

**FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING IN A PROTRACTED
CONFLICT: KOREA, 1948-1993**

Keung Ryong Chang
Department of Political Science
McGill University
Montreal, Canada

January 1996

A thesis submitted to
the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

© Keung Ryong Chang
1996

ABSTRACT

Although there are many studies on long-term conflict, e.g., 'Enduring Rivalry Theory' and 'Protracted Conflict Theory', the literature suffers from neglect of the decisional dimension in such a conflict. This dissertation is on foreign policy decision-making in protracted conflict. The core question is: what creates, prolongs, and terminates such conflict? The Korean conflict, 1948-1993, is studied as a case. This study presents the argument that both national interest and identity are sources of protracted conflict, and that three factors are especially important in affecting the development of a protracted conflict, namely: decision-makers' negative perceptions of their adversaries; institutionalized commitments of involved states against each other; and biased coping strategies. International crises, including war, and rare accommodation successes are behavioral patterns in a protracted conflict. Value-sharing, increased complementary interests, and a diminished threat to national identity may terminate protracted conflict.

EXTRAIT

Bien qu'il y a beaucoup d'études sur le conflit à long-terme, i.e., 'La Théorie de Rivalité de Longue Durée' et 'La Théorie du Conflit Prolongé', la littérature souffre d'une négligence d'une dimension décisionnelle dans un tel conflit. Cette dissertation porte sur la décision de la politique étrangère sur le conflit prolongé. La question centrale est: qu'est-ce qui crée, prolonge, et termine un tel conflit? Le conflit Coréen, 1948-1993, est une étude d'un tel cas. Cette étude présente les arguments qui tous deux: l'intérêt national et l'identité sont des sources de conflit prolongé, ainsi que les trois facteurs importants dans l'affectation du conflit prolongé, c'est-à-dire: les preneurs de décision, la perception négative des adversaires; les commentaires institutionnels des états impliqués entre eux; et les stratégies partielles préconçues. Les crises internationales, incluant la guerre, les rares succès sont des comportements dans un conflit prolongé. Le partage des valeurs, les intérêts complémentaires augmentés, et une menace diminuée de l'identité nationale ce qui peut mettre fin au conflit prolongé.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Michael Brecher, for his support and encouragement in the preparation of this dissertation and throughout my years of graduate studies at McGill University. His seminar on CONFLICT, CRISIS AND WAR awakened me to the disturbing questions surrounding the Korean conflict. His confidence in me was the stimulus for my intellectual rebirth. While I was writing this thesis, his interest, suggestions, and continued guidance have been invaluable.

I am grateful for the thoughtful advice provided by Professor T.V. Paul. He was kind enough to read through all my initial thesis drafts and gave me valuable comments and suggestions. I also owe a great debt of gratitude to Professor Jung Hyun Shin. He read several drafts of Chapters 1 through 4, provided invaluable advice, and contributed significantly to the shaping of the dissertation. My thanks go as well to Professors Mark Brawley, Patrick James, and Hudson Meadwell. They offered penetrating comments on specific issues that helped me to refine my ideas in the preliminary stages. I am grateful to Professor Wan Kyu Choi for his interest and support while I was doing research in Seoul for this thesis. I wish to thank Elizabeth Speyer, without whose careful editing and uncommon kindness this thesis would not have been as readable as it is.

Beyond the writing of the dissertation, I wish to acknowledge the help I received from many people. Very special thanks go first to Dr. Young Sik Choue who encouraged and provided me with the opportunity to study abroad. I also thank professors Myung Sik Lee, Byung Il Kim, Jun-Ki Min, Jong Yil Rah, and Chung Won Choue for their continued interest and encouragement. During my stay at McGill University, I received valued mental stimulation from numerous Professors: James Booth, Jerome Black, Barbara Haskel, Baldev Raj Nayar, Paul Noble, John Shingler, Blema Steinberg, Charles Taylor, and James Tully.

With special love and devotion, I turn to my family. The love I have for my two young sons, Jung Jae and Sung Jae, has been a constant inspiration. I hope that in some way my work and research on the origins and resolution of conflict will help make the future world a better place for them. Young Joo, my wife, deserves endless thanks for her love, patience, and care for me during the long period of study. Her constant smile and ever-giving advice have been tremendous sources of support and encouragement.

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Bum Soo Chang and Kang Ok Lee, and my mother-in-law, Deok Soon Kim, as a way of expressing my profound thanks for their wise guidance, support, and encouragement; and to the memory of my grandmother, Keum Nyun Kim, and my father-in-law, Jung Mann Suh, as an expression of my regret for their passing away before its completion.

CONTENTS

Abstract	i
Acknowledgements	ii
List of Figures and Tables	v
Preface	vi
PART ONE: THEORY	
CHAPTER 1. A STUDY OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT	2
I. Overview of the Perspective	2
II. Relation to Previous Studies	5
CHAPTER 2. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	25
I. Definition of a Protracted Conflict	25
II. Variables	27
III. Models and Propositions	45
CHAPTER 3. THE INTER-KOREAN PROTRACTED CONFLICT	60
I. In-Depth Case Study as a Methodology	60
II. The Inter-Korean Conflict as a Case	62
III. Overview of the Inter-Korean Conflict	63
PART TWO: CASE STUDIES	
CHAPTER 4. CRISES AND WAR	71
I. US Intervention in the Korean War, 1950	81
II. Chinese Intervention in the Korean War, 1950	95
III. The January 21 and Pueblo Crises, 1968	120
IV. The Poplar Tree Crisis, 1976	150
CHAPTER 5. ACCOMMODATION ATTEMPTS	185
I. The Armistice Agreement, 1953	186
II. The July 4 Joint Communiqué, 1972	211
III. The Basic Agreement, 1992	233
PART THREE: ANALYSIS	
CHAPTER 6. ROLE OF THE MAJOR POWERS	264
I. Crises and War	264
II. Accommodation Attempts	273
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS	282
I. Proposition-Testing: Findings	282
II. Theoretical Implications	318
III. Policy Implications	321
IV. Some Personal Reflections	325
APPENDIX: Chronology	329
Bibliography	349

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures

2.1	Model 2.1: Sources of Protracted Conflict	47
2.2	Model 2.2: Decision-Making in Protracted Conflict	50
2.3	Model 2.3: Foreign Policy Behavior in Protracted Conflict	53
2.4	Model 2.4: Integrated Model of Protracted Conflict	55

Tables

2.1	Protracted Conflicts and the Frequency of International Crises	30
2.2	Phases: Crisis, Accommodation, and Accommodation Failure	32
2.3	Combined Protracted Conflicts	40
4.1	The Ratio of North Korea's Defense Expenditure to the National Budget in Percentages (1953-1968)	125
6.1	The Role of the Major Powers in the Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict	279
7.1	Summary of Case Study Findings	313

PREFACE

This dissertation is a study of foreign policy decision-making in protracted conflict. The inter-Korean conflict is the particular case.

When I was in elementary school in the early 1960s, each June we students were asked to draw a picture or devise a slogan in commemoration of the Korean War. Many drawings showed Kim Il Sung sitting on a tank, blood pouring down. One motto that I remember was: "Muchireuja, Kongsan-dang; Ddaeryo Chapja, Kim Il Sung" [Let's obliterate the Communists, and strike Kim Il Sung dead]. When I was in high school, the January 21 and Pueblo crises of 1968 exploded. In 1972, the two Koreas issued the July 4 Joint Communiqué for peaceful unification, but by 1973, it had ceased to function in practical terms. When I was serving as a private near the DMZ in 1976, the Poplar Tree crisis erupted. When I was working on an earlier version of this thesis in 1992, the two Koreas issued important documents on inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation, goals which were not implemented successfully. In 1995, North Korea increased its ground forces by ten thousand, which brought its army to 1.04 million. South Korea in its White Paper on National Defense, 1995-6, designated North Korea as its 'major enemy' (Hanguk Ilbo, 3/10/1995).

Despite their common goal (e.g. unification), why have the two Koreas, people of the same nation, continued their conflict for half a century? In general terms, what generates a protracted conflict and how does it evolve? Can there be any escape from a protracted conflict? These are the core questions of this study. To answer them, I have undertaken an in-depth case study of the inter-Korean conflict.

This thesis comprises three parts. In Part One (Chapters 1-3), I discuss theoretical aspects of protracted conflict. In Chapter 1, I examine previous studies of long-term conflict. My review of the literature is based on my arguments about

protracted conflict: (1) both national interest and identity are major factors in stimulating protracted rivalry; (2) the behavioral patterns of protracted conflict include numerous crises/war and accommodation failures; (3) decision-makers' choices are influenced by their perceptions of the adversary and by commitments to protect national interest and/or identity on both sides, and these choices are critical in the evolution of a protracted conflict. Based on these arguments, I review theories of 'enduring rivalry' and 'protracted conflict'; national identity and interest; three behavioral patterns of protracted conflict (i.e., crises/wars, normal relations range, and accommodation (or its failure)); and decision-making in a protracted conflict.

In Chapter 2, I provide a conceptual framework. First, I offer a definition of protracted conflict, which differs from that of Azar (1979). Second, key variables are selected. National interest and identity are the independent variables. Why and how national interest and identity function as sources of conflict are discussed. The dependent variable is a protracted conflict in which behavioral patterns are characterized by a series of war/crises and accommodation failures. Definitions of crisis, accommodation, and accommodation failure are provided. The decision-making process is defined as an intervening variable. Decision-makers' perception, institutionalized commitments, and coping strategies are discussed. Third, four models of protracted conflict are presented: SOURCES; DECISION-MAKING; FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR; and an INTEGRATED MODEL. Related propositions on each variable and each Model are presented.

In Chapter 3, I explain why a case study is essential for an understanding of the nature of protracted conflict, in general; and why I chose the inter-Korean conflict as a case. The nature of Korean conflict has received little theoretical attention from scholars, in spite of the fact that it has great significance for the study of protracted conflict.

In Part Two (Chapter 4-5), a detailed case study of the inter-Korean protracted conflict is presented. In Chapter 4, the pre-Korean War period (1920s - 1950) is reviewed for background, and four cases of crises/war in the inter-Korean conflict are studied: two cases of US and Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950-

1953); the January 21 crisis and subsequently, the Pueblo crisis (1968); and the Poplar Tree crisis (1976). All the cases are examined in sequential phases: pre-crisis, crisis, and end-crisis. In Chapter 5, I study three cases of accommodative behaviors: the Armistice Agreement (1953); the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972); and the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration (1992). The accommodation cases are also studied sequentially: initiation, negotiation and accommodation, and implementation.

In Part Three (Chapter 6-7), I provide an integrated analysis of the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Chapter 6 examines how the major powers (i.e., the US, the USSR, China, and Japan) conditioned and influenced both Koreas' foreign policies. In Chapter 7, I provide a recapitulation of the core concepts and key variables in my study and examine in detail the formulated propositions (Ch. 2) from case studies in Part Two. I then present the significance of my research findings for a theory of protracted conflict. I offer policy suggestions and an agenda for further study.

A study of protracted conflict is important. The superpowers have enjoyed a "long peace" since 1945 (Gaddis, 1991). According to some, wars by the major powers have become obsolescent (Mueller, 1989). However, does this mean the "end of history" as others have argued (Fukuyama, 1992)? This argument may be correct in terms of the Cold War and the dominant system, but not for protracted conflicts. The post-Cold War global system is entering a new era in which numerous crises are likely to erupt (Brecher, 1993: 546), and accommodations usually fail, thus resulting in an increase in protracted conflicts.

As for the extent of protracted conflicts, there are: in Africa, Ethiopia/Somalia, Chad/Libya, Morocco/Polisario movement, Rwanda/ Burundi; in the Americas, Guyana/ Venezuela, Ecuador/Peru, Nicaragua/Honduras; in Asia, in addition to the two Koreas, India/Pakistan, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Vietnam/Cambodia, China/India, PRC/Taiwan, China/Vietnam, China/Russia; in the Middle East, Arab/Israel, Greece/Turkey, Iran/Iraq, and Iraq/Kuwait. The collapse of the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia provides fertile ground for protracted conflicts. Examples are ethnic conflict between Armenians and Azeris, and among Croat, Muslim and Serbian communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In view of these numerous protracted conflicts, it is more likely that we are entering "a new era" in world history (Gurr and Harff, 1994: xiii), not experiencing its "end".

Part One. Theory

In Part one, I consider theoretical aspects of long-term conflict. In Chapter 1, I begin by evaluating 'enduring rivalry theory' and 'protracted conflict theory'. Based on my assessment of these two major theories dealing with long-term conflict, I provide in Chapter 2 a conceptual framework for this study. I redefine the concept of protracted conflict. Variables are selected and illuminated; four models of protracted conflict are formulated; and related propositions on each variable and model are presented. In Chapter 3, I outline my methodology, which is to treat the inter-Korean protracted conflict as an in-depth case study. An overview of the inter-Korean conflict is provided.

CHAPTER 1: A STUDY OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT: A Review of the Literature

I. Overview of the Perspective

Whereas some international conflicts terminate in a relatively short-term period, others extend over many years with recurrent hot points (Lockhart, 1977: 385). Some contemporary scholars focus on the 'long peace' between the superpowers (Gaddis, 1991), but many minor states have endured persistent conflict since 1945 and even after the end of the superpowers' conflict. The inter-Korean conflict, for example, has been protracted in spite of a common nation, a common cultural heritage, and even a common goal (e.g., reunification). As well as the comparable length of the conflictual period, there must be other aspects to the differences between protracted conflict and non-protracted conflict¹. It is difficult to comprehend what makes a conflict endure and what makes it terminate.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the specific features of a protracted conflict in terms of origins and processes. The study of protracted conflict is important for the following reasons:

First, a protracted conflict has a higher propensity to escalate into war. Major processes of a protracted conflict are violent interactions, violent crisis management, serious clashes, or ultimately all-out war. Brecher (1993: 164) found that 52% from 317 crises within protracted conflicts (1918-1988) resulted in serious clashes or full-scale war. Goertz and Diehl (1992b: 158-159) found that 53% of enduring rivalries (1816-1976) resulted in war and that 79% of militarized interstate disputes took place in some rivalry contexts. Second, the resolution of a protracted conflict tends to be difficult. Demonstrating the relationship between repeated crises and the high

probability of war, Vasquez (1993: 300) advises us to try to resolve the underlying issues in order to avoid successive crises between states with the same parity. The problem, however, lies in the fact that a protracted conflict is characterized by deep-rooted animosities and is more difficult to resolve than an isolated conflict (Azar, 1979; Northrup, 1989: 56). Third, protracted conflicts are threats to global peace. Gochman and Maoz (1984: 611) state that enduring rivalries between minor states appear to be "an important source of threat to world order", and thus a protracted conflict may disrupt the global status-quo.

For a comprehensive understanding of protracted conflict, not only its origins but also its processes should be studied. As a subset of international conflict, protracted conflict also involves two or more states which perceive or are aware of the incompatibility of goals². Hence it is crucial to know the origins of the incompatibility that exists between two conflicting states. A protracted conflict, however, has its own influence on the process of conflict because of the decision-makers' awareness of rivalry. Williams and McGinnis (1992: 87) argue that the military and diplomatic hostility of the US and the USSR can be attributed to the effects of "the dimension of rivalry." Thus a protracted conflict should be viewed not only as a manifestation of incompatibility but also as a process of perceptual and behavioral interactions between the involved states³.

Incompatibility may take two forms: incompatibility of goals and incompatibility of values. If adversaries experience incompatibility of goals, then conflict of interest arises (Axelrod, 1967: 87). Adversaries may also have different values and be mutually intolerant of the other's values (Kriesberg, 1984: 476). Different values are usually associated with different identities. Thus the incompatibility of values arises basically from different identities and is manifested as a conflict of identity. In this context, the first argumant in this study is that both national interest and national identity are major factors in stimulating conflict, including protracted conflict.

The second argument is that a protracted conflict is composed of sub-conflicts, accommodation-failures, or rare accommodation. To analyze these events is important in comprehending the total process of protracted conflict because each

sub-conflict contributes to the evolution of protracted conflict itself. Lewis A. Coser (1962: 39) says:

When conflicts continue over time they may be analyzed in terms of battles, skirmishes...major encounters, and the like. Each one of these can then be treated as a conflict in its own right... In all such cases it would seem analytically profitable to record in detail how the total conflict moves through a number of patterned phases, each involving specific termination points.

Each conflict not only contributes to the development of the total process of a protracted conflict, but also influences successive events. Thus Goertz and Diehl (1992a: 106) maintain that, within continuing rivalries, individual conflicts are not independent events and that we need a greater understanding of how conflict events are related to each other.

The third argument posits that, given the national interest and the national identity, conflictual or cooperative behaviors between states will depend upon the decision-makers' perceptions of the changing environment. Any event which may trigger conflict or stimulate opportunities for cooperation does not automatically produce conflict or cooperation. Rather, everything is "filtered through decision-makers' perception" (Brecher et al., 1969) and is assessed by the decision-makers' calculation. Whereas the second argument focuses on the action-reaction process at the inter-state level, the third argument focuses on decision-makers' perception, coping, and choice within each state.

These three arguments constitute the primary criteria for reviewing previous studies. This chapter attempts to review existing literature for the purpose of posing the following questions: How and to what extent do national identity and/or national interest contribute to the creation and maintenance of protracted conflict? How do decision-makers, given environmental changes, perceive and manipulate these two factors in determining conflictual or accommodative behaviors?

For the literature review, I begin by examining the main thrusts of 'enduring rivalry theory' and 'protracted conflict theory'. This is followed by a review of the function of national identity and national interest as factors stimulating a conflict.

I continue with a discussion of three types of behavioral patterns to be found in a protracted conflict: normal relations, crises, and accommodation failures. Finally, I consider decision-making that is assumed to be critical for the analysis of foreign policy in a protracted rivalry.

II. Relation to Previous Studies

II.1. 'ENDURING RIVALRY' AND 'PROTRACTED CONFLICT'

Major previous studies that deal with extended duration of hostility can be categorized as 'enduring rivalry' theory and 'protracted conflict' theory. In this section, I assess these two theories insofar as they are relevant to the three arguments and questions above.

II.1.a. Enduring Rivalry Theory

Vasquez (1993: 82) maintains that rivalry signifies a process characteristic of relative equals. What kind of process then should we expect from an 'enduring rivalry'? According to Gochman and Maoz (1984), it is 'militarized interstate disputes'. They define enduring rivalries as pairs (dyads) of states that have engaged most often in militarized disputes with another. They qualify militarized interstate disputes as "a set of interactions between or among states involving threats to use military force, displays of military force, or actual uses of military force" (ibid.: 587). Diehl (1985b: 250) suggests the operational definition of enduring rivalry as rivalry in which "two nations engage in at least three militarized disputes within a period of 15 years." For the theorists of enduring rivalry, the process is characterized by frequent militarized disputes or periodical eruption into open violence⁴.

What are the views of the theorists on the causes of enduring rivalries? Although most theorists of enduring rivalry do not explicitly state its causes, they seem to regard conflicting national interest as its cause⁵. For example, Williams and McGinnis (1992: 89) hold that rivalry occurs when two states see each other as the

primary threat to their own national security. Diehl (1985b) explicitly believes that clash of interests can form the basis for a rivalry if they are repeated over time. The study of enduring rivalry is significant because it shows us that the incompatibility of such national interests as security may evolve into long-term conflicts which can produce a behavioral pattern of frequent militarized encounters between the involved states.

The theory of enduring rivalry, however, does not take into consideration the importance of identity as a major cause of enduring rivalries. Levy (1992: 3) contends:

Perhaps an important component of enduring rivalries is to be found not just in the relationships between states but also rather in the relationships between peoples or societies...these enduring rivalries between communal (ethnic/ linguistic/ religious) groups often persist regardless of changing political arrangements at the state level.

Although Levy seems to emphasize the importance of society or the communal group, not the state, as a level-of-analysis, equally important is his indication that the locomotive of such enduring social conflict is group-identity.

Another shortcoming of the theory of enduring rivalry is that it does not show us how and when the militarized disputes occur. For example, the initiator's behavior may not automatically stimulate reaction from the target state. The mechanism that generates the target state's response is the decision-makers' perception of a threat, display, or use of military force. This perceptual dimension is the connection between two states' behaviors (Leng and Singer, 1988). To obtain a more comprehensive picture of long-term conflict, it is necessary to consider the function of identity in stimulating persistent conflict, decision-makers' perception of external threats, and the decision-making process.

II.1.b. Protracted Conflict Theory

Vasquez (1993: 311) makes a distinction between enduring rivalry and protracted conflict. For him, the former is between equals in terms of capability, and the latter

is between unequals. I will not, however, consider the dimension of capability in my examination of long-term conflict because, although minor states are weak in military or industrial capabilities, they may engage in longer conflict with major states if they have full and irrevocable commitment⁶ or high determination⁷. Gochman and Maoz (1984) found that 'minor-major' disputes have a considerably higher propensity to involve the use of force [72.7 % of their cases of militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1976]⁸.

What then endows the minor power with such stronger commitment? SarDesai (1992) interprets the Vietnamese long-term conflict with France, the US, and China as the struggle for national identity. Contrary to the scholars of enduring rivalry, most scholars of protracted conflict tend to emphasize the importance of group or national identity in stimulating a protracted conflict. For example, Azar and Farah (1981: 320) believe:

Protracted social conflicts are distinguishable from other conflicts in terms of their focus on group and national identity and the rights and privileges associated with them.

Rothman (1992: xi) further states that in protracted social conflict, each party views the legitimization of the other's identity as threatening to its own well-being. This situation resembles Rapoport's (1974) concept of 'fight' in which the mere presence or existence of the other is perceived as a threat.

Protracted conflicts have a different process of evolution from non-protracted conflicts. In the former case, the process is characterized by increased hostility in the perception of the involved states towards each other and the difficulty of conflict resolution. Because of prior negative memories of the adversary, demonization of the enemy develops within each party (Rothman, 1992: 14). This process of demonization leads them to the delegitimation of the adversary as a political power (Auerbach and Ben-Yehuda, 1987: 329). All these processes hinder the involved parties from easy conflict resolution⁹. Lewis Coser (1968b: 37) declares that such social conflict is a process which has no explicit termination point and that it terminates only when one of the antagonists is totally destroyed. Coser's theory is

supported by Azar and his colleagues (1978: 50) who contend that protracted conflicts are processes which experience sporadic outbreaks of open warfare.

The most important contribution of the theorists of protracted conflict probably lies in their conceptualization of identity-based conflict as a major source of long-term conflict. Nevertheless, it has some shortcomings. First, it does not consider the importance of national interest in stimulating protracted conflicts. Second, it does not provide us with data as to when and how the threat to identity kindles the eruption of serious clashes or open warfare.

To sum up, both 'enduring rivalry' theory and 'protracted conflict' theory describe the behavioral pattern of long-term conflict as one of repeated militarized disputes and/or sporadic open warfare. However, the theory of enduring rivalry focuses on national interest as a cause, the theory of protracted conflict emphasizes national identity. Thus these two theories are not identical in their focus. In addition, neither enduring rivalry or protracted conflict theory pays sufficient attention to how and with what criteria decision-makers perceive, interpret, and cope with external or environmental changes and how they make choices, conflictual or cooperative, which eventually contribute to the evolution or termination of a long-term conflict. Having identified these two theoretical attempts to deal with long-term conflict, I continue this overview by examining the extent to which the previous studies provide an answer to the three arguments and questions above.

II.2. NATIONAL IDENTITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST

In identifying the origin of a protracted conflict, most scholars emphasize its inevitability. Stoessinger (1985) argues that wars between minor powers allied with major powers tend to be indeterminate. Some scholars (Azar, 1990; Burton, 1986b; Rapoport, 1974; Smith, 1986) consider collective identity to be a major source of a protracted conflict because values such as identity are not negotiable whereas vested interests are (Azar, 1986a). Strausz-Hupé (1959), however, argued that Communist China deliberately engaged in a protracted conflict with the West for strategic interest. In addition, Karl Deutsch (1978) also maintains that diametrically opposed

interests produce a protracted conflict. The problem remains one of discerning which factor, identity or interest, determines a state's decision-making in a protracted conflict.

II.2.a. National Identity

Identity, the sense of wholeness, develops within the psyche of a group such as an ethnic population (Smith, 1986; Wegde, 1986). Group identity, however, cannot be a cause of conflict unless the group's sense of 'self' (Rothman, 1992) or 'collective narcissism' (Fromm, 1973: 231) is endangered. Once it is threatened, the resulting conflict can be intense and serious. Compromise is difficult in such a situation because identity is not something that the person possesses but is an intrinsic part of the self (Boulding, 1962: 312). National identity consists of a common history and a common destiny. Due to the common history, ethos is central to national identity, and because of the common destiny, national identity is a major political issue¹⁰. States' foreign policy, in this sense, should be understood not simply as a product of strategic concern but also as a process of maintaining identity (Campbell, 1992). As for international conflict, John Burton (1984) contends that it is an individual's sense of identity with some group that will fulfil his/her needs, not national interests, that produces international conflict.

If conflict escalates into a crisis situation, the sense of identity will be intensified within each camp (Mitchell, 1981: 88). For example, even pacifists within each camp may become more belligerent because of deep feelings of tension, anxiety, or fear (North, 1990: 170). This process of polarization between adversaries produces hatred (Rapoport, 1974: 185), stereotyped images of the enemy, severe defects in judgment (Fromm, 1973), and sometimes fierce conflict (Kriesberg, 1984: 473). These negative experiences penetrate all levels of each side, intensifying aggressiveness. The intensified rivalry further consolidates identity, leading to a vicious cycle of conflict. Thus Rapoport (1974) believes that identity is a major factor in the course and persistence of social conflict. In this sense, national identity is crucial to the study of protracted conflicts. However, Huth and Russett (1993: 64) argue that even

severe identity-based conflicts (e.g., ethnic or ideological) have less tendency to result in militarized disputes when competing national interest (e.g. over territory) is not involved. In what ways and to what extent does national identity, as distinct from national interest, influence a state's decision-making in producing and maintaining a protracted conflict? The theorists of protracted conflict do not pay attention to these questions.

II.2.b. National Interest

Although Morgenthau (1958) contends that national identity is included in national interest¹¹, he (1985: 178-183) warns that giving overriding importance to a single factor such as nationalism is an error in the assessment of national power or national interest. The theorists of protracted conflict have perpetuated this kind of error, by overemphasizing national identity. How then does national interest contribute to enduring conflicts and what is its nature? Many scholars of enduring rivalry point out the importance of territory or territorial control as a major cause of enduring conflicts.

Huth and Russett (1993) claim that most enduring rivalries have been rooted in competing claims to territory and population. McClelland (1972: 87) interprets such chronic conflicts as the Berlin crises and the Taiwan-Strait crises as examples of a struggle for territorial control. Goertz and Diehl argue that territory and the legitimacy of its transfer are significant predictors of future conflict in recurring conflicts. Goertz and Diehl (1992a: 14) consequently argue that territory is one of the keys for assessing when a conflict will occur or when it will be peacefully resolved. Weede (cited in Goertz and Diehl, 1992a: 26) and Vasquez (1993: 123-152) further contend that states with contiguous territory have an increased likelihood of engaging in militarized interstate disputes.

Other scholars claim that enduring conflict is intentionally pursued for states' strategic interests. Strausz-Hupé's (1959) example of Communist Chinese strategy toward the West is an example. Paul (1994: 24-25) argues that a weaker party in a asymmetric conflict may adopt a strategy of protracted warfare. The purpose would

be to wear down the militarily stronger opponent through "a series of set piece battles". A similar argument is illustrated by Tonnesson's case study of the Indochinese Wars. Tonnesson (1985: 23) explains that these wars were between a militarily weak party and one that was militarily strong. In this situation, Tonnesson continues:

The militarily weak party...had to adopt a strategy of protracted war in which the goal was to exhaust the other psychologically, not to defeat them militarily... It took a long time before the Vietnamese were able to 'exhaust' French and American public opinion, but that was the way in which they won the wars.

All these discussions lead us to consider the importance of national interest (i.e., territorial security, strategy, and other factors) in producing protracted conflicts. Vital interest is also a major source of coercive bargaining in recurring crises (Leng, 1983: 416-417). Even if both parties want to accommodate each other, there could be recurring crises or wars if their national and political interests are irreconcilable (Lebow, 1981: 41, 55-56).

II.2.c. National Identity and National Interest

Can national identity and national interest be isolated from each other? The two factors are conceptually independent, but are related in practice. For example, a danger is not a thing which exists independently for those to whom it poses a threat. A notion of 'what we are', identity, is essential to an understanding of 'what we fear' or 'what we want', interest (Campbell, 1992: 1, 58; Beiner, 1983: 144-152). Identity-based conflict is almost always accompanied by interest-based conflict. Furthermore identity-based conflict also exacerbates conflict of interest (Aubert, 1963: 29; North, 1990). Conflict of interest can also be transformed into one of identity. This occurs because, when national interests are threatened, the target state tends to attribute the cause of conflict to the evil traits of the initiator (Rothman, 1992: 50).

If the conflict of interest continues, a deep-rooted conflict of identity may arise,

which in turn, exacerbates the conflict of interest. These conflicts interact with each other. Van Doorn (1966, cited in Druckman and Zechmeister, 1973: 452, fn. 3) argues that in political decision-making, conflict is more likely to arise from the interplay between ideological differences and competing vested interests. Even Robert Gurr (1993: 166-167), to whom the theorists of 'human needs' or 'protracted social conflict' frequently refer, explicitly states:

[P]rotest and rebellion by communal groups are jointly motivated by deep-seated grievances about group status and by the situationally determined pursuit of political interests... It is evident...that their [communal groups'] mobilization and strategies are based on the interaction of both kinds of factors.
[emphasis in original]

To summarize, 'enduring rivalries' may develop from purely interest-based conflict¹². 'Protracted conflicts' may evolve from purely identity-based conflict. Identity and interest, however, empirically often interact, although they are conceptually distinct. Conflict of identity and of interest reinforce each other as each of these conflicts intensifies. The vicious cycle thereby escalates, not only within each type of conflict but also between the two kinds of conflicts. Most previous studies, 'enduring rivalry theory' and 'protracted conflict theory', neither concentrate on these two major factors of conflict, nor consider the interplay between them. This vicious cycle of conflict needs to be examined through a study of its process.

II.3. BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Even the most intense long-term conflicts do not always experience overt violence or open warfare. They also have periods of latent conflict and accommodation attempts. These behavioral patterns will be dealt with in greater detail below.

II.3.a. Normal Relations Range and Its Breaking

Azar et al. (1978) suggest that a protracted conflict has a 'normal relations range' (NRR) which is bounded by an upper threshold (beyond normal conflict) and a lower threshold (below normal cooperation). The upper threshold comprises any

threat of damage to people or things, whereas the lower threshold represents any threat to national identity. The normal relations range is characterized by relatively latent conflict. Azar et al. argue further that one of the unique features of a protracted conflict is 'sporadic outbreaks of open warfare'. In such a case, the conflict is overt. The contribution of Azar and his colleagues was to clarify the patterns of states' behavior in a protracted conflict. However, their suggestions are essentially descriptive in nature because they do not provide any explanation of when and why the normal relations range is exceeded and sporadic open warfare results.

Incorporating Azar's theory of protracted conflict, Schrodt (1981, 1984) and Hill (1990) develop a model of persistent conflict. Although Schrodt and Hill approach the model differently, they both contend that persistent conflict has three modes of behavior: 'stability', a 'limit cycle', and 'sporadic flare-ups', or 'peak and lull'. They argue that there are cleavages within a state and that these divided interests reflect the cyclical patterns of conflict. To them, the oscillation between stability and instability is due to interactions between groups within states, one of which prefers escalating conflict while the other chooses to defuse it. Their rationale, however, is contrary to the main thrust of protracted conflict theory because they assume the existence of divided groups within states. Moreover, their models may not be applicable to the analysis of inter-state conflictual process because these models primarily attribute the various modes of behavior to the internal conditions within states.

Another pioneering work on the conditions of diverse modes of behavior during a protracted conflict has been done by Muncaster and Zinnes (1990). They postulate that the variance of protracted conflict patterns is determined by the combination of what they call 'a system of social forces' which is composed of 'grievance', 'friendship', 'fear', 'aggression', 'deterrence', and 'pull to war'. To them, the behavioral patterns of a protracted conflict are conflict resolution, war, continuation of protracted conflict, and some combination of such behaviors. Should conflict resolution arise, all the factors reducing conflict must be operating. The factors facilitating resolution are friendship (a pressure to resolve conflict), fear (fear of

conflict escalation), and deterrent force. Alternatively, either deterrence or friendship should be great enough to counteract aggression. War can erupt when the forces of grievance, aggression, and pull to war all act to increase the levels of conflict. Alternatively, when fear is present, either grievance or the pull to war should be great enough to contain any efforts to de-escalation. Other combinations of such social forces produce the continuation of protracted conflict or combinations of various behaviors.

Muncaster and Zinnes believe that deterrent force is essential in preventing states from waging war, and that friendship force is critical in producing conflict resolution, even when war is possible. Muncaster and Zinnes thus clarify under what conditions war and conflict resolution are possible and why some protracted conflicts remain within a normal relations range. Compared to Schrodtt and Hill, who focused on the competition between groups within a state as a cause of divergent behavior, Muncaster and Zinnes explicitly attribute the different patterns of states' behavior to existing inter-state rivalry. In this context, their model has a greater capacity to explain inter-state protracted conflict. They neglect to point out, however, what states might consider a grievance, what momentum drives them to aggressiveness or pull to war, or what makes them experience a conciliatory mood towards the adversary. Another limitation of their model lies in the neglect of the escalation process from militarized disputes to war. They simply present various combinations of different behaviors that may lead to conflict resolution or war. However, in order to understand the progression from the normal relations range to war, it is necessary to comprehend the process of conflict escalation (i.e., interstate militarized disputes or crisis).

To incorporate Muncaster and Zinnes' model into the previous studies, it is necessary to focus, not on war, but on militarized disputes or crises. Using similar logic, in clarifying the process from protracted conflict to its resolution, it is important to identify the conditions of accommodation. These points will be examined in more detail below.

II.3.b. International Crisis

In examining the relationship between protracted conflict and international crisis, Brecher (1993: 162, 164) found that during 1918-1988, 47% of protracted conflicts, while only 30% of non-protracted conflicts, experienced direct violent triggers or severe violence in the escalation phase. He also found that 52% of protracted conflicts, whereas 33% of non-protracted conflicts, experienced serious clashes or full scale war. Diehl (1985a) found that war between states with enduring rivalry usually occurred after a number of clashes. Findings of Brecher as well as Diehl imply that patterns of conflictual behavior in a protracted conflict cannot fully be described if we dichotomize them into war or non-war, as 'protracted conflict' theorists do. In this sense, 'enduring rivalry' theory is more appropriate than 'protracted conflict' theory to describe the process of a long-term conflict.

The concept of militarized interstate disputes itself, however, is limited in describing consistent conflictual behavior because simple threat or display of force may not produce a reaction from the adversary. To qualify as a substantial militarized interstate dispute, which may result in minor or serious clashes, the initiator's threat should be perceived by the target. In other words, if one of the states does not perceive a crisis, then minor or major clashes may not result. Leng and Singer (1988) found that only 593 cases (62%) of the 965 cases of militarized disputes (1816-1976) were identified as cases in which decision-makers experienced crises. In this context, international crises, rather than simple militarized disputes, are a more appropriate indicator in describing conflictual behaviors of states engaging in a protracted conflict. Huth and Russett (1993: 61) also argue:

What differentiates a period of overt conflict from a period when...the threat or use of military force is not exercised? The question can be partially answered by identifying the conditions under which military-diplomatic crises escalate to full-scale war, but it equally requires understanding the conditions which lead to the emergence of crises.

In studying conflictual behavior, it is useful to examine crises because crises are characterized by an unusually high intensity of interaction between the involved

parties (Leng and Singer, 1988: 160), and are thus the most salient and visible points of interstate conflict (Lebow, 1981: 309). Huth and Russett (1993: 63) describe protracted periods of rivalry as punctuated by crises and war. Crises may be interpositions between war and non-war (McClelland, 1972: 83). What patterns of crises should we expect then from a protracted conflict? The patterns take the form of a series of crises or recurring crises. Naveh and Brecher (1978) found that crises in the Middle East (1938-1975) happened in a wave-like flow with cyclical patterns of peaks and troughs. Neither 'enduring rivalry' theory nor 'protracted conflict' theory gives much attention to repeated crises as a perceptual and behavioral interaction pattern between states in a protracted conflict.

II.3.c. Accommodation

To examine the process of accommodation between states in a protracted rivalry, it may be useful to start with two theories: one based on 'cooperation'; the other on a 'problem-solving approach'.

II.3.c.1. Cooperation

Despite the theoretical attention given today to both long-term conflict and cooperation among nations, few attempts have been made to link the resolution of intransigent conflict to cooperation. On the one hand, this is presumably because researchers of protracted conflicts have concentrated on national identity, relegating national interest to a mere underpinning for strategic interactions (Azar and Burton, 1986). Cooperation theorists, on the other hand, have concentrated on self-interest of states, ignoring national identity, which is one of the major causes of deep-rooted conflicts. Cooperation theorists argue that the egoistic rationale of states in anarchy enables them to cooperate, given foreseeable absolute-gains (Axelrod, 1984; Keohane, 1984; Oye, 1986a) and durable relationships (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). Cooperation may also be enhanced by international institutions or international regimes created for that purpose (Keohane, 1984, 1989; Krasner, 1983; Ruggie, 1983; Young, 1989).

In such a conflict as deep-rooted as a protracted one, however, (1) the awareness of relative-gains outweighs the expectation of absolute-gains because conflicting states are deeply concerned about the relative balance of power or their relative position of security (Evangelista, 1990: 514; Gowa, 1986; Grieco, 1988, 1990; Lipson, 1984: 14; Waltz, 1979), (2) durable relationships may not be expected by states in enduring rivalry due to their persistent mutual distrust, (3) agreement on the principles or norms of international institutions may be hampered by clashing national identities and different value systems. States' leaders who are concerned about gains, whether relative or absolute, base their decision-making vis-à-vis cooperation on expected utility. Another strand of cooperation theory can be found from 'prospect theory'.

In contrast to expected utility theory, prospect theory maintains that human beings tend to give more weight to losses than to gains, and that they are generally risk-averse for gains and risk-acceptant for losses (Jervis, 1992; Levy, 1992b, 1992c; Stein, 1992; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). With respect to conflict, Jervis (1992) reasons that conflicts and wars are most likely to occur when both adversaries anticipate the losses resulting from no-fighting. With respect to cooperation, Janice Stein (1992) argues that decision-makers choose to cooperate not because of the plausible gains but because of the anticipated losses resulting from the failure to cooperate. For deescalation or accommodation, both involved parties need to see the risks and costs of continuing crisis outweighing anticipated gains (North, 1990: 172).

Both expected utility theory and prospect theory point out the importance of leaders' calculation, gains and/or losses, of interests in stimulating cooperation. These theories, however, do not consider the socio-psychological barriers to cooperation between states engaged in deep-rooted conflict. Mandell (1992) argues that a protracted conflict such as Cyprus contains pathological elements, and that the settlement of objective interests is likely to be superficial if the underlying subjective components of conflict are not resolved. The psychological dynamics (e.g., sense of solidarity within states) of conflict need to be resolved prior to any other issues if deescalation or resolution of protracted conflict is to occur (Lamare, 1991: 2; Ross,

cited in Rothman, 1992: 41). These factors may limit and condition the leaders' initiatives for cooperation with the long-term adversary (Husbands, 1991: 107-108). A theory based on a 'problem-solving approach' deals with these issues.

II.3.c.2. 'Problem-Solving Approach'

According to Burton (1986a), 'settlement' represents a compromise of interest, whereas 'resolution' is an outcome which fully accommodates the unmet human needs of all conflicting parties. Scholars of human needs (Gurr, 1970; Runciman, 1966; Sites, 1973) argue that if those needs are not met, men rebel or violate social codes. 'Problem-solving approaches' (Azar, 1990) are those devised to accommodate the unmet human needs by emphasizing the role of panels. The panel, or third party, is expected to facilitate mutual understanding and induce 'win-win outcomes' for both sides (Burton, 1986a; Duffy and Frensey, 1991: 110; McDonald, 1991). However, how are win-win outcomes achieved when the issue at stake is ethnic identity? If they involve peaceful coexistence, to what extent does this resolution differ from settlement? Burton and Azar failed to present convincing answers to these questions.

It may not be possible for states in long-term conflict to achieve win-win outcomes in terms of national identity. Win-win outcomes are possible if different national identities are not only mutually accepted but if each state is better off as a result of the interaction. However, if states are unable and unwilling to recognize differences in national identities, or if they attempt to impose their identities upon each other, conflict continues. Thus any notion of win-win outcomes in terms of national identity alone is inappropriate¹³. States in protracted conflict can be accommodating when diminished threat to national identity, and increased benefits from accommodation (Northrup, 1989), or anticipated losses from accommodation-failure are perceived. Ideally, minimizing threats to national identity and maximizing national interests (Aubert, 1963: 32; Luard, 1986: 183), i.e., expanding gains or preventing losses, are the necessary and sufficient conditions for accommodation between states in a protracted conflict.

II.3.d. Crisis and Accommodation

In addition to cooperation theory and the theory of the problem-solving approach, there is a growing body of literature that believes crisis itself may induce accommodation. Such research is important because a long-term rivalry is characterized by recurring crises and the difficulty of conflict resolution. For example, from prospect theory, it is expected that states may seek cooperation or de-escalation if they experience losses or expect further losses after serious clashes (Ruloff, 1975). Lebow (1981: 326-337) notes that crises can be turning points of conflict escalation or accommodation. In his view, crises may produce policy-makers' re-assessment of foreign policy, domestic opposition to further conflict, cautious foreign policy behavior because of the fear of war, settlement of outstanding issues, leaders' empathy with the other side, thus facilitating the road to accommodation. Lebow concludes that crisis may be essential to rapprochement in some cases of long-standing rivalries. A similar perspective is advocated by Stephen Rock (1989) who argues that crises were catalysts for rapprochement between great powers involved in long-term rivalry.

II.3.e. Leaders' Dramatic Initiative

Finally, it should be noted that a specific strategy (Phillips, 1978) or leaders' dramatic action (Larson, 1987) may significantly contribute to the resolution of long-term conflict. One important prerequisite to accommodation is flexibility in the value images of the involved parties (Boulding, 1962: 311). Dramatic events or dramatic actions may render the adversaries' deep-rooted images flexible, thus producing a drastic reorganization of their value-structures (Boulding, 1962: 312; Jervis, cited in Lebow, 1981: 333). Only these types of initiatives will influence the historically compounded distrust or current level of conflict, as well as counteracting ineffective cooperation (Ward, 1982). An outstanding example is Egyptian President's Sadat's visit to Israel in 1977. This dramatic gesture significantly affected the Israeli public, psychologically restructuring their perception, and induced the Israeli leaders to react positively toward Sadat's accommodation initiative

(Kriesberg, 1984: 483; Stein, 1989: 50). Why, when, and how do decision-makers decide to take such dramatic actions for accommodation? Conversely, under what conditions do policy-makers decide to maintain or break the upper level of the normal relations range? My next section deals with these questions.

II.4. DECISION-MAKING IN A PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Although the levels of analysis in this study are related to states, the focus is on decision-makers and decision-making within each state. Such a focus is necessary because decision-makers' perceptions of themselves and of the adversary's intentions, power and capabilities (Stoessinger, 1985), or their calculations of expected utility (Bueno de Mesquita, 1981), or anticipated losses (Jervis, 1992; Stein, 1992) are critical in initiating conflictual and/or accommodative behavior. Without leaders' interpretation, persuasion, and mobilization of their constituents, group grievances may not escalate into conflict (Duffy and Frensey, 1991). From his study of 227 communal conflicts since 1945, Gurr (1993) found that even the significance of group grievance in stimulating conflict decreased once leaders' political actions were underway. With respect to accommodation, the leaders' role is also important because they are aware of domestic discontent or interest group pressure over the unresolved issues (Lockhart, 1977: 385-386). Moreover, a shift in the leaders' perceptions of specific issues can lead to deescalation-initiatives (Kriesberg, 1984: 482).

To clarify the conditions of leaders' decisions on crisis or accommodation, it is essential to identify the decision-making process because actual policies are decided in this process. How and to what extent do decision-makers consider national interest and national identity in framing their foreign policy? How do they cope with triggering events, conflictual or cooperative? With what criteria and under what conditions do they change their current foreign policy? In what manner do they implement their policies? All these questions can be answered only through a study of the decision-making process. Neither 'enduring rivalry theory' nor 'protracted conflict theory' pay much attention to these vital questions concerning the decision-

making process.

The last point to be considered is the interrelationship of decision-making patterns within and outside the normal relations range of a protracted conflict. Within the normal relations range, reciprocity between involved states is a long-term process. Past grievances and memories of previous conflict are significant in foreign policy decision-making within this range. Decision-makers follow long-term and carefully established strategies against the adversary. When the normal relations range is exceeded, inter-adversary reciprocity tends to be a short-term process of action-reaction. Decision-makers' attention shifts from mere past memories to more urgent matters (Muncaster and Zinnes, 1990: 34). Decision-makers may adopt an ad hoc approach in order to cope with short-term or immediate concerns (Maoz and Astorino, 1992: 377). Long-term reciprocity within the normal relations range may formulate a norm of behavior which may be applied to short-term interactions (Ward and Rajmaira, 1992: 345). The long-term patterns of behavior, however, can also be altered by interactions of short-term reciprocity, such as crisis (Leng, 1983: 413, ft. 15). In a protracted conflict, all reciprocities, conflictual and/or cooperative, within and without the normal relations range, are interrelated. Without theoretical linkages between sub-events and the entire process of a protracted conflict, we may not grasp the dynamics of a protracted conflict.

Summary

In this chapter, I assessed previous studies dealing with extended duration of hostility: 'enduring rivalry theory and protracted conflict theory'. I find that a significant number of existing studies attribute the causes of a protracted rivalry to the factors of national identity or national interest. An attempt needs to be made to synthesize national identity and national interest as sources of protracted conflict. Most previous studies are largely descriptive in their examination of the patterns of foreign policy behavior between states in a protracted conflict. There are few, if any,

studies that attempt to link the decision-making process to foreign policy behavior in a protracted conflict. Few studies make explicit the explanatory mechanism that links the sub-events to the total process of a protracted conflict, and vice versa. In the following chapter, I will elaborate the relationships that exist among key variables and develop the explanatory conceptual framework.

Notes to Chapter 1

Complete authors' names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography.

1. Although I borrow the term 'protracted conflict' from Azar, it should be noted that my term is broader than his concept. The concept of protracted conflicts will be dealt in detail in Chapter 2.
2. Boulding (1962: 5-6); Kriesberg (1968: 9); Mitchell, (1981: 17).
3. Kriesberg (1968: 8-9) divides conflict into two classes: conflict 'as a relationship or condition' and conflict 'as a process'. For the former, he emphasizes the awareness of incompatibilities among two or more parties; for the latter, he emphasizes the sequence of interaction between the parties. He finally defines conflict as "a fundamental social process and relationship".
4. Midlarsky (1992) defines enduring rivalries as "long-term conflicts between two or more countries, states or other coherent social entities that periodically erupt into open political violence".
5. Referring to Gochman and Maoz (1984) and Diehl (1985), Morrow (1989: 225-226) sees a 'fundamental policy disagreement' as the cause of enduring rivalry.
6. Coser (1962: 108) reasons that if relatively small groups are able to mobilize their members' commitment to the fullest, they can exert influence on a larger adversary. Boulding (1962: 315) indicates that the weaker bargaineer is frequently in the strongest bargaining position because there is no place to retreat for him, thus producing irrevocable commitment.
7. North (1990: 165-166) notes that high determination may compensate for relatively low capabilities in bargaining and leverage exchanges.

8. In their cases, Gochman and Maoz define 'minor-major' disputes as one that involve only minor power participants on the initiator's side but include at least one major power on the target's side.
9. Auerbach and Ben-Yehuda (1987) contend that in protracted social conflict both the 'cognitive component' (i.e., the de-legitimation of the adversary as a political power) and the 'affective component' (i.e., overwhelmingly hostile feeling toward the enemy) produce 'behavioral component' (i.e., a taboo on the enemy). They conclude that rapprochement between states in a protracted conflict is conceptually impossible as well as impracticable.
10. For example, the value orientation of the culture, as the basis of national identity, determines the pattern of group decisions (Hong, 1978; Vertzberger, 1990). National self-image, an outgrowth of national identity, also influences foreign policy decisions.
11. Rosecrance (1973) seems to clearly distinguish national interest from national identity. He suggests that national goals vary from expansion to consolidation. This argument may imply that national interest and national identity are conceptually different because national expansion results from national interest, and national consolidation is the main function of national identity.
12. Although Goertz and Diehl (1992b: 153, 155) explicitly state that enduring rivalries can take place because of intangible good (e.g., influence, ideology, or religion) as well as of tangible good (e.g., natural resources and territory), their testing of enduring rivalries has been focused on 'territorial changes'.
13. Although I doubt the possibility of win-win outcomes in terms of national identity, I do not underestimate the role of third parties in mediating. The panels or third parties are, in this study, considered to be only supplementary (Saaty and Alexander, 1989) or limited (Ruloff, 1975).

CHAPTER 2: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Examination of the literature in Chapter 1 convinces me that a more careful delineation of the key variables that stimulate protracted conflict is essential. This chapter will provide a conceptual framework for this study. The fundamental research question in this study is: What creates, maintains, and terminates protracted conflict? This comprises an array of specific questions. How and in what ways do national interest and national identity produce protracted conflict? Given the setting of protracted conflict, under what conditions do decision-makers perceive an opportunity for accommodation or a foreign policy crisis? What conditions prevent decision-makers from making an accommodation; promote recurring crises; and lead to accommodation? How do accommodation failures and international crises affect the entire process of protracted conflict, which in turn has an impact on both states' future foreign policy decision-making? To answer these questions, I begin by defining the term, protracted conflict. Next, I deal with key variables, describing a protracted conflict as the dependent variable; national interest and national identity as independent variables; and the decision-making process as the intervening variable. In the last section, I specify four models and their derivative propositions.

I. Definition of a Protracted Conflict

Although scholars have dealt with protracted conflict or similar phenomena, most do not provide a clear-cut definition of protracted conflict¹. Edward Azar is an exception. He and his colleagues (1978) contend that a protracted conflict is distinguished from a non-protracted conflict by its extended and intense hostility, sporadic outbreaks of open warfare, the protagonists' very high stakes, and no

distinguishable termination of conflict. They consider national identity the major factor in stimulating protracted conflicts. Azar and Farah (1981: 320) state:

Protracted social conflicts are distinguishable from other conflicts in terms of their focus on group and national identity and the rights and privileges associated with them.

Two weaknesses have been noted in Azar's definition. First, his definition cannot describe protracted conflicts which do not result in open warfare (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 127). For example, although the East/West conflict has been protracted since 1945, it has not resulted in open warfare between the principal adversaries. Second, his definition, which focuses exclusively on national identity, cannot explain accommodation or recognizable termination of a protracted conflict (e.g., US-China, 1972; Israel-Egypt, 1979; Israel-PLO, 1993; Israel-Jordan, 1994). Nor can it explain why some states that have been engaged in persistent conflicts have managed to achieve a *modus vivendi* or even unification (e.g., Germany, 1989).

As opposed to Azar's definition, I define a protracted conflict as:

a cumulative conflict between the same adversaries who endeavor to protect and preserve their national interest and/or national identity, actual or perceived. The conflict is characterized by a series of subconflicts such as international crises, war, and consistent accommodation failure.

This definition may be better equipped than Azar's to describe a variety of protracted conflicts. It focuses on international crisis, making it possible to analyse protracted conflicts that did not result in war but in serious crises (e.g., US-USSR, the East-West Crises over Berlin), as well as those in which war was the outcome (e.g., Arab-Israel). My definition, which focuses on national interest as well as national identity, may also have better potential for explaining such phenomena as accommodation between states long engaged in protracted conflict. Azar's definition is not as reliable for predicting accommodation between states in a protracted conflict because he concentrates on the conflict dimension solely in terms of national identity. If common interests are paramount, accommodation may be

possible.

I now turn to the discussion of how and in what ways national interest and/or national identity lead to conflict, crisis, accommodation failure, and thus protracted conflict.

II. Variables

In this section I delineate the key variables in my study, first specifying key concepts that characterize a protracted conflict. The dependent variable is protracted conflict. The two independent variables that lead to conflict are defined and related to the process of protracted conflict. The intervening variable, which is the decision-making process, is then considered.

II.1. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE: PROTRACTED CONFLICT

In this study, the dependent variable is protracted conflict. In my definition of a protracted conflict, the behavioral pattern of a protracted conflict is posited to have a series of conflicts such as international crises, which may include war, and rare accommodations. An elaboration of key concepts follows:

II.1.a. International Crisis

I have adopted the definition of international crisis from the ICB (International Crisis Behavior) Project (Brecher, 1993: 3; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 5, 19, 209), which defines an international crisis as:

(1) a change in type and/or an increase in intensity of disruptive interactions between two or more states, with a heightened probability of military hostilities; that, in turn, (2) destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system.

An international crisis has three phases (Brecher, 1993; Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989, ch. 14): onset (or pre-crisis), escalation (or crisis), and deescalation (or end-

crisis) The onset or pre-crisis phase is characterized by a departure from normal relations to those in which increased hostility, verbal and/or physical, becomes evident. However, war is not likely. During the escalation or crisis phase, the disruptive interactions between adversaries are intensified and are accompanied by the heightened probability of war. Deescalation or end-crisis phase is characterized by a reduction in the volume and intensity of conflictive interactions. Each phase of an international crisis (inter-state/macro level) is linked to a parallel period in a foreign policy crisis (state/unit level). For example, intensified hostile interactions in the onset phase of an international crisis trigger a state's foreign policy crisis, which in turn may precipitate an international crisis.

The ICB Project proposes that a foreign policy crisis for a state derives from interrelated perceptions of

- (1) threat to one or more basic values; (2) finite time for response; and (3) heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities before the challenge is overcome (Brecher, 1993: 3).

All three perceptions are held by the highest-level decision-makers of the state concerned (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 5, 209-210).

A foreign policy crisis is triggered by an environmental or situational change, an external or internal act, or an event. A foreign policy crisis also proceeds through three periods: pre-crisis, crisis, and end-crisis. In the pre-crisis period, states perceive a higher-than-normal threat from their adversary's statements or acts. The probability of war, however, remains low. During the crisis period, decision-makers of the involved states perceive increased value-threat, finite time, or time pressure (James and Wilkenfeld, 1984: 114; Paul, 1995), to respond, and heightened probability of war. These perceptions generate a foreign policy crisis. End-crisis period is characterized by decision-makers' perception of declining threats, time pressure, and war likelihood.

An international crisis results from behavioral change by adversaries. A foreign policy crisis results from the perceptions of decision-makers in each state. Behavioral

change, accompanied by an increase in hostile interactions, is perceived by decision-makers as triggering a foreign policy crisis. This combination of international and foreign policy crisis may lead a state involved in a protracted conflict to perceive persistent and frequent threats to its basic values. The state may have no other recourse but to respond with violence (James and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 122). Thus a protracted conflict is a conflict with intermittent and/or frequent international crises, including war. This is supported by the findings of Brecher (1993), presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1 here

II.1.b. Accommodation

I define accommodation as:

A substantive agreement concluded and implemented by adversaries. In a narrow sense, it connotes a shift to a less intense level of hostile inter-action than that which prevailed during the crisis or war. In a broad sense, it refers to any agreement between adversaries which practically contributes to the termination of conflict in which international crises occur.

Accommodation involves three stages: (1) initiation, (2) negotiation, (3) agreement. Each stage operates at two levels: macro (inter-state/ behavioral) and micro (state/ perceptual). Initiation refers to the making of a proposal for accommodation. At the macro level, it denotes an initial decrease in conflict behavior and/or conciliatory signals are transmitted. At the micro level, it indicates decision-makers' perceptions that compromise or value-sharing is called for. Value is shared when both sides are willing to accept tacitly the other's policy or position. Mutual tolerance is present.

Negotiation concerns the exchange and adjustment of views on the issues in

Table 2.1: **Protracted Conflicts and the Frequency of International Crises**

Cases	Duration	Frequency
Africa		
Rhodesia	1965–80	11
Western Sahara	1975–	10
Angola	1975–	9
Chad-Libya	1971–	8
Ethiopia-Somalia	1960–	6
Ethiopia-Italy	1934–45	2
Rwanda-Burundi	1963–	1
Americas		
Chaco	1928–35	2
Essequibo	1968	2
Asia		
Indo-China	1953–75	19
India-Pakistan	1947–	8
PRC-Taiwan	1948–	4
Indonesia	1945–49	3
Pushtunistan	1949–	3
Japan-China	1927–45	7
Korea	1950–	3
Sino-Soviet	1969–89	1
Europe		
Poland-Lithuania	1920–38	3
Trieste	1945–53	2
France-Germany	1920–45	5
World War II	1939–45	24
Middle East		
Greece-Turkey	1920–	9
Arab-Israel	1947–	25
Yemen	1962–90	6
Iran-Iraq	1959–	4
Multiregional	1945–89	19

Source: Michael Brecher, *Crisis in World Politics*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993, 72.

dispute. At the macro level, it takes the form of a meeting of officials from the contending parties. At the micro level, decision-makers in each state increasingly perceive the utility of compromise.

An agreement is generally treated as synonymous with accommodation. It will include the satisfaction of complementary interests, which are perceived when one party's goal cannot be achieved without the other's collaboration. Mutual cooperation is required. At the macro level, it denotes a substantive agreement with the adversary, de facto relations, or diplomatic recognition. At the micro level, it signifies the fulfilment of three necessary conditions of accommodation: (1) value-sharing, (2) diminished threat to national identity, (3) increased complementary interests.

II.1.c. Accommodation Failure

An accommodation failure is primarily the negative conceptual counterpart of accommodation. At the macro level, it is characterized by the ignoring of conciliatory signals from the adversary, turning down proposals for accommodation, refusing to participate in meetings or to negotiate, refusing to reach a substantive agreement, and breaking an accommodative agreement. At the micro level, it constitutes the decision-makers' failure to perceive the necessity and/or sufficiency of accommodation, to accept the adequacy of any proposed compromise, or to perceive the necessity of maintaining accommodative agreement. The discussion of crisis, accommodation, and accommodation failure at macro and micro levels is summarized in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2 here

Table 2.2: **Phases: Crisis, Accommodation, and Accommodation Failure**

Event	Phase	Macro Level (inter-state)	Micro level(state)
CRISIS	Pre-Crisis	More hostility than normal relations	Perception of higher than normal threat
	Crisis	More hostility than in pre-crisis phase and higher war likelihood	Perception of: higher value threat, finite time for response, and higher war likelihood
	End-Crisis	Reduced hostility than in crisis phase and/or accommodation	Perception of: declining threat, time pressure, war likelihood
ACCOMMO-DATION	Initiation	Decrease in conflictual behavior and/or conciliatory signals	Perception of need for compromise and value-sharing
	Negotiation	Exchange and adjustment of views	Perception of increased utility of compromise
	Accommodation	Agreement	Perception of: Value sharing, diminished threat, and complementary interests
ACCOMMO-DATION FAILURE	Initiation Failure	Ignoring conciliatory signals	No Perception of need for compromise
	Negotiation Failure	Turning down proposals	No perception of need for compromise
	Accommodation Failure	Failure of making an agreement	Failure to perceive any or all condition(s) of accommodation
	Implementation-Failure	Breaking agreement	Failure to perceive the necessity of maintaining agreement

II.2. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: National Interest and National Identity

In this part, I first clarify how two independent variables, i.e., national interest and national identity, lead to conflict. Next, I describe how conflict of interests and conflict of identities between states are combined and affect each other.

II.2.a. National Interest

National interest, or the decision-makers' perception of it, may change with the changing context of the international system² or because of changes in a state's economy, military capability, or technological strategy³. However, the debate about what constitutes national interest continues.

This is because (1) the concept of national interest is too broad and ambiguous (J. Frankel, 1970; Kirk, 1952; Rosenau, 1971), and too complex (Levi, 1971) to perform a "useful analytic function [and] to serve as a guideline for policy makers" (Sondermann, 1977); (2) it is not easy to distinguish national interest as an 'end' as opposed to a 'means' (Wolfers, 1952, 1962); and (3) it is a matter of controversy as to 'whose interest' should be interpreted as national interest, and 'who determines it' (Beard, 1966; Flathman, 1966; Kratochwil, 1982; Schilling, 1956; Wolfers, 1962, 1966). To avoid these difficulties, it is important to specify what I mean by national interest and under what conditions the concept of national interest shall be used.

First, national interest in this study does not cover the wide range of interests which are pursued by states in the international system, but is confined to the national interest of states in protracted conflict. In conflict, decision-makers feel vital interests are being threatened. Therefore, it is easier to assess what kind of interests decision-makers deem vital if we investigate foreign policy decision-making in conflictual situations. In a protracted conflict, we may observe some "settled responses to repetitive situations" (Corbett, 1952: 49). Thus national interest which is consistently pursued by decision-makers will be more clearly grasped. Furthermore, 'crisis' in this study is an important concept. Crisis does not result unless one state attempts to coerce the other with threats of force and the target

state resists, or at least, perceives the threat (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1988; Snyder and Diesing, 1977: 8). Through the examination of crisis decision-making, we can ascertain "whether, when and in what manner" national interest enters into the decisional process (Sondermann, 1977: 136). By limiting the scope of study to the national interest of states in protracted conflict, the concept of national interest can be made more concrete and specific.

Second, in this study any concrete means of achieving the ultimate goal of continued statehood will be treated as national interest. In other words, the survival of the state is the superior goal and any means of fostering or protecting this superior goal become subordinate goals which comprise national interest in this study. I regard the relationship between the superior goal and the subordinate goals in the same light as the link between 'independent interest and dependent interests'; or between 'goal values and instrumental values' (Van Dyke, 1962); or between 'one overall national interest and many particular interests' (Huntington, 1991); or between 'aspirational level interest and operational level interest' (J. Frankel, 1970).

Third, my study argues that national interest is perceived and defined by those who make foreign policy. There are two approaches to the study of national interest: the objectivist approach and the subjectivist approach (J. Frankel, 1970; Rosenau, 1971). The objectivist approach maintains that national interest can be estimated by objectively definable criteria. The subjectivist approach assumes that national interest cannot be objectively defined, but is a constantly changing subjective preference of decision-makers. This subjectivist approach maintains that "national interest constitutes an element in the making of foreign policy to which, however it may be defined, statesmen profess to attach great importance" (J. Frankel, 1970: 18; see also, Luard, 1986: 133), or that "the exact definition of core value or interest...depends on the attitudes of decision-makers" (Holsti, 1988: 124). The attitudes of decision-makers and how much importance they attach to the national interest in question can be ascertained by assessing the sacrifices the decision-makers commit to on behalf of stated goals because "all goals are costly" (Wolfers, 1962:

71). Thus, my study reasons that national interest can be grasped through an investigation into decision-makers' actual commitments.

To summarize, the concept of national interest in my study is limited to that of states in protracted conflict. National interest may therefore be any instrumental goal which serves the superior goal, which is state survival. To safeguard the state, decision-makers specify and pursue subordinate ends. Thus the concept of national interest is used in this study to connote a set of concrete instrumental goals arrived at through a decision-making process. These goals are assumed to be actually pursued for the overall goal of state survival. To achieve this ultimate goal of state survival, the crucial means are security of the state, economic prosperity, and politico-diplomatic capability. If there are significant discrepancies between two or more states in protecting and/or enlarging one or more of these crucial means, conflict of interest may arise.

(1) National Security: National security interest refers to the protection of territory and the maintenance of a military balance. When a state perceives a threat to its territory⁴ or to its interest in an area which is strategically important (Holsti, 1991: 310; Luard, 1986: 125, 177, 310), the probability of crisis or war increases. One party's possession of a strategically important region becomes at the same time a threat to the other (Luard, 1986: 103). For the assessment of territorial interest, one may consider invasion, occupation of territory, and border clashes⁵. Between states engaged in an ongoing conflict, a shift in the balance of military power in an adversary's favor can be a threat, provoking crisis or war⁶. For the evaluation of military balance, one may examine military build up, troop mobilization, and massive military exercises.

(2) Economic Prosperity: Economic prosperity is defined as the protection of existing national productivity and the increase of national wealth. Control of, or access to, valuable resources is a major cause of conflict (Holsti, 1991: 285, 317). Some small or developing states may be more desperate than others to preserve certain raw materials if these are perceived to be vital for their survival (Holsti, 1991). Luard (1986: 285) believes that struggle over valuable raw materials has been

the source of numerous prolonged frontier disputes (e.g., Peru-Colombia, 1932; Bolivia-Paraguay, 1932-5; Peru-Ecuador, 1942, 1981). Trade restrictions which reduce economic prosperity may also increase the probability of conflict. To evaluate the role of economic self-interest, one may consider the seizing of raw materials; the hindering of economic movement; and the imposing of economic sanctions.

(3) Politico-diplomatic Capability: Politico-diplomatic capability incorporates the increase or preservation of international influence and recognition (i.e., status or legitimacy). If two states are in conflict, they may seek to increase their influence over each other as well as to gain recognition from the international community. They also seek to prevent the other from increasing its influence, status, and recognition. Such an increase is perceived as a decrease in the politico-diplomatic influence of the other⁷. In this context, one may look at strategies designed to undermine rival states, such as blocking and vetoing proposals or policies in the UN or other international organizations.

These three kinds of national interest are interrelated. Both economic power and military capability may bolster and sustain national security. The concern for security, however, may sap economic power⁸.

Before I turn to a discussion of national identity, I must state that my study attempts to avoid ad hoc or post hoc interpretations of national interest in foreign policy decision-making. Some argue that some foreign policies are accidental or happen by chance, thus ad hoc or post hoc interpretations of foreign policy are sometimes submitted (Sondermann, 1977). My study contends that ad hoc or post hoc interpretation of foreign policy can be avoided by employing both deductive and inductive approaches. The deductive approach sets up a hierarchy of national interest. For example, this approach gives priority to national survival and self-preservation, while other interests such as national prestige are regarded as secondary (Osgood, 1953); or else it postulates some core element of national interest (e.g., "power"), from which other relevant interests can be derived (Beard, 1966; Morgenthau, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1985). The inductive approach maintains that national interest can be ascertained by looking at behavior patterns (Chase, 1956;

Krasner, 1978). My study assumes that decision-makers reaffirm their superior national goal, from which particular instrumental goals are derived, during the decision-making process. This is the deductive approach. If decision-makers actually pursue their instrumental goal, foreign policy behavior should reveal it. By comparing the decision-making process in which national interests are clarified, with foreign policy behavior in which national interests are actually expressed and pursued, we can avoid the ad hoc or post hoc interpretation of foreign policy.

II.2.b. National Identity

By national identity I mean a people's sense of themselves as a nation. This self-perception may be based on ethnicity, ideology, religion, and/or culture⁹. National identity may fluctuate through mobilization and manipulation if the opportunity to enhance or threaten it arises¹⁰. Because different national identities signify alien value and belief systems¹¹, identity conflicts are essentially value conflicts. In these circumstances, if one party perceives a threat, it may attempt to eliminate the other party in order to protect and maintain its identity. If both parties perceive incompatibility of values, serious and intractable conflict may result¹². I propose to consider national identity under three major categories: (1) ethnicity, (2) ideology, (3) religion.

(1) Ethnicity: I designate ethnicity as a recognizable group identity rooted in a common national community and language¹³. Ethnicity can be altered through the stimulation and mobilization of ethnic awareness¹⁴. Jackson (1984: 216) contends that political democracy, socio-economic modernization and national self-determination are forceful catalysts in this ethnic awakening. Among rival ethnicities, any mobilization of one party may be perceived as a threat to the other, triggering a crisis. Holsti (1991: 311) found that 52 percent of the post-1945 wars have had their origin in the goal of creating a statehood based on exclusive ethnic, linguistic, and religious identity.

(2) Ideology: I specify ideology as a manifestation of a state's beliefs or ideas about ultimate national goals and ways of achieving them¹⁵. The national goals and

their desired fulfilment find expression in ruling principles, ideology. Ideology is often utilized to change, control, or dominate others. For this purpose, ideological implantation is deliberately attempted¹⁶. Any state under threat from an opposing irreconcilable ideology will stubbornly resist, not only because succumbing to it means the loss of national cultural autonomy, but also because any challenge to its ideology, whether internal or external, cannot be tolerated. When adjustment between ideologically opposed states fails, force may be used. Reconciliation usually breaks down because of the inherent competitive nature of ideology itself.

(3) Religion: There are two causes of religious or religion-related war. One lies in the fact that most adherents of a religion will not accept any deviation from prescribed doctrine, nor will they tolerate the proselytizing of their members by an alien faith. Doctrinal certitude motivates expansionism and aggression, with antagonism, threats and even persecution¹⁷. The second cause arises from the function of religion itself. Religion ritualizes what people consider fundamental (e.g., birth, death, and social mores). In a society or state dominated by religion, all aspects of communal life are coherently integrated with religion¹⁸. Thus a war between nation-states, each with a strong and unique religious fabric, is a war that touches every facet of each nation's life. Because of religious commitment, religious war is usually ferocious and difficult to ameliorate¹⁹.

II.2.c. Relationship Between Interest and Identity

How do national interest and national identity interact with each other? When national identity is not threatened, states may give precedence to interest over identity²⁰. National interest, however, is usually limited by or based on national identity (Wolfers, 1962: 80). This would indicate that national interest and national identity are not separate. Thus conflict of interest and conflict of identity are also not separate. Conflict of interest, for example, may unleash a dormant conflict of identity or values²¹, strengthening a state's internal cohesion and converting a conflict of interest into a conflict of national identity. Conflict of identity, in turn, makes conflict of interest more intense and prolonged. Conflict of identity itself can

also intensify conflict of interest in situations of inter-state rivalry. The two types of conflict affect each other, resulting in combined conflicts of both interest and identity²². Most protracted conflicts have features of the combined conflicts of interest and identity (see Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 here

II.3. THE INTERVENING VARIABLE: Decision-Making

Interest and/or identity are basic factors that lead to conflict or cooperation. However, the onset of crisis or war, or the making of an agreement, may not be fully understood without a knowledge of the situation in which decisions related to these events were made. When decision-makers perceive a stimulus as a potential factor in enhancing or threatening their national interest and/or national identity, the stimulus creates a situation in which foreign policy may change. The stimulus from environmental change is subjectively perceived and interpreted by decision-makers. Brecher and his colleagues (1969) believe that environmental stimuli, external or internal, are filtered through the image of decision-makers and thus influence their decisions²³. Decision-makers' perceptions thus are one of the crucial elements in comprehending a state's foreign policy. Furthermore, the decision-making process in protracted conflict is constrained by institutionalized commitment (e.g., governmental policy or organizations implementing decision-makers' commitment) that has been formed through previous conflicts. Another essential element in understanding the choice of specific foreign policies is the decision-makers' coping strategies. Upon perceiving events that are out-of-the ordinary, decision-makers may adopt coping strategies to deal with them. The main features of the decision-making process in protracted conflict thus comprise: (1) decision-makers' perceptions, (2) institutionalized commitments, (3) coping strategies.

Table 2.3: Combined Protracted Conflicts

Cases	Issues for Original Combatants
India-Pakistan 1947-8	1. ethnic/religious unification (Pakistan) 2. territory 3. national consolidation (India)
India-Pakistan 1965	1. ethnic/religious unity (Pakistan) 2. national consolidation (India) 3. territory
India-Pakistan 1971	1. secession/independence 2. protect ethnic confreres (India) 3. territory 4. prevent population movement (India) 5. maintain integrity of state(Pakistan)
Israel-Arab League 1948-9	1. national liberation/ state creation (Israel) 2. national survival (Arab League) 3. protect ethnic/religious confreres (Arab League)
Israel-Egypt 1967	1. national survival (Israel) 2. strategic territory 3. commerce/ navigation 4. territory 5.liberate ethnic/ religious confreres (Egypt)
Israel-Egypt, Syria 1973	1. territory 2. strategic territory 3. national survival (Israel)
Israel-PLO. (Lebanon) 1982	1. strategic territory (Israel) 2. protect domestic population 3. state creation (PLO)

Source: K. Holsti, *Peace and War: armed conflicts and international order 1648-1989*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, 274-278.

Table 2.3: *Continued*

North Korea-South Korea 1950-53	1.national unification (N. Korea) 2.ideological liberation (N. Korea) 3.state/regime survival (S. Korea)
N. Vietnam-S. Vietnam 1958-75	1.national unification (N. Vietnam) 2.ideological liberation (N. Vietnam) 3.regime/state survival (S. Vietnam)
USA-Viet Cong 1965 75	1.defend/support ally (US) 2.strategic territory (US) 3.national unification (N.V.) 4.ideological liberation (V.C.)
ZAPA, ZANU (Angola, Zambia, Tanzania)-Rhodesia (S. Africa) 1967-80	1.government composition 2.major rule principle 3.regime survival (Rhodesia)
Turkey-Cyprus 1974	1.protect ethnic confreres (Turkey) 2.ethnic unification (Cyprus) 3.government composition 4.autonomy (Turkey)
Angola-UNITA 1975	1.government composition 2.commerce/resource 3.defend/support ally (Angola; UNITA)
Somalia-Ethiopia 1977-78	1.ethnic unification (Somalia) 2.territory 3.protect integrity of state (Ethiopia) 4.strategic territory
Libya-Chad 1978-87	1.government composition 2.defend/support ally (Chad) 3.commerce/resource (Lybia; Chad) 4.territory (Lybia; Chad)

II.3.a. Decision-Makers' Perceptions

Holsti and his colleagues (1968: 128-129) view perception as the process by which decision-makers become aware of stimuli from their environment, and interpret or assign meanings to them. Perception, however, should not necessarily be confined to that of the external event because the external stimuli itself may be filtered through the decision-makers' prior perception of (1) self, (2) other states, and (3) bilateral relations with other states.

