

**Giving In is not always Giving Up:
A Theory of Rational Appeasement**

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Abstract: ‘Appeasement’ is often considered a doomed grand strategy in the study of international relations as a result of Neville Chamberlain’s disastrous attempt to appease Hitler at the Munich conference. This thesis challenges the perceived inevitable failure of appeasement: using neoclassical realist framework (resource levels, balance of power, and time frames) overlain by a rational actor models (risk inclination, gains preference and information availability) it expands upon existing models of so-called ‘rational’ appeasement to provide a more nuanced understanding of what objectives a state could rationally pursue and expect to achieve using an appeasement strategy. It also looks at the conditions under which those efforts are more likely to succeed or fail. Using historical case studies to demonstrate the model as a viable explanatory tool, it is then applied as a predictive tool for the most contemporary and controversial case of ‘doomed’ appeasement—the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to explain the rational logic behind the deal and its likelihood and best chances of success.

Resumé: À l’intérieur de l’étude des Relations internationales, la politique d’apaisement est souvent considérée comme une stratégie nécessairement vouée à l’échec, suite à la tentative désastreuse de Melville Chamberlain pour apaiser Hitler lors de la conférence de Munich. Ce mémoire cherchera à réfuter cette présomption d’échec vis-à-vis la politique d’apaisement. L’approche théorique réaliste néoclassique, constituée des ressources actuelles d’un état, l’équilibre international du pouvoir et de plages de temps, servira de base du travail dans cette recherche et sera superposé par un modèle théorique d’acteur rationnel plus spécifiquement la propension aux risques, la préférence des gains relatifs ou absolus et l’accessibilité aux informations. Ce travail développera des modèles d’acteurs rationnels déjà existant en tentant de donner matière à une meilleure compréhension d’abord des objectifs stratégiques qu’un acteur rationnel pourrait poursuivre et achever par conciliation, puis des conditions formant la base d’une politique d’apaisement judicieuse dans le but d’atteindre un de ces objectifs, et enfin de la probabilité de succès d’un cas spécifique de politique d’apaisement. Suite à la démonstration de l’applicabilité du modèle théorique d’acteur rationnel dans le contexte de quelques cas historiques, celui-ci sera appliqué au cas de politique d’apaisement le plus récent et le plus controversé, le Plan Global d’Action Conjoint. L’intention de cette démarche est d’expliquer la logique derrière la décision de signer cet accord, puis de décrire les conditions idéales pour en assurer le succès et enfin d’en évaluer la probabilité de succès.

Introduction

Due to a longstanding and historically informed bias, appeasement is a largely underestimated, underused and misunderstood foreign policy tool and grand strategy. The ‘Munich Lesson’ has perpetuated the definition of appeasement as a unilateral act of accession, which serves only to strengthen an opponent without returns. This operates on traditional realist assumptions of power: concessions strengthen a rival state and embolden it to make further demands with greater leverage. This exacerbates the power disparity in the relationship and can cascade into the rise of an expansionist state. Empirical cases of appeasement are labeled as such only when they match this traditional understanding, perpetuating the myth of appeasement as a pre-determined failed policy. Samuel Azubuike summarizes the recent history of attitudes towards appeasement: “appeasement has undergone a rapid metamorphosis from the positive, pragmatic and principled to the negative and pejorative...policymakers [who] persist in using the Munich-tainted definition of appeasement... cite the ‘lessons of the past’ to justify, advocate, diagnose and facilitate decisions and preferred policies...”¹

This approach fails to add nuance to the conceptual understanding of appeasement and it is inherently exclusive to a number of historical cases that should be labeled as such. By expanding the definition of appeasement to that of a calculated policy and grand strategy choice, several more empirical cases are evident throughout history. This could be done from a traditional realist, liberal or other perspective in terms of order of preferences however these theories lack the nuance in their starting assumptions and logical models or concepts to make a convincing case Traditional theory and revisionism

¹ Azubuike, Samuel. " To Appear or to Concede? Contrasting Two Modes of Accommodation in International

both have failed to redefine the term by offering a coherent interpretation or model of what the concept and the policy of appeasement really are or should be.² However, a neoclassical realist perspective takes into account both domestic resources and the international systemic environment in explaining the choice to appease and provides a stronger theoretical premise on which to demonstrate that appeasement can be an intelligent and successful policy choice for states given the appropriate context.

Providing an alternative discourse on appeasement is needed to counter the monotone narrative on appeasement among politicians, the public and the media. This is particularly important as the international political community faces an increasing array of protracted conflicts, pervasive threats and new security challenges. Appeasement has been described variously as ‘synonymous with weakness or cowardice, a corrupted policy of compromise, and a policy which results from ‘weakness or ignorance,’ and as such policy-makers naturally try to distance themselves from the term or avoid the policy.³ This attitude restricts policy-makers from considering a useful grand strategy in order to achieve their objectives. For the United States in particular, as it grapples with nuclear threats from North Korea, ongoing wars from the beginning of the 21st century and the resource draining fight against ISIS, the need to prioritize among threats and challenges is critical. The immediate dismissal of appeasement is an obstacle to the needed quality of evaluation in decision-making processes. This bias paired with decades of hostility have been the basis of unfounded claims of enabling Iran to become a nuclear power without critically engaging with the facts. This thesis will deconstruct the theoretical bias against

² Azubuike, "To Appease or to Concede?," 50.

³ Ibid.

appeasement and subsequently the practical bias against appeasement as it applies to Iran, and make policy recommendations to optimizing the outcome of the JCPOA.

Literature Review and Theoretical Foundation

Traditional Theories

Appeasement has traditionally been explained using one set of assumptions. The traditional view of appeasement argues that appeasement inherently does not work and serves only to bolster further demands of an opponent. The ‘Munich Lesson’ is both the epitome and the foundation of this logic as it serves to explain the failure of Chamberlain to stay the aggression of Hitler’s Germany with a set of conceded demands. This lesson has yielded various principal explanations of why appeasement is used; including orthodox conceptions, revisionist and counter revisionist theoretical arguments.⁴

These theories have ranged in their explanations from blaming individual leaders for poor policy making to revisionist schools contending that policy appeased not due to a lack of will but rather to substantial systemic constraints them which led them to commit to a doomed policy given lack of viable alternatives.⁵ Counter revisionists fall in the middle, arguing that while Chamberlain did face substantial constraints, a more skilled diplomat would have been able to better manage the situation and avoid the trappings of an appeasement policy.⁶ These theories all assume appeasement to be an inherently doomed policy and at best ‘justify’ a poor decision with various explanations.

Alternative Theoretical Explanations- Neoclassical Realism

The traditional dismissal of appeasement as a beneficial grand strategy stems from the premise that as a policy it is self-destructive and guaranteed to catalyze a

⁴ DiMuccio, Ralph B.A. "The Study of Appeasement in International Relations: Polemics, Paradigms, and Problems." *Journal of Peace Research* 246).

⁵ Beck, Robert J. "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered." *International Security*, 166-167.

⁶ Beck, "Munich's Lessons Reconsidered," 168.

domino effect detrimental to a state's power, security and absolute or relative material and other gains. To challenge this narrative, appeasement can be understood using a rational choice model. Rationalism presumes decision-making to be calculated choices as a function of preferences and means with 1 emphasis on acquiring and using information.

Neoclassical realism is a highly compatible theory or paradigm in which to analyze appeasement as rational choice: it incorporates a state executive as the decision maker who selects strategy on the basis of realist security and power preferences, and chooses a method to pursue those preferences, factoring in resource constraints at the domestic and system level. This permits nuance that doesn't find space in other more traditional theories— several scholars have expanded on appeasement as a rational choice, including Daniel Treisman and Stephen Rock. Those and other works will be the starting point for this model to explain both the choice to appease and the likelihood of successful appeasement, using rational choice models and neoclassical realism.

Rational Choice Models

Neoclassical realism is the most holistic theoretical explanation for appeasement on the basis that it is the theory most suited to explaining complex strategic behavior. Berejekian advances a theory of gains preference that is not specific to neoclassical realism but complements its application to appeasement. The premise is that “State attempts to secure international cooperation are confined by the distribution of power across relevant actors, the constraints imposed by the international system, and the intentions and actions of other states.”⁷ He argues that both traditional liberal and realist theories operate on the assumption that states actively pursue gains whenever the weighted probability of benefits outweighs the costs. He points out that both traditional

⁷ Berejekian, Jeffrey. "The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice." *The American Political Science Review*, 789.

theories require a priori assumptions about preference and gains maximization. He makes the case for endogenizing gains preferences and action choices using the Powell model;

“[Under] a prisoner's dilemma, in which states are assumed to maximize absolute gains, there exist plausible scenarios for interaction between states in which an equilibrium solution results in the unequal distribution of gains. A state attends to absolute gains because the relative gains of a rival cannot be altered, and such rival gains have no bearing upon the state's ability to pursue its own gains in the next round. That is, to realize any gains the two states must cooperate, and the unequal gains resultant from that cooperation do not represent a threat, nor can they be used to change the incentive structure for the next round of interaction... once it becomes possible for unequal gains from one round to be used as leverage in the next, states become acutely concerned with their relative position.”⁸

Endogenizing preferences on the basis of calculating their effect on power distribution, resource distribution and relationships creates the possibility for the strategic use of cooperation or appeasement. If a state can select where to make concessions, account for where it can afford to sacrifice gains and where might recover losses in the future, it can advantageously conduct its foreign policy on a short and long term Pareto curve. This logic is most compatible with neoclassical realism, because it incorporates a rational state executive to calculate strategy by factoring means and ends simultaneously.

The logical process of the gains preference model begins with the assumption that state preferences, regarding ‘sure’ gains, risky ventures and potential losses, depend on their evaluation of decisions and prospects against a reference point. This usually refers to the ‘status quo’ and decisions are made on the basis of ‘prospect theory.’ For a state that views itself as better off vis a vis an opponent in its status quo, it will opt to *maintain the status quo* when confronted with a choice of actions between either a smaller positive expected value with smaller risk of loss or an action with a larger expected positive value but also a larger risk of loss. This is because it will prefer the certainty of maintaining a

⁸ Berejekian, “The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice,” 794.

position it finds beneficial even if it forgoes larger but more uncertain gains. A state that views itself as worse off in the status quo is more likely to pursue a riskier option with expected loss, if this choice of action also offers a small possibility of relative gain. He explains it further in a model of state behavior.⁹

The different aspects of this logic provide a comprehensive model of decision-making behavior that explains why states might forego maximizing short-term gains.

Calculating a state's own position in the system depends on the capability to match means and preferences. The overall consensual opinion is that bargaining power is a measure of, and therefore reflects, both will and capabilities.¹⁰ When assessing its means, neoclassical realists argue a state needs to evaluate its own available resources, the threats it faces and the subsequent distribution of those resources. To establish preferences in strategy, the state must also be able to understand the relative power of an adversary and in doing so, calculate the balance of power between itself and its adversary or adversaries fairly accurately. Subsequent strategy choice based on both means and preferences rests on the logic of the Powell model, in which any decision or action must be taken with attention to potential immediate threats that could arise as a consequence.

Rational Choice in Neoclassical Realism and Appeasement

This naturally lends itself to understanding appeasement in international relations. Appeasement involves unilateral (or asymmetrical) concessions, which ultimately are an absolute loss and can be equated to the decision to forego gains maximization. If this action is to be rational, there must be a larger strategic purpose.

⁹ Berejikian, "The Gains Debate: Framing State Choice," 793;

¹⁰ Azubuike, Samuel. "To Appease or to Concede?," 54

Rational choice theory appeals to three distinct elements in the choice situation. The first element is the feasible set; the set of all courses of action which are rationally believed to satisfy various constraints.¹¹ These constraints are represented by the domestic means, systemic threats and current status quo balance of power a state executive knows to exist. The second is a set of rational beliefs about the causal structure of the situation, which determines what actions will lead to what outcomes.¹² It is at that point that a state executive is mapping the outcomes of the various strategies ranging anywhere from military balancing to appeasement. The third is a subjective ranking of the determined alternatives, derived by ranking the outcomes to which they are expected to lead.¹³ To act rationally is to choose the highest-ranked element in the feasible set, and to appease rationally is to choose appeasement when it is the preferred feasible alternative, or the policy most likely to achieve the desired outcome. Collectively rational choice models, which include the gains preference logic, the Powell model and prospect theory, provide a framework for understanding the strategic choice to appease.

In operationalizing the concepts above, there is a delineated space for the logical, strategic use of appeasement in neoclassical realist theory. Neoclassical realism is still a realist theory and uses balance of power logic: it has room for a state to be either comfortable or threatened by the status quo. It is sensitive to the system level reality of difference in preferences, distribution of capabilities, and the presence of multiple external threats. It recognizes that domestic level capabilities or available resources may not allow a state to pursue certain ends, or that a state may have the room in its domestic

¹¹ Kahler, Miles. "Rationality in International Relations." *International Organization*, 923

¹² Ibid

¹³ Ibid

capacities to ‘afford’ making concessions and not place additional strain on itself. These conditions represent the constraints of rational choice models.

In general neoclassical realism is a paradigm that is more permissive to the complexity of any state’s position in the system. It acknowledges that these system and domestic level considerations are not fixed values and that states may act in order to prepare themselves for a future iteration of the same game. Finally it provides the vehicle of a state intermediary to perform the calculations described by prospect theory.

Neoclassical realism rejects the logic of traditional theories that every game is a single iteration in which absolute or relative gains are made or lost, without factoring in attention to future iterations of the same game. It rejects the realist argument that States will always seek to balance against aggressors to the extent they are able, and it rejects the liberal premise that states pursue preferences determined exogenously to their available means. Instead both the gains preference model and the state behavior as explained in neoclassical realism describe the state calculating its relative position in the system, perceiving threats and identifying available domestic resources as well as the way those resources are allocated at time t . On the realist assumption that overall the goal of a state is to maximize both its power and security, the state adjusts its time frame for achieving those goals on the basis its perceived leeway within the current distribution of power, and its perceived potential to preserve or retrench resources so that the outcome at $t+1$ will not leave it vulnerable and in fact might empower it at time $t+n$.¹⁴ This is the operationalization of determining causality of outcomes immediately and over time.¹⁵

¹⁴ Treisman, Daniel. "Rational Appeasement." *International Organization*, 361.

¹⁵ Kahler, "Rationality in International Relations," 940

Existing Arguments and Applied Models

Several neoclassical realist approaches to appeasement work towards modeling rational appeasement. Schweller presents a neoclassical realist paradigm of balancing. He describes four categories of state behavior when responding to system level threats; appropriate balancing, overbalancing, non-balancing and under balancing. Appeasement falls into the category of non-balancing which includes “buck-passing, bandwagoning, appeasement, engagement, distancing, or hiding. These policies are prudent and rational when the state is thereby able to avoid the costs of war either by satisfying the legitimate grievances of the revisionist state, or by allowing others to do so, or by letting others defeat the aggressor while safely remaining on the sidelines.”¹⁶

Schweller focuses more on the under-balancing phenomenon, which he specifies can encompass the same behaviors as non-balancing under different circumstances. It follows more of a traditional realist line of thought on appeasement; “under-balancing... occurs when the state does not balance or does so inefficiently in response to a dangerous and unappeasable aggressor, and the state's efforts are essential to deter or defeat it. In this case, the under-balancing state brings about a war that could have been avoided or makes the war more costly than it otherwise would have been.”¹⁷ His is a self-identified ‘theory of mistakes;’ it is neoclassical realist in the sense that it focuses on domestic resources and societal relations as the causes of errors by state leaders in choosing a course of action when the system in reality demanded more aggressive strategies and the

¹⁶ Schweller, Randall L. "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." *International Security*, 168.

¹⁷ Ibid

state was 'unwilling' or politically 'unable' as opposed to materially unable to pursue the appropriate response because it miscalculated or misprioritized its objectives.¹⁸

When breaking down the category of non-balancing to understand appeasement, Stephen Rock's work *Appeasement in International Politics* is a useful place to start as it challenges common wisdom and traditional realists on appeasement. He outlines a framework of the objectives of appeasement along the dimensions of maintaining or altering the status quo, and the temporal range of the objectives as short or long term.

The first of these objectives is *crisis resolution*, the combination of a short-term objective to maintain the status quo of bilateral relations. Rock says crisis resolution is likely to emerge as an objective where the Appeasing State "is confronted by an adversary threatening or another area to which it is committed, (so that) a state may try to avert conflict by meeting some or all of its opponents demands."¹⁹ This objective is influenced by the incentives of a more pressing threat in the system, or the constraint of more limited resources. Another objective, long term in the interest of maintaining the status quo is *crisis prevention*. In crisis prevention 'a state that truly wishes to avoid conflict is not likely to be satisfied with trying to cope with crises as they arise. Rather it will prefer to forestall the outbreak of potentially explosive disputes.'²⁰

Where the state wants to alter the status quo in the short term, its objective will be a *limited political trade* where 'in return for its concession the appeaser expects some specific form of reciprocation on the part of its adversary.' If the state seeks to alter the status quo in the long term, its objective may be to forge a *friendship or alliance* where

¹⁸ Schweller, "Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing." 169.

¹⁹ Rock, Stephen R. *Appeasement in International Politics*. Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2000: 13.

²⁰ Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, 13.

“by reducing tensions with the opposing state, the appeaser attempts to fundamentally change... its relationship with that country, securing goodwill and cooperation...”²¹

These objectives disaggregate appeasement into the reasonable choice of strategy on the basis of resources, system level constraints and the state’s evaluation of the state opposite to it in any bilateral consideration of appeasement. On the premise of a rational preference model like the one explained above, this accumulates to explaining appeasement as a strategic choice. Objectives are defined as the interaction of a preference to alter or maintain the status quo and time frame. Status quo preference is a reflection of the balance of power considerations and perception of the relative power and ‘space’ available for concessions described in the gains preference theory and the Powell model. Time frame is in a sense a reflection both of the resources available to act in the short term, the anticipation of available resources in the future, and again the ‘space’ for concessions perceived as a function of the relative power between two adversaries. Rational actors have the capability of thinking about the present and future, and time horizon considerations have the potential to forego immediate gains or to accept poorer payoffs in a transaction on the basis of expected future benefits.²²

Daniel Treisman defines appeasement as “the policy of making unilateral concessions to a challenger or potential challenger in the hope of avoiding or delaying conflict.” Treisman’s argument is that unilateral concessions to a challenger just to avoid war can be an effective survival or reputation preserving strategy. His explanation is based on rational and strategic selection of an appeasement in the face of resource

²¹ Rock, *Appeasement in International Politics*, 14.

²² Azubuike “To Appease or to Concede,” 62.

constraints.²³ His argument deals primarily with the impact of appeasement on a state's reputation for resolve or its military reputation as soft resources, but it draws on many of the rational actor arguments outlined above. He argues that appeasement can preserve a reputation for future challenges in which it is more necessary and eliminate strain on resources. In this model his logic expands to all resources, including the material ones.

Outstanding Flaws in the Current Models

The neoclassical realist argument presented here will use the same mechanisms of state leaders calculating the system level threats filtering through domestic level considerations. It will focus more on these calculations done in the face of the material 'ability' component of policy-making than Schweller's 'willingness' based explanation. While Schweller's main premise is that state leaders often miscalculate whether it is necessary to pursue a riskier balancing strategy as a result of domestic preferences and end up under-balancing too frequently, he gives focus to domestic actors in a way that more closely resembles analytical liberalism as it describes the state as a vehicle to execute societal preferences. Domestic level factors include domestic preference, but also include material resources and generate a composite value of whether the state has the capacity to pursue balancing or if a better strategy is available in the context of a given set of means. The result is that the focus of this model will shift more towards the non-balancing category as opposed to selective under-balancing.

One weakness of Rock's model is his relaxed definition of what constitutes as appeasement, particularly in the *friendship or alliance* category. Rock defines it as "the policy of reducing tensions with one's adversary by removing the causes of conflict and

²³ Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," 347.

disagreement,”²⁴ while most of the literature understands appeasement more strictly as unconditional and unilateral. The *friendship and alliance building* objective deals with the socialization and reformation of an aggressor, which extends beyond seeking a specific outcome to explaining a constructivist attempt to fundamentally change another state. The objective to forge a friendship or alliance removes the opposing state as an adversary, rendering the model moot for explaining appeasement outcomes.

This weakness can in part be corrected by drawing from Treisman’s argument, which contains a stricter definition of appeasement as strictly concession based without the intention of socially reconstructing the opponent. This represents the opposite end of the spectrum in defining appeasement, which leaves little room for reciprocation. However this stricter definition is accompanied by the admission that there are historical examples that constitute appeasement and involved minimal reciprocal concessions.²⁵

Remodeling Rock and modeling Ripsman and Levy

For the model below his definition will be slightly relaxed to permit asymmetric concessions and to expand his logic of preserving reputation as a soft resource, to the desire to preserve all resources including material. This definition is a middle ground between the too conciliatory and too demanding definitions of appeasement and provides more flexibility for strategic use. It is taken from Ripsman and Levy:

²⁴ Treisman, “Rational Appeasement,” 347.

²⁵ Ibid.

“We define appeasement as a strategy of sustained, asymmetrical concessions in response to a threat, with the aim of avoiding war, at least in the short term. By emphasizing that concessions are sustained and asymmetrical, we distinguish appeasement from other negotiating strategies that involve some form of concessions... A strategy of appeasement is based on the expectation that the adversary will probably not reciprocate one's concessions with its own concessions of comparable value. In addition, we require that concessions be asymmetrical but not necessarily unilateral.”²⁶

Ripsman and Levy define three patterns of appeasement: resolving grievances, diffusing secondary threats, and buying time. Resolving grievances involves the expectation that substantial and asymmetrical concessions, as an alternative to balancing against the adversary, will resolve conflicts and avoid war for the foreseeable future. A second pattern of appeasement, often adopted by states facing multiple threats and possessing limited resources, involves extensive concessions to a less threatening adversary so as to maximize the prospects of deterrence or defense against a more threatening adversary. This works because the state conserves resources, denies allies to a more threatening adversary, or redirects the threat from the less threatening adversary, towards the more threatening one. The final pattern is using appeasement in order to ‘buy time.’²⁷ The aim is to alleviate a threat temporarily and avoid war in the short term, thus facilitating balancing over the longer term by buying time to build up one's military power internally or to secure allies against the external threat. The goal is either to deter a future war that one perceives to be likely or to prevail in war in the event that deterrence fails. Leaders would presumably regard satisfying the adversary's grievances and avoiding war as a desirable outcome although it is not guaranteed.²⁷

²⁶ Ripsman, Norrin M., and Jack S. Levy. "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time? The Logic of British Appeasement in the 1930s." *International Security*; 154.

