Individuals and the Significance of Affect:

Foreign Policy Variation in the Middle East

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November 2006

Abstract

This dissertation seeks to expand our understanding of variation in foreign policy. Although we have a series of large, extant literatures dealing with the sources of foreign policy, there has been less attention paid over the last decade to understanding why states change their behavior. At the same time, the thesis argues that foreign policy change is best understood as a result of the role of individual decision-makers and the role that emotion plays in their foreign policy calculations.

Foreign policy depends on the decisions made by individual leaders. The type of individual thus determines the specific policy. Here individuals are categorized as ideological or adaptable. Ideological individuals are more rigid in their belief structures, are more likely to select policies that fit with their extant understandings of the world and the position of their state in it, and more likely to rely on the emotional or affective appeal an object or issue holds for them. Adaptable leaders are more flexible, not tied to specific ideologies or reliant on emotion to guide their thinking, and thus more likely to choose or learn ideas that best respond to changing environmental conditions. At the same time, how a state's decision-making institutions are structured tells us how likely it is that an individual's own predilections matter. In polities where decision-making is centralized (e.g., in the office of the prime minister), individuals have greater leeway to put their ideas (whether based on their ideological outlooks or shifting environmental circumstances) into practice, while in de-centralized polities other actors constrain the leader from autonomous decision-making. In such cases, it is

likely that an individual's ideas will conform to those of the constraining actors. Finally, the role of ideas is taken into consideration, as the dominant national ideas about foreign policy regarding a specific issue-area help us better understand the context in which individuals make (or change) foreign policy.

This model is tested against alternate explanations—systemic imperatives, Constructivism, public opinion, poliheuristic theory, and prospect theory—in two case studies: the Israeli decision to pursue and sign the 1993 Oslo Accords, and the 2002 decision by the Islamist government in Turkey to actively lobby for membership in the European Union. Both foreign policies represent significant variation, and both provide important theoretical and empirical puzzles for scholars.

Résumé

Cette dissertation cherche à augmenter notre arrangement de variation de la politique étrangère. Bien que nous ayons une série de grands, literatures existants traitant les sources de politique étrangère, il y a eu moins d'attention prêtée pendant la dernière décennie à l'arrangement de pourquoi les états changent leur comportement. En même temps, la thèse argue du fait que la modificaton de police étrangère est mieux est comprise en raison du rôle de différents décideurs et le rôle d'émotion joue dans leurs calculs de politique étrangère.

La politique étrangère dépend des décisions prises par différents chefs. Le type d'individu détermine ainsi la politique spécifique. Ici des individus sont classés par catégorie soit idéologiques ou adaptables. Les individus idéologiques sont plus rigides en leurs structures de croyance, sont plus pour choisir les politiques qui équipent de leurs vues existantes du monde et de la position de leur état dans lui, et plus probable pour compter sur l'appel émotif ou affectif d'un objet ou d'une issue qui se tient pour elles. Les chefs adaptables sont plus flexibles, non attachés aux idéologies spécifiques ou dépendant sur l'émotion pour guider leur pensée, ainsi plus probable pour choisir ou apprendre les idées qui répondent mieux à changer des conditions environnementales. En même temps, comment des établissements de la prise de décision d'un état sont structurés nous indique comment probablement c'est que les propres prédilections d'un individu importent. Dans les polities où la prise de décision est centralisée (par exemple, dans le bureau du premier ministre), les individus ont une plus grande marge de sécurité pour mettre leurs idées (soit basé sur leurs outlooks idéologiques ou

circonstances environnementales de décalage) en pratique, alors que dans des polities décentralisés d'autres acteurs contraignent le chef de la prise de décision autonome. Dans ces cas-ci, il est probable que les idées d'un individu se conforment à ceux des acteurs de contrainte. En conclusion, le rôle des idées est pris en compte, comme idées nationales dominantes au sujet de la politique étrangère concernant un issue-secteur spécifique aidez-nous à mieux comprendre le contexte dans lequel les individus définissent (ou changement) la politique étrangère.

Ce modèle est examiné contre des impératifs explication—systémiques alternatifs, le Constructivisme, l'opinion publique, la théorie poliheuristic, et la perspective théorie—dans deux études de cas: la décision israélienne pour poursuivre et signer les ententes 1993 d'Oslo, et la décision 2002 par le gouvernement islamiste en Turquie pour inciter activement à l'adhésion dans l'union européenne. Les deux politiques étrangères représentent la variation significative, et toutes les deux fournissent des casse-têtes théoriques et empiriques importants pour des disciples.

Acknowledgements

Ph.D. programs and, especially, dissertations can be tough to get through, and I would not have done so without the moral, social, intellectual, and financial support of many people. My first thanks go to my supervisor, Steve Saideman. He took me in under irregular circumstances and went beyond the call of duty in carefully reading my (excessively) long drafts. He was responsive to all my questions, strengthened my research design and my theoretical understanding of the issues, and taught me a great deal about thinking and writing on foreign policy analysis. Thanks also to my proposal committee (Harold Waller, Rex Brynen, and Mark Brawley) for making me think more broadly and deeply about the role of ideas in policy making. Michael Brecher was also very helpful in providing advice at an early stage, and I learned much from him as a student. I also want to thank the external reviewer of my dissertation, for prompting me to think more systemically about foreign policy decision-making.

My friends in the program sustained me from the beginning and made the doctoral experience that much more enjoyable and stimulating: Rachel Brickner, Brian Greene, Bill Wieninger, Cori Sommerfeldt, Matt Hennigar, and James Devine. Rachel was crucial for getting me started on my proposal, and Brian was especially helpful and generous with his time when I had theoretical or methodological questions. They all exemplified what should be the norm of cooperation between both graduate students and scholars.

I've also been fortunate enough to have a wider group of associates and friends who've helped me over the years in a number of ways. George MacLean

research or writing assistant, her support was far more invaluable and necessary.

She provided me with time, understanding, and space within which to work. This

is as much her effort as it is mine.

ABBREVIATIONS

AKP   *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—Justice and Development Party

AP   *Adalet Partisi*—Justice Party

CHP   *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—Republican People's Party

DOP   Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements

DP   *Demokrat Parti*—Democrat Party

Etzel   *Irgun Zvai Leumi*—National Military Organization

EU   European Union

FP   *Fazilet Partisi*—Virtue Party

GNA   Grand National Assembly

Mapai   *Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel*—Workers Party of the Land of Israel

MGK   *Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*—National Security Council

MNP   *Milli Nizam Partisi*—National Order Party

MSP   *Milli Selamet Partisi*—National Salvation Party

PKK   *Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan*—Kurdistan Workers Party

PLO   Palestine Liberation Organization

SP   *Saadet Partisi*—Felicity Party

TSK   *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*—Turkish Armed Forces

WBG   West Bank and Gaza Strip

WP   *Refah Partisi*—Welfare Party

WZO   World Zionist Organization

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Chapter One

Explaining Foreign Policy Variation

Introduction

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR) have given little consideration to foreign policy variation. Some attention was paid to it in the 1980s and early 1990s (see Carlsnaes 1993; Goldmann 1988; C. Hermann 1990; K. Holsti 1982; and Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994). But despite the slim hope acknowledged by some that, by the mid-1990s, this was beginning to change (Rosati, Sampson, and Hagan 1994, 7-8), this early anticipation has not panned out. Rosati, Sampson, and Hagan's earlier assessment that "the study of foreign policy change remains largely an unexplored area of great significant and promise as a tool to enhance the understanding of the dynamics of world politics" (1994, 14) is nearly as accurate today as when it was first noted. Foreign policy variation remains an under-studied phenomenon in IR and FPA because most research in this area focuses on explaining a specific foreign policy without necessarily placing it in a historical context, that is, whether or not the policy is new or different from older policies. Alternately, studies concentrate on foreign policy continuity, particularly those that stem from domestic-level factors such as culture or institutions. Where research has incorporated a discussion of a state's foreign policy changes over time, it has tended to be descriptive and, certainly, without a rigorous theoretical analysis of change.

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This study will fill this gap by developing a decision-making model for understanding foreign policy change. The model argues that there are two types of leaders: ideological and adaptable. It has been well established for several years now that individuals' cognitive processes and belief structures are the key to unlocking why individuals engage in specific policies. What is less well known, and what is under-studied in the foreign policy decision-making literature, is the role of emotion in this decision-making process. Emotion, or affect, conditions how much meaning events and objects hold for leaders; in turn, these leaders make decisions based on the affective meaning these events or objects hold for them. This is how individuals choose among the various policy options available to them. At the same time, even when individuals prefer one policy idea to another, it may not matter for foreign policy. Only leaders who occupy the central position in a polity's decision-making institutions matter. Thus we need to examine the relevant individuals, the structures of decision-making, and the various foreign policy ideas available to them. Two empirical case studies will be used to judge the strength of the model.

This chapter sets out the parameters of the dissertation. The first section will examine the role of individuals in foreign policymaking, highlighting the importance—indeed, necessity—of studying individuals in both foreign policy analysis and International Relations. The following part notes the difference in this study from the common tactic of studying whether or how decisions are made that are bad, or suboptimal. Instead, the study examines just the decision itself, without judging its appropriateness or effectiveness—which, in any case, is not

easily done so by external standards. The next section will present the argument in brief, by examining the role of individuals, institutions, and ideas. After that, the chapter addresses the question of the case studies and methodology used, by first presenting the empirical puzzles that form the basis for theory development. Finally, the last segment will describe in more detail the structure of the dissertation.

The Role of Individuals in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

There are large extant literatures arguing that individuals, in fact, are not the key elements in foreign policymaking. They are, it is posited, surrounded and affected by bureaucracies, small groups of advisors, domestic political forces, and broader global influences that remove an independent causal role for individuals. It is certainly true that some leaders, in some contexts, are less causal in foreign policy decision-making than others. And there should be no doubt that individuals do not make foreign policy decisions in a vacuum; there would be no theoretical benefit—and it would be completely out of touch with empirical evidence—to argue that they do. All other factors play some role, even where leaders are strongly autonomous. But if we are to properly construct a workable theory we must identify general patterns of cause-effect, and in the study of foreign policy a close examination reveals that individuals occupy a central role in this process.

In focusing on individuals this study addresses a main difference between the FPA and IR literatures. In the former, individuals have long been recognized as being the very center of the foreign policymaking process (Hudson 2005;

Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1962). Substantial research in the later 1970s and 1980s has demonstrated the importance of personality and individual psychological characteristics and cognitive processes on foreign policy decision-making (see as examples Brecher 1975, 1972; Falkowski 1979; M. Hermann 1984, 1978, 1977; Hermann and Hermann 1989; Herrmann 1985; Jervis 1976; Larson 1985; Steinbruner 1974; Stoessinger 1985[1]). State behavior is the result of choices made by individual policymakers who interpret their environments and make decisions based on these interpretations. Understanding who these policymakers are and what drives their decision-making is considered to help observers better understand state behavior. This is of even greater relevance when we consider foreign policy change: as Lebow and Stein put it, "[i]ndeed, policy change can be viewed initially as a function of cognitive change by individuals" (1993, 95). Or, as Young and Schafer assert, if there were no differences between leaders, "there would be no unanticipated actions by states or policymakers" (1998, 64).

But IR has tended to neglect the role of the individual in determining state behavior. Partly this is because IR is more about general group interaction, while FPA is about individual government (or leader) actions. Lake and Powell (1999, 13) assert that "the study of international politics would be hopelessly complicated if every international outcome had to be traced back to the goals and actions of individuals." The trick, they continue, is to abstract from the individual into groups of individuals, as firms, states, and so on (ibid., 14). A major criticism of prospect theory (which has been used to explain the decisions of individual

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[1] Studies before the second half of the 1970s were generally less rigorous and more anecdotal (Brecher and Steinbruner are key exceptions). See O. Holsti (1976) for a good critique of earlier works.

leaders), for example, has been that it has failed to develop a theory of inter-state interactions at the international level (see Levy 1998, 113; Levy 2000, 200; and McDermott 2004, 305-306).

But this lacuna is also the result of what have become the leading approaches in IR. IR theory in the 1980s was dominated by debate between two structural theories, Neorealism and Neoliberalism, which focused on patterns at the level of the global system (see, e.g., Baldwin 1993). In the 1990s, these theories were supplemented by Constructivist approaches, which also focused on international structure but in terms of norms and social relations rather than power (e.g., Wendt 1999). Additionally, state behavior was increasingly seen as the result of collective discourses such as national identity and culture (e.g., Katzenstein 1996). In all of these approaches, individuals are subsumed under more macro structures and processes, playing at most an intervening role. They are dismissed as having any causal role in the determination of state behavior.

The main problem with these approaches is that while structural or social milieus matter, they do not of themselves cause a particular foreign policy decision. Some have begun to recognize the inappropriateness of the prevailing environment and called for greater attention to the study of individuals in IR (see Byman and Pollack 2001). But there is still much room for improvement. There is no good reason why theories at the level of foreign policy should not also be relevant for IR (see Elman 1996). Tetlock and Goldgeier (2000) argue that even systemic theories of world politics are unconsciously based on motivational and psychological approaches. And, after all, the foreign policies of states can have a

clear impact on the international system in general. The best example is the most

dramatic: Gorbachev's foreign policies contributed to the end of the Cold War by

creating a less hostile relationship with the United States, allowing former Soviet

satellite states to remove their Communist governments without Soviet military

intervention, and not opposing the American invasion of a former ally (Iraq).

Though several other individuals and groups did have input into his thinking on

foreign affairs, it was Gorbachev's individual predilection to these types of

changes in international politics and his own preferences and objectives that

mattered. The attempt by hard-line Communists, in August 1991, to reverse

Gorbachev's changes further illustrates the critical importance played by

Gorbachev as an individual as leader.[2]

We can, therefore, best understand foreign policy variation by tracing the

decision-making process behind specific foreign policy decisions. This process

involves the central role of individuals in positions of power who choose to

incorporate incoming information from their environments and utilize it to make

decisions. It also involves the decision-making institutions of the polity that

provide these individuals with (or withhold from them) the capacity to put their

decisions into practice.

Not Good or Bad Decisions, Just Decisions

In the study of foreign policy, it is critical that we identify the specific

foreign policy or foreign policy variation that we are trying to explain—that is,

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[2] For more detailed discussion of the importance of Gorbachev in changing Soviet foreign policy and ending the Cold War, see Checkel (1997), Risse-Kappen (1994), and Stein (1994).

the dependent variable (see C. Hermann 1995, 253, 1978). Having a clear dependent variable, which in this study is foreign policy change, allows for more effective theoretical formulation and empirical research.

This study is different from previous studies on the effect of individuals on foreign policy decision-making. Any focus on the causal role of individuals must include an analysis of an individual's cognitive processes; how individuals process incoming information is widely recognized in the psychology and decision research literatures as the key to understanding decision-making. IR scholars studying foreign policy decision-making have adopted this method.

There are three problems with this approach that this study tries to resolve. First, there has been little attention to variation in decision-making, in foreign policy or other areas; instead, attention has focused on explaining decisions, that is, specific choices made by individuals. When considering policy of any kind, policy change is neglected in favor of simply policy.

Second, there is a tendency in the decision-making literature—whether in psychology, decision research, or IR—to focus on suboptimal decisions; that is, on explaining how and why individuals make "bad" decisions.[3] I am not concerned with whether a decision is good or bad, or whether the decision-making process was effective or not. My concern is only to explain why a particular foreign policy decision is made over others, and in this context how variation in state behavior can be explained. Too often the judgment that a decision/policy is bad is too subjective—what a decision-maker thinks is a good

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[3] For noted psychologist Reid Hastie, for example, the starting point for an examination of decision-making is that human behavior is "frequently errorful, imprecise, and haphazard" (1986, 29).

decision might not be the same as what a researcher does, even if the consequences of the decision have become known and appear negative in other areas. What matters to the decision-maker is not the same thing that matters to the observer. Most members of the current Bush Administration, for example, continue to believe that the decision to overthrow Saddam Hussein was a good one, regardless of the problems it has led to for the American military, Iraqi society, and in American-European relations.

Third, arguing about whether a decision is good or bad assumes a rational-objective type of framework that, like any rational choice framework, may not be appropriate to understanding individual decision-making, which often varies from what is expected as rational (see Chapter 2). But we can only judge the effectiveness or "good-ness" or "bad-ness" of a decision according to the goals individuals set out for themselves—not those determined by observers. Simon (1985, 298) recognized this early on but few political analysts have heeded his caution. Moreover, as this study demonstrates, individual decision-making is often driven by emotion, which structures decisions in a subjective framework for the one making the decisions but may seem "off" or inconsistent to observers working from a set, "objective" standard. Different individuals value different things, and it is not the researcher's place to decide whether a decision is thus appropriate or not.

The Argument in Brief

This section presents an outline of the dissertation's argument. Above all, it is an attempt to explain foreign policy variation by studying the process of foreign policy decision-making. It also only examines one stage of the decision-making process: the point at which a foreign policy decision is made. How that decision is implemented and how it impacts on future policymaking is not addressed here.

The model is an attempt to integrate various levels of analysis, theoretical explanations, and insights from different literatures.[4] It also tries to combine area studies with IR theory (see Chapter 8). In addition, it is dynamic: it seeks to explain variation in state behavior by reference to individual leaders, whose decisions are based their own capacity for learning or adopting new ideas. The result is a model of foreign policy change that focuses on the importance of individuals in the foreign policymaking process, underlines the conditions under which individuals matter, and highlights variation in foreign policy.

The model integrates three elements: individuals, institutions, and ideas. Individuals matter in the foreign policymaking process because they make the decisions about which ideas become policy. Not all individuals matter in foreign policy; when trying to understand foreign policy in general, and foreign policy variation in particular, we must know which individuals are in positions of power to make foreign policy decisions. For this we need to study the institutions in

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[4] The idea that the complexity of politics cannot be explained in many cases by a single theoretical framework, and hence the need for synthesis between approaches, has been highlighted many times before. See Brecher (1999); Legro and Moravcsik (1999, 50); Ruggie (1998, 859). See Hudson (2005) for this contention in regard to foreign policy analysis.

which individuals operate. Finally, there are always ideas about foreign policy floating around; which ideas are chosen to become policy—which ideas "win" over others in a world of competing ideas—are determined by the individual leader who makes foreign policy decisions. On a methodological note, ideas are also important for comparison: they illustrate to the observer whether or not a change in policy takes place. It is to be expected that when new leaders come to office, there will be at least some changes in policy, however minor (see Bunce 1981). But foreign policy variation is more significant when the new policy contradicts previously long-held policy or general ideational structures. This makes the variation that much more of a puzzle, and indeed empirically has a greater effect on international politics.

First, we can distinguish between ideological and adaptable individuals.[5] Which category leaders fall into tells us how likely they are to engage in foreign policy variation. Ideological leaders are individuals who maintain more rigid belief structures. These types of leaders are more "emotional" than adaptable leaders. That is, certain events or objects, or classes of events or objects, hold deep personal meaning for them, which condition their own cognitive processes by filtering out incoming information that does not fit with their extant, affect-laden belief structures. The only policy ideas that are adopted are those that fit with pre-existing understandings of the world.

In contrast, adaptable individuals are more flexible. They do not rely on firm cognitive structures to tell them what information to assimilate and what

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[5] The distinction is similar to Margaret Hermann's classification (1993; Hermann and Hermann 1989). Like Hermann, I use these as ideal-type categories (see M. Hermann 2003).

decisions they can take. They are less emotional about events or objects because they are more flexible; they are not tied down by emotional attachment to certain conditions and so can more easily adapt to circumstances, making decisions based on what best fits with contemporaneous situations and problems.

Second, we must examine the decision-making institutions of the particular polity under study. Because individuals matter for foreign policymaking only when they have the capacity to translate these ideas into policy, we must understand how centralized a polity's institutions are.

The relevant institutions are the formal decision-making structures of a polity, particularly the office(s) that must be occupied in order to put ideas into practice. In democracies, for example, the primary decision-makers are presidents or prime ministers. Institutions are thus "transmission belts" carrying policy ideas through the policymaking process toward a final political outcome. When institutions are centralized, the primary decision maker is more able to translate ideas into policy, because other political actors do not block her from doing so. When institutions are de-centralized, other actors can have a greater influence on policymaking, and thus potentially block or limit an individual's ideas from becoming policy.

Third, we must account for the ideas present in the polity and society. The role of ideas in the foreign policymaking process received much attention in the 1990s (see, for examples, Checkel 1997; Goldstein 1993; Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; McNamara 1998; and Parsons 2003). But problems have continued to plague the incorporation of ideas in the study of state behavior that make it

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difficult to theorize an autonomous role for ideas. These problems include: a focus on the abstract concept of interests, as opposed to the more concrete and proper unit of analysis, the individual; an emphasis on the institutionalization of ideas in political, cultural, and social structures—which in essence becomes an analysis of the institutions themselves rather than the ideas (see Blyth 1997, 243; Yee 1996, 89);[6] and a pronounced inability to explain causality, which is, in Parsons's view, "the largest remaining obstacle to the broad acceptance of ideas as major causes in politics" (2003, 11).[7] These difficulties mean that ideas must be attached to some other element, to help us understand when they matter. This study attaches them to individuals, who are more or less willing to adopt different policy ideas, depending on their own emotional and cognitive natures.

A consensus has been reached in the ideational literature that defines ideas as strategies for obtaining specified goals,[8] and ideas are defined here in similar terms. They are strategic models: judgments about the ultimate national security objectives of a state, the specific policy methods required to achieve them, and how these policies fit with the national identity or value system of the state. In this sense, they provide a blueprint for policymakers regarding specific foreign policy situations that they must address. We must specify the available strategic models

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[6] This is precisely why Blyth (2002, 18-27) classifies ideational studies as part of the historical institutionalism literature. It is also why he talks about institutional change, rather than the specific role of ideas.

[7] Some have also criticized ideas as being too "fuzzy" or ambiguous for definition and measurement, or simply epiphenomenal to state behavior (see for instance Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/01; Desch 1998, 150-152). I do not believe this critique is valid: virtually all ideational studies have been explicit about both defining and measuring ideas and in underlining the importance of doing so.

[8] The two most explicit and easily rendered categorizations are Hall's "policy paradigms" (1993) and Goldstein and Keohane's "road maps" (1993a, 12).

that are presented to decision-makers, if only to provide more context to the changes in foreign policy we are explaining.

The Empirical Puzzles: Case Study Selection and Methodology

The development of this model of foreign policy variation is built on two empirical puzzles. In order to better demonstrate the utility of the model not only to FPA but also to IR, the case studies focus on the high political decisions often considered part of the core interactions in IR: accommodation and confrontation with one's enemies and antagonists. They are therefore not only critical foreign policy decisions, but important in an IR sense as well since they helped lead to a change in international political relations and the regional structures in which they took place.

The 1993 Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accords

In September 1993, Israel—under Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin—signed the Oslo Accords with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an agreement that was a giant step toward resolving their conflict. The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP—the official name of the Oslo Accords) was signed in Washington, D.C., on 13 September 1993.[9] Although it was only a general, interim framework (much of the nuts and bolts of the DOP were negotiated throughout 1994 and signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, while several issues were left for final status negotiations), it entailed direct

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[9] Foreign Minister Shimon Peres had initialed it on behalf of Israel in a secret ceremony in Oslo, in the early morning hours of 20 August, nine days before the Israeli Cabinet was informed of it.

negotiations with the PLO and laid the groundwork for an independent Palestinian state.[10]

What is puzzling here is that Oslo entailed two features that went against decades of official government policy, including the policy under Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, Rabin's immediate predecessor: direct negotiation with the PLO and setting the foundation for an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The treaty came, moreover, at a moment of unprecedented Israeli standing in the region, as a result of the decline of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Iraq by the American-led coalition in 1991, and the reduction in importance of the Palestinian *intifada* to global audiences. This was paralleled by the position of the PLO having reached its nadir as a result of, in addition to these same factors, its support for Saddam Hussein against the coalition. Why would Israel agree to work under these conditions with an organization it regarded as an enemy dedicated to its destruction, and more importantly lay the groundwork for an independent Palestinian state, when there seemed to be little incentive to do so?

The 2002 Turkish Effort to Join the European Union

The second puzzle is the decision by Turkey's second Islamist government in November 2002 to actively seek membership in the European Union (EU). Membership in the EU[11] has existed as an option for Turkish policymakers for decades. What is new in the context of this discussion is that the 2002 decision

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[10] For good discussions on the Oslo process, the lead-up to and the details of it, see Corbin (1994) and Makovsky (1996). As well, various participants have written their own memoirs of the negotiations: see Abbas (1995); Beilin (1999, Part 2); Peres (1995, Chapters 24-27); Savir (1998). Note that there are some discrepancies among the accounts on various dates.

[11] In order to avoid confusion and streamline the discussion, the EU will be taken to mean all previous similar institutions—the European Economic Community and the European Community.

marked the first time an Islamist leader decided to aggressively pursue a policy that previously only Kemalists and pro-Westernists had called for. Since the 1963 Association Agreement between Turkey and the EU, the expectation among many Kemalists in Turkey was that Turkey would eventually become part of the EU. As global and domestic (in both the EU and in Turkey) changes developed during the mid- to late-1990s, Turkish laicist governments began to push harder for EU membership, by both pressing their case directly to EU governments and by engaging in domestic reforms designed to bring Turkey's legal and political structures in line with EU standards. But the first Islamist government (1996-1997) bucked the trend: although he did not severe relations with the EU, Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan all but ignored the EU and put relations with the Islamic world instead at the top of his agenda. In contrast, his Islamist successor in 2002, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,[12] went even beyond the Kemalist policy to aggressively push for membership.

This decision presents a puzzle to analysts in two ways. First, an Islamist prime minister in 2002 went against the long-standing Islamist agenda—an agenda that he himself had vocally supported earlier in his political career—and which had adamantly opposed membership on the grounds that it was both harmful to Turkey's interests and did not coincide with Turkey's own identity, which they argued was Islamic and Eastern, rather than Western. Second, the

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[12] Erdoğan is the focus of this study since he is the primary leader of the Islamist party and government, though technically speaking, Erdoğan was not the country's second Islamist prime minister; it was his colleague, Abdullah Gül. Erdoğan was convicted in 1998 of religious incitement, and the Constitution stipulates that individuals convicted of a crime cannot enter parliament. A constitutional amendment in December 2002 allowed him to compete in a by-election in March 2003, which he won. Gül then resigned and was replaced by Erdoğan.

vigorous appeals for membership he engaged in were in dichotomous opposition to the policy of the first Islamist prime minister (1996-1997), who actively neglected Europe in favor of the Islamic world. There was, therefore, a stark difference in policy between two Islamist politicians. Why would this government engage in pronounced and vigorous efforts, that even some non-Islamist governments had avoided, to join an institution that it had long considered would subsume Turkish structures in its own and thus quite possibly undermine the long-held Islamist agenda? Although they were not in power during consecutive terms, it is important to compare them because: (a) they come from the same (Islamist) background and so provide for useful comparison; and (b) comparing individual leaders from the same movement/political party helps identify and emphasize the critical differences between individuals.

Studying Middle Eastern Parliamentary Systems

These are puzzles that have not been adequately untangled by existing analyses and theoretical frameworks. I argue that the best way to understand these shifts in foreign policy is by focusing on the four relevant prime ministers and comparing their foreign policies. Using two case studies also enhances the comparative method. Both the similarities and differences between the case studies strengthen the applicability of the model. The similarities allow for conclusions to be drawn regarding states with comparable polities and analogous divisions or non-divisions within society, while the differences indicates that the model's basic components can be applied to states with diverse institutional,

political, and historical circumstances. All of this underlines that the model can "travel" easily to other explanations of foreign policy change.

Israel and Turkey are both states in the Middle East that share similarities and differences. Belonging to the same region allows for some similarity in regional circumstances (recognizing that each state faces its own particular set of foreign policy problems, as well). This allows for better theory development and theory testing.

At the same time, both Israel and Turkey are democratic parliamentary systems in which the primary decision-maker is the prime minister.[13] This controls for political structure and permits better understanding of centralization. Altogether, the study of two states from the same region and with similar political structures allows for better comparative analysis. A focus on prime ministers in parliamentary systems fills a gap in the study of individuals in democracies, which has tended to focus on presidents (especially American presidents) (see Kaarbo and Hermann 1998).[14] To further strengthen our understanding of foreign policymaking in parliamentary systems, this study compares prime ministers within the same country—a method used too infrequently in the study of prime ministers in parliamentary systems (Kaarbo 1997).

In addition, the countries examined here are somewhat in-between places: democracies located in the developing world and faced with a set of foreign and

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[13] It is recognized that there have been many criticisms of both the breadth and depth of Israeli and Turkish democracy, regarding the Arab and Kurdish segments of the population, respectively. Certainly, there are questions regarding the social and civil aspects of democracy, as opposed to the political facet, but democracy in both countries remains "real" enough. Moreover, the fact that such criticism extends to both states actually controls for the type of democracy.

[14] Where the literature has looked at prime ministers, the emphasis has been on Britain.

domestic problems unusual for modern democracies (conditions of prolonged conflict or antagonism with neighboring states, serious domestic divisions, and in the case of Israel and only recently less so in Turkey, violent challenges to the state by groups operating within their spheres of control).

Finally, Israel and Turkey are important states in the Middle East and in the broader global system. They are the preeminent military powers in their region. Israel is at the center of one of the longest, most intense and violent conflicts in the international system. Its clashes with the Arab states and the Palestinians has had worldwide consequences, including bringing the superpowers close to a nuclear confrontation. For its part, Turkey is strategically situated at the crossroads of several volatile regions—the Middle East, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Balkans. Its role in a variety of international issue-areas is critical for international stability and development in these areas and more widely. It, too, is engaged in a series of disputes with its neighbors, including Greece, Syria, Iran, and Armenia. Understanding the changes in Israel's and Turkey's foreign policies will provide a better understanding of their behavior in international politics, and offers a way of explaining the behavior of other states also engaged in conflict.

Methods of Investigation

A study that focuses on individuals requires an in-depth analysis of the individuals in question. In order to understand whether or not individuals are ideological or adaptable we need to trace both the individuals' behavior and their policies. This requires in-depth understanding of leaders' personalities—without

close examination of their personality, past experience, belief structures, and emotional attachments, we cannot explain how likely it is that they would choose the specific foreign policies they did. To explain foreign policymaking we must also examine the polity's decision-making institutions to determine how centralized they are, and whether they allow (or do not allow) for autonomous policymaking. Finally, in order to judge how significant foreign policy variation is (for instance, we are not interested here in minor tactical shifts), we must also examine the prevailing ideational structures of a society-polity. This study is, therefore, a qualitative comparative analysis of Israel and Turkey's ideational and institutional structures, and of the two prime ministers relevant for each state's variation in foreign policy.

For an understanding of the four leaders involved in this study (Yitzhak Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin, Necmettin Erbakan, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan) I have relied on their public speeches, statements, and interviews. This method of analysis is well proven in psychological investigations of individuals (see Suedfeld, Guttieri, and Tetlock 2003). I have also used other analysts' published works on these leaders, for both their own impressions of them and direct quotes provided in their works. In addition, for the Israeli case study, I conducted fieldwork interviews with former aides and advisors to both Shamir and Rabin. By comparing these two cases studies, and the two prime ministers in each, I can better highlight the model's validity.

To understand the development and contemporary manifestations of the decision-making institutions and various policy ideas in Israel and Turkey I have

used secondary sources by other scholars who have studied the history, politics, culture, and development of these states.

Plan of the Dissertation

The dissertation is divided into eight chapters. Chapter 1 sets out the introduction to the study, discussing the importance of individuals in policy making and setting out the argument in brief. Chapter 2 contains the alternative arguments that might be used to explain the two case studies and against which the model is tested. The theoretical and empirical weaknesses of these alternate accounts are highlighted here. Chapter 3 moves on directly from Chapter 2, providing a more in-depth examination of the model that forms the theoretical basis for this study. It constructs a model of foreign policy change, drawing out three hypotheses that better operationalize the model.

The next four chapters deal with the case studies. Chapters 4 and 5 examine the Israeli case study, the variation in policy that was the Oslo Accords. Through a historical account of the relevant institutional and ideational developments in Israel, Chapter 4 develops the institutional variable of the model, and examines the dominant ideational structures in the country. Doing so helps us identify when the variation that occurred in foreign policy on the relevant issues, and why Rabin's decision was so anomalous and puzzling. By examining the decision-making institutions of Israel, we can identify Israel as a state with centralized decision-making structures. Chapter 5 discusses the dynamic variable

of the model, the role of individuals, by comparing the emotional and belief structures and policies of Prime Ministers Shamir and Rabin.

Chapter 6 is the Turkish counterpart of Chapter 4. It discusses the development of Turkey's institutional and ideational structures. Again, understanding how Turkey's decision-making structures developed provides greater appreciation for the constraints facing contemporary Turkish prime ministers. The chapter also explains the development of Turkey's ideational structures, dichotomized as Westernism versus Islamism. This allows us to understand why and how much the 2002 decision to join the EU by an Islamist prime minister is a puzzle. Chapter 7 examines the differences between the two prime ministers, their different cognitive and affective structures, and how these impacted on their policy toward EU membership.

The conclusion, Chapter 8, compares the two case studies, and offers suggestions for further empirical and theoretical research to illustrate the applicability of the model to both foreign policy analysis and International Relations. Finally, it discusses the empirical, theoretical, and policy implications of the model.

Chapter Two

Alternate Explanations

Introduction

This chapter sets the foundation for the rest of the dissertation, by highlighting alternate explanations for the two case studies and why they do not provide much insight into foreign policy variation. This moves the dissertation into the presentation of a better explanation based on the model set out in Chapter 3. At bottom, variation in foreign policy cannot be understood through existing approaches; these have a series of theoretical weaknesses, and the empirical conditions that made up the foreign policy decisions highlight the indeterminacy or inaccuracy of these approaches. It is necessary to show why these accounts fail to provide an effective explanation of the puzzle.

The first three alternate explanations examined are Structural Realism, Constructivism, and public opinion. It might be argued that none of these is an appropriate foil for the argument presented in this study, since they are macro-structural processes that are not suitable for examining specific foreign policy decisions. This is not true for two reasons: First, all three are habitually used to explain state behavior. Since the model presented here is designed to help us better understand the conduct of international politics, it is useful to compare the model with other common approaches. Second, and as is dealt with in greater detail below, they are specifically used to explain the case studies examined here,

particularly in the Israeli case. Therefore, highlighting their inadequacies provides for a more useful comparison for the model, and illustrates the effectiveness of the model on the same "territory" used by these alternate explanations.

The last two contending accounts are poliheuristic theory and prospect theory. Both are considered to be theories of decision-making; that is, they focus on the specific decisions themselves (rather than the macro-structural processes that force decisions) and those who make them. As such, they provide a stronger test for my model since they operate on the same theoretical terrain (cognitive processes and the role of individuals). Although there are several other theories of decision-making, these are currently the most exciting and expansive research programs in this area, and so provide a useful test of contemporary approaches.

All five approaches are inadequate for explaining the variation in foreign policy examined in the study. The first three shed light on some motivations and influences behind foreign policy, but they are far weaker at helping us understand why foreign policy changes, and in particular the substance of these differing foreign policies—they are indeterminate. Though they may help explain the timing and general direction of foreign policy, on their own they do not make the ultimate outcome of foreign policy inevitable, nor do they tell us anything about the *process* of change (Hall 1993, 284).[1] The last two are more effective, in that they incorporate individuals and their specific views on foreign policymaking. But they, too, are deficient because they focus only on rigid pre-set decision-making forms, and they ignore the specific and diverse motivations that drove the individuals studied here in their policymaking. Moreover, they cannot account for

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[1] See Fearon (1991, especially 184-185) for a conceptual discussion on this type of reasoning.

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changes in individuals' thinking as they respond to changes in environment. Finally, each approach can shed some light on at best only one leader's actions. But because they cannot account for the foreign policy decisions across leaders, they cannot account for foreign policy variation. They are thus limited in their usefulness as explanations for state behavior.

Each section below explains the specific alternate approach, then discusses its theoretical weaknesses as well as its inability to successfully account for the actual empirical conditions they seek to explain.

Structural Realism

An explanation of foreign policy based on external stimuli or structural imperatives is typically Realist-based, with a focus on the distribution of power among state actors in the international system (usually referred to as Structural Realism) (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994/95). These accounts argue that the system's structure constrains the choices available to states, making them act in predictable ways that do not change as states' internal make-up and conditions change (either over time or cross-nationally).

Yet although all states do share some minimal common objectives, such as ensuring their survival as political/territorial units and enhancing their prosperity, there are many other actions that states engage in that are not shared with all other states in the way that structural explanations posit. Structural Realist explanations fail to capture the relevant dynamics of foreign policy making, because of their assumption that structural forces compel all states to respond similarly to the same

events.[2] Its emphasis on structural forces has led it to ignore domestic variables, designating them as sinful "reductionism" (Waltz 1979), but making it underspecified in the determination of state behavior. Even other Realists have recognized that this neglect of non-systemic factors is damaging to Structural Realist theories, since they cannot account for changes that result from non-material factors (see Walt 1987; Wohlforth 1994/95).[3] Moreover, Structural Realism has been singled out for criticism for an inability to explain political change, because of its focus on continuity: the end of the Cold War is the most frequently cited example of this.[4] The Realist contention that change is the direct result of "the rise and decline of states' relative power conditioned by the nature of the overall distribution of capabilities" (Wohlforth 1994/95, 105) is not borne out by the empirical evidence.

At the same time, while international factors are relevant they are in many cases only enabling factors. Systemic theories in general are thus too indeterminate; they cannot account for causality. They help us identify general constraints and opportunities generated by international forces, but they cannot

[2] There is debate about whether systemic theories like Structural Realism can be used to explain individual states' foreign policy: Elman (1996), Farkas (1998), and Fearon (1998) argue that it can. For an opposing view, see Waltz (1996). Both Duffield (1999, 766) and Fearon (1998) make the compelling point that structural theories are in actuality theories of foreign policy, since the outcomes that systemic theories seek to explain (such as the balance of power, major power war, and so on) are themselves actual foreign policies—or the direct result of foreign policy, even if unintended. It has also become common for scholars focusing on foreign policy in the security area to set their approaches and models up in opposition to Structural Realism; Katzenstein's edited 1996 volume, for example, is explicit about doing this.

[3] One might argue that Realist attempts to incorporate non-structural or –materialist factors into a Realist framework effectively counters this criticism. As Legro and Moravscik (1999) argue, however, efforts to bring perceptual, cognitive, or other psychological or domestic political factors into a Realist framework dilutes Realism to the point where the core elements of the paradigm no longer operate—making it problematic to refer to such arguments as Realist.

[4] For criticisms of Structural Realism on these grounds, see Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994); Lebow (1994); and Risse-Kappen (1994). For a spirited defense of Realism against these attacks, see Wohlforth (1994/95).

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tell us anything about the specific decisions that are taken, or the processes by which these decisions are arrived at.[5] Finally, the parsimonious nature of such accounts may sacrifice too much explanatory power, because of its reduction in the number and scope of variables included (on this point see also Checkel 1997).

Structural Realism and the Oslo Accords

Analyses of Israeli foreign policy have long focused on the causal impact of systemic pressures such as external threats (from the Arab states), inter-state enmities, superpower competition, and related influences (see for examples Bar-Siman-Tov 1987; Inbar 1997; Safran 1978; Telhami 1990; Yaniv 1987). While it is true that these factors matter, it is less certain that they are *causal* in instances of foreign policy decision-making. For example, Bar-Siman-Tov (1987) makes a compelling argument that during wartime, superpower pressures can have a profound impact on the specific policies of their clients and allies. Aside from the questions such an analysis raises on its own (and even Bar-Siman-Tov admits these are qualified conditions [239]), not all foreign policy decisions are about war.[6] More importantly, the consistency highlighted by structural explanations does not account for changes in Israeli foreign policy.

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[5] In Stephen Haggard's words, "[i]t is undeniably true that the distribution of capabilities influences behavior, but these claims are not illuminating unless it is specified *when* these factors matter, *how much* they explain, and over *what range* of outcomes" (1991, 405; emphasis in original). See his chapter for a good critique of structural theories in general. See Gause (1999) and Noble (2004) for good discussions on the limitations of systemic theories in the context of Middle East foreign policies.

[6] The period under examination here also offers another empirical problem with superpower pressure as a foreign policy influence: US President George H.W. Bush put significant pressure on the Shamir government to make changes to its peace policy, even threatening at one point to withhold $10 billion in loan guarantees if Israel did not move into line with Washington's wishes. Shamir resisted these pressures to the end, and they had no effect on his policy (see Arens 1995, Chapter 10). For a more detailed discussion of the loan guarantees dispute, see Rusonik (1992).

In the period examined here, profound regional and global changes had occurred that lasted through both the Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin prime ministerships. The dissolution of the Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1990s and the subsequent emergence of unchallenged American dominance meant Israel's primary enemies in the region (especially Syria) were left without a superpower patron. The defeat of Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War meant an end to one of the more serious military threats to Israel. And the PLO, after opting to support Saddam Hussein in the confrontation with Kuwait and then the United States, earned the hostility and anger of even its former Arab supporters. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states withdrew millions of dollars that supported PLO activities, and thousands of Palestinian workers were kicked out of the Persian Gulf states, meaning a loss in remittance income from these sources as well. At the same time, the effects of the *intifada* were tapering off in several areas: the shock value of the uprising had begun to wear off of international audiences because the violence had dragged on for so long, and Israelis and Palestinians were already negotiating with each other through the Madrid process, so there was no outside pressure on Israel to engage in immediate, drastic change. The onset of the Gulf crisis in August 1990 further diluted the attention paid to the Palestinian uprising.