First, at the level of perception of self in protracted conflict, states may need to justify their previous decisions in light of sacrifices made and resources invested (Lebow, 1981: 44; Staw, quoted in Kahn and Kramer, 1990: 156). In doing so, they may commit themselves to further conflict, increasing military power or strengthening their defensive power, as well as ignoring the necessity and possibility of accommodation. Due to a consistent threat to core values, there could also be growing internal cohesion within states or, at minimum, political leaders may try to consolidate national identity.

Second, perception of the other states may determine whether the initiatives are cooperative or conflictive (Jervis, 1976; Snyder and Diesing, 1977). Cooperative initiatives are influenced by a state's image of the other state because the initiator's assessment of the target state's anticipated response is shaped by its underlying image of the other (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 7). A distorted image of an adversary may lead to the misinterpretation of signals from this adversary. Moreover, a false image or misperception on the part of decision-makers can be a factor in precipitating war (Stoessinger, 1985). As the negative image is reinforced, the process of dehumanization may arise. Each state sees the rival as an entity composed not of fellow humans but of beings who are sub-human.

Third, perception of bilateral relations affects the attitudes and posture of states involved in conflict. I regard relations simply as patterns of interaction, conflictual or cooperative. The relations between states are intersubjective phenomena (Greenhalgh and Kramer, 1990: 185) because decision-makers perceive and interpret them. The perception of relations depends upon how decision-makers see the

relations with respect to national interest and identity.

II.3.b. Institutionalized Commitments

The greater the threat to national interest and/or identity, the stronger is the decision-makers' commitment to preserve them. Institutionalized commitments are represented by the governmental policies and their related governmental organizations which have been instituted in order to implement decision-makers' commitment to preserve or enhance national interest and/or identity. For example, being aware of the escalation of conflicts into war, states involved in ongoing conflict may have a war plan, or at minimum, a worst-case plan (Ikle, 1991; Lebow, 1981). The war plan or worst-case plan may in turn lead decision-makers to perceive the would-be initiator as permanent adversary, to overreact to perceived or actual threats, or to underestimate the accommodating initiatives from the rival state. In this sense, rigid policies can be a factor spurring conflict and impeding de-escalation.

Some specific governmental organizations may also be instituted or enacted to implement the decision-makers' commitment. Such particularized institutions may hinder accommodation initiatives or a conciliatory agreement with the adversary. Some specific institutions operate on their organizational principles. Different organizations function differently. They may therefore interpret the same stimulus differently, suggesting divergent or even contradictory policies to the decision-makers. These non-congruent interpretations and policy suggestions inhibit the decision-makers' appropriate reactions to the adversary's initiatives--conflictual or cooperative.

In sum, in protracted conflict, decision-makers' perceptions may lead them to strengthen their physical preparations for further conflicts; to view the adversary as a permanent enemy (Ikle, 1991: 11); and to have a general sense of direction precluding any shift or change in foreign policy (Lebow, 1981: 201-202). In other words, decision-makers' perceptions lead decision-makers to have their commitments institutionalized (Atkeson, 1976), which may in turn consolidate their negative image of the adversary. The formation of this strengthened negative image facilitates

violent behavior toward the opponents who are viewed as non-human (Northrup, 1989: 70-74). If the dehumanizing syndrome is joined with the enemy's institutionalized commitment to further conflict and military build-up, frequent and intense violence will result.

II.3.c. Coping Strategies

Haas (1992) believes that decision-makers facing unaccustomed issues have a tendency to ask specialists to help them clarify the uncertainties, understand the issues, and anticipate the future trends. This quest for information represents a part of the coping process, which can be understood as the decision-makers' effort to manage external and/or internal stimuli²⁴. To comprehend the coping strategy at the state level, it is necessary to consider how decision-makers, along with their staffs or advisors, deal with the issues in question. In this study, the general framework of the decision-makers' coping mechanisms is taken directly from Brecher's study.

Brecher (1979a) suggests four stages of coping: (1) information search, (2) consultation, (3) decisional forum, (4) evaluation of alternatives²⁵. (1) Information search represents decision-makers' efforts to seek information about the challenging event(s) or act(s). The reception of information can be achieved without any distortion, or can be biased by national identity (i.e., ideology) or by the perception of relations (i.e., memories of past experiences). (2) Consultation is undertaken with decision-makers' staffs (e.g., high-policy elite, bureaucratic and military subordinates), which can be a small circle of senior members or a large number of subordinates. The form of consultation varies from ad hoc to institutional. The consultation may be constrained or biased by institutionalized commitment. (3) Decisional forum refers to the actual decision-unit. It varies in size, structure, and degree of institutionalization, as well as the authority pattern of the decisional unit, centralized or decentralized. (4) The evaluation of alternatives involves the examination by decision-makers of options.

This process may reveal the extent to which decision-makers facing an environmental change consider national interest and/or national identity. It may also

reveal whether or not decision-makers exhibit cognitive rigidity in seeking and evaluating alternatives, and whether, in weighing the consequences of various options and making a choice, they make rational calculations, or take decisions that are emotionally biased. Although Brecher's study of coping focuses on crisis situations, I incorporate his suggested stages of the coping mechanism into my study of both the crisis and the accommodation process. I do this because accommodation itself is an unusual phenomenon which may require coping strategies on the part of those states engaged in a protracted conflict.

III. Models and Propositions

In this section, I present four models of protracted conflict: (1) SOURCES; (2) DECISION-MAKING; (3) FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR; and (4) an INTEGRATED MODEL. Derivative and related propositions that illustrate foreign policy decision-making is provided. The rationale for these models and propositions has already been presented in previous sections.

III.1. SOURCES: National Interest and/or National Identity

What makes a conflict prolonged? How do national interest and national identity contribute to protracted conflict and what is their nature? In what ways do conflict of interest and that of identity interact with each other, and what is the result of their interplay? If states seriously clash over national interests in a way that one party benefits at the expense of the other, protracted conflict of interest may result. In such a case, the involved states initially may not have antithetical identities. Some national interests are more apt to lead to serious clashes than others. In this study, among the three categories, priority is given to national security, then to economic prosperity, and lastly, to politico-diplomatic capacity. If national identities are mutually incompatible or antagonistic, each will stubbornly seek the upper hand and a protracted conflict of identity may result (Mitchell, 1981: 31).

If protracted conflict of interest continues due to a consistent threat to core interest, there could be growing internal cohesion within each state or, at the minimum, political leaders may try to consolidate national identity. Conflict of interest may also unleash the dormant conflict of identity, strengthening states' internal cohesion. Protracted conflict of identity makes conflict of interest more intense and prolonged. Conflict of interest and conflict of identity thus reinforce each other as each of these conflicts intensifies. If states experience extremely intense conflict of interest as well as extremely divergent national identities, the probability of protracted conflict increases. A discussion of the sources of protracted conflict is depicted in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1 here

Summarized propositions are:

PROPOSITION A1: The more serious the clashing national interests, the greater the probability of a protracted conflict of interest.

PROPOSITION A2: The greater the divergence of national identities, the greater the probability of a protracted conflict of identity.

PROPOSITION A3: The longer any kind of conflict persists, the more interplay between the two kinds of protracted conflict and the greater probability of a combined protracted conflict.

III.2. DECISION-MAKING

In a setting of protracted conflict, if decision-makers receive external stimuli from environmental change, how do they perceive, manage, and cope with the stimuli? To states in protracted conflict, if environmental change, external or internal, is perceived as enhancing their national interest through accommodation, they may




Figure 2.1: Model 2.1: Sources of Protracted Conflict

initially consider it an opportunity. However, if they still perceive incompatible values or any threat to national identity, they may discount the value of accommodation. When any party, during the period of latent protracted conflict, mobilizes its population or attempts to coerce or eliminate the opponent, the latter may perceive a foreign policy crisis, with the resulting necessity of responding quickly and the probability of heightened military hostilities.

Does an opportunity for accommodation produce actual accommodation? If so, how? Or, if not, why? Can a foreign policy crisis be a prelude to an international crisis? If so, how? And, if not, why? These questions are directly related to the decision-making process in protracted conflict, because decision-makers' interpretation and management of external stimuli is crucial in choosing a state's response behavior. If protracted conflict is distinguished from non-protracted conflict, what specific features are involved in decision-making in protracted conflict? In what manner do these features influence the way states cope with environmental change in a setting of protracted conflict?

Because of consistent threats, each state may have an image of itself as victimized defender. Because any threatening behavior to core values is attributed to the evil traits of the other, decision-makers in protracted conflict may have a negative image of the adversary and of relations from previous conflicts. As the negative image is reinforced, the process of dehumanization occurs within each party. As the decision-makers' negative image evolves, decision-makers may attempt to strengthen their commitment to preserving the national interest and identity at any cost. Their efforts may be reflected in the rigidifying of policy, the enacting of laws, the creating of specific governmental organizations.

Decision-makers may also find themselves in institutionalized commitments which were established in previous conflicts. Both negative image and institutionalized commitments may bias decision-makers' coping strategies. For example, any information that conflicts with the decision-makers' image may either be dismissed or interpreted in such a manner as to justify the decision-makers' institutionalized commitments or previous behavior. The discussion of the decision-making process

of states engaged in a protracted conflict is depicted in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2 here

Related propositions are summarized as:

PROPOSITION B1: There is a clearer perception of an opportunity for accommodation on the part of decision-makers when there exists (1) value-sharing; (2) diminished threat to national identity; (3) complementary interests.

PROPOSITION B2: There is a clearer perception of a foreign policy crisis on the part of decision-makers when there exists (1) a threat to national interest and/or national identity; (2) the necessity to respond in a finite time; (3) the heightened probability of military hostility.

PROPOSITION B3: The more intense and/or the more numerous the previous crises, the greater will be the negative image of decision-makers in a protracted conflict.

PROPOSITION B4: The greater the negative image of decision-makers during a protracted conflict, the greater the institutionalized commitment.

PROPOSITION B5: Decision-makers' negative images and institutionalized commitments may lead them to cope with external stimuli in a biased manner.

III.3. FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR

My definition of protracted conflict emphasizes frequent eruptions of crises and rare accommodations. Put differently, a protracted conflict oscillates between a normal relations range (NRR) and specific events, such as crises and accommodation attempts and failures. What causes protracted conflict to fluctuate between




Figure 2.2: Model 2.2: Decision-Making in Protracted Conflict

international crises, normal relations range, and accommodation? With what criteria and under what conditions do decision-makers decide to maintain or change their current foreign policy? How and in what ways do national interest and national identity determine decision-makers' choice of foreign policy behavior? In what manner do decision-makers implement their policies? What influence does this foreign policy behavior have on protracted conflict?

International crisis occurs when both parties commit themselves to preserve their national interest and/or national identity and to display their willingness to fight with heightened readiness. The choice of international crisis may also be made by both parties' anticipation of losses resulting from not fighting (Jervis, 1992). The existence of a stressful and biased psychological atmosphere (i.e., negative image, institutional commitments, and biased coping strategies) makes it more likely that international crises and wars arising in a setting of protracted conflict will be numerous and intense.

The accommodation process comprises initiation, negotiation, making of an agreement, and implementation. If decision-makers of one party acknowledge, through the decision-making process, the necessity of enhancing complementary interests and/or the possibility of diminished threat to national identity, they may decide to initiate accommodation or display conciliatory behavior. Upon receiving signals, the target state may consider the necessity of accommodation. If both states acknowledge the necessity of accommodation, they may negotiate with each other to outline an accommodation procedure. If both states have a strong incentive toward accommodation, and, if they negotiate successfully, they might make an agreement that may terminate protracted conflict. Decision-makers' strong incentive toward accommodation may arise either from increased complementary interests or from anticipated losses from the failure to accommodate. However, due to the nature of protracted conflict, states may not accommodate each other unless there is a minimal threat to their national identity. Simply making an agreement may not achieve a substantial accommodation because an international accommodation is related to behavioral features. When both states' leaders show their willingness and capability

to implement an agreement, actual accommodation, which amounts to the termination of conflict, can be achieved. Normal relations range comprises deescalation from international crisis, accommodation failure, and the latent period of conflict.

How do states' foreign policy behavior at a particular period influence the entire process of protracted conflict? Because leaders are unlikely to get domestic support for further conflict with its subsequent military build up, or internal cohesion without some concrete manifestation of the external threat, they may exaggerate the significance of international crisis and accommodation failure. This may intensify the negative image of the other as well as increase institutionalized commitment. As the decision-makers' negative image intensifies and institutionalized commitment rigidifies, greater threats to core values are perceived by the adversary, resulting in further protracted conflict. Discussion of states' choice of foreign policy behavior and its impact on the expansion of conflict is depicted in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.3 here

Summarized propositions are:

PROPOSITION C1: The stronger the committed behavior on the part of both adversaries to protect national interest and/or national identity, the greater the probability of escalation to an international crisis.

PROPOSITION C2: The less the committed behavior by either party to reducing the threat to the other's national interest and/or national identity, the greater will be the probability of accommodation failure.

PROPOSITION C3: The greater the committed behavior on the part of both sides to assure (1) value-sharing, (2) diminished threat to national identity, and (3) increased complementary national




Figure 2.3: Model 2.3: Foreign Policy Behavior in Protracted Conflict

interests, the greater will be the probability of accommodation.

III.4. AN INTEGRATED MODEL: Entire Process of Protracted Conflict

The above discussion, models, and propositions have been presented to describe sources and processes of protracted conflict. Model 2.1 and propositions focus on sources of protracted conflict. Model 2.2 and propositions focus on each state's decision-making process when facing environmental change, whether cooperative or conflictual. Model 2.3 and propositions focus on decision-makers' choice of foreign policy behavior and the impact of their behavioral choices on future protracted conflict. My summary of the entire process of protracted conflict follows.

When states have highly clashing national interests and/or highly divergent national identities, protracted conflict may arise (t-1). When environmental change occurs (t), in a setting of protracted conflict, both national interest and national identity are factors which stimulate decision-makers to perceive an opportunity for accommodation or a foreign policy crisis (t1). To cope with the external stimuli, decision-makers have to engage in foreign policy decision-making (t2). But decision-makers may suffer from negative images of the adversary, as well as institutionalized commitments which have been formulated in previous conflicts (t-1). If both states possess the willingness and capability to accommodate and to implement accommodation, protracted conflict may terminate. If, however, states escalate their conflict to international crisis or fail to accommodate (t3), protracted conflict may ensue. The escalatory feedback may be reflected in each state's decision-making process; in the perception of interest and identity; and finally, in the future process of protracted conflict (t4).

The discussion of the entire process of protracted conflict is depicted in Figure 2.4 and is presented in the following summary proposition:




Figure 2.4: Model 2.4: Integrated Model of Protracted Conflict

SUMMARY PROPOSITION:

Both national interest and national identity are sources of protracted conflict. Decision-makers' negative perceptions, institutionalized commitments, biased coping strategies, all with their negative feedback stimulate cumulation of conflict. Minimizing threats to identity as well as maximizing complementary interests may terminate protracted conflict.

Summary

In this chapter I have attempted to describe how, and under what conditions, protracted conflict arises, continues, and terminates. For this purpose I begin by redefining protracted conflict. In my definition, the dependent variables are operationalised as a series of international crises and accommodation failures. I propose that both national interest and national identity can lead to protracted conflict and that mutual interests alone do not contribute to accommodation unless the preservation of national identity is assured. The relationship between national interest and national identity, on the one hand, and the protracted conflict, on the other, is affected by the decision-makers' perceptions, institutionalized commitments, and coping strategies. These three intervening variables of decision-making connect foreign policy crisis and opportunity for accommodation with international crisis, accommodation, or accommodation failure. In the development of four models of protracted conflict, several sets of illustrative propositions have been presented.

Notes to Chapter 2

Complete authors' names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography.

1. The term 'protracted conflict' is used by scholars such as Azar (1979, 1986a), Azar and his colleagues (1978, 1981, 1985), Brecher (1984), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989), Strausz-Hupé, et al. (1959), and Vasquez (1993). Gochman and Maoz (1984), Levy (1992), Midlarsky (1992), and Vasquez (1993) term long-run conflicts as 'enduring rivalries'. Vasquez distinguishes protracted conflict from enduring rivalries. The former is between unequals and the latter is between equals. To describe similar phenomena, Luard (1986) uses the term 'long-standing rivalries'. Husbands (1991) and Northrup (1989) use the term 'prolonged conflict'.
2. Given the detente between the US and the USSR, Jervis (1991/1992) argues that the national interest of the United States should shift to non-security issues.
3. See, for example, Gilpin (1981). Gilpin contends that if some states develop their economy, military, or technology to a certain point, their goal changes from maintaining to changing the existing international system in order to find ways of enhancing their national interests. Gilpin's view is supported by Power Transition Theory. For Power Transition Theory, see Kugler and Organski (1989); Organski (1958); and Organski and Kugler (1980).
4. For the importance of territory or 'territoriality' in understanding interstate war, see Goertz (1992b); Vasquez (1993: Ch. 4); and Wolfers (1962: 73).
5. For the measurement of each variable in this study, I first relied on Goldstein's (1992) 'New Weights for WEIS (World Events Interaction Survey) Events' and Eckhardt and Azar's (1978) '15-point COPDAB (Conflict and Peace Data Bank) International Interactions Scale'. I then reconstructed the clusters of

events which are directly relevant to my study. For example, Azar's scale point of 1 (voluntary unification into one nation) or scale point 2 (major strategic alliance between previous adversaries) was eliminated because those events are beyond accommodation.

6. See Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989: 19); and Lebow (1981: 62).
7. Chase (1956: 723); B.C. Koh (1984: 8); and Wolfers (1962: 73).
8. For the interrelatedness of security and economy, see Gilpin (1981: 23); Holsti (1986: 623-72); Kennedy (1988); Strange (1988); and Viner (1987: 71-84).
9. For the definition and characteristics of identity, see Buchanan (1968: 57-61); and Northrup (1989: 55, 63). For the definition and characteristics of national identity, see Bloom (1990: 79); Holsti (1991: 317); Luard (1986: 66); and Smith (1991: 1-28).
10. Besson (1991: 133-45); Bloom (1990: 79, 114-5).
11. Different value and belief systems are primarily on a desirable future life in terms of social structure or social objectives and on the ways of achieving them. See Aubert (1963: 29); Druckman and Zechmeister (1973: 450); Northrup (1989: 60-61).
12. This is because there is a tendency for people in an identity-salient group to maintain or enhance their shared identity, especially when it is threatened. See Bloom (1990: 23); Northrup (1989: 67-70).
13. Most scholars include national community, religion, culture, and language in defining ethnicity. I, however, consider national community the major component of ethnic conflict. For the definition of ethnicity, see Besson (1991: 134); Jackson (1984: 206-207); das Gupta (quoted in Jackson, 1984: 231); and Enloe and Cynthia (quoted in Jackson, 1984: 230).
14. Carment (1989: Ch. 5); and Jackson (1984: 213-217).
15. For a good explanation of the socio-cultural function of ideology, see Geertz (1973: ch. 8). Howard deals with how ideology should be understood in international

relations (1991: ch. 9).

16. Howard (1991: 142, 145-146) classifies ideology into two groups: one that naturally develops; the other that is deliberately implanted (e.g., proletarian ideology of Marxism; 19th-century nationalism).
17. Luard (1986, 44, 93-4, 153). Some of Luard's examples of religious wars fought in order to dominate particular regions are Calvinists in the Netherlands (1572-1648); Catholics in Scotland (1567), England (1569) and Ireland (1579-80).
18. Ferguson (1978: 1).
19. For example, India-Pakistan (Hinduism vs. Islam) and Iraq-Iran (Sunni vs. Shi'ite Moslems). See Stoessinger (1985: 209).
20. Gaddis and Luard believe that during the Cold War era, the US and the USSR preferred pursuing strategic interest to ideological interest. See Gaddis (1989: 26); and Luard (1986: 177). For a similar argument, see Frankel (1970: 21).
21. Aubert (1963); Frankel (1970: 75).
22. Druckman and Zechmeister (1973: 457-8).
23. Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein (1969: 81). Elsewhere Brecher divides environment into two: (1) operational environment, incorporating external setting (i.e., global system, regional system, and bilateral systems) and internal setting (i.e., economic power, military power, political dynamics); (2) psychological environment, incorporating attitudinal prism (i.e., ideology, historical legacy, personality predispositions) and elite images of the operational environment). See Brecher (1972).
24. Lazarus and Folkman (quoted in Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989: 222).
25. Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989: 222-3).

CHAPTER 3: THE INTER-KOREAN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

In Chapter 2, I redefined the concept of protracted conflict, which I designated as the dependent variable. I consider national interest and national identity as independent variables, and the decision-making as the intervening variable. I then specify models and propositions. In this chapter, I attempt to prove that the inter-Korean conflict is a protracted one, beginning with a discussion of the importance of an in-depth case study when analyzing protracted conflict. I follow this by presenting the inter-Korean conflict as a case. A brief overview of the inter-Korean conflict is included.

I. In-Depth Case Study as a Methodology

Aggregate data analysis and in-depth case study are complementary (Brecher and Wilkenfeld, 1989; Eckstein, 1975; George, 1979; Lijphart, 1971; Rosenau, 1987). Aggregate data analysis is useful in the search for variables showing correlational patterns (Brecher et al., 1988; Jervis, 1990). Questions typical of this approach are: "how often ... and under what conditions such events are likely to occur" (Russett, 1972: 16). Due to the nature of such questions, aggregate data analysis demands a wide range of cases with quantitative indicators. The major assumption of this approach is that the universality of cases can be ascertained through systematic analysis (Brecher et al., 1988). Once patterns of the past have been uncovered, hypotheses and modeling make predictions possible. This approach, however, is necessarily characterized by the lack of in-depth knowledge. In-depth case studies permit intensive analysis so that critical variables or causal relationships between variables can be found (Eckstein, 1975; Russett, 1972). In other words, if we employ

aggregate data analysis alone, then we are likely to suffer from sacrificing much about the particular 'kinds' of cases or novel facts (Eckstein, 1975; Jervis, 1985; Krasner, 1985). Both approaches have their weaknesses as well as strengths. Therefore it is important that they complement each other in a critical way. For example, once critical variables have been discovered through case studies, they can provide a new data base or suggest fine-tuning for aggregate data analysis.

The choice of approach should be based on at least two criteria: (1) the state of theoretical development in the study (Richardson, 1987; Russett, 1974), (2) the nature of the questions which a researcher wants to answer (Jervis, 1990; Kaplan, 1966; Yin, 1989). In view of these two criteria, in-depth case study seems to be preferable for my study.

First, a taxonomy of protracted conflicts has not been developed yet¹, which implies that 'a standard set of categories that attempt to identify the important variables' (Russett, 1974) of protracted conflict has not yet been constructed. Intensive study of a variety of protracted conflicts or enduring rivalries is important in order to identify some of the crucial variables of protracted conflict (Levy, 1992) and thus to extend the present state of research.

Second, the focus of enquiry in my study is on foreign policy decision-making of the two Koreas towards each other. Here investigating the decision-makers' perceptions of the internal environment is important because decision-making is a crucial element in understanding a state's foreign policy (Brecher, 1969, 1972; George, 1979; Hermann and Peacock, 1987). A study of how the decision-maker's perception of 'self' and 'interest' changes over time (Jervis, 1990) cannot be made by using aggregate data analysis at one time² only. Therefore research into a decision-maker's changing perception of national identity and national interest throughout a long period of conflict demands a case study.

Third, the decision-maker's perception of the external environment also differs from government to government within a given state, resulting in different policies towards the same environment (Papadakis and Starr, 1987). This implies that there is a variety of cases within a single major case (Krasner, 1985; Rosenau, 1987;

Russett, 1974), which may suggest alternatives to decision-makers in other protracted conflicts by identifying likeness with and differences from the case(s) of my study (Kennedy, 1979; Lebow, 1981; May, 1973; Neustadt and May, 1986; Vertzberger, 1990).

II. The Inter-Korean Conflict as a Case

The reasons for selecting the North/South Korea case are two fold: (1) it is in many ways a representative protracted conflict which has continued for forty-eight years since 1948; (2) it is, however, a deviant case because the two Koreas share many things in common such as their ancestry and cultural heritage, and lack the ethnic conflict featured in many protracted conflicts. As a representative one, the Korean case could provide us with the opportunity of testing previously generalized hypotheses. As a deviant one, it could reveal additional variables that were previously ignored (Lijphart, 1971). In this sense, studying the Korean case may contribute to the development of a theory of protracted conflict.

Furthermore, my models of protracted conflict are also expected to contribute to the accumulation of knowledge about the inter-Korean conflict. Moon (1989) surveyed Korean scholars' studies (1978-1988) on the (1) nature, (2) origin, (3) types and processes of conflicts, and (4) management of the inter-Korean conflict. Among the total of 1062 studies, 556 (52.4%) dealt with the origin of the conflict; 219 (26.2%) dealt with the types and processes of conflict; 287 (27%) dealt with conflict management; and only 9 (0.85%) dealt with the nature of the inter-Korean conflict. His findings are significant for my study in that (1) only 28 studies (2.64%) attempted to ascertain the effects of regime differences, ideological incompatibilities, and socio-psychological distances on the conflict; (2) few studies dealt with the relationship between leaders' attitudes, cognition, orientation, threat perception, and the entire process of the inter-Korean conflict; (3) only 26 studies (2.45%) dealt with direct militarized interstate disputes; and (4) few attempted to analyze the inter-Korean

conflict with respect to its frequency, intensity and protractedness. Moon concluded that (1) the inter-Korean conflict itself has not been treated as a dependent variable, (2) the nature of the inter-Korean conflict has not been clarified, (3) the conflict has not been treated as dyadic-interactions, but as unilateral actions from the North. In this sense, my study may contribute to existing knowledge on the Korean conflict.

III. Overview of The Inter-Korean Conflict

In this section I attempt to provide an overview of the inter-Korean protracted conflict, which has unique features. First, the Korean conflict is characterized by an extended duration of hostility. The duration of inter-state conflicts since World War Two averaged two to three years (Eckhardt and Azar, 1978). By contrast, the Korean conflict has lasted more than four decades. Second, it has experienced numerous confrontations, crises, and accommodation-failures. Despite numerous accommodation proposals and counter-proposals by each side, the conflict continues and shows no sign of terminating. Third, the conflict has been rooted in national identity and national interest. The Korean War, for example, was a conflict over national interest (i.e., territory and security) and national identity (i.e., ideology). After the Korean War, the two Koreas were obsessed with competing in terms of national interest (i.e., economic development) and also national identity (Choue, 1985; Paige, 1964). The last two features, which are fundamental to my definition of protracted conflict, will be dealt with in greater detail below.

III.1. CRISES AND ACCOMMODATION ATTEMPTS IN THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT

Existing studies on the inter-Korean conflict reveal a striking absence of attention to South Korea's provocative action, intentional or unintentional, against North Korea (Moon, 1989: 280). North Korea, however, has perceived serious threats from the US/South Korean joint annual 'Team Spirit' military exercises. North Korea's perception of a serious security threat is also revealed by its proposal for a peace

treaty with the US; by its demand for the withdrawal of US forces in South Korea; by its insistence upon a solution to politico-military problems first in the inter-Korean dialogue; and by its demand for arms reduction (B.C. Koh, 1991: 3).

The pattern of North Korea's provocative behaviors changed from direct military confrontations to indirect provocation. In the 1950s, North Korea's provocative behavior reached a climax in the Korean War (1950-1953). During the 1960s, its behavior was marked by the dispatch of armed guerrillas (e.g., the January 21 crisis of 1968; 120 North Korean guerrilla infiltration in 1968). In the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea's behavior was characterized by indirect infiltration attempts (e.g., The Poplar Tree crisis of 1976; Rangoon incident of 1983).

With frequent and highly militarized confrontations, a dangerous arms race between the two Koreas would appear to be inevitable. Nevertheless, many proposals for arms reduction or accommodation were advanced by North and South Korea. According to the survey of the National Unification Board, North Korea made 27 proposals on 205 separate occasions, while South Korea initiated 16 official proposals on 55 occasions, during the period between 1948 and 1984 (J.K. Park, 1986: 15). These accommodation attempts encompass proposals for: mutual reduction of forces (N. Korea, 1955); arms reduction (N. Korea, 1962); well-intentioned competition (S. Korea, 1970); the July 4 Joint Communiqué on peaceful unification (N. & S. Korea, 1972); a Peace Agreement (S. Korea, 1973); a mutual Non-aggression Pact (S. Korea, 1974); the unconditional resumption of North-South dialogue (S. Korea, 1979); summit talks (S. Korea, 1983); parliamentary talks (N. Korea, 1985); talks for arms control (N. Korea, 1987, 1988, and 1990); a 'Korean Commonwealth' (S. Korea, 1989); and the Basic Agreement (1992). There has been, in spite of these overtures, no clear termination of the inter-Korean conflict. This is underlined by the inter-Korean conflict over North Korea's nuclear program.

Why have these accommodation attempts failed? First, one of the factors stimulating accommodation failure can be found in the two sides' strategic thinking. Because of the numerous and serious confrontations, both sides have found themselves in fiercely competitive relationships. This situation has led them to seek

ways of maximizing their gains through bargaining and coercive diplomacy. Each side has feared losses (i.e., exploitation by the other side) when it received accommodative signals (Young, 1983: 77). Second, accommodation failures were related to each party's fear of the collapse of their identity. North Korea feared the infiltration of liberal ideology into its socialist state. South Korea was afraid of the infiltration of socialist ideology into the working class in the South, resulting in a socialist revolution (Guha, 1984/85: 68). These two factors were interrelated and prevented the two Koreas from achieving accommodation or even their common goal (e.g., reunification). S.J. Han (1990: 83) observes:

Even as they call for "national unification," neither Pyongyang nor Seoul is willing to share power with the other side, much less give it up in the name of unification. Thus, when one side calls for unification, those on the other side believe...it wants to subjugate them, whether through conquest, subversion or "absorption."

These negative factors oblige the researcher to consider the factors of national identity and national interest.

III.2. IDENTITY AND INTEREST IN THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT

One of the most serious elements in the North-South confrontation is the existence of different ideologies. The two Koreas are captives of concepts of identity and socio-culture (Burton, 1984: 56). North Korea was originally founded and guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology. This Korean communism has been displaced gradually by Kim Il Sung's Juche idea from 1955 through 1972. Kim Il Sung argued that the theory of Marxian-Leninism should be creatively applied to the particular conditions of Korea and the Korean people. The Juche comprises: political independence; economic self-sustenance; and self-defence in military affairs. The alleged political ideology of South Korea has been liberal democracy. But in 1972, Park Chung Hee declared Siwol-Yushin ("October Restoration"), committing himself to strengthening national power through social reform (Bae, 1989: 94-98) and internal consolidation.

Ideological differences in politics were reflected in the two Koreas' economic

policies. The means of production were collectively owned and controlled by the state in the North. In the South, the economy was based on private ownership and private profit although some of the key enterprises were owned and operated by the state (Kihl, 1984: 6-7). These different approaches to economic activity were linked to national identity. Another feature of the identity conflict has been the quest for legitimacy. Each of the two Koreas has sought to represent itself as the only legitimate state (B.C. Koh, 1984, 1991). To both Koreas, the question of legitimacy has been perceived as basic to the very survival of their political systems and their identity. These conflicting concepts of legitimacy led them to compete fiercely in other fields in order to prove that their own system was superior to that of their opponent (Kihl, 1984: 158). This rivalry also involved a conflict of national interests.

Along with the inter-Korean conflicts over national interests, the greatest concern of the two Koreas has been national security. North Korea constantly accuses South Korea/the US of preparing for war against it, as shown in its reactions to the annual 'Team Spirit' military exercises in the South. Because of such perceptions of insecurity, North Korea built an impressive military force. As a result, South Korea's sense of insecurity is also serious. After experiencing the Korean War (1950-1953) and successive serious crises, South Korea became convinced that North Korean military capability far exceeded its need for security, and that the North Korean strategy is offense-oriented, and thus threatening. For example, during his visit to China on 18 April 1975, shortly before the fall of South Vietnam, Kim Il Sung pronounced:

If a war broke out in Korea, the military demarcation line would be lost and unification would be gained. If revolutionary events took place in the South, we would not sit idle, but support the South Korean people (Rodong Shinmun, 19/4/1975).

All this North Korean behavior was perceived as a serious threat by South Korea.

Added to the tensions over national security, the two Koreas have been engaged in keen economic competition. Although economic development and prosperity in one state does not preclude a similar achievement in another, in the case of the two

Koreas, because their economic systems were ideologically opposed, economic success was seen to present the superiority of one system over the other. Furthermore, this perception of superiority was seen to vindicate the system's legitimacy in the international sphere. Similarly, economic development has very real implications in the security capability of each state (B.C. Koh, 1984). In this sense, the inter-Korean conflict has been a struggle for national identity (e.g., ideology and legitimacy), as well as national interest (e.g., security and economic development). I now turn to a discussion of decision-making in the inter-Korean conflict.

III.3. DECISION-MAKING IN THE INTER-KOREAN CONFLICT

Yang (1981) holds Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee responsible for the prolongation of the inter-Korean conflict. In Yang's view, Kim and Park had different perceptions of the Japanese occupation of Korea (1910-1945). Kim believed that Japan's occupation should be terminated for the sake of Korean independence. Park considered it an opportunity to reject traditional patterns and to accept a new political order. These different views of the end of the Japanese period and its aftermath led Kim and Park to pursue different foreign policies from the early 1960s. Kim pursued an independent foreign policy even at the expense of economic development, whereas Park favored economic development, even at the risk of dependence on foreign capital and foreign markets. Yang argues that these different values of the decision-makers promoted the continuing psychological division of Korea.

The extended duration of hostile interactions between the two Koreas has built up psychological barriers that are difficult to dismantle in a short period of time. The two Koreas' decision-making has been influenced by negative feelings and mirror images. North Korea's images of South Korea and the US are extremely negative. It sees South Korea as hostile and aggressive. Such negative projections select, distort, or amplify information emanating from the South so that it conforms to North Korea's values or expectations. South Korea's images of North Korea are shaped by anti-communist ideology and painful memories of repeated conflicts. Its

image of North Korea is also extremely negative. It sees the North as being hostile, deceptive and belligerent. These parallel mirror images are held by both sides. It is not difficult to conclude that the decision-makers' perceptions and images of both Koreas continue to influence their foreign policy decision-making in the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Summary

In my consideration of the study of the inter-Korean conflict as a case, I have argued that an in-depth case study is important for the accumulation of knowledge on the nature of protracted conflict. It is hoped that my models will contribute to further theoretical research on the inter-Korean conflict. An overview of the Korean conflict has also been provided. In the next chapter, I analyze carefully selected cases of international crisis in the inter-Korean conflict.

Notes to Chapter 3

Complete authors' names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography.

1. Although there is no taxonomy for protracted conflicts based on specified variables, an exceptional aggregate data analysis for the relationship between international crises and protracted conflict has been done by Brecher (1984), and Brecher and Wilkenfeld (1989). Findings from these studies shows that there are significant differences in crisis behavior between dominant system protracted conflicts and subsystem protracted conflicts. What specific variables account for the difference, however, has not yet been studied.
2. To study the decision-maker's perception of 'self' and 'interest' is particularly pertinent to my study because in my study 'national identity' and 'national interest' are independent variables.

Part Two. Case Studies

This study now turns from theoretical considerations to a detailed case study of a protracted conflict. In the previous three chapters, I examined previous studies on protracted conflict and enduring rivalry; presented a conceptual framework for my study; and provided an overview of the inter-Korean protracted conflict. In Chapter 2, I argue that a protracted conflict is characterized by a series of sub-conflicts, such as international crises, wars, and accommodation failures. The following two chapters focus on particular cases of international crises/war (Chapter 4) and accommodation successes or failures (Chapter 5). I will analyze these cases in an attempt to show how the variables and models formulated in Chapter 2 can improve our understanding of cases of protracted conflict.

CHAPTER 4: CRISES/WAR IN THE INTER-KOREAN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

In this chapter I deal with four crises representative of one aspect of behavioral patterns in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Close attention is also given to the perceptual and decisional dimensions of each crisis. I begin by studying the pre-Korean War period because it was a transition from protracted social conflict to the beginning of an inter-state conflict. I follow this with a study of the US intervention in the Korean War (1950); the Chinese intervention in the Korean War (1950); the January 21 and Pueblo crises (1968); and the Poplar Tree crisis (1976).

The Pre-War Period: BACKGROUND

To understand the origin of the inter-Korean conflict, it may not be sufficient to examine who started the Korean War (Cumings, 1981; Merrill, 1983; Vadney, 1992) because South Korea as well as North Korea wished to break the status quo surrounding the 38th parallel (H.J. Lee, 1988: 273-4; Rah, 1991: 25-6). The question then arises as to why both regimes were mutually hostile. To respond, I begin with a study of Korea under Japanese occupation. This is because it was during the Japanese period that the inter-Korean protracted social conflict began to develop. I argue that the inter-Korean conflict had its roots in a protracted social conflict, which may be defined as protracted conflict at the societal level.

THE JAPANESE OCCUPATION PERIOD (1910-1945):

Korea is a peninsula 600 miles long in north-east Asia. It lies between the Sea of Japan on the east and the Yellow Sea on the West. Historically, Korea has been

a battleground in the struggle for influence among Russia, China, and Japan. It was invaded by the Mongols in the 13th century. Japan attempted to conquer it in 1592-7. It came under the overlordship of the Manchu emperors of China in the first half of the 17th century. Japan and China fought over Korea in 1894-5. Japan and Russia fought the war of 1904-5 to determine who would control Korea. On 29 August 1910, Japan annexed Korea¹ and occupied it for 35 years.

Numerous independence movements by the Korean people occurred during the period of Japanese occupation. The March First Independence Struggle in 1919 is noteworthy. Its significance lies in the fact that, although it was led by members of the enlightened, patriotic, bourgeois class, the workers and peasants who also participated in the struggle developed a remarkably high political and social consciousness. Workers and peasants have been prominent in subsequent national independence movements. In the 1920s, there were significant activities by rebellious workers and peasants, which provided a base for the Korean socialist movement (M.K. Kang, 1984: 47). It should be noted, however, that the Korean socialist movement was not motivated by a Korean class struggle among Koreans, but for fighting Japanese imperialism. Korean independence was the primary goal (ibid.: 69; D.S. Suh, 1986: 19).

After the independence struggle of 1919, an exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was set up in China on 15 September 1919. In 1924, anti-Japanese guerrilla activity dominated by Korean communists and other leftists began in Korea. In 1925, the Korean Communist Party was established in Korea. During the 1920s however, the division of the anti-Japanese struggle into left and right emerged. The left-wing faction regarded the KPG as non-representative of the Korean people, but the right-wing followed the KPG line. The two factions differed radically in ideology. Contrary to socialist or communist political philosophy, the KPG adhered to liberal democracy or democratic republicanism. Well before Korean independence was achieved in 1945, serious internal conflicts within the anti-Japanese movements had emerged (H.J. Kim, 1989: 34, 38).

Meanwhile, in Cairo on 1 December 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang Kai-

shek agreed that 'in due course Korea shall become free and independent'. In July 1945, the Postdam Declaration reaffirmed the Cairo Declaration. In August, Russia declared war on Japan. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, it was agreed that Soviet and American troops would occupy Korea to effect the surrender of Japanese troops. A demarcation line along latitude 38 established the respective areas of Soviet and American occupation. Thus, after Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945, two zones of military occupation came into existence in the Korean peninsula.

1945 - SEPTEMBER 1948:

On the day of the Japanese surrender, the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) was formed by a coalition of nationalist leaders--both right and left. By the early September, however, the CPKI was led by socialists dominated by the Korean Communist Party. Hundreds of 'Red Peasant Unions' and labour organizations took shape. On 6 September 1945, the CPKI proclaimed a Korean People's Republic (KPR). The local branches of the CPKI reconstituted themselves into local authorities called 'People's Committees', and these spread throughout the Korean peninsula. Their proposals for radical social change enjoyed widespread support among the Korean workers and peasants and provided an opportunity for Korean communists and leftists to increase their following.

Not all Koreans, however, welcomed these developments. Conservative nationalists, the right-wing in the country's political life, attempted to organize an anti-CPKI group. In the same month that the KPR was established, the Korean Democratic Party (KDP) was founded (4 September 1945) with the backing of important landlord and entrepreneurial interests. This party became the strongest of several right-wing parties and factions in South Korea. It did not want radical reforms but wished to maintain the traditional social system. The KDP also denounced the various left-wing groups as Communists bent on revolution in Korea, thus identifying itself as anti-Communist. At this point, the two groups, i.e., the KPR and the KDP, became the dominant political groups in Korea after its liberation from Japan. This polarization created the potential for organized conflict between

right-wing and left-wing factions in the country. This situation was exacerbated by the US military government's policy in the South.

In the South, the Americans regarded the Koreans as incapable of self-government, thus they retained a number of landlords and former collaborators with Japanese rule in their military government. To the US military government, only these two groups were perceived as capable implementers of their containment policy. These two groups opposed land reform because of their vested interests. The US military government entrusted these groups with control of the South, thus ignoring the desperate needs and demands of the peasants and workers for survival (M.H. Heo, 1990: 169). In view of the revolutionary potential of the KPR, the US considered it an obstacle to the integration of Korea into the Western bloc. It was clear that the US military government would have to act forcefully to suppress the supporters of the KPR and the People's Committees. Accordingly the US moved to outlaw the KPR, the People's Committees, and their affiliated unions.

These policies of the US military government aroused strong opposition among the Koreans. A series of demonstrations and strikes in the South during the autumn of 1946 attested to the strength of the left². It should be re-emphasized however, that the numerous strikes of Korean peasants and workers occurred not because they were communists a la Marxism-Leninism, but because they desperately wanted fundamental social change, change in the land tenure system, self-government, and better economic conditions (Cumings, 1981; M.H. Heo, 1990: 174-5). The US military government misjudged the Korean workers' and peasants' aspirations. This error came from views of the Soviet Union as a threat to US interests and ideology. American Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union and the resultant containment policy escalated the conflict between right-wing and left-wing factions.

Soviet troops began to occupy the North on 20 August 1945. The Soviet Union's approach, contrary to that of the US in the South, was to foster and guide rather than reverse existing trends in the North. The Soviets, in particular, eliminated the former collaborators with the Japanese occupation and supported the organization of People's Committees in every province where communists were dominant. Soviet

interests were basically compatible with those of the People's Committees, so that the USSR turned to them as the foundation of a provisional communist regime north of the 38th parallel. On 18 October 1945, the Northern Branch of the Korean Communist Party was established.

On 9 February 1946, a Provisional People's Committee for North Korea was formed under Kim Il-Sung. The northern government immediately instituted a series of reforms designed to enhance the credibility of the communists. These began in the spring and summer of 1946. The most important was land reform. The North enacted the 'Land Reform Law' on 5 March 1946, completing its implementation by 31 March. In 1946, the Soviets began to equip the North with arms. On 8 February 1948, the North Korean People's Army was established. C.K. Kim (1991: 209-210) interpreted this process of Sovietization and militarization of the North as the cause of the Korean War at the macro level.

MID 1948 - EARLY SUMMER 1950:

The stalemate with the Soviet Union over the future of Korea induced the US to propose that the two countries place the matter before the UN. The Russians opposed this and wanted the occupying powers simply to withdraw. They believed that without the protection of the Americans, the right-wing would be defeated in the South and a government compatible with their interests would emerge in Korea as a whole. The Americans rejected this proposal and proposed that a special commission be created to supervise separate elections in each zone.

The UN-supervised elections took place in the South only on 10 May 1948. The result was a victory for Syngman Rhee. On 31 May 1948, perceiving threats from communist activity, Rhee urged all Koreans to make every effort to consolidate and strengthen his new government. Subsequently Rhee's commitments were institutionalized through (1) the National Council, (2) the Korean Youth Movement, and (3) the Korean Students' Patriotic Association. The three movements were characterized by their concentration on anti-communism, and national defense through military mobilization and modernization of weapons (H.J. Lee, 1988: 251-8).

The formal inauguration of the new South Korean government took place on 15 August 1948. In December 1948, the UN declared the Republic of Korea the only lawful government in the Korean peninsula.

On 25 August, the communists held their own elections in the North for a Supreme People's Committee of Representatives. Kim Il-Sung became the Premier in the North. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed on 9 September 1948. In October 1948, the Soviet Union declared the DPRK as the only lawful government of Korea. On 26 December, the Soviet Union stated that the evacuation of its troops from the North had been completed. It was now clear that two regimes had been established on the Korean peninsula and that the conflict in the Korean peninsula had gradually been replaced by two Koreas instead of the US and the Soviet Union. Each regime claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the whole Korean peninsula, and had the potential to initiate serious conflict in the course of protecting their territorial interest as well as their ideology. The societal level conflict (Halliday and Cumings, 1990: 34) had been transmuted into an inter-state conflict.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1949, the first border clashes and serious confrontations took place along the 38th parallel. Merrill (1983) argued that many of the border clashes were initiated by the South in an attempt to force the Americans' hand, through a 'policy of bluff', thereby making US commitment to the South a *fait accompli*. The border incidents were timed to reinforce Rhee's 'march-to-the north' policy⁴. By late 1949, leftist activity in the South had changed from protracted social conflict over socio-economic issues into a part of inter-state conflict, with overtones of a general civil war (M.H. Heo, 1990: 176). On 30 September 1949, Rhee claimed that to fight the communist regime was to liberate the Koreans in the North. On 1 November 1949, Sung M. Shin, Minister of Defence, made a public statement, saying that the South was ready to invade the North, but was held in check by the Americans. At the same time, Rhee again asserted that, if necessary, the South would resort to arms to unify the Korean peninsula. His intention to engage in a 'march-to-the north' was re-iterated on 1 March 1950 (H.J.

Lee, 1988: 337-342).

As stated earlier, the South Korean government believed itself to be threatened by the communists in South Korea. In particular, the period of fall 1947 to spring 1948 saw the rapid escalation of conflict between the Right and the Left (Merrill, 1983). The Cheju-island strike in April 1948 manifested this. Another affair which fed the threat-perception of the South Korean government was the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion in October 1949. This incident revealed widespread communist penetration in the South Korean constabulary and produced a tremendous sense of insecurity among South Koreans. South Korea responded with the institutionalization of the National Security Act. In addition, the frequent confrontations along the 38th parallel (US Department of State, Bulletin, 24/4/1950: 627) led the South Korean government to an increased state of militarization (S.J. Kim, 1990).

By the early summer of 1950, each side felt it had more reason than ever to strike at the other (Vadney, 1992: 142). For Syngman Rhee, there was the danger that Northern efforts to conspire with his political opponents might be successful. At the same time a war would permit him to solve the political, economic and security problems once and for all. Young S. Louis Yim, the first Minister of Commerce and Industry, described the South's situation, a couple of months before the Korean War, as follow:

We expected something to happen, we thought that it would be war... North Korea finally initiated the war, but who can attribute it only to the North? All the circumstances in Korea were optimum for war (Louis Yim, 1959: 295, quoted in H.J. Lee, 1988: 353).

The North did not make a public statement on unification by force. Kim Il-Sung, however, would probably have perceived both a danger and an opportunity from the instability in the South. The danger was that Rhee would launch a war against the North. The South Korean President had been explicit about his intention to do so sooner or later. Rhee's threatening policy toward the North would increase its

efforts to augment its military capability (H.J. Lee, 1988: 282). The South's provocative rhetoric of 'march-to-the north' and its actual increase in military capability would be perceived by the North as a prelude to invasion. The incoming information about the South's policy and its implementation would be channeled through the North's image of the South. In consequence, the North's decision-makers decided on a preemptive strike (Simmons, 1973: 356). The cumulative effects of the South's battle-cry of 'march-to-the north', as well as the border provocations, might well have created the image of a long-term South Korean threat to the North's decision-makers (Merrill, 1983: 50).

Rhee's policy of bluff would also lead the US to perceive the South Korean military capability as superior, or at least equal to that of the North (H.J. Lee, 1988: 346). In late 1948, when one US division was evacuated from South Korea, Syngman Rhee in fact made a public statement to the effect that South Korea in the near future would have sufficient self-defense capability without foreign aid. Accordingly the US did not provide sufficient arms for the defense of South Korea. Moreover, given the South's provocative actions along the 38th parallel, and the North's relatively low frequency of provocative activity, the gradual deployment of the North Korean forces toward the parallel after the fall of 1949 could easily be interpreted by the US merely as defensive reactions.

The political uncertainty following South Korea's May election might well have been perceived by the North Korean decision-makers as an opportunity for an easy Northern victory. By this time the North's capability of launching a war was ready due to a long-process of its institutionalized commitments. For example, on 18 March 1949, North Korea and China made a secret military treaty. North Korea also began to recall about fifty thousand troops from China, where they had been fighting as part of the Red Army in the Chinese civil war. At the same time, since 1949, the North Korean military recruitment system had been changed from volunteers to conscripts. Compulsory military training had been extended to the age of seventeen through forty. North Korea attacked South Korea on 25 June 1950.

The Korean War

I now turn to a case study of US intervention in the Korean War, followed by a case study of the Chinese intervention. My focus is not on tactical offensives and counter-offensives between the states involved, but on how and why the US and China chose war when they perceived a foreign policy crisis. Both interventions signified the expansion of the war through the entrance of new actors and it meant that the actual offensives and counter-offensives would be framed by the motivations of these external actors. An overview of the Korean War precedes these two case studies.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE KOREAN WAR:

When North Korea launched a surprise attack on South Korea, its forces captured Seoul, the capital, within 3 days. Despite US/UN and South Korean resistance, the North Koreans occupied the entire South except the area around Pusan. There US/UN and South Korean troops held out until 15 September, when General MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon. The North Koreans were driven back across the 38th parallel but they refused to agree to a cease-fire. The US/UN troops then advanced into the North, capturing its capital, Pyongyang, and reaching the Yalu River, which marks the frontier between Korea and Chinese Manchuria, on 24 October 1950.

Meanwhile China had warned repeatedly of the possibility of its intervention. These warnings, however, were ignored, its military capability being underestimated by the US. Small groups of Chinese forces were captured in mid-October. Responding to MacArthur's 'end-the-war by Christmas' campaign (24/11/1950), the Chinese troops launched a massive attack on the UN forces at the end of November, inflicting heavy losses and forcing MacArthur to retreat. Seoul fell into communist hands for the second time in January 1951. A counter-offensive in the second half of January gradually recovered lost ground. The US/UN forces

successfully contained two major attacks launched by the Chinese in April and May 1951, followed this with a counter-offensive in June which enabled the US/UN troops to establish a defensive line slightly north of the 38th parallel. By the summer of 1951, the battle line had become stabilized near the 38th parallel. Truce talks began in July 1951 at Kaesung and were later shifted to Panmunjom. After a long process of negotiation, an armistice was signed in July 1953.

Case 1. US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950

I. South Korea's and US's Foreign Policy Crises

North Korea attacked South Korea at 4:00 a.m. on 25 June 25th 1950. When the North Korean forces invaded the South, President Syngman Rhee perceived initially a crisis in Chinese terms: danger and opportunity. The danger was a threat to the very existence of South Korea. Shortly after 12:00 a.m. on 25 June, Han Pyo-wook, the Korean Ambassador to the US, received an urgent phone call from Rhee directing him to ask the US to support South Korea as quickly as possible. Han was asked to notify the US government that South Korea urgently needed military aid to drive the North Korean forces back⁵. President Rhee however, told Muccio, the US Ambassador to South Korea, that the crisis would be a golden opportunity to settle the Korean problem once and for all⁶. Although the President did not clarify what he meant by the Korean problem, there is no doubt that the problem of unifying the entire Korean peninsula was his priority. Until General MacArthur's Inchon landing of 15 September, however, Rhee had little ground for optimism.

On 12 January 1950, Acheson had declared that Taiwan and Korea were not included in the US defense perimeter in East Asia. The US, however, quickly responded to North Korea's aggression. This raises the question of why, given Acheson's declaration, the US should have perceived any crisis in the Korean conflict.

First, the US did not regard a North Korean attack as imminent. North Korea was seen as being under the direct control of the Soviet Union (George and Smoke, 1974: 168). The latter was seen as threatening but weak and cautious (Jervis, 1980: 570). The US thus expected that the Soviet Union, hesitating to risk a general war with the US, would prevent North Korea from initiating a war, at least in the

immediate future. Second, the intensity of the North Korean attack exceeded by far what the US had deduced from the communists' provocative behavior. It was expected that the communists might initiate strikes, sabotage, guerrilla or civil war against the anti-communist South Korea. The North Korean all-out offensive against the South was perceived as "a new phase" in communist strategy⁷. The US, obsessed with containment policy, did not expect this kind of aggression (Kissinger, 1994: 474). Third, the US did not know what its response should be if South Korea became the victim of the communist forces, or if other great communist powers intervened. The US did not have any specific plan because Korea was not considered strategically important (Paige, 1968: 98; Warner, 1951: 105). Fourth, North Korea's invasion of the South was interpreted by the US as a challenge to the collective security system of the UN, backed by the US. The US, however, was aware of the possible disastrous consequences of inaction (Tsou, 1963: 559). Communist North Korea's higher-than-expected conflictual behavior led the US to perceive a serious threat to the collective security system and to anti-communist countries. I now turn to the analysis of how the US dealt with this Korean crisis.

II. US Decision-Making on Intervention

On 24 June 1950 (at 9:26 p.m.), US Ambassador Muccio's telegram reached the US State Department. It read:

North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning... It constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea.

By 10:30 p.m., Under Secretary James Webb, Ambassador Philip G. Jessup, Assistant Secretary of State John Hickerson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, and many others were conferring at the State Department. Rusk telephoned Secretary Acheson. Shortly before midnight, Acheson discussed the Korean crisis by phone with President

Truman. That night the State Department's decisions were: (1) to bring the matter to the urgent attention of the UN and (2) to consider which measures were to be taken within the framework of existing policy and plans (FRUS, 1950: VII: 158).

To this group of officials, available information was fragmentary. They could not assess the capability and intention of the North Koreans (Paige, 1968: 96). They expected that the South Korean army could bar the North Korean attack unless Soviet forces were actively supporting the North⁸. Contrary to US officials' expectations, the situation in the South was rapidly deteriorating. The North Korean forces were close to Seoul and every effort by the South Korean army was totally ineffective. The South Korean government's crisis management at this time took the form of an appeal to the US for immediate aid⁹: On 26 (Korean time), the National Assembly of the South appealed to the US for "effective and timely aid." It also appealed to the UN for "immediate and effective steps" to guarantee the security of South Korea (Oliver, 1978: 279). Ambassador Han received another phone call from President Rhee. Han recalls that the President's voice was strained with anxiety. In their communication, Rhee explained to Han that the South Korean situation had taken a serious turn, and directed Han to ask President Truman for urgent military support (P.W. Han, 1991: 100). Rhee directly appealed to the US President and Congress for increased support and aid (FRUS, 1950: VII: 167).

II.1. THE FIRST BLAIR HOUSE MEETING (25 June, Washington Time)

At 7:45 a.m., on 25 June, the first Blair House conference was held. Thirteen of the US top diplomatic and military leaders assembled¹⁰. The information available on the Korean crisis was still sparse. Important decisions made at this meeting were: (1) Authorization of General MacArthur to furnish South Korea with arms and equipment from the Far East Command; (2) Employment of the naval and air units of the Far East Command to insure the safe evacuation of American civilians from Korea; (3) Sponsorship of assistance to Korea under the flag of the UN; (4) Interposition of the US Seventh Fleet between Formosa and the Chinese mainland in order to prevent any conflict escalation between the two Chinese regimes (Paige,

1968:137-41; FRUS, 1950, VII: 157-8). These decisions were initially recommended by Acheson. The advisors agreed on most of his recommendations; and the President finally approved all of them. Why was there such unanimity?

The decisions at the First Blair House meeting were initially made under the framework of previously established US commitments, such as the MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program) and in particular, under the terms of the UN collective security system. These commitments initially framed the scope of the US foreign policy decision-making. Before the consultation with his advisors, President Truman declared, "We can't let the UN down" (Paige, 1968: 125). Given the lack of a war plan in Korea, the tendency to follow the existing policy was probably accelerated. Even the sudden turn of events in Korea did not change US leaders' "previous opinion" that Korea was not strategically important in the case of general war (General Bradley, cited in Paige, *ibid.*: 128).

The decisions were also made under the strong assumption that the Soviet Union was behind North Korea. There was a consensus among conferees at the meeting that the Soviet Union was using North Korea as an agent to test US resolve (Paige, 1968: 132-3). Decisions were made by US decision-makers who were strongly suspicious of the Soviet Union. President Truman was of the opinion that the Soviet Union was provoking the US (Memoirs, II: 335). General Bradley regarded the North Korean action as a testing of the US by the Soviet Union. Ambassador Jessup thought that the Soviet Union was "probing for a soft spot" (Paige, 1968: 133). The US decision-makers' focus was less on North Korea than on the Soviet Union.

What they perceived as the real threat was not the defeat of South Korea itself, but the gradual expansion of communist movements along the periphery of the Soviet Union, or in the Far East (Jessup, cited in Paige, *ibid.*). If the communists' adventurism continued without hindrance, a Third World War between communist and non-communist states was anticipated by US leaders. President Truman was advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the State Department to consider it "the time and place" for a decisive stand (Oliver, 1950: 143). The President himself considered it right to resist "promptly and effectively" the North Korean aggression

(Paige, 1968: 115). The South Korean government also believed that the North Korean attack "could not have been done without Soviet direction¹¹." To the conferees, the authorization of MacArthur to use the air and naval forces under his command was necessary to ensure the prompt and effective arms-aid assistance to South Korea (Paige, *ibid.*: 137-9).

In these circumstances, the US needed more information on the intentions of the communist bloc. President Truman ordered a worldwide intelligence recheck of the intentions of the Soviet Union and its allies (Paige, 1968: 134). Considering the North Korean aggression as "only the first" of a series of Soviet conspiracies, the State Department intensified their research on communist activity through the US world-wide network (Cagle and Manson, 1957: 34, cited in *ibid.*). In the minds of the conference members, it was not North Korea but the Soviet Union which was leading communist expansionism under the guise of the Korean conflict.

At the time of the first Blair House meeting, the US decision-makers did not consider direct military intervention. They agreed that North Korean aggression should be blocked but they did not perceive the necessity of active US involvement in the ground war. This was based on their unrealistic estimation of South Korean and North Korean military capability. Twenty four hours after the North's attack, President Rhee acknowledged that total disaster loomed (Paige, 1968: 157). Many Koreans and Americans, however, were optimistic about the capability of the South Korean Army to repel the North Korean forces. Major General William F. Dean, Commander of the 24th Infantry Division, classed the North's attack as only a slightly larger version of the many border incidents (Paige, 1968: 87-8). Even President Truman and his advisors, at the first Blair House meeting, were optimistic that South Korea could repel the North's forces if the North did not get any outside assistance. This optimism was based on their earlier assessments, which had overestimated South Korea's military capability.

The overestimation of the South was counter-balanced by an underestimation of the North. Previous US assessments of North Korea's army had designated it as simply a constabulary type of military organization which would not likely be superior

to the army of the South. Washington's information about North Korean weapons was provided by a military editor of the New York Times, Hanson Baldwin. Baldwin reported that no Russian-made tanks had been identified in the North Korean forces (cited in *ibid.*).

The US overestimation of the South's capability and underestimation of the North's capability resulted from lack of accurate US information on both regimes. This ignorance might have been related to down-grading of Korea in US foreign policy. In addition, the inter-Korean conflicts before the Korean War certainly encouraged biased information on both regimes' capabilities. For example, General William L. Roberts, former KMAC Commander, discounted the superiority of the North because in many of the past skirmishes, one South Korean regiment had easily proven to be a match for one North Korean Brigade (Paige, 1968: 130). President Rhee's 'march-to-the north' policy and the policy of bluff also encouraged strong perceptions on the part of the US decision-makers of the South's superiority. As a result, the conferees at the first Blair House meeting neither changed their previous perception of the strategic unimportance of Korea nor considered intervention in the Korean conflict. Their decisions were only related to the necessity of blocking communist adventurism as represented by North Korean aggression.

In sum, to the US leaders, direct military intervention was not required at that time, a policy that was based on the underestimation and overestimation of both North and South Korea's capability. These misjudgments arose from the US lack of information about both Koreas and US ignorance of the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula. Both inter-Korean border clashes before the war and Rhee's policy against the North exaggerated US misjudgments.

II.2. THE SECOND BLAIR HOUSE MEETING (26 June)

On 26 June, at 2:00 p.m., South Korean President Rhee gave Truman a personal phone call to plead for the rescue of his government from complete disaster. By the evening, US decision-makers had a clearer but more depressing picture of the military situation in Korea. External threats to South Korea were worse than the US

decision-makers had expected. Truman and Acheson agreed that the military situation was serious enough to hold another full-scale conference.

At 9:00 p.m., the second Blair House meeting was held, the conferees being the same as before. At this meeting five recommendations were made by Acheson and approved by President Truman. These were: (1) the fullest support of South Korea with American air and naval forces, being limited to the area south of the 38th parallel; (2) the repositioning of the Seventh Fleet to bar possible military action between Taiwan and mainland China; (3) the fortification of US forces in the Philippines with increased military assistance to the Philippine government; (4) the acceleration of military assistance to Indochina; and (5) the reporting of any US actions under the above recommendations to the UN (FRUS, 1950, VII: 178-80; Paige, 1968: 164).

At the time of the second Blair House meeting, the US decision-makers' previous perception that Korea was not strategically important had not changed. They still did not want to risk the expansion of the Korean conflict into a general war elsewhere (Paige, 1968: 167). They realized however, that they had to repel North Korea as quickly as possible. To remain inactive was intolerable. The North Korean invasion of the South was seen in part as "a limited challenge"¹². Truman regarded the attack as a larger scale repetition of the Greek Crisis of 1947 and the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49, one of "probing for weakness" (Paige, 1968: 170). The conferees agreed that not to repel North Korean aggression was nothing but appeasement. Here again, President Truman and some of his advisors drew historical parallels with Germany, Italy, and Japan, when tolerance of aggression led to the Second World War (Paige, *ibid.*: 174; Phillips, 1966: 291-292). President Truman explicitly stated:

This is the Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, there won't be any next step (Stoessinger, 1985: 63).

Now the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it (FRUS, 1950, VII: 183).

The most important decision taken at the meeting was not to appease the

communists, even if it meant the beginning of World War Three¹³. The rapidly deteriorating military situation in Korea was another factor which contributed to the US resolve not to succumb to appeasement. General MacArthur's most recent report was presented at the meeting. MacArthur assessed, in his report, that "a complete collapse is imminent" (Paige, *ibid.*: 162). Truman and his advisors perceived no alternative but to repel North Korean aggression. Related decisions were increased military aid to the Philippines and to the French in Indochina.

The US, however, wanted to avoid provoking a general war with the communist bloc. Given this proviso, the only way of repelling North Korea, while assuring the Soviet Union that the US was "not looking for trouble" (Acheson, cited in Paige, 1968: 167), was to make available the US air and naval forces within the area south of the 38th parallel, a limited reaction. Another effort by the US to limit its involvement was the repositioning of the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and mainland China. The possibility of Chinese intervention in the Korean war was not given much consideration by the conferees. The US simply estimated China as being incapable of mobilizing its forces in the near future. The conferees, however, wanted to make sure to keep China and Formosa well apart and avoid conflict in this sphere. Aggression on Formosa's part could extend the area of conflict (Truman, Memoirs, II: 337).

All these decisions reflected US policy to discourage communist moves elsewhere, to localize the conflict, and induce communist withdrawal from Korea by demonstrating American strength and commitment. This commitment arose from the US perception of a serious and direct threat to its national security interest. Acheson reasoned that if the US did nothing while South Korea was being swallowed up, such inaction would defeat the collective security system on which US safety ultimately depended (Paige, 1968: 176). The US decision-makers did not perceive a threat from the loss of Korea itself. What gave them the perception of a direct threat was the ultimately dangerous "consequences" of the loss of Korea due to the withholding of U.S. aid, as well as the collapse of the principle and system of collective security. The effectiveness of collective security through the UN was

considered to be one of the pillars of US security (Acheson, cited in *ibid.*). Another concern relating to US national interest was its reputation or prestige as a credible ally with other non-Communist countries (Vandenberg, Hearings, II: 1504, cited in Paige, *ibid.*: 175).

The US decision to repel the North Korean invasion was also based on ideology-based interest. Secretary Johnson maintained that the conferees at the second Blair House meeting were concerned about "resisting aggression", but not about "fighting communism" (Hearings, Part IV, 2585, cited in Paige, 1968: 177). Dean Rusk also stated that the decisions had almost nothing to do with Communist ideology per se (*ibid.*: 178). Their logic, however, is not persuasive when we see President Truman's intentions in repelling North Korea. Truman stated:

More seriously, a Communist success in Korea would put Red troops...within easy striking distance of Japan...and Formosa would be open to attack from two sides (Memoirs, II: 337).

The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a communist Korea would be a threat to Japan's security (Paige, 1968: 174). As mentioned earlier, US leaders saw the communist Soviet Union as their major rival in global influence, and any aggressive behavior from any of its pawns could be interpreted as a threat to the non-communist bloc. To the conferees, the Korean conflict was seen as an ideological struggle between communism and non-communism. Truman's statement on 27 June succinctly expressed this belief. The statement read:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain ...that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations (American Foreign Policy, 1971: 2540).

At the second Blair House meeting, US decision-makers made a decision to repel the North Korean rapid advances. But the scope and intensity of the counter-attack had to be limited. The reasons were: (1) The information on the military situation in the Korean peninsula did not yet justify an extensive operation; (2) A more extensive operation could provoke China's or the Soviet Union's intervention, which could result in a general war. At this time, US leaders believed that only minimal

and essential measures were required.

II.3 STRONGER COMMITMENTS (27 - 29 June)

On 27 June, at noon, Truman made a public statement on US commitment to resist North Korean aggression. In the afternoon, the State Department directed Ambassador Kirk in Moscow to ask for the help of the Soviet Union in halting the hostilities in Korea. No satisfactory response resulted. The UN passed a resolution calling for UN member-states to assist South Korea, signifying an increase in military assistance. The resolution stated:

Having noted...that...North Korea has neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel...urgent military measures are required... ("The Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea", S/1511 (27/6/1950).

On 28 June, bad news reached President Truman. Two South Korean divisions had disintegrated. On 29, the US perceived a more serious threat to the existence of South Korea. Another decision was required. At 5:00 p.m., a National Security Council meeting was held. The participants agreed that South Korea would be lost unless ground forces were thrown in. They had no assessment, however, of the forces required, or of the response demanded should China or the Soviet Union intervene. At this juncture, US policy remained one of excluding Korea from the US defense perimeter in East Asia, and therefore the US had no specific war plan in relation to Korea (Warner, 1951: 105). No final decision on sending ground forces was taken.

II.4. DECISION-MAKING ON INTERVENTION (30 June)

On 30 June, the US State Department received a telegram from General MacArthur at 1:31 a.m.¹⁴. The telegram described the situation as disastrous and stated the urgent need of US ground forces. It read:

It is essential that the enemy advance be held or its impetus will threaten the overrunning of all Korea... If the enemy advance continues much further it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic. The only assurance for the holding of the present line,

and the ability to regain later the lost ground, is through the introduction of US ground combat forces into the combat battle area (FRUS, 1950, VII: 249; Paige, 1968: 254).

MacArthur also insisted: "Time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is essential" (Paige, *ibid.*: 255; Stoessinger, 1985: 67). At 4:00 a.m.¹⁵, Army Secretary Pace reported MacArthur's message to the President. President Truman approved, "Go ahead and send the troops." Within a few hours the first American ground forces were being put into Korea from the 24th Division in Japan. At 9:30 a.m., President Truman held a White House meeting with his advisors. By 10:00 a.m., the President and conferees made decisions to send additional ground forces to the one regimental combat team already authorized, to authorize the US Air force to conduct missions on specific military targets in North Korea wherever militarily necessary, and to establish a naval blockade of the entire Korean coast. General MacArthur was authorized to use certain supporting ground units (Paige, 1968: 255-7).

It was MacArthur who initially suggested the use of US ground forces for offensive operations, a recommendation that was based solely on the "necessities of the rapidly deteriorating military situation" in Korea (George, 1955: 222-3). By this time, US decision-makers had also perceived necessary conditions to strengthen their commitment. As mentioned earlier, the US policy-makers' initial objectives were North Korea's immediate withdrawal from the South, containment of Communist aggression in Korea, and deterring Soviet conspiracy in other places. With these objectives in mind, they made efforts to get the UN cease-fire resolution (25 June) and announced their strengthened commitment. US initial efforts, however, were unsuccessful. The North Korean forces did not withdraw. The US decision-makers thus came to recognize the fact that North Korean forces had no intention of withdrawing. No other choice remained but that of "direct military pressure" as a means of inducing North Korean withdrawal (*ibid.*: 226-7).

When the US policy-makers decided to use ground forces, they did not foresee the numbers that would eventually be required. They had no way of knowing the

extent of the increased commitments that would be subsequently required. At this stage, they were improvising (George, 1955: 225). This decision to use US ground forces marked the beginning of a significant change in US commitment to Korea. The US decision was a clear-cut reversal of the US previous strategic plan symbolized by the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea in 1949. It also was a reversal of Marshall's view that US ground forces should not be used in Asia¹⁶ (Tsou, 1963: 558). It represented a major change in US institutionalized commitment, not only in Korea, but in Asia as well.

Why did the US change its policy? What I want to re-emphasize is that the US focus was not on North Korea itself, but on the Soviet Union. At the same time, what the US feared was not the defeat of South Korea itself, but the consequence of US inaction against North Korean aggression. Put differently, what made the US strengthen its commitment was rivalry with the Soviet Union. The US hoped to block the Soviet Union's other aggressions, including a general war, elsewhere (George, 1955: 219-20). The US decision-makers believed that the North Korean attack was a part of the international communists' world-wide strategy, backed by the Soviet Union (John Foster Dulles, radio interview over CBS, 1/7/1950)¹⁷.

This implies that US decision-making was significantly based on and biased by their perception of the Soviet Union. Although Kim Il Sung consulted with Stalin and Mao about the invasion of South Korea, his motivation was primarily based on his own calculation. The US interpretation of the cause of the war, however, was exclusively focused on the Soviet Union as leader of the Communist bloc. The North Korean invasion of the South merely confirmed the US image or suspicion of the international communist threat (G.H. Chang, 1990: 76). The US decision-makers' beliefs on the Cold War or global rivalry with the Soviet Union determined its change of foreign policy (Ziegler, 1990: 59).

III. Prelude to Chinese Intervention

On 2 July [Korean Time], the First Battalion of the 24th Division's 21st Regiment reached the fighting front in the Taejon area. On 7 July [Korean Time], the UN Security Council Resolution on "The Creation and Operation of the United Command (S/1588)" was passed. It requested the US to designate the commander of the united forces. On 15 July [Korean Time], President Rhee relinquished his office as commander-in-chief for the duration of the Korean conflict (Syngman Rhee, 1950). All land, sea and air forces of South Korea were placed under the command of General MacArthur. On 1 August, General MacArthur visited Chiang Kai-shek in Formosa and they issued a joint communique. On 10 August, the US delegate, Warren Austin, stated that the goal of UN action was a unified Korea. On 15 September, MacArthur's forces landed at Inchon in the rear of North Korean forces. The US/UN counteroffensive began at the Pusan perimeter.

After MacArthur's landing at Inchon, Mao Tse-Tung in China sent five military officers to assess the military situation to North Korea. Mao perceived the inevitability of the PRC's intervention in the Korean War. On 21 September, Zhou En-lai hinted at China's intervention to India's ambassador in China, Panikkar. This, however, was not the first time China's decision-makers considered intervention. I now turn to the analysis of the Chinese intervention.

Summary

North Korea's invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950 [Korean Time] triggered a foreign policy crisis in the US. The threatened core values were: the "consequences" of the loss of South Korea, i.e., expansion of communist movements under control of the USSR; the UN collective security system; and US identity and reputation as a credible ally of non-communist countries.

At the first Blair House meeting on 25 June [Washington Time], US decision-

makers did not perceive the necessity of direct military intervention. They overestimated the military capability of South Korea, but underestimated that of North Korea. These misjudgments originated from the lack of information on both Koreas, caused by US underestimation of Korea as a strategically important area.

At the second Blair House meeting on 26 June [Washington Time], US decision-makers accepted the need to repel North Korean forces as quickly as possible. US support for South Korea was strengthened as US air and naval forces offered full support. Truman saw the North Korean invasion as a large-scale repetition of Soviet strategy which had been revealed in the Greek crisis of 1947 or the Berlin crisis of 1948-49. US decision-makers' belief that tolerance of aggression by Germany, Italy, and Japan had contributed to World War II convinced them not to appease the communists.

North Korea's rapid advance between 27 and 29 June [Korean Time] stimulated on 30 June [Washington Time] US decision-makers to send ground forces. MacArthur's telegram made it clear that there was a limited time for the US to respond. Persuaded that North Korea did not intend to withdraw, and that the USSR was behind the invasion, US decision-makers decided on "direct military pressure". This decision to use US ground forces in the Korean War was a clear-cut reversal of previous US policy in Korea, implemented in the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea in 1949. It was the critical factor in inducing Chinese intervention in the Korean War.