²⁷ Ripsman and Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?," 154-156.

These neoclassical realist approaches to appeasement already make significant strides in addressing the gap between the bias against appeasement and its actual practical application. Each has different minor shortcomings but they can be used to support each other and overlaid in order to address those weaknesses. Rock's model requires a revised category, which is provided in part by Treisman and Ripsman and Levy. Ripsman and Levy fail to model their patterns of appeasement as clearly as Rock does, however their patterns are critical to the logic behind the revisions to the objectives in the Rock model.

Ripsman and Levy essentially provide in clear terms the bridge between the rational choice models and strategic appeasement by including time frame, multiple threats and overstretched resources as considerations for a neoclassical realist model's state executive. Only Treisman and Schweller go as far to discuss predictions for success of the policy but lack a model for those predictions. The model to follow is a composite model that synthesizes different components of the arguments of these three authors, and is further supplemented with rational actor models to address the more nuanced objectives of appeasement and the likelihood of its successful use.

The Two-Stage Model: Variables and Outcomes

The model is developed in two stages: the first deals with explaining objectives in the intra-category of non-balancing, in which appeasement can be a rational choice. The second predicts the success or failure of appeasement in achieving the objectives.

Stage 1: Objectives and a Strategic Appeasement Alternative

This is largely based on Rock's model, using the same independent variables of status quo preference and time frame in order to generate dependent variable outcomes. One outcome objective in Rock's original model will be altered, applying Treisman's

argument in its place. The original model and the modified version are presented in Appendix Figures 1a and 1b respectively.

To explain the model as a gains preference theory in the neoclassical realism paradigm, both variables—status quo preference, and time frame—can be explained by the gains preference logic, with neoclassical realist inputs: domestic resources and systemic threats and calculated/executed by a state-level executive. To illustrate the model, the appeasing state will always be referred to as State A, while the state being appeased will always be referred to as State B.

Status quo preference is broken into State A either preferring to maintain or alter the status quo. When State A is seeking to ‘alter’ the status quo, it is because it in some way sees itself as relatively worse off to State B, or other states in the system, in the status quo. This rests on basic balance of power calculations, including factors such as: historical lessons from prior conflicts with more powerful adversaries, experiencing a recent systemic shock that exposed weakness, being in an extended period of relative decline, being overstretched due to facing several adversaries having a protracted conflict with another state perceived as more powerful, or existing in a siege mentality.

Time Frame

Short-term versus long-term considerations reflect a composite function of available means. This includes resource availability, the number of system level threats a state faces and its subsequent resource distribution. Resource distribution is deterministic because State A’s available means limit its strategic options and shape its preferences. Relevant factors include whether the state has the resources available to make concessions it considers inexpensive relative to a conflict or balancing, whether it is

facing several threats and seeking to eliminate drains on its resources where it is able, or whether it is seeking to retrench and accumulate resources for the future.

Time frame also reflects the decision-making window of an executive; where there is a crisis, decision-making windows are truncated and even rational executives operate in a shorter time frame. When there is no immediate threat, geographical distance or the vested interest is not a question of survival the decision-making window is lengthened and rational executives can operate in the long-term.²⁸

Intention to Alter the Status Quo

Actors seeking to alter the status quo in the short term see themselves at a disadvantage in the existing balance of power, and face resource shortages, which limit their strategic options to pursue that alteration. If State A has that preference, it will seek a *limited political trade*. State A is seeking to change the balance of power despite its resource shortages in a concrete and immediate way. It lacks the space in relative power disparities to make unilateral concessions and requires a somewhat immediate return to its concession.

While State A incurs an absolute loss in the form of a concession, the potential for relative gain is present in how the reciprocal concession, and the net value of the overall exchange, changes the balance of power. Although making a concession is a guaranteed absolute loss, the trade may also involve the return of needed resources of a specific sort. State A may be able to acquiesce something it does not attach a significant amount of value to in exchange for something of lesser absolute value but that it desires for a specific reason, or to simply induce the desired behavior from State B at what it views as

²⁸ Russett, Bruce M. "Cause, Surprise, and No Escape." *The Journal of Politics* 24, no. 1 (February 1962): 13, 17.

a reasonable cost.²⁹ Appeasement is feasible alternative to a more aggressive or expensive response the state does not have the resources to pursue.

Stalling as an Objective

In Rock's model, if State A is seeking to alter the status quo in the long term seek to reform its opponent it will want to form a *friendship or alliance*. Theoretically, this is a more constructivist approach. Constructivism relies on norms to influence behavior by changing a states preferences and beliefs on what is appropriate, permissible or even beneficial. This would align well with using appeasement to change the preferences of an opponent to alliance and future cooperation. However it is less compatible with a rational actor model, which is still oriented towards making strategic absolute or relative gains. In this model appeasement is more issue specific, to achieve a particular, limited objective. Constructivist appeasement would likely resemble a more comprehensive approach of overhauling a bilateral relationship in its entirety.

The model can instead benefit in explaining appeasement of State B by replacing this category with the objective of *stalling* as a function of a preference to alter the status quo in the long term. The result is a new model that can be explained with the composite logic of the models explained above. Unilateral concessions to State B to avoid war are sometimes a rational and strategic survival strategy in response to resource constraints.³⁰ Ripsman and Levy define this as 'buying-time' and the logic they provide is:

²⁹ Azubuike "To Appease or to Concede," 58

³⁰ Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," 347.

"Political leaders are most likely to adopt a buying-time strategy believe that time is on their side - if they expect that the dyadic balance will shift in their favor and that they would be able to make better lay in hostilities than would their adversary. What they expect to change is not necessarily the adversary's grievances, but its ability to make and follow through on threats in support of those grievances and to prevail is subsequent military confrontation. Leaders may also adopt a buying-time strategy if they anticipate, or at least hope, that the adversary's threat might dissipate even in the absence of shifting power..."³¹

State A, seeking to alter the status quo in the long term, sees itself at a disadvantage in the existing balance of power but does not face the same pressing resource constraints or imminent threat that demand immediate return to their concessions. The objective is labeled as *stalling* because it is in line with the dual hope for either a more optimal balance of power or a dissipation of sources of conflict as a result of time.

This also matches the logic of the Powell model, in the sense that State A determines that making a concession will not create an immediate threat to its security and can be afforded for the time being, even if those concessions represent unequal relative gains. The Powell model explains that once it becomes possible for unequal gains from one round to be used as leverage in the next, states become acutely concerned with their relative position. States have the option to stall until the threat is immediate.

Similar logic is found in Treisman's argument as he argues that actors can rationally choose appeasement if the cost of delaying a confrontation does not outweigh the benefits; the cost of delay or stalling is determined by the impact the concessions have on increasing the strength of the opponent. If State B will continue to grow stronger to the point it will have a hard resource advantage in the near future, there is a high cost

³¹ Ripsman and Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?," 156

to strategic delay³² and State A cannot operate on a long-term time frame. This would shift the State A away from stalling into one of the short-term objectives.

Both Ripsman and Levy and Treisman acknowledge resource constraints and multiple threats as crucial to establishing the stalling outcome. In the modified Rock model it establishes the concept of buying time or strategic delay. If State A is facing multiple threats and its resources are overstretched, making concessions where unequal gains do not pose an immediate threat can be a relief to resource stocks. This creates an opportunity to address other outstanding security threats and accumulate resources for future use. It draws on Ripsman and Levy's subtype of 'conserving resources' as a motivation to appease, which is applicable across objectives.³³

Appeasing in the stalling context is still rational despite the possibility of a future conflict in which making a concession would create an actual security threat from that opponent, because the state operating in the long-term time frame has the space to re-evaluate its strategy in the future and re-allocate its resources when and where they are needed. By *stalling* and altering the status quo for the future by accumulating resources and resolving other conflicts, the state can use appeasement to rationally pursue a balance of power in which it can better confront its opponent should it later find it threatening.

Intention to Maintain the Status Quo

State A, seeking to maintain the status quo in the short-term, perceives itself as relatively well off in the existing balance of power and wants to maintain its position. If there is an immediate threat to its existing resources, which in part constitute its position in the system, it will seek to remove that drain or threat as quickly and efficiently as

³² Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," 347

³³ Ripsman and Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?," 155.

possible. Draining resources in extended engagement in a crisis, and potential military losses are a threat to that position and therefore the objective is *crisis resolution*. A concession that State A calculates will least affect its relative position as opposed to other feasible alternatives is a rational strategic choice. State A is less likely to incur drastic losses, despite the certain absolute loss that is inherent to making a concession. If the crisis is resolved, State A achieves maintaining the status quo and maintains a relatively stable position and level of resources. States with limited resources and other pressing threats may use appeasement to diffuse threats selectively. Settling grievances can avoid costly wars and conserve resources.³⁴

State A, seeking to maintain the status quo in the long term, operates on the same logic: it sees itself as relatively well off in the existing balance of power and seeks to maintain it. The difference is that there is no existing or imminent drain on resources. Balance of power perception is based on relative and not absolute power and can be evaluated on overall territorial control or other non-military factors. As such, State A may lack fungible resources to apply to a crisis situation and attempting to pursue military responses to such a crisis might drain what resources do exist, as well as expose military weakness and decrease overall perceived relative power.

State A may also be at a comfortable place with its existing resources and be seeking only to avoid any engagements, which would decrease that level of resources. By resolving grievances State A can avoid wars into the foreseeable future, preclude the formation of alliances against it and prevent aggressive balancing by opponents while maintaining a comfortable level of resources.³⁵ As State A desires to maintain the status

³⁴ Ripsman and Levy, "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?," 154

³⁵ Ripsman and Levy "Wishful Thinking or Buying Time?," 155

quo it can make concessions to avoid costly military escalation or potential military losses, which Treisman explains would translate to a loss in reputation and an overall loss of power. Appeasement is again a rational strategic choice granted that the concession does not affect the balance of power to the extent that the status quo remains the same.

These categories are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b which depict Stephen Rock's original model as well as the modified version alongside it: the independent variables are along both axes as 'status quo preference' and 'time frame' while the boxes reflect the value of the dependent variable 'objective.' It is assumed a priori that appeasement is the strategy pursued. In essence it is a model of Schweller's non-balancing category, in which balancing is already determined not to be preferable and the state is pursuing alternative objectives. The value of that objective changes based on the status quo preferences of the state and the time frame it is operating in as a function of available resources, systemic threats and resource distribution. The function of this model is to explain the rational logic of choosing appeasement to obtain a particular objective.

Stage 2: Predicting Success or Failure of Strategic Appeasement

Once established as a rational strategic decision, 'non-balancing' appeasement can then be categorically considered alongside 'under-balancing' appeasement. Under balancing according to Schweller resembles more closely some of the more traditional explanations or understandings of appeasement: those of misguided faith, or a forced hand option. These strategic uses can be used to optimize a state's available resources for meeting systemic threats. Under-balancing implicitly presumes policy failure, as do most of the traditional theories of appeasement. The second level of this model, introduced by the expansion of *non-balancing* appeasement is to predict the success or failure of the

policy. Predicting when *strategic, non-balancing appeasement* specifically will succeed or fail again applies gains-preference theory and neoclassical realist paradigm logic.

Level of and Attitudes towards Risk

The portion of gains preference theory that is useful to predicting success and failure operates on the basis of risk aversion and risk inclination. As discussed the gains preference model begins with the assumption that states prefer ‘sure’ gains to risky ventures, but do not necessarily avoid risk; State A’s actions are dependent on its perception of conditions.

Decisions are predicted on the basis of the ‘prospect theory’: It posits when State A will opt to forego a particular opportunity for gains or proceed with an action despite the potential of suffering losses. Risk aversion and risk inclination logic means that because states determine their objectives as a function of maintaining or altering the status quo, certain objectives are associated to greater risk. If State A views itself as better off vis a vis an opponent in its status quo, it will opt to *maintain the status quo* when confronted with a choice of action that has both a positive expected value and also some smaller risk of loss, even if this means foregoing potential larger gains because these states are risk averse. If State A that views itself as worse off in its status quo (and therefore prefers to *alter the status quo*), it is more likely to pursue a riskier option with expected loss, if this choice of action also offers a small possibility of relative gain because it is more risk inclined.

The time frame variable also has implications for the degree of risk. Short-term time frames lend themselves to greater risk because they have a smaller window of time in which State A may alter its actions or decisions should the payoff be different than

expected. Long-term time frames create greater space for re-evaluation and therefore reduce the risks associated to a decision or policy. This creates three nominal categories, which will function as one independent variable in the model predicting success or failure of appeasement. State A trades off the loss of strategic advantage against the chance of acquiring information about its adversary's objectives.³⁶

The 'risk' component of the success or failure prediction has low-risk, medial-risk and high-risk values. Each of these values has certain objectives associated to it from the previous stage of the model as a function of status quo preference and time frame. This will be depicted in Figures 1c. The low-risk objectives represent the intersection of a preference to maintain the status quo (risk aversion) and a long-term time frame; the associated objective is crisis prevention. The medial-risk objectives represent two combinations – a preference to alter the status quo with a long term time frame, or to maintain the status quo with a short term time frame – stalling and crisis resolution objectives respectively. Finally the high-risk objective is the intersection of a preference to alter the status quo with a short-term time frame; the associated objective is limited political trade. The decision to concede in exchange for a political trade rests on State A's perception of State B's ultimate objectives and whether State B's interest is limited to the specific issue or is a springboard for more demands or challenges and a short term time frame reduces the room for subsequent policy adjustment.³⁷

The effect of sufficient information

The explanation for the other independent variable used for predicting the success or failure of strategic appeasement stems from the assumptions of neoclassical realism. In

³⁶ Treisman, "Rational Appeasement," 347.

³⁷ Azubuike, "To Appease or to Concede," 58.

a neoclassical realist model, the state level executive is ultimately the one deciding upon and pursuing a strategy. He or she does so on the basis of calculations, which are a function of perceptions of the system and of available domestic means. This model assumes that executives have perfect information of their own domestic means and resources, as these have been calculated at the first stage of the model in deciding to strategically appease at all. Domestic means are therefore excluded from the second level of the model determining success or failure of the policy.

However, information on the system and specifically on the opposing state is assumed not to be perfect and is therefore variable. Information about the opposing state is critical because it helps State A to understand the likelihood that State B is at all appeasable. This information can vary in nature but may include: whether State B abundant fungible resources, whether State B is: a rising power, is revisionist, is dealing with domestic unrest, whether there are hard-liners or moderates in power, and whether it is facing another or several other external threats.

It can help State A assess limits to State B's aims, as revisionist states seeking to upend the system are less likely to be satisfied with concessions intended to avoid confrontation and perpetuate the status quo. Information on State B's resources and other outstanding threats can help calculate the strategic cost of delay; rising powers with growing resources and shrinking opposition will be increasingly difficult to challenge.³⁸

State A can gather information in a variety of ways: signaling and screening are a primary means by which states in general accumulate information about intentions. It is particularly important because power alone does not determine outcomes in rationalism, unlike in realism. The distribution of information about intentions, in particular its

³⁸ Ibid

asymmetric quality, is equally decisive.³⁹ Screening sources of information lend themselves more to inductive sources of information are those in which concrete pieces of information are accumulated prior to evaluating the State B's behavior. This can include bilateral communication, intelligence gathering efforts or reporting done by international organizations. Signaling sources lend themselves to a deductive process, in which State B's behavior is analyzed to generate assumed information; this includes State B's reputation and historical lessons drawn from past bilateral interactions or interactions of State B with other third party states. State A uses both to infer State B's preferences.⁴⁰

Having adequate information to determine these preferences is important because accumulating information about State B is necessary to understand if State B has limited aims and is thus appeasable. The belief that appeasement will work, that it is the best feasible alternative to achieve an outcome depends on State A's perception of the State B's ultimate objectives: that is, whether State B's interest is limited to the specific issue or whether it is merely the springboard for more fundamental goals and challenges.⁴¹ States operating in this model of strategic appeasement and rationalism are "not consistently wary of others, they are more sensitive to information and interested in collecting it. It helps them develop beliefs about the intentions of others with whom they are in strategic relationships."⁴² Information is necessary to evaluate appeasement as a strategy, and to State A's decision to pursue it on the basis of expected success.

This model cannot map out every possible combination of information centrality

³⁹ Rathbun, Brian C. "Uncertain about Uncertainty: Understanding the Multiple Meanings of a Crucial Concept in International Relations Theory." *International Studies Quarterly*, 544.

⁴⁰ Shapiro, Michael J., and G. Matthew Bonham. "Cognitive Process and Foreign Policy Decision-Making." *International Studies Quarterly*

⁴¹ Azubuike "To Appease or to Concede," 58.

⁴² Rathbun, "Uncertain about Uncertainty," 543

nodes. The scope here is limited to predicting the effect of having more information about the opposing state that suggests the likely success of appeasement is a rational expectation. There will be two values of the level of information in predicting the success of appeasement; abundant information and sparse information.

In international affairs, nations make considerable efforts to gather information, inputting time, energy and resources to accumulate it as they actively evaluate intentions. As applied to strategic situations, this model of decision-making holds that State A assesses the relative probabilities of particular outcomes given the information available, which includes all data available.⁴³ Ultimately the evaluation of when it has sufficient information is subjective to State A. Here it must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Operationalizing sufficient information in this model will be loosely based on the concept of network centrality, in particular information centrality, which determines the access a state (here State A) has to another member of a network (here State B) by the number of nodes and subsequently the strength of the path for information flow.⁴⁴ There are several ways to operationalize nodes of information but this model will include 6. The first will be mutual membership in IGOs, the second will be established bilateral relations, the third will be formal communications regarding the point of conflict or concession, the fourth is established intelligence gathering efforts, the fifth is historical lessons based on prior successful cooperation and the last will be the existence of 'broker' groups or issues that increase the access to information and to decision makers in State B. Each category is binary and if State A has access to that node it is counted as 1, while if it does not it is counted as 0. Existence should denote access to an information

⁴³ Rathbun, "Uncertain about Uncertainty," 544.

⁴⁴ Stephenson, Karen, and Marvin Zelen. "Rethinking Centrality: Methods and Examples." *Social Networks* (1989): 1-37

node whose substance suggests that State B will be receptive to appeasement and supports an appeasement policy as rational to achieve the given strategic objective.

Qualitative analysis will determine through which nodes State A is able to access its opponent. If State A only has access to 1, 2 or 3 nodes, this will be categorized as sparse information because of minimal informational centrality. If State A has access to 4, 5 or all 6 of these relevant nodes, it will be classified as having high information centrality or ‘abundant’ information. Visual representation and further explanation of the model can be found in Appendix Table 2 and Figure 2(a).

The Predictive Model and Hypotheses

The available information independent variable interacts with the three categories of risk, as depicted in Figure 2, and produces three possible values of the dependent variable ‘policy outcome’ as success, failure or undetermined.

The matrix has six of these interactions each with an attributed dependent value. Where there is abundant information and a low or medial risk objective, the model predicts a successful policy outcome. Where there is abundant information and a high-risk objective the outcome is undetermined; high-risk objectives abjectly carry the risk of failure. Where there is low risk and sparse information the outcome is uncertain because of the possibility state misperceptions and miscalculations. Where there is sparse information and medial-high risk objectives the model predicts a high probability of failure of the policy. There may still be spurious instances of success that are equitable to State A being ‘lucky’ but the most likely outcome is policy failure.

The objective of limited political trade, a high-risk objective, is one State A would pursue because it seeks to alter the status quo and are risk inclined. If it has sparse

information the policy is predicted to fail. If State A has abundant information the predicted outcome is undetermined as failure is inherently possible in high-risk objectives, but concurrent abundance of information increases the chance for success.

The objective of crisis resolution is a medial risk objective along the lines of a risk-averse State A, seeking to maintain the status quo but with a short-term time frame. If information is sparse the predicted outcome is failure because the time frame limits the possibility of adjusting policy and State A may lack the information for an accurate calculation. As State A is risk averse, it would only choose to pursue appeasement here if it is calculated to carry less risk than balancing. However with sparse information the model would still predict this possibility is likely to fail. If State A is able to gather abundant information the policy is likely to succeed because State A is risk averse in seeking to maintain the status quo and with the necessary information to make strategic calculations it is likely to pursue a safe policy with predictable success.

The objective of stalling is also a medial risk objective with the same predicted outcomes for appeasement of likely success with abundant information and likely failure with sparse information. State A pursuing the stalling objective wants to alter the status quo and is thus more risk inclined. Therefore State A is more likely to pursue this policy even with sparse information however the predicted outcome is still likely failure as the sparse information indicates a lack of accessible information that State A would need to adjust its strategy in the long-term. The possibility of policy adjustment in the long term is what reduces the risk of stalling from high to medial, and so where information is sparse it carries more of the possibility of failure inherent to riskier policies.

Finally, the objective of crisis prevention is the lowest risk category. Where State A has abundant information the likelihood of success is very high as it would be more able to accurately calculate if its concessions will in fact prevent crises. Where there is low information the outcome is uncertain due to the possibility of calculation errors and the indication of limited access to information, which in turn limits State A's ability to readjust its policy according to new information. State A pursuing crisis prevention is risk averse as it seeks to maintain the status quo and so is less likely to appease without adequate information. However should it choose to appease the predicted outcome is not necessarily failure because of the low risk nature of the objective itself.

Overall the model predicts the most positive outcomes and chances of success for State A using appeasement to pursue crisis prevention, or pursuing stalling and crisis resolution with abundant information. The most likely negative outcomes are for State A pursuing limited political trade, stalling or crisis resolution with sparse information.

The likelihood of success is inversely related to the degree of risk and linearly related to the amount of available information. While all objectives have room for potentially successful appeasement given abundant information, they each carry the possibility for failure when information is sparse. This generates some testable hypotheses for the case studies to follow:

Hypothesis A: State A requires abundant information to succeed in appeasement.

Hypothesis B: State A will always succeed when using appeasement if it pursues a low risk objective.

Hypothesis C(a) Appeasement is likely to fail as a policy to alter the status quo.

Hypothesis C (b) Appeasement is can only be a successful policy for altering the status quo when a state has abundant information.