It would seem, then, that Israel was in a far stronger position in the regional balance of power in 1992 (the year of the Israeli elections that brought Rabin to power) than at any time since 1967. Structural Realist-based explanations would thus expect Israel to maintain the status quo, there being no reason to engage in bargaining with actors demonstrably weaker than it. This

helps to explain Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's policy, at least in part (see below). Alternately, the changes in the distribution of power in the international system, represented by the end of the Cold War, have been argued as changing the calculations of Israel, by providing it with an opportunity to impose terms more favorable to it (Smith 1996, 322).

But the distribution of power was a constant among both Shamir and Rabin: these external changes cannot tell us why one prime minister chose to engage in negotiation, while the other did everything he could to *avoid* engaging in direct negotiations with the PLO that might result in anything other than the status quo (see also Telhami 1996, 38-39). They also cannot explain why the Gulf War and its aftermath had no effect on Shamir, who continued to maintain the same position on dialogue with the PLO and peace talks in general. Focusing on external elements also ignores the relative importance of domestic features that matter: there would not have been such a profound shift in Israeli policy if a national election had not replaced the Shamir government with a Rabin government. A Structural Realist account is thus not very useful.

Structural Realism and Lobbying for EU Membership

There is no doubt that strategic considerations have pushed Turkey toward the West; the Soviet threat during the Cold War was a powerful motivator and helped cement ties with the United States and Western Europe. The end of the Cold War increased Turkey's threat perception, with the emergence of unstable and volatile regions on all sides of it, including the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Caucasus and Central Asia (Barkey 1996; Fuller 1993; Makovsky and Sayarı

2000b; and Nachmani 2003; on the relationship between security and foreign policy in Turkey in general, see Robins 2003, Chapter 5). The Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ethnic wars in the Balkans in the mid- and late-1990s, fighting in Chechnya in this same period, the continuing instability and crises in the Central Asian states, and the perception of competition for influence in the Caspian Sea basin with Russia and Iran have all made Ankara acutely aware of the potential negative impact all these issue-areas could have on Turkey.

Given that Turkey perceived its security interests lay in stronger ties with the West and that it has remained a full member of most Western security and political institutions, it follows that Turkey might well use its relationship with Europe to enhance its security. Becoming a member of the EU would entitle Turkey to a host of economic, political, and military benefits that would strengthen it and make it better able to deal with the myriad concerns and threats surrounding it.

There are two main problems with such an analysis. First, it is too simplistic to argue that strategic considerations are the sole concern of Turkish policy makers, even staunch Kemalists. In fact, although it was the Kemalists who in the early republican period first oriented Turkish foreign policy toward the West, it was as the culmination of the emulation of Western civilization. Membership in Western institutional structures was seen as the foreign policy complement to domestic policies; moreover, it was the dream of the founder of modern Turkey, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, for Turkey to be a full member of

European *civilization*, not security structures (see Kinross 1964; Mango 2001); Kemalist actors throughout the Turkish state and society were committed to this. Beyond this, while it is true that relations with the United States were conditioned almost solely on strategic factors, this was not true of the relationship with Europe (see Müftüler-Bac 1997, Chapter 3).

Second, more specifically in the context of this case study, Necmettin Erbakan simply did not think in security terms; his guiding framework was Islamism, which although it might entail continued relations with Europe, pointed to a focus elsewhere—namely, the Islamic world. His repeated statements regarding the need to strengthen Turkey's relations with the Islamic world testify to his concentration, and his ties to radical Islamic organizations and Islamic states considered pariahs by much of the international community underlines this. Although he allowed his foreign minister to manage the "European portfolio," he made no effort to actively pursue EU membership.

Structural Realist-type explanations thus cannot explain either prime minister's policies. In one attempt to utilize this type of understanding, Meltem Müftüler-Bac (1997) argues that Turkey's efforts to join the EU can be understood through this perspective, but even she unwittingly undermines this argument, since she notes that one of the motives for Turkish efforts to join the EU was "as the culmination of the Turkish *orientation* to the West" (54; emphasis added).[7] Focusing on external imperatives presents too simplified a picture of

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[7] She also undermines this argument in a later work, in which she argues that structural factors made Turkey *less relevant* to Europe, because the end of the Cold War removed Turkey's strategic relevance, highlighted its poor human rights record, and raised the importance of Central and Eastern European countries over Turkey (1999, 245).

reality, since it does not distinguish between Europe and the United States (which was more important for security purposes than Europe), does not account for the ideational importance of Europe to Turkey, and ignores the highly relevant domestic and personal factors. Where one Islamist prime minister tried to avoid membership as a policy issue, the other actively committed himself to it but for strictly domestic political reasons. Structural Realist accounts are thus unhelpful for an understanding of foreign policy change.

Constructivism

Constructivist accounts of international politics focus on non-material, particularly social, elements—for example, actors' interpretations, social relationships, and ideational factors (ideas, norms, culture, identity) (see Checkel 1998). Ideational factors in many cases, if not all, trump sheer material forces, because material forces on their own cannot determine state behavior. In Alexander Wendt's words, "people act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not" (Wendt 1992, 396-397; see also Checkel 1998, 326; Wendt 1999, 24). It is not the objective capabilities that enemies have that make them enemies, but rather the nature of the relationship. Offensive weapons are not threatening of themselves; they are only threatening when a state possessing them is perceived as hostile (Wendt 1992, 397; see also Jepperson, Wendt, and Katzenstein 1996, 34).

Like Structural Realism, Constructivism has largely been a macro-systemic analysis that has difficulty explaining specific foreign policies. Two examples of such an attempt include Jennifer Milliken's analysis of the Korean War (2001) and Karin Fierke's study of changes in East-West relations toward and after the end of the Cold War (1998). Yet both are inadequate, since they remain systemic analyses and thus suffer from the same indeterminacy as Structural Realism does. Despite their arguments to the contrary, they continue in the structural-Constructivist vein by explaining foreign policy change by reference to inter-state social interactions (macro processes). They fall into the same trap of indeterminacy as Structural Realism, by assuming away the role of specific leaders and not delving into explanations of *why* leaders make the decisions they do.

Milliken, for example, specifies her focus: "State behaviour is unlike an individual's behaviour in that state behaviour is made up of the activities of a variety of different persons and groups which represent a state" (2001, 21); and points out that her analysis "says absolutely nothing at all about Kim Il Sung or Harry Truman and what motivated these and other individual state rulers" (2001, 28). Instead, her locus is the interactions that unfold over time between states. For her part, Fierke also ignores the role of individuals by focusing instead on "grammars," which are large bounded arenas of interaction that constrain and guide behavior (Fierke 1998, 46). In neither case, despite the authors' claims that they are examining foreign policy, do foreign policy decisions stem from individual decision-making, but rather pressures from inter-state social

relationships. Individuals are thus shaped over time like clay by social and cultural contexts, with personal characteristics being irrelevant. Similar to Structural Realism, Constructivism's over-emphasis on overarching norms and frameworks has largely sidelined the role and impact of particular "agents" who specifically make decisions (see Checkel 1998, 325). It is thus too imprecise.

<div align="center">Constructivism and the Oslo Accords</div>

Few studies of Israeli foreign policy utilize a Constructivist framework. One exception is Barnett's (1996a) analysis of Israel's relationship with the United States. The relationship, Barnett argues, is conditioned on a shared identity—liberal democracy and Western orientation (ibid., 403). When Israeli identity began to change in the late 1980s, the foundation for the relationship cracked and led to problems (changes) in the relationship (ibid., 438). In the specific case of Oslo, Flamhaft has argued (1996, 94-95) that the global changes in the form of the end of the Cold War forced Israel to reconsider its own policies, and, in line with changing international normative structures, to choose peace with the PLO as a necessary alternative to hostility.

The problem with such an approach is the same identified above regarding Structural Realism: it is too indeterminate. Rabin certainly recognized that changing international circumstances conditioned changing social relations between states, and allowed Israel to move toward a more cooperative foreign policy (see Inbar 1999, 134-139), which eventually led to Oslo. But Shamir faced the same changed circumstances, yet drew the opposite conclusion from Rabin: he felt that Israel could not let its guard down. He insisted, for example, in a March

1991 interview that Israel's regional position had not improved despite the obvious positive changes in the global arena (i.e., the end of the Cold War, and the establishment of diplomatic relations with India, China, and Russia) (*Jerusalem Post* 29 March 1991, 7; see Chapter 5 for more). In other words, the two prime ministers held very different ideas about the social structures of the regional and global systems, and so had very different ideas about the contours of Israeli foreign policy. This was most obvious in policy toward talks with the PLO and a Palestinian state: Shamir was adamantly opposed to both, while Rabin was willing to chance them and—in the end—engaged in policies that included these very objectives. Constructivism cannot account for this variation in foreign policy because Israel's social relations with other states did not change from Shamir's tenure to Rabin's.

Constructivism and Lobbying for EU Membership

Constructivist accounts of Turkish foreign policymaking are even less common than with Israel; instead, analysts focus on strategic imperatives (security) or domestic politics (Kemalism). However, we can imagine that such an argument would go something like this: Turkey's relations with Europe are conditioned by social forms. When relations between the two were sour (based on the promulgation in 1993 of the Copenhagen Criteria and the European view that the recently enacted Customs Union between the two was more of a "mechanism to improve cooperation" and not related to full membership [Eralp 2000, 180]), Erbakan as prime minister sought to reorient Turkey away from Europe and

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toward the Islamic world. By the time relations had improved,[8] Erdoğan had come

to power and therefore worked under a very different (and more positive) set of

social structures, which conditioned his efforts to seek full membership in the EU.

This argument is not effective for two reasons. First, it ignores the fact that

economic factors in large part drove Turkey's desire for closer relations with

Europe in the 1990s, factors which were completely separate from social

interpretation. Beginning just before the coup in September 1980 Turkey began its

shift from an import-substitution policy to an export-oriented strategy: trade as a

percentage of Gross National Product increased from 15.7% in 1980 to 23.4% in

1990 and 40.8% in 2000 (Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade 2005). At the same

time, Europe was becoming Turkey's most important trading partner: by 1990 the

EU accounted for 56.5% of Turkish exports and 45.8% of Turkish imports (ibid.).

Individual European countries (especially Germany, Britain, France, and Italy)

similarly occupied the top positions in trade.

Second, more specifically, Erdoğan has engaged in his foreign policies

primarily for domestic political reasons—to reduce the influence of the military in

policymaking and to ensure legal and political guarantees that Islam would not be

repressed in the public sphere. His priority is domestic reforms, and the EU is

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[8] The improvement in relations was based on several factors: First, both Brussels and Ankara realized that excluding Turkey would damage the relationship and that such neglect could not be sustained much longer. Second, the 1998 change in Germany's government from the Christian Democrat coalition to a Social-Democrat-Green coalition led to a more open and inclusive attitude regarding EU expansion and Turkey. Third, a severe earthquake that struck Turkey in August 1999 led to a sympathetic response on the part of Greece, including a decision not to veto Turkey's candidacy. Fourth, the EU decided at the December 1999 Helsinki summit to accept Turkey as an official candidate. Fifth, the EU at its Nice Summit in December 2000 approved an Accession Partnership with Turkey setting out a road map for membership. And sixth, non-Islamist governments passed a series of domestic reforms between October 2001 and February 2002 to bring Turkish political and legal structures in line with European standards.

seen as an instrument in this regard (see Chapter 7). His efforts have not, therefore, been conditioned on the changed nature of the Turkish-European relationship. A focus on macro social structures thus ignores the critical role of the individual beliefs of leaders, and the impact they have on foreign policy.

Public Opinion

A third plausible motivation in foreign policy making relies on the competition for power between politicians. Given that politicians seek public support to remain in office, one might intuitively think that leaders engage in policies that are popular, in order to retain public goodwill and support. There is a substantial literature on the impact of public opinion on foreign policy making that cannot be reviewed here.[9] Using specific examples drawn largely from American politics, this literature has pointed out the relevance of public opinion on leaders' policy calculations. There are, however, several theoretical and empirical defects to such an account of foreign policy making.

Risse-Kappen (1991, 480-484) sums up these weaknesses as being far too simplistic: in many cases, decision-making elites *and* masses show similar support for the same foreign policy goals, while many foreign policies are chosen without any public consensus at all. Such an approach also ignores the fact that

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[9] For some examples, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rhode (1990); Berger (1998); Foyle (1999); O. Holsti (2004); and Ostrom and Job (1986) (and the citations therein). For an understanding of this type of political behavior as economically rational, see Downs (1957) and Siverson (1998). Note that there is much more consensus on the link between public opinion and domestic public policy.

some societal groups may impact the policymaking process at different times, through different means, and on different issues.[10]

More generally, the causal link between public opinion and foreign policy has been identified as murky (O. Holsti 2004, 56-69, Chapter 7; O. Holsti 1992; Page and Shapiro 1983; Rosenau 1961; Sobel 2001, 9). Congruence has been demonstrated, but causality has been more difficult to establish both theoretically and empirically. The evidence suggests that public opinion tends more to set the foreign policy parameters within which decision makers operate, rather than pointing to specific policy options: it "has a guiding or limiting influence on policy. Support permits or facilitates, while opposition limits or deters, policymakers' discretion" (Sobel 2001, 10). Even where it does matter, its role tends to be issue-specific, and, more importantly, highly subject to numerous other factors, including personality, domestic political conditions, and external events (see Foyle 1999; Powlick and Katz 1998; Risse-Kappen 1991; and Rosati 1999, 384-389).[11] Finally, evidence has suggested that public attitudes may be used instrumentally—not to formulate policies, but to help design ways of manipulating society into accepting preferred policy (Cruz 2000, 277-278; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000).

Public opinion might be most consequential in electoral terms: politicians are brought into office in order to engage in specific policies deemed appropriate by the populace (see, for example, Bunce 1981; Holsti 1992, 452). But focusing

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[10] This also raises problems of measurement. How questions are phrased in surveys that help determine public attitudes, even the order they are presented, may be highly relevant (see Holsti 2004, 310-315).
[11] For an opposing argument, see Eichenberg and Stoll (2003).

on elections ignores two critical elements: First, they cannot account for the fact that leaders do not always know the *specific* policies they will engage in; elections are more about general, even vague, policy positions. Once in office, politicians can also undergo a learning process that society cannot anticipate—or even change their minds. Broadly speaking, elections may help to explain the timing of a policy shift, but not why a specific policy was chosen from among other alternatives.

Second, focusing on elections does not take into account changes in domestic or international environments that occur after elections, and must be dealt with; therefore, voters have no way of anticipating what will happen and how their leaders will react beforehand. President George Bush was elected in the United States in 1987, but the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred in August 1990. While scholars might be able to argue in advance, based on investigation of leaders' personalities, how an individual might react, the general population would not. At the same time, events that occur after elections can unfold rapidly and in different ways, thus making it difficult for anyone to predict specific policy. To continue with the Iraq example, while Bush stopped the US-led coalition attack once Iraq was thrown out of Kuwait and intended to stop any intrusion into Iraq itself, the Shi'ite and Kurdish rebellions and, especially, the violent reaction by the Iraqi military to put them down pushed the US to do what it had not wanted to in the first place: put considerable time and resources into Iraq, through enforcement of the no-fly zones over the north and south of the

country. The Bush Administration had been publicly clear about avoiding any investment of this kind, but events compelled it to act otherwise.

Public Opinion and the Oslo Accords

Although public opinion does not feature prominently in analyses of Israeli foreign policy, given the remarkable nature of this "revolution" in Israeli policy, it would be reasonable to assume that Rabin could not have signed the Oslo Accords if he was not sure that public opinion supported him (Auerbach and Greenbaum [2000] provide the strongest argument on this). Both Michael Barnett (2002) and Mira Sucharov (2005) argue, for example, that any Palestinian-Israeli peace treaty would have to fit with national identity/role conception. Sucharov in particular presents a strong argument regarding the importance of the public's understanding of its own identity and its contribution to Rabin's willingness to engage in the Oslo Accords. Such accounts point to a dovishness in Israeli public opinion that both provided support for and helped nudge politicians toward a more conciliatory policy toward the PLO and the Palestinians. The leftward drift in the Labor party itself (see Inbar 1991) provides further proof of this. Indeed, Asher Arian, a prominent analyst of Israeli public opinion, has found that from the 1980s to the early 1990s there was a "creeping dovishness" that slowly moved public opinion toward conciliation with the Palestinians (1995, Chapter 4; Shamir and Arian 1990, 78; see also Goldberg, Barzilai, and Inbar 1991; Levinsohn and Katz 1993, 53-63).

The problem with this analysis is twofold. First, Israeli decision-making in the foreign policy arena is highly personalized and centralized, with little room

for any sustained consideration of public opinion. This stems from several sources: One, the growing centralization of the Israeli decision-making. Israel's first prime ministers, especially David Ben-Gurion, enhanced personal control over foreign and security policy, and the development of the prime minister's office through subsequent prime ministers further entrenched this process legally, politically, and normatively (see Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002). The heavy institutionalization of political parties in Israel has also meant that politics is played out primarily within and through the party (see Arian 1998, 73; Eisenstadt 1985; Horowitz and Lissak 1978; Shimshoni 1982; Yishai 1991), with little room for voters to have an impact on electoral candidates.[12]

Two, in their study on the increasing centralization of power among prime ministers, Arian, Nachmias, and Amir found that there is no evidence Israeli prime ministers felt the need to bring in public opinion for a policy they considered important (2002, 154). In fact, Arian (1995) found that politicians considered public opinion relatively malleable, and available for manipulation to support their policies. Support among Jewish Israelis for the peace process, for example, increased significantly *after* the Oslo Accords were signed (see Arian 1993, 3, 8), an indication that public opinion often reacts to events rather than determines them.

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[12] In addition, the proportional representation system, in which parties present a list of candidates to the entire country as a single constituency, provides no opportunity for voters to influence individual candidates; parties control who becomes a candidate, and parties are responsive to broad segments of the population. Alternately, if a core group obtains control of the central committee mechanisms that decide on parties' lists, they can make these lists reflect their own ideological and policy preferences, regardless of how much it fits with broader public opinion.

Three, the Israeli public has tended to accept the decisions of government in foreign and security matters, particularly in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In their 1988 analysis, Arian, Talmud, and Hermann found that "there is tremendous deference in Israel to the leadership precisely because security problems are so difficult and intractable. Public opinion appears to be more reactive than active, more led than leading" (82; see also S. Cohen 1995, 9). In this same vein, Makovsky points to public opinion polls during the 1991 Gulf War. Before the war, polls showed a majority favored retaliation if Iraq fired SCUDs at Israel; but once the government invoked its restraint policy, 80% supporting the government's position on non-involvement (1996, 78).

A public opinion explanation of the Oslo Accords might be strongest when considering the 1992 elections, when voters replaced a Shamir government with a Rabin government. Since the public made an obvious choice between different parties, we might assume that they were aware that some degree of policy difference (i.e., change) would be the result. In 1992 voters chose the Labor Party, which since the 1980s had come to represent a much more left-leaning position on the Arab-Israeli conflict and, especially, policy toward the WBG (Inbar 1991). Combined with the "creeping dovishness" among the population, it would be reasonable to assume, then, as some observers have (King 1994, 97; Ross 2004, 85; Slater 1996, 501-502) that Israelis brought Rabin to the prime ministry because they wanted a change in policy toward the Palestinians.

There are three problems with this assumption. First, the voters did not bring Rabin in because he had promised to talk directly to the PLO and negotiate

the beginnings of an independent Palestinian state. As Makovsky notes, "not once during the election did Rabin mention swapping land for peace, even though the Labor platform called explicitly for territorial compromise" and that he "avoided making the election a referendum on the idea of trading land for peace" (1996, 85, 86).[13] Makovsky continues that "he did not confuse the Israeli public's willingness to probe the seriousness of potential Arab peace interlocutors with a desire to make sweeping *a priori* territorial concessions" (1996, 86).[14] At the same time, Labor was careful not to offer distinct alternative positions on many of the foreign (and domestic) policy positions advocated by Likud, focusing instead on valence issues (those on which there is widespread agreement) (see Mendilow 1995).[15] In Inbar's words, "Labor won the elections precisely because it refrained from advocating a dovish platform" (1995, 40).[16]

Second, relatedly, the vote for Labor was in many cases a vote *against* Likud. This meant that the electorate was not looking for Labor and Rabin's specific policies, but an alternative from Likud and Shamir's policies: that voters switched for a variety of domestic "system management" or socioeconomic reasons (Arian and Shamir 1995; Aronoff 1995, 1993; Mendilow 1995; Reich, Wurmser, and Dropkin 1995; Shachar and Shamir 1995). Arian and Shamir write

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[13] Rabin did claim he was willing to get rid of Gaza, seeing it as an economic, moral, political, and military drain (Makovsky 1996, 86). He also specifically stated that there was "no chance" he would abandon the West Bank during his first term (Elazar and Sandler 1995, 12).

[14] Prominent Labor doves who did well in the party primaries and supported such policies, such Haim Ramon, Avraham Burg, and Yael Dayan were not given significant roles in the campaign.

[15] For example, according to Mendilow (2003, 139) controversial foreign and security issues that took up 37% of all of Labor's broadcast time during the 1988 election made up only 5% of Labor's messages in 1992.

[16] This is in contrast to the 1988 election, in which Peres, as leader, conducted a campaign that emphasized the differences on foreign policy issues between Labor and Likud. The effort led to a decline in perceptions of Labor's ability to look out for Israel's interests. See Inbar (1992); Steinberg (1992, 173-186); and Torgovnik (1992, 74-77).

specifically that Labor's focus on socioeconomic priorities "could appeal not only to Likud voters with more conciliatory attitudes toward the territories, but also to hard-line voters who were not willing to give up the territories but felt that their direct concerns of employment and opportunity were being neglected because of the Likud government's order of priorities" (1995, 40).[17] This was underlined by the feeling that the 1990-1992 government, led by Likud but relying on the extremist far-right parties and the religious parties, reduced the Likud's image as a centrist party.

Finally, concentration on elections cannot account for the specific policies a leader engages in, since elections are more about broad, sometimes vague, positions. This conclusion is enhanced when a learning process takes place, or is continuing. Rabin simply did not know in 1992 what policy he would choose: he not only rejected several attempts to bring the government into contact with the PLO, but his alternate hard-line stance on security issues[18] and dovish pronouncements indicate that he was unsure himself what direction he wanted to move in. Rabin only came to trust the secret channel when he learned that the Washington talks would not move forward without PLO permission, and when Beilin, Peres, Savir, and, especially, Singer (whom he most trusted) reported positively on the Oslo talks.

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[17] In the last several weeks before the election, a poll found that of potential Likud defectors, 21.6% pointed to unemployment as their determining factor, 18.9% to socioeconomic conditions, 16.2% to government corruption and inefficiency, and 13.5% to appeal of Rabin as leader. Only 1.7% mentioned the settlement issue at all (Mendilow 1995, 221).

[18] Such as the deportation of 415 Hamas activists in December 1992 into the wintry no-man's land in Lebanon, the sealing off of the WBG in spring 1993, and the bombardment of Lebanon in July 1993.

Public opinion does matter. It was important for Rabin, since it both contributed to his electoral victory and provided a responsive public attitude for his policies. As Auerbach and Greenbaum (2000) point out, Rabin used private polling data to gauge popular attitudes in order to formulate his policy messages. But it seems public opinion was used less to shape policy than how to present it. According to the authors, Rabin gauged his image as a security hawk by the polls; but he did this to gain credibility so that he could engage with the Palestinians. At the same time, public opinion had not moved substantially in the direction that Rabin eventually did with Oslo. Support for a Palestinian state among the Jewish public never reached higher than 40% (see the figure in Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002, 123). Because public opinion never reached a majority, it is hard to argue that Rabin used it to do something beyond what the public was willing to accept. More importantly, though, because the same explanation cannot account for Shamir's lack of change, public opinion is not a deep enough analysis, and so only tells part of the story.

Public Opinion and Lobbying for EU Membership

As in Israel, public opinion in Turkey is generally considered to play a minor role in foreign policy making. However, it has been noted that popular opinion, combined with intensive media attention, can impact on foreign policy issues with high emotive value and symbolism, particularly on Cyprus and relations with Greece (e.g., Makovsky and Sayarı 2000a, 7). Moreover, consistently large numbers of Turks support EU membership: a poll conducted in 1995 revealed that two-thirds of Turks supported strong ties with Europe (White

1997, 30), while a May/June 2002 survey conducted by the respected research institute TESEV found that a similar number (64%) still supported EU membership (TESEV 2002, 38). Based on this, it would be reasonable to assume that Erdoğan believed he was constrained by public opinion toward Europe, and had to engage in active efforts at membership.

But the study of the link between public opinion and foreign policy in Turkey is very under-developed. There has been little academic study on this topic (see Çarkoğlu 2003, 172; Makovsky and Sayarı 2000a, 6). Theoretical and empirical lacunae thus prevent an adequate understanding of the role of popular demands on foreign policy making and make any empirical conclusions difficult to sustain.

Beyond this, there are two main problems with using public opinion to explain Turkish foreign policy toward the EU. First, the Turkish population seems to hold little interest in foreign affairs in general—meaning that while Turks may hold positive views of the EU, this does not translate into active lobbying efforts on membership. A mid-1997 survey found that 57% of Turks were "not interested" in foreign policy, and only 23% "interested" (cited in Makovsky and Sayarı 2000a, 6). While the media has given foreign affairs much coverage, and foreign affairs columnists among the major newspapers can have significant influence on various issues, this has not percolated down through society in general. Andrew Mango, a long-time and keen observer of Turkey, writes that these issues interest "most people in Turkey only to the extent that events abroad affect their livelihood....But for most ordinary people it is a subject of platonic

interest, something to discuss idly in front of the family TV set" (2004, 115).[19] It

might be argued that membership in the EU would impact on the economic

capacities of Turks and Turkey, given the free flow of goods, services, and people

within a huge geographic area, but this is debatable. The reality of the Customs

Union and the increasing lowering of trade barriers under the WTO's free trade

regime already provide many of these benefits, and the strong and persistent

political and economic nationalism that permeates much of Turkish society might

well offset this.

Second, also as in Israel, foreign policy making in Turkey is an elite affair,

particularly of the state elite.[20] This stems from the tradition of the strong state in

Turkey (see Heper 1985). As Robins put it, "[t]he state tradition in Turkey is that

the people exist to serve the state rather than the state existing to serve the people"

(2003, 89). This long-entrenched practice of ignoring public opinion began in the

Atatürk period, when the Kemalists engaged in a series of domestic reforms

designed to separate society from one of its historical guiding precepts, Islam.

Many of these reforms were not widely, or easily, accepted, particularly in rural

areas, but this was irrelevant to those who wanted to impose a new political and

social system on the country. Numerous other examples exist to support this

argument: *Operation Provide Comfort*, the enforcement of the no-fly zone over

northern Iraq, was never popular but its mandate was always renewed by

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[19] As an example, he cites the low turnout to a rally in Istanbul in 1994 to protest the treatment of Bosnian Muslims, despite the fact that hundreds of thousands of Turks are descended from refugees from Bosnia (2004, 115).
[20] Robins identifies the main actors in foreign policy making as the president, the prime minister, the foreign minister, the army, and the foreign ministry bureaucracy (itself a mini-elite within the state apparatus) (2003, 68-79).

successive and varied governments. And when in June 1999 a Turkish court sentenced Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the militant separatist Kurdistan Workers Party (*Partiya Karkerana Kurdistan*—PKK) to death, the government decided, in deference to relations with the EU, not to carry out the sentence despite the wild popularity the sentence garnered among the public.

Policy making in Turkey is also an affair of the political elite (Çarkoğlu 2003). Until the advent of multi-party democracy in 1946, the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*—CHP), the only legal party, ran the government. From 1950 to the military coup in 1960 it was the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*—DP). In both cases, the party supplied ministers and other top officials to the government and bureaucracy. The coming to power of the DP, especially, emphasized this trend: it sought to replace CHP-affiliated officials with its own loyalists, and in what has been called the "colonization" of the bureaucracy (Özbudun 2000, 36; see also Heper and Sayarı 2002). This practice was followed by successive parties—including the Islamists, though they were much less successful. The breaking down of politics into a series of parties concerned with their own interests, personal conflicts between leaders, and efforts to implant their partisans into the state (Sayarı 2002) has meant that policy making has been relegated to secondary concern and reflective of whatever party holds the relevant policymaking bureau at the time.

The weakest argument within this framework is an electoral politics one. As with public opinion more generally, it has been pointed out that there are few aggregate studies of voting in Turkey, so that little is known about electoral

behavior (Esmer 2002). This complicates any theoretical analysis of the impact of elections on foreign policy making. In fact, where studies have pointed out the importance of the 2002 elections, it has been in domestic terms and not foreign policy orientation (see, for examples, Müftüler-Bac 2004; Özel 2003). What is most obvious about the 1995 and the 2002 elections is that they did not give the Islamist governments a mandate to engage in either an Islamist agenda or an active effort to obtain EU membership. White (1997, 26) calculates that non-Islamic parties received four-fifths of the vote in 1995. Vertigans (2003, 76) points out that the Islamist victory in 2002 really represented only 25% of the electorate, once spoiled ballots and those who voted for other parties are taken into account; much of the Islamist electoral support was about voting *against* other parties as it was about voting *for* the Islamists. These are not electoral mandates on which to base policy shifts, in any direction. At the same time, significant support for both parties was based on a variety of domestic motivations, including demands for provision of better socio-economic goods, which the Islamists had done at the municipal level (see Heper 1997, 36; White 2002), frustration and resentment toward the established parties and the promise of a fresher approach (Sayarı 1996), and a general expressions of "dissatisfaction with the existing order" (Narli 1999, 41).

Public opinion is relevant for any explanation of Turkish policy toward the EU, since engaging in active efforts to secure Turkish membership is made easier by the majority support provided by the population. But because it was a constant during both Erbakan's and Erdoğan's tenures, while it might help explain in part

Erdoğan's foreign policy, it cannot explain the foreign policy *variation* between the two. Most importantly, the two elections in Turkey highlighted here do not explain foreign policy variation among the Islamist prime ministers. Both belonged to the same type of party, received similar levels of support from the population, yet engaged in very different—even contradictory—foreign policies.

Poliheuristic Theory

Poliheuristic theory was designed to incorporate the cognitive processes of individual leaders with a rational choice-style (expected utility) selection of strategies. According to the theory, when making decisions leaders pass through two phases. The first is a noncompensatory phase in which leaders eliminate all the possible policy options that might harm them in domestic political terms[21] through the use of heuristics (mental shortcuts) that tell them which policies are acceptable. In the second stage individuals utilize an expected utility framework to rationally choose from the remaining options the one that maximizes benefits and minimizes risks/harm (Mintz 2004; Mintz and Geva 1997).

There are two theoretical flaws that undermine poliheuristic theory's usefulness for a study of foreign policy variation. First, although it is an important contribution to our understanding of foreign policy decision-making, because it tries to combine cognitive processes with expected utility theory, in the end it de-emphasizes the former while over-emphasizing the latter to the point where cognitive processes play no role in decision-making. Because poliheuristic theory

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[21] This can include any of the following: loss in popular support; threat to survival; a drop in public support for a particular policy; potential electoral defeat; inter- or intra-party opposition and competition; collapse of a government; and so on (see Mintz 2004, 9).

assumes that the cognitive shortcut used in the first stage of decision-making is political survival, there is little if any difference between this and an expected utility approach that argues that politicians' highest goals are to stay in power and act accordingly (see Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Downs 1957; Siverson 1998).

It becomes, then, essentially an exercise in rational choice. And while rational choice is useful for the study of international relations (particularly in terms of prediction), this usefulness depends on the question being asked. Because it assumes that the structure of incentives is the same for all leaders, poliheuristic theory ends up ignoring individuals' cognitive and emotional decision-making processes (see Stein and Welch 1997). It cannot explain why different individuals act differently under the same circumstances. It cannot provide an effective explanation of what are at bottom decisions based on individual leaders' specific cognitive and affective structures. Poliheuristic theory cannot explain foreign policy variation since it does not investigate the different motivations that drive different leaders, assuming instead that they are all motivated by the same incentive structures (in this case, domestic political survival) (on this critique, see McDermott 2004, 14).[22]

Second, poliheuristic theory over-emphasizes domestic political concerns as driving the elimination of alternatives in the first phase of decision-making

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[22] Similarly, proponents of poliheuristic theory also acknowledge that on any given dimension (especially the political one) in the first phase of decision-making, there is a cutoff point below which an alternative is considered problematic enough that it is eliminated as an option. The only way to know that cutoff, though, is to know the individual decision-maker, which requires in-depth study of her personality characteristics. Poliheuristic theory does not engage in this type of exploration, and so misses a critical element in the decision-making process.

(e.g., DeRouen and Sprecher 2004, 57; Goertz 2004, 15). In Mintz' words, "[p]olitical leaders almost by definition take into account political factors and consequences while making decisions. They measure success and failure, costs and benefits, gains and losses, and risks and rewards in political units" (Mintz 2003, 3). These are the "essence of decision," since all decisions stem from domestic political considerations (Mintz 2004, 7). This has, as one scholar put it, seemed to act "very close to an absolute constraint on policy making" (Stern 2004, 110).

There is little doubt, of course, that politicians would prefer to be in than out of power. But that this is such an overriding motivation that it conditions how leaders choose among their alternatives is not necessarily so. Such an over-emphasis ignores the complexity of individuals and their thinking processes, and how these impact on which alternatives are chosen and which are rejected. Some leaders are less focused on their standing, particularly when they believe very strongly in a particular course of action or hold fast to a specific ideology. Poliheuristic theory claims to utilize the psychological characteristics of individuals as the defining feature of the first stage of decision making, but by focusing almost solely on domestic political considerations, it ignores them.

Poliheuristic Theory and the Oslo Accords

Poliheuristic theory fails to capture the dynamics behind both Shamir's and Rabin's decision-making regarding the PLO and a Palestinian state in the WBG, because of its emphasis on identical incentive structures, concern for political survival. But both prime ministers engaged in policies that were

unpopular among significant portions of their domestic constituencies, in Shamir's case eventually causing him the ultimate political harm—the loss of an election and a removal from office. Shamir and Rabin both interpreted their environments differently, and both not only utilized incentive structures different from what poliheuristic theory predicts, but also dissimilar from each other.

It seems that Rabin's decision-making is more amenable to a poliheuristic approach. He did, after all, use polling data to gauge the public's willingness to engage in serious efforts at peace talks with the Palestinians (see Auberbach and Greenbaum 2000). The problem with such an explanation is that it ignores Rabin's lack of concern with domestic political considerations once he decided to go with Oslo, particularly in the aftermath of the agreement when terrorism against Israelis continued and the public began questioning the wisdom of bringing the PLO into the WBG. In January 1995, for instance, after a series of particularly horrific terrorist attacks, he insisted that "I know that many of you are asking, have you brought us peace, or terror? The road to peace is not easy....There is no other alternative. We will achieve peace, for this is the solution for the long term, and for terrorism, even if it is difficult for us now" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995b). If Rabin were more amenable to domestic political considerations in 1992-1993, why would he not be in 1993-1995, particularly when the latter period saw a much greater degree of popular dissatisfaction with him? The focus on political survival, as predicted by poliheuristic theory, does not apply to Rabin's decision-making.

The case of Shamir illustrates even more strongly the weakness of poliheuristic theory due to its focus on political concerns as incentive for decision-making. Shamir acted before and during the 1992 election campaign (when one might expect leaders to be most concerned with domestic political considerations) in decidedly un-rational ways. He simply did not care about political consequences. First, from 1989 to 1992 he insisted that Israel would not allow any PLO member to join Israeli-Palestinian peace talks, he refused to commit Israel to anything beyond the administrative autonomy envisaged for Palestinians in the 1978 Camp David Accords, and he maintained that Israel would continue to settle the WBG. This he insisted on in the face of growing American pressure, to the point where he provoked a public clash with the Bush Administration (on the loan guarantees; see Rusonik 1992). Since good relations with the US were a staple of Israeli foreign policy since the 1970s, Shamir's actions aroused concern among the Israeli public and augmented their dissatisfaction with him (Arian and Shamir 1995, 49).

Second, even more glaringly at odds with poliheuristic theory, Shamir insisted throughout the election campaign on stressing his ideas about settlements in the WBG and the importance of the Land of Israel, even in the face of evidence that such declarations were only harming his and Likud's chance for re-election (see, for example, Arens 1995). The Russian immigrant community, for example, was a natural constituency for Likud, but its focus at this point was on its members' economic status. Yet instead of providing sympathy and solutions for them, Shamir called for them "to elevate the welfare of the country's strategic

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calculus [that is, settlements in the WBG] above any personal goals or difficulties they were presently enduring" (Nisan 1995, 48). Toward the end of the campaign, in recognition of this, Likud finally began to "bypass" a focus on Shamir in favor of focusing on attacking Rabin (see Halevi and Susser 1992).

Poliheuristic thus cannot explain the variation in Israeli policy that was Oslo, because it cannot explain the motivations behind Shamir's and Rabin's decisions. It assumes that leaders work under an incentive structure that stresses political survival, but both Rabin and Shamir ignored these incentives in favor of policies that they personally believed were most appropriate. It contributed to Shamir's electoral loss, and significantly undermined support for Rabin by the time of his murder in 1995. It therefore cannot provide an explanation for the Israeli case study.

Poliheuristic Theory and Lobbying for EU Membership

A poliheuristic approach might in fact be able to explain Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's foreign policy on active lobbying for EU membership.[23] As explained in Chapter 7, Erdoğan learned from the experience of others that the Turkish military was prepared to block any foreign policies that it did not deem appropriate. There was, in other words, a high domestic political cost that conditioned Erdoğan's decision-making and made him reluctant to antagonize the relevant actors. He therefore chose from among a remaining set of alternatives a policy that would not anger the military, and thus keep him safe in his position.

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[23] Poliheuristic theory has not yet been applied to Turkey. Mintz (2004, 8-9) refers to Turkey in a few paragraphs but without any sustained or in-depth analysis. His conclusion there is also open to debate.

The effort to join the EU was seen by Erdoğan as part of a broader strategy to relieve the Islamist movement of constrictive military pressure.

But though it might shed light on Erdoğan's decision-making, poliheuristic theory does not do so for Erbakan. It cannot explain Erbakan's overt efforts to engage in a policy unpopular with these "veto players" (the term is Mintz's [2004, 9]), antagonizing them to the point where it became obvious even to Erbakan that his political position was in danger. In the end, he provoked the 1997 "soft coup," in which the military not only pressured him out of office, but engaged in a sustained campaign for some years against the Islamist movement in general. The argument that Erbakan may have been more concerned with his Islamist base than with the military does not hold; already by 1996 Erbakan had a reputation as someone who overrode the concerns of his supporters, even joining coalition governments twice (1974 and 1996) that included parties the Islamists were diametrically opposed to, despite the objections of his party colleagues (Atacan 2005, 190-191; Özbudun 2000, 92; Özdalga 2002, 137-138). In short, Erbakan simply did not care all that much about any type of domestic opposition and so the incentive structures posited by poliheuristic theory cannot explain his foreign policy.

Poliheuristic theory is thus not insightful as an explanation of foreign policy variation. It cannot account for the actions of both Islamist prime ministers, and thus cannot help us better understand foreign policy variation.

Prospect Theory

Like poliheuristic theory, prospect theory is a decision-making model that incorporates individual cognitive processes to explain why people engage in risk-seeking or risk-avoiding behavior. First, prospect theory notes that individuals have a particular reference point around which they base their decisions. People are more sensitive to losses than to gains from this reference point. That is, they overvalue losses compared to comparable gains—"losses hurt more than gains gratify" (Levy 1998, 97). Second, people engage in a two-stage decision-making process: In the first stage, individuals "edit" their alternatives by identifying their reference point, the available options around that reference point, and the value of each option. In the second stage, individuals evaluate their options based on the value they ascribe to them and weight them with probabilities to settle on their eventual choice. At bottom, individuals are so loss averse that they are willing to take considerable risk to avoid the loss, despite the fact that an even greater loss may well result (see Kahneman and Tversky 2000, Chapters 1, 2, and 7).[24]

There are, however, two theoretical weaknesses inherent in prospect theory that undermine its capacity to explain foreign policy variation. First, despite its numerous and robust findings from both experimental evidence and International Relations, prospect theory has not been able to explain the process of how individuals frame decisions (Boettcher 2004, 332; Fischer and Johnson 1986, 58; McDermott 2004, 304-305). The conditions under which and how actors identify reference points ("framing") has not been specified; in large

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[24] These are reprinted articles from the late 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. All of the main studies that formed the core of prospect theory's early research program and laid out the basic model are found in this edited volume.

measure this is because different individuals will identify different reference points. Levy (2000, 200) emphasizes this by illustrating the methodological problem of inferring an individual's reference point by looking at behavior, rather than identifying an actor's reference point independent of behavior. This creates problems of tautology. A more in-depth examination of individuals and their personal characteristics and the impact these have on their behavior apart from the specific decision under study would provide a better explanation. This requires more comprehensive investigation of an individual's personality than prospect theorists have been willing to engage in. In this vein, prospect theorists often lose the individual in their analysis, by focusing on collective (i.e., state) behavior (see, for example, Berejikian 2004; Taliaferro 2004).

This leads to the second main criticism: an over-emphasis on context at the expense of individuals (see in particular Kowert and Hermann 1997). Because prospect theory emphasizes losses and gains around a given reference point, the emphasis in the model is on the domain in which an individual operates—rather than on the individual himself (McDermott 2004, 290, 294-297, 300-301). But in order to understand why individuals choose a particular reference point, we must understand the individual himself and his preferences, beliefs, and motivations, which shape his foreign policy decisions. Prospect theory is thus indeterminate as an explanation for foreign policy change, and therefore its use in such an analysis can lead to inaccurate conclusions and predictions.

Prospect Theory and the Oslo Accords

Prospect theory is more effective at explaining foreign policy decision-making than poliheuristic theory, because the process of framing incorporates the notion that individuals differ on what they consider important and on what they base their decisions on. This can account for differences across individuals and might, at first blush, seem appropriate for explaining foreign policy variation. Certainly, in the Israeli case study Shamir's frame was very different from Rabin's (the Land of Israel versus the security of Israel; see Chapter 5). And, in fact, Shamir's actions demonstrated a pronounced fear of loss, particularly of the Land, its settlements, and a major piece of identity of the Jewish people.