Case 2. CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR, 1950

In this section I deal with China's decision-making related to its intervention in the Korean War. I begin with China's pre-crisis period between June and mid-September 1950. The crisis decision-making period focused on the period between MacArthur's Inchon landing and mid-October 1950. As a background to this analysis, I consider why and how the US shifted its commitment from repelling North Korean forces into one of unifying Korea. This investigation is followed by analyses of Chinese decision-making related to the intervention; US failure to receive accurately the Chinese warnings; and US adherence to its commitment despite the Chinese intervention.

I. Pre-Crisis (June - mid September 1950)

On 27 June, President Truman publicly announced US policy with respect to the Korean crisis. He stated:

The attack upon Korea makes it plain...that communism...will now use armed invasion and war... In these circumstances, the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific area... Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa... I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland (American Foreign Policy, 1971: 2540).

China responded to this statement with a denunciation on the interposition of the US Seventh Fleet. Mao Tse-Tung immediately castigated US policy as an "open exposure by the United States of its true imperialist face" (T.L. Chang, 1951: 31-2, cited in Tsou, 1963: 561). On 28 June, Zhou En-lai condemned Truman's Taiwan containment order of the Seventh Fleet as "armed aggression against the territory

of China," declaring that Truman's decision was one more step in the "secret plans of American imperialism to seize all of Asia."¹⁸

Given Truman's explicit statement on the purpose of the neutralization of the Seventh Fleet, why did China criticize the US? Why could China not see that the US policy as clarified by Truman did not entail an invasion of China? First, Chinese leaders had a negative image of Western countries. Due to the colonial experience of China and other Asian countries, China retained a long-term hatred for the West. China saw the US policy of interposing the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait as a signal of the "new aggression of American imperialism in the Orient" (T.L. Chang, 1951: 32, cited in Tsou, 1963: 563). Second, China had a self-image as a leader among international communist movements. One important aspect of Chinese communist policy during this period was "joining with revolutionaries" in other countries (Steiner, 1958, cited in Tsou, 1963: 563). China therefore perceived a threat to its revolutionary interest (Tsou, 1963: 564). Third, during the early period of the Korean War, Chinese leaders were isolated from almost all the non-communist countries (Whiting, 1960: 26), and thus had no opportunity to revise their previous image of self, as well as that of non-communist countries. Any change in policy by the West was seen through China's perceptual prism and interpreted accordingly.

The US policy of interposing the Seventh Fleet in the Formosa Strait reinforced the Chinese negative image of the US. The sudden reversal of US policy on Taiwan and Korea, which contradicted Acheson's previous statement, discounted the credibility of Truman's intentions and confirmed Chinese leaders' opinion of the US as an imperialistic power (G. Chang, 1990: 78; Tsou, 1963: 562-3). The US did not foresee and assess the implication or significance of its Seventh Fleet policy on China.

Perceiving threats from a powerful enemy, China began to react to the perceived hostility of the US. On 30 June, based on the recommendations of China's top military leaders, Mao sent military observers to North Korea to assess the military situation. On 7 and 10 July, Zhou En-lai held a meeting of the Central Military Committee and decided to organize the North-East Localized Troops, which became

the major fighting forces during the Korean war. During the period of June-July 1950, Chinese authorities redeployed troops¹⁹ from Hu-Nan to Manchuria²⁰. They were trained under the slogan of "fight against US intervention in Taiwan and Korea" (B.J. Lee, 1990: 238; Farrar-Hockley, 1984: 289-90). By early July, China had completed its military preparations for both Taiwan and Korea and were waiting for the right moment of intervention (B.J. Lee, *ibid.*: 239). By the end of July, China perceived the expansion of the Korean War as an increased threat and began to consider seriously intervening. Information about the military situation in the Korean peninsula was gathered. On 5 August, China's Central Military Committee assembled to consult and assess the feasibility of intervention in August. At this time Chinese leaders anticipated that the US/UN forces would land somewhere along the western seashore of the Korean peninsula. Their emergency plan made it possible to intervene in August (B.J. Lee, 1990: 241).

This decision, however, was postponed to the end of September. On 18 August, China had accepted the inevitability of a clash with the US and ordered its North-East Localized troops to strengthen their war-readiness and to mobilize for intervention by the end of September (D.B. Park, 1990, cited in B.J. Lee, 1990: 241). At the same time, China carried out a "Hate America" campaign throughout the summer of 1950. In early September, China searched for alternatives to direct intervention²¹. On 5 September, Mao emphasized the risk of intervention. This implied that Chinese leaders were very cautious about intervention. Although they were preparing for a possible war with the US, Chinese leaders maintained strict self-control to avoid direct clashes with the US. MacArthur's Inchon-landing on 15 September, however, triggered a serious foreign policy crisis in China. Chinese decision-makers believed that the US would attack China in the near future. They perceived the inevitability of intervention in the Korean war (Chai and Zhao, 1989: 73). MacArthur's landing at Inchon changed the US/UN commitment as well.

II. International Crisis

II.1. US CHANGE IN ITS COMMITMENTS

On 15 September, MacArthur staged a landing at Inchon, near Seoul. Two weeks after MacArthur's successful landing, the North Korean forces were in full retreat and the US/UN forces had an opportunity to enter North Korea by crossing the 38th parallel²². President Truman stated previously that his initial goal was only to push the North Koreans back behind the 38th parallel (Memoirs, II: 341). On 7 October, however, US/UN troops entered North Korea just as the UN General Assembly was passing a resolution, which stated that all appropriate steps would be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea. This implied that the UN initial objective of repelling North Korean forces was abandoned and that the UN had adopted a new objective, unification of Korea by force if necessary (Whiting, 1991: 104). Despite the US hope of avoiding the expansion of the war and China's serious warning of intervention, US forces crossed the 38th parallel. How and why?

First, US decision-makers, before MacArthur's Inchon landing on 15 September, had already considered crossing the 38th parallel as a necessary condition of stability in Korea. In his memorandum to Nitze on 14 July 1950, Dulles wrote that there was the ever-present danger of war as long as the 38th parallel existed and that crossing it was the only option available to the US (FRUS, VII, 386-7; Warner, 1980: 102). In early August, some other US leaders also had the idea of crossing the 38th parallel²³ (Tsou, 1963: 569). One of them was MacArthur. MacArthur thought that the UN Resolution of 27 June gave him ample authority to cross the parallel. In his view, it would not be possible to secure his forces without such authority. MacArthur presented his view to the President, and on 27 September, Truman authorized MacArthur to destroy the North Korean forces and to conduct military operations north of the 38th parallel, provided there was no intervention by the Soviet Union or China (Memoirs, II: 360; Stueck, 1995: 89-90).

Second, after mid-September, US public opinion²⁴ in favor of striking North

Korean forces in order to unify Korea was too strong to resist (Lebow, 1981: 176). By this time, most US leaders also wanted a unified Korea. Korean unification per se was not considered vital to the US, but a complete victory over North Korean aggression at low-risk was the favored opinion (George and Smoke, 1974: 198). President Truman no doubt thought he was free to act because by September it was clear that the Soviet Union had no intention of intervening militarily. Truman felt he could win. The temptation of total victory was too strong to resist (Stoessinger, 1985: 79; Vadney, 1992: 148).

Third, the US underestimated China's strong motivation to resist if the US crossed the parallel. US leaders believed that intervention by China would weaken it domestically and internationally (Acheson's testimony). The US thus assumed that there would be no Chinese intervention. MacArthur had persuaded Truman that it was most unlikely that China would intervene in the Korean conflict. Virtually all US leaders then and later agreed that Chinese intervention was against China's interest. Their calculations of the possibility of Chinese intervention at this time was primarily focused on the Chinese national interest. China's leaders, however, acting from a Marxist viewpoint, were prepared to risk a general war if Western imperialism made conflict inevitable. What the US failed to grasp was the importance of the ideology which was embedded in Chinese leaders' mentality and which consequently determined Chinese foreign policy (Tsou, 1963: 579; Whiting, 1960). This will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section.

Fourth, the US stereotype of China was of a regime with no strong military capability. China was seen as "the sick man of Asia" that would not dare to challenge the US military operation (Tsou, 1963: 579). In addition, the US saw its relationship with China as amicable. Because of the US perception of the "traditional friendship" between the Chinese people and America, the US believed that China would accept its stated non-hostile intention in the crossing of the 38th parallel (George and Smoke, 1974: 217).

MacArthur's successful landing at Inchon offered the US a golden opportunity to achieve its goal, that of unifying Korea. A consensus among US leaders and the

populace had been reached on the question of striking at North Korea beyond the parallel. The US underestimation of Chinese commitment to protect its revolutionary interest; ignorance of Chinese policy reference based on ideology; and misunderstanding of the Sino-American relationship all decisively contributed to the US dismissal of the possibility of Chinese intervention and to the decision to cross the 38th parallel (G. Chang, 1990: 78; George and Smoke, 1974: 191-2; Stueck, 1981: 230-1).

The US decision to cross the 38th parallel was a significant departure from the Truman administration's containment policy, formulated in 1947 by George Kennan, and which had become the firm policy of the US. Both the US departure from the containment policy and the UN's new war objective implied a significant change in US/UN institutionalized commitment. China, however, completed consultation on intervention on the same day that the US forces entered North Korea (7/10/1950). What made China intervene? What was wrong with the US anticipation that China would not intervene? I now turn to these questions.

II.2. CHINESE DECISION-MAKING ON INTERVENTION

After MacArthur's landing at Inchon on 15 September 1950, China strengthened its commitment to intervention and did three things in order to meet a possible clash with the US.

First, China undertook a massive military build-up along their Korean border. In addition to the approximately 180,000 Chinese troops which were re-deployed in June and July, China began to re-deploy several more armies from the south. By October, the Chinese forces near the Korean border consisted of approximately 320,000 soldiers (Lebow, 1981: 173). Second, China intensified its quest for information. Mao sent five additional military officers to North Korea in order to assess the military situation there (D.B. Park, 1990, cited in B.J. Lee, 1990: 242). Third, China repeatedly warned the US of its intention to intervene. On 21 September, Zhou En-lai gave the Indian Ambassador, Panikkar, a hint that China would intervene if the U.S. crossed the parallel. The warning was reiterated on 25

September, in an unofficial meeting between a Chinese top military leader and Panikkar and transmitted to the US side. On 30 September, Zhou En-lai reconfirmed the Chinese commitment in public. At midnight, 2 October, Zhou strongly confirmed to Panikkar China's commitment, saying that if the US troops crossed the parallel, China would intervene (B.J.Lee, *ibid.*: 244-5).

On the same day, China held an extended consultation of the Politburo of the Party. A number of Chinese communist party and military leaders such as Zhou En-lai, Zhu De, Lin Biao, and Gao Gang were assembled. The conferees initially could not reach a consensus on the necessity of intervention. Zhou En-lai and Zhu De agreed with Mao who wanted intervention. Lin Biao, Gao Gang, and Ye Jianying, however, did not agree with Mao. They reasoned that another war could induce political instability and impose a heavier economic burden on China (Gittings, 1974: 184; Stueck, 1995: 98). They insisted that China, weary after 25 years of civil war, was not prepared to undertake an international war with the US. Compared with US fire power, modern weapons system and enormous potential, Chinese forces were far from adequate. They thus suggested that China should wait and prepare for at least 4 more months before intervening.

Zhou En-lai, however, recommended active intervention. In his view, the US attack on mainland China was possible from three points such as Taiwan, Vietnam, and Korea. Zhou thus considered it the best defense strategy to initiate a positive and active attack on the US if a clash was inevitable (cited in Hao and Zhai, 1990). After free discussion among the conferees, Mao finally decided to intervene in the Korean War. A day before this conference, Mao Tse-Tung had received a telegram from Kim Il Sung and Park Hun Young. In his telegram, Kim Il Sung pleaded for urgent support from China.

On 4 October, Mao called Peng Dehuai to Peking and explained the necessity of intervention. Mao's reasons were: (1) in practical terms, the US advance toward the Yalu river was intolerable. US forces adjacent to the Sino-Korean border would increase the threat to heavy industry in Manchuria, as well as to the Supoong water power house on the Yalu riverside. The US threatened Chinese industrial security;

(2) China, as a great power within the socialist group of countries, should live up to its position in the international communist movement and aid North Korea; and (3) in strategic terms, the US was limited in its Korean involvement by its military commitments throughout the globe. On the possibility of US use of nuclear power, Mao and General Nie Rongzhen believed that the Soviet Union also had nuclear power, that the effectiveness of using nuclear power would be low because the Chinese people was dispersed throughout the country, and that the determinant of victory in a war was not a weapons-system, but human resources (Ryan, 1989: 67; Whiting, 1960: 142).

By 7 October 1950, Chinese top decision-makers completed the process of decision-making regarding intervention. On the same day, the UN passed its resolution related to the crossing of the 38th parallel by UN forces. On 8 October, Mao Tse-Tung ordered General Peng to mobilize his forces, collaborate with North Korea and achieve victory in the Korean war. From that date Chinese intervention in the Korean war became an established fact. At the same time, Mao asked Kim Il Sung to send delegates to China to discuss the reinforcement of Chinese troops in North Korea (B.J. Lee, 1990: 245).

On 10 October, Mao sent Zhou En-lai to Moscow to request Soviet support of China's intervention in the war. Zhou met Stalin on 12 October. At this meeting, Stalin explained to Zhou the difficulty of Soviet support and turned down China's request for the support of the Soviet air force. Stalin agreed only to supplying a limited quantity of weapons (B.J. Lee, 1990: 245-6). Mao immediately held an emergency meeting of the Politburo on 13 October. The Chinese decision-makers agreed that, in spite of the difficulties, the intervention in the Korean War was necessary. There was a consensus that a North Korea occupied by the US would threaten Chinese Manchuria. On 19 October, Chinese troops secretly crossed the Yalu river and clashed with South Korean troops for the first time on 25 October.

In view of its military unpreparedness, what made China intervene in the Korean War? It should be recalled that China had considered intervention from the end of

July. It, however, continued to search for alternatives from July through early September and avoided direct clashes with the US. During this period, China experienced internal instability as well as the external threat from the US. The UN advance after MacArthur's successful Inchon landing operation convinced Chinese leaders of the heightened probability of war with the US and the need to cope with this external threat first.

In weighing the pros and cons of intervention, Chinese leaders were concerned with three national interests: security; China's industrial base in Manchuria; and its international prestige. Chinese decision-makers' perception that the US would attack China itself forced them to intervene. Facing US policy shifts in Korea, Mao Tse Tung suspected that the US would launch major and prolonged attacks against China (Camilleri, 1980: 35; Stueck, 1995: 100; Spanier, 1959: 87) after it had achieved its initial objective, i.e., unification of Korea by force on US terms. Whiting (1960: 152) argued that the security of industry in Manchuria was not the primary factor in determining intervention. However, in his recent interview with a reliable military source in China, Whiting learned that Mao was in fact concerned about the Manchurian industrial base and felt it necessary therefore to block US occupation of North Korea (Whiting, 1991: 115). The fear of losing China's industrial security was one of the major factors in deciding intervention. China, in addition, believed that it had nothing to lose if it intervened. Identifying the US as an imperialist power, China thought that a defeat would simply be a repetition of resistance against Japan. A stalemate with a powerful enemy would be a victory for China and a victory in a war against the US would raise China's international status (Chou Ch'ingwen, cited in Tsou, 1963: 578-9).

China's decision-making on intervention was not based solely on national interest, but also on national identity as a socialist country. Communist China saw the world as being divided between a socialist or anti-imperialist camp on the one hand and a capitalist or imperialist camp on the other (Whiting, 1960). China's confidence in victory was rooted in the communists' faith in the "scientific laws" of history which ensured the ultimate victory of socialism (Tsou, 1963: 578). Because

of this identification with socialist ideology, China could intervene in the war despite its sense of insecurity and inferiority.

China's image of the US as an imperialistic power and a long-term enemy contributed to China's intervention. Mao Tse-Tung did not want a border contiguous with a determined and powerful enemy. The mere presence of a powerful imperialist nation on China's doorstep was not to be tolerated because of the possibility of US exploitation of China's internal weakness (Lebow, 1981: 210; Rees, 1964: 113; Whiting, 1960: 150). As stated earlier, China viewed the US as a long-term adversary and feared that the nearer the enemy approached, the greater the opportunity for the enemy to capitalize on China's internal instability (Whiting, 1960: 158).

Chinese leaders perceived an intense time pressure (Paul, 1994: 92) to attack the US before it reached the Sino-Korean border. They acknowledged that the logistical demands made on their forces placed them in jeopardy, especially in winter. To avoid a winter campaign, China had to intervene before winter. Chinese leaders thus recognized that time constraints must influence their response to the crisis. Given the necessity of protecting national interest and identity, and of barring the US approach to the Sino-Korean border, along with a time limit to respond, China considered that a surprise attack was the best strategy to overcome its insufficient military preparedness (Paul, 1994: 92-93). The CPV (Chinese People's Volunteers) began secretly to cross the Yalu river on 19 September.

Chinese decision-making on intervention in the Korean War shared similarities with those of the US. First, just as the US did not intervene for the survival of South Korea, China did not intervene for North Korea per se but for the political and strategic importance of the existence of a North Korea. To lose North Korea was perceived as having a powerful enemy (i.e., the US) on China's border. Just as a North Korean victory over South Korea was perceived by the US as a direct threat, so China perceived a South Korean victory over North Korea as a direct threat to its security. Second, just as Truman drew historical parallels when he faced the North Korean attack, China saw US advances as a repetition of Japan's conquest

of China in the past. The US was perceived as a substitute for Japan in the Far East (Tsou, 1963: 577; Whiting, 1985: 73). Third, just as the US policy on North Korea was framed within the context of its rivalry with the Soviet Union, so too Chinese decisions were strongly influenced by its long-term rivalry with the US.

What made China perceive a threat from the US commitment to unify Korea were its security concerns, coupled with the image of the US as the foremost imperialist power. China saw the US as a designated enemy. Why was this so?

Because of some 50 years of non-Chinese rule under the Japanese, Chinese leaders had a strong tendency to resist any indications of penetration by foreigners (Whiting, 1960: 2-6). The US was seen as another imperialist power that should be blocked before it invaded China. The image of the US as an imperialist nation was based not only on ideology but on the Chinese interpretation of the Sino-American relationship. Chinese leaders considered that the US had pursued a consistently aggressive policy against China throughout the nineteenth century. This perception was aggravated by US support of the Formosa regime during the Chinese civil war (G. Chang, 1990: 79; Tsou, 1963: 578). Chinese antagonism against the US had been building up for over a century.

The Chinese negative image of the US was worsened by the change in US policy. Truman's explicitly stated goal of US/UN forces, that of repelling North Korean forces beyond the 38th parallel, had now changed into one of crossing the parallel. This change in policy probably convinced the Chinese of US imperialist ambitions. While Truman stated, in a non-hostile manner, US limited aims in Korea, MacArthur was speaking belligerently against mainland China. The communist Chinese leaders discounted the reliability of Truman's intentions and were at a loss as to who in fact had power and authority in determining US policy toward China (Whiting, 1991: 117). Chinese leaders were perplexed by a series of policy shifts by the US. They wished to forestall any further shift which might embody a more direct threat to China (Ziegler, 1990: 61).

The neutralization of the Seventh Fleet in Taiwan Strait was equated with protecting the Formosa regime, the major enemy of the PRC. To aid its rival was

seen as an assault on China itself. The US commitment to give military aid to French troops fighting against the revolutionaries in Indochina was also perceived as an aggressive position toward the Chinese identity, a socialist country. The US rearming of Japan, China's major traditional enemy, could not be tolerated. In these circumstances, Truman's statement of non-hostility toward China was not given any credence by Chinese leaders (Stoessinger, 1985: 74).

II.3. US FAILURE TO PERCEIVE CHINA'S SIGNAL ACCURATELY

The day after South Korean forces entered North Korea (1/10/1950), Ambassador Panikkar issued warnings to the US side. Three days after US forces crossed the parallel, Zhou En-lai warned that China would not stand idly by if the US invaded North Korea. US officials dismissed Chinese warnings as bombast. At a meeting of Truman and MacArthur on 15 October at Wake Island, MacArthur stated that he was no longer fearful of Chinese intervention. On 19 October, when UN forces entered Pyongyang, US top officials, including Truman and Acheson, were unanimous in their conclusion that Chinese intervention was unlikely. On that very day, however, the Chinese Fourth Field Army crossed the Yalu River in secret.

Why did the US fail to recognize the validity of the Chinese warnings? Contrary to the Chinese perception of the US as a long-term antagonist, the US perception of the Sino-American relationship was one of long-standing friendship (Stoessinger, 1985: 73). Acheson was convinced that China would not intervene in the Korean War because China would recognize US concern for China's territorial integrity (Lebow, 1981: 209). He and his colleagues believed that US friendly intentions vis-a-vis China would be transmitted to Chinese leaders. Dulles stated that the US had acted for 150 years as a friend of China, and had supported the political and territorial integrity of China. Dulles accepted the premise of a stable and lasting friendship between China and the US²⁵. The US image of China was based on a previous and now invalid perception of the US relationship with China. Prior to the Korean War, the US perceived its relationship with China as one of enduring friendship based on mutually common interests (Lebow, 1981: 227).

In his assessment of the possibility of Chinese intervention, MacArthur concentrated solely on Chinese military capability. He thought that the timing and military preparedness of China precluded its intervention. The underestimation of Chinese capability enhanced US confidence when assessing its own military capability, especially in air power (Tsou, 1963: 575). MacArthur underestimated Chinese military capability and did not take Panikkar's warning seriously. Panikkar was also disbelieved by Truman for whom Panikkar was not an impartial mediator, having been in the past, on the side of China (Truman, Memoirs, I: 362; Ziegler, 1990: 61-2).

The new commitment of unifying Korea prevented the US from searching for alternatives after receiving the Chinese warnings. Once the commitment of unifying Korea was made public on 7 October, the reversal of that policy was seen as a threat to US national interest, that is, a serious loss of prestige (De Rivera, 1968: 146). The commitment itself made US leaders insensitive to other information which did not fit their policy framework²⁶. The commitment also engendered wishful thinking. After the decision to cross the 38th parallel was taken, US leaders received some indications from a variety of sources that their policy was based on erroneous assumptions. They, however, discounted the warnings and relied instead on the assurances of advisors that all would turn out as they wished (Lebow, 1981: 169).

III. After the Chinese Intervention

Despite the Chinese intervention, the US commitment to unifying Korea was neither reassessed nor changed (Whiting, 1991: 109). Rather it was strengthened by a changing image of China (Jervis, 1980: 582). When China intervened, the US perceived the intervention not as a Chinese reaction to US involvement but as heightened armed aggression by the communist camp (Jervis, *ibid.*: 579).

In its 6 November report, the CIA stated that China was engaged in a build-up of its combat power to check US forces and that there was a danger of the situation

getting out of control, and leading to general war (CIA, NIE-2, 6/11/1950). By 9 November, all the US decision-makers knew that the Chinese were deeply involved in the Korean War. MacArthur, however, on 24 November 1950, announced his end-the-war offensive and his forces advanced to the Yalu River. This triggered the massive Chinese full-scale offensive against the UN forces on 26 November. The US had not recognized how much China perceived a threat to its security if the US advanced to the Yalu river. US leaders continued to believe that China must be aware of US non-hostile intentions (Jervis, 1980: 583). After great military difficulties and the loss of Seoul for the second time, a stable defensive line was finally established.

Given the information on the presence of Chinese forces in Korea, why did the US advance to the Yalu River? The answer lies in the US institutionalized commitment which was primarily represented by a directive to General MacArthur. In the October 9th directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General MacArthur, US decision-makers gave MacArthur considerable discretion for operational decisions in Korea. It reads:

Hereafter in the event of open or covert employment anywhere in Korea of major Chinese Communist units, without prior announcement, you should continue the action as long as, in your judgment, action by forces now under your control offers a reasonable chance of success (Whiting, 1991: 105, Emphasis mine).

President Truman was seriously concerned about MacArthur's insufficient attention to the Chinese military build-up in Manchuria and the possibility of Chinese intervention (Harriman, 1977: 233). Truman himself, however, was trapped in his definition of the role of President. He noted:

What we should have done is to stop at the neck of Korea... But [MacArthur] was commander in the field. You pick your man, you've got to back him up... I got the best advice I could and the man on the spot said this was the thing to do...So, I agreed (Memoirs, II:383-4).

As George and Smoke (1974: 192) argued, the difficulty of controlling MacArthur was a partial consequence of Truman and his advisors' decisions. Both the reluctance to reverse the goal of unifying Korea and the giving of considerable latitude in military operations to MacArthur were major factors in the US decision to launch a massive offensive after China intervened.

Summary

China began to consider intervening in the Korean War at the end of June 1950 when Truman stationed the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese intervention was considered more seriously at the end of July. On 5 August, China assessed the possibility of intervention in August. By mid-August, China had accepted the inevitability of a clash with the US. Although increasing its war preparations, China understood the risk of intervention in early September and sought an alternative to direct intervention. However, MacArthur's Inchon landing (15 September) enabled South Korean forces to advance northward. This very serious change in the military situation fixed China's determination to intervene.

From 2 through 7 October 1950, China completed its decision-making on intervention. With the US advance, China perceived a serious foreign policy crisis that threatened its industrial security in Manchuria, as well as its Supoong water power installation on the Yalu riverside. Strategically, to lose North Korea was equated by Chinese decision-makers with having an imperialist power on its doorstep. The Chinese national identity as a socialist country and a powerful communist leader in Asia were other important factors leading to China's decision to intervene. China perceived a time limit in order to avoid a possible winter campaign. China's negative image of the US as an imperialist enemy had deep roots in its perception of Sino-American relations in the past. This perception was aggravated by the US support of the Formosa (Taiwan) regime during the Chinese civil war and by frequent shifts of US policy during the Korean War. Thus the US military advance

constituted a primary threat to China.

Contrary to the Chinese perception of its relations with the US, the latter saw their relations as friendly. This naive perception; the underestimation of China's military capacity; and the new US commitment of unifying Korea by force, led the US to dismiss China's repeated and serious warnings of intervention.

The Post-War Period: IMPACT OF THE KOREAN WAR

The Korean War ended on 27 July 1953 when the cease-fire was signed by the major actors: the US, China and North Korea. The cease-fire process will be treated in Chapter 5 which deals with accommodation attempts. In this section I consider the impact of the Korean War on the international system, as well as on South Korea and North Korea. I concentrate specifically on the two Koreas' identity and interest; their perception of self and of each other; and the institutionalized commitments that grow out of the relations between these mutually hostile states.

I. The International System

From 1945 to the onset of the Korean War, the Western bloc led by the US and the Eastern bloc led by the Soviet Union had experienced a protracted conflict composed of a series of crises (e.g., Greece-Turkey crisis, 1947; Berlin Blockade, 1948), resulting in a high degree of conflict between the superpowers and their satellites (Jervis, 1980; Ziegler, 1990: 45-55). In these circumstances, the Korean War developed from a civil war in a strategically neglected area into an international war in which the US and China were engaged.

The Korean War introduced Chinese leaders to the deadly but effective power of the modern weaponry which the US used against the People's Volunteers (G. Chang, 1990: 79). Consequently China, right after the Korean War, initiated a policy of modernization of its military forces. Chinese leaders no longer believed that Chinese forces, with inferior equipment, could withstand a superior technology. Under the guidance of General Peng, China decided to upgrade its army with modernized standard equipment, to institute a conscriptive recruiting system, and to develop a select and well-trained officer corps (Farrar-Hockley, 1984: 303).

After the Chinese intervention, US leaders' perception of China was one of a hostile regime. The American perception of the communist bloc as a rival camp to be strongly contained on a global level was reinforced. After the war, the US vastly increased its defense budget at home. It led the militarization of NATO, signifying a commitment to build up more powerful forces capable of resisting a Soviet attack. The Western countries' perception of the Sino-Soviet communist bloc became more negative, and anti-communist movements spread on a global scale (Jervis, 1980: 579-80).

As a result of the Korean War, China became a militarily powerful state in the international system and especially in the Far Eastern regional system. The Chinese ground forces and the US's naval and air forces created and maintained a balance of power in the Far East. This tension turned the Korean peninsula into a hot spot for politico-military struggles between East and West blocs and for the Cold War (Jervis, 1980; Tsou, 1963: 588-9).

II. South Korea

II.1. IDENTITY AND INTEREST

The Korean War was an internecine war, giving rise to South Korean skepticism toward the concept and reality of 'nation' or national consciousness. South Koreans observed first hand that ideology took precedence over nation and that national community could be abandoned in favor of ideology (T.H. Kim, 1990: 69-70). Democracy became the ideology with which South Koreans identified themselves. After the Korean War, South Koreans bonded together for democracy despite President Rhee's autocratic methods (The Economist, 25/8/1956)²⁷. Because of their perception of national insecurity and the threat from North Korea, South Koreans came to be more tolerant of Rhee's authoritarian regime.

The experience of the North Korean invasion forced Syngman Rhee's government to give precedence to the politico-military issue rather than to economic

reconstruction. According to a content analysis of President Rhee's speeches on national policy, governmental emphasis on the politico-military issue of anti-communism had increased from 25% in 1948 to 33.7% in 1953, 53.2% in 1956, and 54.7% in 1960, whereas economic reconstruction did not receive much attention. The South Korean government devoted to economic problems only 23.7% in 1948, 22.1% in 1953, 32.6% in 1956 and 29.5% in 1960 (S.J. Kim, 1990: 102). South Korea's national interest priority was its security.

II.2. PERCEPTION OF SELF AND OF ENEMY

After the founding of the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Syngman Rhee's government identified itself as the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula. This conviction was embedded in its constitution, stating that liberal democracy was the basis of politics, that capitalism was the foundation of the economy, and that this politico-economic system should be expanded into North Korea. This South Korean self-identity as a democratic-capitalist state was further invigorated by the Korean War (S.W. Rhee, 1986: 671).

Before the Korean War, many South Korean intellectuals were communist sympathizers. The war, however, radically changed their image of communists. The older generation that experienced the war became imbued with strong anti-communist feelings and hatred for North Korea. These emotions and attitudes had a powerfully negative influence on both Koreas' accommodation attempts in later days (B.Y. Ahn, 1988: 409; S.W. Rhee, 1986: 671-2). Many South Koreans came to detest Communist North Korea even more than the Soviet Union or Red China because of the North Korean invasion²⁸ of its own people (S.S. Park, 1991: 303-4).

II.3. INSTITUTIONALIZED COMMITMENTS

The North Korean invasion of South Korea, coupled with South Korea's perception of itself and of North Korea, strengthened South Korean institutionalized commitments to defeat North Korea. South Korean commitments were implemented through education, economic development, a mutual security treaty with the US and

a no-contact policy toward communist countries.

Anti-communism became not mere political propaganda but a principal value, an ethos, for political socialization and school education (S.J. Kim, 1990). Syngman Rhee's government set educational goals such as anti-communism, defense education, and a spirit of self-sacrifice for the nation (C.B. Bae, 1989: 69; M.K. Kang, 1989: 255-6). Education for anti-communism was directed towards producing a fighting-spirit in a populace that could defeat the enemy, communist North Korea (C.B. Bae, 1989: 71). Anti-communism in South Korea was further reinforced after Park Chung Hee's coup in 1961. In his Revolution-Pledge, Park Chung Hee declared that anti-communism was uppermost in national policy; that South Korean anti-communism, formerly rhetoric, should be re-vitalized; and that a national capability which could defeat communism was essential. With respect to political education, Park Chung Hee established three goals: (1) annihilating espionage and the infiltration of North Korean agents; (2) reconstructing South Korean consciousness; and (3) conquering poverty (C.B. Bae, 1989: 79). Park's commitment to anti-communism was reinforced by a tough intelligence system such as KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) in order to facilitate the anti-Communist National Security Law²⁹ (B.Y. Ahn, 1988: 415; D.S. Suh, 1988: 227).

The Korean War stimulated South Korean commitment to economic development led by the state (B.Y. Ahn, 1988: 414). The South Korean leaders, especially Park Chung Hee, thought that strong economic prosperity was essential to win North Korea as well as to gain international prestige. In the South Korean leaders' view, being defeated by North Korea in economic competition represented the victory of socialism over capitalism. Such a demonstration of economic success by North Korea could provide a rationale, in propaganda terms, for the communization of South Korea (S.S. Park, 1991: 307-308)³⁰.

Right after the Korean War, South Korea safeguarded its security by concluding a Mutual Defense Treaty³¹ with the US on 1 October 1953. The treaty declared that South Korea and the US made "common determination to defend themselves against external armed attack..."; that the parties will "consult together

whenever...security of either of the [P]arties is threatened by external armed attack" (Article II); that when "an armed attack in the Pacific area on either of the [P]arties" happened each party "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" (Article III); and that South Korea granted the US "the right to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about the territory of the Republic of Korea...(Article IV)". The Mutual Defense Treaty became the basis of South Korea's security and diplomacy (C.W. Chung, 1988: 331) and was a controversial issue in later inter-Korean or North Korea-US crises.

South Korea, now bound in a close relationship with the US, strengthened two other policies. Firstly, it avoided any contact with North Korea, with other communist countries, and with non-communist countries friendly to North Korea. This was because South Korea did not recognize the legal status of North Korea as a state. Secondly, South Korea made efforts to win support from the international community (S.S. Park, 1991: 308-9).

III. North Korea

III.1. IDENTITY AND INTEREST

Throughout the Korean War, North Korea failed to achieve its goal, a unified and communized Korea. The Soviet Union's aid to North Korea during the war was not satisfactory, whereas the alliance between South Korea and the US was strengthened by the war. These environmental changes compelled North Korea to redefine its identity and interest.

North Korea re-defined its self-identity as a base for the Korean socialist revolution (Kim Il Sung, 1978: 365). The US/UN and South Korea were confirmed as major adversaries which must be defeated. South Korea had to be eliminated as a puppet of the imperialistic US in order to achieve the socialist revolution throughout the entire Korean peninsula. To accomplish this, powerful politico-

economic-and military capabilities were required, and were regarded as decisive factors in achieving North Korea's primary goal: a unified and communized Korea (C.K. Kang, 1991: 81).

This referential framework for North Korean policy grew out of the North's assessment of the Korean War. From the Korean War experience, Kim Il Sung stated (1) that anyone with a strong Juche (self-identity or self-reliance) could defeat an imperialistic enemy in spite of his powerful armaments; (2) that national liberation and world peace could be achieved and maintained only through relentless struggle; and (3) that the determinant of victory in war did not reside in techno-military superiority, but in the force of a united population (The Korean Labour Party, 1979: 396-397). The purpose of these arguments was to consolidate and strengthen North Korean identity and commitment in the struggle against the US and eventually to occupy South Korea's territory.

III.2. PERCEPTION OF SELF AND OF ENEMY

North Korean leaders diagnosed the causes of their failure to unify Korea as the intervention of the imperialist US and the UN; the ineptness of South Korean guerrillas who were supposed to collaborate with North Korean forces in the invasion; and the shortage of modern weapons and war planes (B.S. Kim, 1986: 64-5). North Korea, furthermore, found that it did not have the revolutionary support of people in South Korea. The Korean War was very likely influential in revising the North Korean self-image (S.W. Rhee, 1986: 673-4) from one of a state that could easily occupy and communize South Korea into one that was far from being able to attain that goal.

Various factors contributed to this revision of North Korea's image of South Korea: (1) the South Korean forces' high morale and indomitable fighting spirit during the war; (2) the failure of South Korean uprisings when North Korean forces invaded; and (3) the strength of democracy in South Korea after the war. As a result, North Korean behavior toward South Korea became very cautious (S.W. Rhee, 1986: 674).

The Korean War reinforced the North's negative image of the US as an imperialist enemy. As stated earlier, the US Military government in South Korea after Korean independence in 1945 was interpreted by North Korea as a forced occupation by the ringleader of imperialism. The Military Government's suppression of the South Korean rebellions of 1946, 1948 and 1949 was regarded as a manifestation of US willingness to colonize South Korea. Anti-Americanism thus was well-rooted in North Korea before the Korean War. The Korean War simply gave concrete evidence of North Korea's enemy image of the US (C.K. Kang, 1991: 194-5).

After the Korean War, both Koreas came to see the other as a de facto, if not a legal, state. Nevertheless, both North Korea and South Korea still retained the belief that the other's territory should be occupied. From then on, both Koreas ceased to view their relationship in intra-Korean terms. They became inter-state rivals. This perception of their new relationship was characterized by a zero-sum game. Both Koreas made efforts to surpass the other in every sphere: security, economy, and politico-diplomatic relations.

III.3. INSTITUTIONALIZED COMMITMENTS

The Korean War was a devastating experience for North Korea because of its failure to unify the peninsula, as well as the massive destruction it suffered. After the Korean War, North Korea thus strengthened or changed its policies toward education, unification and security, economic prosperity and politico-diplomatic relations (D.S. Suh, 1990b: 381-2, 405).

North Korean efforts to establish self-identity had been pursued in their education system. On 1 April 1955, Kim Il Sung proposed to strengthen education for class consciousness in order to imbue North Korean labour, workers and communist party members with socialist determination in the class struggle against bourgeois capitalism (Kim Il Sung, 1955a: 119-25). On 20 November 1958, Kim Il Sung outlined the kind of education needed to build communism. He argued that socialism or communism was superior to capitalism; that North Korea should

eliminate individualism and egoism; and that North Koreans should adopt socialist patriotism, proletarian internationalism and revolutionary fervor (Kim Il Sung, 1958: 155-60). North Korean efforts to inculcate its self-identity was also clearly manifested in Kim Il Sung's address on independence in August 1966. He stated that independence could only be maintained through the nation's strength and through the Koreanization of Marxism-Leninism. This policy was later embodied in North Korea's foreign policy toward the Soviet Union and China. In 1955 and in October 1966, Kim Il Sung declared North Korean political independence from the Soviet Union and China which came to recognize North Korea's self-reliant identity (cited in M.H. Heo, 1990b: 395).

Although North Korea until today has sustained its doctrine of 'Socialist Revolution throughout the Entire Korea' as the basis for its unification policy (W.K. Choi, 1993), the Korean War forced North Korea to change the means of unification from open attack or outright military action to subversion, terrorism or insurgency. After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung did not mention unification for over ten years (D.S. Suh, 1990b: 401-4). Kim Il Sung, however, seriously began to discuss reunification at the 8th plenum of the 4th Central Committee in February 1964. On the last day of the plenum, 27 February, three necessary forces to achieve reunification were emphasized and adopted as a policy. These three forces were: (1) the revolutionary force of the North, (2) the revolutionary force of the South, and (3) the international force. Kim emphasized that various South Korean revolutionary organizations should unite, and that liberation of the South Korean people was the primary task of the North Korean Communist Party (D.S. Suh, 1990b: 401).

The Korean War facilitated North Korean efforts to institute a socialist mode of production throughout the country by August 1958. The total destruction and starvation caused by the Korean War forced farmers to collaborate with each other and to share the limited quantity of farming tools, manpower, and farmland. This necessitated the setting up of 'cooperative farms', a necessary feature of the socialist mode of production. North Korean authorities reinforced this agrarian revolution by indoctrinating the farmers with socialist thought and class consciousness

(C.K. Kang, 1991: 185).

Case 3. THE JANUARY 21 AND PUEBLO CRISIS, 1968

In this section I deal with two crises: the January 21 crisis and the Pueblo crisis, which occurred almost simultaneously. I provide a summary of the two crises within the context of North Korea which triggered them. An analysis of the two crises follows. Greater attention is given to the Pueblo crisis because it led to an international crisis. The impact of the two crises is then investigated.

Brief description and significance of the crises

The January 21 crisis of 1968 occurred when North Korea's 31-member Commando unit reached South Korean President Park Chung Hee's residence in order to assassinate him and his aides³². This daring raid was the most threatening assault by North Korean agents since North Korea intensified its subversive activities in 1967. Furthermore, it was the first time that they had succeeded in reaching Seoul from the border. The crisis engendered by this raid was perceived by South Korea as a serious threat to its security.

Two days after the January 21 crisis, the Pueblo crisis took place. It occurred when North Korea seized the USS Pueblo, a US Navy intelligence collection ship, in the Wonsan Bay in the Sea of Japan. Eighty-three crewmen, which included 6 officers, 75 enlisted men, and 2 civilians, were on the ship. The pattern of North Korean attacks up to 1967 had been primarily against South Korea. The Pueblo crisis, however, was a direct confrontation between North Korea and the US (Lentner, 1969: 57). The Pueblo incident posed a foreign policy crisis to the US because of US prestige as a superpower and of the survival of 83 Americans.

Background

In the previous section, I have dealt in part with the impact of the Korean War on North Korea in terms of national identity, interest, perception and institutionalized commitments. In this section, the relevance of this legacy with the January 21 and Pueblo crises will be treated in greater detail.

Following the Korean War, Kim Il Sung had imposed his Juche idea on the politics of North Korea. Juche literally means an autonomy based on self-identity. Under Kim Il Sung's regime, Juche can be interpreted as an attempt to solve all North Korea's problems unilaterally by using North Korean methods (S.S. Cho, 1969: 36). Kim Il Sung stated in December 1955 that Juche was the foundation of North Korean policy. Juche was also a personal strategy for Kim, who was trying to project an image of independence from the USSR and China. In short, Kim was trying to Koreanize Marxism-Leninism. Kim Il Sung tried to consolidate the populace of North Korea by emphasizing Korean nationalism and the Koreanization of Communism. The Juche policy was strengthened again in 1957 when Kim took an independent line in opposition to that of the USSR. From then on, North Korean Soviet relations deteriorated.

On 16 May 1961, a military coup occurred in South Korea. The new military government manifested itself as strongly anti-communist. "Unification through victory over communism" policy was adopted (Park Chung Hee, 1971: 97-99). The South's commitment, for example, was represented by a new "Anti-Communist Law" which was enacted on 3 July 1961. Before the coup, the US and Japan had signed a new "US-Japan Security Treaty" on 19 January 1960. Perceiving threats from the South's anti-communism and the US-Japanese mutual security pact, Kim Il Sung immediately signed cooperation and mutual assistance treaties with the USSR and China on 6 and 11 July 1961, respectively. Furthermore, in the 4th Plenum of the Korean Workers' Party Congress on 11 September 1961, Kim Il Sung declared that the North Korean "peaceful unification policy" was to be replaced by a "violent

revolution policy."

South Korea's strong anti-communism also provoked North Korea to adopt a new military policy in the Party Central Committee Congress on 10 December 1962 (B.C. Koh, 1969a: 270; J.C. Baek, 1986: 111). A new four-pronged military policy was adopted: (1) arming all the people; (2) turning the entire country into a fortress; (3) converting the entire army into an army of cadres; and (4) modernizing the entire army from top to bottom. This new military direction became the basis of the entire North Korean military strategy (J.C. Baek, 1989: 326). North Korea organized 'Worker-Peasant Red Guards.' Meanwhile by 1962, North Korean-USSR relations were worsening.

In 1964, North Korea began to concern itself again with the reunification of Korea, by adopting a policy to strengthen the revolutionary forces in both North Korea, South Korea, and the international society³³. This implied first a political, economic, and military reinforcement of the existing revolutionary base in North Korea. Kim Il Sung also thought that North Korea might lose the opportunity to unify the Korean peninsula if there was no strong revolutionary force in the South. Finally, Kim believed that it was essential to unite all the socialist countries in support of North Korea's unification policy. He also wished to strengthen North Korea's international prestige (J.C. Baek, 1989: 335-6).

South Korea, in 1965, was perceived by Kim Il Sung as a threatening entity to be deterred as well as a territory to be united by socialist revolution. During these days, Kim Il Sung perceived that South Korea's strong anti-communism and the existence of US forces in South Korea were great obstacles to guerrilla war and socialist revolution in South Korea³⁴. Having accepted the necessity of a South Korean revolution, Kim Il Sung had interpreted South Korean strikes and demonstrations against the South Korean government as evidence of the socialist movement. For example, during the period of April through August 1965, there had been numerous demonstrations by opposition parties and students in South Korea. The demonstrations were undertaken to prevent the South Korean government from signing a Normalization Treaty with Japan. The opposition parties, however, were

not communists or socialist revolutionaries. Kim Il Sung, however, was ignorant of this fact (D.S. Suh, 1988: 227-31).

Nevertheless, Kim Il Sung perceived South Korea as a serious threat. The militant anti-communist South Korean government decided in 1965 to send troops to the Vietnam War. To Kim Il Sung, this act was a clear manifestation of US-South Korea's strong military alliance against communist countries. Another serious challenge to the North was South Korea's successful first Five-Year Economic Plan of 1962-6 (B.C. Koh, 1969: 274-5). Ever since 1965, Kim Il Sung believed and continuously insisted that the US and South Korea were preparing a new war against North Korea (ibid.: 271). On 11 February, USSR's Kosygin visited North Korea to sign a treaty, which implied that North Korea could rely militarily on the USSR.

North Korea's image of South Korea persisted until 1966. Rodong Shinmun (12/8/1966), in its editorial, urged a reinforcement of the revolutionary forces in South Korea and a formation of a 'national liberation front.' From 5 to 12 October 1966, the 14th Plenary meeting of the 4th Central Council of the NKLP (North Korean Labour Party) was held. At this meeting, Kim Il Sung insisted that South Korea and the US posed a new war threat to North Korea; that North Korea would abandon its peaceful unification policy; and that a six-member presidium would be created in order to cope with the North Korean crisis and to achieve North Korean goals.

Meanwhile US President Johnson visited South Korea on 31 October 1966. His visit was compared by North Korea with John Foster Dulles' visit to South Korea in 1950 (Burchett, 1968). The North Korean change of military policy and South Korean economic success, coupled with Johnson's visit, aggravated North Korean aggressive behavior towards the South. From August 1966, Kim Il Sung had declared a firm commitment to his Juche ideology. He had denounced China and the USSR again and had encouraged an independent policy on the part of the minor socialist countries.

In March, 1967, the Central Committee of the Korean Labour Party decided to infiltrate guerrillas into South Korea. The opponents of this decision were purged

immediately. From early 1967 through 1968, USSR military assistance was increased dramatically. The 124th Unit of North Korean specialized troops, which was infiltrated to assassinate the South Korean president on 21 January 1968 was organized in July 1967. The 6th Plenum of the Central Party emphasized the importance of liberating South Korea in their lifetime. On 16 December, Kim Il Sung clarified 10 policy-lines of the DPRK, stating that North Korea's immediate concern was to help the revolutionary forces and assist the revolution in South Korea. He reiterated his conviction that North Korea embodied the Juche idea in every sphere, and re-affirmed the four-pronged military policy which was declared in 1962.

Just before the January 21 and Pueblo crises, Kim Il Sung was obsessed with the image of the US as an imperialist power which had plotted another war in the Korean peninsula for 18 years (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 83-5). Kim Il Sung's self-image was negative: isolation and powerlessness. Internationally, because of its Juche ideology, Kim Il Sung found himself isolated by the Sino-Soviet dispute (H. Chang, 1968: 455) and discovered that neither China nor the Soviet Union was a reliable ally (S.S. Cho, 1969: 36). Domestically, North Korea's retarded economy³⁵ as compared with that of the South created panic in Kim (Okai, 1968). Kim Il Sung desperately needed to prove himself the true leader of the Korean people (H. Chang, *ibid*).

In sum, because in 1964 North Korea had re-defined its national goal, which was the unification of Korea, it had continuously strengthened its institutionalized commitments to achieve this goal. For example, when it decided to infiltrate guerrillas into South Korea in 1967, the defense budget dramatically increased (See Table 4.1).

Table 4.1: The Ratio of North Korea's Defense Expenditure to the National Budget in Percentages (1953–1968)

YEAR	1953	1954	1955	1956
%	(15.2)	(8.0)	(6.2)	(5.9)
YEAR	1957	1958	1959	1960
%	(5.3)	(4.8)	(3.7)	(3.1)
YEAR	1961	1962	1963	1964
%	(2.6)	(2.6)	(1.9)	(5.8)
YEAR	1965	1966	1967	1968
%	(8.0)	(10.0)	(30.4)	(32.4)

Source: National Unification Board, cited in Jong Chun Baek, “[North Korea’s] Military Affairs: A Consistent Policy of Staying Predominant in Military Preparedness” in Sang Woo Rhee et al., *Forty Years of North Korea*, 4th ed., Seoul, Korea: Eulyu, 1989, 357.

THE JANUARY 21 CRISIS

I. South Korea's Foreign Policy Crisis

North Korea's attempt to assassinate President Park Chung Hee presented South Korea with the most serious threat to its security yet experienced, recalling the Korean War to South Koreans (Hanguk Ilbo, 26/3/1968, editorial). Although South Korea had experienced North Korea's intensified subversions since the end of 1966, the commando-type raid threw South Koreans into a panic and awakened them to the reality that South Korea was really vulnerable.

The January 21 crisis confirmed President Park in his belief that the goal and strategy of North Korea was the communization of the entire Korean peninsula through violence (Hanguk Ilbo, 2/2/1968). Top-ranking South Korean officials³⁶ reported to the Congress that the North planned to infiltrate a highly-trained guerrilla group of 15,000 into the South by 1970; that the North had a superior weapons system³⁷; that the North was supported by the Soviet Union; and that North Korea planned a bloody forced annexation in 1970 (Mainichi Daily News, 5/2/1968). Accordingly, North Korea was now seriously perceived by South Korea as preparing for another war in the Korean peninsula.

I.1. CRISIS DECISION-MAKING

To confront the January 21 crisis, the South Korean government considered an immediate retaliation. Perceiving that North Korean aggressiveness had increased dramatically³⁸ in the previous 14 months, South Korean decision-makers believed that timely preemptive strikes against one or more North Korean bases would be easier than coping with another future attack (S.S. Cho, 1969: 30). Dissatisfied with what he considered a lukewarm response to the Pueblo crisis of 23 January, President

Park told US Ambassador Porter that South Korean forces could occupy Pyongyang within two days³⁹. Because of South Korea's willingness to retaliate, a serious military clash appeared to be imminent (J.C. Baek, 1986: 112). The likelihood of war was heightened. South Korea's willingness to retaliate, however, was restrained by the US which was deeply involved in the Vietnam War and was reluctant to risk another war in Asia (S.S. Cho, 1969: 30).

I.2. SOUTH KOREA'S DEMANDS OF THE US: Security Guarantee

Two days after the January 21 crisis, North Korea seized the Pueblo. The US reacted initially by taking a firm stand. Subsequently, however, it began to turn its policy into a tepid and compromising posture, especially from late January onward. This sudden policy switch increased South Korea's perception of a serious threat to its national interest as well as identity.

The talks between the US and North Korea on the release of the Pueblo and its crew were secret and first hand. The January 21 crisis, however, was not discussed at all in the Pueblo talks. US indifference to the January 21 crisis was intolerable to South Korea because it was more threatening to national security than the Pueblo crisis⁴⁰. Representatives from South Korea were not allowed to participate in the talks about the Pueblo. The exclusion of South Korean representatives in the secret direct talks with North Korea were perceived by South Korea as de facto recognition of North Korea as a separate state (Far Eastern Economic Review, 22/1/1968). This was an unbearable affront to South Korean national identity, which considered itself the only lawful state in the Korean peninsula.

US diplomacy in the matter of the Pueblo crisis caused South Korea grave concern and aroused much skepticism regarding US commitment towards safeguarding South Korea's national security. Furthermore, China gave verbal support to North Korea on the Pueblo Crisis on 28 January (Mainichi Daily News, 30/1/1968). Perceiving threats to its security, South Korea abandoned its policy of retaliation against its enemy, North Korea, to one of getting assurance of security from its ally, the US.

South Korea wanted foremost to persuade the US to amend the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty⁴¹, signed by the US and South Korea on 1 October 1953. A major problem, among others, was Article III of the Treaty, which states that "it [each party of the treaty] would act to meet the common danger in accordance with constitutional processes". South Korean leaders considered Article III inadequate in a crisis situation because 'constitutional processes' would slow US reaction (S.S. Cho, 1969: 31; Hanguk Ilbo, 13/2/1968). South Korea accordingly requested that the US commit itself to rendering "immediate" support to South Korea in case of external aggression. In addition, South Korea desired the transfer of the operational control of South Korean forces from the UNC to its own government. It also asked for the build-up of South Korean forces' self-defense capacity, including the modernization of equipment (S.S. Cho, *ibid*; D. Hwang, 1968a: 300).

The South Korean government reasoned that mild reaction on the part of the US to North Korea's violence might encourage another onslaught by North Korea. Aware of the possibility of the recurrence of such incidents as the January 21 crisis, South Korea again declared that if there was to be no US firm security guarantee, or guarantee of collaborated retaliation against any future external aggression, South Korea would take unilateral action in self-defense measures in a few days (Hanguk Ilbo, 6/2/1968). The South Korean position was presented to the US. South Korea linked the present lukewarm policy of the US to the onset of the Korean War, followed by Acheson's statement on the exclusion of South Korea from the US defense line in the Far East (Hanguk-Ilbo, editorial, 9/2/1968).

In response to South Korea's discontent, President Johnson ordered Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Defense Secretary, to South Korea on 9 February to have talks on the "grave threats" to South Korea. In his telephone interview with Jack Anderson on 12 February, President Park of South Korea again insisted that if North Korea did not offer an appropriate apology, South Korea would retaliate. Park stated that it was not too late to retaliate (Hanguk Ilbo, 14/2/1968). After two talks between Vance and Park on 12 and 15 February, they issued a Joint Communiqué which stated that the US and the ROK would undertake "immediate consultation"

if the security of South Korea were threatened in the future, and that the two states would hold annual meetings at the National Defense Ministry level in order to consult on mutual security matters. In addition, there would be a \$100,000,000 increase in US military assistance to South Korea (Department of State Bulletin, 15/2/1968: 345). The communique, however, did not include South Korea's demand of "immediate but collaborated retaliation" against the external threat. This issue was discussed again later in the Park and Johnson talks.

On 17 April [Honolulu Time], 1968, South Korean President Park and US President Johnson met in Honolulu to discuss matters of common interest and mutual concern, including security issues. They issued a Joint Communiqué in which President Johnson reaffirmed the "readiness and determination" of the US to render "prompt and effective assistance" to repel attacks against South Korea. Johnson also agreed that continuous efforts to strengthen Korean and US forces were needed in order to be able to cope "effectively and swiftly with all contingencies" in Korea (Department of State Bulletin, 6/5/1968: 576). What was significant to South Korea in the communiqué was the US commitment of 'immediateness' should North Korea offer provocation in the future. Park Chung Hee was satisfied with US reaffirmation of the security of South Korea (Hanguk Ilbo, 20/4/1968).

THE PUEBLO CRISIS

I. Pre-Crisis

(9 - 23 January, Korean Time)

US leaders first interpreted North Korea's seizure of the Pueblo as a manifestation of the Cold War. President Johnson understood the incident as an attempt by Communists to divert South Korean and US military sources in Vietnam (NYT, 27/1/1968). Most conferees⁴² at the NSC (National Security Council)

meeting on 24 January 1968 agreed that it was deliberately plotted by North Korea after consultations with the Soviet Union, with the intent to weaken US strength in the Vietnam War⁴³.

The incident, however, took place in part as a result of US ignorance of North Korea's warnings on the Pueblo mission. It was reported by Sankei Shimbun that North Korea had warned on 9 January that it would take action if the Pueblo continued its intelligence activities beyond two weeks (Gallery, 1970). Washington had directed Adm. Ulysses S. Grant Sharp, Commander in Chief, Pacific, to be prudent. The directive, however, did not reach the Pueblo (NYT, 27/1/1968). Just before the last cruising, a radio broadcast from North Korea warned again that there would be drastic action against any ship found near its coast. Based on this broadcast, NSA (National Security Agency) sent a warning to the JCS that the Pueblo's mission was fraught with risk (Gallery, 1970: 12). This warning did not reach the top levels of staffs. The US ignored or did not take seriously North Korea's warnings. Exactly two weeks after North Korea's first warning on 9 January, the incident took place. Throughout this period, the Pueblo's activity and North Korea's warnings to the US exhibited an increased hostility.

II. International Crisis

(23 - 28 January, Korean Time)

II.1. US FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS

North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and its 83-member crew in Wonsan Bay on 23 January 1968, at 13:45 p.m., in Korean time (22 January, 11:45 p.m., Washington time). Given the protracted conflict with North Korea and the increased North Korean hostility towards South Korea and the US forces in South Korea in the previous eighteen months (Department of State Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 198), the US government viewed the North Korean action with the utmost gravity and seriousness (Department of State Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 190). The attack on an American vessel

constituted a blow to US national interest, in particular, its national prestige. US decision-makers faced a foreign policy crisis that possessed a finite response period (Lentner, 1974: 184; 1969: 56). During the initial stage of the crisis, the US took both military and diplomatic measures for the release of the Pueblo and its crew.

II.1.a. US Military Measures

On 22 January [Washington Time] at 2 a.m., Walt W. Rostow, Assistant to the President, gave the first report of the capture of the Pueblo by North Korea to President Johnson. The President ordered Rostow to hold a NSC meeting as soon as possible, and discussed the incident at the regular Tuesday strategy luncheon meeting on 23 January with Defense Secretary McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and other senior staff members (NYT, 24/1/1968). A JCS meeting was also held. The first US official reaction on the 23 January [Washington Time] described the situation as "very serious" and said that the US intended to take "grave measures"⁴⁴ to cope with the seizure of the Pueblo. To substantiate its resolve, the US diverted the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Enterprise, from a Vietnam-bound course and sent it into Wonsan Bay where North Korea had hijacked the Pueblo (Hanguk Ilbo, 25/1/1968).

North Korea publicly stated that it had seized an imperialist US ship which had been engaged in a provocative activity in North Korean territorial waters (Rodong Shinmun, 24/1/1968) which it interpreted as an invasion of its sovereignty and security. North Korea saw the Pueblo's activity in the context of its protracted conflict with US imperialism, and viewed the Pueblo's action as simply an extension of the violent behavior of an imperialist US throughout the previous 15 years (Rodong Shinmun, 9/2/1968).

The US held another NSC meeting at midday on the 24th [Washington Time]. Conferees were President Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary McNamara, CIA Director Helms, Chairman of the JCS, Wheeler and other top officials. At this meeting, bombing one or more North Korean military bases was considered (Hanguk Ilbo, 25/1/1968). In the afternoon, the meeting resumed in the

office of the Secretary of State. At this meeting, top decision-makers' perception of the possibility of Soviet collaboration with North Korea on the seizure of the Pueblo led them to consider coping with the crisis in a firm and resolute manner. A number of strategic options were discussed. Some were selected for recommendation to the President. Consideration was given to warning North Korea indirectly that the US was prepared to take drastic action, and that this could take the form of air strikes, retaliatory raids beyond the DMZ, and the quarantine and blockade of North Korean naval harbors. At this point, the US was committed to get the Pueblo back "by whatever means it takes" (State of Department Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 190).

II.2. NORTH KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS

While the top US decision-makers discussed the specific measures of crisis management, the US Navy's task force, led by the Enterprise and followed by the nuclear-powered destroyer Truxton and the frigate Halsey, was already north of the 38th parallel on the 24th (NYT, 26/1/1968). North Korea responded to the US military movement. It declared that the US had miscalculated, that the US would be punished if it continued to invade the sovereignty of North Korea, and that North Korea would resolutely retaliate against any US assault (Rodong Shinmun, 26/1/1968).

In spite of its bold rhetoric, North Korea clearly perceived a grave threat from the US. Kim Il Sung ordered the mobilization of the entire armed forces (Hanguk Ilbo, 26/1/1968). He was shocked by the US immediate and firm stance. Had North Korea anticipated the escalation of the crisis by the US, it might not have seized the Pueblo in the first place. At this juncture, US prompt reaction came as a surprise to North Korea (Gallery, 1970: 64). In addition, and contrary to US expectation of Soviet collaboration with North Korea, Kim Il Sung did not expect any external support from China or the USSR because his Juche doctrine had for too long emphasized North Korea's desire to operate in total independence (D.S. Suh, 1988: 233). Isolation from its allies could well have induced a panic reaction from North Korea.

II.3. ESCALATION

II.3.a. US Diplomatic Efforts

Nevertheless, the US approached North Korea on the diplomatic front. North Korea's Major General Pak Chung-kuk, however, at the 261st meeting of the MAC (Military Armistice Commission) at Panmunjom on 24 January [Korean Time] rejected the US demand for the immediate return of the Pueblo and its crews. He insisted that the US had infiltrated North Korean territory and that its allegations were false (Mainichi Daily News, 25/1/1968).

What the Panmunjom meeting illustrated was that each side considered the other a long-term enemy who threatened their security or that of an ally. US Admiral Smith insisted that North Korea had intensified its provocation, sabotage and assassination since 1967. North Korea's Pak Chung-kuk claimed that the recent hostile acts were linked to US imperialism and US provocation for a new war. North Korea, nevertheless, clarified three conditions for releasing the Pueblo and its crew: (1) US admission of its criminal intrusion; (2) an apology for the intrusion; and (3) an assurance of no further aggressive activities (Rodong Shinmun, 25/1/1968). Right after the meeting, the US asked North Korea for private negotiations on the incident. The US thought "secrecy" was essential if negotiation was to be effective (Brandt, 1969: 112). US diplomatic efforts were also concentrated on the Soviet Union but the USSR refused this first request to intercede (NYT, 25/1/1968). On 24 January, the Radio Pyongyang broadcast of North Korea said that Commander Lloyd Mark Bucher confessed⁴⁵ that the Pueblo had indeed made "deep intrusions" into North Korean waters.

II.3.b. Increased US Military Pressure (25 January)

Confronted with a deadlock in its diplomatic efforts, the US stepped up military pressure on North Korea in order to end the impasse. President Johnson stated on television on the 25th that seizure of the Pueblo was the climax in a whole series of aggressive violations over the past 15 months by North Korea. The President saw the

incident not as an accident but as a deliberate plot. After a White House breakfast meeting, Johnson ordered 14,787⁴⁶ Air Force and naval air reservists to active duty (NYT, 26/1/1968). Phil G. Goulding, the Pentagon spokesman, said the order had been recommended by the JCS and Defense Secretary, McNamara (NYT, 26/1/1968). Johnson's limited reserve call-up meant the activation of 372 fighters, bombers, reconnaissance and transport planes, which was a military preparedness not seen since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Department of State Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 192; Mainichi Daily News, 27/1/1968).

This military escalation was primarily precautionary, but it was also a signal to North Korea of the US firm intent to act (NYT, 26/1/1968). The White House also let it be known that an additional call-up of some Army and Marine Corps reservists was under consideration (NYT, 26/1/1968; Mainichi Daily News, 27/1/1968). The carrier Yorktown and a screen of destroyers were moving toward Wonsan Bay to join the carrier Enterprise and the guided-missile frigate Truxtun. The South Korean Army was on a full alert along the 151-mile DMZ. Combined with the January 21 crisis of two days before, the Pueblo crisis worried the US that North Korea was attempting another invasion of South Korea (Brandt, 1969: 112).

These preparations were the military alternative to diplomatic failure and consisted of (1) an attack on the Port of Wonsan, (2) seizure of a North Korean ship, (3) the bombing of North Korea, (4) blocking North Korean harbors, (5) demolishing the Pueblo at the risk of sacrificing the Pueblo and its crew, and other measures (Hanguk Ilbo, 26 & 27/1/1968). The US, however, was seriously concerned about two things: (1) that military escalation might provoke Chinese or Soviet intervention, resulting in a possible nuclear war and (2) that tension in the Korean peninsula might divert US military strength from Vietnam (Hanguk Ilbo, 26/1/1968). Two squadrons of US Air Force jet fighters, comprised of 36 aircraft, including F-4 Phantom and F-105 Thunderchief, based on Okinawa, Japan, were sent to South Korea (Hanguk Ilbo, 26/1/1968; Mainichi Daily News, 26/1/1968).

Nevertheless, the US continued its diplomatic efforts. On the afternoon of 25 January, after intensive consultation with his senior advisors, President Johnson

instructed Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg to request an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to consider the grave situation (State Department Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 192). A second attempt by Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson to enlist Soviet help did not have the appearance of success (Mainichi Daily News, 27/1/1968). Radio Moscow had said previously that North Korea was right to detain the Pueblo (cited in Asahi Evening News, 26/1/1968). During this phase, Japan also made an effort to get the Soviet Union's good offices for a peaceful settlement. Japan did not want new tensions in an area so close to her, and was thus not prepared to be an idle spectator (Asahi Evening News, 27/1/1968).

II.3.c. North Korea' Denunciation of the US (27 January)

US Secretary of State Rusk said suddenly on 26 January that the US had no fixed deadline for the return of the Pueblo and its crew (Asahi Evening News, 27/1/1968). Although Johnson emphasized that the US military was prepared for any contingency that might arise in Korea (Asahi Evening News, 27/1/1968), he reiterated that the US would continue its diplomatic efforts to solve the crisis peacefully.

US diplomatic efforts on 26 January were concentrated on the UN Security Council, the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross), and on Poland. In the UN, the Soviet representative, Morozov, argued that the main obstacles to peace in Korea were the presence of US forces and the US fleet, and he claimed that the UN could not and should not debate the Pueblo incident. The Soviet argument reflected the position of North Korea. On behalf of the US, Arthur Goldberg said that the capture of the Pueblo was "an act of wanton lawlessness" and that it would be intolerable if the Security Council refused to deal with the crisis (Brandt, 1969: 113; Mainichi Daily News, 28/1/1968). The US also requested that the ICRC establish contact with the Red Cross of North Korea. US Ambassador John A. Gronouski also asked Jozef Winiewicz, the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister, for help in obtaining the release of the Pueblo and its crew (Mainichi Daily News, 29/1/1968). Poland was a member of the NNSCK (Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission on Korea) which had been established after the 1953 truce.

On the other hand, the US continued its precautionary military preparations. It was reported that the guided missile cruiser Canberra and the aircraft carrier Yorktown were scheduled to join the US Navy task force (NYT, 28/1/1968; Mainichi Daily News, 29/1/1968). A spokesman for South Korea confirmed that additional US reinforcements for the contingent of 18 fighter-bombers had followed the transfer of 36 jet fighters (NYT, 28/1/1968). General Charles H. Bonesteel III, commander-in-chief of the UNC (United Nations Command) in Korea, said the UNC was "fully determined" and "capable" of meeting any North Korean action (Mainichi Daily News, 29/1/1968).

On 27 January [Korean Time], the North Korean government clarified its position on the Pueblo crisis. In the statement, North Korea interpreted the incident in the context of a protracted conflict with the US and declared that the imperialist US had destroyed "systematically" the Korean armistice agreement by perpetrating "continued" military provocations against North Korea. North Korea accused the US of instigating the Pueblo crisis as a part of an American plot to foment another war in Korea and stated that the US posed a grave menace to Far Eastern security. The statement affirmed North Korea's readiness to withstand any attack by the US and to retaliate. The statement ended by denouncing the UN as a tool of the imperialist US during the Korean War and by asserting that North Korea resolutely opposed any discussions on Korea in the UN and would not recognize any UN resolutions (Rodong Shinmun, 28/1/1968). The UN remained the "enemy" (The Economist, 3/2/1968).

II.3.d. North Korea's Emphasis on Its National Identity (27 January)

On 27 January, the UN Security Council meeting was simply a verbal battleground for two Cold War superpowers. Morozov of the Soviet Union drew a historical parallel with the 1960 U-2 incident in which Francis Gary Powers was shot down in a spy plane over Russia. Goldberg of the US charged that the Soviet spy ship *Gidrolog* was trailing the USS *Enterprise* off the Korean coast (Mainichi Daily News, 29/1/1968). The Soviet warship was close behind the *Enterprise*, which was

at the entrance to the Sea of Japan north of the Tsushima Straits. The Soviet warship was a missile-equipped destroyer of the Kildane type of 3,000 tons (Asahi Evening News, 29/1/1968). All diplomatic overtures toward the Soviet Union had failed. State Department sources described the Soviet attitude as "negative, but not hopeless" (NYT, 28/1/1968). US top advisors⁴⁷ met on 27 January to review the progress of diplomatic efforts, if any, and to continue contingency planning for possible military action (NYT, 28/1/1968).

North Korea reaffirmed its position on 28 January [Korean time]. In its editorial, Rodong Shinmun (28/1/1968) again interpreted the Pueblo activity as a signal of the US and South Korea's intention to provoke another war. North Korea described the US as an imperialist power which had, in previous years, worked to mobilize a puppet army in South Korea, pouring in military equipment, setting up a new weapons system, militarizing the economy of the South, and indoctrinating the populace with a war psychology. The editorial stated that US imperialism had become dramatically more blunt after Johnson visited South Korea in 1966. Unlike the government's statement on 27, which emphasized security, this editorial stressed national identity. Its major theme was that North Koreans must protect their socialist system at the risk of their lives. It sharply distinguished current North Korea from the North Korea of the Korean War. It defined North Korea's self-image as an entity which had been formed in the crucible of Juche thought and wartime resistance to imperialism.

This rededication to the socialist system by North Korea brought overt expressions of support from other socialist countries. China said on 28 January in a Government statement that she firmly supported North Korea in the dispute with the US; that the Pueblo had deliberately intruded into North Korean waters for espionage activities; that the US had tried to intimidate the Korean people with war blackmail; that the US had forgotten the lesson it had been taught in the Korean War; and that the US was asking for a confrontation that would be more severely punished on the next occasion (Mainichi Daily News, 30/1/1968). North Vietnam also defined the Pueblo incident as one more example of US violence against an

Asian people (Asahi Evening News, 29/1/1968).

III. End-Crisis (29 January - 23 December)

On 28 January, the Pentagon announced that some American military units "have been alerted for possible movement" to increase US strength in South Korea (Mainichi Daily News, 30/1/1968). On 29 January, the US ordered the US Air Force in South Korea to build up its strength, not for the current crisis but to deter North Korea from embarking on a war. Johnson told his advisors that he did not want a failure similar to the Bay of Pigs crisis (Hanguk Ilbo, 30/1/1968).

III.1. INITIATION (29 - 31 January, Korean Time)

Contrary to its current policy of strengthening military maneuvers, the US began on 29 January to show a more moderate approach toward North Korea, declaring suddenly that it was ready to negotiate at any time or place all Korean issues with North Korea if the Pueblo and its crew were released (Hanguk Ilbo, 31/1/1968). At the meeting with Congressional leaders on 31 January, the Administration clarified its more prudent approach toward North Korea. Possible reasons for this sudden policy shift were: (1) The US major concern was now the release of the Pueblo and its crew; (2) By this time, the previous belief that the USSR was behind North Korea had weakened. It was considered that the incident might have been undertaken solely by North Korea; (3) Diplomatic efforts to secure the assistance of the USSR remained futile. The ICRC also did not receive any response from the North Korean Red Cross (Hanguk Ilbo, 30/1/1968). Because of these elements in the situation, the US perceived a need to compromise directly with North Korea for the immediate release of the crew.

At the same time, North Korean official, Kim Kwang Hyop, argued through a radio broadcast on 31 January that it was a serious miscalculation on the part of the US to solve the crisis "by military threats, or by the methods of aggressive war, or

through illegal discussions at the UN". He suggested, however, that although the UN was not the forum for a solution, the MAC (Military Armistice Commission) might be (Mainichi Daily News, 3/2/1968). Both the US and North Korea had now sent each other conciliatory signals. One day after Kim Kwang Hyops's statement, the US State Department accepted North Korea's suggestion, saying that it "was prepared to deal with this matter through this channel [the MAC]" (Asahi Evening News, 2/2/1968). From then on, a long process of negotiation between the US and North Korea continued.

III.2. NEGOTIATION (2 February - 31 October)

In this phase, both states' behavior was characterized by an exchange of views. The first meeting was held on 2 February. The 40-minutes talk were not constructive. President Johnson, however, responded to the discouraging results by saying that "these things take time" (Public Papers of the President: L.B.Johnson, 2/2/1968: 158).

On 3 February, Rear Admiral John Smith of the US and Park Chung-kuk of North Korea met in secret at Panmunjom for the second time. It was not known whether any progress was made (Mainichi Daily News, 4/2/1968), but it was believed that the US virtually agreed to accept North Korea's conditions for release of the crew. These conditions were (1) US admission that the Pueblo had intruded into North Korean territorial waters, (2) an apology for the intrusion, and (3) assurances of no further violations (Asahi Evening News, 5/2/1968). At this point the US began to admit the possible intrusion of the Pueblo into North Korea's waters. On 4 February, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Defense Secretary McNamara conceded that the Pueblo might have violated North Korea's territorial waters at the time of its capture. The Pentagon also admitted on 9 February the possibility of the Pueblo's intrusion into North Korea's territorial waters (Mainichi Daily News, 11/2/1968). Given the possibility of its actual intrusion, the US now perceived increased pressure for compromise. The US admission of the Pueblo's intrusion was a step toward reaching a compromise because it fitted the first of the three

conditions demanded by North Korea. US hostile behavior toward North Korea had also decreased. By 7 February, the US had withdrawn the Enterprise from the Sea of Japan (Asahi Evening News, 8/2/1968).

North Korea still perceived a foreign policy crisis. In the international sphere, North Korea could not get any support from non-aligned nations. It could not exclude the possibility of US retaliation. It was not ready, in spite of its rhetoric, to test its Juche ideology in a struggle with a formidable enemy. Because of its crisis-perception, all festivities planned for the 20th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army on 8 February were cancelled (D.S. Suh, 1988: 233).

In the crisis-context, North Korea decreased its hostile behavior toward the US. It did not want to risk an unnecessary conflict escalation now that the US had accepted North Korea's first condition and was almost ready to accept the other two. On 10 February at the fifth meeting, North Korea agreed to free three wounded Pueblo crewmen. The Soviet Union was also trying to mollify North Korea. On 17 February, Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin said that the Soviet government was "taking all necessary measures" to keep the Pueblo crisis from escalating into another Korean war (Mainichi Daily News, 19/2/1968). Negotiations, however, continued until December without any progress on the issue of releasing the crew. On 9 February, North Korea began to insist emphatically on the second condition of releasing the crew: an apology from the US (Asahi Evening News, 10/2/1968).

