

**The Slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna”:  
A Comparative Study of the Responses of  
Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Nurcholish Madjid**

A thesis submitted to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research  
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of  
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

by

Yudian Wahyudi

The Institute of Islamic Studies  
McGill University, Montreal, Canada  
(2002)



National Library  
of Canada

Acquisitions and  
Bibliographic Services

395 Wellington Street  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

Bibliothèque nationale  
du Canada

Acquisitions et  
services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington  
Ottawa ON K1A 0N4  
Canada

*Your file Votre référence*

*Our file Notre référence*

The author has granted a non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission.

L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

0-612-78794-X

**Canada**

To:  
My Mother, who, though never taught to read,  
compares everything

## Abstract

Author : Yudian Wahyudi

Title : The Slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna”: A Comparative Study of the Responses of Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Nurcholish Madjid

Department: Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University

Degree : Doctor of Philosophy

---

This thesis compares and contrasts the responses of Ḥasan Ḥanafī (Egypt, b. 1935), Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī (Morocco, b. 1936) and Nurcholish Madjid (Indonesia, b. 1939) to the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” a slogan that many modern Sunni reformers consider as the ideal solution to the decline of Islam in the modern age. The comparison is analyzed in the light of Ḥanafī’s three dimensional Islamic reform project known as Heritage and Modernity (*Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*). Their responses to the factors that have led to the decline of Islam in the modern age will be compared from the perspective of the first and second dimensions of his project, which examine the implications of the classical Islamic and Western heritages, respectively, for the reform of Islam. It is, however, in the context of the third dimension of Ḥanafī’s project, which deals with the theory and practice of interpretation, that we will examine their hermeneutics of the return to the Qur’ān and the Sunna. In the process we will demonstrate how their respective backgrounds, political influences and concerns have led each of



them to adopt a position that is, at one and the same time, radical and traditional.

## Résumé

Auteur : Yudian Wahyudi  
Titre : Le slogan du “retour au Coran et à la Sunna”: Une étude comparative des réponses d’Hasan Hanafi, de Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī et de Nurcholish Madjid  
Department : Institut des Études Islamiques, Université McGill  
Diplôme : Doctorat ès Philosophie

---

Cette thèse compare les réponses d’Ḥasan Ḥanafī (né en Egypte 1935), Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī (Maroc, 1936) ainsi que Nurcholish Madjid (Indonésie, 1939) au slogan du “retour au Coran et à la Sunna, un slogan que plusieurs sunnites considèrent comme étant la solution idéal au déclin de l’Islam de l’ère moderne. La comparaison est ici analysée à la lumière du projet de réforme islamique tridimensionnelle de Ḥanafī, mieux connue sous le titre Héritage et Modernité (al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd). Ces réponses face aux facteurs expliquant le déclin de l’Islam de l’ère moderne, seront donc comparées à la première et à la seconde dimension du projet de Ḥanafī qui examinent l’implication des héritages musulmans classiques et occidentaux face à la réforme de l’Islam. Cependant, ce sera dans le contexte de la troisième dimension du projet de Ḥanafī, qui explique notamment la théorie et la pratique de l’interprétation, que l’attention sera portée sur leurs herméneutiques concernant le retour au Coran et à la Sunna. Au cours de cette recherche, il sera démontré comment le vécu, les influences politiques ainsi

que les intérêts personnels de Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī et Madjid leur ont amené à adopter une position qui est à la fois radicale et traditionnelle.

## Table of Contents

Dedication, ii

Abstract, iii

Table of Contents, vi

System of Transliteration, viii

Acknowledgements, ix

Introduction, 1

Chapter I: The Slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” as  
the Ideal Solution to the Decline of Islam in the  
Modern Age: A Historical Introduction, 14

Chapter II: Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and  
Nurcholish Madjid: General Similarities and  
Differences, 114

Chapter III: The Hermeneutics of the Return to the Qur’ān  
and the Sunna, 207

Conclusion, 295

Bibliography, 309

Appendix: A List of English-Arabic Terms, 353

## System of Transliteration

Here I follow an adapted version of the transliteration system for Arabic of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. However, all Indonesian words or names derived from Arabic are written in the form most commonly cited in the sources. For example: “Nurcholish Madjid” rather than “Nūr Khālīṣ Mājīd,” “Nūr Khālīṣ Majīd” or “Nūr Khālīṣ Majīd” and “Nahdlatul Ulama” rather than “Nahḍat al-‘Ulamā’.” The same also applies to non-Arabic derived Indonesian words or name, regardless of their old or new spelling. Some differences between the old spelling and the new one (1971 onward) are as follows: (1) *dj* becomes *j*, such that *Djakarta* becomes *Jakarta*; (2) *j* becomes *y*, such that *jang* becomes *yang*; (3) *nj* becomes *ny*, so that, for example *njanji* becomes *nyanyi*; (4) *sj* becomes *sy*, so that *sjari’ah* becomes *syari’ah*; (5) *tj* becomes *c*, so that *Atjeh* becomes *Aceh*; (6) *ch* becomes *kh*, as when *Cholish* becomes *Kholish*; and (7) *oe* becomes *u*, such that *oelama* becomes *ulama*.

## Acknowledgements

Without the help and contribution of many people, this dissertation would have never been completed. First and foremost I would like to thank K.H. Abdurrahman Wahid (former President of the Republic of Indonesia) for introducing me to Prof. Ḥasan Ḥanafī's *Les méthodes d'exégèse* (even though its language in 1992 remained something of a barrier to me), and *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra* (From Theology to Revolution). Profs. Howard M. Federspiel and A. Üner Turgay, my supervisor and co-supervisor respectively, have also my undying gratitude for showing such tremendous patience and understanding with respect to the nature of my project. Their critical evaluations gave my dissertation its present form. I thank as well Mr. Steve Millier not only for editing my English, but also for encouraging me to take up the study of German to access certain vital sources in this language. I am grateful also to Miss Jane Tremblay for translating my Abstract into French.

I would also like to thank the Indonesia-Canada Islamic Higher Education Project (Wendy Allen, director; Susy Ricciardelli, Lori Novak and Joanna Gacek) for providing me with a full scholarship to do my Ph. D. program at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University. I would also like to acknowledge my debt to Profs. Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Ahmad Syafii Maarif, Sjafri Sairin, Nourouzzaman Shiddiqi, Muin A. Umar, Zarkasy A. Salam, Saad A. Wahid, and Martin van Bruinessen for encouraging me to continue my studies at McGill University. K.H. A.R. Fakhruddin (former

chairman of the Muhammadiyah) also very kindly suggested that I write my dissertation on K.H. Ahmad Azhar Basyir's legal philosophy, a sympathetic offer that I unfortunately had to decline since it is the focus of my wife's B.A. thesis.<sup>1</sup>

Nor will I ever forget the "brave" step taken by the Department of Religious Affairs of Indonesia, under the leadership of Munawir Sjadzali (Minister), Tarmizi Taher (Secretary General) and Zarkowie Sojoethie (Director General of Muslim Institutions and Societies), in commencing the Program Pembibitan Calon Dosen IAIN se-Indonesia (Pre-Departure Program for the Candidates of all-Indonesia Lecturers of the State Institute of Islamic Studies) in 1988. "Brave" since it endeavoured objectively to select the best recent graduates of the IAIN and train them in preparation to study at Western universities.<sup>2</sup>

I would also thank Prof. Ḥasan Ḥanafī for personally helping me to gain access to his works and writings on his thought. Without his help, it would have been impossible for me to obtain a copy of Dr. Jam'a's

---

<sup>1</sup>For a summary of this thesis, see Siti Handaroh, "Hubungan antara Maslahat dan Adat: Studi tentang Pemikiran Ahmad Azhar Basyir [The Relationship between Public Interest and Custom: A Study of Ahmad Azhar Basyir's Thought]," in Yudian Wahyudi, ed., *The Qur'ān and Philosophical Reflections* (Yogyakarta: Indonesian Academic Society XXI, 1998): 3-26.

<sup>2</sup>Nineteen graduates of the Program Pembibitan published a collection of articles based on papers written during their course of study at McGill University to celebrate its tenth anniversary. See Yudian Wahyudi, Akh. Minhaji and Amirul Hadi, eds., *The Dynamics of Islamic Civilization: Satu Dasawarsa Program Pembibitan (1988-1998)* [A Decade of the Program

dissertation. Prof. Ḥanaḥī even invited me to present my dissertation proposal at Cairo University, an academic honor that I happily accepted. After my presentation, Dr. Yumnā Ṭarīf al-Khūlī suggested that I contact her former student Dr. al-Barbarī, whom I subsequently visited in his home town of Manoufia. He generously provided me with a number of “not-easy-to-find” books on both Ḥanaḥī and al-Jābirī, including his own newly published book. I will never forget how, on our way back to Cairo from Manoufia, my Indonesian colleagues Arif Hidayat and Syafaat el-Mukhlās and I almost lost our lives due to the “adventurous courage” of the driver of the public transport that we were taking!

Dr. ‘Alī Mabruk also spent considerable time answering my preliminary questions concerning Ḥanaḥī’s reform project and gave me a number of his works, for all of which I am most grateful. The Cairo branch of the KMNU (Students of the Indonesian Nadlatul Ulama) then cordially invited me to deliver a speech on the epistemological problems of the return to the Qur’ān. In addition, two other Cairo-based Indonesian student associations kindly invited me to deliver “A Critical Evaluation of the Backwardness of Islamic Civilization” and “Why Should We Study Islam in the West?”, topics that formed two important themes in Chapter II of this dissertation.

I would also like to thank here Mr. Edward A. Silooy, who lent me his colossal support during my terms as president of the Indonesian Students Pembibitan (1988-1998)] (Yogyakarta: Forum Kominikasi Alumni Program



Association in Canada (PERMIKA) and the Indonesian Academic Society in 1997 and 1998-1999, respectively. Without his generosity, it would not have been possible for the PERMIKA to publish and launch *Pengalaman Belajar Islam di Kanada*,<sup>3</sup> *Petunjuk Praktis Belajar di Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Kanada*,<sup>4</sup> and *Islam and Development: A Socio-Religious Political Response*.<sup>5</sup> His benevolence also made it possible for the Indonesian Academic Society to publish and launch *The Qur'ān and Philosophical Reflection*,<sup>6</sup> *Kyai Haji Abdul Wahid Hasyim*,<sup>7</sup> and *An Examination of Bint al-Shāfi's Method of Interpreting the Qur'ān*.<sup>8</sup>

---

Pembibitan Calon Dosen IAIN se-Indonesia, 1988).

<sup>3</sup>See Yudian Wahyudi Asmin, ed., *Pengalaman Belajar Islam di Kanada* [The Experience of Studying Islam in Canada] (Yogyakarta: PERMIKA-Titian Ilahi Press, 1997). It was launched at McGill University on May 2, 1997.

<sup>4</sup>See Akh. Minhaji and Iskandar Arnel, *Petunjuk Praktis Belajar di Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Kanada* (A Practical Guide to Studying at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, Montreal, Canada) (Yogyakarta: PERMIKA-Montreal in collaboration with Lembaga Penterjemah & Penulis Islam Indonesia, 1997). It was launched at McGill University on November 10, 1997.

<sup>5</sup>See Sri Mulyati, Ujang Tholib and Iftitah Jafar, eds., *Islam & Development: A Politico-Religious Response* (Yogyakarta: PERMIKA-Montreal in collaboration with Lembaga Penterjemah & Penulis Muslim Indonesia, 1997). It was launched at McGill on December 10, 1997.

<sup>6</sup>See footnote 1 to these acknowledgements. It was launched at McGill University on June 22, 1998.

<sup>7</sup>See Achmad Zaini, *Kyai Haji Abdul Wahid Hasyim: His Contribution to Muslim Educational Reform and Indonesian Nationalism during the Twentieth Century* (Yogyakarta: Indonesian Academic Society, 1998). It was launched at McGill on January 25, 1999. For a review of the book, see R. Michael Feener, "[A Review of] Achmad Zaini's Kyai Haji Abdul Wahid Hasyim: His Contribution to Muslim Education Reform and Indonesian

Some of the material appearing in this thesis, it should be noted, formed parts of earlier studies that were presented to various forums, although never heretofore published. Thus my paper on “Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s Concept of al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd” presented to the XXXVIth International Congress of Asian and North African Studies, held in Montreal from August 27 to September 2, 2000, forms the backbone of Chapters II and III. Similarly, “Moroccan and Indonesian Responses to the Call ‘Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna’,” read at the 34<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association held in Orlando, Florida, from 17-19 November, 2000, forms a part of Chapter I. Likewise, my paper entitled “Arab Responses to Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s *Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb* [Introduction to Occidentalism],” presented at the conference “Orientalism Reconsidered: Emerging Perspective in Contemporary Arab and Islamic Studies,” held April 18-19, 2001 by the University of Exeter on the occasion of rewarding honorary degrees to Profs. Mohammed Arkoun and Edward W. Said, constitutes a very small part of my Chapter II, and is under review for publication.

Other papers accepted for other conferences but never presented (due to either schedule conflicts or visa problems) include: “Ahmad Khan’s and Afghani’s Responses to Imperialism,” which was to be presented at the Annual

---

Nationalism during the Twentieth Century Indonesia,” *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* vol. 33 no.1 (Summer 1999): 86.

<sup>8</sup>See Sahiron Syamsuddin, *An Examination of Bint al-Shāfi’s Method of Interpreting the Qur’ān* (Yogyakarta: Indonesian Academic Society, 1999). It was launched in Toronto on 30 November 1999.

Meeting of the Mid-Atlantic American Academy of Religion and Society of Biblical Literature, held on March 15-16, 2001, in Jamaica, New Brunswick (now forming a very small part of my Chapter I); “Egyptian Responses to the Call “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” due to be read in New Jersey at the same time I had to be in Exeter (now forming part of my Chapter I); and “Was Mu‘tazilism an Expression of Islamic Left?: A Comparison of Egyptian, Moroccan and Indonesian Contemporary Responses” accepted for the 35<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Middle East Studies Association, held in San Francisco on 17-20 November, 2001 (now forming a portion of Chapter II).

As I approach the end of these acknowledgements, I would like also to extend my very deepest gratitude to K.H. Hamdani B.Z., K.H. A. Malik Madani (of the Shari‘a Faculty, the Sunan Kalijaga IAIN, where I teach *Falsafat al-Tashri‘ al-Islāmī* or “Islamic Legal Philosophy”), Thoha Hamim, Faisal Ismail, Akh. Minhaji, Ahmad Hakim, M. Nafis, Iskandar Arnel, Fuadi Mardhatillah, Ruswan Thoyib, Sahiron Syamsuddin, Achmad Zaini, M.B. Badruddin-Audiba, Lathiful Khuluq, Didik Eko Pujianto, Ratno Lukito, Fauzan Saleh, M. Ali Ridho, Hamdiah Lathif, Mbak Ina-Mas Zaenal, Sri Tejowulan, Supanjani, Sri Mulyati, Inna Muthmainah, Andy Nurbaety, Sudarkam Mertosono, Munir A. Muin, Mujiburrahman, Labibah Zain, Mustafid Dahlan (Cairo) and [Ibu] Sandra Thibaudeau, to name only a few, for their true friendship, generous support and intellectual stimulation. I am grateful also to Miss Salwa Ferahian and Mr. Wayne St. Thomas of the library

of the Institute of Islamic Studies for kindly helping me find the books I needed during my studies.

A debt that can never be repaid I owe to my late father Asmin, who passed away in 1992 when I was doing my M.A. program. I am beginning to understand now his 1973 advice to me not to study at Al-Azhar (at the time Egypt was at war with Israel), and yet I have still not published *Al-Asmin: A Pocket Dictionary of Modern Terms, Arabic-English-Indonesia*, a work dedicated to him that I finished compiling in 1991 during my first semester at the Institute. Perhaps with the completion of this thesis I will be able to fulfill this task.

Last but not least, of course, my profoundest thanks go to my wife Siti Handaroh and my daughter Zala, who sacrificed so much to my “eccentric” approach to completing my studies. Zala keeps speaking about “when she returns to Indonesia,” while my wife –who as Dr. Federspiel constantly reminds me-- has given me her unquestioning support, and was away from her father’s bedside when he passed away in 1998, having accompanied me to Montreal. In closing let me say that, despite all the assistance and suggestions that I have received in the course of writing this dissertation, I alone bear responsibility for any of its shortcomings.

Montreal, March 1, 2002

Y.W.

## Introduction

Islam, like all other religions, confronts its adherents with the everlasting dialectic between revelation (divine but limited in extent) and civilization (human but ever-developing).<sup>1</sup> The dialectic between the divine and human versions of making history, a process that *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* (classical Islamic “hermeneutics”) calls *ijtihād* (“interpretation”), forms the essence of what may be referred to as the problem of “authenticity” (*al-aṣāla*) and “contemporaneity” (*al-mu'āṣira*), which includes “modernity” (*al-aṣrāniyya* and *al-ḥadātha*). Classical Islamic tradition recognized the two sides of the debate as being constituted of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (people of prophetic “tradition”) and the *ahl al-ra'y* (people of reason), respectively. The *ahl al-ḥadīth*, who are conservative in outlook, generally try to superimpose the face-value of Scripture (the Qur'ān and the Sunna) on civilization. They are thus puritan, idealist, and fundamentalist in their strict effort to adapt reality to Scripture. The *ahl al-ra'y*, on the other hand, stress the function of reason, which to some extent includes nature (and, hence, civilization), in the process of making history. They are for this reason more liberal and realist in their willingness to explore other sources of Scripture. The divine guarantee of this everlasting dialectic is called *tajdīd*, which is often coupled with *iṣlāḥ*,

---

<sup>1</sup>One may, in principle, use the Arabic terms *wahy*, *naṣṣ*, *shar'* or *dīn* interchangeably to indicate religion or revelation, and the terms *'urf*, *'āda*, *turāth* or *wāqī'* to indicate civilization or history.

translated by John O. Voll as “renewal” and “reform,” respectively.<sup>2</sup> The process of *tajdīd* is viewed as a centenary cycle, based on the Prophet Muḥammad’s prediction that “God will raise at the head of each century such people of this *umma* [Muslim community], as will revive (*yujaddidu*) its religion for it.”<sup>3</sup>

The slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” represents the oldest and strongest Sunni effort to reassert the position of revelation in this dialectic. Significantly, the slogan has often provided the doctrinal, ideological or geopolitical theme used by peripheral Muslim groups against a central power. This was the case in such classic conflicts of authority as those of the Kharijites versus ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, the Abbasid revolutionary movement against the Umayyads, and Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal against al-Ma’mūn, which gave rise to some of the most fundamental clashes of Islamic civilization. In order to gain the upper hand, peripheral groups tried to identify themselves with a pure, ideal Islam, while at the same time condemning their centrist opponents as impure, deviating Muslims. And in identifying with Scripture, they interpreted

---

<sup>2</sup>John O. Voll, “Renewal and Reform in Islamic History: Tajdid and Islah,” in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 32.

<sup>3</sup>Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan Abī Dāwūd* (Beirut: Dār al-Jinān, 1988), 2: 512. The translation is taken from Thoha Hamim, “Moenawar Chalil’s Reformist Thought: A Study of an Indonesian Religious Scholar (1908-1961)” (Ph. D. diss., McGill University, 1996), 2.

this in as literal, and hence as absolutist and exclusivist, a light as possible.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, the bigger the challenge from the center, the stronger the response from the slogan. When Islam, once a “conquering ideology,” found itself becoming more and more a “conquered ideology” by the eve of the eighteenth century (coming as a result of the military and economic imperialism of the Western countries operating in the Muslim world), Muslim reformers began to see the slogan as the ideal solution to the decline of Islam in the modern era. The slogan, as Fazlur Rahman rightly says, succeeded in liberating Muslims from the yoke of Western colonialism.<sup>5</sup> The contemporary response to the slogan can be seen in the writings of Muslim intellectuals from every corner of the Muslim world, including the three studied in the present work: Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Nurcholish Madjid.

Ḥanafī is the rightful heir to the Egyptian slogan in the second half of the twentieth century, since his “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd” (Heritage and Modernity) reform project is an effort to recast the *salafī* (“puritan” and “fundamentalist”) truth of the slogan in a *tajdīd* (modern and even contemporary) way. The project, for Maḥmūd Amīn al-‘Alīm, indicates Ḥanafī’s role as a bridging reformer (*mujaddid jusūr*) between Islam and the

---

<sup>4</sup>John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 37.

<sup>5</sup>Fazlur Rahman, “Revival and Reform in Islam,” in P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 2: 636-640.

West,<sup>6</sup> a position that Jūrjī Tarābīshī calls contradictory.<sup>7</sup> Some Egyptian ‘ulamā’ even accused him of unbelief in 1997 for his formulations, while Ibrāhīm Mūsā compares him favourably with Fazlur Rahman.<sup>8</sup> Likewise, Muḥammad Ābid al-Jābirī has rightfully inherited the Moroccan slogan, as his “Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha” (Heritage and Modernity) and “Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī” (Criticism of the Arab Mind) projects indicate. However, unlike Ḥanafī who criticizes the slogan directly, al-Jābirī criticizes Salafism (“fundamentalism”) as being responsible for the decline of the Arab world,<sup>9</sup> its Moroccan Islamic expression being little more than Wahhabism<sup>10</sup> (the modern pioneer of the slogan). At the same time, however, he too clings to the values

---

<sup>6</sup>Maḥmūd Amīn al-‘Ālim, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya min al-Turāth* (Cairo: Dār Qaḍāyā Fikriyya, 1997), 11.

<sup>7</sup>Jūrjī Tarābīshī, *Al-Muthaqqifūn al-‘Arab wa al-Turāth: Al-Taḥlīl al-Nafsī li ‘Iṣāb Jamā‘ī* (Beirut: Dār al-Rays, 1991), 105.

<sup>8</sup>Ibrāhīm Mūsā, “Al-Ḥadātha wa al-Tajdīd: Dirāsa Muqārana fī Mawqif Fazlur Rahman wa Ḥasan Ḥanafī,” in Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭīyya, ed., *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā’āt Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī Milādih al-Sittīn* (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997), 107-113.

<sup>9</sup>Abdellah Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels arabes* (Paris: L’Harmattan, 1993), 131.

<sup>10</sup>J. Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement (1963),” in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 491; and Bernard Lewis et al., ed., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. “Salafiyya,” by P. Sinar (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 8: 905-906. Al-Jābirī himself even admits that Moroccan Salafism is Wahhabism. Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, “Al-Ḥaraka al-Salafiyya wa al-Jamā‘a al-Dīniyya al-Mu‘āṣira fī al-Maghrib,” in Ismā‘īl Ṣabrī ‘Abd Allāh, ed., *Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya al-Mu‘āṣira fī al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya and Jāmi‘at al-Umam al-Muttaḥida, 1989), 193-196.



of the Qur'ān and the Sunna.<sup>11</sup> Thus while Issa J. Boullata considers al-Jābirī's project as "the most serious attempt in the Arab world to go beyond ideology to epistemology in order to analyze the workings of the Arab mind,"<sup>12</sup> Tarābīshi concludes that al-Jābirī has succeeded not only in closing a number of the doors of "interpretation" (*al-ta'wīl* and *al-ijtihād*), but also in condemning Islamic schools of thought as unbelief (*takfīr* and *tabdī'*).<sup>13</sup> On the other hand, both Abdellah Labdaoui<sup>14</sup> and 'Alī Ḥarb<sup>15</sup> compare him with both Mohammed Arkoun and Ḥanafī. Finally, we come to Nurcholish Madjid, the true legatee of the Indonesian expression of the slogan, since he has tried to revise its "fundamentalist" and "modernist" wings, a delicate project that has won for him accusations by his opponents that he is an agent of Orientalism and even Zionism. He is a leading but dangerous scholar –to cite Howard M. Federspiel's phrase in summarizing his critics.<sup>16</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup>Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr (Ḥiwār)," *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat al-Thaqāfa al-Shahriyya* 8 (1998): 16.

<sup>12</sup>Issa J. Boullata, *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought* (New York: State University of New York Press, 1990), 45.

<sup>13</sup>Jūrjī Tarābīshī, *Midhbahat al-Turāth fī al-Thaqāfa al-'Arabiyya al-Mu'aṣira* (London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1993), 91-92 and 117.

<sup>14</sup>Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 126.

<sup>15</sup>'Alī Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut and Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1995), 89-116, and 44 (no. 3); and idem, *Al-Mamnu' wa al-Mumtani': Naqd al-Dhāt al-Mufakkira* (Beirut and Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1995), 61.

<sup>16</sup>Howard M. Federspiel, *Muslim Intellectuals and National Development in Indonesia* (Newark: Nova Scientia, 1992), 40-43 and 181; and idem, "Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals: An Examination

Contemporary Western scholars with particular insight into modern Islam, such as Voll,<sup>17</sup> John L. Esposito,<sup>18</sup> Leonard Binder,<sup>19</sup> Henry Munson, Jr.,<sup>20</sup> and R. Hrair Dekmejian<sup>21</sup> are fully aware of the significance of the slogan, but significantly, none of them make it the focus of their works. While recognizing the socio-political manifestation of the slogan in their studies, they are largely silent when it comes to the topic of the hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna, which is the chief concern of the present dissertation. And while his *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought*<sup>22</sup>

---

of the Sources for their Concepts and Intellectual Constructs,” (Unpublished paper, McGill University, 1996), 64.

<sup>17</sup>Voll, “Renewal and Reform,” 32-47; idem, “Wahhabism and Mahdiyyism: Alternative Styles of Islamic Renewals,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4,1 (1982): 110-126; idem, “The Evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism in Twentieth Century Sudan,” in Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, eds., *Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan* (New York: Praeger, 1983); idem, “Islamic Renewal and ‘The Failure of the West’,” in Richard T. Anton and Mary Elaine Hegland, eds., *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 127-144.

<sup>18</sup>See Esposito, *Islam and Politics*; and idem, “Law in Islam,” in Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, Byron Haines and Ellison Findly, eds., *The Impact of Islam* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 69; and idem, “Sudan’s Islamic Experiment,” *The Muslim World* 76 (1986): 202.

<sup>19</sup>Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1964); and idem, *Islamic Liberation: A Critique of Development Ideologies* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

<sup>20</sup>Henry Munson Jr., *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988).

<sup>21</sup>R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*, second edition (New York: 1995).

<sup>22</sup>Daniel W. Brown, *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought* (Cambridge: University Press, 1996).

is more focused on the theory behind the slogan than are the works of the aforementioned writers, Daniel W. Brown deals only with the history of this notion in the Indian sub-continent. I believe however that in order to understand the evolution of the concept and its relevance to the Islamic world today, the net has to be cast more widely, and the investigation brought up to date. It is for this reason that I propose to examine the issues surrounding the slogan of a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna as a problem in interpretation, and how this problem is being addressed in the works of scholars from three different regions of the Muslim world.

Ḥanafī's thought has only recently begun to attract the attention of scholars; however, such preliminary studies as those of Fahima Charafeddine,<sup>23</sup> Abubaker A. Bagader,<sup>24</sup> 'Alī Mabruk,<sup>25</sup> Jūrjī Tarābīshī,<sup>26</sup> Shahrough Akhavi<sup>27</sup> and R. Hrair Dekmejian<sup>28</sup> have only touched briefly on

---

<sup>23</sup>Fahima Charafeddine, *Culture et idéologie dans le monde arabe* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994), 219-223.

<sup>24</sup>Abubakar A. Bagader, "Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World," in Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, eds., *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1994), 120.

<sup>25</sup>'Alī Mabruk, "Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd: Mulāḥazāt Awwaliyya," in Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, ed., *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'āt Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī Milādih al-Sittīn* (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997), 33-42.

<sup>26</sup>Jūrjī Tarābīshī, *Naẓariyyat al-'Aql* (London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1997), 11-24.

<sup>27</sup>Shahrough Akhavi, "The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997): 377-401.

his ideas and significance. Like Kazuo Shimogaki, who discusses only a part of Ḥanafī's reform project,<sup>29</sup> Thomas Hildebrandt analyzes his *Muqaddima fī 'Ilm al-Istighrāb* (Introduction to Occidentalism)<sup>30</sup> as representative of "Our Attitude towards Western Heritage," only one element out of Ḥanafī's three-dimensional reform. And although he provides us with a wider perspective on Ḥanafī by comparing him with Abdallah Laroui in terms of Ḥanafī's reform project,<sup>31</sup> Muḥammad Ḥasan Muslim Jam'a nevertheless ignores the hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna.

As for al-Jābirī, such scholars as al-'Ālim,<sup>32</sup> Charafeddine,<sup>33</sup> and 'Alī Ḥarb<sup>34</sup> have begun to pay attention to his thought and its development. Going

---

<sup>28</sup>R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Multiple Faces of Islam," in A. Jerichow and J. Baek Simonsen, eds., *Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East* (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997), 9.

<sup>29</sup>Kazuo Shimogaki, *Between Modernity and Post-Modernity: The Islamic Left and Dr. Hasan Hanafi's Thought: A Radical Reading* (Tokyo: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, 1988).

<sup>30</sup>Thomas Hildebrandt, *Emanzipation oder Isolation vom westlichen Lehrer? Die Debatte um Ḥasan Ḥanafī's "Einführung in die Wissenschaft der Okzidentalistik"* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 1998).

<sup>31</sup>Muḥammad Ḥasan Muslim Jam'a "Ishkāliyyat al-Tajdīd bayn Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa 'Abd Allāh al-'Arwī [Abdallah Laroui]," (Ph. D. diss., Al-Jāmi'a al-Lubnāniyya [University of Lebanon], n.d.).

<sup>32</sup>Maḥmūd Amīn al-'Ālim, *Al-Wa'y wa al-Wa'y al-Za'if fī al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'aṣir*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 1988), 72-78; idem, *Mafāhīm wa Qaḍāyā*, 77; idem, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya min al-Turāth* (Cairo: Dār Qaḍāyā Fikriyya, 1997), 71-85.

<sup>33</sup>Charafeddine, *Culture et idéologie*, 206-218.

<sup>34</sup>'Alī Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, second edition (Beirut and Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfi al-'Arabī, 1995), 115-130.

beyond even these preliminary contributions, Jūrjī Tarābīshī,<sup>35</sup> Abdellah Labdaoui,<sup>36</sup> Michael Gaebel,<sup>37</sup> Yaḥyā Muḥammad<sup>38</sup> and Sayyār al-Jamīl<sup>39</sup> have offered some rather critical evaluations of al-Jābirī's position. Aḥmad Muḥammad Sālim al-Barbarī<sup>40</sup> too has deeply analyzed his thought, but unlike others who have exclusively focused on al-Jābirī, he compares him with Ḥanafī, as Boullata<sup>41</sup> and Ḥarb<sup>42</sup> briefly do. Yet while al-Barbarī essentially deals with the essence of their reform project, which is the focus of my study, he offers only an indirect comparison, whereas mine is a direct one. Moreover, he treats the reform project from an Arab-centered perspective, something I have tried to correct here by adding Madjid to the equation, who, according to Federspiel, "undisputedly ranks as the leading Muslim intellectual of

---

<sup>35</sup>Tarābīshī, *Naẓariyyat al-'Aql*, 11-24; and idem, *Madhbahat al-Turāth*, 73-126.

<sup>36</sup>Abdellah Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels arabes* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993), 123-173.

<sup>37</sup>Michael Gaebel, *Von der Kritik des arabischen Denkens zum panarabischen Aufbruch: Das philosophische und politische Denken Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Ġābirīs* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1995).

<sup>38</sup>Yaḥyā Muḥammad, *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabī fī al-Mīzān* (Beirut: Al-Inshār al-'Arabī, 1997).

<sup>39</sup>Sayyār al-Jamīl, *Al-Ru'ya al-Mukhtalifa: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Manhaj Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī* (*Ajwibat al-Khiṭāb 'an As'ilat al-Tārīkh*) (Beirut: Al-Ahliyya, 1999).

<sup>40</sup>Aḥmad Muḥammad Sālim al-Barbarī, *Ishkalīyyat al-Turāth fī al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir: Dirāsa Muqārana bayn Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī* (N.p.: Dār al-Ḥaḍāra, 1998).

<sup>41</sup>Boullata, *Trends and Issues*, 40-55.

<sup>42</sup>Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 89-116, and 44 (no. 3); and idem, *Al-Mamnu' wa al-Mumtani'*, 61.

Indonesia.”<sup>43</sup> The most substantial difference however is that al-Barbarī, like all other commentators on Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, does not deal with the hermeneutics of the return to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.

Such scholars as Muhammad Kamal Hasan<sup>44</sup> and Federspiel<sup>45</sup> shed light on the socio-political significance of Madjid’s thought in Suharto’s New Order, while William B. Liddle<sup>46</sup> and Mark R. Woodward<sup>47</sup> reveal the implications of his theology of tolerance in Indonesian Islam. Greg Barton, like Karel A. Steenbrink,<sup>48</sup> describes Madjid’s Neo-Modernism, although Barton<sup>49</sup> touches more on the relations between the past and the present in his reform

---

<sup>43</sup>Federspiel, “Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals,” 14.

<sup>44</sup>Muhammad Kamal Hasan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses to “New Order” Modernization in Indonesia* (Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982).

<sup>45</sup>Federspiel, *Muslim Intellectuals*, 40-43 and 181.

<sup>46</sup>William B. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and Action in New Order Indonesia,” in James Rush and Mark Woodward, eds., *Intellectual Development in Indonesian Islam* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1995), 267-289.

<sup>47</sup>Mark R. Woodward, “Introduction: Talking Across Paradigms: Indonesia, Islam, and Orientalism,” in Mark R. Woodward, ed., *Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), 11-13.

<sup>48</sup>Karel A. Steenbrink, “Recapturing the Past: Historical Studies by IAIN-Staff,” in Mark R. Woodward, ed., *Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought* (Tempe: Arizona State University, 1996), 164-166.

<sup>49</sup>Greg Barton, “The International Context of the Emergence of Islamic Neo-Modernism in Indonesia,” in M.C. Ricklefs, ed., *Islam in the Indonesian Social Context* (Canberra: Annual Indonesian Lectures Series No: 15, 1989), 69-82.

project. Compared to them, Thoha Hamim gives us a more detailed analysis of the history of the slogan for a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna in Indonesia, but his main focus is on Moenawar Chalil's and not Madjid's thought. Likewise, Hamim concentrates on Chalil's insistence on purifying the basic teachings of Islam (*aqīda* and *ibāda-mahḍa*) of un-Islamic influences,<sup>50</sup> a field of as little interest to Madjid as it is to Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī. Nor do any of these Indonesianists compare Madjid with thinkers from other regions of the Muslim world, either. Thus the hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna is the most serious lacuna in the contributions of modern scholars, as is their reluctance to compare what is being said by different voices from different regions. It is my hope that I will be able to bridge these gaps in knowledge and approach by investigating these thinkers from three great centers of Islamic civilization: Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia.

This dissertation is comprised of three chapters. Chapter I briefly traces and links the slogan of a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna as the ideal solution to the decline of Islam in the modern age in Egypt, Morocco and Indonesia up to the emergence of Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid. The socio-political implications of the basic principles of the slogan are compared and analyzed in keeping with such theories as challenge and response, continuity and change, and conflict of periphery and center. Chapter II reveals some general similarities and differences between Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid as

---

<sup>50</sup>Hamim, "Moenawar Chalil's Reformist Thought."

reflected in their responses to factors that led to the decline of Islam in the modern age. The comparison is carried out in the light of Ḥanafī's three-dimensional reform project known as Heritage and Modernity, which consists of "Our Attitude towards Classical Heritage," "Our Attitude towards Western Heritage," and "Our Attitude towards Reality: Theory of Interpretation," respectively. Their responses to the internal (Islamic) factors are first of all compared from the perspective of "Our Attitude towards Classical Heritage," whereas their responses to the external (Western) factors are analyzed according to "Our Attitude towards Western Heritage." Chapter III compares their hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna in terms of "Our Attitude towards Reality: Theory of Interpretation." Chapters II and III compare Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's concepts more directly, while Chapter I focuses on their predecessors.

That Ḥanafī's thought is used as the criterion to compare the ideas of both al-Jābirī and Madjid in this dissertation is due to a number of reasons. The first of these is "[i]n view of Egypt's geostrategic location and centrality in the Middle Eastern and Islamic spheres,"<sup>51</sup> a fact that many Western scholars consider as the bastion of Sunnite fundamentalism.<sup>52</sup> Morocco's position ranks

---

<sup>51</sup>R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Resurgent Islam and the Egyptian State," in Reeva S. Simon, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz* (Columbia: Columbia University, Middle East Institute, n.d.), 204.

<sup>52</sup>This was true before the emergence of the Taleban in Afghanistan five years ago. It is highly probable that Egypt will now regain its prominence



second, while Indonesia is third. Epistemologically, moreover Ḥanafī is the most articulate thinker of the three in terms of the slogan, where his expertise in *‘ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* plays a significant role in solving the problem of how to go back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna, the most forgotten aspect of the call for a return to the sources of Islam. Compared to both al-Jābirī and Madjid, he wrote in languages more accessible to the modern world, and the Muslim world in particular. In addition to Arabic and French, in which languages al-Jābirī also expresses his ideas, Ḥanafī has written in English. Madjid on the other hand has never written in Arabic or in French, though like Ḥanafī he has written in English. Of course, unlike the others, he has written extensively in Indonesian, and he is thus mainly read in that language. Finally comes the principle of “age before beauty,” whereby Ḥanafī, the oldest, has pride of place before al-Jābirī and then Madjid, the youngest among the three thinkers. Of course, this means that he has been exposed the longest to the intellectual currents of this century, and, in a sense, has set the pace for his contemporaries.

---

as a center of Sunni fundamentalism with the recent collapse of the Taleban government.

# **Chapter I**

## **The Slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” as the Ideal Solution to the Decline of Islam in the Modern Age: A Historical Introduction**

In his article entitled “Revival and Reform,” Fazlur Rahman proposes a new categorization of Islamic reform into pre-modernist and modernist movements. Unlike such Western scholars as Charles C. Adams,<sup>1</sup> Wilfred C. Smith,<sup>2</sup> Hamilton A.R. Gibb,<sup>3</sup> and G.G. Pijper,<sup>4</sup> he begins his account of the pre-modernist reform movement with Shaykh Aḥmad of Sirhind (d. 1034/1625), and not with Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb (d. 1206/1792), the founder of the Wahhabite movement.<sup>5</sup> This new approach gained currency

---

<sup>1</sup>Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (London: Oxford University Press, 1933).

<sup>2</sup>Wilfred C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

<sup>3</sup>Hamilton A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (New York: Harper & Brother Publishers, 1959).

<sup>4</sup>G.P. Pijper, *Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia 1900-1950*, trans. Tudjimah and Yessy Augusdin (Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1984), 103.

<sup>5</sup>Fazlur Rahman, “Revival and Reform,” in P.M. Holt, Ann K. S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, eds., *The Cambridge History of Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 2: 673.

when scholars like Harun Nasution<sup>6</sup> and John O. Voll began to apply it. Even John L. Esposito, though he starts with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb,<sup>7</sup> follows Rahman’s categorization. I will, however, begin my discussion by arguing the earlier thesis, namely, that it was Wahhabism that pioneered the modern reform movement. This is simply because it was Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, and not Shaykh Aḥmad of Sirhind, who had the most influence on the mainstream Islamic reform movements in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia --the three countries on which I focus in this dissertation in the person of certain representative thinkers.<sup>8</sup> In order to set these movements against their respective historical

---

<sup>6</sup>Harun Nasution, *Pembaharuan dalam Islam: Sejarah Pemikiran dan Gerakan* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982).

<sup>7</sup>Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 33-34.

<sup>8</sup>Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s influences were different from those that affected Sirhindi. Unlike Sirhindi, who was an Indian and, therefore, on the periphery of the central Islamic lands, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb was a native of the Hejaz, the birthplace of Islam. His claim to “Islamness” was, therefore, more legitimate in terms of language and religious symbolism. While Sirhindi struggled against Hinduism, in the eyes of which his Islam was not only a “stranger” but a minority religion clinging to political power, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb called for a return to a pristine Islam, whose Scripture was expressed in his native language. Sirhindi had to face the challenge of Hindu symbols in his attempt at reviving his Indian Islam, whereas Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb was easily able to benefit from the proximity of Islamic sanctuaries like the Ka’ba and the Masjid al-Nabawī (The Prophet’s Mosque). Another important difference was political. Sirhindi worked under the auspices of the Mughal Empire, while Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb rebelled against the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman and the Mughal states were two independent Muslim empires, but the former was greater and the real Muslim superpower of the day, which makes it an even greater irony that the Ottomans were never fully able to control the Ḥarāmayn (the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina), for whereas they held the power, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb wielded the authority, and used it for his own political purposes. At the same time, the Arabs, who considered the Turks as usurpers of power, gained momentum when Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb grounded his

backgrounds, however, only their most basic concepts will be compared and analyzed in keeping with such theories as challenge and response, continuity and change, and conflict of periphery and center.

The emergence of Wahhabism from Najd in Central Arabia confirms the applicability of Frederick Jackson Turner's "Frontier Theory," as Emmanuel Sivan interprets it,<sup>9</sup> to the movement for Islamic reform.<sup>10</sup> As the birthplace of this politico-religious movement, Najd had been marginalized in the Muslim world since the short-lived removal of the capital of the Islamic caliphate from Medina to Kūfa by 'Alī ibn 'Abī al-Ṭālib in 656. Subsequent caliphs such as Mu'āwiyya ibn Abī Sufyān and al-Manṣūr played important roles in further marginalizing Najd, in the case of the first by his removal of the capital from Kūfa to Damascus in 661, and in that of the second by his decision to shift it from Ḥarrān to Baghdad in 762. Ultimately, the Mongol conquest of 1258 put

---

revolt on the call for a "return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna," an allegedly theological legitimacy that non-Arabs such as the Turks and Indians, sorely lacked. The success of the slogan would to some extent liberate the Arabs from the yoke of Turkish imperialism and reinforce their standing as candidates for the caliphate, as reflected in the slogan "*al-a'imma min Quraysh*" (Islamic leadership must come from Quraysh). It is for these reasons I disregard Rahman's Indian-centered thesis.

<sup>9</sup>Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 22.

<sup>10</sup>See also, R. Hrair Dekmejian, "Charismatic Leadership in Messianic and Revolutionary Movements: The Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad) and the Messiah (Shabbatai Sevi)," in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, eds., *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 97; and idem, "Resurgent Islam and the Egyptian State," in Reeve S. Simon, ed., *The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 205.

an end to the centrality of the Arabs in Islamic history. Sultan Selim I of the Ottoman Empire effectively terminated the political role of the Arab elite in Islamic history by conquering Egypt in 1517, whose capital of Cairo had functioned as the site of the caliphate after the fall of Baghdad. Thus by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s time the political center of Islam lay in Istanbul, which was not only outside of the Arab heartland but also partly located in Europe.

Najd, on the other hand, was “in the heart of the Arabian desert,”<sup>11</sup> a fact that, according to Ibn Khaldūn’s estimation, rendered it unsuitable for the development of civilization.<sup>12</sup> In spite of this, Gibb says, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb chose Najd as the basis of his movement for strategic purposes, given that it was such an isolated area that it lay beyond the control of Ottoman central power.<sup>13</sup> Thus when in 1774 Sultan Abd al-Hamid I (1773-1789) proclaimed for the first time in Ottoman history that he was the universal caliph of all Muslims, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb rejected this claim and joined forces with Muḥammad ibn Sa‘ūd.<sup>14</sup> In doing so he showed that he was fully aware of the implications of

---

<sup>11</sup>Abdul Hamid Siddiqi, “Renaissance in Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and His Movement,” in M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy with Short Accounts of Other Disciplines and the Modern Renaissance in Muslim Lands*, fourth edition (Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1995), 2: 1447.

<sup>12</sup>Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, edited by ‘Alī ‘Abd al-Wāḥid Wāfi (Cairo: Lajnat al-Bayān al-‘Arabī, 1965), 2: 72-74.

<sup>13</sup>Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam*, 40.

<sup>14</sup>Esposito regards the event as marking the birth of the Wahhabite movement because he sees Ibn Sa‘ūd as “a local tribal chief.” Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 35. On the other hand, Hourani considers this alliance as the formation of a state, since Ibn Sa‘ūd for him was a “ruler of a small town,

the Ottoman defeat at the hands of the Russians, and of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarja that was signed in its wake on July 12, 1774. The treaty allowed, among others, the Muslim Tartars to establish a semi-independent state within the Ottoman Empire under the auspices of the Russian Tsar (which he annexed nine years later).<sup>15</sup> Austria even seized Bukovina from the Ottoman Empire in the same year, although she had been neutral in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768-1774.<sup>16</sup> Both the Treaty and Austria's victory, for the Wahhabites, opened the way for the periphery to defeat the political center.

The problem of periphery versus center in Wahhabite religious politics is even more obvious when one tries, following Voll's suggestion, to approach it from the "within" perspective,<sup>17</sup> to see its application within the context of an Islamic movement. Diagnosing society as suffering from "the moral laxity

---

Dar'iyya." Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 40. For Olivier de Corancez, writing in the first decade of 1800, "Diriya was the capital of the new [Wahhabite] empire." Louis Alexander Olivier de Corancez, *The History of the Wahhabis from their Origin until the End of 1809*, trans. Eric Tabet (Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 1995), 8.

<sup>15</sup>Dilip Hiro, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1989), 44.

<sup>16</sup>M.E. Yapp, *The Making of the Modern Near East 1792-1923* (London and New York: Longman, 1987), 47. See also, Emory C. Bogle, *The Modern Middle East From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958* (New Jersey, 1996), 13-14; and Bernard Lewis, "Islam and the West," in Edward Ingram, ed., *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Khadduri* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 25.

<sup>17</sup>Voll, "Wahhabism and Mahdiism," 110-111.

and spiritual malaise of his time,”<sup>18</sup> since it deviated from the divine blue-print, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb prescribed a course of treatment that had important repercussions. Instead of supporting the Ottoman Empire as the only viable Muslim superpower, he accused it of being a source of *bid‘a* (innovation). To prevent Najd, which was a Hanbalite stronghold, from being further marginalized, he severely criticized modernism, which he saw as creeping Westernization, at the center of Islamic power.<sup>19</sup> To counter its influence, he revived Hanbalism (as interpreted by Ibn Taymiyya).<sup>20</sup> Realizing that, as a minority school, it would almost never gain the upper hand in a vote-based consensus (*ijmā‘*), Hanbalism accepts the latter concept only in a very limited sense, just as the Kharijites had done in respect of ‘Alī’s peace agreement with Mu‘āwiyya. The decision by the Wahhabites to limit *ijmā‘* to the first three generations of Islam<sup>21</sup> was in this context designed to forestall the non-Arab political elite of the empire. Furthermore, in response to the complicated problems facing the empire, which included (among others) a lack of technological and scientific knowledge vis-à-vis the West, Ibn ‘Abd al-

---

<sup>18</sup>Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 35. See also, Derek Hopwood, “A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?” *The Islamic Quarterly* 15,4 (1971): 152.

<sup>19</sup>R. Hartmann, “Die Wahhabiten,” *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 68,2 (1924): 176-213. See also Geoffrey Lewis, *Turkey*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 35.

<sup>20</sup>See also Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 6<sup>th</sup> edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 253-254.

<sup>21</sup>S.M.A. Sayeed, *The Myth of Authenticity (A Study in Islamic Fundamentalism)* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995), 43.

Wahhāb applied the literal and textual approaches of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* (people of prophetic “tradition”) rather than the more flexible outlook of the *ahl al-ra’y* (people of reason) to the interpretation of Islam. Although for Gibb<sup>22</sup> and Khouri<sup>23</sup> Wahhabism cannot be equated with Arabism, it was Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s belief that “only the Arabs could bring Islam back to its original pristine purity,”<sup>24</sup> implying an exclusively Quraysh-based elitism (“*al-a’imma min Quraysh*”) in rejecting the legitimacy of the Ottomans. Thus “the Wahhabiyya,” says Hopwood, “was in some ways specifically Arab.”<sup>25</sup>

Muslims, according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s point of view, had deviated from the divine plan, which had led to their decline. Instead of strictly observing the teachings of the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, they had mixed these with un-Islamic practices. From the perspective of his puritan theology, he condemned this development as *bid‘a*. He accused above all the sufis, who were again mostly non-Arab and popular figures, as the primary innovators. He desacralized them by imposing his “message-oriented *tajdid*” --to use Voll’s term.<sup>26</sup> Although the majority of the Shiite-sufi elite were of Arab origin, and even based their legitimacy on descent from the Prophet Muḥammad, they had

---

<sup>22</sup>Gibb, *Modern Trends*, 45.

<sup>23</sup>Philip Khouri, *The Patterns of Mass Movement in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970), 96.

<sup>24</sup>Bassam Tibi, *Islam and Nationalism between Islam and the Nation-State*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 88.

<sup>25</sup>Hopwood, “A Pattern of Revival Movements,” 158.

<sup>26</sup>Voll, “Wahhabism and Mahdiyyism,” 123.



become Persianized. In this context, Wahhabites and Shiites are almost mutually exclusive descriptors. Thus, while the former were wholly against the idolization of any human being, regardless of his or her socio-spiritual status, the Shiites made their hereditary relationship to the Prophet Muḥammad the basis of their legitimacy. Hence the latter became the chief target for the Wahhabites because of their claim to act as intercessors between man and Allāh; indeed Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb considered the whole idea of intercession as unforgivable sin (*shirk*).<sup>27</sup> This mutually exclusive conflict found practical expression when the Wahhabites attacked Shiite shrines and other symbols. In 1802, under the leadership of Sa‘ūd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, they went so far as to pillage the city of Karbala and destroy the tomb of Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, the Wahhabites kept preaching to their fellow Muslims, regardless of their country of origin, the Ḥadīth “*Kullu bid‘atin ḍalāla wa kullu ḍalālātin fi-an-Nār*” (Every innovation is going-astray and every going-astray leads to Hell).

These popular, deviating practices were, according to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, one result of an epistemological dependency. In addition to the

---

<sup>27</sup>Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* (Cairo: Dār al-Miṣr, n.d.). See also Phoenix, “A Brief Outline of the Wahhabi Movement,” *Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society* 7 (1930): 402.

<sup>28</sup>Ronald R. MacIntire, ed., “Saudi Arabia,” in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 10; and *Tendances et courants de l’Islam arabe contemporain*, Vol. 2: *Un modele d’état islamique: l’Arabie saoudite*, by Adel-Theodor Khoury (Mainz: Grünewald, 1983), 13.

unquestioned obedience by a disciple (*murīd* or *sālik*) to a master (*murshid* or *shaykh*) taught by some dominant schools of sufism, *taqlīd* (imitation) was a common practice even among mainstream Sunnite scholars. Not only did absolute obedience and *taqlīd* create idols, preventing Muslims from achieving the truth by themselves, they also weakened their will to act. Some Islamic legal authorities (*fuqahāʾ*) even claimed that the door of *ijtihād* was forever closed, thereby strengthening the sufi and non-Ḥanbalite ‘*ulamaʾ*’ establishment and the *status quo*. Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, however, rejected this centrist vision. By condemning *taqlīd*,<sup>29</sup> he chose to become part of what Arnold Toynbee calls a “creative minority” vis-à-vis that of an “un-creative majority,”<sup>30</sup> epistemologically speaking. On the other hand, he emphasized that to restore the authenticity of Islam, one has to undertake *ijtihād* oneself. For him “[t]his purification,” as Esposito explains it, “was the prerequisite for a strong, powerful society as well as a requirement for eternal life.”<sup>31</sup> In so doing, he sought to liberate his society from what he saw as the danger posed by sufis, non-Ḥanbalite ‘*ulamaʾ*’, and the non-Qurayshite elite of the Ottoman Empire. However, he had no faith in the significance of imitation law (*uṣūl al-fiqh*: the level between “*taqlīd*” and “*ittibāʾ*”) in the history-making process. Instead of opening his epistemological principles to the achievements of human

---

<sup>29</sup>See also, Siddiqi, “Renaissance in Arabia,” 1448.

<sup>30</sup>Arnold J. Toynbee, *A Study of History*, 17<sup>th</sup> edition (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 246.

<sup>31</sup>Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 35.

civilization for the sake of his Islamic reform, he selectively criticized all post-prophetic tradition. At the same time, he sacralized the practice of the earliest Muslims, by calling for a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna in imitation of the righteous ancestors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*). Disregarding the Ottoman Empire, the largest empire ever built by Muslims,<sup>32</sup> he instead offered his followers a much smaller political model, i.e., the “Arab” one of the rightly guided Caliphs.

Realizing the pointlessness of a life of faith (*īmān*) without practice (*‘amal*), which was the approach of most of the Muslims of his day, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb took steps to impose on his fellow Muslims a strict and literal lifestyle that called for a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. In addition to considering those who resisted his appeal to be *mushrikūn* (non-believers),<sup>33</sup> he and his fellows actually took up weapons to destroy their opponents’ holy places, such as tombs, in order to put a stop to their un-Islamic practices. They even tightened their monopoly on truth by prohibiting (in around 1803-1811) “l'accès des Villes Saintes aux Musulmans qui n'appartenaient pas à leur Ecole...”<sup>34</sup> These initiatives suggest to Arnold Hottinger<sup>35</sup> that the Wahhabites

---

<sup>32</sup>See also John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 43.

<sup>33</sup>Phoenix, “A Brief Outline,” 402; and Zaharuddin, “Wahhabism and Its Influences,” 149.

<sup>34</sup>Michaux-Bellaire, “Le Wahhabisme au Maroc,” *Renseignements coloniaux et documents* (Publiés par Le Comité de l'Afrique Française et le Comité du Maroc) 1928: 491.

<sup>35</sup>Arnold Hottinger, *Islamischer Fundamentalismus* (Paderborn, München, Wien, and Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1993), 14.

were fundamentalists, a description which Dekmejian<sup>36</sup> echoes while calling them puritans and militants as well. Rahman on the other hand characterizes them as “Islamic positivist transcendentalists.”<sup>37</sup> The Wahhabites, from Rahman’s insider standpoint, were preoccupied with “the situation of Islamic societies *in this world* and their proposed remedy in terms of ‘obedience to God’s law.’”<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, both Rahman<sup>39</sup> and Voll<sup>40</sup> are inconsistent in characterizing Wahhabism as Islamic fundamentalism. Like Dekmejian, Tibi tends to neglect the pragmatic aspect of Wahhabism; whereas the former equates Wahhabism with “primitivism,”<sup>41</sup> the latter judges it a “backward-looking utopia.”<sup>42</sup> In point of fact, the Wahhabites not only desacralized such religious practices as the usage of the rosary and the visitation of shrines which they considered un-Islamic, but also to some extent improved the lives of Muslims by prohibiting such harmful vices as smoking tobacco. While such a ban was already characteristic of Protestant Christians, he actually anticipated

---

<sup>36</sup>Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 16 and 17.

<sup>37</sup>Rahman, “Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism,” 26.

<sup>38</sup>Ibid. Italics are Rahman’s.

<sup>39</sup>Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 223. See also idem, “Modern Muslim Thought,” *The Muslim World* 45 (1955), 17.

<sup>40</sup>Voll’s criteria for fundamentalism fit Wahhabism perfectly. Voll, “The Evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism,” 115-117. He is even very explicit about this. See his *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982), 53-56.

<sup>41</sup>Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 17.

<sup>42</sup>Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 89.

the objections to smoking being voiced today in such post-industrial countries as the United States, Great Britain and Canada. Tibi is also mistaken in characterizing Wahhabism as an archaic-millenarian movement,<sup>43</sup> when Islam is clearly centenary in its outlook –witness the belief that God will send a *mujaddid* (reformer) at the beginning of each new Islamic century.<sup>44</sup>

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s message-oriented *tajdīd* was to some extent also a form of “secularism,” since he insisted on a separation between spiritual and temporal power. In his power sharing with Ibn Sa‘ūd, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb chose the title of Supreme Shaykh, i.e., one “who provided a puritanical religious ideology,”<sup>45</sup> while leaving the title of General of the Wahhabite order or Imam (the role of “political-military chieftain”<sup>46</sup>) to the former. “Temporal and spiritual power [were] thus [to be] held in different hands.”<sup>47</sup> Far from proving a hindrance, this arrangement resulted in the Islamic positivist transcendentalism of the Wahhabite state, extending “from Aleppo in the North to the Indian Ocean and from the Persian Gulf and the Iraq frontier in the East

---

<sup>43</sup>Ibid.

<sup>44</sup>See Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 2: 512.

<sup>45</sup>Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 131.

<sup>46</sup>Ibid.

<sup>47</sup>Olivier de Corancez, *The History of the Wahhabis*, 8.

to the Red Sea.”<sup>48</sup> This would soon be perceived as the Wahhabite “menace,” affecting the balance of political and economic power in the Middle East.<sup>49</sup>

In response, the Ottoman sultan ordered Suleiman Pāshā, the governor of Baghdad, to take military action against the Wahhabites. After the failure of this 1797 campaign,<sup>50</sup> the Sultan in 1811 ordered Muḥammad ‘Alī Pāshā, the governor of Egypt, who was another powerful threat to him from periphery, to march against the Wahhabites. After this campaign ended in failure, Tūsūn, a son of Muḥammad ‘Alī, was more successful, in that he was able to capture Medina in 1812 and even Mecca and Ṭā’if in 1813. In 1818, Muḥammad ‘Alī’s eldest son Ibrāhīm Pāshā completely crushed the Wahhabite forces under the leadership of ‘Abd Allāh, who had succeeded his father Sa‘ūd ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz in 1814 after the latter’s death.<sup>51</sup> This political defeat did not, however, extinguish the flame of Wahhabite religio-spiritual awakening. Instead it won wider attention when its liberating ideology spread outside the Hejaz and inspired the emergence of such Islamic revival movements as the Fulani (1754-1817) in Nigeria, the Sanusi (1787-1857) in the Sudan, the

---

<sup>48</sup>H. St. J. Philby, *Arabia* (London, 1930), 8. See also Munson, Jr., *Islam and Revolution*, 66.

<sup>49</sup>Zaharuddin, “Wahhabism and Its Influence,” 150.

<sup>50</sup>Olivier de Corancez, *The History of the Wahhabis*, 19.

<sup>51</sup>Esther Peskes, *Muḥammad b. ‘Abdulwahhab (1703-92) im Widerstreit: Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der Frühgeschichte der Wahhabiya* (Beirut: In Kommission Bei Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1993), 128; and Zaharuddin, “Wahhabism and Its Influence,” 150. See also, Ghassan Salamé, “Political Power and the Saudi State,” in Albert Hourani, Philip S.

Faraizi of Hajji Shariat Allah (1764-1840) in Bengal, the Mujahidin of Ahmad Barelwi (1786-1831) in India, the Paderi movement (1803-1837) in West Sumatra (now a part of Indonesia), and the Mahdist rebellion (1848-1885) in the Sudan.<sup>52</sup> Nevertheless, for the purposes of this dissertation I will focus only on Wahhabite influence in Egypt, Morocco, and Indonesia.

The early response to the Wahhabite movement in Morocco came from a central personality. The Alawite Sultan Muḥammad ibn ‘Abd Allāh (1757-1790) saw the Wahhabite slogan as a potential instrument to assist in consolidating his own power within the realm. Morocco had remained independent from Ottoman control for almost one thousand years,<sup>53</sup> even to the extent that the sultan was referred to as both commander of the faithful (*amīr al-mu’minīn*) and caliph, and yet his power was still limited. Although he presided over the *makhzan*, a deliberative body that Laroui describes as “le groupe qui choisit et qui exécute,”<sup>54</sup> his authority was not *the* center because he had always to face the challenge of his traditional competitors, the marabouts,

---

Khoury, and Mary C. Wilson, eds, *The Modern Middle East* (London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993), 579.

<sup>52</sup>Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, 50.

<sup>53</sup>John Damis, “Early Moroccan Reaction to the French Protectorate: The Cultural Dimension,” *Humaniora Islamica* 1 (1973), 18; and Kees Wagtendonk, “Islam, the Makhzan and the French: Some Remarks on Moroccan Islam, 1830-1980,” in Ibrahim A. El-Sheikh, C. Aart van de Koppel and Rudolf Peters, eds., *The Challenge of the Middle East* (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1982), 142.

<sup>54</sup>Abdallah Laroui, *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)* (Paris: François Maspero, 1977), 111.

militant sufi warrior groups who used their *zāwiyyas* (retreats) as fortresses to dominate politically their surrounding areas. While the marabouts “recognized” the place of the sultan as the chief political official, they, in fact, disputed his control over them and the population they controlled. The Moroccan populace, torn between conflicting centers of political power, recognized that both the sultan and the marabouts had *baraka* (grace) of their own kind, but that in times of political conflict the marabouts’ *baraka* was often a more effective defence. As a descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad, the sultan too had a *baraka*, but this lesser legitimacy was of little use in any challenge to the collective *baraka* of the marabouts, since the marabouts, who exercised a very strong spiritual influence over the tribes, claimed, like the sultan, to be descendents of the Prophet. Then there was the dichotomy of *sharīʿa* and *ḥaqīqa*, a third element that Wagtendonk considers to have been a determining factor in the conflict of authority between the sultans and marabouts. As members of the central government (*makhzan*), the ‘*ulamāʾ*’ were the sultan’s loyal supporters, but their *ẓāhīr* (exoteric) religious authority was always challenged by the marabouts, who were representatives of the *bāṭinī* (esoteric) expression of Islam. In this context, Moroccans believed that the marabouts, unlike the ‘*ulamāʾ*’ who represented the *sharīʿa*, received ‘immanent revelation.’ It was therefore in order to strengthen his *bilād al-makhzan* (the supremacy of his central government in terms of law and order), and to weaken the marabouts’ support of *bilād al-sībaʾ* (dissidence against the



central power), that the sultan introduced Wahhabite reforms to Morocco.<sup>55</sup> The sultan also found the Arabness of the Wahhabite slogan of particular significance to the historical defense of Moroccan rulers against the threat of Ottoman domination.<sup>56</sup>

To counter the authority of the marabouts, Sultan ‘Abd Allāh used the long held supremacy of orthodox jurisprudence over mystical practice, particularly those aspects of it considered esoteric. His first step was the removal of the marabouts’ preferred legal text *al-Mukhtaṣar*, “a manual of Muslim jurisprudence according to the Malikite rite prepared by the fourteenth century Egyptian canon lawyer Khalil b. Ishaq al-Jundi,”<sup>57</sup> from the curriculum of the University of Qarawiyyīn. The replacement of the *Mukhtaṣar* with Qur’ān-and-Sunna-oriented jurisprudence would, Sultan ‘Abd Allāh reasoned, reduce the popular authority of the marabouts, since the university’s graduates (as candidates for the new religious elite) could more easily criticize the

---

<sup>55</sup>Wagtendonk, “Islam, the Makhzan, and the French,” 142-143; Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 12; and Egbal Ahmad, “Islam and Politics,” in *The Islamic Impact*, edited by Yvonne Haddad, Byron Haines and Ellison Findly (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 17.

<sup>56</sup>Edmund Burke, “Pan-Islamism and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912,” *Journal of African History* 12 (1972), 101.

<sup>57</sup>J. Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement (1963),” in Immanuel Wallerstein, ed., *Social Change: The Colonial Situation* (New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), 491.

marabouts using the Qur'ān and the Sunna as their main sources.<sup>58</sup> By insisting on the simple, strict and literal teachings of Hanbalism (although he was himself a Malikite by rite) vis-à-vis the complicated, imaginary and superstitious teachings of the marabouts, Sultan 'Abd Allāh tried to desacralize their *baraka*. To accomplish this, he accused them of deviating from true Islam, of being in effect against Islam, and therefore against him. To back up his “message-oriented *tajdīd*,” to use Voll’s term,<sup>59</sup> he brought to Morocco “copies of the *Musnads* of the great *imams* of the school of Muslim jurisprudence.”<sup>60</sup>

Sultan 'Abd Allāh further strengthened his position by compiling the *al-Futuḥāt al-Ilāhiyya fī Aḥādīth Khayr al-Bariyya al-latī Tushfā bihā al-Qulūb al-Sādiyya* (Divine Disclosures of the Ḥadīths of the Best Creature [the Prophet Muḥammad], by which the Ambitious Hearts are Healed), a collation of “the traditions in the six canonical books of Prophetic traditions in one volume.”<sup>61</sup> He completed this task in 1784, which allowed him to establish his religious authority in addition to gaining popular recognition as sultan and as a descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad. The same year, however, saw a more serious conflict of authority. Feeling insecure about his politico-religious legitimacy, the sultan destroyed most of Boujad, a city where the Sharqawite

---

<sup>58</sup>'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Zaydān, *al-Durar al-Fākhirā bi Ma'āthir Mulūk al-'Alawiyyīn bi Fās al-Zāhira* (Rabat, 1937), 60-61.

<sup>59</sup>Voll, “Wahhabism and Madhiism,” 123.

<sup>60</sup>Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 492.

*zāwiyya* was located.<sup>62</sup> The latter institution under the leadership of a charismatic marabout Sid al-‘Arbī (d. 1819) posed, at least in the sultan’s eyes, a threat to his authority. He was eager to put an end to the political significance of the *zāwiyya*, “a sanctuary powerful enough to provide security for refugee tribesmen and Makhzen officials negotiating amnesties (*aman-s*) from the Makhzen.”<sup>63</sup> He might have been able to place the *bilād al-siba’* under military control, but he still had to face their stronger challenge. Despite this bold move against the marabouts, they remained strong enough politically to support the revolt of the sultan’s son Mawlāy Yazīd against him in 1787. And yet the changed political landscape was apparent when the sultan was finally able to pacify the revolt.

When Sultan ‘Abd Allāh died in 1790, there emerged a civil war among his three sons. While Mawlāy Hishām was recognized as sultan in Marrakesh, Mawlāy Yazīd held power elsewhere. In his earlier revolt against his father, Mawlāy Yazīd had been supported by “Berber marabouts and tribesmen in the Rif and Middle Atlas mountains.”<sup>64</sup> However, the youngest of the three, Mawlāy Sulaymān spent two years locked in a bitter struggle against

---

<sup>61</sup>Ibid.

<sup>62</sup>Dale F. Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center* (Austin and London: University of Texas, 1976), 40.

<sup>63</sup>Ibid.; and see idem, “Ideological Change and Regional Cults: Maraboutism and the Ties of ‘Closeness’ in Western Morocco,” in R.P. Werbner, ed., *Regional Cults* (London, New York, and San Francisco: Academic Press, 1977), 7.

<sup>64</sup>Eickelman, *Moroccan Islam*, 41.

his brothers in a bid to be finally recognized as sultan throughout Morocco, which he succeeded in accomplishing in 1792.<sup>65</sup> In a significant policy reversal, Sultan Sulaymān restored the text of *al-Mukhtaṣar* to the position it had enjoyed before his father's reform.<sup>66</sup> Despite this sop to the marabouts, he apparently regarded them as his rivals and he continued --even expanded-- the policy of his father against them.<sup>67</sup> His "pastoral letter" (1811) so challenged the marabouts that he had to use military force to quell the uprising against him that nearly swept away the dynasty (1822).<sup>68</sup> He also counterattacked the religious authority of the marabouts, who were the backbone of his powerful rival and brother Yazīd, by using the Wahhabite interpretation of Islam. Stressing "the need to conform to the Quran and the Sunna,"<sup>69</sup> he identified himself with the sacred, long-recognized sources of religious knowledge. At the same time he condemned his opponents for deviating from the true Islam, by prohibiting their festivals and their visits to shrines.<sup>70</sup> In the process, he undermined their political significance, and liberated much of Moroccan

---

<sup>65</sup>Ibid.

<sup>66</sup>Aḥmad b. Khālīd al-Nāṣirī, *Kitāb al-Istiḳṣā' li Akhbār Duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* (Casablanca, 1954), 7: 67.

<sup>67</sup>Abun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement," 492.

<sup>68</sup>Lewis et al., *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v., "Salafiyya," by P. Sinar (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 8: 905.

<sup>69</sup>Henry Munson, Jr., *Religion and Power in Morocco* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993), 85.

<sup>70</sup>Abun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement," 492.

society from the grip of the marabouts, while at the same time gathering it into his own control.

By contrast, the early response of Indonesian Muslims to the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” came from a group that was peripheral, both in terms of geography and its sponsors. Unlike Egypt and Morocco, West Sumatra was far from the center of the last Muslim super-power in Istanbul, and even within its region it was outside the local Islamic center of Java and Aceh. Moreover, not only were its Sumateran advocates Miskin, Sumanik, and Piobang commoners, they also represented a new kind of ‘*ulama*’ rejected even by their own society.<sup>71</sup> Miskin and his colleagues imported the potent Wahhabite revolutionary spirit to West Sumatra upon their return from the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1803. Like other Wahhabite movements, Miskin’s movement (the so-called Paderi movement) concentrated on reforms aimed at purifying Islam.<sup>72</sup> Such practices as cock-fighting, gambling, and alcohol

---

<sup>71</sup>W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesië van Vorstenrijk tot Neo-kolonie* (Amsterdam: Boom, 1978), 5, quoted in Karel A. Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 34.

<sup>72</sup>Taufik Abdullah, “Adat dan Islam: Tinjauan Konflik di Minangkabau,” in Taufik Abdullah, ed., *Sejarah dan Masyarakat: Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 1987), 1174-118; idem, *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987), 7, 10 and 92-93. See also Yudian Wahyudi “Introduction: Was Wahid Hasyim Really Just A Traditionalist?,” in Achmad Zaini, *Kyai Haji Abdul Wahid Hasyim: His Contribution to Muslim Educational Reform and Indonesian Nationalism during the Twentieth Century* (Yogyakarta: Indonesian Academic Society XXI, 1998), xiv.

drinking,<sup>73</sup> all of them quite popular in West Sumatera, were declared to be against the *Shari'a* and, hence, to constitute a politico-cultural threat to true Islam in the region. Also in keeping with their peripheral character, the Paderis challenged the matriarchal system of Minangkabau, according to which female members of the society had more customary value and influence than males.<sup>74</sup> The importation of the Wahhabite revolution challenged this gender relationship by asserting a higher worth for males, since a patriarchal system could be justified through their particular interpretation of the Qur'ān and the Sunna. The Qur'ān provided them with the justification "men are in charge of women" (Q. 4: 34), which they used to legitimize the patriarchal system they strove to build.

The Paderis, like Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, found political authority in their region to be very diffuse, based as it was on clan groups, confederacies within Minangkabau and generalized treaty obligations with the Dutch or English in Jakarta. And like Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (but unlike Sultan 'Abd Allāh), they strongly emphasized Islamic solidarity in the face of other political entities since both the Minangkabau and Dutch forms of authority were regarded as unsuitable for true believers. The Paderis also imitated Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb (and indeed Sultan 'Abd Allāh) in imposing an Islamic positivist

---

<sup>73</sup>Bernhard Dahm, "Islam in Sumatera," in Werner Draguhn, ed., *Der Einfluß des Islam auf Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Südostasien* (Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 1983), 64.

<sup>74</sup>B. J. Schreike, *Pergolakan Agama di Sumatera Barat, Sebuah Sumbangan Bibliografi* (Jakarta: Bhratara, 1973), 12-14.

transcendentalism, which consisted in attacking the non-Wahhabite practices of the West Sumaterans. Like the Wahhabites, the Paderis directed their attack against the proponents of custom (*kaum adat*) who controlled Minangkabau society and were supported by the Dutch or English overlords. The *kaum adat* reacted hostilely, resulting in the first armed conflict over this issue, which took place in Lawas. Under pressure from their opponents, the *kaum adat* asked for British help, to which appeal the British Lieutenant Governor Raffles responded by building a fort in Semawang in 1818. It was not until 1821 however that the Paderis, under the leadership of Tuanku Pasaman, attacked this stronghold; in the meantime the Dutch had replaced the British as colonial overlords in the region. In 1824 the Paderis again attacked the Dutch, this time in Suruaso and once again in vain, but the latter, although they weathered the assault, were unable to respond militarily because they in 1825 were faced with another major rebellion in Yogyakarta under the leadership of Prince Diponegoro.<sup>75</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup>Karel Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950*, translated by Jan Steenbrink and Hanry Jansen (Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi B.V.m 1993), 74-75. The royal family of the Yogyakarta Sultanate had rejected Diponegoro's nomination to succeed his father on the basis of the non-royal origins of his mother, to which the Dutch added their fear of his Islamic orientation. In 1825 some of his property, including land on which his palace stood, was confiscated. It was not, however, until the Yogyakarta government decided to build a new road on his land with the help of the Dutch that he began to voice to some extent a Wahhabite-inspired Kharijite egalitarianism in calling for *jihād* against both the Yogyakarta Sultanate and the Dutch. Idem, *Beberapa Aspek*, 19 and 32.

After subduing the Diponegoro movement (a rebellion popularly known as the Java war) in 1830, the Dutch were finally able to move their Yogyakarta-based troops to Minangkabau. This allowed the Dutch to fight back “against the *Padri* until the main leader, Imam Bonjol, gave up the struggle in 1837.”<sup>76</sup> At the same time, as Abdullah explains, “the rural areas of Minangkabau were included in the *Pax Neederlandica*, which was continuing its attempts to ‘pacify’ and, hence, expand and annex territories.”<sup>77</sup> The Dutch ultimately sent Imam Bonjol and a number of his leading followers into exile, moving them from place to place until finally settling on Minahasa, North Sulawesi, where he died on 6 November 1864. The Paderis, like their Wahhabite forebears, lost their battle but won their war against the Dutch, since they succeeded in Islamizing *adat* by ensuring that the “pure” Islam, as they understood it, was regarded as the only valid criterion of Minangkabau custom. The Minangkabau thereafter observed the principle of “*agamo mangato, adat mamakai*” (religion rules, while *adat* practices), a new regulation that categorically condemned *jahili adat* as forbidden.<sup>78</sup> Moreover, like their Wahhabite masters, whose influence spread far beyond the boundaries of their native country, the Paderis exported their campaign for a purer Islam to a number of islands and, quite possibly, kingdoms, which were eventually to form the modern state of Indonesia. Thus non-Minangkabau

---

<sup>76</sup>Steenbrink, *Dutch Colonialism*, 75.

<sup>77</sup>Abdullah, *Islam dan Masyarakat*, 118.



Muslims throughout the archipelago assimilated the reform ideas of the Paderis. The influence of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” in Indonesia subsequently manifested itself in modern socio-religious organizations.<sup>79</sup>

In contrast to Indonesia, where the rebellious wing of Wahhabism ceased to be model, Egypt saw a revival in the populist revolutionary spirit of the doctrine with the arrival of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (1838-1897) there. Wahhabism had exerted hardly any influence in the country beforehand due to the influence of Muḥammad ‘Alī and his dynasty, backed by the pro-establishment forces of al-Azhār. Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and the Paderis, al-Afghānī was a personality from the political periphery of the day. Persian and Shiite by birth, he embraced both these identities during his early life, pursuing a traditional education before rising to the position of prime minister under the Qajar ruler Dūst Muḥammad ‘Alī. Some time after being toppled from that post, he dropped the al-Asādābādī *nisba* (relation) from his name and began to identify himself as a Sunnite Muslim, concealing his Shiite origin (according to Goldziher<sup>80</sup> and Nikki R. Keddie<sup>81</sup>). Up to this point nothing had been heard

---

<sup>78</sup>Abdullah, “Adat dan Islam,” 119.

<sup>79</sup>Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan: Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), 32, 61 and 179.

<sup>80</sup>Bernard Lewis et al., *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. “Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī,” by Ignaz Goldziher (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965), 2: 417.

<sup>81</sup>Nikki R. Keddie, *Sayyid Jamal al-Din “al-Afghani”: A Political Biography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1972), 10.

of his slogan for a return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. Quite the contrary, for after adopting this new identity he travelled to Istanbul to lend support to the secularist reforms of the Tanzimat.<sup>82</sup> In an act that certainly runs counter to his peripheral identification, al-Afghānī attempted, while in Istanbul, to reinforce the secularist position then prominent at the center, even distancing himself from Islam on the excuse that “neither man’s existence nor his survival depended on God’s will, creation, or law”—to quote Niyazi Berkes.<sup>83</sup> But this identification with the center was shortlived, for his views had begun to diverge from those of the leading government officials and after his second lecture to the Dar-ul-Funûn in December 1870, the Seyh-ül-Islām Hasan Fehmi reacted so negatively that, to avoid possible arrest, al-Afghānī fled the capital for Egypt. Unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, whose reforms were merely an internal response to the decline of Muslim world,<sup>84</sup> al-Afghānī, like the Paderis, had begun to see the West as a major threat to Islam’s identity and mission, a

---

Muhsin Mahdi, however, insists that al-Afghānī was not a Shiite. Mohsen Mahdi, “Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani,” *Arab Journal* 4 (1966-67): 18-19.

