# THE MICRO-STORY OF MULTICULTURALISM:
## DIVERSE SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE SOCIALIZATION OF TOLERANCE

**ALLISON HARELL**

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
MCGILL UNIVERSITY, MONTREAL
JANUARY, 2008

# ABSTRACT

Does political tolerance have any limits? What must people "put up with" to be considered politically tolerant? In political science, tolerance has been conceived and measured as an absolute democratic value. The politically tolerant are willing to put up with everything and any objection to public expression is branded intolerant by empirical political science. This dissertation challenges this approach to the concept of tolerance. It demonstrates that civil liberties decisions in contemporary, multicultural democracies are increasingly complicated by values other than freedom of expression, such as social inclusion and non-discrimination. A more nuanced view of political tolerance is necessary.

Drawing from comparative and critical race legal studies' of free speech, a theoretical distinction is developed between exclusionary expression and other types of objectionable speech. Exclusionary speech is defined as a form of public expression with the intent to exclude minorities from full participation in society. The focus is on rights denial, and such speech typically comes from more privileged social groups. This speech is argued to be fundamentally different from other types of speech.

This theoretical distinction is examined empirically using the Comparative Youth Study, a survey conducted with $10^{th}$ and $11^{th}$ grade students in Belgium and Canada (n=9599). Results suggest that many young people in these countries do distinguish between exclusionary and other forms of speech when making civil liberties judgments. Young people who express tolerance for some forms of speech, but draw the line at exclusionary speech are considered to endorse a multicultural form of political tolerance. Multicultural tolerance is shown to be empirically distinct from both a general intolerance and absolute tolerance.

To explain who develops multicultural tolerance, this dissertation extends social psychological research on the contact hypothesis to political tolerance judgments. Results indicate that as expected, majority group members who have more interaction with people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds are more likely to express

multicultural tolerance. The thesis concludes by arguing that the targets of tolerance judgments must be incorporated into our understanding and measurement of political tolerance. The implications of these findings are discussed in light of concerns about the impact of increasing diversity on democratic politics.

ഈ ഇ ഈ

Y a-t-il des limites à la tolérance politique? Faut-il que les gens supportent tous genres d'expression pour être considérés comme tolérants? En science politique, la tolérance a été conçue et mesurée comme une valeur démocratique absolue. Les personnes politiquement tolérantes doivent tout supporter et ne jamais restreindre l'expression publique d'aucune manière. Cette thèse remet en question cette approche de la tolérance. Elle démontre que dans les démocraties multiculturelles, les jugements sur les libertés civiques sont fortement compliqués par des valeurs autres que la liberté d'expression, comme l'inclusion sociale et la non-discrimination. Une perspective plus nuancée est nécessaire.

En utilisant les perspectives comparatives et les études de *critical race theory*, une distinction théorique se développe entre les expressions d'exclusion et d'autres types d'expressions publiques. Les propos d'exclusion sont définis par l'expression publique d'idées qui ont pour but d'exclure les minorités de la pleine participation sociétale. Ces propos tendent à bafouer les droits et proviennent d'habitude de groupes sociaux plus privilégiés. Cette forme d'expression publique est considérée comme fondamentalement différente d'autres types d'expression.

Cette distinction théorique est examinée avec l'Étude Comparative de la Jeunesse, une enquête présentée aux étudiants de IV$^{ème}$ et V$^{ème}$ années de Secondaire, en Belgique et au Canada (n=9599). Les résultats suggèrent que dans ces deux pays, beaucoup de jeunes font la distinction entre les propos d'exclusion et d'autres formes d'expression lorsqu'ils portent des jugements sur les libertés civiques. Les jeunes qui sont capables de tolérer certaines expressions, mais qui mettent une limite à l'expression d'exclusion, sont considérés comme adhérant à une forme multiculturelle de la tolérance politique. Il est

démontré que cette forme de tolérance est bien distincte d'une intolérance générale et d'une tolérance absolue.

Afin d'expliquer qui développe une tolérance multiculturelle, cette thèse étend la recherche de la psychologie sociale sur l'hypothèse de contact aux questions de la tolérance politique. Comme prévu, les résultats indiquent que les jeunes de la majorité sociale qui ont plus de contacts avec les gens d'autres races et ethnicités, ont plus de chances d'adhérer à une tolérance politique multiculturelle. Cette thèse conclut en soutenant que les objets de tolérance doivent être incorporés dans notre compréhension et notre mesure de la tolérance politique. Au final, les implications des ces résultats sont examinées en lien avec les préoccupations de l'impact de la diversité ethnoculturelle sur le fonctionnement des politiques démocratiques.

# Acknowledgments

During the writing of this dissertation, the famous feminist theorist Iris Marion Young passed away. While the work in this dissertation is not directly related to hers, the ways in which I think about political inclusion and what is required for democratic politics to not only work, but to work fairly, are very much inspired by her texts. In reading *Inclusion and Democracy* (2000), she reminded me what it means to be passionate and excited about what one is doing and that what 'political science' is about is not just knowledge, but knowledge that matters for real world problems. Her theoretical work is grounded in reality and the issues found there. The work that follows is an attempt to see how free expression works in the real world and to understand the various ways in which people understand the role of free expression in coming to just, democratic solutions. I would be remiss not to acknowledge the role that her work and her energy has done to inspire this.

Of course, it takes more than inspiration to write a dissertation. There are many people without whom I would not have had the guidance, support, and thoughtful criticism that contributed to this research being completed to the standards that it is. My dissertation supervisor, Dietlind Stolle, has been an invaluable resource and mentor in this process. She has taken an interest in my work, provided me with countless opportunities for feedback, collaboration and discussion, and always had positive, encouraging words for me. She has also always made sure I had the financial support I needed to complete this massive undertaking in a timely manner. This dissertation would certainly not have been possible without her willingness to include me in the development and administration of the Comparative Youth Study, which is the primary database used through this study.

The Comparative Youth Study was a collaborative effort by two research teams, one in Canada and one in Belgium. Marc Hooghe, who is the principal investigator for the Belgian team, was gracious enough to include my questions in the Belgian survey, which made possible the comparative component of this study. Other members of the Canadian and Belgian research teams deserve my gratitude as well for their diligence in

The members of my dissertation committee, Elisabeth Gidengil and Stuart Soroka, have been invaluable during the writing and analysis stages of this dissertation. They both provided me with timely feedback and thoughtful criticism. I would like to thank Elisabeth especially for her close, scrutinizing readings of numerous drafts and Stuart for many insightful discussions we had concerning the statistical analyses conducted in this work.

I have also received financial support from the American Association of University Women's American Dissertation Fellows Program, McGill University and the Department of Political Science at McGill. Additional travel and statistical training would not have been possible without support from the McGill-University of Montreal European Studies Institute, the Quebec Interuniversity Centre for Social Statistics, and the PGSS at McGill.

Many colleagues and friends have also supported this project in numerous ways. Anna Carastathis, and my dear younger brother Kiel, have both read drafts of chapters and provided useful feedback. In addition, I would like to thank Kelly Blidook, Marc-André Bodet, Rachel Brickner, Jillian Evans, Elizabeth Goodyear-Grant, Bill Hunt, Christine Knott, and Jason Roy for their support and friendship during this process.

And to Blake Andrew, what can I say? I thank him for reading all those drafts, listening to me endlessly discuss the nuance of this graph or that concept, and for always

being there, personally and professionally. He kept me sane and always reminded me to put things in perspective.

Finally, I would be remiss not to thank my parents. Growing up, I never realized how fortunate I was to have parents who believed in me unquestionably and allowed me to make my own decisions, both in everyday life and on larger questions about my place in the world and what I would do with the time I have in it. They let me leave the 'nest' very early to explore the world for myself. Their love and support, as well as their constant interest in what I was doing, even when my studies had surpassed their own, have given me the confidence to pursue this research. I hope the text that follows makes them proud.

Of course, as a Chinese proverb reminds us: A teacher opens the door. You go through it yourself. While many people have opened doors for me, the text that follows and any shortcomings are my own. Regardless of any limitations, the manuscript would surely never have been completed to the standard it is without the support – intellectual, financial, and emotional - from the people who have helped me along the way. My heartfelt thanks go out to all of them.

<div style="text-align: right">

Allison Harell
Montreal, Canada
January 8, 2007

</div>

# Table of Contents

# List of Tables

# List of Figures

# AN INTRODUCTION

---

> *We are not faced with the straightforward choice between a complete refusal to criticize the practices and beliefs of other cultures ("multiculturalism") and simply accepting whatever prejudices and antipathies children might possess so long as they do not act on them ("toleration"). Neither of these options is defensible. What we need to recognize is that any inculcation of the virtue of toleration (and any coherent form of multiculturalism) must attend to questions about what it is reasonable to object to, as well as about which of those things that are objectionable should be tolerated and which should not.*
>
> John Horton (1996, 37)

A core feature of contemporary democracies is the value that is placed on individual freedoms of expression and thought. The idea that citizens must tolerate a diversity of beliefs is fundamental to democratic politics. Yet, as societies become increasingly composed of different ethnocultural communities, as conflicts over religious accommodation and social integration are debated within governments and popular media, a key question of our time is whether political tolerance has any limits in multicultural societies. Both multiculturalism and liberal notions of toleration have at their core a celebration of diversity. Yet, they differ dramatically in how such diversity is to be protected. On the one hand, multiculturalism encourages people to understand other cultures on their own terms. People are encouraged to see the value of other ways of living and encouraged to overcome any negative feelings they may hold toward other people. Liberal notions of toleration, on the other hand, are typically defined in terms of overcoming one's prior negative judgments about a set of values or opinions. The perspective of 'live and let live' does not require acceptance. In fact, political tolerance, under most accounts, is only necessary in situations where the other perspective is viewed as wrong or immoral.

The juxtaposition of multiculturalism and liberal toleration is much more than a normative thought experiment. It has very real and important consequences for everyday politics as well. Democratic societies, in their legal frameworks, classrooms, and policy initiatives, encourage citizens to be socially tolerant – that is to learn to interact and accept other social groups in their private and public lives – and simultaneously to be politically tolerant – to put up with the expression of ideas that they find reprehensible. What happens when these two values clash? Should we teach young people to be tolerant of everything, even the intolerant? Or should we teach them to embrace diversity in a way that isolates those who would challenge it? The main research questions focus on two issues: whether young citizens favor restrictions on speech that promotes social intolerance, and the extent to which exposure to ethnocultural diversity explains such restrictions.

The conflict between social and political tolerance is most evident in hateful speech directed at ethnic and racial minorities. In recent years, many advanced, industrialized democracies, especially in Europe, have increasingly struggled with how to balance rights to free speech with laws that are intended to prevent mass intolerance of minority groups. Holocaust denial laws, for example, restrict people's right to publicly challenge the occurrence or nature of the mass genocide of Jews in Europe during the Second World War.[1] Holocaust denial is a crime in a number of Western democracies, including Belgium, France, and Germany, and is limited in other countries by broader hate speech legislation, such as in Canada and the United Kingdom (Boyle 2001; Rosenfeld 2003; Douglas-Scott 1999; Coliver et al. 1992).

The use of such legislation is often highly contested. Consider the trial of David Irving, a British historian and infamous Holocaust "revisionist" who was sentenced to three years in prison by an Austrian court in 2005 for denying that the Holocaust occurred. In Austria and across Europe and North America, the sentence has raised debates about whether courts should intervene in cases where the only crime is one of words. Many have argued that trying Irving's absurdity gives it a legitimacy it does not

---

[1] The implication of denying the holocaust is usually either expressly or implicitly that the Holocaust is a hoax perpetrated by Jews in order to gain reparations. For a discussion of Holocaust denial and the movement that endorses it, see Lipstadt (1993).

deserve.[2]   The idea that hateful speech is more accurately combated by more speech, rather than censorship, is a view that has been advocated even by those who have argued the most forcefully about the harms such speech can cause (Butler 1997; see also, Gelber 2002).   Yet, the very existence of such legislation in Canada and many established Western European democracies raises questions about why such laws are considered legitimate (and constitutionally protected) when freedom of expression is a key guiding principle of democratic politics.

While the United States is often cited as an exception to such laws (Boyle 2001), it too has seen substantial debate over the appropriate limits of speech.  The 1980s and 1990s saw a trend on university campuses to institute hate speech ordinances which placed limits on derogatory speech aimed at minority groups (see, for example, Lawrence 1990; Downs 2004).  Despite the fact that these ordinances were overturned by the courts in the United States, they highlight how similar concerns about the limits of speech in racially and ethnically diverse contexts are emerging.

Debates surrounding holocaust denial and hate speech codes are instructive because they shine light on two very different public reactions.  Some argue that such speech denies minorities' rights to live their lives free from physical and psychological threat, while others argue that freedom of speech is an unconditional, inalienable right. To place limits on it arguably risks censoring legitimate dissent that is fundamental to democratic debate.  More generally, such controversies highlight the tension between freedom of expression and increasing concern about being tolerant toward minorities in contemporary, multicultural democracies.  As a leading multicultural theorist notes, the last four decades have seen a rise in identity politics where the "demand for recognition goes far beyond the familiar plea for toleration, for the latter implies conceding the validity of society's disapproval and relying on self-restraint.  Rather they ask for the acceptance, respect and even public affirmation of their differences" (Parekh 2000, 1). How can such calls for acceptance be reconciled with the rights of those who adamantly *reject* such pleas?

---

[2] See, for example, responses provided by Lipstadt, an American academic who is a scholar and vocal critic of holocaust denial.  She publicly questioned Irving's sentence, arguing that she "is uncomfortable with imprisoning people for speech.  Let him go and let him fade from everyone's radar screens" (O'Neill 2006).

This dissertation argues that the study of citizens' attitudes about speech fails to capture important distinctions that people make across different types of speech. Citizens' attitudes toward freedom of expression are typically embodied by the concept of political tolerance. Dating back to Locke and Mill, political tolerance has become central to liberal democratic thinking, and has been defined largely in terms of the extension of civil liberties such as speech and assembly to groups that a majority find objectionable (Stouffer 1963; Sullivan et al. 1982). Most liberals argue that limitations on speech violate the autonomy of individual citizens, prevent rational and democratic debate and give too much power to the state to censor meaningful dissent.[3] Freedom of expression, from this perspective, is absolute. Yet, there are situations in which freedom of expression is used to challenge individual autonomy and democratic debate. This arises in the case of exclusionary speech.

Exclusionary speech is defined in this research as the expression of ideas by dominant social group members that are intended to deny or denigrate the inclusion of ethnocultural minorities in public life through intimidation and the propagation of prejudice. Despite popular debates and comparative juridical differences with how exclusionary speech is dealt with, little empirical research has integrated these concerns into the conceptualization and measurement of civil liberties judgments at the individual level. How do citizens understand and define the limits of tolerance? In the chapters that follow, I will demonstrate that many young citizens favor some limits on free expression, and they do so in ways that appear to balance the demands of democratic politics and the need to promote social inclusion in increasingly diverse countries. In doing so, this research problematizes an absolute conception of political tolerance and examines what limits, if any, the next generation of citizens place on speech.

Drawing on critical race and comparative legal studies, I develop in Chapter 1 a typology of speech with a specific focus on legal and normative limitations on exclusionary forms of expression. I argue that objections to certain forms of speech should not be constructed as intolerance. Multicultural theorists have increasingly pointed to the need to consider the role of groups in structuring one's experiences,

---

[3] Defenses of freedom of speech are numerous, and many of the key texts stem from the American First Amendment experience. Important defenses of freedom of expression include Nagel (1995), Sunstein (1993; 2003), Dworkin (1985; 2000), Scanlon (1972), Fiss (1996b; 1996a) and Meiklejohn (2000).

4

whether that be through group-specific rights or group-based remedies to social exclusion (Kymlicka 1995b; Taylor and Gutmann 1992; Young 1990, 2000). Hate speech laws are examples of legislation that acknowledge group-based offenses, and implicitly make distinctions between differently-situated groups in society. The rights of minority groups to equal participation in society have been interpreted by courts in many countries to mean that certain types of speech that promote hatred toward people defined by race, ethnicity, religion and, in some countries, sexuality can be censored.

Whether or not such restrictions are justified is a normative question that is beyond the scope of this research. However, the fact that such debates exist means that defining citizens' civil liberties judgments as democratic or not without considering the types of speech they are being asked to tolerate does not take into account the diversity of opinions that exist about what must be tolerated in contemporary, multicultural democracies.[4] Only by examining civil liberties judgments across different types of speech can the nature of citizens' dispositions toward speech rights be assessed. A key contention of this project is that 'intolerance' of groups that promote hatred must not be deemed evidence of a general intolerance unless it is accompanied by a parallel willingness to suppress the civil liberties of other groups. In other words, a willingness to censor exclusionary speech may not be related to a general intolerance. When it is not, I argue, we get legitimate disagreements among citizens about the limits of tolerance. Such disagreements usually coalesce into two unique tolerance dispositions, which I will call absolute tolerance and multicultural tolerance. In the former, free speech is assumed to be paramount and inviolable whereas in the latter, speech can be limited in instances where it threatens social inclusion.

By considering hate speech as exclusionary and by showing the comparative prominence of such restrictions, I challenge the group-blind approach to conceptualizing, and in turn measuring, political tolerance that is prominent in the literature. While political tolerance – the willingness to extend civil liberties to groups which one finds objectionable – is an important democratic value, contemporary controversies concerning

---

[4] For a philosophical treatment of the challenge that diverse societies pose to a uniform definition of political tolerance, see McKinnon and Castiglione (2003).

the limits of free expression suggest that a more nuanced view of civil liberties judgments is appropriate.

The empirical analysis that underpins this study is presented in the remaining chapters. Data for this analysis are drawn from the Comparative Youth Study (CYS), which was conducted in Canada and Belgium during the 2005-2006 academic year. The CYS entails responses to almost 10,000 questionnaires administered to students in tenth and eleventh grade classrooms, and includes a measure developed specifically to test inter-target group tolerance judgments. The choice to examine civil liberties judgments in these two countries provides a comparative test of the presence and possibility of a more multicultural form of tolerance in contemporary, multicultural democracies. Canada is considered as a crucial case study in this comparison, as it has a population that is characterized by an extremely high level of ethnic and racial diversity and has a long history of multicultural policies. Belgium provides a comparison case that shares many of the same structural characteristics as Canada but differs with respect to its history of immigration and current levels of ethnic and racial diversity. One of the special features of the CYS is its focus on youth. I argue that increasing ethnocultural diversity in these two countries is most likely to impact the political tolerance values of young people who have grown up surrounded by ethnically and racially diverse peers. A complete description of the data, methods and sampling is provided in Chapter 2.

These data are employed in Chapter 3 to provide evidence that young people in Canada and Belgium are less willing to tolerate groups associated with hate speech. At the individual level, three dispositions toward political tolerance are possible: some individuals are simply intolerant of dissent, a small portion of youth meets the ideals of absolute political tolerance found in the literature, and finally, a significant portion in both countries responds across target groups in a manner consistent with a more multicultural conception of tolerance. Multicultural tolerance is defined as a willingness to tolerate some objectionable speech, but setting a limit when it comes to exclusionary speech. This finding challenges the uni-dimensional construction of political tolerance dominant in the literature. These results further suggest the need for an alternative measurement of political tolerance that captures inter-target group distinctions in political tolerance, which is presented in this chapter.

Chapters 4 and 5 examine how we can understand the development of multicultural tolerance. In Chapter 4, I examine the major correlates of political tolerance found in the literature to examine their leverage in explaining tendencies toward multicultural rather than absolute forms of tolerance. The results suggest that the correlates prominent in the literature provide little leverage in explaining why some young people show a targeted "intolerance" of exclusionary speech. Instead, the traditional correlates of absolute political tolerance, such as democratic participation and education, tend to distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. This chapter provides compelling support for the idea that intolerance of exclusionary speech, when combined with a willingness to allow other objectionable speech, is fundamentally different from a general intolerance. This "targeted intolerance" does not correspond with political intolerance more generally. Rather, it represents a pattern of civil liberties judgments that is consistent with a more multicultural form of tolerance.

Chapter 5 then presents and tests an alternative set of explanatory variables. Drawing on detailed social network data gathered in the CYS, I demonstrate that multicultural tolerance is more likely to emerge in socially diverse settings. It is perhaps not surprising that young people who are surrounded by socially-diverse others will be more socially tolerant. What is important is that these contexts also help to explain why some people make distinctions across speech types. Young people who have more socially diverse networks are shown to find exclusionary speech more objectionable and to be less willing to allow its expression.

More specifically, I demonstrate that white youth who are exposed to greater levels of racial and ethnic diversity are more likely to be multicultural tolerators than either intolerant or absolutely tolerant. The reason, I argue, is that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity leads to greater identification with minorities, especially when diversity occurs among closer friends. At the same time, diversity among weaker ties facilitates the development of cognitive skills that makes tolerance of other types of speech more likely. These two processes provide the foundation for the causal argument that multicultural tolerance emerges in more diverse settings, where positive interaction between people from different backgrounds can facilitate identification with the targets of

exclusionary speech as well as generate a respect for dissenting opinions that underpins support for free speech.

A key contribution of this study is to elucidate the nature of civil liberties judgments in multicultural democracies among the newest generation of citizens. As societies increasingly face serious questions about how to balance individual rights with the need for a socially inclusive society, it is necessary to understand how attitudes toward rights develop. It seems undeniable that the populations in advanced industrialized democracies will continue to become more diverse as immigration from developing nations brings in people with different religious, ethnic and cultural backgrounds. Different birthrates within countries also contribute to shifts in the demographic make-up of countries like Canada and Belgium. The impact this has on the functioning of democratic politics is largely unknown. Concern over social integration and political disengagement must be balanced with an empirical examination of the ways in which such diversity not only changes political attitudes and behaviors, but also how it can force researchers to re-evaluate the ways in which democratic values are understood, and in turn, measured.

The saliency of such issues has never been more important. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, Canada, the U.S. and Western Europe have seen an increase in anti-immigrant – and especially anti-Muslim – sentiment (Larsson 2005; Panagopoulos 2006; Ahmad 2006). Reports in the popular media, as well as among politicians, are increasingly asking how far Western societies should go in accommodating the needs of minority groups and the impact this may have on cherished democratic rights. For example, in 2007 in Quebec, a provincial commission was set up to assess how far Quebec society could accommodate the practices of minority groups. Among the many issues that emerged were questions about whether or not religious and cultural symbols, especially the *hijab*, should be allowed in public spaces such as schools and voting booths. Individual rights to religious expression, when used by religious minorities, were seen as threatening other rights, such as equality between the sexes and a division of church and state. Such discussions are not limited to Quebec either. In 2004, a French law banned the wearing of ostensible religious symbols in public schools, which was seen by many to directly target Muslim youth who wear the veil.

8

Such fear over individual expression of religious faith (especially particular religious faiths) is complicated. On the one hand, ethnic and religious minority groups are guaranteed the same right to expression, assembly and religion that define democratic politics. The ability of society to "put up with" how they use these rights is a measure in many ways of the ability of democratic politics to be inclusive. Yet, the fear among the larger society is that such rights will be used to undermine the very democratic freedoms that such rights ensure.

This dynamic is highlighted in the recent controversy that emerged after a Danish newspaper, *Jyllands-Posten*, published a series of 12 satirical cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in September, 2005. Over the months that followed, Muslims around the world expressed anger and outrage – some peacefully and others quite violently – over the images.[5] The Danish paper explained that the commissioned cartoons were a "response to several incidents of self-censorship in Europe caused by widening fears and feelings of intimidation in dealing with issues related to Islam" (Rose 2006). The argument was that increasing efforts to accommodate and be sensitive to Islam was resulting in a chilling effect on democratic debate. They maintained that publishing the cartoons was not only legal, but a necessary use of their right to free expression.

Yet, many Muslims saw the publication as contrary to the country's ideals of social inclusion. In Islam, images of the Prophet are prohibited and those that portray him negatively, as in two of the cartoons in particular, were seen as particularly insulting.[6] The images were said to be offensive, and even illegal given the countries restrictions on hate speech and religious blasphemy. More importantly, the publication was not seen as a legitimate use of rights, but rather a provocation of Muslims in Denmark and the West more generally. Many vocal Muslim critics of the publication argued that freedom of speech is not the only paramount right that characterizes a democracy. As Sharaf Sharafeldin, President of the Muslim Association of Canada notes in a press release on February 6, 2006, the cartoons and ensuing controversy should

---

[5] Newspaper coverage of the controversy was extensive. Newspapers in over 50 countries republished the cartoons, while many major papers, notably in North America and Britain, refrained from reprinting the images while still arguing in editorials for freedom of the press.

[6] The two most controversial images include one of the Prophet with a bomb in his turban and another where the Prophet is turning back suicide bombers because they have 'run out of virgins'.

"…contribute to a serious dialogue about the different freedoms that characterize civil society: freedom of expression but also freedom from harassment and insult."[7]

The Danish cartoon controversy highlights how issues around speech are not just about individual rights. Advanced, industrialized democracies are dealing with increasingly diverse populations. How to ensure that individual rights are balanced against other concerns, such as cultural accommodation and social inclusion, is a defining feature of contemporary debates in North America and Western Europe. This dissertation contributes to these debates by problematizing an absolute conception of individual rights that ignores the challenges that ethnic, racial and religious diversity poses to liberal conceptions of democratic politics. This is not to say that alternatives are not democratic. The point is that democratic values are contested. They are shaped by how democratic institutions have emerged historically, but also by how rights are used, transformed and challenged by marginalized groups in advanced, industrialized democracies.

The study of political tolerance, from this perspective, must take into account how citizens actually make civil liberties judgments across a range of target groups. This study is a major contribution to the empirical study of political tolerance by documenting how political tolerance decisions vary across types of speech, which has received very little acknowledgement in current work on the topic.[8] The empirical study of politically tolerant attitudes has a long and established history in political science dating back to Stouffer's (1963) seminal study of attitudes toward Communists in the United States. Since then, the nature and structure of such attitudes has been the focus of considerable debate (Sullivan et al. 1979; 1981; Gibson 1992a, 2005a, 2005b; Marcus et al. 1995; Mondak and Sanders 2003, 2005). This dissertation makes a theoretical and empirical contribution to this discussion which has largely assumed that the nature of objection to target groups makes no difference in how political tolerance is understood.[9]

---

[7] The statement by Sharafeldini was released February 6, 2006 online at http://www.macnet.ca/national/modules /wfchannel/html/Caricatures_Controversy.pdf. This controversy is not the first time citizens have questioned the value of free expression, of course, but it is illustrative of the global resonance that such concerns have taken.

[8] See, however, Wilson (1994) and Chong (2006).

[9] However, see work by Marcus and colleagues (1995) who provide detailed analysis of how contemporary information and antecedent considerations about groups impact levels of tolerance. They notably point to the role that threat plays in such judgments.

10

This study also addresses the nature of the relationship between social and political tolerance. Rather than seeing social tolerance as an impediment to free speech (Gibson 1998b; Peffley et al. 2001; Druckman 2001), it incorporates the conflict between social and political tolerance into our understanding of civil liberties judgments. I do so by re-conceptualizing this conflict as essential in understanding the ways in which the next generation balances the demands of democratic citizenship. The result of this balancing act, multicultural tolerance, is shown to be fundamentally different from a general intolerance. This finding is at odds with current understandings of political tolerance and further challenges the group-blind approach to measuring political tolerance.

By providing a more nuanced conceptualization of political tolerance, this research also contributes to the large literature that examines the causes of political tolerance. Despite many appeals to the value of exposure to diversity, the way in which social diversity impacts political tolerance judgments is understudied. Very little research has actually measured the link between exposure to racial and ethnic diversity and politically tolerant attitudes. Young people's exposure to people from racialized minorities proves to be an important explanation of young people's decision to deny the expression of exclusionary ideas. By highlighting the role that social networks play in fostering multicultural tolerance, I highlight the socially-constructed nature of political attitudes.

Furthermore, this dissertation speaks directly to the larger debate in political science about the impact of social diversity on the nature of political values and attitudes in contemporary, multicultural democracies (Alesina and Ferrara 2000, 2002; Putnam 2007; Banting et al. 2007; Hooghe et al. 2007b; Soroka et al. 2007; Stolle et al. forthcoming). The implications go beyond how we understand the ways in which young citizens view speech rights. It also addresses larger debates about how social diversity impacts group specific policies, whether they are about immigration or the distribution of services by the government. This study suggests strongly that citizens' attitudes in these realms are likely shaped in part by the interaction that people have with those individuals affected by them. In general, then, the research presented in the following pages aims to contribute to understanding the ways in which multiculturalism – as both a situation and

as an ideal – impacts the nature of citizens' democratic values in advanced, industrialized democracies.

# Chapter 1: Political Tolerance in Multicultural Democracies

As contemporary democracies in North America and Western Europe become increasingly composed of diverse ethnic, racial, and linguistic communities, a serious reconsideration of how to balance the calls for social equality from marginalized groups with individual liberty is required. While the traditional integration of minority groups into the dominant social order has been constructed as one of assimilation into the majority's cultural framework (Alba and Nee 2003; Gordon 1964), contemporary democratic theory has begun to challenge these conceptions on two fronts. Some liberal theorists have tried to reconcile individual and group rights by arguing that a diversity of cultural groups is necessary for individual freedom to truly exist (Kymlicka 1989, 1995b). Critiques of liberal theory, on the other hand, argue that different cultural groups require recognition and rights as groups, not just as individuals (Young 1990; Taylor and Gutmann 1992; Young 2000). When individual rights and group recognition clash, which side are citizens to defend? Is defending individual rights always the democratic answer? If ethnic, racial and cultural identities are recognized, and even valued, what implications does this have on the conceptualization of other rights? This chapter examines how individual rights of free speech are tempered by concerns about the rights of marginalized social groups to participate in society free from discrimination.

Liberal democratic theorists tend to view free speech as an absolute value. Any limits imposed on an individual's right to express themselff publicly are viewed as politically intolerant. However, the comparative reality is that contemporary democracies do impose restrictions on certain forms of speech. How to integrate this reality into the study of attitudes toward free expression is the goal of this chapter. I explore the value of political tolerance in democratic politics and how it has been conceptualized in the empirical political science literature. Drawing on the concerns of critical race and feminist scholars about the impact of speech on marginalized groups in society, I argue that exclusionary speech – such as racial incitement, holocaust denial, and other forms of hate speech – poses a fundamental challenge to how we think about, and in turn measure, political tolerance. Citizens in multicultural countries are likely to disagree about the

proper balance between concerns over social inclusion and political tolerance. These disagreements need to be integrated into the definition and measurement of political tolerance.

## *What is Political Tolerance?*

What does it mean to tolerate something? The everyday use of the term tolerance can range from putting up with a noisy neighbor ("I tolerate the noise because my neighbor is otherwise considerate") to embracing social diversity ("We teach students about other cultures so that they will grow up to be tolerant"). The use of the word tolerance is similarly messy in contemporary political debates.[10] As the Danish cartoon example in the Introduction highlights, Muslims upset about the publication of editorial cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed argued that the images represented intolerance toward the Muslim minority both in Denmark and around the world. *Publishing* the cartoons was said to highlight widespread intolerance of Muslims, whereas liberals saw any *restrictions on publishing* the cartoons as intolerance of dissenting viewpoints.

Indeed, many people defending the publication of the cartoon argued that such a publication was a demonstration of the tolerance required in a democracy. The dynamic in the Danish example is not unique either. In another well-known example, Salman Rushdie's publication of *Satanic Verses* (1988) in Britain led to a similar response: outrage (and violence) over its publication on one side and adamant defenses of liberal free speech on the other.[11] Specifically in the types of highly contentious situations where a concept such as tolerance is supposed to provide insight and direction, both sides seem to appeal to it to defend their competing position. These examples raise the question of what limits, if any, should be placed on free expression. In this section, I explore the meaning of political tolerance as it has developed in empirical political science and argue for a more nuanced understanding of the ways in which individual citizens deal with objectionable speech.

---

[10] For a discussion of the "indeterminacy" of tolerance, see Heyd (1996a, 3).
[11] For discussion of the *Satanic Verses* controversy, see, for example, Newey (1992), Parekh (1995), and O'Neill (1999).

14

*Defining Political Tolerance*

Tolerance is traditionally understood to imply restraint when confronted with a group or practice found objectionable (Heyd 1996b; Mendus 1988, 1989, 2000; Horton and Nicholson 1992; Horton and Mendus 1991; Sullivan et al. 1979; Cohen 2004). *Political* tolerance typically refers to individual-level attitudes or institutional arrangements that permit groups to express opinions or maintain practices that a majority find objectionable.  At both the individual and institutional level, political tolerance thus refers to the willingness to refrain from preventing people (or groups of people) from expressing their disliked opinions, lifestyles, preferences, or world views (McKinnon 2003, 55-61; see also Walzer 1997; Weissberg 1998).[12]  Defenses of political tolerance largely frame it as a second order value (Heyd 1996b; see, however, Barnes 2003).  In other words, political tolerance is morally defensible because it ensures other higher order principles, such as individual autonomy or the functioning of democratic politics.

The idea that liberal democratic citizens must 'put up with' ideas that they disagree with was most famously taken up by John Stuart Mill. In *On Liberty* ([1859] 2003), he argues that

> "… it is useful that while mankind [*sic*] are imperfect there should be different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any one thinks fit to try them" (ibid, , 122).

Political tolerance for Mill was a necessary condition for the flourishing of individuality. Modern interpretations of Mill have taken two key arguments from his work in defense of freedom of expression: first, its connection to individual liberty and self-development, and second, it relationship to social progress and the discovery of truth.[13]

Political tolerance as a value, then, is based on the premise that people have a fundamental right to make their own decisions about what they think and how they want to live their lives.  This is argued to be good not only for the individual, but also ensures a healthy confrontation of ideas that promote the advancement of knowledge and the

---

[12] A linguistic distinction is sometimes made between tolerance and toleration which correspond with these two levels.  Tolerance refers to the individual-level attitude and toleration connotes political arrangements. See, for example, Walzer (1997, xi) and Galeotti (2003).  The main focus of my work is on individual level attitudes.

[13] See also Williams (2004) for the role that autonomy and truth play in the defense of free speech.

Figure 1.1: Definition of Absolute Political Tolerance



functioning of democratic governments. The idea that there are political, as well as individual-level justifications for political tolerance plays an important role in contemporary defenses of the concept (Scanlon 1972; Sunstein 1993; Fiss 1996a, 2003; Meiklejohn 2000; Sunstein 2003). Meiklejohn ([1948] 2000), most notably, has maintained that free debate allows rational citizens to gain information that they require to make political judgments. The confrontation of ideas, furthermore, fosters the types of skills necessary to evaluate such information. In sum, the philosophical literature has viewed tolerance as a means to ensuring both individual rights to autonomy and individuality, as well as larger goals of social progress and democratic government.

Similar to the theoretical literature, empirical political science has typically defined political tolerance as "a willingness to 'put up with' those things one rejects or opposes. Politically, it implies a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes" (Sullivan et al. 1982, 2). There are two key features of how political tolerance has been defined in empirical political science. The first is disapproval. If a person is indifferent or endorses the perspective, tolerance is not necessary because there is nothing to which the person objects. Thus, political tolerance can only be extended in situations of dislike or disagreement (Sullivan et al. 1979; 1981; 1982; Mendus 1989, 8; Gibson 1992a). The other feature of political tolerance is its unified nature. Political tolerance is considered as an absolute value, which extends to any type of objectionable

group and the reason for the objection is considered irrelevant. Political tolerance is considered as a single value which has similar causes and consequences regardless of target groups.[14] This conceptualization of tolerance, which I will refer to as *absolute political tolerance*, is summarized in Figure 1.1.

This way of thinking about political tolerance can be seen in practice in measures of political tolerance. Politically tolerant attitudes are usually assessed based on whether respondents in surveys agree that a given political group should be allowed to participate in activities such as giving public speeches, holding rallies, running for office, having books in local libraries, and other similar activities. When respondents agree to extend civil liberties, they are providing tolerant answers. When they disagree, it is considered intolerant.

One of the major advances in the study of political tolerance was the inclusion of the idea of prior disapproval into the measurement of politically tolerant attitudes. While early studies (Stouffer 1963; Nunn et al. 1978) focused exclusively on left-wing groups in the United States, critiques by Sullivan and his colleagues have resulted in standard measures of political tolerance which involved either "least-liked" groups (Sullivan et al. 1981; 1982; 1979) or include a variety of different groups to ensure that each respondent has an opportunity to be intolerant (Gibson 1992a).[15] In the former, respondents are given a list of potentially objectionable groups and told to select the one they like the least. The respondent is in turn asked if that group should be allowed to do a given activity. In the latter, respondents are asked to make tolerance judgments for a pre-determined list of potentially objectionable groups which is balanced between left-wing and right-wing groups, presumably giving everyone a chance to find some of the groups to be objectionable. While these two measures vary in the overall tolerance levels they generate at the aggregate level, they appear to perform equally well in helping to understand the causes of (in)tolerance (Gibson 1992a). Both measures, however, incorporate the idea that tolerance only occurs when a prior objection exists.

---

[14] However, recently there has emerged a debate between Gibson (2005a; 2005b) and Mondak and Sanders (2003; 2005) about whether tolerance is a continuous or dichotomous variable. While this debate nuances our understanding of political tolerance, it does not distinguish between target groups. Rather, it seems to be about further defining absolute tolerance.

[15] The former method is also referred to as "content-controlled."

In contrast, the unified nature of political tolerance measures has rarely been problematized beyond the need for prior disagreement. Little attempt has been made to distinguish between types of objectionable groups or to consider the nature of the prior objection. While there has been recognition that the targets of intolerance vary by country (Sullivan et al. 1985), only a few studies have focused on specific types of target groups, such as extreme religious sects (O'Donnell 1993), racists (Davis 1995; Marcus et al. 1995; Gross and Kinder 1998; Chong 2006), pornographers (Lambe 2004) or social categories (Sniderman 2000). The assumption has largely been that tolerance judgments require a disliked target group, but there is little focus on how the type of target group affects tolerance judgments.

This failure to examine the grounds of objection and how the type of target group under consideration can impact an individual's willingness to extend civil liberties is an important gap in how the empirical literature conceptualizes, and in turn measures, politically tolerant attitudes. While I agree that prior disapproval with a target group is a necessary condition for considering civil liberties judgments as tolerant, such a conceptualization is not sufficiently nuanced to allow for legitimate disagreements about the limits of political tolerance in contemporary, multicultural democracies. In the next subsections, I will draw on the philosophical literature on political tolerance to problematize how prior objection informs the conceptualization of political tolerance used in the empirical literature.

*Grounds of Objection: Inclusionary Intolerance?*

The first component of absolute political tolerance is what Gibson (2006b, 22) has called the "objection precondition". In essence, one can not tolerate that which is not first found to be objectionable. As William's (1996, 18) notes, "Toleration, we may say, is required only for the intolerable." Yet, why is it that we should allow something we think is wrong? If in fact objection is a precondition for tolerance, we are left asking why we should bother tolerating the thing in the first place. This presents what is commonly referred to as the paradox of tolerance (Horton 1994; Mendus 1989; Heyd 1996b; Williams 2000; Cohen 2004). Liberals argue that people tolerate others expressing their viewpoints because they recognize them as autonomous people; they value what their

speech may add to public discourse; or as a necessary condition of democratic governance. There may still be disagreement with the perspective, but individuals who are tolerant are willing to allow it for these other reasons, at least if the democratic rationales presented in the previous subsection are accurate.

The objection precondition, I argue, is problematic because it ignores important contributions of the philosophical literature about when an initial objection can be justified.[16] An absolute conception of political tolerance does not take into account the reasons for objecting to the expression of particular viewpoints. It only requires objection. While such a conception might be politically justifiable or even normatively defensible, the assumption in the literature that this *must* be the case needs to be elaborated and defended. As it stands, the literature has adopted the view found largely in American First Amendment jurisprudence that speech must not be restricted in any way (although even in the U.S. there are a number of important restrictions) and furthermore, that any limitations on speech must be content-neutral.[17] The adoption of these values into the definition of political tolerance means that any discussion of the proper objects of toleration or the proper grounds for objection is assumed *a priori* inappropriate.

I argue, instead, that one can not begin to understand people's civil liberties judgments unless proper consideration is given to the nature of their objection. There are three questions that require answers when assessing the nature of civil liberties judgments. First, what is the goal of the speech? If free expression is to serve democratic ends, then speech that threatens democratic considerations seems to warrant further attention. Second, what is the effect of the speech? If certain forms of expression cause harm to others, are there not reasons to consider restricting it? The famous example of yelling fire in a crowded theatre is problematic precisely because of the potential harm it can cause. And finally, who is the speaker? This last question is perhaps most contentious, and often the least discussed in the literature. This is partly because American First Amendment jurisprudence is fundamentally opposed to

---

[16] For example, several authors explore whether or not objections must be moral (or morally defensible) or if objections can be based on dislike (Horton 1996; Churchill 2003; Mendus 1989; Churchill 1997; Williams 1996; Heyd 1996b).

[17] For an overview of limitations, see Paul, Miller and Paul (2004) and Cohen (2003)

considering who the speaker is.[18]  I will instead draw on critical race and feminist theorists to argue that discriminatory and racist speech can not be separated from histories of oppression and racial hierarchies that such speech relies on.  For this reason, it is useful to examine not only what is said, but who is saying it.  In this subsection, I explore different ways of answering these questions with a focus on the role of expression in democratic debate.

To avoid confusion, the answers I provide are not intended to be definitive as normative goals, but rather are used to demonstrate that absolute political tolerance is not the only coherent option for those concerned with ensuring freedom of expression in a democracy, or at least the goals that are said to underpin such freedom.  Rather, there are principled reasons why some citizens may support certain restrictions on speech.  By exploring the principles at stake, I develop the basis of an alternative form of tolerance.

The first question that seems pertinent to understanding an individual's objection to certain viewpoints is the ends such speech serves.  As explained previously, liberal democratic theory assumes that speech serves in the development of individual autonomy, progress toward truth, and in providing information and accountability in democratic societies.  A predicament emerges in situations where the speech's goal is to undermine the very democratic values which free expression is supposed to protect.  In such cases, the question is whether an individual's liberties should be protected at the cost of other important values.  Absolute political tolerance assumes that individual liberties should always win, but numerous instances exist where courts have sided with other values, such as equality and social inclusion.  For example, in the *Keegstra* case in Canada, the court found that hate speech restrictions were in fact a restriction of an individual's freedom of expression, but that such restrictions were justified because of the need to protect ethnic, racial and religious minorities from the potential harms that such speech might cause.[19]

---

[18] The content-neutral component of speech regulation was solidified in U.S. Supreme Court case *R.A.V v. St. Paul* (1992), where the court overturned the conviction of individuals under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime  Ordinance for setting a cross on fire on the front lawn of a black family.  The court argued that the law was unconstitutional because it prohibited speech based on the content of what was being said.

[19] Sumner (2004, Ch. 3), for example, has argued that the Canadian courts determine the limits of speech through a 'balancing act' where they consider the value of free expression against the harms of such speech.

How are we to conceptualize such limitations? Harel (1996) provides a useful distinction between what he calls exclusionary and inclusionary intolerance. While he is focusing on tolerance in general, and not specifically *political* tolerance, the distinction is insightful. Exclusionary intolerance arises when a group that is interested in reinforcing its distinctiveness wants society to respect its right to be intolerant of other groups. Essentially, it is asking society to allow it to be intolerant of others in order to protect its own world view. An example of exclusionary intolerance would be a religious group that wants to prevent homosexuals from becoming priests. Such a restriction would limit the rights of homosexuals to become priests.

Inclusionary intolerance, on the other hand, arises in circumstances where minority groups are trying to fully participate in society by restricting the expression of prejudice directed at them. Unlike the former case, this case involves restricting the rights of the intolerant. Preferential hiring regulations would be an example of inclusionary intolerance; such regulations limit the rights of employers to hire (or rather not hire) who they want. Indeed, most anti-discrimination legislation could be considered as inclusionary intolerance which limits the right of people to act on their biases in areas like employment and housing.

While both these situations involve a question of tolerance – of putting up with practices or behaviors one objects to – Harel argues that in fact the two forms of intolerance are distinct, and require distinct responses from society. He argues that exclusionary intolerance must be considered in terms of how fundamental a practice is for a group's way of life and its impact on the target of such intolerance.[20] Inclusionary intolerance, on the other hand, is far more acceptable because it limits rights with the goal of reducing prejudice, rather than reinforcing it.

Harel's argument focuses on whether society should allow practices that appear to be 'intolerant' of other groups in society. If this thinking is extended specifically to the context of *political* tolerance, we are provided with a useful distinction between exclusionary and inclusionary political intolerance. Exclusionary political intolerance means limiting a person or group's access to democratic debate based on prejudices

---

[20] There is extensive debate about what forms of intolerant practices should be permitted in liberal democracies. See, for example, Kymlicka (1996).

toward that group's ideas. Inclusionary political intolerance, on the contrary, involves limiting a person or group's access to democratic debate to prevent the expression of prejudice. Speech which has as its goal the promotion of social exclusion and denigration of marginalized groups, as is often the case with hate speech or holocaust denial, could be limited within such a framework, without denying the value of free speech more generally.[21] Absolute conceptions of political tolerance have no room for such a distinction.

One of the reasons that this distinction is compelling is because it challenges us to think about both the content and intended effect of speech. It would be difficult to support restricting exclusionary content if such speech had no repercussions for democratic debate. Yet, the impact of such speech is another key consideration when considering civil liberties judgments. A key feature of Mill's original defense of free speech is the harm principle (Feinberg 1984; see also, Jacobson 2000; Sumner 2004, Ch. 2, 2000). Basically, it is the idea that a government should not interfere with individuals except when their actions injure others.[22] Mill (2003, 80) states unequivocally "[t]hat the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his [*sic*] will, is to prevent harm to others." In liberal interpretations of this principle, speech is either viewed as harmless (Dworkin 1977, 1996) or that the 'harm' it causes is more akin to offense than injury (Feinberg 1985). Further, even if harm is assumed to result, many interpretations argue that the cost of interfering with harmful speech must be outweighed by the benefits that accrue from it (Sumner 2004, 33). These two views have been coined by Cohen (1993) as a minimalist and maximalist view. Either speech does not cause harm, or it is so important that any harm it causes can never be outweighed by the benefits of restricting it.

The answer that many liberals provide, thus, to what effect speech has is largely guided by this notion of harm. This understanding is based on two contestable assumptions: first, that speech differs from conduct, and second, that speech does not cause injury. The speech-conduct distinction has been much contested by feminist theorists, who argue that speech is an action that not only has physical manifestations, but

---

[21] See Harel (1992) for further discussion of how egalitarian goals can be used to justify limiting speech.
[22] See Jacobson (2000) for further discussion of the harm principle and its interpretations and mis-interpretations.

is also essential in constructing the meaning of physical objects (Butler 1997).[23]  Brison (1998), for example, makes a compelling argument that speech and conduct both share a number of important features.  First, both speech and conduct can result in psychological and physiological injuries.  Second, both speech and conduct may be belief-mediated.  In other words, to understand (and to judge) both acts and speech requires context.  As she notes, "…both verbal and physical assaults take place in an interpretive context and cause harm, to a large extent, according to how they are experienced" (ibid, 56).

When the speech-conduct dichotomy is challenged, the idea that "words can wound" becomes more comprehensible (Matsuda et al. 1993).  Critical race legal scholars in particular have pointed to the impact that hate speech has on its victims.  The impact has been documented in both narrative and experimental settings (Boeckman and Liew 2002; Matsuda et al. 1993; Bryant-Davis and Ocampo 2005; Boeckman and Turpin-Petrosino 2002; Leets 2002; Nielson 2002).  In order to understand people's civil liberties judgments, it seems important to understand whether or not their intolerance is based on the perceived harm that speech in certain circumstances can cause.

The final, and perhaps most contentious, question that must be addressed when considering legitimate grounds for objection is who is speaking.  More precisely, what is the relationship between the speaker and the target of her speech?  Individuals are at least partial products of the environments in which they live, and individuals both gain meaning from larger group identifications and are often treated – or mistreated – based on such group identifications (Benhabib 1996; Young 1990, 2000; Kymlicka 1995a; Taylor and Gutmann 1992).  When considering the goals and effects of speech, we must at least allow for the possibility that speakers who are marginalized in the social structure have different access to democratic communication than those in positions of privilege (Young 1990, 2000).  When exclusionary practices are used to further marginalize a group, such as when government regulations are used to prevent a minority group from protesting against discrimination, it is a clear situation that is counter to liberal democratic norms.  However, when limits are placed on powerful actors to prevent them from contributing to the marginalization of a group, the question of what the "democratic" and "tolerant"

---

[23] Brison (1998; 2004) and Collier (2002)  provide an interesting exchange over the merits and misunderstandings of this view.

solution is becomes far more difficult to definitively state. This is precisely the case with many forms of hate speech where majority group members perpetuate and reinforce harmful stereotypes about minority group members and promote their exclusion from society.[24] It is this special case that I turn to next.

*Hate Speech – Or Why Differentiating Targets Matters*

In the previous subsection, I have suggested that the objection precondition in the definition of absolute political tolerance is overly simplistic and does not take into account legitimate concerns about what the proper grounds of objection are. I have suggested that how people judge speech that has 1) exclusionary goals, 2) the intent to harm and 3) that originates from people in positions of authority or privilege is problematic because such speech does not clearly further the ends that political tolerance is ideally suppose to ensure. Instead, such speech threatens other important democratic values, such as social inclusion and equal participation.

In this subsection, I take a closer look at hate speech as a form of expression that meets these three criteria. In doing so, I argue that hate speech is a form of exclusionary speech that may be objected to for principled reasons in line with the values underpinning contemporary, multicultural society. As Harel (1996) suggests, "inclusionary intolerance" may have its purpose in liberal democracies. Furthermore, because the current conceptualization of political tolerance considers it as an all-or-nothing value, current understandings do not allow for distinctions between target groups. By considering hate speech as exclusionary speech and by showing the comparative prominence of hate speech restrictions, I challenge such a group-blind approach to conceptualizing, and in turn measuring, political tolerance. This is one of the key contributions of this study and will be the basis for the empirical analysis that follows in later chapters.

"Hate speech" is used to designate a variety of forms of expression that involve the advocacy of hatred, genocide or inferiority of individuals or groups of individuals

---

[24] This is not to say that members of minority groups can not speak in ways that are potentially discriminatory against either the majority or internal minorities in the group. The nature of power relations between the source of speech and its intended target is somewhat context specific. I will argue, however, that exclusionary ideas expressed by majority social groups toward historically marginalized groups are worth of special consideration.

24

based on their race, color, national and ethnic origin, or other "ascriptive" categories, sometimes including sex and sexual preferences (Cortese 2006; Parekh 2006; Delgado and Stefancic 2004; Matsuda et al. 1993; Sumner 2004).[25]  Parekh (Parekh 2006, 214) argues that it has three essential features:

> "First, it singles out an individual or a group of individuals on the basis of certain characteristics… Secondly, hate speech stigmatizes its target by ascribing to it a set of constitutive qualities that are widely viewed as highly undesirable…Thirdly, the target group is placed outside the pale of normal social relationships."

It can take many forms, including incitement to violence, fighting words, and group defamation and is usually limited to speech that is directed at historically disadvantaged groups.[26]

Legislation and legal interpretations which put restrictions on hate speech have been widely used in contemporary democracies, with the United States being the most notable exception (Boyle 2001; Rosenfeld 2003; Parekh 2006; Moran 1994; Bird 2000; Appleman 1996; Cohen-Almagor 2000; Douglas-Scott 1999; Coliver et al. 1992).  Unlike most other Western countries,  American First Amendment jurisprudence has constructed the bounds of legitimate expression very broadly to include racist and anti-Semitic speech (Walker 1994).[27]  In Table 1.1, I provide a selected overview of hate speech legislation in several North American and European countries.  The countries were selected to include the United States, which is an outlier in terms of hate speech legislation, along with the two case countries examined in this study (Canada and Belgium) and three other major European powers (Britain, France and Germany) which are representative of the types of hate speech legislation that are found in Western Europe.

---

[25] For example, the 2003 Anti-Discrimination Act in Belgium extends the ethnocultural categories to include a whole list of categories, including sexual preference, marital status, birth, wealth, age, religion or philosophy, present or future state of health, and handicap or physical characteristic.

[26] Discussions of hate speech often overlap in many ways with feminist critiques of pornography.  Indeed, many of the key texts collapse these two areas under the label of hate speech. I will restrict my focus to hate speech targeted at racial, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities.  For a critique of pornography that parellels many of the arguments against hate speech, see MacKinnon (1993).

[27] The key cases on hate speech in the United States include: Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); National Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Smith v. Collin, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  For an overview of hate speech cases in the United States, see Paul, Miller and Paul (2004) and Cohen (2003).

Table 1.1: A Comparative Look at Hate Speech Legislation

|  | **Hate Speech Legislation** | **Specific Holocaust Legislation** |
|---|---|---|
| Belgium | *The Anti-Racism Act (1981) prohibits incitement or publication of intention to incite hatred, discrimination or violence toward identifiable groups based on race, color, descent, national or ethnic origin. The Anti-Discrimination Act (2003) extends the list of identifiable groups to include sexual preference, gender, disability and other categories.* | *Act of 23 March 1995 prohibits denial, minimization or justification of Nazi genocide* |
| Britain | *Section 17 of the Public Order Act (1986) – Prevents 'stirring up' racial hatred.* | None |
| Canada | *Section 318 and 319 of the criminal code prohibits promotion of hatred against or genocide of identifiable groups based on color, race, religion or ethnic origin. Human rights codes also provide civil remedies. Bill C-220 (2004) extends identifiable groups to include sexual orientation.* | *None* |
| France | *Pleven Law (1972) provides criminal and civil remedies to defamatory, contemptuous or offensive speech.* | *Gayssot Law (1990) makes it illegal to publicly deny occurrence of Holocaust.* |
| Germany | *Article 130 of Criminal Code criminalizes incitement to hatred, degradation and defamation of segments of the population, and distribution of material inciting hatred.* | *Article 130 of Criminal Code penalizes approval, denial and minimization of Holocaust. Also sanctioned under Article 185 (offense of insult) and Article 189 (defamation of memory of dead).* |
| USA | *None* | *None* |

As can be seen from this selective overview of legislation, there is clearly a tendency among advanced, industrialized democracies in Western Europe and North America to legislate certain types of speech that willfully promote hatred of people based on their social background. Such legislation extends to verbal speech as well as written speech and encompasses precisely the types of activities which are included in most measures of political tolerance.[28] The legal justifications against hate speech vary from protection of public order in Britain (Feldman 2000) to understanding rights within the

---

[28] Racists and Klu Klux Klan are popular groups to include in measures of political tolerance, in the US as well as comparatively. See, for example, Sniderman et al. (1996) in Canada and Marquart-Pryatt and Paxton (2006) in the European context.

framework of multiculturalism in Canada (Sumner 1994; Greenawalt 1995; Martin 1995; Moran 1994; Sumner 2004) and the inherent falseness and danger of racial arguments, especially holocaust denial, in France (Bird 2000; Imbleau 2003) and Germany (Appleman 1996; Stein 1986).  The implication of this cross-national diversity in dealing with hate speech is that similarly democratic countries have set different restrictions on what forms of expression must be tolerated.

The presence of such legislation implies that there are legitimate disagreements over what type of political tolerance is required of democratic citizens.  From a comparative perspective, asking citizens to tolerate racist or anti-Semitic speech as a measure of their 'political tolerance' is problematic not only because laws in many countries prevent such speech, but because the values underpinning such laws represent different, but equally liberal, ways of ensuring democratic debate.  Restricting hate speech, in many countries, is argued to ensure that all people are able to fully participate, without discrimination, in society.  When diversity is valued, in other words, the limits of political tolerance may need to be reconsidered.

To demonstrate this, I will focus on how hate speech functions as exclusionary speech.  First, hate speech is designed to demonize and delegitimatize the participation of minorities in public life.  The *intent* of hate speech is by its very nature exclusionary, and some suggest it is successful at encouraging exclusion through a number of mechanisms. Sumner (2004, 162-3), for example, argues that hate speech serves primarily as a means of recruitment for and identification with hate organization who have been linked to racial violence.  While white supremacy groups in the United States are the most common example, the presence, and some argue increase, of such groups in Canada and Europe is well documented (Kinsella 2001; Fraser 2001).  Hate speech contributes to the discriminatory treatment of minority groups by the general public by stigmatizing a group and "normalizing" such treatment of them (Parekh 2006, 217).  Several authors have provided historical accounts of how hate speech and group vilification are key to processes of large scale oppression and genocide (Tsesis 2002; Bosmajian 1974; Mullen 2001; Cortese 2006).  Furthermore, at the individual level, there is evidence that witnessing ethnic slurs or other derogatory comments directed at a minority can make

majority group members feel more negatively toward them (Greenberg and Pyszczynski 1985; Kirkland et al. 1987; Mullen 2001; Simon and Greenberg 1996).