Stage 1 of the model deals exclusively with demonstrating that appeasement is a viable grand strategy based on principals of rationality with respect to time frame and gains preference. Information, a central component of rationality, enters in at the second stage. For the historical cases presented, where the decision to appease has already taken place, determining information centrality to predict success or failure and compare it to the actual outcome has an explanatory intention. If, in a historical case, appeasement failed and it can be tied to the absence of adequate information, that can be attributed to a failure to act rationally. This can be tied back to rationality based on the second variable of risk inclination. A second possibility failure can be tied specifically to rationality within the neoclassical realist framework insofar that the theory pins decision making to a state-level executive who despite seeking to act rationality has the potential to make a mistake in their decision.

If appeasement succeeded and it can be demonstrated that this was pursuant to a State A decision maker having adequate information suggesting State B would be appeasable then the decision to pursue appeasement can be reasonably explained based on a rationally expected outcome. If a risk averse State A with insufficient information appeased and that was a success it could be spurious luck or it could demonstrate a flaw in the model. As a predictive tool, which is how the model will be applied to the final case of Iran where the outcome is at present unknown, having adequate information centrality and reasonable expectation that appeasement will achieve the objective, the model can be used to both predict the outcome of the policy, and to support the State A executive's rationality in deciding to pursue it.

This model also offers some prescriptions, which will be elaborated further on. States pursuing objectives with strategic appeasement should maximize their information prior to making concessions in order to maximize the success of their appeasement strategy. States could also pursue lower risk objectives, however the preference to maintain or alter the status quo and the time frame as a function of resources, resource distribution and systemic threats is often out of the states control. Access and accumulation of information is something a state has more autonomy to pursue prior to decision-making. If a state is unable to acquire information then appeasement may not be the best strategic choice of policy. Despite this the model predicts that certain states will pursue appeasement regardless of probable failure if it offers the possibility of greater gains to the risk inclined state or minimal losses to the risk averse state. This possibility of pursuing appeasement when the predicted outcome is failure does not discredit the model; it integrates the logic that states can miscalculate or run risks.

Success and failure are measured as the achievement or non-achievement of the particular objective. This means that where the objective was crisis resolution, the crisis was resolved. Where the objective was crisis prevention no crisis surrounding that source of conflict occurred, for limited political trade the state received the expected reciprocal concessions and for stalling the state engaged in the conflict at a later date and was victorious. For crisis prevention and stalling it is more difficult to attribute causality to appeasement because success is dependent on either the absence of an event, or a counterfactual of what the outcome of a conflict would have been at an earlier date. However because appeasement is usually the subject of significant scrutiny when used as a policy tool, scholarly and public attribution of avoided conflicts or later success in

conflict to the policy would mean the policy made a significant enough contribution to success to withstand criticism. In the one predictive case, success or failure will only be discussed in terms of probability, as the outcome is undetermined as of writing.

Case study methodology:

The goal is to adjust the existing models of rational appeasement in order to generate one that is more applicable historically and moving forward. The methodology is qualitative at both levels of the model. Case studies of identified instances of concession will be evaluated to determine what the model predicts as their objective. Content analysis of primary and secondary sources will be used to verify whether or not the state showed any indication that they were pursuing either a limited political trade, stalling, crisis resolution or crisis prevention. For each case a list of key words specific to the crisis, agreement or bilateral relationship will be derived based on preliminary reading of secondary sources. The list will then be applied to primary sources to supplement the analysis and demonstrate the presence of different variables in the model. This content analysis will serve evidence of objectives and of independent variables. The terms can be found according to case in Appendix Table 1.

To avoid cherry picking only successful cases, there will be two cases per objective, identified by other scholars and historians as instances of appeasement. One will be selected first on the evidence of its preferences and time frame with its objective confirmed after. The other will be evaluated first for its objective, followed by evidence to confirm or not that its objective was a function of its IV characteristics.

One of the cases for each objective will then be assessed at the second level of the model. Based on the pre-determined objective it will be categorized into a certain risk

category. These cases will be re-examined for evidence of whether evidence was abundant or scarce in its moment of decision-making. A prediction will be made on the basis of the matrix and the hypotheses above, and after the predictions there will be another round of primary and secondary content analysis to determine whether policy makers, domestic groups and other relevant actors considered their objective successfully met. There will also be a section analyzing the findings in terms of the hypotheses.

Finally, the model will be applied to one contemporary and ongoing case: the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. As this model is primarily applicable to bilateral relations, the assessment will focus on the U.S. and Iran using similar methodology but with a greater focus on prediction, and outcome to date at the second stage of the model.

Model Application: Cases and Stage 1

The following section is composed of eight cases illustrating the rational choice logic behind pursuing an appeasement policy based on a state's policy objective as a function of its status quo preferences and time frame. Each objective is represented by two cases, one argued inductively from evidence of the independent variables and one argued deductively based on evidence of the dependent variable outcome. Each case will be discussed in the context of neoclassical realism and the rational actor model.

Crisis Resolution

1. Britain (State A) and China (State B): The 1927 Hankow Crisis

1.1. Case Description:

In 1927 Nationalist Chinese forces took Hankow by force during ongoing efforts between the Chinese and the British to alter uneven treaties the British had imposed in prior decades. The British were faced with a choice to reclaim Hankow by force, or to

include concession of control in Hankow in ongoing treaty renegotiations with the Chinese.⁴⁵ These negotiations took place alongside an escalating crisis; British troops surrounded Shanghai as a protective measure and the Chinese frequently halted negotiations in response.⁴⁶ The British chose to appease in the Chen-O'Malley agreement, granting China control of Hankow, establishing a collaborative council with representatives from both nations to regulate and manage the district's financial matters, and recognizing the nationalist Chinese government as its official negotiating partner.⁴⁷

1.2 Evidence of a Crisis Resolution Objective:

As Fung notes: "The desire to resolve the crisis in 1927 was apparent and Hankow was part of its desire of securing a *modus vivendi* with the Nationalists if possible."⁴⁸ Hankow itself was not a major or critical economic interest like Shanghai was, which was "a hub of British trade and commercial interest...[to] be defended at all costs against mob violence."⁴⁹ ⁵⁰ Britain lacked the financial and military resources to engage in a protracted conflict in an overwhelmingly large and far away adversary's territory.⁵¹ The British Foreign Office perceived a more conciliatory policy when possible was seen as more conducive to the expansion of trade in China.⁵² The choice to appease was tailored towards crisis resolution and was reflected in the treaty, which was specifically designed to remove this specific source of tension with the Chinese.

⁴⁵ Fung, Edmund K. "The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931." *Modern Asian Studies* 17, no. 1 (1983): 79-105. JSTOR. P.87

⁴⁶ Reports Made 1916-1929: Extracts From D.S.I. Robertson's Report Re L.K Kentwell July 1, 1927. 1 July 1927. MS Policing the Shanghai International Settlement, 1894-1945: Shanghai Municipal Police Files, 1894-1945. National Archives (United States) p.550

⁴⁷ Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement," 88.

⁴⁸ Ibid

⁴⁹ Ibid

⁵⁰ Ibid

⁵¹ Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement," 83

⁵² Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement," 97

1.3 Evidence of a Preference to Maintain the Status Quo:

Britain had been acting as an imperial power for decades in China establishing substantial economic interests. As was reported at the time, British leaders were willing to “do anything to maintain her property and prestige in China.”⁵³ Overall Britain’s position in China was one of strength and economic prosperity and its actions were founded on the intention to preserve its vital interests and maintain access to the benefits it received from its position in, and in relation to, China.⁵⁴ Allowing the conflict to continue threatened the British position of strength and its businesses in China, which provided vital resources for Britain in mitigating its decline at the international level. This preference is deducible from the nature of the concessions, which were limited to “minor interests that could be surrendered voluntarily”⁵⁵ in order to preserve vital interests.

1.4 Evidence of Short-Term Time Frame

Although Hankow was a minor interest, the crisis surrounding China’s forceful reclaim and occupation was a priority for the Foreign Office. Attacks on Shanghai were seen as probable after the Chinese success in Hankow and therefore the longer the crisis continued, the greater the risk to vital interests. The perception of imminent threat was demonstrated by the decision to dispatch the Shanghai defense force in January 1927.⁵⁶ When this military escalation compounded the crisis by provoking the Chinese to halt all negotiations the Hankow became an even more immediate threat.⁵⁷ All of this reduced the decision-making window for Britain’s foreign policy executives. It also raised the

⁵³ Kentwell, L.K., *Reports Made 1916-1929*: Extracts From D.S.I. Robertson's Report July 1, 1927. 1 July 1927. MS Policing the Shanghai International Settlement, 1894-1945: Shanghai Municipal Police Files, 1894-1945. National Archives (United States) DOI: Gale Document Number: GALEISC5100445596 p.410

⁵⁴ Fung, “The Sino-British Rapprochement,” 88.

⁵⁵ Fung, “The Sino-British Rapprochement,” 86.

⁵⁶ Fung, “The Sino-British Rapprochement,” 88.

⁵⁷ Kentwell, L.K., “*Reports Made 1916-1929*”, p.550

concern that the Chinese might shift their approach to negotiating away from a case-by-case approach to a more comprehensive one, reducing Britain's flexibility in future negotiations.⁵⁸ The short time frame is deducible from the concessions as they were specific to the Hankow crisis, and included a guaranteed precedent of negotiated settlements although relations despite continued tension in subsequent years.⁵⁹

1.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

The Chen-O'Malley agreement fits within the model because a key stipulation of the model is that rational actors are capable of ordering their preferences and select a strategy based on anticipated outcomes. The British concessions were limited to minor interests designed to maintain the status quo, in order to preserve its more vital interests as it expected appeasement to do. The concessions also follow the pattern of the Powell model as the decision makers were acutely aware that the concessions had to leave overall balance in its relationship to China unaffected. These concessions were intentionally made quickly to preserve vital interests and to ensure their acceptance.

The role of the executive as described in neoclassical realist theory is also visible in this case. The British Foreign Office and its delegation in Beijing disagreed on the appropriate response to the Hankow crisis. Although both expressed the desire to maintain Britain's position of strength in China and recognized the threat to greater interests they differed on "their divergent views on the role of force in the protection of British interests. The position of the Foreign Office was that the use of force was undesirable and counter-productive," while Minister Lampson, the diplomat in Beijing, felt "that the Chinese yield nothing to reason but everything to force, and that [was] the

⁵⁸ Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement," 96.

⁵⁹ Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement," 90

most effective way of dealing with them.”⁶⁰ Neoclassical realism delegates an important role to executive level perceptions in its explanations. Despite having access to the same information, the Foreign Office decided on appeasement as one of several possible rational strategies based on what it perceived would best achieve its objective.

2. *Germany (State A) and France (State B): Agadir Crisis- Morocco 1911*

2.1 Case Description:

In 1911 Germany sent one of its gunboats the *Panther* to the sea bordering Southern Morocco near Agadir in response to French encroachment and expanded control over Morocco. This was in spite of a 1909 agreement between France and Germany to mutually respect economic interests within Morocco, to not pursue or encourage the creation of economic privilege and to generally ensure peace in order to every Powers’ mutual benefit.⁶¹ Dispatching the *Panther* was intended to signal the expectation that France would compensate Germany with the Southern portion of Morocco on the basis of this violation. Due to poor communication and miscalculated timing the German boat was perceived as a threat and the situation escalated as French reinforcements were sent to the area.⁶² The crisis was eventually resolved through negotiation, without war between the Powers. Germany conceded control of the Moroccan protectorate to France in exchange for non-lucrative territory in Sudan.⁶³

⁶⁰ Fung, “The Sino-British Rapprochement,” 97.

⁶¹ Edwards, E. W. “The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909.” *The English Historical Review* 78, no. 308 (July 1963): 507.

⁶² Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. The Macmillan Company, 1918. *The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative, and International Law, 1600-1926* p.133

⁶³ Keiger, John. “Jules Cambon and Franco-German Détente, 1907-1914.” *The Historical Journal* 26, no. 3 (September 1983): 646.

2.2 Evidence of Preference to Maintain the Status Quo

The intention behind Germany's decision to dispatch the *Panther* is the primary evidence that it preferred to maintain the status quo of relations with Britain and France because "the Agadir affair was not an effort to break the entente [of 1909]. Rather, it was aimed at gaining for Germany compensation similar to that received by other powers interested in the Moroccan question."⁶⁴ Morocco had become a symbol of declining prestige for Germany and so the German Foreign Office's priority was to maintain that world power prestige by acquiring territory for colonial expansion and compensation for French encroachment on Morocco as a symbolic recognition of its rights as a world power.⁶⁵ Allowing a new situation to develop in Morocco without French recognition of encroachment on Germany's stake there would have been a serious diplomatic defeat.⁶⁶

Records of planning the deployment indicate there was no intention to create a crisis:

"Simultaneously with the appearance of the gunboats, notices should appear in the German press, which were to emphasize that the action was not intended to make difficulties for the French. On the contrary, the German government realized the necessity for such steps by France...They now realized that in actuality Morocco was not, or could not be, capable of governing herself. All that Germany sought was the protection of her nationals and their interests in southern Morocco. Such an attitude of calm and complete understanding expressed in the German press was expected to forestall any [antagonism]."⁶⁷

The German government was seeking a diplomatic victory that would ensure Germany's continued place as a major world power. This intention was communicated too late to know if the French would have found it amicable but because the gunboat arrived without an expression of the intention, it was taken as an aggressive move and escalated into the

⁶⁴ Lockhart, Charles. "Conflict Actions and Outcomes: Long-Term Impacts." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 22, no. 4 (December 1978): 584.

⁶⁵ Mortimer, Joanne S. "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy in the Agadir Crisis." *The Historical Journal* 10, no. 3 (1967): 440.

⁶⁶ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 443..

⁶⁷ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 444.

Agadir crisis.⁶⁸ Germany had no desire to fight a war it was unprepared for and switched its objective from compensation in the form of control in Southern Morocco to unspecified compensation more generally to meet the German Foreign Offices desire to avoid war and obtain the minimum compensation for the diplomatic victory it sought.⁶⁹

2.3 Evidence of Short-term Time Frame

The decision to deploy the *Panther* gunboat to Agadir was based on Germany's anticipation of further French troop deployment to areas near Fez.⁷⁰ This anticipation was communicated in the German Foreign ministry's memorandum on Moroccan affairs issued prior to the crisis.⁷¹ The German Foreign Office was also operating on the premise of a limited window in which to assert their right to compensation by France specifically for breaching the 1909 agreement. The crisis here also reduced the decision-making window for Germany's foreign executive. This was due to the expectation that a delay in deploying the *Panther* in protest would result in no recognition of the breach, leaving Germany without compensation and diplomatically humiliated. Once the crisis had escalated due to miscommunications, Germany was under pressure to resolve the crisis quickly to prevent the negotiations from breaking without receiving its compensation and forcing it to accept nothing or to fight a war it did not have the resources to win.

2.4 Objective of Crisis Resolution:

Given its preference to maintain the status quo and the time constraint presented by an unexpected militarized situation, the German objective morphed into crisis resolution. This meant the compensation it required in order to maintain the status quo

⁶⁸ Lockhart, "Conflicts Actions and Outcomes," 587.

⁶⁹ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 450-451.

⁷⁰ Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. P. 132

⁷¹ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 450.

had to be amenable to the French. The French wanted to close the Moroccan question but the “German orientation had a greater element of problem-solving to it...”⁷² because the only way it could obtain compensation and maintain the global status quo was to resolve the crisis at Agadir peacefully and quickly by giving France a large concession in the form of control over a conflict free Morocco.⁷³

2.5 Rational Actor Logic and Neoclassical Realism

“German compensation in Central Africa was clearly smaller and less useful than the two portions of the French payoff collectively.”⁷⁴ This would seem to be irrational for the Foreign Office without understanding that the objective was not the content of the compensation it received but to resolve the crisis by settling for symbolic compensation. The German Foreign Office’s main objective was to resolve a conflict that would have resulted in either a diplomatic loss or a military one, and humiliation and loss of prestige either way because “World opinion would picture Germany as the villain, for 'no one wishes a European war over Morocco'. Germany must avoid such a defeat.” The German Foreign Office made a rational calculation that it needed to avoid war and obtain a diplomatic win; they first chose to send a gunboat to Agadir with the expectation it would ensure their compensation in Southern Morocco.⁷⁵ As the crisis developed they recalculated and appeased in order to still obtain some form compensation and avoid war.

The German Foreign Office believed there was risk in inaction and because they sought to maintain the status quo, they were not risk inclined. Their calculation was that their gunboat would not be taken as an aggressive move but would mitigate the potential

⁷² Lockhart, “Conflicts Actions and Outcomes,” 584.

⁷³ Lockhart, “Conflicts Actions and Outcomes,” 586.

⁷⁴ Ibid

⁷⁵ Mortimer, “Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy,” 441.

that it could be left with nothing.⁷⁶ When the plan failed to create leverage and instead created a crisis they recalculated and made the necessary concessions to avoid a war Germany could not win. This was premised on calculations of what could be reasonably forfeited and what Germany's bottom line was to avoid a major relative loss of power.

The major elements of neoclassical realism prominent in this case are the role of the German Foreign Office in making these calculations, their potential for error, and the domestic and system level pressures limiting their action. A state executive, even if acting rationally, can miscalculate the outcome of its actions. Rational executives are able to recalculate and adapt to their preferences. It is also important to note that the German Foreign Office faced domestic pressure from prominent economic groups who insisted on compensation in the form of control over Southern Morocco. Analytical liberals would expect to lead to German insist on that specific form of compensation. Neoclassical realism explains the decision to accept compensation in Sudan on the basis of the German Foreign Office's calculation of its bottom line and its assessment of the entente between France and Britain which meant a likely military defeat if it persisted. The Foreign Office opted to forego domestic preferences and pursue its rationally calculated objective.

Crisis Prevention

3. Sweden (State A) and Norway (State B): Negotiated Secession 1905

3.1 Case Description

In 1905 the Norwegian parliament made a unilateral declaration to secede from Sweden following a political dispute in which King Oscar vetoed a measure to provide for a distinct consular service, denying Norway access to independent representation

⁷⁶ Bullard, Arthur. *The Diplomacy of the Great War*. P. 121

abroad despite. The potential for a military conflict escalated as Sweden, which had considerable military superiority, prepared to invade in response. Ultimately the dissolution was negotiated and peacefully recognized by Sweden in the 1905 Treaty of Karlstad.⁷⁷ The only major condition was the destruction of Norway's border fortresses.⁷⁸

3.2 Evidence of Crisis Prevention Objective

Secessionist conflicts are prone to escalate in violence, but the dissolution of Sweden and Norway demonstrated intentional effort to prevent that outcome.⁷⁹ Swedish decision-makers recognized the need to maintain friendly relations with geographical neighbors.⁸⁰ While some pressed for military action given Sweden's advantage, they lacked support from their colleagues and the King who, despite authorizing early deployments, supported a negotiated settlement for Norway's independence.

3.3 Evidence of Desire to Maintain the Status Quo

Sweden had an indisputable military advantage over Norway and had more power given that Norway had never existed independently and had been part of Sweden since Denmark ceded control in 1814. Sweden had only maintained that control by continuously exerting its military and political superiority as late as 1891.⁸¹ Sweden had substantial economic interests in Norway and relied on the union to provide continued

⁷⁷ Sperry, Charles S., William I. Buchanan, Chandler Hale, James B. Scott, and Charles H. Butler. "The Dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden." *The American Journal of International Law* 1, no. 2 (April 1907): 443.

⁷⁸ Berg, Roald, and Eva Jakobsson. "Nature and Diplomacy: The Struggle Over the Scandinavian Border Rivers in 1905." *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, no. 3-4 (December 2006): 270.

⁷⁹ Tir, Jaroslav E. "Dividing Countries to Promote Peace: Prospects for Long-Term Success of Partitions." *Journal of Peace Research* 42, no. 5 (September 2005): 558.

⁸⁰ Braekstad, H. L., and Karl Staaff. "The Scandinavian Crisis." *The North American Review* 181, no. 585 (August 1905): 295.

⁸¹ Braekstad and Staaff, "The Scandinavian Crisis," 283.

access to resources and trade.⁸² Early in the dissolution crisis it became clear that forcing continued subordination of Norway would inevitably lead to continuing resistance and impeded access whereas peaceful settlement held the potential to negotiate for their guaranteed right to use.⁸³ Additionally, Sweden was acutely aware that the other powers were against use of force to resolve the conflict; “the European powers would never permit Sweden to attack Norway; Sweden was isolated and could expect no foreign aid; Scandinavia must never become a “Balkan peninsula.”⁸⁴ Sweden had an interest in maintaining the status quo of benefitting from resources in Norway and enjoying the respect of world powers given that it was confronted with resource constraints and external pressure to avoid a conflict.⁸⁵ This is deducible from the crisis prevention negotiations with Norway, which emphasized continued economic cooperation and demilitarization of relations.

3.4 Evidence of a Long-term Time Frame

Swedish leadership vocally recognized in their discussions that allowing Norway to secede was the only way to ensure good future relations. Forcing the continuation of the union might have led to a long-term strain in relations and perhaps even a civil war.⁸⁶ The Riksdag was focused on finding “a policy, which would unite Sweden, not necessarily against Norway, but in favor of a future security without a union.”⁸⁷ The negotiated solution depended strongly on the destruction of border fortresses. Both

⁸² Sperry et.al “The Dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden,” 444.

⁸³ Berg and Jakobsson, “Nature and Diplomacy,” 279.

⁸⁴ Lindgren, Raymond E. *Norway-Sweden: Union, Disunion, and Scandinavian Integration*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2015: 134.

⁸⁵ Kupchan, Charles A. “Enemies Into Friends: How the United States Can Court Its Adversaries.” *Foreign Affairs* 89, no. 2 (March 2010): 124

⁸⁶ Sperry et.al “The Dissolution of the Union of Norway and Sweden,” 441.

⁸⁷ Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden*, 141

Branting and Staaff accepted the principle of demolishing the forts as assurance of future peace and stability.⁸⁸ The dialogue among Swedish leadership denotes hyper-focus on long-term outcomes and potential returns from a negotiated solution. The disproportionate military advantage lengthened the decision-making window and although the potential for crisis continued past the point of formal recognition, but the perceived benefits of peaceful dissolution continued to be a key component of crisis prevention.⁸⁹ The long-term commitment to peace with Norway, even as it concluded treaties with other powers to safeguard against the perceived threat of Swedish aggression indicated the long-term focus of the Swedish leadership regarding relations with Norway.