<sup>82</sup>A. Albert Kudsi-Zadeh, “Islamic Reform in Egypt: Some Observations on the Role of Afghani,” *The Muslim World* 61,1 (1971): 2.

<sup>83</sup>Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), 186.

<sup>84</sup>Charles Adams, “Conservative Movements in the Arab World,” *Arab Journal* 4,1 (1966-1967): 62; Voll “Islamic Renewal,” 128; Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, 18; Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 32, and Gabriel Baer, “Islam and Politics in Modern Middle Eastern History,” in Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, eds., *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984), 14.

discovery, as Rahman suggests, that marked the beginning of Islamic modern history.<sup>85</sup>

Although he was eventually instrumental in helping the Egyptians replace the pro-British Khedive Ismāʿīl in 1879 with the new Khedive Tawfīq, al-Afghānī was soon to be disappointed in the latter. Under British pressure,<sup>86</sup> Tawfīq sent al-Afghānī into exile when the latter “pressed hard for constitutional reforms and for the dismissal of Europeans from governmental posts.”<sup>87</sup> From his new place of exile in Hyderabad, India, al-Afghānī attacked a central figure in the Indian Muslim community, Aḥmad Khan, in the pages of his *Refutation of the Materialists*, where he condemned the latter’s pro-British attitude.<sup>88</sup> Meanwhile, the ‘Urabi revolt (1881-1882) – “the ‘Young Egyptian Movement’, with which Jamal has been so prominently identified”<sup>89</sup> -- failed, leading the British to occupy Egypt.<sup>90</sup> Since his political positions left him little influence within the Muslim world, he turned to the outside world as a

---

<sup>85</sup>Rahman, “Modern Muslim Thought,” 16.

<sup>86</sup>Concerning this, Allana says: “Under instructions from London, Vivian, the British Consul-General in Cairo, prevailed over Tawfiq Pasha, the Khedive of Egypt, to force Jamaluddin to leave Egypt.” G. Allana, *Muslim Political Thought through the Ages: 1562-1947* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988), 142.

<sup>87</sup>Kudsi-Zadeh, “Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the National Awakening,” 302-303.

<sup>88</sup>Gibb, *Modern Trends*, 58.

<sup>89</sup>Sami Abdullah Kaloti, “The Reformation of Islam and the Impact of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad ‘Abduh on Islamic Education” (Ph. D. diss., Marquette University, 1974), 50.

<sup>90</sup>Munson, *Islam and Revolution*, 75.

base from which to reassert his influence. It was in Paris in 1884 that he, together with Muḥammad ‘Abduh (likewise barred from Egypt for his involvement in ‘Urābī’s abortive *coup d’état* of 1881-1882),<sup>91</sup> started the writing and publication of *al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā* (The Indissoluble Link), an anti-British and Pan-Islamist journal of the day.<sup>92</sup> He started to work out Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s slogan in a wider and more strategic perspective to avoid any potential internal disaster if he strictly followed the latter’s message, adapting only the emphasis, targets, and approaches to the slogan. He was fully aware of a double challenge facing the Muslim world. The Muslim world, he decided, had to cope with its internal weaknesses, while responding to the politico-military challenges of the West.

Al-Afghānī, like Sultan ‘Abd Allāh and the Paderis, reemphasized the significance of purifying Muslim practices of un-Islamic rituals. This purification, which he believed conformed to the spirit of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, was a prerequisite for reversing the decline of the Muslim world. However, unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, who adopted a divisive approach to reform by accusing non-Wahhabite Muslims of being polytheists, al-Afghānī, like Sultan ‘Abd Allāh and the Paderis, worked hard to make it a unifying factor. In order to face the West, Muslims, he argued, should return to a pristine Islam and, at the same time, unite themselves under a universal banner. Thus instead of

---

<sup>91</sup>Bogle, *The Modern Middle East*, 61.

<sup>92</sup>Homa Pakdaman, “Notes sur le séjour de Djamal al-Din al-Afghani en France,” *Orient* 35 (1965): 204.

condemning their fellows as non-Muslims, as the Wahhabites did, Muslims should tolerate the differences among themselves as long as these did not concern fundamental Islamic teachings. Al-Afghānī also replaced Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s literal approach to the Qur’ān and the Sunna with a rational method. In their return to authenticity, al-Afghānī furthermore reasoned, Muslims should dare to accept from other traditions whatever may be beneficial. Thus rather than restrict the process of *ijtihād* to the experiences of a certain historical circle of scholars, as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb had done, al-Afghānī encouraged his fellow Muslims to accept as well what was offered by Western modernity. The ultimate goal however was to go beyond imitation, i.e., mastering Western knowledge and technology, and to achieve diversity-law, namely, returning to the Qur’ān and the Sunna in order to defeat the West.<sup>93</sup>

Moreover, unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb who preferred to operate on the periphery, al-Afghānī constantly sought to achieve results at the center of power, Istanbul. It was from there that in 1892, as a cabinet minister under the auspices of Sultan Abdülhamid II, he called for pan-Islamism.<sup>94</sup> Because he felt secure in being a member of the ruling majority (in contrast to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb), he dared to try to build a universal consensus (*al-ijmā’ al-‘āmm*).<sup>95</sup>

---

<sup>93</sup>See also Nejla Izzeddin, *The Arab World* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953), 63-92.

<sup>94</sup>Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 115-116. See also, Landau, “Al-Afghani’s Panislamic Project,” 51.

<sup>95</sup>Hamilton A.R. Gibb, “The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World (I),” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 14-15.

However, gradually sensing that his support was too tenuous (especially since his patron was only an empty symbol of his movement), al-Afghānī made contact with the Egyptian Khedive ‘Abbās Ḥilmī, who visited Istanbul in 1895, and proposed to him the idea of proclaiming the Khedive as caliph.<sup>96</sup> Al-Afghānī planned in the same year to leave Istanbul to realize his underground connivance with the Khedive, but the Ottoman sultan kept al-Afghānī in a “golden cage” until his death on March 9, 1897.<sup>97</sup> Al-Afghānī was thus the first peripheral figure to be able to transform the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” into pan-Islamism (the world wide political slogan for Muslim unity under the leadership of the “Universal Caliph” in order to defend their interests against the West), despite the fact that his initiative got stuck at the center of power.

Although Morocco, unlike Egypt and Indonesia, had yet to be subjected to colonial overlordship, Sultan Mawlāy Ḥasan I (r. 1873-1894) still needed an increased religious legitimacy in order to retain his throne. Faced with what Sylvia Haim calls “the general crisis of Islam,”<sup>98</sup> he entrusted, among others, the pro-al-Azhār theologian ‘Abd Allāh ibn Idrīs al-Sanūsī (d. 1931) with the

---

<sup>96</sup>Aziz Ahmad, “Aḥmad Khan, al-Afghani and Muslim India,” 71; and Keddie, *An Islamic Response*, 31.

<sup>97</sup>Osman Amin, “Jamal al-Din al-Afghani,” in M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy: With Short Accounts of Other Disciplines and The Modern Renaissance in Muslim Lands* (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1966), 2: 1488.

<sup>98</sup>Sylvia Haim, “Introduction,” in Silvia Haim, ed., *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962), 6.

task of carrying out the mission of reviving the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” that had fallen into abeyance after the death of ‘Abd al-Raḥmān in 1859. Ḥasan I appointed al-Sanūsī to his royal council of ‘*ulamā*’ in Fez<sup>99</sup> in order to bring the non-Wahhabite members of the council over to his side. To bolster Ḥasan I’s strategy, the council tried to reinforce its religious authority by discussing the *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Collection of Sound Ḥadīth) of al-Bukhārī on a regular basis. The internalization of the values of the *Ṣaḥīḥ* by the members of the council, Ḥasan I hoped, would reduce the authority of “deviating” marabouts, since he was confronting them with the six foremost Ḥadīth collections (*al-Kutub al-Sitta*), which in terms of authoritativeness ranked second only to the Qur’ān. However, al-Sanūsī failed to legitimize the religious authority of his patron, as “his insistence on the literal text of the Qur’ān and the Sunna without recourse to later interpretation”<sup>100</sup> raised suspicions on the part of many non-Wahhabite members of the council. Instead of recognizing his literal interpretation as the true, pure Islam, they found themselves resenting his attacks on their religious authority under the guise of his anti-sainthood (*wilāya*) and anti-miracle (*karāma*) interpretations.<sup>101</sup> Their counterattack forced Ḥasan I to send al-Sanūsī into exile elsewhere in the

---

<sup>99</sup>‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Fāṣī, *Mu‘jam al-Shuyūkh al-Musammā bi-Riyāḍ al-Janna, aw al-Mudhish al-Muṭrib* (Fez: al-Maṭba‘a al-Jadīda, 1931), 2: 81-84; Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 493; and Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 37.

<sup>100</sup>Munson, *Religion and Power*, 86.

<sup>101</sup>Al-Fāṣī, *Mu‘jam al-Shuyūkh*, 2: 84.

Middle East (whence he returned in 1894 after the death of Ḥasan I and the accession of Sultan Abd al-‘Azīz). Thus instead of centralizing the authority of his royal patron in the eyes of the charismatic marabouts, al-Sanūsī only succeeded in marginalizing himself.

Al-Sanūsī’s case was, for Ḥasan I, additional proof of the long conflict of authority between the royal family and the marabouts, the solution to which he saw, following in the footsteps of sultans ‘Abd Allāh and Sulaymān, as lying in the confrontation of *bid’a* and *khurāfa* notions with the *sunna*. The well-known scholar Mā’ al-‘Aynayn, on the other hand, was instrumental in providing him with religious authority and even political power. Unlike al-Sanūsī, who was a man of theory, Mā’ al-‘Aynayn was a sufi activist leader who started his reform efforts from within sufism. Mā’ al-‘Aynayn went beyond al-Sanūsī, since he revolutionized sufi passivity to contend against *bid’a* and *khurāfa*. This revolutionary reform strengthened Ḥasan I’s image of being a true, charismatic Muslim ruler who was backed by the revolutionary “collective” *baraka* supplied by Mā’ al-‘Aynayn and based on the latter’s pan-Islamic program of uniting sufi brotherhoods under his leadership. Ḥasan I, however, found the problem of competition between the two *barakas* (namely, that of the palace, over which he presided, and that of the mosque and religious shrine under the command of the marabouts) far more complicated, once the French intervened. To implement their policy of “divide and rule,” the French backed the autonomous rights of the *sharīf* of al-Wazzān, Mawlāy ‘Abd al-



Salām, who was their protégé.<sup>102</sup> In this way the French used the Idrisid *shurafa'*, who never fully accepted the authority of the Alawite (Filalite) dynasty, to weaken the centralization process which the *makhzan* had reasserted.<sup>103</sup> In this difficult situation, however, Ḥasan I was fortunate to have the backing of Mā' al-'Aynayn, who was also famous for his successful resistance against French colonialism in Mauritania.<sup>104</sup>

Pan-Islamism was just then becoming more widespread, being regarded by many as the ideal solution to the general crisis of the faith.<sup>105</sup> Ḥasan I, however, tended to see a very serious threat to his throne behind al-Afghānī's Pan-Islamic project, especially as it was sponsored by Sultan Abdülhamid II. The slogan "Back to the Qur'ān and the Sunna" on the international scene represented, for Ḥasan I, no more than al-Afghānī's attempt to legitimize Abdülhamid II as leader of "the true Islam." This he could not accept, especially in view of Abdülhamid's Turkish origin, a "defect" which Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb had used to reject Ottoman claims over the caliphate. Furthermore, Abdülhamid was disqualified from holding the office of caliph due to his non-*sayyid* status, whereas he himself, though ruler of a much less extensive

---

<sup>102</sup>Jean-Louis Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe* (Paris, 1961-1963), 4: 44-81.

<sup>103</sup>Burke, "Moroccan Ulama," 110-111.

<sup>104</sup>Paul Marty, "Les Fadelia," *Revue de Monde Musulmane* 31 (1915-1916): 160-166.

<sup>105</sup>Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance," 101.

domain, based his legitimacy on the fact that he was a descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad. For these reasons Ḥasan I saw that to welcome al-Afghānī's pan-Islamic project to Morocco was tantamount to renouncing his own royal claim to the caliphate, although he avoided any overt attack on pan-Islamism.<sup>106</sup> Nevertheless, this stance in fact encouraged unofficial contacts between various Moroccan and Ottoman proponents of pan-Islamism,<sup>107</sup> which were tolerated as long as they did not jeopardize Ḥasan I's position as a *sharīf*. With the support brought to him by this unofficial tolerance of pan-Islamism --essentially the international manifestation of the slogan "Back to the Qur'ān and the Sunna"-- Ḥasan I resisted the European challenge. The internal stability that he won by this policy allowed him to reassert control over his outlying frontiers and to maintain the status quo vis-à-vis the European powers, while playing them off against one another.<sup>108</sup>

Sayyid 'Uthmān (1822-1913) was another Indonesian peripheral puritan figure. As a *sayyid*, he, like Sultans 'Abd Allāh and Ḥasan I, and al-Afghānī, enjoyed some of the privileges of religious aristocracy, but his *sayyid*-ness resembled that of al-Afghānī more than it did 'Abd Allāh's or

---

<sup>106</sup>Miège, *Le Maroc et l'Europe*, 4: 173-9.

<sup>107</sup>Burke, "Pan-Islam and Moroccan Resistance," 102.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*, 101. "With the help of diplomatic backing from Britain," Stéphane Bernard says, "he succeeded in thwarting the annexationist ambitions of France and Spain, and was able to open Morocco to international trade..." Stéphane Bernard, *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1943-1956* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968), 6.

Ḥasan I's. 'Uthmān, like al-Afghānī, belonged to a minority group, since the number of Arab emigrants was insignificant in Indonesia. 'Uthmān condemned --as the Wahhabites, Sultans 'Abd Allāh and Ḥasan I, the Paderis, and al-Afghānī had done-- un-Islamic practices. Because they were not ready to practice the real sufi way of life (*ṭarīqa*), Indonesian Muslims in general, 'Uthmān reasoned, fell easily into *ghurūr* (deceptive) practices. They did not in fact know that their *ṭarīqa* practices deviated from true sufi teachings. The sufi shaykhs were, he observed, responsible for the spread of amulet-selling, which resulted in disbelief; this Muslims should avoid, he argued, by observing Islamic teachings on *karāma*, *ma'ūna*, and *istidrāj*.<sup>109</sup> And whereas such proponents of the slogan as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī and the Paderis fought hard to revive Islam in the face of sufi passivity, 'Uthmān took a totally opposite approach to their common strategy. He condemned the insistence by some shaykhs of the Indonesian sufi orders on the free-will of Indonesian Muslims, a trend which Rahman regards as characteristic of Neo-Sufism.<sup>110</sup> Moreover, as an *adviser honorair* on Islam and Arab affairs to the Dutch government, 'Uthmān, like Sultan 'Abd Allāh, blamed resistance efforts for

---

<sup>109</sup>'Uthmān, *Manhaj al-Istiḳāma fī al-Dīn bi al-Salāma*, 17-22. Both *karāmā* ("honor") and *ma'ūna* ("help" or "protection") are positive, but *istidrāj* ("advancing") is negative, since the former are "miracles" that God grants to a saint due to his good practice, while the latter is a spiritual power that God gives to someone that seems to be beneficial but which ultimately leads to humiliation.

<sup>110</sup>Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformations of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

creating instability and disorder in the country. He, like ‘Abduh, rejected *jihād* as the ideal solution for liberating Indonesia from Dutch rule, even though his fellow Muslims formed the majority in Indonesia, as they did in Egypt.

The political context of ‘Uthmān’s puritan reform was understandable, given the failure of the 1888 liberation movement which was partially fuelled by the spiritual influence of sufi shaykhs. The Dutch had not only increased taxes, but they had also interfered with Islam by prohibiting the reciting out loud of the *ṣalawāt ‘alā al-nabī* (prayers for the Prophet Muḥammad) and other prayers in mosques, a regular practice among both sufi and more “traditional” Muslims.<sup>111</sup> Thus we see the Bantenese turning to Kyai Haji Tugabus Ismail, a descendent of the Bantenese sultans, and a legitimate member of the Bantenese politico-religious aristocracy, to lead them against the Dutch. Upon his return from Mecca in 1883, he was immediately expected to liberate, and hence revive, the Bantenese Sultanate. On July 9, 1888 Haji Wasid, with the approval of Ismail, commanded the Bantenese to revolt against the Dutch, who easily quelled this uprising twenty-one days later. The role the sufi shaykhs played in crystalizing the *jihād* ideas behind the revolt was, for ‘Uthmān, reason enough to destroy the sufi orders, which he saw as *agents provocateurs*. The abortive *jihād*, he argued, did not meet the conditions (*arkān* and *shurūṭ*) of *jihād* as Islam teaches. The amulets supplied to the

---

<sup>111</sup>Pangeran Aria Ahmad Djajadiningrat, *Kenang-kenangan* (Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1936), 49-79; and Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasant’s Revolt of*

*mujāhids* by the sufi shaykhs could never compete with the modern weapons of the Dutch army. *Jihād* under such circumstances was, therefore, invalid (*bāṭil* and *fāsid*), since it posed not only a danger to the individuals who took part in the campaign, but also to Indonesian society in general. The Dutch government had gotten tougher and more hostile as a result, not only toward the followers of sufi orders, but also toward all Muslims under their control. Given that abortive *jihād* risked destroying Islam, ‘Uthmān charged its participants with having been trapped by Satan, in support of which interpretation he quoted the Qur’ān (Q. 35: 5-6).<sup>112</sup>

‘Uthmān’s anti-sufi, and hence anti-*jihād*, stance led Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (the prominent Dutch government official responsible for Dutch-Muslim relations), a close friend of his ever since their meeting in Mecca in 1885, to characterize him as “een Arabisch bondgenoot der Nederlandsch Indische regeering” (an Arab collaborator of the Dutch government).<sup>113</sup> Although the colonial authorities did not see him as a true friend, and even accused him of insincerity when he prayed for the happiness and prosperity of

---

*Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, Course and Sequel* (Den Haag’s-Gravenhage: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 342.

<sup>112</sup>‘Uthman, *Manhaj fī al-Istīqāma*, 21-22. See also, E. Gobée and C. Andriaanse, *Nasihat-nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda 1889-1936*, tr. Sukarsi (Jakarta: Seri Khusus INIS IX, 1994), 1627.

<sup>113</sup>Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek*, 136. See also, Gobée and Andriaanse, *Nasihat-nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje*, 1627-1628.

the Dutch Queen,<sup>114</sup> ‘Uthman did not waver in his loyalty to them, and even condemned the great popularity of the first mass Muslim organization in modern Indonesia, known as Sarekat Islam, and its founder Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto. The foundation of Sarekat Islam on 11 November 1912<sup>115</sup> was, ‘Uthmān realized, a real political threat to the Dutch government. In keeping with his judgement on the abortive revolt of 1888, ‘Uthmān tried to preserve his fellow Indonesian Muslims from what he regarded as further *ghurūr* (deception), by discouraging them from becoming involved in the newly established politico-religious movement. The Dutch, for their part, distributed his pamphlet entitled “Menghentikan Rakyat Biasa dari Bergabung dengan Sarekat Islam” (Stopping the Indonesian Masses from Joining the Sarekat Islam) to Islamic teachers throughout Indonesia.<sup>116</sup>

Just as the Dutch successes in Indonesia had done, the British victory in Egypt discouraged Islamic positivist transcendentalism, manifested there in the personality of Muḥammad ‘Abduh (1849-1905). Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Sultan ‘Abd Allāh, the Paderis, al-Afghānī, Sultan ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and ‘Uthmān, ‘Abduh considered un-Islamic practices as diverting Muslims from the right

---

<sup>114</sup>Gottfried Simon, *The Progress and Arrest of Islam in Sumatra* (London: Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1912), 40.

<sup>115</sup>For more information on the Sarekat Islam, see, for, example Ahmad Timur Jaylani, “The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism” (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1958); and Latiful Khuluq, “Sarekat Islam: Its Rise, Peak and Decline,” *Al-Jami’ah* 60 (1997): 246-272.

<sup>116</sup>Deliar Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942*, 7<sup>th</sup> edition (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994), 205-206; and Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek*, 146-147.

path, and as a contributing factor in their decline. He, as other reformers had done, stressed the purification of the faith as the key to awakening, and hence strengthening, the Muslim world. Not only did sufism isolate most sufis, who were central figures in popular Islam, but it also weakened the will of the masses. To liberate them from the grip of the sufis, who distracted their attention from worldly affairs by constantly stressing the life hereafter, ‘Abduh reintroduced Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s and al-Afghānī’s activism. Unlike the former, who was inward-looking, ‘Abduh followed the latter in opening his mind to non-Islamic epistemological discourse. He reinterpreted al-Afghānī’s favorite verse on the freedom of the will (Q. 13: 11) more in light of the positivism of Auguste Comte, the French philosopher,<sup>117</sup> so that he reconfigured the understanding of Islamic teachings on the laws of history from the perspective of philosophy of history. Muslims, he argued, should understand the dynamics of Islamic teachings on *al-qadr* (indeterminism) and *al-jabr* (determinism) from the perspective of the philosophy of history then being developed in the West, and rejected Islamic traditional theology that had grown too abstract and devoid of empirical content, and had led them into passivity. On the other hand, ‘Abduh advanced his “mentalist” belief, by depicting the human being not only as God’s ‘*abd*’ (slave) as sufis did, but also as His *khalīfa* or “agent of God on earth charged with the task of building and

---

<sup>117</sup>William Sands, “The Middle East Background,” in Georgiana G. Stevens, ed., *The United States and the Middle East* (England and New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 26.

constructing a civilization.”<sup>118</sup> ‘Abduh thus “underlined the essence of a Muslim ‘humanism.’”<sup>119</sup>

‘Abduh, like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and al-Afghānī, saw *taqlīd* as a cause of Muslim ignorance and passivity. Like them he was also selective in condemning *taqlīd*, but unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, who stopped his deconstructionism at Hanbalism and the righteous ancestors (*al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*), while closing off his epistemological discourse to the pan-humanity of knowledge, ‘Abduh put *taqlīd* under the microscope of the Qur’ān.<sup>120</sup> He carefully scrutinized the authority of *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* that the Wahhabites defended so rigorously. He was even very selective in his approach to Ḥadīth (prophetic tradition), the second highest religious authority that the Wahhabites had placed above *al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, by judging it against the criterion of the Qur’ān.<sup>121</sup> ‘Abduh further applied his “liberal and modernizing spirit”<sup>122</sup> to the

---

<sup>118</sup>Yvonne Haddad, “Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform,” in Ali Rahnama, ed., *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995), 46.

<sup>119</sup>P.J. Vatikiotis, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh and the Quest for a Muslim Humanism,” *Arabica* 4 (1957): 61. The article is reprinted in P.J. Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm; and New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 5.

<sup>120</sup>Muḥammad ‘Abduh, *al-A‘māl al-Kāmila*, edited by Muḥammad ‘Amāra (Beirut: al-Mu’assasa al-‘Arabiyya li al-Dirāsa wa al-Nashr, 1972), 1: 153.

<sup>121</sup>*Ibid.*, 1: 116-117.

<sup>122</sup>Charles C. Adams, “Muḥammad ‘Abduh and the Transvaal Fatwa,” in William G. Shellabear, Edwin C. Calverey, and Ruth S. McKensen, eds., *The Macdonald Presentation Volume* (Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton



concepts of *sunna* and *bid'a* by introducing the concept of *maṣlaḥa* (public interest), a concept which is no better than *bid'a* for a strict and literal Islamic legal school. He also pioneered “the improvement of the status of Muslim women.”<sup>123</sup> More than either Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb or al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh subjected the Qur’ān to the criterion of reason.<sup>124</sup> If an apparent text of the Qur’ān contradicts reason, the latter, ‘Abduh suggested (in line with Mu‘tazilism), should take precedence; this could be achieved by interpreting the former metaphorically in order to harmonize it with the latter.<sup>125</sup> Although he urged his fellow Muslims to adopt “imitation law” more than al-Afghānī did,<sup>126</sup> ‘Abduh also condemned blind imitation of the West. Borrowing from the West is only a first step (after which Muslims must undertake their own *ijtihād*) towards achieving the ideal harmony between science (a predominantly Western experience), and the Qur’ān.<sup>127</sup> Declaring *ijtihād* a means of returning to an authentic Islam, which would allow Muslims to achieve modernity at the same time, ‘Abduh underlined the Islamic principle

---

University Press; and London: Humphrey Milford & Oxford University Press, 1933), 13.

<sup>123</sup>Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 58.

<sup>124</sup>Michel Allard says that “il [le sens du réforme religious préconisé par ‘Abduh] ne faut pas seulement revenir aux sources, mais aussi ‘considérer la religion à partir des normes de la raison (*mawazin al-‘aql*)’.” Michel Allard, “Méthode d’analyse de texte appliquée a un passage de Muḥammad ‘Abduh,” *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970): 22.

<sup>125</sup>Muḥammad ‘Abduh, *al-Islām wa al-Naṣrāniyya* (Cairo: al-Manār, 1938), 54-55.

<sup>126</sup>Koury, *The Patterns of Mass Movements*, 102.

of “*al-muḥāfaẓa ‘alā al-qadīm al-ṣāliḥ wa al-akhdh bi al-jadīd al-aṣlah*” (preserving a valid heritage, while taking benefit from the most valid new experience).

In his response to the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” ‘Abduh agreed entirely with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and al-Afghānī that diversity among Muslims contributed to their weakness. Muslims, he stressed, should leave their differences behind them and instead unite, just as the first generation of Islam had done. His slogan for the unity of the Muslim world expressed in the pages of *al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā* (The Indissoluble Link, published with collaboration with al-Afghānī out of Paris in 1884), to which Voll’s crisis hypothesis<sup>128</sup> fully applies, softened after he had to take his own course of action. In contrast to al-Afghānī, who had moved to the center of the Muslim world, ‘Abduh left for Lebanon, on the periphery of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, unlike al-Afghānī and the Paderis, who increasingly adopted the liberating spirit of Wahhabism, ‘Abduh, like ‘Uthmān in 1882, lost interest in this Islamic brand of positivist transcendentalism after his return to Egypt from exile.<sup>129</sup> His Islamic positivism shifted to Islamic positivist modernism or simply Islam without *jihād*. On the other hand, he acknowledged Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s insistence “on the Arab’s centrality in

---

<sup>127</sup>‘Abduh, *Risālat al-Tawhīd*, 10 and 55.

<sup>128</sup>Voll, “Revivalism and Social Transformations,” 170.

<sup>129</sup>Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 57.

the *umma* to the detriment of the Turk.”<sup>130</sup> He blamed the Turks, as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb had done, for crystallizing the institution of *taqlīd*. For, unlike al-Afghānī, he did not believe in the feasibility of pan-Islamism under the command of the Universal Caliph of the Ottoman Empire. He became a bitter enemy of al-Afghānī instead. And just as Aḥmad Khān had done in India under the British administration, he “attempted to transform his lack of political opportunities into a vision of Islam as a universal force intervening in the formation of modern subjects and loyal citizens.”<sup>131</sup> ‘Abduh understood the success of Khan’s religious educational reform under the British, who had become his new masters in Egypt in 1882. The British were, ‘Abduh realized, not only masters of science and technology, but also, unlike the Ottomans, avowed constitutionalists.<sup>132</sup>

Events in Morocco at this time were following a similar pattern. Compared to his predecessors, the legitimacy of Sultan Mawlāy ‘Abd al-‘Azīz (r. 1894-1908) was in a serious crisis. Like all Muslim countries in the world at the turn of the century, Morocco had to face the challenge of Western colonialism. His nation had suffered a number of defeats, leading some of his

---

<sup>130</sup>Armando Salvatore, *Islam and the Political Discourse of Modernity* (Berkshire: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1997), 86.

<sup>131</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>132</sup>See also, Rashīd Riḍā, *Tārīkh al-Ustādh al-Imām Muḥammad ‘Abduh* (Cairo: Maṭba‘at al-Manār, 1344 H.), 1: 153.

rivals to accuse him of selling his country to Christians.<sup>133</sup> To appease the British “who had preserved Morocco’s independence for most of the nineteenth century,”<sup>134</sup> while imposing his *salafi* condemnation of superstition, he executed on 17 October 1902 a Muslim who had helped kill a British missionary for entering the most sacred shrine in Morocco, that of Mawlāy Idrīs II. The sultan’s sacrifice of a Muslim subject, who was merely defending the sacredness of “the ancestor of the Idrissi shurafa,”<sup>135</sup> placed his popular legitimacy as an Alawite in doubt. The Idrisid *shurafa* had never fully recognized the Alawites, and they at the same time constituted “a powerful check upon the centralizing ambitions of the Alawis.”<sup>136</sup> Thus, when faced with the revolt of Abū Ḥimāra (Ba Hmara) in 1904, the sultan, whose *salafi* orientation was strongly influenced by al-Sanūsī,<sup>137</sup> appealed for a return to the two highest authorities of Islam. A *fatwā* (legal opinion) was issued by the Fez ‘*ulamā*’ at his behest insisting that the Qur’ān and the Sunna teach that obedience to the imam is obligatory,<sup>138</sup> and this was enough to enable the sultan to bring the revolt under control.

---

<sup>133</sup>De Saint-Aulaire, *Confession d’un vieux diplomate* (Paris: Flammarion, 1953), 120.

<sup>134</sup>Munson, *Religion and Power*, 57.

<sup>135</sup>Ibid.

<sup>136</sup>Burke, *Moroccan Islam*, 98. Idem, “Moroccan Ulama,” 108-109.

<sup>137</sup>Al-Fāsī, *Mu‘jam al-Shuyūkh*, 2: 85.

<sup>138</sup>Burke, “Moroccan Ulama,” 108-109; and Munson, *Religion and Power*, 58-59. On the *fatwā*, see *Afrique Française* (1903): 225-226.

‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s victory, however, was only temporary. The accusation that he was selling out Morocco was gaining ground instead of disappearing. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz not only lost some of his territory to France, but also to his powerful British ally. Four years after invading Touat in 1900, the French succeeded in persuading England to leave Morocco to them.<sup>139</sup> The signing of the agreement on April 8, 1904 by the British, who in return received a free hand in Egypt from the French, left ‘Abd al-‘Azīz alone to face the increasing challenges of the French and the marabouts, without the nineteenth-century British prop to his nation’s independence. Over the objections of Muḥammad al-Kabīr ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb al-Kattānī (d. 1909, “chief of the Kattāniyya order and leader of clerical opposition to France”<sup>140</sup>), who strongly encouraged him to disregard French proposals which contradicted the Qur’ān and the Sunna,<sup>141</sup> ‘Abd al-‘Azīz signed the Act of Algeiras on June 18, 1906. The signing of the Act not only gave the French almost direct control over Morocco politically, economically and militarily,<sup>142</sup> but also added fuel to the campaign for his deposition. In response to the failure of ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to resist the French military occupation of Oujda and Casablanca in 1907, the ‘*ulama*’ of

---

<sup>139</sup>A. G. P. Martin, *Quatre siècles d’histoire marocaine* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923), 414; and Mark I. Cohen and Lorna Hahn, *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation* (New York, Washington and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 19.

<sup>140</sup>Sinar, “Salafiyya,” 8: 95.

<sup>141</sup>Muḥammad al-Manūnī, *Maẓāhir Yaqẓāt al-Maghrib al-Ḥadīth* (Casablanca: Sharīkat al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī’ al-Madāris, 1985), 2: 231.

Marrakesh issued a *fatwā* on August 17 of the same year, in which they proclaimed his illegitimacy and his replacement by his brother ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz.<sup>143</sup> The further endorsement of this *fatwā* by the ‘*ulama*’ of Fez on January 4, 1908<sup>144</sup> brought the traditional maraboutic supporters of Yazīd’s revolt against his father in 1787 into the opposition to the salafi sultan ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.

The marabouts, who practiced a marginal brand of Islam, tried to get closer to the center of power by joining the revolt against ‘Abd al-‘Azīz.<sup>145</sup> A day before the ‘*ulama*’ of Marrakesh issued their *fatwā*, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz paved the way for this by appealing to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.<sup>146</sup> Like the Paderis and especially al-Afghānī, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz strongly urged the elite of Marrakesh, with whom he was meeting, to find an alternate sultan capable of waging a holy war against the infidels. The meeting itself ended with his being himself elected to this post.<sup>147</sup> Faced with this threat, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz soon counterattacked the legitimacy of the Qur’ān-and-Sunna-backed “sultan of

---

<sup>142</sup>Cohen and Hahn, *Morocco: Old Land*, 19.

<sup>143</sup>Martin, *Quatre siècles*, 451-355.

<sup>144</sup>Burke, “Moroccan Ulama,” 105 and 121.

<sup>145</sup>Martin, *Quatre siècles*, 473; Ross E. Dunn, *Resistance in the Desert: Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism 1881-1912* (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1977), 233; and Burke, “Moroccan Islam,” 109.

<sup>146</sup>Al-Manūnī, *Mazāhir*, 2: 355.

<sup>147</sup>Edouard René-LeClerc, “Les débuts de règne de Molay Hafid,” *Renseignements Coloniaux* 2 (1908): 43.

*jihād*” by forcing “twenty-seven prominent ulama of Fez”<sup>148</sup> to issue another *fatwā* in his favor. These ‘*ulamā*’, invoking the same principles of the Qur’ān and the Sunna used to crush the revolt of Abū Ḥimāra in 1904,<sup>149</sup> declared the illegitimacy of ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ. In the end, however, this attempt failed. The *bay’a* (oath of allegiance) to ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ was even sworn in the sanctuary of Mawlāy Idrīs I,<sup>150</sup> bestowing on the former the approval as well as the sacredness of the Idrisid *baraka*. The success of the “*jihād* sultan” in dethroning ‘Abd al-‘Azīz on August 21, 1908<sup>151</sup> was tantamount to “leaving the country in the hands of a regime promising a radical return to militant Islam.”<sup>152</sup>

Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, the Paderis, al-Afghānī, Riḍā, and ‘Abduh, the Indonesian reformer Kyai Haji Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923) was something of a peripheral figure in Javanese society when he first expressed the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.” His father Kyai Haji

---

<sup>148</sup>Munson, *Religion and Power*, 68.

<sup>149</sup>Laroui, *Les origines sociales*, 388-389.

<sup>150</sup>Muḥammad Gharrīṭ, *Fawāṣil al-Juman fī Anbā’ Wuzarā’ Wa Kuttāb al-Zamān* (Fez: al-Maṭba‘a al-Jadīda, 1928), 104. See also F. Weisberger, *Au Seuil du Maroc moderne* (Rabat: 1947), 181; and David S. Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 12.

<sup>151</sup>Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 121.

<sup>152</sup>Dunn, *Resistance in the Desert*, 231.

Abubakar Sulaiman was a *khaṭīb* at the Sultan Mosque of Yogyakarta.<sup>153</sup> The decline of Islam in the modern era was, in Dahlan's eyes (as in those of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb and his Egyptian and Moroccan supporters), attributable to the deviation of Muslims from the true Islam. This was particularly true in Indonesia. Like other proponents of the slogan, Dahlan saw the purification of Indonesian Muslim practices as the first condition for the recovery and revival of Islam, and for this reason he was especially critical of sufi practices. The sufi concept of *wasīla* (intermediation between a human being and God) was, he judged, no less than *shirk* (polytheism).<sup>154</sup> Although he was in line with such revolutionary advocates of the slogan as Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī, and the Paderis in blaming *wasīla* practices for spreading passivism among Indonesian Muslims (usually to the profit of some sufi masters), Dahlan differed from his fellow reformists in the solution he proposed. He did not try to radicalize politically his fellow Indonesian Muslims, since he regarded any *jihād* against the Dutch as suicidal. In this regard, Dahlan, like other contemporary Muslim modernists such as 'Abduh and 'Uthmān, laid stress on the difference between *jihād al-akbar* (greater holy war) and *jihād al-aṣghar*

---

<sup>153</sup>Solichin Salam, *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan Reformer Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1963), 20; and Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam*, 85.

<sup>154</sup>Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises Over the Banyan Tree: A Study of the Muhammadiyah Movement in a Center Java Town* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), 10; Howard M. Federspiel, "The Muhammadiyah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia," *Indonesia* 9 (1970): 64-67; and John David Legg, *Indonesia*, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Sydney: Prentice-Hall of Australia, 1980), 64-65.



(smaller holy war). The military *jihād* against the Dutch was, for him as for ‘Abduh and ‘Uthmān, a *jihād al-aṣghar*, while the *jihād al-akbar* involved struggling against oneself. Thus a military *jihād* against the Dutch was less important compared to the *jihād al-akbar* that Indonesian Muslims had to wage constantly in combatting their own internal weaknesses in all aspects of life, such as education, economy, and politics.<sup>155</sup>

To be able to carry out such a difficult task, Indonesian Muslims had, Dahlan declared, to undertake *ijtihād*, without which the true Islam and, hence, victory in both this world and the world to come, could never be achieved. However, he was not wholly anti-*taqlīd* as many believe, since like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, he strictly applied the principle of letting the Qur’ān speak for itself,<sup>156</sup> but like ‘Abduh (although to a much lesser extent), he also assigned a significant role to reason in the interpretation of scripture. Like al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh, Dahlan saw “imitation law” as a necessary step for Indonesian

---

<sup>155</sup>See also, Alwi Abdurrahman Shihab, “The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia,” (Ph. D. diss., Temple University, 1995), 277-278.

<sup>156</sup>Although this method was derived from the Qur’ān itself and was given emphasis by the Prophet Muḥammad, Ahmad Syafii Maarif (now an acting chairman of the Muhammadiyah) regards it as a new method since he only first became aware of it from Fazlur Rahman, whose student he was at the University of Chicago. Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Sebuah Kata Pengantar: Kyai Haji Mas Mansur: Manusia dengan Dimensi Ganda,” in Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, *Kumpulan Karangan Tersiar*, ed. Amir Hamzah Wiryosukarto, 3<sup>rd</sup> edition (Yogyakarta: Persatuan, 1992), xix. This lack of methodology in the elite circle of the Muhammadiyah in understanding the scripture will be seen below has had consequences for Nurcholish Madjid’s criticism of the organization, as will be discussed in chapter three.

Muslims to cope with their problems. Indonesian Muslims under Dutch colonialism would not be able to liberate themselves without first absorbing the strengths of their colonial masters. Moreover, Dahlan --like Sultan ‘Abd Allāh, the Paderis, and al-Afghānī-- saw the conflict among Muslim leaders as the second most influential internal cause for the decline of Islam, the solution to which he seems to have found in al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh,<sup>157</sup> rather than in the Shafiism of his Indonesian teacher in Mecca, Ahmad Khaṭīb. Considering adherence to a *madhhab* a form of narrow-minded fanaticism, Dahlan preferred al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism and ‘Abduh’s non-madhhabism to Khaṭīb’s Indonesian Shafiism. It was for the purpose of spreading these beliefs that he founded the organization known as Muhammadiyah on November 18, 1912.

Dahlan made the Muhammadiyah his means of responding to the challenges facing his society as they were, and of transcending them in the end. The slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” was, mainly through his efforts, manifested in a number of the Muhammadiyah’s subsidiary propaganda organizations. In 1918 he founded, among others, the Hizbul Watan (Arabic: *Hizb al-Waṭan*) and the PKU (Penolong Kesengsaraan Umum or Public Misery Relief), both of which he modeled after the Protestant *zendings* and Roman-Catholic missionary social organizations. However, he

---

<sup>157</sup>See also, Snouck Hurgronje, *Mekka in the Latter Part of the Nineteenth Century* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1933), 260-261; C.A. O. van

transcended them by making Islam a necessary focus of Hizbul Watan (the Muhammadiyah-based scouting movement) and by basing the operation of the PKU on Islamic values.<sup>158</sup> The most strategic use of “imitation law” by Dahlan, undertaken only for the sake of the future of Indonesia, was his educational reform in line with Dutch policy, by which he strove to move his fellow Muhammadiyah members from a peripheral into a mainstream position.<sup>159</sup> Although he, like ‘Abduh,<sup>160</sup> encouraged the teaching of modern sciences and Islam in the schools he founded (Muhammadiyah-based, in his case) he went beyond ‘Abduh in terms of empowering women. For whereas ‘Abduh merely issued *fatwās* in support of this, Dahlan actually gave women a role and a voice by providing them with modern organizations such as Aisyiyah [Arabic: ‘Ā’ishiyya, modelled after the name of the Prophet’s third wife ‘Ā’isha] for mature women and Nasyi’atul Aisyiyah [Arabic: Nāshi’at al-‘Ā’ishiyya, the Young ‘Ā’isha] for younger female members.

By contrast, ‘Abduh’s influence in Egypt manifested itself in the politically oriented reformist Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā (1865-1935), who

---

Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958), 45; and Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 81.

<sup>158</sup>Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam*, 91.

<sup>159</sup>Federspiel, “The Muhammadiyah,” 58 and 60; and Alfian, *Muhammadiyah: The Political Behaviour of a Muslim Modernist Organization under the Dutch Colonialism* (Yogyakarta: Gadjahmada Press, 1969), 178.

<sup>160</sup>Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam*, 45.

argued, in keeping with Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb and al-Afghānī,<sup>161</sup> that Muslim deviation from true doctrine resulted in their decline and backwardness.<sup>162</sup> Under the influence of the journal *al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā*, which he called “his second teacher,”<sup>163</sup> he attacked such un-Islamic practices as *bid‘a* and *khurāfa*.<sup>164</sup> In his endeavor to eliminate “Islamic passivism,” which he saw the sufis as popularizing through their doctrine of fatalism, Riḍā advocated al-Afghānī’s and ‘Abduh’s concept of will, while not entirely rejecting the Ghazalian expression of sufism.<sup>165</sup> A human being, he reminded his audience, is not only a slave (*‘abd*) as the sufis teach, but a vicegerent of God on earth (*khalīfat Allāh fī al-Ard*) at the same time.<sup>166</sup> Like al-Afghānī and ‘Abduh -- although still under the shadow of Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb-- Riḍā sought to unify Muslims through community, nation, religion, law,

---

<sup>161</sup>Juan Ricardo Cole, “Rashid Riḍa on the Baha’i Faith: A Utilitarian Theory of the Spread of Religions,” *Arab Studies Quarterly* 5 (1983): 276.

<sup>162</sup>Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 228. See also Javaid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey* (London: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 130.

<sup>163</sup>Adams, *Islam and Modernism*, 179.

<sup>164</sup>K.R. Singh, “North Africa,” in Mohammed Ayoob, ed., *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 58.

<sup>165</sup>David Commins, “Ḥasan al-Banna (1906-1949),” in Ali Rahnema, ed., *Pioneers of Islamic Revival* (London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994), 128. The Ghazalian expression of sufism is a sufism that strictly abides by the *Shari‘a* (Islamic law), as Abū Ḥamid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) proposes in particular in his magnum opus *Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn* (The Revival of Religious Sciences). It is also called sunnite sufism (*al-taṣawwuf al-sunnī*) in the sense that it is orthodox, since it does not deviate from the true Islamic teachings.

brotherhood, citizenship, justice, and language under the banner of Islam, while criticizing the *madhāhib* (Islamic legal schools) for dividing them into smaller but fanatic religious groups.<sup>167</sup> His awareness of the significance of Western science as a tool for building civilization allowed Riḍā, although “much more conservative and traditionalist than ‘Abduh,”<sup>168</sup> to reject the Wahhabite xenophobic historical leap. The *ijtihād* that Muslims needed to engage in for the sake of achieving modernity, he said, had to take into account the experiences that the West had undergone;<sup>169</sup> otherwise, purification would only mean an epistemological condemnation and, ultimately, suicide. The West had been able to achieve “diversity-law” (*uṣūl al-fiqh: “ijtihād”*) that they enjoyed as masters of science and technology, Riḍā explained, because they had passed the stage of imitation law, by recovering their knowledge and science from the Muslims in the Middle Ages.<sup>170</sup> This was the Islamic educational reform that Riḍā strove for.

---

<sup>166</sup>Mohammed M. H. Shehab Eddin, “Pan-Arabism and the Islamic Tradition” (Ph.D. diss., The American University of Cairo, 1966), 263.

<sup>167</sup>Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Waḥy al-Muḥammadi* (Cairo: al-Maṭba‘a al-Manār, 1935), 225; and idem, *Tafsīr*, VI: 420.

<sup>168</sup>Abdulwahab El-Efendy, *Turabi’s Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan* (London: Grey Seal, 1993), 10.

<sup>169</sup>Yusuf H.R. Seferta, “The Concept of Religious Authority according to Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida,” *The Islamic Quarterly* 30 (1986), 163.

<sup>170</sup>See also Emad Eldin Shahih, *Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Riḍa and the West* (Herndon, Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993), x.

Disciples do not always agree with mentors. ‘Abduh had already abandoned al-Afghānī’s politically-oriented pan-Islamism by 1885, but Riḍā joined al-Afghānī in Istanbul and remained there until al-Afghānī’s death in 1897. In the same way, Riḍā was under ‘Abduh’s shadow in Egypt after having to flee Istanbul to avoid suffering al-Afghānī’s fate, while he struggled to advance al-Afghānī’s and, hence, the Wahhabite, liberating agenda. It was from the periphery that Riḍā attacked the Ottoman authorities through his journal *al-Manār* (The Lighthouse, which he founded in 1898); it was influential enough that in 1906 the Ottoman authorities in Tripoli issued an order for his arrest.<sup>171</sup> Riḍā regarded the Ottoman regime as headed in the wrong direction, certainly away from the position regarding Islamic influence that he favored. Consequently, he openly advocated replacing the Hamidian regime with a democratic one.<sup>172</sup> His joy over the deposition of Sultan Abdülhamid II by the 1908 Young Turk revolution was however short-lived, for the Committee of Union and Progress, which succeeded Abdülhamid, rejected his proposal “to mediate between the Arabs and the Turk in the Ottoman Empire and to establish a school for Islamic missionaries in Istanbul.”<sup>173</sup> As a result, instead of working to strengthen the Ottoman Empire

---

<sup>171</sup>Adams, *Islam and Modernism*, 177-204; and Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 22-24, 298-306.

<sup>172</sup>Eliezer Tauber, “Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought of ‘Abd al-Raḥman al-Kawakibi, Najib ‘Azuri and Rashid Riḍa,” *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21,2 (1984): 196.

<sup>173</sup>*Ibid.*

under the aegis of the Young Turks, Riḍā encouraged the Arabs to secede from the Ottoman Empire and establish a pan-Arab empire, consisting of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria and Iraq. To this purpose he founded the Jam‘iyyat al-Jāmi‘a al-‘Arabiyya (the Society of the Arab Association).<sup>174</sup>

Carrying this viewpoint forward to World War I, it is not surprising that Riḍā joined the 1916 Arab Revolt under the leadership of the pro-British Sharif Ḥusayn, ruler of the Hejaz.<sup>175</sup> In the end, however, he was dismayed by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement which divided the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire between Britain and France.<sup>176</sup> “Britain,” he insisted, “is the rival of the great, firm and strong Islamic caliphate,”<sup>177</sup> and so he offered Ḥusayn his services and a recommendation that a new Arab union without British ties should be established. Ḥusayn however rejected the offer. Predictably, Riḍā became anti-Hashimite,<sup>178</sup> identifying himself with the “sacred” (Islam as he saw it), just as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb had done when faced with Ottoman opposition. Hence Riḍā declared Ḥusayn to be a heretic and an oppressor, from whose grips the Ḥijāz needed to be saved.<sup>179</sup> By this

---

<sup>174</sup>Riḍā, *al-Khilāfa*, 123.

<sup>175</sup>C.E. Dawn, “Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt,” in J. Kritzeck and R. Bayly Winder, eds., *The World of Islam* (New York, 1960), 233-48.

<sup>176</sup>George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition (New York, 1965), 243.

<sup>177</sup>Riḍā, *Al-Khilāfa*, 115.

<sup>178</sup>*Al-Manār* 24: 8, 13 August 1923.

<sup>179</sup>*Al-Manār* 29: 1, 3 March 1927, 5-6.

time Ḥusayn's fortunes were on the wane and British support, with the advance of World War I, was no longer as strong, so he found it expedient to identify himself with the "sacred," declaring himself Caliph of the Muslims in 1924 when Kemal Atatürk abolished the Ottoman caliphate. In his response to this incident, Riḍā had recourse to Islamic positivist transcendentalism, and chose instead to support the Wahhabite Ibn Sa'ūd's struggle against Ḥusayn. Yet on defeating Ḥusayn in the same year,<sup>180</sup> Ibn Sa'ūd did not claim the title of caliph.<sup>181</sup>

Riḍā's sense of crisis, which, seen in historical context was more serious than al-Afghānī's and 'Abduh's, compelled him to try to rebuild the caliphate, the ruined unifying symbol of the Muslim world, on the principles of the Qur'ān and *Shari'a*.<sup>182</sup> He, like Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī and 'Abduh, turned to Islamic dualism. In terms of *'aqīda* (basic belief), on which a future, revived caliphate would be based, he came closer to Wahhabism, which both Rahman<sup>183</sup> and Naser<sup>184</sup> call Islamic fundamentalism. On the other hand, leaving aside Wahhabite rejectionism and instead elaborating al-

---

<sup>180</sup>Tibi, *Arab Nationalism*, 114; and Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 231.

<sup>181</sup>Shiddiqi, *Modern Reformists*, 157.

<sup>182</sup>Hamid Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 69; Nazih Ayubi, *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World* (London and New York: Routledge, 1993), 64; and Vatikiotis, *Arab and Regional Politics*, 37.

<sup>183</sup>Rahman, *Islam*, 223.

<sup>184</sup>Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *The Plight of Modern Man* (London: Longman, 1975), 146.



Afghānī's and 'Abduh's constitutionalism, Riḍā selectively adopted Western political ideas. Clothing democracy in Islamic terms, Riḍā limited the absolute power of the Islamic ruler<sup>185</sup> while making people the source of power through consensus (*shūrā*).<sup>186</sup> In the Islamic republican caliphate of his dreams, he placed the '*ulamā*' --a marginalized religious class in the newly founded national and secular states-- at the center of power, making them the consultants of the caliph.<sup>187</sup> The caliph, moreover, would have to share his power with a president and a council of ministers. Asserting Islamic authenticity in the face of Arab-Egyptian nationalism and secularism --the latter supported by some of al-Afghānī's and 'Abduh's former pupils such as Sa'ad Zaghlūl, Muṣṭafā Kāmil, Ṭāhā Ḥusayn and 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq-- Riḍā declared Qurayshite descent to be one of the requirements of a caliph. Riḍā's locus of Islamic authenticity was, moreover, not to be his second home of Egypt, but rather Saudi Arabia and Syria. In his Islamic *trias politica*, Riḍā saw Mecca as the headquarters of the caliphate and Damascus, his native city,

---

<sup>185</sup>A. A. Duri, *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation* (New York: Croom Helm, 1987), 186.

<sup>186</sup>Riḍā, *Tafsīr*, 5: 198-199. See also Aliezer Tauber, "Rashid Riḍā and Fayṣal's Kingdom in Syria," *The Muslim World* 85 (1995): 244-245. Although he promoted the status of women, he did not accept the possibility of there being a female caliph. Riḍā, *Khilāfa*, 18. See also Enayat, *Modern Islamic Political Thought*, 93.

<sup>187</sup>Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, 666.

the headquarters of the presidency and the councils of deputies,<sup>188</sup> leaving almost no role to non-Arabs. In proposing Arabic as the unifying language of the caliphate, Riḍā further isolated Atatürk's Turkey, a newly-marginalized former center of Islam.<sup>189</sup>

Just as in Egypt, the slogan "Back to the Qur'ān and the Sunna" in Morocco had a role to play in political conflict, since Sultan 'Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ had gained access to the center of power by voicing the slogan, even though he found his authority limited. Unlike his Moroccan royal predecessors, he was bound to abide by the conditions of the *bay'a*, by which he was proclaimed the legitimate "*jihād* sultan" in place of his brother. Being at the center of Moroccan power, he in turn imposed a scriptural authoritarianism—in a sense taking the Qur'ān and Sunna into his own hands and out of those of his supporters-- when beginning in February 1908 he tried to reject the conditions which obliged him to liberate his corner of *dār al-Islām* (the abode of Islam) from French occupation. The proposed acts of liberation ranged from abrogating the Act of Algeciras to repudiating 'Abd al-'Azīz's debts to Western powers, and from abolishing foreign privileges and capitulations to

---

<sup>188</sup>Rashīd Riḍā, "General Organic Law of the Arab Empire," enclosed with FO 882/15: note, Ronald Stors (Cairo) to Gilbert F. Clayton (Cairo) 5 December 1915.

<sup>189</sup>Following Riḍā's *fatwā* declaring the translation of the Qur'ān to be *kufr* (unbelief), Mehmet Akif, although he was under orders from Atatürk to translate the Qur'ān into Turkish, sabotaged the project. Javid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey* (London: Praeger, 1994), 187.

reintegrating Moroccan territory.<sup>190</sup> At the same time, the *bay'a* imposed (through the influence of al-Kattānī) one of the essential elements of the periphery-versus-center conflict in Islam --one that had been inspired by the success of the Young Turks in deposing the absolute, pan-Islamic sultan 'Abdülhamid II. This was the injunction laid upon Sultan 'Abd al-Hāfīz to consult the *umma* (here, the Moroccan people), in all his efforts to reach any agreement with foreigners,<sup>191</sup> and to cooperate with other Muslim powers, especially the Ottoman Empire. Adopting al-Afghānī's universalism and rejecting Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb's provincialism, al-Kattānī thus forced the "*jihād* sultan" to recognize the non-sayyid-ness of the Ottoman authorities for the sake of the Moroccan people as a whole vis-à-vis Western imperialism. Al-Kattānī clearly saw the political significance for Morocco of the Young Turks' policy of strengthening both Ottoman pan-Islamism and anti-British and French sentiment in the Muslim world. In imitation of the Ottoman policy, Morocco therefore forged a strong alliance with Germany against the French and the British.<sup>192</sup> Germany in turn strove to oppose France's recognition of

---

<sup>190</sup>See Ibn Zaydān, *Ithāf A'lām al-Nās*, 1: 448-453; 'Allāl al-Fāsi, *Ḥafriyyat 'an al-Ḥaraka al-Dustūriyya fī al-Maghrib qabl al-Ḥimāya* (Rabat, n.d.), 20-23; Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 115-166; Laroui, *Les origines sociales*, 396; Jacques Cagne, *Nation et nationalisme au Maroc* (Rabat: Dār al-Nashr al-Ma'rifa, 1988), 411-415 and 455-456.

<sup>191</sup>Muḥammad Bāqir al-Kattānī, *Tarjamāt al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Kattānī* (1962), 92-94, 198, and 206.

<sup>192</sup>See, for example, E. E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks* (Princeton, 1957); Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress*

‘Abd al-‘Azīz as the legitimate sultan of Morocco on the basis of his acceptance of the Act of Algeciras, although the French finally won this conflict in January 1909.<sup>193</sup>

The substance of the *bay‘a* also stipulated that the “*jihād* sultan” put into practice the “true Islam,” while demanding of him that he protect the traditional prerogatives of the ‘*ulama*’ and *shurafa*’, the latter of which included the abolition of the *masks* (non-Qur’anic taxes) that ‘Abd al-‘Azīz had imposed on them in an effort to limit their power.<sup>194</sup> Considering this “new Islamic constitutionalism” (and especially the variety that would oblige him to liberate Morocco from foreign domination) as hampering his power to govern,<sup>195</sup> ‘Abd al-Ḥafīz turned to his own version of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.” Holding the reins of power, he decided to use the *makhzan* (central government) against the *bilād al-sībā’* (rebellious region). Following in the steps of his predecessors, he created a counter-slogan by seeking the support of another segment of the *salafī* ‘*ulama*’. He appointed Abū Shu‘ayb ibn ‘Abd al-Raḥmān al-Dukkālī (1878-1937), whom he had recalled from his teaching post in Mecca to teach at Qarawiyyin University in

---

*in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914* (London, 1969), and Burke, “Pan-Islamism and Moroccan Resistance,” 108.

<sup>193</sup> Abun-Nasr, *A History of the Maghrib*, 302.

<sup>194</sup> For more information on the *bay‘a*, see Ibn Zaydān, *Ithāf A‘lām al-Nās*, 448-453; al-Fāsī, *Ḥafriyyat*, 20-23; Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 115-166; Laroui, *Les origines sociales*, 396; Cagne, *Nation et nationalisme*, 411-415 and 455-456; and Munson, *Religion and Power*, 72.

<sup>195</sup> Al-Kattānī, *Tarjuma*, 211-212.

1907, as his religious advisor.<sup>196</sup> At the same time, he cemented his relationship with the ‘Ayniyya, a pan-Islamic and puritan sufi brotherhood.<sup>197</sup> It was under the guise of purifying Moroccan Islam from the un-Islamic practices of other sufi brotherhoods that ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ launched, on the advice of Dukkālī<sup>198</sup> (“the Moroccan ‘Abduh”<sup>199</sup>) and with the backing of the ‘Ayniyya, “a broad-ranged attack on three of the most important brotherhoods in the north Morocco”<sup>200</sup> in 1908-1909. This was intended to weaken the *baraka*, and hence the political threat, of Idrisid shaykhs like al-Kattānī.<sup>201</sup> To further develop his image as the “true” defender of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ condemned the Tījanite order through the publication of his book entitled *Kashf al-Qinā’ ‘an I’tiqād Ṭawā’if al-*

---

<sup>196</sup>‘Allāl al-Fāsī, *Ḥadīth al-Mashriq fī al-Maghrib* (Cairo: 1956), 10.

<sup>197</sup>Paquignon, “Un livre de Moulay Abd al Hafid,” *Revue du monde musulman* 7 (1909): 125-128.

<sup>198</sup>Abu-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 494-6. See also J. Berque, “Ça et là dans les débuts du reformisme religieuse au Maghreb,” *Études d’orientalisme dédiés à la memoire de Levi-Provençal* (Paris, 1962), 2: 480-483.

<sup>199</sup>Sinar, “Salafiyya,” 905.

<sup>200</sup>Burke, “Moroccan Islam,” 110-111.

<sup>201</sup>Michaux-Bellaire, “Une tentative de restauration idrisite à Féz,” *Revue du Monde Musulmane* 2 (1908): 393-395; and ‘Allāl al-Fāsī, *Al-Ḥaraka al-Istiqlālīyya fī al-Maghrib al-‘Arabī* (Cairo: Lajnat al-Thaqāfa al-Waṭaniyya al-Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl, 1948), 133.

*Ibtidāʾ* (Unmasking the Creeds of Innovating Groups),<sup>202</sup> while reducing the autonomous power of the Wazzāniyya order.<sup>203</sup>

However, the marabouts who had brought ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ to power were not fooled, and saw clearly his rejection of the constitutional restrictions of the *bayʿa* he had received in Fez.<sup>204</sup> The “*jihād* sultan” considered in turn a *jihād* against France as suicidal, since Morocco was too weak to win the war,<sup>205</sup> and instead followed the principles of Islamic modernism that al-Dukkālī set forth. In response, al-Kattānī asserted his pro-Ottoman pan-Islamism against both ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ and France. ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ however acted decisively and had al-Kattānī executed on 4 May 1909.<sup>206</sup> At the same time, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ moved further toward the consolidation of his *salafī* puritan religious authority by paying due attention to the Sunna of the Prophet. Like his predecessor Sultan ‘Abd Allāh, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ had “a comprehensive guide to the principal books of hadiths”<sup>207</sup> compiled. Of course, his appointment of Muḥammad ibn Jaʿfar al-Kattānī (d. 1937) to undertake such a “sacred” project was a part of his strategy to win al-Kattānī to his cause. Indeed, after his signing of the Treaty of Fez on 30 March 1912, which established a French protectorate over Morocco,

---

<sup>202</sup> Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 502, no. 19.

<sup>203</sup> Burke, “Moroccan Islam,” 110.

<sup>204</sup> Cagne, *Nation et Nationalisme*, 410-56.

<sup>205</sup> Laroui, *Les origines sociales*, 413-414.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.*, 406.

<sup>207</sup> Munson, *Religion and Power*, 94.

‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ became a sufi disciple of al-Kattānī.<sup>208</sup> He not only “wrote a volume of verse extolling the Sufis,” but also regarded al-Kattānī as the intermediary between him and God. Although making free-will the starting point for his effort to liberate his country from French colonialism, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ took refuge in the passivity of the sufi to dissociate himself from his political failure.

By contrast, Indonesia saw the emergence of a highly peripheral individual in terms of origin and background --Aḥmad al-Shurkaṭī al-Anṣārī (1872-1943), a Sudanese who had arrived in Indonesia in October 1911 at the invitation of Jamiat Khair (Benevolent Organization; Arabic: Jam‘iyyat al-Khayr, founded in Jakarta in 1905), having been hired to teach. Like virtually all the figures we have met to this point, al-Shurkaṭī actively promoted an anti-*bid‘a* and *khurāfa* program. Also like them, he condemned the practice of *wasīla*, although he followed Riḍā in not rejecting the Ghazalian wing of sufism. Last but not least, like his fellow puritan modernists, al-Shurkaṭī directed the activities of Indonesian passivism at the internal circle of his new homeland. His non-political puritan reform was, however, a middle position between the “right wing” of ‘Uthmān and al-Dukkālī on the one hand, and the “left wing” of ‘Abduh and Dahlan on the other. Al-Shurkaṭī did not openly

---

<sup>208</sup>Victor Monteil, *Morocco* (London: 1964), 56; Cohen, *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation*, 14; John P. Halstead, *Rebirth of A Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 24; Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif*, 13; and King Hassan II, *The*

support imperialism, as ‘Uthmān and al-Dukkālī had done with the Dutch and the French respectively, although he did not, like ‘Abduh and Dahlan, rely on the strength of the Dutch to advance his goals. At no time did he invite the Dutch to intervene in the internal affairs of Islam, although he did not reject them when they sought his help for the sake of the whole society. Another dimension of his attempt to reverse Indonesian passivism vis-à-vis the practice of *wasīla* was the emphasis he placed on the equality of Muslims. Like al-‘Arbī al-‘Alawī, al-Shurkatī criticized the allegedly “Islamic” marriage tradition that almost all Arab religious aristocrats strictly practiced. And yet, while al-‘Alawī criticized the tradition on account of his immediate need to marry a non-*sharīfa*, al-Shurkatī had no personal interest in pointing out its shortcomings.

In contrast to Moroccan *sharīfs*, Indonesian *sayyids* were more open to marrying outside their caste. Unlike the former, the latter were unable to find *sharīfas* or *sayyidas* to marry because many of their ancestors had been young un-married male emigrants to Indonesia. The religio-political feudalism of Indonesia, however, allowed them to benefit from their status all the same. The marriage of a *sayyid* to a non-*sayyida*, let alone a non-Arab woman, cost him less dowry (*mahar*) compared with marriage to a *sayyida*. More importantly, many Indonesian Muslim parents were so dominated by the long quasi-religious practice, that they saw marrying their daughters to *sayyids* as the ideal



means of improving the socio-religio-political status of their family and, more specifically, any male descendents resulting from the marriage. On the other hand, the Indonesian *sayyids* were as strict as their fellow Moroccan *sharīfs* in opposing the marriage of a *sayyida* to a non-*sayyid*. Although Riḍā had issued a *fatwā* in 1908,<sup>209</sup> declaring that the marriage of a *sayyida* to a *sayyid* was not prohibited (this in response to the ethnic arrogance of Sayyid ‘Uthmān ibn Sālīm al-‘Aṭṭās of Padang), al-Shurkaṭī had still to face this tradition. In an egalitarian speech he delivered at Solo in 1913, al-Shurkaṭī encouraged the *sayyids* to be more flexible in applying the concept of *kafā’a* (equality) to the marriage of a *sayyida* to a non-*sayyid*.<sup>210</sup> Taking offense at this, his *sayyid* employers at the Jamiat Khair severely criticized him. The competition between *sayyid* and non-*sayyid* Indonesian Arabs had after all started long before the coming of al-Shurkaṭī to Indonesia, with the non-*sayyids* having been able to gain an upper hand due both to their talents and Dutch political intervention. To weaken the potential rebelliousness of the *sayyids*,<sup>211</sup> the Dutch had appointed such non-*sayyid* figures as Shaykh Umar Manggus and

---

(London: Macmillan London Limited, 1978), 14.

<sup>209</sup>Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, *al-Manār* 16 (1326 A.H./1908 A.D.).

<sup>210</sup>Al-Shurkaṭī later on published a twenty-nine page treatise entitled *Ṣurat al-Jawāb* in Surabaya, with neither date nor publisher known. See Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, 120 no. 35.

<sup>211</sup>See also Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles, *The History of Java*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (London: n.p., 1930), 2: 2.

Shaykh Awad Sungkar as “captains” of the Arabs in Jakarta and Solo respectively, under whose control the non-*sayyids* were placed.<sup>212</sup>

Seeing the treatment accorded by the *sayyids* of Jamiat Khair to al-Shurkatī, who favored rule by the long exploited majority of Indonesians to that of the long exploitative minority of Arab *sayyids*, the non-*sayyid* Arabs chose to support him. Together they founded Al-Irsyad or Jam‘iyyat al-Islāh wa al-Irshād in 1913.<sup>213</sup> Their message-oriented *tajdīd* was crystallized in Al-Irsyad’s statutes. No *sayyid*, according to article 5 of this document, was eligible to serve on the board of the organization.<sup>214</sup> The *sayyids* in turn demanded that the Dutch government take action against these former members of their exclusive, elitist organization, accusing them of “Bolshevism” in an attempt to tie their rivals to the leftist political threat then facing the Dutch administration. The *sayyids* likewise criticized Al-Irsyad for not supporting the new British-backed caliph, Sharīf Ḥusayn of Mecca,<sup>215</sup> thus enabling the *sayyids* to claim to represent the true Islam and to be the defenders of Indonesia. Al-Shurkatī was, they argued, not only a foreign Negro, but also a false teacher whose teachings created instability. He

---

<sup>212</sup>Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam*, 73-74.

<sup>213</sup>Pijper believed that the name of Al-Irsyad was taken from Riḍā’s Jam‘iyyat al-Da‘wā wa al-Irshād. Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, 114.

<sup>214</sup>Perserikatan Al-Irsyad, *Anggaran Dasar Al-Irsyad* (Jakarta: Perserikatan Al-Irsyad, 1915), article 5.

<sup>215</sup>Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam*, 78.

therefore deserved to be sentenced to death.<sup>216</sup> In 1932, however, Al-Irsyad further desacralized the title of *sayyid* by equating it with the common English title of “mister.” Its argument was that, given that Islam teaches that all human beings are equal (a provision with which the *sayyids* had to abide), the descendents of the Prophet Muḥammad could not claim a higher position than anybody else. Their aristocratic claims were furthermore invalid because the Prophet had only one child that lived, a daughter Fāṭima, while Arab social structure was traditionally patriarchal in nature.<sup>217</sup> Thus al-Shurkaṭī transcended Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, ‘Abduh, al-Dukkālī, and even Riḍā in applying the egalitarianism of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.”

Although Riḍā himself failed to transform his politico-liberationist vision into a political struggle,<sup>218</sup> Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949), an avid reader of his journal *al-Manār*, was inspired by it to found not only “the largest and most influential Islamic organization in the Sunni Arab world,”<sup>219</sup> but also

---

<sup>216</sup>B. Schreike, “De Strijd onder de Arabieren in Pers en Literatuur,” *Notulen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap voor Kunsten en Wetenschappen*, 58 (1920), 203-204 quoted in Noer, *Gerakan Modern Islam*, 77 no. 104.

<sup>217</sup>Perserikat Al-Irsyad, *Titel Sajid Djadi Urusan, Pemerintah Tjampur Tangan? Keterangan dan Penerangan Djelas Tentang Hak dan Hukum yang Njata Di dalam Islam* (Jakarta: Perserikatan Al-Irsyad, 1932).

<sup>218</sup>Sami Zubaida, *Islam, the People and State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East* (London and New York: Routledge, 1989), 94.

<sup>219</sup>Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, “On the Modernity, Historical Specificity and International Context of Political Islam,” in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, eds., *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), 6.

“...the most powerful Islamic movement in the world,” i.e., the Ikhwān al-Muslimīn (Muslim Brothers).<sup>220</sup> Maintaining the purification theme that the Wahhabites, al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh, and Riḍā had called for, al-Bannā concluded that “Muslim weakness and vulnerability to European domination stemmed from Muslims’ deviation from ‘true’ Islam,”<sup>221</sup> for which mistake the ‘*ulamā*’ should be held responsible. He demanded that Muslims abandon all historical accretions and return to the Qur’ān and Sunna. Like Riḍā, al-Shurkaṭī, and al-Fāṣī, al-Bannā did not condemn, but instead radicalized, sufi passivity. His infusion of the concept of obedience to the *shaykh*, one of the most important elements of sufi leadership, into the Muslim Brothers<sup>222</sup> made him a charismatic leader<sup>223</sup> vis-à-vis Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s message-oriented *tajdīd*. To this type of leadership, he added not only fascist-style discipline and obedience, but Communist-style co-operation as well.<sup>224</sup> In contrast to the Saudi Wahhabite xenophobic historical leap and the rejectionism manifested in their response to the material achievements of the West, al-Bannā selectively welcomed learning from the West, while at the same time condemning its

---

<sup>220</sup>Munson, *Islam and Revolution*, 77.

<sup>221</sup>Commins, “Hasan al-Banna,” 133. See also John Waterbury, “Egypt: Islam and Social Change,” in Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan, eds., *Change and the Muslim World* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981), 52.

<sup>222</sup>Commins, “Hasan al-Banna,” 131.

<sup>223</sup>Dekmejian, *Islam and Revolution*, 75.

<sup>224</sup>Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren*, 93.

moral laxity.<sup>225</sup> His non-foundationalist approach,<sup>226</sup> following in the footsteps of al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh and Riḍā, in turn led to his being characterized as a nativist. In addition to his strategy of making the material achievements of the West one of his most potent weapons against the West itself,<sup>227</sup> al-Bannā alerted others to the urgent need to reassert Islam as an indigenous culture and political ideology, to establish Arabic as a unifying language, and to root out the Westernized Egyptian elites,<sup>228</sup> who “sought to implement Western-based models in political, social, and economic development.”<sup>229</sup>

Compared to his three masters (al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh and Riḍā), al-Bannā faced more serious problems, which led to his becoming the leading exponent of what Tibi calls “a defensive culture.”<sup>230</sup> Not only was the caliphate abolished in 1924 by some of his fellow Muslims, but almost all

---

<sup>225</sup>Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 125.

<sup>226</sup>Binder, *The Ideological Revolution*, 137.

<sup>227</sup>Charles Wendell, “Introduction,” in Ḥasan al-Banna’, *Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949)*, tr. Charles Wendell (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1978), 3. See also Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren*, 89.

<sup>228</sup>Tibi, “Islam and Nationalism,” 62; and Waterbury, “Egypt: Islam and Social Change,” 52.

<sup>229</sup>Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 133.

<sup>230</sup>Bassam Tibi, “Islam and Nationalism,” in Barbara Freyer Stowasser, ed., *The Islamic Impulse* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm in association with Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1987), 64-65.

Muslim countries had been subjected by this time to Western colonialism,<sup>231</sup> the lowest point ever in the political history of Islam. Disregarding the moral defeatism of the Muslim modernists implied in ‘Abduh’s solution, al-Bannā took up the activism of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī, and Riḍā instead. Indeed, al-Bannā joined the 1919 Egyptian nationalist uprising against the British presence in Egypt.<sup>232</sup> In contrast to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s strategy, al-Bannā made Ismā‘īliyya, “the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company and the British troops in Egypt,”<sup>233</sup> the focus of his peripheral counterattack. In his efforts to put into practice his strong belief in the dual function of the caliphate as a symbol of Muslim unity and of the relationship between state and religion, he made this one of the two basic goals of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>234</sup> In 1936 he called upon King Fārūq, al-Nahhās Pāshā and the kings and princes of the Islamic world to follow the path of Islam, while forsaking the way of the West.<sup>235</sup> In 1937 he stepped up the pressure by declaring colonialism to be the first enemy of Islam. He sought by this double strategy, which he characterized as the two basic goals of the Muslim Brotherhood, to liberate the Islamic

---

<sup>231</sup>Ḥasan al-Banna’, *Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Banna’ (1906-1949)*, tr. Charles Wendell (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978), 22-23.

<sup>232</sup>Ḥasan al-Banna, *Memoirs of Ḥasan al-Banna Shaheed* (Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981), 84. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 132. Commins, “Ḥasan al-Banna,” 127; and Munson, *Islam and Revolution*, 76.

<sup>233</sup>Hiro, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 61.

<sup>234</sup>Abdulnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 34.

<sup>235</sup>Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren*, 14.

nation from all foreign powers. He fully expected that an Islamic state would come into existence, as would a revived caliphate that functioned according to the Shari‘a.<sup>236</sup>

Eventually, al-Bannā abandoned altogether his own eclectic and non-foundationalist approach to the material achievements of the West,<sup>237</sup> and instead fell back on Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s and Riḍā’s rejectionism in his vision of the nature of the Islamic state. In spite of his satisfaction with the Muslim Brotherhood, which he described in 1938 as “a Salafite movement, an orthodox way, a sufi reality, a political body, an authentic group, a scientific and cultural society, an economic company and a social idea,”<sup>238</sup> he insisted in the same year on the ideological, instead of geographical or racial, relationship of the Islamic nation.<sup>239</sup> In his capacity as chairman of the Brotherhood, al-Bannā had to respond to Marxism, a new but potent enemy of Islam. After insisting at a congress of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1938 on how the Islamic identity of the organization demanded that Muslims return Islam to the Qur’ān and the traditions of the righteous ancestors,<sup>240</sup> al-Bannā persuaded the Muslim Brotherhood to build a mass-based movement in response to the challenges of

---

<sup>236</sup>Ḥasan Al-Bannā, *Majmū‘āt Rasā’il al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā* (Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1965), 225.

<sup>237</sup>Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 121.

<sup>238</sup>*Min Khuṭab Ḥasan al-Bannā*, 14-15; the translation is taken from Husaini, *The Moslem Brethren*, 15.

<sup>239</sup>Abdulnasser, *The Islamic Movement in Egypt*, 35.

<sup>240</sup>Anawati and Borrmans, *Tendances et courants de l’Islam*, 1: 27.

“other emerging mass-based movements such as the Egyptian Communist Party and *Misr al-Fatat* [Young Egypt].”<sup>241</sup> Thus like the Wahhabites he emphasized “the perfection and comprehensiveness of Islam and hence its self-sufficiency,”<sup>242</sup> all the while rejecting their divisive interpretation in favour of al-Afghānī’s pan-Islamism. The next year however saw his Muslim Brotherhood coming into conflict with the government. While liberal nationalism was under attack due to the nation’s defeat in the Palestine war, the consequent establishment by the United States and Britain of the state of Israel, Egypt’s inability to force the British out of the country, and “massive unemployment, poverty, and corruption, al-Bannā’s Muslim Brotherhood greatly enhanced their credentials as patriotic sons of Egypt and Arab nationalists in their significant participation in the 1948 Palestine war and again in the 1951 Suez crisis.”<sup>243</sup>

In Morocco, al-Dukkālī showed great consistency in advising the ruler on “the need to return to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah,”<sup>244</sup> which ‘Abd al-Ḥafīz made a major part of his religious strategy.<sup>245</sup> Following Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb,

---

<sup>241</sup>Eric Davis, “The Concept of Revival and the Study of Islam and Politics,” in Barbara Freyer Stowasser, *The Islamic Impulse* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm in association with Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1987), 47. Italics are mine.

<sup>242</sup>Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 133.

<sup>243</sup>Esposito, *Islamic Threat*, 120.