This is not to say that such contentions are unchallenged. The success of hate speech laws in effectively countering the societal problems they are said to address is debated (Coliver et al. 1992; Braun 2004; Weissberg 1998). Suppressing the expression of ideas, as Locke informed us long ago, does not necessarily change the ideas people hold. Yet, proponents of hate speech restrictions argue that suppressing such expression may not change the speaker's opinion, but it will prevent the creation of a climate where large scale discrimination is accepted.

Proponents of hate speech restrictions further argue that the cost to the victim of such speech outweighs the speaker's right to express her opinion. Those who defend hate speech as protected speech appeal to the harm principle by either arguing that speech does not actually cause "harm" as intended by Mill (Weinstein 1999, Ch. 7; Wolfson 1997) or that individuals' rights to free expression are more important than any harm inflicted by such speech (Scanlon 1972, 204; Nagel 1995).[29] Proponents of hate speech restriction argue, on the other hand, that racist remarks are based on racial hierarchies that are known to be false, and therefore tolerating such remarks is not required. The expression of such ideas is not necessary for enlightened debate, and causes disproportionate *harm* to the person or group of people the speech is directed at (Matsuda et al. 1993; Schauer 2000; Feinberg 1984, 1985; Brison 1998; Downs 1985; Delgado and Stefancic 2004). Matsuda (1993, 24-5) argues,

> "The negative effects of hate messages are real and immediate to victims. Victims of vicious hate propaganda experience physiological symptoms and emotional distress…Victims are restricted in their personal freedom… As much as one may try to resist a piece of hate propaganda, the effect on one's self-esteem and sense of personal security is devastating."

The harm caused by hate speech is highlighted in the aptly titled volume, *Words that Wound* (Matsuda et al. 1993) through narrative and personal stories and is supported by recent work dealing with the effects of hate crimes and hate speech on victims

---

[29] For example, Nagel (1995, 98) argues, "Willingness to permit the expression of bigotry and stupidity, and to denounce or ignore it without censoring it, is the only appropriate expression of the enlightened conviction that the proper ground of belief is reason and evidence rather than dogmatic acceptance."

(Boeckman and Liew 2002; Bryant-Davis and Ocampo 2005; Boeckman and Turpin-Petrosino 2002; Leets 2002; Nielson 2002).

One of the reasons hate speech is so destructive is because it reinforces a racial ideology and a power structure that contributes to the inferior status of minorities in contemporary democracies. Race and racialized ideology are used in many ways to reinforce and perpetuate inequality (Razack 2002; Bonilla-Silva 2001). This account in many ways mirrors that of Young (1990, Ch. 2), who argues that oppression is a concept that recognizes that discrimination and injustice are based in the social structure and result from unequal positions between social groups. Hate speech and other hate crimes, in many ways, are extreme manifestations of this power structure and are one of the reasons that the law in many countries recognizes hate crimes as an aggravating circumstance that permits more severe punishment.[30] When hate speech is used to reinforce this dominant structure, the impact of hate speech discussed above is accentuated.

The liberal tradition has tended to see freedom of speech, religion and assembly as a liberating force for the oppressed (Marcuse 1969). Seeing political tolerance as potentially *oppressive* to social minorities runs counter to this tradition. Yet, we must be aware that democratic politics does not place equal burdens on all citizens (Parekh 2006; Junn 2004). Asking marginalized groups to 'put up' not only with their marginalization, but with verbal attacks that represent and reinforce this marginalization seems to be asking more of them than majority group members. This is not to say that marginalized groups are incapable of using 'hate speech', for they may well be able to. But as Harel (1996, 122) argues, inegalitarian practices and sentiments are particularly harmful when they are adopted by people that are well-integrated into dominant society. Using the power of the state to censor marginalized groups seems of a different nature, and perhaps more dangerous to democratic values, than when the same power is turned against intolerant majorities.[31]

---

[30] See Roberts (1999) for an overview of hate crimes in Canada, the USA, and the United Kingdom.
[31] This is precisely what happened in Britain in the 1960s, when racial incitement laws were used to punish leaders of the Black Liberation Movement (Rosenfeld 2003, 1546-7). Crenshaw (1993) also provides an interesting account of how laws designed to protect minorities in the U.S. have been used to censor minority groups.

In sum, hate speech is a form of exclusionary speech that is regulated and restricted in many contemporary democracies. The rationale for such restrictions is based in the values of social equality and anti-discrimination which have become prominent features underpinning increasingly diverse democratic governance. Hate speech has an exclusionary intent and is argued to have both societal and individual level implications for the equal participation of minority groups in society. What I have termed "absolute political tolerance" leaves no conceptual space for such considerations, in spite of the fact that such thinking is well established in comparative jurisprudence and critical race legal theory.

### *Complicating Tolerance*

Political tolerance, as an ideal in contemporary, multicultural democracies, needs to be problematized. Concerns over equality that are often framed in terms of *social tolerance* need to be incorporated into how social scientists discuss and measure political tolerance. In the previous section, I have focused on how political tolerance has been defined in the literature and the ways in which exclusionary forms of speech challenge this definition. This section turns to the relationship between social tolerance and political tolerance. I focus on what research tells us about what citizens do when social and political tolerance values are in conflict, and how social diversity more generally affects political attitudes. In doing so, I develop a framework and set of testable hypotheses about how citizens balance individual rights to free speech with concerns about social inclusion. This framework posits as an empirical question, rather than a normative assumption, what limits people place on free expression in contemporary, multicultural democracies and the role that social diversity plays in such decisions.

### *Social Tolerance as a Democratic Value*

Political tolerance is associated with restraint in the face of disagreement. This use of the concept of "tolerance" differs significantly from uses of tolerance associated with embracing diversity, which implies a lack of disagreement with diverse others. The latter use of the term is closer to the way that tolerance is used to describe openness to people from different backgrounds, usually referred to as social tolerance. Describing individuals as socially tolerant usually implies that they are at a minimum indifferent to

30

and at best embrace the ways in which different people live their lives. One would expect that such a person would not have any objections to having a person with a different religion or ethnocultural background over for dinner. In fact, social tolerance is often measured by asking respondents precisely such questions. For example, Sullivan and colleagues (Sullivan et al. 1982, Ch. 5) test a measure of social tolerance with their least-liked method, using the respondent's willingness to invite a disliked group member home for dinner, and the level of displeasure at having such a person as a neighbor and dating their son or daughter. Social tolerance is usually understood, therefore, in terms of the inclusion of minority social groups (homosexuals, ethnic and racial minorities, etc.) in one's life and community; it involves a *lack of* prejudice instead of one's ability to overcome such prejudice.

Social tolerance tends to be considered by empirical researchers as a separate concept from political tolerance, although there is significant disagreement in the literature about the nature of the relationship between the two. In a recent review of the state of the research, Gibson (2006b, 25-7) has argued that one of the five most important questions facing political tolerance research is explaining this relationship because research findings to date are mixed. In Sullivan and colleagues' (1982) early study of tolerance, they find that their measure of social tolerance is distinct from political tolerance although it is correlated.[32] While their measure tests social tolerance of *the same targets* as their political tolerance battery, research that looks at social tolerance as a general construct, and its relationship to political tolerance, has reported mixed findings.

The idea that social and political tolerance are strongly related is taken up most rigorously by Stenner (2005).[33] She attempts to demonstrate that both social and political (in)tolerance stem from the same underlying authoritarian dynamic. Inspired by Adorno (1950) and Altemeyer's (1988; 1996) work on authoritarian personalities, she argues that "racial, political and moral intolerance, normally studied in isolation, are really kindred

---

[32] However, the distinction between the factors is obtained using an oblique rotation. The two loadings are not as distinct when they use the more traditional orthogonal rotation, reported by Sullivan and his colleagues. In particular, willingness to have a disliked member teach loads relatively low on both political and social tolerance, .44 and .33 respectively, in the orthogonal rotation (1982, 111).

[33] In a recent study in South Africa, Gibson (2006a, 679) also finds that interracial tolerance (which I have been referring to as social tolerance) and political tolerance are correlated; however, the strength of this relationship is not particularly strong, especially among blacks (r=.10 among blacks vs r=.25 among whites).

spirits: primarily driven by the same fundamental predisposition, fueled by the same motives, exacerbated by the same fears" (ibid, 325). To demonstrate this, she draws on a wealth of survey and experimental evidence which consistently shows a relationship between an underlying authoritarian predisposition[34] and expressions of various types of intolerance, which are exacerbated in contexts of threat.

While Stenner maintains that social and political tolerance stem from the same underlying disposition, another line of research views social tolerance as a barrier to political tolerance. This research often frames the question as how social *tolerance* leads to political *intolerance* because it creates a value conflict (Marcus et al. 1995; Sniderman et al. 1996; Gibson 1998a; Peffley et al. 2001) or fuels out-group hostility that underpins opposition to civil rights for salient groups (Gibson and Gouws 2000; Skitka et al. 2004).[35] The alleged conflict between social and political tolerance has received increasing scholarly attention (Chong 2006; Dow and Lendler 2002; Gross and Kinder 1998; Cowan et al. 2002; Sniderman et al. 1996; Druckman 2001). Experimental survey research in the United States tends to support the view that raising concerns about social tolerance makes political tolerance judgments more difficult. Several studies have shown that when respondents are primed about equality issues before being asked to make a tolerance judgment for racist groups, they are more likely to deny such groups civil liberties (Druckman 2001; Cowan et al. 2002). The reverse also tended to be true. If primed about free speech issues, respondents were more likely to support the rights of racist groups to exercise their civil liberties. They conclude that when issues of racial equality are raised, people are more willing to curb the civil liberties of socially intolerant groups.[36] There is, furthermore, some evidence to suggest that when there is a value conflict, politically tolerant attitudes are the ones that suffer (Peffley et al. 2001; Gibson 1998b).

In the Canadian context, Sniderman and colleagues (1996) have argued that a similar conflict between social and political tolerance is evident. They report that 74

---

[34] The authoritarian disposition is measured by Stenner using questions about child-rearing values, which are intended to get at fundamental values about authority and uniformity versus autonomy and diversity.
[35] For a critique of the value-conflict model, see Miller and colleagues (2001).
[36] The notable exception to these findings is work by Gross and Kinder (1998). In their analysis of the 1990 General Social Survey, they argued that freedom of speech principles dominated respondents' answers about racist speech; feelings about racial equality issues did not.

32

percent of Canadians support hate speech legislation in Canada and that racists are the most common target of intolerance among both the elite and general sample in their study (ibid, 1996, 55-64). They conclude that the consensus in Canada seems to support social tolerance over political tolerance, even among elites who normally show greater levels of political tolerance than the general public (Sniderman et al. 1996, 66-9). Similar to the experimental manipulations in American studies, they also show that when issues about ethnic discrimination are raised, people become less politically tolerant of racists. While their analysis provides a basic demonstration that racists are 'harder' to tolerate than other groups and that raising issues of ethnic discrimination make people reconsider their political tolerance judgments, they do not directly test the relationship between interracial prejudice (or the lack of it) and political tolerance judgments. Yet, in a country like Canada where multiculturalism has been an official policy since 1971 and hate speech is in fact illegal, one might expect such a value conflict to play a more prominent role in citizens' civil liberties judgments.

Thus, the research provides mixed results about the relationship between social and political tolerance. On the one hand, people who are socially intolerant tend to also be more willing to deny civil liberties to groups they find objectionable. On the other hand, raising issues about social inclusion also seems to lead to political intolerance, especially of racists. How can these two sets of findings be reconciled? While social and political *intolerance* may stem from a similar, underlying disposition that is hostile to non-conformity and difference, as Stenner (2005) argues, this also implies that at the individual level, people who are socially *tolerant* should also tend toward political tolerance. Exclusionary speech raises a specific challenge for such people because it puts these two tendencies in conflict. Yet, current conceptualizations of political tolerance do not incorporate such conflicts into how civil liberties judgments are understood. While research into value conflict is a good starting point, a failure to take into account target group distinctions means that political tolerance research is missing an important aspect of how civil liberties judgments differ across target groups for some people. One of the primary objectives of this dissertation is to bring target group distinctions into the conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance judgments. The role that

attitudes and experiences with social diversity play in such distinctions is the second major contribution.

One of the most recent, and most compelling, attempts to examine how attitudes about social diversity impact political tolerance judgments across target groups is Chong's (2006) work on the effect of multicultural values on civil liberties judgments for racist speech. After showing that general levels of political tolerance have remained the same over 25 years of US General Social Surveys, he shows that those who attended university beginning in the 1980s when concerns about multiculturalism and hate speech first arose on college campus are less likely to tolerate racists.[37] This finding is particularly striking given that education has tended to increase tolerance levels among citizens in the United States (Bobo and Licari 1989). He relates this intolerance of racist speech among the younger cohort to support for multicultural values, which are significantly and negatively related to tolerance of racists among the most recent generation. This effect is reversed among the older cohort, where support for multiculturalism is positively related to tolerance of racists. Chong argues that universities are increasingly exposing students to the value of multiculturalism and rhetoric of political correctness that represents a shift in liberal discourse where social and political tolerance were viewed as completely compatible values.

This research is noteworthy because it provides a strong battery of questions about racial equality and group specific treatment that are less directly linked to questions about political tolerance in the survey (as they are in experimental manipulations).[38] The second noteworthy feature of this argument is the recognition that the conflict between social and political tolerance is historically-contingent on the contemporary discourse about what social and political equality means, and in turn, requires from citizens. This echoes Sniderman and colleagues' (1996, 54) contention that "the very strengthening of a commitment to social tolerance has now made the value of political tolerance contestable in a way it was not before." The rise of so-called identity politics and the shift away from a rhetoric of individual rights to group rights coincides with new ways of thinking about the appropriate manner to reconcile competing demands of social and political tolerance

---

[37] See Dow and Lendler (2002) for a campus case study of how attitudes toward racists and hate speech codes play out among an American liberal arts campus student body.
[38] See Chong (2006, 50-1) for specific questions included in scale.

Figure 1.2: Categories of Tolerance and Intolerance

|  | Permit Exclusionary Speech | Censor Exclusionary Speech |
|---|---|---|
| **Censor Free Speech** | *Authoritarian Intolerance* | *Absolute Intolerance* |
| **Support Free Speech** | *Absolute Tolerance* | *Multicultural Tolerance* |

(Kelly 2002; Benhabib 1996, 2002; Raz 1994; Kymlicka 1995a; Taylor and Gutmann 1994; Kymlicka 2001; Young 1990, 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Parekh 2000). Chong's work suggests that in the United States, segments of the younger, more educated generation are reconciling this conflict in a way that is distinct from past generations for whom politically tolerant responses coincided with an individual-oriented view of equal rights.

Chong's research provides support for the idea that among younger generations, at least some people's political tolerance judgments are diverging across target groups. Yet, there is no discussion about how this shifting norm environment actually impacts the conceptualization and measurement of political tolerance. By integrating target group distinctions into political tolerance measures, this dissertation develops a theoretical and methodological perspective on political tolerance that takes Chong's work one step further. In particular, this work suggests the need for a tolerance typology that distinguishes between two separate tolerance dispositions: multicultural and absolute tolerance. Distinguishing attitudes toward exclusionary speech and more general support for free speech are key.

Figure 1.2 provides a breakdown of these tolerance dispositions. I argue that political tolerance judgments need to be thought about in a two-by-two matrix where one dimension is driven by values of free speech and the second dimension is driven by values of social tolerance that underpin attitudes toward exclusionary speech. Whereas

absolute political tolerance emerges when people consistently permit free expression, even to those expressing exclusionary ideas, multicultural tolerance is defined by a general support of free speech combined with a willingness to censor exclusionary speech. This is consistent with research that suggests that when issues of social and political tolerance are confronted, many citizens choose to limit the rights of exclusionary groups. However, this seems distinct from a general willingness to censor all forms of speech, which I have labeled as absolute intolerance, where an individual is consistently intolerant of all types of speech. Finally, for the purposes of this dissertation a fourth category is labeled authoritarian intolerance, which represents individuals opposed to speech rights in general, but do not oppose the expression of exclusionary speech. Such individuals may not have a prior objection to exclusionary speech, which means allowing it does not represent a tolerance dilemma. Such individuals represent people who are both socially intolerant (have no objection to exclusionary speech) and politically intolerant (willing to censor free speech). These people represents most closely the type of general intolerance which spills over into all forms of non-conformity (political, social and moral) as documented by Stenner (2005), and will be beyond the scope of this dissertation, as they represent people for whom a prior objection to exclusionary speech does not exist.[39]

This conceptualization is an improvement on the current understanding of political tolerance because is takes into account that not all speech is the same. It integrates target group distinctions into the definition of tolerance and recognizes the conflict that emerges between social and political tolerance in the case of exclusionary speech. In addition, it recognizes the legal reality in Canada and many European democracies where certain forms of speech are restricted. It also begins to capture the disagreements among normative scholars about the limits of political tolerance while providing empirical researchers with a way to examine how these conflicts play out on the ground.

---

[39] The other possibility is that people tolerate exclusionary speech (i.e. find it objectionable but choose to allow it anyways) but not other forms of speech. While such a combination is possible, it is extremely unlikely precisely because exclusionary speech is argued to hold a special status in contemporary democracies. This statement receives empirical support in Chapter 3. Overcoming objection to exclusionary groups is highly unlikely when there is not a corresponding willingness to tolerate other groups.

While these dispositions may be partly reflected in Chong's empirical findings, they have not been synthesized in his work into competing conceptions of rights, as is done here. This work further diverges from Chong's work in explaining the cause of the target group distinctions that underpin a more multicultural form of tolerance. Chong's research focuses on the socialization of new norms that arose from the increasing rhetoric of political correctness and debates over speech codes on university campuses. A separate, perhaps complementary, explanation emerges for his findings. A principal reason that there were increasing concerns about hate speech on campus in the United States is because universities became far more diverse. Speech codes emerged as a way in which to manage this increasing diversity and were a response to incidents of racial antagonisms on campuses across the country (Delgado and Stefancic 2004). Whereas norm socialization is one explanation of changing attitudes toward racist groups, Chong does not explore how actual exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may also help to account for such shifts. Distinctions between exclusionary groups and other types of potentially objectionable speech may be driven more specifically by exposure among majority group members to racial and ethnic diversity. Rather than being an elite-driven shift in norms that has emerged primarily on university campuses, I will argue instead that intolerance of exclusionary speech emerges from individual-level experiences with racial and ethnic diversity.

*Social Diversity and Political Tolerance*

The role of racial and ethnic diversity in explaining political tolerance attitudes has received almost no attention among political tolerance researchers, despite increasing interest in the impact of racial and ethnic diversity on attitudes about shared citizenship, distributive policies and other democratic values like generalized trust (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Rice and Steele 2001; Alesina and Ferrara 2002; Marschall and Stolle 2004; Putnam 2007; Soroka et al. 2007; Stolle et al. forthcoming). Racial and ethnic diversity should be particularly important if distinctions across target groups are incorporated into the definition and measurement of political tolerance.

Exposure to diversity is often mentioned in explanations of absolute political tolerance, although such explanations rarely measure actual exposure directly. While this

research does not directly focus on racial and ethnic diversity, it provides a starting place for understanding possible mechanisms between exposure and tolerance judgments. There are three main ways in which exposure to diversity, broadly defined, has been used to explain political tolerance as traditionally measured in empirical political science. First, early studies argued that stable socio-demographic characteristics were related to tolerance outcomes because of the way such characteristics structured exposure to different ideas and people. For example, Stouffer's (1963) foundational study found that education was highly correlated with political tolerance. He argued that education forces individuals to think about topics in less rigid, more nuanced ways (ibid, 94) and encourages respect for dissenting views by *exposing* people to them (ibid, 99).[40] Stouffer also explained differences between urban and rural dwellers as well as regional differences based on how likely different contexts were to cause people to "rub shoulders with more people who have ideas different from his [*sic*] own and he learns to live and let live (ibid, 122; see also, Wilson 1985; Wilson 1991). Similarly, Stouffer originally claimed that women's greater intolerance partly resulted from less exposure to diversity caused by their isolation in the home (1963, Ch. 6).[41] While these early explanations posit exposure to diverse others as an important causal explanation, exposure was never directly tested and research on these factors has either ignored exposure as an explanation (as with education and gender) or failed to provide micro-level tests of the explanation (as with location). Furthermore, there is no effort to link the *type* of exposure with judgments toward particular target groups.

Political experience is another common explanation used to explain absolute political tolerance which partly relies on the idea that exposure to diversity is important in increasing respect for free expression. The relationship between political activity and political tolerance has yielded mixed findings in the literature (McClosky 1964; Nunn et

---

[40] The relationship between education and political tolerance has been consistently found, although Stouffer's original claim that it was a socialization effect has been largely ignored. Instead, the education effect is attributed to increases in cognitive sophistication that appear to underpin the relationship (Bobo and Licari 1989; Nie et al. 1996; Vogt 1997) and the information about democratic values that can be transmitted through direct discussions (Avery et al. 1997; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Bird et al. 1994).

[41] Golebiowska (1999) has conducted the most rigorous recent examination of gender effects on tolerance, showing that education, political expertise, threat perception, tolerance of uncertainty and moral traditionalism partially explain the differences, although controlling for these factors does not completely eliminate the gender gap.

al. 1978; Sullivan et al. 1982; Gibson and Bingham 1984; Barnum and Sullivan 1990; Fletcher 1990; Guth and Green 1991; Gibson and Duch 1991; Sullivan et al. 1993; Sniderman et al. 1996; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003).[42]  Recent work by Cigler and Joslyn (2002) provides the most direct test of how political participation can increase political tolerance through an exposure mechanism.  Focusing on the types of organizations that are likely to involve crosscutting cleavages, they show that members of inward-looking organizations show less tolerance than members of organizations where people are more likely to encounter divergent political views.[43]  Yet, they do not measure the actual presence of such diversity in these organizations, but instead rely on a questionable distinction between inward and outward-looking organizations.[44]  In fact, Hooghe (2003) offers an alternative explanation, arguing that what is more important about networks is a homogeneity of values within them that can reinforce democratic values.[45]  Of course, it is hard to discount the possibility that more tolerant individuals self-select into certain types of organizations. Research suggests that among adults, network effects from formal association membership are more likely an outcome of particular dispositional characteristics instead of their cause (Stolle and Hooghe 2004a; Stolle 2001).

Whereas exposure to diversity has played at least a partial role in explanations for the relationship between demographic characteristics, political participation, and political tolerance, there are a handful of studies that attempt to actually measure some types of diversity and its relationship to absolute political tolerance.  In a study of 12 European countries, Duch and Gibson (1992) report that ideological diversity in mature democracies is associated with higher levels of political tolerance.  Measuring ideological diversity by the presence of radical party voting in each country, they find a moderate

---

[42] The main disagreement is about whether this results from a selection effect of more educated, more participatory people or greater adherence to democratic norms through an exposure and socialization mechanism. The finding that elites are more tolerant is not without its critics either.  See, for example, Sniderman and colleagues (1991b) and Shamir (1991).

[43] Furthermore, some argue that the actual level of exposure to the types of conflictual situations which supposedly stem from diversity within associations is far lower than such accounts assume (Theiss-Morse and Hibbing 2005).

[44] For example, it is not clear why unions are inward-looking but professional associations are outward-looking.

[45] Hooghe focuses on how organizations with more highly educated, and presumably more socially tolerant, individuals are more likely to exhibit value convergence around attitudes toward foreigners.

correlation between diversity and aggregate tolerance scores for countries (r=.40) (ibid, , 262). In a similar study of intra-country variation in diversity, Gibson (1990) measures socio-economic diversity between U.S. states to test if this has an effect on levels of actual repression of Communists during the McCarthy era, yet he fails to find a relationship. While not a direct measure of political tolerance as a value, it is one of the only studies that attempts to get at the diversity-tolerance hypothesis. While these studies are important in attempting to measure diversity, they provide only a very limited look at its impact at the individual level.

Recent work by Mutz (2002b; 2006) begins to address individual level dynamics. She shows that when one's personal networks include people with divergent political opinions, one is more likely to be politically tolerant.[46] She demonstrates that exposure to "cross-cutting networks" increases respondents' ability to provide rationales for opposing political opinions (see also Huckfeldt et al. 2004).[47] In an experimental confirmation, she further provides evidence that people exposed to opposing political rationales show higher levels of absolute political tolerance, and this is especially true for individuals that already had high perspective-taking ability.

In both the work by Duch and Gibson (1992) and Mutz (2002b), the focus is on exposure to *political* diversity, and both provide evidence that the relationship is positive, i.e. more exposure to diversity is related to higher levels of political tolerance. What is missing from this research is any consideration of how different types of exposure might affect tolerance judgments toward specific target groups. Is exposure to political diversity more likely to increase tolerance of explicitly political groups? Does exposure to communists increase one's willingness to tolerate communists, or does it have a spill-over effect to all groups, as an absolute conception of political tolerance would assume. More importantly, how do other types of diversity, such as racial and ethnic diversity, contribute to a willingness to extend civil liberties to different target groups?

---

[46] Gibson (2001) reports similar findings in Russia for abstract support of democratic norms, including civil liberties based norms. Using a name-generator technique similar to that employed by Mutz, he finds that networks where political discussion occurs and involves weaker ties are moderately associated with support for democratic norms. However, he excludes political tolerance from his analysis.
[47] The type of diversity measured by Mutz is diversity of mainstream political opinions within close networks of friends.

40

To my knowledge, there is no research that explores how exposure to racial and ethnic diversity relates to political tolerance judgments, nor research that links exposure to diversity with specific target groups.[48]   If recent studies on political diversity are extended to other forms of diversity, then one might expect that increasing exposure to racial and ethnic diversity will lead to a greater willingness to extend civil liberties to various groups.  Why might this be so?  Dealing with diversity is argued to lead to reconsidering one's own position or values and trying to understand the other person's different point of view (Coser 1975; Mutz 2002b; Reich and Purbhoo 1975; Huckfeldt et al. 2004).  In addition, it is argued to foster the development of more general cognitive skills necessary for applying abstract democratic principles like free speech to concrete situations (Nie et al. 1996; Vogt 1997).  Exposure to diversity, from this perspective "provides an incentive to lessen complete reliance on established beliefs and predispositions" (Marcus et al. 1995, 7), which in turn might help individuals look past their initial dislike of a target group.  Racial and ethnic diversity may provide these cognitive benefits and increase tolerance of objectionable speech.

The idea that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may be significantly related to political tolerance is also supported by research that shows that social and political tolerance tend to be correlated (Stenner 2005).  People who are more socially tolerant are more likely to expose themselves to diverse others. In fact, social tolerance is often described in terms of behavior such as willingness to marry someone of a different race, to live in a diverse neighborhood or to have someone from a different ethnic group over for dinner.  Such "socially tolerant behaviors" are what one expects a socially tolerant person to do, regardless if such behaviors are viewed as a cause or consequence of socially tolerant attitudes.  This implies that exposure to diversity may be positively related to political tolerance because it is an artifact of the socially tolerant attitudes which tend to be positively related to political tolerance.

Yet, I have argued that target groups matter in tolerance judgments, and there is reason to believe that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may actually decrease

---

[48] It should be noted that Golebiowska (2001; 1996) is a partial exception, as she does look at how exposure to target group members in different circumstances affect political tolerance judgments toward the same target group.  She uses gays and racists in her experiment, and finds exposure to atypical target group members and positive interaction increase political tolerance levels for target groups.

tolerance for specifically exclusionary speech, despite a positive relationship to other forms of objectionable speech. Exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may cause an individual to find racists more objectionable because individuals, through exposure to racial and ethnic diversity, learn to identify with minorities who are targeted by hateful speech. Such a socialization process may make hate speech appear more threatening. Indeed, research on political tolerance has consistently shown threat perception to be a major and consistent correlate of tolerance judgments (Stouffer 1963; Stenner 2005; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). This explanation is a causal one, implying that exposure to increasing diversity itself leads to intolerance of exclusionary speech.[49]

Such a perspective is consistent with the contact hypothesis that has emerged in social psychological research on intergroup relations. Social psychological research has documented the propensity of people to favor their own group members and to have negative, hostile feelings toward out-group members (Tafjel and Turner 1986).[50] Yet, the contact hypothesis, as originally described by Allport (1958), argues that contact with out-group members can reduce prejudice. When specific conditions are met, such contact can lead to reduced out-group animosity and a re-definition of the in-group to include former out-group members in one's self-concept (Allport 1958; Pettigrew 1998b; Abrams et al. 2005; Dovidio et al. 2003). These findings have been extensively replicated and provide the basis for understanding how exposure to social diversity can create friendships across social boundaries. If such a framework of intergroup contact is extended to include two sorts of out-group members (racial and ethnic minorities and exclusionary groups), one might expect that increased positive contact with racial and ethnic minorities will increase hostility toward the other out-group. Once such friendships are created with racial and ethnic minorities, I will argue that people should

---

[49] The argument that exposure to social diversity leads to less tolerant attitudes is commonly referred to as the threat hypothesis. This hypothesis has gained some support in studies of generalized trust. Recent work has shown that higher levels of ethnic diversity are negatively related to generalized trust (Alesina and Ferrara 2002; Putnam 2007), although there is some evidence that these are contextual effects, rather than resulting from actual interaction (Marschall and Stolle 2004; Stolle et al. forthcoming).

[50] See Hogg and Abrams 2001 for an overview of the field.

be more willing to censor the expression of ideas that are antithetical to such relationships.

Some support for the mechanisms underpinning this argument can be found in research that shows that empathy (Cowan and Khatchadourian 2003) and out-group hostility (Kuklinski et al. 1991) have a negative impact on tolerance judgments and they stem more from emotional responses to target groups than cognitive skills. Identifying with the victims of exclusionary speech and increased hostility toward racist groups are likely consequences of greater exposure to racial and ethnic diversity. The result, I will argue, is decreased willingness to tolerate exclusionary speech. There is little reason to assume that such hostility will negatively impact tolerance of other types of speech. Given the other research reviewed in this section, one might actually expect exposure to racial and ethnic diversity to increase tolerance of other types of speech while decreasing support for exclusionary speech. Such a bifurcated impact would mean that the type of tolerance that one endorses depends in part on the social networks that one maintains.

In brief, while research in political science has begun to integrate the extensive findings of the contact hypothesis into research on political attitudes, especially when it comes to prejudicial attitudes and opinions about racial policies,[51] there has been a failure to address how exposure, and more specifically the type, quality and extent of exposure to racial and ethnic diversity impacts political tolerance. Given recent interest in the relationship between social and political tolerance, deciphering how and when issues of social inclusion clash with individual rights of free speech seems well warranted. By distinguishing exclusionary speech from other types of potentially objectionable speech in democratic politics, this section has laid the groundwork for a theory of multicultural tolerance which defines multicultural tolerance and sets the stage for testable hypotheses about its emergence in contemporary, multicultural democracies.

---

[51] See, for example, Kalin (1996), Oliver and colleagues (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003), Blake (2003), and Branton and Jones (2005). The results from this line of research indicate the complexity of the issue: diversity can lead to either hostility, namely in low socio-economic conditions where groups may feel they are in competition for scarce resources, or positive outcomes such as high socio-economic conditions where cooperation is more likely (Gimpel et al. 2003; Branton and Jones 2005). Such a complex interaction may well benefit from an analysis of what sorts of interaction individuals actually have with people from other backgrounds. Furthermore, this literature largely addresses prejudice and racial policies, instead of more general democratic values such as tolerance.

## _A Theory of Multicultural Tolerance: A Research Agenda_

Throughout this chapter, I have raised several challenges to how we understand political tolerance as a democratic virtue for citizens.  In the first section, I raised the issue of how to think about the nature and targets of objection and concluded that exclusionary speech may present a special case of expression over which citizens may legitimately disagree.  In the second section, I focused on what previous research says about the role of social tolerance and exposure to social diversity in understanding political tolerance.   When target group distinctions are incorporated into the conceptualization of political tolerance, then a more nuanced understanding of citizens' responses to civil liberties dilemmas is required.  By defining multicultural tolerance, this research 1) provides a different way to understand competing results that have emerged for the relationship between social and political tolerance and 2) highlights the importance of a previously under-examined variable, namely exposure to racial and ethnic diversity.  In this section, I elaborate in more detail the research framework and hypotheses that emerge from these observations and the research questions that this framework suggests.

### _Re-Defining Political Tolerance_

It is ironic that a literature that maintains so strongly that any view, however controversial, should be permitted to be heard refuses to recognize the dissenting voices that question the absoluteness of tolerance as a democratic value.  In order to understand the role of political tolerance in modern, multicultural democracies, political scientists need to problematize the absolute definition of tolerance found in the empirical literature. In the tradition of Mill, we need to value the diversity of opinion that can legitimately exist about what is best for a democracy, for  "…the only way in which a human being can make some approach to knowing the whole of a subject, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of every variety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be looked at by every character of mind" (Mill 2003, 90).  Given the potential harm of hate speech for democratic debate and the presence of hate speech legislation in many democratic countries, it is reasonable to question whether or not citizens should be

44

Figure 1.3: A New Definition of Tolerance Dispositions



expected to tolerate oppressive speech by hate groups. This is particularly relevant given concerns about social inclusion in increasingly multicultural countries.

To re-iterate, absolute political tolerance has two key features: it requires prior objection, and the target of the objection is unimportant. The normative framework for absolute political tolerance has its roots in liberal democratic theory and American constitutional jurisprudence, and it prioritizes individual autonomy, ensuring a marketplace of ideas and holding government accountable. I have argued that the key features of absolute political tolerance are contestable and that the values underpinning it are not the only ones endorsed in democratic politics. More specifically, I have argued that the nature of the objection must be considered and that there are reasons that exclusionary speech may require that the targets of political tolerance be differentiated if social equality is to be prioritized in democratic politics.

An alternative framework for conceptualizing political tolerance judgments was provided in Figure 1.2. In Figure 1.3, I further elaborate the three outcomes of interest in this dissertation, incorporating the distinction between objectionable and exclusionary speech. Exclusionary speech was defined in the previous section as speech that is designed to promote the discrimination or elimination of social groups from participation in society, causes harm to individuals at whom the speech is directed, and is done from a

position of authority or privilege. When an individual citizen is asked to allow the expression of objectionable ideas, in this framework they have three possible options. The first option is *absolute intolerance* of all objectionable speech, whether it be exclusionary or otherwise. For those willing to allow objectionable speech, there are two separate value options. *Multicultural tolerators* are those that are generally willing to allow the expression of objectionable speech, except in the case of exclusionary speech. *Absolute tolerators*, by contrast, permit the full spectrum of speech, both exclusionary and objectionable.

The use of the term multicultural tolerance is an intentional shift from Harel's discussion of inclusionary intolerance. Using the term multicultural tolerance recognizes that I am conceptualizing it as a form of *tolerance* and not *intolerance*. It also corresponds to developments in political theory that increasingly focus on how multicultural politics challenges us to reconsider the just political integration of minority groups in contemporary democracies (Kelly 2002; Benhabib 1996, 2002; Raz 1994; Kymlicka 1995a; Taylor and Gutmann 1994; Kymlicka 2001; Young 1990, 2000; Kymlicka and Norman 2000; Parekh 2000). A theory of multicultural tolerance, then, suggests that citizens in a democracy can and do embrace two different versions of political tolerance that are based on more fundamental conceptions individuals have about what equality and liberty mean. For my purposes, the distinction between multicultural and absolute tolerance is not intended to be a normative one, but rather reflects the reality that reasonable people can disagree about what forms of expression can and should be tolerated within a democratic system. In the next subsection, I develop the implications of this framework for empirical research.

*Testing the Presence of Multicultural Tolerance*

The approach to political tolerance presented here requires that we not only allow for alternative conceptions of what it means to be politically tolerant, but also show that these alternatives correspond to ways in which actual people think about civil liberties dilemmas. Two main research questions emerge:

1) Do individuals distinguish between different types of objectionable speech?

2) And, how does social tolerance and exposure to social diversity affect these distinctions?

These are the key research questions that are the focus of the work presented in the following pages. But first, a clearer statement of the expectations that emerge with respect to each of these questions is in order.

In this chapter, I have suggested that by problematizing the objection precondition of absolute conceptions of political tolerance, legitimate disagreements concerning the right to express exclusionary viewpoints arise. More specifically, at the aggregate level, I expect:

*Hypothesis 1*: The level of willingness to extend civil liberties will be lower for groups associated with exclusionary speech than other forms of objectionable speech.

Previous research has suggested that racist groups in particular tend to be hard for individuals to tolerate (Sniderman et al. 1996), especially among more recent generations (Chong 2006). Aggregate levels of willingness to allow different forms of objectionable speech should reflect disagreement about the proper limits of free expression that are present at the individual level. I further expect that:

*Hypothesis 2*: At the individual level, responses across target groups should conform to three types of tolerance: intolerance, multicultural tolerance and absolute tolerance. Multicultural tolerance will be distinct from both intolerance and absolute tolerance.

In essence, this implies that we should find among the population people who endorse a more multicultural form of political tolerance and others who take a principled position of absolute political tolerance (as well as people that are generally intolerant).

I expect that part of the explanation for differences in tolerance will result from individual respondents' social characteristics. Research suggests that women may be less supportive of hate speech because they value individual liberty less and social cohesion more than their male counterparts (Gilligan 1982; Cowan and Mettrick 2002; Cowan and Khatchadourian 2003). However, perhaps this will result in greater multicultural tolerance, rather than mere intolerance. Furthermore, there is some evidence that racial and ethnic minorities, at whom exclusionary speech is targeted, may be less tolerant of

such speech (Davis 1995).[52]   This will surely be part of the story in explaining who endorses these alternative conceptions of tolerance.  More generally, though, I expect that variables such as education, socio-economic status and political involvement which have been used to explain absolute political tolerance will also help to explain differences between intolerance and multicultural tolerance.  This leads to the following hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 3*: On important demographic and political correlates of intolerance, multicultural tolerance will significantly differ from intolerance in the same direction and to the same degree as absolute tolerators differ from the intolerant.

If support is found for this hypothesis, it will be a key contribution of this study, because it challenges the idea that a limited 'intolerance' of exclusionary speech differs significantly from a general disposition toward intolerance.  In other words, multicultural tolerance is not simply a targeted intolerance.  Rather, it is a more principled balancing of competing rights.

Perhaps the most important part of this story will be to examine the sources of such a balancing act.  I have suggested that social tolerance as a value may conflict with tolerance for exclusionary speech, but it also might reflect a process of socialization that results from exposure to racial and ethnic diversity.  The literature has suggested, although not overwhelmingly, that social tolerance as a value makes political tolerance less likely (Peffley et al. 2001; Druckman 2001).  Chong (2006) has more specifically implied that among the younger generations, people who are endorsing more multicultural values are less willing to tolerate racist groups.  This study has gone beyond his work in developing a typology of tolerance dispositions.  Contrary to his argument, I maintain that rather than a shift in values driven by discourses within higher education, the source of shifting attitudes toward exclusionary speech is actually a result of exposure to racial and ethnic diversity.

While little research has been conducted on the role of exposure to racial and ethnic diversity in political tolerance judgments, I have suggested a dual process that takes into account distinctions across target groups.  First:

---

[52] Although see Gross and Kinder (1998) who find no substantial racial differences in tolerance judgments toward racists despite the fact that racial and ethnic minorities.

*Hypothesis 4a*: Individuals exposed to more racial and ethnic diversity should be less tolerant of exclusionary speech.

This hypothesis is based on an affective mechanism by which individuals who are exposed to racial and ethnic diversity identify more strongly with the intended victims of exclusionary speech and find such speech more threatening to their values and their relationships.

Exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may have an alternative impact on other types of objectionable speech. Research on demographic and political diversity suggests that exposure to all sorts of diversity should increase one's cognitive capacities to deal with political dissent. In other words, it should make it easier to understand alternative perspectives and to develop the abstract reasoning skills required to apply abstract principles in practice. When target group distinctions are incorporated into our understanding of political tolerance judgments, the possibility emerges that these findings only extend to other types of objectionable speech, and not exclusionary speech. In other words, I expect that:

*Hypothesis 4b*: Exposure to racial and ethnic diversity should increase political tolerance of other objectionable speech.

Hypothesis 4a and 4b imply that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may simultaneously make exclusionary speech less tolerable, while increasing a person's willingness to extend civil liberties to other objectionable groups. Indeed, it is this dynamic that I will argue is the source of multicultural political tolerance. In the next chapter, I set out the methods for testing these hypotheses.

# Chapter 2: An Approach to Studying Tolerance

While the philosophical and legal arguments for and against unrestricted free speech are compelling, the empirical literature to date has ignored the wealth of normative positions that are democratically defensible.  In modern, multicultural democracies, we need to understand how experiences with and attitudes toward diversity shape citizens' civil liberties judgments toward different types of speech.

Yet, the study of attitudes presents a host of challenges, and the study of political tolerance is no different.  The measurement of political tolerance has undergone an immense amount of scrutiny since Stouffer's (1963) original study of political tolerance in the United States.  An impressive array of scholarly publications deals specifically with how political tolerance should be measured and how such measurements impact the interpretation of democratic tendencies among citizens (Sullivan et al. 1979; 1981; 1982; Gibson 1992a; Mondak and Sanders 2003; Gibson 2005a; Mondak and Sanders 2005; Gibson 2005b).  While such studies have contributed importantly to coherence in the measurement of political tolerance, the failure to question the normative underpinnings of the concept have led to a measurement that, while coherent, misses important variation in the ways in which people make civil liberties judgments across different types of speech.

In this chapter, I introduce the general research design of this study and the data and methods used to carry it out.  The study focuses on youth in two advanced, industrialized countries, Canada and Belgium.  Given the high levels of ethnic and racial diversity in Canada and a developed discourse around multiculturalism, I expect it to be a crucial case country in assessing the presence and prominence of multicultural tolerance among the youngest generation.  The Belgian case provides an extension of this argument to a context that shares many structural features with Canada, but lacks the high levels of diversity and history of immigration that characterizes the Canadian context.  The focus on youth in each country is intentional because recent generations are more likely to be exposed to the ethnocultural diversity that I argue underpins the development of multicultural tolerance.

The empirical investigation is based on a multivariate, statistical analysis of comparative survey data that were collected in 10th and 11th grade classrooms in Canada and Belgium during the 2005-2006 academic year. The main dependent variable is derived from a set of questions within this survey that ask a young person whether or not five different potentially objectionable groups should be allowed to participate in two different civil liberties activities. The main objective of this chapter is to describe why and how this indicator was employed and the main explanatory variables that will be used to examine variation in responses to different types of target groups. In the first section, I discuss the selection of my case countries and youth sample. In the second section, I discuss how political tolerance is operationalized as a concept. In the final section, I turn to the data collection that is the foundation of this study.

## *Multicultural Tolerance: Where and When*

In Chapter 1, multicultural tolerance was defined as a simultaneous valuing of free speech and social inclusion that resulted in people "drawing the line" at exclusionary speech. While it is an empirical question if the inter-target group distinctions that underpin such tolerance actually exist, I will argue that certain conditions will make it more likely for citizens to make such distinctions.[53] In particular, advanced, industrialized democracies face increasing pressure to address issues of social tolerance as their populations become increasingly diverse. This should create an environment where people learn to balance individual rights such as freedom of speech against other values, such as social inclusion. This should be particularly the case in countries where legislative restrictions have been placed on the expression of exclusionary speech. Furthermore, one might expect that people who have grown up with legislative and normative restrictions on hate speech, and who are maturing in a period when social diversity is an unmistakable characteristic of their societies, will be the most affected.

### *Case Countries: Canada and Belgium*

The two case countries used in this analysis are Canada and Belgium. The selection of these two case countries is intentional, and the characteristics that they share

---

[53] As mentioned in Chapter 1, there is some empirical support for target group distinctions in the U.S. context among the university-educated in recent generations (Chong 2006).

– and do not share – make them ideal tests of the presence and extent of multicultural tolerance among the younger generation.[54] Canada was selected to represent what Eckstein (1975) has called a "crucial case study". A crucial case study essentially implies the selection of a most-likely case in which a phenomenon may occur in order to test whether a theoretical perspective can be validated (ibid, 118-9).[55] In other words, if multicultural tolerance is to occur among a population, I will argue that it is most likely to occur among Canadian youth. Belgium, in contrast, is included to extend the findings, if any, from the Canadian context to a country that shares many of the structural characteristics of Canada, but which differs with respect to the variables that are argued to make Canada the crucial test that it is: namely, a country that has a high level of ethnic and racial diversity and a developed discourse around multiculturalism and social inclusion.[56]

Table 2.1 provides a breakdown of the important characteristics of these two countries. In many ways, Canada and Belgium are similar in terms of their institutional structures.[57] Belgium, with a population of approximately 10.5 million, is a parliamentary democracy under a constitutional monarchy. It is divided between a Dutch-speaking population in the North (Flanders) and a French-speaking population in the South (Wallonia).[58] Belgium was originally a centralized state after it broke off from the Dutch kingdom in 1830, but beginning in the 1960s, increasingly took on federal characteristics that divided the country into linguistic regions. In 1993, Belgium was formally defined as a federal state, with overlapping units known as regions (Flanders, Brussels and Wallonia) which have responsibilities over regional economic matters and

---

[54] I use the term 'case' here loosely. While both Belgium and Canada are my case countries, my unit of analysis (or 'case' in a stricter sense) is actually at the individual level.

[55] Crucial case studies can also refer to the use of 'least-likely cases' in which the research attempts to confirm a theory, rather than invalidate it. Eckstein (1975, 119) argues that whether a case is most or least likely is a question of research design and objectives, rather than inherent to a case.

[56] As Lijphart (1971, 687) explains, using a set of comparable cases reduces the number of potential explanatory variables to account for differences across contexts.

[57] For a compact summary of both systems, see the *Handbook of Federal Countries* (Griffiths 2002).

[58] There is also a small German-speaking population (<1%) along the German border.

Table 2.1: Key Similarities and Differences between Two Case Countries

| Canada | Belgium |
|---|---|
| Parliamentary democracy in a constitutional monarchy.  While the constitution was repatriated in 1982, the British monarchy continues to be represented in Canada by the Governor-General. | Parliamentary democracy in a constitutional monarchy. |
| Federation with multiple official linguistic communities that are regionally concentrated: French in Quebec and English in the rest of Canada). | Federation with multiple official linguistic communities that are regionally concentrated: Flemish (Dutch-speaking) in Flanders and Walloon (French-speaking) in Wallonia.† |
| Clear legal restrictions in both criminal and civil law which prohibit the promotion of hatred or genocide of groups based on color, race, religion, and ethnic origin, and sexual preference. | Clear legal restrictions in both criminal, and more recently civil law, which prohibit incitement or publication of the intention to incite hatred, discrimination or violence toward identifiable groups based on race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin, sexual preference, gender, disability and other categories. |
| Multinational discourse at the federal level focuses on two linguistic communities (and sometimes Aboriginal communities), but competes with a multiculturalist discourse focused on ethnic diversity. | Multinational discourse at federal level centers around two constituent linguistic communities. |
| *Historically a British colony settled primarily by European immigrants with an internal, colonized Aboriginal population.* | *Long-standing, Western European democracy with a history as a colonial power in present-day Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.* |
| *The foreign-born population is 18%, of which over half come from non-white countries, especially Asia (37% of immigrants).* | *The foreign-born population is 8.5% of the population, with the 76% of immigrants from other European countries.  The largest non-white immigrant population comes from Africa (14% of immigrants).* |
| *Significant visible minority population (13%).* | *Vast majority of population are of European descent (1.8% of population are immigrants from outside of Europe and North America).* |

Note: † The German-speaking community in Belgium is also an official language group that is geographically concentrated along the German border.  However, they make up a very small proportion of the population (less that 1%).
Source: Population figures for Belgium are from the *Direction générale statistiques et informations économique* based on 2006 data and, for Canada, from *Statistics Canada* based on 2001 census data.

communities (Flemish, French and German) which have responsibility for cultural and social issues and education.[59]

With a population of approximately 32 million people, Canada is also a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy, although its monarchy is linked

---

[59] In Flanders, the region and community are housed within a single government, but remain separate in Wallonia and for the largely French-speaking population in Brussels.  The merging of regional and community institutions in Flanders occurred in 1980.

with its history as a British colony. Canada is similarly a federal system with regionally concentrated linguistic communities (English and French). The English speaking population is the largest in the country with approximately 58.5% of the population declaring English as their mother-tongue. The French-speaking population (approximately 22.6%) is largely concentrated in the province of Quebec.[60]

Along with structural similarities, both Canada and Belgium have clear legal restrictions which prohibit hate speech. Restrictions are present in both criminal and civil law and have been upheld by the courts in both countries. One might expect that where legal restrictions are present, citizens will be more likely to make distinctions between exclusionary speech and other forms of objectionable.[61] While much of the research on political tolerance has been conducted in the United States, the selection of two countries where hate speech restrictions have been codified provides likely contexts in which to test my theoretical contention that differences in conceptions of political tolerance are possible among citizens that are not fully captured by the dichotomy between tolerance and intolerance. Such a distinction is, after all, supported by the country's legal regime. [62]

Yet, despite these similarities, Canada diverges in important respects from Belgium. Most importantly, the racial and ethnic diversity of Canada is far greater than in Belgium. Fully 18 percent of the Canadian population is foreign-born, over twice as high as the percent of the foreign-born population in Belgium (8.5%). Canada has one of the highest rates of immigrants in the world. Equally important, the source countries of immigrants in Canada are most likely to come from countries whose populations are primarily non-European, whereas two thirds of Belgian immigrants come from other European countries. The changing demographics of immigration, as well as a significant non-white population already living in Canada, means that the country is not only characterized by linguistic diversity, but a significant portion of the population (13%)

---

[60] There is also a large community of non-French and non-English speaking people in Canada which makes up over 17% of the population.
[61] One process by which hate speech legislation can legitimize restrictive attitudes about exclusionary speech is through media coverage when such legislation is used. Such cases tend to be very high profile, and research suggests that such coverage can raise awareness about the falseness of the claims of exclusionary speech (Weimann and Winn 1986).
[62] See Table 1.1 in Chapter 1 for details about the specific legislation pertaining to hate speech in these two countries.

also are characterized as visible minorities.[63]  In contrast, Belgium has a very small population of people from non-European backgrounds.  Census data in Belgium do not contain racial information; however a telling indicator is that less than two percent of the population has emigrated from countries outside of Europe or North America.

Canada's history as a country of immigrants and its present racial and ethnic diversity are tied to the development of a discourse of multiculturalism.  It also creates opportunities for actual contact between the primarily white majority and ethnic and racial minorities.  Canada is rightly described as a white settler society, created by European settlers who arrived as a result of European exploration and colonialism.[64]  Similar to other white settler societies like the United States and Australia, its national identity has developed largely based around the settler experience of European people.  As Razack (2002, 2-3) argues, this racialized mythology has largely shaped the social relations between the settlers and the original Aboriginal communities as well as more recent waves of immigrants from non-European countries.  What distinguishes Canada from other white settler societies, however, is the parallel existence of the Francophone minority that has taken on a nationalist discourse which distinguishes it from the larger English-speaking community.  Some have argued that this duality can partly explain both appeals by ethnocultural communities for recognition as well as state policies to support ethnocultural communities (Pal 1993; Mackey 2002). For example, the government officially recognized its bilingual nature in 1969 with the Official Languages Act, but the recommendations simultaneously included recommendations for a policy of multiculturalism, which the government announced in 1971 as an official policy of the federal government.[65]

In other words, there is reason to believe that the Canadian discourse around multiculturalism partly emerged from both its ethnic and its linguistic diversity.  Some go as far as to argue that Canadian national identity is actually defined by its diversity

---

[63] The Canadian census used the term visible minority to capture people who come from ethnic and cultural backgrounds that are distinct from the largely white, European-descent majority.

[64] For discussion of the concept of "white settler societies" and its implication for ethnocultural communities, see Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis (1995) and Razack (2002).

[65] The policy became legislation when the Canadian Multicultural Act was officially passed in 1988.

(Kymlicka 1998; Mackey 2002).[66]   Support for multiculturalism has generally increased in the past thirty-five years and there is no evidence that such support competes with stronger feelings of national identity in the Canadian context (Dasko 2004; Kalin and Berry 1995; Berry and Kalin 1995).[67]   This may partly be due to Canada's particular immigration regime, which selects a high proportion of educated and skilled immigrants compared to most European countries whose immigrants (at least from non-European source countries) are primarily asylum seekers and refugee claimants (Abu-Laban and Gabriel 2002).   This increasing support for multicultural policies mirrors demographic shifts in the visible minority population, which has risen from less than 5 percent of the population in 1981 to over 13 percent in 2001.   Population estimates suggest this trend will continue, and by 2016, visible minorities will account for fully one-fifth of the population.[68]

Unlike Canada, Belgium does not have an indigenous population and has historically played a role as colonizer in other countries.   European countries have been shaped by a nation-state discourse that imagines countries composed of single, homogenous ethnic groups (Anderson 1983; Smith 1987).   Belgium became a single state in 1830, despite its bilingual nature, and some argue it was a single nation as well (Deprez and Vos 1998, 8).   Yet, the linguistic diversity during the 19th and 20th centuries led increasingly to subnational communities emerging among the Flemish and Walloon. The multinational character of Belgian society has been incorporated into its national identity which recognizes these two constituent cultural segments (Maddens and Vanden Berghe 2003).   Yet, there is little room in this discourse for immigrant communities, especially those from non-European countries (Morelli and Schreiber 1998).

---

[66] The common description of Canada as a cultural mosaic compared to the American melting pot represents this attempt as defining Canadian uniqueness based on its preference for cultural accommodation rather than assimilation (Gibbon 1938).
[67] Note, however, that during Quebec's Silent Revolution, Quebecois identity was largely seen as an ethnic one.   While there is still a sense that being a Quebecois(e) requires being from 'vieille souche' – in English, old stock – the nationalist discourse in Quebec has slowly shifted to become more inclusive of francophone immigrants, despite the recent controversies over reasonable accommodation that have emerged in the province.
[68] This information was published in a report by Statistics Canada on January 21, 2003 in a document titled "Canada's Ethnocultural Portrait: The Changing Mosaic, 2001 Census".   The document is available online at http://www.statcan.ca.

Immigration to Belgium is seen as a newer phenomenon, in contrast to settler societies where immigration is part of their founding myths.  Furthermore, the vast majority of immigrants are from other European countries.  A small proportion (24% of the immigrant population) comes from countries outside of Europe, with the majority coming from African countries.  The nationalist discourse in this regionally divided country, as Morelli and Schreiber (1998) argue, means that immigrants are the 'last Belgians'; in other words, immigrants see their host community as Belgium, whereas natives are increasingly segregating themselves into their regional communities.  This is supported by recent research that demonstrates that native born Belgians are more likely to identify with regional communities, whereas Muslim immigrants are more likely to identify with the larger Belgian community (De Raedt 2004).

Thus, both Belgium and Canada have identities that include a sort of multiculturalism: the idea that the larger community is composed of multiple cultural communities.  Yet, Canada's history as a settler society and Belgium's position as a European nation-state and colonial power have meant that immigrants have been incorporated into these identities differently: in Canada, multiculturalism has become almost synonymous with the integration of immigrant communities, whereas in Belgium, Belgian identity is often seen as one composed of the two founding linguistic communities, despite the fact that the Flemish and Walloons are increasingly less likely to identify with this larger identity.  The lack of incorporation of immigrants (especially racialized minorities) into a Belgian identity and differences in its history of immigration are likely explanations for the lower levels of contact between majorities and minorities in Belgium and lower levels of identification with racial and ethnic minorities.  This means despite the structural similarities in Belgium and Canada, I expect the frequency of multicultural tolerance to be lower among Belgian youth.

In sum, Canada, given its history of immigration and multicultural discourse, is the most likely context where one might find recent generations of citizens who solve the conflict between social inclusion and freedom of expression by siding with social inclusion.  Belgium, given its structural similarities to Canada but divergent history of immigration, makes it a useful comparative context in which to test whether this framework is specific to Canada, or if it can be generalized to other contexts where

discourses around free speech and social inclusion are shaped by different historical experiences.