However, Rabin's foreign policy can only be explained by the opposite of what prospect theory predicts. That is, Rabin took a major risk for a *gain* rather than a loss—a chance to improve Israeli security by negotiating directly with the PLO and laying the groundwork for a Palestinian state, both of which he himself considered to be "losses," in the sense that he never trusted the PLO or accepted that it could be a full partner in peace. He took this risk by making Israel lose what it already held—land and control over it. And he strengthened the PLO at a time when it was at its weakest point and on the verge of irrelevance. In this sense, he took a major risk by tolerating a major loss—not to keep what *might be* lost, but to actually "lose" something by purposefully giving it up.

To explain foreign policy variation, a theory must be able to account for why two different foreign policy decisions were made. Prospect theory can

explain, in the Israeli example, only one decision. As such, it is not particularly useful for an understanding of variation in foreign policy.

Prospect Theory and Lobbying for EU Membership

It is difficult to identify what loss Prime Minister Erdoğan was seeking to avoid when he engaged in active lobbying efforts to join the EU. This example highlights the fact that not all foreign policy decisions are about risk, the core premise on which prospect theory is based.[25] In addition, it is hard to argue that Prime Minister Erbakan was seeking to avoid a loss when he pursued closer ties with the Islamic world at the expense of Europe. He simply believed that this direction was the appropriate one for Turkey, and one that would in fact strengthen it by returning it to its glorious past through a return to Islam (what might be classified as a search for a gain).

There is no doubt that Erbakan was well aware of the "risk" (in prospect theory terms) he ran if angered the anti-Islamist military; at one of his first press conferences, he stressed that Turkey was a secular state based on the principles of Atatürk (*Turkish Daily News* 30 June 1996). While this might seem to open the door to prospect theory as an explanation for this case study, the fact that six months later Erbakan began pursuing a foreign (and domestic) policy opposite to his declaration in June (and thus completely ignoring the risks involved in stirring the military to action against him), it was because he perceived he could make a gain (an improved position for Islam in society) rather than trying to avoid a loss. When the military did move against him in February 1997, he actively resisted

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[25] This is underlined by the fact that the term "risk" is often used in the titles of various studies utilizing prospect theory to explain state behavior. See, for examples, Berejikian (2004); McDermott (1998); Taliaferro (2004); and Weyland (1996).

them by refusing to sign a document they presented him demanding a curtailment of Islamist activities, and then—when he did eventually sign it—avoided applying the directive in practice.

Erbakan's actions over time aroused the military's suspicion, then anger; at any point had Erbakan stopped his provocations, it is likely the military would have left him in power. But instead, he continued to seek what he considered to be gains. He ignored the fact that there was a risk in continuing his foreign (and domestic) policies, even though in the end he did through his actions ensure he suffered a major loss (i.e., being thrown out of office). The critical element here is that Erbakan was not interested in or focused on avoiding any loss. His actions may have engendered such a reaction, but he himself was focused only on the gains for Islamism. Because prospect theory assumes that individuals do concentrate on avoiding losses, it cannot apply to cases where leaders ignored such considerations and focused only on gains.

In short, it is sometimes difficult to identify whether an individual is working for a gain or to avoid a loss, if she is working under conditions of risk at all; indeed, the identification of either may be more useful as ideal-types rather than specific objectives. Some individuals (such as Shamir and Erbakan) pursue objectives based only on their ideological preferences, even in the face of obvious constraints and potentially large losses such as electoral defeat or direct intervention by other political actors. Prospect theory can shed light on particular foreign policy decisions, but because of this discrepancy it cannot do for foreign

policy variation where the different leaders held different objective vis-à-vis gains and losses.

All of the above approaches are indeterminate, inaccurate, or able to explain only one part of the foreign policy variation under study. The macro-structural processes detailed by Structural Realism, Constructivism, and public opinion are certainly relevant; external and domestic events impact on decision-making by emphasizes certain events and developments over others, and by providing constraints on or opportunities for decisions. But while they may help explain general timing or contours of a foreign policy, they cannot explain the particular foreign policy decisions under study, particularly when different leaders make different policies in similar environments. Poliheuristic theory and prospect theory are better explanations, because of their focus on the specific process of decision-making. But they, too, fall short since they can at most explain only one leader's policies but not the other's in the two dyads highlighted in the case studies. All five thus fail to help us understand the causes of foreign policy variation.

A more insightful model would examine the individual cognitive and affective structures that condition each individual leader's decision-making. It would examine the development of these personal characteristics so as to provide an in-depth understanding of why certain leaders engage in certain policies. And, by emphasizing the role of individuals, would provide a more effective

explanation for foreign policy change. Such a model is presented in the next chapter.

Chapter Three

A Model of Foreign Policy Variation

Introduction

How can we explain foreign policy variation? This chapter seeks to answer this question by constructing a model of foreign policy decision-making that emphasizes the role of the individual leader. It does so by classifying leaders as ideological or adaptable. This definition builds on earlier understandings of the role of individuals in policymaking, but it strengthens them by changing the elements of the definition and including the role of affect and emotion.

In addition, we must also identify the conditions under which individuals matter. We do this by assessing the decision-making structures in which the leader operates. Centralized decision-making institutions provide greater autonomy for individuals to make policy; under these conditions, leaders' own belief structures can impact on policy. In de-centralized institutions, leaders' own ideas about policy matter less, since regardless of where their ideas come from they are blocked from translating them into policy by other institutional actors. We must also identify the ideational structures that prevail in a given society-polity at the time of the foreign policy decision under study. This is necessary in order to better measure the capacity of a leader to enact new policy, and to determine whether and how much of a variation has taken place in foreign policy.

To this end, the chapter begins with a discussion of the role of individuals in foreign policy decision-making. Although widely accepted as a critical variable in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and, to a lesser extent, in International Relations (IR), there is still insufficient understanding of how individuals matter—that is, how specifically they impact on foreign policymaking.

The next section deals with the role of affect in foreign policy decision-making. This segment requires much more discussion, because affect is a little used concept in both FPA and IR. The first subpart seeks to provide a workable definition of emotion, a problematic endeavor in even the psychology literature. The following part focuses on the affect heuristic—a device similar to the cognitive heuristics mentioned previously but connected to emotional rather than cognitive processes. The third part discusses the (limited) use of affect in FPA and IR, and makes the argument that, in fact, this is a useful concept for understanding foreign policy and international politics. The next two sections form the core of the theoretical model developed in this chapter—the classification of individuals as ideological or adaptable. The conditions under which individuals matter in the actual process of making foreign policy are discussed in the following section, on the impact of institutions on policymaking. The final segment notes the important role ideas play in measuring whether and how much foreign policy variation actually takes place.

The Role of Individuals in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

It has already been established that individuals matter in foreign policy decision-making. How they matter, and the conditions under which they matter, must still be explored. This section does so by focusing on the cognitive and emotional processes that individuals undergo in their decision-making processes, which impact on their ultimate decisions. The identification of these processes helps us categorize individuals as ideological or adaptable.

The mental simplification of reality is the critical way in which individuals understand their environments. The process of simplification is the first line of defense against the amount and complexity of information assaulting all our senses, which would otherwise overwhelm most humans. Although the psychology, decision research, and neural science literatures have established that humans share basic models of simplification and decision-making, the evidence also suggests that decision-making—as a process of information processing—is still quite an individual affair. The basic elements of this process are shared across individuals, but the specific ways in which we incorporate information and then make decisions varies "as a function of the characteristics of individuals (traits) and their current cognitive and affective circumstances (state)" (Szalma and Hancock 2005, 177). Even in the same general circumstances, individuals make different decisions: different individuals focus on different aspects of their environments; spend more or less time on specific issues than others; interact with others in different ways; recall different past experiences; hold different institutional positions; and so on. No individual feels and thinks the same way.

Studying an individual as an individual is a beginning step, but does not help us understand why individuals differ in their foreign policy decisions. We must compare leaders, then; studying one leader is useful for thick description but not so useful for theory development. By comparing leaders, we can better understand which cognitive or affective factors are more relevant, and how they impact on political outcomes.

Belief Structures, Heuristics, and the Simplification of Reality

Given the inherent ambiguity and informational complexity in the world, the mental simplification of reality is the critical way in which individuals understand their environments. Our capacity for rationality is "bounded" (Simon 1985), and therefore we must make simplified assumptions about our environments in order to make it easier for us to understand our circumstances and make decisional responses to them. In the study of politics, these simplifications therefore "underlie all political behavior," since all individuals must engage in some sort of thinking process in order to arrive at a decision for action (Young and Schafer 1998, 64).

This simplification process is accomplished through our belief structures, or schemas. Schemas define our situations for us, by interpreting, storing, and evaluating incoming information. They do so by helping us define and understand our contemporary situations in light of our past experiences and knowledge (Fazio 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991, 99; Lau 1986; Vertzberger 1990). In this sense, they incorporate our beliefs, values, attitudes, and past experiences, and synthesize them into representational structures that we can rely on for interpretation of our

contemporary environments. Without these kinds of simplifications to define our expectations and frame our responses, we would have difficulty functioning since we would have to cope with what would otherwise be new situations all the time.[1]

But even our schemas can be too complex for direct use, and it has been found that humans rely on mental heuristics as shortcuts to and simple representations of our schemas. Heuristics structure this information so that we can make decisions in a quicker, more orderly manner (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991; Vertzberger 1990). Like schemas more generally, heuristics provide *a priori* assumptions and expectations about one's contemporary environment (Fiske and Taylor 1991, Chapter 9; Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Tversky and Kahneman 1974).[2]

There is a large literature demonstrating how schemas (also referred to as cognitive maps) help foreign policymakers simplify their environments and guide their decisions (for some examples see Axelrod 1976; George 1979; M. Hermann 2003, 1993; Jervis 1976; Khong 1992; Lebow and Stein 1993; Vertzberger 1990; for a good overview of the various literatures, see Young and Schafer 1998). Although this literature effectively utilizes the concept of judgmental heuristics as a form of schema, it has been much less interested in incorporating affect in the foreign policy decision-making process. It therefore misses a critical element in the decision-making process of state leaders, and prevents us from reaching a

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[1] There are other psychological models that are not schema-based, but there is wide consensus among researchers on the appropriateness of studying schemas.

[2] The experiments that established the existence of heuristics were designed to explain errors and biases in human decision-making—that is, why people made bad decisions. The problems with such an approach in decision-making are highlighted in Chapter 1.

more insightful understanding of foreign policy change. The next section addresses this gap by incorporating affect into the theoretical model.

The Role of Affect in Foreign Policy Decision-Making

Emotion has had a rough ride in the study of decision-making. It was, for a long time, considered irrelevant in decision-making, which has been dominated by a focus on cognitive processes since the cognitive revolution in the 1960s. At best, it was considered to be relevant only because it caused people to become irrational and make poor decisions. Cognition was considered a rational, analytical process, while emotion was seen as unstructured, instinctive, reactive, and overly passionate, which in turn crowded out measured, cost-benefit analysis. The difference between the two was, it was claimed, clearly found in the logical or illogical decisions that people made, depending on whether cognition (rationality) or emotion (irrationality) structured the decision-making process.[3]

In light of this, psychologists and some political psychologists have, in recent years, begun to expand their understanding of heuristics. There is widespread agreement now that humans use not only cognitive heuristics, but also "affective" heuristics that utilize emotion, rather than cognitive processes, to take shortcuts to one's schemas (Finucane, Peters, and Slovic 2003; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002;

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[3] Emotions are sometimes considered to be similar to rational mental processes, in that they provide us with an *emotional* cost-benefit analysis (see Elster 1999, 301-306 for more discussion). They are non-rational mental states that do impact on our decisions, but they are not *irr*ational. Or rather, they might appear rational to the decision-maker ("retaining a specific policy is important to me because I believe passionately in it, therefore I will not budge from that policy regardless of the costs") but not to others or even in terms of the overall, long-term position for the state.

Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). Some have even argued that when engaged, affect and emotion often have a "dominating" influence over behavior, shunting aside cognitive processes (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001). But this growing recognition has not spread very far in foreign policy analysis or, especially, International Relations.

Two areas where emotion has been used—particularly during the 1980s and early 1990s—is in the literature on suboptimal group decision-making, and in parts of the literature on deterrence, crisis, and bargaining (all of which are related) (see Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; Lebow 1996, Chapter 13; Lebow and Stein 1993). This has been a useful first step, but there have been two problems. First, in many cases the use of emotion (often referred to as motivated bias) is considered as part of the cognitive process, rather than as a separate variable with its own distinct impact (e.g., Lebow 2005). Stemming from this is the second snag: much of this literature does not examine the direct impact of emotion on policy, but rather how it works more indirectly through cognitive structures, particularly by biasing individuals against making "good" decisions.[4] For example, many authors argued that emotion (motivation) impacted on foreign policy decision-making by pushing leaders to maintain or choose policies that fit with their self-images or needs (see, for example, the discussions in Jervis 1985a, 24-27; Lebow 1981, 107-111).

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[4] This criticism raises a third problem, as highlighted in Chapter 1 and above: namely, that the literature focuses on how both emotional and cognitive biases (and their interaction) lead to poor or wrong decisions. This undermines the study of affect and policymaking since it prejudices methodology, case studies, and conclusions.

Beyond this, these are lone examples of the incorporation of affect into foreign policymaking. The discussion below delves deeper into the role of emotion in human thinking and ties it into a process of foreign policy decision-making, thus helping to fill the large theoretical gap in FPA and IR.[5]

The Affect Heuristic

Today we know from brain research, physiological studies, and experimental evidence that affect and emotion play a critical role in the decision-making process (though there continues to be disagreement over whether or not they do so independently from or in conjunction with cognitive processes). They do so by acting as judgmental shortcuts, similar to cognitive heuristics. Instead of cognitive processes, though, an affect heuristic shapes decisions by highlighting the intuitive or emotional meaning that objects, events, or people have for the decision-maker. Instead of appraising objects, events, or people by cognitive analysis, we simply *feel* what these objects, events, or people mean to us and respond accordingly.[6] This heuristic "tags" all stimuli with an affective label that

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[5] There continues to be disagreements over what affect and emotion actually are and what components are included in each (for an overview see Elster 1999). There is also disagreement over where emotion stems from—whether from neural-biological (Damasio 1994; LeDoux 1996), psychological (Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone 2001), or social contexts (Parkinson, Fischer, and Manstead 2005). Finally, there are differences over whether emotion and cognition work hand-in-hand (Epstein 1994), whether one precedes and drives the other (Ellis 2005; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001), or whether they are completely independent of each other (see the debate between Lazarus 1984, and Zajonc 1984). In this study affect refers to a broad, overall mental framework an individual undergoes for long periods of time, possibly their entire lives (broadly divided into general positive or negative feelings), while emotions are feelings of much shorter duration, often much more intense and sharp. Some psychologists have argued that there is no such thing as an objective emotional state, calling it an "ontological illusion" and claiming that emotion is really only "some physiological state which is the basis of some felt perturbation" (Harré 1986, 4).

[6] Some psychologists do argue that cognition plays this same role as well—that it can also be just as direct, automatic, and immediate as an emotional reaction, and in this way precede emotion (see Lazarus 1984). See Ellis (2005) for an opposite argument. The difference appears to lie in how emotion is defined (Cornelius 1996, 130). There is some evidence to suggest that the availability heuristic may be partly due to affect, in addition to cognition, in that ease of recall might be

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bestows meaning on a piece of information (Hancock, Szalma, and Oron-Gilad 2005, 165-166; Lodge and Taber 2005; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002). As the image or stimuli is brought before an individual's attention, the affective heuristic is engaged and the individual produces a decision based on how the heuristic tells her she feels (e.g, I don't *like* bungalows therefore I will not buy that one-story house). Zajonc argued that the difference between affect and cognition is that affect provides an *early* or *immediate* reaction that conditions how we think of things. In his words, "[w]e do not just see 'a house': we see 'a *handsome* house,' 'an *ugly* house,' or 'a *pretentious* house'" (1980, 154; emphasis in original). Because it is automatic and immediate (emotions are "powerful impulses that do not permit the mediation of thought" [Simon 1985, 301]), an affect heuristic is considered by some to be a more efficient heuristic, in that reliance on affect makes for a faster, easier, and more efficient method of decision-making (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 398). This is considered helpful, since humans cannot, as noted above, process the range of incoming information that we face every day.[7]

We know that affect impacts on decision-making because neural science has proved that emotions stem from within us and that the brain uses emotion as

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underlined by the fact that the image being recalled retains an affective appeal or repulsion (see Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 414). The idea is that events that hold emotional significance for an individual will be easier to recall; and the easier it is to recall an event, the more likely a decision about a contemporary event will be made in light of the past event. This would support Epstein's (1994) and others' contention that a dual process of both cognition and affect work to influence decision-making, and that they cannot easily be separated.

[7] In this context, research has found that less politically sophisticated (that is, knowledgeable) people rely more heavily on affect heuristics)—or at least uses emotion more frequently and easily (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002). For instance, an unsophisticated voter might think, I like liberals, therefore I will not vote for conservative candidates, while a sophisticated voter might examine a candidate's stance on various issues before deciding how to cast her ballot.

part of the decision-making process at least in some areas. Deep within our brains is a part that self-organizes our responses to the environments in which we act—not in the sense of reacting *to* our environments, but in acting *on* them (Ellis 2005). Humans respond to a stimulus first by having an emotional reaction to it. In fact, this is the only way we can become conscious of it. Only then can we respond to it cognitively, that is, by making a decision about how to react. This process is regulated by the various parts of the brain, particularly in the frontal and parietal lobes, which begin the process of making us aware of—at the beginning stages—vague sensorimotor images that inform us about what is going on in our environments. Damascio's research has found, in this sense, that patients with brain lesions did not experience certain feelings (which stem from emotions) such as fear and anxiety, and thus engaged in decisions that were obviously counter-productive (Damascio 1994; see also LeDoux 1996).

A wealth of experimental research by psychologists has also proven that emotion matters when making decisions. Importantly, this research differs from earlier exploration of emotion, which highlighted the negative impact affect could have. Much contemporary research focuses on the effect emotion has in general, without judging its consequences.[8] Such studies have focused on the attractiveness (affective appeal) of particular options over others (Mellers, Schwartz, and Ritov 1999; Svenson 2003); and the desire to expend more resources for objects or act differently toward individuals that are *liked* or toward which there is a more positive feeling (Alhakami and Slovic 1994; Hsee and Kunreuther 2000; LaFrance and Hecht 1995; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein

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[8] For a good overview, see Finucane, Peters, and Slovic (2003).

1998). Affect and emotion thus work because of their immediate effect: there is an unconscious, rapid, automatic interpretation of an event that produces an emotion, and the nature of this pre-emotional process is so automatic and sudden that it precludes any type of cognitive process we might call rational—or even cognitive in the political psychological sense of the word (Epstein 1994).

Affect in FPA and IR

How can we connect the existence of an affective heuristic to foreign policy decision-making? It should be much easier than it is. Crawford (2000) points out that emotion has always been subconsciously present in IR, and indeed has been an implicit or explicit element in the writings of most of the great political thinkers and philosophers of the human condition throughout the ages— including Aristotle, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hume, Darwin, and many others.[9] And yet, as Crawford continues, it has largely been ignored as an important factor in foreign policy decision-making and world politics. This study aims to rectify this unbalanced state.

In part this imbalance stems from the mystifying nature of emotions, which do not lend themselves easily to probing (at least until recent decades); in part this has been due to the difficulty in quantifying and measuring emotions; and in part it is because of an implicit and explicit preference in the study of politics for what is considered reasoned, rational behavior in the pursuit of "good" political decisions and which emotions are perceived to disrupt. The perception of

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[9] For overviews of the incorporation of emotion in political science more generally, see Clarke, Hoggett, and Thompson (2006a) and Marcus (2000). Most of these studies focus on politics as the outcome of popular attitudes, opinions, votes, and social movements; few focus on the impact of emotions on decisions at the elite level or on specific domestic or foreign policies.

IR researchers of the inherent difficulty in measuring emotions in policymakers is similar to the view held by psychologists up to fifteen or twenty years ago. But as discussed above, a body of evidence in psychology, neural science, and decision research has been accumulating over the past several years that not only demonstrates the impact of affect and emotion on decision-making, but also effectively measures this impact.[10]

If an object or event has an affective impact on a decision-maker, it means that the object or event holds intense, emotional, deep meaning for that individual. It matters for her in a way that other foreign policy issues do not. And the more something has meaning for us (whether consciously or unconsciously), the more emotion we generate regarding that something. Emotions are states of being, but they are not simply states of being that are suspended in an environmental vacuum—they are *about* things: "One is not simply angry...rather one is angry at someone, about something" (Crawford, Kippax, Onyx, Gault, and Benton 1992, 33; see also Schwarz and Clore 1988[11]).[12] In foreign policy, then, we must focus on what an individual thinks about a particular object, event, or class of objects or events.

Attractiveness of a particular foreign policy over any other foreign policy is thus based at least sometimes and for some individuals on the affective value one attaches to an object, event, or person. Policymakers judge incoming

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[10] We might also determine the impact of affect by utilizing more conventional IR methods: by closely examining a leader's upbringing, views, experiences, attitudes, belief structures, actions, and public and private statements. From this we can draw a picture of how that individual feels about a particular foreign policy issue.

[11] The authors also point out that when asked to judge what we think about something or someone, humans often answer in terms of how we *feel* about that thing or person.

[12] This understanding is considered to help distinguish between emotion and mood.

information according to how their heuristics structure that information. The representativeness and availability heuristic, for example, might prompt decision-makers to make choices based on their interpretation of present events in light of past events, but this interpretation is heavily loaded with affective appeal—that is, on the meaning the information holds for the individual. As Fiske and Taylor (1991, 427) put it, "schemas based on prior experiences can carry immediate affective tags. When a new instance fits the schema [or is made to fit], not only does prior knowledge apply, but so also may prior affect." Simply put, "emotion serves to make information more personally relevant" (Szalma and Hancock 2005, 184). In the foreign policy arena, this means that policymakers who feel strongly/emotionally about a foreign policy objective are not willing to give it up or change policy away from attaining it, even in the face of difficult circumstances and contradictory incoming information. The underlying central role that territory plays in many ethnic conflicts especially is a major example of this, particularly at the mass level.

This affective appeal, like cognitive heuristics in general, stems from one's past experiences, belief structures, and the way in which previously incorporated information has been evaluated and stored. We cannot escape from our past experiences, unless we can expunge memory from our minds, and the emotional values we have unconsciously attached to our past experiences always impact on our present interpretations, even unwittingly (Jones 2005).[13] It is not

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[13] This conclusion relies heavily on the connection of memory to decision-making, which is beyond the scope of this study. On the importance of memory to decision-making, not least because it better frames one's understanding of a problem by relying on previously absorbed information, see Dougherty, Gronlund, and Gettys (2003).

just that individuals remember past events and understand contemporary events in the light of similar past events, but it is also that the contemporary events elicit an emotional response. Understanding the present in light of the past is more than a cognitive process, it is an emotional response since we react on the basis of how we *feel* about something.[14] This highlights the individual nature of decision-making; different individuals, based on their own individual experiences and pasts, value different things (see, for example, Kahneman, Ritov, and Schkade 1999; Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein 1998). This further underlines the importance of in-depth study of decision-makers, in order to understand the foreign policymaking process.

<div align="center">The Interaction between Cognition and Emotion:
Ideological versus Adaptable Individuals</div>

To date cognitive models have dominated the application of psychology to International Relations. Lebow and Stein (1993) made an early plea for a combination of cognition and emotion in an IR framework, but few have taken up the call, despite the evidence from psychology that both cognition and affect matter in decision-making (see, e.g., Clarke, Hoggett, and Thompson 2006b, 7-9).[15]

The theoretical model presented here is based on the assumption that cognition and affect work hand-in-hand in the study of foreign policy variation. For some individuals, affect is the predominant heuristic while for others a

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[14] This is the implicit, yet underlying, point of historical analogizing (e.g., Khong 1992).

[15] Hsee (1996), for example, found that under certain conditions a more rational-cognitive type of decision-making takes place, while under other conditions an affect-laden image can influence a decision.

cognitive framework, relatively free from affective influences, prevails.[16] These

cognitive and affective conditions help us determine whether an individual is

ideological or adaptable, which in turns helps us explain why foreign policy

variation occurs.[17]

The political psychology literature has already established the

classification of leaders into two main categories: "principled" versus "pragmatic"

(the vocabulary is Margaret Hermann's; see M. Hermann 1993; see also M.

Hermann 1984, 54-55, 61, 64; Hermann and Hermann 1989, 365-366;

International Studies Review 2001; and Stoessinger 1985). My use of the terms

ideological and adaptable builds on this taxonomy, but I argue that these are more

effective terms in that they better represent the personalities of leaders and their

foreign policy decision-making predilections. Most importantly, my

categorization is better able to capture the affective nature of decision-making

than Hermann's, which focuses only on cognitive processes. As discussed above,

this is not a fair reflection of the reality of decision-making.

The literature broadly supports the definition of principled and pragmatic

leaders in the following terms:

> The more goal-driven leaders—the crusaders, the ideologues, those
> who are directive, task-oriented, or transformational in focus—
> interpret the environment through a lens that is structured by their
> beliefs, attitudes, motives, and passions. They live by the maxim

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[16] I say "relatively free" because, aside from sociopathic criminals or medical patients who have had the relevant parts of their brains removed, no person can ever truly be free of emotional appeal. But the theoretical underpinnings remain relevant—that affect matters more for some individuals than it does for others.

[17] These categories are, of course, theoretical ideal-types. In reality leaders can be placed along a continuum between these two poles. The empirical examples in the following chapters use these terms for convenience and shorthand, while recognizing that few if any individuals really exist at either extreme. M. Hermann (2003) uses a computer program to provide a statistical continuum of this and other personality traits.

"unto thine own self b[e] true," their sense of self being determined by the congruence between who they are and what they do....they act on the basis of a set of personal standards....Because they tend to selectively perceive information from their environment, such leaders have difficulty changing their attitudes and beliefs...

Leaders who are more responsive to the current situation—the pragmatists, the opportunists, and those who are consultative, relations-oriented, or transactional—tend...to see life as a theater where there are many roles to be played. Indeed, people are essentially performers whose main function is choosing the "correct" identity for the situation at hand....They seek to tailor their behavior to fit the demands of the situation in which they find themselves, and, before making a decision, ascertain where others stand with regard to an issue and estimate how various groups and institutions are likely to act....In essence, the self-image of these leaders is defined by the expectations and interests of others. To become acceptable, ideas, attitudes, beliefs, motives, and passions must receive external validation from relevant others (Hermann, Preston, Korany, and Shaw 2001, 86-87;[18] see also Kaarbo and Hermann 1998, 249).

There are several problems with these definitions. First, it is not true that the less principled a leader is, the less likely it is that a state's foreign policy will be determined by the individual's own desires or goals. This implies that pragmatic leaders are "weak" personalities, in that they do not assert themselves and instead rely on cues from others around them to determine policy. But a pragmatic-adaptable leader can have as strong a personality as an ideological leader, in the sense of holding to personal objectives even in the face of contrasting advice and demands from those around her. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, President Kennedy—who would likely be classified as a pragmatic leader—exerted a forceful personality when he resisted efforts by hard-liners in the administration to take a more active military response to the

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[18] This article is used as the representation of these categories, because it utilizes and synthesizes the long-standing and varied literatures on this topic, distilling them into the archetypical definitions and traits of the two types of leaders.

placement of missiles in Cuba, leading to great frustration and even contempt by some, such as Curtis LeMay (Allison 1971).

Second, it is not only principled leaders who respond to foreign policy problems on the basis of their ideas, beliefs, and attitudes. Adaptable leaders are less likely to rely on simple heuristics to process complex information, but they can also be considered principled in the definition as cited above. Egypt's President Nasser was an ideologue: his staunch belief in asserting Egypt's regional dominance—which included a removal of Western influence from the Middle East as well as a commitment to Arab nationalism—remained his overriding goal for his entire presidency. Yet he often shifted tactics to achieve that goal, responding to circumstances in ways he was not previously prepared to do. As Safran argues (1969, 78-81), Nasser's idea of pan-Arab unity did not include direct merger with other Arab countries until he was prompted into one with Syria in 1958 and came to view this as a tactic for achieving Egyptian dominance.

Third, it is a mistake to argue that only ideologues are goal-oriented and filter out information that does not correspond to their personal goals. This is an over-simplification, as it assumes that one type of leader has vastly different degrees of goals than another. All leaders have goals. We must then ask, how are these goals formulated, what are they based on, and how do leaders go about trying to achieve them? I agree with the general contours of the definition of "principled," but surely there is much more to such leaders. Current Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has never been classified as an ideologue; indeed, he was

often derided for being too much of a "pragmatist" (as defined above). Yet since Ariel Sharon fell into a coma and Olmert's election to the prime ministry in March 2006, he has publicly and privately committed his government to the single task of "convergence" (his plan for withdrawing Israeli troops and settlers from much of the West Bank). His "ideological" commitment to this goal has, in fact, now been derided as a mistake and likely to worsen Israel's security situation. This pursuit of a goal by an adaptable leader fits more with the definition of a principled leader rather than a pragmatic leader.

Finally, in both the definitions provided above and the literature that dichotomizes leaders in this way affect and emotion are largely absent from consideration. Affect and emotion are hinted at, as when ideologues are considered to make policy at least partly on the basis of their "passions" (Hermann et al. 2001, 87, 89). Moreover, referring to such leaders as crusaders and ideologues implies an affective basis for their decisions—leaders who feel that strongly about an issue usually do so because of the powerful emotional appeal the issue has for them. But neither principled nor pragmatic leaders, according to the definition, rely on affective heuristics in their decision-making process; they utilize only cognitive heuristics. This literature therefore leaves a large gap in the study of foreign policymaking—a gap that has been steadily closing in the psychology and decision research. My study is an attempt to bring IR more in-line with developments in these other fields by re-defining ideological and adaptable individuals—including their predilections toward emotion or cognition—in the following manner.

Ideological individuals, as suggested above, rely on their (often dogmatic) principles and ideas about the world around them. Incoming information is stored in belief structures that are rigid in what they filter out and what they retain. These schemas either ignore information that does not fit with preconceived notions about issues, events, and other actors or bend them to fit.[19] Ideological individuals are less sensitive to contextual situations and incoming information, are less likely to change their ideas, and therefore are more likely to utilize their ideological beliefs as the basis for their foreign policy decisions. State behavior will be conditioned by the leader's ideological considerations.

Social psychological research has found that there is a difference in how "experts" (those with more involvement in and knowledge of a subject) and "novices" (those with only a rudimentary involvement and knowledge) process incoming information. The former do so in a more complex manner, while the latter in a more simplistic manner (e.g., Fiske, Kinder, and Larter 1983).

In the description of these conditions, "complex" and "simplistic" could be substituted with "cognition" and "affect. I posit that this dichotomy also applies to ideological-adaptable individuals. Ideological individuals are more likely to utilize affect heuristics in their decision-making processes. That is, they will reach back into their schemas not by cognitive processes that utilize a rational-analytical approach, but rather on the basis of the meaning a particular foreign policy issue holds for them; that is, how they *feel* about that issue, not what they *think* about it. The simplistic nature of an affect heuristic lies in its

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[19] On the use of beliefs, values, and stereotypes to process information see Vertzberger (1990, 113-127).

capacity to recall information more quickly and directly, due to the stronger affective appeal or repulsion that information holds for the decision-maker (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 2002, 414). Like analogies in general, emotion matters more in determining decisions the more one has connections to similar or analogous situations (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch 2001, 271). Ideological individuals who rely on an affect heuristic will likely have a connection of some kind to an event or object, or class of events or objects. Ideological leaders are therefore more likely to be "emotional" about foreign policy issues, and are thus more likely to be influenced by their affective understandings and beliefs about situations than adaptable individuals. This emotional attachment makes the ideological leader that much less likely to incorporate contradictory information or change foreign policy course; that is the power of affective connections.

In contrast, adaptable leaders are not tied to rigid schemas or use affect heuristics to simplify their decision-making. They have greater capacity for flexibility. They will tailor their policies to fit the demands of the situation (and not, as outlined above, what *others* think of the situation). They do so by incorporating incoming information without filtering out pieces that may not fit with their already-developed belief structures—which are subject to change. Because they do not rely on specific unbending ideological ideas about other actors, events, and issues, they are more willing to change policy. Adaptable individuals will adopt new ideas even if they do not fit with existing understandings of their environments, and moreover can learn or be convinced of

the benefit of these ideas. Their thinking can change according to changed circumstances.

We can code this dichotomy into the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Ideological leaders are more likely to base their decision-making on affective appeal; adaptable leaders are more likely to base their decision-making on cognitive appraisal.

Adaptable Decision-Makers and The Capacity to Learn

Where ideological individuals are prone to be emotional in their decision-making, and thus acting more rigidly in their foreign policy decision-making, adaptable leaders are given to learning. These are in many ways opposites: being emotional (in the sense of the dichotomy discussed here) prevents an individual from being flexible enough to learn; and being adaptable excludes affect as a constraint on decision-making. Adaptable leaders' cognitive flexibility precludes them from overly relying on affect to determine policy and allows them judge their situations on the merits or problems of the situational conditions, and not on what these conditions or the situation itself means to them (in an emotional sense). They can learn when policy is not working, when environmental conditions are constraining a particular policy, or when changed circumstances necessitate a shift in policy.

Learning is a fundamental element of human behavior: it is how we adapt to our environments (Lindsay and Norman 1977, 499).[20] It is in this sense, as both neural science and psychology have pointed out, a goal-oriented activity (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell 1995; Newell 1990, 317), beginning in humans as early as

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[20] For critiques of learning as an explanatory approach, see Evangelista (1991, 266-275) and Tetlock (1991).

six months of age. In other words, individuals learn better ways to attain their aspirations. They do this by acquiring new information (Kandel, Schwartz, and Jessell 1995, 651). But new information in itself does not lead to learning; it merely means more information is absorbed in our memory banks. The newly acquired information matters only when we realize that our existing policies are not working, that is, not meeting our objectives (see especially Sitkin 1992[21]). In this way we learn that new policies are necessary to help us reach our goals.[22]

However, some individuals—that is, ideological persons—do not wish to learn or adapt (consciously or unconsciously). This is because their policies already fit with their existing schemas; the rigidity of these schemas preclude them from learning when the new information (and any subsequent new policy) contradicts their deeply-held beliefs—or if they do incorporate the incoming information, they do so by fitting them with their schemas or subsuming them under more preferred knowledge. This is amplified when an issue holds deep affective appeal. Extrapolating from this, state leaders do not believe they need to change their state's foreign policies because the contemporary ones already work fine in terms of meeting the policy objectives these leaders have set out.

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[21] The international political economy focuses on learning from external shocks (usually sudden changes in the global economy, such as the 1980s debt crisis or rising unemployment in the 1970s related to the decade's oil crises) (see Gourevitch 1978; Hall 1989; Keohane and Milner 1996). The ideational literature focuses on policy failure (see Legro 2000, 426; McNamara 1998). Some also refer to uncertainty in the international environment as prompting a learning of new ideas (Blyth 2002, 35-37; Jacobsen 1995, 293).

[22] Note that this is not the same as the type of learning associated with historical analogies, which Khong calls decision-making using history (Khong 1992, 6, fn.17). Learned ideas may not be based on historical analysis but rather contemporaneous analysis or simply creative thinking. Moreover, this definition of learning is problematic when applied to contemporaneous ongoing experiences. On learning from history, see Jervis (1976, Chapter 6); Khong (1992); May (1973); Neustadt and May (1986); and Reiter (1996).

Adaptable individuals are more likely to learn from past experience or new information than ideological individuals, who are more likely to judge present experiences as the same or similar to past experiences or to ignore information that dissents from their extant conclusions, which in turn are shaped by their belief structures. Quite simply, ideological leaders, because they are more likely to rely on emotion to guide their decisions about specific issues, are less likely to learn when it comes to that issue. The object of activity holds such a powerful affective resonance with them, that they cannot make alternate decisions.

These predilections are captured in the second proposition:

Hypothesis 2: Adaptable leaders are more likely to learn from past experiences or policy failure and therefore we can expect them to change policy; ideological leaders are less likely to learn from past experiences or policy failure and therefore we can expect them not to change policy.

Having identified the differences between ideological and adaptable individuals, we must now consider how to determine which category a leader falls into. Admittedly, this can be difficult—as Mark Snyder (1987) has noted, people have both a public and private persona, and when it comes to public figures it is more complicated to get at the underlying motivations and decision-making processes behind a public policy decision. However, the rather large literature on political psychology—which focuses on leaders' beliefs, attitudes, personality characteristics, and so on—has regularly used the methods outlined in Chapter 1 (analysis of speeches, statements, interviews with colleagues and advisors, and probing of secondary sources) to do so, and it has become a common method to study the formative experiences and personality development, over time, of

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individual leaders in order to explain their political decisions (e.g., George and George 1956; Greenstein 1994; Mango 2001; and Volkan, Itzkowitz, and Dod 1997).

In order to classify an individual into one of the two categories, we must be able to identify the schemas and heuristics that motivate his behavior (see M. Hermann 1993, 82). Doing so in regard to the particular foreign policy decision under examination cannot be the basis for our characterization. This would ensure a tautology that undermines the falsifiability of the model. Instead, we must examine the individual's actions and decisions on *other* issues, and *before* the behavior in question has taken place (e.g., in the case of Yitzhak Rabin, before he contemplated the decision to pursue and sign the Oslo Accords).[23] An in-depth study of the leader can accomplish this. The evidence for assessing type of leader is therefore separate from the decision itself. Again, this is a common method in analyses of leaders, and it avoids the problem of tautology inherent in assessing type according to behavior (for a recent use of this methodology, see Chiozza and Choi 2003).

In this method, other behavior is used to gauge type. If an individuals acts ideologically on a range of other issues, we can expect that she will do so in regard to the specific foreign policy issue under study; if a leader is consistently adaptable on other foreign policy issues over time—that is, if he is flexible enough to change his own preferred policies or previously-held ideas to fit with the demands of existing circumstances—we can expect that he will be just as

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[23] Including observation of behavior is also necessary in order to avoid measurement problems associated with studying a leader's public statements, speeches, memoirs, etc., which are often self-serving and not objective.

flexible on the foreign policy issues under consideration. It can be difficult, but in any study of the role of individuals in policymaking, there is no way to explain the impact of an individual's characteristics on policy without an in-depth investigation of her actions on a range of issues.

Institutions: Domestic Structures as "Transmission Belts"

Belief systems matter more when individuals face environmental uncertainty and when there are several policy options to choose from. However, there is much more to foreign policymaking than individual cognitive processes. Ole Holsti noted long ago that although the cognitive processes of decision-makers may be necessary to understand foreign policy decisions, they are not sufficient (1976, 36). We must therefore explain the conditions under which individuals matter, since while understanding the personalities of leaders may tell us how they will respond to policy problems, they do not tell us how likely it is that their preferred decisions will be enacted—i.e., about state behavior.

Domestic structures have long been recognized as relevant in foreign policymaking, first becoming popular in the international political economy literature, particularly in terms of comparing different states (Gourevitch 1986; Katzenstein 1978). Later, scholars used institutions to help us understand a variety of foreign policies, including economic policy (McNamara 1998; Odell 1982), European integration (Parsons 2003), and in general theoretical development (Evangelista 1997; Kissinger, 1977; Risse-Kappen 1995, 1994, 1991). The common thread running through this literature is the recognition that domestic

institutions are important because, as representative rules, regulations, and practices, they constitute "the critical 'transmission belt' by which the preferences and social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy" (Moravcsik 1997, 518). The political structures of a polity are the corridors connecting ideas and foreign policy outcomes.

Although institutions can be understood in formal and informal terms (see Ikenberry 1988), they are defined here as the formal decision-making structures of a polity. This includes the office(s) that individuals must hold in order to decide what policy a state will follow and to have enough authority to have that decision implemented. In terms of authoritative decision-making, the ultimate arbiter is the individual who wields the most power to decide—presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, or some other actor. Constitutionally, legally, and politically in democracies the head of government is the key decision-maker (though, as M. Hermann [1993, 80] points out, he may choose not to take advantage of this). Informal structures can help transmit ideas toward the top policymaker, but in democracies with clearly spelled out roles and positions, it is the formal authority to decide that allows individuals the capacity to make policy decisions.

The conditions under which individuals matter is therefore understood through a third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3: Individuals will matter more in foreign policy decision-making the more decision-making autonomy they have; individuals will matter less in foreign policy decision-making the less decision-making autonomy they have.

That is, individuals who occupy decision-making offices relatively free from constraints (i.e., pressure from other actors to change their decisions in

accordance with these other actors' preferences) matter, and vice versa. This conceptualization may seem self-evident, but when studying the role of individuals in foreign policymaking, we must specify the conditions under which they matter.[24] Centralized decision-making institutions provide individuals with greater capacity (power) for putting their ideas into practice: the possibility of decision-makers influencing policy based on their own ideas (whether stemming from their ideology or incorporation of new information) is increased in highly centralized decision-making structures. In less centralization institutions, power is more diffused among other actors who could well impose their own ideas on the formal decision-maker.[25]

How do we measure centralization? One could argue that examining constitutions and laws would tell us which office has how much power. But this would not be enough—often the practical application of decision-making differs from what is set out in documentary form. In the United States, for example, the Senate was originally meant to play a major role in foreign policymaking, but in practice presidents have come to assume the central role. Even beyond this, American presidents have often been constrained by Congress in specific foreign policy situations. Centralization, then, can be measured by how much decision-making power the primary leader—as identified in a polity's political

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[24] The conceptual importance of institutions in this context is also highlighted by the work of the Hermanns and others, who focus on specific types of decision-makers based on their institutional make-up and structures. (Individuals are only one type of their decision-making unit taxonomy: see M. Hermann 1993; Hermann and Hagan 1998; and Hermann and Hermann 1989).