III.3. ACCOMMODATION

After twenty-eight secret talks over 11 months, the US and North Korea finally agreed to compromise. In December, for the first time since 31 October, the US and North Korea resumed talks. At the meeting of 17 December, Woodward (US) and Pak Chung-guk (North Korea) worked out the details of a document concerning the release of the crew. Pak worked out the statement he wanted Woodward to sign which declared that the US Government acknowledged the "validity of the confessions" of American crew members and that North Korea had seized the Pueblo in defense of its territorial waters (Brandt, 1969: 227-8). Although he signed

the document, which was entirely written by Pak, General Woodward told Pak that it was false and that the US would immediately repudiate it upon release of the crew. The US proposal of simultaneous confession and repudiation was accepted by North Korea on 19 December. Why then was the negotiation prolonged inspite of the US admission in early February of its intrusion into North Korean waters?

First, the US faced a dilemma. It concerned its national prestige. According to Dean Rusk's later admission, this dilemma was how to obtain the release of the crew without having the US Government seeming to verify a statement which was not true (NYT, 23/12/1968). To resolve the dilemma, the State Department proposed that the US acknowledge the confession and repudiate it simultaneously, thus probably minimizing the cost to its prestige (Lentner, 1969: 63). This strategy induced North Korea to meet with the US representative at the meeting in Panmunjom.

Second, the bargaining positions of the US and North Korea were asymmetric. The fact that the US crew members were hostages weakened the US bargaining position. North Korea had greater power of decision in dealing with the issue of the crew (Lentner, 1969: 56) and was therefore reluctant to compromise. The US told North Korea on 17 December that if the US proposal was not accepted in time for the crew to be released by 23 December, the offer would be withdrawn. North Korea would have to start renegotiating from the beginning with the new administration of President-elect, Richard M. Nixon (NYT, 23/12/1968).

Third, given the US acceptance of apology, as well as President Johnson's resignation, North Korea felt it unnecessary to continue the chess game with the US. A compromise at this point was probably seen by North Korea as still fulfilling its strategy of humiliating its incarnate enemy, Johnson, and of lessening the possibility of an invigorated reaction by the new US Administration.

The US and North Korea finally agreed on the release of the crew on condition that the US acknowledge its guilt and offer a formal apology. Although the US repudiated the validity of the statement before signing it, the document which Woodward and Pak Chung-guk signed admitted that (1) the Pueblo had illegally

intruded into North Korean territorial waters, (2) the US apologized for the intrusion, (3) the US admitted the validity of confessions made by the US crewmen, and (4) the US gave firm assurances that no US ship would violate again North Korean waters (NYT, 23/12/1968). These conditions were precisely what North Korea had demanded since the seizure of the *Pueblo*. The crew were released on 23 December 1968, at 11:30 a.m. [Korean Time].

III.3.a. North Korea's Aims

North Korea's aim in accepting the compromise was to disgrace and humiliate the US before the world, and gain face for itself (Brandt, 1969: 118-9; Gallery, 1970: 98-9; B.C. Koh, 1969: 278). Of the three conditions for the release of the *Pueblo* and its crew, North Korea's priority was the US apology, not an assurance of no further violations. From the initial stage to the end of the *Pueblo* crisis, North Korea wanted an apology in the form of an admission of guilty by the US. It wanted to show its lenient forgiveness toward the US. From a paper which North Korea pushed the crew to sign in February, we find the clue to North Korea's demands. The paper read:

...[O]ur sincere deep apologies...beg your generosity...have mercy on us...we firmly pledge...please take mercy on us...give us a chance...we will never join in such acts again...our desire to open our hearts to the Korean people...we beg... [We] are on [our] knees...forgive us generously and leniently... (cited in Brandt, 1969: 119-20).

North Korea persisted in its posture to the end. After the US agreed to sign the statement of apology, North Korea decided to release the crew. A North Korean general called a mass meeting of the US crew on 21 December. He announced that the US had knealt down and admitted its crimes and and as a consequence, North Korea had decided to deal leniently with them (Brandt, 1969: 229).

North Korea purposefully made the best of the *Pueblo* crisis in order to humiliate the US. In his confession, Mark Bucher conceded that the *Pueblo*'s espionage activity in North Korean territorial waters was a dirty, violent crime

(Rodong Shinmun, 26 & 27/1/1968). The second confession by Stephen Robert Harris was in a similar vein (Rodong Shinmun, 4/2/1968). Harris' confession went further in denouncing President Johnson's policies (Mainichi Daily News, 4/2/1968).

Why was North Korea so determined to humiliate the US? To Kim Il Sung, the Korean Armistice Agreement was a humiliation (Gallery, 1970: 130). Kim Il Sung, who directly managed the Pueblo crisis (Brandt, 1969: 125), seized a chance to retaliate against the US by seizing the Pueblo. The shame and humiliation (B. Steinberg, 1991) of the Korean War pushed Kim Il Sung into a tough negotiating posture toward the US. North Korea linked the Pueblo crisis with its experience in the Korean War (Brandt, 1969: 125).

In the Orient, face means far more than status. It means honor, integrity and trustworthiness. When an Oriental loses face, he is utterly degraded and becomes a nobody (Gallery, 1970: 99). Confession is also important. In the Orient, a confession means much more than the literal term. It is related to one's face. One who confesses loses face. Whether the confession is true or not makes little difference (Gallery, 1970: 74). North Korea, having decided to release the crew, probably concluded that putting the US to shame publicly was more important than the substance of the confession (B.C. Koh, 1969: 278). North Korea probably did not initiate deliberately the seizure of the Pueblo, but used the crisis as a means of humiliating the US after the fact.

IV. Impact

IV.1. SOUTH KOREA/THE US

In a joint meeting of the South Korean government and the ruling party at the Blue House (the presidential residence) on 24 January, Park Chung Hee encouraged a stiffened anti-communist stand (Hanguk Ilbo, 25/1/1968). On 27 January, Congressional leaders adopted a joint communiqué which stated that the Government should make a firm commitment and take resolute measures to prevent

North Korea's violations; that the US should promptly support the modernization of South Korean forces; and that the US should take severe measures against North Korea (Hanguk Ilbo, 28/1/1968). This communiqué was prompted by the January 21 and Pueblo crises which also gave rise to an increased sense of danger and new policies as follows: (1) an aggravated negative image of North Korea and hardened anti-communism, (2) a firm commitment to strengthen its military capability, and (3) reinforced support for the modernization of the South Korean army by the US.

This aggravated image of North Korea pushed South Korea to adopt an aggressive and uncompromising attitude (Park Chung Hee, 1970: 272). On 1 March 1968, President Park stated that South Korea was undergoing its most serious trial since the Korean War; that there was no possibility of compromise with North Korea, but only armed struggle; and that the South Korean people should consolidate national unity in order to be ready for the struggle (Hanguk Ilbo, 2/3/1968). This psychological offensive was first manifested in a revised education system. South Korea established model schools for military training in September 1968. By 1970, military training had been expanded to all the high schools, colleges and universities (C.B. Bae, 1989: 83). Education for anti-communism became a priority⁴⁸.

The US lukewarm reaction to the Pueblo crisis propelled South Korea to revise its security system through (1) a reappraisal of its relative military capacity, (2) the creation of a defense industry, (3) the establishment of additional military forces, and (4) the instituting of changes in its military strategy and foreign policy.

The South Korean weapons system was far behind that of North Korea, whose forces were equipped with modern Soviet AK machineguns. These had five times the fire power of South Korea's outmoded M1. North Korea's planes outnumbered South Korea's tenfold. The North Korean air force had MIG-21s and IL-28 jet bombers. North Korea also had 30 modern artillery pieces, 500 medium size tanks, 450 armored cars, SAM-2 missiles, and new radar systems (Dong-A Ilbo, 24/1/1968).

Aware of South Korea's relative military weakness and its serious vulnerability in the event of a North Korean attack, Park Chung Hoon, Vice-Premier of South Korea, declared on 6 February that South Korea was considering the creation of a

defense industry. He said that after the January 21 and Pueblo crises, the Government keenly recognized the need for a defense industry that could produce ammunition, grenades, armored motors, and small size navy vessels (Hanguk Ilbo, 7-11/2/1968).

South Korea built up a Defense Reserve Army composed of 1,000,000 discharged soldiers based locally. Park Chung Hee was convinced that North Korean guerrilla infiltration would dramatically increase (Park Chung Hee, 1970: 232; 1971: 163-164) and stated that it was necessary to equip the Reserve Army in order to defend the rear as well as to mobilize in case of war (Hanguk Ilbo, 7/2/1968). The South Korean government decided on February 20th to arm all members of the Reserve Army under the age of 35 (Hanguk Ilbo, 21/2/1968). A specialized task force which could be a match for and could cope with the North Korean specialized 124th Units, which had tried to assassinate President Park in the January 21 crisis, was also created (Wolgan Jung-ang, September 1993). An anti-espionage task force and combat-police were also set up (Hanguk Ilbo, 2 & 7/2/1968). South Korean intelligence forces increased their surveillance activities (D.S. Suh, 1990b: 402). The identification cards of all South Koreans were changed in order to prevent and ferret out North Korean agents (Hanguk Ilbo, 22/2/1968).

By June, South Korea's capital defense line had been moved from the Han River northward to the Imjin River, just south of the DMZ. This signified that South Korea and the US had changed their commitment from retreating southward for terrain more advantageous to the defense of the capital, Seoul (S.S. Cho, 1969: 31). South Korea's foreign policy also changed. In addition to strengthening its security measures, South Korea attempted to isolate North Korea from the rest of the world. It abandoned the Hallstein doctrine which stated that South Korea would not have any diplomatic relations with any state that recognized North Korea. It started to expand its diplomatic relations with countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America (S.S. Cho, 1969: 32).

The US supported the South Korean commitment to strengthen its military capability. The US acknowledged that South Korea's military preparedness had

been weak whereas North Korea had systematically improved its military capability. The US decided to send additional military aid in support of South Korea's annual modernization plan of its weapons system and to assist South Korea to surpass North Korea militarily (Hanguk Ilbo, 17/2/1968). From this additional support, South Korea could begin to create a battalion of Phantoms (F4-C) by the end of 1968 (Hanguk Ilbo, 17/2/1968).

President Johnson was determined to keep the US the strongest state in the world. To meet US commitments to international stability, as well as to confront any menace from the Soviet Union, or other communist countries, Johnson kept in mind President Truman's warning: unchallenged aggression from communists would mean another world war (Department of State Bulletin, 30/9/1968: 325-6). In these circumstances, the Johnson administration decided to bolster the South Korean Air Force.

IV.2. NORTH KOREA

North Korea had strengthened its commitment to foster its economy and military power. Right after the two crises, North Korea urged (27 February 1968) its population to dedicate themselves to economic development and defense capability. Kim Il Sung recognized that economic development and a powerful military capability were an essential combination (Rodong Shinmun, editorial, 27/2/1968).

Kim Il Sung's strategy of encouraging socialist revolution in South Korea did not change. He continuously argued that power came from bullets (Chokuk Tongil, 28/2/1968, cited in Naewoi Tongshin, IV: 337); that the only decisive struggle was in armed conflict; that national liberation was the goal of this struggle (Choguk Tongil, 28/2/1968); and that North Korea was the only legitimate government of Korea. Kim Il Sung continued to advocate armed struggle within South Korea (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 154). North Korea, even during the negotiation period with the US on the Pueblo crisis, mounted the largest infiltration operation against South Korea in November, 1968.

Kim Il Sung declared on 2 November 1970 that North Korea should continue to

pursue its two chief goals: the building up of defense capability, and economic development. In the late 1970, Kim Il Sung began to give military strength priority over economic development. Referring to the Pueblo crisis and the EC-121 incident, Kim Il Sung stated that North Korea should increase its defense capacity even though it might delay the success of economic development (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 276-7).

The North Korean four-pronged military line and the development of the national defense industry were vigorously supported (Kim Il Sung, 1975). Kim Il Sung was certain that North Korea was in danger of attack (Kim Il Sung, 1971: 211). He believed that the four-pronged military line was vital to North Korea's security. Kim Il Sung took a strong defensive position, as did Park Chung Hee of South Korea in 1968. Kim Il Sung therefore prepared for a combination of regular-army conflict as well as guerrilla warfare, producing weapons suitable to North Korea's geographical conditions, and accelerating war preparations (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 312-6). The ideology of both Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung resided in military force.

Summary

The January 21 crisis (1968) was triggered when North Korean specialized troops attempted on that date to assassinate President Park Chung hee and his aides. The commando units nearly reached the Presidential residence, threatening South Korea's national security. Two days after the January 21 crisis, North Korea seized the USS Pueblo and its eighty-three crewmen. This incident triggered a US foreign policy crisis and a direct confrontation between the US and North Korea.

Before these two crises, North Korea had strengthened its war commitments against South Korea and the US by instituting: (1) a revolutionary and violent unification policy in 1961, (2) a new four-pronged military policy in 1962, (3) the 1964 policy of strengthening three sources of socialist revolution in the Korean peninsula, and (4) the 1967 specialized forces which would be used for infiltration

into South Korea. In addition to North Korea's willingness to unify the Korean peninsula by force, North Korea's perception of environmental changes surrounding South Korea motivated it to reinforce its commitments. These environmental changes were (1) the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, (2) the rise of a strongly militant anti-communist government in South Korea in 1961, (3) the sending of South Korean troops into the Vietnam War in 1965, and (4) South Korea's success in the First Economic Development Plan, and (5) President Johnson's visit to South Korea in 1966.

When the January 21 crisis took place, the South Korean government considered an immediate retaliation against North Korea, believing that a timely preemptive strike was preferable to coping with another attack. South Korean leaders were restrained by the US from such a response. Later, the US accepted South Korea's demand for prompt and effective assistance should North Korea launch another attack.

The Pueblo crisis was triggered by North Korea. However, because it had ignored North Korea's warnings regarding the Pueblo's activity in North Korean waters, the US was not exempt from criticism under the circumstances. The seizure of the Pueblo was a threat to US prestige and to the survival of its crew. The US believed it had a finite time to respond and viewed the incident initially as plotted by North Korea in collaboration with the Soviet Union. The Enterprise was ordered to sail to Wonsan Bay where the Pueblo was being held. Both North Korea and the US interpreted the other's action as an extension of previous violent activities. Cold War tensions with the USSR led US decision-makers to take a firm and resolute stand. When all its diplomatic efforts seemed to fail, the US gradually intensified its military pressures toward North Korea. North Korea denounced US diplomacy in the UN and re-affirmed its national identity as a socialist state. China and North Vietnam supported North Korea.

On 29 January, the US offered to negotiate with North Korea at any place, anytime. North Korea suggested the MAC as a proper forum in which to negotiate, which the US accepted. On 4 and 9 February [Washington Time], the US conceded

that the Pueblo might actually have intruded into the North Korean waters. Negotiations continued until December without progress. Aware of the humiliating Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War, Kim Il Sung attempted to humiliate the US in a face-saving strategy. Believing it had achieved this goal, North Korea decided to release the crew.

The January 21 and Pueblo crises pushed South Korea to strengthen its institutionalized military commitments by fostering a negative image of North Korea; creating additional military forces; changing its foreign policy and defense strategy; and promoting US military support for South Korea. Because of the firm and prompt action of the US, North Korea experienced a foreign policy crisis and committed itself to strengthening its defense industry and military capacity, even at the expense of its economic progress. It also emphasized adherence to the four-pronged military policy adopted in 1962.

Case 4. THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS, 1976

In this section I deal with the Poplar Tree Crisis of August 18th, 1976. I begin with a brief description of the crisis and its significance and background. I follow this with an analysis of the crisis in a successive manner: pre-crisis phase, international crisis phase, and end-crisis phase. Finally, the impact of the crisis will be investigated.

A Brief description and significance of the crisis

On 18 August, at 10:45 a.m. [9:45 p.m., Washington time], North Korean soldiers, with axes and metal pikes, killed two US soldiers in the JSA⁴⁹ (Joint Security Area) in the DMZ⁵⁰ near Panmunjom. The incident took place when US and Korean soldiers tried to do their routine task, pruning a poplar tree hindering the view of the foremost observation post⁵¹. The incident had placed both South Korean forces, US forces in Korea, and North Korean soldiers on the alert. US aircraft were flying to South Korea and the Midway, an air craft carrier, was heading for South Korea from Japan. An international crisis had developed. Three days later Kim Il Sung sent the US side a letter of "regrets", which finally led the US to soften its stance. On 6 September, a new agreement on DMZ security measures was made.

The US saw the North Korean soldiers' killing of the two US soldiers as unusually brutal even measured against past provocations (NYT, 19/8/1976). The US State Department issued a statement on 18 August [Washington time] citing the deaths of the US soldiers the "first" murder in the JSA since the Armistice Agreement and declaring that such "violent and belligerent" actions could "not be tolerated." When eventually the US implemented Operation Paul Bunyan, cutting down the controversial poplar tree, the tension on the Korean peninsula was the highest since the Pueblo crisis of 1968 (Newsweek, 8/30/1976: 50).

Background

After the January 21 and Pueblo crises of 1968, South and North Korea had each strengthened their commitment to suppress the other. Thus the inter-Korean conflict was greatly intensified. For example, there were 760 incidents, including 356 shooting clashes, with a total of 500 deaths on the two sides in 1968 (NYT, 19/8/1976).

After the communization of Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975, tension in the Korean peninsula had risen remarkably. On 5 May 1975, Kissinger stated that one of the purposes of the military operation to recover the "Mayaguez" was to deter North Korean adventurism and to reaffirm the US defense commitment to South Korea. This specific statement provoked North Korea's strong resentment and led to increased hostile actions toward the US. On 30 June, a US soldier, Maj. William D. Henderson, was beaten by North Korean soldiers.

In mid-1976, North Korea declared that national defense took precedence over all other national goals (Naewoi Tongshin, 7/1/1976). It also asserted that by introducing F-111 fighters into South Korea the US was deliberately trying to provoke a war (Naewoi Tongshin, 16/2/1976). On 25 June, Chung Joon-gi, the Vice Premier of North Korea, redefined the US as a one-hundred-year mortal enemy which had brought suffering and national catastrophe to the Korean people. Chung emphasized the necessity of preparing for an all-out war (Naewoi Tongshin, 29/6/1976). On the next day, twenty North Korean soldiers threatened a US guard and his South Korean partner with ax-handles. On 10 July, in a private meeting, Kim Il Sung stated frankly that he might invade South Korea in 1977 (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 148). On the same day, Mao Tse Tung announced that China and North Korea had established a blood relationship in their protracted fight against the common enemy and that China would firmly support the Korean people in their just struggle against the imperialist US (Head et al., 1978: 154).

While North Korea's conflictual behavior towards the US had steadily increased,

the US made clear its position on the Korean peninsula. It was a response to North Korea's stubborn position on the Korean issue. North Korea had incessantly argued for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. On 22 July 1976, Kissinger stated that North Korea's demand for the unconditional dissolution of the UNC and the unilateral withdrawal of all US forces in South Korea could not be accepted. Kissinger's counter-proposal was that if China and the USSR were prepared to improve their relations with South Korea, then the US would take similar steps toward North Korea. He added that the US was prepared to negotiate with North Korea over a new basis for the Armistice Agreement. Kissinger, however, stressed that the US would stick to the principle of the balance of power in the Korean peninsula. The purposes of the policy, stated Kissinger, were to deter any external attacks on the established frontier and to secure the national security of the US and Japan (Department of State Bulletin, 16/8/1976: 222-3).

As stated earlier, the US commitment to South Korea had been strengthened since the Korean War. The US goals in the Korean peninsula since the Korean War had been the stability of the Korean sub-system, the viability of South Korea, and the blocking of Soviet influence (Head et al., 1978: 150). In the 1970s, however, the US began to abandon its self-image as a physically predominant state (Kissinger, Department of State Bulletin, 16/8/1976), choosing, instead, to take a two-sided policy against former or potential adversaries: reciprocity and the power principle. The former was represented by a policy of accommodation; the latter by balance of power. US forces had been stationed in South Korea in order to implement the above strategy. The specific functions of US forces in South Korea were (1) to provide US substantial commitment to South Korea; (2) to deter a North Korean attack; and (3) to dissuade China or the Soviet Union from condoning such violations (Head et al. 1978: 150-1).

In sum, when the Poplar Tree crisis took place, both China and the US affirmed verbally or in practice their support of their client states. From the close of 1960 onward, each client state, North and South Korea, strengthened its commitment to its autonomy and security, especially after the communization of Cambodia and

Vietnam in 1975.

I. Pre-Crisis (5 - 17 August 1976)

Throughout the first half of August 1976, North Korea showed awareness of its foreign policy crisis. This is evident in excerpts from a White Paper issued on 5 August by the North Korean government and reveals the imminence of war in the Korean peninsula. It reads:

The long-standing tensions in Korea have now reached an acute state as never before and...war may break out at any moment. The US and the South Korean authorities...have now finished war preparations and are going...to directly ignite the fuse of war... The US...openly declared South Korea its forward defense zone (cited in Head et al., 1978: 155; see also NYT, 20/8/1976; Naewoi Tongshin, III: 149).

The second indication was Kim Il Sung's cancellation, on 15 August, of his schedule to participate at the Conference of Non-aligned nations in Sri Lanka. In his notice to President Tito, Kim Il Sung attributed the cancellation to a "deteriorating situation on the Korean border" (Head et al., 1978: 158). The third indication was a warning on 18 August by North Korea's Foreign Minister. He warned that another Korean war might break out at any moment (Dong-A Ilbo, 19/8/1976). All the facts suggest that North Korea was fully conscious of its foreign policy crisis.

In spite of its emergency, North Korea intensified its conflictual behavior toward the US. On 6 August, in the JSA area of the DMZ, six South Korean workers and four UNC guards approached a poplar tree in order to cut it down. The tree had long been an obstacle to the UN side, obscuring the view from UN Observation Post No. 5 to the general area around UN Guard Post No. 3. North Korean guards, however, told the UNC guards to leave the tree alone. The workers withdrew (Head et al., 1978: 156).

North Korea also attacked the US verbally. On 17 August at the UN, the North Korean representative argued that the US should (1) remove all the new types of

military equipment, including nuclear weapons, from South Korea, (2) end all the aggressive acts against North Korea, and (3) terminate all provocative actions, such as military maneuvers and exercises (Head et al., 1978: 158). Pyongyang Broadcast announced that war probability was heightened because of war preparations by the US and South Korea.

During these days, especially from 5 August, some US intelligence analysts noticed an unusual amount of North Korean hostility. They, however, interpreted this as being simply an attempt by North Korea to persuade the world that the US and South Korea were planning another war (NYT, 20/8/1976). Accustomed to a protracted conflict with North Korea, the US side tended to interpret North Korea's signals as everyday propaganda or rhetoric (Hwang and Hong, 1990: 12-3). This US bias prevented it from relaying the signals to higher level decision-makers. Two things illustrate this mindset.

First, some lower-ranking officials of the US Defense and State Departments acknowledged that the North Korean statement on 5 August had unusual features, which were: (1) North Korea claimed that the US and South Korea had completed war preparations and (2) the White Paper was authorized by the North Korean government. Such a formal statement had been issued only two times: when North Korea seized the Pueblo in 1968 and when the EC-121 aircraft was lost in 1969 (Head et al., 1978: 155). Both the UNC in South Korea and US State Department ignored the statement, however, because (1) the signal was too ambiguous and (2) it was perceived as mere routine ideological rhetoric characteristic of the high tension in a protracted conflict (Head et al., 1978: 155).

Second, the episode of the withdrawal of US guards and Korean workers on 6 August gave the JSA (Joint Security Area) commander the impression that this was a warning that any action on the tree might require special attention (Head et al. 1978: 156). General Stilwell at the UNC, however, did not receive any report on the episode at that time. Washington of course could not be aware of the significance of North Korea's action. North Korea's prevention of the UNC soldiers from pruning the tree on August 6th was not included in Stilwell's initial reports to

Washington on the Poplar Tree crisis (Head et al. 1978: 175).

II. International Crisis (18 - 22 August)

On 18 August, 10:45 a.m. [17 August, 09:45 p.m., Washington Time], North Korean soldiers killed two US soldiers. An hour after the killings, a report of the killings reached the Korean desk officer at the State Department in Washington [11:15 p.m., 17 August]. Kissinger was informed at about 6:00 a.m. on 18 August [Washington Time]. After conferring with his advisors⁵², Kissinger made two decisions: to inform the President in Kansas City and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, General Scowcroft; and to call a meeting of the WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group) for 3:30 p.m. General Scowcroft informed President Ford at 9:00 a.m., Kansas time [10:00 a.m., Washington Time]. President Ford instructed Scowcroft to convene the WSAG and to search for strategic options for the US response (Head et al., 1978: 172).

II.1. US FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS AND DECISION-MAKING

Kissinger's immediate call for the WSAG⁵³ meeting signified that the US had set a deadline for a response (Head et al., 1978: 304, fn. 18) to North Korea's provocative action. The U.S. perceived a foreign policy crisis. In its statement on 18 August, the State Department said such North Korean brutal and belligerent actions in the JSA area were the first since 1953 and that the US viewed the incident with "gravity and concern". It warned North Korea that it "must bear full responsibility for all the consequences of its brutal action", and that the North Korean actions "cannot be tolerated" (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 392-3). President Ford in Kansas City made a similar statement on 18 August.

The US and South Korea viewed the incident as another North Korean strategy to raise tension at the current conference of Non-aligned nations in Sri Lanka at which North Korea urged the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Dong-A

Iibo, 19/8/1976; NYT, 19/8/1976). North Korea had charged on 18 August that the actions by its guards were in self-defense against imperialistic provocations by the US (Mainichi Daily News, 20/8/1976).

II.1.a. THE FIRST WASG MEETING

II.1.a.1. The First WSAG Meeting

Before the formal WSAG meeting of 3:30 p.m., the staffs from the State Department, the JCS, and ISA (International Security Affairs/Office of the Secretary of Defense) gathered to discuss the options. After considering US national interest and objectives, the conferees initially and in general agreed that a strong military reaction was necessary to demonstrate clearly US resolve and seriousness to Kim Il Sung (Head et al., 1978: 179). Nevertheless, given the US perception that the situation was dangerous and had a risk of escalating into a serious military confrontation, the conferees also considered broader alternatives: (1) do nothing; (2) stage a show of force with the units in Korea; (3) deploy forces from other Pacific units to Korea; (4) deploy a squadron of fighters from the US to Korea; (5) deploy an aircraft carrier to Korean waters; (6) increase the readiness posture of UN forces; and (7) conduct a retaliatory response (Head et al., 1978: 179).

On August 18th at 3:30 p.m., Washington Time, the first formal meeting of the WSAG was held in the White House Situation Room. The total number of conferees was twelve⁵⁴, drawn from the White House, NSC, Defense and State Departments, and CIA. The purposes of the first WSAG meeting were to review the situation and to search for military and diplomatic responses to the Korean crisis. The conferees, however, considered two future possibilities: escalation into a war, and a military attack from North Korea. Aware of the US' international role as a superpower, they were concerned about the implications of their responses beyond the immediate context, and in particular, of the impact of US military movements on the USSR and China (Head et al. 1978: 181). On the other hand, George Bush of the CIA reported that the probability of a North Korean thrust toward the DMZ was

unlikely (NYT, 20/8/1976; Newsweek, 30/8/1976: 51). Nevertheless, it was agreed that the US should prepare for any contingency from North Korea.

Wishing to avoid a serious escalation and to prevent a North Korean aggressive move, President Ford approved some diplomatic and military options recommended by the WSAG meeting. They were: (1) deployment of a twenty-plane squadron of F-4 Phantom fighter-bombers from Okinawa to Korea; (2) an increase in the alert status of US forces in Korea; (3) preparation for deployment of one F-111 squadron from the U.S. to Korea; (4) preparation for the use of B-52s on training missions from Guam to Korea; (5) preparation for deployment of the aircraft carrier Midway from Japan to Korean waters; and (6) notification of UN delegates and the Security Council of the North Korean assault (Head el al., 1978: 182).

To prevent China from misunderstanding US military movement, Kissinger later met Huang Chen, the chief of the PRC Liaison Mission in Washington. In his talks with Huang, Kissinger emphasized the common interests of the US and China in finding a permanent solution to the Korean problem, and made clear US military intentions toward North Korea (NYT, 20/8/1976). Kissinger also met with the Japanese Ambassador during the evening of August 18th and discussed the deployment of US military forces in Japan.

II.1.a.2. US Military Escalation/ North Korea's Foreign Policy Crisis

About 7 hours after the first WSAG meeting, the US began to execute its military plans. At 10:18 p.m., Washington Time (11:18 a.m., Korean Time), the JCS ordered the deployment of a squadron of F-4 tactical fighters from Japan to South Korea. The Midway was put on alert to sail for the Korean Strait. Strategic Air Command was ordered to prepare to fly B-52 training missions from Guam to Korea. At noon on the 19th [Korean Time], the 40,000 US servicemen in South Korea were ordered to return to their units immediately and to be in full combat gear (Dong-A Ilbo, 19/8/1976).

Around 5:23 p.m. [Korean Time], it was reported by Radio Prongyang that Kim Il Sung, as Supreme Commander of the KPA (Korean People's Army), had ordered

an alert and a war posture for North Korean regular military units, Worker-Peasant Guards, Red Youth Guards, and reserve troops (Dong-A Ilbo, 20/8/1976; Naewoi Tongshin, III: 132; NYT, 20/8/1976). The North Korean alert was seen as a response to US military escalation (Head et al., 1978: 188). Regular broadcasting was cancelled (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 133). North Korea had perceived a serious threat to its security; maintained that the US maneuvers had entered an extremely reckless stage; and that the US was igniting the fuse of war (Mainichi Daily News, 21/8/1976). Rodong Shinmun (19/8/1976), in its editorial, argued that the Poplar Tree incident had been deliberately fabricated by the US in order to initiate another war in Korea.

Shortly after the North Korean alert, the first of the US military movements was completed. Twelve F-4D Phantom fighters and six F-4C Wild Weasel aircraft from Okinawa, Japan, began to land at Kunsan Air Base on August 19th about 6:00 p.m. (Head et al., 1978: 188).

II.1.a.3. US Demands of North Korea

While the US was stepping up its military maneuvers, the 379th meeting of the MAC was held in Panmunjom at 4:00 p.m. on August 19th [Korean Time]. At this meeting, Rear Admiral Frudden, the UN representative, clarified the US demands: (1) North Korea's admission of its responsibility for the crime; (2) assurance of the security of the UN forces in the JSA; and (3) punishment of the murderers. The North Korean representative, Han Ju-kyong, responded to Frudden by simply reiterating that the US was accelerating war tension and that a war could break out if US provocations continued (Head et al., 1978: 187-8).

II.1.b. The Second WSAG Meeting/ Ford's Decision-Making

About three and half hours after Kim Il Sung's order of a war posture, the Second WSAG meeting was held (8:00 a.m., August 19th, Washington time) in the White House Situation Room. The purposes of the meeting were to review the situation, to consider whether and how to cut down the poplar tree, and to evaluate

other alternatives (Head et al., 1978: 189). At this point, the conferees had a consensus that an outbreak of military action seemed unlikely (NYT, 20/8/1976).

The conferees tentatively agreed upon: (1) validation of the F-4 squadron deployment and recommendation to deploy an F-111 squadron from Idaho to Korea; (2) validation of the increased alert status of US and UNC forces in Korea, especially in response to North Korea's war posture; (3) the recommendation to move the Midway task force from Japan to the Korean strait; (4) the recommendation to accept General Stilwell's basic concept of operations, i.e. to enter the JSA with a show of military force and cut down the controversial poplar tree; and (5) the decision to include a flight of three B-52s from Guam in a show of force over South Korea (Head et al., 1978: 189-90). Kissinger was charged to report the above WSAG recommended options to President Ford.

While he was explaining the above strategic options to President Ford, Kissinger suggested more forceful action. He believed that stronger action was essential in order to demonstrate US resolve in defense of its national interests. He did not want to create the precedent that Americans could be slaughtered with impunity anywhere (Head et al., 1978: 191). Kissinger was convinced that North Korea would not retaliate against a powerful US show of strength (Head et al., 1978: 190). General Scowcroft also recommended stronger U.S. responses. After discussion with Kissinger and Scowcroft, President Ford conditionally approved the options of cutting down the tree and the show-of-force. He wished to reserve the final decision-making on the tree-cutting until General Stilwell's specific plan was reported to him. He directed that the recommended deployments be implemented (Head et al., 1978: 191).

On the evening of the 19th, the JCS ordered the following deployments: a squadron of twenty F-111s from Mountain Home, Idaho; US Navy Task Force group movements, consisting of the carrier Midway, four frigates (Cook, Lockwood, Kirk, and Francis Hammond), and a 5,670-ton guided missile cruiser Gridley (Mainichi Daily News, 22/8/1976); a Guam-based B-52s' training mission over South Korea. Within hours, the F-111 squadron of twenty jet fighter-bombers was headed from

Idaho for Taegu Air Base, South Korea. Before these JCS orders were issued, the Pentagon was ordered to place US forces in South Korea on an increased combat posture. On a scale of 1 to 5, the US forces in South Korea and South Korean forces were placed on DefCon (Defense Condition) 3 instead of DefCon 4 (Dong-A Ilbo, 20/8/1976). During the Cuban Missile crisis in 1962 and the Middle East crisis in 1973, US forces were on DefCon 2 and 3 status respectively (NYT, 20/8/1976).

During 20 and 21 August, North Korea simply reiterated Kim Il Sung's order of alert and related war slogans, emphasizing the population's loyalty to Kim Il Sung and to the Labour Party of North Korea (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 133-4).

II.1.c. The USSR and South Korea

On 19 August, a Moscow Radio broadcast called for the withdrawal of US forces and arms from South Korea. A resolution condemning US action was passed at the conference of Non-aligned nations. South Korean President Park Chung Hee declared on 20 August that there was no reason why South Korea should be unilaterally subject to North Korea's provocation; that there was a limit to South Korean patience; and that future North Korean provocations, major or minor, would be met with immediate retaliation. Because of his perception of protracted conflict with North Korea and of Kim Il Sung's incessant provocative actions, Park Chung Hee came to see Kim Il Sung as sub-human. In his statement, Park called Kim Il Sung "a mad dog who needed a beating" (Mainichi Daily News, 21/8/1976; NYT, 20/8/1976).

II.2. 'OPERATION PAUL BUNYAN'

A final decision on the Poplar Tree crisis was made on 20 August (Kansas Time), when General Scowcroft briefed President Ford on General Stilwell's detailed proposal. Kissinger was present. The primary element of General Stilwell's operation was cutting down the controversial poplar tree. In his message to the JCS, Stilwell pointed out that the UNC must "maintain its legitimate rights" in the DMZ; that the operation was to maintain a "major principle"...to ensure the protection of

[the UNC] forces; and that the UNC forces must enter the JSA and cut the tree down (cited in Head et al., 1978: 183). General Stilwell's plan later became 'Operation Paul Bunyan'.

President Ford approved Stilwell's plan on the condition that the US-South Korean side not be the first to use force. Ford reasoned that an appropriate amount of force would be effective in demonstrating US resolve and that excessive gambling with North Korea might suddenly induce a full-scale war (Head et al., 1978: 193). The operation finally approved was in four-steps: (1) to raise the readiness posture of the UNC and South Korean forces. Although the first step was taken as a precautionary measure, its practical purpose was to divert North Korean forces' offensive posture into a defensive one, thereby delaying their time for a possible initiative; (2) to increase the UNC's capacity of collecting military intelligence through SR-71 scout planes flying over the DMZ; (3) to mobilize the F-111s and B-52s from US Air and Navy forces. These planes were assigned to nose for Pyongyang and to make their presence visible to North Korean radar; (4) to cut down the problem tree and remove two illegal North Korean guard posts without notice (J. Young, 1994: 493-4).

On 21 August, at 7:00 a.m. [Korean time], the UNC sent into the DMZ troops composed of a 16-man tree-cutting detail, a 30-man security platoon armed with sidearms and ax-handles, and 64 specially trained South Korean soldiers (NYT, 26/8/1976). The UNC had already raised its readiness posture from DefCon 3 to DefCon 2 (G.J. Cho, 1991: 395). DefCon 1 is war footing. While the team was cutting down the tree, F-4 Phantoms and F-111 fighter-bombers were flying around in South Korean airspace in order to let the North Koreans know they were there. Off to the east, three B-52 strategic bombers flew along the southern edge of the DMZ, dropping metallic chaff to blind North Korean radar. Twenty-six helicopter gunships hovered protectively over the American patrol as it surrounded its objective. A quick-reaction force of 300 US and South Korean soldiers was standing in position a mile from Panmunjom (NYT, 22/8/1976; Newsweek, 30/8/1976). The Midway was in Korean waters. The Marine Corps was ready to implement a landing operation

(G.J. Cho, 1991: 395). By 7:45 a.m., the soldiers had completed cutting-down the tree. Their mission had been accomplished without firing a single shot.

II.2.a. Significance of 'Operation Paul Bunyan'

The US had two public purposes in mind with 'Operation Paul Bunyan': practical and symbolic. In practical terms, US military moves were designed to demonstrate to North Korea that the US was willing and able to move decisively to counter any threat in the Korean peninsula. In symbolic terms, the tree-cutting operation and removal of North Korea's illegal barriers within a military context was designed to make it clear to North Korea that the US would not tolerate interference with the UNC's right and security in the JSA, authorized in the Armistice Agreement of 1953 (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 389). Kissinger clearly stated that the US would not permit the principle to be established that Americans could be assaulted with impunity anywhere (NYT, 21/8/1976). The operation also demonstrated to North Korea the US-South Korea military collaboration. To Kim Il Sung, the tree-cutting operation was a stinging loss of face (Newsweek, 30/8/1976).

Nevertheless, the significance of 'Operation Paul Bunyan' was not obvious, related as it was to the possibility of another war in the Korean peninsula. Operation Paul Bunyan did not exclude escalation to a full-scale war. Before the Operation of 21 August, a State Department official said that the US was prepared to retaliate if North Korea tried to prevent 'Operation Paul Bunyan' (NYT, 21/8/1976). US strategy lay in its contingency planning based on the secondary task force under the command of General Morris J. Brady. This task force included one artillery battalion of ROK troops, and another of US forces. This force was assigned to open fire immediately if an order was issued to do so (J. Young, 1994: 494). A South Korean infantry company was placed on the outside edge of the JSA. On the south of the DMZ, a US infantry company stood by with twenty utility helicopters escorted by seven Cobra attack helicopters (Head et al., 1978: 194).

The possibility of escalation to a war was also discussed in talks between General

Stilwell and President Park Chung Hee of South Korea. Stilwell visited President Park Chung Hee on 20 August, a day before the operation. In their talks, Stilwell reported that the military nature of Operation Paul Bunyan was limited and localized. However, if North Korea used force to interfere with the UNC soldiers' tree-cutting, Stilwell planned to have the UNC attack and occupy KaeSung and advance deeply into the plains of Yunbaek, Hwang-hae Province, North Korea (G.J. Cho, 1991: 395). President Park agreed with Stilwell's plan. He immediately discussed a possible attack against North Korea with Defense Minister Jong-chul Suh, the Chief of the JCS Jae-hyun Roh, and the Chief of ROK Army, Se-ho Lee. How and why did Park Chung Hee give a ready consent to Stilwell's plans?

Park Chung Hee was entirely convinced that South Korea had been unilaterally provoked by Kim Il Sung. He was obsessed with the experiences of the January 21 and Pueblo crises, 1968; the EC-121 incident, 1969; North Korean agents' attempts to assassinate him, and the killing of his wife, 1974; and the underground tunnels constructed by North Korea, 1974 and 1975. Park was especially disconcerted over US lukewarm reactions during the January 21 and Pueblo crises. The communization of Vietnam and Cambodia in April 1975 gave Park a serious crisis perception in addition to those of 1968-75. In these circumstances, the Poplar Tree crisis, which had galvanized the US into taking some action, was perceived by Park as an excellent opportunity to retaliate against North Korea (G.J. Cho, 1991: 393-5). The South Korean National Assembly's National Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee demanded on 21 August speedy retaliation against North Korea (Mainichi Daily News, 23/8/1976). On the day when Stilwell and Park met, a spokesman for South Korea's NSC said that tension on the Korean peninsula was the highest since the Korean War (The Jerusalem Post, 22/8/1976).

II.2.b. North Korea's Response

At this point, North Korea perceived a crisis. Although North Korea insisted that it would not be intimidated by any US military threat (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 136-7), it was preparing for defense in the name of 'Operation Taepoong 3'. Chan

Il Ahn, then a sergeant in the North Korean army, admitted recently that he felt greater imminence of war at this time than was the case with either the Pueblo crisis or the EC-121 incident (G.J. Cho, 1991: 395). As Kissinger anticipated, North Korea did not respond with force. If they had interfered with 'Operation Paul Bunyan', the UNC could have implemented its contingency plan under the immediate order of President Ford and the Secretary of Defense (Head et al., 1978: 195). North Korea's retaliation took the form of a mere verbal accusation of the US (Mainichi Daily News, 23/8/1976; NYT, 22/8/1976). The Poplar Tree crisis did not escalate into war--full-scale or limited.

III. End-Crisis (21 August - 16 September, Korean Time)

Within four hours after 'Operation Paul Bunyan' (at noon on 21 August, Korean Time), a private meeting was held at Panmunjom, at the request of Han Jukyong of North Korea, the first encounter since the Pueblo crisis in 1968 (Newsweek, 30/8/1976). Han, the North Korean principal negotiator, conveyed a message from Kim Il Sung to Admiral Frudden, delivering it in a tone that was mild and conciliatory (Newsweek, 30/8/1976). The message reads:

[I]t is regretful that an incident occurred in the Joint Security Area... An effort must be made so that such incidents may not recur in the future... [B]oth sides should make efforts. We urge your side to prevent the provocation. Our side will never provoke first, but take self-defensive measures only when provocation occurs. This is our consistent stand (NYT, 22/8/1976).

North Korea's crisis perception throughout the US show of force probably pushed Kim Il Sung to attempt to terminate the crisis by sending a signal of conciliation. North Korea had found the US military maneuvers unexpectedly strong. In addition, North Korea did not receive strong support from its allies--China, the USSR and non-aligned nations.

Kim's message was initially not well received by the US and South Korea.

President Ford declared that the North Korean statement was unacceptable because it did not represent an apology. The State Department announced that the US did not find the message acceptable because there was no admission of North Korean responsibility for the deliberate and premeditated murders (Head et al., 1978: 200; Mainichi Daily News, 24/8/1976). The State Department reiterated that the US was skeptical of Kim's message and that the heightened military readiness in the Korean peninsula would be maintained (NYT, 22/8/1976).

The State Department viewed Kim's message as not fulfilling the conditions of compromise established and transmitted to North Korea at the 379th meeting of the MAC on 19 August. As noted earlier, the conditions were basically: (1) accept responsibility for the killings, (2) provide assurances that such incidents would not happen in the future, and (3) punish the men responsible (Head et al., 1978: 198). South Korea also stated that, in view of the gravity of the incident, Kim's message was not adequate or acceptable and did not contain any admission of responsibility (Mainichi Daily News, 24/8/1976; NYT, 22/8/1976).

Nevertheless, the next day, 23 August, the US suddenly shifted its stance toward North Korea. The State Department eased its position and came to see the North Korean expression of regret as a "positive step", thus departing sharply from its 22 August statement. The 23 August position was considerably less harsh. Why did the US reverse its stand?

First, the US wished to secure the separation of forces in the JSA in order to prevent future incidents. For this reason it wished to capitalize on the conciliatory tone of Kim's message and not lose this opportunity. The intermingling of forces in the JSA had been the cause of numerous low-level but tense incidents during the previous years (Head et al., 1978: 199). By extending the crisis period, the US attempted to gain assurance for its security. If North Korea was ready to accept the US proposal for the safety of US personnel in the DMZ, the US might be ready to lower its combat-alert status (NYT, 25/8/1976).

Second, the US was prepared to consider different interpretations of Kim's message by other nations who saw it as a "diplomatic defeat for North Korea" or

a "virtual capitulation" (Mainichi Daily News, 26/8/1976; Head et al., 1978: 212). China especially advised the US to interpret Kim's message from his difficult situation (Dong-A Ilbo, 26/8/1976). The Ford Administration finally came to see the message as an "implicit acceptance of responsibility" when contrasted with North Korea's usual rhetoric (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 389). As a result, the US acknowledged that North Korea fulfilled the first of the three criteria it had demanded.

Third, the fact that this was the first time Kim Il Sung had sent any message led the US to reappraise its significance. Kim had remained silent throughout the Pueblo crisis and EC-121 incident. For him to express "regret" to North Korea's implacable enemy, the US, was a sufficiently unusual gesture to represent the first indication of any apology since the Korean War (NYT, 25/8/1976). The officials in the Korean working group in Washington saw the expression of regret as an "uncharacteristic behavior of North Korea". To them, the message was more than they had expected, even if it did not satisfy the criteria of the State Department (Head et al., 1978: 198-9).

At this point, the Poplar Tree crisis changed into an end-of-crisis phase. Although the American B-52s continued to fly daily "practice bombing missions" over South Korea (NYT, 25/8/1976), the US did not perceive the necessity of further actions (Head et al., 1978: 201-2). In the Ford Administration, there was no crisis atmosphere by 25 August. The US expected the end of the phase of a show of military strength and a return to normal conditions within a few days (NYT, 25/8/1976). Remaining were the negotiations over the second and the third conditions: security of UNC personnel in the JSA area and punishment of the killers.

III.1 Negotiations

III.1.a. The 380th Meeting of the MAC (25 August, Korean Time)

Requested by the US side, the 380th meeting of the MAC was held on 25 August. At this meeting, both sides exchanged views on the security of personnel.

Without responding to Frudden's demand of punishment for those responsible for killing two Americans, Han Ju-kyong proposed a partition of the security personnel on both sides in the Panmunjon Truce village, which had been jointly guarded by both sides, along the Military Demarcation Line (Mainichi Daily News, 25-6/8/1976; NYT, 26/8/1976). The North Korean proposal was made in response to the US demand that assurances be given that there would be no further attacks from North Korea.

III.1.b. The 381st Meeting of the MAC (28 August, Korean time)

At the 381th meeting of the MAC, the US told North Korea it would consider the North Korean proposal if two conditions were fulfilled: (1) the guaranteed safety of US guards within the JSA and (2) punishment of the personnel who were responsible for the killings (Dong-A Ilbo, 30/8/1976). Frudden argued that North Korea's assurances for UNC personnel were "essential and not subject to compromise" (Mainichi Daily News, 30/8/1976). He demanded the removal of North Korean guard posts inside the southern section of Panmunjom. Frudden said that immediate removal of the North Korean guard posts would serve as proof of the seriousness of the security guarantee (Mainich Daily News, 29/8/1976). Han Ju-kyong rejected the US demand for any punishment; repeated North Korea's earlier proposal; and refused to give any safety assurance (NYT, 29/8/1976). North Korea, however, agreed with the US proposal to open working-level discussions between their Joint Secretaries on separating their security guards at the Truce Village. This agreement meant that the US no longer insisted on the punishment of the killers.

III.1.c. The 446th Meeting of the Joint Secretaries (31 August - 6 September)

When the talks between the US and North Korea were transferred from the MAC meetings to the meetings of the Joint Secretaries, negotiations on the Poplar Tree crisis changed into working-level talks. The 446th meeting of the Joint Secretaries was held from 31 August through 6 September. On the last day (6 September), the US and North Korea signed a new JSA agreement to be effective

on 16 September. Its major features were: (1) joint establishment and marking of the MDL through the JSA, (2) restriction of military personnel from crossing over to the opposing side or the MDL at the MAC conference site area, (3) removal of all guard posts presently constructed, and (4) the requirement that each side insure the safety of the personnel of the opposing side legally crossing the MDL (Head et al., 1978: 203). The new agreement was the first substantive change in JSA procedures since 1958 (Head et al., 1978: 204).

III.2. RETURNING TO NORMAL RELATIONS (After 7 September)

Between 6 and 15 September, a joint observer team surveyed the MDL. North Korea dismantled the four guard posts--KPA 5, 6, 7 and 8. During this period, a spokesman for the Defense Department announced that two battalions of F-4 and F-111 fighters would remain in South Korea, and that the Midway, accompanied by five cruisers, would continue its mission (Dong-A Ilbo, 9/9/1976). Nevertheless, General Stilwell stated on 8 August that a new agreement on the security of the UNC personnel in Panmunjom had been completed so that military operations and maneuvers had returned to the normal level. The State Department announced simultaneously that the alert posture was suspended. The Poplar Tree crisis had ended.

III.3. END-CRISIS AND THE SUPERPOWERS

The communist superpowers did not get involved in the initial stages of the Poplar Tree crisis. However, they were influential to some extent during the end-of-crisis period. The position of China and the Soviet Union in the initial stage of the crisis was characterized by restraint. Both states worried that North Korea's aggressive activities might spark another conflict (Newsweek, 30/8/1976). They made no inflammatory comments on the crisis (Head et al., 1978: 212-3; Newsweek, 30/8/1976: 51). The Soviets did not want to damage Ford's position at that time because it wished to see him reelected rather than their having to adjust to a new Democratic President (Zbigniew Brzezinski, cited in Far Eastern Economic Review,

3/9/1976). According to Jack Anderson, the Soviet Union wanted no involvement in a second Korean War. North Korea would be on its own (Dong-A Ilbo, 26/8/1976).

For its part, the US tried not to provoke China or the Soviet Union. It clearly understood the restraint being exercised by China and the Soviet Union as evidence of their lack of enthusiasm for North Korean belligerence, as well as their reluctance to be sharply critical of US reactions (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 390; 4/10/1976: 414-5).

US diplomacy toward China and the USSR was active. These two states were the ones to which the US paid most careful attention, especially when implementing a hostile policy toward North Korea. Both Communist superpowers were the indirect target of US policy toward North Korea. Kissinger had engaged in direct diplomatic communications with China. He reasoned that China had a pivotal geopolitical interest in any regional conflict involving North Korea. He knew that it was vital to keep the Chinese informed of US intentions during the Korean War and its aftermath (Head et al., 1978: 212). Ogawa, Japanese Ambassador to Peking, affirmed that China during these days had given priority to a peaceful resolution of the escalating conflict (Dong-A Ilbo, 28/8/1976). China's role in influencing the US to soften its stance was particularly important. Jack Anderson, using information from Ford's administration, argued that the sudden shift of the US attitude toward North Korea was probably a result of China's efforts. He argued that China advised the US through its Liaison Office in Washington that it was important to consider not only the literal expression of Kim's message but its context and Kim's situation (Dong-A Ilbo, 26/8/1976).

IV. Impact

IV.1. SOUTH KOREA

After the Poplar Tree crisis, Choi Kyu-ha, Prime Minister of South Korea, argued

on 4 September 1976 that North Korea would intensify its efforts to foster social unrest in South Korea. If North Korea could not expect a decisive military victory, it would harass the rear of South Korea. This South Korean perception of North Korea motivated its government to stiffen its internal cohesion (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/9/1976).

South Korea's negative image of North Korea had been reinforced in the 1970s. Since the January 21 and Pueblo crises, South Korea had experienced a series of North Korean provocations. South Korea discovered three underground tunnels from North Korea in 1974, 1975, and 1978 respectively. The Poplar crisis in 1976 and EC-121 incident in 1977 added to the already negative image that the South had of the North (Clough, 1986: 326). As stated earlier, Park Chung Hee defined the North Korean leader as a mad dog who was preparing an invasion of South Korea and continued to slander and deceive South Korea (Dong-A Ilbo, 20/8/1976).

These perceptions of North Korea motivated South Korea to prepare for an immediate retaliation if North Korea gave further provocations. The South Korean government also revised and energized its education policy on anti-communism with security-oriented education (C.B. Bae, 1989: 119-20).

IV.2. THE US (AND SOUTH KOREA)

After the Poplar Tree crisis, the US continued to see that North Korea's major goal was to destroy the military balance between the two Koreas by effecting the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Department of State Bulletin, 1/9/1976: 387). Given this perception, the US reaffirmed its commitment to the national security of South Korea and to US interest in the Korean peninsula. Although the US decision not to withdraw its forces from South Korea was not greatly influenced by the Poplar Tree crisis, the US reappraised the significance of effective US-South Korean military collaboration during the Poplar Tree crisis (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 392 & 4/10/1976: 1976). This experience prompted the US and South Korea to reconfirm their collaboration through a Joint Communiqué on 6 September. The communiqué emphasized that North Korea had a responsibility not

to attempt any provocative actions and that both the US and South Korea would maintain their commitment to react resolutely to any North Korean provocation (Dong-A Ilbo, 7/9/1976).

IV.3. NORTH KOREA

From the onset of the Poplar Tree crisis, North Korean leaders warned the population that the crisis could escalate into a full-scale war. They said that the US was trying to initiate a war of invasion step-by-step (Rodong Shinmun, 25/8/1976). Three months after the crisis, Rodong Shinmun (11/11/1976) argued that it was important for North Korea to provide a revolutionary base for achieving economic development and military build-up. Only in this way could North Korea's two national goals be realized: the total victory of socialism; and the reunification of the Korean peninsula.

As did South Korea, North Korea also made an effort to unite its people, especially through education. In his address to the students of Kim Il Sung University on 29 November 1976, Kim Il Sung stated that loyalty to the Party and the revolution was the ethos of the university. He stressed the need for complete preparedness for war at any time (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 130-1). And in 1977, the Supreme People's Congress declared that increasing military strength was of primary importance in North Korea's struggle against US imperialism (Naewoi Tongshin, IV: 246).

Summary

Since mid-1976, North Korea had accused the US of being a permanent enemy who was trying to initiate another Korean war. North Korea had consequently intensified its conflictual behavior toward the US. Inured to protracted conflict, the US did not take this North Korean intensified conflictual behavior seriously.

When North Korean soldiers killed two US soldiers on 18 August [Korean time],

the US perceived a foreign policy crisis. The core values threatened were: a dangerous precedent of killing Americans with impunity; the safety of UNC personnel; UNC's legitimate right which was guaranteed by the Armistice Agreement; and the existing structure of the Korean sub-system. The US felt a finite time to respond. Although no evidence of any North Korean thrust toward the DMZ was reported, the US could not exclude this possibility.

With a self-image as a superpower, the US was concerned over the escalation of the crisis into a conflict with China or the Soviet Union. To avoid this danger, Kissinger contacted China and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, believing that North Korea could not retaliate against the strong US response, Kissinger suggested stronger actions than the WSAG meetings recommended. Given the US institutionalized commitment to South Korea, Kissinger reasoned that a strong reaction to the deaths of the American soldiers was essential. Because of North Korea's provocations since the 1960s, South Korea's perception of North Korea was extremely negative. South Korea therefore was in favor of a strong reaction by the US. In these circumstances, the U.S. escalated its military maneuvers.

On 19 August [Korean time], Kim Il Sung ordered all North Korean military units into a war posture. An international crisis had developed. 'Operation Paul Bunyan' was a strategic maneuver by the US. It assumed no first reprisal by the US and was implemented to show that the US could and would counter any threat from North Korea to US rights and security. If North Korea interfered with the tree-cutting again, the US planned to retaliate. At this time, North Korea had not responded to the US three demands: admission of the criminal act; assurance of safety in the DMZ; and punishment of the killers.

Facing both US military escalation and the three demands, North Korea took a desperate countermeasure by sending a message of regret in the name of Kim Il Sung. This conciliatory gesture induced the US to decrease its level of hostility. On 6 September, the North Korean proposal of partitioning the Truce Village was accepted by the US, establishing new measures of security for the soldiers of both sides. After 7 September, the US and North Korea returned to normal relations, i.e.,

those of protracted conflict.

Brief Exposition of Crises/War in The Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict

In this section I apply the key variables and Models 2.1 through 2.3 to illustrate crises and war in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Cases cited are: (1) US intervention in the Korean War (1950); (2) Chinese intervention in the Korean War(1950); (2) the January 21 and Pueblo crises (1968); and (4) the Poplar Tree crisis (1976). A detailed and integrated analysis of these cases is provided in Chapter 7.

Model 2.3 deals with the behavioral patterns of states in a protracted conflict. It illustrates that an international crisis or war erupts when decision-makers of adversarial states choose to escalate their hostile behavior. The war between the US and China erupted as a result of their military intervention in the Korean War. Following the Pueblo crisis, ordering the US Enterprise to Wonsan resulted in an international crisis. Following the North Korean soldiers' killing of two US soldiers in 1976, the directing of the US Midway to Korea and North Korea's war alert precipitated the Poplar Tree crisis.

Model 2.2 illustrates the dynamics of decision-making.

US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR: North Korea's invasion of South Korea represented an environmental change, triggering a US foreign policy crisis. Values threatened were: the UN collective security system and containment of USSR expansion. The rapidly deteriorating military situation in South Korea gave the US an impression of the heightened likelihood of war with the communist side and a time limit in which to respond. The US perception of the USSR as an evil enemy and of North Korea as an aggressor with no intention of withdrawing convinced US decision-makers that no other choice remained but direct and intensified US military intervention.

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR: To China, numerous

US policy shifts and intensified conflictual behavior toward North Korea (e.g., sending ground forces in the war; MacArthur's Inchon landing (15/9/1950); and US/UN forces crossing of the 38th parallel) were environmental changes, triggering a foreign policy crisis. The threatened values were security of its industrial base in Manchuria; the possibility of US exploitation of its internal instability; revolutionary interest; and the presence of imperialist US forces on its border. Chinese decision-makers perceived a time limit for blocking US forces before they reached China's doorstep. The inevitability of war with the US was accepted by Chinese decision-makers.

China's deep-rooted negative image of the US as a long-term enemy and an imperialist power was confirmed by a series of sudden US policy shifts. It led Chinese decision-makers to gradually strengthen their commitment to block any US advance by redeploying troops from Hunan to Manchuria (June-July 1950); by reconsidering intervention (July-October); and by reinforcing the North-East Localized Troops (August). At a conference (2-7 October), China concluded that it was better to take the initiative and attack the US if a war was unavoidable. China therefore decided to intervene.

THE JANUARY 21 AND PUEBLO CRISES: The North Korean commando raid on 21 January 1968 triggered a foreign policy crisis in South Korea. The value threatened was security. Decision-makers of South Korea perceived a moderate time limit in which to retaliate and they anticipated military clashes in the near future. South Korea's willingness to retaliate forcefully, however, was restrained by the US.

North Korea's capture of the USS Pueblo on 23 January 1968 triggered a US foreign policy crisis. The threatened values were US national prestige as a superpower and the survival of the Pueblo and its crew. US decision-makers experienced a finite response period. They could not exclude the probability of North Korean military action. The US initial decision to take a firm and resolute stand was significantly influenced by its perception of North Korea as supported by the USSR, as well as North Korea's intensified provocations over a period of 14 months. However, a serious concern that military escalation might induce Soviet

intervention led the US to restrain its provocative behavior.

The crisis began to deescalate when the US showed its readiness to negotiate. In negotiation, Kim Il Sung concentrated not so much on national interest as on national prestige and his self-image. When Kim Il Sung concluded that the US had been humiliated publicly, he decided to release the Pueblo and its crew. The crisis ended.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS: The Poplar Tree crisis was triggered by North Korea. To the US, the North Korean soldiers' killing of two US soldiers in the JSA was a serious environmental change. It threatened the safety of UNC personnel and the US military; UNC's legitimate right; and the stability of the Korean sub-system. A deadline to respond was set by US decision-makers. The probability of military movement by North Korea could not be ignored.

US decision-makers' perception of North Korea at first led the US to counter with a strong and resolute response. Park Chung Hee's exaggerated image of Kim Il Sung predisposed him to agree readily with the US stance. In dealing forcefully with the crisis, the US wished to maintain its previous commitments: to protect South Korea; to block communist expansion; and to protect the security of the US and Japan. However, recognition of China/the USSR interest in the region forced the US to choose an appropriate amount of pressure toward North Korea in order not to provoke China/the USSR.

On 21 August, Kim Il Sung sent a message of regret, which eventually led the US to soften its stand. The US, urged by other nations, especially China, accepted North Korea's regret. Kim's message was interpreted as unusually conciliatory behavior. On 6 September, the crisis ended.

Model 2.1 analyses the sources of protracted conflict. In addition to the fact that the crises cited above erupted due to the involved states' willingness to protect their national interest as well as identity, these crises expanded the inter-Korean protracted conflict which was rooted in national interest and identity. For example, the Korean War intensified pre-war inter-Korean conflict over territory, legitimacy,

and ideology. Both the January 21 and Pueblo crises and the Poplar Tree crisis led both Koreas to institutionalize intensively their commitments to protect their security and ideology. A combined protracted conflict of interest and identity resulted.

This brief explanation shows that a threat to ideology and/or national security triggers a state's foreign policy crisis. Decision-makers' commitments on both sides are made to protect core values. Negative perceptions of the adversary [Model 2.2] lead them to escalate conflictual behavior, resulting in numerous international crises/wars [Model 2.3]. Furthermore, a combined protracted conflict of national interest and identity develops as international crises/war are repeated [Model 2.1]. Thus key variables and models in this study demonstrate their utility in explaining international crises/war in a protracted conflict.

Notes to Chapter 4

Complete authors' names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography.

1. For a general introduction to Korean history, see W.K. Han (1970). For the contemporary history of Korea, see M.K. Kang (1984).
2. M.H. Heo (1990) demonstrates that during the period, August 1945 - August 1946, there were 1299 strikes in which 229,998 Koreans participated. Heo argues that these events occurred because workers' wages had been lowered even below those of the Japanese occupation period, and because peasants were dissatisfied with the South's insufficient land reform.
3. For Rhee's 'policy of bluff,' see H.J. Lee (1988), 337-347.
4. The 'policy of bluff' and 'march-to-the north' slogans were related to each other. For example, Rhee's demand for military aid from the US was not for self-defense, but to achieve unification (Rah, 1991: 31; H.J. Lee, 1988: 287).
5. P.W. Han (1991: 95). For Rhee's request for more arms from the US, see also FRUS, 1950, VII: 130.
6. Telegram from Muccio to Acheson (FRUS, 1950, VII: 131).
7. John Foster Dulles' interview over CBS on 1 July, Department of State Bulletin (10/7/1950: 50).
8. Only a few days before the North Korean attack, a staff of the US Economic Co-operation Administration had assured a Congressional committee that the South Koreans could defend themselves (Warner, 1951). In addition, Rhee's 'march-to-the north' slogan might have resulted in the US overestimation of South Korea's military capability.

9. The day after the North Korean attack, Rhee already decided to move his government to Taejon. This decision was made without consultation with any of his staffs and was not changed despite Muccio's plea not to do so (FRUS, 1950, VII: 141-3).
10. They included: from the State Department, Secretary Acheson, Under Secretary Webb, Assistant Secretaries Hickerson and Rusk, Ambassador Jessup; from Department of Defense, Secretary Johnson, Secretary Pace of the Army, Secretary Francis P. Matthews of the Navy, Secretary Finletter of the Air Force; from the Joints Chiefs of Staff, General Bradley, General J. Lawton Collins, Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, and General Hoyt S. Vandenberg (Paige, 1968: 125).
11. A remark made by John M. Chang, the South Korean Ambassador in the US, when he visited Dean Rusk.
12. The term "limited challenge" was first used by General Bradley (Testimony of General Omar N. Bradley, Hearings, Part II, 1070, cited in Paige, 1968: 170, fn. 97).
13. Ambassador Jessup, Interview with Glenn D. Paige, July 28th, 1955 (Paige, 1968: 173).
14. Paige (1968: 253) insists that MacArthur's cable reached the Pentagon at 3:00 a.m.
15. Stoessinger (1985: 67) argues that Pace communicated with Truman at 5 a.m.
16. General Marshall's policy urged the US not to intervene in the Chinese civil war (Tsou, 1963: 558).
17. John Foster Dulles, Department of State Bulletin (10/7/1950: 49-50).
18. See also Whiting (1960: 58) and Paige (1968: 210).
19. About 180,000 soldiers from the Fourth Field Army.
20. The redeployment of Chinese troops is usually cited as evidence that China was preparing to intervene in the Korean War. Farrar-Hockley (1984), however,

argues that the redeployment of troops from south to north-east China was actually a "demobilization" of Chinese troops. He reasons that the returned soldiers engaged in production work as their comrades did in other regions.

21. For example, when Chow Ching-Wen met Lin Biao at Peking 2 September, Lin asked Chow about the possibility of North Korean guerrilla warfare without Chinese direct involvement (D.B. Park, 1990, cited in B.J. Lee, 1990: 241).

22. After the Inchon landing, President Rhee of South Korea again declared the necessity of liberating the northern part of the Korean peninsula, and of creating a unified, democratic Korea (Hausman, 1991: 113).

23. Ambassador Austin clarified on 30 September the US position on crossing the 38th parallel. He stated that the 38th parallel was artificial, that it had no basis for its existence, and that North Korea itself denied the reality of such a line through its armed aggression (Goodrich, 1956: 130-1).

24. For example, Senator Knowland of California claimed that not to invade North Korea was simply appeasement (Lebow, 1981: 176).

25. Dulles' statement was made before Committee I on 27 November 1950. See Department of State Bulletin (1950: 990).

26. George and Smoke (1974: 170-2) argued that US leaders' perception of Korea as not being strategically important and their subsequent policy made them insensitive to the available warnings of a North Korean attack. The case of US leaders' failure to receive accurately Chinese warnings of intervention paralleled US insensitivity to a North Korean attack.

27. In South Korea at this time, there were two conflicting factions on the question of priority between security and democracy. One group insisted upon more democracy for the sake of security, and the other advocated strong national security for the sake of democracy in the long term (S.S. Park, 1991: 306).

28. According to a poll conducted by Dong-A Ilbo on 3 June 1990, the older

generation (those in their 50s or over) who experienced the Korean war disliked North Korea more than the young (those in their 30s and 40s) (S.S. Park, 1991: 303).

29. The anti-communist National Security Law (NSL) was enacted when the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion broke out led by pro-communist military groups. The NSL defined North Korea as a mere anti-Korean political organization and outlawed any contact between South Koreans and any communist countries (S.S. Park, 1991: 309).

30. In 1960, the per capita GNP of South Korea was \$79, whereas that of North Korea was \$137. In 1972, both Korea's GNPs were equal at \$316. In 1988, South Korea's per capita GNP was \$4,040, whereas North Korea's was \$980 (S.S. Park, 1991: 308).

31. Y.H. Chyung (1961: 308-11). For more details, see H.J. Lee (1988: 373-383).

32. This was disclosed by North Korean Second Lieut. Kim Shinjo who was captured. On 6 February, North Korea for the first time admitted its assassination attempt. This admission was heard through the loudspeaker broadcast beamed at South Korean soldiers in the demilitarized zone.

33. For the relationship of the four-pronged military line with the policy of strengthening three revolutionary forces, see J.C. Baek (1989: 333-7).

34. On 10 April 1965, Kim Il Sung visited Jakarta, Indonesia, where he confessed that there were three obstacles to implementing guerrilla war in South Korea. These were (1) U.S. forces in South Korea; (2) South Korean leaders' anti-communism; (3) South Koreans' strong anti-communism.

35. North Korea's first seven-year economic development plan was officially extended for three years at the meeting of North Korea's Communist Party representatives in October 1966.

36. They were composed of Premier Chung Il Kwon, Defense Minister Kim Sung Eun, Home Minister Lee Ho, and Foreign Minister Choi Kyu Ha.

37. They included 2 squadrons of MIG-21 jets, 4 submarines operating out of Wonsan, heavy tanks, anti-surface vessel missiles, and high-speed torpedo boats (Mainichi Daily News, 5/2/1968).
38. In 1967, 566 North Korean infiltrations and the killing of 122 UN soldiers occurred. During the first 26 days of 1968, North Korea was responsible for 66 infiltrations and 36 killings of UN soldiers (S.S. Cho, 1969: 30).
39. US Congress, House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Investigation of Korean-American Relations, Part 4, 95th Congress, 1st session, 22 June 1977 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), 37, cited in Yang-Moon (1988: 62).
40. President Park Chung Hee of South Korea told U.S. Ambassador William Porter that the January 21 crisis, from the perspective of South Korea's security, should be considered as more threatening than the Pueblo crisis, and that if North Korea's attempts to raise tensions continued, the economic development of South Korea must be impeded. Thus South Korea had no choice but to react firmly to North Korea (Hanguk Ilbo, 27/1/1968). To Park Chung Hee, the January 21 crisis was a threat not only to national security but also to economic prosperity, which were the two primary goals of Park's national policy.
41. For the indicated problems of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty, see commentaries by Pong-sik Park and Che-suk Sohn in Hanguk Ilbo (10-11 and 14/2/1968).
42. These were Dean Rusk, the Secretary of State; McNamara, Defense Minister; Wheeler, the Chief of JCS; Helms, the CIA Chief.
43. White House Central File, "Notes on the Presidential Meeting with the NSC," 24 June 1968, Lyndon B. Johnson Library Case #NLJ 83-25, Document #8a.
44. This US willingness was reported on 24 January 1968 to President Park of South Korea by US Ambassador William Porter (Mainichi Daily News, 25/1/1968).

45. For the text of Bucher's confession, see New York Times (25/1/1968).
46. According to the Pentagon, the 14,787 reservists comprised of 9,340 Air Force National Guardsmen, 4,847 Air Force reservists, and 600 Navy air reservists in 16 states and the District of Columbia (Mainichi Daily News, 27/1/1968). For the text of Johnson's order on call-up, see New York Times (26/1/1968).
47. Gathered at the meeting were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under Secretary Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, CIA Director Richard Helms, Chairman of JCS General Earle G. Wheeler, and lower-ranking administration specialists on the Far East.
48. For more details, see Hanguk Ilbo (10 & 14/2/1968).
49. The JSA (Joint Security Area) is a roughly circular area of the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone). The MAC (Military Armistice Commission) meetings are held in the JSA. It is a neutral area, maintained and patrolled by North Korean and UNC sides. Each side is permitted to have 35 armed guards in the JSA at any given time. Some specific tasks such as pruning of trees had been carried out without prior notice to the other (Department of State Bulletin, 27/9/1976: 387-8).
50. The DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) is the 4-kilometer band that separates the two Koreas. The JSA (Joint Security Area) is the circle 800-meter in diameter within the DMZ. Under the 1953 armistice agreement, the JSA has been a neutral zone where both the US or South Korean and North Korean soldiers' free movements are guaranteed.
51. For details, see the formal statement by the UNC, read at the 379th MAC (Military Armistice Commission) meeting on 19 August; NYT (19/8/1976); Newsweek (30/8/1976: 51).
52. They were the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., and Under-Secretary for Political Affairs Philip Habib.
53. The WSAG was created in 1969 by President Nixon for crisis decision-making.

Although it had become a routine meeting by 1976, its major function was to discuss crises (Head et al., 1978: 179).

54. They included Secretary of State Henry Kissinger; William Clements, Jr., deputy secretary of defense; Deputy Assistant Secretary Morton Abramowitz; Philip Habib, under-secretary for political affairs; Admiral James Holloway from JCS; William G. Hyland, the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs; George Bush from CIA; and others.

CHAPTER 5. ACCOMMODATION ATTEMPTS IN THE INTER-KOREAN PROTRACTED CONFLICTS

In Chapter 2, I indicated that there are two different behavioral patterns between adversaries in a protracted conflict: a series of crises/wars and of accommodation attempts. In Chapter 4, I dealt with four cases of crisis or war in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. In this chapter, I deal with three cases of accommodation attempts: the Armistice Agreement (1953); the July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué (1972); and the North-South Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation, as well as the Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (1992).

I examine the cases of accommodation attempts in subsequential phases: initiation; negotiation and accommodation; and implementation. For the initiation phase, I examine what environmental changes spur decision-makers to perceive an opportunity for accommodation. As for the negotiation and accommodation phases, focus is on exchange and adjustment of the involved states' positions on their national interest and/or identity. I finally concentrate on the extent and the ways that national interest and identity affect the implementation of their agreements.

Case 1. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, 1953

US Secretary of State Dulles once stated that the Korean armistice negotiations were the most difficult in his forty years' experience in international affairs (Bailey, 1992: 138). The Korean armistice negotiations lasted two years and seven months, i.e. from the end of 1950 through 27 July 1953, with some adjournments (22 August to October 1951; and 8 October 1952 to 6 April 1953). In the course of the negotiations, 159 plenary meetings and some 500 meetings at a subsidiary level were held. Documents reveal a vast verbiage, 18 million words (Bailey, 1992: 70; H.J. Kim, 1989: 251). Few studies, however, have been devoted to the protracted negotiations of the Korean armistice (Bernstein, 1983: 263)¹.

I now turn to the question of why these negotiations were so prolonged. I begin with the failure of the first serious initiative for cease-fire talks (end of 1951 to early 1952). This is followed by an examination of the negotiation phase during the Truman years (June 1951 to early 1953). Finally I analyse the Eisenhower administration's cease-fire policy.

I. Initiation Failure (End of 1951 to Early 1952)

Although a proposal for a cease-fire was initiated on 25 June 1950, by Ernst Gross, the US Ambassador to the UN², the first serious attempt to end the war was made in early December, 1950³.