*Youth Socialization and Attitude Change*

If changes are occurring in how political tolerance is thought about, they are most likely to be observed in the youngest generation. Early research on political socialization suggested that experiences during youth and adolescence are important predictors of adult political attitudes (Greenstein 1965; Allerbeck et al. 1979; Hess and Torney-Purta 1967; Youniss 1980). More recently, a revival of political socialization studies highlights the importance of early socialization experiences, especially through schools, on both political participation and political knowledge (Niemi and Junn 1998; Galston 2001; Torney-Purta 2001).[69] Despite renewed interest, the early focus on political socialization as a source of values, rather than information or future participation, has received less attention (Finkel and Ernst 2005). Yet, there are many reasons to believe that experiences during youth are fundamental to the types of attitudes people hold as adults, not only in terms of providing the foundation for them, but also in shaping how people interpret later experiences.

Miller and Sears (1986), for example, provide evidence that an individual's norm environment remains remarkably similar during adult years. While changes in the context can induce attitude change, they argue that most people are fairly consistent in the norm environment they expose themselves to. This finding complements more recent studies that have found that network effects among adults – at least when it comes to formal associations – are more likely an outcome of particular dispositional characteristics instead of their cause (Stolle 2001; Billiet and Cambré 1999). In other words, adults are likely to have some stable attitudes and these attitudes are likely to structure the types of experiences they expose themselves to.

The literature on political socialization points to youth experiences as a key source of civic attitudes and behaviors (Stolle and Hooghe 2004a), and justifies a focus on youth experiences with diversity as a potentially important component in understanding attitudes. During adolescence, young people are developing a sense of self

---

[69] For a useful review of the major developments in political socialization research, see Sapiro (2004).

58

and their interactions with peers are becoming more important to this development (Furman and Buhrmester 1992; Erikson 1963). They are also developing the capacity for moral reasoning to deal with conflicts that emerge in social settings (Patterson 1979). The people they interact with and the nature of these interactions, I will argue, can have important and lasting effects on the way people view the world. I will argue throughout this dissertation that a key explanation for tolerance judgments toward different forms of objectionable speech is a young person's experience with social diversity.

There is a small amount of research that has considered political tolerance judgments among youth.[70] From the limited research to date, evidence suggests that young people can be taught to apply general democratic principles to specific situations requiring tolerance (Avery 1988; Vogt 1997; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Bird et al. 1994; Avery et al. 1997) and that similar relationships are found between political tolerance and its correlates among young people as we find among adult samples (Sotelo 2000; Patterson 1979). As with the political tolerance literature more generally, however, there is no attempt in these studies to measure the composition or quality of adolescents' networks, despite the fact that exposure at this stage may have even stronger effects than for adults. There has also been no attempt to consider the ways in which young people evaluate different forms of objectionable speech.

Yet, it is precisely my argument that the type of speech one is being asked to tolerate is important. In the contemporary context, there is reason to believe that public attitudes toward different forms of objectionable speech may be shifting. This shift has been documented in the U.S. context. In his analysis of General Social Survey data in the United States from 1976 to 1988, Wilson (1994) provides support for this contention. He demonstrates that while tolerance for left-wing groups in the United States increased during this period, there is no evidence of such increases for the right-wing groups in his study.[71] In fact, he shows that when considering those who oppose racism, tolerance of

---

[70] Education, however, is a key correlate of absolute political tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Golebiowska 1995; Nie et al. 1996). While not usually studied among a youth sample, it is generally considered a socialization effect.

[71] Importantly, this result holds even when the level of disagreement with each group is controlled for. In other words, while there have been changes in support for different types of groups, if we look only at those who disagree with groups on the left and on the right, *tolerance* of left-wing groups has increased.

racists during this period actually *decreases* (ibid, 547).[72]   This overlaps with earlier findings by McCutcheon (1985) that suggested that right-wing intolerance differed from both left-wing intolerance and general tolerance.  He also finds that the younger and more educated are generally more tolerant, but that this does not extend to specifically right-wing intolerance.

A recent analysis by Chong (2006) of US General Social Survey data provides a more detailed account of this trend in attitudes toward racist speech.  He shows that those who attended university beginning in the 1980s and those who endorse multicultural values in this generation are less likely to tolerate racists.  This echoes the findings of a campus case study that found that liberal students tended to be more tolerant than more moderate students of offensive speech, except when it was racist in nature (Dow and Lendler 2002, 551).  Among the younger and more educated, then, a countervailing trend has been emerging that runs counter to the generally positive relationship between education and political tolerance: we are observing a singling out of categories of exclusionary speech among more recent generations for censorship, especially those with higher levels of education.   The pre-university sample examined here will be an important test of whether such distinctions are tied as closely to the university experience as these studies have suggested.

This generational shift may be particularly noteworthy in countries like Canada and Belgium, where legislative restrictions on hate speech are in place.  Such laws may be instructive to the public about what is allowable and what is not.  The generation of young people considered here grew up in a period after which such legislation had been constitutionally upheld by the highest courts in their respective countries.  It is interesting to note that in Canada, the courts have actually used this socialization argument as a justification for the law.  In the landmark *Keegstra* case ("R v. Keegstra" 1990), the majority decision argued that one of the reasons that the hate propaganda law is justified is because it not only serves a valid purpose but also has an educative function (Sumner 2004, 58).  In Chief Justice Dicken's words,

> "Section 319(2) serves to illustrate to the public the severe reprobation
> with which society holds messages of hate directed towards racial and

---

[72] Note however that he finds that younger generations in general tend to be more tolerant, although this effect is weaker for racists than all other groups.

60

religious groups. It makes that kind of expression less attractive and hence decreases acceptance of its content. Section 319(2) is also a means by which the values beneficial to a free and democratic society in particular, the value of equality and the worth and dignity of each human person can be publicized" ("R v. Keegstra" 1990)

Legal norms are seen from this perspective as helping to lay out what are acceptable uses of ones right's are. Young people who grow up with such legislation in place may be most susceptible to such messages as they develop the political values and attitudes that they will likely hold through later life.

In sum, then, I expect that more recent generations are particularly susceptible to differentiation between exclusionary speech and free expression more generally. Youth are most likely to be impacted by their experiences with social diversity and to translate these experiences into an attitude disposition that reflects the competing demands that contemporary democracies place on them. When these experiences occur within countries that have strong, established legal norms against hate speech, the tendency to distinguish exclusionary speech from other speech may be all the more likely. While longitudinal data would be required to test the generational change argument, this dissertation will focus on cross-sectional, comparative data to document the presence of multicultural tolerance, its prominence among this generation, and its relationship to social diversity among an age group where I expect it will most likely be found.

## *Defining Political Tolerance*

With the case selection and sample selection delineated, the next task will be to clarify how political tolerance is operationalized among youth in each country. In Chapter 1, I presented a more nuanced view of political tolerance than is usually employed in empirical studies of civil liberties judgments. What I share with these studies is a focus on conceptualizing political tolerance as it relates to people's attitudes toward the public expression of objectionable ideas. Where I differ is in the role that different types of expression play in categorizing individuals as tolerant. Before discussing how political tolerance is measured, a few clarifications are in order about the meaning of expression and objection.

As noted, political tolerance is associated with the *expression* of ideas, which in the jurisprudence of most modern democracies includes written and oral communication, as well as acts that express a viewpoint.[73] In addition, political tolerance often focuses on expression that is *public*. While distinctions between the public and private sphere are contested among feminist scholars (Pateman 1983), legislation that limits speech usually is restricted to public expression, which is understood to exclude conversations between family and friends, and other communication which is not intended for a larger audience. Public is also often defined spatially to include 'public spaces' such as in the streets, government buildings, parks, and similar settings where protests, rallies and speeches are often held. While I am sympathetic to feminist critiques of the public/private dichotomy, I do not problematize it here. Instead, I focus on two activities that clearly fall within common conceptions of public expression: a public march and discussion on public television.

There is also considerable debate about what the target of tolerance judgments is. More precisely, the question raised is whether it is the people holding objectionable views, or the objectionable views themselves that are tolerated (see especially, Cohen 2004, 90-2). This may seem purely semantic, but in fact the difference is often used in order to solve the supposed "paradox of tolerance." Heyd (1996a), for example, argues that by basing tolerance judgments on individuals (instead of their beliefs, values or practices) we can overcome our objections to the latter by focusing on the inherent worth of the former. In empirical studies of political tolerance, the definition generally focuses on ideas, yet the measurement is based on respondents' reactions toward groups of actors who are associated with a viewpoint, as is true with the measurement of tolerance used here. In this study, I focus on groups who are associated with exclusionary speech. While theoretically it is the speech that one is being asked to tolerate, in practical politics there are actors associated with the expression of such ideas.

Furthermore, it seems to me that from a social psychological perspective (rather than a philosophical one), the distinction between values, attitudes, and practices of a person or group and the person or group themselves is not as distinct as it appears. Research has shown that out-groups are often attributed negative characteristics or

---

[73] I use the term expression and speech interchangeably. Both terms are intended in this larger sense.

stereotypes simply by being members of an out-group.[74]  If we assume that many of the conflicts that occur in modern, multicultural democracies arise from viewpoints based in different groups, then to distinguish between viewpoints and the groups (or people in these groups) to which they are attributed seems somewhat artificial.  The distinction between speech and actor, in my opinion, serves more as a way in which individuals can justify their attitudes, of either tolerance or intolerance, rather than a meaningful distinction that requires a change in the operationalization of political tolerance.  For this reason, I will discuss speech and the actors responsible for the speech in largely equivalent ways.

Finally, a note on the importance of disagreement: as already mentioned, prior objection has become a key part of the definition of political tolerance.  There remains, however, serious debate among philosophers about the nature of this objection. In particular, many authors explore whether or not objections must be moral (or morally defensible) or if objections can be based on dislike (Horton 1996; Churchill 2003; Mendus 1989; Churchill 1997; Williams 1996; Heyd 1996b).  My focus being on citizen attitudes, I think the valid grounds for objections must be conceived broadly to capture the types of disagreements that actually occur in contemporary democratic debates. However, a related distinction between disagreement (and rationality) and dislike (and affect) continues to emerge in philosophical inquiries (see, for example, Heyd 1996b).  In studies of public opinion more generally, and political tolerance in particular, the focus on understanding citizen's attitudes as a rational calculus or principled decision contrasts with how most studies on political tolerance measure objection by asking respondents how much they like or dislike a group (implying an affective relationship).[75]  The survey used for this analysis intentionally asks respondents about their level of disagreement in order to be consistent with the idea that tolerance means overcoming objection.  It also assumes that many affective reactions are based on disagreement (or at least perceived disagreement and stereotypes about groups).  In brief, objection is understood to broadly

---

[74] Research on social categorization theory and the minimal group paradigm as developed by Tafjel and Turner (1986) has provided extensive evidence for this assertion.  See Hogg and Abrams (2001) for an overview of this research.

[75] While this seems to be a slip between the definition and operationalization of political tolerance, Kuklinski and colleagues (1991) lend support to such an operationalization by showing that affective considerations better explain tolerance judgments.

refer to disagreement even though I acknowledge that this process contains both affective and cognitive components. That being said, the attempt to isolate exclusionary speech is also a way to distinguish between types of objection. While we might expect citizens to overcome their disagreement with most objectionable speech, I argue that we should consider it reasonable (and perhaps preferable) that not all citizens overcome their objection to exclusionary speech.

*From Concept to Measurement*

This line of reasoning provides the foundation for the actual measurement of types of tolerance. The main dependent variable for the analysis is based on a tolerance battery which I developed as a modified version of political tolerance batteries commonly used in surveys.[76] The goal was to include a number of potentially objectionable identity-based groups that differed in the exclusionary nature of their speech, their ideological association, and that were salient in both the Canadian and Belgian contexts. The final battery includes five different potentially objectionable groups: racists, skinheads, radical Muslims, gay rights activists, and Quebec and Flemish separatists (in Canada and Belgium respectively). The respondent is asked "For each of these groups, please indicate if they should be allowed to do the activities listed: 1) hold a peaceful march in your neighborhood; 2) talk on public television about their views." The answer category is dichotomous, yes or no.

The two activities were selected to vary in terms of how threatening they might be to the respondent. The peaceful march scenario intentionally specified that it occur in the respondent's neighborhood. The proximity of this activity makes it more threatening – an "in your face" activity that has more potential to affect the respondent and would be harder to ignore if it occurred. Substantial research supports the contention that the perception of threat decreases tolerance levels (Stouffer 1963; Stenner 2005; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995), and therefore varying the level of threat in the two questions is important. That being said, while it may be more difficult for respondents to allow a group to hold a peaceful march in their neighborhood (high threat)

---

[76] See Finkel, Sigelman and Humphries (1999) for a comprehensive overview of the development of various measures of political tolerance.

than to allow the same group to talk on public television (low threat), there is still a general tendency for people to be consistent with their responses toward a group regardless of the activity.[77]

In addition, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement or disagreement with each group on an 11-point Likert scale.[78] The inclusion of this item allows me to replicate a modified version of the 'least-liked' methodology created by Sullivan and colleagues (1979) while still ensuring that I am able to make comparisons across different types of target groups. Controlling for the level of disagreement has become common practice among political tolerance studies; however, unlike the method developed by Sullivan and colleagues, I do not require respondents to rank groups by level of dislike. Rather, I allow respondents to find multiple groups equally objectionable by asking respondents to rate and provide civil liberties judgments for all target groups.[79]

Throughout the text, I will use the term disagreement and objection interchangeably. Because the disagreement scale I use allows for variations in the level of disagreement, the analysis will shift between analyzing those who disagree (i.e. provide 0-4 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale) and those who report the highest level of disagreement possible (i.e. a 0 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale). The terms disagreement and objection are used to refer to the former, and high disagreement and high objection are used to refer to the latter.

In addition to the political tolerance battery, two general statements were included in the survey which attempt to gage respondents' general support for civil liberties as well as their general support for hate speech restrictions. The free speech statement was: "We are all better off if everyone is free to speak their mind in politics, even if some of the things people say are obnoxious or offensive." The hate speech statement was: "It should

---

[77] For each group, the pair of activities (march and talking on television) are significantly and positively correlated at between .51 and .59. Similarly, *across* groups, there are higher correlations obtained within each activity than across activities. However, see Hurwitz and Mondak (2002) for a compelling argument that some people are intolerant of specific activities, regardless of the target group doing it. Although my measure of political intolerance does not allow for this, only a small percentage of people report agreeing with a particular groups' position but do not allow it to engage in one or both of the activities.

[78] The exact question wording was: "How much do you agree or disagree with the beliefs of the following groups?".

[79] While preferable for my purposes, this does complicate the creation of a single measure because respondents vary in the number of groups they find objectionable. I discuss this further in Chapter 3.

be illegal to say hateful things publicly about racial, ethnic and religious groups."[80] Similar to previous research that has compared general support for civil liberties to specific tolerance judgments (Prothro and Grigg 1960), these two questions allow me to investigate the relationship between abstract support and decisions in more specific scenarios. The inclusion of a specific question concerning support for hate speech restrictions, in particular, provides a means of contrasting support for speech in general with support for exclusionary speech, which is a key distinction of my theoretical framework. I expect that support for these general statements will mirror distinctions that occur at the target group level. More specifically, I expect some people 1) to take a principled stand of absolute tolerance (support for free speech and lack of support for hate speech restrictions), others 2) to be generally intolerant of all speech (lack of support for free speech and support for hate speech restrictions), and finally 3) for some respondents to provide answers consistent with multicultural tolerance (support for free speech *and* support for hate speech restrictions). Furthermore, I expect these general attitudes to show consistency at the target group level.

## *Comparative Youth Study*

The main source of data for the analysis is the Comparative Youth Study (CYS), a large-N, survey-based data set that was collected during the 2005-2006 academic year in Belgium and Canada (Stolle and Hooghe 2006). The CYS is a collaboration between two separate but parallel studies that were conducted among 10th and 11th grade students in each country: the Belgium Youth Survey (BYS) and the McGill Youth Survey (MYS) (Hooghe et al. 2006; Stolle et al. 2006). The grade selection was based on a decision by the research teams to sample youth who were approximately 16 years of age.[81] In this section, the CYS data sampling design is described in detail.

---

[80] This question is a modified version of the question used by Sniderman and colleagues (1996) in their study of civil liberties judgments in Canada.

[81] Sampling 16-year-olds was intended to capture young people before they were able to vote in each country, at a point in their development when they have some independence from parental control, and are likely to be increasingly influenced by their peer groups.

Table 2.2: Number of Schools Surveyed by Location in Belgium

| School Type | Flemish | French | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| Catholic | 40 | 30 | 70 |
| Public | 14 | 15 | 29 |
| Local Community * | 6 | 7 | 13 |
| Total | 60 | 52 | 112 |

Note: Community schools are public schools organized at the municipal rather than regional level.

The Belgian survey was conducted in a stratified sample of secondary schools in ten provinces in the French and Flemish communities, with an over-sampling of five additional Dutch schools in Brussels.[82] Schools were selected within each province to represent the diversity of educational institutions present there. Table 2.2 provides a breakdown of the number of schools by community and school type. In each school, approximately 50 students in 10th grade classes were surveyed with a self-administered, paper-based survey that took approximately one-period to complete.[83] The survey was administered in French in the French community's schools and in Dutch in the Flemish community schools. In total, 6,265 students completed surveys.[84] The average age of respondents was 15.9 years old. The total response rate across schools was 66 percent.

Sampling for the Canadian survey was also done at the school level. Seven cities were sampled in Ontario and Quebec, and the cities were selected to vary in terms of size and were 'matched' across provinces. More specifically, the two largest cities were selected in each province (Toronto and Montreal), along with two medium sized cities of approximately 150,000 inhabitants, and three small towns with approximately 15,000 inhabitants. Two small towns were selected in Ontario that varied in their linguistic composition (one almost entirely English-speaking, while the other had a significant French-speaking minority) and one small town in Quebec that was almost exclusively French-speaking.

---

[82] No schools were sampled in the German community, as the German community makes up less than 1% of the total population of the country.
[83] In the Belgian system, the 10th grade equivalent is 4th year.
[84] For more information, see the BYS technical report (forthcoming).

Table 2.3: Number of Schools Surveyed by Location in Canada

| Location | Quebec | Ontario | Total |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Large cities** | **34** | **32** | **66** |
| *Public* | *15* | *20* | *35* |
| *Private* | *19* | *12* | *31* |
| **Medium cities** | **5** | **5** | **10** |
| *Public* | *3* | *5* | *8* |
| *Private* | *2* | *0* | *2* |
| **Small cities** | **3** | **3** | **6** |
| *Public* | *2* | *3* | *5* |
| *Private* | *1* | *0* | *1* |
| **Total** | **42** | **40** | **82** |

Within each of the two large cities, schools were intentionally selected to vary in terms of the socio-economic status of students and the homogeneity of the student population. This was done using provincial educational statistics and census tract information when available, as well as information gathered from individual school websites and the Fraser Report.[85] In the medium and small towns, all school boards were contacted and an effort was made to survey as many schools as possible in each setting.[86] The final distribution of schools surveyed is presented in Table 2.3. The response rate for schools was 54 percent.

In each school, two classrooms were normally surveyed of 10th or 11th grade students.[87] A total of 3334 respondents completed the self-administered questionnaire in Canada.[88] The survey was administered in either French or English, depending on the

---

[85] The Fraser Report is published by the Fraser Institute, a Canadian independent research and educational organization that publishes a report card on schools in Canada that contains a ranking of schools, as well as selected raw socio-demographic and educational statistics.

[86] Because the small and medium sized towns had fewer schools, contacting all available schools in each city was the selected method of sampling in order to ensure a sufficient number of respondents from these non-urban areas. For more information, see the MYS technical report (forthcoming).

[87] In some instances, one or multiple classrooms were surveyed at the request of the school principal or as a result of availability and willingness of the school staff. An attempt was made to do two classrooms per school as a rule.

[88] In the classrooms selected for our survey, 97 percent of students participated in the cross-sectional survey. However, an accurate response rate is almost impossible to calculate because the MYS research team required approval prior to entering the classroom from a number of levels: the school board, the

language of the school. The average age of respondents was 16.2 years old, which makes the sample comparable to the Belgian sample in terms of age distribution. However, because the sample is non-random and confined to seven locations, generalization to aggregate levels in Canada is limited. In particular, there is an over-representation of urban youth in the sample which is made clear in Table 2.3. This overrepresentation is intentional because the goal of the survey was not to assess general levels of engagement and attitudes in the Canadian youth population, but rather to ascertain the relationship among variables, notably the role of social diversity. For that reason, an over-sampling of urban areas allows for a sufficient number of people from diverse backgrounds for analysis purposes, as well as sufficient numbers of people who have the opportunity to create diverse networks.[89]

Within each city in the sample, the socio-economic and linguistic backgrounds of the students are roughly similar to the larger city in which they were sampled. For example, Table 2.4 provides an overview of income information provided by young people in the McGill Youth Study, compared with the distribution in the census for each city, based on two-parent family incomes. While young people's ability to estimate their family income is certainly prone to some unreliability, the distributions are largely similar to the census data. In addition, an effort was made to sample schools in accordance with the linguistic composition of the larger school systems in each city and to represent the public and private institutions in accordance with their actual distribution in the school population.[90] This suggests that the sample, while not representative, is suggestive of the context within these seven cities.

After the administration of the surveys, the responses were entered by trained research assistants at McGill University and the Catholic University of Leuven, under the supervision of the principal investigators of each study. The datasets were cleaned and

---

individual school principal, teachers willing to allow us to enter their classroom, and in some cases parental consent.

[89] It should be noted that this creates a risk of having insufficient numbers from more homogenous communities. However, the decision to sample three small towns instead of two, as well as to sample all schools that were willing to participate in the study from these areas was made to minimize this risk. In total, 741 respondents were from medium or small towns (approximately 22% of the sample).

[90] The public and private school composition in Quebec and Ontario differ in important ways. According to the *Statistiques de l'Education, 2004*, approximately 24 percent of schools in Quebec are private schools (28). However, in Montreal, 42 percent of schools are private (31). In Ontario, the Ministry of Education's *Quick Facts, 2002-2003*, reports that 28 percent of the schools in the province are private.

| Table 2.4: Comparison of Reported Family Income and Census Income Distribution | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Quebec | | Ontario | |
| | MYS | Census | MYS | Census |
| **Big City** | | | | |
| less than 20,000 | 5.1% | 3.7% | 4.9% | 4.1% |
| 20,000-40,000 | 13.5% | 12.8% | 10.8% | 9.4% |
| 40,000-60,000 | 35.1% | 35.4% | 21.7% | 21.9% |
| 60,000-80,000 | 20.2% | 20.9% | 16.5% | 16.5% |
| more than 80,000 | 26.3% | 28.1% | 46.1% | 48.0% |
| **Medium City** | | | | |
| less than 20,000 | 1.6% | 2.7% | 1.6% | 0.9% |
| 20,000-40,000 | 9.8% | 8.2% | 9.8% | 6.5% |
| 40,000-60,000 | 24.4% | 28.0% | 24.4% | 24.3% |
| 60,000-80,000 | 29.0% | 29.1% | 28.0% | 28.5% |
| more than 80,000 | 32.1% | 31.9% | 36.2% | 39.7% |
| **Small Towns** | | | | |
| less than 20,000 | 0.8% | 0.8% | 6.9% | 7.7% |
| 20,000-40,000 | 9.1% | 8.7% | 17.2% | 19.2% |
| 40,000-60,000 | 41.7% | 41.2% | 24.1% | 19.2% |
| 60,000-80,000 | 23.0% | 23.3% | 34.5% | 34.6% |
| more than 80,000 | 25.4% | 25.8% | 17.2% | 19.2% |
| | | | | |
| less than 20,000 | na † | | 21.7% | 20.0% |
| 20,000-40,000 | | | 13.0% | 15.0% |
| 40,000-60,000 | | | 26.1% | 25.0% |
| 60,000-80,000 | | | 30.4% | 35.0% |
| more than 80,000 | | | 8.7% | 5.0% |

Note: Census income is the distribution of income levels for two-parent census families with children. The MYS data are based on the respondents' reported family income. Source: Statistics Canada, Population Census 2001. † Only one small town was surveyed in Quebec.

analyzed for mistakes, and any anomalies were checked against the hard-copy questionnaires of respondents. The data input and cleaning was conducted in the spring of 2006. After the two country databases were complete, I merged the data files in fall 2006 into the final Comparative Youth Study dataset. Additional diagnostics were run on the merged files to ensure that data entry errors were minimized as much as possible.[91]

The CYS provides an ideal data set for exploring the hypotheses set out in Chapter 1. Along with detailed measures of civil liberties judgments and prior disagreement, the survey includes extensive questions on network diversity, attitudes

---

[91] I was involved in all stages of the survey development, administration and coding. The survey instrument was used in both the MYS and BYS, with slight modifications, and I collaborated in its creation (Stolle et al. 2005). I have been working as the research coordinator for the MYS since January, 2005. My responsibilities included contacting school boards and research sites to gain access, overseeing other research assistants, administering the survey, and design, oversight and quality control of the data input. I have permission from the principal investigators of the project to use the data for my dissertation and have exclusive rights to the tolerance batteries I created until the completion of my doctoral work.

about social diversity, and a host of background characteristics that are important in understanding the context in which young people are reacting to civil liberties questions. All of these variables are described in the Appendix, and will be addressed in the following chapters as they enter the analysis.

*Delimitations and Limitations*

Before concluding, a few comments are required on the external validity of the results of this study, as well as limitations in the research design. The theoretical framework that I have set out is posed as a challenge to dominant understandings of how political tolerance as an attitude is conceptualized and measured. I have intentionally chosen a research design in which I examine a case country (Canada) and an age group (youth) that provide the most likely context in which to find the phenomenon that I am discussing. In addition, a second comparable case (Belgium) is included in the analysis that varies primarily on the key feature which makes the Canadian case such an interesting one: the historical construction of belonging and experiences with immigration. The comparison with the Belgian data provides a first extension, but the extent to which the theoretical argument extends to other contexts will require further research. I expect that 'multicultural tolerators' will be present in most advanced, industrialized democracies, especially settler societies with hate speech legislation codified in law. However, the size of this group will vary across contexts. If my argument about the importance of social diversity is correct, however, we should see contexts with greater opportunities for relationships to develop among majorities and ethnocultural minorities to be particular prone to developing a more multicultural form of tolerance.

One short-coming of the present study is that the data from the two case countries are not identical in terms of their sampling, which makes it impossible to fully ascertain whether or not the distinctions between the Canadian sample and the Belgian sample result from differences in the populations sampled, or from the larger differences between these two countries. The Canadian sample is not representative for the country and over-sampled individuals in diverse settings, especially in urban areas. The Belgian sample, by contrast, is representative in its sampling design. While this prevents me from

generalizing about the differences found between the two countries, the more representative sample in the Belgian context is an important test for the extent that multicultural tolerance can be found in a wider section of a population.  More importantly from a theoretical perspective, having two case countries allows me to document the presence of multicultural tolerators in each country and to assess whether the hypothesized relationship exists between diversity and multicultural tolerance holds in each sample.  This is more fundamental to the research questions of interest in this study than documenting the actual levels of multicultural tolerance within the larger population.

As with any study that relies primarily on statistical data, this study also is unable to speak to the actual reasoning of young people as they make civil liberties judgments. That being said, the survey data provide an excellent means of ascertaining whether associations exist between answers to different types of questions, and the data analysis attempts to get at the causal mechanism underpinning these relationships.   Further research is needed, however, that examines the thought process that goes into such judgments.  Despite these shortcomings, the present study provides a compelling test of the presence and causes of the types of tolerance distinctions that young people make and should encourage further research into how far it can be generalized to other contexts and the more nuanced thought-processes that go into making such judgments.

# Chapter 3: Absolute versus Multicultural Tolerance

Although there has been growing recognition that political tolerance is sometimes at odds with other democratic values (Sniderman et al. 1996; Nelson et al. 1997; Weissberg 1998; Peffley et al. 2001), its current measurement does not account for legitimate disagreement about the limits of tolerance in a democracy. Liberal theory often evokes toleration as a virtue that facilitates the peaceful coexistence of a diverse population (Walzer 1997). Yet, the definition of tolerance in political science fails to recognize the complexities of the conflicts that emerge in multicultural democracies. Multicultural policies attempt to foster respect and recognition of minority groups' rights. At the same time, traditional liberal definitions of tolerance require that all groups – even groups that challenge minority groups' rights – be tolerated. Is siding with the rights of the intolerant the only 'democratic' choice for citizens? The fact that contemporary democracies in North America and Western Europe are increasingly composed of distinct ethnic, racial, and religious communities presents an opportunity, and indeed a need, to re-evaluate our understanding and measurement of political tolerance as a democratic value.

In this chapter, I draw on the Comparative Youth Study (CYS) to challenge the conceptualization of political tolerance as a group-indifferent concept.[92] One of the main research questions driving this study is whether individuals distinguish between different types of speech. I show that young people in Belgium and Canada differentiate between exclusionary groups and other objectionable groups, and that they do so in ways that make sense in contemporary, multicultural democracies. This chapter is organized into two sections that deal specifically with the first hypothesis that emerged in Chapter 1. *Hypothesis 1* is that the level of willingness to extend civil liberties will be lower for groups associated with exclusionary speech than other forms of objectionable speech. In the first section, I examine civil liberties judgments across target groups to document a

---

[92] All figures and tables present data from the Comparative Youth Study, unless otherwise indicated. The data are usually disaggregated into the two country samples: the McGill Youth Study (MYS) and the Belgian Youth Study (BYS).

significant variation consistent with this hypothesis.  Given this variation, I develop in the second section a way to measure this inter-target group variation.  In essence, I will demonstrate that individuals can be divided into three types of tolerators: the intolerant, absolute tolerators and multicultural tolerators (*hypothesis 2*).  This measure will then be used in later chapters to examine the correlates of political tolerance with a special focus on the variables that distinguish those who are multicultural tolerators from the intolerant and absolute tolerators (*hypothesis 3 and 4*).  In general, the findings in this chapter point to a new direction for the empirical measurement of political tolerance.

### *The Role of Target Groups in Tolerance Decisions*

The current definition of political tolerance focuses on the extension of civil liberties to objectionable groups, without any distinction between what types of groups people consider offensive.  The normative implication is that the only 'democratic' answer when confronted with offensive groups is tolerance.  This largely American conception is inadequate for cross-national research because there are legitimate reasons that some people support restrictions on certain forms of speech.  The way that tolerance is conceptualized, and in turn measured, needs to allow for this.

Hate speech legislation is an example of how a democracy can set limits on offensive speech.  In Chapter 1, I discussed hate speech as an example of exclusionary speech and provided evidence that many countries indeed recognize such speech as a special category which requires regulation.  In both the case countries in this study, hate speech restrictions have been passed into law and have withstood constitutional review by the countries' highest courts.[93]  In Canada, Sections 318 and 319 of the criminal code prohibit the promotion of hatred against or genocide of identifiable groups based on race, color, religion, ethnic origin, and, more recently, sexual orientation.[94]  In addition, the Canadian Human Rights Act provides protection from hate speech under civil law, with recourse provided in Human Rights tribunals.[95]  In Belgium, the Anti-Discrimination Act

---

[93] The key hate speech cases in Canada are the *Keegstra* and *Zundel* cases ("R v. Keegstra" 1990; "R. v. Zundel" 1992; "Citron v. Zundel" 2002).  In Belgium, the prosecution of the Vlaams Blok upheld restrictions on hate speech as constitutional ("Decision of Nov. 9, 2004").

[94] Bill C-250, which was passed in 2004 in Canada, officially adds sexual orientation to the list of protected categories.

[95] For a discussion of the differences between the criminal and civil codes, see Sumner (2004, 170-2).

of 2003 provides similar protection against incitement of hatred, discrimination and violence.[96]   One of the most controversial and public cases involving hate speech legislation in Belgium was the disbanding of the popular *Vlaams Blok*, a far-right nationalist party in Flanders.[97]   In the Canadian context, legislation has only been used against individuals, and cases have tended to focus on people related to the underground white supremacy movement.[98]   The targets of legal actions have never been as integrated into mainstream political debate as in the case of the *Vlaams Blok*.[99]

Regardless of some differences in the application of such laws, both countries have clear civil and criminal restrictions on hate speech.  This is particularly noteworthy because most research that examines political tolerance has been developed in the U.S. where there are no restrictions on hate speech and where proposed restrictions have consistently been struck down by the courts ("R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul" 1992; "Smith v. Collin" 1978; "New York Times Company v. Sullivan" 1964).  Research that has considered political tolerance in comparative perspective has rarely problematized the varying legal contexts in which political tolerance questions are asked.[100]  Yet, both within the U.S. and in the comparative context, it is fair to ask whether this absolute conception is the only democratic response when faced with exclusionary speech.  While many citizens may still think that racist groups *should* have speech rights, it is difficult to call those who disagree intolerant.  Rather, individuals may be generally tolerant of the

---

[96] The 2003 Anti-Discrimination Act extends the 1981 Anti-Racism Act (also known as the *Loi Moureaux*), to a larger list of identifiable groups.  In Belgium, a state agency, called the Centre pour l'égalité des chances et la lutte contre le racisme (CECLR), provides information and legal support to victims of discrimination, and has filed complaints using hate speech legislation in a number of cases, including the case against the *Vlaams Blok*.  There is also specific restrictions on holocaust denial (Act of 23 March, 1995), which do not exist in the Canadian case.

[97] The *Vlaams Blok* received a stunning 24.1% of the vote in Flanders (the Flemish-speaking region of the country) in the 2003 general election, receiving the highest percentage of the popular vote of any party in the region.  See Brems (2006) for a detailed description of the court case that resulted in the parties disbanding.

[98] See Kinsella (2001) for an in-depth look at white supremacy movements in the Canadian context.

[99] The *Vlaams Blok* is an example of a growing trend in European democracies for the emergence of far-right parties with explicitly anti-immigrant platforms.  For a discussion of the emergence of these parties in the European context, see Kitschelt (1995), Van de Brug, Fennema and Tillie (2000) and Schain, Zolberg and Hossay (2002).

[100] For example, in a recent comparative article by Marquant-Pryatt and Paxton (2006), they analyze a political tolerance scale in 14 European countries which includes 'neo-nazis' as a potential target group, despite the fact that several of the countries in their sample have legal hate speech restrictions.  This is particular problematic in the former West Germany sample where there are explicit legal restrictions against the display of Nazi symbols.

Table 3.1: Agreement with Statements for Free Speech and Hate Speech Restrictions

| | "We are all better off if everyone is free to speak their minds in politics, even if some of the things people say are obnoxious and offensive" | "It should be illegal to say hateful things publicly about racial, ethnic and religious groups" |
|---|---|---|
| *Canada* | | |
| Disagree strongly | 6% | 11% |
| Disagree somewhat | 23% | 15% |
| Agree somewhat | 43% | 25% |
| Agree strongly | 28% | 49% |
| *Belgium* | | |
| Disagree strongly | 17% | 12% |
| Disagree somewhat | 41% | 25% |
| Agree somewhat | 28% | 34% |
| Agree strongly | 14% | 30% |

Source: Comparative Youth Study

expression of objectionable viewpoints, but have a specific objection to hate speech that is in line with a more multicultural conception of political tolerance.[101]  In this section, I take a detailed look at the interplay of attitudes toward different types of objectionable speech among youth in Canada and Belgium.

The basic puzzle motivating this research is whether or not attitudes toward exclusionary speech are simply a manifestation of political intolerance like any other, or if individuals are capable of being 'politically tolerant' while still placing limits on specific types of speech.  Table 3.1 provides a preliminary look at this puzzle based on responses to two statements.  The first captures the general idea behind free speech, basically that we are all better off if everyone has the right to say what they think, even if people find some of the things said offensive.  The second statement elicits attitudes

---

[101] For an additional critique of the concept of political tolerance in contemporary democracies, see Newey (2001).

towards specifically exclusionary speech by asking respondents whether it should be illegal to say hateful things publicly about racial, ethnic and religious groups.[102]

In the case of the free speech statement, 71 percent of the Canadian sample and 42 percent of the Belgian sample agreed somewhat or strongly with the ideal of free speech. This suggests greater support for free speech principles among Canadian youth (or at least among those sampled), but in both countries a substantial portion of respondents are supportive of the general idea of free speech.[103] If we turn to support for hate speech restrictions, we might expect similar levels of *dis*agreement since, from an absolute political tolerance perspective, hate speech legislation is simply a form of 'obnoxious and offensive' speech like any other. However, only 27 percent of Canadian youth and 37 percent of Belgian youth disagreed somewhat or strongly with the idea that hate speech should be illegal. From an absolute tolerance perspective, this is a particularly puzzling result in the Canadian sample, where such high levels of support for the free speech statement should translate into high levels of *dis*agreement with hate speech restrictions. More specifically, if political tolerance is a coherent, absolute value that underpins a respondent's statements to a variety of speech statements, the current political tolerance paradigm would suggest that those respondents who agree with the first statement in support of free speech should be the same respondents who disagree with the idea of limiting it.

Yet, in Chapter 1 I developed a more nuanced way of thinking about political tolerance that does not ask whether a person is absolutely tolerant or not, but rather attempts to capture what distinctions people make and when. Recall that in Figure 1.2, theoretical distinctions between types of tolerance were presented in a two-by-two matrix where one dimension was driven by values of free speech and the second dimension is

---

[102] This statement is a slightly modified version of a question used in Sniderman et al. (1996): "Do you think it should be against the law to write or speak in a way that promotes hatred toward a particular racial or religious group?" I simplified the language given the age group of our sample. In the representative Canadian sample from 1987, they found that 74% agreed with this statement.

[103] While these inter-country differences are significant at the <.01 level for the sample (Kendall's Tau-C), it is difficult to extrapolate these findings to the youth populations in each country given the variation in sampling methods described in Chapter 2. However, there are indications that these differences did not emerge simply as an artifact of the disproportionate number of urban respondents in the Canadian sample. Neither a breakdown by urban and rural respondents nor a breakdown by visible minority status diminished the general tendency documented above (analysis not shown).

Table 3.2: Breakdown by Type of Tolerance and Intolerance

**Canada**

| | Disagree: Hate Speech Should Be Illegal | Agree: Hate Speech Should be Illegal |
|---|---|---|
| **Disagree: Better if Free to Speak Minds** | 7% | 22% |
| **Agree: Better if Free to Speak Minds** | 20% | 52% |

**Belgium**

| | Disagree: Hate Speech Should Be Illegal | Agree: Hate Speech Should be Illegal |
|---|---|---|
| **Disagree: Better if Free to Speak Minds** | 22% | 37% |
| **Agree: Better if Free to Speak Minds** | 15% | 27% |

Note: These categories are created based on responses to the general attitude statements in Table 3.1. Somewhat and strongly agree were collapsed, as were somewhat and strongly disagree. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

driven by attitudes toward exclusionary speech.[104] I was particularly interested in the bottom-right hand quadrant of this figure which captures those who are generally supportive of free speech but have specific objection to exclusionary speech, which I labeled multicultural tolerance. This differed from the absolutely tolerant who were argued to show a consistent willingness to allow all speech, including hate speech and from the absolutely intolerant, who were unwilling to allow either exclusionary speech or other objectionable speech. Finally, I labeled a fourth category – authoritarian intolerance – which represents individuals opposed to speech rights in general, but have no objection to exclusionary speech.

This way of thinking about political tolerance can be captured by the responses to the two statements presented in Table 3.1. In Table 3.2, I present the combinations of agreement with these two statements in each sample. "Consistent" answers in the dominant political tolerance paradigm would be found in the bottom left-hand and upper

---

[104] Figure 1.2 is found in Chapter 1.

right-hand quadrants, which represent absolute tolerance and absolute intolerance respectively. If we consider just these two quadrants, it is apparent that more respondents provided politically intolerant responses (22% in the Canadian sample and 37% in the Belgian sample) than politically tolerant answers (20% and 15% respectively). What is striking, however, is the percent of respondents who do not fit into the traditional definition of political tolerance. As expected, there are substantial numbers of respondents, especially in Canada, who fall in the bottom right-hand quadrant, which represents the idea underpinning multicultural tolerance. A prominent 52 percent of Canadian youth fell into this category, making it clearly the most common combination of responses. A smaller percentage of Belgian respondents fell into this category, although 27 percent did agree in principle to free speech but agreed to limit hate speech. This suggests that there is a substantial but ignored population of young people who are making what appears to be a principled distinction between free speech principles and exclusionary speech. Finally, in the upper left-hand quadrant, only 7 percent of the Canadian youth expressed disagreement that obnoxious and offensive ideas should be publicly expressed but were willing to allow hateful things to be said about ethnocultural minorities. Almost 22 percent of Belgian youth responded this way. This is an interesting category, because it suggests that some people endorsed restrictions on "obnoxious and offensive" speech, but did not consider hate speech to fall into this category.[105]

While these are only single-item indicators, the distribution of responses presents an empirical contradiction for the conventional view of political tolerance. In such a view, the free speech statement would be coded as an endorsement of speech rights, while the second would represent censorship of speech rights and respondents would be expected to support one statement and disagree with the other, implying acceptance of

---

[105] While at first the presence of some youth in the authoritarian intolerance category may seem odd, it is important to remember that responses to these two general attitude statements do not control for prior disagreement. This means that one can not tell if those who disagreed with hate speech restrictions did so because they thought all speech should be permitted (which is presumably not the case for this category, since they have disagreed with the free speech statement) or if they simply do not have a prior disagreement with hateful speech. The higher levels in the Belgian case may reflect the higher levels of social intolerance in Belgium (which will be documented in Chapter 5), but the level of disagreement with hate speech restrictions may also be unusually high in reaction to current events in Belgium where hate speech legislation was used to disband a political party, the *Vlaams Blok*, which was accused of promoting hatred of foreigners through its highly anti-immigrant rhetoric.

unrestricted speech rights (or undifferentiated censorship). Yet clearly, about one-quarter of Belgian respondents and over half of Canadian respondents have agreed with both ostensibly contradictory statements. There are many young people who appear to draw the line at exclusionary speech and express responses to these two statements that are consistent with a more multicultural form of tolerance.

Yet, other explanations are also available for the inconsistency, which challenge my argument that endorsement of a more multicultural form of tolerance underpins these results. One explanation is that young people, like many citizens in advanced industrialized democracies, simply have inconsistent or ambivalent political attitudes. Early research documented that people often fail to provide consistent answers over time when asked about their political opinions (Converse 1964, 1970). Zaller (1992) argues that most people fail to have any opinion at all and that survey responses simply reflect salient features in the information environment. The potential for response bias is accentuated in Table 3.2 because agreement with both statements (i.e. multicultural tolerance) may be prone to some acquiescence bias where respondents are more likely to agree than to disagree with survey items (Schuman and Presser 1996, Ch. 8).[106] The extent to which acquiescence bias is skewing responses can not be ascertained from these questions alone, and one of the challenges of this chapter will be to show that this pattern reproduces itself in other question formats that are less prone to such biases.

Another explanation also emerges from the burgeoning literature that sees response inconsistencies as evidence of attitude ambivalence (Alvarez and Brehm 2002; Craig and Martinez 2005).[107] Attitude ambivalence is usually defined as holding simultaneous positive and negative feelings toward the same object. For Alvarez and Brehm (2002, 58), survey inconsistencies emerge when questions put an individuals' predispositions or underlying values into conflict. Recall that recent studies have shown that when respondents provide a politically tolerant answer, raising competing values of

---

[106] A further possibility is that the inconsistency stems from the differences in the level of abstraction of the two statements (Sniderman et al. 1991a, 58-69). Whereas the free speech statement is vague, the hate speech statement asks respondents to apply the principle to a specific type of offensive speech. As with previous research, 'intolerance' is more likely in the application of the principle (McClosky 1964). However, I will show in the next section of this chapter that such an explanation does not hold precisely because citizens find it easier to apply the principle to non-exclusionary speech.

[107] For a recent compilation of articles around the issue of attitude consistency, see Saris and Sniderman (2004), especially the chapter by Sniderman and Bullock, pp. 337-358.

social equality or security may result in the respondent flip-flopping on their initial civil liberties judgment (Dow and Lendler 2002; Gibson 1998b; Gross and Kinder 1998; Cowan et al. 2002; Sniderman et al. 1996; Druckman 2001). Most studies interpret this as resulting from an underlying value conflict between political tolerance and social inclusion. The answer inconsistency between these two statements may reflect this conflict; yet, this is not necessarily contrary to the perspective developed in Chapter 1. Indeed, part of my argument is that such conflict produces multicultural tolerance, a simultaneous valuing of free expression (political tolerance) and social inclusion (social tolerance).[108]

While responses to the two general statements provide a preliminary breakdown of these categories, they are more illustrative than they are instructive. A much more stringent test of this argument requires an analysis of how young people respond when faced with allowing different types of target groups to participate in various activities. In the following subsections, I will take a detailed look at these reactions. Recall that the five target groups that were included in the Comparative Youth Study are: gay rights activists, Quebec separatists (in Canada) and Flemish separatists (in Belgium), radical Muslims, skinheads and racists. As discussed in Chapter 2, skinheads and racists were selected as prototypical examples of groups associated with exclusionary speech.

*Disagreement and Target Groups*

One way in which to examine differences in how individuals react to different types of speech is by considering the extent of disagreement with the beliefs of target groups. For each target group, respondents were asked the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with the groups' beliefs on an 11-point scale, where 0 is strongly disagree and 10 is strongly agree.[109] Table 3.3 presents the average responses on this scale in the two country samples. It is clear from the mean scores on the full scale that respondents find racist and skinhead groups more objectionable than separatists or gay rights activists.

---

[108] However, the idea that social and political tolerance are conflicting attitudes receives mixed support in the literature, as was discussed in Chapter 1. Stenner (2005), in particular, has provided a wealth of evidence that social intolerance (defined as racial or ethnic prejudice) and political intolerance (an unwillingness to extend civil liberties to offensive speech) both stem from an underlying authoritarian disposition.

[109] A full description of the variable is available in the Appendix.

Table 3.3: Objection by Target Group

| **Canada** | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Mean (Full Scale) | N | s.d. | Mean Disagreement* | N | s.d. |
| Racists | 1.36 | 3126 | (2.85) | 0.26 | 2659 | (0.74) |
| Skinheads | 1.98 | 3095 | (2.92) | 0.59 | 2388 | (1.14) |
| Radical Muslims | 2.64 | 3091 | (2.96) | 0.92 | 2113 | (1.33) |
| Quebec/Flemish Separatists | 3.87 | 3113 | (3.41) | 1.16 | 1680 | (1.40) |
| Gay Rights Activists | 5.43 | 3125 | (3.75) | 1.07 | 1125 | (1.43) |
| **Belgium** | | | | | | |
| | Mean (Full Scale) | N | s.d. | Mean Disagreement* | N | s.d. |
| Racists | 2.12 | 5433 | (2.91) | 0.76 | 4225 | (1.24) |
| Skinheads | 2.55 | 5313 | (2.81) | 1.05 | 3801 | (1.40) |
| Radical Muslims | 1.95 | 5388 | (2.52) | 0.92 | 4325 | (1.32) |
| Quebec/Flemish Separatists | 3.55 | 5368 | (3.05) | 1.31 | 3052 | (1.52) |
| Gay Rights Activists | 5.24 | 5462 | (3.27) | 1.43 | 1862 | (1.56) |

Source: Comparative Youth Study

* Mean disagreement is calculated only for those who express some prior disagreement. Therefore, average disagreement is based only on respondents who reported 0-4 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale.

Gay rights activists in both samples actually fall slightly on the agreement side of the scale, whereas all other groups, on average, were found objectionable. When considering only those who expressed some level of disagreement, we see that the ordering of groups remains largely the same. In short, those groups associated with exclusionary speech are also those with whom respondents expressed the most disagreement.

The one exception to this pattern is radical Muslims in the Belgian sample. They receive the lowest score on the full scale, although this response is not significantly different from the score for racists. This pattern is not simply a result of greater support (i.e. agreement) with certain groups like gay rights activists. If we consider the levels of disagreement *only among those respondents who disagree* with each target group

(labeled mean disagreement in Table 3.3), we see that the variation in disagreement reproduces the expected pattern, although the intensity of that disagreement varies less than when considering the full spectrum of agreement and disagreement.

Table 3.3 therefore suggests that far more people are supportive of separatists and gay rights activists than racists and skinheads, and to a certain extent, of radical Muslims in the Canadian sample. Attitudes toward racist groups are the most extreme in both countries when looking at the intensity of disagreement. Skinheads, while slightly less intense, also receive more extreme disagreement than other objectionable groups in the Canadian sample. In the Belgian sample, radical Muslims are seen as slightly more objectionable on average. This may result from the politicalization of immigration in Western European democracies during the time of the survey, especially as issues emerged around the Danish cartoon controversy. Despite this anomaly (which will be explored in more detail later), it is clear from this initial look at levels of objection that exclusionary groups are seen as particularly objectionable by these respondents. This is consistent with previous research that has documented a trend in greater acceptance of certain groups, especially of the political Left (Wilson 1994) while attitudes toward racist speech seem to be diverging from the trend in greater levels of political tolerance, especially among younger people (Chong 2006).

Establishing prior disagreement with each target group is interesting in itself. The variation across target groups is consistent with the idea that exclusionary speech holds a special place in multicultural democracies as particularly harmful. This also raises a challenge in the analysis of other types of target groups though, because only in the case of prior disagreement are respondents faced in theory with a question of toleration. For example, if a respondent said they agree with gay rights activists, they are not included among those for whom tolerance (or alternatively intolerance) is an option. They would rather be described as supporting gay rights activists, not just tolerating them.

To address the need for prior objection, "tolerance" levels throughout this research are always calculated based solely on those respondents who expressed prior disagreement with a group. Because respondents vary in their level of disagreement, tolerance is measured at two different levels of stringency. I first isolate those who expressed any disagreement with the target group (which I generally refer to as

83

disagreement or objection). I also isolate those who report the highest level of disagreement possible on the scale provided (which I refer to as high disagreement or highly objectionable).[110]

While Sullivan and colleagues (1979; 1982) have provided a compelling argument that tolerance requires prior disapproval, their 'least-liked' methodology forces objection extremity, despite the fact that research indicates that the major correlates of absolute political intolerance differ little regardless of the type of measure used (Gibson 1992a). My measure allows me to get at extreme disagreement by limiting the analysis to only those who strongly disagree with each target group; however, a consideration of those target groups who receive less extreme levels of disagreement is of interest, especially in my re-conceptualization of the concept. This is because it is possible that one of the causes for multicultural tolerance is also related to the roots of people's initial objection. One obvious example is that those who value social diversity may also be more likely to object more intensely to exclusionary groups or to be accepting of groups that endorse minority rights. By imposing prior disagreement in the measure of political tolerance, I recognize the theoretical importance of prior disagreement defining political tolerance. However, leaving open the analysis to all levels of disagreement recognizes the possibility that part of what is driving multicultural tolerance may also impact the levels of prior disagreement with different types of speech.

*Civil Liberties Judgments across Target Groups*

The empirical results so far suggest that when asked to respond to general statements about speech rights, some young people distinguish between exclusionary speech and other forms of objectionable speech. Past research suggests that people's general attitudes toward speech are significantly related to their extension of civil liberties to specific groups (McClosky 1964; Craig and Martinez 2005; Prothro and Grigg 1960), although I have argued that at least a preliminary look at attitude statements suggest some conflict between attitudes towards free speech and attitudes toward exclusionary speech. In addition, there is clear evidence that exclusionary groups receive

---

[110] Disagreement with the group means the respondent rated the group between 0 and 4 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale. High disagreement indicates the respondent reported a 0 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale.

84

Table 3.4: Percent Tolerant Among Those Who Disagree

| | Talk on Public Television about Views | | | | Hold a Peaceful March in Respondent's Neighborhood | | | |
| | Canada | | Belgium | | Canada | | Belgium | |
| | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Racists | 19% | 2584 | 17% | 3445 | 10% | 2605 | 13% | 3653 |
| Skinheads | 22% | 2320 | 15% | 3114 | 11% | 2335 | 14% | 3338 |
| Radical Muslims | 35% | 2061 | 19% | 3552 | 19% | 2074 | 17% | 3762 |
| Gay Rights Activists | 50% | 1085 | 38% | 1414 | 29% | 1094 | 29% | 1578 |
| Quebec/Flemish Separatists | 63% | 1621 | 36% | 2481 | 38% | 1643 | 29% | 2619 |

in general more extreme levels of disagreement. The task now is to find out how this distinction plays out when people are asked to make civil liberties judgments about specific groups. In other words, do young people tolerate exclusionary speech at similar levels as other potentially objectionable speech?

Table 3.4 presents the levels of tolerance for two types of activities among all those who have indicated some level of disagreement with each group: talking on public television about one's views and holding a peaceful march in the respondent's neighborhood. As noted in Chapter 2, I expect that levels of tolerance for talking on television will be higher than for peaceful marches because the proximity of the latter activity makes it more threatening – an "in your face" activity that has more potential to affect the respondent and would be harder to ignore if it occurred.

Table 3.4 bears this expectation out. Indeed, in every single case, the tolerance level in each country is higher in the television scenario than the march scenario for a given target group. What is more noteworthy for my purposes is the variation across target groups within each scenario. First, the percent of respondents in Canada and Belgium who were willing to tolerate each group talking on television about their views follows the hypothesized pattern: racists and skinheads, which represent exclusionary groups, are less likely to be tolerated than radical Muslims, gay rights activists or separatists. In Canada, racists and skinheads receive the lowest levels of tolerance, with only about one in five young people permitting them to talk on public television about their views. This is in contrast to the other three target groups that receive between 35

and 63 percent tolerant responses. In the Belgian data, racists and skinhead again receive the lowest levels of tolerance (17 and 15 percent respectively) whereas over twice as many respondents were willing to allow gay rights activists and Flemish separatists to talk on television about their views. Radical Muslims, on the other hand, only receive slightly higher levels (19%). The gap between the most and least tolerated groups is over 40 percentage points in the Canadian sample, and over 20 percentage points among Belgian youth.

A similar pattern emerges when respondents were asked if each group should be allowed to hold a peaceful march in their neighborhood. As expected, levels of tolerance for each group are lower for this more threatening activity, but the distribution across groups is consistent with the television scenario. Almost 30 percentage points separate the tolerance levels of racists and skinheads from gay rights activists and separatists in the Canadian sample, and over 15 points separate these groups in the Belgian sample.

The general pattern is evident among young people in both case countries: Exclusionary groups are less likely to be tolerated on average than other groups. While the variation in the Canadian sample is greater, this evidence suggests that young people in both countries are distinguishing between types of speech. Clearly, more young people find it harder to tolerate exclusionary speech than other forms of speech, especially among the youth surveyed in Canada.

However, some might argue that the differences across target groups are simply an artifact of the variation in levels of objection. This is a more critical challenge to the idea of multicultural tolerance because it suggests that the inter-group variation is simply an artifact of differences in levels of objection. The level of objection is indeed correlated with the level of tolerance (with more objection making groups "harder" to tolerate), and the patterns presented here support that finding.[111] Racists and skinheads are generally the least liked in the full sample and are the least tolerated as well. This suggests that one of the reasons for decreased tolerance is higher levels of objection. There is one notable exception. Skinheads in the Belgian sample, who were found slightly less objectionable on average than radical Muslims, received lower tolerance

---

[111] This intuitively makes sense: the more offensive one considers an idea, the less likely one is to tolerate it. This is also empirically the case: tolerance levels decrease in a sample as disagreement increases.

Table 3.5: Percent Tolerant Among Those Who Highly Disagree

| | Talk on Public Television about Views | | | | Hold a Peaceful March in Respondent's Neighborhood | | | |
| | Canada | | Belgium | | Canada | | Belgium | |
| | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N | % Tolerate | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Racists | 18% | 2239 | 13% | 2316 | 9% | 2245 | 10% | 2432 |
| Skinheads | 18% | 1727 | 9% | 1826 | 9% | 1738 | 8% | 1937 |
| Radical Muslims | 25% | 1256 | 12% | 2208 | 13% | 1264 | 10% | 2317 |
| Gay Rights Activists | 32% | 636 | 19% | 663 | 19% | 642 | 16% | 763 |
| Quebec/Flemish Separatists | 53% | 836 | 21% | 1270 | 31% | 840 | 18% | 1341 |

Source: Comparative Youth Study

scores than radical Muslims, despite being less liked. This suggests that exclusionary groups may be more difficult to tolerate than other types of groups that people find objectionable even after controlling for different levels in objection.

