. Muşaddiq and Kāshani sent a joint telegram to the workers, expressing their sympathy with them and also inviting them to leave the matter with the National Front:

After receiving the telegraph sent by the striking Khūzistān workers, the National Front held a meeting in the presence of Āyatullāh Kāshāni and the meeting continued until 11 PM, and the following is our reply to you: Mr. Ahmadi, Mr. Muvvahidi and other respected representatives, your telegraph was received and the government immediately warned to take necessary steps to ensure the welfare of the strikers. Also according to your demands a panel was instructed to make inquiries. ...We expect you to respect patriotism as you have done already in order to avoid the conspiracies of foreigners, to respect the peace and to keep us informed as usual. Sayyed Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni, Muḥammad Muşaddiq.<sup>39</sup>

Āyatullāh Kāshāni also sent a personal message to the workers in which he encouraged them to break the strike:

During the last two hundred years, especially the last fifty years that the British have had a grip on our oil, Iran and Iranians under the burden and tyranny of foreigners have not seen a happy day yet. However, praise Allah the Exalted One, by the efforts of the nation (millat), the majlis shawra and the majlis sena (the two Parliaments) the bill for the nationalization of oil has been approved; however the implementation of the bill needs some time. Very soon though this matter will be resolved, the miseries of this unfortunate nation will end and the reign of independence, honor, peace, welfare, health and Medicare, education, social justice and everything sought by people will commence. My dear brothers the life of this company is ending soon. Do not fall for their trick and conspiracy. It is necessary and essential that you avoid any strike since that would please them and make us hopeless.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile Jamal Imāmī, a royalist and also pro-British, visited Muşaddiq in his home and invited Dr. Muşaddiq to accept the portfolio of Prime Minister. Muşaddiq refused since he found himself more useful as a member of the Majlis and of the oil committee. However, Muşaddiq was informed that the royalists and pro-British had already chosen

Sayyed Z̤iya-al-din Ṭabāṭabā'ī (involved in the British-engineered 1919 coup), as their candidate for the post, and that the visit by Jamal Imāmi, the speaker of the Majlis, was to reassure themselves of Muṣaddiq's refusal. The plan was to nominate Dr. Muṣaddiq officially to the premiership of the Majlis, and upon Muṣaddiq's refusal to give the portfolio to Sayyed Z̤iya-al-din Ṭabāṭabā'ī.

The plan was put in motion by Jamal Imāmi who called upon all the deputies to appoint Dr. Muṣaddiq to the premiership, praising him and emphasizing that Dr. Muṣaddiq was the sole person capable of implementing the nationalization of the oil industry. However the unexpected happened; Muṣaddiq, aware of the plan, accepted the portfolio and opened a new page in the history of Iranian democracy.<sup>41</sup>

Soon after, Jamal Imāmī would call Muṣaddiq a mob leader and a public menace, criticizing Muṣaddiq's appeal directly to the people instead of to their deputies. Muṣaddiq regarded the deputies as the appointees of people like Hazhir and other pro-British elements. Imāmī, his interests being threatened, attacked Muṣaddiq thus:

Statecraft has degenerated into street politics. It appears that this country has nothing better to do than hold street meetings. We now have meetings here, there and everywhere. Meetings for this, that and every occasion. Meetings for university students, high-school students, seven-year-olds, even six-year-olds. I am sick and tired of street meetings. Is our premier a statesman or a mob leader? What type of premier says "I will speak to the people" every time he is faced with a political question? I always considered this man to be unsuitable for high office. But I never imagined, even in my worst nightmares, that an old man of seventy would turn into a rabble rouser. A man who constantly surrounds the Majlis with thugs is nothing less than a public menace.<sup>42</sup>

Muṣaddiq's reply was "the Majlis is where the people are".<sup>43</sup> However he was aware that the early support of the parliamentary majority and the Shah would not last much longer, and bearing in mind the priority of nationalizing the oil industry as soon as possible, he decided to take steps in order to extend the duration of their support and that of the people until he could achieve his goal. He therefore tried to please his conservative critics by giving eight ministerial posts to members of the pro-Front traditional wing. Among them were Bāqir Kāzīmī, a religious statesman trusted by the ulama, and Mehdī Bāzargān the founder of the Islamic Society who was appointed as assistant minister of education. Muṣaddiq also appointed four royalists in order to please those deputies who made up the majority in the parliament. Muṣaddiq needed more than ever his devoted friends from the modern wing of the National Front in order to fortify his and the Front's positions in the Majlis. Other moves that were popular with the traditionalists were his decisions to outlaw the sale of alcoholic beverages, to ignore in his draft electoral law the right of women to vote, and to confirm the ulama's position in the supervisory councils.<sup>44</sup>

Muṣaddiq's conservative moves provoked the Fedā'iyans who also wanted to have a few representatives in the cabinet. They put pressure on Muṣaddiq to release Khalil Ṭahmāsibī, Razmārā's assassin. Āyatullāh Kāshāni, now a powerful ally of Muṣaddiq and highly respected by the Fedā'īyan, mediated the issue and explained the importance of nationalizing the oil industry to Navvāb Safavī, the leader of the Fedā'īyān, who publicly confirmed his support of Muṣaddiq as long as the Front continued its sacred and national struggle against the British. In his interview with the French newspaper *Paris Liberee*

Ayatullah Kāshāni expressed his support for Dr. Muṣaddiq's decision to keep the Front's deputies in the Majlis instead of having them in the cabinet, although he also mentioned that he would have preferred to have Dr. Muṣaddiq in parliament because of his ability in leading the deputies to protect the interests of Iranians. Kāshāni explained his position thus:

I did not like the idea of Dr. Muṣaddiq leaving the Majlis because Dr. Muṣaddiq had a great responsibility in administering and guiding the representatives of the Majlis in the direction which is in the best interests of our people. However since the country was in an exceptional situation Dr. Muṣaddiq's appointment to the office was supported by me as well and I have great hope that Dr. Muṣaddiq will be successful in the nationalization of Iran's oil industry.<sup>45</sup>