[25] The epistemic communities literature follows the same logic, though more implicitly, by its focus on the necessity of decision-making power (see *International Organization* 1992). Haas puts it specifically thus: "It is the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing institutions which lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality" (Haas 1992, 27). Peterson (1992) provides a good example of how a lack of institutional power inhibits a change in policy.

regulations—has exercised on controversial issues. If a president or prime minister can impose her preferred policy options on issues over which other elites disagree, we can say that that individual has significant centralized decision-making power. If, on the other hand, that type of decision-maker cannot, and is constrained by other elite actors, we would argue that decision-making authority is de-centralized.[26]

We need to examine the historical development of decision-making institutions in order to see how they have become structured. In this sense, I draw on insights from historical institutionalism, which points to the importance and constraining or enabling nature of institutions based on their previous construction, though I do not discuss the path dependency of institutions that this literature focuses on.[27]

Ideas as Measurements of Foreign Policy Variation

An effective way to measure whether and how much foreign policy variation has taken place is by comparing leaders' foreign policies to prevailing ideational structures. It has been argued that a country's identity shapes its foreign policy along specific lines that fit with its cultural proclivities and the national conception of itself (for general discussions see Katzenstein 1996; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996). We would expect, then, that foreign policy variation is more prominent when it differs from long-standing general national belief structures

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[26] Similar to the caveat added regarding ideological versus pragmatic individuals, centralization and de-centralization are ideal types.

[27] For good recent statements and examples, see Pierson (2004) and Pierson and Skocpol (2002). Good earlier discussions include March and Olsen (1989) and Powell and DiMaggio (1991).

and, especially, from previous foreign policies that are tied to these structures. In addition, studying ideas helps us identify the policy choices available to leaders, which allows for better operationalization of foreign policy change by specifying the options available to policymakers. Without knowing the options, we cannot explain whether or not a particular leader is likely to adopt one of the options.

Ideas are typically referred to as some type of road map, providing a policy guide toward specified objectives. Such understandings are too limited, however. In most cases policy ideas are more than just tactical methods; they encompass an ultimate goal toward which these methods are oriented. Leaders' calculations also take into account how well their policy goals fit with national role conceptions and their own ideas of what their state requires. Canadian policymakers, for instance, tailor their policies toward a cooperative foreign policy relying on negotiation and coordination with other states, while American leaders construct policies to reflect their idea of the requirements of a global hegemonic power, which includes more aggressive, even unilateral, actions.

Ideas are defined here as "strategic models." These frameworks are ideas about the ultimate national security objectives of a state, the specific policy contours (i.e., methods) required to achieve them, and how these policies fit with the national identity or value system of the state.[28] They can be held by several

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[28] I recognize that this definition may confuse preferences, interests, and strategies. It is not my intention to confuse the distinction between them but to illustrate that policy ideas cannot be divorced from the ultimate preferred outcomes of an individual/state (see Frieden [1999] for a good discussion on these issues). Empirically, it may be impossible to do so, since policymakers do not normally engage in behavior they consider at odds with their state's self-conceptions and value structures.

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individuals at once, specific elites, large groups within society, or even by most members of society.

It is in the second and fourth form that ideas are most effectively used to measure foreign policy variation. When elites or society-at-large holds specific ideas about a foreign policy issue, it is more likely that the primary decision-maker will conform to these preferences in broad terms (see the discussion on public opinion in Chapter 2). When a leader shifts the state's foreign policy away from these general conceptions, we can more easily measure foreign policy variation. Indeed, such shifts provide us with significant empirical puzzles.

It is, in fact, in this way that foreign policy variation matters more for IR, rather than just for FPA. When leaders change their state's policies on critical foreign policy issues, they are for the most part re-directing state behavior in unexpected ways. These major—or drastic—changes thus shift the state's relationships with other actors, as well as the political, military, or economic structures of their immediate systems (or even of the larger regional or global systems).[29]

Having described the model and its causal processes, the discussion can now utilize the model to explain the empirical puzzles laid out in Chapter 1. The next chapter will examine the development of Israeli political institutions and ideational structures regarding a Palestinian state and negotiation with the

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[29] Ideational scholars often argue that new policies are more likely to be adopted if they fit with extant ideational and institutional structures (Goldstein 1993; Sikkink 1991). As the discussion of public opinion in Chapter 2 points out, though, ideational structures provide only broad outlines within which substantial room for policy maneuver exists. They can, moreover, be manipulated by clever leaders. See Mendelson (1998) for an opposing view within the ideational literature.

Palestine Liberation Organization. This will set the background necessary for understanding how centralized Israeli decision-making institutions are, and how much of a policy change was Rabin's policy on these issues.

Chapter Four

The Institutional and Ideational Setting

in Israel

Introduction

The institutional and ideational structures of a polity are critical elements in the

model presented in Chapter 3. Understanding the historical development of a

country's decision-making institutions is the most effective method for classifying

these institutions as centralized or de-centralized. The power of such offices is

spelled out in formal legal and constitutional structures, but the practice of

decision-making may differ greatly in reality. Understanding the development of

a country's ideational structures is also important in explaining foreign policy

variation, since such structures often provide broad contours of a state's foreign

policy. When policy shifts away from such general pressures, foreign policy

variation is much more noticeable and indeed much more of a puzzle.[1]

The discussion below is a historical analysis of Israel's institutions and

ideas. Only by clearly outlining how decision-making power became centralized

are we able to categorize Israel as a centralized polity. At the same time, by

identifying what the dominant ideational structures within a state are, we can

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[1] Pierson (2004) provides a detailed argument on the theoretical necessity of understanding historical development.

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better recognize understand the context Israel's foreign policy, particularly its variation, as when it differs from long-standing national conceptions and previous policies that fit with these conceptions.

The chapter proceeds as follows. First, the development of Israeli decision-making institutions will be examined, in order to set the stage for our understanding of how centralized the Israeli political system has become. This includes the process of labor dominance, external security threats, and the course of state building efforts. The next section will focus on the ideational structures of Israel. It will detail ideas held toward Palestinian Arabs before the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the seizure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967. This will be followed by an analysis of Labor's and Likud's (the only two parties that have governed Israel until 1993) policy toward a Palestinian state and negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The conclusion drawn is that despite some policy distinctions between the two on issues such as settlements, both adamantly rejected negotiation with the PLO and a Palestinian state. In addition, the 1992 Labor government's shift in foreign policy marks a dramatic change from Likud's foreign policy, particularly as the latter coincided with general popular conceptions of Israel and Israel's place in the regional and global system. This makes the Oslo Accords both a significant variation in foreign policy and a puzzle.

Institutional Setting

Israeli decision-making authority in foreign policy and security matters is centralized in the office of the prime minister. The Basic Law: The Government, which sets out the workings of Israeli governing structures, designates as the head of government a prime minister (Articles 4 and 5), but also requires that she be accountable and responsible to the Knesset (parliament) in all areas of administration (Basic Law: The Government 2001). Yet in practice this stipulation has not been borne out. Institutionally, Israeli prime ministers have concentrated decision-making power in their hands in the areas of foreign and security policy, often making decisions in secret (and only informing the Knesset afterward), not consulting even the entire cabinet, and justifying their actions on the exigencies of Israel's security situation. This, they argue, requires fast, secret, and firm action, none of which is conducive to consultation and debate with larger political groups.

This centralization of power especially in foreign policymaking is the direct result of the historical construction and development of decision-making institutions during both the *Yishuv* (the Jewish community in pre-state Palestine) and early state periods. Three patterns contributed to this development: the dominance of the labor movement (Mapai/Labor) in the building of the Jewish community; the importance of security matters stemming from the threats posed by hostile neighboring Arab states; and the necessity of state-building after the establishment of the state in 1948, which meant the concentration of

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administrative power in state institutions at the expense of political parties, which had previously run much of the affairs of the *Yishuv*.

The Rise and Dominance of Labor Zionism

Yishuv and then Israeli politics and institution building were dominated by the labor/socialist movement, particularly in the form of Mapai[2] and then the Labor Party.[3] The identification of Mapai/Labor with the establishment and defense of the state and achievement of the Zionist dream intensified this pattern. The importance of *Yishuv* politics has been highlighted by every analyst of Israeli political development; the institutions (formal and informal) that were created during this period (approximately the 1880s to the establishment of Israel in 1948) essentially were adopted by Israel after it was declared independent (see as examples Eisenstadt 1985; Horowitz and Lissak 1978; Sachar 1996; Shimshoni 1982).

The supremacy of the labor movement began near the beginning of *Yishuv* politics. The onset of sustained and organized Jewish immigration into Palestine (*aliyot*) in the 1880s brought to the area the socialist future leaders, particularly during the Second *Aliyah* and mainly from Russia (1904-1914) (Sachar 1996, 88). They came with revolutionary ideas about a strong, independent Jewish community with an underlying Jewish working and especially agricultural class that would re-claim their biblical and historical heritage and re-establish a Jewish

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[2] *Mifleget Poalei Eretz Israel*—Workers Party of the Land of Israel. Formed in 1930, it was an amalgam of several other labor and socialist parties. For an excellent discussion of the formation of Mapai, and its importance, see Aronoff (1993); Medding (1972); and Shapiro (1976).
[3] The Israel Labor Party first came into existence in 1968, as three parties merged into it. In 1969 it became (for the second time) the Alignment (*Ma'arach*) when Mapam, a party to the left of Labor, joined. It became Labor again when Mapam separated just before the 1992 elections. See Lochery (1997).

political entity in Zion (Sachar 1996; see also Halpern and Reinharz 1998, Chapter 7; Shapira 1992, Chapter 2).

Labor's control began in the World Zionist Organization (WZO), which after 1897 provided most of the funding and organizational support for Zionist activity in Palestine. First, socialist Zionism forged an alliance with the WZO to further Zionist objective along socialist directions. Second, the labor movement gained a majority in the WZO itself beginning in the 1930s. More importantly, the workers of the Second *Aliyah* set up the first political institutions in the area, which gave them a head start in political and social organization, permitting them to dominate these institutions once other Zionist movements and parties joined them. The collectivist-nationalist ideals inherent in their value structures enhanced their domination, instilling in the Jews a sense of national commitment and willingness to work under the socialist leadership for ultimate Zionist goals (Shapiro 1976, 2-3).[4]

The establishment of Mapai in 1930 went a long way toward the institutionalization of labor supremacy in the *Yishuv* and then in Israel.[5] First, the welter of parties in the *Yishuv*, combined with the highly competitive democratic nature of its and Israel's politics, meant that no single party ever received an absolute majority to govern on its own; it had to rely on coalition partners in either the National Assembly or, after 1948, in the Knesset in order to form a

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[4] The workers also won the competition over how to achieve Zionist objectives: their arguments that an independent Jewish economy based on Jewish labor was the *sine qua non* of any successful Zionist enterprise earned them the institutional and financial support of the .WZO (Shapiro 1976, Chapter 8).

[5] Aronoff (1993, 32) argues that Mapai was specifically formed to enhance the control of the main socialist Zionist parties in the economic and political institutions of the *Yishuv*.

government. Because Mapai/Labor always obtained a plurality, it was in a position to trade concessions for support. In this way it was able to hold on to the top foreign policymaking portfolios (the prime ministry, defense ministry, and foreign ministry). At the same time, because Mapai/Labor occupied the center of the political spectrum, in order to form a government parties on either side would have to cooperate to take control from it. This was next to impossible given the often diametrically opposing views these parties had on various issues, thus ensuring Mapai/Labor's continued preeminence.[6]

Second, the labor movement's control of the levers of decision-making authority enabled it to entrench its ideology and agenda in *Yishuv* and Israeli political institutions. This was facilitated by a lack of qualified career civil servants and administrators. Since it was the party in control of government, Mapai naturally put its own people and supporters into these open positions (Medding 1972, 29-30), thus embedding its message and objectives directly into policymaking institutions and setting the policy agenda.

Finally, in addition to controlling the Jewish community's resources, the labor movement also organized and ran its economic assets (Shimshoni 1982, 22-23). In 1920, even before the formation of Mapai, two of the parties that eventually folded into it set up the *Histadrut* (the General Federation of Hebrew Workers in *Eretz Israel*). A giant economic labor federation designed to meet the needs of the independent Jewish economy in Palestine, it came to provide for many of the services necessary for the effective working of the Jewish community

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[6] The indispensability of Mapai to forming a government is captured in the observation that elections were not conducted to determine who would lead the country, but rather who would become Mapai/Labor's coalition partners.

(such as economic activity, health care, education, and so on). It also became a primary patronage instrument, as it allocated a wide range of resources and services on the basis of labor priorities.

The Centrality of Security

In addition to the dominance of socialist Zionism, the centralization of Israeli decision-making was facilitated by the precarious security situation. Surrounded by Arab states and irregular forces publicly committed to its destruction, Israel for the first twenty-five to thirty years of its existence faced an existential threat that permitted prime ministers wide latitude to make foreign policy, tied as it was into national security and defense affairs.

The life-and-death nature of these threats allowed prime ministers to argue that there was little time or space for prolonged debates on foreign and security policy; and that even if there were, the demands for secrecy would severely limited any such discussions (see Klieman 1988). In most cases, the prime minister, defense minister, foreign minister, and one to a few other key ministers or advisors made decisions on their own, presenting them to the Knesset and the public afterward as a *fait accompli*.[7] The decision to obtain a nuclear weapons capability, for example, was made in total secret by David Ben-Gurion, the country's first prime minister, and only two or three others; Ben-Gurion purposely denied the existence of such a program to his fellow citizens (see A. Cohen 1998).

The concentration on security and foreign affairs also stemmed from the understanding that these issues were the most important for the development and

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[7] Most Israeli leaders have eschewed an institutionalized staff, preferring to consult with personal advisors (within or without the government and party) on specific issues (see Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002, Chapter 6). Both Rabin and Shamir followed this trend.

safety of the state (see Arian 1998, 290; Garfinkle 1997, 108-115; Heller 2000, 13-17; Peri 1983). Israeli prime ministers have tended to neglect both internal party affairs and domestic issues, leaving the latter to senior cabinet ministers (Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002, 49).[8] Israeli society generally agreed with this analysis, and therefore acquiesced in this process of decision-making (see Arian, Talmud, and Hermann 1988). It was easy, then, for Ben-Gurion to set the standard when he kept the Defense Ministry for himself during his tenure as Prime Minister (1948-1953, 1955-1963) (see Kurzman 1983; Levite 1989; Medding 1990, 210-220). Rabin also held the defense portfolio during his second tenure as prime minister, while other Israeli prime ministers held instead the Foreign Ministry.

<center>The Requirements of State-Building</center>

The third trend that led to the centralization of decision-making power in Israel was the shift from an informally institutionalized Jewish community to a state after the state's establishment in 1948. This meant that official, formal frameworks had to be set up, and that the state had to consolidate all administrative and decision-making authority in its own institutions. Only in this way could the fledging state survive and be successful.

From the beginning the Zionists were intent on creating their own governing institutions in Palestine. Their creation was motivated by three main ideas: to provide the Jewish community with the ability to look after itself, particularly as it was felt the British were not doing this satisfactorily (see Segev

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[8] This changed somewhat in the 1980s, as prime ministers came to devote more attention to non-security matters.

2000, for an opposing argument); to prepare for at a minimum communal autonomy and at a maximum an independent state; and, stemming from the last point, the desire to separate themselves from the Arab community and to form their own national institutions (see Horowitz and Lissak 1978, Chapter 2).

But the influx into Palestine of a myriad of different movements, groups, and parties—all based on different Zionist ideologies and visions—helped entrench the system of autonomous parties that acted as their own sub centers (Horowitz and Lissak 1978). These were comprehensive institutions, each with their own sports and youth clubs, school systems, and particular philosophical and ideological outlooks (see Horowitz and Lissak 1978: Chapter 4; Roberts, 1990; Sachar 1996, 147; Yishai 1991, Chapter 1). Political parties were oligarchic, led by their founding fathers and run by an efficient, bureaucratic party machinery that controlled all elements of life for their members—what Medding (1990, 8) refers to as the "partification" of society. The parties were not willing to give up their independence, fearing a loss of influence and thus ability to meet their particular visions of the Zionist dream; these divisions carried over into the state period.

As the founding father and first prime minister of Israel, Ben-Gurion played a critical role in the early establishment of Israeli governing institutions. He adhered to a policy of statism (*mamlachtiut*), which entailed the transfer of most activities that were previously the purview of the independent parties to the state (see Avi-hai 1974; Kurzman 1983). All decision-making functions and activities (in political, economic, military, cultural, and social areas) had to be

concentrated in the state, and state interests took precedence over all others (Liebman and Don-Yehiya 1983, Chapter 4; Medding 1990, Chapter 7; Yanai 1989). Although the process was not successful in all areas (particularly in health care and economic activity, where the *Histadrut* managed to retain a good deal of independence, and in education, where the religious parties kept a separate schooling system for their own segment of the population), in foreign and security policy it was.

Crucially, because Mapai/Labor was the dominant party in the system, neither it nor Ben-Gurion, who was also the leader of the party, ever intended that it should not retain the central position in the Israeli polity, despite Ben-Gurion's genuine commitment to state consolidation and democratic debate. Mapai essentially saw its own interests as identical to those of the state; this was reflected in its domination of state institutions and the integration of Mapai members—with Mapai ideology—into the nascent bureaucracy. In Medding's words, Mapai "established and directed the new state structures, headed all cabinets, chose its coalition partners, manned the important ministries, set national priorities, determined the political agenda, and centralized and controlled policy-making and its implementation" (1990, 178).

Executive power in the hands of the prime minister has been steadily, if slowly and even intermittently, increasing since 1948 (Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002). This was not how it was intended to be: The leaders of Mapai/Labor were genuinely concerned to construct a "normal" Western-style parliamentary democracy. But because of their position in the Israeli polity, their long-time

dominance in *Yishuv* politics, their expectation that they would continue to hold this standing after 1948, and Ben-Gurion's own personal efforts to concentrate power in his hands, the result was a centralization of power that was maintained and strengthened even after Labor was overtaken in office by Likud. As Arian, Nachmias, and Amir (2002, 48) put it, "[p]rime ministers have been the predominant figures in the Israeli government. While by design the prime minister, prior to the [1992 direct election] reform, has been *primus inter pares*, in practice all Israeli prime ministers have been *primus*."[9]

In sum, the ongoing centralization of power in the hands of the labor movement continued with the establishment of the state. Strong prime ministers who concentrated power in their own office combined with the needs of building state institutions after 1948 to put decision-making power in their own hands. The security situation facilitated this, by sanctioning the perceived necessity of quick and secret decisions that would best protect the new state and allow for the most efficient process of decision-making. This historical sketch allows us to categorize Israel as a centralized state: the primary decision maker (the prime minister) holds the decision-making authority in foreign policy matters.

Ideational Structures

Similarly, a historical analysis is necessary because it can help us determine the general patterns of ideas toward negotiating with the PLO and an

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[9] The authors also note there is a normative-societal dimension to this as well: Israeli prime ministers that do not display decisive leadership roles are perceived as weak and ill-suited to lead Israel. The example of Levi Eshkol during the crisis leading up to the 1967 war is cited as a good example (Arian, Nachmias, and Amir 2002, 48; also Arian, Talmud, and Hermann 1988, 16-17).

independent Palestinian state—both of which were generally opposed by most elites and much of the population in Israel, yet both of which were incorporated into the decision to sign the 1993 Oslo Accords. The fact that such ideas were never part of official government policy or widely agreed to among the public makes Rabin's decision to sign the agreement a dramatic variation and puzzle in Israeli foreign policy.

This section begins with a short discussion on how Palestinians were viewed by the Jews before the establishment of Israel in 1948. From 1948 to 1967 the Palestinians did not figure much in Israeli policy: the West Bank was under Jordanian control while Gaza was retained by Egypt.[10] But after the 1967 Six Day War, when Israel seized the WBG, ideas about a Palestinian state and talking to the PLO became unavoidable. In this context, we will focus on the policies and ideas of the two main political parties, Labor and Likud, since these were the only parties to form and lead Israel's governments up until the 1993 Oslo Accords.[11]

Ideas about the Palestinians during the *Yishuv*

How the Zionists viewed the Arabs in Palestine before 1948 is critical for understanding how most Labor and Likud leaders thought of them from 1967 to 1993. At bottom, they were seen as, first, competitors for employment, and second, as a threat to the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine. With the onset of the 1947-1949 War and its results, little if any thought

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[10] Indeed, most analysts agree that from 1948-1967, the Palestinians were not important for Israel in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, which instead focused on relations between Israel and the Arab states, particularly Egypt (see Tessler 1994, 336). For good studies of the history of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, see Morris (2001) and Tessler (1994).

[11] Only in 2006 was this trend broken, when a completely new party, *Kadima* (made up of former Likud and Labor members) became the senior partner in the government coalition.

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was given to a Palestinian state; and there was no need to consider dialogue with the PLO (formed only in 1964), since the PLO's stated policy was the "liberation" of Palestine from the Jews. By this they meant Israel, and this was not something the Israelis would obviously contemplate.

The Zionists were aware of the Arabs in Palestine from the beginning of the movement's creation, but the existence of another communal group in the territory they intended to shape into a homeland played almost no part in public debates among the Zionists.[12] The oft-heard refrain, "a land without a people for a people without a land," was not intended to mean that the land was completely empty of people, but rather that in its undeveloped and neglected state, it was waiting for an industrious people willing to settle in harsh conditions to revive it. In fact, the prevailing view among the socialist Zionists, stemming from the influence of the Second *Aliyah* members and in keeping with their emphasis on working the land, was that the land belonged to those who expended the effort to develop and take care of it—which the Arabs were not doing to any great degree.[13]

In this context, the Arabs were mostly seen as contenders of labor. The ideological outlook of the Second *Aliyah* members was that the Jews could only become a nation and a state if they worked the land themselves. The Arabs were

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[12] There were some Zionists who recognized that the Arabs already living in Palestine would pose problems for the Zionist enterprise, or whose rising nationalism would eventually clash with Jewish nationalism, and wrote or spoke about it. But they were to the greatest extent ignored or dismissed, subsumed under the larger questions with which Zionism was concerned; namely, the welfare of the Jewish community and developing authoritative and allocative institutions to look after it. See Dowty (2001).

[13] Ben-Gurion, in particular, was very public and specific about this viewpoint: see Kurzman (1983, 160) and Teveth (1985, Chapter 3). Although he recognized that where Arabs did work the land, they were entitled to it, he qualified this by noting that the Jewish *need* for a Jewish homeland was far greater.

seen as rivals for this, particularly as they were willing to work for less pay. In the

1920s the Labor-Zionists had mixed success in imposing their ideas on First

Aliyah farmers, who were the main employers of Arab labor. By the 1930s, the

socialists began to take more aggressive action, leading strikes against Jewish

farmers who employed Arab labor, and often strong-arming the Arabs into

quitting (Sachar 1996, 157).

When the Zionists did think about the Arabs in non-competitive terms, it

was mostly in a paternalistic fashion—that Jewish work, technological and

organizational advancements, and economic activity would benefit the Arabs to

the point that the latter would welcome Jewish immigration and be willing to live

within a Jewish national home.[14] There was thus no "Arab problem," since once

the Arabs saw how much they benefited from Jewish efforts, they would be

content (Penslar 1991; Sachar 1996, Chapter 8; Shapira 1992, 40-52).[15] As

Shapira put it, the Zionists quite simply lacked a real understanding of both the

conditions within Palestine, and the budding nationalism of the Arabs (1992, 51).

The Arabs in Palestine were thus not ignored so much as dismissed,

particularly in their potential as a cohesive communal group with nationalist

aspirations similar to those of the Jews. But by the late 1920s Zionist thinking

began to shift, as a result of violence between Arabs and Jews; the Arab Revolt

(1936-1939) crystallized for many Zionists this emerging attitude (see Shapira

1992, Chapters 5-6). The notion of separation of the two communities, already

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[14] The right-wing groups believed that the Arabs would eventually come to accept Israeli sovereignty not because of the benefits but because of its inevitability (see Shavit 1988, 266).

[15] This viewpoint also stemmed from the self-perception of the Zionists as universalists and humanists, concerned with human progress in general. They believed whole-heartedly that their actions in Palestine would benefit all its inhabitants.

evident in the desire for two different economies based on Arab and Jewish labor, became more prominent and was now perceived as necessary, in both security and economic terms. This notion of territorial partition became the traditional view of Labor on Palestine/Israel, transforming itself into acceptance of the 1949 armistice borders that divided the Land of Israel into a Jewish state and Arab-held territories. The end of traditional Labor partitionism did not come until 1967, with the conquest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

1967, the Occupation of the Territories, and Ideas Toward a Palestinian State

In June 1967 Israel fought a war against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, seizing from them the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights respectively.[16] The armistice lines of the 1947-49 War, which had been regarded by most of the socialist movement as the legal and factual borders of Israel (Avi-hai 1974, 128, 175, 187) became less relevant regarding the WBG. The war and its results raised questions about who would be the permanent governing authority over them (Israel or one of the Arab states), what kind of political entity would emerge and what would its boundaries be, and crystallized the nationalist/territorial aspirations for the Palestinians, particularly in the form of the Palestine Liberation Organization.[17]

Perhaps most importantly for Israel, it raised questions about Israeli identity and its connection to Israeli borders and *Eretz Israel* (the Land of Israel)

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[16] The onset and conduct of the war is not germane to the discussion at hand. For insightful and full accounts, see Morris (2001, Chapter 7); Oren (2002); and Shlaim (2001, Chapter 6). For a discussion of Israeli decision-making, see Brecher (1975, Chapter 7).

[17] The PLO was created in 1964 in an effort to increase Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser's control over the Palestinian cause and Middle East politics. The Israeli capture of the West Bank and Gaza galvanized the PLO to an extent not possible before 1967.

itself (see Sprinzak 1991, especially Chapter 3). Subsumed within these issues was the proper status of the Palestinians within the WBG. Before 1967, only smaller groups on the right had continued to advocate a Greater Israel to include all of Mandatory Palestine, but the dominance of Labor and the centralization of power that allowed it to impose its ideological outlook on the rest of the country essentially prevented any policy movement toward expanding Israel's borders. It was also considered unlikely that Israel could ever take these lands away from the Arab states holding them.

But the capture of the West Bank provided all Israelis with a glimpse, as it were, into the historical and biblical heartland of the ancient Jewish kingdoms, typically referred to as Judea and Samaria. Equally, the capture of the eastern portion of Jerusalem put into Israeli hands for the first time in almost 2,000 years the Old City. Under Jordanian control since 1949, it held the holiest site in Judaism and the Jewish identity: the Western Wall, a slice of the wall surrounding the Holy Temple that was the center of the Jewish religion and identity until it was destroyed by the Romans in 70 C.E. The Jordanians had refused to let Jews worship at the site.

The impact on the Israeli elites and masses alike cannot be exaggerated— the country shifted rapidly from a mood of fear for its survival before the war, through a swift and overwhelming victory against its enemies, to the conquest of its historical homeland; the outpouring of emotion could not be ignored. Labor leaders were not immune to this feeling, and within three weeks the government

formally annexed all of Jerusalem,[18] while in December the government officially changed the name of the West Bank to "Judea and Samaria" (though in Hebrew only). At the same time, nationalist sentiments more attuned to a larger Israeli state were aroused across the political spectrum, making ideas which had previously been limited to the right wing parties and abstract discussion suddenly concrete and possible. 1967 opened up for legitimate and even necessary debate the meaning and identity of Israel, the requirements of security, and which party could best represent the former and achieve the latter.

Each party held specific ideas about these issues, and these "interpretive struggles" (the word is Sikkink's 1991, 22) were thus reflected into the political arena, where the contestation over the prime ministership also meant who would get to set or reflect the contours of Israeli identity. (See Barnett 2002, for a four-category classification of these distinctions and their impact on foreign policy; also Peleg 1998.) However, in reference to the dependent variable, an independent Palestinian state, the basic position of both parties remained the same: outright rejection. For Labor, this potential would be worked around by tying the territories into some kind of confederation with Jordan; for the Likud, there could be no shared sovereignty with any other power. The rest of the section analyzes the parties' ideas about a Palestinian state. This will set the benchmark against which the policy change of 1993 occurred.

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[18] Golda Meir, a key Mapai/Labor leader and later prime minister, mentions that although she was due to leave the country the day after the war, she could not leave before seeing the Western Wall; she received special permission from the government to do so (Meir 1975, 105). Rabin notes that he was "breathless" when he first reached the Wall (Rabin 1994, 87). When Moshe Dayan, Defense Minister, entered the Old City of Jerusalem just after its capture, he declared in typical dramatic fashion: "We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again" (cited in Sachar 1996, 673).

Labor and Territorial Compromise

Labor was unable to ignore the emotional and psychological pull of the West Bank on the Israeli psyche. But because it had a tradition of acceptance of partition in exchange for an independent Jewish entity, and had always been guided primarily by strategic-security concerns in settlement policy, it was from the beginning interested in ceding control of some territory to the Arab states provided it was assured of a peace agreement in return. Despite factional differences within the party, all of Labor agreed that Israel had to remain a Jewish state with a Jewish majority, and had to remain committed to democratic norms of governance. Holding on to the territories with their large Arab populations undermined both.[19]

The West Bank and Gaza were thus viewed not as permanent additions to Israel, but as temporary advantages. This is further underlined by the lack of planning for administration of the territories before the 1967 war, and the decision "not to decide" about what to do with them after the war (see Gazit 1995; Nisan 1978). In the context of contributing to Israel's security, they were seen as strategic assets in two ways: as bargaining chips to be used in any eventual negotiations with the Arabs states (Gazit 1995, 294); and as a means of extending a buffer zone between Israel and any threats from the south and the east. Jerusalem was thus willing to return part, but not all, of the territories (see, for example, Meir 1975, 371). The term "defensible borders," the new watchword in this context, came into use in the weeks immediately after the Six Day War

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[19] According to Friedgut (1995, 72), the question of the impact of holding on the territories on Israel's democracy and Jewish character was first mentioned only a few weeks after the war, at a symposium at Hebrew University.

(Horowitz 1993, 49, fn. 12). On 19 June 1967, the Labor government officially decided it would sign a peace treaty with Egypt and Syria on the basis of the international (1949) border, with some security modifications, but the WBG was only vaguely referred to.[20]

In keeping with both its traditional position and the security lens through which it viewed the West Bank and Gaza, Labor policy toward them was defined as territorial compromise. However, because in the immediate aftermath of the war Labor displayed indecision toward the territories, coupled with the emotional tug of the land, and because there did not seem to be any willingness on the part of the Arab states to explore peace options, Labor recognized that the inhabitants needed to be taken care. But not wanting to take complete responsibility for them (and thus minimizing the costs of occupation), Israel sought to work something out with the Arab state it saw as most likely to cooperate with Israel, and which had ruled the area from 1948 to 1967: Jordan.

The Jordanian Option

According to Sandler and Frisch, three things guided Israeli thinking on the territories: (1) Israel could not, for historical, cultural, religious, and political reasons, replace Jordanian rule; (2) Israeli security interests were intimately linked to the territory itself, as opposed to the people; and (3) Jordan was still an important actor in controlling the territories, with numerous ties to the inhabitants, and so some form of cooperation had to be worked out with it (1984, 58-59). These ideas formed the basis of what has become known as the "Jordanian

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[20] The decision was later rescinded in the wake of the 1967 Khartoum Summit, where the Arab leaders declared their three noes: no recognition, no negotiation, and no peace with Israel.

option" in Labor policy toward the territories. This entailed working with Jordan, usually through direct talks, over the status of the WBG, rather than with "local" Palestinians or the PLO.

From the time of Ben-Gurion, Labor leaders had been meeting secretly with the kings of Jordan to work out a *modus vivendi* between Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom. Long considered one of the more moderate of the Arab states, Jordan was seen as a critical ingredient in a Middle Eastern framework that ensured Israel's security. Amman's ambition to retain the West Bank for itself and control over the Islamic holy places in Jerusalem provided a basis for cooperation, since Israel under Labor did not hold any pretensions toward conquest of the West Bank during the 1947-49 war (see Kurzman 1983, 275; Kurzman 1970, 22-24; Sandler and Frisch 1984, 108).

In addition to dealing solely with Jordan, territorial compromise for Labor also came to mean some form of Jordanian control, preferably joint management with Israel. There was no thought given to handing over the territories to complete Jordanian sovereignty: Jordan's participation in the 1967 war, against Israeli warnings, and the fact that Jordan agreed to have other Arab forces stationed on its territory, combined with the obvious inability of the country's leadership to resist the pan-Arab necessity of standing together against Israel, convinced most Israeli leaders that the West Bank could never be allowed to fall under the control of a potential enemy. This option was advocated by Labor leaders even up until the signing of Oslo.[21] There was no consideration given to the possibility of an

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[21] Even in May 1993, while the Oslo talks were ongoing, then-Foreign Minister Shimon Peres was still talking about a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation. See Peres (1993, Chapter 13).

independent Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza; it was simply assumed that Jordan had to be involved in some way.

Two dominant ideas emerged among the Labor leaders after 1967, reflecting these ideas about the Jordanian option and heavily influencing future policy. The first was the Allon Plan, based on the notion of territorial compromise; the second was the Dayan Plan, which was about functional compromise (Sandler 1993, 188). There were many similarities between them: both were designed primarily with Israel's security in mind, and both incorporated the notion that Israel must control the strategic points in the occupied territories. Finally, both also saw Jordan as the only partner with whom Israel could work on the West Bank (Sandler 1993, 188-189).

The Allon Plan called for the establishment of a security zone along the Jordan River, in areas not densely populated by Arabs, and at some other points in the West Bank. In return for a peace treaty, Israel would give most of the West Bank and all of Gaza to Jordan (Allon 1976; M. Benvenisti 1984, 51-52). This was, in essence, a newer version of partition. It was adopted by the government in June 1968 as a settlement plan, though not as a formal territorial plan (since the government was still plagued by uncertainty and indecision). In 1977 Labor did adopt it as part of its official policy platform (see Inbar [1991] for more discussion on this).

Moshe Dayan was considered to be a more hawkish member of Labor, and his plan reflected in many ways some of the thinking of the Likud party (indeed, he served as foreign minister in the first Likud government in 1977). Rather than

any shared sovereignty over the West Bank and Gaza, he proposed a "functional" division instead, with Israel retaining overall security control and Jordan given administrative and civic control. With the decline in Dayan's influence after the 1973 War and his agreement to work in the first Likud government after 1977, the Dayan Plan ceased to be part of Labor policy; in fact, it become associated with Likud's autonomy plan in the Camp David Accords (see below).

In the context of the Allon Plan, Israel set about establishing a series of political liberalization efforts combined with strengthening the economic links between the West Bank and Gaza. The main purpose was to make the territory relatively self-sustaining, so that Israel would not have to pay for the occupation (see Sandler and Frisch 1984, 48-58, 61-65; on the legal absorption of the territories, see E. Benvenisti 1990). While placing the areas under military government, Jerusalem also ensured that Jordan continued to play a crucial role in West Bank and Gaza life. But nowhere in any of the ideas presented by Labor leaders was mention made of an independent Palestinian state, or of negotiating with the PLO on the future of the territories.

Likud and Greater Israel

A combination of Israeli policy contradictions, Jordan's own ambivalence about joint control with Israel, and most importantly the unexpected rise to power of the Likud party in 1977 effectively ended the Jordanian option, although it remained the guiding principle for Labor until 1993. Where Labor was willing to entertain some form of territorial compromise, Likud was opposed to any agreement that would remove Israeli sovereignty over what it saw as the biblical

and historical heritage of the Jews. The most that Likud leaders were willing to consider was some form of Menachem Begin's autonomy plan, presented in the 1978 Camp David Accords. If for Labor the territories were a means to an end (enhancement of Israel's security and bargaining chips for peace talks), for Likud the territories were an end in themselves (see Sandler and Frisch 1984, Chapter 6).

The Likud party was rooted in the Revisionist Zionist movement that began in the 1920s. The Revisionists opposed the labor movement's vision of Zionism, including its emphasis on agricultural labor and socialism, and its gradualist approach to the attainment of Zionist objectives. It stood for a build-up of Jewish military power and its use against both the Arabs and the British if either group opposed the establishment of a Jewish state. And it adamantly rejected any partition of the biblical Land of Israel (see Shavit 1988; Shindler 1995, Chapter 1).

Herut, the core element of Likud (which was an amalgam of several smaller parties), was essentially the heir of the Revisionists. As a political party, it was formed by Menachem Begin and the other leaders of the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization, commonly called the Irgun or by its Hebrew acronym, *Etzel*), an underground military organization that broke from the Labor-controlled pre-state Jewish army because of its policy of restraint in the face of Arab attacks. It also held to a maximalist position on the boundaries of a Jewish state: Herut's emblem was a map of the Land of Israel on both sides of the Jordan River, though this was later modified to include only Israel, the West Bank, and

Gaza. It was also a nationalist, rather than a religious, emphasis. There was no room here for a Jordanian option or any independent Arab political entity—the West Bank was referred to by Herut as the "eastern part of the western Land of Israel" (Shindler 1995, 45). In Ilan Peleg's words, "[t]he cornerstone of Begin's foreign policy throughout his tenure as Israel's prime minister was his effort to maintain Israel's control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip" (1987, 95).

Although the later transformation of Herut into the Likud helped expand its support base and give it a policy cast beyond hard-line territorial demands, it was the Six Day War that made the Likud more germane for policy debates over the territories, in two ways. First, during the crisis leading up to the war, both elite and popular pressure forced the Labor leaders to create a National Unity Government, by bringing in Gahal (the party formed by a merger between Herut and the Liberals) and other parties for a united front in the face of a national emergency. Herut/Gahal leader Begin became a Minister without Portfolio. This provided Begin and Herut with national legitimacy, portraying them as responsible political actors concerned not just without their own partisan interests, but with the national interest as well.

Second, the results of the 1967 war suddenly made Herut "more relevant to an Israel that had acquired the territories. The right to the territories, which became the issue of the day, was what Herut had preached during its many years in opposition" (Torgovnik 1986, 58). The nationalist framework that rejected territorial compromise and partition (seen as capitulation) that Herut had been preaching was now given concrete manifestation, and its ideological vision and

emotional attachment no longer seemed far-fetched or unrealistic. The fact that the territories were (a) captured by Labor; (b) held on to by Labor; and (c) first settled by Labor also increased legitimacy for Likud's vision of Greater Israel. If the traditionally legitimate and ruling party could acquiesce in these things, then surely Likud's ideas could not be all bad?

Changes in Israeli society and politics also impacted on general ideational structures regarding a Palestinian state. The decline of Labor as the dominant political force was reflective of, and contributed to, the weakening of its image as the primary vehicle for the Zionist enterprise. This mattered less so long as it was impossible to settle beyond the 1949 armistice lines, but the capture of the WBG provided a new arena in which the Zionist mission could take place. By this time, Labor's decline was almost complete, and Likud's takeover was supplemented with the rise of another entity as representative of the historic Zionist mission of settling the land, at the expense of the Labor movement: *Gush Emunim* (Bloc of the Faithful).[22] The *Gush* presented itself as continuing the Zionist enterprise as begun by Labor, earning greater appeal than it might otherwise have obtained (see Aronoff 1989, Chapter 4; Sprinzak 1991, 43-51, 114-117).[23] This helped generate support for Likud's policy of settlement in and retention of the WBG.

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[22] The *Gush* was formed in 1974. Made up of young religious-nationalists tied to the National Religious Party, the traditional coalition partner of Labor, it was formed in the wake of the trauma of the 1973 War. Labor's policy of holding the territories in stasis in the hopes of trading them for peace with the Arabs was widely considered to have failed. To fill the gap of despair, these youth sought to rejuvenate the historic Zionist mission; this was enhanced by the fact that the places open for settlement were the heart of the ancient Jewish kingdoms (Drezon-Tepler 1990, 170-171; Sandler and Frisch 1984, 118-132).

[23] Aronoff, for one, believes that the *Gush* would not have been as successful as it was had Labor been in the prime of its political life (1989, 87).

Autonomy

The Likud rejected both the Jordanian option and partition. However, the Likud could not ignore the existence of hundreds of thousands of Arabs living on these lands, and so in lieu of a Jordanian option, the Likud began advocating autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, but not for the territory itself. In other words, the territories were to remain under Israeli control, but the inhabitants could exercise some form of self-government. Foreign policy thus shifted from a security-oriented motivation to an "ethnonational" inspiration (Sandler 1993).

Begin presented his "home-rule" plan in December 1977, based in part on the Dayan Plan, as a mechanism for retaining control over the territories. Because for Begin and other Likud leaders (including Yitzhak Shamir) the historical right of the Jews to the Land of Israel took precedence over everything (Shindler 1995, 89-90; Sofer 1988, 124, 129-130), autonomy for the people was the most that could be offered. The plan called for an end to military government in the territories, and Palestinian elections to an Administrative Council, which would hold responsibility for education, religious affairs, finances, transportation, housing, health services, industry, justice, and local police forces. Palestinians would have a choice of either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship; Israel would hold responsibility for public order and overall security, and land and water rights; and Jews would be allowed to buy land and settle wherever they wished (Shindler 1995, 90; Sofer 1988, 135). The autonomy plan became the basis for Likud policy

throughout the negotiations with Egypt on the Camp David Accords, and throughout the 1980s.[24]

Likud's priorities are best reflected in its settlement policy. Because Likud policy was based not on security considerations, settlement policy came to reflect the nationalist demands of the right in Israel and *Gush Emunim*. From the beginning the *Gush* pushed for settlements in densely populated Arab areas, in sharp contrast to Labor's policy of keeping away from these districts. It was hoped that once the new settlements became established facts, the government would have no choice but to support and protect them, building up the infrastructure around them and incorporating them into the Israeli social, political, economic, and security networks.[25]

Settlement activity under the Likud differed considerably from settlement patterns under Labor (see Sandler 1993, 203-210) in three main ways. First, Labor settlements were concentrated in three areas: the Jerusalem area, the Etzion bloc (a concentration of Jewish settlements between Jerusalem and Hebron, toward the south-west corner of the West Bank), and the Jordan Valley. Begin extended the settlements around and beyond all these areas. Second, where under Labor the original settlers came from youth movements or kibbutzim associated with Labor or the National Religious Party, and came to protect the borders of Israel, those who came under the Likud were motivated by nationalist-religious ideals, to

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[24] In fact, Ezer Weizman, who was involved in the discussions with the Americans and Egyptians leading up to the Camp David Accords, believes that Begin only agreed to return the Sinai "to protect himself against any eventual concessions in the West Bank" (Weizman 1981, 151, 190-191).