When US/UN forces reached the Sino-Korean border on 26 October 1950, US decision-makers thought that their primary goal had almost been achieved. The Chinese troops, however, launched a massive attack on the US/UN forces at the end of November. MacArthur's forces had to retreat. Truman then stated on 9 December that the US was prepared to end the fighting in Korea through

negotiations (H.J. Kim, 1989: 226). The US signaled again on 15 December that it would agree to a cease-fire based on the establishment of a demilitarized zone twenty miles deep, the southern boundary of which was the 38th parallel. The US, however, clarified that it would not accept the People's Republic of China (the PRC) as representative at the UN.

The PRC initially rejected the US proposal on 22 December because it did not satisfy China's political goals: (1) the total withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea; (2) the abandonment of US protection of Taiwan; and (3) The PRC's admission to the UN (New China News Agency 22/12/1950, cited in Simmons, 1975: 187). On 23 January 1951, Zhou En-lai demonstrated China's softened posture by saying that, if foreign troops were withdrawn from Korea, China would advise the CPVs to return. Zhou's statement revealed China's willingness to discuss the cease-fire in more concrete terms. However, Zhou wanted a definitive affirmation of the legitimate status of China in the UN (NYT, 23/1/1951), which the US clearly rejected. The US/UN, moreover, contrary to China's expectation, branded China an "aggressor" at the UN⁴ on 30 January 1951. Responding to the US/UN actions, China defined the US as "the deadly enemy of world peace" (People's Daily, 2/2/1951) and halted any effort to negotiate. Zhou's proposal was nullified.

Thus the first opportunity for serious negotiations had passed. Each party ignored the other's conciliatory signals. The PRC's insistence on its national interests nullified the US initiative for negotiations. The US effort to brand China an aggressor undermined China's self-esteem. The cease-fire initiatives by both sides failed to achieve any negotiations. Until January 1951, there had been no obstacles which significantly prolonged the negotiations in the following 1.5 years (Simmons, 1975: 190). For example, before early 1951 the POW issue had not been pressing. When it did become a major issue, it contributed to the protracted negotiations of later days.

II. Negotiation

II.1. INITIATION (23 June 1951)

The second serious attempt at cease-fire negotiations was initiated by the Soviets. After meetings with Kennan on 31 May and 5 June, Malik, on 23 June 23 1951, called for a ceasefire. The significance of Malik's statement was that it did not refer to China's previous three goals (Bailey, 1992: 67; Simmons, 1975: 199). Malik's proposal, however, was not well received by China/the DPRK or the US.

China/the DPRK were reluctant to accept the Malik proposal because the alliance between China/the DPRK and the USSR had become strained (Simmons, 1975). For example, China was emphasizing the ideas of Mao Tse Tung rather than Stalin in establishing Chinese communism. Displeased with the USSR's breach of its promise to support North Korea during the Korean War, North Korea was emphasizing the importance of the Korean War for the security of the USSR (Simmons, 1975). As direct actors in the Korean War, both China and North Korea were suspicious of the outsider's (eg. USSR's) real goals and commitments (Toland, 1991: 474).

The US was also uncertain about the USSR's intentions, believing that the USSR might have aggressive motives in encouraging peace talks⁵. The ceasefire could possibly be designed to lead to the collapse of the Western allies; to eliminate Western influence in the Korean peninsula; or to frustrate Western rearmament efforts (Foot, 1985: 161-162). These US interpretations arose out of US decision-makers' perception of the USSR as an opportunistic power (ibid: 162). All the belligerent parties, however, finally decided to negotiate a ceasefire. Why?

II.1.a. Environmental Changes

By June 1951, the US, China, and North Korea perceived environmental changes. They had experienced drastic casualties; a failure to implement their previous policies; and the increased risk of a general war between the US and the USSR.

II.1.a.1. The United States

In mid-May 1951⁶, the US reevaluated and reestablished its commitments in Asia in NSC 48/5. The stated immediate US goals were (1) the termination of hostilities under an "appropriate armistice arrangement"; (2) the establishment of South Korea at least as far north as the 38th parallel; (3) the withdrawal of non-Korean armed forces from the peninsula. This signaled that the US had again shifted its main goal on the Korean peninsula from victory over the Communists (the US position of October 1950) into containment of the Communists (the US pre-war position) (Fehrenbach, 1963: 477-478). NSC 48/5 concluded that the US should seek to prevent the escalation of the Korean conflict into a general war with the USSR or of its extension beyond Korea into a conflict with China, without the support of major allies (FRUS, 1951, VII.: 439-442, 17/5/1951). Acknowledging that the US current goal had become containment rather than victory over the communist side, the next step was to create conditions favorable to a settlement of the Korean conflict (Toland, 1991: 471). Why then did the US again change its goal in the Korean War?

First, the US was concerned about its security and economic interests. The dramatic increase in casualties of the US/UN forces⁷, caused by the Chinese spring assaults in 1951 pushed the US to consider a ceasefire. To continue the war, the US would have to spend 900 million dollars per year (FRUS, 1950, I: 478). The US decision-makers thus concluded that the US might have greater personnel and material losses if it continued the fighting. Second, the US did not want to take the risk of a military conflict with the USSR. Thus, as long as Soviet influence in the Korean peninsula could be blocked and US interests in the Far East were not compromised, a negotiated cease-fire was perceived as advantageous. The achievement of a cease-fire at this time was described by Kennan as a "much greater blessing" (FRUS, 1951, VII, 1: 538).

II.1.a.2. China

During the Korean war, China achieved some politico-diplomatic goals:

establishing China as a great military power in Asia due to its victory over the US/UN forces. China also gained security benefits: driving the US forces back from the Yalu River and leaving North Korea a secure buffer against US incursions in the future (Alexander, 1987: 430). These aims were accomplished, however, at the cost of 1.2 million casualties. The US assault in May devastated the CPVs' communication and transportation systems. China recognized that victory over the US/UN forces was an impossible goal (Simmons, 1975: 194). In addition, Truman signaled in June that the US would use the atom bomb unless the fighting stopped. Considering the USSR's breach of promise⁸, the impossibility of reconquering South Korea, and the US threat to its security, China concluded that it was too risky to continue the war. China was forced to revise its policy.

Among the three options⁹, i.e., deadlock, cease-fire, a total counterattack against the US force, Chinese decision-makers chose the cease-fire (B.R. Shin, 1989: 260). They believed that, if China could recover the pre-war situation, a cease-fire along the 38th parallel would be the wisest choice¹⁰ (Agent Report, 308th CIC Det., cited in B.R.Shin, 1989: 261). If not the best option, it was nevertheless the only way to gain support from its allies in a future war. This option could also save China's face with its allies (ibid.). Mao Tse Tung now ordered the CPV to engage in an "active defence" (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 160).

II.1.a.3. North Korea

North Korea perceived continuation of the war against the US/UN, with its superior firepower as too great a risk to its security. Rehabilitating the national economy was perceived as a paramount goal. On 14 August 1951, Kim Il Sung stated that it was necessary for North Korea to have peace in order to rebuild and develop the demolished industry and the people's economy (H.J. Kim, 1989: 313). There was also the need to prevent the worsening of diplomatic relations with the USSR. These considerations forced North Korea to consider a ceasefire. Its goal now shifted from unifying Korea to maintaining the pre-war status quo. Radio Pyongyang (27/6/1951, cited in Simmons, 1975: 206, fn. 50) broadcast that the enemy must be

driven south of the 38th parallel. Formerly, North Korea had insisted that the US/UN forces should be driven out of the entire Korean peninsula.

II.1.a.4. The USSR

In May-June 1951, the USSR did not want a general war with the US or a possible defeat (Fehrenbach, 1991: 478). If military competition with the US continued, a general war seemed inevitable (Strausz-Hupé, The Saturday Evening Post, 24, 1951, cited in B.R. Shin, 1989: 262). The USSR was not ready for another world war. Its politico-diplomatic interest pushed it to consider a ceasefire. Considering the worsening military situation, the USSR calculated that it might lose North Korea if the situation deteriorated further (Bacchus, 1974). The Chinese intervention in the Korean War was assessed as a significant factor that increased Chinese influence at the expense of Soviet influence in North Korea. It was thought wise to negotiate a ceasefire to prevent China from increasing its influence and to maintain China/North Korea's dependence on the USSR (B.R. Shin, 1989: 263).

In sum, by June 1951: the US goal of unifying Korea had failed; the Chinese goal of sweeping US/UN forces out of the Korean peninsula had failed; and North Korea's goal of unifying Korea by force had failed. None of the combatants had achieved its goal (Berger, 1964: 140). A drastic increase in casualties on both sides; the perceptions of failures of their objectives; and the risks attached to continuing the war pushed all sides to consider cease-fire negotiations. Each party perceived the need for compromise to prevent the worsening of its military security, economic conditions, and politico-diplomatic interests. Thus the value of a cease-fire and a return to the pre-war status quo (or containment) was shared on a mutual basis.

II.2. NEGOTIATION

On 30 June 1951, Ridgway sent a message to the CPV/DPRK command, suggesting a meeting to discuss an armistice. It responded on 1 July in a message from Kim Il Sung (DPRK) and Peng Dehuai (China), suggesting a meeting between 10 and 15 July at Kaesong. The US promptly¹¹ accepted the CPV/DPRK offer.

At their preliminary meetings to consider cease-fire negotiations, both sides expressed indirectly their major concern, which was security. At the first negotiating session at Kaesong on 10 July, the CPV/DPRK offered: (1) an immediate cease-fire; (2) withdrawal of forces to opposite sides of the 38th parallel; (3) removal of all non-Korean troops from the Korean peninsula; and (4) once this was done, POWs would be exchanged and peace declared. The US counter offer was: (1) adoption of the agenda; (2) limitation of discussion to purely military matters related to Korea only; (3) cessation of hostilities in Korea under conditions that would protect against resumption of armed conflict in Korea; and (4) agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea. Others included were: (1) composition, authority and functions of a military armistice commission; (2) agreement on the principle of inspection within Korea by military inspection teams; (3) composition and functions of these terms; and (4) arrangements pertaining to POWs.

Both sides were obsessed with security. The CPV/DPRK was afraid that strong US/UN forces remaining in South Korea could threaten North Korea, thereby endangering China's buffer in the future (Alexander, 1987: 434-7). The US feared that, if its forces were pulled out of Korea, China could send massive reinforcements to North Korea, thus endangering South Korea (Schnabel and Watson, 1991). Both sides, however, had different views on security requirements. The US demanded an armistice commission and a demilitarized zone. China/the DPRK wanted withdrawal of US/UN forces from Korea. Both sides thus began the cease-fire talks with deeply clashing interests.

On 25 July 1951, North Korea withdrew its insistence on troop withdrawal from Korea as an agenda item, altering insistence to simply a recommendation to the governments on both sides (Alexander, 1987: 438). This enabled the negotiation agenda to be adopted on 26 July. The agenda as presented was as follows:

- (1) Fixing a military demarcation line and a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea [Item 2];
- (2) Concrete arrangements for a cease-fire and armistice, including the composition and authority of a supervisory organization for carrying out

the terms of the cease-fire and armistice [Item 3];

- (3) Arrangements relating to prisoners of war [Item 4];
- (4) Recommendations to the governments concerned on both sides [Item 5].

My study will concentrate on the first three issues of the agenda. Compared to others, Item 5 did not contribute to the prolongation of negotiations. Both parties held 8 meetings and spent only 11 hours on item 5.

II.2.a. Item 2 [On the Location of the Demarcation Line]

There were 65 meetings on Item 2 involving 186.6 hours. The US proposed that the demarcation line be a zone 20 miles wide, running from the existing line of contact, which was slightly above the 38th parallel¹². China/the DPRK proposed that the demarcation line should be the 38th parallel and that the two sides should each withdraw 10 kilometers (Bailey, 1992: 78).

II.2.a.1. Negotiation Failure (27 July - 22 August 1951)

What the US looked for in a demarcation line was not real estate per se, but military security during the armistice. Having experienced the numerous clashes along the 38th parallel before the Korean War, the 38th parallel was not perceived by US decision-makers as desirable (Goulden, 1982: 569). The US thus wanted a demilitarized zone above the 38th parallel as maximum assurance against a possible renewal of aggression by China/the DPRK (Bailey, 1992: 78). North Korea, however, wanted territory. Fearing that the armistice could become a permanent settlement, North Korea did not want to lose the territory it had occupied before the war (Pravda, 15/8/1951, cited in Berger, 1964: 144). The clashes between the US's security interest and North Korea's territorial interest, as well as other factors¹³ led to the failure of any agreement on Item 2. Negotiation meetings were recessed and both sides stepped up conflictual behaviors toward each other.

II.2.a.2. Hostility Escalation (23 August - 24 October 1951)

Suspicious of CPV/DPRK commitments in Korea, the US implemented 'Operation Hudson Harbor' between September and October, simulating an atomic attack. Although China/the DPRK became more confident by the summer and autumn of 1951 of their capacity of holding the battle line¹⁴, the US 'Operation Hudson Harbor' recalled to North Korean leaders the devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 165). China accused the US of threatening China as well as North Korea.

In early September 1951, the US-Japan Security Treaty was concluded and was perceived by China/the DPRK as a serious security threat (ibid.). Both the US and Japan were seen as war criminals by China/the DPRK. China declared that the US-Japan treaty increased the menace of war and was an exercise by the US in military adventurism (Simmons, 1975: 220). In response, China/the USSR issued a joint communique emphasizing China's concern for not only practical interests but also those of communism in the east (People's Daily, 16/9/1951, cited in Simmons, 1975: 219-220).

During the recess period both sides experienced a mirror image (Alexander, 1987: 437). Suspicious of China/the DPRK's motives and commitments in negotiating a cease-fire, the US escalated its military and diplomatic actions. China/the DPRK's suspicion of the US as a powerful imperialist, coupled with the latter's intensified hostility, led China/the DPRK to respond in kind.

II.2.a.3. Agreement

Talks were resumed on 25 October, when both sides had begun to modify their positions. China/the DPRK stopped insisting on the 38th parallel as a demarcation line (Alexander, 1987: 449; Bailey, 1992: 78). The US offered to accept a line further south and narrowed the demilitarized zone. On 7 November, China/the DPRK proposed that the existing line of contact be the demarcation line and that both sides withdraw two kilometers to form a demilitarized zone (Alexander, 1987: 449). On 27 November, the UNC accepted the China/DPRK's proposal, provided an

armistice were achieved within thirty days¹⁵.

Factors stimulating the agreement on Item 2 were each side's increased need for compromise. China, still consolidating its revolution, did not have the capability to continue the war and was seriously concerned over its dependence on the USSR. North Korea, smashed by US bombings and ground warfare, was also eager to end the conflict. The US was seeking a settlement and compromise (Bernstein, 1983: 271-272). To this end, the US increased its military and diplomatic actions. Once agreement was reached on the demarcation line, the US/UN force reduced the scale of its military operations (Bailey, 1992: 79).

II.2.b. Item 3 [Supervising the Armistice]: (27 November 1951 - 7 May 1952)

Negotiations on Item 3 took five months and ten days, from 27 November 1951 through 7 May 1952. 156 meetings were held and 239.6 hours were spent on negotiations over Item 3, which was concerned about the concrete arrangements for an armistice, including methods of supervision. Its focus, however, was on the issue of the Soviets' qualifications as a supervisory commission member and on that of airfield rehabilitation.

On 27 November 1951, when negotiations on Item 3 began, both sides immediately agreed on some points¹⁶. The remaining issues were more difficult to resolve. The US wanted (1) a guarantee¹⁷ of no increase in military forces, supplies, or facilities by either side, and (2) free access by the armistice commission and joint observer teams to all parts of Korea. China/the DPRK, however, argued (1) that if foreign troops withdrew from Korea, free access for joint observer teams was entirely unnecessary, and (2) that the proposed ban on the increase of military forces and facilities would be an interference in the internal affairs of North Korea (Bailey, 1992: 82).

From the end of November 1951 to early April 1952, the negotiators quarreled about the related issues of inspection of the armistice, membership on the commission supervising the armistice, and reconstruction of airfields (Bernstein, 1983: 272). By 28 April¹⁸, these issues were narrowed to two: (1) Soviet membership on

the supervisory commission, which the US resisted; and (2) reconstruction of airfields, which the Communists demanded (Hermes, 1966: 121). On 2 May, the communists endorsed part of the US proposal: withdrawal of the USSR from the armistice commission in return for unrestricted reconstruction of airfields. Five days later, an agreement on Item 3 was concluded.

Why was the US so intransigent on Item 3? The US did not want the USSR involved in the armistice commission. To Truman, the USSR was deeply involved in the war and thus should not be allowed to participate in a neutral commission. The US position was firm and irrevocable (Bernstein, 1983: 273). To the US, the major obstacle to talks was not in Panmunjom, but in Moscow. The USSR was perceived by Truman as a major obstacle to the progress of peace talks (Goulden, 1982: 590-591). US rivalry with the USSR was at the root of US intransigence on Item 3.

However, the existence of the USSR, ironically, was a factor in persuading North Korea to accept the US proposal. Kim Il Sung argued on 1 May 1952 that the Korean people should follow Leninism and 'Proletarian internationalism' based on Stalinism in order to protect the fatherland and its people. This indicated that North Korea committed itself to the USSR's cease-fire policy. In addition, Kim Il Sung, in the same statement, argued that peace was required for economic development and reconstruction (H.J. Kim, 1989: 315). To North Korea, acceptance of the USSR's cease-fire policy was essential for its economic development.

II.2.c. Item 4 [Arrangements Relating to POWs]

Although the official debate on Item 4 began on 27 November, the actual negotiations started on 11 December 1951 after the sub-delegation meetings (Bailey, 1992: 85; Joy, 1955: 148). The negotiations on Item 4 were the most troublesome and resulted in serious deadlock. Two hundred meetings were held and 344.5 hours expended on these negotiations. The issue at stake was which prisoners should be released after the armistice, to whom, and under what conditions (Goulden, 1982: 587). The US proposed a 'voluntary (or non-forcible) repatriation' of the POWs

of both sides. China/the DPRK argued that the US proposal contravened the Geneva Convention and proposed an immediate 'automatic repatriation' of all POWs. Here it would be better to review first the uniqueness of the Korean case in relation to the Geneva Convention.

II.2.c.1. Geneva Convention and the Korean Case

Article 118 of the Geneva Convention¹⁹ of 1949 stated: "Prisoners of war shall be repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities". The Korean War, however, created difficult problems in relation to POWs. The problems arose from the division of states with the same ethnicity. During the Korean War, the CPVs of the PRC had included some who were loyal to Nationalist China (i.e., the Formosa regime). North Korea also had incorporated some captured South Korean troops and citizens into its armies. Moreover, as the war raged back and forth across the 38th parallel, some Korean civilians had been captured along with communist soldiers (Bernstein, 1983: 275). Thus a large number of the Communist POWs held by the UNC were ex-South Korean and ex-Nationalist Chinese soldiers. Serious problems arose when thousands of CPV soldiers told US/UN interrogators that they wished to go to Formosa rather than return to China. Some DPRK POWs also wished to defect to the South (ibid). Repatriation of those who did not wish to return to their place of origin became the urgent question for the US as well as for China/the DPRK.

II.2.c.2. Initial Commitments of China and the US

When China/the DPRK rejected the US proposal of the principle of voluntary repatriation in January 1952, Mao Tse Tung declared that every Chinese POW in Korea must be repatriated (Friedman, 1975: 78). China feared loss of face and national humiliation if some POWs refused to return home (Bernstein, 1983: 278). This factor led China to take a decisive position on Item 4 even at the risk of a breakdown in negotiations. When negotiations on Item 4 began, Mao had instructed negotiators not to be afraid of calculated procrastination as the price of peace

(Toland, 1991: 493).

The US too was resolute on the principle of repatriation. At the mid-January meeting on the issue of voluntary repatriation, CIA, State, and Army officials recommended that the US should insist on voluntary repatriation even at the risk of China's breaking off negotiations, or even of another world war. The US wished to show that a majority of people opposed communism (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 181) and that many POWs from communist countries would forcibly resist returning to communist regimes (Alexander, 1987: 452).

Both parties' initial commitments to saving face or to maintaining national pride (e.g. communism vs non-communism) sowed the seeds of trouble for negotiations on Item 4. Why then did the US run the risk of expanding the war or of undermining the principle of the Geneva Convention by insisting upon voluntary repatriation?

II.2.c.3. US Rivalry with the Communist States

The US insisted on the principle of voluntary repatriation to foster the legitimacy of a democratic regime and to uphold its security interest.

First, the US wanted to demonstrate the victory of the Western allies over Communism. The US decision-makers believed that some CPV/DPRK POWs, if given a free choice, would choose not to return to a communist regime (Bailey, 1992: 87). If some of the CPV/DPRK soldiers refused to return, voluntary repatriation could serve as a propaganda victory in the Cold War, thus resulting in a victory in the world-wide contest with communist regimes for the support of neutral powers. Second, the US wished to use the principle of voluntary repatriation to block Soviet expansion. If the US established the precedent that POWs would not be automatically returned, the Communist states could not trust their soldiers not to defect in future wars. This distrust of their soldiers could serve as an effective deterrent against future aggression by the Soviets (Bernstein, 1983: 282-283, 305-306).

The US decision-makers²⁰ thus affirmed on 27 February 1952 that they would not return unwilling POWs. Voluntary repatriation became the US's irrevocable moral principle (ibid.: 279) and fixed goal (Foot, 1985: 174). US decision-makers,

however, did not realize that these commitments would produce a lengthy stalemate (Bernstein, 1983: 282). They seemed to believe that the Communists would concede or that some way of achieving voluntary repatriation could be found. In their opinion, selective bombing and simultaneous negotiations could end the war within a few months, or within a year, at the most (ibid).

II.2.c.4. US Misjudgment and Its Efforts to Compromise

After one month passed without an agreement on the principle of repatriation, China/the DPRK suggested on 2 April that instead of quarreling on the principle of repatriation, it would be better to look at the actual numbers of POWs who wished to repatriate (Bailey, 1992: 95). The US responded that about 116,000 of the 132,474 POWs would accept repatriation. The number of 116,000 repatriates was apparently more than the Communists had expected (Goulden, 1982: 594) and this stimulated their desire for ongoing negotiations (Bailey, 1992: 95). The US estimate, however, turned out to be widely inaccurate. Of the approximately 21,000 Chinese POWs held, only about 5,100 said they wished to go back to the PRC. Only about 64,900 POWs of the North Korean, South Korean, and civilian internees questioned, wished to return (ibid.: 100). The UN informed the Communist side that only about 70,000 POWs would be returning. When informed of these figures, the Communists totally rejected the concept of voluntary repatriation and suspended the talks on 20 April.

Acknowledging its miscalculation, the Truman administration decided to compromise (Goulden, 1982: 594). On 28 April, the US offered a compromise package proposal: the US would not oppose the rehabilitation and reconstruction of airfields in North Korea; it demanded in exchange that the Communists accede to the US position on the composition of the neutral commission to oversee the peace and the exchange of POWs (ibid.: 595). On 2 May, the Communists responded that they would abandon their hitherto-rigid insistence on the USSR being a member of the neutral commission. However, Nam Il, the chief negotiator for North Korea, insisted upon the return of 132,000 POWs and that no Chinese soldiers be left under the control of the UN. Truman did not want to make any further concessions (ibid.).

From 7 May 1952, negotiation on Item 4 remained deadlocked.

II.2.c.5. US Intensification of Military Pressure (May to September 1952)

Facing a deadlock, the Truman administration considered how to compel the communists to accede to US terms. The Truman administration gave priority to the value of force over diplomacy as a way of obtaining significant political concessions from the enemy²¹. They believed that the air war, by blasting North Korean cities and industries, might compel the Communists to yield.

On 23 June, more than 500 US planes began to bomb North Korea's hydroelectric plants, such as Supung dam²² on the Yalu River (Simmons, 1975: 216). The raid on Supung dam was the biggest single strike of the Korean war (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 187). These devastating attacks lasted three days. North Korea had a complete blackout of fifteen days and lost almost all its electrical power for the rest of the war (ibid.: 188). Manchuria lost 23% of its power requirements for the entire year, 1952, as a result of these raids. The New York Times (26/6/1952) reported that the raids were only the first step in an expanded US naval and air war to push China/the DPRK to accept a cease-fire. Beginning on 11 and 12 July, US bombers and South Korean planes again carried out a series of massive raids on Pyongyang (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 188).

While accelerating its military actions on 13 July, the UNC offered a slight increase in the number of POWs who would be repatriated, i.e. 83,000. China/the DPRK rejected this figure, declaring that this US concession was 'clearly incapable of settling the question' of repatriation. China reiterated its position that the repatriates should be 116,000, of whom 20,000 should be Chinese (Bailey, 1992: 110). The bombing of Pyongyang escalated on 29 August, culminating in a massive raid, the war's heaviest attack on the city (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 188). There were 1,403 sorties, and nearly 700 tons of bombs were dropped (Foot, 1987: 178). North Korea reported 6,000 civilian deaths from this one raid alone out of a population of less than 50,000 (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 188). An oil refinery at Aoji, eight miles from the Russian border and four miles from Manchuria, was bombed on 1

September for the first time (Simmons, 1975: 217).

II.2.c.6. US Perception and Institutionalized Commitments

The US decision to increase its coercive behavior against the communists was rooted in its perceptual, strategic, and tactical assumptions.

First, Truman's negative perception of the USSR determined his policy. The President saw China and North Korea as simply pawns of the USSR. To Truman, the Korean theatre was only part of US global strategy to block Soviet expansion as had been demonstrated in Greece and Turkey in 1948 as well as Berlin in 1948-49 (Bernstein, 1983: 288). In a war against an evil enemy, compromise was considered immoral. Truman thus probably believed that standing up to China/the DPRK on the issue of Item 4 was the only way to deter a future war initiated by the Soviets.

Second, the US stepped up its military pressure for a strategic purpose, which was to avoid giving the communists a perception of US weakness. At the meeting of 15 September, Truman and high-ranking members of the Defense Department and the JCS agreed that any sign of weakness on the US part and any evidence of being willing to negotiate indefinitely would merely convince the Communists that the US would make further concessions (ibid.: 299). One week later, Truman still held to his opinion that there could be no prospect of an armistice if there were no continuing military pressure.

Third, military escalation had been pursued for tactical reasons. Truman was not willing to accept an armistice which would place China in a position to renew the fighting. Accepting a false armistice would mean that the US would lose the gains it had achieved in Korea since June 1950 (Goulden, 1982: 622). In addition, once Truman's determination had been phrased publicly as a matter of moral principle, retreat seemed to be impossible (Bernstein, 1983: 296).

Truman's perception of the communists, coupled with his institutionalized commitments, made a US compromising stance extremely difficult.

II.2.c.7. The Six-Months Recess

On 28 September, the US delivered its final offer: let the POWs choose whether they wanted to go home, under either the scrutiny of a commission from neutral nations, or the International Red Cross (Bernstein, 1983: 303). Nam Il of North Korea replied that he could not find anything in the US proposal that met the 'reasonable requirement' of the Communist side and he reiterated that all the Chinese POWs must be repatriated (Bailey, 1992: 111). Faced with the procrastination of the communists, the US announced on October 8 an indefinite recess and withdrew from the talks. Eight days later, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai also acknowledged the futility of continued talks. All negotiations ceased.

The US decision-makers believed that military force was the extension of diplomacy. Thus they were convinced that successful negotiations on Item 4 would depend upon heavy bombing (Bernstein, 1983: 296). However, after months of the heaviest bombing of the entire war, the US strategy of Truman's administration seemed to be a failure.

II.2.d. The US versus China

A US President-elect who had campaigned on the pledge "I shall go to Korea"²³, Eisenhower was determined to fulfil it. He and his advisors agreed that the only strategy to break the stalemate and end the conflict was to "make the other side want to end it" (Eisenhower, 1963, I: 96) by showing US decisiveness (Middleton, 1965: 223). In Eisenhower's perception, the enemy would not be impressed by words, but by deeds (Caridi, Korean War and American Politics, 1968: 253, cited in Foot, 1985: 205).

II.2.d.1. Eisenhower Brought Into Focus on China

Believing that there was nothing left to be destroyed in North Korea (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 191), Eisenhower switched the focus of US commitment from North Korea to China. After he took office, Eisenhower announced on 2 February 1953 two policies vis-à-vis China.

First, Eisenhower posed an indirect threat to China by reassigning US forces

guarding Taiwan (i.e., Formosa regime). The US Seventh Fleet would no longer be a buffer between Taiwan and mainland China. This meant that the Seventh Fleet would no longer restrain Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist forces (Middleton, 1965: 224). Eisenhower believed that China had attacked US/UN forces because of Truman's announcement (27/6/1950) on the neutralization of the Seventh Fleet (Bailey, 1992: 127), thus shielding Communist China. Chiang Kai-shek's forces now became an indirect threat to mainland China (Bacchus, 1974: 565).

Second, Eisenhower threatened China directly with a nuclear assault. The US let it be known that atomic weapons were being deployed on Okinawa. US decision-makers assumed that the US had nuclear superiority²⁴ over the Soviet Union. The combination of restraint and resolve in atomic diplomacy during the Berlin Blockade (1948-9) had worked and could very well be effective in other crises (Dingman, 1988/89: esp. 51-2). They now believed that it was the right time and place, i.e. in Korea, to test their assumptions.

II.2.d.2. China's Brinkmanship and Dilemma

China immediately denounced the US and its threat to extend the war to the Chinese mainland and to use nuclear weapons (Edward Rice, 1972: 149, cited in Friedman, 1975: 82). Zhou En-lai announced on 4 February that China/the DPRK would continue to struggle against the US, which was guilty of trying to expand the Korean War (People's China, 16/2/1953, cited in Friedman, 1975: 83). On 7 February, Mao Tse Tung expressed even more strongly China's commitment to continue fighting against US imperialism and military aggression (People's China, 1/3/1953, cited in Friedman, 1975: 83).

Chinese decision-makers thought that the US commitment to extend the Korean War was a bluff or, at best, brinkmanship (Friedman, 1975: 83). People's Daily (23/1/1953) treated the atomic threat as bluster. From its experience of victories over the US in the autumn of 1951 and in the October 1952 offensive, China believed that its determination to fight would push the US to make concessions (Friedman, 1975: 83). Chinese decision-makers believed that the resumption of talks

in 1951 and 1952 was only possible after China's resolute stand against and defeat of the US (Guoji wenti yenjiu, 13/7/1960, cited in Friedman, 1975: 83). Mao thus stood firm again and engaged in brinkmanship.

China, on the other hand, wished to end a war that had become a military stalemate and a severe drain on its economy. In his 7 February address, Mao seemed to put more emphasis on China's economic reconstruction (Simmons, 1975: 230). Zhou En-lai stated on 4 February 1953 that peaceful coexistence was possible between countries with different political systems. He indicated China's willingness to resume trade relations with any country which desired to maintain peaceful relations with China (Radio Peking, 4/2/1953, cited in Simmons, 1975: 224).

These Chinese feelers towards some compromise had already begun in the fall of 1952. During the Peace Conference of the Asian and Pacific Region (2 - 12 October 1952), China displayed a rhetoric of "peaceful coexistence" and showed a greater fear of Japanese resurgence than of the Korean War (Toland, 1991: 547). Thus China engaged in brinkmanship until it faced a new set of international circumstances.

II.2.d.3. Stalin's Death and China's New Role

On 28 March, Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai announced that they would accept the US offer made in February, that is, the exchange of sick and wounded POWs. Zhou En-lai enlarged upon this offer on March 30, stating that the exchange could be extended to the settlement of the entire Korean War (Radio Pyongyang, 30/3/1953, cited in Goulden, 1982: 630). Why did China accept the US proposal rather than continue its brinkmanship? China's foreign policy change was related to Stalin's death.

Stalin died on 5 March. The Soviet Union began to show clearly its indifference to the Korean War. No Pravda editorials on Stalin's death mentioned the Korean War (Simmons, 1975: 231). The Soviet Union even indicated a willingness to improve its relationship with the US. On 15 March, for example, Malenkov said that any conflict could be settled peacefully through mutual agreement between the

countries involved, including the US (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 191-192; Stueck, 1995: 308; Toland, 1991: 557).

These Soviet conciliatory statements were not new. Malenkov had already declared on 5 October 1952 that the Soviet Union was ready to trade and cooperate with any country on the basis of mutual advantage, different social systems notwithstanding (Simmons, 1975: 223). Stalin had expressed his wish to meet President-Elect Eisenhower in December 1952 (Ulam, 1974: 537-8). The Korean War was a constant drain on Soviet economic resources. Furthermore, it was not only a catalyst for escalation but it also stimulated US belligerency against the USSR in Europe. Finally, the Korean War could strengthen Chinese military and diplomatic capability beyond Soviet control in the future (Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 18/10/1952, cited in Simmons, 1975: 227).

To China, however, Stalin's conciliatory signals were not as significant as the determination of Stalin's successors to end the war. Before his death, Stalin seemed to allow China to play out brinkmanship. However, when Malenkov and Molotov ruled out the strategy of brinkmanship and wished to end the war, China/the DPRK could only move toward compromise (Friedman, 1975: 87).

Although the Soviet Union's determination to disengage itself from the Korean War pushed China to adopt a compromise posture for awhile, it also gave China a position of leadership in the communist camp for the remainder of the war. China thus became a major decision-maker. Four days after Zhou En-lai's statement, Molotov praised the Zhou proposal and announced the Soviet Union's willingness to cooperate with China in carrying out the Zhou proposal (Goulden, 1982: 630). This signified that the Soviets had begun to accept China's hegemony in determining the outcome of the Korean War (Simmons, 1975: 234). Eisenhower now focused on China as the major target of US policy and China became the major decision-maker for the communist side in the Korean War.

II.2.d.4. China's Spring Offensive

On 11 April, liaison officers of China/the DPRK and the UNC agreed to the

return of 700 Chinese and 5,100 Korean sick and wounded POWs, while China/the DPRK would return 450 Korean and 150 non-Korean POWs (Goulden, 1982: 630). 'Operation Little Switch'²⁵ took place between 19 April and 3 May. The full delegations met on 26 April at Panmunjom for the first time in six months.

Nevertheless, China launched "spring offensives" in April and May, in spite of the fact that negotiations were proceeding. Although Soviet disengagement from the Korean War increased the political vulnerability of China/the DPRK²⁶, it also gave China a broader strategic option. The experience of pushing back the US/UN offensives in 1951 and 1952 and of prodding the US to accept the necessity of peace talks (Friedman, 1975: 83) led Chinese decision-makers to believe that the US would not concede to armistice negotiations unless pressured by military action (L.L. Sun, 1960: 26, cited in Friedman, 1975: 84). This strategy, however, had also been adopted by the US.

II.2.d.5. US Decision-Making on 20 May 1953

On 20 May, the JCS proposed to the NSC a new US strategy for ending the war²⁷, that is, an extension and intensification of military action through direct air and naval operations against China and Manchuria. This multi-purpose strategy was to destroy the enemy's military power in Korea; to reduce the enemy's capability for further aggression in Korea, as well as the Far East; and to induce the communists to accept an armistice on US/UN terms. The JCS also insisted that the new strategy would require the use of large-scale nuclear weapons to ensure its success (Foot, 1985: 208).

In March, Dulles and Eisenhower had already agreed to abandon the taboo of using atomic weapons (FRUS, 1952-54, 15: 827, 31/3/1953). US decision-makers had simply to decide how and when to employ nuclear weapons for conflict management (Dingman, 1988/89: 54). At this juncture, the JCS suggested at the 20 May meeting that time was important for "maximum surprise and maximum impact" (Goulden, 1982: 629). Eisenhower said that, if the NSC members agreed, he would endorse the JCS recommendations. The President was convinced that, if US military action was

required by circumstances, then the JCS plan would be essential to achieve the US goal. The Chinese spring offensives probably influenced the President to arrive at his decision.

The JCS proposal received few challenges (Foot, 1985: 209), and the NSC approved it. Although US decision-makers feared escalation to a war with the USSR, a fear that was much greater in May than in previous months, Eisenhower believed that the speed of the operation would lessen the risk of Soviet involvement. The strategy of a speedy attack outweighed the fear and risk of a direct Soviet intervention (Foot, 1985: 226). Eisenhower decided to "hit them with everything we have got" (FRUS, 1952-54, V: 1739, 4/12/1953). Dulles informed Nehru, India's Prime Minister, that if armistice negotiations did not proceed successfully, the US would probably intensify its military efforts and that this might well expand the area of conflict geographically (FRUS, 1952-1954, 15: 1067-68 (20/5/1953); 15: 1068 (21/5/1953)). He emphasized that the US was prepared and willing to use force that could bring about an end to hostilities, i.e., nuclear weapons, and that it was not bluffing (FRUS, 1952-54, V: 1811-1813, 7/12/1953).

In addition to the above rationale, the US favored intensified military operations for economic, military-security, and politico-diplomatic interests. First, US decision-makers considered the continuance of much longer negotiations fruitless (Foot, 1985: 229). The Korean War was a drain on US resources, aggravating the military deficit. Future continued military activity would require an increase in the military budget (*ibid.*). Second, intensified military action, if successful, could lead to a decrease in US military aid to South Korea. This in turn would allow the US to concentrate on the defense of more strategically vital areas, such as Europe (*ibid.*). Third, an intensified military operation was considered essential to counteract the harsh criticism by allies²⁸ of the US that an expansion of the war would cause. Eisenhower anticipated that US willingness to use the atomic bomb, if necessary, would strongly damage the US alliance system. He calculated, however, that this damage would not be permanent if the US offensive was highly successful (Eisenhower, 1963, I: 180; Bailey, 1992: 129).

III. Accommodation

On 25 May, the UNC presented its final negotiating position. The UNC by this time had already been given permission to break off the talks if agreement was not forthcoming. The US/UN forces were simultaneously preparing to step up the bombing campaign as a prelude to the spread of hostilities into China (Foot, 1985: 230). Impending warfare threats were given to the communists. The threat of using the atomic bomb, i.e. "naked and massive power", appeared to be a reality (Joy, 1955: 161-2). China/the DPRK were gradually coming to the opinion that the POW issue was not worth the price of an expanded war (Stueck, 1995: 330).

On 4 June, China/the DPRK accepted the UNC final proposals, with the counter-proposal that non-repatriates who wished to go to neutral nations should be sponsored by a Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission and by the Red Cross Society of India (FRUS, 1952-54, XV. 1: 1137, cited in Bailey, 1992: 133). On 6 June, the UNC accepted the main elements of the Communist counter-proposal. A final agreement on POWs was made on 8 June. By 17 June, a revised demarcation line (Item 3) had been established. The armistice agreement between China/the North Korea and the US was finally signed on 27 June 1953.

Summary

By the time Malik proposed a cease-fire (June 1951), all the parties involved were experiencing environmental changes: (1) a dramatic increase in casualties on both sides augmented their military and economic burdens, and (2) the possibility of an expanded war seemed likely. Both sides' decision-makers acknowledged the failure of their previous policies. The US had failed to reunify Korea on its own terms. China had failed to expel US troops from the Korean peninsula. North Korea had failed to unify Korea by force. The US thus changed its policy from achieving victory over communism to containment of it. China/the DPRK also

wanted a cease-fire. The need for a cease-fire was shared by all the states involved. Thus they accepted the USSR proposal. Exchange of views on the cease-fire (i.e., negotiations) began.

Three items on the negotiation agenda contributed to protracted negotiations for the Korean armistice. Item 2 (the location of the demarcation line) caused both sides to have serious clashes on security or territory. Rigid attitudes and the projection of their own assumptions about the enemy blocked any mutual accommodation. Both sides came to be suspicious of the other's sincerity. US military pressure finally led China/the DPRK to return to the cease-fire talks again, and an agreement on Item 2 was reached. As for item 3 (supervising the armistice), the US image of the USSR as a devil who was deeply involved in the Korean War was a major obstacle, prolonging negotiations.

Item 4 (arrangements relating to POWs) was the most troublesome and resulted in serious deadlock. The US proposed a voluntary repatriation of the POWs, whereas China/the DPRK insisted upon forcible repatriation. The US hoped to demonstrate that a majority of POWs would not return to live under a communist regime if they had a choice. This was a propaganda ploy that would represent a victory of the Western politico-economic system. The US also wanted to block Soviet expansionism. The USSR's distrust of their soldiers who might defect in future wars could serve as an effective deterrent. China feared loss of face and national humiliation. In mid-October, 1952, all negotiations ceased for six months.

When Eisenhower was inaugurated as the US President, he switched the focus of US policy from North Korea to China. The post-Stalin USSR leadership began to show its indifference to the Korean War and a wish to improve its relations with the US. These changes in USSR policy made China a leading decision-maker, as well as a major protagonist, in the Korean War. Eisenhower seriously considered using nuclear weapons against China and informed the Communist side of his intention. On 25 May 1953, a final negotiating offer by the US was made. The US threat of atomic warfare appeared real to China/the DPRK and led to a compromise on both sides. The enormous casualties inflicted by China/the DPRK in June and

July was a powerful incentive for the US to achieve a ceasefire (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 199). The armistice agreement was signed on 27 July 1953.

Case 2. THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ, 1972

The Korean War ended when the Armistice Agreement was signed on 27 July 1953. It is the only formal agreement that presently exists related to the Korean situation. Between 1971 and 1973, North and South Korea undertook a dialogue on peaceful unification and arrived at an agreement on 4 July 1972.

Description and significance

Secret negotiations for an agreement to hold political talks between the two Koreas took place in late 1971. The first-level contact for the opening of the North-South Korean dialogue was between Lee Hu Rak, Director of the South Korean CIA, and Kim Il Sung: They met in Pyongyang between 2 and 5 May 1972. Talks between Pak Sung Chul, Vice Premier of North Korea, and Park Chung Hee followed in Seoul between 29 May and 1 June 1972.

The Joint Communiqué was an admission that both Koreas' previous policy of ignoring the other's existence had changed (B.C. Koh, 1984: 19). It also can be regarded as a basic protocol for relaxing inter-Korean tensions (Guha, 1984/5: 60). The dialogue, however, turned out to be a "half-hearted exercise" (B.C. Koh, 1984: 18) when the co-chairmen of the NSCC (North-South Coordinating Committee) announced North Korea's withdrawal from the talks. The Joint statement was not motivated by significant shifts of commitments or unification strategies by either side. It was rather a manipulation of their different approach to the other.

For my analysis of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, I divide the accommodation process into three phases. The first phase (Initiation) was between the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969 and November 1971, when both Koreas agreed to hold political talks. The second phase (Negotiation and Agreement) was between

November 1971 and 4 July 1972. Finally, the third phase (Implementation Failure) was between 4 July 1972 and 28 August 1973.

I. Initiation

The initiation of the two Koreas' conciliatory attitudes towards each other in the early 1970s revealed changes in their respective unification policies. Two US policies related to East Asia played a significant role in both Koreas' altered policies: (1) The Nixon Doctrine (1969), and (2) US-Sino rapprochement (1971-2).

I.1. THE NIXON DOCTRINE

On 25 July 1969, Nixon asserted that the US would avoid involvement in another war like that in Vietnam; that the Asian states were expected to be more responsible for their own defense; and that US forces in allied countries²⁹ would be reduced (NYT, 26/7/1969).

One year after the declaration of the Nixon Doctrine, Park Chung Hee of South Korea announced on 15 August 1970, (1) that South Korea wished to negotiate with North Korea on unification and tension-reduction; (2) that South Korea had practical suggestions for the removal of the artificial barriers to peaceful unification, and (3) that South Korea wished to transform the extreme inter-Korean conflict into 'bona fide competition' between democracy and communism (Dong-A Ilbo, 15/8/1970). South Korea also dropped its long-standing opposition to North Korea's participation in the annual UN debate on Korea.

Park's statement signified that South Korea had changed its unification policy and would no longer ignore the reality of Kim Il Sung's North Korea. It was the first response from South Korea to North Korea's various proposals for unification. Prior to this statement, Park Chung Hee had believed that to talk with Kim Il Sung, initiator of the Korean War, was unthinkable. Park's position had been that he would reconsider reunification when North Korea had new leaders (Jung-Ang Ilbo,

8/6/1966).

North Korea responded in April 1971 by displaying a willingness to negotiate on various inter-Korean problems. It dropped the previous long-standing condition for negotiation with South Korea, i.e., withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Rodong Shinmun, 13/4/1971). Both Koreas, then, were sending, directly or indirectly, conciliatory signals towards each other. What common interests contributed to these attitudes of compromise? South Korea feared for its security. North Korea also feared for its security; its worsening economy, and its desire to encourage the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea.

I.1.a. South Korea

To South Korea, the Nixon doctrine undermined its security and came as a shock. On 6 June 1970, the US had announced that it would withdraw one army division from South Korea. The Nixon Doctrine and its subsequent implementation alarmed South Korean decision-makers. They feared losing the support of their patron and were skeptical of the US security guarantee. After experiencing intensified aggressive behavior in the 1960s from North Korea, especially during the period of 1968-69 (e.g., the January 21 and Pueblo crises, and EC-121 incident), South Korea's fear for its security was exaggerated by these new US policies (Park Chung Hee, 1970: 212, 214).

Until the Nixon Doctrine was declared, South Korea had concentrated on its economic development with a slogan of 'economic construction first and unification later'. Whereas South Korea's economic policy resulted in a dramatic increase in its economic development, its military power lagged behind that of North Korea. In this context, the Nixon Doctrine and contingent US policies exerted critical pressure on South Korea's national security, thus motivating South Korea's need to negotiate with North Korea.

I.1.b. North Korea

North Korea felt uncomfortable with the Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué

(November 1969). Sato of Japan had hinted that the reduction of US forces in South Korea could possibly be compensated for by the Self-Defense Forces of Japan. Although North Korea might not have perceived a direct and imminent threat from Sato's statement, it wished to block the possibility of the substitution of Japanese troops for those of the US. Zhou En-lai and Kim Il Sung denounced Sato's statement in April 1970, declaring that Japanese militants were collaborating with the US in an attempt to initiate another war on the Korean peninsula (Clough, 1986: 320).

Economic difficulties also pushed North Korean decision-makers to consider alternatives to their serious military burdens. Kim Il Sung frankly pointed out in November 1970 that North Korea's defense expenditures had been too heavy for its economy (Rodong Shinmun, 21/11/1970). In April 1971, Choi Yun Su, Finance Minister of North Korea, reported that 30% of North Korea's budget for national defense was hampering the Six Year Economic Plan.

Finally and most significantly, North Korea may have wished to exploit the US withdrawal of its forces from South Korea by holding talks with South Korea at a time when the latter's leadership was feeling vulnerable as a result of the US policy change. The withdrawal of 20,000 US troops from South Korea was completed on 27 March 1971. Talks with South Korea were perceived to be necessary for North Korea's economic development and to expedite the withdrawal of US forces.

Given these conciliatory gestures on both sides, Nixon's statement on 16 July 1971 that he would visit the PRC became a catalyst to further inter-Korean contacts.

I.2. NIXON'S STATEMENT AND SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUÉ

If the Nixon Doctrine had a different significance for each Korea, the Sino-US rapprochement (1971-2) had the same impact; that is, it created suspicion of their respective patrons.

North Korea indicated on 6 August 1971 its willingness to talk with all South Korean social organizations, all individuals, even with the Democratic-Republican party, South Korea's ruling party (Rodong Shinmun, 7/8/1971). Inclusion of the

Democratic-Republican party as a negotiating partner signaled a drastic change in North Korea's policy toward South Korea. North Korea had previously maintained that it would never negotiate with the "traitorous Park Chung Hee clique" (B.C. Koh, 1974c: 182).

South Korea formally responded on 12 August 1971, suggesting that inter-Korean talks be held between the Red Cross of both Koreas for the humanitarian purpose of reuniting 10 million families separated since the onset of the Korean War. On 14 August, North Korea accepted South Korea's suggestion (Rodong Shinmun, 15/8/1971). The first contact between the Koreas, initiated by themselves, was to pave the way for a later political dialogue (B.C. Koh, 1984: 157). In November 1971, North and South Korea agreed to hold 'high-level talks'. What factors turned the incubating conciliatory attitudes into an actual agreement to hold political talks?

I.2.a. South Korea

When Nixon stated that he would visit the PRC in 1972, South Korea began to feel a threat, not only from North Korea but also from the big powers' detente. Nixon's statement alerted South Korea to the possibility that its long-standing patron might reach an agreement with China, South Korea's enemy during the Korean War (Watts et al., 1979: 76-7). Park Chung Hee and his advisors did not trust the US promise to guarantee Korea's security. Park's suspicion of the US was well expressed in his speech on 1 October 1971 in which he argued that the US guarantee might encourage North Korean aggression (Egan, 1972: 21). Park's fear for South Korea's security was further exaggerated by the Shanghai Communiqué (27/2/1972). The Communiqué stated that the US and China agreed to peaceful coexistence and to expand their contacts, and it hinted that the Korean problem should be solved by the Koreans themselves (Hanguk Ilbo, 29/2/1972).

The policy shifts on the part of major powers caused Park Chung Hee to fear seriously another war in the Korean peninsula. A Western visitor who talked with Park in April 1972 described Park's fear as genuine (Mainichi Daily News, 7/7/1972). The South Korean leaders' fear of the Sino-US detente and the security

of South Korea reached a climax in Park Chung Hee's address on 17 October 1972. He warned that:

The big powers might sacrifice the Third World or minor states under the guise of detente. The balance of power among the big powers surrounding the Korean peninsula was changing drastically. I believe that these changes could undercut our national security... No one could be assured that there could be no war in this region. (cited in W.S. Choi, 1990: 66)

South Korean leaders thus believed that South Korea's national security had to be protected and that the destiny of South Korea should be in their own hands.

South Korea's fear of another war was reinforced by its in-depth study of North Korea's behavior. According to Lee Hu Rak, who negotiated with Kim Il Sung for the July 4 Joint Communiqué, Park Chung Hee had ordered him in December 1970 to study thoroughly North Korea's movements. Based on Lee's study, South Korean decision-makers concluded that North Korea was ready to invade South Korea and was awaiting an opportunity to do so (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972). In view of their experience of the Korean War and other crises, both Koreas had continuously strengthened their military capacity. At this point of extreme tension, South Korea's decision-makers wished to prevent a war even if it meant having to institute a dialogue with North Korea. They decided to meet the enemy (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972).

I.2.b. North Korea

Sino-US rapprochement was a shock to North Korea as well. The US was its natural enemy and the common enemy of all the socialist states. According to the Marxist theory, the collapse of US imperialism was preordained. A compromise between socialist and imperialist states was unthinkable (B.C. Koh, 1974: 176). Such a compromise between one of its major allies (i.e., China) and its archrival (i.e., the US) prompted North Korea to initiate some moves on its own (B.C. Koh, 1984: 135). In the talks on 10 December 1972 with the South Korean representative, the North Korean counterpart disclosed North Korea's real motive for political talks with

South Korea, which was to avoid being cut off from the world-wide current of 'detente' (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 326).

The US-Sino rapprochement, more significantly, indicated the complete failure of North Korea's previous policy toward South Korea. In 1964, North Korea had decided to strengthen revolutionary forces in both North Korea and South Korea, as well as in the international community (See Chapter 4 above). When North Korea was forced to acknowledge the reality of a Sino-US rapprochement, it began to perceive that its major patron would no longer support its revolutionary strategy for the reunification of Korea. The Soviets also were in favor of peaceful unification only. North Korea had serious misgivings about relying on its major patrons.

Furthermore, North Korea's efforts to build up its military capability was proving to be too costly and was weakening its economy. From 1967 to 1970 North Korea had spent 31% of its national budget on national defense. If defense spending was diverted into the economy and if military forces could be used to compensate for the shortage of manpower, the North Korean economy could be developed. In a sense, North Korea's economy, rather than the Sino-US detente, was the major factor in North Korea's conciliatory posture toward South Korea (Harrison, Washington Post, 2/7/1972).

Lastly, North Korea had exaggerated the threat to its security presented by the remaining US forces after the partial withdrawal. Kim Il Sung said that after the Pueblo crisis in 1968 the US continued its aerial reconnaissance of North Korea and that it pushed North Korea into a de facto state of war (Kim Il Sung, 1976: 191; Minjoo Chosun Daily, 1/7/1972).

Kim Il Sung probably believed that North Korea's initiation of a dialogue would lighten its military burden; accelerate the withdrawal of US forces; and pave the way for penetrating South Korean society, thereby boosting a revolutionary atmosphere (B.C. Koh, 1984: 136; J.H. Song, 1984: 633).

II. Negotiation and Accommodation

Chung Hong Jin (South Korea) and Kim Deok Hyun (North Korea) met in secret 11 times between 20 November 1971 and 22 March 1972. Exchanging general views on reunification, on 14 March, they agreed on the necessity of the meeting between Lee Hu Rak (Director of the KCIA, South Korea) and Kim Young Joo (Director of the Central Committee, North Korean Workers' Party) for the opening of political talks.

II.1. KIM IL SUNG versus LEE HU RAK (2 - 5 May 1972)

From 2 to 5 May 1972, Lee Hu Rak visited Kim Il Sung and Kim Young Joo (White Paper, 1988: 58). In their talks on 4 May, Kim Il Sung and Lee Hu Rak exchanged views on (1) peaceful reunification, (2) tension reduction, and (3) overcoming their differences of ideology and political systems.

As for the reunification issue, Lee Hu Rak and Kim Il Sung agreed on the principles of independent and peaceful unification by Koreans. Based on these two principles, both sides agreed to promote the third principle of national unity. They each recognized that their primary difficulty in holding to these principles was to remove mistrust and to build mutual understanding (White Paper, 1988: 58-9). Lee Hu Rak claimed that South Korea's deep-rooted distrust of North Korea had its origins in radically different ideas and systems. Combined with this was the experience of the Korean War, along with a series of North Korean military provocations and conspiracies to overthrow South Korea's government. Responding to Lee Hu Rak's analysis, Kim Il Sung said that "past was past"; that North Korea would not invade South Korea at any time in the future; and that South Korea need no longer fear such aggression (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 345, 365, 368). He apologized for the January 21 crisis of 1968, and further stated that North Korea no longer feared South Korea's policy of reunification by force because Park Chung Hee had said that he did not intend to invade North Korea in collusion with

the US and Japan (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 346, 365, 367).

For the reduction of tension and mistrust, Lee Hu Rak suggested the cessation of: (1) slandering and defaming each other; (2) proposing unification policies for propaganda purposes; and (3) harassing each other through the use of military stratagems. He further suggested reuniting families separated since the Korean War by using the North-South Red Cross, and fostering inter-Korean exchanges of personnel, materials, and communications. Most importantly, he urged inter-Korean political talks based on the degree of success of the above initiatives. Kim Il Sung proposed the creation and operation of a North-South Coordinating Committee (NSCC) for implementing Lee Hu Rak's suggestions, as well as mutual arms reductions (White Paper, 1988: 59).

Both parties touched on the issue of the difference in ideology. Kim Il Sung admitted that North Korea should not try to push socialism on South Korea. He, in turn, demanded that South Korea abandon its policy of victory over communism and cease its efforts to have North Korea abandon communism (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 366). Both Koreas thus agreed to tolerate their differences in ideology. This recognition of their irreconcilable differences was expressed simply in their Joint Communiqué as, "transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems" (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 346). Thus the bedrock obstacles to the success of their future debates were pushed aside and ignored.

II.2. PARK CHUNG HEE versus PAK SUNG CHUL (29 May - 1 June 1972)

The second round of political talks was held when Park Sung Chul, who replaced Kim Young Joo, visited Seoul between 29 May and 1 June 1972. On 31 May 1972, Park Chung Hee told Pak Sung Chul that the key to a successful inter-Korean dialogue depended upon the removal of mutual distrust, which could only be achieved over time. His position was that both Koreas should make major efforts to transcend differences in political systems; to avoid infringing upon the other's system; and to bring about a national consensus (White Paper, 1988: 60). The two Koreas agreed to constitute and operate the North-South Coordinating Committee

which Kim Il Sung had proposed and to establish a couple of sub-committees for promoting contact and cooperation (White Paper, 1988: 60).

These secret talks produced the North-South Joint Communiqué on 4 July 1972³⁰. The Communiqué confirmed the principles agreed upon in the talks, as follows.

1. Reunification should be achieved through
 - (a) independent Korean efforts without interference by external forces;
 - (b) peaceful means, not through the use of force against each other;
 - (c) a national unity transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems;
2. The two parties agreed to
 - (a) restrain from slandering or defaming each other, and from undertaking armed provocations, great or small; and to take positive measures to prevent unexpected military encounters;
 - (b) promote various exchanges in many fields;
 - (c) expedite North-South Red Cross talks;
 - (d) install a "hot line" between Seoul and Pyongyang;
 - (e) establish the North-South Coordinating Committee to promote the implementation of the agreement.

III. Implementation Failure

(July 1972 - 28 August 1973)

The July 4 Joint Communiqué provided a basic framework for the unification of Korea (D.G. Lee, 1991: 209), and inter-Korean conflictual behavior drastically decreased in 1972 (D.H. Chung, 1982: 32-3). Three NSCC (North-South Coordinating Committee) meetings were held: 30 November - 1 December 1972; 15 March 1973; and 12 - 13 June 1973.

The NSCC talks were not serious negotiations on concrete agenda, however (B.H. Han, 1979: 73). Both sides simply became more aware of their conflicting approaches to unification³¹. The Red Cross talks paralleled the deadlock³² (White paper, 1988: 96). Even these relatively unproductive talks ceased to function when North Korea's Kim Young Joo stated on 28 August 1973 that North Korea would

refuse to continue them.

Nevertheless, North Korea agreed to hold ad hoc meetings, such as the vice-chairman's meeting of the NSCC and the working-level contacts of the Red Cross. From 5 December 1973 through 14 March 1975, the NSCC had 10 meetings under the aegis of the vice-chairman. Red Cross representatives met from 28 November 1973 through 29 May 1974. Twenty-five working-level talks were held between 10 July 1974 and 9 December 1977. Nevertheless, no substantial talks took place between the two Koreas (J.H. Song, 1984: 641). In a practical sense, the July 4 Joint Communiqué ended on 28 August 1973. Talks after that date had merely been a confirmation of the failure of the implementation process.

III.1. THE ROAD TO IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE

What brought about implementation-failure on both sides? Firstly, the two Koreas had vastly different approaches to reunification. Moreover, they did not make serious efforts to overcome the differences. Secondly, decision-makers on both sides were greatly influenced by the legacy of the inter-Korean protracted conflict (i.e., negative perception of the other and institutionalized commitments to oppose their rival). Thirdly, the two Koreas did not perceive the necessity of maintaining their agreement, the July 4 Joint Communiqué.

Right after the simultaneous announcement of the Joint Communiqué, both Koreas were shocked by their remarkably different interpretations of the principles of reunification. These differences originated in different approaches to reunification and the failure to have serious and substantial negotiations on how to overcome the differences during their political talks.

III.1.a. Different Interpretations of the Three Principles

North Korea's interpretation of the first principle of independent unification was that only the Koreans, not external forces, should and could solve the issue of Korean unification. North Korea thus reasoned that the first principle necessitated the exclusion of the UN from future debates on the Korean question (Minjoo

Chosun, 6/7/1972), and that US forces must withdraw from South Korea at once (Pyongyang Times, 6/7/1972; Rodong Shinmun, 5/7/1972). South Korea, however, argued that neither the US troops in South Korea nor the UN constituted external forces (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972). Kim Jong Pil, Prime Minister of South Korea, insisted that South Korea interpreted the first principle of "Korean efforts without interference by external forces" as meaning simply the avoiding of reliance on the big powers in achieving Korean unification (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972).

North Korea interpreted the second principle of peaceful reunification as the reduction of both sides' armed forces and the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. In North Korea's perception, threats of war originated only from US imperialism; from Japanese militants; and from the acquiescence to external interference. North Korea believed that peaceful reunification could be achieved if external interference was ended and if military potential on the Korean peninsula was reduced (Minjoo Chosun, 6/7/1972). South Korea, however, simply evaluated the second principle as a renunciation of force for the settlement of the reunification issue.

The third principle stated that the achievement of Korean national unity could be achieved through transcending differences in ideology and systems. On this principle, North Korea argued that South Korea's opposition to Communism was tantamount to opposing national unity, and thus to national reunification. North Korea asked South Korea to repeal its Anti-Communist Law as well as National Security Law; to release all prisoners convicted under these laws; and to legalize Communist activities in South Korea (Rodong Shinmun, 11/7/1972). Lee Hu Rak of South Korea, however, said that the term, 'national unity', was only the political expression of the Koreans' long-cherished ideal to overcome the tragic division between people of the same nation (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972). Four days later, the Prime Minister of South Korea, Kim Jong Pil, reinforced Lee Hu Rak's interpretation of the third principle (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). How and why then did the two Koreas come to interpret their mutual agreement differently? The answer lies in both Koreas' fundamentally different approaches to the same goal, i.e.,

reunification of the Korean peninsula.

III.1.b. Different Approaches To Reunification

III.1.b.1. South Korea

For the achievement of reunification, South Korea advocated an incremental and gradual approach, by which it meant resolution of non-military issues first, and politico-military issues later. For example, believing that the building of mutual trust necessitated a gradual approach, South Korea proposed at the first NSCC talks the establishment of only two subcommittees: one on economic, the other on socio-cultural issues. At the third NSCC talks, South Korea proposed methods of expanding mutual contacts and communication in the economic and socio-cultural fields. South Korea was primarily concerned with gradual confidence-building in the non-military sphere (J.H. Shin, 1991: 88).

III.1.b.2. North Korea

North Korea consistently rejected South Korea's approach on the ground that the South Korean proposal would perpetuate the division of Korea. North Korea argued that the whole range of problems facing divided Korea should be solved simultaneously, with top priority being given to the issue of military tension-reduction. North Korea demanded first the cessation of arms reinforcement and the arms race; mutual reduction of their respective forces to 100,000 or less; the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea; and the conclusion of a peace treaty between the two sides. North Korea thus proposed the simultaneous formation of five subcommittees within the NSCC to work for collaboration: (1) economic, (2) cultural, (3) military, (4) diplomatic, and (5) political.

North Korea wanted a package resolution of the Korean reunification problem, with priority given to the politico-military issue, whereas South Korea favored a gradual approach starting with contacts and cooperation on socio-economic matters. Differences in policies toward unification led the two Koreas to interpret their

agreement from opposite poles.

III.1.c. No Substantial Negotiations

Although the two Koreas had clearly different approaches to reunification, they did not try in their talks to deal with this reality. Rather they dismissed the most important ingredient as trivial, which was to devise methods of implementation. At the meeting on 4 May 1972, Kim Il Sung said that ways of implementing the principles of reunification could be found if both Koreas had heart-to-heart talks. Dancing to Kim's tune, Lee Hu Rak said that different opinions on the methods of implementation were of "little importance" and that problems could "be solved easily" in the future as long as both Koreas had a common goal (Documents on North-South Talks, 1991: 363). Why were substantial negotiations on implementation methods avoided?

First, the two Koreas from the outset had no confidence that the principles of the Joint Communiqué could be implemented successfully. Both sides saw signing the Communiqué as only a first step along an arduous road. North Korea declared right after the announcement of the Communiqué that numerous barriers and obstacles to reunification remained (MinJoo Chosun, editorial, 6/7/1972), while Park Chung Hee of South Korea stated that the first step in implementation marked only the beginning of trial and challenge (Dong-A Ilbo, 17/7/1972).

Second, both sides were not ready to accommodate the other. South Korea seemed not to expect serious results from the dialogue. To South Korean decision-makers, the dialogue itself was not a peace but only a means by which to seek it (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972). Park Chung Hee took this view of the process (S.W. Lee, 1984, cited in W.S. Choi, 1990: 68). Defining South Korea as its archrival, to be defeated and communized eventually by force, North Korea regarded the negotiations as simply warfare by other means (J.H. Song, 1984: 630, 648, 659). To Kim Il Sung, there could be no compromise with enemies of North Korea (ibid., 1984: 630). North Korean decision-makers thus considered the dialogue of 1972 as a way of pursuing a non-violent struggle with South Korea, not as negotiations based

on mutual concessions (ibid.: 659).

Why did the two Koreas have neither the confidence nor the will to accommodate each other? The impact of the inter-Korean protracted conflict explains it.

III.2. IMPACT OF THE INTER-KOREAN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

The legacy of the inter-Korean protracted conflict was characterized by extremely negative perceptions of the opposing side and strong commitments against the "enemy".

III.2.a. Perception of the Other

III.2.a.1. North Korea

Experiencing different interpretations of the Joint Communiqué and observing South Korea's behavior since its announcement, North Korea came to believe that South Korea had deliberately undertaken a double-faced strategy, e.g. "competition with dialogue" (Tak Jin et al., 1985: 276-277). Kim Young Joo argued that South Korea (1) had contravened the principles which the two Koreas had agreed upon and had stimulated confrontation and competition; (2) had refused to reduce the military tensions; and (3) had rejected any practical methods for cooperation and exchanges. Kim Young Joo thus concluded that South Korea had tried to deceive people; to continue its reliance upon external powers and a war strategy; to strengthen anti-communism, and thus to perpetuate the divided Koreas under the guise of North-South dialogue (Kim Young Joo, 1973: 299). To North Korea, South Korea was perceived as not having any sincere intention of solving the grave problems the two Koreas faced (D.H. Chung, 1982: 39).

III.2.a.2. South Korea

South Korea's negative image of North Korea also weakened its expectations of the Joint Communiqué. On 8 July 1972, only four days after the announcement of

the Communiqué, Kim Jong Pil described communists as those who discard promises as if they were old shoes (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). He argued that no one could be assured that North Korea would not invade South Korea (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). To Kim Jong Pil, communists could be expected to invade even after making a non-aggression treaty (Dong-A Ilbo, 17/7/1972).

South Korea was uncertain about North Korea's intentions. Park Chung Hee argued on 6 December 1971 that North Korea accepted the Red Cross talks because of its double-faced strategy of a spurious peace offensive and renewed armed provocations (Egan, 1972: 20). South Korea believed that North Korea had simply tried to take advantage of the Sino-US detente in the 1970s, and had not intended to have a serious dialogue with South Korea.

South Korea's deep-rooted negative image of North Korea came from its experience of North Korea's continued provocations. Park Chung Hee stated on 1 October 1970 that:

For twenty years, North Korea's puppet regime prepared for an invasion of South Korea, an intent which it tried to conceal by making overtures for peace.

.....
In the early 1970s, North Korea believed the time was ripe to invade South Korea. Attempts were made to weaken the defensive capability of South Korea, and to stimulate the withdrawal of US forces from the peninsula. (Dong-A Ilbo, 1/10/1970).

III.2.b. Institutionalized Commitments

III.2.b.1. North Korea

North Korea did not change its strategy of instigating, by violent means, a South Korean revolution. On 3 July 1972, one day before the Joint Communiqué was announced, Kim Il Sung stated that Korean reunification could be achieved only through violent South Korean revolution³³ (Radio Pyongyang, 3/7/1972, cited in D.S. Kim, 1987: 203). On the same day it was hinted that North Korea's

commitment to a South Korean revolution would not change even after a North-South Korean agreement for peaceful reunification (Rodong Shinmun, 3/7/1972).

North Korea made an effort to strengthen its internal cohesion after the announcement of the Communiqué (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 452-453). In its New Socialism Constitution³⁴, revised on 27 December 1972, North Korea specified the goal of its political education process as being one of the total victory of socialism and of its Juche ideology. The purpose of the revised constitution was to reinforce North Korean socialist consciousness.

While it continued its own commitments, North Korea nevertheless demanded that South Korea abandon its institutionalized commitments. At the first meeting of the co-chairmen of the NSCC on 12 October 1972, North Korea argued that because both Koreas had agreed upon the three principles of unification, South Korea should abandon its policy of anti-communism and acknowledge the legitimacy of communism; ask the UN not to interfere in Korean unification; not rely on external powers; promote the immediate withdrawal of US forces from South Korea; and stop strengthening South Korean forces and cease all military exercises.

On 24-26 October 1972, at the third meeting of the Red Cross, North Korea furthermore demanded that, in return for its facilitating the reunion of the separated families, South Korea revoke all its anti-communist legislation. At the second meeting of the co-chairmen of the NSCC on 2-3 November 1972, North Korea demanded that South Korea abrogate its Anti-Communism Law, its National Security Law, and its Korea-Japan friendship treaty. North Korea also insisted upon withdrawal of US forces. It also proposed the realization of a North-South Confederal System through negotiations at the highest levels (White Paper, 1988: 68).

On 9-10 May 1973, at the sixth meeting of the Red Cross in a plenary session, North Korea again demanded that South Korea revoke its Anti-Communism Law and National Security Law; disband anti-Communist agencies and organizations; ban all anti-Communist activities; and guarantee freedom of speech, of publication, of meetings and movement for North Koreans visiting South Korea to meet with their separated families (Rodong Shinmun, 12/5/1973).

III.2.b.2. South Korea

South Korea also did not change its institutionalized commitments. On 8 July, Kim Jong Pil stated that South Korea would not change the unification policy based on liberal democracy, which was South Korea's ideology, and that any words and acts that violated the national interest would be punished (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). The South Korean Public Procurator's Office stated that it would continue to deal severely with those who praised communism, or acted in any way in its favor, and that South Korea was determined to protect its liberal democracy (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). Kim Jong Pil declared on 12 July 1972 that US forces in South Korea would remain until North Korea had abandoned its policy of violent reunification (Dong-A Ilbo, 12/7/1972).

As with North Korea, South Korea attempted to strengthen its internal cohesion through education and revision of the national constitution. Although educational circles of South Korea favored partial changes in textbook content relating to North Korea (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972), Park Chung Hee instructed his Cabinet to strengthen anti-communist education (Dong-A Ilbo, 8/7/1972). On 20 July, Park Chung Hee anticipated that South Korea would face a heightened dimension of inter-Korean competition, and that the internal cohesion of South Korea and its national development in all fields were essential for survival in the new phase of confrontation³⁵ (Dong-A Ilbo, 20/7/1972).

South Korea's emphasis on internal cohesion was institutionalized through Park's policy of Siwol Yushin ("October Restoration") on 17 October 1972. The alleged substance of the Siwol Yushin was that, given the drastic changes in international politics, as well as internal affairs, South Korea should find a way out of its difficulties through South Korean efforts. Park thought that Siwol Yushin would be an effective instrument in fostering internal cohesion and in mobilizing national strength (Newsweek, 4/11/1974: 15).

South Korea's continued emphasis on its institutionalized commitments had resulted in North Korea's negative reactions. Kim Il Sung complained that South Korea had a two-faced policy; had not implemented sincerely the Communique; and

that this behavior of South Korea would arouse the animosity of all Koreans (Mainichi Daily News, 19/9/1972). After Park Chung Hee's emphasis on anti-Communism on 1 October 1972, North Korea began to call Park Chung Hee and his advisors "conspirators" who were obstructing reunification (Rodong Shinmun, 3/10/1972).

III.3. NO NECESSITY OF MAINTAINING AGREEMENT

III.3.a. South Korea

South Korea's motivation to continue the dialogue was weakened by North Korea's constantly reiterated demand that South Korea revoke previous policies. North Korea's demand for the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and for the cessation of the modernization program of the South Korean army made South Korea doubt the sincerity of North Korea and fear for South Korea's national security. South Korean leaders strongly suspected that what North Korea really wanted was a drastic change in the military balance on the Korean peninsula (B.C. Koh, 1984: 178) and that North Korea was trying to exploit the dialogue as a tactic to ignite a South Korean revolution (J.H. Song, 1984: 613). In the view of South Korea's leaders, North Korea "made only demands but offered no concessions" (White Paper, 1988: 161-2). Under these circumstances, South Korea was not prepared to make any substantial concessions in this inter-Korean dialogue.

III.3.b. North Korea

North Korea may well have calculated that, if the North-South dialogue proceeded successfully, it might be able to facilitate the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea; to weaken South Korea's policies; and to block the modernization of South Korea's military forces. However, North Korea could not consider that anything had changed in Seoul (B.C. Koh, 1984: 138) after the announcement of the Communiqué. South Korea's unwillingness to alter its policies and continued US support³⁶ for South Korea were contrary to North Korea's tactical goals. This

refusal may have persuaded the North that continuing the dialogue with South Korea might not be favorable to its national interest (ibid.).

In addition, North Korea may have had to revise its myopic view of the South Korean economy. South Korea was not the living hell that North Korean leaders consistently propagated to their own people. North Korea probably perceived a threat to its communist ideology system, when its system was compared to that of South Korea. Continuation of the dialogue might further accentuate this disparity (J.H. Song, 1984: 639). Finally, North Korea must have perceived that trying to infiltrate South Korean society through the North-South dialogue had failed. Park Chung Hee's invocation of the dialogue as the main justification for his Siwol Yusin policy may have made North Korean decision-makers realize that such a dialogue might well serve to justify Park's political power at home (B.C. Koh, 1984: 177). In this context, North Korean decision-makers realized that the possibility of converting the South Koreans through contacts and dialogue was very slight (B.C. Koh, 1984: 138-9). This failure of their policy goals seriously dampened their desire to continue the dialogue.

IV. Returning to a Normal Relations Range

North Korea's announcement on 28 August 1973 of its withdrawal from the talks froze inter-Korean relations. The pre-dialogue state of mutual slandering was restored. Mutual distrust and animosity between the two Koreas were even higher than before. For all practical purposes, the July 4 Joint Communiqué was null and void (B.C. Koh, 1974: 186). The accommodation attempts deepened both Koreas' antagonism, rivalry, and distrust. Inter-Korean relations returned to the normal relations range of a protracted conflict.

Summary

The Nixon Doctrine (25/7/1969) generated for decision-makers of both Korea's the perception of the need to compromise for the sake of their security, economy, and other interests. The Sino-US rapprochement (1971-1972) greatly increased South Korea's fear for its security. As for North Korea, its leaders acknowledged that previous policy (e.g. socialist revolution in South Korea by force) had been ineffective. When the patrons for the opposite sides in the Korean War began to accommodate each other, both Korea's decision-makers had misgivings about Korea's actions in a future war or crises. Each Korea was forced to revise its perception of itself and recognize its position as a minor state which could be sacrificed as a result of the big powers' detente. This was a shared value for both Korea's. Perceiving a greater need to compromise, both Korea's sent conciliatory signals toward the other and agreed to meet.