Indeed, the degree of disagreement only explains some of the variation in tolerance levels. In an effort to approach as closely as possible the 'least-liked' method of Sullivan and colleagues (1979), Table 3.5 presents tolerance levels among respondents who report the highest level of disagreement possible (i.e. where the respondent reported a 0 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale).[112] This effectively controls for differences in the aggregate levels of disagreement across groups by eliminating the variation. As one might expect when limiting the sub-sample to only those who strongly disagree with a target group, tolerance levels for those groups that were less objectionable on average decrease more substantially than for groups that were already found, on average, to be more objectionable. For example, willingness to allow gay rights activists to talk on television drops from 50 percent to 32 percent among Canadian youth. While tolerance levels in Belgium started off at a lower level (38%), a similar drop is seen when considering the high disagreement sub-sample, down to 19 percent. The parallel drop for racists and skinheads is only a couple of percentage points. Thus, one of the reasons for

---

[112] Obviously, this method is not identical to the least-liked methodology, in which respondents are forced to choose the group they dislike the most. In the Comparative Youth Study, respondents were allowed to give a score of 0 to as many groups as they wanted. On average, a respondent coded 1.97 groups as highly objectionable. There was significant variation (p<.01) between the two samples: in the MYS, the average number of highly objectionable groups was 2.20 and in the BYS, the average was 1.84.

the variation across target groups is the difference in the levels of aggregate disagreement.

This reduction in variation does not radically change the observed pattern, however, suggesting that level of disagreement is an important control but does not fully explain the aggregate level variations. Individuals continue to be less willing to extend civil liberties to exclusionary groups than to other groups, even with this important control. When it comes to groups expressing their ideas on public television, a 35 percentage point gap exists between the most and least tolerated group in the Canadian sample, and a 12 percentage point gap is observed in the Belgian sample. In the more threatening context of a march in one's neighborhood, an 8 percentage point gap remains in the Belgian context, and a 22 percentage point gap in the Canadian. As in Table 3.4, we also see that the variation across groups is greater in the Canadian sample.

On the whole, there are marked differences in young people's willingness to tolerate various groups, even under the most stringent conditions (high disagreement and high threat). Furthermore, the differences are in the hypothesized direction. Racists and skinheads are tolerated at lower levels than other potentially objectionable groups. This pattern seems to be particularly strong in the Canadian context. While this distinction does not explain all of the inter-group variation (for example, separatists seem to be seen as more legitimate actors in the public sphere than gay rights activists, and radical Muslims approach exclusionary groups in some instances), the focus on the exclusionary nature of a group's speech provides a needed insight into why individuals make such distinctions. Yet, the evidence provided thus far only demonstrates this distinction at the aggregate level. In the next sub-section, these distinctions are documented at the individual level.

*Individual-Level Distinctions in Target Group Tolerance Judgments*

There are two main reasons why one might observe the patterns described in the previous subsection. On the one hand, among the samples there may be two distinct sub-samples: those who disagree with exclusionary groups and those that disagree with other groups. If the latter sub-sample is more tolerant for some reason, the differences in target group tolerance levels may result from differences in the people who object to them. On

the other hand, I have suggested that such variation results from *individuals* making distinctions between groups they find objectionable. In other words, within the population some individuals are choosing to extend civil liberties to some forms of objectionable speech, but draw the line at exclusionary speech. The aggregate level pattern could result from either of these scenarios.

I will provide evidence in this subsection that the latter is the case: young people ascribe to varying conceptions of what free speech in a democracy requires. As presented in Chapter 1, I refined the traditional definition of tolerance found in the literature to allow for this. To recall, *objectionable speech* simply refers to most opinions in a democratic society about which people might disagree. In a democratic society, citizens are expected to put up with the expression of ideas that they disagree with. But there are specific categories of speech for which democratic theory (and different legal systems) provide mixed support. This is the case with *exclusionary speech*, which is associated with the expression of opinions that are meant to denigrate minority groups and promotes their exclusion from full and equal participation in society. This distinction between objectionable and exclusionary speech results in three possible dispositions.[113] First, denying civil liberties to both groups would define intolerance. Second, supporting civil liberties for all forms of speech implies a citizen holds an absolute conception of political tolerance. Finally, those who support the extension of civil liberties to objectionable speech *except* in the case of exclusionary speech endorse what I propose is multicultural political tolerance. The presence of a substantial number of individuals who subscribe to this third category would result in the variation at the aggregate level documented previously. But is there evidence of such distinctions at the individual level?

First of all, there is little evidence that those who find exclusionary speech objectionable are distinct sub-samples in the CYS. As Table 3.6 indicates, over half of respondents in both surveys found every target group objectionable with the exception of gay rights activists (who only received disagreement from about one-third of the samples). On average, respondents indicated some level of disagreement with just over three groups. Of these three groups, respondents usually rated about two of them as highly objectionable. Racists and skinheads were among many respondents disliked

---

[113] These are illustrated in Chapter 1, Figure 1.3.

Table 3.6: Percent of Sample Finding Target Group Objectionable

|  | Canada | Belgium |
|---|---|---|
| Racists | 85% | 78% |
| Skinheads | 77% | 72% |
| Radical Muslims | 68% | 80% |
| Quebec/Flemish Separatists | 54% | 57% |
| Gay Rights Activists | 36% | 34% |
| Average Number of Groups Found Objectionable | 3.19 | 3.20 |
| Average Number of Groups Found Highly Objectionable | 2.20 | 1.84 |

Note: As with previous tables, objectionable implies the respondent reported a 0-4 on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale. Highly objectionable is 0 on this scale. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

groups, but the vast majority of those finding at least one exclusionary group objectionable *also* disagreed with one of the remaining three groups. In fact, 80 percent of respondents disagreed with at least one of each type of group. This suggests that the aggregate level variation can not result simply from differences in those who find different target groups objectionable. Rather, it is driven by distinctions made among those 80 percent of respondents who have reason to disagree with at least one of each type of group.

One of the strengths of the CYS question format I developed is that respondents were allowed to disagree with as many of the five target groups as they wished. Unlike least-liked question formats that force respondents to rank their disagreement or the balanced-scale technique that emerged out of Stouffer's early tolerance battery, this technique allows me to consider variations in target group tolerance (which the balanced scale allows for) while still requiring a prior objection (which the least-liked methodology is designed to capture).[114] In doing so, I am able to look at how individuals who disagree with multiple groups make distinctions across target groups that they find objectionable.

---

[114] See Gibson (1992a) for a detailed review and analysis of the least-liked and balanced-scale techniques.

This is also, however, a challenge of the design. Because respondents were allowed to agree or disagree with as many of the five groups as they wished, a simple comparison of civil liberties judgments excluding those who agree with each group is not possible. Only about 17 percent of respondents found all five groups objectionable, and less than 6 percent found all five groups highly objectionable. Limiting a comparison across groups to these respondents would unduly restrict the analysis to a special subset of respondents. Instead, a comparison of response dyads provides an accurate insight into inter-group tolerance judgments without imposing strict guidelines on the number of groups the respondent found objectionable.[115]

Tables 3.7 and 3.8 have been designed to capture individuals' willingness to extend civil liberties within pairs of groups the respondent finds objectionable. This comparison examines tolerance judgments only among those who disagree with both groups in the dyad and excludes respondents within each pair who agree with one or both of the groups in the dyad. The scores were calculated, therefore, by taking those who disagree with both groups in the dyad and subtracting the level of tolerance for the row group from the column group. Percentages close to zero imply that when respondents tolerated (or not) the group listed in the column, they responded similarly to the group listed in the row. Percentages farther from zero indicate the difference in tolerance levels between the column and row groups to partake in each activity. Positive scores imply the column group was more likely to be tolerated, whereas negative scores imply the row group was more tolerated.

The purpose of this analysis is to demonstrate that at the individual level, respondents were less willing to allow exclusionary groups to talk on public television about their views or to hold a peaceful march than other groups. What I would expect to see is a higher positive percentage among dyads that include both an objectionable group in the column and an exclusionary group in the row. This implies that individuals were more likely to tolerate objectionable speech than they were to tolerate exclusionary speech. Conversely, I would expect tolerance values between pairs of objectionable groups or between pairs of exclusionary groups to be closer to zero.

---

[115] About 12 percent of the sample is excluded from this analysis because they did not find at least two groups objectionable, which is required for them to be captured in at least one dyad.

Table 3.7: Percentage Difference within Group Dyads in Canada

**Tolerance of Talking on Public Television**

| | | Gay Rights Activists | Quebec Separatists | Radical Muslims | Skinheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quebec Separatists | % Difference | -8% | | | |
| | N | 713 | | | |
| Radical Muslims | % Difference | 20% | 29% | | |
| | N | 735 | 1204 | | |
| Skinheads | % Difference | 27% | 42% | 14% | |
| | N | 811 | 1376 | 1772 | |
| Racists | % Difference | 29% | 45% | 17% | 4% |
| | N | 864 | 1471 | 1935 | 2182 |

**Holding a Peaceful March in Respondent's Neighborhood**

| | | Gay Rights Activists | Quebec Separatists | Radical Muslims | Skinheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Quebec Separatists | % Difference | -3% | | | |
| | N | 727 | | | |
| Radical Muslims | % Difference | 10% | 19% | | |
| | N | 743 | 1218 | | |
| Skinheads | % Difference | 14% | 27% | 8% | |
| | N | 823 | 1401 | 1782 | |
| Racists | % Difference | 15% | 29% | 9% | 2% |
| | N | 873 | 1492 | 1944 | 2202 |

Note: Percentage difference is calculated by subtracting the percentage of respondents tolerant of the row group from the percentage tolerant of the column group. Within each pair, only respondents who disagreed with both groups were included. Negative differences imply that the column group was less tolerated than the row group. Source: McGill Youth Study.

Let me first consider the Canadian data presented in Table 3.7. The pattern here is consistent with my hypothesis. Turning first to tolerance decisions toward talking on television, consider the dyads that contrast tolerance levels of gay rights activists and separatists with skinheads and racists. These are found in the lower left-hand corner of the top panel. When only considering individuals who disagree with both groups in the dyads, tolerance levels are still between 27 and 45 percentage points higher for gay rights activists and separatists than for the two exclusionary groups. In contrast, the difference that emerges between tolerance levels of gay rights activists and separatists is only 8 percentage points in favor of Quebec separatists. Similarly, the difference between tolerance of racists and skinheads is only 4 percentage points. Dyads that include radical

Muslims are slightly less clear-cut. While they do receive higher levels of tolerance than skinheads and racists (14 and 17 percentage points respectively), they receive substantially lower tolerance levels than gay rights activists and separatists.

Turning to the tolerance decisions about holding a peaceful march, we see an almost identical pattern emerge in this higher threat scenario, although the differences are less dramatic. The largest differences emerge between exclusionary groups and gay rights activists and separatists, even after limiting the comparisons to only those who find both groups objectionable. Differences of 14 to 29 percentage points exist between the tolerance levels of gay rights activists and separatists compared to the two exclusionary groups. The results in Table 3.7 control for disagreement with the group and provide strong support for my contention that young people distinguish exclusionary speech from other objectionable speech.

A similar pattern emerges in Table 3.8 for the Belgian data. Considering young people's tolerance of a target group talking on television, we can see that a difference of over twenty percentage points exists between those tolerating either gay rights activists or Flemish separatists and one of the exclusionary groups. It is noteworthy that similar gaps in tolerance also exist in this sample between gay rights activists or Flemish separatists and radical Muslims. This suggests there is an added distinction being made with respect to radical Muslims, which I will address in the next section. The results for holding a peaceful march mimic this pattern.

What does this mean for our understanding of political tolerance judgments? Clearly, some people do make distinctions across target groups when deciding whether or not to extend certain civil liberties. This is particularly evident for civil liberties activities that are more distant and less 'in your face'. These distinctions emerge at the aggregate level, and more compellingly, at the individual level, even after controlling for disagreement. The differences are not simply an artifact of varying levels of objection, nor are they an artifact of distinct sub-samples of individuals who disagree exclusively with one type of group. Rather, it seems that some groups are viewed as more legitimate participants in democratic debate, in spite of any objection to the point of view being expressed. At the same time, other groups are seen as less legitimate, and perhaps more threatening to democratic politics.

Table 3.8: Percentage Difference within Group Dyads in Belgium

**Tolerance of Talking on Public Televison Television**

|  |  | Gay Rights Activists | Flemish Separatists | Radical Muslims | Skinheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flemish Separatists | % Difference | 4% |  |  |  |
|  | N | 932 |  |  |  |
| Radical Muslims | % Difference | 21% | 18% |  |  |
|  | N | 1178 | 2125 |  |  |
| Skinheads | % Difference | 23% | 21% | 3% |  |
|  | N | 1115 | 2036 | 2630 |  |
| Racists | % Difference | 20% | 21% | 4% | 0% |
|  | N | 1044 | 2164 | 2874 | 2714 |

**Holding a Peaceful March in Respondent's Neighborhood**

|  |  | Gay Rights Activists | Flemish Separatists | Radical Muslims | Skinheads |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flemish Separatists | % Difference | 0% |  |  |  |
|  | N | 1048 |  |  |  |
| Radical Muslims | % Difference | 15% | 14% |  |  |
|  | N | 1307 | 2245 |  |  |
| Skinheads | % Difference | 16% | 16% | 2% |  |
|  | N | 1254 | 2169 | 2802 |  |
| Racists | % Difference | 14% | 17% | 5% | 1% |
|  | N | 1167 | 2291 | 3065 | 2910 |

Note: Percentage difference is calculated by subtracting the percentage of respondents tolerant of the row group from the percentage tolerant of the column group. Within each pair, only respondents who disagreed with both groups were included. Negative differences imply that the column group was less tolerated than the row group. Source: Belgian Youth Study.

Clearly, threat is an important and key variable in understanding tolerance decisions (Stouffer 1963; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). It may well be that exclusionary groups are seen as more threatening, and this is the reason for the distinctions documented across groups here. Unfortunately, there is not a direct measure of threat available to test this contention in the CYS. However, saying that exclusionary groups are more threatening seems to beg the question of why. What is it that makes exclusionary groups appear more threatening? Yet, as Gibson (2006b, 24) has noted, "…no existing research provides anything remotely resembling a comprehensive empirical explanation of variation in perceived group threat." By documenting the

94

consistent variation in young people's tolerance of different types of target groups, this chapter has suggested that one of the factors that perhaps drives threat is indeed concerns about the exclusionary nature of the speech under consideration.

The empirical story in this section is consistent with the theoretical expectations developed earlier. No matter how the data are examined, a similar pattern emerges that suggests that at least some young people are making inter-group distinctions consistent with multicultural tolerance. In the face of this evidence, a more nuanced approach to identifying different types of tolerance is required. It is to this task that I turn in the next section.

### *Defining Multicultural Tolerators*

If people are making distinctions across target groups, and doing so in predictable ways, how can we capture this in a single measure? I have argued that traditional measurements are inadequate for capturing important distinctions that individuals make between target groups. It is necessary to develop a simplified measure that takes into account both disagreement and the variation in the numbers of groups found objectionable. Doing so will help to reveal exactly who is more prone to endorse different types of tolerance and intolerance.

In Chapter 1, I argued that tolerance judgments can be conceptually constructed within a two-by-two matrix (Figure 1.2). Multicultural tolerance is defined by the situation where individuals are generally tolerant of objectionable speech, but do not extend this tolerance to exclusionary speech. In this chapter, after looking at general attitudes toward free speech and hate speech, I found evidence that such distinctions are made when we examine civil liberties judgments toward different target groups. While a comparison of dyads provided the most rigorous test, it resulted in a substantial portion of respondents being excluded from any given dyad. I therefore begin this section by developing a more nuanced measure of tolerance.

### *A Measure of Multicultural Tolerance*

The ideal-types of tolerance presented earlier in Figure 1.2 were categorical in nature. While current conceptualizations of tolerance also discuss tolerance and intolerance in a categorical way, the measure of a person's political tolerance is often

constructed with a scale of responses to different potentially objectionable groups (Gibson 2005a, 2005b). In other words, most studies model political tolerance in a linear fashion. People are seen as more or less tolerant depending on how many groups are allowed to do a given activity (as in the balanced scale used in the U.S. General Social Survey) or how many activities people permit an objectionable group to do (as in the least-liked methodology). Mondak and Sanders (2003; 2005) have challenged this strategy for measuring tolerance, arguing that tolerance is a dichotomous, not a continuous, variable. They argue that whether or not a person is tolerant is a separate question from the extent of a person's intolerance. In essence, Mondak and Sanders are defining this notion of absolute tolerance, what Gibson (Gibson 2005b, 339) has subsequently called 'Kelvinist tolerance'. I agree that the literature has largely constructed tolerance in this absolute manner; however, I disagree that anything else represents varying levels of intolerance. Indeed, in both the scale and dichotomous form, there is no consideration of the democratic legitimacy of placing restrictions on certain target groups. As already discussed, most advanced industrialized democracies have legal restrictions on certain forms of exclusionary speech.

The need to incorporate target groups means that neither a simple scale nor isolating the extreme of the scale can detect the presence of multicultural tolerance. Rather, a measure is required that categorizes individuals based on the combinations of responses they provide for target groups. When respondents allow exclusionary speech along with other objectionable speech, they are categorized as absolute tolerators. When they allow objectionable speech but not exclusionary speech, they are classified as multicultural tolerators. When they do not allow objectionable speech or exclusionary speech, they are considered absolutely intolerant.

There is also a fourth possibility that someone allows exclusionary groups speech rights but denies them to other groups is also a possibility. This idea was captured under the heading of authoritarian intolerance. However, once disagreement is controlled for, very few people permit exclusionary speech but do not allow speech rights to other potentially objectionable groups. In the CYS, only 2 percent of respondents fell into this category. When limiting it to cases of high disagreement, the percentage fell to 1 percent. Authoritarian intolerance, as defined by Stenner's (2005) work, is distinct from these

individuals in so far as she examines social tolerance and political tolerance separately, in which socially intolerant people would likely not express prior disagreement with exclusionary groups. Given that I control for prior disagreement, the fact that so few people are found in this category is consistent with my argument that exclusionary speech is particularly unlikely to be tolerated in contemporary, multicultural democracies. This does not rule out the possibility that authoritarian intolerance as conceived by Stenner exists. It is simply beyond the scope of this chapter to examine individuals who do not express a prior disagreement with racist ideas.

Given that, I focus here on three categories of individuals:

1) *The Intolerant*: These individuals do not support speech rights for any objectionable group. Most research on political tolerance is actually concerned with this group of individuals.[116]

2) *Multicultural Tolerators*: Individuals who support speech rights for objectionable groups, but do not extend them to exclusionary groups.

3) *Absolute Tolerators*: Individuals who extend speech rights, irrespective of the target group.

A categorical variable has been developed in order to empirically capture these three types of individuals. In reality, it is probably more accurate to characterize people as tending toward specific tolerance dispositions. The measure I create in categorical format is intended to capture these tendencies, and can be denoted as follows:

$$\text{TYPE OF TOLERANCE} = \text{TOLERANCE}_{\text{OBJECTIONABLE}} + \text{TOLERANCE}_{\text{EXCLUSIONARY}}$$

where the type of tolerance is computed based on whether the respondent is tolerant of at least one objectionable group *and* at least one exclusionary group. This is a stringent test of tolerance because it requires prior disagreement in order to be considered tolerance.

Tolerance of objectionable groups is coded 2 when at least one of the objectionable groups the respondent disagrees with is permitted to hold a march and talk on television, and 0 otherwise. Tolerance of exclusionary speech is dichotomous where 1 represents a respondent's willingness to allow at least one exclusionary group they find

---

[116] The debate over whether social and political tolerance are complementary values is actually more a debate about whether or not social and political *intolerance* go together. See Stenner (2005), Gibson (2006a) and Gibson and Gouws (2000).

objectionable to hold a march and talk on television. A choice was clearly made to force respondents to allow at least one objectionable group to participate in *both* of the civil liberties activities asked about in the survey, rather than at least one of the two activities. This was intentional in order to force respondents to be principled in their application of rights, rather than responding simply to the threatening stimulus of the march scenario. This is also an attempt to make this a stricter test of my hypothesis that tolerance distinctions emerge based on target group distinctions (and not distinctions between situations where tolerance is asked to be applied). Three outcomes are possible: 0 represents the intolerant, 2 represents multicultural tolerance and 3 represents absolute tolerance.[117] These categories were recoded to 0 (intolerant), 1 (multicultural tolerance) and 2 (absolute tolerance) for simplicity in future analyses.

*Exclusionary Speech in Practice: A Complication*

In order to apply the measure developed in the previous subsection, a researcher is required to distinguish between exclusionary speech and other potentially objectionable speech. In Chapter 1, I drew on critical race legal theory to develop three characteristics of exclusionary speech: speech with an *aim* of demonizing the participation of minority groups in public life, which causes substantial *harm* to its victims, and emerges from racialized ideologies that have been used historically to justify the privileges of social groups in power.

The application of this definition in practice is obviously not always clear-cut. Groups like racists and skinheads are associated with promoting exclusionary ideas often characterized as hate speech. Yet, the definition of hate speech in a legal sense is often vague. Even in the face of such difficulty, courts in many developed countries do make such judgments. Granted such judgments are usually contested, but my inclusion of racists and skinheads as target groups in the tolerance battery was specifically designed to capture the types of speech that would likely fall under such legislation in the two case countries. One of the reasons I focus on youth is because in both Canada and Belgium, such laws may be instructive to the public about what is allowable and what is not.

---

[117] Again, a very small percentage of respondents (2% based on my categorization of groups) received a score of 1 based on this formula. In other words, they were willing to permit an exclusionary group to partake in both civil liberties activities but did not extend this same right to another group. These individuals have been excluded from this analysis for reasons I previously discussed.

Does this mean that every group can clearly be labeled as exclusionary or not? Obviously, not everything that a racist or skinhead may say when talking on television or holding a march would be grounds for criminal action under the hate propaganda laws in these two countries, so I am assuming that young people are making reasonable assessments about what would occur in each of these scenarios. Such reasonable assessments are harder in other cases where a group may be associated in some of its discourse with exclusionary practices, but its speech is associated with a much broader array of topics. This is precisely the case with two of the target groups in my sample: Flemish separatists and radical Muslims.

In the first case, the separatist cause in Belgium in recent years has had as a vocal advocate the *Vlaams Blok*, a far-right wing party that received over 24 percent of the popular vote in Flanders in the 2003 federal election. In November, 2004, Belgium's highest court upheld a ruling that convicted the party of belonging to or assisting a group that advocates discrimination. This decision was based primarily on an examination of a large amount of written material produced by the party which the court ruled as providing evidence of a clear intention to incite hatred and discrimination against foreigners (see Brems 2006). Like many far-right wing parties in Europe, the *Vlaams Blok*'s message was largely anti-immigrant. The general term "Flemish separatist" was intentionally included in the target group list to cue reactions to the idea of separation, but it is likely that some respondents associate this movement with the *Vlaams Blok* and its exclusionary messages toward foreigners. Such an association would not be unreasonable, given the successful court case and research that suggests that ethnocentric attitudes largely drove votes for the party (De Witte and Klandersmans 2000; Billiet and De Witte 1995).

Despite this association, the data presented in this chapter suggest that the general trend is to deal with Flemish separatists distinctly from racists and skinheads. Remember that in Table 3.8 Flemish separatists consistently received higher tolerance levels than the two more arguably clear-cut exclusionary groups. The results mirrored those for gay rights activists, suggesting that young people are more likely to see them as a legitimate actor in public debate.

The evidence is less obvious when it comes to radical Muslims, especially in the Belgian data where this group received only slightly higher tolerance scores than the two

exclusionary groups. Recall that among Canadian youth, the gaps in levels of tolerance varied from 8 to 17 percentage points between radical Muslims and the two exclusionary groups, whereas among Belgian youth, the gaps were only 2 to 5 percentage points. This deviation from what is predicted by a theory of multicultural tolerance requires some discussion.

If there is a social group in Western democracies that is viewed as especially threatening in the current context (rightly or wrongly), it has to be individuals associated with Islam. Since the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001, a number of incidents have aroused anti-Muslim sentiment in North America and Western Europe, including bombings in London in 2005 as well as public outcry over the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark that led to violence in many countries. For these reasons, "radical Muslims" may be regarded as a particularly threatening group. While I have argued that a theory of multicultural tolerance would lead one to expect that exclusionary speech would be seen as particularly intolerable, it does not exclude the possibility that circumstances may arise when other groups, rightly or wrongly, may be the object of public intolerance.

There are two explanations for the low level of tolerance of "radical Muslims." The first explanation is that "radical Muslims" as a group may also be perceived as exclusionary. While my definition of exclusionary speech focuses on people from social groups who have historically been privileged, much debate in recent years has focused on the position of women within Islam. And indeed, sexism is a form of oppression that parallels how racism and xenophobia work to exclude ethnic, racial and religious minorities (Young 1990). Debates over Muslim women wearing the veil or the introduction of Sharia law in western democracies are often thought about as a conflict between minority rights and women's rights (see, for example, Okin 1999). While these discussions often take on a highly paternalistic tone, the situation of "minorities within minorities" points to the difficulty of balancing group rights with individual rights in practice (Eisenberg and Spinner-Halev 2006).

An alternative, and perhaps more likely, explanation is that greater social intolerance of Muslims may be forcing tolerance levels down. One of the reasons that speech rights are protected is precisely because social minorities are often the targets of

Table 3.9: Ethnocentrism and Tolerance of Radical Muslims

| | Anti-Immigrant Attitudes | | Closeness to Minorities Scale | | Dating Minorities Scale | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Canada** | | | | | | |
| | Mean | (s.d) | Mean | (s.d) | Mean | (s.d) |
| Talk on Television | | | | | | |
| Tolerant | 0.25 | (0.20) | 0.52 | (0.22) | 0.51 | (0.27) |
| Intolerant | 0.34 | (0.24) | 0.47 | (0.24) | 0.44 | (0.28) |
| *Significance* | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** |
| Public March | | | | | | |
| Tolerant | 0.23 | (0.20) | 0.55 | (0.22) | 0.54 | (0.28) |
| Intolerant | 0.32 | (0.23) | 0.48 | (0.24) | 0.45 | (0.27) |
| *Significance* | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** |
| **Belgium** | | | | | | |
| | Mean | (s.d) | Mean | (s.d) | Mean | (s.d) |
| Talk on Television | | | | | | |
| Tolerant | 0.45 | (0.22) | 0.33 | (0.26) | 0.35 | (0.24) |
| Intolerant | 0.53 | (0.24) | 0.29 | (0.25) | 0.29 | (0.24) |
| *Significance* | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** |
| Public March | | | | | | |
| Tolerant | 0.45 | (0.22) | 0.33 | (0.26) | 0.34 | (0.23) |
| Intolerant | 0.53 | (0.24) | 0.28 | (0.26) | 0.29 | (0.24) |
| *Significance* | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** | *** |

Source: Comparative Youth Study.

Note: *** significant <.01. All variables run from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating higher levels.

discrimination. Such rights help to ensure that social intolerance is not used to curb the political rights of minority groups. I have already mentioned that disagreement with radical Muslims is the most intense among the 'non-exclusionary' objectionable groups. Even more telling is the relationship between young people's social tolerance and their attitudes towards radical Muslims. Table 3.9 presents the differences between those who are tolerant and those who are intolerant of radical Muslims on three measures of social intolerance: anti-immigrant attitudes, closeness to minorities and willingness to date minorities. All three scales run from 0 to 1. The anti-immigrant attitudes scale is an

additive measure of four anti-immigrant statements, with higher scores indicating more hostile attitudes. The closeness to minorities scale is the sum of a respondent's answers to how close or distant they feel to three groups, blacks, Muslims and immigrants, on an 11-point feeling thermometer from distant to close. The willingness to date minorities scale is the sum of respondents' answers to whether they would date blacks, Muslims and immigrants if they had the opportunity on a 5-point scale from very unlikely to very likely. All three scales are reliable (Alpha Cronbach scores > .82) and intended to capture attitudes toward ethnic and racial minorities.[118]

Clearly in Table 3.9, those who hold more anti-immigrant attitudes, feel more distant from minorities or are less willing to date minorities are also less likely to tolerate radical Muslims talking on public television about their views or holding a demonstration. These results are consistent in both samples and are significant at the <.01 level in every instance. This suggests that one of the sources of political intolerance toward radical Muslims is indeed *social* intolerance. While this does not rule out other explanations, it does lend support to the idea that part of what is fueling political intolerance of radical Muslim speech are exclusionary rather than inclusionary ideals. This distinguishes such judgments from those of multicultural tolerators whose inter-group distinctions are based on inclusionary goals.

It should be noted that a similar analysis was conducted of how political tolerance of exclusionary groups related to these measures of social tolerance. The results suggested that intolerance of exclusionary speech (e.g. racists and skinheads) was either positively related with social tolerance or the relationship was not significant (results not shown). These results are not surprising, given my argument that the relationship between social tolerance and civil liberties judgments towards exclusionary groups should be positive. Indeed, I argue that the relationship can only be teased out in comparison to individual's civil liberties judgments towards *other* objectionable speech. In Chapter 5, I will return to this relationship and examine in more detail whether or not social tolerance can help distinguish multicultural tolerators from absolute tolerators. But the contrary relationship between social tolerance and tolerance of radical Muslims' speech rights suggests that people are not viewing it as an exclusionary group. Rather,

---

[118] Full details of the scales are provided in the Appendix.

Table 3.10: Breakdown by Type of Tolerance (Disagreement)

| | | Canada | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intolerant | % | 38% | 52% |
| | N | 1043 | 2362 |
| Multicultural Tolerator | % | 52% | 38% |
| | N | 1424 | 1733 |
| Absolute Tolerator | % | 10% | 10% |
| | N | 278 | 438 |
| | Total | 2745 | 4533 |

Note: Cells are column percentages.  Breakdown excludes 1598 respondents who did not find at least one of each type of target group objectionable, as well as 788 respondents who failed to complete the tolerance battery.  Source: Comparative Youth Study.

one of the variables driving intolerance of this sort of speech is simply social intolerance of minorities more generally.

The cases of Flemish separatists and radical Muslims highlight the challenge of applying the theoretical construct of exclusionary speech to groups that actually exist within the political landscape.  Because speech rights are a key democratic right in any democracy, it is necessary to be very careful in extending rights of censorship too broadly.  Clearly, the risk is the suppression of legitimate forms of speech that contribute to healthy democratic debate.  Despite these risks, I think it is useful to examine how young people distinguish between groups that are clearly exclusionary (racists and skinheads) from the other three target groups addressed in the CYS questionnaire (gay rights activists, Quebec and Flemish separatists, and radical Muslims).  I have tried to make the case in this section that such a distinction is in line with both my theoretical perspective developed in Chapter 1 as well as the empirical data presented thus far in this chapter.

*A Breakdown by Types of Tolerance*

The concept of multicultural tolerance is theoretically interesting from the point of view of political theory because it captures some of the concerns of multicultural theorists about how minority groups can and should be integrated into a larger democratic political system.  Yet, if such distinctions are not being made by actual citizens, they are

of little use to empirical researchers that are interested in political tolerance as a democratic value. On the other hand, if substantial portions of young people subscribe to this more multicultural form of tolerance, then the study of democratic values must take much more seriously how citizens deal with the challenges of making civil liberties judgments in multicultural democracies.

Table 3.10 provides the distribution of types of tolerance. It suggests that this idea of multicultural tolerance is in fact a characteristic of a substantial portion of young people's thinking. In the Canadian sample, 52 percent of respondents are categorized as multicultural tolerators. That is, about half of the young people in the Canadian sample provided tolerant answers to some groups, but made an exception for the exclusionary groups. Another 38 percent responded in an intolerant manner, and only 10 percent of respondents were 'principled' in their willingness to extend civil liberties judgments across groups. This is the same percentage of absolute tolerators in the Belgian sample. However, in this case, the intolerant (52%) seem to be more prevalent than multicultural tolerators, although the number of multicultural tolerators is still 38 percent.

The low frequency of absolute tolerance is not surprising. Mondak and Sanders (2003, 496-7), who have argued that absolute tolerance (i.e. tolerance for all groups) is fundamentally different from variations in intolerance, report that about 18 percent of the American public can be described as such.[119] This figure is based on the pooled GSS (1976-1998) tolerance battery that includes five groups (including racists) and three civil liberties activities, where all items are added together. Respondents with a 0 on the resulting scale were coded as tolerant. Since the scale included racists as well as other groups, this coding implies they would have been willing to allow racists as well as other groups to partake in civil liberties, which makes it similar to my own category of absolute tolerance. If I construct a parallel scale with the CYS to that created by Mondak and Sanders, about 5 percent of the youth sample scores 0.[120]

---

[119] It is interesting to note that when Gibson (2005a, 317-8) reanalyzed the 1987 GSS dataset, he shows that about two-thirds of these seemingly tolerant individuals do in fact provide intolerant answers using the least-liked methodology that was administered several months after the initial survey to 1200 of the respondents.

[120] All responses to the five groups and two activities were scored a 1 if the respondent did not permit the group to partake in a given activity. The items included in the CYS are not identical to those included in the GSS, so the differences in the percent of absolute tolerators can not be directly attributed to differences in tolerance levels between the samples.

The problem with their technique is that there is no consideration of how variations across target groups are conceptualized. This forces them to argue that the rest of the scale represents simple variation in intolerance. My definition, in contrast, represents a theoretically driven account about what explains this variation, namely the types of target groups the scale is composed of. Furthermore, my theoretical framework suggests *which* target groups are driving this variation. My measure controls for disagreement while not being limited by the number of groups in total that the respondent finds objectionable.[121] Mondak and Sanders may consider this distinction between groups simply a specification of levels of intolerance, but the distinction is more fundamental than that.

Using conventional measurement techniques, multicultural tolerators would show up in the middle of an undifferentiated scale, and such a score would be interpreted as either somewhat tolerant (or somewhat intolerant). Yet, there is no understanding of the nature of this tolerance: what types of target groups benefit from this tolerance, and what groups do not. A simple scaling technique (whether it isolates absolute tolerance or not) ignores the nature of the target group, and furthermore, ignores the pattern that I suggest exists between tolerance toward different types of target groups. In contemporary, multicultural democracies, it is far more likely that a citizen will deny civil liberties to a racist group than to another group that is not characterized by exclusionary goals. In fact, less than two percent of the sample extended civil liberties to one of the exclusionary groups but denied them to another objectionable group. This number is so small as to be almost inconsequential.

Now, some may argue that this pattern emerges because exclusionary groups tend to be found *more* objectionable than other groups. Indeed, this is a possibility given the measure presented in Table 3.10 because any level of disagreement with a group was counted as prior objection on which a tolerance judgment could be based. I presented evidence earlier in Table 3.3 that there are, in general, higher mean disagreements with racists and skinheads than other groups. Yet, tolerance levels across groups continued to

---

[121] There is no control for disagreement in Mondak and Sanders' battery. However the authors note that almost 100% of respondents disliked at least one of the groups included in the GSS battery (2003, 498). My measure of absolute tolerance requires that the respondent find one of *each type* of group to be objectionable, so is in some ways a more stringent test of absolute tolerance.

Table 3.11: Breakdown by Type of Tolerance (High Disagreement)

|  |  | Canada | Belgium |
|---|---|---|---|
| Intolerant | % | 51% | 58% |
|  | N | 1206 | 1783 |
| Multicultural Tolerator | % | 43% | 35% |
|  | N | 1027 | 1081 |
| Absolute Tolerator | % | 6% | 6% |
|  | N | 145 | 192 |
|  | Total | 2378 | 3056 |

Note: This table is limited to only those respondents who found at least one of each type of group highly objectionable. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

vary even after limiting the sample to those who found each group highly objectionable. This means that disagreement accounts for some, but not all, of the variation across target groups.[122]

If we consider the tolerance typology described above, one might expect that a consideration of only those who *highly* disagreed with at least one of each type of group would result in an increase in the intolerant category and a reduction in both of the tolerance categories. This would likely leave a small number of principled, absolute tolerators, and very few multicultural tolerators. Table 3.11 suggests otherwise. While there is an increase in the number of individuals labeled intolerant, almost 43 percent of Canadian respondents and 35 percent of Belgian respondents continue to be labeled as multicultural tolerators. In other words, even after limiting the sample to only those who disagree highly with at least one of each type of group, we still see a large proportion of respondents able to overcome their objection to some groups, while denying civil liberties to exclusionary groups. The drop in the percent of multicultural tolerance is between 3 and 9 percentage points (compared with 4 percentage points in absolute tolerators), which leaves a substantial proportion of the sample making a principled distinction between exclusionary speech and other forms of objectionable speech.[123]

---

[122] See Table 3.4.

[123] Limiting the analysis to only high objection also does not increase the category of those who would permit exclusionary speech but not allow other speech. Only 1 percent of the sample falls into this category, again suggesting that there is a direction to the distinction that people are making.

In conclusion, there is clearly variation across individuals in the extent that people subscribe to a more multicultural form of political tolerance. In this chapter, I have demonstrated that a substantial portion of young people make distinctions between exclusionary speech and other forms of objectionable speech. I have also developed a way of identifying different types of tolerance in the population. In doing so, I have argued that the study of political tolerance needs to move beyond asking about the degree of tolerance and intolerance, and start examining the nature of a person's civil liberties judgments.

Understanding political tolerance as a variety of dispositions rather than a linear scale opens new avenues of research. Importantly, it raises the question of why citizens make the distinctions they do when deciding whether or not to extend civil liberties. Exclusionary speech for many people is distinct from other forms of objectionable speech in contemporary democracies because it is fundamentally in conflict with other important democratic values that are important in the functioning of diverse, multicultural polities. The value of social inclusion, and the contexts that foster it, are likely sources of such distinctions. In the following chapters, I will turn to the question of who makes such distinctions across speech. In doing so, I will not only offer a more robust understanding of the diversity of people's tolerance dispositions, but demonstrate how increasing racial and ethnic diversity is impacting the democratic values that people hold.

# Chapter 4: Distinguishing Types of Tolerators

---

Political tolerance raises a moral dilemma (Horton 1994; Mendus 1989; Heyd 1996b; Williams 2000; Cohen 2004). If people sincerely believe that another individual's ideas or actions are morally wrong, what drives them to ignore their objections? This dilemma, referred to in philosophical debates as the paradox of tolerance, is usually overcome by appealing to the larger values that toleration is said to protect. In Chapter 1, I pointed to several goals that underpin liberal defenses of tolerance, including the need for peaceful coexistence, recognition of other people's autonomy, human infallibility, and a larger concern for ensuring state neutrality and the democratic process.

Yet, such defenses do not completely resolve the paradox of tolerance precisely because when tolerance is used to defend larger values, the answers suggested by such values are not always toleration. A pointed example is provided by John Horton (1996). He raises the issue of racial prejudice. Because racial prejudice is based on ideas and notions that are morally indefensible, he argues that tolerating such ideas is not necessarily what is required (33-5). In his words, "…there are some things to which it is wrong or unreasonable to have any objection [like a person's skin color], and to which toleration is therefore a morally inappropriate response" (35). He argues that the best solution would be to eliminate racial prejudice (by changing people's opinions), which he acknowledges may be impossible. A second-best solution is to attempt to control racial discrimination by limiting individuals' ability to act on such opinions (37). Neither changing people's opinions nor controlling the outcome of such opinions would normally fit into the ideal of political tolerance. By their nature, these solutions put restrictions on individuals' thoughts and actions; such restrictions are in complete contrast to the ethic of absolute political tolerance.

This is precisely the dilemma that respondents are placed in when they are asked to allow exclusionary groups to publicly express their views. While I have argued that both allowing and prohibiting exclusionary speech have justifications in democratic theory, it is yet to be seen whether such decisions are related to a more general

108

disposition toward intolerance. In Chapter 3, I developed an alternative measurement technique that allows researchers to distinguish simple intolerance from two distinct types of tolerance, which I have called multicultural and absolute tolerance. This theoretical and empirical distinction makes possible an analysis of the correlates of different types of tolerance and intolerance. In this chapter, I turn to the task of explaining multicultural tolerance based on the important correlates of tolerance present in the literature. The goal will be to assess the validity of the hypothesis that the correlates of intolerance will distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators (*hypothesis 3*).

One of the key contributions of this chapter will be to demonstrate that multicultural tolerance is not simply a form of targeted intolerance (and hence similar to intolerance more generally). Throughout this chapter, I will examine what political and demographic characteristics distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. Conceptually, I have argued that denying civil liberties to exclusionary groups is fundamentally different than political intolerance. Yet, if by examining the correlates of multicultural tolerance we find that it "walks and talks" like intolerance, then the distinction is somewhat meaningless. Multicultural tolerators would simply be intolerant people whose target group happens to be racists or skinheads, as the least-liked methodology implies.[124] Yet, I have argued that a failure to extend civil liberties to exclusionary groups is only intolerance in so far as it is indistinguishable from a failure to extend civil liberties to other objectionable groups. By isolating multicultural tolerators from the intolerant, I can examine the extent to which multicultural tolerators resemble (or rather do not resemble) the types of people who are generally intolerant. If multicultural tolerators *are* distinct from the intolerant, however, then the question becomes the extent to which they resemble absolute tolerators.

A further contribution of this chapter will be methodological with respect to the measurement of political tolerance. As discussed earlier, the dominant measurement of political tolerance entails a scaling technique that either sums responses across a range of

---

[124] It is not unreasonable to assume that many of the respondents in the CYS would select racists or skinheads as their least liked group, given that young people expressed the most disagreement with these groups. Recall in Table 3.3 that the mean disagreement for racists was .26 in the Canadian sample and .76 in the Belgian sample on the 0-10 disagree/agree scale. In both countries, this was the most objectionable group among the five that were queried.

target groups (the balanced scale) or sums multiple responses to a respondent-selected target group (least-liked methodology). Both measurement techniques assume that political tolerance is a uni-dimensional construct and there is no distinction across types of speech. The young people whom I have identified as multicultural tolerators would be represented on balanced scales as a middle ground or as intolerant in the least-liked methodology. Yet, I will demonstrate in this chapter that multicultural tolerance represents a unique category of respondents. The analysis techniques used in this chapter are based on this premise and will provide support for the contention that those who adhere to multicultural tolerance are far more like the absolutely tolerant than the intolerant. This will set the foundation for further analysis of the ways in which multicultural tolerators differ from absolute tolerators. I will argue that the more similar they are to each other on the primary correlates of intolerance, the less support there is for either of the measurement techniques that are prominent in the literature. This leaves open the question, which will be addressed in Chapter 5, about what causes young people to endorse one type of tolerance over the other.

## *Exploring Multicultural Tolerance*

Over fifty years of research has provided a host of solid empirical studies on what distinguishes the intolerant from other people, but very little research focuses on how attitudes toward exclusionary speech are developed or how civil liberties judgments vary across different types of target group speech.[125] Many young people do demonstrate politically tolerant attitudes, but they do not see exclusionary speech as a legitimate use of speech rights in democracies that require citizens to respect and recognize the rights of a diverse population. When target group distinctions are not incorporated into our understanding of political tolerance, this important nuance is overlooked. Chapter 3 argued that the two dominant measurement techniques (the balanced scale and the least-

---

[125] There has been a small number of research articles that consider specifically the correlates of hate speech (Lambe 2004; Cowan and Khatchadourian 2003; Cowan and Mettrick 2002). In addition, Wilson (1994) has documented increased aggregate levels of tolerance for left-wing groups while right-wing groups did not see a parallel increase in the United States. Only Chong (2006) has actually posited a distinction for attitudes toward exclusionary speech in his analysis of hate speech on university campus. His analysis documents the trend among younger, more educated individuals to be less tolerant of hate speech than prior research would suggest, which he argues reflects a changing norm environment on university campuses.

liked technique) for ascertaining the political tolerance of a population fail to account for important distinctions that citizens make across target groups. This section documents the importance of such distinctions by demonstrating that multicultural tolerators – despite being "intolerant of intolerance" – differ in key ways from the intolerant.[126]

To be clear, research on political tolerance, whether is has focused on political, demographic or psychological explanations, has primarily tried to explain *intolerance*, either through the use of a balanced civil liberties scale or using the least-liked methodology of Sullivan and colleagues (1979). Despite the fact that technically, multicultural tolerators are expressing a targeted intolerance toward exclusionary speech, from the perspective developed throughout this thesis, multicultural tolerance is *not* a form of intolerance. A compelling test of this assertion will be to demonstrate that the correlates of political intolerance distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators.

*Hate Speech as Targeted Intolerance?*

The assumption that multicultural tolerators are not simply intolerant is key and requires empirical examination. While objections to hate speech may be underpinned by a general unwillingness to allow the public expression of ideas one disagrees with, it may also represent a sincere belief that some forms of speech are contrary to the healthy functioning of a democracy, as is argued to be the case with hate speech.[127] When people are faced with exclusionary forms of speech, they are required to choose between the rights of individuals to express themselves and the need to ensure public safety as well as foster an environment where minorities are not discriminated against. Qualitative research suggests that when individuals are faced with such dilemmas, they can and do reason through the implications of their decisions (Chong 1993). For example, Chong reports that when his American interview participants were asked about the rights of Nazi groups and the Klan to spread their ideas, respondents often had "dual considerations" where "support for an abstract right [is] combined with an apprehension about the

---

[126] The idea of "intolerance of intolerance" is discussed by many normative theorists and is highlighted in empirical work by Sniderman and colleagues (1996, 37).
[127] For an interesting case study of how hate speech raises contradictory responses from even the most adamant supporters of free speech, see Gibson and Bingham's (1985) study of ACLU members' reactions to the Skokie controversy.

consequences of granting such rights in the first place" (ibid, 875).[128] Quantitative research supports this finding, demonstrating that when respondents are asked to think about public security or equality issues when making civil liberties judgments, intolerance increases (Druckman 2001; Nelson et al. 1997; Gibson 1998b; Sniderman et al. 1996; Cowan et al. 2002). Similarly, framing civil liberties questions as issues of free speech can increase tolerance; however, Gibson (1998b) and Peffley and colleagues (2001) have both shown that it is easier to persuade individuals to deny civil liberties than vice-versa.

The value conflict between free speech and social inclusion is consistent with the idea of multicultural tolerance.[129] As I already documented in Chapter 3, many young people simultaneously support free speech *and* hate speech restrictions – two potentially conflicting ideals. While support for free speech in principle may push people away from complete intolerance, other values like social equality may play a more important role in distinguishing between multicultural and absolute tolerators. It is not that multicultural tolerators value free speech less, but rather that they place equal or greater weight on social inclusion.

One way to capture an initial glimpse into the ideas underpinning multicultural tolerance is to examine the consistency between tolerance judgments and more general attitudes about censoring exclusionary speech. Previous research has documented that general attitudes about free speech tend to be correlated with people's ability to extend civil liberties in particular instances (Prothro and Grigg 1960). One might, therefore, expect that multicultural tolerators are also more likely to support restrictions on exclusionary speech. This idea receives some support in Figure 4.1, which shows the percent of each type of tolerator who strongly agree with the statement: "It should be illegal to say hateful things publicly about racial, ethnic and religious groups." While support for hate speech restrictions receives higher levels of support in Canada than in Belgium, in both cases multicultural tolerators are the most likely to express strong agreement with hate speech restrictions. About 55 percent of Canadian youth, and 36

---

[128] In fact, across ten different civil liberties issues, Chong (1993, 873) reports that about one-third of respondents actually talked themselves out of their initial position.
[129] See Peffley and colleagues (2001) for a detailed look at political tolerance judgments from a value conflict perspective.

Figure 4.1: Percent Strongly Agree with Hate Speech
Restrictions



Note: Points represent percent within each tolerance type who strongly agree with
hate speech restrictions.  Source: Comparative Youth Study

percent of Belgian youth, strongly agreed with this statement.  This is about seven
percentage points higher that the percent of the intolerant who agreed with this statement,
and 12 to 18 percentage points higher than the percent of absolute tolerators who agreed
with this statement.[130]

While this may be intuitive, given the importance of exclusionary speech in
categorizing multicultural tolerators, recall that tolerance types have been calculated
based on the combination of responses to two sets of target groups: exclusionary groups
and other objectionable groups.  This means that the intolerant, as well as multicultural
tolerators, have *both* rejected the extension of civil liberties to exclusionary groups.
Furthermore, multicultural tolerators have been willing to tolerate other types of speech.
The fact that multicultural tolerators are significantly more likely to agree with hate
speech restrictions, therefore, does not make sense given traditional conceptions of
political tolerance as unidimensional.  One would expect that the intolerant should be

---

[130] Responses to hate speech restrictions were based on a four-point disagree/agree scale.  If somewhat and
strongly agree are analyzed together, multicultural tolerators still appear to be the most likely to agree with
hate speech restrictions.  In Canada, 79 percent of multicultural tolerators agree somewhat or strongly,
compared to 70 percent of the intolerant and 68 percent of absolute tolerators.  In Belgium, 71 percent of
multicultural tolerators agree, compared to 64 percent of the intolerant and 60 percent of absolute
tolerators.

equally, or perhaps even more likely to support speech restrictions. Yet this does not appear to be the case.

These results suggest that multicultural tolerators respond to more general statements about speech rights in a way that makes sense in light of the theoretical approach to political tolerance developed in this research. These young people have demonstrated a willingness to tolerate some speech, but appear to be bothered by exclusionary speech in a way that the intolerant are not. This does not make sense if multicultural tolerance is simply a "targeted intolerance" because multicultural tolerators clearly have shown some tolerance of objectionable speech (which is a prerequisite for being categorized as a multicultural tolerator). Rather, their support for free speech is more qualified than absolute tolerators, and their support for hate speech restrictions is greater than among both the intolerant and absolute tolerators.

The responses of multicultural tolerators appear more intolerant of hate speech than even the intolerant, yet we know they are capable of tolerating some speech. It appears that those who respond across target groups in a manner consistent with multicultural tolerance also tend to respond to general principle statements in ways that are consistent with these applied tolerance judgments. In other words, there is some consistency between applied tolerance judgments (i.e. about specific groups) and support for general principles, suggesting that multicultural tolerators are not simply somewhat (in)tolerant, nor are such responses simply evidence of incoherence. Rather, they represent a particular disposition toward tolerance that sees free speech as important, but balances individual civil liberties against other values.

Yet, just how different are multicultural tolerators from the intolerant? A seven percentage point gap in support for hate speech restrictions between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators, while significant, is not substantively very large. While it provides the first piece of evidence that multicultural tolerators differ from the intolerant, the goal of this chapter will be to examine to what extent the factors that predict intolerance also predict multicultural tolerance. If the latter is simply a form of targeted intolerance, then the correlates of intolerance should do little to distinguish them.

When people are asked to uphold "democratic values" – either in a scenario asked on a survey or in the rough-and-tumble of everyday life – we know that a number of

factors affect their willingness and ability to do so. When it comes to political tolerance, previous research provides a wealth of evidence about what types of people are more likely to express tolerant attitudes. Stouffer's (1963) original study of civil liberties judgments in the United States documented a number of relationships that remain valid today. One of the key findings was political elites tend to be more tolerant than the general public (ibid, Ch. 2; see also Nunn et al. 1978; McClosky 1964; Sniderman et al. 1996; Gibson and Bingham 1984; Barnum and Sullivan 1990; Guth and Green 1991; Gibson and Duch 1991; O'Donnell 1993; Sullivan et al. 1993). Involvement in the political system – at both the elite and popular level – is supposed to foster knowledge of the rules of democratic politics as well as facilitate the ability of individuals to apply general democratic principles to specific situations (Finkel and Ernst 2005; Fletcher 1990; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003).[131]

Demographic differences between the politically active and the general population also help to account for differences in tolerance. The more educated consistently show higher levels of political tolerance (Bobo and Licari 1989; Bird et al. 1994; Avery et al. 1997; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Nie et al. 1996; Vogt 1997).[132] Other important predictors of intolerance include living in a more rural or more Southern location in the U.S., religious affiliation and religiosity, and being a woman (Stouffer 1963; Wilson 1991, 1985; Nunn et al. 1978; Sullivan et al. 1982; Cowan and Mettrick 2002; Cowan and Khatchadourian 2003; Marcus et al. 1995; Golebiowska 1999).

Beyond demographic explanations, research has also focused on more psychological explanations of political tolerance. Stouffer (1963) noted that fear and threat were key in understanding civil liberties judgments. Those who perceive a group to be more threatening, either because they are predisposed to find non-conformity threatening or because of situational variables, are less likely to extend civil liberties (Stouffer 1963; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). In addition to threat, other underlying dispositions such as authoritarianism and dogmatism have

---

[131] See Guth and Green (1991) for a contrary argument that political and social participation are not associated with higher levels of political tolerance among elites. Rather, they argue that demographic and ideological differences account for increased tolerance.
[132] Stouffer argues that one of the reasons that young people express higher levels of tolerance is because younger generations have higher levels of education (Stouffer 1963, Ch. 4).

been argued to make tolerance more difficult (Sullivan et al. 1982; Stenner 2005; Marcus et al. 1995), whereas high self-esteem, perspective-taking ability and openness to experience are positively related to increased willingness to extend civil liberties (Marcus et al. 1995; Mutz 2002b). These findings in general seem to suggest the same thing: people who are better able to deal with diversity in their environment are more likely to be willing to allow the expression of such diversity. The opposite is also true. Those with psychological insecurities about diversity and non-conformity are more likely to support its repression.

As noted, the research in this vein does not address how these variables impact distinctions across target groups nor has it measured tolerance dispositions as set out in this research. However, if the findings from this long research tradition are generalized to the theoretical approach in this study, I expect that many of the correlates of intolerance will distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. This is because I argue that multicultural tolerance is in fact a form of tolerance: those who endorse multicultural tolerance should exhibit many of the same characteristics as politically tolerant individuals measured under alternative techniques. Given the brief overview of the correlates of intolerance, several variables seem to have straightforward applications to multicultural tolerance, namely, political engagement, education and urban/rural status. I expect these variables to decrease intolerance, without necessarily pushing an individual toward a particular conception of tolerance. I will address these factors in the next subsection. The relationship of other demographic characteristics, such as gender, race and religious background, will likely have a more complicated connection to multicultural tolerance by impacting the type of tolerance to which an individual subscribes. These factors will be addressed separately in the subsequent subsection.

*Multicultural Tolerance and the Sources of Intolerance*

The ways in which certain factors impact political tolerance seem to readily apply to distinctions between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators. Political engagement, education, and living in urban areas are all argued to contribute to more tolerant attitudes by developing the types of skills that enable citizens to overcome their prior objection and to see the value of allowing groups they disagree with to express themselves

116

publicly. Because multicultural tolerators have expressed at least some 'political tolerance' as traditionally understood, one would expect that these three sets of factors should help distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. Proponents of an absolute conception of tolerance might extend this argument farther and suggest that because absolute tolerators have been tolerant of more groups (both exclusionary and objectionable), these same factors should help to distinguish them from what I have termed multicultural tolerators. In this section, I will discuss how much this linear logic applies to multicultural tolerance and the extent to which it receives empirical support.

To examine these relationships, Table 4.1 presents bivariate breakdowns of tolerance types by political engagement, educational background and urban/rural status. Let us first consider political engagement. One might expect multicultural tolerators to be more engaged in politics than the intolerant. First of all, those who know more about the political system (Nie et al. 1996; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and those more involved in it (Fletcher 1990; Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003; Sullivan et al. 1982; Cigler and Joslyn 2002) are argued to be better prepared to apply general democratic "rules of the game" to specific scenarios where such norms apply. In both the Canadian and Belgian contexts, the rules of the game include limits on speech rights when it comes to hate speech. I would therefore expect multicultural tolerators to be more engaged and informed about politics than the intolerant. The expectations with respect to absolute tolerance, however, are less clear.