[25] The West Bank road system under Labor, for example, was designed primarily along a north-south axis, in keeping with its strategic ideas about the position of the West Bank in Israel's overall security framework. Under Likud, it was laid out along an east-west line, to connect the West Bank and Jewish settlements with Israel (M. Benvenisti 1984, 23).

entrench the Jewish right to settlement in their historic homeland. At the same time, the government, particularly under Ariel Sharon as Minister of Agriculture, began encouraging Israelis who wanted a better quality of life, cheaper housing, and space away from the heavy urban areas to move to the territories, through a series of financial and economic inducements. Third, Labor's plans evolved from three considerations: security, the density of surrounding Arab populations, and economic viability and self-sufficiency. For Likud, the settlements had to be tied to Israel's economic structures, to facilitate control over the area (see also M. Benvenisti 1984; Eisenstadt 1985, 511-513; Sandler and Frisch 1984, 135-136). Likud policy thus reflected Likud ideas about Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank.

We can see the different party policies on these issues through an examination of elections platforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s (see Yishai 1986, 237-238). However, the basic underlying policy was the same for both parties: Labor advocated some form of territorial compromise while Likud insisted on overall Israeli sovereignty, but neither party accepted the necessity or possibility of an independent Palestinian state. For all their differences in policy on settlements and ultimate control over the territories, the idea of a third independent state in the area was a non-starter for both parties.[26] The 1977 elections that brought a very different party to power did not change Israeli policy on this point. Even after Palestinian nationalism became a prominent issue in

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[26] Inbar (1991) analyzes the shift throughout the 1980s in Labor ideas about a Palestinian state (and negotiations with the PLO). Although there was a clear swing toward acceptance of such prospects, it was never officially endorsed by the party; more importantly, neither Peres nor Rabin, the two main leaders of the party, ever accepted either of these options.

Arab-Israeli relations from the mid-1970s, the dictates of security or ideology prevented any movement on the part of Israel toward such a goal.

Direct Talks with the PLO

Less discussion is necessary regarding ideas about negotiating with the PLO. This is for three reasons: First, the Palestinians as an independent actor were simply ignored by both Labor and Likud. This disregard stemmed from three factors. One, it was a function of the lack of progress on the peace front: with no Arab state or other international actor either interested in focusing on the Palestinian issue or having the capacity to influence Israel on this matter, there was no reason for Israel to concern itself with the WBG.[27] Two, lack of armed conflict between Israel and the Arabs[28] removed a key element that normally helped push the Palestinian issue to the top of the Israeli-Arab agenda. Three, and stemming from the first two facets, Israelis simply had no motive to be concerned about the Palestinians and their conditions in the WBG. Palestinians had for long not been a factor in Middle East politics, ignored by both Israel and the Arab states when it suited them; they were simply unseen, and the territories were considered a "distant land" that few Israelis outside of the government agencies that dealt with them thought about, except perhaps as a place to obtain cheaper goods and services.

Second, the PLO was regarded by both parties as a terrorist organization with no redeeming qualities. This left it outside the pale in terms of peace

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[27] Although the 1978 Camp David Accords tried to bring the Palestinian issue to the center of Israeli-Arab negotiations, neither Begin nor Egyptian leader Anwar Sadat had all that much interest in doing so, preferring to concentrate on ending their own bilateral state of war.

[28] The war in Lebanon was essentially over by 1985, but even while it was ongoing it was confined to Lebanon itself and Israeli-PLO interactions.

negotiations. Third, it was not until the later 1980s that the PLO became an actor relevant in its own right, as it began to receive significant international support (particularly from the Americans) as the representative of the Palestinian people. The onset of serious efforts to establish a negotiating framework in this period raised questions about who would or could represent the Palestinians, thus also raising the profile of the PLO. In short, the PLO was a non-entity for Israeli government foreign policy considerations until the second half of the 1980s. Chapter 4 discusses these last two factors in greater detail.

This chapter has summarized the institutional and ideational developments of Israel. The centralization of Israeli decision-making structures is based on a long process of concentration of power in the office of the key decision maker, the prime minister. This allows Israeli prime ministers more capacity to put their own preferences into practice. The ideas about the WBG held by both Labor and Likud, despite significant differences on settlement policy and issues of sovereignty, were the same: no Palestinian state in the WBG. Similarly, both parties rejected negotiation with the PLO as dangerous, unfeasible, and potentially opening the door to the first shared commitment, no independent Palestinian state.

The two variables, however, do not tell the entire story of Israeli foreign policy variation in the form of the Oslo Accords. The dynamic element that is necessary to complete the picture can be found in the different individuals who held decision-making power; specifically, the different belief structures they held, the emotion generated by these structures, and how these impacted on their

foreign policy decisions. Where Yitzhak Shamir was ideological and given to making decisions based on the affective appeal of an object, Yitzhak Rabin was adaptable and less willing to rely on emotion as a determinant of policy. This pragmatism allowed Rabin to undergo a learning process that culminated in the 1993 Oslo Accords—a major variation in Israeli policy toward the PLO and an independent Palestinian state.

Chapter Five

From Confrontation to Accommodation:

The Oslo Accords and

Foreign Policy Variation in Israel

Introduction

As the first step toward providing an effective explanation for the 1993 Oslo, we have identified the historically conditioned institutional structures of Israel that have given prime ministers autonomy in foreign policymaking. We have also noted the long-standing ideational structures of the country in order to help distinguish when a new policy decision is made. In this case, Oslo represents a new policy because it entailed direct negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and—at a minimum—recognition that an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza (WBG) would be the likely outcome of such a dialogue, both of which were directly opposite to the policy of all Israeli governments (Labor and Likud) since 1967.

Oslo is a good case study because it highlights the differences between Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, and therefore the impact that their personal beliefs had on their foreign policies. Individuals are therefore the dynamic variable that provides the key to understanding this variation in foreign policy. It

is the difference between individual leaders that best explains how and why Oslo

marks a departure from previous foreign policy. This chapter will focus on this

differentiation, between Israeli Prime Ministers Yitzhak Shamir (who opposed

talking to the PLO and a Palestinian state) and Yitzhak Rabin (who pursued and

signed Oslo by negotiating directly with the PLO and thus laid the groundwork

for a Palestinian state).[1]

In order to demonstrate the significance of these differences and their

impact on policy, the chapter will analyze the different belief structures of the two

leaders. The first part will focus on the independent variables: that is, the personal

characteristics and policies of the prime ministers that allow us to code them as

ideological or adaptable. The discussion does this by examining the different

cognitive and affective structures of Shamir and Rabin through their

understanding of Zionism, and then examining their actions and responses to the

intifada and their view of Israel's position in the region in light of changed global

conditions. By studying the experiences of these individuals and their policies

toward issues other than the PLO and a Palestinian state, we are able to determine

where to place Shamir and Rabin on the ideological-adaptable continuum and

avoid problems of tautology and determining categorization based on the decision

under study. Once we have coded these individuals, the second part examines

these conclusions in light of the dependent variable, their policies toward direct

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[1] It might be argued that any discussion of the Oslo process focus extensively on Yossi Beilin, the Deputy Foreign Minister who essentially created and guided the preparations for the secret talks for the first several months, and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, who nurtured the process by bringing Beilin into the Ministry in the first place and working hard on the details of the negotiations. While it is true that Oslo would not have occurred without them, they are relevant in the context of the model being offered here in that they provided a menu of ideas for the main policymaker, Rabin, who had the authority to reject the process or shut it down at any time. This was, in fact, Beilin's fear for much of the process (see Beilin 1999, Part 2, *passim*).

talk with the PLO and a Palestinian state in the WBG. For Rabin, this section will also include a discussion of the learning process he underwent, which pushed him to reconsider both his own and long-standing government policy about these matters. A short summary of the findings in this case study will be presented at the end.

The Role of Individuals: Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin

The key difference that can explain Oslo is the difference in belief structures between Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin, and the resulting cognitive and affective processes that drove their foreign policy decisions. This is illustrated through a discussion of Shamir and Rabin, their belief structures, their ideas toward both direct talks with the PLO and the possibility of an independent Palestinian state, and their consequent reactions to related environmental circumstances.

The Independent Variable: Yitzhak Shamir

Yitzhak Shamir is an ideological individual, and affect plays a determinative role in his decisions on foreign policy. This stems from a very basic source, which is the starting point for both individuals: their Zionism. Shamir's Zionism was heavily, if not solely, concentrated on the meaning of *Eretz Israel* (the Land of Israel) for the Jewish people in a strongly nationalist sense (Ahimeir 2006; Ben-Aharon 2005; Pazner 2005). He believed it belonged to the Jews by both divine mandate and especially by historical legacy. Being born outside of Palestine was a critical element in the development of his thinking on these

matters: Born in Rujenoy, a small town in Poland, Shamir's Zionist upbringing (by his father, the Jewish school he attended, and indeed most of the town's Jews [see Shamir 1994, Chapter 1]) was overlaid with idealistic (some might say romantic) visions of the land and what it meant for the Jews. It was not the desperate needs of the Jewish people, anti-Semitism, or the desire for normality among the nations (elements that drove many of the disparate groups within the Zionist movement) that inspired and motivated Shamir, but rather the Land of Israel in its historical incarnation. The Jews, he felt, belonged to the Land in its entirety (including the WBG), and the Land belonged to the Jews. Reflecting on the achievements of Zionism with the establishment of Israel, Shamir wrote:

> In 1948, a Jewish state came into being which was a far cry from that of which I had dreamed: a Jewish state from which much of the Land of Israel was severed. I have done all I could, in various ways, in the intervening years to help rectify this distortion to which I can never be reconciled, and to prevent others like it (Shamir 1994, 26).

Herzl Makov, Shamir's Chief of Staff in 1992, later said that "to him [Shamir], *Eretz Israel* was everything. And everything else was supposed to be subordinate [to] *Eretz Israel*" (Makov 2005; Arens [1995] also stresses this element in Shamir's policy thinking.)

Shamir was thus naturally drawn to the right-wing Revisionist youth movement, Betar, by the time he came to Palestine in 1935. Betar advocated maximalist territorial demands and immediate military action to establish a Jewish state in the Land of Israel, both ideas with which Shamir heartily agreed. As Revisionist leader Vladimir Jabotinky appeared to become more moderate in his policies toward the British, Shamir was drawn to the more right-wing elements

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within the *Yishuv* (Shindler 1995, 174). In 1939 he joined the paramilitary organization of the Revisionist, the *Irgun Zvai Leumi* (National Military Organization—*Etzel*) because he believed it was most dedicated to establishing a Jewish state on the Land of Israel, by force of arms if necessary (see Shamir 1994, 18-20).

Shamir eventually broke with *Etzel* when it decided, in the early 1940s, to suspend its military campaign against the British in order not to undermine the Allied effort to defeat the Nazis. For Shamir and his ideological associates, Britain was the greater enemy, since it was directly preventing the establishment of the Jewish state. He joined the Stern Group, which was the most active right-wing group in the *Yishuv* at the time. Nothing better illustrates Shamir's later beliefs about the WBG than the commitment he made to the Stern Group. The Group was led by Avraham Stern, who relied on the Bible rather than the Mandate or any other structure to determine what the boundaries of the Jewish state should be. This was reflected in the "Eighteen Principles" that members of the Group had to pledge to uphold, including the injunction from Genesis 15:18: "To your seed, I have given this Land from the River of Egypt [presumably the Nile] to the great River, the River Euphrates" (Shindler 1995, 176).[2] This belief remained a part of his thinking and subsequent foreign policy for his entire political career.[3]

In short, the Land of Israel held intense affective appeal for Shamir. As discussed below, this colored his thinking on various issues related to it and to

[2] For the full eighteen principles, see Shavit (1988, 154-155).
[3] Shamir later stopped thinking about Jordan as part of *Eretz Israel*, referring to it instead as a state for Palestinians (see below).

Israeli foreign policy, and in the end prevented him from making any changes to Israel's longstanding policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian state. The affective appeal of the WBG, as the Land of Israel, was simply too great; Shamir could not conceive that a Palestinian state in this areas should be an option, or that the PLO should be engaged with toward such an end. His rigidity on these and related issues is illustrated below. He was not capable of incorporating contrasting information into his decision-making process. Instead, he viewed everything through the emotional prism that is based on his upbringing and personal ideas about Zionism and Israel.

Shamir's Reaction to the *Intifada*

With hindsight, many Israelis and analysts have come to accept that the *intifada* (the Palestinian uprising that began on 8 December 1987 and lasted until 1993) sprang from the poor living conditions in the territories.[4] But Shamir continued to believe it was not about socio-economic conditions or even the desire for national self-determination, but rather a war over Israel's right to exist (Shamir 1994, 182). As the rioting and stone-throwing (and sometimes Molotov cocktails) spread and persisted throughout the WBG, Shamir remained unconvinced that the *intifada* represented a new phase in Palestinian action and Palestinian-Israeli relations. The policy corollary was to do nothing to encourage the belief that the uprising would lead to any change in the political status quo. Harry Hurwitz, a close speechwriter for Shamir, reported that Shamir did not believe Israel should make any concessions under fire—not to mention the fact that Shamir simply did not conceive of the necessity of any political concessions

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[4] For a good discussion, see Schiff and Ya'ari (1990).

(Hurwitz 2005). Rather than convincing Shamir that new ideas and policies were necessary to deal with changed circumstances, the *intifada* only validated his extant beliefs that any Palestinian-run entity with any real power in the WBG would be a threat to Israel, not to mention remove any chance Israel would have at retaining its historical heritage.

Shamir's Response to Israel's Position in the Regional Balance of Power

The *intifada* represented for Shamir only one more attempt in a long list of efforts by an unremittingly hostile world to attack the Jews. Stemming from his experience in the Holocaust,[5] Shamir simply could not incorporate new information into his thinking processes and policies on the WBG, even when global and regional changes occurred that improved the regional balance of power in Israel's favor. The emotional appeal of these areas was too great. In fact, he simply ignored these changes, continuing to see other states as "inherently hostile, unsympathetic, and, in many cases, anti-Semitic" (Steinberg 1995, 175) and unable or unwilling to alter their perceptions. In an interview in March 1991, Shamir insisted that despite these positive changes, Israel still faced dangers from a hostile regional environment (*Jerusalem Post* 29 March 1991, 7). None of these external changes mattered to Shamir; he did not distinguish between the various threats to Israel, and areas where different policies might be called for. Overall, he perceived that Israel was still under siege by a world that was at best indifferent, at worst hostile.

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[5] Shamir suffered a terrible ordeal in the Holocaust: Rujenoy's Jews were almost all killed by the Nazis; his mother and sister died in the Holocaust, while a second sister, her husband, and their children were betrayed by a fellow Pole who had promised to help them but in the end killed them himself. Finally, his father was also betrayed by former non-Jewish friends from the village, and also murdered (Shamir 1994, 5).

The Dependent Variable:
Shamir's Policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian State

Shamir is clearly an ideological individual. His belief structures are tied to an affective attachment to the Land of Israel, which has conditioned his understanding of Israeli foreign policy objectives. Even when circumstances changed (the end of the Cold War and the *intifada*) Shamir could not ignore his emotional attachment to the Land, and therefore he was unable to change his foreign policies in light of a changing environment. Having demonstrated the importance of affect in his decision-making, we can see how it applied to the two issues of Oslo. Shamir's attitudes toward the PLO and a Palestinian state further underline his attachment to the land and his unwillingness to consider any changes in his foreign policy even as circumstances themselves changed. Since Shamir never did engage in any policy similar to Oslo, the closest comparison we can contemplate is his response to the American efforts that entailed at least some minimal form of the very things that Oslo stood for.

Ideas Regarding a Palestinian State

Building on his conception of Zionism and his policies on the issues cited above, we can better understand Shamir's position on a potential Palestinian state in the WBG. Simply put, and based on the intense affective appeal the WBG had for him, Shamir believed that the sovereignty of the Jewish people over the WBG was mandated by God and by history. There was therefore no room for a Palestinian state on any of these lands. When Prime Minister Begin signed the Camp David Accords with Egypt in 1978, Shamir reports that he was "thunderstruck" when he heard about the agreement, believing that it undermined

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"the abiding Jewish claim to the Land of Israel" and set a "disastrous precedent"

of Israel's willingness to withdraw from its historic lands (Shamir 1994, 104).

Indeed, when Moshe Arens, a close associate of Shamir within Likud, suggested

that Israel give up Gaza—a place with far less historical and emotional

significance for Jews and far more strategic and moral problems than the West

Bank, given the large numbers of Palestinians living there—Shamir rejected the

idea out of hand (Arens 1995). Shamir told Yossi Ahimeir, a close advisor, that so

long as he was prime minister there would be no territorial concessions that

resulted in a loss of Israeli sovereignty over the WBG (Ahimeir 2006).

Instead, he maintained that the Palestinians already had their own state in

Jordan, which did not encroach upon the Jewish state. In an address to B'nai Brith

International Leadership on 15 August 1981, he said that "[t]he Palestinians have

a homeland in Jordan....There is no justification for a second Palestinian Arab

state, except as a base against Israel's existence" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs

1981a). He referred to such an entity as "an Arafatist state," thus delegitimizing

the idea that such a state would reflect national aspiration of a distinct people

(Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1981b). In a speech to the UN General Assembly at

the beginning of October 1981, he again repeated his belief that

> [t]he Palestinian Arabs do have a state on a major part of the
> territory of Palestine. In Jordan there exists a Palestinian Arab state
> in everything but name. It is a Palestinian Arab state by virtue of
> its geography, demography, history, culture, religion and
> language....There is thus no need to speak further of Palestinian
> self-determination; their homeland is already in existence
> (Ministry of Foreign Affair 1981c).

And in presenting the outline of his government's guiding principles in 1988 (in which Likud was the senior partner to Labor), Shamir asserted that "Israel will oppose the establishment of an *additional* Palestinian state in the Gaza district and in the area between Israel and Jordan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988; emphasis added). Finally, he peppered his opening speech to the Madrid peace conference on 31 October 1991 with references to Israel's rightful claim to the Land of Israel, thus implicitly denying the possibility of Palestinian claims (see Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1991).

As part of his belief that the WBG belonged to the Jews, Shamir also felt that Jews had the right—even the duty—to settle anywhere in the WBG they desired. In his speech presenting his government to the Knesset when he became prime minister after Begin's resignation, he noted that "Paths must be opened and cleared for Jewish settlement throughout the Land of Israel....This sacred work must not stop; it cannot stop; it is the heart of our existence and life" (cited in Shamir 1994, 146). The Basic Guidelines of his 1990 government (which included all of the far-right parties) stated explicitly that "The eternal right of the Jewish people to Eretz Yisrael is not subject to question" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990).

Shamir insisted on the right of the Jews to settle in the WBG even in the face of concerted American pressure,[6] and even while he knew this would

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[6] From 1989 to the onset of the Madrid peace process in October 1991, the United States pushed hard to bring Israel and the Arabs states and the Palestinians together to negotiate an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Recently-elected President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker believed that changes in the international environment made conditions ripe for Arab-Israeli peace, and they were determined to effect it (see Baker 1995, 412, 414-415, 422; Quandt 2001, 303-306). At first peace efforts were concentrated on putting together a Palestinian delegation to design with Israel a framework for elections in the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians would

undercut the purpose of any peace negotiation (see for example *Jerusalem Post* 5 June 1990, 1). President Bush eventually sent a letter to Shamir in June 1990, explicitly threatening to publicly oppose Israel if it did not stop settlement expansion (*Jerusalem Post* 29 June 1990, 1).

Shamir's absolute conviction in the right of the Jews to the Land of Israel also, in this context, allowed him to believe that the Palestinians themselves would eventually come to acknowledge and accept this reality. This strengthened his own belief that there was no need to grant concessions to the Palestinians that would lead to a state. According to Eytan Bentsur, Deputy Director-General of the Foreign Ministry under Shamir and Rabin, Shamir reiterated to the Americans throughout 1989 and 1990 his firm belief that Jewish settlements in WBG would not prevent an agreement with the Palestinians (Bentsur 2001, 23), implying that the Palestinians would accept whatever was offered to them. Yossi Ahimeir, Herzl Makov, and Avi Pazner (one of his chief foreign policy advisors) have all said that Shamir believed that if Israel held to its position, the Palestinians would eventually come to accept autonomy as inevitable and even good for them, particularly as they had not experienced anything like the autonomous decision-making they would have under Shamir's designs before (Ahimeir 2006; Makov 2005; Pazner 2005).

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use the elections to select another delegation that would then negotiate with Israel on a final settlement of the conflict. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1991 Gulf War interrupted these efforts, but they intensified soon after, with a different focus: an international conference that would bring Israel and all the Arabs (including the Palestinians) together to dialogue about bilateral and regional issues.

Attitude toward the PLO

Shamir also maintained a firm policy against negotiation with the PLO. He viewed it as a terrorist "murderous organization" (Shamir 1994, 258) bent on the destruction of Israel. He wrote that "the only peace the PLO could produce in terms of Israel was the peace of cemetery" (1994, 198). At the same time, because the PLO was the representative of Palestinian refugees, he argued it was committed to undermining the Jewish character of Israel because of its demand for the "right of return"; the outcome for the Jewish state would be the same as if military force had been against Israel. (Several former advisors stress this latter factor: Arens 1995, *passim*; Ben-Aharon 2005; Makov 2005; and Pazner 2005.)

This approach to the PLO had clear policy implications: When presenting his government to the Knesset in 1988, Shamir stated that flatly "Israel will not negotiate with the PLO" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1988). The guidelines for the 1990 government included the stipulation that "Israel will not negotiate with the PLO, directly or indirectly" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1990). Finally, when asked in a February 1990 interview (during the period of American attempts to bring Israel and the Palestinians together in a negotiating session) if there was anything the PLO could do to make itself acceptable to Shamir, he responded that "[t]he only thing it should do is dismantle itself" (*Jerusalem Post* 23 February 1990, 5).

In addition, Shamir rebuffed American pressure, in the context of their efforts to establish a negotiating framework for Palestinian autonomy in the WBG at the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. This focus on autonomy was relatively

unproblematic even for Likud, which had committed to autonomy in the 1978 Camp David Accords with Egypt and consistently upheld them during election campaigns in the 1980s as the proper framework for negotiation with the Palestinians. Shamir himself often used the Accords during the period under examination to demand that the Americans stop pushing Israel beyond what was envisaged in them.

The key stumbling block, though, was in both the composition of either of the delegations, and which Palestinians would be allowed to vote in elections, and for whom. Likud's position (and the official government position, given Likud's seniority in it) was that it was opposed to any member of the delegation coming from "outside" the territories (essentially a euphemism for the PLO) or those living in East Jerusalem, since this would undermine Israel's claim to Jerusalem as the "eternal, undivided capital" of the Jewish state. Under pressure from Washington, Shamir finally presented the Americans with an Israeli plan incorporating these elements in April 1989 (with considerable input from Rabin), which later became the official Israeli blueprint for peace when the government as a whole accepted it on 14 May (Arens 1995; Bentsur 2001, 28).[7]

But Shamir almost immediately undermined the initiative. On 26 June he told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that the proposal was a public relations show, and then bowing to pressure from the more hawkish elements in the Likud, he soon after announced that the Likud would never give the territories up to foreign sovereignty, and that elections would only take place

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[7] The broad principles of the initiative were direct negotiations between Israel and the Arab states; no dialogue with the PLO; and no independent Palestinian state could be the final outcome. For the full document, see Knesset (1989).

once the *intifada* was ended (Aronoff 1993, 210).[8] He resisted any attempt to allow the PLO some form of involvement, even in the face of heavy American pressure and signs of PLO moderation, arguing that the association of the PLO with peace efforts was hindering any progress (see *Jerusalem Post* 3 June 1990, 1) and that there was no difference between moderates and extremists within the group (see *Jerusalem Post* 5 June 1990, 1). And he insisted that the government would only work with Palestinians who accepted the autonomy framework beforehand (*Jerusalem Post* 13 June 1990, 1); this of course meant the automatic exclusion of the PLO, which stood for Palestinian self-determination.

The Washington talks that followed the opening convention at Madrid were the culmination of American efforts. They entailed both bilateral discussions between Israel and each Arab state (including a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation) and multilateral talks involving all participants on a range of regional issues. Shamir's strategy during these talks appears to have been to simply drag the process out (at least with regard to the Palestinians) in the hopes that nothing concrete would ever be achieved and Israel would not have to talk to the PLO or consider the possibility of a Palestinian state (see Bentsur 2001, 79, 121). According to Arens, Shamir had never really been interested in any peace initiatives, and he stuck to "unrealistic doctrines" that made any such attempts doomed from the start (Arens 1995, 60, 126). One writer referred to Shamir's plan as a "smokescreen" designed to leave the status quo in place (Shindler 1995, 250). Shamir himself is said to have confirmed that his strategy was to drag the process

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[8] Shamir was also under heavy internal pressures from would-be contenders for leadership in his party, which may also explain in part his readiness to take a hard-line stance.

out so that nothing substantial would result (see *New York Times* 26 June 1992, 1). (Though he later said he was misquoted, Shamir's intention might be gleaned from statements made earlier, such as in an interview with the *Jerusalem Post* in which he asserted that "negotiations for resolving territorial conflicts between various countries take years" [*Jerusalem Post* 13 June 1990].[9])

Based on Shamir's responses, the Americans themselves became convinced that Shamir was purposefully intransigent and was only out to stymie their peace efforts (see Baker 1995, 493-496; Ross 2004, 68-72, 77-78, 82-85). Dennis Ross, a key negotiator for the US, specifically notes that the Americans considered the fall of the National Unity Government in March 1990 as a good thing: "There were no tears in Washington over its demise. Shamir's opposition to the dialogue confirmed what Bush and Baker believed—namely, that he had been stringing us along" (64; see also Quandt 2001, 299). (The Americans later felt the same way about the Likud defeat in the 1992 elections to Rabin [see Quandt 2001, 312-313].)

For his own part, Shamir was convinced that the American efforts would undermine both Israeli security and its claims to the WBG (see Arens 1995, Chapters 3-9; Bentsur 2001, Chapters 1-3). In fact, he came to believe that the Americans were purposefully undermining his and the government's efforts to resist these outcomes. He wrote: "I felt I could no longer fend off or deny the

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[9] Those who have worked with Shamir maintain that he did not say this in the way it was written up in the newspapers. Though these advisors have emphasized different aspects of the intention and meaning behind Shamir's words, they are unanimous in their agreement that the words were taken out of context—that Shamir was sincere about engaging in negotiations, though on his terms (Ben-Aharon 2005; Makov 2005; Pazner 2005). Dan Meridor, a close advisor to Shamir, believes that Shamir simply did not think anything would come out of the Madrid talks (Meridor 2005).

realization that what President Bush wanted—and what Secretary Baker was determined to secure for him—was no less than Israel's total withdrawal from Judea, Samaria [the West Bank] and the Gaza district and, if possible, the handing over of these territories to the Arabs" (1994, 105).

We can see from the preceding discussion that Shamir was an ideological individual, as classified in Chapter 3. His basic understanding of Zionism, his ideas about the WBG, and his feelings toward the PLO all pushed him, in various manifestations, to reject any possibility of a Palestinian state in the WBG and the PLO as a viable partner for negotiation. Both his words and his actions support this conclusion. In the context of this discussion, this meant that he formulated Israeli foreign policy according to his own ideological belief structures, which themselves were formulated through his affective understanding of the place of the WBG in Israeli identity and history. By 1993, however, he was no longer prime minister, and so could not translate his ideas into policy and block movement on these issues. Under the new prime minister, Yitzhak Rabin, Israel pursued a foreign policy that was a significant variation from its previous policy. The discussion now turns to Rabin, in order to complete the explanation based on individual decision makers.

The Independent Variable: Yitzhak Rabin

In contrast to Shamir, Yitzhak Rabin can be classified as adaptable. Although he held strong views on Oslo-related issues, he was not emotionally attached to any of them. To begin with, Rabin's Zionism was rooted in a completely different basis. Where Shamir was born outside of Palestine, Rabin

was a *sabra* (a Jew who is born in Israel). Where all Israeli leaders who have been born outside of Israel normally spend the first chapter or two on their Zionist upbringing, Rabin's memoirs (1994) skip this pattern: there was no reason for it, since living and growing up in Palestine was the most complete Zionist experience one could have. Instead of seeing the Land of Israel through pictures gleaned from the Bible or stories from family and friends, he experienced it firsthand. Rabin was engaged throughout his life in a realistic struggle to reclaim *Eretz Israel* for the Jews, through practical agricultural and military efforts. His parents instilled in him the socialist-Zionist values of manual labor as the beginning of individual and national redemption (Slater 1977, 14-15, 22-23, 35), he passed through a school system that emphasized the same values (including the Kadouri Agricultural school, which combined military activities with schooling), and he became involved with the *Palmach* (the left-wing paramilitary group that made up the elite strike force of the Jewish military organization, the *Haganah*).

Rabin's Zionism, then, was of a practical nature: though the Land of Israel mattered to him, he was less interested in its affective appeal and more concerned with how to better the lives of the Jews who lived in Israel. He saw the position of the Jews in Palestine and the problems they faced from many directions in trying to establish themselves in the Land of Israel. His focus became the security of the Jewish community and the eventual Jewish state. In the end, he gave up a civilian career (he wanted to be a hydraulic engineer) to remain in the military because he felt "the needs of the *Jewish people* led me on the path that had me spend much of my life dealing with the security of Israel" (Rabin 1994, II; emphasis added). The

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prominence of security is abundantly clear throughout Rabin's memoirs and his public statements: he notes several times that "security takes preference even over peace" (Rabin 1994, VIII). His presentation of the government in July 1992, for example, asserted his priorities in this way: "The central goals of the Government are: national security and personal security; peace; the prevention of war" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992b). Rabin and Shamir thus had radically different ultimate objectives: Shamir wanted to hold on to as much of *Eretz Israel* as possible, while Rabin wanted to ensure the security of the Jews as much as possible.

Rabin's Reaction to the *Intifada*

Like many other Israeli leaders, Rabin did not appreciate that the onset of rioting in December 1987 marked a new stage in Israeli-Palestinian relations (see Slater 1996, 401-415). Two days after the *intifada* began, he flew, as defense minister, to Washington and did not return until 21 December. Like other leaders, Rabin did not think that it was a local response to intolerable social, economic, and political conditions imposed by an increasingly ambivalent and neglectful Israeli occupation. On his return to Israel, Rabin told a press conference, before he received any briefing on what was happening, that he was sure Iran and Syria were behind the rioting (Schiff and Ya'ari 1990, 25).

However, even when he did come to realize what was different about this round of demonstrations, rioting, and violence, Rabin never viewed the uprising in life-or-death terms for Israel the way Shamir did. First, he simply did not see the Palestinians as a strategic threat to Israel; his focus was shifting instead to Iran

(Inbar 1999, 139-140). Second, in this context, he was keenly aware that military efforts would not resolve what was essentially a political issue, namely, the necessity of satisfying Palestinian nationalist needs in some form (see Slater 1996, 418-422). Despite the calls by many Likud leaders for a harsher military response to the uprising, Rabin engaged in a series of changes designed to mitigate both the impact of the suppression on Palestinian lives and the negative media attention the whole affair was bringing to Israel (see Schiff and Ya'ari 1990). He also became convinced that the Palestinians would have to be engaged as independent partners in dialogue, and he began to soften his opposition to PLO involvement somewhat, asserting in an interview with American media in spring 1988 that he was prepared to talk to PLO officials on the condition that they renounced the Palestine National Covenant, accepted United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and ended all acts of terror (Slater 1996, 419). According to Dan Pattir, a close advisor and friend, Rabin was aware that his contacts with West Bank Palestinians included behind-the-scenes guidance by the PLO, and he did not actively oppose "outside" Palestinians being in a peace delegation, even though he was well aware that this would leave open the back door for PLO influence (Pattir 2006).

Rabin's Response to Israel's Position in the Regional Balance of Power

Rabin did share with all Israeli leaders an inherent mistrust of the outside world when it came to relying on the Gentile world for support (Inbar 1999, 8-12), but he did not share the unmitigated suspicion of that world that Shamir had. At least part of this can be traced once again to the different circumstances of

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Rabin's and Shamir's births. While the Holocaust was a personal experience for Shamir, it was not for Rabin; for Shamir, then, the personal experience of the Holocaust did lead to, as psychologists have posited (see Chapter 3), intense emotional impact on future policies regarding related issues. Where the Holocaust shaped an image of the Jews from Europe as powerless in the face of their own destruction, Rabin had no such experience: his entire life, and that of his parents, was based on the notion "of the Jew empowered by his own efforts on his own behalf" (Friedgut 1995, 78).

At the same time, because he was not subject to an overall worldview that categorized an anti-Semitic Gentile world against the Jews/Israel, Rabin was able to perceive layers of threat (e.g., differences between Iran and the Palestinians) and accept the necessity of different policies tailored to specific dangers. The same international changes that had no impact on Shamir's view of the outside world—the end of the Cold War, the undisputed hegemony of the United States, the defeat of Iraq—convinced Rabin that Israel's strategic position was considerably improved (see Inbar 1999, 134-139; see Chapter 6 for a fuller discussion). He was confident that these changes heralded an Israel that had grown stronger and could engage in reasonable concessions to the Arabs in order to strengthen its security. In his address presenting his government to the Knesset in July 1992, he noted, in obvious contrast to Shamir's thinking, that

> [n]o longer are we necessarily 'a people that dwells alone,' and no longer is it true that 'the whole world is against us.' We must overcome the sense of isolation that has held us in its thrall for almost half a century. We must join the international movement toward peace, reconciliation and cooperation that is spreading over the entire globe these days....the winds of peace have lately been

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blowing from Moscow to Washington, from Berlin to Beijing (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992a).[10]

The Dependent Variable:
Rabin's Policy toward the PLO and a Palestinian State

The above discussion brings us to the conclusion that Rabin was an adaptable individual: his focus on security for Israel and for Israelis indicates flexibility; lack of emotional attachment to a particular issue in Israeli identity meant that he would not be prey to rigid ideological belief structures that constrained his policy options. We can apply this categorization now to the dependent variable, the issues contained in Oslo: direct talks with the PLO and the possibility of a Palestinian state.

Ideas Regarding a Palestinian State

Because his concern was security and not the Land itself, Rabin was able to conceive of several different avenues toward obtaining his goal. Because he was not emotionally tied to an abstract conception such as the "Land" or to the physical contours of the WBG, he could view the land as a strategic resource, and he could concede at least parts of the WBG to the Palestinians provided this did not undermine the security of Israelis or of the state. This is not to say that he advocated a Palestinian state in all of the WBG; indeed, even at the end of his life he was at least publicly ambivalent about how much land he was willing to give up. In fact, in his early political career Rabin was close to Shamir's position on an independent Palestinian state.

During his first tenure as prime minister (1974-1977) Rabin explicitly opposed an independent Palestinian state (Rabin 1994, 216, 230, 232), calling this

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[10] He added though that the dangers of war in the region remained.

an "extremist" position offered by the PLO (ibid., 260). He saw such an entity as a clear security threat to Israel, because it would be run by the PLO, which sought Israel's destruction, and would be used as the first stage in a process designed to achieve a single state between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. This would effectively mean the end of Israel as a Jewish state (ibid., 262). When asked directly, in a September 1974 interview with the now-defunct *Davar* newspaper, whether he objected to a Palestinian state, Rabin replied that it "would be the biggest mistake Israel could make" (though he qualified it by adding "at this time") (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974b). His presentation of the government's principles to the Knesset in June 1974 noted, as Shamir did later, that either the Palestinians already had a state in Jordan or that any Palestinian entity would be confederated with Jordan: "Israel rejects the establishment of a further separate Arab State west of the Jordan" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1974a). In this he much preferred the long-standing position advocated by Labor since 1967, the Jordanian option—that is, negotiating directly with Jordan on a political settlement of the WBG that entailed some form of shared control between the two states.

This opposition to an independent Palestinian state remained with him through his tenure as defense minister during the National Unity Governments of the 1980s, his capture of the Labor leadership, and in the early months of his second tenure as prime minister after June 1992. At the Labor Party convention in November 1991, Rabin categorically stated that Israel would not return to the pre-June 5 borders, and there would not be a Palestinian state (*Jerusalem Post* 21

November 1991, 1). During a televised debate with Shamir, on 16 June 1992, Rabin specifically said there would be no Palestinian state and no return to the 1967 borders (cited in Lochery 1997, 214). In the first months of his prime ministry in 1992 and 1993, he did not once advocate anything like the establishment of a Palestinian state.

We cannot of course know what Rabin would have done had he been prime minister at the time of American efforts to construct a negotiating dialogue between Israel and the Arabs, in the late 1980s and up to 1992.[11] But we can derive some conclusions from Rabin's stated positions. Underlying his stance was his advocacy of the long-standing Labor policy based on territorial compromise (see Chapter 3). He was willing to consider options that would lead to concessions on land, and for this reason he was not opposed to engaging the Palestinians in a serious political dialogue (even if it entailed indirect involvement of the PLO) (Avner 2006; Pattir 2006). In contrast to Shamir's and Likud's position that American efforts were threatening to Israel, Rabin and Labor believed they were reasonable and that Shamir and Likud were actively trying to prevent any progress at all on the peace front.

Attitude toward the PLO

Rabin's attitude toward the PLO in his early years in politics was, again, similar to Shamir's. He consistently repeated that the PLO was a terrorist organization that Israel could not negotiate with. In January 1976, he stated in an

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[11] Although he was not head of Labor at the time (he was not elected to this post until February 1992) Rabin remained one of the top two leaders in the party, holding second place after Shimon Peres. Because he also later became prime minister, and pursued the Oslo channel, Rabin's ideas during this period do matter.

interview that "'[w]e cannot sit down and negotiate with a terrorist organization whose fundamental political position is in direct opposition to the very existence of Israel'" (cited in Slater 1977, 238). According to Dan Pattir, a close colleague of Rabin during his first prime ministership, Rabin never trusted Yasser Arafat, which prevented him from considering any negotiations between Israel and the PLO (Pattir 2006). He believed that PLO leader Yasser Arafat was no more than a common murderer: "'I hate what he stands for, when I see the atrocities that he and his organization carry out. He represents to me all that is evil, and a concept, a philosophy which is contradictory to the very existence of this country'" (cited in Slater 1996, 281).

It is informative to look more closely at Rabin's position on talking to the PLO during the later 1980s and early 1990s, since this was a period of broad international acceptance of the PLO, the United States was pushing to leave the door open for some informal PLO influence in any negotiating framework with the Palestinians, and efforts to bring Palestinians and Israel together seemed to abound. But as with his ideas about a Palestinian state, Rabin's position on negotiating with the PLO remained similar throughout his political career and he resisted doing so as long as he could.

In May 1990, Rabin criticized those in the Labor party for spreading the impression that peace was impossible without a dialogue with the PLO (cited in Aronoff 1993, 224). At the Labor party conference on 19-21 November 1991, a debate was resolved when the party officially "abandoned its longstanding objection to negotiations with the Palestine Liberation Organization," but Rabin

did not support the resolution, maintaining that the PLO was a terrorist organization dedicated to Israel's destruction (ibid.). Shimon Peres notes that he twice (in August 1992 and in January 1993) raised the issue of direct talks with the PLO, but both times Rabin rejected the idea (Peres 1995, 280). On at least two other occasions in 1992 Rabin indicated his desire to avoid the same: in October Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), a senior PLO leader, suggested to Rabin, through the Egyptians, that secret talks begin between Israel and the PLO; and at the end of December 1992, in a Cabinet meeting, the issue was raised of including the PLO in the Madrid peace talks. Both times Rabin rejected the proposals (Aronoff 1995, 132). And in March, 1993, he deflected American pressure to negotiate with the PLO, even though he was fully aware of the Oslo channel at the time.[12]

However, Rabin still felt that it would be difficult if not impossible to shut the PLO out completely of the negotiating framework the United States was working hard to build, and so to stand against any agreement or final resolution on this ground was simply a formula for avoidance. He acted toward this end on several occasions, sometimes behind the National Unity Government's back. During the 1989 discussions on Palestinian elections, he argued that Palestinians from outside the territories should be allowed to participate in the delegation to

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[12] Despite these public positions, it is sometimes assumed that Rabin had fully intended to talk to PLO when he came to power in 1992. Aside from these public statements, there is good reason for supposing the opposite. First, Yossi Beilin points out that Rabin was in no rush to repeal the law prohibiting contact with the PLO, and in fact initially opposed doing so (Beilin 1999, 59). Second, Rabin always intended any agreement reached at Oslo to remain secret, with the document either signed by Rabin and a representative of the WBG Palestinians (the usual nominee was Faisal Husseini (see ibid., 57 and Part 2, *passim*) or brought to the official delegations in Washington. Third, even before Oslo, in March 1990 when the National Unity Government was on the verge of breaking up, Rabin opposed those Laborites who wanted to leave the government because of Likud's peace policies, which included continued exclusion of the PLO. And fourth, when the subject of recognition of the PLO came up in the context of the Oslo process, Rabin resisted doing so; he tried to negotiate the agreement without official recognition, and only agreed when it became obvious that the DOP could not be signed until Israel recognized the PLO.

meet with Israel to discuss elections. Egypt sent an advance summary of a blueprint for negotiation to Rabin through the Americans two weeks before it was officially submitted to the Israeli government. The plan entailed indirect PLO involvement, as it allowed the PLO to authorize the Palestinian delegation that was to dialogue with Israel (Bentsur 2001, 24). It was sent to Rabin because he was publicly known to accept that indirect PLO participation was unavoidable.