3.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

Sweden had significantly more power than Norway by nearly every measure. Concessions, even as large as recognizing secession and independence, did not affect Sweden's relative power to a degree that would threaten its security. Maintaining the status quo, in which Sweden benefitted economically and avoided repercussions from world powers, by making concessions that did not constitute a threat made crisis prevention a rational objective and appeasement a logical strategy for Sweden's leaders.

Sweden's choice was also made in the context of an ongoing endeavor to unite the country internally and to maintain access to resources that did not occur naturally within Sweden. It also had to grapple with the reality that the opinion of world powers was not in its favor. Forcefully retaking Norway was expected to rock the boat internationally and establish a contentious relationship and perpetual conflict with Norway. A protracted conflict would continue to threaten Sweden's access to resources and it was clear it

⁸⁸ Lindgren, *Norway-Sweden*, 147

⁸⁹ Kupchan, "Enemies Into Friends," 126

would not have external support. These domestic and system level factors were included in the state level executive's decision to accept secession and negotiate the dissolution peacefully as appeasement was expected to best achieve Sweden's long term goals.

4. *China (State A) and Pakistan (State B): 1963 Border Agreement*

4.1 Case Description:

Pakistan's Northern areas consisting of Baltistan, Gilgit and Hunza have a long common border with Chinese Province of Sinkiang.⁹⁰ In early 1962 Pakistan formally proposed to China negotiations for a boundary agreement. The Chinese agreed with the condition that these negotiations would focus on: the ground situation, customary law and practices, and mutual accommodation.⁹¹ The border was defined by a Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 2 March 1963.⁹² The agreement demarcated the border, granted Pakistan control of contiguous territories and constituted de facto recognition of Pakistan's claim to Kashmir by including disputed territories in the negotiations.

4.2 Evidence of Preference to Maintain the Status Quo:

Analyzing the power cycles in Asia shows that the late 1950s through the 1960s was a period in which China's share of relative power continuously and steadily increased, primarily at India's expense.⁹³ China emerged from the 1962 war with India with significant territorial gains and a new degree of predominance in the region. However India had increasing support both from the Soviets and the United States in

⁹⁰ Cheema, Pervaiz I. "Significance of Pakistan-China Border Agreement of 1963." *Pakistan Horizon* 39, no. 4 (1986): 45.

⁹¹ Khan, Riaz M. "Pakistan-China Relations: An Overview." *Pakistan Horizon* 64, no. 4 (October 2011): 11.

⁹² Cheema, "Significance of China-Pakistan Border Agreement," 45.

⁹³ Kumar, Sushil. "Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics." *International Political Science Review* 24, no. 1 (January 2003): 116

their efforts to weaken and isolate China.⁹⁴ This created a security concern specific to the potential rise of India.⁹⁵ As a regional hegemon, China's preference was to maintain its dominant position in the region. Maintaining the status quo of regional dominance meant minimizing or avoiding any relative or absolute losses to India. China demonstrated a pattern during this period in reaching border arrangements with several of its smaller neighbors is evidence of its desire to avoid the possibility of another wasteful conflict like the one it fought with India.⁹⁶ Enhancing cooperation with other players was an integral part of its efforts to maintain regional predominance by targeting its primary rival.

4.3 Evidence of Long-Term time Frame:

Although the region was volatile, none of the wars or proxy conflicts that played out in Asia at the time had been between China and Pakistan; the border with Pakistan had never been a militarized issue and did not present an imminent threat for China, lengthening the decision-making window significantly. This was evident from the delay between Pakistan's offer to negotiate a border demarcation and China's initial response.⁹⁷ Pakistan had never been particularly hostile or friendly towards China, but defining the border on friendly terms was part of the Chinese strategy to eliminate potential sources of tension by laying the foundation for an enduring friendly relationship.⁹⁸ China's commitment to defining borders in South Asia was a "derivative of the subcontinent's location on China's south-western flank next to the troublesome Tibetan and Sinkiang region," and was part of its interest in perpetually balancing India.⁹⁹

⁹⁴ Cheema, "Significance of China-Pakistan Border Agreement," 45.

⁹⁵ Kumar, "Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan," 118.

⁹⁶ "Economist. "Clouded Concord." *The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2011*, March 9, 1963, p. 880

⁹⁷ Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations: An Overview," 11.

⁹⁸ Cheema, "Significance of China-Pakistan Border Agreement," 52.

⁹⁹ Barnds, William J. "China's Relations with Pakistan: Durability amidst Discontinuity." *The China Quarterly* (September 1975): 464.

4.4 Evidence of Crisis Prevention Objective

China had limited policy options in pursuing sustained regional predominance; it could attempt friendly relations with India, which it had tried and failed to do in the 1950s; it could seek friendly relations with world powers to prevent their support of India, a policy Chinese leadership deemed too volatile; or it could seek a “close working relationship with a Pakistan hostile to India in order to keep New Delhi as preoccupied as possible within the subcontinent and thus reduce its ability to challenge China.”¹⁰⁰

Pakistan’s relative power was at the regional bottom so it did not constitute a threat to China’s position particularly from a friendlier and less powerful neighbor.¹⁰¹ The lack of interest China had shown in defining previously ambiguous borders is a testament to its objective to prevent crisis.¹⁰² These had the potential to be a contentious issue that would drain China’s attention and resources and negatively impacts its position relative to India. Friendly relations with Pakistan would demonstrate to the United States and to Soviet leaders that using India to counter China had drawbacks.¹⁰³ It also served to weaken India by supporting one of its major adversaries, isolating it in the region and solidifying China’s base of power through the development of friendly relationships.

4.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

The border agreement fits into the rational actor model primarily on the basis of relative shares of power because “Pakistan was large enough to be important, but not large enough - or strong enough - to be viewed as a potential rival such as India.”¹⁰⁴ The

¹⁰⁰ Barnds, “China's Relations with Pakistan,” 465-66,

¹⁰¹ Kumar, “Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan,” 118.

¹⁰² Cheema, “Significance of China-Pakistan Border Agreement,” 52.

¹⁰³ Our Commonwealth Affairs Correspondent. “Pakistan May Turn to China.” Daily Telegraph, 19 Oct. 1963, p. 13.

¹⁰⁴ Barnds, “China's Relations with Pakistan,” 466.

border concessions were minimal in absolute terms. Control over contiguous territory and in contested areas like Kashmir and Sinkiang were a larger but still relatively cheap concession for the Chinese in exchange for ensuring regional support and establishing counterbalances to the more pressing rivalry with India.¹⁰⁵ Concessions that are an absolute loss, but that create no threat to relative power shares, are logical within the rational actor model. Small territorial concessions from China to Pakistan demonstrated this logic. They also demonstrate the risk-averseness of a regional power seeking to maintain the status quo by pre-eminently resolving potential sources of conflict.

The desire to prevent a crisis with Pakistan was part of China's larger attempts to increase its overall share of regional and global power as can be explained by realism. Avoiding conflict with Pakistan was the policy with the most likely outcome of sustaining China's position of power. This policy relied on the decision of Chinese leaders to actively pursue better relations with Pakistan because although the two had not had open hostilities, Pakistan had engaged in policies in direct conflict with China's interests prior: it had joined SEATO, voted against recognition of the PROC in the United Nations, criticized China's suppression of the Tibetan uprising, among others.¹⁰⁶

Chinese leaders, in the pursuit of their preferences and their long-term perception, explicitly rationalized Pakistan's behavior in their own dialogue. They were aware of the hostility between India and Pakistan, and became disposed to accept the periodic assurances of Pakistani officials that Pakistan had no quarrel with China and that its involvement with SEATO was directed against India. This reaffirmed their conviction that China did not need to fear aggression from Pakistan, which they

¹⁰⁵Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 470.

¹⁰⁶ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 468-69.

expressed at the Bandung Conference where Chou Enlai stated “although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China... As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding...”¹⁰⁷

Limited Political Trade

5. Britain (State A) and Italy (State B): 1938 Anglo-Italian Agreement (Easter Accords)

5.1 Case Description:

The British negotiated and reached an agreement regarding several outstanding issues with Mussolini’s Italy in April 1938, which went into force that November. The British formally recognized Italy’s claim to Abyssinia in Ethiopia, agreed to mutual respect of interests in the Mediterranean and agreed to maintain free access to the Suez Canal and to exchange military intelligence among other small concessions. In exchange, Italy agreed to abstain from hostile propaganda against Britain, as its radio station Bari was causing problems for Britain in the Middle East particularly in Palestine. They also agreed to respect British interest in Lake Tana and British religious groups in Italian East Africa and committed to not recruiting a large native army in Italian East Africa.¹⁰⁸ This agreement was in the context of growing German hostility and the ambiguity of fascist Italy’s ties to Nazi Germany.

5.2 Evidence of Limited Political Trade Objective:

The scope of the actual agreement was very limited; the bilateral relationship was tense on several levels however the Anglo-Italian Agreement addressed only a few specific sources of tension without addressing the relationship as a whole. Some of Britain’s territorial recognitions helped to consecrate Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.

¹⁰⁷ Barnds, “China's Relations with Pakistan,” 469.

¹⁰⁸ “Anglo-Italian Accord.” *World Affairs* 101, no. 4 (December 1938): 1.

The main reciprocations regarded removing Italian troops in Ethiopia and Spain, and ceasing propaganda in the Middle East. The desire to prevent Italy from allying with Germany underlay the diplomatic drive but was not addressed in the agreement.¹⁰⁹

5.3 Evidence of Desire to Alter the Status Quo

Britain had been facing significant unrest in Palestine and was facing depletion of resources as the result of the rising German threat. On a bilateral level, this made its ongoing contest with Italy in the Mediterranean and the unrest against it in the Middle East an uncomfortable status quo. This was obvious in the content of the agreement because the concessions Britain did ask for in return were focused on reducing the unrest in areas it had no resources to devote. While Italy alone was not a particular threat to Britain, “[it] could not face three enemies simultaneously. Germany and Japan were considered the most likely enemies and the government did not wish to add Italy, which lay across imperial lines of communication, to this number.”¹¹⁰

Britain also was seeking to alter the status quo at the system level in its favor against a rising Germany by driving a wedge between Germany and Italy by “using an appeasement wedge strategy [which would] detach its target by offering a primary ... territorial asset.”¹¹¹ This preference to alter the alliance structure in Europe was underlying the terms of the agreement, which was designed to make major concessions on the largest source of tension between the two countries. In exchange it expected to change Italy’s behavior to be less favorable to the Germans, and to allow Britain to retrench some of its resources by relieving strain in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

¹⁰⁹ Crawford, Timothy W. "Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics." *International Security* 35, no. 4 (2011): 178.

¹¹⁰ MacDonald, Callum A. "Radio Bari: Italian Wireless Propaganda in the Middle East and British Countermeasures 1934-38." *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 2 (May 1977): 198-199.

¹¹¹ Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions," 168.

5.4 Evidence of a Short-term Time Frame

The efforts to resolve the Mediterranean question had been ongoing since the Gentleman's Agreement of 1937 a year prior; After a year of stagnated progress on the Italian side regarding the Mediterranean, particularly as its troops continued to occupy Spain, a new agreement with new concessions was important to increase pressure and accelerate the pace of returned concessions so that the British could eliminate one of the major drains on its resources.¹¹² Similarly Italian broadcasts were adding to unrest against the British in Palestine and across the Middle East and hindering its capacity to operate in the region. The imminence of war in Europe also shaped the perceived time frame: Chamberlain hoped that by recognizing Italy's Ethiopian empire, the League would prompt Italy's return to the allies.¹¹³ Linking this broader effort to isolate Germany as a separate and additional objective to Britain's bilateral concerns with Italy compounded the need for an immediate resolution.

5.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

Although making such large concessions to Italy ultimately amounted to loss of British influence in the Mediterranean, Britain was aware of its significant resource overstretch and its inability to pursue a different policy. Rational actors are also modeled with the ability to calculate and consider a range of factors: linking the Easter Accords to the greater threat of a rising Germany also made the significant concessions seem rational as they were designed to serve the dual purpose of eliminating drains on British resources

¹¹² *For Peace and Plenty*. Manuscript. London : Purnell and Sons, Ltd. *Archives Unbound*:169.

¹¹³ Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions," 178.

and prevent Italy from forming an alliance with Germany, thereby changing the balance of power more in its favor than the triple threat it faced from Italy, Germany and Japan.¹¹⁴

British leadership perceived Italy as the most susceptible target for concessions, and had been looking for a way to link the concessions on Ethiopia to its broader strategic goals.¹¹⁵ This was a calculation made at the state executive level as a function of the overstretch of British resources that characterized most of its foreign policy at the time, the growing system level threat from Germany and the possibility that Italy would become its ally. The rationale of altering that balance of power more in Britain's favor, minimize resource drain and to do so as quickly as possible culminated into a policy of limited political trade through a negotiated agreement, exchanging a major concession essentially for Italian non-aggression. The limited political trade is rational in theory when seen as part of a broader set of policies to counter the German threat.

6. Argentina (State A) and Brazil (State B): 1979 Tripartite Agreement

6.1 Case Description

In 1979 Argentina and Brazil signed the Tripartite Agreement to solve the conflict on their shared use of the Parana River's water resources and the potential construction of a hydroelectric dam. The agreement is regarded as the starting point of a new course of relations between the two countries as well as Paraguay. However on its own it was limited to resolving the dispute over the dam of Itaipu, which was only source of friction addressed in the agreement. The Tripartite Agreement was signed in October 1979 and brought the "dispute over the water resources of the river Parana to a definite close...[it] was a recognition of the Brazilian right to own and operate a power plant on the river,

¹¹⁴ Voigt, F. A. "The Anglo-Italian Agreement." *The Listener*, 27 Apr. 1938. *The Listener Historical Archive, 1929-1991*: 886.

¹¹⁵ Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions," 178.

with the reciprocal conditions of agreement to limitations on water levels and specified times when water flow could be interrupted.”¹¹⁶ Agreements on the size and production capacity of the dam and power plant were also negotiated.

6.2 Evidence of Desire to Alter the Status Quo

Argentina had been in progressive regional decline as its economy and military power had stagnated relative to Brazil’s acceleration, which was visible in the lack of willingness to budge on Itaipu prior to 1979. Construction of a Brazilian power plant at Itaipu was expected to give Brazil a clear economic and geo-strategic advantage in the area and invariably compromise Argentinian projects downstream of Parana River. Alone, the Tripartite Agreement would appear counterintuitive to the desire to alter the status quo bilaterally with Brazil. However, Argentinian leadership recognized that its projects were not major losses because they were neither economically nor technically viable.¹¹⁷ Conceding building rights to Brazil therefore became a feasible policy.

Brazil had largely overtaken Argentina as a new industrializing country and recovered its preeminence in South America. Even so, despite understanding and acknowledging its predominance, Brazil had refrained from displaying high-profile attitudes of regional leadership.¹¹⁸ Argentina’s decline was not only relative to Brazil but to South America in general and it was facing an escalating militarized conflict with Chile. Altering the status quo took on a regional tone as opposed to a bilateral one.

¹¹⁶ Gardini, Gian L. "Making Sense of Rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, 1979-1982." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* (April 2006): 60.

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ Bandeira, Luiz. "Brazil as a Regional Power and Its Relations with the United States." *Latin American Perspectives* 33, no. 3 (May 2006): 21.

6.3 Evidence of Short-term Time Frame

The dispute over Itaipu was not militarized, but it was urgent because the river's provided most of Argentina's access to energy. In addition, its conflict with Chile was rapidly escalating. Argentina was facing significant resource overstretch and could not afford to keep open two fronts of tensions and was willing to compromise on the Itaipu question, which it regarded as a less urgent geo-strategic problem than the threat of Chile's acquiring the Beagle Channel and gaining control of Argentina's fish and oil resources. Since Itaipu was a non-priority, there was pressure to resolve that contest and relieve the resources allocated to protecting Argentina's interests from a non-belligerent neighbor.¹¹⁹ The negotiations accelerated with Argentina's more conciliatory approach.

6.4 Evidence of Limited Political Trade Objective

The terms of the agreement were specific in nature and addressed only that source of tension; the concessions Brazil sought to ensure its own energy security and economic benefit were granted without issue or reference to reciprocal concessions other than the technical ones listed above. The single-issue scope of the agreement indicates the urgency of a needed resolution and a change in the existing stalemate. The Tripartite Agreement largely shaped Brazil and Argentina's relationship thereafter but because the substance of the agreement was so limited "it cannot... be regarded as decisive, unless one accepts that the dispute over the dam of Itaipu was the one and only significant reason for friction... so that, once this was eliminated, no further obstacle remained for the development of friendly and cooperative relations."¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Gardini, "Making Sense of Rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil," 59.

¹²⁰ Gardini, "Making Sense of Rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil," 57.

6.5 Rational Actor Logic and Neoclassical Realism

As with the Easter Accords, a limited political trade involving appeasement fits into rational actor logic when the preference to alter the status quo reference the system level balance of power, beyond the bilateral relations of the two states involved with the concessions. Although Brazil's economic dominance was already exceedingly obvious at the time,¹²¹ leaders in Argentina did not perceive it as pursuing regional hegemonic policies: Argentina had other priorities in the region and the logic of the Powell model applied once its leaders decided concessions in Itaipu would not result in relative losses and instead would maintain the balance with Brazil while altering the status quo of overall Argentinian decline in the region by allowing it to more easily confront Chile.

The decision to appease Brazil on a specific issue was a function of limits on domestic resources and greater system level threats, which created a need to eliminate unnecessary sources of conflict and ensure continued access to existing resources.¹²² The balance of domestic constraints and system level threats, calculated by state executives when forming a policy, fits the neoclassical realist framework. Appeasing a state that is perceived as the least threatening rival is a rational choice for a state like Argentina with considerable restraints, seeking to improve its position as rapidly as possible.

Stalling

7. The United States (State A) and Iraq (State B): Iran-Iraq War through the Gulf War

7.1 Case Description:

In 1982 the U.S. shifted from a formal position of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war shifted positions to supporting Iraq through a series of concessions designed to sustain its

¹²¹ Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook--1982*. Washington D.C.: Library of Congress, 1982: 9, 28.

¹²² Kupchan, "Enemies Into Friends," 125.

war efforts. In February the State Department removed Iraq from its list of terrorism-sponsoring states, despite the lack of any indication of meaningful policy change, so it could receive U.S. government-financed export credits and to import dual-use technology. The U.S. also approved a \$484 million loan to support the construction of an Iraqi oil pipeline as well as several millions of dollars worth of agricultural loans to allow Baghdad to preserve its budgetary resources for the war. This rapprochement accelerated reestablished diplomatic relations in November 1984 and expanded their bilateral intelligence sharing.¹²³ In 1987 Reagan ordered the U.S. Navy to ostensibly enter the war on Iraq's behalf, by escorting Kuwaiti oil tankers traversing the Persian Gulf¹²⁴ despite continued transgressions by Iraq in the same naval waters.¹²⁵

These actions amount to concessions because prior to the Iran-Iraq war the two countries' relationship was characterized by ideological and geopolitical differences. The U.S. provided Iraq with military support to prevent a rapid loss to Iran despite:

“(1) Iraq's continued sponsor of international terrorism against Western targets and, relatedly, its staunch opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process; (2) its suspected efforts to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; (3) its repeated and flagrant use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops and Kurdish civilians; (4) suspected illicit use of certain U.S. exports for the purpose of waging the conventional war against Iran; and (5) its severe repression of human rights domestically.”¹²⁶

7.2 Evidence of a Stalling Objective

The U.S. did not resolve its outstanding issues with Iraq prior to the Iran-Iraq war. Grievances towards Iraq's support of terrorism, its initiatives against U.S. influence in the region, its nuclear and chemical weapons programs, and its aggressive behavior in the

¹²³ Resnick, Evan N. "Strange Bedfellows: U.S. Bargaining Behavior with Allies of Convenience." *International Security* 35, no. 3 (2010-2011): 162.

¹²⁴ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 163.

¹²⁵ Reagan, Ronald. "Foreign Policy March 1987." TS Washington, D.C. Bureau Records, 1938-2009: Series I. Presidential Wires AP16; Box 28, Folder 358. Associated Press Corporate Archives. *Associated Press Collections Online*: 71.

¹²⁶ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 164.

Middle East persisted alongside concessions during the 1980s. They became the basis of the Gulf war catalyzed by the invasion of Kuwait. However at the time refusing to support Iraq was likely to prevent U.S. access to the Gulf as it would have exacerbated the challenges to entering the hostile war zone. Turning a blind eye to geopolitical tension with Iraq was the least bad strategy to ensure continued access to the Gulf.¹²⁷

Resnick characterizes U.S.-Iraqi cooperation during the war as an ‘alliance of convenience.’ U.S. support enabled Iraq to maintain its war efforts and permitted the U.S. to remain involved in promoting its regional interests.¹²⁸ This was part of a strategy to wear down Iran through attrition, weakening the largest perceived threat to U.S. interests and creating a more optimal regional balance of power. Later the U.S. confronted Iraq from a more optimal point during the Gulf War, with less concern about Iran.¹²⁹

7.3 Evidence of a Desire to Alter the Status Quo

At the start of the Iraq- Iran War Iran posed a greater threat to the United States than Iraq did because the Iranian Revolution had more recently deposed the U.S. regional ally. Iran had been exercising its capacity to shut the Persian Gulf off to the world and stem oil flow since, despite sanctions and efforts against it. The U.S.’ priority was to guarantee Gulf access and to do so it needed to shift power away from Iran.¹³⁰

The U.S.’s concessions to Iran can be directly linked to its preference to alter the regional status quo because despite its outstanding issues with the Hussein regime Iran's threat to the region and its proclaimed desire to expand its anti-west theocratic ideology, left Washington with few good options but to support Iraq in order to prevent an Iranian

¹²⁷ Reagan, “Foreign Policy March 1987,” 89.

¹²⁸ Resnick, “U.S. Bargaining Behavior,” 164.

¹²⁹ Reagan, “Foreign Policy March 1987,” 84.