Shortly afterwards Dr. Muṣaddiq liberated twenty-eight followers of the Fida'iyan including Khalil Ṭahmāsibī the assassin of Razmārā.<sup>46</sup>

In the meantime Kāshāni started to mobilize support from different classes, professions and age-groups to fight against foreign influence in order to nationalize the oil industry. Having most of the bazaar merchants and some ulama and seminary students (tullāb) under his influence, he expanded his anti-British mission to the younger generation. In his message to the Iranian students in the universities and high-schools Kāshāni reminded them that they were defenders of the deprived people of Iran and that they must fight against the foreigners who had exploited those people for years. He also invited them to perform their national duties with bravery and honor.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile in the Majlis, Muṣaddiq continued his efforts at the nationalization of the oil industry by encouraging the deputies to appoint a committee to help the government to

implement the nationalization law. A committee of five deputies (including four Front activists) was formed and its members sent to Khūzistān in order to take over the oil company. In July 1951 the negotiations with the AIOC were completed and by September 1951 the oil company had closed down its refineries and evacuated its technicians. Meanwhile, the British government reinforced its naval forces in the Persian Gulf and brought a complaint against Iran to the United Nations Security Council. In October 1951, Muṣaddiq accompanied by a delegation of 15 ministers, Majlis deputies, interpreters, and newspaper editors, went to New York in order to present the Iranian case before the Security Council. His son, Dr. Ghulām Ḥusain Muṣaddiq, and his daughter, Mrs. Ziya (their expenses paid for by Dr. Muṣaddiq personally) escorted Muṣaddiq, since he had once again fallen ill. On arrival he was transferred to the Cornell Medical Center for observation, again at his own expense.

The inquiry into the British complaints began in the Security Council on 16 October 1951. First George C. McGee, Britain's representative to the United Nation, read the complaints and accused Iran of jeopardizing world peace. Muṣaddiq, as the representative of Iran replied to the complaints and accusations in French and provided the council with a historical background of the oil company and British interference in the political and economic affairs of Iran.<sup>48</sup> Dr. Muṣaddiq then went on to give a thorough account of the circumstances which had led to the nationalization of the oil industry and refuted Britain's accusations by continuously emphasizing the fact that oil nationalization was an internal affair between the Iranian people and the oil company only, and was not the concern of the

British government. He argued that the dispute should have been pursued within the Iranian legal system. The Iranian delegation was not present at the session held on 17 October when the decision of the Security Council was deferred pending a decision by the International Court in The Hague.<sup>49</sup>

Muṣaddiq had two official meetings with President Truman, and they reached an agreement respecting Iran's oil nationalization program; however the agreement was not accepted by the British government. Muṣaddiq then tried to seek financial assistance from the World Bank. The refusal of his application by the bank left Muṣaddiq with no other choice but to accuse the British of interfering in Iran's external and internal political affairs; in retaliation he closed down all British consulates in Iran.<sup>50</sup>

The Iranian delegation returned to Iran, but since Prime Minister Muṣaddiq had been officially invited by Naḥḥās Pāshā's government to visit Egypt, Dr. Muṣaddiq went there first and was warmly received by the Egyptians who were struggling to free themselves from British control.<sup>51</sup>

Muṣaddiq went back to Iran and turned his attention to the election for the 17th Majlis. Muṣaddiq tried to weaken the royalists and pro-British conservatives by modifying the 1944 bill for electoral reform in order to increase the number of representatives elected by the urban population, especially that of Tehran. The bill was contested by the opposition and was not passed. The National Front entered the election and this time they had to compete with conservative land-owners and tribal chiefs. Consequently the opposition had

the upper hand on the Front in most provinces and rural districts; however, the Front did win all twelve seats in Tehran. Muşaddiq, aware of the opposition's strength, stopped the election as soon as the minimum number of deputies required to form a parliamentary quorum had been elected. The term of the 16th parliament had come to an end in February 1952 and the 17th Majlis convened with 79 deputies on 27 April 1952, 30 of them belonging to or supporting the National Front, leaving 49 seats to royalists such as the Imam-i Jum'ah of Tehran, who became president of the Majlis, and to pro-British conservatives and landlords.<sup>52</sup>

Muşaddiq's opponents were aware of his popularity with the public; therefore pretending to be Muşaddiq's supporters in public, they weakened the government in the Majlis by refusing every proposal of the government and by criticizing everything the government tried to accomplish. In the meantime, the Iranian delegation led by Dr. Muşaddiq went to The Hague in order to present the oil nationalization issue in the International Court. Iran defended its case from 9 to 23 June 1952. Although Iran was legally represented by Professor Rolin, it was Muşaddiq who started the defense and submitted to the court that Britain had sent her naval force to the Gulf before submitting her complaints against Iran to international channels. Professor Rolin continued the defense and the court finally decided in favor of Iran.<sup>53</sup> However Britain continued to create problems for Iran by encouraging oil customers to stop dealing with Iran.



When Muṣaddiq returned to Iran, his newest priority was to gain some control over the army. After five months of irregular and ineffective parliamentary debates on the matter he decided to use his constitutional right as prime minister to nominate the minister of war and chose to run the war ministry himself for a period of time. The shah refused Muṣaddiq's suggestion. On 16 July 1952 Muṣaddiq announced his resignation; and instead of submitting his resignation to the Majlis, he broadcasted it in the news to the public, and thus for the first time in the history of Iran, a prime minister publicly criticized the Shāh for having violated the constitution and for standing in the way of the national struggle. Muṣaddiq stated:

In the course of recent events, I have come to the realization that I need a trustworthy war minister to continue my national mission. Since His Majesty has refused my request, I will resign and permit someone who enjoys royal confidence to form a new government and implement His Majesty's policies. In the present situation, the struggle started by the Iranian people can not be brought to a victorious conclusion.<sup>54</sup>

The royalists and the pro-British forces were pleased with their victory, and invited Qavam al-Saltāneh to take up the premiership, hoping that the latter could pull his previous allies and supporters away from Muṣaddiq. However, contrary to their expectations, the public guided by Āyatullāh Kāshāni, the National Front, the Tudeh Party, the Toilers Party and the Iran Party started protest strikes and mass demonstrations in favor of Dr. Muṣaddiq. Qavām al-Saltāneh government retaliated and took control of the radio stations and the telegraph offices.