Although Rabin's position on direct talks with the PLO and an independent Palestinian state were similar to Shamir's, the pragmatism that marked his policymaking—free from the intense emotional attachments that guided Shamir's policymaking—allowed him to react very differently to the three key external developments of the time, the *intifada*, the changing regional power structures, and American peace efforts. Simply put, Rabin was much more flexible about the final outcomes of all three developments, he did not consider that Israel was explicitly threatened by any of them, and he responded in a manner that raised questions about how committed he actually was to the positions outlined above.

Rabin's Learning Process

Although he originally opposed both direct talks with the PLO and an independent Palestinian state, by 1993 Rabin had come to accept the necessity of the former and the strong possibility of the latter; his responses to the developments listed above indicate his path toward this recognition. These realizations culminated in his pursuit of the Oslo channel and the signing of the mutual recognition letters with the PLO and then the DOP. How can we explain

Rabin's shift from opposition to endorsement of these positions? It is by tracing the learning process Rabin went through. A series of developments occurred that convinced Rabin that his opposition to the PLO and a Palestinian state were not helping—and may have been undermining—Israel's security. These developments—the *intifada*, the failure of the Washington talks, and the early successes at Oslo—proved to Rabin that the PLO was a necessary partner in dialogue and that a Palestinian state, provided it was created with enough safeguards for Israel, would not threaten the Jewish state.

A learning process leading to a change in policy is possible only in an adaptable individual, not an ideological leader. While Shamir can be classified as the latter, Rabin falls into the former category. A common thread running through various observers' comments about Rabin is his pragmatism, his flexibility: Uri Savir, the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry, consistently describes Rabin as a pragmatist throughout his memoir of the peace process between 1993 and 1996 (Savir 1998). Eitan Haber, Rabin's closest aide and an opponent of the timeframe for resolution established through Oslo, emphasizes that Israeli security was the overriding concern for Rabin, which in the end allowed him to consider the Oslo option (Haber 2005). In her analysis of Rabin's personality, Yehudit Auerbach notes that his "realism bordering on pessimism" was a hallmark of his behavior: "His belief in the duty and ability of a statesman to exploit every opportunity to promote the affairs of his country and not sit idly by has guided him through every political post" (1995, 301); she continues that "[h]e is not locked into positions which do not stand the test of reality but is willing to

reexamine them, declare them invalid, and adopt new positions" (1995, 307). In other words, Rabin was willing to try even radical solutions that went against decades of government policy, and his own preferences, if he thought it would ensure security for the country.

While Shamir was incapable of viewing the *intifada* as anything but a challenge to Israel's right to exist, Rabin came to see it as proof that a political solution of some kind that would satisfy the Palestinians—and not just the Israelis—was necessary. Two developments flowed from the uprising that contributed to this learning process. First, although the PLO was caught as much by surprise by the rioting as Israel was, it soon came to exert some control over the demonstrations. During his (initially secret) meetings with WBG Palestinians beginning in May 1988 Rabin was repeatedly told that local leaders could not engage in any political negotiations with following PLO directives (Haber 2005). The refusal of WBG Palestinians to sign on to any kind of agreement without PLO involvement indicated that PLO influence was likely too entrenched to ignore. Indeed, as early as the mid-1980s, when Labor (and Rabin) was part of a National Unity Government with Shamir and Likud, Rabin entertained the possibility that the PLO would have to be part of any dialogue: Shlomo Gazit, the head of Military Intelligence during Rabin's first tenure, headed a small delegation that met with PLO officials; Rabin was fully informed of the meeting and the purposes behind it, and did not oppose it (Gazit 2006).

Second, the uprising caused King Hussein of Jordan to renounce, on 31 July 1988, the monarchy's long-held claim to the West Bank, and turn

responsibility over to the PLO. This removed the Jordanian option as a viable policy for Labor and reinforced for Rabin that even a "local" option (i.e., WBG Palestinians) might not be practicable. Rabin came to realize during the course of the uprising that it was going to have serious political implications, and he became more willing to consider policies that would meet at least some of the Palestinians' political demands (Heller 2000, 29; Horovitz 1996, 111-112; Inbar 1999, 105).[13]

The advent of the Madrid process and subsequent failures at the Washington talks underlined for Rabin the ever-present influence of the PLO, and the feeling that nothing would ever get done without its involvement. All the Israeli leaders, including Shamir, were well aware that PLO officials in Tunis were guiding the Palestinian position, and that Palestinian negotiators were reporting back to the PLO and asking for directions (Bentsur 2001, 158; Peres 1993, 4-5; Shamir 1994, 228-229, 241). As Haber succinctly put it, "[Rabin] heard during the Madrid convention [that the Palestinian delegation] called Tunisia to get orders every two minutes. So he said if they are doing it, why do we have to negotiate with them, let's negotiate with the PLO" (Haber 2005). Rabin himself admitted that "[d]uring the course of the negotiations with the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in Washington, it became truthfully clear over

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[13] It is also possible that Rabin's role in the suppression of the uprising played a crucial function in changing his understanding of how to resolve the issue. Rabin is generally considered the person who was most in charge of the response to the *intifada*, in his capacity and Minister of Defense and head of the Territories Forum, which included the relevant agencies and decided policy toward the WBG. None of those involved in the Forum "had the least doubt that the man who was making the decisions and directing this war ... was Rabin himself" (Schiff and Ya'ari 1990, 138-139). Thus, the decisions on how to respond and the fallout from them could be laid directly on him.

time that the one and only address for decisions was PLO headquarters in Tunis" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b).

This disillusionment with the Washington talks finally prompted Rabin to think seriously that the PLO would have to be engaged more directly. Rabin had pledged, during a Labor Central Committee meeting on 1 March 1992, to reach an agreement on autonomy with the Palestinians within six to nine months of taking office. It was only after prominent West Bank Palestinian leader Faisal Husseini joined the official Washington talks, and they still went nowhere, that he began to worry his pledge could not be met through official channels. It was not desire but necessity that drove Rabin to engage directly with the PLO—a necessity that Shamir never perceived. As he stated in his explanation to the Knesset for signing the DOP, on 21 September 1993,

> This [the PLO] is an organization of terror and destruction that has known no mercy; an organization that dispatched the murderers of children against us—in Avivim, in Ma'alot; those who shot guests at the Savoy Hotel in Tel Aviv, those who attacked innocent (...) bus [passengers] on the coastal road; [those responsible] for hundreds of terrorist, murder and injurious activities.
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> ...
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> But, we have chosen another way, that which gives a chance, which gives hope. We have decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people for negotiations, within the framework of the peace talks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993b).

In a later interview with IDF Radio in October 1993, at a time of growing concern over the activities of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (two fundamentalist terrorist groups opposed to both the Oslo Accords and the PLO's decision to sign it), when asked if he expected the PLO to at least condemn terrorist attacks on

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Israelis, Rabin replied that "at this phase, I do not expect them to demonstrate such heroism. We know with whom we are dealing." But he also noted that the difference between the PLO and Hamas is that the former was, with the DOP, no longer opposed to Israel's existence (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993a).

Nowhere was the clash between necessity and preference illustrated better than Rabin's personal struggle to deal directly with Yasser Arafat, leader of the PLO. His aversion was made public in September 1993, when he hesitated before shaking Arafat's hand after the signing ceremony at the White House, and refrained from showing any joy in the contact (in contrast to Arafat, who energetically pumped Rabin's hand).[14] Savir said: "Rabin, the pragmatist, saw the agreement as a national imperative and regarded the Palestinians as partners in peace but still felt toward them, and especially toward their leader, revulsion that he had great difficulty concealing" (1998, 78). Rabin himself wrote of the handshake that: "I knew that the hand outstretched to me ... was the same hand that held the knife, that held the gun, the hand that gave the order to shoot, to kill. Of all the hands in the world, it was not the hand that I wanted or dreamed of touching" (Rabin 1994, II-III).

Rabin also came to realize that no Israeli offer could ever be acceptable to the Palestinians if they always included the stipulation that all of the WBG would remain under Israeli sovereignty. This belief was reflected in the Basic Guidelines for the government Rabin set out in 1992: Point 2.5 stated that "[t]he Government

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[14] Further evidence of Rabin's profound psychological barrier was his refusal to conduct an interview Barbara Walters had requested: she wanted to meet with him and Arafat at the same time, similar to the interview she had conducted with Sadat and Begin in 1977. But Rabin simply could not bring himself to sit down with the PLO leader. See Horovitz (1996, 147).

will advance the peace process in the region with representatives of Arab states and the Palestinians, without any preconditions" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1992a). While this should not be taken as implicit support for an independent Palestinian state, the fact that this outcome was not rejected outright indicates at a minimum a willingness to have the subject brought up in discussions. The Guidelines went on to assert in Point 2.8 that "[i]n the negotiations with the Palestinians, the Government will propose—as an interim arrangement—a program for the implementation of self-administration for the Palestinians in Judea, Samaria and Gaza" (ibid.). The emphasis on an interim solution again implies that the final status might well be something very different.

The final development that convinced Rabin that the PLO was the only real partner for dialogue and that a Palestinian state would have to be considered a viable outcome was the process of Oslo itself. The inclusion of Joel Singer, an international lawyer who had worked with Rabin in the Defense Ministry, into the negotiations was critical in this respect: he was seen as the representative of Rabin, and it was his advice that Oslo was a serious channel that convinced Rabin to continue with and invest more time and energy in it.[15] Moreover, Singer's argument that the DOP could not be signed without first mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO essentially enabled Rabin to take this final step, formal acknowledgment of an organization he had always referred to as murderous and terrorist. At the same time, the provisions laid out in the drafts and final agreement that came out of Oslo convinced Rabin that a Palestinian state,

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[15] Singer points out that once Rabin decided to go with Oslo, he essentially took firm control of the process: "every comma, every word" in the draft agreements was scrutinized by Rabin (Singer 2005).

provided it was established with due care for Israel's needs, would not be as much of a threat after all.[16]

The idea that a Palestinian state—however small or bounded—would be the outcome of Oslo was a greater turn-around in Israeli policy than even recognition of the PLO. The establishment of a Palestinian state went against the firm policy of every government since the WBG was captured in 1967. Only a leader not emotionally committed to the Land of Israel could engage in such a process. Rabin was pragmatic enough to consider the possibility and willing to let it happen. Although he never spoke about the actual creation of a Palestinian state, either publicly or privately, all the evidence indicates that he was well aware that this would be the outcome of Oslo. Oslo negotiators Yair Hirschfeld, Ron Pundak, Uri Savir, and Joel Singer have all said everyone involved in the Oslo channel was well aware that the ultimate outcome, beyond Oslo as an interim agreement, would have to be an independent Palestinian state (Hirschfeld 2005; Pundak 2005; Savir 2006; Singer 2005).[17] Eitan Haber adds that despite the fact that he refused to use the words "Palestinian state," Rabin knew this would be the final outcome (Haber 2005). Joel Singer says that during the preparation for one of Rabin's speeches to the Knesset, when one speechwriter proposed to Rabin that he include the sentence "there will never be a Palestinian state," Rabin refused; he

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[16] This was also likely due to Rabin's belief that not all of the WBG would become a Palestinian state, for security reasons. In an address to the country on 23 January 1995, he reiterated that peace "must lead to separation, though not according to the borders prior to 1967: Jerusalem will remain united forever. The security border of the State of Israel will be situated on the Jordan River" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995b). And in presenting to the Knesset, in October 1995, a third agreement worked out with the Palestinians, he specified that "[t]he borders of the State of Israel, during the permanent solution, will be beyond the lines which existed before the Six Day War. We will not return to the 4 June 1967 lines" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995a).
[17] Though Hirschfeld is much more skeptical that Rabin was certain they were moving in this direction.

would not say there *would* be a Palestinian state, but he would also not say there *would not* be one (Singer 2005).

The specifics entailed in Oslo add further evidence. Peres states that he and Rabin agreed that Article 1 of the Oslo Accords could include the proviso that negotiations on the final settlement would lead to implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (Peres 1995, 290), which called for Israel withdrawal from some of the territories occupied in the 1967 war. The extensive provisions for self-government and physical jurisdictions provided for in the DOP (and in the later agreements signed by the Rabin government) set Israeli-Palestinian negotiations on a path that could not lead anywhere else but a Palestinian state (Heller 2000, 25). Moreover, the PLO saw itself as the vehicle for Palestinian self-government, in both legal and practical terms: Article 26 of its Charter explicitly states that as the primary representative of the nationalist struggle, the PLO is responsible for the Palestinian people's self-determination in Palestine. Other articles reiterate the theme of Palestinian self-government,[18] and given that the PLO saw itself (and was recognized by many others, including Rabin at the end of the Oslo process) as the legitimate representation of this, Rabin could not have avoided the inference that the PLO would be satisfied with anything less.

Yehuda Avner, a close advisor to Rabin during his first term as prime minister and a long-time friend, reports that he had the feeling that Rabin's "heart was never really in it" [the Oslo process] because of how he felt about the PLO

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[18] The Palestinian National Charter, available at: http://www.pna.gov.ps/ Government/gov/plo_Charter.asp.

(Avner 2006). But the fact that Rabin did go through with the Oslo process, even in the face of growing public discontent with it, highlights his classification as adaptable. He continued to stick by a foreign policy because he believed it would in the end be better for Israel, even though he personally could never reconcile himself to it. An ideological leader with emotional attachments could never contemplate such a policy shift. In addition, the fact that Rabin went with such a controversial and dramatic policy shift without consulting any of even his closest aides indicates that the prevailing definition of pragmatism (see Chapter 4) is misleading.

In sum, Rabin had come to learn two things: First, that the PLO was the only partner Israel had for negotiation if it wanted to come to some sort of interim or final settlement of the conflict. Neither Jordan nor the WBG Palestinians had the authority or legitimacy to negotiate with Israel, and although the thought of talking to an organization he considered terrorist was loathsome to Rabin, he did it nonetheless because he believed it was necessary to come to a solution. Second, Rabin came to accept that a Palestinian state in at least part of the WBG was necessary, in order to entice the Palestinians into negotiation. The Palestinians (and their representative, the PLO) simply did not want anything less, and Rabin saw that continuing to reject this stalemated all attempts at negotiation. Moreover, because he did not see such an entity as a threat to Israel and, perhaps more importantly, because he was not wedded to the idea of retaining *Eretz Israel* for the Jews, he could consider the establishment of a Palestinian state on land even he believed had been the Jews' by both God and history.

Summary

The analysis above illustrates that it was the crucial difference between Yitzhak Shamir and Yitzhak Rabin that explains the variation in Israeli foreign policy represented by Oslo. The idea of Oslo (direct negotiation with the PLO and a basis for an independent Palestinian state) was presented to Rabin at a time when he was struggling to find a way to meet his promises to achieve an agreement with the Palestinians. It also came at a time when Rabin had come to the conclusion that working through non-PLO Palestinians or other Arab states was simply not a viable option anymore. As such, it provided a specific strategic model for Rabin. This is not to say that Rabin had a change of heart, or that he came to believe that Arafat and the PLO were genuinely sincere in their commitments to give up the option of violence. But sincerity is not a condition for a learning process. What matters is that Rabin saw that embracing these positions was necessary for the security of Israel.

The fact that he went with Oslo, despite the risks to both his personal credibility and political position (see Auerbach and Greenbaum 2000, 38, 40), indicates the importance he attached to any such efforts. Yitzhak Shamir, even had the Oslo option been presented to him, would have rejected it outright. If he refused to bow to American pressure to open the back door for PLO involvement in negotiations, he could not have countenanced direct talks with that organization. Moreover his ideological nature and his emotional attachment to *Eretz Israel* would never have allowed him to contemplate the type of agreement

that Oslo was meant for—that is, laying the groundwork for a Palestinian state on these very lands.

Given the highly centralized nature of Israeli decision-making institutions, both Shamir and Rabin, as prime minister, were able to block or enable policies reflecting their ideas on these issues. Shamir was able to block Labor and American efforts at peace, while Rabin was able to give the Oslo channel the necessary authority it needed and, indeed, translate it into official government policy. As Beilin himself notes, without Rabin "the Oslo concept would have become just another instance of missed opportunity, and since there have been so many of these in the Middle East, this one might not even have merited a footnote" (Beilin 1999, 137).

Chapter Six

The Institutional and Ideational Setting

in Turkey

Introduction

This chapter introduces the second case study, the shift in foreign policy under Turkey's second Islamist prime minister toward joining the European Union (EU). As in Chapter 4, it is necessary to trace the historical development of Turkey's institutional and ideational structures, in order to measure the centralization of its decision-making institutions and determine the prevailing national ideas about EU membership.

To this end, the chapter is set out in the following manner. The first section discusses the institutional setting in Turkey, detailing the events that led to the rise of a de-centralized polity, where the primary decision maker has been constrained from real autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. This stems from the actions of the early Kemalists upon the creation of modern Turkey (1923) and then the repeated military interventions in politics. This section goes on to discuss the role of the Constitution and the military as the institutional constraints on decision-making. The next part focuses on the ideational structures of Turkey, divided into two opposing elements: Westernism and Islamism. Both will be considered in some detail, and what they mean in foreign policy terms.

Understanding this dichotomy will help us understand why the Islamist shift to advocacy for membership in the European Union is such a puzzle.

Institutional Setting

Contemporary Turkish decision-making is not centralized. Although the Turkish Constitution intended the prime minister to be the primary decision maker in a parliamentary system (Article 112[1]), in practice the prime minister has, especially since 1960, been subject to the influence, control, and direct intervention of a number of other state actors, including the military, the president, the judiciary, and the civil service.

This resulted from the historical development of Turkey's political institutions dating back to the practice of the Ottoman Empire, in which a strong state autonomous from society and political elites was deemed necessary for the extraction of resources and the ability to wage war (see Heper 1985). The expansion of the Empire also necessitated an expanding bureaucracy capable of dealing with the myriad administrative issues inherent in any large political entity.[2] This trend continued into the republican period (beginning with the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923), as the country's leaders sought to stabilize the polity and strengthen it internally (vis-à-vis those opposed to the laicist nature of the polity and its economic, political, and social institutions) and externally (vis-à-vis its enemies and allies in the international system).

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[1] All references to the Constitution are from the Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information (http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm).
[2] For a good history of the Ottoman Empire, see İnalcık (1973); also Lewis (2002, 107-123).

Efforts to surround the primary decision maker with a series of constraints preventing him from using his decision-making authority autonomously in the modern period grew out of two developments. First, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in his zeal to strengthen and modernize Turkey from the early 1920s to the late 1930s, created state institutions that were insulated from public or political pressure. This was necessary, he believed, because a strong state was required to correct the backwardness in which Turkey was mired, and because the people were not yet ready to act responsibly enough to govern themselves (Kinross 1964, 392). Second, the three military coups (1960, 1971, 1980) in which the army overthrew the government subsequently led to increasingly tight restrictions on the civilian authorities, hemming them in through a series of legal and political structures that gave the military tremendous powers of oversight.

This de-centralization of power is reflected in two key institutions: the Constitution and the armed forces. Both institutions developed into powerful mechanisms for control over the parliamentary process, including the capacity for the prime minister to make decisions autonomously. This concentration has meant that new policy ideas matter much less than old ideas (i.e., ideas held by the constraining actors). This inhibits the role of individuals in determining foreign policy that are at variance with the general policy parameters preferred by the constraining actors. An analysis of the restrictive nature of the Constitution and the military follows.

The Constitution

An examination of Turkey's Constitution is relevant because it provides the legal and institutional basis for the de-centralization of Turkish decision-making, and facilitates the intervention of other state actors—primarily the military—into the decision-making process. Almost a contradiction, the Constitution identifies the prime minister as the key decision maker but also curtails his power by ascribing a powerful role to other state actors to make decisions and even change the prime minister's own policies.

Turkey has had three Constitutions, each building on the last. The first, in 1924, essentially was used to enshrine and provide legitimacy to the political and social reforms passed throughout the 1920s and 1930s. It remained in force until 1961, when the military government that had taken power in the 1960 coup convened a Constituent Assembly to draw up a new Constitution to replace the 1924 document.

The 1961 Constitution was a contradiction in terms. On the one hand, it was the most liberal Constitution in Turkey's history, creating space for civil societal organizations and autonomy from the state. On the other hand, it established a series of checks and balances against the government, out of the fear of repression that the *Demokrat Parti* had engaged in during the second half of the 1950s.[3] These included: dividing the parliament into a lower House of Representatives and a higher Senate (150 members were elected, fifteen were nominated by the president, and the rest were Life Members from the military

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[3] These checks and balances are also sometimes considered to be part of the liberal nature of the state, since they are presumed to inhibit any autocratic tendencies among governments.

government); establishing the Constitutional Court to ensure laws conformed to that document; allowing for greater autonomy for universities and the press; and, most importantly for our purposes, it created the National Security Council, an advisory body dominated by the military (see below). It also made the Chief of Staff directly responsible to the prime minister, rather than the defense minister as he had been previously, and put in place an electoral system based on proportional representation.

Although the military after the 1971 coup did not write up a new Constitution, it did pressure the government to pass a number of constitutional amendments and laws that restricted civil freedoms and the institutional autonomy of non-state actors (see Hale 1994, 198-199), including the establishment of State Security Courts, which tried crimes against the Turkish state as defined by the Constitution.[4] The violence and instability of the 1960s, it was feared, was the direct result of the liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution. The changes enhanced the capacity of the government to deal with threats to national security and public order, and increased the autonomy of the military to do the same (Harris 1988, 188). However, because these were only piecemeal changes and there was no overhaul of the system, the same conditions continued into the 1970s, leading to a coup in 1980 and military government from 1980-1983. More importantly, though, was the beginning of the re-definition of national security threats to internal elements.

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[4] One of its three judges came from the military. These courts "died" when the government failed to renew them in 1976, but were later written into the 1982 Constitution. They were abolished in 2004.

The 1982 Constitution was designed specifically to remove the liberal freedoms from 1961 in a comprehensive and definitive manner, by furthering the tradition of the strong state and setting powerful limits on what the civilian governments could do. Given the complete breakdown in public law and order and the inability of the politicians to resolve their personal differences and deal with the ongoing crisis, there was simply no choice but to intervene: the army believed it was trying to "save Turkish democracy from itself" (Harris 1988, 193; see also Hale 1994, 231-238).

The 1982 Constitution strengthened the capacity of both the government to act to protect it and, failing that, the state itself (mostly through the military and the judiciary[5]). The limits of the Constitution and the Turkish polity are set by surrounding them with the Kemalist legacy, making Atatürk's reforms the framework for Turkish society and politics and anything outside of it a threat. The Preamble states specifically that the Constitution is founded on Atatürk's principles and reforms, that no activity can be allowed to disrupt these, and that there will be no "interference" of religion in "state affairs and politics."[6] In addition, Article 1 proclaims the state as a Republic, and Article 2 explicitly defines the state as "secular." According to Article 4, neither of these articles can be amended, "nor shall their amendment be proposed." Thus, all the institutions created by the Constitution and any subsequent laws must be based on the Kemalist ideational structure.

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[5] One observer remarked that the 1982 Constitution was so effective at entrenching the military's power that "it made crude military intervention into politics redundant" (Sakallioğlu 1997, 153-154).

[6] Although a series of amendments took place in 2001, the elements discussed here were not changed.

In addition to enshrining these principles, the Constitution also protects them by specifying where they might be undermined—designating these as threats that can be responded to accordingly by the state. Article 5, which succinctly captures the essence of the Kemalist revolution and the legacy that the military considers itself upholding, specifies that "The fundamental aims and duties of the state are; to safeguard the independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic and democracy," while Article 14 stipulates that "None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights." Article 81, the oath sworn by members of the Grand National Assembly (GNA, Turkey's parliament) taking up their duties, includes the provision: "I swear upon my honour and integrity, before the great Turkish Nation ... to remain loyal to the supremacy of law, to the democratic and secular Republic, and to Atatürk's principles and reforms."

The Constitution also provides specific roles for specific state actors, to protect these (Kemalist) principles. In addition to the military, as discussed below, the president and the judiciary have critical functions in this regard. The judiciary, in the form of the Constitutional Court, has final say on whether or not a political party, a policy, or any legislation is contrary to the principles enshrined in the Constitution (Article 148). It can, therefore, annul these changes. The president, despite being designated as the head of state, also has wide latitude of

enforcement. Article 104 entrusts the president with the duty to "ensure the implementation of the Constitution," and with the ability to "to return laws to the Turkish Grand National Assembly to be reconsidered." The president can also appeal to the Constitutional Court if he thinks specific laws are contrary to the Constitution. And he has the duty to appoint some of the country's highest civil servants, including to the judiciary, education, and the Chief of Staff, and he chairs the National Security Council (Article 118).

The Military

Of all the state institutions, it is the military that is the strongest, and the institution with the greatest sense of self-identity and mission. As an institution, the military[7] has exerted a constraining role on the prime minister since the 1960 coup, curtailing the autonomy of the individual meant to be Turkey's primary decision maker. Understanding the development of the military and its self-perceived role within Turkey will help us better understand the de-centralized nature of the Turkish polity.

The growth of the TSK's institutional controls and contemporary role has been historically conditioned by four main elements, all of which have instilled within the military a sense of near-complete identification with the state (see also Hale 1994). These include: the warrior tradition of the Turks; the army's premier role in instigating and benefiting from reforms during the Ottoman period; the strict guidelines set out by Atatürk himself on the role of the military; and the military as the embodiment of the Turkish people's most important values.

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[7] Most commentators use the terms "military," "army," and "armed forces" (also known as the *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*—TSK, Turkish Armed Forces) interchangeably. I will follow this custom.

First, the martial tradition of the Turkic peoples from Central Asia and more importantly the Ottoman Empire provided the army with a sense of strength, tradition, and a mission of protecting the Turkish state (Karpat 2004, 235). As the oldest surviving institution in Turkey, the army was the primary vehicle of expansion, integration, consolidation, and the bedrock of internal support.[8] Until its decline, the Ottoman army was one of the most powerful and feared forces of its time. Internally, the Janissaries that formed the core of the army could also depose the Sultan when he was considered to be harming the Empire. These developments meant that the army prospered and declined in tandem with the state, thus fusing its identity with that of the state. The role of the military in defeating the Greek invasion (widely considered to have galvanized the nationalist resistance [see Hale 1994, 60; Lewis 2002, 242]) continued this tradition. It was critical also in that as the leading element in the resistance against both the Greeks and the Allied attempts to divide and weaken Turkey, the War of Independence fostered the notion that the army embodied the nation's values (independence, nationalism) and was its highest protector.

Second, the military's role in reforming and protecting the state from both internal and external enemies stems from its complete identification with the reforms of the Ottoman era. Although education and administration were marked as necessary, the military was identified as the most important institution needing reform, since without the necessary protection, "any other kind of political

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[8] It also acted as the instrument of the state in other areas, such as by collecting taxes and administering the provinces (Karakartal 1985, 47).

reconstruction seemed pointless" (Hale 1994, 13).[9] It was in the vanguard of modernization in two ways: One, as an institution it underwent restructuring and change to strengthen it. Two, it promoted reform in general. The army, for example, established the first secular schools in the Empire, considered to be well run for the most part. Because reforms were based on Western—European— models, modernization came to be associated with Westernization, and the military became the primary vehicle of this effort.

Third, the military followed the guidelines established by Atatürk: that it had no place in politics, *unless* the Turkish state itself *or* its guiding principles, as laid down by Atatürk himself, were under dire threat. Atatürk said that "'[t]he Turkish nation ... considers its army the guardian of its ideals,'" and that "'[o]ur Republic respects only the will of the people and the guidance of the military'" (cited in Maniruzzaman 1987, 71). As early as 1919 he called the army the "willing servant of the national will" (Atatürk 1963, 37), and put it on equal status with the civil administration in safeguarding "the independence of the State and the Nation" (ibid.). This principle is reflected in Article 35 of the Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law (1960), which specifically notes that the military is the guardian of the republic: it is the army's duty is to "'safeguard and defend Turkish territory and the Republic of Turkey as designated by the constitution'" (cited in Yavuz 2003, 245).[10]

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[9] See Hale (1994, Chapter 2) for a fuller discussion of these reforms.

[10] This is also reflected in the army's efforts to ensure that Islamists do not enter its own officer ranks. Its Supreme Military Council has expelled hundreds of officers suspected of Islamist sympathies or activities; some banned officers have even reported that they were required to show family photographs when being recruited, to determine if the parents had overt signs of piety (beards, headscarves), which was considered an indication of Islamist empathy (Jenkins 2001, 23).

Fourth, the military was and is identified as the embodiment of the highest virtues and values of the Turkish nation. The Janissaries supplied many of the government ministers and civil servants during the Ottoman era, and most of the leaders of the post-World War One national movement were from the military. Beyond the instrumental role of the army, it has been argued that based on its collectivist culture and patriarchal and hierarchical tendencies, Turkish society respects an institution that promotes loyalty to the group (the military, the state). It thus sees the military as embodying the very notion of "Turkishness" (Jenkins 2001, 12-14).[11] In December 1996 a survey found that 81.3% of the public trusted the military; the figure was 78.8% in January 1997, and 78.9% in June 1999. Even after a devastating earthquake struck in August 1999, and public resentment at the slow and inept response of the state was high, 65.1% still trusted the armed forces, compared to 15% for politicians (see Jenkins 2001, 16). An August 2003 poll found that 88% Turks considered the military the most trustworthy institution in the country (Mango 2004, 134).

In sum, the military has come to be seen by the vast majority of Turks as the most important actor in Turkish politics, even above the prime minister. This has been reflected the levels of support for or lack of concern at the various military interventions, which the public has typically seen as necessary and acceptable.

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[11] The military sees itself in these terms, as well. See Jenkins (2001, Chapter 2) for a full discussion.

The National Security Council

The military's institutional autonomy and capacity for restriction and control is set out primarily by the Constitution, which in addition to setting out the framework of principles the army must protect, provides an institutional structure and policy tool in the form of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*—MGK).[12] This provides the army with the capacity for ongoing participation in decision-making, particularly by setting policy limits beyond which civilian politicians cannot go.[13]

The MGK was created by the 1961 Constitution to assist the government in decision-making related to national security. Article 111 gave it advisory status only. An amendment in spring 1962 strengthened it, by giving it the ability to set the government agenda in this arena through participation in cabinet discussions (see Özbudun 2000, 107-108). Its main purpose was to provide a legal and constitutional vehicle for the military to pass its ideas and preferences on to the civilian government; the capacity for influence was reflected in the nature of its decisions, which were required by law to be taken into account by the government.

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[12] There were/are other institutional privileges, but the MGK is the main instrument used by the military to restrict civilian leaders. For example, the State Supervisory Council (Article 108 of the Constitution) is given the role of supervising other state agencies in accordance with the Constitution's principles; but the army is excluded from its purview. The Defense Ministry has no control over the military as an institution: its job, advised by the army itself, is weapons procurement, conscription, and relations with other ministries; in protocol, the Chief of Staff ranks above the Defense Minister, second only to the Prime Minister (Jenkins, 2001: 22). The military also has an internal research department to monitor the political orientations of public institutions and leaders (see Cizre 2003, 218-219).

[13] On the military's role in various foreign policies, see Jenkins (2001, 72-82) and Robins (2003, 75-79).

The 1961 Constitution also set the participants on the council: they included the Chief of Staff and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force. (The head of the Gendarmerie was later added; these five members have not changed since.) Civilians included the prime minister and other ministers as determined by law, some of who were left to the prime minister's discretion (which gave the civilians potentially greater numerical weight than the military members). The council is chaired by the president.

After the 1971 coup, the military pressured the government into passing a set of laws designed to strengthen the capacity of the state for restriction. One of the legal changes made the MGK's decisions "recommendations," as opposed to the "presentations" they had been before (Harris 1988, 188), thus giving its decisions added weight. Its role to "assist" the government was also changed, with "assist" being removed (Özbudun 2000, 108).

The MGK's authority, and the authority of the military within it, was increased substantially in the 1982 Constitution. First, the civilian members were set as the prime minister and ministers of defense, internal affairs, and foreign affairs. The military members were specified as the Chief of Staff and the service commanders, with the Deputy Chief of Staff serving as the secretary. Second, the weight of its decisions increased: the government was now required to give "priority consideration" to its decisions. This severely constrained the government from acting on its own in national security affairs, without military input and direction.

The MGK's authority vis-à-vis the underlying principles of the Turkish state were specified in the 1983 Law on the National Security Council: Article 2 defined national security as the constitutional order of the state (that is, the principles outlined in the Preamble and Articles 1-4 in the Constitution) and the integrity of the state (in territorial and ideological terms) (Özbudun 2000, 108). This meant that the army was specifically identified as the guardian of the Kemalist ideational structures of the state, but it also meant the military has great leeway in defining what matters fall within its national security ambit and responding to that threat in a manner it deems appropriate. The key to the army's official power is thus this broad definition of national security (see Cizre 2003). The military's website illustrates this expansive understanding of national security. It notes that, in addition to combat, the armed forces' mission includes "operations other than war" and "crisis management" which includes "internal and external risks" (Turkish General Staff website, *Mission*), while its defense policy lists "religious extremism" as one of its basic security concerns (Turkish General Staff website, *Turkey's Defense Policy*).

Finally, the MGK is responsible for collecting information and putting together the National Security Policy Document, which sets out the main threats to national security and how to respond to them. It is a classified document.

Amendments passed in October 2001 reduced some of the MGK's legal capacity. Article 118 on the National Security Council has increased the number of civilians vis-à-vis the military. More importantly, the government is no longer required to give priority to the MGK's decisions; instead, it is only to "evaluate"

them, and may or may not act on them. Although institutionally this may seem like a major change, the army's authority and influence remains strong in national security affairs—as Philip Robins put it, although the MGK's position has been legally reduced, "in practice it is virtually unheard of for cabinets and parliaments to publicly question its views" (Robins, 2003: 76).

Drawing on its institutional authority, and despite its general reluctance, the army has intervened four times in politics—twice directly taking over the government (1960-1961 and 1980-1983), and twice ousting the government in favor of another civilian administration through indirect means (1971 and 1997).[14] Aside from the 1997 coup (see Chapter 7) these interventions will not be discussed, as they are not part of the case study.[15] But these four incidents do provide excellent examples of the constraining nature of the army, its persistent influence in policymaking, and the justifications and motivations for its involvement.

In sum, despite the removal of some of its constitutional and legal privileges, the military remains the key actor constraining prime ministers and the government from complete independence, at least in the realm of national security, while at the same time its informal influence remains relatively undiminished. In Jenkins' words, "[t]he result is a system in which civilian authority is primary, rather than supreme, and where the military is able to

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[14] Prior to 1960, the military did not play an active role in politics. To the extent that it was involved, it was primarily as members of cabinet and parliament, and provincial governors, especially in the early days of the republic (Karpat 2004, 239).

[15] On the 1960 coup, see Ahmad (1977, Chapters 2, 6); Hale (1994, Chapter 5-6); Karpat (2004). On the 1971 coup, see Ahmad (1977, Chapter 7); Hale (1994, Chapters 7-8). On the 1980 coup, see Hale (1994, Chapters 9-10).

prevent policy from straying outside specific parameters" (2001, 8). It is thus well placed to influence foreign policy. As the next chapter demonstrates, the military was the critical element in the learning process that differentiates the two Islamist prime ministers, Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and their foreign policies.

To the question of centralization in Turkish decision-making institutions, we can now answer in the negative. This historical discussion has illustrated the de-centralized nature of decision making in Turkey, with the prime minister constrained by Constitutional mandates and army-induced institutional and practical limits. We can expect, therefore, that individuals will matter less in forming foreign policy, unless it follows the guidelines set by the constraining actors. What ideas were held by the two Islamist prime ministers and what their eventual foreign policies looked like, and the differences between them, is further elaborated in the next section and in Chapter 7.

Ideational Structures

In its ideational context, examination of its historical development provides the key to understanding the differences in today's Turkey between Kemalism and Westernism on the one hand, and Islamism on the other. Not only does understanding these differences help us identify what goes on in Turkish politics, but it also directly impacts on the case study. Since membership in the EU has been considered the outgrowth of Western-oriented identity and policy, the event of one Islamist party and prime minister changing tack and pursuing the

same foreign policy as Kemalists (and in contrast to the previous Islamist government) provides the empirical puzzle. It also offers a good case with which to test the alternate explanations set out in Chapter 2.

Much like Turkey's institutional structures, its ideational structures are drawn from its past. We may categorize structures into two opposing poles: Westernism and Islamism. The former drew on the Ottoman and republican desire to join the West, adopt its ideas, and emulate its structures; while the latter generally opposed the wholesale adoption of Western modes of behavior and to some extent of its techniques, and preferred to draw for its models and inspiration from Islam. As one scholar put it, "[m]odern Turkish history is one of continuous struggle between these two tendencies" (Müftüler-Bac 1999, 243). Although the clash between the two is primarily over domestic affairs, it is also well represented in the foreign policy arena, particularly as it relates to relations with the European Union. By examining the differences in their preferred foreign policies, we are able to identify the puzzle in Turkish foreign policy that ensued when the Islamist government of 2002 decided to actively seek EU membership.

Westernism

The advent of Westernism dates to the Ottoman period, particularly the two main periods of reform, the eras of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. The decline of the Ottoman Empire encouraged the adoption of methods and ideas that could be used to strengthen it and help prevent the hemorrhaging of its territorial possessions. Since the Empire was in direct contact with the West (defined at this point as Europe) through trade and war, and since it was the West

that was beating the Empire, it made sense to look to that same place for models for reform (much as the Japanese did during the Meiji Restoration). Strategically located, the Ottoman Empire was also brought into Great Power geopolitical struggles.[16] This gave it an enhanced awareness of its inferior position, at least in military and organizational terms, and a realization that failure to adapt to the clearly predominant West would mean the end of the Empire. This feeling was taken up wholeheartedly by the Kemalists during their struggle for independence. As Atatürk and his supporters came to dominate, then control, the resistance, they also came to shape the structures of the emerging country. These reflected their belief in the adoption of Western ideas and political, social, and cultural norms. Indeed, they came to adopt an emotional attachment to Westernism.

Reform as Westernization meant not only adopting certain models and structures from Europe, but also referred to identification—it was, according to Berkes, an "appropriation" of European civilization (Berkes 1964, 463). Thus, in addition to helping Turkey develop, Westernization meant running the country's polity, society, and economy along Western dimensions not only because it was *helpful*, but also because it was the *right thing to do* if one wanted to join the community of civilized states. Atatürk often stressed this during his reform efforts (see Berkes 1964, 463-464, Chapter 16).

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[16] Though Philip Robins cautions us to avoid the impression that the place of the Empire in European Great Power politics meant Turkey was European: "to infer from this that the Ottoman Empire and the successor state of Turkey is somehow intrinsically European as a result of such an experience is simply the ill informed product of wishful thinking" (2003, 102).

Westernism relied on Kemalism, an ideology of six guiding principles (republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and reformism).[17] These were enshrined in the Constitution, and they form the basic understanding of the military in its actions toward policymaking. In the context of this study, secularism is the key element. It is the flip side to the coin of Westernization.

If the stated objective was modernization, and modernization meant Westernization, then everything associated with the past was regressive and negative, and prevented Turkey from becoming strong and civilized. The past was Islam and the Ottoman Empire. Both had dragged the country down, it was argued, straitjacketing it in old ideas and concepts and preventing any progress and development from taking place. Islam was seen as a backward-looking religion that could not adjust to modern life, full as it is of "superstition, false ideals, and dogmas" (Ayata 1996, 41). Anything that represented Islam had no place in modern Turkey. In his great thirty-six hour speech to the Grand National Assembly in 1927, Atatürk referred several times to the Caliphate as dangerous for the country (Atatürk 1963, 698-9, 702). As a representation of everything that Atatürk perceived Islam to stand for, he also argued it was "necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilization" (Atatürk 1963, 738; also Berkes 1964, 457-460). The

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[17]. Republicanism referred to the shift from an Islamic- and Ottoman-based system to a modern one, including constitutional and parliamentary democracy; nationalism meant the creation of an ethnically and culturally homogenous Turkish nation-state; populism was about popular sovereignty, and the notion that the Turkish nation was an undivided whole without class distinctions; statism meant heavy government involvement in Turkish societal and economic life; secularism was the removal of Islam from the public sphere; and reformism (revolutionism) underlay the others—it meant the implementation of radical reforms of the country's structures. For discussions of Kemalism, see Karal (1981); Poulton (1997, Chapter 4).

past had broken the Ottoman state; the future therefore had to be free of Ottoman and Islamic influence.

Rather than a separation of religion and state, secularism as a Kemalist principle more appropriately referred to "laicism." It is about the predominance and control of the state and its values over religion (see Berkes 1964, 479-481). It is not, nor was it ever, about the eradication of Islam (there was a role for an Islam "friendly to the state" [Zürcher 1998, 303]), but about the disestablishment of it from the public sphere (Lewis 2002, 412-416). The practice of Islam was not forbidden; but its role in the construction of Turkish identity and institutional structures had to be, since it would hamper development in these areas (Berkes 1964, 483-490).[18]

Such ideas were enshrined throughout the Constitution: Article 24 states that "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of personal or political influence, or for even partially basing the fundamental, social, economic, political, and legal order of the state on religious tenets." Article 136 furthers the state's control over it, by giving the Department of Religious Affairs the capacity to direct Islamic activities "in accordance with the principles of secularism."