The CYS provides three separate measures of political engagement: participation in political activities, involvement in organizational life, and political knowledge. The number of political activities and the number of organizations are count variables based on the reported number of activities or groups the respondent has participated in during the past 12 months. Clearly, political engagement among young people is likely to differ from adults. Young people tend to have their own repertoire of political actions that are tailored to their position in the public sphere. Certainly, the youth in this sample are not of voting age, and their involvement in politics tends to include newer and alternative forms of participation (Bennett 1998; Zukin et al. 2006; Micheletti et al. 2003; Inglehart and Catterberg 2002). The organizational and political activities scales attempt to capture

**Table 4.1 Social Demographics, Political Engagement and Tolerance**

| | Canada | | | | | Belgium | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | | Multicultural Tolerators | | Absolute Tolerators | Intolerant | | Multicultural Tolerators | | Absolute Tolerators |
| Number of Political Activities (count) | 2.96 | *** | 3.88 | ns | 3.76 | 1.69 | *** | 2.18 | ns | 2.16 |
| Number of Organizations (count) | 1.61 | * | 1.71 | *** | 1.97 | 1.28 | *** | 1.52 | ns | 1.48 |
| Political Knowledge Scale (0-1) | 0.43 | *** | 0.54 | * | 0.50 | 0.27 | *** | 0.32 | ns | 0.30 |
| Average Grades (1=Fs to 5=As) | 3.35 | *** | 3.57 | ns | 3.57 | | | *not available* | | |
| Educational Aspiration | | | | | | | | | | |
| Less than University Degree | 28% | *** | 18% | ns | 18% | 71% | *** | 61% | ns | 65% |
| University Degree | 72% | | 82% | | 82% | 29% | | 39% | | 35% |
| Parental Education | | | | | | | | | | |
| Neither Parent University Educated | 52% | *** | 41% | ns | 43% | 77% | *** | 73% | ns | 74% |
| One or Both Parents University Educated | 48% | | 59% | | 57% | 23% | | 27% | | 26% |
| Urban-Dweller | | | | | | | | | | |
| Urban | 79% | ns | 76% | ns | 74% | 26% | * | 29% | ** | 23% |
| Rural | 21% | | 24% | | 26% | 74% | | 71% | | 77% |

Note: *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10; ns=not significant. Cells for count and scale variables are means across columns and significance was acquired using ANOVA for pairs of outcomes. Cells for dichotomous independent variables are column percentages and significance was acquired using tau-b for each pair of outcomes. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

118

these sorts of activities.[133]   Finally, the political knowledge scale is based on multiple choice questions which ask respondents to identify contemporary political figures (e.g. who is the prime minister?) as well as questions about institutions (e.g. what is the parliament composed of?).[134]   The McGill Youth Study contained three questions and the Belgian Youth Study contained four items.  The additive scales of correct answers were standardized between 0 and 1, where higher scores indicate more correct answers.

The number of political activities is perhaps the most direct measurement of exposure to the 'rough and tumble' of politics.  Previous research has suggested that participation in these more direct, participatory forms of action are key in the development of tolerance, and I would expect this to hold for multicultural tolerance as well (Peffley and Rohrschneider 2003).  Young people are clearly engaging in direct forms of political action.  Among the youth surveyed, 15 percent have reported participating in a legal march, and around one quarter have boycotted or bought items for political or ethical reasons.  These types of activities, while perhaps sporadic, do represent political engagement among teenagers and should logically be positively related to tolerance.  As expected, multicultural tolerators are significantly more active than the intolerant (p<.01) whereas there is no significant difference between the levels of activism of the two types of tolerators.  This is despite the fact that multicultural tolerators, by definition, have shown a "targeted intolerance" toward exclusionary speech under more traditional conceptualizations.

Organizational involvement is another way to capture the engagement of young people, and such organizations – from sports teams and religious organizations to environmental action groups – are argued to be the building blocks of civil society (Putnam 1993, 2000).  In both samples, we see that the intolerant are involved on average in significantly fewer organizations than multicultural tolerators (p<.10 in Canada, p<.01 in Belgium).  The difference between the two types of tolerators is not significant in the

---

[133] Political activities included a list of 10 questions ranging from signing a petition or taking part in a march to forwarding an email with political content or donating money for a cause.  The number of organizations computed from a list of 11 (in the MYS) and 13 (in the BYS) clubs and groups a youth may have been involved in during the past 12 months.  A full description of the item is available in the Appendix.

[134] See Appendix for complete details.  The questions appear to have been of varying difficulty in the two countries, as the average number correct in the Canadian sample (1.45 questions out of 3) was higher than it was for the Belgian sample (1.09 questions out of 4).

Belgian sample. However, in the Canadian sample, there is evidence that the two types of tolerators have significantly different levels of organizational involvement, and the direction is in line with a linear relationship. The intolerant are somewhat less involved than multicultural tolerators ($p<.10$) who are in turn less involved than absolute tolerators ($p<.01$). On measures of involvement in both organizational life and political activities, multicultural tolerators are more active than the intolerant, despite their 'targeted intolerance' of exclusionary speech. Furthermore, in three of the four instances, they were also indistinguishable from absolute tolerators.

One of the reasons that involvement in public life is argued to increase politically tolerant attitudes is that it teaches participants about democratic politics. One way to capture this awareness is by assessing a young person's knowledge of politics. People who know more about politics are argued to understand the requirements of a democracy and to be better equipped to apply them in practice (see, for example, Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 220-4). Yet, I have argued that multicultural democracies like Canada and Belgium not only ensure freedom of speech, but also have in place rules to combat discrimination. People who know more about politics may also be more aware of the limits, at least in countries where hate speech restrictions are enshrined in law.[135] Table 4.1 lends some support to the idea that the intolerant on average know significantly less about politics than multicultural tolerators ($p<.01$ in both samples). Political knowledge levels are very similar between absolute and multicultural tolerators, with multicultural tolerators actually averaging slightly higher scores, although the difference is only weakly significant in the Canadian sample ($p<.10$) and not significant in the Belgian case. Substantively, the differences in knowledge scores are small, yet it is important to remember that the questions that compose this scale are only tangentially related to political information about rights and responsibilities. I would expect that if questions were available about rights-based institutions and laws, stronger differences would emerge.[136]

---

[135] Unfortunately, the CYS did not include a question about the respondent's knowledge of the legality of hate speech.

[136] Ideally, questions about bills of rights, hate speech legislation, or the high courts would provide a more direct link between knowledge about rights and their application in specific instances. The closest item in the CYS was a question asked in the Canadian sample about what the Supreme Court does. Twenty-one

Clearly, when it comes to political engagement, whether it is measured by political knowledge, organizational involvement or more active forms of political activism, multicultural tolerators consistently show higher levels than those who are intolerant. There is little evidence that these variables help to distinguish multicultural from absolute tolerators, with the lone exception of organizational involvement in the Canadian sample. This is partly because the mechanisms that are said to underpin these relationships make sense in terms of curbing intolerance, but the very same mechanisms – more awareness of the rules of the game or experience with the game itself – do not intuitively lead to one type of tolerance over the other. As I have argued, multicultural tolerance *is* a form of tolerance, and as such, it should not be surprising that engagement in politics fosters it.

Education is another important variable in explaining tolerance judgments. Stouffer's (1963) original study argued that it encourages individuals to think about topics in less rigid, more nuanced ways (ibid, 94) and encourages respect for dissenting views by exposing people to them (ibid, 99). More recent research attributes the education effect to increases in cognitive sophistication (Bobo and Licari 1989; Nie et al. 1996; Vogt 1997) and the information about democratic values that can be transmitted through the curriculum (Sullivan et al. 1982; Avery et al. 1997; Finkel and Ernst 2005; Bird et al. 1994). Multicultural tolerators, as defined here, are capable of applying democratic principles to some objectionable groups and clearly capable of cognitive sophistication if they apply these principles in a consistent manner based on distinctions about the limits of acceptable speech.

Recent work by Chong (2006) lends further support to the relationship between multicultural tolerance and education. He has demonstrated in the U.S. that the link between education and political tolerance seems to be diverging across target groups. In particular, he demonstrates that among the university-educated in recent generations, young people are *less* likely to tolerate racists, while showing higher levels of tolerance for other groups. While education is argued to foster cognitive sophistication, Chong's work suggests that the norms surrounding free speech are also transmitted through the

---

percent of the intolerant answered this question correctly, compared to 29 percent of multicultural tolerators and 31 percent of absolute tolerators.

educational system. As these norms change to recognize the multicultural nature of society, so too might the message.

While Chong's work suggests that university education is a key experience in fostering this change in norms, in the literature more generally education is argued to foster tolerance in multiple ways that are not directly related to the university experience. First, education is argued to increase cognitive sophistication (Bobo and Licari 1989; Nie et al. 1996). Cognitive sophistication should reduce intolerance, yet there is no reason to expect it to foster one form of tolerance over another. While a direct measure of cognitive sophistication is not available in the Comparative Youth Study, the Canadian survey did ask students their average grades. This is not an ideal measure, but it does capture how well the student is doing in school, and presumably their ability to do so.[137] Second, education may be an indicator of social status and the norms and values that social status fosters. From this perspective, knowing which individuals come from more educated families is a proxy for family social status. In addition, a measure of desired educational attainment is also available. Both parental education and educational aspirations are presumed to be indicators of those likely to pursue further education and to come from families where the values of such institutions are more likely to be transmitted.

In Table 4.1, the story that emerges from these three variables is in the expected direction. The differences between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators are significant at the <.01 level. Multicultural tolerators are significantly more likely than the intolerant to report having higher grades in school, to come from a family with at least one university-educated parent, and to expect to attend university themselves. There are no discernable differences, however, between the educational backgrounds of multicultural and absolute tolerators.

Given the prominence of university education as a key factor in explaining tolerance, it is noteworthy that significant differences emerge already among young people in these two samples. Clearly, the education effect can not be entirely about the university experience itself, nor can it be solely about cognitive skills. There must be a

---

[137] Clearly, a host of factors impact a young person's ability to succeed in the classroom, making this only an indirect test of cognitive abilities.

process of socialization that occurs in the family which links tolerance judgments to education.  Perhaps some other characteristics make it more likely that young people from educated backgrounds will self-select into institutions of higher education and demonstrate more tolerant attitudes.  Or perhaps more educated families transmit the norms of higher education in their families.  The mechanism underpinning this relationship is not self evident, but it is clear that education, even with the limited measures reported here, is negatively associated with intolerance. It does not, however, seem to foster one type of tolerance over another.

The last relationship of interest is place of residence. One might expect city dwellers to demonstrate more multicultural tolerance.  City dwellers are forced to "rub shoulders with more people who have ideas different from his [*sic*] own and he learns to live and let live" (Stouffer 1963, 122; see also, Wilson 1985; 1991).  Traditionally, living in more urban settings has been associated with greater levels of political tolerance (ibid). Yet, city life is also argued to be an environment that makes people more sensitive to the demands of accommodating ethnic and racial diversity (Tuch 1987; Wirth 1938).  This is to say that one should expect urban dwellers to be more likely to express multicultural tolerance than their rural counterparts, and this factor may also distinguish them from absolute tolerators.  To capture the types of environments that living in urban settings is supposed to entail, an urban/rural variable was created in the CYS which isolated the two large cities in the Canadian sample (Montreal and Toronto) and schools found in the five largest metropolitan areas in Belgium.  All other respondents were coded as rural (or more accurately, not urban).  This involved all respondents in the Canadian sample from the two medium sized cities (populations≈150,000 that were not suburbs of major metropolitan areas) and three small towns (population≈15,000 also located at substantial distance from metropolitan areas.)  In Belgium, this included all respondents not in the five largest cities.

The data do not provide much evidence that urban-dwellers are more likely to be multicultural tolerators.  There are no statistically significant relationships between living in a large city and tolerance dispositions in the Canadian sample.  In the Belgian sample, there is only a weak relationship: multicultural tolerators tend to be found slightly more

often in large urban areas compared to either intolerance ($p<.10$) or absolute tolerance ($p<.05$).

Given the importance of living in urban areas in past research, it is surprising to note that there is only modest support here. One reason for this may be that the urban effect is largely one of self-selection among adults. Individuals who are more open to diversity (whether it be a diversity of people or a diversity of ideas), are more likely to move to areas that expose them to it. The youth sample analyzed here, however, had much less choice in the environment in which they live. Certainly, they come from families that have made such choices and it would be surprising if parents did not have some influence on these values. Yet, the exposure argument that is inherent in explanations of urban/rural differences does not receive much support based on this rough division between urban and rural environments. The next chapter returns more specifically to the exposure argument by isolating the extent to which young people are actually exposed to a diversity of people. While it is impossible to isolate selection effects from socialization effects among adults, analyzing the extent to which young people in urban settings are actually exposed to a diversity of people will provide a much stronger test of the supposed urban effect.

In general, these findings suggest that educational and political variables help to distinguish multicultural tolerators from the intolerant, while few differences emerge on these variables with respect to the type of tolerance endorsed. Furthermore, there is little evidence that multicultural tolerators are more likely to be found in urban areas, with only a weak relationship being found in the Belgian sample, and no parallel relationship among Canadian youth. In sum, then, it appears multicultural tolerators are more likely to be politically active and knowledgeable, and to come from more educated backgrounds than the intolerant. These differences are inconsistent with the idea that multicultural tolerators are simply expressing a targeted intolerance of exclusionary speech, in which case we would expect multicultural tolerators to be indistinguishable from the intolerant, rather than indistinguishable from absolute tolerators. In the next subsection, we turn our attention to how other variables may impact the adoption of multicultural tolerance, with a specific focus on gender and ethnocultural background.

*Lived Experiences and the Adoption of Multicultural Tolerance*

While I have argued that educational variables and political engagement are likely to decrease intolerance without necessarily pushing individuals toward a particular conception of tolerance, other variables may be more likely to have an impact on the type of political tolerance to which an individual subscribes: namely, gender and ethnocultural background. The reason these items are examined separately is because I expect that young people's tolerance dispositions will be structured in important ways by these background characteristics: such characteristics may well structure not only an individual's experiences, but also how these experiences are understood and translated into political attitudes.

Let us first consider gender. The research to date on gender has consistently found lower levels of support for civil liberties among women (Stouffer 1963; Marcus et al. 1995; Golebiowska 1999). In early work, Stouffer (1963, Ch. 6) argued that women were less tolerant of left-wing speech because of their isolation in the home and because of their greater religiosity. Golebiowska's (1999) more recent work shows that education, political expertise, threat perception, tolerance of uncertainty and moral traditionalism partially explain the lower levels of political tolerance among women. While controlling for these factors does not completely eliminate the gender gap, it is noteworthy that these variables do seem to mediate the impact of gender. This suggests that women's and men's values, experiences and perspectives are partly structured by gender.

What gender differences might we expect when it comes to multicultural tolerance? The concept of multicultural tolerance is underpinned by a valuing of social relationships and social diversity. Gender research has long pointed to differences in socialization between the sexes that result in women taking less individualistic approaches to moral dilemmas (Gilligan 1982) and approaching politics with a more social focus (Gidengil 1995; Burt 1986). Women are often socialized to attach more weight to the maintenance of relationships and are often more averse to confrontational behavior (Weigel and Ballard-Reisch 1999). This line of research suggests a more psychological account for the consistent finding that women are less supportive of free speech, as traditionally measured. Women's lower level of concern with individual rights

combined with a tendency to prefer social harmony should lead to less value being placed on absolute political tolerance.

Work by Cowan and colleagues (Cowan and Mettrick 2002; Cowan and Khatchadourian 2003) provides some evidence that perhaps what is driving women's "intolerance" is really an aversion to exclusionary speech. They show that women are in fact more negatively disposed toward hate speech than men and that they value freedom of speech less than men. Women were more likely in their study to perceive hate speech as harmful and this was related to higher levels of empathy with the groups targeted by hate speech. This suggests, then, that women's experiences may in fact incline them to a different set of values. This line of reasoning suggests that women may be more likely to endorse a more multicultural form of tolerance, rather than simply being intolerant as the literature suggests.[138] It is important to note, however, that Cowen and colleagues used an experimental design with American college students.[139] Gross and Kinder (1998, 463), using nationally representative data in the United States, find little evidence that men and women show differences in their tolerance of racist speech or that their (in)tolerance is driven by greater concern for racial equality. The divergent findings may result from differences in instrumentation, but also may reflect the fact that younger, more educated individuals are more likely to consider racist speech as a distinct category (Chong 2006).

Along with gender, I also expect ethnocultural differences to emerge between types of tolerance. One way to capture such differences is through an examination of people's racial background. Undoubtedly, the concept of 'race' introduces normative challenges, given that race as an empirical category is problematic. Yet, there is no doubt that while race may be a constructed category, citizens in advanced, industrialized democracies are clearly racialized (Stasiulis and Yuval-Davis 1995; Martinot 2002; Dalal 2002).[140] Research into all sorts of political attributes tends to document some differences in the political tendencies of people considered part of the white majority

---

[138] This is also consistent with a study among adolescents conducted in Spain that found young women show greater levels of tolerance than young men when asked about the civil rights of various social groups (Sotelo 1999).

[139] The statements were rated on a 5-point Likert scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree, and both positive and negative items were included.

[140] For a discussion of the concept of racialization, see Rohit and Bird (2001).

compared to racialized minorities.[141] These differences are only partly accounted for by the socio-economic position of racialized minorities. In much the same way as gender structures political attitudes, racial backgrounds seems to indirectly impact the roles and positions of minorities in a society and also directly shape their outlook and interpretation of their experiences (Dawson 1994; Hero 1998).

Past research on the relationship between political intolerance and 'race' in the United States has documented some tendency among black Americans to be less tolerant than white Americans, although this relationship is in part due to differences in the educational and socio-economic position of blacks (Sullivan et al. 1982, 129-31; Stouffer 1963; Green and Waxman 1987; Wilson 1991).[142] One of the reasons that blacks are argued to show greater intolerance is because they are most likely to select groups that directly threaten them. Racists are more often selected by blacks as their "least-liked" group (Davis 1995, 3; Green and Waxman 1987, 151). Davis (1995, 2) argues that black intolerance is directed at groups that "threaten their existence directly". He demonstrates this by showing that blacks are especially unlikely to permit Klan members to speak publicly compared with their white counterparts, but that this heightened intolerance does not spill over to other objectionable groups (ibid, 5). This argument is not without its critiques. For instance, Gross and Kinder (1998) have found very little difference between blacks and whites in the United States when it comes to regulating racist speech, and demonstrated that support for racial equality played a limited role in tolerance judgments among both groups. Such findings are consistent with other studies that have not found blacks to be any less tolerant of racists than other target groups (Bobo and Licari 1989; Wilson 1991; Ellison and Musick 1993).

While research in the United States on minority attitudes toward speech is limited, there are even fewer studies conducted outside the American context. The notable exception is work by Gibson in the South African context where group identities have been argued to fuel political intolerance. Despite the prominence of group-based explanations of intolerance, he shows that strong group identities are not important

---

[141] Much of the research into minority-majority differences has been conducted in the US. See, for example, Sniderman and Piazza (2002) and Dawson (2001).

[142] However, see Sampson (1998) for evidence that blacks in the US are more likely to show lower levels of support for a variety of deviant behaviors.

**Figure 4.2: Gender and Minority Support for Hate Speech Restrictions**



Source: Comparative Youth Study

predictors of political intolerance, either among the black majority or the white minority (Gibson 2006a). While there may be some reasons to believe that minorities in the Canadian and Belgian context may be less inclined to tolerate racist speech, it is unclear from previous research to what extent tolerance of other target groups will be affected. Given the importance of threat for explaining political intolerance, Davis' argument is compelling that racialized minorities may show a targeted intolerance of exclusionary speech that does not extend to other groups. If this is the case, then one might expect racialized minorities to be slightly more inclined to multicultural tolerance, after controlling for differences in background variables, by creating lower support for the civil liberties of racist speech without creating a greater tendency to deny civil liberties to other groups.

A breakdown by gender and racialized minority status on attitudes toward hate speech provides an initial test of the hypotheses developed in this subsection. In Figure 4.2, the percent of respondents that strongly agreed with a statement in support of hate speech restrictions is broken down by gender and minority status in each country. The white-minority divide is a derived variable from background information provided by respondents which is intended to identify individuals that differ from the primarily white, European descent population that makes up the majority of the population in Canada and

128

Belgium.[143]   Gender is the reported sex of the respondent which is meant to capture differences in the socialization experiences of young men and young women.

In terms of gender, there is a small gap in support for hate speech restrictions.  If we isolate white respondents, it is clear that young women were significantly more likely to support hate speech restrictions than young men in both case countries.  In Canada, 54 percent of young white women strongly agreed, compared with 42 percent of young white men (p<.01).   There was substantially less support for hate speech restrictions among white respondents in Belgium, with 29 percent of white women and 25 percent of white men strongly agreeing with restrictions (p<.01).   A smaller, but still significant, gap emerges among racialized minorities in each country (p<.01).  Six percentage points separated minority men (46%) from women (52%) in the Canadian data, and ten percentage points in Belgium (41% for men, 51% for women).  There is, then, evidence of significant gender gaps in support for hate speech restrictions.

There is mixed support, however, for a white-minority gap in support of hate speech restrictions.  In Canada, minorities are no more likely to strongly agree with hate speech restrictions than whites.  This is not the case in Belgium, however, where a large and significant (p<.01) gap emerges between whites and minorities.   There is a 22 percentage point difference in agreement with hate speech restrictions between minority and white women, and a similar 16 percentage point gap among men.

Recall that in Figure 4.1, multicultural tolerators were more supportive of hate speech restrictions than either the intolerant or absolute tolerators.   From these initial findings, we might expect to find important gender and racial differences in the endorsement of multicultural tolerance.   Table 4.2 provides a breakdown by gender and racialized minority status for the different types of tolerance.   While we see few differences in the endorsement of absolute tolerance across these categories, a significant gender gap again emerges in the expected direction in the Canadian sample.   Among whites, young women are significantly more likely to be multicultural tolerators than young men (60% vs. 52%) and significantly less likely to be intolerant (28% vs. 39%). A similar pattern emerges among minority youth in Canada.  In Belgium, the gender gap is somewhat smaller among whites, and not significant among minorities.  These findings

---

[143] See Appendix for complete details about how this variable was derived from each questionnaire.

**Table 4.2: Tolerance Dispositions by Gender and Minority Status**

| | Canada | | | Belgium | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | Multicultural Tolerators | Absolute Tolerators | Intolerant | Multicultural Tolerators | Absolute Tolerators |
| *Sample* | **38%** | **52%** | **10%** | **52%** | **38%** | **10%** |
| **Whites** | **33%** | **56%** | **11%** | **51%** | **39%** | **10%** |
| Male | 39% | 52% | 9% | 55% | 35% | 10% |
| Female | 28% | 60% | 12% | 47% | 42% | 10% |
| **Racialized Minorities** | **46%** | **44%** | **9%** | **57%** | **36%** | **7%** |
| Male | 54% | 38% | 8% | 59% | 36% | 5% |
| Female | 40% | 50% | 10% | 56% | 37% | 8% |

Note: Tolerance types are based on measure developed in Chapter 3, and distributions are presented here by gender and minority status. Cells contain row percentages by country. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

clearly contradict the expectation in the literature that women tend to be more intolerant than men. It also lends some support to the idea that women may place different limits on tolerance, rather than assuming that they simply value free speech less. However, it is also plausible that there has been a reverse in the gender gap in intolerance from prior generations, which can not be discounted with the youth-only sample analyzed here.[144]

When it comes to racialized minority status, the results are consistent with some previous research suggesting that minority group members tend more towards intolerance. In Canada, 46 percent of racialized minorities were categorized as intolerant, compared to 38 percent of majority group members (p<.01). In Belgium, the gap is smaller (57% vs. 51%), however it also reaches statistical significance (p<.01). Despite the theoretical expectation that the introduction of multicultural tolerance as a category would counter this finding, in the absence of controls, the breakdown in Table 4.2 suggests racialized minorities are more likely to be intolerant than they are to be multicultural tolerators. This is accentuated further by the gender gap, making male minority youth the most likely in both countries to be categorized as intolerant (54% in Canada and 59% in Belgium).

That being said, there are other ethnic and cultural characteristics, as well as intra-minority groups breakdowns, that may capture different tendencies in tolerance not

---

[144] The lower levels of intolerance among young women is consistent with one study that has been conducted in Spain with adolescents (Sotelo 1999, 2000).

captured by a single dummy variable for racialized minority status. One alternative source of minority status is religious affiliation. A consistent finding in political tolerance research is the importance of religion and religiosity in predicting intolerance. For example, Nunn and colleagues (1978) argued that individuals who are more religious tend to be more ethnocentric in their attitudes. They find that non-religious people tend to be more tolerant (on a balanced scale) than both Catholics and Protestants. Jews tended to show higher levels of tolerance than both the non-religious and Christians. Other studies demonstrate that greater religiosity among Christians correlates with intolerance of political nonconformity, while Jews and the non-religious tend to show more political tolerance (Sullivan et al. 1982). While some denominational differences have been documented (Jelen and Wilcox 1990; Beatty and Walter 1984), it seems to be religiosity – or its opposite, secular detachment – that affects tolerance more than religious affiliation (Sullivan et al. 1981, 101). Little research has extended these findings to religious denominations that are more prominent among immigrants from outside of the Americas and Europe, such as Islam, although in an analysis of Muslim youth, Hooghe and colleagues (2007a) have found low levels of support for the civil rights of gay rights activists among Muslim youth.

When it comes to multicultural tolerance, one might expect the general findings that religiosity fosters intolerance to hold. I expect that young people who are not religious – those who reported no religious affiliation as well as those that do not attend any services – will be more likely to be multicultural tolerators than to be intolerant. Furthermore, given that exclusionary speech has historically been directed at specific groups like Jews and the consistent finding that Jews show higher levels of political tolerance as traditionally defined, one might also expect that Jews will show a preference for multicultural tolerance over absolute tolerance.

**Table 4.3: Tolerance Dispositions and Religion**

| | Intolerant | Multicultural Tolerator | Absolute Tolerator | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Canadian Sample** | | | | |
| **Religious background** | | | | |
| Not religious | 30 | 56 | 14 | 401 |
| Catholic | 37 | 54 | 9 | 1263 |
| Other Christian | 44 | 46 | 10 | 518 |
| Jewish | 31 | 61 | 8 | 100 |
| Muslim | 45 | 46 | 10 | 226 |
| Other or multiple religions | 40 | 50 | 11 | 218 |
| **Religiosity** | | | | |
| Never | 32 | 57 | 10 | 1010 |
| A few times a year | 37 | 54 | 9 | 1057 |
| A few times a month | 48 | 42 | 10 | 247 |
| Once a week or more | 48 | 40 | 12 | 419 |
| **Belgian Sample** | | | | |
| **Religious background** | | | | |
| Not religious | 49 | 41 | 10 | 1172 |
| Catholic | 52 | 38 | 10 | 2746 |
| Other Christian | 61 | 32 | 7 | 127 |
| Jewish † | | | | |
| Muslim | 62 | 31 | 7 | 324 |
| Other or multiple religions | 52 | 37 | 11 | 97 |
| **Religiosity** | | | | |
| Never | 52 | 38 | 10 | 2161 |
| A few times a year | 50 | 40 | 10 | 1927 |
| A few times a month | 58 | 36 | 7 | 194 |
| Once a week or more | 62 | 28 | 10 | 233 |

Note: Cells contain row percentages by country. † There was an insufficient number of Jewish respondents (n=8) in the Belgian sample for any meaningful breakdown. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of tolerance types by the religious background of the young person as well as the frequency with which the respondent attended a religious service in the past 12 months. First, let us consider differences in religious denomination. The non-religious and Catholics in both countries show similar tendencies toward multicultural tolerance: around 40 percent of the non-religious and Catholics in Belgium are labeled multicultural tolerators and about 55 percent in the Canadian data.[145]  It is

---

[145] The other and multiple religions category scores similarly to the non-religious in the Belgian sample, and a middle ground in the Canadian sample. This category includes a variety of young people, and so generalizations from this finding are difficult. One possibility, however, is that young people who come

noteworthy that the non-religious are the most likely, at least in the Canadian data, to be categorized as adhering to absolute tolerance (14%) compared to any other religious background. Consistent with previous research, Jewish youth (31%) are unlikely to be categorized as intolerant.[146] Jews also show the highest levels of multicultural tolerance of any group (61%). The contrast between the non-religious and Jews is particularly interesting. Previous research finds Jewish religious affiliation to be related to lower levels of intolerance similar to the non-religious (Sullivan et al. 1982), which is consistent with the findings here. However, the distinction between multicultural and absolute tolerators suggests that there is a divergence in the type of tolerance endorsed by these two groups: Jews tend to be more likely to endorse multicultural tolerance compared to the non-religious (61% vs. 56%) and less likely to endorse absolute tolerance (8% vs. 14%). This is significant (p<.05), and also makes sense given that Jews have been a historic target of exclusionary speech (as well as exclusionary practices). This finding does not extend, however, to the other primarily minority religion in the sample. Muslim youth are the most likely to be categorized as intolerant, along with other Christian religions. They are also the least likely to be categorized as multicultural tolerators at similar levels as other Christian religions.[147]

These patterns suggest that some religious affiliations are positively associated with intolerance, yet the inclusion of religious grouping that are more likely to capture minorities in Western democracies (Jewish and Muslim), do not show a consistent relationship with intolerance. Whereas Muslims showed similar levels of intolerance as some Christian sects, Jews showed high levels of multicultural tolerance even compared to the non-religious. The non-religious, on the other hand, showed the highest levels of absolute tolerance, at least in the Canadian sample. As I have argued in Chapter 1, it may

---

from families with multiple religions are unlikely to have a strong religious identification themselves, and are therefore more like the non-religious.

[146] A breakdown for Jewish youth is only possible in the Canadian sample. There were too few Jewish respondents in the Belgian sample for a breakdown (n=8).

[147] The other Christian category is a derived variable for individuals who identified as Protestants, Orthodox Christians, and other Christians. An analysis of these individual items shows that it is the other Christian category that is driving the percent of intolerant away from the levels found for the non-religious and Catholics, which is consistent with past research that suggests that fundamentalist and evangelical sects of Christianity, which are likely captured in the 'other Christian' grouping, tend more toward intolerance than Catholic or Protestant sects (Ellison and Musick 1993).

be that absolute political tolerance places too much of a burden on those that are often the targets of such speech.

It is important to point out that young people were asked to indicate their family's religious background, rather than their own, so the similarity between the non-religious and Catholics may not be surprising. Many young people likely come from a Christian family but would not necessarily describe themselves as such. As noted, previous research has pointed to religiosity as more important than denominational affiliation. Looking at actual attendance at religious services is one way to capture this. The pattern between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators is clear in this respect. Youth who never attend a religious service, or only attend a few times a year, are least likely to be intolerant and most likely to be multicultural tolerators. More regular religious attendance demonstrates the opposite relationship. This pattern does not replicate itself for those labeled as absolute tolerators, where religious attendance does little to distinguish absolute tolerators.

The impact of religiosity, rather than religious denomination, may help to explain the divergence in levels of intolerance across religious groups. Levels of religiosity vary significantly across denomination. Being Catholic or Jewish in Canada and Belgium are likely cultural as well as religious identifiers and this is reflected in lower levels of religious attendance among these two groups. On the other hand, Muslims and other Christians report the highest levels of religious attendance in both countries. In other words, following the findings of Sullivan and colleagues (1982), it appears that religiosity, and not a particular religious affiliation, is fueling intolerance. Isolating Muslims as a minority religion does little to distinguish them from non-Catholic Christians. However, there was some limited evidence in the Canadian sample that some components of religious affiliation do impact the adoption of multicultural over absolute tolerance: whereas the non-religious were most likely to be absolute tolerators, Jews showed a tendency to adopt a more multicultural form of tolerance.

To summarize the findings from the previous two subsections, there seems to be clear evidence that multicultural tolerance is distinct from intolerance. A targeted intolerance of exclusionary speech does not seem to be well-predicted by prominent correlates of intolerance. In some ways, multicultural tolerators seem to share the

democratic qualities of absolute tolerators – they are knowledgeable and engaged in politics – while their social backgrounds distinguish them equally well from the intolerant. Multicultural tolerators are distinct from the intolerant, despite the fact that the least-liked methodology would often categorize them as intolerant. Targeted intolerance of exclusionary speech, when it is combined with a willingness to extend civil liberties to other groups to whom one objects, is distinct from a general intolerance of all objectionable speech.

### *Distinguishing Multicultural from Absolute Tolerance*

While there appears to be a difference between multicultural tolerators and the intolerant, the question remains: how distinct are they from absolute tolerators? In Chapter 3, the percent of those who report an absolute form of political tolerance, as is consistent with previous research, was quite low.[148] Only about 10 percent of respondents in either country were willing to extend civil liberties to both an exclusionary group and another objectionable group. In contrast, a large portion of both the Canadian (52%) and Belgian (38%) samples were categorized as multicultural tolerators. Substantively, this suggests that young people are far more likely to extend civil liberties to groups that are viewed as more legitimate in political debates, even after controlling for disagreement. In the previous section, evidence was presented that the intolerant were less knowledgeable and engaged in politics, less likely to come from educated backgrounds, and more likely to be minorities, male and religious. In contrast, few distinctions emerged in the bivariate analysis between multicultural and absolute tolerators.

Yet, if absolute tolerators are uncommon, are they simply demonstrating extreme tolerance? One way to think about multicultural tolerance is simply as a midpoint on a continuum from intolerance of everything to tolerance of everything. This is in fact where multicultural tolerators would be found on a balanced, Stouffer-like scale, where

---

[148] In traditional scaling techniques, very few respondents provide consistently tolerant answers across target groups. See, for example, a discussion between Gibson (Gibson 2005a, 2005b) and Mondak and Sanders (Mondak and Sanders 2003, 2005).

answers across target groups are summed up.[149]  Yet, I have argued that multicultural tolerance should be thought of more as a disposition than a midpoint, and many of the correlates of intolerance should do little to differentiate multicultural from absolute tolerators.  The following subsection will assess this claim by analyzing the extent to which multicultural tolerators are distinct from absolute tolerators, while examining if the distinctions between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators hold in a multivariate analysis.

*Modeling Tolerance Dispositions*

Table 4.4 provides multinomial logistic regressions models for each country.[150]  Separate analyses were run for each country sample and the democratic engagement scales and social background variables presented in the previous subsections were included in the analyses.  The educational level of parents was selected as the best indicator of socio-economic status.[151]  Religious denominations and racialized minority status were simplified to best capture the actual diversity present in each country.  In the Canadian sample, a dummy for racialized minority was included as well as a set of dummies for religious denomination including a variable for Catholics, other Christian, and Jewish.  The reference category is therefore the non-religious and those with multiple or other religions.  In the Belgian sample, a variable for racialized minority was included.  In terms of religious affiliation, only a variable for Catholic and other Christian was included in the model.  Jewish youth made up a very small portion of the sample (<0.1%).  In addition, being Muslim was highly correlated in both countries with being a

---

[149] In fact, if one simply adds all of the "tolerant" responses for the two civil liberties activities for all five groups, the intolerant score on average 2.1, multicultural tolerators score 4.0 and absolute tolerators score 7.4 on the 0 to 10 scale.

[150] The tolerance typology is a categorical variable with three distinct categories: intolerant, multicultural tolerance and absolute tolerance.  Multinomial logistic regression is the most appropriate technique for analyzing such categories.  The method allows a multivariate analysis of the correlates which distinguish pairs of categories without assuming that the distance between categories is equal. Multicultural tolerance is the reference category in all analyses, which means coefficients should be interpreted as whether or not a variable distinguishes either intolerance or absolute tolerators from multicultural tolerators, after controlling for other variables in the model.

[151] Parental education was a dummy variable coded 1 if one or both parents had attended university.  Educational aspiration and parental education were not both included in the model because of collinearity (r=.37).   Similarly results are attained if the educational aspiration variable is included in the model instead of parental education (not shown).  Reported grades were not available in both surveys.

136

Table 4.4: Modelling Political and Demographic Variables on Types of Tolerance (Multinomial Logistic Regression)

| | Canada | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | | | Absolute Tolerators | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | | Coef. | (s.e.) | |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.162 | (0.16) | *** | -0.260 | (0.25) | |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.176 | (0.03) | *** | -0.112 | (0.05) | ** |
| Number of Organizations | 0.046 | (0.05) | | 0.144 | (0.07) | ** |
| Female | -0.551 | (0.11) | *** | 0.092 | (0.16) | |
| Urban | 0.055 | (0.18) | | -0.228 | (0.24) | |
| Parent(s) University Educated? | -0.377 | (0.10) | *** | -0.127 | (0.14) | |
| Racialized Minority | 0.349 | (0.12) | *** | -0.370 | (0.22) | * |
| Catholic | 0.170 | (0.14) | | -0.465 | (0.16) | *** |
| Other Christian | 0.401 | (0.16) | ** | -0.206 | (0.26) | |
| Jewish | -0.079 | (0.45) | | -0.503 | (0.31) | a |
| Religious Attendance | 0.220 | (0.05) | *** | 0.196 | (0.07) | *** |
| Constant | 0.395 | (0.25) | a | -1.255 | (0.37) | *** |

| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.060 | | N | | 2309 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared | 0.125 | | Prob > Chi-Square | | 0.00 |

| | Belgium | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | | | Absolute Tolerators | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | | Coef. | (s.e.) | |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.458 | (0.14) | *** | -0.248 | (0.19) | |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.148 | (0.03) | *** | 0.016 | (0.04) | |
| Number of Organizations | -0.093 | (0.03) | *** | 0.021 | (0.06) | |
| Female | -0.257 | (0.08) | *** | -0.063 | (0.10) | |
| Urban | -0.171 | (0.10) | * | -0.268 | (0.16) | * |
| Parent(s) University Educated? | -0.157 | (0.10) | a | -0.032 | (0.14) | |
| Racialized Minority | 0.180 | (0.12) | a | -0.327 | (0.22) | a |
| Catholic | -0.007 | (0.08) | | -0.021 | (0.14) | |
| Other Christian | 0.100 | (0.22) | | 0.014 | (0.37) | |
| Jewish | na | | | na | | |
| Religious Attendance | 0.115 | (0.05) | ** | 0.047 | (0.08) | |
| Constant | 0.791 | (0.14) | *** | -1.277 | (0.18) | *** |

| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.020 | | N | | 3680 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared | 0.043 | | Prob > Chi-Square | | 0.00 |

Note: Multicultural Tolerators are the reference category. The variable for Jewish has been dropped in the Belgian regression due to small subsample size. Being Muslim is strongly correlated with racialized minority status, and therefore both variables are not included in the regression. Results are similar regardless of which variable is included. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p<.10; a p<.15. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

137

racialized minority.[152]   A separate dummy variable for Muslim and Jewish were not therefore included.  Religious attendance was included in both models.

The dependent variable is types of tolerance.  The reference category for the analysis is multicultural tolerance, which means that the results should be read essentially as tests of the impact each independent variable has on the likelihood of intolerance or absolute tolerance compared to the reference category.   The raw coefficients are presented in Table 4.4.  While the coefficients are difficult to interpret directly, they do provide information about the significance and direction of significant effects.

In that vein, the direction and significance of coefficients reported in Table 4.4 largely reflect the bivariate results from the previous section.  There are a few notable exceptions.  In both the Canadian and Belgian sample, the multivariate analysis suggests that racialized minorities are significantly less likely than whites to be absolute tolerators rather than multicultural tolerators, although the effect is of borderline significance ($p<.10$ in Canada and $p<.15$ in Belgium).  While there is strong evidence that racialized minorities are more likely than whites to be intolerant, the negative coefficients in the absolute tolerance column in Table 4.4 provide some support for the argument that racialized minorities are also less likely to tolerate exclusionary speech than  whites, as some authors have argued (Davis 1995).  Two other small differences also emerge that are not consistent across country samples.  In the Canadian sample, controlling for other variables, those who are more politically active are significantly less likely than those who are not active to be intolerant ($p<.01$) *and* to be absolute tolerators ($p<.05$) rather than multicultural tolerators.  In addition, in the Belgian sample the inclusion of other controls variables reduced the parental education variable to borderline significance.  Despite these small differences, in general the multivariate results corroborate the relationships found in the bivariate analyses.  Political and socio-demographic variables help to distinguish between the intolerant and multicultural tolerators, and to a lesser extent, between absolute tolerators and multicultural tolerators.

---

[152] Ninety-four percent of those identified as Muslim in the Canadian sample, and 91 percent in the Belgian sample were also identified as racialized minorities.

## Figure 4.3: Marginal Effects on Type of Tolerance

**Canada**



**Belgium**



□ Intolerance ▨ Multicultural Tolerance ■ Absolute Tolerance

Bars represent the marginal effect of each independent variable on the probability of each outcome, where all independent variables are set at their means. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

The actual impact of these variables, however, is hard to compare through an examination of raw coefficients in multinomial logistic regression results. In order to simplify interpretation and allow for comparison of effects across variables, Figure 4.3 presents the marginal effects that each variable has on exhibiting intolerance, multicultural tolerance or absolute tolerance.[153] Marginal effects are the partial change in the probability, or the slope of the probability curve, when the independent variables are set at a given level. In this analysis, all variables have been set at their means.

In Figure 4.3, the importance of political variables in distinguishing the intolerant from multicultural tolerators is clear: political knowledge has the largest marginal effects compares to any other variable in the model, and seems particularly salient in impacting the likelihood of intolerance compared to multicultural tolerance. The effect of gender on intolerance and multicultural tolerance is the second largest in Figure 4.3. Like Sotelo (1999), I find that young women have a greater probability of being tolerant of the civil liberties of some groups compared to men.

In addition, parental education appears to have a fairly strong impact on the probabilities of intolerance and multicultural tolerance. Whereas having university-educated parents tends to decrease the probability of intolerance, it has a positive impact on the likelihood of multicultural tolerance, when all variables are held at their means. Whereas past research has focused on university attendance as fostering cognitive skills as well as transmitting norms (Bobo and Licari 1989; Chong 2006), it is noteworthy that differences emerge already in young people's willingness to be tolerant of some objectionable speech (namely groups not associated with exclusionary ideas). Parental education captures a family's socio-economic status as well as the transmission of norms that parents may have assimilated in post-secondary institutions. It is unclear what the mechanism behind the impact of parental education is, yet experiences prior to university are clearly important in curbing political intolerance among young people.

---

[153] The marginal effects were estimated using the mfx command in Stata followed by predict for each outcome. An alternative analysis was conducted assessing the discrete change in probabilities for a change from the minimum to the maximum value on each independent variable (Long 1997). Despite the possibility for marginal effects to be misleading when the probability curve is non-linear (ibid, 165-6), an analysis of the discrete change provided similar results as those presented and in no case was the direction of change reversed from those in Figure 4.3 (analyses not shown).

Racialized minority status also tends to increase the probability of intolerance. In Figure 4.3, the contrast between intolerance on the one hand and multicultural and absolute tolerance on the other hand implies that racialized minorities may be more prone to intolerance of all forms of non-conformity (Sampson 1998), even after the inclusion of controls for other background variables, such as religiosity and parental education.

With respect to the religious variables, Figure 4.3 also highlights the importance of some religious variables in explaining the probability of different types of tolerance and intolerance in Canada. Catholics and those with a different Christian religion appear to have an increased probability of intolerance in Figure 4.3 compared to the non-religious. However, the results in the full model, as well as the graphic, suggest that the 'other Christian' variable is more important in distinguishing the likelihood of intolerance compared to multicultural tolerance (p<.05) while being Catholic appears to be more important in distinguishing the intolerant from absolute tolerators (p<.01). Interestingly, the Jewish variable also presents one of the only instances in which the marginal effect for multicultural tolerance is about equal in size and in the opposite direction as the marginal effect of being Jewish on absolute intolerance. While this relationship falls short of statistical significant (p=.101), it is substantively in line with the suggestion in the previous section that Jews are more likely than non-Jews to be multicultural tolerators rather than absolute tolerators. As with the bivariate results, there is no evidence that Jewish youth are more prone or less prone toward intolerance compared to non-religious youth.

In the Belgian model, no similar effects are found for being from a Catholic family. The direction of marginal effects for being from another Christian religion follow the pattern found in the Canadian sample, but the effects are small and are not significant. Religious attendance, in contrast, does show similar and significant effects in both countries. Those who more regularly attend a religious service are significantly more likely than those who do not regularly attend to be intolerant. In Canada, religious attendance appears to increase the likelihood of intolerance *and* absolute tolerance (p<.01). In Belgium, the biggest changes in probabilities appear between intolerance and multicultural tolerance (p<.05). At least in the Canadian case, then, religiosity appears to

be related to more rigid ways of thinking: the more religious are more likely to be either intolerant across all target groups or tolerant across all types of target groups.

As in the bivariate results, there are no significant differences between those living in large cities and other respondents in their likelihood of being categorized as intolerant or multicultural tolerators in the Canadian sample. Youth in major urban areas in Belgium, on the other hand, do have a lower likelihood of being intolerant (p<.10). This is consistent with expectations that multicultural tolerance will be more likely to be fostered in urban areas. Notably, living in a large urban area also reduces the likelihood of absolute tolerance compared to multicultural tolerance in the Belgian sample (p<.10). This is illustrated in Figure 4.3 by a positive marginal effect on the grey bar for multicultural tolerance and negative effects for both intolerance and absolute tolerance.

The absence of a significant impact in the Canadian sample, however, restricts the generalizability of these results. The failure to find a significant effect in the Canadian sample may be an artifact of the survey design, which was not representative and intentionally over-sampled urban youth. While the sample in the urban areas is fairly representative of two of the largest urban centers in Canada, the selection outside of these major metropolitan areas was limited to five locations which were not selected based on their representativeness.[154] Rather, these locations were partly selected to have higher levels of diversity than the average city of their size.[155] A more representative sample of respondents outside metropolitan areas would be necessary to rule out a similar urban/rural cleavage in Canada as that found in Belgium.

Overall, the results in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 should be read as fairly strong evidence that the correlates of intolerance help distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. This is illustrated in Figure 4.3, where the greatest contrasts in

---

[154] The criteria for selecting the medium and small sized cities were to "match" them between provinces. The aim was to select two medium sized cities with approximately 150,000 inhabitants and three small towns with approximately 15,000 inhabitants. While the students in the sample correspond well to the socio-economic status of families in each location, suggesting they are representative of each location, the five areas are not necessarily representative of this size of city in Canada.

[155] Part of the larger goal of the Canadian study was to study the impact of various forms of diversity. Because of this, the medium and small towns were intentionally selected to include some forms of diversity. There was substantial French and English populations in two of the cities in Ontario as well as the small town in Quebec, and several of the cities in both provinces had comparably high levels of aboriginals. At the same times, the towns selected had slightly elevated levels of unemployment, especially in Ontario.

marginal effects emerge between intolerance (white bar) and multicultural tolerance (grey bar). The largest marginal effects were found for political knowledge, gender, and to a lesser extent parental education, minority status, and religiosity. This is consistent evidence that "intolerance" of exclusionary speech is not the same as a more general disposition toward intolerance of all forms of objectionable speech. Yet, if multicultural tolerators are more like the 'tolerant' than the 'intolerant', what distinguishes them from absolute tolerators? There were few significant differences which emerge between multicultural tolerators and absolute tolerators. In Belgium, there was some evidence that urban dwellers (p=.091) and racialized minorities (p=.135) were less likely to exhibit absolute tolerance, although the significance of these effects were marginal. More differences were found in Canada. All else equal, racialized minorities were less likely to exhibit absolute tolerance than whites were. Jews and Catholic youth had lower probabilities of absolute tolerance than the non-religious, while religiosity appeared to increase the chances of absolute tolerance. Finally, there were countervailing effects for political engagement: political activism decreased the probability of being an absolute tolerator while organizational involvement increased the probability of absolute tolerance.

These findings provide some support for the argument presented in this chapter that the correlates of intolerance do not explain an intolerance of exclusionary speech among young people who only limit the speech rights of exclusionary groups (this is the definition of a multicultural tolerator). There is also evidence for the critique of current measurement techniques that would brand multicultural tolerators as simply 'somewhat' tolerant. Creating a simple scale of all civil liberties responses where higher scores indicate more responses in favor of speech rights, those categorized as intolerant would average about 2.1, multicultural tolerators would average 4.0 and absolute tolerators would average 7.4. If the correlates of intolerance were linearly related to civil liberties judgments, then the implication would be that multicultural tolerators should be found 'between' the intolerant and absolute tolerators on many of the important correlates of intolerance. For example, they would be more knowledgeable than the intolerant, but less knowledgeable than absolute tolerators. Absolute tolerators would come from the most educated backgrounds, be the least religious, and so forth.

The empirical results shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 simply do not conform to such expectations.[156]  The variables that distinguish multicultural tolerators from the intolerant, with few exceptions, provide little help in distinguishing multicultural from absolute tolerators.  There is no evidence that those categorized as absolute tolerators are significantly more knowledgeable or engaged in politics, that they have higher educational aspirations or are any less likely to be female.  Furthermore, the relationships that are significant are not always in the direction that might be expected.  In the Belgian sample, while racialized minorities are less likely than whites to be absolute tolerators (and more likely to be intolerant), the only other variable that significantly distinguished multicultural from absolute tolerators is urban/rural status.  Being from an urban area decreases the odds of being intolerant and being an absolute tolerator, suggesting multicultural tolerators are disproportionately from urban areas.  This is contrary to the expectation in the literature that "more" tolerance is related to living in cities.

In the Canadian sample, the urban variable again does not show up as significant. However, in this sample more variables appear to help make the distinction.  The number of organizations a respondent has participated in during the past 12 months increases the probability of absolute tolerance compared to multicultural tolerance, which is consistent with the idea that absolute tolerators should show higher values on such variables than multicultural tolerators.  Yet, absolute tolerators have a significant and negative coefficient for political activism, which again raises the question of the extent to which multicultural tolerators should be thought of as simply 'somewhat' tolerant.  This is further problematized by the evidence that certain people have a greater likelihood of being multicultural tolerators than either of the other two categories, which was the case with Jewish respondents and those who were less religiously involved.

The bottom line is that multicultural tolerators look, in many ways, similar to absolute tolerators, both in the bivariate and multivariate results.  Yet, something about their experiences and their outlook make them draw the line at exclusionary speech. Multicultural tolerance does *not* appear to be simply a form of targeted intolerance,

---

[156] Clearly, multinomial logistic regressions assume nominal dependent variables.  Yet, by setting multicultural tolerance as the reference category, this allows me to test the extent to which correlates distinguish the categories that in a scale would be placed to the left and right of multicultural tolerance. This allows me to infer the relationship, and challenge the claim that that multicultural tolerance is simply a middle range of tolerance.

despite the fact that it would likely be categorized as such in a least-liked technique.[157] When it comes to different types of tolerance, educational and political variables are only of limited use in distinguishing multicultural tolerators from absolute tolerators, despite the fact that multicultural tolerators would most often be categorized on a midpoint when using a Stouffer-like scale. Religious and minority-status variables provide the most leverage in this respect. Racialized minorities were less likely to be absolute tolerators, as were Catholics and Jews compared to non-religious youth. However, more active involvement in one's religion was positively associated with absolute tolerance. This evidence leaves open the question of what it is about minority status and religious identification that make absolute tolerance less likely. Are certain experiences related to a person's willingness to extend tolerance to some groups, while refusing to extend such rights to exclusionary speech?

## *A Distinction in Search of a Cause?*

One conclusion that may be drawn from this chapter is that when it comes to distinguishing multicultural tolerators from the intolerant, the established literature on the causes of intolerance provides a good starting point. Yet, the analysis in this chapter also raises important questions about why some people draw the line at exclusionary speech. Multicultural tolerance represents a balancing of support for free speech with a willingness to set limits on exclusionary speech. Hate speech restrictions in contemporary, multicultural democracies are a legislative expression of this balancing act. It has been clearly established that multicultural tolerators are distinct from the intolerant. Multicultural tolerators share many of the characteristics of absolute tolerators that make the 'politically tolerant' good citizens such as being politically informed and engaged in politics. Yet, this chapter raises the question of why some people ascribe to a more absolute conception of political tolerance, while others favor limits on exclusionary speech.

The answer to this question may lie in more psychological explanations that have not been discussed in this chapter. The ways in which young people perceive (and some would argue rightly so) the dangers of exclusionary speech may have the biggest impact

---

[157] This is not an unreasonable assumption, either, since skinheads and racists consistently scored the lowest on the disagree/agree scale.

on the type of tolerance to which they subscribe. Threat perception is perhaps one of the most robust correlates of intolerance (Stouffer 1963; Stenner 2005; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). Yet, as Gibson (2006b, 24) has noted, "…no existing research provides anything remotely resembling a comprehensive empirical explanation of variation in perceived group threat." By considering differences across target groups, the study begins to disentangle why some people distinguish exclusionary speech from other objectionable speech. I have argued that it may well be because it is seen as more threatening and perceived to conflict with other important values in a democracy. Notably, increased identification with the people at whom exclusionary speech is targeted is likely to make exclusionary speech appear more threatening. In order to understand the sources of tolerance dispositions, then, we need a theory of the sources of socially tolerant attitudes as well. The social psychological literature provides a wealth of research as to what fosters identification with minorities. In the next chapter, we turn to addressing how more socially tolerant attitudes – and the contexts which are argued to foster them – impact the ways in which young people make tolerance decisions.

# Chapter 5: Network Diversity and Tolerance

People's politics are embedded in the social context in which they find themselves. While political science tends to take an overly individualistic view of the sources of people's political values and behaviors, social relations can play an important role in shaping our understanding of what community life requires of us (Zuckerman 2005). Attitudes about speech rights are not an exclusive product of a person's background. Models of political tolerance must also take seriously the relationship between the individual and the larger community. This includes targets of civil liberties judgments and the people that such speech may impact. This chapter will argue that social networks are a key, under-explored variable in understanding political tolerance judgments, especially when distinctions between exclusionary speech and other forms of speech are conceptualized into our understanding of civil liberties judgments.

The role of social diversity in explaining political tolerance is a neglected area of research. Little focused research has actually examined how living in more diverse settings impacts individuals' tolerance judgments, despite a long tradition in social psychology of documenting how creating cooperative relationships between people from different backgrounds can decrease inter-group prejudice (Allport 1958). Throughout this study, I have argued that multicultural political tolerance emerges as a response to the competing demands of citizenship in multicultural democracies where norms about speech rights are often balanced against equally compelling requirements to promote social inclusion. In this chapter, I examine what the political tolerance literature tells us about the relationship between social diversity and political tolerance and how the social psychological literature on inter-group contact can inform our understanding of this relationship.

The key question examined in this chapter is whether racial and ethnic diversity impacts the types of tolerance judgments an individual makes. I will argue that white youth with connections to people from racialized minorities will be more likely to ascribe to multicultural tolerance. This is because exposure to racialized minorities fosters the types of target group distinctions that underpin multicultural tolerance. Those with more

diverse networks will more readily identify with racialized minorities and in turn, view exclusionary speech as particularly harmful to democratic debate. At the same time, such exposure decreases an individual's propensity to be intolerant of other types of speech by increasing a person's ability to see things from another's perspective.

This chapter begins with a synopsis of what is known about network effects and the types of relationships that one expects to find between network diversity and political tolerance. This review underpins the causal argument developed later in this chapter that increased social diversity – especially racial and ethnic diversity – is an essential part of understanding why some young people draw the line at exclusionary speech. After outlining the composition of young people's networks, the chapter turns to an empirical exploration of how racial and ethnic diversity impacts political tolerance judgments among youth in Canada and Belgium.

## *Political Tolerance and Contact*

People's ability to deal with diversity has played a role in the discourse around political tolerance. Being exposed to a diverse group of people and ideas is argued to lead people to reconsider their position or values and try to understand others' point of view (Coser 1975; Mutz 2002b; Reich and Purbhoo 1975; Huckfeldt et al. 2004). In general, exposure to diversity is argued to foster the development of more general cognitive skills necessary for applying abstract democratic principles to concrete situations (Nie et al. 1996; Vogt 1997). Part of the reason for this is that "diversity provides an incentive to lessen complete reliance on established beliefs and predispositions" (Marcus et al. 1995, 7), which in turn might help individuals look past their initial dislike of a target group. As Chapter 1 pointed out, exposure to diversity has played at least a partial role in explanations proffered for the relationship between demographic characteristics, political participation, and political tolerance.

While these studies mention exposure in their explanations, there is almost no research that directly tests the exposure-tolerance link, especially when it comes to diversity defined by salient demographic characteristics. The one exception to this is the limited literature that addresses the urban/rural cleavage in political tolerance. Recall that people living in urban areas tend to report higher levels of political tolerance than those

living in rural areas (Stouffer 1963; Nunn et al. 1978; Wilson 1985, 1991; Moore and Ovadia 2006). Stouffer's (1963, 122) original study argued that the main reason that living in an urban area decreased intolerance was because urban areas were heterogeneous and forced people to "rub shoulders" with a variety of people.[158] Attempts have been made to test this hypothesis, primarily through the inclusion of community-level data which capture contextual differences between cities and rural areas. Wilson (1985; 1986; 1991), for example, finds that the size of one's community is modestly associated with greater political tolerance, measured using a Stouffer-like balanced scale. More importantly, he shows that the effect of community size is greatest for those individuals who move from rural areas to more urban environments. The reason size of community is argued to matter is because it exposes the individual to greater social heterogeneity.[159] More recently, Moore and Ovadia (2006) have directly tested the extent of social heterogeneity using census-tract information about the religious, educational and racial composition of an area. They attribute the urban/rural gap in political tolerance primarily to higher levels of education in urban areas, and find no support for their measure of racial heterogeneity (ibid, 2214).[160]

Theoretically, this line of research provides support for the idea that exposure to people who differ on salient social characteristics should increase political tolerance, yet the empirical support for this contention is limited. While community size is arguably important, the mechanism linking community size to politically tolerant attitudes is unclear. Moore and Ovadia's study measured racial heterogeneity directly, and no significant effects were found for living in a more racially diverse area. Perhaps the main shortcoming of this research is that there is no direct measure of actual exposure. Relying on community-level census data in the United States, actual contact between groups is simply an assumption, and an unlikely one given what is known about residential segregation in urban centers in the U.S. (Iceland et al. 2002). Furthermore, the mechanisms by which such contact is argued to increase tolerance are underspecified.