<sup>244</sup>Munson, *Religion and Power*,

<sup>245</sup>Muḥammad al-Mukhtār al-Sūsī, *Ḥawla Ma’īdat al-Ghaddā’* (Rabat: Maṭba‘at al-Sāhil, 1983), 47, 64, 86-87; Cagne, *Nation et nationalisme*, 355.



al-Afghānī, and ‘Abduh to the letter, al-Dukkālī showed no compromise in his stance on purifying the Islamic ‘*aqīda* of un-Islamic influences. Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Dukkālī resorted to Islamic positivist transcendentalism in denouncing polytheism, and even went so far as to physically cut down –and thus desacralize-- an allegedly sacred tree. At the same time he declared open the supposedly closed doors of *ijtihād*. In 1907 al-Dukkālī reintroduced, under the auspices of ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz, the teaching of *tafsīr* to the curriculum of Qarawiyyīn University.<sup>246</sup> Almost as part of a double strategy, however, he set aside the Islamic fundamentalism of Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, the Paderis, and al-Afghānī vis-à-vis imperialism. Instead, he literally transferred ‘Abduh’s modernism to Morocco in order to protect Muslims from any further damage that imperialism might cause.

Whereas most of his fellow Moroccan Muslims completely rejected imperialism, al-Dukkālī saw in it a positive aspect, that of an alternate protector of their interests (*maṣāliḥ*). He officially welcomed the conquering French to Morocco in September 1912, for which act the colonizers rewarded him by appointing him “Minister of Justice, a position he held until 1923.”<sup>247</sup> At the same time he, like ‘Uthmān, condemned al-Ḥibā, one of the most important pan-Islamic and purificationist think-tanks of the deposed sultan ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz, since it was his dream to transform the next generation of

---

<sup>246</sup> Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 496.

<sup>247</sup> Munson, *Religion and Power*, 100.

Moroccan Muslims into a *salaf al-ṣālih*. Ibn ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, a brother of the leader of the insurgent ‘Ayniyya sufi brotherhood, accused al-Dukkālī of being an apostate for condemning the ‘Ayniyya’s revolt against the French under al-Ḥibā’s leadership. Al-Dukkālī in turn made it clear that his criticism applied to imbalanced *jihāds* only. Instead of liberating Morocco from French imperialism, their revolts would, he reasoned, contribute to its further submission to France, since the European troops could easily crush such poorly equipped opponents.<sup>248</sup> For his part, therefore, he criticized a suicidal *jihād*.

Giving full expression to his Islamic modernism in the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” during the First World War, al-Dukkālī supported imperialism. In his attempt to oppose German-backed Ottoman pan-Islamism, he encouraged his fellow Moroccan Muslims to reject the legitimacy of the Ottoman sultan as the caliph of Islam, and imitated Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s and Riḍā’s rejection of the Ottoman sultan due to his non-Qurayshite descent. Mawlāy Yūsuf, installed by the French in 1912, ought instead to be recognized as the legitimate caliph of Moroccans, he felt, because he at least was a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad. In so arguing, al-Dukkālī reasserted the existence of the Sharifian Sultanate vis-à-vis the penetration of the old dominating non-Qurayshite Ottomans that had returned to Morocco under the guise of pan-Islamism. Al-Dukkālī used the French protectorate over Morocco as a pretext to legitimize the very existence of the Moroccan Islamic state,

---

<sup>248</sup>‘Abbās ibn Ibrāhīm, *Al-I’lām bi man Ḥalla Marrākish wa Aghmāt*

quoting the prophetic tradition that “The sultan is the shadow of God on earth and it is with him that all oppressed find refuge.”<sup>249</sup>

Unlike al-Dukkālī, who worked from within the Moroccan center of power, the Indonesian thinker Ahmad Hassan (1887-1958) carried out his reform from and in the periphery. Like al-Shurkaṭī, Hassan was not entirely of Indonesian origin, for he had been born in Singapore to an Indian father. Like Dahlan, however, he was Indonesian on his mother’s side. While his homeland, compared to al-Shurkaṭī’s, was closer to Indonesia, it was further from the center of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunnah.” His reformism can even be characterized as peripheral, for he never studied in Middle Eastern countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, and may even be regarded as a self-educated thinker. Like al-‘Arbī al-‘Alawī and al-Shurkaṭī, Hassan encountered an ingrained attitude which equated Arabness with Islamness, the former of which was seen as giving access to a sort of religious aristocracy. Like his predecessors, Hassan criticized deviations from the principle of *kafā’a*. But while al-‘Arbī al-‘Alawī restricted himself to combatting the rigidity of *sharīf* and *sharīfa* marriage, Hassan was under the influence of al-Shurkaṭī’s *Ṣurāt al-Jawāb* which fought to exclude Arab feudalism from al-Irsyad forever. Hassan for his part severely criticized the practice of *taqbīl*, according to which a non-*sayyid* was expected to kiss the

---

*min al-A‘lām* (Rabat: n.d.), 2: 479-480.

hands of a *sayyid* when they met as a sign of respect. The publication of his message-oriented *tajdīd* criticism of the *taqbīl* practice in *Utusan Melayu* in 1914 so shocked Singaporean Muslims that authorities warned him against creating further disturbances,<sup>250</sup> but like al-Shurkaṭī, Hassan did not change his stance that *taqbīl* has no textual basis in either the Qur'ān or the Sunna. He saw it as a kind of social *bid'a*, against which a true Muslim must struggle to achieve social justice in his relationships with other human beings. Like al-Shurkaṭī, who excluded scriptural feudalism, Hassan too injected a strictly puritan interpretation of Islam into the statutes of his group Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union).<sup>251</sup>

As the leading *'ālim* of Persatuan Islam, Hassan played a key role in determining its religious policy. He directed his organization towards an anti-*bid'a* and *khurāfa* stance, giving no place to non-Qur'anic or non-Sunna authorities in the organization.<sup>252</sup> In order to realize his puritan reform he, like the Wahhabites, took an isolationist approach towards the popular practices of Islam. He, for instance, prohibited Persatuan Islam from participating in the Bandung Mawlūd festival of 1936. Despite the fact that his fellow Indonesian

---

<sup>249</sup>Abū Shu'ayb al-Dukkālī, "Opinion de Bou Chaib Doukkali," *Revue du Monde Musulmane* 29 (1914): 361. The translation is taken from Munson, *Religion and Power*, 101.

<sup>250</sup>Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, 130; and Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam*, 97-100.

<sup>251</sup>For more information on the Persatuan Islam, see Howard M. Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1970).

Muslims enjoyed celebrating the birth of Prophet Muḥammad to show their deep love for him, Hassan condemned the festival as a *bid'a*. His rejectionist approach in this regard reflected the principle of *al-takfīr wa al-hijra*, based on which fundamentalist Muslims divide society into *minnā* (among us; our group) and *minhum* (among them; their group), seeing it as their duty to isolate themselves in order to achieve salvation. Unlike his fellow reformists, Hassan sought to advance his efforts at purifying Islam of un-Islamic influences by challenging his critics to undertake open debate. A series of discussions were consequently held on the topic of *talqīn*, a practice he likewise considered as *bid'a*,<sup>253</sup> including one with Haji Abul Khair and Haji Abdul Wahhab of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Arabic: Nahḍat al-‘Ulamā’)<sup>254</sup> in Ciledug, Cirebon, West Java, in 1932, and another (accompanied by Maqsudi) with the Gebang chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama in 1936.<sup>255</sup> Hassan also challenged the advocates of the Qadian Ahmadiyah (then under the leadership of Rahmat Ali) to engage in public debate to prove their claim that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad was

---

<sup>252</sup>See Pijper, *Beberapa Studi*, 130.

<sup>253</sup>Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 224. *Talqīn* is “(Arabic) A term used to denote an instruction given by a religious teacher, and generally denoting instruction given to the deceased at the grave side at the case of the burial service.” Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 21.

<sup>254</sup>The Nahdlatul Ulama was founded in 1926. For more information, see, for example, Achmad Farichin Humaidi, “The Jam’iyyah Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Rise and Early Development (1926-1945)” (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1957); and Martin van Bruinessen, *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru* (Yogyakarta: LkiS, 1994).

<sup>255</sup>Persatuan Islam, *Verslag Openbaar Debat Talqin*, 2<sup>nd</sup> (Bandung: Persis, 1933).

a prophet. Several debates between the two groups took place in Bandung between 14 and 16 April 1933 and in Jakarta between 28<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> of the same month.<sup>256</sup> In addition to discussions with both traditional and deviating-reformist Muslims (the Nahdlatul Ulama and the Qadian Ahmadiyah respectively), Hassan even undertook debates with the leaders of the Christian Seventh Day Adventist church.<sup>257</sup> These debates however gave a greater impression of his intransigence rather than his tolerance or openness to dialogue.

As a true defender of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” Hassan saw nationalism as a threat to the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. As a manifestation of *‘aṣabiyya*, nationalism, he insisted, divides Indonesian Muslims from their co-religionists in India, China, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt, and therefore contradicts the pan-Islamic principle that Muslims must unite and be brothers (Q, 49: 10; 3: 103). To become a member of a national party means to leave Islam, since a national party will never adopt the Shari‘a in any future state constitution.<sup>258</sup> Like Dahlan and al-Shurkaṭī, Hassan was a non-political partisan, but in the context of the Indonesian independence movement his *fatwā* justified pan-Islamist or Indonesian Islamist groups who

---

<sup>256</sup>For more information on the debates, see Persatoean Islam, *Officiëel Verslag Debat Pembela Islam-Ahmadiyah* (Bandung: Pendidikan Islam, Bagian Penjiaran) and Persatoen Islam, *Officiëel Verslag Debat “PembelaIslam” dengan Ahmadiyah Qadian di Gang Kenari Djakarta* (Bandung: Persatoean Islam, 1933).

<sup>257</sup>Noer, *Gerakan Moderen Islam*, 103.

<sup>258</sup>Ahmad Hassan, *Soeal Djawab* II: 22.

wanted to establish an Islamic state, but were hampered by nationalism. In 1921, Communism divided the Sarekat Islam Party, the first all-embracing Indonesian modern party, into white (Islamic) and red (Communist) wings, since the latter, among others, opposed the pan-Islamic orientation of the party.<sup>259</sup> The central position of Islam as *the* symbol of the Indonesian independence movement<sup>260</sup> was further marginalized when Sukarno founded the Indonesian National Party in 1927 on purely nationalist principles.<sup>261</sup> However, in 1937 Hassan published *Soerat-soerat Islam dari Ende* [Islamic Letters from Ende],<sup>262</sup> a collection of Sukarno's correspondence with him from his political exile in Ende, demonstrating Sukarno's reconversion to Islamism under his influence, after having abandoned it in 1927. "For me," Sukarno responded to Hassan in 1936, "anti-taqīdism means not only 'returning' to the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth, but also 'returning' to the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth with the help of knowledge and science,"<sup>263</sup> which was in line with Hassan's anti-

---

<sup>259</sup>Bernard H. M. Vlekke, *The Story of the Dutch East Indies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945), 186.

<sup>260</sup>See J.D. Legge, *Indonesia* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965), 128.

<sup>261</sup>See Zamakhsyari Dofier, "K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim Rantai Penghubung Peradaban Pesantren dengan Peradaban Indonesia Modern," *Prisma* 8 (1984): 75.

<sup>262</sup>For more information on this correspondence, see Bernhard Dahm, *Sukarnos Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhängigkeit* (Frankfurt am Main-Berlin: Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde in Hamburg, n.d.), 137-42.

<sup>263</sup>Sukarno, *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi*, edited by Muallif Nasution, 3<sup>rd</sup> (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1963), 1: 337.

xenophobic historical leap.<sup>264</sup> Like al-Shurkafī, but unlike Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, ‘Abduh, and Riḍā, Hassan’s slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” was a slogan for an Islam without Arabism as a consequence of his anti-nationalism.

Sayyid Quṭb (1906-1966), as the crisis hypothesis understands him, turned out to be a staunch defender of the slogan when he abandoned his earlier pro-Westernization ideology in 1948. This came in the wake of the marginalization of the Palestinians by the Western powers, in particular Great Britain and the United States of America, who supported the formation of the State of Israel while denying the Palestinians their rights. Thus, for Quṭb, the West was a hypocrite.<sup>265</sup> On the other hand, he saw how many Muslim Brothers were heroically struggling for the Palestinians. His defense mechanism sharpened when he was in the United States from 1948 to 1950. Instead of feeling welcomed in the new center of the world, he was struck by a further bias. The American press not only failed to express any sorrow about the assassination of Ḥasan al-Bannā, they actually publicly applauded it! Upon his return to Egypt in 1950, he began to insist, through his *al-‘Adāla al-Ijtima’iyya fī al-Islām* (Social Justice in Islam), on what Haddad calls his

---

<sup>264</sup>See also, Ahmad Hassan, *Risalah Al-Madzhah: Wadjibkah atau Haramkah Bermadzhah?* (Bangil: Penerbit Persatoean Islam, 1956), 12-13.

<sup>265</sup>Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Qur’anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Quṭb,” *The Middle East Journal* 17,1 (1983), 18.



vision of a “neo-normative Muslim.”<sup>266</sup> Like other puritan supporters of the slogan, Quṭb blamed un-Islamic practices as responsible for the decline of Islam, but he shifted the paradigm of *bid‘a* and *sunna* in his solution to the problem. Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, the Paderis, al-Afghānī, al-Kattānī (d. 1908), Riḍā, Mā’ al-‘Aynayn and al-Bannā, Quṭb transformed the conflict between *bid‘a* and *sunna* into a clash between *sunni* (legitimate or “Islamic”) and *bid‘ī* (illegitimate or non-“Islamic”) political authorities.<sup>267</sup>

To bring victory to Islam in the modern world, the *sunna* party had (as Quṭb insisted in his absolutist interpretation of Islam) to revolt against the *bid‘a* party. While the former consisted of Muslims who observed the *Shari‘a* in its entirety, the latter consisted of Muslims who did the opposite. In other words, the former were the *ḥizb Allāh* (party of God), and the latter the *ḥizb al-Shayṭān* (party of Satan) or *ḥizb al-Tāghūt* (party of the Tyrant). Unlike such top-bottom reformists as ‘Uthmān and al-Sanūsī, Quṭb did not pay attention in his elaboration of the conflicting parties to such trivial deviating practices as reciting *uṣallī* (I pray) at the beginning of a prayer or reciting *tahlīl* prayer for the dead.<sup>268</sup> For Quṭb, such a puritan reform would not in itself be able to

---

<sup>266</sup>Haddad, “Qur’anic Justification,” 15.

<sup>267</sup>Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Quṭb* (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992), 161-162; idem, *Qirā‘a Naẓariyya Ta’sīsiyya fī al-Khiṭāb al-Islāmī al-Uṣulī (Naẓariyyāt al-Ma’rifa wa al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama’* (Beirut: Al-Nāshir, 1993), 70.

<sup>268</sup>Tahlil is “(Arabic) the act of repeating the ejaculation la illa illa llah!, i.e., “There is no god but Allah!” It is believed by Muslims that repetition of

change the fate of Muslims in the world. They had no choice but to radically transform their religious practices into Islamic positivist transcendentalism. Although stressing in his liberation theology that Islam is not “the opiate of the masses”<sup>269</sup> but the motor of change, Quṭb --like al-Afghānī, Riḍā, ‘Abduh and al-Bannā-- had to challenge pro-establishment ‘*ulamā*’. Quṭb even arbitrarily accused “the professional men of religion,” in particular those of al-Azhār University, of selling out Islam by legitimizing their rulers, regardless of their religion, and, hence, their own socio-economic interests. Thus the most dangerous *bid‘a* they spread throughout the Muslim world was, for Quṭb, the notion that Islam was not a revolutionary religion, when in fact Islam had come to change the world from an unjust into a just one. Its very purpose was to convert inequality into equality in all dimensions of human history, the starting point of which is to rebel against the political domination of the tyranny (*tāghūt*).<sup>270</sup>

For Quṭb, political *bid‘a* could come to dominate the practice of Muslims not only due to the submission of the professional men of religion to their oppressive governments, but also to the imitation of Westernized Muslim thinkers. Although he criticized “the political and cultural hegemony of the

---

the tahlil, will cleanse a person’s sins and gain him religious merit.” Federspiel, *Persatuan Islam*, 210.

<sup>269</sup>Ibrahim Abu-Rabi, “Sayyid Qutb: From Religious Realism to Radical Social Criticism,” *The Islamic Quarterly* 28 (1984): 108.

<sup>270</sup>Yvonne Y. Haddad, “Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival,” in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 85-86.

West,” Quṭb –in rejecting Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s xenophobic historical leap-- was very eager to transform the scientific and technological achievements of the West, shorn of its theological and moral defects, for the sake of his revolutionary movement of establishing an Islamic state.<sup>271</sup> In sharp contrast to such supporters of secularism, Quṭb made the unity of religion and state the absolute solution to the decline of Islam,<sup>272</sup> the achievement of which was hampered by imperialism, the exploiters and oppressors, professional men of religion and Communism. Quṭb’s hopes to establish an Islamic state in Egypt led him to join forces with the Free Officers under the leadership of Gamal Abdun Nasser, whom he saw as a possible instrument for gaining power in the state and open to an Islamic solution to national questions. Consequently, he supported the Free Officers in their July Revolution of 1952, which toppled the government of King Fārūq. Quṭb apparently believed that the success of the Revolution would bring Egypt closer to the creation of an Islamic state since Arab nationalism, espoused by the Free Officers, was marked in many respects by the pan-Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>273</sup> Nevertheless, Quṭb’s expectations did not come true, for after their defeat of their common enemy Nasser and Quṭb became sworn enemies, in part because of ideology but also

---

<sup>271</sup>Sayyid Quṭb, *Naḥw al-Mujtama‘ al-Islāmī*, 5<sup>th</sup> edition (Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1982), 11-12; and idem, *Al-Mustaqbal liḥādḥā al-Dīn* (Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1965), 71-90.

<sup>272</sup>Abu-Rabi, “Sayyid Quṭb,” 107.

<sup>273</sup>Sayyid Quṭb, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya* (Cairo: 1971), 163-164. See also, Maḥdī Faḍl Allāh, *Ma‘ Sayyid Quṭb fī Fikrih al-Siyāsī wa al-Dīnī* (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risāla, 1978), 91.

because of personal political competition.<sup>274</sup> Nasser accused the former of revolting against his government and subsequently imprisoned him.<sup>275</sup> Nasser's Arab nationalism was, Quṭb declared from prison, nothing more than modern ignorance (*jāhiliyya*) against which the Qur'ānic generation (*ṭalī'a* or vanguard) had no choice but to revolt in order to establish an Islamic state. Nasser in turn cited Quṭb's *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* (Signposts), filled as it was with statements against Muslims (i.e., army leaders) who were following paths inconsistent with Quṭb's own ideological goals, as the clearest proof of Quṭb's guilt (for which he was hanged in 1966).<sup>276</sup> Significantly, *Ma'alim* also promoted the guidance and interpretation leading to the founding of the Takfir wa al-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight) and the Tanẓīm al-Jihād (Jihad Organization) groups, two of the most radical Islamic fundamentalist groups to emerge in Egypt during the last half of the twentieth century.<sup>277</sup> These two organizations, with their highly ideological orientations and uncompromising values regarding Islamic advancement in the political life of Egypt, constituted

---

<sup>274</sup>Vatikiotis, *The Modern History of Egypt*, 326.

<sup>275</sup>Ṣalāḥ 'Abd al-Fattāḥ Khālīdī, *Sayyid Quṭb al-Shahīd al-Ḥayy* (Amman: Maktabat al-Aqṣā, 1981).

<sup>276</sup>Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Quṭb*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1995), 52.

<sup>277</sup>Saad Edin Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants," *MERIP Reports* 103 (February, 1982): 14; and Abu Rabi, "Sayyid Qutb," 119; and Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism*, 36.

an important legacy of Quṭb and were long a reminder to Egyptian rulers of the strength of his conceptions and inspiration.

To describe ‘Allāl al-Fāsī (d. 1972) as al-Bannā’s twin in Morocco<sup>278</sup> is accurate since the former shared the uncompromising attitudes held by such staunch defenders of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” as Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, Sultan ‘Abd Allāh, the Paderis and al-Afghānī towards the *bid‘a* and *khurāfa* practices that they considered to be the main internal cause of the decline of Islam. In particular, he supported his teacher al-‘Arbī al-‘Alawī’s circulation of Egyptian *salafi* books like Ibn Taymiyya’s *Kitāb al-Furqān* (The Book on the Decisive Criterion [the Qur’ān] between Good and Evil) and *al-Tawassul wa al-Wasīla* (The Problem of Intercession) the journals *al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqā* and *al-Manār*, and al-Shāṭibī’s *Kitāb al-I’tisām bi al-Kitāb wa al-Sunna* (The Book on Seeking Refugee in the Qur’ān and Prophetic Tradition) through his own writings in *Izhār al-Ḥaqīqa* (Showing the Truth).<sup>279</sup> He also joined in the effort to establish a free school, as reflected in his clandestine broadsheet *Umm al-Banīn* (Mother of Children).<sup>280</sup> Although he, like Riḍā and al-Shurkaṭī, approved the Ghazalian wing of sufism,<sup>281</sup> al-Fāsī

---

<sup>278</sup>Hasan Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: *Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘aṣir* (Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998), 52.

<sup>279</sup>Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 496-498.

<sup>280</sup>Halstead, *Rebirth of A Nation*, 166 and 311.

<sup>281</sup>Attilio Gaudio says that “Allal El Fassi trouva dans la pensée philosophique d’El Ghazālī un premier réponse à sa recherche de l’équilibre

generally condemned the sufi orders of his time and place for spreading deviant religious practices and for weakening the historical consciousness of Muslims. In criticizing these orders his goal was to liberate his fellow Moroccan Muslims from their epistemological dependence on Tijanite sufis, in part because he regarded them as un-Islamic and also in part because the mystical orders were supported by the French who used sufism as a means of occupying Morocco.<sup>282</sup> Like his fellow reformists, al-Fāṣī saw *ijtihād* as a means of achieving true Islam, without getting trapped in Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s xenophobic historical leap.<sup>283</sup> *Ijtihād* was, for him, a dynamic process by which Muslims could solve all the legal problems facing them, and was even a liberating process by which he could set his ordinary fellow Muslims free from the grip of Muslim aristocrats. In contrast to puritan reformists like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī, ‘Abduh and Dahlan, who placed their faith in the ‘*ulamā*’, al-Fāṣī asserted that that it was the ‘*umma* (people) --not the state nor the sultan— who should elect the *mujtahids*. It was the popularly elected *mujtahids* who would use *ijtihād* properly and who would be “qualified deputies of the nation.”<sup>284</sup>

---

éthique de l’homme musulman.” Attilio Gaudio, *Allal El Fassi ou l’histoire de l’Istiqlal* (Paris: Alain Moreau, 1972), 27.

<sup>282</sup> Abun-Nasr, “The Salafiyya Movement,” 498.

<sup>283</sup> Lindholm, *The Islamic Middle East*, 199.

<sup>284</sup> Al-Fāṣī, *al-Ḥaraka al-Istiqlāliyya*, 158.

Al-Fāsī, like al-Afghānī and Riḍā, intensified his efforts to organize Muslims into political parties and, under the influence of the Moroccan Socialist Party, into trade unions, as a means of liberating Morocco from France. Like al-Afghānī's pan-Islamism, al-Fāsī strove to unite Muslims everywhere in opposing common enemies and asserted that, without unity, the Salafiyya movement would inevitably fail. It was his conviction that "Muslim countries should associate into one political entity,"<sup>285</sup> relying on the Arabic language to unify them. Considering foreign domination as an obstacle to the establishment of independent Muslim states, he transformed the epistemologically liberating spirit of *ijtihād* into a liberation movement motivated by *jihād*. Ultimately he was successful in this venture, mainly by bringing foreign pressure to bear on developments within Morocco, but also because he was able to move the Salafiyya movement from a purely intellectual stance to politico-nationalist activity, particularly in 1925 in response to France's involvement in the Rif War.<sup>286</sup> For this accomplishment Abun-Nasr characterizes him as the founder of the Neo-Salafiyya in Morocco.<sup>287</sup> However, in 1930 the French moved further towards consolidating

---

<sup>285</sup>Abun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement," 498.

<sup>286</sup>Halstead, *Rebirth of A Nation*, 166 and 311. For more information on the Rif war, see for example Charles-André Julien, ed., *Abd el-Krim et la république du rif* (Paris: François Maspero, 1976), and Woolman, *Rebels in the Rif*.

<sup>287</sup>Abun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement," 496-497. See also, Baer, "Islam and Politics," 19.

their position in Morocco by introducing the Berber *dahir* (decree), which “placed the bulk of the tribes under French criminal law, reorganized the judicial competency of the tribal jemaâ, or customary courts, and provided for a higher customary court of appeal.”<sup>288</sup>

Young Moroccan nationalists saw the move as francifying society and uprooting the social elite from its Berber and Islamic moorings. It was at this moment that help came from abroad. The Arab writer and activist Shakīb Arslān voiced a general call to action, to which Egyptian, Indian, and Indonesian Muslims responded by setting up committees of international Islamic solidarity.<sup>289</sup> It was under the pressure of Moroccan nationalists and Islamic international solidarity that the French canceled the *dahir*. This proved al-Fāsī’s contention that pan-Islamic action could be very effective when properly focused on a specific issue. Al-Fāsī further directed his Islamic positivist transcendentalism not only towards the struggle against imperialism (as the Paderis, and al-Afghānī had done), leading him to be “considéré de par le monde comme l’un des premiers leaders du Tier Monde qui ont lutté pour la liberation de leur pays,”<sup>290</sup> but also, like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, towards criticizing an independent Morocco to which he himself had contributed a great deal through his Independence Movement (*Ḥarakat al-Istiqlāliyya*). But

---

<sup>288</sup>Douglas E. Ashford, *Political Change in Morocco* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 31-32.

<sup>289</sup>*Ibid.*, 32.



unity only went so far, and al-Fāṣī could not agree with others on the important question of the caliphate when the office fell vacant in 1924. He did not support Riḍā's proposal to revive the caliphate as an Arab institution. The caliphate was, for al-Fāṣī, as for Atatürk, a historical achievement of earlier Muslims rather than an Islamic doctrine on the form of an Islamic state. Like Atatürk, he preferred a national state for an independent Morocco rather than a caliphate, but he --in line again with Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, al-Afghānī, 'Abduh, and Riḍā-- rejected Atatürk's purely nationalist tendencies in favour of an Islamic nationalism. And yet unlike Atatürk,<sup>291</sup> al-Fāṣī made the Sharī'a "the source of all modern legislation in all Muslim states,"<sup>292</sup> including Morocco. In his capacity as Minister of Islamic Affairs, al-Fāṣī, manifesting his pan-Islamic tendencies and ignoring Atatürk's Turkification, made Arabic the first language of primary and secondary schools in order to prepare future Moroccan generations to be nationalist Muslims. Like Atatürk, however, al-Fāṣī strove to build a republican, constitutional, democratic, and egalitarian state, but failed since King Hassan II, a descendant of the Prophet Muḥammad, succeeded in maintaining his kingdom.<sup>293</sup> Thus al-Fāṣī, like al-Shurkaṭī, was opposed to scriptural feudalism and authoritarianism.

---

<sup>290</sup>Mohamed el Alami, *Allal el Fassi Patriarche du nationalisme marocain* (Casablanca: Dar el Kitab, 1980), 181.

<sup>291</sup>Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 40-56.

<sup>292</sup>Al-Fāṣī, *al-Ḥaraka al-Istiqlāliyya*, 158.

<sup>293</sup>El Alami, *Allal el Fassi*, 124, 126-127, and 173-176.

The career of the Indonesian reformist Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo (1905-1962) by contrast, resembles that of Quṭb rather than that of al-Fāṣī. This was mainly because he added a peripheral epistemology to the existing peripheral geo-politics of local advocates of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna.” For, in contrast to previous Indonesian reformists, Kartosuwirjo, like Quṭb, was not an ‘*alim* in the traditional religious sense, but a student of the secular sciences and a product of the Dutch high school system.<sup>294</sup> His knowledge of Islamic state theory was obtained from his mentor, Hadji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto, president of the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia or Indonesian Islamic Sarekat Party).<sup>295</sup> As private secretary to Tjokroaminoto, Kartosuwirjo grew to prefer Islam, instead of nationalism, in contrast to another of Tjokroaminoto’s protégés, his son-in-law Sukarno, who had abandoned the political teachings of his master in 1927 to found the Indonesian National Party. Kartosuwirjo, under the pan-Islamic influence of Tjokroaminoto, did not agree with Sukarno’s synthesis of nationalism, Communism and Islam into a mixed ideology as the basis for his independence movement. Sukarno was very eager to make use of Communism as a means of liberating Indonesia from their common enemy, the efficacy of which he saw in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and in the 1926 abortive coup of the Indonesian Communist Party. Kartosuwirjo, nevertheless, considered

---

<sup>294</sup>Pinardi, *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo* (Jakarta: 1964), 27-28.

Communism an atheist threat to the very existence of Islam, since not only had Russian communists played a significant role in destroying the Ottoman Empire, but the Indonesian Communist Party had also fragmented the Sarekat Islam and allowed the government to destroy the movements' effectiveness as a national political force.<sup>296</sup> Moreover, Sukarno considered Ataturk a pioneer of republicanism and democracy in the Muslim world, while Kartosuwirjo saw him as an enemy of Islam whose revolution had destroyed the Islamic caliphate in the process of creating the very small national state of Turkey.

Van Nieuwenhuijze tells us that a year before he was elected vice president of the PSII in 1936, Kartosuwirjo had already started promoting the idea of establishing an Islamic state.<sup>297</sup> This shows an unwillingness to cooperate, not a desire to establish an Islamic state in an independent Indonesia. He also founded the Suffa Institute with training designed to build a cadre for Islamic state, but in response to Japanese (who occupied Indonesia throughout World War II) demands in 1942, he transformed the institute from

---

<sup>295</sup>Bernard Johan Boland, *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), 55.

<sup>296</sup>For more information on the Indonesian Communist Party, see, for example, Harri J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960); Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965); Takashi Shiraishi, "Islam and Communism: An Illumination of the People's Movement in Java, 1912-1926," (Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1986); and Michael Charles Williams, *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten* (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1990).

<sup>297</sup>Van Nieuwenhuijze, *Aspects of Islam*, 168.

a spiritual training center into a military base camp.<sup>298</sup> However, immediately after the Japanese surrendered to the Allied Forces on 14 August 1945, he proclaimed an Islamic state, which was left unrecognized by other Muslim leaders who gave allegiance to the Sukarno declaration a few days later. He then threw his support behind the Republic of Indonesia, arming his trained Suffa Institute recruits as a military unit in West Java where they skirmished with Dutch forces for two years. On his own authority, he called for *jihād* against the Dutch on 21 July 1947. Occupying almost all of West Java, the Dutch forced Indonesia to sign in January 1948 the Renville Agreement, one of whose stipulations was that the Indonesian Armed Forces (Siliwangi Brigade) had to leave for Yogyakarta (the capital of the Republic of Indonesia). The Siliwangi Brigade marched toward Yogyakarta, but Kartosuwirjo's troops, who totally rejected the agreement, occupied the strongholds that the Siliwangi left behind instead. To isolate the Republic of Indonesia, the Dutch employed the strategy of "divide and rule," by creating the Pesundan People's Party and appointing R.A.A. Surjakartanegara as its president. At the same time, they attacked Yogyakarta on 19 December 1948, to which Kartosuwirjo responded by calling for *jihād* against them.

The Republic of Indonesia, which considered the Dutch to have reneged on the Renville Agreement, ordered the Siliwangi to reoccupy their previous positions in West Java. On the way, however, they clashed with

---

<sup>298</sup>Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 55.

Kartosuwirjo's Indonesian Islamic Army in Garut on January 25, 1949, since the latter regarded the Siliwangi as cowards for having left for Yogyakarta in the first place. Kartosuwirjo later proclaimed his Indonesian Islamic State on 7 August 1949, replacing the Republic of Indonesia. Like al-Fāṣī, he made the Qur'ān and the sound Ḥadīth the constitution of his new Islamic republic.<sup>299</sup> In the meantime, the Republic of Indonesia persuaded the Dutch at the Round Table Conference held in the Haag on 27 December 1949, to recognize the *de facto* and *de jure* sovereignty of Indonesia, although according to the agreement the Republic of Indonesia would be replaced with the United States of Indonesia, a federation consisting of 16 states. Because the Republic of Indonesia no longer officially existed, the Dar al-Islam/Indonesian Islamic Army felt perfectly justified in defending their Indonesian Islamic State as their own. On 22 October 1950, Kartosuwirjo demanded that President Sukarno abandon both Communism and nationalism, and return to Islam as the only ideology capable of saving the Republic of Indonesia,<sup>300</sup> but otherwise made no move to reconcile himself with the new internationally recognized government of Indonesia. Sukarno eventually defeated the Dar al-Islam movement through a vigorous anti-guerrilla campaign in the period 1960-

---

<sup>299</sup>Negara Islam Indonesia, *Kanun Azasy Negara Islam Indonesia*, quoted in Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 257 (Appendix IV).

<sup>300</sup>Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia, "Nota Rahasia Kedua," quoted in Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 246-247 (Appendix II).

1962,<sup>301</sup> but Kartosuwirjo was the only Islamic positive-transcendentalist able to establish a true Islamic State, for ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ never actually changed the nature of the Moroccan sharifian sultanate. Unlike Riḍā, moreover, Kartosuwirjo never expressed any reservations about the possibility of a woman being elected president,<sup>302</sup> and, to demonstrate further his independent approach, he made Indonesian instead of Arabic the official language of his Islamic State.<sup>303</sup>

Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, as I have shown in this study, made the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” a theological means of transforming his political position from a peripheral to a central one. Although Voll’s “dramatic change hypothesis” is helpful in explaining the factors that led to the emergence of Wahhabism, Dekmejian’s “crisis hypothesis” provides more accurate description. The dramatic change that led to Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb’s reform was not the defeat of the Ottoman empire by Russia and Austria, but rather Sultan Abdülhamid I’s temerity in declaring himself to be *the* universal caliph of all Muslims, and in giving notice to the West that the Muslim world was behind him. The dramatic change, for Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, was the perception that the Arabs were being further marginalized. In order to achieve his myth of origin, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb shared some of his myth of demand

---

<sup>301</sup>See also, Voll, *Continuity and Change*, 243.

<sup>302</sup>Pemerintah Negara Islam Indonesia, *Kanun Azasy*, article 28.

<sup>303</sup>*Ibid.*, article 33.

with Ibn Sa‘ūd, for otherwise he would have had to face two challenges at the same time. In other words, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb conformed to the *uṣūl al-fiqh* principle of “*mā lā yudrak kulluh lā yutrak kulluh*” (something that cannot be achieved completely --namely, a successful revolution against the Ottoman Empire)-- cannot be abandoned totally --namely, he had no choice but to accept Ibn Sa‘ūd’s help in countering the same empire). Nor does Voll’s characterization of Wahhabism as message-oriented *tajdīd* apply entirely to the movement either, since the Wahhabites ultimately founded a political unit, though they believed their own claim to have returned to the *salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, whose first four caliphs --regarded by the Wahhabites as their ideal exemplars-- had been “elected.” In a sense McDonald (writing at the turn of the last century) was right to conclude that “attempts at reformation in Islam have never led to anything but the founding of new dynasties . . . The Wahhabites were no exception,”<sup>304</sup> although his generalization cannot apply to Kartosuwirdjo’s Indonesian Islamic State, since it was a “republic.”

Like Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhāb, many of the Egyptian, Moroccan, and Indonesian advocates of the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” also saw it as a means of transforming their peripheral position into a central one. On the other hand, the four Moroccan sultans --namely, ‘Abd Allāh, Ḥasan I, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ, who were already at the center of power in

---

<sup>304</sup>Duncan B. McDonald, *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory* (New York, 1903), 60.

Morocco-- were more in need of the slogan to legitimize their authority over the periphery. ‘Abd Allāh for instance used it to strengthen his religious and Arab authority vis-à-vis the charismatic marabouts and to elude the domination of non-Arab Ottoman sultans. However, when al-Afghānī legitimized Sultan Abdülhamid II with the same slogan, Ḥasan I’s reaction was negative: he did not officially recognize pan-Islamism, which was the international political manifestation of the slogan. Even though he was more exposed to the challenges of the Western powers than ‘Abd Allāh had been, Ḥasan I used the slogan, minus its pan-Islamic dimension, to strengthen his religious authority vis-à-vis the charismatic marabouts, while preserving his peripheral power vis-à-vis both the non-Arab Ottoman and Western powers. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, on the other hand, was unable to use the pro-establishment Moroccan slogan to legitimize his religious authority in the face of a challenge posed by another Moroccan faction of the slogan under the leadership of his brother ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ, which failure resulted in his downfall. ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ’s victory over his brother earned him the title of “*jihād* sultan,” but he in turn became a victim of his own theological manipulation when the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” which he had employed to reach the center of Moroccan political power, backfired. Instead of calling for *jihād*, as he had when his brother hesitated to counter Western incursions, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiẓ virtually handed his country over to the French.



The Egyptian, Moroccan, and Indonesian supporters of the slogan showed a strong tendency towards purifying the Islamic *'aqīda* of non-Islamic influences, leading to some extent to xenophobic, isolationist, and rejectionist frames of thought, and even the creation of an Islamic liberation theology, but they differed in applying their paradigm to non-*'aqīda* fields. They made the reopening of the allegedly closed door of *ijtihād*, coupled with their non-sectarianism, a starting point of their epistemological liberation process, yet they differed in determining which of the old authorities they wanted to use as a basis for liberating their society. Their local circumstances played a major role in making the paradigm admit two categories of modern Muslim reform, i.e., fundamentalist and modernist wings of the slogan, with the conservatives as the only target of their attack. While the fundamentalist wing was an exact manifestation of what Rahman calls "Islamic positivist transcendentalism," the modernist wing was an "Islamic positivist transcendentalism without *jihād*," so that in the latter case his criticism that the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna amounts to epistemological suicide does not apply.<sup>305</sup> Islamic modernism was a new phenomenon in the history of the relationship of Islam with other religions, and only emerged when Islam became a conquered ideology. The modernists arrived at the center of power without *jihād* even when democratic channels were closed or cut off. Al-Dukkālī officially welcomed the French, just as 'Abduh and 'Uthmān did in the case of the "unbelieving" British and

---

<sup>305</sup>Rahman, "Revival and Reform in Islam," 640.

Dutch colonial governments after withdrawing support for the “believing” Ottoman Empire and the Bantenese *jihād* movement, respectively. Likewise, the farther the slogan went, the less did its ethnic character apply, such as in the case of the Indonesian reformers, who were the only group in this study that disregarded the element of Arabism inherent in the slogan.

We have so far compared Egyptian, Moroccan and Indonesian responses to the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” a reform movement that many Egyptian and Moroccan thinkers call “salafism” (more in the sense of “fundamentalism” than orthodoxy). Indonesian reformists in their turn call it puritanism or, mistakenly, modernism, whereas Indonesian traditionalists ironically identify themselves as salafis vis-à-vis the reformists, whom they refer to as “khalafis” (“modernists”).<sup>306</sup> Regardless of the terminology used in various places it is apparent from the preceding analysis that the religious thinking and action surrounding the slogan has provoked and developed the modern Islamic world in the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. That influence has been underplayed, evoked much popular support; even if it has been approved by other Muslims with other outlooks –and it has developed similar themes in prominent timeframes in the various religious it has affected.

---

<sup>306</sup>It is common that Indonesian traditional *pesantrens* (Islamic boarding schools) declare themselves to be *salafi pesantrens*, while they are the targets of puritan (*salafi*) criticism for their sufi practices. K.H. R. As’ad Syamsul Arifin, a charismatic sufi shaykh and senior *kyai* (‘*ālim*) of the Nahdlatul Ulama, for example, founded the Salafiyah Syafi’iyah [Shafiite Salafis] *pesantren* at Sukorejo, Asembagus, Situbondo, East Java.

With this rich tradition in place it is not surprising that a new wave of Islamic thinking based on the slogan should emerge, seeking to apply earlier principles to the new post-colonial world that unfolded in the 1950s and 1960s and presented strong challenges to Muslim in the development of new nation states with dominant Muslim populations. There were many such thinkers, but we now narrow our examination to the three already mentioned in the introduction: i.e., Ḥasan Ḥanafī of Egypt, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī of Morocco and Nurcholish Madjid of Indonesia. This is because Ḥanafī’s “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd” (Heritage and Modernity), al-Jābirī’s “Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha” (Heritage and Modernity) and Madjid’s “Islam, Modernity and Indonesianness” reform projects are all in principle a critical rethinking of the slogan in three different ways. First of all, the three thinkers absolutely believe in reform from “within” Islamic tradition, but sharply criticize the salafi (“fundamentalist”) interpretation of the slogan. Secondly, although they support the modernist wing of the slogan for “desacralizing” historical Islam, they carefully detect the danger of modernist, let alone secularist, uncritical imitation of the West. Lastly, they argue in favor of opening Islamic thought to modern non-Muslim achievements, as the modernists do, but make Quranic and Sunna values the main criteria.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are three representatives of what Federspiel calls “societal intellectuals”<sup>307</sup> in their respective countries. Ḥanafī,

---

<sup>307</sup>Federspiel, “Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals,” 12.

for Robert Brunschvig, is the first Muslim scholar to try to reinterpret the classical *uṣūl al-fiqh* totally.<sup>308</sup> Al-‘Alim even considers him to be a bridging reformer for mastering both the Islamic and Western philosophical heritages.<sup>309</sup> Al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī (in Ḥarb’s,<sup>310</sup> al-‘Alim’s,<sup>311</sup> Muḥammad’s,<sup>312</sup> and Tarābīshī’s<sup>313</sup> assessment), is recognized as one of the most well-known thinkers in the Arab world. This position parallels Madjid’s in his own context, since he, according to Federspiel, “undisputedly ranks as the leading Muslim intellectual of Indonesia.”<sup>314</sup> However, Ḥanafī’s project, according to Boullata, is “too theoretical to be practical in the real world,” while the limitation of al-Jābirī’s contribution is “that it is intellectual and, as such, can only benefit a small elite.”<sup>315</sup> Madjid in turn often indulges in abstract theorization, making himself vulnerable to sharp criticism.<sup>316</sup> He is

---

<sup>308</sup>Robert Brunschvig, “Préface,” [Foreword to] Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d’exégèse: Essai sur la science de fondements de la compréhension “‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh”* (Cairo: Le Conseil supérieur des arts, des lettres et des sciences sociales, 1965), iii.

<sup>309</sup>Al-‘Alim, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya*, 11.

<sup>310</sup>Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 27 and 115.

<sup>311</sup>Al-‘Alim, *Mafāhīm wa Qadāyā*, 143.

<sup>312</sup>Muḥammad, *Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī fī al-Mīzān*, 5.

<sup>313</sup>Tarābīshī, *Naẓariyyat al-‘Aql*, 11.

<sup>314</sup>Federspiel, “Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals,” 14. On the recognition of Madjid’s early involvement in Indonesian Islamic thought, see for example, Boland, *The Struggle of Islam*, 221-224.

<sup>315</sup>Boullata, *Trends and Issues*, 45 and 54.

<sup>316</sup>For more information on the criticism of Madjid by his Indonesian opponents, see, for example, Hidayat Nataatmaja, *Hanacaraka Ilmu dan*

thus a leading but “dangerous” intellectual –to use Federspiel’s phrase in summarizing Madjid’s Indonesian critics.<sup>317</sup> Interestingly, Ibrāhīm Mūsā compares Ḥanafī with Rahman,<sup>318</sup> and both Ḥarb<sup>319</sup> and Labdaoui<sup>320</sup> start comparing al-Jābirī with Arkoun, but no one compares Madjid with such internationally recognized non-Indonesian Muslim thinkers. It is to fill this lacuna that I will compare him with Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī (who are themselves being read more and more by Indonesian Muslims) in the next two chapters.

---

*Alfabet Perjuangan (Al-Fajr)* (Malang: LP2LPM, 1985), 250-262; Ahmad Husnan, *Ilmiah Intelektual dalam Sorotan (Tanggapan terhadap Dr. Nurcholish Madjid)* (Solo: Ulul Albab Press, 1993); Abdul Qodir Djaelani, *Menelusuri Kekeliruan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam Nurcholish Madjid* (Bandung: Yadia, 1994); and Lukman Hakiem, ed., *Menggugat Gerakan Pembaharuan Keagamaan: Debat Besar “Pembaharuan Islam”* (Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan, 1995).

<sup>317</sup>Federspiel, *Muslim Intellectuals*, 42; and idem, “Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals,” 6.

<sup>318</sup>Ibrāhīm Mūsā, “Al-Ḥadātha wa al-Tajdīd: Dirāsa Muqārana fī Mawqif Fazlur Rahman wa Ḥasan Ḥanafī min al-Turāth,” in Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭiyya, ed., *Qirā’a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī: Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar* (Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997), 107-112.

<sup>319</sup>Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 115-116. Likewise, Ḥarb shortly compares Ḥanafī with both al-Jābirī and Arkoun. Ḥarb, *Al-Mamnu’ wa al-Mumtani’: Naqd al-Dhāt al-Mufakkira* (Beirut and Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 1995), 61.

<sup>320</sup>Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 125-126.

## Chapter II

### Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Nurcholish Madjid:

#### General Similarities and Differences

This chapter will explore some of the similarities and differences between Ḥasan Ḥanafī, Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī and Nurcholish Madjid as reflected in their responses to factors that led to the decline of Islam in the modern world. Ḥanafī’s vision is that of a comprehensive renaissance of [Islamic] civilization (*nahḍa ḥaḍārīyya shāmila*) to be realized through his projects known as *al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd* (Heritage and Modernity) and *al-Yasār al-Islāmī* (the Islamic Left).<sup>1</sup> For al-Jābirī, the solution lies in the Arab (Islamic) Renaissance (*al-Nahḍa al-‘Arabiyya*), to be achieved through a process that he calls *Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī* (Criticism of the Arab Mind),<sup>2</sup> while for Madjid the decline can only be stopped with Islam-Civilization, achievable through recognition of Islam, Modernity and, in his own local context, Indonesianness.<sup>3</sup> A second dimension of this comparison will focus on

---

<sup>1</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, “Mādhā Ya’nī: al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* 1 (1981): 5, 13, 46, and 48.

<sup>2</sup>Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī‘a, 1985), 1: 5; and idem, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 16.

<sup>3</sup>This is the title of a collection of Madjid’s articles. See Nurcholish Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan* (Bandung: Mizan, 1987).

Ḥanafī's,<sup>4</sup> al-Jābirī's,<sup>5</sup> and Madjid's<sup>6</sup> respective applications of similar methods, particularly in the sense that they do not believe in starting from zero in attempting reform. Yet although proposing reform from within the Islamic heritage, the three thinkers exploit both Islamic and "other" heritages, by applying the dialectics of *la loi imitation*, *la loi différente*, and *la loi transcendente* in their respective projects.

This approach has led them to take the best elements of the achievements of the past, while leaving aside the negative ones. They have a

---

<sup>4</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, "Fī 'Id Milādih al-Māsī," in Aḥmad 'Abd al-'Ālim 'Aṭiyya, ed., *Dirāsāt Muḥdā ilā Maḥmūd Āmin al-'Ālim fī 'Id Milādih al-Māsī* (Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1999), 17; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd: Mawqifunā min al-Turāth al-Qadīm*, 4<sup>th</sup> edition (Cairo: Al-Mu'assasa al-Jāmi'iyya, 1984), 13; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya* (Cairo: Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, 1988), 52-53; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl* (Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1998), 9 and 251; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa fī al-Waṭan al-'Arabī* (Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1998), 13; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World* (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1995), 1: 452.

<sup>5</sup>Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha: Dirāsāt wa Munāqasāt* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1991), 33, 37, 41; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1994), 229, 250-252, and 294; idem, *al-Muthaqqifūn fī al-Ḥadāra al-'Arabiyya: Miḥnat Ibn Ḥanbal wa Nukbat Ibn Rushd* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1995), 7; idem, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 16; and idem, "Afkār ḥawl Iṣlāḥ al-Ta'lim bi al-Maghrib al-Rāhin," *Fikr wa Naqd* 12 (1998): 14.

<sup>6</sup>Nurcholish Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," in Al-Kindi et al., *Khazanah Intelektual Islam*, translated and edited by Nurcholish Madjid (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984), 33-35 and 79; idem, "Keilmuan Pesantren, Antara Materi dan Metodologi," *Pesantren* No. Perdana (1984): 15; idem, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad: Masalah Kontinuitas dan Kreativitas dalam Masalah Memahami Pesan Agama," in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 342; and idem, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan*, 33.

tendency to deconstruct the latter, while they in turn reify the former. They also approach the present and the future with the same dialectically open, but critical, eyes focused on their respective projects. Both al-Jābirī and Madjid restrict themselves to particular regions, Arabia and Indonesia, respectively, but Ḥanafī does not. He is even willing to let others characterize his Islamic Left as “Islamic or Arab, international or national, religious or secular, since Islam,” he argues, “is religion and nation, Arab and international, religion and state.”<sup>7</sup> The rest of this chapter will focus on revealing the epistemological bases of the responses of the three thinkers. It is a general approach, for which reason I call this chapter “response I.” In chapter three we will attempt a more detailed, specific and applied comparison of their responses to the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” a process which consists in returning to these latter sources, and which I call “response II.” Thus chapter two may be considered preliminary to the discussion in chapter three.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are contemporaries, Ḥanafī having been born on 13 February, 1935 in Cairo (Egypt),<sup>8</sup> al-Jābirī in 1936 in Figuig (Morocco),<sup>9</sup> and Madjid on 17 March, 1939 in Jombang, East Java

---

<sup>7</sup>Ḥanafī, “al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 45.

<sup>8</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie: L'état actuelle de la méthode phénoménologie et son application au phénomène religieux* (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-'Arabī, 1966), back cover; idem, *La phénoménologie de l'exégèse: Essai d'une herméneutique existentielle à partir du Nouveau Testament* (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1988), back cover.

<sup>9</sup>Muḥammad 'Abid al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabī: Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya Naqdiyya li Nuzum al-Ma'rifa fī al-Thaqāfa al-'Arabiyya* (Beirut:



(Indonesia).<sup>10</sup> They are furthermore all philosophers by training. Ḥanafī received his Doctorat d'Etat from the Sorbonne (in Paris) in 1966,<sup>11</sup> al-Jābirī his doctorate from Université Mohammed V in Rabat (Morocco) in 1970, and Madjid his Ph. D. degree from the University of Chicago in 1984. Both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī have published their dissertations --*Les Méthodes d'exégèse: Essai sur la science des fondements de la compréhension "‘Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh"*<sup>12</sup> and *Fikr Ibn Khaldūn: Al-‘Aṣābiyya wa al-Dawla* (Ibn Khaldūn's Thought: Group Feeling and State),<sup>13</sup> respectively-- while Madjid's "Ibn Taymiyya on *Kalām* and *Falsafa*" remains unpublished to date. Ḥanafī,<sup>14</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>15</sup> and

---

Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1986), back cover; idem, *al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī: Muḥaddadātuh wa Tajalliyyātuh* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1990), back cover; idem, *Al-Muthaqqifūn fī al-Ḥaḍāra al-‘Arabiyya*, back cover; idem, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Naḥḍawī al-‘Arabī: Murājī‘at Naqdiyya* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1996), back cover; idem, *Qaḍāyā fī al-Fikr al-Mu‘āṣir: Al-‘Ulama - Ṣirā‘ al-Ḥaḍārāt - al-‘Awda ilā al-Akhlāq - al-Tasāmuḥ, al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya wa Nuḥūm al-Quyyum - al-Falsafa wa al-Madīna* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997), back cover; and idem, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr, Dirāsa wa Nuṣūṣ* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997), back cover.

<sup>10</sup>Nurcholish Madjid, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem* (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997), 112; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius: Membumikan Nilai-nilai Islam dalam Kehidupan Masyarakat*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2000), 183.

<sup>11</sup>Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie*, back cover; idem, *La phénoménologie de l'exégèse*, back cover.

<sup>12</sup>Published in Cairo by the Conseil Supérieur des Arts, des Lettres et des Sciences Sociales of the United Arab Republic in 1965.

<sup>13</sup>Published in Dār al-Bayḍā' (Casablanca) by Dār al-Thaqāfa in 1971.

<sup>14</sup>Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie*, back cover; idem, *La phénoménologie de l'exégèse*, back cover. Ḥanafī wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Robert Brunschvig. See Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa*

Madjid<sup>16</sup> are all full professors in their respective institutions --Cairo University, Université Mohammed V and the Jakarta State Institute of Islamic Studies. Politically, Ḥanafī is a leftist and has been ever since his Nasserist period, as was al-Jābirī in his support for the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires, at least up to 1980 when he left the party to pursue teaching and research.<sup>17</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, was initially known by the informal title of “Young Natsir,” after Moehammad Natsir, the former Chairman of the modernist Indonesian Muslim political party Masjumi. Madjid’s involvement with Masjumi --a party that many saw as an Indonesian Ikhwān al-Muslimīn-- ended in 1970 when he broke ranks with his patron. In this sense Madjid’s

---

*al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: *Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir* (Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998), 622.

<sup>15</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, back cover; idem, *al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī*, back cover; idem, *Al-Muthaqqifūn fī al-Ḥaḍāra al-‘Arabiyya*, back cover; idem, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, back cover; idem, *Qaḍāyā fī al-Fikr al-Mu‘āṣir*, back cover; and idem, *Ibn Rushd*, back cover. See also Gaebel, *Von der Kritik des Arabischen Denkens*, 3. Al-Jābirī wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Najīb Baladī. Walid Hamarneh, “Introduction,” [to] Mohammed ‘Abed al-Jabri [Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī], *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique*, translated from French by Aziz Abbassi (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999), vii.

<sup>16</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 189; and idem, *Tidak Ada Negara Islam*, 113. Madjid wrote his dissertation under the supervision of Fazlur Rahman.

<sup>17</sup>Ahmed Mahfoud and Marc Geoffroy, “Présentation,” in Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, *Introduction à la critique de la raison arabe*, translated by Ahmed Mahfoud and Marc Geoffroy (Paris: La Découverte, 1995), 5. The party was changed later on into the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires. Hamarneh, “Introduction,” vii.

Islamic politics were closer to those of Ḥanafī, since the latter asserts that he was also a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.<sup>18</sup>

In his works *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*<sup>19</sup> (Contemporary Problems), *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*<sup>20</sup> (The Malaise of Arab Thought and Nation) and *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdā‘* (From Translation to Creation),<sup>21</sup> Ḥanafī characterizes the emergence of his reform project from the perspective of the crisis hypothesis. He sets out to respond to the Arab defeat of 1967 at the hands of Israel, a defeat he himself characterizes as the most significant clash in the history of the modern Arab world after the loss of Palestine and the establishment of Israel in 1948. The defeat changed the way in which the Arabs, and the Egyptians in particular, looked at themselves, betraying attitudes ranging from self-confidence to self-criticism. The intelligentsia especially moved from an idealistic to a positivistic outlook, from the concerns of academic research to mass mobilization. Like his Egyptian contemporaries, Ḥanafī sought to discover the factors that had led to their defeat and at the same time those that could spur their resistance to and, if possible, their victory over their enemies, in a confrontation that he characterizes as one of “*al-*

---

<sup>18</sup>“Anā al-Nāṣirī al-Ikhwānī,” says Ḥanafī in his *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 629-630.

<sup>19</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira* 1: *Fī Fikrinā al-Mu‘āṣir* (Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1981), 7; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira* 2: *Fī al-Fikr al-Gharbī al-Mu‘āṣir*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1988), 5-6.

<sup>20</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: *Al-Turāth wa al-‘Aṣr wa al-Ḥadāra* (Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998), 7.

*ākhar*” (the other) --namely, Israel and the West-- versus “*al-ana*” (the self), i.e., Arabs and Muslims.<sup>22</sup> These oft-repeated, first-hand observations leave no room for Voll’s dramatic change hypothesis<sup>23</sup> as an explanation of the factors that led to Ḥanafī’s reform.

Nor does Voll’s hypothesis apply to al-Jābirī or Madjid either. This is because al-Jābirī, for one, is endeavoring to solve the two-centuries old progressive failure of the Arab Renaissance,<sup>24</sup> although Israeli victory over Arab forces in 1967, he admits, had a particularly serious impact on the decline of Arab culture in that it has not moved forward since.<sup>25</sup> Madjid, for his part, also found Indonesian Muslims in the midst of a crisis, but unlike the other two, has tried to address the challenge faced by his own countrymen, though without completely forgetting the wider crisis of the Muslim or Arab world.<sup>26</sup> Madjid’s slogan of “Islam, Yes, but Islamic Party, No” was specifically

<sup>21</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdā’*, 1: *al-Naql* (Cairo: Dār al-Qibā’, 2000), 24.

<sup>22</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981*, 6: *Al-Uṣūl al-Islāmiyya* (Cairo: Maktaba Madbūfī, 1988), 91.

<sup>23</sup>See Voll, “Wahhabism and Mahdism,” 110-126.

<sup>24</sup>Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, *Al-Khiṭab al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir: Dirāsa Naqdiyya*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalī’a, 1985), 5; and idem, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 7.

<sup>25</sup>Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, “Al-Muthaqqifūn, al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya, al-Taṭarruf,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 15 (1999): 5. See also, Charaffeddine, *Culture et ideologie*, 207.

<sup>26</sup>He says, for example, that the Arabs are misunderstood more than any other people. Instead of making a fair judgement of their effort to liberate Palestine, the Western media often identify it with terrorism. See Nurcholish Madjid, *Kaki Langit Peradaban Islam* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), 197.

designed to accommodate Suharto's military government which was promoting the slogan "the end of ideology" and marginalizing Muslims as a political force. Suharto was already reaping the benefits of the dismemberment of the strongest Indonesian (Islamic) political party, Masjumi, by his predecessor Sukarno. It was Madjid's view that, without an Islamic reform movement, Suharto, who was heavily influenced by the United States and by the small but resourceful Indonesian Christian minority, would have no reason to give Muslims a role in governing Indonesia. Indeed, political Islam was perceived as one of the two bitterest enemies of the nation by the Indonesian Armed Forces, the other one being the Communists (whom Suharto had managed to crush in 1966). Suharto had even changed the direction of Indonesian foreign policy from Sukarno's pro-Soviet Union to a pro-Western Bloc approach. To further legitimize himself --given that he lacked grass roots support-- Suharto introduced his Five Year Plan of Economic Development. Through such efforts and his policy of banning ideological discussion, he managed to prevent the revival of what he perceived to be his two deepest enemies: Masjumi and the Indonesian Communist Party.<sup>27</sup>

---

<sup>27</sup>See, for example, Nurcholish Madjid, "The Issue of Modernization among Muslims in Indonesia: From a Participant's Point of View," in Ahmad Ibrahim, Sharon Shiddique and Yasmin Hussain, eds., *Readings on Islam in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), 379-382; Herbert Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," *Indonesia* 6 (1968): 88-105. Alfian, "Suharto and the Question of Political Stability," *Pacific Community*, II.3 (1971): 536-57; Allan A. Samson, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia" (Ph. D. diss., University of California, 1972), 297-99; Hassan,

It should be kept in mind as we continue with our comparison of the respective responses of Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī, and Madjid to the decline of Islam that our analysis will be made above all in the light of Ḥanafī's dialectical approach, which he refers to as the Islamic Left, the essential ideology behind his manifesto *Heritage and Modernity*. In adopting this perspective, Ḥanafī endeavors to establish a new balance (syn-thesis) out of the old alternatives (*bada'īl*, or, theses and anti-theses). In so doing, he criticizes some of the older alternatives that the Islamic classical heritage (*al-turāth al-qadīm*) offered, while introducing some other alternatives in arriving at his new balance. The old alternatives, which he roundly criticizes, he calls the Islamic Right, just as the ones he prizes the most he calls the Islamic Left (although he to some extent fails to realize that his approach is weakened by his over-insistence on a certain point or stage in the development of Islamic thought that he takes as an exemplar for his Islamic Left).<sup>28</sup> A reading of al-Jābirī and Madjid from the perspective of Ḥanafī can of course lead to a reductionist understanding of their thought, but this is the only choice that entails the least confusion while guaranteeing the best results. The following analysis will, therefore, focus on the first two dimensions of Ḥanafī's three-dimensional Islamic reform project known as *Heritage and Modernity*, namely,

---

*Muslim Intellectual Responses*, 3; and Howard M. Federspiel, "The Military and Islam in Sukarno's Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs* 46.3 (1973): 419-420.

<sup>28</sup>See also Yudian Wahyudi, "Kata Pengantar: Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi, Memahami Hasan Hanafi Sang 'Pembalap Usia'," [Foreword to]

“Mawqifunā min al-Turāth al-Qadīm” (Our Attitude Towards Classical Heritage) and “Mawqifunā min al-Turāth al-Gharbī” (Our Attitude Towards Western Heritage), while leaving the third dimension, which is “Mawqifunā min al-Wāqī’: Nazariyyat al-Tafsīr (Our Attitude Towards Reality: Theory of Interpretation), to chapter three.

Ḥanafī blames Ash‘arism for having caused the decline of Islam because it gave priority to *naql* (religious text) over *‘aql* (reason), to God over human beings. This dominant theology of the Islamic Right resulted in the loss of both human life and human history in Islam. In its stead he would substitute Mu‘tazilism, a rational and natural theological system of Islam, but coupled with revolutionary content.<sup>29</sup> The strength of Ḥanafī’s five volume work *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra* (From Faith to Revolution),<sup>30</sup> says ‘Alī Mabruk, lies in its starting from, and reconstitution of, the structures of *‘ilm uṣūl al-dīn*

---

Hasan Hanafi, *Tafsir Fenomenologi*, translated by Yudian Wahyudi (Yogyakarta: Pesantren Pasca Sarjana Bismillah Press, 2000), I: ix.

<sup>29</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 14; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 617; idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya* (Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1982), 14; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World 1: Religion, Ideology and Development* (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1995), 8-17.

<sup>30</sup>The volumes are as follows: the first is *Al-Muqaddimāt al-Nazariyya* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988); the second is *Al-Tawhīd* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988); the third is *Al-‘Adl* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988); the fourth is *Al-Nubuwwa wa al-Mi‘ād* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988); the fifth is *Al-Imān wa al-‘Amal-Imāma* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988). Ḥanafī sometimes calls the project “From Theology to Anthropology.” See also Ḥasan Ḥanafī, “Théologie ou anthropologie?,” in Anouar Abdel-Malek, Abdel-Aziz Bela and Hassan Hanafi, eds., *Renaissance du monde arabe* (Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1972): 233-264; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 636.

(Islamic theology).<sup>31</sup> Both al-Jābirī and Madjid (unlike Ḥanafī who considers Ash‘arism to represent the absolute “Right”) believe that Ash‘arism slowly but steadily moved from the left (Ḥanafī’s Left), although they do not state so directly. This process began when al-Ash‘arī (d. 300 H./915 M.) abandoned Mu‘tazilism at the age of forty to pursue the Islamic Middle Way (*al-Waṣṭiyya* or *al-Tawāzun*) by joining the Jamā‘a or Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a (People of the Prophetic-Tradition and Community). In terms of human free will, Ash‘arism, in the view of both al-Jābirī and Madjid, was an attempt at mediation between the dogmatism of Sunni conservatism and the rationalism of Mu‘tazilite liberalism.<sup>32</sup> Al-Ash‘arī’s theory of *kasb* (acquisition), adds Madjid, implied that those guilty of capital sin, who could easily be found within the ruling elite of the Umayyad dynasty, were responsible for their actions, since their acts of murdering their political opponents became human upon their decision to proceed with them.<sup>33</sup> Likewise, al-Ash‘arī used the Mu‘tazila’s own logic to counter his former old school of thought. He not only

---

<sup>31</sup>Mabrūk, “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd,” 15.

<sup>32</sup>Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, “Madkhal ‘Āmm: Fī Tārīkh ‘Ilm al-Kalām,” [Foreword to] Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf ‘an Manāḥij al-Adilla fī ‘Aqā’id al-Milla aw Naqd ‘Ilm al-Kalām dīdd al-Tarsīm al-Idīyyūlujī li al-‘Aqīda wa Difā’an ‘an al-‘Ilm wa Ḥurriyyāt al-Ikhtiyār fī al-Fikr wa al-Fi’l*, edited by Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998), 24; and Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 28.

<sup>33</sup>Madjid, “Keilmuan Pesantren,” 16-17.



succeeded in enervating Mu'tazilism, but also in "saving" Islam from the assault of the first wave of Hellenism.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, ironically, despite Ḥanafī's identification of Ash'arism with the "pure" Right, both al-Jābirī and Madjid contend that Ash'arism once represented the "Islamic Left." As they argue, Ash'arism was once subjected to the political pressure of Mu'tazilite proponents such as al-Kundurī and Tughril Beg, the latter of whom tortured al-Juwaynī in 445 H. and forced him into exile. Upon return from his exile to Mecca and Medina, where he was awarded the title of *Imām al-Ḥaramayn* (Religious Leader of the Two Holy Cities), al-Juwaynī came to influence Nizām al-Mulk (the great vizier of the early Seljukite Sultans), whose era marked the triumph of Ash'arism over its enemies, and over the Batinites in particular.<sup>35</sup> Although the Batinites finally murdered Nizām al-Mulk in 1092, Ash'arism grew stronger due, says Madjid,<sup>36</sup> to its inclusive and pluralist frame of thought, although Ḥanafī argues that it no sooner did so than it began trampling on the principles it once advocated by becoming increasingly pro-establishment and by rendering Islamic thought more one-dimensional. As the official ideology of most Sunnite states, and the Saljukite empire in particular, Ash'arism, he points out, made itself out to be the only valid religious interpretation in the Islamic

---

<sup>34</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 28.

<sup>35</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Tārīkh 'Ilm al-Kalām," 28; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 174.

<sup>36</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 28.

heritage, judging any disagreement with it as a revolt against the system and, hence, unbelief and atheism.<sup>37</sup>

Ḥanafī sets out to undermine the nine centuries-long Ash‘arite theological domination of the Muslim world, a policy that both Madjid and al-Jābirī support, although for different reasons and to a greater or lesser extent. While Madjid stresses the panacea of advantages offered by al-Ash‘arī’s solution that tempted his fellow Muslims to believe in the perfection of *‘ilm al-kalām*,<sup>38</sup> al-Jābirī condemns the school’s epistemological weaknesses, relegating these to the category of what he calls *‘ulūm al-bayān*, namely, the pure deductive sciences of Arabic grammar, jurisprudence, theology and rhetoric (*al-balāgha*), so common to Arabo-Islamic tradition. Al-Jābirī further classifies *bayān* discussions into the kind that deals with the rules of interpreting discourse and the kind that concerns itself with the conditions for producing discourse. While the former began as early as the time of the Prophet Muḥammad --when his companions asked him about the interpretation of some Qur’ānic words or sentences-- the latter first made its appearance only after the *taḥkīm* (peace agreement) between ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiyya to end the civil war that culminated in the battle of Ṣiffīn, when rhetoric and theological debate became a means of spreading propaganda, winning over supporters, and

---

<sup>37</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 14. See also, Ḥasan Ḥanafī and Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, *Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib* (Casablanca: Dār Tūbqāl, 1990), 23; Ḥanafī, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 6; and idem, *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra*, 5: 393-407.

silencing enemies. In the context of Qur'anic discourse the *bayān* is a certain principle and a specific method of expressing the Qur'ān.<sup>39</sup> Thus al-Jābirī is in line with Ḥanafī when he concludes that “[l]’indication’ représente la structure majeure dans la raison arabe.”<sup>40</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>41</sup> and Madjid,<sup>42</sup> like Ḥanafī,<sup>43</sup> recommend that Muslims add an inductive approach to this text-oriented interpretation, although they stop short of calling this approach the “Islamic Left.”

To counter the negative effects of the Ash‘arite Right, Ḥanafī, as stated above, would reintroduce Mu‘tazilism, a move with which both al-Jābirī and Madjid are in sympathy, but not to the extent of seeing Mu‘tazilism as a part of the “Islamic Left,” as Ḥanafī does. They all tend to agree on the potential of Mu‘tazilism as a solution to the decline of Islam, since Mu‘tazilism, for Ḥanafī, was originally a revolution of thought, of physical nature, and of free

---

<sup>38</sup>Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 29.

<sup>39</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 13-23.

<sup>40</sup>Ahmed Maḥfoud and Marc Geoffroy, “Présentation,” in Mohammed Abed al-Jabri, *Introduction à la critique de la raison arabe*, translated by Ahmed Maḥfoud and Marc Geoffroy (Paris: La Découverte and Institut du Monde Arabe, 1995), 12.

<sup>41</sup>The inductive approach the essence of al-Jābirī’s demonstrative sciences (*al-‘ulūm al-burhāniyya*).

<sup>42</sup>Madjid, “Pendahuluan,” xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 27-28; idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 117; idem, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 280-281; and idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 111.

<sup>43</sup>Ḥanafī, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 114-116.

will.<sup>44</sup> Al-Jābirī,<sup>45</sup> like Madjid,<sup>46</sup> considers rational and enlightened Mu'tazilism as having its origins in the theo-political opposition to Umayyad rule, just like Kharijism. Both the Kharijite and Mu'tazilite theological positions implied that the Umayyads were illegitimate and, hence, were obliged to step down, especially since the Kharajites insisted that members of the Umayyad ruling elite were guilty of capital sin in killing their Muslim opponents, and were therefore unbelievers. Teaching that human beings are capable of creating their own actions, and that they are consequently responsible for them, the Mu'tazilites criticized the Jabarites and, by way of implication, the Umayyads. The latter were, after all, the authors of their own political deeds and, hence, had to take responsibility for them. Emerging with this religio-politico ideological stance almost at the end of the period of the Umayyad rule, Mu'tazilism, for al-Jābirī,<sup>47</sup> represented a rational and radical reform movement vis-à-vis the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā'a in general, which in its turn was conservative or pro-status quo in defending an unjust dynasty over *fitan* (civil wars or disorders) and revolutions.

The Leftist character of Mu'tazilism, to apply Ḥanafī's frame of thought *stricto sensu*, found its fullest expression when it played a role in the Abbasid revolution against the Umayyads in 750. However, the success of the

---

<sup>44</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 14.

<sup>45</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Tārīkh al-'Alāqa," 16; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Akhlāqī al-'Arabī*, 67-68.

<sup>46</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 20.

revolution, say both al-Jābirī<sup>48</sup> and Madjid,<sup>49</sup> moved Mu‘tazilism to the Right, since Mu‘tazilism had thrown in its lot with the new establishment. At the same time the majority of the formerly pro-establishment Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a evolved into opposition groups, who suffered from Abbasid political vengefulness for their continuing loyalty to the defeated Umayyads. As a defense mechanism, the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a accused the Abbasid dynasty of introducing *bid‘a* by basing itself on Mu‘tazilism. In so doing, the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a made Prophetic tradition their theological weapon, clung to the literal meaning of religious texts and gave priority to tradition (*al-riwāya*) over research (*al-dirāya*). Al-Jābirī clearly regards Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and his early supporters as the leaders of this opposition group within the Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a, and then the Ash‘arites;<sup>50</sup> indeed, Ḥanafī<sup>51</sup> names Ibn Ḥanbal as one of the heroes of his “Islamic Left” due to his bravery in the face of unjust rule. Nevertheless Ash‘arism, Ḥanafī states with regret, succeeded in replacing Mu‘tazilism and became the dominant theological school in the Muslim world, resulting in a number of weaknesses that he sets out to reverse radically by promoting the Mu‘tazilite philosophy of history.<sup>52</sup>

---

<sup>47</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Tārīkh al-‘Alāqa,” 6.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 16.

<sup>49</sup> Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 20.

<sup>50</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Tārīkh al-‘Alāqa,” 6.

<sup>51</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 47.

<sup>52</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 41; and idem, *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdā‘*, 1: 18.

In addition to reintroducing the theological significance of the five Mu'tazilite principles, Ḥanafī underlines their political implications. Mu'tazilism, Ḥanafī explains, was an expression of open opposition from within the system.<sup>53</sup> Al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī, confirms that the five principles were religious in form, but political in content. *Al-Tawhīd* (the unity of God) means the union of God's Essence and attributes, but politically it implies that God creates human actions, while providing them with the ability to act, freedom and free will. Given that He lets them create their actions, they are responsible for them, just as the Umayyads were responsible for their actions because they stole their political power on purpose. *Al-'Adl* (justice), in theological terms, means the denial that God can be anything less than just, but politically it means that the Umayyad rulers were the sources of injustice in their kingdom, as it is impossible for God to force a human being to do something and then punish him or her in the hereafter for that act. *Al-wa'd wa al-wa'id* (promise and threat) means doctrinally that God must do what He says in the Qur'ān, but politically it is a direct rejection of the Umayyads' belief that God would not punish caliphs. The traditional Mu'tazilite *manzila bayn al-manzilatayn* (position between two positions) was a direct rejection of the Kharijites who considered capital sinners to be unbelievers: for Mu'tazilites these were neither total believers nor total unbelievers. And yet, since the Umayyads were capital sinners, they were clearly imperfect believers

---

<sup>53</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 63.

and, therefore, illegitimate. Mu'tazilism transferred the moral principle of *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar* (encouraging others to do something good and forbidding them to do something wrong) onto the political stage, implying that the Umayyads had to abide by Mu'tazilite principles to achieve legitimacy.<sup>54</sup> For Madjid, as for both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, the Mu'tazilites' rational and inductive approaches are of the highest significance to Islam and Indonesianness, although Madjid, unlike Ḥanafī, severely criticizes the Mu'tazilite "Authoritarian Right" that ended up defeating itself. Thus Indonesian Islam does not need to repeat the experience of a Mu'tazilite-supported inquisition; instead, Mu'tazilite enlightenment and intellectual bravery are both necessary and sufficient to the task of facing the challenge posed by the "other": Hellenism for the Mu'tazilites, globalization for current Islam.<sup>55</sup>

Ḥanafī supported the popular position held by modern reformist critics that the decline of Islam began with al-Ghazālī's attack on the rational sciences.<sup>56</sup> However, both al-Jābirī and Madjid look at the problem differently.

---

<sup>54</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 151-152; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Siyāsī al-'Arabī*, 323-325.

<sup>55</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 20; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 48-49; and idem, "Agama dan Rasionalitas," [Foreword to] Munawir Sjadzali, *Ijtihad Kemanusiaan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997), xiv-xv.

<sup>56</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 14; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa fī al-Waṭan al-'Arabī* (Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1998), 359; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140-141.

Unlike Ḥanafī, who seems totally opposed to al-Ghazālī,<sup>57</sup> al-Jābirī states that the latter's attack on philosophers, and on Ibn Sīnā in particular, was only by-accidence and not by-essence. It was a conditional attack, so that if Ibn Sīnā had not tried through his *Ilāhīyāt* (Metaphysics) to establish a Fatimite-backed Ismailite theology (which was an ideology) in place of Sunni-Seljukite-based Asharite theology, al-Ghazālī would never have written his *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* (The Incoherence of Philosophers). On the other hand, al-Ghazālī made Aristotelian logic an absolute criterion of truth.<sup>58</sup> In this sense, al-Ghazālī, as an *uṣulī* (Islamic legal philosopher), applied the jurisprudential principle of *al-ḥukm yadūr ma' al-'illa wujūdān wa 'adaman* (the existence of a ruling depends on the existence of its cause). Al-Ghazālī, as both Madjid<sup>59</sup> and al-Jābirī see it, attacked philosophy in order to destroy the Batinites, but philosophy in the Muslim world was only weakened and did not die at the hands of his *Tahāfut*, as is clear from the emergence of such philosophers as Ibn Rushd, Ibn Taymiyya, Mullā Ṣadrā, Aḥmad Sirhindī and Shāh Wafī

---

<sup>57</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 618; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 17-18.

<sup>58</sup>Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī, "Madkhal 'Āmm: Al-Ṣirā' al-Madhabī, wa laysa al-Dīn, warā' *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* li al-Ghazālī," [Foreword to] Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: Intizār al-Ruḥ al-'Ilmiyya wa Ta'sīs al-Akhlāqiyya al-Ḥiwār*, edited by Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1998), 44-46; and idem, "Muqaddima Taḥlīliyya: Kitāb li al-Difā' 'an al-Ru'ya al-'Ilmiyya wa Akhlāqiyyāt al-Ḥiwār," in *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, 61-66.