The oil workers in Ābādān and Khurramshahr stopped work and started demonstrations on 17 July 1952 in response to Muṣaddiq's resignation. The National Front deputies in the Majlis called for a public protest on 21 July.<sup>55</sup> In the meantime there was a major pro-Muṣaddiq demonstration in Tehran. With the radio and telegraph under the government's control, Ayatullāh Kāshāni chose to call all the newspapers to a press conference. During the press conference Ayatullah Kashani denounced Qavām al-Saltāneh's appointment, declaring it unconstitutional since the Majlis sitting that had approved it was without a quorum. He expressed his view of Qavām al-Saltāneh thus: "Aḥmad Qavām is not spiritually, ethically or physically worthy of the premiership." He then praised Dr. Muṣaddiq, stating: "now the Egyptians are following Muṣaddiq's example. Muṣaddiq respects his people's wishes." Āyatullāh Kāshāni ended his speech by saying: "While blood still flows in my veins and in those of this nation, we should not accept Qavām's rule. ...Although people are suffering from poverty, we urge everyone in Tehran and all Iran to close businesses and offices tomorrow, and if necessary even the day after tomorrow."<sup>56</sup>

As was expected by both sides, on 21 July 1952 (30 Tir) bloody confrontations took place between unarmed citizens garbed in white robes (kafan), many of whom died screaming: "bā khūn-i khud nivishāim yā marg yā Muṣaddiq" (we wrote by our blood, death or Muṣaddiq), and the army, which was instructed by the Shāh to shoot to kill if necessary. Two hundred and fifty people died or were injured in Tehran, Hamedan, Ahvaz, Isfahan and Kirmānshāh. The Shāh ordered his troops to withdraw. In the afternoon of the same day, both the Majlis and the Sena confirmed Muṣaddiq's appointment. An alliance between the

intelligentsia, religious groups and the bazaar merchants, all of whom shared anti-foreign sentiments and in various degrees belief in democracy, once again led Iran to victory against the despotic ruling government, thus fixing 21 July 1952 as the Day of National Rising (Qiyam-i Milli) and the casualties as national martyrs (Shuhadā-ye milli) in the history of Iran.

On 26 July Muṣaddiq introduced his cabinet to the Shah with himself as acting minister of war. The royalists were excluded from the cabinet. On 3 August Muṣaddiq asked the Majlis for limited legislative powers for a period of six months in order to take the necessary steps for reforms. The two parliaments accepted Muṣaddiq's request and on 11 August a bill covering the following provisions was approved by the Majlis and the Senate:

1. Reform of the electoral law offering the Majlis and the municipalities
2. Reform of financial affairs and revision of the budget by reducing expenses and establishing direct taxes and, if necessary indirect taxes
3. Reform of the economy through increasing production, creation of additional employment, and the revision of monetary and banking laws
4. Exploitation of the country's oil resources, in accordance with the law concerning the implementation of the nationalization of the oil industry
5. Reform of administrative organizations and civil, judicial, and employment laws
6. Establishment of local councils in villages for the purpose of social reform through enactment of taxes
7. Reform of laws governing the press
8. Reform of the laws relating to the judiciary
9. Reform of educational affairs, public health, and means of communications<sup>57</sup>

Shortly after this Muṣaddiq attempted to limit the power of the royal court by imposing political and economic control over it. He appointed Qasim Anīnī as court minister and forbade the Shah to have direct communication with foreign diplomats. He forced Princess Ahraf, the most powerful authority in the court after the Shah, to leave Iran. He transferred Reẓā Shāh's lands back to the state, cut the palace budget, and transferred the savings from the budget cut to the Ministry of Health. He also brought the royal charities under government control. Muṣaddiq next appointed a parliamentary committee to investigate the constitutional issues between the cabinet and the Shah. This committee concluded that the armed forces fell under the jurisdiction of the government and not the Shah's according to the constitution. Muṣaddiq then cut the military budget by 15% and renamed the War Ministry the Ministry of Defense. He then forced a number of pro-shah military commanders to retire and imprisoned some officers whom he found to have been responsible for shooting people during the Qīyām-i Milli demonstration on 21 July 1952. These officers were later released and dismissed from military service.<sup>58</sup>

On 7 January 1953 Muṣaddiq requested from the Majlis a one year extension on his limited legislative power. Āyatullāh Kāshāni, the speaker of the Parliament, declared that the request was contrary to the constitution. Nevertheless Muṣaddiq's request was approved with 59 votes in favor and seven against.<sup>59</sup> This was the beginning of the conflicts between Muṣaddiq and Kāshāni which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter.

Meanwhile the Shah, who felt that his position was becoming increasingly a ceremonial one, and having exhausted all his efforts in trying to regain power, decided to leave Iran in order to seek foreign assistance to reinforce his position. Muṣaddiq approved of the Shah's trip and provided him with \$11,000 U.S., hoping thereby to keep him out of the country forever. Muḥammad Reżā Shāh sent a radio message to the people and informed them he and the Queen Surayya were making the trip abroad for medical reasons. Meanwhile the Bakhtiyārī tribe, a loyal ally of the Shah (the Queen was herself a Bakhtiyārī) came to Tehran to demonstrate in support of the shah. Moreover, the royalist Ayatullāh Bihbahāni, with Āyatullāh Kāshāni at his side, led a mob to the royal palace on 1 February 1953 in order to assassinate Dr. Muṣaddiq when he was to arrive with the money and the passports for the Shah's trip. Muṣaddiq however had arrived at the palace ahead of time and was inside when the mob arrived. The prime minister was alarmed and he left the palace by a back entrance.<sup>60</sup> This incident persuaded Muṣaddiq that immediate and drastic action had to be taken to check the opposition, which was becoming increasingly dangerous. He began to introduce many major reforms into the existing social, judicial, educational, economic and military systems in order to bring more supporters to his side. To do this he took the opportunity afforded to him by the limited legislative power that had been delegated to him.