¹³⁰ Reagan, “Foreign Policy March 1987,” 24.

victory in the war.¹³¹ At the same time, the U.S. was highly concerned with Iraq's continuing support of terrorism and its nuclear development. The ultimate goal was to not only improve U.S. capability to deter outside pressure on the Gulf, but also to deal with pressures arising within the Gulf. This required weakening both Iraq and Iran. Given Iran's obvious military advantage in the war U.S. support was designed to keep Iraq afloat with substantial military benefits, to drag on a war and drain both of its ideological adversaries, without providing enough to allow Iraq to achieve a decisive victory.¹³²

7.4 Evidence of Long-term Time Frame

Addressing the U.S.' outstanding issues with Iraq was not an immediate priority compared to the threat posed by Iran; concessions on several of these outstanding issues were "directly related to the U.S.'s primary aim of preventing Iraq from suffering a military defeat at the hands of Iran... choosing instead to let them slide."¹³³ Additionally the U.S. had the luxury of asymmetric dependence given that it was a global economic and military power, located halfway across the world. Its involvement and interest in the situation and in its relationship with Iraq had to do with protecting influence and promoting interest in the Gulf and faced no significant threats to its existence, security or prosperity from the war between the two Gulf powers.¹³⁴ The U.S. had the resources to sustain Iraq in the war, albeit while incurring significant war debts and reconstruction costs, while imposing similar war costs on Iran.¹³⁵ The U.S. took a long-term approach to

¹³¹ Yetiv, Steve A. "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm: Some Antecedent Causes." *Political Science Quarterly* 107, no. 2 (1992): 197.

¹³² Yetiv, "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," 206.

¹³³ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 164.

¹³⁴ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 167.

¹³⁵ Reagan, Ronald. "Foreign Policy January 1988." TS Washington, D.C. Bureau Records, 1938-2009: Series I. Presidential Wires AP16; Box 28, Folder 358. Associated Press Corporate Archives. *Associated Press Collections Online*.

weakening the two major regional powers in the Gulf, prioritizing Iran and establishing itself with more relative power with which to challenge Iraq at a later date.

7.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

The U.S.' concessions to a geopolitical rival fit into the rational actor model because they demonstrate the U.S. administration's prioritization of threats, and its conscious efforts to make strategic concessions that would weaken its rivals and alter the status quo in the Gulf in its favor. Iraq was anticipated to lose the war relatively quickly and so appeasement was a rational strategy to prevent that outcome because Iran was the primary threat of Iran. Iraq posed less of an immediate threat and the concessions were designed to avoid empowering it as an enemy, delaying confrontation to a more optimal moment to confront it. While providing Iraq with dual use technology carried significant risk, the U.S. was more risk-inclined as its goal was to alter the status quo in its favor. Additionally U.S. tension with Iraq and its concessions did not constitute an existential threat; the power asymmetry increased the threshold for rational concessions.¹³⁶

Domestic opinion and congressional preference was strongly opposed to providing support to Iraq. Those preferences are in part why the U.S. was not able to move from providing general cooperation to committing tangible military assistance prior to 1986.¹³⁷ The Reagan administration maintained the war of attrition between two U.S. rivals. Neoclassical realism best explains this by including attention to calculated objectives separate from domestic opinion or realist power expectations.

¹³⁶ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 166.

¹³⁷ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 170-171.

8. China (State A) and Japan (State B): 1932-1937

8.1 Case Description:

Beginning with the Shanghai Truce of 1932, in the five-year period immediately preceding the Second Sino-Japanese war the relationship of China and Japan was marked by successive crises and subsequent negotiated agreements. The Chinese conceded to Japanese imperialism with minimal resistance and without reciprocity in the agreements. There were four major agreements that constituted China's appeasement of Japan. The first was the demilitarization of Shanghai following an extended crisis; the Chinese reversed their position on Japanese demands and unilaterally halted military activities, making Shanghai a demilitarized zone. The next was the Tanggu Truce: a ceasefire signed in 1933 formally ending resistance to the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and formally recognizing its control. It also granted Japanese demands for a demilitarized zone surrounding the Great Wall, for control of the Great Wall, and for demilitarization exemptions allowing Japanese troops to continue their operations in those zones. This was followed by the Hu-Umezu agreement in 1935. After a series of assassinations of Japanese officials by rebel Communist forces, the Chinese conceded to dismiss Chinese officials in Tianjin from their posts. They also ceased political activities in several major cities, replaced law enforcement officials, withdrew all military forces from the surrounding area of Hebei, and pledged to disband all anti-Japanese forces in China.

Finally, the Chin-Doihara Agreement was also reached in 1935. It addressed a small-scale crisis, which the Japanese used to make far-reaching demands. The Chinese withdrew their army from Changpei and granted the Japanese control of the area. Migration and settlement was halted entirely and China recommitted to several of

promises to cease its political activities and disband anti-Japanese groups. These agreements were a continuous stream of Chinese concessions with no reciprocity other than ceasefire specific to the acute crisis instigated each agreement.

8.2 Evidence of a Desire to Alter the Status Quo

Throughout this five-year period, Japan aggressively expanded its presence in China, a trend China wanted to reverse.¹³⁸ Chiang Kai-Shek's approach to Japan was often construed as "nonresistance," but his diaries and speeches indicated humiliation and indignation towards Japan's encroachments on China.¹³⁹ His position was succinctly outlined in two speeches at Nanchang in March 1934; Japan had superior military forces and was using them to subjugate China. His policy was sensitive to the existing balance of power between the two, but not satisfied or acquiescent to it as "he was enough of a realist not to give up on the possibility of an alliance with Russia and a peaceful settlement with Japan. He thought that China's only possible help in the international arena might come from Britain and the United States."¹⁴⁰ He explored policy options ranging from cooperation with Russia to rejecting that relationship in order to avoid pushing other powers towards Japan. While several approaches were considered and even tested, all of them had the same motivation of narrowing the power disparity with Japan.

8.3 Evidence of a Long-term Time Frame

Chiang was acutely aware of China's military and economic inferiority to Japan and regarded launching a war as irresponsible.¹⁴¹ In July 1934, Chiang Kai-shek delivered a series of lectures to his officers at Kuling outlining the basis for China's resistance to

¹³⁸ Chor, So Wei. "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy, 1932-1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei." *Modern China* 28, no. 2 (April 2002): 225.

¹³⁹ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 232.

¹⁴⁰ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 238.

¹⁴¹ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 233.

Japan. The lectures were secret, since the two were formally at peace. Chiang was pursuing a policy of appeasement while preparing for what he perceived as an inevitable conflict. These lectures have now been published and they demonstrate an attack was always expected: "Japan believes that with her present military strength she can, if she wants, occupy the whole of China without much difficulty... How much time we still have on hand we can easily guess... three or five years to ten years." Chiang believed the Japanese underestimated the Chinese will to resist.¹⁴²

The threat was inevitable but non-imminent; the inevitability of conflict extended the decision-making window substantially. That long-term perspective was exacerbated because the Nationalist government in China perceived a more pressing threat from internal Communist unrest. This policy was summarized in Chiang Kai-Shek's declaration that "Japan is not qualified to be our enemy; our present enemy is the red bandits."¹⁴³ The Communist problem was ongoing and compounded the tendency of Chinese officials to relegate confrontation with Japan to the future for their agenda.

8.4 Evidence of Objective to Stall

China's official policy was "First internal pacification, then external resistance."¹⁴⁴ The policy hinged on Chiang's belief that the communist threat was a "disease of the vital organs." The reluctance to fight the Japanese also stemmed from his belief that China was too weak to engage in such a war. During the Manchurian Incident and the Shanghai War, Chiang publicly stated that Japan would overrun major cities and coastal China in a few days if full-scale war broke out.¹⁴⁵ The objective was to stall the

¹⁴² Mallory, Walter H. "The Strategy of Chiang Kai-Shek." *Foreign Affairs* 17, no. 4 (July 1939): 700

¹⁴³ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 231.

¹⁴⁴ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 230-231.

¹⁴⁵ Chor, "The Making of the Guomintang's Japan Policy," 232.

threat of being overrun and to not concede on certain critical issues. China was strategically resisting to slow Japan's efforts and forcing it to extend its operations as far as possible. This would make Japan's progress costly, prolong a victory and allow China time to seek foreign help for a counter-offensive.¹⁴⁶ While several of the agreements with Japan between 1932 and 1935 infringed on China's sovereignty in North China, territorial integrity in Northern China was a consistent red line. In numerous public statements as well as instructions to Chinese negotiators shaping treaty terms with Japan, Chiang always emphasized that if Japan intended to improve relations with China, it would need to return occupied territories in the northeastern provinces. These red lines kept Japan from overrunning China past a point of return as it dealt with its internal issues. It also established conditions for a successful resistance to Japan in the future when its forces would be stretched geographically and when China hoped to have stronger relations with and support from other external powers. This was expected to provide a stronger footing to challenge Japan if the issue of its continuing expansion was not resolved.

8.5 Rational Actor Model and Neoclassical Realism

The leadership in China had a clearly prioritized order of threats, and saw the threat from Japan as secondary to the growing internal threat of communism. There was a corresponding long-term approach to countering the encroachment of Japan. At the same time the red line stances demonstrate the logic of the Powell model that certain concessions would have been unacceptable to make because they would have seriously threatened China's existence. Japan had superior military force, and China's preference was to avoid losing a war, which Chiang anticipated in that five-year window. The

¹⁴⁶ Mallory, "The Strategy of Chiang Kai-Shek," 699.

objective was also expel Japan when China was able to. Appeasement was a strategic tactic to achieve that preference and to work towards placing China in a better position from which to address Japan in the future when it had worn down and stretched out its forces and when China had international support. Delay tactics were rational given China's inability to meaningfully challenge Japan in 1932.

This inability to put up a meaningful challenge was the result of resource overstretch; there was a real power disparity between at the system level and domestic weaknesses due to communism, which complimented each other as factors in generating the non-confrontation policy. In addition, evidence shows that the policy as a whole was entirely contingent on the policies of Chiang and his advisors. Their policy was based on their expectation they would eventually acquire foreign support, resolve the communist problem and the amount of room to maneuver vis a vis Japan's expansionist tendencies.

Stage II Model: Predicting the Success or Failure of Appeasement

This section of the research will revisit four of the cases from Stage I, one from each category, and predict the likelihood of success or failure of appeasement in achieving the objective based on the risk level and the information centrality of the appeaser. It will also compare the historical evidence to see whether the outcome matched the prediction. The methodology is the same as in stage I including content analysis of primary and secondary sources. The model for this stage can be found in Appendix Figure 3(a). Risk level is categorized according to the objective while information centrality ranges from a scale of 1-6 according to the accumulated score of each indicator scored as 0 or 1; Mutual membership in at least one intergovernmental organization (IGO), pre-existing and formal bilateral relations between the two countries

involved; prior communications specific to the source of tension; intelligence gathering efforts independent from communication between the two parties; access to broker groups—this can include individuals, interest groups or salient issues directly affecting public opinion in the opposing state that can provide reliable insight to the opponent or create intrinsic pressure for more predictable decisions; and finally historical lessons of cooperation in past interactions and create reasonable anticipation of similar cooperation.

9. Crisis Resolution: Agadir Crisis

9.1 Risk Level

Crisis resolution is a medial risk objective: the appeasing state intends to maintain the status quo, which inherently lends itself to risk-averse behavior. However the shortened response time of a crisis increases the risk level. This was illustrated by the crisis in Agadir as the Germans had intended to communicate the intention of sending a warship. It expected that the move would be understood and well received since it was intended to affirm their right to compensation and not to incite a conflict they did not want to engage in.¹⁴⁷ The poor reception of the ship's deployment created 'a diplomatic stir' and a response that militarized the situation by heightening France's disposition to deploy and increasing troop presence.¹⁴⁸ Appeasing France by conceding Morocco and only requesting compensation in Sudan was intended to maintain peace and stabilize the balance of power even as the negotiations unfolded in a tense environment.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ *Financial Times*. "Germany and Morocco." London: 5 July 1911. *The Financial Times Historical Archive, 1888-2010*: 5.

¹⁴⁸ Oliver, Frederick Scott. *Ordeal by Battle*. Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1915. *The Making of Modern Law: Foreign, Comparative, and International Law, 1600-1926*: 335

¹⁴⁹ Our Special Correspondent. "France and Germany." *Daily Telegraph*, London: 11 Sept. 1911. *The Telegraph Historical Archive*: 11.

9.2 Germany's Information Centrality

Mutual Membership in IGO's

The occurrence of this crisis preceded the creation or participation of nations in permanent international governance mechanisms. This category is negatively scored as 0.

Pre-existing Bi-Lateral Relations

The French and Germans had established and signed an agreement pertaining to Morocco in 1909 in which:

“The Government of the French Republic... resolved to safeguard economic equality there and consequently not to hinder German commercial and industrial interests there, and the Imperial German Government, pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing furthermore that the special political interests of France there are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace and resolved not to hinder these interests, declare that they will not pursue and will not encourage any measure of a nature to create an economic privilege in their favor or in favor of any Power, and that they will seek to associate their nationals in affairs for which they are able to obtain the concession.”¹⁵⁰

This was in addition to general tension between France and Germany leading up to contention over Morocco specifically. This category is positively scored as 1.

Prior Formal Communications on the Incident

Kiderlen failed to communicate German objectives to France prior to and even subsequent to the crisis escalation; “the various governments concerned with Morocco were to have been notified the day before the arrival of the gunboats, but, in fact, they were presented with the notes on the same day that the Panther arrived off Agadir. Secondly, the press coverage, which was to have allayed all fears in either the French or the British mind had not succeeded.”¹⁵¹ Relations between Kiderlen and Cambon were

¹⁵⁰ Edwards "The Franco-German Agreement on Morocco, 1909," 507.

¹⁵¹ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 449.

formally established after the arrival of the Panther but were on and off throughout the crisis and therefore not very effective.¹⁵² This category is negatively scored as 0.

Historical Lessons:

The crisis in Agadir was preceded by a period beginning in 1907 of agreements and overall detente specifically pertaining to the Morocco question. The 1906 Algeciras Act solved the first Moroccan crisis, proclaiming the sovereignty of Morocco and the economic equality of the contracting powers in the area. After this initial agreement, was a period of improved economic and financial relations between France and Germany. This period saw each government's mutual encouragement of rapprochement of its communities in Morocco and Germany saw repeated reaffirmation of Jules Cambon's faith in a rapprochement with Germany.¹⁵³ This informed its anticipation of a positive reception to its demand for compensation. This category is positively categorized as 1.

Access to Broker Groups:

Germany had no influence over reporting by the foreign press or the opinion of influential domestic groups within France.¹⁵⁴ Its efforts were directed at French officials and not towards public opinion via the press. This indicator is negatively scored as 0.

Intelligence Gathering Efforts

As early as May the foreign ministry received the first of numerous reports, which German officials on the ground prepared describing the local state of affairs near Agadir. The foreign ministry drew up a new memorandum covering affairs in Morocco based on the reports outlining prospects for German action if the situation deteriorated as was

¹⁵² Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 453.

¹⁵³ Keiger, "'Jules Cambon and Franco-German Détente, 1907-1914.'"

¹⁵⁴ Reuter. "Situation at Agadir." *Daily Telegraph*, London: 4 July 1911 *The Telegraph Historical Archive*: 11.

expected. It drew the conclusion that the basis of the 1909 Algeciras Act was in danger and that expected French action constituted an imminent threat. The need to ensure grounded demand for compensation was seen as urgent.¹⁵⁵ These reports continued through September. The German Foreign Office also gathered intelligence from pro-German Chieftains to increase their knowledge of the ongoing civil war, the situation on the ground and Moroccan attitudes towards France.¹⁵⁶ This case is scored positively as 1.

9.3 Overall Information Centrality Score and Predicted Outcome

Germany's information centrality score tallies to 3, which leaves it short of the threshold for adequate information. The predicted outcome using the model is **uncertain**.

9.4 Outcome of Appeasement for Crisis Resolution

The immediate crisis was successfully resolved according to the German Foreign Office as it received the compensation it had been hoping to receive in order to maintain its prestige and there was no conflict in 1911. The German government was satisfied with the resolution.¹⁵⁷ This solution was obviously not long-term as World War I broke out not long after partly as a function of dissatisfaction with reduced economic returns and degraded position on the world stage among the German national sentiment.¹⁵⁸

10. Crisis Prevention: Pakistan and China 1963

10.1 Risk Level

Crisis prevention is a low risk objective based on the risk averse preference to maintain the status quo and the increased reaction window in a long-term approach. China's assessment of the region generated its desire to mitigate the volatile shifts in the

¹⁵⁵ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 443.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid

¹⁵⁷ Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 456.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid

balance of power after the Sino-India war after which it found itself as the regional hegemon.¹⁵⁹ Pakistan was an attractive partner because “Pakistan was large enough to be important, but not large enough - or strong enough - to be viewed as a potential rival such as India or Japan.”¹⁶⁰ Granting territorial concessions to the state with the least potential to overtake it, and which wasn’t particularly hostile, was seen as the best option to consolidate China’s power inexpensively and counter pressure from India and its allies.

10.2 Information Centrality

Mutual Membership in an IGO

One of the few pre-existing sources of tension between Pakistan and China was Pakistan’s refusal to support the PROC’s claim to UN membership due to its alliance with the U.S.¹⁶¹ In 1961, Pakistan shifted its rhetoric and said it would “would almost certainly vote for Communist Chinese entry into the U.N. at future sessions...” although it still “regularly went along with postponing the question.”¹⁶² However, at the time of the agreement the PCOR did not have recognition in the U.N. This indicator is coded as 0.

Pre-existing Bilateral Relations

China signed its first trade agreement with Pakistan in 1963, a few months prior to the border agreement and the subsequent months saw a significant increase in diplomatic visits and exchanges between the two.¹⁶³ While the strength in this relationship was relatively new, it did already exist and this indicator is coded as 1.

Prior Formal Communications on the Incident

¹⁵⁹ Kumar, "Power Cycle Analysis of India, China, and Pakistan," 116.

¹⁶⁰ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 466.

¹⁶¹ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 470

¹⁶² Dobell, W M. "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty." *Pacific Affairs* 37, no. 3 (1964): 264.

¹⁶³ Azeemi, Haris R. "55 Years of Pakistan-China Relationship." *Pakistan Horizon* 60, no. 2 (April 2007): 110.

In early 1962, there was an exchange of notes between China and Pakistan establishing the context and premise of the border agreement; “Pakistan formally proposed to China negotiations for a boundary agreement. The Chinese responded, following a delay of several months, asking for the parameters of such negotiations. The Pakistani response that drew a prompt affirmative Chinese reply identified three elements: the ground situation, customary law and practices, and mutual accommodation. This serious response stood in sharp contrast with the Indian ambivalence on the Chinese proposals for a boundary agreement during the heyday of Sino Indian amity and injected the necessary trust that is critical for diplomacy and building strong cooperative relations. Negotiations for a provisional boundary agreement began in October of the same year. The agreement was signed within six months in March 1963.”¹⁶⁴ The communication pertaining specifically to the border agreement is evidence to code this indicator as 1.

Intelligence Gathering Efforts

There is no real evidence of intelligence gathering by the PCOR on Pakistan, as generally the assessment was that Pakistan lacked the power to challenge China, and was more inclined to direct its energy towards the perceived threat from India or communists. There is evidence rather that Pakistan’s formal statements expressing they had no intention to challenge China were taken at face value and this indicator is coded as 0.

Historical Lessons

Developments in their bilateral relations began in the mid-1950s and influenced China’s perception. Pakistan opposed China’s membership in the U.N. however other historical lessons also informed China’s evaluation; “While Pakistan initially backed the

¹⁶⁴ Khan, "Pakistan-China Relations: An Overview," 11.

United Nations action in Korea... it opposed branding China as an aggressor when it entered the war late in 1950. It also opposed any embargo on trade with China...”¹⁶⁵

The most controversial historical lesson was Pakistan’s decision to join South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), an organization directed against China. Still, Pakistan’s membership in the organization was not concerning for China. The Chinese leaders were aware of its hostility towards India and were predisposed to accept Pakistani officials’ periodic assurances that there was no quarrel with China. Peking saw that Pakistan's involvement with SEATO was directed against India rather than China.¹⁶⁶

The Chinese view was expressed at the Bandung Conference. Chou Enlai made a statement regarding a conversation with Pakistani Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali; "although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding...”¹⁶⁷ As such, at a point in time when Peking was promoting a policy of peaceful co-existence and good relations with neighbors, it had the historical premise to be favorably disposed towards Pakistan. This indicator is coded as 1.

Access to Broker Groups

Pakistan’s political priorities were largely directed by how its activities would affect the Kashmir dispute with India.¹⁶⁸ The negotiations and ultimately the border agreement “placed the Chinese formally and firmly on record as maintaining that Kashmir did not belong to India. It was a disputed territory and not an integral part of

¹⁶⁵ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 468.

¹⁶⁶ Barnds, "China's Relations with Pakistan," 469.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid

¹⁶⁸ Our Commonwealth Affairs Correspondent. "Pakistan May Turn to China." Daily Telegraph, 19 Oct. 1963, p. 13.

India as the Indians wanted rest of the world to believe. Although the boundary negotiations did not involve the question of ownership of Kashmir as it was made quite clear that the border negotiations could be reopened between the sovereign authorities concerned after the settlement of Kashmir dispute, the signing of even a provisional agreement challenged India's repeated assertions that Kashmir belonged to India.”¹⁶⁹ Linking the border agreement to the Kashmir question created additional reassurance that opinion towards good Sino-Pakistan relations would persist. This indicator is coded as 1.

10.3 Overall Information Centrality Score and Predicted Outcome

The information centrality score in the China-Pakistan border agreement case is 4, meaning it surpasses the threshold for adequate information. This, combined with the low risk level of the objective makes the case a best-fit case for the success of appeasement.

10.4 Outcome of Appeasement for Crisis Resolution

The treaty successfully demarcated the boundary in the contiguous areas and labeled them under Pakistan's actual control of areas including Hunza and Baltistan.¹⁷⁰ There were not and have not been crises between Pakistan and China pertaining to the border and the contiguous territory between them. China is considered to be Pakistan's most trusted and enduring military ally. After the 1965 Pakistan-India war, Pakistan and China realized the importance of their bilateral defense cooperation and China has been supporting Pakistan in military and defense infrastructure since.¹⁷¹ The two have strong defense ties and historically cooperated with each other on several issues.

The low risk objective, which was cheap and secure for China as it didn't fear as much from it as a regional power and saw it as a long term investment in

¹⁶⁹ Cheema, "Significance of Pakistan-China Border Agreement of 1963," 49.