<sup>59</sup>Madjid, "Masalah Ta'wil sebagai Metodologi Penafsiran Al-Qur'an," in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 16.



Allāh.<sup>60</sup> Whereas al-Jābirī limits his analysis to the internal (*al-anā*) political conflict behind the attack of *al-Falāsifa*, a target that he characterizes as composed of neither philosophy nor philosophers but rather Shiites, Madjid goes beyond this to address the external (*al-ākhar*). Madjid, too, echoes al-Jābirī in stating that the target of al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut* was Ibn Sīnā, a prominent exponent of Ismailism or Batinism. One can, therefore, see the title *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* as really being a refutation against Ibn Sīnā (*Tahāfut Ibn Sīnā*).<sup>61</sup> Without al-Ghazālī's *Tahāfut*, the Muslim world would have lost its authenticity in the second wave of Hellenism, since, while his *Tahāfut* severely criticized "foreign" metaphysics, his *Ihyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Revival of Religious Sciences) combined esoteric (*bāṭinī*) and exoteric (*ẓāhirī*) aspects of Islam. While the former is a religious experience (*al-dhawq*) through *'ibāda*, the latter is normative legitimacy through *sharī'a*. The combination thus strengthened Muslim religiosity against a foreign intellectual onslaught.<sup>62</sup>

Unlike Ḥanafī, Madjid even suggests that Muslims need to repeat the experience of al-Ghazālī, who refuted philosophy after he had mastered it, since al-Ghazālī was a direct successor of al-Ash'arī (albeit with a greater

---

<sup>60</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 6, 48 132, and 133.

<sup>61</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 318.

<sup>62</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 33-35; idem, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 15; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 4-5; idem, *Pintu-Pintu*, 202; idem, *Bilik-bilik Pesantren: Sebuah Potret Perjalanan* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1977), 52, 57 and 202; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban: Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995), 92 and 113; and idem, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 119-121.

intellectual capacity). Like his master, al-Ghazālī not only borrowed Mu'tazilite methods, but also the methods of his enemies, who were neo-Platonists and Aristotelians, in order to establish his historically unbroken Sunnism. Al-Ghazālī's works played their most important role in making Ash'arism the central doctrine of Sunnism by filling the existing gap between sufism and other Islamic fields, but especially between *'aqīda* and *sharī'a*, a place that had been occupied far too long by esotericism.<sup>63</sup> For al-Jābirī, esotericism constituted the most serious challenge posed by the Ismailites to al-Ghazālī's thought. Al-Ghazālī, he insists, criticized the Ismailite concept of an infallible imam, as is obvious from his *Faḍā'ih al-Bāṭiniyya* (The Infamies of Batinism) and *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl* (The Deliverance from Error).<sup>64</sup> Madjid, however, comes closer to Ḥanafī's condemnation of al-Ghazālī in acknowledging that the latter's solutions were so remarkable that Muslims were "hypnotized." As he explains it, Muslim intellectuals have all taken a turn in the prison that al-Ghazālī found himself in, but they have to realize they

---

<sup>63</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 33-35; idem, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 15; idem, "Tasauwuf dan Pesantren," in M. Dawam Rahardjo, ed., *Pesantren dan Pembangunan* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1974), 102; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 4-5; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 92 and 113.

<sup>64</sup>Muḥammad 'Abid al-Jābirī, "Madkhal 'Āmm: Tārīkh al-'Alāqa bayn al-Dīn wa al-Falsafa fī al-Islām," [Foreword to] Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl fī Taqrīr mā bayn al-Sharī'a wa al-Ḥikma min al-Ittiṣāl aw Wujūb al-Naẓr al-'Aqlī wa Ḥudūd al-Ta'wīl (al-Dīn wa al-Mujtama')*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abid al-Jābirī (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1997), 18-23; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 173-174.

must escape from it in order to recover their dynamism.<sup>65</sup> Thus al-Ghazalism, for both Ḥanafī and Madjid, has been blown out of all proportion (*al-isrāf*). It is *ḥarām*, to use an Islamic legal term, to pursue a course of thought that may lead to the intellectual stagnation of the Muslim world. It is, indeed, in view of this out-of-all-proportion aspect of al-Ghazalism that Ḥanafī felt justified in characterizing it as a part of the Islamic Right, to balance which Ḥanafī reintroduced Ibn Rushd, another element of his Islamic Left.

Ḥanafī,<sup>66</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>67</sup> and Madjid<sup>68</sup> all insist on the significance of the revival of Ibn Rushd's scientific rationalism for their respective projects. The burning of Ibn Rushd's books by the '*ulamā*'-backed rulers of his native Cordoba, adds Madjid, is indicative of the incapability of Muslims, and the orthodox in particular, to accommodate philosophical tradition. For this stubbornness they had to pay the price of the collapse of the philosophical tradition in general and Islamic Aristotelianism in particular, not to mention the loss of Andalusia to the hands of the enemy.<sup>69</sup> Ḥanafī makes Averroism the essential epistemological base of his Islamic Left, since Ibn Rushd was the

---

<sup>65</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 35.

<sup>66</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140-141.

<sup>67</sup>Muḥammad 'Abid al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr, Dirāsa wa Nuṣūṣ* (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1998), 10-11.

<sup>68</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 38; and idem, "Kemungkinan Menggunakan," 280-281.

<sup>69</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 35-38; and idem, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 120.

rightful heir to the first Islamic philosopher al-Kindī --both of them, after all, insisted that philosophy is not only a pillar of religion, but a principle that manages the laws of nature for the sake of human beings. Although both aspects are essential to the awakening of every society into illumination, Ḥanafī<sup>70</sup> insists, Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī changed al-Kindī's orientation, resulting in the view that reason is limited in its ability to know the essences of things. It follows that reason needs divine help and communication with the Active Intellect to understand anything. The One, The Almighty thus becomes the leader who gives inspiration, the one by whose orders everybody should abide. Like Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī blames Ibn Sīnā for diverting Islamic philosophy from al-Kindī's open rationalism to a pernicious irrationalism, citing Ibn Sīnā's *Al-Ḥikma al-Mashriqiyya* (Eastern Philosophy) as an irrational but ideological discourse. It was a Persian and, hence, Shiite philosophy held up in opposition to Arab Sunnism.<sup>71</sup> Thus, while al-Jābirī defends al-Ghazālī's attack on the Batinites in his works *Faḍā'ih al-Bāṭiniyya*, *Tahāfut al-Falāsifa* and *al-Munqidh min al-Dalāl*, he nevertheless criticizes him for maintaining,

---

<sup>70</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140-141.

<sup>71</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy*, 58; idem, *Ishkalīyyāt al-Fikr al-'Arabī*, 46; idem, *Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 25; idem, "Al-Sīnawīyya: Fuṣūluhā wa Uṣūluhā," in Al-Ṭāhir wa 'Azīz, ed., *Dirāsāt Maghribiyya: Muḥdā ilā al-Mufakkir al-Maghribī Muḥammad 'Azīz al-Jabbābī*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1987), 149; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 173-174.

and even developing, their gnosticism.<sup>72</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, supports without cavil both al-Ghazālī's and Ibn Rushd's criticisms of al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's neo-Platonism.<sup>73</sup>

Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā divided the individual human being into mortal body and immortal spirit. The former is the object of physics, the latter that of metaphysics. This division, Ḥanafī argues, results in a serious double problem. While the mortal body demands food, lodging, transportation and health, the immortal spirit is prone to laziness, indifference and *riḍā* (contentment). The paradigm shift also results in the superiority of theoretical values over practical ones, since theory and meditation are more important than action and production. Although philosophy was coopted into sufism at the hands of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd bravely endeavored to restore reason to its rightful original place and to liberate nature from the grips of theology, while attacking both Ash'arite metaphysics and sufism.<sup>74</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>75</sup> and Madjid<sup>76</sup> regret, as does Ḥanafī,<sup>77</sup> Ibn Rushd's short-lived reform of Islamic philosophy. To reintroduce the scientific, critical, but open-to-truth spirit of Ibn

---

<sup>72</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Al-Ṣirā' al-Madhhabī," 44-46; idem, "Kitāb li al-Difā'," 61-66; and idem, "Tārīkh al-'Alāqa," 18-23.

<sup>73</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 38.

<sup>74</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 37.

<sup>75</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Akhlaqī al-'Arabī*, 622.

<sup>76</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 38.

<sup>77</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16.

Rushd, al-Jābirī has edited and republished what he calls the lost heritage of Ibn Rushd's original works, namely *Faṣl al-Maqāl* (Decisive Criterion), *Manāḥij al-Adilla* (Methodologies), *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut* (The Incoherence of the Incoherence), and even *Al-Kuliyāt fī al-Ṭibb* (The Fundamentals of Medicine) –all of which he released in 1998, the eight hundredth anniversary of Ibn Rushd's death.<sup>78</sup> Madjid in turn has translated Ibn Rushd's *Faṣl al-Maqāl* into Indonesian.<sup>79</sup> It is in the aforementioned original works that readers, al-Jābirī stresses, will rediscover the true Arabo-Islamic Ibn Rushd. Representing a necessary introduction to every reform of Arabo-Islamic culture starting from “within,” these original works deal with problems from the perspective of Arabo-Islamic values such as *ijtihād* in *fiqh*, “correction” of belief in *‘ilm al-kalām* (Islamic theology), “correction” of the position of philosophy in Arabo-Islamic thought, and reconstruction of the relation of philosophy to religion.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11; idem, “Faṣl Ākhar min ‘Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib’: Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya fī al-Taswiyya al-Salāmiyya ma’ Isrā’īl,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 4 (1997): 15; idem, “Jadīd fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī bi al-Turāth al-‘Arabī,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 13 (1998): 6; idem, “Ibn Rushd: Al- ‘Ilm wa al-Faḍīla,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 14 (1998): 5-13; and idem, “Ibn Rushd: ‘Al-‘Aṣā al-Qātīla’ wa al-Rajul ‘al-ladhī Afsada Jamī‘at al-Atṭibā’ fī Awrūbā,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 17 (1999): 5-25.

<sup>79</sup>The Indonesian translation of Ibn Rushd's *Faṣl al-Maqāl* is an integral part of Madjid's *Khazanah Intelektual Islam*, 207-244.

<sup>80</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11.

Like al-Jābirī and Madjid, Ḥanafī<sup>81</sup> also tries to reintroduce the European experience of Latin Averroism to the Muslim world, a step that al-Jābirī calls a new Averroism in the process of Arab renaissance and reform.<sup>82</sup> Yet Ḥanafī has developed a more ambivalent attitude towards Ibn Rushd over the years, to the point where in 1999 he published a thorough criticism of his thought. For Ḥanafī, Ibn Rushd was not an exponent of the Islamic Left, but of the Islamic Right, all the while wearing the mask of the Islamic Left, and this for the following reasons. First, he was esoteric (*ta'wīlī*) on the surface, but exoteric (*ẓāhirī*) deep down. Second, he was rational (*'aqlānī*) on the outside, but textual (*naṣṣī*) on the inside. Third, he was Malikite in his theory, but Hanbalite in his practice. Fourth, he was a commentator on the outside, but an author in his real being. Fifth, he was a philosopher in performance, but a theologian at heart. Sixth, he was Mu'tazilite in his stated intention, but Ash'arite in his application. Seventh, he was a theologian in general, but a judge in particular. Eighth, he was a judge in reality, but a scientist in intention. Ninth, he was an atheist in statement, but a believer in vision. Last, he was an opposition thinker in his behavior, but pro-establishment (*sulṭawī*) in his orientation.<sup>83</sup> It is only in his reevaluation of Ibn Rushd's position that Ḥanafī does not stop his dialectical analysis at a certain stage of thesis or anti-

---

<sup>81</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 158-159.

<sup>82</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11.

<sup>83</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, "Al-Ishtibāh fī Fikr Ibn Rushd," *'Ālam al-Fikr* 27.4 (1999): 122-123; and idem, *Minal al-Naql ilā al-Ibdā'*, 1: 18.

thesis, a process that he would have done in other cases. By contrast, Ibn Rushd, al-Jābirī reminds us, was opposed to authoritarianism and absolutism, since he called for politico-religious reform,<sup>84</sup> although Madjid does not agree with Ibn Rushd's emphasis on the elitism of the philosophers' right to undertake *ta'wil* (philosophical interpretation).<sup>85</sup>

Both Ḥanafī<sup>86</sup> and al-Jābirī<sup>87</sup> consider sufism to be one of the factors that led to the decline of the Muslim world, although each traces its origins back to a different source. For Ḥanafī, sufism emerged in reaction to the deviations of the Umayyads, who had been corrupted by their luxurious lifestyle and had tried to correct this by appealing to and adopting such traditional mystical values as poverty, fear, hunger, submission –all of which Ḥanafī calls weak and defeatist defenses of the soul.<sup>88</sup> Here we might add that sufism for Madjid, as for Ḥanafī, is of Islamic origin, but that Madjid sees the emergence of sufism as a natural continuation of the Muslim need for a kind of scientific differentiation in the second and third centuries of Hijra.<sup>89</sup> Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, is convinced that sufism is of Greek origin and classifies it

---

<sup>84</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Jadīd fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī,” 15.

<sup>85</sup> Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 39; and idem, “Masalah Ta'wil,” 15.

<sup>86</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 16-17; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22, 101 and 102; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 371.

<sup>87</sup> Al-Barbarī, *Ishkāliyyat al-Turāth*, 346.

<sup>88</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 17 and 92-93; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22 and 101.



under the gnostic sciences (*'ulūm al-'irfān*). Gnostic trends, al-Jābirī elaborates, are of three kinds: the kind dominated by a gnostic attitude of resistance, such as among the sufis (*aṣḥāb al-aḥwāl*); the kind that is philosophical in nature, as in the case of rational sufis such as al-Fārābī with his theory of happiness, or Ibn Sīnā with his philosophy of *al-mashriqiyya* (easternism); and finally, the kind that is totally mythical, as in the instance of Ismailite philosophers and Batinite sufis.<sup>90</sup> Sufism, he says, was a part of Hermetism, a trend that had its origins in Hellenistic civilization during the period of its decline. In their effort to solve the problem, Greek thinkers turned to spiritual forces for help, forgetting their long-trusted weapon --reason. The practice not only destroyed the Greek belief in reason, but it also diverted them into believing in foreign supranatural forces.<sup>91</sup>

Sufism, Ḥanafī argues, changed Islam from a “horizontal movement within history” into a “vertical movement within history but outside the universe,” resulting in a reverse of the course of Islamic history. Instead of making Islam a goal in history, sufism changed it into a goal outside history.<sup>92</sup> Al-Jābirī for his part condemns the Batinites for making Hermetism their weapon against the Sunnites, since it turned out to be the source of

---

<sup>89</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 107; idem, “Tasauf dan Pesantren,” 98; and idem, *Bilik-bilik Pesantren*, 48-49.

<sup>90</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 269.

<sup>91</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 167.

irrationalism (*al-lā'aqlāniyya*) in Islam. The irrational trend of Islamic gnosticism, insists al-Jābirī, changed Muslims from natural- into more supranatural-oriented human beings.<sup>93</sup> Every Muslim should observe the *Shari'a*, states a disapproving Ḥanafī,<sup>94</sup> but sufism shifted it into an exclusively sufi-dominated truth, a judgement that neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid challenges, although their emphasis is slightly different. Sufism, al-Jābirī stresses, is not only an individual, but also --more importantly-- an aristocratic salvation, the achievement of the both of which is restricted to a select group of gnostics, who in turn become pure spiritualists and even form a sort of spiritualist class.<sup>95</sup> On the other hand, sufism, for Madjid, greatly contributed to lessening the effects of Javanese feudalism, though it in turn led to an increase in religious feudalism in the sense that the son of a *kyai* (Javanese sufi 'ālim) came in turn to monopolize almost completely the chances of becoming a *kyai*, in his turn, at the expense of regular candidates.<sup>96</sup>

While al-Jābirī tends to regard sufism as a matter of individual orientation,<sup>97</sup> both Ḥanafī and Madjid work hard to prove its nature as a socio-religious movement. Sufi reform, for Ḥanafī, is an escape from reality, an

---

<sup>92</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16-17; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 17-18; idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 11-13; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 371.

<sup>93</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ishkalīyyāt al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir*, 46.

<sup>94</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16-17.

<sup>95</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 25.

<sup>96</sup>Madjid, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 15-16.

inward looking cure, and an imaginary world, leading him to condemn negative values like *al-faqr* (poverty), *al-khawf* (cowardice) and *al-jū'* (hunger) as responsible for the Muslim global problems of poverty, cowardice and hunger. Muslims, he goes on to say, do not have anything to refrain (*zahada*) from. *Al-ṣabr* (patience) and *al-riḍā* (contentment) convince them to accept whatever circumstances they may face. *Al-tawakkul* (submission) teaches them to abandon planning and preparation for the future. *Al-fanā'* (absorption) and *al-ittiḥād* (union) lead them into an imaginary and unreal world. They may think they are the best community ever sent to human beings, but they do not practice *al-amr bi al-ma'rūf wa al-nahy 'an al-munkar*, the Qur'anic injunction that insures this<sup>98</sup> and a condition that Madjid interprets as fundamental to practicing the best values.<sup>99</sup> Their lands are occupied by foreigners, and their properties are monopolized by kings and emirs, a situation that stimulates Ḥanafī to reinterpret sufi teachings radically and functionally. *Al-fanā'* (absorption), he offers, should be taken to mean *al-fanā'* in action and sacrifice for the sake of mission, and *al-ittiḥād* as a means of applying the *Sharī'at* Allāh and of transforming *al-wahy* (revelation) into a world system

---

<sup>97</sup> Al-Barbarī, *Ishkāliyyat al-Turāth*, 317.

<sup>98</sup> Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 16-17; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 45; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 25-43; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 62-63.

<sup>99</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 334.

through action, hard work (*al-juhd*), and Muslim movements in history.<sup>100</sup> While al-Jābirī insists on cutting off sufism at the epistemological level and replacing it with Averroism,<sup>101</sup> Madjid recommends that Indonesian Muslims teach sufi values to their fellow Indonesians in accordance with their intellectual capacity as a part of experiencing the highest level of religiosity, namely, by practicing *iḥsān* (acting well) through *‘ibāda* (worship), as al-Ghazālī teaches, but without necessarily becoming followers of any actual sufi orders.<sup>102</sup>

Ḥanafī on the other hand makes Shiism a revolutionary element of his Islamic Left. Despite the fact that ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib had shown himself to be a leader of the Islamic Right in rejecting Mu‘āwiyya ibn Abī Ṣufyān’s demand that justice be done to the murderers of Caliph ‘Uthmān ibn ‘Affān, Ḥanafī positions ‘Alī on the Left with Mu‘āwiyya on the Right, and even arbitrarily calls Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī *sayyid al-Shuhadā’* (the master of Muslim martyrs) as the Shiites do,<sup>103</sup> whereas Islamic tradition awards this title to Hamzat ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭālib, an uncle of the Prophet Muḥammad who was killed at the battle of Uḥud. Madjid, like Ḥanafī, appreciates Shiism, while insisting that an understanding of its historical division into the Mu’alliḥa (those who believed

---

<sup>100</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 16-17.

<sup>101</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Arab Islamic Philosophy*, 104.

<sup>102</sup>Madjid, “Keilmuan Pesantren,” 14; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 107-113; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 319; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 92 and 113.

in ‘Alī’s divinity), the Ghullā (those who believed in ‘Alī’s prophethood), and the Rāfiḍa (those who rejected Abū Bakr’s, ‘Umar’s and ‘Uthmān’s caliphates, while declaring ‘Alī the most eligible for the office) is essential to appreciating its role in Muslim society. The Shiites, but the Rafidites in particular, believe in man-oriented *tajdīd*, since they, according to Madjid, consider their imam the mediator between God and human beings. It is a hereditary office,<sup>104</sup> a process that al-Jābirī condemns as a sign of the domination of religious aristocracy.<sup>105</sup> Shiite political defeats, adds Madjid,<sup>106</sup> made them depend more on the concept of messianism, a form of political escapism that al-Jābirī identifies as being the source of Islamic irrationalism.<sup>107</sup> In contrast to al-Jābirī, Ḥanafī stresses that some modern Shiites come closer to their Sunnite counterparts since they have abandoned their extreme, innovative beliefs.<sup>108</sup> Madjid is of the opinion that the division into Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a and Shī‘a is an unfair one and suggests that Muslims at least rename the parties Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a (People of the Prophetic-Tradition) and Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Shī‘a (People of the Prophetic-Tradition and Shiism).<sup>109</sup>

---

<sup>103</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 16; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 81.

<sup>104</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 216-217.

<sup>105</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 25.

<sup>106</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 216.

<sup>107</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 165.

<sup>108</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 14.

<sup>109</sup> *Media Dakwah*, Januari 1993, 44-45.

The revolutionary character of Shiism, which Khomeini exploited in the Iranian Revolution of 1978, is identified by Ḥanafī as the driving force behind his own vision of Islam. Ḥanafī explains that the project of the Islamic Left was timed to coincide with the coming of the 15<sup>th</sup> century of Hijra, in the course of which God is expected to send His *mujaddid* (reformer).<sup>110</sup> Madjid, however, sees Shiism as valuable to Indonesian Islam for its philosophical tradition, noting that the modern Sunnite reform movement owes much to al-Afghānī (a Shiite who pretended to be a Sunni for pragmatic reasons). It was indeed through his Egyptian student ‘Abduh that al-Afghānī’s ideas took root in Sunnite communities. The reintroduction of Shiism to Indonesian Islam in the wake of the Iranian Revolution will, from Madjid’s point of view, assuage the monolithic character of Indonesian Islam, which consists in an unrelenting version of Sunnite-Shafiism.<sup>111</sup> In contrast to Ḥanafī, who was and still is a fervent supporter of the Iranian Revolution,<sup>112</sup> Madjid is clearly unwilling to encourage any unrest in Indonesia, and suggests that Indonesian Muslims focus

---

<sup>110</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 13; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 81; idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 90, 142 and 478; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 646.

<sup>111</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 216-217; idem, “Masalah Ta’wil,” 2; idem, “Skisme dalam Islam,” 668; and idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 310.

<sup>112</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 646; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 6: 270; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 90, 140 and 141.

their efforts at reform of social justice, thereby helping to prevent any possible revolution.<sup>113</sup>

At the same time, Ḥanafī,<sup>114</sup> like both Al-Jābirī<sup>115</sup> and Madjid,<sup>116</sup> rejects any “man-oriented tajdid,” or the Islamic Right aspects of the Shiite revolution, as he would put it. Ḥanafī spent some time in Qum discussing the concept of *wilāyat al-faqīh* (government by Muslim jurists) with Khomeini, and published the latter’s *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* (or *Al-Ḥukūma al-Islāmiyya* (Islamic Government)) and *Jihād al-Nafs* (Struggle against One’s Self, or *Jihād al-Akbar* (Greater Struggle)) at his own expense, distributing them on the main streets of Cairo at no charge in order to start an Islamic revolution in Egypt. Nevertheless, he demanded that Khomeini drop any statements to the effect that imams are closer to Allah than prophets are, since he considered these to be exaggerated theological claims.<sup>117</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, criticizes the absolute claim to authority by clerics under Khomeinism,<sup>118</sup> a criticism that al-Jābirī totally echoes.<sup>119</sup> The Iranian Revolution, al-Jābirī states, transcended

---

<sup>113</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 219.

<sup>114</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 646-647.

<sup>116</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 217; and idem, “Konsep Muhammad saw sebagai Penutup Para Nabi dan Implikasinya dalam Kehidupan Sosial serta Keagamaan,” in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 527 and 533.

<sup>117</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 2: 646; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 6: 270; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 474.

<sup>118</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 218.

<sup>119</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 25.

the problem of a hidden imam since it established both *wilāyat al-faqīh* and a modern elective government. Unlike the system in place under the “old” Shiism, Khomeinist Iran chooses its president through a parliament (*majlis al-shūrā*), making the country, in Madjid’s analysis, the second most democratic of Muslim countries, Pakistan being the first.<sup>120</sup> However, Khomeinists have neither an absolute theological claim to authority nor a right to act as though they are religious aristocrats. The danger is that the Revolution could easily transform the latent, oppressed irrationalism and aristocracy of Shiite Islam into a state-sponsored version.<sup>121</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, believes that the reintroduction of Shiism to Indonesia will not be difficult, for out of the four Islamic legal schools (*al-madhāhib*), Shafiism, to which the majority of Indonesian Muslims belong, has the closest affinity to Shiism. Indeed, the Nahdlatul Ulama, the largest Indonesian Islamic organization and a largely Shafiite institution at that, has always offered praise to the *ahl al-bayt* (the descendants of the Prophet Muḥammad). This, argues Madjid, will make the reintroduction of Shiism to Indonesia easier, but the acceptance of Shiism within Indonesian Islam depends upon its being shorn of its extremely innovative theological teachings<sup>122</sup> --elements that both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī nonetheless consider essential to their respective projects.

---

<sup>120</sup> Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 108.

<sup>121</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 131; and idem *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 25.

<sup>122</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 117-122.



Among the most significant factors leading to the decline of Islam, from Ḥanafī's point of view, was the loss of revolutionary spirit within the Islamic Left, especially when Muslims fell under the various pro-establishment influences of the Islamic Right of Ash'arism, sufism and al-Ghazalism, as explained above. To make up for the loss of the living example of Islamic praxis, Ḥanafī turns to the Kharijite revolution for model, which he accepts as a historical legacy of the Islamic Left. Ḥanafī,<sup>123</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>124</sup> and Madjid<sup>125</sup> all agree that the Kharijite interpretation of action as an integral part of faith is highly significant to reviving the praxis tradition of modern Muslims, but Madjid stops short of recommending that any revolution take place in Indonesia. Ḥanafī on the other hand calls upon his fellow Muslims to observe the Kharijite interpretation of Islamic egalitarianism according to which "Arabs have no superior claim over non-Arabs. It is *taqwā* (the observance of Islamic teachings) that discourages bias in Islam."<sup>126</sup> Madjid also attributes to *taqwā* the fact that the Kharijites were among the first Muslims in Islamic

---

<sup>123</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 14; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 21, 61 and 63; idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution: Essays on Judaism, Christianity & Islam* (Cairo: Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, 1977), 1; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 10-16.

<sup>124</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 140.

<sup>125</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 35; and idem, "Islam, Iman dan Ihsan sebagai Trilogi Ajaran Ilahi," in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 463.

<sup>126</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 14; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Hiwār*, 428.

history not to discriminate between Arab and non-Arab Muslims.<sup>127</sup> The Kharijites, Ḥanafī reminds us, even promoted the “modern democratic” principle that a caliph should be elected on the basis of *bay‘a* (social contract),<sup>128</sup> a radical egalitarianism that Madjid for his part sees as reflecting the true spirit of Islam as the Prophet Muḥammad taught.<sup>129</sup>

In principle, al-Jābirī encourages the same Islamic egalitarianism, but he sees it differently, tracing as he does the origins of Kharijite egalitarianism to the group’s minority position in the conflict between the caliph ‘Alī and the governor of Syria, Mu‘āwiyya. The Kharijite leaders came from poor Bedouin tribes who had always been in competition and conflict with both the Umayyads and the Hashimites. The *taḥkīm* (peace agreement) between ‘Alī and Mu‘āwiyya weakened the Kharijites’ bargaining position, since they were now faced with a united front rather than two warring factions whose differences they could exploit. Upon ‘Alī’s rejection of their proposal to kill Mu‘āwiyya, the Kharijites called for a return to a true Islam by voicing the slogan of “*Lā ḥukm illā li Allāh*” (There is no binding ruling, except the one that is for God’s sake), to which ‘Alī responded through his well-known judgement of “*Kalimat ḥaqq urīda bihā al-bāṭil*” (The statement is right, but is used to achieve the wrong objective). Al-Jābirī is very clear in concluding that the Kharijites were the first Islamic extremists, who in turn used the slogan of

---

<sup>127</sup>Madjid, “Skisme dalam Islam,” 682.

<sup>128</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 63.

“*Lā ḥukm illā li Allāh*” to legitimize their revolt against, and even murder of, ‘Aḥī.<sup>130</sup> Madjid, like al-Jābirī, sees the Kharijites as guilty of having trampled upon their own principles, since they were intolerant in forcing others to accept their belief. Their extreme radicalism led them to kill ‘Aḥī and plot the murder of Mu‘āwiyya. They considered most of their fellow Muslims to be outside their group, while those who did not want to undertake *hijra* (migration) fell, in their eyes, under the heading of unbelievers, among whom they counted ‘Uthmān, ‘Aḥī, and Mu‘āwiyya, and of course all the orthodox caliphs with the exception of Abū Bakr and ‘Umar.<sup>131</sup>

The Kharijites, adds al-Jābirī, went on to radicalize their extremism, by making *al-takfīr* (condemning those not belonging to their group as unbelievers) their principal ideology, a one-sided absolutism that claims an exclusive monopoly on the truth while condemning others as wrong. As a closed ideology, Kharijite extremists were unable to maintain their own unity, let alone that of all Muslims, since they were divided into a huge number of sub-groups who considered each other to be unbelievers. Their extremism thus brought them to the point of division and even of killing each other. Their place in Islamic history, as with all extremist movements, was on the

---

<sup>129</sup>Madjid, “Skisme dalam Islam,” 679-680.

<sup>130</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 140-141; and idem, “Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa al-Thaqāfa al-Mu‘āṣira,” in Sa‘d al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, ed., *Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa Humūm al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī* (Oman: Muntadī al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1987), 285.

<sup>131</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 33-35.

margins,<sup>132</sup> even to the point of “self-annihilation” to use Madjid’s term.<sup>133</sup> Both Ḥanafī and Madjid are in agreement with al-Jābirī in rejecting all Islamic forms of extremism. Ḥanafī rejects any one-dimensional approach to Islam since it is a sign of backwardness and domination, but incorporates the Kharijites’ open opposition (but from outside of the system) into his Islamic Left, while promoting their within-history-movement.<sup>134</sup> In other words, Ḥanafī changes Kharijism into a “real” Islamic Left, by accepting its Left while condemning its extremism and its “Right.” Madjid in his turn converts Kharijite revolutionary extremism into a sort of loyal opposition --namely, opposed to the Indonesian government, but loyal to the Indonesian State--<sup>135</sup> or makes it more like the Mu‘tazilite open but from-within-the-system opposition --to use Ḥanafī’s term.<sup>136</sup> Kharijite absolutist sectarianism, for Madjid, is a kind of polytheism (*shirk*) that every Muslim must exchange for an open,

---

<sup>132</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 145-146; and idem, “Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya,” 285.

<sup>133</sup>Madjid, “Skisme dalam Islam,” 680.

<sup>134</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 58 and 212; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 37; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 73; and idem and al-Jābirī, *Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib*, 23.

<sup>135</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 7.

<sup>136</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 19-20.

Islamic non-sectarianism.<sup>137</sup> Absolutism, Madjid adds, is a closed issue and, hence, obsolete.<sup>138</sup>

The Qur'anic sciences, Ḥanafī goes on to explain, have also led to a decline in Islamic realism or experimentalism, since Islamic contemporary thought is a textually oriented interpretation that tries to transform an Islamic text into a reality, whereas the text is a verbal expression that explains, but cannot replace, reality.<sup>139</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>140</sup> and Madjid<sup>141</sup> follow Ḥanafī<sup>142</sup> in making the Qur'ān and Sunna the starting point of their reform, yet they also believe that a text requires *a priori* belief. While Ḥanafī calls the text a specific argument, since only those who believe in it can use it,<sup>143</sup> both al-Jābirī<sup>144</sup> and Madjid<sup>145</sup> make adherence to the Qur'ān and the Sunna the principle of authenticity, which is the first and primary principle for its being the source of the validity of any Islamic interpretation. Ḥanafī reinterprets the occasions of

---

<sup>137</sup>Madjid, "Skisme dalam Islam," 687-688; and idem, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme terhadap Islam," in Abdurrahman Wahid, ed., *Kontroversi Pemikiran Islam di Indonesia* (Bandung: Rosda, 1990), 96.

<sup>138</sup>Madjid, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 348.

<sup>139</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981* (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 1988), 7: 76; idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 13-14; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 370.

<sup>140</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6 and 16.

<sup>141</sup>Madjid, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 340-341.

<sup>142</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 76.

<sup>143</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 30.

<sup>144</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 16.

<sup>145</sup>Madjid, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 340-341.

Qur'anic revelation (*asbāb al-nuzūl*) by assigning priority to real events over surmised ones<sup>146</sup> and by emphasizing the human and historical dimension, to use Madjid's term.<sup>147</sup> Al-Jābirī for his part has no reservations regarding Ḥanafī's reconstruction of the occasions of Qur'anic revelation, as long as these contribute to realizing the objective of revelation, which is to ensure the public interest (*maṣāliḥ*) of Muslims, and of human beings in general.<sup>148</sup> However, given that the sources of *asbāb al-nuzūl* are historical accounts transmitted on the authority of the Prophet's Companions and even that of the Followers of the Companions (*tābi'īn*), Hanafi,<sup>149</sup> like both al-Jābirī<sup>150</sup> and Madjid,<sup>151</sup> insists that Muslims must critically verify the accuracy of these accounts by examining them for ideological motives and by referring their content to the highest possible authority --the Qur'ān itself.

Ḥanafī also reinterprets the science of the abrogating and abrogated verses as part of the process of the evolution of Islamic law (*tashrī'*) in

---

<sup>146</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 30-31; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 24.

<sup>147</sup>Madjid, "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul," 32; and idem, *Islam Kerakyatan*, 212.

<sup>148</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 8; idem, "Quyyūm Thaḳāfat al-Salām fī al-Diyyānāt al-Samāwiyya," *Fikr wa Naqd* 8 (1998): 6; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 6.

<sup>149</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 1: 22-23.

<sup>150</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 7-8.

<sup>151</sup>Madjid, "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,"

accordance with human capability.<sup>152</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, considers it to be a consequence of the existence of *asbāb al-nuzūl*, for the inclusion in it of human-historical awareness enables Islam to face the challenges of time and place.<sup>153</sup> While Ḥanafī reinterprets the Meccan and Medinan verses as meaning, respectively, concept and system, or *‘aqīda* and *sharī‘a*, or even theory and praxis,<sup>154</sup> Madjid stresses the differences between *muḥkamāt* (univocal) and *mutashābihāt* (equivocal) verses, the latter of which he calls the “parameters of Islam.” They are eternal and independent of time and place in terms of meaning, spirit or universal objective.<sup>155</sup> Going beyond both al-Jābirī and Madjid, Ḥanafī encourages Muslims to transform these Qur’anic sciences into such disciplines as statistics, the humanities, historical sciences, ideology, and even politics and economics,<sup>156</sup> although he does not explain how. Al-Jābirī, for his part, sees these efforts as a part of *ijtihād* for the sake of human beings that is open to anyone who is capable of it,<sup>157</sup> but Madjid is closer to

---

<sup>152</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18; idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 15; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 59.

<sup>153</sup>Madjid, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 35-36.

<sup>154</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 24; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 420.

<sup>155</sup>Madjid, “Taqlid dan Ijtihad,” 344-345.

<sup>156</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18.

<sup>157</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 8; and idem, “Quyyūm Thaḳāfat al-Salām,” 6.

Ḥanafī in suggesting that his fellow Indonesian Muslims incorporate the social sciences into their new approach to religious texts.<sup>158</sup>

Ḥanafī moreover condemns interpreters of the Qur'ān for misunderstanding the Qur'anic account of history. Contrary to their belief, the Qur'ān, for him<sup>159</sup> as for Madjid,<sup>160</sup> does not speak about material events in a certain time and place, but merely encourages action, with the result that its theoretical truth corresponds to human experience.<sup>161</sup> Al-Jābirī and Madjid, on the other hand, both see historical interpretation as necessary, although for different reasons. For al-Jābirī, who adopts a Khaldunian point of view,<sup>162</sup> the historical approach is a criterion for achieving objectivity,<sup>163</sup> whereas for Madjid it is a means of differentiating between the historical and a-historical elements of the Qur'ān, the latter of which constitute universal truth and,

---

<sup>158</sup>Nurcholish Madjid, "Pendahuluan," in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 27-28; and idem, *Pintu-Pintu*, 117.

<sup>159</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 18; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 104; idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 17; idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 21; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 370.

<sup>160</sup>Madjid, "Keluarga 'Imran," 385-386.

<sup>161</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 18; idem, "Hal Yajūz Shar'an al-Ṣulḥ ma' Banī Isrā'īl?," *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* 1 (1981):100; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 104.

<sup>162</sup>'Abd al-Karīm Ghallāb, "Ta'qīb," in Ismā'īl Ṣabrī 'Abd al-Fattāḥ, ed., *Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya al-Mu'aṣira fī al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition (Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1989), 236.

<sup>163</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy*, 16.



hence, the meeting point of all religions.<sup>164</sup> Ḥanafī,<sup>165</sup> al-Jābirī and Madjid,<sup>166</sup> however, all seem to agree that historical interpretation will be totally wrong if the textual sources used as its basis are erroneous, since such historical accounts are often mixed with *Isrāʾīliyyāt* (Jewish traditions) and myths that the Qurʾān does not mention. Ḥanafī goes beyond both al-Jābirī and Madjid, in that his Islamic Left replaces historical interpretation with a phenomenological one<sup>167</sup> that makes the Qurʾān the criterion for explaining the human position in the universe and mankind's interrelationships at the level of society and state.<sup>168</sup> Both Ḥanafī and Madjid however reject lengthy interpretation (chapter-by-chapter or verse-by-verse), suggesting instead that such approaches be replaced with thematic interpretation, which consists in interpreting a topic by comparing all related verses.<sup>169</sup> To this, Ḥanafī adds psycho-social interpretation as a means of reviving faith in an individual, while putting the interests of the reader at the heart of the text. He also calls this interpretation *al-tafsīr al-uṣūlī*, a process of interpreting the Qurʾān from the

---

<sup>164</sup>Madjid, "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul," 37; and idem, Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 200-201; and idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 68.

<sup>165</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 83-84; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 6.

<sup>166</sup>Madjid, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat," 100; and idem, *Kaki Langit*, 48.

<sup>167</sup>For detailed information on Ḥanafī's phenomenological interpretation, see his *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie* and *La phénoménologie de l'exégèse*.

<sup>168</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 19.

<sup>169</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 19; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 25, 104 and 158.

perspective of public interest.<sup>170</sup> Although they themselves favour this last kind of interpretation, both al-Jābirī and Madjid tend to disagree with Ḥanafī's program of achieving such a goal through the establishment of a revolutionary interpretation of the Qur'ān. For while Ḥanafī is very eager to transform Islamic traditional theology into revolutionary ideology,<sup>171</sup> both al-Jābirī<sup>172</sup> and Madjid<sup>173</sup> are reluctant to attempt any such thing. Further discussion of the position and importance of the Qur'ān in their respective systems will take place in the next chapter.

Ḥanafī,<sup>174</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>175</sup> and Madjid<sup>176</sup> are unanimous in agreeing that the Ḥadīth represents the second source of Islam. Yet although they believe that there is no place for the application of historical criticism to the question of the authenticity of the Qur'ān, they do not take the same attitude towards Ḥadīths because historical criticism has proved that a great many of them are not authentic. The Ḥadīth experts (*muḥaddithūn*) basically classified Ḥadīths into *al-ḥadīth al-aḥad* and *al-ḥadīth al-mutawātir*: while the former is a Ḥadīth that

---

<sup>170</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 19; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 25 and 159; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-115 .

<sup>171</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 19; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 356-357.

<sup>172</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 8-9.

<sup>173</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 7.

<sup>174</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 76.

<sup>175</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 6 and 16.

<sup>176</sup>Madjid, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 340-341; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 3.

a single line of individuals has transmitted from the Prophet Muḥammad, the latter is one that a huge number of people (*al-jamāʿa*) have narrated. Unlike the former, which Ḥadīth experts do not accept as a valid second source of Islam, the latter type is considered sound by virtue of its having been transmitted by so many people, such that it is inconceivable that they could have cooperated in spreading a lie.<sup>177</sup> Another criterion is that its content should not contradict the meaning of the Qurʾān. However, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid condemn the fact that the issue of the chain of transmission (*al-sanad*) dominates Muslim argumentation on the Ḥadīth, a trend that Ḥanafī views as another factor that has caused their decline. The classical Ḥadīth experts, all three of our authors<sup>178</sup> insist, placed the emphasis on the validity of the chain of transmission in order to verify the accuracy of a transmission (*al-riwāya*), since a huge number of conflicting political groups fabricated their own Ḥadīths both to legitimize and to achieve their sectarian goals.

These fabricated Ḥadīths not only lent support to the political groups that invented them, but they also diverted Muslims from the true path of Islam. To solve such politico-ideological conflicts the Ḥadīth experts worked on

---

<sup>177</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9.

<sup>178</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 19 and idem, “Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn: Kayfa Tustakhdam al-‘Ulūm al-Insāniyya wa al-Ijtimāʿiyya fī Naqd al-Matn al-Ḥadīth al-Nabawī? Al-Bukhārī Namudhājan,” *Al-Jamʿiyya al-Falsafiyya al-Miṣriyya* 5 (1996): 135; al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 8; idem, *Al-ʿAql al-Akhlāqī al-ʿArabī*, 67-68; and Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 72-73.

tightening the conditions for transmitters rather than on measuring the accuracy of the content (*al-matn*) against Qur'anic criteria, by establishing various methodologies, such as *'ilm al-jarḥ wa al-ta'dīl*.<sup>179</sup> The latter science set certain criteria by which Ḥadīth experts were able to detect the ideological inclination and personal capability of each transmitter. The science to some extent succeeded in ascertaining which of the Ḥadīths attributed to the Prophet were genuine, after these had been mixed with spurious ones in the period before they were actively collected. However, given that the science was established under the auspices of the Umayyad rulers, it also lent the process a politico-religious character. The Umayyads' enemies in turn created their own chains of transmission. The *sanad*-oriented argument thus boiled down to the authority of one set of transmissions as opposed to another, while the truth may have lain somewhere outside of the transmission. Whatever the success of the Ḥadīth experts in deciding on the soundness of the content on the basis of a Ḥadīth's transmission, contemporary Muslims, Ḥanafī insists, cannot cling to the same principle, since times have changed.<sup>180</sup>

Ḥanafī goes on to say that, unlike their classical forbears, contemporary Muslims are relatively free of ancient ideological conflicts and, hence, are

---

<sup>179</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 20 and 105; idem, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 29; idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60; al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 8; and Madjid, "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul," 26.

<sup>180</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 20 and 105; idem, "Min naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 134; idem, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 127-161; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Hiwār*, 6.

more capable of avoiding subjective interpretation. For the sake of true Islam, they should undertake internal criticism, consisting essentially in giving priority to content over chains of transmission, by which they may conclude the validity of a Ḥadīth based on the soundness of its *matn* and its conformity with reason, reality, experiment and public interest.<sup>181</sup> The content of a Ḥadīth, for al-Jābirī<sup>182</sup> and Madjid,<sup>183</sup> should be a commentary on, and hence in agreement with, the Qur'ān. The internal criticism of Ḥadīth, if successfully undertaken in all aspects of Islamic teaching, will automatically transform Muslim awareness, which was mostly formed out of Ḥadīths that had escaped such rigorous analysis. “Ideologically fabricated” Ḥadīths such as these expressed the views of the establishment, which Ḥanafī calls the “safe group” (*al-firqa al-naḥiyya*), which stood opposed to any and all other *ijtihāds* that endangered the position of the powers-that-be. Internal criticism, on the other hand, not only supports the application of sound Ḥadīth --whichever group it may favour-- but it also decreases the influence of Ḥadīth on the hidden interests that contradict reason and public interest (*maṣlaḥa*).<sup>184</sup> Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid thus call for the superiority of the content of Ḥadīth over the

---

<sup>181</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 105; idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 369.

<sup>182</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 8.

<sup>183</sup>Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 3.

<sup>184</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18-19; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 158; idem, *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra*, 5: 393-407; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 6.

person who reported it and, in turn, the superiority of Qur'ān-inspired Ḥadīth over the personality of the Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>185</sup> Again, we will return to further discussion of Ḥadīth in the next chapter as a part of the development of the hermeneutics of three contemporary authors.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid have no doubts about the effectiveness of classical biography (which Ḥanafī describes as the sciences of biography or *'ulūm al-sīra*) in spreading but also changing ideas, schools of thought, principles and systems of state. Muslim practices, Ḥanafī asserts, indicate that historical Islam is subject to this principle, as is obvious from the tendency of its adherents to “worship” persons who disseminate ideas rather than practice the ideas themselves. Instead of observing the revelation that Allāh ordered the Prophet Muḥammad to announce to human beings, many Muslims tend to honour the messenger.<sup>186</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, is of the opinion that Muslims are lucky to have the biography of the Prophet Muḥammad, providing them as it does with a global view of his Sunna, for which reason Ibn Ishāq's *al-Maghāzī* [*wa al-Siyār*] ranks second only to the Qur'ān in his eyes. Nevertheless, he<sup>187</sup> is in line with both Ḥanafī<sup>188</sup> and al-Jābirī in acknowledging that the prophets were only human beings. Their presence in

---

<sup>185</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18-19.

<sup>186</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 104-105.

<sup>187</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 76 (no. 3) and 139.

<sup>188</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 105; and idem, *Ḥiwār li al-Da'wa*, 413.

the world, Madjid stresses,<sup>189</sup> made them subject to human historical laws (*al-a'rāḍ al-bashariyya*). Given that Muḥammad was just a prophet and, hence, a human being, he could, as the Qur'ān (Q. 18: 110) reminds us, die and even be murdered. The acceptance of truth should, therefore, be independent of one's perception of its announcer, be this a person or a group, since the announcer has a historical existence. They must emulate 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, who, on hearing Abū Bakr's reminder that Prophet Muḥammad was dead, realized that he was no different from other prophets in this respect. 'Umar's case is therefore an ideal that Muslims might care to follow in understanding the relationship between revelation and its announcer (*muballigh*).

Ḥanafī for his part holds the Shiites (*āl al-bayt*, the descendents of the Prophet Muḥammad) responsible for taking advantage of the biographical genre to transform their human leaders into supernatural (or at least infallible) imams.<sup>190</sup> While al-Jābirī<sup>191</sup> in principle agrees with Ḥanafī,<sup>192</sup> Madjid pinpoints that the secret doctrine of Shiism is the starting point of the Shiite theory of the infallible imam.<sup>193</sup> Sufi biographies, Ḥanafī asserts, also play a significant role in diverting Islamic teachings into person-worshipping concepts,

---

<sup>189</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 139; idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 62-63; and idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 48.

<sup>190</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 104-105.

<sup>191</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 154-156.

<sup>192</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 105.

<sup>193</sup>Madjid, "Tasauf dan Pesantren," 108-110; and idem, *Bilik-bilik Pesantren*, 51.

for theories like *al-shafā'a* (recommendation), *al-wilāya* (holiness) and *al-tawassuṭ* (intercession) make sufi masters intermediary agents between Allāh and human beings, lending considerable spiritual power to sufi brotherhoods.<sup>194</sup> On the other hand, al-Jābirī believes that biographies can also hide facts. Orientalists, for example, keep writing on Ibn Rushd the translator and commentator of Aristotle, while ignoring Ibn Rushd the Muslim philosopher, the *faqīh* (Muslim jurist) and even the medical doctor –all of which talents he displays in his *Faṣl al-Maqāl*, *Manāhij al-Adilla*, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut*, *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid* and *Al-Kulliyyāt fī al-Ṭibb*. It is the forgotten Ibn Rushd that Arab-Muslim readers need for their renaissance. It was to correct the misunderstanding of this legacy that al-Jābirī wrote, among other works, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr* (Ibn Rushd: Life and Thought), a new biography of Ibn Rushd,<sup>195</sup> a step similar to the one that Ḥanafī took earlier in 1978.<sup>196</sup>

Considering this deviation from message-oriented Islam to personality-centered worship to be one of the factors that has led to the Muslim decline, Ḥanafī,<sup>197</sup> al-Jābirī and Madjid endeavor to purify Islam by desacralizing such sufi, *al al-bayt* and political figures, whom they see as having identified themselves with Allāh through their innovative theories like *al-shafā'a*, *al-*

---

<sup>194</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 104-105.

<sup>195</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikra*, 10-11. Another biography by al-Jābirī is *Ḥafariyyāt fī al-Dhākira min Ba'īd* (Casablanca: Dār al-Nashr al-Maghribiyya, 1997; Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Wahda al-'Arabiyya, 1997).

<sup>196</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 157-206.



*wilāya*, and *al-tawassuṭ*, by which means they became religious aristocrats. The historical analysis of the Shiite theory of an infallible imam, Madjid adds, should begin with the revelation of their secret doctrine. Given that the Shiites transformed their political defeats into a kind of superhuman expectation, a new era of biographical writing should proceed by emphasizing the natural dimensions of human beings, since Muslims cannot overcome their problems unless they abide by the *sunnat Allāh* (“natural laws”). Pretending that someone is superhuman is no more than an elaborate form of self-deception.<sup>198</sup> Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are determined to restore the functions of the sciences of biography to their natural<sup>199</sup> state, out of a concern to liberate their fellow Muslims from the bondage of loyalty to a person rather than to ideas, from the grips of loyalty to a prophet to loyalty to revelation, from the constricting effects of charismatic fascination rather than respect for rational leaders, and from the grasp of slavery to a religious aristocracy rather than devotion to Islamic egalitarianism. In short, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid advocate “message-oriented tajdid” –to use Voll’s term—<sup>200</sup> since they believe that the renaissance can only be achieved by practicing what has been revealed

---

<sup>197</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 104-105.

<sup>198</sup>Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 104; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 26, 33, 146-150 and 164-168.

<sup>199</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 104-105; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 76.

<sup>200</sup>Voll, “Wahhabism and Mahiism,” 123.

instead of worshipping the one who revealed it, be this a prophet, a religious leader, or a religious institution.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid all maintain that Islamic jurisprudence (*al-fiqh*) is the Islamic science *par excellence*. Nevertheless, they are convinced that *fiqh* now is hampering instead of accelerating the Islamic renaissance. Ḥanafī criticizes contemporary fellow Muslims for focusing their *fiqh* discussions on *‘ibādāt* (Islamic ritual practices), while neglecting *mu‘āmalāt* (worldly affairs).<sup>201</sup> Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, makes it clear that he is neither a religious reformer, nor a preacher, nor an initiator of new Islamic theology, though he criticizes *fiqh*, and for a number of reasons. First of all, the traditional classification of such Islamic sciences as *fiqh*, Ḥadīth and language into *‘ulūm naqliyya* is epistemologically an external one, in replacement of which he offers a new classification that he calls *‘ulūm al-bayān*. Second, he blames the decline of Arab civilization, among other factors, on *fiqh*, since it plays a very important role in maintaining the practice of *qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā al-shāhid* (“analogy of the unknown after the known”). Given that the unknown is the “future” while the known is “the greatness of our civilization,” the process leads backwards rather than forwards.<sup>202</sup> Madjid, as Ḥanafī does with respect to his fellow Egyptians, laments the fact that

---

<sup>201</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 26,106 and 159; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 137.

<sup>202</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 9; and idem, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy*, 17.

Indonesian Muslims indulge themselves in questions of *'ibādāt* to the complete neglect of *mu'āmalāt*. They forget that the *'ibādāt* deal with already decided matters, while the *mu'āmalāt* never cease being subject to the challenges of time and space. Both the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam waste valuable time over trivial discussions of daily prayer, an orientation that he characterizes as *ad hoc* reform.<sup>203</sup> Madjid emphasizes that although the Muhammadiyah is fully committed to spreading the slogan of “Back to the Qur’ān and the Ḥadīth,” its achievements do not go beyond pronouncing on such rituals as the *qunūt* and *uṣallī* devotions, as well as the two calls for prayer.<sup>204</sup>

The development of *'ibādāt*-oriented *fiqh*, Ḥanafī emphasizes, was a historical achievement of the early Muslim *mujtahids* in their efforts to establish Islam as a new religion, but their successors did not realize that the focus of *fiqh* changed after Muslims of the classical era had learned to practice *'ibādāt* properly.<sup>205</sup> It is apparent to both Madjid<sup>206</sup> and Ḥanafī that *fiqh* later became the most effective means of attaining power, though Ḥanafī,<sup>207</sup> unlike Madjid, states that Muslim rulers dictated their interests in the systematization

---

<sup>203</sup>Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 107-108; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 54; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 112, 117, 119, 122, 145, 231 and 249.

<sup>204</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 249.

<sup>205</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 106 and 159.

<sup>206</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 111-112; and idem, *Bilik-bilik Pesantren*, 8.

<sup>207</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 106 and 159.

of *fiqh* (*tabwīb al-fiqh*). They intentionally encouraged *fiqh* experts to place more stress on ‘*ibādāt*’ aspects in order to divert the attention of their subjects—who might otherwise have been critical of their secular practices. The process ended with Muslims becoming increasingly ignorant of *mu‘āmalāt*, making it easier for rulers to introduce new *mu‘āmalāt* practices in the agricultural, industrial, trade, labour and investment fields as they wanted. Worse still, they legitimized their actions with formal legal steps which their *fuqahā’* were ready to provide at a moment’s notice. Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī<sup>208</sup> and Madjid<sup>209</sup> believe that the replacement of ‘*ibādāt*-oriented *fiqh* with *mu‘āmalāt*-oriented *fiqh* --but with a political *fiqh* (*al-fiqh al-siyāsī*) in particular-- will broaden the perspectives of Muslims on their own duties and rights. Given that politics is the only medium of communication between the masses and state, as al-Jābirī<sup>210</sup> puts it, the revival of political *fiqh* will restore Muslim awareness of democracy and rationalism. To revive Islamic political *fiqh*, Indonesian Muslims, Madjid suggests, need to revisit such classical textbooks as al-Ghazālī’s *Naṣīḥat al-Mulūk* (Conseils of the Kings) and al-Māwardī’s *al-Aḥkām al-Sulṭāniyya* (Principles of Islamic Government), while taking into consideration modern political theories.<sup>211</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 13.

<sup>209</sup> Madjid, *Bilik-bilik Pesantren*, 15.

<sup>210</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 13.

<sup>211</sup> Madjid, “Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 109; and idem, “Menatap Masa Depan Islam,” 46.

To further correct this wrong-headed approach to *fiqh*, Ḥanafī recommends that Muslims reconsider reality-oriented Malikism as a tool for defending their public interests, just as ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb ---and later on ‘Abd Allāh ibn Mas‘ūd and Mālīk ibn Anas-- practiced. Ḥanafī also suggests that Muslims accept Hanafism, but without its hypothetical jurisprudence (*al-fiqh al-iftirādī*).<sup>212</sup> Madjid for his part considers the emergence of Hanafite rationalism as the first, standard and steadiest expression of Islamic jurisprudence.<sup>213</sup> Even though he himself favours a combination of reason and reality by adding Shafiism, and though he considers adding both Malikism and Hanafism to his syncretism, Ḥanafī declares his strict adherence to principles (*al-uṣūl*) that denote loyalty to Hanbalism, but without its literal interpretation of religious texts.<sup>214</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, sees the combination of rational-and-reality-oriented Shafiism with Hanafī rationalism as a return to the right principles of jurisprudence, since al-Shāfi‘ī (150-204 H./767-812 A.D.) took his rationality from Hanafism, and from Malikism not only his realism but also his Sunna-oriented *fiqh*. It was al-Shāfi‘ī who systematically formulated the rule that the only valid Sunna is one that came from the Prophet

---

<sup>212</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 15; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 14, 22, 25, 26, 159.

<sup>213</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 73.

<sup>214</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 15; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 235.

Muḥammad.<sup>215</sup> Furthermore, both al-Jābirī<sup>216</sup> and Madjid<sup>217</sup> consider Ibn Rushd's *Bidāyat al-Mujtahid* (Introduction to Interpreters) as a model for the *fiqh* of the future due to its systematic, realistic, argumentative and comparative approach. Thus Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid all encourage their co-religionists to rethink the Islamic legal heritage by adopting two different policies, namely, accepting those rulings that are found in the Qur'ān and the sound prophetic tradition (*al-sunna al-ṣaḥīḥa*), while undertaking *ijtihād* to determine the legal status of newly found cases that do not have textual bases. Ḥanafī,<sup>218</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>219</sup> and Madjid<sup>220</sup> all argue that both *ijtihād* and *ijmā'* are always feasible, are limited to a certain age and are not binding once and for all, since situations change.

*ʿIlm uṣūl al-fiqh*, for Ḥanafī, is the supreme and most unique science that Islamic civilization ever produced. As an *ʿilm al-tanzīl* (a science that is capable of transforming revelation into inductive and experimental methods), it is a practical science. Having as its aim the protection of human interests, it grounds itself on both rational *istidlāl* (demonstration) and experimental induction, within which human efforts (*ijtihād*) find a wide field of play. In

---

<sup>215</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 73.

<sup>216</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11.

<sup>217</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 105; and idem, *Pintu-Pintu*, 26-27.

<sup>218</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 15.

<sup>219</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qadāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn," 15-16; idem, "Quyyūm Thaḳāfat al-Salām," 6; and idem, "Ḥawl al-Awḍā' al-'Arabiyya al-Rāhina," *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* 11 (1982): 114-115.

contrast to mysticism (*'ilm al-taṣawwuf*), for instance, *uṣūl al-fiqh* accepts neither illuminationist concepts, since it bases itself on causation (*ta'līl*), nor theoretical beliefs, since it sees Allāh as merely the Lawgiver (*al-Shārī'*).<sup>221</sup> By comparison, al-Jābirī criticizes the traditional classification that places *uṣūl al-fiqh* within the category of the *'ulūm al-naqliyya*. Regarding this classification as foreign and, hence, as unhelpful to discovering the epistemological grounds for Arab thought, he replaces it with an internal one, within which he places *uṣūl al-fiqh* under the heading of *'ulūm al-bayān*.<sup>222</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, states that *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* is an excellent creation of Islamic civilization, noting in addition that it was al-Shāfi'ī who founded it. The rationality and realism of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, Madjid adds, are discernible in such maxims as “the existence of a ruling depends on the existence of its cause” (*al-ḥukm yadūr ma' al-'illa wujūdān wa 'adaman*) and “something that cannot be achieved totally cannot be abandoned totally” (*mālā yudrak kulluh lā yutrak kulluh*).<sup>223</sup> Nevertheless, Ḥanafī readily acknowledges that, although it gives priority to human welfare over religious texts --as is obvious from its general maxims such as “there is no place for issuing a harmful ruling nor responding with a harmful ruling in Islamic law” (*lā ḍarar wa la ḍirar*), “emergencies allow [a

---

<sup>220</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 120-121.

<sup>221</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 14 and 166; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 160-161 and 178; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 622; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 115-116.

<sup>222</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 9.

<sup>223</sup>Madjid, “Keilmuan Pesantren,” 12-14; and idem, *Kaki Langit*, 73.

Muslim to do] the prohibited” (*al-darūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥzūrāt*) and “it is illegal for a Muslim authority to issue a ruling that it is beyond human capability to undertake” (*lā yajūz taklīf mā lā yuṭāq*)-- *uṣūl al-fiqh* constitutes an obstacle to the Islamic renaissance since all classical *istidlāl*s start with the Qur’ān and Sunna, and then proceed to consensus and analogy. Some contemporary “rational” schools even continue to give priority to the text (*al-naṣṣ*) over public interest (*al-maṣlaḥa*).<sup>224</sup> The problem, according to al-Jābirī, is due to the domination of the “wrong-headed” mental act of analogizing of the unknown after the known,<sup>225</sup> or due to, as Madjid puts it, the loss of the true perspective of *uṣūl al-fiqh*.<sup>226</sup>

To reverse the order of the traditionally oriented hierarchy of *uṣūl al-fiqh* –a system of reasoning that glorifies raw texts at the expense of human interests-- Ḥanafī introduces his “from text to reality” reconstruction project. In accordance with the latter he insists that Muslims start their legal reasoning directly on the basis of analogy, making public interest the priority in their inductive and experimental effort. They should not be afraid of violating the Qur’ān and the Sunna, since the new order of *uṣūl al-fiqh* reasoning that he is proposing will automatically be in line with the spirit of the text, just as were ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb’s efforts to prove that revelation is for the sake, and not

---

<sup>224</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 177; idem, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 15; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 166; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 178; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 115-116.

<sup>225</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Arab-Islamic Philosophy*, 17-22.



at the expense, of human beings.<sup>227</sup> In principle, both al-Jābirī and Madjid are supportive of Ḥanafī on this question. Al-Jābirī insists that Muslims be guided by this reorientation of interest, that they issue a ruling by referring a particular ruling of the Qur'ān and the Sunna to this general principle of public interests, as 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb did in his time.<sup>228</sup> Madjid's position is that if Muslims only approach *uṣūl al-fiqh* more conceptually, they will rediscover their intellectual dynamism.<sup>229</sup> To the use of analogy as a source, furthermore Ḥanafī adds an additional principle, that of *al-ḥukm bi al-maqāṣid al-sharī'a* (to issue a ruling based on the aims of Islamic law), which consists in protecting the five *ḍarūriyyāt* (necessities or factors that must exist for the sake of human beings, the absence of which may be detrimental to them) that Ḥanafī calls the pillars of life. These are life itself (*al-ḥayā* or *al-nafs*), intellect (*al-'aql*), religion (*al-dīn*), dignity (*al-'ird*), and property (*al-māl*).<sup>230</sup> While al-Jābirī calls *al-ḥukm bi al-maqāṣid al-sharī'a* the issuing of a ruling based on

---

<sup>226</sup>Madjid, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 14-15.

<sup>227</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 178; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 166-167; idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 12-14; and idem, "Al-Muslimūn fī Āsiyā fī Maṭla' al-Qarn al-Khāmis 'Ashar al-Hijrī," *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* 1 (1981): 169.

<sup>228</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 184, 186 and 187; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 56.

<sup>229</sup>Madjid, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 13; and idem, "Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan dalam Menangkap Makna dan Semangat Ketentuan Keagamaan: Kasus Ijtihad Umar ibn al-Khattab," in Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, ed., *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988), 12-13.

*ḥikma*,<sup>231</sup> Madjid calls it *ratio legis*, which is equivalent to understanding the essential message of the Qur'ān.<sup>232</sup> In addition, al-Jābirī makes *al-ḥukm bi al-maqāṣid al-sharī'a* a starting point of religious dialogue, since Islam, from Ādam to Muḥammad, has always had a common goal, namely, that of saving human lives both in this world and in the hereafter, which is perfectly reflected in this concept. Taking the *maqāṣid al-sharī'a* as their starting point, Islam, Christianity and Judaism (*al-adyān al-samāwiyya*) can together, al-Jābirī contends, build a common culture of peace.<sup>233</sup>

Any such reorientation, Ḥanafī argues, should aim to reduce the emphasis on the principles of obligation and prohibition (*al-awāmir wa al-nawāḥī*). Contemporary Muslims should leave behind the old paradigm that Islamic rulings (*al-aḥkām al-shar'iyya*) are obligations imposed on them, and should instead observe them in the light of the humanity of their subjects. The paradigm shift, according to Ḥanafī, must begin with a reinterpretation of *al-wājib* (obligation) as a pillar of or as affirming life, *al-ḥarām* (prohibition) as harmful to life, *al-mandūb* (commendable) as permission granted to do something good both voluntarily and according to one's capability, *al-makrūh*

---

<sup>230</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 166-167; idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 10; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 282 and 363.

<sup>231</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuquq al-Insān*, 186; and idem, "Al-Muslimūn fī Āsiyā," 169.

<sup>232</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 111; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 130.

<sup>233</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Quyyūm al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya," 6-7.

(indifference) as a reminder to avoid, voluntarily, doing anything that might damage one's life, and *al-ḥalāl* (lawful) as a licence to enjoy everything that is not dangerous to oneself.<sup>234</sup> This stress on Muslim humanity in the issuing of Islamic rulings, for both al-Jābirī and Madjid, is a necessary step in any contemporary reform. Al-Jābirī, like both Ḥanafī and Madjid, is convinced that *uṣūl al-fiqh* can be of help in overcoming the decline of Islam if Muslim legal philosophers dare to give priority to public interest over text as the primary goal of *Shari'a*, to be achieved by referring a particular ruling to a general principle of the Qur'ān in the light of both the occasions of Qur'anic revelation and causation (*ta'līl al-aḥkām*).<sup>235</sup> It is in this way that Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid endeavor to restore the human dimensions of Islamic law. The process would mean referring such particular rulings as capital punishment (*al-ḥudūd*) to the general objectives of the Qur'ān and the Sunna. Thus a thief, for example, would be immune from the penalty of amputation if he had to steal to save his life. In this case, it is the absence of cause that prevails, i.e., the absence of any intention to steal for one's own benefit at the expense of others. Furthermore, amputating his hand would mean violating the essential message of the Qur'ān and the Sunna, which is saving human life,<sup>236</sup> since the thief would face a double punishment: poverty and inhuman application of the law.

---

<sup>234</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 166-167; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 39.

<sup>235</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 186-187; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 70.

Encouraging their co-religionists to practice *maṣlaḥa*-oriented *uṣūl al-fiqh* in their everlasting *ijtihād*, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid urge them to take into account considerations of time and place in realizing the Islamic message.

So far we have discussed Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's concepts of reform of Islamic tradition through a comparison made in the light of the first dimension of Ḥanafī's reform project, i.e., "Our Attitude Towards the Classical Heritage," where he classifies the sciences of the Islamic classical heritage that he is planning to revive. This is a three part scheme, which includes: first, traditional-textual rational sciences (*al-'ulūm al-naqliyya al-'aqliyya*), under which category fall theology, Islamic legal philosophy (or *la science des fondements de la compréhension*), and mysticism; second, pure rational sciences (*al-'ulūm al-'aqliyya waḥdaha*), to which belong mathematics, astronomy, natural science, pharmacy, and biology; and third, the pure traditional-textual sciences (*al-'ulūm al-naqliyya waḥdaha*), including Qur'anic sciences, the sciences of prophetic tradition, the sciences of the Prophet's biography, Islamic jurisprudence, and the sciences of Qur'ānic interpretation.<sup>237</sup> We have hitherto compared Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's responses to the first and the third classifications in the light of their practitioners. Although in this chapter we will avoid discussion of the sciences that Ḥanafī consigns to the second category, since they fall outside my area of

---

<sup>236</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 166-167.

<sup>237</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 13; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 154-186; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 100-106 and 157-167.

expertise, it cannot be stressed too highly how significant these pure rational sciences are to his project for a future Islam. Now the second dimension of Ḥanafī's reform project, namely, "Our Attitude towards the Western Heritage," will be examined in the rest of this chapter, where we will compare and contrast the responses of all three thinkers to the West as an external factor that has led to the decline of Islam. The following section will, therefore, compare their responses to Imperialism, Orientalism (including the possibility of establishing Occidentalism), Zionism, and the problem of unity in the Muslim world.

For Ḥanafī, the dynamism of Islam lies in the dialectics between Islamic texts, namely, the Qur'ān and the Sunna on the one hand, and 'urf ('āda) or reality (i.e., historical events) on the other. While the former are divine and limited in extent, the latter is pan-human and ever-developing. Allāh creates human beings as His caliphs (representatives) on earth to engage in this dialectic. Muslim scholars call this *ijtihād* or the civilizational process (*al-'amal al-ḥaḍārī*), to use one of Ḥanafī's terms,<sup>238</sup> and the person who undertakes it a *mujtahid*. As an emerging civilization, Islam had to respond to the environment surrounding it. The process very often turned out to be tendentious, and frequently resulted in wars between Muslims and non-Muslims on the one hand, and between Muslims themselves on the other. While the first part of this chapter has examined the significance of the

---

<sup>238</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'āṣira*, 1: 12.

heritage of Islamic internal tensions to the process of overcoming the decline of Islam in the modern world, the remaining part will focus on revealing Islamic responses to non-Islamic civilizations, and the West in particular. Nonetheless, it is worth noting before we start comparing Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's responses to modern Western challenges, that the discussion will deal in brief with their understanding of the classical dialogue between Islam and the West, and Greek civilization in particular, which represented "modernity" to many generations of Muslims. In its response to Greek civilization, Islam, Ḥanafī says, moved forward. Muslim theologians, for example, only established *'ilm al-kalām* after they had found out the limitations of internal Muslim thought. On the other hand, Muslim thinkers were only able to develop Islamic philosophy after they had found out the limitations of "foreign" schools of thought. To achieve this both groups had to confront new ideas with the Qur'ān.<sup>239</sup> Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, believes that the Abbasid Caliph al-Ma'mūn had to introduce Aristotelian demonstration to his empire in order to counter Shiite hermetism as reflected in their secret doctrines, since Mu'tazilism had shown itself incapable of opposing this trend.<sup>240</sup> To the openness of Islam as both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī understand it, Madjid adds that it was technology – of a kind quite different from the technology of the modern world-- that characterized the superiority

---

<sup>239</sup>Ibid., 1: 11.

of the Islamic classical heritage. This technological advancement was due to its interaction with world civilization, and with Hellenism in particular.<sup>241</sup> Yet it is only since the 18<sup>th</sup> century that Islam has had to face the problem of modernity in the Western sense.

In their discussion of the problem of modernity in Islam, Muslim and non-Muslim historians usually confine themselves to the mainland of the Muslim world, while ignoring its periphery. They are too ready to conclude that the Muslim world faced the challenge of modernity for the first time only with Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1789, forgetting that the Portuguese had conquered Malaka as early as 1511. The fall of Malaka itself was to some extent the fall of a symbol of Southeast Asian Islam, within which "Indonesian" Islam had just started to grow. This tragedy can to some degree be compared to the fall of Cairo to the Ottoman Turks in 1517. The main difference is that, while the latter fell into "Western" Muslim hands, the former fell into Western Christian hands. Both Portugal and the Ottoman Empire were at the peak of their strength, since the former had conquered Malaka only 18 years after they and their Spanish brethren had retaken the Iberian peninsula from Muslim hands (1492 – the same year that Columbus discovered America), while the latter took Egypt 64 years after having conquered Constantinople, the capital of "Eastern" Christian power. Just 6 years after the

---

<sup>240</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Tārīkh al-'Alāqa," 18; and idem, "Tarikh 'Ilm al-Kalām," 14 and 25.

<sup>241</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 15; and idem, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan*, 54.

Portuguese had taken Malaka, the Ottomans thus conquered the Egyptian Abbasid Empire. The fall of Malaka paved the way for Western powers to colonize the newly established Islamic sultanates in the region that modern historians have come, since 1945, to call Indonesia. Napoleon's attack on Egypt may have shocked Muslims, and Arabs in particular, and yet, while his victory indicated the power of Western modernity vis-à-vis Muslims in the central Islamic lands, the Dutch for their part caused equal consternation with their defeat of Sultan Agung of Yogyakarta when he attempted to take Batavia (now called Jakarta) from them in 1628-1629. The Dutch, who were the forerunners of modernity and powerful enough to establish a base in America that they called Neuen Amsterdam (later changed by the British to New York), were obviously too powerful for the Yogyakarta Sultanate, which was a small and brand-new Islamic kingdom.

Java, the island where Madjid was born, was thus the scene of a long series of defeats for the local population at the hands of the Dutch, who ultimately crushed local resistance in the form of the Diponegoro movement in 1830. Thus the problem of modernity in Nusantara (the earlier name of Indonesia) was very different from that of Egypt, especially when one considers as well the miserable experiences suffered by other, non-Javanese sultanates at the hands of different agents of European modernity like the Portuguese, the British and the Dutch. Hanafi himself even recognizes that Western imperialism in the Islamic nations of Southeast Asia, and in Indonesia



in particular, was no less dangerous or violent than the version unleashed on Arab countries like Morocco, Egypt, Iraq and Palestine.<sup>242</sup> In fact, it is even more likely that the fall of Spain in 1492, and not Napoleon's attack on Egypt in 1789, represented the beginning of the Muslim failure to respond to European modernity --if one insists on territorial conquest as the main criterion. While the debate over exactly when this modernity came to the Muslim world remains open, according to Ḥanafī, it is nonetheless a fact that the current situation of the Muslim world more or less resembles the one it enjoyed when it initially encountered the West. While the former was growing intellectually (especially after the age of the translations in the 9<sup>th</sup> century), the latter was expanding territorially. In its response to Greek civilization, Islam rejected its literature while incorporating its philosophy, spurned Aristotle's metaphysics while adopting his natural science, and ignored Plato's notion of "Ideas" while accepting his *Republic*. Today, just as it did long ago, Islamic civilization is growing in terms of quality compared to the expanding power of the West.<sup>243</sup> To rediscover the dynamism of their civilizational spirit, contemporary Muslims, Ḥanafī insists, must respond to Western civilization, just as their ancestors did in the classical era,<sup>244</sup> by engaging in the struggle

---

<sup>242</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, "Al-Muslimūn fī Āsiyā," *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* 1 (1981): 158.

<sup>243</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 2: 12-13.

<sup>244</sup>Ḥanafī dedicated his *L'Exégèse de la phénoménologie* "Aux Philosophes Musulmans Contemporains en vue d'un Dialogue avec la Culture

between “self” (Arabs and Muslims) and “other” (the West and Israel). He explores the dialectics of authenticity and modernity in the second dimension of his Heritage and Modernity reform project, an agenda that he calls “Our Attitude toward Western Heritage,” as compared to “Our Attitude toward Classical Heritage.” For while the latter focuses on the beginning of the Third World’s historical awareness, the former deals with the loss of Europe’s leadership in history.<sup>245</sup>

The West, for Ḥanafī,<sup>246</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>247</sup> and Madjid<sup>248</sup> constitutes one of the most powerful outside factors in the political decline of Islam in the modern world. In line with Ḥanafī, who characterizes the modern clash between Islam and the West as a new multi-dimensional crusade against Islam,<sup>249</sup> al-Jābirī regards the modern Arab renaissance as a product of the clash with the foreign and menacing forces of the West, and Napoleon’s attack on Egypt in 1789 in particular.<sup>250</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, traces the origins of the confrontation between Islam and the West or Christianity back to the

---

Européenne comme celui de nos Philosophes Anciens avec la Culture Grecque,” 1.

<sup>245</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 183; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 7 and 2: 5; and idem, *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī: Al-Mi’āwiyya al-Ulā* (1897-1997) (Cairo: Dār al-Qibā’, 1998), 123.

<sup>246</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 481; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 142.

<sup>247</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 74.

<sup>248</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 299.

<sup>249</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī,” 32.

earliest period of Islam. The confrontation was unavoidable because Christians considered Islam to be an innovation of, and challenge to, their religion, while Islam, as the Qur'ān teaches and Muslims understand it, is merely a continuation of Christianity. This confrontation of theological understandings drew both sides to the battlefield, changing the nature of their relationship into a socio-political confrontation.<sup>251</sup> Western imperialism, al-Jābirī says, is both theoretical (a system of thought) and practical (applied colonialism) at the same time, within which the latter can be seen as a continuation of the former. Theoretical imperialism, which originated in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, an era that al-Jābirī reminds us was the Age of Enlightenment, provided the ideological foundations for the practical version, which originated in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. While al-Jābirī refers to the latter as the century of imperialism,<sup>252</sup> Ḥanafī argues that the 15<sup>th</sup> century, the century that Europeans themselves called the Age of Geographical Discovery, was ironically the beginning of Western imperialism in the Muslim world.<sup>253</sup> Madjid, unlike Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, acknowledges that in this socio-political confrontation, Muslims succeeded in taking almost all Christian lands in the Middle East. Moreover, in addition to ruling Spain for more than seven centuries, Muslims were able to conquer Eastern Europe, whose former capital Constantinople is still under Muslim

---

<sup>250</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 74.

<sup>251</sup> Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 299.