He began by introducing a bill which would oblige landlords to return 10% of their share of the revenues from crops to the peasants and another 10% to a fund for rural development. The elected village councils were instructed to use the latter fund for projects

in the transport, education and social services in the rural sectors. A new tax bill shifted the pressure of high taxes away from low-income people. The Ministry of Finance was instructed to sell the state's lands in urban areas to first-time home buyers at a low cost, and 20 newly established construction banks were instructed to supply low-cost housing loans. Two successful projects were completed in Tehran: one in Narmak for lower income groups and one in Naziabad for the poor.

Muṣaddiq's legislation protecting workers and employees provided many benefits which had never existed before such as: medicare; sickness and accident insurance for workers and their families; supplementary welfare benefits for workers with large families; emergency cash support for cases like; marriage; childbirth or funerals; unemployment insurance benefits ; and retirement and pension benefits. These innovative programs were financed partly by transferring funds from different government departments and the state insurance company, and partly by contributions from industry itself, with one-third paid by employees and two-third by employers.<sup>61</sup>

A bill covering electoral reforms, which finally provided women with the right to vote, was drafted; however it was strongly opposed by powerful conservative religious leaders like Āyatullāh Burūjirdī (the Marjʿa-e Taqlīd), and Āyatullāh Bihbahāni (a long time supporter of the Shāh), as well as to everybody's surprise, by Āyatullāh Abul-Qasim Kāshāni.<sup>62</sup>

Although Ayatullah Kashāni had called upon Iranian women to rise against British influence and Qavām al-Saltāneh's appointment to power on 19 July 1952, stating during his press conference: "Today is a day that this nation, men, women, every member of society should unite and fight against the foreigners, and they should be ready to sacrifice...",<sup>63</sup> nonetheless sent the following reply to a demand for the vote by the Popular Movement's Women's Organization published in the newspaper *Ittīlāāt*: "Avoid creating conflicts between women and men, also avoid an activity which causes disturbance."<sup>64</sup>

Muṣaddiq's reforms were debated by the oppositions in both houses of Parliament. The National Front came up with a plan to eliminate the opposition. To do so, the National Front resigned and left the Majlis below its quorum so that the Majlis would consequently be dissolved, therefore resulting in the need for a national referendum. The plan was successful and Muṣaddiq called for a national referendum in July 1953, stating:

The people of Iran --and no one else-- has the right to judge on this issue. For it was the people of Iran who brought into existence our fundamental laws, our constitution, our parliament and our cabinet system. We must remember that the laws are created for the people; not the people for the laws. The nation has the right to express its views, and, if it wishes, to change its laws. In a democratic and constitutional country, the nation rules supreme.<sup>65</sup>

Āyatullah Kāshāni opposed the referendum, and his ally in the Majlis, Qanātābādī, left the Parliament with other pro-Kāshāni deputies in order to create the *fraksiyun-i Islām* outside the Majlis. Kāshāni then accused Muṣaddiq of being a dictator and called the referendum unconstitutional. On 31 July 1953, Kāshāni invited the foreign and domestic press into his house and said the following:

Our purpose in fighting with the British and in terminating relationship with Britain was to rectify the affairs of the country. Ever since Dr. Muṣaddiq has been in charge he has not performed any rectification ; instead the situation is changing every day for the worse, and the democracy which came into existence in 1940 is being converted into a dictatorship. Dr., Muṣaddiq has shown disrespect for the constitution. In fact the referendum is against the constitution.<sup>66</sup>

However in spite of Kāshāni's position and those of other anti-referendum activists and ex-supporters of the prime minister like Makki, Baqāi and Haerizadeh, the referendum was held and Muṣaddiq received an overwhelming vote of confidence, winning over 2,043,300 of 2,044,600 ballots cast throughout Iran, and 101,396 of 101,463 ballots cast in Tehran alone.<sup>67</sup>

Muṣaddiq, now feeling confident about his control over the military and his new opponents and trusting in the strength of his supporters, took serious steps towards introducing secularism. He appointed people with secularist reputations to his cabinet in order to accomplish educational, social and judicial reforms. The portfolios of the ministries of interior, transport and agriculture were given to three leaders of the secularist Iran party. Abul-'Alī Luṭfi, an anti-clerical judge, was assigned to the justice ministry and Āzād, a pro-Tudeh university professor was promoted to the ministry of education. Qanātābādī accused Muṣaddiq of bringing "Kremlin-controlled atheists" to the ministries of justice and education and claimed that Muṣaddiq's doctoral dissertation contained strong anti-clerical views. Baqāi, the leader of the Toilers' party accused Muṣaddiq of creating a social revolution and in retaliation expelled Khalil Maleki from the party. Khalil Māleki, who was a strong ally of Muṣaddiq formed a new organization and named it the Third Force (Nirū-ye Sevvom),



bringing the youth wing and the women's section of the Toilers' party into his organization. The Iran party fully supported Muṣaddiq and called Kāshāni a "political mullā" and furthermore accused Baqāʿ, Hāerizādeh and Qanātābādī of being self-seekers.<sup>68</sup>

Meanwhile Iran was suffering from economic hardship caused by the oil boycott orchestrated by the British. Unemployment was high and people were hungry; yet every attempt taken by the government of Dr. Muṣaddiq to provide food or money to the needy people was interpreted by the opposition as a socialist or even a Communist action. For example, when the Minister of Transport proposed nationalizing the Tehran Bus Company in order to provide an economic break for the people, Makkī, now allied with General Zahidi (pro-American), and Āyatullāh Kāshāni claimed that the government was trying to take over all the small businesses and even groceries and that soon Iran would end up like the Soviet Union. When in a desperate attempt to reduce the price of bread by bringing in more competition, the minister of economy tried to open new bakeries, the bazaar guild, supported by Kāshāni, accused the government of trying to get involved in the free market. The proposal by the minister of communications to nationalize the telephone company faced similar opposition, and this time Hāerizādeh described the proposal as being against the shari'ah, describing that "Islam respects and protects private property." When Muṣaddiq's advisor Dr. Fatemi advised the prime minister to legalize alcoholic beverages so that the revenue derived from taxes on alcohol would provide funds for the government, Qanātābādī attacked him and accused the government of anti-Islamic activities.<sup>69</sup>