---

[158] See also Wirth (1938).
[159] By looking at the distribution of responses to a variety of attitudes toward deviant behavior, Wilson (1986) has found support for the idea that larger communities have a wider distribution of attitudes toward deviance, which he defines as social heterogeneity.
[160] In Canada, education levels in an area have also been found to be more important in explaining immigrant and minority attitudes than the racial composition of the area (Blake 2003).

While Stouffer originally argued that exposure increases one's ability to deal with dissenting ideas, there is a substantial gap in theorizing about this relationship when it comes to exposure between groups defined by salient social characteristics.

What research has been done at the individual-level has focused almost exclusively on political diversity (i.e. exposure to a diversity of opinions about politics).[161] This literature provides a useful starting point for examining the potential impact of other types of diversity on political tolerance. Mutz (2002b; 2006) in particular shows that when one's personal networks include people with divergent political opinions, one is more likely to be politically tolerant.[162] In her work, the presence of network diversity is measured by the presence of close friends who differ in their political outlook from the respondent.[163] She demonstrates that exposure to such "cross-cutting networks" increases respondents' ability to provide rationales for opposing political opinions (see also Huckfeldt et al. 2004). This in turn is linked to greater political tolerance, measured as the average agreement on a four point scale that a disliked group should be allowed to do six different civil liberties activities. In an experimental confirmation, she further provides evidence that people exposed to opposing political rationales provide more politically tolerant responses using the least-liked methodology, and this is especially true for individuals that already had a high perspective-taking ability and were leery of inter-personal conflict.[164] This work provides a detailed analysis of how such exposure may be linked to politically tolerant responses through a perspective-taking mechanism. As she notes, "[t]he capacity to see that there is more than one side to an issue, that a political conflict is, in fact, a *legitimate* controversy with rationales on both sides, translates to greater willingness to extend civil liberties to even

---

[161] A partial exception is the work by Joslyn and Cigler (2002) that examines political tolerance from a social capital perspective. They find that certain types of associations that are likely to expose individuals to "cross-cutting cleavages" increase political tolerance. However, the assumption of exposure to cross-cutting cleavages is left untested as there is no measure of actual diversity within organizations.

[162] See also Duch and Gibson (1992), who have conducted an aggregate-level study of the ideological diversity in 12 European countries. They report that ideological diversity, measured by the presence of radical party voting in each country, is associated with higher levels of political tolerance in mature democracies.

[163] The measure of exposure to dissonant political views is based on an additive scale of five questions about each discussant with whom the respondent discusses politics. The questions focus on political disagreement generally and include two items that focus on mainstream political differences (i.e. party affiliation and support for a presidential candidate). Full details are available in Mutz (2002b, 123).

[164] Gibson (1992b) argues that politically homogenous networks (measured similarly to Mutz) are more likely to cause people to perceive less freedom and breed intolerance of non-conformity.

**Figure 5.1: A Model of Absolute Tolerance**

```
┌─────────────────────┐        ┌─────────────────────┐        ┌─────────────────────┐
│                     │        │ Cognitive Abilities │        │                     │
│ Exposure to Political│  + ──> │   to Deal with      │  + ──> │   Tolerance of      │
│     Diversity       │        │     Diversity       │        │ Objectionable Speech│
│                     │        │                     │        │                     │
└─────────────────────┘        └─────────────────────┘        └─────────────────────┘
```

those groups whose political views one dislikes a great deal" (Mutz 2006, 85).[165]  This dynamic is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  In essence, exposure to political diversity is argued to increase cognitive skills needed to deal with diversity, which in turn lead to a greater willingness to extend civil liberties to objectionable groups.

There are two reasons why this line of thinking might apply to other types of diversity, such as racial and ethnic diversity.  First, one might argue that many political disagreements are based, at least partially, in salient social groups which structure how individuals interpret and experience the society in which they live (Young 1990, 42-8). Voting behavior research has long documented how religious identification, class, racial identity and other salient social categories influence people's political opinions.[166] One might expect, therefore, that being exposed to a variety of people may expose an individual to a variety of political perspectives.  In other words, ethnocultural, class, or gender diversity in one's networks may be significantly correlated with the types of political diversity to which one is exposed.  If this is the case, then exposure to these other types of diversity may similarly function to increase political tolerance of all types of speech.  A second, related possibility is that exposure to social diversity may increase the cognitive skills that are argued to increase political tolerance, such as perspective-taking and the ability to deal with conflict.  This line of reasoning would hold even if greater social diversity was not directly related to greater political diversity among one's associates.  The mechanisms linking exposure to tolerance would function similarly, though: knowing people from different backgrounds might make it easier for an individual to see things from a variety of perspectives and acknowledge the legitimacy of different viewpoints.

---

[165] Emphasis was included in original text.
[166] See, for example, early studies of voting behavior in the U.S., such as Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) and Campbell et al. (1960).

When it comes to racial and ethnic diversity, this line of reasoning would suggest that greater diversity promotes a willingness to extend civil liberties across target groups. Yet, an equally plausible alternative hypothesis is possible if the nature of target groups is taken into consideration. Social psychological research has long been concerned with the impact of exposure to ethnocultural diversity on people's attitudes, and generally finds that contact decreases prejudice among social groups primarily through a process of identification with out-group members (Allport 1958; Tafjel and Turner 1986; Pettigrew 1998a; Dovidio et al. 2003; Brown and Hewstone 2006).[167] As an individual gets to know people from different backgrounds, there is a general tendency for out-group hostility to diminish.[168] Furthermore, such contact may then lead to a new, inclusive identity that subsumes the former categories (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000). If exposure to racial and ethnic diversity tends to reduce prejudice, then the impact of such exposure on political tolerance may actually result in less willingness to extend civil liberties to specific types of target groups that promote prejudice.[169] Exclusionary ideas for them may seem more threatening, or at least conflict with other values like social tolerance.

This reasoning is in line with experimental research on political tolerance demonstrating that an appeal to ideas of social equality can make politically tolerant responses more difficult (Dow and Lendler 2002; Gibson 1998b; Gross and Kinder 1998; Cowan et al. 2002; Sniderman et al. 1996; Druckman 2001). Experimental survey research in the United States tends to support the view that social tolerance concerns make political tolerance judgments more difficult. For example, several studies have shown that when respondents are primed about equality issues before being asked to make a tolerance judgment for racist groups, they are more likely to deny such groups

---

[167] Whereas the social psychological literature tends to focus on contact, there is also a large body of research which argues that increases in contextual diversity tend to promote intolerance (Blumer 1958; Giles and Buckner 1993; Tolbert and Grummel 2003). The "threat hypothesis" suggests that as an areas becomes increasingly diverse, out-group hostility increases, especially in less privileges areas and in the absence of meaningful contact (Oliver and Mendelberg 2000; McLaren 2003; Branton and Jones 2005).

[168] Of course, prejudice also decreases the likelihood that out-group member contact will occur.

[169] A handful of studies have employed the inter-group contact framework to political tolerance, although in slightly different ways than those proposed here. For example, Gibson (2000; 2004, 240-55; 2006a) has drawn on the general inter-group framework to understand the intervening role of threat and identity in tolerance judgments. However, the most direct application of the contact hypothesis has been done by Golebiowska (1996; 2000; 2001), who looks at contact with target group members. She shows that contact with racists and gays increases political tolerance of both groups, especially when an individual gets to know the target group member before finding out the individual is either racist or gay.

civil liberties (Druckman 2001; Cowan et al. 2002). While this relationship works in the opposite direction as well, there is some evidence that politically tolerant responses are more malleable when other issues are raised than vice-versa (Peffley et al. 2001; Gibson 1998b). This suggests that when issues of racial equality are raised, people are more willing to curb the civil liberties of socially intolerant groups.

If such value conflict decreases tolerance of exclusionary speech, then individuals who are exposed to greater racial and ethnic diversity may be particularly susceptible to appeals for social inclusion. This extension of the contact hypothesis only applies to exclusionary speech and is based on the idea that contact with people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds should increase identification with the minority groups that exclusionary speech aims to denigrate. While social intolerance is often associated with political intolerance (Stenner 2005), I have suggested that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity should lead to a type of political tolerance that views exclusionary speech as outside the realm of legitimate political debate.[170] Exclusionary speech is an expression of prejudice in its most blatant and ugly form which challenges in a fundamental way the values of individuals surrounded by social diversity. Given the legal restrictions on exclusionary speech in the two countries under examination here, the extent to which citizens isolate exclusionary speech for censorship and the impact of their social context on political tolerance are worthy of empirical scrutiny.

*A Model of Social Network Effects*

To summarize the previous subsection, there have been no studies that examine directly the impact of racial and ethnic diversity on the ways in which an individual makes civil liberties judgments across target groups.[171] The literature suggests two possibilities for how exposure to racial and ethnic diversity may impact political tolerance judgments. On the one hand, political tolerance research suggests that exposure

---

[170] The fact that there are legislative prohibitions on hate speech in both Canada and Belgium make is reasonable to assume that, at least for some people, exclusionary forms of speech fall outside of that which is necessary for healthy, democratic debate.

[171] This is not to say that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity has not been used as an explanatory variable for other political attitudes. In particular, the logic of inter-group contact has been applied to the study of generalized trust. While much of this research shows a negative impact of diversity on trust (Alesina and Ferrara 2002; Hero 2003; Delhey and Newton 2005; Putnam 2007), recent work that incorporates actual contact – rather than simply contextual diversity – has resulted in positive effects that are in line with the contact hypothesis (Marschall and Stolle 2004; Stolle et al. forthcoming).

is likely to increase the cognitive skills that makes tolerance more likely. On the other hand, social psychological research suggests that racial and ethnic diversity may make tolerance of exclusionary speech less likely. I will argue in this chapter that these two processes are not necessarily mutually exclusive when distinctions across target groups are incorporated into our understanding of political tolerance. Recall that tolerance dispositions for my purposes are defined by the nature of people's responses to two types of groups: those associated with exclusionary speech and those who are found objectionable for other reasons. Taking this observation into account, the two outcomes can be restated as the hypotheses found in Chapter 1:

> *Hypothesis 4a*: Individuals exposed to more racial and ethnic diversity should be less tolerant of exclusionary speech.

> *Hypothesis 4b*: Exposure to racial and ethnic diversity should increase tolerance of other types of speech.

Diverse social networks may well equip people with cognitive skills needed to "put up with" ideas they find objectionable (see, for example, Stouffer 1963; Duch and Gibson 1992; Mutz 2002b).[172] However, consistent with the perspective developed here that target groups matter in political tolerance judgments, the cognitive impact of racial and ethnic diversity may only extend to groups which are seen as legitimate actors in democratic debate and such exposure may make exclusionary speech seen as particularly illegitimate. The result of this process is the development of multicultural tolerance.

This causal logic is illustrated in Figure 5.2. In sum, racial and ethnic diversity may decrease tolerance of exclusionary speech by fostering identification with the minorities at which such speech is aimed. At the same time, racial diversity may also foster the cognitive skills that increase tolerance for other objectionable groups. The result is that people with racially diverse networks should be most likely to exhibit multicultural tolerance, as defined in Chapter 3.

---

[172] Others suggests that exposure to a diversity of opinions increases attitudinal ambivalence by making a person more aware of the justifications that exist on both sides of an issue (Mutz 2002a; Huckfeldt et al. 2004; Mutz 2002b). However, see also Page (2007) for a discussion of how differences in perspective lead to better group decision making.

**Figure 5.2: A Model of Multicultural Tolerance for Majority Group Members**



This dynamic should be most applicable to white youth in Belgium and Canada. An individual's status as racialized minorities in her society should underpin identification with other minority groups, regardless of actual contact between them. Furthermore, exclusionary speech targets minority group members who likely feel more directly threatened by exclusionary ideas. While contact by racialized minorities with other minorities may foster stronger in-group identities (Demo and Hughes 1990; Harris 1995), minority group members are argued to have a pre-existing intolerance of exclusionary speech that makes the impact of contact small or non-existent. In other words, racialized minorities may be particularly prone to intolerance of exclusionary speech regardless of their social context, as argued in the previous chapter.[173] Whites, on the other hand, may not feel individually threatened by exclusionary speech or have any pre-existing identification with members of minority groups. However, when they have positive contact with minorities, identification with the targets of exclusionary speech should increase, leading to the target group differentiation that underpins multicultural tolerance. The focus of this chapter will therefore primarily be on the experiences of white youth.[174]

The main independent variable is exposure among whites to racial and ethnic diversity. Based on the contact hypothesis, I am interested in exposure that occurs

---

[173] In Table 4.4, recall that the variable for racialized minorities was negative and marginally significant in distinguishing absolute from multicultural tolerators.

[174] The full model presented in this chapter for whites was run for racialized minorities. As expected, there are no significant effects of racial and ethnic diversity among minorities in the Belgian sample. In the Canadian sample, greater racial and ethnic diversity is weakly significant in distinguishing the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. The output is available in the Appendix.

primarily in social networks. Social networks capture the relational ties between individuals. Such ties allow for the distribution of information, norms and ideas among people (Granovetter 1973, 1983; Coleman 1988; Burt 1997; Lin et al. 2001). The focus on social networks is important because for the identification process in Figure 5.2 to occur, social psychological research suggests that certain conditions must be met: namely, contact must be among individuals of relatively equal status where shared goals and activities are cooperative in nature (Allport 1958). In such settings, consistent evidence suggests that inter-group animosity can be reduced, and that larger, supra-ordinate identities can be formed among members of formerly dissimilar groups (Gaertner and Dovidio 2000; Dovidio et al. 2001).[175] The types of social networks examined here are likely to entail such conditions, as I will focus on friendship and acquaintance[176] networks among adolescents.

There is, however, a tension between focusing on social networks and diversity. People tend to associate with others who are similar with respect to demographic variables like race and gender as well as attitudinal and behavioral attributes (Joyner 2000; Gibson 1992b; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987; Mutz 2006; Kandel 1978). This tendency for 'like to attract like' is known as homophily and is a significant barrier to cross-group ties. Moreover, racial and ethnic dissimilarity appears to be one of the most salient characteristics on which social networks segregate (McPherson et al. 2001). This is particularly true among more intimate relationships. People are exposed to the most diversity among "weaker ties", i.e. people who are not as central in their networks (Granovetter 1973, 1983). In sociological research, such weak ties are arguably a source of new information and perspectives that are not available among relatively homogenous groups of close friends (ibid, see also Page 2007).

In contrast, the more affective mechanism based on identification with racialized minorities is likely to occur in closer relationships. While contact between whites and racialized minorities in closer friendships is less likely to occur given the principle of

---

[175] While not a direct measure of prejudice, work in political science that looks at actual interaction has found some support for the idea that increased sociability and contact in diverse settings can improve (or at least counteract a decline) in values like generalized trust (Marschall and Stolle 2004; Stolle et al. forthcoming).

[176] The CYS asks specifically about other students at school with whom the respondent talks. These are the acquaintances of interest for this study.

homophily, when it *does* the impact on a person's willingness to extend civil liberties to exclusionary groups should be the greatest. I expect that exposure to racialized minorities will have the greatest impact among closer networks of young people. The CYS database allows for such a distinction by providing multiple measures of the racial and ethnic diversity of other students the respondent talks to at school, among close friends, and among friends within the classroom.[177] Obviously, contextual factors impact the opportunity to interact with people from different backgrounds. Research suggests that when a given context is more diverse, people are more likely to make cross-group friendships (Joyner 2000; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987).[178] However, without interaction, contextual diversity has been shown to actually increase intergroup hostility (Blumer 1958; Giles and Buckner 1993; Quillian 1995; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; McLaren 2003). Contextual diversity may therefore confound the impact of actual interaction on political attitudes by limiting the opportunity for some youth to make cross group friendships (in homogenous areas) and by counteracting identification in areas characterized by diversity that do not result in positive interaction. For these reasons, it will be important to control for the context in which opportunities for exposure are embedded. The school is the relevant context in this study, and so a control will be included for the percent of non-white students at school.

Figure 5.2 illustrates the causal logic from exposure to identification that is consistent with the inter-group contact literature. The veracity of this suggestion has been extensively replicated, primarily in laboratory experiments where the order of contact and attitude change can be controlled (see, for example, Abrams et al. 2005; Brown and Hewstone 2006; Pettigrew 1998b; Dovidio et al. 2003). However, outside of the laboratory the direction of causation is less clear. The people that one chooses to associate with are likely *a result of* one's attitudes toward social diversity as much as they are *a cause of* them (Stolle and Hooghe 2004b). Exposure and attitudes likely exist within a reciprocal relationship, especially if we think about an individual's networks over the life course rather than at a given moment in time (Kandel 1978). The research design employed here is unable to distinguish the direction of causality between these

---

[177] The racial diversity of friends within the classroom is only available in the MYS.
[178] Furthermore, in extremely diverse settings, there is evidence that the impact of homophily, or the preference for in-group members, is minimal (Smith and Schneider 2000).

two variables, despite the fact that a large body of research in social psychology provides compelling evidence that the order is from exposure to attitudes.[179]  This sort of dynamic process can not be fully modeled with the cross-sectional data employed here.  While youth experiences with diversity may have a lasting impact on their attitudes about social diversity and political tolerance, there is certainly a risk that young people's willingness to make friends with people from different backgrounds is partly shaped by preexisting attitudes about racial and ethnic diversity.

To summarize, exposure to racial and ethnic diversity will have different effects on political tolerance judgments, depending on the type of target group. Similar to political diversity, I expect racial and ethnic diversity to relate positively to an individual's cognitive capacity to deal with politically diverse speech.  In general, this should lead to more tolerance of some objectionable speech (i.e. non-exclusionary speech).  However, racial and ethnic diversity should also make identification with the intended victims of exclusionary speech more likely.  This, in turn, should decrease tolerance of exclusionary speech.  The expected outcome is that those with more racial and ethnic diversity in their networks will be most likely to be multicultural tolerators: people who are more willing to allow objectionable speech, yet favor limits on speech that threatens the social inclusion of minorities in society.

Those not exposed to racial and ethnic diversity should be less likely to make distinctions across speech, and other variables should push them either toward intolerance or absolute tolerance.  As we saw in the previous chapter, political and demographic variables are important predictors of intolerance.  These should continue to push individuals away from intolerance regardless of the racial composition of their social networks.  However, as demographic variables, political experiences and exposure to other types of diversity push individuals away from intolerance, racial and ethnic diversity is hypothesized to be a key variable in distinguishing multicultural tolerance from absolute tolerance.

---

[179] The survey on which this research is based is cross-sectional in design.  A stronger causal argument could be made by utilizing longitudinal data that assessed social tolerance and exposure to social diversity over the life course.  In any case, the direction of causation here is not the main focus of this research and the direction of causality is not essential to the larger argument I am making about *political* tolerance.  I assume both attitudes and network exposure are correlated and should impact political tolerance.

The contributions to the literature from this framework are at least threefold. First, while the relationship between exposure and social tolerance is well documented, the relationship between exposure and civil liberties judgments has received little attention in previous research. Although Gibson (2004; 2006a) and Stenner (2005) have begun to look more systematically at the relationship between social tolerance and absolute political tolerance, I provide a more robust examination of the contact hypothesis by including *actual* exposure to racial and ethnic diversity. Furthermore, as indicated in Figure 5.2, I expect exposure to have different impacts depending on the nature of the objectionable speech. This focus on differences across target groups is an addition to a literature that largely constructs political tolerance as a uni-dimensional concept. Finally, my focus on racial and ethnic diversity is intentional in order to address the source of many of the identity-based conflicts that emerge in multicultural democracies.

*Exposure to Diversity among Youth in Canada and Belgium*

Advanced, industrialized democracies are becoming composed of more and more people from different ethnic groups as a result of increasing immigration from outside of Europe. Increasing diversity has led to heightened awareness and concern about the impacts of racialized diversity for democratic politics (Putnam 2007). If diversity is to have a positive impact, the contact hypothesis literature suggests that it will likely come from people's actual interaction across lines of differences. In this subsection, the actual exposure young people have to racial and ethnic diversity will be examined among majority group members.

For the purposes of this chapter, I will be focusing specifically on racial and ethnic diversity within the social networks of white youth. A variable for whites is derived based on self-reported "racial" categories in the Canadian sample and imputed based on immigration data in the Belgian sample.[180] A dummy variable was then created

---

[180] See Appendix for full details about raicalized minority coding. In the Belgian sample, the country of origin for the respondent and her parents were available. Given the recent immigration of racialized minorities to Belgium, respondents who were from, or for whom at least one parent was from, a country of primarily non-white people were coded as racialized minorities. In the Canadian sample, when "race" was unclear or missing, responses to an open-ended question about ethnic background were used to impute a racial category to respondents.

Figure 5.3: Distribution of Racial and Ethnic Network Diversity among Whites



Note: Bars represent percent of sample indicating each level of diversity. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

to separate students who would be considered white or European descent from those who would be seen as belonging to racialized minorities in the Canadian and Belgian contexts.[181]  To capture the diversity of young people's network composition, two network composition variables were included in both surveys which distinguish strong from weak ties.  Students were asked to indicate how many of their close friends were from a different race and ethnicity and how many of the other people they talked to at school were from a different race or ethnicity.[182]  Answers varied on a seven point scale from 0=none to 6=all.

Figure 5.3 presents the breakdown of these items in the two countries for whites.  As expected, the reported levels of diversity tend to be greater among acquaintances (on the right) than it does among close friends (on the left).  This is consistent with people's tendency toward homophily in their networks.  Both measures, however, are highly correlated implying that those with diverse close friend networks are more likely to have diverse acquaintances, and vice versa (r=.656).

---

[181] In general, this included students born in each country and indicating a white or European background. For a complete description of the minority status variable, see the Appendix.

[182] There were four versions of the survey (two versions in each country for each official language).  In the English version of the Canadian survey, the questions referred only to a "different race" rather than "race and ethnicity."  This inconsistency makes comparisons in the level of racial diversity across survey types problematic.  However, respondents in the English questionnaire report on average the highest levels of racial diversity, despite the fact that the question wording limits the type of diversity about which the respondent is asked to think.  I expect the relationship to hold within each sample.  However, a control for the language of the survey will be included in all models in this section to ensure that question wording differences are not confounding the results.

**Table 5.1: Exposure to Racialized Diversity among Whites**

|  | Canadian Sample | Belgian Sample |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Exposure to Diversity among **Whites** |  |  |  |
| Average % Racialized Minority at School Among Whites | 24% | 7% | *** |
| Mean racial/ethnic diversity of aquaintances (scale 0-6) | 2.32 | 1.11 | *** |
| Mean racial/ethnic diversity of close friends (scale 0-6) | 1.69 | 0.89 | *** |
| % who named 1 or 2 friends that are racialized minorities? | 28% | n/a |  |

Note: *** p=<.01, ** p=<.05, * p=<.10.  Source: Comparative Youth Study.

There is also a clear tendency for Canadian youth to report higher levels of network diversity than Belgian youth.  In the Canadian sample, young people scored on average 1.7 on the racial and ethnic diversity scale for close friends (or less than "a few") and 2.3 for acquaintances at school (or more than "a few").  Belgian youth reported on average 0.9 on the racial diversity scale (about "almost none") for close friends and 1.7 for acquaintances (less than "a few").[183]  The divergence may not be surprising given the intentional over-sampling of urban areas in the Canadian sample.  The large metropolitan areas are more likely to provide opportunities to meet people from different racial and ethnic groups.  The CYS data reflect this greater opportunity: in the Canadian sample, 38 percent of the respondents are coded as racialized minorities compared to only 14 percent in Belgium.  While this difference is partly a result of the sampling techniques, it should be noted that Canada is generally more ethnically and racially diverse than Belgium.[184] This means that Canadian youth in general may have more opportunities for cross-group friendships.

Table 5.1 reports the mean levels of racial and ethnic diversity for whites.   There is clear evidence that young people in the Canadian sample have higher levels of racial and ethnic diversity in their friendship networks.[185]   When we look at the reported diversity of actual networks among whites, Canadian youth report significantly more

---

[183] Using independent samples t-test, the differences between the two countries are significant.  Because the sampling techniques in the two samples are not identical, it is difficult to ascertain whether these results are due to differences in samples, differences in the two populations, or an artifact of question-wording.
[184] See Chapter 2 for a detailed description of differences in the levels of diversity in these two countries.
[185] Obviously, there is likely some sampling effect, as the whites that were sampled were more likely to be found in schools where they had an opportunity to meet minority group members.

racial diversity among both their close friends and among their acquaintances (p<.01).[186] White youth in Canada were also more likely to be found in schools where there was a higher level of diversity. For white respondents, the average percent of racialized minorities in the schools sampled in Canada was 24 percent minority, compared to only 7 percent in Belgium (p<.01).[187] In general then, white youth in Canada appear to have greater exposure to diversity, in their schools and in their networks.

While the focus here is on whites, it is notable that a similar pattern is evident when racialized minorities are examined separately (not shown). It has been well-documented that ethnic and racial minorities tend to have more diverse friendships than those from the majority (see, for example, McPherson et al. 2001, 420-2; Blau 1977; Marsden 1987). This is also true in both the Canadian and Belgian data.[188] Yet, similar to the majority results, Canadian minorities also tend to report more racial and ethnic diversity in their networks than Belgian minorities (p<.01). This suggests that Belgian youth, whether they are from the white majority or from a racialized minority, are more segregated in their networks than Canadian youth.

The racial and ethnic composition variables for close friends and acquaintances were self-reported. There are notable limits on this question formalation. While such questions are intended to capture a larger network than is possible by alternative techniques, the question may be more difficult to respond to, given the amorphous nature of social networks (especially when dealing with weaker ties). The composition variables more accurately measure the perception of diversity in one's network than the actual diversity present.

---

[186] This is despite a question wording difference in the English version of the questionnaire which limited diversity only to "race".

[187] The measure of racial diversity at school is calculated based on the survey responses of the students sampled in each school. While an official breakdown of the entire student population at each institution would be preferable, record-keeping of this type of information varied substantially across schools and prevented a reliable school-reported measure. The CYS is based on two classes on average per school, and every effort was made to arrange for typical classrooms to survey. Schools were asked to provide classrooms that were part of the general curriculum for which any student in the school would likely be involved, rather than special-tracked classes.

[188] For racial and ethnic diversity among close friends, Canadian minorities report on average 2.9 compared to 1.7 among Canadian whites (p<.01). Belgian minorities report 1.9 versus 0.9 among Canadian whites (p<.01). A similar pattern emerges for acquaintances: Canadian minorities report 3.5 versus 2.3 for whites, and Belgian minorities report 2.5 versus 1.1 for whites (p<.01 in both cases).

The Canadian survey provides an additional, alternative measure of network diversity.[189] The question, which is formulated similarly to the name-generator technique in the General Social Survey, asks respondents to name two other students with whom they are closest in the classroom in which they were surveyed. Because entire classrooms were surveyed, it was possible to link the named friend with the demographic information provided by that friend on their own survey. Based on this question, I was able to create a dichotomous variable which indicates whether a respondent named at least one friend who was a racialized minority.[190] While this technique does limit the range of people captured in the network, it provides a reliable indicator of the background of the people within this limited network because racial background is reported directly by the named friend in the survey. Among white Canadian youth, 28 percent named at least one friend that was from a minority group.

Among majority group members, then, networks appear to be more homogenous than diverse. Among whites in both Canada and Belgium, Table 5.1 provides evidence that homogeneity, rather than diversity, more accurately describes young people's social networks. This is consistent with sociological research on homophily. Yet, clearly some exposure to racial and ethnic diversity does occur to varying degrees in these two countries. The impact such diversity may have on political tolerance judgments will be the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

### *Network Diversity and Multicultural Tolerance*

The basis of the contact hypothesis is that exposure to out-group members reduces out-group hostility and facilitates shared identity. Certainly, when considering the impact of the composition of one's networks outside of a controlled experiment, the diversity may be both a cause and a consequence of the types of attitudes that one holds about out-group members. Yet, the literature does make clear that we should expect individuals with more racially and ethnically diverse networks to also express greater identification

---

[189] While the name generator question was asked in the Belgian survey, the author does not have access to the confidential files containing respondents' full names which were used to link named friend to racial information provided directly by that friend.

[190] This question resulted in a substantial number of missing cases, for individuals for whom a friend could not be clearly identified. This occurred when nicknames were used, or there were multiple respondents in the class with similar names. The racial background of at least one friend was determined in 49% of the cases.

**Table 5.2: Exposure to Diversity and Closeness to Minorities among White Youth**

| | Closeness to Minorities Scale (0-1) | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Canadian Youth | Belgian Youth |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Close Friends (0-6) | 0.29 *** n=1967 | 0.35 *** n=4719 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Acquaintances at School (0-6) | 0.27 *** n=1958 | 0.23 *** n=4699 |
| % Racialized Minority in School | 0.16 *** n=1972 | 0.24 *** n=4761 |

Note: Pearson's correlations are reported and the sample is limited in each sample to white respondents.   *** p=<.01, ** p=<.05, * p=<.10.
Source: Comparative Youth Study.

with minorities.  The claim in this chapter is that diverse networks, and the socially tolerant attitudes that accompany them, should make multicultural tolerance more likely. The first step in assessing the validity of this claim is to establish that network diversity and identification with minorities are in fact significantly related in these two samples.  A measure has been created which is intended to capture identification with racialized minorities.  Respondents were asked to rate how close they felt to three groups: Muslims, immigrants and blacks.[191]  Answers ran from 0 to 10, where 10 meant feeling close to the interests, feelings and ideas of the group, and 0 meant feeling distant from that group. The responses were compiled into a single additive scale that I will refer to as the Closeness to Minorities scale.  It ranges from 0 to 1 (Alpha=.835).[192]

Table 5.2 presents the correlations between the Closeness to Minorities scale and three measures of diversity in the networks of white youth.  As expected, whites who report more racial and ethnic diversity in their networks are more likely to feel close to minorities.  As suggested earlier, the relationship appears to be strongest for racial and ethnic diversity among close friends and is a similar level in both country samples (p<.01, r≈.3).  When it comes to acquaintances at school, the relationship is not as strong (.27 in Canada and .23 in Belgium) but remains statistically significant (p<.01).  For

---

[191] In the Canadian survey, "new immigrants" was used to distinguish current waves of immigrants from historical immigrant groups, such as the Italians and Portuguese.
[192] The scale reaches acceptable levels of reliability in both country samples as well (Alpha=.72 in MYS and .86 in BYS).

Figure 5.4: Network Diversity and Identification with Minorities among Whites

Note: Analysis limited to w hite respondents.  X axis corresponds to reported racial and ethnic diversity among respondents' close friends.  Almost all and all have been collapsed due to small sample sizes. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

contextual diversity, the correlation drops to .16 in the Canadian sample, but remains slightly stronger in the Belgian sample (r=.24).  While the direction of causality can not be established, there is clearly support for the underlying assumption discussed earlier that white youth who have friends that are from different racial and ethnic backgrounds are also more likely to express feeling close to minorities.  As hypothesized, this relationship appears strongest for racial and ethnic diversity among close friends.  While other variables may impact people's identification with minorities, having racially and ethnically diverse networks appear to be at least partially related to such attitudes.

To further illustrate this point, Figure 5.4 presents the mean scores on the Closeness to Minorities scale for white youth based on the reported racial and ethnic diversity of close friends.  There is a clear trend for young people with more diverse networks to feel closer to minorities.  Among white youth in Canada, those with half or more friends from a different racial or ethnic background score on average over 20 percentage points higher on the Closeness to Minorities scale.  A similar positive relationship is found in the Belgian sample, where the increase from none to half or more is about 30 percentage points.  It should be noted that while the relationship is similar, the overall levels for feeling close to minorities are significantly higher among Canadian youth.

These findings should not be surprising as they replicate a consistent finding in the social-psychological literature. What is of interest for the research presented here is the way in which network diversity and identification with minorities impact civil liberties judgments across target groups. There is strong support for the link between racial and ethnic diversity and increased identification (at least as measured by the Closeness to Minorities scale). The challenge will now be to see how network diversity translates into tolerance dispositions, after controlling for a variety of other factors that can influence both one's exposure to diversity and one's attitudes about civil liberties.

*Linking Network Diversity to Tolerance Judgments*

Allowing the expression of exclusionary speech necessarily requires people who value social inclusion *and* freedom of expression to decide between two morally defensible ideals. In contemporary, multicultural democracies, I have argued that young people are unlikely to be "tolerant of the intolerant". As I have documented in Chapter 4, a failure to extend civil liberties to exclusionary groups is not consistent with a general intolerance of all dissenting ideas. Rather, those who endorse a more multicultural form of tolerance resemble those who endorse absolute tolerance in many ways. The question remains, however: what distinguishes those who single out exclusionary speech from those who ascribe to a more absolute form of tolerance? Does exposure to racial and ethnic diversity provide leverage in this respect?

Table 5.3 provides an initial bivariate examination of the relationship between network diversity, identification and tolerance types for white youth. The working hypothesis is that network diversity, and in turn identification with minorities, will make multicultural tolerance more likely. This leads to the expectation in Table 5.3 that multicultural tolerators should report higher mean levels of racial and ethnic diversity and identification with minorities than the intolerant and absolute tolerators. The results are partly in line with expectations. In every case, multicultural tolerators report more ethnic and racial diversity among their close friends and acquaintances than either the intolerant or absolute tolerators, although these differences are not always significant. Additionally, in the Belgium case multicultural tolerators also report feeling closer to minorities (p<.01). While these results generally fit with expectations, they are substantively small

**Table 5.3: Diversity, Identification and Types of Tolerance among Whites**

| | Intolerant | ←sign.→ | Multicultural Tolerator | ←sign.→ | Absolute tolerator |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Canada** | | | | | |
| Closeness to Minorities Scale (0-1) | 0.46 | ←p=.165→ | 0.48 | ←p=.254→ | 0.50 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Close Friends (0-6) | 1.61 | ←p=.112→ | 1.74 | ←p=.448→ | 1.65 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Acquaintances at School (0-6) | 2.19 | ←p=.002→ | 2.40 | ←p=.627→ | 2.35 |
| **Belgium** | | | | | |
| Closeness to Minorities Scale (0-1) | 0.28 | ←p=.000→ | 0.33 | ←p=.000→ | 0.27 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Close Friends (0-6) | 0.90 | ←p=.097→ | 0.96 | ←p=.000→ | 0.72 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Acquaintances at School (0-6) | 1.09 | ←p=.209→ | 1.14 | ←p=.121→ | 1.03 |

Note: Analysis limited to white respondents. Significance was calculated for intolerance vs. multicultural tolerance and multicultural tolerance vs. absolute tolerance in separate ANOVA tests. Numbers represent mean scores on each scale for each type of tolerance. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

and fail to reach statistical significances in many cases. Further analysis is required to ascertain the extent to which these small differences are sustained, or even strengthened, in a multivariate analysis where other confounding factors are controlled for.

In Table 5.4 and 5.5, multinomial logistic regressions are presented for white youth in each country. The models test whether racial and ethnic diversity in one's networks help to distinguish between types of tolerance, after controlling for other important predictors (Model 1). [193] In a second step, closeness to minorities is added to the model in order to assess closeness as an intervening variable between network diversity and tolerance judgments (Model 2), as illustrated in Figure 5.2. Network diversity is measured with a composite score for reported diversity among close friends and among acquaintances. [194] The two measures have been combined initially because of

---

[193] Model 1 was restricted to respondents who had valid responses across all variables in Model 2. In total, this meant that 25 respondents in Canada and 51 respondents in Belgium who had valid responses to all items in Model 1 were excluded to ensure comparability across models.

[194] The two scales have been added together and divided by two so the resulting scores are on the original scale from 0 to 6. The distribution of the original variables was provided in Figure 5.3. The means on the

their high intercorrelation (r=.66) with the aim of getting a general measure of overall network diversity.[195] The analysis is limited to white youth in each sample, and the raw coefficients are presented, which provide the direction and significance of effects.[196] Other control variables mirror the analysis from the previous chapter. However, racialized minority was dropped as a predictor given that the analysis was limited to white, European-descent respondents and urban was dropped because an additional control variable was included to control for contextual diversity. The measure used is the log of the percent of racialized minorities in the school.[197] As noted before, contextual diversity impacts the opportunities young people have to make cross-group friendships and may also confound the impact of such friendships on the dependent variable.

The results in both samples provide support for the dynamic discussed in this chapter, although there is some variation between the two case countries. In Table 5.4, the results for Canadian youth in Model 1 suggest, as predicted, that racial and ethnic diversity in one's networks has a significant negative effect on both intolerance *and* absolute tolerance, and the size of the coefficients are similar.[198] This means that racial and ethnic diversity in one's networks increases the likelihood of multicultural tolerance. Surprisingly, the impact of racial and ethnic diversity remains negative and significant for both intolerance and absolute tolerance in Model 2 when the Closeness to Minorities scale is introduced into the model. This is contrary to expectations that identification with minorities was the main way in which racial and ethnic diversity translated into multicultural tolerance. Instead, increases in racial and ethnic diversity among one's

---

combined network scale which runs from 0 to 6 is 2.1 in the Canadian sample and 1.1 in the Belgian sample. The distribution of this combined scale is available in the Appendix. While the Canadian scale is relatively normal, the Belgian scale is substantively skewed toward 1. The impact of this skewness will be discussed during the interpretation of the findings and an alternative test will be introduced.

[195] Further analysis will subsequently present the results for the close friends and acquaintances measures separately.

[196] These effects will be further examined in a later table using predicted probabilities.

[197] The log was used rather than the raw score given the skewed nature of racial diversity toward 0.

[198] Because there was a difference in the wording of the network diversity variables in the French and English version of the survey in Canada, a second set of models was run which includes a control variable for language of survey. No substantial differences in the variables of interest are observed. This alternative model is available in the Appendix.

**Table 5.4: Network Diversity, Identification and Tolerance Types among White Youth in Canada**

| | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | |
| | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | -0.167 | (.07) ** | -0.143 | (.08) * | -0.171 | (0.08) ** | -0.159 | (0.09) * |
| **Closeness to Minorities** | | | | | 0.069 | (0.33) | 0.292 | (0.39) |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.186 | (.23) | 0.140 | (.27) | 0.186 | (0.23) | 0.142 | (0.27) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.182 | (.19) *** | -0.061 | (.30) | -1.180 | (0.19) *** | -0.054 | (0.30) |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.158 | (.04) *** | -0.097 | (.06) a | -0.159 | (0.04) *** | -0.101 | (0.06) * |
| Number of Organizations | 0.002 | (.06) | 0.162 | (.08) * | 0.001 | (0.06) | 0.159 | (0.09) * |
| Female | -0.465 | (.14) *** | 0.184 | (.22) | -0.467 | (0.14) *** | 0.176 | (0.22) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.350 | (.15) ** | -0.051 | (.20) | -0.349 | (0.15) ** | -0.045 | (0.19) |
| Catholic | 0.123 | (.20) | -0.523 | (.21) ** | 0.121 | (0.20) | -0.529 | (0.21) ** |
| Other Christian | 0.413 | (.24) * | -0.247 | (.27) | 0.413 | (0.24) * | -0.247 | (0.27) |
| Jewish | -0.296 | (.43) | -0.859 | (.40) ** | -0.295 | (0.43) | -0.852 | (0.40) ** |
| Religious Attendance | 0.254 | (.06) *** | 0.096 | (.13) | 0.254 | (0.06) *** | 0.097 | (0.13) |
| Constant | 1.049 | (.37) *** | -0.859 | (.51) * | 1.033 | (0.36) *** | -0.931 | (0.51) * |
| N | | | 1398 | | | | 1398 | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | | | 0.056 | | | | 0.056 | |
| Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared | | | 0.118 | | | | 0.118 | |

Note: † Racial and Ethnic Diversity is a composite scale for both friends and acquaintances at school. Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Model 1 contains only respondents without missing cases on the Closeness scale. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, a p=<.15. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

**Table 5.5: Network Diversity, Identification and Tolerance Types among White Youth in Belgium**

| | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | 0.052 | (.06) | -0.172 | (.09) * | 0.073 | (.06) | -0.128 | (.09) |
| **Closeness to Minorities** | | | | | -0.381 | (.20) * | -0.776 | (.32) *** |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.278 | (.28) | -0.062 | (.17) | -0.253 | (.28) | -0.016 | (.18) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.644 | (.16) *** | -0.363 | (.23) a | -0.637 | (.16) *** | -0.349 | (.23) a |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.130 | (.03) *** | 0.061 | (.05) | -0.121 | (.03) *** | 0.080 | (.05) * |
| Number of Organizations | -0.104 | (.04) *** | -0.035 | (.06) | -0.100 | (.04) *** | -0.027 | (.06) |
| Female | -0.322 | (.11) *** | -0.093 | (.12) | -0.312 | (.11) *** | -0.072 | (.13) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.129 | (.12) | 0.044 | (.15) | -0.125 | (.12) | 0.050 | (.15) |
| Catholic | 0.022 | (.10) | -0.114 | (.15) | 0.016 | (.10) | -0.125 | (.16) |
| Other Christian | 0.093 | (.35) | -0.410 | (.59) | 0.099 | (.35) | -0.403 | (.58) |
| Jewish | na | | na | | na | | na | |
| Religious Attendance | 0.092 | (.06) a | 0.077 | (.10) | 0.096 | (.06) a | 0.086 | (.10) |
| Constant | 0.400 | (.37) | -1.062 | (.36) *** | 0.470 | (.37) | -0.935 | (.35) *** |
| N | 2865 | | | | 2865 | | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.022 | | | | 0.024 | | | |
| Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared | 0.048 | | | | 0.051 | | | |

Note: † Racial and Ethnic Diversity is a composite scale for both friends and acquaintances at school.  Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category.  Analysis is limited to white respondents.  Model 1 contains only respondents without missing cases on the Closeness scale.  Source: Comparative Youth Study.  *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, a p=<.15.  Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

networks appear to increase the likelihood of multicultural tolerance, even after controlling for identification with minorities.

Table 5.5 presents the same models among Belgian youth. Considering Model 1, the coefficients for racial and ethnic diversity are only significant in distinguishing absolute from multicultural tolerators. The effect is significant, negative, and similar in size to the Canadian model (p<.10). However, no similar effect is evident for intolerance. Furthermore, in Model 2, the impact of racial and ethnic diversity is reduced to insignificance when identification with minorities is introduced. Feeling closer to minorities has a negative and significant impact on intolerance and absolute tolerance, which is as expected. As in Chapter 4, there is generally a poorer fit in the Belgian data and fewer controls variables appear to help distinguish between types of tolerance.

One difficulty in the Belgian data is that the amount of exposure to racial and ethnic diversity tends to be quite low. On the racial and ethnic diversity composite scale, Belgian youth report on average a 1.0 on the 0 to 6 scale, the equivalent of "almost none" on the original scales. One possible reason that fewer significant effects were found in Table 5.5 for Belgian youth is the skewed nature of this variable. An option to address this problem is to transform the variable of interest to make the distribution more linear. A log transformation is one way to address skewness in a variable. When a log transformation of the racial and ethnic ties scale is included in the model, the log of racial and ethnic ties remains negative for absolute tolerance, as in the models presented in Table 5.5; however, it fails to reach statistical significance (see Appendix for model summary). This provides limited support for the results in Table 5.5 for absolute tolerance, despite the skewed nature of the racial and ethnic diversity variable. However, in Model 2, when the closeness variable is included, the coefficient for intolerance is positive (as in Table 5.5) but reaches borderline significance (p=.12). In other words, there is some suggestion in this data that racial and ethnic diversity may increase the probability of intolerance compared to multicultural tolerance in the Belgian data.[199]

---

[199] Weak but similar findings are obtained when dummy variables are included instead of a log transformation as well (analysis not shown). However, neither alternative modeling technique, when run on the Canadian data, changes the direction or significance of results in that sample, suggesting the findings are robust in the Canadian context.

Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities of Tolerance by
Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Whites in Canada

Racial/Ethnic Diversity in Networks Varying Closeness to Minorities
with Mean at Each Level of Network Diversity

Source: CYS. CLARIFY is used to obtain predictions. See text for details of estimation.

This is not consistent with expectations, and suggests caution in interpreting the results in Belgium as in line with the hypothesized relationships.

In order to better highlight the estimated effects, Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present the predicted probabilities that a white youth will be in a given tolerance category as racial diversity among close friends increases and closeness to minorities increases. For each level of racial and ethnic diversity, predicted probabilities are estimated where the value of the Closeness to Minorities scale is set to the sample mean among respondents who reported having that level of racial and ethnic diversity.[200] The choice to vary network diversity and closeness simultaneously reflects the theoretical perspective presented here that network diversity and attitudes toward minorities are causally related. All other variables are set to their means, except gender which is set to female and the religious denomination variables which are set to 0, making the non-religious the default category.

The results for white youth in Canada are presented in Figure 5.5, and the pattern conforms to theoretical expectations. As network diversity increases, the probability that a respondent is a multicultural tolerator increases from 51 percent for "none" to 69

---

[200] CLARIFY is used to obtain the predicted probabilities (King et al. 2000). The means on the Closeness to Minorities scale for each level of racial and ethnic diversity which are used in the simulation are provided in the Appendix.

172

Figure 5.6: Predicted Probabilities of Tolerance by
Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Whites in Belgium



Source: CYS. CLARIFY is used to obtain predictions. See text for details of estimation.

percent "almost all" for non-religious women when all other variables are held at their
means.[201] The probability of intolerance or absolute tolerance decreases. This is
precisely the pattern that was expected: exposure to racial diversity is significantly linked
to the likelihood that an individual will express a more multicultural form of tolerance. It
also appears, as expected, to be related to a decreased probability of both intolerance and
absolute tolerance.

The results in the Belgian sample, however, fail to conform to the hypothesized
pattern. Figure 5.6 presents the predicted probability of each type of tolerance based on
varying the racial and ethnic diversity scale from none to about half.[202] In Figure 5.6,
network diversity does appear to be related with a decreased likelihood of being an
absolute tolerator (from 14 percent to 8 percent), as was found in the Canadian sample.

[201] This upward pattern is obtained regardless if closeness to minorities is varied or is simply set at its
mean. It should be noted as well that the 'all' category was not estimated, given the small number of
respondents at the extreme of this scale. Given that the average response on the racial and ethnic ties scale
was about 2, the estimations are only slightly higher than the distribution in the full sample. The slightly
higher levels are likely a result of the decision to set sex as female, who tend to be more likely to be
multicultural tolerators than men. An alternative model simulation is available in the Appendix. Changing
the simulation criteria does not change the direction of effects in Figure 5.5, although it does shift the
levels.
[202] Limiting the variation on the diversity scale was intentional to reflect the skewed nature of this variable
in the Belgian data. Over 95 percent of the Belgian sample score from 1 to 4 on this scale.

Yet, there is no discernible impact for multicultural tolerance, and the probability of intolerance actually increases 6 percentage points as racial and ethnic diversity increases from "none" to "about half".[203] This suggests that unlike their Canadian counterparts, white Belgian youth who have more friends from racially different backgrounds express more intolerance. While no significant positive effect was found in Table 5.5, there was some evidence in the alternative modeling that in contrast to no diversity, low levels of racial and ethnic diversity were positively associated with the likelihood of intolerance (see Appendix). The vast majority of observations in Belgium occur at 'none', 'almost none' and 'a few', and there is no way to tell from the current data if higher levels of ethnic and racial diversity would reproduce the negative effect found among Canadian youth.[204] Part of the case selection was driven by the assumption that higher levels of diversity would facilitate the type of positive intergroup interaction that is argued to underpin multicultural tolerance. One possibility is that the overall levels of diversity are simply too low in Belgium, and the effects of networks in such contexts simply do not behave similarly as more diverse contexts where intergroup friendships have become more common.

In sum, there is substantial support for the finding that young whites with more diverse networks are less likely to ascribe to an absolute form of tolerance in either Canada or Belgium. For those surrounded by racially and ethnically diverse friends in both countries, tolerating exclusionary groups, as absolute tolerators do by definition, became increasingly unlikely. If absolute tolerance is the democratic ideal, as it appears in much of the literature, then increasing racial and ethnic diversity would seem to have dire consequences for democratic politics. Yet, the Canadian data provide reason to question the extent to which contact with racial and ethnic diversity leads to political intolerance.

Young Canadians with more racially and ethnically diverse networks were not only less likely to be absolute tolerators, they were also significantly less likely to be

---

[203] Again, these results are not simply an artifact of how the simulation was specified. When gender and religious affiliation are specified differently, a similar pattern emerges. See Appendix for alternative simulation results.

[204] It should be noted that when dummy variables are used for the racial and ethnic diversity variable in the Canadian model, there is no evidence of a curvilinear effect of diversity on intolerance. The dummy variables for low levels of diversity are not significant.

174

politically intolerant. These findings suggest that the link between exposure to racial and ethnic diversity and attitudes about civil liberties is a development of distinctions across target groups. In Canada, young people who are able to make friends with people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds appear to be more tolerant, both socially and politically. Yet, they are also more likely to display nuance in the types of speech that are seen as legitimate for democratic debate. A similar dynamic was not fully supported in Belgium, however, suggesting that network effects may partly be contingent on the contexts in which they occur.

## A Further Test of the Causal Mechanisms

In the previous subsection, the measure of racial and ethnic diversity was aggregated for both close friends and acquaintances at school. This measure was intended to be a measure of overall exposure to racial and ethnic diversity among peers. However, along with the extent of diversity, other features of networks may also be important, such as the strength of ties. A breakdown of diversity measures for acquaintances and close friends provides a further test of the ways in which network diversity can impact tolerance judgments. Recall that the key mechanism which underpins hypothesis 4a was an affective mechanism whereby interaction with people from different racial and ethnic backgrounds was argued to make exclusionary speech appear more threatening because it attacks minorities with whom the respondent more strongly identifies. Such an affective mechanism should logically work best among closer ties. Previously, the correlation between the close friends measure, the acquaintance measure, and the Closeness to Minorities scale were presented, and as expected, racial and ethnic diversity among close friends was more strongly related to feeling close to minorities than diversity among weaker ties.[205]

However, hypothesis 4b, that exposure to racial and ethnic diversity should increase tolerance of other types of speech, relies largely on a cognitive mechanism. A greater diversity of people was argued to expose an individual to a wider variety of political perspectives and facilitate the ability of people to see things from another person's point of view. This argument was drawn from research that examines the

---

[205] See Table 5.2. In Canada, the difference in correlations was small (.27 for acquaintances and .29 for close friends). In Belgium, the difference was much larger: .35 for close friends and .23 for acquaintances.

importance of political diversity (Mutz 2002b, 2006) and was argued to extend to racial and ethnic diversity for two possible reasons: 1) either racial and ethnic diversity was likely to underpin important differences in political perspectives and/or 2) many types of diversity develop people's perspective-taking ability and other cognitive skills.

Sociological research has long argued that weaker ties are more likely to expose individuals to a greater amount of diversity and to provide new information that is not available among closer ties (Granovetter 1973, 1983). Given the principle of homophily discussed earlier, closer friends are more likely to share many perspectives, preferences and ideas even in the presence of racial and ethnic diversity. In other words, racial and ethnic diversity may have a stronger impact on increasing tolerance of other types of speech when it occurs among weaker ties. This is because weaker ties may provide greater opportunity for differences in 'race' and ethnicity to overlap with differences in opinions. The weak ties argument implies, therefore, that racial and ethnic diversity may be conducive to increasing levels of tolerance for other objectionable speech only in so far as such diversity is a proxy for exposure to a diversity of ideas.

In sum, a distinction between strong and weak ties leads to further expectations about the impact of racial and ethnic diversity on political tolerance judgments:

1) Racial and ethnic diversity among closer ties should be more important in distinguishing multicultural from absolute tolerators. This is because the affective mechanism in the model (identification) which causes an intolerance of exclusionary speech should work best in stronger relationships.

2) Greater racial and ethnic diversity among acquaintances should be more important in distinguishing the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. This is because weaker ties are argued to expose the individual to a wider variety of perspectives than is available among closer friends which facilitate greater tolerance of other objectionable speech.

To test these implications, Table 5.6 presents the coefficients for racial and ethnic diversity among close friends and acquaintances entered separately into the models presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. Table 5.6 proceeds in three steps: Model 1 includes only the two network measures, as well as the controls; Model 2 adds the Closeness to Minorities scale to the model; and finally, Model 3 adds in a measure of exposure to

176

**Table 5.6: Strong vs. Weak Ties and Types of Tolerance**

| | Intolerance | | | Absolute Tolerance | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Canada** | | | | | | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | |
| **Model 1** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.037 | (.05) | | -0.108 | (.06) | * |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | -0.235 | (.07) | *** | -0.034 | (.10) | |
| **Model 2** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.031 | (.05) | | -0.111 | (.07) | a |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | -0.249 | (.08) | *** | -0.034 | (.10) | |
| Closeness to Minorities | 0.056 | (.32) | | 0.303 | (.39) | |
| **Model 3** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.034 | (.05) | | -0.120 | (.07) | * |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | -0.229 | (.08) | *** | -0.057 | (.10) | |
| Closeness to Minorities | -0.040 | (.34) | | 0.359 | (.41) | |
| Political Diversity Scale | -0.093 | (.07) | | 0.212 | (.12) | * |
| **Belgium** | | | | | | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | |
| **Model 1** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.012 | (.04) | | -0.197 | (.09) | ** |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | 0.041 | (.05) | | 0.032 | (.07) | |
| **Model 2** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.025 | (.04) | | -0.154 | (.09) | * |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | 0.049 | (.05) | | 0.025 | (.08) | |
| Closeness to Minorities | -0.373 | (.20) | * | -0.713 | (.32) | ** |
| **Model 3** | | | | | | |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Close Friends | 0.016 | (.04) | | -0.162 | (.09) | * |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversty - Acquaintances | 0.067 | (.05) | | 0.006 | (.08) | |
| Closeness to Minorities | -0.432 | (.20) | ** | -0.717 | (.32) | ** |
| Political Diversity Scale | -0.123 | (.05) | *** | 0.059 | (.07) | |

Note: Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command. Controls were included in each model for: log of % racialized minority, political knowledge, political activism, involvement in organizations, female, parental education, religious denomination and religious attendance. Full models available in the Appendix. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, a p=<.15.

political diversity, which was included in the CYS and asked in the same question format as racial and ethnic diversity.[206] The inclusion of political diversity in Model 3 is a test of whether the impact of racial and ethnic diversity is spurious: rather than being a cause of tolerance dispositions, it may simply be related to the extent to which people are

---

[206] Respondents were asked how many of their 1) close friends and 2) other people at school they talk to, disagreed with them about politics on a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 means "none" and 6 means "all". The two questions were used to create an additive scale standardized from 0 to 6. See Appendix for full details.

exposed to a diversity of political viewpoints. To simplify the presentation, only the variables of interest are presented in Table 5.6.[207]

The distinction between strong and weak ties generally performs as expected for Canadian youth. In Model 1, greater racial and ethnic diversity among acquaintances in Canada is negatively related to intolerance as an outcome compared to multicultural tolerance (p<.01). Likewise, greater racial and ethnic diversity among close friends is negatively related to absolute tolerance as an outcome compared with multicultural tolerance (p<.10). Neither the inclusion of feeling close to minorities nor the inclusion of exposure to political diversity change in any substantial way the size or significance of these effects. In other words, while the impact of racial and ethnic diversity is strong, there is less support for the hypotheses that this relationship is caused by increased identification or increased political diversity. Instead, the impact appears to be robust to the inclusion of these potentially intervening variables. Political diversity seems to have an independent, positive effect on the likelihood of absolute tolerance (p<.10) but falls short of significance in decreasing the probability of intolerance (p=.17).

The Belgian models are less consistent with the hypotheses developed in this chapter. As with earlier models, there is no evidence that greater racial and ethnic diversity decreases the likelihood of intolerance, either among close ties or among acquaintances. Diversity among close friends, however, does significantly decrease the likelihood of absolute tolerance compared to multicultural tolerance (p<.05), as predicted. This effect of diversity among close friends appears to be slightly mediated by identification with minorities, as measured by the Closeness scale. The inclusion of political diversity has an independent, negative effect on the likelihood of intolerance compared to multicultural tolerance (p<.01).