<sup>252</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 74.

control.<sup>254</sup> Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, characterizes this military confrontation as one primarily between a liberation movement (*fath*) for purely *da'wa* (call to Islam) purposes,<sup>255</sup> and a bold move by Western imperialists to regain their lost territory.<sup>256</sup>

Napoleon's attack on Egypt, from al-Jābirī's point of view, transferred to the Muslim world the three pillars of European modernity: first, power, though colonial expansion was largely at the expense of the Arabs; second, European competition, in the sense that France competed with the British Empire while presenting the Arabs with a dilemma as to which of the powers to follow; and third, knowledge, which was modernism. The encounter thus resulted in the crystallization of the Arab renaissance project, but in the opposite direction, since European modernity was a dominating, powerful master, while the Arab renaissance was in a weak and dominated state. In this way, the Enlightenment expressed two contradictory dimensions: the values of freedom, equality and justice on the one hand, and the practical expression of Enlightenment ideology on the other. The former reinforces the latter but sometimes with contradictory results, such as terrorism, the justification being the exploitation of colonies or the liberation of slaves. The Arab renaissance not only lived in the shadow of the decline of this second dimension of the

---

<sup>253</sup>Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie*, 6; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 2: 352.

<sup>254</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 299.

<sup>255</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Huwiyya*, 136.

Enlightenment and the tyranny of the “other dimension” of European modernity, but it also gave its supporters the impetus to resist the introduction of this modernity into Arab lands. The resistance was thus a struggle against colonial penetration and foreign aggression.<sup>257</sup>

Unlike Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, though, who stress the victory and aggression of the modern West over the Muslim world, Madjid insists that the confrontation between Islam and the West has always been, to some extent, a confrontation between two cultures having two different perspectives. Western culture is a continuation of Greco-Roman culture. Its Christianity is often called “Western Christianity” in contrast to “Eastern Christianity”, i.e., eastern Mediterranean Christianity. While the latter has retained its Semitic roots, Christianity in the West was adapted according to the formula *Maria sopra Minerva*. By this image Madjid means that although Semitic Christianity was originally from the East, and was symbolized in Maria the mother of Jesus, it was superimposed upon and adjusted to Roman myth, itself symbolized in the goddess Minerva. The division resulted in a different relationship between Christianity and Islam, for while the relationship between Islam and “Eastern Christianity” has always been smooth and characterized by tolerance (since both came from relatively the same culture), the relationship between Islam

---

<sup>256</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 299.

<sup>257</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 20; idem, “Al-Gharb wa al-Islām: 1-Al-Anā wa al-Ākhar..aw al-Mas’ala al-Ghayriyya,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 2 (1997): 18; and idem, “Al-Gharb wa al-Islām: 2- Namī Akhar.. min al-Wa’y bi ‘al-Ākhar’,” *Naqd wa Fikr* 3 (1997): 9.

and “Western Christianity” has always been one of hostility.<sup>258</sup> It is this “Western Christianity” that both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī characterize as Western imperialism vis-à-vis Islam, culminating in the First World War (1914-1918), after which the victorious Western allied forces carved up the Ottoman Empire. History was convulsed when a huge number of former Ottoman provinces came under Western domination, although Istanbul itself was left in Turkish hands.

The Muslim world would liberate itself from Western military imperialism in the 1950s, but it still falls, according to Ḥanafī, under the shadow of the Great Powers, who in turn control a huge chunk of the economies of modern Muslim states through vast international corporations.<sup>259</sup> Like Ḥanafī, who stresses that Western cultural imperialism forces the Muslim world to acknowledge the West as the source of all knowledge, science and technology, al-Jābirī severely criticizes Western imperialism for destroying the culture of the nations it has colonized, while pretending, in place of Islam, to be an “international culture,” the culture of the civilized world.<sup>260</sup> Like their counterparts in the Middle East, Western imperialists, Madjid emphasizes, destroyed Indonesian cultures, through the policy of “divide et impera.” They discouraged Indonesia Muslims from practicing their religion by giving Islam

---

<sup>258</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 299-300; and idem, “Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 93.

<sup>259</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140-142.

a negative image, while making local cultures their weapon against Islamic practices.<sup>261</sup> The Muslim world, Ḥanafī says, has to fight against Western civilizational imperialism as the most dangerous threat of all, since the West at this stage keeps trying to devalue Muslims, who have strong historical roots, by controlling them, by imprisoning their spirit and creativity, while transforming their cultures into living museums.<sup>262</sup> Al-Jābirī, however, concludes that in Arab countries in general, imperialism cannot destroy Islamic national culture, for the latter has always been a living and “knowing” culture --whether as language, literature, religion or thought— that is deeply rooted in Arab feeling, mind and behavior. It was even the source in which Arabs have traditionally found recourse to counter any foreign threat, in particular the West.<sup>263</sup> On the other hand, neo-imperialism, Ḥanafī notes, is trying to control Muslims by hampering liberation movements in the Muslim world on the ground that the revolutions pose a communist threat. This imperialism even presents itself as the only guarantee against such a threat. Thus the concepts of freedom, democracy and justice apply exclusively to Europe,<sup>264</sup> a double standard that al-Jābirī calls the “other face,” namely, the “tyrannical

---

<sup>260</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 87.

<sup>261</sup> Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 307-309.

<sup>262</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32.

<sup>263</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 87.

<sup>264</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32.

dimension,” of European modernity.<sup>265</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, encourages Indonesian Muslims to learn Western science and technology while adhering to Islamic morality.<sup>266</sup>

Ḥanafī,<sup>267</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>268</sup> and Madjid<sup>269</sup> assert that the West used Orientalism to further their cultural and civilizational imperialism. The concept of “Orient,” al-Jābirī clarifies, was prominent in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and served to balance the concept of “Europe” helping to define European self-identity more exactly. As a specific epistemological field, Orientalism painted the “Orient” as an object of wonder (*al-gharīb* and *al-‘ajīb*), and served almost as *the* “science” of “others,” i.e., having “others” as its object.<sup>270</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, states that Orientalism did not originate in such European imperialist states as Great Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, Spain and Portugal, but in Germany, much less of an imperialist state compared to its counterparts. Germans were interested in studying Islam for its strong influences on modern European civilization; British, French and Dutch scholars only followed their lead, though they to some extent displaced them. The Orientalists in turn, Madjid explains, recruited Muslim students, who then became professors at

---

<sup>265</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 19-22.

<sup>266</sup> Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 15; idem, “Keilmuan Pesantren,” 19; and idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 179.

<sup>267</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 75-96.

<sup>268</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 28.

<sup>269</sup> Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 58; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 297.

<sup>270</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 28.



Western sponsored universities for “natives” like Cairo University and American University in Beirut<sup>271</sup> --a development seen by al-Jābirī as one of the primary success of the Orientalist project.<sup>272</sup> Orientalism, for Ḥanafī<sup>273</sup> as for both al-Jābirī<sup>274</sup> and Madjid,<sup>275</sup> is a reflection of the way the West views Islam rather than a method of explaining what Islam is. Nevertheless, Madjid acknowledges that Orientalism has to some extent served a useful purpose in introducing Islam to the West using Western language and imagery, resulting in the conversion of a number of modern Western figures, who made a considerable contribution to Muslim contemporary cultures like Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthall, Muhammad Asad (formerly Leopold Weiss), Frithjof Schuon, Martin Lings, Roger Garaudy, T.B. Irving, Maurice Boucaille and Yusuf al-Islami (formerly Cat Stevens). At the same time, Orientalism has made it possible for Muslim thinkers to teach at its institutions like Fazlur Rahman, John Woods and Robert Bianci all at the University of Chicago, Muhsin Mahdi at Harvard University, Mahmud Ayub at Temple University, Seyyed Husain Nasr at Georgetown University, Hamid Algar at the University

---

<sup>271</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 58.

<sup>272</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Huwiyya*, 134.

<sup>273</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 75-96.

<sup>274</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū' al-Nahḍawī al-'Arabī*, 27-28; idem, *Takwīn al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 13; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Huwiyya*, 133; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 168.

<sup>275</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 66; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 307-308.

of California (Berkeley), Ismail Poonawala at the University of Los Angeles and A. Üner Turgay at McGill University.<sup>276</sup>

Orientalists pretend to be neutral in their study of Islam, but they nevertheless, Ḥanafī asserts, destroy Islam by rejecting its claim to be a religion revealed by God. Instead, they reduce it to material factors like politics, economics and geography, by applying the methods of history, analysis, projection, and interaction. Another danger of Orientalism, Ḥanafī insists, is that Orientalists usually come to the study of Islam from other disciplines, since Orientalism is a by-product of other fields like history, geography, language, civilization and philosophy.<sup>277</sup> Although he agrees with Ḥanafī in his rejection of the European assumption that its civilization is the one that is most truly international,<sup>278</sup> al-Jābirī does not define it simply as a worldview hostile to Arabs, since Orientalism is not always homogenous or one-dimensional. Defining Orientalism in essence as “searching for the East,” al-Jābirī believes that Westerners search for the East for different purposes. Unlike those who did so to serve the purposes of 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> century expansionist imperialism, some were interested in the East as a “wonderful and marvelous country.” When the spices of the East came to be sought after, its cultures and religions began to attract interest as well. Some Westerners even searched for the East for the sake of their “spirituality” after Europe had lost or

---

<sup>276</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 312-313.

<sup>277</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 71-74.

almost lost its religious faith, while others came to it out of a love of knowledge, that is to say, to know themselves through knowing “others.”<sup>279</sup> Unlike Ḥanafī, who rejects the historical approach and replaces it with a phenomenological one,<sup>280</sup> Madjid encourages Indonesian Muslims to use the Orientalist principle of the “genealogy of knowledge” in order to differentiate between historical and a-historical elements of Islam.<sup>281</sup> Again unlike Ḥanafī, who tends to believe in the permanent state of Orientalism, Madjid sees it as having adjusted its attitude from one of subjective prejudice to one of objective analysis. Cornell’s Modern Indonesia Project, for instance, began by trying to downplay the role of Islam in Indonesia while highlighting Javanese culture, whereas McGill’s Institute of Islamic Studies and Georgetown University’s Center of Muslim-Christian Understanding have gradually developed into institutions that honestly apply objective and academic methods to the study of Islam. Marshall G.S. Hodgson (the author of *The Venture of Islam*), to cite an individual example given by Madjid, criticizes Clifford Geertz (the author of *Religion of Java*) for applying a colonial *strategem* that endeavors to lessen the significance of Islam in a Western colony.<sup>282</sup>

---

<sup>278</sup>Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie*, 6.

<sup>279</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 270-271.

<sup>280</sup>In this regard, Ḥanafī refers the development of Islam to Qur'anic revelation as idealism that had led Muslims to make history.

<sup>281</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 63.

<sup>282</sup>Madjid realizes that a number of “Islamic religious technorats” received their academic training at McGill’s Institute of Islamic Studies, and

While Ḥanafī,<sup>283</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>284</sup> and Madjid<sup>285</sup> are in principle unanimous in their condemnation of Orientalism as an obstacle to the renaissance of Islam, they differ in the degree to which they criticize it. Ḥanafī insists that the West, with Orientalism as its think-tank, return to its natural boundaries. Despite its claim to the contrary, the West is merely a local civilization that forced non-Western nations to recognize it as the center of world civilization. This international myth, in fact, was used to colonize non-Western nations. Nonetheless, the Western crisis in the twentieth century is seen by Ḥanafī as the beginning of an Islamic renaissance. It is within “the concept of the ‘failure of the West’” –to use Voll’s term<sup>286</sup>— that the Islamic Left has, according to Ḥanafī, gained momentum not only in pushing back the West to its internal and natural boundaries, but also in explaining its own local character as

---

jokingly calls them “McGill’s Mafia of the Indonesian Department of Religious Affairs.” Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 281 and 308-312; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 121; idem, *Islam Kerakyatan*, 151; and idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual dan Kebangkitan Kembali Islam,” in Rusdy Hamka and Iqbal Emsyarif ARF Saimima, eds., *Kebangkitan Islam dalam Pembahasan* (Jakarta: Yayasan Nurul Islam, 1980), 117.

<sup>283</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 74; idem, *Islam in the Muslim World*, 2: 353-365; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 13.

<sup>284</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 73; and idem, “Al-Ru’ya al-Istishrāqiyya fī al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya: Ṭabī’atuhā wa Mukawwinātuhā al-Idiyūlūjiyya wa al-Manhajīyya,” in Ṣāliḥ Kharfī et al., eds., *Manāḥij al-Mustashriqīn fī al-Dirāsāt al-‘Arabiyya al-Islāmiyya* (Riyād: Maktab al-Tarbiyya al-‘Arabī li Duwal al-Khalīj, 1985), 1: 316.

<sup>285</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 311.

<sup>286</sup>John O. Voll, “Islamic Renewal and the ‘Failure of the West’,” in Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, eds., *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 127.

reflected in local development. To achieve this goal, Ḥanafī offers occidentalism as a replacement for Orientalism. In contrast to the latter, the former is a new science that takes Western civilization as an independent object of study.<sup>287</sup> Al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī, criticizes Western thought from a different perspective, namely, that of an “outsider,” and not an “insider” point of view. Unlike the West, which has always considered its modern history to be a continuous exercise in self-criticism from Descartes up to now, which is itself a self-construction and a self-reconstruction, Arabs and non-Arabs must take Western thought as the object of their study, analyzing its history and relativity, investigating its claims, and removing the mask that hides its covert yet very real motives.<sup>288</sup> Like Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī encourages non-Westerners to initiate occidentalism, but Ḥanafī went beyond this when he published his *Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb* (Introduction to Occidentalism), an achievement that even al-Jābirī has not yet equalled,<sup>289</sup> while Madjid reminds

---

<sup>287</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 22; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 2: 354-355.

<sup>288</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 261-262; idem, “Al-Ru’ya al-Istishrāqiyya,” 316; and idem, “Al-‘Ulama wa al-Huwiyya al-Thaqāfiyya,” *Fikr wa Naqd* 6 (1998): 18.

<sup>289</sup>See Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb* (Cairo: Al-Mu’assasa al-Jāmi’iyya, 1992); and idem, *Islam in the Modern World 2: Tradition, Revolution and Culture* (Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1995), 353-365. For more information, see also, Nāhiẓ Hattār, *Al-Turāth, al-Gharb, al-Thawra: Baḥth ḥawl al-Aṣāla wa al-Mu’āṣira fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī* (Omman: Shaqīr wa ‘Akāsa, 1986), 153-163; Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭiyya, “Al-Tafkīk wa al-Ikhtilāf: Jaques Derrida fī al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu’āṣir,” in Maḥmūd Āmin al-‘Alīm, ed., *Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī ‘alā Mashārif al-Qarn al-Ḥādī wa al-‘Ishrīn* (Cairo: Qaḍāyā li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1995), 175-176; Yūsuf

his co-religionists to be critical in reading the works of Orientalists, he also encourages *pesantreners* (students in *pesantrens*) to study in the West.<sup>290</sup>

Zionism --for Ḥanafī,<sup>291</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>292</sup> and Madjid<sup>293</sup>-- is another external threat to Islam. According to Ḥanafī, it had its origin in 19<sup>th</sup> century Europe. He points out Bauer, who tried to liberate Jews in Germany through the State, a national and liberal state that he envisioned as based on German Ideology (namely, the awareness of self, society and freedom --which were German

---

Zaydān, "Al-Istighrāb: Judhūruh wa Mushkilātuh," in Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, ed., *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Ākhar: Qira'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* (Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997): 147-160; Yumnā Ṭarīf al-Khūfī, "Jadal al-Anā wa al-Ākhar fī Mashrū' Ḥasan Ḥanafī," in idem, 179-194; Majdī 'Abd al-Ḥafīz, "Dirāsa Naqdiyya li Kitāb 'Ilm al-Istighrāb," in idem, 195-214; Ṣalāḥ Qanṣuwa, "Qira'a Mukhtalifa li 'Ilm al-Istighrāb," in idem, 215-222; Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 27-60; al-'Ālim, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya*, 25-37; and Heidelbrandt, *Emanzipation oder Isolation*.

<sup>290</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 65-66; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 313; and idem, "Keilmuan Pesantren," 19. In his appeal to the *pesantreners*, who belong for the most part to the ranks of Indonesian Muslim traditionalists, Madjid in fact seems to envision them as potential neo-modernists, since the traditionalists, unlike Indonesian Muslim modernists, usually master Arabic and gain a substantive knowledge of Islam, but unlike the modernists, lack exposure to methodological approaches. Thus if *pesantreners* study in the West, where they will be exposed to Western methodological principles as the modernists are, they could come to represent the ideal Muslim thinkers, whom Madjid calls neo-modernists, for they will master Islam from its primary sources, while using Western modern methodologies. In short, it is these Western educated *pesantreners* who could continue his neo-modernist reform project. See also, Wahyudi, "Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi," vii-viii.

<sup>291</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 32; idem, "Hal Yajūz Shar'an," 96-127; idem, "Muqaddima," in Rūḥ Allāh al-Khumaynī, *Al-Ḥukūma al-Islāmiyya* (Cairo: Ḥasan Ḥanafī, 1979), 6; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa*, 128; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 481.

<sup>292</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 89; and idem, "Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya fī al-Taswiyya," 5-36.

<sup>293</sup>Madjid, *Pintu-pintu*, 74 and 78.

Enlightenment values). Marx, however, adopted a different strategy, believing that liberating all the oppressed people in the world would automatically liberate the Jews.<sup>294</sup> Although al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī, traces the origins of Zionism back to Europe, he asserts that Zionism ran counter to the trend of practical European modernity, since the French Revolution of 1789 did not apply the principle of equality to ethnic groups as whole but to individuals. The debate over French identity (held on August 20-26, 1789) thus ended with “La declaration des droits humains et citoyens,” and decided that French Jews were French citizens.<sup>295</sup> Al-Jābirī concludes that Jewish thinkers such as Albert Einstein, Sigmund Freud and Theodore Herzl established their Vienna circle to criticize the hypocrisy of modernity. Ḥanafī, on the other hand, insists that the Jews did not accept Napoleon’s decision to make them French citizens with the same rights and duties as other citizens had.<sup>296</sup> When Herzl went to Paris, al-Jābirī goes on to explain, he had to face the controversy over Dreyfus (a French-Jewish officer who was accused of spying on France for the sake of Germany). The court eventually released Dreyfus for lack of proof, but intellectuals demanded that his trial be resumed, declaring his case as a proof of Semitic sentiment against France. In his response to this anti-Semitic position, Herzl wrote *The Jewish State* in 1896, and it was due to the influence

---

<sup>294</sup>Ḥasan Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī wa al-Mas’ala al-Yahūdiyya,” *Al-‘Arabī* 486 (1996): 30; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 185.

<sup>295</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashru’ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 30-33.

of this work that Jews held the first congress of Zionism in Basel in 1897. At the congress they also established the International Zionist Movement, electing Herzl its president.<sup>297</sup>

This event, according to both Ḥanafī<sup>298</sup> and al-Jābirī,<sup>299</sup> resulted in a paradigm shift. It transformed Zionism from a spiritual Zionism, which sought to protect Jewish identity from the danger of imitation of Western nationalist cultures, into a political Zionism that looked at Jewish problems in the light of 19<sup>th</sup> century European nationalism,<sup>300</sup> out of which the project of a “Jewish national state in Palestine” found its practical expression.<sup>301</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>302</sup> and Madjid,<sup>303</sup> on the other hand, argue that Zionism was simply another form of Imperialism. In his attack on Syria in 1799, Napoleon, al-Jābirī states, called the Jews to support him against the British with the promise that he would return them to Palestine. However, the British defeated him and ultimately adopted the Zionist agenda for their own sake.<sup>304</sup> Although, according to

---

<sup>296</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī,” 32; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 185-186.

<sup>297</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 30-33.

<sup>298</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī,” 32.

<sup>299</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 34.

<sup>300</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī,” 32; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 180-181.

<sup>301</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 34.

<sup>302</sup>*Ibid.*, 30-33 and 37-38.

<sup>303</sup>Madjid, *Pintu-pintu*, 78.

<sup>304</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 30-33 and 37-38.



Ḥanafī, Western Jews approached the Ottoman Sultan hoping to buy Palestine, which was under the control of his caliphate, he rejected the idea.<sup>305</sup> Zionists, al-Jābirī adds, likewise submitted a proposal to European states to convince them that establishing a Jewish state in Palestine would prove fatal to the Ottoman Empire, hoping thereby to win their support for the project. The Zionists, al-Jābirī reasons, knew perfectly well that Europe regarded the Ottoman Empire as a double enemy; she dominated the path to the East and, hence, blocked the way of European imperial expansion, and was at the same time an Islamic caliphate. Her success in conquering a huge swathe of European land (*al-futuḥāt*) had made Christian Europe consider her their direct enemy.<sup>306</sup> In the end, of course, Zionism succeeded in realizing its goal of establishing a Jewish State in 1948 thanks to British help, an historic moment that Ḥanafī characterizes as one of the two most significant disasters in the history of the modern Arab world, the other one being the 1967 defeat of the Arab forces by Israel.<sup>307</sup>

The 1948 Partition of Palestine took place 30 years after the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in 1918. The “Sick Man” of Europe could not defend Palestine against both Imperialism and Zionism, since he had himself ceased to exist due to his defeat in the First World War. The Zionist state, which was

---

<sup>305</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī,” 32.

<sup>306</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashruʿ al-Nahḍawī al-ʿArabī*, 30-38.

<sup>307</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Muʿāṣira*, 1: 7, and 2: 5-6; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-ʿArabī*, 1: 7; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr*, 6: 91.

established on the ruins of the Universal Caliphate, could thus easily impose its own “Western” experiences on its new Middle Eastern life. Ḥanafī contends that it is an expression of imperialism that Zionism has come to occupy more land than it had asked for in the 1948 partition of Palestine. At the same time he wrote, Israel had not only annexed the whole of Palestine, but also some parts of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt,<sup>308</sup> a criticism that both al-Jābirī<sup>309</sup> and Madjid<sup>310</sup> echo. Al-Jābirī tends to accept the existence of Israel, while demanding that the Israelis return to the lands they occupied before their 1967 victory as a prerequisite to the naturalization of Arab-Israel peace relations.<sup>311</sup> Madjid says that Israelis and their Western imperialist backers are too intent on confiscating and destroying al-Masjid al-Aqṣā, on which they are hoping to build a new (third) Temple of Solomon. The Israelis, Madjid insists, should be thanking rather than attacking Islam, for it was ‘Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb that allowed Jews to return freely to Jerusalem after the pagan and then Christian Romans had hampered and oppressed them for hundreds of years.<sup>312</sup> It was

---

<sup>308</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 180-181.

<sup>309</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 33.

<sup>310</sup>Madjid, *Pintu-pintu*, 78.

<sup>311</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya fi al-Taswiyya,” 8.

<sup>312</sup>Madjid, *Pintu-pintu*, 78; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 29-30; and idem, “Al-Quds (Yerusalem): Tanah Kelahiran Para Nabi,” in Nurcholish Madjid et al., ed., *Rekonstruksi dan Renungan Religi Islam* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996), 254-257.

also under Andalusian Islam, both Ḥanafī<sup>313</sup> and Madjid<sup>314</sup> add, that Jewish civilization achieved its Golden Age, during which era Jews developed to the full their traditional-textual rational sciences like theology and philosophy, their traditional sciences like language and grammar, and their pure rational sciences like mathematics and biology, all of which they wrote down in Arabic. Zionism furthermore represents an attempt to implant a Western pattern of modernity in the Arabo-Muslim world, which has resulted in the marginalization of the latter civilization.<sup>315</sup> In so doing, al-Jābirī concludes, Zionism totally contradicts its *raison d'être* by practicing the oppression that the Jewish people suffered in their European existence.<sup>316</sup> And yet, although Zionist imperialism and modernity are powerful obstacles to the renaissance of Arab Muslims, and for their geopolitical position in particular, both Ḥanafī<sup>317</sup> and al-Jābirī<sup>318</sup> are optimistic that this renaissance will finally materialize. Islam, they reason, survived the onslaught of Western imperialism and modernity, the lowest point of which was the defeat of the Ottoman caliphate in the First World War, age of imperialism is outdated and therefore no longer

---

<sup>313</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī,” 33-34.

<sup>314</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan*, 54-58.

<sup>315</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 32; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 181.

<sup>316</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashru' al-Nahḍawī al-'Arabī*, 33; and idem, “Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya fi al-Taswiyya,” 6.

<sup>317</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 183; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'āṣira*, 1: 7 and 2: 5; idem, *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī: Al-Mi'āwiyya al-Ulā* (1897-1997) (Cairo: Dār al-Qibā', 1998), 123; and idem, “Taqdīm,” 12-14.

a danger, as they see it. Madjid for his part shares their optimism, but on the basis of a different reasoning. Zionism does not pose a direct challenge to Indonesian Muslims, whereas in the broader context God has promised to keep Islam growing, so that if Muslims observe His commands (*sunnat Allāh*) they will receive the chance to lead the world once again.<sup>319</sup>

To implement the theories of both the revival of the traditional Muslim sciences and the critical response to the West, as explained above, contemporary Muslims –according to Ḥanafī,<sup>320</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>321</sup> and Madjid--<sup>322</sup> need a reliable means. Ḥanafī makes it clear that his project of Heritage and Modernity aims in the end to unify the Islamic sciences (*tawḥīd al-‘ulūm*) in order to unify Muslims.<sup>323</sup> Even so, he criticizes Muslims for weakening their own position through divisiveness, thus allowing Western imperialism the opportunity to colonize them.<sup>324</sup> Like Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī,<sup>325</sup> Madjid sees Muslim schism as a dominant factor that has led to the political defeat of the Muslim world. The unity of all Muslims is thus an essential step in solving the

---

<sup>318</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mashrū‘ al-Nahḍawī al-‘Arabī*, 33.

<sup>319</sup> Madjid, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 20-22; idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 93; idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 124; and idem, “Al-Quds (Jerusalem),” 258.

<sup>320</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 34.

<sup>321</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Al-Muthaqqifūn, al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya, [wa] al-Taṭarruf,” 7.

<sup>322</sup> Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 24.

<sup>323</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 172-176.

<sup>324</sup> Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 34; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 35.

problem and then accelerating the achievement of the Islamic renaissance.<sup>326</sup> Unity, however, is not an easy goal to achieve, since certain ideologically fabricated Ḥadīths, Ḥanafī laments, continue to divide Muslims, who do not realize for instance that the “Ḥadīth of the saved group” (the one stating that “My community will divide into 73 groups, none of whom will enter Paradise except one”) was concocted in order to delegitimize such opposition groups as the Kharijites, Shiites and Mu‘tazilites for the sake of the pro-establishment group, which was Ash‘arism.<sup>327</sup> The difficulty of achieving Arab unity, al-Jābirī insists, lies in the fact that Arabs tend to deny their real life, while depending on blessing.<sup>328</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, believes that Islamic brotherhood is a central concept, but that contemporary Muslims should view it in the light of the Qur’ān and the Sunna.<sup>329</sup> Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid all emphasize that pluralism is one of God’s laws for human beings. When Muslims themselves interpret the Qur’ān and the Sunna in accordance with their own perspective, this tends to enrich Islamic civilization; indeed, they concur in stating that the disagreement of Muslims is a grace (*ikhtilāf ummati*)

---

<sup>325</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 75; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 203.

<sup>326</sup> Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 24.

<sup>327</sup> Ḥanafī, *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra*, 5: 393-407; and idem, *Al-Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 6.

<sup>328</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 212.

<sup>329</sup> Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 24; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 119.

*rahma*). Thus the unity of all Muslims --for Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid-- does not imply that Muslims are monolithic in all their views.

Basing himself on the aforementioned fact, Ḥanafī calls for dialogue between all Islamic schools of thought, whose proponents he characterizes as “Brothers in Allāh,” in order to unite on points of agreement, while respecting one another on points of disagreement. Therefore, while the Islamic Left does not consider any Muslims as infidel, it calls them to adopt the *kalimat al-sawā*’ (meeting point), the least criterion of which is Egyptian national unity. The Islamic Left also directs its call for dialogue to “Brothers in Nation” –whom he enumerates as Egyptian Liberals, Marxists, and Nasserists, since the Islamic Left shares their goals of achieving freedom, democracy and social justice, although by different means. Unlike those who subscribe more to foreign, Western values, the Islamic Left starts from the Islamic heritage, ensuring that its future remains as a continuation of its past and that its present is firmly set in the course of history.<sup>330</sup> Al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī, insists that his fellow Arabs return to their real life. They should regard Arab unity as a historical fact in the sense that they should base their unity on interests (*al-maṣlaḥa*) and agreement (*al-tarāḍī*) on the one hand, while accelerating the Arab objective of co-existence, co-operation and harmony between Arab states on the other.<sup>331</sup>

---

<sup>330</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 42-43; idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 6-23; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 325; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 35.

<sup>331</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 212.

Madjid, like both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, encourages Indonesian Muslims to find the *kalimat al-sawā'* among themselves, while leaving their disagreements behind. On the national level, Madjid considers Pancasila (the state philosophy of Indonesia) as the *kalimat al-sawā'* uniting different Muslim groups on the one hand and Muslim and non-Muslim Indonesians on the other, particularly Protestants and Catholics.<sup>332</sup> Thus the unity of all Muslims --for Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid— consists in the unity in diversity, by which Muslim countries contribute to helping each other solve their common problems at an international level. Nonetheless, unlike both al-Jābirī and Madjid, Ḥanafī still insists on the unity of all Muslims, a kind of pan-Islamism, as a means of countering Western imperialism.<sup>333</sup>

To sum up, finding the solution to the decline of Islam in the modern world is a concern that links Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid. They are alike in attempting to implement reform from “within” their respective ideological and even national positions by striving to revive such forgotten principles of Islam as rationalism, experimentalism, equilibrism, praxism, and egalitarianism within the Islamic tradition. In geo-political terms, however, al-Jābirī implicitly sees Morocco as the new center of the Muslim world, in

---

<sup>332</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 110-111; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 24-34; idem, “Islam di Indonesia dan Potensinya sebagai Sumber Substansiasi Ideologi dan Etos Nasional,” in Nurcholish Madjid et al., eds., *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* (Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994), 577-578; and idem, *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan*, 3-21.

<sup>333</sup>Ḥanafī, “Muqaddima,” 13-14; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 35.

contradistinction to Ḥanafī, who explicitly makes Egypt the center of his international Islamic reform, and Madjid, who focuses on Indonesia's peripheral role. Al-Jābirī after all attributes the weaknesses of Arab Islamic civilization to non-Moroccan elements. Thus "Western" (*Maghrib*) Muslim philosophers as Ibn Rushd and al-Shāṭibī, he reasons, provided a more rational response than "Eastern" (*Mashriq*) Muslim philosophers as Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī, in that the former championed demonstrative experimentalism (*al-burhānī*) against the textualism (*al-bayānī*, which includes *fiqh*, *uṣūl al-fiqh* and *'ilm kalām*, to name few) and irrationalism (*al-'irfānī*, i.e., Shiism and sufism) of the "Easterners."<sup>334</sup> Encouraging his fellow Arabs to repeat the geo-epistemological rupture that their "Western" predecessors had effected with respect to their "Eastern" rivals, in order to restore the demonstrative experimentalism of the "Westerners" to the whole of the Arab world, al-Jābirī champions the superiority of a Moroccan --over an Egyptian-- centred Arab civilization.<sup>335</sup> Indeed, since Andalusia --home to the largest share of the "Western" heritage-- is now in Christian hands, Morocco is the only heir to

---

<sup>334</sup>The contrast between the "Eastern" and the "Western" epistemology is that while the former is "un travail d'interprétation," the latter is "un travail de production" --to use Labdaoui's phrases. Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 124.

<sup>335</sup>Al-Jābirī ideologically glorifies every product and method brought out by Aristotelian and Maghribi ["Western"] practice, while depreciating all those produced by "Eastern" and gnostic (*'irfānī*) thought. Muḥammad, *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabī fī Mīzān*, 160. It is against al-Jābirī's "racist" and ideological epistemological break that Tarābīshī wrote his *Waḥdat al-'Aql al-'Arabī al-Islāmī* (The Unity of the Arabo-Islamic Mind) (London: Dār al-Sāqī, 2002).



this tradition, and, hence is the only legitimate candidate to lead Arab Islamic civilization forward. It is this “Western” demonstrative experimentalism, he implies, that will make it easier for Morocco to interact with the modern scientism of the West.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid consider the West as the most powerful “outside” obstacle to the future renaissance of Islam. Neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid supports Ḥanafī’s suggestion that Muslims revolt against the West, but all three thinkers acknowledge that Muslims need to learn from its strengths, while avoiding its weaknesses. Majid offers a more practical solution, since he believes that technological superiority was the source of the strength of the *salaf* (early “orthodox” Muslim) generation. Making technological superiority the linking point between the *salaf* then and the West in the present day, Madjid tries to show what is lacking in Muslim heritage compared to its Western counterpart with all its technological might. At the same time, Madjid acknowledges the fact that, in their original political confrontation, Muslims succeeded in taking a huge number of Christian and, hence, Western lands, an achievement that both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī preferred to call *fath* (liberation for the purposes of the call to Islam) instead of conquest. One implication of this is that, whereas the West has failed to retake their “ancient” lands. Muslims –or at least Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī-- have to stop accusing the West of colonialism, since otherwise they might be obliged to return the Christian lands they have been occupying since they took them in the classical age.

Likewise, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid see Orientalism as a think tank of Western imperialism that continues to pose a cultural challenge to the Muslim world, but they differ in some respects. Unlike Ḥanafī, for instance, al-Jābirī and Madjid see Orientalism as changing. On the other hand, while both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī suggest that Muslims establish Occidentalism to counter Orientalism, Madjid encourages Indonesian Muslims, and even the most traditionalist among them, to study Islam in the West, since Orientalism can also serve as a means of improving the Muslim understanding of Islam and introduce their religion to the West and, hence, the whole world. Both al-Jābirī and Ḥanafī warn against the threat that Zionism poses to the Muslim world, whereas Madjid does not see its immediate relevance to Indonesia. And although they agree with Ḥanafī on the unity of the Muslim world as the key factor in forestalling Muslim political defeat, neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid believes in Pan-Islamism. It is, therefore, possible to say that the subject matters of all three thinkers center on discussion of the same points --strikingly so. In general there is broad agreement on both traditional Islamic historical matters and on modern phenomena affecting the Muslim world. Their differences are only nuances, merely interpretation in personal and national contexts. This shows clearly that the slogan “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna” to which all three subscribe, is based on a congruent worldview. We will see in the next chapter their actual response to the meaning of the slogan itself.

### Chapter III

#### The Hermeneutics of the Return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna

This chapter will compare Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna in the light of Ḥanafī's "Theory of Interpretation." It is the last step in his reform project, since it completes the process of reconstructing Islamic civilization based on two earlier stages.<sup>1</sup> In his own words, the theory of interpretation is thus "a theory that determines the relation between revelation and reality –let us say between religion and the world, or more appropriately between Allāh and human beings,"<sup>2</sup> by which he repositions revelation as both the source and object of knowledge. This new kind of interpretation will, Ḥanafī contends, become the foundation of the Islamic reform movement and legitimize the destruction of all other interpretations that try to defend the status quo, hamper social change, or halt the historical process<sup>3</sup> --a position that on the whole reminds one of Georg Lukács' (1885-1971) "standpoint of the proletariat,"<sup>4</sup> which in its

---

<sup>1</sup>They are "Our Attitude towards the Classical Heritage" and "Our Attitude towards the Western Heritage," respectively.

<sup>2</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 177. See also, idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-78; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 409.

<sup>3</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 185; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140-141.

<sup>4</sup>Anthony Mansueto, "From Hermeneutical Circle to the Dialectical Spiral Philosophy and Ideological Criticism," [www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/1593/doc/episteme/hcde.html](http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/1593/doc/episteme/hcde.html) (accessed March 13, 2001), 6.

Egyptian manifestation Fu'ād Zakariyā calls absolutism.<sup>5</sup> Ḥanafī's Islamic Left, for al-Bābarī,<sup>6</sup> advocates the worldview embodied in Nasser's *Al-Mithāq* (Manifesto),<sup>7</sup> a reasonable analysis since Ḥanafī himself translates *al-ḥizb al-ṭalī'ī* ("vanguard party," which he designates as the backbone of his Islamic Left) into "proletariat party."<sup>8</sup> Seeing the theory of interpretation as conforming to, in effect, the logic of revelation, Ḥanafī tries to reconstruct Islamic universal civilization, relying on what Hans Küng calls the "liberating role of Scripture."<sup>9</sup>

---

<sup>5</sup>Fu'ād Zakariyā, *Al-Ḥaqīqa wa al-Wahm fī al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya al-Mu'aṣira* (Cairo: Dār al-Qibā', 1998), 36-37.

<sup>6</sup>Al-Barbarī, *Ishkalīyyat al-Turāth*, 177.

<sup>7</sup>Jamāl 'Abd al-Nāṣir, *Al-Mithāq* (Cairo: al-Dār al-Qawmiyya li al-Ṭibā'a, 1962).

<sup>8</sup>In other words, the Islamic Left is a combination of Nasserism and Muslim Brotherhood ideals. Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 128-146; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 116; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 629-630 and 639; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 3: 112-141; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 2: 54. See also, Wahyudi, "Hasan Hanafi: Mujaddid Abad ke-15?," xv-xvi; idem, "Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi," iii-iv; and idem, "Senam Hermeneutika bersama Hasan Hanafi," [A foreword to] Hasan Hanafi, *Sendi-sendi Hermeneutika: Membumikan Tafsir Revolusioner*, translated by Yudian Wahyudi and Hamdiah Latif (Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press in collaboration with Pesantren Pasca Sarjana Bismillah Press, 2002), v-vi. However, in 2001 Ḥanafī said that his Islamic Left was neither influenced by Marxism nor by Socialism. See *Tempo* No. 14/XXX/4-10 Juni 2001. On Ḥanafī's seemingly contradictory stance, see, for example, al-'Ālim, *Al-Wa'y wa al-Wa'y al-Zā'if*, 79; and idem, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya*, 49-58 as al-'Ālim's response to Jūrjī Ṭarābīshī's *Al-Muthaqqifūn al-'Arab wa al-Turāth: Al-Taḥlīl al-Nafsī li-'Uṣāb Jama'ī* (N.p.: Dār al-Rays, 1991).

<sup>9</sup>Hans Küng, "A New Basic Method for Theology: Divergences and Convergencies," in Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future*, translated by Margaret Köhl (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 448.

Basing his theory of interpretation on a direct intuition of the present state of human society, Ḥanafī<sup>10</sup> --in line with al-Jābirī<sup>11</sup> and Madjid<sup>12</sup>-- declares the slogan of “Back to the Qur’ān and the Sunna,” which Egyptian reformists such as ‘Abduh and Riḍā revived in modern times, to be at an impasse. For him, its solution to the modern problems facing the Muslim world always looks back at a past reflected in the experiences of the first four generations of Muslims, whose leaders steadily declined in authority from the Prophet to his Companions (*al-ṣaḥāba*), to the Followers of the Companions (*al-tābi‘ūn*) and to the followers of the Followers of the Companions (*tābi‘ū al-tābi‘īn*), respectively.<sup>13</sup> The slogan, Ḥanafī points out, has every potential of isolating the Muslim world from the present, since it is all at once a kind of escapism, rejectionism and romanticism, while its supporters are what al-Jābirī calls rejectionist fundamentalists (*al-salafiyyūn al-rāfiḍūn*).<sup>14</sup> Instead of interacting with the present, the slogan takes refuge in the golden age of Islam by making and, hence, isolating, a certain period of Islamic history as its

---

<sup>10</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 183.

<sup>11</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ishkāliyyāt al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir*, 10; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 104; and idem, *Naḥn wa al-Turāth*, 13.

<sup>12</sup>Madjid, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 104, 109 and 124; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 249.

<sup>13</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 183; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 156-157; idem, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī Miṣr*, 10; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 87-88; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 284.

<sup>14</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ishkāliyyāt al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir*, 10; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 44; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 30.

foundation.<sup>15</sup> Those who limit themselves to this stance are furthermore defined by al-Jābirī as falling into the category of moderate fundamentalists (*al-salafiyyūn al-mu'tadilūn*).<sup>16</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, predicts that the current Indonesian version of the slogan will end up an empty shell if its advocates simply repeat it as their mantra (*wird*) or at best consider it an *ad hoc* reform program for the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam organizations.<sup>17</sup>

On the other hand, some pro-establishment figures, according to Ḥanafī's dialectical materialist analysis, use the slogan as an ideological weapon to defend the status quo and even to avoid having to respond to changes in the name of scripture. Shaykh Muṣṭafā al-Ghānimī al-Taftāzānī, to cite one of Ḥanafī's examples, used the verse "And Allah hath favoured some of you above others in provision" (Q. 16: 71)<sup>18</sup> to attack revolutionary movements like the Egyptian Socialist Party upon its foundation in 1921, accusing every natural orientation of being nothing other than atheism and materialism.<sup>19</sup> Al-Jābirī, moreover, finds salafism ideologically limited to the

---

<sup>15</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'āṣira*, 1: 183.

<sup>16</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ishkalīyyāt al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir*, 10; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 104; idem, *Naḥn wa al-Turāth*, 13; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 44.

<sup>17</sup>Madjid, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 104, 109 and 124; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 249; and idem, "Abduhisme Pak Harun," 104.

<sup>18</sup>The translation is taken from *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'an* by Mohammad Marmaduke Pickthal (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 1996), 199.

<sup>19</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'āṣira*, 1: 183; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; 2: 34; and idem, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī al-Miṣr*, 63. For more

project of reviving heritage, projecting the ideologically sought future onto the past. The movement thus believes in the possibility of materializing the past in the future. This, for him, is no more than understanding heritage from the perspective of heritage (*al-fahm al-turāthī li al-turāth*), from the grips of which fallacy he strives to liberate his fellow Arabs.<sup>20</sup> Madjid, like both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, recognizes the slogan for a return to the Qur'ān as a dominant phenomenon not only in Indonesia, but also in the Muslim world as a whole. He sees its emergence as useful in reminding Muslims that their decline in the modern world is due to their ignorance of Scripture. However, Madjid criticizes many Indonesian Muslims (as both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī do their respective Egyptian and Moroccan audiences) for taking the wrong approach in demonstrating their “new” love of the Qur'ān. For while the traditional Muslims rightly see it as a ritual and spiritual (*ta'abbudī*) process of renewal, proponents of reformist Islam, such as the Muhammadiyah and Persatuan

---

information on Ḥanafī's structuralist approach to the social class and ideological inclination of interpreters, see his *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 111-119, and *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 546-547; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 16. In addition, it must be remembered that “[t]he two most influential concepts in Egypt today trace their origins back to Islam. Both Arab Nationalism and Arab Socialism are presented to the masses as Islamic, and are explained as the revival of the great Islamic past.” Ali Dessouki, “The Mass Political Culture of Egypt: A Case Study of the Persistence of Cultural Traits,” *The Muslim World* 16 (1971): 16.

<sup>20</sup> Al-Jabiri, *Ishkālīyyāt al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir*, 10; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 15-17, 26, 29 and 104; idem, *Naḥn wa al-Turāth*, 13; and idem, *Wijhat Nazr*, 44-46.

Islam movements, use it to impose their literal and dogmatic readings on their fellow Indonesian Muslims, especially on their respective members.<sup>21</sup>

The solution to this impasse, Ḥanafī suggests, would be a return to nature (*al-‘awda ilā al-ṭabī‘a*), since nature is a source of thought and not vice versa. Revelation itself, moreover, is a return to nature as reflected in the *asbāb al-nuzūl*, indicating that revelation was a response to the call of nature and not a contradictory obligation external to it.<sup>22</sup> By returning to nature as the Qur’ān teaches, contemporary Muslims will expose themselves to the laws of nature, within which paradigm they will face truly human situations.<sup>23</sup> Madjid, like Ḥanafī, strongly encourages his fellow Indonesian Muslims to reconnect to nature by observing the *sunnat Allāh* and *taqdīr Allāh* at the same time. While the former consists of God’s laws in human social life, the latter constitutes His laws in human material life.<sup>24</sup> The realization of the need to reconnect to nature, Ḥanafī insists, is one of the primary reasons for the success of the West

---

<sup>21</sup>Madjid, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 104, 109 and 124; idem, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 104; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 249.

<sup>22</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, CCIX [sic!] and 309-321; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 185; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 15, 116, 136, 166 and 167; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 2: 29; 7: 69 and 108; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 56; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 17-56.

<sup>23</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 184; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 547; and idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 232-233.

<sup>24</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 26, 33, 34, 146-148, 160 and 164-167; idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxvi-xxvii; idem, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 20; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 33 and 160-161; and idem, “Pandangan Dunia Al-Qur’an,” 7.



after Spinoza had recognized its principles in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>25</sup> Ḥanafī's call for a return to nature, however, does not mean that he wants to replace the Qur'ān with nature. On the contrary, he wants to complete the former with the latter, since he takes the former as his starting point,<sup>26</sup> as do both al-Jābirī<sup>27</sup> and Madjid.<sup>28</sup> The Qur'ān, for Ḥanafī, is the main factor that has differentiated Muslims from every other nation (*umma*) and civilization in both the classical and modern eras.<sup>29</sup> It is an attempt to combine Martin Luther's *Sola Scriptura* with Galileo Galelei's *Sola Natura*, a combination of what Patrick A. Heelan calls "methodological or weak hermeneutics" with "strong hermeneutics,"<sup>30</sup> which is similar to Madjid's combination of Qur'anic, "natural" and "historical" verses<sup>31</sup> or simply a combination of vertical (*ta'wīl* or *ṣā'id*) and

---

<sup>25</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 184; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-78.

<sup>26</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 184; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-78; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 185; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 409; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 57; and idem, "Hal Yajūz," 97. See also, John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic Modern World*, s.v., "Ḥasan Ḥanafī," by Issa J. Boullata (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2: 99.

<sup>27</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Qaḍāyā fī al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 16.

<sup>28</sup>Madjid, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 105, 106 and 109; idem, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 340-341; idem, "Masalah Ta'wil," 11; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 226.

<sup>29</sup>Ḥanafī *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 175; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 156-157; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-78.

<sup>30</sup>Patrick A. Heelan, "Galileo, Luther, and the Hermeneutics of Natural Science," in Timothy Stapleton, ed., *The Question of Hermeneutics: Festschrift for Joseph Kockmans* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994): 363-375.

<sup>31</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 170; and idem, "Pendahuluan," xxvi-xxvii.

horizontal (*nāzil* or even *tanzīl*) hermeneutics, to use Ḥanafī's own terms.<sup>32</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, proposes the combination of religious (*ta'abbudī*) and scientific approaches to the slogan, while overhauling the current Muslim *Weltanschauung*. It is in this paradigm shift that the combination of *sunnat Allāh* and *taqdīr Allāh* will find its perfect expression.<sup>33</sup>

Before we proceed to compare further Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's responses to the slogan, it may be useful to look at Ḥanafī's theories of interpretation in the light of his hermeneutic concepts, and to do so it is necessary to understand first of all the two most substantial differences between Western and Islamic hermeneutics. In Greek and then Western Christian hermeneutics, it is the task of the messenger (the god Hermes/Christ) to interpret God's message to human beings.<sup>34</sup> In the Islamic tradition, on the other hand, Angel Gabriel (Holy Spirit) has no right to interpret Allāh's verbatim revelation, since he is merely a mediator between Him and the

---

<sup>32</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 34; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 409; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 547; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 57; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 9-11.

<sup>33</sup>Madjid, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 122 and 124; idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 80 and 231; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 33 and 160-161; idem, "Pendahuluan," xxvi-xxvii; and idem, "Pandangan Dunia Al-Qur'an," 7.

<sup>34</sup>Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 121. "The verb *hermeneuo*," says Vic Reasoner, "is used in Luke 24:27 where Christ interprets or explains the Old Testament. It means to verbalize, translate, and explain. This word, in various forms, is used in Matthew 1:23; Mark 5:41; 15:22,34; John 1:8, 38; 9:7; Acts 4:36; 9:36; 13:8; 1 Corinthians 12:10; 14:28; Hebrews 7:2." Dr. Vic Reasoner, "Principles of Bible Interpretation," [www.imarc.cc/reasoner6.html](http://www.imarc.cc/reasoner6.html) (accessed June 30, 2001), 1.

Prophet Muḥammad. Given his “neutral consciousness,” to use Ḥanafī’s term,<sup>35</sup> Gabriel dictates Allāh’s verbatim revelation. “L’authenticité de l’information,” Ḥanafī asserts, “dépend de la neutralité de la conscience du rapporteur.”<sup>36</sup> In turn, the Prophet Muḥammad, as well as all transmitters of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth, must, like Gabriel, adopt a neutral consciousness in transmitting the Words of Allāh. The Qur’ān, like all other scriptures, is an ancient text for its readers, and therefore entails the problem of psychologism (namely, the problem of bridging the cultural and time differences between an author and his readers).<sup>37</sup> However, the Qur’ān is unlike all other scriptures in that it is written in the “native” language of many Muslims, including both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī. Madjid however, for whom the Qur’ān is in a “foreign” language, argues that most Arab Muslims do not appreciate its eloquence, though he implies that both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī are an exception to this rule due to their expertise in Arabic idiom.<sup>38</sup> Finally, like other Scriptures, the Qur’ān denies the principle of “the death of the author” –a concept dear to many Western deconstructionists, since otherwise the theory of *maqāṣid al-*

---

<sup>35</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7.

<sup>36</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 45.

<sup>37</sup>Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, tr. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985), 153-154; Richard E. Palmer, “The Liminality of Hermes and the Meaning of Hermeneutics,” [www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/liminality.html](http://www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/liminality.html) (accessed February 18, 2001), 4; and idem, “The Relevance of Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics to Thirty-Six Topics or Fields of Human Activity,” [www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/relevance.html](http://www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/relevance.html) (accessed February 18, 2001), 1.

*Shari'at*, and even revelation as a whole, will be useless.<sup>39</sup> Differently put, to accept the principle of “the death of the author” is tantamount to supporting “the death of God” and, thus, falling into Nietzschean nihilism.

Hermeneutics, in Ḥanafī's phenomenological approach, is “the science that determines the relation between consciousness and its object, namely, the scriptures.”<sup>40</sup> Since this kind of hermeneutics deals with scripture, it is called by some *hermeneutica sacra* (sacred hermeneutics: *al-tafsīr al-muqaddas* or *al-tafsīr al-khāṣṣ*), forming a part of general hermeneutics (*al-tafsīr al-'āmm*).<sup>41</sup> Ḥanafī's *hermeneutica sacra* consists of three elements, all of which indicate that he, like both al-Jābirī<sup>42</sup> and Madjid<sup>43</sup> (though to a lesser degree),

---

<sup>38</sup>Madjid, “Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105.

<sup>39</sup>“In hermeneutics, intention is equated with being, since sacred texts were examined for the trace of transcendental will presumably conveyed by them. As the writer was frequently a saint, a divinely inspired rabbi, or a person touched by the gift of higher consciousness, writings were a reflective of his state of being, and also that of the Master Hand that guided the text.” Francisco J. Ricardo, “Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Promotion of Reflective Writing in Educational Software,” <http://netcenter.org/fjr/pub/QP> (accessed June 30, 2001), 9. See also, Chris Lang, “A Brief History of Literary Theory VIII,” [www.xenos.org/essays/litthry9.html](http://www.xenos.org/essays/litthry9.html) (accessed June 30, 2001), 2.

<sup>40</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 1.

<sup>41</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 528, no. 8.

<sup>42</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 16, 35, 38 and 40-43; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 96-102; and idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 197.

<sup>43</sup>Madjid, “Pandangan Kontemporer tentang Fiqh,” 388; idem, “Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual,” 113; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 250; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 108; idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 50;

is an exponent of what David Tracy would call “the new historically conscious paradigm.”<sup>44</sup> The first element of this hermeneutics is historical criticism, a process that determines the authenticity of the text and its degree of certitude. Ḥanafī also calls this “historical consciousness” (*la conscience historique*). The second is the science or theory of interpretation, which defines the meaning of a text and makes it rational. It is also called by him “eidetic consciousness” (*la conscience éidétique*). Lastly, we have “practical consciousness” (*la conscience active*), which is the process of realizing the meaning of the text as understood in the second step.<sup>45</sup> This third element is considered practical because it takes “meaning as a theoretical bas[is] for action and leads revelation to its final goal in human life and in the world [–that of ....] an ideal structure in which the world finds its perfection.”<sup>46</sup> While the theory of interpretation is the second element of Ḥanafī’s hermeneutics, I will take his hermeneutics as the starting point of the

---

idem, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 35-37; idem, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 7; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 13 and 231.

<sup>44</sup>David Tracy, “Hermeneutical Reflection in the New Paradigm,” in Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future*, translated by Margareth Köhl (New York: Crossroad, 1991), 35.

<sup>45</sup>Ḥanafī *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 5; idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 1-2; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 189; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 80.

<sup>46</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 1-2.

discussion below. Although both al-Jābirī<sup>47</sup> and Madjid<sup>48</sup> are “reluctant” to apply historical criticism to the Qur’ān, I will compare their general principles with those of Ḥanafī. The significance of historical criticism in the understanding of a scripture is primary, since no understanding is possible without the certitude that its content is historically authentic. The accuracy of historical criticism will, in turn, make it easier to pronounce on what is authentic practice and to bring to Muslims a certain “peace of mind” –to use Madjid’s term.<sup>49</sup> Ultimately, from Ḥanafī’s point of view, historical criticism will play a key role in the emergence of Islamic reform, as it has in the case of Christian reforms in modern times.<sup>50</sup>

Historical criticism --for Ḥanafī,<sup>51</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>52</sup> and Madjid--<sup>53</sup> is already a part of Islamic tradition, having been used by classical Muslim scholars in analyzing both the Old and New Testaments. Ibn Taymiyya, for example, relied on it when writing his *Al-Jawāb al-Ṣaḥīḥ li-man Baddala Dīn al-Masīḥ* (The Correct Answer to Those Who Changed Jesus’ Religion). Ḥanafī even

---

<sup>47</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 278. See also, Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 116.

<sup>48</sup>Madjid, “Taqlid dan Ijtihad,” 340-341; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 3.

<sup>49</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 4.

<sup>50</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Muqaddima,” 20.

<sup>51</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 180-185; idem, *L’exégèse de la phénoménologie*, 25; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518-519.

<sup>52</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 5.

insists that historical criticism is the first of three presuppositions found in the Qur'anic verses (and even Ḥadīth texts) that deal with Holy Books --the second and third presuppositions-- being eidetic understanding and mode of action, respectively.<sup>54</sup> In the West, historical criticism began, according to both Ḥanafī<sup>55</sup> and al-Jābirī,<sup>56</sup> with the Jewish Dutch philosopher Benedict de Spinoza (1632-1677). Yet while al-Jābirī merely refers to Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* in his proof, Ḥanafī has gone even further by translating it into Arabic under the title *Risāla fī al-Lāhūt wa al-Siyāsa*.<sup>57</sup> This was to incur for Ḥanafī accusations of anti-Semitism when Israel held up his translation as proof of anti-Jewish feeling in Egypt. Ḥanafī, however, insists that it is Spinoza who scientifically proved Qur'anic hypotheses (*mujarrad iftirādāt*) about the alterations undergone by books of the Bible and fundamental beliefs, and that it was again Spinoza who criticized the priesthood.<sup>58</sup> Al-Jābirī, when looking at Spinoza's work from the perspective of the relationship of religion and politics, declares it to be secularism (*al-*

---

<sup>53</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 269; and idem, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 99.

<sup>54</sup>Ḥanafī, *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie*, 25.

<sup>55</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 629-630.

<sup>56</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 5 and 12.

<sup>57</sup>(Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1971; second edition, 1981). Two years before the appearance of the first edition of the translation, Ḥanafī's article "Risāla fī al-Lāhūt wa al-Siyāsa li Spīnūzā" appeared in *Turāth al-Insāniyya* 7,1 (March 1969). The article is republished in Ḥanafī's *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣirā*, 2: 59-88.

<sup>58</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 630.

'ilmāniyya).<sup>59</sup> Ḥanafī though ranks Spinoza among the greatest “Islamic” thinkers for having shown Islamic thought how to move beyond its own boundaries.<sup>60</sup>

Accepting historical criticism as an objective science with its own foundation, Ḥanafī insists that it be completely free of pseudo-criticism. Theological, philosophical, mystical or even phenomenological criticism, for him, is anti-critical, for it destroys the results of objective and independent criticism by trying to conserve the traditional concepts on the unity, integrity, and inspiration of scripture. All of them provide new justifications for old traditions by deforming new science.<sup>61</sup> In his critique of both the Old and the New Testaments, Ḥanafī argues that it is historical criticism that guarantees the authenticity of scripture in history. Unlike his fellow Muslims in general, who in the first place believe in the Qur’anic verse “Lo! We, even We, reveal the Reminder, and lo! We verily are its Guardian” (Q. 15:9)<sup>62</sup> as a divine guarantee, Ḥanafī insists that neither God, nor the Angel Gabriel, nor religious authority itself, is sufficient to guarantee the authenticity of the Qur’ān in

---

<sup>59</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 12.

<sup>60</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 630.

<sup>61</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; and idem, “Al-Muqaddima,” in Benedict de Spinoza, *Risāla fī al-Lāhūtiyya wa al-Siyāsa*, translated by Ḥasan Ḥanafī (Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1981), 18.

<sup>62</sup>The translation is taken from *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an*, 191.



history.<sup>63</sup> Al-Jābirī, likewise, disregards theological arguments in concluding on the authenticity of the Qur'ān.<sup>64</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, takes the aforementioned Quranic verse as his starting point in explaining the authenticity of Muslim scripture. The verse, he reasons, is a consequence of God's making the Qur'ān His last message and the one He revealed to His last Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>65</sup>

Ḥanafī's first step in applying historical criticism to the Qur'ān involves classifying scriptural words into two patterns. The first of these consists in the words uttered by the Prophet Muḥammad as dictated to him by God via the Angel Gabriel and dictated by the Prophet in turn to the secretaries of revelation (*kuttāb al-wahy*) immediately at the time of utterance and conserved in writing until today. These words constitute the revelation in verbatim, since they did not pass through a period of oral transmission.<sup>66</sup> Unlike the Old Testament, which had passed through centuries of oral transmission before being committed to paper, or the New Testament, which

---

<sup>63</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4.

<sup>64</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

<sup>65</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 3; idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 47, 187 and 247; and idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532.

<sup>66</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; and idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135. By oral transmission Ḥanafī means "le passage de la parole d'une bouche en bouche en remontant au dernier rapporteur jusqu'au premier Enonciateur." Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes*, 30; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 27-28; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 165; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 413 and 518; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 58.

underwent the same process for a century at least, the Qur'ān, Ḥanafī insists,<sup>67</sup> was written down at the moment of its verbal expression on such items as stones, date stems and animal skins, although he fails to mention that it was also memorized *in toto*. Furthermore, as al-Jābirī<sup>68</sup> insists, not only did the Prophet Muḥammad order his secretaries of revelation never to copy down any of his statements that did not constitute revelation in order that they not be mixed with Qur'anic pronouncements, but he also followed 'Umar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb's suggestion to order his secretaries of revelation not to write down his words as he lay on in his deathbed so as to prevent Muslim division after his death—a point that Ḥanafī is careful to make.<sup>69</sup> In the later development of its written transmission, the Qur'ān --both Ḥanafī<sup>70</sup> and al-Jābirī<sup>71</sup> argue-- is again unlike the Old and the New Testaments in that it still contains the exact same words uttered by the Prophet, preserved in their entirety due to Muslim hermeneutic efforts to conserve its authenticity in the decades following the

---

<sup>67</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 27; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 413 and 518.

<sup>68</sup>Al-Jabiri, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

<sup>69</sup>Ḥanafī, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135.

<sup>70</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; idem, Ḥanafī, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 144; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 27; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 165; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518.

<sup>71</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

Prophet's death. Madjid argues essentially the same point,<sup>72</sup> while paying more attention to the role of the *ḥuffāz* (those who memorized the Qur'ān *in toto*).

This written transmission of the Qur'ān, states Ḥanafī, was conducted in accordance with certain rules applied to the written transmission of Islamic knowledge as a whole, like *al-munāwala* and *al-ijāza*.<sup>73</sup> Thus the *muṣḥafs* were passed down in succession from the Prophet to Abu Bakr, 'Umar and 'Uthmān, until this last person collected, compared and referred the *muṣḥafs* to each other, the result of which was later to become known as the *Muṣḥaf 'Uthmān*,<sup>74</sup> or what al-Jābirī calls the official standard Qur'anic text, in view of 'Uthmān's policy of establishing a "*lajnat*" *kuttāb al-waḥy* ("committee" of secretaries of the revelation) to determine the authentic version, while burning other *muṣḥafs* to prevent any contamination.<sup>75</sup> Madjid in turn calls it *Kodifikasi 'Uthmānī* ('Uthmān's Codification), using an idiom that Indonesian

---

<sup>72</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 4 and 10; idem, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 4-5; and idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532.

<sup>73</sup>*Munāwala* is "le passage du recueil de la main du maître-rapporteur à la main de son disciple. La maître-rapporteur donne par la main le recueil en disant : 'prends ce recueil et rapporte d'après moi ce qu'il contient car je l'ai entendu d'un tel.'" *Ijāza* is "la permission donnée par le maître-rapporteur à son disciple en lui disant 'je t'ai permis de rapporter d'après moi ce que contient ce recueil.'" Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 61.

<sup>74</sup>Ḥanafī, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135; idem, *Ḥiwar al-Ajyal*, 518; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 58.

<sup>75</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 279-280.

Muslims would be more familiar with.<sup>76</sup> The result was an accurate and universally agreed-upon version of the Qur'ān, al-Jābirī states, arguing on the basis of proof from silence that, had it been otherwise, there would have been a substantial body of literature criticizing the process and the outcome.<sup>77</sup> At the same time neither the Old nor the New Testament, in Ḥanafī's<sup>78</sup> and al-Jābirī's<sup>79</sup> eyes, meets the conditions of reliable written transmission, since their sources are, comparatively speaking, unknown. Historical criticism in the West, according to Ḥanafī,<sup>80</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>81</sup> and Madjid,<sup>82</sup> has proven that the authors of the Old and the New Testaments lived in different places, times, and circumstances, and that their compilation took some centuries to accomplish.

Ḥanafī asserts that the function of the Prophet, which is to communicate God's Words in verbatim, is in the first level of Words. In this regard, no other person has the same role as he does, even though he is simply a means of pure communication without any interference on his part, whether

---

<sup>76</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 7; and idem, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 5.

<sup>77</sup>Al-Jabiri, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

<sup>78</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 1: 27.

<sup>79</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 279-280.

<sup>80</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 1: 27; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 413.

<sup>81</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

<sup>82</sup>Madjid, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 99; and idem, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 105 and 110.

in language or in ideas. This function Ḥanafī considers to be the second condition of revelation in verbatim, the first being the absence of an extended period of transmission. It is these two conditions that guarantee the divine authenticity of the terms and meanings of the Qur'ān.<sup>83</sup> Both al-Jābirī and Madjid, moreover, agree with Ḥanafī on the function of the Prophet, but without explaining whether the communication is verbatim in terms of language and ideas, as Ḥanafī says, or whether it is in what Rahman calls “the Prophet’s mind.” Likewise, al-Jābirī is in line with Ḥanafī in arguing that the authors of both the Old and New Testaments, unlike the secretaries of the Qur'ān, were people who lived in different situations. They never met each other, since they lived at different periods of time.<sup>84</sup> The Holy Bible, Madjid further emphasizes, is no more than a collection of expert advice on daily problems, with the Old Testament being a compilation or collection of thousand years-old legends. He, likewise, contrasts this situation with that of the Qur'ān, which has not undergone any *tahriḥ* (change) --whether in terms of wording or the addition of false elements-- since it has been preserved intact since the death of the Prophet Muḥammad.<sup>85</sup>

And since the principle of verbatim revelation entails, according to Ḥanafī, that the text be written in the same language as its original utterance,

---

<sup>83</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 23-26.

<sup>84</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 6; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 165.

neither the Old nor the New Testament qualifies. Unlike the Qur'ān, for instance, which was revealed in Arabic and is preserved in that language, the Old Testament is conserved in Hebrew except for some verses in Aramaic and Chaldean, and the New Testament in Greek, whereas Jesus spoke Aramaic.<sup>86</sup> Nor is the Bible, according to Madjid and Ḥanafī, read in one and the same language, since every Christian group has its own vernacular version of the text when in fact translation cannot fully represent the Scripture.<sup>87</sup> Likewise for this reason the Qur'ān, al-Jābirī<sup>88</sup> concludes (in line with both Ḥanafī<sup>89</sup> and Madjid),<sup>90</sup> does not face the same problem of hermeneutics that the Bible does. Likewise for this reason, Ḥanafī asserts that the Qur'ān is the only Biblical scripture that can be interpreted on the basis of its original language and the application of its grammatical rules.<sup>91</sup> Ḥanafī's conclusion, which

---

<sup>85</sup>Madjid, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 99.

<sup>86</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 22; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 165.

<sup>87</sup>Madjid, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 105 and 110.

<sup>88</sup>Al-Jabiri, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6; and idem, *Takwīn al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 75.

<sup>89</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58.

<sup>90</sup>Madjid, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 105 and 110; and idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532.

<sup>91</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 416 and 427.

Madjid echoes, is proof that God has maintained the Qur'ān's authenticity as He promised.<sup>92</sup>

The fact that revelation was given to the Prophet in verbatim, Ḥanafī underlines, entails a differentiation between the theories of prophecy and hermeneutics. The theory of prophecy is vertical in nature. It deals with the nature of revelation as a communication between God and the Prophet and how the latter received the divine words. Hermeneutics, on the other hand, is horizontal, since its starting point must come after the Prophet has spoken, though historical criticism guarantees the authenticity of the words of God that the Prophet uttered in history. Hermeneutics deals with these words uttered in history and communicated from man to man.<sup>93</sup> Unlike Ḥanafī, neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid says anything about the difference between the theories of hermeneutics and prophecy, but in principle al-Jābirī confirms Ḥanafī's characterization of hermeneutics. After the Prophet Muḥammad died, some of his leading Companions, al-Jābirī recounts, went to war against their opponents in a conflict that had deep religious ramifications, although neither side ever accused the other of tampering with the Qur'anic text. In their struggle for instance against Mu'āwiyya ibn Abī Sufyān (himself a secretary of revelation under the Prophet Muḥammad) at the battle of Ṣiffīn, they said

---

<sup>92</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 10; and idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532.

“Qatalnākum ‘alā tanzīlih wa al-yawm nuqātilukum ‘alā ta’wīlih (We struggled against you to defend the Qur’ān and now we are struggling against you to defend its interpretation).” The statement, for al-Jābirī, means that the Companions had struggled against the Qurayshites under the leadership of Abū Sufyān due to their attack on the Qur’ān before his conversion to Islam, but now, at Siffin, they were preparing to fight against Mu‘āwiyya over his interpretation of the Qur’ān. Thus the conflict in the time of ‘Uthmān and Mu‘āwiyya, concludes al-Jābirī, centered around the “interpretation” (“*al-ta’wīl*”) and had nothing to do with the text (“*al-tanzīl*”) at all.<sup>94</sup> Madjid for his part observes only that, compared to the Bible, the Qur’ān is in a much better position, since one group of Christians will not be able to read the Bible of another, which is not the case with the Qur’ān.<sup>95</sup>

The function of the Holy Spirit in the theory of prophecy, Ḥanafī adds, is only to communicate the message from God to the Prophet, by dictating it, and not by means of inspiration.<sup>96</sup> The Islamic theory of prophecy is, therefore, in diametrical opposition to Greek and Western hermeneutics that assign

---

<sup>93</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 27; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 165; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 70.

<sup>94</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 6.

<sup>95</sup>Madjid, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105; and idem, “Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 99. See also, Smith, *Islam in Modern History*, 25-26, note 13; Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 5; and idem, “Konsep Muhammad saw,” 532.

<sup>96</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58.



interpretation of God's messages to divinities, Hermes and Christ, respectively. Ḥanafī says that the unity of the Qur'ān, unlike that of the Old Testament or the New Testament, is affirmed, since all the material contained in it was dictated by the Prophet after receiving a message from God via the Holy Spirit. Both the Old and the New Testaments on the other hand exhibit diversity instead of unity due to the multiplicity of their sources.<sup>97</sup> Al-Jābirī echoes Ḥanafī in criticizing the books of the Bible, but unlike Ḥanafī, he recognizes that some accounts speak of different *muṣḥafs*, such as that of Ibn Mas'ūd, which varied slightly from that of 'Uthmān. However, he insists, these differences do not affect the authenticity of the Qur'anic text as a whole. Even the different canonical readings (*ikhtilāf al-qirā'āt*), which are so well-known, do not compromise the unity of the text.<sup>98</sup> Madjid's position (which resembles that of al-Jābirī) is that even the Shiites, who do not like 'Uthmān for political reasons, recognize the validity of 'Uthmān's Muṣḥaf. Since the Qur'ān conserves all the divine words that the Prophet uttered, no one single edition of the Qur'ān in the world differs from another, even in the case of a single word.<sup>99</sup> In keeping with his principles of historical criticism, Ḥanafī argues that revelation is infallible if it meets the conditions of authenticity in history. On

---

<sup>97</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 20.

<sup>98</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 279-280.

<sup>99</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 4 and 10; idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532; idem, "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual," 105; and idem, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 5.

the other hand, it is fallible if it lacks these conditions.<sup>100</sup> It is in this context that al-Jābirī concludes that there is no room for the application of historical criticism to the question of the authenticity of the Qur'anic text, since it is hard to conceive of anyone coming to the same conclusions as those reached by Western critics of the Old and New Testaments.<sup>101</sup>

The second pattern of scriptural Words, according to Ḥanafī's classification, consists in the words of the Prophet himself. Unlike the Qur'ān's words, which were dictated by God via the Holy Spirit, the Words of the second pattern derive from the Prophet alone and serve to explain an idea or to make precise a modality of action, which in turn serve as prototypes for every time and place.<sup>102</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>103</sup> and Madjid<sup>104</sup> confirm Ḥanafī's second pattern of scriptural Words, a classification that Islamic tradition calls Ḥadīth or Sunna. According to them, the words of the Prophet, as in the case of the Qur'ān, will never contain error, since he was directed by and connected to God --Who would have corrected him right away if he had made a mistake.<sup>105</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58.

<sup>101</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 279-280.

<sup>102</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 4; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 58-59.

<sup>103</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 7.

<sup>104</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 3; and idem, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 348.

<sup>105</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 42; and idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 148 and 153; and Madjid, "Taqlid dan Ijtihad," 348.

All three of our thinkers agree on the standard division of this second pattern into words, deeds and consents, but Ḥanafī feels it necessary to add that they can never be the products of “dreams, night visions, ecstatic states or direct encounters with God.”<sup>106</sup> Ḥanafī then contrasts the Qur’ān with the Gospels in this sense. Unlike the Gospels, which mix the words of Jesus as verbatim revelation given by God with explanations of previous revelation which had never before been expressed, the Qur’ān is pure revelation and as such is to be totally differentiated from the Ḥadīth. Due to the mixture between the two patterns, the Gospels, Ḥanafī argues, present their readers with the problem of knowing where the revelation is independent of time and place (i.e., the words of the first pattern), and where it consists in applied revelation, guided and directed by the prophet<sup>107</sup> (or the problem of interpretation to use al-Jābirī’s term).<sup>108</sup> Therefore, unlike the Old and the New Testaments, which confront their readers with the difficulty of distinguishing between universal and particular messages, the Qur’ān presents its readers with no such problem. Compared to the two Testaments, the relationship between the first and the second patterns in Islamic scripture (according to with Ḥanafī’s analysis), is logical in that the first pattern (the Qur’ān) gives the general idea, while the second (the Ḥadīth) describes an individual case. It is the difference between

---

<sup>106</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7; al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 7; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280; and Madjid, “Taqlid dan Ijtihad,” 348.

<sup>107</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7.

general and particular meaning.<sup>109</sup> Al-Jabirī's<sup>110</sup> and Madjid's<sup>111</sup> words echo him in stating that the Sunna explains the Qur'ān.

Where the second pattern diverges most decisively from the first in the eyes of Ḥanafī,<sup>112</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>113</sup> and Madjid<sup>114</sup> is in the fact that it passed through a period of transmission. Ḥanafī makes it clear that the Ḥadīth presents a varying degree of authenticity compared to all the words of the Qur'ān, which are absolutely authentic,<sup>115</sup> and both al-Jābirī<sup>116</sup> and Madjid<sup>117</sup> agree with him on this. To determine the authenticity of the second pattern of the Words, one can examine the chain of reporters (*al-sanad*) and the report itself (*al-matn*). In terms of methods of oral transmission, Ḥanafī classifies the chains of reporters

---

<sup>108</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 6.

<sup>109</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 455-456.

<sup>110</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>111</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 3.

<sup>112</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7. Oral transmission, for him, is less reliable than written. Idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 21.

<sup>113</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>114</sup>Madjid, "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul," 26.

<sup>115</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7; idem, "Hal Yajūz," 99-100; idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 518; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 58-61.

<sup>116</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>117</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 3; idem, "Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 99; and idem, "Konsep Muhammad saw," 532.

into *la transmission multilatérale, la transmission unilatérale, la transmission par le sens and la position par le sens*,<sup>118</sup> but stresses that the first, namely, “la transmission par plusieurs personnes en différents lieux, de telle sorte que toute condescendance ou invention serait impossible”<sup>119</sup> (known as *al-ḥadīth al-mutāwātir*),<sup>120</sup> is the only transmission that offers an absolute authenticity,<sup>121</sup> since it, adds al-Jābirī, is totally in line with the ‘*ibādāt* and moral teachings of the Qur’ān.<sup>122</sup> Madjid echoes al-Jābirī in declaring the function of the Sunna to be that of explaining the Qur’ān, but he attaches a stricter legitimacy to the Sunna by defining it as a practice of the Prophet Muḥammad that the Qur’ān validates.<sup>123</sup>

Like Ḥanafī, who acknowledges that the transmission of Ḥadīth is subject to human error (due, among other things, to the socio-political interests

---

<sup>118</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 34-56.

<sup>119</sup>Ibid., 34. Ḥanafī adds that the multilateral information is “la transmission de plusieurs rapporteurs, les uns après les autres jusqu’à l’Enonciateur” or “la méthode multilaterale est un transmission rétrograde, à partir de l’auditeur jusqu’à l’Enonciateur.” Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 36; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518.

<sup>120</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280; and Ḥanafī, “Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn,” 134.

<sup>121</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 7; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60.

<sup>122</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>123</sup>Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 3.

of the reporters),<sup>124</sup> al-Jābirī insists that a sound Ḥadīth (*al-ḥadīth al-ṣaḥīḥ*) is not so much sound in content as it is in the sense that it meets the conditions set for it by Ḥadīth collectors such as al-Bukhārī and Muslim.<sup>125</sup> Madjid for his part therefore sees it as perfectly understandable that classical Muslim scholars should have established Islamic historical criticism (*‘ilm al-tajrīḥ wa al-ta’dīl*<sup>126</sup> or *‘ilm al-jarḥ wa al-ta’dīl* to use the standard terms in the sciences of Ḥadīth as Ḥanafī does<sup>127</sup>). Ḥanafī stipulates that in order to prevent all possibility of error, the multilateral transmission should meet four conditions before it can be declared absolutely authentic, for the tradition that does so “presents the highest degree of historical certitude. It is apodictic in theory and in practice.”<sup>128</sup> The first condition is that the reporters have to be independent of each other in order to eliminate all possibility of contamination. Applying this condition to the Gospels, he notes that its four reporters were not independent. The accounts of two of them, Luke and Mark, affirm the dependence of their Gospels on each other.<sup>129</sup> Madjid acknowledges Ḥanafī’s

---

<sup>124</sup>Ḥanafī, “Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn,” 135; idem, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 29; idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 59-60; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518.

<sup>125</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8.

<sup>126</sup>Madjid, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 26.

<sup>127</sup>It, according to Ḥanafī, is “une sort de critique morale appliquée sur la conscience du rapporteur pour déterminer le degré de son objectif.” Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 29; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60.

<sup>128</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9.