Thus Muṣaddiq was losing his traditional supporters, the most significant among them being Āyatullāh Kāshāni, who described his conflicts with Dr. Muṣaddiq during a press interview thus:

Why have I opposed Dr. Muṣaddiq for the past few months, although I agreed with him from the beginning and supported his government? I remember very clearly that my first disagreement with him started when he asked for one year of emergency powers. According to the constitution there are three powers: the legislative; the judicial; and the executive. Therefore I did not deem it advisable for the people, the country and the constitution to give him all this authority. I cannot analyze the reasons presently. The second reason for my disagreement with his government was his disrespect for the law. Dr. Muṣaddiq was against martial law, yet during most of his premiership he has imposed martial law. He did not pay any attention to the economy, to unemployment or the people's misery; and his weakening of all those people who had helped him during the struggle, these were the source and origin of the struggle, as was my other reasons.<sup>70</sup>

Although Dr. Muṣaddiq did not enjoy the extended limited powers for long, nevertheless a review of the first six months of this arrangement clearly shows contradictions in Kāshāni's view on this subject. First, the authority given was not for an indefinite period of time but first for six months and later for one year. Second, Muṣaddiq was not granted the authority to enact any law, but was permitted to prepare bills and implement them on a trial basis; therefore, contrary to Kāshāni's allegations, Muṣaddiq held neither legislative nor executive powers. Moreover, this authority was approved by the Majlis, the Sena and the shah, and was submitted to a vote of confidence in the Majlis on 16 September 1952, which was granted him by a majority of 60 votes in his favor and one against, and again on 7 January 1953, with 59 votes in his favor and seven against; therefore his limited powers were entirely according to the constitution.

As to the accusation regarding martial law, in actual fact Tehran and some large cities like Tabrīz had been continuously under martial law during the period 1941 to 1951. Muṣaddiq had lifted the martial law in Tehran on 12 August 1952 while he had limited legislative powers. However on 18 August 1952, there were clashes between the Tudeh Party and the Sumka (neo-fascists) in Tehran, and when on the next day "Muslim combatants" joined the clash, Muṣaddiq was forced to re-establish martial law on 20 August in order to bring security to the city. Also during the period of martial law the press remained free and political rights were respected as well. These actions were in direct contrast to those of previous governments which had used martial law to suppress the Media and political rights.<sup>71</sup>

Meanwhile a group of military commanders and officials who had been forced to resign or had been expelled were meeting regularly and had formed a secret committee to save the Fatherland (Kumīṭch-ye Nijāt-i Vatan). General Zāhedī, who opposed Muṣaddiq but who had stayed friendly with Āyatullāh Kāshāni, Makkī, and Baqāī, was its leader. Prominent army generals like Muqaddam (head of the gendarmerie), Arf'a, Hejāzī and Hīdāyat were involved with the committee as well.<sup>72</sup> General Zahedi was arrested on 24 February 1953 and charged with inciting opposition against the government. Due to his influence with the court and Āyatullāh Kāshāni, however, he was released a month later. Following his release, the committee planned to kidnap General Afshartus, who had replaced Zāhedī as the head of the police force. A few days later on 2 May 1953, Afshartus was found dead. The same day the government indicted Zāhedī and Dr. Muzzafar Baqāī for

the kidnapping and murder of Afshārtūs. Ayatullah Kashani provided asylum to Zāhedī in the Majlis, and visited him on 4 May 1953.<sup>73</sup> The following is an account of Ayatullah Kāshāni's visit with Zāhedī in his sanctuary in the office of the president of the Sena:

The building of the parliamentary assembly (majlis-i shawr) is in front of the old sena building, and Mr. General Zāhedī is staying in the office of the ex-president of the sena in that building according to the order and agreement of the Hon. Ayatullah.

When they informed Mr. General that the Hon. Ayatullāh was coming to meet him, he (Zahedi) came to the front of the building to welcome him (Kashani). The Hon. Ayatullāh greeted General Zahedi and then entered the room. General Zahedi stated his great appreciation of the Āyatullāh's visit. The Hon. Ayatullah in response mentioned their old friendship and said: "You are guest of the Majlis and in addition you have been and will be respected by everybody. I am very sorry for the harassment you have gone through. I will never forget your services for the national movement of Iran and I hope you provide more. Here is the home of the nation (Khāneh-ye millat) and you can stay here as long as you want."<sup>74</sup>

Meanwhile the new administration in Washington headed by General Eisenhower reversed the United States' previous policy which had favored Iran and decided to support Britain against Iran. The state department sent Kermit Roosevelt to Tehran in order to finance a coup against the Muṣaddiq government and bring the Shah back to power. With Roosevelt's support, Zāhedī brought a number of high-ranking and influential individuals into the committee, among them General Naṣīrī (head of the royal guard), Taymurtash Bakhtiyār (cousin of Queen Surayyā) and Gilānshāh (head of the air force). Meanwhile the Shah signed Muṣaddiq's dismissal from premiership and appointed General Zāhedī as prime minister on 13 August 1953. On 19 August royalist officers went to Muṣaddiq's house to arrest him; however they were stopped by Tudeh Party supporters who had been informed of their plan. In the resulting disorder the Shāh fled Iran for Iraq, and the Tudeh Party

supporters celebrated his departure by overthrowing his statues on the streets. Muṣaddiq was approached by US officials and was promised support and aid if he could bring order to the country. Therefore Muṣaddiq directed the army to suppress the riots on the streets, an order which the army obeyed. In the meantime however, Zāhedī surrounded Muṣaddiq's house with 35 tanks and arrested the Prime Minister on 20 August 1953.<sup>75</sup>

Dr. Muṣaddiq was detained for two months without being either interrogated or indicted. He was finally questioned on 17 September 1953 for twelve days and the military prosecutor subsequently brought an indictment against him on charges of treason on 1 October 1953. On 15 November 1953, he was court-martialed and, having been found guilty as charged on 21 December 1953, was sentenced to three year solitary confinement. His appeal to the Supreme Court was delayed and postponed, and he received the judgment of the High Court of Judicial Discipline only two weeks before he completed his three-year sentence. On 3 of August 1956 he was released and escorted to his village Aḥmadābad where he spent the rest of his life under house arrest.<sup>76</sup>