¹⁷⁰ Dobell, "Ramifications of the China-Pakistan Border Treaty," 285

¹⁷¹ Azeemi, "55 Years of Pakistan-China Relationship," 111.

counterbalancing India, compounded by adequate information on Pakistan's potential as a partner in maintaining a peaceful border, contributed to the appeasement policy's success in preventing crisis and allowing China to maintain regional hegemony.

11. Limited Political Trade: Anglo-Italian Agreement of 1938

11.1 Risk Level

Limited Political Trade is the highest risk objective in the model because of the risk inclination associated with altering the status quo and the shortened reaction time frame. In the 1938 Anglo-Italian case there was a pressing need to alter the balance of power against Germany and to resolve the stalemate in the Mediterranean. While there was no existing crisis with Italy, the concessions were made with the expectation that Italy would cease the harmful behaviors in the Middle East and Mediterranean that were draining Britain's limited resources. It was also expected that Italy would act against in favor of the allies instead of supporting Germany thanks to the concessions.¹⁷²

This was all with the looming start of another war with hostile Germany, which would have a considerably more power if Italy supported it despite the concessions. The policy was tantamount to wedge alliance tactics, "a state using an appeasement wedge strategy seeks to detach its target by offering a primary - usually territorial - asset (e.g., contiguous territory, a strategic waterway, or an overseas possession) that is under the divider's exclusive control and on which the target has made claims – riskiest use of wedge alliance tactics is flat-out appeasement."¹⁷³ The already risky policy was compounded by separate tension between Britain and Italy on the propaganda issue.

¹⁷² Voigt, "The Anglo-Italian Agreement." 886.

¹⁷³ Crawford, "Preventing Enemy Coalitions," 168.

11.2 Britain's Information Centrality

Mutual Membership in IGOs

Britain and Italy both joined the League of Nations upon its creation, however Italy withdrew from the League of Nations in December of 1937. While the build-up and initial conversations on Anglo-Italian affairs preceded Italy's withdrawal, it did withdraw prior to finalizing the 1938 Anglo-Italian agreement. This indicator is coded as 0.

Pre-existing Bi-Lateral relations

Britain and Italy's modern bilateral relations initiated from the 1915 London Pact allying them in World War I. Britain had an ambassador to Italy through 1940, including at the time of the agreement. Despite disagreements, there was no total halt of bilateral agreements until 1940 when Italy signed the Axis Pact.¹⁷⁴ This indicator is coded as 1.

Prior Formal Communications on the Incident

There were two tracks of communication on the Anglo-Italian Agreement. There were the public negotiations between the Italian Ambassador Grandi, Chamberlain and Eden. There were also secret communications between Dingli, an Italian who had worked with British Intelligence, and Ball. Both were established ministers but their communications were not public and they had no official status as peace brokers.¹⁷⁵

Dingli's diaries on the time period were later discovered and denoted that he "would do his utmost to end the misunderstandings between the countries for their mutual benefit, counting Ball as 'an admirable ally and ... director of my actions.' Between them they agreed on the key points to be explained to the Italians: namely that

¹⁷⁴ Kington, Tom "Recruited by MI5: the name's Mussolini. Benito Mussolini ". London: 13 October, 2009. *The Guardian*.

¹⁷⁵ Mills, William C. "Sir Joseph Ball, Adrian Dingli, and Neville Chamberlain's 'Secret Channel' to Italy, 1937- 1940." *The International History Review* 24, no. 2 (June 2002): 282

Ball and Dingli were 'acting unofficially'; that Ball's view that ... Chamberlain was keen to restore cordial relations; and that Dingli would... express these view." He indicates that the topics of their discussions were "Italy's anti-British broadcasts; the need for a Mediterranean agreement and for recognition of Italy's position in Abyssinia." These were not formal negotiation but there is evidence that they were taken seriously and their conversations factored into the formal negotiations.¹⁷⁶ This indicator is coded as 1.

Successful Intelligence Gathering Efforts

Ball's notes recollecting the negotiations reference British Intelligence efforts pertaining to Italy at the time. Part of the focus was on Dingli as a source of insight into Italy; "Admiral Sir Hugh Sinclair, head of the secret intelligence service (M.I.6), responsible for international intelligence-gathering, who reported to the permanent under-secretary at the foreign office... Sinclair was probably interested in tapping Dingli because, by 1936, alarmed by the risk of war, he was enlarging his staff in an attempt to overcome M.I.6's dearth of reliable intelligence about Britain's possible enemies. Ball also took the precaution of notifying... M.I. 5, of his actions."¹⁷⁷ This indicates that although there was something lacking in the intelligence in 1936, considerable resources were devoted towards intelligence gathering on Italy and this indicator is coded as 1.

Historical Lessons of Cooperation

While there were encouraging historical lessons from World War I, from the ascension of Mussolini's fascist government the historical lessons were discouraging. The Hoare-Laval Pact had been a spectacular moral failure within Britain and Italy had continued its aggression regardless. Despite the Anglo-Italian Gentleman's Agreement of

¹⁷⁶ Mills, "Secret Channel to Italy," 286.

¹⁷⁷ Mills, "Secret Channel to Italy," 285.

January 1937 Mussolini continued to exploit British difficulties in the Middle East. In the spring of that year there was intensive Italian activity in the area including newly built coastal highways, two new army corps established in the colony, Mussolini's self declaration as 'Protector of Islam' in Tripoli in order to emphasize the difference between Italian 'friendship' for the Arabs and British policy in Palestine. The message was pushed over Bari, which stressed Italian military might and British weakness. The historical lessons for British-Italian agreements did not exist and this indicator is coded as 0.

Access to Broker Groups

Although there was the secret channel of communications, it was a complement to the formal relations and had no control or independent influence on decision-makers. Mussolini and representatives of the fascist government were isolated from broker groups and from public opinion favorable to Britain.¹⁷⁸ This indicator is coded as 0.

11.3 Informational Centrality Score and Predicted Outcome

Britain's information centrality score is a 3, below the threshold for sufficient information. Paired with the high-risk objective the model would predict failure.

11.4 Outcome of Appeasement for Limited Political Trade

The propaganda issue was temporarily settled by the Anglo-Italian Agreement of March 1938. Britain promised de jure recognition of the Italian position in Abyssinia in return for Italian concessions on troop levels and propaganda. Although Bari switched to a campaign against France. Italy did not decrease its troop presence and soon after it entered into the war on the German side without delivering any of the reciprocal concessions it had agreed, maintaining its claim to Abyssinia, and re-embarking on its

¹⁷⁸ Voigt, "The Anglo-Italian Agreement." 886.

anti-Britain propaganda campaign in 1939.¹⁷⁹ The failure of the policy may have had to do with the fact that several of the historical lessons, although they existed, were largely ignored or misperceived by the British leadership. However the British received none of the benefits it sought with the policy and ultimately appeasement failed in this case.

12. Stalling: U.S.- Iraq 1982-1990

12.1 Risk Level

Stalling is a medial risk objective; Iraq was not an imminent threat to its power or security, but rather to its interests in the region, and Iran posed a larger threat. ‘Altering the status quo ‘ here references a desire to enhance U.S. influence in the region by weakening Iran. Tension with Iraq posed no immediate existential danger however the issues remained perpetually unresolved so the policy was also not entirely risk-free.

12.2 The United States’ Information Centrality

Mutual Membership in an IGO

At this point the United States and Iraq were both members of the United Nations, which until then was their primary forum of communication. This indicator is coded as 1.

Pre-existing Bilateral Relations

Although the United States formally recognized Iraq at the end of World War II the status of bilateral relations fluctuated in subsequent decades. After Iraq intervened militarily on the Arab side in both the 1967 Six-Day War and 1973 Yom Kippur War against Israel U.S.- Iraqi diplomatic relations were formally severed and not re-established until the middle of the stalling period in 1984.¹⁸⁰ This indicator is coded as 0.

Prior Formal Communications on the Incident

¹⁷⁹ MacDonald, "Radio Bari," 204.

¹⁸⁰ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 161-162.

The Iran-Iraq war catalyzed the resurgence of communication between the U.S. and Iraq specifically oriented towards intelligence sharing and other support. Before any major concessions in the form of intervention or weapons exchanges the State Department removed Iraq from its list of terrorism-sponsoring states in February 1982, thereby permitting Iraq to receive U.S. government-financed export credits and to import high-technology, dual-use U.S. goods. From there, the White House began to provide Baghdad with highly classified military intelligence on Iran. It also privately encouraged the United States' Arab and West European allies to secretly (and illicitly) sell their U.S.-made armaments to Iraq and the concessions continued to grow from the initial re-installation of communication, limited to the Iran-Iraq war up through the bilateral relationship's 'turning point' of formally reestablished diplomatic relations in November 1984, the expansion of bilateral intelligence sharing and the U.S. approval of larger numbers of licenses for high-technology, dual-use exports to Iraq and eventual military intervention to protect Kuwaiti tankers.¹⁸¹ This indicator is coded as 1.

Intelligence Gathering Efforts

At this point U.S. intelligence capabilities were formidable and Iraq was a primary focus of the intelligence community. In addition to years spent on watch-lists of the Carter administration, there are numerous foreign policy intelligence reports that have since been de-classified demonstrating the substantial effort and success of intelligence gathering on Iraq presented to decision-makers.¹⁸² This indicator is coded as 1.

¹⁸¹ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 162.

¹⁸² 'Reagan, Ronald - Foreign Policy March 1987. Mar. 1987.', 'Reagan, Ronald - Middle East April 1982. Apr. 1982.', 'Reagan, Ronald - Foreign Policy Septemebr 10, 1983. 10 Sept. 1983.', 'Reagan, Ronald - Foreign Policy July 1984. July 1984.', 'Reagan, Ronald - Foreign Policy January 1988. December 30, 1987-January 13, 1989.' TS Washington, D.C. Bureau Records, 1938-2009: Series I. Presidential Wires AP16; Box 28, Folder 357.

Historical Lessons

Geopolitically, for more than two decades, Iraq's foreign policy had been increasingly at odds with the United States' global interests, as well as its more acute regional interests to protect Israel and promote peaceful resolution of the Arab- Israeli conflict. The U.S. was informed of Iraq's regional aspirations, to expand and grow its influence, by its positions and by its invasion of Iran. The U.S. made the decision to stall based on its calculations about those aspirations.¹⁸³ This indicator is coded as 1.

Access to Broker Groups

Although the U.S. had inside sources it relied on for intelligence, these did not provide an avenue to influence the Hussein regime. Still, Hussein operated within the Middle East's volatile balance of power and the U.S. had strong allies in the region whose interests were also tied to improving U.S. influence in the Gulf. These allies were not inside the Hussein government but they were a strong intrinsic force on its policy leading up to the war. This indicator is coded as 1 because the GCC acted as a substantial intermediary for the U.S. in the region:

“throughout the 1980s the GCC helped increase the internal stability of pro-American Gulf states and enhanced their military coordination. It also improved their defense and strategic interaction with Washington and gave them a political forum within which to coordinate their policies. In addition, the GCC was the vehicle by which the otherwise reserved Saudis assumed a greater role in regional politics and security. Since the U.S.-led coalition benefited from quick and effective security-political cooperation from Arab Gulf states... it is reasonable to believe that Operations Desert Shield and Storm would have proceeded less smoothly had the GCC never formed [prior to the invasion of Kuwait].”¹⁸⁴

12.3 Overall Information Centrality Score and Predicted Outcome:

The U.S.' information centrality score relative to Iraq was a 5, above the threshold

¹⁸³ Resnick, "U.S. Bargaining Behavior," 160.

¹⁸⁴ Yetiv, "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," 200.

for adequate information. Paired with a medial risk objective, the model predicts appeasement would be successful in stalling until an optimal moment for confrontation.

12.4 Outcome of Appeasement for Stalling

Although the outcome was the gulf war this ultimately indicates success of the appeasement policy; the U.S. had greater footing to address the outstanding tensions that made Iraq an adversary. Supporting Iraq had prolonged the Iran-Iraq war and prevented Iraq's early defeat and empowerment of Iran,¹⁸⁵ while still managing to drain Iraq of its resources and creating enormous debt. It had maintained access to the gulf and improved its influence in the region through the creation of the GCC all without resolving its conflicts with the Iraqi agenda. With the reduction of the Iranian threat, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in the continued pursuit of expansion, the U.S. engaged in the Gulf War with more international and regional support, more access to information about Iraq and against an already tired adversary, all of which contributed to its success.¹⁸⁶ With enough information, appeasement can be used to successfully achieve riskier state objectives.

13. China and Britain (1927), Sweden and Norway (1905), Brazil-Argentina (1979), China-Japan (1932-37)

The remaining cases were run through the model and are summarized for discussion. The information centrality scores can be found in Appendix Figure 2(b).

The British chose to appease China to maintain the status quo in China and protect their interests in Shanghai from the immediate threat presented by the violent repossession of Hankow.¹⁸⁷ This was a medial risk objective and Britain had adequate

¹⁸⁵ Reagan, Ronald. "Foreign Policy January 1988."

¹⁸⁶ Yetiv, "The Outcomes of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," 209.

¹⁸⁷ Kentwell, L.K., *Reports Made 1916-1929: Extracts From D.S.I. Robertson's Report July 1, 1927.*

information; the predicted and actual outcome was successful appeasement. The Hankow crisis was resolved and Shanghai remained under British control until it was peacefully turned over to China with substantial protection for economic interests.¹⁸⁸

Sweden wanted to maintain the peaceful status quo in the long-term with Norway in order to maintain its access to resources regionally, and its prestige globally and to ensure peace with the neighboring population in the long-term. The objective was crisis prevention, a low-risk objective but with sparse information; meaning the outcome would be uncertain. The dissolution agreement prevented the crisis specific to the dissolution although relations continued to be tense until World War I with occasional flare-ups.¹⁸⁹

Argentina's objective was a limited political trade with Brazil as it wanted to improve its position in the region and had to do so urgently due to its ongoing conflict with Chile. This was a high-risk objective as the balance of power placed Brazil at a significant advantage and had it refused to comply with the terms of the agreement the effects on Argentina would have been immediate and crippling. However Argentina had an adequate information centrality score regarding Brazil. The predicted outcome was uncertain and the actual outcome was a successful limited trade that served as a basis for continued positive development in Brazil and Argentina's relationship.¹⁹⁰

China appeased Japan in order to stall confrontation with a less-pressing enemy to a more optimal time. This is a medial risk objective as there is no guarantee of improvement of the power balance in the future and no certainty that the power disparity will grow past a point of return. However China fell short of sufficient information and

¹⁸⁸ Fung, "The Sino-British Rapprochement, 1927-1931," 100.

¹⁸⁹ Kupchan, "Enemies Into Friends," 126.

¹⁹⁰ Paul, T. V. *Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons*. N.p.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000. Chapter XI: *Non-Allied States: Argentina and Brazil*: 102

the predicted outcome would be uncertain. The Chinese did eventually confront the Japanese after their invasion. The war ended with unconditional Japanese surrender to the Allied powers of World War II and the return of invaded territory.¹⁹¹

Discussion and Hypotheses *Stage 1 Discussion*

The majority of the hypotheses relate to the second stage of the model, as the first stage is primarily intended to illustrate and model how rational actors might have objectives that can be attained with appeasement. However, applying the model to the cases both illustrated the mechanisms of rational decision-making in practice, and revealed ways in which it could be refined to be a more accurate explanatory tool.

Appeasement, as demonstrated in the model and in the cases necessarily involves some form of absolute loss; rationality assumes that there is a logical calculation behind accepting or choosing an absolute loss and explains that logic. In each of the cases, it was possible to trace one of the rational actor mechanisms for using appeasement as a grand strategy based on the objective (preferences) and time-frame (means). Whether appeasement was used to preserve higher priority preferences (feasible set logic); pursue sure gains over risky higher payoffs (gains preference model and prospect theory; or to push confrontation into the future without empowering the adversary (Powell Model), that policy choice was calculated as opposed to deterministic. This distinction is crucial in understanding the second stage of the model because the successes and failures become the result of how accurate a state executive was in those rational calculations.

¹⁹¹ *Illustrated London News*. "Hongkong, Singapore and Elsewhere after the Final Defeat of Japan." London: 6 Oct. 1945. *The Illustrated London News Historical Archive*:372-373.

The most outstanding is that preferences to alter or maintain the status quo are not as black and white as they were made out to be in the original model. The rational actor model assume that if a state wants to alter or maintain the status quo this preference was in direct relation to the state it was appeasing. Three cases contradicted this assumption; Brazil and Argentina, the Agadir crisis and the dissolution of Sweden and Norway.

Preferences to alter or maintain the status quo can be complicated, as can its time frame, when a third party is involved as was the case also in Agadir, or between the U.S. and Iraq where the appeaser is geographically removed from the situation.

Argentina was a weaker state than Brazil and therefore its desire to alter the status quo should have seen only concessions that would not further empower Brazil and widen the power disparity between them, but the concessions Argentina made to Brazil did exactly that because it perceived Brazil as non-belligerent, and was primarily interested in altering the status quo in the region overall even if not in relation to Brazil specifically.

For Sweden and Norway, Sweden's power advantage translated to a desire to maintain the status quo. Allowing Norway to secede altered the status quo by creating an independent country, but was still central to crisis prevention because peaceful relations with Norway were expected to contribute to maintaining Sweden's international prestige and economic prosperity, even if Norway gained power alongside its new statehood.

In the Agadir Crisis the concessions Germany made to France expedited the process of completely surrendering influence in Morocco, despite the desire to maintain the status quo that rationalizes appeasement for crisis resolution. However for the German leadership it is documented that their attention was directed towards obtaining compensation as a symbolic gesture. Compensation from France for going back on its

1909 agreement indicated respect for Germany as a World Power. Although conceding Morocco altered the status quo between France and Germany, Sudan was satisfactory for the leadership focused on maintaining prestige.

For the United States, its ability to stall a geopolitical rival came from its physical removal from the Gulf. Its concern with Iraq presented no existential threat to the and its efforts to alter the status quo didn't have to do with increasing its share of power in the world, but rather its influence in the region by addressing Iran as a more hostile adversary. This created a lot of temporal leeway for the U.S. despite the fact that there was an ongoing war, which generally would shorten the time frame in the original model.

These examples demonstrate that explaining objectives and the choice to appease as a function of status quo preferences is more nuanced than the initial model suggests. Further attention to understanding these nuances is a good place for further research.

Stage II and Hypothesis Discussion

The hypotheses pertaining to the use of appeasement were as follows:

Hypothesis A: State A requires abundant information to succeed in appeasement.

Hypothesis B: State A will always succeed when using appeasement if it pursues a low risk objective.

Hypothesis C(a) Appeasement is likely to fail as a policy to alter the status quo.

Hypothesis C (b) Appeasement is can only be a successful policy for altering the status quo when a state has abundant information.

The distribution of success and failure across risk level and the information threshold generally support the hypothesis with some adjunction. The only concrete case of failure was Britain's attempt to appease Italy, with sparse information and a high-risk objective. Argentina successfully appeased with a high-risk objective but adequate information. Within the medial risk objectives, the two cases in which the actors had

adequate information were clearly successful. However two of the other cases with sparse information (and uncertain predictions) had ambiguous outcomes. They were formally categorized had complicating factors, which did not map onto the model as neatly as expected. In the Agadir case, Germany's Foreign Office officially resolved the crisis and achieved its preferred outcome, however the resolution failed to fully resolve the source of tension, which was the German perception of its interests being undermined by France in Morocco. While appeasement resolved the crisis, this perception remained a main source of the discontent that culminated into World War I.¹⁹² In the China-Japan case, the war became linked to World War II and the Japan's surrender was to all of the Allies. It is uncertain what the outcome would have been independently. However, involvement of world powers was part of China's calculation so the outcome of the policy is success. In the low risk objective cases, China-Pakistan had adequate information and its outcome was clear success. Sweden also had a sparse information centrality score but a lower risk objective. Although it still continued to navigate somewhat tense relations with Norway for several years it was successful in preventing a secessionist conflict.¹⁹³ These trends support hypothesis B. Both low risk objectives had successful outcomes, the only failure was a high-risk objective and the medial risks had successful or ambiguous outcomes.

The evidence also provides support to hypothesis A: variation in information centrality explains the difference in outcome of the two high-risk objectives, and accounts for the variation at the medial risk level between ambiguous and successful outcomes. When comparing the only clear-cut appeasement failure (Anglo-Italian Agreement) against the other high-risk case (Tripartite Agreement) Hypothesis A.

¹⁹² Mortimer, "Commercial Interests and German Diplomacy," 456.

¹⁹³ Kupchan, "Enemies Into Friends," 126.

Argentina had a higher information centrality score and successfully used appeasement for a limited political trade. Britain was below the threshold for information centrality while Argentina was above it and had more success in using appeasement. Within the medial risk cases, The U.S.-Iraq and Britain-China cases where there was adequate information had clearly successful outcomes while the Germany-France and China-Japan cases, with sparse information, had ambiguous outcomes. This demonstrates a trend that more information increases the likelihood of successful appeasement as opposed to failure or ambiguous outcomes counterparts with sparse information centrality.

Hypothesis C (a) and C (b) need to be considered together; Hypothesis C(a) predicts that states altering the status quo are less likely to successfully appease. The only clearly failed case was Britain's attempt to alter the status quo. One of the two ambiguous outcomes was China's attempt to alter the status quo against Japan. The other ambiguous case was Germany's attempt to maintain the status quo in Agadir. However all the other states preferring to maintain the status quo were successful in using appeasement, as were the remaining states preferring to alter the status quo. Hypothesis C (b) helps to explain that by identifying that states preferring to alter the status quo will be more successful with greater information centrality. The failed attempt by Britain to alter the status quo suffered from sparse information, while the successful use of appeasement by states seeking to alter the status quo had high scores, which partially supports the hypotheses. It also reinforces the conclusion that *the information centrality indicators and variable needs to be further refined and improved*. This also suggests that the status quo preference variable is also in need of more clarity and refinement.

While the evidence supports the hypotheses, the fact that several cases had

ambiguous outcomes has several potential implications. It could indicate that the information centrality measure is not as robust as it should be. If there is a threshold, all those cases above it should be clearly successful while all those below it should be clear failures. Ambiguity suggests there might be nuance in the information centrality scoring that has a significant impact on outcomes. However this may also indicate that the indicator for success or failure of appeasement is under-elaborated or too vague. With stricter criteria the cases could potentially be categorized in a way that more clearly proves or ends up disproving the hypotheses.