<sup>129</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 8-9; idem, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 38-39; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518.

comments on the Ḥadīth, but does not criticize the Gospels in the same regard. Rather, he reminds his fellow Indonesian Muslims of the varying degree of authenticity of the reports on the *asbāb al-nuzūl*. Since the reporters of such accounts often came from communities at odds with one another, including newly converted Muslims of Christian or Jewish background, some wanted to introduce their ideological precepts into Islam. Therefore, he suggests that his fellow Indonesian Muslims be careful about accepting any report of this kind, and to begin by applying the principles of *‘ilm al-tajrīh wa al-ta’dīl*.<sup>130</sup> Like Madjid, al-Jābirī reminds his co-religionists of the fact that classical Muslim scholars had criticized Ḥadīth since the age of codification (*‘aṣr al-tadwīn*), which corresponded to the second century of Hijra, and had come up with a system of classifying Ḥadīth into sound and unsound in terms of the chain of reporters.<sup>131</sup>

Secondly, a sufficient number of reporters, Ḥanafī says, makes it more likely that the report is authentic. Again he draws a comparison with the Gospels, where, as with some “politically” motivated Ḥadīths, three or four reporters are not sufficient to guarantee the authenticity of Jesus’ message.<sup>132</sup> Neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid is specific about this condition as Ḥanafī is, but

---

<sup>130</sup>Madjid, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 26.

<sup>131</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>132</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9; idem, Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d’exégèse*, 39; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 456 and 456; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60.

they do in principle fall in line with him in applying the principle of corroborative induction. Following the classical Ḥadīth experts, who based their argument on the number of reporters, al-Jābirī classifies Ḥadīth into two different categories. The first, *al-ḥadīth al-aḥad* (solitary Ḥadīth) is a Ḥadīth that is reported by one reporter from the Prophet Muḥammad, the certitude of which al-Jābirī questions –as do the Ḥadīth experts. On the other hand, *al-ḥadīth al-mutāwatir* is a Ḥadīth reported by a group of reporters (*al-jamā'a*), the certitude of which is beyond question, since the sufficient number of its reporters (in accordance with expert opinion and Ḥanafī in particular) gives certitude, while at the same time it is impossible for them to agree with one another in falsifying their reports. Moreover, al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī, believes that the Gospels were lacking in certitude due to the insufficient number of reporters, none of whom had ever met each other either.<sup>133</sup>

Thirdly, the degree of expansion of the report must, Ḥanafī reminds us, be homogenous over time. The propagation of a report from the first generation down until the (fourth) generation, when tradition would have first been written down, must be uniform through the four generations. The sudden expansion of a narrative in a given generation betrays the intervention of human will in the invention of this new report, or the intervention of human interest in the concentration on this particular narrative. The case of the fourth

---

<sup>133</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fi Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.



Gospel, according to Ḥanafī, is evident: more was known about it at the end of the first century than was known in the first generation.<sup>134</sup> Neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid says anything about this, but in so far as the Ḥadīth are concerned both of them agree with Ḥanafī and the majority of Ḥadīth experts that a huge number of such reports are spurious (*mawḍūʿ*), in particular those with sectarian or ideological content. In the face of such difficulties, al-Jābirī encourages his fellow Muslims to rethink their heritage as necessary, but at the same time he limits himself to his own expertise, namely, criticism of the Arab mind.<sup>135</sup> “The reconstruction of understanding the religious texts,” al-Jābirī says, “is not my interest, since I am not a religious reformer nor a propagandist. I do not have any interest in establishing a new theology (*‘ilm al-kalām’ jadīd*).”<sup>136</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, says that Christians selected four Gospels –namely, John, Mathew, Mark and Luke-- out of many and considered them to be the most authentic,<sup>137</sup> “...and order was given for the rest to be concealed; hence the term ‘Apocrypha’” –to quote Maurice Bucaille.<sup>138</sup>

---

<sup>134</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9; idem, Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 38; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60.

<sup>135</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8-9; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 281.

<sup>136</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8-9.

<sup>137</sup>Madjid, “Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 99.

<sup>138</sup>Maurice Bucaille, *The Bible, the Qur’an and Science: The Holy Scripture Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge*, translated by Alastair D. Pannell and the author (Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979), vi.

Fourthly, the content of the report must, according to Ḥanafī, conform to human experience and sensory perception,<sup>139</sup> and both al-Jābirī and Madjid<sup>140</sup> agree. And yet, unlike Ḥanafī --who stresses excessively his “modernist” point of view when judging that revelation has nothing extraordinary, supernatural or even miraculous in its nature<sup>141</sup>— they believe in the conformity of the Ḥadīth with the Qur’ān. Since the Ḥadīth cannot contradict the Qur’ān, both al-Jābirī<sup>142</sup> and Madjid would accept the narratives in the latter about miracle, which are in fact quite numerous. Although it is officially opposed to myths and legends, the Qur’ān, Madjid says, narrates Moses’ miracles in his rebellion against Pharaoh, as depicted in the Qur’ān 7: 122 and 126 as well as in 26: 48.<sup>143</sup> Like Ḥanafī, they strongly insist that the felicity of man depends on the rational organization of daily life,<sup>144</sup> but they do not agree with him regarding his stipulation that the nonconformity of revelation with the senses serve as a basis for rejecting a report. Like Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī tries desperately to retain the rationality of the Qur’ān and Ḥadīth so

---

<sup>139</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revelation*, 9; idem, Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 38; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 456 and 518; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 60.

<sup>140</sup>Madjid, *Pintu-pintu*, 92.

<sup>141</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 518.

<sup>142</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 7; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 256, 257 and 260; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280-281.

<sup>143</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 169-174; and idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 92.

<sup>144</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 9.

much so that he, according to Tarābīshī's and Ḥarb's criticism, tends to attribute any irrationalities or mistakes of Islam to non-Arab Islamic sources, including Shiism. In so doing, al-Jābirī thus exerts his Arab and even Moroccan centrality,<sup>145</sup> but still accepts the authenticity of the text of the Qur'ān itself concerning miracles. Ḥanafī seems not to realize that his “modernist” approach to the stipulation violates the essence of revelation, since the source of the Qur'ān is The Unknown, The Supra-Natural, as the Qur'ān teaches.

Ḥanafī says that the text of the report itself, contained in the second element of the narrative, or *matn*, must be given exactly and without any changes, since a diminution or an augmentation in the text, even if not essential, may give a different or extra meaning to it.<sup>146</sup> Neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid gives any specific details in this regard, but their stance is obvious from their insistence that the content of the Ḥadīth should not contradict that of the Qur'ān, implying that the content of a Ḥadīth report should be as strictly maintained as that of the Qur'ān.<sup>147</sup> In addition, Madjid demands that any *tahrīf* (i.e., diminution or augmentation according to Ḥanafī's understanding) be carefully avoided as much in the Ḥadīth report as in the Qur'ān, since the

---

<sup>145</sup>Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 118-119. See also al-Barbarī, *Ishkalīyyat al-Turāth*, 346 and 426.

<sup>146</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 10; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 519; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 61.

<sup>147</sup>Madjid, “Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105 and 110.

latter cannot (and al-Jābirī agrees with him) contradict the former.<sup>148</sup> Given that the relationship between the meaning of a word and the word itself is an absolute one, Ḥanafī insists that this meaning be expressed by this word and no other.<sup>149</sup> Madjid, in line with both Ḥanafī (who also says that any other word would give only a shadow, but never the same meaning) and al-Jābirī,<sup>150</sup> makes it clear that translation can never accurately represent the Scripture.<sup>151</sup> Although a multi-lateral transmission of the chain and the exact text of the body of the narrative gives the highest degree of certitude, the words uttered by Jesus (as recorded in the Gospels), Ḥanafī contents, were transmitted in terms of meaning but not in literal terms, as is evident from the fact there are textual differences between the narratives.<sup>152</sup> These differences, concludes al-Jābirī, were the natural consequence of the Gospels being written by different authors from different periods of time,<sup>153</sup> and even, Madjid would say, of their being translated into different vernaculars.<sup>154</sup>

---

<sup>148</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 7; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>149</sup> Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 10; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 519.

<sup>150</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 75.

<sup>151</sup> Madjid, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105 and 110.

<sup>152</sup> Ḥanafī, *Revolution & Religious Dialogue*, 10.

<sup>153</sup> Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 6; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 280.

<sup>154</sup> Madjid, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105 and 110.

Ḥanafī insists absolutely on the faithful textual transmission (*al-riwāya bi al-lafẓ* and even *bi al-naṣṣ*) of the content of a Ḥadīth as one of the conditions for its authenticity.<sup>155</sup> He stipulates that only those parts of the narrative written in direct speech should be retained, since the parts in indirect speech are not parts of the narrative;<sup>156</sup> on this issue neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid has anything to say. Instead, they tend to abide by the principles set by Islamic historical criticism,<sup>157</sup> of whose strictest interpretation Ḥanafī approves. Likewise, Ḥanafī,<sup>158</sup> al-Jābirī and Madjid<sup>159</sup> all highlight the humanity of Muḥammad, on whom God bestowed revelation at the age of forty years, resulting in a differentiation between his activities as a regular human being from birth to the moment before receiving the first revelation on the one hand, and those he engaged in from that moment to the time of his death on the other. Since beyond his prophetic function Muḥammad was a normal human being, his words in childhood or (theoretically) after his death, must be set aside from other reports because they are not the words of God's messenger.

---

<sup>155</sup>Idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 519; idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 61; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 369.

<sup>156</sup>Ḥanafī, *Revolution & Religious Dialogue*, 10.

<sup>157</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 7; and Madjid, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 26.

<sup>158</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 1: 18.

<sup>159</sup>Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 104; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 26, 33, 146-150 and 164-168; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 76 (no. 3) and 139; idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 62-63; idem, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 48; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 217; idem, “Konsep Muhammad saw,” 527 and 533; and idem, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 80.

Moreover, a child, Ḥanafī adds, has not yet attained the age of reason, whereas speaking after death is contrary to the laws of nature.<sup>160</sup> Following Ibn Taymiyya, Madjid classifies Muḥammad's actions into prophetic and purely human actions. Muḥammad's actions were infallible (*'iṣma*) (and hence, binding for Muslims) only in his capacity as Prophet, as the one on whom revelation was bestowed. On the other hand, Muḥammad, by virtue of his nature as a human being, was capable of doing right or wrong, while his actions in either case are not binding unless they are validated by the Qur'ān as prophetic practices.<sup>161</sup> Madjid, therefore, set a stricter criterion for rejecting any irrational dimensions of reports on the Prophet in this regard.

Ḥanafī's final condition is that the reporter be of a neutral consciousness in that, like the Prophet in the case of the Qur'ān, he has no right to interfere in his narrative by adding his own words, images, feelings, interests or interpretations. In order to be able to communicate the words of the Prophet to the next generation, as passively and neutrally as a tape recorder, the reporter must, Ḥanafī emphasizes, have a rational conscience; balanced emotions and extreme honesty based on piety.<sup>162</sup> Al-Jābirī's and Madjid's own support of the principles of *'ilm al-tajrīḥ wa al-ta'dīl* implies that neither has any problems with the conditions that Ḥanafī sets, since neither questions the

---

<sup>160</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 10.

<sup>161</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 3 and 80.

<sup>162</sup>Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 10; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 133; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 61.

validity of such elements as *al-‘āqil*, *al-bāligh*, *al-thiqqa*, *al-ḍabt*, and *al-juhd*. Given that an act of narration or *kayfiyyat al-taḥammul wa al-ada’* (to use the terms of *‘ilm muṣṭalaḥ al-ḥadīth*) occurs in three steps –namely, hearing, retaining in memory, and reporting-- a narrative, according to Ḥanafī, is authentic only if all three of these steps are identical, i.e., when what is heard is identical to what is retained, and when what is retained is identical to what is reported. However, the reporters of “political” Ḥadīths to some extent lived their faith and interpreted their reports in their own way, much in the same way as the reporters of the New Testament did. Mark, Ḥanafī explains, wanted to prove Christ was an Ebionite, while Matthew wanted to emphasize the messianism and the ecclesiaticism of his mission. John, on the other hand, wanted to prove the miraculous and supranatural elements of Christ’s message.<sup>163</sup> In the same way in the “political” Ḥadīths, Shiite, Sunnite and Kharajite reporters competed with each other in trying to prove the validity of their respective political claims, while invalidating the political claims of their respective opponents.<sup>164</sup> Similarly, Smith’s equation of the Bible with the Ḥadīth, rather than the Qur’ān, concludes Madjid, is an acknowledgement of the vulnerable authenticity of Christian scripture.<sup>165</sup>

It is thus certain that neither Ḥanafī, nor al-Jābirī, nor Madjid for that matter, doubts the authenticity of the Qur’ān, while they are unanimous in

---

<sup>163</sup>Ibid.

<sup>164</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 31; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 518.

accepting various types and quantities of Ḥadīths as authentic. In terms of the authenticity of the Qur'ān and Ḥadīth, Ḥanafī is the strictest and the most articulate thinker of the three, but neither Ḥanafī<sup>166</sup> nor al-Jābirī<sup>167</sup> distinguishes Ḥadīth from Sunna, since for both of them they are the same thing, though with different degrees of authority. Every Sunna is Ḥadīth, but it is as a whole composed of *mutawātir*, and thus *ṣaḥīḥ* Ḥadīth, only. On the other hand, the Sunna, for Madjid, is the Prophet Muḥammad's practice that, in turn, is legitimized by the Qur'ān.<sup>168</sup> Madjid is stricter than both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī in terms of the divine value of the Sunna, whereas they are equally puritan in their attitude towards the theological foundations of what Ḥanafī calls "Western Heritage." Their respective attitudes towards the Qur'ān and the Sunna on the one hand, and the various books of the Bible on the other, is most clearly shown in their critical view of the authenticity of reports based on both Jewish and Christian traditions (*al-Isrā'īliyyāt* and *al-Naṣrāniyyāt*). Neither Ḥanafī,<sup>169</sup> nor al-Jābirī, nor Madjid<sup>170</sup> consider these traditions valid in their

---

<sup>165</sup>Madjid, "Pengaruh Kisah Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 99.

<sup>166</sup>See also, Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 389.

<sup>167</sup>Al-Jābirī, "Qaḍāyā fī al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 174, 219, 225, 260 and 261; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 38; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 57 and 74; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Akhlāqī al-'Arabī*, 67-68 and 601.

<sup>168</sup>Madjid, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 3; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 120.

<sup>169</sup>See also, Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 21; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 83; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 412.



purely theological (*'aqīda*) sense unless these two external sources or *shar' man qablanā* (religions that God had revealed before Islam, to use the *uṣūl al-fiqh* term) can be seen as conforming to the Qur'ān and the Sunna as they understand them. Ḥanafī's, al-Jābirī's and Madjid's strict conviction that the Qur'ān constitutes the continuation and correction of the Abrahamic Scriptures at the same time leads them to make the Qur'ān their criterion in considering the validity and acceptability of the Jewish and Christian traditions in their respective reforms.

The methods to be adopted in returning to the Qur'ān and the Sunna are, of course, the most important aspects of the slogan, since the absence of a sound methodology will, as Rahman would put it, invite civilizational suicide.<sup>171</sup> Many Muslim thinkers, as explained earlier, criticize the supporters of the slogan for being unable to provide their co-religionists with solid methods, but they fail in their turn to go beyond this criticism by offering the proper solutions to the problem. Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are in fact like their predecessors in this respect, for they too are less than explicit about the mechanisms of returning to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. However, unlike al-Jābirī and Madjid, who do not concern themselves with questions of method, Ḥanafī makes the problem the starting point of his entire scholarly approach. His Ph.D. dissertation, *Les méthodes d'exégèse* --a work that Shahrough

---

<sup>170</sup>See also, Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 65-66; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 72-73.

Akhavi strangely fails to mention<sup>172</sup> but which Brunschvig calls “une grande aventure, celle de la réinterprétation totale des *uṣūl al-fiqh* traditionnels”<sup>173</sup>-- serves as the epistemological backbone to his Heritage and Modernity reform project, the third dimension of which is nothing less than the theory of interpretation. For Ḥanafī, the latter represents for the Middle East what Epistemology does for the West.<sup>174</sup> Since Ḥanafī insists that without a theory of interpretation (which is the second element of his hermeneutics), any real understanding of the Qur’ān will be impossible,<sup>175</sup> I will apply his theory of interpretation in the following pages to his method of returning to the Qur’ān and the Sunna, and from this perspective compare his position with those of al-Jābirī and Madjid, just as I did with the first element of their hermeneutics.

Ḥanafī’s method of returning to the Qur’ān and the Sunna, to put it simply, essentially consists in social interpretation (*al-manhaj al-ijtimā’ī fī al-*

---

<sup>171</sup>Rahman, “Revival and Reform in Islam,” 640.

<sup>172</sup>Akhavi, “The Dialectics,” 377-401. For further criticism, see Wahyudi, “Hasan Hanafi Mujaddid Abad ke-15?,” x.

<sup>173</sup>Brunschvig, “Préface,” i.

<sup>174</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 57. Hermeneutics is a crucial part of epistemology. See, for example, Hendrik Krabbendam, “The New Hermeneutics,” in Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Prues, eds., *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1984), 535; and Dwight Poggemiller, “Hermeneutics and Epistemology: Hirsch’s Author Centered Meaning, Radical Historicism and Gadamer’s *Truth and Method*,” <http://capo.org/premise/95/sep/p950810.html> (accessed June 30, 2001), 10.

<sup>175</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu’āṣira*, 1: 165-166.

*tafsīr*).<sup>176</sup> It is, therefore, thematic. Before we proceed, I will, however, discuss what he calls the [five] premises of the method. As a philosophical foundation of method, “[a] premise,” Ḥanafī says, “is not a mere presupposition, but a factual given, a constation of reality, a declaration of modesty, a recognition of the limitations, the affirmation of pluralism and the motivation for open inquiry.”<sup>177</sup> Al-Jābirī for his part is concerned with the problem of objectivity in the Arab approach to dealing with heritage; his aim is to modernize the methodological tools applied to the reading of a text, so as to make it contemporary to itself and to its readers at the same time. In this paradigm, a methodology is relative, leading to a relative and, hence, intersubjective and pluralistic objectivity as well.<sup>178</sup> Madjid, like both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī in their respective contexts, reintroduces some lost principles of Islam to his fellow Indonesian Muslims, many of whom still believe in the human capability of achieving absolute truth. Unlike them, however, Madjid proposes the idea of internal relativism. Given that pure truth is an impossible goal to achieve, and that human beings cannot always be right, one must, Madjid argues, dare to criticize oneself and accept the criticism of others at the same time in order to perfect one’s understanding. Since the relativity of the truth that one might achieve depends on the approach one uses, and since a problem needs a multi-

---

<sup>176</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 69.

<sup>177</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 416.

<sup>178</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 31-33; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 284.

dimensional approach to arrive at a solution, one must be open to criticism or further inquiry—<sup>179</sup> a position that both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī take as well.

In his first premise, Ḥanafī places revelation in brackets, neither affirming nor denying it, but reemphasizing his differentiation between the theories of interpretation and hermeneutics. Thematic interpretation, as a hermeneutic process, begins with the given (the Book) after its being given. While the theory of prophecy deals with the question of “how,” thematic interpretation involves the question of “what.”<sup>180</sup> Al-Jābirī puts forward a similar idea, which differs only in degree. Considering the Qur’ān and the Sunna as the primary sources of heritage, and not the heritage itself, al-Jābirī sets all previous attempts at understanding heritage aside<sup>181</sup> instead of revelation itself as Ḥanafī does.<sup>182</sup> Madjid, like both Ḥanafī<sup>183</sup> and al-Jābirī,<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>179</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 72, 91 and 265; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 41-42, 128 and 149; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 59 and 66; idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxv and xxviii; idem, “Masalah Ta’wil,” 20-21; idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 140 and 157; and idem, “Dialog Agama-agama,” 10.

<sup>180</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 416 and 427; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 70.

<sup>181</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 32; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 254.

<sup>182</sup>Al-Jābirī, according to Ḥarb, deliberately focuses his criticism on discourses that emerged and revolved around the Qur’anic text to avoid theological criticism, the time for which has not yet come. Ḥarb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 116. Indeed, al-Jābirī repeatedly stresses that Muslims do not need theological criticism, but the reasons for him are slightly different from Ḥarb’s conclusion. Al-Jābirī would allow Muslims to undertake theological criticism if only they could achieve findings different from those debated in the classical conflict of *‘ilm al-kalām*, a historical discussion that is long of date. On the other hand, Islam, unlike European Christianity, has an authentic Scripture that has never

considers the Qur'ān and the Sunna as the primary sources of heritage,<sup>185</sup> and yet follows al-Jābirī in bracketing all interpretations of the Qur'ān and the Sunna instead of the Qur'ān and the Sunna themselves, since all previous interpretations are, by definition, relative.<sup>186</sup> Thus the three thinkers are to some extent Husserlian phenomenologists, but with Ḥanafī the “purest” of the lot by virtue of his applying the principle to revelation instead of or in addition to its interpretations. In this regard, Ḥanafī, as al-‘Ālim rightly says, is an idealist,<sup>187</sup> for in keeping with Husserlian phenomenology he considers revelation, and not material factors (as Orientalists believe), to be have been the primary factor –or the certain starting point (*nuqṭat yaqīn*) in Ḥattār’s

---

changed, since the Qur'ān at the disposal of Muslims today is exactly the same as the original transmitted from the time of the Prophet’s Companions, codified under the auspices of Caliph ‘Uthmān. Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 278.

<sup>183</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu’āṣira*, 1: 175 and 184; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-78; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 156-157, 16, and 185; idem, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 46; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 409; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 57.

<sup>184</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 32.

<sup>185</sup>Madjid, “Taqlid dan Ijtihad,” 340-341; idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 105-106; idem, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 105; idem, “Masalah Ta’wil,” 11; and idem, “Masyarakat Madani dan Investasi Demokrasi: Tantangan dan Kemungkinan,” [A foreword to] Ahmad Baso, *Civil Society versus Masyarakat Madani: Arkeologi Pemikiran “Civil Society” dalam Islam Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Hidayah, 1999), 27-28.

<sup>186</sup>Madjid, “Pendahuluan,” xxvii-xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 65-66; idem, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 105; idem, “Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 96; and idem, “Masalah Ta’wil,” 20-21.

<sup>187</sup>Al-‘Ālim, *Al-Wa’y wa al-Wa’y al-Zāif*, 79.

term—<sup>188</sup> in motivating Muslims (*muwajjih li al-sulūk*) to create Islamic civilization.<sup>189</sup>

Having stated the first premise that thematic interpretation starts with, and does not precede, the receiving of the Book, Ḥanafī moves on to his second premise, i.e., the principle that the Qur’ān is like any other text whether sacred or secular. Since it is subject to interpretation, it is subject to the same rules of interpretation.<sup>190</sup> He is consistent in his criticism of both the Old and New Testaments for having become divorced from their original languages, which in turn resulted in problems of interpretation. On the other hand, though, he seems willing to allow the interpretation of the Qur’ān, a process that belongs to *hermeneutica sacra*, in the light of general hermeneutics. Such a stance may, in Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mabruk’s analysis, confront the first time readers of Ḥanafī with the question of whether his thought is Islamic or secular.<sup>191</sup> Al-Jābirī for his part proposes a structuralist diagnosis (*al-mu’ālaja al-bunyawiyya*), a process of studying heritage by starting from texts as they are. This involves not only setting aside all previous

---

<sup>188</sup>Ḥattār, *Al-Turāth, al-Gharb, al-Thawra*, 105 and 109.

<sup>189</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 71; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 353-365; and idem, *Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb*. See also, Wahyudi, “Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi,” iii.

<sup>190</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 416-417; idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6 and 58; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 412.

<sup>191</sup>Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Mabruk, *Muwājahat al-Muwājaha: Al-Munāqasha al-Islāmiyya li al-Afkār al-‘Ilmāniyya wa Kutub al-Muwājaha* (Cairo: Dār al-Thābith, 1994), 205.

attempts at understanding heritage, but also limiting interaction with these texts as a whole.<sup>192</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, subjects the Qur'ān to the standard rules of Islamic interpretation, while paying special attention to the Indonesian context.<sup>193</sup> “In order to *menduniawikan* [‘secularize’], to give a solid cultural basis to Islam in Indonesia,” Steenbrink says in summarizing Madjid’s arguments, “the local condition has to be taken into consideration along with other aspects such as the history, and especially the religious history of the country.”<sup>194</sup>

In his third premise, Ḥanafī categorically differentiates between a text and its interpretation,<sup>195</sup> a paradigm that both al-Jābirī<sup>196</sup> and Madjid<sup>197</sup> have striven to impress upon their respective Muslim audiences. Ḥanafī, however, insists that “there is no true or false interpretation, right or wrong understanding. There are only different efforts to approach the text from different interests for different motivations,”<sup>198</sup> a reversal of his 1981 position

---

<sup>192</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 32.

<sup>193</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 170; idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxvi-xxviii; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 115.

<sup>194</sup>Steenbrink, “Recapturing the Past,” 165-166.

<sup>195</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 176; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 57; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 22.

<sup>196</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭīyya wa Ḥuquq al-Insān*, 194-196; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 259 and 283.

<sup>197</sup>Madjid, “Pendahuluan,” xxv-xxviii; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 72 and 91; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 149; and idem, *Kaki Langit*, 59 and 65-66.

<sup>198</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 57; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 22.

on right and wrong interpretation.<sup>199</sup> This however is something that neither al-Jābirī nor Majid can accept: for them there are indeed true and wrong interpretations. To achieve an objective meaning, and hence a true interpretation, of a text, an interpreter should, al-Jābirī proposes, cut himself off from the object and the object off from himself at the same time, by having recourse to a proven historical critical method (*asbāb al-nuzūl*).<sup>200</sup> Majid, as Ḥanafī did in 1982,<sup>201</sup> bases his stance on the fact that the Prophet Muḥammad promised a hierarchy of rewards to *mujtahids*. Two rewards are to be given to the *mujtahid* whose *ijtihād* is right: one for the relative truth of his right *ijtihād*, and the other for exercising his efforts in trying to solve the problem facing him or his society. One reward, on the other hand, will be given to a *mujtahid* whose *ijtihād* is wrong, for engaging in *ijtihād* in the first place. Given that the latter reward was meant to encourage Muslims to exercise their reason (*j-h-d*, the root of *ijtihād*) in determining right from wrong, the real mistake, Majid argues, lies in the failure of Muslims to undertake *ijtihād* to begin with.<sup>202</sup>

---

<sup>199</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 29; idem, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 30; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22; and idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135.

<sup>200</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 31; and idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 194-196.

<sup>201</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22.

<sup>202</sup>Majid, "Pendahuluan," xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 65-66; idem, "Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 96; idem, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 80-81; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 41-42 and 120-121.



Essentially, a text, as Ḥanafī states in his fourth premise, accepts pluralistic and, hence, different interpretations, depending on the different perspectives of the interpreters. Since text is merely a form, an interpreter may very well fill it with content from his own time and space.<sup>203</sup> In other words, Ḥanafī –as he does in his third premise—adopts a Heideggero-Gadamerian approach to the text in stressing its subjective truth,<sup>204</sup> rejecting the theory of objective meaning as Wilhelm Dilthey (1883-1911)<sup>205</sup> proposed and supported by Hirsch<sup>206</sup> and Betti.<sup>207</sup> For both al-Jābirī<sup>208</sup> and Madjid,<sup>209</sup> as for Ḥanafī,<sup>210</sup> a text accepts a pluralistic interpretation in more or less direct proportion to the socio-political and cultural backgrounds of the interpreter. In addition, the

---

<sup>203</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 43.

<sup>204</sup>Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 194-195; and Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 397.

<sup>205</sup>Wilhelm Dilthey, "The Rise of Hermeneutics," translated by T. Hall, in P. Connerton, ed., *Critical Sociology: Selected Writings* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 104-116.

<sup>206</sup>E.D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967).

<sup>207</sup>Emilio Betti, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften," in J. Bleicher, ed., *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), 51-90.

<sup>208</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuquq al-Insān*, 194-196; and idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 259 and 283.

<sup>209</sup>Madjid, "Pendahuluan," xxv-xxviii; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 72 and 91; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 149; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 59 and 55-56; idem, "Masalah Ta'wil," 20; and idem, "Abduhisme Pak Harun," 105.

<sup>210</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, 29; idem, "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn," 135; and idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417.

level of difference of human understanding also plays a significant role. On the other hand, both al-Jābirī and Madjid, unlike Ḥanafī, are more inclined to the Hirschian concept of “author centered meaning” because, while Ḥanafī would allow an interpreter to fill the text with any amount of content from his own time and space, both al-Jābirī<sup>211</sup> and Madjid<sup>212</sup> place special emphasis on what Gadamer calls “fusion of horizons”<sup>213</sup> in their modern reading of heritage. Unlike Ḥanafī, who eagerly espouses the Heideggerian transfer from knowing into existential being, al-Jābirī tries to make an ancient text contemporary to itself and to its readers at the same time.<sup>214</sup> While for Ḥanafī interpretation is subjective or intersubjective (at best due to what Heidegger calls “prejudice” in existential knowing<sup>215</sup>), the meaning for both al-Jābirī<sup>216</sup> and Madjid<sup>217</sup> is “objective,” or so they claim at least when trying to dialogize their present horizons and the author’s past horizons (God, in the case of the Qur’ān)

---

<sup>211</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī*, 8.

<sup>212</sup>Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 106-107.

<sup>213</sup>Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 273.

<sup>214</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 48-53; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 193-197; and idem, *Al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī*, 8.

<sup>215</sup>Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 150. See also, Magda King, *A Guide to Heidegger’s Being and Time* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001), 6-8; Richard Rorty, *Essays on Heidegger and Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 10; and Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl,” in Theodore Kiesel and John van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 231-244.

<sup>216</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 194-196; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 40-41; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 47-59.

through historical critical method. As a result, the value of an interpretation is never purely divine, but a kind of divinely inspired human (*ilāhī* but *wadʿī*) value. Ḥanafī on the other hand explicitly states that “[T]he Qur’an itself, especially the Hadith, is a transmutation of human language.”<sup>218</sup>

Ḥanafī’s subjective approach to the text easily leads him to adopt a historical materialist approach<sup>219</sup> (or Habermasian critical hermeneutics<sup>220</sup>) in his fifth premise, i.e., that conflict of interpretation is essentially socio-political. Since interpretation is a value-laden ideology, it expresses the socio-political commitments of the interpreter. Conservatives may, for instance, use it to maintain the status-quo, just as revolutionaries may on the same basis challenge the established order.<sup>221</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>222</sup> and Madjid<sup>223</sup> also contend that the conflict over interpretation is mostly socio-political in nature, but they

---

<sup>217</sup>Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 106-107.

<sup>218</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-ʿArabī*, 1: 23.

<sup>219</sup>Ḥatr, *Al-Turāth, Al-Gharb, al-Thawra*, 179.

<sup>220</sup>Critical hermeneutics: “an outgrowth of Frankfurt School critical theory is an approach that claims that interpretation is constrained and biased by social, political and economic forces. These include biases that have been introduced by factors defined in terms of class, race, and gender.” “Critical Approaches to Hermeneutics,” [www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.html](http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.html) (accessed June 30, 2001), 1.

<sup>221</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; 2: 34; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 117-120; idem, *Qaḍāyā Muʿāṣira*, 1: 183; and idem, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī al-Miṣr*, 63.

<sup>222</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 47-56.

recognize that objective epistemological factors --like differences in approach or level of understanding-- can lead two different interpreters to two conflicting interpretations. And while Ḥanafī gets easily trapped in the confusion of meaning with relevance, both al-Jābirī and Madjid avoid this obstacle. Al-Jābirī, unlike Ḥanafī, achieves a certain balance by making heritage contemporary to itself first, which is an objective meaning, and then by making it contemporary to its readers, which renders it relevant to its audience or interpreters.<sup>224</sup> Madjid, like al-Jābirī, distinguishes meaning from relevance, by paying special attention to the original meaning of the words used in the Qur'ān through his historical critical method. Finding the original and thus objective meaning of the Qur'ān is the first step that an interpreter should take before transferring its relevance to his own time and space.<sup>225</sup>

Neither Ḥanafī, nor al-Jābirī nor Madjid, as I stated earlier, provides us with a systematic scheme for returning to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. On the other hand, Ḥanafī, the only one of the three who is explicit about the methods of interpretation, confronts us with a problematic systematization of his

---

<sup>223</sup>Madjid, "Masalah Ta'wil," 11, 16-18 and 20; idem, "Abduhisme Pak Harun," 105; idem, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 177; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 153.

<sup>224</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 47-56.

<sup>225</sup>Madjid, "Abduhisme Pak Harun," 106-107; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 38-41.

theories that he outlines in such articles as “Naẓariyyat al-Tafsīr”<sup>226</sup> (The Theory of Interpretation, 1967), “Mādhā Ya‘nī: al-Yasār al-Islāmī?”<sup>227</sup> (What Does Islamic Left Mean? 1981), “Manāhij al-Tafsīr ma Maṣāliḥ al-Umma”<sup>228</sup> (The Methods of Interpretation and the Interests of Muslims, 1981),<sup>229</sup> “Qirā‘at al-Naṣṣ”<sup>230</sup> (Reading of the Text, 1988), and “Method of Thematic Interpretation of the Quran” (1993),<sup>231</sup> all of which are to some extent summaries and extensions of his main thesis in *Les méthodes d'exégèse*. Ḥanafī’s method of returning to the Qur’ān and the Sunna seems to consist largely in social interpretation. While the standard classification of Islamic interpretation would consign social interpretation to the category of thematic interpretation (*al-tafsīr al-mawḍū‘ī*), Ḥanafī does the reverse, and subordinates

---

<sup>226</sup>The article “Naẓariyyat al-Tafsīr” forms chapter six of Ḥanafī’s *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 165-176. The title is a collection of three articles, which are “Hal Ladaynā Naẓariyya fī al-Tafsīr?” (Do We Have A Theory of Interpretation?), written in 1966 but unpublished; “Ayyuhumā Asbaq: Naẓariyya fī al-Tafsīr am Manhaj fī Taḥlīl al-Khibrāt?” (Which One Is First: A Theory of Interpretation or Analysis of Experience?), written in 1966 but not submitted to the journal *Minbar al-Islām* as had been planned; and “‘Awd ilā al-Manba‘ am ‘Awd ilā al-Ṭabī‘a?” (Return to Source or to Nature?), an appendix to his articles “al-Aṣāla wa al-Mu‘āṣira” (Authenticity and Contemporaneity) and “Mawqifunā al-Ḥaḍārī” (Our Civilizational Attitude), but one that was rejected for publication.

<sup>227</sup>See Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 5-48.

<sup>228</sup>The article was originally written in 1988 and published in *Ḥanafī, Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 77-115.

<sup>229</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 2: 648.

<sup>230</sup>The article was originally published in *Alif* 7 (1988) and republished in Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 523-549.

thematic interpretation to social interpretation. For practical purposes, I will, however, take his thematic interpretation as his method of returning to the Qur'ān and the Sunna, within which process I will resystematize his social interpretation in accordance with his thematic interpretation, since he himself acknowledges the latter as being the form of interpretation most capable of achieving the goals of social interpretation.<sup>232</sup> As a method, thematic interpretation, according to Ḥanafī, operates according to at least eight rules: (1) socio-political commitment; (2) looking for something; (3) synopsis of the verses concerning one theme; (4) classification of linguistic forms; (5) building the structure; (6) analyzing the factual situation; (7) comparison between the Ideal and the real; and (8) description of modes of action.

In explaining “socio-political commitment”,<sup>233</sup> (the first rule cited above), Ḥanafī makes a diametral distinction between the reporter and the interpreter. To preserve the verbatim authenticity of God’s Words, a reporter must possess a neutral consciousness, whereas an interpreter, who is not bound to the same extent by this stipulation, must in turn be subjective and consciously devoted to a cause. In contrast to a reporter, whose main function is to transmit God’s Words as they are, an interpreter is an agent of social

---

<sup>231</sup>This article was written in 1993 and published in Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 407-457.

<sup>232</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 117; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 104.

<sup>233</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 25 and 546.

change.<sup>234</sup> Both al-Jābirī<sup>235</sup> and Madjid<sup>236</sup> are like Ḥanafī in that they encourage their fellow interpreters to recast so-called “true” interpretation in an ideological perspective, but only after this has been objectively and scientifically reformulated. In his hermeneutic act, Ḥanafī achieves Gadamer’s moment of self-recognition, as John D. Caputo understands it, namely, “a moment in which the text or work of art says to us ‘that is you’,”<sup>237</sup> specifically by making his fifth premise (i.e., the conflict of interpretation is essentially socio-political) predominate in his thematic interpretation. By contrast, both al-Jābirī<sup>238</sup> and Madjid think first of bridging the time and cultural differences of the text for the reader. Both of them engage in a dialogue with their and the author’s horizons before they recast their interpretation.

Ḥanafī acknowledges the centrality of the problem of objectivity versus subjectivity in the course of interpretation, but absolutely dismisses the concept

---

<sup>234</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417-419; idem, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 6; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 184; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 358 and 381; and idem, “Hal Yajūz,” 99.

<sup>235</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 32; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Huqūq al-Insān*, 194-196; and idem, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 255, 295, 296 and 300.

<sup>236</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 43-49; and idem, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 106-107.

<sup>237</sup>John D. Caputo, *More Radical Hermeneutics on Not Knowing Who We Are* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000), 55.

<sup>238</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 31; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Huqūq al-Insān*, 194-196; and idem, *Al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī*, 8.

of objective meaning,<sup>239</sup> since for him “[p]reundersanding,” to cite István M. Fehér’s principle, “is a necessary prerequisite of knowledge,”<sup>240</sup> leading al-‘Ālim, Mabruk and Abū Zayd to criticize his preoccupation with the Heideggerian concept of “bring[ing] hermeneutics from a theory of interpretation to a theory of existential understanding” –to quote John C. Malery.<sup>241</sup> Ḥanafī, for both al-‘Ālim<sup>242</sup> and Mabruk,<sup>243</sup> emphasizes the role of reader at the expense of text, while for Abū Zayd, given that Ḥanafī engages in what he would define as a kind of coloration (*talwīn*) rather than interpretation (*ta’wīl*),<sup>244</sup> Ḥanafī might well be accused of *muṣawwiba*, a type of medieval Islamic legal relativism that Ḥanafī himself severely criticizes in some places. Yet unlike Ḥanafī, who severely criticizes “wrong” interpretations of Islam as

---

<sup>239</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 57 and 536; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 43.

<sup>240</sup>István M. Fehér, “Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, *Lebensphilosophie*: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers,” in Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, eds., *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (New York: State University of New York, 1994), 79.

<sup>241</sup>John C. Malery, “Hermeneutics: From Textual to Computer Understanding?,” <http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/jema/papers/1986-ai-memo-871/memo.html> (accessed June 30, 2001), 3.

<sup>242</sup>Al-‘Ālim, *Al-Wa’y wa al-Wa’y al-Zā’if*, 79.

<sup>243</sup>Mabruk, “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd,” 33-42.

<sup>244</sup>Naṣr Ḥamid Abū Zayd, “Al-Turāth bayn al-Ta’wīl wa al-Talwīn: Qirā’a fī Mashrū’ al-Yasār al-Islāmī,” *Alif* 10 (1990): 54-109; republished in Naṣr Ḥamid Abu Zayd, *Al-Khiṭāb al-Dīnī: Ru’yat Naqdiyya nahw Intaj Wa’y ‘Ilmī bi-Dilālat al-Nuṣuṣ al-Dīniyya* (Cairo: Dār al-Muntakhab al-‘Arabī, 1992), 75-127. For Ḥanafī’s responses to Abū Zayd, see Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 407-511; and idem, *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdā’, Al-Mujallad al-Awwal: 1. Al-Naql* (Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 2000), 7-11.



innovations and even superstitions,<sup>245</sup> al-Jābirī (and Madjid<sup>246</sup> as well) is willing to condemn “wrong” interpretations of matters of pure worship in Islam (*‘ibādāt maḥḍa*) as innovations, while welcoming “wrong” interpretations of matters not related at all to worship as “good innovations” (*bid‘āt ḥasana*).<sup>247</sup> Nevertheless, al-Jābirī’s relativism, a principle that he firmly believes can give meaning to the lives of Muslims, comes closer to Ḥanafī’s *muṣawwiba* when he, quoting Muslim classical legal scholars, concludes that “they have undertaken *ijtihād* and every *mujtahid* is right.”<sup>248</sup> Madjid, on the other hand, replies “Let’s find it together” to his own diplomatic question “Where then is the truth?”<sup>249</sup> a principle that Ḥanafī asserted earlier in his writing career<sup>250</sup> but disregarded later on.<sup>251</sup>

Ḥanafī’s inconsistency, therefore, violates his own premise of a subjective, pluralistic, and relativistic interpretation when he demands that

---

<sup>245</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 162; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; 2: 34; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 117-120; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 183; and idem, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī al-Miṣr*, 63.

<sup>246</sup> Madjid, “Tasauf dan Pesantren,” 114-115; idem, “Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 96; and idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 109.

<sup>247</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 52-53; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 41. Tarābīshī even criticizes al-Jābirī for condemning almost all schools of Islamic thought that he does not agree with as unbelief and innovative (*takfīr* and *tabdī‘*). Tarābīshī, *Madhbiḥat al-Turāth*, 117.

<sup>248</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 75.

<sup>249</sup> Madjid, “Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme,” 96.

<sup>250</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 22; idem, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 47; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22.

anyone undertaking such a task identify himself with the poor and the oppressed. It is quite obvious that an interpreter can --according to his own third, fourth and fifth premises<sup>252</sup>-- have virtually any ideological orientation. Ḥanafī ultimately concludes that an interpreter must be “a reformer, a social actor, a revolutionary,”<sup>253</sup> conveying his admiration of such Muslim revolutionary thinkers as al-Afghānī,<sup>254</sup> Quṭb<sup>255</sup> and even Nasser<sup>256</sup> to his fellow readers. Ḥanafī, therefore, encourages them to apply what Yvonne Haddad calls “Quranic liberation theology,”<sup>257</sup> making his theory of interpretation the criterion by which all other interpretations that try to defend the status quo, hamper social change or halt the historical process<sup>258</sup> (a socialist

---

<sup>251</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 417; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 57.

<sup>252</sup>See above pp. 251-256.

<sup>253</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; and idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘aṣira*, 1: 184.

<sup>254</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 5 and 48; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 174; idem, *Al-Afghānī*, 19-10; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘aṣira*, 1: 63; and idem, “*Taqdīm*,” 12-13.

<sup>255</sup>Ḥattār, *Al-Turāth, al-Gharb, al-Thawra*, 60, 111 and 179.

<sup>256</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 629-630. See also, al-Barbarī, *Ishkalīyyat al-Turāth*, 177; and Zakariyā, *Al-Ḥaqīqa wa al-Wahm*, 36-37.

<sup>257</sup>Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, “Qur’anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Quṭb,” *The Middle East Journal* 17,1 (1983): 28. See also, Wahyudi, “Hasan Hanafī: Mujaddid Abad ke-15?,” xii.

<sup>258</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 183; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 358 and 381; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 142.

and Marxist stance that al-Jābirī abandoned in the early 1980s)<sup>259</sup> are to be judged and rejected. Madjid,<sup>260</sup> like both Ḥanafī (originally) and al-Jābirī (generally), supports a relative, intersubjective and pluralistic interpretation of Islam, but with greater consistency than either of these two. It is for this reason that Mark R. Woodward rightly characterizes Madjid's position as a "theology of tolerance."<sup>261</sup>

Ḥanafī's second rule, i.e., "looking for something," is an elaboration of his first rule, according to which he assigns priority to the reader's intentionality (*qaṣd al-qārī*) over that of the author (*qaṣd al-shāri'*). Determining that there is no interpreter without a commitment to something, Ḥanafī obliges an interpreter to orient his consciousness to the purpose of problem-solving,<sup>262</sup> based on the priority of Muslim needs. If, for example, their fundamental problem is liberating their land from the grips of imperialism, Muslims should give priority to interpreting verses on *jihād* rather than passages dealing with other topics.<sup>263</sup> Al-Jābirī agrees with Ḥanafī's 'Umarism (*al-fiqh al-'Umarī*) that, since the Qur'ān is for human beings (*li*

---

<sup>259</sup>Gaebel, *Von der Kritik des arabischen Denkens*, 124.

<sup>260</sup>Madjid, "Pengaruh Israiliyat dan Orientalisme," 96; idem, "Pendahuluan," xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 65-66; idem, "Masalah Ta'wil," 20; idem, "Warisan Intelektual Islam," 80-81; and idem, "Pandangan Dunia Al-Qur'an," 7-8.

<sup>261</sup>Woodward, "Talking Across Paradigms," 11.

<sup>262</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 56-57 and 546; and idem, "Hal Yajūz," 99. See also, Wahyudi, "Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi," iii.

*maṣāliḥ al-‘ibād*),<sup>264</sup> and not for God, an interpreter should look for something --a stage that Madjid<sup>265</sup> also makes an integral part of his methods of interpretation. On the other hand, Madjid is closer to al-Jābirī in that he applies it without first defining it as one of his steps in interpreting the Qur’ān, as Ḥanafī does. Madjid, like al-Jābirī, thus takes the principle for granted, hoping that his audience will understand it as a necessary mechanism. Madjid gives as an example, the problem of cult in Islam, which an interpreter can help resolve by understanding and at the same time teaching Islam rationally, just as the Qur’ān does when calling human beings to the faith by rhetorically asking “Have ye then no sense?” (Q. 2: 44).<sup>266</sup>

The mechanism to be followed in the process of “finding something” in the interpretation of the Qur’ān is one of Ḥanafī’s, al-Jābirī’s and Madjid’s major concerns in their efforts to make Islam relevant to the modern world. In contrast to Ḥanafī’s movement, which “starts from subject and ends in object”

---

<sup>263</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 107; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 358; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 140.

<sup>264</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 63-67; idem, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Fikr wa al-Dīn,” 8; and idem, “Quyyūm Thaqāfat al-Salām fī,” 6.

<sup>265</sup> Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 199; and idem, “Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan,” 12-13.

<sup>266</sup> Madjid, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 105-106; and idem, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 137-141. The translation is taken from *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur’an*, 37.

or “starts from the inside and ends outside,”<sup>267</sup> al-Jābirī instead proposes his double movement “from subject to object” and “from object to subject,”<sup>268</sup> preferring what he calls rational relations (*al-munāsiba al-fikriyya*) to poetic relations (*al-munāsiba al-shā'iriyya*) because the latter, under which category Ḥanafī's stance falls, is subjective. Rational relations, on the other hand, start from epistemological objectivity, in that an interpreter interacts with the text that he chooses as his object by setting aside subjectivity, which he reintroduces only when he feels that the distance that cuts him off from the “objectivity” is historically accounted for.<sup>269</sup> It is a rational present in contrast to Ḥanafī's emotional presence, which when pursued to the maximum extent may, from Madjid's point of view, result in absolute subjectivity (*hawā'*). While he supports Ḥanafī's principle that it is the interpreter's intention that will determine the meaning of a text, Madjid delays this stage until after the interpreter has undertaken the process of discovering an objective meaning, just as al-Jābirī suggests.<sup>270</sup>

As for what ought to be found in an interpretation, the three thinkers are unanimous in designating *'ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* (an Islamic discipline that

---

<sup>267</sup> Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 545-546; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 358; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 162; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 43.

<sup>268</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 31-33.

<sup>269</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 254; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Siyāsī al-'Arabī*, 8.

Ḥanafī translates as *les méthodes d'exégèse*), and the theory of *maqāṣid al-sharī'a* (purposes of Islamic law) in particular, since the objectives of this procedure revolve around the concepts of achieving what is in the public interests (*jalb al-maṣāliḥ*) and of avoiding public evils (*dar' al-mafāṣid*), which themselves are to be found at the first level of necessities (*al-darūriyyāt*).<sup>271</sup> They differ only in terms of degree, since Ḥanafī's revolutionary socio-political commitment compels him to assign priority to property (*al-māl*) --here especially, the liberation of Muslim lands from foreign occupation, especially the Israeli occupation of Palestine-- over religion, intellect, pride and progeny. The success of liberating a Muslim land from foreign occupation of any kind will, in Ḥanafī's calculation, lead to the achievement of the other four goals.<sup>272</sup> On the other hand, the utmost goal of al-Jābirī's interpretation is to rescue intellect from its damaged state and thereby achieve modernity, for which task Arabs and Muslims desperately

---

<sup>270</sup>Madjid, *Islam Agama Peradaban*, 156-157 and 231; and idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 160-161.

<sup>271</sup>Ḥanafī, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 23, 25 and 166-167; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 261, 267, 278, 297, 298 and 324; al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 186-187; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 56; idem, "Quyyūm al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya," 6-7; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 186; and idem, *Al-'Aql al-Akhlāqī al-'Arabī*, 620; and Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 111; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 130; and idem, "Mempertimbangkan Kemaslahatan," 12 and 27.

<sup>272</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 177; idem, "Muqaddima," 11-13; idem, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 19; idem, "Hal Yajūz," 99; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 166; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 107; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1:

need democracy and rationality.<sup>273</sup> Madjid, like al-Jābirī, makes intellect the main target of his interpretation, out of which improvements to the other four necessities will gradually be achieved (as may discerned from his preoccupation with such subjects as rationalization and democratization).<sup>274</sup> All three thinkers, therefore, see their interpretive effort as serving the wider needs and interests of the Muslim community.

Unlike his first and second rules –which may perhaps be regarded as methods of interpretation in the classical sense, but which are more a kind of reinforcement of his third, fourth and fifth premises-- Ḥanafī comes to the standard notion of method of interpretation in his third rule. Here, he proposes approaches that classical Qur'anic interpretation would characterize as thematic (*al-mawḍū'ī*), inductive (*al-istiqrā'ī*), contextual (*al-siyāqī*) and cross-referential (*al-Qur'ān yufassir ba'duh ba'dan* and *irtibāṭ al-āyāt*) hermeneutics, since this stage calls for a synopsis of the verses concerning one theme. It is, therefore, a particularist (*juz'ī*) interpretation of the Qur'ān, since

---

418; idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 617; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 10 and 140.

<sup>273</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 6, 13 and 62-63; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 33; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 250 and 260; idem, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 194-196; idem, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 8-9 and 13; and idem, "Quyyūm al-Thaqāfat al-Islām," 6.

<sup>274</sup> Madjid, *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan*, 181-183; idem, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 180-194; idem, *Masyarakat Religius*, 125; idem, "Abduhisme Pak Harun," 104; and idem, "Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan," 12-13. He also calls for the spreading of such principles as *da'wa li al-khayr* (call for an idealistic good), of *amr bi al-ma'rūf* (call for a

this kind of interpretation starts by determining what Muslims need most in the Scripture.<sup>275</sup> Essentially, both al-Jābirī and Madjid adopt similar approaches to that of Ḥanafī, but unlike the latter (who explains the procedure that an interpreter should follow in collecting, reading and understanding simultaneously all the verses concerning the theme that is of interest to him), neither of them elaborates on any specific steps. Ḥanafī would even have the interpreter carry out these steps several times over in order to grasp the overall orientation of the verses under study, but more in terms of topic than chronology.<sup>276</sup> By thus favouring content over historical context, moreover, Ḥanafī replies to Rahman, who strove to establish in his responses to Islamic fundamentalism on the one hand and Western modernity on the other the interpretive value of chronology.

Compared to both al-Jābirī and Madjid, Ḥanafī can also be said to be the more articulate in this regard, because while neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid is explicit, Ḥanafī is emphatic: “The Qur’ān interpreted is not the Holy Qur’ān, but the Qur’anic Lexicon, *al-Mu‘jam al-Mufahras*, the Qur’ān edited according to theme in alphabetical order of words, verbs, nouns and articles.”<sup>277</sup> In

---

practical good), and of *nahy ‘an al-munkar* (call for avoiding evil). Idem, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 200-201.

<sup>275</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 419; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 102.

<sup>276</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 419; and idem, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 19.

<sup>277</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 419.



practice, however, both al-Jābirī<sup>278</sup> and Madjid<sup>279</sup> apply the standard classical approaches in their interpretation of the Scripture, just as Ḥanafī does. The difference between Ḥanafī on the one hand and both al-Jābirī and Madjid on the other lies mainly in the fact that the initial concern of the latter two is not with the reconstruction of *‘ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* (a largely forgotten Islamic methodology) as it is Ḥanafī’s. Nevertheless, neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid can ignore the fact that, as Muslim scholars, they must both be ready to solve daily Islamic problems in the strictest religious sense (*fiqhī*) in order to be accepted by their fellow Muslims. In this respect, al-Jābirī tends to contradict himself. “The reconstruction of understanding the religious texts,” he firmly states, “is not my interest, since I am not a religious reformer nor a propagandist. I do not have any interest in establishing a new theology.”<sup>280</sup> The last phrase of the foregoing reminds one of the primary goal of Ḥanafī’s *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra* (From Faith to Revolution), due to which some Egyptian *‘ulamā’* have accused him of unbelief.<sup>281</sup> Nevertheless, al-Jābirī’s credentials as a religious

---

<sup>278</sup>See for example, al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 200-261; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 70.

<sup>279</sup>See for example, Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 152; idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 262; and idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxiv-xxvii.

<sup>280</sup>Al-Jābirī, “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr,” 8-9.

<sup>281</sup>For more information on Egyptian responses to Ḥanafī’s *Min al-‘Aqīda ilā al-Thawra*, see, for example, Mabruk, “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd,” 15; ‘Abd al-Mu‘ī Muḥammad Bayūmī, “Ḥasan Ḥanafī bayn al-‘Aqā‘id wa ‘Ilm al-‘Aqā‘id,” in Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭiyya, ed., *Jadal al-Āna wa al-Aḥkar: Qirā‘āt Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī ‘Id Milādih al-Sittīn* (Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997), 41-80; ‘Alī Ḥusayn al-Jābirī, “‘Aqlāniyyat Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa

scholar are unquestioned thanks to the volume of his writings on strictly *fiqh* and *kalām* problems.<sup>282</sup>

Madjid's dialectics travel from Ḥanafī to al-Jābirī and back to Ḥanafī again. "Young" Madjid was at one time supportive of the slogan "Islām: 'Aqīda wa Sharī'a (Islam: Faith and Law)," which happens also to be the title of one of Maḥmūd Shaltūt's most famous works, and one popular among members of the "radical" modernist wing of the Masjumi. At this stage he may be said to have resembled Ḥanafī, but Madjid then abandoned the approach in 1970 by questioning "the sacred cow of Islamic politics," to use Greg Barton's term,<sup>283</sup> since his slogan "Islam, Yes, but Islamic Party, No" deconstructed the *fiqh*-based Masjumi political orientation, while leading Madjid to promote what he notoriously used to call "Snouckism" referring to the Islamophobia that Suharto's New Order used to promote. This resulted in Madjid's demotion as the "crown prince" of Masjumi (he had been popularly known as "Young

---

Makānatuh," in idem, 241-260; and Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, "Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa Nuqqāduh," in idem, 331-353; al-'Ālim, *Mawāqif Naqdiyya*, 19-24.

In addition, Ḥarb criticizes Ḥanafī, whom he considers as too ambitious to be recognized as *the* founder of Occidentalism, for not mentioning Arab thinkers who have similar ideas about Occidentalism (like al-Jābirī and Maṭā' Ṣafādī) in his *Muqaddima fī 'Ilm al-Istighrāb*. Harb, *Naqd al-Naṣṣ*, 27-60. Nevertheless, Ḥarb ignores the fact that Ḥanafī constantly writes "with my colleague Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī" when quoting his *Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib* (A Dialogue between East [Egypt: Ḥanafī] and West [Morocco: al-Jābirī]). On the other hand, al-Jābirī always says "mu'allif mushāriq" (co-writer) when referring to the book, thus avoiding any explicit reference to Ḥanafī. See Wahyudi, "Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi," viii-xv.

<sup>282</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 180-261.

<sup>283</sup> Barton, "The International Context," 75.

Natsir”).<sup>284</sup> It was in order to accommodate Suharto’s militarism that Madjid popularized the term neo-modernism, in the sense that he tried to unite Muslims belonging to such puritanist and modernist organizations as the Persatuan Islam, Masjumi and Muhammadiyah on the one hand, and such traditionalist ones as the Nahdlatul Ulama and Al-Washliyah on the other, all of whom were known for their *fiqh*-oriented Islam. On the other hand, he introduced his concept of civilizational Islam to “transcend” the “Islam: ‘Aqīda wa Sharī‘a.” Like al-Jābirī, however, Madjid had to face reality in the sense that his civilizational Islam would only have an impact on Indonesian Muslims if he could solve their daily problems related to *fiqh*. Willingly or unwillingly, this “contemporary” Madjid, like al-Jābirī, has had to become a *faqīh*, teaching in his turn what he has criticized elsewhere as *ad hoc* Islam, and its proponents as *fuqahā’ al-ḥayḍ* (Muslim jurists who specialize in menstruation (a derogatory term)) as Ḥanafī likewise calls them, quoting al-Khumaynī.<sup>285</sup> Madjid,<sup>286</sup> like Ḥanafī,<sup>287</sup> who has written on such standard topics as fasting,

---

<sup>284</sup>Madjid, “The Issue of Modernization,” 379-382; Faith, “Suharto’s Search,” 88-105; Alfian, “Suharto and the Question,” 536-537; Samson, “Islam and Politics,” 297-299; Hasan, *Muslim Intellectual Responses*, 3; and Wahyudi, “Hasan Hanafi Mujaddid Abad ke-15?,” xv.

<sup>285</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 19; and idem, “Hal Yajūz,” 99.

<sup>286</sup>Madjid, for example, “Penghayatan Makna Ibadah Puasa,” 411-421; idem, “Abduhisme Pak Harun,” 107-108; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 54; and idem, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 112, 117, 119, 122, 145, 231 and 249.

<sup>287</sup>See, for example, Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 385-421.

but unlike Ḥanafī, whose initial concern was *uṣūl al-fiqh*,<sup>288</sup> he had to refamiliarize himself with the discipline.<sup>289</sup>

Ḥanafī underlines the function of language, making the classification of linguistic forms the fourth rule of his thematic interpretation. Language, for him, is merely a thread leading to the content of thought, that is to say, meaning (whose point of reference is in turn external reality).<sup>290</sup> The application of linguistic principles (like *ḥaqīqa* and *majāz*, *muhkam* and *mutashābih*, *mujmal* and *mubayyan*, *ẓāhir* and *mu'awwal*, *muṭlaq* and *muqayyad*, *'āmm* and *khāṣṣ*), as well as the analysis of formal structure and linguistic formulation from the perspective of grammar to the Qur'ān, will help determine (Ḥanafī assures us) and even guarantee the validity of the meaning deduced from it.<sup>291</sup> Al-Jābirī likewise makes language an integral part of his

---

<sup>288</sup>See also, Wā'il Ghālī, *Ibn Rushd fī Miṣr* (Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1999), 80.

<sup>289</sup>As a graduate of a *pesantren*, Madjid has a better knowledge of *uṣūl al-fiqh* than many of those Indonesian Muslim doctors who earned their Ph.D. degrees specializing in non-*uṣūl al-fiqh* subject, but who criticize *uṣūl al-fiqh* based at best on their two introductory semesters at the IAIN. Some of them do not even know Arabic. See Wahyudi, "Hanafi: Mujaddid Abad ke-15?," xviii, no. 28; and idem, "Senam Hermeneutika," iv. It is likewise due to the lack of an understanding of *uṣūl al-fiqh* and Arabic even among some Madjid's supporters that some criticisms of Madjid by his enemies are left unanswered. It is thus clear that Madjid comes closest to Ḥanafī when he draws on his *pesantren* background, an education that some of his staunchest supporters like M. Dawam Rahardjo and Fakhri Ali are lacking.

<sup>290</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418-419; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 59; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 74.

<sup>291</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 185; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 79-80; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 411; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 422-423 and 455-456.

historical critical method,<sup>292</sup> as he demonstrates, for instance, in rejecting the term *al-ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya* (Islamic awakening) and using the term *tajdīd* in its place. For unlike *ṣaḥwa*, which tends to signify the superficial and local dimensions of Islamic history, *tajdīd* has a deeply rooted Islamic dimension that has manifested itself in the past and will continue to do so in future: its origin can be traced as far back as the Ḥadīth “God will raise at the head of each century such people for this *ummah*, as will revive (*yujaddid*) its religion for it.”<sup>293</sup> Since it relates to the improvement of both worldly and heavenly conditions, the *tajdīd* in religious affairs is tantamount to *tajdīd* in worldly affairs as well. *Ṣaḥwa* on the other hand is foreign to the Islamic tradition. Not only is it a Western-imported concept (usually translated as “Islamic awakening” in English), but it is also pejorative, since it implies that Islam has fallen asleep while the West has remained wide awake. For al-Jābirī, Islam never sleeps; hence, a term that implies passivity must be rejected.<sup>294</sup>

In addition, al-Jābirī demands that an interpreter read the words before reading the meaning of a text, and that he clear his mind of heritage-

---

<sup>292</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 182-187; idem, *Al-‘Aql al-Akhlāqī al-‘Arabī*, 144; and idem, *Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī*, 270-314.

<sup>293</sup> Al-Jābirī does not provide us with any references in quoting the Ḥadīth, but it can be found in Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, 2: 512. The translation is taken from Hamim, “Moenawar Chalil’s Reformist Thought,” 2.

<sup>294</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naḡr*, 39-41; and idem, “Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa al-Thaqāfiyya al-Mu‘āṣira,” in Sa‘d al-Dīn Ibrāhīm, ed., *Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa Humūm al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī* (Oman: Muntadī al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1987), 275-276. See also, ‘Amrū al-Shawbakā, “[A Review of] Muḥammad

presumptions or present interests before embarking on his task. Distractions of this sort should be set aside, clearing the way for a single purpose, which is to derive the meaning of the text from the text itself.<sup>295</sup> Madjid puts special stress on the significance of linguistics in interpretation, since, like Ḥanafī, he acknowledges that the classical classification of Qur'anic words into such pairs as *muḥkam* and *mutashābih* is of great importance to the understanding of Scripture. This classification is, however, not only a source of pluralistic but also of conflicting interpretation,<sup>296</sup> the latter aspect being what Ḥanafī tries to eradicate through his Heritage and Modernity movement.<sup>297</sup> Moreover, Madjid, like al-Jābirī, also makes language an integral part of his historical critical method,<sup>298</sup> although in some ways to so excessive an extent that his critics accuse him of harming Islam by trying to separate the linguistic dimension of

---

‘Ābid al-Jābirī’s *Al-Dīn wa al-Dawla wa Taṭbīq al-Sharī‘a*,” *Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabī* 10 (1996): 144-145.

<sup>295</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 32; and idem, *Al-‘Aql al-Siyāsī al-‘Arabī*, 8. Tarābīshī, however, criticizes al-Jābirī for being inconsistent. Instead of applying this principle, he jumps to the meaning he wishes to derive. He even changes and transfers the original texts under study by projecting on them his own understanding. Tarābīshī, *Madhbiḥat al-Turāth*, 91-92; and idem, *Naẓarriyat al-‘Aql*, 266. Muḥammad, on the other hand, does not agree with Tarābīshī’s accusation, since al-Jābirī in his view does not steal someone’s ideas. Muḥammad, *Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī fī al-Mizān*, 206-207 and 243-246.

<sup>296</sup> Madjid, “Masalah Ta’wil,” 11; and idem, “Taqlid dan Ijtihad,” 344-345.

<sup>297</sup> Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 185; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 183; idem, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 418; 2: 34; idem, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya fī Miṣr*, 63; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 111-119; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya*, 546-547.

an established concept from its standard Islamic (*sharʿī* or *isṭilāḥī*) one. A case in point is Madjid's translation of "Lā Ilāha illā Allāh" into "There is no god but God" instead of "There is no God but Allāh." This approach has been resented in some quarters, as Woodward explains it, "Madjid was denounced as a theosophist; an agent of Zionism and its supposed ally, Western Orientalism; an apostate; an enemy of Islam seeking to destroy Islam from within; a person who should be 'b[r]ought to justice by the Islamic community;' a 'stranger in the land of Allah;' and a 'cancer which must be removed from the body of Islam.'"<sup>299</sup>

The first appearance of the meaning, according to Ḥanafī, is the linguistic form, which he classifies into six aspects. The first of these is verbal (indicating action) or nominal (referring to substance). The second is time, namely, present, past and future, indicating the difference between the narrative, the factual description, and the future; indeed, reality (truth) is expressed in three modes of time to indicate its permanence. The third is number, which can be in singular form, indicating an individual quality like consciousness (*shu'ūr*), or in plural form referring to collective or social concepts such as people (*nās*). The fourth is the possessive adjective, which can be a pronoun or a relative conjunction (indeed, those nouns that do not take a possessive adjective cannot be owned or personalized, like heaven or earth),

---

<sup>298</sup>Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 254.

<sup>299</sup>Woodward, "Talking Across Paradigms," 12.

with pronouns being further classified into the first, second or third person. The fifth is vocalization, significant because nouns can be nominative (indicating action of the efficient cause or subject), accusative (indicating object) or dative (indicating spatial relations between subject and object). The sixth is definition, according to which nouns can be either definite (which indicates a singularity and is an address to the particular) or indefinite (which refers to collectivism and is an address to the general).<sup>300</sup> By contrast, it is interesting that neither al-Jābirī nor Madjid has anything to say about the classification of linguistic forms and its effects on interpretation.

Unlike al-Jābirī and Madjid, who are both silent on the concept of building the structure of the interpreted object, Ḥanafī makes this his fifth rule. The interpreter must, Ḥanafī insists, adopt Husserl's approach in going "from the meaning to the object, from the *noesis* to the *noema*."<sup>301</sup> What is interesting here though is his departure from his own third, fourth and fifth premises and his first and second rules of interpretation, according to which he laid heavy stress on the interests, and thus the subjectivity, of the interpreter. With his fifth rule, Ḥanafī attempts a fusion of horizons, by reducing the reader's intention to the same level as that of the author as expressed in the text. "The meaning and the object," he explains, "are one thing, two facets of the same intentionality. The meaning is the subjective object, the object is the objective

---

<sup>300</sup> Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 419-420.

<sup>301</sup> *Ibid.*, 1: 420. Italics are mine.



subject.”<sup>302</sup> In gravitating towards the position of both al-Jābirī and Madjid, Ḥanafī thus tries to solve the problem of psychologism by minimalizing the confusion of meaning and relevance that characterizes his originally subjective approach, since at this stage he only emphasizes the process of verticalizing the reader’s understanding of the text (*ta’wīl* or *ṣa’id*), while leaving the process of rehorizontalizing (*tanzīl*) his horizons to the next step (rule 6). Al-Jābirī would in turn consider this as the process of balancing poetic and rational relations (*al-munāsaba al-shā’iriyya* and *al-munāsaba al-fikriyya*), making the text contemporary both to itself and to its readers at the same time.<sup>303</sup> In this way, Ḥanafī, like both al-Jābirī and Madjid, upholds the principle of “author-centered meaning,” by acknowledging the moment of self-recognition in the dialectics between the reader’s intention and the author’s intention or between the *qaṣd al-Shāri’* (to use the *uṣūl al-fiqh* term) and the reader’s intention.

Nevertheless, the process of grasping the author’s intention, as Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid all confirm, confronts one with another procedural problem, since none of them deals with what both *‘ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* and *‘ilm al-tafsīr* characterize as the *tartīb al-āyāt min ḥayth al-mawḍū’* (the thematic hierarchy of Qur’anic verses). The failure to take account of this step may result in confusion as to which verse best expresses a given theme, leading in turn to different and even contradictory interpretations. On the other hand,

---

<sup>302</sup>Ibid.

while the three thinkers are aware of another problem, i.e., that of how to grasp the author's intention (namely, the conflict of authority (*ta'arud al-adilla*)), Ḥanafī and Madjid tend to disregard it, though for slightly different reasons. Ḥanafī for his part condemns any discussion of "impractical" issues when engaged in interpretation, such as the Hanafite arguments of hypothetical jurisprudence (*fiqh al-iftirādī al-Ḥanafī*).<sup>304</sup> On the other hand, Madjid seems to have left the problem for others to solve, while he indulges in an "impractical" understanding of Islam, which has led some of his opponents to criticize him severely<sup>305</sup> -- "as a dangerous thinker," to quote Federspiel.<sup>306</sup> Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, puts a little more effort into solving the problem. Insisting that there is no real contradiction in the Qur'ān, al-Jābirī reintroduces several *uṣūl al-fiqh* solutions. To determine the meaning of the seemingly contradictory Qur'ānic verses, one should consider them, he says, in the light of the *maqāṣid al-Sharī'a* and the *asbāb al-nuzūl*. Thus when a specific ruling

---

<sup>303</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 254; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 54-56.

<sup>304</sup>Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 15; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 26; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 70. It is to transform an "impractical" Islam into a "practical" one that Ḥanafī wrote his *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra*, as al-Barbarī rightly recognizes. Al-Barbarī, *Ishkāliyyat al-Turāth*, 223-230. See also, Wahyudi, "Hasan Hanafi: Mujaddid Abad ke-15?," xii; and idem, "Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi," vii.

<sup>305</sup>See, for example, Nataadmaja, *Hanacaraka Ilmu dan Alfabet Perjuangan*, 250-262; Husnan, *Ilmiah Intelektual dalam Sorotan*; Djaelani, *Menelusuri Kekeliruan*; and Hakiem, ed., *Menggugat Gerakan Pembaharuan Keagamaan*.

<sup>306</sup>Federspiel, *Muslim Intellectuals*, 42.

(*al-ḥukm al-juzʿī*) can be shown to contradict a general ruling (*al-ḥukm al-kullī*), then the former can be analyzed according to the perspective of the latter. By the same token, one must consider *al-mutashābih* verses in the light of *al-muḥkam* ones, and in so doing conform to the rule of the *al-mabādīʾ wa al-kullīyyāt* (general and universal principles of the Qurʾān).<sup>307</sup>

Ḥanafī does however recognize the inherent weaknesses in the deductive linguistic method that he outlines, especially the fact that it ignores inductive experimental method, which he in turn considers as an Islamic (*sharʿ*) principle and a valid form of legal analogy (*al-qiyaṣ al-sharʿī*), based on the analysis of efficient cause. To fill this lacuna he obliges an interpreter to look at the *asbāb al-nuzūl*. The significance of the latter is that they represent the actual circumstances surrounding the revelation of individual verses, and that these circumstances are at the same time representative of the repeated experiences in the lives of others. By referring the understanding of the verse to the living experiences of the interpreter, one transforms the *asbāb al-nuzūl* into the living/present human situation,<sup>308</sup> an approach with which both al-Jābirī<sup>309</sup> and Madjid<sup>310</sup> completely agree. It is thus clear that Ḥanafī, who

---

<sup>307</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 182-187; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 54-56; and idem, *Al-Masʾala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260.

<sup>308</sup> Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Muʾaṣira*, 1: 185; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 116; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 43; and idem, “Hal Yajūz,” 100.

<sup>309</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 182-187; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 76; and idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 59.

elsewhere designates the reader's intention as the center around which everything else must revolve, now postpones the process until he arrives at the stage of grasping the author's intention, as do both al-Jābirī and Madjid. As a result, the criticism levelled by al-‘Ālim,<sup>311</sup> Abū Zayd<sup>312</sup> and Mabrūk<sup>313</sup> at Ḥanafī for sacrificing the objectivity of the text for the subjectivity of the interpreter seems no longer to be irrelevant.

Yet in his sixth rule, “analyzing the factual situation,” Ḥanafī tries to restore the balance by minimizing the subjectivity of the interpreter. While acknowledging the unavoidability of what Heidegger defines as “the circularity of human understanding,”<sup>314</sup> Ḥanafī still insists on the importance of the dialogue between the author's and the reader's horizons. Nevertheless, he places more weight on the author's intention (“the meaning in the dynamics of the text in the external world”<sup>315</sup>), a dimension of the Qur’ān that Madjid calls its “natural” and “historical” verses,<sup>316</sup> by obliging the interpreter to switch to

---

<sup>310</sup>Madjid, “Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul,” 38; and idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 111.

<sup>311</sup>Al-‘Ālim, *Al-Wa’y wa al-Wa’y al-Zā’if*, 79.

<sup>312</sup>Mabrūk, “Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd,” 33-42.

<sup>313</sup>Abū Zayd, “Al-Turāth bayn al-Ta’wīl wa al-Talwīn,” 54-109; and idem, *Naqd al-Khiṭāb al-Dīnī*, 75-127.

<sup>314</sup>Adam Davidow, “Gadamer: The Possibility of Interpretation,” <http://www.sbccc.us/academic/phil/stoa/Davidow.html> (accessed 18 November, 2001), 1.

<sup>315</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 420.

<sup>316</sup>Madjid, *Kaki Langit*, 170; idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxvi-xxvii; and idem, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 280-282.

the factual reality of the topic he is trying to interpret. By reinterpreting the *asbāb al-nuzūl* as a Qur'anic response to the realities of nature (which in turn is the source of revelation itself) and thus a call for a return to nature,<sup>317</sup> Ḥanafī rehorizontalizes in his sixth rule the interpreter's understanding of the text (*tanzīl*).<sup>318</sup> By the same token al-Jābirī reformulates the significance of the *asbāb al-nuzūl*, demanding that, in addition to their classical understanding of these circumstances, contemporary Muslims make them relevant to their present Islam by expanding them to encompass what Ḥanafī calls the “living/present human situation,”<sup>319</sup> consisting of both the present and the future.<sup>320</sup> According to classical *uṣūl al-fiqh*, the three thinkers might be said to favour the formula “*al-‘ibra bi-‘umūm al-lafẓ lā bi-khuṣūṣ al-sabab*” (the principle is the universality of ruling and not the particularity of cause), a way of thinking that renders an ancient event relevant to Muslims both now and in the time to come.

---

<sup>317</sup>Ḥanafī, *Les méthodes d'exégèse*, CCIX [sic!] and 309-321; idem, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 185; idem *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 15, 116, 136, 161, 162, 166 and 167; idem, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 30-31; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 2: 29; 7: 69, 73-75, 78 and 108; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 24 and 56; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī*, 1: 17-56

<sup>318</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 161-162; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 22; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 7: 73-75.

<sup>319</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu‘āṣira*, 1: 185; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 116; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 43.

<sup>320</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 195-197; idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 76; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadāitha*, 59; and idem, *Al-‘Aql al-Akhlaqī al-‘Arabī*, 143.

Ḥanafī also encourages the application of disciplines like statistics, so as to provide Muslims with external proofs of the truth of the text.<sup>321</sup> Their failure to do so until now has resulted in their relative backwardness with respect to the West, where it is expected that an interpreter should “know quantitatively and statistically the real components of the situation, causes of phenomenon and factors of change, with the maximum of precision using figures and diagrams.”<sup>322</sup> Nor does al-Jābirī or Madjid doubt the efficacy of the humanities and social sciences (like statistics) as tools for bridging the distance between internal and external truth. This, for Madjid, will help an interpreter grasp the objective, and hence, the true meaning of the Qur’ān,<sup>323</sup> while for al-Jābirī it would serve to deconstruct the domination of the fundamentalist understanding of heritage from the perspective of heritage alone and at the same time make the Qur’ān contemporary to its readers.<sup>324</sup>

All three of our thinkers conform to Habermas’s recommendation of the application of “critical or depth hermeneutics” by engaging in “scientific explanation of the real (social and economic) constraints placed upon their

---

<sup>321</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 18; and idem, *Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 13-14 and 114-115.

<sup>322</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 420; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 548; and idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 291.

<sup>323</sup>Madjid, “Pendahuluan,” xxviii; idem, *Kaki Langit*, 27-28; idem, *Pintu-pintu*, 117; idem, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 280-281; and idem, “Al-Qur’an, Kaum Intelektual,” 111.

<sup>324</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ishkāliyyat al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir*, 10; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 104; idem, *Naḥn wa al-Turāth*, 13; and idem, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 44-46.

interpreters.”<sup>325</sup> It is at this stage that the three thinkers fully express the combination of Qur’anic, “natural” and “historical” (the last of which Ḥanafī would call “social”) verses, a kind of combination of Madjid’s *sunnat Allāh* and *taqdīr Allāh*,<sup>326</sup> which to some extent parallels Dilthey’s formula *Verstehen* and *Erklären*.<sup>327</sup> On the other hand, Ḥanafī intentionally reminds his contemporary fellow Muslims of the significance of reviving the forgotten Islamic sciences in the strictest modern Western sense by taking the same approach to them as in natural science, biology, astronomy or pharmacy.<sup>328</sup> This essential element, in al-‘Alim’s viewpoint, distinguishes Ḥanafī from some other contemporary reformists, like ‘Ādil Ḥusayn.<sup>329</sup> Ḥanafī,<sup>330</sup> al-Jābirī<sup>331</sup> and Madjid<sup>332</sup> thus promote the revival of neo-Averroism in order that

---

<sup>325</sup>“Critical Approaches to Hermeneutics,” [www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.htm](http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.htm) (accessed November 18, 2001), 1.