On 21 December 1953 the Tehran daily *Ittīlāʾāt* reported on page one that Dr. Muṣaddiq had been found guilty and that the relationship between Iran and Britain had entered a new era with the reopening of the British Embassy with 15 diplomats.<sup>77</sup>

Consequently a democratic government which had been created by a nationalist movement for the purpose of nationalizing the oil industry and which had gained momentum by struggle against foreign economic and political interference, was brought

down by foreign involvement on the one hand and by the conflict between traditional groups (those of religious background and the bazaar merchants) and the new middle class (the intelligentsia and secularist groups) on the other. The umbrella of the National Front was not large enough to cover royalists, conservatives, religious or Communist sentiments. As a result, a short but violent period of conflict began which paved the way for the return of dictatorship and despotism which lasted for 26 years.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> For more information on the Qavam- Sadchikov Agreement see: Fakhreddin Azimi, *Iran The Crisis of Democracy 1941-1953*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), pp.147-164.
- <sup>2</sup> Ronald W. Ferrier, "The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute: a Triangular Relationship," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill and W. M. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988), pp.166-167.
- <sup>3</sup> Fakhreddin Azimi, "The Reconciliation of Politics and Ethics, Nationalization and Democracy: an Overview of the Political Career of Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq," in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A. Bill & W.M. Roger Louis, (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988), p.52. See also: 'Alī Asghar Shamīmī, *Iran in the Reign of His Majesty Mohammad Reṣā Shāh Pahlavi*, trans. Dr. Aladin Pazargadi (Tehran: Central Council Celebration of the 25th Century of the Foundation of the Iranian Empire, n.d.), p.75.
- <sup>4</sup> Azimi, *Iran The Crisis of Democracy*, pp.178-179. For more information on Qavam see *ibid.*, pp.63-80 and 147-183.
- <sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.183-201.
- <sup>6</sup> Faghfoory, "The Role of Ulama," p.191.
- <sup>7</sup> Shahrokh Akhavi, "The role of the Clergy in Iranian Politics, 1949-1954" in *Musaddiq, Iranian Nationalism, and Oil*, ed. James A Bill & W.M. Roger Louis (London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1988), p.93.
- <sup>8</sup> Azimi, *Iran the Crisis of Democracy*, pp.204-206.
- <sup>9</sup> Abrahamian, *Iran Between Two Revolutions*, pp.252-253.
- <sup>10</sup> Susan Siavoshi, *Liberal Nationalism in Iran: the Failure of a Movement*, (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 1990), p.50 and 53-54.
- <sup>11</sup> Abrahamian, *Iran Between two Revolutions*, pp.252-257. For more information on the first twenty embers of the National Front see *Ibid.*, pp.254-255.2.
- <sup>12</sup> Husain Makki, *Khātirāt-i Siyāsī-ye Husain Makki*, (Tehran: Intishārāt-i 'Elrāi, 1989), pp.182-183.

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- <sup>13</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions, p. 252. For more information on Dr. Husain Fatemi see: Naṣrullah Shīfī, Zendeḡi-nāmeḡ va Mubārizat, (Tehran: Chap-Khaneh Khushah, 1364/ 1985).
- <sup>14</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between two Revolutions, pp.252-253.
- <sup>15</sup> The Fabian Society is an organization which was founded in Britain in 1883. It promotes the gradual spread of democratic socialism.
- <sup>16</sup> Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism, pp.70-72; see also Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.253- 256.
- <sup>17</sup> Siavoshi, Liberal Nationalism, pp.68-69.
- <sup>18</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.256-257.
- <sup>19</sup> *ibid.*, pp.253-260
- <sup>20</sup> Makki, Khatirat-i Siyasi, pp.208 -210.
- <sup>21</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.260.
- <sup>22</sup> Akhavi, "The Role of the Clergy," p.93.
- <sup>23</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.262.
- <sup>24</sup> Abul-Qāsim Kāshāni, Majmūḡ-i az Maktūbāt, Sokhanrāniḡā, Payāmbā va Fatāwi-ye Āyatullah Kāshāni, ed. M. Dehnāvi, (Tehran: Chāpaksh, 1361/1982), vol.1, pp.71-74.
- <sup>25</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.262.
- <sup>26</sup> Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power, (London: Croom Helm, 1979), pp.33. Also: Suḡi Kanti Ghosh, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute, (Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960), pp.14-15.
- <sup>27</sup> Ghulām-Reḡā Nijati, Junbish-i Milli Shudan-i Naft-i Iran, (Tehran: Intishār, 1985), pp.16-18.
- <sup>28</sup> Ronald W. Ferrier, "Anglo-Iranian.." in Muḡaddiq, pp.164-165.
- <sup>29</sup> Graham, Illusion, p.35.



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- <sup>10</sup> Ferrier, "Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute," p.165. Ghulam-Reza Nijati reports the British share as having been 56 % in 1914; see his Junbish, p.19.
- <sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp.166-167, and Nijati, Junbish, pp.21-29.
- <sup>12</sup> Ibrahim Safaci, Ishtibah-i bozorg, Milli shudan-i Naft? (Tehran: Kitabsara 1371/1992), pp.22-47. See also; Nijati, Junbish, p.26.
- <sup>13</sup> Nijati, Junbish, p.26-27.
- <sup>14</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.265-266.
- <sup>15</sup> Jafar Mehdi-Nia, Zindegi-ye Siyāsi-ye Razmārā, (Tehran: Sanubar, 1364/1985), pp.345-353.
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p.350.
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p.352.
- <sup>18</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.266-267.
- <sup>19</sup> Kashani, Majmūch, vol. 1, p.115.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid., pp.116-117.
- <sup>21</sup> Ghulam Husain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinār-i Pedaram, p.61. See also; Nijati, Junbish, pp.136-139; see also; Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and Struggle, pp.82-83 and 93.
- <sup>22</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.267-268.
- <sup>23</sup> Nijati, Junbish, p.204.
- <sup>24</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.268-275.
- <sup>25</sup> Kashani, Majmūch, vol. I, pp.130-134.
- <sup>26</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.275.
- <sup>27</sup> Kashani, Majmūch, vol. I, pp.124-125.
- <sup>28</sup> Ferrier, "Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute," pp.182-183; also Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.268-269; also Nijati, Junbish, pp.159-167.