While there is certainly room to strengthen and refine the indicators, the demonstrated trends hold significant implications. Information affected intra-risk category outcomes: States were able to overcome the high or medial risk obstacles with adequate information, and other states without adequate information were only completely successful in low risk categories. This suggests that *information may be a more weighted variable than risk in determining the outcome of appeasement, complemented by the policy's associated level of risk*. This would require testing information independently and modeling risk as an intervening variable, or testing more cases for intra-risk category comparison.

The conclusion that information may hold more weight as a variable would be consistent with a rational actor model, as rationality, risk assessment and strategic decision making are all premised on gathering and evaluating information to produce the best decision in any given case. This also ties back to the discussion of Section I and the conclusion that success or failure is not deterministic, it depends on the accuracy of executive calculations and their predisposition to act based on those calculations.

Information is critical in establishing the accuracy of anticipated outcomes prior to deciding on a strategy. From that point rational actors can be risk averse or more risk inclined, in a neoclassical realist framework, based on their perceptions of the balance of power and of domestic resources. Rational state executives have a *subjective* preference to alter or maintain the status quo based on system and domestic level factors. They seek objective information in order to predict whether appeasement will achieve their objective and will pursue a policy more or less likely to succeed based on their degree of risk inclination. A main conclusion regarding the model itself is that in a neoclassical realist model, which models significant autonomy of the state level executive, risk assessment, risk aversion and risk inclination are each subjective to an extent. As a result preferences to alter or maintain the status quo are not black and white and the existence of ‘grey’ areas creates the need to more clearly define and understand that concept. Another conclusion is that while the findings about the role of information generally supported the hypotheses, some cases had ambiguous outcomes indicating that the information centrality variable needs significant further research and clarification.

Finally, while the model was mostly accurate in predicting the outcomes, it was weakest in the ‘uncertain’ category predictions because these were the cases where the lack of clarity in Stage 1 and the lack of nuance in the information centrality variable compounded and created uncertain predictions with similarly ambiguous outcomes. At this point the model explains best-fit cases well and is a strong explanatory model because the variables function well enough to illustrate a more nuanced model of appeasement. However the concepts are nuanced within themselves and need further testing to clarify its individual components and strengthen its predictive capability.

Original and Contemporary Case: Revisiting Munich and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran

14. Revisiting Munich

The Munich case will not be run through the model in the same format as other historical cases and the contemporary case below. However Ripsman and Levy wrote an article reconsidering the Munich lesson, which departs from the other articles considered in the literature review.¹⁹⁴ It looks at the merits of Munich as a strategic choice and what appeasement may have accomplished in the most referenced case of appeasement failure.

Some of the findings here complement that article and merit brief discussion. They rethink appeasement as a foreign policy tool and argue that it can “be used to reduce tensions with one adversary to conserve resources for use against a second, more threatening, adversary; to separate an adversary from potential allies; to redirect an adversary's hostility toward another target; or to buy time to build up strength for deterrence or defense against the adversary.”¹⁹⁵ These mechanisms fit into the categories of this model for different time frames, and different status quo preferences. They also characterize “that British leaders recognized the growing German threat but felt they had no good options for dealing with it. They believed that Germany had already surpassed Britain in effective military power, and consequently that Britain, alone or even with France, could not yet win a war against Germany. They believed, however, that with a major rearmament effort the military imbalance could be corrected by the late 1930s.”¹⁹⁶

Essentially they argue that Britain was stalling its confrontation with Germany and that such a choice was strategic by demonstrating the constraints Britain faced, its

¹⁹⁴ Ripsman and Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time.”

¹⁹⁵ Ripsman and Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time,” 150.

¹⁹⁶ Ibid

assessment of the balance of power with Germany and its efforts to use the time to alter its position. However the argument sets its own limit and stops short of asserting that this policy choice was the best one. Of course to definitively say that a policy was the best possible choice is impossible as counterfactuals are not sufficient evidence, the model here can retroactively predict the expected success of the Munich policy. Ripsman and Levy's arguments make the case for categorizing Britain as having a stalling objective placing it in the medial risk category and demonstrate why it would be rational. Stage II of the model is applied to determine Britain's information centrality score.¹⁹⁷ This is a complementary assessment to explain why the policy failed despite its rational objective to buy time. This re-affirms the need to separate the rationality of appeasement from its outcomes. Failed appeasement does not imply the policy was irrational and vice-versa.

15. The U.S. (State A) and Iran (State B): 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

15.1 Case Description

In July 2015 Iran and the P5+1 group comprised of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and led by the United States signed an agreement regarding Iran's nuclear program after two years of ongoing negotiations under subsequent interim agreements. The deal that went into effect in 2016 permitted Iran to continue developing its nuclear energy program for peaceful purposes and included provisions to gradually lift the sanctions regime against it.¹⁹⁸ The "the condition for implementation" of the nuclear deal in Iran is the closing of the possible military dimensions issue."¹⁹⁹ Iran's commitments regarding de-weaponization of its nuclear facilities included reducing its

¹⁹⁷ Appendix Supplement 1: Munich Information Centrality Score

¹⁹⁸ Albright, David, and Andrea Stricker. "Iran's Nuclear Program." United States Institute of Peace: The Iran Primer. 2015: 3

¹⁹⁹ Davenport, Kelsey. "Iran Dismantling Centrifuges, IAEA Says." *Arms Control Today* 45, no. 10 (December 2015):2.

total number of installed centrifuges from 19,000 to 6,104 first-generation centrifuges, of which 5,060 will enrich uranium to reactor-grade levels at Natanz. The remaining 1,044 will be at Fordo, which is to be converted to an isotope research center. All dimensions of the de-weaponization process, as well as Iran's continued nuclear energy development program will be monitored by the IAEA with full access.²⁰⁰

15.2 Preference to Alter the Status Quo

As with several of the cases, the preference to alter the status quo does not reflect the balance of power specifically between the United States and Iran. The status quo in this case has to do with the consistent progress Iran had been making since 1988 when it began working on achieving a full nuclear cycle, building uranium enrichment infrastructure and conversion capabilities, building crude nuclear explosives and warheads. Iran accelerated its centrifuge-manufacturing program in 2006 and refused to answer IAEA inquiries on its experiments, research and development. The discovery of its secret enrichment facility in Qom revealed its proximity to breakthrough capacity despite the longstanding set of sanctions imposed from 2006 to 2010.²⁰¹

Its progress was almost entirely beyond the scope of the international non-proliferation monitoring mechanisms as it continued to refuse to comply with the IAEA, expand its work at Natanz and Fordo with increasing numbers of centrifuges and enriching uranium to 20%. Reports by the IAEA and vocal concerns of the international community indicate the belief that Iran had developed to the point that it was six to twelve months from producing enough weapon-grade uranium to build a nuclear weapon.

²⁰⁰ Albright and Stricker, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 9.

²⁰¹ Ibid

This indicated that Iran had maintained momentum towards acquiring a nuclear weapon, and the sanctions regime was insufficient or ineffective. The growing possibility of Iran's acquisition of a weapon, given that Iran's centrifuge program had an estimated potential breakout time of about two months at the start of negotiations, was unacceptable.²⁰² Many of Iran's neighbors were wary of an Iranian nuclear bomb and could seek their own nuclear deterrent, or even to duplicate the nuclear capabilities if Iran succeeded. If Iran had successfully built a nuclear weapon at that point, the status quo would have been for it to continue to operate without complying to IAEA safeguards.²⁰³

All of this was unacceptable to the United States and its partners. The nuclear deal was designed to address the status quo surrounding Iran's nuclear program by essentially locking Iran into the nuclear oversight framework.²⁰⁴ Prior to Washington's engagement in negotiations, Iran had withdrawn from its Additional Protocol agreement, which is the mechanism that permitted the IAEA to search for evidence nuclear facilities undeclared by the government, and to monitor them should they be detected. The deal creates leverage to bring Iran's now legal nuclear program under proper surveillance with a re-implemented Additional Protocol and keep it energy oriented.²⁰⁵ Covertly building a weapon after the deal would require Iran to replicate from scratch its enrichment program prior to the deal, which would costly, complicated and detectable.²⁰⁶ A covert program could also serve as the basis for military action against it, which further shifts the balance

²⁰² Glaser, Alexander, Zia Mian, Hossein Mousavian, and Frank von Hippel. "Agreeing on Limits for Iran's Centrifuge Program: A Two-Stage Strategy." *Arms Control Today* 44, no. 6 (July 2014): 9.

²⁰³ Albright and Stricker, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 1.

²⁰⁴ Nephew, Richard. "How the Iran Deal Prevents a Covert Nuclear Weapons Program." *Arms Control Today* 45, no. 7 (September 2015):10-12

²⁰⁵ Kerr, Paul K. "Iran's Nuclear Program: Tehran's Compliance with International Obligations." *Congressional Research Service* (April 4, 2017): 4.

²⁰⁶ Nephew, "How the Iran Deal Prevents a Covert Nuclear Weapons Program," 10.

of power between Iran and those opposed to the potential military dimensions of a nuclear program.²⁰⁷ The deal was designed to alter the status quo by shifting the direction of direction of the program from progression to regression albeit temporarily, and by integrating Iran into the non-proliferation oversight regime.

15.3 Evidence of a Long-term Time Frame

Although the deal was pushed through with the intention of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon in the imminent future, the deal itself and the negotiations leading up to it were all designed as postponements. Regarding the negotiations the repeated extension of the negotiations saw the slow release of concessions in exchange for enhanced safeguards against military use.²⁰⁸ The focus of the negotiations and of the deal were two-fold; to prolong the time-frame for militarization of Iran's nuclear capacity which was evident in the continued renewal of interim deals and in the final substance of the deal, and to reposition Iran's nuclear program in the international government and regulation framework in contrast to its unmonitored acceleration in the past. The JCPOA is expected to be a "very thorough nonproliferation agreement that will reverse Iran's progress and stop it well short of nuclear weapons for a generation or more [as] it requires a substantial reconfiguration of Iran's program."²⁰⁹ Although the intention was to prolong an imminent threat, the negotiations and the final deal were also forward looking.

Furthermore "failure to reach a deal was expected to mean a revert to a hostile stance in which Iran raised its enrichment levels to more than 20% and Washington

²⁰⁷ Nephew, "How the Iran Deal Prevents a Covert Nuclear Weapons Program," 12.

²⁰⁸ Geranmayeh, Ellie. "Extending the Iran Nuclear Talks: Not Ideal, but Not Defeat." *Arms Control Today* 45, no. 1 (January 2015): 8.

²⁰⁹ Kimball, Daryl G. "Why Congress Should Support the Iran Deal." *Arms Control Today* 45, no. 7 (September 2015): 3

considered its military options.”²¹⁰ By refusing to abandon negotiations Washington demonstrated that the focus was not on immediately destroying Iran’s program through military means, but to take a moderate paced negotiating route with gradual relaxation of relations and of the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.

15.4 Evidence of Objective to Stall

The JCPOA ultimately has an expiration date and its primary objective was and remains to preclude Iran’s immediate breakthrough at a time when the U.S. and its partners have no effective way of monitoring or engaging with it on the nuclear issue. The JCPOA lengthened “Iran’s ‘breakout time’ from roughly one to two months as of late 2013 to seven to 12 months during the first 10 years of the deal.”²¹¹ It placed significant limits on Iran’s nuclear enrichment program for at least 10 years although once the 10 years expires there is an expected quick return to breakout time. After 10 years Iran will be allowed to deploy advanced centrifuges, reducing breakout timelines to about six months. After 15 years of the agreement, breakout timelines can reach as little as a few days with enrichment in advanced centrifuges and the removal of the cap on the 3.67 percent LEU and resumed production of near 20 percent LEU.²¹²

This acts as evidence of a strategic stalling approach in two ways: first, “The JCPOA’s fundamental goal is to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful even after its major nuclear limitations end. For 10 years, this agreement creates conditions that will make any serious effort by Iran to build nuclear weapons highly time consuming and vulnerable to detection...but whether [it] meets the goal of preventing Iran from building

²¹⁰ Geranmayeh, “Extending the Iran Nuclear Talks,” 9.

²¹¹ Ibid

²¹² Albright and Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 10.

nuclear weapons in the long term is more doubtful.”²¹³ The deal at minimum acts as a postponement mechanism and works to alter the status quo either to the point that Iran no longer seeks a weapon, or when it does the international community is in a better position to deter it as opposed to starting from a place of extensive but ineffective sanctions.

This case is the best illustration, along with the U.S. and Iraq, of the explanatory superiority of neoclassical rational actor appeasement as opposed to constructivism, The JCPOA was not designed to improve the U.S. relationship with Iran on a whole, but to address the very acute and imminent threat posed by its nuclear program. This was a strategic and rational decision, made based on the knowledge of what the U.S. could stand to put to the side in order to resolve a threat it lacked the present capacity to address.²¹⁴

Although the JCPOA is not a permanent halt on the program, it created space between the present and the moment Iran would have the capability to acquire a weapon too quickly for the international community to respond. It also shifts Iran’s relation to the non-proliferation framework in a more permanent way;

“the deal included blocking of the plutonium production pathway for 15 years through a re-design of Arak reactor, no production of heavy water, and no plutonium reprocessing allowed during this period; Regulation of Iran’s nuclear related imports for 10 years through a U.N. mandated procurement channel; an enhanced transparency and verification of Iran’s nuclear program through its implementation of the Additional Protocol, a binding IAEA access provision to sites suspected of secret nuclear activities, and a parallel process for settling the IAEA’s concern about the possible military dimensions...”²¹⁵

These provisions represent efforts at a permanent and fundamental change to the international community’s ability to monitor and regulate Iran’s nuclear program because

²¹³ Albright and Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 11.

²¹⁴ Dr. Gary Samore, Robert J. Einhorn. Ray Takeyh interviewed by Deborah Amos. *The President’s Inbox Series “The Iran Nuclear Deal: The Future of the JCPOA”* Council on Foreign Relations. February, 2017.

²¹⁵ Albright and Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 8.

“It puts in place safeguards the notification of design changes or new nuclear projects. As opposed to Iran’s continued non-adherence to Additional Protocols for comprehensive monitoring, under the JCPOA the additional protocol and early-notification requirements will remain in place. Together, these rigorous limits and transparency measures will make it very likely that any future effort by Iran to develop nuclear weapon be detected promptly, providing world powers with the opportunity to stop the effort,”²¹⁶

This new infrastructure is meant to establish a new normal of greater access to information and capacity to handle Iran’s eventual nuclear breakthrough, should it occur.

16. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: Stage II and Prediction

16.1 Risk Level

One of the major criticisms of the JCPOA is the presumed risk that Iran could simply carry on weapons development covertly while still benefitting from the concession it will receive as part of the deal. A second associated risk is that Iran’s nuclear plan will simply revert to its rapid breakout capacity once the deal expires and the United States and its allies will not in a better position to confront the problem. There are components of the deal that validate these risk concerns to an extent;

“No intermediate penalties are outlined in the JCPOA for responding to minor problems or violations by Iran of its commitments. Most U.N. and national sanctions will be removed at the start of the agreement and only their full “snapback” is designated to deal with issues of noncompliance. This means that the deal would likely be terminated by Iran over a P5+1 decision to escalate to snapback, thus the P5+1 may accept less than full compliance by Iran in order to avoid this. Leverage for ensuring Iranian compliance is thus far from certain.”²¹⁷

The concern regarding noncompliance without penalty is coupled with the risk that Iran will resist integration into the nuclear nonproliferation oversight framework. The scope and manner of the investigation agreed to by the IAEA and Iran over possible military dimensions of the program is not public information. Iran could deny the IAEA access to sites, information, or individuals and in theory conduct covert nuclear activities.

²¹⁶ Kimball, “Why Congress Should Support the Iran Deal,” 3.

²¹⁷ Albright and Stricker, “Iran’s Nuclear Program,” 8.

The P5+1 may tolerate refusals to cooperate or grant access, or even a weakened inspection arrangement, in order to keep the deal from collapsing. In addition there are several critical protocols, which do not come into effect as late as 8 years into the deal.²¹⁸

The risk is the possibility that the deal will not in fact alter the status quo and will increase the momentum and progress of Iran towards being a nuclear power. Part of this presumed risk is contingent on the assumption that the U.S. and its partners will be unable to detect violations, which was demonstrated above to be difficult and unlikely, or that they will do nothing if violations are detected. While this is possible, it would not be rational to ignore those violations in a longer time frame, which provides the time to adequately respond to such violations. Additionally, the rationality of continuing the deal in the face of known violations is separate from the rationality of the initial appeasement.

16.2 Information Centrality

Most criticism of the JCPOA revolves around the inability to effectively monitor compliance and implement safeguards to prevent Iran from continuing its activities covertly. For the agreement to be rational, it needed to be expected to succeed in stalling nuclear breakthrough. Forming that expectation required considerable information.

Mutual Membership in IGO's

The deal was negotiated between the P5+1, the European Union and Iran in the United Nations setting.²¹⁹ The deal is inextricably linked to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and regulated through U.N. organs like the Office on Disarmament Affairs and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and

²¹⁸ Albright and Stricker, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 9.

²¹⁹ United Nations Security Council, 7350th Meeting. Sixty-Ninth Year. Non-proliferation: *Briefing by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)*. 18 December 2014.

addresses the sanctions regime established by the United Nations Security Council. The JCPOA was also reinforced by UNSC Resolution 2231, which the Council adopted in July 2015 to override its previous resolutions pertaining to Iran's nuclear program.²²⁰ Iran, the U.S. and its negotiating partners are part of the United Nations and participate in the non-proliferation regime established by the NPT. This indicator is coded as 1.

Pre-existing Bi-lateral Relations

While some of the negotiating partners have bilateral relations with Iran, the United States does not. The United States maintains an interests section in the Swiss Embassy in Tehran, while Iran maintains an interests section in Pakistan's Embassy in Washington.²²¹ The negotiations are the first overt engagement between the two since the Iranian Revolution and hostage crisis. This indicator is coded as 0.

Prior Negotiations

The final JCPOA followed two years of negotiations under an interim framework established in subsequent Joint Plans of Action also following a series of back channel talks between Iran and the U.S.²²² These interim agreements were intended to freeze Iran's nuclear progress while negotiating a longer-term.²²³ This indicator is coded as 1.

Intelligence Gathering

The momentum to begin negotiations was the result of significant intelligence gathering efforts regarding Iran's nuclear program. In September 2009, the United States, France, and Britain revealed the existence of a small, covert, and deeply buried uranium

²²⁰ Kerr, "Iran's Nuclear Program," Summary.

²²¹ "Embassy of Switzerland - Foreign Interests Section," ; "Interests Section of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

²²² Albright and Stricker, "Iran's Nuclear Program," 2.

²²³ United Nations Security Council, 7350th Meeting. Sixty-Ninth Year. Non-proliferation: *Briefing by the Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006)*. 18 December 2014: 6.

enrichment plant being built in Iran near the city of Qom.²²⁴ The United States and its allies have developed extensive intelligence agencies that cooperate extensively on counter-terrorism, which includes surveillance of state sponsors such as Iran.

Additionally, although Iran has been resistant to IAEA monitoring, the organization still has a significant capacity to gather information about the programs, especially with the newly re-implemented Additional Protocol. It shares this information with United Nations members in reports and has for the most part been effective in surveillance of Iran's program and determining its capacity.²²⁵ This indicator is coded as 1.

Historical Lessons

The only historical lesson to the JCPOA is the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) preceding it for the duration of negotiations restricted the amount of enriched uranium Iran could produce, reduced the number of centrifuges and sites it could operate, lengthened the time to “break out” —or the amount of time it would take Iran to produce one significant quantity of weapon-grade uranium for a nuclear weapon— and opened its program to additional transparency.²²⁶ However this does not constitute a historical lesson as it is part of the same specific case. The U.S. and Iran have had no cooperation, aside from the disastrous Iran-Contra affair since the post-revolution regime in Tehran. Iran has been one of the United States' greatest geopolitical rivals so the U.S. had no model for successful cooperation with Iran prior to this deal. The indicator is coded as 0.

Access to Broker Groups

Iran has significant division in its internal politics between hard-liners and moderates. While policy ultimately lies with the country's Supreme Leader Khomeini,

²²⁴ Ibid

²²⁵ Kerr, "Iran's Nuclear Program."

²²⁶ Albright and Stricker, "Iran's Nuclear Program,"7.

who has said parts of the deal will not go into effect before the conclusion of the IAEA's investigation into Possible Military Dimensions of the program,²²⁷ moderates have considerable leverage in a country whose population overwhelmingly favors engagement. This was demonstrated even in Iran's most recent re-election of President Rouhani over his hard-liner opponent. The moderate factions of government are responsible for reciprocal engagement on the nuclear deal.²²⁸ They have incentive to negotiate and finalize a deal they can successfully pass through domestic procedures for the purposes of their own credibility in pushing for engagement and their negotiations are most likely to reflect what can be realistically expected to succeed. This indicator is coded as 1.

16.3 Information Centrality Score and Predicted Outcome

The information centrality score is 4, which is above the threshold of adequate information but on the lower end of adequate. Paired with medial risk, the outcome would still be predicted as success. For clarity, success does not denote an eradication of Iran's nuclear program; it refers to the successful delay of breakout capacity to the future date set within the agreement and improvement in the position of the U.S. and its negotiation partners relative to Iran in terms of monitoring and preparedness as this was the deal's intended strategic purpose. In more concrete terms this would mean a successful reduction in breakout time, maintained for the duration of the agreement and cooperation with IAEA monitoring, establishing infrastructure for ongoing monitoring in the future.

²²⁷ Davenport, "Iran Dismantling Centrifuges, IAEA Says," 24.

²²⁸ *BBC Middle East*. "Iran election: Hassan Rouhani wins second term as president," BBC News. 20 May, 2017.

16.4 Outcome to Date

Initially following the agreements implementation Iran began dismantling centrifuges to comply with the restrictions on its nuclear program. In its quarterly report, the IAEA counted 4,530 of them as dismantled.²²⁹ Pursuant to the JCPOA “Tehran has rendered the Arak reactor’s original core inoperable. Iran has also begun to fulfill all JCPOA requirements to redesign and rebuild the Arak reactor based on a design agreed to by the P5+1 so that it will not produce weapons-grade plutonium.