Article 174 adds the last constraint against any use of religion in politics: Referring to many of the major reforms passed against Islam in the 1920s and

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[18] The delegitimization of religious education was also a key facet to these reforms. The introduction of secular curriculum across the country was meant to replace Koranic and prayer classes with courses that emphasized science, rationality, secularism, and other elements the Kemalists believed were representative of a modern civilization and educational system (Göle 1997, 49; Kadioğlu 1996, 186).

1930s, it states that "No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey."[19] (See also Berkes 1964; Kinross 1964, Part Three.)

After 1960, when the military became the leading element of the state defending the Kemalist reforms and continuing with the Kemalist developmental path, Islam was gradually securitized. It came to represent a threat to both the Kemalist order (especially laicism) and to its main foreign policy objectives— affiliation with Europe. Islamist demands for a re-shaping of the political and social configurations of the country and of its foreign relations is seen as an existential threat to the Turkish nation and state, as defined in the Constitution.

These domestic priorities were reflected in the foreign policy arena. At first, Westernism was translated into neutralism ("non-internationalist" [Váli 1971, 55]). In the beginning years of the republic, its two main leaders, Atatürk and Ismet Inönü, were careful to keep Turkey as neutral as possible in international affairs, but the threat from the Soviet Union combined with the Kemalist elite's orientation toward the West inevitably drew Ankara into the

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[19] These reforms included: the abolishment of the Caliphate (the preeminent symbol connecting the Ottoman Empire and Islam); the abolishment of the religious court system and enforcement of a secular justice system; the banning of the fez; the outlawing of the religious order (*tarikats*) and worship at Islamic shrines and tombs; the replacement of the Islamic calendar with the Gregorian one; the substitution of the *Şeriat* (Islamic law) with the Swiss civil code; and the replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet. In one of the more far-reaching reforms, the Kemalists removed the clause from the 1924 Constitution proclaiming the religion of the state to be Islam; in 1937 Article 2 of the Constitution was amended to specifically proclaim the state as secular, as it has remained since then. Finally, Atatürk enhanced the status of women in society, giving them the right to vote and become members of parliament.

Western camp during the Cold War, but primarily in strategic terms (as a bulwark against Soviet expansionism in the Middle East). Once the European Economic Community was established during the 1950s, it became the objective to join what it perceived as the institutional expression of Western-European civilization. As Öniş put it, "eventual membership in the EU has been interpreted as a necessary counterpart of the westernization and modernization drive" (2003, 17). It became, in Andrew Mango's words, the "Red Apple" for Turkey—a legendary objective of the Ottomans that symbolized both their greatest achievements (the conquest of Constantinople) but also their un-obtained goals as well (Vienna) (Mango 2004, 233).

Islamism

In direct contrast to Kemalist preferences, Islamism refers to the foundation of the economic, social, and political system on religious values and on the ideas set out by Mohammed the Prophet in the 17th century.[20] Given its deep historical ties to the Turkish people, Islamism has always played an important role in mobilizing society for whatever purposes deemed important by the state: during the Ottoman period it was used for control and keeping together the various regions of the empire (Yavuz 2003, 43-45),[21] and indeed it played a critical role in motivating and inspiring the Islamic warriors who conquered Constantinople and expanded the Ottoman boundaries. The fusing of the

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[20] Scholars have also used the terms "political Islam" to describe this ideology. Vertigans (2003) calls it "praxist Islam." It has been described as "a political movement which utilizes the discourse and symbols of Islam to come to power and to establish a non-secular social order based upon *shar'a*" (Akinci 1999, 75, fn.1). More generally, it is a commitment "to see Islam play a greater role in the society and/or the polity" (Heper 1997, 33). Much like Kemalism, Islamism combines a religious commitment (in place of a laicist commitment) with a political consciousness and social action format (Göle 1997, 46).

[21] The 1876 Constitution defined Ottomans in terms of their religion.

Sultanate as the temporal authority with the Caliphate as the religious head of all Muslims in 1517 entrenched the notion that religious principles formed an essential element of the state structures. Lewis notes that even aside from the Caliphate, Islam was seen as the primary justification for the empire itself: "From its foundation until its fall the Ottoman Empire was a state dedicated to the advancement or defence of the power and faith of Islam" (2002, 13; see also Yavuz 2003, Chapter 3).

Even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Islam was considered a crucial element in state action. In the War of Independence it was appealed to for the sake of nationalist unity, given that the religious leaders formed an important contingent of the resistance. Atatürk himself exhorted his followers in the name of the Caliph (Kinross 1964, 216-217). With the increasing predominance of the Kemalists after 1923, it was used by the state to control its activities (e.g., the Directorate of Religious Affairs). Finally, during the pluralist period it was used by the various parties to mobilize votes, through appeal to Islamic consciousness and concessions toward the more open practice of it in the public sphere. The very fact that Islam could be used in these ways highlights the deep and abiding connection Turks feel toward it.

The Islamist agenda and its increasing relevance to the public particularly after the 1960s is best encapsulated in the National Outlook framework, an amalgam of "traditional Sunni-based Islamic culture and Sufi worldview embedded within a developmentalist discourse" (Yıldız 2003, 189) and underlain with a historical view of Turkey's glorious past and potential for great future—

both based on Islam. The latter is also founded on economic and industrial development. Necmettin Erbakan, the first Islamist prime minister, was himself the founder of this framework of thought (see Chapter 7). The National Outlook reflected all the changes described above that strengthened the appeal of Islam within society and made it a viable alternate paradigm for many Turks.

In the foreign policy arena, this framework meant a rejection of Western orientation, since the West had nothing to offer except perhaps in technological terms. Identification and alliance with the West was seen as a denial of Turkey's own Islamic roots and proper orientation. Islamists frequently criticized the EU and rejected it as the natural home of Turkey, something that was a fundamental assumption for the Kemalists.

At the same time, ties with the Islamic world were highlighted as being necessary for both Turkish development and Turkish identity. The various incarnations of Islamist political parties were unconvinced that Turkish ideational structures (Ottomanism, Islam, Turkish nationalism) and European ideational structures (liberal democracy, free market capitalism) were compatible. For them, democracy "was seen as a component of an infected Western system" (Ayata 2004, 243-244). In short, orientation toward the EU—much less membership in— was something the Islamists not only disagreed with, but also actively believed was harmful to Turkey. Turkey was a Muslim country, with roots in Islam that had once made it the most feared empire in the world. Regaining that heritage and applying it to the present was possible only by a reassertion of Islam within Turkey. Membership in the EU could only stifle and kill this endeavour.

Islamism has become a powerful, and thus relevant, force in Turkey, particularly since the 1980s,[22] for three main reasons. First, while the Kemalists succeeded in removing Islam from the public sphere, they could not reduce its influence among the population, particularly in the considerably more traditional rural areas. Islamic consciousness remained deeply rooted, not least because the private practice of it was never banned. This failure left much of the traditional social structures and loyalties in place. This imposition from above of laicism was designed to induce a "general state of amnesia which would lead to a process of estrangement of the people from some of their own cultural practices" (Kadioğlu 1996, 186). Its failure alienated large segments of society from the state, and made them more inclined to follow Islamist principles when they were offered as political and social choices (Yavuz 2003, 55; 1997, 64).

Second, the onset of severe economic problems and the socio-economic dislocations that have resulted from them have left many Turks struggling on a daily basis to meet their basic requirements (see White 2002). Islam has been able to provide a viable alternative paradigm for both the physical and the spiritual needs of Turks, in a way that Kemalism could not. Islamist groups were able to take advantage of this to mobilize support for their political parties. In this sense, the growing strength of Islamist parties in the 1990s and 2000s is less sudden discovery of religion, but rather an "awakening" or "resurgence" (Vertigans 2003; Yavuz 2003).

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[22] Though Uriel Heyd argues that the "revival" of Islam began as early as in the 1940s (Heyd 1968).

Although there is debate over the impact of economic conditions on the rise of Islamist consciousness and action in Turkey,[23] there is certainly a link of some kind. The shift to economic neo-liberalism at the beginning of the 1980s has led to a series of socio-economic changes in society, including spreading urbanization due to migration from rural to urban areas; unemployment; capacity for corruption; inflation; fluctuation in interest rates; growing gaps between the haves and the have-nots; and strict International Monetary Fund-mandated privatization and structural reform schemes (see Ayata 1996; Barkey 1996, 45; White 1997; Yavuz 2003, Chapter 4; Zürcher 1998, 304). The spectacle of politicians squabbling incessantly among themselves and paying more attention to their personal needs than those of society has only enhanced these feelings of alienation (Çarkoğlu 1998, 544, 553; Heper 1997, 36; Sakallioğlu 1996, 231).

Third, the economic and political liberalizations beginning in the 1980s provided an opening for Islamist groups to mobilize more widely and publicly, and engage in political participation (Yavuz 2003, 4).[24] The appeal of Islamist groups in this context is two-fold: One, Islamist parties have been very successful at engaging in intimate and personal contact with people, canvassing door-to-door, holding public meetings, and arranging for foodstuffs and other necessities to be given to those most in need. Two, Islam has a durable and continuous political connection to the past, a language for communication, easily recognisable symbols, and is an outlet for despair, making it an effective and,

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[23] White (2002) and Vertigans (2003) provide strong arguments and evidence against this linkage, pointing out that such explanations cannot account for the rise of Islamist sentiment among the middle and wealthier classes in society. See also Yavuz (2003).

[24] For an account of the liberalization policies in this period, see Saracoğlu (1994).

importantly, a familiar paradigm to seek comfort in (see Bulliet 1993; Turan 1994).

Politically, the military regime of 1980-1983 decided that although Islam still had no role in public life, there was a clear role for it to play within the country. First, it became identified with the right end of the political spectrum, and thus a useful counter-measure against radical leftist forces (Yavuz 2003, 62). Second, the army believed that if the people had some contact with Islam, it would lessen their need to turn to it for political purposes (ibid., 69-75). Toward these ends, it created the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, an artificial construction designed to fuse Turkish nationalism and Kemalism with a compatible Islam. Common ideas between the two were stressed, such as a sense of justice, belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality (see Poulton 1997, 184). The military government encouraged the spread of religious education and the religious brotherhoods, which had been banned in 1925. It even tried to portray Atatürk as a pious Muslim trying to purge Islam of negative elements and helping it grow stronger, publishing a three-volume biography on his life that stressed his religious commitments and beliefs (Yavuz 2003, 70-71). The Özal government that followed (1983-1989) continued the tolerance of Islam—Özal himself was known to be relatively pious and open about his practice of it. These actions generated a widespread rise in Islamic awareness, culminating in the incredible increase in the number of religious foundations, religious schools, mosques, and Korans.[25]

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[25] A 1990 Directorate of Religious Affairs report found that the number of *imam-hatip* schools rose from 2,688 in 1973 to 39,907 in 1988; 1500 new mosques were built each year; and the

Other related patterns have also been noted: rising levels of education produced Turks who both were able to read and discuss religious texts and ideas, and provided more traditional leaning Turks with the capacity advance higher up the social and economic ladder, taking their Islamist sentiments with them. The spread of the media has been noted as particularly helpful (see Yavuz 2003, Chapter 5). This trend, particularly regarding newspapers, gave Turks the ability to compare their society with others, and to see what was happening elsewhere. The spread of the Islamic media (newspapers, radio, television, tapes, the Internet) contributed to the direct distribution of the Islamist message. The rise of a new class of wealth and businesspeople, Anatolians from traditional and rural background, brought Islam into the cities without associating it with poorer and more marginal classes. These individuals have helped extend the reach of Islamist ideas through their capacity for investment and other supportive efforts.

All these trends have contributed to the growth in power of Islamist political parties (see Chapter 7).[26] Before 1950 there was little public space for Islamist to operate, Islamic groups operated either on the fringes of the political process (Çarkoğlu 1998, 544) or within larger center-right parties such as the DP and the Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*—AP). The advent of multi-party politics in 1950 began the process of encouraging political Islam (in large part because Inönü believed democracy and Islam were compatible [see Heper 1998]). This set

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number of Korans inspected and official approved by the military government leaped from 31,075 in 1979 to 259,731 in 1981 (Poulton 1997, 186).

[26] In addition to political parties, Islamist sentiments have also been manifested in radical, militant forms as well—much like Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Middle East. However, radical Islam is not relevant to the case study, and so will not be dealt with. See Karmon (1997) for more on this segment of Islamism.

the stage for the promotion of Islamist ideational structures at the expense of Kemalist structures. This has led, in the 1990s and after, to a direct clash between the two frameworks, and in political terms resulted in the Kemalist elites trying to limit the advancement of Islamist parties in the political process. The confrontation between the two has been played out in the foreign policy arena, and helps explain the variation in foreign policy discussed in Chapter 7.

This chapter has summarized the historical development of Turkey's institutional and ideational structures. Chapter 7 fills in the last piece of the model, by focusing on the different individuals who are responsible for the variation in Turkish foreign policy discussed in this study.

The existence of the strong state tradition, coupled with the early efforts by the Kemalists and then the repeated military interventions, has created a de-centralized policymaking structure in Turkey. Prime ministers have been subject to oversight and influence by a host of state actors, but primarily the army, that have constrained their capacity for autonomous decision-making. This prevents both individuals from translating their own ideas into policy, but also promotes the longevity of adaptable individuals who can work within such constraining frameworks. Ideological individuals emotionally attached to policies or objectives at odds with those of the stronger political actors are less likely to survive in office, since they are likely to warrant the intervention of these other actors. More specifically, in Turkey's case, the very different ideas held by the Kemalists (who

are typically those actors that constrain the prime minister) and the Islamists creates a large space for collision between these opposing worldviews.

Chapter 7 builds on these understandings by comparing the two Islamist prime ministers and their different ideas about EU membership. Because of the de-centralized nature of the system, neither was able to implement their preferred Islamist agendas. But in the case of one, he learned to both work within this system and that by following the ideas promoted by the constraining actors, he could actually benefit the Islamist agenda by protecting it from these very actors. While Necmettin Erbakan neglected the EU and continued to bang his head against the wall of the military's staunch Kemalism, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was pragmatic enough to learn from Erbakan's mistakes and work within the Kemalist constraints, and came to understand that EU membership would be beneficial for the Islamists because the military would have to follow EU political standards. The role of individuals helps us better understand this foreign policy variation.

Chapter Seven

From Neglect to Advocacy:

EU Membership and

Foreign Policy Variation in Turkey

Introduction

An analysis of the historical development of the institutional and ideational structures of Turkey tell us that (a) Turkey is a de-centralized polity, in which state actors often severely constrain the primary decision maker (the prime minister) from acting autonomously; and (b) that Turkey has long been split along a Kemalist-Islamist axis, with each ideational framework identifying very different domestic priorities and foreign policies. Because Turkey is a de-centralized polity, we can expect that its prime ministers will matter less in charting an independent foreign policy course than in a centralized polity such as Israel. Leaders are constrained to conform to the ideas held by those actors who constrain them—in this case, the Kemalist elements of the state, especially the military. Whether they do so depends on the nature of the individual in office. In addition, by mapping out the dichotomous ideational structures of Turkey, we can recognize when a variation in foreign policy occurs, because it does not fit with traditional ideas coming out of these frameworks. In this case study, one Islamist

prime minister oriented his foreign policy *away* from Europe, in keeping with the Islamist agenda, while the other moved closer *toward* Europe, in stark contrast to the Islamist agenda.

The dynamic variable that best represents this shift is the individual leader. Focusing on institutions and ideas does not tell the whole the story. Therefore, this chapter will complete the empirical analysis by focusing on the differences in the role of emotion in the belief structures of Prime Ministers Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and their consequent foreign policies is the basis for the following discussion.

The chapter is laid out in the following manner. The first part, an analysis of the independent variable, will compare the belief structures between Erbakan and Erdoğan, the individuals who made these foreign policy decisions. We will look at their basic conception of and attachment to Islam and what role they wanted for it within Turkey. Then we will examine the consequences this had for their behavior on specific issues. The next section will focus on the dependent variable, policy toward the European Union. Here we will also analyze Erdoğan's learning process, since this highlights the critical difference between his and Erbakan's belief structures. The last part will summarize what this discussion has meant for the effectiveness of the model as presented in Chapter 3.

The Role of Individuals: Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Erbakan and Erdoğan were both committed Islamists. But they their belief structures incorporated affective attachment to their religion in different ways.

This is underlined by a discussion of these differences and the impact they had on policy toward the EU. After discussing Islam as the core of their belief systems, we will turn to the impact this had on two (non-EU) policy issues: the focus they engineered for the political parties they led and their domestic political priorities. Examining these policies is critical for avoiding the tautological conclusion that would be derived from a focus only on their policy toward the EU.

The Independent Variable: Necmettin Erbakan

The foundation of Erbakan's beliefs is rooted in Islamism. He did not have a pious education (there were no religious educations allowed at the time) and indeed his schooling was secular—including his Ph.D. in engineering in Germany—and he pursued activities not considered at the time all that religious.[1] Yet Erbakan was a very devout Muslim with close ties to the Nakşibendi religious brotherhood (indeed, piety was a requirement for membership). He developed a powerful emotional attachment to Islam, which conditioned his belief in the importance and relevance of Islam for Turks and for Turkey. At least in part because the public practice of Islam was suppressed, his religiosity became a focus on moral qualities and moral development for the country (Özdalga 2002, 138-142). He believed that the moral core of society came from Islam: this is what had made Turkey great in the past, and what would make it great again in the future. In his undergraduate program he was remembered as a religious person who spent half his time praying (White 2002, 142). This all had the cumulative

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[1] He founded a motor factory in Istanbul and made contacts in the business community and in industry, which helped him gain the presidency of the Union of the Chambers of Commerce and Stock Exchange in 1969.

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effect of constructing cognitive structures based on affective judgments and thus policy inflexibility.

Erbakan's political actions reflected his deep religious convictions. As founder of the National Outlook movement, he represented the desire for Islam to be the structuring framework of Turkish politics, society, and economy. When he set up the first Islamist political party, the National Order Party (*Milli Nizam Partisi*—MNP) in 1970, it was with the help of the religious Nakşibendi and Nurcu *tarikats*. When he went into self-imposed exile after the closure of the MNP, his supporters referred to this as "the Hegira," after the flight of the Prophet Muhammed who left Mecca for Medina for safety reasons (Özdalga 2002, 130). Whenever divisions appeared within the Islamist political parties between more traditional-conservative and more moderate-progressive factions Erbakan was drawn to the former, where his own sympathies lay.

Erbakan's strong belief in Islamism led him to a political career marked by continuous efforts, in the face of successive closures by the armed forces, to form a political party that would represent the Islamist agenda, work to bring it to fruition, and in so doing re-structure Turkey along what he was convinced was the most appropriate lifestyle. (The most overt displays occurred in September, 1980, when Erbakan led a massive demonstration in Konya, where public calls for the establishment of an Islamic state were made [Hale 1994, 237-238].) Each time a newer version of this attempt was manifested, it had a slightly different emphasis in political terms, but it never removed its core belief that Islamism should be the guiding framework for Turkey. The parties all had the same leaders, publications,

ideologies, and policy recommendations, and much of the same support groups across the country.

Political Party Focus

Because Erbakan has been at the center of all efforts to establish Islamist political parties since the 1970s until the split into two Islamist parties in 2001, we can identify his belief structures (and his consequent policies) more easily if we examine these parties and what they stood for. Although it would be a mistake to refer to Erbakan's parties and their policies as Islamic fundamentalism, their primary emphasis on Islam and the benefits it would bestow upon Turkey—as opposed to the decay and decline that occurred under a secular regime—lead to his categorization as an ideological individual for whom affective appeal trumps pragmatic flexibility.

The first avowedly Islamist party, the MNP, was established in January 1970. It was shut down in the wake of the 1971 military coup, on the grounds that it was trying to set up an Islamic state. In support of the dissolution of the party, prosecutors cited a speech made by Erbakan in October 1970, in which he said "'[w]hen we say the National Order we underline the fact that it is more important to study the Traditions of the Prophet and the works of Imam Ghazali and Imam Rabbani than learning the sociology and ethics now taught in schools. For the believers….should join the National Order by pronouncing the Islamic formula … ['In the Name of God']" (cited in Özdalga 2002, 130). As the first political manifestation of the National Outlook, the MNP argued that Islam would be the motor that would drive Turkey's economic development and expansion of

political power to heights reminiscent of its glorious past (see Yıldız 2003). Because this celebrated past was associated with Islam—indeed, was *due* to Islam—the MNP under Erbakan believed that re-adoption of Islam in society and polity would lead to the same magnificent outcome in the present.

While Erbakan was in Switzerland, where he had fled during the trial against him, supporters set up in October 1972 the National Salvation Party (*Milli Selamet Partisi*—MSP). He took up its leadership after the 1973 elections, leading it until it was banned with all other political parties during the 1980-1983 military government. Fear of the military and of the fate of the MNP motivated the party to de-emphasize Islam in its program. Instead, it advocated a series of socio-economic transformations (rapid industrialization, social and populist economic justice, and equitable distribution of wealth) underlined by a strong moral component, including an emphasis on the importance of family life (Yavuz 2003, 210). At the same time, it looked to the Ottoman era for inspiration. These non-Islamic elements hid, according to many observers, an ideology that was "embedded in a thinly veiled program to restore Islam in state and society and turn it into the major factor in Turkey" (Landau 1997). It was obvious that for the MSP Islam remained the underlying ideal on which Turkish society and policy should be based, and that its focus on "moral development" was a euphemism for religious piety.

When the Turkish Armed Forces (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri*—TSK) overthrew the government on 12 September 1980, it banned all political parties including the MSP and forbade the leading politicians from participating in

politics. Without Erbakan's active involvement but with his clear blessing and guidance, MSP supporters established the Welfare Party (*Refah Partisi*—RP) on 19 July 1983. Although in speeches and in its program it stressed the new Just Order (*Adil Düzen*) as its policy platform, its ideology remained closely associated with the MSP's, and its program retained many of the same elements. This included some support for the free market but also greater social and economic justice, particularly in social reform, pensions, health care, employment, and housing (White 1997, 26).[2] It also distinguished between Westernization and modernization, with the former being bad for Turkey and the latter being something Turks could achieve on their own. But everything was still couched vaguely and surreptitiously in Islamic concepts. It was, according to Jenny White, "a political party defined by its relation to Islam" (2002, 131).

In the wake of the 28 February process (see below) and the closure of the RP, Erbakan set up yet another Islamist political party in December 1997, the Virtue Party (*Fazilet Partisi*—FP), under the nominal leadership of Recai Kutan. For all intents and purposes the FP was the RP under a different name: it retained, for example, most of the RP's seats in the Grand National Assembly (GNA). From behind the scenes Erbakan was much more careful to avoid any rhetoric or policy that might aggravate the military any more than it already was. The FP tried to take a less hard-line stance on the issue of headscarves for women in public places, avoided segregated party social events, and tried to recruit women in high profile positions (Narli 1999, 43-44; see also Yıldız 2003, 198-200). It

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[2] Erbakan had an aversion to free market economics (Robins 2003, 147-148), but included this provision for political purposes.

also advocated more free-market economic policies, contrary to the state-led economy that formed part of the Just Order framework of the RP. But most observers saw this as a mere tactical shift to avoid the same fate as *Refah* (e.g., Yıldız 2003, 199), and the incident surrounding FP member Merve Kavakçi revealed for many the true nature of the FP. Despite a long-time ban on headscarves (a traditional signal of religious devotion for women in Turkey) in public buildings,[3] in May 1999, Kavakçi came to the GNA to be sworn in but wearing the headscarf. Parliament erupted into shouting and insulting, but she refused to remove the offending piece of clothing. Eventually she was forced out of the chamber and, later, stripped of her Turkish citizenship through a legal loophole (though she later regained it). White (2002, 145) asserts her stance was done at Erbakan's direction. If so, it is an excellent example of his Islamist agenda.

The final and current manifestation of Erbakan's Islamist parties is the Felicity Party (*Saadet Partisi*—SP). In June 2001 *Fazilet* was dissolved by the Constitutional Court, also for engaging in activities contrary to the secular nature of the republic. Following past trends, its former deputies began to organize themselves into a new party, except this time the divisions between the conservatives and the moderates could not be contained. The traditionalists (the *gelenekçi*) established the SP while the moderates (also known as the reformers/renewers, the *yenilikçi*) formed the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP) (see White 2002, Chapter 4, for a good discussion of this division).

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[3] For a good discussion of the veiling issue, see Özdalga (1998).

The SP tried hard to recast itself as a "normal" party in Turkish politics. It has avoided any outward display of Islamism—indeed, its official party program makes no mention of Islam, focusing instead on human happiness, love, compassion, and social justice (see *Saadet Partisi* website, http://www.sp.org.tr). It also explicitly accepts the principle of laicism. Still, it is widely recognized as working within the mold of past Islamist parties, particularly given that the moderates have all moved out of the party. Its call for greater compassion and love are seen as only contemporary manifestations of the "moral development" program of the MNP and MSP. It has lost the power of former Erbakan parties, garnering only 2.5% of the vote in the 2002 elections, not enough to pass the 10% threshold required for membership in parliament. The AKP—the first Islamist party not led by Erbakan—has come to represent the Islamist agenda in politics, effectively ending the relevance of Erbakan and his ideas to national politics.

Erbakan's Domestic Priorities

Given that Erbakan's devotion to Islamic ideals and policies was never diluted over the years, despite repeated efforts by the military to shut his parties down and continued warning signs from many laicists during *Refah*'s tenure, we can successfully argue that Erbakan is an ideological individual with a powerful emotional attachment to Islam. The repeated attempts to for an Islamist political is strong evidence of his commitment to Islam and its role in public life. We can gain a better understanding of this categorization by looking at his policies, not only toward the EU but also on domestic issues. This will help us classify him as

ideological separate from an examination only of the foreign policy we are trying to explain.

It is considered normal for Turkish political parties to fill the government agencies they come to control when they attain power with sympathizers and supporters and pursue policies with their own interests in mind (see Sayarı 2002). The National Salvation Party was no exception (the National Order Party did not exist long enough to enter government). What is different is the particular changes the MSP was interested in. When it joined a series of coalition governments in the 1970s, the MNP concentrated especially on education, long seen as a key barrier imposed by the laicist authorities in order to prevent the inculcation of religion into young students. The MSP succeeded in passing legislation that put the religious (*imam-hatip*) schools on par with secular schools, and that allowed graduates from these programs to attend university (Narli 1999, 39). This would allow those instilled (critics would say indoctrinated) with Islamic values and beliefs to go on to higher education and, beyond that, play more significant roles in society, economy, and polity.

But the most effective means of judging Erbakan's domestic priorities is by examining the domestic policies of the Welfare Party. This is because it was the largest and best organized to date of all the Islamist parties, and more importantly it formed the senior partner in a coalition government from the end of June 1996 to June 1997; as such, it was in an ideal position to translate its ideas about Islam into concrete policies.

At first Erbakan was careful to avoid the impression that he and his party were interested solely in advancing the Islamist agenda. At his press conference the day after announcing the formation of the government, Erbakan stressed his commitment to Kemalism, noting of the government coalition that "'[t]he essential basis of the partnership is that the Turkish Republic is a democratic, secular and social state based on law and the principles of Ataturk'" while emphasizing that Turkey would continue its strong relations with the West (*Turkish Daily News* 30 June 1996). At the party's first convention since taking office, there were no public displays of religion and Erbakan and others were careful to heap praise on Atatürk and emphasize their commitment to secularism (see *Turkish Probe* 18 October 1996).

But by December 1996 this caution had dissipated, as a result of both his own increasing confidence and criticism from harder-line elements in the party that he was not doing enough for the cause. Without changing the underlying legal structures, he engaged in a series of efforts to slip the practice of Islam more directly into the public sphere. He proposed amending the work hours of government employees to make it easier for them to observe the Ramazan fast; on 11 January 1997 he hosted a meal in the prime minister's office with leaders from various religious sects (which also angered the staunchly secular Turkish Jurists Association); and there were reports that he was considering allowing for Supreme Military Council[4] decisions to be appealed to civilian courts, as a way of getting around the expulsion of alleged Islamist officers (Jenkins 2001, 61). He further publicly mused about building a mosque in Istanbul's Taksim Square

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[4] The (primarily) military body that decides on promotions in and expulsions from the military.

(*Turkish Daily News* 30 January 1997), the site of several laicist monuments. Although he had made this suggestion two years earlier, and in fact other laicist parties had been promising it for several years already—to meet the area's growing traditional community's needs—what made it relevant this time was that it came on the heels of Erbakan's suggestion that the Islamists would "re-conquer" Istanbul (ibid.).[5]

At the same time, a series of developments occurred that, while not completely under Erbakan's control or direction, nonetheless indicate the general direction of his preferences. There was an increase of incidents during Ramazan in which people who were smoking and drinking in public were attacked (Zürcher 1998, 304). Radicals within the party often shifted non-Islamist civil servants, including judges, to rural areas or to unpleasant, even unnecessary, jobs in order to induce early retirement (see White 2002, 135). In poorer areas, where less attention was paid by the media and the state, Islamist activists closed down libraries and educational centers and replaced them with Koranic courses, while others harassed, intimidated, or interrupted non-Islamist activities and organizations until they either closed or move elsewhere (ibid., 136). Finally, in what has often been classified as the beginning of the end of the *Refah* government, on 31 January 1997 the RP mayor of Sincan hosted the Iranian ambassador for a "Jerusalem night" rally. The ambassador gave a speech praising Islamic government, while signs supporting the Palestinian terrorist group Hamas were displayed. When the *Refah* Justice Minister visited the mayor in prison after

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[5] For further examples, see Shmuelevitz (1999, 12-16).

the military arrested him, it was seen as a signal of support for the mayor's actions.

The Dependent Variable:
Erbakan's Policy Toward the European Union

Having examined Erbakan's ideas about Islam and his domestic political priorities, we can conclude that his affective attachment to Islam and what he considered it meant for Turkey helps his categorization as ideological. In this way we have avoided a tautological reasoning whereby we judge his categorization based on his policy toward the EU—the very dependent variable we are trying to explain. We can now turn to an examination of this policy.

Erbakan's foreign policy agenda reflected his domestic ideas and preferences. He saw the Western world as at best irrelevant to Turkey, at worst a purposeful contributor to its decline. In 1977 he described the EU as a three-story building: on the top floor were the Zionist capitalists, running everything; in the middle were the Europeans, who served the Zionists; and at the bottom floor were the lackeys and others, which is where he argued Europe wanted to place Turkey (Ahmad 1977, 382-383; Robins 2003, 146).

Under his guidance, *Refah* took decidedly anti-Western positions. Although in his inaugural press conference Erbakan was careful to stress that Turkey would continue its strong relations with Europe, he also noted that Turkey would strengthen its relations with the Islamic world (*Turkish Daily News* 30 June 1996). The party publicly declared that "the weakness and backwardness of the Islamic society is not due to Islam but to Western domination of Muslims" (Ayata 1996, 54), which caused the "degeneration of morals in society" and that if

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society lived according to Islamist principles, things would get better (Turan 1994, 46). *Refah* also displayed anti-Israel and anti-Zionist arguments that bordered on anti-Semitism (Kirişçi 1997, 7), which although not directly concerning the EU nonetheless indicate his general worldview. As early as January 1970, Erbakan stated that the MNP was against Freemasons, Communists, and Zionists, and stood for promotion of stronger moral values in society, implying that these ideologies were immoral (Poulton 1997, 176). He had a "deeply held belief" that a Jewish conspiracy to control the world existed and had suckered Europe into it (Nicole and Hugh Pope 1997, 321). The RP's official daily, after it formed the government in 1996, published daily reports asserting that Israel was backing terrorism within Turkey, and argued that all ties to the Jewish state had to be severed (Bengio 2004, 110). He further told a private meeting in the middle of 1996 that he did not like the Jews, and later told others that he had trouble coming to terms with the sight of the Israeli flag (see *Ma'ariv* 14 August 1996).

Erbakan did not engage in any foreign policies to attack or undermine Europe. Instead, despite evidence of the growing importance of Europe for Turkish economy activity, particularly trade, he chose to neglect it and direct his priorities and efforts toward the Islamic world—the diametrically opposite manifestation of a Western orientation that he had long disparaged (see Robins 2003, 149-159 for a concise description).[6] Ties with the Islamic world were

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[6] It has been argued that the coalition government engaged in a division of labor, with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Tansu Çiller given responsibility for the economy and Europe, while Erbakan concentrated on the Islamic world. But this is not satisfactory: Erbakan

highlighted as being necessary for both Turkish development and Turkish identity (see, for example, *Turkish Daily News* 12 August 1996; 17 August 1996). In 1994, Erbakan argued that a new Islamic world order should be created, consisting of an Islamic United Nations, an Islamic NATO, an Islamic UNICEF, and an Islamic common market and currency (see Robins 1997, 89).

Erbakan also displayed an affinity for radical Islamic regimes and organizations. During Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's one-day visit to Turkey in July 1996, Erbakan told Mubarak that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, elements of which have been engaged in a long, violent struggle against the regime, was not so bad as made out to be and that Cairo should reconcile itself with the Brotherhood (*Turkish Daily News* 16 July 1996).[7] His first trip abroad in August 1996 was a ten-day visit focused on boosting economic ties to Asia, to Iran, Indonesia, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Singapore—the first four are among the most populous Muslim states in the world and the first three include some of its most fundamentalist elements. In Iran Erbakan signed a \$23 billion, 23-year deal for the supply of Iranian natural gas to Turkey.[8]

That same month he sent emissaries to Iraq to strengthen ties between the two states. In October Erbakan went to Africa, visiting Egypt, Libya, and Nigeria. Again, the first two are Islamic states while the last has a substantial Muslim

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was the prime minister and so had final say on the direction of Turkish policy, both because of his office and his personality.

[7] Mubarak's reply, somewhat embarrassing to Erbakan, was that if the prime minister liked the Brotherhood so much he could have them in Turkey.

[8] It should be noted that the agreement had been in negotiations for some years before, and that Erbakan was merely finalizing the efforts of laicist leaders before him. Still, the fact that the deal came just days after the US enacted the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (to punish foreign companies that invested over \$40 million in these countries' energy sections) was taken by many as purposeful.

population, among whom elements have installed strict Islamic laws to regulate social behavior.[9] In December, Erbakan publicly mused that Turkey and Iran might cooperate in the defense industry field (though both the Foreign Ministry and the army blocked any movement toward this end). Finally, Erbakan pushed for the establishment of the D-8, a group of eight developing Muslim states, as a new economic and power bloc in international affairs; his initial preference to refer to it as the M-8 (Muslim Eight) provides an indication of his ultimate intention (*Turkish Daily News* 23 October 1996).

This examination has illustrated the ideological nature of Erbakan's belief structures, and the consequent impact it had on his foreign policy toward the EU. He did not try to actively harm Turkish-EU relations, but his concentration on the Islamic world was both a sign of where he believed Turkey's true interests and affiliations lay, and an indication of what he thought of Europe and its place on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. This international orientation stemmed directly from his staunch belief in Islam as the only proper guiding framework for Turkey, in both its domestic and international contexts. Because he was prime minister, Erbakan was able to shunt Europe aside in favour of the Muslim world. The constraints on the power of the prime minister to act independently were ignored. In the end they could not be overcome, and Erbakan was eased out of office amidst a clampdown on the Islamist movement in general. But the evident nature

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[9] The Libyan trip, against the advice of both Çiller and Abdulluh Gül, a leading moderate within *Refah*, was widely perceived as a disaster, as Erbakan was forced to endure a public harangue by Libyan leader Muammar Ghaddafi on Turkey's Kurdish policies (including his calls for an independent Kurdish homeland) and its relationship with the West and Israel (see Robins 2003, 158-159). (A visit to Sudan during this trip was excluded on the insistent advice of Gül and the foreign ministry.)

of these constraints was not enough to push Erbakan to change his foreign policies. His affective attachment to Islam and what it could do for Turkey were too strong

But under a different Islamist prime minister, who held different ideas about the benefits and necessity of EU membership, that policy changed. The next section discusses the new prime minister's own belief structures, and how this impacted on his foreign policy. This will help us understand why there was a variation in Turkish policy toward EU affiliation.

The Independent Variable: Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

Like Erbakan, Erdoğan's belief structures are based on a commitment to Islamism. Yet, where Erbakan's Islamism retained a rigid, ideological structure based on the emotional appeal of Islam, Erdoğan was adaptable enough that he could first shift some of the priorities of an Islamist agenda, and second that he could pursue this agenda within the acknowledged institutional constraints in the Turkish foreign policymaking arena. Emotion played less of a role in his information-processing, and therefore he was able to be more flexible in his foreign policies.

Paradoxically, Erdoğan's religious devotion was evident from the beginning. In primary school he was the only student to volunteer when the headmaster once called on students to pray (*Economist* 18 December 2004, 74). Erdoğan was later enrolled in an *imam-hatip* (prayer-leader and preacher) school. Here his piety was nurtured and strengthened; a good soccer player, he later refused to shave off his beard (considered a sign of a devout Muslim) when

offered a spot on one of the country's top team with a policy of hiring clean-shaven players only (Mango 2004, 108-109). Like Erbakan, he did not pursue a religious career, but obtained a degree in accounting and management at Marmara University. But his Islamist sympathies were expressed in other avenues: He was a member of the MNP's youth branch—at a time when the party was much more openly Islamist in its principles and preferences—and participated in the ideological clashes of the 1970s (Mango 2004, 109). Several observers have noted that Erbakan was in many ways a hero for Erdoğan when he began his work in the Islamist political parties, joining the RP in 1983, going so far as to name one of his sons after Erbakan (Heper and Toktaş 2003, 162).

Erdoğan is considered to have long had two main goals: "to gain recognition for the repressed culture of Muslim believers in Turkey, and to advance their social status" (Mango 2004, 109). The former especially reflects Erdoğan's commitment to Islamist principles, and he is often thought of as having been quite ideological before the split in *Fazilet*. It is reported by those who have worked with Erdoğan as mayor of Istanbul that he has said that "women should try first to find fulfilment in family life, and, failing that, should confine themselves to voluntary work for the party" (Nicole and Hugh Pope 1997, 327). As mayor he also banned alcohol in city cafes. Özbudun cites him as saying, in July 1996, that democracy was not a goal, but an instrument for Welfare (2000, 88).

And yet Erdoğan is an adaptable individual, not ideological like his predecessor. The different personal experiences of Yitzhak Rabin and Yitzhak

Shamir help us better understand why one was adaptable and the other ideological. But this is less clear in the case of Erdoğan and Erbakan. Both grew up feeling devout, and yet one proved to be less ideological about it. We cannot identify the specific internal causal mechanisms that prompted Erdoğan to be more adaptable; this illustrates the inherent difficult in any study of individuals. Since we cannot get inside his head, we cannot point to any specific genetic or physical traits that made him pragmatic rather than rigid. But we can point to a cognitive process that prompted him to become adaptable: the crackdown by the military on the Islamists after the 1997 "soft coup." In this way we can still identify the learning process Erdoğan went through on issues other than policy toward the EU, which means we can categorize him as adaptable apart from the dependent variable.

Political Party Focus

The AKP won the 2002 elections with 34.2% of the vote and, based on the electoral system, 363 seats in the 550-seat GNA—making it the first party since 1987 to earn an outright majority and the ability to form a government alone. (Only one other party passed the required threshold for representation in the GNA.) Portraying itself as socially conservative and economically liberal, the AKP's program is a blend of Westernism, nationalism, and (an underlying) Islamism (Yavuz 2003, 258). Erdoğan himself has referred to the party as being of a "conservative democratic" nature (Office of the Prime Minister 2003).

From the beginning Erdoğan was careful not to present his party and government as anti-Kemalist or pro-Islamist, but as pro-Turkey; and unlike

Erbakan in 1996-1997, Erdoğan maintained this distinction. In presenting his government's program in March 2003, Erdoğan began by praising both Atatürk for his contributions to Turkey and the military for their victory at Çanakkale during World War One, and stressed that the legitimacy for any government in Turkey comes from the Constitution, implying recognition of its entrenched laicist order. He also asserted that his government "views democratic culture as the main principle of its policy" (Office of the Prime Minister 2003). The AKP's platform includes the stipulation that secularism is a pre-requisite for democracy (http://www.akparti.org.tr). Erdoğan has repeatedly pledged allegiance to the laicist state and Atatürk's vision for Turkey, stressing that the party does not have an Islamic agenda (*Turkish Daily News* 5 November 2002). Although he views Kemalism as a religion and therefore a constraint on freedom of expression, Erdoğan supports secularism (as the separation of religion and state) and has said that for him the *Şeriat* is about maintaining a just society, rather than a fundamentalist structure based on scripture (White 2002, 139).

The difference in the foci of Erbakan's and Erdoğan's political parties can be found clearly in their party programs. Where the SP has couched its program in language designed to reflect core Islamic values (happiness, love, compassion), the AKP's platform explicitly focuses on the individual rights and freedoms associated with democracy and political pluralism (see the party website, http://www.akparti.org.tr). This is all the more striking when we consider the results of a poll taken just after the elections: of AKP voters, 81% saw themselves as Muslims first and Turks second, and 60% said that religious values had

precedence over "secular" values such as democracy and human rights (Jenkins 2003, 55).

Erdoğan's Domestic Priorities

The AKP's focus is reflected in the priority Erdoğan has placed on expending most of his and the government's energy on reforming Turkey's legal and political structures, to make them less authoritarian and reduce the influence of non-elected state actors (such as the military) in policymaking. This has left it both with little time and less interest in concentrating on restructuring Turkey along Islamist lines.