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- <sup>49</sup> Ghulām Husain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinar-i Pedaram, pp.76-82.
- <sup>50</sup> Ibid., pp.84-88; also Nijati, Junbish, pp.162-167.
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., pp. 91-96; also Nijati, Junbish, pp. 207-209.
- <sup>52</sup> Habib Ladjevardi, "Constitutional Government and reform under Muṣaddiq" in Muṣaddiq, Iranian Nationalization and Oil, ed. James A. Bill and W.M. Louis (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 70-71; also Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.268-269.
- <sup>53</sup> Ghulām Husain Muṣaddiq, Dar Kinār-i, pp.100-101. See also; Nijati, Junbish, pp.165-167.
- <sup>54</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.271.
- <sup>55</sup> Ladjevardi, "Constitutional Government," pp. 74-75. See also; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, pp.271-272. See also; Katouzian, Muṣaddiq and Struggle pp.114-119; see also; Nijati, Junbish, pp.218-226.
- <sup>56</sup> Kāshāni, Majmūh, vol. 1, pp.200-202.
- <sup>57</sup> Ladjevardi, "Constitutional Government," pp.74-75, 78.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp.76-78.
- <sup>59</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.272-274.
- <sup>60</sup> Nijati, Junbish, p.225, 253-260.
- <sup>61</sup> Ladjevardi, "Constitutional Government," pp.79-88.
- <sup>62</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.276.
- <sup>63</sup> Kāshāni, Majmūh, vol. 1, p.139 and vol. 2, p.211.
- <sup>64</sup> Kāshāni, Majmūh, vol. 3, p.192.
- <sup>65</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.274.
- <sup>66</sup> Kāshāni, Majmūh, vol. 3, pp.420-421.
- <sup>67</sup> Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.274.

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<sup>68</sup> Ibid., pp.275-277.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., pp.275-276.

<sup>70</sup> Kashani, Majmu'eh, vol. 5, pp.270-275.

<sup>71</sup> Ladjevaedi, "Constitutional Government," pp.78-80. According to the author, many of these clashes were staged by British agents and later by the American Intelligence Service, based on recent information.

<sup>72</sup> Nijati, Jumbish, p. 229. See also; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, p.278.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p.262.

<sup>74</sup> Kashani, Majmu'eh, vol. 3, pp.356-357.

<sup>75</sup> Katouzian, Musaddiq and Struggle, pp.188-193.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp.194-195. For more information on Dr., Musaddiq's court-martial, appeal and final appeal, see Ibid., pp.195-207. Also: Jalil Bozorgmehr, Doktor Musaddiq—va Residegi-ye Farjami dar Divan Kishvar, (Tehran: Intishar, 1367/1988). See also: idem, Doktor Muhammad Musaddiq dar Dādgāh-i Tajdid-i nazar-i Nizami, (Tehran: Intishar, 1366/1987). (appendix 1)

<sup>77</sup> During Dr. Musaddiq's court-martial and imprisonment he received many messages of support from Iranians and from people all over the world. The following is a brief list of some of the messages that he received:

A poem was published in the al-Haris, Difa' and Al-Mizan newspapers, praising Musaddiq in his struggle against foreign interests. (appendix 2 and 3).

From Egypt, Muatafa A. Fahmy sent a telegram stating "The liberated people in every country believe in your loyalty to your country and consider you as a great example of patriotism. We pray God to give you victory. We are ready to have the honor of defending you." (appendix 4)

From Mr. S. Kadiresan of Colombo Ceylon. (appendix 5).

From Mr. E.J. Boszo-Costa of Corodoba Argentina who compared his nation's leader Hipolito Irgoyen with Musaddiq and wrote that they had lost him during the fight to nationalize oil in Argentina as well. (appendix 6)

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From Italy, a Mr. Ansaldo wrote to Muşaddiq saying that he was victorious despite the fact that he was being prosecuted since he had achieved victory in the souls and hearts of true Iranians and Italians, and in those of the real freedom-seekers all over the world. (appendix 7)

## CONCLUSION

The period of Iranian history under study in this thesis is remarkable for the extent to which the nation's society and economy underwent change. In many ways Abul-Qasim Kāshānī and Muḥammad Muṣaddiq represented, respectively, the old and the new world. Their backgrounds and careers reflected different traditions, different value systems, and different ambitions for Iran's future.

We have seen how Iran began to emerge from a backward, agrarian society under the later Qajars, and evolve into a nation having, at least on the surface, a resemblance to the Western models which its new generation of leaders wished to emulate. This was accomplished largely through important changes in the country's infrastructure undertaken by Reza Shah. In instituting his reforms however, he realized the essentially conservative nature of Iranian society and took pains not to alienate its chief representatives- the merchant class, rich land-owners and the clergy.

Muḥammad Muṣaddiq's family was necessarily caught up in this series of changes. He though belonged to a generation which looked for rational, secular solutions to traditional problems, an approach resulting from the influence of his reading of Western political literature, his studies abroad and his experience living in Western society. While not forgetting the fundamental truth of the society into which he had been born, he nonetheless

followed a course which inevitably brought him into conflict with his earthwile ally, Abul-Qāsim Kāshānī.

Kāshānī's background was in many ways indistinguishable from those of the countless other ulama in whose footsteps he followed. The difference in his case perhaps lay in his frequent confrontations with foreign interests in Iran and Iraq. These experiences fueled in him a hatred for those countries of Europe with imperialist designs on his homeland, a sentiment which he shared to a greater or lesser extent with his contemporaries Reẓā Shāh and Muṣaddiq. This anti-Western attitude served as the principle point of agreements between all three of these figures.