<sup>326</sup>Madjid, *Masyarakat Religius*, 26, 33-34, 146-148, 160 and 164-167; idem, “Pendahuluan,” xxvi-xxvii; idem, *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan*, 20; idem, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 280-281; and idem, “Pandangan Dunia Al-Qur’an,” 7.

<sup>327</sup>Wilhelm Dilthey, *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by Georg Misch (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 5: 144; James Phillips, “Key Concepts: Hermeneutics,” *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology* 3,1 (1996): 61-62; and Don Ihde, “Expanding Hermeneutics,” [www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/papers/Exptherm.htm](http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/papers/Exptherm.htm) (accessed November 18, 2001), 2.

<sup>328</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 13; idem, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 154-186; and idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafīyya*, 100-106 and 157-167.

<sup>329</sup>Al-‘Alim, *Mafahīm wa Qadāyā*, 74.

<sup>330</sup>Ḥanafī, “Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?,” 16; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa*, 37; and idem, *Dirāsāt Islāmīyya*, 158-159.

<sup>331</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr*, 10-11; idem, “Faṣl Akhar min Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib,” 15; idem, “Jadīd fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī,” 6;

their contemporary co-religionists combine abstract, rational and theoretical considerations with real, practical and empirical approaches in their *ijtihād*, a process that they must, in keeping with *uṣūl al-fiqh*, adopt. Otherwise they are bound to fail (*al-amr bi al-shay' amr bi wasā'ilih* and *mā lā yatimm al-wājib fahuwa wājib*).

In practice, the sixth rule will allow an interpreter to achieve the correspondent and coherent truth of the Qur'ān at the same time, but Ḥanafī still insists that the interpreter recheck the process by comparing the ideal with the real. This is a further indication that he minimizes the subjectivity of the interpreter here by positioning the latter directly in between the text (as *Das Sollen*) and reality (as *Das Sein*), instead of above these two as he did in his first and second rules. “In Hegelian terms,” Ḥanafī explains, “between Being and Nothingness, Becoming emerges.”<sup>332</sup> However, one cannot arrive at an ideal structure through content-analysis of the Qur'ān, as Ḥanafī proposes, unless one has first of all determined the relationship between the Qur'anic divine-yet-finite text (*al-naṣṣ*) and changes of time and circumstance (*al-'urf*). The relationship is on the one hand an integral part of the hermeneutic circle of what is alleged to be Quranic contradiction (*ta'ārūḍ al-adilla*), and what on the other deals with the dialectics of *al-naṣṣ* and *al-'urf*. In other words, *ta'ārūḍ*

---

idem, “Ibn Rushd: al-‘Ilm wa al-Faḍīla,” 5-13; and idem, “Ibn Rushd: al-‘Aṣā al-Qātila,” 5-25.

<sup>332</sup>Madjid, “Warisan Intelektual Islam,” 38; idem, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 280-281; and idem, “Pandangan Dunia Al-Qur'an,” 7-8.



*al-adilla* deals more with different manifestations of God's intentions for human beings as expressed in different Quranic verses, whereas the relationship between text and circumstance pertains more to the dialectics of God and human beings, and, hence, of religion and civilization.

Standard *uṣūl al-fiqh* classifies 'urf into positive and negative (*al-'urf al-ṣaḥīḥ* and *al-'urf al-fāsid*), in the latter of which *maṣlaḥa* (public interest) is to be found, and which in turn the three reformists unanimously consider as the essence of the Qur'ān. In the case of contradiction, public interest should, both Ḥanafī<sup>334</sup> and al-Jābirī<sup>335</sup> conclude, be given priority over the Qur'anic text. Madjid is like both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī in his emulation of 'Umar's comparison between the ideal itself (the universal and particular Qur'anic verses) and the real (Muslim general and particular interests), demonstrated in his approach to distributing the *fa'y* (booty) of the fertile Crescent that the Muslims had just conquered. Madjid, though he is less emphatic than Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, in that he implies that public interest can take precedence over the Quranic text, an *uṣūl al-fiqh* solution that may involve the concepts of *istiḥsān* (searching for good) and *istiṣlāḥ* (searching for interest, defined as *al-maṣlaḥa al-'amma*, *al-maṣlaḥa al-mursala* or *'umūm al-balwā*, all of which he

---

<sup>333</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 420.

<sup>334</sup>Ḥanafī, *Qaḍāyā Mu'aṣira*, 1: 177; idem, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 15; idem, *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya*, 166; idem, *Al-Turaṭh wa al-Tajdīd*, 178; and idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 39.

<sup>335</sup>Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuquq al-Insān*, 186-187; idem, *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya*, 260; and idem, *Al-Turaṭh wa al-Ḥadātha*, 56.

translates into “public interest”).<sup>336</sup> “Hopefully,” Madjid concludes, “we [Indonesian Muslims] can learn from the wisdom of this very decisive figure in Islamic history [‘Umar], whom Muslims often point to as the exemplar of an open, democratic and just ruler.”<sup>337</sup>

If one applies al-Jābirī’s concept of deconstruction (*tafkīk*) to the debate over the booty won by the first generation of Muslims, one could say that ‘Umar deconstructed the real as his opponents presented it to him, since he exchanged the permanent relations structured or fixed in their minds, i.e., their literalist and particularist approaches for his own structureless or merely different approaches (*taḥawwulāt*), which happened to be liberal and universalist in nature. In his conversion of the permanent (*al-thābith*) into the changing (*mutaghayyir*), the absolute (*al-muṭlaq*) into the relative (*nisbī*), the a-historical into the historical, and the eternal (*al-lā zamanī*) into the temporal (*zamanī*),<sup>338</sup> ‘Umar substituted the rights of the *mujāhidīn*, whom the Qur’ān rewards with four-fifths of the booty for their participation in war, with the rights of all Muslims (present and future). ‘Umar in turn believed that he could better protect the latter by paying the troops a salary derived from the booty. In so doing, ‘Umar liberated all Muslims from the monopoly of the *mujāhidīn*

---

<sup>336</sup>Madjid, “Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan,” 12. For more information on these concepts, see, for example, Yudian Wahyudi, “Hasbi’s Theory of *Ijtihād* in the Context of Indonesian *Fiqh*,” M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1993, 50-80.

<sup>337</sup>Madjid, “Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan,” 27.

<sup>338</sup>On the concepts, see al-Jābirī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha*, 47-48.

and their descendants, a hidden agenda which al-Jābirī would call *al-lā-‘aqliyya* (irrationality). Though he faced protest from some *mujāhidīn*, he declared the Prophet’s decision of distributing four-fifths of the booty from Khaybar to all *mujāhidīn* to be a kind of *al-maṣlaḥa al-zamāniyya* (temporary public interest), one that can change depending on changes of people, times, places and causes. On the other hand, al-Jābirī would say that the universal principles (*al-mabādī* and *al-kulliyyāt*) of the Qur’ān that ‘Umar strove to abide by are absolute, while their application, shown in ‘Umar’s departures from the Prophet’s practice remains relative.<sup>339</sup> The significance of ‘Umar’s deconstruction is, thus, his application of what Brian Fay terms “intentional action concepts”<sup>340</sup> in questening the interpreter’s intentions, plans or desires behind his “statistically presented fact.”

Ḥanafī’s eighth and last rule, “description of modes of action,” does not in fact lead an interpreter to conclude that a comparison between the Ideal and the real, as explained in the previous step, will automatically produce a *Zuhandenheit* (“ready-to-hand”) solution –to use Heidegger’s term.<sup>341</sup> On the contrary, it may reveal a gap between them, a fact that both al-Jābirī and Madjid acknowledge as the “objective truth.” The way to close such a gap, for Ḥanafī, is to combine “logos” with “praxis,” a process of adapting the Ideal so

---

<sup>339</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān*, 186-187.

<sup>340</sup> Brian Fay, *Social Theory and Political Practice* (London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1977), 71-72.

<sup>341</sup> Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 69.

that it is closer to the real, and the real so that it is closer to the Ideal.<sup>342</sup> This undertaking --which is essentially Madjid's horizontalization of Islam at the practical, and not theoretical, level (*pembumian Islam*)-- revolves around human relations. This historical interaction (or *ḥabl min al-nās* from the Qur'anic perspective) entails finding a means of communication that will ensure legitimacy. In order to achieve what Habermas calls "undistorted communication,"<sup>343</sup> Ḥanafī makes language reform a necessary step in his methods of reform (*turuq al-tajdīd*). The traditional language of the classical Islamic heritage can no longer, he reasons, serve as a means of communication, since it is out of date. It is inapplicable, since it is uniquely divine, religious, historical and technical in the sense that it revolves around such metaphysical concepts as God and miracles in addition to such out-of-date concepts as that of *jawhar al-fard* (atomism) debated in Islamic theology. Muslims should, according to Ḥanafī, replace this with a new language, which is universal, open, rational, empirical, human, but Arabic, at the same time.<sup>344</sup>

---

<sup>342</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 421; idem, *Les méthodes*, 309-321; and idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 114-116.

<sup>343</sup>"Critical Approaches to Hermeneutics," 1.

<sup>344</sup>Ḥanafī, *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd*, 113-123; idem, *Les méthodes*, LXXIX-CXXXIX (sic!); idem, *Da'wa li al-Ḥiwār*, 7-9; idem, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyāl*, 7-9; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 1: 352-3.

Al-Jābirī wants to maintain the original terminology of Islam,<sup>345</sup> but Madjid necessitates the articulation of a new interpretation in the light of Ḥanafī's paradigm.<sup>346</sup> On the other hand, al-Jābirī is consonant with Ḥanafī's proposal for positioning Arabic as the *lingua franca* of Islamic reform, whereas Madjid takes the opposite stance. The reason for al-Jābirī is geo-political, as it is for Madjid. Given the centrality of Arabs in the Muslim world, al-Jābirī starts his reform movement from and focuses on the Arab lands, a strategy that he justifies by the fact that previous attempts at Islamic reform from the peripheries of Islam such as Turkey, Pakistan, and even Iran have had no real impact on Arab Muslims.<sup>347</sup> Madjid, however, limits his geo-political orientation to Indonesia. For unlike Arabic, which is foreign for the majority of Madjid's audience, the Indonesian language represents the only *lingua franca* that can communicate to these peripheral Muslims the concerns of Muslim geo-politics as well as such local issues as "the Islamization of Indonesia as national issue."<sup>348</sup> The international orientation of Ḥanafī's reform movement<sup>349</sup> lies, as Ḥanafī himself claims, in its ability to bridge the gap

---

<sup>345</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Wijhat Naẓr*, 39-41; and idem, "Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya," 275-276. See also, al-Shawbakā, "[A Review of] Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī's *Al-Dīn wa al-Dawla*," 144-145.

<sup>346</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 115.

<sup>347</sup> Al-Jābirī, "Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr," 16.

<sup>348</sup> Madjid, *Dialog Keterbukaan*, 115. See also, Steenbrink, "Recapturing the Past," 155-156.

<sup>349</sup> Ḥanafī, "Al-Yasār al-Islāmī?," 45; and idem, "Muqaddima," 13-14.

between these two visions, while depending on another *lingua franca*, like English.

The problem of legitimacy emerges, since one should not impose one's personal interpretation (*al-ijtihād al-fardī*) on others. If the latter in turn exercise their right to undertake *ijtihād* on the same matter, they may at best arrive at intersubjective truth –which does not necessarily mean consensus, as Charles Taylor rightly says.<sup>350</sup> In order to achieve what Habermas calls “an ideal speech situation,”<sup>351</sup> they need to legitimize their personal interpretation by undertaking a consensus (*al-ijtihād al-jamʿī*) at different levels from the local into the international, as needed. In case of failure, Ḥanafī recommends “[g]radual steps, time and combined efforts.... without jumping the steps or using violence,”<sup>352</sup> with which position both al-Jābirī and Madjid<sup>353</sup> conform. The revolution of the Islamic Left is not to be identified with violence –or at least this is the impression Ḥanafī gives. Although Marxism-Socialism started to decline in 1980, Ḥanafī was very eager to exploit its strengths to hasten the

---

<sup>350</sup>Charles Taylor, “Interpretation and the Sciences of Man,” in Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre, eds., *Readings in The Philosophy of Social Science* (Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994), 195-196.

<sup>351</sup>“Critical Approaches to Hermeneutics,”1.

<sup>352</sup>Ḥanafī, *Islam in the Modern World*, 1: 421; and idem, *Les méthodes*, 309-321.

<sup>353</sup>Madjid, “Kemungkinan Menggunakan,” 269.

possibility of revolution against Sadat.<sup>354</sup> If it had succeeded, it would have, for him, favoured the coming of the fifteenth century of Islam, the time when he expects the arrival of the *mujaddid*. Al-Jābirī, unlike Ḥanafī, abandoned his Leftist orientation,<sup>355</sup> since the success of the Iranian Revolution confronted him with a political dilemma. For when the Islamic fundamentalists in his country tried to establish an Islamic state, as the Iranians had done, King Hassan II subjugated them; in either case al-Jābirī's Left was an unpopular and even suspect minority.<sup>356</sup> This paradigm shift has led Bagader to characterize al-Jābirī as a liberal and revisionist.<sup>357</sup> Madjid, an eyewitness in 1965 to the Communists' abortive coup d'état in Indonesia, became a convinced anti-Communist due to his own Muslim modernist inclination and the rise of Suharto's brand of militarism. Ḥanafī, on the other hand, changed his stance from physical to theoretical revolution in 2001. In this respect, Boullata is right

---

<sup>354</sup>Ḥanafī, *Ḥiwār al-Ajyal*, 478; idem, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 3: 112-141; 6: 207-292; and idem, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-'Arabī*, 2: 518, 639, 645, 646 and 648.

<sup>355</sup>Mahfoud and Geoffroy, "Présentation," 5; Gaebel, *Von der Kritik des Arabischen Denkens*, 124.

<sup>356</sup>Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 126; Lamchichi, *Islam et Contestation*, 244-246; Emad Eldin Shahin, *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 176; John P. Entelis, "Political Islam in the Maghrib: The Nonviolent Dimension," in John P. Entelis, ed., *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 55; idem, *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 8, 68, 88 and 89. Munson, *Islam and Power*, 135-136; and idem, "Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia," *The Muslim World* 76 (1986): 207.

<sup>357</sup>Bagader, "Contemporary Islamic Movements," 120.

to assert that Ḥanafī's project is theoretical and not practical,<sup>358</sup> since in its revised form it constitutes a revolution of thought, though it awaits the agents who will take it to the next level of physical revolution, much as the theories proclaimed in Marx's *Das Kapital* awaited the coming of Lenin to take on a more concrete form.<sup>359</sup>

Both Ḥanafī and Madjid respond to the slogan "Back to the Qur'ān and the Sunna" directly, but al-Jābirī criticizes Salafism. According to Labdaoui's summary of al-Jābirī's thought, "[l]a **salafiya** aussi bien religieuse, révolutionnaire que libérale porte donc, aux yeux de l'auteur [al-Jābirī], la responsabilité de l'échec arabe et constitue un obstacle pour une recherche de transparence à soi-même."<sup>360</sup> By Salafism in the Moroccan context al-Jābirī means Fundamentalism, the Islamic wing of which is Wahhabism. His criticism of "understanding heritage from the perspective of heritage" is, therefore, an epistemological criticism of the Moroccan form of Wahhabism, which is the fundamentalist wing of the slogan. Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid of course continue to support the puritan and fundamentalist wing of the slogan in terms of 'ibāda-mahḍa and 'aqīda matters. Yet although they are uncompromising with regard to these two basic principles of Islam, they are very flexible in terms of *mu'āmalat*, swinging back and forth between the *ahl al-*

---

<sup>358</sup>Boullata, *Trends and Issues*, 45; and idem, "Ḥasan Ḥanafī," 99.

<sup>359</sup>*Tempo* No. 14/XXX/4-10 Juni 2001.

<sup>360</sup>Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 131. The bold text is Labdaoui's.



*ḥadīth* and the *ahl al-ra'y*. The return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna, for them, is a return to the unity of God's laws set forth for His creatures, while the means of exploring the non-Qur'anic textual basis of this, according to al-Jābirī, is *al-'aql al-kawnī*<sup>361</sup> (or natural reason to use Ḥanafī's term).<sup>362</sup> Hence, it is these laws that determine the rise or the fall of civilization.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are none of them very explicit about the hermeneutics of the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna. While Ḥanafī's and al-Jābirī's concepts are to be found implied in their rules on thematic interpretation and the modern reading of heritage, respectively, Madjid does not formulate them systematically. At the same time they are all clearly supporters of "author-centered meaning" (*maqāṣid al-Sharī'a*), although each has a different starting point. Ḥanafī makes the interpreter the center of this interpretation, around which everything else revolves, and gradually moves towards the object by dialogizing the interpreter's and the author's horizons. Like Ḥanafī, both al-Jābirī and Madjid start from the subject, but, unlike him, they focus on achieving an objective meaning. Hence the most important thing for Ḥanafī is the assertion of the interpreter's interest, whereas for al-Jābirī and Madjid the essential thing is to avoid confusing meaning with relevance. Thus the values of an interpretation, according to the three thinkers, are divinely inspired but human in application (*ilāhī* but *wad'ī*), intersubjective, relative

---

<sup>361</sup> Al-Jābirī, *Takwīn al-'Aql al-'Arabī*, 348-349.

<sup>362</sup> Ḥanafī, *Religious Dialogue & Revolution*, 231.

and pluralistic. Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid can all be seen moreover as neo-modernist Muslims in that they attempt a double movement from the present to the past and a return to the present in their proposed reforms. Al-‘Ālim rightly slots Ḥanafī under the category of [Islamic] neo modernists (*al-salafiyyīn al-judād*), but strangely considers al-Jābirī as falling under the category of cultural modernity (*al-ḥadātha al-thaqāfiyya*).<sup>363</sup> Labdaoui even presents a problematic category when characterizing al-Jābirī as an Islamic secularist.<sup>364</sup>

---

<sup>363</sup> Al-‘Ālim, *Mafāhīm wa Qaḍāyā*, 74 and 77.

<sup>364</sup> Labdaoui, *Les nouveaux intellectuels*, 123.

## Conclusion

Like their predecessors, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are orthodox Muslims in that they display uncompromising Wahhabite and even Hanbalite attitudes in terms of *'aqīda* and *'ibāda-maḥḍa*. Madjid even reinforces his orthodoxy by limiting the concept of Sunna only to those practices of the Prophet Muḥammad legitimized by the Qur'ān. They are also orthodox in their methods and principles of interpretation, since they swing back and forth between the standard classical Islamic schools of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* and *ahl al-ra'y*. They are of the *ahl al-ḥadīth* in making the *maqāṣid al-Sharī'a* ("author-centered meaning") their starting point, but of the *ahl al-ra'y* in expanding the scope of their textual basis to encompass unwritten revelation, namely, natural law. They perfect the combination between the two schools of thought by claiming that the return to the Qur'ān and the Sunna is a return to the unity of God's laws set forth for His creatures, although their focus has incited some of their co-religionists to declare them unorthodox Muslims. Ḥanafī, unlike al-Jābirī and Madjid, uses an "unorthodox" term when naming his movement the Islamic Left, since the term "left" in Qur'anic usage is negative, while the term "right," which has a positive connotation from the Qur'anic perspective, is negative according to Ḥanafī. However, Ḥanafī is an orthodox thinker if one considers first and foremost his intention, which is to express Qur'anic values using human, socio-political speech to communicate with the two strongest opposing majority groups in Egyptian society. There may be some incidental

differences in their systems, therefore, but those differences are mostly semantic.

The views of Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are very consistent with modern supporters of the slogan in terms of their recognition of the basic principles of Islam. Like all their predecessors, they insist on these immutable aspects of Islam in continuation of the guidance provided by the series of messengers sent by God. Continuing the puritan, fundamentalist and uncompromising principles of their predecessors, they rigorously oppose innovations in the purely theological teachings of Islam. They are also unanimous in condemning the practice of *wasīla* (praying to an intercessor between God and human beings) as unforgivable sin, but differ in their attitudes towards sufism, an aspect of Islam in which this tradition finds its practical expression. Assuming that it originated as an Islamic protest movement against the luxurious lifestyle of the Umayyads, Ḥanafī tries to purify sufism of its deviations, and restore its original function as a moral force. Al-Jābirī, unlike his Moroccan predecessors on the one hand and Ḥanafī on the other, attributes sufism to non-Islamic origins, a judgment that Madjid, in turn, does not support. For while al-Jābirī accuses sufism of being the source of irrationalism in Islamic civilization, Madjid (like Ḥanafī and al-Bannā) tries to bring sufism under the control of Islamic law in order to restore it to its original function. Both Ḥanafī and Madjid thus believe that sufism can, like all other things, be beneficial or detrimental to the renaissance of Islam,

depending on how it is used. It is beyond al-Jābirī's nature as a rationalist to be able to tolerate this aspect of sufism, whereas both Ḥanafī and Madjid strive to transform its moral potential into a practical and social-oriented movement.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid respond essentially to the same problem, but with a different focus and solution in each case. For whereas Ḥanafī envisions his "Heritage and Modernity" project as the solution to the decline of the Muslim world, al-Jābirī focuses his efforts on reforming what he sees as a failed Arab Renaissance through his "Criticism of the Arab Mind" project, while Madjid for his part applies his "Civilization-Islam" to the task of solving the decline of Islam in Indonesia. All three acknowledge that there has been a decline, and all three see the solution as lying somewhere within the Islamic heritage. The differences among them lie partly in how each defines that heritage, but even more so in the approaches they take. These approaches incorporate both Islamic and Western methodologies. Thus Ḥanafī, like both al-Jābirī and Madjid to some extent, is a Husserlian phenomenologist in that he makes revelation the motor of Islamic civilization, but, unlike them, he is also a Marxist. For just as Marx transformed Hegel's idealism into a more down-to-earth movement, Ḥanafī turns the metaphysically-oriented Islam into a practically-oriented Islam, as is evident from his ideology of the "Islamic Left" and his five part *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra* projects. Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, is more of a structuralist in his approach in that he hierarchizes the Arabo-Islamic sciences from lowest to highest according to the categories of

“interpretation” (*bayānī*), gnosticism (*‘irfānī*), and demonstrative experimentalism (*burhānī*). Majid, like both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī, rationalizes Islamic tradition by applying the concepts of genealogy and the archeology of knowledge. In his own context, Madjid combines Ibn Taymiyya’s puritanism and fundamentalism with Hodgson’s civilization historical approach and Robert N. Bellah’s sociological methodology. The three are, therefore, similar in their willingness to accept modern Western sources on *mu‘āmalā* matters. Their radical departure from many of their inward-looking reformist predecessors, on the other hand, links them to contemporary and near contemporary Muslim scholars, such as Fazlur Rahman, Shari‘ati and Arkoun.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid, like their predecessors, condemn *taqlīd*, declaring it to be a key factor in the decline of Islam. Seeing it as a source of fanaticism, they strive to “reopen” the allegedly closed door of *ijtihād*. The slogan “the door of *ijtihād* is closed,” they criticize, is tantamount to freezing the dynamics of Islamic civilization. They, again like their predecessors, “desacralize” loyalty to a particular *madhhab* (school of thought), where many of its followers often theologically legitimize their vested interests, since the past achievements of any *madhhab* are relative to their time, culture and socio-political orientation, and, therefore, cannot be binding on other Muslims. However, unlike some their fundamentalist predecessors, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid see Muslim past achievements as practical and functional truth in the sense that they are valid as long as they are useful for contemporary Muslims.

The three, like ‘Abduh in particular, promote the principle of “preserving a valid heritage, while taking benefit from the most valid new experience,” since starting-from-zero reform, as some of their more rejectionist and xenophobic predecessors advocated, is in their eyes simply another kind of epistemological suicide. Significantly, their criticism of *madhhab* fanaticism has changed the concept of *madhhab* in Islam from a religio-epistemological into a religio-national paradigm as a result of the emergence of nation-states in Muslim countries, in particular after they won their independence from Western colonial regimes in the second half of the twentieth century. All three, therefore, promote their own nationally-oriented *madhhabs*, since Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are Egyptian, Arabo-Moroccan and Indonesian neo-modernists, respectively.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid likewise fully support the struggle that their predecessors waged against the lack of free will and the mental passivity that had constituted the primary cause of the decline of Islam. Following in the footsteps of such revolutionary reformists as al-Afghānī, Bannā and Quṭb, Ḥanafī demands that his fellow Muslims revolt against quasi-Islamic passivism. By rectifying their misunderstanding of the Qur’anic teaching on “determinism,” contemporary Muslims will, he reasons, solve the most important internal factor determining the dynamics of historical movement, since change must start from within an agent. Al-Jābirī, like Ḥanafī and Madjid, radically challenges his co-religionists’ misconception of historical

determinism by shifting their focus from idolizing to desacralizing nature, since they must manage it for the sake of their mission as God's vicegerents on earth, which is that of building civilization. In this regard, Madjid contributes to improving the Muslim understanding of historical determinism by distinguishing between the Qur'anic concepts of *sunnat Allāh* and *taqdīr Allāh*, which all Muslims depend on to fulfil their role as free agents. While both al-Jābirī and Madjid have remained in the modernist camp after abandoning their radicalism, Ḥanafī has only recently made a dialectical shift back to Abduh's modernism. For after revising his 1980 statement "I love 'Abduh, but I love Islam more"<sup>1</sup> to read in 1998 "I love 'Abduh, but I love revolution more,"<sup>2</sup> he finally, in 2001, acknowledged that this revolution is one of thought. Significantly, on this crucial aspect of Islamic thought, there is a kind of consensus among the three thinkers.

Like almost all of their predecessors, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid confront their audience with the problem of finding a systematic method of returning to the Qur'ān and the Sunna, but they all confront different obstacles. Both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī are more systematic than Madjid, since both of them clearly set out the rules of thematic interpretation and the modern reading of heritage, whereas Madjid does not explain his methods, but rather forces one to detect them in his writings here and there. A comparison between their

---

<sup>1</sup>It was published in 1998 in Ḥanafī, *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra*, 6: 223.

<sup>2</sup>Ḥanafī, *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan*, 2: 617.



methods from the perspective of Ḥanafī's premises respecting thematic interpretation, does show that their methods of interpreting and, hence "returning to, the Qur'ān and the Sunna" are thematic, inductive, contextual, cross-referential and linguistic, as well as historical. Although they are also supporters of "author-centered meaning" hermeneutics, and thus make the interpreter their starting point, they differ in some respects. While Ḥanafī starts from the "moment of self-recognition" and gradually dialogizes the present horizons of the interpreter and the past horizons of the author, both al-Jābirī and Madjid attempt to resolve the problem of psychologism as a means of finding objective meaning and, hence, avoid the confusion of meaning and relevance. In the end, however, they advocate the same truth, as they believe that the value of interpretation is divine but human at the same time. Since an interpreter can at best reach relative, pluralistic and intersubjective (but never objective) truth as such, he should legitimize the results of his interpretation through a proper decision-making body which can apply intersubjective experience (*ijmā'* or consensus). Here, again, is a near consensus.

Like almost all of their predecessors, Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are peripheral personalities in their own national contexts. As a supporter of Nasserism, Ḥanafī faced radical changes in Egypt at the turn of the 15<sup>th</sup> century Hijra, since Sadat applied the politics of de-Nasserization by releasing Ikhwan political prisoners and diverting the nation's alignment from the socialist Soviet Bloc to the capitalist Western Bloc. As a counter to Sadat, Ḥanafī

proclaimed the Islamic Left in the hope of uniting the Ikhwan and Nasseris (who challenged Sadat's peace agreement with Israel and his protection of the ousted Shah of Iran), but failed to capture any groups in the center of Egyptian political power to mount a viable opposition to Sadat or his successor Mubarak. In al-Jābirī's case, the success of the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979 presented him with the problem of reconciling the arguments of two warring majority groups: the Moroccan government (who defended both King Hassan II and the ousted Shah of Iran) and the Muslim fundamentalists (who wanted to establish an Islamic State). Realizing that his radical socialist ideology spoke for a vulnerable minority in either case, al-Jābirī began instead to advocate an epistemologically-oriented reform, which lacked popular ideological appeal and left him politically weak. Madjid, for his part, tried in 1970 to move to the political center in Indonesia, following an earlier, modernist political strategy of creating a viable Muslim political presence in the country. President Suharto, however, paid little heed as he toughened his stance against political Islam in order to prevent the Iranian Revolution from a similar uprising in Indonesia. Madjid's outlook only gained official recognition in the 1990s with the establishment of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals. Each of the three thinkers then share the common lot of failed political mission, in which fate they resemble many other groups, blocs and personalities in the age of ascendant political systems with limited access to power.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid are like their predecessors in terms of the *mu'āmalā* aspect of the slogan, in the sense they are open to innovation in areas not specifically ruled upon in the Qur'ān, adapting these with the content of their own time and place. Ḥanafī, like al-Afghānī, is against Wahhabite Arabism, since Islam for him, as for both al-Jābirī and Madjid, is a universal religion open to all human beings regardless of their race or geographical origin. Still their strategy to realize the inclusiveness of Islam differs in many respects. Thus, for example, they speak highly of equality, justice and democracy, but they are nationalists in their own contexts. Like his masters (al-Afghānī, 'Abduh, Riḍā and Quṭb), Ḥanafī is in sympathy with the establishment of a “liberal, democratic and republican” Islamic state, whereas both al-Jābirī and Madjid on the other hand are against the establishment of an Islamic state while still supportive of modern state principles like republicanism, nationalism, constitutionalism and democracy. Although he is unlike all of his Moroccan predecessors in his philosophy, al-Jābirī retains their Arab and Moroccan characteristics. Madjid in turn disagrees with Kartosuwirjo's Islamic State and Hassan's anti-nationalism, yet internalizes the former's republicanism, nationalism and sense of Indonesianness. Finally, while both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī propose the language of the Qur'ān as the *lingua franca* of their respective projects, Madjid favours Indonesian as the means of communication in his own realm. While seemingly differing on such

political details, they are actually alike in that the national context is the crucial determinant.

The solution may thus be said to have a geographical aspect. Ḥanafī even suggests that Egypt reclaim its status as the center of the Muslim world, while al-Jābirī implies that Morocco is the true center. Boullata is right in characterizing Ḥanafī's reform project as highly ideological, but fails to detect the almost geo-political agenda behind al-Jābirī's "Criticism of the Arab Mind," since al-Jābirī's structuralism (for Ṭarābīshī and Ḥarb) incorporates an ethnically-oriented epistemology. Classifying Islamic sciences into those of "interpretation," gnosticism and demonstrative experimentalism, al-Jābirī traces the genealogy and the archeology of the Arabo-Islamic sciences. For him, the sciences of "interpretation" were Arab in origin, but the domination of their textual approach is responsible for the decline of Arabo-Islamic civilization. The gnostic sciences moreover were not only foreign to the Arab mind, they also caused the spread of irrationalism and metaphysical speculation among them. The demonstrative sciences on the other hand were Greek in origin, but they were the epistemological weapons that "Western" philosophers like Ibn Ṭufayl and Ibn Rushd used against the "irrationalism" and "metaphysicism" of the "Eastern" philosophers such as Ibn Sīnā and al-Fārābī. Since the renaissance of these "Westerners" was due to their "geo-epistemological break" with the "Easterners," al-Jābirī demands that this step be repeated everywhere in order to bring about a new renaissance. Thus he

asserts the superiority of the Moroccans over other Arabs and Muslims, since the Moroccans are the only legatees of the “Westerners” after Andalusia had fallen to the Christians. Finally, Madjid makes a point of distinguishing Arabia from Islam. Since Arabia is not Islam, and vice versa, Indonesian Islam deserves its own non-Arab local characteristics. Since the rise and fall of civilization has nothing to do with any ethnic division, the peripheral and young Indonesian Muslims can lead the renaissance of Islam if they consistently practice the universal and non-sectarian laws of God ordained for all of His creatures, as was the case with both the Arab and English cultural explosions in the seventh and fifteenth centuries, respectively. In essence, the three intellectuals, therefore, make their respective countries the center of their geographical reforms.

Unlike many of their predecessors --who lived out their entire lives under Western colonial domination-- Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid have spent most if not all their lives as citizens of their respective independent states. However, they all face the same societal problems that each state inherited from its colonized predecessor, since each such government continues to apply, instead of abandoning, colonial practices. At the same time, the West is leaving them further behind. Ḥanafī envisions the new Golden Age of Islam as taking place after the coming seven hundred years, a confusion of hope with fact that has led some of his critics to regard this prediction as a myth. Al-Jābirī, on the other hand, acknowledges that to catch up to the West is now far

more difficult than it was two centuries ago when the Arabs started their renaissance project. Madjid, perhaps even more than both Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī in their respective countries, faces a sharp dichotomy between science and religion, since Indonesian Muslim reformists are technologically oriented groups, but lack of Islamic traditional training. The traditionalists, on the other hand, are mostly religious experts in a narrow sense, but have no modern scientific experiences. Indonesian neo-modernist Muslims are in turn in the minority, caught between these two conflicting majority groups. At the same time Madjid's supporters are more modernist than neo-modernist in the sense that they know more about science than Islam, an epistemological weakness that he frequently criticizes. All three are, therefore, realistic, but pessimistic about the future of their respective reform project.

Ḥanafī, al-Jābirī and Madjid (at least in theory) contribute to building religious and, hence, civilizational dialogue. Ḥanafī applies the meaning of *kalimat al-sawā'* to unite various conflicting groups in Egypt by calling Egyptian Liberals, Marxists and Nasserists "Brothers in Nation" on the one hand, and Egyptian Muslim Fundamentalists "Brothers in Allāh" on the other. Al-Jābirī reintroduces religious pluralism as set forth in al-Shāfi'ī's concept of *maqāṣid al-Sharī'a* and translates it as "peace culture." Madjid bases himself on the same Qur'anic phrase that Ḥanafī uses to call upon Indonesian Muslims, Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists and Hindus to unite under the national umbrella of the Pancasila, a delicate hermeneutics that Woodward calls a

“theology of tolerance.” Our three thinkers, furthermore, contribute to civilizational dialogue by insisting on the unity of God’s laws as ordained for His creatures. In this way, *islām* is taken to mean submission to God’s laws (a set of laws that scientists call the law of nature), and if consistently observed by anyone regardless of his religion and nation, will bring about *salām* (from the same root of *s-l-m*) or peace for all of God’s creatures. Given that *aslama* (the infinitive of *islām*) means to submit to God’s laws in order to make peace with all of His creatures, and human beings in particular, the three thinkers fly in the face of Samuel Huntington’s concept of the clash of civilization. In contrast to the latter, who seems to suggest that his Western audience continue their old political application of Darwinian thought to the Muslim world, thus reducing the encounter to a struggle determined by the survival for the fittest, the three thinkers present the Qur’ānic message calling for “grace for all the worlds” in the age of globalization. This idealistic and even compassionate view is held in common among the three intellectuals and is a fit place to end our comparison.

Finally, I should like to underline that while there are a variety of approaches that one can take, I have chosen to compare both al-Jābirī and Madjid from the perspective of Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s “Heritage and Modernity” project reform. As a result, my analysis tends to be selective, reductionist and even to some extent generalizing. It is therefore to some extent unfair to the subjects. And in what might seem even more of an injustice, I compare them

on a topic that they may consider to be of less than primary concern to their respective reform projects. Of course, the result might have been different if the approach to the comparison had been different. If one, for example, were to make al-Jābirī the criterion to measure Ḥanafī and Madjid, one's conclusions might be different, just as they might be different were Madjid to serve as the yardstick for Ḥanafī and al-Jābirī. A variety of focuses in the comparison would also yield a variety of results. If one were, for instance, to compare the three reformists on democracy, one would come up with several different conclusions, depending on who was chosen as the criterion, not to mention which sources were consulted. It must also be noted that, since the three Muslim philosophers are still alive, they continue to produce new material. Consequently, my study will not cover the later development of their thought. Of course, the problem may turn out to be very serious if they radically revise their opinions on certain topics (such as Ḥanafī did in 2001 when he changed his project from a physically oriented revolution to an epistemologically oriented one, a paradigm shift that al-Jābirī had undergone earlier in 1980, and Madjid even earlier in 1970). My study therefore can make no absolute claims where these three thinkers are concerned.



## Bibliography

### A. Primary Sources

#### 1. Ḥanafī, Ḥasan

- Ḥanafī, Ḥasan. *Les méthodes d'exégèse: essai sur la science des fondaments de la compréhension "ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh."* Cairo: Le Conseil supérieur des arts, des lettres et des sciences sociales, 1965.
- , *L'exégèse de la phénoménologie. l'Etat actuel de la méthode phénoménologique et son application au phénomène religieux.* Paris: 1965. Second edition, 1980.
- , *La phénoménologie de l'exégèse. Essai d'une herméneutique existentielle à partir du Nouveau Testament.* Paris: 1966. Second edition, 1988.
- , "Taṣḍīr." [Foreword to] *Namādhaj min al-Falsafa al-Masīhiyya fī al-ʿAṣr al-Wasīṭ: Augustine-Anselm-Thomas Aquinas* [An Anthology of Medieval Christian Philosophy: Augustine-Anselm-Thomas Aquinas]. Translated, edited and annotated by Ḥasan Ḥanafī, i-ii. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1967. Second edition, 1987.
- , "Muqaddima." [Foreword to] Benedict de Spinoza, *Risāla fī al-Lahūt wa al-Siyāsa* [Tractatus Theologico-Politicus]. Translated by Ḥasan Ḥanafī, 5-106. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1971. Third edition, 1981.
- , "Théologie ou anthropologie?" In *Renaissance du monde arabe*, edited by Anouar Abdel Malek, Abdel-Aziz Bela and Hassan Hanafi [Ḥasan Ḥanafī], 233-264. Gembloux: J. Duculot, 1972.
- , *Qaḍāyā Muʿāṣira al-Juzʾ al-Awwal fī Fikrinā al-Muʿāṣir* [Contemporary Problems. Volume I: Our Contemporary Thought]. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1976. Third edition, 1987. [Collection of articles].
- , *Qaḍāyā Muʿāṣira, al-Juzʾ al-Thānī fī al-Fikr al-Gharbī al-Muʿāṣir* [Contemporary Problems. Volume II: Western Contemporary Thought]. Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1977. Third edition, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , "Taṣḍīr." [Foreword to] Jean Paul Sartre, *Taʿālā al-Anā Mawjūd.* Translated by Ḥasan Hanafi, 7-12. Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 1977.

- , "Muqaddima." [Foreword to] Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, *Tarbiyyat al-Jins al-Basharī wa A'māl Ukhra*. Translated, annotated and edited by Ḥasan Ḥanafī, 9-223. Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 1977.
- , *Religious Dialogue & Revolution, essays on Judaism, Christianity and Islam*. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1977. [Collection of articles].
- , "Muqaddima." [Foreword to the Egyptian edition of] Rūḥ Allāh al-Khumaynī, *Al-Ḥukūma al-Islāmiyya* [Islamic Government], 4-29. Cairo: n.p., 1977.
- , "Al-Judhūr al-Tārīkhiyya li Azmat al-Ḥurriyya wa al-Dīmūqraṭiyya fī Wijdāninā al-Mu'āṣir [Historical Roots of Freedom and Democratic Crises in Our Contemporary Awareness]." *Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* [The Arab Future] 5 (1979). Reprinted in *Al-Dīmūqraṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān fī al-Waṭan al-'Arabī* [Democracy and Human Rights in the Arab Country], edited by 'Alī al-Dīn Hilāl, 175-190. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1983.
- , *Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd: Mawqifunā min al-Turāth al-Qadīm* [Heritage and Modernity: Our Attitude towards Classical Heritage]. Cairo: al-Markaz al-'Arabī li al-Baḥth wa al-Nashr, 1980. Fourth edition, 1992.
- , "Madhā Ya'nī: al-Yasār al-Islāmī? [What Does the Islamic Left Mean?]." *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* [The Islamic Left: Writings on Islamic Revival] 1 (1981): 5-48.
- , "Al-Muslimūn fī Āsiyā fī Maṭla' al-Qarn al-Khāmis 'Ashr al-Hijrī [Muslims in Asia in the Beginning of the 15<sup>th</sup> Century of Hijra]." *Al-Yasār al-Islāmī: Kitābāt fī al-Nahḍa al-Islāmiyya* [The Islamic Left: Writings on Islamic Revival] 1 (1981): 157-212.
- , *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya* [Islamic Studies]. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1981; Beirut: Dār al-Tanwīr, 1982. [Collection of articles].
- , "The Origin of Modern Conservatism and Islamic Fundamentalism." In *Islamic Dilemmas: Reformers, Nationalists and Industrialization (The Southern Shore of the Mediterranean)*, edited by Ernest Gellner, 94-103. Berlin, New York and Amsterdam: Mouton Publishers, 1985.
- , *Al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya fī Miṣr* [Islamic Movement in Egypt]. Cairo: al-Mu'assasa al-Islāmiyya, 1986.
- , *Dirāsāt Falsafiyya* [Philosophical Studies]. Cairo: Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra, Al-Mujallad al-Awwal: Al-Muqaddimāt al-Nazariyya* [From Faith to Revolution. Volume I: Theoretical Introductions]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988.

- , *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra, Al-Mujallad al-Thānī: Al-Tawhīd* [From Faith to Revolution. Volume II: The Unity of God]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988.
- , *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra, Al-Mujallad al-Thālith: Al-'Adl* [From Faith to Revolution. Volume III: Justice]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988.
- , *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra, Al-Mujallad al-Rābi': Al-Nubuwwa-al-Mi'ād* [From Faith to Revolution. Volume IV: Prophethood-Hereafter]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988.
- , *Min al-'Aqīda ilā al-Thawra, Al-Mujallad al-Khāmis: Al-Imān wa al-'Amal-al-Imāma* [From Faith to Revolution. Volume V: Faith and Action-Leadership]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988.
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Awwal: Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa al-Waṭaniyya* [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume I: Religion and National Culture]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Thānī: Al-Dīn wa al-Taḥarrur al-Thaqāfī* [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume II: Cultural Liberation]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Thālith: Al-Dīn wa al-Niḍāl al-Waṭanī* [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume III: Religion and National Struggle]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Rābi': Al-Dīn wa al-Tanmiyya al-Qawmiyya*. [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume IV: Religion and National Development]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Khāmis: Al-Ḥarakāt al-Dīniyya al-Mu'aṣira* [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume V: Islamic Movements in Egypt]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Sādis: Al-Uṣūliyya al-Islāmiyya*. [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume VI: Islamic Fundamentalism]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, Al-Mujallad al-Sābi': Al-Yamīn wa al-Yasār fī al-Fikr al-Dīnī*. [Religion and Revolution in

- Egypt 1952-1981. Volume VII: The Right and Left in Religious Thought]. Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thawra fī Miṣr 1952-1981, VIII: Al-Yasār al-Islāmī wa al-Waḥda al-Waṭaniyyā*. [Religion and Revolution in Egypt 1952-1981. Volume VIII: The Islamic Left and the National Awakening]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūfī, 1988. [Collection of articles].
- , and Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī. *Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib* [The Dialogue between the East (Ḥasan Ḥanafī) and the West (al-Jābirī)]. Casablanca: Dār Tūbqāl li al-Nashr, 1990.
- , "Al-Wahy wa al-Waqt: Dirāsa fī Asbāb al-Nuzūl [Revelation and Time: A Study of the Occasions of Revelation]." In *Al-Islām wa al-Ḥadātha* [Islam and Modernity]. Edited by Adūnīs, 133-175. London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1990.
- , "Min al-Mithāliyya al-Mu‘tadila ilā al-Wāqī‘iyya al-Jidhriyya: Taḥiyyatan ilā wa Ḥiwār ma‘ Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl [From Moderate Idealism to Radical Realism: A Congratulation to and Dialogue with Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl]." In *Al-Kitāb al-Tidhkārī li al-Marḥūm al-Ustādh al-Duktūr Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl*, [In Memoriam of Prof. Dr. Tawfiq al-Ṭawīl] edited by Muḥammad Ḥamdī Ibrāhīm, 25-97. Cairo: Kulliyat al-Ādāb, Jāmi‘at al-Qāhira, 1990.
- , *Muqaddima fī ‘Ilm al-Istighrāb* [Introduction to Occidentalism]. Cairo: al-Mu‘assasa al-Jāmi‘iyya, 1992.
- , *Al-Da‘wa li al-Ḥiwār* [A Call for Dialogue]. Cairo: Al-Hay’a al-Miṣriyya al-‘Āmma li al-Kitāb, 1993.
- , *Islam in the Modern World, I: Religion, Ideology and Development*. Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1995. [Collection of articles].
- , *Islam in the Modern World, II: Tradition, Revolution and Culture*. Cairo: The Anglo-Egyptian Bookshop, 1995. [Collection of articles].
- , "Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir: al-Judhūr wa al-Thamār [Contemporary Arab Thought: Roots and Fruits]." In *Al-Fikr al-‘Arabī ‘Alā Mashārif al-Qarn al-Ḥādī wa al-‘Ishrīn: Ru‘ya Taḥlīliyya Naqdiyya* [Arab Thought at the Crossroads of the Twenty-First Century: A Critical and Analytical View], edited by Maḥmūd Amīn al-‘Ālim, 201-208. Cairo: Qadāyā Fikriyya li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1995.
- , "Taqdīm." [Foreword to] Hānī al-Mur‘ashafī. *Qirā‘at al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī* [Reading of Arab Thought], 7-14. Cairo: Dār al-Ma‘rifa al-Jami‘a, 1996.
- , "Min Naqd al-Sanad ilā Naqd al-Matn: Kayfa Tustakhdam al-‘Ulūm al-Insāniyya wa al-Ijtimā‘iyya fī Naqd Matn al-Ḥadīth al-Nabawī? Al-

- Bukhārī Namūdhan [From Chain Criticism to Content Criticism: How are Human and Sociological Sciences used in Content Criticism of Prophetic Tradition? Al-Bukhārī: A Model].” *Majallat al-Jam‘iyya al-Falsafiyya al-Miṣriyya* [Journal of the Egyptian Philosophical Association] 5 (1996): 131-243.
- , “Taḥlīl al-Khiṭāb [Discourse Analysis].” *Majallat al-Jam‘iyya al-Falsafiyya al-Miṣriyya* [Journal of the Egyptian Philosophical Association] 6 (1997): 257-284.
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Thaqāfa wa al-Siyāsa fī Waṭan al-‘Arabī* [Religion, Culture and Politics in Arab Country]. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998. [Collection of articles].
- , *Hiwār al-Ajyāl* [A Generational Dialogue]. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998.
- , “Taṭawwur al-Fikr al-Dīnī al-Gharbī (Allāh wa al-Insān) [The Development of Western Religious Thought (God and Man).” *Majallat al-Jam‘iyya al-Falsafiyya al-Miṣriyya* [Journal of the Egyptian Philosophical Association] 7 (1998): 126-232.
- , *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī al-Mi‘awīyya al-Ulā (1897-1997)* [Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī: The First Hundred Years (1897-1997)]. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998.
- , *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī, al-Juz al-Awwal: al-Turāth wa al-‘Aṣr wa al-Ḥadātha* [The Malaise of Arab Thought and Nation. Volume I: Heritage, Age and Modernity]. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998. [Collection of articles].
- , *Humūm al-Fikr wa al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī, al-Juz al-Thānī: al-Fikr al-‘Arabī al-Mu‘āṣir* [The Malaise of Arab Thought and Nation. Volume II: Contemporary Arab Thought]. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1998. [Collection of articles].
- , “Fi ‘Id Mīlādih al-Māsī [On His Golden Anniversary].” In *Dirāsāt Muhdah ilā Maḥmūd Amīn al-‘Alīm fī ‘Id Mīlādih al-Māsī* [Studies Presented to Maḥmūd Amīn al-‘Alīm on His Golden Anniversary], edited by Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭīyya, 17-24. Cairo: Dār Qibā’, 1999.
- , “Al-Ishtibāh fī Fikr Ibn Rushd [Ambiguity in the Thought of Averroes].” *‘Ālam al-Fikr* [The World of Thought] 4 (1999): 119-146.
- , “Al-Kiyān al-Ṣahyūnī wa al-Mas’ala al-Yahūdiyya [The Existence of Zionism and the Jewish Problem].” *Al-‘Arabī* [Arabic] 486 (1999): 30-34.

- , *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdāʾ*, *Al-Mujallad al-Awwal: Al-Naql. 1. Al-Tadwīn*. [From Transmission to Creation. Volume I: Transmission. 1. Codification]. Cairo: Dār al-Qibāʾ, 2000.
- , *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdāʾ*, *al-Mujallad al-Awwal: Al-Naql. 2. Al-Naṣṣ*. [From Transmission to Creation. Volume I: Transmission. 2. Text]. Cairo: Dār al-Qibāʾ, 2000.
- , *Min al-Naql ilā al-Ibdāʾ*, *al-Mujallad al-Awwal: Al-Naql. 3. Al-Sharḥ*. [From Transmission to Creation. Volume I: Transmssion. 3. Commentary]. Cairo: Dār al-Qibāʾ, 2000.

## 2. Al-Jābirī, Muḥammad ʿĀbid

- Al-Jābirī, Muḥammad ʿĀbid. *Al-Khiṭāb al-ʿArabī al-Muʿāṣir: Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya Naqdiyya* [Contemporary Arab Discourse: A Critical and Analytical Study]. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1982. Second edition 1985.
- , *Madkhal ilā Falsafat al-ʿUlūm: Dirāsa wa Nuṣūṣ fī al-ʾIbistīmūlūjiyā al-Muʿāṣira, Al-Juzʾ al-Awwal: Taṭawwur al-Fikr al-Riyāḍī wa al-ʿAqlāniyya al-Muʿāṣira*. [Introduction to Philosophy of Science: Study and Texts on Contemporary Epistemology. Volume I: The Development of Mathematics and Contemporary Rationalism]. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1982.
- , *Madkhal ilā Falsafat al-ʿUlūm: Dirāsa wa Nuṣūṣ fī al-ʾIbistīmūlūjiyā al-Muʿāṣira, Al-Juzʾ al-Thānī: Al-Minhāj al-Tajribī wa Taṭawwur al-Fikr al-ʾIlmī*. [Introduction to Philosophy of Science: Study and Texts on Contemporary Epistemology. Volume II: Experimental Method and the Development of Scientific Thought]. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1982.
- , “Ḥawl al-Awḍāʾ al-Rāhina [On the Current Situation].” *Al-Mustaqbal al-ʿArabī* [The Arab Future] 11 (1982): 112-121.
- , “Al-Khiṭāb al-ʿArabī wa al-Turāth [Arab-Discourse and Heritage].” In *Al-Turāth wa al-ʿAmal al-Siyāsī* [Heritage and the Political Act], edited by Muntadī al-Fikr wa al-Ḥiwār, 115-124. N.p.: Al-Majlis al-Qawmī li al-Thaqāfa al-ʿArabiyya, 1984.
- , *Naqd al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī 1. Talwīn al-ʿAql al-ʿArabī* [Criticism of Arab Thought I: Constructing Arab Thought]. Beirut: Dār al-Ṭalīʿa, 1984. Second edition, 1985.
- , “Al-Ruʾya al-Istishrāqiyya fī al-Falsafa al-Islāmiyya: Ṭabīʿatuhā wa Mukawwinātuhā al-ʾIdiyūlūjiyya wa al-Minhājiyya [Orientalist Point of View on Islamic Philosophy: Its Nature and Ideological Foundations and Methods].” In *Manāḥij al-Mustashriqīn fī al-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya al-Islāmiyya* [Orientalist Methods in Arab and Islamic Studies], edited

by Šālih Kharfī, et al., 305-338. Riyad: Maktab al-Tarbiyya al-‘Arabī li Duwal al-Khaḥij, 1985.

- , “Al-Sīnawiyya: Fuṣūluḥā wa Uṣūluḥā [Avicennaism: Its Branches and Roots].” In *Dirāsāt Maghribiyya: Muhadā ilā al-Mufakkir al-Maghribī Muḥammad ‘Azīz al-Jabbābī* [Moroccan Studies: Presented to the Moroccan Thinker Muḥammad ‘Azīz al-Jabbābī], edited by Al-Ṭāhir wa ‘Azīz. Casablanca: Al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 1987.
- , “Al-Ḥaraka al-Salafiyya wa al-Jamā‘ al-Dīniyya al-Mu‘āṣira fī al-Maghrib [Salafism and the Contemporary Religious Group in Morocco].” In *Al-Ḥarakāt al-Islāmiyya al-Mu‘āṣira fī al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī* [Contemporary Islamic Movements in Arab Countries], edited by Ismā‘īl Ṣabrī ‘Abd Allāh, 187-235. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya in collaboration with Jāmi‘at al-Umam al-Muttaḥida, 1987. Second edition, 1989.
- , “Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa al-Thaqāfa al-Mu‘āṣira [Islamic Awakening and the Contemporary Culture].” In *Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa Humūm al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī* [Islamic Awakening and the Malaise of the Arab Nation], edited by Saad Edin Ibrahim, 275-306. Oman: Muntadī al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1988.
- , “Al-Mudākhala (3) [Confirmation (3)].” In *Al-Ṣaḥwa al-Islāmiyya wa Humūm al-Waṭan al-‘Arabī* [Islamic Awakening and the Malaise of Arab Nation], edited by Saad Edin Ibrahim, 162-163. Oman: Muntadī al-Fikr al-‘Arabī, 1988.
- , *Naḥnu wa al-Turāth: Qirā’a Mu‘āṣira fī Turāthunā al-Falsafī* [We and the Heritage: A Contemporary Reading in Our Philosophical Heritage]. Casablanca: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-‘Arabī, 1985.
- , *Introduction à la critique de la raison arabe*. Translated by Mahfoud and Marc Geoffroy. Paris: Institute du Monde Arabe, 1995; translated into *Arab-Islamic Philosophy: A Contemporary Critique* by Aziz Abbassi. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1999.
- , *Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī 2. Bunyat al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī: Dirāsa Taḥlīliyya Naqdiyya li Naẓm al-Ma‘rifa fī al-Thaqāfa al-‘Arabiyya* [Criticism of the Arab Mind 2. Construct of the Arab Mind: A Critical and Analytical Study of the Episteme of Arab Culture]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1986.
- , *Al-Maghrib al-Mu‘āṣir: al-Khuṣūṣiyya wa al-Huwiyya, al-Ḥadātha wa al-Tanmiyya*. [Contemporary Morocco: Characteristics and Identity, Modernity and Development]. Casablanca: Mu’assasa Binshara, 1988. [Collection of articles].

- , "Ḥawl al-Ḥiwār al-Qawmī-al-Dīnī [On Religio-National Dialogue]." In *Ḥawl al-Ḥiwār al-Qawmī-al-Dīnī: Awraq 'Amal wa Munāqashāt al-Nadwā al-Fikriyya allatī Naẓamahā Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya* [On Religio-National Dialogue: Working Papers and the Academic Club Discussions Held by the Center for the Study of Arab Unity], edited by Muḥsin 'Awad, 69-74. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1989.
- , *Ishkalīyyāt al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir* [Problems of the Contemporary Arab Thought] Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1989.
- , *Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabī 3. Al-'Aql al-Siyāsī al-'Arabī* [Criticism of the Arab Mind 3. Arab Political Mind]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1990.
- , and Ḥasan Ḥanafī. *Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib* [The Dialogue between the East (Ḥasan Ḥanafī) and the West (Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī)]. Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li al-Dirāsa wa al-Nashr, 1990.
- , *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadātha: Dirāsāt wa Munāqashāt* [Heritage and Modernity: Studies and Discussions]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1991. [Collection of articles].
- , "Al-Mas'ala al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya wa al-Awḍā' al-Rāhina fī al-Waṭan al-'Arabī [The Problem of Democracy and the Current Situations in the Arab Countries]." *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* [The Arab Future] 3 (1992): 4-16.
- , *Tajdīd al-Nahḍa bi Iktishāf al-Lughāt wa Naqdihā: Da'wa li Tashkhīṣ al-Mawrūth al-Mujtama'ī al-'Arabī wa I'āda Ta'sīs al-Thaqāfa al-'Arabiyya li Nashr Tanwīr Jadīd* [Language Reform by Discovering and Criticizing Language: A Call for Personalizing Arab Social Heritage and Reconstructing Arab Culture for the Sake of Spreading A New Enlightenment]. Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya, 1992.
- , *Wijhat Naẓr nahw I'āda Binā' Qaḍāyā al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir*. [A New Paradigm towards Reconstructing the Contemporary Arab Thought]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1992. Second edition, 1994. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Mas'ala al-Thaqāfiyya* [The Problem of Culture]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1994. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya wa Ḥuqūq al-Insān* [Democracy and Human Rights]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-'Arabiyya, 1994. Second edition 1997. [Collection of articles].



- , *Al-Muthaqqifūn fī al-Ḥadāra al-‘Arabiyya: Miḥnat Ibn Ḥanbal wa Nukbat Ibn Rushd* [Intellectuals in Arab Civilization: Ibn Ḥanbal’s Inquisition and Ibn Rushd’s Misery]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1995.
- , *Mas’alat al-Huwiyya: Al-‘Urūba wa al-Islām...wa al-Gharb* [The Problem of Identity: Europe and Islam... and the West]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1995. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Dīn wa al-Dawla wa Taṭbīq al-Sharī’a* [Religion, State and the Application of Islamic Law]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1996. [Collection of articles].
- , *Al-Mashrū’ al-Naḥdawī al-‘Arabī: Murāji’a Naqdiyya*. [The Project of Arab Revival: A Critical Reference]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1996. [Collection of articles].
- , “Al-Gharb wa al-Islām: 1. Al-Anā wa al-Ākhar...aw al-Mas’ala al-Ghayriyya [The West and Islam: 1. He and I... or the Problem of Otherness].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 2 (1997): 5-18.
- , “Al-Islām wa al-Gharb: 2- al-Namṭ Ākhar.. min al-Wa’y bi ‘al-Ākhar’ [Islam and the West: 2- Another Model... from the Awareness of the ‘Other’].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 3 (1997): 5-17.
- , “Faṣl Ākhar min ‘Ḥiwār al-Mashriq wa al-Maghrib’: al-Mas’ala al-Thaqāfiyya fī al-Taswiyya al-Safīma ma’ Isrā’īl [Another Chapter of the ‘East-West Dialogue’: A Cultural Problem in A Sound Equality with Israel].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 4 (1997): 5-16.
- , *Qadāyā fī al-Fikr al-Mu‘āṣir: Al-‘Ulama – Ṣirā’ al-Ḥadārāt – Al-‘Awda ilā al-Akhlāq –al-Tasāmuh, al-Dīmuqrāṭiyya wa Nuḏūm al-Quyyum – al-Falsafa wa al-Madīna* [Problems of the Contemporary Thought: Globalization – Class of Civilization – A Return to Ethics – Tolerance, Democracy and Value-Systems – Philosophy and Civilization]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997. [Collection of articles].
- , “Madkhal ‘Āmm: Tārīkh al-‘Alāqa bayn al-Dīn wa al-Falsafa fī al-Islām [General Introduction: History of the Relationship between Religion and Philosophy in Islam].” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl fī Taqrīr mā bayn al-Sharī’a wa al-Ḥikma min al-Ittisāl aw Wujūb al-Naẓr al-‘Aql wa Ḥudūd al-Ta’wīl (Al-Dīn wa al-Mujtama’)* [The Decisive Treatise on Determining the Relationship between Islamic Law and Philosophy or the Obligation of Philosophizing and the Limits of Interpretation (Religion and Society)],

edited by Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, 7-50. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997.

- , “Muqaddima Taḥfiliyya [An Analytical Introduction].” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Faṣl al-Maqāl fī Taqrīr mā bayn al-Sharī’a wa al-Ḥikma min al-Ittiṣāl aw Wujūb al-Naẓr al-‘Aql wa Ḥudūd al-Ta’wīl (Al-Dīn wa al-Mujtama’)* [The Decisive Treatise on Determining the Relationship between Islamic Law and Philosophy or the Obligation of Philosophizing and the Limits of Interpretation (Religion and Society)], edited by Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, 51-130. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997.
- , *Ḥafriyyāt fī al-Dhākira min Ba’id* [Archeological Memories from a Distance]. Casablanca: Dār al-Nashr al-Maghribiyya, 1997; Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1997.
- , *Ibn Rushd: Sīra wa Fikr, Dirāsa wa Nuṣūṣ* [Ibn Rushd: Life and Thought, Study and Text]. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.
- , “Madkhal ‘Āmm: Fī Tārīkh ‘Ilm al-Kalām [A General Introduction: the History of Islamic Theology].” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Al-Kashf ‘an Manāḥij al-Adilla fī ‘Aqā’id al-Milla aw Naqd ‘Ilm al-Kalām dīdd al-Tarsīm al-Idīyyūlujī li al-‘Aqīda wa Difā’an ‘an al-‘Ilm wa Ḥurriyyāt al-Ikhtiyār fī al-Fikr wa al-Fi’l* [Revealing the Methodological Arguments of Religious Schools or The Criticism of Islamic Theology against the Ideological Institutionalization of Religion, and the Freedoms of Choice in Thought and Action], edited by Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, 10-45. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.
- , “Madkhal ‘Āmm: Al-Ṣirā’ al-Madhabī warā’ ‘Tahāfut al-Falāsifa’ li al-Ghazālī [General Introduction: The Legal School Conflict behind al-Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers].” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: Intizār al-Ruḥ al-‘Ilmiyya wa Ta’sīs al-Akhlāqiyya al-Ḥiwār* [The Incoherence of the Incoherence: Awaiting Scientific Spirit and Founding the Ethics of Dialogue], edited by Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī, 15-54. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.
- , “Muqaddima Taḥfiliyya: Kitāb li al-Difā’ ‘an al-Ru’ya al-Islāmiyya wa Akhlāqiyyāt li al-Ḥiwār [Analytical Introduction: A Book for Defending Islamic Spirit and the Ethics of Dialogue].” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Tahāfut al-Tahāfut: Intizār al-Ruḥ al-‘Ilmiyya wa Ta’sīs al-Akhlāqiyya al-Ḥiwār* [The Incoherence of the Incoherence: Awaiting Scientific Spirit and Founding the Ethics of

Dialogue], edited by Muḥammad ‘Abid al-Jābirī, 57-98. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.

- , “Al-‘Ulama wa al-Huwiyya al-Thaqāfiyya: ‘Ashra Uṭrūḥāt [Globalization and the Cultural Identity: Ten Theses].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 6 (1998): 5-18.
- , “‘Hiwār al-Diyyānāt’: Quyyūm Thaqāfat al-Salām fī al-Diyyānāt al-Samāwiyya [Dialogue of Religions: The Values of Peace Culture in the Revealed Religions].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 8 (1998): 5-12.
- , “Fī Qaḍāyā al-Dīn wa al-Fikr (Ḥiwār).” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 9 (1998): 5-18.
- , “‘Amaliyya lā Taqbal al-Raj‘a wa illā fa ilā “ayna” Sayakūn al-Rujū’? [The Action of No Return, otherwise Whither Would the Return Go?].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 10 (1998): 5-12.
- , “Al-Širā‘ al-Madhhabī, wa laysa al-Dīn, warā’ ‘Tahāfut al-Falāsifa’ [The Conflict of Legal School and Not Religion behind the Incoherence of the Philosophers].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 11 (1998): 5-26.
- , “Jaḍīd fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī bi al-Turāth al-‘Arabī [A New Dimension in the Political Thought of Arab Heritage].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majalla Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 13 (1998): 5-16.
- , “Taqḍīm.” [Foreword to the republication of] Ibn Rushd, *Al-Ḍarūrī fī al-Siyāsa: Mukhtaṣar Kitāb al-Siyāsa li Aflātūn* [A Political Necessity: A Summary of Plato’s Republic], translated from Hebrew into Arabic by Aḥmad Shahlān, 9-12. Beirut: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥda al-‘Arabiyya, 1998.
- , “Afkār ḥawl Iṣlāḥ al-Ta‘līm fī al-Maghrib [Reflections on the Moroccan Educational Reform].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 12 (1998): 5-14.
- , “Ibn Rushd: al-‘Ilm wa al-Faḍīla [Ibn Rushd: Knowledge and Virtue].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 14 (1998): 5-13.
- , “Al-Muthaqqifūn, al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya, al-Taṭarruf [Intellectuals, Democracy, Extremism].” *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya*

[Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 15 (1999): 5-10.

- , "Al-Maghrib... ilā Ayna? Mustaqbal al-Tajriba al-Dīmūqrāṭiyya fī al-Maghrib [Whither Morocco? The Future of Moroccan Democratic Experiment]." *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 16 (1999): 5-28.
- , "Ibn Rushd al-‘Aṣā al-Qātila wa al-Rajul ‘al-ladhī Afsada Jamī‘a al-Aṭṭibā’ fī Awrūbā [Ibn Rushd: The Killing Stick and the Man Who Destroyed all European Doctors]." *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 17 (1999): 5-26.
- , "Nizām al-Quyyūm fī al-Thaqāfa al-‘Arabiyya: 1. Masrah ‘al-Ḥikma al-Khālida’ wa Mas’alat al-Namūdha [The Value Systems in the Arab Culture: 1. The Stage of ‘Everlasting Wisdom’ and the Problem of Model]." *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 19 (1999): 5-14.
- , "Nizām al-Quyyūm fī al-Thaqāfa al-‘Arabiyya: 2. al-Murū‘a wa al-Ṭā‘a... wa al-Sa‘āda wa al-Fanā’ [The Value Systems in the Arab Culture: 2. Manliness and Obidience... Happiness and Nothingness]." *Fikr wa Naqd: Majallat Thaqāfa Shahriyya* [Thought and Criticism: A Monthly Journal of Culture] 20 (1999): 5-22.

### 3. Madjid, Nurcholish

- Madjid, Nurcholish. "Al-Qur'an, Kaum Intelektual dan Kebangkitan Kembali Islam [The Qur'ān, Intellectuals, and the Revival of Islam]." In *Kebangkitan Islam dalam Pembahasan* [The Revival of Islam: A Discussion], edited by Rusydi Hamka and Iqbal Emsyarip Arf Saimima, 104-124. Jakarta: Yayasan Nurul Iman, 1979.
- , "Cita-cita Politik Kita [Our Political Ideals]." In *Aspirasi Umat Islam Indonesia* [The Aspiration of Indonesian Muslimism], edited by Bosco Cavallo and Dasrizal, 1-36. Jakarta: Leppenas, 1983.
- , "Warisan Intelektual Islam [The Heritage of Islamic Thought]." [Foreword to] al-Kindī et. al. *Khazanah Intelektual Islam* [The Heritage of Islamic Thought], compiled, translated and edited by Nurcholish Madjid, 3-84. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984.
- , "Ibn Taymiyya on *Kalām* and *Falsafa*: A Problem of Reason and Revelation in Islam." Ph. D. diss., University of Chicago, 1984.
- , "The Progress of Islam and the Reformation Process." *Mizan* II, 1 (1985): 61-66.

- , *Islam, Kemodernan dan Keindonesiaan* [Islam, Modernity and Indonesianness]. Bandung: Mizan, 1987. [Collection of articles].
- , "Pertimbangan Kemaslahatan dalam Menangkap Makna dan Semangat Ketentuan: Kasus Ijtihad Umar bin al-Khattab [Public Interest Factor in Grasping the Meaning and Spirit of Islamic Law: A Case Study of 'Umar ibn al-Khāṭṭāb's Legal Hermeneutics." In *Polemik Reaktualisasi Ajaran Islam* [The Polemics of the Reactualization of Islam], edited by Iqbal Abdurrauf Saimima, 12-27. Jakarta: Pustaka Panjimas, 1988.
- , "Pandangan Dunai Al-Qur'an: Ajaran tentang Harapan kepada Allah dan seluruh Ciptaan [The Worldview of the Qur'an: A Doctrine on the Hope for God and all of His Creatures]." In *Al-Qur'an dan Tantangan Modernitas* [The Qur'an and the Challenge of Modernity], edited by Ahmad Syafii Maarif and Said Tuhuleley, 3-10. Yogyakarta: Sipress, 1990.
- , "Islam on the Indonesian Soil: An Ongoing Process of Acculturation and Adaptation." *Arts: The Islamic Word* 20 (1991): 66-68.
- , "Sekapur Sirih." [Foreword to] Pardoyo. *Sekularisasi dalam Polemik* [Secularization: A Polemic]. Jakarta: Grafiti Press, 1993, xiii-xvi.
- , *Islam, Kerakyatan dan Keindonesiaan: Pikiran-pikiran "Nurcholish Muda"* [Islam, Republicanism and Indonesianness: The Reflections of "Young Nurcholish"]. Bandung: Mizan, 1993. [Collection of articles].
- , "Keilmuan Pesantren, Antara Materi dan Metodologi [Islamic Boarding School's Epistemology between Materials and Methodologies]." *Pesantren* [Islamic Boarding School] no. perdana (1994): 12-19.
- , "Beberapa Renungan tentang Kehidupan Keagamaan di Indonesia untuk Generasi Mendatang [Reflections on Religious Life in Indonesia for the Future Generations]." In *Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar "Pembaruan Islam"* [Questioning the Religious Reform Movement], edited by Lukman Hakiem, 30-90. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan, 1995.
- , *Lautan Hikmah: Kumpulan Renungan Keagamaan di Harian Republika* [The Ocean of Wisdom: A Collection of Religious Reflections as Published in the Daily Republika]. Bandung: Mizan, 1994.
- , "Masalah Ta'wil sebagai Metodologi Penafsiran al-Qur'an [The Problem of Esoteric Interpretation as a Method of Interpreting the Qur'an." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 11-23. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Konsep Asbab al-Nuzul dan Relevansinya bagi Pandangan Historis Segi-segi Tertentu Ajaran Keagamaan [The Concept of Occations of

- the Revelation and Its Relevance for Historical Approach to a Certain Islamic Teachings]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 24-41. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Konsep-konsep Kebahagiaan dan Kesengsaraan [The Concepts of Happiness and Misery]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 103-122. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Pergeseran Pengertian Sunnah ke Hadits: Implikasinya dalam Pengembangan Syari'ah [The Change of Meaning from Sunna to Ḥadīth]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 208-223. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Tradisi *Syarah* dan *Hasyiyah* dalam Fiqh dan Masalah Stagnasi Pemikiran Hukum Islam [The Traditions of Commentary and Summary in Islamic Jurisprudence and the Problem of Stagnation in Islamic Legal Thought]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 251-310. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Taqlid dan Ijtihad: Masalah Kontinuitas dan Kreativitas dalam Memahami Pesan Agama [Imitation and Personal-Interpretation: A Problem of Creativity in Understanding of Islamic Message]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 339-354. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Pandangan Kontemporer tentang Fiqh: Telaah Problematika Hukum Islam di Zaman Modern [A Contemporary View on Fiqh: A Study of the Modern Problem of Islamic Law]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah*, [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 378-397. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Puasa [Fasting]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 411-422. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Masalah Simbol dan Simbolisme dalam Ekspresi Keagamaan [The Problems of Symbol and Symbolism in Religious Expression]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 451-462. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Islam, Iman dan Ihsan sebagai Trilogi Ajaran Ilahi? [Islam, Imān and Iḥsān as the Trilogy of Islamic Teachings?]" In *Kontekstualisasi*

*Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 463-482. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.

- , "Penghayatan Keagamaan Populer dan Masalah Religio-Magisme [The Internalization of Popular Religion and the Problem of Religio-Magism]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 494-506. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Konsep Muhammad saw sebagai Penutup Para Nabi: Implikasinya dalam Kehidupan Sosial dan Keagamaan [The Concept of Muhammad --peace be upon him-- as the Seal of the Prophets: Its Implication in the Socio-Religious Life]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 523-536. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Islam di Indonesia dan Potensinya sebagai Sumber Substansiasi Ideologi dan Etos Nasional [Indonesian Islam and Its Potential as A Source of Ideological Substantiation and National Ethics]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 568-581. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Agama dan Negara dalam Islam: Telaah atas Fiqh Siyasy Sunni [Religion and State in Islam: A Study of Sunni Political Thought]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 588-594. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , "Skisme dalam Islam: Tinjauan Singkat secara Kritis-Historis terhadap Proses Dini Perpecahan Sosial-Keagamaan Islam [Schism in Islam: A Short Historical and Critical Review of the Early Socio-Religious Division in Islam]." In *Kontekstualisasi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [The Contextualization of Islamic Doctrines in History], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 632-668. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , *Pintu-pintu menuju Tuhan* [Doors to God]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1994.
- , *Islam Agama Kemanusiaan: Membangun Tradisi dan Visi Baru Islam Indonesia* [Islam Is A Human Religion: Building A Tradition and New Vision of Islam]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995.
- , *Islam and Peradaban: Membangun Makna dan Relevansi Doktrin Islam dalam Sejarah* [Islam and Civilization: Building the Meaning and Relevance of Islamic Doctrines in History]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1995.

- , *Agama dan Dialog antar Peradaban* [Religion and the Dialogue of Civilizations]. Jakarta: Paramadina, ICMI, Yayasan Dialog Bangsa, and Goethe Institute, 1996.
- , "Al-Quds (Yerusalem): Tanah Kelahiran Para Nabi [*Al-Quds* (Jerusalem): Birth Place of Prophets]." In *Rekonstruksi dan Renungan Religius Islam* [A Religious Reconstruction and Reflection of Islam], edited by Nurcholish Madjid et al., 235-264. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1996.
- , *Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem* [There Is No Islamic State: Nurcholish Madjid-Mohamad Roem Political Correspondence]. Jakarta: Djambatan, 1997.
- , *Masyarakat Religius* [Religious Society]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997.
- , *Bilik-bilik Pesantren* [Islamic Boarding School's Rooms]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1997.
- , "Kata Pengantar [Preface]." In *Passing Over: Melintasi Batas Agama* [Passing Over the Limits of Religions], edited by Nurcholish Madjid, xxvii-xI. Jakarta: Gramedia-Paramadina, 1998.
- , "Dialog Agama-agama dalam Perspective Universalisme al-Islâm [Dialogue of Religions from the Perspective of Islamic Universalism]. In *Passing Over: Melintasi Batas Agama* [Passing Over the Limits of Religions], edited by Nurcholish Madjid, 5-23. Jakarta: Gramedia-Paramadina, 1998.
- , "Kebebasan Beragama dan Pluralisme dalam Islam [Religious Freedom and Pluralism in Islam]." In *Passing Over: Melintasi Batas Agama* [Passing Over the Limits of Religions], edited by Nurcholish Madjid, 173-186. Jakarta: Gramedia-Paramadina, 1998.
- , "Keluarga 'Imran, Siti Maryam dan Isa al-Masih [The House of 'Imrān, Maria and Jesus Christ]." In *Passing Over: Melintasi Batas Agama* [Passing Over the Limits of Religions], edited by Nurcholish Madjid, 385-400. Jakarta: Gramedia-Paramadina, 1998.
- , *Pemerintahan yang Amanah* [The Trusted Government]. Jakarta: Bina Rena Pariwara, 1998.
- , *Dialog Keterbukaan: Artikulasi Nilai-nilai Islam dalam Wacana Sosial Politik Kontemporer* [A Dialogue of Openness: Articulating Islamic Values in the Contemporary Socio-Political Discourse]. Jakarta: Paramadina, 1998.