The analysis in Table 5.6 provides an important nuance to the findings in the previous subsection. As expected, racial and ethnic diversity among stronger ties (i.e. close friends) appears to be an important indicator in distinguishing absolute from multicultural tolerators. This is consistent with an affective mechanism that should apply when ties are more intimately related to the respondent. However, there is only partial evidence that this affective mechanism is identification as measured by the Closeness to

---

[207] The full models are available in the Appendix.

178

Minorities scale. Only in the Belgian data did the inclusion of this variable reduce the size and significance of the impact of diversity among close friends, although there was still evidence of an independent effect of network diversity among close friends. In contrast to the findings for close friends, racial and ethnic diversity among weaker ties (i.e. acquaintances at school) was negatively related to intolerance in the Canadian data (p<.01), which is consistent with a more cognitive mechanism. The finding was robust across models, and there was no evidence that this was simply an artifact of greater political diversity in one's networks. No parallel effect, however, was found for Belgian youth. If the impact of weak ties is more about the breadth of contacts with diverse others, rather than the depth of that contact, then one possibility is that network diversity for weaker ties in Belgium is simply too low.[208] As suggested earlier, it may take higher levels of diversity than are typically present among Belgian youth to result in a meaningful reduction in intolerance.

*An Alternative Test of the Exposure Hypothesis*

The Canadian data provide an opportunity to further test the exposure-tolerance link using an alternative network measure that is based on classmates who were named by the respondent. Recall that students were asked to name two other classmates with whom they were the closest. As entire classrooms were surveyed, it is possible to link the names a respondent provided with the demographic information from that named friend directly. While this technique results in a substantial number of missing cases, it does provide a fairly reliable measure of the actual diversity present among some of a young person's friends. This measure provides an alternative to the previous measures because it avoids asking the respondent their perception of the diversity in their network and instead captures background information directly from network members.[209] In addition, because the names of classmates were elicited separately from any reference to

---

[208] The mean level of racial and ethnic diversity among acquaintances for white youth in Belgium is only 1.1, compared with 2.3 for whites in Canada, and the standard error is almost half the size (.016 vs. .30). This suggests that there is just very little racial and ethnic diversity in Belgian acquaintance networks.
[209] It is reasonable to assume there is a fairly high correlation between perception and actual diversity. Network indicators are prone to substantial forgetting when respondents estimate network composition, though, especially when networks are composed of weaker ties (Brewer 2000; Brewer and Webster 2000). While there is little reason to assume such forgetting is not random, it does create the possibility that perception measures are prone to underestimating actual diversity.

**Table 5.7: Minority Classmates and Tolerance among White Youth in Canada**

| | Intolerant | | | Absolute Tolerance | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | |
| **Named Minority Friend** | -0.203 | (0.22) | | -0.597 | (0.32) | * |
| Closeness to Minorities | 0.051 | (0.40) | | -0.346 | (0.54) | |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.267 | (0.25) | | -0.245 | (0.27) | |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.848 | (0.25) | *** | 0.346 | (0.38) | |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.211 | (0.06) | *** | -0.169 | (0.08) | ** |
| Number of Organizations | 0.000 | (0.09) | | 0.066 | (0.12) | |
| Female | -0.363 | (0.20) | * | 0.118 | (0.31) | |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.242 | (0.17) | | -0.115 | (0.29) | |
| Catholic | 0.117 | (0.21) | | -0.568 | (0.32) | * |
| Other Christian | 0.488 | (0.30) | a | -0.211 | (0.40) | |
| Jewish | 0.167 | (0.50) | | -0.812 | (0.67) | |
| Religious Attendance | 0.257 | (0.10) | *** | 0.164 | (0.17) | |
| Constant | 0.106 | (0.38) | | -1.175 | (0.49) | ** |

| | |
|---|---|
| N | 706 |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.050 |
| Nagelkerke Pseudo R-Squared | 0.104 |

Note: Dependent variable is type of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** $p<.01$; ** $p<.05$; * $p <.10$, [a] $p=<.15$. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

diversity, there is less chance that respondents inflated actual diversity in order to appear more tolerant. The trade-off is that exposure is limited to a very small number of people (up to two) and the measure only captures closer ties.

Employing a dummy variable based on the reported friend's racial background, therefore, provides a further test of the exposure hypothesis. Table 5.7 presents the multinomial logistic regression results for the full model where the friend dummy variable is included together with the variables from previous models. As with previous estimations, naming at least one friend in the class who is not white significantly decreases the likelihood that a white youth is absolutely tolerant compared to endorsing a more multicultural form of tolerance ($p<.10$). The effect is consistent with the finding

**Table 5.8: Predicted Probabilities of Tolerance Type among White Canadians (Name Generator)**

| | Named Non-White Friend in Class? | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | Neither | One or Both |
| Intolerance | 0.243 | 0.231 |
| Multicultural Tolerance | 0.561 | 0.643 |
| Absolute Tolerance | 0.196 | 0.125 |

Note: Predicted probabilities were obtained using CLARIFY. The Closeness to Minorities Scale was set at their sample mean for each level of network diversity.  All other values were set at the means, expect female=1, and religious denominations which were set at 0.  Source: McGill Youth Study.

that closer ties should increase the likelihood of multicultural tolerance compared to absolute tolerance.

The magnitude of these effects can be better understood by looking at the predicted probabilities of each type of tolerance based on the presence of at least one racialized minority among those named as close peers.  Similar to previous estimations, CLARIFY was used to estimate the probability of each type of tolerance based on whether the respondent named at least one friend in the classroom who was from a racialized minority.  Other variables were set at their means, with the expectation of gender which was set to female and religious denomination which was set to not religious. [210]  As with the previous estimations, the Closeness to Minorities scale was set at the mean for those who did not name a minority friend and for those who named at least one minority friend in order to capture the likely increase in identification that accompanies greater diversity.[211]  As indicated in Table 5.8, the predicted probability of multicultural tolerance rises from 56 percent for those who did not name a racialized minority as a close peer to 64 percent for those who did.  There is also a substantial decrease in the probability of absolute tolerance from 20 percent to 13 percent.  We see little difference in the probability of intolerance, which is consistent with the previous

---

[210] As with previous simulations, the directions of effects are robust to changes in the specification of the simulation (analysis not shown).

[211] The mean Closeness score for those who did not name a minority friend was .46 versus .51 for those who named at least one minority friend. While the difference is small, substantively setting the means at this level is consistent with the theoretical perspective employed here.  Setting the Closeness scale at the sample mean, however, does not substantively change the predicted probabilities of each type of tolerance (analysis not shown).

findings that network diversity among closer ties will play a more important role in distinguishing multicultural from absolute tolerators.

This alternative test of close ties combined with the results from the previous subsection confirm what appears to be a stable relationship between network diversity and the likelihood that white youth will subscribe to a more multicultural form of tolerance in Canada. These results were obtained even though important controls were included to account for contextual and background variables that may impact both an individual's exposure to diversity and their political tolerance disposition. In other words, there is strong evidence to support the proposition that network diversity increases the likelihood of multicultural tolerance and decreases the likelihood of both intolerance and absolute tolerance. While distinctions between intolerance and multicultural tolerance seem to be driven more by racial and ethnic diversity among weaker ties, the distinction between multicultural and absolute tolerance appears to be driven directly by a person's closer contact with racialized minorities.

## *A Comment on Inter-Country Differences*

The expectations set out in Chapter 2 were that the relationship between racial and ethnic diversity and political tolerance would be stronger in the Canadian context. The analysis in this chapter provides empirical support for this contention. While some similar, significant patterns were found for white youth in both Canada and Belgium, the Canadian models more consistently conformed to expectations. In Belgium, the lower levels of multicultural tolerance and the failure to consistently find positive effects for racial and ethnic diversity on the probability of multicultural tolerance requires further elaboration.

Belgian youth tend to be more isolated from the types of racial and ethnic diversity which are argued to be at the root of multicultural tolerance. The level of racial diversity, as we saw in Figure 5.3, was significantly lower for whites in Belgium. Unsurprisingly, white youth in Belgium also reported feeling more distant from minorities (.28 compared to .47 on the 0-1 Closeness to Minorities scale). Political intolerance is also significantly higher in the Belgian context. Over half of Belgian respondents have been coded as intolerant (52%), compared with only 38 percent of

Canadian youth. In a related way, the discourse around multiculturalism is also arguably stronger in Canada compared to Belgium. The lower levels on the Closeness to Minorities scale are consistent with other measures of social intolerance available in the CYS,[212] and reflect previous research that has found the Belgian population more generally to be characterized by higher levels of social intolerance than other industrialized countries.[213] This can also be seen in the CYS data in the distribution of disagreement with exclusionary groups: in the Canadian sample, a full 53 percent of respondents strongly disagreed with both racists and skinheads, compared to only 34 percent of Belgian youth. This, in combination with elevated levels of social intolerance, suggests that there may be less room for social interaction to impact attitudes and for positive interaction between majorities and racialized minorities to occur.

Beyond attitudinal differences, there are also important structural differences. Canadian diversity is greater than Belgian diversity: the ethnocultural make-up of Canada has a much greater percentage of minorities than Belgium and these minorities are also characterized by an impressive amount of internal diversity. Recent immigration waves from Asia and South and Central America follow previous waves of immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe, as well as the Caribbean. This diversity was injected into a context that already contained salient First Nations communities and Canadians of African descent. The Belgian context, on the other hand, is primarily white, with minority groups making up a small percentage of the population and characterized largely as "foreigners" who arrived in recent waves of immigration largely from Africa. While immigrants of European-descent actually make up the largest group of immigrants, it is largely immigrants from developing nations that are characterized as racialized "others". Diversity in the Belgian context, then, is characterized by a Belgian-"foreigner" distinction and is largely a new phenomenon. In Canada, in contrast, the population is characterized by a far greater diversity that also has a longer, more established history in the country.

---

[212] For example, a scale of anti-immigrant attitudes (standardized from 0 to 1) which is available in both surveys gives a mean level of .30 for Canadian youth compared to a significantly elevated .49 in Belgium. Similarly, when respondents were asked if they would be willing to date various minority groups, Canadian youth were more open (.49 in Canada compared to .31 in Belgium on a standardized scale from 0 to 1).
[213] See, for example, Weldon (2006) where Belgium is categorized as relatively intolerant of ethnic minorities compared to other European democracies.

That being said, the sampling design used in this study likely accentuated these differences by intentionally over-sampling of large urban areas in Canada where the countries racial and ethnic diversity is most present. In contrast, the Belgian sampling design was representative. This means that the findings in the Canadian case can not be generalized to the entire Canadian population. However, they do suggest that at least in the types of areas where diversity is concentrated, greater exposure to racial and ethnic diversity seems to make multicultural tolerance more likely. It is also likely given current immigration trends that Belgium will experience increasing levels of diversity, particularly in its urban centers.

The question remains whether this diversity will come to be viewed as more normal among future generations who grow up with more diversity in their surroundings. The interactions that Canadian youth have with racialized minorities does not occur in a vacuum but is partly shaped by the history and norms dominant in Canadian society. Of course, concrete evidence for the generational argument is not possible without longitudinal data, but it is consistent with recent work that demonstrates younger generations of educated Americans are increasingly intolerant of racist speech (Chong 2006). While this research links this divergence to the endorsement of multicultural attitudes which represent a changing norm environment on university campuses, I have argued that part of the reason for these changing norms shift is the inclusion of racialized minority groups within higher education and in public life more generally. Rather than a norm shift, what we may be witnessing in Canada is a normalization of increasing ethnocultural diversity. In Canada, where multiculturalism has been an official, and widely endorsed, policy of the government for almost forty years, and where hate speech legislation has successfully withstood court challenges, it may not be surprising that young people overwhelmingly find exclusionary speech intolerable. Both the higher aggregate levels of multicultural tolerance, and the stronger support for the hypothesized relationships in the Canadian data, may partly result from this environment. In Belgium, in contrast, the relative newness of ethnic and racial minorities may impact how

184

minorities and majorities interact in distinct ways from countries that have a longer history of multiculturalism.[214]

Attitudes toward free speech are undoubtedly shaped by the discourses present in a country about the rights and needs of a democratic public. This discourse is likely shaped by the presence and mobilization of minority groups who can challenge and change the nature of democratic deliberation. By expanding our understanding of political tolerance to include multiple perspectives, this study has opened up an important avenue for future research to explore how the nature of democratic attitudes are shaped by a people's social context, both within their immediate social networks as well as in the larger context of the country in which they live.

---

[214] For an argument that changes in diversity are more important than actual levels of diversity for understanding its impact on political attitudes, see Hooghe (2007).

# CHAPTER 6: DIVERSITY OF IDEAS, DIVERSITY OF PEOPLE

The study of tolerance, whether philosophical or empirical, has always been about diversity. How is it that a diversity of perspectives and people can be governed in a way that allows individuals the freedom to think, believe and be who they want to be? The study of political tolerance in political science has developed in this tradition and at its core, celebrates the diversity that democratic politics makes possible. Yet, this dissertation has highlighted the limits of current understandings of political tolerance when the complexities of rights in multicultural societies are considered. Two main research questions have driven this study. First, what limits, if any, do young citizens place on speech rights? And second, how does increasing ethnocultural diversity impact these limits? In this concluding chapter, I will review the answers that this study has provided to these two questions and then in the second section, turn briefly to some of the normative issues that this study has raised with respect to the rights of citizens in multicultural democracies. This discussion concludes with a look at implications this study has for future research.

## _Defining and Studying Attitudes Toward Exclusionary Speech_

It has become clear from this study that a substantial portion of young people do indeed favor some limits on speech. The targets of such limits are largely exclusionary groups who use their rights of free expression to promote intolerance of groups based on their racial, religious, or ethnic backgrounds. Exclusionary speech, which has been defined in this study as speech that has as its intent the marginalization of minorities, is likely to cause harm to individuals or groups. Part of the potential for harm emerges because exclusionary speech is based on histories of oppression and privilege that racialized discourses reinforce. Given the increasing value placed on social inclusion in contemporary, multicultural democracies, exclusionary speech emerges as a key dividing line for young people. One of the major contributions of this study is the development of a theoretical framework which outlines this dynamic in Chapter 1. Three unique features of this framework should be reiterated:

1) Exclusionary speech is identified as a unique subset of objectionable speech,

2) People are argued to be capable of distinguishing among target groups (and in fact do) when making civil liberties judgments based on this distinction, and

3) Such distinctions are shown to be consistent with the guiding values of democratic politics.

This theoretical framework is differs from current accounts of political tolerance, at which this study has been primarily directed. Political tolerance has typically been defined as a willingness to "put up with" groups that one is opposed to, and the prerequisite condition for tolerance is a state of objection or dislike of the group (Sullivan et al. 1982, 2). I have argued that while political tolerance is a question of extending speech rights to objectionable groups, defining politically tolerant attitudes at the individual level requires the nature and target of objection to be taken more fully into account.

This observation leads to a re-conceptualization of political tolerance into three dispositions or categories of individuals. Clearly, some people are simply intolerant and refuse to extend speech rights to any group they dislike, regardless of the level or nature of objection or the context in which such rights are to be enjoyed. This study does not deny their existence, nor question the undesirability of such characteristics in democratic citizens. Yet, two other categories emerge when distinctions are made based on the target groups' exclusionary goals. As is consistent with liberal democratic political theory and current measurement techniques, there are some people who take a principled stand that all speech, however offensive or harmful, should be permitted to be expressed publicly. I have labeled such individuals as subscribing to an absolute form of tolerance. In practical terms, this means isolating individuals who permit objectionable groups *and* exclusionary groups to participate in civil liberties activities. Yet, absolute intolerance and absolute tolerance are not the only possible outcomes. A third possibility includes people who are willing to allow some objectionable groups to express their views publicly, but draw the line when it comes to exclusionary groups. I have called such a disposition multicultural tolerance, because it balances the rights of individuals against the need to recognize and include minority groups in public life. In essence, multicultural

tolerators perform a balancing act that weighs the right to free expression against the rights of minority group members to live free from harassment and discrimination.

The bulk of the dissertation has, in turn, been focused on assessing the empirical validity and implications of this theoretical framework. In Chapter 3, extensive empirical evidence was brought forward to demonstrate that civil liberties judgments across target groups were consistent with these three types of tolerance, even in the face of controls for levels of disagreement and the type of activity under consideration. A second primary contribution of this study was to document and develop a measure of these three types of tolerance, which could then be employed to examine the correlates of political tolerance dispositions. This process of documenting target group distinctions presents an important revision to group-blind approaches of measuring political tolerance. At the same time, the empirical examination of target group judgments also highlights the challenge that censoring speech can pose in practice. Not all variation in levels of political tolerance across target groups can be accounted for simply by distinguishing between objectionable and exclusionary speech. Furthermore, there is certainly some slippage between labeling a group exclusionary and documenting a specific instance of exclusionary speech by a group, and without such specifications or detailed interview data from respondents that capture their thought process, it is impossible to know for certain when people are denying civil liberties for inclusionary reasons. Despite the need for further research, the extensive survey data presented in this study are consistent with such distinctions.

This does not mean that difficult cases do not arise. In the real world of politics, exclusionary speech may not be limited simply to the traditional culprits, such as neo-Nazi and white supremacist movements. The very real possibility emerges that groups who are often seen as the victims of exclusionary speech are themselves promoting exclusionary ideas. This possibility emerged in this study in the case of radical Muslims. Yet, even for such cases, the empirical framework provides some guidance in assessing the extent to which intolerance of radical Muslims was driven by inclusionary goals for internal minorities (such as women) versus a general intolerance. Unlike racists and skinheads, Chapter 1 documented the negative relationship between social tolerance of minorities and intolerance of radical Muslims. I argued that such a relationship suggested that despite the possibility that people were showing higher levels of intolerance of

188

radical Muslims than other groups, this represented a more general fear of non-conformity with similar roots as ethnocentric attitudes.

The role of social tolerance in defining and distinguishing multicultural tolerance from both intolerance and absolute tolerance is the third major contribution of this study. The basic hypothesis was that people exposed to more racial and ethnic diversity would be more likely than other people to ascribe to multicultural tolerance. The reasoning behind this logic is based in the social psychological literature on the contact hypothesis. Greater racial and ethnic diversity in one's social networks is argued to decrease tolerance of exclusionary speech through an affective mechanism. In essence, majority group members who knew people from a racial or ethnic minority were argued to identify more with minorities, which makes exclusionary speech more threatening. At the same time, increased exposure to diversity was also argued to better equip individuals with the cognitive skills that increase tolerance of other objectionable speech. The result of this dual process is multicultural tolerance. The values of free speech and social inclusion can and do exist simultaneously in this version of political tolerance.

The empirical support for these contentions was provided in Chapter 5. In the Canadian case, white youth who had more racial and ethnic diversity were significantly less likely to be either intolerant or absolute tolerators compared to youth in more homogenous networks. Similarly, in Belgium a parallel effect was documented for racial and ethnic diversity. It distinguished multicultural from absolute tolerance, although no significant effect was found for distinguishing the likelihoods of intolerance compared to multicultural tolerance. These findings persisted despite the inclusion of theoretically guided control variables, such as the diversity of the school setting. Furthermore, the results were replicated with an alternative network measure in the Canadian data.

The relationship between racial and ethnic network diversity and multicultural tolerance was argued to be mediated by identification with minority groups. Such a framework drew on the contact hypothesis in social psychology which posits a reduction in intergroup animosity as a result of positive interaction across lines of difference (Allport 1958). Little evidence was found for such a mediating effect in the Canadian models, although the introduction of a variable for identification with minorities did reduce the size and significance of racial and ethnic diversity in the Belgian models.

Despite a failure to find a mediating effect, the implications of the more general affective argument did find support when a further analysis broke down the network diversity measure by strong and weak ties. Closer ties were more important in increasing the likelihood of multicultural tolerance compared to absolute tolerance, which is consistent with a more affective mechanism. This finding held in both the Canadian and Belgian data. Weaker ties were found more important in decreasing the likelihood of intolerance, at least in the Canadian data, which is consistent with a more cognitive mechanism. These results provide support for the general intergroup framework that underpins the analysis. A positive relationship between network diversity and multicultural tolerance were consistently found in the survey data. However, the measure of identification used in this study did not receive strong support as the mediating mechanism. Future research is needed to tease out in more detail the ways in which closer ties affect such distinctions. The use of identification may have been too crude a measure to capture the actual affective processes that underpin this relationship. A focus on measuring directly increased empathy with the victims of exclusionary speech or increased threat of exclusionary groups may provide a fruitful avenue for future research in this regard.

These findings, along with the evidence that multicultural tolerance appears to be fundamentally different than a general intolerance, is suggestive of the underlying proposition that has fueled this study: namely, that multicultural tolerance corresponds to a pattern of tolerance judgments that makes sense in contemporary, multicultural societies. It is not simply a targeted intolerance, which was demonstrated in Chapter 4 through an analysis of the major predictors of political tolerance. The same correlates that have been shown to explain political tolerance, as traditionally defined, were fairly successful at distinguishing the intolerant from multicultural tolerators. Multicultural tolerators are more politically engaged, come for more educated backgrounds, and are less religiously involved than the intolerant. These findings are consistent with previous research that indicates these sorts of demographic variables help distinguish more tolerant individuals.

In sum, then, the results of this study are largely consistent with the four hypotheses set out in Chapter 1. There was evidence that the willingness to extend civil liberties to exclusionary groups was lower than for other groups, despite controlling for

differences in levels of disagreement (*hypothesis 1*). Furthermore, at the individual level, there was evidence that responses across target groups conformed to three types of tolerance: intolerance, multicultural tolerance and absolute tolerance (*hypothesis 2*). Multicultural tolerance was shown to 'walk and talk' like absolute tolerance, despite the fact that by definition, multicultural tolerators have expressed a targeted intolerance of exclusionary speech. It appears that the types of factors that predict intolerance, like political engagement and education, work equally well to distinguish the intolerant from multicultural tolerators (*hypothesis 3*). To explain the emergence of multicultural tolerance compared to absolute tolerance, I drew on the rich social psychological literature on inter-group contact and demonstrated that increased racial and ethnic diversity results in a reduction of tolerance for exclusionary speech (*hypothesis 4a*) and an increase in tolerance of other objectionable speech (*hypothesis 4b*) among Canadian youth. Less support was found for hypotheses 4a and 4b among Belgium youth. In general though, this research has documented the emergence of a substantial part of the youngest generation in Canada, and to a lesser extent in Belgian, who demonstrate relatively tolerant attitudes toward the expression of different ideas, but who simultaneously favor limits when it comes to speech that threatens the equal inclusion of racial, ethnic and religious minorities in public life.

Multicultural tolerance is likely a contemporary phenomenon, brought about by larger changes in norms that shape contemporary discourses about multiculturalism and individual rights in diverse societies. Given these changing norms, it appears that increasing diversity may well foster the types of relationships between majorities and minorities that underpin these contemporary ideas about the limits of tolerance. Yet, more than simply being a question of norms, this study has documented that norms are not imposed from above. They emerge, at least partly, from the experiences individuals have with their fellow citizens. The question obviously remains about the impact these changing ideas may have on democratic politics.

### *Multicultural Tolerance and Democratic Politics*

Democratic politics is a balancing act. In multicultural democracies, this balancing act sometimes brings the rights of individuals into conflict with the rights of

groups. The public expression of exclusionary ideas is such an instance: individual rights to free expression must be balanced against the rights of minorities to live free from harassment and prejudice. I have argued that in many advanced, industrialized democracies, there is room for the courts to decide in favor of the rights of minorities in such instances, despite the overwhelmingly absolute nature of free speech in much of the political science literature. As Horton (1996, 37) notes, "What we need to recognize is that any inculcation of the virtue of toleration (and any coherent form of multiculturalism) must attend to questions about what it is reasonable to object to, as well as about which of those things that are objectionable should be tolerated and which should not."

In contemporary democracies, I would argue that one thing that most would agree is unreasonable to object to is skin color or ethnic origin (as well as sex and sexual preference). On the other hand, it seems perfectly reasonable, and indeed desirable, to object to racial and ethnic prejudice. The normative question, for academics as well as citizens, then becomes whether to tolerate the latter, given the unreasonableness of the former. The answer to this question is contested because both responses at their core have a desire to ensure freedom and facilitate the healthy functioning of democratic politics. In Chapter 1, I raised the democratic rationales for absolute tolerance. Clearly, there are reasons to facilitate the development of human autonomy and to ensure a full and healthy confrontation of ideas. I have no doubt that without such liberties, democratic dialogue and the richness of individual experiences would be degraded. Yet, there is also a legitimate argument to be made that permitting the expression of exclusionary ideas does not further these ends.

It is a social scientific question if and how exclusionary speech actually causes harm and whether it promotes widespread prejudice toward minorities. I think the verdict is still out on this question, despite compelling arguments about how speech can be used to generate hostility and even violence toward marginalized groups in society. The implications of such arguments, if true, go to the heart of defenses of absolute toleration. Does the expression of hatred toward racial and ethnic minorities prevent them from fully enjoying their right to be who they are or want to be? If freedom for individuals to live as they see fit is in fact one of the major rationales underpinning political tolerance

(Kymlicka 1996), then it seems to be an inherently fundamental question the extent to which exclusionary speech denigrates particular choices. More importantly, exclusionary speech denigrates particularly ways of being that in many ways have nothing to do with choices.

The perspectives of individuals, whether they are racialized minorities or part of the privileged majority, are partly shaped by their social status. As Young (1990, 45) points out, "A person's particular sense of history, affinity, and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities." If exclusionary speech demonizes particular categories of people on the basis of some constitutive identity, then targeted, hateful and racist attacks on such identities can prevent minority individuals from fully enjoying who they are, or at least who they perceive themselves to be. Racial hierarchies have long been used to create a sense of shame among those individuals at the bottom of such social structures.[215] Exclusionary speech, therefore, may impact the ability of minorities to fully enjoy the freedom to be who they want to be and to participate in a more authentic way in the broader society. I raise these issues not to fully address the normative questions that exclusionary speech poses, but to highlight the potential for multicultural tolerance to be justified using the same terms of references – individual autonomy and democratic debate – that underpin absolute notions of tolerance.

One of the immediate normative questions that this study raises is what effect the endorsement of multicultural tolerance might have on the functioning of democratic politics in multicultural states. I believe the evidence in this study has provided empirical support for the contention that multicultural tolerance is not simply a targeted intolerance. Rather, multicultural tolerance seems to be a response to the very real challenges that diversity can pose when it comes to balancing rights. Indeed, Chapter 5 provided evidence that it is actual exposure to increasing diversity that helps explain its emergence. I would argue, therefore, that the implications of widespread acceptance of a multicultural form of tolerance differ from fears about the result of widespread intolerance. A willingness to censor exclusionary speech does not appear to spill over to intolerance of all objectionable speech. Whether this is the normative ideal in contrast to absolute tolerance is beyond my purview. What is certain, in my opinion, is that

---

[215] For foundational work in this area, see Fanon (1967).

multicultural tolerance appears to raise fewer concerns when it is adopted by citizens than does a general intolerance of dissenting ideas.

This does not mean to suggest that changes in people's willingness to censor exclusionary speech will not have any negative repercussions for democratic politics. Three risks seem noteworthy. First of all, widespread acceptance of multicultural tolerance may legitimize legal censorship of non-exclusionary speech. Indeed, legitimizing some forms of censorship may provide a means for people to use concepts of exclusion to deny the expressions of ideas they simply do not like. However, caution is required in assuming that such abuses of hate speech legislation would be pervasive. Legal cases charging violations of hate speech codes have only rarely occurred in both Canada and Belgium, which is perhaps an indication that courts may be a safeguard against any overzealous censorship that might be desired by the public in the name of inclusionary goals.

Beyond the risks of legal restrictions, support for a more multicultural form of tolerance may actually be fostered by such prohibitions. Indeed, one of the rationales for having hate speech legislation is because it is prescriptive rather than punitive in many ways: it makes a claim as to what is tolerable and what is not. In practice, actual prosecutions of such cases are few and far between. But when the legal statutes are employed, they can further the goals of such legislation. Weimann and Winn (1986), for example, document increased awareness about anti-Semitism as a result of the highly publicized Keegstra case in Canada.

A second, perhaps more likely, risk is that legitimate speech will be censored not by the courts, but by individuals. The development of a culture of political correctness among the public may make it more difficult for people with legitimate concerns or even illegitimate fears about the pace or direction of social change to express themselves for fear of being labeled a bigot or intolerant. Self-censorship, while it may be a desired outcome when it comes to exclusionary ideas, may also constrain democratic debate. This risk is present, and there are no obvious legislative or institutional constraints that can be put in place to fully minimize it. A healthy commitment to free speech and opportunities for contact between members of the majority and racialized minorities, however, may foster the type of dialogue and language that can be used to communicate

194

across racial, religious and ethnic differences in ways that recognize sometimes incompatible perspectives in more respectful ways. Although popular democratic debate may never meet the standards of democratic deliberation as set out by political theory, there must at least be some shared norms about what must and must not be tolerated.[216] While the creation of a culture of political correctness is a legitimate concern, the alternative seems to be a culture where marginalized groups are asked to shoulder a larger burden for the costs of public discussion than other members in society.

The third risk is the potential for widespread support for multicultural tolerance to lead to legal and social norms being used against the very minorities that such legislation is meant to protect. One of the principles underpinning the definition of exclusionary speech employed in this study is the idea that exclusionary ideas are often based in conceptions about racial hierarchy. When people that are privileged by these ideologies (as well as the structures of society that have developed along side of them) use their voices to promote the exclusion of marginalized groups, this is fundamentally different from challenges that emerge from marginalized communities. Yet, discourses of exclusion and inclusion can easily be turned around to 'save backwards communities from themselves', as is often the case with discourses around women in Muslim communities. The expressed desire to ensure inclusion found in such cases can merely mask paternalistic goals or racialized assumptions about modernity.

Similarly, the staunch individualism that underpins liberal democratic regimes can also be the basis of assumptions of so-called reverse discrimination, where the privileged are argued to be facing exclusion and are not receiving "fair" treatment. But when fair is defined as undifferentiated in the case of exclusionary speech, this same logic can be used to argue that minorities are expressing hateful messages about the majority society. While I recognize the potential for hate speech from a person who is a member of a racialized minority, I think the danger is much greater for legitimate criticism and critiques to be censored in such cases. Furthermore, I fail to see that the other key component of the definition of exclusionary speech, namely the intent and effect of causing harm, is as easily applied in such situations. One of the reasons

---

[216] For a review and discussion of the requirements and limits of democratic deliberation, see a recent published symposium on Habermas (Huspek 2007).

exclusionary speech is argued to have powerful and harmful effects is because it is based in racial hierarchies that provide privilege to some. When the tables are turned, the potential harm of exclusionary speech expressed by minorities seems less likely to cause the sorts of social repercussions that are of concern here.

These three risks, then, all emerge as citizens begin to re-conceptualize ideas about the limits of speech rights in such a way that exclude exclusionary speech. Widespread acceptance of a norm of multicultural tolerance is clearly preferable to widespread intolerance. Yet, there are certainly challenges as well. The risk of censorship of legitimate speech is always a concern, whether by state institutions or the more amorphous mechanisms of censorship that emerge through everyday interaction with other members of society. Such challenges must be weighed against the risks that promoting only absolute conceptions of tolerance have, namely, that speech rights are equally shared in principle, but in practice have the potential in diverse societies to disproportionately place undue burdens on racialized members.

## *Future Directions*

This dissertation has focused on the nature of attitudes about speech rights in contemporary, multicultural democracies. What briefly can be taken away from this study? First, target groups matter in how we understand and measure political tolerance. Conceptualizing political tolerance as a group-blind concept ignores the ways in which civil liberties judgments vary across groups. Second, social networks play an important role in people's political tolerance dispositions. The limits people place on certain target groups are partly driven by the relationships that an individual has with other members of society. Diverse social networks impact the ways in which people balance the competing demands of citizenship. Finally, the study of political tolerance must be sensitive to the prevailing politics contexts in which democratic citizens operate. The failure of previous research to adequately address the legal and normative limits that some democratic societies place on speech has led to a concept and measurement of political tolerance that is bounded by the theoretical and legal environment in which it was developed. And even in the American context, there is some evidence that the opposition between absolute intolerance and absolute tolerance is losing leverage in explaining how newer

196

generations of citizens are thinking about what is and is not appropriate in public debate (Chong 2006).

This study points to several new directions for future research. One direct extension of this work would be to more fully model threat perception into target group distinctions. Threat has been shown to play a key role in explaining variation in political tolerance (Stouffer 1963; Stenner 2005; Huddy et al. 2005; Davis and Silver 2004; Sullivan et al. 1981; Duch and Gibson 1992; Chanley 1994; Gibson and Gouws 2001; Marcus et al. 1995). Marcus and colleagues (1995) have documented how threat can function as both a predisposition (seeing the world as a threatening place) but also as a standing decision about a specific target group that can be further accentuated by contemporary information. Future survey research and interview data should be brought to bear on how threat perception varies across types of target groups, and whether or not the characteristics of exclusionary groups are the source of such distinctions. Such distinctions may partly reflect standing decisions about how threatening exclusionary speech is for democratic politics, but may also elucidate more clearly the mechanism linking network diversity to multicultural tolerance.

Future research can also extend the comparative framework presented in this research. One obvious extension would be to examine tolerance dispositions across generations. This study has focused on young people. It was argued that young people would be more likely to endorse a more multicultural form of tolerance than previous generations, yet this claim is left untested in this analysis. Another of the assumptions of this study was that multicultural tolerance would be more likely to emerge in countries where hate speech legislation had been upheld by the courts. Variation in the levels of multicultural tolerance in the two countries examined here which both have strong legal restraints on exclusionary speech point to other possible influences, such as the norm environment around issues of ethnocultural diversity and the levels of actual diversity and the immigration histories that have led to them. Varying the ethnocultural environment and the presence of hate speech legislation simultaneously would lead to a further clarification of the environments in which multicultural tolerance is likely to emerge, and the relative importance of actual legislative prohibitions in this respect. The inclusion of the United States in such a study is an obvious example, given the relative similarities

with the Canadian context with the notable exception that hate speech restrictions have routinely been struck down by the court system and there is a long-standing policy of official multiculturalism.

In addition to extending the comparative framework of this study, this research has also raised important questions about the socialization of political values. When it comes to political values and attitudes that relate, either directly or indirectly, to various social groups in society, it is important that future studies incorporate people's exposure to those who are hurt and those who benefit from a particular perspective, policy or ideological framework. I have suggested that such contact can be particularly important for people during their adolescence when political values and attitudes are taking shape and when peer group influences are particularly strong. It remains an open research question the extent to which racial and ethnic diversity among adults will have similar effects as those found among the young people in this sample. Moreover, it remains to be seen if networks effects can have lasting effects on political attitudes over time. To assess this claim, longitudinal research is really the only way to assess how changes in the composition of people's networks impact their values, and conversely, how resilient early attitude adoption is as circumstances change over the life course.

Finally, this study suggests the value in bridging normative discussions around democratic values with the empirical study of citizen attitudes. By bringing the complexity of multicultural and critical race critiques of liberal democratic norms to bear on the study of political tolerance, this study has added an important dimension to how political tolerance can be conceived and measured. One of the normative implications of the framework employed here is that liberal democratic politics do not place equal demands or present equal opportunities for participation to all citizens in an undifferentiated manner. As Junn (2004, 254) recently noted, "…interpretations of findings need to provide space for the likelihood that strategic calculations among individuals categorized by race and ethnicity vary systematically as a function of the location of their group in the social and political hierarchy." The study of democratic values needs to strive to take into account alternative conceptions of the rights necessary in a democratic society. More importantly, there needs to be some recognition that the cost of rights is not equally shared by all citizens. By recognizing the potential harm of

exclusionary speech, this study has questioned the extent to which young people place limits on rights that infringe on members of society who bear this burden.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abrams, Dominic, Michael A. Hogg, and Jos© M. Marques. 2005. *The Social Psychology of Inclusion and Exclusion*. New York: Psychology Press.

Abu-Laban, Yasmeen, and Christina Gabriel. 2002. *Selling Diversity: Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization*. Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press.

Adorno, Theodor, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson, and R. Nevitt Sanford. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Wiley.

Ahmad, Fauzia. 2006. "British Muslim Perceptions and Opinions on News Coverage of September 11." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 32 (6):961-82.

Alba, Richard D., and Victor G. Nee. 2003. *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Alesina, Alberto, and Eliana La Ferrara. 2000. "Participation in Heterogeneous Communities." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 115 (3):847-904.

———. 2002. "Who Trusts Others." *Journal of Public Economics* 85 (2):207-34.

Allerbeck, K., M. K. Jennings, and L. Rosenmayr. 1979. "Generations and Families." In *Political Action*, ed. B. S. and M. Kaase. Beverly Hills: Sage.

Allport, Gordon W. 1958. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Abridg ed. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday.

Altemeyer, Robert. 1988. *Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-Wing Authoritarianism*. San Fransisco: Jossey-Bass.

———. 1996. The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA.

Alvarez, R. Michael, and John Brehm. 2002. *Hard Choices, Easy Answers: Values, Information, and American Public Opinion*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Anderson, Benedict R. O'G. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Appleman, Bradley A. 1996. "Hate Speech: A Comparison of the Approaches Taken by the United States and Germany." *Wisconsin International Law Journal* 14:422-.

Avery, Patricia G. 1988. "Political Tolerance Among Adolescents." *Theory and Research in Social Education* 16 (3):183-201.

Avery, Patricia G., John L. Sullivan, and Sandra L. Wood. 1997. "Teaching for Tolerance of Diverse Beliefs." *Theory into Practice* 36 (1, Teaching Conflict Resolution: Preparation for Pluralism):32-8.

Banting, Keith, Thomas J. Courchene, and F. Leslie Seidle, eds. 2007. *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*. Vol. 3. Montreal: IRPP.

Barnes, Barry. 2003. "Tolerance as a Primary Virtue." In *Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy*, ed. D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Barnum, David G., and John L. Sullivan. 1990. "The Elusive Foundations of Political Freedom in Britain and the United States." *The Journal of Politics* 52 (3):719-39.

Beatty, Kathleen Murphy, and Oliver Walter. 1984. "Religious Preference and Practice: Reevaluating Their Impact on Political Tolerance." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48 (1):318-29.

Benhabib, Seyla. 1996. *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 2002. *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era*. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Bennett, W.L. 1998. "The UnCivic Culture: Communication, Identity, and the Rise of Lifestyle Politics." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 31 (4):741-61.

Berelson, Bernard, Paul Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee. 1954. *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Berry, J. W., and Rudolf Kalin. 1995. "Multicultural and Ethnic Attitudes in Canada: An Overview of the 1991 National Survey." *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science* 27 (3):301.

Billiet, J. , and B. Cambré. 1999. "Social Capital, Active Membership in Voluntary Associations and Some Aspects of Political Participation." In *Social Capital and European Democracy*, ed. M. M. Maraffi, K. Newton, J. Van Deth and P. Whiteley. London: Routledge.

Billiet, Jaak, and Hans De Witte. 1995. "Attitudinal Dispositions to Vote for a 'New' Extreme Right-Wing Party: The Case of 'Vlaams Blok'." *European Journal of Political Research* 27:181-202.

Bird, Karen L. 2000. "Racist Speech or Free Speech? A Comparison of the Law in France and the United States." *Comparative Politics* 32 (4):399-418.

Bird, Karen, John L. Sullivan, Patricia G. Avery, Kristina Thalhammer, and Sandra L. Wood. 1994. "Not Just Lip-Synching Anymore: Education and Tolerance Revisited." *Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* 16 (3-4):373-86.

Blake, Donald. 2003. "Environmental Determininants of Racial Attitudes Among White Canadians." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 36 (3):491-509.

Blau, Peter M. 1977. *Inequality and Heterogeneity: A Primitive Theory of Social Structure*. New York: Free Press.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *Pacific Sociological Review* 1 (1):3-7.

Bobo, Lawrence, and Frederick C. Licari. 1989. "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53 (3):285-308.

Boeckman, Robert J., and Jeffrey Liew. 2002. "Hate Speech: Asian American Students' Justice Judgments and Psychological Responses." *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2):363-81.

Boeckman, Robert J., and Carolyn Turpin-Petrosino. 2002. "Understanding the Harm of Hate Crime." *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2):207-25.

Bonilla-Silva, Eduardo. 2001. *White Supremacy and Racism in the Post-Civil Rights Era*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Press.

Bosmajian, Haig. 1974. *The Language of Oppression*. Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press.

Boyle, Kevin. 2001. "Hate Speech - The United States Versus the Rest of the World?" *Maine Law Review* 53 (2):487-502.

Branton, Regina , and Bradford Jones. 2005. "Reexamining Racial Attitudes: The Conditional Relationship Between Diversity and Socio-Economic Environment." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (2):359-72.

Braun, Stefan. 2004. *Democracy Off Balance: Freedom of Expression and Hate Propaganda Law in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Brems, Eva. 2006. "Belgium: The Vlaams Blok Political Party Convicted Indirectly of Racism." *International Journal of Constitutional Law* 4 (4):702-11.

Brewer, Devon D. 2000. "Forgetting in the Recall-Based Elicitation of Personal and Social Networks." *Social Networks* 22 (1):29-43.

Brewer, Devon D., and Cynthia M. Webster. 2000. "Forgetting of Friends and Its Effects on Measuring Friendship Networks." *Social Networks* 21 (4):361-73.

Brison, Susan. 1998. "Speech, Harm, and the Mind-Body Problem in First Amendment Jurisprudence." *Legal Theory* 4 (39):40-61.

Brison, Susan J. 2004. "Speech and Other Acts: A Reply to Charles W. Collier." *Legal Theory* 10 (4):261-72.

Brown, R., and M. Hewstone. 2006. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37:255-343.

Bryant-Davis, Thema, and Carlota Ocampo. 2005. "Racist Incident-Based Trauma." *The Counseling Psychologist* 33 (4):479-500.

Burt, Ronald S. 1997. "The Contingent Value of Social Capital." *Administrative Quarterly* 42:339-65.

Burt, Sandra. 1986. "Different Democracies? A Preliminary Examination of the Political Worlds of Canadian Men and Women." *Women and Politics* 6 (4):57-79.

Butler, Judith. 1997. *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. New York ; London: Routledge.

Campbell, Anges, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald Stokes. 1960. *The American Voter*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Chanley, Virginia. 1994. "Commitment to Political Tolerance: Situational and Activity-Based Differences." *Political Behavior* 16 (3):343-63.

Chong, Dennis. 1993. "How People Think, Reason, and Feel about Rights and Liberties." *American Journal of Political Science* 37 (3):867-99.

———. 2006. "Free Speech and Multiculturalism In and Out of the Academy." *Political Psychology* 27 (1):29-54.

Churchill, Robert Paul. 1997. "On the Difference between Non-Moral and Moral Conceptions of Toleration: The Case for Toleration as an Individual Virtue." In *Philosophy, Religion, and the Question of Intolerance*, ed. M. A. Razavi and D. Ambuel. Albany: State University of New York Press.

———. 2003. "Neutrality and the Virtue of Toleration." In *Toleration, Neutrality and Democracy*, ed. D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer.

Cigler, Allan, and Mark R. Joslyn. 2002. "The Extensiveness of Group Membership and Social Capital: The Impact on Political Tolerance Attitudes." *Political Research Quarterly* 55 (1):7-25.

"Citron v. Zundel."2002. C.H.R.R.

Cohen-Almagor, Raphael, ed. 2000. *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: Essays in Honor and Memory of Yitzhak Rabin*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Cohen, Andrew Jason. 2004. "What Tolerance Is." *Ethics* 115:68-95.

Cohen, Henry. 2003. *Freedom of Speech and Press: Exceptions to the First Amendment*. New York: Novinka Books.

Cohen, Joshua. 1993. "Freedom of Expression." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22:207-63.

Coleman, James. 1988. "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital." *American Journal of Sociology* 94:95-120.

Coliver, Sandra, Kevin Boyle, and Frances D'Souza. 1992. *Striking A Balance: Hate Speech, Freedom of Expression and Non-Discrimination*. London: ARTICLE 19.

Collier, Charles W. 2002. "Hate Speech and the Mind-Body Problem: A Critique of Postmodern Censorship Theory." *Legal Theory* 7 (2):203-34.

Converse, Philip E. 1964. *The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics*. New York: The Free Press.

———. 1970. "Attitudes and Non-Attitudes: Continuation of a Dialogue." In *The Quantitative Analysis of Social Problems*, ed. E. R. Tufte. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Cortese, Anthony Joseph Paul. 2006. *Opposing Hate Speech*. Westport, Conn. :: Praeger Publishers.

Coser, Rose L. 1975. "The Complexity of Roles as a Seedbed of Individual Autonomy." In *The Idea of Social Structure: Papers in Honor of Robert K. Merton*, ed. L. A. Coser. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Cowan, Gloria, and Désirée Khatchadourian. 2003. "Empathy, Ways of Knowing, and Interdependence as Mediators of Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Hate Speech and Freedom of Speech." *Psychology of Women Quarterly* 27:300-8.

Cowan, Gloria, and Jon Mettrick. 2002. "The Effects of Target Variables and Setting on the Perception of Hate Speech." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 32 (2):277-99.

Cowan, Gloria, Miriam Resendez, Elizabeth Marshall, and Ryan Quist. 2002. "Hate Speech and Constitutional Protection: Priming Values of Equality and Freedom." *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2):247-63.

Craig, Stephen C., and Michael D. Martinez, eds. 2005. *Ambivalence, Politics, and Public Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Crenshaw, Kimberlè Williams. 1993. "Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live Crew." In *Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment*, ed. M. J. Matsuda, C. R. Lawrence III, R. Delgado and K. W. Crenshaw. Boulder: Westview Press.

Dalal, Farhad. 2002. *Race, Colour and the Process of Racialization: New Perspectives from Group Analysis, Psychoanalysis and Sociology*. Sussex: Brunner-Routledge.

Dasko, Donna. 2004. "Public Attitudes towards Multiculturalism in Canada." *Canadian Issues*:30.

Davis, Darren W. 1995. "Exploring Black Political Intolerance." *Political Behavior* 17 (1):1-22.

Davis, Darren W., and Brian D. Silver. 2004. "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America." *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (1):28-46.

Dawson, Michael C. 1994. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2001. *Black Visions: The Roots of Contemporary African-American Political Ideologies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

De Raedt, Therese. 2004. "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities." *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* 24 (1):9-30.

De Witte, Hans, and Bert Klandersmans. 2000. "Political Racism in Flanders and the Netherlands: Explaining Differences in the Electoral Success of Extreme Right-Wing Parties." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 26 (4):699-717.

"Decision of Nov. 9, 2004." Cour de Cassation [Cass.].

Delgado, Richard, and Jean Stefancic. 2004. *Understanding Words that Wound*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Delhey, Jan, and Kenneth Newton. 2005. "Predicting Cross-National Levels of Social Trust: Global Pattern or Nordic Exceptionalism." *European Sociological Review* 21 (4):311-27.

Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. 1996. *What Americans Know About Politics and Why It Matters*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Demo, David, and Michael Hughes. 1990. "Socialization and Racial Identity among Black Americans." *Social Psychology Quarterly* 53 (4):364-74.

Deprez, Kas, and Louis Vos, eds. 1998. *Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1790-1995*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh. 1999. "The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A Comparison of American and European Approaches." *William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal* 7:305-46.

Dovidio, John, Samuel L. Gaertner, and Kerry Kawakami. 2003. "Intergroup Contact Theory: The Past, Present, and the Future." *Groups Processes and Intergroup Relations* 6 (1):5-21.

Dovidio, John, Samuel L. Gaertner, Yolanda Flores Niemann, and Kevin Snider. 2001. "Racial, Ethnic and Cultural Differences in Responding to Distinctiveness and Discrimination on Campus: Stigma and Common Group Identity." *Journal of Social Issues* 57 (1):167-88.

Dow, Erin, and Marc Lendler. 2002. "Civil Liberties and the Moderate Thought Police." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 35:549-53.

Downs, Donald Alexander. 1985. *Nazis in Skokie: Freedom, Community and the First Amendment*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

———. 2004. *Restoring Free Speech and Liberty on Campus*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Druckman, James N. 2001. "On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame?" *Journal of Politics* 63 (4):1041-66.

Duch, Raymond M., and James L. Gibson. 1992. ""Putting Up With" Fascists in Western Europe: A Comparative, Cross-Level Analysis of Political Tolerance." *The Western Political Quarterly* 45 (1):237-73.

Dworkin, Ronald M. 1977. *Taking Rights Seriously*. Cambridge: Harvard University
    Press.
———. 1985. *A Matter of Principle*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———. 1996. *Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution*.
    Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
———. 2000. *Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality*. Cambridge,
    Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. "Case Study and Theory in Political Science." In *Handbook of
    Political Science*, ed. F. I. Greenstein and N. W. Polsby. Reading, Mass.:
    Addison-Wesley.
Eisenberg, Avigail, and J. Spinner-Halev, eds. 2006. *Minorities within Minorities:
    Equality, Rights and Diversity*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Ellison, Christopher, and M. Musick. 1993. "Southern Intolerance: A Fundementalist
    Effect?" *Social Forces* 20 (6):579-85.
Erikson, Erik H. 1963. *Childhood and society*. 2d ed. New York,: Norton.
Fanon, Frantz. 1967. *Peau noire, masques blancs*. Translated by C. L. Markham. New
    York: Grove Weidenfeld.
Feinberg, Joel. 1984. *Harm to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law*. Oxford:
    Oxford University Press.
———. 1985. "Offense to Others: The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law."
Feldman, David. 2000. "Protest and Tolerance: Legal Values and the Control of Public
    Order Policing." In *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance*, ed. R.
    Cohen-Almagor. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Finkel, Steven E., and Howard R. Ernst. 2005. "Civic Education in Post-Apartheid South
    Africa: Alternative Paths to the Development of Political Knowledge and
    Democratic Values." *Political Psychology* 26 (3):333-64.
Finkel, Steven E., Lee Sigelman, and Stan Humphries. 1999. "Democratic Values and
    Political Tolerance." In *Measures of Political Attitudes*, ed. J. P. Robinson, P. R.
    Shaver and L. S. Wrightsman. San Diego: Academic Press.
Fiss, Owen M. 1996a. *The Irony of Free Speech*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
———. 1996b. *Liberalism Divided: Freedom of Speech and the Many Uses of State
    Power*. Boulder: Westview Press.
———. 2003. "A Freedom Both Personal and Political." In *On Liberty: John Stuart Mill*,
    ed. D. Bromwich and G. Kateb. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Fletcher, Joseph F. 1990. "Participation and Attitudes toward Civil Liberties: Is There an
    "Educative" Effect?" *International Political Science Review / Revue
    internationale de science politique* 11 (4):439-59.
Fraser, Nicholas. 2001. *The Voice of Modern Hatred: Tracing the Rise of Neo-Fascism in
    Europe*. Woodstock, NY: Overlook Press.
Furman, Wyndol, and Duane Buhrmester. 1992. "Age and Sex Differences in Perceptions
    of Networks of Personal Relationships." *Child Development* 63 (1):103-15.
Gaertner, Samuel L., and John Dovidio. 2000. *Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common
    Ingroup Identity Model*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
Galeotti, Anna E. 2003. "Do We Need Toleration as a Moral Virtue." In *Toleration,
    Neutrality and Democracy*, ed. D. Castiglione and C. McKinnon. Dordrecht,
    Netherlands: Kluwer.

Galston, William A. 2001. "Political Knowledge, Political Engagement, and Civic Education." *Annual Review of Political Science* 4:217-34.

Gelber, Katharine. 2002. *Speaking Back: The Free Speech Versus Hate Speech Debate*. Philadelphia: J. Benjamins Publishing.

Gibbon, John M. 1938. *Canadian Mosaic: The Making of a Northern Nation*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Gibson, James L. 1990. "Pluralism, Federalism and the Protection of Civil Liberties." *The Western Political Quarterly* 43 (3):511-33.

———. 1992a. "Alternative Measures of Political Tolerance: Must Tolerance be "Least-Liked"?" *American Journal of Political Science* 36 (2):560-77.

———. 1992b. "The Political Consequences of Intolerance: Cultural Conformity and Political Freedom." *The American Political Science Review* 86 (2):338-56.

———. 1998a. "Putting up with Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy." *Political Research Quarterly* 51 (1):37-68.

———. 1998b. "A Sober Second Thought: An Experiment in Persuading Russians to Tolerate." *American Journal of Political Science* 42 (3):819-50.

———. 2001. "Social Networks, Civil Society, and the Prospects for Consolidating Russia's Democratic Transition." *American Journal of Political Science* 45 (1):51-68.

———. 2004. *Overcoming Apartheid: Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation?* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

———. 2005a. "On the Nature of Tolerance: Dichotomous or Continuous." *Political Behavior* 27 (4):313-23.

———. 2005b. "Parsimony in the Study of Tolerance and Intolerance." *Political Behavior* 27 (4):339-45.

———. 2006a. "Do Strong Group Identities Fuel Intolerance? Evidence from the South African Case." *Political Psychology* 27 (5):665-706.

———. 2006b. "Enigmas of Intolerance: Fifty Years after Stouffer's *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*." *Perspectives on Politics* 4 (1):21-34.

Gibson, James L., and Richard D. Bingham. 1984. "Skokie, Nazis, and the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *The Western Political Quarterly* 37 (1):32-47.

———. 1985. *Civil Liberties and Nazis: The Skokie Free-Speech Controversy*: Praeger Publishers.

Gibson, James L., and Raymond M. Duch. 1991. "Elitist Theory and Political Tolerance in Western Europe." *Political Behavior* 13 (3):191-212.

Gibson, James L., and Amanda Gouws. 2000. "Social Identities and Political Intolerance: Linkages within the South African Mass Public." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2):278-92.

———. 2001. "Making Tolerance Judgments: The Effects of Context, Local and National." *Journal of Politics* 63 (4):1067-90.

Gidengil, Elisabeth. 1995. "Economic Man - Social Woman: The Case of the Gender Gap in Support for the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement." *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (3):384-408.

Giles, Michael, and Melanie Buckner. 1993. "David Duke and Black Threat: An Old Hypothesis Revisited." *Journal of Politics* 55 (3):702-13.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gimpel, James G., J. Celeste Lay, and Jason E. Schuknecht. 2003. *Cultivating Democracy: Civic Environments and Political Socialization in America*. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Golebiowska, Ewa A. 1995. "Individual Value Priorities, Education, and Political Tolerance." *Political Behavior* 17 (1):23-48.

———. 1996. "The "Pictures in Our Heads" and Individual-Targeted Tolerance." *Journal of Politics* 58 (4):1010-34.

———. 1999. "Gender Gap in Political Tolerance." *Political Behavior* 21 (1):43-66.

———. 2000. "The Etiology of Individual-Targeted Intolerance: Groups Stereotypes and Judgments of Individual Group Members." *Political Psychology* 21 (3):443-64.

———. 2001. "Individual-Targeted Tolerance and Timing of Group Membership Disclosure." *Journal of Politics* 63 (4):1017-40.

Gordon, Milton. 1964. *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Granovetter, Mark. 1973. "The Strength of Weak Ties." *American Journal of Sociology* 78 (6):1360-80.

———. 1983. "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." *Sociological Theory* 1:201-33.

Green, Donald Philip, and Lisa Michelle Waxman. 1987. "Direct Threat and Political Tolerance: An Experimental Analysis of the Tolerance of Blacks Toward Racists." *Political Opinion Quarterly* 51 (2):149-65.

Greenawalt, Kent. 1995. *Fighting Words: Individuals, Communities, and Liberties of Speech*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Greenberg, Jeff, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1985. "The Effect of an Overheard Slur on Evaluations of the Target: How to Spread a Social Disease." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 21:61-72.

Greenstein, Fred I. 1965. *Children and Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Griffiths, Ann L., ed. 2002. *Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Gross, Kimberly A., and Donald R. Kinder. 1998. "A Collision of Principles? Free Expression, Racial Equality and the Prohibition of Racist Speech." *British Journal of Political Science* 28 (3):445-71.

Guth, James L., and John C. Green. 1991. "An Ideology of Rights: Support for Civil Liberties among Political Activists." *Political Behavior* 13 (4):321-44.

Harel, Alon. 1992. "Bigotry, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Theory of Unprotected Speech." *Southern California Law Review* 65:1887-931.

———. 1996. "The Boundaries of Justifiable Tolerance: A Liberal Perspective." In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. D. Heyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Harris, David. 1995. "Exploring the Determinants of Adult Black Identity: Context and Process." *Social Forces* 74 (1):227-41.

Hero, Rodney. 1998. *Faces of Inequality: Social Diversity in American Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2003. "Social Capital and Racial Inequality in America." *Perspectives on Politics* 1:113-22.

Hess, Robert D., and Judith Torney-Purta. 1967. *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.