At the first meeting, both sides exchanged general views on peaceful unification, tension reduction, and overcoming their differences of ideology and political systems. However, both sides were too optimistic that serious negotiations could be achieved. The second meeting (29 May-1 June 1972) was held in Seoul between Park Chung Hee and Pak Sung Chul. There was no substantial improvement in negotiations. Two months later, both sides announced a Joint Communiqué (4/7/1972).

When North Korea announced its withdrawal from inter-Korean talks on 23 August 1973, the July 4 Communiqué ceased to function in practical terms. However, the fundamental problems of the Communiqué can be derived from the two Korea's different approaches to unification, which resulted in both Korea's having different interpretations of the three principles of unification. These differences originated from both Korea's negative images of and institutionalized commitments to the other. Both Korea's had to return to the normal relations range of the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Furthermore, the lack of both Korea's willingness to have substantial negotiations, as well as their negative perceptions of

the other's sincerity to maintain the Joint Communiqué after its completion, contributed to the resumption of inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Case 3. THE BASIC AGREEMENT (AND THE JOINT DECLARATION), 1992

North and South Korea put into effect two important documents³⁷ on 19 February 1992: (1) The Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North (hereafter "Basic Agreement") and (2) The Joint Declaration of the De-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (hereafter "Joint Declaration")³⁸.

As the title suggests, the Basic Agreement encompasses three issues: reconciliation, non-aggression, and cooperation.

The first chapter³⁹ deals with inter-Korean reconciliation:

(1) mutual recognition and respect for each other's system; (2) noninterference with the other's internal affairs; (3) restraints from mutual slandering or vilifying; (4) forbearance from attempt to overthrow the other; (5) transformation of armistice into a solid state of peace; (6) cessation of confrontation and promotion of cooperation; (7) establishment of a North-South liaison office; and (8) creation of a North-South Political Committee for effective implementation of inter-Korean reconciliation.

The second chapter deals with a non-aggression pledge:

(1) non-use of force and non-aggression; (2) conflict resolution through peaceful negotiation; (3) maintaining the existing military demarcation line established in the Armistice Agreement (27/7/1953) to define a line and areas for nonaggression; (4) establishment of North-South Joint Military Commission to implement and guarantee non-aggression; (5) installing telephone hotline for effective crisis management; and (6) creation of a North-South Military Committee to implement the measures for non-aggression.

The third chapter is concerned with inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation:

(1) economic exchanges and trade, and cooperation for the national economy and the welfare of the entire Korean population; (2) exchanges and cooperation in various fields such as science, technology, education, sports, and publishing and journalism; (3) promotion of intra-Korean travel and contacts; (4) free correspondence and visits between dispersed family members; (5) the reconnection of railroads and mutual opening of sea and air routes; (6) establishment of inter-Korean postal and telecommunication services; (7) cooperation internationally to promote economic, cultural, and other related activities abroad; (8) establishment of joint commissions

for implementation of the accords on exchanges and cooperation; and (9) creation of a North-South Exchanges and Cooperation Committee for effective implementation of the accords on exchanges and cooperation.

The Joint Declaration⁴⁰ states that:

Both Koreas shall (1) not test, manufacture, procedure, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons; (2) use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes; (3) not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities; (4) conduct inspection of the objects selected by the other side; and (5) operate a North-South Joint Nuclear Control Commission.

In their nature, these documents represent the first official inter-Korean bilateral accord (Commentary, 1992: 18) since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945. In terms of substance, they reveal only a measure of compromise, but they contain numerous implementation methods which were lacking in the July 4 Joint Communiqué of 1972. It took eight preparatory talks; six sessions of high-level talks; and thirteen delegate contacts spanning three years to produce these documents.

In this section, I begin with a brief study of the background and the initiation phase of the inter-Korean High-Level talks. I follow this with an analysis of the negotiation and accommodation phase, concentrating on the 5th session of talks. Finally, I deal with the implementation failure phase. The significance of the nuclear issue to the accommodation failure is examined.

I. Initiation (with Background)

After the July 4 Joint Communiqué of 1972, more than 300 contacts at various levels took place between the two Koreas (Y.H. Park, 1993: 459) before they signed the Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration. These contacts, however, did not signify that serious inter-Korean negotiations were being conducted. Rather, they indicate that there had been no substantial improvements in inter-Korean relations. For example, although there had been over 100 contacts through the Red Cross and NSCC meetings between 1971 and 1977, inter-Korean relations had not improved. US/South Korea and North Korea were embroiled in the Poplar Tree crisis in 1976,

and inter-Korean relations in the late 1970s were characterized by both Koreas' fierce diplomatic competition to prove their legitimacy (ibid.: 463).

Nevertheless, there were intermittent talks in the 1980s. Contacts took place in various areas: economic, athletic, the Red Cross, and even at the Parliamentary level. These produced an exchange of visits in 1985 by a few separated families and by artist groups. Inter-Korean talks ended, however, when North Korea suspended (20/1/1986) all forms of dialogue because of what it termed the US-South Korean 'Team Spirit' joint military exercise. Kim Il Sung stated (30/12/1986) that he wished to have inter-Korean high-level political and military talks, but South Korea rejected the proposal. Kim Il Sung showed further interest in inter-Korean talks in his 1988 New Year's Address, in which he spoke of the possibility of broadening the scope of representatives who would participate (Rodong Shinmun, 1/1/1988). This North Korean proposal of January was timely because South Korea had shown in July its willingness to improve inter-Korean relations.

On 7 July 1988, Roh Tae Woo, President of South Korea, issued a declaration which contained South Korea's six-point policy of unification: (1) an exchange of visits by a broad spectrum of people of the two Koreas; (2) an exchange of correspondence and visits between members of separated families; (3) open trade between the Koreas as a single community; (4) no opposition to nations friendly to the South trading with the North, military goods excepted; (5) cessation of any diplomatic competition with North Korea on condition that North Korea cooperate with the international community; and (6) cooperation with North Korea in its efforts to improve relations with the US and Japan; and on North Korea's part, not to interfere with South Korean attempts to improve its relations with Soviet Union and China (Commentary, 1992: 95-6). In addition to South Korea's willingness to incorporate some features of the North Korean proposal, the July 7 Declaration revealed South Korea's willingness not to compete diplomatically with North Korea. South Korea thus indicated that it was prepared to play a positive role in helping North Korea establish diplomatic relations with Japan and with the US.

Roh also proposed at the 43rd Session of the UN General Assembly on 18

October 1988 that the two Koreas agree and proclaim a non-aggression policy in order to establish fundamental trust and a stable political climate, and that the two Koreas discuss all Korean problems, including peace on the Korean peninsula, inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, disarmament, and other military matters (Commentary, 1992: 107-8). North Korea responded in November 1988. In his letter to South Korea's Prime Minister, North Korea's Premier proposed high-level political and military talks. Kang Young-Hoon, South Korea's new Prime Minister, wrote a letter to North Korea on 28 December 1988, saying that North-South High-Level talks would be held and that military issues could be discussed (Dong-A Ilbo, 28/12/1988). Yon of North Korea agreed on 16 January 1989 to hold the "North-South High-Level Political and Military Talks" (D.W. Lim, 1992: 215). What made the two Koreas agree to these talks?

I.1. NORTH KOREA

As in earlier decades, North Korea in the late 1980s was feeling the weight of its military burdens: its military expenditure per capita was five times that of South Korea (Y.S. Chung, 1991: 380-1). Kulloja (November, 1987: 8), a theoretical journal of the North Korean Workers Party, warned that increased production of consumer goods and the modernization of North Korean industry were urgently required (cited in Harrison, 1991: 614). The hoped-for socialist revolution in South Korea seemed unlikely. Kim Il Sung thus may have realized that the time was not right for the fulfilment of his dream of national reunification by force. A change in North Korea's policy toward South Korea was called for (B.C. Koh, 1992: 465-6). North Korea, however, did not want to change its grand strategy of unification within a confederation in which it would coexist with South Korea. On 8 September 1988, Kim Il Sung argued that the two Koreas should follow the principle of coexistence, leaving the two different systems as they were and uniting them under a confederation (cited in C.S. Lee, 1991: 194).

I.2. SOUTH KOREA

Roh Tae Woo wished to achieve a drastic change in the Korean political climate before the close of his presidency. He pledged on 21 April 1988, at the first press conference after his inauguration, that in his term of office he would transform the Korean situation and bring about an epoch-making improvement in inter-Korean relations (Commentary, 1992: 3). South Korea thus set out its goals for the High-Level talks: (1) improving inter-Korean relations by opening a new age of reconciliation and cooperation; (2) inducing North Korea to reform and open itself; and (3) laying the groundwork for peaceful unification (D.W. Lim, 1992: 215).

In Roh's July 7 Declaration, South Korea displayed its willingness to improve relations with North Korea and not to isolate North Korea from the international community. A positive attitude toward holding talks with North Korea on military issues, too, was revealed in Roh's October 18 statement. These changes in South Korea's foreign policy seemed to satisfy North Korea.

II. Negotiation

II.1. PREPARATORY TALKS

Preparatory discussions for the High-Level talks between the two Koreas began on 8 February 1989. Eight sessions spanning 17 months produced an agenda on 26 July 1990 for the High-Level talks: removal of inter-Korean confrontations on politico-military matters and implementation of various exchanges and other forms of cooperation (Commentary, 1992: 8).

II.2. FULL-DRESS HIGH-LEVEL TALKS

The first three sessions of the High-Level talks merely accentuated the differences between the two Koreas' basic positions. South Korea insisted upon confidence-building measures first. North Korea insisted upon a non-aggression agreement first⁴¹. Each Korea tried to persuade the other of its positions, rather than to seek commonalities (Y.S. Chung, 1991: 372). By the 4th session of the talks,

negotiation progressed, although slowly, and an accommodation was reached by the 5th.

II.2.a. The 1st Session (4 - 7 September 1990)

The first session of High-Level talks was held on 4 - 7 September 1990. South Korea proposed a "Basic Agreement for improving inter-Korean relations". In this statement, South Korea insisted that both Koreas should recognize and respect the other's system, build mutual trust through exchanges, cooperation, before negotiating other issues such as military matters (Dong-A Ilbo, 5/9/1990). North Korea, however, suggested a "Package resolution on the politico-military issue first, exchanges and cooperation later." North Korea argued that, if military issues were resolved, then exchanges and cooperation would follow (Commentary, 1992: 182-3). North Korea thus proposed a non-aggression declaration which included: (1) restraints on military exercises, (2) mutual reduction of forces, (3) the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, and (4) disarmament and a peace treaty between North Korea and the US (Commentary, 1992: 186-7).

II.2.b. The 2nd Session (16 - 19 October 1990)

At the 2nd session of the talks, South Korea proposed to adopt the "Joint Communique for Inter-Korean Reconciliation and Cooperation," which incorporated, in part, North Korea's proposal for a non-aggression declaration. North Korea, however, insisted that negotiations be limited to a non-aggression pact (Commentary, 1992: 188) and demanded the US withdrawal of its forces and nuclear weapons from South Korea (Segye Ilbo, 18/10/1990). South Korean decision-makers saw this as a means for North Korea to use the talks for the sole purpose of achieving the withdrawal of US forces (Y.S. Chung, 1991: 375). No improvement was made at the 2nd session.

II.2.c. The 3rd Session (11 - 14 December 1990)

The 3rd session followed the same pattern. Although South Korea slightly

modified its proposal, both sides' basic positions did not change. South Korea simply argued again that a trustworthy framework for improving inter-Korean relations was essential before a non-aggression pact could be made (Korea Update, 17/12/1990, cited in C.S. Lee, 1991: 200). North Korea stuck to its position and reiterated its demands: (1) adopt a non-aggression declaration, (2) conclude a peace agreement between North Korea and the US, (3) reduce the armed forces of both Koreas drastically, and (4) withdraw the nuclear weapons and US troops from the South (Commentary, 1992: 191). The first three meetings produced no substantive agreements.

II.2.d. The 4th Session (22 - 25 October 1991)

Ten months after the 3rd session, the 4th session⁴² began. It proceeded relatively smoothly and produced a slight compromise (Y.W. Kihl, 1994b: 135; 1993: 72).

At the 4th session, South Korea accepted North Korea's demand of stating clearly in the document the principle of non-aggression (Commentary, 1992: 200). North Korea also showed flexibility in agreeing to negotiate simultaneously the issues (1) of non-aggression and arms control, and (2) of reconciliation, exchanges, and cooperation (Commentary, 1992: 201). North Korea furthermore agreed to (1) abrogate the article that required the removal of institutional restrictions in either North Korea or South Korea; (2) add the article on the reunion of separated families; and (3) add the article on the restraints of provocative actions against the other (Commentary, 1992: 202).

Both sides finally agreed on the format, title, and structure of the document (Commentary, 1992: 201). It was to be adopted at a future prime ministers' meeting that would incorporate the three separate matters to be negotiated: reconciliation, non-aggression, and cooperation and exchanges between the North and the South. What led the two Koreas to have conciliatory attitudes toward each other, if only to a limited degree?

II.2.d.1. North Korea

To investigate North Korea's motives, it would be useful to consider Kim Il Sung's New Year's Address in 1991 (Pyongyang Times, 1/1/1991). In his address, Kim Il Sung condemned "unification by absorption" or the "prevailing over communism" policies of South Korea. South Korea's northern policy was perceived by Kim Il Sung as a strategy to absorb North Korea by relying on foreign forces. To Kim Il Sung, peaceful transition was simply an imperialistic strategy to bring the socialist countries into the US sphere of their politico-economic influence. At the 4th session, North Korea defined the market-economy as the law of the jungle and stated that, if North Korea was forced to accept the law, inter-Korean conflict would be inevitable (Commentary, 1992: 201). North Korea feared absorption by South Korea.

North Korea was desperately trying to maintain its system. Kim Il Sung emphasized that the Party and the Government of North Korea was unshakable and that the socialism North Korea had built by implementing the Juche idea was unconquerable. However, Kim Il Sung's problem was how to maintain his regime but, at the same time, open it to foreign influences. On 24 July 1991, Kim Il Sung said that North Korea was a nation like any other and it would act to keep pace with what was happening. He insisted again that North Korea would continue to uphold "the banner of socialism" (as cited in Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 75), which shows that North Korea wished to expand its national interest as long as its identity-based security was not undermined.

At this juncture, North Korea was forced to change its unification policy slightly. In his address, Kim Il Sung offered a revised confederation formula which proposed to give the regional governments of the confederal republic more rights on a tentative basis, and then to increase the functions of the central government in the future. North Korea's previous position on the confederation formula issued on 18 October 1980 was that the unified confederal government would have more power from the outset than the regional governments (Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 78). The previous proposal assumed one central government and two regional governments. The

revised one assumed one nation, one state, two systems, and two regional governments. North Korea now seemed to want more guarantees for its own system and government than before.

Facing the dilemma of opening or maintaining its system, North Korea probably thought that normalizing relations with the US and Japan was the best strategy. North Korea seems to have realized that the lack of progress in inter-Korean talks could be a hindrance to negotiations on the diplomatic normalization talks with Japan as well as with the US (Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 77). North Korean decision-makers thus perceived that slight compromise was necessary to break the deadlock in the High-Level talks. North Korea began to show compromising attitudes, but within a narrow range.

II.2.d.2. South Korea

South Korea was reluctant to change its policy toward North Korea because its decision-makers began to believe that North Korea could eventually collapse economically if forced to maintain its present high levels of military expenditures. Some argued that South Korea should not accept North Korea's model of accommodation, and that South Korea should keep up the pressure on North Korea. Unification could come about as it did in Germany, through the sheer weight of conditions and events. South Korea thus was inclined to resist a mutual reduction in armed forces, which was the centerpiece of the North Korean proposal (Harrison, 1991: 600-1).

In addition, South Korea began to feared the unification costs. Roh Tae Woo directed a study in mid-June 1991 on the hypothetical emergency that might arise from a North Korean collapse, such as happened in East Germany. The estimated higher economic costs of Korean reunification⁴³, based on the study of the German case, disillusioned South Korea with the unification rhetoric. It led South Korean decision-makers to restrain their initial enthusiasm for reunification (Y.W. Kihl, 1994: 141).

II.2.e. The 5th Session (10 - 14 December 1991)

At the 5th talks, both sides made additional compromises, and finally adopted and signed the Basic Agreement. They also agreed to have contacts no later than the end of December 1991 in order to negotiate the nuclear issue. The most crucial issues in the 5th session were: (1) Article 5 (transformation of the 'state of armistice' into a 'state of peace'), (2) Article 12 (confidence-building measures leading to a guarantee of non-aggression), and (3) Article 26 (non-influence of the Basic Agreement on other extant treaties on both sides). These issues were negotiated on 11 - 12 December.

Up to the afternoon of 11 December, there were no improvements in the negotiations. South Korean working-level representatives thought that the talks were only time-consuming, and left the negotiation table. North Korean representatives, however, expressed their willingness to continue the talks. After 10 p.m. on the 11th, both sides met again, and from then on, North Korean representatives' communications by telephone with their higher-level decision-makers in North Korea were noticeably increased (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991).

South Korean representatives' contacts with top decision-makers of South Korea were also intensified. Kim Jong Hwui, an official South Korean delegate and special presidential assistant for diplomacy and national security, left hurriedly to meet Roh Tae Woo, South Korea's President (Dong-A Ilbo, 14/12/1991). The second working-level contact which was supposed to have been held in the morning session on 12 December was advanced suddenly to 3:00 a.m. (Dong-A Ilbo, 12/12/1991). The first step toward an agreement appeared between 3 and 5 a.m. on 12 December. Around 3 a.m., North Korean representatives expressed their strong willingness to have an agreement no matter what was required (Dong-A Ilbo, 14/12/1991). At the same time, Kim Jong Whui and Choi Bong Chun, North Korea's Liaison Officer, met. They exchanged their revised positions and found that they were close enough for an agreement (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). How did they compromise on the three issues?

The issue of including Article 5 in the Basic Agreement was the most

troublesome. Almost to the end, North Korea opposed the adoption of Article 5. A North Korean representative stated on 10 December that North Korea would concede every issue except those of Articles 5 and 26 (J.W. Chi, 1994: 328). To North Korea, the inclusion of Article 5 was against the principle of "resolution between direct parties involved" in the Korean War (i.e., China/the DPRK versus the US/UN). South Korea insisted upon Article 5, although it had to concede Article 26 on North Korea's terms. North Korea finally accepted Article 5. South Korea, in return, agreed to relinquish Article 26. For Article 12, North Korea insisted upon a declaration only, but South Korea wanted specific measures outlined for the assurance of non-aggression (J.W. Chi, 1994: 330). Both Koreas compromised in setting up a North-South Joint Military Commission for confidence-building, as well as for a guarantee of non-aggression (D.W. Lim, 1992: 218).

On 13 December, the two Koreas expressed their views on the nuclear issue. They announced that both Koreas firmly opposed the presence of any nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula, and that their representatives would hold talks at Panmunjom no later than the end of December, 1991, to discuss the nuclear issue.

Based on the agreement of the 5th talks, the two Koreas held three talks on the nuclear issue on 26, 28, and 31 December 1991. On 26 December, South Korea again demanded that North Korea sign the safeguard accord of the IAEA by 15 January 1992. Again it urged North Korea to permit inspection of nuclear-related facilities and materials by 31 January 1992. North Korea withdrew its previous demand of "Nuclear-Free Zone Declaration" and proposed a revised one, stipulating that there be no nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities on the peninsula. At the other two talks, both sides adjusted their different perspectives on the nuclear issue (Commentary, 1992: 217-8) and adopted the Joint Declaration on 31 December 1991. In view of the long negotiations in the preparatory stage, as well as the High-Level talks, the two Koreas' agreement on both the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration was made with surprising ease and speed. What stimulated such results? An answer can be found in both sides' eagerness to conclude an agreement at the 5th session.

II.2.e.1. Two Koreas' eagerness to conclude an agreement

On 10 December 1991, when North Korean representatives arrived in Seoul, both sides stated that an agreement should be reached no matter what was required (Dong-A Ilbo, 12/12/1991). Both Chung Won Shik (South Korea's Prime Minister) and Yon Hyong Muk (North Korea's Prime Minister) urged, in their keynote speeches, the successful conclusion of the 5th session in a spirit of compromise (Dong-A Ilbo, 12/12/1991). North Korea showed greater eagerness to make an agreement than South Korea. North Korea's representative told his counterpart on 18 December that negotiation should be concluded at the 5th session if it required an extension of the negotiating period (Dong-A Ilbo, 12 & 13/12/1991). Why were both Koreas eager to make an agreement at the end of 1991, but not at an earlier time?

II.2.e.2. North Korea

In the early 1990s, North Korea had been pursuing increasingly conciliatory policies toward South Korea, the US, and Japan (NYT, 9/9/1990), in an effort to escape its difficulties.

Internationally, North Korea had become isolated. Despite North Korea's opposition, the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with South Korea on 1 October 1990. China also made economic overtures to South Korea. South Korea's trade with socialist countries in 1989 increased to \$4.2 billion, compared to \$3.7 billion in 1988 and \$2.1 billion in 1987 (Asian Recorder, 7-13/5/1990). North Korea began to realize that its diplomatic policies in the Cold War were no longer feasible, and that they had led to its economic isolation. The two Koreas' simultaneous entry (17/9/1991) into the UN, which North Korea had strenuously opposed, was clearly an example of North Korea's perceptual change (Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 76).

Domestically, North Korea was suffering from its military and economic burdens. South Korea's per capita GNP in 1991 was believed to be six times that of North Korea (B.C. Koh, 1992: 467). In addition, North Korea spent five times more of its

GNP on defense than its rival (Harrison, 1991: 599). The resulting economic stresses had forced North Korea to take the initiative in negotiations with South Korea. But why was North Korea so eager to make an agreement by the end of the 1991, and not earlier?

North Korea was actively seeking to normalize diplomatic relations with the US and Japan, previously regarded as archrivals. The preconditions set by the US and Japan for this revival of diplomatic relations, however, were progress in inter-Korean relations and resolution of the nuclear problem.

First, North Korea wanted to gain time and credit for any compromise it made on the nuclear issue. Toward the end of 1991, pressure from the international community on North Korea to resolve the nuclear issue was intensified. The North Korean nuclear question thus became a great obstacle in North Korea's attempts at a rapprochement with the US and Japan, a factor which North Korea became well aware of as talks proceeded. For example, Japan's negotiations to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea collapsed in May 1991 when North Korea refused to allow international inspection of its nuclear installations (NYT, 26/5/1991). Because of heightened concern over North Korea's nuclear site, Yongbyon, the US and South Korea moved to isolate North Korea economically and diplomatically in November (NYT, 10 & 14/11/1991). Japan also declared on 13 November that, if North Korea wished to have normal relations with Japan, it would have to dismantle the key part of its secret nuclear center (NYT, 14/11/1991).

Second, North Korea desired to have economic assistance from Japan. When North Korea and Japan agreed in September 1990 to hold talks on establishing diplomatic ties, Japan pledged financial compensation for its occupation, 1910-1945 (NYT, 29/9/1990). In return for this compensation, as well as for the establishment of diplomatic ties and economic support, Japan insisted upon regular inspection of North Korea's nuclear plant (NYT, 7/4/1991). Miyazawa, Prime Minister of Japan, emphasized in November 1991 that Japan's economic support for North Korea depended upon North Korea's nuclear development policy (NYT, 14/11/1991). At this point, North Korea planned to have its 6th talks with Japan at the end of 1992.

Although North Korea had previously avoided South Korea in approaching the US and Japan, it now began to make contacts with these powers through South Korea (Kim Deok, Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991).

II.2.e.3. South Korea

South Korea wished to block North Korea's development of nuclear weapons. It wanted to induce North Korea to join the nuclear safety accord of the IAEA and to allow nuclear investigation by international organizations⁴⁴ (Dong-A Ilbo, 12/12/1991).

As his term drew to a close, Roh Tae Woo, who was facing an election year in 1992, was eager to make a breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. From the inception of his term, he had pledged such a breakthrough. In addition, South Korean decision-makers calculated that, if North Korea signed the safeguard accord with the IAEA in February 1992, thus removing an obstacle to its friendly relations with Japan, then North Korea would not be under pressure to come to an agreement with South Korea (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). At this juncture, the end of 1991 was perceived by South Korean decision-makers as the last chance to make such a breakthrough.

III. Implementation Failure

At the conclusion of the 5th session on 13 December, the premiers of both sides argued that the Basic Agreement differed from the July 4 Joint Communiqué of 1972 because it provided for specific implementation methods and thus opened a new epoch in inter-Korean relations (cited in T.W. Kwak, 1992: 298). The Basic Agreement ceased to function, however, after North Korea rejected on 12 October 1992 South Korea's proposal to hold a 9th session (J.W. Chi, 1994: 327). Before its statement was issued, North Korea learned that the US and South Korea had agreed (7-8/10/1992) to suspend the second phase of reduction in US forces in Korea and

to resume the annual 'Team Spirit' exercise (T.W. Park, 1994: 221). Just as the July 4 Joint Communiqué of 1972 had failed to be implemented, so the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration of 1992 also failed to be implemented. In fact, signs of implementation failure were revealed at the previous three sessions before the suspension of the 9th talks.

At the 6th session (18 - 21 February 1992), the two Koreas put into effect both the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration. However, both sides began to debate the nuclear issue (J.W. Chi, 1994: 337). At the 7th session (5 - 8 May 1992), the two sides agreed to create a liaison office and three joint commissions on military matters; economic exchanges and cooperation; and socio-cultural exchanges and cooperation. Even after these protocols, however, no substantial progress was made due to the stalemate over the issue of on-site nuclear inspection (Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 78).

At the 8th session (15 - 18 September 1992), the implementation protocol on the inter-Korean agreement was signed by the two prime ministers, thereby establishing the mechanism for carrying out the terms of the agreement (Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 78). Nevertheless, both sides began to acknowledge that the goal of improving inter-Korean relations was increasingly connected to the nuclear issue (J.W. Chi, 1994: 337).

IV. Returning to the Normal Relations Range

In his 1993 New Year's address, Kim Il Sung accused South Korea of impeding the implementation of the two agreements and of resuming the provocative 'Team Spirit' exercise (Pyongyang Times, 2/1/1993). In spite of this, the US and South Korea announced on 26 January, that they would resume the military exercise in mid-March 1993. North Korea immediately denounced the US and South Korea. The US-South Korean Joint 'Team Spirit' military exercise was perceived by North Korea as a "large-scale nuclear war gamble involving various kinds of nuclear

weapons and means" (Korea and World Affairs, Spring, 1993: 160).

The IAEA announced on 25 February 1993 that there were significant discrepancies between North Korea's declarations of its nuclear facilities and the findings of the Secretariats of the IAEA (Korea and World Affairs, Spring, 1993: 176). On 12 March, North Korea denounced the 'Team Spirit' exercise and the statement by the IAEA, arguing that both were an encroachment on the sovereignty of North Korea and hostile to the socialism of North Korea (Korea and World Affairs, Spring, 1993: 176-7). Following the above denunciation, North Korea announced (12/3/1992) its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). South Korea equated this withdrawal with a violation of the Basic Agreement (Lee Hong Ku, cited in J.H. Kim, 1994: 349-50). The 1993 'Team Spirit' military exercise was implemented. Thus the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration failed to be implemented.

The possibility of implementation failure was initially perceived by Lee Dong Bok, a South Korean representative. When the North Korean attitude underwent a drastic change at the 5th session, Lee Dong Bok suspected that North Korea might sign the agreement without being serious about implementing it (J.W. Chi, 1994: 332). The doubt about North Korea's sincerity was reinforced by North Korea's glib response to South Korea's sudden proposal for a De-nuclearization Declaration (J.W. Chi, 1994: 332).

The possibility of implementation failure became apparent immediately after the signing of the two documents. Kim Il Sung returned to his previous position on the day after the completion of the two documents (20/2/1992). He argued that the Basic Agreement was another July 4 Communiqué, and that US forces of South Korea should withdraw now that both Koreas had adopted the Basic Agreement (Lee Dong Bok's testimony, cited in J.W. Chi, 1994: 332). As Kim Il Sung returned to his previous position, inter-Korean relations began to return to their normal relations range. Given the specific directives contained in the documents, why did implementation fail? An answer can be found in the absence of substantial negotiations on the nuclear issue.

IV.1. NO SUBSTANTIAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NUCLEAR ISSUE

Both Koreas announced on 13 December 1991 that there should be no nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). Before this, Choi Ho-Joong, South Korean Unification Minister, said that North Korea's nuclear weapons development was a "life-and-death" issue for South Korea, and should be discussed at the 5th session of the Hig-Level talks (Mainichi Daily News, 11/12/1991). Did both Koreas not have serious negotiations on the nuclear issue?

South Korea had two options for negotiating the nuclear issue and for improving inter-Korean relations: the Two-Track policy and the Linkage policy. The Two Track policy was designed to promote simultaneously both the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the resolution of the nuclear issue. It was assumed that inter-Korean relations could be improved before the settlement of the nuclear problem (J.W. Chi, 1994: 335). The Linkage Policy assumed that the improvement of inter-Korean relations could not take place without the resolution of the nuclear issue.

Some of South Korea's representatives insisted upon the Two Track policy. They saw that the opportunity of making an inter-Korean agreement was a chance in a thousand. Another group insisted that South Korea should press North Korea until it agreed to relinquish its nuclear reprocessing facilities (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). The Two Track policy became the final and decisive position of South Korea.

The group favoring the Two Track policy believed that the the Korean problem could not be resolved in the near future as long as South Korea tied negotiations to the nuclear issue (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). Among others, Lim Dong Won, Director of the Institute of Diplomacy and Security, insisted that, if South Korea waited until the nuclear issue was settled, it would not make any progress in "intra-Korean relations". Roh Tae Woo chose the Two Track policy. He said on 23 December 1991 that the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the resolution of the nuclear issue were both important, and that they should be resolved simultaneously (J.W. Chi 1994: 335). This implies that South Korea had decided to focus on the adoption of the Basic Agreement rather than on the actual resolution

of the nuclear problem. This revision of the South Korean policy on the nuclear issue was delivered to North Korean representatives at the last working level contacts. After this, the talks made rapid progress (Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991).

As stated earlier, when the nuclear issue became a critical issue in inter-Korean relations, the two documents could not be implemented. Although the nuclear issue was the nucleus, the real substance, of the talks (Yang Sung Chul and Kim Deok, Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991), the negotiators failed to treat it as such. In spite of the premiers' praise on both sides, the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration, in practical terms, did not specify implementation procedures (Yang Sung Chul, Dong-A Ilbo, 13/12/1991). When both Koreas failed to negotiate the most substantial issue in their relations, that of nuclear power, a return to their protracted conflict relationship was inevitable.

Summary

In December 1986, Kim Il Sung showed a willingness to have High-Level political talks with South Korea. This change of attitude was reiterated in his 1988 New Year's Address. Roh Tae Woo's July 7 Declaration (1988) and October 18 UN speech (1988) revealed South Korea's foreign policy change toward North Korea. On 16 January 1989, both Koreas agreed to hold High-Level political and military talks.

In the late 1980s, North Korea suffered from a serious military burden and the resulting economic stress. A policy change toward South Korea was urgently needed. North Korea had to accept coexistence with South Korea. Roh Tae Woo wanted to bring about major progress in inter-Korean relations. Both sides perceived a need for talks, sent conciliatory signals, and agreed to hold talks.

The first three talks were not productive due to the Koreas' basic positions and policies. South Korea wanted a confidence-building period first. North Korea insisted upon a non-aggression agreement first. At the 4th session, both Koreas made

slight compromises. Perceiving the necessity of improving inter-Korean relations in order to establish diplomatic relations with the US and Japan, North Korea had to have contacts with South Korea.

At the 5th session of the talks, both Koreas agreed to adopt and sign the Basic Agreement. North Korea perceived an increased necessity for accommodation with South Korea in order to avoid intensified international pressure over its nuclear policy, as well as to win economic support from Japan. South Korea's Roh Tae Woo perceived the end of 1991 as a golden opportunity to realize his pledge for a real breakthrough in inter-Korean relations. Both sides were eager to conclude an agreement. Neither side showed any sign of threatening the other's identity. The leaders of both sides perceived benefits from concluding an agreement.

The principles outlined in these two documents ceased to be operative after North Korea refused (12/10/1992) to hold the 9th session. Right after their agreement (February 1992), both Koreas realized that the nuclear question was crucial to progress in inter-Korean relations. As long as they avoided the nuclear issue, which was critical to both Koreas' national security, a return to the previous normal relations range (NRR) was inevitable. US/South Korea announced that they would resume the annual 'Team Spirit' exercise (7-8/10/1992). North Korea withdrew from NPT (12/3/1992). US/South Korea implemented the 'Team Spirit' military exercise in 1993. The former extremely negative image of the other was reactivated. The two Koreas returned to the normal relations range (NRR) of the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Brief Exposition of Accommodation Attempts in The Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict

Although an integrated analysis is provided in Chapter 7, I attempt in this section to show briefly how key variables and models 2.1 through 2.3 are applied to explain the accommodation attempts (or failures) in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Cases cited are: the Armistice Agreement (1953); the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972); and the Basic Agreement (1992).

Model 2.3 illuminates foreign policy behavior in protracted conflict. In accommodation, all three cases reveal three phases of accommodative behavior (i.e., initiation, negotiation, and the conclusion of an agreement). The initiation phases of two cases (i.e., the July 4 Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement) were characterized by the sending of conciliatory signals. Direct actors in the Armistice Agreement case agreed (June-July 1951) to talk after the failure of the first initiation phase (end 1950-early 1951).

In the negotiation phase, the involved states in each case exchanged and adjusted views. However, the cases of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement did not reveal substantial negotiations on anything specific. In the July 4 Joint Communiqué case, each Korea's distinct position on unification and in the Basic Agreement case, on the nuclear issue, was the bedrock agenda on which substantial negotiations should have occurred. As for the actors' behavior, there was a dramatic decrease in conflictual behavior in the case of July 4 Joint Communiqué, but intensification of military pressure on both sides in the case of the Armistice Agreement.

Nevertheless, an agreement was reached in each case although only the Armistice Agreement could be said to function in a substantial way. The July 4 Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement failed to function, resulting in an intensified mutual negative image; the strengthening of institutionalized commitments of both

Koreas; and a return to the normal relations of the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Model 2.2 examines decision-making in protracted conflict.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT: In case of The Armistice Agreement, environmental changes in the initiation phase consisted of: both sides' dramatic increase in casualties; military and economic burdens; the possibility of an expanded war; and both sides' decision-makers' acknowledgement of the failure of their previous policies. An "appropriate cease-fire" or a return to the "pre-war status-quo" was perceived by all the involved states as shared value, as well as complementary interest. In the face of these realities, decision-makers on both sides revised their previous commitments in relation to the Korean peninsula. Serious divisions, however, on strategic security and ideology, as well as mutual suspicion of the other's sincerity in negotiation led the adversaries to intensify their military pressure and to block mutual accommodation. A protracted negotiation resulted.

An important environmental change in the accommodation phase was that, after Stalin's death, China became a major decision-maker on the communist side in the Korean War. The long stalemate; the intensification of military commitments by both sides; US atomic weapon threat to China/the DPRK; and the dramatic increase in US casualties inflicted by China/the DPRK's assault in June and July 1953 led both sides to perceive shared value and complementary interest. They were forced to recognize that there was no alternative to a cease-fire.

THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ: In case of The July 4 Joint Communiqué, environmental changes in its initiation period were the Nixon Doctrine (25/7/1969) and the US-Sino detente (1971-2). Decision-makers in both Koreas became very uneasy and mistrustful about their patrons' actions in a future inter-Korean conflict. Both Koreas acknowledged that they could be sacrificed as a result of the big powers' detente. Shared value was recognized. Decision-makers perceived a need for compromise and for a revision of their previous policies toward each other.

The two Koreas' negotiations were characterized by exchanges of 'general

views' on common interests, unification and tension reduction. Although decision-makers agreed on important principles of unification and some methods of tension reduction, they did not seriously discuss mutual negative perceptions or opposing ideologies, nor did they strive to diminish any commitment against the other.

In the implementation phase, different interpretations by both Koreas on the three principles of unification surfaced. These contrary views functioned as an environmental change which disillusioned decision-makers on both sides. They were forced to admit a vacuum of shared value and common interest. Unification turned out not to be a common interest, but a common ground for further conflict. Both sides' images of the other were aggravated; commitments on both sides were intensified; and the inter-Korean protracted conflict continued.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT: In case of The Basic Agreement, both North Korea's military and economic burden and Roh Tae Woo's eagerness to bring about major progress in inter-Korean relations were environmental changes that could stimulate inter-Korean dialogue. Both sides tacitly accepted the nature of the other's state. Kim Il Sung's coexistence policy and Roh Tae Woo's 'northern policy' constituted shared value.

In the negotiation period, no progress occurred until the 3rd session of the talks (11-14/12/1990). Toward the end of 1991, both sides perceived an increased necessity for accommodation. North Korea's urgent need to improve inter-Korean relations in order to establish diplomatic relations with the US and Japan, as well as the approaching close of Roh Tae Woo's presidency were environmental changes. Each Korea considered the other a prerequisite for achieving their political goals. The leaders of both sides perceived benefits from concluding an agreement. However, there was no complementary interest in a real sense, but only pseudo common interest in "making an agreement".

In the implementation period, North Korea's nuclear weapons development plan resulted in the implementation failure of the Basic Agreement although it was agreed to and signed by both Koreas. To South Korea, North Korea's nuclear capability was a serious threat to its security. To North Korea, diplomatic relations with the

US or with Japan was more important than concentrating on relations with South Korea. Neither shared value nor complementary interest was present. The two Koreas resumed their conflictual behaviors. Mutual negative images were aggravated. They returned to the normal relations range of the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Model 2.1 considers the source of protracted conflict. Both the US and China/the DPRK's intensification of military pressure in the negotiation period of the Armistice Agreement was primarily due to security interest and ideological conflict. The long negotiation process in the case of the Basic Agreement revealed both Koreas' security concerns. The failure of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement demonstrates that the inter-Korean protracted conflict may not terminate with ease due to fears for national security and/or ideological polarization.

This brief application of the models and key variables in this study is feasible in explaining accommodation (or its failure) [Model 2.3]; decision-making in accommodation attempts [Model 2.2]; and the origins of accommodation failure [Model 2.1] in the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Notes to Chapter 5

Complete authors' names, titles, and publication data are given in the Bibliography.

1. For the study of the Korean armistice negotiations, see Bacchus (1973); Bailey (1992); Bernstein (1983); Friedman (1975); Hermes (1966); Joy (1955); Joyce and Gabriel Kolko (1972: 610-617); Schnabel and Watson (1991); and Simmons (1975: 198-240).
2. See Kim, H.J. (1989).
3. On 1 October 1950, South Korean forces crossed the 38th parallel. At this point the USSR proposed a cease-fire plan through Andrei Vyshinsky. Vishinsky's proposed 7-point suggestion was: (1) immediate cease-fire in Korea; (2) immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops; (3) establishment of Unified Congress through a general election by North-South Koreans; (4) organization of North-South Joint Commission based on equal numbers, which might temporarily govern the Korean peninsula; (5) a new UN Commission, composed of states contiguous to Korea, would supervise the general election; (6) economic support to the newly-organized united Korean government; and (7) entrance of the new Korean government into the UN. The USSR suggested the proposal because of the threat of losing influence in North Korea, of North Korea's collapse, and thus of the impending possibility of a unified Korea backed by the UN/US (Bacchus, 1973: 555; H.J. Kim, 1989: 213).
4. On January 1951, the US House of Representatives adopted a resolution urging the UN to declare China an "aggressor". The US formally asked the UN General Assembly to brand China as an "aggressor," and it was passed at the UN (44 to 7) on 30 January 1951.

5. For example, a CIA report evaluated in early July 1951 that the USSR's peace talks were designed to achieve a prolonged armistice or to utilize Chinese resources in Asia or in other areas in the world (Truman Papers, PSF, Special Estimate 8, 6/7/1951, HSTL, cited in Foot, 1985: 161).
6. The US already began to reconsider the cease-fire by mid-March. This was followed by the US/UN forces' counterattack when they began to return to the 38th parallel. Toward the end of March, US/UN forces were established along the 38th parallel. One month earlier, the US estimated that the US/UN forces should hold the 38th parallel for the following reasons: (1) if the USSR/China decided to inflict high casualties on US/UN forces, it was possible for them to do so; (2) the conflict might spill over other areas or could escalate into a general war for which the US was not ready; (3) an indefinite and heavy additional drain on US resources; and (4) loss of unity among US allies (FRUS, 1951, VII, 23/2/1951: 192-193).
7. By end-June 1951, the number of US/UN casualties were 78,400 (death, 21,300; wounded, 53,000; and missing and POWs, 4,400).
8. For example, the USSR promised China that it would send 50 T-50 type tanks, but it provided only 20 tanks. The USSR's promised support of China's air force was not implemented either (Agent Report by 308th CIC Det., RG 338, Box P605, WNRG, cited in B.R.Shin, 1989: 259).
9. The cease-fire option was already chosen in February 1951 when China tried to advance southward. China framed as the worst case scenario the last defense line as the 38th parallel (Agent Report, 308th det., cited in B.R. Shin, 1989: 261).
10. Nie Rongzhen, China's Marshall, testified that Chinese decision-makers were in favor of negotiations (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 160).
11. The US prompt response created for the China/DPRK side the impression of urgency and readiness to make important concessions to end war. Thus the prompt US response probably helped to prolong the eventual negotiations by leading China/the DPRK from the outset to infer that the US was far more anxious for

cease-fire than it was (Bacchus, 1974: 556-7).

12. The US proposal was asking for more than it expected and exceeded US requirements (Bailey, 1992: 78; Bernstein, 1983: 268).

13. China/the DPRK suspended the talks to protest alleged violations in Kaesong. In addition, the US insisted upon moving the meetings from Kaesong where China/the DPRK controlled Panmunjom, which was recognized as a neutral city.

14. CPV/DPRK had built extensive underground fortifications, dug a total of 776 miles of tunnels and 3,427 miles of trenches. In addition, from the middle of 1951, there was a huge increase in the Chinese Air Force (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 165-166). China's reinforcement of its military capacities was begun from the early weeks of the Kaesong Conference (Goulden, 1982: 566).

15. The JCS, backed by Truman and Acheson, already directed General Ridgway on 13 November to accept the present line of contact as a demarcation line, under condition that if other issues were not resolved within thirty days, it must be renegotiated (Alexander, 1987: 449; Goulden, 1982: 579).

16. They were: (1) a cease-fire by all forces of the two sides would take effect within twenty-four hours of the signing of the armistice agreement; (2) a supervisory organ would be established to implement the armistice, equally and jointly manned by the two sides; (3) no armed forces would be permitted in the DMZ except as mutually agreed; and (4) the military commanders of the two sides would administer their own parts of the DMZ (Bailey, 1992: 82).

17. Although the US wanted a security guarantee from China/the DPRK, it had its own worst case scenario. If the armistice was violated by China, the US would expand the war into the Chinese territory. This plan was called by the JCS "greater sanction." It was a strategy chosen by the JCS, State Department, and the President (Alexander, 1987: 450). To these top decision-makers, a warning of greater sanctions to Chinese forces both in Korea and in China's mainland could be the only practical deterrent (Schnabel and Watson, 1991).

18. Before this, by mid-March 1961, the US considered a package deal. It suggested that the US yield on the airfields, and that communists back down on USSR's membership and on repatriation of POWs. To the US, this package proposal was advantageous because the Communists would be forced to reject the US proposal on several grounds and thereby emphasize their intransigence (Bernstein, 1983: 273).

19. Until mid-1951, the US had signed but had not ratified the Geneva Convention. China and North Korea had not signed the Convention. Both China and North Korea, however, stated that they would adhere to the spirit of the Convention.

20. Conferees were Truman; Acheson; Lovett; Vendenberg (Air Force Chief of staff); Fechteler (Chief of naval operations); Hull (Army Vice Chief of staff for operations and administration); Johnson (Deputy Assistant Secretary); and John Snyder (Treasury Secretary).

21. At the end of January 1952, Truman advocated an ultimatum with a ten-day expiration date, while informing the USSR that the US intended to blockade the China coast and destroy military bases in Manchuria. In May 1952, Truman described his plan of either an end to hostilities in Korea or the complete destruction of China and Siberia (Truman Papers, PSF. Longhand Notes File, 27 Jan., 18 May, 1952, Box 333, HSTL, cited in Foot, 1985: 176).

22. The Supung dam supplied about 90% of North Korea's total power, and about 10% of the power of north-east China (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 187).

23. This was widely interpreted to mean that Eisenhower would try to end the war (Halliday and Cumings, 1988: 191).

24. In mid-January 1953, US scientists reported the first successful detonation of an atomic warhead of a size suitable for use in battlefield artillery. This signified that nuclear weapons could be used for tactical as well as strategic purposes (Goulden, 1982: 628).

25. North Korea and China were able to release 471 South Koreans, 149 US personnel, and 65 others, and the UNC released 5194 Korean and 1030 Chinese POWS, and 446 'civilian internees' (Bailey, 1992: 128).
26. When the US considered driving to the waist of Korea and initiating naval and air attacks on China, they did so with Soviet attitudes in mind. Moscow had undoubtedly increased the vulnerability of China/the DPRK (Foot, 1985: 228).
27. In October 1952, the Joint Strategic Plans Committee was instructed by the JCS to reexamine the conclusions of NSC 118/2 and to advise courses of action that might lead to an armistice agreement on US terms. However, final report on these matters was completed on 23 March 1953 (Foot, 1985: 206). Due to Zhou's conciliatory statement on 30 March, the NSC did not immediately implement the Planning Board's recommendations (ibid.: 207).
28. The Eisenhower administration, rather, threatened its major allies with congressional economic redistribution if they did not support the US policy in the Korean War (Foot, 1985: 218-9).
29. AS for South Korea, US Vice-President Spiro Agnew visited and informed South Korea on 24 August 1970 that the US would withdraw its 20,000 forces from South Korea.
30. For the text of the Joint Communiqué, see Dong-A Ilbo, 4/7/1972.
31. For details of the NSCC meetings, see White Paper (1988: 70-75).
32. For details on the Red Cross Talks, see White Paper (1988: 75-105).
33. Kim Il Sung believed that the fundamental task of the South Korean revolution lay in driving out the US forces in South Korea, overthrowing the militant fascist government of South Korea, and in establishing a socialist system (Kim Il Sung, 1976: 141, 155).
34. For the text of the revised constitution of North Korea, see Sang Woo Rhee et al. (eds.), 1988: 610-625.

35. On the same day, Ro Jae Hyun, Chief of the General Staff of the South Korean Army, instructed the major commanders of the ROK Army not to be deceived by North Korea's disguised strategy and to be ready to deter another war through superior military power (Dong-A Ilbo, 20/7/1972).
36. The US State Department spokesman, Charles W. Bray, announced on 5 July 1972 that the US would not change or modify its program of modernizing South Korea's forces and did not have any plan to reduce US forces in South Korea (Dong-A Ilbo, 6/7/1972).
37. The two Koreas, in fact, produced one more document. It was "The Agreement on the Formation of Subcommittees of the North-South High-Level Talks". In this study, however, it will not be analyzed because, in its nature, it was simply a supplement to the other two documents.
38. The Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration were signed on 13 and 31 December 1991 respectively.
39. For the text of the Basic Agreement, see Commentary, 1992, 157-70.
40. For the text, see Commentary, 1992: 171-5.
41. For details, see Commentary, 1992: 184-99.
42. The 4th session was scheduled to be held on 25-28 February 1991. North Korea, however, suspended talks on 8 February because of South Korea's state of alert due to Gulf war and 'Team Spirit' military exercise (Commentary, 1992: 197). The rescheduled meeting, set for late August 1991, was postponed once again by North Korea because of the prevailing uncertain situation following the abortive coup in the Soviet Union (Y.W. Kihl, 1994: 135).
43. The estimated cost of Korean reunification, if North Korea collapses and is absorbed by South Korea, runs anywhere from \$300 billion to \$700 billion depending on when the reunification would take place (as cited in Y.W. Kihl, 1994: 142).

44. North Korea had signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1985. However, it had refused to let the IAEA inspect North Korean nuclear facilities.

Part Three. Analysis

I turn now from an in-depth case study of the inter-Korean protracted conflict to its analysis. In Chapter 2, Part One, I argued that a protracted conflict comprised a series of crises and/or war, and accommodation failures. In Part Two, I presented cases illuminating such situations: in Chapter 4, war and crises; and in Chapter 5, cease-fire and accommodation failure. In Part Three [Chapters 6 and 7], I use the conceptual framework of my study to test the propositions and to analyze the case studies in Part Two.

In Chapter 6, I will examine how the major powers influenced and formulated conditions for both Koreas' decision-making in crises/war and accommodation attempts. In Chapter 7, I will analyse how and why the inter-Korean protracted conflict developed under conditions provided by the major powers. The question of why the great powers promoted their foreign policies will be explained in Chapter 7, which provides an integrated analysis of the research findings in Part Two.

CHAPTER 6. ROLE OF THE MAJOR POWERS

In a sub-system crisis or war, the major powers may pursue a policy of restraint in conflict management in order not to break the stability of the dominant system. Or, they may pursue conflictual behavior in order to protect their client state's interest, which they identify with their own. This constitutes the "paradox of major powers" (Brecher, 1993: 35-6). In the accommodation process between respective client states, the major powers may actively encourage cooperative attitudes in order to strengthen the stability of the sub-system or to seal up the possibility of any conflict. The major powers, however, may not have much interest in their client states' rapprochement if they perceive that it is not significant for their national goal.

In this chapter, I will not examine the general pattern of alliances surrounding the Korean actors. Instead, I will concentrate on the role of the major powers in the cases of crisis/war and accommodation attempts in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. The core questions in this chapter are: What input did the major powers exert on the content in each case; and what foreign policy decision-making conditions did they impose on the two Koreas? This study will be preceded by sequential periods, or phases, in each case: pre-crisis, crisis, and end-crisis for war/crisis; initiation, negotiation, accommodation, and implementation for accommodation attempts.

I. Crises/War

I.1. THE PRE-WAR PERIOD

In the 1920s, socialism and communism were introduced into Korea as part of its independence movement. The left and the right, however, had different

perspectives on how to achieve independence. Serious internal conflicts among Korean national leaders emerged.

After Japan's surrender in 1945, the Korean People's Republic (left-wing) and the Korean Democratic Party (right-wing) polarized Korean politics. Meanwhile, it was agreed at the Yalta Conference (1945) that the Soviets and the US would occupy Korea to effect the surrender of Japanese forces, and that the southern and northern parts along latitude 38 would be the respective occupation area of each side. The Moscow Conference in December 1945 which adopted a four-power trusteeship (US, USSR, Britain, and China) for a period of up to five years intensified intra-Korean conflict (M.K. Kang, 1984: 170; T.S. Byun, 1991: 516; W.K. Choi, 1993: 358). The left-wing, which initially opposed the trusteeship, shifted its position to one of welcoming the trusteeship, whereas the right-wing opposed it. Organized conflict between left and right increased. Attempts to bring about compromise between left and right failed.

In the southern part of Korea, the conflict between left and right was exacerbated by the US military government's harsh policy against the peasants and workers, who were struggling to improve their living conditions. In the northern part, beginning in 1946, the Soviets encouraged North Korea's military build up. On 2 August 1948, North Korea established the KPA (Korean People's Army). The Cold War thus manifested itself in the major powers' satellites. The Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established on 15 August 1948. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) was established on 9 September 1948. The UN and the US declared that the ROK was the only lawful government in the Korean peninsula. The Soviet Union declared that the DPRK was the only lawful government of Korea.

From then on, the conflict in the Korean peninsula became Korean in character, taking over from its Cold War progenitors, the US and the USSR. Each regime claimed exclusive jurisdiction over the whole Korean peninsula. The potential for serious conflict over territory and national identity (i.e., ideology) was great. South Korea pursued a policy of 'march-to-the north'. North Korea accelerated its military build up, and launched a strike on 25 June 1950.

In sum, the major powers' involvement since 1945 had an important impact on Korean politics, intensifying inter-Korean conflict. If, however, the Korean leaders on the left and right had compromised successfully, the major powers would not have been so influential. After the two Koreas were established and supported by the major powers, the possibility of inter-Korean compromise was remote. The two Koreas were convinced that they had to fight for their interest and identity.

I.2. US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR

I.2.a. Pre-Crisis

In 1949, a substantial part of US forces withdrew from South Korea. On 12 January 1950, Secretary of State Acheson stated that Korea was not part of the US defense perimeter in Asia. The US did not consider the Korean peninsula strategically important in the case of general war. The vacuum of US politico-military commitment to South Korea contributed to North Korea's decision to invade on 25 June 1950.

I.2.b. Crisis

Because Korea was not considered strategically important, the US was not prepared with a specific war plan when North Korea attacked South Korea. Nevertheless, North Korea's higher-than-expected conflictual behavior forced the US to cope with the Communist threat to collective security. US decision-makers believed that North Korea was under the direct control of the USSR.

At the first Blair House meeting on 25 June 1950 [Washington Time], the US decided to authorize General MacArthur to furnish South Korea with arms and equipment from the Far East Command. At the second Blair House meeting on 26 June [Washington Time], the US decision-makers decided not to appease the communists, but to fully support South Korea with US air and naval forces in the area south of the 38th parallel. It was decided that North Korean forces had to be repelled. On 30 June [Washington Time], Truman approved MacArthur's urgent

request for US ground forces. As the military situation gravely deteriorated, only direct military pressure remained to US decision-makers.

The crisis marks was the beginning of the change in US policy in Korea, which previously had been to withdraw US forces from South Korea. This policy turn-around was reaffirmed when MacArthur landed at Inchon on 15 September 1950 and when the US/UN forces entered North Korea on 7 October 1950. The US abandoned its initial objective of repelling North Korean forces and adopted a new objective, unification of Korea. This departure from the US's containment policy to one of complete victory over Communist North Korea was of great significance. US rivalry with the Soviets contributed to US intervention in the Korean War and to its foreign policy shifts.

I.2.c. Impact

This series of US policy shifts in Korea induced China to intervene in the Korean War. After lengthy and careful deliberations over intervention, with its accompanying danger of a war with the US, China reached a decision. It entered the war on the very day that US forces entered North Korea (7/10/1950).

I.3. CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR

I.3.a. Pre-crisis

Right after Truman announced on 27 June 1950 his decision to interpose the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, China condemned the action, saying that the US threatened China's territory (28/6/1950). By the end of July, China began to consider seriously military intervention. On 18 August, China stepped up the war-preparedness of its troops in the North-East. In early September, China perceived the risks attached to intervention and searched for alternatives. China was very cautious, maintaining strict self-control (B.J. Lee, 1990: 241). China was not yet a direct actor in the Korean War.

I.3.b. Crisis

MacArthur's Inchon landing and subsequent US policies prompted China to intervene. On 27 September, Truman authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel. Zhou En-lai had strongly hinted at Chinese intervention if US forces crossed the 38th parallel. When they did so on 7 October, China decided to intervene. When the US/UN forces entered Pyongyang on 19 October, Chinese troops secretly crossed the Yalu river. China's role as a direct actor in the Korean War had begun.

I.3.c. Impact

The secret intervention of Chinese forces initially did not change the US goal, victory over the Communists. MacArthur announced on 24 November an end-the-war offensive, which was followed by a massive Chinese full-scale offensive on 26 November. The Chinese offensive contributed to the US willingness to negotiate for a cease-fire on 9 and 15 December, and to the retreat of US/UN forces. The US/UN forces faced an intra-war crisis. Chinese intervention forced the US to reconsider its policy in the Korean War.

I.4. THE POST-WAR PERIOD

After the Chinese intervention, the US and China became arch-rivals. The Chinese ground forces and the US naval and air forces functioned as a balance of power in the Far East. The Korean War turned the Korean peninsula into a hot spot for politico-military struggle in the Cold War. The US rivalry with the communist bloc was reinforced. The militarization of NATO was invigorated. The Cold War took on global dimensions.

After the Korean War, US forces were stationed in South Korea. The US and South Korea signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (1/10/1953). South Korean political, military, and diplomatic dependence on the US increased considerably (C.W. Chung, 1988). Command of the ROK army had already been given to the Commander of the UNC during the Korean War. To North Korea, the US/UN became a deep-

rooted enemy and major adversary which must be defeated. North Korea indoctrinated its people with the view that the imperialistic US was the primary enemy of North Korea (Clough, 1986: 315). North Korea often expressed the conviction that the US goal was colonization of the entire Korean peninsula.

During the Korean War, South Korea was invaded by North Korean forces, using Soviet weapons. The military situation changed dramatically due to Chinese intervention, thereby deepening South Korea's negative image of China. South Korea became more aware of the importance of the major powers (e.g., China/USSR and the US) in international politics (S.W. Rhee, 1986: 672-3). Inter-Korean rivalry and conflict between anti-communism and anti-imperialism greatly increased. North Korea strengthened its military capability and fostered internal cohesion. South Korea strengthened its commitment to defeat North Korea. These emotions and attitudes became powerful negative factors in the two Koreas' accommodation attempts in later decades. The cease-fire will be examined in the accommodation attempt case.

I.5. THE JANUARY 21 CRISIS

I.5.a. Pre-Crisis

Given the ideology of the South Korean government, which was strongly anti-communist, US President Johnson's visit to South Korea on 31 October 1966 was perceived by North Korea in the same light as Dulles's visit in 1950. From then on, North Korea intensified its hostile policies toward South Korea.

I.5.b. Crisis

North Korea's commando unit reached the South Korean President's residence in Seoul on 21 January 1968 in an attempt to assassinate Park Chung Hee. South Korean decision-makers considered an immediate retaliation. They believed that preemptive strikes against some North Korean bases would be more effective than coping with future attacks by North Korea. However, the US mollified and

restrained South Korea's angry reaction. A possible crisis escalation was defused by the US.

I.5.c. End-Crisis and Impact

The significance of the January 21 crisis was nearly ignored by the US because of the Pueblo crisis, which occurred on 23 January. In talks on the Pueblo crisis with North Korea, the US did not even refer to the January 21 crisis. This inaction and indifference greatly displeased South Korea, whose leaders considered Article III of the US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (1953) inadequate in a crisis situation. Article III stated that both states would act to meet the common danger in accordance with their "constitutional processes". On 17 April 1968, South Korea and the US agreed that the US would "effectively, swiftly, and immediately" assist South Korea in the event of a North Korean invasion. In mid-February, the US had agreed to a \$1 billion increase in US military support for South Korea. By objecting to US inaction on the January 21 crisis, Park Chung Hee gained stronger US commitments to South Korea.

I.6. THE PUEBLO CRISIS

I.6.a. Pre-crisis

On 9 January 1968, North Korea warned that it would take action if the USS Pueblo continued its mission in North Korean waters. North Korea's warning was repeated on 23 January, when the Pueblo crisis erupted. The US did not take North Korean warnings seriously. Although the Pueblo crisis was triggered by North Korea, the lack of an appropriate response by the US to North Korea's warnings contributed in part to the seizure of the Pueblo by North Korea.

I.6.b. Crisis

The US committed itself on 24 January [Washington time] to save the Pueblo by "whatever means". The Enterprise, the nuclear-powered destroyer Truxton, and the

frigate Halsey were already north of the 38th parallel. Although the USSR was inactive in the initial phase of the crisis, the possibility of the USSR's collaboration with North Korea was considered by the US. US diplomatic approaches toward the USSR failed, however, the USSR declaring that North Korea was right in detaining the Pueblo.

Facing an impasse in the talks with North Korea, the US began to step up military pressure on 25 January [Washington time]. Johnson ordered 14,787 Air Force and Naval air reservists to active duty. It was a limited precautionary military action. The US did not discount the possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention, and a possible nuclear war. The UN Security Council meeting on 27 January took the form of a verbal battle between the US and the USSR. On 28 January, China gave strong verbal support to North Korea. During those days, the Soviets' warship *Gidrolog* was close behind the *Enterprise*. Although the USSR and China strongly supported North Korea, they did not provoke the US militarily. The limited military maneuvers of the US and the USSR were done very cautiously.

I.6.c. End-crisis

The US suddenly shifted its policy on 29 January, and began to decrease its hostile behavior toward North Korea. On 17 February, Kosygin stated that the USSR was trying to take "all necessary measures" to prevent the Pueblo crisis from escalating. North Korea decreased its hostility toward the US. On 23 December, the crew was released. The US and the USSR's precautionary military maneuvers had prevented superpower crisis escalation. The US's softened posture toward North Korea, supported by the USSR's willingness to help deescalate the crisis, helped to end it.

I.6.d. Impact

The US's reaction to the Pueblo crisis and its inaction in the January 21 crisis motivated South Korea to revise its security system and its inter-Korean policy. After the Pueblo crisis, North Korea also bolstered its defense system because Kim Il Sung

perceived continued hostile behavior by the US. North Korea and China implemented a series of military-technological arrangements between 1969 and 1974 (Bodansky, 1994: 96-7). Inter-Korean conflict was heightened by institutionalized commitments on both sides.

I.7. THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS

I.7.a. Pre-Crisis

When, on 5 May 1975, Kissinger reaffirmed the US defense commitment to South Korea, North Korea greatly resented this and its hostility toward the US was augmented. When, on 10 July 1976, China declared its strong support for North Korea, the US reiterated its stubborn position on the Korean issue, thereby again aggravating North Korea's hostility.

I.7.b. Crisis

North Korean soldiers killed two US soldiers on 18 August 1976 [Korean time]. To the US, the incident was the "first" murder in the JSA since the Armistice Agreement. UNC rights and security in the JSA were authorized by the Armistice Agreement. The US weighed the impact of any future US military movements on the USSR and China, fearing crisis-escalation. The US wished to avoid provoking China or the USSR. Kissinger engaged in direct contacts with China and clarified US military intentions toward North Korea. Neither China nor the Soviets supported North Korea on this issue of the 2 killings. The US perceived that China and the USSR would remain aloof in this case. North Korea had to settle the crisis on its own.

On 19 August [Washington time], Ford decided to implement 'Operation Paul Bunyan': cutting the tree that had precipitated the incident. Although he wished to deploy an "appropriate amount of force", Ford prepared contingency plans. General Stilwell of the UNC discussed with Park Chung Hee the possibility of a UNC attack if North Korea hindered 'Operation Paul Bunyan'. North Korea did not interfere,

and no Soviet military maneuver ensued.

The Poplar Tree crisis did not escalate into a war or a full-scale clash. The two contributing factors were: (1) US caution and China/USSR restraint, and (2) North Korea's inaction against the US operation.

I.7.c. End-crisis

On 21 August [Korean time], Kim Il Sung sent a letter of 'regret' to the UNC. The US initially stated that the letter was unacceptable. On the following day, however, the US suddenly shifted its position of firmness to one of compromise. China had advised the US to consider not only the literal expression of Kim's message but its context. To Kim Il Sung, the tree-cutting operation was a stinging loss of face. China's advice induced the US to interpret positively North Korea's reaction. On 23 August, the US began to soften its posture. China's advice had resulted in an important result: crisis deescalation.

I.7.c. Impact

Although the direct actors in the Poplar Tree crisis were the US and North Korea, the crisis motivated South Korea to stiffen internal cohesion and to prepare for an immediate retaliation. After strengthening its military commitment to South Korea, the US engaged in joint 'Team Spirit' military exercises with South Korea, beginning in 1978. North Korea also consolidated its people's loyalty to the Party and the regime. Kim Il Sung constantly urged the necessity of being prepared for war at any time.

II. Accommodation Attempts

II.1. THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

II.1.a. Initiation

After the Chinese massive attack in October 1950, the US signaled in December its serious willingness for a cease-fire. China's response was nullified when the US/UN branded China an 'aggressor'. China defined the US as the 'deadly enemy of world peace'. Conflict between China and the US escalated. More importantly, up to this time there had not been a troublesome issue (e.g. POWs) to prolong cease-fire negotiations. The failure of the first serious attempt at a cease-fire resulted in a great number of casualties on both sides, and extended the negotiation period.

II.1.b. Negotiation and Accommodation

The second effort to negotiate a cease-fire was initiated by the USSR on 23 June 1951. Compromise on Item 2 was difficult due to conflicting territorial security interests. Military escalation by both sides followed. US rivalry with the USSR prolonged negotiations on Item 3. The Cold War syndrome (i.e., US rivalry with the USSR) greatly prolonged negotiations on Item 4. The US stepped up military pressure again (May - September, 1952). The US policy, however, failed to induce concessions from China/the DPRK.

In February 1953, Eisenhower, Truman's successor, began to focus US military pressure on China. China did not give an inch. In March, the USSR began to show its indifference to the Korean War. The US and China became the major protagonists in this war. Both sides increased military action to induce concessions from the other. The conflict ended when the major protagonists' casualties drastically increased and a nuclear war appeared to be imminent. On 27 July, both sides signed the Armistice Agreement.

II.1.c. Implementation

The significance of the Armistice Agreement was that the fighting had stopped but the Korean War was not yet over. Although there had been numerous clashes and crises since 1953, the Armistice Agreement had functioned as a de facto deterrent for both sides in the inter-Korean conflict.

Since the signatory for the UN side was also the commander of the UNC, the

major component of which was the US, the Armistice Agreement provided the rationale for US forces in South Korea. The presence in South Korea of nuclear weapons, even although they were few (T.H. Kawk, 1990: 178), created a balance of power in the Korean peninsula, and they were probably the most influential deterrent to North Korea (B.R. Shin, 1989: 50).

The Armistice Agreement also contributed to North Korea's perception of security. North Korea never demanded changes in sections 61 (amendments and additions) and 62 (the effectiveness of the articles and paragraphs) of Article 5 of the Armistice Agreement. Rather, when it perceived foreign policy crises, North Korea wished to strengthen Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement, either section 35 or 49, both of which concerned the implementation of an effective armistice (B.R. Shin, 1989: 52). The Armistice Agreement provided a measure of security for North Korea. Kim Il Sung said on 22 August 1974 that South Korea could not invade North Korea as long as US forces were stationed there.

II.2. THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ

II.2.a. Initiation

In his Doctrine of 25 July 1969, Nixon stated that: the US would not become involved in another war like that of Vietnam; Asian states should be more responsible for their own defense; and the US forces in allied states would be reduced. The Nixon Doctrine emphasized the role of Japan in Northeast Asia. In November 1969, Sato, Prime Minister of Japan, hinted that the reduction of US forces in South Korea could possibly be compensated for by using the Self-Defense Forces of Japan. These events stirred changes in the two Koreas' policies toward each other. South Korea revealed its desire to have a dialogue with North Korea on 15 August 1970. North Korea responded in April 1971 in a similar vein. The two Koreas were sending conciliatory signals toward each other.

On 16 July 1971, Nixon stated that he would visit China in 1972. The Shanghai Communiqué was announced on 27 February 1972. These shifts in the major

powers' relations stimulated rapprochement between states that were involved in protracted conflict. For example, in mid-July 1972, India and Pakistan concluded five days of talks to renounce the use of force (Newsweek, 17/7/1972: 30). The Sino-US rapprochement (16/7/1971-27/2/1972) made North and South Korea suspicious of their respective patron states, and this uneasiness became a catalyst for further inter-Korean contacts.

The Sino-US detente itself, however, did not make a crucial impact on inter-Korean negotiations, accommodations, or implementation of the agreement. The US's continued commitment to South Korea and its forces there decreased North Korea's willingness to adhere to the Communiqué. Instead, North Korea attempted in March 1974 to talk directly with the US for the first time (B.C. Koh, 1984: 200).

II.3. THE BASIC AGREEMENT

II.3.a. Initiation

In the late 1980s, the four major East Asian powers (the US, the USSR, China and Japan) began to concentrate more on economic prosperity rather than on military build up. They also sought detente and stability in Northeast Asia (S.S. Park, 1991: 313). In this context, South Korea pursued the 'northern policy', revealed in Roh Tae Woo's July 4 Declaration of 1988, which showed the change in South Korea's policy toward North Korea. Before South Korea's 'northern policy', North Korea proposed in 1986 High-Level Political talks with South Korea. Both sides signaled conciliatory attitudes toward each other.

II.3.b. Negotiation and Accommodation

By 1989, US-USSR detente was a fact and the Berlin Wall came down. The collapse of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union followed. The two Koreas took advantage of these changes in the international system and their conciliatory attitudes were reinforced.

The Soviets established diplomatic relations with South Korea (1/10/1990).

South Korean trade with socialist countries increased annually. North Korea found itself isolated from the international community because of its nuclear power development. Facing the dilemma of opening or maintaining his regime, Kim Il Sung thought that normalizing relations with the US and Japan was the best strategy. These nations, however, responded to North Korea's overtures by saying that both the lack of progress in inter-Korean relations and the nuclear problem were obstacles to diplomatic normalization with Japan and the US.

II.3.c. Implementation

When the two Koreas issued the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration, the conflict between North Korea and the international community on North Korea's nuclear development was intensified. The IAEA's heightened pressure on North Korea to clarify its nuclear development and the US-South Korea's 'Team Spirit' exercise caused North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT. As many anticipated, the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration failed to be implemented, especially with regard to North Korea's nuclear program.

Summary

The major powers' activity was significant in the cases of crises/war in the inter-Korean conflict. US and USSR rivalry exacerbated intra-Korean ideological conflict and contributed to the hostility between the two Koreas. US evacuation of its forces from South Korea in 1949 destabilized the balance of military power in the Korean peninsula, resulting in the Korean War. The war then caused the US to intervene, which caused China to intervene. The war between the US and China escalated the Korean War. After 1953, the Armistice Agreement and US forces in South Korea had been an effective deterrent in the inter-Korean conflict. Although the Pueblo and the Poplar Tree crises erupted in the 1960s, the major powers, afraid to break the stability of the dominant system, pursued a policy of restraint in crisis

management.

As for inter-Korean rapprochement, the major powers' influence on accommodative efforts was not significant. The Nixon Doctrine and Sino-US detente in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to mutual accommodation efforts by both Koreas. The major powers, however, did not make any further contribution to the negotiation and implementation of the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972). In the Basic Agreement case (1992), the US's and Japan's offer of diplomatic relations to North Korea were conditional on improvement in inter-Korean relations. This motivated North Korea's interest in an inter-Korean dialogue. However, there was no collaboration between South Korea and the US or Japan in negotiating and implementing the Basic Agreement. On the contrary, the Basic Agreement was seen by the US as insignificant because there was no clear resolution of the problem of North Korea's nuclear development.

In sum, the major powers were deeply involved in the various crises, but not in the accommodation cases. Given these conditions, how and why the inter-Korean protracted conflict developed will be examined in Chapter 7. Chapter 6 is summarized in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 here

Table 6.1: The Role of the Major Powers in the Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict

Case	Period	Content	Impact
The Pre-War (1945-50)		US-USSR rivalry (The Cold War)	Establishment of the two Koreas; development of the inter-Korean conflict
US inter-vention (1950)	Pre-crisis	US exclusion of Korea from its defense perimeter	North Korea's Invasion of South Korea
	Crisis	US-USSR rivalry: active US intervention	US policy shift; China's military intervention
Chinese inter-vention (1950)	Pre-crisis	Cautious behavior	US entrance of North Korea
	Crisis	Direct involvement	US proposal for a cease-fire
The Armistice Agreement (1950-53)	Initiation (first)	US-China rivalry	Conflict escalation
	Initiation (second)	Accommodative behavior	Beginning of talks
	Negotiation	US-USSR rivalry	Protracted Negotiations; Armistice Agreement
	Implementation	US forces in South Korea	Deterrence
The Post-War (1950s-1960s)			The Cold War on a global level; regional balance of power between the US and China; intensification of the inter-Korean conflict

Table 6.1: *Continued*

The January 21 Crisis (1968)	Pre-Crisis	Johnson's visit to Seoul	Increase in North Korea's hostility toward South Korea
	Crisis	US persuasion of South Korea	Prevention of crisis escalation
	End-Crisis	US indifference to the January 21 crisis	US stronger commitments to South Korea's security
The Pueblo Crisis (1968)	Pre-Crisis	North Korea's warning to the <i>Pueblo</i> ship	Seizure of the <i>Pueblo</i>
	Crisis	US and USSR's limited military maneuvers in a precautionary manner	Preventing crisis escalation
	End-Crisis	US softening posture and USSR's cooperative attitude	Exaggeration of the inter-Korean conflict
The July 4 Communiqué (1972)	Initiation	Nixon Doctrine Sino-US detente	Inter-Korean dialogue
	Acommodation	Inaction	No influence
	Implementation	US continued commitment to South Korea	North Korea wants direct talks with the US

Table 6.1: *Continued*

The Poplar Tree Crisis (1976)	Pre-Crisis	China/US support to respective Korean clients	Increase in North Korea's hostility toward the US
	Crisis	US decisive, but limited military actions; no support of China/the USSR to North Korea	No Crisis-escalation
	End-Crisis	Chinese advice to the US	Stiffening of the two Koreas' policies toward the other
The Basic Agreement (1992)	Initiation	US-USSR detente; collapse of Eastern Europe	Two Korea's efforts to make an agreement
	Acommo-dation	US/Japan's pressure on North Korea	Accommodation
	Implemen-tation	No resolution of North Korea's Nuclear position	Continuance of the inter-Korean protracted conflict

CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSIONS

What creates, develops, and terminates a protracted conflict? This is the core question of my dissertation. In Chapter 6, I examined the roles and impact of the major powers on Korean politics since 1945. In this chapter, I will examine how the inter-Korean protracted conflict erupted and developed under conditions provided by the major powers. Specific questions are: To what extent did both Koreas' national interest and/or identity contribute to the eruption and development of the inter-Korean protracted conflict? What patterns of the two Koreas' behavior are found in the evolution of the inter-Korean conflict? When and in what ways did decision-makers of both Koreas develop or attempt to terminate their protracted conflict? To answer these questions, Chapter 7 provides an integrated analysis of the research in Part II.