First, Erdoğan has made a concerted effort (even in the face of some misgivings of party members) not to disrupt the national consensus on sensitive social issues. Before the 2002 election, for example, the Ecevit government had passed as part of a series of constitutional amendments a civil code that increased the status of women in society, giving all "spouses" equal rights over property, the ability to petition for divorce or alimony, and legislating that wives can keep their maiden names. Erdoğan has made no attempt to change this law, despite the evident unhappiness of many Islamists. On a more contentious issue, although he had campaigned partly on the headscarf issue, Erdoğan softened his rhetoric soon after the election, refusing to set a date by which he would try and overturn the ban on headscarves in public buildings, announcing that his wife (who does wear the headscarf) would not accompany him into public spaces, and even asserting that he would not push for a ban in all public places (*Turkish Daily News* 8 November 2002).

At the same time, despite the inevitability of a clash between the staunchly Kemalist TSK and an Islamist party, Erdoğan has gone out of his way to avoid antagonizing the military, even going so far as to criticize AKP parliamentarians in favor of the TSK (see Heper 2005, 222-223 for examples). This has not altogether prevented friction between the AKP and the armed forces, who continue to see any Islamist-rooted party as dangerous to the Kemalist order,[10] but it highlights the efforts on the part of Erdoğan to avoid antagonizing the military by engaging in activities that would be deemed too religious by the army.

Second, the AKP has enacted in rapid succession a series of "Harmonization packages" and other reforms required by accession agreements with the EU.[11] Under Erdoğan's guidance, the AKP government has passed four Harmonization packages (December 2002, January 2003, and July 2003) and a reformed press law (June 2004).[12] Changes in the first two packages include removing provisions for banning politicians and closing political parties, strengthening punishment for those who commit torture, and greater protection and options for those being tried for criminal activities. The third package focused mostly on providing for more cultural rights for Kurds, while the last set dealt primarily with reducing the military's influence in politics and allowing greater organizational freedom of association and expression. The government also passed in September 2004 a new penal code with sweeping changes. Altogether it

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[10] See, for examples, *The Economist* (3 May 2003, 55; 14 June 2003, 48); Heper (2005, 225-226); and Jenkins (2003, 56).

[11] Previous packages adopted by non-Islamist governments were passed in October 2001 and February 2002. For a good discussion of some of the legislative changes Turkey has made regarding human and civil rights, see Hale (2003).

[12] For complete details of these changes, see the website of the Office of the Prime Minister, Directorate General of Press and Information, available at: http://www.byegm.gov.tr.

has passed over 500 laws—mostly to reform older laws—in the short time it has been in power.

The Dependent Variable:
Erdoğan's Policy toward the European Union

The above discussion allows us to categorize Erdoğan as adaptable. He was flexible enough in the domestic political arena that we can conclude he did not hold to such a powerful affective attachment to Islam that he could not conceive of changing policy to achieve his objectives. We turn now to an examination of how this adaptability applies to his foreign policy toward the EU.

In foreign policy terms Erdoğan and the AKP under his leadership have stressed that it will continue Turkey's efforts to obtain EU membership. Although Erbakan and the RP also paid lip service to the notion that Turkey would retain good relations with the West, Erdoğan and his associates have explicitly and repeatedly pledged not only that such good relations would continue, but also that Turkey under his leadership would actively ensure that they improve. The most important of these pledges is the decision to enthusiastically and vigorously lobby for entry into the EU.

In a post-election interview, Abdullah Gül, a leader of the AKP and a close colleague of Erdoğan, said that the AKP government would not let its foreign policy be clouded by religious convictions, and that entry into the EU remained a priority (*Turkish Daily News* 8 November 2002). In presenting his government to the GNA, Erdoğan specified that since Turkey is "a part of the European political values system," attaining membership in the EU would be "[o]ne of the foremost objectives" of the AKP government." Turkey, he

concluded, has a "rightful place" in Europe (Office of the Prime Minister 2003). In March 2003, Kemal Unakıtan, the AKP's finance minister, told a party meeting that "You must realize that our way leads to Europe....Turkey's place is in the European Union" (cited Mango 2004, 234). And in May 2005, after French voters rejected the proposed EU constitution and concerns arose over the potential electoral defeat of the Social-Democrat government in Germany, Erdoğan stuck by his decision to appoint a chief negotiator for the upcoming talks scheduled for October, and specifically stated that: "Those who are seeking to impede this process [beginning of accession negotiations] are wasting their energy....We will probably face problems, but they will never weaken Turkey's basic objective, which is full membership in the European Union" (AFX News, at *Forbes.com* 24 May 2005).

More specifically, however, Erdoğan began to press European leaders to support an immediate announcement of a date for the commencement of accession talks, traveling throughout the EU even though he was not yet the head of the AKP or the government. In fact, Europe was Erdoğan's first foreign visit after the AKP victory, in sharp contrast to the places Erbakan went to. In December 2002, Erdoğan finally accomplished something no laicist government in Turkey had ever come close to: the European Council summit in Copenhagen decided that Turkey had fulfilled enough of the Copenhagen criteria for membership, and accession negotiations would begin "without delay" (European Council in Copenhagen, Conclusions of the Presidency 2002, 5). To this end, Erdoğan and his deputies immediately and actively again began pushing, this time

for a set date on which to begin official accession negotiations. These efforts paid off: at the European Council summit in Brussels in December 2004, a date was finally established—3 October 2005. This represents an historic achievement for any Turkish government, no less an Islamist one, and Erdoğan's efforts in this regard cannot be under-emphasized.

Erdoğan's Learning Process

As noted above, Erdoğan was at the beginning as staunch an Islamist as Erbakan. He wanted to see Islam play a greater—if not predominant—role in Turkish society and public life, and he gave little consideration to Europe as an important element in Turkey's foreign policy agenda. However, by the spring of 1997, he had begun to think differently about both these things, eventually coming to a completely opposite conclusion regarding the EU and how important it was for Turkey to become a member of it. The culmination of this realization was Erdoğan's active lobbying efforts to convince EU members that Turkey should be admitted, and his pursuit of domestic legal and political reforms to bring Turkey in line with EU standards. The key to explaining this variation in foreign policy between two Islamist prime ministers is the learning process Erdoğan underwent.[13]

The key factor in Erdoğan's learning process was the 28 February process. This convinced him that butting heads with the Kemalists only hurt the Islamists in the end, and that EU membership would actually protect the Islamists from the Kemalists. A third element underlining his learning process was his awareness

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[13] For a similar recent argument on the Islamist movement as a whole, see Mecham (2004). Mecham focuses on the iteration involved in this process over time.

that the AKP's support did not all come from staunch Islamists, but from others who wanted the party to concentrate on improving socio-economic conditions for the country. These developments persuaded Erdoğan that membership would be good for Turkey and good for Islam in Turkey, and that he should actively pursue such an outcome.

As in the case of Shamir, Erbakan was unable to undergo a learning process that taught him EU membership should be a priority for Turkey. There is no doubt that the FP, under Erbakan's covert leadership, learned its lessons from the shock of the 1996 coup; this was reflected in its rhetoric. But with its split into a conservative and a moderate party, it became obvious that the AKP was most committed to the *implementation* of the democracy rhetoric.[14] The affective appeal of Islam was so great for Erbakan that he could not conceive of compromising on it even to achieve his objectives.

At the same time, there is no doubt that Erbakan himself discovered, even during his short tenure, that constraints prevented him from engaging wholeheartedly in his preferred policies (see Robins 1997). But this was not a learning process, because when Erbakan did temper his actions, it was because he was *prevented* from doing so, not because he *learned* not to. In contrast, Erdoğan became known as pragmatist in the aftermath of the 28 February process. One observer commented that although he has retained his Islamic beliefs, he does not rely on dogma to guide his policymaking (White, 2002: 138-139). Some, in fact,

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[14] Referring to Erbakan and the RP, Toprak writes: "Whenever Erbakan or other leaders discussed the question of democratization in Turkey, it became increasingly clear that what they understood from liberal democracy was greater freedom to the Islamists, a sectarian understanding that was solely confined to issues of concern for the party's following" (2005, 175).

have argued that Erdoğan has for a long time been a moderate and not interested in imposing a strict form of Islam on others (e.g., Heper and Toktaş 2003).[15]

The 28 February process refers to a campaign orchestrated by the military to increase pressure on Erbakan and the RP until the government finally fell (often called a "soft coup"), while easing out of political, economic, and educational life those suspected of Islamist tendencies and continuing even after the fall of the coalition.[16] At the 28 February 1997 meeting of the National Security Council (*Milli Güvenlik Konseyi*—MGK), the army presented Erbakan with a list of eighteen directives and demanded that he implement them. The document essentially declared that Islamic fundamentalism (*irtica*) was the main internal security threat to Turkey, even above the Kurdish separatist menace.[17] Erbakan eventually signed the implementation order but continued to avoid applying them in practice. In response the military began organizing various sectors of society against the RP-led government, including the press, the legal and business community, trade unions, women's groups, the bureaucracy, and other political parties.

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[15] It should be noted that many analysts have questioned the sincerity of Erdoğan's (and the AKP's) shift (e.g., Tachau 2002; Robins 2003, 148). But this earnestness is not necessary for a learning process to occur. As with Rabin, who continued until his murder to believe that Yasser Arafat and the PLO were not fully committed to accepting Israel as a normal state in the region but yet still negotiated directly with both, Erdoğan has come to accept that EU membership is instrumental for his own ultimate goals—greater freedom for Islam in Turkey.

[16] There seems to be disagreement over the role of the military in pushing for the dissolution of *Refah*: Yavuz (2003, 247) writes that the military did put pressure on the Constitutional Court to ban the party, while Jenkins (2001, 54) says the army played no part in the prosecution or closure of the RP. Toprak (2005) argues that widespread public opposition to Erbakan and the *Refah* government would likely have forced out the Islamists regardless of military intervention. This is supported by Atacan, who points to the cooperation of the major industrialists, labor, and tradespeople in actively opposing the government (2005, 293).

[17] For the complete list of the directives, see Yavuz (2003, 275-276).

Under intense and continuous pressure, Erbakan finally resigned on 18 June 1997, hoping to re-form the government with his deputy, Çiller, as prime minister and Erbakan in second place. Instead, the mandate to form the next government was given to another party and Erbakan's government was ended. But the process continued: *Refah* was taken to the Constitutional Court by the chief prosecutor, Vural Savas (known to be a hard-line Kemalist) in May 1997. The Court closed down the RP on 16 January 1998, then banned Erbakan and six other *Refah* leaders (including Erdoğan) from politics for five years, for contravening Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution and engaging in anti-secular activities.

The 28 February process had two effects on Erdoğan. First, he came to the realization that pushing too hard against entrenched Kemalist interests (by aggressively advocating for a greater role for Islam in public life) would rebound negatively on the AKP. Struggling against them was futile, if not counter-productive, meant a diversion of resources toward fighting and not serious policymaking, and stirred the military to action. The 28 February process demonstrated the lengths to which the army would go to suppress Islamism: military leaders even visited former extremist left-wingers, who had been jailed and even tortured in the wake of the 1980 coup, for support against the Islamists (Jenkins 2001, 62-63). According to Mango, after Erdoğan was jailed (though for four months only) and lost his job as Istanbul mayor under Kemalist pressure, some of his "rough edges" were rubbed off and he learned "a lesson in prudence" (2004, 110). Erdoğan himself said after serving his jail sentence that he would no

longer use religious symbols in politics (see Heper and Toktaş 2003, 175-176). Commenting in August 2001 on what Islam meant for him, he specified that "[m]y reference is to Islam at a personal level. Political speaking, my reference is the constitution and democratic principles" (cited in Heper and Toktaş 2003, 170).

Second, and perhaps most important, Erdoğan came to understand and accept that membership in the EU would be good for Islam in Turkey. The notion previously prominent among the Islamists—that Turkey was too different from Europe to be included in it—was no longer acceptable, viable, or even relevant.[18] Instead, Erdoğan realized that Islamist sentiments could be better protected within the EU, since its provisions on religious and other freedoms guaranteed that a person could not be prosecuted for advocating an Islamist agenda. At the same time, Turkish entry would force the TSK to conform to patterns of civil-military relations standard to all EU member-states—that is, full civilian control over the army. Outside the EU there was nothing to stop the military from exercising its formal and informal power over decision-making. Inside the EU, its role would have to be severely circumscribed.

Underlying the above two realizations, but perhaps less importantly, is a third factor contributing to Erdoğan's learning process. This is his recognition that many of the AKP's supporters voted for the party not for ideological motivations, but for practical socio-economic concerns.[19] The loss of support for the center-

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[18] Abdullah Gül, who works closely with Erdoğan, once said that "'our opposition to the European Union is based on the idea that we are from a different culture, we have a different identity and a different economic structure than European countries'" (cited in Robins 1997, 86).

[19] Estimates that about 25% of eligible voters did not vote at all (due to spoiled or uncast ballots) strengthens this realization; as well, the fact that all but two parties failed to pass the 10% threshold means that about 46% of votes were "wasted" on non-AKP parties (see Özel 2003, 82).

right parties, traditionally accounting for about 60% of the vote, meant an increase in support for the AKP. This could only indicate unhappiness with these other parties (Ayata 2004, 249). Islamic businesses and the growing Islamic middle class (i.e., those who with conservative, traditional, or more fundamentalist leanings) have also come to appreciate the benefits for the Turkish economy of strong ties to Europe (Ayata, 2004: 264-266, 270). Moreover, Yavuz (2003) argues that the Islamist movement in general has become less radical and more committed to "secularization"—that is, working within Western-style political and economic frameworks. Together, these meant that AKP support relied on meeting its voters' needs, which was not more religion but more economic security.

Erdoğan's pragmatism thus underlay his learning process. He came to the conclusion that, first, pursuing an Islamist agenda in Turkey would backfire on the Islamists themselves, because the Kemalists were resolutely against allowing this to happen and because the public was more interested in improving its socio-economic conditions. Second, Erdoğan came to understand that a modified Islamist agenda—that is, one that did not threaten to overturn the existing laicist political and social structures of Turkey but that did allow for greater acceptance of Islam in public life—would be better served through the EU. A European orientation was not the bogeyman that Erbakan had long believed it to be, and in fact could be helpful for the Islamists. He did not see the EU as a threat to Turkey's economic development or cultural independence, as Erbakan had, but rather as an instrument for advancing Turkey's cultural and economic

development by shielding Islam from the Kemalists. Without an emotional attachment to Islam, Erdoğan could think more pragmatically about how to protect Islam in Turkey.

Summary

This analysis leads us to the same conclusion reached in Chapter 5: that the role of the relevant individual leaders is the most convincing explanation for foreign policy variation in the case study examined here. Both Erbakan and Erdoğan had the option of EU membership as a strategic model before them: efforts to join the EU had been long-standing by then, particularly by the late 1980s. Yet Erbakan's ideological belief structures prevented him from accepting this option, while Erdoğan's pragmatism encouraged him to do so. The idea of EU membership was attractive to Erdoğan because of the shock of the ouster of Erbakan in 1997 and the 28 February process. These developments led him to conclude that a new policy of Islamism, one that would be less aggressive and less antagonistic to the Kemalists, was necessary, and that in foreign policy terms EU membership would actually benefit the Islamists rather than harm them. This is not to say that Erdoğan gave up on implementing an Islamist agenda; but it was a much-modified agenda, and his ultimate framework still draws on Islam (Sufi Islam, in particular). His pragmatism is, therefore, used in service of his Islamist goals. But the important element here is that this pragmatism allowed him to try different policies to meet the same ulterior objectives.

For his part, Erbakan was simply unable to contemplate such a drastic shift in the Islamist outlook and agenda. His ideal of Islam colored his thinking on politics. He had long condemned the EU as an organization purposefully committed to undermining Turkey and preventing it from regaining its past magnificence (either because the Zionists controlled it or because it was an exclusive Christian club with no tolerance for an Islamic country). Moreover, his basic understanding of the importance of Islam for Turkey and its rootedness in Turkish culture and identity pushed him to regard the Islamic world as the most appropriate locus for his foreign policy efforts. Turkey, he believed, would be better served by developing closer relations with this world at the expense of the West. Even though the option of EU membership was there (at least to try for it), he refused to adopt it.

The decentralized nature of Turkish decision-making institutions is a critical element in this case study. Turkish prime minister do not have autonomy in foreign policymaking; they are constrained by other state actors, primarily the military, who limit the foreign policy agenda to Kemalist policies—in foreign policy, a Western orientation. In Erbakan's case, this certainty led to his downfall. Unhappy with his orientation toward the Islamic world, the laicist elements of the state, especially the army, engineered his ouster, banning him and his party from politics. In Erdoğan's case, it provided the key element in his learning process. Erdoğan was determined not to repeat the mistakes of his predecessor, and he was careful to avoid stirring the military's retribution. In the end, this helped push him in the direction of the military's generally preferred path—better relations with

the EU and away from the Islamic world. Erdoğan ended up conforming, in other words, to the ideas advocated by the constraining actors in Turkish policymaking. But only as a pragmatic individual could he do so.

The Turkish case study also underlines the importance of institutions in any study of foreign policy. How a country's decision-making institutions are set up matters, since it prohibits or allows individual leaders to pursue their own personal ideas free from interference from other actors. This seems to highlight the necessary and sufficient nature of institutions, downplaying the role of the individual. But institutions are specified in this model as part of the conditions under which individuals matter. That is, institutions are important variables but, if we are examining foreign policy change, they cannot tell us why a particular decision (or variation) is made. After all, both Erbakan and Erdoğan faced the same institutional constraints—yet one refused to follow the guidelines set out by these institutions, while the other accepted them. This difference led to a foreign policy variation among Islamist prime ministers. The difference therefore lies in the individuals themselves. Institutions might help us understand one individual's decisions, but are not helpful for comparing decision variation.

An approach based on individuals and institutions provides the most effective account in explaining the foreign policy variation between the two Islamist prime ministers. Given their differing natures (ideological versus adaptable), one was unable to avoid clashing head-on with the laicist elements of the state, while the other was able to learn how to prevent such a collision and continue to advance his goals.

Finally, as in the Israeli case study, Erdoğan as an adaptable individual differs from the definition of pragmatism offered by the widely accepted literature on the subject, as detailed in Chapter 3. Erdoğan did actually risk the discontent of significant segments of the Islamist movement in going along with negotiations for EU membership—there was, after all, a second Islamist party that was much more conservative than the AKP. But Erdoğan engaged in this policy even in light of this unhappiness—he was not interested therefore in gaining, as standard definitions of pragmatic individuals argue, assurances and agreement from others, but rather pursued his foreign policy because he genuinely believed it would best serve the Islamist movement, regardless of whether or not there was complete agreement on this.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion: Implications of the Model

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to draw out the general implications of the model and the empirical research that supports it. It does this by highlighting the contributions the model makes to our understanding of Israeli and Turkish foreign policy, foreign policy analysis (FPA) and International Relations (IR), and foreign policy variation.

To this end, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section will compare the two case studies examined in the dissertation. Because the model is designed to explain foreign policy variation across a range of cases, a comparison of the examples can help shed more light on this. Understanding what is divergent in the two cases studies helps us understand how different historical and national circumstances can impact on the foreign policy decision-making process, as well as what elements of the model require further refinement and research.

The next segment focuses on the implication of this research for studying Israeli and Turkish foreign policy. This is done by focusing on the theoretical and empirical gaps in such studies, which the dissertation addresses. The fifth part examines the implications of the model for theory development. It highlights the literatures that it builds upon, as well as its contributions to the study of foreign policy more generally. A crucial piece of this section is the importance of the

model in demonstrating the integration of Middle East studies into IR theory more generally. Typically considered too unique to be part of general theoretical construction, this section illustrates that this is a false understanding that prevents effective explanation. The final section will present the policy implications of the theory, namely the critical importance of understanding who the individual decision-makers are in one's adversaries, allies, and friends.

Comparing the Case Studies

A comparative discussion of the two cases analyzed in the dissertation is helpful because it illustrates the applicability of the model to different states and different foreign policy decisions. Comparison of the two examples also filters out any necessary further empirical and theoretical research and refinements.

Despite the similarities between the two cases, as highlighted in Chapter One, there are significant differences between the case studies, as well. These include: the nature of decision-making institutions, coalition politics, and societal and elite agreement on the particular foreign policies examined here. The differences are perhaps more important than the similarities: if the model can be used to understand foreign policy variation in diverse states, its theoretical benefits are proved again and it is strengthened as a viable approach to foreign policy analysis.

The most important distinction in the two case studies is, of course, the nature of the decision-making institutions. Israel is a centralized polity, while Turkey is de-centralized. That is, Israeli prime ministers have much greater

leeway in making policy because they are not constrained by other actors, while Turkish prime ministers are restrained in their capacity for autonomous action by the Constitution and a host of state actors, including the civil service, the judiciary, and especially the armed forces. We can expect in such cases that individual decision-makers matter less. This is what happened with Erdoğan, who adopted the idea of EU membership after learning that the constraints on Islamist prime ministers were too great, and that membership would, in fact, benefit the Islamists in Turkey. As the evidence shows, there was a range of alternate policies available that previous decision-makers (Shamir and Erbakan) in fact chose, which means that Rabin and Erdoğan's own (learned) decisions were not the only available options. That individual leaders matter in both centralized and de-centralized systems is thus emphasized, strengthening our understanding of the role of individual leaders and the theoretical importance of decision-making institutions. In some countries (such as Turkey), other actors can constrain leaders and impact on their policymaking to a greater extent. Thus outcomes can be shaped not only directly by individuals, but also by institutions, which act on individuals. The conditions under which individuals operate matter, and are thus critical elements of a model of foreign policy change.

A second difference can be found in the nature of the governmental coalitions in Israel and Turkey. In the former, at the time of Oslo, Rabin's government depended on the support of an unwieldy, as it later proved, coalition, with Labor balanced between the more left-wing Meretz and the religious and more right-wing Shas. This impacted to some degree on both the urgency and the

timing of making policy but not the final decision itself. In Turkey, in contrast, the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*—AKP) held a majority of seats in the Grand National Assembly and formed the government alone; it could thus make policy without having to worry about engaging in trade-offs with other parties. But in both cases foreign policy was still decided on by the individual leaders; it was their decisions that mattered.

A third disparity lies is the nature of public support for the foreign policies examined here. Public opinion in Turkey, as well as the bulk of Turkish state and political actors, favored a foreign policy orientation toward Europe. Only the Islamists and, to a lesser degree the ultra-nationalists, disputed this attachment. In Israel, however, while public opinion was in general more supportive of peace efforts with the Palestinians than not, significant segments of the population as well as many members of the political elite disagreed with this support; moreover, the type of support (how much, what kind, etc.) was even more intensely debated. Improving relations with the Palestinians was widely supported, but a Palestinian state was not. Yet again, in both cases the model proves useful for explanation, since it was the individuals that mattered most and—regardless of public or elite support—that best account for the foreign policy variation.

Areas for Further Research

This part considers possible areas for further research, building on the theory presented in Chapter 3 and suggesting other theoretical and empirical avenues. The first point to note is that although case study methodology is widely

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recognized as an important method for explanation and theory development (Eckstein 1975; Jervis 1985b; Rogowski 1995), falsifiability—considered the mark of strong theory—is demonstrated the more case studies there are in an evaluation of a theory (see King, Keohane, Verba 1994). Examining different examples from different regions will also strengthen the model by providing insight into how widely applicable the model is, and how similar or dissimilar cases need be in order to test the model.

Second, the cases examined in this dissertation are from democratic polities. This has been to control for type of political system. These systems were also chosen because they provided harder tests for the model, since democracies are usually considered to be more open to numerous influences that dilute the importance of individual decision-makers. But we clearly need to study the foreign policy decisions of quasi-democracies, as well. The trend toward democratization across the world has affected every state differently; many of those that have been affected have become stuck in a middle-position between democracy and authoritarianism. The role of individuals in these systems is under-studied, and would provide a crucial testing ground for the model, as well as the study of foreign policy change more generally.

Third, although the role of individuals is well developed in foreign policy analysis, it is less commonly used in International Relations, where broader patterns of state behavior are more often the subject of investigation. Because the variables in the model are not specific to the countries examined here, their applicability to other foreign policy variations is a particularly rich area of

potential future research. In addition, foreign policy variation occurs more often than one might think, if one were only to examine the case studies examined in both FPA and IR. Still, if we are to highlight the importance of foreign policy variation to IR, we could distinguish important variations not only because of their contemporary significance for the country involved, but also for their impact on international politics—which constitutes the critical element in IR. Each of the potential empirical cases listed below includes the role of specific individual decision-makers who were central to the foreign policy change. This strengthens the argument for focusing on the impact of individuals in International Relations.

Some examples of foreign policy variations with significant impact on international politics include: Russian foreign policy variation from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin. Putin, compared to Yeltsin, has displayed greater willingness to assert Russian political and economic interests in Asia and parts of Europe (any number of specific decisions from within this broad shift might be chosen). This has complicated American foreign policymaking, as the United States (US) has sought to claim and defend its own political-economic interests. A second good example is the transition from Spanish president[1] José María Aznar to José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Aznar was a staunch backer of the American "war on terrorism" and supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq, including contributing troops to the campaign. His successor, Zapatero, made opposition to the war a central part of his campaign in the national elections in 2004; once elected he withdrew Spanish soldiers from Iraq. Zapatero has also oriented Spanish foreign policy

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[1] The institution of the Spanish presidency is very similar to that of a prime minister; Spain is identified as a parliamentary democracy.

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away from the close alliance with the US Aznar had cultivated, and more toward the United Nations and Latin America.

Iranian foreign policy has undergone significant change in recent years. Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami was widely recognized as a moderate and a reformer, both by internal and external observers. Although he did not preside over a dramatic turnaround in Iranian policy toward the West and the region, he did inject a major amount of moderation in Iranian foreign policy toward Iran's former antagonists in the region and even toward the United States. His predecessor in 2005, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has adopted a very different foreign policy. Instead of trying to show the world a more moderate Iran willing to work with the international community, he has alienated even many supporters in Europe by calling the Holocaust a lie and for the destruction of Israel, aggressively prompting Iran's nuclear program, and antagonizing the US on a host of foreign policy issues. The different policies of the two leaders is quite clear.

Finally, the seemingly sudden burst of American unilateralism under George W. Bush provides a final example, perhaps the most important in terms of its impact on international politics. The ideological framework that Bush operates under, compared to the much more multilateral structure of his predecessor Bill Clinton, has led to a serious shift in foreign policy in a number of areas (though in some cases momentum toward a specific policy was already building under Clinton). The desire to assert American interests and protect them with military force (encapsulated especially in the "war on terrorism") even in the face of

discomfort from allies, has clearly been the result of Bush's particular view of the world and America's place in it.

It is important that foreign policy variation be explained by reference to different leaders. Of course this sounds self-evident—that different leaders will enact different policies. But this is not necessarily so—for a long time different Israeli leaders, from both Labor and Likud, did not change Israeli policy toward the PLO or a Palestinian state. At the same time, we must be careful how we utilize individuals in such a study. There are examples of foreign policy change occurring under a single leader—the case of Ariel Sharon and the disengagement from Gaza is perhaps the most dramatic recent example—but this raises problems of falsifiability for the model. If a leader can simply change her mind, we might say that she is capable of learning. But if a leader appears to be ideological (as Sharon certainly was) *and then* changes his mind and therefore foreign policy, the theory cannot be falsified because we could simply argue that the leader was adaptable all along. We would not be able to explain whether an individual is ideological or adaptable except according to his behavior on the relevant issue; but as pointed out in Chapter 3, this is not an acceptable method for constructing falsifiable theories.

Whether this means that a single individual's belief structures and foreign policies can or cannot be studied as an explanation of foreign policy variation is unclear at this point; more research and development is clearly necessary.[2] The

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[2] Lebow and Stein (1993) have argued that foreign policy change *can* be explained by reference to a single leader, by showing how US President Jimmy Carter genuinely changed his views on the Soviet Union. But as even they argue, a researcher might utilize any one of many cognitive models

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model as currently formulated is not designed to explain foreign policy variation according to a single leader, but since there are cases of one leader changing her mind and the state's foreign policy, this is a fruitful avenue for future consideration.

Finally, there is no doubt that individuals are not always able to make new policy, no matter how centralized their decision-making institutions are. If there are specific conditions that make an individual leader more important, these conditions should be identified and catalogued. Are there times when external forces or domestic politics constrain leaders from making a specific foreign policy decision? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions at play during these moments? Further research on these questions would be useful for both the model and FPA more generally.

Implications for Israeli and Turkish Foreign Policy Analysis

The research conducted in this study contributes much to the study of Israeli and Turkish foreign policy. Although much has been written about both countries, there are some specific gaps in these literatures that this dissertation addresses. The most important element here is the widely considered uniqueness of both states. This exceptionalism, it has been assumed, prevents either country from being considered appropriate test cases for general IR theory development.[3]

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to explain an individual leader's foreign policy change, making such an analyses too circular and difficult to falsify since we could only know if a leader had changed his mind after the fact.

[3] This is not the case in comparative politics, where Turkish case studies have been extensively used in the context of studies on civil-military relations.

In the case of Israel, the fact that it is the only Jewish state in the world, that it is an advanced industrial democracy in a region of underdeveloped authoritarianism, that it is part of the West yet has been engaged in a protracted conflict punctured by several wars, and that it utilizes a mix of socialist and capitalist economic structures has led many scholars to ignore it when constructing general theoretical and empirical conclusions for international politics. In Barnett's words, "[f]or many social scientists the Israeli case represents an unapproachable challenge" (1996b, 3). Some scholars have tried to redress this unnecessary situation (see for examples Barnett 1996a; Telhami and Barnett 2002; Yishai 1991), and this study continues this effort.

In addition, there have been only a handful of theoretical works dealing with Israeli foreign policy over the last fifty years, which is surprising given the attention given to the country in the media, academia, and international politics, and its existence in a crucial and turbulent strategic region of the world. At the same time, while the Oslo Accords have been analyzed in numerous studies, rigorous theoretical analysis of the decision to sign them has been neglected in favor of overly descriptive efforts.

In addition to these theoretical lacuna, this study contributes to the analysis of Israeli foreign policy in two more ways: First, it shows that although Israeli foreign policy is often thought of as responsive to material forces—that is, security threats from surrounding Arab states and from Palestinians or domestic political pressures[4]—this is less often the case than is generally assumed. Second,

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[4] Clive Jones has referred to this as an "axiom" in the study of Israeli foreign policy (Jones 2002, 115)

relatedly, it provides more insight into the nature of Israeli foreign policymaking by focusing on those who make such decisions, rather than on the structural or domestic political forces impinging on Israel.

Turkey, too, has often been assumed to be too distinctive for general IR theory. It is identified as a Muslim-majority state that is staunchly secular, with a Constitutionally-mandated lack of role of Islam in public life—both at odds with other Muslim countries, particularly in the Middle East. As a country directly between Europe and the Middle East, it is seen as geographically, culturally, and politically idiosyncratic, being pushed and pulled both East and West. At the same time, as William Hale argues, "[t]he process of foreign policy-making is one of the least well-studied aspects of Turkish foreign policy, and suggestions can often only be speculative, or illustrated by occasional examples" (2002, 205). In addition, the question of Turkey's membership in the EU, despite the critical significance of it for Turkey (touching as it does on virtually all aspects of its identity, economy, society, and polity), is usually examined in purely descriptive terms, with little rigorous theoretical analysis.

Attempts to explain Erdoğan's decision have often focused on his own belief that EU membership would be better for Turkey and for Islam in Turkey. But these have remained surface analyses, and moreover have been primarily descriptive in nature, with little in the way of more general conclusions drawn for the study of Turkish foreign policy or foreign policy variation in general.

Empirically, the dissertation highlights two areas that require more attention in studying Turkish foreign policy. First, examinations of Turkish

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foreign policy that have focused on domestic politics have highlighted the interaction between the military and civilian leaders and the impact of the military on decision-making. While the army cannot be excluded from analysis, the role of individual decision-makers is stronger than is often assumed. Individuals are relevant, and they can make foreign policy decisions. This has recently become more recognized in comparative political discussions (see Aknur 2005), but it has yet to trickle into FPA. Second, this necessary shift to individuals and their impact on policymaking necessitates a shift from comparative politics arguments (civil-military relations) to models and approaches used more often in FPA. This study is part of this new trend.

Finally, as this study has shown, both Turkey and Israel can contribute to IR and FPA theory building. Case study methodology, in particular, is one way to include these states. All states have special historical and national circumstances that contribute to their foreign policy. We cannot assume these pressures emanate from the same sources, to the same degrees, or are identical over time. Yet if other countries can be used in the development of theory, then so should Israel and Turkey. The variables used in the model are not unique to these countries: individuals and institutions are present in all polities.

Implications for Theory

My study also has several implications for theory development, in both FPA and IR. First, it builds on several literatures, extending our understanding in these fields and contributing to debates within them. This includes: One, and most

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importantly, it strengthens our understanding of the role of individuals in FPA and, where it is especially lacking, in IR and the conditions under which they matter. This strengthens the arguments made by those focusing on psychological aspects of individual leaders and their impact on foreign policy.

Psychological analyses are often considered unique to the individual involved. My model illustrates that such approaches can be used more generally as well, by placing them on a continuum of ideological-adaptable. This builds on the work by others who have defined individuals similarly, but the model used here provides a more effective definition of these categories. Most significantly, the inclusion of affect in explaining foreign policy addresses a major gap in the FPA and IR literatures (see Crawford 2000). IR has generally borrowed concepts from psychology several years after they have already become popular in the latter. The study of affect and emotion on decision-making is already well developed in the psychology, decision research, and neural science literatures. My study brings these concepts into IR and thus provides original understandings of foreign policy decision-making.

At the same time, because of the impact the specific foreign policy variations analyzed here have on international politics more generally, my study answers the call to advance our understanding of the role of individuals in IR, particularly in areas outside of the traditional IR purview such as the causes of war and alliance formation (see Byman and Pollack 2001). The changes in the Israeli-Palestinian relationship since 1993 have had a profound impact on regional politics, while the changes in Turkey's domestic structures and foreign relations

stemming from its desire for EU membership have also have a critical impact on the region. In addition, any improvement in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict will help us better understand protracted conflict elsewhere, while the closer Turkey comes to joining the EU the better understanding we will have of the development of global institutions and the factors (material, ideational) that lead to their maintenance and expansion.

Two, this study expands the literature on strong-weak states and their relations to society. The focus on institutional capacity in the context of policymaking, as presented here, underlines the importance of state capacity vis-à-vis societal elements. Three, the importance of understanding national historical development contributes to the rapidly expanding historical institutionalism literature. The importance of understanding the development of decision-making institutions—a main concern of historical institutionalism—is underlined here. The blending of individuals and institutions opens up exciting new avenues of research in this area.

Four, the ideational structures of a country do matter—the ideational literature has been explicit about this. But how they matter is not so well understood. Understanding the conditions under which these structures impact on foreign policymaking would strengthen the study of the role of ideas in IR. Finally, this study expands our understanding of foreign policymaking in parliamentary systems. This fills a gap in the study of leaders of democracies, which has for the most part focused in presidents, especially American presidents. It is often assumed that prime ministers, by the very nature of the parliamentary

system, are constrained from exerting too much of an autonomous role policymaking, due to the collective, factional, and coalitional nature of government (Kaarbo 1997, 559). This may well be the case in some countries, but as this study demonstrates, it is not the case everywhere. The ability of individual leaders to break free from these constraints—or even operate within them—is highlighted here and demonstrates the importance of individuals even in parliamentary systems to the foreign policy.

Second, my study contributes to our understanding of state behavior by analyzing two examples of foreign policy *variation*. Most analyses of foreign policy focus on either foreign policy continuity (i.e., why a specific state has a specific foreign policy) or on a particular foreign policy (i.e., policy toward another state or an issue-area in international politics). But less attention has been directed at variation in foreign policy. Yet this is a crucial area for FPA and IR, because it can help us understand the conditions under which state behavior changes. After all, states do not have the same policy all the time; policies change. In order to understand *why* they change (i.e., what are the circumstances that lead to change), we must analyze variation in policy. Only by doing so can we understand the conditions that have led to this shift.

Third, underlining all this, my study is a commitment to theoretical synthesis, including a bridge connecting International Relations with comparative politics. As noted in Chapter 1, scholars have for long been emphasizing that researchers should draw together various literatures, levels of analyses, and disciplines in order to construct more multi-causal explanations. I believe this

amalgamation is more effective at explanation and identifying the relevant factors in foreign policy variation.

Fourth, the comparative nature of this study also allows for better understanding of the conditions that underlie foreign policymaking and foreign policy variation. Typically, studies of foreign policy focus on one country only, unless there is a grouping within an edited volume. But including more than one case study helps identify the most relevant factors; comparing case studies highlights the similarities and differences between them, and this allows for the scholar to tease out what is most important for understanding foreign policy variation, and what is specific to a country and what can be generalized to other countries.

The Middle East in IR Theory

A final contribution of this study brings the Middle East into FPA and IR theory development. Like the two countries examined in the dissertation, this region has too often been considered too unique for general theory construction. This has not always been the case: older studies using the Middle East often came under a Realist-type framework (see, for example Walt 1987; for more on this, see Jacoby and Sasley 2002, 3-5). But more recent studies of Middle Eastern foreign policy have tended to utilize a country- or region-specific analytical framework that does not travel easily to other areas of the world. Ideational factors such as culture, identity, and religion tend to be the dominant themes used in these approaches.

A recent study found that of the top three journals in the field of IR (*World Politics, International Studies Quarterly,* and *International Organization*), there is a "relative absence" of studies utilizing the Middle East that is "noteworthy" (Breuning, Bredehoft, and Walton 2005, 456). While there are numerous books on the foreign policy of individual states in the Middle East, the lack of studies on the region in general IR theory development in journals, where much of this work is done, indicates a general belief that the Middle East may not be that relevant for IR theory development.[5] An additional problem in this context is that when studies do try to draw out general patterns of behavior for theory development, the focus is on the Arab world, since Arab states form the overwhelming bulk of the region (see, for example, Gause 1999). My study aims to rectify this unbalanced condition, by showing that the Middle East and its countries (including Israel and Turkey) are perfectly acceptable cases to use for general theory development.

Three points are relevant here. First, studies on the role of ideas have not examined the developing world in general or the Middle East in particular. The focus has been on the advanced industrial democracies or certain other states closely integrated into the Western-dominated international system with a critical role to play in it, such as Russia. Where the role of ideas has been extended to non-Western areas (e.g., Sikkink 1991), the focus has been Latin America, and on domestic issues. Michael Barnett is a notable, nearly lone, example of a scholar who has sought to bring the role of ideas to the study of the Middle East, in both the Arab world (1998) and Israel (2002), but there is clearly a large gap that still needs to be filled. This study aims to address this disparity.

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[5] A notable exception is Korany, Noble, and Brynen (1993).

Second, this study is essentially an argument that theoretical and empirical insights from the Middle East can be relevant not only to other developing regions of the world, but to foreign policymaking and variation in the developed world as well. The incorporation of individuals and institutions (all relevant in general IR, even political science) through Middle Eastern examples confirms both the importance and necessity of studying models beyond Western world application only. Because the model utilizes these general variables, it may be applicable to any state anywhere in the world. Further research on this is, of course, necessary, but a first-cut use of the model suggests that this may well be the case.

Finally, underlying the above points is the importance, perhaps even necessity, of drawing bridges between area studies and IR (for good overall discussions see Brynen 1993 and Tessler 1999). Given the complexity of foreign policymaking and the importance of understanding foreign policy in general and foreign policy variation in particular, scholars must have an appreciation of the distinct historical development and cultural, economic, social, and political elements relevant to any given state or region. Area studies specialists have this knowledge. But in the study of Middle East foreign policy, these scholars have primarily highlighted the overriding importance of state- or region-specific factors, such identity or culture (e.g., the impact of Islam). This inhibits effective comparison between states across the global system.

But by using their intimate understandings of the Middle East to construct more general understandings of international relations and foreign policy, these researchers can contribute to a richer, more nuanced understanding of these

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issues. The accusation that area studies scholars are too parochial, too concerned with descriptive exercises only, and too little versed in general IR theory may have been true at one point, but this is not the case any longer. This study continues the trend toward greater integration of these two fields, by bringing the Middle East into general IR theory development through rigorous theoretical construction and deep empirical research.

Policy Implications

The model has an important policy implication, namely, the value of understanding who the individual decision-makers are in any given polity. This is critical for policymakers in other countries. A better understanding of leaders can provide not only an explanation for their actions, but some predictive value as well—how they might react when presented with specific policy options. Knowledge of a state's external environment, security situation, and domestic politics are all relevant, but none of these can *cause* an individual's policy— examples abound of leaders who have given in to such pressure, but also of leaders who have not. The unchanged variable here is the individual decision-maker.

Ideological leaders are more likely to resist new policy ideas that do not conform to their pre-existing beliefs, while adaptable leaders are more likely to shift foreign policy to meet the challenges and problems of international politics. In Israel, where Yitzhak Rabin was willing to do what he could to improve relations with the United States, his predecessor, Yitzhak Shamir, resisted

strenuous American efforts to fashion a peace framework because he had no intention of giving up any part of the West Bank or Gaza to Palestinian control outside of overall Israeli sovereignty. The Americans, having been told about the existence of the Oslo track early on, might have given it more consideration as the Washington talks continued to stall, had they understood Rabin's pragmatic nature and his strong desire to move ahead on the peace front with the Palestinians. Instead, they were as surprised and unprepared as anyone when Shimon Peres and the Norwegian foreign minister presented it to them in the final draft.

This implication is critically important, for example, in conflict resolution efforts. It can do so by helping policymakers understand the personal motivations and decisions of leaders involved in these types of conflict. The actions of Protestant, Catholic, and British leaders in the conflict in Northern Ireland; the insurgencies in both Sri Lanka and Iraq; and the various low-intensity conflicts throughout south-east and central Asia could all be more effectively dealt with if we can better understand the actions of the individuals leaders and, therefore, what it would take to resolve these prolonged disputes.

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Appendix A: Ethics Approval