Heyd, David. 1996a. "Introduction." In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. D. Heyd. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

———. 1996b. *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Hogg, M.A., and D. Abrams, eds. 2001. *Intergroup Relations : Essential Readings*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.

Hooghe, Marc. 2003. "Value Congruence and Convergence Within Voluntary Associations: Ethnocentrism in Belgian Organizations." *Political Behavior* 25 (2):151-75.

———. 2007. "Social Capital and Diversity: Generalized Trust, Social Cohesion and Regimes of Diversity." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 40 (3):709-32.

Hooghe, Marc, Ellen Claes, Yves Dejaeghere, and Ellen Quintellier. 2006. *Belgian Youth Survey*. Leuven: KU Leuven. Data set.

Hooghe, Marc, Ellen Quintellier, Ellen Claes, Yves Dejaeghere, and Allison Harell. 2007a. "De Houding Van Jongeren ten Aanzien van Hlebi-Rechten. Een Kwantitatieve en Kwalitatieve Analyse." Leuven, Belgium: Rapport Gemaakt in Opdracht van Minister Kathleen Van Brempt.

Hooghe, Marc, Tim Reeskens, and Dietlind Stolle. 2007b. "Diversity, Multiculturalism, and Social Cohesion: Trust and Ethnocentrism in European Societies." In *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada*, ed. K. Banting, T. J. Courchene and F. L. Seidle. Montreal: IRPP.

Horton, John. 1994. "Three (Apparent) Paradox of Toleration." *Philosophical Studies* 9:7-20.

———. 1996. "Toleration as a Virtue." In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. D. Heyd. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Horton, John, and Susan Mendus, eds. 1991. *John Locke: A Letter Concerning Toleration in Focus*. London ; New York: Routledge.

Horton, John, and Peter Nicholson, eds. 1992. *Toleration: Philosophy and Practice*. London Ashgate Publishing.

Huckfeldt, Robert., J.M. Mendez, and Tracy Osborn. 2004. "Disagreement, Ambivalence, and Engagement: The Political Consequences of Heterogeneous Networks." *Political Psychology* 25 (1):65-95.

Huddy, Leonie, Stanley Feldman, Charles Taber, and Gallya Lahav. 2005. "Threat, Anxiety and Support of Anti-Terrorist Policies." *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3):595-608.

Hurwitz, Jon, and Jeffery J. Mondak. 2002. "Democratic Principles, Discrimination and Political Intolerance." *British Journal of Political Science* 32:93-118.

Huspek, Michael. 2007. "Symposium: Habermas and Deliberative Democracy." *Communication Theory* 17 (4).

Iceland, John, Daniel Weinberg, and Erika Steinmetz. 2002. *Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in the United States: 1980-2000*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau.

Imbleau, Martin. 2003. *La Négation du Génocide Nazi: Liberté d'Expression ou Crime Raciste?* Paris :: L'Harmattan.

Inglehart, Ronald, and G. Catterberg. 2002. "Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43 (1):300-16.

Jacobson, Daniel. 2000. "Mill on Liberty, Speech, and the Free Society." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 29 (3):276-309.

Jelen, Ted G., and Clyde Wilcox. 1990. "Denominational Preference and the Dimensions of Political Tolerance." *Sociological Analysis* 51 (1):69-81.

Joyner, Kara. 2000. "School Racial Composition and Adolescent Racial Homophily." *Social Science Quarterly* 81 (3):810-25.

Junn, Jane. 2004. "Diversity, Immigration and the Politics of Civic Education." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 37 (2):253-6.

Kalin, Rudolf, and J.W. Berry. 1995. "Ethnic and Civic Self-Identity in Canada: Analyses of 1974 and 1991 National Surveys." *Canadian Ethnic Studies.* 27 (2):1-15.

Kalin, Rudolph. 1996. "Ethnic Attitudes as a Function of Ethnic Presence." *Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science* 28 (3):171-9.

Kandel, Denise 1978. "Homophily, Selection, and Socializtion in Adolescent Friendships." *American Journal of Sociology* 84 (2):427-36.

Kelly, Paul J., ed. 2002. *Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and Its Critics*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.

King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (2):347-61.

Kinsella, Warren. 2001. *Web of Hate: Inside Canada's Far Right Network*. Rev. & updated to include the Internet ed. Toronto: HarperCollins.

Kirkland, Shari L., Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. 1987. "Further Evidence of the Deleterious Effects of Overheard Ethnic Slurs: Derogation Beyond the Target." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 13:216-27.

Kirtschelt, Herbert. 1995. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Kuklinski, James H., Ellen Riggle, Victor Ottati, Norbert Schwarz, and Robert S. Wyer, Jr. 1991. "The Cognitive and Affective Bases of Political Tolerance Judgments." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (1):1-27.

Kymlicka, Will. 1989. *Liberalism, Community and Culture*. New York: Clarendon Press.

———. 1995a. *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights*. Oxford ; New York: Clarendon Press.

———. 1995b. *The Rights of Minority Cultures*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 1996. "Two Models of Pluralism and Tolerance." In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. D. Heyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 1998. *Finding Our Way: Rethinking Ethnocultural Relations in Canada*. Toronto: Oxford University Press.

———. 2001. *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship*. Oxford New York: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, Will, and Wayne Norman. 2000. *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Lambe, Jennifer. 2004. "Who Wants to Censor Pornography and Hate Speech." *Mass Communication and Society* 7 (3):279-99.

Larsson, Goran. 2005. "The Impact of Global Conflicts on Local Contexts: Muslims in Sweden after 9/11 - the Rise of Islamophobia, or New Possibilities." *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 16 (1):29-42.

Lawrence, Charles R. 1990. "If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus." *Duke law Journal*:431-8.

Leets, Laura. 2002. "Experiencing Hate Speech: Perceptions and Responses to Anti-Semitism and Antigay Speech." *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2):341-61.

Lijphart, Arend. 1971. "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method." *American Political Science Review* 65 (3):682-93.

Lin, Nan, Karen S. Cook, and Ronald S. Burt. 2001. *Social Capital: Theory and Research*: Aldine de Gruyter.

Lipstadt, Deborah. 1993. *Denying the Holocaust: The Growing Assault on Truth and Memory*. New York: Penguin.

Long, J. Scott. 1997. *Regression Models for Categorical and Limited Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Mackey, Eva. 2002. *The House of Difference: Cultural Politics and National Identity in Canada*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

MacKinnon, Catharine A. 1993. *Only Words*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Maddens, Bart, and Kristine Vanden Berghe. 2003. "The Identity Politics of Multicultural Nationalism: A Comparison Between the Regular Public Addresses of the Belgian and the Spanish Monarchs (1990-2000)." *European Journal of Political Research* 42:601-27.

Marcus, George E., John L. Sullivan, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Sandra L. Wood. 1995. *With Malice Toward Some: How People Make Civil Liberties Judgments*. Cambridge ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Marcuse, Herbert. 1969. "Repressive Tolerance." In *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, ed. R. P. Wolff, B. Moore and H. Marcuse. Boston: Beacon Press.

Marquart-Pryatt, Sandra, and Pamela Paxton. 2006. "In Principle and In Practice: Learning Political Tolearnce in Eastern and Western Europe." *Political Behavior* 29 (1):89-113.

Marschall, Melissa, and Dietlind Stolle. 2004. "Race and the City: Context and the Development of Generalized Trust." *Political Behavior* 26 (2):125-53.

Marsden, P.V. 1987. "Core Discussion Networks of Americans." *American Sociological Review* 10:57-76.

Martin, Robert. 1995. "Group Defamation in Canada." In *Group Defamation and Freedom of Speech: The Relationship between Language and Violence*, ed. M. E. Freedman and E. M. Freedman. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

Martinot, Steve. 2002. *The Rule of Racialization: Class, Identity and Governance*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Matsuda, Mari J. 1993. "Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story." In *Words That Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment*, ed. M. J. Matsuda, C. R. Lawrence III, R. Delgado and K. W. Crenshaw. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Matsuda, Mari J., Charles R. Lawrence, Richard Delgado, and Kimberlè Williams Crenshaw. 1993. *Words that Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment*. San Fransisco: Westview Press.

McClosky, Herbert. 1964. "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics." *American Political Science Review* 58:361-82.

McCutcheon, Allan L. 1985. "A Latent Class Analysis of Tolerance for Nonconformity in the American Public." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (4):474-88.

McKinnon, Catriona. 2003. "Toleration and the Character of Pluralism." In *The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies*, ed. C. McKinnon and D. Castiglione. New York: Manchester University Press.

McKinnon, Catriona, and Dario Castiglione. 2003. *The Culture of Toleration in Diverse Societies: Reasonable Tolerance*. New York: Palgrave.

McLaren, Lauren M. 2003. "Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: Contact, Threat Perception and Preferences for the Exclusion of Migrants." *Social Forces* 81 (3):909-36.

McPherson, J. Miller, and Lynn Smith-Lovin. 1987. "Homophily in Voluntary Organizations: Status Distance and the Composition of Face-to-Face Groups." *American Sociological Review* 52 (3):370-9.

McPherson, Miller, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M. Cook. 2001. "Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social Networks." *Annual Review of Sociology* 27:415-44.

Meiklejohn, Alexander. 2000. *Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government*. Union, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange.

Mendus, Susan. 1989. *Toleration and the Limits of Liberalism*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International.

———, ed. 1988. *Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives*. Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

———, ed. 2000. *The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Micheletti, Michele, A. Follesdal, and Dietlind Stolle. 2003. *Politics, Products and Markets: Exploring Political Consumerism Past and Present*. Rutgers: Transaction Publishers.

Mill, John Stuart. 2003. "On Liberty." In *On Liberty: John Stuart Mill*, ed. D. Bromwich and G. Kateb. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Miller, Arthur, Tor Wynn, Phil Ullrich, and Mollie Marti. 2001. "Concept and Measurement Artifact in Multiple Values and Value Conflict Models." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2):407-19.

Miller, Steven D., and David O. Sears. 1986. "Stability and Change in Social Tolerance: A Test of the Persistence Hypothesis." *American Journal of Political Science* 30 (1):214-36.

Mondak, Jeffery J., and Mitchell S. Sanders. 2003. "Tolerance and Intolerance, 1976-1998." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (3):492-502.

———. 2005. "The Complexity of Tolerance and Intolerance Judgments: A Response to Gibson." *Political Behavior* 27 (4):324-38.

Moore, Laura M., and Seth Ovadia. 2006. "Accounting for Spatial Variation in Tolerance: The Effects of Education and Religion." *Social Forces* 84 (4):2205-22.

Moran, May. 1994. "Talking About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate Speech." *Wisconsin Law Review* (6):1425-514.

Morelli, Anne, and Jean-Philippe Schreiber. 1998. "Are the Immigrants the Last Belgians?" In *Nationalism in Belgium: Shifting Identities, 1780-1995*, ed. K. Deprez and L. Vos. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Mullen, Brian. 2001. "Ethnophaulisms for Ethnic Immigrant Groups." *Journal of Social Issues* 57 (3):457.

Mutz, Diana. 2002a. "The Consequences of Cross-Cutting Networks for Political Participation." *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (4):838-55.

———. 2002b. "Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice." *American Political Science Review* 96 (1):111-26.

———. 2006. *Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Nagel, Thomas. 1995. "Personal Rights and Public Space." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 24 (2):83-107.

Nelson, Thomas, Rosalee Clawson, and Zoe Oxley. 1997. "Media Framing of Civil Liberties Conflict and Its Effect on Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 91:567-83.

"New York Times Company v. Sullivan."1964. U.S.

Newey, Glen. 1992. "Fatwa and Fiction: Censorship and Toleration"." In *Toleration: Philosophy and Practice*, ed. J. Horton and P. Nicholson. London: Ashgate Publishing.

———. 2001. "Is Democratic Toleration a Rubber Duck?" *Res Publica* 7 (3):315-36.

Nie, Norman H., Jane Junn, and Kenneth Stehlik-Barry. 1996. *Education and Democratic Citizenship in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Nielson, Laura Beth. 2002. "Subtle, Pervasive, Harmful: Racist and Sexist Remarks in Public as Hate Speech." *Journal of Social Issues* 58 (2):265-80.

Niemi, Richard G., and Jane Junn. 1998. *Civic education : what makes students learn*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Nunn, Clyde Z., Harry J. Crockett, and Allen J. Williams. 1978. *Tolerance for Nonconformity*. 1st ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

O'Donnell, John P. 1993. "Predicting Tolerance of New Religious Movements: A Multivariate Analysis." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 32 (4):356-65.

O'Neill, Brendon. 2007. *"Irving? Let the Guy Go Home"*. BBC News Online, January 4 2006 [cited December 18 2007]. Available from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4578534.stm.

O'Neill, Daniel I. 1999. "Multicultural Liberals and the Rushdie Affair: A Critique of Kymlicka, Taylor, and Walzer." *Review of Politics* 61 (2):219-50.

Okin, Susan Moller. 1999. *Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Tali Mendelberg. 2000. "Reconsidering the Environmental Determinants of White Racial Attitudes." *American Journal of Political Science* 44 (3):574-89.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Janelle Wong. 2003. "Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings." *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4):567-82.

Page, Scott E. 2007. *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Pal, Lesley. 1993. *Interests of State: The Politics of Language, Multiculturalism and Feminism in Canada*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Panagopoulos, Costas. 2006. "Arab and Muslim Americans and Islam in the Aftermath of 9/11." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 70 (4):608-24.

Parekh, Bhikhu. 1995. "The Rushdie Affair: Research Agenda for Political Philosophy." In *The Rights of Minority Cultures*, ed. W. Kymlicka. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2006. "Hate Speech: Is There a Case for Banning?" *Public Policy Research* 12 (4):213-23.

Parekh, Bhikhu C. 2000. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Pateman, Carole. 1983. "Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Dichotomy." In *Public and Private in Social Life*, ed. S. J. Benn and G. F. Gauss. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Patterson, John W. 1979. "Moral Development and Political Thinking: The Case of Freedom of Speech." *Western Political Quarterly* 32 (1):7-20.

Paul, Ellen Frankel, Fred Dycus Miller, and Jeffrey Paul. 2004. *Freedom of Speech*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Peffley, Mark, Pia Knigge, and Jon Hurwitz. 2001. "A Multiple Values Model of Political Tolerance." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 (2):379-406.

Peffley, Mark, and Robert Rohrschneider. 2003. "Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-Level Model of Democratic Learning." *Political Research Quarterly* 56 (3):243-57.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. 1998a. "Intergroup Contact Theory." *Annual Review of Psychology* 49:65-85.

———. 1998b. "Reactions toward the New Minorities of Western Europe." *Annual Review of Sociology* 24:77-103.

Prothro, James W. , and Charles M. Grigg. 1960. "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement." *Journal of Politics.* 22 (2):276-94.

Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

———. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30 (2):137-74.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and Anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60 (4):586-611.

"R v. Keegstra."1990. S.C.R.

"R. v. Zundel."1992. S.C.R.

"R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul."1992. U.S.

Raz, Joseph. 1994. "Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective." *Dissent* 41:67-79.

Razack, Sherene, ed. 2002. *Race, Space and the Law: Unmapping a White Settler Society*. Toronto: Between the Lines.

Reich, Carol, and Mary Purbhoo. 1975. "The Effects of Cross-Cultural Context." *Canadian Journal of Behavioral Science* 7 (4):311-27.

Rice, Tom, and Brent Steele. 2001. "White Ethnic Diversity and Community Attachment in Small Iowa Towns." *Social Science Quarterly* 82 (2):397-407.

Roberts, Julian V. 1999. "Disproportionate Harm: Hate Crime in Canada." In *Diversity and Justice in Canada*, ed. J. A. Winterdyk and D. E. King. Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press.

Rohit, Barot, and John Bird. 2001. "Racialization: The Geneology and Critique of a Concept." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24 (4):601-18.

Rose, Flemming. 2006. "Why I Published Those Cartoons." *The Washington Post*, February 19, 2006, B01.

Rosenfeld, Michel. 2003. "Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Comparative Analysis." *Cardozo Law Review* 24 (4):1523-67.

Sampson, Robert J. 1998. "Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences." *Law and Society Review* 32 (4):777-804.

Sapiro, Virginia. 2004. "Not Your Parents' Political Socialization: Introduction to a New Generation." *Annual Review of Political Science* 7 (1-23).

Saris, Willem, and Paul Sniderman, eds. 2004. *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Non-Attitudes, Measurement Error and Change*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Scanlon, Thomas. 1972. "A Theory of Freedom of Expression." *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1 (2):204-24.

Schain, Martin, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick Hossay, eds. 2002. *Shadows over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave.

Schauer, Frederick. 2000. "The Cost of Communicative Tolerance." In *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance*, ed. R. Cohen-Almagor. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Schuman, Howard, and Stanley Presser. 1996. *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Shamir, Michal. 1991. "Political Intolerance among Masses and Elites in Israel: A Reevaluation of the Elitist Theory of Democracy." *The Journal of Politics* 53 (4):1018-43.

Simon, L, and Jeff Greenberg. 1996. "Further Progress in Understanding the Effects of Derogatory Ethnic Labels: The Role of Preexisting Attitudes Toward the Targeted Group." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 22:1195-204.

Skitka, Linda J., Christopher W. Bauman, and Elizabeth Mullen. 2004. "Political Tolerance and Coming to Psychological Closure Following the September 11, 2001, Terrorist Attacks: An Integrative Approach." *Pers Soc Psychol Bull* 30 (6):743-56.

Smith, Andrea, and Barry Schneider. 2000. "The Inter-Ethnic Friendships of Adolescents: A Canadian Study." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 24:247-58.

Smith, Anthony Douglas. 1987. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford; New York: Blackwell.

"Smith v. Collin."1978. U.S.

Sniderman, Paul M. 2000. *The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Sniderman, Paul M., Richard A. Brody, and Philip Tetlock. 1991a. *Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology*. Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sniderman, Paul M., Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, and Philip Tetlock. 1996. *The Clash of Rights: Liberty, Equality, and Legitimacy in Pluralist Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sniderman, Paul M., Joseph F. Fletcher, Peter H. Russell, Philip E. Tetlock, and Brian J. Gaines. 1991b. "The Fallacy of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and Commitment to Civil Liberties." *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (3):349-70.

Sniderman, Paul M., and Thomas Leonard Piazza. 2002. *Black Pride and Black Prejudice*. Princeton, N.J. ; Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Soroka, Stuart, Keith Banting, and Richard Johnston. 2007. "Ethnicity, Trust and the Welfare State." In *Diversity, Social Capital and the Welfare State*, ed. F. Kay and R. Johnston. Vancouver: UBC Press.

Sotelo, Maria Jose. 1999. "Gender Differences in Political Tolerance Among Adolescents." *Journal of Gender Studies* 8 (2):211-7.

———. 2000. "Individual Differences in Political Tolerance Among Adolescents." *Social Behavior and Perosnality* 28 (2):185-92.

Stasiulis, Daiva, and Nira Yuval-Davis, eds. 1995. *Unsettling Settler Societies: Articulations of Gender, Race, Ethnicity and Class*. London; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Stein, Eric. 1986. "History Against Free Speech: The New German Law Against the "Auschwitz" - and Other - "Lies"." *Michigan Law Review* 85:277-.

Stenner, Karen Lee. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Stolle, Dietlind. 2001. "Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining and Association." In *Trust in Society*, ed. K. S. Cook. New York: Russell Sage Foundation Series on Trust.

Stolle, Dietlind, Allison Harell, Valerie-Anne Mahéo, and Laura Nishikawa. 2006. *McGill Youth Survey*. Montreal: McGill University. Data set.

Stolle, Dietlind, and Marc Hooghe. 2004a. "The Roots of Social Capital: Attitudinal and Network Mechanisms in the Relation between Youth and Adult Indicators of Social Capital." *Acta Politica* 39:422-41.

———. 2004b. "The Roots of Social Capital: Attitudinal and Network Mechanisms in the Relation between Youth and Adult Indicators of Social Capital." *Acta Politica* 39 (4):422-41.

———. 2006. *Comparative Youth Survey: First Wave*. McGill/Leuven. Data set.

Stolle, Dietlind, Marc Hooghe, Allison Harell, and Madeleine Gauthier. 2005. *Youth, Diversity and Citizenship Questionnaire*. Montreal: McGill University.

Stolle, Dietlind, Stuart Soroka, and Richard Johnston. forthcoming. "When Does Diversity Erode Trust?  Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust, and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions." *Political Studies*.

Stouffer, Samuel Andrew. 1963. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind*. Gloucester, Mass.,: P. Smith.

Sullivan, John L., George E. Marcus, Stanley Feldman, and James E. Piereson. 1981. "The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis." *The American Political Science Review* 75 (1):92-106.

Sullivan, John L., James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus. 1979. "An Alternate Conceptualization of Political Tolerance." *American Political Science Review* 73 (3):781-94.

———. 1982. *Political Tolerance and American Democracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Sullivan, John L., Michal Shamir, Pat Walsh, and N.S. Roberts. 1985. *Political Tolerance in Context*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Sullivan, John L., Pat Walsh, Michal Shamir, David G. Barnum, and James L. Gibson. 1993. "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23 (1):51-76.

Sumner, L.W. 1994. "Hate Propoganda and Charter Rights." In *Free Expression: Essays in Lay and Philosophy*, ed. W. J. Waluchow. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 2000. "Should Hate Speech be Free Speech? John Stuart Mill and the Limits of Tolerance." In *Liberal Democracy and the Limits of Tolerance: Essays in Honor and Memory of Yitzhak Rabin*, ed. R. Cohen-Almagor. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

———. 2004. *The Hateful and the Obscene: Studies in the Limits of Free Expression*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Sunstein, Cass R. 1993. *Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech*. New York: The Free Press.

———. 2003. *Why Societies Need Dissent*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tafjel, Henry, and John C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, ed. W. G. Austin and S. Worchel. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Taylor, Charles, and Amy Gutmann. 1992. *Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition: An Essay*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 1994. *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, and John R. Hibbing. 2005. "Citizenship and Civic Engagement." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8:227-49.

Tolbert, Caroline, and John Grummel. 2003. "Revisiting the Racial Threat Hypothesis: White Voter Support for California's Proposition 209." *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 3 (2):183-202.

Torney-Purta, Judith. 2001. *Citizenship and Education in Twenty-Eight Countries: Civic Knowledge and Engagement at Age Fourteen*. Amsterdam: International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement.

Tsesis, Alexander. 2002. *Destructive Messages: How Hate Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements*. New York ; London: New York University Press.

Tuch, Steven A. 1987. "Urbanism, Region, and Tolerance Revisited: The Case of Racial Prejudice." *American Sociological Review* 52 (4):504-10.

Van Der Brug, Wouter, Meindert Fennema, and Jean Tillie. 2000. "Anti-Immigrant Parties in Europe: Ideological or Protest Vote." *European Journal of Political Research* 37 (1):77-102.

Vogt, W. Paul. 1997. *Tolerance and Education: Learning to Live with Diversity and Difference*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Walker, Samual. 1994. *Hate Speech: The History of an American Controversy*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.

Walzer, Michael. 1997. *On Toleration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Weigel, Daniel, and Deborah Ballard-Reisch. 1999. "How Couples Maintain Marriages: A Closer Look at Self and Spouse Influences Upon the Use of Maintenance Behaviors in Marriages." *Family Relations* 48 (3):263-9.

Weimann, Gabriel, and Conrad Winn. 1986. *Hate on Trial: The Zundel Affair, the Media, and Public Opinion in Canada*. Oakville: Mosaic Press.

Weinstein, James. 1999. *Hate Speech, Pornography, and the Radical Attack on Free Speech Doctrine*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.

Weissberg, Robert. 1998. *Political Tolerance: Balancing Community and Diversity*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.

Weldon, Steven A. 2006. "The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2):331-49.

Williams, Bernard. 1996. "Toleration: An Impossible Virtue." In *Toleration: An Elusive Virtue*, ed. D. Heyd. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. "Tolerating the Intolerable." In *The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life*, ed. S. Mendus. Durham: Duke University Press.

Williams, Susan Hoffman. 2004. *Truth, Autonomy, and Speech: Feminist Theory and the First Amendment*. New York ; London :: New York University Press.

Wilson, Thomas C. 1985. "Urbanism and Tolerance: A Test of Some Hypotheses Drawn from Wirth and Stouffer." *American Sociological Review* 50 (1):117-23.

———. 1986. "Community Population Size and Social Heterogeneity: An Empirical Test." *American Journal of Sociology* 91 (5):1154-69.

———. 1991. "Urbanism, Migration, and Tolerance: A Reassessment." *American Sociological Review* 56:117-23.

———. 1994. "Trends in Tolerance Toward Rightist and Leftist Groups, 1976-1988: Effects of Attitude Change and Cohort Succession." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 58 (4):539-56.

Wirth, Louis. 1938. "Urbanism as a Way of Life." *American Journal of Sociology* 44 (2):3-24.

Wolfson, Nicholas. 1997. *Hate Speech, Sex Speech, Free Speech*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger.

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Youniss, James. 1980. *Parents and Peers in Social Development: A Sullivan-Piaget Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zuckerman, Alan S. 2005. *The Social Logic of Politics: Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Zukin, Cliff, Scott Keeter, Molly Andolina, Krista Jenkins, and Michael Delli Carpini. 2006. *A New Engagement? Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing American Citizen*. New York: Oxford University Press.

# APPENDIX

---

## *Question Wording and Scale Details*

### *Political Tolerance*

The survey included two batteries of questions for five different groups. Answer categories are dichotomous (yes/no).

"For each of these groups, please indicate if they should be allowed to do the activities listed: Hold a peaceful march in your neighborhood? / Talk on public Television about their views?"

1) Gay Rights Activists?
2) Quebec Separatists/Flemish Separatists? [217]
3) Skinheads (white power groups)?
4) Racists?
5) Radical Muslims?

These ten questions are used individually in the analysis. In addition to the single items, a tolerance typology is developed that categorizes people based on combinations of responses to different types of groups. For detailed descriptions, see Chapter 3. Coding is 0=Intolerant, 1=Multicultural Tolerance, 2=Absolute Tolerance.

### *Agreement/Disagreement Scale*

"How much do you agree or disagree with the beliefs of the following groups?"

1) Gay Rights Activists?
2) Quebec Separatists/Flemish Separatists? [218]
3) Skinheads (white power groups)?

---

[217] Quebec Separatists were asked in the Canadian questionnaire, and Flemish Separatists was included in the Belgian questionnaire.
[218] Quebec Separatists were asked in the Canadian questionnaire, and Flemish Separatists was included in the Belgian questionnaire.

4) Racists?

5) Radical Muslims?

Responses were on an 11-point scale from strongly disagree=0 to strongly agree=10. It should be noted that in the original survey wording, the English version of the McGill Youth Study reversed the labels of this scale. All items have been recoded to run from strongly disagree to strongly agree. At times in the analysis, the scale has been limited only to those on the disagreement half of the scale (i.e. from 0 to 4).

*Racial/Ethnic Network Diversity*

Respondents were asked:

1) How many of your close friends belong to a different race [or ethnicity] than you?

2) At school, how many of the people you talk to **besides your close friends** belong to a different race [or ethnicity] than you?

Seven answer categories were possible from 0=none to 6=all. In the analysis, these questions are analyzed separately and referred to as racial/ethnic diversity among close friends (1) and acquaintances (2). The two questions were also combined into a single scale 'Racial/Ethnic Diversity of Networks', a composite of the two items standardized from 0 to 6. In the English version of the McGill Youth Study, "or ethnicity" was not included in the question wording.

*Political Network Diversity*

Respondents were asked:

1) How many of your close friends often disagree with you on public issues and politics?

2) At school, how many of the people you talk to **besides your close friends** often disagree with you on public issues and politics?

Seven answer categories were possible from 0=none to 6=all. The two questions were combined into a single scale 'Political Diversity of Networks', a composite of the two items standardized from 0 to 6.

220

## % Racialized Minority in  School

A measure was derived to capture the racialized diversity present at the school.  The measure was created from the derived variable for racialized minority (0=white, 1=racialized minority).  The mean racialized minority in each school was computed, which captures the percent of respondents surveyed that were coded as a racialized minority.

## Named Minority Friend

In the McGill Youth Study, respondents were asked "What is the first name and last name initial of your two closest friends in your class (i.e. John C., Marie J.)?"  The names listed were matched to the ID number of the named friend, and a dummy variable was created if at least one of these friends was coded as a racialized minority.  0=neither named friend is a racialized minority, 1=one or both friends is a racialized minority.

## Anti-Immigrant Scale

This variable is an additive scale of responses to the following questions.
1) "It is better for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions."
2) "If a country wants to reduce tensions, it should stop immigration."
3) "The presence of too many immigrants is a threat to our way of life."
4) "The arrival of new immigrants will make it harder for me to get a decent job later on."

The original answer categories were four-point scales from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  Alpha Cronbach score is .815.  The scale runs from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate more hostile attitudes toward immigrants.  In cases where valid responses were not provided for all four questions, missing values were replaced if at least three valid responses were available.   The mean of the responses to the three valid questions were

imputed for the missing values in these cases.  This imputation increased the valid number of cases from 8418 to 8629.

*Closeness to Minorities Scale*

This variable is an additive scale of responses to the following questions.
"Please rate how close you feel to the following groups on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means you feel close to the interests, feelings and ideas of the group, and 0 means you feel distant from that group"

 1) Muslims
 2) [New] immigrants
 3) Blacks

Alpha Cronbach score is .835.  The scale runs from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate the respondent feels closer to minorities.  The word "new" was not included before immigrants in the Belgian version of the survey.

*Dating Minorities Scale*

Scale is an additive scale of responses to the following questions.
"If you had the opportunity, would you ever date someone from the following groups?"

 1) Muslims
 2) [New] immigrants
 3) Blacks

The original answer categories were five-point scale from "very unlikely" to "very likely".  Alpha Cronbach score is .826.  The scale runs from 0 to 1, where higher scores indicate a greater willingness to date minorities.

*Political Engagement Variables*

Political Knowledge Scale:  A standardized, additive scale was created from 0-1, where higher scores indicated more correct answers.  In the Belgian Youth Study, the scale was created based on four questions:

222

1) Who is the President of the European Commission?

2) What is the Belgian Federal Parliament composed of?

3) Who is the Minister of Justice in the Belgian Federal Government?

4) What political party does the Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt belong to?

In the McGill Youth Study, the scale was based on three multiple choice questions:

1) Who is the provincial premier of your province?

2) Who is the new governor general?

3) What does the Supreme Court do?

The questions in the Belgian Youth Study (mean=.2919) appeared to be slightly more difficult than the questions in the McGill Youth Study (mean=.4948).


Political Activities Scale:  An additive scale was created from 0 to 10 based on responses to the following questions:

In the past 12 months, have often have you…

1) … deliberately worm a patch, sticker, buttom or T-shirt for a political or social cause?

2) … signed a petition?

3) … taken part in a legal march or protest?

4) … raised or donated money for a cause?

5) … boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons?

6) … deliberately bought certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons?

7) … participated in illegal protest activities?

8) … forwarded an email with political content?

9) … wrote or displayed a political statement publicly?

10) … attended a show or cultural event with political content?

Answers were recoded so that 0= "never" and 1= "a few times" or "often".  The Alpha Cronbach score is .666.  Answers were recoded so 0=never done, 1=participated at least a few times.  Respondents reported on average participating in about 2.2 activities during the past 12 months.  Given the skewed nature of the responses, the scale was truncated at 5 activities in the analysis.

Organizational Involvement

Respondents were asked to indicate the types of organizations they had been involved in during the past 12 months. Respondents were allowed to check all that apply. The list of activities included:

- Hobby or artistic group (choir, book club, theatre group, etc.)
- Club at school (student council, yearbook, etc.)
- Youth group outside of school (scouts, etc.)
- Sports team
- Political party
- Volunteer organization (shelter, soup kitchen, etc.)
- Religious organization
- Drop-in youth center or YMCA
- Ethnic/Cultural Organization
- Citizen's assembly or local action group
- Music School (Belgium only)
- Youth wing of a union (Belgium only)
- Environmental, peace or political organization (Green Peace, Amnesty Int'l, etc.)
- Citizen's Assembly or local action Group
- Other

The answer categories were coded 0=not involved, 1=involved and were combined to create a measure of the number of organizations the respondent is involved in. The average number of groups was 1.46. Due to the skewed nature of the scale, the responses were truncated in the analysis at 4 or more organizations.

*Demographic and Control Variables*

Racialized Minorities: In the Belgian Youth Study, respondents were coded 1=racialized minority if they reported being born (or having at least one parent born) in a country outside of North America or Europe. For the purposes of this study, Russia was included with European countries and Turkey was not. In the McGill Youth Study where

respondents were asked to racially identify, any respondent who listed 'white' as their only ethnicity were coded as not being racialized minorities.  For respondents who wrote in an 'other' category, respondents were hand coded based on what they wrote in and their responses to an open-ended question about their ethnic background.  The same country distinctions that were used in the Belgian case (country of origin) were applied in these cases.  In Chapter 5, the analysis is often limited only to 'white' respondents, i.e. those who were not coded as racialized minorities.

Parental Education: 1=one or both parents completed university, 0=otherwise.

Religion:  Respondents were asked: "What, if any, is your family's religious background?" Response categories included: We do not have one; Catholic; Protestant; Orthodox Christian; Other Christian; Jewish; Muslim; Other (please indicate).  Dummy variables were created for the following categories: Catholic, Other Christian (including Protestant, Orthodox, and Other Christian), Jewish, and Muslim.

Religious Attendance: In the past 12 months, about how often did you attend religious services?  1=never, 2=a few times a year, 3=a few times a month, 4=once a week, 5=more than once a week.

Female: 1=female, 0=male.

Urban/Rural: In the Belgian Youth Study, schools located in major metropolitan areas (>100,000 inhabitants) were coded as urban.  In the McGill Youth Study, schools sampled in Montreal and Toronto were coded as urban.  1=Urban, 0=Rural.

## *Additional Analysis, Chapter 5*

**Controlling for Language in Table 5.4**

| | Model 1 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | -0.148 | (.07) ** | -0.135 | (.08) [a] |
| **Closeness to Minorities** | | | | |
| **Language of Survey (French)** | -0.086 | (.17) | -0.523 | (.21) ** |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.166 | (.23) | 0.140 | (.27) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.183 | (.19) *** | -0.027 | (.31) |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.159 | (.04) *** | -0.080 | (.06) |
| Number of Organizations | -0.009 | (.06) | 0.142 | (.09) [a] |
| Female | -0.483 | (.14) *** | 0.120 | (.21) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.349 | (.14) ** | -0.052 | (.19) |
| Catholic | 0.123 | (.19) | -0.386 | (.21) * |
| Other Christian | 0.363 | (.23) [a] | -0.326 | (.27) |
| Jewish | -0.365 | (.41) | -1.048 | (.39) *** |
| Religious Attendance | 0.245 | (.06) *** | 0.068 | (.13) |
| Constant | 1.078 | (.39) *** | -0.628 | (.50) |
| N | 1423 | | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.059 | | | |
| | Model 2 | | | |
| | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | -0.167 | (.08) ** | -0.137 | (.09) [a] |
| **Closeness to Minorities** | 0.068 | (.33) | 0.287 | (.39) |
| **Language of Survey (French)** | -0.103 | (.17) | -0.527 | (.20) ** |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.180 | (.23) | 0.109 | (.27) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.165 | (.19) *** | 0.013 | (.30) |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.156 | (.04) *** | -0.085 | (.06) |
| Number of Organizations | -0.003 | (.06) | 0.142 | (.09) [a] |
| Female | -0.467 | (.14) *** | 0.174 | (.21) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.349 | (.15) ** | -0.048 | (.19) |
| Catholic | 0.138 | (.20) | -0.437 | (.22) ** |
| Other Christian | 0.385 | (.24) [a] | -0.375 | (.27) |
| Jewish | -0.332 | (.42) | -1.022 | (.40) ** |
| Religious Attendance | 0.248 | (.06) *** | 0.066 | (.13) |
| Constant | 1.067 | (.38) *** | -0.778 | (.51) [a] |
| N | 1398 | | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.059 | | | |

Note: † Racial and Ethnic Diversity is a composite scale for both friends and acquaintances at school. Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, [a] p=<.15. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

In Table 5.4, the Canadian models were presented without a control for language of survey. Because there was slight differences in the question wording of the main independent variable (network diversity), the models have been re-run below with a control for language included. While the language control is significant in distinguishing absolute from multicultural tolerators, the variable of interest – network diversity – remains significant even after controlling for the difference in language wording.

ഇ      ൫      ഇ

Table 5.4 and 5.5 use a composite scale of the racial and ethnic diversity among close friends and acquaintances. The distribution of the composite scale is provided below.

Distribution of Racial/Ethnic Network Diversity by Country



ഇ      ൫      ഇ

The base model run in Table 5.4 and 5.5 for whites was re-run among racialized minorities. As expected, there is no evidence of significant effects for network diversity on distinguishing intolerance or absolute tolerance from multicultural tolerance among racialized minorities in Belgium. In Canada, there is a weak and significant impact for knowing other minorities on the likelihood of intolerance compared with multicultural tolerance, but no significant effect for absolute tolerance. This is consistent with

expectations that ethnic diversity among minorities will have fewer effects on the type of tolerance endorsed than among whites.

**Network Diversity and Tolerance Among Racialized Minorities**

| | **Canada** | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerance | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | -0.099 | (.05) * | -0.022 | (.10) |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.575 | (.28) ** | 0.870 | (.82) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.102 | (.29) *** | -0.480 | (.36) |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.154 | (.04) *** | -0.102 | (.09) |
| Number of Organizations | 0.099 | (.07) | 0.154 | (.11) [a] |
| Female | -0.660 | (.18) *** | -0.026 | (.25) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.290 | (.16) * | -0.405 | (.29) |
| Catholic | 0.305 | (.24) | -0.063 | (.35) |
| Other Christian | 0.486 | (.26) * | -0.201 | (.49) |
| Muslim | -0.014 | (.26) | -0.365 | (.49) |
| Religious Attendance | 0.162 | (.08) ** | 0.276 | (.10) *** |
| Constant | 1.344 | (.36) *** | -1.422 | (.69) ** |
| N | 765 | | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.062 | | | |
| | **Belgium** | | | |
| | Intolerance | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Racial/Ethnic Diversity †** | 0.027 | (.07) | -0.100 | (.14) |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.483 | (.29) [a] | -1.070 | (.55) * |
| Political Knowledge Scale | 0.544 | (.31) ** | -0.071 | (.76) |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.296 | (.08) *** | -0.090 | (.16) |
| Number of Organizations | -0.037 | (.11) | 0.743 | (.22) *** |
| Female | 0.142 | (.21) | 0.751 | (.51) [a] |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.133 | (.22) | -0.483 | (.57) |
| Catholic | -0.344 | (.31) | -0.503 | (.64) |
| Other Christian | 0.277 | (.48) | 0.602 | (.81) |
| Muslim | 0.393 | (.32) | 0.409 | (.61) |
| Religious Attendance | 0.160 | (.09) * | 0.240 | (.16) [a] |
| Constant | 0.026 | (.55) | -4.012 | (1.11) *** |
| N | 420 | | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.085 | | | |

Note: † Racial and Ethnic Diversity is a composite scale for both friends and acquaintances at school. Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to racialized minorities. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, [a] p=<.15. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

ဆ     ဃ     ဆ

To examine the impact of racial and ethnic diversity in the Belgian data, an alternative model was run with dummy variables which capture the skewed distribution of responses.

Results for Table 5.5 With Log10 Transformation of Racial/Ethnic Diversity

| | Model 1 | | | | Model 2 | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | | Intolerant | | Absolute Tolerance | |
| | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) | Coef. | (robust s.e.) |
| **Log10 of Racial/Ethnic Diversity** | 0.348 | (.29) | -0.529 | (.43) | 0.460 | (.29) [a] | -0.305 | (.46) |
| **Closeness to Minorities** | | | | | -0.399 | (.20) ** | -0.822 | (.32) ** |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.296 | (.28) | -0.118 | (.17) | -0.271 | (.28) | -0.069 | (.18) |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.644 | (.16) *** | -0.365 | (.23) [a] | -0.636 | (.16) *** | -0.350 | (.23) [a] |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.133 | (.03) *** | 0.055 | (.05) | -0.123 | (.03) *** | 0.075 | (.05) [a] |
| Number of Organizations | -0.104 | (.04) *** | -0.034 | (.06) | -0.100 | (.04) *** | -0.025 | (.06) |
| Female | -0.320 | (.11) *** | -0.088 | (.12) | -0.309 | (.11) *** | -0.066 | (.12) |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.131 | (.12) | 0.039 | (.15) | -0.127 | (.12) | 0.045 | (.15) |
| Catholic | 0.026 | (.10) | -0.110 | (.15) | 0.021 | (.10) | -0.121 | (.15) |
| Other Christian | 0.102 | (.35) | -0.457 | (.59) | 0.113 | (.35) | -0.441 | (.59) |
| Religious Attendance | 0.092 | (.06) | 0.078 | (.10) | 0.096 | (.06) [a] | 0.087 | (.10) |
| Constant | 0.397 | (.34) | -1.330 | (.32) *** | 0.486 | (.35) | -1.159 | (.31) *** |

Note: A log 10 transformatio of the Racial and Ethnic Diversity scale is included in this model to address skewness. Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Model 1 contains only respondents without missing cases on the Closeness scale. Source: Comparative Youth Study. *** p<.01; ** p<.05; * p <.10, [a] p=<.15. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command.

In Chapter 5, simulations were run using CLARIFY where racial and ethnic diversity of networks was varied (see Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6). For each level of network diversity, the mean score on the Closeness to Minorities scale was imputed into the prediction. The table below provides the mean scores on the Closeness to Minorities scale for each level of racial and ethnic diversity, which was an additive scale of the racial and ethnic diversity among close friends and among acquaintances. The additive scale makes middle categories possible (i.e. 1.5) but for illustration purposes, the predictions were calculated at each whole number.

### Mean Closeness to Minorities by Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Whites

|  | Canada | Belgium |
|---|---|---|
| 0 (None) | 0.30 | 0.20 |
| 1 (Almost None) | 0.41 | 0.29 |
| 2 (A Few) | 0.50 | 0.36 |
| 3 (About Half) | 0.54 | 0.48 |
| 4 (Many) | 0.60 | 0.51 |
| 5 (Almost All) | 0.59 | 0.51 |

Note: The Racial and Ethnic Diversity of Friends is a compositie score for both close friends and acquaintances. Means are provided for each whole number between 1 and 6. The final category (6) was excluded due to small sample size. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

The results obtained in Figure 5.5 were not an artifact of the simulation criteria. When gender and religious denomination are changed in the Canadian model, the results are similar to those reported in Chapter 5: increased ethnic and racial diversity increases the probability of multicultural tolerance and decreases the probability of intolerance. There is also a weak and negative effect on the probability of absolute tolerance.

Figure 5.5: Predicted Probabilities of Tolerance by Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Whites in Canada (Alternative)



Source: CYS. CLARIFY is used to obtain predictions. Sex was set to male, religious denomination at "Other Christian" and all other variables set at their means.

જી    ૯3    જી

The results obtained in Figure 5.6 were also not an artifact of the simulation criteria. When gender and religious denomination are changed in the Belgian model, the results are similar to those reported in Chapter 5: increased ethnic and racial diversity increases the probability of intolerance and decreases the probability of absolute tolerance. The probability of multicultural tolerance appears unchanged.

Figure 5.6: Predicted Probabilities of Tolerance by
Racial/Ethnic Diversity Among Whites in Belgium (Alternative)



Source: CYS. CLARIFY is used to obtain predictions. Sex was set to male, religious denomination at
"Other Christian" and all other variables set at their means.

                                    ℘    ℃    ℘

Table 5.6 only presented the coefficients for the variables of interest. The following tables present the full MNL models which were used in Table 5.6.

232

**Full Models for Table 5.6: Canadian Sample**

| | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Intolerance | | | Intolerance | | | Intolerance | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Close Friends | 0.037 | (.05) | 0.45 | 0.031 | (.05) | 0.55 | 0.034 | (.05) | 0.52 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Acquaintances | -0.235 | (.07) | 0.00 | -0.249 | (.08) | 0.00 | -0.229 | (.08) | 0.00 |
| Closeness to Minorities | | | | 0.056 | (.32) | 0.86 | -0.040 | (.34) | 0.91 |
| Political Diversity Scale | | | | | | | -0.093 | (.07) | 0.17 |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.275 | (.25) | 0.26 | 0.292 | (.24) | 0.23 | 0.271 | (.24) | 0.25 |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -1.189 | (.19) | 0.00 | -1.173 | (.19) | 0.00 | -1.100 | (.19) | 0.00 |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.160 | (.04) | 0.00 | -0.158 | (.04) | 0.00 | -0.145 | (.04) | 0.00 |
| Number of Organizations | -0.012 | (.06) | 0.85 | -0.004 | (.06) | 0.94 | -0.005 | (.07) | 0.94 |
| Female | -0.472 | (.14) | 0.00 | -0.454 | (.14) | 0.00 | -0.500 | (.14) | 0.00 |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.347 | (.15) | 0.02 | -0.348 | (.15) | 0.02 | -0.350 | (.15) | 0.02 |
| Catholic | 0.109 | (.19) | 0.56 | 0.121 | (.20) | 0.54 | 0.105 | (.20) | 0.60 |
| Other Christian | 0.383 | (.23) | 0.10 | 0.412 | (.24) | 0.08 | 0.393 | (.23) | 0.09 |
| Jewish | -0.392 | (.40) | 0.33 | -0.354 | (.41) | 0.38 | -0.330 | (.41) | 0.42 |
| Religious Attendance | 0.248 | (.06) | 0.00 | 0.251 | (.06) | 0.00 | 0.247 | (.06) | 0.00 |
| Constant | 1.359 | (.41) | 0.00 | 1.355 | (.40) | 0.00 | 1.508 | (.41) | 0.00 |
| | Absolute Tolerance | | | Absolute Tolerance | | | Absolute Tolerance | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Close Friends | -0.108 | (.06) | 0.09 | -0.111 | (.07) | 0.10 | -0.120 | (.07) | 0.08 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Acquaintances | -0.034 | (.10) | 0.73 | -0.034 | (.10) | 0.73 | -0.057 | (.10) | 0.56 |
| Closeness to Minorities | | | | 0.303 | (.39) | 0.44 | 0.359 | (.41) | 0.38 |
| Political Diversity Scale | | | | | | | 0.212 | (.12) | 0.07 |
| Log of % Minority in School | 0.135 | (.28) | 0.63 | 0.105 | (.28) | 0.71 | 0.122 | (.29) | 0.68 |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.094 | (.31) | 0.76 | -0.052 | (.30) | 0.86 | -0.135 | (.31) | 0.66 |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.096 | (.06) | 0.10 | -0.102 | (.06) | 0.09 | -0.125 | (.06) | 0.04 |
| Number of Organizations | 0.159 | (.09) | 0.07 | 0.160 | (.09) | 0.06 | 0.158 | (.09) | 0.08 |
| Female | 0.117 | (.21) | 0.58 | 0.173 | (.22) | 0.43 | 0.214 | (.23) | 0.34 |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.049 | (.19) | 0.80 | -0.044 | (.19) | 0.82 | -0.084 | (.19) | 0.66 |
| Catholic | -0.468 | (.21) | 0.02 | -0.529 | (.21) | 0.01 | -0.457 | (.21) | 0.03 |
| Other Christian | -0.192 | (.27) | 0.47 | -0.247 | (.27) | 0.36 | -0.212 | (.27) | 0.43 |
| Jewish | -0.849 | (.41) | 0.04 | -0.835 | (.41) | 0.04 | -0.889 | (.42) | 0.04 |
| Religious Attendance | 0.099 | (.13) | 0.45 | 0.098 | (.13) | 0.45 | 0.073 | (.13) | 0.58 |
| Constant | -0.889 | (.56) | 0.11 | -1.038 | (.57) | 0.07 | -1.440 | (.66) | 0.03 |
| N | 1423 | | | 1398 | | | 1383 | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.060 | | | 0.060 | | | 0.064 | | |

Note: Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

233

**Full Models for Table 5.6: Belgian Sample**

| | Model 1 | | | Model 2 | | | Model 3 | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | **Intolerance** | | | **Intolerance** | | | **Intolerance** | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Close Friends | 0.012 | (.04) | 0.76 | 0.025 | (.04) | 0.54 | 0.016 | (.04) | 0.71 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Acquaintances | 0.041 | (.05) | 0.42 | 0.049 | (.05) | 0.35 | 0.067 | (.05) | 0.20 |
| Closeness to Minorities | | | | -0.373 | (.20) | 0.07 | -0.432 | (.20) | 0.03 |
| Political Diversity Scale | | | | | | | -0.123 | (.05) | 0.01 |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.266 | (.28) | 0.34 | -0.260 | (.29) | 0.37 | -0.258 | (.30) | 0.39 |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.649 | (.16) | 0.00 | -0.636 | (.16) | 0.00 | -0.578 | (.16) | 0.00 |
| Political Activism Scale | -0.127 | (.03) | 0.00 | -0.120 | (.03) | 0.00 | -0.093 | (.03) | 0.00 |
| Number of Organizations | -0.107 | (.04) | 0.01 | -0.100 | (.04) | 0.01 | -0.111 | (.04) | 0.01 |
| Female | -0.332 | (.10) | 0.00 | -0.312 | (.11) | 0.00 | -0.329 | (.11) | 0.00 |
| Parent(s) University Educated | -0.110 | (.12) | 0.35 | -0.125 | (.12) | 0.30 | -0.123 | (.12) | 0.30 |
| Catholic | 0.011 | (.10) | 0.92 | 0.017 | (.10) | 0.87 | -0.013 | (.11) | 0.90 |
| Other Christian | 0.118 | (.36) | 0.74 | 0.100 | (.35) | 0.78 | 0.069 | (.35) | 0.85 |
| Religious Attendance | 0.095 | (.07) | 0.15 | 0.095 | (.06) | 0.14 | 0.119 | (.07) | 0.08 |
| Constant | 0.416 | (.37) | 0.27 | 0.456 | (.39) | 0.24 | 0.672 | (.42) | 0.11 |
| | **Absolute Tolerance** | | | **Absolute Tolerance** | | | **Absolute Tolerance** | | |
| | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p | Coef. | (s.e.) | p |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Close Friends | -0.197 | (.09) | 0.02 | -0.154 | (.09) | 0.08 | -0.162 | (.09) | 0.07 |
| Racial/Ethnic Diversity: Acquaintances | 0.032 | (.07) | 0.66 | 0.025 | (.08) | 0.74 | 0.006 | (.08) | 0.94 |
| Closeness to Minorities | | | | -0.713 | (.32) | 0.02 | -0.717 | (.32) | 0.03 |
| Political Diversity Scale | | | | | | | 0.059 | (.07) | 0.41 |
| Log of % Minority in School | -0.107 | (.17) | 0.52 | -0.059 | (.18) | 0.74 | -0.019 | (.18) | 0.92 |
| Political Knowledge Scale | -0.365 | (.22) | 0.10 | -0.341 | (.23) | 0.14 | -0.375 | (.22) | 0.09 |
| Political Activism Scale | 0.058 | (.05) | 0.23 | 0.081 | (.05) | 0.09 | 0.087 | (.05) | 0.07 |
| Number of Organizations | -0.029 | (.06) | 0.63 | -0.028 | (.06) | 0.64 | -0.036 | (.06) | 0.57 |
| Female | -0.113 | (.12) | 0.35 | -0.067 | (.13) | 0.59 | -0.107 | (.13) | 0.42 |
| Parent(s) University Educated | 0.009 | (.15) | 0.95 | 0.051 | (.15) | 0.74 | 0.063 | (.15) | 0.68 |
| Catholic | -0.089 | (.15) | 0.56 | -0.119 | (.16) | 0.45 | -0.102 | (.16) | 0.53 |
| Other Christian | -0.203 | (.55) | 0.71 | -0.394 | (.59) | 0.50 | -0.368 | (.58) | 0.53 |
| Religious Attendance | 0.083 | (.10) | 0.39 | 0.079 | (.10) | 0.44 | 0.066 | (.11) | 0.55 |
| Constant | -1.166 | (.36) | 0.00 | -1.023 | (.35) | 0.00 | -1.025 | (.37) | 0.01 |
| N | 2916 | | | 2865 | | | 2780 | | |
| McFadden's Pseudo R-Squared | 0.022 | | | 0.024 | | | 0.026 | | |

Note: Results are multinomial logistic regressions for types of tolerance, where multicultural tolerance is the reference category. Analysis is limited to white respondents. Standard errors have been adjusted to account for school clusters using Stata's cluster command. Source: Comparative Youth Study.

### *Survey Administration*

Surveys were administered in both Canada and Belgium in classrooms. Prior permission was sought through the school boards and school principals prior to entering a classroom. In addition, parental permission was required for student participation. Parental permission slips were distributed by classroom teachers prior to the survey administration date and were collected on the day of survey administration. After the relevant permissions were received, students were given one classroom period to complete the Youth, Diversity and Citizenship questionnaire (Stolle et al. 2005). The full contents of the questionnaire are available online at www.bridgingdifferences.mcgill.ca.

The administration of the survey was conducted by a trained research assistant who introduced the questionnaire as a study into what young people think about politics and the other things that are going on in society right now. Students were then informed that their involvement in the study was completely voluntary and that their participation or non-participation would not affect their grades in the class. Consent forms were distributed and signed by students, as well as an additional identification form which requested the students name and contact information for a future wave of the survey. This second form was optional and did not prevent participation in the current wave. Students were then given one classroom period to complete the paper and pencil questionnaire. The research assistant was present during the entire administration of the survey, and responded to any questions posed by participants. All participants in the Canadian survey received a complimentary pen with the research website on it as a thank-you for their participation. All surveys were collected at the end of the class period.

Surveys were conducted during the 2005-2006 academic year in 10th and 11th grade classrooms in Canada, and in 10th grade classrooms in Belgium. A total of 82 Canadian schools and 112 Belgian schools participated in the study. The response rate for schools in Belgium was 66 percent. In Canada, 54 percent of schools contacted participated.

After the survey administration phase, data entry was conducted by hand by trained research assistants. The final databases were screened for inconsistencies and double coding was conducted of a random selection of surveys in each country. Any inconsistencies were corrected based on the paper copy of the questionnaire provided by the respondent. The final databases in each country were merged together by the author, at which stage a third data screening occurred to assess any inconsistencies in response categories. Any inconsistencies were checked against the paper copies of questionnaires and corrected.

### *Ethics Approval*

As per university regulations, Ethics approval was granted by McGill University for the administration of the surveys in Canada.  The title of the survey project was: Bridging Differences: Youth, Diversity and Civic Values, under the direction of Dietlind Stolle. The author was involved in the collection of this data, and is listed as a co-investigator. The Belgian data was administered by Marc Hooghe and their research team sought ethics approval through their home university, the Catholic University of Leuven.  The author was not directly involved in the Belgian data collection.  The Belgian data were analyzed as secondary data.  The following page contains a copy of the ethics approval granted for the Canadian data.

# ✠ McGill

**Research Ethics Board Office**                Tel: (514) 398-6831
McGill University                               Fax: (514) 398-4853
845 Sherbrooke Street West                      Ethics website: www.mcgill.ca/rgo/ethics/human
James Administration Bldg., rm 429
Montreal, QC H3A 2T5

**Research Ethics Board I**
**Certificate of Ethical Acceptability of Research Involving Humans**

**REB File #:** 149-0405

**Project Title:** Bridging Differences: Youth, Diversity and Civic Values

**Investigator's Name:** Prof. D. Stolle          **Department:**          Political Science
**Co-investigators:** Prof. M. Gauthier (INRS)
                      Allison Harrell, Ph.D. student, Political Science

**Status:** Faculty

**Granting Agency and Title (if applicable):** SSHRC- Citizenship on trial: the effects of social interaction characteristics on the development of civic attitudes among adolescents

This project was reviewed on _April 7, 2005_ by          Expedited Review _____
                                                         Full Review      ✓

_Lynda McNeil, Research & Ethics Officer_

John Galaty, Ph.D.
Chair, REB I

**Approval Period:** _May 3, 2005_ to _May 2, 2006_

This project was reviewed and approved in accordance with the requirements of the McGill University Policy on the Ethical Conduct of Research Involving Human Subjects and with the Tri-Council Policy Statement on the Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Human Subjects

---

*All research involving human subjects requires review on an annual basis. A Request for Renewal form should be submitted at least one month before the above expiry date.
*If a project has been completed or terminated and ethics approval is no longer required, a Final Report form must be submitted.
*Should any modification or other unanticipated development occur before the next required review, the REB must be informed and any modification can't be initiated until approval is received.

238