I begin with a recapitulation of my definition of protracted conflict and the models developed in Chapter 2. I then proceed move the proposition-testing related to the findings in Chapters 4 and 5. Theoretical and policy implications are discussed. Some personal reflections complete Chapter 7.

I. Proposition-Testing: Findings

I.1. RECAPITULATION OF THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In Chapter 2, I redefined a protracted conflict as:

a cumulative conflict between the same adversaries who endeavor to protect and preserve their national interest and/or national identity, actual or perceived. The conflict is characterized by a series of subconflicts such as international crisis, war, and consistent accommodation failure.

Unlike Azar's definition (1978), mine provides greater potential for describing and explaining a protracted conflict. Because it focuses on international crisis as well as war, my definition can describe protracted conflicts which do not result in open warfare, which is Azar's focus. My definition includes not only national identity, but also national interest, as sources of protracted conflict. Thus it can explain combined protracted conflict of interest and identity [see II.2.c., Chapter 2], which neither protracted conflict theory nor enduring rivalry theory grasps comprehensively.

In this study, the independent variables are national interest and identity. National interest encompasses three categories: security for territory and population; economic prosperity; and the enhancement of politico-diplomatic capability. I define national identity as a people's sense of themselves as a nation. Although I categorize national identity as embracing ethnicity, ideology, and religion, I consider only ideology in this study. I specify ideology as a manifestation of a state's beliefs about ways of achieving ultimate national goals. The two Koreas are of the same nation and there has been no religious conflict in the inter-Korean conflict. A model for the independent variables was presented in Model 2.1 [Sources of Protracted Conflict, Figure 2.1, Chapter 2]. Related propositions are A.1. through A.3.

An intervening variable is the decision-making process. I examine decision-makers' perceptions (of the two Koreas or of other direct actors); the institutionalized commitments of both Koreas; and decision-makers' coping strategies. Also examined are environmental changes in which decision-makers of the two Koreas, or other direct actors, perceive an opportunity for accommodation, or a foreign policy crisis. The question of why the two Koreas' decision-makers or other direct actors made biased decisions, if any, is investigated. All of these factors are presented in Model 2.2 [Decision-Making in Protracted Conflict, Figure 2.2, Chapter 2]. Related propositions are B1 through B5.

The dependent variable in this study is the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Why and how did the two Koreas and other direct actors in this conflict, experience a series of international crises; how did the two Koreas attempt to make accommodative agreements; and why did their attempts fail--these elements in the

protracted conflict are depicted in Model 2.3 [Foreign Policy Behavior in Protracted Conflict, Figure 2.3, Chapter 2] and are tested in Propositions C1 through C3.

In my definition of protracted conflict, I argue that such a conflict is an accumulation of conflicts. Each case of crisis or accommodation failure may influence or provide conditions for those that follow. Major questions raised are: how are previous crises or war reflected in each state's decision-making process, and to what extent; what part do perceptions of interest and identity play; how is the behavior of involved states affected? Responding to these questions constitutes the main part of the summary proposition presented in Model 2.4 [Integrated Model of Protracted Conflict, Figure 2.4, Chapter 2].

I.2. SOURCES OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT

P.A1. The more serious the clashing national interests, the greater the probability of a protracted conflict of interest.

The inter-Korean protracted conflict developed in part out of a conflict over security. An observer described the two Koreas' situation before the Korean War: "North Korea finally initiated the war, but who can attribute it only to the North? All the circumstances in Korea were optimum for war (Yim, 1959: 295, cited in H.J. Lee, 1988: 353). Each Korea's claim since 1948 of exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Korean territory was the genesis of the inter-Korean conflict. Each Korea's security interest was accelerated by the Korean War. The US-South Korea Mutual Security Treaty of 1953 constituted a primary threat to North Korea (B.J. Ahn, 1986: 41), and defined the US as the major enemy of the north.

Long-term conflict on the question of security between North Korea and South Korea which was supported by the US was clearly present in the behavior of both Koreas' decision-makers in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Just before the January 21 and Pueblo crises, Kim Il Sung argued that the imperialist US had "plotted another war in the Korean peninsula for 18 years" (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 85). After the two crises, Park Chung Hee also claimed that North Korea had "prepared for

an invasion of South Korea for twenty years" (Dong-A Ilbo, 1/10/1970). To North Korea, the Pueblo mission was a part of US "continued provocations" against it (Rodong Shinmun, 28/1/1968), whereas the January 21 crisis presented South Korea with the most serious threat to its security yet experienced. The two Koreas began a fierce competition in the 1970s in the field of diplomatic relations in order to prove their legitimacy. South Korea attempted to isolate North Korea from the rest of the world and to expand its diplomatic relations with countries in the Third World (S.S. Cho, 1969: 32; Y.H. Park, 1993: 463).

The first attempt by the two Koreas to terminate their protracted conflict in 1972 failed to be implemented. Both Korea's strong commitment to protect their security interest was a major factor in accommodation failure. North Korea demanded the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea, which South Korea could not accept. South Korean senior decision-makers feared another invasion of South Korea by the North (Dong-A Ilbo, 8 & 17/7/1972). Kim Il Sung's perception of the protracted inter-Korean security conflict was revealed again right before the Poplar Tree crisis of 1976. He believed that "the long-standing tensions" in Korea had reached an acute stage and that the US and South Korea are "going to ignite the fuse of war" (Naewoi Tongshin, III: 149). During these days, the joint US-South Korea 'Team Spirit' military exercise became a real threat to North Korean security (B.C. Koh, 1986: 69; 1984: 88-91).

North Korea's fear for its security did not decrease even after Roh Tae Woo declared (18/12/1991) South Korea to be a Nuclear-Free Zone (18/12/1991). To North Korea, the continued presence of nuclear armed F-16s in South Korea and ballistic missiles on submarines were still a threat to its security (Bodansky, 1994). South Korea's fear of North Korean nuclear weapons was well demonstrated by the implementation failure of the Basic Agreement of 1992. South Korean and US fear of the possibility of North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons caused them to resume the 'Team Spirit' military exercise in March, 1993.

Since 1948, the two Koreas had struggled to surpass the other in every sphere of national interest (e.g. security, diplomacy, and economic prosperity). The security

conflict had been the most serious, resulting in the inter-Korean protracted conflict of interest. Thus, the Korean case supports Proposition A1.

P.A2. The greater the divergence of national identities, the greater the probability of a protracted conflict of identity.

From the 1920s, Koreans had two different ideological backgrounds for their Korean independence movement: the left-wing and the right-wing. These two factions became the two dominant political strands in Korean politics up to 1945. Due to this polarization, all efforts at compromise between left and right to unify Korea by Koreans failed. After the two Koreas were established (1948), North Korea pursued a policy of strengthening its socialist system, whereas South Korea concentrated on the defeat of communism.

The Korean War crystalized these two opposing ideologies and intensified their mutual hostility. The Korean War made South Koreans realize that ideology could take precedence over nation, and despite President Rhee's autocratic methods, they bonded together to support democracy (The Economist, 25/8/1956). Anti-communism became a principal value and an ethos (S.J. Kim, 1990), and was revitalized When Park Chung Hee seized political power in 1961. The Korean War forced North Korea to re-define its self-image and identity as a base for the Korean socialist revolution. To support this posture, in December 1955, Kim Il Sung promoted his Juche idea as an application of Marxism-Leninism to the concrete conditions of Korea. The Juche idea became the foundation of North Korean policy for defeating an imperialist enemy by the force of a united population. The January 21 and Pueblo crises stiffened South Korea's anti-communist stand and promoted internal cohesion. Nevertheless, Kim Il Sung's strategy of socialist revolution in South Korea did not change.

These diametrically opposed ideologies contributed in part to the failure of the July 4 Joint Communiqué. North Korea's argument that South Korea's strong anti-communism was tantamount to opposing national unification, spurred South Korea to believe that its adversary was only trying to exploit the dialogue as a tactic to

ignite a socialist revolution in South Korea (J.H. Song, 1984: 613). Kim Il Sung in fact stated on 3 July 1972 that "Korean unification could be achieved only through violent socialist revolution" in South Korea (Radio Pyongyang, cited in D.S. Kim, 1987: 203). These contradictory viewpoints merely reinforced each Korea's ideology, and were followed by revised policies that increased internal cohesion, even after the July 4 Joint Communiqué.

After the Communiqué was issued, North Korea adopted in 1972 its New Constitution of Socialism, predicting the total victory of socialism. The Juche ideology for reinforcing North Korean socialist consciousness was again proclaimed. South Korea adopted a policy of Siwol Yushin ("October Restoration") and a new Yushin National Constitution in 1972 for Park Chung Hee's alleged "Koreanized democracy". An inter-Korean ideological conflict between North Korea's "Koreanized Marx-Leninism" (i.e., Juche idea) and South Korea's "Koreanized democracy" (i.e., Siwol Yushin policy) was intensified. The Poplar Tree Crisis of 1976 stiffened South Korea's internal cohesion and anti-communist policies (Dong-A Ilbo, 4/9/1976). North Korea re-emphasized its goal: the total victory of socialism and the reunification of a socialist Korea (Rodong Shinmun, 11/11/1976).

Although South Korea did not pursue its Siwol Yushin policy after Park Chung Hee's death (1979), democracy developed in the late 1980s in South Korea. North Korea's Juche ideology retained its value as North Korea's "all-encompassing philosophy of life, as well as a guide to practical action" (B.C. Koh, 1984: 73). While the two Koreas were negotiating the Basic Agreement, North Korea strongly opposed the capitalist system, saying that if South Korea forced North Korea to accept the market-economy, an inter-Korean conflict would result (Commentary, 1992: 201). In 1991 Kim Il Sung reiterated North Korea's commitment to be "the banner of socialism" (cited in Y.W. Kihl, 1993: 75). North Korea feared unification by absorption as had happened in the German case.

Just as the Korean left-wing and right-wing failed to compromise in the 1940s, the two Koreas could not "transcend differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems" in the early 1970s. They still pursue the significantly divergent ideologies which

provide the basis of their national identities up to this day. All these elements led the two Koreas to return to the normal relations of their protracted conflict. The inter-Korean ideological conflict thus supports Proposition A2.

P.A3. The longer any kind of conflict persists, the more interplay between the two kinds of protracted conflict and the greater probability of a combined protracted conflict.

Conflict of interest may inflame the dormant conflict of identity through internal cohesion, which may in turn make conflict of interest more intense. They reinforce each other.

Given the two dominant but ideologically distinct factions in Korea before 1945, US and USSR policies toward the South and the North intensified inter-Korean ideological conflict. After 1948, when the two Koreas were established, they began to struggle, not only over ideology but also territorial interest. Numerous clashes along the 38th parallel occurred.

The Korean War stimulated both sides' commitment to protect their territory as well as their belief systems. North Korea's re-adjustment of its policy toward South Korea emphasized not only the Juche idea but also a relentless struggle against the US and South Korea. North Korea's goal was to occupy South Korea's territory. South Korea saw itself as a stronghold of the democratic capitalist state in the Korean peninsula. It redefined its uppermost national interest as protecting itself against the North Korean attempt to communize the peninsula. Inter-Korean relations became a zero-sum game in which each side competed with the other in terms of their national interest as well as identity.

The interaction of interest-conflict with ideology-conflict, or vice versa, was intensified in the 1960s. For example, Park Chung Hee's strong anti-communism provoked North Korea to adopt (1962) a new four-pronged military policy (J.C. Baek, 1986: 111) and a strategy to stimulate the socialist revolution in South Korea (1964). Right before the January 21 and Pueblo crises of 1968, North Korea pushed (December 1967) both its Juche ideology and the four-pronged military policy. After

the January 21 crisis, Park Chung Hee confirmed that North Korea intended to communize the entire Korean peninsula through violence (Hanguk Ilbo, 2/2/1968). He strengthened anti-communist measures and increased South Korea's readiness for the struggle (Hanguk Ilbo, 2/3/1968).

These combined conflicts of security interest and ideology were revealed strikingly in both Koreas' contradictory interpretations of the three principles of unification in the July 4 Communiqué. The acute issues were the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea and North Korea's demand for the abrogation of South Korea's anti-communist policy. Even when the Basic Agreement was issued in 1992, South Korea was still suspicious and fearful of North Korea's nuclear threat to South Korean security. North Korea also showed its fear of threats from the US and South Korea to North Korea's sovereignty and socialism, a fear that was intensified by the resumption of the US-South Korea 'Team Spirit' and the IAEA statement (Korea and World Affairs, Spring, 1993: 176-7).

Since 1948, crisis or war in the Korean peninsula was always followed by each Korea strengthening its internal cohesion; reaffirming its ideology; and increasing its commitment to a build-up of military capability. Two opportunities which could have ended the inter-Korean protracted conflict were nullified by security interest (e.g., the nuclear issue in the Basic Agreement case), or by combined conflict of clashing interest and ideology (e.g., the July 4 Joint Communiqué). The inter-Korean conflict case supports Proposition A3.

I.3. DECISION-MAKING IN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

My Propositions B1 through B5 concern foreign policy decision-making at the actor-level in protracted conflict. The Propositions are divided into two parts. The first two deal with the perceptual dimension, when decision-makers perceive an opportunity for accommodation or a foreign policy crisis. The other three deal with the decisional dimension: decision-makers' images, institutionalized commitments, and coping strategies.

P.B1. There is a clearer perception of an opportunity for accommodation on the part of decision-makers when there exists (1) value-sharing; (2) diminished threat to national identity; (3) complementary interests.

Value is shared when both sides are willing to accept tacitly the other's policy or position. Mutual tolerance is present. Complementary interest is perceived when one party's goal cannot be achieved without the other's collaboration. Mutual cooperation is required. Three cases are examined: the Armistice Agreement; the July 4 Joint Communiqué; and the Basic Agreement.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT:

In June 1951, when Malik, the Soviet representative to the UN, proposed a cease-fire, the US and China-DPRK came to accept a shared value. The US was seeking an "appropriate armistice arrangement" (FRUS, 1951, VII: 439-442, 17/5/1951). Perceiving the impossibility of destroying a powerful US, China/the DPRK wished to maintain the pre-war status-quo (Radio Pyongyang, 27/6/1951, cited in Simmons, 1975: 206, fn. 50). All the major actors had common interests in a successful cease-fire: decreasing casualties; reducing economic drain; and avoiding the risk of a general war. Although no clear-cut assurance of national identity was achieved by either side, given the conflict between parties which had diametrically opposed ideologies, the shared value can be interpreted as mutual tolerance of the other's ideology. The case of Cease-fire negotiations supports Proposition B1.

THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

Park Chung Hee's willingness to negotiate with North Korea on unification (15/8/1970) signified that South Korea could no longer ignore the reality of Kim Il Sung's North Korea. North Korea's inclusion of South Korea's ruling party as a negotiating partner (6/8/1971) signified North Korea's admission of the reality of South Korea. Thus the two Koreas acknowledged a shared value. South Korea signaled an indirect assurance of North Korea's identity by proposing a 'bona fide competition between communism and democracy'. Both Koreas had a common

interest in protecting their security, made vulnerable by the Nixon Doctrine and the Sino-US detente. The July 4th Joint Communiqué therefore supports Proposition B1.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT:

Here again, the two Koreas experienced a shared-value. Roh Tae Woo's July 7 Declaration of 1988 implied that South Korea would not compete with North Korea in trade and foreign affairs in the future. On 8 September 1988, Kim Il Sung stressed the coexistence of the two Koreas. Although they still did not recognize each other as a 'state', they clearly accepted the other's ad hoc position of having the 'nature or attribute of a state'. Tacit admission of the other's identity was perceived. When Roh Tae Woo proposed on 18 October to discuss all Korean problems, including military matters, both sides had a common interest in holding high-level talks. North Korea perceived an opportunity for negotiating military matters, which it had previously wanted. South Korea perceived an opportunity to keep Roh's pledge that he would make epoch-making progress in inter-Korean relations. Again, the Basic Agreement case supports Proposition B1.

P.B2. There is a clearer perception of a foreign policy crisis on the part of decision-makers when there exists (1) a threat to national interest and/or national identity; (2) the necessity to respond in a finite time; (3) the heightened probability of military hostility.

Four foreign policy crises are studied: US intervention in the Korean War; Chinese intervention in the Korean War; the January 21 and Pueblo crises; and the Poplar Tree crisis.

US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

North Korea's full-scale attack on South Korea triggered a US foreign policy crisis, posing a challenge to US national interest and identity: the UN collective security system backed by the US (Paige, 1968: 176); US global strategy to block

communist expansion; and US prestige as a credible ally of democratic or non-communist regimes (Vandenberg, Hearings, cited in Paige, 1968: 175). MacArthur's forthright telegram on June 30th, 1950, stating that "time is of the essence and a clear-cut decision without delay is essential" (Paige, 1968: 255; Stoessinger, 1985: 67), pressed the US to respond in a finite time. Truman believed that if North Korean forces were not repelled, a world war between communist and non-communist states might be inevitable. In his perception, "communist success in Korea" would lead to another communist attack on "Japan...and Formosa" (Memoirs, II: 337). Proposition B2 is strongly supported in this case.

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

When MacArthur landed at Inchon on 15 September 1950 and when the US/UN forces entered North Korea on 7 October, China perceived a serious foreign policy crisis, a perception that was aggravated when the US/UN forces advanced toward the Yalu River. China perceived threats to its Manchurian heavy industry base (Whiting, 1991: 115) and the Supoong water power house on the Yalu River. The mere presence of a powerful imperialist enemy on its doorstep was also perceived as a grave threat to China's security and identity. China perceived finite time in which to respond to the US forces' advance. The nearer the US forces, the greater the threat to its security. Thus it was necessary for China to respond before US/UN forces reached the Sino-Korean border. China also wished to avoid the logistical demands of a winter campaign. The heightened probability, or even inevitability, of war with the US had already been perceived by China when MacArthur successfully landed at Inchon. The Chinese intervention case fits all the conditions of a foreign policy crisis. Proposition B2 is thus strongly supported in this case as well.

THE JANUARY 21 CRISIS:

This crisis made South Korea perceive itself as highly vulnerable and insecure. Although there was no definite time-response involved, South Korean decision-makers' consideration of preemptive strikes (S.S. Cho, 1969: 30) signifies that they

did not want to lose retaliation initiative and that there was a moderate time limit in which to respond. They were convinced of the probability of military involvement in the near future. In a report to the Congress, South Korean leaders revealed that North Korea had planned a bloody forced annexation in 1970 (Mainichi Daily News, 5/2/1968). The three pre-conditions of a foreign policy crisis for South Korea in the January 21 case do not fit strongly, but still support Proposition B2.

THE PUEBLO CRISIS:

The US decision-makers perceived finite time (Lentner, 1969: 56) to deal with North Korean threats to US prestige as a superpower, and to the survival of 83 Americans. They did not exclude the possibility of North Korean military action due to the Cold War syndrome and the January 21 crisis. Again, Proposition B2 is demonstrated by this case.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS:

The US perceived threats to the security of Americans; the safety of UNC personnel; and the UNC's legitimate right. The US set a deadline for a response to North Korea's provocations (Head et al., 1978: 304). Kissinger's call for a Washington Special Actions Group meeting on 18 August [Washington Time] attests to this. Although no evidence of any North Korean thrust toward the DMZ was reported, the US could not exclude the possibility of a North Korean aggressive move. The US perceived a heightened probability of military involvement when it implemented 'Operation Paul Bunyan'. At that time, the US issued a DefCon 2 alert. DefCon 1 initiates war. The Poplar Tree Crisis supports Proposition B2.

- P.B3.** The more intense and/or the more numerous the previous crises, the greater will be the negative image of decision-makers in a protracted conflict.

Seven cases are examined: the pre-War period; US Intervention in the Korean War; Chinese Intervention in the Korean War; the post-War period; the January 21

and Pueblo crises; the failure of the July 4 Joint Communiqué; and the Poplar Tree crisis.

THE PRE-WAR PERIOD:

The communists' intensified activities in South Korea (e.g., Yosu-Suchon rebellion in October, 1949) increased Syngman Rhee's perception of insecurity. His reiterated 'march-to-the north' policy might have implied a war threat to North Korea (Merrill, 1983: 50). Frequent clashes along the 38th parallel (US Department of State, Bulletin, 24/4/1950: 627) conveyed a war climate to both Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung. The pre-war period supports Proposition B3.

US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

For the US, the Korean War intensified the existing negative image of the USSR, which had been reinforced by the Greece-Turkey Crisis of 1947 and the Berlin Crisis of 1948-49. Truman believed that the Korean War was a repetition of the previous crises on a large scale and was triggered by the USSR (Paige, 1968: 170). To Truman, Korea was "the Greece of the Far East" (Stoessinger, 1985: 63).

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

Prior to the Korean War, China had a negative image of the US due to Western countries' colonization of China in the 19th century and to US support of the Formosa regime during the Chinese civil war (G. Chang, 1990: 79; Tsou, 1963: 578). This image was confirmed by the neutralization of the US Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait. US intervention put the seal on China's image of the US as an imperialist power. With MacArthur's Inchon landing and subsequent advance toward the Sino-Korean border by US/UN forces, the image of the US as a one-hundred-year enemy became entrenched. As the US intensified its military maneuvers in the Korean War, the Chinese negative image of the US was intensified. The Chinese case supports Proposition B3.

THE POST-WAR PERIOD:

The ferocity of the Korean War caused many South Koreans to hate North Korean communists more than the Soviet Union or China (S.S. Park, 1991: 303-4). South Koreans realized that fraternity could be abandoned in favor of ideology (T.H. Kwak, 1990: 69-70). To North Korea, the US intervention was a confirmation of the enemy (C.K. Kang, 1991: 194-5) which had developed out of the US Military Government's suppression of socialist activity in South Korea in the pre-war period. The US became the major enemy to be defeated. The negative impact of the Korean War on both Koreas supports Proposition B3.

THE JANUARY AND PUEBLO CRISES:

These crises reinforced South Korea's negative image of North Korea. Park Chung Hee came to believe that the North Korean strategy was to communize the entire Korean peninsula by force (Hanguk Ilbo, 2/2/1968) or through a dramatic increase in North Korean guerrilla infiltration (Hanguk Ilbo, 7/2/1968). Since North Korea interpreted the Pueblo mission as a US "calculated plot" to break the Armistice Agreement (Rodong Shinmun, 28/1/1968), its image of the US as an imperialist power that was trying to ignite another war became fixed. This case supports Proposition B3 for both Koreas.

THE FAILURE OF THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

The failure of the Communiqué led South Korea to believe that North Korea had wilfully abused the dialogue for the purpose of trying to ignite a socialist revolution in South Korea (J.H. Song, 1984: 613) and to promote the withdrawal of US forces. South Korea was convinced that North Korea was not willing to cooperate for the national interest, or to put aside ideology, or to negotiate for conflict resolution (B.C. Koh, 1984: 101). North Korea saw South Korea as not sincere in trying to resolve the Korean problem, and began to call Park Chung Hee and his aides "conspirators who were blocking unification of the fatherland" (Rodong Shinmun, 3/10/1972). Although the failure of the Joint Communiqué did

not result in military conflict, both sides' exposure of their seriously divided positions intensified the negative image of the other. Proposition B3 is supported in the case.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS:

This crisis added to the already negative image that South Korea had of the North (Clough, 1986: 326). In Park Chung Hee's perception, South Korea had been unilaterally provoked by Kim Il Sung by the January 21 and Pueblo crises (1968); the EC-121 Incident (1969); the North Korean agent's attempt to kill Park Chung Hee and assassination of the President's wife (1974). The Poplar Tree crisis incited Park Chung Hee to see Kim Il Sung as sub-human, "a mad dog who needed a beating" (NYT, 20/8/1976).

It is not difficult to imagine how much North Korea was influenced by the US-South Korean forces' military collaboration during the Poplar Tree crisis, after which North Korea warned its population that the US was trying to "initiate a war of invasion step by step" (Rodong Shinmun, 25/8/1976). Lee Man Woo observed that North Koreans believed that South Korea, under the direct control of the US Department of Defence, would invade North Korea in collaboration with the US and Japan (cited in H.S. Park, 1986: 91). Again, the Poplar Tree crisis case supports Proposition B3.

Bitter memories of the Korean War, numerous crises and provocations, and accommodation failures caused both Koreas to accumulate negative images of the other. Proposition B3 is strongly supported by these Korean cases.

P.B4. The greater the negative image of decision-makers during a protracted conflict, the greater the institutionalized commitment.

If the image that decision-makers have of their adversary is very negative, they may increase their institutionalized commitments, which may take the form of policies, laws, or governmental organizations. These are devised in order to implement the decision-makers' commitment to preserve or enhance national interest and/or identity. Nine cases are examined in this study: pre-war period; US

intervention in the Korean War; Chinese intervention in the Korean War; the armistice agreement; post-war period; the January 21 and Pueblo crises; the July 4 Joint Communiqué; the Poplar Tree crisis; and the Basic Agreement.

PRE-WAR PERIOD:

In the pre-war period, South Korea's sense of insecurity accelerated (1948) its anti-communism, military mobilization, and weapons modernization (H.J. Lee, 1988: 251-8). A National Security Act was also enacted. The clashes along the 38th parallel also increased South Korea's militarization (S.J. Kim, 1990). North Korea might have completed (8/2/1948) its militarization process of its own volition. However, its negative image of South Korea as a military threat, represented in Syngman Rhee's 'march-to-the north' policy, would have been a factor in North Korea's acceleration of its military mobilization (H.J. Lee, 1988: 282). Proposition B4 is supported in the South Korean case, but the evidence is unclear in the North Korean case.

US INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

The US image of "evil" communists in general, and of the USSR in particular, provided the perceived justification for intervention in the Korean War, even though this intervention was contradictory to US previous policy, which was one of indifference to South Korea. After MacArthur's Inchon landing, the temptation of destroying the evil communists in a situation of low-risk was too strong to be resisted. Hence the compulsion to cross the 38th parallel and unify Korea by force. The US negative image of communism encouraged US decision-makers to change their policy of containing it to one of victory over it. Thus the US intervention case strongly supports Proposition B4.

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

The Chinese negative image of the US stimulated it to prepare for war if and when the US intervened in the Korean War. China organized its North-East

Localized Troops; redeployed troops from Hunan to Manchuria; and completed its war preparedness. MacArthur's Inchon landing caused China to perceive the inevitability of intervention and to undertake a massive military build-up along its Korean border. In addition to the forces which had already been redeployed, 140,000 more troops were mobilized (Lebow, 1981: 173). The US/UN advance toward the Yalu River spurred China to intervene. Again, Chinese intervention strongly supports Proposition B4.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT:

Obsessed with their mutual negative images, both the US and China-DPRK positions were fixed and rigid, and resulted in an impasse in the cease-fire negotiations. Throughout the negotiations, both sides frequently increased military pressure. When both sides were deadlocked on Item 2, the US implemented 'Operation Pearl Harbor' (September - October, 1950). The US position on Item 3 was firm and irrevocable (Bernstein, 1983: 273). The principle of 'voluntary repatriation' also became a fixed US goal on Item 4 (Foot, 1985: 174). On the other side, China-DPRK did not yield an inch to the US. When Eisenhower committed his government to ending the war by "mak[ing] the other side want to end it" (Eisenhower, 1963: I: 96), Mao stood firm, refusing any compromise. Proposition B4 is strongly supported in this case.

POST-WAR PERIOD:

The post-Korean War era was marked by remarkably strengthened commitments on both sides. Perceiving the importance of security and ideology, Syngman Rhee gave precedence to politico-military matters rather than to economic development (S.J. Kim, 1990: 102). His commitments to anti-communism and defense education were institutionalized (C.B. Bae, 1989: 69; M.K. Kang, 1989: 255-6). Park Chung Hee revitalized anti-Communism and emphasized national capability. He established the Korean CIA; enacted a new "anti-Communist Law" (3/7/1961); and stimulated economic development. To Park, economic prosperity was essential to win over

communist North Korea and to gain international prestige.

US military support for South Korea was also dramatically increased. A US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953; US expenditures were increased in July 1954 in order to support 320,000 more South Korean soldiers; Honest John missiles, atomic artillery, and Phantom flight formation were deployed in early 1958; the Fourth US Missile Command was stationed near the DMZ in 1958; and the US-South Korea Joint Military Exercise, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons, was begun in 1959 (S.S. Lee, 1991: 65-8).

After 1955, the Juche idea had been promoted by North Korea to foster internal cohesion and the fighting spirit of the people in the struggle against the US. Perceiving a threat from the strong, militant anti-communist government of Park Chung Hee, North Korea countered with a new four-pronged military policy (12/12/1962). When the reunification of Korea became a primary goal, North Korea adopted a policy of strengthening socialist revolution in the Korean peninsula (1964); abandoned its alleged peaceful unification policy (1966); created a decision-making presidium to deal with crisis (1966); and established (July 1967) the specialized forces which were used for the January 21 crisis. The post-Korean War case strongly supports Proposition B4 for both Koreas.

THE JANUARY 21 AND PUEBLO CRISES:

Perceiving increased threats from North Korea as a result of the January 21 and Pueblo crises, Park Chung Hee took more resolute measures to end North Korea's provocations. He created a defense industry that could produce ammunition, grenades, armed motors, and small size navy vessels (Hanguk Ilbo, 7-12/2/1968); established additional forces (e.g., one million men in a Defense Reserve Army and specialized task forces that could match North Korea's special forces); and intensified anti-communist education, as well as introducing military training for students.

US military assistance to South Korea was increased by one billion dollars (February, 1968). South Korea was thus enabled to create a battalion of Phantoms

(F4-C) (Hanguk Ilbo, 17/2/1968). The US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty was revised in April 1968, providing for immediate and swift support in South Korea's crisis. The US-South Korea annual joint conference on security was held, at which it was decided to arm the reserves with modern rifles; to build an M-16 factory (1968 and 1969); and to complete a South Korean forces modernization plan (1971).

Because of the Pueblo crisis and the EC-121 incident, Kim Il Sung gave priority to military capability over economic development (Kim Il Sung, 1975: 276-7). He declared that after the Pueblo incident, the US had continued provocative actions (cited in B.C. Koh, 1974: 177, fn. 5) and thus had driven North Korea into a "state of war". North Korea therefore accelerated war preparations: its four-pronged military policy was vigorously supported; military weapons production was accelerated; and anti-US feeling was incited. Proposition B4 is strongly supported by the case of the January 21 and Pueblo crises.

THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

The July 4 Joint Communiqué did not reduce inter-Korean tensions. Rather, its failure may have boosted the revision of the two Koreas' military operation plans. In 1973, South Korea adopted a 'desperate defense of Seoul' plan which specified that, in the event of a North Korean attack, 13 South Korean divisions and one US division, supported by the US/South Korean air force, would repel North Korean forces in the north of Seoul (K.E. Koh, 1988: 135). North Korea increased its armed forces along the 38th parallel; deployed a number of surface-to-surface missiles just north of the DMZ capable of reaching Seoul; and constructed more than 800 new artillery positions (The Economist, 28/8/1976: 33). Proposition B4 is neither supported nor refuted by the July 4th Communiqué case.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS:

When the Poplar Tree crisis occurred, Park Chung Hee was committed to retaliating against any further North Korean provocations, "minor or major", and to continuing a military build-up. By 1978, South Korea had the capability of producing

long-range missiles and multi-firing rockets. It began to produce M-48A3 and M-48A5 tanks, crew-served weapons, Vulcan anti-aircraft guns, and grenade launchers (B.C. Koh, 1984: 57). In the early 1980s, the US/South Korea shifted their operational plan from a defensive into an offensive one by adapting the new operational concept of US Air-Land Warfare to the Korean situation. The 1983 US-South Korea joint 'Team Spirit' military exercise was based on this revised operational concept (H.K. Kim, 1988: 164).

After the Poplar Tree crisis, obsessed with fear of US-South Korean military collaboration, Kim Il Sung placed North Korea on permanent war-preparedness. The Supreme People's Congress of North Korea urged in 1977 the increase of military strength for the struggle against US imperialism (Naewoi Tongshin, IV: 246). By the early 1980s, North Korea had completed the first phase of its military build up, to the extent that it could meet virtually any military contingency (Bodansky, 1994: 83, 86). For example, specialized troops, such as the 124th Army Unit, which had infiltrated South Korea in the January 21 crisis of 1968, increased from 12,000 in 1970 to 100,000 in the early 1980s (Bodansky, 1994: 88-9). Perceiving the impossibility of protecting North Korea with conventional weapons, North Korea decided in 1985 to hasten the development of nuclear weapons as the ultimate safeguard for national security (Bodansky, 1994: 113). The Poplar Tree case strongly supports Proposition B4.

Seven out of the eight cases cited strongly support Proposition B4. These are: US intervention in the Korean War; Chinese intervention in the Korean War; the Armistice Agreement; the post-war era; the January 21 and Pueblo crises; the Poplar Tree crisis; and the Basic Agreement. In the pre-war case, South Korea's position strongly supports Proposition B4, but North Korea's position supports it only partly. No direct influence of the failure of the July 4th Joint Communiqué on both Koreas' revision of their operational plans was found. Partial influence, however, cannot be excluded. Thus the cases cited support Proposition B4.

P.B5. Decision-makers' negative images and institutionalized commitments may

lead them to cope with external stimuli in a biased manner.

If each party has a distorted image of the other and strongly negative commitments against the other, the decision-making process may be biased. Examined cases are: US policy shifts in the Korean War; Chinese intervention in the Korean War; the armistice agreement; the January 21 and Pueblo crises; the Poplar Tree crisis; the July 4 Joint Communiqué; and the Basic Agreement.

US POLICY SHIFTS IN THE KOREAN WAR:

The US negative image of the USSR and its commitment to blocking communist expansion pressed the US to intervene in the Korean War. Even more biased decision-making was revealed by the entry of US/UN forces into North Korea and their advance toward the Sino-Korean border, which resulted in Chinese intervention.

When the US considered crossing the 38th parallel, its exclusive focus on the USSR encouraged US ignorance of Chinese commitment to protect its security interest. China's ideology-based, self-identity was overlooked by the US and led to the conclusion that China would not intervene (G. Chang, 1990: 78; George and Smoke, 1974: 191-2; Stueck, 1981: 230-1). By September 1950, the knowledge that the USSR would not intervene provided a golden opportunity for the US to cross the 38th parallel and put an end to the divided peninsula which was a constant source of friction (FRUS, VII, 386-7; Stoessinger, 1985: 79; Warner, 1980: 102). A new US commitment to unify Korea was announced and the US/UN forces entered North Korea on 7 October 1950.

Once this new commitment was publicized, US decision-makers became the victims of wishful thinking, believing that everything would turn out as envisioned (Lebow, 1981: 169). China's repeated warnings of intervention were dismissed as bombast. It was unanimously assumed, on the very day (19/10/1950) that CPVs crossed the Yalu River, that China would not intervene. Even after all the US decision-makers acknowledged (9/11/1950) that China was deeply involved in the Korean War, MacArthur's offensive proceeded. Chinese intervention was

interpreted, not as a Chinese reaction to the US, but as the usual communist conflictual behavior (Jervis, 1980: 579). The US decision to cross the 38th parallel and to advance toward the Sino-Korean border strongly supports Proposition B5.

CHINESE INTERVENTION IN THE KOREAN WAR:

The Chinese negative image of the US and its war readiness by mid-August 1950 did not precipitate China's intervention. Until early September, Chinese decision-makers were very cautious about intervention and searched for alternatives to a direct clash with the US. Chinese decision-making before MacArthur's Inchon landing does not support Proposition B5. However, after MacArthur's Inchon landing, Chinese decision-making came to be biased. At an extended consultation of the Politbureau of the Party (2/10/1950), Zhou En-lai strongly recommended a pre-emptive attack on US forces if a clash was inevitable (cited in Hao and Zhai, 1990). In Zhou's view, the US could attack China from three points, such as Taiwan, Vietnam, and Korea. MacArthur's Inchon landing confirmed Zhou's image of the US. Mao accepted Zhou's recommendation. From then on, Chinese intervention became inevitable. After MacArthur's Inchon landing, China's decision-making process on intervention supports Proposition B5.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT:

The US and China/the DPRK's biased decision-making are to be found in the cease-fire negotiations. Both the US and China/the DPRK wanted a cease-fire when Malik proposed it. Both sides, however, were strongly suspicious of the other's motives and commitments in negotiating a cease-fire. Both sides frequently intensified military actions whenever an impasse occurred. Even Eisenhower believed that "the enemy would not be impressed by words, but by deeds" (Foot, 1985: 205). China also believed that the US would not concede to armistice negotiations without Chinese military pressure (L.L. Sun, cited in Friedman, 1975: 84). Both sides' negative image of the other and their commitments stimulated them to dismiss the other's willingness for a cease-fire and to accentuate only the

other's conflictual behaviors. Thus their decision-making was biased. Proposition B5 is supported in this case.

THE JANUARY 21 AND PUEBLO CRISES:

US President Johnson initially interpreted the Pueblo crisis as a manifestation of the Communists' attempts to divert US/South Korean forces in Vietnam (NYT, 27/1/1968). The US took firm and resolute military measures (24/1/1968), ordering air and naval reservists to active duty (25/1/1968). However, US military maneuvers were limited and precautionary. The possibility of Soviet or Chinese intervention prevented the US from implementing drastic action against North Korea. US crisis management was not biased by its image of North Korea and does not support Proposition B5.

South Korea's decision-making was strongly biased by its commitments and its image of North Korea. Park Chung Hee told US Ambassador Porter that South Korea could "occupy Pyongyang within two days" (US Congress, House of Representatives, 22/6/1977, cited in Yang-Moon, 1988: 62). To Park, South Korea had "no choice but to react firmly" in order to terminate North Korean threats to its national security and economic development (Hanguk Ilbo, 27/1/1968). Although Park's willingness to retaliate against North Korea was restrained by the US, his resolution strongly supports Proposition B5.

THE FAILURE OF THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

South Korea believed that North Korea might breach the Joint Communiqué at any time and invade, even after signing a non-aggression pact (Dong-A Ilbo, 17/7/1972); and that North Korea had tried to take advantage of the Sino-US detente in order to ignite a South Korean revolution (J.H. Song, 1984: 613). South Korea thus decided not to change its institutionalized commitments to democracy; to keep US forces in South Korea; and to continue a strong anti-communist policy. Internal cohesion was intensified by the Siwol Yushin ("October Restoration") policy (17/10/1972). South Korea's commitments were seen by North Korea as involving

a persistent reliance on external powers; a virulent anti-communism; and the perpetuation of the division of Korea (Kim Young Joo, 1973: 299), and North Korea insisted that South Korea change these policies. North Korea, for its part, had an agenda to ignite socialist revolution in the South; to end the presence of US forces on the peninsula; and to undermine Park's political power and the internal cohesion of South Korea.

Each Korea's image of the other and their individual commitments significantly distorted their initial wish for accommodation. This case supports Proposition B5 for both Koreas.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS:

Although the US initially considered a strong military reaction (Head et al., 1978: 179), US decision-making on the Poplar Tree crisis was not biased. US decision-makers believed that the crisis could escalate into a serious military confrontation. Preventing a North Korean aggressive move was important. The impact of US military movements on the USSR and China could not be ignored (Head et al., 1978: 181). President Ford thus approved 'Operation Paul Bunyan' on the condition that the US-South Korean side "not be the first to use force". Ford wanted to demonstrate US resolve with an "appropriate amount of force" and "to avoid excessive gambling" with North Korea (Head et al., 1978: 193). No biased decision-making is to be found on the US side. Proposition B5 is not supported in this case.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT:

Perceiving an opportunity for accommodation, both Koreas agreed to the Basic Agreement and the Joint Declaration. However, the implementation failure of this Agreement was caused by both Koreas' biased decision-making. For example, US-South Korea decided to resume the annual 'Team Spirit' military exercise in spite of South Korea's decision not to link the progress of inter-Korean relations with the resolution of North Korea's nuclear development. South Korea should not have resumed the joint 'Team Spirit' exercise, linking the resumption of the 'Team

Spirit' with the inspection of North Korea's nuclear facilities.

North Korea could not tolerate the resumption of the joint 'Team Spirit' military exercise, which it considered a "nuclear war gamble". In addition, perceiving the Basic Agreement as another July 4 Joint Communiqué, Kim Il Sung probably did not have great expectations for the Basic Agreement and thus was not motivated to stop his nuclear development plan. In this context, South Korea's resumption of the 'Team Spirit' may well have confirmed his perception of the Basic Agreement. Due to their commitment to national security and mutual suspicion, the two Koreas could not implement their accommodative agreement. The failure of the Basic Agreement supports Proposition B5.

Four out of the seven cases cited support Proposition B5, namely: cease-fire negotiations; January 21 crisis (and the Pueblo crisis) for South Korea; July 4 Joint Communiqué for both Koreas; and the Basic Agreement for both Koreas. Two cases do not support Proposition B5. These are US decisions in the Pueblo and Poplar Tree crises. In the case of the Korean war, US policy shifts strongly support Proposition B5. Chinese decision-making, however, strongly supports Proposition B5 only after MacArthur's Inchon landing.

I.4. FOREIGN POLICY BEHAVIOR IN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Propositions C1 and C2 deal with the behavioral dimension of protracted conflict. I propose that a protracted conflict comprises (1) international crises/war; (2) normal relations range, including accommodation failure; and (3) a possible accommodation [Model of Foreign Policy Behavior in Protracted Conflict, Figure 2.2., Chapter 2]. Related proposition-testings follow.

P.C1. The stronger the committed behavior on the part of both adversaries to protect national interest and/or national identity, the greater the probability of escalation to an international crisis.

Three cases are examined: The US-China war in Korea; the Pueblo crisis; and the Poplar Tree crisis.

THE US-CHINA WAR IN KOREA:

The US committed behavior to protect its national interest and identity gradually intensified. When the North Korean forces refused to withdraw, the US found "direct military pressure" the only means of inducing North Korean withdrawal (George, 1955: 227). Truman acquiesced on 30 June 1950 to "send the troops". US commitments peaked when MacArthur landed at Inchon on 15 September and when the US/UN forces entered North Korea on 1 October. These commitments were not reversed until China launched a massive attack against the US/UN forces.

China had also strengthened its committed behavior for protecting its national interest and identity, parallel to the US. Beginning with denunciations of the US for blocking the Taiwan Strait with the Seventh Fleet, China redeployed troops from Hunan to Manchuria in June-July. By 18 August 1950, China ordered its North-East Localized Troops to war-readiness (B.J. Lee, 1990: 241). MacArthur's Inchon landing and the US/UN forces' entrance into North Korea generated a sharp increase in conflictual interactions. China warned repeatedly of its intervention, began to undertake a massive build-up along the Korean border, and confirmed its plan to intervene. When Chinese troops secretly crossed the Yalu River on 19 October 1950, a challenge to the existing structure of the Korean system (i.e., a war) began. Proposition C1 is supported in this case of war between the US and China in the Korean peninsula.

THE PUEBLO CRISIS:

When the US began to take "grave measures" to cope with the Pueblo crisis, disruptive interactions between the US and North Korea erupted. The US sent the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, Enterprise, into Wonsan Bay. On 24 January, the US strengthened its commitment to prevail "by whatever means it takes" (State of Department Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 190). North Korea stated that it would retaliate if the US continued the threat to its sovereignty, and mobilized its entire armed forces (Hanguk Ilbo, 26/1/1968). On 25 January [Washington Time], President Johnson ordered the activation of 372 fighters, bombers, the carrier Yorktown, and

reconnaissance (Department of State Bulletin, 12/2/1968: 192). The US feared another invasion of South Korea by the North (Brandt, 1969: 112). North Korea reaffirmed on 27 and 28 January [Korean Time] its readiness to retaliate if its socialist system was threatened by the US (Rodong Shinmun, 28/1/1968). Both sides' behavior destabilized the armistice agreement, and a serious military clash appeared imminent (J.C. Baek, 1986: 112). Proposition C1 is supported by the Pueblo crisis.

THE POPLAR TREE CRISIS:

Sixteen hours after the the Poplar Tree crisis took place, the US began to show stronger resolve in defense of US national interest (Head et al., 1978: 190-1). It stepped up its naval and air maneuvers on 19 August. North Korea ordered war-readiness for its military units, Worker-Peasant Guards, Red Youth Guards, and Reserve troops (NYT, 20/8/1976; Dong-A Ilbo, 20/8/1976). An international crisis developed, posing a challenge to the existing structure, namely the Armistice Agreement. War probability was heightened when 'Operation Paul Bunyan' was implemented on 21 August. The US affirmed that if North Korea hindered the US operation, it would retaliate against North Korea (NYT, 21/8/1976). DefCon 2 was issued. Again, Proposition C1 is supported by the Poplar Tree crisis.

P.C2. The less the committed behavior by either party to reducing the threat to the other's national interest and/or national identity, the greater will be the probability of accommodation failure.

Accommodation failure is the conceptual counterpart of accommodation success, which can be achieved only if both sides have the willingness and the capacity to implement their agreement. If any party's behavior threatens the other's interest and/or identity, accommodation failure results. Three cases are examined: the Armistice Agreement, the July 4 Joint Communiqué, and the Basic Agreement.

THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT:

The entire process of cease-fire negotiations up to the signing of the Armistice Agreement was marked by initiation and negotiation failure. The first serious US initiative for a cease-fire failed because it did not meet Chinese political goals. The US/UN's branding China as an "aggressor" nullified completely the cease-fire initiative. Items 2 through 4 involved numerous negotiation failures. Both sides clashed over security interest on Item 2. The US rivalry with the USSR and with China-DPRK in terms of strategic interest and ideology dramatically prolonged negotiations on Items 3 and 4. The cease-fire negotiation case supports Proposition C2.

THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

In spite of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, neither side mitigated its threatening posture toward the other's security and identity. South Korea and the US stated that there would be no arms reduction or withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. South Korea also asserted that it would not revoke its anti-communist laws. Instead, internal cohesion was vigorously reinforced through Siwol Yushin policy. For its part, North Korea did not abandon its strategy of fomenting a South Korean revolution. Kim Il Sung stressed North Korea's stubborn policy of "unification through violent socialist revolution in South Korea" (Radio Pyongyang, 3/7/1972, cited in D.S. Kim, 1987: 203; Rodong Shinmun, 3/7/1972). Neither side tried to ameliorate the ideological antagonism. The failure of the July 4th Joint Communiqué supports Proposition C2.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT:

After the the Basic Agreement was signed, neither party made a sincere effort to assure the other's security interest. South Korea, which did not want the linkage between the progress of inter-Korean relations and a resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, agreed (October, 1992) with the US to suspend the scheduled reduction of US forces and to resume the annual 'Team Spirit' military exercise. One day after the signing of the Basic Agreement, Kim Il Sung demanded the

withdrawal of US forces from South Korea (Lee Dong Bok's testimony, cited in J.W. Chi, 1994: 332). Just as South Korea's 'Team Spirit' threatened North Korea, North Korea's nuclear development threatened South Korea. The Basic Agreement failure supports Proposition C2.

P.C3. The greater the committed behavior on the part of both sides to assure (1) value-sharing; (2) diminished threat to national identity; and (3) increased complementary national interests, the greater will be the probability of accommodation.

Proposition C3 concerns an accommodation success. Because the two Koreas did not achieve any substantial accommodation, Proposition C3 may not be substantiated. However, we may draw some deductions from the two cases of accommodation failure (i.e, the July 4th Joint Communiqué of 1972 and the Basic Agreement of 1992) by examining how the two Koreas' behavior precluded shared value and complementary interests.

THE JULY 4 JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ:

In Proposition C2, we have seen that neither Korea attempted to accommodate the other's policy or position, despite their agreement to "transcend differences" in ideology and political system. In addition, North Korea continuously demanded that South Korea revoke its anti-communist policies. The two Koreas lacked shared values.

The alleged common interest for the two Koreas in the Joint Communiqué was the reunification of Korea. This goal, however, was beyond their capacity to achieve. This limitation was revealed in their different approaches to unification and the interpretation of the three principles of unification. The two Koreas' will to achieve unification was not strong enough to permit substantial negotiations. Unification was not so much a common interest as a source of conflict, an arena in which the two Koreas' conflict of interest and identity took place.

THE BASIC AGREEMENT:

In the preamble to the Basic Agreement, the two Koreas stipulated that inter-Korean relations were not a "relationship between states" but a "special interim relationship" until they had achieved unification (Commentary, 1992). It was hoped that such a *modus vivendi* would enable them to focus on reconciliation and non-aggression rather than on unification exclusively. As a result, neither mutual tolerance nor mutual intolerance was present at the time of the Basic Agreement (1992), as it had been at the time of the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972), when mutual intolerance was paramount.

Nevertheless, the two Koreas in general, and North Korea in particular, did not perceive complementary interest. They had stipulated that improvement in inter-Korean relations would advance "common national interests and prosperity" and would achieve "peaceful unification" (Commentary, 1992: 162). North Korea, however, showed greater interest in concluding a peace treaty, and in establishing diplomatic relations with the US and Japan: with the US for security; with Japan, for economic assistance. North Korea wished to improve inter-Korean relations in order to meet the preconditions of improved relations with the US and Japan. The Basic Agreement may well have encouraged North Korea to have direct talks with the US. In this context, North Korea may not have perceived an increased necessity to cooperate with South Korea for the stipulated common interests of prosperity and unification.

In sum, the cases of both the July 4th Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement indicate that the unification issue functioned not as a genuine complementary interest for both Koreas, but as a pseudo common interest that reinforced their political agenda. A consideration of the motives of both Koreas' accommodation initiatives in the early 1970s, and the failure of the Basic Agreement in the 1990s, reveals that assurance of mutual security was a common interest for each Korea. They did not, however, acknowledge this reality. In the case of the July 4th Joint Communiqué, both sides focused primarily on unification, an issue that was beyond their capacity and will to resolve. In the case of the Basic Agreement, they

ignored the crux of the security factor (i.e., the nuclear issue) in order to achieve "an agreement". The "agreement" was useless as a means of resolving the North Korean nuclear development problem.

Table 7.1 presents the results of testing Propositions related to the inter-Korean protracted conflict.

Table 7.1 here

I now turn to a summarized explanation of the entire process of the inter-Korean protracted conflict, which constitutes a proposition-testing for the Summary Proposition, demonstrated in the Integrated Model of Protracted Conflict [Model 2.4].

Interpreting the Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict

I.5.a. The Dependent Variable: The Inter-Korean Protracted Conflict

As I argue in the beginning of this study, behavioral patterns in a protracted conflict consist of a series of international crises/wars and accommodation failures. The two Koreas experienced 12 foreign policy crises beginning in 1950 (Brecher, 1993: 72), out of which developed the Korean War (1950); the January 21 and Pueblo crises (1968); and the Poplar Tree crisis (1976). Both Koreas also experienced a number of initiation failures in their attempts at arms reduction or peace negotiations. Even the two Koreas' accommodative agreements failed, as demonstrated by the cases of the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972) and the Basic Agreement (1992). The inter-Korean conflict fits the behavioral pattern of a protracted conflict [Model 2.3], which is defined in my study as a dependent variable. What led the two Koreas to exhibit such behavioral patterns?

Table 7.1: Summary of Case Study Findings

Cases	Propositions											
	Source			Decision-Making					Behavior			
	A1	A2	A3	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	C1	C2	C3*	
Pre-War												
NK	S	S	S			S	S					
SK	S	S	S			S	M					
Intervention/Policy												
US					S	S	S	S	S			
China					S	S	S	M	S			
Armistice Agreement												
NK/China				S		S	S	S			S	
US				S		S	S	S			S	
Post-War												
NK	S	S	S			S	S					
SK	S	S	S			S	S					
January 21 Crisis												
NK		S										
SK	S	S	S		S	S	S	S				
Pueblo Crisis												
NK	S	S	S			S	S					
SK	S	S	S			S	S	S				
US					S		S	NS	S			
July 4 Communiqué												
NK	S	S	S	S		S	M	S			S	
SK	S	S	S	S		S	M	S			S	
Poplar Tree Crisis												
NK	S	S	S			S	S			S		
SK	S	S	S			S	S					
US					S			NS	S			
Basic Agreement												
NK	S	S	S	S				S			S	
SK	S			S				S			S	

Code: S = Supported; NS = Not Supported; M = Mixed findings

*: Proposition C3 could not be tested because the two Koreas did not achieve any substantial accommodation.

A blank set: The propositions which were not directly relevant in the inter-Korean conflict were left in a blank set.

I.5.b. Independent Variables: Interest and Identity

National interest (e.g., national security in particular) and national identity (i.e., ideology) were sources of the inter-Korean protracted conflict [Model 2.2; Propositions A1-A3].

The introduction of socialism into Korea in the 1920s sowed the seeds of intra-Korean ideological conflict. The involvement of the US and the Soviet Union in Korean politics after the Japanese surrender, greatly intensified this ideological conflict. After the establishment of the two Koreas in 1948, the North and South became involved in an inter-state conflict over territory and ideology. The Korean War (1950-53), triggered by North Korea, was a struggle over regime survival. The war greatly intensified each Korea's security interest and ideological commitment: anti-communism in South Korea; the Juche idea in North Korea. By the end of the 1960s, the inter-Korean conflict had become a protracted one, with security interest and identity its major components.

Some foreign policy crises [Model 2.2; Proposition B2] of the US and/or South Korea developed into international crises due mainly to security interest [Model 2.3; Proposition C1]. The January and Pueblo crises and the Poplar Tree crisis illustrate the above statement. These crises in turn rigidified each Korea's security commitments against the other. They also intensified South Korea's anti-communism and North Korea's Juche idea and anti-US position. The two Korea's struggle over security and ideology continued throughout the 1980s and persisted through the 1990s. North Korea was strongly opposed to a market-economy and was committed to its role as a "banner of socialism". Its nuclear weapons development threatened South Korea's security.

This conflict over national security and ideology hindered successful negotiations, prevented implementation of inter-Korean accommodation attempts, and extended the inter-Korean protracted conflict. In the case of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, opportunities for accommodation [Model 2.2; Proposition B1] were unfulfilled because of antagonistic ideologies and/or clashing national interest related to the issue of US forces in South Korea [Model 2.3; Proposition C2]. The Basic

Agreement clearly shows that inter-Korean accommodation cannot be achieved without a resolution of the security issue.

I.5.c. The Intervening Variable: Decision-Making

In the inter-Korean protracted conflict, a series of international crises and accommodation failures resulted when decision-makers of each Korea or of other direct actors (e.g., the US; China) perceived threats to their national interest and/or identity. In addition to these threats, decision-makers' negative perceptions of the other [Proposition B.3]; the institutionalized commitments of each Korea [Proposition B.4]; and decision-makers' biases, all contributed to accommodation failure [Proposition B.5].

In the case of the War between the US and China, US decision-makers' perception of the USSR as an evil enemy trying to test US resolve, precipitated US direct military intervention in the Korean War. The US decision to cross the 38th parallel, and its new commitment to unify Korea by force was based on misinformation. US decision-makers discounted in September 1950 the possibility of Soviet intervention in the Korean War and greatly underestimated China's commitment to protect her interest and identity. China's long-term image of the US as an imperialist power prepared China for a possible war with the US when the latter became directly involved in the Korean War. China's commitment to fight against the US intensified as the latter strengthened or shifted its policy in the Korean War. MacArthur's Inchon landing confirmed China's negative image of the US and significantly influenced its decision to intervene in the Korean War.

Because of their mutual negative images, negotiations on the Armistice Agreement between the US and China were prolonged. Both the US and China/the DPRK's mutual suspicion of the other's sincerity and intentions in the cease-fire negotiations not only resulted in both sides' frequently strengthened military pressures against the other in order to induce concessions, but also blocked any mutual accommodation.

Confronted with the January 21 and Pueblo crises (1968), South Korean decision-

makers calculated that a preemptive strike would be more effective than coping with "future attack" by North Korea. South Korea's anticipation of another attack by North Korea in the near future emanated from South Korea's long-term perception of North Korea as a designated enemy. In this context, South Korea's commitment to take the initiative in the inter-Korean protracted conflict biased its decision-making, favoring an "immediate retaliation". The January 21 and Pueblo crises intensified South Korea's negative perceptions of North Korea, leading it to undertake a massive arms build-up and closer collaboration with the US military. The Pueblo crisis forced North Korea to accelerate its war preparation through four-pronged military policy and a massive arms build-up.

In the case of the July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972), each Korea's perception of the other, and its eagerness to keep its institutionalized commitments against the other, led to biased decision-making in implementing the agreement. South Korea remained unconvinced, even after the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, that North Korea would not again invade the South. South Korea suspected the North of using the negotiations as a mere strategy. For these reasons, South Korea was adamant in its refusal to agree to the evacuation of US troops. North Korea also suspected the South of a two-faced strategy in the implementation of the Communiqué, a perception that led the North to suspend the agreement. North Korea refused to drop its demand for the withdrawal of US forces from South Korea. Neither did the Koreans make an effort to "transcend differences in ideologies and systems" despite their agreement to do so. Rather, they attempted to strengthen internal cohesion through New Constitutions to protect their ideologies. The July 4 Joint Communiqué case shows that decision-makers of states in protracted conflict are so trapped in their negative perceptions of the adversary and in their previous commitments against the "enemy" that accommodation failure and consequently, an extension of protracted conflict, usually results.

In response to the Poplar Tree crisis (1976), the National Defense Committee of South Korea's Congress demanded on 21 August speedy retaliation against North Korea. Park Chung Hee agreed immediately to the US's worst case plan, i.e.,

partial invasion of North Korea if North Korea hindered US 'Operation Paul Bunyan'. South Korea saw the crisis as a means of long-desired retaliation against the North for its provocations against the South from the 1960s on. After the Poplar Tree crisis, South Korea's wish to retaliate against North Korea found expression in a drastic military build-up. Park Chung Hee came to see Kim Il Sung as sub-human. North Korea's war preparations were completed by the late 1970s. North Korea also decided in 1985 to accelerate its nuclear weapons production. The inter-Korean protracted conflict shifted to a competition to acquire nuclear weapons, which became the major barrier in implementing the Basic Agreement in the early 1990s.

North Korea's nuclear development plan and the nuclear weapons issue seriously jeopardized the Basic Agreement (1992). South Korea turned its concern from improving inter-Korean relations to protecting its national security, and decided to resume the 'Team Spirit' military exercise. North Korea saw 'Team Spirit' as a 'large-scale nuclear war gamble.' South Korea's resumption of the 'Team Spirit' military exercise and North Korea's withdrawal from NPT in 1993 signified the return of both Koreas to the normal relations range of their protracted conflict. Each Korea's commitment to protect its national security was thereby intensified.

The entire process of the Korean protracted conflict shows that both crises and accommodation failures had an impact on the decisional dimension by stimulating the negative images each Korea had of the other [Proposition B3]. Their institutionalized commitments were also affected [Proposition B4]. In retrospect, if the efforts of each Korea to assure the other's security interest had been sincere, and at the same time, if each had genuinely tried to transcend or tolerate, at the minimum, the other's contradictory ideology, the inter-Korean protracted conflict might have been terminated [Proposition C3]. Thus the entire process of the inter-Korean protracted conflict [Model 2.4] supports the Summary Proposition, which is stated as:

Both national interest and national identity are sources of protracted conflict. Decision-makers' negative perceptions,

institutionalized commitments, biased coping strategies, and their negative feedback stimulate cumulation of conflict. Minimizing threats to identity as well as maximizing complementary interests may terminate protracted conflict.

II. Theoretical Implications

In Chapter 1, I reviewed 'enduring rivalry' theory and Azar's 'protracted conflict' theory in relation to previous studies of long-term conflict. What does the Korean case indicate about theories on long-term conflict, including the above two theories?

II.1. BEHAVIORAL PATTERNS IN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Azar characterizes behavioral patterns of protracted conflict as 'sporadic outbreaks of open warfare'. However, there has been no sporadic open warfare in the inter-Korean protracted conflict after the Korean War. Thus sporadic open warfare is not a necessary condition of a protracted conflict, which weakens Azar's definition. Enduring rivalry theorists argue that numerous 'militarized inter-state disputes' constitute long-term rivalry. However, the concept of 'militarized disputes' is too broad to clarify when and why decision-makers of both adversaries exhibit conflictual behavior. Not all militarized disputes give decision-makers a perception of crisis (Leng and Singer, 1988). It is important to examine not just militarized disputes, but crisis, which is the most salient and visible point of interstate conflict (Lebow, 1981: 309). Thus I propose to examine 'international crisis', which is in-between 'militarized disputes' and 'open warfares', in order to describe the behavioral patterns in a protracted conflict.

From the Korean case, we have seen that accommodation failures repeatedly occur. Neither enduring rivalry theory nor Azar's protracted conflict theory delve profoundly into the matter of accommodation failure. It is important to study accommodation failure because it stimulates decision-makers' negative image of the

adversary, and leads to commitments to protect national identity and/or interest through internal cohesion and military build-up. The end result is a cumulation of conflict. The failure of the July 4 Joint Communiqué resulted in a strengthening of the internal cohesion of both Koreas. The failure of the Basic Agreement and the deadlock over North Korea's nuclear plans resulted in a continuous military build-up in both Koreas. In other words, a series of international crises represent overt conflictual behaviors, whereas repeated accommodation failures stimulate covert conflictual behavior, which again may intensify future international crises. We may not grasp comprehensively the entire picture of a long-term conflict if we neglect to study accommodation failure.

II.2. SOURCES OF PROTRACTED CONFLICT

In tracing the sources of protracted conflict, Azar and his colleagues concentrated on national identity; enduring rivalry theorists, on national interest. The Korean case suggests that we must incorporate both factors.

John Burton (1984) emphasizes national identity, not national interest, as a factor in producing international conflict. My study shows that 'territorial interest' (Huth and Russett, 1993; McClelland, 1972: 87; Goertz and Diehl, 1992b: 14; Vasquez, 1993) was one of the most significant factors in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. The Korean War and North Korea's continued attempts to communize the entire Korean peninsula illustrate my position. In broader terms, national security was the most salient issue in the inter-Korean conflict. South Korea's response to the January 21 and Pueblo crises; the Poplar Tree crisis; and North Korea's nuclear development supports this position. To North Korea, the mere "presence or existence" (Rapoport, 1974: 180) of its major enemy (i.e., the US forces in South Korea) near its border was a serious threat to its security. As Huth and Russett (1993: 64) imply, the two Koreas' different ideologies were not a direct cause of recurring crises when threats to their security were not also present.

This does not mean that the two Koreas' opposing ideologies did not have any effect in fomenting the inter-Korean protracted conflict. On the contrary, their

significance was apparent when the two Koreas attempted accommodation. As was shown in the failure of the July 4 Joint Communiqué, the contradictory ideologies caused the two Koreas to approach the alleged common interest (i.e., unification) very differently and also to interpret their agreement differently. While clashing national security interest led the two Koreas to experience recurring international crises, the divergent ideologies, coupled with security interest, hindered them in achieving inter-Korean accommodation. Thus a return to normal relations within the context of a protracted conflict was inevitable.

As Gurr (1993: 166-7) implies, the interplay between ideological differences and competing vital interests resulted in the inter-Korean protracted conflict. Foreign policy decision-making of states in protracted conflict is related not only to national security but also to the will of a nation to maintain its identity. Neither enduring rivalry theory nor Azar's protracted conflict theory deals comprehensively with these two major factors.

II.3 DECISION-MAKING IN PROTRACTED CONFLICT

Neither enduring rivalry theory nor Azar's protracted conflict theory pays sufficient attention to the decisional dimension in protracted conflict. I studied this factor in terms of decision-makers' negative image of the other; institutionalized commitments; biased decision-making; and the impact of previous conflicts on those that followed.

The Korean case shows that different identities are not the only source of mutual negative images. Intensified clashes over interest and/or identity intensifies the established negative image of the adversary. For example, the Korean War caused South Korea to favor ideology over nation. It caused North Korea to demonize the US. It caused the two Koreas to delegitimize each other as a political power (Auerbach and Ben-Yehuda, 1987: 329) up to the early 1970s. Although national interest and identity are sources of conflict, the Korean case suggests that the conflict developed because of both Koreas' institutionalized commitments, rigid policies, and hostile strategies toward each other. Because the two Koreas experienced numerous

crises and accommodation failures, which were coupled with decision-makers' negative perceptions, they strengthened their physical preparations for further conflicts.

These negative images and commitments lead inexorably to decision-makers' bias, resulting in a crisis escalation and then serious clashes. However, as previously noted, South Korea's willingness to retaliate against North Korea (e.g., the case of the January 21 and Pueblo crises of 1968) was restrained by the US. Does this mean that decision-makers' images and commitments are not significant in developing a protracted conflict if major powers are deeply involved? I found in the Korean case that returning to the normal relations range offers a greater potential for further conflict due to the impact of the previous conflict. In other words, long-term patterns of behavior are confirmed by the interactions of short-term conflicts, such as crises and accommodation failures.

Neither enduring rivalry theory nor Azar's protracted conflict theory provides us with theoretical linkages between 'militarized disputes' or 'sporadic open warfares' and the entire process of a protracted conflict. The dynamics of a protracted conflict are not adequately explained by these theories.

III. Policy Implications

The theoretical implications of my study on protracted conflict, illustrated by the Korean case, suggest some policy implications.

First, decision-makers of states involved in a protracted conflict need to realize that intensifying military strength may not be the only way to end conflict, but a dangerous way to augment it. An increase in one party's military strength may induce a preemptive strike or surprise attack by the adversary despite its military inferiority (Lebow, 1987: 131-139; Paul, 1994). Furthermore, as Paul (1995: 276) argues, a sudden increase in one party's strength may place the other under pressure to respond quickly in some way, resulting in disastrous consequences. Paul thus

suggests that decision-makers in a protracted rivalry not introduce new weapons, nor form new alliances, nor adopt offensive strategies. The existing institutionalized commitments of each state, as evidenced by its armed forces and various military strategies, have an influence on its adversary. If these commitments are intensified, the perception of a foreign policy crisis arises (Atkeson, 1976) which in turn intensifies each state's commitment to protect its core values. As Waltz (1993: 75) implies, institutionalized commitments of both Koreas were "created by their enemies".

In contrast, decision-makers should reduce or modify their institutionalized commitments in order to create an environment favorable to a successful accommodation. As the cases of the July 4 Joint Communiqué and of the Basic Agreement show, the two Koreas' institutionalized commitments significantly contributed to the accommodation failures. The opposite process can lead one adversary to perceive a decreased threat to its security as well as to its identity. Identity, i.e., the notion of 'what we are', is closely connected to 'what we fear or want' (Campbell, 1992: 58; Beiner, 1983: 144-52). The opposite process thus may fulfill the three conditions of successful accommodation proposed in my study.

Second, decision-makers of states in a protracted conflict should make an effort to manage crisis more effectively from the pre-crisis through to the end-crisis phase.

In the pre-crisis phase, it is important for decision-makers not to underestimate any signal from the other. The fact that the US ignored North Korea's warnings in early January 1968 on the Pueblo's activity in North Korean waters contributed in part to the eruption of the Pueblo crisis. In the case of the Poplar Tree crisis, the US interpretation of North Korea's unusually hostile behavior in early August 1976 as the usual propaganda prevented US decision-makers from adopting suitable counter-measures before the crisis took place. The cases cited imply that decision-makers experiencing a protracted conflict may be so accustomed to the normal relations range (NRR) of the conflict that they may lose the facility for observing the adversary's slightly higher-than-normal conflictual behavior.

When an international crisis erupts, it is important that decision-makers be

flexible when implementing their committed behavior, and to seek alternatives to a direct military clash. The US decision to cross the 38th parallel in early September 1950 during the Korean war cancelled any possible alternatives. It also illustrates a lapse by US decision-makers in recognizing indications, in this case, Chinese intervention. When military pressure seems to be inevitable, decision-makers should implement it gradually and send clear messages to the adversary regarding its military maneuvers and its objectives. A deadline for an expected response from its adversary should also be specified. This process is important in showing one's resolute stance as well as a precautionary measure. It also gives the adversary a moderate time in which to reassess its policy. In the case of the Pueblo crisis, Johnson's limited reserve call-up, followed by his announcement on a possible additional call-up, showed US restraint but also a firm intent to act if necessary. In the case of the Poplar Tree crisis, the US statement on 21 August 1976 that the US was prepared to retaliate if North Korea prevented 'Operation Paul Bunyan' made the US limited objective very clear, as well as establishing US resolve. Both cases did not result in a serious military clash.

In the end-crisis phase, it is desirable to try to negotiate a more comprehensive agenda which includes the issues at stake. The end-crisis phase may be the very point at which mutual suspicion and hatred against the other have peaked. However, as my study shows, each crisis or war is followed by the intensification of mutual negative images and institutionalized commitments. Thus it is essential to negotiate the fundamental issues before negative feedback cumulates on each side. Furthermore, decision-makers who have experienced a recent crisis may be able to reassess their national interest and/or identity. Decision-makers thus should take advantage of a crisis as a catalyst in the transformation of a protracted conflict--a turning point that can lead to its end (Lebow, 1981; Rock, 1989).

Third, it is extremely important that decision-makers begin any accommodation attempt with sincerity and a genuine hope of success. This is because its failure exaggerates the on-going protracted conflict.

Frequent initiatives or proposals for accommodation should be avoided. This

does not mean that rival states should not make an effort to accommodate each other, but rather that they should first be honest and serious about accommodation.

Many fruitless accommodation initiatives decrease credibility for future attempts and increase mutual suspicion. For this reason, decision-makers should avoid initiatives that are made just for system-maintenance or political slogans. Fewer proposals do not indicate weaker possibilities for accommodation (S.J. Han, 1990).

After negotiations begin, decision-makers should concentrate on the major issues. For example, the lack of substantial negotiations on both Koreas' national security and/or on ways of transcending different ideologies contributed to the failure of both the July 4 Joint Communiqué and the Basic Agreement. It is advisable for decision-makers to work toward a package deal. To illustrate, South Korea consistently wanted confidence-building measures while North Korea wanted arms control and/or withdrawal of US forces in South Korea. My study shows that these two facets are different sides of the same coin. The states in a protracted conflict suffer from both mutual suspicion and the adversary's institutionalized commitments. Both confidence-building and military issues need to be settled simultaneously. Decision-makers thus should take important steps toward accommodation by treating different obstacles in the manner described.

In the implementation phase, decision-makers on any side must show first their sincere willingness for carrying out the terms of the accommodative agreement. When the US attempted a detente in the 1970s, President Nixon demonstrated US willingness to hold negotiations with China by first taking a series of unilateral actions favorable to China (cited in Clemens, 1973: 552-3). Decision-makers should exercise patience in their expectations of a response from the other side. Laws can change faster than the practices which they authorize (Russett, 1993: 34). Inter-state agreements can be made quickly, but cooperation in implementing agreements takes considerable time. The Korean cases show that implementation was a lengthy process.

IV. Some Personal Reflections

IV.1. SIGNIFICANCE OF MY STUDY

The purpose of this study is to analyze the origins and processes of protracted conflict. Nothing is more important in today's world than to understand why such conflicts erupt and why they continue for years, even generations. Recent ethnic disputes have revealed the potential of becoming protracted conflicts, escalating into war and proving to be impervious to resolution. I examine the Korean case in order to answer the core question of my thesis: What creates, continues, and terminates protracted conflict? My hope is that I have made a contribution to the existing research on this vital subject.

First, my study adds to the existing studies on the inter-Korean conflict. Moon's (1989) survey shows that most studies concentrated on the origins (52% out of 1062 studies between 1978 and 1988) and on the management (27%) of the inter-Korean conflict. However, without clarifying the nature of the inter-Korean conflict, it would be difficult to grasp the significance of its origins, or to discern a suitable method of conflict management. In Moon's survey, only 0.85% dealt with the nature of the inter-Korean conflict. By defining the inter-Korean protracted conflict as a dependent variable, I explain the nature of this particular conflict in terms of its origins and processes.

Second, my study also enlarges upon protracted conflict theory by defining the decisional dimension as an intervening variable. In their study on enduring rivalry, Goertz and Diehl suggested an agenda for research, which they consider critical to understanding international conflict. Their questions are:

How do rivalries begin? What makes a proto-rivalry develop into an enduring one? What processes operate to make the context of the enduring rivalry important in affecting the behavior of the rival states? What are the manifestations of those processes? How do rivalries end, and in particular, when do they end peacefully? (Goertz and Diehl, 1992b: 161).

Most of these interesting and important questions cannot be answered by either enduring rivalry theory or Azar's protracted conflict theory. By defining both national interest and identity as independent variables, I attempt to discover the origins of protracted conflict. Behavioral patterns in protracted conflict are determined by certain processes: decision-makers' negative images; institutionalized commitments; bias; and the cumulative effect of previous conflicts (i.e., crises/war and accommodation failures) on those that follow. Diminished threats to national identity, shared value, and expanded common interests can lead to a termination of protracted conflict.

IV.2. AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In pursuing my research, I increasingly realized how complex was the subject and how many areas remain to be explored.

First, ideology in my study is the only factor considered in an examination of national identity. More knowledge is required on the decisional process of states with different culture groups. Do they put more emphasis on identity over interest in crisis situations? When and how do they make institutionalized commitments (e.g., 'ethnic cleansing')? Recent ethnic conflicts demonstrate how important is this aspect of protracted conflict.