Such a negative ideology however was no foundation on which to construct a working partnership. The alliances and efforts at accommodation that existed between them at various times collapsed because of fundamental differences in outlook. The most lasting of these, that between Kāshānī and Muṣaddiq, depended on more than just a rejection of the West. They both realized the need for a stronger national economy, the keystone of which was oil nationalization. However, Kāshānī's identification with clerical interests and his suspicion of Muṣaddiq's secular and socialist agenda resulted in a split which eventually led to both of them being removed from the political stage.

Their joint legacy is difficult to pinpoint. Iran regained control of its natural resources thanks to their efforts, but their alienation of conservative interests (particularly the Shah) and foreign powers led not only to their political demise but also to a long period

of autocratic rule. Kashani may be seen as a model for the involvement of clergy in politics, and Muṣaddiq for the technocrat adapting Western know-how to Shiite traditions. The current revival of interests in their contributions is itself indicative of the important roles they played in the history of modern Iran.

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
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## APPENDIX 1



## APPENDIX 2

بيوت شماره ٢

روزنامه (الخارجين)

٢٠٨



فِي الْمَضَلَّاتِ وَلَمْ يَخْشَكَ لِلنَّظَرِ  
لَوْلَاكَ تَسَوَّى فِي الْبِلَادِ وَتَوَرَّقَ  
سِرًّا وَغَيْرِكَ لَوْ حَاسِبًا بِفَرْقِ  
فِي الشَّرْقِ حَكْمَ الْأَيْبَانِ مَطْلَقِ  
لِأَرَادَةِ نَلْسْتُمْ مَعْنَى غَلَقِ

أَمَّيْدِي بِكَفِّكَ أَنْكَ لَمْ كُنْ  
كَفَيْتَ لِلْيَسْتُمْرِ مَطْلَقًا  
بُحْرِيَّتِ مِنْ غَرِّ الْقَبِيلَةِ أَكْثَرًا  
فُذِّبَتْ أَفْئِدَةُ الْهَيْبِ بِهِمْ  
بَجَرَحَتِ مَطْلَقِيَّةَ الْهَيْبِ بِحَرَمِ

فَنَدَّتْ لِأَجْلِكَ كُلِّ أَبٍ نَطْرُقُ  
حَصْبَتِ مَكَائِدُهَا بِهَا تَفْزُقُ  
نِيهَا وَفِي مَدَمِ الْحَيَا تَنْتَلِقُ  
فِي خِيَةِ الْقَبَا وَأَنْتَ مَوْفَقُ  
فِيهَا تَطَالُلُ نَجْمُهَا لِلتَّالِقِ

هَرَّتْ مَأْمَةٌ (لَنْدُنْ) وَهَاطَهَا  
بُغْدَتُ النَّحْتِ لَهَا مَلَكُ الْهَلَا  
بِأَنَّكَ تَرُفَلُ فِي خِلَاةِ مَكْرَهَا  
أَوْكِنَا فَلَوْ تَهَيَّأَ وَتَرَا جِئْتَ  
فَرَزَمْنَا فِي الْمُسْتَقِ قَرَّ هَزِيمَةِ

مَكْنَتُهُ الْاِقْدَارُ مَلَكُ الْهَلَا  
لَوْلَاكَ عَنْ مَعْنَى الْبِسَاةِ تَنْطَقُ  
رَأْمُو التَّحَوُّرِ لِلْمَوَاطِنِ مَنَاقِ  
أَتْرَابِهِ هَوْنٌ لِلطَّامِمِ بِأَقْ  
لَا مَابَ غَرَّ أَوْ نَجْرًا أَحَقُّ  
حَاجَ سَالِمِ الْمَسُونِ

رَجَّحَ الضَّمِيرَ فَلَمَّتْ لَوْلَ مَنْقُذِ  
يَسْجِلُ التَّأْرِخِ الصَّحْ صَفْحَةِ  
عَمَّ مَنْصَبِ الْحَكْمِ الَّذِي هُوَ لَلَالِ  
أَذْهَبَ قُلُوبَ التَّرَوُّبِ لِأَكْبَرِ الْكَوَالِ  
أَنْتَرِ مَهْدَكَ وَالْأَلْهَ بِحَوْطِ  
مَوْقِ الْعَبْرُوحِ

### APPENDIX 3

بیوست شماره ۴

در مرثیه عمران (الایری) (دفع) (المیزان) درج شده

الشرق لم یجب سواک زعیما  
فلت فی الشرق الشعوب وزیدنا  
وسطا علیه العزک حتی ساءه  
وناهک المستعرون کمنوز  
ثارت علی المستعین شعوبه  
وهنا فی أقصى المشارق امة  
نقرن الی سرح الکفاح وظلمت

واذا نظرت الی بیوردک نظرة  
این انجنت رأیت شعبا باثنا  
یظن علی الخصر لظنون معذبا  
ما بین کفیه العن لکنه  
یکبر الضار علی شراه جدا ولا  
والشعب یوح الشعب فی ضررنا

اصدق البطل المناضل انت من  
نصرته من موطن ترکوا به  
هتفت لك الدنيا وصوتی هلا  
ما ذا یضربک ان وقعت بردف  
وعلیک بالکم الطغاة توأطوا  
فلأنت ارفع من خصرک رتبة  
لا یزال اللام لک الضربة کلیم  
جواد کتم فتلکوا وفضحتهم  
ودعشت اقوال الذاب بنطق  
وهتکت من اسرارهم ما بینوا  
لذبت من یوم یکون حسابهم

قامت اظفار العید انقلبا  
کل الحصاد وغادره هشیما  
للمناضل وبه اجتمعوا نعظما  
سن الحصرم به علیک هجومنا  
وابواسو بان یظهر ذل اثیما  
ان حاکما کنت اصبحت ارحمکوما  
الی علیک وکنت انت کبریا  
فجهدتم لئلا یمن خصرنا  
فبع دمعنا الداء المزمنا  
وهکت انت ریدته نرسنا  
فیه شهیدا والعقاب عظما

شاعر عراقی معروف :  
الی زعيم ايران الدكتور محمد مصدق

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