In the final stage of negotiation, Iran began providing the IAEA information it had been withholding since 2007 regarding the organization’s investigation into substantive concerns with the “Possible Military Dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. The two issued a joint statement describing a “Framework for Cooperation,” in which Iran and the IAEA agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program through the resolution of all outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA.”²³⁰ The IAEA confirmation that Iran has taken the steps required for Implementation Day in 2016, it now focuses on monitoring and verifying Iran’s JCPOA implementation “in light of” UNSC Resolution 2231.²³¹ Since then Iran has mostly complied with monitoring and when the IAEA has identified non-compliance in its quarterly or special reports, Iran has then provided the information. It has begun re-implementing the Additional Protocol it retracted from in 2006 establishing greater monitoring capacities for the IAEA.²³²

²²⁹ Davenport, "Iran Dismantling Centrifuges, IAEA Says," 24.

²³⁰ Kerr, "Iran’s Nuclear Program," 2.

²³¹ United Nations Security Council: Security Council Facilitator for the Implementation of Resolution 2231. *Letter dated 25 July 2016 from the Security Council Facilitator for the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).*

²³² Kerr, "Iran’s Nuclear Program," 4.

There have been recorded concerns of activities by Iran since the deal's implementation, although all of these issues were raised and addressed by the IAEA. Iran has announced a plan to build a 10-MWt light-water research reactor near Shiraz for which it would need LEU fuel- this is not in violation of the deal but it would make Iran the non-nuclear weapon state with the most high-power research reactors which could be concerning without continued enforcement of expanding the monitoring framework.²³³

The most recent reviews of the deal's progress, issued in April, have all found Iran to be in compliance with the nuclear deal. This includes an assessment done by the new administration. Despite this positive review of Iran's compliance, the Trump administration has ordered a review of the concessions promised in the nuclear deal due to Iran's continued state sponsorship of terrorism.²³⁴

16.5 Rational Actor Framework and Neoclassical Realist Framework

The pattern of sanctions relief found in the JCPOA directly reflects the logic of the Powell Model. Slow release of assets and conditional sanctions relief as compensation for meaningful progress and change indicates the logic of not strengthening an adversary with concessions that would empower them beyond a point of redress. The U.S.-Iran case is also the strongest case presented that demonstrates the need for stalling through appeasement and the concept of strategic delay. There is a very pure calculation of how valuable time is. The negotiations and the agreement with all of its concessions were made because there was a clear expected benefit to buying that time. Strategic delay works up to the point that prolonging the confrontation no longer gives the appeasing state an advantage. Buying time to integrate Iran into a monitoring

²³³ Glaser et.al. "Agreeing on Limits for Iran's Centrifuge Program," 10.

²³⁴ Wroughten, Lesley. "U.S. says Iran complies with nuke deal but orders review on lifting sanctions." *Reuters World News*. 19 April 2017.

framework and to make efforts towards normalized relations while only providing concessions upon evidence of progress towards those expected benefits clearly demonstrates the mechanism of prolonging without empowering.

While the outcome is still undetermined the case supports the conclusion that information centrality is the vital component of strategic appeasement as the deal emphasized depended on IAEA monitoring and international regulation.

The role of the executive is also exceedingly clear in the U.S.-Iran case. The agreement was a major initiative of the Obama administration. It faced domestic resistance from Congress, the public and interest groups but was executed by rational leaders. The change of administration can have as great an impact on undoing the agreement as the original administration had in executing it. Although Iran's recent presidential election reaffirmed the strength of Iranian moderates, which is encouraging for engagement between Tehran and Washington, progress is tenuous. The outcome of the deal in stalling confrontation with Iran and integrating it in the non-proliferation framework is uncertain if the U.S. reverses its decision to strategically appease.²³⁵

16.6 Policy Prescriptions

There are some policy prescriptions, which arise from the discussion above about the potential for the JCPOA's success. However given the drastic shift in attitude between the current administration and its predecessor, many of these prescriptions are not likely to be implemented. While the Trump administration's position on the JCPOA is at best stable, it is unclear where the policy will go in the future. The recommendations will be presented in ascending order of likelihood to be implemented, beginning with

²³⁵ Erdbrink, Thomas. "Rouhani Wins Re-election in Iran by a Wide Margin," New York Times: Middle East. 20 May 2017.

actions that would encourage success but which the current administration is highly unlikely to pursue given its policies, official statements or tweets.

- **Prescription I:** The administration should limit its retaliatory sanctions for the duration of the period in which it reviews its position on the JCPOA.
 - Although these sanctions are related to sponsorship of terrorism or other non-JCPOA, Iran has made it clear that sanctions that might breach the JCPOA's stipulations will lead to retaliation.²³⁶
 - Sanction activities targeted towards non-JCPOA issues, implemented in the context of the policy review, threaten the progress made in weakening Iran's nuclear program and enhancing the international community's verification capacity.
- **Prescription II:** The United States should continue and augment efforts at implementation and upholding the JCPOA in conjunction with its other international partners, as the best option for handling exclusively nuclear issues as they pertain to Iran.
- **Prescription III:** Use the agreed duration of the JCPOA in full to generate as much information as possible via international organizations (IAEA regulation.)
 - The U.S. should channel its public verification efforts through the IAEA consistently and be present throughout the process in appropriate channels.

²³⁶ Amos, *The President's Inbox Series "The Iran Nuclear Deal: The Future of the JCPOA*, February 2017

- The U.S. should also pursue or continue pursuing national intelligence gathering efforts on Iran's capabilities, terrain and all other information relevant to current and potential future capacities
- **Prescription IV:** The U.S. should seek to enhance its information centrality by encouraging private sector linkages with the potential to further influence favorable decisions within Iran.
 - This prescription is deemed unlikely given the current legislative efforts lauded by the executive to sanction Iran outside of the JCPOA framework.²³⁷
- **Prescription V:** Given that the success of appeasement to achieve a stalling objective is contingent on stalling until the opportune moment, the U.S. should avoid violating its commitments in the JCPOA as this could cause Iran to withdraw from the JCPOA pre-emptively.
 - Non-JCPOA Iran policies should be treated with caution to the extent that they could be interpreted as breaching the agreement with the same outcome of Iran's pre-emptive withdrawal.
- **Prescription VI:** The U.S. should absolutely refrain from withdrawing from the JCPOA in the near future prior to allowing Iran to further travel down the path of disarmament or in anyway cutting short the potential of the IAEA to gather crucial information via its verification procedures.

²³⁷ Associated Press, "President says Iran will 'respond' if US missile law passes." *Washington Post*, July 2017.

These policy recommendations are largely in conflict with the current administrations position. At the time of writing the United States remains party to the JCPOA but is ‘reviewing’ its Iran policy and vocalizing its reservations publicly, floating the possibility of withdrawal. This is harmful to the potential of the JCPOA to achieve its strategic stalling objective and therefore there is an overarching recommendation to refrain from brandishing this inflammatory policy stance.

Conclusion

Appeasement has the potential to be a rational and successful grand strategy for a state seeking to strategically achieve its policy objectives. Despite the negative historical lessons perpetuated by Munich, there have been successful uses of appeasement. Those successes, as well as failures can be modeled based assuming a unitary rational actor. Rational actor models require information and an individual with autonomous capacity to make calculations. In a theoretical model, these can be neatly depicted as a function of balance of power, risk adversity or propensity, time frames and available information. This theoretical model is sufficient as a basis for establishing appeasement as a strategic and rational choice, which departs from the conventional wisdom on that policy. The cases, as run through the model, demonstrate how these mechanisms can explain the rationale behind the choice of appeasement given domestic constraints, extrinsic systemic threats and the perceived bilateral relationship between two adversaries.

However, the case studies in this paper highlighted that in empirical cases, these variables are not as neat as in the theory. ‘Preferences to alter or maintain the status quo’ can describe a range of dynamics based on geographic proximity, relative hostility of the adversary, among other factors. This variable covers a considerable grey area and may be

best evaluated case-by-case using the model as a guideline. This makes future application less replicable, although it is likely to be more accurate if case specifics can be evaluated.

The highest chances of success are in well-informed and least risky choices to appease. The highest chance of failure comes with the least-informed and riskiest choice to appease. The most concrete variable in the rational model is information; to increase the chances of successful appeasement, increasing information is the primary prescription. Perfect information does not exist in practice and indicators for information in a theoretical model are complex in design. Time frame can vary both between and within objectives and rational actors may have subjective evaluations of whether or not they will act based on their risk inclination or aversity; more robust model of information centrality is critical to further advance a model of rational appeasement.

It is also important to note that this model can really only exist in a neoclassical realist framework, as it relies heavily on the mechanism of an individual performing these strategic calculations. Neoclassical realism is the only paradigm that models in an autonomous state executive, sensitive to both domestic and system level constraints and capable of absorbing this information to set objectives and rationally arrive at a decision to appease in order to pursue them. This is especially important given the conclusion that understanding appeasement implies sensitivity to ‘grey areas’ in decision-making because “in such an ambiguous environment, the perspectives of the leaders involved in foreign policy making can have more influence on what governments do.”²³⁸

²³⁸ Hermann, Margaret G., and Joe D. Hagan. "International Decision Making: Leadership Matters." *Foreign Policy* (1998):125.

This has both positive and negative implications for the contemporary case between the United States and Iran. The JCPOA has been accurately labeled as a appeasement, but the negative connotation to that was initially inaccurate. The concessions resulted in considerable strides in gaining the ability to effectively monitor Iran's nuclear program and lengthened the time frame for Iran reaching breakthrough capacity. Continuing through with the deal would likely have been successful in integrating Iran into the non-proliferation framework and in putting the United States in a better position to confront a nuclear Iran in the future. However the change in leadership in the U.S., particularly to an arguably less-than-rational actor means it is unlikely the JCPOA will achieve its potential in achieving U.S. objectives, despite its initial success.

Understanding the distinction between Stages I and II of the model is the key theoretical takeaway for understanding the concept of rational appeasement. Appeasement can deterministically be a rational policy choice to achieve the four objectives modeled in Stage I in that appeasement in theory could obtain those objectives at a preferential cost. This is separate from the likelihood of success of the policy, which need to be evaluated and determined separately. Failure of appeasement in a case where it could have been predicted to fail does not and should not imply that appeasement is an inherently irrational policy. As with any model that incorporates agency and is not deterministic, its predictive capabilities are uncertain but can still contribute to understanding why specific attempts at using appeasement failed without perjuring the policy as a whole. It is important to move away from the presumption that appeasement is inherently doomed as it has the potential to resolve international crises and tensions more strategically, more effectively and efficiently, and more peacefully.

The thesis was also written with the intention to provide suggestions on how the U.S. might successfully execute appeasement to achieve a strategic goal vis a vis Iran; the policy prescriptions are written with that intention. However, given recent developments and Iran's public response there is the very real possibility the JCPOA will fall apart without having accomplished these goals. Should that happen, this model serves to clarify that it is not appeasement itself that is an inadequate strategy for achieving state objectives and that the Iran case should not be seen as an example to that effect. Rather, it is the poor execution of the policy in the areas of risk inclination and attention to information that could cause the failure and if the JCPOA should fall apart the case can be an example of the caliber of leadership required to execute appeasement successfully.

Appendix

Figure 1a: Stephen Rock's Model of Appeasement Objectives

	Time Frame		
		Short Term	Long Term
Status Quo Preference	Alter Status Quo	Limited Political Trade	Friendship/Alliance Building
	Maintain Status Quo	Crisis Resolution	Crisis Prevention

Figure 1b: Modified version of Rock's Model of Appeasement Objectives

	Time Frame		
Status Quo Preference		Short Term	Long Term
	Alter Status Quo	Limited Political Trade	Stalling
	Maintain Status Quo	Crisis Resolution	Crisis Prevention

Figure 1c: Risk categories associated to State Objectives

	Time Frame		
Status Quo Preference		Short Term	Long Term
	Alter Status Quo	(High Risk) Limited Political Trade	(Medial Risk) Stalling
	Maintain Status Quo	(Medial Risk) Crisis Resolution	(Low Risk) Crisis Prevention

Table 1: Content Analysis terms by Case

Case	Content Analysis Terms				
Britain-China	Hankow Concession Negotiations Britain	Interests Crisis China	Resolution Conflict 1927		
Germany-France	Germany Agadir Crisis Interests	France Britain militarization 1909, 1911	(Southern) Morocco deployment/dispatch Compensation troops	Congo/Sudan Panther/gunboat concession diplomacy	
Sweden-Norway	Sweden Secession negotiation Fleet	Norway Union/Dissolution Military/mobilization Borders	1905 Peaceful invade/invasion Fortresses	Karlstad resolution	
China-Pakistan	Pakistan (Demarcated) Border Region/Regional	China Contiguous (territory) Balance (rising)	India 1963	Kashmir Power (Cycles)	
Britain-Italy	Anglo-Italian Germany East Africa 1938	Easter Accords Alliance/allies Middle East/Mediterranean Balance	Triple Threat Britain Propaganda	Axis Italy interests	
Brazil-Argentina	Power Brazil Interest	Regional/region Argentina Dam/Power plant	River/Itaipu Cooperation	1979 Concession	
U.S.-Iraq	United States War Loans/Debt Geopolitical (rivalry/tension)	Iraq prolonged/sustained Ships/tankers	Iran ignore Kuwait terrorism/nuclear/chemical	(Persian) Gulf Dual Use/Arms Aggression/Invasion	
China-Japan	China North/Northern China Western Powers military/outbreaks/war	Japan territory/expansion Communists red line	Manchuria Russia/Moscow/Soviets Nationalists Concession	Shanghai Chiang Kai-Shek	
U.S.-Iran	United States IAEA water/reactor/LEU Sanctions	Iran monitoring/framework/regulation Timeline nuclear (program/deal)	European Union PMD breakout capacity	Security Council/P5+1 centrifuges/heavy	

Table 2: Information Centrality Nodes

Indicator	Example Scoring Criteria (non-exhaustive)
Mutual Membership in International Governmental Organizations (IGOs)	Both states are Members/communicate in the U.N. or League of Nations and/or are part of a supplementary or separate international governance body/regulatory framework
Pre-existing bi-lateral relations	The two states had established, formal bilateral relations and not simply informal communication prior to the incident. Establishment of bilateral relations in the course of the appeasement policy does not qualify.
Prior Communication on the Outstanding Issue	This may include exchange of letters, ongoing negotiations or back-channel discussions leading to an agreement, formal statements. These must be specific to the issue area of the appeasement/concessions.
Historical Lessons of Cooperation	These are any existing interactions between the two states (excluding interactions predating a regime change that drastically shifted one or both of the states' positions) that offer indication of the potential for cooperation.
Intelligence gathering efforts	Specifically refers to covert efforts to gather information on the state in the context of considering making concessions through intelligence agencies, informants etc.
Access to Broker Groups	Access to people, interest groups or public opinion via salient issues. These must have an effect on decision makers in the opposing state (dictators shown to be especially isolated from public opinion would indicate the public was not a broker group.) These groups should be expected to exert pressure and create more reliable insight on anticipated outcomes.


Figure 2 (a): Information Centrality Threshold Model

Figure 2 (b) Information Centrality Scores of Additional Cases

Case ²³⁹	IGO	Bi-lateral relationship	Prior Communication	Historical Lessons	Intelligence Gathering	Broker groups	Total Score
Britain-China 1927	1 League of Nations	1 Several asymmetric treaties (1800s) favoring Britain and Establishing Legations	1 Britain had begun to re-examine Territoriality treaties.	1 Britain switched in 1920s from use of force to protect its interests to more cooperation	0 No evidence of covert intelligence gathering efforts	1 A large part of successful appeasement had to do with recognizing one side of China's ongoing domestic struggle as a negotiating partner	5
Brazil-Argentina 1979	1 United Nations	0 Communication and physical integration between the two neighbors was limited until the 1970s.	1 Negotiations were ongoing as of 1977; 4 years after the initial tension over the dam began.	0 The 1970s was a particularly tense decade for Brazil and Argentina with several failed attempts at cooperation.1979 is seen as a watershed moment in shifting away from bilateral antagonism	1 There was information collected on the Brazilian project on the river; what its effect would be on Brazil and on Argentina's own projects if any. This was used to determine whether the concession was even a consideration.	1 The armed forces in both countries were opposed to a possible conflict. relations were the most tense, in July 1977, the military activated parallel channels of dialogue. After one of these high level meetings, negotiations re-opened	4
Sweden Norway 1905	0 Norway not its own state and was represented by Sweden abroad; its Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created upon dissolution	1 Norway did have its own autonomous governance bodies (Parliament) and Constitutional Monarchy but it operated under Personal Union with the King of Sweden and the relationship operated as such.	1 Although dissolution was not disclosed to Sweden prior to its unilateral declaration, in the crisis diffusion that followed there were agents sent on behalf of Norway to negotiate with the Riksdag,	0 The 90 years of Union were characterized by Norway devoting significant tie and energy to resist Sweden's attempts to extend the bonds of an already asymmetric Union.	1 A report by "the History of War Department" within the Swedish Defense Staff from 1958 documents in detail the huge efforts on both sides to be ready for war. Sweden knew the extent of its military superiority prior to appeasing.	0 Swedes made no efforts to travel to Oslo or to see Norwegians in Stockholm, which was not surprising in view of the nature of the trouble between the two peoples.	3
China-Japan 1932-1937	0 Japan withdrew from the League of Nations after the assembly adopted a report blaming it for events in Manchuria	1 Although asymmetric, the two countries signed the '13 Demands' treaty issued as an ultimatum by Japan, which defined the relationship until World War II.	1 Chinese leadership was always in communication with the Japanese surrounding the incidents	0 The Japanese had been aggressively expanding without exception since World War I.	1 In 1933 Chiang set up the Office of Personal Attendants within the Military Commission to handle covert intelligence diplomatic and military information	0 No evidence of broker groups in Japan over which China had influence to pressure Japan into a more conciliatory approach or to limit its expansion	3

²³⁹ Fung 82-83, Gardini 59-60, 66, Lindgren 137-138, 141, Staaff 282 Defense Staff K.A., Nish 98-99, Chor 218, 221, Nish.

Figure 2 (c) Information Centrality of All Cases

Information Centrality Score	← 1	Sparse Information 2	→ 3	← 4	Adequate Information 5	→ 6
Cases	None	None	Britain- Italy 1938 Germany- France 1911 Sweden- Norway 1905 China- Japan 1932-37	China- Pakistan 1963 Brazil Argentina 1979 United- States Iran 2015/16	United States-Iraq 1982-88 Britain- China 1927	None

Figure 3 (a): Prediction Model: Probable Outcome of Strategic Appeasement

		Strategic Objective Risk Level		
Information Level		Low Risk (Crisis Prevention)	Medial Risk (Crisis Resolution, Stalling)	High Risk (Limited Political Trade)
	Abundant Information	Success	Success	Undetermined
	Scarce Information	Undetermined	Failure	Failure

Figure 3 (b): Predictions and Actual Outcomes Respective Information Scores/Risk

Levels

Case	Information Centrality Score	Risk Level	Predicted Outcome	Actual Outcome
Britain-China	5	Medial	Success	Success
Germany-France	3	Medial	Undetermined	Success (ambiguous)
Sweden-Norway	3	Low	Uncertain	Success
China-Pakistan	4	Low	Success	Success
Britain-Italy	3	High	Failure	Failure
Brazil-Argentina	4	High	Uncertain	Success
U.S.-Iraq	4	Medial	Success	Success
China-Japan	3	Medial	Uncertain	Success (ambiguous)
U.S.-Iran	4	Medial	Success	TBD

Supplement 1: Munich Information Centrality Score

Mutual Membership in IGOs

Germany left the League of Nations in 1933 and the Munich Conference was in 1938. This indicator is coded as 0.

Pre-existing Bi-Lateral Relations

While the bilateral relationship began to be tense in 1933 as well, formally the two maintained relations. They signed the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 and in 1936 Chamberlain began his policy of appeasement that eventually culminated into the Munich Agreement.²⁴⁰ This indicator is coded as 1.

Prior communication on the Issue

The signed Munich Agreement was the settlement out of the Munich Conference. The Conference itself was the result of cumulative negotiations arising out of the Sudetenland Crisis and Hitler's refusal to forego control over Germans in Czechoslovakia. This indicator is coded as 1.

Historical Lessons of Cooperation

Chamberlain pursued his appeasement policy for two years prior to the Munich Agreement, in each instance with the proclaimed intention to prevent re-armament or further territorial expansion (notably the remilitarization of the Rhineland and the violation of the Naval Agreement) with no success.²⁴¹ This indicator is coded as 0.

Intelligence Gathering

Germany was the focus of substantial intelligence efforts by Britain and its allies. However "once British documents for the period were declassified in the late 1960s,

²⁴⁰ D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935: An Interim Judgement" *Journal of Modern History* 28, no.2 (1956): 155-175

²⁴¹ D.C. Watt, "The Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935".

revisionists began to understand appeasement not as the product of naive idealists, but rather as the consequence of poor intelligence.”²⁴² While the efforts were there they were not significant due to gross inaccuracy and this indicator is coded as 0.

Access to Broker Groups

As the epitome of a fascist regime, there was no external group through which Britain could effectively pressure Hitler. This indicator is coded as 0.

Information Centrality Score and Prediction

With the lowest centrality score presented in this paper of 2 as well as a medial risk objective, appeasement would be expected to fail in accomplishing its objective of delaying , buying-time or stalling the outbreak of war with Germany.

Outcome and Analysis

The Munich Agreement clearly failed to delay the outbreak of war as it was violated so shortly after. The lack of information on Germany’s military preparedness, its intentions for the near future and other relevant factors the expected failure is easily explainable. However the expected failure of appeasement in order to stall is entirely separate from its rationality as an objective in the first place. Britain needed the time to re-arm and it was rational, although still somewhat risky, to try and prolong the outbreak of an inevitable conflict. However without adequate information with which to approach and structure the strategy its failure was expectable despite the objective being rational.

²⁴² Ripsman and Levy, “Wishful Thinking or Buying Time,” 152

Supplement 1 Figure A: Predicted Munich Outcome by ICS and Risk Level

	Medial Risk Objective (Stalling; Long-term time frame, alter the status quo)
Sparse Information (ICS Score = 2)	Predicted Failure

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