Second, the Korean case represents conflict at the level of decision-makers only. The people of the North and South do not hate each other. How does protracted conflict develop between states in which hatred exists at the populace level? Does hatred at this basic level significantly influence a state's decision-making? If so, how?

Third, because no substantial accommodation in the Korean conflict occurred, I could not study this possible feature of protracted conflict. To what extent do the three conditions required for accommodation proposed in my study (i.e., shared value; diminished threats to identity; and increased complementary interests), contribute to accommodation success between states in protracted conflict? A consideration of the PLO-Israeli accommodation (1994-5) procedure would be

valuable in this context.

IV.3. SOME PERSONAL REFLECTIONS

In this dissertation, I argue that a protracted conflict comprises a series of crises/wars as well as numerous accommodation failures; that both security interest and identity are major factors in stimulating crisis/war and in precluding successful accommodation; that both adversaries' negative images, strengthened commitments, and biases are very important factors in the development of a protracted conflict. To manage protracted conflict effectively, policy-makers need to exercise prudence, namely: precautionary behavior in each phase of crisis; sincere behavior in each stage of accommodation attempts; and restrained behavior in strengthening institutionalized commitments. How can decision-makers acquire such prudence? My response to this question completes the dissertation.

Policy-makers must first acquire the capacity to change their perception of the adversary. Without this flexibility to revise their perceptions, decision-makers cannot hope to end a protracted conflict. If South Korea, for example, were to acknowledge the validity of North Korea's perception of a threat (Y.H. Lee, 1992: 144), it could be more flexible in dealing with arms control and could promote its accommodative attempts. How can decision-makers change their perceptions of the adversary? 'Empathy' toward the adversary is required. Morgenthau (1985: 13) argues that if we regard other nations as we do our own, we might pursue more favorable policies toward them. His suggestion implies that it is essential for decision-makers in policy-making to feel empathy toward the other. How do we acquire empathy? Personal 'introspection' is essential.

Although states in protracted conflict suffer from clashes over national interest and different identities, they have one thing in common, namely: the ethos of 'endless threat perception'. It is therefore necessary that decision-makers examine closely their threat perceptions and their negative images of the adversary. If the adversary can be seen as having similar perceptions, he may be seen as a fellow victim of unfortunate circumstances, rather than as an evil enemy. This empathy may

enable decision-makers to reassess a conflict situation in terms of the "fears, aspirations, pressures, and constraints of their adversaries" (Lebow, 1987: 139, emphasis mine). This process of introspection is possible for decision-makers of any state in protracted conflict, and it is essential if prudent decisions are to be made.

This vital pattern of introspection, empathy, alteration of perception, and consequent prudent decision-makings in crises, accommodation attempts, and institutionalized commitments could well lead to the termination of a protracted conflict. The task before decision-makers of states in protracted conflict is thus not simply a matter of strategic calculation against their adversary, but a comprehensive political judgment that penetrates into "inter-subjective phenomena" (Greenhalgh and Kramer, 1990).

Appendix: CHRONOLOGY

All dates in this chronology are based on Korean time. Washington time, if necessary, will be clearly indicated as [WT].

<u>DATE</u>	<u>ACTION</u>
The Pre-War Period (1910-50)	
1910 Aug. 29	Japan annexed Korea.
1919 Mar. 1	The 1 March independence struggle.
Sept. 15	An exiled Korean Provisional Government (KPG) was set up in China.
1924	Anti-Japanese guerrilla activity dominated by Korean communists began.
1925	The Korean Communist Party (KCP) was established.
1920s	The division of the anti-Japanese struggle into left and right emerged; serious intra-Korean conflict within the independent movements began.
1943 Dec. 1	The Cairo Declaration; Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek agreed that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent".
1945 July	The Postdam Declaration; the Cairo Declaration was reaffirmed.
Aug. 15	Japan's surrender; two zones of military occupation by the US and the USSR came into existence in the Korean peninsula; the Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence (CPKI) was established.

1945	Aug. 20	USSR troops began to occupy the North.
	Sept.	The KCP-dominated Korean socialists came to lead the CPKI.
	4	The Korean Democratic Party (KDP) was founded by the right-wing.
	6	The CPKI, the left-wing, proclaimed the Korean People's Republic (KPR); the potential for organized conflict between the right and left increased.
	Oct. 18	The Northern Branch of the KCP was established.
1946	Feb. 9	A Provisional People's Committee for North Korea was formed under Kim Il Sung.
	Mar. 5	The North enacted the 'Land Reform Law'.
	Fall	Numerous strikes by peasants and workers occurred in the South; the US Military Government employed harsh policies against these strikes.
1948	Feb. 8	The North Korean People's Army was established.
	Apr.	The <u>Cheju</u> island strike took place.
	May 31	Syngman Rhee emphasized anti-communism, internal consolidation, and national defense.
	Aug. 15	The Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established in the South.
	Sept. 9	The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) was proclaimed in the North.
1949	Spring - Summer	The first border military clashes took place along the 38th parallel.
	Sept. 30	Syngman Rhee argued that fighting against communists was to liberate the Koreans in the North.
	Oct.	<u>Yosu-Sunchon</u> rebellion occurred.
	Nov. 1	Shin, South Korea's Minister of Defense, said publicly that the South was ready to invade the North.

- 1950 Jan. 12 Acheson declared that Taiwan and Korea were not included in the US defense perimeter in the Far East.
- Mar. 1 Syngman Rhee's policy of 'march-to-the north' was reiterated.

US Intervention in the Korean War (1950)

- 1950 June 25 North Korea attacked South Korea.
- 24 [WT] Ambassador Muccio's telegram reached Washington.
- 25 [WT] The First Blair House Meeting was held.
- Decisions made were: (1) to furnish South Korea with some arms and equipment; (2) to employ US naval and air forces for the safe evacuation of American civilians from Korea; (3) to place US assistance under the flag of the UN; and (4) to interpose the US Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and mainland China.
- 26 [WT] The Second Blair House Meeting was held.
- Decisions made were: (1) to give the fullest support of US naval and air forces to South Korea only in the Southern area; (2) to strengthen the role of the Seventh Fleet; (3) to bolster US forces in the Philippines; (4) to increase military assistance to Indochina; and (5) to report any US actions to the UN.
- 27 [WT] The situation in South Korea became more serious; Truman stated in public the US policy, made on 26 June, with respect to the Korean War.
- 29 [WT] The US NSC (National Security Council) met; The question of sending US ground forces was raised; No final decision was made.
- 30 [WT] The US decided to send ground forces to Korea.

Chinese Intervention in the Korean War (1950)

PRE-CRISIS

1950	June 28	Zhou En-lei condemned the US containment policy over Taiwan.
	30	China sent military observers to North Korea to assess the Korean military situation.
	June-July	China redeployed troops from Hunan to Manchuria.
	July 7 & 10	China's Central Military Committee decided to organize North-East Localized Troops which later became the foundation of the China's People's Volunteers (CPVs) in the Korean War.
	end-	China perceived threats of the expansion of the Korean War and began seriously to consider intervention and to search for information on the progress of the Korean War.
	Aug. 5	China's Central Military Committee assessed the possibility of intervention in August.
	18	China perceived the inevitability of a clash with the US, ordered additional reinforcements of the Localized Troops, and stepped up its military preparedness.
	Sept. 2	China searched for alternatives to avoid direct military intervention.
	5	Mao Tse Tung called attention to the risks of intervention, but emphasized the need to be fully prepared.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS/WAR

	15	General MacArthur staged a landing at Inchon.
	mid-	Mao Tse Tung sent 5 military officers to North Korea to assess the military situation there. He perceived again the inevitability of intervention.
	21	Zhou En-lei hinted at the intervention to Indian Ambassador, Panikkar.
	25	Zhou's warning was reiterated and transmitted to the US.

- 1950 sept. 27 Truman authorized MacArthur to cross the 38th parallel.
- 30 Zhou reconfirmed in a public speech the possibility of intervention.
- Oct. 1 Mao received a telegram from Kim Il Sung; South Korean troops, on the US 8th Army's order, entered North Korea; MacArthur issued an ultimatum to North Korea to surrender.
- 2 Zhou strongly hinted at the possibility of intervention if US/UN troops crossed the 38th parallel; China broadened intervention discussions to include the Politbureau of the Party, which decided to intervene in the Korean War.
- 4 Mao called General Peng Dehuai to Peking and explained the inevitability of intervention.
- 7 China completed the consultation on all the processes of intervention; The UN passed the resolution allowing its forces to cross the 38th parallel; US troops entered North Korea.
- 8 Mao ordered Peng to mobilize the CPVs and notified Kim Il Sung about Chinese mobilization.
- 10 Zhou warned that China would take action in the event of war of a US invasion.
- 11 China's Central Committee of the Party ordered Peng not to cross the Yalu River.
- 12 Zhou met Stalin and requested Soviet's air support. Stalin, however, rejected China's proposal and offered limited aid in the form of weapons.
- 13 An emergency meeting of the Politbureau was held; Chinese decision-makers concluded that, despite the various difficulties, intervention would be beneficial for China in the long run.
- 15 Truman and MacArthur met at Wake Island and agreed that China neither would nor could intervene in the Korean War.
- 19 Chinese troops secretly crossed the Yalu River.

The Armistice Agreement (1953)

INITIATION FAILURE (1st attempt)

- 1950 Oct. 26 US forces reached the Sino-Korean border.
- Nov. end- CPVs launched a massive attack on US/UN forces, inflicted heavy losses, and forced MacArthur to retreat.
- Dec. 9 Truman showed US willingness to negotiate a cease-fire.
- 15 The US proposed concrete conditions for a cease-fire.
- 22 Zhou rejected the US proposal because it made no reference to China's call for the removal of all foreign troops from Korea and offered no recognition of its claim to a seat in the UN.
- 1951 Jan. 23 China showed a softening posture toward cease-fire negotiations; Zhou said that China would advise CPVs to return if US/UN troops withdrew from Korea. He again insisted upon recognition of China's legitimate status in the UN.
- 30 The UN and the US condemned China as an 'aggressor'.
- Feb. 2 China defined the US as 'the deadly enemy of world peace'; the first opportunity for serious negotiations was lost.
- May mid- The US Administration's NSC 48/5 set out three goals relating to Korea: (1) an appropriate armistice; (2) the establishment of South Korea, at least as far as the 38th parallel; (3) the withdrawal of foreign troops from the Korean peninsula. The US assault devastated the CPVs' communication and transportation systems.

INITIATION (2nd attempt)

- 1951 May 31 US and USSR diplomats (George Kennan and Jacob Malik) met to discuss ways to end the Korean War.
- June 5 Kennan and Malik met again.

- 1951 June 23 Malik called for a cease-fire and an armistice. He did not mention China's specific conditions for the cease-fire.
- 27 North Korea broadcast a demand that the US/UN army should be south of the 38th parallel. It had previously demanded the total withdrawal of the US/UN forces from the Korean peninsula.
- 30 The UN/US commander, General Ridgway, offered to meet the commander of the communist forces in Korea to discuss a cease-fire and armistice.
- July 1 Kim Il Sung and Peng Dehuai agreed to truce discussions.

NEGOTIATION

- 1951 July 10 Peace talks opened at Kaeung.
- 25 North Korea withdrew its demand for UN/US troop withdrawal from Korea as an agenda item.
- 26 Agreement on the agenda for the armistice talks was reached.
- Aug. 22 Communist delegates suspended armistice negotiations after alleged UN violations of the neutral zone at Kaesung.
- Sept. The US-Japan Security Treaty was signed.
- Sept.- Oct. The US implemented 'Operation Hudson Harbor', which seriously threatened the security of North Korea.
- Oct. 25 Cease-fire discussions resumed at Panmunjom; both sides began to modify their positions.
- Nov. 27 The demarcation line was established on condition that armistice was achieved within 30 days; negotiations on Item 3 (supervising the armistice) began.
- Dec. 11 Negotiations on Item 4 (POW issue) began.
- 27 No progress was made on the other issues within the 30-day limit; the demarcation line was invalidated.
- 1952 Jan. Mao Tse Tung declared that every Chinese POW should be

		repatriated; the US decided to stick to the principle of 'voluntary repatriation'.
1952	Feb. 27	The US reaffirmed its position on not repatriating to China POWs unwilling to return.
	Apr. 2	China/the DPRK suggested an investigation of the numbers of POWs who wished to return; the US calculated that approximately 116,000 of the 132,474 POWs wished to return.
	20	The US informed China/the DPRK that an official poll showed only 70,000 of 132,000 POWs were willing to return home; negotiation on Item 4 was suspended.
	May 2	China/the DPRK endorsed part of the US proposal for Item 3 but rejected the principle of 'voluntary repatriation'. North Korea insisted upon 132,000 POWs being returned.
	7	An agreement on Item 3 was concluded; both sides announced a stalemate over Item 4.
	June 23	The power plant on the Yalu River was bombed by the US for several days to induce a more cooperative attitude at the truce talks.
	July 13	The US stepped up its military action, and increased the number of POWs who would be repatriated to 83,000; China/the DPRK rejected the US offer.
	Aug. 29	The heaviest US air raid was launched against Pyongyang.
	Sept. 28	US/UN delivered a final offer on the POW issue.
	Oct. 8	The proposal was rejected; US/UN announced an indefinite recess.
	16	All negotiations ceased.
	24	Eisenhower announced that, if elected, he would go to Korea.
1953	Jan. 20	Eisenhower was inaugurated as the US President.
	Feb. 2	Eisenhower's State of the Union speech ended the neutralization of the Seventh Fleet and raised the possibility of

- the use of nuclear weapons.
- 1953 Feb. 4 Zhou En-lei stated that China would continue the struggle against the US.
- 7 Mao declared that China was not intimidated by US military aggression.
- Mar. 5 Stalin died; the new leadership of the USSR began to show their indifference to the Korean War.
- 28 China/the DPRK showed a willingness to compromise with the US.
- 30 Zhou En-lei agreed to the exchange of wounded and sick POWs; stated that these exchanges could be extended to a cease-fire; and proposed that those prisoners unwilling to be repatriated be transferred to a neutral state.
- Apr. 26 Armistice negotiations resumed.
- Apr.- May China launched 'Spring Offensives'.
- May 13-16 The US bombed dams near Pyongyang; gigantic flooding resulted.
- 20 The US National Security Council (NSC) decided that, if more positive action in Korea was seen as necessary, air and ground operations would be extended to China and Manchuria; the use of nuclear weapons was considered.
- 22 Dulles hinted at the expansion of the war.
- 25 US/UN offered its final terms and was authorized to break off the talks if these were rejected.
- 28 The US Ambassador to Moscow explained to the USSR the seriousness and importance of recent US decisions.

ACCOMMODATION

- June 4 China/the DPRK accepted the US proposal and made counter-proposals.

1953	June 6	The US accepted the main elements of China/the DPRK's counter-proposals.
	8	Negotiations resolved the POW issue, and the principle of 'voluntary repatriation' was accepted.
	17	A revised demarcation line was settled.
	July 27	The armistice was signed.

The Post-War Period

1955	Dec.	Kim Il Sung stated that <u>Juche</u> is the foundation of North Korean policy.
1960	Jan. 19	The US and Japan signed a new Security Treaty.
1961	May	A strongly anti-communist military government came to power in South Korea.
	July 6	North Korea and the Soviet Union signed a Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty.
	11	North Korea and China signed a Cooperation and Mutual Assistance Treaty.
	Sept. 11	Kim Il Sung stated that North Korea would adopt a policy of violent revolution for the reunification of Korea.
1962	Dec. 10	North Korea adopted a new four-pronged military policy.
1964		North Korea began to concern itself again with the reunification of Korea and adopted a policy for strengthening three sources of socialist revolution.
1965		South Korea sent troops to the Vietnam War.
1966		South Korea successfully accomplished its first Five-Year Economic plan (1962-6).
	Oct. 5-12	North Korea insisted that it would abandon its peaceful unification policy because of the war threat from the US and

South Korea.

1966 Oct. 31 President Johnson visited South Korea.

The January 21 and Pueblo Crises (1968)

BACKGROUND

1967 Mar. North Korea decided to infiltrate guerrillas into South Korea.
July North Korea organized the 124th Unit of North Korean specialized troops.
Dec. 16 North Korea declared 10 policy-lines.

PRE-CRISIS

1968 Jan. 9 North Korea warned that it would take action if the Pueblo continued its mission beyond two weeks in Korean waters.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

1968 Jan. 21 North Korea's commando unit reached the Blue House and attempted to assassinate Park Chung Hee.
23 North Korea seized the Pueblo and its crew.
22 [WT] Walt Rostow gave the first report to President Johnson.
23 [WT] NSC meeting; Tuesday strategy luncheon meeting; and JCS meeting were held. The US ordered the Enterprise to Wonsan, North Korea.
24 North Korea declared that it might retaliate against the US if the latter continued its assaults. It also clarified three conditions for the release of the Pueblo and its crew.
24 [WT] A second NSC meeting was held; Firm and resolute military measures were considered; US Navy's task force was north of the 38th parallel.

- 25 [WT] US President Johnson ordered 14,787 air force and naval air reservists to active duty.
- 27 North Korea denounced the UN as a tool of the imperialist US during the Korean War.
- 1968 Jan. 28 China gave verbal support to North Korea in the Pueblo crisis; North Korea emphasized its national identity as a socialist country.

END-CRISIS

- 1968 Jan.29 [WT] The US announced its readiness to negotiate all Korean problems with North Korea if it released the Pueblo and its crew.
- 31 North Korea indicated the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) as a preferred place to negotiate.
- Feb. 1 The US accepted North Korea's suggestion.
- 4 [WT] The US conceded the possibility of the Pueblo's intrusion into North Korean waters.
- early- South Korea stated that it might take unilateral action against North Korea in a few days.
- by 7 The US decreased its hostile behavior toward North Korea.
- 12 Park Chung Hee stated that it was not too late to retaliate against North Korea.
- 15 Park Chung Hee and Vance issued a Joint Communique.
- Apr. 17 Park and Johnson issued a Joint Communique, emphasizing US readiness and determination to safeguard South Korea's security.
- Dec. 19 North Korea accepted the US proposal.
- 23 The crew were released.

The July 4 Joint Communiqué (1972)

BACKGROUND

1969	July 25	Nixon Doctrine.
1969	Nov.	Nixon-Sato Joint Communiqué: Sato hinted that the US forces in South Korea could be replaced by Japan's Self-Defense Forces.
1970	Apr.	Zhou En-lei - Kim Il Sung Joint Communiqué: Zhou and Kim denounced the revival of Japanese militarism.

INITIATION

1970	June 6	The US announced the reduction of US forces in South Korea.
	Aug. 15	Park Chung Hee proposed the removal of artificial barriers between the two Koreas; and said he would not oppose North Korea's participation in the UN debate on the Korean question.
	Oct. 1	Park Chung Hee severely denounced North Korea.
1971	Mar. 27	The US completed withdrawal of 20,000 forces in South Korea.
	Apr.	North Korea dropped the withdrawal of US forces as a precondition for negotiations.
	July 16	Nixon made known that he would visit the PRC (People's Republic of China) in 1972.
	Aug. 6	North Korea stated that it would negotiate with all South Korean parties, including the Democratic Republican Party.
	12	South Korea proposed Red Cross talks for the humanitarian purpose of reuniting separated families.
	14	North Korea accepted South Korea's proposal.
	Nov. 20	Unofficial contacts of liaison delegates from both Koreas were made.

NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMMODATION

- 1972 Feb. 28 Nixon visited China (Shanghai Joint Communiqué).
- Mar. 14 Both Koreas agreed to secret negotiations on peaceful reunification.
- May 2 - 5 Lee Hu Rak, Director of KCIA, met Kim Il Sung; They exchanged views on reunification and on trust-building.
- 1972 May 29 - 1 Pak Sung Chul, Second Vice-Premier of North June Korea, met Park Chung Hee.
- July 4 North-South Joint Communiqué was issued.

IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE

- July 4- 17 Different interpretations of the three principles of unification were expressed by both Koreas; negative images of the other were shown; both Koreas reaffirmed their previous policies toward the other.
- Aug. 11 Both sides decided to hold meetings of the full-dress talks of the NSRCC (North-South Red Cross Conference).
- Oct. 1 Park Chung Hee denounced North Korea.
- 17 South Korea announced its Siwol Yushin policy, which was allegedly designed to strengthen internal cohesion.
- Dec. 27 North Korea adopted its new Socialism Constitution, which claimed the total, inevitable victory of socialism.
- 1973 Aug. 23 North Korea announced the suspension of inter-Korean talks.

The Poplar Tree Crisis (1976)

BACKGROUND

- 1975 May 5 [WT] The US stated that one of the purposes of the military operations was to recover the Mayaguez and deter North

Korea's adventurism.

- June 30 A US soldier, Maj. William D. Henderson, was beaten by North Korean soldiers.
- 1976 June 26 Twenty North Korean guards with ax-handles and other weapons threatened a US guard and his Korean partner.
- 1976 July 10 Kim Il Sung stated that he might invade South Korea in 1977; Mao Tse Tung stated that China firmly supported North Korea.

PRE-CRISIS

- Aug. 5 The North Korean Government stated officially that the US and South Korea were ready to invade North Korea.
- 6 UNC personnel attempted to prune a tree obstructing view. North Korea guards told them to leave the tree alone.
- 15 Kim Il Sung cancelled his schedule to participate at the Conference of Non-aligned nations in Sri Lanka.
- 17 Pyongyang Broadcast announced that the probability of war was heightened because of preparations by the US and South Korea.
- 5 - 17 The US intelligence team noticed an unusual level of North Korean hostility toward the US.

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

- Aug. 18 North Korea warned that another Korean war might break out at any moment; North Koreans killed two US officers (10:45 a.m.).
- 18 [WT] President Ford was briefed on the Poplar Tree incident (11:00 a.m.).
- The first WSAG (Washington Special Actions Group) was held (3:30 p.m.), considered, and recommended options: move F-4s from Japan to Korea; increase defense posture; alert the Midway task forces; alert the USAF on a possible F-111 deployment.

Kissinger met Huang Chen, PRC Ambassador, and consulted with Japanese officials (evening).

JCS ordered (10:18 p.m.) deployment of one F-4 tactical fighter squadron from Kadena, Japan to South Korea; Midway was put on alert to sail for Korean Strait; Strategic Air Command was ordered to prepare to fly B-52 training missions from Guam to Korea.

ROK and US forces in South Korea received (11:00 p.m.) orders to increase their level of readiness.

1976 Aug.18 [KT] 379th MAC meeting was held (4:00 p.m.).

19 [KT] Kim Il Sung ordered (5:23 p.m.) all of North Korean regular and reserve forces to "war posture"; regular broadcasting was cancelled; there were, however, no overt signs of increased military activity.

[WT] The second WSAG meeting was held (8:00 a.m.) and recommended F-111 deployment, movement of the Midway, General Stilwell's plan, and B-52 flights.

JCS raised the war-readiness level of US forces in Korea to DefCon 3.

JCS ordered (evening) F-111 deployment, Naval task group movements, B-52's training mission over South Korea.

[KT] General Stilwell visited Park Chung Hee and explained 'Operation Paul Bunyan'.

20 [WT] Ford made (10:15 a.m.) a final decision to approve Stilwell's plan to cut down the tree.

21 [KT] UNC group cut down the tree and removed two illegal North Korean road barriers (7:00-7:45 a.m.); The US still requested North Korea for "explanation and reparation".

North Korea sent (noon) Kim Il Sung's message of "regret" to UNC commander.

22 [WT] The US said Kim's message was not acceptable.

END-CRISIS

1976 Aug.23 [WT] The US softened its stance and accepted Kim's message as a "positive step".

1976 Aug.24 [WT] No crisis atmosphere in Washington.

25 [KT] The 380th meeting of the MAC; the UNC demanded of North Korea (1) to punish the murderers; (2) to assure the safety of UNC personnel; and (3) to assure the free movement of guards on both sides. North Korea proposed joint efforts to prevent similar incidents in the future.

Sept. 6 [KT] UNC and North Korea agreed to separate their security guards.

7 US forces in South Korea reduced readiness posture.

9 UNC and US State Department announced that everything had returned to normal.

The Basic Agreement (1992)

INITIATION

1986 Dec. 30 Kim Il Sung stated that he wished to have High-Level talks with South Korea; South Korea refused.

1988 Jan. 1 Kim Il Sung showed further interest in inter-Korean talks.

Apr. 21 Roh Tae Woo pledged that in his term of office as President he would bring about epoch-making progress in inter-Korean relations.

July 7 Roh Tae Woo issued the July 7 Declaration which contained South Korea's six-point policy of unification; The Declaration incorporated some features of North Korea's previous proposal,

and showed changes in South Korea's policy toward North Korea.

- Sep. 8 Kim Il Sung argued that the two Koreas should coexist.
- Oct. 18 Roh Tae Woo proposed an inter-Korean agreement and a non-aggression declaration; He also wished to hold talks with North Korea to discuss all Korean problems, including military matters.
- 1988 Nov. North Korea proposed High-Level political and military talks.
- Dec. 28 South Korea responded positively.
- 1989 Jan. 16 North Korea agreed to hold "North-South High-Level Political and Military Talks".

NEGOTIATION AND ACCOMMODATION

- 1989 Feb. 8 The 1st session of preparatory talks.
- 1990 July 6 The 8th session of preparatory talks; an agenda for the High-Level talks was adopted.
- Sep. Japan pledged to compensate North Korea for its occupation.
- 4-7 The 1st session of the High-Level talks.
- Oct. 1 South Korea established diplomatic relations with the USSR.
- 3 Reunification of Germany.
- 16-19 The 2nd session of the High-Level talks.
- Dec. 11-14 The 3rd session of the High-Level talks.
- 1991 Jan. 1 North Korea denounced South Korea's unification policy and offered a revised confederation formula.
- Apr. Japan set regular inspection of North Korea's nuclear plant as a precondition for diplomatic normalization with and economic aid to North Korea.
- May The talks between North Korea and Japan on the establishment of diplomatic relations collapsed due to North Korea's refusal to international inspection of its nuclear installations.
- July 24 Kim Il Sung said that North Korea would act to keep pace with

- what was happening in the international community.
- Sep. 17 The two Koreas' simultaneous entry into the UN.
- Oct. 22-25 The 4th session of the High-Level talks produced a slight compromise; both sides agreed on the format, title, and structure of the document.
- Nov. US/South Korea moved to isolate North Korea economically and diplomatically.
- 1991 Nov. 13 Japan reaffirmed its conditions for diplomatic relations and aid to North Korea (see April 1991 above).
- Dec. 10-14 The 5th session of the High-Level talks; the two Koreas adopted and signed the Basic Agreement; they agreed to have contacts no later than the end of December 1991 to discuss the nuclear issue.
- 26-31 The two Koreas held talks on the nuclear issue; they adopted the Joint Declaration.

IMPLEMENTATION FAILURE

- 1992 Feb. 18-21 The 6th session of the High-Level talks; both Koreas began to debate the nuclear issue.
- 20 Kim Il Sung argued that the Basic Agreement was another July 4 Joint Communique (1972) and that US forces in South Korea should withdraw.
- May 5-8 The 7th session of the High-Level talks; no substantial progress was made due to stalemate over the issue of on-site nuclear inspection.
- Sep. 15-18 Both sides began to acknowledge that the goal of improving inter-Korean relations was increasingly connected to the nuclear issue.
- Oct. 7-8 The US/South Korea decided to suspend the 2nd phase of

- reduction in US forces in South Korea and to resume the annual 'Team Spirit' military exercise.
- Oct. 12 North Korea rejected South Korea's proposal to hold the 9th session of the High-Level talks.
- 1993 Jan. 1 North Korea accused South Korea of impeding the implementation of the Basic Agreement and Joint Declaration.
- 1993 Jan. 26 The US/South Korea announced that they would resume the 'Team Spirit' military exercise.
- Feb. 25 The IAEA announced that there were significant discrepancies between North Korea's declaration on its nuclear program and the findings of the IAEA.
- Mar. 12 North Korea denounced the 'Team Spirit' exercise and the statement by the IAEA; it also announced its withdrawal from the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty); the US/South Korea implemented the 'Team Spirit' military exercise in March 1993.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Official Records and Publications

I.1. U.N. DOCUMENTS

Chyung, Y.H. The United Nations and the Korean Question. Seoul: The U.N. Association of Korea, 1961.

I.2. U.S. DOCUMENTS

Central Intelligence Agency. National Intelligence Estimate. No. 2 (6/11/1950).

Department of State. Department of State Bulletin.

_____. American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1950-1955. Vol. II. New York: Armo Press, 1971.

_____. Foreign Relations of the United States. Washington, D.C., 1947-1951.

Public Papers of the President: Lyndon B. Johnson. Vol. I. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970.

I.3. NORTH KOREAN DOCUMENTS

Kim Il Sung. "On Education for Communism [20/11/1958]", in Dong-A Ilbosa (ed.). North Korea: 1945-1988. Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1989a (in Korean).

_____. "On the Intensifying the Class Education Movements among Party Members [1/4/1955]", in Dong-A Ilbosa (ed.). North Korea: 1945-1988. Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1989b (in Korean).

_____. Selected Works. 7 Vols. Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1980a.

_____. On the Building of the People's Government. I. Pyongyang, Korea: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1978.

- _____. For the Independent Peaceful Reunification of Korea. New York: Guardian Associates, 1976.
- _____. On Juche in Our Revolution. Vol. II. Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1975.
- _____. Revolution and Socialist Construction in Korea. New York: International Publishers, 1971.
- _____. Shinnyonsa [Annual New Year Address] (in Korean).
- Kim Young Joo. "Statement on the Suspension of North-South Dialogue [28/8/1973]", Shin Dong-A (January 1991), A Supplement, 299-302 (in Korean).
- Korean Labour Party, Central Committee. The History of Korean Labour Party (1979). Seoul, Korea: Dolbegye, 1989 (in Korean).
- North Korea, 1945-1988: Documents and Primary Sources. A Supplement to the ShinDong-A (January 1989). Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1989 (in Korean).
- Tak Jin, Kim Gang Il, and Pak Hong Je. Great Leader: Kim Jong Il [1]. Tokyo, Japan: Sorinsa, 1985.

I.4. SOUTH KOREAN DOCUMENTS

- Kim, Se-Jin (ed.). Korean Unification: Source Materials With an Introduction. Seoul: Research Center for Peace and Unification, 1976.
- National Unification Board. Commentary: The Basic Agreement. National Unification Board, 1992 (in Korean).
- _____. White Paper on North-South Dialogue. Seoul: National Unification Board. 1988 (in Korean).
- Park Chung Hee. To Build a Nation. Washington, D.C. Acropolis Books, 1971.
- Republic of Korea, Ministry of Defense. White Paper on National Defense: 1994-1995. Seoul, Korea: Gukbang-bu, 1994 (in Korean).
- Shin, Bum Shik. (Compiled). Major Speeches by Korea's Park Chung Hee. Seoul, Korea: Hollym Corporation, 1970.

US Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs. The Korean Conundrum: A Conversation with Kim IlSung. Report of a study mission to South Korea, Japan, the People's Republic of China, and North Korea, July 12-21, 1980. 97th Congress, 1st session, August 1981.

II. Books and Articles

Ahn, Byungyoung. "The Political Impact of the Korean War", in Dong-A Ilbo (ed.). How Should We Interpret Modern History?. Seoul: Dong-A Ilbo, 1988, 395-416 (in Korean).

Alexander, Bevin. Korea: The First War We Lost. New York: Hippocrene, 1987.

Atkeson, Edward B. "The Impact of Crises on the Evolution of Strategy and Forces in an Era of Détente", in US Army War College. (ed.). National Security and Détente. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1976, 25-54.

Aubert, V. "Competition and Dissensus; Two Types of Conflict and Conflict Resolution", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 7, 1 (1963), 26-42.

Auerbach, Yehudit and Hemda Ben-Yehuda. "Attitude Towards an Existent Conflict: Begin and Dayan on the Palestinian Issue", International Interactions, 13, 4 (1987), 323-351.

Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984.

_____. "Conflict of Interest: an axiomatic approach", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 11, 1 (1967), 87-99.

_____, and Robert O. Keohane. "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, 226-254.

Azar, Edward. The Management of Social Conflict. Hampshire: Dartmouth, 1990.

_____. "Protracted International Conflicts: Ten Propositions", in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, 28-39.

- _____. "Peace Admist Development: A Conceptual Agenda for Conflict and Peace Research", International Interactions, 6, 2 (1979), 123-143.
- _____. and John Burton (eds.). International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
- _____. and Chung-in Moon. "Managing Protracted Social Conflict in the Third World: Facilitation and Development Diplomacy", Millennium, 15, 3 (1985), 393-406.
- _____. and N. Farah. "The Structure of Inequalities and Protracted Social Conflict: A Theoretical Framework", International Interactions, 7, 4 (1981), 317-335.
- _____. Paul Jureidini and Robert McLaurin. "Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Practice in the Middle East", Journal of Palestine Studies, VIII, 29 (1978), 41-60.
- Bacchus, Wilfred A. "The Relationship Between Combat and Peace Negotiations: Fighting While Talking in Korea, 1951-1953", Orbis, 17, 2 (Summer 1973), 545-574.
- Bae, Chan Bok. Political Socialization in North and South Korea. Seoul, Korea: Bummunsa, 1989 (in Korean).
- Baek, Jong-Chun. "[North Korea 's] Military Affairs: A Consistent Policy of Staying Predominant in Military Preparedness", in Sang Woo Rhee et al. (eds.), Forty Years of North Korea. Seoul, Korea: Eulyu, 1989, 323-437 (in Korean).
- _____. "The Military Capability of North Korea", in Jaekyu Park (ed.). The Foreign Policy of North Korea. Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1986, 101-125 (in Korean).
- Bailey, Sydney D. The Korean Armistice. New York: St. Martin 's Press, 1972.
- Baldwin, Frank (ed.). Without Parallel: The American-Korean Relationship since 1945. New York: Pantheon Books, 1974.
- Beard, Charles A. The Idea of National Interest: An Analytic Study in American Foreign Policy. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966.
- Beiner, Ronald. Political Judgment. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1983.
- Berger, Carl. The Korea Knot: A Military-Political History. 2nd ed. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964.

- Bernstein, Barton J. "The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation?", in Bruce Cumings (ed.), The Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983, 261-307.
- _____. "The Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel and Marching to the Yalu", Foreign Service Journal, 54 (March 1977), 16-22, 29.
- Besson, Yves. "Identity Crises as a paradigm of Middle Eastern Conflictuality", International Social Science Journal, 127 (February 1991), 133-145.
- Bloom, William. Personal Identity, National Identity and Inter-national Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Bodansky, Yossef. Crisis In: Korea. S.P.I. Books, 1994.
- Boulding, Kenneth E. Conflict and Defense. New York: Harper, 1962.
- Brandt, Ed. The Last Voyage of USS Pueblo. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969.
- Brecher, Michael. Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1993.
- _____. "International Crises and Protracted Conflicts", International Interactions, 11, 3-4 (1984), 237-297.
- _____. "State Behavior in International Crises: A Model", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 23, 3 (1979), 446-480.
- _____. The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Settings, Images, Process. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1972.
- _____, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. "International Crises and Global Instability: The Myth of the Long Peace", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991, 85-104.
- _____, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. Crisis, Conflict and Instability. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1989.
- _____, et al. Crisis in the Twentieth Century: Vol. 1. Handbook of International Crisis. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1988.

- _____, and Patrick James. Crisis and Change in World Politics. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986.
- _____, and Hemda Ben Yehuda. "System and Crisis in International Politics", Review of International Studies, 11 (1985), 17-36.
- _____, with Benjamin Geist. Decisions in Crisis: Israel 1967 and 1973. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1980.
- _____, Blema S. Steinberg and Janice Stein. "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior", Journal of Conflict Resolution, XIII (1969), 75-101.
- Buchanan, William. "Identification, Political." International Encyclopedia of Social Science, 1968, 57-61.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. The War Trap. New Haven, CT: Yale university Press, 1981.
- Burchett, Wilfred G. Again Korea. New York: International Publishers, 1968.
- Burton, John W. "The History of International Conflict", in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986a, 40-55.
- _____. "The Procedures of Conflict Resolution", in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986b, 92-116.
- _____. Global Conflict: The Domestic Sources of International Crises. Brighton, Eng.: Wheatsheaf Books, 1984a.
- _____. "North and South Korea: Shared and Separate Values", Korea and World Affairs, 8, 1 (Spring 1984b), 48-61.
- Byun, Tae Sup. The Korean History. Seoul, Korea: Sam-Young Sa, 1991.
- Camilleri, Joseph. Chinese Foreign Policy: The Maoist Era and its Aftermath. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1980.
- Campbell, David. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

- Carment, David. "Selected Readings on Ethnic Research: An Annotated Bibliography". Paper prepared for the Canadian International Development Agency, 1989.
- Chai, Cheng-Wen and Yong-Tian Zhao. Panmunjom Negotiations. Peking: PLA Publishing Agency, 1989.
- Chang, Gordon H. Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1990.
- Chang, Henry S. "In the Wake of the Pueblo", Far Eastern Economic Review (14/3/1968), 454-456.
- Chase, John L. "Defining the National Interest of the United States", Journal of Politics, 18, 4 (November 1956), 720-724.
- Chi, Jae Won. "Before and After the Basic Agreement", Shin Dong-A (June 1994), 324-337. (in Korean).
- Cho, Gap-Je. "The Statecraft Strategies of Park Chung Hee and Kim Il Sung", Wolgan Chosun (Jan. 1991), 380-405. (in Korean).
- Cho, Soon Sung. "North and South Korea: Stepped-up Aggression and the Search for New security", Asian Survey, 9, 1 (January 1969), 29-39.
- Choi, Wan-kyu. "Inter-Korean Relations in the Transition Period", in The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (ed.). New Currents in Korean Politics and Society. Seoul, Korea: Nanam, 1993, 353-394 (in Korean).
- Choi, Weon Seok. "A Study on Environmental Factors of the South-North Dialogue (1971-73)". Master thesis, Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, 1990 (in Korean).
- Choue, Chung-won. The Integration of Korea: Theory and Research. Seoul: Koreaone, 1985.
- Chung, Chongwook. "The Korean War and South Korea's Diplomacy", in Dong-A Ilbosa (ed.). How Should We Interpret Modern History?. Seoul, Korea: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1988, 327-347 (in Korean).
- Chung, Dae-hwa. "The July 4 Joint Communiqué in Perspective, with Special Emphasis on the Circumstances surrounding its Miscarriage", Pusan Daehakgyo Sawhoi-Gwahak Nonchong, 1, 1 (1982), 27-45, (in Korean).

- Chung, Kyu-Sup. A Study on Environmental Factors and Changing Process of North Korea's Foreign Policy. (Unpub. Ph.D. Diss.), Yonsei University, 1990 (in Korean).
- Chung, Yong Seok. "The Non-Aggression Agreement and the Structure of the Inter-Korean Conflict", Tong-il Minje Yeon-gu, 3, 1 (Spring 1991), 372-403 (in Korean).
- Clemens, Walter C., Jr. "GRIT at Panmunjom: Conflict and Cooperation in a Divided Korea", Asian Survey, 13, 6 (June 1973), 531-559.
- Clinton, W. David. "The National Interest: Normative Foundations", in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), Perspectives on World Politics. London: Routledge, 1991, 47-58.
- Clough, Ralph N. "North Korea and the United States", in Jaekyu Park (ed.). The Foreign Policy of North Korea (in Korean). Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University press, 1986, 313-333.
- _____. Deterrence and Defense in Korea: The Role of U.S. Forces. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1976.
- Corbett, P.E. "National Interest, International Organization, and American Foreign Policy", World Politics, 5, 1 (October 1952), 46-65.
- Coser, Lewis A. "The Termination of Conflict", in Louis Kriesberg (ed.). Social Processes in International Relations: A Reader. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968b, 36-44.
- _____. Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Cumings, Bruce. The Origin of the Korean War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981.
- _____. (ed.). Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.
- De Rivera, Joseph H. The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy. Columbus, OH: C.C. Merrill Publications Co., 1968.
- Deutsch, Karl W. The Analysis of International Relations. 2nd ed. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1978.

- Deutsch, Morton. "Subjective Features of Conflict Resolution: Psychological, Social and Cultural Influences", in Raimo Vayrynen (ed.). New Directions in Conflict Theory. 1991, 26-56.
- Diehl, Paul F. "Arms Races to War: Testing Some Empirical Linkages", The Sociological Quarterly, 26, 3 (1985a), 331-349.
- _____. "Armaments without War: An Analysis of Some Underlying Effects", Journal of Peace Research, 22, 3 (1985b), 249-259.
- Druckman, K. and K. Zechmeister, "Conflict of Interest and Value Dissensus; Propositions in the Sociology of Conflict", Human Relations, 26, 4 (1973), 449-66.
- Duffy, Gavan and Nathalie Frensley. "Community Conflict Processes: Mobilization and Demobilization in Northern Ireland", in James W. Lamare (ed.). International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s. New York: Praeger, 1991, 99-135.
- Eckhardt, William and Edward E. Azar. "Major World Conflicts and Interventions, 1945-1975", International Interactions, 5 (1978), 75-110.
- Eckstein, Harry. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science", in Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1975, 79-137.
- Edelman, M. "Escalation and Ritualization of Political Conflict", American Behavioral Scientist, 13, 2 (1969), 231-246.
- Eisenhower, Dwight D. The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956. Vol. I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963.
- Egan, Jean. "Wider Thoughts of Park Chung Hee," Far Eastern Economic Review (8/1/1972), 20-22.
- Evangelista, Matthew. "Cooperation Theory and Disarmament Negotiations in the 1950s", World Politics, XLII, 4 (July 1990), 502-528.
- Farrar-Hockley, Anthony. "A Reminiscence of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the Korean war", The China Quarterly, 98 (June 1984), 287-304.
- Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War: A Study in Unpreparedness. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1963.

- Ferguson, John. War and Peace in the World's Religions. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Flathman, Richard E. The Public Interest. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966.
- Foot, Rosemary. The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953. Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1985.
- Frankel, Joseph. National Interest. New York: Praeger, 1970.
- Frieden, J.A. and D.A. Lake. International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- Friedman, Edward. "Nuclear Blackmail and the End of the Korean War", Modern China, 1, 1, (January 1975), 75-91.
- Fromm, Erich. The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness. New York: Fawcett Crest, 1973.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. "Great Illusions, the Long Peace, and the Future of the International System", in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (ed.), The Long Postwar Peace. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991, 22-55.
- _____. "The Post-War International System: Elements of Stability and Instability", in B. Russett, H. Starr, and R.J. Stoll (eds.), World Politics: Sovereignty and Interdependence. Freeman and Company, 1989, 6-26.
- Gallery, Daniel V. The Pueblo Incident. New York: Doubleday & Company, 1970.
- Geertz, Clifford. The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, 1973.
- George, Alexander. (ed.). Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
- _____. "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison", in Lauren (ed.), Diplomacy, 1979, Chapter 6.
- _____. "American Policy-Making and the North Korean Aggression", World Politics, 7, 2 (October 1954-July 1955), 209-232.
- _____, and Richard Smoke. Deterrence in American Foreign Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

- Gilpin, Robert. War and Change in World Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Gittings, John. The World and China, 1922-1972. Harper and Row Publishers, 1974.
- Gochman, Charles S., and Zeev Maoz, " Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816-1976: Procedures, Patterns, Insights", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 28, 4 (1984), 585-615.
- _____, and Alan Ned Sabrosky. (eds.). Prisoners of War?: Nation-States in the Modern Era. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1990.
- Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. Territorial Changes and International Conflict. New York: Routledge, 1992a.
- _____. "The Empirical Importance of Enduring Rivalries", International Interactions, 18, 2 (1992b), 151-163.
- Goldstein, Joshua S. "A Conflict-Cooperation Scale for WEIS Events Data", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, 2 (June 1992), 369-385.
- _____, and John R. Freeman. Three Way Street: Strategic Reciprocity in World Politics. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1990.
- Goodrich, Leland M. Korea: A Study of United States Policy in the United Nations. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956.
- Goulden, Joseph C. Korea: The Untold Story of the War. New York: NYT Times Books, 1982.
- Gowa, Joanne. "Anarchy, egoism, and third images: The Evolution of Cooperation and international relations", International Organization, 40, 1 (Winter 1986), 167-186.
- Greenhalgh, Leonard, and R.M. Kramer. "Strategic Choice in Conflicts: The Importance of Relationships", in Robert L. Kahn and Mayer N. Zald (eds.). Organizations and Nation-States: New Perspectives on Conflict and Cooperation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990, 181-220.
- Grieco, Joseph M. "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realistic Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", International Organization, 42, 3 (Summer 1988), 485-507.

- Guha, Amalendu. "Two Koreas: One People, Two Systems", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 16, 1 (Winter 1984/85), 57-83.
- Gurr, Ted R. (ed.). "Why Minorities Rebel: A Global Analysis of Communal Mobilization and Conflict since 1945", International Political Science Review, 14, 2 (1993), 161-201.
- _____. Why Men Rebel. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- _____, and Barbara Harff. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994.
- Ha, Young Sun. (ed.). Recognizing Military Competition in the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea: Ingan Sarang, 1988 (in Korean).
- Haas, Peter. "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination", International Organization, 46, 1 (Winter 1992), 1-35.
- Halliday, Jon and Bruce Cumings. Korea: The Unknown War. New York: Penguin Books, 1990.
- Han, Bae Ho. "Negotiations with Communists and the North-South Dialogue", North-South Dialogue, 21 (September 1979), 59-77 (in Korean).
- Han, Pyo-wook. "Recollection of the Korean War", in Sung Chul Yang and Jong Yil Rah (eds.), Witness of the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Yejin, 1991, 87-103 (in Korean).
- Han, Sung-Joo. "More Differences Than Similarities: Korea Remains Frustrated and Hopeful", Koreana, 4, 4 (1990), 82-84.
- Han, Woo-Keun. The History of Korea. Trans. by Lee Kyung-Shik. Seoul, Korea: The Eul-Yoo Publishing Co., 1970.
- Hao, Yufan and Zhihai Zhai. "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War (1950-1953)". Peking: PLA Literature Press, 1991.
- Harrison, Selig. "A Chance for Detente in Korea", World Policy Journal, 8, 4 (Fall 1991), 599-631.
- Hausman, James. "A Witness by the US Military Advisory Group to the Republic of Korea", in Sung-Chul Yang and Jong Yil Rah (eds.), Witnesses on the Korean War. Seoul, Korea, Yejin, 1991, 105-117 (in Korean).

- Head, Richard G., Frisco W. Short and Robert C. McFarlane. Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision-Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Confrontations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978.
- Hensley, Stewart. "Korean Detente: By-Product of Nixon Strategy", Mainichi Daily News (8/7/1972).
- Heo, Mane. The Korean Peninsula and Foreign Policy. Seoul, Korea: Kyoyuk Kwahak-sa, 1988 (in Korean).
- Heo, Man Ho. "The Origins of the Korean War: A Dialectic of the Division and the Unification of the Korean Nation", in War Memorial Service-Korea (ed.), The Historical Reillumination on the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Korean War Research Conference Committee, 1990, 165-193.
- . "The Continuity of the Korean Nationality", The Korean Journal of Political Science (in Korean), 23, 1 (1989), 105-124.
- Hermann, Charles F and Gregory Peacock. "The Evolution and Future of Theoretical Research in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 13-32.
- Hermes, Walter G. Truce Tent and Fighting Front. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, United States Army, 1966.
- Hill, Walter. "Persistent Cyclical Conflict By Way of a Time Lagged Logistic", International Interactions, 16, 1 (1990), 81-90.
- Holsti, Kalevi J. Peace and War: armed conflicts and international order, 1648-1989. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- . International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, 5th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentic Hall, 1988.
- . "Politics in Command: foreign trade as national security policy", International Organization, 40, 3 (Summer 1986), 623-672.
- . "Detente as a Source of International Conflict", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 9, 1 (1977/78), 51-60.
- Holsti, Ole R., North, and R. Brody. "Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis", in J.D. Singer (ed.). Quantitative International Politics, 1968, 123-158.

- Hong, L.K. "Risky Shift and Cautious Shift: Some Direct Evidence on the Culture-Value Theory", Social Psychology, 41, 4 (1978), 342-346.
- Howard, Michael. The Lessons of History. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
- Huntington, Samuel P. "America's changing strategic interests", Survival, 33, 1 (January/February 1991), 3-17.
- Husbands, Jo L. "Domestic Factors and De-Escalation Initiatives", in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.), Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991, 97-116.
- Huth, Paul and Bruce Russett. "General Deterrence Between Enduring Rivals: Testing Three Competing Models", APSR, 87, 1 (March 1993), 61-72.
- Hwang, Byung-Moo and Han-Soo Hong. "The US Crisis Management during the Poplar Tree Incident", Kukbang Yeungu, 33, 2 (Dec. 1990), 5-21. (in Korean).
- Hwang, Don. "Stepping Up the Price", Far Eastern Economic Review (22/2/1968), 300.
- Ikle, Fred C. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991.
- The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University. (ed.). New Currents in Korean Politics and Society. Seoul, Korea: Nanam Publishing House, 1993 (in Korean).
- _____. (ed.). The Korean War and Structural Changes in North and South Korea. Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, 1991 (in Korean).
- The Institute for Korean Politics, Seoul National University (ed.). Is North Korea Changing?. Seoul, Korea: Eumun-gak, 1990 (in Korean).
- Jackson, Robert H. "Ethnicity", in Giovanni Sartori (ed.). Social Science Concepts: A Systematic Analysis. Beverly Hills: SAGE, 1984, 205-233.
- James, Patrick. Crisis and War. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1988.
- _____. "Externalization of Conflict: Testing a Crisis-based Model", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 3, 3 (1987), 573-598.
- _____, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. "Structural Factors and International Crisis Behavior", Conflict Management and Peace Science (1984), 33-53.

- Jervis, Robert. "Political Implications of Loss Aversion", Political Psychology, 13, 2 (1992), 187-204.
- _____. "The Future of World Politics: Will It Resemble the Past?", International Security, 16, 3 (Winter 1991/1992), 39-73.
- _____. "Models and Cases in the Study of International Conflict", Journal of International Affairs, 44, 1 (Spring/Summer 1990), 81-101.
- _____. "Pluralistic Rigor: A Comment on Bueno de Mesquita", International Studies Quarterly, 29 (1985), 145-149.
- _____. "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 4 (December 1980), 563-592.
- _____. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- _____, R. Ned Lebow and Janice G. Stein. (eds). Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
- Joy, C. Turner. How Communists Negotiate. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1955.
- Kahn, Robert L. and Roderick M. Kramer. "Untying the Knot: De-Escalatory Processes in International Conflict", in Robert L. Kahn and Mayer N. Zald (eds.). Organizations and Nation-States. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1990.139-180.
- Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk", Econometrica, 47, 2 (March 1979), 263-291.
- Kang, Chung Koo. "The Korean War and the Construction of North Korean Socialism", in The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (ed.). The Korean War and Structural Changes in North and South Korea. Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyung Nam University, 1991, 159-201 (in Korean).
- Kang, Man Kil. The Contemporary History of Korea. 7th ed. Seoul, Korea: Changjak kwa Bipyung, 1984 (in Korean).
- Kang, Sung Hack. "Crisis Management under Armistice Structure in the Korean Peninsula", Korea Journal, 31, 4 (Winter 1991), 14-28.

- Kaplan, Morton A. "The Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations", World Politics, XIX (1966), 1-20.
- Kennedy, Mary M. "Generalizing From Single Case Studies", Evaluation Quarterly, 3, 4 (November 1979), 661-678.
- Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. London: Unwin, 1988.
- Keohane, Robert O. International Institutions and State Power. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989.
- _____. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Kihl, Young Whan. "The Politics of Inter-Korean Relations: Coexistence or Reunification", in Young Whan Kihl (ed.), Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 133-152.
- _____. "Trends in ROK-DPRK Relations: DPRK Perspectives", in Lee, Hong Yung and Chung Chongwook (eds.), Korean Options in a Changing International Order. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1993, 72-91.
- Kim, Boo Sung. "North Korean Interpretation of the Korean War", Pukhan, 174 (June 1986), 61-65. (in Korean).
- Kim, Chull-Baum. (ed.). The Truth about the Korean War: Testimony 40 Years Later. Seoul, Korea: Eulyoo Publishing Co., Ltd. 1991 (in Korean).
- Kim, Chum Kon. "The Lessons of the Korean War", in Sung Chul Yang and Jong Yil Rah (eds.), Witnesses of the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Yejin, 1991, 205-215 (in Korean).
- Kim, Dal Sool. "North-South Dialogue", Korea and International Politics, 3, 1 (Spring 1987), 199-242 (in Korean).
- Kim, Deok-Hyung. "Inter-Korean Talks rejecting New Thinking", Wolgan Chosun (March 1990), 244-256 (in Korean).
- Kim, Hak-Joon. The Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Pakyoung-sa, 1989 (in Korean).

- Kim, Heung Kyu. "Inter-Korean Military Competition in the 1980s", in Young Sun Ha (ed.), Recognition of Military Competition in the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea: Ingan Sarang, 1988, 162-190 (in Korean).
- Kim, Jae Hong. "Interview with Lee Hong Ku, South Korea's Minister of Unification", Shin Dong-A (June 1994), 338-352 (in Korean).
- Kim, Se-Jin and Chang-Hyun Cho. (eds.). Korea: A Divided Nation. Silver Spring, MD: Research Institute on Korean Affairs, 1976.
- Kim, Seok Joon. "The Korean War and the State Reformulation", Hyundai Sawhoi, 36 (Spring/Summer 1990), 81-113. (in Korean).
- Kim, Tae Hwan. "The Korean War and Perceptual Change in Korean Society", Hyundae Sahwoi, 36 (Spring/Summer, 1990), 66-80. (in Korean).
- Kirk, G.L. "In Search of the National Interest", World Politics, 5, 1 (October 1952), 110-115.
- Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994.
- Koh, Byung Chul. "The Inter-Korean Agreements of 1972 and 1992", Korea and World Affairs, 16, 3 (Fall 1992), 463-482.
- _____. "Policy Toward Reunification", in Youngnok Koo and Sung-joo Han (eds.), The Foreign Policy of the Republic of Korea. New York: Columbia University, 1985, 69-105.
- _____. The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- _____. "The Korean Worker's Party and Detente", Journal of International Affairs, 28, 2 (1974), 175-187.
- _____. "The Pueblo Incident in Perspective", Asian Survey, 9 (April 1969), 264-280.
- Koh, Kyung Eun. "Inter-Korean Military Competition in the 1970s", in Young Sun Ha (ed.), Recognition of Military Competition in the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea: Ingan Sarang, 1988, 131-161 (in Korean).
- Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.

- Krasner, Stephen D. "Towards Understanding in International Relations", International Studies Quarterly, 29 (1985), 137-144.
- _____. (ed.). International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- _____. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Kratochwil, F. "On the notion of "interest" in international relations", International Organization, 36, 1 (Winter 1982), 1-30.
- Kriesberg, Louis. "Social theory and the de-escalation of international conflict", The Sociological Review, 32, 3 (August 1984), 471-491.
- _____. "Processes and Conditions", in Louis Kriesberg (ed.), Social Processes in International Relations: A Reader. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1968, 8-12.
- Kugler, Jacek, and A.F.K. Organski. "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and prospective evaluation", in Manus I. Midlarsky (ed.). Handbook of War Studies. Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989, 171-194.
- Kwak, Tae-Hwan. "The Reduction of US Forces in Korea in the Inter-Korean Peace Process", The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2, 2 (Winter 1990), 171-193.
- _____. "Current Developments in Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 17, 3 (Summer 1986), 51-70.
- Lamare, James W. (ed.). International Crisis and Domestic Politics: Major Political Conflicts in the 1980s. New York: Praeger, 1991.
- Larson, Deborah Welch. "Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State Treaty", International Organization, 41, 1 (Winter 1987), 27-60.
- Lebow, R. Ned. Between Peace and War. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Lee, Byung Joo. "The Chinese Intervention into the Korean War and Its Impact", The Korean Journal of International Relations, Special issue (June 1990), 233-253 (in Korean).
- Lee, Chong-Sik. "North and South Korea at a crossroad", in Chong-Sik Lee (ed.). In Search of a New Order in East Asia. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1991, 190-206.

- Lee, Dalgon. "Negotiation Strategy between the Two Koreas: with emphasis on Politico-Military Affairs", The Korean Journal of International Studies, 22, 2 (Summer 1991), 207-233.
- Lee, Ho-Jae. The Ideal and Reality of Korean Foreign Policy. 5th ed. Seoul, Korea: Bummun sa, 1988 (in Korean).
- Lee, Jeong-Soo. "The Heterogeneity of South and North Korea and Methods for Its Elimination", Korea and World Affairs, 9, 2 (Summer 1985), 292-306.
- Lee, Ki-Tak. The Unification of the Korean Peninsula and International Relations. Seoul, Korea: Sam Young, 1991 (in Korean).
- Lee, Samsung. "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War and South Korea-U.S. Relations", in The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (ed.), The Korean War and Structural Changes in North and South Korea. Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1991, 29-70 (in Korean).
- Lee, Seok Soo. The Anatomy of the Korean Conflict: Its Genesis, Process, and Management. (Unpub. Ph.D. Diss.), University of Kentucky, 1993.
- Leng, Russell J. "When Will They Ever Learn? Coercive Bargaining in Current Crises", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 27, 3, 1983, 379-419.
- _____, and David Singer. "Militarized International Crises: The BCOW Typology and its Applications", International Studies Quarterly, 32, 2 (1988), 155-173.
- Lentner, Howard H. Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1974.
- _____. "The Pueblo Affair: Anatomy of a Crisis", Military Review, 44 (July 1969), 55-66.
- Levi, Werner. [Review article] on Joseph Frankel's "National Interest", American Political Science Review, 65, 2 (September 1971), 587-588.
- Levy, Jack. "Enduring Rivalries: Tentative Thoughts on Conceptualization and Research Design", Paper prepared for a Round-table on "Theoretical Perspectives on Enduring Rivalries." Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, March 31 - April 4, 1992a, Atlanta, Georgia, 1-5.
- _____. "An Introduction to Prospect Theory", Political Psychology, 13, 2 (1992b), 171-186.

- _____. "Prospect Theory and International Relations: Theoretical Applications and Analytical Problems", Political Psychology, 13, 2 (1992c), 187-204.
- Lijphart, Arend. "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method", The American Political Science Review, 65 (1971), 682-693.
- Lim, Dong Won. "Inter-Korean Relations oriented toward Reconciliation and Cooperation", Korea and World Affairs, 16, 2 (Summer 1992), 213-223.
- Lipson, Charles. "International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs", World Politics, 37, 1 (October 1984), 1-23.
- Lockhart, Charles. "Problems in the Management and Resolution of International Conflict", World Politics, 24, 3 (April 1977), 370-403.
- Luard, Evan. War in International Society: A Study in International Sociology. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.
- "Mao's Dispatch of Chinese Troops to Korea: Forty-six Telegrams, July-October 1950", Chinese Historians, 5 (Spring 1992), 63-86.
- Maoz, Zeev and Allison Astorino. "Waging War, Waging Peace: Decision Making and Bargaining in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1970-1973", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36 (1992), 373-399.
- May, E.R. "Lessons" of the Past. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- McClelland, Charles A. "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Arenas", in Charles F. Hermann (ed.). International Crises. New York: Free Press, 1972, ch. 5.
- Mc Donald, John W. "Further Exploration of Track Two Diplomacy", in Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (eds.). Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991, 201-220.
- Merrill, John. "Internal Warfare in Korea, 1948-1950: The Local Setting of the Korean War", in Bruce Cumings (ed.), Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.
- Middleton, Harry J. The Compact History of The Korean War. New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1965.

- Midlarsky, Manus I. "Polarity and Enduring Rivalries", Paper for the Roundtable entitled "Theoretical Perspectives on Enduring Rivalries". International Studies Association Convention, March 31 - April 4, 1992, Atlanta, Georgia, 1-4.
- Mitchell, C.R. The Structure of International Conflict. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981.
- Moon, Chung-in. "A Comprehensive Survey of the Study of the Korean Conflict and Search for New Alternatives", in Sung Chul Yang (ed.), New Development of Theories of Korean Unification. Seoul: Kyungnam University Press, 1989, 223-306 (in Korean).
- Moore, Stanley. "Identifying the Peninsula Threat", Far Eastern Economic Review (22/1/1972), 16-18.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations, 6th ed., Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson. New York: Knopf, 1985.
- _____. Dilemmas of Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- _____. "Another Great "Debate": The National Interest of the United States", American Political Science Review, XLVI, 4 (December 1952), 961-988.
- _____. In Defense of the National Interest. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
- _____. "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions", American Political Science Review, XLIV: 4 (December 1950), 833-854.
- Morrison, Charles E. and Astri Shurke. Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller States. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.
- Morrow, James D. "Bargaining in Repeated Crises: A Limited Information Model", in Peter C. Ordeshook. (ed.). Models of Strategic Choice in Politics. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1989, 207-228.
- Mueller, John. Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War. New York: Basic Books, 1989.
- Muncaster, Robert G. and Dina A. Zinnes. "Structure and Hostility in International Systems", Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2, 1 (1990), 31-58.

- Naveh, H. and M. Brecher. "Patterns of International Crises in the Middle East, 1938-1975: Preliminary Findings", Jerusalem Journal of International Relations, 3 (Winter-Spring 1978), 277-315.
- Neustadt, Richard E. and Ernest R. May. Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers. New York: Free Press, 1986.
- North, Robert C. War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis. Boulder: Westview Press, 1990.
- Northrup, Terrell A. "The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict", in Louis Kriesberg, T.A. Northrup, and S.J. Thorson (eds.). Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation. Syracuse University Press, 1989, 55-82.
- Okai, Terue. "Background of Guerrilla Activities", Asahi Evening News (25/1/1968), 4.
- Oliver, Robert T. Syngman Rhee and American Involvement in Korea, 1942-1960. Seoul: Panmun Book Co., 1978.
- _____. "Why War Came in Korea", Current History, 19, 109 (September 1950), 139-143.
- Organski, A.F.K. World Politics. New York: Knopf, 1958.
- _____, and Jack Kugler. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Osgood, Robert E. Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations. The University of Chicago Press, 1953.
- Oye, Kenneth A. "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies", in Kenneth A. Oye (ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986a, 1-24.
- _____. (ed.). Cooperation Under Anarchy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986b.
- Paige, Glenn D. The Korean Decision, June 24-30. New York: Free Press, 1968.
- _____. Communism and Revolution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964.
- Paik, Jin-Hyun. "Necessity and Tasks for More Active Policy of Peaceful Coexistence and Cooperation", Korea and World Affairs, 16, 4 (Winter 1992), 638-653.

- Papadakis, Maria and Harvey Starr. "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between Environment and Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley, and James N. Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 409-432.
- Park, Han-shik. "Juche Idea and North Korean Foreign Policy", in Jaekyu Park (ed.), The Foreign Policy of North Korea. Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1986, 78-99 (in Korean).
- Park, Jaekyu. (ed.). The Foreign Policy of North Korea. Seoul, Korea: Kyungnam University Press, 1986 (in Korean).
- Park, Sang-seek. "Legacy of the Korean War", Korea and World Affairs, 15, 2 (Summer 1991), 302-316.
- Park, Tong Whan. "Improving Military Security Relations", in Young Whan Kihl (ed.), Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994, 217-231.
- Park, Young-Ho. "North-South Dialogue in Korea: Ways toward Cooperation?", Korea and World Affairs, 17, 2 (Fall 1993), 459-477.
- Paul, T.V. "Time Pressure and War Initiation: Some Linkages", Canadian Journal of Political Science, XXVIII, 2 (June 1995), 255-276.
- . Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Peng, Dehuai. Memoirs of Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974). Zheng Longpu (trans.). Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1984.
- Phillips, Cabell. The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966.
- Phillips, Warren R. "Prior Behavior as an Explanation of Foreign Policy", in Maurice East, Stephen Salmore and Charles F. Hermann (eds.), Why Nations Act. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1978.
- Rah, Jong Yil. "Preface", in Sung Chul Uang and Jong Yil Rah (eds.), Witness on the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Yejin, 1991, 17-37 (in Korean).
- Rapoport, Anatol. Conflict in Man-Made Environment. Middlesex: Penguin, 1974.

- Rees, David. Korea: The Limited War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1964.
- Rhee, Sang Woo. The Security Environment of Korea Vol. I and II. Seoul: Seogang University Press, 1986 (in Korean).
- Rhee, Syngman. "Letter from President Rhee to General MacArthur (15/7/1950)", in Y.H. Chyung (ed.), The United Nations and The Korean Question. Seoul: The UN Association of Korea, 1961, 216-218.
- Rhee, Young Hee. "A Comparative Study of the Two Koreas' War Capability", in The Institute for Far Eastern Studies (ed.), Inter-Korean Arms Race and Disarmament. Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1992, 117-144 (in Korean).
- Richardson, James L. Crisis Diplomacy: The Great Powers since the Mid-Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Richardson, Neil R. "Dyadic Case Studies in the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy Behavior", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 161-177.
- Rock, Stephen R. Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1989.
- Rosecrance, Richard. International Relations: Peace or War? New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973.
- Rosenau, James N. "Toward Single-Country Theories of Foreign Policy", in Charles F. Hermann, Charles W. Kegley Jr., and James N. Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy. Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 53-74.
- _____. The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy. New York: Free Press, 1971.
- Ross, Marc Howard. The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993.
- Rothman, Jay. From Confrontation to Cooperation: Resolving Ethnic and Regional Conflict. London: SAGE, 1992.
- Ruggie, John Gerard. "International regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar economic order", in Stephen D. Krasner (ed.), International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983, 195-231.

- Ruloff, D. "The Dynamics of Conflict and Cooperation between Nations", Journal of Peace Research, 12, 2 (1975), 109-121.
- Runciman, W.G. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. London: Routledge and Kagan Paul, 1966.
- Russett, Bruce. Power and Community in World Politics. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1974.
- Ryan, Mark A. Chinese Attitudes toward Nuclear Weapons: China and the United States during the Korean War. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1989.
- Saaty, Thomas L. and Alexander, Joyce M. Conflict Resolution: The Analytic Hierachy Approach. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- SarDesai, D.R. Vietnam: The Struggle for National Identity. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
- Schaller, Michael. Douglas MacArthur, The Far Eastern General. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Schilling, Warner R. "The Clarification of Ends or, Which Interest is the National?", World Politics, 8, 4 (July 1956), 566-578.
- Schnabel, James F., and Robert J. Watson. The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Korean War, Part II. Trans. by Han-Guk Chai. Seoul, Korea: Ministry of Defense, 1991 (in Korean).
- Schrodt, Philip A. "A Mathematical Model of the Persistence of Conflict", International Interactions, 8, 4 (1981), 335-348.
- Shin, Bok Ryong. "Truce in the Korean War", in The Association of Korean Politico-Diplomatic History (ed.), A Politico-Diplomatic Historical Study of the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Pyungmin-sa, 1989, 255-278 (in Korean).
- Shin, Jung Hyun. "Korea and a New Regional Order in Northeast Asia", Bulletin of Peace Proposals, 23, 1 (1992), 85-92.
- _____. (ed.). Peace Beyond The East-West Conflict: Northeast Asian Security and World Peace in the 1990s. Seoul: Kyung Hee University Press, 1990a.
- _____. Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula. Seoul, Korea: Yejin, 1990b (in Korean).

- Simmons, Robert R. "The Communist Side: An Explanatory Sketch", in Francis H. Heller (ed.), The Korean War: A 25-year Perspective. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977, 197-208.
- . The Strained Alliance: Peking, P'yongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War. New York: Free Press, 1975.
- . "Comment: Some Myths about June 1950", The China Quarterly, 54 (April/June 1973), 354-361.
- Sites, Paul. Control, the Basis of Social Order. New York: Dunellen Publishers, 1973.
- Smith, Anthony D. National Identity. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
- . "Conflict and Collective Identity", in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
- Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and System Structure in International Crises. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Sondermann, F.A. "The Concept of the National Interest", ORBIS, 21, 1 (Spring 1977), 121-138.
- Song, Jong Hwan. "How the North Korean Communists Negotiate", Korea & World Affairs, 8, 3 (Fall 1984), 610-664.
- Spanier, John W. The Truman-MacArthur Controversy and the Korean War. Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1959.
- Spurr, Russell. Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War against the US in Korea 1950-51. New York: Newmarket Press, 1988.
- Stein, Janice. "International Co-operation and loss avoidance: framing the problem", International Journal, XLVII, 2 (Spring 1992), 202-234.
- Steinberg, Blema S. "Shame and Humiliation in the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Psychoanalytic Perspective", Political Psychology, 14, 4, 1991, 653-690.
- Stoessinger, John G. Why Nations go to War. New York: St. Martin's Press, 4th ed., 1985.
- Strange, Susan. States and Markets. Pinter, 1988.

- Strausz-Hupé, Robert et al. Protracted Conflict. New York: Harper, 1959.
- Stueck, William. The Korean War: An International History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- _____. The Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1981.
- Suh, Dae-Sook. "The Impact of the War on North Korea: The Internal Dimension", in War Memorial Service-Korea (ed.). The Historical Reillumination on the Korean War. Korean War Research Conference Committee, 1990, 379-411.
- _____. Kim Il Sung: The North Korean Leader. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Toland, John. In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991.
- Tonnesson, Stein. "The Longest Wars: Indochina 1945-1975", Journal of Peace Research, 22, 1 (1985), 9-29.
- Truman, Harry S. Memoirs, Vol. I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1955.
- _____. Memoirs, Vol. II. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965.
- Tsou, Tang. America's Failure in China, 1941-1950. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1963.
- Ulam, Adam B. Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-73 (2nd ed.). New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974.
- Vadney, T.E. The World Since 1945. 2nd ed. Penguin Books, 1992.
- Van Dyke, Vernon. "Values and Interests", World Politics, LVI:3 (September 1962), 567-576.
- Vasquez, John. The War Puzzle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Vertzberger, Yaacov Y.I. The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decision-Making. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990.

- Viner, Jacob. "Power versus Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries", in J.A. Frieden and D.A. Lake (eds.), International Political Economy. New York: St. Martin's, 1987, 71-84.
- Waltz, Kenneth N. "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, 18, 2 (Fall 1993), 44-79.
- _____. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
- Ward, Michael D. "Cooperation and Conflict in Foreign Policy Behavior", International Studies Quarterly, 26 (1982), 87-126.
- _____, and S. Rajmaira. "Reciprocity and Norms in US-Soviet Foreign Policy", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, 2 (June 1992), 342-368.
- War Memorial Service-Korea. (ed.). The Historical Reillumination on the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Korean War Research Conference Committee, War Memorial Service-Korea, 1990.
- Warner, Albert L. "How the Korea Decision Was Made", Harper's Magazine, 202, 1213 (June 1951), 99-106.
- Warner, Geoffrey. "The Korean War", International Affairs, 56, 1 (Jan. 1980), 98-107.
- Watts, William, George R. Packard, Ralph N. Clough, and Robert B. Oxnam. Japan, Korea, and China. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1979.
- Wedge, Bryant. "Psychology of the Self in Social Conflict", in Edward E. Azar and John W. Burton (eds.), International Conflict Resolution. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986.
- Whelan, Richard. Drawing the Line: The Korean War, 1950-1953. Boston: Little, Brown, 1990.
- Whiting, Allen S. "The U.S.-China War in Korea", in Alexander L. George (ed.), Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management. Boulder, Westview Press, 1991, 103-125.
- _____. China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960.

- Williams, John T. and Michael D. McGinnis. "The Dimension of Superpower Rivalry: A Dynamic Factor Analysis", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, 1 (March 1992), 86-118.
- Wolfers, Arnold. "Disarmament, Peacekeeping, and the National Interest", in Arnold Wolfers (ed.), The United States in a Disarmament World. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, 3-32.
- _____. Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962.
- _____. "National Security" as an ambiguous symbol", Political Science Quarterly, LXVII, 4 (December 1952), 481-502.
- Yang, Sung Chul. Korea and Two Regimes: Kim Il Sung and Park Chung Hee. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1991.
- _____, and Jong Yil Rah (eds.). Witness on the Korean War. Seoul, Korea: Yejin, 1991 (in Korean).
- _____, and Chung In Moon. "Re-illuminating the Security Relations Between South Korea and the US: Crisis and Alliance Management in USS Pueblo Crisis", in D.C. Kim, B.J. Ahn, and H.S. Rim (eds.), Reilluminating Korea-US Relations. Seoul, Korea: The Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University, 1988, 47-75 (in Korean).
- _____, and Duk-hyun Cho. "An Analysis and Evaluation on the Arms Control Proposals of the North and South Koreas", The Journal of Korean Political Science, 21, 1 (1987), 91-113 (in Korean).
- _____. On the Spot Reports of Dispatching Troops to Korea. Peking: Ji-Nan Press, 1991b.
- Yin, Robert K. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. CA: SAGE, 1989.
- Yoshidaka, Nakamori. "An Exclusive Interview with Kim Il Sung", Wolgan Chosun (June 1991), 106-123 (in Korean).
- Young, James V. "The Hidden Story of the Three Events in the 1970s", Wolgan Chosun (May 1994), 484-511 (in Korean).
- Young, Oran R. International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

Zhou En-lai. Selected Works of Zhou Enlai, II. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1981.

Ziegler, David W. War, Peace, and International Politics, 5th ed. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1990.

III. Newspapers, Periodicals, and Radio Broadcasts

Asahi Evening News

Asian Recorder

Choguk Tongil

Dong-A Ilbo

The Economist

Far Eastern Economic Review

Hanguk Ilbo

Jung-Ang Ilbo

Korea and World Affairs

Kulloja

Mainichi Daily News

Minjoo Chosun

Naewoi Tongshin

Newsweek

New York Times

Pyongyang Times

Rodong Shinmun

Segye Ilbo

Shin Dong-A

Vantage Point

Washington Post

Wolgan Jungang

Wolgan Chosun