## B. Secondary Sources

- Abāh, al-Sayyid waladuh. "Al-Tanwīr wa al-Ta'ṣīl: Qirā'a fī Ba'd A'māl Ḥasan Ḥanafī [Enlightenment and Authentication: A Reading in Some of Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Works]." In *Jadal al-Ana wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, 17-32. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- 'Abd al-Nāṣir, Jamāl. *Al-Mīthāq* [Manifesto]. Cairo: Dār al-Qawmiyya li al-Ṭibā'a, 1962.
- 'Abd al-Wahhāb, Muḥammad Ibn. *Kitāb al-Tawḥīd* [The Book of the Unity of God]. Cairo: Dār al-Miṣr, n.d.
- Abdelnasser, Walid Mahmoud. *The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-81*. New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Abd-el-Jalel, Jean. *Aspects intérieurs de l'Islam*. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, n.d.
- 'Abduh, Muḥammad. *Al-Islām wa al-Naṣrāniyya*. Cairo: al-Manār, 1938.
- , *Risālat al-Tawḥīd* [A Treatise on the Unity of God]. Cairo: Dār al-Ma'ārif, n.d.
- , *Al-A'māl al-Kāmila* [Complete Works]. Edited by Muḥammad 'Amāra. Beirut: al-Mu'assasa al-'Arabiyya li al-Dirāsa wa al-Nashr, 1972.
- Abdullah, Taufik. *Islam dan Masyarakat: Pantulan Sejarah Indonesia* [Islam and Society: A Historical Reflection of Indonesia]. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1987.
- , "Adat dan Islam: Suatu Tinjauan tentang Konflik di Minangkabau [Custom and Islam: A Study of Conflict in Minangkabau]." In *Sejarah dan Masyarakat: Lintasan Historis Islam di Indonesia* [History and Society: Indonesian Islam from Historical Perspective], edited by Taufik Abdullah, 104-127. Second edition. Jakarta: Pustaka Firdaus, 1987.
- Abun-Nasr, J. "The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco: The Religious Bases of the Moroccan Nationalist Movement (1963)." In *Social Change: The Colonial Situation*, edited by Immanuel Wallerstein, 489-502. New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1966.

- Abu-Rabi, Ibrahim. "Sayyid Qutb: From Religious Realism to Radical Social Criticism." *The Islamic Quarterly* 28 (1984), 101-126.
- , *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World*. New York: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- Abū Zayd, Naṣr Ḥāmid. "Al-Turāth bayn al-Ta'wīl wa al-Talwīn: Qirā'a fī Mashrū' al-Yasār al-Islāmī [Heritage between Interpretation and Coloration: Reading in the Project of the Islamic Left]." *Alif* 10 (1990): 54-109; republished in Naṣr Ḥāmid Abu Zayd, *Al-Khiṭāb al-Dīnī: Ru'ya Naqdiyya nahw Intāj Wa'y 'Ilmī bi Dilālat al-Nuṣūṣ al-Dīnīyya* [Religious Discourse: A Critical Evaluation towards the Production of Scientific Awareness through The Indications of Religious Texts]. Cairo: Dār al-Muntakhab al-'Arabī, 1992: 75-127.
- Adams, Charles C. *Islam and Modernism in Egypt*. London: Oxford University Press, 1933.
- , "Muḥammad 'Abduh and the Transvaal Fatwa." In *The Macdonald Presentation Volume*, edited by William G. Shellabear, Edwin C. Calverey, and Ruth S. McKensen, 13-29. Princeton and New Jersey: Princeton University Press; London: Humphrey Milford & Oxford University Press, 1933.
- Adams, Charles [J.] "Conservative Movements in the Arab World." *Arab Journal* 4.1 (1966-1967): 57-62.
- Ahmad, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908-1914*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Ahmad S., Moussalli. *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb*. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1992.
- , *Qira'a Ta'sīsiyya fī al-Khiṭāb al-Islāmī al-Uṣūlī (Naẓariyyāt al-Ma'rifa wa al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama')* [A Basic Reading on Islamic Fundamentalist Discourse (Theories of Epistemology, State and Society)]. Beirut: al-Nāshir, 1993.
- Akhavi, Shahrough. "The Dialectic in Contemporary Egyptian Social Thought: The Scripturalist and Modernist Discourses of Sayyid Qutb and Hasan Hanafi." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 29 (1997): 377-401.
- Alami, Mohamed el. *Allal el Fassi, patriarche du nationalisme marocain*. Casablanca: Dar el Kitab, 1980.
- Al-'Ālim, Maḥmūd Amīn. *Al-Wa'y wa al-Wa'y al-Zā'if fī al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'aṣir* [Awareness and the False Awareness in the Contemporary

- Arab Thought]. Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīda, 1986; second edition, 1988.
- , *Mafāhīm wa Qaḍāyā Ishkālīyya* [Problematic Concepts and Problems]. Cairo: Dār al-Thaqāfa al-Jadīd, 1989.
- , *Mawāqif Naqdiyya min al-Turāth* [Critical Attitudes regarding Heritage]. Cairo: Dār Qaḍāyā Fikriyya, 1997.
- , "Al-Mashrū' al-Ḥaḍārī 'ind Ḥasan Ḥanafī [Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Civilizational Project]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 161-178. Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Allana, G. *Muslim Political Thought through the Ages: 1562-1947*. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1988.
- Allard, Michel. "Méthode d'analyse de texte appliquée à un passage de Muḥammad 'Abduh." *Studia Islamica* 31 (1970): 15-27.
- Amīn, Ḥusayn Aḥmad. *Al-Islam fī 'Ālam al-Mutaghayyir* [Islam in the Changing World]. Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 1988.
- Amīn, Osman. "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani." In *A History of Muslim Philosophy: With Short Accounts of Other Disciplines and Other Modern Renaissance in Muslim Lands*, edited by M.M. Sharif, 2: 1490-1513. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1966.
- Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*. Fourth edition. New York, 1965.
- Ashford, Douglas E. *Political Change in Morocco*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- 'Atīyya, Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm. "Al-Tafkīk wa al-Ikhtilāf: Jacques Derrida wa al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'āṣir [Deconstruction and Conflict: Jacques Derrida and Contemporary Arab Thought]." In *Al-Fikr al-'Arabī 'alā Mashārif al-Qarn al-Ḥādī wa al-'Ishrīn: Ru'ya Tahlīliyya Naqdiyya* [Arab Thought at the Crossroads of the Twenty-First Century: A Critical and Analytical View], edited by Maḥmūd Amīn al-'Ālim, 159-190. Cairo: Qaḍāyā Fikriyya li al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1995.
- , "Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa Nuqqāduh [Ḥasan Ḥanafī and His Critics]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 331-353. Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.

- Ayubi, Nazih N.M. "The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 12 (1980): 481-499.
- Ayubi, Nazih. *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
- Al-Azmeh, Aziz. *Islams and Modernities*. Second edition. London and New York: Verso, 1996.
- Azzam, Maha. "Egypt: The Islamists and the State Under Mubarak." In *Islamic Fundamentalism*, edited by Abdul Salam Sidahmad and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 109-122. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Baer, Gabriel. "Islam and Politics in Modern Middle Eastern History." In *Islam and Politics in the Modern Middle East*, edited by Metin Heper and Raphael Israeli, 14-. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1984.
- Bagader, Abubakar A. "Contemporary Islamic Movements in the Arab World." In *Islam, Globalization and Postmodernity*, edited by Hastings Donnan and Akbar S. Ahmed, 114-126. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
- Al-Bannā, Ḥasan. *Majmū'āt Rasā'il al-Imām al-Shahīd Ḥasan al-Bannā*. [A Collection of Ḥasan al-Bannā's Letters]. Beirut: Dār al-Andalus, 1965.
- , *Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Banna' (1906-1949)*. Translated by Charles Wendell. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1978.
- , *Memoirs of Hasan al-Banna Shaheed*. Karachi: International Islamic Publishers, 1981.
- Al-Barbarī, Aḥmad Muḥammad Sālīm. *Ishkalīyyat al-Turāth fī al-Fikr al-'Arabī al-Mu'aṣir: Dirāsa Muqārana bayn Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī* [The Problem of Heritage in Contemporary Arab Thought: A Comparative Study of Ḥasan Ḥanafī and Muḥammad 'Ābid al-Jābirī]. Cairo: Dār al-Ḥadāra, 1998.
- Barton, Greg. "The International Context of the Emergence of Islamic Neo-Modernism in Indonesia." In *Islam in the Indonesian Social Context*, edited by M.C. Ricklefs, 69-82. Canberra: Annual Indonesian Lectures, 1989.
- Bayūmī, 'Abd al-Mu'ṭī Maṣḍar. "Ḥasan Ḥanafī bayn al-'Aqā'id wa 'Ilm al-'Aqā'id [Ḥasan Ḥanafī between Faiths and Theology]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 41-81. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.

- Al-Bayūmī, Zakariyyā. *Jamā'at al-Islāmiyya fi al-Ḥayā al-Siyāsiyya al-Miṣriyya 1928-1948* [Islamic Groups in the Egyptian Political Life]. Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1979.
- Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork. "On the Modernity, Historical Specificity and International Context of Political Islam." In *Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report*, edited by Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, 3-25. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997.
- Benda, Harri J. and Ruth T. McVey, eds., *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960.
- Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964.
- Bernard, Stéphane. *The Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1943-1956*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Berque, J. "Ça et là dans les debuts du reformisme religieuse au Maghreb." In *Etudes d'orientalisme dédiés à la mémoire de Lévi-Provençal*, edited by J. Berque, 2: 471-494. Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962.
- Betti, Emelio. "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften." In *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy, and Critique*, edited by J. Bleicher, 51-90. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.
- Binder, Leonard. *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East*. New York, London and Sydney: John Wiley & Sons, 1964.
- , *Islamic Liberation: A Critique of Development Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988.
- Bogle, Emory C. *The Modern Middle East From Imperialism to Freedom, 1800-1958*. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996.
- Boland, Bernard Johan. *The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.
- Boullata, Issa J. *Trends and Issues in Contemporary Arab Thought*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
- , "Ḥasan Ḥanafī." In *The Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, edited by John L. Esposito, 2: 97-99. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Brown, Daniel W. *Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

- Bruinessen, Martin van. *NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru* [The Nahdlatul Ulama, Power Relations and the Search for New Discourses]. Yogyakarta: LkiS, 1994.
- Brunschvig, Rober. "Préface." [Foreword to] Ḥasan Ḥanafī. *Les méthodes d'exégèse: essai sur la science des fondaments de la compréhension "Ilm Uṣūl al-Fiqh,"* i-iii. Cairo: Le Conseil supérieur des arts, des lettres et des sciences sociales, 1965.
- Bucaille, Maurice. *The Bible, the Qur'ān and Science: The Holy Scriptures Examined in the Light of Modern Knowledge*. Translated by Alastair D. Pannell and the author. Lahore: Kazi Publications, 1979.
- Burgat, François. *L'islamisme au Maghreb: La voix du Sud*. Paris: Karthala, 1988.
- Burke, Edmund. "Pan-Islamism and Moroccan Resistance to French Colonial Penetration, 1900-1912." *Journal of African History* 12.1 (1972): 97-118.
- , *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Precolonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976.
- Busool, Assad Nimer. "Shaykh Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā's Relations with Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh." *The Muslim World* 66 (1976): 272-286.
- Cagne, Jacques. *Nation et Nationalisme au Maroc*. Rabat: Dār al-Nashr al-Ma'rifa, 1988.
- Caputo, John D. *More Radical Hermeneutics on Not Knowing Who We Are*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2000.
- Charaffeddine, Fahima. *Culture et idéologie dans le monde Arabe*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994.
- Cohen, Mark I. and Lorna Hahn. *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation*. New York, Washington and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.
- Cole, Juan Ricardo. "Rashid Riḍā on the Baha'i Faith: A Utilitarian Theory of the Spread of Religions." *The Arab Studies Quarterly* 5 (1983): 276.
- Commins, David. "Ḥasan al-Banna (1906-1949)." In *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, edited by Ali Rahnema, 125-149. London and New Jersey: Zed Books Ltd., 1994.
- de Corancez, Louis Alexander Olivier. *The History of the Wahhabis from Their Origin until the End of 1809*. Translated by Eric Tabet. Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 1995.

- "Critical Approaches to Hermeneutics." [Www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.html](http://www2.canisius.edu/~gallagher/ahcri.html) (accessed November 18, 2001): 1-5.
- Dahlstrom, Daniel O. "Heidegger's Critique of Husserl." In *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earlier Thought*, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, 231-244. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Dahm, Bernard. *Sukarnos Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhängigkeit*. Frankfurt am Main-Berlin: Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde in Hamburg, n.d.
- , "Islam in Sumatera." In *Der Einfluß des Islam auf Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in Südostasien*, edited by Werner Draguhn, 55-74. Hamburg: Mitteilungen des Instituts für Asienkunde, 1983.
- Damis, John. "Early Moroccan Reaction to the French Protectorate: The Cultural Dimension." *Humaniora Islamica* 1 (1973): 15-31.
- Davidow, Adam. "Gadamer: The Possibility of Interpretation." <http://www.sbccc.cc.us/academic/phil/stoa/Davidow.html> (accessed 18 February, 2001): 1-13.
- Davis, Eric. "The Concept of Revival and the Study of Islam and Politics." In *The Islamic Impulse*, edited by Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 37-58. London and Sydney: Croom Helm in association with Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1987.
- Al-Dawla, 'Iṣmat Sayf. "Al-Hākimiyya lil-Lāh: Ḥiwār ma' al-Duktūr Ḥasan Ḥanafī [God's Sovereignty: A Dialogue with Dr. Ḥasan Ḥanafī]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, 273-296. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Dawn, C.E. "Ideological Influences in the Arab Revolt." In *The World of Islam*, edited by J. Kritzecek and R. Bayly Winder, 375-393. London: Macmillan, 1960.
- Dāwūd, Abū. *Sunan Abī Dāwūd*. 2 vols. Beirut: Dār al-Jinān li al-Ṭibā'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī', 1988.
- de Saint-Aulaire, *Confession d'un vieux diplomate*. Paris: Flammarion, 1953.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. "The Anatomy of Islamic Revival: Legitimacy Crisis, Ethnic Conflict and the Search for Islamic Alternatives." *The Middle East Journal* 34,1 (1989): 1-12.
- , "Charismatic Leadership in Messianic and Revolutionary Movements: The Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad) and the Messiah (Shabbatai Sevi)." In

- Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism*, edited by Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, 78-107. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1987.
- , *Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World*. Second edition. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1995.
- , "Resurgent Islam and the Egyptian State." In *The Middle East and North Africa: Essays in Honor of J.C. Hurewitz*, edited by Reeve S. Simon. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989.
- , "Multiple Faces of Islam." In *Islam in a Changing World: Europe and the Middle East*, edited by A. Jerichow and J. Back Simonson, 1-12. Richmond: Curzon, 1997.
- Deprez, Jean-Robert. "Pérennité de l'Islam dans l'ordre juridique au Maghreb." In *Islam et Politique au Maghreb*, edited by Ernest Gellner and Jean-Claude Vatin, 315-54. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1981.
- Dessouki, Ali E. Hilal. "The Mass Political Culture of Egypt: A Case Study of the Persistence of Cultural Traits." *The Muslim World* 16 (1971): 13-20.
- , "Official Islam and the Legitimation in the Arab Countries." In *The Islamic Impulse*, edited by Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 135-156. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987.
- Dilthey, Wilhelm. *Gesammelte Schriften*, edited by Georg Misch. 23 vols. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924.
- , "The Rise of Hermeneutics." Translated by T. Hall. In *Critical Sociology: Selected Writings*, edited by P. Connerton, 104-116. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976.
- Djaelani, Abdul Qadir. *Menelusuri Kekeliruan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam Nurcholish Madjid* [Tracing the Mistakes of Nurcholish Madjid's Reform of Islamic Thought]. Bandung: Yadia, 1994.
- Djajadiningrat, Pangeran Aria Ahmad. *Kenang-kenangan* [A Memoir]. Jakarta: Balai Pustaka, 1936.
- Djawadi, Radik. *Kisah Kahar Muzakar* [The Story of Kahar Muzakar]. Surabaya: GRIP, n.d.
- Dofier, Zamakhsyari. "K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim Rantai Penghubung Peradaban Pesantren dengan Peradaban Indonesia Modern [K.H.A. Wahid Hasyim: An Islamic-Boarding-School Link to Modern Indonesian Civilization." *Prisma* [Prism] 8 (1984): 75.
- Al-Dukkālī, Abū Shu'ayb. "Opinion de Bou Chaib Doukkali." *Revue du Monde Musulmane* 29 (1914): 361.



- Dunn, Ross E. *Resistance in the Desert: Moroccan Responses to French Imperialism 1881-1912*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1977.
- Duri, A. A. *The Historical Formation of the Arab Nation*. New York: Croom Helm, 1987.
- Eddin, Mohammed M. H. Shehab. "Pan-Arabism and the Islamic Tradition." Ph.D. diss., The American University of Cairo, 1966.
- El-Efendy, Abdulwahab. *Turabi's Revolution: Islam and Power in Sudan*. London: Grey Seal, 1993.
- Eickelman, Dale F. *Moroccan Islam: Tradition and Society in a Pilgrimage Center*. Austin and London: University of Texas, 1976.
- , "Ideological Change and Regional Cults: Maraboutism and the Ties of 'Closeness' in Western Morocco." In *Regional Cults*, edited by R. P. Werbner, 3-28. London, New York and San Francisco: Academic Press, 1977.
- Enayat, Hamid. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982.
- Entelis, John P. "Political Islam in Maghrib." In *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa*, edited by John P. Entelis, 43-74. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- , *Culture and Counterculture in Moroccan Politics*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
- Esposito, John L. "Islamic Law." In *The Impact of Islam*, edited by Yvonne Yazbec Haddad, Byron Haines and Ellison Findly, 69-88. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984.
- , "Sudan's Islamic Experiment." *The Muslim World* 76 (1986): 181-202.
- , *Islam: The Straight Path*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- , *Islam and Politics*. Third edition. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991.
- , *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Faḍl Allāh, Maḥdī. *Ma'a Sayyid Quṭb fī Fikrih al-Siyāsī wa al-Dīnī* [With Sayyid Quṭb's Political and Religious Thought]. Beirut: Mu'asasat al-Risāla, 1978.
- Faruqi, Ziya-ul-Hasan. "A Note on the Wahhabiyah." *Islam and the Modern Age* 4,1 (1973): 38-50.

- Al-Fāṣī, ‘Abd al-Ḥāfiz. *Al-Ḥaraka al-Istiqlāliyya fī al-Maghrib al-‘Arabī* [Freedom Movement in the Arab West (Morocco)]. Cairo: Lajnat al-Thaqāfa al-Waṭaniyya al-Ḥizb al-Istiqlāl, 1948.
- , *Ḥafriyyāt ‘an al-Ḥaraka al-Dustūriyya fī al-Maghrib qabl al-Ḥimāya* [Memoirs on the Constitutional Movement in Preprotectorate Morocco]. Rabat, n.d.
- , *Ḥadīth al-Mashriq fī al-Maghrib* [The Story of the East in the West]. Cairo: 1956.
- Fay, Brian. *Social Theory and Political Practice*. Second edition. London, Boston and Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1997.
- Federspiel, Howard M. *Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970.
- , “The Muhammadiyah: A Study of an Orthodox Islamic Movement in Indonesia.” *Indonesia* 9 (1970): 57-79.
- , “The Military and Islam in Sukarno’s Indonesia.” *Pacific Affairs* 46,3 (1973): 407-420.
- , “Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists: A Study of Accommodation between Traditional Islam and an Ultranationalist Ideology.” In *Essays on Islamic Civilization: Presented to Niyazi Berkes*, edited by Donald P. Little, 89-102. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976.
- , *Muslim Intellectuals and National Developments in Indonesia*. Newark: Nova Scientia, 1992.
- , “Islam and National Identity in Indonesia.” Unpublished paper, The Ohio State University, n.d.: 1-7.
- , “Contemporary Southeast Asian Muslim Intellectuals: An Examination of the Sources for their Concepts and Intellectual Constructs.” Unpublished paper, McGill University, 1996: 1-18.
- Fehér, István M. “Phenomenology, Hermeneutics, *Lebensphilosophie*: Heidegger’s Confrontation with Husserl, Dilthey, and Jaspers.” In *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, edited by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, 73-89. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Feillard, Andrée. “Traditionalist Islam and the State in Indonesia: The Road to Legitimacy and Renewal.” In *Islam in an Era of Nation-States*, edited by Robert W. Hefner and Patricia Horvath, 129-153. Honolulu: University of Hawaii’s Press, 1997.

- Gaebel, Michael. *Von der Kritik des arabischen Denkens zum panarabischen Aufbruch: Das philosophische und politische Denken Muḥammad 'Abid al-Ġābirīs*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1995.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Truth and Method*. Translated by Garrett and John Cumming. New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1985.
- Gaudio, Attilio. *Allal El Fassi ou l'histoire de l'Istiqlal*. Paris: Alain Moreau, 1972.
- Geertz, Clifford. *Islam Observed, Religious Development in Morocco and in Indonesia*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968.
- George, David. "Pax Islamica: An Alternative New World Order?" In *Islamic Fundamentalism*, edited by Abdul Salam Sidahmad and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 71-90. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Ghālī, Wā'il. *Ibn Rushd fī Miṣr* [Ibn Rushd in Egypt]. Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1999.
- Gharriṭ, Muḥammad. *Fawāṣil al-Juman fī Anbā' Wuzarā' wa Kuttāb al-Zamān* [Distinguished Sessions on the News of Ministers and Writers of the Age]. Fez: al-Maṭba'a al-Jadīda, 1928.
- Gibb, Hamilton H.R. *Modern Trends in Islam*. New York: Harper & Brothers Publisher, 1959.
- , "The Heritage of Islam in the Modern World (I)." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1 (1970): 14-15.
- Gobée, E. and C. Adriaanse. *Nasihat-nasihat C. Snouck Hurgronje Semasa Kepegawaiannya kepada Pemerintah Hindia Belanda 1889-1936* [C. Snouck Hurgronje's Advices during His Service to the Dutch Government 1889-1936]. Translated by Sukarsi. Jakarta: INIS, 1994.
- Goldziher, I. "Djamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī." In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by Bernard Lewis, et al., 2: 417. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1965.
- Grandguillaume, G. "Islam et politique au Maghrib." In *L'islam et l'état dans le monde d'aujourd'hui*, edited by Olivier Carré, 45-64. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982.
- Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. "Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Quṭb." *The Middle East Journal* 17,1 (1983): 14-29.
- , "Sayyid Qutb: Ideologue of Islamic Revival." In *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, edited by John L. Esposito, 67-78. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- , "Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform." In *Pioneers of Islamic Revival*, edited by Ali Rehnema, 30-59. London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1995.

- Haim, Silvia. "Introduction." In *Arab Nationalism: An Anthology*, edited by Silvia G. Haim: 3-72. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Al-Ḥafīz, Majdī 'Abd. "Dirāsa Naqdiyya li Kitāb 'Ilm al-Istighrāb [A Critical Study of the Book Introduction to Occidentalism]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥafīm 'Aṭīyya, 195-214. Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- , *Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī wa Ishkālīyyat al-Aṣr* [Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and the Problem of the Age]. Cairo: Mu'assasat al-A'lā li al-Thaqāfa, 1997.
- Hakim, Lukman, ed. *Menggugat Gerakan Pembaruan Keagamaan: Debat Besar "Pembaruan Islam"* [Questioning the Religious Reform Movement: The Big Debate over "Islamic Reform"]. Jakarta: Lembaga Studi Informasi Pembangunan, 1995.
- Halstead, John P. *Rebirth of A Nation: The Origins and Rise of Moroccan Nationalism, 1912-1944*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.
- Hamim, Thoha. "Moenawar Chalil's Reformist Thought: A Study of an Indonesian Religious Scholar (1908-1961)." Ph. D. diss., McGill University, 1996.
- Ḥarb, 'Alī. *Naqd al-Naṣṣ* [Textual Criticism]. Casablanca and Beirut: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1995.
- , *Al-Mamnu' wa al-Mumtani': Naqd al-Dhāt al-Mufakkira* [The Prohibited and the Allegedly Prohibited: Criticism of the Thinker]. Beirut and Casablanca: al-Markaz al-Thaqāfī al-'Arabī, 1995.
- Hartmann, R. "Die Wahhabiten." *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 68,2 (1924): 176-213.
- Hasan, Muhammad Kamal. *Muslim Intellectual Responses to "New Order" Modernization in Indonesia*. Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, 1982.
- Hassan, Ahmad. *Risalah Al-Madzhab: Wadjibkah atau Haramkah Bermadzhab?* [A Treatise on the Islamic Legal School: Is it an Obligation or Prohibition?] Bangil: Penerbit Persatoean Islam, 1956.
- Hassan II, King. *The Challenge: The Memoirs of King Hassan II of Morocco*. Translated by Anthony Rhodes. London: Macmillan London Limited, 1978.
- Ḥattār, Nāhiḍ. *Al-Turāth, al-Gharb, al-Thawra: Baḥth ḥawl al-Aṣāla wa al-Mu'aṣira fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī* [Heritage, the West and Revolution: A Study of Authenticity and Contemporaneity in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's

- Thought]. Amman: Shāqir wa 'Akāsha li Ṭibā'a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawqī', 1986.
- Heelan, Patrick A. "Galileo, Luther, and the Hermeneutics of Natural Science." In *The Question of Hermeneutics: Festschrift for Joseph Kockmans*, edited by Timothy Stapleton, 363-375?. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994.
- Heidegger, Martin. *Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit*. Translated by Joan Stambaugh. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996.
- , *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959.
- Hildebrandt, Thomas. *Emanzipation oder Isolation vom westlichen Lehrer? Die Debatte um Hasan Hanafi's "Einführung in die Wissenschaft der Okzidentalistik."* Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1998.
- Hiro, Dilip. *Islamic Fundamentalism*. Second edition. London: Paladin Grafton Books, 1989.
- Hirsh, E. D. *Validity of Interpretation*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- Homa, Pakdaman. "Notes sur le séjour de Djamal al-Din al-Afghani en France." *Orient* 35 (1965), 203-207.
- Hopwood, Derek "A Pattern of Revival Movements in Islam?" *The Islamic Quarterly* 15,4 (1971): 152.
- Hottinger, Arnold. *Islamischer Fundamentalismus*. Paderborn, München, Wien, and Zürich: Ferdinand Schöningh, 1993.
- Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- , *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Humaidi, Achmad Farichin "The Jam'iyah Nahdlatul Ulama: Its Rise and Early Development (1926-1945)." M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1957.
- Hurgronje, Christiaan Snouck. *Mekka in the Later Part of the Nineteenth Century*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1933.
- Husnan, Ahmad. *Ilmiah Intelektual dalam Sorotan (Tanggapan Terhadap Dr. Nurcholish Madjid)* [The Scientificness of An Intellectual (A Response to Dr. Nurcholish Madjid)]. Solo: Ulul Albab Press, 1993.
- Ibn Ibrāhīm, 'Abbās. *Al-I'lām bi man Ḥalla Marrākish wa Aghmāt min al-A'lām* [Information on Those Who Occupied Marakesh and Clouds of the World]. Rabat: n.d.

- Ibn Khaldūn, *al-Muqaddima* [Introduction]. Edited by 'Alī 'Abd al-Wāḥid Wāfi. Second edition. Cairo: Lajnat al-Bayān al-'Arabī, 1965.
- Ibrahim, Ibrahim. "Religion and Politics under Nasser and Sadat, 1952-1981." In *The Islamic Impulse*, edited by Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 121-134. London and Sydney: Croom Helm, 1987.
- Ibrahim, Saad Edin. "Egypt's Islamic Militants." *MERIP Reports* 103 (February, 1982).
- Ihde, Don. "Expanding Hermeneutics." *www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/papers/Expherm.htm* (accessed November 18, 2001): 1-5.
- Izzeddin, Nejla. *The Arab World*. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1953.
- Al-Jābirī, 'Alī Ḥusayn. "'Aqlāniyya Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa Makānatuh [ The Position of Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Rationalism]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, 241-260. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Jam'a, Muḥammad. "Ishkāliyyat al-Tajdīd bayn Ḥasan Ḥanafī wa 'Abd Allāh al-'Arwī [The Problem of Reform between Ḥasan Ḥanafī and Abdallah Laroui]." Ph.D. diss., Al-Jāmi'a al-Lubnāniyya [The University of Lebanon], n.d.
- , "Mashrū' Ḥasan Ḥanafī li al-Turāth [Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Project on Heritage]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, 113-143. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Jansen, Johannes J.G. *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986.
- Jaylani, Ahmad Timur. "The Sarekat Islam Movement: Its Contribution to Indonesian Nationalism." M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1958.
- Jawad, Haifaa. "Pan-Islamism in the Middle East: Prospects and Future." *The Islamic Quarterly* 37 (1993): 207-222.
- Julien, Charles-André. *Abd el-Krim et la république du rif*. Paris: François Maspero, 1976.
- Kaloti, Sami Abdullah. "The Reformation of Islam and the Impact of Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī and Muḥammad 'Abduh on Islamic Education." Ph. D. diss., Marquette University, 1974.

- Kartodirdjo, Sartono. *The Peasant's Revolt of Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, Course and Sequel*. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966.
- Al-Kattānī, Muḥammad Bāqir. *Tarjamat al-Shaykh Muḥammad al-Kattānī* [A Biography of Shaykh Muḥammad al-Kattānī]. N.p. 1962.
- Keddie, Nikki R. *Sayyid Jamal al-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, 1972.
- Kerr, Malcom. "Rashīd Riḍā and Islamic Legal Reform: An Ideological Analysis. Part I. Methodology." *The Muslim World* 50 (1960): 99-108.
- , "Rashīd Riḍā and Islamic Legal Reform: An Ideological Analysis. Part II. Application." *The Muslim World* 50 (1960): 170-181.
- Al-Khasht, Muḥammad 'Uthmān. *Al-Islām wa al-'Ilm bayn al-Afghānī wa Rīnān* [Islam and Science between al-Afghānī and Ernest Renan]. Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1998.
- Khālidi, Ṣalāḥ 'Abd al-Fattāḥ. *Sayyid Quṭb al-Shahīd al-Ḥayy* [Sayyid Quṭb the Living Martyr]. Amman: Maktabat al-Aqṣā, 1981.
- King, Magda. *A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001.
- Koury, Enver M. *The Patterns of Mass Movement in Arab Revolutionary-Progressive States*. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1970.
- Khoury, Adel-Theodor. *Tendénces et courants de l'Islam arabe contemporain, 2: Un modele d'état islamique: l'Arabie Saudite*. Mainz: Grünewald, 1983.
- Khoury, Paul. *L'Islam critique de l'Occident dans la pensée arabe actuelle*. Altenberger: Oros Verlag, 1994.
- Khoury, Richard K. "A Critique of Hassan Hanafi concerning His Reflections on the Scarcity of Freedom in the Arab-Muslim World." In *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*, edited by Şerif Mardin, 87-115. Leiden, New York and Köln: E.J. Brill, 1994.
- Al-Khūlī, Yumnā. "Jadal al-Anā wa al-Ākhar fī Mashrū' al-Turāth wa al-Jadīd [Dialogue between Self and Other in the Project of Heritage and Modernity]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Ākhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn*, edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 179-189. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Khuluq, Latiful. "Sarekat Islam: Its Rise, Peak and Decline." *Al-Jami'ah* 60 (1997): 246-272.
- Krabendam, Hendrik. "The New Hermeneutics." In *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and Bible*, edited by Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Prues, 533-558. Michigan: Zondervan, 1984.

- Kraus, Werner. *Zwischen Reform und Rebellion über Entwicklung des Islams in Minangkabau (Westsumatra) zwischen den Beiden Reformbewegungen der Padri (1837) und der Modernisten (1908)*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1984.
- Kudsi-Zadeh, A. Albert. "Islamic Reform in Egypt: Some Observations on the Role of Afghānī." *The Muslim World* 61 (1971): 1-12.
- , "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and the National Awakening of Egypt." In *Actes Ve Congrès international d'Arabisants et d'Islamisants, Bruxelles 31 August to 6 Septembre 1970*, 297-305. Bruxelles: Publications du Centre pour l'Études des problèmes du Monde Musulman Contemporain, 1971.
- Küng, Hans. "A New Basic Method for Theology: Divergences and Controversies." Translated by Margaret Köhl. In *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future*, edited by Hans Küng and David Tracy. New York: Crossroad, 1991.
- Labdaoui, Abdellah. *Les nouveaux intellectuels arabes*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993.
- Lagge, J.D. *Indonesia*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1965.
- Lamchichi, Abderrahim. *Islam et contestation au Maghreb*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1989.
- , *Islam, islamisme et modernité*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994.
- Lang, Chris. "Brief History of Literary Theory VIII," [www.xenos.org/ essays/ litthy9.html](http://www.xenos.org/essays/litthy9.html) (accessed June 30, 2001): 1-2.
- Lapidus, Ira M. *A History of Islamic Societies*. Sixth edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Laroui, Abdallah. *L'idéologie arabe contemporaine*. Paris: François Maspero, 1973.
- , *Les origines sociales et culturelles du nationalisme marocain (1830-1912)*. Paris: François Maspero, 1977.
- , *La crise des intellectuels arabes: Traditionalisme ou historicisme?* Paris: François Maspero, 1974.
- , *Islam et modernité*. Paris: Éditions la découverte, 1987.
- Lawrence, Bruce B. *Shattering the Myth: Islam Beyond Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Leveau, Rémy. "Islam et le contrôle politique au Maghreb." In *Islam et politique au Maghreb*, edited by Ernest Gellner and Jean-Claude Vatin, 271-280. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1981.



- , "Réaction de l'Islam officiel au renouveau islamique au Maroc." In *Le Maghreb musulman en 1979*, edited by Christiane Souriau and Paul Pascon, 205-218. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983.
- Lewis, Bernard. "Islam and the West." In *National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Khadduri*, edited by Edward Ingram, 16-30. London: Frank Cass, 1986.
- Lewis, Geoffrey. *Turkey*. Third edition. Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.
- Lindholm, Charles. *The Islamic Middle East: A Historical Anthropology*. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.
- Maarif, Ahmad Syafii. "Sebuah Kata Pengantar: Kyai Haji Mas Mansur: Manusia dengan Dimensi Ganda [A Preface: Kyai Haji Mas Mansur: A Man with A Dual Dimension]." [Foreword to] Kyai Haji Mas Mansur, *Kumpulan Karangan Tersiar* [A Collection of Previously Published Articles], edited by Amir Hamzah Wiryosukarto, xiii-xxii. Third edition. Yogyakarta: Persatuan, 1992.
- Mabrūk, 'Alī. "Al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd: Mulāḥazāt Awwaliyya [Heritage and Modernity: Preliminary Remarks]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 31-41. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Mabrūk, Muḥammad Ibrāhīm. *Muwājahat al-Muwājahā: al-Munāqasha al-Islāmiyya li al-Afkār al-'Ilmāniyya wa Kutub al-Muwājahā* [Face to Face: An Islamic Discussion on Secular Thought and the Books Face to Face]. Cairo: Dār al-Ṭibā'a al-Ḥadītha, 1994.
- MacIntire, Ronald R. "Saudi Arabia." In *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, edited by Mohammed Ayoob, 9-29. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Mahdi, Mohsen. "Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani." *Arab Journal* 4 (1966-67): 17-22.
- Malery, John C. "Hermeneutics: From Textual to Computer Understanding?" [Http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/jema/papers/1986ai-memo-871/memo.html](http://www.ai.mit.edu/people/jema/papers/1986ai-memo-871/memo.html) (accessed March 13, 2001): 1-9.
- Ma'lūm, Ḥusayn. [A Review of] "Muhammad 'Abid al-Jābirī's *Al-Turāth wa al-Ḥadāitha: Dirāsāt wa Munāqashāt* [Muḥammad 'Abid al-Jābirī's Heritage and Modernity: Studies and Discussions]." *Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabī* [The Arab Future] 8 (1992): 158-163.

- Al-Manūnī, Muḥammad. *Mazāhir Yaqẓat al-Maghrib al-Ḥadīth* [The Phenomena of Awakening in Modern Morocco. Casablanca: Sharīkat al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī' al-Madāris, 1985.
- Martin, A. G. P. *Quatre siècles d'histoire marocaine*. Paris: Félix Alcan, 1923.
- Marty, Paul. "Les Fadelia." *Revue de Monde Musulmane* 31 (1915-1916): 160-166.
- Mansueto, Anthony. "From Hermeneutical Circle to the Dialectical Spiral Philosophy and Ideological Criticism." [www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/1593/doc/episteme.hcds.html](http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Thebes/1593/doc/episteme.hcds.html) (accessed March 13, 2001): 1-9.
- Mendel, Miloš. "Islamic Fundamentalism as an Ideological Instrument of Social Communication." In *Threefold Wisdom –Islam, The Arab World and Africa*, edited by Otakar Hulec and Miloš Mendel, 173-182. Praha: Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic Oriental Institute, 1993.
- McDonald, Duncan B. *Development of Muslim Theology, Jurisprudence and Constitutional Theory*. New York, 1903.
- Miége, Jean-Louis. *Le Maroc et l'Europe*. Paris, 1961-1963.
- Michaux-Bellaire. "Une tentative de restauration idrisite à Fèz." *Revue du Monde Musulmane* 2 (1908): 393-395.
- , "Le Wahhabisme au Maroc." *Renseignements Coloniaux et Documents* (Le Comité de l'Afrique Française et le Comité du Maroc), 1928: 491.
- Mifi, Muḥsin. *Zāhirat al-Yasār al-Islāmī (Qirā'a Taḥlīliyya Naqdiyya)* [The Phenomenon of the Islamic Left (A Critical and Analytical Reading)]. Carthage: Maṭba'at Tūnis, 1983.
- Monshipouri, Mahmood. *Islamism, Secularism, and Human Rights in the Middle East*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
- Monteil, Victor. *Morocco*. London: 1964.
- Moussalli, Ahmad S. *Qira'a Ta'sīsiyya fī al-Khiṭāb al-Islāmī al-Uṣūlī (Nazariyyat al-Ma'rifa wa al-Dawla wa al-Mujtama')* [Basic Reading on Islam Fundamentalist Discourse (Theory of Knowledge, State and Society)]. Beirut: Al-Nāshir, 1993.
- , *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Quṭb*. Second edition. Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1995.
- Mughīth, Anwār. "Al-Taghayyur wa al-Thawra: Qirā'a fī Maḥmūd Ḥasan Ḥanafī lil Marksīyya [Change and Revolution: A Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Marxist Concepts]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue

between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 223-237. Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.

Munson, Henry Jr. "Islamic Revivalism in Morocco and Tunisia." *The Muslim World* 76 (1986): 43-74.

-----, *Islam and Revolution in the Middle East*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1988.

-----, *Religion and Power in Morocco*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993.

Musallam, Adnan A. "Sayyid Quṭb and Social Justice." *Journal of Islamic Studies* 4,1 (1993): 52-70.

Al-Nāṣirī, Aḥmad b. Khālīd. *Kitāb al-Istiṣā' li Akhbār Duwal al-Maghrib al-Aqṣā* [A Guide to the Events in Far Western States]. Casablanca, 1954.

Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. *The Plight of Modern Man*. London: Longman, 1975.

Nasution, Harun. *Pembaharuan dalam Islam: Sejarah Pemikiran dan Gerakan* [Reform in Islam: A History of Thought and Movement]. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1982.

Nataatmaja, Hidayat. *Hanacaraka Ilmu dan Alfabet Perjuangan (Al-Fajr)* [The Science of ABCs and the Struggle over the Alphabet (The Dawn)]. Malang: YP2LPM, 1985.

Nieuwenhuijze, Van. *Aspects of Islam in Post Colonial Indonesia*. The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958.

Noer, Deliar. *Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942* [The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942]. Seventh edition. Jakarta: LP3ES, 1994.

Palmer, Richard E. "The Liminality of Hermes and the Meaning of Hermeneutics." [www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/liminality.html](http://www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/liminality.html) (accessed February 18, 2001): 1-7.

-----, "The Relevance of Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics to Thirty-Six Topics or Field of Human Activity." [Www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/relevance.html](http://Www.mac.edu/~rpalmer/relevance.html) (accessed February 18, 2001): 1-14.

Parsons, F. V. *The Origins of the Moroccan Question 1880-1900*. London: Duckworth, 1976.

Persatoean Islam. *Verslag Openbaar Debat Talqin* [Open Debate over Talqin]. Second edition. Bandung: Persis, 1933.

-----, *Officiëel Verslag Debat Pembela Islam-Ahmadiyah* [Official Document on the Debate between the Pembela Islam (Defender of Islam) and the Ahmadiyah]. Bandung: Pendidikan Islam, Bagian Penjiaran.

-----, *Officiëel Verslag Debat "Pembela Islam" dengan Ahmadiyah Qadian di Gang Kenari Djakarta* [Official Verslag Debate between the Pembela Islam (Defender of Islam) and the Ahmadiyah Held in Kenary Bloc, Jakarta]. Bandung: Persatoean Islam, 1933.

Perserikatan Al-Irsyad. *Anggaran Dasar Al-Irsyad* [The Constitution of Al-Irsyad]. Jakarta: Perserikatan Al-Irsyad, 1915.

-----, *Titel Sajid Djadi Urusan, Pemerintah Tjampur Tangan? Keterangan dan Penerangan Djelas Tentang Hak dan Hukum yang Njata Di dalam Islam* [The Sayyid Title Becomes a Problem, did the Government Intervene? Information and Clear Information on the Rights and Rulings according to Islam]. Jakarta: Perserikatan Al-Irsyad, 1932.

Paquignon. "Un livre de Moulay Abd al Hafid." *Revue de Monde Musulmane* 7 (1909): 125-128.

Peskes, Esther. *Muhammad b. 'Abdulwahhab (1703-92) im Widerstreit: Untersuchungen zur Rekonstruktion der Frühgeschichte der Wahhabiya*. Beirut: In Kommission bei Franz Steiner Verlag Stuttgart, 1993.

Philby, H. St. J. *Arabia*. London: Macmillan, 1930.

Phillips, James. "Key Concepts: Hermeneutics." *Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology* 3,1 (1996): 61-69.

Phoenix. "A Brief Outline of the Wahhabi Movement." *Journal of the Royal Central Asiatic Society* 7 (1930): 402.

Pijper, G.P. *Beberapa Studi tentang Sejarah Islam di Indonesia 1900-1950* [Studies in Indonesian Islam 1900-1950]. Translated by Tudjimah and Yessy Augusdin. Jakarta: Universitas Indonesia Press, 1984.

Pinardi. *Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo*. Jakarta: 1964.

Poggemiller, Dwight. "Hermeneutics and Epistemology: Hirsch's Author Centered Meaning, Radical Historicism and Gadamer's Truth and Method." [Http://capo.org/premise/95/sep/p950810.html](http://capo.org/premise/95/sep/p950810.html) (accessed June 30, 2001): 1-11.

Purdi, Susan Selden. "Legitimation of Power and Authority in A Pluralistic State: Pancasila and Civil Religion in Indonesia." Ph.D. dis., Columbia University, 1984.

Qanṣuwa, Ṣalāḥ. "Qirā'a Mukhtalifa li 'Ilm al-Istighrāb [A Different Reading in Occidentalism]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭīyya, 215-222. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.

- Quṭb, Sayyid. *Al-Mustaqbal li hādha al-Dīn* [The Future of Islam]. Cairo: Maktabat Wahba, 1965.
- , *Dirāsāt Islāmiyya* [Islamic Studies]. Cairo: 1971.
- , *Naḥw al-Mujtama' al-Islāmī* [Towards Islamic Society]. Fifth edition. Beirut: Dār al-Shurūq, 1982.
- Raffles, Sir Thomas Stamford. *The History of Java*. Second edition. London: n.p., 1930.
- Rahman, Fazlur. "Modern Muslim Thought." *The Muslim World* 45 (1955): 16-25.
- , "Revival and Reform in Islam." In *The Cambridge History of Islam*, edited by P.M. Holt, Ann K.S. Lambton, and Bernard Lewis, 2: 632-652. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.
- , "Roots of Islamic Neo-Fundamentalism." In *Change and the Muslim World*, edited by Philip H. Stoddard, David H. Cutchell, and Margaret W. Sullivan, 23-35. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
- , *Islam*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979.
- , "A Survey of Modernization of Muslim Family Law." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 11 (1980): 451-465.
- , *Islam and Modernity: Transformations of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Rejwan, Nissim. *Arabs Face the Modern World*. Florida: University Press of Florida, 1998.
- René-LeClerc, Edouard. "Les débuts de règne de Molay Hafid." *Renseignements Coloniaux* 2 (1908): 43.
- Richardo, Francisco J. "Philosophical Hermeneutics and the Promotion of Reflective Writing in Educational Software." [Http://netcenter.org/fjrr/pub/OP](http://netcenter.org/fjrr/pub/OP) (accessed June 30, 2001): 1-47.
- Riḍā, Muḥammad Rashīd. *Al-Manār* [The Lighthouse] 16 (1326 A.H./1908 A.D.).
- , *Tārīkh al-Ustādh al-Imām Muḥammad 'Abduh* [The History of Muḥammad 'Abduh]. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Manār, 1344 H. 1: 153.
- , *Al-Wahy al-Muḥammadī* [Muḥammadan Revelation]. Cairo: Maṭba'at al-Manār, 1935.
- Rorty, Richard. *Essays on Heidegger and Others*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Roy, Olivier. "Conclusion: Les nouveaux intellectuels islamistes: essai d'approche philosophique." In *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam*

- contemporain*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard, 259-284. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990.
- Roussillon, Alain. "Intellectuels en crise dans l'Égypte contemporain." In *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam contemporain*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard, 213-258. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990.
- Saeed, Javaid. *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*. London: Praeger Publishers, 1994.
- Salam, Solichin. *K.H. Ahmad Dahlan Reformer Islam Indonesia* [K.H. Ahmad Dahlan the Indonesian Islamic Reformer]. Jakarta, 1963.
- Salem, Paul. *Bitter Legacy: Ideology and Politics in the Arab World*. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994.
- Salamé, Ghassan. "Political Power and the Saudi State." In *The Modern Middle East*, edited by Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khourie, and Mary C. Wilson, 579-600. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 1993.
- Sālim, Aḥmad Muḥammad. "Muqārana bayn al-Turāth wa al-Tajdīd wa Naqd al-‘Aql al-‘Arabī [A Comparison between [[Ḥanafī’s]] Heritage and Modernity and [[al-Jābirī’s]] Criticism of the Arab Mind]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā’a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī ‘Id Mīlādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī’s Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Aṭīyya, 81-106. Cairo: Madbūfī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Salvatore, Armando. *Islam and the Political Discourse*. Berkshire: Garnet Publishing Limited, 1996.
- Sands, William. "The Middle East Background." In *The United States and the Middle East*, edited by Georgiana G. Stevens, 9-29. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964.
- Sayeed, S.M.A. *The Myth of Authenticity (A Study in Islamic Fundamentalism)*. Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1995.
- Schreike, B. *Pergolakan Agama di Sumatera Barat, Sebuah Sumbangan Bibliografi* [A Religious Struggle in West Sumatera, A Bibliographical Contribution]. Jakarta: Bhratara, 1973.
- Schulze, Reinhard. "How Medieval is Islam? Muslim Intellectuals and Modernity." In *The Next Threat*, edited by Jochen Hippler and Andrea Lueg, 57-70. Amsterdam: Pluto Press and Transnational Institute, 1995.
- Seferta, Yusuf H.R. "The Concept of Religious Authority according to Muhammad ‘Abduh and Rashid Rida." *The Islamic Quarterly* 30 (1986): 159-164.

- Shahin, Emad Eldin. *Through Muslim Eyes: M. Rashid Riḍa and the West*. Herndon, Virginia: The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 1993.
- , *Political Ascent: Contemporary Islamic Movements in North Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1997.
- Shawbakī, ‘Amrū. “[A Review of ] Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī’s *Al-Dīn wa al-Dawla wa Taṭbīq al-Sharī’a* [Muḥammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī’s Religion, State, and the Application of Islamic Law].” *Al-Mustaqbal al-‘Arabī* (The Arab Future) 10 (1996): 141-145.
- Shepard, William E. “Islam as a ‘System’ in the Later Writings of Sayyid Qutb.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 25,1 (1989): 31-50.
- Shihab, Alwi Abdurrahman. “The Muhammadiyah Movement and Its Controversy with Christian Mission in Indonesia.” Ph. D. diss., Temple University, 1995.
- Shimogaki, Kazuo. *Between Modernity and Post-Modernity: The Islamic Left and Dr. Hasan Hanafi’s Thought: A Critical Reading*. Tokyo: The Institute of Middle Eastern Studies, International University of Japan, 1988.
- Shiraishi, Takashi. “Islam and Communism: An Illumination of the People’s Movement in Java, 1912-1926.” Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1986.
- Siddiqi, Abdul Hamid. “Renaissance in Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab and His Movement.” In *A History of Muslim Philosophy with Short Accounts of Other Disciplines and the Modern Renaissance in Muslim Lands*, edited by M.M. Sharif, 2: 1446-1457. Fourth edition. Delhi: Low Price Publications, 1995.
- Simon, Gottfried. *The Progress and Arrest of Islam in Sumatra*. London: Marshall Brothers Ltd., 1912.
- Sinar, P. “Salafiyya.” In *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, edited by Bernard Lewis et al., 8: 900-905. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995.
- Singh, K.R. “North Africa.” In *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, edited by Mohammed Ayoob, 55-75. London: Croom Helm, 1981.
- Sivan, Emmanuel. *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985.
- Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. *Islam in Modern History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Steenbrink, Karel A. *Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* [Aspects of Indonesian Islam Nineteenth Century]. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984.

- , *Dutch Colonialism and Indonesian Islam: Contacts and Conflicts 1596-1950*. Amsterdam and Atlanta: Rodopi B.V., 1993.
- , "Recapturing the Past: Historical Studies by IAIN-Staff." In *Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, edited by Mark R. Woodward, 155-192. Tempe: Arizona State University, Program for South East Asian Studies, 1996.
- Sukarno. *Dibawah Bendera Revolusi* [Under the Banner of Revolution]. Edited by Muallif Nasution. Third edition. Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1963.
- Al-Sūsī, Muḥammad al-Mukhtār. *Ḥawla Ma'idat al-Ghadā'* [Around the Dining Table]. Rabat: Maṭba'at al-Sāhil, 1983.
- Tarābīshī, Jūrjī. *Madhbahat al-Turāth fī al-Thaqāfa al-'Arabiyya al-Mu'ašira* [The Heritage Killingfield in Contemporary Arab Culture]. London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1993.
- , *Naẓariyyat al-'Aql* [Theory of Mind]. London: Dār al-Sāqī, 1996.
- , *Waḥdat al-'Aql al-'Arabī al-Islāmī* [The Unity of Arab Islamic Mind]. London: Dār al-Sāqī, 2001.
- Tauber, Aliezer. "Rashid Riḍa and Fayṣal's Kingdom in Syria." *The Muslim World* 85 (1995): 235-245.
- Tauber, Eliezer. "Three Approaches, One Idea: Religion and State in the Thought of 'Abd al-Raḥman al-Kawakibi, Najib 'Azuri and Rashid Riḍa." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 21,2 (1994): 190-198.
- Taylor, Charles. "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man." In *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Science*, edited by Michael Martin and Lee C. McIntyre, 181-211. Cambridge: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1994.
- Tessler, Mark. "The Origins of Popular Support for Islamic Movement: A Political Economy Analysis." In *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa*, edited by John P. Entelis, 93-127. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Tibi, Bassam. "The Renewed Role of Islam in the Political and Social Development of the Middle East." *The Middle East Journal* 37.1 (1983): 3-13.
- , "Islam and Nationalism." In *The Islamic Impulse*, edited by Barbara Freyer Stowasser, 59-74. London and Sydney: Croom Helm in association with Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, 1987.



- , *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998.
- , *Arab Nationalism Between Islam and the Nation-State*. Third edition. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997.
- Toprak, Binnaz. *Islam and Political Development in Turkey*. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981.
- Toynbee, Arnold J. *A Study of History*. Seventeenth edition. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1963.
- Tozy, Mohammed. "Le prince, le clerc et l'État: la restructuration du champ religieux au Maroc." In *Intellectuels et militants de l'Islam contemporain*, edited by Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard, 71-103. Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1990.
- , "Monopolisation de la production symbolique et hiérarchisation du champ politico-religieux au Maroc." In *Le Maghreb musulman en 1979*, edited by Christiane Souriau and Paul Pascon, 219-234. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1983.
- Tracy, David. "Hermeneutical Reflection in the New Paradigm." Translated by Margareth Köhl. In *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future*, edited by Hans Küng and David Tracy. New York: Crossroad, 1991.
- Tripp, Charles. "Islam and the Secular Logic of the State in the Middle East." In *Islamic Fundamentalism*, edited by Abdul Salam Sidahmad and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, 51-70. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996.
- Vatikiotis, P.J. *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East*. London and Sydney: Croom Helm; and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- , *The Modern History of Egypt*. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1969.
- , *Arab and Regional Politics in the Middle East*. London and Sydney: Croom Helm; and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Vedder, Ben. *Was ist Hermeneutik? Ein Weg von der Textdeutung zur Interpretation der Wirklichkeit*. Stuttgart, Berlin and Köln: Kohlhammer, 2000.
- Verve, Barbara Sillars. *Pemberontakan Kahar Muzzakar dari Tradisi ke DI/TII* [The Kahar Muzzakar Revolt from Tradition to the Darul Islam/Islamic Indonesian Army]. Jakarta: Gratifipers, 1989.
- Vlekke, Bernard H. M. *The Story of the Dutch East Indies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945.

- Voll, John O. "Wahhabism and Mahdiism: Alternative Styles of Islamic Renewals." *Arab Studies Quarterly* 4,1 (1982): 110-126.
- , *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.
- , "The Evolution of Islamic Fundamentalism in Twentieth-Century Sudan." In *Islam, Nationalism, and Radicalism in Egypt and Sudan*, edited by Gabriel R. Warburg and Uri M. Kupferschmidt, 113-142. New York: Praeger, 1983.
- , "Revivalism and Social Transformations in Islamic History." *The Muslim World* 76 (1986): 168-180.
- , "Islamic Renewal and the 'Failure of the West.'" In *Religious Resurgence: Contemporary Cases in Islam, Christianity, and Judaism*, edited by Richard T. Antoun and Mary Elaine Hegland, 127-144. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987.
- Wagtendonk, Kees. "Islam, the Makhzan and the French: Some Remarks on Moroccan Islam, 1830-1980." In *The Challenge of the Middle East*, edited by Ibrahim A. El-Sheikh, C. Aart van de Koppel and Rudolf Peters, 141-159. Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1982.
- Wahyudi, Yudian. "Hasbi's Theory of *Ijtihād* in the Context of Indonesian *Fiqh*." M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1993.
- , "Peran Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy dalam Pembaharuan Hukum Islam di Indonesia Abd XX [Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy's Contribution to Indonesian Legal Reform in the Twentieth Century]." In *Ke Arah Fiqh Indonesia: Mengenang Jasa Prof. Dr. T.M. Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy* [Towards Indonesian Islamic Law: In Memoriam Prof. Dr. T.M. Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy], edited by Yudian Wahyudi, 3-16. Yogyakarta: Forum Studi Hukum Islam Fakultas Syari'ah IAIN Sunan Kalijaga, 1994.
- , "Reorientasi Fiqh Indonesia [Reorientation of Indonesian Islamic Law]." In *Islam Berbagai Perspektif Didedikasikan untuk 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. Munawir Sjadzali, MA* [Islamic Perspectives: Commemorating the Seventieth Birthday of Prof. Dr. Munawir Sjadzali, MA]. Edited by Sudarnoto Abdul Hakim, Hasan Asari, and Yudian Wahyudi, 223-232. Yogyakarta: Lembaga Penterjemah & Penulis Muslim Indonesia, 1995.
- , "Introduction: Was Wahid Hasyim Really Just A Traditionalist?" [Foreword to] Achmad Zaini, *Kyai Haji Abdul Wahid Hasyim: His Contribution to Muslim Educational Reform and Indonesian Nationalism during the Twentieth Century*, ix-xvii. Yogyakarta: Indonesian Academic Society XXI, 1998.
- , "Kata Pengantar: Hasan Hanafi Mujaddid Abad ke-15? [Preface: Is Hasan Hanafi A Reformer of the Fifteenth Century of Islam?]"

- [Foreword to] Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Turas dan Tajdid: Sikap Kita terhadap Turas Klasi*, translated by Yudian Wahyudi, v-xxiv. Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press in collaboration with Pesantren Pasca Sarjana Bismillah Press, 2000.
- , "Kata Pengantar: Dari Disertasi menuju Revolusi, Memahami Hasan Hanafi Sang 'Pembalap Usia' [Preface: From Dissertation to Revolution, Understanding Ḥasan Ḥanafī the 'Racer of Age']." [Foreword to] Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Tafsir Fenomenologi: Kondisi Aktual Metode Fenomenologi dan Penerapannya pada Fenomena-fenomena Keagamaan*, translated by Yudian Wahyudi, 1: i-vii. Yogyakarta: Pesantren Pasca Sarjana Bismillah Press, 2001.
- , "Kata Pengantar: Senam Hermeneutika Bersama Hasan Hanafi [Preface: Hermeneutic Aerobic with Ḥasan Ḥanafī]." [Foreword to] Ḥasan Ḥanafī, *Sendi-sendī Hermeneutika: Membumikan Tafsir Revolusioner* [Fundamentals of Hermeneutics: Bringing Down to Earth the Revolutionary Interpretation], translated [from a collection of three articles, which are "Hal ladaynā Nazariyyat al-Tafsīr [Do We Have a Theory of Interpretation?]," "Hermeneutics as Axiomatics: An Islamic Case," and "Qirā'at al-Naṣṣ" [Reading of Text]] by Yudian Wahyudi and Hamdiah Latif, i-x. Yogyakarta: Titian Ilahi Press in collaboration with Pesantren Pasca Sarjana Bismillah Press, 2002.
- Walt, Susan. "The Politics of Human Rights in the Maghreb." In *Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa*, edited by John P. Entelis, 75-92. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- Waterbury, John. "Egypt: Islam and Social Change." In *Change and the Muslim World*, edited by Philip H. Stoddard, David C. Cuthell, and Margaret W. Sullivan, 49-58. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1981.
- Wendell, Charles. "Introduction." In Ḥasan al-Banna'. *Five Tracts of Ḥasan al-Banna' (1906-1949)*. Translated by Charles Wendell. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1978.
- Weisberger, F. *Au Seuil du Maroc moderne*. Rabat: 1947.
- Wertheim, W. F. *Indonesië van Vorstenrijk tot Neo-kolonie*. Amsterdam: Boom, 1978. Quoted in Karel A. Steenbrink, *Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19* [Aspects of Islam in Nineteenth Century Indonesia]. Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1984.
- Williams, Michael Charles. *Communism, Religion, and Revolt in Banten*. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1990.
- Woodward, Mark R. "Introduction: Talking Across Paradigm: Indonesia, Islam and Orientalism." In *Toward A New Paradigm: Recent Developments*

- in Indonesian Islamic Thought*, edited by Mark R. Woodward, 1-45. Tempe: Arizona State University, Program for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996.
- Woolman, David S. *Rebels in the Rif: Abd el Krim and the Rif Rebellion*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969.
- Yapp, M.E. *The Making of the Modern Near East 1972-1923*. London and New York: Longman, 1987.
- Zaharaddin, M.S. "Wahhabism and Its Influence Outside Arabia." *The Islamic Quarterly* 23 (1979): 146-157.
- Zakariyyā, Fu'ād. *Al-Ḥaqīqa wa al-Wahmiyya fī al-Ḥaraka al-Islāmiyya al-Mu'aṣira*. [Fact and Myth about Contemporary Islamic Movement]. Cairo: Dār Qibā', 1998.
- Zaydān, 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn. *Al-Durar al-Fakhira bi Ma'āthir Mulūk al-'Alawiyyīn bi Fās al-Zāhira* [Prestigious Diamonds in the Early Heritages of the Alawite Kings at the Enlightening Fes]. Rabat, 1937.
- Zaydān, Yūsuf. "Al-Istighrāb: Judhūruh wa Mushkilātuh [Occidentalism: Its Roots and Problems]." In *Jadal al-Anā wa al-Akhar: Qirā'a Naqdiyya fī Fikr Ḥasan Ḥanafī fī 'Id Milādih al-Sittīn* [Dialogue between Self and Other: A Critical Reading in Ḥasan Ḥanafī's Thought on His Sixtieth Birthday], edited by Aḥmad 'Abd al-Ḥalīm 'Aṭiyya, 81-106. Cairo: Madbūlī al-Ṣaghīr, 1997.
- Zubaida, Sami. *Islam, the People and State: Essays on Political Ideas and Movements in the Middle East*. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.

## Appendix:

### A List of Arabic-English Terms

*‘Abd* = slave

*‘Ada* = tradition, custom (“civilization”)

*‘Adl* = justice

*Al-adyān al-samāwiyya* = revealed religions (Islam, Christianity and Judaism)

*Al-aḥkāṁ al-shar‘iyya* = Islamic rulings

*Ahl al-ḥadīth* = people of prophetic “tradition”

*Ahl al-ra’y* = people of reason

*Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘a* = People of the Prophetic-Tradition

*Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Shī‘a* = People of the Prophetic-Tradition and Shiism

*Al-a’imma min Quraysh* = Islamic leadership must come from Quraysh;  
exclusively Quraysh-based elitism

*‘Ajīb* = an object of wonder

*Al-ākhar* = the other

*Al al-bayt* = descendents of the Prophet Muḥammad

*‘Alim* (pl. : *‘ulamā’*) = Muslim scholar

*‘Amal* = practice

*‘Amal ḥaḍarī* = civilizational process

*Amīr al-mu‘minīn* = commander of the faithful

*Al-amr bi al-ma‘rūf wa al-nahy ‘an al-munkar* = encouraging others to do  
something good and forbidding them to do something wrong

*‘Āmm* = general; universal

*Al-amr bi al-shay’ amr bi-wasā’ilih* = An order to something is an order to do its means

*Al-anā* = the self

*Al-a’rāḍ al-bashariyya* = human historical law

*‘Aqīda* = basic belief

*‘Aql* = intellect; reason

*‘Aql kawnī* = natural reason

*‘Āqil* = prudent; reasonable

*‘Aqlānī* = rational

*Aṣāla* = authenticity

*Asbāb al-Nuzūl* = occasions of revelation; “historical critical method”

*Aṣḥāb al-aḥwāl* = sufis

*‘Aṣr al-tadwīn* = the age of codification

*Al-awāmir wa al-nawāḥī* = principles of obligation and prohibition

*Al-‘awda ilā al-ṭabī‘a* = a return to nature

*Badīl* (pl.: *bada’il*) = alternative

*Balāgha* = rhetoric

*Bāligh* = having attained puberty;

*Baraka* = grace

*Bāṭinī* = esoteric expression of Islam

*Bay‘a* = oath of allegiance; social contract

*Bid‘a* = innovation

*Bid‘ī* = illegitimate; un-Islamic

*Bilād al-makhzan* = the supremacy of Moroccan central power in terms of law and order

*Bilād al-sibā'* = dissidence against the Moroccan central power

*Dabt* = accuracy; reliable

*Dār al-Islām* = the abode of Islam

*Dar' al-mafāsīd* = avoiding public evils

*Al-darūrāt tubīḥ al-maḥzūrāt* = emergencies allow [a Muslim to do] what is prohibited

*Darūriyyāt* = necessities or factors that must exist for the sake of human beings, the absence of which may be detrimental to them

*Da'wa* = call to Islam

*Dhawq* = religious experience

*Dīn* = religion

*Dirāya* = research

*Al-Fahm al-turāthī li al-turāth* = understanding heritage from the perspective of heritage

*Fanā'* = absorption

*Faqīh* (pl.: *fuqahā'*) = Muslim jurist

*Faqr* = poverty

*Fath* (pl.: *futuḥāt*) = liberation movement

*Fatwā* = legal opinion

*Al-firqa al-nājiyya* = the safe group

*Fiqh* = Islamic jurisprudence

*Fiqh al-iftirādī* = hypothetical jurisprudence

*Fiqh al-'Umarī* = 'Umarism

*Fitna* (pl.: *fitan*) = civil war or disorder

*Fuqaha' al-ḥayḍ* = Muslim jurists who specialize in menstruation (a derogatory term)

*Gharīb* = an object of wonder

*Ghurūr* = deception

*Ḥabl min al-nās* = human relations; historical interaction

*Ḥadātha* = modernity

*Al-ḥadātha al-thaqāfiyya* = cultural modernity

*Ḥadd* (pl.: *ḥudūd*) = capital punishment

*Ḥadīth* = Prophetic tradition

*Al-ḥadīth al-aḥad* = solitary Ḥadīth

*Al-ḥadīth al-mutawātir* = recurrent Ḥadīth

*Al-ḥadīth al-ṣaḥīḥ* = sound Ḥadīth

*Ḥalāl* = lawful

*Ḥaqīqa* = reality; truth

*Ḥarakat al-istiqlāliyya* = independence movement

*Ḥarām* = forbidden

*Hawā'* = "absolute subjectivity"

*Ḥayā* = life

*Hijra* = migration

*Ḥizb al-ṭalī'ī* = vanguard party

*Ḥizb Allāh* = party of God

*Ḥizb al-Shayṭān* = party of Satan

*Ḥizb al-Tāghūt* = party of the Tyrant



*Ḥuffāz* = those who have memorized the Qur'ān *in toto*

*Al-ḥukm al-juz'ī* = a specific ruling

*Al-ḥukm al-kullī* = a general ruling

*Al-ḥukm yadūr ma' al-'illa wujūdān wa 'adaman* = the existence of a ruling depends on the existence of its cause

*'Ibāda* (pl.: *'ibādāt*) = ritual; worship

*'Ibāda mahḍa* = pure worship

*Al-'ibra bi-'umūm al-laḥẓ lā bi-khuṣūṣ al-sabab* = the principle is the universality of ruling and not the particularity of cause

*Ijmā'* = consensus

*Al-ijmā' al-'āmm* = universal consensus

*Ijtihād* = interpretation

*Ijithād fardī* = personal interpretation

*Ijithād jamā'ī* = collective interpretation; consensus

*Ikhtilāf al-qirā'āt* = different canonical readings

*Ikhtilāf ummatī rahma* = the disagreement of Muslims is a grace

*Ilāhī* = divine

*'Ilm al-jarḥ wa al-ta'dīl* or *'ilm al-tajrīḥ wa al-ta'dīl* = Islamic historical criticism

*'Ilm al-kalām* = Islamic theology

*'Ilm al-taṣawwuf* = mysticism

*'Ilm uṣūl al-dīn* = Islamic theology

*'Ilm uṣūl al-fiqh* = classical Islamic "hermeneutics;" Islamic legal philosophy;  
*la science des fondements de la compréhension*

*‘Ilmāniyya* = secularism

*Imām al-Ḥaramayn* = Religious Leader of the Two Holy Cities of Islam  
(Mecca and Medina)

*Imān* = faith

*‘Irq* = dignity

*Iṣḥāḥ* = reform

*‘Iṣma* = infallibility

*Israf* = out of all proportion

*Isrā’iliyyāt* = Jewish traditions

*Istidlāl* = demonstration

*Istiḥsān* = searching for good; juristic preference

*Istiqra’i* = inductive

*Istiṣḥāḥ* = searching for interest

*Ittiḥād* = union

*Jabr* = determinism

*Jāhiliyya* = ignorance; un-Islamic

*Jalb al-maṣāliḥ* = achieving what is in the public interests

*Jamā’a* = a group of reporters (in Ḥadīth, etc.)

*Jawhar al-fard* = atomism

*Jihād al-akbar* = greater holy war

*Jihād al-aṣghar* = smaller holy war

*Ju’* = hunger

*Juz’i* = particular; particularist

*Kafā'a* = equality

*Kalimat al-ḥaqq urīda bihā al-bāṭil* = the statement is right, but is used to achieve the wrong objective

*Kalimat al-sawā'* = meeting point

*Karāma* = miracle

*Kasb* = acquisition

*Kayfiyyat al-taḥammul wa al-adā'* = act of narration

*Kaum adat* (Arabic: *qawm 'āda*) = proponents of custom

*Khalīfat Allāh fī al-arḍ* = a vicegerent of God on earth

*Khaṣṣ* = particular; specific

*Khawf* = cowardice

*Khurāfa* (pl.: *khurāfāt*) = superstition

*Kuttāb al-waḥy* = secretaries of revelation

*Kutub al-Sitta* = six foremost Ḥadīth collections

*Lā'aqlāniyya* = irrationalism

*Lā ḍarar wa lā ḍirar* = there is no place for issuing a harmful ruling nor responding with a harmful ruling

*Lā ḥukm illā li Allāh* = There is no binding ruling, except the one that is for God's sake

*Lā zamānī* = eternal

*Lajnat Kuttāb al-Waḥy* = committee of secretaries of the revelation

*Mā lā yatimm al-wājib illā bih fa-huwa wājib* = Something necessary for the accomplishment of an obligation is an obligation to do

*Mā lā yudrak kulluh lā yutrak kulluh* = something that cannot be achieved totally cannot be abandoned totally

*Al-mabādī' wa al-kulliyyāt* = general and universal principles of the Qur'an

*Madhhab* (pl.: *madhāhib*) = Islamic legal school

*Majāz* = allegory

*Majlis al-shūrā* = parliament

*Makhzan* = Moroccan central government

*Makruh* = indifference

*Māl* = property

*Al-manār* = lighthouse

*Mandub* = recommended

*Al-manhaj al-ijtimā'ī fī al-tafsīr* = social interpretation

*Al-manzila bayn al-manzilatayn* = position between two positions

*Maqāsid al-Sharī'a* = purposes of Islamic law; “author-centered meaning”

*Mashriqiyya* = easternism

*Maṣlaḥa* (pl.: *maṣāliḥ*) = public interest

*Al-Maṣlaḥa al-‘āmma* = public interest

*Al-Maṣlaḥa al-zamāniyya* = temporary public interest

*Matn* = content of a report

*Mawḍū‘* = spurious

*Mawḍū‘ī* = thematic

*Mīthāq* = manifesto

*Al-mu‘ālija al-bunyawiyya* = a structuralist diagnosis

*Mu‘āmalā* (pl. : *mu‘āmalāt*) = worldly affairs

*Mu‘āṣira* = contemporaneity

*Muballigh* = announcer

*Mubayyan* = explained; detailed; conditional

*Muḥaddithūn* = Ḥadīth experts

*Muḥkam* = univocal

*Mujaddid jusūr* = a bridging reformer

*Mujarrad iftirāḍāt* = mere hypotheses

*Mujmal* = global

*Mujtahid* = interpreter

*Al-munāsaba al-fikriyya* = rational relations

*Al-munāsaba al-shi‘riyya* = poetic relations

*Muqayyad* = conditional

*Murīd* = disciple

*Murshid* = master

*Muṣḥaf ‘Uthmān* = Uthmān’s Codification; the Official Standard Qur’anic Text

*Mushrikūn* = non-believers; polytheists

*Mutaghayyir* = the changing

*Mutashābih* = equivocal

*Muṭlaq* = absolute

*Nafs* = soul; life

*Nahḍa ‘Arabiyya* = Arab [Islamic] renaissance

*Nahḍa ḥaḍāriyya shāmila* = a comprehensive renaissance of [Islamic] civilization

*Naql* = active transmission of religious text

*Naqd al-‘aql al-‘Arabī* = criticism of the Arab mind

*Nās* = people

*Naṣrāniyya* = Christian traditions

*Naṣṣ* = text

*Naṣṣī* = textual

*Nāzil* = horizontal

*Nisba* = relation

*Nisbī* = relative

*Nuqṭat yaqīn* = a certain starting point

*Qadr* = indeterminism

*Qasḍ al-qārī* = the reader’s intention

*Qasḍ al-Shārī* = God’s intention; the author’s intention

*Qiyās al-ghā’ib ‘alā al-shahīd* = analogy of the unknown after the known

*Qiyās al-shar’ī* = valid form of legal analogy

*Al-Qur’ān yufassir ba’ḍuh ba’ḍan* and *irtibā’ al-āyāt* = cross-referential character of the Qur’ān

*Ridā* = contentment

*Riwāya* = tradition; transmission

*Al-Riwāya bi al-lafẓ* = verbal transmission

*Al-Riwāya bi al-naṣṣ* = textual transmission

*Ṣabr* = patience

*Ṣaḥāba* = companions of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Ṣaḥwa* = awakening; revival

*Ṣa'id* = vertical

*Al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ* = righteous ancestors; early Muslim orthodox generations

*Al-salafiyyūn al-judād* = neo-modernists

*Al-salafiyyūn al-mu'tadilūn* = moderate fundamentalists

*Al-salafiyyūn al-rāfiḍūn* = rejectionist fundamentalists

*Ṣalawāt 'alā al-nabī* = prayers for the Prophet Muḥammad

*Sālik* = disciple

*Sanad* = chain of transmission

*Sayyid* = male descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Sayyida* = female descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Shafā'a* = recommendation

*Shar'* = religion

*Shar'ī* or *iṣṭilāḥī* = standard Islamic concept

*Shārī'* = Lawgiver (God and the Prophet Muḥammad)

*Sharī'a* = Islamic law

*Sharī'a* and *ḥaqīqa* = exoteric and esoteric expressions of Islam

*Sharīf* (pl.: *shurafā'*) = descendent of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Shaykh* = master

*Shirk* = polytheism; unforgivable sin

*Shūrā* = consultation

*Shu'ūr* = consciousness

*Sulṭawī* = pro-establishment

*Sunna* = tradition; Prophetic-Tradition

*Sunnat Allāh* = God's laws in human social life; natural laws

*Ta'abbudī* = spiritual and ritual

*Ta'āruḍ al-adilla* = conflict of authority

*Tābi'ūn* = followers of the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Tābi'ū al-tābi'īn* = followers of the followers of the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad

*Tabwīb al-fiqh* = systematization of Islamic jurisprudence

*Tafkīk* = deconstruction

*Al-tafsīr al-'āmm* = general hermeneutics

*Al-tafsīr al-khāṣṣ* = sacred hermeneutics; *hermeneutica sacra*

*Al-tafsīr al-muqaddas* = sacred hermeneutics; *hermeneutica sacra*

*Al-tafsīr al-mawḍū'ī* = thematic interpretation

*Taḥāwulāt* = changes; “different approaches”

*Taḥkīm* = peace agreement

*Taḥrīf* = change

*Tajdīd* = renewal; reform; modernity

*Takfir wa tabdī'* = condemning Islamic schools of thought as unbelief

*Ta'līl* = causation

*Talwīn* = coloration

*Tanzīl* = horizontalization

*Taqdīr Allāh* = God's laws in human material life

*Tarāḍī* = agreement

*Tarīqa* = sufi way of life; sufi order

*Tartīb al-āyāt min ḥayth al-mawḍū'* = the thematic hierarchy of Qur'anic verses



*Taqbīl* = kissing the hands of a *sayyid* when non-*sayyids* meet him as a sign of respect

*Taqlīd* = imitation

*Taqwā* = the observance of Islamic teachings

*Tawakkul* = submission

*Tawassuṭ* = intercession

*Al-Tawāzun* = Islamic middle way

*Tawḥīd* = the unity of God

*Tawḥīd al-‘ulūm* = the unification of sciences

*Ta’wīl* = interpretation; vertical; verticalization; philosophical interpretation

*Ta’wīlī* = esoteric

*Thābit* = permanent

*Tashrī‘* = process of the evolution of Islamic law

*Thiqqa* = trusted; reliable

*Ṭubāwī* = mythical

*Turāth* = heritage (tradition, custom, “civilization”)

*Ṭuruq al-tajdīd* = methods of reform

*Al-‘ulūm al-‘aqliyya waḥdahā* = pure rational sciences

*‘Ulūm al-bayān* = interpretive sciences

*‘Ulūm al-‘irfān* = gnostic sciences

*Al-‘ulūm al-naqliyya waḥdahā* = pure traditional-textual sciences

*Umma* = nation, Muslim community

*Umm al-Banīn* = Mother of Children

*‘Umūm al-balwā* = public interest

*‘Urf* = tradition, custom (“civilization”)

*Uṣalli* = I pray

*Uṣul* = principles

*Uṣulī* = Islamic legal philosopher

*Al-wa‘d wa al-wa‘īd* = promise and threat

*Waq‘ī* = human

*Wahy* = revelation

*Wāqī‘* = reality

*Wasīla* = intermediation between a human being and God

*Al-waṣṭiyya* = Islamic middle way

*Wilāya* = sainthood

*Wilāyat al-faqīh* = government by Muslim jurists

*Wird* = mantra

*Al-Yasār al-Islāmī* = the Islamic Left

*Zāhiri* = exoteric expression of Islam

*Zamānī* = temporal

*Zāwiyya* = retreat